George Washijigton Flowers Memorial Collection DUKE UNIVFRSITY LIBRARY ESTABLISHED BY THE FAMILY or COLONEL FLOWERS Ticaauie Room Digitized by tine Internet Arciiive in 2010 witii funding from Duke University Libraries littp://www.arcliive.org/details/reportofspecialcOOconf REPOE 'y Richmond, March 31, 18G2. ) His Excellency f the President : Sir : I have the honor to submit the following answers, prepared by my predecessor in office, to the resolutions of inquiry, adopted by the House of Representatives, in regard to the disasters at Forts Henry and Donelson, &c., kc. I have just had the honor to receive a copy of the addi- tional resolution of the House of Representatives, this day adopted, calling for the official response of General Albert S. Johnston to the interrogatories propounded to him in re- gard to those subjects, and also for a copy of the supple- mentary report of General Pillow, in regard to the affair at Fort Donelson, &c., &c. I have the honor to reply, that the department is informed that General Johnston is engaged, as rapidly as the circum- stances of his command -will permit, in preparing an answer to these inquiries, and it is not deemed expedient to submit General Pillow's supplementary report, in advance of the other military documents by which it should be accompanied. Only a copy of this report has been submitted to the depart- ment. The original is in possession of General Johnston, and will be forwarded by him, with the accompanying docu- ments, in connection with his own report. Very respectfully, Your obedient servant, GEO. W. RANDOLPH, Secretary of War ANSWERS OF THE WAR DEPARTMENT TO IN- TERROGATORIES OF SPECIAL COMMITTEE. I have the honor to submit the following answers to cer- tain enquiries of the House of Representatives, of which copies were furnished to this department on the 11th inst. Much delay has intervened in the hope of receiving such reports from the army in Tennessee as would render it pos- sible to make full and satisfactory answers. Some of these reports are still delayed, and it is therefore considered due to the House to give all the information now possessed by the department, and to add hereafter, whatever further de- tails may be received. The inquiries and answers have been numbered for the sake of convenience. 1 and 2. At what period was it that the Confederate forces under Gen. Johnston first established themselves in the city of Bowling Green, and what was our force at that time and within the period of a week ? What was the force of the enemy at that period between Bowling Green and the Ohio River, and where located ? General Johnston first established himself with the Con- federate forces at Bowling Green early in October, the pre- cise day not known. There is nothing on file in the department showing the number of his forces and those of the enemy at that period. It is, however, known that the enemy's force was largely in excess of that of General Johnston. 3. What prevented General Johnston, at that time, from making a forward movement towards the Ohio river ? Was he restrained by instructions from the War Department, or was he left to his own discretion in the matter ? The cause which prevented General Johnston from making a forward movement at that time towards the Ohio river, was thus stated by him in a letter of 22d October, 1861 : '< We have received but little accession to our ranks since the Confederate forces crossed the line. In fact, no such en- 10 thusiastic demonstration as to justify any movements not ■warranted by our ability to maintain our own communica- tions." General Johnston was left to his own discretion in all his military movements, and was never at any time restrained by instructions from the War Department, from moving his forces in any manner he deemed advisable. 4, 5, and 6. What forces, if any, were sent from Bowling Green to Fort Donelson previous to the first battle at that place, and under vrhose command ? What number of forces did Gen'l Johnston retain at Bow- ling Green up to the time of its evacuation ? Did General Johnston reinforce, or attempt to reinforce, the Confederate army at Fort Donelson during the progress of the conflicts at that place ? To these inquiries the only information that can be given must, necessarily, be derived from the official report of Gen- eral Johnston, which has been called for, but not yet re- ceived at the Department. It will be submitted as soon as received. 7. Is it within the knowledge of the War Department that any applications were made by the commanders of our forces at Foit Donelson, during the progress of the con- flicts at that place ? It is now Icnown to the Department, through the reports of Generals Floyd and Pillow, and the supplementary report of General Pillow, that no such applications for reinforcements were made. 8. Was General Johnston restrained by orders from the War Department from sending reinforcements, or was he left to his ow)i discretion in that regard? No orders on the subject were issued from the Depart- ment. GenU Johnston's discretion on the subject was unre- strained. 9. 10, and 11. What means of transportation had Gen'l Johnston at Dowling Green to enable him to reinforce Fort Donelson, during the contests, had he been disposed to do 80? When were the fortifications at Fort Donelson and Fort Henry constructed, and in what mode? Was thoie any military reconnoissance along the banks of the Oumberland and Tennessee rivers, with the view to judicious Belections of places for fortifications, before the sites for Forts Henry and Donelson were selected." n On these subjects nothing is recorded in the books of the War Department. 12. Did Gcn'l Johnston fall back from BoAvling Green in accordance "witli instructions from the War Department, or was he left to his own discretion in the matter ? Gen'l Johnston received no instructions from the War Department on this subject. He acted on this, as on all other questions of military movements and operations, in accordance with his own judgment. lie counseled with Generals Beauregard and Hardee before withdrawing from Bowling Green. 13 and 14. Why was Nashville surrendered to the enemy ? Did General Johnston proceed upon his own discretion, or under instructions from the War Department, in regard to the act of surrendering that city into the hands of the enemy ? The reasons for evacuating the city of Nashville, arc given by General Johnston in his letter of 25th February, of which a copy is hereto annexed. In doing this, he acted on his own judgment, and without instructions from the War Department. 15. When Gcn'l Johnston, about the 1st October last, made a call upon several of the States of the southwest, in- cluding the State of Tennessee, for large numbers of troops, why was that call revoked? Was the act of revocation in pursuance of an order of the War Department, or upon his own judgment merely? General Johnston received no orders on the subject from the War Department; but, in a private and coniidential let- ter to him, he was informed by the Secretary of War that the Government did not approve of calling for unarmed men for a less period than the war ; that the Government could procure unarmed men for the war in numbers as large as it could supply with arms ; that it gave the preference to ''war" men over "twelve months" men in distributing arms; that unarmed twelve months men were the most costly and least useful troops that could be called for; and, that it was desirable he should call for no more men for a less period than three years or the war, unless they came with arms. IG. Has the Department received any official report of the affair at Fort Henry or Fort Donelson, or touching the surrender of Nashville ? If so, communicate the same. The Department has already communicated all the re- ports received by it of the above mentioned affairs, except a 13 copy unofficially communicated, of a supplementary report of General Pillow to General Johnston, which is retained until the original as well as other reports arc received from General Johnston, so that the whole subject may be sub- mitted together. The only report of the surrender, or rather the evacuation, of Nashville, is contained in the let- ter of Gen'l A. S. Johnston, above mentioned, and of which a copy is annexed. It is, however, known to the Department that General Johnston is engaged as actively as the exigencies of his command will permit, in preparing for the Congress full in- formation on all the points suggested in the above enquiries, and it is hoped that the report will be received at a very early day. LETTER OF GENERAL A. S. JOHNSTON. Headquarters Western Department, ) MuRFREESBORo', Tenn., Feb. 25, 1862. \ Hon. J. P. Benjamin, Secretary of War, Richmond, Va. : Sir : The fall of Fort Donelson compelled me to withdraw the remaining forces under my command from the north bank of the Cumberland and to abandon the defence of Nashville, Avhich, but for that disaster, it was my intention to protect to the utmost. Not more than 11,000 effec- tive men were left under my command, to oppose a column of General Buell's of not less than 40,000 troops, moving by Bowling Green, while another superior force, under Gen- eral Thomas, outflanked me to the east, and the army from Fort Donelson, with the gun-boats and transports, had it in their power to ascend the Cumberland, now swollen by recent flood, so as to intercept all communication with the South. The situation left me no alternative but to evacu- ate Nashville, or sacrifice the army. By remaining the place would have been unnecessarily subjected to destruc- tion, as it is indefensible, and no adequate force would have been left to keep the enemy in check in Tennessee. Under these circumstances I moved the main body of my command to this place on the 17th and 18th insts., and left a brigade under General Floyd to bring on such stores and property as were at Nashville, with instructions to remain until the approach of the enemy, and then to rejoin me. This has been in a great measure effected, and nearly all the stores would have been saved, but for the heavy and unusual rains, which have washed away the bridges, swept away por- tions of the railroad, and rendered transportation almost impossible. General Floyd has arrived here. The rear 14 guard left Nashville on the night of the 23d. Edgefield, on the north bank of the Cumberland, opposite the city, was occupied yesterday by the advanced picket of the enemy. I have remained here for the purpose of augmenting my forces and securing the transportation of the public stores. By the junction of the command of General Crittenden and the fugitives from Fort Donelson, which have been reor- ganized as far as practicable, the force now under my com- mand will amount to about 17,001) men. General Floyd, with about 2,500 troops, has been ordered to Chattanooga, to defend the approaches towards Northern Alabama and Georgia, and the communication between the INIississippi and Atlantic, and with the view to increase his forces by such troops as may be sent forward from the neighboring States. The Quartermaster's, Commissary's and Ordnance stores, which are not required for immediate use, have been ordered to Chattanooga, and those which will be necessary on the march have been forwarded to lluntsville and Decatur. 1 have ordered a depot to be established at Atlanta for the manufacture of supplies for the Quartermaster's Depart- ment, and also a Laboratory for the manufacture of percus- sion caps and ordnance stores, and at Chattanooga depots for distribution of these supplies. The machinery will be immediately sent forward. Considering the peculiar topography of this State, and the great power which the enemy's means of transportation af- ford, upon the Tennessee and Cumberland, it will be seen that the force under my command cannot successfully cover the whole line against the advance of the enemy. I am compelled to elect, whether he shall be permitted to occupy Middle Tennessee, or turn Columbus, take Memphis, and open the Valley of the Mississippi. To me the defence of the Valley appears of paramount importance, and conse- quently I will move this corps of the army, of which I have assumed the immediate command, toward the left bank of the Tennessee, crossing the river near Decatur, in order to enable me to co-operate or unite with General Beauregard, for the defence of Memphis and the Mississippi. The Department has sent eight regiments to Knoxville for the defence of East Tennessee, and the protection of that region will be confided to them and such additional forces as may be hereafter sent from the adjacent States. General Buckner was ordered by the Department to take command 15 of the troops at Knoxville, but as he was at that time in presence of the enemy, the order was not fulfilled. As it would be almost impossible for me under present circum- stances to superintend the operations at Knoxville and Chat- tanooga, I would respectfully suggest that the local com- manders at those posts should receive orders from the De- partment directly, or be allowed to exercise their discretion. With great respect. Your obedient servant, (Signed,) A. S. JOHNSTON, General 0. S. A. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT OP BRIGADIER-GENE- RAL FLOYD. fi*^ Knoxville, Tennessee, March 20, 1862. H. P. Brewster, A. A, General Sir — Your communication of the 16th inst. from Decatur reached me here to-day, where I came in compliance vrith an order from Major General Smith, who felt his position endangered from the advance of the enemy. In that communication you say : " Under date of March the 11th, the Secretary of War says : ' The reports of Gen- erals Floyd and Pillow are unsatisfactory, and the President directs that hoth these Generals be relieved from command till further orders.' He further directs General Johnston * in the meantime to request them to add to their reports Buch statements as they may deem proper on the following points : ' Ist. The failure to give timely notice of the insufficiency of the garrison of Fort Donelson to repel attack. * 2d. The failure of any attempt to save the army, by evacuating the post, when found to be untenable. ' 3d. Why they abandoned the command to their inferior officer, instead of executing themselves whatever measure was deemed proper for the entire army. ' 4th. What Avas the precise mode by which each effected liis escape from the post, and what dangers were encountered in the retreat. * 5th. Upon what principle a selection was made of par- ticular troops, being certain regiments of the senior Gene- ral's Brigade, to whose use all the transportation on hand was appropriated. 17 * 6th. A particular designation of the regiments saved and the regiments abandoned, which formed part of the se- nior general's brigade.' " In obedience to this order, I am directed by General Johnston to request your compliance with the wishes of the President in these particulars, with as little delay as possi- ble, and forward the report to these headquarters. Under the same direction General Johnston h'ls required a report from Colonel Forrest, detailing particularly the time and manner of his escape from Fort Donelson, the road he took, the number of enemies he met or saw in mak- ing his escape, and the difficulties which existed to prevent the remainder of the army from following the route taken by him in his escape with his command. I give at once the additional information which seems to be asked for in the communication of the Secretary of War to which you refer. The first charge is as follows : *' The failure to give timely notice of the insufficiency of the garrison of Fort Donelson to repel attack." I presume the General knew, before I was ordered to Fort Donelson, that neither the works nor the troops sent there could withstand the force which he knew the enemy had in hand, and which could be brought speedily to that point. I knew perfectly well that if the whole force under General Johnston's command at Bowling Green had been sent to Fort Donelson, it would prove utterly insufficient to repel the advance of the enemy up the Cumberland river. General Johnston's entire force, including the troops at Donelson, as I understood it, did not exceed thirty thousand (30,00(1) men. I knew what I believe every body else did, for it was made public through the newspapers, that the enemy had in Ken- tucky alone one hundred and nineteen (11 9) regiments, and that he had nearly, if not quite, as many at Cairo, St. Louis and the towns near the mouth of the Cumberland. It was also known that the enemy had unlimited means of trans- portation for concentrating troops. How then was it possi- ble for G.eneral Johnston's whole army to meet that force, which was known to be moving towards the mouths of the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers ? The sequel proved that this information was correct, for not only were the troops occupying Kentucky sent up the Cumberlmd, but large additions were made to them from Missouri and Illi*. nois, as stated by prisoners and by the official reports of 2 18 their own commanders. I could not, under a sense of duty, call for reinforcements, because the force under General Johnston was not strong enough to afford a sufficient num- ber to hold the place. I considered the place illy chosen, out of position, and entirely indefensible by any reinforce- ments which could be brought there to its support. It had but thirteen guns, and it turned out that but three of these were effective against iron-clad steamers. I thought the force already there sufficient for sacrifice, as well as enough to hold the place until Bowling Green could be evacuated ■with its supplies and munitions of war. This I supposed to be the main object of the movement to Donelson, and the only good that could be effected by desperately holding that post with the entirely inadequate means in hand for defence of the Cumberland and Tennessee rivers. With a less force than fifty thousand (50,000) men, the position at Fort Tonelson was, in my judgment, quite un- tenable, and even with that force it could have been held for only a short time, unless a force of twenty thousand (20,000) men Avas supporting it at Clarksville, and twenty-five thou- sand (25,000) more at least had been stationed at Nashville. While these were my own views and opinions, I nevertheless transmitted to General Johnston the exact state of affairs at the fort at every stage of the conflict. My vicAvs and opinions upon the defence of Fort Donel- son, and the means of extricating the army from the trap in ■which necessity had thrown them there, had been sec forth in a letter addressed to the General from Clarksville before I received orders to go to Fort Donelson, bearing date 12th of February. I annex a copy of that letter : Clarksville, Tenn., Feb. 12, 1862. General Johnston : Sir : — There is but little known satisfactorily of the enemy or their movements ; up to 10 o'clock last night all Avas quiet as usual at the Fort. General Buckner is now there. I have thought the best disposition to make of the troops on this line Avas to concentrate the main force at Cumberland City — leaving at Fort Donelson enough to make all possible resistance to any attack Avhich may be made zipon the Fort, but no more. The character of the country in the rear and to the left of the Fort is such as to make it dangerous to concentrate our Avhole force there ; for, if their gun-boats 19 should pass tlie Fort and command tlie river, our troops •would be in danger of being cut off by a force from the Ten- nessee. In this event, their road would be open to Nash- ville, without any obstruction whatever. The position at Cumberland City is better ; for there the railroad diverges from the river which would afford some little facility for transportation in case of necessity ; and from thence the open country southward towards Nashville is easily reached. Besides, from that point we threaten the flank of any force Bent from the Tennessee against the Fort, I am making every possible effort to concentrate the forces here at Cum- berland City. I have been in the greatest dread ever since I reached this place at their scattered condition. The force is inadequate to defend a line of forty miles in length which can be attacked from three different directions. We can only be formidable by concentration. A strong guard is all that can be left here, and this no longer than your movement can be made. I shall begin to-day, if the engineers report favorably, to blockade the river at the piers of the railroad bridge. I have taken up an idea that a ''raft," secured against this bridge, can render the river impassable for the gun-boats. If this is possible, it will be an immense relief to the movements above. I am quite sure this blockade can be made at a lower stage of water ; but the present stage of water renders this experiment somewhat doubtful, still 1 will make every exertion to effect the blockade, if possible, I received by telegraph your authority to make any disposi- tion of the troops which, in my judgment was best, and acknowledged it by a dispatch immediately. I am acting accordingly. I am, General, very respectfully, your ob't serv't, JOHN B. FLOYD, Brigadier General, C. S. A. Charge 2nd. — " The failure of any attempt to save the Army by cvacuaiing the post when found to he untenable.''^ I have been unfortunate if I have failed to show in my report of the battle at Fort Donelson that the fight on the 15th of February, outside of our entrenchments, was noth- ing but an " attempt to save the army by evacuating the Fort," which the position and numbers of the enemy had already rendered untenable. In my report of the 27th of February, I attempted to explain why we left our entrench- ments on the loth to give battle, and the object I had ia 20 view in doing so. I said '* I had already seen the impossi' bility of holding ou_t for any length of time -with our inade- quate numbers and indefensible position. There was no place in our entrenchments but could be reached by the enemy's artillery from their boats or their batteries. It was but fair to infer that whilst they kept up a sufficient fire upon our entrenchments, to keep our men from sleep and prevent repose, their object was merely to give time to pass a column above us on the river, both on the right and the left banks and thus to cut off all our communications and to prevent the possibility of egress. I then saw clearly that but one course Avas left by which a rational hope could be entertained of saving the garrison or a part of it. That was to dislodge the enemy from his position on cur left and thus to pass our people into the open country lying south- ward towards Nashville." Upon the failure of this enterprise, the causes of which are fully set forth in my report, it obviously became impos- sible to *' save the army by evacuating the post ;" the " attempt" to save the army had been made. I thought then, and still think, that a more earnest " attempt" could not be made by an equal number of men to accomplish any enterprise by force of arms. To extricate the army, then, involved the necessity of anoth«rr battle that night, more desperate than that of the morning, because the enemy had been greatly reinforced, and held their former position with fresh troops. There is such a thing as human exhaustion, an end of physical ability in man to march and fight ; how- ever little such a contingency may seem possible to those Avlio sleep quietly upon soft beds, who fare sumptuously every day, and have never tried the exposure of protracted battles and hard campaigns. This point had been reached by our men; the conflict, toil, and excitement of unsus- pended battle, running through eighty-four hours, was enough to wear out the physical strength of any men ; espe- cially so, when the greater part of the time they were ex- posed to a storm of sleet, snow, and continued frost, and opposed to a force five or six times greater than their own, without shelter or fire. Many of the men had been frost- bitten ; and a great many were so overcome by fatigue and want of sleep as to be unable to keep open their eyes standing on their feet, in the face and under the fire of the enemy. In fact the men were totally out of condition to fight. There were but two roads by which it was possible to retire. 31 If they went by tlie upper road they would certainly have a strong position of the enemy to cut through, besides having to march over the battle field strewn with corpses ; and if they retired by the lower road they would have to wade through water three feet deep ; which latter ordeal the medical director stated would be death to more than half of the command on account of the severity of the weather and their physical prostration. It was believed in council that the army could not retire without sacrificing three-fourths of it. The consultation which took place among the officers on the night of the loth was to ascertain whether a further struggle could be maintained, and it was resolved in the negative unconditionally and emphatically. General Buck- ner, whose immediate command was the largest in the fort, was positive and unequivocal in his opinion that the fight could not bo renewed. I confess I was myself strongly influenced by this opinion of General Backner; for I have not yet seen an ofiiccr in whoso superior military ability, clear discriminating^ judgment, in whose calm unflinching courage and unselfish patriotism I more fully confide than in his. The loss to the Confederacy of so able, brave and accomplished a soldier is irreparable. From my own knowledge of the condition of the men, I thought that but few of them were in condition to encounter a night conflict. So the plan of renewing the battle was abandoned ; and thus the necessity of surrender was pre- sented. All agreed that the necessity existed. That con- clusion having been reached, nothing remained but to con- sider the manner of it ; and that is fully set forth in my former report. The third charge is, '" why they abandoned the contmand to their inferior oflScer, .instead of executing themselves whatever measure was deemed proper for the entire arm3^" The *' abandonment of command" here imputed, I sup- pose to mean the act of transferring to General Buckner, who was willing to execute it, the performance of the for- malities of surrender. The surrender was a painful and inexorable necessity which could not be avoided, and not a ''measure deemed proper for the entire army." On the contrary, my proposition to take away as large a portion of the forces as possible met, I am sure, with the approbation of the whole council. One of the reasons which induced me to make this transfer to General Buckner was in order thai I might be untrammelcd in the effort, I was determined to 22 malce to extricate as many of the command as possible from tlic fort, to which object I devoted myself during the night of the 15th. So that I accomplished the fact of bringing off troops from the position, I thought little of the manner of doing so. AH possibility of further fighting was over. Not another gun was to be fired, no personal risk Avas to be in- curred, certain and absolute freedom from all personal dan- ger was secured to those who surrendered ; further danger, conflict and toil could befall those only who should attempt to escape and those I chose to lead. Nothing was to be done by those who remained but to hoist the white flag, and to surrender. This I would not do, for the "measure" of surrender had not been thought of by myself or any officer present in the council as one proper for the " entire army," I supposed it to be an unquestiona- ble principle of military action, that in case of disaster it is better to save a part of a command than to lose the Avhole. The alternative proposition which I adopted in preference to surrendering the " entire army," was to* make my way out of the beleagured camp with such men as were still able to make another struggle, if it could be accomplished ; and if it could not be, then to take any consequences that did not involve a surrender. The fifth charge is, " upon what principle a selection was made of particular troops, being certain regiments of the senior General's brigade, to whose use all the transportation on hand was appropriated." The answer to this charge leads directly to that of the fourth, and I therefore respond first to this. I presume it is well established that a senior general can select any troopa under his command for any service or purpose or plan he may choose to execute ; and if the means were offered of extricating only a portion of men from a general surrender, I presume the selection of this portion would rest with him rather than with any other person or persons. This would' be a sufficient answer to the charge in question, if I chose to rely upon it, which I do not. My real answer I will give fully. It is untrue that " all the transportation on hand wa* appropriated to certain regiments of the senior Generars bri- gade." It is untrue that a selection was made of " particular troops." I am sure that quite as many men belonging to other brigades were provided with "means of escape," "by the trans- portation on hand" as Avere of the senior General's brigade. Late at night it was ascertained that two steamboats would- probably reach the landing before day-light. Then I de- 23 termmed to let Col. Forrest's cavalry proceed on their march by the river road, which was impassable for anything but cavalry, on account of the back water and over-liow whilst I would remain behind and endeavor to get away as many men as possible by the boats. The boats came a short time before day-light, when I hastened to the river and be- gan to ferry the men over to the opposite shore as rapidly as possible. • "^ The men were taken on indiscriminately as they came tc the boats; but in the first instance more of the '' Seni^i Gcnerars Brigade" were present than of other troops, from this circumstance, namely : That when I determined not to surrender, I caused my brigade to be drawn up in line and to await my final preparation for a forward movement This was promptly done, and as they were nearest the leit flank where the fight would first begin, so likewise were they nearest to the river landing. From this circumstance, it happened that the troops from my immediate command were among the first to enter the boats; but all the men from all portions ot the army, who were present and could be gotten on board, were taken indiscriminately as far as I had any knowledge. No man of the army was excluded to make room for my brigade. On the contrary, all who came wore taken on board, until some time after day-li.rht when I re- ceived a message from General Buckner that'any further delay at the wharf would certainly cause the loss of the boat with all on board. Such was the want of all order and dis- cipline by this time on shore, that a wild rush was made at the boat, which the captain said would swamp her unless he pushed off immediately. This was done, and about sunrise the boat on which I was (the other having gone) left the shore and steered up the river. By this - precise mode " I effected my "escape," and after leaving the wharf the De- partment will be pleased to hear, that I encountered no dan- gers whatever from the enemy. I had announced in council my determination to take my own brigade and attempt a retreat; and this, I presume, is What IS referred to in the charge of "selecting certain reffi- ments of the Senior Gcnerars Brigade." I -selected" this command, because they had been with me in the most tryinff service for seven months, had been repeatedly under fire had been exposed to every hardship incident to a campai<^n' had never on any occasion flinched or faltered, had ne?er uttered a complaint ; and I knew were to be relied on for 94 any enterprise that could be accomplislied. In announcing this intention, it was far from my purpose to exclude any troops who might think proper, or might be physically able, to join me in making the movement. The sixth charge is — " A particular designation of the regiments saved, and the regiments abandoned, which formed part of the Senior General's brigade." My brigade consisted of the 36th Reginffent Va. Vols., the 5!)th llcg't Va. Vols., the 51st Regiment Va. Vols., the ^th Rcg't Va. Vols., and the 2()th Reg't Miss. Vols. No one of these regiments was cither wholly saved or wholly left. I could obtain no reports from regiments until I ar- rived at Murfreesboro'. There our morning reports show the aggregate of each regiment present respectively to have been of the 36th Rcg't Va. Vols., 243; 5iith Reg"t Va. Vols., 285; 5 1st Reg't Va. Vols., 274; 5Dth Regiment Va. Vols., 184; the 2Uth Reg't Miss. Vols, handed in no report at Murfreseboro', and what there was of it was ordered away by General Johnston ; but I am informed that their morning report will show over three hundred (300) as present. These reports were made before those who had been ferried over the river at Donelson had come up. A considerable number of men from each of these regi- ments were " saved," and many of each were left behind. Of my own brigade, a great many who were left effected their escape by every means they could command, and joined their regiments and companies, except the 20th Regiment Miss. Vols., which, by General Johnston's order were de- tached and sent home to recruit. This regiment, at the last accounts I had of it, immediately after the fight of Fort Donelson, numbered, as already stated, about three hundred (300) men ; but I have no accurate information on the sub- ject. The loss I felt most seriously, was that of my three artillery companies of Virginia troops, so remarkable for their efficiency and real gallantry, who had followed me so faithfully throughout my service in Virginia, and who fought so bravely during the whole of the trying conflict at Donelson. I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant, JOHN B. FLOYD, [Copy.] Brig. General C. S. A. Peter Otey, A. A. General. LETTER OF GEN. JOHN B. FLOYD TO CHAIR- MAN OF SPECIAL COMMITTEE. *Abingdon, March 25th, 1862. Hon. Henry S. Foote, Chairman, &fc , House of Representatives : Sir : Just as I Avas getting ready to leave Knoxville, where I had been ordered by Major General Smith, to as- sist with my command in the defence of that locality, I re- ceived your letter, sent back from Decatur whither it had been first sent. I had, the day before, received the order from the War Department, relieving me from my command, and a letter, preferring certain charges against me, for which I suppose this punishment was inflicted. To these charges I was re- quired to answer, which I have done ; and, as they cover the points of inquiry pending before your honorable committee, I have thought proper to send you, in answer to your in- quiries, for the information of your committee, a copy of my answer to the charges of the War Department. The delay in responding to these inquiries has grown out of my failure to got the official documents requiring the answer until within a few days past. I regret that my first report should have proved so unsat- isfactory to the authorities of the Confederacy. It was, to be sure, written very hurriedly in my tent, at night, after a long day's march, and after the business of that day and the preparations for the march of the next were completed. But I supposed that a simple narrative of the ti'ansactions which led through the terrible and most sanguinary fight of Fort Donelson to the painful, but unavoidable necessity of a small force yielding at last to an overwhelming one, was all tliat could be expected officially at my hands. If I had been at leisure, and had determined to go into a detailed statement of all the facts and incidents within my know- 2G ledge, I should equally have failed to cover the points raised in the accusations preferred against me by the De- partment. I never dreamed, for a moment, that I had done anything, or had neglected any duty, for which, in my re- port of that battle, I should find it necessary to present a defence against grave and dishonoring charges. But far less did I suppose it possible that I should be held responsi- ble for failing to defend the Cumberland river and the capi- tal of Tennessee, with the insignificr.nt means put at my command, against an overwhelming force, at least six times my own in numbers, advancing )yith perfect preparation by land and water. It ought to have been understood that this fort could not withstand the force which the enemy were certain to bring against it. It was ill-conceived, badly executed, and still worse located, with only thirteen guns of all calibres, the greater part of them small, and therefore useless. It had in fact only three effective guns, and an important portion of its defensive works was not commenced until the enemy had made his appearance before it in force. It was to sus- tain a continued attack from the gunboat fleet, known for months to have been preparing in the West by the enemy for operations against our western rivers, and numbering at least ten (10,) carrying each probably sixteen to twenty guns of the largest calibre. These gunboats were to be seconded by a land force, drawn from an army in the West well known to be organized on the most formidable scale, amounting, in the aggregate, to 200,1)00 men, all so stationed as to be easily concentrated on the banks of the Cumber- land, or any other western river, in the space of one week, heavy columns of which, at the time I was sent to Fort Donelson, were known to be moving upon the Cumberland river. The naked fort, as I have described it, constituted the entire preparation of the Confederate Government for meet- ing the advance of this most formidable array up the Cum- berland river. The little intrenchments or rifle pits around the encampments, constructed to defend our people against the land attack, were not completed until the morning of the 13th February, the men working all the night before upon them, the enemy having appeared in force and begun the attack on the preceding day. I have caused a diagram of the fort and defences around it to be made, which I append to this communication. You 27 will see from it, that the river bounded our position etitirelj on the north, and the encampment and batteries of the enemy surrounded us on every other side. Again, referring you particularly to my supplemental re- port of the 2Uth inst., heretofore forwarded through General A. S. Johnston to the War Department, a copy of which is herewith sent, as containing minute answer to the points of inquiry embraced in your letter to me, I have the honor to be, With the highest respect, Your obedient servant, JOHN B. FLOYD, Brigadier General C. S. A. GENERAL PILLOW'S REPORT OF THE BATTLES AT FORT DONELSON. (^^ 41 '^■' Columbia, Tennessee, ) February 18, 1862. \ Captain Clarence Derrick, Assistant Adjutant General : On the 9tli instant, General A. S. Johnston ordered me to proceed to Fort Donelson and take command at that post. On the 10th instant, I arrived at that place. In detailing the operations of the forces under mj command at Fort Donelson, it is proper to state the condition of that work, and of the forces constituting its garrison, Whon I ar- rived, I found the work on the river battery unfinished and wholly too weak to resist the force of heavy artillery. I found a 10-inch Columbiad and a 32-pounder rifled gun had not been mounted. Deep gloom was hanging over the command, and the troops were greatly depressed, and de- moralized by the circumstances attending the surrender of Fort Henry and the raanner of retiring from that place. My first attention was given to the necessity of strength- ening this work, and mounting the two heavy guns, and to the construction of defensive works to protect the rear of the river battery. I imparted to the work all the energy which it was possi- ble to do ; working day and night with the whole command. The battery was without a competent number of artillerists, and those that were there were not well instructed in the use of the guns. To provide for this want I placed the artillery companies under active course of instruction, in the use of their guns. I detailed Capt. Ross, with his company of light artillerists to the command of one of the river batteries. These heavy guns being mounted, and provision made for working them, and a proper supply of ammunition having been procured, by my orders, from Nashville, I felt myself prepared to test the effect of the fire of heavy metal against the enemy's gun-boats, though the work stood much in need of more heavy pieces. The armament of the batteries con- sisted of eight (8) 32-pounders ; three (3) 32-pounder car- ronades, one (1) 8-inch Columbiad, and one (1) rifle gun of 32-pounder calibre. The selection of the site for the work was an unfortunate one. While its command of the river was favorable, the site was commanded by the heights above and below on the river, and by a continous range of hills around the work to its rear. A field work of very contracted dimensions had been constructed for the garrison to protect the battery, but the field works were commanded by the hills already referred to, and lay open to a fire of artillery from every direction except from the hills below. To guard against the effects of fire of artillery from these heights, a line of defensive works, consisting of rifle pits and abattis for infantry, detached on our right, but con- tinuous on our left, with defences for our light artillery were laid off by Major Gilmer, Engineer of Gen. A. S. Johnston's stafi", but on duty with me at the post, around the rear of the battery, and on the heights from which artillery could reach our battery, and inner field work, enveloping the inner work and the town of Dover, where our principal supplies of Commissary and Quartermaster stores were in depot. These works pushed with the utmost possible energy were not quite completed, nor were my troops all in position, al- though nearly so, when Brigadier General Floyd, my senior officer, reached that station. The works were laid off with great judgment and skill by Major Gilmer, — were well executed and designed for the defence of the rear of the work ; the only objection being to the length of the line, which, however, was unavoidable from the surroundings. The length of the line and the inadequacy of the force for its defence was a source of embarrassment throughout the struggle which subsequently ensued in the defence of the position. I had placed Brigadier General Buckner in command of the right wing, and Brigadier General B. R. Johnson in command of the left. By extraordinary eflorts, we had 99 barely got these worjcs in defensible condition, -wlien tbe enemy made an advance in force around and against the entire line of outer work. THE BATTLE OF THE TRENCHES. The assault was commenced by the enemy's artillery against the centre of our left wing, which was promptly re- sponded to by Capt, Greene's battery of field artillery. After several hours of firing between the artillery of the two armies, the enemy's infantry advanced to the conflict, all along the line, which was kept up and increased in volume from one end of the line to the other, for several hours, when, at last, the enemy made a vigorous assault against the right of our left wing, the position assaulted being a height commanded by Col. Ileiman and defended by his brigade, consisting of the lOth Tennessee, under com- mand of Lieut. Col. McGavock, Col. Vorhies', Col. Hughes', and Col. Head's regiments, Tennessee volunteers, and de- fended by Capt. INIaury's field battery. This assault was vigorously made, and the position as vigorously defended, and resulted in the repulse of the enemy here and everywhere around the line. The result of the day's work pretty well tested the strength of our defen- sive lines, and established, beyond question, the gallantry of the entire command, all of which fought gallantly their por- tion of the line. The loss sustained by our forces in this engagement was not large, our men being mostly under shelter in the rifle pits, but we, nevertheless, had quite a number killed and wounded, but owing to the continued fighting which followed, it was impossible to get any official report of the casualties of the day. On the same day our battery on the river was engaged with one of tlie enemy's gun-boats, which occasioned quite a lively cannonading for more than an hour, in which the gallant Capt. Dixon of the engineer corps was killed in- stantly at the battery. This officer had been on duty for some months at the post, and had shown great energy and professional skill, and by his gallant bearing on that day, while directing the operations of the day, under my orders, had justly earned for himself high distinction. His death was a serious loss to the service, and was a source of no little embarrassment in our after operations. 31 On the 12t]i we had quiet, but we saw the smoke of a large number of gun-boats and st3am-boats below. We also received reliable information of the arrival of a large number of new troops, greatly increasing the strength of the enemy's forces, already said to be from 2(J to 3U,U00 strong. BATTLE WITH THE GUN-BOATS, On the 13th these reinforcements were seen advancing to their position in the line of investment, and while this was being done six of the enemy's iron-cased gun-boats were seen advancing up the river, five of which were abreast and in line of battle, and the sixth some distance to the rear. When these gun-boats arrived within a mile and a half of our battery, they opened fire on the battery. My orders to the officers. Captain Shuster and Captain Standewitz who commanded the lower battery of eight guns, and Captain Ross who commanded the upper battery of four guns, were to hold their fire until the enemy's boats should come within point blank range of their guns. This they did, though the ordeal of holding their fire, while the ene- my's shot and shell fell thick around tlieir position was a se- vere restraint to their patriotic impulses ; but nevertheless, our batteries made no response until the enemy's gun-boats got within range of these guns. Our entire line of batte- ries then opened fire ; the guns of both parties were well served ; the enemy constantly advancing, delivering direct fire against our batteries from his line of five gun-boats, while the sixth boat, moving up in rear, kept the air filled with shells which fell thick and close around the position of our batteries. The fight continued, tlic enemy steadily advancing slowly up the river, the shot and shell from fifteen heavy rifled guns tearing our parapets and plunging deep in the earth around and over our batteries, for nearly two hours, and until his boats had reached within the distance of one hundred and fifty yards of our batteries. Having come in such close conflict, I could distinctly see the effects of our shots from the heavy guns to one of his boats, when she instantly shrunk back and drifted helpless below the line. Several shot struck another boat tearing her iron case and splintering her timbers and making them crack as if by a stroke of lightning, when she too fell back. Then a third received several severe shocks, making her metal ring, and her timbers crack when the whole line gave way, 3« and fell rapidly back from our fire, until they passed out of range. Thus ended the first severe and close conflict of our heavy guns with the enemy's gunboats, testing their strength and the power of our heavy guns to resist them. The shot from our 32-pounder guns produced but little effect ; they struck and rebounded apparently doing but little damage ; but I am satisfied by close observation that the timbers of the frame work did not, and could not withstand the shock of the lO-inch Columbiad, or 32-pounder rifled gun. These gunboats never renewed the attack. I learned from citizens living on the river below that one of the injured boats sunk, and that others had to be towed to Cairo. This information may or may not be true ; but it is certain that all of the boats were repulsed and driven back after a most vigorous and determined attack, and that two of the boats were badly damaged, and that a third was raorc or less injured. It is diflficult to over-estimate the gallant bearing and heroic conduct of the officers and men of our batteries, who so well and so persistently fought our guns, until the enemy's determined advance brought his boats and guns into such close and desperate conflict. Where all did their duty so well it is almost impossible to discriminate. The Captains have already received and their Lieutenants (whose names for want of official reports, I cannot give) all deserve the highest commendation. Lieut. George S. Martin, Avhose company is at Columbus, Ky., but who was ordered to that post by Major General Polk, commanded one of the guns, and particularly attracted my attention by the energy and judgment with which he fought his gun. The wadding of his gun having given out, he pulled off" his coat and rammed it down his gun as wadding, and thus kept up the fire until the enemy were finally repulsed. On the evening of this day, we received information of the arrival of additional reinforcements of infantry, cavalry and light artillery by steamboat, all of which were disem- barked a short distance below our position. BATTLE OF DOVER. On the 14th inst., theenemy were busy throwing his forces of every arm around us, extending his line of investment entirely around our position, and completely enveloping us. 33 On the evening of this day we ascertained that the enemy had received by steamboat additional reinforcements. We were now surrounded by an immense force, said by prisoners whom we had taken to amount to fifty-two regi- ments, and every road and possible avenue of departure cut off, with the certainty that our sources of supply by river AYOuld soon be cut off by the enemy's batteries, placed upon the river above us. At a meeting of General Officers, called by General Floyd, it was determined unanimously to give the enemy battle next day at daylight so as to cut open a route of exit for our troops to the interior of the c:>untry, and thus to save our army. We had knowledge that the principal portion of the enemy's forces were massed in en- campments in front of the extreme left of our position, com- manding the two roads leading to the interior, one of which we must take in retiring from our position. We knew be had amassed in encampment anothei- large force on the Winn's Ferry Road, opposite the centre of our left wing ; Avhile still another was massed nearly in front of the left of our right wing. His fresh arrival of troops being encamped on the bank of the river two and a half miles below us, from which latter encampment a stream of fresh troops was constantly pouring around us on his line of in- vestment and strengthening his general encampment on the extreme right. At each of his encampments, and on each road, he had in position a battery of field artillery and 24-pounder iron guns on siege carriages. Between these encampments on the roads was a thick undergrowth of brush and black-jack, making it impossible to advance or manoeuvre any consider- able body of troops. The plan of attack agreed upon and directed by General Floyd to be executed was that, with the main body of the forces defending our left wing, I should attack the right wing of the enemy, occupy ig and resting on the heights reaching to the bank of the river, accompanied by Col. For- rest's Brigade of Cavalry. That General Buckner, with the forces under his command, and defending the right of our line, should strike the enemy's encampment and forces on the Winn's Ferry road. That the forces under Col, Ileiman should hold his position and that each command should leave in the trenches troops to hold the trenches. In this order of battle, it was easy to be seen that if my attack was successful and the enemy was routed, tliat his retreat would be along hia 3 S4 line of investment towards the Winn's Ferry encampment, and tlicnce towards his reserve at the gun-boats below. In other words, my success would roll the enemy's force in re- treat over upon General Buckner, when by his attack in flank and rear, we could cut up the enemy and put him completely to rout. Accor 'ingly, dispositions were made to attack the enemy. At five o'clock, on the morning of the 15th, I moved out of my position to engage the enemy. In less than one half hour our forces were engaged. The enemy was prepared to receive me in advance of his encampment, and he did receive me before I had assumed a line of battle, and while I was moving against him without any formation for the engagement. For the first half hour of the engagement, I was much embarrassed in getting the command in position properly to engage the enemy. Having extricated myself from the po- sition, and fairly engaged the enemy, we fought him for nearly two hours before I made any decided advance upon him. He contested this field most stubbornly. The loss of both nrmies on this position was heavy — the enemy's par- ticularly so, as I discovered by riding over the field after the battle. The enemy having been forced to yield this portion of the field retired slowly towards the Winn's Ferry road — Buckner's point of attack. He did not retreat, but fell back fighting us and contesting every inch of ground. The fight was hotly contested and stubborn on both sides and consumed the day till 12 o'clock, to drive the enemy as far back as the centre where General Buckner was to Hank him. While my command was slowly advancing and driving back the enemy, I was anxiously expecting to hear General Buckner's command open fire in his rear, which not taking place, 1 was apprehensive of some misapprehension of orders and come from the field of battle Avithin the work to ascer- tain what was the matter. I there found the command of General Buckner massed behind the ridge within the work taking shelter from the enemy's artillery on the Winn's Ferry road, it having been forced to retire before the bat- tery as I learned from him. My force was still slowly advancing, driving the enemy before the battery. I directed General Buckner immediately to move his command round to the rear of the battery, turn- ing its left, keeping in the hollow, and attack and carry it. Before the movement was executed, my forces, forming the 35 attacking party on the right, with Col. Forrest's regiment of cavalry, had reached the position of the battery. Col. Forrest's cavalry gallantly charged a large body of infantry supporting the battery, driving it and forcing the battery- to retire, and taking six pieces of artillery — four brass pieces and two 24-pounder iron pieces. In pursuing the enemy falling back from this position, General Buckner's forces became united with mine and engaged the enemy in a hot contest of nearly an hour with large forces of fresh troops that now met us. This position of the enemy being carried by our joint forces, I called off the further pursuit, after seven-and jv- half hours of continuous and bloody conflict. ■ Alter the troo^is were called off from the pursuit, orders were immediately given to the different commands to form and retire to their original positions in the entrenchments. The operations of the day forced the entire command of the enemy around to our right and in front of General Buckner's position in the entrenciiments, and when he reached his position he found the enemy advancing rapidly to take possession of his portion of our works. He had a stubborn conflict, lasting one and a half hour, to regain his position ; and the enemy actually got possession of the ex- treme right of his works, and held them so firmly that he could not dislodge him. The position thus gained by the enemy Avas a most important and commanding one, being immediately in rear of our river batteries, and fieldwork for its protection. From it he could readily turn the entrench- ed work occupied by General Buckner, and attack him in reverse, or he could advance under cover of our intervening ridge, directly upon our battery and field work. While the enemy held the position, it was manifest we could not hold the main Avork or battery. Such was the condition of the two armies at nightfall after nine hours of conflict on the 15th instant, in which our loss was severe, and leaving not less than one thousand of the enemy dead upon the field. We left upon the field nearly all of his wounded, because we could not remove them. We left his dead unburied, because we could not bury them. Such carnage and conflict has, perhaps, never before occur- red on this continent. We took about three hundred pri- soners and a large number of arms. We had fought the battle to open the way for our army, and to relieve us from an investment which would necessa- 56 rilv reduce us and the position wc occupied by famine. Wc had accomplished our object, but it occupied the whole day, and before we could prepare to leave, after taking in the wounded and dead, the enemy had thrown around us again, in the night, an immense force of fresh troops, and reoccu- pied his original position in the line of investment, thus again cutting off our retreat. We had only about 13,Uli() troops all told; of these we had lost a large proportion in the three battles. The com- mand had been in the trenches night and day for five days, exposed to the snow and sleet, and mud and ice water, with- out shelter and without adequate covering, and without sleep. In this condition the General oflficers held a consul- tation to determine what we should do. General Buckner gave it as his decided opinion that he could not hold his po- sition a half hour against an assault of the enemy, and said he was satisfied the enemy would attack him at daylight the next morning. The proposition was then made by the undersigned to again fight our way through the enemy's lines and cut our way out. General Buckner said his command was so worn out and cut to pieces and demoralized, that he could not make another fight; that it would cost the command three- fourths its present numbers to cut its way out, and that it was wrong to sacrifice three-fourths of a command to save one-fourth ; that no officer had a right to cause such a sacri- fice. General Floyd and Major Gilmer, I understood to concur in this opinion. I then expressed the opinion that we could hold out another day, and in that time we could get steamboats and set the command over the river, and probably save a large portion of it. To this General Buck- ner replied that the enemy would certainly attack us in the moaning, and that he could not hold his position a half hour. The alternative of these propositions was a surren- der of the position and command. General Floyd said he would not surrender the command, nor would he surrender himself a prisoner. I had taken the same position. Gene- ral Buckner said he was satisfied nothing else could be done, and that, therefore, he would surrender the command, if placed in command. General Floyd said he would turn over the command to him, if he could be allowed to with- draw his command. General Buckner consented to this. Thereupon the command was turned over to me, I passing it instantly to General Buckner, saying I would 87 neither surrender the command nor myself. I directed Colonel Forrest to cut his way out. Under these circum- stances General Buckner accepted the command, and sent a flag of truce to the enemy for an armistice of six hours to negotiate for terms of capitulation. Before this flag and communication were delivered, I retired from thp garrison. Before closing my report of the operations of the army at DoRclson, I must, in justice to tlie ofhcers and commands under my immediate command, say that harder figliting or more gallant conduct in officers and men I have never wit- nessed. In the absence of oflicial reports of brigadier and regimental commanders, of which I am deprived by the cir- cumstances detailed in this report, I may not be able to do justice to the diiferent corps. I will say, however, that the forces under my immediate cominand, during the action, bore themselves most gallantly throughout the long and bloody conflict. I speak with especial commendation of the brigades commanded by Colonels Baldwin and Wharton, McCausland, Simonton and Drake, and of Captains Maney and Green, who fought their guns under the constant and annoying fire of the enemy's sharp-shooters, and of the concentrated line from his field batteries, from which both commands suff"ered severely. Captain Maney Avas himself wounded, and had several laeutenants killed and wounded, and many of his company also killed and wounded. Such was the case also with Captains Graves and Porter. If I should, hereafter, receive the reports of regimental and bri- gade commanders, giving me detailed information of the conduct and bearing of ofiicers and men, I will make a sup- plemental report. The absence of official reports deprives rae of the means of giving lists of the killed and wounded of the different commands. I am satisfied that in such a series of conflicts our loss was heavy. I know the enemy's was, from passing over the field of battle, in the evening immediat.^ly after the battle, in company with General Floyd. His loss in killed was terrible, exceeding anything I have ever seen upon a battle field. Our total force in the field did not exceed in,0!)() men, while from what I saw of the enemy's force, and from in- formation derived from many prisoners of the enemy, we are sure he had between 30,000 and 40,000 men in the field. I must acknowledge many obligations to Major Gilmer, Engineer, for especial and valuable services rendered me in laying off these works, and the energy displayed hy him ins directing their construction, and for his counsel and advice. I, likewise, acknowledge my obligations to Captain Gus. A, Henry, jr., my A. A. General; to Colonel John C. Burch, my Aid-de-camp ; to Major Field, to Lieutenant Nichol- son, to Lieutenant Chas. F. Martin, and Colonel Brandon, my Volunteer Aids-de-camp ; to Major Hays, my Assistant Commissary, and ]Major Jones, my Assistant Quartermaster, for the prompt manner in which they executed my orders, under trying circumstances, throughout the long and con- tinued conflicts, and to Major Gilmer, who accompanied mc to the field, and was on duty with me the entire day. Also to Captain Parker, of my Staff, whom I assigned to the command of Captain Ross' field battery, with new recruits as gunners, and who fought and served them well. The conduct of these officers coming under my immediate atten- tion and observation, met my hearty approval and com- mendation. Colonel Brandon was severely wounded early in the action. Colonel Baldwin's Brigade constituted the front of the attacking force, sustained immediately by Col. Wharton's Brigade. These two brigades deserve especial commendation for the manner in which they sustained the first shock of battle, and under circumstances of great embarrassment threw themselves into position and followed up the conflict through- out the day. Being mostly with these two brigades, I can speak from personal knowledge of the gallant conduct and bearing of the two Brigade Commanders, Col. Baldwin and Wharton. I must also acknowledge my obligations to Brig- adier-General B. R. Johnson, who assisted me in the com- mand of the forces with which I attacked the enemy and •who bore himself gallantly throughout the conflict, but having received no official report from him, I cannot give the detailed operations of his command. I have pleasure in being able to say that Col. Forrest, Avhose command greatly distinguished its commander as a bold and judicious officer and reflected the highest honor upon itself, passed safely through the enemy's line of investment, and trust it will yet win other honors in defence of our rights and the just eause of our country. GIDEON J. PILLOW, Brig. GmH C. S. A.. RESPONSE OF BRIGADIER GENERAL GIDEON J. PILLOW TO THE ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR, OF MARCH 11, 1862. Captain H. P. Brewster, Assistant Adjutant General : Sir : In my supplemental report which is furnished through General A. S. Johnston, I have, as I conceived, sub- stantially answered the points indicated in the order of the Secretary of War as unsatisfactory to the President. But to be more specific, and to reply directly to these points, I beg to say, that — 1st. General Floyd reached Fort Donelson early on the morning of the 13th of February, and being my senior offi- cer assumed command. Up to that time we had no need of additional forces, for at that time, the enemy had only about 20,000 troops, and we had a force fully sufficient to defend the place against that force, and I did not, and could not know with what force they meant to invest us. We were attacked -by that force on the 13th around our whole line, and after three or four hours of vigorous assault we re- pulsed his forces every where. After General Floyd's arrival, being second in command, I could not, without a violation of military usage, apply for reinforcements. But I do not seek to shelter mj-self from responsibility by this consideration. Though the enemy's force greatly exceeded ours, we felt that we could hold our position against him, until his large force of fresh troops ar- rived on the 13th, 14th and 15th. These arrivals of about thirty thousand troops made it manifest that we could not hold the position against such overwhelming numbers, par- ticularly as they were then enabled to completely invest us, and cut off our communication by river. 40 It was tli^n impossible to get reinforcements from Bowling Green or elsewhere in time to relieve us. It required three days hy railroad and river for the forces which did come to us to get there, owing to the shortness of transportation. I apprised GeneralJohnston of the arrival of the enemy's large reinforcements ; giving him every arrival. But I had just come from Bowling Green, and was of opinion, that the force received for that position was inadequate for its defence against a large assaulting force, and I knew General Johnston could not give me any reinforcements, unless he abandoned that place, a measure which I did not consider it my province to suggest. Knowing this I felt it my duty to make the best possible defence with the forces we had. We had one additional regiment or battalion there which Gene- ral Floyd sent to Cumberland city to protect public stores that had been forwarded to that place. These are the reasons why no application had been made for reinforce- ments. 2d. In response to the second point made by the Secre- tary's order I have to say that arrangements were all made, orders given to the whole command to evacuate the work, and troops were under orders to march out when informa- tion was received that we were re-invested. Up to this time the General Officers were all agreed upon the line of action necessary and proper under the circumstances. (See sup- plemental report.) It was as to the necessity of a change of policy in the new state of the case, that a diiference of opinion arose between the General Officers. I was for cut- ting our way out. Generals Floyd and Buckner thought surrender was a necessity of the position of the army. In response to the point made by the Secretary's order that it was not satisfactorily explained how a part of the com- mand was withdrawn and the balance surrendered, I have to say : On the night and evening of the 1 5th of February, after the battle, in expectation of evacuating the place that night. General Floyd had sent oif every steamboat we had with the prisoners and our sick and wounded. As matters turned out this was most unfortunate, but I do not perceive that the act could be censured, for it was a measure prepara- tory to evacuation, and no one could have foreseen the course of events which late that night defeated that measure. The act, however, was that of my senior officer, and I was not even consulted about its propriety. When we ascertained, between three and four o'clock that 41 night, that we were reinrested, and the question of our po- sition became one of vital interest to the commanding offi- cers, we had not a single boat ; neither skiff, yawl, nor even flat, or other ferry-boat. There was no means of crossing the river. The river was full and the weather intensely cold. About day-break the steamer General Anderson and one other little boat came down. One of the boats had on board about 40 > raw troops. I had then crossed the river in a small hand flat, about four feet wide by twelve hnig, which Mr. Rice, a citizen oLDover, (acting as my Volun- teer Aid-dc-camp) had, by some means, brought over from the opposite side of the river. Upon the arrival of these steamers General Floyd, acting I presume, under the agreement between him and General Buckner, before the command was turned over, crossed over to the opposite shore as many of his troops as he could, un- til he was directed by General Buckncr's staff officers to leave, as the gun-boats of the enemy were approaching. This information was given me by General Floyd, when we met at Clarksville. My horses were brought across the river on one of the boats that brought over the troops. My- self and staff then made our way to Clarksville by land. These facts explain hoAV a portion of the command was withdrawn, when the residue could not be. I, however, had no kind of agency in it. 3d. In response to the third point, upon which informa- tion is called for by the Secretary's order, viz. : Upon what principles the senior officer avoided responsibility by trans- ferring the command ? I have only to say that I urged from first to last the duty of cutting through the enemy's line with the entire command. I was not sustained, but was alone in my position, and with General Buckner's avowal that his troops could not make another fight, and without the assistance of either General in the command, and in an enterprise of great difficulty and peril, I could scarcely hope to cut through the enemy's line unaided. Yet it was against my conviction of duty to surrender. Under the circum- stances in which I was placed, I saw no means of defeating the surrender, and, therefore, considering myself only tech- nically the recipient of the command, when turned over by General Floyd, I promptly passed or' declined to accept it. It was in this sense that I said in my original report that when the command was turned over to me, I passed it. In point of fact, however, the command was turned over by 42 General Floyd to General Euckner. In proof of Avliich I embcdy in this report a- despatch from General Floyd to General A. S. Johnston, on the morning of the IGth of February. I also embody an order of General Buckuer, after he had assumed command, to Brigadier General B. R, Johnson. GENERAL FLOVd's DESPATCH. CuMRERLAND CiTY, ) % Feb. 16, 1862. 5 To General Johnson : This morning, at 2 o'clock, not feeling willing myself to surrender, I turned over the command to General Buckner, ■who determined a surrender of the fort and the army, as any further resistance would only result in the unavailing spilling of blood. I succeeded in saving half of my own command by availing myself of two little boats at the wharf, all that could be commanded. The remainder of the entire reserve of the army fell into the hands of the enemy. The enemy's force was largely augmented yesterday by the arri- val of thirteen transports, and his force could not have been less than fifty thousand. I have attempted to do my duty, in this trying and difficult position, and only regret that my exertions have not been more successful, (Signed) J. B. FLOYD. ORDER OF BRIGADIER GENERAL BUCKNER TO BRIGADIER GENERAL B. R. JOHNSON. Headquarters Dover, Feb. 16, 1862. Sir : The command of the forces in this vicinity has de- volved upon me by order of General Floyd. I have sent a flag to General Grant, and during the correspondence, and until further orders, refrain from any hostile demonstrations, with a view to preventing a like movement on the enemy's part. You will endeavor to send a flag to the enemy's posts in front of your position, notifying them of the fact that I have sent a communication to General Grant from the right of our position, and desire to know his present headquarters. Respectfully, your ob't serv't, (Signed) S. B. BUCKNER, Brigadier General C. S. A. 43 These orders show that all parties understood that the command was turned over, not to myself, but to General Buckner, The reason for this was obvious. Both Generals Floyd and Buckner Averc of opinion that a surrender of the command was a necessity of its position, The}^ had both heard me say that I would die before I would surrender the command. General Buckner had said that, if placed in comTnand, he would make the surrender, and he had agreed with General Floyd that he might witlitlraw his brigade. This understanding and agreement; and my posi- tion, necessarily excluded me from actual command. Having gone into the council of general officers, and taken part in its deliberations, I felt bound by its decision, although against my conviction of duty. I, therefore, d.termincd not to assume nor accept the command. I still think' that in acquiescing in the decision, as a necessity of my position, I acted correctly, although my judgment Avas wholly against the surrender. 1 had no agency whatever in withdrawing any portion of the command, except to di- rect Colonel Forrest to cut his way out with the cavalry, all of which I had organized into a brigade under him. 5th and 6th. In response to the 5th and 6th enquiries of the Secretary's order, I reply I do not know what regiments of General Floyd's brigade were surrendered, nor which were withdrawn, nor do I know upon what principle the se- lection was made. For further information reference is made to my original and supplemental reports. Before closing this response to the Honorable Secretary's order, I deem it not improper to say that the only doubt I felt in any opinion I expressed, position assumed, or act I did, was as to the propriety of retiring from the garrison, when I could not control the fate of the command, whose surrender was not my act, nor Avith my approval. Upon this point I consulted Generals Floyd and Buckner. For these reasons, and knowing that the general officers Avould n ot be permitted to accompany the men in captivity, I finally determined to retire, hoping I might be able to render some service to the country. Very respectfully, GID.'J. PILLOW, Brigadier General C. S. A. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT OF THE BATTLES AT DONELSON. Headquarters 3rd Division, ) Decatur, Alabama, March 14, 1863. ) Colonel W. W. Mackall, Assistant Adjutant General : The position we occupied -was invested on the 11th Feb- ruary, by a force which we estimated to be about 20,000 strong. This force had approached us partly by water, but mainly by land from Fort Henry. I considered the force we had sufficient to repulse the assault of this force. We repulsed every where a vigorous assault made by the enemy against our position. Fresh troops, however, continued [to arrive] every day, by water until the 14th. We are satisfied the enemy's forces were not short of 30,000 men. Our impressions of his strength were confirmed by information derived from prisoners we had taken on that day. That evening the enemy landed thirteen steamboat loads of fresh troops. It was now manifest that we could not long maintain our position against such overwhelming numbers. I was satisfied that their last troops were of General Buell's command. We felt the want of reinforcements, but we did not ask for them, because we knew they were not to be had. I had just come from Bowling Green, and knew that General Johnston could not spare a man from his position. He had, in fact, already so weakened himself that he could not have maintained his position against a vigorous assault. Under these circumstances, deeming it utterly useless to apply for reinforcements, we determined to make the best possible defence with the force in hand. Our investment by a force of 30,000, on the 14th being completed, and the enemy on that evening having received thirteen boat loads of fresh 45 troops, a council of General Officers was convened by Gen- eral Floyd, at which it was determined to give the enemy battle at day light next day, so as to cut up the investing force, if possible, before the fresh troops were in position. In that council, I proposed as the plan of attack, that with the force in the entrenchments of our left wing, and Col. Hanson's regiment (of General Buckner's Division,) I would attack the enemy's main force on his right, and if successful, that would roll the enemy on his line of invest- ment to a point opposite General Buckner's position, when he would attack him in flank and rear, and drive him with our united commands back upon his encampments at the river. To this proposition, so far as alloAving me to have Col. Hanson's regiment. General Buckner objected, and I waived the point, saying I only asked the assistance of that regiment because my portion of the labor to be performed was by far the greatest, and that upon my success depended the fortunes of the day, and that a very large portion of the force I had to fight Avere fresh troops and badly armed. General Buckner then proposed, as a modification of my plan of battle, that he should attack the enemy simultaneously with my attack, that his attack should be against the posi- tion on the Winn's Ferry Road, where he had a battery nearly opposite the centre of the left wing, and that he would thus lesson the labors for my command and strike the enemy in a more vital point. To this modification, I agreed as an improvement upon my proposed plan. In carrying out this plan thus agreed upon, it became proper for Colonel Hei- man's Brigade to maintain its position in the line, otherwise the enemy might turn the right of General Buckner's posi- tion, and take his forces on the right flank and thus defeat our success. It was arranged accordingly. General Floyd approved this plan of battle and ordered that it should be carried out next morning at day light. I then sent for all the commanders of brigades to explain to them our situation (being invested), our purpose and plan of battle, and to assign to each brigade its position in my column, all of which was done, and I gave orders to have my whole force under arms at four and a half o'clock, and to be ready to march out of our works precisely at 5 o'clock. At 4 o'clock I was with my command, all of which was in position, except Col. Davidson's Brigade, none of which were present. I immediately directed General B. R. Johnson, who was present, and to whose immediate command Colonel 46 Davidson's Brigade belonged, to dispatch officers for that bri- gade, and to ascertain the causes of its deLay. He did so. I likewise sent several officers of my staff upon the same duty. Both sets of officers made the same report, viz : That Col. Davidson had failed to give any orders to the colonel's of his brigade, and that Colonel Davidson was sick. It is proper to state that he Avas complaining of being unwell when the orders were received. The instructions to the brigade commanders were given about 2 o'clock that morning. My command was delayed in its advance about half an hour by the necessity of bringing up this brigade. My column was finally ready and put in motion about fif- teen minutes after 5 o'clock. I moved with the advance and directed General B. R. Johnson to bring up the rear. The command of Colonel Davidson's Brigade devolved upon Col- onel Simonton, which, owing to the reasons already stated, was brought into column in the rear, and into action last under General Johnson, to whose report for its good be- havior on the field I particularly refer, having in my original report omitted to state its position on the field. Many of these incidents, not deemed essential to the proper under- standing of the main features of the battle of the loth of February, were omitted in my orginal report, but are now given as parts of its history. In my original report I gave the after operations in the battle of the 15th February, and shall now pass over all the events occurring until the council of General Officers held on the eight of the loth. The lodge- ment of the enemy's force, in the rifle pits of General Buck- ner's extreme right, late in the evening of the 15th February, induced General Floyd to call a meeting of General Officers at my headquarters that night. We had fought the batile of the 15th to open the way (through the enemy's line of investment) to retire to the interior. The battle had occupied the day, and we were, until about 12 o'clock that night, bringing in the wounded. At about one o'clock we had all the commanders of regi- ments and brigades assembled, and given orders to the entire command to be under arms at 4 o'clock to march out on the road leading towards Charlotte. I had given instructions to Major llaynes, my Commissary, and Major Jones, my Quartermaster, immediately after our evacuation of the place, to burn all their stores. About 3 o'clock, (perhaps a little earlier,) we received intelligence from the troops in the trenches that they heard dogs barking around on the outside 47 of our lines, and tbey thought the enemy were reinvesting our position. General Floyd immediately directed me to send out scouts to ascertain the facts. This duty was per- formed. When the scouts returned, they reported the enemy in full force, occupying his original positions, and closing up the routes to the interior. Not being satisfied with the truth of the report, I directed Colonel Forrest to send out a second set of scouts, and at the same time directed him to send two intelligent men up the bank of the river to ex- amine a valley of overflowed ground laying to the rear, and the right of the enemy's position, and if the valley of over- flowed ground could be crossed by infantry and cavalry, and to ascertain if the enemy's forces reached the river bank. The one set of scouts returned and confirmed the previous reports, viz. : that the woods were full of the enemy, occu- pying all of his previous positions in great numbers. The scouts sent up the river to examine the overflow, reported that the overflow valley was not practicable for infantry ; that the soft mud was about half leg deep, and that the water was about saddle skirt deep to the horses, and that there was a good deal of drift in the way. We then sent for a citizen whose name is not remembered, said to know that part of the country well, and asked his opinion ; he confirmed the reports of the river scouts. In addition to the depth of the water, the weather was intensely cold ; many of the troops were frost-bitten, and they could not have stood a passage through a sheet of water. With these facts all before Gen- erals Floyd, Buckner and myself, the two former having remained at my quarters all the intervening Avhile, General Floyd said, well, gentlemen, what is best now to be done ?- Neither General Buckner nor myself having answered promptly. General Floyd repeated his enquiry, addressing himself to me by name My reply was, that it was difficult to determine what was best to be done, but that I was in favor of cutting our way out. lie then asked General Buckner what he thought we ought to do. General Buck- ner said his command was so worn down and cut up and demoralized that he could not make another fight ; that he thought we would lose three-fourths of the command we had left in cutting our way out, and that it was wrong ; that no ofiicerhad the right to sacrifice three-fourths of the command to save one-fourth ; that we had fought the enemy from the trenches, we had fought his gun -boats, and had fought him in the open field to cut our way through his line of invest- 48 ment ; tlicat we were again invested with an immense force of fresh troops ; tliat the army had done all it was possible to do, and that duty and honor required no more. General Floyd then remarked that his opinion coincided with General Biickner. Brigadier-General B. 11, Johnson had previously retired from the council to his quarters in the field, and was not present. In my original report I stated it was my impression Major Gilmer wa-* consulted and concurred in the opinion of Generals Buckner and Floyd, but from subsequent conversation with Major Gilmer, I learn from him that he had retired to another room and laid down, and was not present at this part of the conference, and I am therefore satisfied that I was mistaken in the statement in regard to him. The proposition to cut our way out being thus disposed of, I remarked that we could hold our position another day and fight the encjmy from our trenches, that by night our steamboats that had taken off the prisoners and our own wounded men would return ; that during tlie next night we could set our troops on the right bank of the river, and that we could make our escape by Clarksville, and thus save the army. To this proposition General Buckner said, gentle- men, you know the enemy occupy the rifle pits on my right and can easily turn my position, and attack me in rear or move down on the river battery. I am satisfied he will attack me at day light, and I cannot hold my position a half an hour. Regarding General Buckner's reply as settling this proposition in the negative, for I had quite enough to do, with my heavy losses in the battle of the previous day to defend my own portion of the line, and I could give him no reinforcements, I then said, gentlemen, if we cannot cut our way out nor fight on, there is no alternative left uS but capitulation, and 1 am determined that I will never surren- der myself a prisoner ; I will die first. General Floyd re- marked that that was his determination ; that he would die before he would do either. General Buckner said that such determination was personal, and that personal considerations should never influence official action. General Floyd said he acknowledged it Avas personal witli him, but nevertheless such was his determination. Thereupon, General Buckner said that being satisfied that nothing else could be done, if he was placed in command, he would surrender the command and take the fate of the command. General Floyd imme- diately said, Genei'al Buckner if I place you in command 49 will you permit me to draw out my brigade ? General Buck- ner promptly replied, yes, provided you do so before the enemy act upon my communication. General Floyd imme- diately remarked, General I'illow, I turn over the command'. I replied instantly, I pass it. General Buckner said, I assume it ; bring me a bugler, pen, ink and paper. General Buckner had received pen, ink and paper, and sat down to the table and commenced writinp^, when 1 left and crossed the river, passing outside the garrison before General Buck- ner prepared his communication to the enemy, and went to Clarksville by land on horse back. I did not know what ho had written until I saw the published correspondence with General Grant. It may be asked, if I was in favor of cut- ting our way out, why, when the command was turned over to me, I did not cut it out ? My reply is, that though tech- nically speaking, the command devolved on me when turned over by General Floyd, it was turned over to General Buck- ner in point of fact. All parties so understood it. In proof of this. General Floyd, under hia agreement with General Buckner, actually withdrew a large portion of his brigade by setting them across the river in the steamer General Anderson, that arrived just before day light. In further proof of this, I embody in thivS report an order of General Buckner to General B. R. Johnson, after he had assumed command. Order — A copy. Headquarters, ^ Dover, Feb. 16, 1862. S Sir : The command of the forces in this vicinity has de- volved upon me by order of General Floyd I have sent a flag to General Grant, and during the corresp_ondcnce, and until further orders, refrain from any hostile demonstrations, with a view to preventing a like movement on the enemy's part. You will endeavor to send a flag to the enemy's posts in front of your position, notifying them of the fact that I have sent a communication to General Grant from tho right of our position, and desire to know his present headquarters. Respectfully, your ob't serv't, (Signed) S. B. BUCKNER, Brigadier General C S. A. In addition to this, General Floyd was my senior, and of high character and acknowledged ability. General Buck- ner, though my junior in rank, possessed a high reputation 4 m OS an officer of talents and experience. With the judgment of both against my position, if I had acted upon my own convictions, and had fallen or involved the command in heavy less, I was apprehensive it would be regarded as an act of rashness, and brought upon me the censure of the gov- ernment and the condemnation of the country. Besides, without their as:^istnnce in command, and with the moral \\eight of their oj)inions with the troops against the step, I did not regard it j)racticable to make a successful efforc to cut out. I declined to assume the command when turned over by General Floyd, because it was against my convic- tions of duty to surrender the command, and under the de- cisions of Genei-als Floyd and Buckner, (a majority of the council.) I could do nothing but surrender it. It is proper to say that thedifterence of opinion between Generals Floyd, Buckner and myself upon this branch of the subject con- sisted in this, viz. : they thought that it would cost three- fourths of the command to cut out. I did not think the loss would be so great. If it had been settled that the sacrifice would be as much as three-fourths, I should have agreed with them that it was wrong to make the attempt. Again, I believe we could have maintained our position another day, and have saved the array by getting back our boats and set- ting the command across the river; but, inasmuch as Gen- eral Buckner was of opinion that he could not hoi . his posi- tion half an hour, and I could not possibly do more than hold my own portion of the line, I had no alternative but to submit to a decision of a majority of my brother General Officers. While I thus differed with them in opinion, I still think I did right in acquiescing in opinion with them. We all agreed in 02)inion that we could not long maintain the position against such overwhelming numbers of fresh troops as were daily arriving. We all agreed that the army had performed prodigies of valor, and that if possible further sacrifice should be avoided Men will differ or agree accor- ding to their mental organization. I censure not their opin- ions, nor do I claim merit for my own. The whole matter is submitted to the judgment of the government. Since my original report was prepared I have seen and read the official report of General Grant and Commodore Foote. From these reports I learn that the damage done the enemy's fleet of gun-boats on the 13th was greater by far than was represented in my original report. Four of the enemy's gun-boats were badly disabled, receiving over 51 one hundred sliots from our battery, many of whicli went entirely through, from stem to stern, tearing the frame of the boats and machinery to pieces, killing and wounding fifty-five of their crews, among whom was the Commodore himself. There can, therefore, no longer be a doubt as to the vulnerability of these to heavy shots, but it required a desperate fight to settle the question, and there is danger that the public mind will run from one extreme to the other, and arrive at a conclusion underrating the power of the enemy's gun-boats. In estimating the loss inflicted upon the enemy, on the 1 5th February, I saw that the whole field of battle for a mile and a half was covered with his dead and wounded, and believe that his loss could not fall short of five thousand men. I am satisfied from published letters of the officers and men of the enemy, and from acknowledgements of the North- ern press, that his loss was much greater than was originally estimated in my report. I stated in my original report that after we had driven the enemy from, and captured his bat- tery on the Winn's Ferry Road, and were pursuing him around to our right, and after we had met and overcome a fresh force of the enemy on the rout towards his gun-boats, I called ofi" the pursuit, but in the hurry in which that report was prepared, I omitted to state my reasons for so doing. I kncAv that the enemy had twenty boat loads of fresh troops at his landing, then,cnly about three miles distant. I knew from the great loss my command had sustained during the protracted fight of over seven hours, my command was in no condition to meet a large body of fresh troops, who I had every reason to believe were then rapidly approaching the field. General Buckner's command, so far as labor was con- cerned, was comparatively fresh, but its demoralization, from being repulsed by the battery, had unfitted it to meet and fight a large body of fresh troops. I, therefore, called ofi" the pursuit, and explained my reasons to General Floyd, who ap- proved the order. This explanation is now given as neces- sary to a proper understanding of that order. It is further proper to say that from the moment of my arrival at Donel- son, I had the whole force engaged night and day in the work of strengthening my position until the fighting com- menced, and when the fighting ceased at night, it was again at work. I did not, therefore, and could not get a single morning report of the strength of my command. The four Virginia 52 regiments did not exceed, I am confident 350 each for duty. The Texas regiment did not number 301) men ; several Mis- sissippi regiments were nearly equally reduced, while those of Colonels Voorhies, Abernathy and Hughes (new regiments) were almost disbanded by measles, and did not exceed 200 each for duty. Colonel Browder's regiment had but sixty men. and it was by my order placed under Captain Parker to work artillery. All others w^ere greatly reduced by wastage. The whole force, therefore, was greatly less than would 1)0 supposed from the number of nominal regiments. Of this force, General Floyd, under his agreement with General Buckner, before he turned over the command, drew out a large portion of his brigade, (how many I do not know), by taking possession of the steamer xVnderson, which arrived at Dover just before day, and setting them across the river. A large portion of the cavalry, under orders, passed out. All of the cavalry was ordered to cut out, and could have gone out but for the timidity of officers. Several thousand infan- try esc:iped one way or another, many of whom are now at this place, and all others are ordered here as a rendezvous for re-organization. From the list of prisoners published in the Northern papers which I have seen, it required the pri- Boners of six regiments to make nine hundred men. I do not believe that the number of prisoners exceeded that stated by 'the Northern papers, which is put at 5,170 privates. During the afternoon of the 15th, I had caused the arms lost by the enemy to be gathered up from about h If the field of battle, and had hauled and stacked up over five thoii- sand stand of arms and six pieces of artillery, all of which were lost in the surrender of the place for want of trans- portation to bring them away. In regard to the enemy's force with which we were engaged in the battle of Dover, General Grant, in an official report, says that he had taken fifteen thousand prisoners ; ihat Generals Floyd and Pillow made their escape with about 15,000 men, and that the forces engaged were about equal. While his estimate of the num- ber of prisoners taken, and the number with which General Floyd escaped, is wide of the mark, yet the aggregate of these numbers as given by himself is 30,000, and his ac- knowledgement that the forces were about equal furnishes conclusive evidence that we fought 30,000 men, the same number given by prisoners we had taken, and agreeing with my original estimate of his strength. General iialleck, in a telegraphic despatch of February IG, from St. Louis, to Gen- eral McClellan, said he had invested Fort Donelson with a force of 50,000 men, and he had no doubt all communica- tion and supplies were cut off. This corroborates Grant's statement, for the troops which arrived on the 14th and 1 5th February, being twenty steam-boat loads, had not reached the battle-field on the morning of the 15th, and it is proba- ble that parts of those that arrived on the evening of the 1 3th had not reached it. These sources of information make it clear that we fought 30,000 of the enemy on the 15th, and [that] we were re-in- vested that night with all tie enemy's disposable force, in- cluding his fresh troops, cannot be doubted. Nothing has occurred to change my original estimate of our loss in the several conflicts with the enemy, at the trenches, with the gun-boats and in battle at Dover. My original estimate was that our loss in killed and wounded was from fifteen hundred to two thousand. We sent up from Dover 1,134 wounded. A Federal surgeon's certificate, which I have seen, says there were about 400 wounded Confederates in hospital at Paducah, making 1 ,534 wounded. I was satisfied that the killed would increase the number to 3,000. As, in the absence still of regimental and brigade com- manders, it is probable that I have not done justice to all the officers or their commands. To Brigadier General John- son's report, which is herewith forwarded, I particularly refer for the conduct of officers and commands under his imme- diate observation during the battle. The forces under ray immediate command in the conflict with enemy's right did not exceed 7,000 men, though it never faltered and drove the enemy from the position of his extreme right, slowly, but steadily advancing over one and a half mile, carrying the' positions of his first battery and two of his guns, and of the battery on the Winn's Ferry Road, taking four more guns, and afterwards uniting with General Buckner's command, drove him (the enemy) back, sustained by a large accession of fresh troops. Yet it is manifest that the fruits of our victory would have been far greater had General Buckner's column been suc- cessful in its assault upon the Winn's Ferry. Equally clear is it that the enemy eff"ecting a lodgement in General Buckner's rifle pits, on his right, brought the command and position into extreme peril, making it absolutely necessary to take immediate action, in which we were under the neces- sity of cutting our way out, of holding out another day, and / 54 throwing the command across the r'ver, or of capituhiting; my own position upon these several propositions having been explained more fully and in detail in this my supplemental report, nothing more remains in the performance of my duty to the government, but to subscribe niyself, Very respectfully, Your obedient servant, GIDEON J. PILLOW, Brig. Gen. C. S. A. IsToTE. — That there maybe no doubt about the facts stated in .this report, I append the sworn testimony of Colonel Bur^h, Colonel Forrest, Majors Henry and Ilaynes and Nicholson, to which I ask the attention of the government. (Si-ned) GIDEON J. PILLOW, Brig. Gen. C. S. A. COLONEL BURGH'S STATEMENT. {Referred to in the foregoing.) Dkcatuh, Ala., ) March 15th, 1862. ] On Saturday evening, February 15th, all of the boats which wc had at Donelson were sent up the river Avith our sick, wounded and prisoners. After supper a council of oflScers was held at Brigadier General Pillow's headquarters. I was not present at this council, but during its session, be- ing in an adjoining room, I learned from some officer that intelligence had been received from scouts on the cast side of the river that fourteen of the enemy's transports were landing reinforcements one and a half or two milea below us at their usual place of landing. After I had learned this, and during the session of the same council, two couriers came to Brigadier General Buckner — one, and perhaps both, sentby Captain Graves, of the Artillery ; ono stating that a large force was forming in front of our right (General Buck- ner s) wing ; the second stating that large bodies of the ene- my were seen moving in front of our right, around towards our left. After the adjournment of this council, about 11 or 12 o'clock, I learned that it had been determined to eva- cuate the post, cut our way through the right wing of the enemy's investing force, and make our way towards Char- lotte, in Dixon county. Orders were given for the command to bo in readiness to march at 4 o'clock, A. M. After this, being in General Billow's private room, where Generals Floyd, Pillow and Buckner all were, two scouts came in, stating that the ene- my's c"mp fires could be seen at the same places in front of our left that tUey had occupied Friday. From the re- marks of the Generals this information seemed to lie con- firmatory of information which they had previously received. Major Rice, an intelligent citizen of Dover, was called in and interrogated as to the character of the road to Char- lotte. His account of it was decidedly unfavorable. In the course of the conversation which then followed among • 56 tlie Generala — General Pillow insisting upon carrying out the previous determination of the council to cut our way out — Brigadier General Buckner said that such was the ex- hausted condition of the men, that, if they should succeed in cutting their way out, it would be at a heavy sacrifice, and, if pursued b}"^ the large cavalry force of the enemy, they would be almost entirely cut to pieces. General Floyd concurred with General Buckner. General Pillow said : Then we can fight them another day in our trenches, and by to morrow we can have boats enough here to transport our troops across the river, and let them make their escape to Clarksville. General Buckner said : that such was the po- sition of the enemy on his right, and the demoralization of his forces, from exposure and exhaustion, that he could not hold his trenches a half an hour. As an illustration of the correctness of his remark, he said : " You, gentlemen, know that yesterday morning I considered the Second Kentucky, (Hanson's regiment), as good a regiment as there was in the service, yet sucli was their condition yesterday afternoon that, when I learned the enemy was in their trenches, (which were to our extreme right, and detached from the others) before I could rally and form them, I had to take at least twenty men by the shoulders and put them into line as a nucleus for formation." General Floyd concurred with General Buckner in his opinion as to the impossibility of holding the trenches longer, and asked : what shall we do ? General Buckner stated that no ofiicer had a right to sacri- fice Ins men, referred to our various successes since Wed- nesday, at Donelson, and concluded by saying that an offi- cer who had successfully resisted an assault of a much larger force, and was still surrounded by an increased force could surrender with honor ; and that we had accomplished much more than was required by this rule. General Pil- low said that he never would surrender. General Floyd said : that he would suffer any fate before he would surrender or fall into the hands of the enemy alive. At the suggestion of some one present, he said : that personal considerations influenced him in coming to this determination, and further stated that such considerations should never govern a gene- ral officer. Colonel Forrest, of the cavalry, who was present, said : he would die before he would surrender ; that such of his men as would follow him, he would take out. General Floyd said : he would take his chances with Forrest, and asked 57 General Buckner if he would make the surrender ? Gene- ral Buckner asked him if he (General Floyd) would pass the command to him ? General Floyd replied in the affirma- tive. I understood General Pillow as doing the same. Then, said General Buckner : I shall propose terms of capitula- tion, and asked for ink and paper, and directed one of his staff to send for a bugler and prepare white flags to plant at various points on our works. Preparations were imme- diately begun to be made by General Floyd and staff, Gene- ral Pillow and staff, and Colonel Forrest, to leave. This was about 3 o'clock, A. M. It was suggested by some one that two boats that were known to be coming down the river might arrive before day, and General Floyd asked, if they came, that he might be permitted to take off on them his troops. General Buckner replied that all might leave who could before his note was sent to General Grant, the Fede- ral commander. Thus ended the conference. After this I met or called on General Pillow in the pas- sage, and asked him if there was any possibility of a mis- understanding as to his position ? He thought not ; but I suggested to him the propriety ot again seeing Generals Floyd and Buckner, and see that there was no possibility of his position being misunderstood by them. He said he would, and returned to the room in which the conference was held. In my statement of what transpired, and of the conversa- tions that were had, I do not pretend to have given the exact language used, and I may be mistaken as to the order of the remarks that I have endeavored to narrate. (Signed) JNO. C. BURGH, Aid to General Pilloto. Sworn to and subscribed before me this 15th day of March, 1862. LEVI SUGANS, Intendant of the toivn of Decatur, Ala., and ex offi. J. P. COL. FORREST'S STATEMENT. [Referred to in General Pillow's Supplemental Report.) March 15, 1862. Between one and two o'clock on Sunday morning;. Feb- ruar}^ 16th, being sent for, I arrived at General Pillow's headquarters, and found him, General Floyd and General Buckner in conversation. General Pillow told me that they had received information that the enemy were again occu- pying the same ground they had occupied the morning be- fore. I told him I did not believe it, as I had left that part of the field, on our left, late the evening before, lie told me he had sent out scouts who reported large forces of the enemy moving around to our left. He instructed me to go immediately, and send two reliable men to ascertain the con- dition of a road running near the river bank, and between the enemy's right and the river, and also to ascertain the position of the enemy. I obeyed his instructions and awaited the return of the scouts. They stated that they saw no enemy, but could see their fires in the same place where they were Friday night ; that from their examination and from information obtained from a citizen living on the road, the water was about to the saddle skirts, and the mud about half leg deep in the bottom where it had been over- flowed. The bottom was about a quarter of a mile wide, and the water then about one hundred yards wide. During the conversation that then ensued among the general officers, General Pillow was in favor of trying to cut our Avay out. General Buckner said that he could not hold his position over half an hour in the morning, and that if he attempted to take his force out, it Avould be seen by the enemy who held part of his entrenchments, nnd be followed and cut' to pieces. I told him that I would take my cavalry around them and he could draw out under cover of them. He said that an attempt to cut our way out would involve a loss of three- fourths of the men. General Floyd said our force was so demoralized as to cause him to agree with General Buckner as to our probable loss in attempting to cut our way out. I 59 said that I would agree to cut my way through the enemy's lines at any point the General might designate, and stated I could keep back their cavalry, which General Buckner thought would greatly harrass our infantry in retreat. Gene- ral Buckner or General Floyd said that they (the enemy) would bring their artillery to bear on us. I went out of the room, and when I returned General Floyd said he could not and would not surrender himself. I then asked if they were going to surrender the command ? General Buckner remarked that they were. I then stated that I had not come out for the purpose of surrendering my com- mand, and would not do it if they would follow me out; that I intended to go out if I saved but one man, aud then turn- ing to General Pillow, I asked him what I should do ? He replied cut your way out. I immediately left the house and sent for all the officers under my command and stated to them the facts that had occurred, and stated may determina- tion leave, and remarked that all who wanted to go could follow me, and those who wished to stay and take the con- sequences might remain in camp. All of my own regi- ment, and Captain Williams, of Helm's Kentucky regiment, said they would go with me if the last man fell. Col. Gaute was sent for and urged to get out his battalion as often as three times, but he and two Kentucky companies (Captain Wilcox and Captain Henry,) refused to come. I marched out the remainder of my command, with Captain Porter's artillery horses, and about two hundred men, of dif- ferent commands, up the river road and across the overflow, which I found to be about saddle-skirt deep. The weather was intensely cold, a great many of the men were already frost-bitten, and it was the opinion of the Generals that the infantry could not have passed through the water and have survived it. (Signed) A. B. FORREST, Forrest's Regiment Cavalry. Sworn to and subscribed before me on the 15th day of March, 1862. LEVI SUGANS, Intendant of town of Decatur, Ala., and ex qffi. J. P. MAJOR HENRY'S STATEMENT. {Referred to in General Fillow's Supplemental Report.) Decatur, Ala,, ) March 13, 1862. \ On the morning of tho 16th February, 1862, I was pre- sent during the council of war held in Brigadier General Pillow's headquarters at Dover, Tennessee, Generals Flojd, Pillow, Buckner and General Pillow's staff being present. On account of being very much exhausted from the fight of the loth inst., I slept the forepart of the night and came down stairs from my room into General Pillow's about one or two o'clock. At the time I entered General Pillows room it had been decided that we should fight our way out, and G moral Pillow gave me orders to gather up all the papers and books belonging to my department. Whereupon, I immediately executed the orders given to me and then returned to Gene- ral Pillow's room, when a change of operations had been decided upon, on account of information received from scouts, ordered out by General Pillow, to ascertain whether the enemy re-occupied the ground they were driven from the day previous. The scouts returned and reported that the enemy had swung entirely around and were in possession of the very same ground. General Pillow being still in doubt, sent a second party of scouts who made a thorough recon- noisance, and reported that the woods were perfectly alive with^troops, and that their camp fires were burning in eveiy direction. General Pillow then sent a party of cavalry to inspect a slough, that was filled with back water from the river, to see if infantry could pass; they returned after hav- ing made a thorough examination on horseback and on foot, and reported that infantry could not pass, but they thought cavalry could. Communication being tlius cut off, General Pillow urged the propriety of making a desperate attempt to cut our way out, whatever might be the consequences, or make a fight in the work and hold our position one more day, by which time we could get steamboats sufficient to put the Avhole command over the river, and make our escape by the way of Clarksville. General Buckner then said : that 61 in consequence of tlie worn-out condition and demoralization of the troops under his command, and the occupation of his rifle pits on the extreme right by the enemy, that he could not hold his position a half hour after being attacked, which he thought would begin about da3'light. General Pillow then said: that by the enemy's occupation of the rifle pits on Gencr;il Buckner's right, that it was an open gateway to our river battery, and that he thought we ought to cut our way through, carrying with us as many as possible, leaving the killed and wounded on the field. General Buckner then said: that it would cost three-fourths of the command to got the other fourth out, and that he did not think any General had the right to make such a sacrifice of human life. General Floyd agreed with General Buckner on this point. General Tiilow then rose up and said: '* Gentlemen, as you refuse to make an attempt to cut our way out, and General Buckner says he will not be able to hold his position a half hour after being attacked, there is only one alternative left : that is capitulation," and then and there remarked that he would not surrender the command or himself; that he would die fir t. General Floyd then spoke out and said that he would not surrender the command or himself. General Buckner remaked that, if placed in command he would sur- render the command and share its fate. General Floyd then said: "General Buckner, if I place you in command, will you allow me to get out as much of my brigade as I can ?" General Buckner replied, "I will, providedyou do so before the enemy receives my proposition for capitulation." Gene- ral Floyd then turned to General Pillow and said : " I turn the command over, sir." General Pillow replied promptly, "I pass it." General Buckner said: "I assume it; give me pen, ink and paper, and send for a bugler." General Pil- low then Started out of the room to make arrangements for his escape, when Col. Forrest said to him : " General Pil- low, what. shall I do ?" General l*iIlow replied, " cut your way out, sir;" Forrest said, " I will do it," and left the room. (Signed) GUS. A. HENRY, Jr., Assistant Adjutant General. To Brigadier General Pillow. The SrATK, of Alabama, ) Morgan County. > This day personally came before me, Levi Sugans, Inten- 62 dant of the town of Decatur, County and State aforesaid, Major Gus. A. Henry, Jr., -who makes oath in due form of law, that the above statements are true. Sworn to and sub- scribed before me on the 14th day of Mai eh, 1862. (Signed) GUS. A. HENRY, Jr., Assistant Adjutant General. (Signed) LEVI SUGANS, Jntendant. MAJOR HAYNES' STATEMENT. [Referred to in General Pillow's Supplemental Report. Office Kivision Ccmmtssary, ) Decatur,- Ala., March 13, 1862. J I was present at the council of officers, held at Briiradier General Gideon J. Pillow's headquarters, in the town of Dover, Tenn., on the morning of the 16th February, 1S62. Was awoke in my quarters at one o'clock, A. M., by Colo- nel John C. Burch, aid-de-camp, and ordered to report to General Pillow forthwith. I instantly proceeded to head- quarters, where I saw Brigadier Generals Floyd, Pillow and Buckner, Colonel Forrest, Majors Henry, Assistant Adju- tant General, Gilmer and Jones, and Lieutenants Nicholson and Martin, the two latter volunteer aids to General Pillow. . On my entrance in the room, was accosted by General Pillow, and being taken to one side, was informed by him that they had determined to cut their way through the enemy's lines, and retreat from Dover to Nashville, and he desired me to destroy all the commissary stores, and then make ray escape across the river. I desired to know at what hour General Pillow wished his order to be executed, when, looking at his watch, he replied at half past five o'clock. I then retired from the room to inform my assistants of the order, but in one hour, returned to headquarters. On re entering the room, heard General Buckner say, "I cannot hold my position half an hour after the attack," and General I illow, who was sitting next to General Buckner, and immediately fronting the fire place, promptly asked, ** why can't you ?" at the same time adding, *' I think you can hold your position ; I think you can, sir." General Buckner retorted, " I know my position ; I can only bring to bear against the enemy about four thousand men, while he can oppose me with any given number." General Pillow then said: "well, gentlemen, what do you intend to do ? I am in favor of fighting out." General Floyd then spoke, and asked General Buckner what he had to say, and 64 General Buckner answered quickly, " that the attempt to cut a way through the enemy's lines and retreat would cost a sacrifice of three-fourths of the command, and no com- mander had a right to make such a sacrifice." General Floyd concurring, remarked, " we will have to capitulate ; but, gentlemen, I can not surrender ; you know my position ■with the Federals ; it >• ould'nt do, it wouhrnt do ;" where- upon General Pillow, addressing General Floyd, said, *' I will not surrender myself nor the command ; will die Jirst.'^ ** Then, I suppose, gentlemen," said General Buckner " the surrender will devolve upon me ?" General Floyd replied, speaking to General Buckner, •" General, if you are put in command, will you allow me to take out by the river my brigade ?" " Yes, sir, " responded General Buckner, ** if you move your command before the enemy act upon my com- munication, ofi"ering to capitulate." " Then, sir," said General Floyd, '* I surrender the command," and General Pillow, who was next in command, very quickly exclaimed, '* I will not accept it ; I will never surrender," and while speaking, turned co General Buckner, who remarked, " I will accept and share the fiite of my command," and called for pen, ink, paper and a bugler. After the capitulation was determined upon, General Pil- low wished to know if it would be proper for him to make his escape, when General l^loyd replied that the question was one for every man to decide for himself, but he would be glad for every one to escape that could. " Then, sir, I shall leave here," replied General Pillow. Colonel Forrest, who was in the room, and heard what passed then, spoke : *' I think there is more fight in these men than you all sup- pose, and if you will let me, I will take my command. Gen- eral Pillow responding to him, " yes, sir, take out your command, cut your way out." Generals Floyd and Buckner assented. General Floyd, by saying, " yes, take out your command," and General Buckner, by expressing : " I have no objection." The means of getting away was then dis- cussed, and soon after we began to disperse. "While the gentlemen were leaving the room, I approached General Buckner and wished to know if General Pillow's order to destroy the commissary stores should be carried out, and he answered: ''Major Ilayncs, I countermand the order." It may be proper for me to say that I never met General Pillow before the morning of the 9th February, 1862, having been upon Brigadier General Charles Clark's 65 staff since my entrance into the service, and only went to Donelson with General Pillow to take temporary charge of the commissariat. General Pillow assigned mc to duty on his staff after arriving at Donelson, on the 10th February, 1862. (Signed) W. H. HAYNES, Major and Brigade Commissary. State of Alabama, > Morgan County. 5 Personally appeared before me Levi Sugans, Intendant of the town of Decatur, and ex officio Justice of the Peace, Major W. H. Haynes, who makes oath that the statements herein made relating to what was said in the council of offi- cers, on the morning of the 16th February, 1862, are true. Sworn to, and subscribed before me this 14th March, 1862. (Signed) W. II. HAYNES, Major and Brigade Commissary. (Signed) LEVI SUGANS, Intendant^ 5 HUNTER NICHOLSON'S STATEMENT. (^Referred to in General Pillow'' s Supplemental Report.) I was present at the council of war, held at Brigadier General Pillow's headquarters in Dover, on Saturday night, Feliruary 15th, 1862. I came into the room about two o'clock. There were present Generals Floyd, Pillow and Buckner, Major Gilmer, Colonel Forrest, and several staff officers, among whom 1 distinctly remember Major Henry and Colonel Burch, of General Pillow's staff. The Generals were discussing the necessity and practica- bility of marching the forces out of the entrenchments and evacuating the place. Major Rice, a resident of Dover, and an aid-de-camp of General Pillow, was describing the nature of the country and character of the roads over which the army would have to pass. He referred to some citizen, I think, a doctor, but do not remember his name, whom he represented as more familiar with the roads. In a little while, or perhaps, during the conversation of Major Rice, the gentleman referred to was announced. He gave a de- scription of the roads, which, from my ignorance of the locality, I am unable to repeat. The substance was, however, that though exceedingly difficult, it was possible to pass the road with light baggage trains. General Pillow asked most of the questions propounded to this gentleman, as also of those to Major Rice. At this point I was called into an adjoining room, where I remained but a few minutes. When I returned Major Jones, Brigade Quartermaster, was just entering the room. General Pillow at once approached him, and taking him a little one side, explained to him that it had been determined to evacuate the place, and that he must prepare to burn the quartermaster's stores in his hands. Major Jones enquired at what time ; General Pillow replied about daybreak, about half-past five o'clock. Major Jones left very soon, and I did notsee him in the room afterwards, that I recollect. In a few minutes Major Haynes, Brigade Commissary, entered the room, and received similar instruc- tions as to the commissary stores under his charge. About 67 this time a scout was ushered in who announced that the enemy had re-occupied the lines from which they had been driven during the fight on Saturday. General Pillow doubt- ed if the scout was not mistaken ; so another was sent out. About half an hour had elapsed when Major Haynos return- ed and remained near me in the room during the remainder of the discussion. Just as he entered General Buckncr re- marked : " I am confident that the enemy will attack my lines by light, and I cannot hold them for half an hour." General Pillow replied quickly : '* Why so, why so, Gene- ral ? " General Buckner replied: "Because I can bring into action not over four thousand men, and they demoral- ized by long and uninterrupted exposure and fighting, while he can bring any number of fresh troops to the attack." General Pillow replied : " I differ with you ; I think you can hold your lines ; I think you can, sir." General Buck- ner replied : '* I know my position, and I know that the lines cannot be held with my troops in their present co.idi- tion." General Floyd, it was, I think, who then remarked : '* Then, gentlemen, a capitulation is all that is left us." To which General Pillow replied: " I do not think so; at any rate we can cut our way out." General Buckner replied : ** to cut our way out would cost three-fourths of our men, and I do not think any commander has a right to sacrifice three-fourths of his command to save one-fourth." To which General Floyd replied : *' certainly not." About this time the second scout sent out returned and reported the enemy in force occupying the position from which they had been driven. Thereupon two of Colonel Forrest's cavalry were sent to examine the back water, and report if it could be crossed by the army. These scouts re- turned in a short time and reported that cavalry could pass, but infantry could not. General Buckner then asked : " well, gentlemen, what are we to do ?" General Pillow replied : '* you understand me, gentleman, I am for holding out, at least to-day, getting boats and crossing the command over. As for myself, I will never surrender; I will die first." General Floyd replied: " nor will I, I cannot and will not surrender ; but I must confess personal reasons control me." Gen. Buckner replied: " but such considerations shouW not control a General's ac- tions." General Floyd replied : " certainly not ; nor would I permit it to cause me to sacrifice the command." General Buckner replied : " then, I suppose the duty of surrender- 68 ing the command will devolve on me ?" General Floyd asked : " how will you proceed ?" General Buckner replied : *' I Avill send a flag asking for General Grant's quarters, that I may send a message to him, I will propose an armistice of six hours to arrange terms." A pause here ensued. Then General Buckner asked : " am I to consider the com- mand as turned over to me ?" General Floyd replied : "certainly; I turn over the command." General Pillow replied, quickly : *' I pass it ; I will not surrender." Gen- eral Buckner then called for pen, ink and paper and a bugler. General Floyd then said : " well, General, will I be permit- ted to take my little Brigade out if I can ?" General Buck- ner replied ; " certainly, if you can get them out before the terms of capitulation are agreed on." Colonel Forrest then asked: *' gentlemen, have I leave to cut my way out with my command ?" General Pillow replied : " yes, sir ; cut your way out ;" and continuing, *' gentlemen, is there any- thing wrong in my leaving ? " General Floyd replied : ** every man must judge for himself of that," General Pil- low replied : " then, I shall leave this plaee." Here Gene- ral Pillow left the room ; but returning in a short time and taking a seat between Generals Floyd and Buckner, said : "gentlemen, in order that we may understand each other, let me state what is my position. I differ with you as to the cost of cutting our way out ; but if it was ascertained that it would cost three-fourths of the command, I agree that it would be wrong to sacrifice them for the remaining fourth." Generals Floyd and Buckner replied : " we understand you, General, and you understand us." After this I left the room, and soon after, the place. (Signed) HUNTER NICHOLSON. Sworn to and subscribed before me on this 18th day of March, 1862. (Signed) LEVI SUGANS, Intendant of the town of Decatur, Ala., and ex offi. J. P. REPORT OF MAJOR U. N. BROWN, TWENTIETH REGIMENT OF MISSISSIPPI VOLUNTEERS, ON THE BATTLES AT FORT DONELSON. To General George W. Randolph, Secretary of War, C. S. A. : I am directed by his Excellency, President Davis, to make to your department a report of the part taken by tlie twen- tieth Mississippi Regiment, in the engagements with the enemy at Fort Donelson, Tenn., February 13th, 14th and 15th, 1862, also all other facts concerning the investment and subsequent surrender of that post. The regiment was assigned to the command of Brigadier General John B. Floyd in Western Virginia, during the past summer, and went to Kentucky, and from thence to Fort Donelson, as part of his ''immediate command," arri- ving at that place at daylight on the 13th February. By sunrise we were ordered into position as a reserve, im- mediately in rear of a point which was said to be our centre. During the day heavy cannonading was kept up by both sides, mostly of shells and shrapnel, which resulted in killing one man, and wounding slightly three or four others. At night we bivouacked in position until 12 o'clock, when an order came from General Pillow to relieve the 7th Texas Regiment, commanded by Colonel John Gregg, then in the trenches. At that time a brisk firing was going on, sup- posed to be induced by the enemy's scouts and sharpshooters. The breast-works were thought insufficient from the test of the preceding day, so the remainder of the night was occupied in strengthening them, and clearing out the trenches now partially filled with water and snow. The next day (Friday) was spent in occasional engagements with the ene- my's sharpshooters. The fort was actively engaged in re- pelling an attack of the gun-boats of the eneiny. My position did not afford me a view of the proceedings, Avhich have been fully reported by others. About one o'clock I received an order to form my regiment 70 on the extreme left, in an open field, for the purpose of making a sortie on the enemy, whose formation was executed in a very short time. By order of General Pillow, the 20th Mississippi was attached to the brigade of Colonel Wm. E. Baldwin, 1 4th Mississippi Regiment, for the occasion. Before the order to advance had been given, a few guns of the enemy were heard, and by the time we had advanced one hundred yards, a private in company " D" Avas shot down, showing that the enemy was close at hand. We continued the march one hundred yards more, when the order to halt was given, said to come from General Floyd, with the ex:- planation that wc did not have time to accomplish what he wanted, and the order to countermarch being given, we did so in proper order and returned to the trenches. About one o'clock on that night (Friday,) I received an order to form again, as the preceding evening, which was executed promptly, and, by direction of General Pillow was «gain placed under the command of Colonel Wm. E. Baldwin, 14th Mississippi Regiment, acting Brigadier. I made a report to him of the casualties of that day while in captivity, but as he has been prohibited from making a statement to the War Department of this government, as likewise General Buckner, I hereby append substantially the same of that day's proceedings, which were confined parti- cularly to the 2()th Mississippi Regiment, " Being the only field officer present, I was in command and greatly assisted by Captain H. Cautey, company " A," and Captain C. K. Massey, company " D," who were se- lected by the officers of the regiment to assist in field duty, (there being some difficulty as to seniority of Captains). Adjutant J. M. Couper was also very efficient, and rendered valuable assistance. Assistant Surgeon J. B. Elkin was present, and rendered every assistance in his power to the wounded. [The casualties are omitted, but to keep up the connectioQ the recapitulation is given as follows, viz.:] 5U() aggregate engaged; 20 killed; 68 wounded ; 454 surrendered ; that being the number returned by the commanding officers of companies on Sunday, February 16, 1862, the day we were surrendered ; afterwards many reported that they had several to escape. 71 On the morning of Saturd than himself and General Floyd, and asked the lattcr's opinion as to the propriety of his accompanying General Floyd, To this enquiry the latter replied that it was a question for every man to decide for himself. Gene- ral Pillow then addressed the same enquiry to me, to which I remarked that 1 could only reply as General Floyd had done, that it was a question for every officer to decide for himself, and that in ray own case I regarded it as my duty to remain with my men and share their fate, whatever it might be. General Pillow, however, announced his purpose to leave, when General Floyd directed me to consider myself in com- mand. 1 remarked that a capitulation would be as bitter to me as it could be to any one, but I regarded it as a necessity of our position, and I could not reconcile it with my sense of duty to separate my fortunes from those of my command. It is due to General Pillow to state that some time after the command had been transferred to me, and while prepara- tions were making for his departure he returned to the room and said to General Floyd and myself that he wished it un- derstood that he liad thought it would have been better to have held the fort another day in order to await the arrival of steamers to transport the troops across the river. I again recapitulated my reasons for thinking it impossible to hold our position ; and whatever may have been General Pillow's opinion, he certainly impressed me with the belief that he again acquiesced in the necessity of a surrender. It was now near daylight of Sunday morning the IGth. I ordered the troops back to their positions in entrench- ments, and addressed a note, a copy of which is enclosed, to the Federal commander, Brigadier General U. S. Grant. His reply is also transmitted. When it was received, but a small |>ortion of the troops had returned to their lines. A I)ortion of my field guns had been spiked when the troops had been withdrawn under General Floyd's order. The gunners had not yet returned to the water batteries. A degree of confusion amounting almost to a state of <;isor- ganization, resulting from the knowledge of our position, pervaded a considerable portion of the troops. A corps of not less than fifteen thousand of the enemy, with fifteen pieces of artillery, were in position to assault the extreme right of the line, which was effectually turned, and the 106 ■water batteries exposed to assault witliout the power of re- sisting the attack. At the point most strongly threatened I could not have opposed at the time a thousand men. Every road leading from the lines was effectually closed. Even the river road, hy which the cavalry had left, and Avhich was impassable by infantry, was closed by a force of the enemy within fifteen minutes after Forrest had passed, and Overton's Cavalry was forced to return to the lines. The troops Avere broken down oy unusual privations. Most of them had labored or fought almost incessantly for a week. From Thursday morning until Saturday night they had been almost constantly under fire. From Thursday evening until Sunday morning they had suffered intensely in a heavy snow-storm, and from intense cold, almost without shelter, with insufficient food and almost without sleep. They had behaved with a gallantry unsurpassed, until the power of further endurance was exhausted. The supply of ammuni- tion was very small. The aggregate of the army, never greater than about twelve thousand, was never reduced to less than nine thousand men after the departure of General Floyd's brigade. The investing force of the enemy was about fifty thousand strong, and considerably exceeded that force by the following morning. Under these circumstances no alternative was left me but to accept the terms demanded by our ungenerous enemy. A copy of the order of General Grant, fixing the terms of the surrender, is herewith en- closed. I do not seek to avoid any responsibility which, in the judgment of the President, may attach to my action, which was guided in every instance by a feeling of duty. My chief wish is, that he will find it consistent with the public interest to permit me still to unite my fortunes in the con- test for independence with those of the brave men whose gallantry I have witnessed, whose dangers and hardships I have shared, and in common with whom I have endured the privations of imprisonment amongst a vindictive and tyran- nical foe, I cannot close this report without calling special attention to the gallant and able conduct of my brigade commanders, Colonel John C. Brown, of the 3d Tennessee, and Colonel ^Villiain E. Baldwin, of the 14th Mississippi,, and of Colonel 11. W, Hanson, commanding the 2d Ken- tucky, detached from Breckinridge's Kentucky Brigade. For the operations of Colonel Baldwin's troops, I refer to 107 his report, as he was detached from my command during the siege. But he, as well as the other two officers, were con- spicuous on every occasion for their gallantry and military judgment, and merit the special approbation of the Govern- ment, Amongst the regimental commanders, Colonel J. M. Lil- lard and Colonel E. C. Cook merit the highest commenda- tion for their gallant bearing and the excellent manner in which they handled their regiments; and Major W. L. Doss behaved with marked gallantry. Mnjor George B. Cosby, my chief of stalf. deserves the highest commcmhition for the gallant and intelligent discharge of his duties ; and the other members of my staff are entitled to my thanks for their gallantry and for the efficient discharge of their appro- priate duties: Lieutenant Charles F. Johnson, aid-dc-camp; Lieutenant T. J. Clay, acting aid ; Major Alexander Cassi- day, acting inspector general ; Major 8. K. Hays, quarter- master ; Captain R. C. Wintersmith, commissary of subsis- tence ; Major Davidson, chief of artillery ; Mr. J. N. Gal- laher, acting aid ; Mr. Moore, acting topographical officer ; Mr. J. Walker Taylor, commanding a detachment of guides, and Mr. D. P. Buckner, volunteer aid. Major Barbour, A. D. C. to Brigadier General Tilghman, though wounded, remained with me on the 13th. I cannot bestow sufficient praise upon Captain Porter and Captain Rice E. Graves, and their officers and men for the gallant and efficient handling of their batteries. Artillery was never better served, and artillerists never behaved, under trying circum- stances, with greater coolness. Porter's battery, from its more exposed position, lost more than half its gunners, and its intrepid commander was severely wounded late in the afternoon of Saturday, being succeeded in command by the gallant Lieutenant Morton. Captain Jackson's Virginia battery, though not so fre- quently engaged, is entitled to notice. For an understanding of the particular operations of General Pillow's division, I refer you to the reports of his brigade commanders, Colonel William E. Baldwin, Colonel A. Heiman, Colonel John Gregg, and to the reports of their subordinate commanders. Accompanying this report is a list of the strength of my division and of its killed and wounded. My aggregate force at the beginning of the contests, w1 ich was constantly 108 tllminishing, did not exceed 3,025 infantry and two batteries artillery. Two of my regiments in addition, 844 men, were constantly under the command of General Pillow. The length of my lines exceeded three-fourths of a mile. I am, sir, very respeetfully, Your obedient servant, S. B. BUCKNER, Brigadier General, C. S. A. Lately commanding 2d Division central army of Kentucky. To Gen. S. Ccoper, Adj't and Inspector Gen., C. S. A., Richmond, Ya. ORIGINAL RErORT OF GENERAL S. B. BUCKNER, ADDRESSED TO COLONEL W. W. MACKALL, A. A. G. Headquarters Cumberland Armv, Dover, Tenn., February l.Sth, 1862. Sir : It becomes my duty to report that the remains of this army, after winning some brilliant successes, both in repulsing the assault of the enemy and in sallying success- fully through their lines, has been reduced to the necessity of a surrender. At the earliest practicable day I ■will send a detailed report of its operations. I can only say now that after the battle of the loth instant had been won, and my division of the army was being established in position to cover the retreat of the army, the plan of battle seemed to have been changed and the troops were ordered back to the trenches. Before my own division returned to their works on the ex- treme right, the lines were assailed at that point, ;ind my extreme right Avas occupied by a large force of the enemy. But I successfully repelled their further assaults. It was the purpose of General Floyd to effect the retreat of the army over the ground Avhich had been won in the morning, and the troops moved from their works with that view ; but before any movement for that purpose was organ- ized a reconnoisance showed that the ground was re-occupied by the enemy in great strength. General Floyd then deter- mined to retreat across the river with such force as could escape ; but as there were no boats until nearly daylight on the 1 6th, he left with some regiments of Virginia troops about daylight, and was accompanied by Brigadier-General Pillow. I was thus left in command of the remnant of the army, which had been placed in movement for a retreat which was no discovered to be impracticable. My men were in a state of complete exhaustion, from extreme suffering, from cold, and fatigue ; the supply of ammunition, especially for the artil- lery, was being rapidly exhausted, the army was to a great extent demoralized by the retrogade movement. On being placed in command, I ordered such troops as could not cross the river to return to their entrenchments, to make at the last moment such resistance as was possible, to the overwhelming force of the enemy. But a small portion of the forces had returned to the lines when I received from General Grant a raply to my proposal to negotiate for terms of surrender. To have lefused his terms would, in the condition of the army at that time, have led to the massacre of my troops without any advantage resulting from the sacrifice. I there- fore felt it my highest duty to these brave men whose con- duct has been so brilliant, and whose sufferings had been so intense, to accept the ungenerous terms proposed by the Federal commander, who overcome us solely by overwhelm- ing supoiiority of numbers. This army is, accordingly, prisoners of war; the officers retaining their side arms and private property, and the soldiers, their clothing and blankets. I regret to state, however, that, notwithstanding the earnest efforts of General Grant and many of his officers to prevent it, our camps have been a scene of almost indiscriminate pillage by the Federal troops. In conclusion, I request at the earliest time practicable, a court of enquiry to examine into the causes of the surren- der of this army. I am, sir, very respectfully, Your obedient servant, (Signed) S. B. BUCKNER, Brigadier-General, C. S. A. To CoL. W. W. Mack. MX, Ass't Adj't Gkneral, Nashville, Tenn. CORRESPONDENCE REFERRED TO IN GENERAL BUCKNER'S REPORT. Headquarters Fort Donelson, > February 16tb, 1862. J Sir : In consideration of all tlie circumstances governing the present situation of affairs at this station, 1 propose to the commanding officer of the Federal forces the appoint- ment of commissioners to agree upon terms of capitulation of the forces and post under my command, and in that view suggest an armistice until 12 o'clock to-day. I am, sir, very respectfully, Your obedient servant, (Signed,) S. B. BUCKNER, Brigadier General, C. S. A. To Brig. Gen. U. S. Grant, Commanding U. S. Forces near Fori Donelson. Reply of General Grant to a proposal for ati Armistice,. Headquarters Armv in the Fi.ei,d, ) Camp near Donelson, Feb. lo, 1862. y General S. B. Buckner, Confederate Army : Sir : Yours of this date proposing armistice and appoint- ment of commissioners to settle terms of capitulation is just received. No terms except unconditional and immediate surrender can be accepted. I propose to move immediately upon your works. I am, sir, very respectfully, Your obedient servant, U. S. GRANT, Brigadier General.. 9 112 [Copy.] Reply of General Buckner to General U. S. Grant. Headquarters, Dover, Tenn., Feb. 16, 1862. To Brigadier-General U. S. Grant, United States Army : Sir : The distribution of the forces under my command, incident to an unexpected change of commanders, and the overwhelming force under your command, compel me, not- withstanding the brilliant success of the Confederate arms yesterday, to accept the ungenerous and unchivalrous terms ■which you propose. I am, sir, your obedient servant, (Signed) S. B. BUCKNER, Brigadier-General, C. S. A. Agreement of General Grant to allow officers taken at Donelson to retain their side arms, Sfc, Sfc. Headquarters, Army in the Field, Fort Donelson, Feb. 16, 1862. Special Order. All prisoners taken at the surrender of Fort Donelson will be collected as rapidly as practicable near the village of Dover, under their respective company and regimental com- manders, or in such manner as may be deemed best by Brig- adier-General S. B. Buckner, and will receive two days rations preparatory to embarking for Cairo. Prisoners are to be allowed their clothing, blankets and such private property as may be carried about the person, and commissioned officers will be allowed their side arms. By order. U. S. GRANT, Brigadier- General. RErORT OF THE THIRD BRIGADE— COL. JOHN C. BROWN. To Major G. B, Cosby, A. A. General, 2nd Division C. A., Kj. Sir : — I have the honor to report, that the Srd, ISth, and 32nd, Tennessee regiments, composing the 3rd brigade of your division, arrived at Fort Donelson on the 9th and 10th days of February, and were assigned position hy Brig. Gen. Pillow, then in command on the riglit of the line of de- fences, — (the extreme right being occupied by the 2nd Ken- tucky regiment). I commenced at once the construction of rifle-pits and forming abatis by felling timber, but the sup- ply of tools was wholly inadequate, and before the works were scarcely half completed, the enemy appeared in our front, on Wednesday the 12th, about noon. After this, the incessant fire from the enemy's sharpshooters, rendered labor upon our Avorks, almost impossible during the day, and large fatigue parties were necessary during the entire nights of Wednesday, Thursday and Friday, although the weather was intensely cold. On Thursday the 13th, the 14th Mississippi, commanded by Major W. L. Doss, and the 41st Tennessee, commanded by Col. R. Farquharson, were temporarily attached to my brigade. The centre of my portion of the line, being the most elevated, and command- ing point was defended by Capt. Porter's light battery of six guns, while Capt. Graves' battery was posted near the left, commanding a long wide valley separating my left from Col. Heiman's right. The position was an admirable one to support my left and Col. Heiman's right, while it also commanded the hills immediately in front. About 1 1 o'clock on Thursday, I discovered the enemy moving in considerar- 114 ble force upon Col. Heiman's centre, and before the column come within range of Col. Heiman, and indeed, before it could be seen from Col. Heiman's position, I directed Capt. Graves to open fire from all his guns, which he did with such spirit, and fatal precision, that in less than fifteen minutes, the whole column staggered, and took shelter in confusion and disorder, beyond the summit of the hill, still further to our left, when Col. Heiman opened fire upon it, and drove it beyond range of both his and my guns. Later in the day, the enemy planted one section of a battery on a hill, almost in front of Capt. Graves, and opened an en- filading fire upon the left of my line, and at the same time a cross fire upon Col. Heiman. Capt. Graves handling his favorite rifle piece, with the same fearless coolness that charac- terized his conduct during the entire week, in less than ten minutes, knocked one of the enemy's guns from its carriage, and almost at the same moment, the gallant Porter disabled ;)nd silenced the other, while the supporting infantry re- treated precipitately before the storm of grape and canister poured into their ranks from both batteries. Nearly one- half of my command was constantly deployed in the rifle- pits, while the residue was held under arms, and in position as a reserve, but on Thursday, Col. Hanson, on the extreme right, being attacked by a large force, I sent by General Buckners orders, the 18th Tennessee to his support, which remained with him until Friday night. On Saturday morn- ing I had orders to move my command towards the left, so soon as Col. Head should relieve my men in the rifle-pits. He was late in reporting, and without waiting longer, I put the column in motion, directing the men in the rifle-pits to follow us, so soon as relieved, which they did very promptly, but in some disorder. My whole command was provided Avith three days cooked rations, and marched with their knapsacks, the purpose being, to turn the enemy's right wing, and march out on the Wynn's Ferry road, to fall back upon Nashville. Arriving at the point where the Wynn's Ferry road crosses the entrenchments, the 3rd Tennessee was deployed in the rifle-pits, while the remain- ing regiments Avere held in reserve. The enemy had already been attacked on his right by our left wing, and we were awaiting the proper moment of co-operation, and by Gen. Buckner's directions, I sent the 14th Mississippi to the front as skirmishers, the enemy occupying a hill in considerable force not far distant. The 3rd and 18th Tennessee regi- ii5 ments, (the former commanded by Lieut, Col. Thos. M Gordon, and the latter by Col. J. B. Palmer,) were sent forward in quick succession, to support the 14th Mississippi As they advanced over the abatis and through comparatively open ground, and especially on reaching the summit of the hill, they were met by a murderous fire. Some confusion ensued, but they returned a steady fire until the enemy re- tired under cover of dense timber and undergrowth, with- drawing his battery which had been pouring a heavy five into our reserves. Further pursuit being impracticable in that direction, and companies having become separated, and somewhat intermixed, on account of the obstacles ovcrAvhich they had marched, the command retired within the entrench- ments, and immediately reformed to renew the attack still further to the right, whither the enemy were retiring. And about 12 o'clock, under the direction of Brig. Gen. Buck- ner, I led the 3rd and 18th Tennessee, as well as the 3'2n(l Tennessee, (Col. Ed. C. Cook,) across an open field on the right of the Wynn's Ferry road, under the fire of a battery posted on that road. As we appeared upon the summit ot the hill, the force supporting the battery retreated about 300 or 400 yards, still farther to our right and farther from our lines, leaving one section of the battery, which fell into our hands. The hill to which the enemy retreated, was so densely covered with trees and undergrowth, that our skir- mishers could not ascertain his position and numbers, but we Avere led to suppose that his battery at that point was supported by a force not exceeding one thousand men, bat it was afterwards ascertained that his strength was nearly 7,000, while there were five regiments within supporting distance. Acting iipon the first and only information we could then obtain, a charge was ordered, and the whole command moved forward with spirit and animation, but when within about 100 yards of the enemy, who was upon higher ground, we were met by a fire of grape and musketry that was ter- rific, but fortunately passing above our heads. We halted and opened a fire of musketry upon them, which, althougii continuing only a few minutes killed and wounded not less than 800 of the enemy. Lieut. Col. Gordon of the 3rd, having been wounded, ordered the regiment to fall back un- der cover of the hill. I rallied it at about 100 yards, and placed it in command of Col. Chaires. The 18th and 32nd fell back a short distance, and just then being re-inforced l)y 116 the. 14th Mississippi, we were renewing the attack, when the enemy left the field, leaving his dead and wounded. While we were engaged, the gallant Graves came in full speed to our assistance, with a part of his battery, and maintained his position until the enemy retired. Our loss in this en- gagement did not exceed fifty in killed and wounded. But the brave and accomplished Lieut. Col. Moore, of the 32nd Tennessee regiment, fell mortally wounded, while aiding his no less worthy commander in cheering his men to the cjiarge. Just as the enemy left the field, entirely opening the Wynn's Ferry road, my command Avas ordered by Brig. Gen. Pillow, repeated by Brig. Gen. Floyd, to return at once to its position on the right of our line of defences. My men had scarcely deployed in the rifle-pits, when I was ordered to re-inforce Col. Hanson on the extreme right, whose w,orks had been stormed and taken by the enemy before he had re-occupied them. An obstinate fire was maintained until dark, but we held the ground to which Col. Hanson had retired, although opposed by a superior force of fresh ti oops. Captains Porter and Graves, did efficient service in their engagement with their batteries, — indeed, they excited the admiration of the whole command, by an exhibition of coolness and braveay, under a heavy fire (from which they had no protection,) which could not be excelled. Capt. Porter fell, dangerously wounded by a Minie ball through his thigh, while working one of his guns — his gunners being, nearly all of them, disabled or killed. The command then devolved upon Lieut. Morton, a beardless youth, who stepped forward like an old veteran, and nobly did he emulate the example of his brave Captain. Fatigue parties were employed until two o'clock Sunday morning strengthening our position, when an order reached mc, to spike the guns on my line and march my command towards the left as on Saturday morning. The order was in- stantly executed, but before the column had proceeded one mile, I was directed to counter-march and re-occupy the works and display flags of truce from the front of our works. At y o'clock the same morning the command was surrendered. My command was so much worn and exhausted from in- cessant labor and watching during the entire week — expo- s.ure to intense cold, as well as from the fatigues of the bat- tle on the preceding day, as to be wholly unable to meet any spirited attack from the enemy on Sunday morning. Our ammunition, both for artillery and small arms, was well nigh exhausted. 117 It might do injustice to others to particularize many in- stances of daring and bravery among officers and men. With but few exceptions, they all deserve the highest praise for the determined and gallant spirit with which they bore themselves under their first exposure to fire My killed amount to - - . 33 " wounded amount to - - 244 For details, reference is made to the report of regimental commanders, marked respectively A. B. C. D. and E. I have the honor to be sir, Very respectfully. Your obedient servant, JOHN C. BROWN, Colonel 3rd Tennessee regiment, „ , Commanding 3rd brigade. February 16th, 1862. REPORT OF COLONEL W. E. BALDWIN, COM- MANDING SECOND BRIGADE. Fort Warren, } Boston Harbor, March 1 2th, 1862. j Major George B. Cosbv, Assistant Adjutant General : Sir : Left by General Buckner, at Cumberland city, on the 1 1 th of February, on the night of the 1 2th instant I re- ceived orders, by telegraph, from Brigadier General Pillow, commanding at Fort Donelson, to hasten to that place with two regiments of my command. The 26th Tennessee, Col- onel Lillard, and the 26th Mississippi, Colonel Reynolds, were immediately embarked and arrived at Dover about one o'clock in the morning of Thursday the IStli. These regi- ments were at first posted immediately on the left of the centre of our lines of rifle trenches, as a support to one of our batteries. This disposition was changed after daylight the same morning: the 26th Mississippi being placed in the trenches on the extreme left and the 26th Tennessee placed in reserve as a support to the former. About nine o'clock A. I\I., the enemy commenced a brisk artillery fire apparently on our whole line. This fire, kept up with but little intermission throughout the entire day, pro- duced but little eifect upon the left until late in the evening, when, the enemy having reduced his charges, several of the shells, which had previously passed too high, fell in our midst, mortally wounding one man and slightly wounding two others in Colonel Lillard's regiment. On the 14th the fire was not resumed. About noon Gen- eral Pillow directed the left wing to be formed in the open ground to the left and rear of our position in the lines, for the purpose, apparently, of attacking the enemy's right. 119 My command, to which the 20th Mississippi, Major Brown, was temporarily attached, constituted the advance in the following order: first, the 26th Mississippi, second, the 26th Tennessee, third, the 20th Mississippi. Formed in column by platoon, we advanced in a road leading from a point about two hundred yards from the left of our trenches, and approaching nearly perpendicularly the enemy's right. We had proceeded not more than one-fourth of a mile, when General Pillow ordered a countermarch, saying that it was too late in the day to accomplish anything, and Ave returned to our former position in the lines. Late that night, commanders of brigades were summoned to a council at General Pillow's headquarters, where, after being duly advised of our perilous situation, enveloped by a largely superior force, which was being constantly increased, and our communications already at the mercy of the enemy, it w^as unanimously determined to endeavor to extricate the army by a bold and vigorous attack on the right of the Fed- eral lines, early on the morrow. The regiments composing our left wing were to form at four o'clock A. M., on the same ground, and in the same order as on the previous evening, and to advance, under command of General Pillow, to attack the extreme right of the enemy, supposed to be posted in force at a distance of one and a half or two miles. This movement was to be supported by our right wing, un- der General Buckner, who Avas to move from the lines at a later period, follow up the first blow, and, should the com • bined movement not prove successful in creating a panic in the enemy's ranks, a way might at least be opened by turn- ing his right, for the egress of our Avhole force. In antici- pation of thus attemping our escape the men were directed to take knapsacks, blankets and all the rations that cuuld be immediately provided. Precisely at ten minutes past four o'clock, on tlic morn- ing of Saturday the lath. General PilloAV arrived on the ground and found my three regiments, Avhich Avere to con- stitute the advance, formed and ready to march. Some delay Avas caused by regiments not arriving promptly, and it was six o'clock jjcforc the column Avas put in motion. Marching by the right flank in a narroAV and obstructed by- road, the head of the column had advanced not more than one-third of a mile, when, ascending a slight elevation, the advanced guard composed of a company of the 26th Missis- 120 sippi deployed, was fired upon by what was supposed, at first, to be only the enemy's pickets, A second company of the same regiment was immediately thrown forward to sup- port the first, but both were soon driven back by a brisk and well sustained fire, which indicated the presence of consid- erable force. Meanwhile, the column was formed by com- pany, and the leading regiment deployed into line to the right. This method of forming line of battle was rendered advisable by the peculiar features of the ground, which sloped gently to the right, thickly covered with timber. About ten yards to the left of the road, and running nearly parallel was a fence, which bounded on that side an open field of some four hundred or five hundred acres extent. This field afi'orded no protection to our troops if brought " forward into line, " but would expose them in executing the movement, to a destructive fire, should the enemy have taken advantage of the position. In executing the deployment the 26th Mississippi was three times thrown into confusion by the close and rapid fire of the enemy taking the men in flank, and three times were they rallied, finishing the movement some fifty yards to the rear, and a little to the right of the exact point where their line should have been placed. The subsequent con- duct of this regiment fully demonstrates the fact, that any other than forward movements are extremely dangerous with volunteers, for during the remainder of the day both ofiicers and men behaved with great coolness and gallantry. The 26th Tennessee was then brought forward and five companies deployed so as to occupy the space between the fence on the left and the 26th Mississippi on the right, leav- ing the remaining five companies in column in the road to strenghten that point, which would evidently become the centre and point of operations. Soon after this disposition was completed, a stafi" officer having been sent to advise General Pillow that the enemy was before us in force, other regiments were sent forward from the rear of the column to right and left. Colonel Mc- Causland, of Virginia, with his command formed on the right of the 26th Mississippi, the 1st Mississippi, Colonel Gregg's Texas, and Lieutenant-Colonel Lyons 8th Kentucky regi- ments were formed still farther to our right, the latter regi- ment thrown back perpendicularly to our line to prevent the enemy taking advantage of the cover afi'orded by the slope of the ground to turn our right. 121 The 20th Mississippi was sent into action, as I have since learned, bj^ direct order of General Pillow, and caused to take position in the field on the left, where they were openly exposed to a destructive fire which they were not able to return with effect. The. regiment was soon recalled, but not before its left Aving had suft'ered heavy loss. Our line advanced some 50 or lUi) yards up the slope and remained stationary for more than an hour, the position of the enemy being so well chosen and covered that it seemed impossible to gain an inch of ground. A small detachment of Vir- ginia troops on the left of the 26th Tennessee, and in the open field twice endeavored to gain ground forward to a point where their fire could be effective, but were unable to stand the destructive effect of the minnie balls. At this juncture the 20th Mississippi again came up across the field and took possession, slightly covered by an inequality of the ground. Observing a regiment or more of our troops posted inac- tive, some 300 or 400 yards still more to our left, where the shallow ravine which covered our front spread out and was lost in the plain, I requested the commanding officer to throw forward his left and advance up the hollow in a direction nearly parallel to our line of battle, and attacking the ene- my's right flank. This movement being supported by the whole line, all the regimenia on the left throwing forward their left wings, we succeeded in executing a change ot front to the right, turning the right of the enemy, and driving him at once from his position. Up to this time our condition Avas one of extreme peril, and nothing but the native gallantry of troops, brought for the first time under heavy fire, And the extraordinary exer- tions of many of the field and company officers, saved us from being thrown back in confusion into our trenches. From this time the enemy were slowly driven from each position, which the ground, favorable for defence enabled them to take. Two sections of artillery were taken. These placed to bear on our lines of rifle trenches, Avere rushed upon in flanks and seized before they could be turned upon us or be taken from the field. The first section Avas taken by the 26th Tennessee, the second by the 26th Mississippi. Advancing in a direction nearly parallel to our line of de- fence, when nearly opposite the centre, our course Avas for some time impeded by the desperate stand made by the ene- my, who was probably reinforced, and occupying ground 122 most favorable for shelterinn; liis troops. Our ammunition had been so rapidly expended as to entirely exhaust the sup- ply of some regiments. Numbers had- provided themselves from the cartridge boxes of the dead and wounded enemy. Our force had been considerably reduced by casualties, and the numerous attendants ■\vlio conveyed the "woun ed from the field. Having no mounted officer to send I rode up to where Captain Graves' battery was posted in the trenches, and requested supplies of ammunition and reinforcements, if any could be spared, giving Captain Graves' an intimation as to the relative positions of the forces engaged. Imme- diately on my return he opened a fire of grape, which so disordered the enemy that we were again enabled to advance, driving him from his camp of the night before. lie took a new position still further retired, holding it for some time, until Colonel Hanson, with the 2nd Kentucky regiment, coming to our assistance, poured afire into the enemy's flank, who immediately fled in confusion. This completed the rout of the extreme right of the federal forces. Uncertain sis to the movements of our right wing, I paused to obtain the information necessary to render our future movements effec- tive, and to restore order from the confusion incident to a continuous combat of nearly six hours in the woods. •^ Here, General B, R. Johnson came up to me for the first time, although I leatn that he Ifad at different times during the morning directed other portions of the line. He could give no information, but soon after, whilst my attention was directed to the 26th Mississippi and 26th Tennessee, moved off all the other regiments including the 2()th Mississippi. I saw no more of these during the remainder of the day. After the lapse of an hour, observing troops from the right returning to their original positions in the lines^ I di- rected the tv/o regiments left with me, also to return to the trenches. Three times during the day I had sent a staff officer to General Pillow for instructions, advising him of our situa- tion. But no orders or directions were received from him, except, to do " the best I could." Being totally unacquainted with the topographical features of the ground, unadvised as to the movements of the general command, it was impossible for me to do more than simply dislodge the enemy as from time to time he made a stand before us. I would beg leave to remark here, that the efficiency of 123 the smooth bore musket and ball and buckshot cartridges was fully demonstrated on this occasion, and to recommend that our troops be impressed with the advantage of closing rapidly upon the enemy Avhen our rapid loading and firing proves immensely destructive, and the long range arms of the enemy lose their superiority. For lists of killed and wounded and minor details re- counting the conduct of subaltern officers and men, I beg leave respectfully to refer to reports of regimental com- manders, which accompany this report. Justice requires that I should refer to the coolness and gallantry of Colonel John M, Lillard, who, wounded in the early part of the engagement remained at the head of his command during the whole day. It is difficult to determine which deserves most commendation, this regiment or its commander. Lieutenant-Colonel Boone and Major Parker, 26th Mis- sissippi, both conducted themselves as officers and brave men, and this regiment bore its part well in the conflict. Major Brown, commanding the 2()th Mississippi is enti- tled to honorable mention ; his left wing thrown in the early part of the day into an exposed position, by an ill advised order, held its ground until recalled, and afterwards the whole regiment was among the foremost in every advance. I can- not forbear to mention that Colonel MaCausland ( — ) Vir- ginia, not assigned to my command, voluntarily tendered his co-operation, and was conspicuous for his daring intre- pidity. The members of my personal staff deserve especial notice. Lieutenant S. D. Harris, 14th Mississippi, xVcting Assis- tant Adjutant General, was of great assistance. He merited and has received my thanks. So, likewise did Thomas A. Burke, a private in company I, 14th Mississippi, appointed an acting aid-de-camp. L. F. Carrington, a private in company K, 14th Mississippi, also an acting aid-de-camp was severely, I fear mortally, wound- ed in the early part of the action, an accident which de- prived me of the services of a valuable aid. Captain 1). H. Spence, of Murfreesboro', Tenn., volunteer aid was severely wounded in the head whilst gallantly ex- posing himself on the top of a fence and urging " Tennes- seean's onward." My own regiment, the 14th Mississippi, Major Doss was sent to Fort Donelson some days in advance of my arrival. 124 The 4 1st Tennessee, Colonel Farquharson, -was brought down on the 13th. Both regiments were posted on the right and they tempo- rarily separated from my command. Neither representations nor solicitations on my part could avail in inducing such change as would reunite these regi- ments, or place me where I desired to be, under the imme- diate direction of my proper commander. The reports of these latter regiments have been made to Colonel John C. Brown, commanding 3d brigade, under whose orders they Avere temporarily placed. A condensed statement of killed and wounded is annexed. Respectfully, Your obedient servant, W. E. BALDWIN, Colonel Commanding 2d Brigade, Gen. Buckner's Division. SUMMARY OF KILLED AND WOUNDED. 2 xS f- < 00 February 16th, 1822. ] Colonel John C. Brown, Colenel Commanding od Brigade, 2d Division Central Army, Kentucky : The thirty-second Tennessee regiment reached Fort Don- elson on the night of the 10th instant, with five hundred and fifty-five men rank and file, many of the regiment having been left sick at Russollville, Kentucky, many at Bowling Green, Kentucky, and some on furlough sick at home. We were placed on the left of General Buckner's Division. The entire regiment were employed making entrenchments till the same were finished. The enemy began to fire upon us with artillery and sharpshooters as early as Tuesday even- ing the 11th. The weather was extremely cold, and being kept contin- ually at labor and on duty we suffered much from exposure. The regiment, although held in readiness at every moment, was not engaged in actual fight until Saturday the 15th. On Friday night Ave were ordered to have cooked rations for three days, and Avith knapsacks packed, to be ready to march at 4 o'clock next morning. I then learned that it had been determined by the Generals in council at that hour to march to the extreme left of our entrenchments, attack the enemy's riglit wing and turn it, and if we succeeded, to march for Nashville, The next morning at 4 o'clock, our brigade marched to the left of our entrenchments. Just as we were approaching the extreme left of our entrenchments General Backner ordered me to place my regiment in column of di- vision under cover of the hill in the rear of Green's battery and to sustain it. We remained here until about ten o'clock^ 133 A. M., when General Pillow ordered me to move my regi- ment to tlie right, and to cross the entrenchments and attack a battery of the enemy, which was then firing at us, and seemed to be situated some eight hundred yards from our entrenchments. Just as we were marching across the en- trenchments General Buckner and Colonel Brown came up, and upon learning the order General Pillow had given. Gen- eral Buckner ordered me to proceed to attack the battery, and ordered Colonel Palmer with his regiment to sustain me. I forwarded the regiment, crossed the entrenchments, threw out two companies as skirmishers, and moved forward the regiment in the direction of the enemy's battery. The skirmishers very soon engaged the enemy's skirmishers, drove them back, killing some, taking five prisoners, and capturing some five Minnie muskets. We moved forward Ihrough woods with thick undergrowth ; the bushes were covered with snow which wns melting slowly and it was very difiicult to move forward. We had advanced within seventy- five or a hundred yards of the enemy, and he had opened fire upon us with his battery, when Colonel Brown rode up and ordered me to move my regim?nt to the right and attack the battery at this point. The bushes Avere very thick and we could Avith great difficulty move forward. Our skirmishers fired upon the enemy and rallied upon the battalion. I im- mediately ordered the regiment to kneel and fire, and to load and fire kneeling ; the fire began. Colonel Palmer on my left immediately opened fire from his regiment. The firing was kept up rapidly ; the regiment all the while slowly but gradually moving forward. We were protected by cover of the timber and hill from the enemy's shot. Lieutenant Colonel W. P. Moore fell very early in the action wounded in the right knee and was carried from the field to the hospital. This left me with no field officer to aid me, Major Brownlow having been left sick at Bussell- ville ; Adjutant Jones being on duty part of the day, but was not with the regiment in this engagement. I soon dis- covered many of the muskets failed to fire, the priming being wet. (The most of the regiment being armed with inferior flint lock muskets.) After awhile the left wing of the regiment began to fall back slowly, and then the right wing in good order, and being satisfied the condition of many of the guns, in order to do execution, must be wiped out and dried, and knowing the regiment, after fivlling back a short distance, would be entirely protected from the 134 enemy's shot, I determined to let them fall back. After they fell back about one hundred yards I halted the regi- ment and ordered the men to wipe and dry their guns. Upon inquiry as to why they fell back, the officers informed me they heard an order " to fall back " and believed it came from proper authority. After the guns were cleaned I threw out two companies of skirmishers, who proceeded as far as the " Wynn's Ferry road," in which was placed the enemj^'s battery, where we attacked it, and the skirmishers returned and reported that the enemy had retired beyond the road and could not be seen. After waiting some time and receiving no orders, Colonel Palmer anti I, after con- sultation, determined to march our regiments back to the entrenchments, where we had crossed and Avhere m}-- regi- ment had left their knapsacks. ^Vhen we reached the en- trenchments Major Cosby gave me an order from General Buckner to march my regiment immediately back to the en- trenchments we had left in the morning. At this moment we felt satisfied that the Wynn's Ferry road was clear and the way to Nashville open. " That fortune had smiled upon us, and that we ought to prove to her we were worthy of her favors." We marched rapidly back to our entrench- ments and took position in them. In a few minutes the enem}' appeared in large furce in front of us and threatened to attack us until night came on. Early at night I received orders to have three days cooked rations prepared, and with knapsacks packed to be ready to march at four o'clock next morning. At the appointed hour we marched out for Dover, and before we reached Dover we were ordered to return to our entrenchments and learned that capitulation for a sur- render was going on. It gives me pleasure to state that the officers and privates of the regiment, although jaded from labor and exposure, at all times exhibited great willingness to obey, and anxiety to promptly execute all orders : in battle they behaved coolly and courageously, and not one of the regiment ever left the line or his post of duty. The morale of the regi- ment Avas not corrupted or destroyed, and even after it was known we Avere surrendered Ave had not a single straggler from the regiment. During the engagement on the 15th, Ave lost in killed, and had wounded in company A, commanded by Captain Willis Worley, one killed and three wounded, whose names I cannot give, as I have no report from company A. I hereto 135 attach a list of the other companies of the regiment, giving the names and numbers engaged, and the killed, wounded and missing. At the earliest moment it can be obtained, I will forward a list of company A to be made a part of the exhibit hereto. Our gallant Colonel Moore died from the wound he re- ceived. The regiment, as well as all who knew him, deeply mourn his death. The Surgeon, James F. Grantt, Quartermaster John T. Shepai'd, Commissary E. Shields Wilson, Quartermaster's Sergeant James P. Campbell, were all at their post and did their full duty. Captain Jobn D. Clark, a drill master, was on duty during the entire week, and in the engagement of the loth. Captain D. C. Sims, a drill master, assigned to my regiment, was on duty a portion of the Aveek, but not in the engagement of the loth, being reported sick. RECAPITULATION. Number of Regiment rank and file at Fort Donelson, ooo Number of Regiment at Donelson not engaged on Saturday 21 Number of Regiment at Donelson engaged on Satur- day 534 Number of Regiment killed 3 Number of Regiment wounded and surrendercil 15 Number of Regiment wounded and not surrendered. . 21 Number of Regiment missing 1 Number of Regiment escaped I Number of Kegiment wounded 36 Number of Regiment surrendered 528 538 Respectfully, ED. C. COOK, Colonel S2nd Tennessee Regiment. Fort Warren, July SiUh, 1862. REPORT OF MAJOR N. F. CHEAIRS, COMMAND- ING THIRD TENNESSEE REGIMENT. FonT Vf ARREN, Boston Harbor, ) Massachusetts, March 10th, 181)2. \ To Col. John C, Brown, Commanding Srd Brigade, 27id Division, Central Army of Kentucky, C. S. A. : The 3rcl Tennessee regiment of volunteers arrived at Fort Donelson on the night of the 8th of February, 18132, Avith an aggregate reported for duty of seven hundred and fifty men. On the day after reaching Donelson, the ■whole regi- ment was employed in the preparations of works of defence — rifle-pits, trenches, &c., at Avhich both men and ofiicers con- tinued night and day, until the evening of the 12th, at which time a skirmish took place with the Federals about a mile or a mile and a half in advance of our trenches, by a company of the ISth Tennessee regiment, who had been sent out on picket duty. Immediately after the return of said company to the trenches. General Buckner's division, which occupied the right of the whole line of our defence, was arranged in order of battle for the general engagement which ensued. The Srd Tennessee regiment occupied the 4th position from the right, and five companies were deployed in the rifle-pits, and five held in reserve, commanded by myself with orders to sustain the companies deployed in the pits under the com- mand of Lieutenant Colonel S. M. Gordon, and to support Porter's artillery on my right as circumstances might re- quire. Such was the position held by the Srd Tennessee regiment until the morning of the 15th February. At about 4 o'clock of said morning, the Srd Tennessee regi- ment was ordered to be put in motion and march in the direction of our left wing with knapsacks, haversacks, and 137 three days rations, with whatever else that could be conve- niently carried. This order was immediately executed, and the regiment marched out beyond and to the right of Dover, where it was halted and ordered to deploy as skirmishers in the rifle-pits — and to the left of the lith Mississippi and 18th Tennessee, at about eight and a-half or nine o'clock in the morning. The 14th Mississippi and the .Srd Tennessee, were ordered by Colonel Brown, (General Buckner also being present,) to attack one of the cncm;y's batteries, located some three or four hundred yards in front of our trenches, and from their position were firing heavily upon us. This battery was supported by several regiments of infantry. We succeeded (after a hot contest of about three quarters of an hour.) in driving the enemy back, and oc- cupied their position until ordered back to the trenches by Major Cassaday of General Buckncr's staff. The 3rd, 18th, and 32nd Tennessee regiments, were ordered across the trendies to attack another one of the enemy's batteries, supported by a heavy column of infantry located on or near the Wynn's Ferry road, and much farther from our works. The 3rd Tennessee was on tlic left — the 18th in the centre and the 32nd on the ri^rht, in the arranf]:cment for this at- tack. The trenches were soon crossed and the battalions formed in double column and marched in the direction of the battery. When in about one hundred and fifty yards of it, it opened upon us with grope and canister, and seconded by the infantry. Lieutenant Colonel Gordon being in com- mand of the 3rd regiment, ordered it to lay down. In a few seconds he was wounded, and by some unfortunate order being given just at that time, which the regiment took for retreat, and thereupon did retreat some hundred or hun- dred and fifty yards, when they were rallied by Colonel Brown and reformed in line of battle. General Buckner being present, and discovering the enemy had aho fallen back, ordered me, as next in command to Lieutenant Colonel Gordon, (he having retired from the field,) to take the 3rd Tennessee regiment back to the trenches which order I obeyed. On arriving at the trenches, I met with Gen. Pillow, who or- dered me, (after ascertaining I was in command.) to take the Tennessee regiment back to the position we had occupied on the right wing, and the one we had left at about 4 o'clock in the morning. I immediately formed the regiment and exe- cuted the order. A few minutes after reaching our original position, an attack was made upon Colonel Hanson, the 2nd 138 Kentuck}' regiment's trenches, by the enemy in strong force. Colonel Hanson not having more than one or two companies in position, fell back upon the 18th Tennessee, (Colonel Palmer.) and I was ordered to bring up the 3rd Tennessee, to support the 2nd Kentucky and 18th Tennes- see, which order was executed at the shortest possible notice, — and in. justice to the officers and soldiers, must say they bore themselves most gallantly, — notwithstanding they were completel}'", or nearly so, worn down by incessant fighting and fatigue duty, for eight consecutive days. We succeeded in driving back the enemy, although they had fresh and we had exhausted troo])S. Lieutenant Colonel Gordon was in command of the regiment from the time we arrived at Donelson on the night of the 8th, until about 1 o'clock P. M., on the 15th, when he was wounded and re- tired from the field. I was then in command until the sur- render, which was at 6 o'clock Sunday morning, February 16th, 1862. For a detailed account of the killed and wounded of the 3rd Tennessee regiment, during the entire fight at Donelson, I refer you to the subjoined paper marked 11. Killed twelve, wounded seventy-six. The foregoing report of the conduct and actions of the 3rd Tennessee regiment, and of its casualties at Fort Donel- son, I have the honor to submit to you. Very respectfully, N. F. CHEAIRS, Major conimandi7\g Srd Tennessee regiment. REPORT OF MAJOR W. L. DOSS, COMMANDING FOURTEENTH MISSISSIPPI REGIMENT. To CoLONKL John C. Brown, Commanding Fi ■ st Brigade General Buckncr's Division : Sir : I have the honor to report the following operations of the 14th regiment Mississippi Volunteers during the en- gagement at Fort Donelson, ending on the 15th February, 1862: On the morning of the 15th of February, at three o'clock A. M., I received orders to have my regiment in readiness to move in two hours. About daylight we took up line of march in the direction of our left wing. It was with great difficulty that we progressed owing to the country which was hilly or mountainous and covered with snow and ice. During our march shells were constantly falling around us without doing any damage until we halted in rear of the entrenchments, where I formed the regiment in close column by company. We were protected, to some extent, from the shells of the enemy by forming on the hill side, which was thickly set with undergrowth. At this place Captain J. L. Crigler, of company " G," was severly wounded in the right arm by the explosion of a shell and was unable to proceed farther with his company. I received orders to deploy two companies as skirmishers, and soon after the battalion was ordered to dislodge a bat- tery in position apparently about four hundred yards to our front. The regiment moved off by the right flank until it reached our entrenchments, when it advanced in line of battle. We very soon came to a small field containing about ten or fifteen acres, where our march was somewhat impeded by an abatis made by the enemy. At this point we were fired upon their skirmishers. I ordered the battalion not to re- turn the fire. The right wing of the battalion was faced to 140 the right and marched up the hill some distance under a heavy fire, then faced to the front and ordered to open fire upon the enemy. In the meantime the left wing had marched through a gap in the abatis, faced to the right and rejoined the four right companies when a general engage- ment ensued. At this point Capt. F. M. Rogers, of company *' E," fell, gallantly cheering^his men on. The engagement at this point continued for about an hour or more, the men displaying great coolness and courage, and the officers great gallantry. The regiment sufl'ered severely at this point and was ordered to retreat by Major Cassiday, who had been appointed by General Buckner to assist me. (Coionel Baldwin being in command of a brigade on t'le extreme left.) After falling back some two hundred yards I endeavored to rally the regiment, on the 18th Tennessee regiment, but Major Cassiday insisted and gave the order to the regiment to fall back to the entrenchments which was done. After remaining there about one hour, we were again ordered out by General Buckner to support a section of Captain Graves' battery. We marched down the '* Wynn's Ferry road" about one mile and were halted on the top of a hill by General Buck- ner, when the enemy's battery opened a galling fire of shot and shell upon us. It was soon ascertained that Capt. Graves' bat- tery could do but little good there, and was ordered to fall back, (I think by General Pillow ;) whereupon my regiment was ordered to take its original position on the right. Upon our arrival there we found that the enemy were in possession of the entrenchments on the extreme right, which had been occupied by the I'nd Kentucky regiment, and which was then engaged with the enemy to regain their original position. My regiment was immediately ordered to their support, and, on arriving there, we found, the enemy advancing upon us in considerable numbers, when we were ordered to open fire upon them, which was kept up from about three o'clock until about about dark, when the enemy retired. The men slept upon their arms during the night. About one o'clock I re- ceived your order to have my regiment ready to march in an hour, which order was countermanded about daylight. Respectfully submitted, W. L. DOSS, Major commanding 1 4tk Regiment Mississippi Volunteers. REPORT OF COLONEL JOSEPH B PALMER, COM- MANDING EIGHTEENTH TENNESSEE REGI> ME NT. Fort Warren, Boston Harbor. ) Massachusetts, March 7th, 18G2. ) To Colonel John C. Brown, Commanding 3cJ Brigade, 2d Division, Central Army of Kentucky, C. S. A. : The 18th Regiment of Tennessee Volunteers, arrived at Fort Donelson on the 8th of February, 1862, with an aggre- gate reported for duty of six hundred and eighty-five (085), and there encamped mainly -without tents, or other protec- tion from the weather, and with scarcely any cooking uten- sils until the surrender of the forces at that point on the 16th day of the same month. On the day after reaching Donelson the ■svliole regiment was employed in the preparations of works of defence, rifle- pits, trenches, etc., at which both men and officers continued without relief or rest, night and day until the 12th. Early in the forenoon of that day, pursuant to orders from brigade headquarters, I ordered out company C, commanded by Captain W. R. Butler, on picket service, with the usual in- structions. They went in the direction of the enemy's lines about one-and-a-half miles and took position, when suddenly they discovered several thousand Federal troops advancing towards our encampment. Capta/n Butler thus finding his position greatly exposed, conducted a prudent and skillful retreat, gradually fiilling back so as to keep the enemy under constant observation, finally fired upon them and came within my encampment, subuiitting a report of this intelligence which I immediately communicated to you and General Buck- 142 ner in person. General Buckner's Division, ■which occupied the right of the whole line of our defence was therefore arranged in order of battle for the general engagement which ensued. The 2d Kentucky (Colonel Hanson's) was first, and my regiment second on the right. I deployed compa- nies A, B, and G, (Captains Rushing, Joyner and McWhirter) in the rifle-pits, immediately in my front, placing them in command of Major S. W. Davis. The other companies were formed in double column just in rear of the former in charge of myself and Lieutenant-Colonel A. G. Cardcn, with orders from General Buckner to sustain the line cov- ered by my deployment, to support Porter's artillery on my left, or reinforce Colonel Hanson on my right, as circum- stances might require. Such was the position held by me until the morning of the 15th February. I had occasion however, on the 13th to dispatch companies E and K (Cap- tains Sorre and Bandy) to reinforce Colonel Hanson, upon whom the enemy was opening a considerable fire, but after a very spirited engagement the attack was repulsed. I had^ occasion also on the 14th to send the balance of my reserve (Captains Webb, Wood, Putman, Butler and Lieutenant John's companies) to reinforce the right, where it was ex- pected the enemy would, on that day, make a desperate attack, simultaneously with a fire on the fort from their gun-boats. But owing probably to a failure of success in the latter — no further than the general fire was made upon us at that time. On Saturday morning, 1 5th February, at about two and-a-half or three o'clock 1 received orders from brigade headquarters to put my whole command in motion, and to march in the direction of our left wing, with knap- sacks, haversacks, provided with -three days rations and whatever else the men and officers could carry. Sending all my wagons except enough for the transportation of ordnance stores across Cumberland river, I proceeded immediately to execute this order, and marched out beyond and to the right of Dover, where I was ordered to halt and take posi- tion in a general line-of-battle, on the right of the 3d Ten- nessee regiment. Very soon afterwards the 14th Missis- sippi and 3d Tennessee were ordered by Colonel Brown (Gen- eral Buckner also being present) to attack one of the ene- my's batteries just in our front and about three hundred yards beyond the trenches, and from their position were firing heavily upon us. This battery was supported by sev- eral regiments of infantry, which in connection with it turned 143 a terrible fire on the two regiments just named, against which they fought gallantly and bravely, thus making a severe engagement, which having continued for some con- siderable time I was ordered across the trenches to their support, and reached there just about the time the enemy abandoned their position and yielded the ground. Under the order of Major Cassidy, 1 returned to my former posi- tion in connection with the other two regiments in the gene- ral line-of-battle. The 3d Tennessee, 32d and 18th Ten- nessee, were then ordered across the trenches to attack another one of the enemy's batteries located on or near the Wynn's ferry road and much further beyond our works. Col- onel (book's regiment was on the right, my own in the centre, and Colonel Brown's on the left in the arrangement for this attack. Tlie trenches were soon crossed, the battalions formed in double column and we marched on to the supposed position of the battery. Colonel Cook being in advance of my regiment with skirmishers in his fi'ont. We found some, I may sa}'- much embarrassment in having insufficient infor- mation in regard to the enemy's location, as we could only judge in reference to that by the smoke and reports of pieces lately heard and seen in that direction. We found also very considerable difficulty in marching in the requisite order owing to the timber and denseness of the undergrowth, on which the snow was thickly depositing and melting some- what rapidly. We advanced forward, however, in quick time until nearing the enemy, when we halted for the purpose of gaining if pos- sible some more definite idea of his position, the skirmishers having rallied on their battalion without (as I learned from Colonel Cook) being able to furnish very definite informa- tion. Colonel Cook and myself advanced a few paces beyond our commands for the purpose of taking such observations as would enable us to direct the movements of our regiments to the best possible advantage. We discovered portions of the enemy's baggage at the distance of about one hundred yards, just over the point of a hill in our front. Being thus better satisfied of their position and that an engagement must immediately occur, we accordingly deployed as rapidly as possible in line-of-battle, my right resting on Colonel Cook's left, and the 3d Tennessee on my left. The enemy opened a terrific fire upon us about the time or before Ave had fairly executed the deployment. The force here against us consisted of one battery, supported by six infantry regi- 144 ments, all of -whicli ultimately engaged in the fight. I order- ed my entire command to fire and load kneeling as in that position, the main body of the enemy's fire would and did pass over us. The officers and men under me on this occasion evinced great coolness, bravery and determination for success in this most unequal contest. They directed their fire with unusual accuracy, which told desperately and rapidly upon the enemy, who, under its terrible effect and force, gave ground, while we advanced upon them about twenty paces. A further advan e would have lost on our part an advantage in position, by which we had been very considerably bene- fitted. And although the enemy continued their retreat until they had gone beyond the reach of our guns, it was not deemed consistent with the orders for the movements of our whole army on that day, as made known on the previous night from Generals Floyd, Pillow and Buckner to myself and other commanders of regiments, to pursue the several forces any further in that direction. Besides this, many of ray arms, (flint lock muskets,) by coming in contact Avith the melting snow, had become too inefficient for further use until they could be dried and put in proper order. My ordnance wagons were more than a half mile distant, and the men only had a few rounds of ammunition each remain- ing in their boxes. I marched my regiment, therefore, back to a better position a distance of say one hundred and fifty paces, ordered the men to put their pieces in order by dry- ing as rapidly as possible, sent for an' additional supply of ammunition, made details to have my wounded taken from the field and properly cared for, and threw out a small num- ber of skirmisheis, in connection with Colonel Cook, to no- tice the movements and position of the enemy, Avho reported that he had gone back beyond the Wynn's Ferry Road, and could not be seen at all from the position of our late engage- ment. I was informed on the afternoon of the lltli of February, and again at a late hour of that night by General Buckner and Colonel Brown that, for the reasons given at the time, (not material here to recite) the generals in command had determined to evacuate Donelson and move the whole of our troops to Nashville, or in that direction, and orders were given me by Colonel Brown to prepare my command accord- ingly with rations, &c., for the march. I was further informed that to execute this purpose our whole army would, 145 at an early hour on the morning of the loth, move upon the right wing of the Federal lines, cut our way through •and march out in the direction stated. The whole of the enemy's right having been driven back, thus as I waa informed, removing all further difficulty in the way of exe- cuting our purpose, I was every moment expecting to receive orders to march my regiment, together with the balance of our troops, in the direction of Nashville. But before I could get all of my dead and wounded from the field and have them provided for and disposed of, an order came to me, said at the time to come from General Pillow, to move my command immediately back to the position from which I started on tliat morning, and which I ha\ INDEX Title of the Report, - - - - - - ] Resolutions creating the Special Ounuuittce, . . 3 Members of the Committee, - - - - - C! Special Report, - - - - - - 4 ^Ie3sage of the President, transmitting letter of Secretary of War, - - •- - - - - 5 Letter of the Sccretar}'^ of War, - - - _ T Answers of War Department to interrogatories of Special Committee, - - - * - - - 9 Letter of Ceneral A. S. Joiuiston, - - - Hi Supplemental Report of (ieiieral J. J3. Floyd, - - 16 Letter of General J. B. Floyd, to Chairman of Special Com- mittee, -_._.. 2-T