ci4^3. ?ffik.Y\-2V>. ^ TRINITY COLLEGE LIBRARY Q, DURHAM = NORTH CAROLINA Rec’d ,.v.«U.€> 1 NAPOLEON BY THE SAME AUTHOR. THE ROMAN THEOCRACY AND THE REPUBLIC, 1846-1849. Lon¬ don, Macmillan & Co. 1901. THE NAPOLEONIC EMPIRE IN SOUTHERN ITALY AND THE RISE OF THE SECRET SOCIE¬ TIES. 2 vols. London, Macmillan & Co. 1904. MEMOIRS OF “MALAKOFF,” Cor¬ respondence and papers of the late William Edward Johnston, edited by his son, R. M. Johnston. 2 vols. London, Hutchinson & Co. 1907. LEADING AMERICAN SOLDIERS. New York, Henry Holt & Co. 1907. THE FRENCH REVOLUTION, A SHORT HISTORY. New York, Henry Holt & Co. 1909. Digitized by the Internet Archive in 2018 with funding from Duke University Libraries https://archive.org/details/napoleon01john I. II. NAPOLEONIC MEDALS The above are enlarged reproductions of originals in the author’s possession; the actual diameter is 13 mil. These small medals were generally struck in gold, silver, and bronze, and were used for throwing broadcast among the people or soldiers. I. — Struck during the Consulate, in 1S03, just before the rupture of the peace with England. The legend, Arme pour la paix, armed for peace, is suggestive. H. — The last medal bearing the effigy of Napoleon struck under the Empire; to commemorate the Champ de Mai , eighteen days before Waterloo. Napoleon 4 A SHORT BIOGRAPHY By R. M. Johnston M.A., CANTAB. Assistant Professor of History in Harvard University VS co 4S Copyright, IQ04 By A. S. Barnes and Company Published February, 1904 Second Printing, March, 1904 Third Printing, October, 1905 Fourth Printing, May, 1909 Fifth Printing, January, 1910 ^ / t/ hj l (o PREFACE T HIS book is intended to present to the reader in the most concise form pos¬ sible, but yet with historical accuracy, an outline of the history of Napoleon that will convey an adequate first impression of his genius and policy. Without some knowledge of this extraordinary man and of his period it is impossible to understand the politics, consti¬ tution, and general circumstances of modern Europe. But the literature of the Napoleonic period is so vast, probably approaching forty thousand books, that the reader who feels dis¬ posed to get some acquaintance with it is frequently unable to find a practicable way through the maze. It may be said without disparagement to their writers that any one of the three or four best general histories of Napoleon, taken alone, is inadequate to con¬ vey a sufficient impression of the man and his times. But to Napoleonic literature as a whole there is no key; a complete bibliog¬ raphy is so vast an undertaking that even the labours of Baron Lumbroso and Herr vii PREFACE viii Kircheisen appear to offer little promise of completion. The latter’s select bibliography is the best available guide ; but, however valu¬ able for the student, some two hundred pages of bare bibliographical entries cannot be of great service to those not possessing some previously acquired knowledge. It is part of the purpose of the present work to enable the ordinary reader or the would-be student safely to take a few first steps in Napoleonic literature, avoiding the innumerable books of little or no authority, and getting some sort of notion beforehand of what those here rec¬ ommended are likely to give him . 1 As to the narrative itself the desire to attain conciseness combined with true proportion pre¬ sents difficulties and disadvantages, results in unavoidable gaps. Thus no attempt can be made to narrate the numerous military opera¬ tions of Napoleon on the same scale. Certain campaigns and battles, — Wagram, Austerlitz, Waterloo, for instance, — have been treated more fully as being of special importance politically or strategically; others have been passed over with a bare mention, though not without due consideration for the clearness 1 As to the selection of books see also the remarks in the note to Chapter I. PREFACE IX and continuity of the narrative. Where details and anecdotes have been brought in it has invariably been for the purpose of illustrating broad issues. '''"To furnish a correct outline of Napoleonic history and to point the way along which it may be profitably pursued, that, and nothing more, is what this book aims at effecting. This new edition is revised to date in the bibliographies, and is corrected in a few typo¬ graphical and other slips. Its appearance co¬ incides with that of my French Revolution, of which it forms the continuation. Will the reader kindly note, however, that this is not a short history, as that is, but a short biography? The one book continues the other, but in a dif¬ ferent key. Cambridge, Mass., April, 1909. CONTENTS Chapter Page I. Napoleon before the Revolution .... i Birth and Childhood — Education — Appearance and Char¬ acter—The Revolution. II. Toulon and Vendemiaire.14 Bonaparte and Corsica — Siege of Toulon — The Terror — Vendemiaire—Marriage of Napoleon and Josephine Beau- harnais — Army of Italy — Tactics and Strategy in 1 796. III. The Campaign of Italy. 1796-1797 .... 27 Montenotte—Armistice of Cherasco—Crossing of the Po — Lodi — Lepetit caporal —Entrance into Milan — Casti- glione and Lonato — Bassano — Areola — Rivoli — Fall of Mantua. IV. Campo Formio and Egypt.41 Armistice of Leoben — Fall of Venice — Peace of Campo Formio — Methods of the French Armies, and of Bonaparte, his relations with the Directoire — The Eastern question — Expedition to Egypt—Capture of Malta—Battle of the Nile — Campaigns in Egypt and Syria—Return to France. V. The i8th of Brumaire.59 French Policy and Disasters — Sieyes — Novi and Zurich — Landing of Bonaparte — His Attitude — Episode with Josephine — Conspiracy — Bonaparte appointed to com¬ mand Troops in Paris— Fall of the Directoire. VI. The 19TH of Brumaire and Marengo ... 71 Scenes at St. Cloud — Formation of the new Government — External Affairs — The Army of Reserve— Plans of Cam¬ paign — Passage of the Alps — Marengo — Triumph of Bonaparte. CONTENTS xii Chapter Page VII. Legislation and Administration .... 88 The Consular Constitution — Bonaparte secures a Dictator¬ ship — Plebiscites — Legal Reform — Influence and Work of Bonaparte — The Napoleonic Bureaucracy — Religious Questions — Death of Washington — The Press — Royalist Overtures. VIII. The Due d’Enghien and Trafalgar . . . 103 Conspiracies — The Bonaparte family — Moreau — Im¬ perial Aspirations—The Due d’Enghien — Proclamation of the Empire —War with England — The Trafalgar Campaign. IX. Austerlitz.119 Ulm — A Proclamation of Napoleon — Occupation of Vienna — Austerlitz — Peace of Pressburg. X. Jena and Friedland. 130 War with Prussia — Jena— Murat’s March to Lubeck — Eylau— Friediand. XI. Napoleonic Policy. 1806-1S08.142 Napoleon’s Ambition — Fall of the Germanic Empire — War and Finance — Tilsit — Commercial War on Eng¬ land— Copenhagen — Junot occupies Lisbon — Con¬ tinental Policy — Spanish Intrigue — Occupation of Madrid — Joseph Bonaparte King of Spain. XII. VVagram. 157 Austrian Jealousy — French Discontent — Napoleon leaves Spain — War with Austria—Aspern and Essling — Dispossession of the Pope— Wagram — Peace. XIII. The Austrian Marriage and the Campaign of Russia . 17° Dynastic Question — Napoleon marries Maria Louisa — Jealousy of Russia — Causes for War—Preparations — Campaign of Russia — Borodino — Moscow — The Retreat. CONTENTS xiii Chapter Page XIV. The Struggle for Germany and Italy. 1813 189 Effects of the Russian Catastrophe — Lutzenand Bautzen — Austrian Intervention — Dresden — Leipzig — Murat and Italy. XV. The Campaign of France.198 Napoleon’s last Defence — St. Dizier—Brienne — La Rothifere — Montmirail — Laon— Chatillon — Fall of Paris — Abdication — The Final Scene at Fontainebleau. XVI. Elba.210 Return of the Bourbons — Congress of Vienna — French Dissatisfaction — Napoleon leaves Elba— His progress to Paris — Changed Situation—Attitude of the Powers— Champ de Mai. XVII. Waterloo and St. Helena.223 Plan of Campaign — Ligny — March on Brussels — Waterloo — Second Abdication — St. Helena — Death of Napoleon. Appendix—Bonaparte Family.239 Index.241 LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS Napoleonic Medals. Frontispiece MAPS. To face page Campaign of Italy.28 The Quadrilateral.34 The Swiss base, 1800.So Austerlitz.124 Wagram.164 The French Empire after Wagram.170 Campaign of Germany, 1813.190 Campaign of France, 1814.198 Position at nightfall, June 17, 1815 ..224 NAPOLEON CHAPTER I NAPOLEON BEFORE THE REVOLUTION Birth and Childhood — - Education — Appearance and Character — The Revolution. I N the history of Napoleon Bonaparte we plunge into the characteristic at the very outset, — the date of his birth. 'He was born either in 1768 or 1769'; probably, but not certainly, in the latter year. \As late as in 1796, when he married, the date of his birth was given as February 1768; later it was fixed at the 15th of August 1769. This is not a matter of vital importance, yet it is not without interest, for two reasons. In the first place, it is typical of Napoleon’s methods that he should have placed the celebration of his birthday at the same date as that of the As¬ sumption, which is one associated with rejoic¬ ing and merry-making in all Latin countries. Another interesting point in this connection is that in 1768 the island of Corsica, the home of the Bonapartes, was Genoese; a year later 1 1 NAPOLEON it was French. If Napoleon was born in 1 768, he was born a Genoese, if in 1769, a Frenchman. However this may be, and the point has been the subject of some controversy, it is certain that all the circumstances of his birth and youth left him nearly devoid of what might be described as national traditions or feeling, though in his boyhood he was in¬ tensely Corsican. The Bonapartes were a noble but poor family of Italian extraction, settled at Ajaccio, where Charles Bonaparte,— Napoleon’s father. — exercised legal functions under the Genoese government. He took part in the civil wars that preceded Napoleon’s birth, in which Paoli became prominent. The Corsican disorders need not be related here. It will suffice to say that Charles Bonaparte transferred his allegiance to France in 1769, when the sovereignty of the island was aban¬ doned by the Genoese. Yet by race neither he nor his son was a Frenchman. The Genoese were a maritime people. Their home was the Mediterranean. Their standards had been carried in triumph at various periods from the Strait of Gibraltar to the Bosphorus and Con¬ stantinople. This is worthy of note, for the boy brought up in the Genoese atmosphere and BEFORE THE REVOLUTION 3 traditions who became Emperor of the French had for many years his eyes and his policy constantly fixed on the Mediterranean. At every stage of his career we find that great inland sea, around which our civilization took its earliest shape, playing an all-important part. ^Napoleon first crossed it in the year 1779 when his father succeeded in securing his appointment to a free cadetship at the military school of Brienne.! Young Bonaparte’s school days were not very remarkable. His ignorance of the French lan¬ guage, his lack of fine clothes and fine manners, his innate pride and aloofness, kept him solitary. He did not shine in arts and literature, but showed conspicuous ability and quickness in mathematics and geometry. In one other respect he impressed several of his teachers, and that was with his strong and domineering ♦ temperament. In 1784 he was transferred from Brienne to the military academy at Paris, and no sooner was he there than he revealed his force of character even more strongly by draw¬ ing up a memorandum exposing the numerous shortcomings of the establishment as a military training school, and setting out a scheme for its reformation. This did not tend to make the fifteen-year-old Corsican popular with those <\ '1 /I ■1 4 NAPOLEON placed over him ; how little could they then foresee that he was fated to carry out this and many other even more important reforms within a very few years ! He spent only twelve months in Paris, and then received his commission as a sublieutenant of artillery. Three years later the French Revolution broke out, and in ten years more the Corsican sublieutenant of artil¬ lery was the ruler of France. What were the causes that brought about this wonderful rise of fortune? Chiefly two: the extraordinary character of the man ; the extraordinary char¬ acter of the circumstances into which he was thrown. Had not those two srreat factors co- O incided with such precision, it is quite safe to assume that European history would be with¬ out what is perhaps its most wonderful page. It is therefore important, before we go further, to consider the personality of Napoleon, after which a brief view of the origin of the French Revolution must be taken ; this will lead us to the events in which the Revolution and the man who was destined to be its heir were both concerned. Napoleon Bonaparte was a short, dark, swarthy man, of typically southern appearance. In his early years, until 1805, he was extremely thin; it was not until his face filled out that BEFORE THE REVOLUTION 5 his features could be pronounced handsome, though his nose was salient and mouth well formed. His hands and feet, like those of his brothers and sisters, were beautifully modelled. His head was large, full, and intellectual, but what produced the greatest impression on all who met him was the brilliancy and imperious¬ ness of his steel-blue eyes; they revealed the volcanic energy of the soul beneath. He was given to violent bursts of temper, the occasional outbreaks of a nearly superhuman mental energy and of a temperament easily swayed to passion by personal and selfish considerations. He was perhaps the greatest egotist the world has , ever seen, with the result that he often applied his indomitable will and magnificent qualities to very low aims. Judged hastily and by certain traits alone, he might be thought to be little more than contemptible, — thus, in the matter of veracity. He viewed lying from a strictly utilitarian point of view, and always said just what was convenient, so that his history written from his own statements would be little better than fiction. He played cards as he conducted warfare, obtaining every advantage he could, legitimate or otherwise. Yet he cannot be called a small man, only a man with small aspects, and if he won by his cheating at cards, 6 NAPOLEON he always returned the stakes after the game was over. When found out in his perversions of truth he was prepared to own up. On one occasion Metternich stoutly declined to believe some information published in the Moniteur , and at last Napoleon laughed and confessed: “Sono bugie per i Parigini, they are lies for the Parisians /” Alongside of this trait was a wonderful largeness of perception; and many, v in fact, have said that it was Napoleon’s breadth of view that constituted his genius. It was not so much that as the perfect combination of breadth of view with attention to the most minute detail. His.powerful imagination made ■■ him see events in their fullest possible exten¬ sion ; as he said himself, he was always living two years ahead. At the same time his instinct for detail was the nightmare of every colonel in the army, of every functionary in the Empire; the memoirs of the period are full of anecdotes illustrating this. Philippe de Segur relates that he was sent on a tour of inspection in which he visited several fortresses, many camps and forts, and numberless earthworks and bat¬ teries. On his reporting to the Emperor, he was cross-examined at great length, but went through the ordeal with flying colours until at last asked whether at a particular spot on a BEFORE THE REVOLUTION 7 small cross-road not far from Antwerp two field-pieces were still in position! The brain of Napoleon was like a machine,' so perfect, so accurate in its working; but the spirit that impelled it was that of a soldier and a gambler. Logical perception of chances was instantaneous with him, and promptly turned into action with perfect audacity and relentless activity. It was among his soldiers that he was happiest, and few anecdotes told of him are more characteristic than that related in the memoirs of a Polish officer who served in the campaign of Russia. Napoleon had just joined headquarters after three years of peace, and was in the midst of the numerous columns converging on the points at which the Russian frontier was to be crossed. In the middle of the night the officers of the staff were awak¬ ened by an unusual noise. Napoleon was sleepless, and was tramping up and down his bedroom singing at the top of his voice the revolutionary marching song, Lc chant du depart! He was happy once more, he was playing the biggest stake of his life, with the biggest army he had ever assembled; it was the satisfaction of the roulette player sitting down at his accustomed chair with a large pile of gold in front of him. But there are 8 NAPOLEON yet other aspects of the character of this the most extraordinary man of modern times that must not be omitted in attempting to portray him. Making exception of the rhetoric he so fre¬ quently used in addressing his soldiers and occasionally in his diplomatic relations, his cor¬ respondence constitutes a wonderful intellectual achievement. In the thirty-two volumes pub¬ lished officially one might nearly say that there is not a superfluous word, not an embellish¬ ment. Conciseness, energy, decision, perception, stand out with overpowering force from every page; and it may quite properly be said that the correspondence of Napoleon is a great literary monument. It is safe to predict that it will be read when the names of Chateau¬ briand, of Delavigne, and of Lamartine are well- nigh forgotten. His bombast has been alluded to. However distasteful to Anglo-Saxon ears, it often enough produced its due results: inspired his soldiers, terrified his enemies. In nothing was Napoleon more an Italian than in his strong dramatic sense, and his public life, from the moment he got his foot on the first rung of the ladder of ambition, was one long pose. He did his best to create, and to send down to posterity, the BEFORE THE REVOLUTION 9 Napoleonic legend; and even at the present day, when more reasonable views are beginning to prevail, there are many, even among staid his¬ torians, who are prepared to accept him at his own valuation. Before closing this brief sketch of his personality, it may be as well to add that a view that seems becoming popular in some quarters at Hhe present day, — the view that 'Napoleon was an epileptic,—reposes on very slight evidence. It is possible, just as many other hypotheses are, but on the other hand it is certain, if this theory is accepted, that he was a very slight sufferer, and that no epilep¬ tic ever showed greater clearness of intellect. Historically speaking, to say that Napoleon was epileptic is probably untrue, and is cer¬ tainly irrelevant and misleading. Here, then, in the year 1789, was a young, sublieutenant of artillery from whom great things might be expected. Yet had not his path crossed that of a great political cataclysm, it is certain that he would never have found the opportunities that enabled him to rise to the level of his genius. The misgovernment and ineptitude of the Bourbons had at last been visited with retribu¬ tion. Although France was fast increasing in wealth, more than half her people knew the IO NAPOLEON pangs of famine, many had died of hunger. Montesquieu, Voltaire, Rousseau, Helvetius, Diderot, d’Alembert, had stirred the reason of the thinking class. France had within her all the makings of a great modern nation, as was conclusively demonstrated by Napoleon ten years later; yet she was degraded by such bar¬ barities as the mutilation and execution of the Chevalier de La Barre, or the attempt to pre^ vent the burial of Voltaire’s body; she was brought to bankruptcy by the criminal folly of the court and its ministers. Retribution followed, the Revolution broke out, and reac¬ tion swung far in the direction of popular absurdities and horrors. From 1789 to 179 4 the complete scale of democratic passions was exhausted. The most excellent reforming zeal, the most exalted sentiments of patriotism and disinterestedness, caught in a rising tide, hur¬ ried into a whirl of political disintegration, finally disappeared or made way for mob rule, violence, terrorism, suspicion, and anarchy. While in the cities the Revolution gra dually fell into the hands of gangs of political fanatics or unprincipled ruffians, its best elements found refuge in the armies of the assailed Republic. Birth was no longer essential for becoming an officer, and great soldiers like Ney, Massena, 4 BEFORE THE REVOLUTION n or Murat, found their path no longer stopped at the rank of sergeant; court favour no longer made generals, and a Bonaparte might expect to rise above all his fellows. His first opportunity came in 1793, at the siege of Toulon, but before coming to that it will be as well briefly to indicate what had occurred previously and since Bonaparte had entered the army. CHRONOLOGY 1261. 1529. 15 Aug., 1769. April, 1779. Oct., 1784. Aug., 1785. 14 July, 1789- Earliest Bonaparte at Florence. Bonapartes go to Corsica. Napoleon Bonaparte born. He goes to school at Brienne. Proceeds to military academy, Paris. Sublieutenant of artillery. Capture of the Bastille. — French Revo¬ lution. NOTE Bibliographical: General Histories. — Among the nu¬ merous general histories of Napoleon the following are best to consult: Lanfrey, Histoire de Napoleon, Paris, 1875, 5 vols. (unfinished and hostile), also English translation; Rose, Life of Napoleon /., London, 1902, 2 vols. (English point of view) ; Fournier, Napoleon /., Leipzig, 1886, 3 vols., also English translation, New York, 1903 (Con- 12 NAPOLEON tinental point of view and good bibliography). For illus¬ trations, but not matter, see Dayot, Napoleon raconte par 1 'image, Paris, 1894; Tarbell, Short Life of Napoleon, New York, 1895 ; Sloane, Napoleon, New York, 1896 (but contains many fancy pictures) ; for coins and medals see Delaroche, Tresor de numismatique, Paris, 1832 ; for bibli¬ ography see Kircheisen, Bibliographie Napoleon's , Leipzig, 1902. Memoirs of the Napoleonic period are numerous and generally not very trustworthy ; they convey, however, a local colour that no history does, and no real impression of the epoch can be gained without reading into them. As a first instalment Madame Junot, Marbot, and Sir Robert Wilson might be recommended ; the reader wish¬ ing to go further could then choose among the following : Bourrienne, Thi£bault, Le Normand, Pasquier, Meneval, Segur, B. Jackson, Bausset, Cavaignac (Memoires d'une inconnue), Remusat, and Durand; Talleyrand is dis¬ appointing, Metternich voluminous and a little difficult. Other memoirs will be mentioned for particular subjects at the end of later chapters. It must be understood that these notes are only designed to cover a limited field; they are intended to serve as an introduction to Napoleonic literature, nothing more. This will explain why no reference is here made to such works as, for instance, the Correspondence of Napoleon, the Memoirs of King Joseph, or the works of Roederer. For the preceding chapter the following may be con¬ sulted : On the youth of Napoleon : Chuquet, La jeunesse de Napoleon, Paris, 1899 ; Jung, Bonaparte et son temps, Paris, 1883, 3 vols.; Bourrienne, Memoires , Paris, 1830, 10 vols. On his father, mother, and family: Masson, Napoleon et sa fa mi lie, Paris, 1897 (also Napoleon inconnu ); BEFORE THE REVOLUTION 13 Nasica, Memoires sur I'enfance . . . de Napoleon , Paris, 1852 ; Larrey, Madame Mere, Paris, 1892, 2 vols. For the character and appearance of Napoleon a reference to nearly all the memoirs of the period would be necessary; the most brilliant portrait by any modern writer, though overdrawn, is that of Taine in Les origines de la France Contemporaine ; the thirteenth chapter, Vol. III., of Bour- rienne’s Memoirs (see above) should always be consulted on this point. Sorel’s L’Europe et la revolution franqaise, Paris, 1904, eight volumes, is the best accredited modern work on the subject which it brings down to the Congress of Vienna. The first volume of Mme. de Boigne’s Memoirs, Morvan’s Soldat Imperial, and Fisher’s Bonapartism, are of value in their sphere. CHAPTER II TOULON AND VENDEMIAIRE Bonaparte and Corsica — Siege of Toulon — the Terror — Venddmiaire—-Marriage of Napoleon and Josdphine Beau- harnais — Army of Italy — Tactics and Strategy in 1796. ROM 1789 until 1793, during, that is, the first four years of the Revolution, Bona- parte was striving to improve his pros¬ pects in connection with Corsican affairs. He paid several visits to the island, joined the French democratic party, but could not suc¬ ceed either in securing the victory of that party at Ajaccio, or in bringing to a favourable end a small military expedition he led into Sardinia. In the course of these intrigues and proceedings we catch an interesting glimpse of him noted by his school friend Bourrienne dur¬ ing a short stay in Paris. The young Corsican officer, whose watch was in pawn and whose dinners were generally provided by his friends, saw among other sights the march of a mob of five hundred men to the Tuileries, and Louis XVI. complying with their TOULON AND VENDEMIAIRE 15 orders by appearing at a window wearing a red Phrygian cap. Bonaparte was deeply moved at this spectacle, and declared with indigna¬ tion that with a couple of guns he could have dispersed all this scum of the faubourgs and taught them a lesson they would never have forgotten. The doings of Bonaparte at this period have no large bearing on history and are in part somewhat obscure. But after the final failure of the French party in Corsica he returned to his occupation as an officer of artillery, serving now in the rank of captain (1793). In August of the same year the French Republic, assailed on every side, received a severe blow by the in¬ habitants of Toulon proclaiming the King and calling to their help an Anglo-Spanish fleet. The government immediately sent troops to attempt the recapture of the fortress, and Bona¬ parte found himself in command of the small force of artillery collected. His skill and judg¬ ment quickly won recognition, and he was soon promoted to the functions of a lieutenant- colonel. His energy made feasible the only plan that promised success. It consisted in capturing one of the English • positions, the fort de lEguillette, whence the bay and ship¬ ping could be commanded. Bonaparte pressed / NAPOLEON 16 forward the work, but the British fire was severe and the guns of his battery were si¬ lenced. He then had recourse to his knowl¬ edge of human nature and of the French soldier. A large sign was posted: This is the battery of the men without fear , and a call was made for volunteers. This was well responded to, some severe fighting ensued, finally the British position was breached and stormed. As Bonaparte had foreseen, this success of the French entailed the immediate evacuation of Toulon by the Anglo-Spanish forces. Thus Bonaparte won his first reputation, and before many months passed his services were recog¬ nised by promotion to the rank of brigadier- general. It was at the period we have now reached that the Revolution attained its extreme of vio¬ lence. The government of France had been seized by the Jacobin Club and Robespierre. An enthusiastic conformity to their doctrines appeared the only means of escaping the guil¬ lotine. Bonaparte, like nearly every other of¬ ficer of the French army, made show of zeal in support of the Terrorists, and was during some months on close terms with Robespierre Jetme. But in Thermidor (July) 1794, the Jacobin tyranny was broken, and in the reac- TOULON AND VENDEMIAIRE 17 tion that followed Bonaparte was for a few weeks placed under arrest. After his release, having thrown up his command in the south¬ ern army, he went to Paris where he probably hoped to find some opportunity of advancement in the turmoil of politics. That opportunity was slow in coming, but he refused the com¬ mand of a brigade of infantry in the army of the West rather than leave the capital. At last, in the autumn of 1795, events took place that marked his first step forward in the politi¬ cal world. Since the fall of Robespierre in 1794 a strong movement of reaction had taken place in the capital, partly royalist, wholly con¬ servative. Most of the Sections of Paris were hostile to the Convention, which aimed at re¬ taining power under a newly framed constitu¬ tion ; and as each Section had its battalion of national guards, the movement soon took an insurrectional and menacing aspect. The ex¬ ecutive power of the Republic was to be vested in a committee of five, — the Directoire , — among the members of which was Barras, who, as a representative of the government, had known Bonaparte at Toulon and had been struck by his talents. In the last days of September 1795, the movement of the Sections became more pro- 2 1 8 NAPOLEON nounced, the symptoms of an approaching storm more clear, and the Convention charged Barras with its defence and with the command of all the troops in Paris. But Barras was a civilian and needed military assistance. He therefore called to his aid several generals then in the capital; among them was Bonaparte, who accepted, though not without hesitation; his personality, his decision and promptitude completely turned the scale. At this point we may pause for one moment to recall an anecdote of those days that is emi¬ nently characteristic of the man. Thiebault, a young officer, reported at headquarters, and found the newly appointed general seated at a table in conversation. He appeared small, of poor physique, with long, lanky hair and a shabby uniform. He was asking questions of the most elementary character of officers of far greater experience and seniority in mili¬ tary administration. There was an inclina¬ tion among some of those present to smile at the ignorance displayed by the newcomer, but Thiebault admired his complete absence of false pride, the searching character of his inquiries, and the rapidity with which he appeared to assimilate the information he ac¬ quired. The officers placed under his com- TOULON AND VENDEMIAIRE 19 mand were certainly not inclined to think lightly of him for long. On the 13th ofy Vendemiair.e the revolt came to a head, and the Sections prepared to march against the Assembly. Bonaparte seized all the available artillery, owing to the promptitude of a major of cavalry, Murat by name. The few thousand troops available were concentrated about the Tuileries, and as soon as the national guards began their movement, Bonaparte opened with grape along the streets leading to his central position. There was considerable bloodshed, but the insurrection collapsed immediately, as must all insurrections treated in that prompt and uncompromising way. Bonaparte’s second successful demonstration of his knowledge of the theory and practice of artillery received large recognition, for he was shortly afterwards appointed to the command of the army of the Interior. He was now a rising man in the State, and for this reason succeeded in winning the hand of a lady of rank and beauty to whom he had been paying his attentions for some months. Josephine Tascher de La Pagerie was a beautiful creole who had married the Vicomte de Beauharnais, an officer in the French service, by whom she had two children, Eugene and Hortense. 20 N APOLEON Beauharnais fought for the Republic, was un¬ successful, and went to the guillotine one of the last victims of the Reign of Terror. His widow became one of the beauties of the new fashionable society that centred about the dis¬ sipated Barras and his wife. Whether sh e love d Bonaparte is very doubtful, but it is clear that she felt his magnetic power, and when it was decided that he was to have the command of one of the armies on the frontier, she married him. The marriage took place on the nth of March 1796, and on the 21st Bonaparte started for Nice to assume com¬ mand of the army of Italy. It appears not improbable that Josephine's influence with the Barras had been largely instrumental in secur¬ ing this important appointment. We now have come to the beginning of Napoleon's career as a commander-in-chief, and since his history must be essentially mili¬ tary, since he remains without question the greatest soldier concerning whom we have ac¬ curate information, it will be well to examine at this point, before we follow him into Italy, what was actually represented by a movement of troops or a battle in his time. To speak of an advance or retreat of a right or left wing, or of a movement resulting in so TOULON AND VENDEMIAIRE 21 many thousands being killed, wounded, or taken prisoners, conveys but the vaguest notion of the evolutions actually carried out; when con¬ sidering the history of the greatest of captains it will not be out of place to take a prelimi¬ nary view of the tactics and strategy of his day, and to attempt to convey some more precise impression of the actual occurrences of the battle-field. When the French Revolution broke out, the art of war was as much trammelled by narrow regulations as was that of letters. The methods and traditions were those of Frederick the Great, but dogmatism had supplanted genius. Rigidity of discipline and tactical formalism were the foundation of the system. The soldier was a brutalized individual, skilled in multitudinous attitudes and formations, fighting like" a machine under the inspira¬ tion of constant floggings. Two opposing lines of infantry, each formed on a depth of two or three ranks, would advance nearer and nearer to each other in the most perfect align¬ ment, every musket even, every toe turned to the same angle. When within firing distance the one whose discipline was the more rigid would generally manage to survive the two or three mechanical volleys that would be ex- 22 NAPOLEON changed at a range of fifty to one hundred and twenty yards. With regiments thus drilled the great aim of every commander was to attain tactical perfection, and the conduct of a battle-field became slow and artificial. War was turned into a scientific game with arbitrary rules. France revolutionized war as she had every political and social observance. With promo¬ tion thrown open to every soldier; with the doctrine of Liberty, Equality, Fraternity, pro¬ claimed; with many of the old officers leaving the country, it became impossible to maintain discipline, and in many of the early battles of the Republic the French army suffered in con¬ sequence. The Convention declared that cor¬ poral punishment should not be inflicted on- free men; the sentiment was to its honour, but the army was soon reduced to chaotic condi¬ tions. From these conditions arose a new army, bolder and greater than the old. It was inspired by ardent patriotism, that finest of all the military virtues, and made up in dash, intelligence, and courage what it lacked in science. From these circumstances a new system of tactics was evolved, of which the most characteristic innovation may be under¬ stood by the following convenient illustration. TOULON AND VENDEMIAIRE 23 A body of men marching along a road will naturally form a column, — say four abreast. Suppose such a column arrives near a village occupied by the enemy, and attempts to take it, — what is the simplest, least scientific man¬ ner in which this might be accomplished? In the first place the most raw of officers and inexperienced of troops would quickly learn to double up so as to convert a front of four into a front of eight; then a quick dash, the bayonet, the pressure of the rear ranks on the first, would do the rest. This was, in its rough¬ est form, the usual French system of attack during the wars of the Republic and Empire. The same column deployed, or opened up right and left, would give an extended front for firing when on the defensive. When attacking, the distance the column would have to cover exposed to musketry fire will be realized when it is stated that the extreme range of the mus¬ ket then in use was two hundred yards. Effec¬ tive volleys were generally fired at from one hundred and twenty down to sixty yards.- When a French brigade attacked the usual disposition was for about one quarter of the infantry to be dispersed as skirmishers to draw and divert the enemy’s fire. Behind these skirmishers, columns would be formed, NAPOLEON 24 brought up as far forward as the ground would permit, and at the proper moment launched at the enemy’s line at the charge. The forma¬ tion of these columns varied according to circumstances, but a front of sixteen and depth of seventy men, equivalent to two battalions of reduced strength, may be taken as repre¬ senting a rough average. The French infantry excelled in offensive evolutions, in quickly seizing a hill, house, or hedge, and their celer¬ ity of movement and intelligence proved more than a match for the methods of the armies opposed to them. Before many years had passed every country of Europe, save Great Britain alone, abandoned the old tactics and copied the new. Similar changes took place in the handling of artillery and especially of cavalry, which were now used with far greater boldness, especially for completing the destruc¬ tion of the enemy after a successful engage¬ ment; perfect alignment became a secondary consideration. Strategy changed on the same lines as tactics. Slow, methodical movements were checked by rapid marching; the capture of a fortress became an object of less impor¬ tance than the destruction of an army. Bona¬ parte fought his first campaign when the new TOULON AND VENDEM IAI RE 25 theories of war were just beginning to emerge from chaos, when a number of self-made and excellent officers had won their way to the heads of regiments and brigades; he grasped with a firm hand the instrument Fate had placed in his hands and wielded it from the very first instant with the skill of a master. CHRONOLOGY Sept., 1789, to Leb., 1791. ) B ona p ar te in Corsica. Aug., I 79 G to May, 1792- ) May, 1792. Bonaparte fails to secure success of French party at Ajaccio. 21 Sept., U Proclamation of the French Republic. 21 Jan., 1793 - Execution of Louis XVI. Feb., a Bonaparte fails in an expedition to Sar¬ dinia. 28 Aug., u Toulon occupied by Anglo-Spanish forces. Nov., “ 4-12 Sept., “ 12 Nov., “ 17 “ “ 14 Jan., 1797. 16 “ “ 2 Feb., “ CHRONOLOGY Bonaparte’s first victory, Montenotte. Millesimo. Mondovi. Armistice of Cherasco. Po crossed at Piacenza. Lodi. French entry into Milan. Passage of Mincio. Siege of Mantua begins. Lonato. Castiglione. Bonaparte’s pursuit of Wurmser, — Verona, Bassano, Mantua. Alvintzy successful at Caldiero. Areola. Rivoli. Provera capitulates at La Favorita. Fall of Mantua. NOTE Bibliographical: General. — See page n. Add for military history: York von Wartenburg, Napoleon a/s Feldherr, Berlin, 1886, 2 vols. (also French and English translations). For preceding chapter: G. Fabry, Histoire de l'a?'mee d'Italie (zypd-py) , Paris, 1900, 2 vols.; Bouvier, Bona¬ parte en Italie, Paris, 1899 (only to the occupation of Milan). For other than military matters see note to next chapter. CHAPTER IV CAMPO FORMIO AND EGYPT Armistice of Leoben — Fall of Venice—Peace of Campo Formio — Methods of the French Armies, and of Bonaparte, his relations with the Directoire —The Eastern question — Expedition to Egypt — Capture of Malta — Battle of the Nile — Campaigns in Egypt and Syria — Return to France. T WO phases of Bonaparte’s campaign of Italy have now been reviewed; the first, essentially offensive, during which the French swept the Austrians back from the Alps to the Quadrilateral ; the second, essen¬ tially defensive, during which they reduced the fortress of Mantua and foiled every effort to relieve it. The third and last phase was to be offensive once more. A new Austrian army had been formed numbering about fifty thou¬ sand men, and had been placed under the command of the young Archduke Charles who had just begun his brilliant military ca¬ reer. Bonaparte was slightly stronger in num¬ bers, and manoeuvring with wonderful strategic skill first through the Upper Venetian prov¬ inces, then through the Julian Alps, he con¬ stantly out-generalled his opponent, won a 41 9 42 NAPOLEON number of small engagements, and forced him steadily backwards. So relentlessly did he urge on his columns that on the 7th of April he had reached the little town of Leoben on the northern slope of the Alps, less than one hundred miles from Vienna. Then at last Austria acknowledged defeat; an armistice be¬ tween the two armies was agreed to, and the basis for negotiating a peace. Just at the moment when the negotiations of Leoben were freeing the French army from all anxiety in the north, the inhabitants of the Venetian mainland, long dissatisfied with mili¬ tary rule and rapacity, rose against the invaders. At Verona and elsewhere massacres took place. Nothing could have happened more oppor¬ tunely for Bonaparte. The excuse was a con¬ venient one for colouring the spoliation of the ancient republic of Venice, the neutrality of which neither France nor Austria had respected, the spoils of which both had coveted. The Doge and Senate were too weak to offer any resistance, and on the nth of May the city was occupied by French troops. The long history of Venice had come to an inglorious, nearly unnoticed close. Bonaparte spent that summer at the castle of Montebello near Milan, conducting the CAM FO FORMIO AND EGYPT 43 peace negotiations with the Austrian commis¬ sioners. With the attractive but extravagant Josephine by his side he held an informal court, to which many were attracted by the grace and beauty of Madame Bonaparte, but most by a curiosity to see the extraordinary soldier who in a few short months had carved himself a place alongside of the greatest cap¬ tains of all ages. On the 17th of October peace was signed at Campo Formio. Its chief provisions were those that gave France the Rhine as frontier, that stipulated for the recognition by Aus¬ tria of the newly formed Ligurian and Cis¬ alpine republics (Genoa, Lombardy, Modena, and Bologna) and that transferred to Austria as a compensation for Lombardy, Venice and her Adriatic provinces. In the account given of the campaign of Italy the military operations have hitherto received nearly exclusive attention. There are a few other matters, however, that deserve passing notice. The French army, unpaid, weak in commissariat, loosely disciplined, followed by a horde of needy and not over-scrupulous adventurers, made the people of Italy pay dearly for the introduction among them of the glorious principles of the Revolution. Even 44 NAPOLEON Bonaparte, who from the point of view of mili¬ tary efficiency disliked and did his best to pre¬ vent license, made the Italian cities disburse largely in return for the measure of liberty he brought them. Enormous contributions of war were imposed, and these took the form, in part, of a seizure of the treasures of Italian art for the benefit of the French national museums* Bonaparte pushed his odd and inexpensive collecting mania to great lengths, denuded northern Italy of nearly every masterpiece, and was accordingly elected a member of the In- stitut de France. How complacently he viewed this queerly won scientific distinction may be judged by the fact that, for several years after, he frequently wore the official dress of his new colleagues, and generally began his proclama¬ tions after the following fashion: Le citoyen Bonaparte , Membre de VInstitut, Commandant- en-chef etc. Notwithstanding the corruption that attended the contracts for the provisioning of the French army, it seems pretty clear that the fingers of the general-in-chief remained clean. Large profits accrued to him legitimately in connection with prize money, but that was all. The genius of Bonaparte had been felt not by his army alone. The magnetic influence CAMPO FORMIO AND EGYPT 45 of his superiority had touched the Dircctoire. But for the present there was no obvious jeal¬ ousy or estrangement between that body and its masterful general; each felt a need for the support of the other. When in the summer of 1797 there was fear of a new reactionary movement in Paris, Bonaparte gave his un¬ compromising support to the government, offered to march to Paris with the army, and sent General Augereau to carry out the Direc¬ tive's mandates for suppressing its opponents. The purging process then carried out in the ranks of the Royalists and Conservatives is known as the revolution of Fructidor. What is perhaps most important to note in this con¬ nection is the fact that the victorious army had now become the mainstay of the Republic. The Revolution had swallowed up all that was best fitted to govern in the civil population of France, all the elements of strength and char¬ acter were now to be sought for in the army alone; and the soldiers, led by generals like Jourdan, Bernadotte, Augereau, Murat, Victor, Ney and others, comrades who had carried the musket and nsernTrom their ranks, were dem¬ ocrats to the last man. Towards the close of 1797, France being now at peace, General Bonaparte proceeded to Paris NAPOLEON 46 where he met with a triumphant reception. In this connection it may be well to notice an important aspect of his remarkable personality: he not only knew how to win a battle, but also how to make the most of it. At that period newspapers were few and made little effort to obtain news at first hand. There were no special correspondents at General Bonaparte’s battles, but he took care in person that they should be duly recorded. His bulletins, written in a rhetorical style suited to the public and military taste of his day, rarely mentioned the general-in-chief, gave the credit of every achieve¬ ment to the soldiers, but never failed when expedient to distort and falsify facts, all to the greater glory and profit of Napoleon Bona¬ parte. His numbers were always understated, those of his opponents exaggerated; even de¬ feats such as that of Caldiero were officially travestied into victories. Thus a perfectly de¬ ceptive legend began to come into existence from the first weeks of the campaign of Italy, and thus it was studiously continued, even in the last painful days of the prisoner of Saint Helena, even in the last clauses of his will. At the Directoire s official reception of the general on his return to Paris in 1797, this talent of his for impressing the public mind was CAMPO FORMIO AND EGYPT 47 visibly manifested; for he carried in his hand to present to the government a parchment scroll, which was the treaty of Campo Formio, and behind him was displayed a large tricolour flag covered with gilt lettering recording the sixty victories of the army he had commanded, the capture of one hundred and fifty thousand prisoners, of one hundred and seventy colours, of fifteen hundred cannon. The wild enthusiasm displayed by the spec¬ tators of this dramatic scene did not lead Bonaparte, as it might have a weaker or more short-sighted man, to bid too openly for popular support. He declined to show himself in pub¬ lic, and even when he went to the theatre gen¬ erally occupied the darkest corner of his box. With him this was all a matter of calculation; he saw no real political opening for the present, or, as he put it, the pear was not yet ripe, and he did not want the Parisian public to take him up like some new toy and then quickly tire of him. At first Bonaparte’s idea appears to have been that he might be brought into the Di- rectoire , but the fact that he was only twenty- eight, and that the legal age for belonging to the executive body was forty, served as a good ex¬ cuse for keeping him out. The question was, 4 8 NAPOLEON how was he, now that the Continent was at peace, -vto keep himself before the public and earn new laurels ? The only hope of solving this ques¬ tion lay in the circumstances of the maritime war still proceeding with England. The Di- rectoire was as anxious as the young general that he should find some military employment, and he soon left Paris with a small staff per¬ sonally to inspect the French ports and camps facing the British coast along the Channel. This inspection proved unsatisfactory, and Bon¬ aparte decided that there was nothing in this direction to tempt him. But, as a result of the last war between France and England, there was an attractive theory firmly fixed in the public mind, a theory on which military action might be based, a theory still of considerable moment in world politics. In the war which was closed by the treaty of Versailles in 1783, France had won the honours and Great Britain had met with many reverses. French fleets had swept the Channel, English commerce had been harried, the American colonies had become the United States, France had made territorial gains; yet within a few months of the peace it was found that British prosperity was greater than ever, increasing by leaps and bounds, whereas France was heading straight towards bankruptcy. CAMPO FORMIO AND EGYPT 49 What was the explanation of this curious re¬ sult? It would be out of place here to dis¬ cuss the economic aspects of this question ; to state the opinion then generally accepted in France is all that is necessary. That opinion was that the prosperity of Great Britain was chiefly due to her possession of and commerce with India; therefore to deal an effective blow at Great Britain it was necessary to strike at India. Bonaparte through all his life accepted this as sound doctrine; the only question with him was: How was India to be reached ? There were at that day, as there are now, three lines of approach from Europe to India, one by sea, one by land, the other of a mixed character. The sea route was that leading from the Atlantic round the extremity of Africa into the Indian Ocean ; the preponderance of Eng¬ land in naval strength placed this line of ap¬ proach virtually under her control, and although the possession of the Cape of Good Hope did eventually become a matter of dispute, opera¬ tions on this line were never seriously contem¬ plated by France. The land route was one that should lead from Russia or Asiatic Turkey through Persia and Afghanistan or Beluchistan to the valley of the Indus; in the year 1798 it 50 NAPOLEON was far removed from any political combination that the French government was in a position to attempt, though ten years later it entered the field of practical politics. The third line of approach, the most rapid and convenient, was that running through the Mediterranean to Egypt and thence either overland or by the Red Sea. Bonaparte was a son of the Medi¬ terranean, his imagination had often evoked visions of Oriental conquest. He now eagerly took up the idea of dealing a powerful blow at Great Britain on her line of approach to India. His immediate aim was to establish the power of France in Egypt; his ulterior one not well defined. He probably viewed as possible the eventual marching of an army from Egypt to the confines of India. The Directoire, pleased at the thought of ridding France of the presence of one in whom they detected a formidable rival, equipped a large fleet and placed a fine army of thirty thousand men under Bonaparte’s orders. With these he sailed from Toulon in May 1798. A British fleet under Nelson had been sent into the Mediterranean to watch this great French armament, destined, as many supposed, for the invasion of England; but for the moment Bonaparte and his admiral, Brueys, avoided CAMPO FORMIO AND EGYPT 51 meeting the enemy. They reached Malta on the 10th of June and the Grand Master of the ancient Order of St. John was summoned to surrender his fortress to the army of the Republic. This he did; and the French, hav¬ ing garrisoned Malta, sailed once more towards the east, shaping a course for Crete. After sighting this island, Admiral Brueys turned south-east and on the 1st of July arrived in sight of Alexandria. Bonaparte now learned that Nelson with the British fleet had been there only two days previously, but had sailed away again to the north-east. He gave orders for immediate disembarkation, took possession of Alexandria, and started the next day on the advance to Cairo, the capital of Egypt. In the meanwhile Brueys moored his thirteen line- of-battle ships and frigates as close to the shore as he thought possible and awaited events at the anchorage of Aboukir. The British fleet under Nelson had left the straits of Messina a few days after Bonaparte sailed from Malta. Nelson shaped his course direct for Egypt, crossed that of his opponents so close as nearly to sight them, left them to northwards in the direction of Crete, and arrived off Alexandria first. He then cruised in various directions for information, and fi- NAPOLEON 52 nally appeared off Aboukir again on the 1st of August. On sighting the French fleet at anchor the British admiral immediately took his ships into action, succeeded in getting part of his fleet between the enemy and the shore, and battering the motionless French ships from both sides, consecutively sank or captured nearly every one of them. The French fought with great courage and obstinacy, and Admiral Brueys was lost with the flagship L'Orient, whose magazine exploded. The daring and skil¬ ful manoeuvre that had turned the French line and placed two British ships opposite each French one had decided the result of this great naval battle. Bonaparte and his army were now cut off from the world, and that in a country where the stores necessary for a European army could not be procured. Had Brueys’ fleet not anchored at Aboukir, but sailed back to Malta, to Corfu, or even to Toulon, the position would have been threatening for England; as it was, Bonaparte and his thirty thousand men were in great jeopardy. He proceeded, however, with his extraordinary enterprise with an im¬ perturbable self-reliance that inspired all those with whom he came into contact. Egypt was at that time a dependent province CAMPO FORMIO AND EGYPT 53 of the Turkish Empire ruled by a Bey and a dominant caste of military colonists who formed a splendid body of feudal cavalry known as the Mameluks. They proved, however, no match for the French army, and were crushed by the steady firing of the republican infan¬ try at the battle of the Pyramids on the 21 st of July. This victory gave Bonaparte possession of Egypt which he now administered and converted into a source of supply in even more relentless fashion than he had treated Italy. During the autumn and early winter months he was actively engaged in matters of administration and prepared to turn Egypt into a firm base from which the next move might be securely made. What that next move might have been is perhaps indicated by the fact that he dispatched a letter to an Indian prince then at war with Great Britain, Tippoo Sahib, urging him to new efforts and promising him assistance. But India and even Constantinople were far off, and it is best to view as tentative this step of Bonaparte’s, and to treat as only vague purposes the sayings attributed to him at this period in which he referred to the possibilities of founding a new Oriental empire, or of returning to France by way of Constantinople. 54 NAPOLEON What it is important not to forget is that once in Egypt every one of Bonaparte’s movements was perfectly sound from a military point of view. Not one of them was based on any considerations in the least approaching the romantic. In January 1799, he had to resume active warfare. The Sultan decided to drive the French invaders out of his dominions, and for that purpose prepared two expeditions: one was to proceed by sea, the other by land through Asia Minor. Bonaparte determined not to await this double attack, but to take the offensive and deal with his opponents one at a time. Accordingly in January he marched across the desert from Egypt into Syria and after many hardships reached Jaffa, a small port already occupied by a Turkish advance guard. There was some severe fighting, the town was stormed and captured, and the French accepted the surrender of some two thousand prisoners. But the question at once arose: what was to be done with these men ? The army was short of food, and an arduous march through barren country lay before it. If the prisoners consumed rations, it would mean privation, perhaps even starvation for the army; if they were released they would probably CAMPO FORMIO AND EGYPT 55 rejoin the Turks, or at all events take to the hills and marauding. It was a difficult problem, and was resolved in the safest but least merciful way : the Turks were taken out and shot down. This terrible incident has long been one of those most criticised in Bonaparte’s career, yet modern military writers do not hesitate to justify it on the ground that a general can never sacrifice the vital interests of his army to those of humanity. This may be true, but it might also be pertinently asked : was not the unprovoked attack of France on Malta and on Egypt at least as great a subject for reproach ? Is it not far more important to award blame for the waging of an unjust war, than for what is only a military incident, of g ;essity, occurring in the course r ? Bonaparte marched northwards the main Turkish force, and at l a severe check. The Turks, ptain Sidney Smith of the British navy, defended the town with the utmost reso¬ lution, an<^ after a siege of two months the French were beaten off. It wa^during this siege that a well-known incktent occurred: Sidney Smith sent into the French camp a challenge inviting Bonaparte to meet him in L * NAPOLEON 56 single combat, to which he received the per¬ tinent reply that the French general would accept if the British would produce a Marl¬ borough to meet him! During these two months the French overran northern Palestine and fought numerous engagements against the Turks, one of which, that of Mount Tabor, was a brilliant and decisive victory. On the 20th of May the retreat began, and the army, after heavy losses and intense suffering, owing to lack of food and water and an outbreak of plague, reached Cairo a month later. Within a few weeks it was called on to make new exer¬ tions, for the Turkish fleet made its appearance off Aboukir and there disembarked some ten thousand troops. Bonaparte collected every available man, marched against the^S^rks, found them badly posted with their backs to the sea, routed, and in great part destroyed them. This was the battle of Aboukir (July 26). Shortly afterwards he gave secret orders to have a small frigate got ready in the port of Alexandria, and on the 23d of August 1799, accompanied by Berthier, Murat, and a few othersCFe. left the army and sailed for France. After a long journey and several nar¬ row escapes*’ from British cruisers, he arrived in the bay of Frejus on the 9th of October. CAMPO FORMIO AND EGYPT 57 Had he commanded events and dates at the hand of Fate he could not have chosen better; for the pear was now exactly ripe. One month later he was the master of France. 2 Feb., 18 April, May-July, 4 Sept., 17 Oct., Nov., 19 May, 10 June, 2 July, 21 “ x Aug., 6 March, March-May, 15 April, 25 J ul y> 22 Aug., 9 Oct., CHRONOLOGY 1797. Fall of Mantua. “ Treaty of peace with Pope at Tolen- tino. “ Leoben, — peace preliminaries be¬ tween France and Austria. “ Bonaparte at Montebello. “ 18th Fructidor, — royalist move¬ ment put down by Augereau. “ Treaty of Campo Formio between France and Austria. “ Bonaparte proceeds to Paris. 1798. Expedition to Egypt sails. “ Arrives at Malta. “ Alexandria taken. “ The Pyramids. “ Battle of the Nile. 1799. Jaffa stormed. W “ Siege of Acre. C “ Mount Tabor. w “ Aboukir.v \\ “ Bonaparte leaves Egypt. “ Lands at Fr^jus. 58 NAPOLEON NOTE Bibliographical: General Histories. — See page it. For the Campaign of Italy, see page 40 ; also for non- military affairs, Gaffarel, Bonaparte et les Republiques italiennes, Paris, 1894. For France and England, with the expedition to Egypt: Mahan, Influence of Sea Power, London, 1892; Desbri^re, Projets de debarquements aux iles Britanniques, Paris, 1901 ; La Jonquiere, Expedition d'Egypte, Paris, 1901 ; Burgoyne, Naval and Military Operations in Egypt , London, 1885. The memoirs of Bourrienne and Savary, though far from trustworthy, are the best for this period. Napoleon’s attitude towards the question of Italian nationality is dealt with as a whole in a later chapter. CHAPTER V THE 18 TH OF BRUMAIRE French Policy and Disasters — Siey&s— Novi and Zurich — Landing of Bonaparte—His Attitude — Episode with Josephine — Conspiracy — Bonaparte appointed to command Troops in Paris— Fall of the Directoire. T HE peace signed at Campo Formio did not prove of long duration, for at the very time that Bonaparte was sailing for Egypt the Directoire had proved its incapacity by reversing his Italian policy and giving provocation to the Powers. During the course of the Italian campaign Bonaparte had shown an accommodating spirit in his relations with the two southern Italian States, the Papacy and the kingdom of Naples. He did not wish to weaken himself by carrying on military operations in such an ex-centric direction, nor would he associate himself too closely with the extreme anti-religious policy of the Directoire. But while the Egyptian expedition was prepar¬ ing, and after its departure, the French govern¬ ment successively quarrelled with and occupied 59 6o NAPOLEON both Rome and Naples, and there promoted the establishment of republics. The jealousy of Austria and Russia was at once kindled, and these two Powers took up arms. In the spring of 1799, the French were several times defeated in northern Italy by Souvaroff, while the Aus¬ trians threatened the Rhine and an AnsJo- Russian army prepared to operate from Holland. This military failure was not all, however; for the Directoire was as feeble and unsuccessful at home as abroad. In 1798 France became bankrupt. In the spring of 1799 the Jacobin party, representing what was left of the Terror¬ ist element, was successful in the elections and secured nearly one half of the seats in the Council of Five Hundred (lower House). The government had neither money, nor adminis¬ trative system, nor moral strength; France was overrun by lawlessness, taxes were un¬ paid, gold was hoarded, and the only thing that prevented the Republic from sinking was the ^general fear of a Bourbon restoration. Nearly ! all men wanted to keep something of the Revo¬ lution, but so many political panaceas had already been exploded that there appeared little hope of agreement or salvation. At this crisis, in the early part of 1799, an important group of moderate men, anxious to save the THE 1 8 T H OF BRUMAIRE 61 Republic by means of some administrative or constitutional reform, turned to that eminent statesman Sieyes, then French ambassador at Berlin. Sieyes had been a prominent debater from the earliest days of the Revolution, and had gained the reputation of being the greatest constitutional authority of France. By a pru¬ dent course he had weathered the storms of Jacobinism, and now a convenient expurgation of the Directoire gave him a seat in that body, while the best men in the legislative and ad¬ ministrative field rallied to his support and looked to him to effect a constitutional reform that should give stability to the State. Sieyes thought that to effect a change in the govern¬ ment the support of the army was essential. Bonaparte was in Egypt, and the British cruisers intercepted all communications. Under these circumstances, Sieyes decided that Gen¬ eral Joubert’s should be the arm to deal the necessary blow. But in the summer of 1799 the military fortunes of France had sunk so low that it was thought indispensable that Joubert should first retrieve something of the lost prestige. He was accordingly given all the troops that could be collected and sent into Italy to rally the dispirited remnants of the French army in that country and to bring the 6 2 NAPOLEON Austro-Russians to battle ; from his anticipated victory he was to return to Paris and help Sieyes reform the State. At Novi, on the 15th of August, one week before Bonaparte set sail from Alexandria, the two armies met; Souvaroff was once more successful, Joubert was not only defeated but killed. This blow placed Sieyes for the moment in a desperate position; and not only Sieyes but France, for the German and Italian frontiers were now both uncovered. Only one French army, that of Massena in Switzerland, still held the field. For a few weeks after Novi the Repub¬ lic appeared doomed, and then, in the last days of September, Massena won a series of splendid successes in the neighbourhood of Zurich. A thrill of hope ran through France once more, and just at that moment Bonaparte landed. It was an extraordinary coincidence of prevision, audacity, and chance; he had just caught the turn of the tide that carries on to fortune. The feeling that Bonaparte was the only man who could save the State was so universal that no sooner was his frigate at anchor than she was boarded by a mob of excited people who took not the slightest heed of quarantine regula¬ tions. The general and his companions landed and proceeded on their journey to Paris, every THE 1 8 T H OF BRUMAIRE 63 stop, every change of horses being the occasion of enthusiastic demonstrations in honour of the conqueror of Italy, of the victor of Aboukir. But Bonaparte knew enough of the necessities of the times, of the temper of France, not to pose as the ambitious general. Moreau, Joubert, . Massena, Jourdan, Hoche,had shown themselves fine soldiers, but Bonaparte alone had closed a series of victories by forcing a peace. It was peace France now wanted; and it was the gen¬ eral who had presented the treaty of Campo Formio to the Directoire who was now declar¬ ing to those who eagerly pressed about him, that the government of France was driving her to ruin, but that he intended that peace should be obtained and that all classes of Frenchmen should enjoy its benefits. As a result of his Italian campaign, he declared, France had been left prosperous, victorious, and honoured; he now found her bankrupt, de¬ feated, and disgraced. He allowed it to be understood that either with or without the Di¬ rectoire he was prepared to save the country. Bonaparte’s return to Paris was marked by an important incident in his relations with Josephine. Probably no great man was ever less influenced in a political sense by women, and for that reason there will be little said on 64 NAPOLEON that subject in this book ; yet the incident we are now coming to must receive notice because it partly leads up to and explains events of the greatest importance that took place ten years later. Josephine Bonaparte was beautiful and a woman of her period, frivolous, charming, ex¬ travagant, tender-hearted, and perfectly lax in her morality. Bonaparte had loved her in¬ tensely, fervently, as the letters he wrote to her in the course of the Italian campaign sufficiently disclose. But when in Egypt, intercepted cor¬ respondence and the tittle-tattle of kind friends had revealed to him that he had ample cause for divorce. Josephine hurried from Paris to meet her returning husband on the Lyons road, so as to place her version of affairs before him ere he should reach Paris. But the family feud be¬ tween the Bonapartes and the Beauharnais was already in full force. Napoleon’s brothers, Joseph and Lucien, who had now become im¬ portant political personages in Paris, had deter¬ mined to overthrow Josephine so that their influence might predominate with their brother. They also hastened to meet him and succeeded in doing so, whereas Josephine failed. For several days after his return to his little house in the rue Chantereine , of which the name had been changed to rue de la Victoire , Bonaparte THE 1 8 T H OF BRUM AIRE 65 refused to see his wife. Finally her lamenta¬ tions and entreaties, with those of her two chil¬ dren, Eugene and Hortense, together with the feeling that an action for divorce would be im¬ politic at such a crisis, prevailed with Napoleon, and a reconciliation took place. The really important question was: how and by what means could a change of govern¬ ment giving power to Bonaparte be effected ? There were several ready formed parties anx¬ ious to win his support, but on his first arrival he practically declined all overtures, even those of his own brothers, declaring firmly that he belonged to no party, that he was in favour of no party, but that he was for all good Frenchmen to whatever party they belonged. In fact, he would follow no man, but wanted all men to follow him. The Directoire was too divided and impotent to take notice of the open challenge involved in the conduct of the Corsican general. He was in a sense a deserter from his army; he had come from a plague-stricken port and had violated the quarantine regulations; he openly impugned the conduct and threatened the existence of the government, yet the Di¬ rectoire dared not order his arrest for his moral strength was far greater than theirs. Public 5 66 NAPOLEON opinion saw in him the only man in France of sufficient ability and of sufficient strength of character to draw the country from the quagmire in which it was sinking. Probably Bonaparte’s first intention was to make use of Barras with whom he had so effectively co-operated in crushing the rising of Vendemiaire 1795. Barras was still a mem¬ ber of the Directoire , but was now too dis¬ credited with the best section of public opinion to be of any political utility. Between Sieyes and Bonaparte there was at first much cool¬ ness, but it was clear to many that in their co-operation was the only hope of effecting something useful. A party in which Talley¬ rand, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Cam- baceres, Lucien and Joseph Bonaparte were active, succeeded in bringing the two men together. From that moment the scheme for effecting a revolution proceeded fast. The precise form that should be given to the new constitution was for the present left undeter¬ mined. What the conspirators were agreed on was that the executive power of the Republic must be strengthened and that a committee of three should hold it: Bonaparte, Sieyes, and a colleague who followed his lead, Roger Ducos. Few were let into the secret, but THE 1 8 T H OF B R U M A I R E 67 there was a vast tacit conspiracy supporting jBonaparte and Sieyes that placed at their Deck and call a large number of men in the legislative bodies, especially in the Council of Ancients. Few of them knew exactly what was intended, but most of them were prepared to take up any lead shown them. The cue was soon given. Bonaparte had since his return received many applications to review various bodies of troops quartered in the capital, but had deferred answering. On the night of the 17th of Brumaire (November 8, 1799) he accepted all these invitations and fixed the following morning for the inspection, asking each commanding officer to march his troops to the garden of the Tuileries. He also wrote personal letters inviting every officer of note in Paris to call at his house in the rue de la Victoire at an early hour of the morning. During the course of the night the secretaries of the Council of Ancients, whose support had been secured by the Bonaparte-Sieyes faction, wrote and dispatched messages convening the members to a morning session on the 18th of Brumaire; in a few cases where opposition might be expected, these messages were either not sent or failed to reach their destination. 68 NAPOLEON Early in the morning a large assemblage of officers in full uniform gathered in the rue de la Victoire; at the sight of their numbers all realized that the long-expected hour had come, though how the change in government was to be effected, none knew. All, however, save General Bernadotte whose sympathies were with the Jacobin party, fol¬ lowed Bonaparte, who led them in a body to the Tuileries where the Council of Ancients was already in session. That assembly, on the motion of one of the conspirators and in perfect accord with the terms of the exist¬ ing constitution, declared Paris to be in a condition threatening to the security of the State, decreed that both the upper and lower House should suspend their sessions and ad¬ journ to St. Cloud on the 19th, and that General Bonaparte should assume command of all the troops quartered in and near Paris. The general was now introduced, and harangued the legislators, declaring that he would support them and save the Republic. He then proceeded to the gardens where the troops were assembled and passed them in review, being at all points greeted with tre¬ mendous enthusiasm. While a packed meeting of the Council of THE 1 8 T H OF BRUMAIRE 69 Ancients was thus placing the power of the sword in Bonaparte’s hands, the Directoire was rapidly disintegrating. As had been pre¬ concerted Sieyes and Roger Ducos made their appearance before the Council of Ancients and declared that they resigned their func¬ tions. Barras hesitated, but on pressure of some private nature being put on him by Talleyrand, he decided to make a virtue of necessity and signed his resignation. This left only two out of the five Directors in office, Moulins and Gohier; their influence was slight and did not affect the crisis. But there was a third body in the State, one in which the Jacobins were strong and from which trouble might not unreasonably be antici¬ pated, the Council of Five Hundred. In the enthusiasm created by the return of Bonaparte from Egypt that assembly had elected his brother Lucien president, and Lucien was now to play an almost decisive part. The Five Hundred were to assemble at noon that day in the ordinary course of business. No sooner had they done so than Lucien, declining to listen to any motion, declared the session ad¬ journed till the following day at St. Cloud, according to the terms of the perfectly consti¬ tutional decree issued by the Ancients. To 70 NAPOLEON this ruling the members perforce submitted, and thus every item of the day’s programme had passed off without a hitch. All Paris appeared to rejoice at the events that had occurred, and, unique fact in the history of revolutions, the government stocks rose in the course of the day from ii| to I2f. But the revolution was only half accom¬ plished, and the 19th of Brumaire proved as stormy as the 18th had been peaceful. CHRONOLOGY 1798. <( a 25 March, 1799. 15 Aug., 22 “ “ 25 Sept., “ 9 Oct., “ 9 Nov., “ Bankruptcy of the Directoire. Invasion of Rome and Naples. Russia and Austria resume war. Jourdan defeated at Stockach. Joubert defeated and killed at Novi. Bonaparte leaves Egypt. Mass£na’s victory at Zurich. Bonaparte lands at Frdjus. 18th Brumaire. NOTE Bibliographical: General. — See page 11. For Brumaire there is nothing of the same rank as Vandal’s Avenement de Bonaparte , Paris, 1902, perhaps the finest work yet written on Napoleonic history. CHAPTER VI Li- i X. THE 19 TH OF BRUMAIRE AND MARENGO Scenes at St. Cloud—Formation of the new Government — External Affairs — The Army of Reserve — Plans of Cam¬ paign— Passage of the Alps — Marengo—Triumph of Bonaparte. I N the early hours of the 19th of Brumaire troops were marching out from Paris to St. Cloud, some five miles distant, to take charge of the palace where the legislative bodies were to meet. This palace, destroyed by the German bombardment in 1870, was on a hillside close by the river Seine, and its buildings, courts, and terraces were com¬ pletely encircled by massive iron grilles. Fol¬ lowing the troops came a constant stream of carriages and pedestrians, of legislators and spectators, so that by eleven or twelve o’clock the little village of St. Cloud was crowded with a representative audience come to witness the politico-dramatic performance announced to take place. Many pressed up to the grilles, watching the privileged few within and exchang- 71 7 2 NAPOLEON ing comments with the sentries pacing beyond. These sentries really represented the essential factor in the situation, and therefore it will be well to note a few particulars concerning the troops. Of the thirty-five hundred men pres¬ ent most were devoted to Bonaparte. The cavalry consisted of several squadrons of dra¬ goons commanded by Colonel Sebastiani; he was a Corsican and had placed himself unre¬ servedly at his compatriot’s disposal. The infantry consisted nearly entirely of several battalions that had followed Bonaparte in the campaign of Italy. They not only felt a per¬ sonal devotion for their old general, but a de¬ testation for what they called a government of lawyers from which they had never received proper treatment. The soldiers displayed their dilapidated uniforms to the spectators and com¬ plained that for six months the Directoire had left them starving and without pay. In one company a single pipe of tobacco was gravely passed from man to man, so that each might puff in turn and enjoy his proper share of this somewhat Spartan luxury. There could be no doubt as to what answer these soldiers would give if the question between Bonaparte and the government was placed clearly before them. But there was another body of some four hun- 19TH OF BRUMAIRE 6? MARENGO 73 dred men whose sentiments appeared more doubtful; these were the guards of the Coun¬ cils. These men, picked to defend the Councils against Parisian disorder, were stout repub¬ licans, well paid and not disaffected; it was uncertain how they would act, though their superior officers had been won over by the Sieyes-Bonaparte faction. It had been arranged that the Council of Ancients should meet in a hall in the body of the Palace, the Council of Five Hundred in a covered orangery outside. It was from the Jacobins in the latter body that resistance was feared, for they had during the previous after¬ noon and evening been actively debating means of resistance to what they denounced as an attempt to overturn the Republic in favour of a dictature. Jourdan and Bernadotte, who each had some following in the army, were not disinclined to support the extremists, but noth¬ ing more was settled than that the Five Hun¬ dred would oppose a strenuous resistance to any constitutional amendment. Was constitutional amendment, however, the course that Bonaparte and Sieyes intended to adopt? No one could tell. The fact was that the conspirators, who had planned every detail of the first day with such minute care, had left 74 NAPOLEON the second to take care of itself; there was absolutely no plan of action. When Bonaparte and his supporters arrived at St. Cloud on the morning of the 19th, they found preparations for the meeting of the two assemblies incomplete. It was past noon before the orangery was ready for use, and by that time impatience and nervousness had set in. At last Lucien Bonaparte took his seat in the presidential chair and the proceed¬ ings of the lower House opened. Many motions and resolutions were handed in, but one only met with the general approval of Jacobins, Bonapartists, and all sections: this was that the members should individually renew their oath to maintain the constitution. This was eminently characteristic of the assem¬ bly, a resort to talking when it was essential to act. At two o’clock the solemn farce began, at four it was still proceeding. In the meanwhile the Ancients had also got to business; but unfortunately none of the members appeared to know precisely what course to take. Finally, getting no lead from Bonaparte or Sieyes, a proposal was put for¬ ward that the three vacancies in the Directoire should be filled up. Till this moment Bona¬ parte had been little seen. From a room in the 19TH OF BRUMAIRE & MARENGO 75 palace he had watched events, confidently awaiting their development in a favourable direction; but the more he waited, the less satisfactory did the appearance of affairs be¬ come, and now, trusting to his soldier’s instinct, he determined to proceed to the point of danger. Accompanied by his chief of staff, Berthier, and by his secretary, Bourrienne, he presented himself at the entrance of the Council of Ancients and, unbidden, entered the hall, making his way to the foot of the president’s tribune. He then hastily and nervously deliv¬ ered a speech, the worst of his life. Unused to the atmosphere of a deliberative assembly, unprepared with any definite propositions, he excitedly stumbled from blunder to blunder. The Ancients were not disinclined to support him, but when he explained that the Republic was in danger from a great conspiracy, there were immediate demands that he should specify what his accusations meant. He grew em¬ barrassed and talked louder; the legislators pressed questions on him and became heated; finally Bonaparte began telling of what he had and what he could accomplish by the might of the sword. By this time Berthier and Bourrienne were pulling at his coat tails, and in the midst of much excitement they NAPOLEON 7 6 finally half dragged, half persuaded him away. This was a bad beginning, but worse was to follow. Bonaparte was now roused, and, not waiting to cool, proceeded from the Ancients to the Five Hundred in the orangery below. There was a crowd at the door through which he slipped nearly unrecognized and began elbow¬ ing his way down a gangway blocked with members towards the presidential tribune. A moment later a voice shouted, “Down with the Dictator! Down with the Tyrant! ” and a rush was made for the spot where the little Corsican was still struggling to make his way. An inde¬ scribable uproar followed. The cry of “ Outlaw him!’’that five years before had sounded the knell of Robespierre, now rose loudest of all; and, surrounded as he was by the furious depu¬ ties, Bonaparte appeared lost. But Murat with other officers and a few grenadiers were forcing their way through to save their general. In a moment more he was dragged safely away, half suffocated, his coat torn, his face scratched and bleeding. He retired to his room for a short while, then descended to the courtyard and mounted his horse; he was more at home in the saddle glancing down a row of bayonets than in the midst of legislative assemblies. 19 TH OF BRUMAIRE & MARENGO 77 The incursion of Bonaparte into the Council of Five Hundred resulted in the putting for¬ ward of a formal motion of outlawry, and it was well for him that his brother happened to be president of the assembly. Lucien showed as much resource and coolness in this crisis as Napoleon had impetuosity and rash¬ ness. He first declined to accept the motion, then finding he could not resist it, claimed his right to speak, and leaving the presidential chair, ascended the tribune. Notwithstanding the Jacobin efforts to howl him down he held his ground for some time, and succeeded in whispering a message to a friend to the effect that the conspirators must act at once or all would be lost. This message resulted in the appearance of half a dozen grenadiers in the hall, who proceeded to the tribune, surrounded Lucien, and escorted him out into the court¬ yard. No sooner was he in the open than he called for a horse, and jumping into the saddle pushed up to the ranks of the guards of the Council. He addressed them in ringing tones, declaring that a faction of assassins had dominated the assembly; that his life and that of his brother were no longer safe; that he, the president, represented the assembly, and called on them to restore order; and that if 78 NAPOLEON his brother intended or ever attempted any¬ thing against republican institutions he would stab him with his own hands. At the con¬ clusion there was much loud shouting of Vive Bonapcu'te! The guard of the Coun¬ cils appeared shaken, the soldiers of the line had long been stamping with impatience. At this moment some one, perhaps Murat, gave an order, and a drum began to roll out the charge; Murat promptly made for the door of the Council chamber, followed by Leclerc and the infantry. This move was decisive. At the sight of the troops the legislators hur¬ ried to leave the hall, most of them by the windows, and Murat, ordering bayonets to be fixed, cleared the room. The revolution was accomplished. In the late hours of that evening small groups of the Five Hundred and of the Ancients representing the victorious faction met in the now deserted halls of the palace of St. Cloud, and gave an appearance of legality to the decrees sent for their approval by Bona¬ parte and Sieyes. On the following morning proclamations appeared announcing a new government under three Consuls, Bonaparte, Sieyes, and Roger Ducos, and declaring a policy of the reunion of all parties and of peace. 19TH OF BRUMAIRE MARENGO 79 It is curious to reflect, when viewing Bona¬ parte’s career as a whole, that it was on a policy of peace that he attained power. Yet it was so; that was undoubtedly the great desire of the French people in 1799, and it was the perfectly well-founded opinion of the country that if any man could give it peace, internal and external, it was Bonaparte. Yet the military situation of France was so weak in regard to the three great Powers with which she was at war that few believed in the possibility of foreign peace save through victory. Bonaparte, however, was no sooner in office than he made pacific propositions to the allies, and so far succeeded that he detached the Czar Paul from the alliance. Great Britain declined all overtures, being then in hopes of soon reducing the French garrisons in Malta and Egypt; but this she did in terms that showed peace to be possible in the near future. With Austria, however, it was clear that a campaign must be fought. That cam¬ paign will now be related and a considera¬ tion of the internal policy of Bonaparte after Brumaire must be for the moment postponed. In the spring of 1S00 the military position was as follows. The remnant of the French army of Italy was covering Genoa under the 8o NAPOLEON command of Massena; a much superior Aus¬ trian army under Melas eventually drove it into that city and threatened an invasion in the direction of Toulon and Marseilles. In southern Germany Kray with one hundred and fifty thousand men menaced the Rhine. Moreau with an army nearly equal stood on the defensive at Basle. As against these two Austrian armies the French had a great ad¬ vantage of position owing to their holding the projecting bastion of Switzerland ; in strategic language they had a double base from which to manoeuvre, either to the north or to the south. The meaning of this will appear from the plans formed by Bonaparte. His first proposal was this: that all the available reserves should be marched into Switzerland to strengthen Mo¬ reau; that that general should transfer his / army from Basle to Schaffhausen whence he could march, so as to place himself on the Aus¬ trian lines of communications; that Bonaparte should accompany the army to supervise the operations. Moreau rejected this scheme; he preferred a plain frontal advance to the more daring and destructive one proposed, and he objected to Bonaparte’s virtual assumption of supreme command. Precisely at this juncture came the news that Melas had driven Massena The Swiss base, 1800 19TH OF BRUMAIRE fc? MARENGO 81 into Genoa, and Bonaparte promptly deter¬ mined to alter his plans. Instead of basing himself on Switzerland to attack Kray’s lines of communications, he would turn south and deal a similar blow at Melas. His prepara¬ tions for this were eminently characteristic of his genius. His first move was to deceive the enemy as to his strength and intentions. The newspapers accordingly announced the forma¬ tion of a camp at Dijon, where a formidable army of reserve was to be assembled. The First Consul, as he was now officially known, went down to inspect the troops and so, of course, did the spies of all the Powers. They found nothing more than a few weak battalions made up of boys and cripples and presenting a most ragged appearance. In a few weeks Bonaparte’s army of reserve was the laughing stock of the courts of Europe; but not for long. The camp at Dijon was only a blind. With Berthier at the Ministry of War the most strenuous efforts were being made to squeeze out of the nearly exhausted resources of France one more effective army. There were other camps besides that of Dijon, where strong battalions were being got into shape. In April it was reported that reinforcements were to be marched to Nice where Suchet with a small 6 82 NAPOLEON force was facing Melas. In May it became known that Bonaparte was leaving Paris for a tour of inspection that was to last just two weeks. By an article of the new constitution it was provided that the First Consul should not exer¬ cise any military command. Such a clause was not likely to hold good with a man like Bonaparte at the head of the State. Yet the ^situation was precarious. The government was very new, and a military failure might spell ruin. In this difficult position, anxious to direct operations, to keep up the military deception, to make Paris believe his absence momentary,—-Bonaparte took the following steps. He appointed Berthier general-in-chief of the army of reserve, but arranged per¬ sonally to supervise the operations of that general; he gave out that he was only leaving the capital for a fortnight, and that his diplo¬ matic receptions would not be interrupted. He left Paris on the 6th of May, and from that moment his plan ripened with startling rapidity. From the centre and east of France long columns had been for many days con¬ versing on Geneva and southern Switzerland. On the 14th the first column of a large army began ascending the pass of the Great 19TH OF BRUMAIRE & MARENGO 83 St. Bernard; a week later the army of re¬ serve, strengthened by a corps taken from Moreau, had struggled through the snow and ice of the Alps by various passes between the Mont Cenis and the St. Gotthard, and was rapidly marching down into Piedmont and Lombardy, straight towards Melas’ lines of communications. The operations of the next three weeks may be summed up in a few words. It was some days before Melas realized that a French army of considerable size had descended from the Alpine passes into Italy; by this time his line of retreat towards the Quadrilateral was cut. He then appears to have done all that was possible under such circumstances. He con¬ centrated his columns with a view to march¬ ing on the enemy, pressing on the siege of Genoa in the meanwhile. On the 4th of June Massena and his starved garrison surrendered after a memorable defence. In the week that followed Melas marched towards Alessandria, and on the 14th there was fought near that fortress the battle of Marengo that decided the result of the campaign. Bonaparte having occupied Milan and pushed Murat with the cavalry as far as Piacenza, crossed the Po, advanced to Stradella, and 84 NAPOLEON thence spread out his corps right and left so as to intercept the Austrian retreat at every point. Strategically he had already won a nearly decisive advantage; for being between the Austrian army and its base he had but to succeed in holding the defensive to win. Yet his anxiety to extend north and south led him into error, left him too weak centrally, and nearly resulted in disaster. The French main column marching south-west from Stradella came into contact with the Austrians march¬ ing north-east on the 13th, but failed to rec¬ ognise the fact that the enemy was in force; Melas probably had some thirty-five thousand men present, Bonaparte not more than twenty thousand. On the following morning the Austrians advanced resolutely, deploying right and left of the main road. Bonaparte hastily sent orders to his outlying columns to march to his support, and withstood the attack as best he could. Heavy fighting followed, gradually turning in favour of the Austrians. By three o’clock in the afternoon the French had been driven some five or six miles, their left was completely routed, their right was in great confusion and in the centre alone was there still some sem¬ blance of effective resistance. To Melas the 19 TH OF BRUM AIRE &f MARENGO 85 battle now appeared won; leaving the pursuit to his chief of staff he turned back to Alessan¬ dria, where he wrote dispatches to his govern¬ ment describing his victory over the French. On the departure of Melas the mass of the Austrian infantry was ordered to continue its advance along the road to Stradella in one heavy column, battalion after battalion. This over-confident and faulty disposition proved fatal. At four o’clock General Desaix, who,, had marched since the morning on the sound of the firing, brought up his division to the aid of the First Consul. A battery was placed across the road and suddenly unmasked; the head of the Austrian column was broken; several of Desaix’ fresh battalions were rushed forward with the bayonet, and at the same moment Kellermann charged down in flank with five or six hundred dragoons. In a few moments the dense Austrian ranks were in confusion and at the mercy of the horsemen. There was no time and no space in which to deploy. Bonaparte pushed his advantage home. The straggling French were rallied and brought back to the attack; the fresh troops of Desaix carried everything before them, and avenged the fate of their general who fell early in the fight. In half an hour’s time the victory 86 NAPOLEON of the Austrians had been turned into a disas¬ trous rout in which they lost thousands of prisoners and all the positions they had cap¬ tured earlier in the day. On the following morning Melas offered to negotiate. A convention was agreed to whereby the Austrian army was permitted to continue its retreat, in return for which Lom¬ bardy and all the western parts of Italy were ceded to the French. It is not altogether correct to think of Ma¬ rengo as a lucky victory. In one sense it was so; but even had Melas won the field, Bona¬ parte had already secured so great a strategic advantage that he would probably have won the campaign. Had he retreated to the in¬ trenched position of Stradella and been rejoined there by the corps of Desaix and Serurier, it does not appear likely that Melas could have succeeded in dislodging him. Failing in that he was cut off from his base and would have had to pay the consequences. Bonaparte’s return from Marengo to Paris was the greatest, the truest triumph of his life. The enthusiasm everywhere evoked was based on the idea that the struggle he had waged so successfully was necessary to the existence of France and was the herald of an honourable 19 TH OF BRUM AIRE 6? MARENGO 87 peace. So it proved. A few months later Moreau defeated the Archduke John with great loss at Hohenlinden, and Austria gave up the struggle. Peace was signed at Luneville on the 9th of February 1801, and left France and Austria in about the same position as the treaty of Campo Formio four years before. CHRONOLOGY 10 Nov., 1799. 15 Dec., “ 6 May, 1800. 14—20 “ “ 4 June, “ 14 “ “ 3 Dec., “ 9 Feb., 1801. 19th Brumaire. New Constitution proclaimed. Bonaparte leaves Paris for army. Crossing of the Alps. MassOia surrenders Genoa. Marengo. Hohenlinden. Peace of Lundville. NOTE Bibliographical: General. — See note page 11. For Brumaire see last chapter. For Marengo, Huffer, Quellen fur Geschuhte dcs Zeitalters . . . Leipzig, 1900, Vol. II.; De Cugnac, Campagnes de I'armee de reserve, Paris, 1901. CHAPTER VII LEGISLATION AND ADMINISTRATION The Consular Constitution — Bonaparte secures a Dictator¬ ship— Plebiscites—Legal Reform—Influence and Work of Bonaparte — The Napoleonic Bureaucracy — Religious Questions — Death of Washington — The Press — Royalist Overtures. I T will be better briefly to depart from a chronological order and to consider as a whole the institutions that owed their origin to Napoleon ; they came into existence for the most part shortly after his accession to power, and may be conveniently thought of as originating in the period 1800-1805. There are three chief questions to be considered in ; this respect: first, constitutional; second, legal and administrative ; third, religious. The new constitution of France, evolved from the revolution of Brumaire, had as its fundamental fact the personality of Bonaparte. For the sentiment that had made Brumaire possible, the sentiment represented by Sieyes and the moderate politicians, was that the exe¬ cutive power must be strengthened or the Re- 88 LEGISLATION, ADMINISTRATION 89 public would perish. But theories are not the business of a strong executive officer ; charac¬ ter, personality, and facts must be the predom¬ inant note, — and this was what France found in Bonaparte. The very first meeting of the new government showed clearly what had hap¬ pened. On the day following the overturning of the Council of Five Hundred, the three provisional Consuls assembled at the Luxem¬ bourg. Sieyes on entering the room asked the question: “Who is to preside?” But Bona¬ parte had already sat down at the head of the table, and Roger Ducos replied: “ Do you not see that the general presides ? ” The question was never raised again. The new constitution was prepared by the provisional Consuls working with a large com¬ mittee representing the faction of the Ancients and Five Hundred that had supported the new government. It was principally made up of men who, whatever they had been in the early republican days, were now in favour of modera¬ tion and a strong executive ; with many, if not with most, the fact that the new government might have occasion to utilize and to remuner¬ ate their talents had the greatest weight. The committee and Consuls now set to work to frame a new constitution. Their first care 9 o NAPOLEON was to create four great bodies: first, the Coun¬ cil of State whose functions were to advise the executive in the preparation of legislation; second, the Tribunate, which was to discuss all laws, but without voting on them ; third, the Legislative Body, which, by a converse process, was to vote on all laws but without discussing them ; fourth, the Senate, whose principal duty was to decide on constitutional questions raised by the Tribunate. This may be characterized in a few words, as the diffusion of the political forces of the country, and as the provision of a large number of salaried positions in which the men of the Revolution might be conveniently deposited. The really useful body of the four was the Council of State in which were placed all the workers with practical knowledge of questions of finance, law, or administration. But, however great the lassitude of France, it was impossible to put forward any constitu¬ tion that did not make some show of being based on democratic principles. It was there¬ fore provided that there should be elections ; but these were of a very indirect and illusory character. Their result was merely to place before the executive a list, arrived at by several progressive steps, from which members of the Senate were appointed; the senators in turn LEGISLATION, ADMINISTRATION 91 named the members of the Tribunate and Leg¬ islative Body. In practice this gave the head of the State a fairly effective control over all these bodies. The most thorny subject of discussion in the framing of the constitution was left for the last: what was to be the nature and extent of the executive power ? On this subject Sieyes had some ready-made theories to propose; but they were of an un¬ practical nature and were rapidly demolished by Bonaparte. This marked the point at which his influence gained a complete predominance and that of Sieyes began to sink. During the lengthy discussions that had taken place Bona¬ parte had shown that his was the master mind, and Sieyes soon after dropped out of the gov¬ ernment, receiving handsome compensation in emoluments and honours. It was finally de¬ cided that there should be a first, second, and third Consul, appointed for ten years; that these officials should have a general control over foreign affairs, the army, navy, and police; that Bonaparte should be First Consul, and should appoint the other two. Last of all came the question: what should be the powers of the consuls as between one another? Here really lay the knot of the new constitution, and most 92 NAPOLEON declined the attempt to untie it. One solution would give France a modified Directoire, the other a master. At this point, when all hesi¬ tated, Bonaparte’s prompt intervention proved decisive, and all bowed to his imperious will. He dictated a clause whereby no act of the executive was to be undertaken without the First Consul consulting his colleagues, but they were given no vote, all decisions resting solely with him. This clause made Bonaparte in effect a dictator, and among those who realized the fact were doubtless more than one who believed that this was, after all, the best thing for France and for themselves. Bonaparte appointed as his colleagues Cam- baceres, an eminent jurist, who as a member of the Convention had voted for the death of Louis XVI., and Lebrun, a conservative of great financial knowledge, respected for his integrity and moderation. Among the first ministers were men of all shades of opinion, notable among whom were Talleyrand-Peri- gord, ex-abbe and member of the Convention, a subtle intriguer and experienced diplomatist; Gaudin, a functionary in the department of finance, whose ability in that sphere was of the greatest; Fouche the ex-Terrorist, famous for the massacres of Lyons, always ready to sup- LEGISLATION, ADMINISTRATION 93 port whatever government might be in power, a master craftsman in every device and deceit of secret police work. As soon as the new constitution was formu¬ lated it was submitted to the popular acceptance by a plebiscite or referendum, the result of which was satisfactory to the government. The plebiscite has played a large part in French politics since that date, and it is as well to state that it is in a strict sense not a true test of the political opinion of a country when the ques¬ tion at issue is one involving a change of government. In such a case it is usual to frame the question submitted to the people in such a form that a negative vote implies a desire for turning out the government de facto. It is self evident that the citizens must always be few whose disapproval of such a government will carry them to the point of recording a vote which, if successful, could only mean revolution or civil war. So much for the constitution evolved from the revolution of Brumaire. Let us now con¬ sider the great legal and administrative work undertaken by the newly made First Consul. Napoleon has been called the new, or the modern Justinian; he was, in fact, a great codi- * fier of the law. Like his Roman predecessor 94 NAPOLEON he intrusted to his ablest jurist the care of reducing the chaos of French laws to order. The upheaval and confusion caused by the Revolution facilitated the task of Cambaceres and his assistants. The ordonnances of Louis XIV., the subsequent laws of the Monarchy, the mass of legislative enactments of the Re¬ public, were recast in one piece and fitted into a somewhat theoretical framework derived from the principles of the Roman law. Bonaparte’s technical knowledge did not fit him to take a very active part in these labours, yet the credit for the framing of the Code Napoleon is prop¬ erly his, for it was his unceasing stimulation that got the work done. He would occasion¬ ally keep his Councillors of State working all through the night till dawn, he would decide the points on which the jurists disagreed, and even the most narrow specialist rarely left the council board without feeling that the marvel¬ lous pressure and power of elucidation of the great intellect that had presided had deepened his own knowledge of his particular subject. The Council of State was eminently a body for work, and its master drove it as hard as he did himself. The civil code, afterwards called Code Napo¬ leon , was published in 1804; it was followed LEGISLATION, ADMINISTRATION 95 by commercial and criminal codes, but it does not come within the scope of this book to attempt a description of their provisions. It will suffice to say that the legal system of Napoleon forms at the present day the basis • of much of the legislation of the world; its influence is strong from Prussia to Sicily, from St. Petersburg to Madrid, and even in such distant parts of the globe as Java, South Africa, and Louisiana. If it is possible to give an im¬ pression of the Code Napoleon in a few words, one might describe it as representing the mass of the laws and customs of old P"ranee, purged by the Revolution and poured by the genius of Napoleon into a Latin mould, paternal, authori- tive, clear, but inelastic. The Code was akin in spirit to the adminis¬ trative fabric that was erected alongside of it. The State was converted into one great bureau¬ cratic machine; every phase of the life of each citizen was classified, supervised, and directed. What the French people want, declared Bona¬ parte, is equality, not liberty; and his system was accordingly framed to provide all with equal justice, equal privileges, equal opportunity of advancement. But if the State was prepared to grant justice and preferment, it also took care to secure the services of all the intellect of NAPOLEON 96 the country and to repress all attempts at individual action. Even education and religion O were brigaded and administered in military fashion. Membres de l'Institute illustrious sa¬ vants or artists, — Cuvier, Laplace, or David, — were officials salaried, uniformed, and supervised by the State. France had been divided into departments by the Republic; each of these divisions had as chief administrator a prefect, depending on the Minister of the Interior. The principal duties of this functionary were to administer matters of revenue and police. Under him came the mayors of townships, and lower still came sub¬ ordinate officials, all under the control of the government, down to the game-keepers or sell¬ ers of tobacco and salt. The administrative or bureaucratic machine was powerfully supported by an extensive system of secret police. The ramifications of this department were so exten¬ sive that Fouche is reported actually to have secured reports from Josephine herself as to the daily doings of the household of the First Consul. With such a system there was a chance for every citizen, provided only he would accept the political situation and support the govern¬ ment; but it was entirely a downwards system, LEGISLATION, ADMINISTRATION 97 proceeding from the governor, not from the governed, and in no wise resembling free in¬ stitutions. Feudalism and privileges had been swept away by the Revolution, but personal government had been reinstated by Bonaparte, — and personal government of a far more efficient and stable form than that of the Bourbons, because wonderfully adapted to the practical requirements of a European nation in the nineteenth century. Bonaparte had created what was the most powerful and effective in¬ strument for governing a country and for cen¬ tralizing and directing its strength yet seen in Europe; none could fail to see the good points of his system. The opponents of France after suffering from the effects of the machine Napo¬ leon had constructed, copied it; and now bu¬ reaucratic government with a greater or less admixture of democratic tendencies or appear¬ ances, with an executive directing power strong in some countries, weak in others, is the one form to be met with in every part of the continent of Europe. But what else could be expected from Napoleon ? The revolution of Brumaire was not the work of a man whose first thought was the good of his country, and the two great currents of sentiment that brought it about were nothing better than 7 NAPOLEON 98 self-preservation on the part of the Sieyes fac¬ tion and ambition on that of Bonaparte. The religious question yet remains to be dealt with. In this as in all things Bonaparte took a purely practical point of view. He con¬ sidered Christianity, with Mohammedanism and all other religions, respectable and useful. For many years he had apparently no religious be¬ lief, but during boyhood and towards the close of his life he observed the forms of the Catholic faith. Whatever his inmost belief, as a states¬ man his attitude towards Rome may be said to have been purely political. During the cam¬ paign of Italy, in 1796-97, the Directoire had repeatedly pressed him to action against Rome, but he had shown enough reluctance in carry¬ ing out these orders to make clear to the astute Papal diplomatists that the young Republican general might one day be their friend. No sooner was he in power than he issued orders for removing the trammels placed on the Catholic worship. The ringing of the church bells throughout France a few days after the 18th of Brumaire created a religious ferment that astonished the government and the coun¬ try, but that did no harm to the First Consul’s popularity. He recognised even more clearly than before the deep attachment of the people LEGISLATION, ADMINISTRATION 99 to their religion and determined to go further. Notwithstanding the murmurs of the army, in which atheism had been promoted to the rank of a creed, negotiations were opened with Rome, and in 1801 a treaty was signed re¬ establishing C atholici sm in a privileged posi¬ tion. By the Concordat, as this treaty is known, Bonaparte obtained control of the nomination and salaries of all high ecclesiasti¬ cal dignitaries, thus securing over them a hold nearly equal to that which he had over his civil and military functionaries. A solemn service held to celebrate this event at Notre Dame led to unseemly scenes in which some of the generals, among them Lannes and Augereau, gave full vent to their disapproba¬ tion of the course taken by the First Consul. The feelings of the staunch republicans were further ruffled by the introduction of prayers for the head of the State. Bonaparte was clear-sighted in his religious policy, and took this great step forward with calm decision. Like every other act of the consulate, it turned partly on considerations relating to the strengthening of his personal authority. In the early days, however, when his supporters were still republican soldiers or republican politicians and not yet Bonapartists, IOO NAPOLEON it was impossible for him to profess any but republican opinions and intentions. A few weeks after his accession to power a very sol¬ emn farce was played on the occasion of the death of George Washington (December 14, 1799). A funeral ceremony was held in honour of the American patriot, and the speeches delivered on that occasion more than inferred that France could now gaze on a Washington of her own. Yet when we are inclined to view with amused indignation the obvious fraud and hollowness of such professions, ought we not to marvel equally at the fact that the politicians of America have generally shown more respect for the methods and aims of Bonaparte than they have for the lofty states¬ manship and patriotism of Washington. i Acting on the principle he had constantly invoked since his return from Egypt, Bonaparte once in power, stopped the excessive political persecution that had so long been thought necessary. Many political prisoners were speedily released, and France was thrown open to thousands of exiles. While with one hand he thus acted with great apparent liberality, with the other he skilfully seized and muzzled the press, which he retained completely in his power during the next fourteen years. To LEGISLATION, ADMINISTRATION ioi what extent this control was carried may be judged by the fact that the Aloniteur never at any time made the slightest reference to the greatest naval battle of modern times, one in which France was not successful, that of Trafalgar! The new government was a success from the first, and after Marengo its popularity was immense. Every month the position of France seemed to improve visibly, and Bonaparte soon thought he might advance a step towards the throne. The Comte de Provence, elder of the surviving brothers of Louis XVI., approached him with a view to a Bourbon restoration. This overture Bonaparte politely declined, and shortly afterwards a pamphlet appeared entitled: “ Parallel between Cromwell , Caesar , Monk , and Bonaparte ,” in which the imperial ambitions of the First Consul were clearly revealed. The impression produced was not favourable. France was not yet ready, and both the ardent republicans and the ardent royalists realized that Bonaparte was their most dangerous enemy and prepared to destroy him. 102 NAPOLEON NOTE Bibliographical : General. — See page 11. For preceding chapter, Taine’s Origines de la France contcinporaine is the capital work, though the twisting of the argument to lit the writer’s negative thesis must be guarded against; see also Monnet, Histoire de l'administration, Paris, 1885 ; Perouse, Napoleon 1 er et les lois Civiles, Paris, 1866 ; D’Haussonville, L'Eglise romaine et le premier Empire, Paris, 1870; Debidour, L'Eglise et /’Etat en France, Paris, 1898 ; Welschinger, La censure sous le premier Empire, Paris, 1882 ; Nervo, Finances franqaises, Paris, 1863. Among Memoirs those of Pasquier, Gaudin, Thibaudeau, Mollien, and Bourrienne may be consulted. Fournier (see page n) has a good study of Napoleonic legislation ; Fisher, Napoleonic Statesmanship, Germany, Oxford, 1903, may be consulted for the applica¬ tion of the system in Germany. CHAPTER VIII THE DUC D’ENGHIEN AND TRAFALGAR Conspiracies — The Bonaparte family — Moreau — Imperial Aspirations — The Due d’Enghien — Proclamation of the Empire — War with England — The Trafalgar Campaign. A LONGSIDE of the extraordinary build- ing up of the Napoleonic legislative and ■*“ administrative edifice, the consulate was one long and secret struggle against the agitation and plots of the ultra-Jacobins on the one hand and of the ultra-Royalists on the other. Not long after Marengo a desperate attempt on the First Consul’s life was made. A barrel of gunpowder was loaded on a hand¬ cart that was placed in a convenient position at a spot in the rue Ste. Nicaise by which the First Consul’s carriage must be driven on its way to the opera. That night Bonaparte was unpunctual, and the coachman, who is said to have been intoxicated, lashed his horses furi¬ ously through the intricate network of streets at the back of the Tuileries to make up for the lost time. The explosion took place just an 103 104 NAPOLEON instant too late, and though many lives were lost and much damage was done, the First Con¬ sul went unscathed. At the opera there was a scene of the greatest excitement during which only two persons maintained a calm and dig¬ nified exterior, Napoleon and his sister Caroline. The personal friends of the First Consul, such men as Duroc and Junot, were quite unnerved, Hortense Beauharnais was crying, Josephine was hysterical, the spectators were eagerly demonstrating their joy at the escape of the head of the State, and Caroline alone with her brother sat in the front of the box watching: the scene with a cool gaze. Of all Napoleon’s brothers and sisters she probably resembled him most in uniting passionate ambition to cool calculation and boundless courage. Of the brothers the strongest in character was Lucien, whose decisive action on the 18th and 19th of Brumaire has already been noted. Con¬ spicuous during the early days of the Consulate, he soon quarrelled with his powerful brother on a matrimonial question and eventually sepa¬ rated himself from him and lost all political influence. The eldest, Joseph, was the most subservient and useful. Stronger in intellect than in character, he was always conspicuous as a subordinate, and was eventually rewarded DUC D’ENGHIEN &? TRAFALGAR 105 with two insecure thrones. Louis, a man of intelligence but uncertain disposition, married Napoleon’s step-daughter Hortense, who in¬ herited much of her mother’s charm and tem¬ perament. What with matrimonial difficulties with Hortense and political ones with Napoleon, Louis found his career not an easy one. He was never an important figure, but a son of Hortense was destined to restore the Empire as Napoleon III. The youngest of the brothers, Jerome, was the least weighty, though even he was to become a king; his grandson, Prince Napoleon Victor, is at the present day the Bonapartist Pretender. Thus of the five sons of Charles Bonaparte one was to be an emperor and three, kings; his daughters rose almost equally high. Elisa married a Corsican who was later created Prince Baciocchi and was given an Italian principality; Pauline, the most beautiful member of a striking family, married first, General Leclerc, and after his death in the expedition of San Domingo, Prince Bor- ghese. Caroline, the youngest, married Joachim Murat, and eventually became Queen of Naples; her ambition finally drove her to betray her brother in his greatest hour of need. Jose¬ phine’s son, Eugene, is the only member of the First Consul’s family not yet mentioned. io6 NAPOLEON At the commencement of the consulate he was a mere boy; before the end of the Empire he had made his mark and shown such qualities, political and military, that it will be no exagger¬ ation to say that it would have proved fortu¬ nate for France had the imperial throne come to him as a consequence of the fall of his step-father. But this enumeration of the Bonapartes and Beauharnais is a digression; it is now.necessary to return to the struggle of the consular gov¬ ernment for existence. Plot succeeded plot; the enemies of Bonaparte became more and more desperate as each month increased his power and brought him nearer to what was now his undisguised goal, the throne. The crisis culminated in the early weeks of 1804 when a number of sensational arrests startled Paris. Several Royalist conspirators, with the secret assistance of the British government, had made their way into the capital with the intention of making some attempt against the First Consul. They were mostly men of desperate fortunes who had taken part in the insurrectionary movements in Vendee and Brittany; their leaders were Cadoudal and the ex-republican general Pichegr-tr. Cadoudal was only taken after a fierce resistance; Pichegru DUC D’ENGHIEN fc? TRAFALGAR 107 was found strangled in his prison shortly after his capture. But the most important and sensational arrest of all was that of Gen¬ eral Moreau, who appears to have had no real connection with the conspiracy. Moreau, the victor of Hohenlinden, was as beloved by the army of Germany as Bonaparte was by the army of Italy. Moreau, the staunch repub¬ lican, was the hope of many who saw in Bona¬ parte the coming Caesar. Moreau, who had always retreated from politics, might be used to pull down a fellow general who had for¬ gotten his soldier’s duty. He was accused of complicity in the royalist plot, arrested and tried. Although nothing substantial could be proved against him, he was driven into exile and left France for America. Cadoudal was less fortunate and he, together with several of his accomplices, was sentenced to death. But the matter did not end here. The extremely dangerous conspiracy of Ca¬ doudal, followfrrg- as it had many others, and coinciding with the moment at which Bona- parte had at last decided to seize the crown, appears to have thrown him into a state of nervous excitement. Was he to reach the object of his ambition or were his enemies to pull him down at the last moment? He seems 108 NAPOLEON to have thought, and Macchiavelli would have approved, that under such circumstances he could keep his enemies down only by a stroke of terror. He aimed a blow at the repub¬ licans by arresting Moreau, he dealt one to the Bourbons by virtually assassinating the Due d’Enghien. This young prince of the Conde branch of the House of Bourbon was near the French frontier staying in a country house in the duchy of Baden. He had held a command in the army with which the French emigres had fought the Republic, and his presence on the border was held to signify that on the success of Cadoudal he was to enter France and take command of the royalist movement. On the 15th of March a party of gendarmes commanded by Savary, a confidential agent of Bonaparte, violated the frontier of Baden, and taking the duke from his bed placed him in a carriage and hurried him to Paris. He arrived there on the night of the 19th, was conveyed to the fort of Vincennes, tried by a subservient court- martial in the course of the same night, sen¬ tenced to death on no evidence, and shot at dawn. This crime, the most obvious blot on Napoleon’s name, produced a wave of indigna¬ tion that swept all Europe including France. / DUC D’ENGHIEN fc? TRAFALGAR 109 Not one of the First Consul’s supporters ap¬ proved the act, most of them regretted or re¬ pudiated it. Chateaubriand resigned from the diplomatic service; Talleyrand sententiously declared that the execution of the Due d’En- ghien was worse than a crime, it was a blunder. Yet as a stroke of terror, however unsuited to the political conditions of the nineteenth century, it was not altogether unsuccessful. From that time on France acknowledged her master without question, and the stain of blood of the 20th of March 1804, did not prevent the proclamation of the Empire on the 18th of May following. In 1802 a plebiscite had converted Bona¬ parte’s consulate for ten years into a consulate for life. In 1804 there was little more to do than to make the dignity hereditary and to change its title. That of king would not have been tolerated by France; even that of em¬ peror, which Bonaparte chose, was associated with the continuance of France as a Republic, and for many months after the proclamation of the Emperor Napoleon, France still retained the political style she had assumed on the 1st of Vendemiaire of the year 1, the 22d of Sep¬ tember 1792. The coronation of the new Emperor took place at the Cathedral of Notre I IO NAPOLEON Dame on the 2d of December following his proclamation. The ceremony was invested with the greatest pomp, and the Pope was per¬ suaded into travelling to Paris to perform it. It was many years since the annals of the Papacy had registered a similar event, and in the minds of all people of the Latin race it gave the new monarch a consecration that placed him on a not much lower level than that of the proudest Houses of Europe whose power reposed on the basis of divine right. In the following May (1805) Napoleon proceeded to Milan, the capital of what had hitherto been known as the Cisalpine Republic. There he proclaimed the kingdom of Italy, an ambitious and suggestive name for such a small State as Lombardy and her dependencies; he crowned himself with the Iron Crown of the Lombards, and announced that the viceroyalty would be entrusted to Prince Eugene, who would be his heir to the Italian throne. During these cere¬ monies the republic of Genoa sent a deputa¬ tion asking for incorporation with France. This was, of course, an instigated act; it gave more obvious proof than any previous one that am¬ bitious aggressiveness might be expected as the keynote of the policy of the Emperor Napoleon; it offended Austria’s pride and before long drew DUC D’ENGHIEN & TRAFALGAR hi that Power into a new contest with France, the third since the days of the Republic. We must now re-enter the atmosphere of war that constitutes the background of Napo¬ leon’s career. In 1805 began the first of the three great cycles of the wars of the Empire. But to understand the events of the continental war of 1805 we must first take up the relations of France and England at the point at which we left them. Austria signed peace with France at Lune- ville after Marengo, in 1801, leaving Great Britain alone at war. That Power having driven the remains of Bonaparte’s army from Egypt, and having also captured Malta, now entered into negotiation. Peace was eventually concluded at Amiens on the 27th of March 1802. The negotiations were difficult, but tMfe only essential question was really that of the Mediterranean and Malta. Great Britain finally agreed to withdraw from the island in favour of some neutral Power. But the position of Malta, midway between the western and eastern ex¬ tremities of the Mediterranean, and the now unveiled ambition of Bonaparte to acquire a colonial empire, and to resume sooner or later his movement towards the east, made the British cabinet defer evacuation. French 1 11 NAPOLEON troops occupied part of the kingdom of Naples with the port of Taranto, and the French gov¬ ernment declined to remove them so lonsf as the British remained at Malta. The peace be¬ tween the two countries was in fact little more than a truce, as was well shown by a medal struck by Denon in which Bonaparte’s head is covered with a helmet and surmounted by the threatening legend : Armepour la paix ,— armed for peace. After much diplomatic dis¬ putation, during which the First Consul was strengthening his hold on Italy and Switzer¬ land and preparing plans for trans-oceanic ex¬ tension, Great Britain broke off negotiations on the question of Malta, and withdrew her ambassador from Paris on the 12th of May 1803. This renewal of hostilities between France and Great Britain made Bonaparte adjourn his colonial ambitions; it influenced among other things his relations with America. The ag¬ gressive policy of the Directoire had led to a rupture between France and the United States in 1798; this had been patched up by Bona¬ parte in 1801. But a little later he set his eyes on Louisiana and would have probably attempted its occupation with the assent of its Spanish owners in the face of clearly expressed DUC D’ENGHIEN &? TRAFALGAR 113 American opposition, had not the inevitable¬ ness of war with England led him to reconsider his decision. The people of the United States viewed the transfer of Louisiana from Spain to France with the utmost dislike. It would have given France the western bank of the Missis¬ sippi from the Gulf to the Canadian lakes, bar¬ ring all possibility of expansion to the west. So it proved fortunate for the good relations of France and the United States that the former now plunged into war with Great Britain once more. By so doing she lost all power of action beyond the seas and was better prepared to abandon her new colonial scheme. A rapid negotiation resulted in the transfer of Louisiana to the United States for a sum of sixty mil¬ lion francs ($1 1,250,ooo). 1 In 1803 the position of Bonaparte in regard to a war with Great Britain was very different from what it had been in 1798. Then the re¬ sources of France were limited, the ambition of the young general urged him to hazardous courses; now the resources of the country were vastly increased, and the First Consul was no longer ready to leave France and seek for glory 1 Louisiana included not only what is now the State of that name, but the whole of the western half of the basin of the Mississippi. 8 NAPOLEON 114 at the further end of the Mediterranean. For every reason the opposite mode of attack to that of 1798 was chosen, and Bonaparte decided on the invasion of _ England. This great naval and military operation could not be carried out at a moment’s notice, but necessitated prepara¬ tions spreading over many months. From Dieppe to Antwerp the coast was armed with batteries covering numerous camps in which troops began to accumulate. Every port, great and small, was fortified, improved, and filled with pontoons and gunboats. Hundreds of gun vessels and numerous light cruisers were collected to engage the British ships that scoured the Channel. But it was useless to venture troops in light transports to cross the Channel while the British fleet held command of the sea; nor did Napoleon seriously contemplate doing so. He planned a gigantic naval campaign that was to give him control of the Channel. His plan changed in details almost from day to day, but in broad outline, as it came nearest execution, it was as follows. There were at that time several French squadrons of which the two largest were stationed at Brest and Toulon. Between these two ports, following the coastline of France DUG D’ENGHIEN fc? TRAFALGAR 115 and of Spain her ally, were several others, such as Rochefort, Ferrol, Cadiz, and Cartagena, where smaller divisions were stationed. But the Brest fleet was closely blockaded by Lord Cornwallis, and that at Toulon was watched by Lord Nelson. At every point, as the fleets were distributed, the British were practically assured of success. To neutralize this advan¬ tage, to delude the British admirals, to con¬ centrate the greatest possible force on the decisive point, Napoleon worked out a scheme of which we will now follow the unfolding. Admiral Villeneuve, commanding the Toulon fleet, in obedience to instructions, took advan¬ tage of a favouring slant of wind to make his escape from that port in the spring of 1805. He sailed through the Strait of Gibraltar, and thence nearly due west. Nelson was quickly on his track and followed out into the Atlantic. The British admiral soon learned that his adversary was sailing west, and concluding that his business was in the West Indian Islands, determined to cross the Atlantic in pursuit. But Villeneuve’s real objective was not the West Indies; his long journey of three thou¬ sand miles was only intended to deceive and distract the eye from the real point of danger. Had Nelson’s instinct been as keen as Napo- NAPOLEON 116 leon’s plan was large, he would have sailed from Gibraltar not for the West Indies, but for the mouth of the Channel, for there was the vital point. As it was he sailed west, and having reached the West Indies discovered that Villeneuve, after a stay of a few days only, had put to sea again, this time steering east. Once more Nelson pursued, but once more he failed to see the bearing of Villeneuve’s extraor¬ dinary movement and did not shape his course for the Channel, but sailed back towards the Mediterranean. The intention of Napoleon was that the fleet should make land at Ferrol, free the small squadron there, and thence sail to Rochefort and Brest. At that point he hoped that the superiority of his combined fleets would enable them to owerpower Cornwallis and sweep up the Channel. It would have taken a stronger man than Villeneuve to carry out this great plan successfully. He fought an indecisive action with a smaller English fleet under Calder off Ferrol, on the 22d of July, and then decided he could not reach Brest, eventually retiring to Cadiz. Other events had meanwhile put an end to Napoleon’s project of an invasion of England, but before relating those events, the fate of Villeneuve’s fleet must be briefly told. The l DUC D’ENGHIEN £sf TRAFALGAR 117 Emperor was indignant at what he considered his admiral’s pusillanimity. Villeneuve, to fore¬ stall his removal from command, determined to take his fleet out of Cadiz and fight at any cost. On the 21st of October 1805, he met Nelson off Cape Trafalgar, and was utterly defeated by the superior skill of his opponent. The Franco-Spanish fleet was nearly entirely destroyed, but England’s greatest admiral paid for victory with his life. CHRONOLOGY Sept., 1800. British capture Malta. Aug., 1801. British capture Egypt. 1 Oct., U Peace preliminaries, France and Great Britain. Jan., 1802. Bonaparte President of Cisalpine Re¬ public. 27 May, (( Treaty of Amiens. 1 Aug., u Bonaparte consul for life. 12 May, 1803. Renewal of war with England. 20 March, 1804. Due d’Enghien shot. 18 May, (< Proclamation of Empire. 2 Dec., (C Coronation of Napoleon. 21 Oct., 1805. Trafalgar. NOTE Bibliographical : General. — See page 11. For the expedition to San Domingo see H. Adams, Historical Essays, New York, 1891. For relations of 118 NAPOLEON France and Great Britain see Browning, England and Napoleon in 1803, London, 1887 ; Desbri^re, Projets et tentatives de debarquement, Paris, 1902 ; Jurien de la Graviere, Guerres maritimes, Paris, 1864; Mahan, In¬ fluence of Sea Power, London, 1892 ; for conspiracies against Napoleon, see Guillon, Complots Militaires, Paris, 1894; on the last subject and on the intrigues and life of the consular court in general the following memoirs may also be consulted: Bourrienne, Duchesse d’Abrantes, Le Normand; also several works by Tlrquan, though these are not altogether recommendable. The CEuvrcs of Roederer and Correspondence of Joseph Bonaparte are of the highest importance but too voluminous for the ordinary reader. Rose is of special value on the relations between France and England. See also Broadley and Wheeler, The Invasion of England, London, 1908 (contemporary illustrations) ; Coquelle, Napoleon et VAngleterre, Paris, 1905. CHAPTER IX AUSTERLITZ Ulm — A Proclamation of Napoleon —- Occupation of Vienna — Austerlitz—Peace of Pressburg. T HE threat of invasion had created the most profound alarm in England, and British diplomacy had exerted itself to the utmost to provoke a continental war that should draw Napoleon’s great army away from its camps on the coasts of the Channel. In this it was successful, for in the autumn of 1805, Austria and Russia, having previously entered into a treaty with Great Britain, began moving their armies towards the French fron¬ tiers. War had long been foreseen. The grow¬ ing strength of France, the brutally asserted ambition of the new made Emperor, the losses and humiliations suffered by Austria in two previous wars, all tended to bring about this re¬ sult. Napoleon had long been preparing for it. He abandoned without hesitation his camps along the ocean and began transferring the army thence to the heart of Germany. The 120 NAPOLEON march began on the 27th of August; it was of some five hundred miles ; on the 14th of Octo¬ ber Munich, the capital of Bavaria, was occu¬ pied ; a week later the first Austrian army had been virtually destroyed. General Mack, the Austrian commander, had invaded Bavaria in September and thence ad¬ vanced towards the Rhine, eventually occupy¬ ing a position at Ulm facing the Black Forest. He expected that the French would advance from some point between Basle and Mayence and appear in this direction. Napoleon did everything possible to lull Mack into security. He proceeded in person to Paris, handed over the command of the army to Murat, and osten¬ tatiously sent him to Strasbourg. He moved large detachments of dragoons and light cavalry into the duchy of Baden and into the Black Forest, simulating a screen behind which the army was concentrating. Later, when it be¬ came necessary for him to leave for the front, public attention was again called to Strasbourg by the imperial baggage taking this route and by the Emperor’s also following it. While these demonstrations were keeping Mack motionless at Ulm anxiously watching the debouches of the Black Forest, the seven French army corps, starting from a base that stretched from Bou- AUSTERLITZ I 2 I logne to Hanover, were sweeping to the north¬ west of Mack through Mayence, Coblentz, and Cassel, circling around his right wing, and finally sweeping down from the north on to the valley of the Danube in his rear. It was a repetition of the strategy of Marengo, and the Austrians were half beaten before a shot was fired. The fighting that followed was desultory. Isolated Austrian divisions tried to force their way through and escape, but were in nearly every case overpowered, defeated, or captured. Mack himself, with twenty thousand men, sur¬ rendered at Ulm on the 20th of October. The events of the campaign were summed up with some exaggeration in one of Napoleon’s bul¬ letins. It will serve to illustrate his history and character to give the text of one of these documents; the one that follows is that which records the downfall of Mack. Soldiers of the Grande Armtfe : In fifteen days we have finished a campaign. Our intentions have been carried out: we have driven the troops of the House of Austria from Bavaria and re¬ established our ally on his throne. This army, that had so ostentatiously and impru¬ dently placed itself on our borders, is now destroyed. But what cares England for that! Her object is 122 NAPOLEON gained: we are no longer at Boulogne and her sub¬ sidies will be neither diminished nor increased. Of the hundred thousand men who made up this army, sixty thousand are prisoners: they will fill the places of our conscripts in the labours of the field. Two hundred guns, the whole train, ninety colours, all their generals are ours. Only fifteen thousand men have escaped. Soldiers! I had prepared you for a great battle; but, thanks to the bad manoeuvres of the enemy, I have reached equal results without taking any risk; and, — unprecedented event in the history of nations, — this result has been gained at an expense of less than fif¬ teen hundred men out of action. Soldiers! this success is due to your unlimited confidence in your Emperor, to your patience in sup¬ porting all kinds of fatigue and privations, to your splendid valour. But we cannot rest yet. You are impatient for a second campaign. The Russian army, drawn by the gold of England from the furthest limits of the earth, must suffer the same fate. In this contest the honour of the French infantry is more especially at stake; for the second time the question must be decided, as already once before in Switzerland and in Holland, whether the French in¬ fantry is the first or the second in Europe. Among them are no generals from whom I have any glory to win. My whole anxiety shall be to ob¬ tain the victory with the least effusion of blood pos¬ sible: my soldiers are my children. Napoleon. AUSTERLITZ 123 Whatever may be thought of Napoleon’s rhetoric by the reader, there is one point that must be kept steadily in mind: that it produced the results he expected. It was designed to inspire the morale of his troops, and it suc¬ ceeded in doing so. All ranks were full of confidence in the genius of their great captain, and the large proportion of veterans from the wars of the Republic steadied the dash of the troops with a leaven of solidity and skilled leadership. The victorious army with which Napoleon now found himself in Bavaria has been generally conceded to have been the finest he ever commanded. He now had the following military problem to face. Some one hundred and fifty miles or more due east, down the valley of the Danube, lay Vienna. Between him and the capital, and to the northeast in Bohemia, were various Austrian and Russian corps, large in the aggregate but not yet concentrated. To the southeast the Archduke Charles was re¬ tiring towards the Austrian capital from Italy, followed by Marshal Massena with a large army. A less bold general than Napoleon would probably have given his enemies enough time to concentrate in front of Vienna, but the Emperor waited not one day and urged 124 NAPOLEON his columns rapidly down the valley of the Danube. There was no serious resistance offered, and on the 31st of October the French cavalry under Murat reached the Austrian capital. Only eleven days had passed since the capitulation of Ulm three hundred miles away. 1 From Vienna the French marched northwards towards Moravia,where the Emperor Francis and the Czar Alexander had now as¬ sembled a large army. Napoleon hoped for a decisive battle, and his opponents gratified his desire by advancing to meet him. The position of Napoleon, in spite of his great success at Ulm, was in reality very criti¬ cal. The internal affairs of France were dis¬ quieting chiefly owing to a grave financial crisis, but what was perhaps more important, the military situation was far from sound. The French army was now four hundred miles or more from its base and much weakened by detachments. The line of communications ran through southern Germany, of which the States professed amicable sentiments; but to the north Prussia was avowedly on .the point of declaring war and had concentrated a large army under Marshal Mollendorf. It was evi- 1 A large part of the French army was at Munich and be¬ yond when Ulm capitulated. Austerlitz AUSTERLITZ I2 5 dently the policy of Russia and Austria to keep Napoleon’s army employed in Moravia without cominq- to battle until the action of Prussia could take effect on his line of com¬ munications. But the impetuosity of the young Czar and of his advisers threw counsels of prudence to the winds and led him into the very course Napoleon hoped he would adopt. For several days the Emperor slowly retired before the advancing allies, having selected a position near Austerlitz from which he ex¬ pected to derive great advantage. The French army took station there on the night of the ist of December, Kutusofif with the two allied Emperors disposing his troops on the rising ground opposite. Napoleon’s left was solidly established on a hill named the Santon that had been well intrenched. His centre was strongly placed on ground that was not likely to tempt the enemy to a decisive attack; but the right was far otherwise situated. It was drawn up on flat and unfavourable ground and appeared to the Russians weak in numbers and exposed. The command of this wing was given to the dogged Davoust, whose orders were to hold on to his position as long as possible, while at another point the Emperor was deciding the fortune of the day. Davoust’s 1 26 NAPOLEON wing was in reality far better placed than it appeared to be, and he had strong defensive positions on which to fall back protected by water and swampy ground. Having thus placed his right wing as a bait to the enemy, Napoleon crowded the corps of Soult, of Berna- dotte, of Oudinot, and the Imperial Guard out of sight behind some buildings and rising: ground in his centre; with these troops he proposed dealing the decisive stroke. Kutusoff arrived in front of the French position on the 1st of December. He had an army of some eighty-five thousand men and estimated his enemy at about fifty thousand; in this he was wrong, for Napoleon had brought in several detachments by forced marches and had raised his numbers to about sixty-five thou¬ sand. The Russian general-in-chief decided to attack the weak French wing and thus to possess himself of the road to Vienna that lay behind it; he made his intention clear on the afternoon before the battle by moving troops from the strong plateau of Pratzen in his cen¬ tre down towards the hollow occupied by Davoust. From the moment Napoleon ob¬ served these movements he looked on the coming battle as already won. On the night before the battle occurred an AUSTERLITZ 127 incident that shows with what feelings the first army of the Empire viewed its leader. Napoleon proceeded on foot to visit the out¬ posts and observe the enemy. His short figure, grey coat, and little cocked hat, were recognised by some grenadiers, who raised shouts of Vive 1 'Empereur! reminding him that the 2d of December was the anniversary of the coronation. From man to man the enthusiasm spread, and soon all the long lines of the bivouac were up and an improvised illumination of twisted straw whisps burst out; it astonished the Russian camps as much as it gratified the heart of Napoleon. At the earliest dawn the two armies were in their positions for battle, and just as the first shots were fired the sun burst through the heavy winter mist. Soon the two lines were engaged, the Austro-Russians pressing hotly on the French right. Davoust disputed the ground fiercely, but was slowly forced back, a great part of the enemy descending from the heights at Pratzen and extending into the low land out beyond the French centre. At last Napoleon gave the signal, staff officers dashed off in every direction, and from behind the ridge that concealed them the dense columns of Bernadotte and Soult marched forward on 128 NAPOLEON the Russian centre and climbed the heights; Oudinot with the grenadiers and part of the Imperial Guard followed in support. Kutusoff was unprepared for such an attack, his centre was strong by nature but was now denuded of troops, and the Pratzen was soon in the hands of the French. To regain this position was essential, for, with Napoleon there, the allies were completely cut in two. The only avail¬ able reserve was the Russian Imperial Guard, and this was sent in. Fierce fighting followed, but the French were not to be dislodged, and the severed right of Kutusoff rolled back de- feated. In the meanwhile Davoust was still hotly engaged with the other wing, but help was coming. From the heights of Pratzen long lines of French guns were now playing on the rear of the Russian left, while Davoust still kept up the fight in front. Thus cut off and surrounded there was nothing left but retreat. The flat ground, cut with streams and ponds, was bad for this purpose, and many of the fugitives who attempted to cross the frozen lake of Sastchan broke through the ice. Probably several thousand were thus drowned. 1 The battle cost the allies a loss of thirty-five thousand men and two hundred guns, while the 1 Recent investigation shows that this was not so. AUSTERLITZ 129 French reserves were not even brought into action and their loss was probably not more than five thousand men. Two days later the Em¬ peror Francis met Napoleon at the outposts, and agreed to an armistice as a preliminary of peace. CHRONOLOGY 27 Aug., 1805. 14 Oct., “ 20 u (i 3 1 “ “ 2 Dec., “ 26 “ “ Gra?ute Armcc leaves Channel camps. Munich occupied. Surrender of Mack at Ulm. Vienna occupied. Austerlitz. Peace of Pressburg. NOTE Bibliographical : General. — See page 11. In the foregoing and the succeeding chapter the military operations of Napoleon are taken consecutively from Ulm to Friedland. Political matters are left over for general consideration with the treaty of Tilsit. For Ulm and Austerlitz, see Schonhals, Der Krieg, '05, Vienna, 1874; Stutterheim, Bataille d'Austerlitz, Hamburg, 1805 (and numerous other editions). 9 CHAPTER X JENA AND FRIEDLAND War with Prussia — Jena — Murat’s March to Lubeck — Eylau — Friedland. O present a clear impression it will be better to follow the first great cycle of wars to its conclusion, postponing till its termination a consideration of the political events and changes that accompanied it. A peace between France and Austria quickly followed Austerlitz, and after the treaty, signed at Pressburg on the 26th of December, the French troops gradually evacuated Austrian territory. But instead of being brought back to the English Channel the corps of the Grande Armee remained for the most part quartered in the South German States that were on friendly terms with Napoleon. The reason of this was that the downfall of Austria had settled nothing; Russia was still threatening; war with Prussia had long appeared probable. Hanover, which Napoleon had seized immediately after his rupture with England, was dangled as a bait be¬ fore King Frederick William’s eyes, while the JENA AND FRIEDLAND 131 Emperor pressed on him an anti-British commer¬ cial policy. Diplomatic bickering proceeded through the summer of 1806, and on the 1st of October the Prussian Ambassador at Paris presented a series of demands, including one for the withdrawal of the French troops from southern Germany, that brought matters to a crisis. The demands of Prussia were rejected by Napoleon, who was already in the midst of his troops. Once more, as at Ulm, the Emperor repeated the strategic manoeuvre of Marengo. To under¬ stand what took place a glance at the map is necessary. From the French frontier to the capital of Prussia ran perhaps the most impor¬ tant road in all Germany, one that was to figure conspicuously in the history of Napoleon; it led northeast from Mayence on the Rhine, through Erfurt and Leipzig to Berlin. Mid¬ way between the two latter places it crossed at right angles the river Elbe, which was de¬ fended by several large fortresses. This road described what was practically a straight line between Paris and Berlin and appeared to be the necessary scene of the campaign now about to open. But the Prussian generals had not yet learned the methods of Napoleon. Their army, of 132 NAPOLEON which the highest ranks were filled by veterans trained under the eye of the great Frederick, was confident in its machine-like precision, was inspired to martial ardour by the influence of the patriotic Queen Louisa and the Princes of the royal House. Young officers had whetted their swords on the stone steps of the French embassy in Berlin, and the whole army was animated by hatred of France and a blind con¬ fidence in its superiority. But the aged Duke of Brunswick, who was in command, fell into error. The Prussian divisions were marched beyond the Elbe and thence slowly advanced in a great semicircle stretching out on either side of the Mayence road. On the 5th of October headquarters were at Erfurt, and the one hundred and ten thousand men of the Prussian army presented a front of about ninety miles between Cassel and Rudolstadt, watching the Thuringian forest for a first glimpse of the enemy. Meanwhile what had Napoleon been doing? Aiming, as always, at dealing a decisive blow, he rapidly moved the corps that were protecting the French frontier, not along the Mayence- Berlin line, but to the eastward through Wur- temberg and Bavaria, where they joined the troops already stationed close to the Austrian y JENA AND FRIEDLAND 133 border. The army, numbering about one hun¬ dred and ninety thousand men, was strongly con¬ centrated about Bamberg, and thence marched north and slightly east towards the corner of Bavaria, Saxony, and Bohemia. On the 5th of October the front of the French army, cover¬ ing not more than thirty-five miles, was between Coburg and Hof, and Napoleon, who already shrewdly suspected the approximate position of the Prussians, declared that if he could march unimpeded a few days more, he would be in Berlin first. The French pressed on by long days’ marches, and a week later the outposts of the two armies were in touch not far from Saal- feld; the French extreme left had come into contact with the extreme left of the Prussians; the French were rapidly marching north, the Prussians slowly south-west. Napoleon’s object was now to swing about towards his left so as to get across the great road in the rear of the Duke of Brunswick. This manoeuvre was suc¬ cessfully carried out, the French corps getting into a line roughly indicated by Saalfeld, Jena, and Naumburg, the main strength constantly tending northwards and towards the Elbe. When the Duke of Brunswick discovered that the French army had completely turned l 3 4 NAPOLEON his left flank and was rapidly moving towards his line of communications, he issued orders for a general movement eastwards in hones of being able to retreat towards the line of the Elbe through Jena and Naumburg; but he was just a few hours too late and was com¬ pelled to fight with his enemy between him and his line of retreat. On the 14th of Octo¬ ber were fought two battles within a few miles, at Jena and at Auerstadt. At Auerstadt Davoust with inferior numbers held his posi¬ tion all day and prevented the passage of the King of Prussia and the Duke of Brunswick. At Jena with superior numbers Napoleon utterly crushed Hohenlohe. The Prussian infantry fought well until beaten, then the French cavalry rode them down with ease. The pursuit of the defeated army by Murat was of an extraordinary character; he all but literally galloped from Jena to Lubeck, on the Baltic Sea, in three weeks. With the corps of Lannes, Soult, and Bernadotte, together with a large division of cavalry, he swept up the remains of the Prussian army, and captured all the fortresses he passed. Blucher with twenty thousand men was the last to hold out, sur¬ rendering, after Murat had stormed Lubeck, on the 7th of November. In the meanwhile \ JENA AND FRIEDLAND 135 Napoleon with the other half of the army had pressed on to Berlin, which he occupied on the 27th of October. This was the most decisive and brilliant in its results of all the campaigns of Napoleon; but the uncertainty of war, the fickleness of fortune, were demonstrated by the course of that which was immediately to follow. Russia was now as anxious to support Prus¬ sia against France as she had been to support Austria. But once more the allies had gone in singly and paid the consequences. By the time that Napoleon had destroyed the army of Prussia and occupied her capital with the greater part of her territory, the Russian corps were barely across the frontier. Napoleon decided not to await them but to march, even to Poland if necessary, and there dispose of these last enemies. During two months following Jena, French columns were marching steadily north and east from prosperous and rich central Germany towards the desolate plains of eastern Prussia and Poland. Napoleon, so as to utilize the political sentiments of the Poles now in hopes of recovering their lost independence, deter¬ mined to base himself on the line of the Vistula and to place his headquarters at Warsaw. NAPOLEON 136 The Russian commander, Bennigsen, anxious to support the Prussians, moved into the coast provinces, covering Konigsberg and operating towards Dantzig. These two fortresses with a small body of troops now represented all that remained of the Prussian power. On the 25th of December a partial engage¬ ment between the two armies took place at Pultusk in which the losses were heavy and the results indecisive. Then Napoleon and Bennigsen both went into winter quarters until early in February 1807, when the latter de¬ termined to make an attempt to crush Berna- dotte’s corps before it could be assisted by the others. In this he failed; Napoleon, rapidly concentrating, hoped in turn to deal a heavy blow at his antagonist. But the success of great military operations often depends on the most trifling details. A staff officer conveying dispatches to Marshal Bernadotte fell into the hands of the Cossacks, and Bennigsen thus became informed of Napoleon’s plans. He promptly moved his army to safer positions and finally stood his ground and offered battle near the little village of Eylau. There on the 8th of February was fought one of the most bloody battles of the Empire. A raging snow storm impeded the first movements of the French; JENA AND FRIEDLAND 137 Marshal Augereau’s corps lost its direction, ad¬ vanced to the attack diagonally, and was sur¬ rounded and annihilated by the Russians. A great gap was opened in the French line at Eylau, and Bennigsen sent forward his infantry to pierce it. Napoleon and his staff appeared in the greatest danger, but a few battalions of the Guard held their ground with grim desperation, and the Emperor, calm and unmoved, declined to change his position. It was necessary to relieve the pressure on the French centre at any cost and thus gain time to‘bring fresh troops up, so Murat was ordered to collect all the available cavalry and advance on the Russian centre. Seventy squadrons of dragoons and cuirassiers, lancers and chasseurs, about ten thousand men, then followed that most brilliant of cavalry leaders through the whirls of snow straight for the Russian line. This remarkable charge of cavalry was carried a distance of nearly three thousand yards before it was spent; it swept everything in its front, pierced com¬ pletely through the Russian centre, and gave Napoleon the relief he so urgently needed. From then on to dusk the battle was fought with dogged obstinacy on both sides, the French making but little progress. At night each army and each commander was beaten, thirty 138 NAPOLEON thousand dead men, four thousand dead horses lay between them. Napoleon and Bennigsen both made prepara¬ tions for retreat, but the former guessed his op¬ ponent’s intentions in time, countermanded his first orders, occupied the Russian positions next morning, and claimed Eylau as a victory. But the French army and all Europe realized that the victory was purely technical, and that Bennigsen had come very near defeating the invincible conqueror. Was the spell broken ? All through Germany, in Austria, and in the remotest parts of Italy, the opponents of Na¬ poleon drew breath and declared his fall was near. He, meanwhile, retired to winter quar¬ ters once more, and called up from every cor¬ ner of the Empire fresh contingents of men to stop the enormous gaps made in his ranks; one of Napoleon’s favourite theories was that numbers constituted the essential factor of success. It was not till June that the armies could be once more got into motion in a country where the spring comes so late as in Prussian Poland. The new campaign opened badly for the French, as Bennigsen held his ground successfully in a partial engagement at Heilsberg. Manoeuvring followed, and at last an opportunity arose of JENA AND FRIEDLAND 139 which Napoleon took full advantage. Bennig- sen marched down the right bank of the Alle towards Konigsberg, which one half of the French army, under Murat, was threatening. At Friedland he sent a detachment to the further bank to occupy that town. A French corps, that of Fannes, deployed against the town and engaged the Russians. Bennigsen sent over more troops in support, and seeing no sign of French reinforcements came to the hasty conclusion that he had only Fannes’ corps to deal with. He accordingly decided to cross the river in strength and crush this iso¬ lated opponent. But behind Lannes, in the wooded semicircle of hills that nearly surround Friedland, the Emperor, Oudinot, Ney, Victor, Mortier, and the Guard were hurrying on. Napoleon watched the Russian movements un¬ til he judged that Bennigsen had gone too far to withdraw, and then the whole army advanced to Lannes’ support. The Russians were out¬ numbered nearly two to one and were in a wretched position to fight, massed in a con¬ tracted space where the converging fire of the French artillery could not fail to cause havoc, and with a river behind them. Bennigsen was utterly defeated with heavy loss, and retreated with his shattered army to the Russian from 140 NAPOLEON tier. Napoleon pursued and a few days later reached the little river Niemen, boundary of Prussia and Russia. At this point he received overtures for peace from the Czar Alexander, which he accepted, and it was agreed that the two Emperors should meet in a raft moored in midstream close to the town of Tilsit. This famous interview, which will be dealt with in the following chapter, marks the close of the first great cycle of the wars of the Empire, that which was marked by nearly unclouded success. 26 Dec., 1805. CHRONOLOGY Treaty of Pressburg. Feb., 1806. Invasion of Naples by Mass^na. March, “ Joseph Bonaparte King of Naples. July, British victory at Maida. 12“ “ Confederation of the Rhine formed. x Oct., “ War between Prussia and France. 14 “ Jena and Auerstadt. 27 “ “ Napoleon occupies Berlin. 7 Nov. “ Murat storms Lubeck. 8 Feb., 1807. Eylau. xo June, “ Heilsberg. 14 “ Friedland. JENA AND FRIEDLAND 141 NOTE Bibliographical : General. — See page 11. The invasion of Naples is not dealt with, though it will be alluded to later; see also Helfert, Konigin Karolina, Vienna, 1878. For the preceding chapter see, Foucart, Campagne de Prusse ftde Pologne, Paris, 1882-87 ; Von Lettow-Vorbeck, Der Krieg von 06-07, Berlin, 1891-96 ; Petre, Napoleon's Campaign in Poland, London, 1901. CHAPTER XI NAPOLEONIC POLICY 1806-1808 Napoleon’s Ambition—Fall of the Germanic Empire—War and Finance — Tilsit — Commercial War on England — Copenhagen—Junot occupies Lisbon — Continental Policy — Spanish Intrigue — Occupation of Madrid—Joseph Bonaparte King of Spain. I T is now time to consider the questions of policy that underlay the wars we have just followed, and that soon drove Napoleon to new and less fortunate enterprises. And first the personal element, the man, must engage attention. His successes, his ambitions, his plans, were immoderate; they were the result of an insensate craving to satisfy the selfish appetites of a gigantic intellect. The good of others was with Napoleon nothing more than a means for attaining some personal end, and France was rather the instrument than the object of his achievements. To Cromwell and to Washington, even in a way to Caesar, their country had been a suf¬ ficient world of action; but Bonaparte’s imagi- 142 NAPOLEONIC POLICY 143 nation ever soared to fresh fields of conquest The Corsican lieutenant of artillery had made France his, and now stretched his hand over Europe; — had he made Europe his, nothing can be more certain than that he would thence have risen to the conquest of Asia or America. He was the embodiment of man struggling to better himself as conceived by Utilitarian or Darwinian philosophers, and the field of am¬ bition in which he strove for existence was only bounded by planetary space. Nor was his aggressiveness veiled, it was the man him¬ self, and came out in all his acts. In his bulle¬ tins and familiar soldier’s talk he used the most offensive language towards his opponents, spar¬ ing not even a woman such as Queen Louisa of Prussia. In his diplomatic encounters he showed no greater generosity. When his op¬ ponent was down he took from him everything he could, and even when possible, more than was bargained for. Thus it was after the treaty of Pressburg that followed Austerlitz. By the terms of peace Napoleon extorted every cession ■ of territory and of money he could ; yet he took more in the months that followed. Hav¬ ing by the terms of the treaty increased the South German States, especially Bavaria, at the expense of Austria, he subsequently proceeded 1 4 - 4 - NAPOLEON to form a south and west German body which he called the Confederation of the Rhine and took under his Protectorate. Bavaria and Wurtemberg which he now raised to the rank of kingdoms, with Westphalia later, were the principal among the numerous German States that either through necessity or ambition joined the new Confederation. But these States had been component parts of the Germanic body or Germanic Holy Roman Empire of which the head was the Emperor Francis of Hapsburg- Lorraine. The Empire had long been a weak and tottering institution, this thrust of Napoleon overthrew it; for the Emperor Francis there¬ upon issued a declaration announcing the dis¬ solution of the Germanic Empire and his assumption of the style of Francis first heredi¬ tary Emperor of Austria. There was another feature of Napoleon’s system of politics that became strongly empha¬ sized immediately after Austerlitz: this was that he intended war to be self-supporting. Heretofore in European politics war had been an abnormal condition entailing abnormal ex¬ penditure on the country waging it, with this consequence, that on a peace, armaments were reduced. With Napoleon all this was changed. After Austerlitz the French battalions were NAPOLEONIC POLICY 145 not reduced by one man; the army was to its master what the tool is to the craftsman, and he would not admit of its efficiency being diminished. At the same time it appeared in every way contrary to Napoleon’s interests that the abnor¬ mal charge for maintaining this great army should be borne by France. He consequently entered on the policy of quartering on his enemies if possible, otherwise on his allies, large bodies of troops which they were called on to maintain and in many cases to pay. For' seven years, 1806-13, the greater part of Ger¬ many thus served as pasture ground, and so evil and burdensome was the system that even the placid people of that prosperous country were nearly driven into open rebellion. When the victory of Friedland forced his last great continental antagonist to confess defeat, Napoleon touched the summit of his power. The days of the struggling consulate appeared long past. Already after Austerlitz a great change had come over him physically. He was no longer the lean, intriguing Corsican, Struggling to reach the front rank, but had filled out and assumed a better satisfied cor¬ poral aspect. He had now established his equality with the greatest sovereigns of Europe. 10 146 NAPOLEON Eighteen months later, at Tilsit, equality no longer satisfied him, and he decided to divide the hegemony of the Continent with the Czar, providing that sovereign would consent to follow his policy against Great Britain. France and Russia could clearly dictate terms, for Prussia was reduced to a secondary rank, while Austria alone retained a claim to military power. It was on this basis that Napoleon framed his policy at Tilsit. He was prepared to be friendly with Russia. Of Alexander he claimed no territory, save the little island of Corfu; all he asked was co-operation in his struggle against England. He took pains to charm the Czar, and succeeded, for his fascina¬ tion could be as great as his invective was brutal. Alexander agreed to all that Napoleon asked of him, was content to see peace made at the expense of Prussia, and was repaid by gaining a free hand to take Finland from Sweden and various provinces from Turkey. The Czar begged hard for his ex-ally, King Frederick William, but Napoleon was bent on crushing the Prussian monarchy under his heel. By the terms of peace Prussia was not only despoiled of much territory, but was also charged with an enormous war indemnity, pending payment of which French troops were NAPOLEONIC POLICY 147 to occupy Berlin and her most fruitful prov¬ inces. So loose were the terms of the treaty that Prussia remained saddled with the French occupation until after the great catastrophe of November—December 1812. But the point of greatest interest in the agreement arrived at by the two Emperors was that which concerned Great Britain. Alexan¬ der, glad to pay for Austerlitz and Friedland at so little direct cost, fascinated by the cajoleries of the great captain, agreed to turn against his ancient ally. This part of the negotiations was intended to be kept secret for the present, but the British Cabinet secured information and determined to forestall a pro¬ jected move of the two great continental Powers. Instead of accepting a proposal for the mediation of Russia with a view to a general peace, the government of King George sent an expedition to Copenhagen to seize the Danish fleet. This event (September 1807) rendered pros¬ pects of a peace with Great Britain even more remote, it ruined Napoleon’s naval projects, and it prompted him to a counterstroke at England. Nearly every country of the Con¬ tinent except Sweden and Turkey was now closed to British trade. But in Portugal her 148 NAPOLEON commerce found free outlet, and Napoleon de¬ termined, as an offset to Copenhagen, to close the Portuguese ports to Great Britain. To effect this, military action became necessary, and a small army under General Junot was marched through Spain and occupied Lisbon at the end of November 1807. The Portuguese royal family fled to Brazil. This incursion into Portugal, though it ap¬ peared merely a counterstroke for the British seizure of the Danish fleet, was in reality an integral part of a vast scheme which Napoleon’s mind had long been maturing. The war of 1805 had drawn him from the Channel; Tra¬ falgar and Copenhagen had deprived him of the naval strength he required, and the invasion of England had faded into the background of possibilities. But though invasion was no longer possible, the commercial attack was; if Napoleon could no longer march an army to London, he might yet hope to starve and ruin her. His first step towards effecting this was when the conquest of Prussia gave him the power to stretch his hand over the north¬ western seaports. In November 1806 he issued the famous Decree of Berlin, whereby it was ordered that no port in the French Empire or its dependencies should receive any NAPOLEONIC POLICY 149 ship coming from Great Britain or any of her colonies, that Great Britain herself was in a state of blockade, and that all British goods were seizable wherever found. To this the British reply was an Order in Council practi¬ cally forbidding neutral vessels to trade except through British ports, and later proclaim¬ ing all French ports blockaded. Napoleon answered this by declaring all neutral vessels carrying British papers denationalized and seizable. This last decree was in November 1807. The whole force of Napoleon’s intellect was now turned towards making this extraor¬ dinary economic policy effective. He had not only to devise means whereby English cottons and colonial products should not be smuggled through his extensive cordons of custom house officers, but he had to devise means of bringing the whole of the Continent into his policy, for it was only on the largest scale that it could be effective. Having secured the Czar’s promise of co-operation, having a strong hold on the coasts of the Baltic and North Seas, his atten¬ tion was now more closely directed to the south. Italy was his as far as the Strait of Messina, for the treaty of Pressburg had added Venetia to the kingdom of Italy; the Papal dominions were virtually under French control; 150 NAPOLEON the Bourbons had been driven from Naples, where Joseph Bonaparte was installed king- in 1806. The treaty of Tilsit had given Corfu to France, and now, in the winter of 1807-08, Napoleon was revolving plans whereby, acting from that island and in concert with Russia, he might arrange to partition Turkey and thence launch a Franco-Russian expedition through Persia towards India. These schemes were inordinately vast, and their execution never passed the initial stages; but leaving the eastern for the western basin of the Med¬ iterranean there was another detail of the Napoleonic plans that required attention but appeared to offer little or no difficulty. Junot’s march to Lisbon in the autumn of 1807 has already been noticed. Portugal had fallen without resistance and the capital had not fired a shot to stop the paltry force that captured it. Spain appeared as rotten, as effete, as Portugal. The king, Charles IV., was perhaps the most inept of all Bourbon sov¬ ereigns, and to make matters worse the Queen and the favourite Godoy were little better than the King. In 1795 Spain had abandoned the struggle against the French Republic and ever since had dragged by her side in an uncon¬ vinced and ineffective alliance. But the people NAPOLEONIC POLICY 151 and even the minister tired of French dicta¬ tion, and in 1806, shortly before Jena, Godoy showed clear indications that he only awaited a favourable opportunity to turn against Napo¬ leon. The Spaniard chose his time badly; the Corsican played his game more deliberately. He wanted the full use of the Spanish naval resources against England, he viewed with con¬ tempt the Bourbon occupant of the throne, he did not contemplate as possible a serious resistance from Spain to the conqueror of Austria, Prussia, and Russia. Without show¬ ing his hand very clearly, without perhaps quite deciding what his precise policy should be, he pushed on supporting columns behind Junot’s army of Portugal, and gradually established a considerable force in the northern provinces of Spain. In the early months of 1808 Napoleon showed his hand more clearly; a large French army was now moving towards Madrid, and Murat was given supreme command. This steadily in¬ creasing pressure applied by Napoleon proved too much for the Bourbons, dislodged them from their throne. There were recriminations between Charles IV., his son Ferdinand, and his minister Godoy. Popular discontent broke out. Charles IV. resigned. A mob nearly mas- I 5 2 NAPOLEON sacred Godoy who was barely saved by the French troops. Murat, who had quietly in¬ stalled himself at Madrid, declined to recognise Ferdinand as king, and Charles repented his hasty abdication. Father and son proceeded to Bayonne to lay their case before Napoleon, and he by menace and cajolery obtained from them a renunciation of their rights in his favour. Spain was now apparently his, and he appointed to its throne his brother Joseph, giving in turn that of Naples to Murat. It was on the 5th of May that the renuncia¬ tion of his crown by Charles IV. gave Napoleon Spain with a stroke of the pen, but the people of Madrid had demonstrated that they were no willing parties to the shameful transaction of their king three days earlier. A street insur¬ rection broke out which Murat subdued with much trouble and punished severely. It was the precursor of a national rising continued for five years and that ended in success. France had hitherto conquered by means of a national army; she was now to be met with the same arm she had so triumphantly used and abused. French troops were now advancing in every direction, but a provisional government or¬ ganised resistance, and within a few weeks the imperial arms received the most decisive check NAPOLEONIC POLICY 153 they had yet met with. South of Madrid the French general Dupont allowed his communi¬ cations to be cut, and failing to force a passage l was compelled to surrender with twenty thou¬ sand men at Baylen (July 19). A few weeks later a similar disaster occurred in Portugal. A British force under Sir Arthur Wellesley, afterwards Duke of Wellington, landed close to Lisbon, fought and defeated Junot’s army (Vimiero, August 21). A capitulation was signed at Cintra a few days later, whereby the French evacuated Portugal. These unexpected reverses roused Napoleon. His army in Spain was made up mostly of new levies; he now ordered several corps of the Grande Armee to leave their cantonments in Germany for the peninsula. Other corps were formed in France and hurried to the frontier, and Napoleon determined to take command in person. He joined his troops in November; they were then concentrated between the Ebro and the Pyrenees, faced by several Spanish armies for the most part poorly drilled, insuffi¬ ciently equipped, and miserably led. A few rapid strokes to the right and left shattered re¬ sistance, and Napoleon marched irresistibly on Madrid, which he entered on the 4th of December. 1 54- NAPOLEON This first success was illusive. There were several peculiarities that rendered campaigning in Spain a far more difficult task than in Italy or Germany. The country was poor and troops had to be accompanied by long convoys ; the peasantry, fanaticized by the priests, took up arms, cut off detached parties, and isolated the French columns; the mountain ranges of the peninsula ran generally east and west, that is across the line of invasion, making movements slow and arduous, and affording continuous openings for rapid flank attacks up the val¬ leys. While Napoleon was marching south on Madrid, a British army under Sir John Moore was moving east from Lisbon and nearly suc¬ ceeded in striking the French line of communi¬ cations in the neighbourhood of Valladolid. No sooner did Napoleon realize the presence of this new enemy than he turned all his available force towards the British, and taking command pushed forward to attack Sir John Moore. It was now winter and the mountain passes were covered with snow, but the French pressed on rapidly, and the British general, heavily outnumbered, hastily retreated. He eventually reached Corunna after severe losses and hardships, and there succeeded in embark¬ ing his army but lost his life in the fighting. NAPOLEONIC POLICY 155 Napoleon had not pursued the British as far as Corunna ; midway important dispatches had reached him from Paris. Handing over the command to Marshal Soult he took a few per¬ sonal attendants, and galloping as fast as saddle and post horses could carry him, unexpectedly reached his capital on the 23d of January 1809. CHRONOLOGY 7 July, 1807. Sept., “ 30 Nov., “ 2 May, 1808. 5 “ 19 July, “ 21 Aug., “ Sept., “ Nov., “ 4 Dec., “ 23 Jan., 1809. Treaty of Tilsit. Capture of Danish fleet at Copenhagen. Junot occupies Lisbon. Madrid riot. Bayonne. Charles IV. resigns his crown. Surrender of Dupont at Baylen. Junot defeated at Vimiero. Interview of Erfurt. Napoleon joins army in Spain. Occupies Madrid. Napoleon returns to Paris. NOTE Bibliographical : General. — See page 11. For Tilsit and the relations of France and Russia there is no authority comparable to Vandal’s Napoleon et Alex¬ andre, Paris, 1896. For the Continental blockade see Mahan, Influence of Sea Power, London, 1892. For NAPOLEON i S 6 Spain, Oman, Peninsular War, London, 1902-03 (two vol¬ umes only, to 1809) ; or the classic but not altogether reliable Napier, Pe?iinsular War. Rose is good to consult on France and Great Britain after Tilsit, and Fisher on Germany. The war in Spain will not be followed after this chapter, as Napoleon took no further personal part in it; only such brief allusions to it will be made as will suffice to keep the reader abreast with the general progress of affairs. CHAPTER XII WAGRAM Austrian Jealousy — French Discontent — Napoleon leaves Spain — War with Austria — Aspern and Essling—Dis¬ possession of the Pope —Wagram — Peace. AT ^HERE were two causes that brought Napoleon suddenly back from Spain to Paris, one general and widely known, the other of a more intimate and obscure char¬ acter. The first of these was connected with the relations of France with the great Powers of north-eastern Europe; to understand it we must go back a little and pick up the thread of policy spun by Napoleon at Tilsit in 1807. With Prussia reduced to impotence and largely occupied by French troops, there were now as military factors but two Powers in the north-east, Russia and Austria. The friendly advances of Napoleon to the former indicated beyond question that his policy in that quar¬ ter would turn on the balancing of these two Powers one against the other. And further, his friendship with Russia was held at Vienna to iS7 NAPOLEON 158 imply hostility to Austria. The inference was obvious and told more deeply owing to the repeated humiliations Austria had met with, though Napoleon would doubtless have been pleased to remain at peace with her. From the time when Eylau opened anew the possi¬ bility of shaking off the Napoleonic yoke, the Cabinet of Vienna made great efforts to re¬ organize its army and resources. But the Emperor’s relations with Alexan¬ der, though outwardly friendly, had already developed slight points of friction, and in the summer of 1808 an interview between the two was arranged for the discussion of their in¬ terests. It took place at Erfurt. Here amid much pomp, surrounded by the princes of Ger¬ many and of the French Empire, they privately debated the questions of Poland, of Prussia, of Great Britain, and in short the whole political field from St. Petersburg to Cadiz and from Norway to India. The nature of these con¬ ferences was not generally known, and it was only a few of the best placed and most astute observers, such as Talleyrand, who detected the fundamental incompatibility of views between Napoleon and Alexander that must sooner or later break down their alliance. The general opinion was that France and Russia were in WAGRAM l S9 perfect accord, and that jointly they could con¬ trol the whole of continental Europe. In reality the Czar chafed at the pressure of the French Empire eastwards in Prussia, in Poland, in the Balkan peninsula. The conference at Erfurt alarmed Austria. Her statesmen were not sure that Napoleon had not given Russia a free hand against Sweden and Turkey as a price for her absten¬ tion from interfering against his carrying out some design against Austria. Was it his in¬ tention to reduce the Emperor Francis to the position of King Frederick William, or perhaps even to steal his throne, as he had that of Charles IV. ? There was little present ground for fear, yet Austria pressed her armaments for¬ ward. Napoleon declared to Count Metternich, Austrian ambassador at Paris, that if Austria armed she could never afford to disarm without fighting and that war must therefore follow, and he disclaimed, probably sincerely, all hostile intention. Yet the dangerous process continued during the autumn and winter months of 1808. By the beginning of 1809 Austria had gone so far that war was inevitable and it became clear that sooner or later Napoleon must leave Spain and return to Germany.) It does not appear probable, however, that he would have 160 NAPOLEON abandoned the pursuit of Sir John Moore quite so precipitately as he did, had there not been another matter of importance that required his presence in Paris without delay. On 1799 Bonaparte’s advent to power had been eagerly supported by reasonable men of many shades of political opinion. His early steps as a ruler tended to confirm the hopes of those who looked to him to provide stability; and even if he aimed openly at personal power, yet through him was introduced such sound administration, finance, and justice as France had never known. Many, therefore, viewed his personal rule so far as a blessing. But the development of Napoleon’s policy after the proc¬ lamation of the Empire, after Austerlitz, after Jena, and especially after Tilsit, frightened those who dared think for themselves and whose insight was not obscured by apparent prosper¬ ity, large salaries and unaccustomed titles. Talleyrand after long directing the Ministry for Foreign Affairs had held back strongly from the Tilsit policy, and had been transferred to the non-political functions of High Chamberlain. Fouclie, the ex-Terrorist and Jacobin, head of the secret police, thought that Napoleon was going too far, saw in the Spanish war the pos¬ sibility of a personal or military disaster for WAGRAM 161 the Emperor, and ever on the lookout for political evolutions, viewed with complacency an eventual vacancy of the throne and the pos¬ sible promotion of his friend, the dashing, popular, liberal-minded, and liberal-handed Joa¬ chim Murat, King of Naples. Nothing much was actually done, yet a political demonstra¬ tion of the greatest significance occurred.' For many years Talleyrand and Fouche had been estranged and barely on speaking terms. One night, while Napoleon was toiling through the snow-clad passes of revolted Spain after Sir John Moore, these two important political per¬ sonages made their entrance at a fashionable reception arm in arm, and ostentatiously prome¬ naded their alliance before the astonished guests It was a little thing, and yet it was a great one; for Talleyrand and Fouche were the two most delicate political weathercocks in France, and if they both veered together it was safe to con¬ clude there was something in the wind. So Napoleon thought, as he spurred and galloped back to Paris.) He publicly disgraced Talleyrand; he privately admonished Fouche, but continued to employ him. But though on the surface this was the close of the incident, there can be little doubt when the course of events is noted, that Napoleon now had II 162 NAPOLEON brought into stronger prominence before him than ever the perplexing question of the im¬ perial succession. v He was now the most powerful sovereign of Europe ;\ he had already established his fame as the greatest legislator and conqueror of history; yet two of his subjects could venture to suggest publicly that they, and not he, might eventually decide to whom his magnificent empire should revert. Josephine could not give him an heir; he had no faith in the power of any of his brothers to retain his throne. Yet he could not live for ever, more especially if continually exposing his life to the dangers of the battle-field. It was in no pleasant mood that Napoleon now faced the fast-approaching war with Austria,—a war he did not seek, from which he could gain little, and that interfered with the completion of the conquest of Spain. It came at the last somewhat unexpectedly. On the tenth day of April 1809, the Archduke Charles crossed the Bavarian frontier announc¬ ing in his proclamations that Austria was championing the cause of European liberty and calling on all Germans to rise against their oppressors;. It was making the coura¬ geous stand of the people of Spain a text for all the nations of Europe. For a few days the WAGRAM 163 Archduke held a great strategic advantage, and had he pressed forward among the scat¬ tered French corps, would probably have won considerable successes. Napoleon hurried on from Paris and by a series of rapid manoeuvres which he always considered the most brilliant he ever carried out, concentrated his corps, forced the passage of the Isar, and brought the Archduke to a general engagement at Eckmuhl. The interest of these operations depends on an examination too minute and lengthy to be fol¬ lowed out here; all that it will be possible to say is that at Eckmuhl the Archduke Charles was severely defeated and Napoleon found himself, as after Ulm, on the highroad to Vienna. On the 10th of May occurred a slight incident of which the interest is of a character rarely to be found in the life of Napoleon. The French had arrived in front of Vienna, and although the Archduke Charles with the great mass of the Austrian army was on the further bank of the Danube, there was an attempt at resistance. The invaders brought- artillery into position and opened fire on the city. Napoleon was now informed that the young Archduchess Maria Louisa had not been able to leave the palace owing to illness; 164 NAPOLEON he immediately gave orders to have the guns trained in another direction. He probably little guessed that the princess for whom he showed this consideration would in less than twelve months be Empress of the French. The resistance of Vienna was not serious, and the French army quickly occupied itl While Napoleon was maturing a plan for crossing to the north side of the Danube, whence the Archduke Charles was watching his movements with a large army, he issued a decree annexing Rome to the Empire (May 17). The army was now moved a few miles east of Vienna, bridges were constructed, and on the 21 st the leading brigades began to deploy on the further bank between the villages of Aspern and Essling. At this point desperate fighting took place during the 21st and 22d. The Archduke Charles attacked in force ; the French numbers on the northern bank gradually in¬ creased until on the second day a rise of the Danube broke down the bridges. Then it be¬ came a question of whether the French could hold their ground. While engineers worked desperately to re-establish communications, Lannes and Massena held the Austrians at bay with dogged obstinacy, fought on till night, and thus enabled the troops to retreat in safety. Enzensdorf i Austrian Positions. Wagram WAGRAM i6 5 But Napoleon had lost twenty-five thousand men, including Marshal Lannes who was mor¬ tally wounded at the close of the dayf and whatever excuses there might be to offer, he had been defeated by the Archduke Charles. The French army had now retreated from the northern bank into the large island of Lobau, and the marshals whom Napoleon consulted were all of opinion that the retreat should be continued to Vienna, or at all events to the southern bank. Napoleon’s decision admirably illustrates a cardinal principle of strategy. It is nearly invariably the rule that of two armies one is attacking, the other defending; one has the offensive, the other the defensive. So long as that relation holds the army on the offensive has the move; that is, it may within certain limits choose a line of operations which its opponent is compelled to devise methods to defend. The offensive in the hands of a com¬ petent general is an immense military advan¬ tage to be retained at any cost, and for this reason Napoleon decided to keep his army in the island of Lobau rather than seek safety on the southern bank of the Danube] For in that position he still threatened Aspern and Essling which the Archduke could not aban¬ don ; but had he fallen back, then the offensive 166 NAPOLEON would have passed to the enemy and he would have been obliged to reply to whatever move the Archduke chose to make. v Napoleon therefore remained cooped up with his army in the island of Lobau while the Aus¬ trians daily intrenched themselves along his front. iThe check was not unlike that at Eylau, and all Europe was eagerly on the watch for several weeks to see what the next move would be. I The opponents of Napoleon plucked up courage, the more so as Sir Arthur Wellesley was once more operating in Portugal and had defeated Soult at Oporto. Germany appeared on the point of rising; the dispossessed Pope fulminated a degree of excommunication against his spoilers and had to be removed from Rome as a prisoner; a British fleet and army occupied the island of Ischia in the bay of Naples and threatened Joachim Murat in his capital. Once more, as at Austerlitz, as at Friedland, Napoleon cleared a threatening situation by a great military stroke. At the north-west corner of the island of Lobau where his bridges had been established opposite the heavily forti¬ fied Austrian lines at Aspern and Essling, he placed his largest guns and opened a fierce bombardment. He wanted the Austrians to believe that he intended forcing their position WAG RA M 167 by a frontal attack. In the meanwhile secret preparations were made for another move. On the night of the 4th of July bridges were rapidly thrown over the Danube from the lower or south-eastern end of the island, and in the early hours of the 5th, the army had got a footing on the northern bank in the Marchfeld, thus turning the Archduke’s posi¬ tion at EsslingA The Austrians changed front, and during that day there was considerable fighting between the two armies. On the 6th was fought the memorable battle of Wagram, in which about two hundred and fifty thousand men were engaged. The Austrians having abandoned their Ess- ling-Aspern position had now fallen back a few miles to the west. Napoleon faced them and made dispositions not dissimilar to those that had given him such a complete victory at Austerlitz. The Archduke's right was extended towards the Danube nearly opposite Vienna, and it was clearly to his interest not to be driven back at this point. There was a further incitement to strengthen this wing, because, if the opposite wing of the French could be made to give away, Napoleon’s line of retreat through the island of Lobau would be compromised. The Emperor, divining his opponent’s thoughts 168 NAPOLEON and relying on his own numerical superiority, decided to encourage the Archduke to attack this part of his line, but placed Massena, the most resolute and resourceful of all the mar¬ shals, in command. In the meantime the French right under Davoust strongly attacked the Austrian left. The Archduke Charles met with some measure of success at first; though pressed by Davoust on his left, his centre held its ground and his right was slowly driving back Massena. As success began to appear possible on this part of the field the Austrian supports were gradually pushed out from the centre towards the right, until at last Napoleon judged the moment had come for the decisive move¬ ment. A battery of one hundred and twenty guns was suddenly massed within short range of the Austrian centre. Bernadotte and Mac¬ donald were pushed forward and the Archduke found his line too weak to resist. His right wing was in the greatest danger of being cut off and separated, and there was no alternative but to order a retreat along the whole line. He drew off his army, defeated, but far from routed. Some fifty thousand men were killed and wounded, the losses being fairly equally divided, but though beaten the Austrians left behind them practically no prisoners. WAGRAM 169 ^Shortly afterwards an armistice was con¬ cluded, and for the fourth time Austria accepted defeat at the hands of Napoleon.y This was recorded in the treaty of Schonbrunn whereby she lost with other territory, Trieste and Illyria, thus becoming an inland power. But, how¬ ever humbled and weakened for the moment, an unexpected event a few months later gave the House of Hapsburg renewed importance in the politics of Europe. That event must be discussed in the next chapter. CHRONOLOGY Eckmtihl. Vienna occupied. Decree annexing Rome to the Empire. Napoleon defeated at Aspern. Wagram. Treaty of Schonbrunn. NOTES Bibliographical : General. — See page 11. For War of 1809 see Saski, Campagne de ’og, Paris, 1899. On the picturesque side, Marbot, Memoirs, Vol. II. For an account of Hofer and the revolt of the Tyrol, see Clair, Hofer et Vinsurrection du Tyrol, Paris, 1873. The Duke of Brunswick’s raid through Germany has been the subject of Review articles. For the Austrian point of view see various works of Fournier and Wertheimer. y 22 April, 1809. 13 May, “ 17“ “ 22 “ “ 6 July, “ 14 Oct., “ CHAPTER XIII THE AUSTRIAN MARRIAGE AND THE CAMPAIGN OF RUSSIA Dynastic Question — Napoleon marries Maria Louisa — Jeal¬ ousy of Russia — Causes for War — Preparations — Cam¬ paign of Russia — Borodino — Moscow — The Retreat. H AVING concluded the treaty of Schon- brunn with Austria, Napoleon left Vienna for France- but he returned in a far different mood to that in which he had returned from Tilsit in 1807. Then an un¬ clouded series of successes lay behind him, and before him arose great schemes that were to lead to the glorious day when Great Britain should be at his feet; but now his pre¬ occupations were on a smaller scale, for the security of his own throne shared his thoughts with the overthrow of his hated enemy. There were many reasons for the Emperor’s dissatisfaction. The defeat of Austria had proved a harder task than ever before - *; at Essling the Archduke Charles had claimed a victory, at Wagram he had withdrawn his 170 The French Empire after Wagram THE AUSTRIAN MARRIAGE 171 army from the field virtually intact. In Spain, too, a British general was proving more than a match for the best marshals of the Empire, while from one end of the Peninsula to the other insurrection blazed, and King Joseph could barely maintain himself at Madrid. Greatest of all his anxieties was the dynastic question: whose was to be the reversion of the imperial throne ? The idea had long been working in his head; the question had now become an acute one; perhaps an incident that occurred during his stay at Vienna drove him finally and reluctantly to an act that he had first contemplated on his return from Egypt in 1799. While the peace negotiations were progressing a German student named Staps approached the Emperor as he was in¬ specting the guards in the court of the palace of Schonbrunn. His movements were sus¬ picious; he was arrested and on him was found a knife that could leave no doubt as to his intentions. Brought before Napoleon he avowed, with perfect composure, his intention of killing him as an enemy of the human race y and on the Emperor’s asking him what he would do if he were released, he replied phleg¬ matically that he would take the earliest oppor¬ tunity of assassinating him. This courageous 17 2 NAPOLEON student was necessarily shot, but he had evoked before the Emperor the spectre of revenge that underlay German opinion, and Napoleon was profoundly affected by the incident. On his return to France his resolve was fixed; he had decided that there must be a direct heir to the Empire, and he promptly announced her fate to Josephine. After a painful scene she consented to all that was asked of her, and a divorce was decided on. The Pope refusing his consent, a somewhat irregular form was gone through by the com¬ plaisance of a committee of cardinals, but had Napoleon pronounced the decree of his own will and authority it is not likely that any one would have dared question its efficacy. In the meanwhile it was necessary to find a suitable consort for the Emperor and the alliance between France and Russia imme¬ diately suggested the Grand Duchess Anna, sister of the Czar. Informal overtures were made at St. Petersburg; they met with doubt¬ ful answers; it appeared possible that an eventual no would be the result, and this was an affront Napoleon could not bear to face. Just at this delicate moment Austrian diplo¬ macy, now under the wary guidance of Count THE AUSTRIAN MARRIAGE 173 Metternich, succeeded in suggesting the Arch¬ duchess Maria Louisa, who in point of age was far more suitable than the young Russian princess. Metternich, whom the Emperor had liked as ambassador, promptly seized the opportunity, placed it beyond doubt that a favourable reply would be given to any proposal made, and secured this enormous politico- matrimonial prize for his master’s daughter. The rapid conduct of the preliminaries, the pomp and magnificence of the ceremonies, the effusions of the French and Austrian courts, the gratification of Napoleon with his Hapsburg bride, the amicable married life that ensued,—all these are matters of which the details can find no space here. It is the grim reverse of the medal that must be dwelt on, the political aspects of the marriage, the so- called reasons of State that made the bringing of one child into existence the cause for the destruction of hundreds of thousands of lives! Metternich had come into power at the moment when Austria had touched her lowest point. He was determined to restore her for¬ tunes, and to do that he saw clearly that she must not again bear the brunt of war, but, leaving that to others, quietly prepare to throw in her sword when next the scale balanced / 174 NAPOLEON and her intervention might be decisive. He followed up the French marriage closely, anxious to profit, clearly perceiving that France must lean either on Russia or on Austria, and already convinced that the Czar and Napoleon were fast drifting apart>, Two new and grave causes of disagreement had arisen between France and Russia as a con¬ sequence of the war of 180c),. One was the sud¬ den manner in which Napoleon had dropped the proposal for marrying the Grand Duchess Anna, the other was of an even more serious char¬ acter. At the peace of 1807, partly to reward the Poles who had long served France, partly to obtain a political support in the north-east, Napoleon had formed of Prussian Poland the Grand Duchy of Warsaw under the rule of his ally, the King of Saxony. This was virtually reconstituting Polish independence and caused great uneasiness to the Czar. When the war of 1809 broke out, Napoleon called on Alex¬ ander as his ally to place an army in the field. This the Czar did but in an inefficient way that did nothing to help Napoleon’s operations. The Poles of the Grand Duchy however, ably led by Poniatowski, made a strong diversion in Galicia, and Napoleon duly rewarded them with a large slice of Austrian Poland when THE AUSTRIAN MARRIAGE 175 peace was signed after Wagram. Nothing could have been more calculated to alarm and alienate the Czar, who was now declaredly offended at the course of French policy. The year 1810 was not old before it was common report that a war between the two great empires must surely ensue, and it appears that from that date both Napoleon and Alexander began quietly to make preparations for the gigantic struggle all felt was coming. But in its essential aspect this great war arose from Napoleon’s policy of the continental blockade. For a brief moment it looked as though that policy might meet with success. In 1810 British funds fell to 65, commer¬ cial ruin appeared imminent, bread was at famine prices, the Tory Cabinet was falling to pieces. Wellington’s generalship probably saved his country from a humiliating peace. Driven from Spain by Massena he fell back on the lines of Torres Vedras in front of Lisbon and there successfully stopped the French ad¬ vance to the sea. His foresight and strategy had turned the scale in the Spanish war, for from this moment the Anglo-Spanish position grew steadily stronger, and it may be said with little exaggeration that the lines of Torres Vedras mark one of the great turning-points NAPOLEON 176 in Napoleonic history. xFor it was essentially the commercial necessities of the war against O Great Britain that led to the rupture between France and Russia in 1812.' Even in northern Germany, — notwithstanding armies of custom¬ house officers, repressive and inquisitive laws, wholesale burnings and destroyings, — British goods still found a market, though at exorbitant rates. The Baltic trade was still carried on under the neutral flag, and Russia, in defiance of the continued representations of the French ambassador, did not defend herself very strenu¬ ously against the importation of British luxuries. The court party at St. Petersburg constantly opposed the French policy, and Alexander was easily convinced that he must arm and prepare to struggle against Napoleon's dictation\ In the spring of 1811 both empires were openly preparing for war, yet in Paris all appeared prosperous^ Never had Napoleon enjoyed the splendour of reigning as he did at this period, and his last wish was gratified /when, on the 20th of March 1811, the Empress Maria Louisa gave birth to a son whom he named King of RomeV The title of this ill- fated child, taken from what was now the second city of the Empire, was reminiscent of the King of the Romans, the appointed succes- THE AUSTRIAN MARRIAGE 177 sor to the crown of the Germanic Roman Empire that Napoleon had destroyed. 'In the early part of 1812 came the long- expected crisis in the relations of France and Russia'. Napoleon summoned Alexander to carry out his obligations and exclude British commerce; elusive answers were returned, and the troops received marching orders. Napoleon had often declared that an invasion of Russia was a foolhardy undertaking, and that he would never, as Charles XII. had, lead an army to destruction in the steppes. He had always dis¬ liked the enterprise, and it was only the alter¬ native of seeing the continental blockade policy fail that drove him into it. His preparations were of the most elaborate nature ; the army he assembled was gigantic. In 1811 the move¬ ment of these masses from France, Germany, and Italy towards Poland and Russia had begun.) Every little detail of organization and especially of transport received the Emperor’s personal attention. Austria was summoned to affirm her alliance by placing an army in the field, and sent thirty thousand men to the frontier under Schwarzenberg; this body formed Napoleon’s extreme right. Unfortunate Prussia was com¬ pelled, at the point of the sword, also to furnish a body of troops which, together with a French 12 NAPOLEON 178 corps under the command of Marshal Mac¬ donald, was to operate along the Baltic and form the extreme left. In the centre came the vast hosts that Napoleon in person was to lead.) The old corps of the Grande Armee, under such leaders as Davoust, Ney, Oudinot, St. Cyr, Bes- sieres, Junot, Victor; the massed cavalry, chas¬ seurs, lancers, dragoons, and cuirassiers under the King of Naples; the Westphalians under King Jerome; the Italians under Prince Eu¬ gene; the Poles under Poniatowski; the Saxons, the Bavarians, the magnificent divisions of the Old and Young Guard, with its veteran bodies of grenadiers and voltigeurs and its superb horse artillery and cavalry, —\all made up a central army of more than three hundred thousand men\ Including the flanking armies and the supports that followed the main columns, it is calculated that over five hundred thousand men marched into Russia that summer; As had been the case in 1807 it was well on in June before active operations became pos¬ sible. Napoleon and Maria Louisa made a short stay at Dresden, capital of their ally, the King of Saxony; there they met the Emperor and Empress of Austria, with many of the Princes of Germany. Thence the Emperor proceeded to join his army whose columns THE AUSTRIAN MARRIAGE 179 were already converging on the Niemen. The French army crossed that river, nearly one thou¬ sand miles from the frontiers of France, on the 24th of June 181 2) Napoleon hoped to be opposed, to crush the Russian generals with his superior numbers, and to conclude a prompt peace without advancing far; but in all this he was disappointed. The advance of the French was opposed only by Cossacks or light cavalry, the Russians showed no sign of effective resist¬ ance. On the 28th Napoleon reached Wilna, and so disinclined was he to plunge further into the half-desert country beyond that he stayed there three weeks hoping for some arrange¬ ment. But Alexander gave no sign; he had long foreseen the situation that now faced him, and both he and his advisers believed that Napoleon could be defeated. \More than two hundred thousand Russians were in the field, but the Czar had decided not to rely on his troops alone, but also on the nature of his coun¬ try. From the Niemen to Moscow was a dis¬ tance of some seven hundred miles through thinly peopled steppes in which supplies could only be obtained during the summer months. Moscow was nearly two thousand miles from Paris'^ and between them lay hostile Europe ; was it possible that Napoleon could maintain NAPOLEON 180 himself there? Such was the Czar’s reasoned attitude, and the Russian armies were given orders not to engage, but to fall back before the French advance, until a favourable oppor¬ tunity should arise. Finding the occupation of Wilna fruitless, Napoleon advanced into the interior of Russia, and after an action with the enemy’s rear guard occupied Smolensk on the 18th of August. His line was now extremely extended; his transport arrangements had broken down; the army was much disorganized. 'Yet, against the feeling of all the marshals, he decided that the war must be brought to a conclusion by a decisive move and ordered the advance to Moscow. The Czar now departed from his policy of retreat, for it was impossible and impolitic to resist the clamour of the Russian army to fight; it was decided to make a stand before Moscow and Kutusoff selected a strong position barring the road at Borodino on the Moskva. Here on the 7th of September the two armies met, the French numbering rather more, the Rus¬ sians rather less than one hundred and twenty thousand men. j The fighting was of a des¬ perate character and might have ended in a decisive victory for Napoleon had he consented THE AUSTRIAN MARRIAGE 181 to employ the Guard ; but he probably already viewed his position so far from France with secret anxiety and would not risk impairing the efficiency of that splendid body. As it was, a bare victory was won at the frightful cost of not less than thirty thousand men to each side? and Kutusoff retreated during the night, leaving Moscow at the mercy of the French. Napoleon entered the ancient capital of Russia on the 14th of September and there awaited once more proposals for peace from Alexander. But they came not, and Moscow itself was burned down by incendiaries. It was difficult to feed the army from day to day, and the Cossacks made foraging difficult. The total of the Grande Arm'ee after its losses in detachments and in action was barely ninety thousand men. The King of Naples was hard pressed to maintain his line of outposts against Kutusoff, and suffered one severe reverse. Au¬ tumn was now nearly spent and to delay longer was madness ; on the 18th of October Napoleon began his retreat. He attempted to follow a road to the south of that by which he had ad¬ vanced, so as to pass through country not yet wasted by war. But Kutusoff barred the way, and for some days there was heavy fighting and marching. It appears probable that Napoleon i 82 NAPOLEON could have forced a passage, but he dared not draw too largely on his reserves of ammunition and abandoned the road throusrh Kalou^a to return to that by which he had advanced, past the ghastly fields of Borodino, where the remains of thousands of their unburied comrades greeted the retreating troops. In the first week of November, when midway to Smolensk, the Grande Armee was suddenly struck by the first wave of the Russian winter. v The roads became frozen sheets of ice and in a week nearly all the horses perished. The cavalry was dismounted and could no longer patrol and ward off the Cossacks; many of the guns had to be aban¬ doned, and there was no artillery to fight a big battle ; the convoy was in large part unhorsed, and the army’s supplies had to be abandoned. Food had been scanty enough from the first, but now the soldiers had little else than what they could find in the desolate villages they had already plundered in their advance. The ma¬ rauders were cut down and captured by the Cossacks, and the army began to melt at a frightful rate. There was nothing to do now but to press forward, giving Kutusoff no time to catch up the fugitives before they reached Smolensk. At that point were large maga¬ zines, and there Napoleon hoped he would be THE AUSTRIAN MARRIAGE 183 able to restore order and perhaps take winter quarters. But the disintegration and demoralization of the starving army made such alarming progress that Napoleon was only able to stay a few hours at Smolensk. The first column of the fugitives to reach the town threw themselves on the magazines, and, before the last passed out, it had been completely pillaged and gutted. Just beyond Smolensk Kutusoff succeeded in throwing his leading division across the* road, cutting off the French rear guard under Ney. The marshal succeeded in holding his ground all day, crossed the Dnieper on the ice during the night, made a long detour, and finally rejoined the army a few days later; _ but his corps had dwindled away to less than a hundred men. The army was now reduced to some fifteen thousand men; it presented an appalling spectacle of misery and appeared doomed. At its head marched Napoleon clad in furs and supporting himself with a stick, his face covered with a beard, his expression set but curiously placid. Behind him marched a new formed corps in which the rank and file were captains or lieutenants, and officers of the highest rank acted as majors and captains. Then on the road came a few harnessed wag- NAPOLEON 184 ons with the Emperor’s papers and war chest, and behind them a long column of men in* which only here and there was there any sem¬ blance of alignment or discipline. Towards the end came the stragglers, unarmed, limping, half frozen, some wandering away with ravenous looks, others dropping by the roadside. Thus marched the army in several divisions from Smolensk westwards. Between Smolensk and the river Berezina, a few days’ march distant, was the most critical point of the retreat. To the north of Smolensk, Oudinot and Victor had been operating to cover the line of communications against a Russian army under Wittgenstein. They were now retreating before him to join Napoleon, with some eighteen thousand men in fair fighting condition. So here were two French armies converging on the Berezina, one from the east the other from the north-east, each with a superior Russian force in hot pur¬ suit. - But there was a third Russian army marching from a totally different direction, the south ; that army under the command of Tchitchagof was on the further side of the Berezina and reached its southern bank just in time to oppose the passage of the French. To make matters worse for Napoleon the THE AUSTRIAN MARRIAGE 185 wave of cold was now spent, a thaw had set in, the ice was broken up, and the rivers were impassable . 1 To steal apassage across the Berezina between the three converging Russian armies was now the only means of escape, and Napoleon solved the problem on familiar lines. He demon¬ strated ostentatiously at the point where he did not mean to cross, and thus persuaded Tchitcha- gof to draw off his troops from the point he had decided on. Victor’s and Oudinot’s corps were drawn up so as to hold off Wittgenstein and Kutusoff, and the long train of fugitives be¬ gan to cross the bridges. The passage closed in disaster. Wittgenstein drove in the French rear guard long before the crowd of fugitives had finished crossing; many of the stampeded mob were crowded into the river; the Russian artillery found them an easy target and, most horrible of all, the French rear guard corps whose efficiency made them too precious to lose, received orders to force their way through to the bridge by firing on their disbanded and un¬ armed comrades. Last of all the bridges were broken down amid the despairing shrieks of the wretched beings who saw in them their only avenue to safety. The tragic passage of the Berezina cost the French army about eigh- 186 NAPOLEON teen thousand lives, roughly one half of its strength. No sooner had the remnant of the army crossed than a second and more severe cold wave overtook it.' The Russian pursuit, save that of the Cossacks, was now fairly distanced, but Nature proved an even more terrible de¬ stroyer. Thefewremaining thousands struggled on, but hunger and cold killed the greater part. Every morning fewer men arose from the snowy bivouacs than had lain down the night before^ Advancing supports fared no better than the exhausted men who had marched the whole weary way from Moscow. Two regiments of light horse of the Neapolitan Royal Guard, freshly arrived from the south, were nearly en¬ tirely destroyed in two nights without even seeing the enemy. At Gumbinnen near the frontier Napoleon decided to leave the army for Paris, where his presence was urgently required. He handed over the command to the King of Naples, and wrote the famous Twenty-ninth Bulletin of the Grande Arm'ee , in which he acknowledged such parts of the catastrophe that had overtaken him as it was useless to deny. But in what light did that great calamity, that direct and awful warn¬ ing of Nature as many thought it, appear to him THE AUSTRIAN MARRIAGE 187 on whose shoulders was its responsibility? He closed the Bulletin with the words: “The Em¬ peror has never been in better health ”! The awful destruction, and death, and sorrow, the loss of so many brave lives, all counted but as an incident in the personal career of a soldier of fortune! On the 6th of December the fugitives reached Wilna, still numbering twenty thousand men. 1 When Marshal Ney, the bravest of the brave, musket in hand, brought the rear guard in to Konigsberg some days later, he counted less than one thousand men under arms. 1 The discrepancy in figures is only apparent. As the army retreated it picked up some detachments left in garrison, and met others advancing from the base. CHRONOLOGY 2 April, 1810. Marriage of Napoleon and Maria Louisa. July, Ct Wellington retreats on lines of Torres Vedras. 20 March, 1811. Birth of the King of Rome. 24 June, 1812. French army invades Russia. 7 Sept., u Borodino. 14 “ u Moscow occupied. 188 NAPOLEON 18 Oct., 1812. Retreat begun. 26-29 Nov., “ Passage of the Berezina. 5 Dec., “ Napoleon leaves army for Paris. NOTE Bibliographical: General. — Seepage 11. For the negotiations and rupture between France and Russia see Vandal, Napoleon et Alexandre. For the divorce and second marriage of Napoleon, see Welschinger, Le divorce de Napoleon, Paris, 1889 ; Helfert, Marie Louise, Vienna, 1882. For the campaign of Russia the classical but not very trustworthy account is that of Segur, Histoire, Paris, 1873 ; f° r picturesque details see such Memoirs as Wil¬ son, Belliard, Marbot, Bausset, Bourgogne, and others ; also among more recent writers : Margueron, Campagne de Lassie, Paris, 1897 (only in part published) ; George, Napoleon's Invasion of Russia, London, 1899. CHAPTER XIV THE STRUGGLE FOR GERMANY AND ITALY 1813 Effects of the Russian Catastrophe — Lutzen and Bautzen — Austrian Intervention — Dresden — Leipzig — Murat and Italy. T HE great catastrophe of Russia had a twofold effect, material and moral. It destroyed the veteran army that had for so long imposed its master’s will on the Continent, it broke the spell of invincibility that had so often paralyzed Napoleon’s enemies. Schwarzenberg, who had done little or nothing, concluded a military convention with the Rus¬ sian general and withdrew his troops. The Prussians serving under Macdonald deserted him and)before many weeks had passed, the Prus¬ sian government plucked up enough courage to approve this course officially, signed a treaty of alliance with Russia (Kalisch, February 27) and declared war. The King of Naples soon abandoned his trust as commander-in-chief to return to his capital, and Prince Eugene, who assumed command, then gradually withdrew the 189 190 NAPOLEON small army he had collected from the Vistula to the Oder, and then from the Oder to the Elbe; his numbers were quite insufficient to meet the Russians and Prussians in the field. Meanwhile Napoleon in Paris was making gigantic efforts to retrieve his impaired fortunes. New levies were raised amounting for the whole year 1813 to over a million men. .Women, ^children and old men did the work of the fields, while every able-bodied man and boy was seized by the conscription, passed through the barrack- yard, armed, uniformed, and marched on the road to Germany) By the month of April Napoleon once more had a large army across the Rhine rapidly ad¬ vancing to join that of Prince Eugene) The Emperor took command in person and pushed on towards Leipzig. He effected his junction with the prince and was preparing to march on Berlin when he was attacked in flank by the ,/Russians and Prussians under Wittgenstein and Blucher at Lutzen (May 2). Here a great battle was fought and the French conscripts astonished their generals and brought victory back to the imperial standards. But Lutzen was a hard-fought field barely won, and Napo¬ leon’s lack of cavalry prevented his impeding the retreat of the allies. Campaign of Germany, 1813 GERMANY AND ITALY 191 Three weeks later another battle was fought, with much the same results at Bautzen./ In the pursuit that followed into Silesia Napoleon once more sadly missed an efficient force of cavalry and on the 4th of June he agreed to an armistice that gave him Saxony and the line of the Elbe. He hoped by this means to gain time to bring up his strength in men and horses, but as events turned out, the suspension of hostilities proved more to the advantage of the allies. During this armistice came the news of Wellington’s decisive victory at Vittoria which drove the French from Spain, and Austria notified France that she was prepared to offer her mediation with a view to peace/ As soon as Metternich had realized the mas;- nitude of the disaster that had overtaken the French army in Russia, he determined to pre¬ pare to take advantage of it, but advanced with prudence. The Austrian army was rapidly in¬ creased and placed on a war footing, and after many hesitations due to the timidity of the Emperor Francis, Austria finally put forward her conditions. These were broadly that the Grand Duchy of Warsaw should be abolished; that Prussia should regain her boundaries of 1805 ;\ that the Confederation of the Rhine should be dissolved, and that Austria should 192 NAPOLEON regain Trieste and Dalmatia. There followed interviews between Napoleon and Metternich, extensions of the armistice, a peace Congress at Prague, but the Emperor never meant to accept peace, he was only negotiating to gain time. The upshot was that Austria, on her mediation failing, joined the allied Powers. On the 10th of August hostilities were resumed, and Napoleon now had to face an Austrian army of two hundred thousand men besides those of Russia, Prussia, and Sweden.) For Sweden had now joined the allies ; Mar¬ shal Bernadotte had been elected Crown Prince three years before and now led her army, while another Frenchman, General Moreau, had left the United States and joined the staff of the Czar Alexander. Even Murat, sick of war and anxious for his throne, had been engaged in negotiations with Austria, while the French army was utterly dispirited and longed for peace. The marshals were weary and entreated the Emperor to accept reasonable conditions, the conscripts mutilated themselves by thousands so as to be sent home. Yet Napoleon’s relent¬ less energy drove his army to victory once more.\ At Dresden, on the 27th of August, the Austrians under Schwarzenberg were heavily defeated, largely owing to the King of Naples’ GERMANY AND ITALY 193 brilliant leadership of the French right. Then followed a series of inconclusive manoeuvres and partial engagements in which the allies were constantly successful against the detached French corps. The weather was inclement, the country exhausted, and the French army was reduced to some two hundred thousand men,Awhile that of the allies had gradually in¬ creased to more than double that figure. Ger¬ many was now partly in arms, and as success appeared more hopeful, defection spread from one State to another. North, south, and east of the Elbe between Dresden and Magdeburg three great allied armies nearly surrounded that of Napoleon, avoiding battle with him, but engaging his marshals when he was absent. Finally, on Bavaria joining the allies, Schwar- zenbers: moved from Bohemia westwards and threatened to strike at the Mayence-Leipzig road in Napoleon’s rear. The Emperor now divided his army ; one half marched northwards under his own orders for a stroke at Blucher or Bernadotte; the other under the King of Naples was left to contain Schwarzenberg. Napoleon failed in his attempt to bring the Prusso-Russians, or Swedes, to an engage¬ ment, and fell back towards Leipzig; at the same time the King of Naples retired towards *3 1 94- NAPOLEON the same point, pressed hard by Schwarzenberg’s superior numbers. ) All the armies were now converging from south, east, and north on Leipzig, one hundred and fifty thousand French, three hundred thou¬ sand allies, and on the 16th and 18th of October a decisive battle was fought there.! The French, placed in a semicircle, fought on the defensive, but were slowly and surely driven back. A dramatic incident marked the second day’s fighting, when a corps of Saxon troops left their position in the French lines and went over to the enemy. \On the night of the 19th Napoleon, though hard pressed and driven back, still held positions covering the town, but he was virtually defeated and had not enough ammunition in hand to continue the struggle.'. Orders for a retreat were therefore issued. But to leave Leipzig by the road to Mayence a bridge over the Elster had to be crossed. This was insufficient for the passage of the army, and Napoleon, bent as ever on the offen¬ sive, had neglected to make provision for a retreat. \On the morning of the 19th the last French corps were caught in the trap, and the bridge was blown up when thirty thousand men or more were still on the further bank.! Probably Napoleon’s total losses at Leipzig did not fall GERMANY AND ITALY 195 far short of sixty thousand meql, and a few weeks later the army he led back across the Rhine only numbered about seventy thousand. An incident of this retreat must now be mentioned that will lead to a digression on the affairs of Italy hitherto somewhat neglected. A few days after leaving Leipzig Joachim Murat suddenly left headquarters and, travel¬ ling post-haste, returned to Naples, where he arrived in the first week of November. ‘'Murat, like nearly every one of Napoleon’s generals, was heartily sick of war, and now considered the Emperor irretrievably defeated. He hoped for a prompt peace, but was anxious, whatever happened, to maintain his own position as King of Naples. If fighting were to continue this could only be done, so he thought, either by treating with the allies or in another way, one that opens up a large and interesting question of policy. By various consecutive steps, by the creation of the kingdom of Italy, by the conquest of the kingdom of Naples, by the absorption^ of the States of the Church, Napoleon had brought all the peninsula of Italy under his rule. For the first time since the days of Rome, Italians from north and from south fought under the same flag, obeyed similar NAPOLEON 196 laws, were governed by the same system; and this too was the work of a man of Italian race. The designation he had chosen for his Lombard provinces, the declarations he had made during the campaign of 1796, the title he had given his son, were all indications of a possible creation of an Italian nationality. I Now that Germany and Spain were lost, now that victorious Austria was on the point of invading her lost provinces south of the Alps, the question arose: how were they to be defended? Prince Eugene, Viceroy of Italy, had been sent to assume command of such troops as could be collected. But his army was small, there was no public spirit behind him, and the King of Naples persistently declined to move his troops to assist the Prince. Murat wanted to do one of two things: either to obtain a guarantee of his throne from Austria and Great Britain, or to obtain from Napoleon a declaration creating Italy one, and giving him the command of her combined and now national resources. In the latter case he made sure that, joining his troops to those of the Viceroy and supported by the nationalist sentiment of the people, he could successfully resist any Austrian invasion. Appealing both to Metternich and to Napoleon, GERMANY AND ITALY 197 he found the former willing, the latter unwill¬ ing to treat. The dream of Italian unity faded and Murat turned traitor to his old colours by signing a treaty of alliance with Austria on the nth of January 1814.] At that date the Austrians had already occupied Vene- tia to the south of the Alps, while to the north they had crossed the Rhine and were marching on Paris. CHRONOLOGY Lutzen. Bautzen. | Armistice. Wellington successful at Vittoria. Dresden. Leipzig. NOTE Bibliographical: General. — Seepage 11. For the negotiations between Napoleon and Metternich, see the latter’s Memoirs. For the war in Germany gen¬ erally, see Oncken, Oesterreich und Preussen, Berlin, 1876 ; Luckwaldt, Oesterreich und die Aufdnge des Be/reiungs- krieges, Berlin, 1894; Pain, Manuscrit de 1813, Paris, 1824. For the affairs of Italy, see Helfert, Murat, Vienna, 1878, and Weil, Lc Prince Eugene, Paris, 1902, and Johnston, The Napoleonic Empire in Southern Italy and the Rise of the Secret Societies, London, 1904. 2 May, 1813. 21 “ “ 4 June, “ 10 Aug., “ 21 June, “ 26 Aug., “ 16-18 Oct. “ CHAPTER XV THE CAMPAIGN OF FRANCE Napoleon's last Defence — St. Dizier — Brienne — La Rothi&re — Montmirail — Laon— Chatillon — Fall of Paris — Abdica¬ tion— The Final Scene at Fontainebleau. D RIVEN from Russia in 1812, from Germany in 1813, Napoleon was now, in 1814, preparing to defend France.! Yet peace had always been within his reach, and even after so many disasters, when the allies were mustering half a million of men on the frontiers of exhausted France, she might still have retained the natural frontiers won by the Republic, — the Alps and the Rhine. During the last few months negotia¬ tions proceeded, at Frankfort, at Chalons; but beneath the diplomatic superficialities and wrancdinRS was the unmistakable fact that 'Napoleon was always thinking of victory rather than of peace jj he aimed at regaining the whole of his position and would not accept a diminished portion ; he was the man of success and could not acknowledge defeat. 198 , V \ \ y XrcUb---_r--C- Mcmux a -« - -"'> i8i 5 - 25 Feb., “ 1 March, “ 20 “ “ 3 Ma y> “ 1 June, “ Congress of Vienna. Treaty of Alliance, Austria, France, and Great Britain. Napoleon leaves Elba. Disembarks at Cannes. Arrives at Paris. Murat defeated at Tolentino. Champ de Mai. NOTE Bibliographical: General. — See page u. For the Congress of Vienna, see Pallain’s Correspondance de Talleyrand, Paris, 1881 ; also Metternich’s Memoirs , and D’Angeberg, Cong7'fc de Vienne, Paris, 1847. For Italian affairs, Helfert and Weil as already referred to. For the journey to Elba and subsequent events, see Truchsess von Waldburg, Bonaparte's Reisc von Fontainebleau, Berlin, 1815; Houssaye, 1815, Paris, 1898; Gruyer, Napoleon, King of Elba, London, 1906. CHAPTER XVII WATERLOO AND ST. HELENA Plan of Campaign — Ligny — March on Brussels — Waterloo — Second Abdication — St. Helena— Death of Napoleon. I T is curious to find Napoleon confronted in his last campaign by precisely the same military problem as in his first, ap¬ plying the same solution, but meeting with a different result. In 1796, as now, his opponents were superior in numbers, occupied an ex¬ tended line and belonged to two armies operat¬ ing from two different bases ; in 1815, as before, he decided to strike in full force at the point of junction of his opponents and to throw them back in diverging directions on their respective bases. The French army numbering about one hundred and twenty thousand men was rapidly concentrated during the first week in June, and on the nth the Emperor left Paris to take command.) On the 14th he was at Beaumont on the frontier, in the midst of his troops, and within a few days’ march of Brussels. 224 NAPOLEON So rapid was the French advance that the Prussians and English got little warning of the approaching storm. Blucher, in command of the former, was operating on the line of the Sambre and Meuse through Liege and Namur, and his different corps were distributed in the neighbourhood of the last-named city and Charleroi. The British under the Duke of Wellington had their base at Antwerp and their line of communications ran from that city to Brussels, and thence some twenty-five miles south where the troops were quartered to the west of the Prussians in the neighbourhood of Quatre Bras, Genappe, Nivelles and further to the west. A road running east and west through Quatre Bras and Ligny served to connect the Prussian right with the British left. It was at this point that Napoleon aimed. On the 15th the armies were in contact, the French driving back such opposition as they met with and occupying Charleroi. Blucher succeeded, however, in concentrating the greater part of his troops in the course of the night, and determined to hold his ground at St. Amand and Ligny the next day. The British were more completely surprised than the Prus¬ sians, yet the small force occupying Quatre Position at nightfall, June 17, 1815 IH in WATERLOO AND ST. HELENA 225 Bras was left there and received such supports as could be pushed forward. On the 16th Na¬ poleon advanced to the attack of the Prussians, detaching a corps under Ney to operate against the British.: A fierce struggle took place for the possession of the villages of St. Amand and Ligny that were at last carried by the French ; Blucher, although he had lost heavily, retired slowly towards Gembloux in fairly good order. During the course of the same day Ney had been engaged with the British at Quatre Bras, but had not gained any ground. Yet on the whole the operations of the 16th had been very favourable to Napoleon: he had defeated the Prussians, inspirited his soldiers, and broken through the line of contact between the two allied armies. That night Napoleon formed a corps of some thirty thousand men which he placed under Grouchy, ordering him to follow Blucher’s retreat) The Prussian general might withdraw along the line of the Sambre and Meuse; this was the obvious course for him to follow and the one Napoleon hoped he would take. But he might play a bolder game and leaving his line of operations move north and attempt to join hands with Wellington in the neighbourhood of Brussels; bolder yet, he might retreat ex-centrically and threaten the *5 Il6 NAPOLEON French line of communications. ''•During the early hours of the 17th Napoleon waited to get information £ but Blucher moved fast, Grouchy slowly; the French light cavalry was at fault and could get no certain news. At last, hear- ing that the British still held Ouatre Bras, Napoleon put the whole army in movement towards that point. Wellington had no intention of holding Ouatre Bras now that the Prussians had been forced to retreat, and he had only a rear guard in position when Napoleon arrived on the scene. The Duke got into communication with the Prussians, and believed that Bluchers intention was to move north and to effect a junction in front of Brussels if possible. He therefore decided to fall back some miles from Ouatre Bras to a strong position at Mont Saint Jean, where he hoped for support. ( On the morning of the 17th he had not yet de¬ cided whether he would risk a battle at that point or not; that, as he explained to one of Bluchers staff officers, entirely depended on whether Blucher could undertake to support him with one of his corps.- 1 All through the afternoon of the 17th of June Napoleon pushed on with cavalry and horse artillery after the British rear guard from WATERLOO AND ST. HELENA 227 Quatre Bras northwards towards Brussels. In the evening he had reached the farm of La Belle Alliance and thence saw a mile in front the whole of Wellington’s army evidently prepared to give battle. The Emperor now stopped, and as the evening passed into night long columns of soldiers came up and were bivouacked right and left of the road between Genappe and La Belle Alliance. On that same night Grouchy, marching with painful hesitation and slowness, had only reached Gem- bloux. He had now, however, ascertained that the Prussians had retreated towards Wavre, and proposed marching in that direction the fol¬ lowing morning. Blucher had, indeed, acted with the boldness, decision, and promptitude of a good soldier, and on the night of the 17th he had his whole army concentrated near Wavre. Thence he dispatched a staff officer to inform Wellington that not one corps, but three, under his personal command, would march to the assistance of the British early in the morning. This message reached the Duke about two o’clock in the morning of the 18th, and he determined in consequence to hold his ground. yOn the 18th of June was fought the battle of Waterloo, so called from a village some way from the scene of action, the last and most 228 NAPOLEON disastrous field of the greatest soldier known to history.; Napoleon had some seventy thou¬ sand men actually present, Wellington rather less. ) Blucher, who came up late, engaged his troops gradually, and probably, at the last, had not more than thirty thousand in the fighting. Wellington’s army was of mixed composition, and many of his corps, newly recruited in Hol¬ land, were of very poor quality ; he relied chiefly on his excellent British and German infantry. He had disposed his line according to his favourite method some fifty or one hundred yards back from the summit of a slope that the French would have to top in their advance. His infantry was in part further protected by a transversal sunken lane that acted as a sort of natural ditch. Wellington’s position stretched out east and west of the Brussels road. On his right the manor house and enclosures of Hougoumont formed a strong natural bastion. In the centre the farm of la Haye Sainte formed another advanced position. The British left was more open, but a move in that direc¬ tion led over ground heavy and in part impass¬ able for horses, while it might also result in exposing the French to a flank attack from the Prussians. Napoleon, contrary to the opinion of all those of his generals who had fought the WATERLOO AND ST. HELENA 229 British in Spain, decided not to manoeuvre but to attack frontally. In this it is hard to be¬ lieve that he was right, for the French troops manoeuvred more rapidly than any in Europe, while the British were equally pre-eminent for their unflinching steadiness under attack and their deadly musketry. N Heavy rain since the preceding day had turned the roads into quagmires; guns and transport wagons could be moved only with the greatest difficulty} Napoleon could not get his army ready for action, and the morning hours slowly passed. During that time Grouchy was marching steadily towards Wavre, while Blucher was struggling hard to get his columns on towards Mont Saint Jean but made hardly any progress in the muddy lanes of the valley of the Dyle. At last at 12 o’clock the Emperor opened the battle by sending the King of Westphalia to the attack of Hougouniont. This was only a demonstration, though fierce fighting took place at this point throughout the day. The real attack was to be made at the centre, where Napoleon intended to force the British line and establish himself at the cross-roads of Mont Saint Jean. Heavy columns of infantry, twenty thousand men in all, marched forward to the attack, faced the 230 NAPOLEON fire of the British artillery, breasted the slope, topped it, and then received the volleys of the British infantry) There was a fierce struggle; Picton led forward his brigade with the bayonet and was killed ; the British cavalry charged and finally the French rolled back from the slope beaten, while the horsemen wrought havoc among them. The British cavalry went too far in pursuit, and was now assailed and routed by the French cavalry; the Emperor supported the first by fresh squadrons, and a great mass of horse soon climbed the slope from which the French in¬ fantry had been so disastrously driven. The British infantry was now thrown into squares, alternating on two lines in chess-board pattern, and the cavalry charged in among them, but with no success. A new and more determined effort was made. Ney led the attack. iEvery available horseman was thrown in. Long lines surged upwards, steel-breasted cuirassiers, tall horse grenadiers in bearskins, carabineers with gilded armour and enormous curved helmets, Polish lancers with fluttering pennons, dragoons, hussars. The British gunners from the crest line ploughed great holes in their ranks, then at the last moment ran back to the infantry squares for protection. But though the French WATERLOO AND ST. HELENA 231 cavalry easily overran the guns and swallowed the squares of red-coated soldiers in their midst, they could make little impression on the coolly levelled bayonets, while a destructive fire mowed them down in hundreds. Three times was the charge renewed, but after the fourth failure it was no longer possible to hope that the Em¬ peror’s cavalry would turn the fortunes of the day. \A great part of it lay dead and mangled along the front of the British position. The battle had not been long in progress when Napoleon observed a dark column of soldiers winding along a road some miles away to the east. Before long it became clear that some Prussian movement was to be expected from that direction, and the French right was thrown back and reinforced. The Prussians attacked as soon as they could be brought into action fighting in a line that may be roughly described as at right angles with the British left and parallel with the Brussels-Quatre Bras road. This they were beginning to threaten to the rear of the French right while the great cavalry charges against Wellington’s centre were progressing. Napoleon, however, was still hopeful of forcing the British line before the Prussian attack had developed sufficient force. He also hoped that Grouchy might come up 2J2 NAPOLEON on his right, and sent orders for that marshal to march in the direction of the main army. But Grouchy, obeying his original orders in a strict sense, was following the Prussian rear guard which kept him engaged during the whole day in the neighbourhood of Wavre. The Emperor now ordered Ney to resume the attack and to carry la Haye Sainte at any cost. Ney led his men in person, and after a fierce struggle drove the defenders from the farm. He had now obtained a foothold in the British centre, and getting some guns in position at short range opened a deadly fire.) Several of the English brigades were now nearly shattered, some German and Dutch troops gave way, and a stream of fugitives set in from the field towards Brussels. But Wellington and his splendid infantry remained firm, gaps were filled as best they could be, and Ney could get no response to his pressing call for some fresh troops to drive home the attack. Napoleon had in truth at that moment no troops to spare; all the re¬ serves had been used save a few regiments of the infantry of the Guard, and the Prussians had just carried the village of Planchenoit within striking distance of his line of retreat. The position was fast getting desperate for the Em¬ peror. Two regiments of the Guard, however, WATERLOO AND ST. HELENA 233 drove the Prussians out of Planchenoit, and taking advantage of this respite Napoleon aimed one last blow at Wellington’s centre. Some four thousand infantry of the Guard were massed into column and Ney advanced at their head over the ground where he had led the cavalry earlier in the day. The exhausted com¬ batants to the right and left, from la Haye Sainte to Hougoumont, paused and watched the slow advance of that magnificent infantry, the last remnant of veterans of the great armies of the Republic and the Empire. From along the crest the English gunners poured down grape and cannister. The commander of the infantry of the Guard, Count Friant, fell dead ; Ney’s horse was shot down, but the marshal jumped to his feet, drew his sword, and marched on through the smoke dauntlessly. Once more the crest was won, once more the British infantry behind it poured in their withering musketry. The Old Guard deployed its melting lines as best it could, and for five or ten minutes struggled to hold its ground. But the fire was too deadly, the French began to recede, and soon their broken lines were flowing backwards. At this moment the Duke of Wellington rode forward to the crest, his figure could be seen for some way along the British line; he raised his hat 234 NAPOLEON high in the air and waved it towards the enemy, At this victorious signal the British regiments advanced along the whole line, fifes and drums, bugles and bagpipes urging the men forward. The French army was beaten. The sight of the Old Guard rolling back in confusion, of fresh columns of Prussians closing in on the right, told the defeated French that all was lost. On the high road by la Belle Alliance a few squares of grenadiers still held their ground and gave Napoleon shelter; but all attempts to stay the panic that had now seized the whole army was hopeless. The pursuit was taken up by the Prussians, and it was not till three days later and many miles within the French frontiers that the army could be restored to some semblance of order. Napoleon had appealed to the supreme po¬ litical test and failed, and he now apparently entertained no hope of being able to recover his position. He arrived in the capital on the night of the 20th, and on the following day the Chamber, on the motion of Lafayette, declared itself in permanent session and di¬ rected the ministers to report to it. In effect this was a withdrawal of authority from the hands of Napoleon, and he accepted it in that sense. On the following day he abdicated for WATERLOO AND ST. HELENA 235 the second time in favour of his son. A week later the allies were nearing Paris, and the provisional government, led by Fouche, was intriguing with the Bourbons. There was nothing Napoleon could now do but to try to leave France. He proceeded to Rochefort, whence he expected to be able to find ship for the United States. But a British cruiser block- 1 / aded the port, and Napoleon finding no other course possible finally went on board H. M. S. Bellcrophon , Captain Maitland, and threw him¬ self on the generosity of Great Britain. The arrival of the Bellcrophon and her illus¬ trious passenger at Portsmouth created great excitement in England. It is easy to see at this distance of time that Napoleon’s career was run, and that a magnanimous treatment would not have been dangerous. But the feeling of those days was violent. Never had Great Britain been so threatened and alarmed as she had been when the army of Austerlitz was en¬ camped along the shores of the Channel. The generation that had struggled with and defeated Napoleon could not forgive him, and General Bonaparte, as the British Government child¬ ishly insisted on addressing him, was sent to the island of St. Helena, in the South Atlantic, as a State prisoner. 236 NAPOLEON Of his six years’ residence in that island there is but little that can be said here with advantage. Controversy has raged about the trivial matters over which the illustrious pris¬ oner and his gaoler, Sir Hudson Lowe, disputed. Englishmen have written to prove that Napo¬ leon was insulted and shabbily treated, French¬ men to prove that he spent his whole time lying and intriguing against Sir Hudson Lowe. It is altogether fortunate that these matters are of minor importance, and that they need not be discussed in a work of these dimensions. It is a self-evident proposition that under the most favourable circumstances the coupling of Napo¬ leon with a British military officer not remark¬ able for tact or urbanity on a barren rock in mid Atlantic could hardly lead to agreeable results. For those who have noted the pecul¬ iarities of Napoleon’s character it will appear natural that his constant occupation at St. Helena was to dictate to some of his compan¬ ions in exile statements of a biassed and mis¬ leading character as to his history. He was busy elaborating the Napoleonic legend, creat¬ ing an artificial atmosphere of fact from which he hoped would emerge in some future time an empire for his son. Towards the little King of Rome his thoughts frequently turned, and WATERLOO AND ST. HELENA 237 when in 1820 it became clear that an illness he had felt before at intervals was now becom¬ ing dangerously acute, he dictated long in¬ structions for the future guidance of his son. The last sentence of his will was of an extraor¬ dinary character. Was it hallucination, or was it astute calculation, that made him write: “ My wish is to be buried on the banks of the Seine in the midst of the French people whom I so dearly loved ” ? He died on the 5th of May 1821, of cancer in the stomach, and was buried under a weep¬ ing willow near Longwood, where he had spent six weary years of exile. British soldiers ac¬ companied him to his rest with reversed arms, and fired a parting salute over his grave. Twenty years later, as if the violent contrasts of his life had not yet been exhausted, his body was ceremoniously transferred to Paris and buried in the Invalides with every circum¬ stance of military pomp and national mourning and under the auspices of a Bourbon King. 16 June, 1815. Ligny. 18 “ “ Waterloo. 22 “ “ Napoleon abdicates. 5 May, 1821. Death of Napoleon. CHRONOLOGY t 238 NAPOLEON NOTE Bibliographical: General. — See page 11. For the Waterloo campaign see Houssaye, 1815, Paris, 1898; Ropes, Campaign of Waterloo, London, 1893; Siborne, War in Fratice, London, 1848. For St. Helena, Rosebery, The Last Phase, London, 1901 ; Las Cases Memorial, Paris, 1823; O’Meara, Napoleon i?i Exile, London, 1822 ; Seaton, Napoleon's Captivity, London, 1903; Jackson, Memoirs, London, 1903; (Seaton or Jackson should be read to check the attacks made on Lowe). For Waterloo see also: Kelly, The Battle of Wavre, London, 1906, and various articles in German reviews by Pflugck-PIarttung and Lettow-Vorbeck. Charles Bonaparte — Letizia Ramolino APPENDIX A BONAPARTE FAMILY — Joseph, King of Spain, d. 1844, —(no male descendants). — Napoleon, d. 1821. |-Duke of Reichstadt, d. 1832. Maria Louisa — Lucien, d. 1840, (barred from imperial succession). — Louis, King of Holland, d. 1S46. |-Napoleon Charles, d. 1807. Hortense Beau- —Napoleon Louis, d. 1831. harnais —Louis Napoleon, Emperor, d. 1873. |- Napoleon Louis, d. 1879. Eugenie Montijo — Jerome, K. of Westphalia, d. i860. |-Napoleon Joseph, d. 1891. Catherine of | - J — Victor Napoleon Wurtemberg Clotilde of Savoy |— Louis Napoleon — Elisa I Prince Baciocchi — Pauline I Prince Borghese — Caroline |-Murat family. Joachim Murat, King of Naples, d. 1814. INDEX OF NAMES OF PLACES AND PERSONS The heavy type indicates books referred to in the notes. Aboukir, 51, 52, 56. ABRANTES, see Junot. Acre, 55. ADAMS, H., Hist. Essays, 117. Adda, 32. Adige, 35, 36, 38, 39. Adriatic, 43. Afghanistan, 49. Africa, South, 49. Ajaccio, 2, 14. Alembert, d’, 10. Alessandria, 28, 30, 83, 85. Alexander, Czar, 124, 125, 140, 146, 147, 158, 172, 174-181, 200. Alexandria, 51, 56. Alle, 139. Alps, 83, 198. Alvintzy, 37-39- America, 48; see also United States. Amiens, 1 it. ANGEBERG, D’, Congrls de Vienne, 222. Anna, Grand Duchess, 172-174. Antwerp, 7, 114, 224. Arcis-sur-Aube, 205. Areola, 38, 39. Asia Minor, 54. Aspern, 164-167. Atlantic, 49. Auerstadt, 134. Augereau, 27, 32, 45, 99, 137. 16 2 Austerlitz, 125. Austria, 60, 158, 196, 197. Azores, 212. Bacciochi, 105; see also Bona¬ parte, Elisa. Baden, 108, 120. Baltic, 134, 149, 176. Bamberg, 133. BARING, Staff Coll. Essays, 26. Barras, 17, 18, 20, 66,69. Basle, 80, 120, 200. Bassano, 36. BAUSSET, Mems., 12, 188. Bautzen, 191. Bavaria, 123, 143, 144, 193. Baylen, 153. Bayonne, 152. Beauharnais, family, 64. “ , Eugene, 19, 65, 105, 106, no, 178, 189, 190, 196, 218. “ , Hortense, 19, 65, 104, 105. “ , Josephine, see Bona¬ parte. “ , Vicomte de, 19, 20. Beaulieu, 28-31, 34- Beaumont, 223. Belle Alliance, 227, 234. Belliard, 206. BELLIARD, Mems., 18S. .1 242 INDEX Beluchistan, 49. Bennigsen, 136-139. Berezina, 184-186. Berlin, 131, 133, 135, 147. Berlin decree, 148, 149. Bernadotte, 45, 68, 73, 126, 127, 134. i3 6 . 168, 192, 193. Berthier, 56, 75, 81, 82, 218. Bessieres, 178. Black Forest, 120. Blucher, 134, 190, 193, 200-206, 221, 224-229. Bohemia, 123, 193. Bologna, 43. Bonaparte, Caroline, 104, 105. “ , Charles, 2, 105. “ , Elisa, 105. “ , Jerome, 105, 178, 229. “ , Joseph, 64, 66, 104, 150, 171, 206. “ , Josephine, 19, 20, 43, 64, 65, 96, 104, 105, 162, 172, 218. “ , Louis, 105. “ , Lucien, 64, 66, 69, 74, 77 . 78 , 104. “ , Napoleon, passim. “ , Pauline, 105. BONAPARTE, JOSEPH, Correspondence , 118. Borghese, 105. Borodino, 180, 182. Bosphorus, 2. Boulogne, 121. Bourbons, 9. BOURGOGNE, Mems., 188. Bourrienne, 14, 75. BOURRIENNE, Mems., 12, 13, 26, 58, 102, 118. BOUVIER, Bonaparte, 40. Brazil, 148. Brenta, 37. Brest, 114-116. Brienne, 3, 200, 201. Brittany, 106. BROWNING, England and Napoleon, 118. Brueys, 50-52. Brunswick, Duke of, 132-134. Brussels, 223-228 BURGOYNE, Naval and mili¬ tary operations, 58. Cadiz, 115-117. Cadoudal, 106-108. Cairo, 51, 56. Calder, 116. Caldiero, 38, 46. Cambaceres, 66, 92. Campo Formio, 43, 47, 59, 87. Canadian lakes, 113. Cannes, 215. Carnot, 219. Cartagena, 115. Cassel, 121, 132. Castiglione, 35. CASTLEREAGH, Dispatches, 209. Caulaincourt, 202. CAVAIGNAC, Mems., 12. Ceva, 28. Chalons, 198, 200. Champaubert, 202. Channel, the, 48, 114, 116, 130, 148. Chantereine, rue, 64. Charleroi, 224. Charles IV. of Spain, 150-152. Charles, Archduke, 41, 123, 162- 170. Chateaubriand, 8, 109. Cherasco, 29, 30. CHUQUET, Jeunesse de Napo¬ leon, 12. Cintra, 153. Cisalpine republic, 43, no. INDEX 243 CLAIR, Hofer et Is Tyrol, 169. Coblentz, 121. Coburg, 133. Colli, 28. Constant, 219. Constantinople, 2, 53. Copenhagen, 147, 148. Corfu, 52, 146, 150. Cornwallis, 115, 116. Corsica, 1, 15. Corunna, 154, 15 5 - COTTIN, Toulon et les Anglais , 26. Craonne, 204. Crete, 51. CROMER, see Baring. CUGNAC, DE, Ca?npagne, 87. Cuvier, 96. Dalmatia, 192. Danube, 121, 123, 163, 167. Danzig, 136, 199. David, 96. Davidowich, 36-38. IJavoust, 125-128, 134, 168, 178. DAYOT, Napoleon, 12. DEBIDOUR, L’Eglise et r£tat, 102. Deeres, 27. Dego, 28. DELAROCHE, Numismatique, 12. Delavigne, 8. Denon, 112. Desaix, 85, 86. DESBRIERE, Projets de de- barquement , 58, 118. Diderot, 10. Dieppe, 114. Dijon, 81. Directoire, 17, 45 “ 47 , 5 °, 59 ” 66 . 69. 72, 74. 9 2 > 9 8 - Dnieper, 183. Doulevent, 206. Dresden, 178, 192, 193, 199. Ducos, Roger, 66, 69, 78, 89. Dupont, 153. DURAND, Mems., 12. Duroc, 104. DU TEIL, Napoleon, 26. Dyle, 229. Ebro, 153. Eckmiihl, 163. Eguillette, Fort of, 15. * Egypt, 5°"55. 79, I”- Elba, 207, 211, 213. Elbe, 131, 132, 190, 191, 193. Enghien, Due d’, 108, 109. England, 48, 49, 147, 158, 196, 211. Erfurt, 131, 132, 158, 159. Essling, 164-167, 170. Eylau, 136-138. FABRY, Armee cf/talie, 40. FAIN, Manuscrit de 1813, 197; Manuserit de 1814, 209. Ferdinand of Naples, 211. Ferdinand of Spain, 151, 152. Ferrol, 115, 116. Finland, 146. FISHER, Napoleonic Statesman¬ ship, Germany, 102, 156. Fontainebleau, 206-208, 213. FO U C A R T, Campagne de Prnsse, 141. Fouche, 92, 160, 161, 235. FOURNIER, Congress von Cha- tillon, 209; Napoleon, 11, 102, 169. Francis, Emperor, 124, 144, 178, 191, 200, 220. Frankfort, 198. Frederick the Great, 21. Frederick William, 130, 146, 200. Frejus, 56. 244 INDEX Friant, 233. Friedland, 139. GAFFAREL, Bonaparte, 58. Galicia, 174. Garda, 35. Gaudin, 92. GAUDIN, Mans., 102. Gembloux, 225, 227. Genappe, 224, 227. Geneva, 82. Genoa, 28, 43, 79, Si, 83, no. Genoese, 12. GEORGE, Napoleon's invasion of Russia, 188. German Empire, see Holy Roman. Gibraltar, 2, 115, 116. Godoy, 150-152. Gohier, 69. Good Hope, Cape of, 49, Great Britain, see England. Grenoble, 215. Grouchy, 225-232. GUILLON, Complots viilitaires, 118. Gumbinnen, 186. Hamburg, 199. Hanover, 121, 130. HAUSSONVILLE, D', L'Eglise romaine, 102. Haye Sainte, 228, 232, 233. Heilsberg, 138. HELFERT, Konigin Karolina, 141; Marie Louise, 188; Murat, 197, 222. Helvetius, 10. Hoche, 63. Hof, 133. Hohenlinden, 87. Ilohenlohe, 134. Holland, 60. Holy Roman Empire, 144. Hougoumont, 229, 233. HOUSSAYE, 1814, 209; /8/j, 222, 238. HUFFER, Quellenfur Geschicte, 87. Illyria, 169. INCONNUE, see Cavaignac. India, 49, 50, 53, 150. Indian Ocean, 49. Indus, 49. Invalides, 237. Isar, 163. Ischia, 166. Italy, 20, 149, 195, 196. JACKSON, B., Mans., 12, 238. Jackson, T. J., 37. Jacobins, 16, 60, 68, 69, 73, 74, 77. Jaffa, 54, 55. Jena, 133, 134, 151. John, Archduke, 87. JOMINI, Art of War, 26. Joseph, see Bonaparte. Joubert, 61-63. Jourdan, 45, 63, 73. Julian Alps, 41. JUNG, Bonaparte, 12. Junot, 104, 148-153, 178. JUNOT, Mems., 12, 26, 118. JURIEN DE LA GRA- VIERE, Guerres maritimes, 118. Kalisch, 189. Kalouga, 182. KIRCHEISEN, Bibliographic, 12. Konigsberg, 136, 139, 187. Kray, 80, 81. Kutusoff, 125-128, 180-185. La Barre, de, 10. Labedoyere, 216. Lafayette, 234. LA JONQUIERE, Expedition d’Egypte, 58. I N D EX 2 45 Lamartine, 8. LANFREY, Napoleon, II. Lannes, 32, 99, 134, 139, 164, 165. Laon, 204. Laplace, 96. La Rothiere, 201, 202. LARREY, Mine. Mire, 13. LAS CASES, Memorial, 238. Lebrun, 92. Leclerc, 78, 105. I.egnago, 34, 3 6 - Leipzig, 131, 190, 193-195- LE NORMAND, Mems., 12,118 Leoben, 42. LETTOW-VORBECK, Der Kriegvon ’06, 141. Liege, 224. Ligny, 224, 225. Ligurian republic, 43. Lisbon, 148 153. Lobau, 165-167. Lodi, 31, 32. Lombardy, 30, 43, 83, 86, 196. Lonato, 35. Longwood, 237. Louis XVI., 14. Louis XVIII., 101, 207, 214. Louisa of Prussia, 132, 143. Louisiana, 112, 113. Lowe, Hudson, 236. Lubeck, 134. LUCKWALDT, Oestcrreich und Befreiungskriege, 197. Luneville, 87, 111. Lutzen, 190. Macdonald, 168, 178, 189, 216. Mack, 120, 121. Madrid, 151-154, 171. Magdeburg, 193. MAHAN, Influence of Sea Power, 58, 118, 155. Maitland, 235. Malmaison, 218. Malta, 51, 52, 55, 79, ill, 112. Mameluks, 53. Mantua, 31-36, 39. MARBOT, Mems., 12, 169, 188. Marchfeld, 167. Marengo, 83-86. MARGUERON, Campagne de Russie, 188. Maria Louisa, 163, 164, 173, 176, 178, 206, 212, 213. Marne, 200-204. Marseilles, 80. Massena, 10, 27, 62, 63, 80, 83, 123, 164, 168, 175. MASSON, Josephine, 26; Napo¬ leon, 12. Mayence, 120, 121, 131, 132, 193, 194, 200. Meaux, 204, 206. Mediterranean, 2, 3, 50, in, 116, 150. Melas, 80-86. MENEVAL, Mans., 12. Messina, 51, 149. Metternich, 6, 159, 172, 173, 191, 192, 196, 197, 213. METTERNICH, Mems., 12, 222. Meuse, 224, 225. Mexico, Gulf of, 113. Milan, 30, 31, 33, 34, 83. Mincio, 34. Mississippi, 113. Modena, 43. Mollendorf, 124. MOLLIEN, Mans., 102. Mondovi, 28. MON NET, Hist, de /’ adminis¬ tration , 102. Mont Cenis, 83. Montebello, 42. Montenotte, 28. 246 INDEX Montereau, 203. Montesquieu, 10. Montmirail, 202. Mont St. Jean, 226, 229. Moore, Sir J., 154, 160, 161. Moravia, 124, 125. Moreau, 63, 80, 83, 87, 107, 108, 192. Mortier, 139. Moscow, 179-181. Moskva, 180. Moulins, 69. Mount Tabor, 56. Munich, 120. Murat, 10, 19, 45, 56, 76, 78, 83, 120, 124, 134, 137, 139, 151, 152, 161, 166, 178, 181, 1S6, 189, 192- 197, 211, 220. Namur, 204, 224. Nangis, 203. NAPIER, Peninsular war , 156, 209. Naples, 59, 60, 112, 150, 195-197, 211, 220. NAPOLEON, Corresp., 12. Napoleon III., 105. NASICA, Mems ., 13. Naumburg, 133, 134. Neipperg, 213. Nelson, 50, 51, 115-117. NERVO, Finances frangaises, 102. Ney, 10, 45, 139, 178, 1S3, 187, 216, 225, 230, 232, 233. Nice, 20, 28, 81. Niemen, 140, 178. Nivelles, 224. Nogent, 201, 202. North Sea, 149. Novi, 62. Oder, 190. OMAN, Peninsular war , r 56, 209. O’MEARA, Napoleon in exile, 238. O N C K E N, Oesterreich tend Preussen, 197. Oporto, 166. Oudinot, 126, 128, 139, 178, 184, 185. Padua, 39. Palestine, 56. PALLAIN, Corresp. de Talley¬ rand, 222. Paoli, 2. Papacy, 59, 149. Paris, 3, 4, 14, 17, 45, 48, 179, 20 3 . 204, 205, 237. PASQUIER, Mems., 12, 102, 209. Paul, Czar, 79. PE ROUSE, A r apoleon, 102. Persia, 49, 150. Peschiera, 34. PETRE, Napoleon's campaign in Poland, 141. Piacenza, 31, 83. Piave, 37. Pichegru, 106, 107. Picton, 230. Piedmont, 83. Pius VII., no, 166, 172. Planchenoit, 232, 233. Po - 3 °' 3 L 35 - 8 3 - Poland, 135, 158, 174,211. Poniatowski, 174, 178. Portugal, 147, 148, 150. Prague, 192. Pratzen, 126-128. Pressburg, 130, 143, 149. Provence, 215. “ , Comte de, see Louis XVIII. Provera, 39. Prussia, 124, 125, 146, 147, 158. INDEX 247 Pul tusk, 136. Pyrenees, 153, 204. Pyramids, 53. Quadrilateral, 35, 83. Quatre Bras, 224-227. Quosdanowich, 35. Red Sea, 50. REMUSAT, Mems., 12. Kheims, 204. Rhine, 43, 60, 80, 198, 200, 205, 221. Rivoli, 38, 39. Robespierre, 16, 17. Robespierre Jezme , 16. Rochefort, 115, 116, 235. ROEDERER, (Euvres, 12, 118. Rome, 60. “ , King of, 176, 206, 212, 236, 2 37 • Ronco, 38. ROPES, Waterloo, 238. ROSE, A'apoleon, n, 118, 156. ROSEBERY, The Last Phase, 238. Rousseau, 10. Roveredo, 37, 39. Rudolstadt, 132. Russia, 49, 60. Saale, 194. Saalfeld, 133. St. Amand, 224, 225. St. Bernard, 82, 83. St. Cloud, 68-71. St. Cyr, 178. St. Dizier, 200. St. Gotthard, 83. St. Helena, 235-237. Ste. Nicaise, rue, 103. Sambre, 224, 225. Santon, 125. Sardinia, 14, 28, 30. SASKI, Campagne de ’09, 169. Sastchan, 128. Savary, 108. S A VARY, Mems., 58. Saxony, 174, 178, 191, 211. Schonbrunn, 169-171. SCHONHALS, Per Krieg ’op, 129. Schwarzenberg, 177, 189, 192-194, 200-206, 221. SEATON, Napoleon's Captivity, 238. Sebastiani, 71. Segur, 6. SEGUR, Mems., 12, 188. Seine, 200-203, 2 °6- Serurier, 27, 86. Shenandoah, 37. SI BORNE, War in France, 238. Sieyes, 61, 62, 66, 67, 69, 73, 88- 9 1 - Silesia, 191. SLOANE, Napoleon, 12. Smith, Sidney, 55. Smolensk, 1S0, 1S2-1S4. Soult, 126, 127, 134, 155, 166, 203, 218. Souvaroff, 60, 62. Spain, 150, 151, 154, 171. Staps, 171, 172. Stradella, 83-86. Strasbourg, 120. STUTTERHEIM, Bataille d’Austerlitz, 129. Suchet, 81. Sweden, 146, 192. Switzerland, 80, 81. Syria, 54. TAINE, Origines, 13, 102. Talleyrand, 66, 69, 92, 109, 158, 160, 161, 207, 218. 248 INDEX TALLEYRAND, Corresp., 222; Mctns., 12. Taranto, 112. TARBELL, Napoleon , 12. Tchitchagoff, 184, 185. THIBAUDEAU, Mails., 102. Thiebault, iS, 217. THIEBAULT, Mems., 12. Thuringian forest, 132. Tilsit, 140, 146, 150, 157 Tippoo Sahib, 53. Tolentino, 220. Torres Vedras, 175. Toulon, 10, 15, 16, 50, 52, 80, 114, 11 5 - Trafalgar, 101, 117, 148. Trent, 36. Trieste, 169, 192. Troyes, 203. TRUCHSESSVON WALD- BURG, Bonaparte’s reise, 222. Tuileries, 14, 67, 68, 103, 216, 217. Turin, 28, 30. Turkey, 49, 146, 147, 159. TURQUAN, Sceurs de Napoleon, 26, 118. Tyrol, 35. Ulm, 120, 121, 124. United States, 48, 112, 113. Valenza, 30, 31. Valladolid, 154. VANDAL, Avenemcnt de Bona¬ parte, 70; NapoUonet Alexandre, 155, 1S8. Vauchamps, 202. Vendee, 106. Venetia, 149. Venice, 42, 43. Verona, 34, 36-39, 42 Versailles, 48. Vicenza, 36, 37, 39. Victoire, rue de la, 64, 67, 68. Victor, 45, 139, 178, 184, 185. Victor Napoleon, 105. Vienna, 42, 123, 124, 163-167. “ , Congress of, 210, 211, 213, 218. Villeneuve, 115-117. Vimiero, 153. Vincennes, 108. Vistula, 135, 190. VITROLLES, DE, Mans., 209. Vitry, 200. Vittoria, 191. Voltaire, 10. Wagram, 167, 170. Warsaw, 135, 174, 191. WARTENBURG, see York. Washington, too. Waterloo, 227-234. Wavre, 227, 229, 232. Wellington, 156, 166, 175, 19 i, 203, 221, 224-228, 231-234. WELSCHINGER, La censure, 102; le divorce de A T apoleoi', 188 ; le roi de Rome, 209. WEIL, le Prince Engine, 19;', 222. WERTHEIMER, 169. West Indies, 115, 116. Westphalia, 144. Wilna, 179, 180, 187. WILSON, Mans., 12, 188. Wittgenstein, 184, 185, 190. Wurmser, 35-39. Wurtemberg, 144. YORK VON WARTEN¬ BURG, Napoleon, 40. Zurich, 62. R. M. JOHNSTON’S LEADING AMERICAN SOLDIERS Biographies of Washington, Greene, Taylor, Scott, Andrew Jackson, Grant, Sherman, Sheridan, McClellan, Meade, Lee, “ Stonewall ” Jackson, Joseph E. Johnson, With portraits. 1 vol. $1.75 net ; by mail $1.88. ' The first of a new series of biographies of leading Americans. “Performs a real service in preserving the essentials."— Review of Reviews. " Very interesting. . . . Much sound originality of treatment, and the style is clear. "—Springfield Republican. 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