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SOUTH AFRICA DESPATCHES. 
 
 VOL. I. 
 
 Presented to Parliament by Command of His Majesty. 
 
 LONDON 
 
 PRINTED FOR HIS MAJESTY’S STATIONERY OFFICE, 
 BY HARRISON AND SONS, ST. MARTIN’S LANE. 
 
 PRINTERS IN ORDINARY TO HER LATE MAJESTY. 
 
 And to be purchased, either directly or through any Bookseller, from 
 EYRE and SPOTTISWOODE, East Harding Street, Fleet Street, E.C., and 
 32, Abingdon Street, Westminster, S.W. ; or 
 
 JOHN MENZIES & Co., Rose Street, Edinburgh, and 
 90, West Nile Street, Glasgow; or 
 HODGES, FIGGIS & Co., Limited, 104, Grafton Street, Dublin. 
 
 C . 457.] Price Is. 2 d. 
 
 1901. 
 
SOUTH AFRICA DESPATCHES. 
 
 J> 
 
 <f> '-H 
 
 VOLUME I. 
 
 _ 
 
 / 9 o I 
 
 No. 1. 
 
 14 I - ■*- > 
 
 From Field-Marshal Lord Roberts to the Secretary of State for War. 
 
 Army Head-Quarters, South Africa, 
 
 My Lord, Cape Town, 6th February, 1900. 
 
 Now that I have been nearly a month in South Africa, and will shortly be 
 leaving Cape Town for the operations which I propose to carry out for the 
 relief of Kimberley and in the Orange Free State, it seems desirable that 1 
 should submit for the information of Her Majesty’s Government a concise 
 account of the state of affairs in this country as I found them on my arrival 
 on the 10th January. 
 
 The force which was despatched from England between the 20th October 
 and the early part of December had been greatly scattered. The Army-Corps 
 organization had been broken up, and even the formation of the Divisions and 
 Br igades materially differed from what had been originally contemplated. On 
 assuming the chief command, the first step which Sir Redvers Buller undertook 
 was to despatch Lord Methuen with the Brigade of Guards, the 3rd, or 
 Highland Brigade, and a third Brigade, improvised from 3| battalions on the 
 Lines of Communication which were immediately available, for the relief of 
 Kimberley. As vour Lordship is aware, this force succeeded in crossing the 
 Modder River ; but the subsequent attack on the Boer position at Magersfontein 
 having been repulsed, Lord Methuen fell back on the river, where be has formed 
 an entrenchment facing that thrown up by the ememy. 
 
 The original intention was that, simultaneously with Lord Methuen’s 
 advance, Lieut.-General Clery, with the Second Division, should operate 
 from Port Elizabeth by the Midland line of railway through Naauwpoort on 
 Colesberg, and that Lieut.-General Gatacre should similarly move from 
 East London by the Eastern line of railway on Stormberg and Burghersdorp. 
 This plan for occupying the Northern frontier of the Colony had to be 
 abandoned owing to the urgent demands for assistance from Natal. In the 
 middle of November, Lieut.-General Clery was sent to Durban with the 
 2nd, 4th, and 6th Brigades, being followed shortly afterwards by Sir Redvers 
 Buller himself. On the 1st December, the 5th Brigade was ordered from 
 Cape Town to Natal. With these reinforcements, and the force previously 
 available, an attempt was made on the 15th December to effect the passage of 
 the Tugela River in the vicinity of Colenso, but this having failed, Sir Redvers 
 Buller was obliged to withdraw his troops to Chieveley. Meanwhile, the 
 5th Division had arrived at Cape Town, and after the action of the Tugela, 
 Sir Redvers Buller directed its commander, Sir Charles Warren, with half of 
 the 10th Brigade and the whole of the 11th Brigade, to proceed to Natal, 
 Towards the end of November, the 1st Royal Dragoons and the 13th Hussars 
 were also transferred to Natal, followed shortly afterwards by two squadrons of 
 the 14th Hussars. 
 
 On arrival here on the 10th January, I found the state of affairs to be as 
 follows :—On the west of the Cape Colony, Lieut.-General Lord Methuen 
 was occupying the position already described. Lieut.-General French, with 
 three Cavalry regiments and one and a half battalions of Infantry, was 
 holding the line from Naauwpoort to Rensburg. Lieut.-General Sir W. F. 
 Gatacre, who had two batteries of Artillery and four and a half battalions 
 under his orders, having been defeated in his attack on Stormberg, was 
 occupying Sterkstroom and the country in its vicinity. In Natal, Sir Redvers 
 Buller, having found himself unable to advance by the direct route to the 
 relief of Ladysmith, had fallen back on Chieveley to await reinforcement by 
 the 5th Division under Lieut.-General Sir Charles Warren. 
 
 A 2 
 
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4 
 
 In view of the distance of my head-quarters from Natal, and of the fact 
 that on the date of my arrival Sir Redvers Buller had made his dispositions 
 for the second attempt to relieve Ladysmith, I thought it best to leave him a 
 perfectly free hand, and not to interfere with his operations. 
 
 In the Cape Colony a serious feeling of unrest prevailed. The withdrawal 
 of so large a portion of the Army-Corps had encouraged the disloyal among 
 the inhabitants, and I found that His Excellency the High Commissioner was 
 extremely anxious as to whether it would be possible to preserve peace and 
 order throughout the province. After consulting Sir Alfred Milner, I decided 
 that it would be best to remain on the defensive until a sufficient force was 
 available to enable an advance to be made into the Orange Free State. I 
 hoped that the effect of such an advance, if adequately supported, would be to 
 relieve the hostile pressure at Ladysmith, and between Ladysmith and the 
 Tugela, and also between the Modder river and Kimberley. In pursuance of 
 this policy, and with a view to facilitating offensive action as soon as the 
 strength and organization of the troops at my disposal would admit of it, I 
 directed Lieut.-Generals Lord Methuen and Gatacre to remain strictly on 
 the defensive. Lieut.-General French, with his head-quarters at Rensburg, 
 was instructed to patrol the country round Colesberg, and to keep the enemy, 
 into wdiose hands that place had fallen, from moving further to the south. 
 Shortly after my arrival, the troops of the 6th Division, under Lieut.-General 
 Kelly-Kenny, reached Cape Town, and were despatched to Naauwpoort, one of 
 the brigades being temporarily detached for employment under Lieut.-General 
 French. The duty assigned to Lieut.-General Kelly-Kenny was to allay unrest 
 and check disaffection among the Colonial population, and to open up the 
 railway line as far as possible from Middleburg in the direction of Stormberg. 
 
 A subject which from the first, attracted my special attention was the 
 development and organization of the Colonial forces, of which I was inclined 
 to think that sufficient use had not been made. I therefore arranged for one 
 mounted corps to be raised by Colonel Brabant, to whom, with the approval of 
 the High Commissioner, the rank of Brigadier-General has been given. In¬ 
 clusive of this corps, it is intended to place a body of Colonial mounted troops, 
 about 3,000 strong, under Brigadier-General Brabant’s command, on Lieut.- 
 General Gatacre’s right flank, for the purpose of guarding the eastern portion 
 of the Colony and pushing back the enemy from the neighbourhood of Storm- 
 berg. The head-quarters of this Colonial force will be at Dordrecht, where it 
 will be in readiness to operate northv'ard towards Jamestown. Two other 
 regiments, designated at the particular request of the members “ Roberts’s ” 
 and “Kitchener's Horse,” have also been formed, chiefly from men who have 
 found their way to South Africa from various parts of the world. Additional 
 corps are being raised by influential gentlemen in the Colony, and evei*y 
 encouragement and assistance are being given to the men who desire to enlist 
 
 Shortly after my arrival the question of reinforcements had to be dealt 
 with. I was reluctant to indent on the home Army for an 8th Infantry 
 Division and an additional Cavalry Brigade, and I expressed the opinion that 
 it would suffice to order out two more Line battalions (one from Malta and the 
 other from Egypt), two companies of Mounted Infantry from Burma, and 
 13 Militia battalions from England for duty on the Lines of Communication. 
 The failure of the second attempt to relieve Ladysmith may possibly necessitate 
 the despatch of the larger reinforcement, which I w ; as at first prepared to 
 dispense with. 
 
 Since 1 have been here I have taken no steps to render active assistance 
 to General Sir Redvers Buller, as he had a force at his disposal which seemed 
 sufficient for the relief of Ladysmith, and, after being reinforced by the 
 5th Division, he had informed me that his task would not be rendered easier 
 by a further addition to the number of his troops. Moreover, I had no troops 
 to spare. The frontier of the Cape Colony was weakly held, and the attitude 
 of a portion of the Colonists bordering the Orange Free State was in some 
 cases doubtful, and in others disloyal. The conclusion I arrived at was that no 
 sensible improvement in the military situation could be hoped for until we were 
 prepared to carry the war into the enemy’s country, and all my efforts have 
 accordingly been exerted in that direction. 
 
 This plan w r as, however, attended with considerable difficulties. The tw r o 
 main roads leading from Cape Colony to the Orange Free State were held in 
 
force by the Boers at the points where those roads crossed the Orange River, 
 and it seemed certain that the bridges over that river would be destroyed, 
 if the enemy could be forced to retire to the northern bank. Moreover, 
 I could not overlook the fact that, even if either of these routes could 
 be utilized, the movement of an army solely by means of a line of railway is 
 most tedious, if not practically impossible. The advantage is all on the side 
 of the enemy, who can destroy the line and occupy defensible positions when 
 and where they please. In a hilly, enclosed country, or where any large 
 river has to be crossed, they can block the line altogether, as was proved in 
 the case of Lieut.-General Lord Methuen on the Modder River, of Lieut.- 
 General French on the Orange River, and of General Sir Redvers Buller on 
 the Tugela. 
 
 A railway is of the greatest assistance, it is indeed essential to an army 
 for the conveyance of stores and supplies from the base, and it is a most 
 valuable adjunct if it runs in the direction of the objective, but, even then, a 
 certain proportion of the troops must be equipped with wheel or pack transport 
 to enable supplies to be collected, and to render the force sufficiently mobile 
 to deal with many tactical difficulties which have to be surmounted owing 
 to the greatly increased range and power of modern projectiles. 
 
 No organized transport corps existed when 1 arrived in South Africa. 
 Some thousands of mules have been collected and a number of ox and mule 
 wagons had been purchased, but what is known as the regimental system had 
 been adopted, which consists in providing each unit with sufficient transport 
 for its ammunition, baggage, and two or three days’ supplies. Such a system 
 may answer well enough for peace manoeuvres where the troops march short 
 distances daily for a week or ten days, and where depots are established in 
 advance from which the regimental supplies can be replenished. But this 
 system is quite unsuitable for extensive operations in a district where no food 
 and scarcely any forage can be procured, where advance depots cannot be 
 formed, and where all the necessaries required by an army in the field have to be 
 carried for a considerable distance. It is, moreover, a very extravagant system, 
 for during a campaign every corps is not required to be continually on the move. 
 A certain number have to garrison important points and guard lines of com¬ 
 munication, and for these transport is not needed. On the regimental system, 
 the transport attached to such corps would remain with them, and would there¬ 
 fore not be available for general purposes, or, in the event of its being taken 
 away from them, no one would be specially responsible for its supervision. 
 
 Major-General Lord Kitchener’s experience in this important matter 
 coincided with my own, and we decided that the first thing to be done was to 
 form a properly organized Transport Department. 
 
 On the 26th January I received intelligence of Sir Redvers Buller’s 
 withdrawal from Spion Kop to Potgieter’s Drift. The second attempt 
 to relieve Ladysmith having failed, it has become imperatively necessary 
 to give early effect to the policy indicated above. With this object 
 I am collecting as large a force as possible to the north of the Orange 
 River Railway Station, with the view of joining the troops under 
 Lord Methuen’s command, and proceeding, in the first instance, to relieve 
 Kimberley. The Column, including Cavalry and Mounted Infantry, will 
 number 35,000 men, with about 100 guns. On the relief of Kimberley 
 being accomplished 1 propose to leave a moderate garrison at that place, and 
 with the remainder of the force, to move eastward for the purpose of threatening 
 Bloemfontein and seizing some point on the railway between that place and 
 Springfontein. This operation will, 1 trust, cause the Boers to reduce the forc« 
 which they have concentrated round Ladysmith, and enable our garrison there 
 to be relieved before the end of February. 
 
 In order to carry out the concentration north of the Orange River, I shall 
 have to make use of the whole of the 6th and 7th Divisions, and am obliged to 
 postpone the reinforcement of Lieut.-General Gatacre’s force, although it is 
 barely sufficient effectively to control a civil population which contains many 
 disturbing elements, or to regain possession of the territory which the enemy 
 has invaded. I am compelled also to withdraw the greater part of the force 
 under Lieut.-General Kelly-Kenny from Naauwpoort and its neighbourhood, in 
 spite of the importance of restoring railway communication between Middleburg 
 
 223314 
 
6 
 
 and Stormberg. The arrival of 15 additional battalions* of the Line and 
 Militia will place matters on a better footing, but in view of the possibility that 
 the third attempt to relieve Ladysmith may fail, the dead.lock in Natal which 
 will follow, and its probable effect on the South African population, 1 have 
 reluctantly arrived at the conclusion that more troops are needed for the active 
 prosecution of the war. 
 
 On the 28th January I applied for another Infantry Division and Cavalry 
 Brigade from home. The Cavalry Brigade has been placed under orders for 
 field service, but the despatch of the Infantry Division has I am informed 
 been suspended for the present. If, as I hope, the relief of Ladysmith can be 
 affected, at any rate as soon as the enemy’s attention has been distracted by 
 offensive operations on our part in the Orange Free State, the transfer of an 
 Infantry Division from Natal to Cape Colony may perhaps become feasible. 
 On this point, however, I shall be better able to offer an opinion when the 
 result of the further operations in Natal is known. 
 
 It might appear at first sight that the force in this country is equal to the 
 military requirements of the situation, but the difficulties of carrying on war in 
 South Africa do not appear to be sufficiently appreciated by the British public. 
 In an enemy's country, we should know exactly how we stood; but out here, 
 we have not only to defeat the enemy on the northern frontier, but to maintain 
 law and order within the Colonial limits. Ostensibly, the Dependency is loyal, 
 and no doubt a large number of its inhabitants are sincerely attached to the 
 British rule and strongly opposed to Boer domination. On the other hand, a 
 considerable section would prefer a Republican form ot government, and 
 influenced by ties of blood and association, side with the Orange Free State 
 and Transvaal. Even the public service at the Cape is not free from men 
 whose sympathies with the enemy may lead them to divulge secrets and give 
 valuable assistance to the Boer leaders in other ways. 
 
 I append tabular statements showing the strength of the troops in the 
 Cape Colony and Natal respectively on the 31st January 1900. The numbers 
 a« regards Natal are only approximate, as no recent returns are available. 
 
 I have the honour to be. 
 
 My Lord, 
 
 Your Lordship’s most obedient Servant, 
 
 ROBERTS, Field-Marshal, 
 
 Commanding-in-Chief , South Africa. 
 
 1 the Line battalions will not arrive until the middle of March. 
 
7 
 
 Enclosure 1. 
 
 Effective Fighting Strength of Force in Natal on 31st January 1900. 
 
 (Approximate only.) 
 
 Description. 
 
 No. 
 
 Total. 
 
 Remarks. 
 
 At Ladysmith. 
 
 
 
 t • 
 
 Cavalry—4 regiments 
 
 1,200 
 
 1,200 
 
 
 Artillery—6 batteries Royal Field Artil- 
 
 36 guns 
 
 36 guns and 
 
 
 lery. 
 
 
 1,080 men. 
 
 
 Infantry—11 battalions .. 
 
 7,500 
 
 7,500* 
 
 * Including 7th and 8tb 
 
 
 
 
 Brigades. 
 
 Between the Tugela River and 
 
 
 
 
 Durban. 
 
 
 
 
 Cavalry—2f regiments .. 
 
 1,100 
 
 1,100 
 
 
 Artillery— 
 
 
 
 
 1 battery, Royal Horse Artillery 
 
 6 guns 
 
 1 
 
 
 7-> batteries, Royal Field Artillery 
 
 44 „ 
 
 1 62 guns, 
 
 
 1 mounted batterv 
 
 6 „ 
 
 f 1,800 men 
 
 
 1 howitzer battery 
 
 6 „ .. 
 
 J 
 
 
 Infantry— 
 
 
 
 
 5^ Brigades 
 
 16,500 
 
 1 17 300 
 
 
 Other than above 
 
 800 
 
 
 
 Colonial troops— 
 
 
 
 
 Field Artillery .. 
 
 22 guns 
 
 22 guns, 
 
 
 
 
 550 men. 
 
 
 Mounted .. 
 
 1,500 
 
 1 o q nn 
 
 
 Dismounted 
 
 800 
 
 > Z,oUU 
 
 
 Infantry Volunteers 
 
 2,000 
 
 2,000 
 
 
 Grand Total, 34,830 men and 120 guns. 
 
 To above may be added— 
 
 Royal Engineers .. .. .. .. 1,100 
 
 Army Service and other departmental corps.. 1,472 
 
 Sick.—Number unknown. 
 
 Men at dep6ts, and otherwise employed.—Number unknown, 
 
 Effective Fighting Strength of Force in Cape Colony on 31st January 1900. 
 
 Description. 
 
 No. 
 
 Total. 
 
 Remarks. 
 
 Cavalry—81 regiments 
 
 
 • • 
 
 4,196 
 
 
 4,196 
 
 
 Artillery— 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 8 batteries, Royal Horse Artillery 
 
 • • 
 
 48 guns .. 
 
 ~ 
 
 
 
 12 batteries, Royal Field Artillery 
 
 
 72 „ .. 
 
 
 150 guns 
 
 
 2 howitzer batteries 
 
 # # 
 
 
 12 „ .. 
 
 
 )> and 4,500 
 
 
 2 siege companies 
 
 . , 
 
 
 12 „ 
 
 
 men. 
 
 * 8—6-inch howitzers ; 
 
 1 ,, company 
 
 • 0 
 
 • # 
 
 6 „ t • • 
 
 
 
 4—4-7-inch guns. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 t 5-inch B.L. guns. 
 
 Mounted Infantry .. 
 
 
 
 3,050 
 
 
 3,050 
 
 
 Infantry— 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 st Brigade 
 
 
 
 3.754 
 
 
 
 ■< 
 
 3rd ., 
 
 • # 
 
 # # 
 
 3,121 
 
 
 
 
 9th „ 
 
 , , 
 
 
 2,754 
 
 
 
 
 13th „ 
 
 
 
 2,885 
 
 
 33,809 
 
 
 14th „ 
 
 
 
 3,322 
 
 
 
 
 15th ., 
 
 , , 
 
 # . 
 
 3,601 
 
 
 
 
 Other than above 
 
 . , 
 
 # . 
 
 14,372$ 
 
 
 
 $ Including Royal Cana- 
 
 Colonial troops— 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 dian Regiment, 925 
 
 Cape Colony, mounted .. 
 Over sea, mounted 
 
 •• 
 
 •• 
 
 2,000 
 
 1,385 
 
 ' 
 
 3,385 
 
 strong. 
 
 Cape Colony, Infantry Volunteers 
 
 •• 
 
 2,960 
 
 
 2,960 
 
 
 Grand Total, 51,900 men and 150 guns. 
 
 Jo above may be added— 
 
 Royal Engineers .. .. . . .. 2,000 
 
 Army Service and other departmental corps. . 4,278 
 
 Sick.2,118 
 
 Grand Total, including above, 60,296 men and 150 guns. 
 
s 
 
 No. 2. 
 
 From Field-Marshal Lord Roberts to the Secretary of State for War. 
 
 Array Head-Quarters, South Africa, 
 
 My Lord, Camp Jacobsdal, 16th February 1900. 
 
 In continuation of my letter No. 1, dated 6th February 1900, I have the 
 honour to report, for your Lordship’s information, that I left Cape Town for the 
 Modder River on the evening of that date, arriving at Lord Methuen’s camp 
 on the morning of the 8th. Before quitting the sea,t of Government I received 
 a memorandum from the High Commissioner, in which Sir Alfred Milner 
 reviewed the political and military situation, and laid stress on the possibility 
 of a general rising among the disaffected Dutch population, should the Cape 
 Colony be denuded of troops for the purpose of carrying on offensive opera¬ 
 tions in the Orange Free State. In reply I expressed the opinion that the 
 military requiiements of the case demanded an early advance into the enemy’s 
 country, that such an advance, if successful, would lessen the hostile pressure 
 both on the northern frontier of the Colony and in hiatal, that the relief of 
 Kimberley had to be effected before the end of February,* and would set free 
 most of the troops encamped on the Modder River, and that the arrival of 
 considerable reinforcements from home, especially of Field Artillery, by the 
 19th February, would enable those points along the frontier which were weakly 
 held to be materially strengthened. I trusted, therefore, that his Excellency’s 
 apprehensions would prove groundless. No doubt, a certain amount of risk 
 had to be run, but protracted inaction seemed to me to involve more serious 
 dangers than the bolder course which I have decided to adopt. 
 
 Since the date of my former letter important events have occurred in 
 Natal. As your Lordship is aware, Sir Redvers Buller telegraphed on the 
 29th January to the effect that he had discovered a new drift to the east of 
 the Spion Kop, and that in view of the objections to further delay in relieving 
 Ladysmith he proposed to make a fresh attempt by that route as soon as 
 a battery of Horse Artillery had reached him from India, without waiting to 
 see what effect my intended operations in the Orange Free State might produce 
 on the force opposed to him. 
 
 On the 6th February I received a telegram from Sir Redvers Buller 
 reporting that he had pierced the enemy’s line, and could hold the hill which 
 divided their position, but that to drive back the enemy on either flank, and 
 thus give his own Artillery access to the Ladysmith plain, 10 miles from Sir 
 George White’s position, would cost him from 2,000 to 3,000 men, and success 
 was doubtful. General Buller enquired if I thought that the chance of 
 relieving Ladysmith was worth such a risk. On the same day I replied that 
 Ladysmith must he relieved even at the cost anticipated. I urged Sir Redvers 
 Buller to persevere, and desired him to point out to his troops that the honour 
 of the Empire was in their hands, and to assure them that I had no doubt 
 whatever of their being successful. 
 
 On the 9th February General Buller reported that he found himself not 
 strong enough to relieve Ladysmith without reinforcements, and that, with 
 the force at his disposal, he regarded the operation upon which he was 
 engaged as impracticable. 
 
 As Sir Charles Warren confirms the views of Sir Redvers Buller I have 
 informed the latter that, though I have no wish to interfere with his 
 dispositions, or to stop his harassing the Boers as much as possible, my 
 original instructions must hold good. 
 
 I received reports on the 2nd February that parties of the enemy had 
 been observed some 8 miles to the west of the railway between the Orange 
 and Modder Rivers, their object apparently being either to injure the line or to 
 get grazing for their horses and oxen. I therefore gave orders on the 3rd 
 February for Major-General MacDonald with the Highland Brigade, two 
 squadrons of the 9th Lancers, the 62nd Field Battery and No. 7 Field 
 Company, Royal Engineers, to move from the Modder camp down the left 
 
 * I had enquired by heliograph and been informed by Lieut.-Colonel Kekewich that 
 Kimberley could not hold out longer than the end of Februarv 
 
9 
 
 bank of the Modeler River and make a show of constructing a small field redoubt 
 commanding the Koodoosberg Drift, distant about 17 miles from the camp. 
 The object 1 had in view was to threaten the enemy’s line of communication 
 from the west of the railway to their position at Magersfontein, and also to lead 
 the Boers to believe that I intended to turn their entrenchments from the left 
 of the Modder River camp. 
 
 The troops marched early on the 4th, bivouacked for the night at Fraser’s 
 Drift, and reached Koodoosberg Drift at 2 p.m. on the 5th, the enemy’s scouts 
 being met with as soon as the Cavalry approached the drift. The position was 
 reconnoitred that afternoon, and on the morning of the Gth February work was 
 begun on the redoubt, a site for which was chosen on the north or right bank 
 of the stream in close proximity to the drift. The enemy, however, had now 
 occupied in some strength a kopje to the north of the drift, Avhence the site of 
 the redoubt was' within artillery range, and it became necessary to dislodge 
 them. After some desultory fighting the southern portion of the kopje Avas 
 occupied by the Highland Brigade, and fighting continued throughout the day, 
 both on the summit of the hill and betAveen it and the river. As the number 
 of the enemy Avas manifestly increasing, Major-General MacDonald thought it 
 desirable to ask for the reinforcement Avhicli had been held in readiness to 
 support him. This, consisting of tAvo batteries of Horse Artillery and a 
 Brigade of Cavalry, under Major-General Babington, marched from the camp 
 at Modder to Koodoosberg along the northern bank of the river, and arrived 
 at about 3 p.m. on the 7th. The fight Avhich had recommenced at daybreak 
 continued until nightfall, the enemy gradually falling back, and being folloAved 
 up by the Horse Artillery and Cavalry. 
 
 It being evident that permanently to hold the Koodoosberg Drift Avould 
 require a larger force than could be spared, and the troops employed there 
 being by this time required elseAvhere,the Cavalry and Infantry Brigades were 
 ordered to return to the Modder River camp, which they did on the 8th Avithout 
 molestation, the Boers having previously fallen back from the position. 
 
 I will now briefly describe the operations for the relief of Kimberley, the 
 troops selected for this purpose being detailed in the annexed return. 
 
 On the 11th February the Cavalry Division, under ffieut.-General French, 
 Avith seven batteries of Horse Artillery and three Field batteries, proceeded 
 from Modder River camp direct to Ramdam, the 7th Infantry Division, under 
 Lieut.-General Tucker, proceeding to the same point from the raihvay 
 stations of Enslin and Graspan. On the 12th February I moved to Ramdam; 
 the Cavalry Division marched to the Riet River, occupied Avith slight 
 opposition the Dekiel and Waterval Drifts, and reconnoitred across the river; 
 the 7th Division proceeded to the Dekiel Drift; and the Gth Division, under 
 Lieut.-General Kelly-Kenny, Avhich had moved by rail to Enslin and Graspan, 
 replaced the 7th at Ramdam. On the 13th February the Cavalry Division 
 advanced to the Modder River, seizing the Ronddavel and Klip Drifts, Avhile 
 the Gth Division moved from Ramdam to the Waterval Drift on the Riet 
 River. The 9th Division, under Lieut.-General Sir Henry Colvile, proceeded 
 on this day to Ramdam, aa hile the 7th Division Avas occupied in getting supply 
 Avagons across the Dekiel Drift, where I established my head-quarters. On the 
 14th February the Cavalry Division reconnoitred to the north of the Modder 
 River; the Gth Division moved down the Riet River from the Waterval to 
 the Wegdraai Drift; the 7th Division from the Dekiel Drift to the Waterval 
 Drift, and the 9th Division from Ramdam to the Waterval Drift. My head¬ 
 quarters Avere at the Waterval Drift. 
 
 For some time previous to this I had been moving troops to the cast of 
 the Orange River station, in order to attract the enemy’s attention to that 
 quarter, and, if possible to give rise to the idea that my intention Avas to 
 make for Bloemfontein, via Fauresmith. 
 
 A considerable force of Cavalry and Mounted Infantry Avas collected at 
 Zoutpan’s Drift, under the command of Colonel Hannay, and that Officer was 
 ordered to proceed on the 11th February toAvards the Riet River, to act in 
 conjunction Avith the Cavalry Division. Near Wolve K raal Colonel Hannay 
 came in contact Avith the Boers, avIio held the hills on his right flank. He 
 handled his troops with ability, and while he contained the enemy with 
 a portion of his force, he pushed his baggage and main body through to 
 Ramdam. 
 
 07 ) 
 
 B 
 
10 
 
 Late in the evening of the 14th February, the 6th Division marched to 
 Ronddavel Drift, on the Modder, and the 7th Division to the Wegdraai Drift, 
 on the Riet. On this date troops from the 6th Division entered Jacobsdal, 
 and found it deserted by the enemy, though the houses were still occupied by 
 their women and children. The troops were fired on when returning to camp, 
 and a further encounter took place on a stronger detachment being sent out to 
 drive off the Boers. This detachment fell back before nightfall with the loss 
 of eight killed and wounded. On the 15th February I proceeded from the 
 Waterval Drift to Wegdraai, accompanied by the 9th Division. 
 
 During the day of the 14th I informed Lieut.-General Kelly-Kenny how 
 essential it was that he should join hands with Lieut.-General French in order 
 to free the Cavalry for a further advance, and notwithstanding the long and 
 fatiguing march of the previous day, the 6th Division pushed on that night 
 across the veldt, and reached Klip Drift before daybreak on the 15th February. 
 
 Being thus free to act, Lieut.-General French at 9.30 a.m. proceeded on 
 his journey towards Kimberley. The enemy’s suspicions had by this time 
 been aroused, and they had been able to occupy two lines of kopjes, a 
 few miles north of the Modder River, and through which the road to 
 Kimberley via Abons Dam and Olifantsfontein runs. Bringing a fire to bear 
 upon these kopjes by the Brigade Divisions of Horse Artillery, under 
 command of Lieut.-Colonels Eustace and Rochfort, and escorted by the 
 1st Cavalry Brigade under Colonel Porter, Lieut.-General French, with the 
 2nd and 3rd Brigades under Brigadier-Generals Broadwood and Gordon, and 
 the Brigade Division Horse Artillery under Colonel Davidson, galloped 
 through the defile in extended order until he reached some low hills from 
 which he was able to cover the advance of the rear troops. Casualties— 
 1 Officer (Lieut. A. E. Hesketh, 16th Lancers) killed, and 20 of all 
 ranks wounded. 
 
 At Kimberley, the inhabitants were found to be in good health and spirits. 
 On the 16th the 6th Division marched to Klip Drift and was opposed by the 
 enemy, who were driven off with loss. The 9th Division joined the 7tli at 
 Wegdraai, 200 Mounted Infantry under Colonel Ridley being left behind at 
 Waterval to escort a supply column of ox wagons thence to Wegdraai. 
 Shortly after the departure of the 9th Division from Waterval, a Boer force 
 with several guns, which must have come up during the night, attacked Colonel 
 Ridley's detachment, and did a good deal of injury to the oxen and wagons of 
 the supply column. On hearing of this, I sent back a reinforcement, consisting 
 of one Field battery, one battalion, and 300 Mounted Infantry at 10 a.m., and 
 subsequently despatched a second battery and battalion, on the arrival of which 
 the enemy disappeared. 
 
 I he Kative ox drivers had, however, taken to flight, so that it was 
 impossible to inspan the ox teams. The wagons contained a quantity of 
 supplies of groceries for the troops and of grain for animals, and I felt that 
 to abandon them meant a considerable loss to the stores on which we had 
 to depend. In view, however, of the absolute necessity of pushing on 
 the advance, and realising, as I did, that to leave troops at Waterval Drift 
 until such time as the convoy could again be set in motion would weaken 
 my force and probably cause it to be delayed, I decided to abandon the 
 supplies, wagons, and oxen, and to order the troops to withdraw to Wegdraai 
 Drift during the night, which operation was carried out unmolested by the 
 enemy. 
 
 At 11 a.m. on this day I directed Major-General Wavell’s Brigade, of the 
 7th Division, to occupy Jacobsdal, which was done with very slight opposition. 
 The Officers and men who had been wounded and taken prisoners the previous day 
 were found in the hospital at this place, as well as several other wounded men, 
 both British and Boer. All had been taken the greatest care of by the German 
 Ambulance. 
 
 On the 16th February I moved my head-quarters to Jacobsdal, replenished 
 my supplies from Honey Kest Kloof and the Modder camp, and established 
 telegraphic communication between the latter place and Jacobsdal. The 
 Cavalry Division has been following up the enemy to the north of Kimberley, 
 and the 6th Division, which has marched to the east of Klip Drift, has been 
 similarly occupied. By midday I received information from Lord Methuen 
 that the Magersfontein entrenchments had been abandoned, and the latest 
 
11 
 
 reports point to a general retreat of the Boers in the direction of 
 Bloemfontein. It is my intention to follow them up as rapidly as possible, • 
 and by taking full advantage of the shock which they have sustained, to break 
 up their organization* as a fighting force. Lord Methuen has been ordered to 
 proceed to Kimberley, after restoring the railway line, for the purpose of 
 putting affairs into order, arranging for the military control of the town and 
 district, and taking steps to re-open communication with Mafeking. 
 
 In conclusion I may mention a few matters of minor importance which 
 have been dealt with during the last 10 days. 
 
 On my way from Cape Town to the Modder River I inspected the field 
 hospitals at De Aar and Orange River, and finding the accommodation 
 inadequate gave orders for its being enlarged, and for more nurses’ quarters 
 being provided. I also arranged that additional nurses should be posted to 
 these hospitals. 
 
 To meet medical requirements I have applied to your Lordship for the 
 personnel needed to establish another general hospital in the vicinity of Cape 
 Town. 
 
 One of the most pressing needs in South African warfare is the supply of 
 a sufficient quantity of drinking water to the troops when marching, especially 
 in the daytime, the climate being an extremely dry one and the sun’s heat very 
 trying. The number of water-carts at present available is inadequate. 
 Moreover, these carts cannot follow the troops over stony or broken ground, 
 and I have, therefore, asked for 2,000 bheesties, with a due proportion of 
 mussacks and pakhals to be sent here from India. 
 
 I have the honour to be, 
 
 My Lord, 
 
 Tour Lordship’s most obedient Servant, 
 
 ROBERTS, Field-Marslial, 
 
 Commandliny-in- Chief, South Africa. 
 
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13 
 
 No. 3. 
 
 From Field-Marshal Lord Roberts to the Secretary of State for War. 
 
 Army Head-Quarters, South Africa, 
 
 My Lord, Camp Paardeberg, 28tli February 1900. 
 
 In my letter No. 2, dated the 16th February 1900, the narrative of the 
 operations in the Orange Free State was carried up to the occupation of 
 Jacobsdal, and the pursuit of the enemy in an easterly direction to Klip Drift, 
 on the Modder river. On the above date 78 ox-wagons loaded with stores, 
 and two wagons containing Mauser rifles, explosives, and ammunition, were 
 captured at Klip Drift, by the 6th Division. On the evening of that day 1 
 ordered the 9th Division, consisting of the 3rd and 19th Brigades under 
 Lieut.-General Sir Henry Colvile, to Klip Kraal Drift. Early the next morning 
 Lieut.-General Tucker, commanding the 7th Division, with the 14th Brigade, 
 marched from Wegdraai Drift to Jacobsdal which the other brigade of the 
 division, the loth, under Major-General Wavell, had occupied since the 15th 
 February. 
 
 On the 17th February arrangements were made for the military adminis¬ 
 tration of Kimberley, and the protection of the railway line between that place 
 and the Orange River. The command was entrusted to Lieut.-General Lord 
 Methuen, who was directed to move his head-quarters to Kimberley as soon as 
 the railway had been repaired. The following troops were placed at his 
 disposal:— 
 
 1,000 Imperial Yeomanry. 
 
 20th and 38th Batteries, Royal Field Artillery. 
 
 2 Canadian Field Batteries. 
 
 1 New South Wales Field Battery. 
 
 The 9th Infantry Brigade, consisting of— 
 
 1st Bn. Northumberland Fusiliers. 
 
 1st Bn. Loyal North Lancashire Regiment. 
 
 2nd Bn. Northamptonshire Regiment. 
 
 2nd Bn. Yorkshire Light Infantry. 
 
 A second Infantry Brigade consisting of— 
 
 1st Bn. Highland Light Infantry. 
 
 3 Militia Battalions, leaving England on the 15th February, 
 and due at Cape Town about the 10th March. 
 
 On the arrival of the Militia Battalions, the 2nd Bn. Royal Warwickshire 
 Regiment, is to join the 18th Brigade, and the 1st Bn. Munster Fusiliers, the 
 19th Brigade. 
 
 The 1st or Guards Brigade was thus set free to join the force operating 
 in the Orange Free State. 
 
 While leaving it to Lord Methuen to employ the troops under his com¬ 
 mand as he might think best, I impressed on him the desirability of holding 
 the Modder Railway Bridge with a battalion of Infantry in an entrenched 
 position, and of guarding other important points along the line. I also 
 desired him gradually to break up the Field Hospital at Modder River by the 
 transfer of the sick and wounded to Cape Town. 
 
 On the 17th and 18th February my head-quarters remained at Jacobsdal 
 with the 7th Division. On the former date the pursuing troops came into 
 contact with the enemy under Cronje below Paardeberg Drift. Throughout 
 the day a series of rear-guard actions took place, the enemy skilfully seizing 
 one defensible position after another and delaying our advance. The Boers 
 continued their retreat, and on the morning of the 18th were found to be 
 holding a position in the bed and on the north bank of the Modder, 3 miles 
 above Paardeberg Drift, where the river makes a curve to the north In 
 this position they had begun to entrench themselves during the previous night. 
 As soon as our troops came up, the 6th Division occupied the ground to the 
 south of the stream opposite the Boer laager, with Mounted Infantry in its 
 front to the east. The Highland Brigade was also on the south side of the 
 
14 
 
 Modder, while the 19th Brigade of the same Division, under Major-General 
 Smith-Dorrien, advanced along- the north side, on which also two Brigades of 
 Cavalry under Lieut.-General French were converging from the direction of 
 Kimberley. Early in the afternoon it seemed likely that the laager would be 
 captured, but the Boers held their ground so obstinately, and it was so difficult 
 to force a passage through the trees and undergrowth fringing the river on 
 both banks, that the troops had to be drawn off. Heavy loss was inflicted on 
 the enemy, while our own loss was hardly less serious, the casualties being as 
 follows:— 
 
 Officers (Duke of Cornwall’s Light Infantry.—Lieut.-Colonel W. Aldworth, 
 D.S.O. ; Captain E. B. Wardlaw; Captain B. A. Newbury. Seaforth 
 Highlanders.—2nd Lieutenant R. H. McClure. Argyll and Suther¬ 
 land Highlanders.—Lieutenant G. E. Courtenay. West Riding 
 Regiment. — Lieutenant F. J. Siordet. 1st Bn. Yorkshire Regi¬ 
 ment.—2nd Lieutenant A. C. Neave. Oxfordshire Light Infantry.— 
 Lieutenant A. R. Bright; 2nd Lieutenant V. A. Ball-Acton. King’s 
 Royal Rifles.—Captain J. Dewar; Lieutenant E. Percival. Norfolk 
 Regiment.—Lieutenant J. C. Hylton-Joliffe. Seaforth High¬ 
 
 landers.—2nd Lieutenant D. P. Monypenny. Mounted Infantry 
 Staff.—Colonel O. C. Hannay. Welsh Regiment •— Lieutenant 
 Angell) killed, 15; wounded, 54; missing, S; prisoners, 3. 
 
 Men—killed, 1S3 ; wounded, 851; missing, 88; prisoners, 9. 
 
 The Officers and men shown as missing must, I am afraid, have been 
 killed, as the enemy could not have sent prisoners to the rear, while only the 
 numbers shown above as prisoners have been released by the eventual capture 
 of the laager. 
 
 A kopje to the south-east of the position, commanding the Boer entrench¬ 
 ments, and the whole course of the stream from the Paardeberg Drift upwards, 
 was captured during the afternoon of the 18th, but retaken by the enemy after 
 nightfall, owing to the Mounted Infantry who held it having gone down to the 
 river to water their horses. 
 
 On the evening of this day I directed the Brigade of Guards to march 
 from their camp at Modder along the north bank of the river to Klip Drift. 
 I also ordered the 14th Brigade of the 7th Division, under Major-General Sir 
 Herbert Chermside, to proceed from Jacobsdal to the Paardeberg camp, distant 
 about 30 miles, which was reached on the evening of the 19th. 
 
 Leaving Jacobsdal at 4 a.m. on the 19th, I reached Paardeberg at 10 a.m. 
 When I arrived on the scene I learnt that an armistice of 24 hours 
 had been granted to General Cronje, who had asked for it on the plea 
 that he desired to bury his dead. This armistice I immediately revoked, and 
 ordered a vigorous bombardment of the enemy’s position. General Cronje 
 knew, as we knew, that considerable reinforcements were hastening to 
 his assistance from Natal and from the south, and his request was obviously 
 only an expedient to gain time. 
 
 I found the troops in camp were much exhausted by their previous 
 marching and fighting, and I therefore decided not to make a second assault 
 on the laager, the capture of which by a “ coup-de-main ” would have 
 entailed a further loss of life, which did not appear to me to be 
 warranted by the military exigencies of the situation. During the morning 
 of the 20th February the kopje on the south-east, which 1 have already 
 mentioned, was recaptured, the enemy abandoning their defences on being 
 threatened in rear by the Cavalry and Mounted Infantry. In the afternoon 
 the Boer laager and the entrenchments surrounding it were bombarded tor 
 several hours with Naval guns, 5-inch howitzers and field guns, much damage 
 being done to the enemy’s wagons, trek oxen, and horses. On the 21st and 
 22nd the bombardment was continued, and trenches were gradually pushed 
 forward on both flanks of the river, but chiefly on the north, in view of an 
 eventual assault, should such an alternative be forced upon me. 
 
 After his force had been surrounded, Cronje contrived to open heliographic 
 communication with Bloemfontein and doubtless asked for assistance, as rein¬ 
 forcements began to come up in scattered parties of varying strength from the 
 east and south-east. Each commando was composed of men belonging to 
 
15 
 
 different districts, some of them having been withdrawn from Ladysmitn ana 
 others from the northern frontier of the Cape Colony. On the morning of 
 23rd February the 1st Bn. Yorkshire Regiment engaged one of these parties, 
 about 2,000 strong, at the eastern end of the position south of the river, and 
 drove off the enemy with heavy loss, losing themselves 3 Officers and 17 men 
 wounded. Later in the day the 2nd Bn. of the Buffs, which had come up in 
 support of the Yorkshire Regiment, captured 80 Boer prisoners. Similar 
 parties of the enemy appeared in other directions, but were beaten back 
 without difficulty by our troops. After being repulsed the Boers seem in most 
 cases to have dispersed, whether to their homes or to join other commandoes 
 it is impossible to say. 
 
 On this day a balloon reconnaissance was made of the Boer laager and 
 entrenchments, which showed that much injury had been done to the enemy s 
 wagons and stores by shell fire. On the 24th February, 40 more prisoners were 
 taken and a considerable number of Natives came in from the enemy’s camp 
 both on this day and on the previous days, having managed to escape during 
 the night time. The services of these Kaffir refugees are being utilized to 
 look after trek oxen and slaughter cattle, about 800 of which were captured in 
 the vicinity of the Boer laager. Our casualties from the 19th to the 24th 
 February inclusive, were as follows :— 
 
 Officers—wounded, 12. 
 
 Men—killed, 9; wounded, 102; missing, 8. 
 
 Nothing calling for special notice occurred on the 25th February, except 
 that heavy rain caused the Modder River to rise over 3 feet, and thus 
 delayed the movement of convoys from and to the advanced base at the 
 Modder Station as well as from and to Kimberley, where a supplementary 
 Commissariat Depot had been established. I may here mention that the 
 railway to Kimberley was re-opened on the 18th, and that Lord Metheun 
 established his head-quarters there on the same day. 
 
 Early on the 26th four 6-inch howitzers arrived at this camp from Modder, 
 and the Boer laager was again shelled during the afternoon. 
 
 At 3 a.m. on the 27th the Royal Canadian Regiment, and No. 7 
 Company, Royal Engineers, commanded respectively by Lieut.-Colonel W. D. 
 Otter, and Lieut.-Colonel W. F. Kincaid, supported by the 1st Bn. Gordon 
 Highlanders, advanced under a heavy rifle fire to within 80 yards of the 
 enemy’s defences, and succeeded in entrenching themselves, with the loss 
 of 2 Officers wounded, 7 men killed, and 27 wounded. A gallant deed, 
 creditable to all who took part in it. 
 
 At 6 a.m. I received a letter from General P. A. Cronje, making an 
 unconditional surrender, and throwing himself and his troops on Her Majesty’s 
 clemency. The following is a translation :— 
 
 “ Head-quarter Laager, 
 
 “ Modder River, 
 
 “Honoured Sir, “27th February 1900. 
 
 “Herewith I have the honour to inform you that the Council of War 
 which was held here last evening, resolved to surrender unconditionally 
 with the forces here, being compelled to do so under existing circumstances. 
 They therefore throw themselves on the clemency of Her Britannic Majesty. 
 
 “As a sign of surrender a white flag will he hoisted from 6 a.m. 
 to-day. The Council of War requests that you will give immediate orders 
 for all further hostilities to be stopped, in order that more loss of life may 
 be prevented. 
 
 T have the Honour to be, Sir, 
 
 Your most obedient Servant, 
 
 (Signed) P. A. Cronje, 
 
 General. 
 
 “ To Field-Marshal Lord Roberts. 
 
 “P.S.—Messrs. G-. R. Keizer, my secretary, and H. C. Penzhorn are 
 authorized to arrange all details with your Lordship.” 
 
16 
 
 Cronje was received by me in camp at 8 a.m., and he with the other 
 prisoners, numbering 3,919 men, exclusive of 150 wounded, were des¬ 
 patched in the afternoon lo Cape Town. 
 
 In addition to the prisoners’ rifles and a large quantity of Mauser 
 ammunition, three 7'5 centimetre Krupp field guns, one old pattern 12-pr. 
 quick-firing gun, and one Vickers-Maxim automatic 3'7 centimetre quick-firing 
 gun have been taken, as well as many ox and mule wagons. 
 
 A very large area has to be occupied in a country like this, consisting 
 of flat plains with isolated hills or kopjes, to prevent the enemy from seizing- 
 one or more of the latter, and thence hy long-range gun and rifle fire rendering 
 the interior of the position untenable. The perimeter of the Paardeberg 
 encampment surrounding the Boer laager was about 24 miles, and the distances 
 from one point to another added greatly to the labours of the troops. 
 
 I enclose a list of prisoners taken on 27th February. 
 
 I am sanguine enough to hope that the complete defeat and surrender of 
 Cronje will materially improve the prospects of the campaign. For over two 
 months he held us in check at Magersfontein, and his following included many 
 influential men both from the Orange Free State and from the South African 
 Republic. The despatch of these men, with nearly 4,000 other prisoners, to 
 Cape Town, cannot fail to encourage the loyal inhabitants of the Cape Colony 
 and Natal, and to dishearten the disaffected, while the capture of one of their 
 ablest and most determined commanders must inflict a severe blow on the 
 Boer cause. 
 
 It is my present intention to halt here for about a week longer, in order 
 to get the Cavalry and Artillery horses into better condition, replenish my 
 supplies of food and ammunition, and prepare my transport train for a further 
 advance. On reaching Bloemfontein 1 propose to re-open railway communica¬ 
 tion between that place and the Midland railway line, and to transfer my 
 advanced base from the Modder River Station and Kimberley to Colesberg or 
 Naauwpoort. In anticipation of this transfer, and to relieve the congested 
 state of the docks at Cape Town, I have directed a number of vessels carrying 
 stores and supplies to proceed to East London. 
 
 Since I last addressed your Lordship the situation on the frontier north 
 of Naauwpoort has remained virtually unchanged. On the enemy at Colesberg 
 being reinforced, Major-General Clements found it necessary to withdraw from 
 Rensburg to Arundel, where he experienced no difficulty in maintaining his 
 position. A portion of the Boer force has now retired for the purpose of 
 •covering Bloemfontein, and on 27th February Rensburg was re-occupied by 
 our troops. 
 
 On the eastern frontier Brigadier-General Brabant moved forward on the 
 •evening of the 16th February, and, after continuous fighting on the 17th, 
 stormed the Boer position near Dordrecht. 
 
 On the 23rd February Lieut.-General Gatacre made a reconnaissance in 
 the direction of Stormberg, which showed that the hostile garrison had been 
 reduced in men and guns. Our casualties on this occasion amounted to 
 2 killed, 2 wounded, and 6 missing, among the last being included Captain the 
 Hon. R. de Montmorency, Y.C., 21st Lancers, and Major P. R. Hockin, 2nd 
 Devonshire Volunteer Artillery, two very promising Officers. 
 
 On the 24th February Lieut.-General Sir W. Gatacre provided a garrison 
 for Dordrecht by moving to that place from Bird River 2 guns, 2 companies of 
 Infantry, 50 signallers, and 50 mounted police. The garrison was directed to 
 entrench and occupy a commanding position to the south of the town. 
 
 As regards Natal the reports received from General Sir Redvers Buller, 
 are to the following effect. On the 14th February he attacked strong positions 
 held by the enemy on the right bank of the Tugela immediately to the east of 
 Colenso. These positions on the Cingolo and Monte Cristo heights covered the 
 left flank of the Boers. Cingolo Avas gradually occupied by our troops, and on 
 the 18th February the 4th and 6th Brigades assaulted the entrenchments on 
 Monte Cristo, the enemy falling back after having offered but slight resistance, 
 and being driven across the Tugela with the loss of their camps and supplies. 
 Sir Redvers Buller has brought to special notice the work done by the 2nd Bn. 
 The Queen’s, 2nd Bn. Royal Scots Fusiliers, Rifle Brigade, and Irregular 
 Cavalry; but all the troops are reported to have behaved admirably, and 
 the Royal Artillery and Naval gun detachments to have rendered great 
 assistance. 
 
17 
 
 On the 21st February Sir Redvers Buller telegraphed that commandoes 
 from the Bethlehem, Heilbron, and Senekal Districts had returned by train the 
 previous week from Spion Kop to the Orange Free State. On the same date 
 he reported that the 5th Division had that day crossed the Tugela by a 
 pontoon bridge, driving hack the enemy’s rear guard. 
 
 Subsequent telegrams show that on the 22nd the 11th Brigade forced the 
 passage of the Onderbrook Spruit and seized the Landrat heights which 
 command it, while on the 23rd the 5th Brigade crossed the Langawachtf 
 Spruit and similarly occupied the adjacent heights. On the 25th the force 
 had.not advanced far enough to the north to keep down the enemy’s-long- 
 range Artillery and Infantry fire, and the country is stated to he extremely 
 difficult, hut Sir Redvers Buller is endeavouring to turn the Boer position to the 
 east, and hopes to succeed in outflanking the enemy and reaching Ladysmith. 
 
 Apart from the progress of the war, there are two matters affecting the 
 force under my command, to which a brief reference seems desirable. On 
 the 25th February, I telegraphed to your Lordship requesting that 100,000 khaki 
 warm coats of the Indian pattern might he sent to the Cape Colony and Natal 
 from India. These coats proved very serviceable during the expeditions on 
 the North-west frontier in 1897-98. and will greatly conduce to the health 
 and comfort of the troops in. South Africa as soon as the cold season sets in. 
 On 26th February, in reply to a telegram from your Lordship, I asked for the 
 8th Infantry Division to be despatched to South Africa as quickly as possible, 
 more troops being needed in my opinion to enable me to operate in sufficient 
 strength in the Orange Free State and Transvaal. 
 
 I have the honour to he, 
 
 My Lord, 
 
 Your Lordship’s most obedient Servant, 
 
 ROBERTS, Field-Marshal, 
 
 Commanding-in- Chief, South Africa. 
 
 PrisonK its taken at Paardeherg, 27th February 1900. 
 
 Orange Free State Artillery, under Major Albrechts 
 Officers—V. Dewitz. 
 
 V. Heister. 
 
 45 men. 
 
 Angenstein. 
 
 
 J 
 
 3 Krupps, 7'5-cm.* 
 1 M.H. Maxim.* 
 
 Orange Free State. 
 
 Commando. 
 
 Commandant. 
 
 Field Cornets. 
 
 Men. 
 
 K roonstadt 
 
 J. V. Meantges 
 
 F. Nell. 
 
 134') 
 
 Ladybrand 
 
 R. J. Sneyman 
 
 • • • • 
 
 134 
 
 
 Ficksburg .. 
 
 De Villiers .. .. 
 
 • • • • 
 
 44 
 
 
 Wynberg ft) 
 
 J. W. Kok .. 
 
 
 GO 
 
 
 „ (2) . 
 
 , , 
 
 Oosthuizen 
 
 133 
 
 
 Hoopstadt., 
 
 J. Greyling - .. .. 
 
 T. Nieuwondt .. 
 
 l r 
 
 
 
 
 8. V. Zeyl 
 
 
 
 Rloemfontein— 
 
 
 
 
 H .327 
 
 Town.. ., 
 
 
 W. Akermann .. 
 
 31 
 
 De Wetsdoro 
 
 Fouri.. .. .. 
 
 • • 
 
 104 
 
 
 Mid., Mud River 
 
 
 J. J. Boshof .. 
 
 67 
 
 
 Jacobsdal .. 
 
 A. Sinit 
 
 
 iG 
 
 
 Bosliof 
 
 
 J. W. Griinewald 
 
 112 
 
 
 Petrusburg and Fauresmith 
 
 
 • • • • 
 
 GG 
 
 
 Vryburg .. 
 
 
 • • • • 
 
 l 
 
 
 Natives 
 
 • • 
 
 .. 
 
 'J 
 
 
 * The guns taken are 3- 
 Vickers-Maxini automatic gun. 
 
 (+7) 
 
 -7'5-cm., Krupp’s; 
 
 c 
 
 old pattern Q.F., about 12-pr.; 1- 57 ctu. 
 
18 
 
 Transvaal. 
 
 Commando. 
 
 Commandant. 
 
 Field Cornets. 
 
 Men. 
 
 Potcbefstroom 
 
 Roos .. 
 
 Demmer.. 
 
 .. 300 
 
 | 615^ 
 
 
 
 
 Hatting.. 
 
 .. 315 
 
 
 ’> • • 
 
 Wolmarans .. 
 
 Du Plessis 
 
 .. 100 
 
 j 161 
 
 
 
 De Veileres 
 
 61 
 
 
 „ (Schoenspniit) .. 
 
 ,, . • • • 
 
 Venters.. 
 
 .. .. 
 
 275 
 
 
 
 .. 
 
 Naude .. 
 
 • • • 
 
 210 
 
 
 Gatsrand .. .. .. .. 
 
 Maartens 
 
 Oostkuizen 
 
 .. 349 
 
 I 
 
 .2,592 
 
 
 
 Alberts .. 
 
 37 
 
 >446 
 
 
 
 Naude .. 
 
 60 
 
 / 
 
 
 Scandinavians 
 
 .. 
 
 Friis 
 
 .. 49 
 
 49 
 
 
 Bowyk 
 
 
 Terblanch 
 
 .. 318 
 
 318 
 
 
 Bloemhof .. 
 
 Woeste 
 
 Badenhorst 
 
 .. 107 
 
 j 
 
 
 
 
 Sneyman 
 
 .. 171 
 
 >518 
 
 J J 
 
 
 Grand total (besides about 
 
 
 Bosnian .. 
 
 .. 240 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 150 wounded, &c.) 
 
 • • 
 
 • • 
 
 • • 
 
 
 3,919 
 
 No. 4. 
 
 From Field-Marshal Lord Roberts to the Secretary of State for War. 
 
 Army Head-quarters, South Africa, 
 
 Government House, Bloemfontein, 
 
 My^Lord, 15th March 1900. 
 
 In my letter No. 3, dated the 28th February 1900, I continued my 
 narrative of the operations in the Orange Free State and elsewhere up to the 
 end of the month. 
 
 On the 1st March I proceeded to Kimberley, from my camp at Paardeberg, 
 for the purpose of discussing with Lieut.-General Lord Methuen the measures 
 to be taken for the relief of Mafeking. I returned the next day to Osfontein, 
 about 5 miles east of Pardeberg, where I established my head-quarters. 
 
 The troops at Paardeberg marched to Osfontein on the 1st, on which day 
 the following movements were ordered : — 
 
 The Mounted Infantry at the Modder Camp to leave on the 4th March, 
 and arrive at Osfontein in three marches ; the three batteries of Field Artillery 
 at Jacobsdal, under Lieut.-Colonel Flint, to proceed to Osfontein, arriving 
 there on the 6th ; the 1st, or Guards Brigade, at Klip Drift and Klip Kraal, 
 similarly to arrive at Osfontein on the 6th; and the 15th Brigade, at 
 Jacobsdal, under Major-General Waved, to accompany the last convoy from 
 the Modder Camp, and to reach Osfontein on the 7th. On these movements 
 being completed I directed the line of communication with the Modder Camp 
 to be abandoned, that with Kimberley being maintained for a few days longer 
 until I was ready to advance on Bloemfontein. 
 
 As there had been considerable additions to the strength of the Mounted 
 Infantry, I redistributed this branch of the Service into the following 
 commands:— 
 
 1st Brigade. 
 
 Lieut.-Colonel E. A. H. Alderson, Commanding. 
 
 1st Regiment Mounted Infantry. 
 
 3rd 
 
 Roberts’s Horse. 
 
 New Zealand Mounted Infantry 
 Rimington’s Guides. 
 
2nd Brigade. 
 
 Lieut.-Colonel P. W. J. Le Gallais, Commanding. 
 
 6th Regiment Mounted Infantry. 
 
 8th 
 
 City Imperial Volunteers. 
 
 Kitchener’s Horse. 
 
 Nesbitt’s Horse. 
 
 New South Wales Mounted Infantry. 
 
 3rd Brigade. 
 
 Lieut.-Colonel C. G. Martyr, Commanding. 
 
 2nd Regiment Mounted Infantry. 
 
 4th „ 
 
 2nd Bn. Durham Mounted Infantry. 
 
 2nd Bn. Essex Mounted Infantry. 
 
 2nd Bn. West Riding Mounted Infantry. 
 1st Queensland Mounted Infantry. 
 
 2nd 
 
 4tii Brigade. 
 
 Colonel C. P. Ridley, Commanding. 
 5th Regiment Mounted Infantry. 
 
 7 th „ „ 
 
 1st City of Gralmmstcwn Volunteers. 
 Ceylon Mounted Infantry. 
 
 Heavy rain fell daily up to the Gth, greatly impeding the march of the 
 troops and delaying the convoys of provisions and stores, the drifts across the 
 Modder River becoming almost unfordable. 
 
 It had been my original intention to move towards Bloemfontein as soon 
 as the enemy’s force under Cronje had been obliged to surrender, but the 
 Cavalry and Artiller}^ horses were so exhausted by their rapid march to 
 Kimberley and back, and so weakened by the scarcity of forage, that I found 
 it absolutely necessary to give them a week’s rest. 
 
 Meanwhile, reports came in that the enemy were collecting in considerable 
 strength to the east of Osfontein, and were entrenching themselves along a 
 line of kopjes, running north and south, about 8 miles distant from the camp at 
 Osfontein. The northernmost or Leeuw Kopje was to the north of, and 2 
 miles distant from, the river ; and the southernmost cluster of kopjes, to which 
 the name of “ The Seven Kopjes ” was given, was 8 miles to the south of the 
 river. The front of the Boer position extended, therefore, for 1<H miles. 
 
 It was noticed that several gun emplacements were being constructed on 
 the summit of a flat-topped kopje (called “ Table Mountain”), which formed 
 a salient in the centre of the alignment, and guns were also mounted on the 
 Leeuw Kopje at the northern end, and on “ The Seven Kopjes” at the 
 southern end. 
 
 On the 6th March I gave orders for an attack on the enemy’s position early 
 the following morning. The Cavalry Division, with Alderson’s and Ridley’s 
 Brigades of Mounted Infantry and 7 batteries of Horse Artillery, was directed 
 to march at 2 a.m., its object being to circle round the left flank of the Boers, 
 to take their line of entrenchments in reverse, and moving eventually to the 
 river near Poplar Grove to cut off their line of retreat. The 6th Division 
 under Lieut.-General Kelly-Kenny, with its Brigade Division of Field Artillery, 
 one howitzer battery, and Martyr’s Mounted Infantry, was to follow the route 
 taken by the Cavalry until reaching a point south-east of “ The Seven Kopjes.” 
 It was then to drive the enemy from these kopjes, and afterwards move to the 
 north in the direction of “ Table Mountain.” 
 
 In the attack on “ Table Mountain ” the 6th Division was to be assisted 
 by Flint’s Brigade Division of Field Artillery, four 4'7-inch Naval guns, 
 
 (47) C 2 
 
20 
 
 Le Gallais’ Brigade of Mounted Infantry, and the Guards Brigade. This latter 
 force was to concentrate at daybreak near a small kopje and farm distant 
 2 miles to the east of Osfontein Farm, where my head-quarters had been 
 established. “ Table Mountain” being the key of the enemy’s position, I 
 anticipated that the Boers would retire to the river as soon as it was occupied 
 by our troops. 
 
 The 14th Brigade of the 7th Division, with its Brigade Division of Field 
 Artillery, Nesbit’s Horse, and the New South Wales and Queensland Mounted 
 Infantry, was ordered to march eastward along the south bank of the river for 
 the purpose of threatening the enemy, distracting attention from the main 
 attack on ■'•'Table Mountain,” and assisting the Cavalry in preventing the 
 Boers from crossing the river at the Poplar Grove Drift. The 9th Division, 
 with three Naval 12-prs., and Mounted Infantry, under Lieut.-Colonels De Lisle 
 and Henry, was instructed to act in a similar manner on the north bank of the 
 river, and to drive the enemy from the Leeuw Kopje, which formed the 
 northern extremity of their defensive position. 
 
 On the 7th March the operations were carried out in accordance with the 
 above scheme, but the 6th Division made too wide a detour to the south, the 
 result being that, before it approached “ The Seven Kopjes,” the Boers had 
 been dislodged by the Horse Artillery fire in reverse, coupled with the 
 well-aimed shell-fire of the 4‘7-inch Naval guns in front, while the turning 
 movement of the Cavalry and Horse Artillery, in conjunction with the advance 
 of the 9th Division and 1st and 14th Brigades, caused the enemy to evacuate 
 “Table Mountain” and the Leeuw Kopje without offering any serious 
 opposition. Long distances had, however, to be traversed by the troops, the 
 ground was heavy owing to the recent rain, and the Cavalry and Artillery 
 horses were in very poor condition. Moreover, the Boers displayed such skill 
 iu delaying the pursuit of the Cavalry Division, that they succeeded in taking* 
 away with them almost all their guns and wagons, and it was not until the 
 evening that the main body of the force reached Poplar Grove, to which I 
 had ordered the baggage to be transferred as soon as 1 perceived that the 
 enemy were in full retreat. 
 
 Had the Cavalry, Horse Artillery, and Mounted Infantry been able to 
 move more rapidly, they would undoubtedly have intercepted the enemy’s line 
 of retreat, and I should have had the satisfaction of capturing t heir guns, 
 wagons, and supplies, as well as a large number of prisoners. The failure to 
 effect this object was the more mortifying when I learnt the next day on good 
 authority that the Presidents of the Orange Free State and South African 
 Republic had been present during the engagement, and had strongly urged the 
 Boers to continue their resistance. Their appeals to the burghers were, 
 bo wever, unavailing, as the Boer forces were quite broken, and refused to fight 
 any longer. 
 
 In the course of the afternoon the Russian and Dutch Military Attaches 
 with the Transvaal Government, Lieut.-Colonel Gourko and Lieutenant 
 Thomson, who were accompanying the enemy, claimed our protection, the 
 horses in the cart in which they were travelling having been killed by shell fire. 
 
 One Krupp gun and six ox wagons were captured during the day, and a 
 large quantity of rifle ammunition was afterwards found in the deserted trenches. 
 The casualties during the day were not heavy, and were confined almost entirely 
 to the Cavalry Division. They consisted of 2 Officers (Lieutenant Keswick, 
 12th Lancers; Lieutenant Frieslich, 1st Grahamstown Volunteers) and 2 men 
 killed, 3 Officers and 46 men wounded, and one man missing. 
 
 On the Sth and 9th of March the force halted at Poplar Grove, but on the 
 latter date the 1st Cavalry Brigade and the 6th Infantr} 7 Division moved 
 8 miles eastward to Waaihoek, on the road to Abraham’s Kraal. 
 
 On the 9th i issued orders for the advance of the force in three columns 
 on Bloemfontein. The left column, under Lieut.-General French, consisted 
 of the 1st Cavalry Brigade, Alderson’s Mounted Infantry, and the 6th Division. 
 The centre column, which I accompanied, comprised the 9th Division, the 
 Brigade of Guards, the 2nd Cavalry Brigade, Martyr’s, and Lc Gallais’ Mounted 
 Infantry, the 65th Howitzer Battery, four 6-inch howitzers, the Naval Brigade, 
 the ammunition reserve, the Supply Park, and the 7th Field Company, Royal 
 Engineers. 'The right column, under Lieut.-General Tucker, included the 
 7th Division, the 3rd Cavalry Brigade, and Ridley’s Brigade of Mounted 
 
 v 
 
21 
 
 Infantry. The left column was to march by the northern road, through 
 Baberspan, Doornboom, and Venter’s Vlei, to Leeuwberg ; on the railway line, 
 about 15 miles south of Bloemfontein ; the centre by the middle road through 
 Driefontein, Assvogel Ivop, and Venter’s Vlei to Leeuwberg ; and the right 
 column through Petrusburg, Driekop, and Panfontein or Weltevradc to Venter’s 
 Vlei, the distance being, in each case, covered in four marches, with halts at 
 the places mentioned. 
 
 It should here be explained that my reason for not proposing to use the 
 northern and most direct road beyond Baberspan was, that 1 had good reason 
 to believe that the enemy expected us to advance by that road, and were ready 
 to oppose us in a strong entrenched position which they had prepared in the 
 vicinity of Bainsvlei. 
 
 On the 10th the movement was begun as ordered, and the right column 
 occupied Petrusburg without opposition. The left column found the enemy 
 holding several kopjes behind Abraham’s Kraal, and endeavoured to turn their 
 left Hank by moving to the south. The Boers, however, anticipated this 
 manoeuvre by a rapid march southward, and took up a fresh position on a ridge 
 about 4 miles long, running north and south across the road 2 miles east of 
 Driefontein. Lieut.-General French followed up the enemy with the 
 1st Cavalry Brigade and the 6th Division, arid came into contact with them 
 at 11 a.m. 
 
 Meanwhile the 2nd Cavalry Brigade had reached Driefontein, and 
 endeavoured, in conjunction with the 1st Cavalry Brigade, to turn the rear of 
 the Boers hy operating in the plain behind the ridge which they were holding. 
 The enemy’s guns, however, had a longer range than our field guns, which 
 were the only ones immediately available, and some time elapsed before the 
 former could be silenced, especially a Creusot gun, which had been placed in a 
 commanding position on an isolated kopje, 2^ miles east of the northern end 
 of the ridge. The Infantry of the 0th Division reached this end of the ridge 
 about 2 p.m., having been under the enemy’s shell fire, which did but little 
 damage, for more than an hour. The Boers were gradually pushed back 
 towards the centre of the ridge, where they made an obstinate stand. 
 
 The 0th Division came up at 5 p.m. and I at once ordered the Guards 
 Brigade and the 10th Brigade to the assistance of the 6th Division; but 
 before these reinforcements could reach the ridge, the enemy’s position 
 was stormed in the most gallant manner by the 1st Bus. of the Essex and 
 Welsh Regiments, supported by the 2nd Bn. of the Buffs. The bodies of 102 
 Boers were afterwards found along the ridge, mainly in the position which 
 they held to the last. Many of their horses were killed. 
 
 I regret to say that our casualties were heavy, aggregating 4 Officers 
 (The Buffs.—Captain Eustace. Welsh Regiment —Captain Lomax. Essex 
 Regiment. — Lieutenant F. IN’. Parsons, 2nd Lieutenant A. B. Coddington) 
 killed, and 20 wounded, and 60 men killed, 314 wounded, and 16 missing. 
 The Cavalry, Attillery, and Mounted Infantry suffered comparatively slight 
 loss, 1 Officer (Mr. McCartie, a retired Indian civilian) being killed and 
 4 wounded, and 4 men killed, 25 wounded, and 2 missing. 
 
 A flagrant breach of the recognised usages of war was the cause of most 
 of the casualties in the Infantry. The enemy held up their hands and hoisted 
 a white flag in sign of surrender, but when our troops approached they were 
 fired on at close quarters by a number of Boers posted under cover in rear of 
 their front line and had to retire until reinforced, when ihe position was 
 carried at the point of the bayonet. 'I he holding up of their hands on the 
 part of the Boers was observed by me and by several Officers of my Staff 
 through telescopes, and it, as well as the persistent use by the enemy of flat¬ 
 nosed expanding bullets, has been brought to the notice of the Presidents of 
 the Orange Free State and South African Republic in a telegram, dated 
 11 th March, a copy of which was forwarded for your Lordship’s information, 
 with a request that its contents might be communicated to the neutral Powers. 
 
 On the evening of the 10th the left and centre columns bivouacked 
 together in the vicinity of Driefontein. On this date I directed Lieut.- 
 General Tucker to halt the 7th Division and 3rd Cavalry Brigade at Driekop, 
 until he was joined by the second battalions of the Hampshire and Warwick¬ 
 shire Regiments. These corps had been left behind, together with Lieut.- 
 Colonels Dc Lisle and Henry’s battalions of Mounted Infantry, at Osfontein 
 
and Poplar Grove respectively, for the purpose of keeping open communica¬ 
 tion with Kimberley, until certain convoys which were being despatched from 
 that place had arrived, and until the sick and wounded who were being sent 
 back from Poplar Grove and Osfontein had crossed the Modder River. 
 
 I may here mention that the Russian and Dutch Military Attaches who 
 had given themselves up on 7th March at Poplar Grove were sent to Kimberley 
 en route to Cape Town with this convoy of sick and wounded. 
 
 On the 11th March the combined left and centre columns inarched to 
 Aasvogel Kop, no opposition being met with. This day I ordered the 3rd 
 Cavalry Brigade with two batteries of Horse Artillery to proceed from Driekop 
 to Venter’s Vlei. On 12th March my head-quarters, together with the 6th 
 and 9th Divisions, moved to Venter’s Vlei, while the 1st and 2nd Cavalry 
 Brigades under Lieut.-General French pushed on to Brand Dam Kop, 7 miles 
 to the south-west of Bloemfontein. I diverted the Cavalry from Leeuwberg, 
 which was their original objective, to a point much nearer Bloemfontein for 
 two reasons :— 
 
 First, it was reported that reinforcements from the north were hourly 
 expected at Bloemfontein, and it thus became imperatively necessary to fore¬ 
 stall the enemy’s movements. This report has subsequently been substan¬ 
 tiated by a telegram from President Kruger to General Joubert, which has 
 fallen into my hands. 
 
 Secondly, if any delay occurred, the Boers would have had time to remove 
 the locomotives and rolling stock, which I understood to be still in the railway 
 station at Bloemfontein. 
 
 Some slight resistance was met with by the Cavalry, but no serious 
 fighting took place, and the only casualties that occurred were on the side of 
 the Boers. 
 
 Early the next morning I proceeded to Brand Dam Kop, accompanied by 
 the 3rd Cavalry Brigade, and found that the hills commanding the town had 
 already been occupied by the 1st and 2nd Cavalry Brigades. At noon several 
 of the leading citizens of Bloemfontein, including Mr. Frazer, drove out to the 
 kopje which 1 had just reached, about a mile from the town, and tendered its 
 submission to the British Government. I entered Bloemfontein at 1 p.m., 
 meeting with a cordial reception from the inhabitants, a number of whom 
 accompanied the troops singing “ God save the Queen,” “ Rule Britannia,” &c. 
 i established my head-quarters in the official residence of the State President, 
 which Mr. Steyn had vacated at G o’clock on the previous evening. The 1st 
 Infantry Brigade marched this day from Venter’s Vlei to Bloemfontein, and the 
 6th and 9th Divisions from the same place to Brand Dam Kop. On the 
 morning of the 14th, the 6th Division advanced to Bloemfontein, being joined 
 there in the course of the day by the 9th Division. As soon as the troops 
 occupied the town I appointed Major-General G. T. Pretyman, C.B., to be 
 Military Governor of Bloemfontein, granting him, subject to your Lordship’s 
 approval, the rank and pay of a Major-General on the Staff while so employed. 
 
 It may here be noted that under my orders the railwa} r north and south 
 of Bloemfontein was broken up for a sufficient distance on the evening of the 
 12th by Major Hunter-V eston, R.E., attached to the Cavalry Division, and 
 this enterprising Officer also succeeded in cutting the enemy’s telegraph and 
 telephone wires in both directions. Eleven locomotives, 20 carriages, and 140 
 trucks were captured at the Bloemfontein Railway Station, the Boers not 
 having had time to remove them. The acquisition of this amount of rolling 
 stock will greatly facilitate the reopening of railway communication with Cape 
 Colony, in spite of the fact that the bridges at Norval’s Pont and Bethulie 
 were blown up by the enemy when they withdrew to the north side of the 
 Orange River. 
 
 Yesterday I issued an Army Order* thanking the troops under my com¬ 
 mand for their conduct during the operations which resulted in the relief 
 
 * ARMY ORDERS, SOUTH AFRICA. 
 
 Bloemfontein, 14th March 1900. 
 
 If. aftords the 1’iehl-.'Marshal Commanding'-in-Chief the greatest pleasure in congratulating 
 the Army in South Airica on the various events that have occurred during the past, few weeks, 
 and he would specially olfer bis sincere thanks to that portion of the Army which, under his 
 
of Kimberley and Ladysmith, the surrender of Cronje, the capture of a large 
 number of prisoners, and the occupation of Bloemfontein. A copy of this 
 Order is appended, and I trust that your Lordship will agree with me in 
 thinking that by their spirit and endurance the soldiers and sailors serving in 
 South Africa have worthily upheld the traditions of Her Majesty’s Forces. 
 
 In Natal events of the highest importance have occurred since I last 
 addressed your Lordship. On 28th February I received a telegram from 
 General Sir Redvers Buller informing me that Major-General Hart was not 
 strong enough on 24th February to take the entrenchments commanding the 
 passage of the Langerwachte Spruit. Sir Redvers Buller had therefore deter¬ 
 mined to make use of another passage which had been discovered below the 
 Falls. 
 
 Finding that he could make a practicable approach to this passage, he 
 recrossed men and guns and took up the pontoon bridge which he caused to 
 be relaid at the new site. The troops meanwhile bivouacked behind hastily 
 constructed shelter trenches, where they were harrassed by the enemy’s rifle 
 and artillery fire. 
 
 On the 27th February Major-General Barton, with two battalions of the 
 6th Brigade and the 2nd Bn. Royal Dublin Fusiliers, crept 1^ miles down the 
 river bank, and ascending an almost precipitous cliff, 500 feet high, assaulted 
 and occupied the top of Pieter’s Hill. This to some extent turned the enemy’s 
 left, and enabled Lieut.-General Sir Charles Warren, with the 4th Brigade 
 under Colonel Norcott and the 11th Brigade under Colonel Kitchener, to 
 assail the main position, which was carried by the 1st. Bn. South Lancashire 
 Regiment, 2nd Bn. East Surrey Regiment, and 1st Bn. Rifle Brigade, about 
 sunset. Sixty prisoners were captured, and the enemy scattered in all 
 directions. 
 
 On the evening of the 28th February Major-General Lord Dundonald 
 with the Natal Carbineers and a composite Cavalry Regiment entered Lady¬ 
 smith, the country between that place and Pieter’s Hill being found to be 
 clear of the enemy. The next day Sir Redvers Buller moved his head¬ 
 quarters to Nelthorpe. 
 
 On 2nd March 73 wagon loads of supplies entered Ladysmith, the first 
 seven containing hospital comforts. On the same date Sir Redvers Buller 
 telegraphed to the effect that there was no prospect of the enemy making 
 any further stand up to Laing’s Nek, as the whole district was clear of them 
 except at the top of Van Reenen’s Pass, where a few wagons were visible. 
 The last train load of Boers had left Modderspruit at noon on 1st March and 
 the bridge had afterwards been blown up. They had abandoned vast 
 
 immediate command, have taken part in the operations resulting' yesterday in the capture of 
 Bloemfontein. 
 
 On (he 12th February this force crossed the boundary which divided the Orange Free State 
 from British territory. Three days later Kimberley was relieved. On the 15th day the bulk of 
 the Boer Army in this State, under one of their most-trusted Generals, were made prisoners, On 
 the 17th day the news of the relief of Ladysmith was received, and on the 13th March, 21) days 
 from the commencement of the operations, the capital of the Orange Free State was occupied. 
 
 This is a record of which any Army may well be proud—a record which could not have 
 been achieved except by earnest, well-disciplined men, determined to do their duty and to 
 surmount whatever difficulties or dangers might be encountered. 
 
 Exposed to extreme heat by day, bivouacking under heavy rain, marching long distances 
 (not infrequently with reduced rations), the endurance, cheerfulness, and gallantry displayed by 
 all ranks are beyond praise, and Lord Roberts feels sure that neither Her Majesty The Queen, 
 nor the British nation will be unmindful of the efforts made by this force to uphold the honour of 
 their country. 
 
 The Field-Marshal desires especially to refer to the fortitude and heroic spirit with which 
 the wounded have borne their sufferings. Owing to the great extent of country over which 
 modern battles have to be fought it is not always possible to afford immediate aid to those who 
 are struck down ; many hours have, indeed, at times elapsed before some of the wounded could 
 be attended to, but not a word of murmur or complaint has been uttered, the anxiety of all. 
 when succour came, was that their comrades should be cared for first. 
 
 In assuring every Officer and man how much he appreciates their efforts in the past Lord 
 Roberts is confident that, in the future, they will continue to show the same resolution and 
 soldierly qualities, and to lay down their lives if need be (as so many brave men have already 
 done) in order to ensure that the war in South Africa maybe brought to a satisfactory conclusion 
 
 By Order, 
 
 W. F. KELLY, Major-General , 
 
 Deputy Adjutant-General, for Chief of the Staff 
 
24 
 
 quantities of ammunition and stores of every description, including tools, tents, 
 and individual necessaries. 
 
 The troops employed in the relief of Ladysmith wanted a week’s rest, as 
 well as new clothes and boots; those forming the Ladysmith garrison required 
 a fortnight’s rest, food, and exercise. 
 
 As it was most desirable to strengthen the force in Cape Colony operating 
 by the eastern railway line in the direction of Stormberg, especially in view of 
 my advance on Bloemfontein, I requested Sir Redvers Buller to despatch one 
 Infantry division from Durban to East London, with its brigade division of 
 Field Artillery, should it be possible to spare the latter, and with any mounted 
 troops that he could dispense with. 
 
 On the 5th March Sir Redvers Buller telegraphed that he was prepared to 
 send me the 5th Division under Lieut.-General Sir Charles Warren, and two 
 squadrons of the 14th Hussars, the third squadron being already with the force 
 in the Orange Free State. He remarked that the Ladysmith garrison would 
 take some time to regain its fitness for field service. He proposed to reoccupy 
 Dundee and Newcastle. The railway from Ladysmith to Van Reenen’s Pass 
 was practically complete as far as the Reversing Station, but above that point 
 considerably damaged. The pass itself was held by a small party of the 
 enemy who had entrenched themselves. The other passes were not entrenched, 
 and it was doubtful whether they were occupied. The only organized body of 
 the enemy to be heard of in Natal was about 7,000 strong. This body was at 
 “ One Tree Hill,” in the Biggarsberg Range, and it was moving towards 
 Laing’s Nek. 
 
 On the 9th March Sir Redvers Buller informed me that 800 Boers with 
 2 guns were occupying the Tintwa Pass, and the Harrismith and Kroonstad 
 Commandoes with 3 guns were posted at Van Reenen’s Pass. The other passes 
 were being held by small bodies of the enemy. On the Biggarsberg about 
 9,000 Boers were entrenched from Water Kloof, past “ One Tree Hill ” and 
 Hlatikulu, to Glencoe -J unction. These included the Johannesburg, Rustenburg, 
 Middleburg, and Vryheid Commandoes, with 10 guns. Dundee was occupied 
 by the enemy. If he were to remain quiet, Sir Redvers Buller was of opinion 
 that the Boers would begin raiding, and he proposed therefore to repair the 
 railway to Elandslaagte and thence to strike at Dundee through Beith. He 
 would thus turn the enemy’s position and probably save the line to Newcastle. 
 To do this, and simultaneously to threaten the Drakensberg Passes, Sir Redvers 
 Buller considered that he needed all the troops at his disposal, though, if I 
 desired it, he would still send me the 5th Division. 
 
 in reply, on the 10th March, 1 agreed that the despatch of the 5th Division 
 should be postponed until I reached Bloemfontein and was able to judge of 
 the situation as it might then present itself. I added that I had no objection 
 to active operations being undertaken in Natal, but that no attempt should be 
 made to force the passes of the Drakensberg until I was in readiness to co¬ 
 operate from the west of that range. 
 
 Turning now to the northern frontier of Cape Colony, I heard on 28th 
 February from Major-General Clements that he had that morning marched 
 from Rensburg to Arundel, and on arrival there had ascertained that Colesberg 
 had been evacuated by the enemy. He accordingly sent a force to occupy 
 Colesberg Railway Junction and himself with other troops entered the town 
 of Colesberg, where he was accorded an enthusiastic reception by the loyalists. 
 
 On the 3rd March I received new s that a further advance had been made to 
 Achtortang Station and that the line towards Norval's Pont was being repaired. 
 
 On the 5th March the enemy were reported to be holding a position 3 
 miles to the south-west of Norval’s Pont, the bridge being still intact, but 
 during the evening of the same day they crossed to the north side of the 
 river. 
 
 On the 9th Norval’s Pont Station and the adjacent drifts on the south 
 side were occupied by Major-General Clements, who proposes to cross the 
 river as soon as the Pontoon Train arrived, and to begin repairs to the railway 
 line and bridge, the latter as well as the road bridge having been blown up by 
 the enemy. 1 have this morning sent by train a force consisting of the 
 3rd Bn Grenadier Guards and the 1st Bn. Scots Guards, with four guns, from 
 Bloemfontein to Springfontein Junction. I anticipate that their presence will 
 lead to the withdrawal of any Boer troops which may still remain to the north 
 
of Norval’s Pont, and will thus enable railway communication across the 
 Orange Hirer to be restored with all possible speed. 
 
 As regards the eastern line of advance, Lieut.-General Sir W. Gatacre 
 reported on the 3rd March that the number of the enemy at Stormberg had 
 been much reduced. News was also received from Cape Town that the Boers 
 were retreating towards Burghersdorp. 
 
 On the 5th March Lieut.-General Gatacre telegraphed that he had that day 
 occupied Stormberg with one battalion of Infantry, four companies of Mounted 
 Infantry, two held batteries, and some Cape Police. The enemy had evacuated 
 the town during the night of the 4th. Repairs to the railway line were being 
 begun. On the 7 th March Brigadier-General Brabant reported that the enemy 
 had retired from their position in front of Jamestown, and that the road to 
 that place was now open. 
 
 On the same date Lieut.-General Gatacre intimated that the repairs to 
 the railway line towards Stormberg and Steynsburg were being pushed on, 
 and that he intended that day to occupy Burghersdorp. His intention was 
 carried out and the British troops were cordially welcomed by the inhabitants. 
 Many rebels in tlie vicinity were stated to be anxious to lay down their arms, 
 if their lives would be spared. 
 
 Brabant’s force from Dordrecht reached Jamestown on the 8th March 
 without opposition. Information was received from Ladygrey that the rebels 
 were handing in their arms and ammunition to the Field-cornet of Herschel, 
 55 rifles and 70,000 rounds having already been surrendered. The local civil 
 authorities were proceeding to Ladygrey to resume control over the district. 
 
 On the 11th March Lieut.-General Gatacre telegraphed from Burghersdorp 
 that he had reconnoitred to within a mile of the Bethulie railway bridge and had 
 found it blown up, though the piers were standing. The enemy were still 
 holding the north bank of the river. The road bridge at Bethulie was uninjured, 
 though the piers had been mined. It would appear that the charges had failed 
 to explode, and the Boers had no time to attach fresh fuzes. The railway as 
 far as Knapdaar was open on the afternoon of the 11th. 
 
 In the Prieska, Britstown, and Carnarvon districts of Cape Colony, west 
 of the railway between De Aar and Orange River, I regret to report that 
 signs of organized disaffection have been apparent during the past fortnight. 
 
 At the end of February I ordered a force to be held in readiness for 
 operations in this direction. One column from De Aar was directed to con¬ 
 centrate at Britstown under Lieut.-Colonel Adye’s command, consisting of 
 3 companies of Mounted Infantry, 1 Field Battery, and 400 City Imperial 
 Volunteers. Another column under Major-General Settle was to assemble at 
 Hopetown, consisting of Orpen’s Horse about 60 strong, one company of 
 Mounted Infantry, one field battery, and half a battalion of Infantry from 
 the Orange River Station. This left for the defence of the Grange River 
 and Zoutpan’s Drift two 15-prs., two Maxims, four howitzers, 3 companies of 
 Infantry, and 700 City Imperial Volunteers. A third column consisting of 
 3 companies of New Zealand Mounted Infantry and 1 company of West 
 Australian Mounted Infantry, with a Canadian Field battery, was ordered to 
 march on Carnarvon from Victoria West Road Station, and afterwards to 
 occupy Gtterpan to the north. 
 
 On the 3rd March I was informed that Lieut.-Colonel A dye had reached 
 Britstown, and had been instructed to drive the rebels out of Houwwater. 
 Major-General Settle had left for Hopetown and Omdraai Vlei and intended 
 to co-operate with Lieut.-Colonel Adye in an advance on Prieska. The latter 
 Officer appears to have reconnoitred on 6th March towards Houwwater in 
 insufficient strength. The enemy were reinforced and brought up several guns, 
 the result being that our troops were obliged to retire to Britstown with the 
 loss of 1 Officer and 4 men of the Warwickshire Mounted Infantry wounded, 
 and 3 missing, and of 7 men of the City Imperial Volunteers wounded, and 6 
 missing. To ensure the operations being vigorously conducted in the western 
 districts, I desired Major-General Lord Kitchener to proceed to De Aar on 
 8th March with the object of collecting reinforcements, and of taking such 
 steps as might be necessary to punish the rebels and prevent the spread of 
 disaffection. 
 
 The only other event to be recorded is the occupation of Bosliof. about 
 
 (V) D 
 
26 
 
 30 miles to the north-east of Kimberley, which was effected on the 12th March 
 jjy Lieut.-General Lord Methuen, w r ithout any opposition being met with. 
 
 I am at present halting for a few days at Bloemfontein in order to give 
 the troops, horses, and transport animals a much needed rest, to biing up 
 remounts and fresh mules and oxen, to repair wagons which have broken down, 
 to replace worn-out boots and clothing, and to collect supplies and ammunition 
 for a further advance. 
 
 I have the honour to be, 
 
 My Lord, 
 
 Your Lordship’s obedient Servant, 
 
 ROBERTS, Field-Marshal, 
 
 Commanding in Chief, South Africa. 
 
 No. 5. 
 
 From Field-Marshal Lord Roberts to the Secretary of State for War. 
 
 Sir, War Office, 31st March 1900. 
 
 In the foregoing despatches. Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 4, dated respectively, 
 6th February, 16th February, 28th February, and 15th March 1900, I have 
 drawn attention to the conduct of the troops during the operations therein 
 described. 
 
 I would here like to mention the distinguished part played by the Royal 
 Canadian Regiment in its advance on the enemy’s trenches on 27th February, 
 and referred to me in my Despatch No. 3 of 28th February 1900. 
 
 No account of the recent operations would, however, be complete, w r ere I 
 to omit to draw special attention to the good services performed by the 
 splendid and highly efficient body of troops from other parts of Her Majesty’s 
 Empire which have, while serving under my orders, borne a distinguished share 
 in the advance into the Orange Free State. The various contingents from 
 Australia, from New Zealand, and from Ceylon, the several corps which have 
 been formed locally in the Cape Colony, and the City of London Imperial 
 Volunteers have vied one with the other in the performance of their duty. 
 They have shared with the regular troops of Her Majesty’s Army the hardships 
 and dangers of the campaign in a manner which have gained for them the 
 respect and admiration of all who have been associated with them. I 
 trust that your Lordship will concur with me in considering that by their valour 
 and endurance the soldiers and sailors serving in the force which is under my 
 immediate command have worthily upheld the best traditions of Her Majesty’s 
 Army and Navy. 
 
 It is now my pleasing duty to bring to your Lordship’s notice the names 
 of the following Officers, non-commissioned officers and men, on account of the 
 services they have rendered during the recent operations:— 
 
 Major-General H. H. Lord Kitchener of Khartoum, G.C.B., K.C.M.G., R.E., 
 has filled the important post of Chief of the Staff, and I am greatly 
 indebted to him for his counsel and cordial support on all occasions. 
 
 I consider he has rendered invaluable service to the State in his 
 onerous and responsible position. 
 
 Lieut.-Colonel H. V. Cowan, R.A., has filled the post of Military Secretary 
 In that important position he has done most excellent work. He is able, 
 painstaking and methodical, and is possessed of soundjudgment. I could 
 not w'ish for a more useful Military Secretary. 
 
 Colonel N. F. Fitz G. Chamberlain, Indian Staff Corps, Private Secretary, 
 gives me entire satisfaction. His work is constant and he carries it on 
 with zeal and intelligence. I cannot speak too highly of the assistance 
 afforded me by Colonel Chamberlain. 
 
Lieut.-Colonel J. J. Byron, Royal Australian Artillery, Aide-de-Camp. 
 
 Major S. Denison, The Boyal Canadian Regiment of Infantry, Aide-de-Camp. 
 
 Captain H. Watermeyer, Cape Town Highlanders, Aide-de-Camp. 
 
 Colonel H. R. Viscount Downe, C.I.E., was deputed to accompany the Military 
 Attaches representing Foreign Powers, and has discharged his duties with 
 tact and discretion. 
 
 Major-General G. T. Pretyman, C.B., R.A., acted as Head-quarters Com¬ 
 mandant to my entire satisfaction. I selected him to take charge ot 
 General Cronje on the journey to Cape Town, and on my arrival here 1 
 appointed him to the responsible post of Military Governor of 
 Bloemfontein. 
 
 Lieut.-Colonel {local Colonel) G. F. R. Henderson, York and Lancaster 
 Regiment, Director of Military Intelligence, re-organised the Intelligence 
 Department, and gave me valuable and reliable information regarding the 
 physical features of the country and the dispositions of the enemy. 
 
 Captain (Brevet Major and local Lieut.-Colonel) C. J. Mackenzie, Seaforth 
 Highlanders (Ross-shire Buffs, The Duke of Albany’s). On Colonel 
 Henderson being invalided he was succeeded by Lieut.-Colonel 0. J. 
 Mackenzie, who afforded me material assistance by the accurate and 
 valuable reports he submitted. Lieut.-Colonel Mackenzie has drawn 
 special attention to the good service rendered in the Intelligence Branch by 
 Major C. V. Hume, Royal Artillery. 
 
 Major-General W. F. Kelly, C.B., Deputy Adjutant-General, has afforded me 
 very great assistance in the responsible position he has filled, and the 
 vigilance and energy he has shown in the performance of his duties have 
 been most marked. 
 
 Major (locai Lieut.-Colonel) H. I. W. Hamilton, D.S.O., Deputy Assistant- 
 A dj utant- G e ne ral. 
 
 Captain (Brevet-Major) R. M. Poore, 7th Hussars, Provost-Marshal, has 
 exercised his responsible duties, whether as regards the care of prisoners, 
 or in maintaining order in camp and on the line of march, in a most 
 satisfactory manner. 
 
 Colonel (local Major-General) G. H. Marshall, Royal Artillery, Commanding 
 Royal Artillery, has been untiring in his supervision of the large force of 
 Artillery in this country, and 1 would specially refer to the value of the 
 service he rendered during flic bombardment of the enemy’s entrench¬ 
 ments from the 19th to the 27th February 1900. Major-General Marshall 
 mentions the able and unceasing assistance he has received from Major 
 (iocal Lieut.-Colonel) H. C. Sclater, Assistant Adjutant-General, Royal 
 Artillery. 
 
 Colonel (local Major-General) E. Wood, C.B., Royal Engineers, Chief 
 Engineer, supervised the arrangements for pushing forward trenches 
 towards the enemy’s laager at Paardeberg, and the successful result 
 attained there is due in a large measure to that Officer’s efforts. 
 
 Colonel (local Major-General) Sir \V. G. Nicholson, K.C.B., Royal Engineers, 
 undertook, at my request, the organization of a Transport Department in 
 the limited time available. He performed this duty with conspicuous 
 ability, and his services in this connection have contributed materially to 
 the success of the recent operations. 
 
 Colonel W. Richardson, C.B., Army Service Corps, Deputy Adjutant-General, 
 Director of Supplies, has successfully overcome the many difficulties con¬ 
 nected with arranging for the supplies of the Army in a district where 
 scarcely any forage, and no rations, except fresh meat, are procurable. 
 
 Lieut.-Colonel R. L. Hippisley, R.E., Director of Telegraphs, was indefatigable 
 in endeavouring to ensure that I should be in communication with the 
 whole of my force. That such a result was on most occasions attained, 
 despite the distance which had to be traversed in an enemy’s country, is 
 most creditable to Lieut.-Colonel Hippisley, as well as to Captain E. G. 
 Godfrey-Faussett, R.E., who was in immediate command of the Telegraph 
 Division during the march to Bloemfontein. 
 
 (4,7) D 2 
 
23 
 
 Captain (Brevet-Major and Local Lieutenant-Colonel). E. P. C. Girouard, 
 D.S.O., R.E., Director of Railways, has carried out his duties in a highly 
 creditable manner. The concentration of troops prior to my advance was 
 carried out by him without a hitch, and he has recently performed 
 valuable service in restoring through railway communication between the 
 Orange Free State and Cape Colony. 
 
 Surgeon-General W. D. Wilson, M.B., has had responsible and important duties 
 to perform. The arrangements necessary to provide for the wants of the 
 many sick and wounded in South Africa, have required unremitting care 
 and forethought, and the successful way in which they have been carried 
 out reflects the greatest credit on him. 
 
 Colonel W. E. Stevenson, M.B., R.A.M.O., has been Principal Medical Officer 
 with the Force, and I desire to draw attention not only to the efficient 
 manner in which he has supervised the working of the Corps, but also to 
 the assistance I have received from him at all times. 
 
 I cannot speak too highly of the care and devotion shown by the 
 Medical Officers to the sick and wounded, or of the gallant way in which 
 many of them have exposed themselves when performing their duties on 
 the field of battle. 
 
 Mr. Watson Cheyne, M.B., F.R.S., and Mr. Kendal Franks, M.B., F.R.C.S.I., 
 Consulting Surgeons, who have accompanied the Army, have rendered 
 invaluable service by their advice and assistance to the Medical Officers. 
 They have been unwearying in their work among the wounded and sick, 
 and, humanly speaking, many a valuable life has been saved by their 
 skill. 
 
 Major J. H. Eiaschi, New South Wales Medical Staff Corps, is deserving of 
 special mention on account of the assistance which he rendered to the 
 sick and wounded, as well as upon the efficient condition in which he has 
 kept the ambulance under his command, the services of which, ever since 
 its arrival, have been most valuable. 
 
 Honorary Colonel E. G. V. Lord Stanley, 2nd Yol. Bn. The Loyal North 
 Lancashire Regiment, has carried out the difficult duties of Press Censor 
 with tact and discretion. 
 
 The following Officers, non-commissioned officers, and men have 
 distinguished themselves during the recent operations :— 
 
 Army Service Corps. 
 
 Brevet-Colonel F. F. Johnson, Staff Officer to Director of Supplies. 
 Captain R. Ford. 
 
 Lieutenant P. G. P. Lea. 
 
 Transport Department. 
 
 Captain W. T. Furse, Royal Artillery, Deputy-Assistant Adjutant-General. 
 Major S. S. Long, Army Service Corps. 
 
 Major J. T. Johnson, Royal Artillery. 
 
 Brevet Lieut.-Colonel F. I. Maxse, D.S.O., Coldstream Guards. 
 
 Army Veterinary Department. 
 
 Veterinary-Captain L. J. Blenkinsop, D.S.O. 
 
 Veterinary-Lieutenant H. T. Sawyer. 
 
 Staff of the Line of Communications. 
 
 Lieut.-General Sir h. AY. E. F* Forestier-Walker, K.C.B., C. M.G., Commanding 
 the Lines ot Communication, has had heavy and responsible work, not 
 only in questions relating to the disembarkation of troops and military 
 stores, but especially in despatching them to the front. He has carried 
 out these duties with credit to himself and with advantage to the public 
 service. 
 
29 
 
 Captain Sir Edward Chichester, Bart., Royal Navy, has been Chief Naval 
 Transport Officer during the whole campaign, and has carried out his 
 arduous duties with an ability and tact which have ensured the smooth 
 aud successful working of all his arrangements. 
 
 Royal Navy. 
 
 Captain J. Bearcroft, Royal Navy, Commanding the Royal Naval Brigade. 
 My thanks are due to this Officer for the assistance he has at all times 
 afforded me. The Naval Brigade, under his orders, has performed 
 valuable service, and has fully maintained the traditions of Her Majesty’s 
 Navy, not only in action, but also in overcoming the many difficulties 
 attending the march of heavy ordnance over a country devoid of roads. 
 
 Commander AY. L. Grant, K©yal Navy, H.M. Ship “Doris.” 
 
 Commander Spencer de Horsey, Royal Navy, H.M. Ship “ Doris.” 
 
 Lieutenant F. D. Deans, Royal Navy, H.M.Ship “ Monarch.” 
 
 Major A. G. B. Winston, Royal Marine Light Infantry, H.M. Ship “Powerful.” 
 
 Cavalry Division. 
 
 Major-General (local Lieut.-General) J. D. P. French, Commanding the 
 Cavalry Division, carried out to my entire satisfaction the arduous and 
 important duties entrusted to his charge. By his rapid movement from 
 Dekiels drift to Kimberley he relieved that beleaguered town on the 
 loth February 1900. After engaging the enemy the following day, he 
 made a forced march to Koedoesrand drift and cut off the line of retreat 
 of the enemy's force. He bore a distinguished share in the engagements 
 of the 7th, 10th and 13th of March, on which latter date he dislodged 
 the enemy from the vicinity of Bloemfontein. 
 
 Cavalry Divisional Staff and Troops. 
 
 Lieut.-Colonel AV. R. Donovan, Royal Army Medical Corps, Principal Medical 
 Officer. 
 
 Major (local Lieut.-Colonel) Douglas Haig, 7th Hussars, Assistant Adjutant- 
 General. 
 
 Major The Hon. H. Lawrence, 17th Lancers, Deputy-Assistant Adjutant- 
 General for Intelligence. 
 
 Major The Hon. C. E. Bingham, 1st Life Guards, Aide-de-Camp. 
 
 Cavalry Divisional Staff and Troops 
 
 Serjeant A. E. Green. 
 Private W. S. Penny. 
 
 Mr. Hogg. 
 
 French’s Scouts. 
 
 Civil Guide. 
 
 Army Service Corps. 
 4831 Staff* Serjeant-Major T. Sinfield. 
 
 Royal Horse Artillery. 
 
 Lieut.-Colonel AA T . L. Davidson. 
 
 Lieut.-Colonel F. J. AV. Eustace. 
 
 Lieut.-Colonel A. N. Rochfort. 
 
 Major B. Burton. 
 
 Major Sir J. H. Jervis-AVhite-Jervis, Bart. 
 79959 Corporal G. Hearn. 
 
 79243 Gunner F. Wallace. 
 
 20392 Trumpeter R. Hanna. 
 
30 
 
 1st Cavalry Brigade. 
 
 Lieut.-Colonel and Brevet-Colonel T. C. Porter. Commanded the 1st 
 Cavalry Brigade, and handled his troops with ability during the 
 operations ol the 12th and 13th March 1900. 
 
 Lieut.-Colonel the Hon. W. Alexander, Royal Scots Greys, Commanded 
 the 1st Cavalry Brigade at the actions of the Riet and Modder rivers 
 in Colonel Porter’s absence with most satisfactory results. 
 
 6th Dragoon Guards (Carabineers). 
 
 Major A. Sprot. 
 
 2nd Lieutenant W. J. S. Rundle. 
 
 2587 Serjeant W. J. Bowman. 
 
 2758 Serjeant A. Crawshay. 
 
 3211 Corporal A. Blackman. 
 
 3450 Private G. Bunn. 
 
 3726 Private J. Buckenham. 
 
 3764 Private H. Cowley. 
 
 2nd Dragoons (Royal Scots Greys). 
 
 Major H. J. Scobell. 
 
 Lieutenant A. G. Seymour. 
 
 4172 Serjeant A. J. Pott, 
 
 3800 Private A. Elliott. 
 
 6th Dragoons. 
 
 Major E. H. H. Allenby. 
 
 2nd Cavalry Brigade. 
 
 Major and Brevet Colonel (Brigadier*General) R. G. Broadwood, Com¬ 
 manded the 2nd Cavalry Brigade with exceptional ability and dash 
 throughout the operations. 
 
 Household Cavalry Regiment. 
 
 Lieut.-Colonel A. D. Neeld, 2nd Life Guards. 
 
 Lieutenant Hon. R. Ward, Royal Horse Guards. 
 
 Lieutenant Hon. A. A r . Meade, Royal Horse Guards. 
 
 Corporal-Major C. Putman, 1st Life Guards. 
 
 Corporal-Major W. Silwood, 2nd Life Guards. 
 
 Corporal of Horse T. Taylor, Royal Horse Guards. 
 
 10tli (Prince of Wales’s Own Royal) Hussars. 
 
 Lieut.-Colonel R. B. W. Fisher. 
 
 2578 Serjeant S. Sanders. 
 
 2585 Pioneer Serjeant E. Engleheart. 
 
 2882 Lance-Serjeant P. Thwaites. 
 
 3855 Lance-Corporal A. Nugent. 
 
 3815 Private M. Johnson. 
 
 12th (Prince of Wales’s Own Royal) Lancers. 
 
 Lieut.-Colonel D. S. W. The Earl of Airlie. 
 
 Lieutenant C. Fane. 
 
 3rd Cavalry Brigade. 
 
 Lieut.-Colonel (Brigadier-General) J. R. P. Gordon, Commanded with 
 distinction the 3rd Cavalry Brigade, and his services in leading the 
 advance Brigade of the Cavalry Division during the advance on 
 Kimberley are specially worthy of mention. 
 
9th (Queen’s Royal) Lancers. 
 
 Major (local Lieut.-Colonel) M. 0. Little. 
 
 Lieutenant Lord F. T. Hamilton-Temple-Blackwood. 
 2nd Lieutenant L. W. De V. Sadleir-Jackson. 
 
 3810 Corporal C. Wilson. 
 
 3988 Corporal C. Green. 
 
 4223 Corporal T. Mitchell. 
 
 4309 Private C. Stamford. 
 
 3697 Private T. Holman. 
 
 16th (Queen’s) Lancers. 
 
 Major S. Frewen. 
 
 Lieutenant Hon. C. M. Evans-Freke. 
 
 3702 Lance-Corporal F. Flash. 
 
 3994 Private G. Chanlish. 
 
 3528 Private E. Daniel. 
 
 4389 Private F. Moseley. 
 
 Royal Engineers. 
 
 Captain and Brevet Major A. G. Hunter AVeston. 
 Lieutenant J. E. R. Charles. 
 
 26810 Corporal F. Kirby. 
 
 26249 Lance-Corporal S. Edwards, 
 
 1204 Sapper J. Redding. 
 
 1165 Sapper J. Webb. 
 
 22907 Sapper J, Parsons, 
 
 Mounted Infantry with Cavalry Division. 
 
 1st Mounted Infantry Brigade. 
 
 Major and Brevet Lieut.-Colonel E. A. H. Alderson, Royal West Kent 
 Regiment, Commanding 1st Mounted Infantry Brigade. 
 
 Roberts’s Horse. 
 
 Lieut.-Colonel II. L. Dawson, 9th Bengal Lancers. 
 
 Captain A. AV. Pack Beresford, Royal Artillery. 
 
 2479 Trooper L. Chadwick. 
 
 2500 Trooper C. H. Worrod. 
 
 Kew Zealand Mounted Infantry. 
 
 Major A. AV. Robin. 
 
 Rimington’s Guides. 
 
 Major M. F. Rimington, 6th (Inniskilling) Dragoons. 
 
 Lieutenant R. C. Master, King’s Royal Rifle Corps. 
 
 Lieutenant AV. F. Murray. 
 
 Corporal AV. Kirton. 
 
 Guide E. Christian 
 Guide H. E. Jackson. 
 
 2nd Mounted Infantry Brigade. 
 
 Major and Brevet Lieut.-Colonel P. AV. J. Le Gallais, 8th Hussars, 
 Commanding 2nd Mounted Infantry Brigade. 
 
 6th Regiment MouuC.a infantry. 
 
 Captain (local Lieut.-Colonel) H. de B. De Lisle, D.S.O., Durham 
 Light Infantry. 
 
Captain R. Fanshawe, Oxfordshire Light Infantry. 
 
 Captain W. Y. Pennefather, Welsh Regiment. 
 
 Lieutenant B. Anley, Essex Regiment. 
 
 3140 Sergeant F. McKay, Gordon Highlanders. 
 
 2885 Private W. Taylor, Gordon Highlanders. 
 
 8th Regiment Mounted Infantry 
 Major (local Lieut .-Colonel) W. C. Ross, Durham Light Infantry. 
 
 City of London Imperial Volunteers Mounted Infantry. 
 
 Lieut.-Colonel and Hon. Colonel H. C. Cholmondeley, London Rifle 
 Brigade. 
 
 Kitchener’s Horse. 
 
 Major (local Lieut.-Colonel) N. Legge, D.S.O., 20th Hussars. 
 Captain W. N. Congreve, V.C.. Rifle Brigade. 
 
 Captain H. J. M. MacAndrew, 5th Bengal Cavalry. 
 
 Captain and Adjutant C. H. M. Ritchie. 
 
 Lieutenant J. E. Jackson. 
 
 31G7 Squadron Quarter-Master Serjeant D. P. Bree. 
 
 3236 Trooper T. Maldrett. 
 
 3638 Trooper T. Huekle. 
 
 3248 Trooper A. Miller. 
 
 3644 Trooper A. Lewis. 
 
 Major Currie. 
 
 Nesbitt’s Horse. 
 
 New South Wales Mounted Infantry. 
 
 Captain J. M. Antill. 
 
 Corporal English. 
 
 3rd Mounted Infantry Brigade. 
 
 Major and Brevet Lieut.-Colonel C. G. Martyr, D.S.O., Duke of Corn¬ 
 wall’s Light Infantry, Commanding 3rd Mounted Infantry Brigade. 
 
 Queensland Mounted Infantry. 
 
 Captain D. E. Reid. 
 
 Captain R. S. Browne. 
 
 4th Mounted Infantry Brigade. 
 
 Colonel C. P. Ridley, Commanding 4th Brigade Mounted Infantry, 
 performed conspicuous service when the enemy attacked the convoy 
 under his charge on the 15th February, and on other occasions 
 subsequently. 
 
 5th Regiment Mounted Infantry. 
 
 Lieut.-Colonel E. G. I. Bainbridge, The Buffs (East Kent Regiment). 
 
 7th Regiment Mounted Infantry. 
 
 Captain W. D. Holland, the Worcestershire Regiment. 
 
 The Guards Brigade. 
 
 Colonel (local Major-General) R. Pole-Carew, C.B., has commanded the 
 Guards Brigade in a highly efficient manner. 
 
 Although the troops under his command have had no oppor¬ 
 tunity of engaging the enemy during the period under review the 
 have performed excellent service throughout, 
 
33 
 
 6th Infantry Division. 
 
 Major-General (local Lieutenant-General) T. Kelly-Kenny, C.B., Com¬ 
 manding Gth Division, conducted with conspicuous ability the 
 operations which resulted in the force under General Cronje being 
 surrounded by our troops at Paardeberg. He also performed 
 distinguished service in command of his Division in the actions ot 
 the 7th and 10th March at Poplar Grove and Driefontein. 
 
 Divisional Staff and Troops. 
 
 Major C. C. Monro, The Queen’s (Royal West Surrey) Regiment, Deputy 
 Assistant Adjutant-General. 
 
 Captain and Brevet-Major C. F. S. Vandeleur, D.S.O., Scots Guards. 
 Captain W. H. Booth, The Buffs, Aide-de-Camp. 
 
 Lieut.-Colonel W. L. Gubbins, M.B., Royal Army Medical Corps. 
 
 Major W. W. Pike, Royal Army Medical Corps. 
 
 Captain E. C. Anderson, Royal Army Medical Corps. 
 
 Lieutenant J. G. Berne, Royal Army Medical Corps. 
 
 Rev. J. Blackbourne, Chaplain. 
 
 Major R. A. G. Harrison, Royal Field Artillery. 
 
 Major W. H. Connolly, Royal Field Artillery. 
 
 Captain C. F. Stevens, Royal Field Artillery. 
 
 Captain J. A. Hobson, Royal Field Artillery. 
 
 Lieutenant A. H. N. Devenish, Royal Field Artillery. 
 
 R.A./3759 Corporal C. Bowles, 82nd Battery, Royal Field Artillery. 
 29492 Gunner C. H. Fox, 76th Battery, Royal Field Artillery. 
 
 13th Infantry Brigade. 
 
 Colonel (local Major-General) C. E. Knox, Commanding 13th Brigade, 
 performed distinguished services on several occasions, notably during 
 the rear-guard action of 16th February, and the action of 18th 
 February, on which occasion he was wounded. 
 
 2nd Bn. The Buffs (East Kent Regiment). 
 
 Lieut.-Colonel and Brevet-Colonel R. A. Hickson. 
 
 Captain R. McDouall. 
 
 Lieutenant L. H. Hickson, The Queen’s Own (Royal West Kent 
 Regiment), attached. 
 
 1600 Serjeant W. R. Stain forth 
 2682 Private G. White. 
 
 2nd Bn. The Gloucestershire Regiment. 
 
 Lieut.-Colonel R. F. Lindsell. 
 
 Captain C. Moss. 
 
 Lieutenant and Adjutant E. D. A. le Mottee. 
 
 1st Bn. The Duke of Wellington’s (West Riding Regiment). 
 
 Lieut.-Colonel C. E. Lloyd. D.S.O. 
 
 Major B. St. J. Le Marchant. 
 
 Captain O. Harris. 
 
 Lieutenant and Adjutant W. E. M. Tyndall. 
 
 2953 Lance-Corporal T. Hinchcliffe. 
 
 4742 Private C. Horsley. 
 
 1st Bn. Oxfordshire Light Infantry. 
 
 Lieut.-Colonel The Hon. A. E. Dalzell. 
 
 Captain E. A. E. Lethbridge. 
 
 Captain F. J. Henley. 
 
 ( 47 ) 
 
 E 
 
34 
 
 18th Infantry Brigade. 
 
 Colonel (Brigadier-General) T. E. Stephenson, Commanding 18th Brigade, 
 rendered valuable service in command of his brigade on the 18th 
 February at Paardeberg, and again at Abraham’s Kraal on 10th 
 March 1900. 
 
 1st Bn. The Princess of Wales’ Own (Yorkshire Regiment.) 
 
 Lieut.-Colonel H. Bowles. 
 
 Major J. E. Fearon. 
 
 Captain M. Ferrar. 
 
 3549 Serjeant B. Richardson. 
 
 5684 Lance-Corporal A. P. Hatton. 
 
 1st Bn. The Welsh Regiment. 
 
 Lieut.-Colonel R. J. F. Bamfield. 
 
 Major and Brevet Lieut-Colonel W. C. Gifford. 
 
 Captain C. B. Morland. 
 
 Lieutenant C. R. Berkeley. 
 
 2nd Lieutenant H. C. L. Lloyd. 
 
 5166 Serjeant F. Bristowe. 
 
 2917 Private J. Foulny. 
 
 2572 Private G. Argent. 
 
 5361 Private J. Williams. 
 
 1st Bn. The Essex Regiment. 
 
 Major H. IT. W. Y ason. 
 
 Brevet Lieut.-Colonel R. J. Tudway. 
 
 Captain W. K. Legge. 
 
 Captain 0. G. Godfrey-Faussett. 
 
 Lieutenant and Adjutant A. G. Pratt. 
 
 2119 Colour-Serjeant F. Howlett. 
 
 1931 Colour-Serjeant A. Brandon. 
 
 1470 Serjeant J. Francis. 
 
 3093 Serjeant H. W. Crabb. 
 
 3102 Serjeant P. Long. 
 
 2466 Lance-Serjeant H. B. Offen. 
 
 2682 Corporal F. Fenner. 
 
 3721 Private C. Shanks. 
 
 2586 Private S. Copplestone. 
 
 3262 Private W. Campbell. 
 
 7tii Infantry Division. 
 
 Major-General (local Lieut.-General) C. Tucker, C.B., Commanding 7th 
 Division, was in personal command of the force which returned to Water- 
 val drift on the 15th February. He subsequently rendered valuable 
 services at Paardeberg, and during the action at Poplar Grove on the 7th 
 March 1900. 
 
 Divisional Staff and Troops. 
 
 Lieut.-Colonel R. C. Maxwell, R.E. 
 
 14th Infantry Brigade. 
 
 Major-General Sir H. Chermside, K.C.M.G., Commanding the 14tli Infantry 
 Brigade, came specially to my notice by the good service he rendered in 
 assisting to prevent the escape of General Cronje’s force eastwards at 
 Paardeberg, and for the efficient condition of his brigade. 
 
 2nd Bn. The Yorfolk Regiment. 
 
 Captain J. Marriott. 
 
 3237 Corporal R. Chilvers. 
 
35 
 
 2nd Bn. The Lincolnshire Regiment. 
 Captain J. J. Howley. 
 
 1st Bn. The King’s Own Scottish Borderers. 
 
 Captain J. B. T. Pratt. 
 
 Lieutenant E. M. Young. 
 
 2255 Colour-Serjeant G. Armstrong. 
 
 1343 Serjeant J. P. Larkin. 
 
 3724 Private C. Peebles. 
 
 15th Infantry Brigade, 
 
 Major-General A. G. Wavell, Commanding the 15th Infantry Brigade, carried 
 out his duties most satisfactorily during the march to Bloemfontein, and 
 dislodged the enemy from Jacobsdal on the 15th February. 
 
 9th Infantry Division. 
 
 Major-General (local Lieut.-General) Sir H. E. Colvile, K.C.M.G., C.B., 
 Commanding 9th Division, contributed materially to the success of the 
 operations which took place between the IGth and 27th February, and 
 commanded his Division with distinction in the engagement at Poplar 
 Grove on the 7th March 1900. 
 
 Divisional Staff and Troops. 
 
 Major and Brevet Lieut.-Colonel J. S. Ewart, Queen’s Own Cameron 
 Highlanders, Assistant Adjutant-General. 
 
 Captain H. G. Ruggles-Brise, Grenadier Guards, Deputy Assistant 
 Adjutant-General. 
 
 Major A. E. W. Count Gleichen, C.M.G., Deputy-Assistant Adjutant- 
 General for Intelligence. 
 
 The Rev. J. Robertson, Chaplain to the Forces. 
 
 5647 Staff Serjeant-Major W. G. Nash, Army Service Corps. 
 
 Royal Engineers. 
 
 Lieut.-Colonel W. F. H. S. Kincaid. 
 
 Captain F. R. F. Boileau. 
 
 Lieutenant E. E. B. Wilson, 
 
 Lieutenant H. Musgrave. 
 
 The Highland (3rd Infantry) Brigade. 
 
 Colonel (local Major-General) IT. A. MacDonald, C.B., D.S.O., A.D.C., 
 Commanding the Highland (3rd) Brigade, whose services on the 7th 
 February, in the engagement at lvoedoesberg have already been brought 
 to notice, led his brigade with distinguished personal gallantry at 
 Paardeberg on the 18th February 1900, until wounded. 
 
 2nd Bn. The Black Watch (Royal Highlanders). 
 
 Lieut.-Colonel A. M. Carthew-Yorstoun. 
 
 Major N. W. Cuthbertson. 
 
 Lieutenant J. G. H. Hamilton. 
 
 Second Lieutenant C. 0. West. 
 
 1313 Pioneer Serjeant T. Howden. 
 
 6269 Piper Donald Cameron. 
 
 117 Private J. Hastie. 
 
 5657 Private J. R. MacGregor. 
 
 6745 Private W. Forrest. 
 
 E 2 
 
 (47) 
 
36 
 
 2nd Bn. Seafortli Highlanders (Ross-shire Buffs, The Duke of Albany’s). 
 
 Lieut.-Colonel .1. W. Hughes-Hallett. This Officer led the Highland 
 
 Brigade out of action on the 18th February, and commanded it 
 © • * 
 subsequently in an efficient manner. 
 
 Captain E. A. Cowans. 
 
 5627 Lance-Corporal C. McKenzie. 
 
 2466 Private E. Steele. 
 
 3054 Private H. Christian. 
 
 5384 Private J. Hunter. 
 
 4099 Private T. Birch. 
 
 3158 Private T. Rollie. 
 
 1st Bn. Princess Louise’s (Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders). 
 Lieut.-Colonel A. Wilson. 
 
 5714 Corporal Ferrier. 
 
 6442 Private A. Luke. 
 
 3852 Private C. McLaren. 
 
 6403 Private J. McDonald. 
 
 Royal Army Medical Corps. 
 
 1119 Corporal W. Glasgow. 
 
 Cape Medical Bearer Company. 
 
 Captain J. J. Brownlee. 
 
 Serjeant A. Bettington. 
 
 19th Infantry Brigade. 
 
 Lieut.-Colonel and Brevet-Colonel (local Major-General) H. L. Smitli- 
 Dorrien, D.S.O., Commanding 19th Brigade, rendered valuable and 
 distinguished service on each occasion on which his brigade was 
 engaged. 
 
 2nd Bn. Duke of Cornwall’s Light Infantry. 
 
 Major G. A. Ashby. 
 
 Captain F. M. J. D, Rhodes. 
 
 Captain G. B. M. Rawlinson. 
 
 Captain J. M. Mander. 
 
 1178 Colour-Serjeant D. Owen. 
 
 2135 Colour-Serjeant H. F. Smith, 
 
 1095 Serjeant F. J. Symons. 
 
 3058 Corporal H. Cooper. 
 
 3186 Corporal A. Bedford. 
 
 2840 Bugler C. Best. 
 
 2562 Private J. Thompson, 
 
 2757 Private B. Cole. 
 
 3630 Private Retallick. 
 
 5591 Private C. Haythorpe, 
 
 2nd Bn. King’s Shropshire Light Infantry. 
 Lieut.-Colonel J. Spens. 
 
 Captain C. P. Higginson. 
 
 2294 Colour-Serjeant S. Bertram. 
 
 3041 Colour-Serjeant Lea. 
 
 3266 Serjeant W. Henshaw. 
 
 2749 Private E. Bawden. 
 
 4246 Private R. Meredith. 
 
 1st Bn. Gordon Highlanders. 
 Lieut.-Colonel F. Macbean. 
 
 Captain W. E. Gordon. 
 
 Lieutenant D. R. Younger. 
 
37 
 
 3697 Serjeant A. Austin. 
 
 3131 Serjeant J. Saunders. 
 
 2979 Serjeant J. Wills. 
 
 3191 Lance-Corporal R. Edmonstone. 
 
 The Royal Canadian Regiment of Infantry. 
 
 Lieut.-Colonel W. D. Otter, Canadian Staff, Aide-de-Camp to His 
 Excellency the Governor-General of Canada. 
 
 Major L. Buchan. Lieut.-Colonel Royal Canadian Regiment of Infantry. 
 Major O. C. C. Pelletier, Lieut.-Colonel Royal Canadian Regiment of 
 
 Infantry. 
 
 Captain H. B. Stairs, Captain 66th Princess Louise’s Fusiliers. 
 
 Lieutenant and Adjutant A. H. Macdonnell, Captain, Royal Canadian 
 Regiment of Infantry. 
 
 6559 Serjeant Utton. 
 
 8110 Private J. Kennedy. 
 
 7017 Private H. Andrews. 
 
 7040 Private J. H. Dickson. 
 
 7043 Private C. W. Duncafe. 
 
 7376 Private F. C. Page. 
 
 Bearer Company, Royal Army Medical Corps. 
 
 Major R. H. S. Sawyer. 
 
 Captain P. J. Probyn. 
 
 4691 Serjeant-Major F. Crookes. 
 
 10999 Corporal A. C. Ralfe. 
 
 10734 Private F. A. Farrell. 
 
 1 confidently recommend those 1 have named to the favourable considera¬ 
 tion of Her Majesty’s Government. 
 
 The following Officers, who have been killed in action or have died from 
 the effects of wounds, rendered conspicuously valuable services. Had they 
 survived, 1 should have brought their names prominently to Your Lordship’s 
 notice. 
 
 Colonel O. C. Hannay, Commanding 1st Brigade Mounted Infantry. 
 Lieut.-Colonel W. Aldworth, D.S.O., Commanding 2nd Bn. Duke of 
 Cornwall’s Light Infantry. 
 
 Lieut.-Colonel C. E. Umphelby, Royal Australian Artillery. 
 
 Captain and Adjutant D. A. K. Lomax, 1st Bn. The Welsh Regiment. 
 Lieutenant F. Y". Parsons, 1st Bn. The Essex Regiment. 
 
 Lieutenant G. J. Grieve, Yew South Wales Forces, attached 2nd 
 Bn The Black Watch (Royal Highlanders). 
 
 2nd Lieutenant R. H. McClure, 2nd Bn. the Seaforth High- 
 
 landers (Ross-shire Buffs, Duke of 
 2nd Lieutenant D. B. Monypenny,J Albany’s). 
 
 Returns of Casualties and of Transport are attached. 
 
 I have the honour to be, 
 
 My Lord, 
 
 Your most obedient Servant, 
 
 ROBERTS, Field-Marshal. 
 
38 
 
 Casualties from 28th February to 13th March 1900, inclusive. 
 
 Return of mule and ox transport on march from Modder River to 
 
 Bloemfontein. 
 
 Distribution. 
 
 R.E. technical 
 wagons. 
 
 Buck wagons. 
 
 | S.A.A. and jj 
 
 Scotch carts, j 
 
 Water carts. | 
 
 G 'j 
 
 o 
 
 CD 
 
 eg 
 
 £ 
 
 o 
 
 Animals. 
 
 Mules. 
 
 Oxen. 
 
 Mule Transport:— 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 18 Transport Companies .. 
 
 
 8(J4 
 
 72 
 
 18 
 
 •• 
 
 9,360 
 
 • • 
 
 Regimental Transport.— 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Cavalry .. 
 
 
 .. 
 
 • . 
 
 9 
 
 • • 
 
 54 
 
 • • 
 
 Mounted Infantry 
 
 
 
 72 
 
 18 
 
 . . 
 
 612 
 
 • • 
 
 Royal Engineers .. 
 
 32 
 
 
 
 4 
 
 •. 
 
 296 
 
 • • 
 
 Infantry .. 
 
 
 
 104 
 
 52 
 
 
 1,040 
 
 • * 
 
 Ox Transport:— 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 . Naval Brigade 
 
 
 • • 
 
 .. 
 
 • • 
 
 19 
 
 # , 
 
 428 
 
 Royal Artillery .. 
 
 . . 
 
 • . 
 
 • J 
 
 • • 
 
 106 
 
 • « 
 
 1,760 
 
 Supply Park 
 
 
 
 
 
 475 
 
 •« 
 
 7,600 
 
 Total at commencement of movement 
 
 32 
 
 864 
 
 248 
 
 101 
 
 600 
 
 11,362 
 
 9,788 
 
 Casualties during march .. 
 
 
 46 
 
 
 3 
 
 V 
 
 186 
 
 796 
 
 3,500 
 
 Balance 
 
 32 
 
 818 
 
 248 
 
 98 
 
 414 
 
 10,566 
 
 6,288 
 
 Replacements during march.. 
 
 
 •• 
 
 •• 
 
 •• 
 
 184 
 
 •• 
 
 2,680 
 
 Totals on arriving at Bloemfontein .. 
 
 32 
 
 818 
 
 248 
 
 9S 
 
 598 
 
 10,566 
 
 8,968 
 
 No. 6. 
 
 From Field-Marshal Lord Roberts to the Secretary of State for War. 
 
 Head-quarters of the Army in South Africa, 
 
 My Lord, Kroonstad, 21st May 1900. 
 
 My despatch of 15th March 1900 ended with a description of the entry of 
 the Head-quarters of the Army in South Africa into Bloemfontein. 
 
 In the present letter I propose to give a brief account of events from that 
 time up to the 12th May, on which date the force under my immediate com¬ 
 mand occupied Kroonstad, which had been made the temporary head-quarters 
 of the Orange Free State Government. 
 
 2. Our rapid advance from the most western portion of the Orange Free 
 State and the seizure of their capital had greatly dispirited the Boers, and 
 the forces which fell back in front of our main army retired towards Kroonstad, 
 while those which were in the northern districts of Cape Colony, crossed the 
 
39 
 
 Orange River and retreated in a northerly direction along the Basutoland 
 border and the fertile district of Ladybrand. 
 
 3. As these forces cleared off, the southern portion of the State appeared 
 to be settling down. Many Burghers surrendered their arms and horses and 
 took an oath to abstain from further hostilities against the British Government. 
 Had I then been able to follow the enemy up and take advantage of this 
 condition of affairs, the task of bringing the Orange Free State to terms would 
 have been a comparatively easy one. 
 
 4. I found, however, it was impossible to do so. Cape Town, our main 
 depot for supplies, is 750 miles distant from Bloemfontein, with which it is 
 connected by a single line of railway, and communication with Cape Colony 
 had been interrupted by the destruction by the enemy of both the bridges 
 over the Orange River. 
 
 From the country itself we were able to get scarcely anything in the shape 
 of food except meat, and every mile we advanced took us further away from 
 the only place where a sufficiency of supplies was obtainable. Moreover, the 
 army needed rest after the unusual exertions it had been called upon to make, 
 and by which its mobility had been greatly impaired. 
 
 5. The enemy knew exactly how we were situated. They had accurate 
 information as to the condition of our supplies, our transport, and our 
 Artillery and Cavalry horses; they regained courage by our prolonged and 
 enforced halt at Bloemfontein, and their retrograde movement was arrested. 
 They showed considerable strategical skill by reoccupying Ladybrand, and by 
 concentrating a large force between Brandfort and Thabanchu. This gave 
 them free access to the south-eastern districts of the Orange Free State, and 
 prevented me from moving until they had been forced back north of the 
 Thabanchu—Ladybrand line. 
 
 6. I may here mention that, as soon as railway communication with Cape 
 Colony had been restored, the 3rd Division under the command of Lieut. - 
 General Sir W. Gatacre was directed to move up along the railway from 
 Bethulie, via Springfontein, towards Bloemfontein, while the column under 
 Major-General Clements, which had previously dislodged the enemy from 
 Colesberg and ^orval's Pont, marched through Fauresmith and Petrusburg, 
 joining my head-quarters on 2nd April. Meanwhile I had occupied Glen 
 Station and Knree Siding, and on the 29th March a force under Lieut.-General 
 Tucker as detailed in the margin*, attacked the enemy and drove them back 
 to Brandfort afterwards holding and entrenching a position which effectually 
 protected the siding and the railway bridge under reconstruction at Glen. 
 
 7. On the following day, in consequence of a report that a large hostile 
 force had collected near Thabanchu. I found it necessary to withdraw the 
 Cavalry outpost at that town towards Bloemfontein. During its retirement to 
 the Waterworks, 21 miles east of Bloemfontein, the Boers rapidly followed it 
 up, and, by means of a cunningly laid ambush near Sannah’s Post, to which I 
 shall refer in a separate despatch, succeeded in capturing seven 12-pr. guns, 
 with the entire personnel of a Horse Artillery battery and many other prisoners, 
 besides inflicting heavy loss on the troops engaged, and seizing a convoy 
 which accompanied them. Encouraged by this success, the Boer commanders 
 moved southward and came in contact with a weak detachment which had been 
 sent to Dewetsdorp by Lieut.-General Sir W. Gatacre, and was being withdrawn 
 by my orders. The enemy surrounded the detachment, and, before assistance 
 could arrive, it had surrendered to superior numbers, and the Officers and men 
 composing it had been removed, as prisoners of war, to Kroonstad. 
 
 8. The enemy then occupied Dewetsdorp, while a considerable force 
 attacked Wepener, where a column of Colonial troops, under Lieut.-Colonel 
 Dalgety had arrived a few days previously. 
 
 Retiring from the town to a defensible position 3 miles to the west, which 
 commanded an important bridge over the Caledon River, Lieut.-Colonel 
 Dalgety entrenched his force, and for 1G days he succeeded in keeping the 
 Boers in check, despite the fact that they far outnumbered the small body of 
 about 1,000 men under bis command, and had also a considerable superiority 
 in artillery, under pressure from the south and west caused them to withdraw 
 northward along the Basutoland border. 
 
 x 7th Division, 3rd Cavalry Brigade, Le Galluis’ Mounted Infantry. 
 
40 
 
 9. While these events were taking place, the state of my mounted troops 
 prevented me from attempting any operation which demanded rapidity of 
 movement. I was determined, moreover, to adhere, if possible, to my plan of 
 campaign, and not to he led into diverting from it, for operations of subsidiary 
 importance, the troops which I required to attain my main objective, namely, to 
 advance in adequate strength through the northern portion of the Orange Free 
 State on Johannesburg and Pretoria.. I had to content myself, therefore, with 
 carefully guarding the line of railway, and with collecting a force strong 
 enough to drive the enemy north of the Brandfort—Thabanchu line. For this 
 purpose I brought the 3rd Division up to its full strength by the addition of 
 some Militia battalions, and concentrated it, as w^ell as the newly arrived 
 8th division, at Edenburg. I had previously, on the 5th April, requested 
 General Sir Bed vers Buller to transfer the 10th Division, under Lieut.-General 
 Sir Archibald Hunter, together with the Imperial Light Horse, to Cape Colony, 
 additional troops being urgently required to effect the relief of Mafeking, the 
 state of affairs in Natal justifying some reduction in the force quartered there. 
 I utilized Major-General Hart’s Brigade of this division for the relief of 
 Wepener, in conjunction with the main body of the Colonial troops under 
 Brigadier-General Brabant, the remainder of Sir Archibald Hunter’s Division 
 proceeding to Kimberley. I increased and reorganized the Mounted Infantry, 
 supplementing it by several battalions of Imperial Yeomanry, and these troops, 
 together with the 4th Cavalry Brigade, which had recently arrived from 
 England, I collected in the neighbourhood of Bloemfontein. 
 
 10. My dispositions for protecting the railway and expelling the enemy 
 from the south-eastern districts of the Orange Free State had the desired 
 effect, and on the 24th April. Wepener was relieved and Dewetsdorp 
 occupied by a body of troops under the command of Lieut.-General French. 
 The enemy finding themselves thwarted in the south-east portion of the 
 Orange Free State, took up a position between Thabanchu and Ladybrand 
 from which they were gradually pushed back b}' the 8th Division under Lieut.- 
 General Sir Leslie Rundle, Brigadier-General Brabant’s Colonial Division, and 
 a force under the command of Major-General Ian Hamilton. " 
 
 11. On the 28th and 29th April our troops w'ere engaged with the enemy 
 in the neighbourhood of Thabanchu, and on the 1st May the enemy was 
 signally defeated at Houtnek with comparatively small loss on our side, thanks 
 to the admirable dispositions made by Major-General Ian Hamilton. It would 
 doubtless have been more satisfactory had the troops employed at Dewetsdorp 
 and Wepener been able to cut off the enemy’s retreat and capture their guns; 
 but, as I have already explained, they were limited in number, and during the 
 recent operations the Boers moved with hardly any baggage, each fighting man 
 carrying his blankets and food on a led horse. Being intimately acquainted with 
 the resources of the country, and where grain and cattle were abundant, the 
 enemy were not obliged to take their supplies with them, and could march at a 
 pace which our troops could not hope to equal. It followed, therefore, that they 
 were able to escape without suffering any other loss than that inflicted by our 
 troops when dislodging them from the various positions they occupied. 
 
 12. By the beginningof May I had all the strategical points in the south¬ 
 eastern districts securely held, and I was no longer anxious for the safety of the 
 railway. The condition of the Cavalry, Artillery, and Mounted Infantry had 
 materially improved, and a considerable number of remounts had arrived; 
 sufficient supplies had been collected at Bloemfontein, and the arrangements 
 for the transport had been completed. Under these circumstances I felt 
 justified in ordering a forward movement towards Kroonstad. I left Bloem¬ 
 fontein by train tor Karee Siding; to this point I had previously despatched 
 the 11th (Pole-Carew’s) Division. The 1st (Hutton’s) Brigade of Mounted 
 Infantry had moved to Brakpan, 10 miles to the west, while Lieut.-General 
 fucker with the 15th (Waved’s) Brigade of the 7th Division was 2 miles to 
 the east of the siding; the 14th (Maxwell’s) Brigade was at Vlakfontein, 
 5 miles further east. On the morning of this day, Major-General Ian 
 Hamilton’s force was at Isabellafontein. 
 
 This consisted of the 2nd Cavalry Brigade under Brigadier-General Broadwood, the 2nd 
 Brigade of Mounted Infantry under Brigadier-General Ridley, Brigadier-General Smith-Dorrien’s 
 Brigade of the 9th Division, and a newly-formed brigade (21st) composed of 1st Bn. Sussex, 
 1st Bn. Derbyshires, the 1st Bn. Cameron Highlanders and the City Imperial Volunteer Bn. uuder 
 the command of Major-Genera! Bru,ce Hamilton. 
 
41 
 
 13. Brandfort was occupied tlie same afternoon, the Boer forces under 
 General Delarey making but a feeble resistance, as soon as their right flank 
 had been turned by Hutton’s Mounted Infantry. 
 
 14. The following day the 7th and 11th Divisions with the 1st Brigade of 
 Mounted Infantry remained in the vicinity of Brandfort, while Major-General 
 Ian Hamilton engaged and drove back the enemy’s rear guard at W elkom 
 about 15 miles south of Winburg. On this occasion the junction of the two 
 Boer Forces was frustrated by a well-executed movement of the Household 
 Cavalry, the 12th Lancers, and Kitchener’s Horse, under the command ot 
 Lieut.-Colonel the Earl of Airlie. The enemy fled after the encounter, 
 leaving their dead and wounded on the field. 
 
 15. On the 5th May the force which I was accompanying marched to 
 within 3 miles of the Vet River, the north bank of which was held by the 
 enemy in considerable force. For three hours the action was chiefly confined 
 to artillery on both sides, our Field and Kaval guns making excellent practice, 
 but just before dark the Mounted Infantry executed a turning movement, 
 crossing the river 6 miles west of the railway bridge, which, like other 
 bridges over the rivers along our line of advance, had been previously 
 destroyed by the enemy. In this affair the Canadian, Hew South Wales, Kew 
 Zealand Mounted Infantry, and the Queensland Mounted Rifles, vied with 
 each other in their efforts to close with the enemy. We captured one Maxim 
 gun and 26 prisoners, our losses being slight. 
 
 16. On this day Major-General Ian Hamilton captured Winburg after an 
 engagement at Bobiansberg in which the 2nd Bn. Black Watch under Lieut.- 
 Colonel Carthew-Yorstoun greatly distinguished themselves. 
 
 17. During the night the enemy retired northwards to the Zand River, 
 and on the 6th May the main force crossed the Vet River unopposed and 
 occupied Smaldeel Junction. The drifts in the river bed were so bad that 
 considerable delay occurred in getting the baggage and. supply convoy across 
 the Vet, and I was consequently obliged to halt at Smaldeel for two days. 
 The Mounted Infantry, however, pushed on to Welgelegen, and Major-General 
 Ian Hamilton’s force moved some 10 miles north of Winburg, its place there 
 having been taken by the Highland Brigade. 
 
 18. I was joined on the 8th May by Lieut.-General French with the 1st 
 (Porter’s), 3rd (Gordon’s) and the 4tii (Dickson’s) Brigades of Cavalry, and 
 the following day the whole force marched to Welgelegen, the 1st and 4th 
 Cavalry Brigades and the Mounted Infantry moving on to the south bank of 
 the Zand opposite Dupreez Laager. That evening a squadron of the Scots 
 Greys succeeded in crossing the river near Verneulen’s Kraal and holding the 
 drift at that point. The 7tli Division bivouacked near Merriesfontein, and 
 Major-General Ian Hamilton marched to Bloemplaats, and pushed on the 
 1st Bn. Derbyshire Regiment to Junction Drift. 
 
 19. On the morning of the 10th May the enemy could be seen holding 
 the north bank of the Zand in considerable strength. At daybreak Lieut.- 
 General French with two Cavalry brigades crossed the river and made a wide 
 turning movement past the diamond mine at Dirksburg, supported by the 
 1st Mounted Infantry Brigade under Major-General Hutton. 1 directed Ross’ 
 and Henry’s Mounted Infantry battalions to seize the drift near the railway 
 bridge. This they succeeded in doing by 7 a.m. and were followed across the 
 river by the 3rd Cavalry Brigade and the 11th Division. The 7th Division 
 crossed by Junction Drift. Major-General Ian Hamilton pushed forward the 
 Cavalry Brigade across the same drift followed by the 21st Brigade under 
 Major-General Bruce Hamilton, and the 19th Brigade under Major-General 
 Smith-Dorrien. The enemy on bis flank, as well as in front of Lieut.-General 
 French, offered a stubborn resistance, but by 11.30 a.m. they were driven from 
 the positions they had taken up, and withdrew towards Kroonstad, blowing up 
 the railway bridges and culverts as they fell back. 
 
 20. My head-quarters with the 11th Division pressed on that day to Riet 
 Spruit, S miles north of the river. The 7th Division bivouacked at Deelfontein 
 Noord, and Major-General Ian Hamilton’s column halted about 4 miles east of 
 that place. During the afternoon Lieut.-General French with the 1st and 4th 
 Cavalry Brigades, and Hutton's Brigade of Mounted Infantry reached a point 
 4 miles west of Ventersburg Road Station. 
 
 (V) 
 
42 
 
 21. On the 11th May I marched with the 11th Division some 20 miles to 
 Geneva Siding, 14 miles from Kroonstad, and 8 miles from Boscbrand, where 
 the Boers were holding an entrenched position to cover the town. Gordon’s 
 Cavalry Brigade advanced to within touch of the enemy, supported, on the 
 left, by Hutton’s Mounted Infantry. Lieut-General French, with the 1st and 
 4th Cavalry Brigades, marched to the Yalsch River Drift, 10 miles northwards 
 of Kroonstad, with instructions to cut the railway line. The 7th Division 
 halted a short distance south-east of Geneva Siding, with Major-General Ian 
 Hamilton’s column a little further to the east. 
 
 22. During the night the enemy evacuated their entrenchments at 
 Boschrand and retreated northwards, and on the 12th May I entered 
 Kroonstad, with the 11th Division, without encountering any opposition. 
 
 President Steyn had left the town on the evening of the lltli May, after 
 having previously proclaimed Bindley to he the seat of the Orange Free State 
 Government. Commandant - General Botha and Commandant De Wet 
 accompanied the Transvaalers in their retreat northwards. 
 
 23. Turning now to the operations in other directions, I may remark that 
 during the period dealt with in this letter nothing calling for special notice 
 occurred in Natal. The Boers continue to entrench themselves on the 
 Biggarsberg, and held the Drakensberg Passes, but the}^ attempted no 
 offensive action. Sir Redvers Buller remained at Ladysmith, and beyond 
 keeping the enemy under observation did not risk any serious engagement. 
 In this he was acting in accordance with my wishes, for, as he did not feel 
 himself strong enough to force the Drakensberg Passes, he could not afford 
 me any material assistance until I was in possession of Kroonstad and 
 prepared to advance on the Transvaal. 
 
 24. In the vicinity of Kimberley the course of events has been as 
 follows ;—On the 16th March, Lord Methuen reconnoitred as far as Fourteen 
 Streams, returning the same evening to Warrenton. He subsequently visited 
 Barkly West, and repaired the railway line between Kimberley and Warrenton. 
 On the 3rd April he proceeded to Boshof with the force marginally named.* 
 On the 5th April, with the Imperial Yeomanry, Kimberley Mounted Corps, 
 and 4th Field Battery, he surrounded a small Boer commando near Boshof. 
 Colonel de Villebois Mareuil and seven of the enemy were killed, eight were 
 wounded, and the remainder, numbering 54 Boers, Frenchmen, and Germans, 
 were taken prisoners. 
 
 25. On this day, a message, dated 17th March, was received from Colonel 
 Baden-Powell to the effect that the enemy were still besieging Mafeking, 
 though in somewhat reduced numbers. A reinforcement under Colonel 
 Plumer was approaching from the north, but it seemed doubtful whether it 
 could break through the Boer lines. I had previously enquired from him how 
 he stood as regards supplies, and he informed me in reply that they would, in 
 all probability, only last until the 18th May. 
 
 26. On the 17th April, I gave orders for the formation of a flying column 
 of mounted troops about 1,100 strong, with mule transport, for the relief of 
 Mafeking. I placed Colonel B. T. Mahon, 8tli Hussars, in command of this 
 force, which consisted of 000 mounted men, including the Imperial Light 
 Horse, four Horse Artillery guns with 100 men, 100 picked Infantry soldiers to 
 guard the wagons, 52 wagons with 10 mules each, and nearly 1,200 horses. 
 The column was to take with it rations for 16 days and forage for 12 days. 
 Medicines and medical comforts for the Mafeking garrison were also to be 
 taken. Food and other stores for Colonel Baden-Powell’s force were to be 
 sent on by railway as soon as the line could be repaired. The flying column 
 was ordered to start not later than the 4th May. 
 
 27. On the 24th April I instructed Lieut.-General Hunter to have every¬ 
 thing in readiness for an immediate advance, and to co-operate with Lord 
 Methuen in distracting the enemy’s attention until the flying column had 
 crosse 1 tne A aal and had obtained a good start. On the 29th April, Lieut.- 
 General Hunter reported that he hoped to force the passage of the Yaal on 
 the 2nd May, and to send on the flying column on the 4th May. It started 
 on the day specified, and while penning these words the gratifying news 
 
 * Three Field batteries, a section of a Howitzer battery, seven companies of Imperial 
 Yeomanry, Kimberley Mounted Corps, GOO strong, the Oth Infantry Brigade, and two battalions 
 of the 20th Brigade, 
 
43 
 
 reaches me that Mafeking was relieved on the 18th May after an heroic defence 
 of over 200 days. 
 
 28. On the 5th May, Major-General Barton’s Brigade engaged the enemy 
 2,000 strong, 2 miles north of Rooidam, and inflicted considerable loss on the 
 Boers, who retired northward. On the 7th May, Lieut.-General Hunter 
 occupied Fourteen Streams without opposition, the enemy retreating in great 
 disorder, and abandoning their ammunition, clothing, and personal effects. 
 This result was in a great measure due to th© able dispositions of Major- 
 General Paget, who brought a powerful artillery fire to bear on the Boer 
 position. 
 
 29. The repair of the railway bridge at Fourteen Streams was at once 
 taken in hand, and a strong entrenched post to be held by one battalion was 
 constructed. The force under Sir A. Hunter occupied Christiana, and is now 
 moving along the railway line towards Mafeking, while that under Lord 
 Methuen is marching from Hoopstad to join me. 
 
 30. It only remains to say that, since our entry into Bloemfontein on the 
 13th March, the pacification of the Prieska district has been completed. The 
 arrangements for this were initiated by Major-General Lord Kitchener with 
 his characteristic energy, and carried out by Brigadier-General Settle, 
 Colonel Sir C. Parsons, and Lieut.-Colonel Adye. 
 
 31. Tranquillity has been restored in the northern districts of Cape 
 Colony, where a large number of rebels had joined the Boers. 
 
 32. Progress has also been made in organizing a provisional administra¬ 
 tion in that portion of the Orange Free State which is occupied by the British 
 troops, District Commissioners, under the control of the Military Governor of 
 Bloemfontein, having been appointed, and a police force being in course of 
 formation. 
 
 33. I enclose a list of casualties. 
 
 I have the honour to be, 
 
 My Lord, 
 
 Your most obedient Servant, 
 
 ROBERTS, Field-Marshal. 
 
 List of Casualties which occurred in the Force serving in the Orange Free 
 State, South Africa, between the 13th March and the 20th May 1900. 
 
 Operations near the Glen and Ivaree Siding 
 At Sannall’s Post.. 
 
 Reddersburg 
 Siege of Wepener 
 To east of the line of railway 
 To west of the line of railway 
 Advance on Kroonstad .. 
 
 Total 
 
 Killed. 
 
 Wounded. 
 
 Missing. 
 
 Prisoners. 
 
 Officers. 
 
 Other ranks. 
 
 Officers. 
 
 CO 
 
 >> 
 
 s 
 
 © 
 
 V* 
 
 o 
 
 E 
 
 O 
 
 Other ranks. 
 
 Officers. 
 
 
 2 
 
 19 
 
 14 
 
 1C5 
 
 
 1J 
 
 • • 
 
 5 
 
 b 
 
 12 
 
 15 
 
 108 
 
 17 
 
 413 
 
 
 # . 
 
 2 
 
 8 
 
 2 
 
 33 
 
 . # 
 
 , , 
 
 s 
 
 538 
 
 o 
 
 25 
 
 ii 
 
 130 
 
 
 
 
 
 4 
 
 29 
 
 32 
 
 224 
 
 3 
 
 69 
 
 1 
 
 6 
 
 b 
 
 9 
 
 4 
 
 67 
 
 , # 
 
 6 
 
 , . 
 
 11 
 
 3 
 
 29 
 
 13 
 
 149 
 
 2 
 
 35 
 
 3 
 
 8 
 
 20 
 
 131 
 
 91 
 
 876 
 
 22 
 
 534 
 
 12 
 
 568 
 
 F 2 
 
 ( 47 ) 
 
u 
 
 No. 7. 
 
 From Field-Marshal Lord Roberts to the Secretary of State for War. 
 
 Army Head-quarters, South Africa, 
 Pretoria, 
 
 My Lord, 14th August 1900. 
 
 In my last despatch dated the 21st May 1900 I brought my narrative 
 of the Avar in South Africa up to the occupation of Kroonstad on the 12th May. 
 I shall now endeavour to describe the course of events after that date which 
 led to the seizure of Pretoria and to give an account of the several military 
 operations which have been carried out in South Africa up to the 13th June. 
 
 2. Before going into details, a brief reference may he made to the general 
 attitude of the enemy during the period under review. A portion of the Boer 
 commandoes, especially those raised in the Orange Elver Colony, on being 
 driven hack by our advance, during which we occupied Thabanchu and Lady- 
 brand, collected in the north-eastern part of the Colony, whence it seemed 
 probable that they would endeavour to cut our line of communication by rail, as 
 soon as the main force under my immediate command had crossed the Yaal River. 
 These commandos blocked the passes of the Drakensberg range and were 
 likely to oppose any attempt on the part of the Natal force to co-operate with 
 me through Laing’s Nek. A considerable number of the enemy were also 
 disposed along the line of railway for the purpose of holding the several 
 defensive positions and river crossings between Kroonstad and Pretoria. The 
 southern and western districts of the Orange River Colony were settling down 
 and I had good reason to hope that no important concentration of the enemy 
 v*as to be anticipated in the western portion of the Transvaal, as the possession 
 of the railway junctions at Johannesburg and Pretoria and the restoration of 
 the line from Kimberley to Mafeking, would render any such concentration 
 unlikely, if not impossible. 
 
 3. My object then was to push forward with the utmost rapidity, while 
 providing as far as my resources would admit for the safety of the main line 
 of communication by occupying strategical points to the east of the railway at 
 AVinburg, Senekal, Lindley, and Heilbron. I calculated that, as soon as 
 Mafeking had been relieved, a large proportion of the troops under the 
 command of Lord Methuen and Sir Archibald Hunter would be available 
 to co-operate on my left flank and I hoped Sir Redvers Buller would be 
 able to assist by an advance westward to Vrede, or north-westward in the 
 Standerton direction. But whether these anticipations could he realized or 
 not, I felt that the enormous advantage to be gained, by striking at the enemy's 
 capital before he had time to recover from the defeats he had already 
 sustained, w r ould more than counterbalance the risk of having our line 
 of communication interfered with—a risk which had to be taken into 
 consideration. 
 
 4. 1 had to halt at Kroonstad from the 12th to the 22nd May for the 
 repair of the railway upon which I was dependent for my supplies. 
 
 6. On the 14tli May I directed Lieut.-General Ian Hamilton’s column to 
 march from Kroonstad to Lindley and on the 17th that town surrendered to 
 Brigadier-General Broadwood. 
 
 6. Lord Methuen, whom I had ordered to move on the 14th May from 
 Boshof to Hoopstad and there await further instructions, reached Hoopstad on 
 the 17th May. 1 had thought of his force taking part in the Transvaal opera¬ 
 tions, but with regard to the probability of disturbances on the line of railway 
 I determined to place it in the neighbourhood of Kroonstad, to which place it 
 was accordingly directed to proceed. 
 
 7. On the 20th May Lieut.-General French with the 1st and 4th Cavalry 
 Brigades marched from Jordan Siding, north of Kroonstad, to the north-east of 
 Rhenoster Kop, while Major-General Hutton with the 1st Brigade of Mounted 
 Infantry (exclusive of the 4th and 8th Corps, which under Colonel Henry were 
 attached to Army Head-quarters) advanced to the south of the same place 
 and Lieut.-General Ian Hamilton’s column started from Lindley on the road to 
 Heilbron. 
 
 8. On the 22nd of May my Head-quarters with the 7th and 11th Divisions 
 left Kroonstad and advanced to Honing Spruit Siding, while General Ian 
 Hamilton s column reached and occupied Heilbron. The enemy disputed his 
 
passage of the Rhenoster and our loss might have been heavy had not Major- 
 General Smith-Dorrien, Commanding one of Hamilton’s brigades (the 19th), 
 been moved on the previous day to a position from which he was able to deliver 
 at the right moment an unexpected attack upon the Boer flank. 
 
 9. On the 23rd May I marched past Roodeval Station to the Rhenoster 
 River with the Ttli and 11th Divisions, Colonel Henry with the two corps of 
 Mounted Infantry being in advance on the east of the railway. No opposition 
 was met with, although the hills north of the river furnished a strong defensive 
 position and all preparations had been made by the enemy to give us a warm 
 reception. It must be concluded that they felt their line of retreat was 
 threatened from the east by General Hamilton’s column at Heilbron and from 
 the west by the Cavalry and Mounted Infantry under Generals French and 
 Hutton, which had effected a crossing lower down the stream. 
 
 10. On the 24th May I marched with the 11th Division to Vredefort 
 Road Station. The 7th Division bivouacked near Prospect on the west of the 
 railway, 4 miles in rear, and the 3rd Cavalry Brigade 4 miles east of the station. 
 The troops under Generals French and Hutton moved to the north-west, the 
 1st and 4th Cavalry Brigades crossing the Yaal at Parys and Versailles. 
 General Ian Hamilton’s column halted at Eerstegehik, 7 miles north of Vrede¬ 
 fort Road Station and to the east of the railway. 
 
 11. In view of the probability of opposition at the crossing of the Vaal 
 River and of the advantages which a turning movement to the west appeared 
 to afford, I directed Lieut.-General Ian Hamilton to move his column across 
 the railway on the morning of the 25th May and to march in the afternoon to 
 Wonderheuval and thence to the Vaal at Wonderwater Drift, By this move 
 the enemy were completely deceived. They had expected Hamilton’s column 
 to cross the Vaal at Engelbrecht’s Drift, east of the railway, and collected 
 there in some force to oppose him. My Head-quarters with the 11th Division 
 advanced this day to Grootvlei and the 7th Division to Wittlepoort. The 4th 
 and 8th Corps of Mounted Infantry proceeded to Steepan on the railway, 
 10 miles north of Grootvlei, and 3rd Cavalry Brigade to Welterseden to guard 
 our right flank. Generals French and Hutton moved up the Vaal to a drift 
 near Lindaque. 
 
 12. On the 26th May I marched with the 7th and lltli Divisions to 
 Taaiboscli Spruit, while Colonel Henry’s Mounted Infantry reached the Yaal 
 at Viljoen’s Drift and, after occupying the coal mines and railway station on 
 the south bank, crossed the river and held the drift and bridge, one span of 
 the latter having been blown up by the Boers. The 3rd Cavalry Brigade 
 continued to guard my right and General Ian Hamilton’s Column my left at 
 Wonderwater Drift, which was crossed this day by Brigadier-General 
 Broadwood’s Cavalry Brigade. Generals French and Hutton advanced across 
 the Riet Spruit encountering but slight opposition and the Highland Brigade, 
 with the head-quarters of the 9th Division, was ordered from Bindley to 
 Heilbron. 
 
 13. On the 27th May I crossed the Yaal with the 7th and lltli Divisions 
 and 3rd Cavalry Brigade and bivouacked at Vereeniging. Generals French 
 and Hutton moved to Rietfontein and General Ian Hamilton to Rietkuil. 
 
 14. On the 28th May my Head-quarters, with the 11th Division, proceeded 
 to Klip River Station; the 7th Division to Witkop, south of the station ; the 
 3rd Cavalry Brigade to the east and Colonel Henry’s Corps of Mounted 
 Infantry to the north. The troops under Generals French and Hutton, 
 strengthened by the 2nd Cavalry Brigade, advanced to the north-west of 
 Johannesburg and those under Ian Hamilton to Syperfontein 15 miles to the 
 south-west of that town. 
 
 15. On the 29th May I continued my march to Johannesburg, arriving 
 opposite the Germiston Railway Junction at 3.30 p.m. The lltli Division, 
 with the 7th Division on its left, moved along the railway and occupied 
 Germiston after some slight resistance. Colonel Henry, whose Mounted 
 Infantry preceded the main body, met with opposition at Natal Spruit 
 Junction early in the day and later on at Boksburg. Forcing the enemy 
 back, he moved round by his left to the north of Germiston, supported on the right 
 by Gordon’s Cavalry Brigade. General Ian Hamilton, who was advancing to a 
 point about 12 miles west of Johannesburg, found his way blocked at 2 p.m. 
 by a considerable force of the enemy at Doornkop. They had with them two 
 
46 
 
 heavy guns and several field guns and pompoms and were holding a strong 
 position on a long ridge running cast and west. Hamilton decided to engage 
 with the enemy at once. The right attack was led by the 1st Bn. Gordon 
 Highlanders who captured the eastern end of the ridge and, wheeling round, 
 worked along it until after dark. The City Imperial Volunteers led on the left 
 flank and behaved with great gallantry: but the chief share of the action and 
 casualties fell to the Gordon Highlanders, who lost 1 Officer killed and had 
 9 Officers wounded. The enemy, who had fought obstinately, retired during 
 the night. Our casualties in this engagement were 2 Officers and 24 men 
 killed and 9 Officers and 106 men wounded. General French also was 
 opposed throughout his march on the 2$th and 29th May, but he had 
 succeeded by dark on the latter day in working round the very extended right 
 flank of the enemy, thereby facilitating the progress of Ian Hamilton’s column. 
 French’s losses were slight, 2 Officers being wounded and 2 men killed and 
 17 wounded. 
 
 16. The next morning I halted to the south of Germiston, the force 
 being distributed as follows :— 
 
 The 11th Division, with the heavy guns, near my Head-quarters. 
 
 The 7th Division, 3rd Cavalry Brigade, and Colonel Henry’s Mounted 
 Infantry on the heights to the north of Johannesburg. 
 
 Lieut.-General Ian Hamilton’s Column at Florida, 3 miles west of the 
 town. 
 
 The troops under Generals French and Hutton a few miles north-east of 
 Florida. 
 
 On this day I had an interview with Dr. Krause, who had been left in 
 temporary charge of Johannesburg and who agreed to surrender the town to 
 me the next morning. In the course of the day the Queensland Mounted 
 Rifles captured a Creusot field gun, a gun wagon, 11 wagons loaded with 
 military stores and ammunition and 23 prisoners. 
 
 17. Meanwhile, on the 29th May, I had received information that the 
 Highland Brigade was being hard pressed by the enemy at Roodepoort, 
 IS miles south of Heilbron. The Irish Battalion of Imperial Yeomanry had 
 been ordered to proceed from AYntersburg Road Station to join this brigade 
 at Bindley. It had, however, failed to reach that place before the Highlanders 
 left for Heilbron and Lieut.-General Sir H. Colvile, in command of the troops, 
 had started without it. This was very unfortunate, as Colvile was much in 
 need of mounted troops. On this new ? s reaching me, I directed Lord Methuen 
 to despatch Douglas's Brigade from Kroonstad to Colvile's assistance. This 
 order had scarcely been issued when I heard from Lieut.-General Rundle, at 
 Senekal. that the Irish Yeomanry, which had arrived at Bindley only a few 
 hours after the departure of the Highland Brigade, had found that place in 
 the hands of the enemy. Lieut.-Colonel Spragge, who commanded the 
 Yeomanry, accordingly halted 3 miles west of the town and sent messengers 
 to Colvile and Rundle apprising them of his dangerous position, which was 
 aggravated by his having only 1 day’s provisions in hand. Spragge was at 
 first opposed by only a small force, but, on his defenceless position becoming 
 known to the Boers, their numbers rapidly increased. General Rundle could 
 not go to Spragge’s relief as he had been called upon to support Brigadier- 
 General Brabant in the direction of Hammonia, nor could he leave Senekal 
 until the arrival of Major-General Clements, who, with a portion of his 
 brigade, w r as proceeding to that place from AYinburg. Under the impression, 
 however, that he might indirectly relieve the hostile pressure on Lieut.-Colonel 
 Spragge s detachment. General Rundle, with a force of six companies of 
 Yeomanry, two Field Batteries, Major-General Campbell’s Brigade, and the 
 2nd Bn. Royal West Kent Regiment, moved out 4 miles on the Bethlehem 
 Road and encountered the enemy, who -were in considerable strength at 
 Kuring Kraus. After an engagement, which had no decisive result, General 
 Rundle fell back on Senekal, his casualties amounting to 30 killed and 150 
 wounded. 
 
 18. General Colvile, with the Head-quarters of the 9th Division and the 
 Highland Brigade, reached Heilbron on the 29th May. During the latter part 
 ot the march the brigade was but slightly troubled by the enemy, the greater 
 part ot whom had turned their attention to the Imperial Yeomanry. 
 
47 
 
 On this day Lord Methuen left Kroonstad in obedience to my instructions 
 to assist the Highland Brigade. On the third inarch out he received a message 
 from Lieut.-Colonel Spragge, dated the 29th May, reporting that he was 
 heavily pressed by the enemy and was short of food and ammunition, hut 
 hoped that he would be able to hoitl out until the 2nd June. This message 
 Lord Methuen repeated to me by telegraph and I at once ordered him to push 
 on to Lieut.-Colonel Spragge’s assistance, and on the 1st June, half an hour 
 after the receipt of my reply, he started off with his mounted troops, Imperial 
 Yeomanry, a Field battery, one section of pompoms and reached Lindley 
 at 10 o’clock the following morning, having covered 44 miles in 25 hours. 
 Unfortunately he was too late, as Lieut.-Colonel Spragge had found it necessary 
 to surrender 2 days before. Methuen, on nearing Lindley, attacked the Boer 
 force, which had increased from 300 to 3,000 strong, and, after a running fight 
 which lasted 5 hours, completely defeated them and occupied the town. I then 
 directed him to leave one of his Infantry brigades (Paget's) and to march 
 with the other (Douglas’s) to Heilbron with supplies for Sir H. Colvile’s 
 force. 
 
 19. To return to the operations at Johannesburg. I received the formal 
 surrender of the town early on the 31st May and entered it at noon with the 
 7(h and 11th Divisions, the Union Jack being hoisted with the usual salute in 
 the main square. After the ceremony, I established my Head-quarters at 
 Orange Grove, 3 miles north of Johannesburg on the Pretoria road, the 
 11 tli Division bivouacking 4 miles further north and the 14th Brigade of the 
 7th Division a short distance to the west. The loth (Wavell’s) Brigade was 
 detailed to garrison the town and Lieut.-Colonel C. J. Mackenzie, Seaforth 
 Highlanders, was appointed Military Governor. 
 
 20. On the 1st and 2nd June my Head-quarters remained at Orange 
 Grove, while Lieut.-General Ian Hamilton’s column moved from Florida to 
 Bramfontein, 4 miles west of Orange Grove, and the 1st, 3rd, and 4th Cavalry 
 Brigades, with Hutton’s Mounted Infantry, were distributed 10 miles to the 
 north of the same place. 
 
 21. During these two days, disquieting news continued to reach me 
 regarding the activity and numbers of the enemy who had opposed 
 us in the Orange River Colony and who were now closing in behind us, 
 threatening the single line of railway leading to Cape Colony, upon which I 
 was dependent for provisioning the army. This information was the more 
 disconcerting, as, owing to our rapid advance and the extensive damage done 
 to the railway, we had practically been living from hand to mouth and, at 
 times, had not even one day’s rations to the good. It was, therefore, suggested 
 to me that it might be prudent to halt at Johannesburg until the Orange 
 River Colony should be thoroughly subdued and the railway from Xatal 
 opened. But, while fully recognizing the danger attending a further advance, 
 I considered the advantages of following up without delay the successes we 
 had achieved and not giving the enemy time to recover from their several 
 defeats, or to remove the British prisoners from Pretoria quite justified the 
 risk being run. Accordingly I advanced on the 3rd June with Pole-Carew’s 
 division and the Head-quarters and Maxwell’s Brigade of the 7th Division to 
 Leeuwkop, a distance of 12 miles, Colonel Henry, with his corps of Mounted 
 Infantry moving to a point 4 miles to the north, Brigadier-General Gordon, 
 with the 3rd Cavalry Brigade, G miles to the east, Lieut.-General Ian 
 Hamilton with his column to Diepsloot, 15 miles south of Pretoria, and the 
 troops under Generals French and Hutton to Rooikrans, 13 miles south-west 
 of Pretoria. 
 
 22. On the 4th June I marched with Henry’s Mounted Infantry, four 
 Companies Imperial Yeomanry, Pole-Carew’s Division, Maxwell’s Brigade and 
 the naval and siege guns to Six Mile Spruit, both banks of which were occupied 
 by the enemy. 'The Boers were quickly dislodged from the south bank by the 
 Mounted Infantry and Imperial Yeomanry and pursued for nearly a mile, when 
 our troops came under Artillery fire. The heavy guns were at once pushed to 
 the front, supported by Stephenson’s Brigade of the 11th Division, and the 
 enemy’s fire was soon silenced. They then moved to the south along a series 
 of ridges parallel to our main line of advance with the object of turning our 
 left flank, but in this they were checked by the Mounted Infantry and Imperial 
 
48 
 
 Yeomanry, supported by Maxwell’s Brigade. As, however, the Boers con¬ 
 tinued to press on our left flank and thus threatened our rear, I ordered 
 Ian Hamilton, who was moving- 3 miles to our left, to incline to his right and 
 close the gap between the two columns. As soon as Ian Hamilton’s troops 
 came up and De Lisle’s Mounted Infantry pushed well round the enemy’s 
 right flank, they fell back on Pretoria, It was now dusk and the troops had to 
 bivouac in the positions which they were occupying, the Guards Brigade near 
 the most southern of the forts defending Pretoria and within 4 miles of the 
 town, Stephenson’s next to the Guards on the west, and Ian Hamilton’s 
 column still further to the west, French with the 1st and 4th Cavalry Brigades 
 and Hutton’s Mounted Infantry towards the north of the town, Broadwood’s 
 Cavalry between French and Ian Hamilton, and Gordon’s Cavalry to the east 
 near the Irene railway station. 
 
 23. Shortly before dusk Lieut.-Colonel De Lisle, whose Mounted Infantry 
 had followed up the enemy to within 2,000 yards of Pretoria, sent an Officer 
 under a flag of truce to demand in my name the surrender of the town. To 
 this no reply was given, hut about 10 p.m. Mr. Sandberg, Military Secretary 
 to Commandant-General Botha, with a General of the Boer Army, brought in a 
 letter from the Commandant-General proposing an armistice for the purpose 
 of arranging the terms under which Pretoria would he handed over to the 
 British force. I replied that the surrender must he unconditional and 
 requested an answer before 5 o’clock the following morning, as my troops had 
 been ordered to advance at daybreak. At the time named on the 5th June 
 I received the reply from Commandant-General Botha to the effect that he 
 was not prepared further to defend the place and that he entrusted the women, 
 children and property to my protection. I, therefore, ordered Pole-Carew’s 
 Division with Henry’s Mounted Infantry to move to within a mile of the 
 town and at 9 a.m. I proceeded myself to the railway station. At 2 p.m. I 
 made a ceremonious entry, the British flag being hoisted on the Raadzaal, and 
 Pole-Carew's Division and Ian Hamilton’s Column marching past. That 
 evening I established my Head-quarters at the British Agency. The 
 14th Brigade was detailed to garrison Pretoria and Major-General J. G. Maxwell 
 was appointed Military Governor. 
 
 24. The prisoners found here on our arrival numbered 158 Officers and 
 3,029 men, but about 900 men had been removed by train the previous day in 
 the direction of Middelburg. 
 
 25. It may be here mentioned that the forts surrounding the town were 
 undefended and that their armament had been dismounted and carried off. 
 The place was quiet and the population orderly; and, though most of the gold 
 in the banks and, all the public treasure had been taken away, no damage 
 had been done to private property. The wives of President Kruger and 
 Commandant-General Botha remained in Pretoria when their husbands left 
 and are still here. 
 
 26. The enemy had retired during the night of the 4th June in an 
 easterly direction, but not to any great distance, and as the presence of a 
 considerable Boer force (calculated at 12,000) was having a very disquieting- 
 effect on the town, I determined to drive them further away. The position 
 they were holding was a strong one along a range of hills at Pienaars Poort, 
 15 miles from Pretoria; the attack commenced early on the 11th June, 
 Pole-Carew’s Division, with the naval and siege guns, moving to Christinen 
 Hall, opposite the Poort, with Ian Hamilton’s column on the right and 
 Broadwood’s and Gordon’s Cavalry Brigades still further to the right in touch 
 with each other and with Hamilton’s column. Henry’s corps of Mounted 
 Infantry was directed to close the gap in the hills at Frankpoort, to the north 
 ot Eerstefabriken Railway Station; while French; with Porter’s and Dickson’s 
 Cavalry Brigades and Hutton's Mounted Infantry, was to work round to the 
 north-east ot the enemy’s position The centre of the Boer alignment at 
 Pienaar’s Poort was so strong naturally that to have assaulted it by direct 
 attack would have involved a useless loss of life. I, therefore, determined to 
 develop flanking operations, knowing by experience that the enemy would 
 retire as soon as their rear was seriously threatened; but the long distances 
 to be traversed and the defensive advantages which the nature of the ground 
 afforded the Boers impeded our advance. Moreover, as I have since learnt, 
 the Boer leaders had intended to follow our tactics and try and outflank us ; 
 
49 
 
 consequently, their centre was but lightly held, whilst the wings of their army 
 were so strong that French and Hutton on our left and Broadwood and 
 Gordon on our right, informed me by signal that they were only just able to 
 hold their own. Broadwood was indeed, at one time, hardly pressed, being 
 under a heavy artillery fire from his front and left, whilst he was simultaneously 
 attacked on his right rear by a commando from Heidelburg. The enemy 
 came on with great boldness and, being intimately acquainted with the ground, 
 were able to advance unseen so close to “Q” Battery, Royal Horse Artillery, that 
 it was with some difficulty they were kept off., while at the same time another 
 body made a separate attack on Broadwood’s right flank. To help the guns 
 and drive off this second body, Broadwood ordered the 12th Lancers and 
 Household Cavalry to charge. Both charges were successful, inasmuch as they 
 relieved the immediate pressure on the guns and Broadwood’s right flank and 
 caused the enemy to revert to artillery and long-range rifle fire ; but 1 regret 
 to saj r that these results were obtained at the cost of some 20 casualties, 
 amongst them being Lieutenant-Colonel the gallant Earl of Airlie, who fell at 
 the head of his regiment, the 12th Lancers. Meanwhile, Ian Hamilton’s 
 Infantry was pressing on as fast as it could to the assistance of the Cavalry, 
 and as each battalion came up, it deployed for attack and very soon became 
 hotly engaged. From my own position I could clearly see (though Ian 
 Hamilton could not) a large number of Boers galloping away in great confusion 
 from a long low ridge some f mile in front of his Infantry, and about 1^ mile 
 short of Diamond Hill near Rhenosterfontein. Diamond Hill appeared to me 
 to be the key of the formidable position taken up by the Boers on this flank 
 and I saw there was every probability of our troops shortly capturing the 
 subsidiary ridge and thereby gaining certain facilities for a further advance on 
 the morrow against Diamond Hill itself. I. therefore, determined to press the 
 attack home at this point next day, and ordering all the troops along our 
 25 miles of battle front to bivouac on the ground they held, I made arrange¬ 
 ments to reinforce Ian Hamilton by the Guards Brigade under Major-General 
 Inigo Jones and two naval 12-prs. under Captain Bearcroft, R.jST. 
 
 27. On the morning of the 12th June, I directed Ian Hamilton to continue 
 his advance on Diamond Hill and then to move towards the railway at Elands 
 River Station, with a view to his threatening the enemy’s line of retreat should 
 they continue to oppose us. 
 
 Hamilton told off Gordon's Cavalry Brigade with one Infantry battalion 
 to guard his right rear and Broadwood’s Brigade with a party of Mounted 
 Infantry to contain the enemy on his right, whilst he attacked Diamond Hill 
 with the S2nd Field Battery, the 1st Battalions of the Sussex and Derbyshire 
 Regiments and City Imperial Volunteer Battalion. The troops advanced under 
 Artillery tire from both flanks, as well as heavy Infantry fire from the hill 
 itself. The steadiness with which the long lines moved forward, neither faltering 
 nor hurrying, although dust from bullets and smoke from bursting shells hung 
 thick about them, satisfied me that nothing could withstand their assault. 
 
 The position was carried at 2 p.m. by the troops above named, the Guards 
 Brigade being in close support. Fighting continued until dusk, the Boers 
 having rapidly taken up a fresh position near the railway. 
 
 28. On the morning of the Kith June it was found that the enemy had 
 withdrawn during the night towards Middelburg and Ian Hamilton at once took 
 up the pursuit, his Infantry moving to Elands River Station, while his mounted 
 troops pushed on .towards Bronkhorst Spruit Station. Generals French and 
 Hutton moved east to Doornkraal, but finding that the enemy had disappeared 
 returned to Ivameelfontein. The enemy having been dispersed, our troops 
 returned the next day to the neighbourhood of Pretoria, the mounted corps 
 requiring a large number of remounts to restore their efficiency. 
 
 29. While the force under my immediate command was thus occupied 
 near Pretoria, the enemy in the Orange River Colony under Commandant 
 Christian De AVet continued their attacks on our lines of communication south 
 of the Yaal. On the 2nd June a convoy of 50 ox-wagons left the Rhenoster 
 River Station for Heilbron with an escort of details proceeding to join the 
 Highland Brigade. The following afternoon the convoy was surrounded by 
 the Boers in greatly superior numbers, but was obliged to surrender before 
 reinforcements from the Vredefort Road Station could reach it. 
 
 Early on the morning of the 7th June the enemy attacked the post on 
 
 <«> G 
 
50 
 
 the Rhenoster railway bridge held by the 4th Bn. Derbyshire Regiment, 70 
 men of the Railway Pioneer Regiment and a few men belonging to the 
 Imperial Yeomanry. Pickets had been posted on the kopjes commanding the 
 railway bridge and camp, but these were driven in by the heavy artillery and 
 rifle tire brought to bear on them from the more distant hills. The engage¬ 
 ment continued up to 11 a.m., by which hour five Officers and 32 men had been 
 killed and 100 men wounded out of a total strength of 700. The Boers 
 having six guns, to which the defenders of the post could not reply, and out¬ 
 numbering the latter in the proportion of six to one, the garrison had to 
 surrender, as further resistance would have been useless. 
 
 30. The possibility of such mishaps had been clearly foreseen by me 
 when I determined to advance on Pretoria, for I knew I was not sufficiently 
 strong in numbers to make the railway line absolutely secure and at the same 
 time have a force at my disposal powerful enough to cope with the main army 
 of the Transvaal supported by forts and guns of position. Now, however, 
 that I was in possession of the Capital and the majority of our prisoners had 
 been recovered, 1 took immediate steps to strengthen the posts along the 
 railway. The liberated prisoners were armed and equipped and despatched to 
 Ycreeniging and other stations south of the Vaal, and as soon as more troops 
 could be spared, they were distributed along the line between Pretoria and 
 Kroonstad. I deputed Lieut.-General Lord Methuen to superintend these 
 arrangements and on the llth June he attacked and defeated the commando 
 under Christian de Wet at the Rhenoster River. The Imperial Y'eomanry Kield 
 Hospital, which had fallen into the hands of the Boers when the Derbyshire 
 Militia surrendered a few days previously, was recovered, together with the 
 Officers and men who had been wounded on that occasion. Other desultory 
 attacks were subsequently made on the railway line and the trains employed 
 for reconstruction purposes, but the enemy were on each occasion repulsed 
 without serious loss on our side and in the course of a few days railway and 
 telegraphic communication were restored. 
 
 31. Turning now to the western side of operations, I have the satisfaction 
 to record that Mafeking was relieved by the flying column under Colonel 
 Mahon’s command on the llth May. Hearing no doubt of the approach of 
 this column, the Boers made a daring attempt to capture the place on the 12th 
 May. Before dawn on that morning a storming party 250 strong, led by 
 Commandant Eloff, rushed the pickets on the west and got into the Staat and 
 Protectorate camp, a severe musketry demonstration being simultaneously 
 made against the eastern part of the defences. The western picquets closed 
 in and prevented the enemy’s supports from following up, thus cutting off 
 Eloff’s line of retreat, while the town guard stopped his further advance. 
 Fighting went on all day and in the evening two parties surrendered, while 
 the third was driven out of the Staat camp under heavy fire. Ten of the 
 enemy were killed, 19 of their wounded were left behind, and 108 prisoners 
 were taken, including among the latter Eloff and 9 Officers, 17 Frenchmen and 
 a good many Germans. Our casualties amounted to 6 men killed and 2 
 Officers and 9 men wounded. 
 
 32. On the 15th May Mahon joined hands with Colonel Plumer’s column 
 at Ian Massibis, 30 miles west of Mafeking, and moving north the next day to 
 the Molopo he was stubbornly opposed by the local Boer force augmented by 
 a commando from Klerksdorp under General Delarey, which had taken up a 
 strong position 9 miles from the town. The Canadian Field Battery from 
 Buluwayo joined Colonel Mahon early that morning, having pressed on by 
 forced marches, and rendered valuable assistance. The enemy were defeated 
 and the combined column entered Mafeking at 4 a.m. on the 17th May. 
 Being there reinforced by the garrison, they marched out after a short rest 
 and attacked the enemy's main laager, capturing one gun and a quantity of 
 stores and ammunition. The Boers retreated into the Transvaal, most of 
 them dispersing to their farms. 
 
 Steps were at once taken to restore railway communication with Mafeking 
 from the north and south. The line from Buluwayo was completed on the 
 26th May and that from Kimberley was nearly finished on the 6th June. On 
 the 20th May Zeerust was occupied without opposition by a flying column 
 under Colonel Plumer and a few days afterwards troops were quartered in 
 Oltoshoop and Polfontein. 
 
51 
 
 33. Lieut.-General Hunter moved from Fourteen Streams into the 
 Transvaal on the 15th May and the next morning entered Christiana 
 unopposed, the Boers 3,000 strong under Du Toit having retired to Klerfis- 
 dorp. Hunter then returned to Fourteen Streams and marched up the railway 
 line, reaching Yryburg on the 24th May. On the 26th I directed him 
 to form an advance base at Doornbult Siding and to concentrate at Holfontein, 
 marching thence to Lichtenburg. 
 
 The force at his disposal consisted of Mahon’s Flying Column, less the 
 Kimberley Mounted Corps which T left with Major-General Baden-Powell, the 
 Scottish Imperial Yeomanry, a brigade-division of field Artillery, and six 
 battalions of Infantry. Hunter’s advanced troops occupied Lichtenburg pn the 
 1st June and his whole force was collected there on the 7th June. On the 
 8th he started via Yentersdorp for Potchefstroom, in order to get into railway 
 communication with Klerksdorp and Johannesburg. 
 
 34. In the western districts of Cape Colony Lieut.-General Warren And 
 Colonel Adye have operated against the rebels with considerable success. On 
 the 21st May Warren surprised the enemy at Douglas, capturing their wagons, 
 tents, and cattle. The Boers retreated northwards. On the 30th May Adye 
 had an engagement near Khees in the Prieska district, our casualties being one 
 Officer and three men killed and four Officers and 16 men wounded. On this 
 occasion over 5,800 head of cattle and sheep were captured with large number 
 of wagons and tents and much personal properly. On the 3rd June Warren 
 advanced against the enemy at Campbell and dispersed them. He reported the 
 Herbert district to be then clear of rebels and that he proposed shortly to 
 occupy Griquatown. 
 
 35. In the Orange River Colony bands of marauders were reported by the 
 Military Governor to be raiding the country in the vicinity of Abraham’s Kraal 
 and on the 13th May I desired Lieut.-General Kelly-Kenny to despatch three 
 companies of Imperial Yeomanry from Bloemfontein with the object of dispersing 
 them, and at the same time of repairing the telegraph line between Bloem¬ 
 fontein and Boshof. This duty was satisfactorily performed, the Yeomanry 
 detachment returning to Bloemfontein on the 22nd May, after having quieted 
 the disturbed district and collected nearly 100 rifles and 3,000 rounds of 
 ammunition. Up to the 24th May 400 Burghers had surrendered to the Officer 
 Commanding at Boshof, including Commandant Duplessis and Field-Cornets 
 Botha and H. J. Duplessis. 
 
 36. During the period dealt with in this letter an important advance has 
 been made by the troops in Natal. Between the 10th and 13th May the 
 force under General Sir Redvers Buller’s command moved by Sunday’s River 
 Drift to Waschbank Station, the enemy retiring to the nek in front of Help- 
 makaar. On the night of the 13th Helpmakaar was evacuated and on the 
 15th our troops occupied Glencoe and Dundee, the Boers falling back on 
 Laing’s Nek. The Cavalry reached Newcastle on the 17th and Sir Redvers 
 Buller with the 3rd Division entered the town the next day. The railway was 
 found to be much damaged and it was necessary to repair it before attempting 
 to cross the Drakensberg. The delay thus caused enabled the enemy to 
 concentrate in greater strength at Laing’s Nek and in front of the Botha and 
 and other passes, and local commandos were reported to be threatening the 
 railway line from the east. Sir Redvers Buller decided first to clear his right 
 flank and on the 27th May lie despatched a column to Utrecht. On the 29th 
 Utrecht surrendered to Lieut.-General Hildyard, while Lieut.-General Don. 
 Neville Lyttelton was marching on Yryheid, which also surrendered a couple 
 of days later. Railway communication was restored to Newcastle on the 
 29th May. On the 4th June Sir Redvers Buller reported that he would be 
 ready to force Laing's Nek by a turning movement on the 6th and that the 
 enemy, though probably 4,000 to 5,000 strong with a considerable number of 
 guns, were much disheartened. 
 
 While deprecating a direct attack which might entail heavy loss of life, I 
 suggested that enough men should be left to occupy the enemy’s attention at 
 Laing’s Nek and that with the rest of his force Sir Redvers Buller should 
 move rapidly through Botha’s or some neighbouring pass, thus obliging the 
 enemy to withdraw from their strong position at the Nek. On the 8th June 
 Sir Redvers Buller attacked and defeated the Boers at Botha’s Pass, and 
 moving northwards again came in touch with them ou the 10th at Gansvlei. 
 
 ( 47 ) G 2 
 
The enemy were driven back along the ridge, which they held till dusk. 
 During the night they withdrew to a range of hills 0 miles north-east of 
 Gansvlei, through which the Yolksrust road passes at a point called Allemann’s 
 ]Sck. On the 11th June Sir Redvers Duller advanced against this position 
 and, after some severe fighting, the brunt of which fell on the 2nd Bn. Dorset¬ 
 shire Regiment, seized Allemann’s Nek and occupied the crest of the hills, the 
 Boers retreating all along the line. The 3rd Cavalry Brigade was also heavily 
 engaged on the right flank. Our casualties amounted altogether to 142 killed 
 and wounded. The same night the Boers evacuated Laing’s Nek and Majuba, 
 Sir Eedvers Buller establishing his head-quarters at Joubert’s Farm 4 miles 
 north of Volksrust. 
 
 37. To the north of the Transvaal some delay has occurred in concentrat¬ 
 ing General Carrington’s force owing to the small carrying capacity of the 
 railway from Beira to Marandellas; but the congestion of traffic has lately 
 been relieved and the greater part of the troops have reached Mafeking, where 
 their co-operation will be very valuable. 
 
 38. In conclusion, I desire to record my high opinion of the conduct and 
 endurance of the troops during the operations summarized in this letter. 
 Their powers of marching and their gallantry when engaged with the enemy 
 were equally admirable ; and it is particularly gratifying to me to bring to 
 notice the services rendered by the Colonial Corps, the Imperial Teomanry and 
 the City Imperial and other Volunteers, who have proved themselves most 
 efficient soldiers. M v acknowledgements are also due to the Militia Battalions, 
 which have done excellent work in the Orange River Colony, in the western 
 districts of Cape Colony, and on the lines of communication. 
 
 I have the honour to be, 
 
 My Lord, 
 
 Your Lordship’s most obedient servant, 
 
 ROBERTS, Field-Marshal, 
 Commanding-in-Chief, South Africa. 
 
 No. 8. 
 
 From Field-Marshal Lord Roberts to the Secretary of State for War. 
 
 Army Head-quarters in South Africa, 
 
 My Lord, Pretoria, 10th October 1900. 
 
 In continuation of despatch, dated 14th August 1900, I have the 
 honour to submit for your Lordship’s information an account of the military 
 operations in the Orange River Colony and Transvaal from the 14th June up 
 to the present date. 
 
 2. Subsequent to the occupation of Johannesburg and Pretoria the 
 organized forces of the enemy were materially reduced in number, many of the 
 burghers in arms against us returning to their farms, surrendering their rifles, 
 and voluntarily taking the oath of neutrality. But the submission only proved 
 real when the burghers were protected from outside interference by the actual 
 presence of our troops. Whenever a Boer Commando has traversed a district 
 the inhabitants of which had ostensibly resumed their peaceful avocations, a 
 considerable part of the male population has again joined the enemy and 
 engaged in active hostilities. In some cases it has been reported that arms 
 have been taken up with alacrity. In most instances, however, hostilities were 
 only resumed with reluctance, and after some pressure had been placed upon 
 them by the Boer Commandants or Field-cornets concerned. 
 
 3. During the period dealt with in this despatch the first objective in urgency 
 and importance was to provide for the security of the railway south of the Vaal, 
 and to capture or disperse the enemy’s forces to the east of that line and in 
 
the north-east angle of the Orange River Colony. The second objective was 
 to push eastward from Pretoria towards Komati Poort, defeating and dispersing 
 the troops under Commandant-General Botha, and releasing the British 
 prisoners confined at Nooitgedacht. But at the same time that portion of the 
 Transvaal which lies west of Johannesburg and Pretoria had to be kept under 
 control; the railway line from Johannesburg through Krugersdorp to 
 Potchefstroom could not be left unguarded ; and, in view of the presence of 
 the enemy north of the Delagoa Bay railway, it would have involved undue 
 risk to attempt an advance against the Boer head-quarters at Machadodorp 
 until sufficient troops were available, not only for the forward movement, hut 
 to secure the line of communication between Pretoria and the field force 
 operating eastward. To obtain these troops L had to wait until the railway 
 from ISTatal to Johannesburg had been restored and proper arrangements made 
 for its protection, and until the action which was being taken in the north-east 
 of the Orange River Colony bad been so far successful as to admit of the transfer 
 to the Transvaal of a considerable portion of the troops engaged in that 
 direction. 
 
 4. In further explanation of the delay which has occurred in dealing with 
 the Boer force under Commandant-General Botha, it may be mentioned that, 
 though the inhabitants of the Lichtenburg, Potchefstroom, and Rustenburg 
 districts seemed at first disposed to submit quietly to the British authorities, a 
 large proportion of them subsequently joined General Dclarey’s Commando 
 and assisted him in attacking the garrisons which were posted at the principal 
 towns and in intercepting convoys of supplies. It consequently became 
 necessary either to withdraw or reinforce these garrisons, as well as organize 
 flying columns for the pursuit of the enemy. 
 
 The vast area of the country in which the operations are being conducted 
 has also to be remembered. The troops have had to march long distances, 
 and, though existing railways have been utilized to the fullest extent, the 
 limited capacity of single lines—especially of that between Pretoria and Bloem¬ 
 fontein—coupled with the scarcity of rolling-stock, has rendered it difficult to 
 move and concentrate rapidly according to the European standard of what 
 should be possible in war. 
 
 5. To deal with the organized forces of the enemy was a comparatively 
 easy matter; but in South Africa the problem has been complicated, and the 
 settlement of the country retarded, by the determination of some of the Boer 
 leaders to pursue a guerilla warfare after their troops had been defeated in the 
 field. Owing to the non-compliance of the Boers with the recognized custom 
 of war which compels combatants to wear a distinctive uniform, they have 
 found it easy to pose as peaceful agriculturists one day and to take part in 
 active hostilities on the next. Their leaders have also usually found means by 
 threats or by persuasions to induce them to disregard their oath of neutrality, 
 although this was voluntarily taken by men who at the time professed them¬ 
 selves anxious to submit to the British Government. To their honour be it 
 said, a few of the burghers have suffered imprisonment or loss of property 
 sooner than thus break their faith, but their number was not sufficient to enable 
 them to exercise any influence on the general situation. 
 
 Recent events have convinced me that the permanent tranquility of the 
 Orange River Colony and Transvaal is dependent on the complete disarmament 
 of the inhabitants; and though the extent of country to be visited, and the 
 ease with which guns, rifles, and ammunition can be hidden, will render the 
 task a difficult one, its accomplishment is only a matter of time and patience. 
 
 0. My last despatch ended with the defeat of the Boers under Louis Botha 
 at Diamond Hill on the 12th June and their retreat the next day towards 
 Middelburg. I then issued orders for the formation at Pretoria of a. strong 
 column* under Lieut -General Ian Hamilton, which would move through 
 Heidelberg on Frankfort, and thence co-operate with Lieut-General Rundle 
 and Major-Generals Clements and Paget with a view to driving the Commando 
 under C. De Wet eastwards towards Bethlehem and surrounding it, as well as 
 the other Boer forces which were still occupying the north-east angle of the 
 Orange River Colony. On reaching Heidelberg the column was to be joined 
 
 * The 2nd and 3rd Cavalry Brigades, the 2nd, 5th, 6th, and 7th Corps of Mounted Infantry, 
 the 21st Infantry Brigade, under Major-General Bruce Hamilton, three batteries of Horse and 
 Field Artillery, and two 5-inch guns. 
 
54 
 
 fcy the 81st Battery, Royal Field Artillery, from the line of communication 
 and by two companies of Imperial Yeomanry from Major-General Hart’s 
 Brigade. Hart, with a portion of his Brigade* * * § was to garrison Heidelberg. 
 On reaching Frankfort Ian Hamilton’s column was to be further strengthened.! 
 The force thus rendered available for operations beyond Frankfort amounted 
 to two Cavalry Brigades, some 3,000 Mounted Infantry, Imperial Yeomanry, 
 and other mounted corps, seven Infantry battalions, three Horse and three 
 Field batteries, two 5-inch guns, 5 pompoms, and twenty-one machine guns. 
 
 To protect the railway between Kroonstad and the Vaal River, and to 
 prevent De Wet from breaking out westward, Lord Methuen’s forced was 
 directed to take up a position in the neighbourhood of Paardekraal, 10 miles 
 south-west of Heilbron on the Kroonstad road. 
 
 Heilbron, which would be lan Hamilton’s base of supply on reaching 
 Frankfort, and operating thence towards Bethlehem, was to be garrisoned bv 
 50 Mounted Infantry and one battalion from the 9th Brigade, with two 
 4'7-inch naval guns. 
 
 The force at and near Lindley under Paget§ was to act in the direction of 
 Bethlehem in conjunction with the troops under Clements. Clements, whose 
 head-quarters were at Senekal, was to be reinforced|| and to proceed to 
 Bethlehem, being joined on the march by Paget’s column. The combined 
 movement from Lindley and Senekal was to begin on 2Sth July. 
 
 Lieut.-General Sir L. Bundle was instructed to occupy the line from 
 Win burg through Trommel to Ficksburg with 1,000 mounted troops. As soon 
 as the combined force under Clements had arrived north of Bethlehem he was- 
 to garrison that place and subsequently to operate against Harrismith. The 
 force at Bundle’s disposal consisted of the balance of the Colonial Division— 
 namely, about 1,200 mounted men, two battalions of Imperial Yeomanry, three 
 Field batteries, and seven Infantry battalions. 
 
 7. Leaving Pretoria on the 19th June, Ian Hamilton’s column occupied 
 Heidelberg on the 23rd. The enemy vacated the town, and were pursued for 
 some distance by our Cavalry. The Boksburg Commando was completely 
 broken up, 60 Boers laying down their arms and the remainder dispersing in 
 different directions. During the Cavalry pursuit, Lieut.-General Ian Hamilton 
 unfortunately broke his collar-bone and had to return to Pretoria. I accordingly 
 placed Lieut.-General Sir A. blunter in command of the column, which he 
 joined on the 25th June. On the 27th, the column left Heidelberg, and, 
 crossing the Yaal at Villiersdorp, reached Frankfort on the 1st July. Two 
 days later Hunter was joined there by the troops from Heilbron under 
 Macdonald. On the 4th July, the force marched south towards Reitz, from 
 which place, on the approach of the British troops, 800 prisoners belonging to 
 the Irish Battalion of the Imperial Yeomanry and the 4th Bn. Derbyshire 
 Regiment were despatched by the Boers across the .Natal frontier, and 
 proceeded to Ladysmith. The Officers, however, were not liberated, but sent 
 to Kooitgedacht, on the Delagoa Bay railway. Bruce Hamilton was left at 
 Reitz with the 21st Brigade, two Field batteries, and the 7th Corps of 
 Mounted Infantry, with orders to send back a convoy of empty wagons to 
 bring on fresh supplies from Heilbron under escort of one battery and one 
 battalion. Hunter reached Bethlehem on the 10th July, where he received 
 orders placing Bundle’s Division and Clements’s column under his command. 
 On the 11th July, the 3rd Cavalry Brigade was sent back to Heilbron via 
 Reitz, the country south of Bethlehem being so hilly that the presence of two 
 Cavalry Brigades seemed unnecessary; and, on the 14th, Bruce Hamilton’s 
 Brigade rejoined Hunter at Bethlehem. 
 
 * One company of Imperial Yeomanry, H battalions of Infantry, and one Field battery. 
 
 t The 5th Battery, Royal Field Artillery; Cavalry and Mounted Infantry details, numbering* 
 350 ; two companies of Imperial Yeomanry, Lovat’s Scouts, Eastern Provinces’ Ilorse, and three 
 battalions of the Highland Brigade, under Macdonald. 
 
 1 Four battalions of Imperial Yeomanry, about 1,000 strong; two Field batteries,two 5-inch 
 howitzers, two Infantry battalions from the 9th Brigade, a provisional battalion of Infantry 
 details, two pompoms, and 10 machine guns. 
 
 § 400 mounted men from Kroonstad, two companies of Imperial Yeomanry, four Field guns, 
 1st Bn. Royal Munster Fusiliers, 2nd Bn. King’s Own Yorkshire Light infantry, 4th Bn. South 
 Staffordshire Regiment, and a wing of the 4th Bn. Scottish Rifles. 
 
 || 1,000 mounted men from the 8th and Colonial Divisions, 400 mounted men from Bloem- 
 lontein, one Field battery, two 5-inch guns, 2nd Bn. Bedfordshire Regiment, 1st Bn. Royal Irish 
 Regiment, 2nd Bn. Worcestershire Regiment, and -2nd Bn. Wiltshire Regiment. 
 
oo 
 
 8. On reaching Bethlehem, Hunter found that it had been occupied on 
 7th July, after two days’ fighting, hy the force under Clements and Paget. 
 The combined movements of troops under the latter Officers, and under 
 Bundle, had been carried out as directed. On the 26th June, Clements 
 ordered his mounted troops, with two field guns, to attack a Boer laager at 
 Rietfontein, 7 miles north of Senekal. The enemy were dispersed and the 
 laager destroyed, our casualties being three killed and 23 wounded. The same 
 day Paget engaged the enemy near Bindley, while they were endeavouring to 
 intercept a convoy of supplies. The Boers were driven off with a loss on our 
 side of 10 men killed and four Officers and 50 men wounded. On 2nd July, 
 Clements and Paget joined hands and began their advance on Bethlehem, the 
 enemy, under C. De Wet, falling back in a south-easterly direction. On the 
 3rd July, Paget drove the Boers from a strong position which they were 
 holding across his line of march, and bivouacked 15 miles north-west ot 
 Bethlehem. On approaching the town on the evening of the 5th July, 
 Clements, who, as senior Officer, was in command of the two columns, found 
 •C. De AVet occupying the hills to the south. The next morning Bethlehem 
 was summoned to surrender, and, on this demand being refused, Paget moved 
 to the north-west with the object of turning the enemy’s left, while Clements’s 
 troops operated on their right flank. On the morning of the 7th, a general 
 assault was made, and by noon the place was in our hands and the Boers were 
 in full retreat to the north-east. On this occasion, the 1st Bn. Royal Irish 
 Regiment specially distinguished itself, capturing a gun of the 77th Battery, 
 Royal Field Artillery, which had been lost at Stormberg. The good service 
 rendered by the 38th Battery, Royal Field Artillery, and the City Imperial 
 Volunteers Battery has also been brought to notice by Major-General Paget 
 
 9. On being driven from Bethlehem, the enemy— estimated at about 
 7.000 strong, with 20 guns—retired through the hills into the Brandwater 
 Basin, around which they occupied positions of great natural strength at 
 Naauwpoort, Retief’s, and Slabbert’s Neks, Witnek and Commando Nek. 
 These, at the time, were believed to be the only points of ingress into, or 
 egress from, the Basin; but it was afterwards found that there was another 
 route available through Golden Gate in the Harrismith direction. The 
 disposition of the investing force, on the 11th July, was as follows :—The 8th 
 and Colonial Divisions, under Bundle, were echeloned along the line from 
 Ficksburg to Biddulphsberg, their duty being to watch Witnek and Commando 
 Nek, and to prevent the enemy from breaking out to the south-west. 
 Clements’s Brigade, awaiting supplies from Senekal, was at Biddulphsberg; 
 while at, or near Bethlehem were the 2nd Cavalry Brigade under Broadwood, 
 the 2nd Brigade of Mounted Infantry under Ridley, the Highland Brigade 
 under Macdonald, the 20th Brigade under Paget, and the 21st Brigade under 
 Bruce Hamilton. On the 15th July, the £nd Cavalry Brigade and the 20th 
 Infantry Brigade were sent out along the road to Senekal, with the object of 
 heading back the enemy if they should attempt to break out in that direction, 
 but during the night a Boer force under C. De Wet, consisting of about 1,500 
 men and six guns, and accompanied by Mr. Steyn, succeeded in escaping 
 through Slabbert’s Nek, and rapidly moved off towards Bindley. On the 16th, 
 Broadwood’s Cavalry, with 800 Mounted Infantry under Ridley, were ordered 
 to pursue De Wet, and Clements was directed to relieve Bundle’s troops in 
 front of Witnek. On the 20th and 21st, Bruce Hamilton, with the Cameron 
 Highlanders, a corps of Mounted Infantry, and the 82nd Battery, Royal Field 
 Artillery, attacked the enemy holding Spitzkop, a hill 9 miles south-east of 
 Bethlehem, and succeeded in occupying it. Drawing his cordon tighter. 
 Hunter, on 22nd July, moved the Highland Brigade, the 5th and 76th 
 Batteries, Royal Field Artillery, Lovat’s Scouts, ami Rimington’s Guides, in 
 front of Retief’s Nek, this force being joined the next morning by the 1st Bn. 
 Royal Sussex Regiment and the 81st Battery, Royal Field Artillery. On the 
 23rd, the heights commanding the nek were seized by the Black Watch and 
 Highland Light Infantry, our casualties being one Officer and 11 men killed, 
 and six Officers and 68 men wounded. The same day Clements effected a 
 junction between his own troops and those under Paget 2 miles north of 
 Slabbert’s Nek. Holding the enemy in front with the 1st Bn. Royal Munster 
 Fusiliers, he gained a footing on the high ground to the right of the nek by a 
 turning movement executed by the 1st Bn. Royal Irish Regiment, the 2nd Bn. 
 
50 
 
 Wiltshire Regiment, and Brabant’s Horse. Early on the 24th, the Boers 
 vacated Retiefs Nek, and Hunter pushed through the pass into the valley 
 beyond, while Clements occupied Slabbert’s Nek and sent his mounted troops 
 and artillery in pursuit of the retreating enemy. Rundle was now directed to 
 move towards Fouriesburg, and, on the 25th, Macdonald and Bruce Hamilton’s 
 blocked the exits from the Brandwater Basin at Naauwpoort Nek and Golden 
 Gate. The same day. Hunter advanced, with Clements’s and Paget’s troops, in 
 the direction of Fouriesburg, on which place the enemy had retired. On 
 entering the town, on the 26th July, he found it already occupied by a portion 
 of Bundle’s Division, headed by Driscoll’s Scouts, who had made a forced 
 march of 25 miles from Commando Nek. Macdonald, in the meantime, had 
 blocked Naauwpoort Nek and Golden Cate, towards which the Boers had 
 fallen back, and, on the 28th, Hunter followed the enemy with Clements’s and 
 Paget’s Brigades, and the available troops of the 8th Division. On the 29th, 
 General Prinsloo asked for a four days’ armistice, and, this request being- 
 refused, agreed to,surrender unconditionally the following morning. On the 
 30tli July, Prinsloo and Crowther, with the Ficksburg and Ladybrand 
 Commandos, 879 strong, surrendered, other commandos coming in later. 
 General Olivier, with his commando, managed, however, to escape during the 
 night through Golden Gate, though he and his men had been included by 
 Commandant-General Prinsloo in the unconditional surrender of the Boer 
 force. The total number of prisoners taken was 4,140, with three guns, two of 
 which belonged to “ U : Battery, Royal Horse Artillery. Over 4,000 horses 
 and ponies, a large number of rifles, and over a million rounds of small-arm 
 ammunition also fell into our hands. 
 
 10. On the surrender of Prinsloo’s force, Hunter directed Macdonald to 
 march on the 1st August to Harrismith in pursuit of < flivier with 700 mounted 
 troops, four battalions, two 5-inch guns and 16 field guns. He reached 
 Harrismith unopposed on the 4th August, and the next day was joined there 
 by two squadrons of the 5th Lancers from Besters and one of the 13th Hussars 
 from Ladysmith. Railway communication was opened between Harrismith 
 and Natal, the line having only been slightly damaged. As it had been 
 ascertained that Olivier had moved northwards through Yrede, and 
 Macdonald’s troops were wanted elsewhere, I ordered them to be relieved by 
 nine companies of Imperial Yeomanry. Driscoll’s Scouts, seven battalions, and 
 14 field guns from the 8th Division, under Rundle, who also provided garrisons 
 for Senekal, Bethlehem, Fouriesburg, Ladybrand, and Thabanchu. Rundle 
 reached Harrismith on the 6th August, Macdonald leaving on the same day to 
 rejoin Hunter at Bethlehem. Meanwhile, Paget’s and Bruce Hamilton's 
 Brigades had marched as escort of the Boer prisoners to Winburg, and 
 Clements’s Brigade had been ordered to Kroonstad. 
 
 11. I have already mentioned that C. De Wet’s commando, which was 
 accompanied by ex-President Steyn, had managed to break through Hunter’s 
 cordon during the night of the 15th July, and had been followed up by a 
 mounted force 2,300 strong, with two batteries of Horse Artillery, under 
 Broadwood, in the direction of Lindlcy. To protect his baggage, Broadwood 
 took the 1st Bn. Derbyshire Regiment and two field guns from the escort of a 
 convo} 7 which he met on the road between Lindley and Bethlehem. The 3rd 
 Cavalry Brigade had reached Heilbron on the 15th July. There Brigadier- 
 General Gordon, who commanded it, was ordered to Pretoria to replace 
 Colonel Porter, who had broken his collar-bone, in command of the 1st Cavalry 
 Brigade, and was succeeded by Lieut.-Colonel Little. On the 16th, the 
 brigade left Heilbron for Kroonstad, and the next day I ordered it to march 
 as rapidly as possible towards Lindley and join Broad wood’s Column. On t oe 
 morning of the 19th, Little came into touch with a portion of De Wet’s 
 commando near Lindley, and in the afternoon Broadwood attacked the 
 enemy’s rearguard, the action continuing until dusk. The commando then 
 broke up into two parties, both of which, owing to the superior mobility of the 
 Boers, contrived to get away during the night. One of these parties reached 
 the railway on the night of the 21st July, and captured a supply train 20 miles 
 north of Kroonstad. The Commando afterwards reunited to the west of 
 Roodeval Station. Broadwood, after joining hands with Little on the 21st 
 July, crossed the railway in pursuit, and three days later found De Wet 
 holding a strong position in the hills east of Reitzburg. Not strong enough 
 
5 7 
 
 to attack the enemy, he held on to Vredefort and awaited the arrival of 
 Infantry reinforcements. 
 
 12. While the operations described above were taking place in the 
 Orange River Colony, the Boers had been displaying considerable activity 
 north of the Vaal, and along the railway in the vicinity of Kroonstad. 
 Botha’s force retreated towards Middelburg on the 13th June, and Baden- 
 Powell from Zeerust occupied Rustenburg on the 14th, a small column being 
 sent the following day from Pretoria to meet him and repair the telegraph line 
 between the two places. On the 14th June, our post on the railway at Zand 
 River was attacked by 800 Boers with three guns, but Major-General Knox, 
 Commanding at Kroonstad, promptly sent out reinforcements, and the enemy 
 were driven off with some loss. On the 18tli June, Hunter, who had been 
 advancing eastward through Potchefstroom, reoccupied Krugersdorp with his 
 mounted troops under Mahon, and one battery of Horse Artillery, being joined 
 the next day by Hart’s Infantry Brigade and a Field battery. On the 
 21st June, Baden-Powell reported that 3,000 rifles had been handed in at Rusten¬ 
 burg, and that the district was quiet, a small commando, under Field-Cornet 
 Duplessis, having retired north-eastward. The same day Hunter was ordered 
 to proceed from Krugersdorp to Heidelberg with troops under Hart and 
 Mahon, Barton’s Brigade, which was then holding Klerksdorp and Potchef¬ 
 stroom, moving on to Krugersdorp. A Field battery and two battalions of 
 the latter brigade, the 2nd Bn. Royal Scots Fusiliers and the 1st Bn. Royal 
 Welsh Fusiliers remained as garrison of Krugersdorp, under Barton, the 
 remaining two, the 2nd Bn. Royal Irish Fusiliers and the 2nd Bn. Royal 
 Fusiliers, being railed to Pretoria. In Hart’s Brigade a wing of the 
 2nd Bn. Somersetshire Light Infantry had remained at Yryburg, while the 
 other wing with the 2nd Bn. Royal Dublin Fusiliers and oneField battery, formed 
 the garrison of Heidelberg, under Hart: the 1st Bn. Border Regiment and 
 the 1st Bn. Connaught Rangers, marching to Irene Station. Mahon’s mounted 
 troops with the Imperial Light Horse and one battery of Horse Artillery, were 
 also moved to Irene. 
 
 13. On the 22nd June, a Boer commando 700 strong, with three guns, 
 attacked the post on the railway at Honingspruit, north of Kroonstad. The 
 enemy were driven off by a force from Kroonstad, after having destroyed 
 three culverts and broken up the line. Lord Methuen was ordered to move 
 his column from Heilbron towards Honingspruit, and after clearing off the 
 enemy to take up a central position near Paardekraal, so as to cover the 
 railway from the cast. 
 
 14. On the 2oth June, a large convey under Colonel Brookfield. 
 Commandant 14th Battalion, Imperial Yeomanry, left Kroonstad for Bindley.* 
 This column was engaged with the enemy, 1,500 strong with two guns, 
 throughout the 26th and 27th. but Colonel Brookfield succeeded in bringing 
 the convoy safely into Bindley on the evening of the latter day. The 
 casualties were two men killed, two Officers and 14 men wounded, and five men 
 missing. 
 
 15. On the 27th June, the post on the railway near Roodeval Station was 
 attacked, but the enemy were repulsed by a detachment of the Shropshire 
 Light Infantry and the West Australian Mounted Infantry, with the aid of a 
 15-pr. gun on an armoured train. 
 
 16. On the 20th June, Lord Methuen reported from Paardekraal that be 
 had captured 8,000 sheep and 800 head of cattle, and that the enemy had 
 withdrawn eastward; and 2nd July lie arrested at Welgelegen Andries 
 Wessels, a prominent Boer member of the Afrikander Bond. The next day 
 he captured 6.000 sheep and 500 oxen, the property of the enemy, near 
 Paardekraal. On the 8th July, Mr. Blignaut, State Secretary of the Orange 
 Free State; Mr. Dickson, Attorney-General; and Mr. van 'Ponder. Member of 
 the Council, surrendered at Ileilbron. 
 
 17. Early in July a force consisting of Mounted Infantry details, about 
 1,200 strong, under the command of Colonel T. E. Hickman, D.S.O., was 
 organized at Kroonstad, to assist Lord Methuen in protecting the railway. 
 The enemy having been pushed back by the combined movement of the troops 
 
 * 800 men of the Imperial Yeomanry and Colonial Corps, a wing of the 2nd Bn. King’s Own 
 Yorkshire Light Infantry, and the 3rd Bn. the Buffs, with four guns of the City Imperial 
 Volunteers and two of the 17th Battery. Royal Field ArU’lerv. 
 
 H 
 
 (47) 
 
58 
 
 under Hunter, Clements, and Paget, Hickman’s force was no longer required 
 south of the Yaal, and on the 11th and 12th July, it was railed from 
 Kroonsiad to Pretoria. For the same reason on the 12th July, I directed 
 Lord Methuen’s column, which had moved to Lindley, to march to Kroonstad, 
 and thence proceed by rail to Krugersdorp. 
 
 18. By 20th June, 4,000 rifles had been collected by Baden-Powell from 
 the Boers in the Rustenburg district, but shortly afterwards signs of unrest 
 were apparent north of the Magaliesberg, and in the country between Rusten- 
 burg and Mafeking. At first only a few scattered parties of the enemy were 
 reported to be in the field, and in order to break them up Baden-Powell was 
 directed to leave a small garrison at Rustenburg, under Major the Hon. A. H. C. 
 Hanbury-Tracy, and to march eastward with the remainder of his troops to 
 Commando Nek. Orders were also given for Carrington’s force to concentrate 
 at Mafeking, detachments being left to guard the principal drifts across the 
 Crocodile River, namely, Baines, Rhodes, and Victoria Drifts. On the 
 5th Jul}% definite information reached me that a commando under Delarey, 
 2,000 strong with four guns, was threatening Rustenburg from the north-east, 
 and that Oliphant's .Nek, 10 miles south of that town, had been occupied by 
 the Boers. Baden-Powell was then holding Commando and Uitval .Neks, with 
 his head-quarters at Rietfontein, south of the Magaliesberg and between the 
 two neks. His force consisted of 450 mounted men, a Canadian Field battery 
 and two Mountain guns. Lieut.-Colonel C. O. Hore was at Elands River, 
 40 miles west of Rustenburg, with 400 Imperial Bushmen, two Field guns and 
 one Maxim. Having arranged to relieve the detachments at Commando Nek 
 and Uitval Nek by troops from Pretoria, I ordered Baden-Pow r ell to return to 
 Rustenburg. On the 7th July, the Boers attacked that place but were beaten 
 off. Hore’s column making a rapid march and reinforcing the garrison 
 towards the end of the engagement. Baden-PoAvell reached Rustenburg the 
 next day, but a large commando remained in position G miles to the south, 
 which he was not strong enough to deal with. 
 
 19. Meanwhile, at the beginning of July, the enemy assumed an 
 
 aggressive attitude towards the east of Pretoria, and the following dispositions 
 were made to prevent them from getting round our right flank and inter¬ 
 rupting railway communication with the south. Mahon’s troops, with the 
 Imperial Light Horse, one battery of Horse Artillery, and two battalions from 
 Hart’s Brigade (the Border Regiment and Connaught Rangers) were ordered 
 to Rietfontein, G miles east of Irene. The column was strengthened by 
 
 Hutton,* who assumed the command. On the 8th July, it was further 
 
 reinforced from Krugersdorp,f Hutton advancing on that date with his 
 
 mounted troops to Rietvlei. On the 9th July, French was sent from Ivameel- 
 drift to the south of the Delagoa Baj* railway,j and on the 11th in co-operation 
 with Hutton, he engaged the enemy and pushed them back to the east of 
 Bronkhorst Spruit. The next day French was directed to return to Pretoria 
 with three battalions and two 5-inch guns, while the 2nd Bn. Duke of 
 Cornwall’s Light Infantry, was moved from Irene to Derdepoort, and the 
 1st Bn. Suffolk Regiment from Irene to Tigerpoort. 
 
 20. When Baden-Powell left Rietfontein for Rustenburg, Commando and 
 Uitval Neks were occupied by the Scots Greys with a battery of Horse 
 Artillery, and the Waterval post north of Pretoria v T as held by the 
 7th Dragoon Guards. The Scots Greys were subsequently reinforced by the 
 2nd Bn. Lincolnshire Regiment, under Colonel H. R. Roberts. On the 
 11th July, the Boers simultaneously attacked Uitval Nek and Waterval. At 
 the former place, owing mainly to the defective dispositions of the Com¬ 
 manding Officer, the enemy gained possession of the pass and captured two 
 guns, almost an entire squadron of the Scots Greys, and 90 Officers and men 
 of the Lincolnshire Regiment, including Colonel Roberts who had been 
 wounded early in the day. The 1st Bn. King’s Own Scottish Borderers, under 
 Lieut.-Colonel Godfrey, were despatched from Pretoria to strengthen the post, 
 but arrived too late to extricate the garrison. At Waterval the 7th Dragoons 
 were well handled, and our loss would have been trifling had not one troop 
 
 * Brigade of Mounted Infantry. 
 
 * voyai Fusiliers and Royal Irish Fusiliers, one Fiel 1 battery, and two o-inch guns. 
 J Carabineers, luniskilling Dragoons, and 81 I 1 Hussars. 
 
59 
 
 mistaken the Boers for their own comrades. The regiment was supported in 
 the early morning by one squadron of the 14th Hussars, one company of the 
 2nd Bn. Hampshire Regiment, and two Field guns, but owing to the numerical 
 superiority of the enemy, it had to fall back to Derdepoort, which was strongly 
 held. 
 
 21. On the 10th July, Smith-Dorrien, whose brigade had been employed 
 in guarding the railway between Pretoria and the Yaal, was ordered to proceed, 
 by rail to Krugersdorp with the 2nd Bn. Shropshire Light Infantry, and 
 1st Bn. Gordon Highlanders. On the 11th, he marched towards Heckpoort 
 with these battalions, one company of Imperial Yeomanry, and two guns ol 
 the 20th Battery, Royal Field Artillery, his object being to collect supplies 
 which the inhabitants were anxious to sell to us before the Boers from 
 Oliphant’s Nek could get hold of them. On reaching Zeekoehoek, 10 miles 
 from Krugersdorp on the road to Heckpoort, he found the enemy holding a 
 strong position across his line of advance, and an engagement which lasted 
 6 hours, resulted in his withdrawal to Krugersdorp, with the loss of one Officer 
 killed and two Officers and 35 men wounded. It had been my intention that 
 the Scots Greys with two guns from Commando Nek should join Smith-Dorrien 
 on his march towards Heckpoort, but this combination could not be effected, 
 owing to the enemy’s attack on the Uitval Nek. 
 
 22. As previously mentioned, Lord Methuen was ordered to Krugersdorp 
 from Lindley on the 13th July; his force consisting of 1,200 mounted troops, 
 2,400 infantry, 12 field guns, two 5-in. howitzers, two pompoms, and nine 
 machine guns. The movement was completed by the 16th, on vhich day T 
 arranged for the column, in combination with the troops under Smith-Dorrien, 
 to clear the road to Rustenburg and relieve the garrison there under Baden- 
 Powell. Leaving Krugersdorp on the 18th July, Lord Methuen reached 
 Heckpoort unopposed on the 19th, Baden-Powell advancing at the same time 
 to Olifant’s Nek with 400 mounted men and six guns. Olifant’s Nek was 
 occupied on the 21st after a short engagement, the enemy retreating hastily 
 eastward along the Magaliesberg range. On the 20th the Boers under General 
 Delarey destroyed the railway line near Bank Station, between Krugersdorp 
 and Potchefstroom. I, therefore, directed Lord Methuen to leave a sufficient 
 garrison in Rustenburg under Baden-Powell, and to return in the direction of 
 Krugersdorp. The 1st Bn. North Lancashire Regiment, from Methuen’s 
 column, with two guns and 50 mounted men from Baden-Powell’s force, was 
 left to hold Olifant’s Nek, while 450 Imperial Bushmen under Colonel Airey 
 were despatched to repair the telegraph line and clear the road between 
 Rustenburg and Zecrust. On the 22nd July this party came into contact with 
 a Boer commando, 1,000 strong, a few miles west of the Magato Pass, and 
 after a protracted engagement succeeded in dispersing the enemy, with the loss 
 on our side of one Officer and five men killed, and 19 men wounded. On 
 the 26th July Lord Methuen’s force had reached Bank Station, and the same 
 day Baden-Powell reported that several Boer commandoes, aggregating 3,000 
 men with eight guns, were concentrating on Rustenburg. Meanwhile a large 
 convoy of supplies escorted by Lieut.-Colonel Ilore had left Matching for 
 Elands River en route to Rustenburg, and Carrington with four companies of 
 Imperial Yeomanry under Lord Erroll, and four squadrons of Paget’s Horse, 
 was ordered to proceed in the same direction with a view to reinforcing Baden- 
 Powell. 
 
 23. At this time C. de Wet was still holding the hills near Reitzburg, and 
 as it seemed likely that he would attempt to cross the Yaal and effect a junction 
 with Commandant-General Botha to the east of Pretoria, I directed Lord 
 Methuen to move on Potchefstroom, and thence take a position from which he 
 could observe the drift across the river near Yenterskroon. On the 28th July 
 Lord Methuen engaged the enemy at Frederickstad, and the next day reached 
 Potchefstroom. Smith-Dorrien was left at Frederickstad, where on the 31st 
 he was attacked, but repulsed the enemy who retired on Yentersdorp. 
 
 24. While these operations were going on, Hutton, whose outposts were 
 holding the Tigerpoort—Witpoort ridge east of Irene, was attacked by 2,000 
 Boers with eight guns at daybreak on the 16th July. On this occasion the 
 detachment at Witpoort under Major Munn, 2nd Bn. Royal Irish Fusiliers, 
 consisting of three companies of that regiment and 60 men of the New 
 Zealand Mounted Rifles with two pompoms, greatly distinguished themselves 
 By 3 p.m. the enemy fell back, and at dusk they were in full retreat eastward. 
 
 H 2 
 
 ( 47 ) 
 
25. The time had now arrived when it was necessary to make a further 
 move to the eastward along- the Delag-oa Bay Railway, but before this could be 
 effected, it was necessary to clear the country to the north and east of Pretoria, 
 where the Boers had been increasing in strength and boldness. A strong 
 column* was, therefore, organized and placed under Ian Hamilton’s command. 
 This column left Pretoria on the 16th July, and on the 18th had reached 
 Hammanskraal, 25 miles north of Pretoria on the Petersburg Railway. A 
 second column! under Mahon was concentrated on the latter date at Kameeldrift, 
 12 miles north-east of Pretoria. The head-quarters of the 11th Division were 
 at Eerste Fabrieken, east of Pretoria, with the Guards Brigade 10 miles further 
 east at Rhenosterfontein. French’s force \ was distributed near Witpoort and 
 Rietvlei, 30 miles south-east of Pretoria, Hutton’s troops being on the left 
 next the Guards Brigade and the Cavalry on the right. Ian Hamilton was 
 ordered to move on Bronkhorst Sprnit, via Doornkraal; Mahon joining him on 
 the 21st July at the latter place, where the two columns were united under 
 Hamilton’s command. From Doornkraal Hickman’s Mounted Infantry returned 
 to Pretoria, escorting an empty convoy. Ian Hamilton’s force reached 
 liustfontein 7 miles north of Bronkhorst Spruit on the 22nd July. The enemy, 
 whose line of retreat was then threatened, abandoned the strong positions 
 which they were holding in front of the 11th Division, and Stephenson’s Brigade 
 advanced unopposed on the 23rd to Eland’s River Station, our right flank 
 being protected by the Mounted Infantry and Cavalry under Hutton and 
 French. The same day French crossed to the east of the Wilge River. On 
 the 24th July I proceed from Pretoria by rail to Van der Merwe Station, 
 marching thence to Bronkhorst Spruit, which was occupied in the course of the 
 day by the lltli Division and Ian Hamilton's column. The enemy opposed 
 Hutton and French 6 miles south of Balmoral. Colonel Aldcrson attacked 
 their right, while the 1st and 4th Cavalry Brigades made a wide turning- 
 movement round their left. The Boers fell back towards Middelburg. On the 
 25th Balmoral was occupied by Ian Hamilton’s troops, and the 11th Division 
 reached Wilge River. French and Hutton crossed Olifant’s River ac 
 Naauwpoort, and bivouacked on high ground whence the enemy could be 
 seen retreating in great disorder through Middelburg. The next day French 
 and Hutton occupied Middelburg, and a line of outposts was established so as 
 to cut off communication between Botha’s force and the Boer commandoes to 
 the west and south of Pretoria. Finding that it would take some tine to repair 
 the railway bridges which had been destroyed between Pretoria and Middelburg, 
 and to collect supplies at the latter place, and being of opinion that a 
 considerably larger force than what was then available would he needed to 
 operate towards Machadodorp, I returned to Pretoria on the 26th July. Ian 
 Hamilton’s column was also brought back to Pretoria, two battalions under 
 Colonel Brooke, with the Canadian battery, being left at Pienaar’s Poort. 
 The 11th Division, under Pole-Carew, was distributed along the line from 
 Balmoral to Middelburg ; French being in command at Middelburg whh his two 
 Cavalry Brigades and Hutton’s Mounted Infantry. On the 30th July, Ian 
 Hamilton reached Pretoria with Mahon’s Mounted troops, Cunningham’s 
 Infantry Brigade, a battery of Horse Artillery, the Elswick Battery, and two 
 5-inch and two 4'7-inch guns. 
 
 26. I have already mentioned that on the 26th July, Baden-Powell 
 reported that a strong Boer force was again threatening Ru-tenburg. As it 
 was impossible at that time to find sufficient troops not only for holding the 
 isolated posts at Rustenburg and Lichtenburg, but for keeping open communica¬ 
 tion with those places, I determined to withdraw the Rustenburg garrison to 
 Commando Nek and the Lichtenburg garrison to Zcerust. !'o effect the 
 first withdrawal I directed Ian Hamilton to march to Rustenburg and bring 
 back with him Baden-Powell's force. Carrington, who was then at Mafeking, 
 
 * An Infantry Brigade, under Brigadier-General G. G. Cunningham. l).r>.0., consisting of the 
 1st Bn. King's Own Scottish Borderers, 1st Bn. Border Regiment, 2nd Bn. Berkshire Regiment, 
 1st Bn. Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, Hickman’s Mounted Infantry, the Canadian and 
 Elswick Batteries, two 6-inch howitzers, and o-inch guus. 
 
 t 1.000 Mounted lufautry, 2nd Bn. Royal Fusiliers, 1st Bn. Connaught Rangers, a battery of 
 Horse Artillery, two 4'7-inch guns. 
 
 t 1 st and" 4th Cavalry Brigades, Hutton’s Mounted Infantry, 1st Bn. Suffolk Regiment, 
 2nd Bn. Royal Irish Fusiliers, three batteries of Horse Artillery, one battery of Field Artillery, 
 two 5-inch gun^. 
 
61 
 
 was ordered to proceed with his mounted troops to Elands River, to which 
 place Lieut.-Colonel Hore, with 140 Bushmen, 80 men of the Rhodesian 
 Regiment, and 80 Rhodesian Volunteers, had escorted a large convoy of 
 supplies for the Rustenburg garrison. After accompanying this convoy into 
 Rustenburg, Carrington was to fall back on Zeerust simultaneously with the 
 withdrawal of Baden-Powell’s force. Ian Hamilton’s column left Pretoria on 
 the 1st August, his Infantry marching to the south and his mounted troops to 
 the north of the Magaliesberg towards Uitval Nek. The next day, on 
 approaching the nek, he found it strongly held by the enemy, whom he 
 engaged in front with a portion of Cunningham's Brigade, while two companies 
 of the Berkshire Reginent gallantly escaladed the steep cliff overlooking the 
 pass on the east. As soon as the Boers found that their position was under 
 fire from above they fled, abandoning their wagons and horses. Our losses 
 amounted to 40 killed and wounded. The mounted troops under Mahon on 
 the north side of the Magaliesberg were delayed, and did not come up in time 
 to take part in the engagement; otherwise but few of the enemy could have 
 escaped. On the 4th August the column reached Kroondal, 5 miles south-east 
 of Rustenburg, and the same day it was reported that a Boer commando, with 
 four field guns and two pompoms, had surrounded Lieut.-Colonel Hore’s camp 
 at Eland’s River. Carrington had marched from Zeerust on the 3rd August 
 with 800 Imperial Yeomanry and Bushmen and a 15-pr. battery manned by 
 New Zealanders. Two days later he was at Marico River, whence he made a 
 reconnaissance to within 2 miles of the post at Elands River. As a result of 
 this, he reported that the enemy were in such great strength that he was 
 unable to open communication with Hore, and he therefore fell hack on Marico 
 River. On the 6th August, Baden-Powell reconnoitred in the same direction 
 from Rustenburg; hut though firing was going on, its sound became more 
 distant, and, concluding that Lieut.-Colonel Hore’s force had been either 
 captured by the enemy or relieved by Carrington, he returned to Rustenburg. 
 The Rustenburg garrison was not rationed beyond the 9th August, while Ian 
 Hamilton had only sufficient food and forage for the return march to 
 Commando Nek. I was therefore obliged to recall Ian Hamilton and Baden- 
 Powell, and as I was unable to reinforce Carrington from the Rustenburg 
 direction, he fell back on Zeerust. In view of the enemy’s numbers and 
 activity, Carrington retired thence to Mafeking, taking with him the Zeerust 
 and Ottoshoop garrisons. Leaving Rustenburg on the 7th August, the troops 
 under Ian Hamilton and Baden-Powell reached Commando Nek on the 9th, 
 accompanied by the Loyal North Lancashire Regiment, which Lord Methuen 
 had left at Olifant’s Nek. 
 
 27. I must now turn to the operations of the Natal force under Sir 
 Redvers Buller, who had occupied Laing’s Nek on the 12th June, and had to 
 halt there until the 18th, in order to bring up supplies and rest his transport 
 animals. Marching on the latter date, he reached Zandspruit on the 20th, and 
 Katbosch Spruit on the 22nd, Dundonald’s Cavalry Brigade entering 
 Standerton unopposed the same day. 18 locomotives and 150 railway 
 carriages and trucks were secured at Standerton. The force concentrated 
 there during the next few days consisted of the 2nd Infantry Division, three 
 battalions of the 11th Brigade, four 5-inch and two 4‘7-inch gnns, two 
 howitzer batteries, and Dundonald’s Cavalry Brigade. On the 25th June, Sir 
 Redvers Buller reported that the enemy, in considerable strength, were 
 threatening the railway line, that the railway bridge at Standerton had been 
 blown up, and would take 10 days to repair, and that he must collect supplies 
 before advancing further. On the 30th June, Clery, with the 4th Brigade, 
 left Standerton for Greylingstad, and, after meeting with some opposition, 
 occupied that place on the 2nd July. On the 4th July, he reached 
 Vlaktontein and met Hart at Zuikerbosch Spruit, relieving the detachment 
 from the Heidelberg garrison which was guarding the railway at that point. 
 This day the line from Natal was opened up to Greylingstad. On the 10th 
 July, the Boers destroyed a railway bridge at Grootspruit, 6 miles east of 
 Greylingstad, and broke up the line. Clery was, therefore, recalled from 
 Vlakfontein, and Hart reoccupied Zuikerbosch Spruit. On the 12th, the 
 South African Light Horse drove off a Boer commando moving upon 
 Vlaklaagte Station, while Clery moved to Witpoort. DundonaM, «couting 
 5 miles north of Clery, captured the camp of the party which had injured 
 
G2 
 
 the Grootspruit Bridge. Clery returned to Yaal Station for supplies on the 
 15th July, and thence marched to Leeuwspruit, 10 miles north of Standerton, 
 with the intention of visiting Bethel. In view, however, of the possibility that 
 C. De Wet, with the commando which had broken through Hunter’s cordon, 
 might endeavour to cross the Yaal opposite Heilbron, and thus effect a 
 junction with Botha’s forces, I directed the column to return to Greylingstad. 
 Clery reached Greylingstad on the 24th July. The same and the following 
 days Hildyard engaged the Lydenburg Commando near Amcrsfort, on which 
 occasion the 13th and (39th Batteries, Royal Field Artillery, the 1st Bn. King’s 
 Royal Rifle Corps, and the 2nd Bn. Gordon Highlanders, distinguished 
 themselves, especially the Volunteer Company of the latter battalion. The 
 enemy retired northward, having suffered considerable loss. 
 
 On the 22ml July, the Boers made a determined attack on the post at 
 Zuikerbosch Spruit, 13 miles east of Heidelberg. This post was held bv two- 
 companies of the Royal Dublin Fusiliers, 110 men of the Royal Engineers, and 
 10 men of the Imperial Yeomanry, under Major English of the first-named 
 regiment. Hart proceeded at once with reinforcements from Heidelberg, but 
 before he arrived the enemy had been beaten off, great credit for the 
 achievement being due to Major English and his small party. 
 
 On the 26th July, the railway to Heidelberg was open, communication 
 between Johannesburg and Natal being thus restored ; and, on the 2Sth, 
 Major-General Cooper, with the 3rd Bn. King’s Royal Rifle Corps and the 1st 
 Bn. Rifle Brigade, took over the command at Heidelberg from Major-General 
 Hart, the latter proceeding by rail to Rhenoster with the Royal Dublin 
 Fusiliers, and a wing of the Somersetshire Light Infantry. Sir Redvers Roller 
 was then ordered to concentrate a Cavalry brigade, 1,000 Mounted Infantry, 
 and an Infantry Division, at Standerton, and to move as early as possible on 
 Amersfort, and thence through Ermelo to’Carolina, with a view to his co-operating 
 with the advance from Middelburg along the Delagoa Bay Railway. He 
 moved to Paardekop on the 2nd August, and reached Amersfort on the 7th, 
 meeting with some slight opposition on the march. He crossed the Riet 
 Spruit on the Ermelo Road on the 9th, and occupied Ermelo unopposed two 
 days later, the enemy having retreated to Lake Chrissie. On the 12th, Clery 
 reported that a Field-Cornet and 182 burghers had surrendered at Waterval 
 Bridge and handed in their arms. On the 14th, Buller's mounted troops 
 entered Carolina and Twyfelaar, his Infantry being at Ivraspan, 10 miles south 
 of Carolina, and the Boers having fallen back on the Komati River. The 
 next day Sir Redvers Bidler established his head-quarters at Twyfelaar, where 
 he awaited the arrival of supplies and the completion of the arrangements for 
 an eastward advance. 
 
 28. And here I will ask your Lordship to revert to the operations against 
 De Wet, whose commando towards the end of July was occupying the hills in 
 the neighbourhood of Reitzburg. The enemy’s position was being watched by 
 the 2nd and 3rd Cavalry Brigades and Ridley’s Mounted Infantry, but it was 
 too strong to be attacked by mounted troops alone. Hart, with one and a half 
 battalions, arrived at Rhenoster on the 30th Juljq and proceeded to Kopje 
 Alleen, 25 miles north of Kroonstad, where he was joined on the 3rd August 
 by Major-General C. E. Knox* from Kroonstad. Broadwood, who was 
 holding the line from Wilgebosch Drift through Wonderheuvel and 
 Leeuwspruit to Yredefort, had with him the 1st Bn. Derbyshire Regiment and 
 Hart’s Infantry force, and was subsequently strengthened by the 2nd Bn. 
 Northumberland Fusiliers from Bloemfontein, and the Canadian Regiment from 
 Springs. The Colonial Division was also transferred from Bundle’s command 
 on the 27th July, and, marching through Kroonstad, proceeded on the 5th 
 August to AVinkledrift on the Rhenoster with orders to watch the principal 
 drifts down stream. Lord Kitchener left Pretoria on the 4th August in order 
 to assume command of the troops surrounding De Wet south of the Yaal, and 
 arrived the next day at Wonderheuvel. At this date, the military situation 
 was as follows :—De Wet was hemmed in on the south by the Cavalry 
 Brigades, the Colonial Division, Ridley's Mounted Infantry, and two Infantry 
 columns under Hart and Knox. North of the Yaal Lord Methuen was in 
 position near Potchefstroom to head De Wet back if he crossed the river, with 
 
 * 1st Bn. Oxfordshire Light Infantry, 3rd Bn. Royal Scots, one Field battery, two pompoms, 
 and 250 Infantry. 
 
63 
 
 Smith-Dorrien in support at Frederickstad. Methuen’s force consisted of 750 
 Imperial Yeomanry, the 2nd Bn. Northamptonshire Regiment, and 1st Bn. 
 Northumberland Fusiliers, with one Field battery, two howitzers, and two 
 pom-poms. Smitli-Dorrien had under his command 250 Mounted Infantry, 
 the 2nd Bn. Shropshire Light Infantry, the 1st Bn. Gordon Highlanders, the 
 City Imperial Volunteers, and one Field battery. I had hoped with so strong 
 a force, distributed in the manner which I have indicated, De Wet would have 
 found escape impossible. But the country round Reitzburg is extremely 
 difficult, and the hills on both sides of the liver furnish an effective screen to 
 the movements of a mobile column. On the 7th August, it was reported that 
 De AVet had succeeded in crossing the A r aal during the preceding night by 
 De Wet’s Drift, and that he was marching rapidly northward. On the Sth 
 and 0th, Methuen engaged his rearguard, having been joined on the latter 
 day by the Colonial Division, which had crossed by Scandinavia Drift. 
 The 2nd and 3rd Cavalry Brigades were at Lindcque Drift on the 0th, with 
 Ridley’s Mounted Infantry on the north bank of the river, and Hart’s column 
 at Kromellenburg Spruit. Lord Kitchener's advanced troops co-operated with 
 Lord Methuen’s force in the attack on De Wet’s rearguard, while Smith- 
 Dorrien moved from Frederickstad to Welverdiend and Bank Stations, the 
 Shropshire Light Infantry marching 43 miles in 32 hours, and the rest of his 
 troops 30 miles in 17 hours. As soon as I had ascertained that De Wet had 
 entered the Transvaal, I ordered Ian Hamilton to march with his column from 
 Commando Nek to Heckpoort, leaving Baden-Powell at the former place with 
 his mounted troops and the 1st Bn. Border Regiment. On the 10th August, 
 Lord Methuen reached Taaibosch Spruit, Lord Kitchener’s force occupied the 
 Gatsrand Range, south of the Potchefstroom —Krugersdorp railway, and 
 Smith-Dorrieu headed back a portion of the Boer commando which attempted 
 to cross the railway near Welverdiend Station. Hearing that the enemy had 
 turned westward, Kitchener changed direction accordingly and moved towards 
 Tafel Kop, the two Cavalry Brigades and Ridley’s Mounted Infantry crossing 
 the railway at Welverdiend on the 11th August. Hart followed the next day, 
 while Knox remained south of the A r aal to watch the drifts in case of any of 
 De Wet’s men breaking back into the Orange River Colony. On the L2th, 
 Methuen again engaged the Boer rearguard a few miles east of Ventersdorp, 
 and captured a gun. Lord Kitchener, with his mounted troops and two 
 Infantry battalions under Smitli-Dorrien, was at Rietvlei, 10 miles east of 
 Lord Methuen, followed by Plart’s column from Welverdiend. On this date, 
 one British Officer and 60 men, who had been taken prisoners by De Wet w hen 
 he seized a train north of Kroonstad, escaped from the enemy’s laager. On 
 the 13th, Lord Kitchener was at Schoolplaats, 8 miles east of AYntersdorp, 
 and Ian Hamilton had reached Blaaubank, 18 miles west of Krugersdorp. On 
 the 15th, Ian Hamilton reached Vlakfontein, 15 miles south-west of Olifant’s 
 Nek; Lord Methuen, with 1.200 mounted troops, was at Buffelshoek, 6 miles 
 south of the Magato Pass, his .Infantry and baggage following him in rear. 
 Lord Kitchener was at Leeuwfontein, 10 miles north-east of Tafel Kop, and 
 Broadwood at Tweefontein, 8 miles further west. During the preceding 
 night, however, De Wet had moved unobserved to the north of Hamilton’s 
 column, and, crossing Olifant’s Nek, he made for Rustenburg. 
 
 20. On the 14th August, information had reached me that Lieut.-Coionei 
 Hore was still defending the post at Elands River, w here lie had been attacked 
 10 days before. Difficulties with regard to supplies rendered it impossible to 
 continue the pursuit of De Wet in a northerly direction, and 1, therefore, 
 desired Lord Kitchener to proceed to Elands River with the 2nd Cavalrv 
 Brigade, Ridley’s Mounted Infantry, and Smith-Dorrien’s Infantry, and after 
 relieving Hore to return to Pretoria, via Boschhoek, Ilustenburg. and 
 Commando Nek. Lord Methuen’s column, with the 3rd Cavalry Brigade, was 
 ordered to Zcerust, and thence to Mafeking. Hart moved to Krugersdorp, 
 and Ian Hamilton was instructed to cross Olifant’s Nek and march back north 
 of Magaliesberg to Commando Nek. On the 16th August, the Elands River 
 garrison was relieved by Lord Kitchener, its casualties being five men killed, 
 seven men died of wounds, and 36 men wounded. The gallant defence of this 
 post was most creditable to Colonel Hore and the troops under his 
 command. 
 
 30. After visiting Rustenburg, De AVet moved eastward to the north of 
 
64 
 
 the Magaliesberg Range. On the 17th August, he reached Wolhuter’s Ivop, 
 15 miles west of Commando Nek, and thence sent a messenger to Baden- 
 Powell summoning him to surrender. On the 18th, Ian Hamilton attacked 
 from the south the detachment which De Wet had left at Olifant’s Nek, and 
 carried the position with very slight loss. Mahon’s mounted troops then 
 pushed on in pursuit towards Rootle Kopjes, while a force under Paget, 
 reinforced by Baden-Powell from Commando Nek, was ordered to march north 
 from Waterval along the Pietersberg Railway. On the 19th, Mahon was 
 engaged with the enemy’s rearguard near Roode Kopjes, and the next day Ian 
 Hamilton crossed the Crocodile River and pressed on in a north-easterly 
 direction. Paget and Baden-Powell. who were advancing north of Hamman’s 
 Kraal, were opposed by Grobler’s commando on the 19th and 20th, but on the 
 latter date they occupied Pienaar’s River Station, the enemy falling back to 
 Warm Baths Station. Lord Kitchener, with Ridley’s Mounted Infantry and 
 Smith-Dorrien’s Brigade, reached Wolhuter’s Kop on the 20th August, and 
 Commando Nek on the 22nd, Lord Kitchener himself returning to Pretoria 
 that afternoon. Three days later Ridley marched into Pretoria, being followed 
 on the 27th August by Smith-Dorrien. Broadwood’s Cavalry Brigade went to 
 Bank Station from Eland’s River to obtain supplies, and thence proceeded to 
 Pretoria, where it arrived on the 30th August. On the 22nd August, Baden- 
 Powell occupied Warm Baths Station, near which he engaged the enemy, 
 rescuing 100 British prisoners and capturing 25 Boers. He was followed by 
 Ian Hamilton, who, passing through Zwaartbooi’s Location, 10 miles west of 
 the railway, between Hamman’s Kraal and Pienaar’s River Station, reached 
 Warm Baths Station on the 24th. On the way he captured 13 Boers and a 
 large number of cattle and sheep. Paget also reached Warm Baths during 
 the night of the 24th. On this date, the enemy broke up into several small 
 parties in the neighbourhood of Nylstroom, which was occupied by Baden- 
 Powell by a flank march on the 26th August. As it appeared that De Wet. 
 with a fetv of his followers, had left the commando which he had brought 
 northward across the Vaal, and was returning to the Orange River Colony 
 through the Potchefstroom district, and as the forces under Paget and Baden- 
 Powell were strong enough to deal with the Boers opposed to them on the 
 Petersburg Railway, I directed Ian Hamilton and Mahon to march back to 
 Pretoria, their troops being needed on the Delagoa Bay line of operations. I 
 also withdrew that portion of Clement’s Brigade which had been supporting 
 Paget at Hamman’s Kraal, as 1 intended this brigade, with Ridley’s Mounted 
 Infantry, to act as a flying column for the purpose of clearing the country 
 between Commando Nek and Krugersdorp. 
 
 31. Seeing no advantage in a further advance towards Petersburg, I 
 desired Paget, on the 27th August, to withdraw Baden-Powell’s troops to 
 Warm Baths Station. Two days later Commandant Grobler sent in to Paget 
 the remaining prisoners in his hands, 34 in all. On the 31st, Plumer left 
 Pienaar’s River Station with a small flying column to clear the country to the 
 east, and the next day he engaged the enemy, capturing 26 prisoners, 31 
 wagons and 90 rifles. On the 1st September, lie attacked the Boers near 
 Rooikop, 25 miles east of Pienaar’s River Station, securing seven prisoners, 
 100 rifles, 40,000 rounds of ammunition, 350 cattle, and three wagons 
 containing supplies. On the 2nd September, he again came into contact with 
 a party of the enemy near Warm Baths Station, seizing a number of cattle and 
 sheep and a large amount of supplies. On reaching Warm Baths Station, 
 Plumer assumed command of Baden-Powell’s troops, the latter Officer having- 
 proceeded on leave. On the 3rd September, during an attack which the Boers 
 made on a kopje held by our troops near Warm Baths Station. Commandant 
 Piet Cronje was killed and the enemy driven off with heavy loss. On the 7th 
 September, Paget fell back with his whole force to Pienaar’s River Station, 
 and thence marched in the direction of Hebron, 16 miles north-west of 
 Pretoria. He arrived there on the 14th, having captured on the way 10 
 prisoners and 2,00<> head of cattle. 
 
 32. In paragraphs 7 to 10, l described Hunter’s operations in the 
 Orange River Colony up to the 6th August. On the loth August, Hunter 
 lett Bethlehem for Kroonstad. He reached Lindley the following day, and 
 
 * I hree battalions of the Highland Brigade, a wing of the 2nd Bn. Bedfordshire Beg-intent, 
 two companies of tlie Imperial Yeomanry. Lovat’s Scouts, one 5-inch gun, and If Field guns. 
 
was then directed to move on Heilbron, so as to guard against any attempt on 
 the part of General Olivier, who was then in the vicinity of Frankfort, to effect 
 a junction with De Wet’s commando at Reitzburg. Sending into Kroonstad 
 his sick and the cattle and sheep which had been captured in Brandwater 
 Basin, Hunter marched north and reached the Rhenoster River on the 13th, 
 On crossing the river next morning, he found the enemy, 1,800 with six guns, 
 under Generals Frohnemann and Olivier, holding a strong position across the 
 road at Witpoort, 12 miles south of Heilbron. After an engagement, which 
 lasted from 11 a.in. until 5 p.m., the position was occupied by our troops, the 
 enemy retiring to the north-east. Our casualties amounted to one Officer 
 and three men killed, and one Officer and 40 men wounded. On Ihe 15th 
 August, Hunter entered Heilbron unopposed, and, on the 20th, Bruce 
 Hamilton’s Brigade arrived at Kroonstad. 
 
 33. As soon as the troops engaged in the pursuit of De Wet became 
 available for operations elsewhere, I redistributed the field army with the 
 object, first, of advancing along the Delagoa Bay Railway to Komati Poort, 
 and, secondly, of forming flying columns to pursue and disperse the scattered 
 Boer commandoes which were carrying on a guerilla warfare both in the 
 Transvaal and the Orange River Colony. As regards the first objective, the 
 military situation was as follows : —On loth August, Sir Redvers Buller’s 
 force'* reached Twyfelaar. Frenchf was in command at Middelburg. On the 
 18th August, the Mounted Infantry were holding the line stretching from 
 Wonderfontein to Doornkop, 12 miles north of Middelburg, and French’s 
 Cavalry was distributed between Wonderfontein and Twyfelaar. On that date 
 French rejoined his two Cavalry brigades. On the 21st, Buller marched to 
 Van Wyk’s Vlei, 15 miles south-east of Belfast, and two days later the 11th 
 Division, under Pole-Carew, was concentrated at Wonderfontein. Buller met 
 with some opposition on the 23rd in the neighbourhood of Van Wyk’s Vlei, 
 and towards evening two companies of the 1st Bn. Liverpool Regiment entered 
 by mistake a hollow, out of sight of the main body, where they came under a 
 heavy fire, losing 10 men killed, and one Officer and 45 men wounded. The 
 other casualties on this occasion were one man killed, and three Officers and 
 four men wounded. On the 24th August. I left Pretoria for AVonderfontein, 
 and on the 25th proceeded to Belfast, which had been occupied the previous 
 day by the 11th Division. Some opposition was encountered, our casualties 
 amounting to one man killed, and one Officer and 14 men wounded. As soon 
 as I arrived, it became apparent to me that we were already in touch with a 
 part of the Boer main position. This position, as far as could be ascertained, 
 extended from the neighbourhood of Swartz Kopjes on the north to 
 Dalmanutha on the south, a distance of some 20 miles. It was furnished with 
 a numerous artillery, including two 6-inch guns, and was entrenched at various 
 points of importance. My first idea was to hold the enemy in front with the 
 11th Division, whilst Buller and French turned their left from the south. On 
 consultation, however, with General Buller, it seemed that the ground was not 
 favourable to a turning movement from this quarter, and 1 therefore decided 
 to contain the enemy’s front by the 18th Brigade and turn his right flank with 
 the Guards Brigade, assisted by General French and Colonel Henry’s Mounted 
 Infantry. With this object French moved, on the 26th, from Geluk, 12 miles 
 south of Belfast, and passing to the west of the town reached Lakenvlei, 
 6 miles to its north on the evening of this day. Pole-Carew, with the 11th 
 Division, endeavoured to advance along the Lydenhurg road in his support, but 
 came under so heavy a shell and rifle fire that he made but little progress. 
 Buller, whose Artillery was engaged throughout the day, pushed back the 
 Boers, who were holding a series of strong positions to the south-east of 
 Belfast, to within 4 miles of the railway between that town and Dalmanutha. 
 Our casualties on this date amounted to five men killed, and two Officers and 
 56 men wounded. On the 27th, French advanced S miles further north, and 
 drove the enemy from Swartz Kopjes. From this position he threatened the 
 enemy’s line of retreat, although he could hardly yet be said to have turned 
 their right flank. Meanwhile, however, General Buller was able to take more 
 decisive action at the other extremity of the Boer line of defence. At 
 
 * Lyttelton’s Division, and two Cavalry Brigades, under Brocklehurst and Dundonald. 
 f 1st and 4th Cavalry Brigades, Hutton’s Mounted Infantry, and the 11th Division. 
 
 I 
 
 (47) 
 
66 
 
 Bergendal, 3 milee south-east of Belfast, the Boers had established a very 
 strong position on a low rocky kopje, and in some farm buildings and 
 plantations, which formed the key to that portion of the main position. The 
 kopje was heavily entrenched, and was garrisoned by the Z.A.R. Police with a 
 pompom. The ground, which sloped gently away in all directions, afforded 
 no cover. Buller attacked this post early in the day, and after some hard 
 fighting it was carried very gallantly by the 2nd Bn. Rifle Brigade, supported 
 by the 1st Bn. Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers. The brunt of the action fell to 
 the former battalion, which lost heavily, our casualties being one Officer and 
 13 men killed, and seven Officers and 57 men wounded. 19 Boers were taken 
 prisoners; 20 of their dead were found on the kopje, and their pompom was 
 captured. The success of this attack was decisive. It was carried out in view 
 of the main Boer position, and the effect of it was such that the enemy gave 
 way at all points, flying in confusion to the north and east. Next morning 
 Buller was able to occupy Machadodorp almost without opposition. On this 
 day, the 28th, Dundonald’s Cavalry pushed on to Helvetia, where they came 
 into touch with the enemy’s rearguard, French’s Cavalry and the 11th Division 
 moved due east to Elandsfontein, 8 miles west of Helvetia. On the 29th 
 August, leaving garrisons at Dalmanutha and Machadodorp, Buller marched to 
 Helvetia and occupied Waterval Boven with his advanced troops. Pole-Carew 
 sent on three battalions to support French, remaining himself with the rest of 
 the 11th Division near Helvetia. On the 30th, French, supported by the 
 Guards Brigade, occupied Waterval Onder, while Buller reported from 
 Weltevreden that Nooitgedacht had been vacated by the Boers, and that the 
 British prisoners confined there were to he seen moving along the road to 
 Waterval Onder. By nightfall the prisoners, numbering 1,800, and including 
 seven Officers, reached our camp at Waterval Onder, and were subsequently 
 sent by rail to Pretoria. The remainder of the Officers had been removed to 
 Barberton. The prisoners stated that President Kruger, ex-President Steyn, 
 and Commandant-General Botha had left for Nelspruit on the 29th August. 
 On the 31st August, Buller fell back to Helvetia, preparatory to marching on 
 Lydenburg, Pole-Carew, with the 11th Division holding Waterval Onder, and 
 Henry’s corps of Mounted Infantry occupying Waterval Boven. French 
 returned with the 1st and 4th Cavalry Brigades to Machadodorp, whence I 
 directed him to move, via Carolina, on Barberton, there being no practicable 
 road to the latter place, from the railway east of Machadodorp. 
 
 In the meantime reinforcements had been moving up from the west. A 
 brigade, under Smith-Dorrien,* had been railed to Belfast between the 26th 
 and 29th August. Mahonf marched from Pretoria on the 30th August. He 
 was followed the next day by Cunningham’s Brigade.^ 
 
 34. On the 1st September, I issued a proclamation annexing the 
 Transvaal under the orders of Her Majesty’s Government. On this day, 
 Buller moved from Helvetia to Elandspruit on the Crocodile River. Next 
 morning his advance was opposed by the enemy, who were holding a strong 
 position at Badfontein, and had with them three 6-inch guns. Buller described 
 the position as resembling Laing’s Nek, and I agreed with him that it would 
 he wiser to defer his attack until I could send him assistance. Accordingly, 
 on the 3rd September, I despatched Ian Hamilton from Belfast^ to turn the 
 right flank of Boer force in front of Buller. Ian Hamilton reached Swart- 
 kopjes, on the Dullstroom road, meeting with but slight opposition. On the 
 4th, he entered Dullstroom—the enemy, with two guns, fighting a rearguard 
 action, and disputing every yard of the way—and on the same day continued 
 his march to Palmietfontein. During his march he was joined by Brocklc- 
 hurst’s Cavalry Brigade from Buffers column. On the same day, French 
 occupied the bridge over the Komati River between Machadodorp and 
 
 * 20th Battery, Royal Field Artillery; Mounted Infantry of the City Imperial Volunteers, 
 2nd Bn. West Yorkshire Regiment, 1st Bn. Royal Scots, 1st Bn. Royal Irish Regiment, and 
 1st Bn. Gordon Highlanders. 
 
 t “M” Battery, Royal Horse Artillery; 3rd Corps of Mounted Infantry, Queensland Mounted 
 Infantry, and New Zealand Mounted Rifles, 79th Company of Imperial Yeomanry, Imperial 
 Light Horse, and Lumsden’s Horse. 
 
 $ “ 1) ” Field Battery, Canadian Artillery; Blswiclc Battery, 1st Bn. King's Own Scottish 
 Borderers, 2nd Bn. Berkshire Regiment, 2nd Bn. Shropshire Light Infantry, and 1st Bn. Argyll 
 and Sutherland Highlanders. 
 
 $ 10 Field u'uus. Royai Scots, Royal Irish, and Gordon Highlanders 
 
67 
 
 Carolina, while Mahon’s mounted troops reached Wonderfontein, and Cunning¬ 
 ham’s Brigade reached Balmoral. At AVonderfontein, the 76th Battery, Royal 
 Field Artillery, and the 1st Bn. Suffolk Regiment were placed under Mahon’s 
 orders, and he was directed to join French at Carolina on 6th September. On 
 the 5th September, Ian Hamilton advanced about 12 miles to Wemershoek, 
 whence by a night march, he occupied Zwagerslioek with the Royal Scots, thus 
 securing the debouchment through the defile into the Lydenburg Valley, and 
 threatening the right rear of the Boer position at Badfontein. The same day 
 Buller demonstrated strongly against the enemy’s left flank, the 1st Bn. 
 Leicestershire Regiment and the 1st Bn. King’s Royal Rifle Corps dragging 
 the guns of a Field battery up a steep hill, whence a heavy fire was brought to 
 bear on the Boers. 
 
 65. On the 6th, owing to the right flank of their position having been 
 turned, and to the pressure on their left flank, the Boers evacuated their 
 stronghold at Badfontein, and fell back through Lydenburg, some going to 
 Kruger’s Post, but the majority with two 6-inch guns, taking up another 
 formidable position at Paardeplaats on the mountains overlooking the town 
 and 7 miles to the east of it. On the same day, Dundonald’s mounted 
 brigade and the Cavalry attached to Ian Hamilton’s force occupied Lydenburg, 
 Buller’s and Hamilton’s Infantry halting 5 miles in rear. French reached 
 Carolina on this date, and he was joined there by Mahon’s column, and the 
 2nd Bn. Shropshire Light Infantry. Cunningham’s Brigade arrived at Pan 
 Station, and Hutton began to concentrate Alderson’s Corps of Mounted 
 Infantry from the line of communication preparatory to marching from 
 Machadodorp along the heights south of the railway towards Tafelkop. On 
 the 8th September, Buller attacked the enemy at Paardeplaats, whence, with 
 their 6-inch guns, they were firing into the camp and town of Lydenburg. The 
 Boers held a precipitous ridge 1,800 feet above the valley, horse shoe in shape 
 and only easily approachable by paths which were completely commanded from 
 the crest. One great feature of the attack was the skill with which the guns 
 were pushed forward from point to point until they reached positions from 
 which they silenced the enemy’s artillery, and greatly subdued the rifle fire. 
 Another was the dash with which the Infantry pressed forward over rocks and 
 across ravines, and other apparently impracticable ground until they carried 
 the ridge. A third was the simultaneous arrival of the right, left, and centre 
 of the attack, namely, the Royal Scots, the Royal Irish, and the 1st Bn. 
 Devonshire Regiment in the enemy’s position. The Boers lost considerably, 
 but their retreat was concealed by heavy mist. Our casualties amounted to 
 13 killed and 25 wounded, three of the former and 16 of the latter belonging 
 to the Volunteer Company of the Gordon Highlanders, which came under 
 shrapnel fire at a distance of nearly 7 miles from the enemy’s guns. In this 
 action Buller reported that Ian Hamilton rendered valuable assistance, and 
 praised the excellent leading of Major-General Smith-Dorrien and Brigadier- 
 General F. W. Kitchener. The next day Buller occupied Mauchberg, the 
 enemy being dislodged by the 1st Bn. King’s Royal Rifle Corps, supported by 
 Artillery fire. 
 
 36. On the 10th September, French crossed the Komati River at Hlomo- 
 hlom unopposed, and made for the high ground near Deerdekop, which he 
 reached after some fighting the next day. Hutton was on the hills south of 
 the railway, protecting the right of the lltli Division at Xooitgedacht. Buller 
 occupied the junction of the roads from the east and south near Spitzkop on 
 the 11th September, the enemy retiring, some to Nelspruit and some to the 
 north across the Sabie River. 300,000 lbs. of Boer supplies, mainly rice, 
 sugar, flour, and coffee, and 300 boxes of small-arm ammunition were captured 
 by Buller at Spitzkop. Ian Hamilton’s column, after leaving Buller, returned 
 to Helvetia on the 12th, and moved the next day to Waterval Onder, where it 
 replaced the 11th Division, which advanced unopposed to Godwaan. The 
 enemy had been holding a strong position commanding Godwaan for some 
 days, but they fell back to Helspruit as soon as they found their line of retreat 
 threatened by Hutton’s occupation of Kaapsche Hoop. On the 12th September, 
 the news reached me that, after resigning the Presidency to Mr. Schalk Burger, 
 Mr. Kruger had left the Transvaal and arrived at Louren 9 o Marques the 
 previous evening, and that Commandant-General L. Botha had been obliged 
 on account of illness to hand over his command to General Viljoen. On the 
 
 <«D 12 
 
08 
 
 13th September, French entered Barberton with his Cavalry, which he took 
 across the mountains, thus completely surprising- the enemy. 82 British 
 prisoners, including 23 Officers, who had been removed to Barberton from 
 Nooitgedacht, were released, and 43 locomotives, with a considerable amount 
 of rolling stock, were found in the railway station. Over 100 Boers were made 
 prisoners. In the town French secured three weeks’ food and one week’s forage 
 for his column, and he seized many Mauser rifles and a quantity of ammunition, 
 50 wagons, and a large number of sheep and cattle. General Schoemann was 
 found in the Barberton Jail, having been imprisoned by the Boers on account 
 of his refusal to break his parole. Owing to the difficulty of getting his 
 transport through the pass leading into the valley, the remainder of French’s 
 force did not reach Barberton until the 14th September. 
 
 37. On this day, the 11th Division marched to Kaapsche Hoop, and Ian 
 Hamilton's column to Isooitgedacht. On the loth September, Pole-Carew, 
 with the Guards Brigade and Colonel Henry's Corps of Mounted Infantry, 
 moved towards Kaapmuiden, and the 18th Brigade, under Colonel Stephenson, 
 towards Nelspruit. Ian Hamilton’s column reached Godwaan Station, to which 
 place Hutton’s Mounted Infantry had returned for supplies. Nelspruit was 
 occupied by Stephenson's Brigade on the 17th, while French’s advance Cavalry 
 captured 50 locomotives at Avoca Station, Ian Hamilton’s column being one 
 march in the rear. On the 19th, Henry’s Mounted Infantry and the Guards 
 Brigade entered Kaapmuiden, where 19 locomotives were found in the railway 
 station, all of them in a damaged condition. 114 trucks containing supplies 
 were also captured. The bridges at this point and at Poort City Station had 
 been blown up by the enemy, but steps were at once taken to repair them. 
 Ian Hamilton’s column followed in support of Pole-Carew’s force. 
 
 38. The Boers, who retreated to Komati Poort as w-e advanced from 
 Machadodorp, were about 3,000 strong, and, out of this number, it was 
 ascertained that 700 had crossed the Portuguese frontier; others dispersed in 
 various directions, and the balance were reported to be occupying spurs of the 
 Lebombo Mountain, south of the railway between Portuguese territory and the 
 bridge over the Komati River. On the 21st September, I returned from 
 Nelspruit to Pretoria. The same day 80 burghers surrendered to Sir Redvers 
 Buller at Spitzkop, while a detachment of the Imperial Light Horse 
 proceeding from French Bob to Kaapmuiden captured 20 prisoners and 
 200 rifles, with a quantity of the enemy’s ammunition. On the 26th 
 September, Buller occupied the Mac-Mac River and eastern side of Burgher’s 
 Pass. The latter is a very awkward defile, but the opposition was slight. On 
 the 27th September, he entered Pilgrim’s Rest, without any casualties. On 
 the 28th, by a well-executed night march, a force under Colonel Byng obliged 
 the enemy to retire hurriedly from Pilgrim’s Hill. The 29th was spent in 
 getting the transport up this exceedingly difficult ascent, which, for a distance 
 of miles, has an average gradient of 10 degrees. The troops worked 
 admirably, and dragged up the guns and wagons by hand. On the 30th, 
 Kruger’s Post was reached, and touch regained with the Lydenburg garrison. 
 The Boers who had been holding Kruger’s Post withdrew to the Waterval 
 Valley, and so evaded our troops. On the 2nd October, Buller returned to 
 Lydenburg. The results of this march were that the enemy were divided into 
 three columns, the largest of which went north to the Limpopo. The intention 
 of concentrating at Spitzkop was also frustrated. During the march 109 
 burghers surrendered or were taken prisoners, 600 head of cattle, 4,000 sheep, 
 and 150 wagon-loads of supplies were captured, and large quantities of 
 ammunition fell into our hands. 
 
 On the 24th September, Pole-Carew, with the Guards Brigade and 
 Henry’s Mounted Infantry, entered Komati Poort, where he found the railway 
 bridge uninjured. Nearly 1,500 trucks, as well as 30 locomotives, including 
 two cog-wheel engines, were recovered on the main line and Selati branch line, 
 while a considerable amount of rolling-stock and of food supplies had been 
 burnt. South of the railway bridge the Boers had left several truck-loads of 
 gun and rifle ammunition, as well as a 6-inch Creusot gun, which had, however, 
 been destroyed. On this date, Ian Hamilton’s column reached Hectorspruit. 
 In the Crocodile River were discovered a number of Field guns, which had 
 been destroyed with dynamite, among them two 12-prs. belonging to 
 “Q” Battery, Royal Horse Artillery. On the 26th, Ian Hamilton joined 
 
Pole-Care w .at Komati Poort, between which place and Pretoria railway 
 communication was this day restored. The line to Lourengo Marques was also 
 open, supplies of food being' sent up therefrom. On the 28th September, the 
 Guards Brigade began to return by rail to Pretoria, where the whole brigade 
 was concentrated on the 4th October. It was followed by two 5-inch guns, 
 two naval 12-prs., the 85th Battery, Royal Field Artillery; Colonel Henry's 
 Corps of Mounted Infantry, and the West Australian Mounted Infantry. 
 
 39. I have already mentioned that, concurrently with the advance along 
 the Delagoa Bay railway, I organized flying columns for the purpose of 
 pursuing and dispersing the enemy’s commandoes which were carrying on a 
 desultory warfare north and south of the Vaal. In addition to the force 
 operating north of Pretoria, under Paget, whose march to Warm Baths Station 
 and thence to Hebron, has been described in paragraphs 30 and 31, a column 
 under Clements* was formed at Commando Nek. The duty assigned to this 
 column was to bring under control the Rustenburg and Heckpoort districts, 
 and to clear the country of marauders between Ivrugersdorp and Johannesburg. 
 Another column under Hart was concentrated at Krugersdorp.t The area 
 allotted to this force stretched from the Vaal to Ivrugersdorp, including 
 Klerksdorp, Potchefslroom, and Ventersdorp. A third column under Lord 
 Methuen had its head-quarters at Mafeking.J Its sphere of action was the 
 Lichtenburg district as far east as Tafel Ivop and Rustenburg, and thence up 
 to the left bank of Crocodile River below its junction with Elands River. 
 
 In the north-east angle of the Orange River Colony, Rundle in command 
 of the 8th Division, formed two columns, one under Boyes§ based on Vrede, 
 and the other under Campbell[J based on Harrismith. In the centre of the 
 Colony and east of the railway, Hunter had under his orders Macdonald’s 
 column^! based on Heilbron, and Bruce Hamilton’s** column based on 
 Kroonstad. A third columnft under Major-General C. E. Knox was also based 
 on Kroonstad for operations between that town and the Vaal. 
 
 40. As regards the operations of the columns in the Transvaal, there is 
 not much that calls for special mention. Clements moved west from 
 Commando Nek into the Hekpoort district and encountered the enemy under 
 Delarey on the 9th September at Hartebeestfontein, his Mounted Infantry 
 clearing the Witwatersberg Range. The next day, he again engaged the Boer 
 commando, which suffered considerable loss, our own casualties being two men 
 killed and 14 wounded. On the 12th September, Delarey fell back on 
 Rustenburg through Oliphant’s Nek. 
 
 On the 29th August, Lieut.-Colonel Bradley, Commanding the 2nd Bn. 
 North Staffordshire Regiment, attacked and dispersed a body of the enemy at 
 Modderfontein, 25 miles south of Ivrugersdorp, and two days later Hart drove 
 off a Boer detachment which was attempting to destroy the main of the 
 Johannesburg waterworks, 10 miles south-west of the town. From the 
 4th September to the 7th September, he pursued small parties of the enemy 
 to the south-west of Ivrugersdorp, Commandant Theron being among the 
 killed in one of the skirmishes which took place. On the 11th September, 
 Hart occupied Potchefslroom by a forced march, his mounted troops having 
 
 * The 8th Battery, Royal Field Artillery; 2nd Bn. Northumberland Fusiliers, 2nd Bn. 
 Worcestershire Regiment, 1st Bn. Border Regiment, 2nd Bn. Yorkshire Light Infantry, and 
 900 mounted troops, under Brigadier-General Ridley. 
 
 f The 28th Battery, Royal Field Artillery; 2nd Bn. South Wales Borderers, 2nd Bn. Royal 
 Dublin Fusiliers, a wing of the 2nd Bn. Somersetshire Light Infantry, 400 Yeomanry, and one 
 4-7-in. naval gun. 
 
 + The 4th Battery, Royal Field A rtillery; four guns of the 83th Battery, Royal Field 
 Artillery; a section of the 37th Howitzer Battery, New Zealand Battery, six pompoms, four 
 battalions of Imperial Yeomanry, under Lord Chesham; Australian Bushmen, 1st Bn. Northum¬ 
 berland Fusiliers, 1st Bn. Loyal North Lancashire Regiment, and 2nd Bn. Northamptonshire 
 Regiment. 
 
 § The 11th Battalion of Imperial Yeomanry, 1st Bn. South Staffordshire Regiment, 2nd Bn. 
 Royal 'A est Kent Regiment, 2nd Bn. Manchester Regiment, and seven Field guns. 
 
 || Three companies of Imperial Yeomanry, Driscoll’s Scouts. 2nd Bn. Grenadier Guards, 
 2nd Bn. Scots Guards, 1st Bn. Leinster Regiment, with six Field guns and one 5-inch gun. 
 
 H 4'ke 2nd Bn. Black \\ atch, 2nd Bn. Seaforth Highlanders, 1st Bn. Highland Light Infantry, 
 with 900 men and 12 Field guns, one 5-inch gun, and one pompom. 
 
 ** The 76th Battery, Royal Field Artillery; 2nd Bn. Bedfordshire Regiment, 1st Bu. Royal 
 Sussex Regiment, 1st Bn. Cameron Highlanders, with 700 mouuted men, under Lieut.-Colonel 
 Ross. 
 
 tt r lhe 17th Battery, Royal Field Artillery; 300 Imperial Yeomanry, and Mounted Infantry, 
 1st Bn. Oxfordshire Light Infantry, and 3rd Bn. Royal Scots. 
 
70 
 
 covered 45 miles, and his Infantry 35 miles, without halting for more than a 
 few hours. The Boers were completely taken by surprise and suffered heavy 
 loss, our only casualty being one Officer killed. On the 30th September, after 
 an absence of 33 days. General Hart returned to Krugersdorp. During that 
 time he had marched 310 miles, and had been almost constantly in touch with 
 the enemy. The Boers suffered considerably in the succession of skirmishes. 
 96 prisoners were taken, and his column captured 2,720 head of cattle, 3,281 
 sheep, 129 horses, ponies, and mules; 67 wagons and carts, and large 
 quantities of supplies. Our casualties were not heavy, namely, three killed, 
 24 wounded, and three missing. 
 
 41. To the w r est of the Transvaal, Carrington engaged the Lichtenburg 
 Commando near Ottoshoop on the 20th and 21st August. Lord Methuen 
 reached Zeerust on the 22nd and Ottoshoop on the 25th. Thence he marched 
 with his own and Carrington’s columns to Mafeking, arriving there on the 28th. 
 On the latter date, as Carrington’s services were required in Rhodesia, I 
 directed him to proceed with his staff to Salisbury, and placed Major-General 
 C. W. H. Douglas in command of Mafeking and the adjacent district. Lord 
 Methuen’s flying column was in readiness to move on the 7th September. He 
 proposed first to clear the country round Jacobsdal and Zeerust, and 
 afterwards to march south towards Schweizer-Reneke, on Hart’s River, the 
 garrison at that place being threatened by a local rising of the inhabitants of 
 the Bloemhof district. A second small column was placed at Douglas’s 
 disposal for operations in the Lichtenburg district, and a garrison was detailed 
 for Mafeking consisting of 400 mounted troops and 800 Infantry with four 
 Field guns. On the 9th September, Lord Methuen moved on a laager under 
 Commandant Vermaas at Melopo Oog, 10 miles south-east of Ottoshoop, and 
 completely dispersed the Boers, taking 30 of them prisoners and seizing 22 
 wagons and 40,000 rounds of rifle ammunition. On the 11th September, 
 Douglas was attacked on the road from Ottoshoop to Lichtenburg, but drove 
 off the enemy, capturing a large quantity of grain and other stores. He was 
 again engaged the following day, when 39 prisoners, 10 wagons, and a 
 considerable number of sheep and oxen fell into his hands. 
 
 On the morning of the 19th, Lord Methuen, while marching from 
 Jachskraal towards Schweizer-Reneke, heard of a Boer convoy moving in his 
 vicinity. He pursued and dispersed it, capturing a 15-pr. gun which had been 
 lost at Colenso by the 14th Battery, Royal Field Artillery, 28 prisoners, 26 
 wagons, 8,000 cattle, 4,000 sheep, some rifles, and 20,000 rounds of 
 ammunition. Next day he continued his march and reached Rietpan, 45 miles 
 north-east of Vryburg Railway Station, where 634 cattle and 3,000 sheep fell 
 into his hands. On the 28th September, Methuen was twice engaged with 
 Lemmer’s force, consisting of 500 men, one gun and one pompom. The Boers 
 had seven killed and 14 of them taken prisoners. Our casualties were two 
 killed and three wounded. On the 22nd, Brigadier-General Settle, with a 
 column from Yryburg, entered Schweizer-Reneke unopposed, and Lord 
 Methuen began to move north with a view to clearing the Rustenburg district 
 from the west. On the 23rd September, General Broadwood, with the 2nd 
 Cavalry Brigade, and a battalion composed of Infantry details from 
 Johannesburg, under Lieut.-Colonel C. E. Bradley, North Staffordshire 
 Regiment, left Pretoria for Commando Nek, to be followed later on by the 
 75th Battery, Royal Field Artillery, a section of Elswick Battery, the 2nd Bn. 
 West Yorkshire Regiment, and the 1st Bn. Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, 
 under Brigadier-General Cunningham, these troops having been withdrawn 
 from the Delagoa Bay line. The above force, in conjunction wdth Clements's 
 column, was intended to operate in the Rustenburg district from the east. 
 Broadwood also arrived at Rustenburg on the 26th, having on the way met 
 with slight opposition from a Boer force consisting of 300 men, one pompom, 
 and two Maxims under Steenkamp. He had no casualties, and captured two 
 wagons. Cunningham reached Elandskraal, half-way between Commando Nek 
 and Rustenburg on the 28th. Between this date and the 4th October, 
 Broadwood, Clements, and Ridley were engaged in clearing the country in the 
 neighbourhood of Rustenburg, while Cunningham occupied the town. They 
 captured 29 wagons, some rifles, and 10,000 rounds of small-arm ammunition 
 No casualties. 
 
 42. The force under Paget, as mentioned in paragraphs 30 and 31, arrived 
 
Tl 
 
 at Hebron on the 14th September. Thence it moved east to Waterval in 
 order to disperse a commando under Erasmus, which was advancing towards 
 Pretoria from Nylstroom direction. On the 23rd September a party of Boers 
 from this commando attacked Elands River Station on the Delagoa Bay 
 Bailway and did some slight damage, but was driven off by the garrison. 
 Meanwhile Erasmus’s camp was surprised by Paget, who during the preceding 
 night had made a forced march with the 1st Bn. West Riding Regiment, two 
 companies of the 2nd Bn. Wiltshire Regiment, two companies of the 1st Bn. 
 Royal Munster Fusiliers, the City Imperial Volunteer Battery, and two 5-inch 
 guns. The camp was captured, together with 12 prisoners, 2,500 cattle, 6,000 
 sheep, 50 horses, and some rifles and ammunition. The commando was 
 simultaneously engaged by Plumer’s Bushmen, who took 11 prisoners, 750 
 cattle, and 1,600 sheep. Four days later the portion of Paget’s force at 
 Pienaar’s River Station, under the command of Colonel L. Chapman, was 
 attacked on two sides, the enemy being able to come up close, under cover of the 
 thick bush. They were beaten off after three hours’ fighting, and were 
 followed up by the Bushmen. Our casualties were one Bushman killed and 
 one wounded, also three Munster Fusiliers taken prisoners. 
 
 43. South of the Vaal the enemy show r ed activity in several directions, 
 but their attemps failed, owing to the prompitude with which troops were 
 concentrated at the points of attack. On the 22nd August Rundle reported 
 that the Imperial Yeomanry patrols which he had sent to Brandwater Basin 
 had brought in 17 rifles, 140,000 rounds of Mauser ammunition, 12 shells, and 
 200 lbs. of dynamite ; while nearly 700 Boers had surrendered in the Harrismith 
 and Vrede districts. On the 24th August it w'as reported from Winburg that 
 Lieut.-Colonel H. M. Ridley, Imperial Yeomany, while reconnoitring 9 miles 
 north-east of that place with 250 mounted troops and a few infantry, had been 
 surrounded by a Boer commando, 1,000 strong with two guns. I therefore 
 directed Hunter to despatch by rail 200 Mounted Infantry, one and a half 
 battalions of Infantry, and eight Field guns, under Bruce Hamilton, to Winburg, 
 and a half battalion with 4 guns to Ventersburg Road Station, to co-operate 
 thence with a small column under Lieut.-Colonel W. L. White, R.A., which 
 Lieut.-General Ivelly-Kenny had sent to Ventersburg. Ridley’s party was 
 relieved and the enemy driven off on the 25th August, the casualties on our 
 side amounting to one man killed, one Officer wounded, and five men missing. 
 On the 27th a Boer force 1,400 strong, under Olivier, attacked Winberg. It 
 was repulsed by Bruce Hamilton, 29 prisoners being taken, including Olivier 
 and his three sons, who w r ere captured by a small detachment of the Queens¬ 
 town Rifle Volunteers. The enemy then moved south-east with a view to 
 attacking Ladybrand and Thabanchu. Kelly-Kenny accordingly railed Lieut.- 
 Colonel White’s column from Ventersburg Road Station to Bloemfontein on 
 the 2Sth August, and sent it thence to the Waterworks on the Modder River. 
 Bruce Hamilton’s Brigade, with Le Gallais’ Mounted Infantry, was also railed 
 during the three following days to Bloemfontein from Kroonstad and Winburg, 
 while MacDonald’s column proceeded from Heilbron to Winburg. The 
 Ladybrand garrison, consisting of 43 men of the Wiltshire Imperial Y’eomanry, 
 and one company of the 1st. Bn. Worcestershire Regiment, under the command 
 of Major F. White, R.M.L.I., District Commissioner, was surrounded on the 
 2nd September by a Boer force 3,000 strong, with nine field guns and two 
 machine guns. Lieut.-Colonel White, R.A., occupied Thabanchu on the 1st 
 September, and the next day he was joined by Bruce Hamilton with a column 
 of 2,000 men, supported by Lc Gallais with his mounted troops and the 2nd Bn. 
 Royal Irish Rifles from the Bloemfontein garrison. Ladybrand was relieved 
 by Bruce Hamilton on the morning of the 5th ; and although the Boers had 
 brought a heavy artillery fire to bear on the entrenchments, our casualties 
 were only one Officer and four men wounded. The enemy had withdrawn 
 north-westward the previous night in the Allandale direction. Bruce Hamilton’s 
 Infantry marched SO miles in 4| days to effect this relief. Meanwhile, Ruudle, 
 with Boyes’ column was marching towards Bethlehem, which he reached on the 
 11 th September, and Campbell’s column passed through Ficksburg on its way 
 to Trommel on the 7th September. On the latter date Bruce Hamilton was 
 ordered to move to the Leeuw River Mills, taking with him the Ladybrand 
 garrison, and Maedonald’s column arrived at Winburg- The object of these 
 movements was to defeat and disperse fee Commandoes which had retired to 
 
the hills near Korannaberg and Doornberg. On the 12tli September a party 
 of Boers belonging to the Commando which had attacked Lad ybrand appeared 
 near Brandfort, with the intention of damaging the railway. Kelly-Kenny 
 reinforced the posts between Bloemfontein and Smaldeel, and communicated 
 with MacDonald, who the next morning crossed to the south of the Yet Biver on 
 the road from Winburg to Bloemfontein, and engaged the enemy 8 miles west 
 of Tafel Kop, driving them across the river and pursuing them to the north of 
 the Winburg—Smaldeel railway. The Boers retired in great confusion, seven 
 prisoners, 31 wagons, 270 trek oxen, and a large quantity of supplies, ammuni¬ 
 tion and dynamite falling into our bands. Lovat’s Scouts especially 
 distinguished themselves during the pursuit. 
 
 On the 18th September, Rundle attacked a party of Boers near Bronkhorst- 
 spruit, 20 miles west of Senekal, capturing one gun and 30 w'agons, while 
 C. Knox successfully engaged the enemy at Klompie Dooms between Senekal 
 and Kroonstad. 
 
 44. It may be here mentioned that, in view of De Wet’s return from the 
 Transvaal to the district between Heilbron and Reitzburg, and the possibility 
 of his collecting a fresh commando in that direction, I thought it desirable to 
 concentrate a strong mounted force at Kroonstad and on the Rhenoster River. 
 The Colonial Division, which had been attached to Lord Methuen’s column 
 during the pursuit of De Wet, w'as accordingly ordered to march from Zeerust 
 to Elandsfontein, vid Krugersdorp. It left Zeerust on the 25th August, being 
 joined by the 3rd Cavalry Brigade under Colonel Little. The same day Colonel 
 Little was wounded near Jacobsdal, and the command of the combined 
 force devolved on Colonel Dalgety. Between Zeerust and Krugersdorp 
 considerable opposition was met with, the casualties in the Colonial Division 
 being 10 men killed and five Officers and 20 men wounded; and in the 3rd 
 Cavalry Brigade one man killed, and one Officer and six men wounded. On 
 reaching Elandsfontein, the Colonial Division proceeded on the 14th September 
 to Rhenoster, a portion of it through Heidelberg, and the remainder along the 
 railway. The 3rd Cavalry Brigade, under Colonel Porter, who by this time 
 had replaced Colonel Little, was railed to Kroonstad ; while De Lisle’s Corps of 
 Mounted Infantry was withdrawn from Clements’s column and moved by rail on 
 the 17th September to Rhenoster, where it was joined by 250 men of Kitchener’s 
 Horse from Kroonstad. 
 
 45. The Boers broke up in small parties from the hills near Doornberg 
 without giving our troops any further chance of attacking them, and as it seemed 
 likely that they would reassemble in the Heilbron and Frankfort districts, 
 Hunter made a fresh disposition of the four columns under his command. On 
 the 22nd September he ordered the force under MacDonald to march to 
 Kaalfontein, on the Valsch River. Bruce Hamilton and Boyes were to converge 
 on Lindley from Senekal and Bethlehem ; and Campbell, who had returned to 
 the latter place, was directed to proceed to the vicinity of Reitz. These 
 movements w'ere completed by the 25th September. 
 
 4G. On the 29th September, the quietude of the Orange River Colony 
 w'as disturbed by a small party of Boers, probably numbering less than 200, 
 and without guns, who moved upon Wepener. About 30 or 40 of the enemy 
 entered the town at 6 a.m. upon that date, and caused a considerable amount 
 of panic amongst the inhabitants. Major Wright, the District Commissioner, 
 w'as also forced to withdraw together with his police into Basutoland. The 
 Boers are reported to have treated the residents with civility, but they helped 
 themselves liberally to money from the bank, and also commandeered clothing 
 and supplies to a considerable extent. The occurrence was unfortunate, but it 
 has not hitherto been found possible to garrison every place which it might be 
 advantageous to occupy, with troops. As soon as I heard of this raid I issued 
 orders for Ladybrand, Wepener, and Dewetsdorp to be occupied by detachments 
 from the Highland Brigade, which had been sent down by rail from Kroonstad 
 to Bloemfontein. 
 
 47. On the 30th September, Hildyard held Wakkerstroom and Utrecht, 
 150 of the commando from the latter place having surrendered. 
 
 I am, my Lord, 
 
 Your most obedient humble Servant, 
 
 ROBERTS, Field-Marshal 
 
No. 9. 
 
 From Field-Marshal Lord Roberts to the Secretary of State for War. 
 
 Head-quarters of the Army in South Africa, 
 
 Johannesburg’, 15th November 1900. 
 Sir, (Despatched 3rd January 1901.) 
 
 In continuation of my despatch, dated 10th October 1900, I have the 
 honour to submit, for the information of Her Majesty’s Government, an account 
 of the military operations in the Orange River Colony and the Transvaal, from 
 the 4th October to the present date. 
 
 2. With the occupation of Komati Poort, and the dispersal of Commandant- 
 General Louis Botha’s army, the organized resistance of the two Republics 
 may be said to have ceased, but there still remained much for the Army in 
 South Africa to do before the country could be said to be completely conquered. 
 Certain Boer leaders, notably De Wet, Delarey, and others of lesser import¬ 
 ance had, and have still to be dealt with, and the guerilla warfare carried on 
 by them put a stop to. 
 
 3. To meet this state of affairs the Army had to be broken up into smaller 
 columns than had hitherto been found advantageous, and the mobility of each 
 column had to be increased. Great difficulty was, however, experienced in 
 carrying out these necessary changes, owing to the time having arrived for the 
 withdrawal of the Royal Canadian Dragoons, the Royal Canadian Regiment, 
 the three batteries of Canadian Artillery, and the greater part of the first 
 contingents furnished by Australia, New Zealand, and Tasmania, and allowing 
 the members of the several South African corps to return to their homes and 
 employments after having been embodied for 12 months. 
 
 It was impossible to disregard the urgent reasons given by our Colonial 
 comrades for not being able to remain longer at the seat of war. They had 
 done admirable service and shown themselves well fitted to take their places by 
 the side of Her Majesty’s Regular troops, and I witnessed their departure with 
 deep regret, not only on account of their many soldierly qualities, but because 
 it materially impaired the mobility and efficiency of the Army in South Africa 
 for the time being, a very critical time, too, until indeed a fresh body of 
 Mounted Infantry could be formed from the nearest available Line battalions, 
 and the several South African local corps could be again recruited up to their 
 original strength. 
 
 4. At this particular period the scattered bodies of Boers became more 
 than usually active. Commandant-General Botha, who had relinquished his 
 command, ostensibly on account of ill-health, after his burghers were defeated 
 at Bergendal, resumed his position, and was joined by ex-President Steyn, who 
 has been indefatigable in his efforts to encourage his countrymen and the 
 Transvaalers to maintain the struggle by deceiving them with false accounts of 
 success on their part, and defeat on ours. 
 
 5. The presence of Botha and Steyn in the Waterberg District necessitated 
 our taking action in that direction, and during the first two weeks of October, 
 Major-General Paget’s mobile columnst were employed clearing the country 
 from the Pretoria—Bronkhurst Spruit railway, as far north as a line joining 
 Pienaar’s River Station with the junction of the Wilge and Olifants rivers. 
 This was accomplished with very little fighting. Paget’s troops captured 150 
 prisoners, 200 rifles, 50 wagons, and 12,000 sheep, and the Boers retired into 
 the bush veldt to the north-east. 
 
 During the latter half of the month Paget’s columns! traversed the country 
 to the west of Pretoria — Pietersburg line, with the two-fold object of clearing 
 the country of scattered bands of the enemy, and of preventing Louis Botha 
 from moving west of the Magaliesberg and Pilandsberg. In these operations 
 
 t Paget’s eommaud.—Plumer’s force, 1st Bn. West Riding Regiment, two companies 1st Bn. 
 Royal Munster Fusiliers, two 5-inch guns, City Imperial Volunteers Battery. 
 
 ;Paget’s command.—Plutner’s force, the Scots Guards, four companies 1st Bn. Royal 
 Munster Fusiliers, two 5-inch guns, 7th Battery, Royal Field Artillery; section Sfcth Battery 
 Royal Field Artillery. 
 
 GD 
 
 K 
 
74 
 
 Paget, in conjunction with the troops in the Rustenburg valley, was successful. 
 Louis Botha’s force did not get beyond Bamakok’s Kraal (3 )7), just west of the 
 junction of the Apies and Crocodile rivers, though he himself was reported to 
 have accompanied Steyn in his journey south as far as Steenbokfontein (-370), 
 about 45 miles west of Rustenburg. Our efforts were then directed towards 
 preventing ex-President Steyn from returning south to rejoin De Wet, but in 
 this we were not successful. He evaded our columns with a small following 
 and succeeded in joining De Wet, being present, as mentioned later, at the 
 commencement of the engagement near Bothaville on the 0th November. 
 
 Paget's force reached Rustenburg on the 31st October, and on the 1st 
 November he bad an engagement to the south-west of Magato Pass, when 
 Plumer's mounted troops drove the Boers from two strong positions over some 
 difficult country. The Yorkshire and Warwickshire 4 eomanry, under Colonel 
 Howard, carried one position by assault, and the 3rd Imperial Bushmen, under 
 Major Vialis, turned another position, which caused the enemy to retreat 
 precipitately. Unfortunately rain had made the roads too heavy for the 
 Infantry and heavy guns to arrive in time to take part in the engagement. 
 Our casualties were one man killed and two wounded. The enemy’s losses are 
 unknown, but six prisoners were left in our hands. 
 
 (5. In the Western Transvaal the mobile columns, under Lieut.-General 
 Lord Methuen, performed good work, clearing the country between 
 Rustenburg and Zeerust. Leaving Rustenburg in two columns on the 9th and 
 10th October, Methuen reached Zeerust on the 20th after a very trying- 
 march through broken country covered with dense bush, and having captured 
 on the way a large number of wagons and prisoners. Delarey was on his 
 flank during the whole march, but refused to fight. On the 16th October, 
 Methuen surprised Lemmer, who retired with some casualties, leaving two 
 dead Boers on the ground. Methuen’s casualties during this march were six 
 men killed and 10 wounded. 
 
 7. On the 24tl: October, Methuen’s column from Buffelshoek (284) w : as 
 joined by Douglas’s Brigade from Zeerust, and engaged the Boer commandos, 
 about 600 strong, under Lemmer, near Kaffir Kraal (214). These 
 commandos were dispersed, leaving six dead and four wounded on the field, 
 while many wounded Boers were seen to be carried off. The Yeomanry, 
 under Lord Krroll, on this occasion showed great dash, and we succeeded in 
 capturing 28 prisoners, ISO,000 rounds of ammunition, 21 wagons with 
 supplies, and a quantity of live stock. Our casualties were six men severely 
 wounded, two slightly, and one man missing. 
 
 S. Large as the force appears to be in South Africa, it has proved all too 
 small for the duties it has been required to perform, and I have not found it 
 practicable to occupy in sufficient strength the many places it would have been 
 advantageous to have held. Every garrison thus isolated not only reduces the 
 power and mobility of the several columns in the field, but necessitates the 
 withdrawal of these columns from other important duties to periodically escort 
 convoys of supplies for its use. Lately, how-ever, since it has not been 
 necessary to have such large columns in the field, I have been able to do more 
 in this way, and, on the 26th October, I arranged for the permanent 
 occupation of Zeerust, much to the satisfaction of the majority of the 
 inhabitants of the Marica district, whose sympathies are more British than 
 Dutch. Methuen was accordingly directed to leave at Zeerust four companies 
 of Infantry, 100 mounted men, and two guns, the whole to be securely 
 entrenched and provisioned for 60 days; and to place himself with the 
 remainder of Lis force (except Douglas’s Brigade) west of Ottoshoop to 
 prevent Botha from moving to the west of the Mafeking—Kimberley railway, 
 as there were very persistent rumours that his intention was to invade the 
 Kenhardt district in the hope of obtaining recruits, supplies, and horses from 
 the disloyal inhabitants of Cape Colony. I ordered Douglas’s Brigade* to 
 Klerksdorp, partly in view of re occupying that place, and partly to assist in 
 some operations I had directed Lieut.-General French to undertake in the 
 valley of the Yaal. Douglas marched to Mababstad on the 1st November, 
 
 * It consisted of Grey’s Mounted Brigade (strength—63 Officers, 764 other ranks), two 
 sections 88th Battery, Royal Field Artillery; four pompoms, head-quarters and two companies 
 1st Bn. Loyal North Lancashire Regiment, 2nd Bn. Northamptonshire Regiment. 
 
and on the 11th he reached Ventersdorp after a 27 miles march across a 
 waterless desert from Tafelkop, arriving- at Klerksdorp on the 16th. After 
 leaving Zeerust, Douglas was frequently engaged. His own casualties were 
 few, while he succeeded in capturing 29 prisoners, 4,700 head of cattle, 11,200 
 sheep, 90 horses and mules, 138 wagons and carts, and large quantities of 
 supplies. 
 
 9. Further to the south and west, in the country extending from Modder 
 River to Vryburg and Schweizer Reneke, the operations were entrusted to 
 Major-General Settle, who left Christiana on the 13th October with 600 
 mounted men, 10 guns, and 1,350 Infantry. He occupied Bloemhof on the 
 14th, having captured 1,000 head of cattle, 12,000 sheep, and SO horses 
 belonging to burghers who had violated their oaths of neutrality, and he 
 secured 50 prisoners. On arriving at Hoopstad on the 17th October, I 
 instructed him to co-operate with Hunter by marching on Botliaville. Hunter, 
 who was then near Kopje Alleen, about 14 miles north-west of Ventersburg 
 Road Station, had received information that 1,600 Boers were moving from 
 the south-east on Botliaville, and was following them up with half the 1st Bn 
 Sussex Regiment and half of the 1st Bn.’ Cameron Highlanders, of Bruce 
 Hamilton’s Brigade, Rimington’s and Le Gallais’ mounted troops, and the 3rd 
 Cavalry Brigade (Porter’s). Hunter reached Botliaville on the 20th October, 
 and sent the 3rd Cavalry Brigade to Commando Drift to reconnoitre that 
 crossing of the Vaal and to communicate with Settle. 
 
 10. Meanwhile Settle was attacked on the night of the 19th October at 
 Elizabeth’s Rust. After a sharp little engagement, lasting 45 minutes, the 
 Boers retreated to the north bank of the Vaal. Our casualties were one 
 Officer and 15 men wounded. On the 21st October, the 3rd Cavalry Brigade 
 met Settle’s advanced troops under Colonel Sir Charles Parsons, as neither 
 force had seen anything of the Boers, Settle retraced his steps on the 22nd to 
 Hoopstad, and Hunter reached Kroonstad on the 26th October. On the 23rd 
 October, whilst on his way to Hoopstad, Settle was closely engaged by a Boer 
 force, numbering about 650 men from the commandos under Potgieters, De 
 Villiers, and Wolmaranstad, which had probably crossed the Vaal from the 
 north. The Cape Police and Cape Mounted Rifles bore the brunt of the 
 fighting, covering the baggage of the column (73 wagons), and were heavily 
 engaged for 2 hours before the Boers were driven off. The Cape Police 
 were forced to abandon their two Maxims (having first rendered them useless), 
 owing to the horses being shot and darkness setting in. Our casualties were 
 seven men killed, 12 men wounded, and 17 missing. Settle arrived at Boshof 
 on the 30th October, and from there made arrangements to send Sir Charles 
 Parsons to Honeynest Kloof to relieve Koffyfontein, he himself following in 
 support. 
 
 11. On the 26th October. Hunter reached Kroonstad and reported that 
 the Boers, with some guns, were in position to the east of the railway between. 
 Ventersburg town and the railway station. As it was necessary that this 
 gathering should be dispersed and the whole of that neighbourhood cleared of 
 the enemy to prevent further attack on the railway in that vicinity, I ordered 
 Hunter to sweep the district, using for that purpose Bruce Hamilton’s troops 
 and the 3rd Cavalry Brigade.* 
 
 In pursuance ot these instructions, Hunter, after some opposition, 
 occupied Ventersburg before daylight on the morning of the 30th October. 
 The 3rd Bn. of The Buffs was hotly engaged and behaved with conspicuous 
 steadiness. The enemy retired north, leaving three of their dead on the 
 field. In this engagement. I regret to say, Major Hanwell, Commanding 39th 
 Battery, Royal Field Artillery, was mortally, and 10 men severely wounded. 
 
 Having completed the work in this neighbourhood. Hunter proceeded to 
 Bloemfontein and took over lvelly-Kenny’s command, and Bruce Hamilton 
 moved with a convoy to Bindley and Frankfort. 
 
 12. Meanwhile, Do Lisle's Mounted Infantry, with the remnant of the 
 Colonial Division, had been watching De \Fct in the neighbourhood of 
 Reitzburg, and after three days' fighting had driven him north of the Vaal near 
 
 * ITnlf Cameron Highlanders, half Sussex Regiment, three 15-pr. guns, Royal Field 
 Artillery; Rimington’s Scouts, 120; Imperial Yeomanry, 70: Mounted Infantry, 40. Additional 
 sent hv General Knox—3rd Bn. The Buffs, 300; one 5-inch gun. 
 
 ( 47 ) K 2 
 
76 
 
 Yenterskroon, but De Lisle’s little column was not strong enough to follow 
 him up, and as it seemed likely that lie would make an attempt again to 
 damage the Krugersdorp— Potchefstroom railway, I directed Barton to 
 proceed on the 9th October to the pass over the Gatsrand at Buffelsdoorns 
 (578). Barton reached Banks Station on the 11th, and Wolverdriend on the 
 13th October, and on the 15th he came in contact with De Wet’s force, said to 
 consist of four guns and 1,800 men, all well mounted, every man having two, 
 and some three, horses. A tight took place at Buffelsdoorns, where the 
 Scottish Yeomanry, under Sir James Miller, and the 1st Bn. Uoyal Welsh 
 Fusiliers, behaved with great gallantry. Six dead Boers were left on the 
 ground, and a large quantity of small-arm ammunition was captured. On the 
 18th October, Lieut.-Coloncl Wools Sampson, with the Imperial Light Horse, 
 joined Barton at Frcderikstad, and on the 20th the camp was attacked and an 
 engagement ensued. The 2nd Bn. Royal Scots Fusiliers had one Officer and 
 one man killed, and the Imperial Light Horse 12 men wounded. 
 
 On the 22nd October, I ordered the 1st Bn. Essex Regiment and some 
 550 mounted men to join Barton, and the same day instructed Charles Knox, 
 then at Heilbron, to take command of a column consisting of the Colonial 
 Division and l)e Lisle’s and Le Gallais’ forces, and to move across the Yaal 
 against the Boers opposed to Barton, who was more or less invested at 
 Frcderikstad until the 25th October, when he attacked the enemy with half 
 the 1st Bn. Royal Welsh Fusiliers and three companies of the 2nd Bn. Royal 
 Scots Fusiliers, supported by his guns and mounted troops, and scattered them 
 in all directions. The Boers suffered heavily, leaving 24 dead and 19 wounded 
 on the ground, while 26 were taken prisoners. Our own casualties were 
 severe, one Officer and 12 men killed, and 25 men wounded. On the 28th 
 October, Barton moved to Potchefstroom and established a permanent 
 garrison there with three months’ supplies. 
 
 13. De Wet, notwithstanding the severe treatment met nith on the 25th 
 October, endeavoured to recross the Yaal, but finding the drifts blocked, he 
 moved along the north bank of the river in the direction of Lindeque, Charles 
 Knox pushing on rapidly from Potchefstroom, caught him at Rensburg Drift 
 halfway between Yenterskroon and Farys. 'The Boers tried to escape south¬ 
 east, but being headed by Le Gallais’ mounted troops, which Knox had sent 
 from Venterskroon towards Yredefort, they made for Parys. They lost 
 considerably in this engagement leaving behind seven killed, while nine 
 prisoners, two guns, and three wagons were captured, and an ammunition 
 wagon was blown up by a shot from :: U ” Battery, Royal Horse Artillery. 
 Darkness and a heavy storm stopped pursuit. Our only casualties were two 
 men wounded. De Lisle handled his troops with great skill over very difficult 
 country, and Le Gallais’ ready co-operation merits much praise. 
 
 14. On the 3rd November Le Gallais was again in touch with De Wet’s 
 scouts cast of Bothaville, and on the night of the 5th surprised the Boer force 
 3 miles south of that place, and was heavily engaged for 5 hours when he 
 was reinforced by Charles Knox with De Lisle’s Mounted Infantry. The 
 enemy were completely defeated. This was a most successful engagement, 
 reflecting great credit on Major-General Charles Knox and all serving with 
 him, especially on the Australian and other mounted troops under Colonel 
 Le Gallais and Lieut.-Colonel De Lisle, who must have felt themselves amply 
 rewarded for the perseverance and energy they had displayed during the 
 preceding weeks which had been most harassing for all concerned. One 12-pr. 
 of “ Q ” Battery, Royal Horse Artillery, and one 15-pr. of the 14th Battery, 
 Royal Field Artillery, were recaptured. Four Krupp guns, one pompom, one 
 Maxim, all the enemy’s ammunition and wagons, and 1O0 prisoners were 
 taken, and 25 dead and 30 wounded Boers were left on the field. Amongst 
 the wounded was de Villiers, Steyn’s secretary, and amongst the dead a Boer 
 doctor, with the red cross on his arm, a rifle in his hand, and a bandolier half 
 emptied. Ex-President Steyn and De Wet were both present at the 
 beginning of the engagement, but made a hurried retreat early in the day. 
 Our casualties were three Officers and seven men killed, and seven Officers and 
 27 men wounded. 
 
 Amongst the killed, I deeply regret to say, was Colonel Le Gallais, 
 8th Hussars, a most gallant and capable leader, whose place it will be very 
 
difficult to fill ; and amongst the wounded Lieut.-Colonel W. Ivoss, Durham 
 Light Infantry, who had done extremely good work throughout the campaign 
 with the Mounted Infantry. 
 
 The advanced troops of Charles Knox’s column under De Lisle reached 
 Kroonstad on the 8th November to refit and obtain supplies, and were 
 followed in the course of a day or two by the rest of the force. 
 
 15. From information which had reached me from various sources, I had 
 for some time been aware that there was likely to be a recrudescence of Boer 
 activity in the southern part of the Orange River Colony. Their stock of 
 ammunition was running short, their numbers were considerably reduced, 
 supplies were not over plentiful, and they hoped that if they could only show 
 themselves south of the Orange River, they would be able to induce many of 
 the disloyal inhabitants of Cape Colony to join their ranks and also replenish 
 their stores. 
 
 The news that the Boers intended to move to the south caused a general 
 feeling of unrest throughout Cape Colony, and the prisoners of war at Cape 'Town 
 were firmly convinced that the time of their captivity was drawing to an end. 
 
 1(3. Up till the middle of October, Steyn and De Wet had been loath to 
 leave the valley of the Vaal, trusting that some fortunate combination of 
 circumstances would admit of their acting in communication with Botha and 
 Delarey, and making a successful attack on Johannesburg or Pretoria. 
 
 The decisive victory of Charles Knox crushed these hopes ; so soon as they 
 could collect their scattered forces, they hurried south to join Harsbruk and 
 Hertzog, who had already given us considerable trouble on the line of railway 
 between Bloemfontein and the Orange River, and amongst the small towns 
 lying to the west of that line. 
 
 17. So many troops had been required for the extended operations in the 
 Transvaal that the southern part of the Orange River Colony had to be very 
 lightly held, and it was not easy, on account of the great distances to be 
 traversed, to increase the strength of Lieut.-General Kelly-Kenny’s command 
 on short notice. As mentioned, however, in my last despatch, the Highland 
 Brigade had already been sent to Bloemfontein on receipt of the news that 
 Wepener had been temporarily occupied by the Boers, and was followed by 
 a few companies of Volunteers which had been withdrawn from their battalions 
 in the hope that it would be possible to let them return to England at an 
 early date. 
 
 On the 27th and 29th October, the 3rd Cavalry Brigade left Kroonstad 
 for the south, and at the same time the 3rd Bn. Grenadier Guards were 
 despatched from Pretoria, and the 1st Bn. Coldstream Guards from Heidelburg, 
 followed on the 7th November by the 1st Bn. Scots Guards. 
 
 18. Meanwhile Kelly-Kenny had recalled Lieut.-Colonel White’s column* 
 from the Smithfield direction, and formed a second column,! under the 
 command of Lieut.-Colonel Barker, R.A. 
 
 Before, however, these troops could he available the south-west of the 
 Orange Iliver Colony became the scene of renewed hostilities. Jagersfontein 
 was attacked by the Boers on the 10th October. The garrison was under the 
 command of Major King-Hall, and consisted of two companies of the 2nd Bn 
 Seaforlh Highlanders, two guns, and 100 Town Guard and Police. ’This force 
 was divided into two parties, one holding two forts to the south of the town, the 
 other a range of kopjes to the north, with a reserve in the town. At daybreak 
 the Boers opened fire from the north-east of the town, and almost simultaneously 
 the reserves in the town were subjected to a heavy fire from the houses. 
 About 25 Boers under cover of the night, and aided by the treachery of the 
 inhabitants, had managed to evade the picqucts and gain entrance to the 
 town, and at daylight, reinforced by sympathisers, both men and women, were 
 in position to open fire in perfect security from the houses. The garrison, under 
 these trying circumstances, were ablv handled and behaved very well. After 
 2 hours’ fighting they drove the Boers from the town and its vicinity, but not, 
 unfortunately, until they had succeeded in releasing the prisoners confined in 
 
 * Two Field guns, one pompom, four companies of Yeomanry, two companies Royal Irish 
 Rifles. 
 
 t Two Field guns, one pompom two companies Irish Yeomanry, one company Mounted 
 Infantry, two companies Sea forth Highlandsrs. 
 
78 
 
 the gaol. The Boer loss was heavy, including Commandant Visser and about 
 27 men being killed. Our casualties were nine men killed, and one Officer and 
 11 men wounded. 
 
 19. Fauresmith, in the same neighbourhood, was attacked on the 
 19th October. The garrison was under the command of Captain Stewart, 
 2nd Bn. Seaforth Highlanders, and consisting of one Officer and 20 men of the 
 30th Company, Imperial Yeomanry, a company of the 2nd Bn. Seaforth 
 Highlanders (117 strong), and a small Town Guard composed of 17 civilians. 
 The configuration of the ground made the place not an easy one to hold 
 against the enemy, but a satisfactory scheme of defence was arranged by 
 holding the large and very rough kopje to the south-east of the town with the 
 Seaforth Highlanders, the Imperial Yeomanry being placed on a low ridge on 
 the northern side, and the Town Guard occupying two houses to the west of the 
 town. About 4.15 a.m. a determined assault on the defences was made by 
 some 400 Boers, who first pushed forward against the kopje held by the 
 Seaforths, where some of the enemy were killed within 10 yards of the piequets. 
 By 6.30 a.m. the Seaforths had cleared this kopje, and by S.30 a.m. the 
 enemy had been repulsed on all sides, and had retired in a southerly direction. 
 Our casualties were three men killed, and an Officer and five men wounded. 
 
 20. Between the 18th and 24th October, Phillipolis was almost daily 
 attacked by the Boers, and gallantly defended by the Resident Magistrate,. 
 Mr. Gostling, who had organized a small local force consisting of IS British 
 residents and 11 police. This force was skilfully entrenched on a kopje having 
 access to a spring. The first attack on the ISth was made by about 60 Boers,, 
 who kept up a heavy fire for 8 hours before they drew off. The same party 
 resumed the attack on the 21st October and kept it up the whole day. On the 
 following day the Boers were reinforced by a commando about 600 strong, 
 under Commandant Schippers. Mr. Gostling’s small garrison, augmented to 
 4 i by the enrolment of a few Afrikanders, continued the fight against these 
 heavy odds during the 22nd, 23rd, and 24th October, being subjected the 
 whole time to a heavy fire from all quarters. 
 
 (hi hearing of the investment of Phillipolis the Commandant of Colesberg 
 despatched, at 11 p.m. on the 20th October, Lieutenant Hanna and 34 men of 
 Yesbitt’s Horse, with instructions to relieve the beleaguered garrison.. 
 Lieutenant Hanna reached Phillipolis on the 21st and posted piequets guarding 
 ihe waterworks and covering the road from Springfontein, but he was ignorant 
 of the overwhelming number of the enemy in the neighbourhood. Early on 
 the 22nd his piequets were heavily attacked and forced to surrender, but 
 Lieutenant Hanna himself and six men succeeded in joining the defending 
 force. In the meantime arrangements were made by Lieut .-General Kelly ~ 
 Kennv for the despatch of two columns to relieve Phillipolis, Lieut.-Colonel 
 White’s column moving from Bethulie, and Lieut.-Colonel Barker's from 
 -Jagersfontein. 
 
 Lieut.-Colonel Whites column moved from Bethulie to Prior’s Siding, 
 where they arrived early on the 24th October, the Infantry and supplies by 
 rail, and the mounted troops and transport wagons by road. Without any 
 delay the force started at 10 a.m., and reached Ostontein, S miles east of 
 Phillipolis about 5 p.m., after a march of 16 miles through a very difficult and 
 rough country. The gun and transport teams were much exhausted. At 
 Osfontcin the sound of Lieut.-Colonel Barker’s guns was audible, so Lieut.- 
 Colonel White sent forward the Yeomanry under Lieut.-Colonel \\ entworth- 
 Forbcs. This force, which had left Bethulie at 6.30 p.m. on the 23rd October, 
 reached Phillipolis at 6.15 p.m. on the 24th, a remarkable performance as the 
 horses finis covered 50 miles in 26 hours. Lieut.-Colonel borbes found the 
 actual town in occupation of the enemy who retired on bis approach, 
 .VI can while, Lieut.-Colonel Barker left Jagersfontein with his column at 
 5.15 a m. on the 24th October, and arrived, without opposition, about 2 miles 
 north of Phillipolis about 5 p.m. ; he succeeded in dislodging the enemy, and 
 the town was entered by the combined forces the following morning. The 
 casualties amongst the garrison and Yesbitt’s Horse amounted to three men 
 killed and 12 men wounded. There were no casualties in the relieving 
 columns. 
 
 21. Again, at Jacobsdal, on the 25th October, the treacherous part played 
 by some of the inhabitants in admitting the Boers into their houses during the 
 
79 
 
 night led to the temporary occupation of that town. The Boers opened fire 
 at daybreak on the garrison, and 14 men were killed and 13 wounded, nearly 
 all belonging' to the Cape Town Highlanders and Cape Artillery. On the 
 news reaching the Modder River post, troops were at once detached to 
 Jacobsdal and drove the Boers off. The houses of the treacherous inhabitants 
 were destroyed ; in three of them were found large stores of soft-nosed bullets. 
 In this engagement the Boer Commandant Bosnian was killed. 
 
 22. On the 20th October, Koffyfontein, an important mining centre, was 
 attacked and gallantly defended by Captain Robertson*, who had organized a 
 defence chiefly from town guards of British mining people and the police. Sir 
 Charles Parsons from Honeynest Kloof, with Settle’s mounted troops, 
 relieved the town, on the 3rd November, without opposition. 
 
 23. Anticipating that more mounted troops would be required in the' 
 Orange River Colony, and anxious that our Cavalry should not be exposed 
 longer than necessary to the horse sickness, which usually rages in the eastern 
 parts of the Transvaal in the summer months, 1 had issued orders, at the end 
 of September, for Lieut.-General French to make the command at Barberton 
 over to Major-General Stephenson, and to proceed himself with all available 
 troops via Carolina, Ermelo, and Bethel to Heidelburg. Frenchf accordingly 
 left Barberton on the 2nd and 3rd October for Macliadodorp, where he 
 remained until the 13th, when he moved off in the direction of Carolina,, 
 having started off Mahon’s Brigade the day before. 
 
 By the evening of the same day French had crossed the Komati River, 
 and occupied the high ground 0 miles north of Carolina. Mahon, who had 
 been specially charged to direct bis march so as to guard the right flank of the 
 division, became heavily engaged near Geluk (143) with a body ot 1,100 men 
 (including the Carolina and Ermelo commandos) with four guns. Although 
 hardly pressed, Mahon succeeded in holding his own until French came to his 
 assistance, when the Boers were driven back in three bodies in a south¬ 
 easterly direction, having sustained some loss. 
 
 Marching by moonlight, on the early morning of the 14th, French 
 occupied Carolina without opposition, the Carabiniers capturing a convoy of 
 the enemy on the way. 
 
 24. French left Carolina on the 16th October, and, moving by Ermelo 
 reached Bethel on the 20th October. The enemy offered a stubborn 
 resistance throughout the march, at times attacking the column from all sides. 
 They were especially bold round Ermelo, but the opposition diminished as our 
 troops approached Bethel. The Ermelo, Standerton, Bethel, and part of the 
 Middclburg commandos were engaged in these operations. Heidelburg was 
 reached on the 26th October. 
 
 All the Cavalry regiments in turn, and on different occasions, got to close 
 quarters with the Boers during this march, and it is beyond doubt that the 
 latter suffered heavily from our shell and pompom fire. Over 60 prisoners fell 
 into French’s hands, and throughout the march very large quantities of cattle, 
 forage, and ammunition were captured. 
 
 French reported that it had been established on reliable authority that 
 the Boers, in many cases, fought in our uniforms, and that armed Kaffirs were 
 to be seen in their ranks, while on occasions our wounded were killed by the- 
 enemy. Our casualties between the 13th and 26th October were: killed, four 
 Officers and 13 men ; wounded, seven Officers and 67 men ; missing, one man. 
 
 On the 30th October, French left Heidelburg for Pretoria, moving via 
 Springs. 
 
 23. The departure of French’s troops encouraged the enemy to again 
 threaten the railway between Belfast and Macliadodorp, and towards the end 
 of October a considerable number of them were reported to be south of Van 
 Wyk’s Ylei (96), consequently Major-General Smith-Dorrien, Commanding a t 
 
 * Assistant Resident Magistrate, and late of the Kimberley Light Horse, 
 f French’s force consisted of— 
 
 Gordon’s Brigade—The Carabiniers, Royal Scots Greys, Inuiskilling Dragoons, ' T ” 
 Battery, Royal Horse Artillery; and section Field Troop, Royal Engineers. 
 
 Mahon’s Brigade—8th Hussars, 14th Hussars, “M” Battery, Royal Horse Artillery 
 and section Field Troop, Royal Engineers. 
 
 Dickson’s Brigade—7th Dragoon Guards, Lumsden’s Horse, Imperial Guides, ' Q’ 
 Battery, Royal Horse Artillery; and section Field Troop, Royal Engineers. 
 
 Iufautry—half 1st Bn. Suffolk Regiment. 
 
so 
 
 Belfast, started off on the evening of the 1st November with the object of 
 attacking the Boers at Van Wyk’s Vlei and at Witkloof, where a second 
 laager was reported. Smith-Dorrien’s force moved in two columns, one 
 commanded by himself, the other bj r Lieut.-Colonel Spens, The King’s 
 Shropshire Light Infantry. Not far from Belfast a violent storm with a cold 
 driving rain set in, hut as the columns were operating in support of each other, 
 and moving several miles apart, neither could turn back. By 7 a.m. both 
 columns had reached Van Wyk's Vlei, and there, owing to the continued 
 inclemency of the weather and exhaustion of the troops, Smith-Dorrien wisely 
 decided to abandon the attack on Witkloof. and to retrace his steps to Belfast. 
 As soon as the retirement was begun the Boers followed up the column with 
 most unusual boldness, in fact one Boer was killed within 50 yards of our 
 Infantry. A steady rearguard action had to be fought the whole way back to 
 Belfast, which was reached at 3 p.m. The Infantry had covered 28 miles in 
 20 hours under the most trying conditions. Our casualties were : killed, one 
 Officer and one man ; wounded, two Officers and 12 men ; missing, one man. 
 
 26. On the 6th November, Smith-Dorrien decided to make another 
 attempt to carry out his original project. Leaving Belfast at 3.30 a.m., he 
 marched towards Witkloof and Lelienfontcin, at both of which places the 
 Boers were known to have camps. By 7.10 a.m., he was in touch with the 
 Boers at Eersteling, and steadily forced them back across Van Wyk’s Vlei. 
 The enemy then took up a strong position along the Komati River, extending 
 from Witkloof to Lelienfontcin. Here they made a determined stand, and it 
 was not till 4 p.m. that a wide turning movement brought the 1st Bn. Suffolk 
 Regiment and the Royal Canadian Dragoons on the Boers’ flank and forced 
 them to withdraw across the river towards Carolina. Smith-Dorrien camped 
 for the night at Lelienfontein. IIis casualties for this day were six men killed 
 and 20 wounded, mostly belonging to the Shropshire Light Infantry, whose 
 conduct was much praised. 
 
 27. On the following day Smith-Dorrien started to march in an easterly 
 direction. Observing this, several hundred Boers at once galloped back to 
 seize their position of the previous day, but were forestalled by Lieut.-Colonel 
 Evans and the Royal Canadian Dragoons, with a section of the 84th Battery, 
 Royal Field Artillery, who by going at full speed for 2 miles succeeded in 
 seizing the key of the position, and in holding about 300 of the enemy in the 
 bed of the river, while the 5-inch guns did good execution among masses of 
 the Boers in tlie open. As it now became evident that the enemy had 
 received large reinforcements after the engagement of the previous day, 
 Smith-Dorrien directed Lieut.-Colonel Spens, Commanding the Advanced 
 Guard, to secure the high ground near Van Wyk’s Vlei, which was done by the 
 5th Lancers. Colonel Lessard, with the Royal Canadian Dragoons and a 
 section of the Royal Canacian Artillery, under Lieutenant Morrison, with great 
 gallantry covered the rear of the force against the enemy’s close attack. 
 About 2 p.m. some 200 Boers suddenly charged our rearguard, and, without 
 dismounting, fired wildly, coming to within 70 yards of the dismounted 
 Di •agoons. Not succeeding in this attempt on our rear-guard, the Boers then 
 threatened us on both flanks in large numbers; our guns, however, were so ably 
 handled that they prevented their coming to close quarters and caused them 
 to retire. Our casualties in this engagement were two killed and 12 wounded. 
 The Boers suffered very heavy losses, amongst the killed being Commandant 
 H. Prinsloo and General Fourie, and amongst the wounded General John 
 Grobelaar. Smith-Dorrien halted for the night at Blyvooruitzicht, and 
 returned to Belfast on the morning of the 8th November. 
 
 28. On the 31st October, Major-General Walter Kitchener, Commanding 
 at Lydenburg, moved out columns from that place and from Witklip (26), anil 
 after capturing Commandant Shoeman’s laager in the Steenkampsberg at 
 dawn, pushed on and shelled Schalk Burgher’s laager at Rooikrantz. The 
 difficult nature of the country, however, made further advance in that direction 
 impracticable, and the columns returned to Lydenburg. Our casualties were 
 five men wounded. The enemy is known to have had five men killed, and 
 some rifles and a quantity of ammunition, with one prisoner, fell into our 
 hands. Kitchener, hearing that Van de Beer’s commando operating to the 
 east of Lydenburg had been reinforced, decided to disperse this body of the 
 enemy. On the night of the 7th November, he proceeded against it with a 
 
mounted column under Captain Chetwode, 19tli Hussars, which succeeded in 
 passing* through the Boer outposts. Then, while the Mounted Infantry of the 
 1st Bn. Manchester Regiment engaged three of the picquets, the Cavalry 
 charged and sabred many of the enemy as they fled in the moonlight. 
 
 Kitchener specially mentions the excellent manner in which the Mounted 
 Infantry engaged the Boers, who opened fire upon the Hussars from no less 
 than three directions while they were charging over exceedingly difficult 
 ground. 
 
 At daylight on the 8th November the second column, consisting of 
 Infantry and Artillery, under Major Callwell, Royal Garrison Artillery, joined 
 the mounted troops. The whole force then continued the pursuit, and drove 
 the enemy from ridge to ridge, until the summit of the Berg was reached. 
 Our casualties were only one man killed and two wounded. The Boers lost 
 heavily and fled, evidently panic-stricken. 
 
 29. While these various movements were being carried out in the 
 Transvaal, Lieut.-General Sir Leslie Rundle was busy in the north-east corner 
 of the Orange River Colony, and, on the 12th October, he moved from Vrede 
 with 300 mounted men, five guns, and two battalions of Infantry, and engaged 
 a small force of the enemy which had collected in that neighbourhood. He 
 drove them back for about 10 miles, with a loss to us of seven wounded. 
 
 30. Leaving 100 Imperial Yeomanry, a section of Artillery, and the 
 1st Bn. Leinster Regiment to hold Vrede, Rundle moved on to Reitz, arriving 
 there on the 19th October. Placing a garrison at Reitz of similar strength to 
 that left at Vrede, he, on the 20th October, proceeded to Bethlehem, which 
 he entered the next day. On our approach, Bethlehem was evacuated by the 
 Boers who, under Commandant Prinsloo, had reoccupied the town on the 1st 
 October; our sick and wounded who had been left there had not been in any 
 way disturbed. On the afternoon of the 24th October, Rundle, in an 
 interview he had with Prinsloo and some other representatives of the 
 Bethlehem commando, told them of ex-President Kruger’s flight, and 
 generally explained the situation. Commandant Prinsloo, however, decided 
 that hostilities must go on, and that he was bound to do his part in 
 maintaining the struggle. 
 
 31. Rundle left the 1st Bn. Worcestershire Regiment, a section of the 
 79th Battery, Royal Field Artillery, and the 02nd (Middlesex) Company, 
 Imperial Yeomanry, under Lieut.-Colonel Oakes of the Worcestershire 
 Regiment, to garrison Bethlehem, and on the 20th October he marched with 
 the rest of his force on Harrismith. 
 
 About 3 miles out of Bethlehem, Rundle found the Boers strongly posted 
 across the road, and on both flanks; an engagement ensued, and it was only 
 after fighting all day that Lieut.-Colonel Golightly, with the Hampshire and 
 Gloucestershire Companies of Imperial Yeomanry, and two companies of the 
 Grenadier Guards, succeeded in driving the enemy from the kopjes they were 
 holding to the north of the road. As soon as this was accomplished, Major- 
 General Campbell, with half a battalion of the Grenadier Guards and half a 
 battalion of the Scots Guards, covered by the fire of our guns, attacked the 
 very strong position held by the enemy to the south of the road. The attack 
 eventually proved successful in spite of a very stubborn resistance by the 
 Boers. Our casualties were three killed and 17 wounded. 
 
 Harrismith was reached on the 30th October, and, with this place as his 
 head-quarters, Rundle has been doing good work clearing the district with a 
 small mobile column, and at the same time provisioning the garrisons of 
 Vrede, Reitz, and Bethlehem. 
 
 32. From this, my final despatch, I have been obliged, on account of its 
 great length, most reluctantly to omit many interesting incidents, and to leave 
 unrecorded many gallant deeds. As it is, I feel an apology is due for the 
 almost inordinate proportions which this, as well as my former despatches, 
 have assumed, owing to the vastness of the country over which operations had 
 to be carried out, the length of time to which they have extended, and 
 consequently the great number of events, going on in different places 
 simultaneously, which have had to be described. 
 
 33. The magnitude of the task which Her Majesty’s Imperial troops have 
 been called upon to perform will perhaps be better realized it’ I give the actual 
 number of miles of the several lines of communication, each one of which has 
 
 ( 47 ) L 
 
82 
 
 had to he carefully guarded, and compare with the well-known countries of 
 Europe, the enormous extent of the theatre of war from one end of which to 
 the other troops have had to be frequently moved. 
 
 The areas included in the theatre of war are as follows :— 
 
 Square miles. 
 
 Cape Colony .. .. .. .. 277,151 
 
 Orange River Colony .. .. .. 48,326 
 
 Transvaal .. .. .. .. 113,640 
 
 J7atal .. .. . 18,913 
 
 Total .. .. 458,030 
 
 Rhodesia .. .. .. 750,000 
 
 And the distances troops have had to travel are :— 
 
 By land— Miles. 
 
 Cape Town to Pretoria ., ,. .. 1,040 
 
 Pretoria to Komati Poort.. .. .. 260 
 
 , Cape Town to Kimberley .. .. .. 647 
 
 Kimberley to Mafeking .. .. .. 223 
 
 Mafeking to Pretoria .. .. .. 160 
 
 Mafeking to Beira. . .. .. .. 1,135 
 
 Durban to Pretoria .. .. .. 511 
 
 From these tables it will be seen that, after having been brought by sea 
 6,000 miles and more from their base in the United Kingdom, the Army in 
 South Africa had to be distributed over an area of greater extent than France 
 (204,146 square miles) and Germany (211.168 square miles) put together, and 
 if we include that part of Rhodesia with which we had to do, larger than the 
 combined areas of France, Germany, and Austria (261,649 square miles). 
 
 And it should be remembered that over these great distances we were 
 dependent on single lines of railway for the food supply, guns, ammunition, 
 horses, transport animals, and hospital equipment, in fact, all the requirements 
 of an army in the field, and that, along these lines, bridges and culverts had 
 been destroyed in many places, and rails were being constantly torn up. 
 
 35. As stated in my Farewell Order*, “the service which the South 
 “ African Force has performed is, I venture to think, unique in the annals 
 “ of war, inasmuch as it has been absolutely incessant for a whole year, in 
 <s some cases, more than a year. There has been no rest, no days off to recruit, 
 “ no going into winter quarters as in other campaigns which have extended 
 “over a long period.” In illustration of this 1 may mention that Lord 
 Methuen’s column marched 1,036 miles between the 14th May and the 
 2nd September, covering, on one occasion, 125 miles in 115 hours. The 
 2nd Cavalry Brigade (Broadwood’s) marched 1,200 miles between the 
 29th April and the 2Sth August. The City Imperial Volunteers marched on 
 75 days, between the 16th April and the 23rd August, the total distance 
 traversed being 1.018 miles, and the average length of march 13| miles. 
 The Brigade of Guards at the commencement of the war formed part of 
 Methuen’s force destined for the relief of Kimberley. In February it joined 
 the Head-quarters of the Army and took part in the march to Bloemfontein 
 and Pretoria. In September, it was at Komati Poort, and now, ^November 
 1900, it is guarding the drifts over the Orange River, close to where it was a 
 year previously, having meanwhile marched from the most western part of the 
 Orange River Colony to the most eastern part of the Transvaal. 
 
 The Imperial Light Horse, the Border Regiment, the Royal Irish 
 Fusiliers, the Connaught Rangers, and the Brigade Division of Artillery 
 attached to Hart’s command, after taking part in all Sir Redvers Buller’s 
 battles on the Tugela and the relief of Ladysmith, were brought round to 
 Kimberley to aid in the relief of Mafeking. Since then they have been over 
 the greater part of the Transvaal, and part of them (the Connaught Rangers) 
 are now on the Orange River engaged in frustrating the Boers in their attempt 
 to invade Cape Colony. 
 
 Dated Johannesburg. 29th November 1900 
 
85 
 
 36. These instances, out of many which might be brought forward, show 
 how severely the troops have been taxed, and how admirably they have 
 responded to the call made upon them. Yor has their discipline, or their 
 conduct when engaged with the enemy, been less praiseworthy than their 
 feats of marching. The Army in South Africa has included many branches 
 of Her Majesty’s Service : the contingent furnished by the Royal Yavy, 
 the Regular Forces, with the Volunteer companies of the Infantry battalions, 
 the Militia, the Imperial Yeomanry, the City of London Imperial Volunteers, 
 and the Colonial corps raised in Canada, Australia, Yew Zealand, Tasmania, 
 South Africa, India, and Ceylon. Yo finer force than that which I have had 
 the honour and privilege to command has ever taken the field under the 
 British flag, and I gladly avail myself of this opportunity to record my 
 acknowledgments to Her Majesty’s soldiers of all ranks, whether drawn from 
 the United Kingdom or from the great Colonies and Dependencies of the 
 Empire, whose exertions and fighting qualities have enabled me to bring this 
 long and arduous campaign to what I hope will ere long prove a successful 
 conclusion. 
 
 37. As the strength of the troops engaged at the occupation of 
 Bloemfontein and Pretoria, and also in the final advance of the Army towards 
 Komati Poort, is not shown in my former despatches, I annex statements 
 giving this information, which I think may prove useful and interesting. 
 
 3S. My recommendations on behalf of individual Officers and men will be 
 submitted in a separate letter. 
 
 I have the honour to be. 
 
 Sir, 
 
 Your most obedient humble Servant, 
 
 ROBERTS, Field-Marshal , 
 
 Commander-in-Chief. 
 
 Strength of the force which entered Bloemfontein, 13th March 1900. 
 This return omits Officers and men of Royal Artillery, Royal Engineers, Yaval 
 Brigade, Staff, Army Service Corps, Transport and Medical Departments. 
 
 
 
 .“a 
 
 a s 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Guns. 
 
 
 
 
 Brigade, &c. 
 
 Officers. 
 
 Warrant, non-coi 
 sioned officers, 
 men. 
 
 Horses. - 
 
 9'45-inch howitzers. 
 
 6-inch howitzers. 
 
 5-inch guns. 
 
 5-inch howitzers. 
 
 & 
 
 o 
 
 15-pr. and 1'2-pr. 
 
 c3 
 
 K* 
 
 cS 
 
 a 
 
 Ph 
 
 i 
 
 03 
 
 •suiodiuoj 
 
 | 
 
 CO 
 
 3 
 
 So 
 
 <D 
 
 O 
 
 C5 
 
 3 
 
 1st Cavalry Brigade 
 
 61 
 
 999 
 
 935 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 18 
 
 
 
 2 
 
 2nd 
 
 68 
 
 965 
 
 971 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 12 
 
 . , 
 
 . , 
 
 1 
 
 3rd 
 
 45 
 
 770 
 
 684 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 12 
 
 •• 
 
 
 3 
 
 Alderson’s Mounted In- 
 
 80 
 
 1,114 
 
 1.220 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 3 
 
 fantry. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Lo Galtais’ Mounted In- 
 
 95 
 
 1,816 
 
 1,480 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 2 
 
 fantry. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Martyr’s Mounted Infantry 
 
 66 
 
 1,414 
 
 1,441 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Ridley’s „ 
 
 47 
 
 955 
 
 878 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 6th Division 
 
 120 
 
 5,071 
 
 • • 
 
 
 
 
 6 
 
 .. 
 
 18 
 
 
 •• 
 
 5 
 
 * til • • • • 
 
 157 
 
 5,811 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 18 
 
 • « 
 
 3 
 
 8 
 
 9th 
 
 122 
 
 4,564 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 18 
 
 • . 
 
 • » 
 
 8 
 
 Guards Brigade 
 
 86 
 
 3,200 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 4 
 
 Naval and Corps Artillery 
 
 • • 
 
 •• 
 
 •• 
 
 •• 
 
 4 
 
 •• 
 
 •• 
 
 4 
 
 •• 
 
 3 
 
 " 
 
 • • 
 
 1 
 
 947 
 
 { 
 
 26,679 
 
 7,609 
 
 c_ 
 
 4 
 
 * * 
 
 6 
 
 *V“ 
 
 113 
 
 4 
 
 96 
 
 3 
 
 > 
 
 3 
 
 36 
 
 (47) h 2 
 
84 
 
 Strength of the force which entered Pretoria, 5th June 1900. This 
 return omits Officers and men of Royal Artillery, Royal Engineers, A r aval 
 Brigade, Staff, Army Service Corps, Transport and Medical Departments. 
 
 Brigade, &c. 
 
 ( 5 
 
 Officers. 
 
 Warrant, non-commis¬ 
 
 sioned officers, and 
 men. 
 
 Ilorses. 
 
 Guns. 
 
 to 
 
 5 
 
 N 
 
 £ 
 
 O 
 
 'o 
 
 1 
 
 o 
 
 to 
 
 s 
 
 *5 
 
 o 
 
 rC 
 
 O 
 
 o 
 
 5-inch guns. 
 
 5-inch howitzers. 
 
 .1 
 
 to 
 
 r cO 
 
 o 
 
 .9 
 
 15-pr. and 12-pr. 
 
 12-pr. naval. 
 
 Pompoms. 
 
 Machine guns. 
 
 1st Cavalry Brigade 
 
 
 GO 
 
 550 
 
 550 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 6 
 
 
 2 
 
 4 
 
 2nd „ 
 
 , # 
 
 60 
 
 660 
 
 600 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 6 
 
 
 2 
 
 3 
 
 3rd „ 
 
 
 60 
 
 1,040 
 
 400 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 6 
 
 
 2 
 
 5 
 
 4th „ 
 
 
 50 
 
 350 
 
 350 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 6 
 
 •• 
 
 1 
 
 3 
 
 Mounted Infantry Division 
 
 299 
 
 4,242 
 
 3,743 
 
 • • 
 
 • • 
 
 2 
 
 • • 
 
 • • 
 
 24 
 
 
 8 
 
 20 
 
 Yeomanry .. .. 
 
 • * 
 
 24 
 
 391 
 
 338 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 2 
 
 lltli Division 
 
 • • 
 
 199 
 
 6,353 
 
 107 
 
 
 
 2 
 
 .. 
 
 
 18 
 
 
 • • 
 
 8 
 
 14th Brigade 
 
 
 87 
 
 2,599 
 
 67 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 18 
 
 • • 
 
 • • 
 
 7 
 
 2ist ,, 
 
 , # 
 
 100 
 
 3,160 
 
 • • 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 6 
 
 # , 
 
 • • 
 
 4 
 
 19th „ 
 
 •• 
 
 136 
 
 4,330 
 
 • • 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 6 
 
 
 •• 
 
 4 
 
 Corps Artillery 
 
 • • 
 
 .. 
 
 
 •• 
 
 2 
 
 4 
 
 •• 
 
 •• 
 
 2 
 
 6 
 
 2 
 
 •• 
 
 
 
 
 1,075 
 
 23,675 
 
 6,155 
 
 2 
 
 4 
 
 4 
 
 
 2 
 
 102 
 
 2 
 
 15 
 
 60 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 -V- 
 
 
 
 —» 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 116 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Strength of the forces which took part in the final advance of the Army 
 towards Komati Poort at end of August 1900. (Officers, men of Staff, Royal 
 Artillery, Royal Engineers, and Departmental Corps, omitted.) 
 
 General Buller’s Column. 
 
 Cavalry 
 
 Colonial and Mounted In¬ 
 fantry. 
 
 Artillery .. .. 
 
 Infantry 
 
 39 
 
 52 
 
 160 
 
 750 
 
 1,050 
 
 6,000 
 
 750 
 
 1,050 
 
 • • 
 
 • • 
 
 • • 
 
 2 
 
 6 
 
 2 
 
 •* 
 
 24 
 
 4 
 
 4 
 
 3 
 
 o 
 
 o 
 
 • • 
 
 8 
 
 251 
 
 7,800 
 
 1,800 
 
 • • 
 
 •• 
 
 2 
 
 6 
 
 2 
 
 24 
 
 4 
 
 4 
 
 14 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 General French’s Column. 
 
 120 
 
 *40 
 
 2,110 
 
 1,560 
 
 1,690 
 
 
 
 
 
 .. 
 
 10 
 
 ii 
 
 1 
 
 .. | 4 
 
 6 
 
 i 
 
 160 
 
 3,670 
 
 1,690 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 10 
 
 • • 
 
 4 
 
 8 
 
 
 
 i 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Cavalry 
 
 Artillery 
 
 Infantry 
 
85 
 
 General Pole-Carew’s Column. 
 
 Mounted Infantry .. .. 50 
 
 Naval and other Artillery.. 
 
 Infantry .. .. .. 160 
 
 900 
 
 6,400 
 
 900 
 
 
 • • 
 
 2 
 
 •• 
 
 2 
 
 18 
 
 
 2 
 
 4 
 
 " 8 
 
 210 
 
 7,300 
 
 900 
 
 • • 
 
 • • 
 
 2 
 
 •• 
 
 2 
 
 18 
 
 •• 
 
 2 
 
 12 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ■ 1 
 
 
 I 1 
 
 
 General Ian Hamilton’s Column. 
 
 Artillery .. 
 
 Infantry 
 
 Mounted Infantry .. 
 
 *60 
 
 10 
 
 .. 
 
 2,300 
 
 80 
 
 80 
 
 
 
 2 
 
 •• 
 
 • • 
 
 10 
 
 .. 
 
 2 
 
 • • 
 
 3 
 
 
 70 
 
 2,380 
 
 80 
 
 • • 
 
 •• 
 
 2 
 
 
 • • 
 
 10 
 
 
 2 
 
 3 
 
 Total Strength. 
 
 Cavalry .. 
 
 159 
 
 2,860 
 
 2,440 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 9 
 
 Colonial and Regular 
 
 112 
 
 2,030 
 
 2,030 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 7 
 
 Mounted Infantry. 
 Artillery .. .. 
 
 
 
 
 
 ' » 
 
 6 
 
 6 
 
 4 
 
 62 
 
 4 
 
 12 
 
 
 Infantry .. 
 
 420 
 
 16,260 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 * , 
 
 
 21 
 
 
 691 
 
 21,150 
 
 4,470 
 
 
 ** 
 
 6 
 
 6 
 
 4 
 
 62 
 
 4 
 
 12 
 
 37 
 
 Fighting strength of other forces at the time of the occupation of 
 Pretoria on 5th June 1900. (Officers and men of Staff, Royal Artillery, Royal 
 Engineers, Naval Brigade and Departmental Corps, omitted.) 
 
 Force, &c. 
 
 
 X - 
 
 
 l 'd ci 
 
 
 o r 
 
 
 V £ 
 
 
 c © 
 
 
 o © 
 
 
 
 
 o 
 
 
 
 m 
 
 G © 
 
 Sh 
 
 $ C G 
 
 © 
 
 O 
 
 u.oo 
 
 8 
 
 
 O 
 
 
 General Hunter’s Force (Lichtenberg District). 
 
 Colonial mounted 
 
 52 
 
 777 
 
 976 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 « 
 
 corps. 
 
 Yeomanry .. 
 
 31 
 
 562 
 
 627 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Artillery 
 
 • • 
 
 • • 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 24 
 
 
 
 
 4 
 
 
 5th Brigade .. 
 
 81 
 
 2,954 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 4 
 
 6th ,, 
 
 97 
 
 2,275 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ' ) 
 
 .. | 
 
 ' * 
 
 •• 
 
 4 
 
 
 261 
 
 7,268 
 
 1,603 
 
 
 •• 
 
 •• 
 
 •• 
 
 • • 
 
 24 
 
 
 
 
 4 
 
 16 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 . 
 
 
86 
 
 General Baden-PoweU's Force (Mafeking—Rustenburg road). 
 
 Colonial mounted 
 
 troops. 
 
 Colonial Artillery 
 
 50 
 
 1,200 
 
 • # 
 
 1,200 
 
 
 ! 
 
 
 
 6 .. 
 
 1 
 
 1 
 
 [ 
 
 2 .. 
 
 5 
 
 
 50 
 
 1,200 
 
 1,200 
 
 
 .... 
 
 • • 
 
 •• 
 
 6 .. 
 
 1 
 
 1 
 
 2 .. 
 
 5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 
 
 
 
 
 I- 
 
 f 
 
 
 Yeomanry 
 
 Artillery 
 
 Infantry 
 
 Lord Methuen's Force (Paardekraal). 
 
 9 . 7 
 
 144 
 
 1,065 
 
 5,483 
 
 1,600 
 
 •• 
 
 
 .. 2 
 
 •• 
 
 16 
 
 *'■ 
 
 • * 
 
 
 
 
 2 
 
 11 
 
 '241 
 
 7,148 
 
 1,600 
 
 
 
 2 
 
 • * 
 
 16 
 
 
 • V 
 
 • • 
 
 •• 
 
 2 
 
 11 
 
 
 
 
 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 | 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 General Colvile’s Force (Heilbron). 
 
 Colonial mounted 
 
 troops. 
 
 Naval and Field 
 Artillery. 
 
 Infantry .. «. 
 
 8 
 
 • • 
 
 88 
 
 183 
 
 • • 
 
 3,327 
 
 177 
 
 •• 
 
 
 •• 
 
 •• 
 
 2 
 
 6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 4 
 
 96 
 
 3,510 
 
 177 
 
 
 
 
 
 2 
 
 6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 4 
 
 
 
 
 . . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 General Clements’ Force (Senekal). 
 
 Mounted Infantry 
 Artillery 
 Infantry .. 
 
 3 
 
 54 
 
 61 
 
 2,549 
 
 66 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 4 
 
 57 
 
 2,670 
 
 66 
 
 •• 
 
 •• 
 
 •• 
 
 •• 
 
 •• 
 
 6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Generals Handle and Brabant’s Forces (Hammonia, Ficksburg, &c.). 
 
 Colonial Division 
 
 102 
 
 1,297 
 
 1,424 
 
 Yeomanry .. .. 
 
 23 
 
 316 
 
 339 
 
 Artillery 
 
 • . 
 
 • . 
 
 • # 
 
 Infantry 
 
 CO 
 
 f-H 
 
 4,822 
 
 
 
 260 
 
 6,435 
 
 1,763 
 
 , 
 
 i 
 
 
 •• 
 
 
 J..| 4 
 
 18 
 
 
 
 
 | 
 
 25 
 
 
 
 
 .. .. j 10 
 
 Summary. 
 
 Mounted troops 
 Artillery 
 
 Infantry 
 
 366 
 
 599 
 
 6,061 
 
 22,110 
 
 6,409 
 
 
 •• 
 
 2 
 
 2 
 
 83 
 
 •• 
 
 1 
 
 1 
 
 2 
 
 6 
 
 17. 
 
 33 
 
 
 965 
 
 28,171 
 
 6,409 
 
 
 
 2 
 
 2 
 
 83 
 
 
 l 
 
 1 
 
 2 
 
 6 
 
 50 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
87 
 
 Fighting' strengths of communications, Sic., forces on the occupation of 
 Pretoria on 5th June 1900. (Officers and men of Staffi Royal Artillery, Royal 
 Engineers, Naval Brigade, and Departmental Corps, omitted.) 
 
 Communications, Pretoria to Kroonstadt, inclusive of latter. 
 
 Mounted Infantry 
 Artillery .. 
 Infantry and details 
 
 40 
 
 13*1 
 
 1,076 
 
 4*,304 
 
 909 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 6 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 
 
 4 
 
 171 
 
 5,380 
 
 909 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 6 
 
 
 
 
 
 5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Johannesburg Garrison. 
 
 Colonial Mounted In¬ 
 fantry and Yeomanry. 
 Infantry .. .. . 
 
 7 
 
 GO 
 
 180 
 
 1,959 
 
 180 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 3 
 
 67 
 
 2,139 
 
 180 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 3 
 
 ■ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Communications, Kroonstadt to Bloemfontein (exclusive of both). 
 
 Yeomanry.. 
 Mounted Infantry.. 
 Artillery .. 
 Infantry and details 
 
 t 
 
 .. 7 
 
 1S2 
 
 192 
 
 ( 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 .. 11 
 
 345 
 
 360 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 • • • • 
 
 , r 
 
 , , 
 
 • ••••• • • 
 
 . # 
 
 2 
 
 . # 
 
 6 .. 
 
 2 
 
 # # 
 
 .. 75 
 
 2,583 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 2 
 
 93 
 
 3,110 
 
 552 
 
 . • • 
 
 
 2 
 
 •• 
 
 6 .. 
 
 2 
 
 2 
 
 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 
 
 
 
 Winburg Garrison. 
 
 Yeomanry.. 
 Artillery .. 
 Infantry and details 
 
 5 
 
 20 
 
 120 
 
 1,000 
 
 120 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 * • 
 
 1 
 
 25 
 
 1,120 
 
 120 
 
 
 
 
 •• 
 
 •• 
 
 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Bloemfontein Garrison and Outposts. 
 
 Yeomanry and Mounted 
 Infantry. 
 
 Artillery .. 
 
 Infantry and details 
 
 15 
 
 260 
 
 260 .... 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 110 
 
 4 ,330 
 
 1 4 
 
 .. 18 
 
 2 17 .. 
 
 
 
 
 n 
 
 O 
 
 125 
 
 4,390 
 
 260 1 4 
 
 .. 18 
 
 2 17 .. 
 
 
 
 
 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 1 
 
 
 
 i 
 
ss 
 
 Communications. Ladybrand to Thabanchu District, &c. 
 
 Colonial Mounted 
 
 In- 
 
 50 
 
 803 
 
 500 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 4 
 
 fantry. 
 
 Yeomanry.. 
 
 
 25 
 
 600 
 
 500 
 
 
 | 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 2 
 
 Infantry .. 
 
 •• 
 
 20 
 
 800 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 
 
 
 
 95 
 
 2,200 
 
 1.000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 t 1 
 
 
 
 
 ' 
 
 
 
 Communications, Bloemfontein to Orange River. 
 
 Mounted Infantry 
 
 10 
 
 250 
 
 250 
 
 
 
 1 
 
 
 | 
 
 Artillery .. 
 
 
 # , 
 
 , , 
 
 • • • • 
 
 .. 4 
 
 .. 1 2 
 
 
 
 Infantry. 
 
 84 
 
 2,541 
 
 
 
 . 1 .. 
 
 
 .. .. 
 
 
 
 94 
 
 2,791 
 
 250 
 
 
 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 I 
 
 
 l 
 
 Eastern Garrisons, Dewetsdorp, Wepener, and Smithfield. 
 
 Yeomanry 
 
 Mounted Infantry 
 
 Artillery .. 
 
 Infantry .. 
 
 10 
 
 5 
 
 30 
 
 120 
 
 135 
 
 1,765 
 
 125 
 
 143 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 268 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 
 
 45 
 
 1,820 
 
 268 
 
 •• 
 
 •• 
 
 •• 
 
 •• 
 
 
 6 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 
 
 
 
 
 1 
 
 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Western Garrisons, Jagersfontein, Hoopstad, and Boshof. 
 
 Yeomanry., ,. .. 
 
 Artillery .. 
 
 Infantry and details 
 
 4 
 
 40 
 
 180 
 
 1,119 
 
 180 
 
 •• 
 
 •• 
 
 •• 
 
 
 •• 
 
 2 .. 
 
 
 2 
 
 ** 
 
 
 •• 
 
 
 44 
 
 1,299 
 
 180 
 
 •• 
 
 •• 
 
 •• 
 
 * * 
 
 •• 
 
 2 .. 
 
 •• 
 
 2 
 
 
 •• 
 
 Summary. 
 
 Mounted troops .. 
 Artillery .. 
 
 Infantry and details 
 
 ..189 
 
 .. 570 
 
 4,248 
 
 20,146 
 
 3,719 
 
 1 4 4 
 
 18 
 
 2 39 
 
 •• 
 
 6 
 
 2 2 
 
 7 
 
 15 
 
 
 759 
 
 24,394 
 
 3,719 
 
 1 4 4 
 
 18 
 
 2 39 
 
 •• 
 
 6 
 
 2 j 2 
 
 22 
 
89 
 
 No. 10. 
 
 From Field-Marshal Lord Roberts to the Secretary of State for War. 
 
 Army Head-quarters, South Africa, 
 
 Government House, Bloemfontein, 
 
 My Lord, 12th April 1900. 
 
 I have the honour to submit, for your Lordship’s information, a despatch, 
 dated 6th April 1900, from Lieut.-General Lord Methuen, describing an 
 engagement which took place the preceding day near Tweefontein, 5 miles 
 south of Boshof, and which resulted in the surrender of the Boer force after its 
 Commander, Colonel de Yillebois, had been killed by a shell. 
 
 2. That the affair was comparatively a small one does not detract from 
 the credit due to Lord Methuen for his promptness in following up and 
 surrounding the enemy, and for the careful dispositions which he made for 
 attacking them. The troops seemed to have behaved admirably, and it is 
 satisfactory to notice that the Imperial Yeomanry rendered valuable service 
 on this occasion. 
 
 3. I concur with the General Officer Commanding in his favourable 
 mention of Brigadier-General Lord Chesham, Lieut.-Colonel Peakman, and 
 Major Butcher. 
 
 I have the honour to be, 
 
 My Lord, 
 
 Your Lordship’s most obedient Servant, 
 
 ROBERTS, Field-Marshal, 
 
 Commanding-in-Chief, South Africa. 
 
 From Lieut.-General Lord Methuen, Commanding ls£ Division, to the Military 
 Secretary, Head-quarters, Bloemfontein. 
 
 Boshof, 
 
 Sir, 6th April 1900, 
 
 News arrived at 10.30 a.m. yesterday that a Boer commando, 300 strong, 
 had passed through Tweefontein, south of Boshof, and about 5 miles off. 
 They had again saddled up and made for a ridge about 2ij miles north of 
 Tweefontein, and again off-saddled. This commando was there at 9 a.m. 
 when the natives left. 
 
 2. My horses were grazing when the information came, and some distance 
 away. 
 
 I ordered the Imperial Yeomanry, 500 strong, under Brigadier-General 
 Lord Chesham, the Kimberley Mounted Corps, 250 strong, under Lieut.- 
 Colonel Peakman, and the 4th Field Artillery Battery under Major Butcher, 
 to saddle up at once. 
 
 3. At 11.50 a.m. the force marched, the Kimberley Mounted Corps under 
 Lieut.-Colonel Peakman leading, and followed by the Imperial Yeomanry 
 under Brigadier-General Lord Chesham. No. 4 Battery under Major Butcher, 
 with one company of Imperial Y’eomanry as escort, brought up the rear. 
 
 4. The natives, who knew the position of the enemy, led the column in a 
 south-south-easterly direction, keeping the column concealed until it reached a 
 knoll, when the position was reconnoitred, but with no result. 
 
 5. A native stated that they still occupied a kopje 2,500 yards in front. 
 
 6. The Kimberley Mounted Corps pushed on to the right flank and front, 
 followed by the Imperial Yeomanry and the battery. One company of the 
 Imperial Yeomanry moved to the left front with the object of cutting off the 
 enemy should they attempt to escape in that direction. 
 
 7. Two Colonial scouts attached to the Imperial Yeomanry brought back 
 the first reliable information regarding the enemy’s position. The column 
 
 ( 47 ) M 
 
90 
 
 reached some small kopjes in front, and a few of the enemy were located 
 occupying some low kopjes about 1,200 yards distant. Firing’ now commenced. 
 
 8. The position taken up by the enemy was composed of a few small 
 low kopjes in the centre of a large flat plain. 
 
 9. I completely surrounded the kopjes before I took any further action. 
 
 10. The guns were kept under shelter, having no target. 
 
 11. I ordered the Imperial Yeomanry and the Kimberley Mounted Corps 
 to attack the kopje from the east, supporting the attack from the south-east 
 and north. 
 
 The order was intelligently carried out, care being taken to advance very 
 slowly, taking all advantage of the fine cover given by the bushes and boulders. 
 
 12. The enemy made a fine resistance from 2 p.m. to nearly 6 p.m., not 
 surrendering until our troops, with bayonets fixed, were 15 yards from them. 
 They sent to my Aide-de-Camp to say they intended to fight to the end, and 
 they only changed their minds when General Villebois de Mareuil was killed 
 by a shell. 
 
 13. The guns found difficulty in firing without endangering our men’s 
 lives, but at last the battery, firing three shell, helped materially towards 
 closing the defence. 
 
 14. The enemy had 7 killed, 11 wounded, and 51 prisoners. I regret the 
 loss of Lieutenant C. Boyle, Imperial Yeomanry, and of Lieutenant A. C. 
 Williams, Imperial Yeomanry; 10 men wounded. 
 
 15. Lieutenant A. C. Williams was killed deliberately, after the white flag 
 was held up. The man who fired was at once shot by my order. 
 
 16. This was the first time the Imperial Yeomanry and the Kimberley 
 Mounted Corps have been engaged with the enemy, and I was much struck by 
 the intelligent manner in which they carried out the attack, and made use of 
 cover. Had they not done so, the list of casualties would have been far greater. 
 
 17. 1 draw attention to the careful manner in which Brigadier-General 
 Lord Chesham, Lieut.-Colonel Peakman, and Major Butcher executed my 
 orders. 
 
 I am, &C., 
 
 METHUEN, Lieut.-General, 
 
 Commanding 1st Division. 
 
 No. 11. 
 
 From Field-Marshal Lord Roberts to the Secretary of State for War. 
 
 Army Head-quarters, Camp Smaldeel, 
 
 South Africa, 
 
 My Lord, 8th May 1900. 
 
 I have the honour to submit tor your Lordship’s information a report, 
 dated 29th April 19C0, from Lieut.-Colonel E. H. Dalgety, Commanding 
 Cape Mounted Rifles, describing the operations in the vicinity of Wepener, 
 between 2nd April and 25th April, during which period the force under his 
 command, numbering some 1,600 men with six guns, two 15-prs., two 12-prs. 
 Naval, two 7-prs., and one Hotchkiss, w T as attacked by a Boer force estimated 
 at about 6,000 men with 10 guns. 
 
 2. The report is somewhat incomplete, and to render it more intelligible 
 I may mention that Lieut.-Colonel Dalgety’s force entered Wepener on 4th 
 April from the south. The Caledon River runs from the north-east to the 
 south-west, about 3 miles west of the town; the Zammersberg bridge, 200 
 yards in length, crossing the river nearly west of Wepener. The enemy 
 advanced from the north and occupied the town, another Boer commando also 
 advancing from the direction of Smithfield. The position taken up by Lieut.- 
 Colonel Dalgety on 5th April consisted of an oval line of kopjes to the west of 
 and commanding the bridge, enclosing a basin about (5 miles in circumference. 
 The enemy’s attack began at 6.30 a.m. on the 9th, and most of the casualties 
 occurred on that and the following day, the defences of the position not 
 having been completed until the morning of the 11th. The investment lasted 
 up to the night of the 24th, the Boers retiring northward early on the morning 
 of the 25th. The relief of the force was effected by the movement on 
 
91 
 
 Wepener from Aliwal North of the 5th Brigade under Major-General A. Fitz- 
 Hugh Hart, and a column of Colonial troops under Brigadier-General Brabant, 
 and by the advance of the 8th Division under Lieut.-General Sir H. M. L. 
 Rundle from Edenburg to Dewetsdorp, supported by the 3rd Division under 
 Major-General Sir H. C. Chermside. Brigadier-General Brabant with his 
 mounted troops entered Wepener at 4 p.m. on 25th April. 
 
 3. The ammunition expended during the investment was as follows :— 
 
 In 
 
 possession. 
 
 Expended. 
 
 
 Rounds. 
 
 Rounds. 
 
 Per rifle 
 
 500 
 
 250 
 
 „ 15-pr. .. 
 
 850 
 
 750 
 
 » 12 -P r . 
 
 250 
 
 200 
 
 „ 7-pr. 
 
 250 
 
 100 
 
 „ Hotchkiss 
 
 350 
 
 342 
 
 The strength and composition of the force 
 
 under Lieut.-Colonel Dalgety’s 
 
 orders are detailed below — 
 
 Officers. 
 
 Non-commissioned 
 officers and men. 
 
 Royal Engineers 
 
 1 
 
 10 
 
 Royal Scots, Mounted Infantry . . 
 
 3 
 
 78 
 
 Cape Mounted Rifles 
 
 18 
 
 409 
 
 1st Brabant's Horse 
 
 25 
 
 320 
 
 2nd Brabant’s Horse 
 
 29 
 
 430 
 
 Kaffrarian Rifles 
 
 23 
 
 370 
 
 Driscoll’s Scouts 
 
 3 
 
 53 
 
 Colonial Artillery (C.M.R. Artillery) 
 
 3 
 
 90 
 
 Royal Army Medical Corps 
 
 6 
 
 27 
 
 4. I am of opinion that the utmost credit is due to Lieut.-Golonel Dalgety 
 and the troops under his command for the stubborn and successful resistance 
 which they offered to an enemy greatly outnumbering them. The hardships 
 of the investment were increased by heavy rain and by the impossibility of 
 relieving the men holding the line of entrenchments for a period of 13 days, 
 owing to the large perimeter which had to be guarded, and the small force 
 available for the purpose. 
 
 5. I cordially support Lieut.-Colonel Dalgety’s recommendations on behalf 
 of the Officers, non-commissioned officers and men, whose services he has 
 brought to special notice. 
 
 I have the honour to be, 
 
 My Lord, 
 
 Your Lordship’s most obedient Servant, 
 
 R0 BERTS, Field-MarsliaL , 
 
 Commanding-in-Chief y South Africa. 
 
 From Lieut.-Colonel E. H. Dalgety, Commanding Cape Mounted Rifles, to the 
 General Officer Commanding, Colonial Division. 
 
 Jammersberg Bridge, 
 
 Sir, 29th April 1900. 
 
 I have the honour to report that, in accordance with instructions received 
 from you, I left Aiiwal North on the morning of the 2nd April, to take 
 command of the Column consisting of the Cape Mounted Rides, 2nd Brabant’s 
 Horse, and a detachment of lvaffrarian Rifles, and Artillery, which had been 
 ordered to proceed to Wepener and hold the bridge over the Caledon River, 
 at the Jammersberg Drift. I arrived at Wepener on the night of the 4th, 
 and early on the morning of the 5th 1 moved on beyond the bridge to take up 
 
 47 ) M 2 
 
92 
 
 the position which had been selected by Major Maxwell, R.E., and from whom 
 1 took over command. 
 
 The troops under my command then consisted of one company of .Royal 
 Scots Mounted Infantry, part of the Cape Mounted Rifles, 1st and 2nd 
 Brabant’s Horse, the Kaffrarian Rifles, and a few of Driscoll’s Scouts, in all 
 about 1,000 men ; there were also about a dozen Royal Engineers, and the 
 Artillery Troop of the Cape Mounted Rifles, with two 15-prs., two naval guns, 
 two 2-5-inch guns, and one Hotchkiss gun. 
 
 The position I occupied was on the north bank of the Caledon River, and 
 formed a sort of circle, being 6 miles in circumference, with a diameter of 
 about 3 miles. When selecting the position it was not supposed that the rear 
 of the position would be likely to be attacked, and this was, therefore, the 
 weakest portion. 
 
 On the evening of the 6th, I received telegrams informing me that the 
 Garrison at Smithfield had fallen back on Rouxville, and then that the Pcouxville 
 Garrison were falling back on Aliwal North, so I then knew that my line of 
 communication with Aliwal North had been cut off, and that I must also be 
 prepared to have the rear of my position attacked. Major Maxwell had 
 already sent into Wepener to commandeer supplies, and, in addition, I found 
 a considerable amount of meal stored in Robertson’s Mill. 
 
 The 7th and 8th were spent in erecting schanzen all along the position, 
 but as, in most instances, there was barely a foot of soil, we had to depend, in 
 a great measure, on stone schanzen. 
 
 About 6.30 a.m., on the morning of Monday the 9th, the enemy 
 commenced shelling the position, which was occupied by the troops as follows, 
 viz., the right front by 2nd Brabant’s Horse, left front by 1st Brabant’s Horse, 
 and part of Kaffrarian Rifles; the left rear by Royal Scots, Cape Mounted 
 Rifles and Driscoll’s Scouts, and the right rear by the Kaffrarian Rifles, while 
 the guns were moved about as it was found necessary. The weakest part of 
 the position was on the extreme left rear, which was held by the Cape Mounted 
 Rifles, and it was here that the heaviest casualties took place, the Cape 
 Mounted Rifles losing 21 killed and 75 wounded out of a total of 33 killed and 
 133 wounded. 
 
 The attack on the 9th was made in force, and lasted the whole day, while 
 again, on the night of the 10th, another determined attack was made on the 
 position occupied by the Cape Mounted Rifles, the enemy coming up to within 
 40 yards of the schanzen, and working round and firing into the rear of them. 
 In both of these attacks we lost heavily. Another attack was made on the front 
 face on the night of the 12th, which was also repulsed, and the enemy then 
 contented themselves with shelling the position more or less heavily, while the 
 snipers harassed our men in the schanzen both by day and night, as they 
 pushed forward, killing and wounding a considerable number. 
 
 It was found to be impossible to contract our lines or to give up any 
 portion of the position held, so that 1 had no reserve available for relief and, 
 consequently, for 16 days and nights the whole force was constantly in the 
 trenches, and in the case of the Royal Scots, Cape Mounted Rifles and Scouts, 
 they had nothing but cold food and water during the whole 16 days, while for 
 
 3 days the trenches were flooded by rain. 
 
 f fhe ammunition, both gun and rifle, was husbanded with the greatest care, 
 and the rifle fire was always kept well under control, while Captain Lukin, who 
 commanded the Artillery, towards the end was only firing about once every 
 
 4 hour, while the enemy were firing, on an average, from 200 to 300 shells 
 a day. 
 
 I cannot speak too highly of the behaviour of the whole force during this 
 time; all did their work cheerfully and well, although the continued strain was 
 telling on all ranks. 
 
 1 would wish to bring to your notice the names of Serjeant Roberts, 
 Privates Rawlings and Robarts, and Trumpeter Washington of the Cape 
 Mounted Rifles, Private Thorn of the Royal Scots, and Private Anderson of 
 2nd Brabant’s Horse, who all performed acts of bravery in bringing in wounded 
 comrades under a very heavy fiic. 
 
 All Officers Commanding corps rendered me most valuable assistance, and 
 1 would particularly beg to mention the names of Lieut.-Colonel Grenfell, 
 ^cnimnnding 2nd Brabant’s Horse, my second in command; Major 
 
93 
 
 Maxwell, R.E, who selected the position and assisted me in every way; 
 Captain Lukin, Cape Mounted Rifles, who commanded the Artillery and did 
 most excellent work, putting one of the enemy’s guns out of action; Captain 
 Cantwell, Cape Mounted Rifles, who, after Major Sprenger was killed and 
 Major Waring was wounded, on the 9th and 11th respectively, commanded the 
 Cape Mounted Rifles in the advanced schanzen; Captain Phillips, the Quarter- 
 Master of the Cape Mounted Rifles, who, when two Officers of the Cape 
 Mounted Rifles were killed and five wounded, took command of 50 men and 
 held a most important position ; and Captain Grant, Cape Mounted Rifles, 
 Field-Adjutant, who did the work of half-a-dozen men; while Captain Farrar 
 of the Ivaffrarian Rifles was invaluable in obtaining supplies from Wcpcner on 
 the 6th, 7th, and 8th, 
 
 The Medical Staff under Major Faskally, although heavily taxed, worked 
 splendidly. 
 
 I have the honour to be, 
 
 Sir, 
 
 Your obedient Servant, 
 
 E. H. DALGETY, Lieut.-Colonel., 
 
 Commanding Cape Mounted Riflemen. 
 
 Assistant Adjutant-General, 3rd Division, Dewetsdorp, 
 
 Forwarded. 
 
 E. G. BRABANT, Brigadier-General, 
 
 Colonial Division. 
 
 Jammersbekg Drift, 
 
 29 1h April 1900. 
 
 No. 12. 
 
 From Field-Marshal Lord Roberts to the Secretary of State for War. 
 
 Army Head-quarters, Pretoria, 
 
 My Lord, 19th June 1900. 
 
 I have the honour to submit for your Lordship’s information a report, 
 dated 20th April 1900, from Brigadier-General R. G. Broadwood, Commanding 
 2nd Cavalry Brigade, describing his withdrawal from Thabanchu and the 
 engagement at Sannah’s Post on the 30th and 31st March 1900. 
 
 2. The reverse which occurred on the latter date resulting in heavy 
 casualties as well as the capture by the enemy of seven 12-pr. guns, the 
 personnel of an entire battery of Royal Horse Artillery, and the convoy of the 
 baggage and supplies accompanying Brigadier-General Broadwood’s column, 
 was most unfortunate, and it seems necessary to examine and weigh carefully 
 the reasons to which it may be attributed. 
 
 It will he observed that when Brigadier-General Broadwood found his 
 position at Thabanchu seriously threatened he directed his baggage to proceed 
 to Sannah’s Post, a distance of some 24 miles, and after successfully warding 
 off the attack of the enemy on the Nek, he withdrew his troops from their 
 positions and reached Sannah’s Post at 3.30 a.m. During the night a party of 
 Boers succeeded in establishing themselves, undetected, in a dry watercourse 
 called the Ivoorn Spruit, some 2,000 yards west of Sannah’s Post, at a point 
 where the road to Bloemfontein crosses the watercourse. It was at this point 
 that the disaster occurred. 
 
 3. I have thought it desirable to call on Lieut.-Colonel Pilcher, command¬ 
 ing the 3rd Mounted Infantry Corps, who escorted the baggage from Thabanchu 
 to Sannah’s Post, to report what steps he took for the security of his bivouac on 
 his arrival in camp. This Officer’s report is appended, and I consider that, in 
 
94 
 
 view of the fact of his finding a body of our troops, equal in strength to the 
 force under his own command, already in occupation of the Waterworks, he was 
 not called upon to make special arrangements for the security of his camp, 
 other than those which he might reasonably expect to find in existence on his 
 arrival there. In addition to the guard on the camp, an Officer’s patrol left camp 
 before daylight, and proceeded some xO miles to the east, towards Thabanchu. 
 Two small patrols were despatched at the same time north and south of the 
 camp, while a patrol of four men left the Waterworks about sunset for Boesman’s 
 Kop, a hill some distance from Sannah’s Post on the Bloemfontein road, where 
 a party of Mounted Infantry were stationed with orders to return 
 between 3 a.m. and 5 a.m. the following day. On the morning of the 
 31st March this patrol was unable to reach Sannah’s Post, owing to the Boers 
 having occupied the Koorn Spruit watercourse during the night, and it does 
 not appear that the men composing it made any attempt to give the alarm by 
 firing their rifles or by an}" other means, on discovering the presence of the 
 Boers in ambush. 
 
 4. After fighting for 10 hours on the previous day, and after a trying 
 night march of 24 miles and a rest of only 2^ hours, Brigadier-General 
 Broadwood found himself at daylight on 31st March under the fire of the 
 enemy’s guns from the hills to the east of Sannah’s Post, at a range to which 
 his Horse Artillery guns could not reply. He thereupon, very judiciously, 
 arranged to withdraw his force out of fire. Theoretically speaking, he should 
 unquestionably have detained his transport until he had detailed a suitable 
 advance guard, or thrown out scouts in front and on the flanks of the column, 
 but my experience leads me to believe that it was impossible for him to 
 restrain the followers and baggage from streaming away to the rear when they 
 unexpectedly found themselves exposed to a heavy shell fire. 
 
 This is precisely what occurred. The fugitives and the leading wagons 
 pressed on so rapidly that they out-stripped the scouts of the advanced guard, 
 and they had entered the watercourse, and had been permitted by the Boers to 
 cross to the other side of the Koorn Spruit, before the Mounted Infantry had 
 been able to get in front of the column and take its proper place. 
 
 5. In my telegram No. 363, dated 31st March 1900, I stated that the 
 Boers had concealed themselves so well in the spruit that our leading scouts 
 passed over the drift without discovering them. Subsequent investigation has 
 proved, however, that such was not the case, but that the sequence of events 
 was as indicated as above. 
 
 6. As regards the point raised in paragraph 9 of the accompanying report, 
 1 consider that Lieut.-General Sir H. Coivile would have done better if, on his 
 arrival with the 9th Division at Boesman’s Kop, he had proceeded at once to 
 the scene of the engagement, and ascertained personally how matters stood, 
 before deciding on the flank movement towards Waterval Drift. 
 
 7. After a very careful consideration of the circumstances, I am of opinion 
 that the disaster is mainly due to the failure of the patrol from Boesman’s Kop 
 to warn their comrades of the ambush which had been prepared during the 
 night, and that no specific blame can be attributed to the General Officer 
 Commanding the force. 
 
 I am further of opinion that Brigadier-General Broadwood displayed 
 presence of mind and gallantry in his endeavours to retrieve the disaster and 
 extricate his troops. In the example he set to his comrades under peculiarly 
 trying circumstances he acted up to the high reputation he had already gained 
 in the Sudan, and in command of a Cavalry Brigade in South Africa, and that 
 reputation has been added to by the distinguished and admirable manner in 
 which he has subsequently exercised his command during the advance from 
 Bloemfontein to Pretoria. 
 
 8. The submission of this despatch has been considerably delayed, but the 
 delay has been an unavoidable one, as I considered it undesirable to submit it 
 until I had had an opportunity of personally enquiring into the case from the 
 principal actors in it. Owing to the manner in which the Cavalry has been 
 employed on detached duties this has not been possible till the Army reached 
 Pretoria. 
 
 9. lu conclusion I am glad to say that on this, as on other occasions, the 
 
95 
 
 troops behaved in a most gallant manner, and I cordially support Brigadier- 
 G-eneral Broadvvood’s recommendations on behalf of the Officers, non-com¬ 
 missioned officers and men whose names he has brought to notice. 
 
 I have the honour to he, 
 
 My Lord, 
 
 Your Lordship’s most obedient Servant, 
 
 ROBERTS, Field-Marshal, 
 Commanding-in- Chief’, South Africa. 
 
 From Brigadier-General Broadwood to the Military Secretary to the 
 Field-Marshal, Commanding-in-Chief, South Africa. 
 
 Bloemspruit, 
 
 Sir, 20th April 1900. 
 
 I have the honour to submit the following report for the information of 
 the Field-Marshal upon the withdrawal from Thabanchu and action at Sannah’s 
 Post on the 30th and 31st March 1900 :— 
 
 1. At 11 a.m. on 30th March 1900, while camped at Thabanchu in 
 command of the force marginally noted,* [ received a report from the 
 outposts that a large force of Boers was moving rapidly on the town along the 
 road from Ladybrand. I reinforced the outposts in that direction by one 
 squadron of Cavalry and 300 Mounted Infantry; immediately afterwards 
 reports were brought in by natives that another hostile force was working 
 round my left or north flank. I occupied a position in that direction with 
 three squadrons, and wired to the Chief of the Staff that, if the latter report 
 was confirmed, I should be compelled to retire on Sannah’s Post, where I 
 should be in open country and within supporting distance of Bloemfontein. I 
 told the Officer Commanding the two companies of Mounted Infantry at 
 Sannah’s Post that I should probably retire on him, and that I wished him 
 specially to reconnoitre to his north. 
 
 2. At 3 p.m. the enemy attacked the nek, 6 miles east of the town. I 
 ordered Lieut.-Colonel Alderson to send an escort with my baggage to Israel’s 
 Poort some 3 miles distant, where I intended to bivouac. Soon afterwards I 
 received corroborative intelligence of a movement round my left. I then sent 
 an order that the retirement was to be continued to Sannah’s Post, a distance 
 of about 24 miles from where my outposts were engaged. I wired to the Chief 
 of the Staff that I was retiring on Sannah’s Post. 
 
 3. At dark the enemy withdrew from the attack on the nek, and by 9 p.m. 
 
 I had withdrawn my troops from their positions, and was retiring on Sannah’s 
 Post, which we reached at 3.30 a.m., the baggage having arrived there at 
 
 II p.m. My intention was to await orders or reinforcements at that point, as 
 it commanded the Waterworks. 
 
 4. Soon after daylight on the 31st March, the Officer Commanding 
 Sannah’s Post detachment reported that his patrol towards Waterval Drift 
 reported that my north flank was clear, but that his patrols were being fired on 
 from the kopjes east of the Modder River. Almost immediately afterwards 
 a heavy shell fire from the latter direction was opened on the bivouac at a 
 range to which my Horse Batteries could not reply. At the same time it was 
 reported to me that about 300 Boers could be seen galloping on the north 
 bank of the river in the direction of Boesman’s Kop, a steep hill on the road 
 by which reinforcements would arrive from Bloemfontein, and on which a 
 detachment of Mounted Infantry was stationed. I ordered the force to retire 
 out of shell fire, and directed Roberts’ Horse and “ U ” Battery, Royal Horse 
 Artillery, to reinforce the post at Boesman’s Ivop, on which point I proposed to 
 withdraw my force. 
 
 * “ Q” Battery, Royal Horse Artillery ; .“ U ” Battery, Royal Horse Artillery; Household 
 Savalry, 160 sabres; 10th Hussars. 160 sabres; Alderson’s Mounted Infantry, 800 rifle-. 
 
96 
 
 One regiment of Mounted Infantry I detailed to act as rear-guard, and 
 one company of Mounted Infantry to reinforce the patrol sent out by the 
 Officer Commanding’ at Sannah’s Post towards Waterval Drift. 
 
 O 
 
 5. The regiment of Mounted Infantry (Roberts’ Horse), ordered to 
 Boesman’s Kop, and the Battery (“ U ” battery. Royal Horse Artillery), moved 
 off on opposite sides of the baggage column, which was clearing rapidly out 
 of the shell fire, and, before they had cleared, the column came on to a deep 
 spruit, about 2,000 yards west of the bivouac. This spruit was occupied by 
 about 600 of the enemy, who seized five guns of the battery and the convoy, 
 and opened a heavy fire on Roberts's Horse and on the main body of Cavalry 
 which was following; these retired out of fire. “ Q ” Battery, owing to its 
 losses in the retirement, was compelled to come into action within 1,200 yards 
 of the spruit, and the Durham Light Infantry Company of Mounted Infantry, 
 which was acting as right flank guard to the retirement, promptly occupied a 
 position on the right and left flank of the battery; this checked any intention 
 the enemy had of advancing from the spruit. 
 
 6. I had remained with the rearguard, thinking it the most threatened 
 point. Proceeding to the scene of the disaster, I found that the enemy were 
 extending up the spruit and over the ridge west of it. 1 ordered the House¬ 
 hold Cavalry Regiment to occupy a point higher up the spruit, and to work 
 down it, one company Mounted Infantry to work along the ridge on the 
 Household Cavalry’s left, and the 10th Hussars to swing round the left of this 
 company and operate against the rear of the enemy in the spruit. As soon as 
 the movement was under weigh I relieved the Household Cavalry by two 
 companies of the Burma Mounted Infantry, and ordered the former to join in 
 the movement of the 10th Hussars. 
 
 7. I did not consider it possible for Major Hornby to move his battery 
 under the heavy fire, hut ordered him to retire as soon as the turning move¬ 
 ment should have had the effect of checking this fire, and to then move round 
 the pivot formed by the Mounted Infantry in the spruit, on Boesman’s Kop. I 
 ordered Lieut.-Colonel Alderson with the remainder of his brigade to hold the 
 enemy, who were pressing vigorously across the river, sufficiently long to 
 cover the retirement of the battery, and to follow its retirement. The whole 
 of this operation was carried out with perfect steadiness by all concerned, the 
 action of “ Q ” Battery, the company of Durham Light Infantry, and of Lieut.- 
 Colonel Pilcher’s regiment of Mounted Infantry being specially worthy of 
 notice. By 11.15 a m. the force was clear, with the loss of seven guns, and of 
 the whole of the convoy, two guns of “ Q ” Battery having to be abandoned 
 owing to the loss of horses. 
 
 8. Lieut.-Colonel Martyr’s Brigade of Mounted Infantry had meanwhile 
 arrived at Boesman’s Kop, one regiment, Lieut.-Colonel Henry’s, had moved 
 on Waterval Drift, where it extricated the company of Mounted Infantry 
 which had been pushed out in that direction earlier in the day. Another 
 regiment, Major Dobell’s, I ordered forward on to the ridge west of the spruit 
 to see what possibility there was of recovering any of the lost guns or convoy. 
 He came under a heavy fire, and reported that the enemy in the spruit had 
 been reinforced to some 1,500 rifles. 
 
 9. About noon a Staff Officer arrived from General Officer Commanding 
 
 9th Division to say he had reached Boesman’s Kop. I suggested that a 
 direct advance on the spruit offered the best chance of assisting. About 
 2 p.m. I was informed that the 9th Division had moved towards Waterval 
 Drift, so seeing any hope of recapturing the guns at an end, I began sending 
 
 the units to their camps, as, owing to the loss of the baggage, it was 
 
 inadvisable to bivouac where we were. 
 
 10. That the reverse was not more serious is, in a great measure, due to 
 
 the skilful handling of his brigade, during the 31st, by Lieut.-Colonel 
 
 Alderson. Conspicuous gallantry was shown by the whole of “ Q ” Battery, 
 Royal Horse Artillery, and by the following Officers, non-commissioned 
 officers, and men who assisted to withdraw the guns under heavy fire :— 
 
 Lieutenant Maxwell, D.S.O., 18th Bengal Lancers, attached to 
 Roberts’ Horse. 
 
 Lieutenant Stirling, 2nd Bn. Essex Regiment. 
 
 Lieutenant Ainsworth, 2nd Bn. Durham Light Infantry. 
 
97 
 
 Lieutenant Way, 2nd Bn. Durham Light Infantry. 
 
 Lieutenant Ashburner, 2nd Bn. Durham Light Infantry. 
 
 Lieutenant Grover, 1st Bn. Shropshire Light Infantry (killed). 
 
 4127 Private Parry, 2nd Bn. West Riding Regiment. 
 
 3840 Private Bright, 2nd Bn. Essex Regiment. 
 
 5908 Private Pickford, 2nd Bn. Durham Light Infantry. 
 
 5708 Private Horton, 2nd Bn. Durham Light Infantry. 
 
 4423 Lance-Corporal Steel, 2nd Bn. Durham Light Infantry. 
 
 The following Officers, non-commissioned officers and men risked their 
 lives to save comrades under heavy fire :— 
 
 Lieut.-Colonel Pilcher, Northumberland Fusiliers. 
 
 Captain Gore Anley, Essex Regiment. 
 
 4103 Corporal Lincoln, 1st Bn. Northumberland Fusiliers. 
 
 4831 Private Evans, 1st Bn. Northumberland Fusiliers. 
 
 Serjeant J. C. Collins, Roberts’ Horse. 
 
 Private T. Murphy, Roberts’ Horse. 
 
 Private V. D. Todd, Roberts’ Horse. 
 
 I am forwarding detailed evidence in the case of such of the above as 
 seem worthy of the special consideration of the Commander-in-Chief. 
 
 I have the honour to be, 
 
 Sir, 
 
 Your obedient Servant, 
 
 R. G. BROADWOOD, Brigadier-General, 
 Commanding 2nd Cavalry Brigade. 
 
 Statement by Lieut.-Colonel Pilcher, Commanding 3rd Mounted Infantry 
 Corps, regarding escorting baggage, &c., on 30th March. 
 
 Pretoria, 
 
 17th June 1900. 
 
 1. At about noon on 30th March, at Thabanchu, Lieut.-Colonel Aldersom 
 ordered me, as Officer Commanding 3rd Mounted Infantry Regiment, to form 
 an escort for the baggage on that day. This was the only order that he gave 
 me, except that he told me that we should probably halt at the pass about 
 3 miles to the west of where we were in bivouac. Before reaching this pass 
 I received information that the force was to proceed across the Modder River. 
 As long as daylight lasted I took up successive positions guarding the right 
 flank of our retirement, and also reconnoitred to the north, but saw nothing of 
 the enemy, except what might have been a few scouts. After sunset I 
 proceeded along the road. All the baggage was parked on the far side (the 
 west side) of the Modder, and my regiment had settled down in bivouac before 
 midnight. 
 
 2. I had received no orders to provide for the safety of the bivouac, but 
 nevertheless, posted five groups round it, at a distance of about 500 yards, on 
 the side of the river to which avc had crossed. There was no moon, and this 
 was all I could do in the dark, besides having a small post at the drift. The 
 Avhole of the force was following the baggage, and was several miles east of 
 the drift when I arrived, besides which, three companies of Mounted Infantry, 
 with a strength equal to my regiment, were occupying the Waterworks, and 
 had presumably taken precautions for safety to the west of the river. 
 
 3. As I have previously stated, I received no orders whatever about 
 finding outposts, and the precautions I took Avere simply for the protection of 
 my bivouac until the remainder of the force arrived. 
 
 T. W. PILCHER, Lieut.-Colonel , 
 
 Commanding 3rd Corps, Mounted Infantry. 
 
 
 N 
 
98 
 
 No. 13. 
 
 From Field-Marshal Lord Roberts to the Secretary of State for War. 
 
 Army Head-quarters, South Africa, 
 
 My Lord, Pretoria, 21st June 1900. 
 
 I have the honour to submit for your Lordship’s consideration a despatch, 
 dated 18th May 1900, with annexures and a letter dated 6th June 1900, from 
 Major-General R. S. S. Baden-Powell, describing the siege of Mafeking which 
 lasted from the 13th October 1899 to the 17th May 1900, and bringing to 
 notice the Officers and men, as well as the civilians and ladies, who rendered 
 good service during the above period. 
 
 2. I feel assured that Her Majesty’s Government will agree with me in 
 thinking that the utmost credit is due to Major-General Baden-Powell for his 
 promptness in raising two regiments of Mounted Infantry in Rhodesia, and for 
 the resolution, judgment, and resource which he displayed throughout the long 
 and trying investment of Mafeking by the Boer forces. The distinction which 
 Major-General Baden-Powell has earned must be shared by his gallant 
 soldiers. No episode in the present war seems more praiseworthy than the 
 prolonged defence of this town by a British garrison, consisting almost entirely 
 of Her Majesty’s Colonial forces, inferior in numbers and greatly inferior in 
 artillery to the enemy, cut off from communication with ("ape Colony, and 
 with the hope of relief repeatedly deferred until the supplies of food were 
 nearly exhausted. 
 
 3. Inspired by their Commander’s example, the defenders of Mafeking 
 maintained a never failing confidence and cheerfulness, which conduced most 
 materially to the successful issue ; they made light of the hardships to which 
 they were exposed, and they withstood the enemy’s attacks with an audacity 
 which so disheartened their opponents that, except on one occasion, namely, 
 on 12th May, no serious attempt was made to capture the place by assault. 
 This attempt Avas repulsed in a manner which showed that the determination 
 and fighting qualities of the garrison remained unimpaired to the last. 
 
 4. In recording my high appreciation of the conduct of all ranks during 
 this memorable siege, I desire cordially to support Major-General Baden- 
 Pow r ell’s recommendations on behalf of those serving under his orders, and the 
 civilians and others who co-operated with him in the maintenance of order, and 
 in the care of the sick and wounded. 
 
 I have the honour to be, 
 
 Sir, 
 
 Your Lordship’s most obedient Servant, 
 
 ROBERTS, Field-Marshal, 
 
 Commanding-in-Chief, South Africa . 
 
 From Major-General Baden-Powell, Commanding at Mafeking, to the Chief St a f 
 
 Officer to Lord Roberts. 
 
 Mafeking, 
 
 My Lord, 18th May 1900. 
 
 ' 1 have the honour to forward herewith my report on the siege of 
 Mafeking by the Boers, from 13th October 1899 till the 17th May 1900, for 
 the information of his Excellency the Field-Marshal Commanding in South 
 Africa. 
 
 I have the honour to be, 
 
 Sir, 
 
 Your Lordship’s most obedient Servant, 
 
 R. S. S. BADEN-POWELL, Major-General . 
 
99 
 
 Table of Contents. 
 
 Part I.—Narrative of the siege. 
 
 Part H.—Minor points connected with the siege. 
 Part III.—Engagements with enemy. 
 
 Part IV.—Recommendation of Officers and others. 
 
 T.—RfiSUMfi OF REPORT ON THE SIEGE OF MAFEKING. 
 
 I arrived in the beginning of August in Rhodesia, with orders— 
 
 1. To raise two regiments of Mounted Infantry. 
 
 2. In the event of war, to organize the defence of the Rhodesia and 
 Bechuanaland frontiers. 
 
 3. As far as possible, to keep forces of the enemy occupied in this 
 direction away from their own main forces. 
 
 I had the two regiments raised, equipped, supplied, and ready for service 
 by the end of September. 
 
 As war became imminent, I saw that my force would be too weak to effect 
 much if scattered along the whole border (500 miles), unless it were reinforced 
 with some men and good guns. I reported this, but as none were available I 
 decided to concentrate my two columns at Tuli and Mafeking, respectively, as 
 being the desirable points to hold. 
 
 Of the two, Mafeking seemed the more important for many reasons, 
 strategical and political— 
 
 1. Because it is the outpost for Kimberley and Cape Colony. 
 
 2. Also, equally, for the Protectorate and Rhodesia. 
 
 3. It threatens the weak flank of the Transvaal. 
 
 4. It is the head-centre of the large native districts of the north-west, 
 with their 200,000 inhabitants. 
 
 5. It contains important railway stocks and shops. 
 
 6. Also large food and forage supplies. 
 
 Therefore, I left the northern column in charge of Colonel Plumer, and 
 went myself to Mafeking, and organized its defence. 
 
 Mafeking. 
 
 Mafeking is an open town, 1,000 yards square, in open undulating 
 country, on the north bank of the Molopo stream. Eight miles from the 
 Transvaal border. White population, about 1,000. 
 
 The native Stadt lies | mile south-west, and contains 6,000 inhabitants. 
 
 Defence Force. 
 
 700 whites, of whom 20 were Imperial Army, remainder Protectorate 
 Regiment, British South Africa Police, Cape Police, and Bechuanaland Rifles 
 (Volunteers). These were used to man the forts and outworks. 
 
 300 able-bodied townsmen enrolled as town guard. Employed to garrison 
 the town itself. 
 
 300 natives enrolled as cattle guards, watchmen, police, &c. 
 
 Half the defenders were armed with L.M., half with M.H. rifles, with 600 
 rounds per rifle. 
 
 Total Numbers. 
 
 White men.. 
 
 • • 
 
 • • 
 
 .. 1,074 
 
 „ women 
 
 # # 
 
 # # 
 
 229 
 
 „ children 
 
 
 • • 
 
 405 
 
 Natives 
 
 • • 
 
 • • 
 
 .. 7,500 
 
 N 2 
 
 ( 47 ) 
 
100 
 
 Our armament consisted of— 
 
 Four 7-pr. M.L. guns, j 
 
 One 1-pr. Hotchkiss >A11 old. 
 
 One 2-in. Nordenfelt J 
 
 Seven '303 Maxims. 
 
 To this armament we afterwards added— 
 
 One 6-pr. M.L. old ship’s gun. 
 
 One 16-pr. M.L. howitzer (made in our own shops). 
 
 I had two armoured engines promised from Kimberley. I had armoured 
 trucks made at Bulawayo and Mafeking. One engine arrived, the other was 
 cut off en route by the enemy and captured at Kraaipan. 
 
 The Siege. 
 
 On the 18th October the siege began. 
 
 General Cronje with an army of 8,000 Boers and 10 guns, most of them 
 of modern pattern and power, surrounded the place. 
 
 On the approach of the eneni} r we sallied out and, in a sharp little engage¬ 
 ment dealt them a severe blow, by which they lost 53 killed and many more 
 wounded, and which had a lasting moral effect. 
 
 During the first phase of the siege, October and November, General 
 Cronje made various attempts to take the place. These attacks we beat off 
 without difficulty in every case, and responded by sorties, varying their nature 
 every time as far as possible, and making them so sudden and so quickly 
 withdrawn as not to give the enemy’s supports time to come up and over¬ 
 power us. Of these “ kicks ” we delivered half-a-dozen, on 14th, 17th, 20th, 
 25th, 27th, 31st October, and 7th November (the Boers quote 14, but they 
 include demonstrations and shelling of dummy forts, guns, and armoured 
 trucks, &c., which we put up to draw their fire). 
 
 The enemy’s losses in this period were very heavy as compared with ours— 
 
 Boers’ losses—287 killed, 800 wounded.* 
 
 Our losses—35 killed, 101 wounded, 27 missing. 
 
 Cronje having lost a month of valuable time at Mafeking, now gave up the 
 idea of taking the place by storm, and moved off south for Kimberley with 
 4,000 men and 6 guns ^leaving General Snyman with the remainder, viz, 3,000 
 to 4,000 men and six guns (including a 94-pr. siege gun) to invest us. 
 
 Seeing then that we could not be relieved for many weeks, if not months, 
 
 I took over into our own management all details such as hospital, municipality, 
 police, treasury, post and telegraph, railway, native affairs, Avater supply, 
 ordnance shops, &c. 
 
 1 also took over all food, forage, and liquor stores, and native supplies, &c., 
 and put everybody on rations. 
 
 I had disposed my garrison over what some of my Officers considered a 
 rather extended perimeter (about 5 or G miles), but everything was arranged 
 for drawing in our horns if necessary. However, in the event we were able to 
 maintain our original position, and even further to extend it as became 
 necessary. 
 
 The next phase lasted 3 months, November to January, during which . 
 Snyman pushed his works and trenches nearer to the place. 
 
 He also drew a cordon of natives around the whole. 
 
 His artillery kept up a continual bombardment on the town. 
 
 On our part, during January, February, and March, we pushed out 
 counter-works and gradually gained point after point of ground till we obtained 
 grazing for our livestock, and finally (after a hard tussle in the “Brickfields,” 
 in trenching and counter-trenching up to within 70 yards of enemy’s works), 
 we drove them back at all points out of range for rifle fire of the town. 
 
 * These numbers are queued from Transvaal newspapers,but must, I think, be exaggerated. 
 
 I think that about GOO killed and wounded would be nearer the mark. 
 
101 
 
 During this period, owing to the careful and systematic sharp-shooting of 
 our men the enemy’s losses continued to be largely in excess of ours. 40 per 
 month killed was admitted by the Boer medical officer. , 
 
 In April the enemy withdrew the siege gun, and contented themselves with 
 investing us at a distance, and shelling our cattle in the hope of starving us 
 into submission. 
 
 On the 12th May the enemy made a bold night attack on the place, and 
 succeeded in getting into the Stadt with their storming party, but we beat back 
 their supports and surrounded the remainder, inflicting on them a loss of 70 
 killed and wounded, and 10S prisoners, including Eloff their commandant 
 (grandson of President Kruger). 
 
 In the meantime, Colonel Plumer had near Tuli prevented a force of 
 Boers from invading Matabeleland from the south. After their retreat the 
 rising of the river made the border comparatively safe, and I called him down 
 to defend the railway and the Protectorate border (which were already being 
 held by a small force organized from Bulawayo by Colonel Nicholson). 
 
 Colonel Plumer accordingly pushed down the line, repairing it to within 
 40 miles of Mafeking, and pushing back the enemy who had been holding it. 
 He then established himself in a good position 35 miles north-west of us, where 
 he was in touch by means of runners and pigeons, was able to afford refuge to 
 our natives escaping out, and he was also able to put a stop to enemy’s 
 depredations and to give security to the natives throughout the Protectorate, 
 his force being too small to effect more till reinforced. His presence enabled 
 us to get rid of nearly 2,000 native women and children, which materially 
 relieved the strain on our food supply. 
 
 Early in May, he was reinforced by Canadian Artillery and Queensland 
 Infantry, &c., and on 15th he joined hands with a relief column from the south 
 under Colonel Mahon. 
 
 And, on the 17th May, the relief of Mafeking was successfully effected by 
 the combined columns, after a siege of 218 days. 
 
 One of the most noticeable features of the long and trying siege has been 
 the loyalty, patience, and good feeling which have prevailed throughout the 
 community, civil, military and native. The steadiness and gallantry of the 
 troops in action, and their cheerful acceptance of hardships, are beyond 
 praise. 
 
 The ladies, and especially those who acted as nurses in the hospitals, 
 displayed the greatest patience and fortitude. 
 
 Resume of Points Gained by the Rhodesian Frontier Force. 
 
 (October 1890 to May 1900.) 
 
 1.—At Mafeking. 
 
 1. A force of 8,000 Boers and 10 guns was contained at the first outbreak 
 of war, and prevented from either combining with the Tuli column, and 
 invading Rhodesia, or joining the forces against Kimberley. Cronje’s 
 commando was thus held here for a month. 
 
 2. From 2.000 to 3,000 Boers and eight guns (including a 94-pr.) were 
 kept employed here for over G months. 
 
 3. The enemy expended considerably over 100 tons of ammunition, and 
 lost over 1,000 men killed and wounded, and had four guns disabled and one 
 captured. 
 
 4. Large stores of food and forage, and general stocks, were prevented 
 from falling into the enemy’s hands. 
 
 5. Valuable railway plant, including JS locomotives, rolling stock, shops, 
 coal, &c., were saved. 
 
 G. Refuge was given to a large number of British from the Transvaal. 
 
 7. Most of the local neighbouring tribes, and all those of the Protectorate 
 and South Matebeieland, remained loyal which they could not have continued 
 to do had Mafeking fallen and they been at the mercy of the Boers. 
 
 S. Loss of- prestige to Cronje’s force, who had apparently expected to take 
 possession at once on first arrival, and had had proclamation printed annexing 
 the district to the South African Republic. 
 
 9. Eloff and 108 Boers and foreigners made prisoners of war. 
 
102 
 
 II.—The Rhodesian Column. 
 
 During the same period the northern portion of my force under Colonel 
 Plumer (in spite of its small numbers and the exceptionally difficult country 
 and trying climate in which it was operating) succeeded— 
 
 1. In holding and sending back the enemy in their attempt to invade 
 Rhodesia, via Tuli. 
 
 2. In holding the Bulawayo railway for some 200 miles south of the 
 Rhodesian border. 
 
 3. In giving direct support and protection to the natives in Khama’s and 
 Linchwe’s domains, and Bathoen’s and the Protectorate generally when 
 threatened by the enemy. 
 
 4. In pushing down and repairing the railway in the face of the enemy to 
 within 40 miles of Mafeking, and there establishing a place of security for our 
 natives escaping from Mafeking, and collecting supplies ready to effect our 
 relief in Mafeking on arrival of reinforcements. 
 
 III.—The Palapye Column. 
 
 A small column organized by Colonel Nicholson, from Bulawayo, with 
 armoured trains, &c., held Mangwe, Palapye, Mochudi, &c., on the railway 
 until Plumer’s column wars available for the duty. 
 
 The whole of the frontier force, north and south columns combined, 
 numbered under 1,700, while the Boers during the early part of the campaign 
 had between 9,000 and 10,000 out on their northern and north-western border. 
 Country operated over, between Mafeking and Tuli, 450 miles in length. 
 
 II.—MINOR POINTS CONNECTED WITH THE SIEGE. 
 (Alphabetically arranged.) 
 
 Ammunition. 
 
 Artillery. 
 
 Casualties. 
 
 Communications. 
 
 Civil administration. 
 
 Compensation. 
 
 Correspondents. 
 
 Defence accounts. 
 
 Defence works. 
 
 Enemy’s artillery—fighting, treachery, field work. 
 Finance. 
 
 Food supply. 
 
 Fuel. 
 
 Garrison. 
 
 Hospital. 
 
 Natives. 
 
 Railway. 
 
 Relief Committee. 
 
 Specialities. 
 
 Staff. 
 
 Spies. 
 
 Transport. 
 
 Water. 
 
 Women’s laager. 
 
 Artillery. 
 
 Our so-called artillery should of course have been entirely outclassed by 
 the modern high-velocity guns of the enemy, but in practice they managed to 
 hold their own in spite of their using powder, shells and fuzes all made in our 
 own shops. 
 
 The artillery and also the ordnance shops were under Major Panzeia, 
 assisted by Lieutenant Daniell, British South Africa Police. 
 
103 
 
 Casualties. 
 
 
 Killed and 
 died of wounds. 
 
 Wounded. 
 
 Missing. 
 
 Died. 
 
 Accident. 
 
 Total. 
 
 I 
 
 — Combatants. 
 
 
 
 
 Whites— 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Officers 
 
 6 
 
 15 
 
 1 
 
 
 t , 
 
 22 
 
 N.O.O.’s and men .. 
 
 61 
 
 103 
 
 26 
 
 16 
 
 5 
 
 211 
 
 Total— 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Whites 
 
 67 
 
 118 
 
 27 
 
 16 
 
 5 
 
 233 
 
 Coloured ,. 
 
 25 
 
 68 
 
 •• 
 
 •• 
 
 •• 
 
 83 
 
 
 
 
 Total combatants .. 
 
 316 
 
 
 II. 
 
 — Non-combatants. 
 
 
 
 
 Whites 
 
 4 
 
 5 
 
 
 32 
 
 
 41 
 
 Natives 
 
 65 
 
 117 
 
 • • 
 
 • • 
 
 , , 
 
 182 
 
 Jlaralongs 
 
 264 
 
 •• 
 
 •• 
 
 .. 
 
 •• 
 
 264 
 
 
 
 
 Total non-combatants .. 
 
 487 
 
 Total all casualties during siege, 803. 
 
 Out of 44 Officers, 21 were killed, wounded, or missing. 
 
 Out of 975 men, 190 were killed, wounded, or missing. 
 
 Communications. 
 
 Local. 
 
 Telephone.—All outlying forts and look-out posts were connected up with 
 head-quarters, under management of Mr. Howat, postmaster, and his staff. I 
 was thus able to receive reports and issue orders for all parts of the defence 
 instantaneously. 
 
 Postal.—To cover the heavy expenses of runners, and for the convenience 
 .of the public, postage was established at: 1 d. for town, 3d. for outlying forts, 
 Is. for up country. 
 
 Signalling.—Heliograph, lamp and flag signalling was established for 
 defence purposes by brigade signallers, under Major Panzera and Serjeant- 
 Major Moffat. 
 
 Megaphones were also made and used in outlying trenches and posts. 
 
 Phonophores were also used on the armoured train, attached to ordinary 
 telegraph lines. 
 
 Distant. 
 
 Runners.—Native runners were employed twice weekly, or oftener when 
 necessary, to take despatches, letters, &c., to our northern column. They had 
 to be highly paid, as the risk of capture and death was very great. 
 
 I was thus practically in touch with my force on the railway, and through 
 them with Colonel Nicholson at the base, and Colonel Plumer’s column at 
 Tuli. 
 
 Civil Administration. 
 
 I established, for the trial of all cases not directly amenable to military 
 law, a Court of Summary Jurisdiction— 
 
 Members : 
 
 Resident Commissioner. ' 
 
 Resident Magistrate. 
 
 • * * Town Commandant. 
 
 Officer Commanding Protectorate Regiment. 
 
 Chief Staff Officer. 
 
104 
 
 At first it was a little difficult to make the civilians appreciate the 
 restrictions of martial law, and, as times grew more critical, there came a 
 tendency to spread rumours and to grumble, this had to be stopped. 
 
 I also published some explanatory remarks and advice on the working of 
 martial law, &c., and these steps had a most marked effect, obedience to orders 
 and a good spirit thenceforward prevailed in the garrison. 
 
 Compensation. 
 
 From the commencement of the siege careful record was kept of all shell 
 fire damage to property, and claims of owners considered and assessed. Total 
 assessed, 16,462/. 10s. 2d. No promise was held out that Government would 
 grant compensation, the proceedings were merely intended to assist the 
 commission should one afterwards be assembled, and to protect Government 
 against exorbitant claims. 
 
 A record was also made of losses suffered by refugees, in property, 
 livestock, &c. 
 
 All livestock killed or wounded by shell fire was bought at a fair price and 
 utilized for food, so that the oAvners have no claims on this head, at the same 
 time the value of the animals is in many cases not represented by cash, and it 
 would be far more satisfactory to the OAvners if they could be repaid in kind. 
 This is a point which I venture to suggest be taken into consideration when 
 -dealing AA T ith the Boers after the war; a substantial fine in cattle Avould touch 
 them heavily Avithout leaving them destitute, and the bestoAval of such cattle 
 on deserving and looted loyalists Avould give great satisfaction and be far more 
 acceptable to them, and less expensive to Government, than grants of money. 
 
 Correspondents. 
 
 (Under Lieutenant the Hon. A. Hanbury-Tracy as Press Censor.) 
 
 These gentlemen gave a certain amount of trouble at first, as for the most 
 part they Avere more reporters than correspondents. Further reforms in the 
 matter of correspondents in the field are very desirable. The enemy derived 
 a great deal of information as to our circumstances from the neAvspapers, not 
 only the local ones, but also from the Colonial and English papers, in spite of a 
 strict censorship on our part. 
 
 Defence Accounts. 
 
 (Under Captain Greener, British South Africa Police.) 
 
 Expenditure during the siege. 
 
 £ 
 
 To labour .. .. .. .. . . .. 13,024 
 
 „ pay, local corps and trench allowance.. .. 20,777 
 
 „ pay, clerical and civil staff .. .. .. 3,543 
 
 „ foodstuffs, grain, rations, &c. . . .. . . 36,076 
 
 „ material, clothing, equipment, &c. .. .. 10,801 
 
 „ hospital staff, comforts, &c. .. .. .. 5,411 
 
 „ local transport .. .. .. .. .. 890 
 
 Total .. .. 90,522 
 
 „ payments other than defence, viz., frontier 
 
 forces, special pay, &c .. .. .. 32,729 
 
 Total .. .. 123,251 
 
105 
 
 Receipts. 
 
 £ 
 
 By foodstuffs, and grain sales 
 
 5,184 
 
 3,242 
 
 442 
 
 238 
 
 G7 
 
 127 
 
 „ soup kitchens 
 
 „ sales of Government property . 
 „ local post office . . 
 
 ,, dog tax .. 
 ,, fines 
 
 Total 
 
 9,300 
 
 Weekly average expenditure in pay 
 Average receipts for rations 
 Soup 
 
 Total .. 
 
 1,225 
 
 Defence Works. 
 
 (Under direction of Major Yyvyan, for town and East Front; Major Godley, 
 
 West Front). 
 
 Scheme.—General scheme at first was to secure the town and Stadt by 
 clearing front, laying mines, fortifying outskirts, &c. 
 
 Then to push out advanced trenches to drive back those of the enemy, 
 and finally to establish a girdle of outlying forts. 
 
 The scheme included the provision of bombproofs and extensive covered 
 ways, gun emplacements, drainage, &c. 
 
 In all some 60 works were made, and about 6^ miles of trenches. 
 
 The perimeter of the works at first was approximately 7 miles, latterly it 
 extended to a little over 10 miles. 
 
 Nature.—Generally semicircular redans, but no two works were similar in 
 trace, they varied according to position, ground, &c. At first dug out and kept 
 very low, latterly, owing to dilliculties of drainage, long grass, inaccuracy of 
 enemy’s shell fire, &c., they were made more upstanding. Head cover was 
 found to be essential. When trenches were near, steel loopholes had to be 
 used, the ordinary sandbag and wooden ones being too good a target to the 
 enemy. 
 
 Huts.—A good form of portable iron and wood hut was devised, and used 
 for housing the garrisons of the forts. 
 
 Enemy’s Artillery—Fighting, Treachery, Field Works. 
 
 Artillery.—Guns employed— 
 
 1— 94-pr. Creusot, 15-cm., 20-lb. charge. 
 
 2 — 7-pr. (Jameson’s). 
 
 2 — 5-pr. Armstrongs’ B.L. 
 
 1—12-pr. B.L. 
 
 1 — 9-pr. Ivrupp, B.L. 
 
 2 Q.F. 14-prs., high velocity. 
 
 2 — 1-pr. Maxims. 
 
 Total .. 11 guns. 
 
 'file 94-pr. fired 1,497 rounds, and the artillery altogether fired 2,000 
 rounds during the siege. 
 
 The damage done was very small, partly owing to the open nature of the 
 town and lowness of our forts, but more especially on account of the want of 
 intelligent directing of the fire. 
 
 Fighting.—The enemy’s attacks invariably failed from want of discipline 
 and pluck on the part cf the men. 
 
 ( 47 ) 
 
 0 
 
106 
 
 In the attack on Cannon Kopje they got within 400 yards, and even 
 started digging shelter trenches, hut when the men began to fall the rest 
 retreated promptly. 
 
 The night attack on the Stadt, on 12th May, was boldly led by Eloff and. 
 a number of foreigners, and had their supports come on with equal pluck we 
 should have had a hard task to drive them out, but as it was the supports were 
 easily beaten off and the storming party surrounded. 
 
 Treachery.—The enemy fired on numerous occasions on our hospital, 
 convent, and women’s laager, although these were conspicuously marked with 
 Red Cross flags, stood in isolated positions, and had been fully pointed out by 
 me to the Boer Generals. 
 
 The women’s laager was deliberately shelled in particular on 24th and 
 30th October, 27th January and 11th April. 
 
 The Red Cross flag was used to cover artillery taking up position on 24th, 
 30th, and 31st October. 
 
 Convent deliberately shelled, 16th October, 3rd and 8th November. 
 
 Our white flag, returning from a conference with the enemy, was 
 deliberately volle} r ed, 17th January. 
 
 Field works.—The enemy’s trenches were of a very good design, and made 
 in w’ell-selected positions. The typical trench or fort consisted of a chain of 
 small chambers 10 feet square, partly excavated, partly built up with sandbags, 
 having stout walls, loopholed to front and rear, the whole roofed in with 
 corrugated iron and railway rails. Command, about 3 feet. 
 
 Finance. 
 
 (Under Captain Greener, as Chief Paymaster.) 
 
 I ordered all Government accounts to be kept settled up to date, so as to 
 leave as little as possible for subsequent settlement; much work and confusion 
 has thereby been saved. 
 
 The accounts were well kept by Captain Greener and his staff. An 
 examiner of accounts was appointed to check accounts before payment, and 
 also an auditor for the larger amounts. 
 
 Cash in bank amounted to 12,000/., of which only 650/. was in silver. 
 Cash soon became scarce, because the public, especially the natives and Indian 
 traders, concealed all the cash they could get, in anticipation of the place 
 being taken by the enemy. 
 
 Paper money thus became necessary, and I issued coupons for Is., 2s. and 
 3 s. Ultimately gold also became scarce, and 1/. notes were printed in 
 cyanotype and issued ; but they never got into real circulation as people kept 
 them as curios to the extent of 700/. 10s. coupons were issued with 
 
 satisfactory result. 
 
 For the convenience of the men, and to get cash from the public, a 
 " Garrison Savings Bank’ - was opened. Deposits amounted to 8,800/. 
 
 £ 
 
 Total Government expenditure to end of May .. 142,660 
 
 Total Government receipts to end of May . . . . 11,828 
 
 Food Supply. 
 
 (Under Captain Ryan.) 
 
 Early in the siege, I took over all merchant stocks and put everybody on 
 rations. 
 
 Beginning on the usual scale, I gradually reduced it to the lowest that 
 would allow ot the men being fit for duty. During the latter part of the siege 
 no extras of any kind were obtainable. All lived strictly on the following- 
 scale:— ' • In 
 
107 
 
 
 At first. 
 
 Latterly. 
 
 Meat .. 
 
 1 lb. 
 
 ^ to 1 lb. 
 
 Bread .. 
 
 1 „ 
 
 5 oz 
 
 Vegetables 
 
 1 >, 
 
 6 „ 
 
 Coffee .. 
 
 i 07 .. 
 
 S' !> 
 
 Salt 
 
 1 
 
 2 ” 
 
 1 
 
 2 ” 
 
 Sugar .. 
 
 2 „ 
 
 • • 
 
 Tea. 
 
 1 
 
 2 » 
 
 
 Sowens .. 
 
 • • 
 
 1 quart. 
 
 We bad a large stock of meat, both live and tinned. 
 
 For livestock, we had to open up wide extent of grazing ground. We ate 
 the fresh meat first in order to avoid loss from enemy’s fire, failure of grass 
 and Avater, lung sickness, &c. 
 
 The tinned meat we stored in bombproof chambers, and kept as reserve. 
 
 During the last 2 months, we Avere on horseflesh three days a Aveek. 
 
 Our stocks of meal were comparatively small, but we had a large supplyjof 
 forage oats. These Ave ground into flour, and fermented the residue into 
 sowens (a form of porridge) and the remaining husks Avent as forage to the 
 horses. 
 
 Fresh vegetables Avere largely grown within the defences, and for a 
 greater part of the siege formed a regular portion of the ration. 
 
 The cost of feeding the troops Avas Is. 3d. per ration, or, Avith fresh 
 vegetables, Is. 6d. ; about 3d. below the contract price in peace. Civilians 
 paid 2s., and women in the laager Is. 2d. 
 
 All liquor was taken over and issued in “ tots ” to the troops on Avet nights, 
 and I think saved much sickness. 
 
 Natives.—For the natives, Ave established four soup kitchens at which 
 horse steAv AA T as sold daily, and five sowen kitchens. Natives were all regis¬ 
 tered, to prevent fraud, and bought rations at 1 quart per adult, and 1 pint per 
 child, at 3d. per pint. 
 
 Defence Avatchmen, workmen, police, &c., and certified destitute persons 
 were given free rations. The kitchens so managed paid their own expenses. 
 
 They Avere under Captain Wilson, A.D.C., with Mr. Myers as cash taker 
 and inspector. 
 
 Fuel. 
 
 Coal.—300 tons available at raihvay store, Avas used for armoured train, 
 ordnance foundry, pumping station, flour mills, forage factory, forges, &c. 
 
 Wood. — 25,000 lb. Aveekly for bakery, soup, and oat-sowen kitchens, 
 cooking, &c. Procured from roofs of huts in the Stadt, old Avagons, lopped 
 trees, fencing, &c. 
 
 Petroleum.—-Asbestos stove made, but Avas not a success. 
 
 Patent fuel.—Cow dung and coal dust, mixed in equal parts and baked, 
 produced 20 tons good fuel. 
 
 Hospital. 
 
 (Victoria Hospital—70 beds. Base hospital). 
 
 Major Anderson, Royal Army Medical Corps, Principal Medical 
 Officer. 
 
 Dr. W. Hayes (acted as Principal Medical Officer during first part of 
 the siege). 
 
 Surgeon-Major Holmden, British South Africa Police. 
 
 Dr. T. Hayes, District Surgeon. 
 
 Dr. Elmes. 
 
 O 2 
 
 ( 47 ) 
 
108 
 
 Garrison. 
 
 Force. 
 
 Commander. 
 
 • 
 
 Strei 
 
 Officers. 
 
 igth. 
 
 Men. 
 
 Protectorate Regiment .. 
 
 Lieut.-Colonel Hore 
 
 21 
 
 448 
 
 British South Africa Police 
 
 Lieut.-Colonel Walford .. 
 
 10 
 
 81 
 
 Cape Police, Division 1 .. 
 
 Inspector Marsh .. 
 
 2 
 
 45 
 
 Cape Police, Division 2 .. 
 
 Inspector Browne.. 
 
 2 
 
 54 
 
 Bechuanaland Rifles 
 
 Captain Cowan 
 
 4 
 
 77 
 
 Deduct missing' at Lobatsi 
 
 1 
 
 26 
 
 Total drilled men .. 
 
 
 38 
 
 679 
 
 Town Guard, 296 men (untrained). 
 
 Total garrison —44 Officers, 975 men. 
 
 From the above Town Guard was formed the Railway Division, 2 Officers, 
 20 men, under (local) Captain More. 
 
 The following commanded sections of the defence :— 
 
 Western defences, Major Godley. 
 
 Stadt and south-western forts, Captain Marsh. 
 
 Cannon Kopje and south front, Colonel Walford. 
 
 South-eastern works (brickfields), Inspector Marsh, at first, Inspector 
 Browne, latterly. 
 
 North-east works, Captain Cowan 
 
 Town, Colonel Yyvyan, at first, Major Goold-Adams, latterly. 
 
 Head-quarters Staff— 
 
 Chief Staff Officer—Lord E. Cecil. 
 
 Deputy-Assistant Adjutant-General (B)—Captain Ryan. 
 
 Intelligence Officer—Lieutenant Hon. Hanbury-Tracy. 
 
 Aide-de-Camp—Captain Wilson. 
 
 Commanding Royal Artillery—Major Panzera. 
 
 Commanding Royal Engineer — Colonel Yyvyan. 
 
 Hospital. 
 
 (Under Major Anderson, Royal Army Medical Corps, as Principal Medical 
 
 Officer). 
 
 Staff- 
 
 Dr. W. Hayes (acted as Principal Medical Officer during first part of 
 siege). 
 
 Surgeon-Major Holmden, British South Africa Police. 
 
 Dr. T. Hayes, District Surgeon. 
 
 Dr. Elmes. 
 
 Victoria Hospital (base hospital).—Nursing Staff : Miss Hill (Matron) 
 and three nurses, assisted by four volunteer nurses; also by Mother Teresa 
 and six sisters. 
 
 Convalescent hospital.—At convent, Lady Sarah Wilson. 
 
 Women and childrens’ hospital—Miss Craufurd. 
 
 On outbreak of war I took over the town hospital, but at first the adminis¬ 
 tration was not satisfactory on account of want of supervision over expenses of 
 stores, and sanitation. I therefore appointed an issuer and storekeeper, and a 
 sanitary inspector. To existing accommodation I added a native ward, nurses’ 
 quarters, a ward for Colonial Contingent, and a boarded marquee for shell 
 wounds, &c. 
 
 Both doctors and nurses did excellent work, ^always shorthanded, and 
 frequently under fire. (All the hospital buildings were struck by shells and 
 bullets, and the first convalescent hospital was wrecked, and the second 
 damaged by 94-pr. shells). 
 
109 
 
 Natives. 
 
 (Under Mr. Bell, Resident Magistrate and Civil Commissioner). 
 
 Natives in Mafeking, during the siege, were— 
 
 Baralongs .. .. .. .. .. 5,000 
 
 Fingoes, Shangans, and district Baralongs .. 2,000 
 
 Total, between 7,000 and 8,000. 
 
 The Shangans were refugees from the Johannesburg mines, and were sent 
 into Mafeking by the Boers on the outbreak of war. Being accustomed to 
 digging they proved useful for working gangs on the defences. 
 
 The district Baralongs, Fingoes, and Cape Boys, came into Mafeking 
 when their villages were burnt and their cattle looted by the Boers. From 
 among them wc got about 300 men to act as armed cattle guards, watchmen, 
 police, &c. 
 
 The local Baralongs living in the Stadt displayed their loyalty, and did 
 some good service (especially after I had deposed their Chief Wessels for want 
 of energy, and supplied good despatch runners, spies, cattle runners, &c. 
 
 Of the natives living in the district, Saani remained particularly loyal, and 
 although a prisoner in the hands of the Boers he managed to send us informa¬ 
 tion from time to time. Bathoen was loyal, but too timid to be of use. 
 Copane, a subject of the Boers, although forced to supply them with men, 
 offered us his allegiance. Hatxiokomo and Matuba (British subjects) joined 
 the enemy, and the latter and his men fought with them. 
 
 Railway. 
 
 (Under Captain More.) 
 
 132 men, 46 women, 86 children. 
 
 Eighteen locomotives, only one of which was damaged by shell fire, as 
 they were moved round to the “ lee ” side of the railway buildings with every 
 move of the enemy’s big gun. 
 
 Also a large amount of rolling stock. 
 
 Value of railway plant, 120,000/. 
 
 A defence railway miles long was laid round the north-east front. 
 
 We made three armoured trucks, walls of steel rails, iron lookout tower, 
 acetyline search light, speaking tubes, electric bells, water, medicine chests, 
 stretchers, &c. 
 
 200 tons of rails were used in construction of bombproofs. 
 
 The armoured trains did much good service. 
 
 Specialities. 
 
 Ammunition.—Mr. Fodisch, our gunsmith, reloaded Martini Henry 
 cartridges, using ordinary gun caps fixed with plaster of Paris for detonators. 
 Powder and bullets were home made. 
 
 Armoured train.—We armoured ordinary long-bogev trucks with steel 
 rails (iron ones not being bullet-proof) to a height of 5 feet, with loopholes and 
 gun ports. I had three prepared at Mafeking under the able direction of 
 Mr. More, Resident Engineer Bechuanaland Railway, also three at Bulawayo 
 by Mr. Wallis, Resident Engineer. 
 
 Brawn was made from ox and horse hides and feet, and was much 
 appreciated as meat. 
 
 Bombs.—Dynamite bombs were made up in small potted meat and milk 
 tins for use as hand grenades, with slow match fuzes, with complete success by 
 Lieutenant Feltham. Serjeant Page, champion bait thrower of Port Elizabeth, 
 by using a whip stick and short line was able to throw these with accuracy over 
 a distance of lOO yards. 
 
 Fuel.—When coal and wood began to run low a very satisfactory fuel was 
 made up ot coal dust and cowdung mixed. 
 
 Fuzes.—A simple and useful percussion fuze was invented by Lieutenant 
 Daniell, British South Africa Police, in which the butt end of a Lce-Melford 
 cartridge was used as detonator. This fuze was in regular use with our locally- 
 made shells. 
 
110 
 
 Howitzer.—A 6-inch howitzer was made in our workshops, under the 
 orders of Major Panzera, by Mr. Conolly. The bore was a tube of steel, with 
 iron rings shrunk on in two tiers. The breech was a block of cast bronze. The 
 trunnions and ring were a similar solid casting. The gun threw a 18-lb. ball 
 (shell), and reached a distance of 4,000 yards. 
 
 Lookout poles.—Telescopic lookout poles were made of lengths of iron 
 piping, and set up with steel wire stays, with a pulley and slung seat to hoist 
 the man to the masthead. Height, about 18 feet. 
 
 Oat bread.—Mr. Ellitson, our master baker, made up our forage oats into 
 a good form of bread. The oats were winnowed, cleaned, kiln dried, ground, 
 steam sieved (twice), and made into bread in the usual way, with a small 
 admixture of Boer meal. 
 
 Search light.—Mr. Walker, agent for the Acetyline Gas Company, under 
 Captain More’s direction, made a very effective and portable acetyline search 
 light with an engine head-light and a theodolite stand. These we had 
 stationed in the principal forts and on the armoured train. 
 
 Signalling lamp.—Serjeant-Major Moffat and Mr. Walker devised a very 
 effective and portable acetyline signalling lamp, which is reckoned to be 
 readable at 15 miles. We had two in work. 
 
 So wens. — This is a form of porridge, made from the fermented bran of 
 oats after the flour had been extracted for making bread. 100 lb. of bran in 
 37 gallons of water give 33 gallons of sowens. On this food we fed both 
 natives and whites. We had five sowen kitchens, each capable of producing 
 800 gallons daily. It was sold at 6cZ. per quart to those not entitled to it as a 
 ration. 
 
 Sausages.—The horses which we used for meat were, as a rule, so poor in 
 condition that we found it best to cut off the flesh from the bones and mince it 
 for issue as ration. The remainder of the carcase then went to the soup 
 kitchen. The mince was then mixed with spice and saltpetre, and made up 
 into sausages, the intestines of the same animal being used for sausage skins. 
 The meat thus treated lasted longer, and was more palatable. 
 
 Steel loopholes. — Finding that the enemy shot through ordinary loopholes 
 at short distances, especially in trench work, I devised a form of steel loophole 
 with two plates of ^-inoh steel bolted together at an angle of 45 degrees, with 
 a hole 2 inches square in the middle of the joint, the shield being 2 feet high 
 and 2 feet wide. 
 
 Steel sap roller.—I also had a sapping shield made of two sheets of f-inch 
 steel, each 4 feet square, bolted together at an angle and mounted on wheels, 
 to be pushed in front of a party pushing a sap under fire. 
 
 Relief Committee. 
 
 Numbers of the refugees and some of the townspeople, being without 
 means during the siege, I formed a relief committee, consisting of the Mayor, 
 the Base Commandant, the Chaplain, and other representative men, with myself 
 as president, for disbursing funds for purchase of clothing and necessaries, &c., 
 and for the issue of rations to deserving cases. 
 
 Sums received from England, from the various relief funds, were thus 
 carefully and advantageously administered and accounted for, and there was 
 no real suffering among the white population. 
 
 Staff. 
 
 Head-quarters— 
 
 Colonel Commanding—Colonel Baden-Powell. 
 
 Chief Staff Officer—Major Lord E. Cecil, D.S.O. 
 
 Deputy - Assistant Adjutant-General (B)—Captain Ryan, Army 
 Service Corps. 
 
 Aide-de-Camp—Captain G. Wilson, Royal Horse Guards. 
 
 Intelligence Officer—Lieutenant Hon. A. Hanbury-Tracy, Royal 
 Horse Guards. >• 
 
Ill 
 
 Local— 
 
 ' . : i O ; 
 
 Commanding Artillery and Deputy-Assistant Adjutant-General— 
 Major Panzera, British South Africa Police. 
 
 Base Commandant and Commanding Engineer—Major C. B. Vyvyan, 
 “ Buffs.” 
 
 Principal Medical Officer—Dr. W. Hayes (at first), Major Anderson, 
 Royal Army Medical Corps. 
 
 Chief Paymaster—Captain Greener, British South Africa Police. 
 
 Town Commandant and Protectorate, Natives—Major Goold-Adams, 
 C.B., C.M.G. 
 
 Local Natives—Mr. C. G. H. Bell, Resident Magistrate and Civil 
 Commissioner. 
 
 Women and children—Mr. F. Whiteley, Mayor. 
 
 Transport—Lieutenant McKenzie. 
 
 Post and telegraphs—Mr. Howat, Postmaster. 
 
 Chaplains—Rev. W. H. Weekes (Church of England), Rev. Father 
 Ogle (Roman Catholic). 
 
 Spies. 
 
 The enemy were well informed of all that went on in Mafeking during the 
 siege. We had over 30 suspects in the goal for the greater part of the time, 
 but it was almost impossible to get proofs against them. The stationmaster 
 had undoubtedly been in communication with an ex-fenian, Whelan, a 
 prominent member of the Irish Land League. This man we arrested on the 
 outbreak of war, and kept in gaol. He had among his papers a code for 
 messages. 
 
 The natives acted as spies for the enemy; we caught two and tried them, 
 and shot them. 
 
 More than half the families in the women’s laager were Dutch, and of pro- 
 Boer sympathies. 
 
 Four of our men deserted to the enemy at different times. 
 
 Transport. 
 
 (Under Lieutenant McKenzie.) 
 
 This department was very ably managed, and though at first much hired 
 transport was employed, Lieutenant McKenzie gradually arranged so that the 
 whole of the Army Service Corps, Royal Engineers, sanitary, &c., duties (as 
 well as the regimental work) were carried out by the Government transport, 
 available, viz.— 
 
 11 wagons. 
 
 6 Scotch carts. 
 
 2 trollies. 
 
 3 ambulances. 
 
 188 mules. 
 
 12 oxen. 
 
 The mules kept their condition wonderfully well, considering the absence 
 of forage and the amount of work. 
 
 Water Supply. 
 
 (Under Major Vyvyan and Major Hepworth.) 
 
 The enemy cut off our water supply from the waterworks during the first 
 few days of the siege. Fortunately the season was unusually wet, and 
 consequently the Molopo stream did not run dry, and house tanks kept fairly 
 filled. But to make sure against contingencies, and to ensure a supply of 
 wholesome water, we cleaned out various wells and dug a new one of great 
 capacity. 
 
 The water from these was issued to the town and garrison by means of 
 tank wagons, filled nightly and posted at convenient points during the day. 
 
112 
 
 Women’s Laager. 
 
 (Under Mr. F. Whiteley, the Mayor.) 
 
 Formed at Mr. Lowland’s house, where everything was placed at the 
 disposal of the refugees in a most kindly way by Mr. Rowlands. 
 
 Number of whites.—10 men, 188 women, 315 children; also about 150 
 native servant girls. 
 
 Health fairly good considering the circumstances. Diphtheria made its 
 appearance, but after four cases was stopped by isolation. Deaths, 24. 
 
 A large bombproof, 180 yards by 5 feet, was made for the accommodation 
 of the whole of the inhabitants of the laager, with protected ways, latrines, &c. 
 
 The women and children were rationed, the supply and distribution being 
 efficiently carried out by Mr. Whiteley, without any kind of remuneration to 
 himself. 
 
 This gentleman carried out the entire management of the laager with 
 conspicuous success, and was very ably assisted by Rev. W. H. Weekes and 
 Mr. Rowlands. 
 
 The following were the cases dealt with by the Court of Summary 
 Jurisdiction :— 
 
 Charges. 
 
 House-breaking 
 
 Treason 
 
 Theft 
 
 Minor offences 
 
 • • • • 
 
 • • • • 
 
 • • • • 
 
 • • • • 
 
 14 
 
 . • 3o 
 
 .. 197 
 
 184 
 
 
 Total 
 
 . . 430 
 
 Punishments. 
 
 
 Death.. „. 
 
 Corporal punishment 
 
 Detention in gaol 
 
 Fines 
 
 Imprisonment with hard labour 
 
 5- 
 
 .. 115 
 
 23 
 57 
 91 
 
 
 Total .. 
 
 .. 291 
 
 Total tines, 140/. 3s. 6d. 
 
 III.—ENGAGEMENTS DURING THE SIEGE. 
 
 Actiqn of 14th October. 
 
 Six miles north of Mafeking on railway. 
 
 Early in the morning of the 14th October our reconnoitring patrols 
 exchanged shots with a strong party of the enemy, who were advancing along* 
 the railway 3 miles north of the town. 
 
 I ordered out the armoured train, under Captain Williams, British South 
 Africa Police, to endeavour to rush the Boers and pour a heavy fire into them, 
 as I wanted to make the first blow felt by them to be a really hard one. The 
 train carried a 1-pr. Hotchkiss and a '303-inch Maxim, and 15 men, British 
 South Africa Police. 
 
 I sent out, in support of the train, a squadron of the Protectorate 
 Regiment, under Captain FitzClarence. 
 
 On coming up with the train he found it heavily engaged with the Boers, 
 who had been strongly reinforced from their laager, some 7 miles north ; they 
 had also brought up a 7-pr. Krupp and a 1-pr. Maxim. 
 
 Captain FitzClarence dismounting his men advanced to attack with his 
 left protected by the train. 
 
113 
 
 For a quarter of an hour he was held by the enemy under a very hot fire, 
 and then, pressing forward, well backed up by the train, he drove the enemy 
 back and successfully beat off their several attempts to encircle his flank. 
 Meantime, I sent up an additional troop under Lord Charles Bentinck, and 
 also a 7-pr. These also became hotly engaged and did good work. The fire 
 from the armoured train put the enemy’s gun out of action before it had fired 
 a shot, and eventually also drove the 1-pr. Maxim from the field. 
 
 The engagement lasted about 4 hours, and the enemy largely outnumbered 
 our men, but Captain FitzClarence made up for this deficiency by the able 
 handling of his men. Moreover, he kept his orders in mind, and when he saw 
 the opportunity he got his wounded on to the train, and after driving the 
 enemy back he withdrew his command quietly on Mafeking, covered by the 
 train, without any attempt on the part of the enemy to follow him up. 
 
 In this their first engagement, the Protectorate Regiment showed a spirit 
 and dash worthy of highly-trained troops, and were most ably led by Captain 
 FitzClarence and Lord C. Bentinck. 
 
 This smartly fought little engagement had a great and lasting moral effect 
 on the enemy. 
 
 Their losses were afterwards found to amount to 53 killed (including four 
 field cornets) and a large number wounded. They also lost a number of 
 horses. 
 
 Our casualties were— 
 
 2 killed. 
 
 16 wounded (including two Officers). 
 
 1 missing (cyclist).. 
 
 4 horses killed. 
 
 12 wounded. 
 
 Enemy’s Attack on the Stadt. 
 
 25th October 1899. 
 
 Enemy commenced shelling at 6.30 a.m. till midday from the east and 
 south with seven guns. At noon they commenced a general advance against 
 the town from the south-west, east, and north-east; the south-west being the 
 main attack directed against the Stadt. Their number about 3,000. The 
 enemy commenced firing at extreme range, to which we made no reply, 
 reserving our fire for close distances. So soon as our volleys and Maxims 
 commenced the enemy stopped their advance, and soon began to withdraw at 
 all points. Casualties on our side were one man w’ounded, and two horses and 
 eight mules wounded. The Boers losses unknown, but probably considerable, 
 as their ambulances were on the field picking up for over an hour after the 
 engagement. 
 
 It was afterwards (10th December) ascertained that the attack on the 
 Stadt was intended as a feint while the main attack should come off to north¬ 
 ward, on our western face. The Boers had expected the Baralongs not to fire 
 on them, and so advanced more openly than they would otherwise have done; 
 nor had they expected to find white men defending the Stadt. Their loss 
 was, therefore, pretty heavy, and, surprised at their rebuff, they fell back 
 altogether. 
 
 At one period of the action, a small mounted troop of Boers advanced at 
 a gallop towards the western position, and came under fire of the Cape Police 
 Maxim, which dropped five of them, the remainder rapidly dispersed. 
 
 During the afternoon some of our scouts near the Brickfields were moving, 
 under fire, when one of them fell with his horse and lay stunned. Two Cape 
 Police troopers in the works ran out and placed the injured man on his horse, 
 and brought him in under heavy fire from the enemy: names, Troopers 
 George Collins and AY. F. Green. 
 
 Night Attack on Boer Trenches. 
 
 27th October 1899. 
 
 During past two days enemy had moved their advanced trenches closer 
 
 ( 47 ) P 
 
114 
 
 into the east face. I determined to make an attack on their main advanced 
 trench with the bayonet, in order to discourage their advancing further. 
 
 A night attack was therefore organized with Captain FitzOlarence’s 
 squadron, Protectorate Regiment, supported by a party of Cape Police. 
 Guiding lights were hoisted, by which Captain FitzClarence was able to lead 
 his party past the flank of the main trench. 
 
 The attacking force moved off 9.30 p.m. in silence, with magazines charged, 
 but no cartridges in the chamber, the order being to use the bayonet only. 
 The men wore white armlets and used “ FitzClarence ” as their pass word. The 
 night was dark, but still. The squadron attained its position on the left rear 
 of enemy’s trench without being challenged or fired at. Captain FitzClarence 
 then wheeled up his men, and with a cheer charged into the main and a 
 subsidiary trench, and cleared both with the bayonet. 
 
 The enemy’s rearward trenches opened a heavy fire, to which the Cape 
 Police replied from a flank, in order to draw the fire on to themselves, and so 
 to allow Captain FitzClarence’s squadron to return unmolested. 
 
 The whole operation was carried out exactly in accordance with instructions, 
 and was a complete success. The more so as the enemy, being taken by 
 surprise, were in much confusion, and, as we afterwards discovered, fired into 
 each other. Their casualties, w r e heard on reliable authority, amounted to 
 40 killed and wounded with the bayonet, (30 killed and wounded by rifle fire. 
 Our casualties were six killed, nine wounded, two missing. 
 
 Killed. 
 
 4323 Corporal Burt, 17th Lancers. » 
 
 442 Trooper Josiah Soundy, Protectorate Regiment. 
 
 443 Trooper Charles Mayfield Middleditcb, Protectorate Regiment. 
 
 171 Trooper Thomas Fraser. 
 
 202 Robert Ryves MacDonald. 
 
 222 Alexander Henry Turner. 
 
 Wounded. 
 
 Captain FitzClarence, slightly. 
 
 Lieutenant Swinburne, slightly. 
 
 Corporal Bernard Johnson. 
 
 Corporal Clement Adkins. 
 
 Trooper Arthur Bodill, severely. 
 
 Trooper Charles Donovan. 
 
 Trooper A. H. Hodgkinson. 
 
 Trooper H. A. Dawson. 
 
 Trooper F. W. Hooper. 
 
 Missing. 
 
 Trooper Thomas Powell. 
 
 Trooper Franz Aurel. 
 
 The missing men were captured by the enemy. 
 
 Action at Cannon Kopje. 
 
 31st October 1899. 
 
 The enemy opened a heavy concentrated shell fire from the south-eastern 
 heights, from the racecourse (east), and from Jackal’s Tree (south-west), 
 directed against Cannon Kopje. The fire was well aimed, and the racecourse 
 gun took the work in reverse. For a time little harm w r as done beyond 
 knocking down parts of the parapet and smashing the iron supports of the 
 lookout tower : most of the garrison were lying in the trenches some 80 yards 
 in rear of the fort. The gun and two Maxims in the work had been previously 
 dismounted and stowed away for safety during shell fire, to which, of course, 
 they were powerless to reply. The telephone wire was cut away early in the 
 proceedings. After half an hour’s steady and accurate artillery fire, the enemy, 
 
116 
 
 who had been gradually massing on the high ground south and south-east of 
 the fort, began to advance in line of skirmishers from three sides at once; 
 they were backed up by other parties in support. A large force also collected 
 in the Molopo Yalley, south-east of the town, and were formed evidently with 
 the idea of storming the town after Cannon Kopje had been captured. 
 
 As the enemy began to get within range of the fort, the garrison moved 
 up from their trench and manned the parapets and Maxims. It was then that 
 we suffered some casualties from shell fire. As the enemy continued their 
 advance, I sent to Captain Goodyear’s Colonial Contingent to advance a party 
 on to a ridge above them, and so to take enemy’s attacking line in flank, but 
 they could not be got to move. 
 
 One Maxim at Ellis’s Corner now jammed, and I had to replace it by one 
 from the reserve. 
 
 Meantime, I had a 7-pr. run out under cover of houses near south corner 
 of the town. This opened, under direction of Lieutenant Murchison, on the 
 flank of the enemy’s line as it began to get near the fort. The gun made 
 excellent practice, every shell going in among them and effectually stopped 
 the further advance of the Boers. 
 
 These now hesitated and began to draw off, and as they did so their guns 
 reopened on Cannon Kopje to cover their retirement. The fire then died 
 down, and enemy sent our ambulances under Red Cross flags to recover their 
 dead and wounded. We lost six killed and five wounded. 
 
 Killed. 
 
 Captain the Hon. Douglas Marsham. 
 
 Captain Charles A. K. Pechell. 
 
 2391 Troop Serjeant-Major William Henry Connihan. 
 
 Troop Serjeant-Major Hugh Bagot Upton. 
 
 2566 Trooper Arthur .John Martyn. 
 
 2517 Frank St. Clair Traill Burroughes. 
 
 Wounded. 
 
 Quarter-Master-Serjeant E. O. Butler. 
 
 Corporal A. J. Cook. 
 
 Corporal F. C. Newton. 
 
 Trooper C. W. Nicholas. 
 
 Trooper F. R. Lloyd. 
 
 (The two latter died the following day.) 
 
 During this fight, the Boers sent out a Red Cross flag on to a commanding 
 point and then brought their guns up into position there. 1 visited Cannon 
 Kopje after the fight and congratulated Colonel Walford and his men on the 
 gallant and determined stand made by them in the face of a very hot shellfire. 
 
 The intention of the enemy had been to storm Cannon Kopje, and thence 
 to bombard the south-eastern portion of the town, and to carry it with the 
 large forces they had collected in the Molopo Yalley. Their whole scheme 
 was defeated by the gallant resistance made by the garrison, and by the 
 telling fire it brought to bear on them. We afterwards learnt that the attack 
 was designed and directed by young Cronje. The enemy’s loss was not known, 
 but ambulances were seen about the field picking up for a considerable time, 
 and native spies reported there was much mourning in the laagers, and that 
 several cart loads of dead had been brought in and buried. 
 
 Surprise on Enemy’s Western Laager. 
 
 7th November 1899. 
 
 At 2.30 a.m., Major Godley paraded his force, in accordance with a plan I 
 had arranged, to attack the western camp of the enemy with a heavy fire at 
 daylight, and then to retire again before enemy’s guns and reinforcements 
 arrived on the scene. The force in enemy's camp was reckoned at 200 to 250. 
 Our force consisted of — 
 
 P 2 
 
 ( 47 ) 
 
116 
 
 Two 7-prs. 
 
 One 1-pr. Hotchkiss, under Major Panzera. 
 
 One squadron of 60 men, Protectorate Regiment, dismounted, under 
 Captain Vernon. 
 
 One troop of 30 men, Bechuanaland Rifles, mounted, under Captain 
 Cowan. 
 
 The force moved out along the heights to about 1,500 yards in advance of 
 Major Godley’s position ; Captain Vernon’s squadron leading in attack order, 
 with the guns on his left rear, and Bechuanaland Rifles covering his right rear.. 
 
 At 4.15 a.m., our guns opened on enemy at 1,800 yards, and the squadron 
 fired volleys by alternate troops into the enemy’s camp, over which the\ r had 
 full command from the heights they were on. The surprise was complete, the 
 enemy bolting in all directions to take cover. Their 1-pr. Maxim and 7-pr. 
 Krupp in the Beacons Fort in a short time responded with a heavy and well- 
 directed fire. Large bodies of reinforcements very soon began to come down 
 from the main south-west laager. Major Godley thereupon commenced with¬ 
 drawing his forces, artillery retiring first; the Bechuanaland Rifles occupying 
 Fort Ayr to cover the retirement, which they did very effectively against a wing 
 of mounted Boers, who had worked round to our right flank. The enemy 
 brought a very heavy musketry fire to bear on our force, but the retirement 
 was carried out with the greatest steadiness. Enemy’s strength, about 800 or 
 1,000. Our retirement was further covered by 7-pr. at the west end of the 
 Stadt, and the Cape Police Maxim and escort. In the course of the retirement, 
 our 1-pr. Hotchkiss upset and broke the limber hook; her crew, Gunners 
 R. Cowan and H. Godson, very pluckily stood up and repaired damage with 
 rope, &c., and got the gun away safely under heavy fire from enemy’s 1-pr. 
 Maxim and 7-pr. Krupp and rifle fire. 
 
 Three of enemy’s ambulances were seen picking up their casualties after 
 the action, and we afterwards learnt that they had lost a considerable number 
 On our side we had five men wounded, five horses killed, five wounded, and 
 36 cattle in the refugee laager killed and wounded by bullets. 
 
 Karnes of wounded. 
 
 Major Godley, slightly. 
 
 Trooper Hodgkinson, Protectorate Regiment. 
 
 Trooper J. G. Thompson, Protectorate Regiment. 
 
 Trooper P. J. Westdyk, Bechuanaland Rifles. 
 
 Corporal R. B. Christie, Cape Police. 
 
 On this day a commando of the Boers made a demonstration against 
 Khama’s men on the Limpopo, and opened fire upon them, but shortly after 
 retired across the border. 
 
 Action at Game Tree. 
 
 , 26th December 1S99. 
 
 The Boers’ work at Game Tree, 2,500 yards north of town, had checked 
 our grazing in that direction, and it commanded our line of communication 
 northward. Some shells thrown into it a few days previously had caused enemy 
 temporarily to vacate it, showing it to be a weak open work; this had been 
 confirmed by reconnaissance by our scouts, but as the enemy had been seen 
 strengthening it during the past few days, I determined to attack before they 
 should make it impregnable. Accordingly, two squadrons Protectorate 
 Regiment, supported by armoured train and Bechuanaland Rifles, were ordered 
 to attack from the left flank of the work, under direction of Major Godley, 
 while three guns and Maxim prepared the way from the right front of the work. 
 This scheme was carried out at dawn on the 26th, the guns making good 
 practice, and the two squadrons advancing in attack formation exactly as 
 required. But on pressing home the attack a heavy fire killed or wounded 
 most of the Officers and the leading troops. These succeeded in gaining the 
 
117 
 
 parapet, but the work was found to have been strongly roofed in and so closed 
 as to be impregnable. 
 
 The attack fell back upon the eastern face, and pushed forward again on 
 the southern face, but eventually had to retire with a loss of— 
 
 Captain Vernon. 
 
 Captain Sandford, 
 
 Lieutenant Paton and 21 non-commissioned officers and men 
 killed, and, 
 
 Captain FitzClarence and 22 men wounded, 
 
 Three missing. 
 
 If blame for this reverse falls on anyone it should fall on myself, as 
 everybody concerned did their part of the work thoroughly well, and exactly in 
 accordance with the orders I had issued. Both Officers and men worked with 
 splendid courage and spirit. 
 
 Boers’ Attack. 
 
 12th May 1900. 
 
 At about 4 a.m. on 12th May, a very heavy long-range musketry fire was 
 opened on the town from east, north-east, and south-east. I sounded the 
 alarm, and the garrison stood to arms. The fire continued for half-an-hour; 
 I thereupon wired to the south-west outposts to be on the lookout. 
 
 At about 4.30, 300 Boers made a rush through the western outposts and 
 got into the Stadt; this they then set fire to. I ordered the western defenders 
 to close in so as to prevent any supports from coming in after the leading body, 
 and sent the reserve squadron there to assist. They succeeded in driving off 
 an attack of about 500 without difficulty, and returned to round up their 
 station. In the meantime the Boers in the Stadt had rushed the British South 
 African Police fort and made prisoners the men in it, viz., three Officers and 
 15 men. staff of the Protectorate Regiment. 
 
 In the darkness the attackers had got divided up into three parties, and as 
 it got light we were able to further separate these from each other, and to 
 surround and attack them in detail. The first party surrendered, the second 
 were driven out with loss by three squadrons, Protectorate Regiment, under 
 Major Godfrey,* and the third, in the British South African Police fort, after a 
 vain attempt to break out in the evening surrendered. During the whole of 
 the day, while the struggle was going on in the Stadt, the enemy outside made 
 demonstrations as if about to attack, and kept up a hot shell fire on the place, 
 but without palpable effect. 
 
 We captured this day 108 prisoners, among whom was Commandant ElofF, 
 Kruger’s grandson. We also found 10 killed and 19 mounded Boers, and their 
 ambulance picked up 30 more killed and wounded. Our losses were four 
 killed, 10 wounded. 
 
 Our men, although weak with want of food and exercise, worked with 
 splendid pluck and energy for the 14 hours of fighting, and instances of 
 gallantry in action were very numerous. 
 
 Relief of Mafeking. 
 
 16th— 17th May 1900. 
 
 When relief became imminent, I formed a small force of ISO men and two 
 
 guns, under Colonel Walford, capable of taking the field should it be desirable 
 
 to make a diversion or counter attack during the probable encounter between 
 
 the investing force and the relieving column. 
 
 © © 
 
 On the evening of the 16th May, the enemy contested the advance of the 
 relief column 6 miles west of the place. Colonel Walford’s party moved out 
 and demonstrated as if to attack the Boers in rear. This caused them to 
 withdraw a 1-pr. Maxim which had been posted on the probable line of advance 
 of the column, and also a number of men with it. Phis move left the road 
 open for Colonel Mahon’s force to come into Mafeking, which it did during the 
 night without the knowledge of the Boers. 
 
 Early next morning, seeing that the enemy we v <' beginning to move 
 
 * ? Godley. 
 
118 
 
 wagons from the laager, I pushed forward Colonel Walford’s force at once to 
 attack, ordering the relief force to join in as soon as possible. This had a 
 good‘effect, as our guns opened on their advanced trenches and prevented 
 them from getting their 5-pr. away, and our men from the Brickfields, moving- 
 up the river, took the trench in rear and cleared it, killing five Boers and 
 taking their flag and gun. Meanwhile, Colonel Mahon and Colonel Plumer’s 
 guns came into action and shelled the enemy’s laager with great effect, the 
 Boers going off in full flight, abandoning several wagons, camp equipment, 
 hospital, &c. Colonel Walford’s men, who had been working up through the 
 bush, quickly took possession and drove off the enemy’s rear guard without 
 difficulty. 
 
 The operations connected with the relief of the place have, I assume, been 
 reported on by Colonel Mahon, but I would add that his clever move near 
 Maritzani, when he shifted his line of advance suddenly from one road to 
 another, quite unexpected by the Boers, entirely puzzled them, and dis¬ 
 concerted their plans. And again, after the fight outside Mafeking, when he 
 bivouacked his column at nightfall, the Boers were prepared to renew the 
 attack in the morning only to find that he had slipped into the place during 
 the night, and was through the town and shelling their laager on the other 
 side. 
 
 The whole operation of the two relief columns was exceedingly well 
 conceived and carried out. 
 
 IV.—RECOMMENDATION OF OFFICERS AND OTHERS. 
 
 1. Staff. 
 
 2. Regimental. 
 
 ) 3. Civil. 
 
 4. Warrant and non-commissioned officers and men. 
 
 1. Staff—Military. 
 
 Major Lord Edward Cecil, D.S.O., as Chief Staff Officer, was of the 
 greatest assistance to me. He stuck pluckily to his work, although much 
 hampered by sickness during the first part of the siege. He did a great 
 amount of hard work in the first organization of the frontier force, and at 
 Mafeking, his tact and unruffled temperament enabled our staff dealings with 
 the Colonial civilians to be carried on with the least possible friction. 
 
 Captain Ryan, Army Service Corps, as Deputy-Assistant Adjutant- 
 General (B), proved an exceptionally capable und energetic Supply Officer. On 
 his shoulders fell the whole work of feeding the entire community, garrison, 
 non-combatants, and native, a duty which he carried out with conspicuous 
 success (practically unassisted), as we took the food supply out of the hands of 
 contractors and merchants ; and he lost the services of his two chief assistants. 
 Captain Girdwood, killed, and Sergeant-Major Loney, convicted of theft of 
 Government stores. Captain Ryan’s work has been invaluable, and has mainly 
 contributed to the successful issue of the siege. 
 
 Lieutenant Hon. A. Hanbury-Tracy, Royal Horse Guards, as Intelligence 
 Officer and Press Censor, has worked hard and successfully, and with tact and 
 firmness in his dealings with the press correspondents. 
 
 Captain G. Wilson, Royal Horse Guards, as my Aide-de-Camp, in addition 
 to his other duties, had charge of the soup and sowens kitchens, and did most 
 useful work. 
 
 To both the above Officers I am much indebted for their willing work and 
 personal assistance to myself. 
 
 Honorary Lieutenant McKenzie as Transport Officer did excellent work in 
 the organization of his departments, and in the purchase of mules and material, 
 
119 
 
 &c. In addition to his other duties he acted as extra Aide-de-Camp to me, and 
 was an exceptionally energetic and useful Staff Officer. 
 
 Major Panzera, British South Africa Police, as Commanding Artillery, 
 showed himself a smart and practical gunner, endowed with the greatest zeal, 
 coupled with personal gallantry in action. The great success gained by our 
 little guns, even when opposed to the modern armament of the enemy, was 
 largely due to Panzera’s organization and handling of them. 
 
 in addition to these duties he acted as my Brigade-Major, and proved 
 himself a most reliable and useful Staff Officer. 
 
 Major (local Lieut.-Colonel) C.B. Vyvyan, the Buffs, was Base Commandant, 
 Commanding Engineer, and (for 3 months) Town Commandant during the 
 siege. As such, he organized the Town Guard and defences in the first 
 instance. To his untiring zeal and ability the successful defence of the town 
 is largely due. He carried out a very heavy amount of work, practically 
 single-handed, and with conspicuous success. 
 
 Major Anderson, Royal Army Medical Corps, throughout the siege showed 
 untiring zeal, coupled with coolness and gallantry, in attending the wounded 
 under fire in action, in addition to his eminent professional ability. Latterly, 
 as Principal Medical Officer, his unfailing tact and administrative capabilities 
 rendered his services of greatest value. The strain of his devotion to his duty 
 told heavily on his health. 
 
 Medical Staff.—Dr. W. Hayes, Surgeon-Major Holmden, British South 
 Africa Police, and Dr. T. Hayes. All worked with conspicuous zeal and skill 
 under a never-ending strain of work; all of them very frequently under fire in 
 carrying out their duties, even in their own hospital. 
 
 Nursing staff.—The work done by the lady nurses was beyond all praise. 
 
 Miss Hill, the Matron of the Victoria Hospital, was assisted by a number 
 of lady volunteers, in addition to her regular staff, consisting of Mrs. Parmister 
 and Miss Gamble. 
 
 Mother Superior Teresa and eight Sisters of Mercy also worked in the 
 hospital. 
 
 Lady Sarah Wilson, assisted by other ladies, managed the Convalescent 
 Hospital. 
 
 Miss Craufurd managed the Women and Children’s Hospital. 
 
 The above ladies worked with the greatest zeal and self devotion throughout 
 the siege. The protracted strain of heavy work, frequently carried out under 
 fire (Lady Sarah Wilson was wounded), told on most of them, Miss Hill being 
 at one time prostrated by overwork. It was largely due to their unremitting 
 devotion and skill that the wounded, in so many cases, made marvellous 
 recoveries, and the health of the garrison remained so good. 
 
 Captain Greener, Paymaster, British South Africa Police, as Chief 
 Paymaster, rendered most efficient and valuable service throughout the siege. 
 He kept account of all Government expenditures and receipts connected with 
 defence, feeding population, &c., in addition to his ordinary police and 
 administrative accounts. By his care and zeal I am convinced that the 
 Government were saved much expense. 
 
 2. Regimental. 
 
 Lieut.-Colonel Here, Staffordshire Regiment, raised, organized, and 
 commanded the Protectorate Regiment, which did invaluable service in the 
 siege. 
 
 Major Godley, Royal Dublin Fusiliers, as Adjutant of the Protectorate 
 Regiment, had much to do with the successful organization of the corps when 
 it was first raised. As commander of the western defences of Mafeking 
 throughout the siege, his services were of the highest value. His coolness, 
 readiness of resource, and tactfulness in dealing with the Colonials, made him 
 an ideal Officer for such command in action. 
 
 He was my right hand in the defence. I cannot speak too highly of his 
 good work. 
 
 Colonel Walford, British South Africa Police, commanded the southern 
 defences, with his detachment of British South Africa Police, throughout the 
 siege with conspicuous success. Always cool and quick to see what was 
 wanted, his services were most valuable. 
 
120 
 
 Inspector Browne, Cape Police, commanded the detachment of Division 2, 
 Cape Police. He and the splendid lot of men under his command did 
 •excellent work throughout the siege, especially in the occupation of the 
 drenches in the Brickfields, where for over a month they were within close 
 range of the enemy’s works, and constantly on the alert and under fire. 
 
 Inspector Marsh, Cape Police, Division 1, commanded the detachment of 
 Division 1 throughout the siege, and carried out his duties most efficiently and 
 zealously. 
 
 Captain Cowan, commanding the Bechuanaland Rifles (Volunteers), had his 
 corps in such a condition of efficiency as enabled me to employ them in all 
 respects as regular troops. He was at all times ready and zealous in the 
 performance of any duty assigned to him. 
 
 (Local) Captain More, Resident Railway Engineer, organized most 
 effectively the railway employes into a paid division for the armoured train, 
 and a division for the Town Guard. He managed their rationing, hospital, 
 defence works, protection for their women and children, &c., in a most 
 practical manner. His energy and resourcefulness were conspicuous throughout 
 the siege. The armoured trains, defence railway, search light, &c„ were made 
 under his supervision. 
 
 Captain Marsh, Royal West Kent Regiment, commanded a squadron of 
 the Protectorate Regiment, with very good results. He also had charge of the 
 defence of the native Stadt, and displayed great tact and patience in his 
 successful management of the natives. 
 
 Captain Vernon, King’s Royal Rifle Corps, was a most successful Officer in 
 command of a squadron, and displayed the greatest gallantry in action. He 
 was killed in action on 26th December. 
 
 Captain FitzClarence, Royal Fusiliers, commanded a squadron in the 
 Protectorate Regiment. He distinguished himself on numerous occasions 
 during the siege by his personal gallantry and exceptional soldierly qualities. 
 He was twice wounded. I have reported more specially on his good w r ork in a 
 separate letter. 
 
 Lieutenant (local Captain) Lord C. Bentinck, 9th Lancers, commanded a 
 squadron of the Protectorate Regiment, with very good results. He did good 
 service by his zeal and readiness in action. 
 
 The following Officers also did much good and useful work:— 
 
 Captain A. Williams, British South Africa Police. 
 
 Captain Scholfield, British South Africa Police. 
 
 Lieutenant Daniells, British South Africa Police. 
 
 Lieutenant Holden, Protectorate Regiment. 
 
 Lieutenant Greenfield, Protectorate Regiment. 
 
 Lieutenant Feltham, Protectorate Regiment. 
 
 Corporal (local Lieutenant) Currie, City Police, did exceptionally good 
 service in command of the Colonial Contingent, to which he succeeded when 
 Captain Goodyear (who originally raised the corps) was severely wounded while 
 gallantly leading his men. 
 
 The following organized and commanded with most satisfactory results 
 the native cattle guards, watchmen, &c. 
 
 (Local) Captain McKenzie, Zulus, &c. 
 
 Mr. D. Webster, Fingoes. 
 
 Corporal (local Serjeant) Abrams, Cape Police, Baralongs. 
 
 These detachments all did most useful and loyal work at different times 
 during the siege in spite of their privations. 
 
 Town Guard. 
 
 Major Goold-Adams, C.B., C.M.G., Resident Commissioner of the 
 Protectorate, commanded the Town Guard during the last half of the siege. 
 His extensive knowledge ot the country and people (both native and white) 
 was of the greatest value, and his advice was always most willingly at my 
 disposal. I am greatly indebted foi the great assistance he at all times 
 afforded me. The fact that the natives of the Protectorate remained loyal to 
 us at a very critical time is due in a great measure to his advice and great 
 personal influence over them. 
 
121 
 
 3. Civil. 
 
 Mr. C. G. H. Bell, Resident Magistrate and Civil Commissioner, had 
 entire charge of native affairs, and he managed the chiefs with great tact, and 
 very successfully, at a critical time when they were inclined to sit on the fence 
 and see which side was going to win, and wore being tempted with offers from 
 the Boers. As magistrate, he also rendered me great assistance during the 
 siege. 
 
 Mr. F. Whiteley, Mayor of Mafeking. This gentleman’s services were 
 invaluable during the siege. In a most public-spirited manner he took up at 
 my request, the difficult task of arranging for the feeding and housing of all 
 the women and children, and carried out their management with marked 
 success throughout the siege, devoting himself to the task without any return 
 whatever. 
 
 He was much assisted by Mr. Rowlands, who gave up his house, garden, 
 water supply, &c., to be used by the laager similarly without drawing any kind 
 of compensation or return. 
 
 The Rev. Mr. W. H. Weekes also rendered valuable service in assisting in 
 the management of the women’s laager, &c. 
 
 Mr. Howat, Post and Telegraph Master, with his staff, namely— 
 
 Messrs. Campbell, Simpson, and McLeod did invaluable work in 
 connecting up, and in keeping in communication with head-quarters the whole 
 of the defence works by telephone. Their duties were unceasing, by night as 
 well as by day, and were frequently carried out under heavy fire and at great 
 personal risk. The zeal, energy, and willingness displayed by these officers 
 was most conspicuous throughout the siege, and their work had a large share 
 in bringing about the successful issue of the siege. 
 
 Mr Heal, the jailer, carried out most arduous and difficult duties most 
 loyally and efficiently. In addition to ordinary prisoners, he had in his charge 
 military offenders, and also a large number of Dutch suspects, spies, and Irish 
 traitors. 
 
 He was unfortunately killed by a shell, 12th May, at his post in the jail. 
 
 Serjeant Stewart, Cape Police, rendered valuable service as head of the 
 civil police during the siege. 
 
 Mr. Millar, head of the refugees’ laager, displayed much zeal and did 
 excellent work in the management of the refugees’ laager and defences, &c. 
 
 4. Non-commissioned Officers and Men. 
 
 Trooper (local Serjeant-Major) Hodgson, Cape Police, acted as Serjeant- 
 Major to the Army Service Corps, and was of the greatest help to Captain 
 Ryan. He proved himself to be a most thoroughly reliable, sober, and 
 upright man, clever at his work, and particularly active and zealous in its 
 performance. 
 
 Serjeant Cook, Bechuanaland Rifles, specially recommended for Clevel¬ 
 and plucky scouting, and for gallantry in action (vide separate letter). 
 
 Serjeant-Major Moffat, signalling staff, for gallantry in action, in bringing 
 a serjeant out of action under heavy fire. Also for good work as a signaller 
 (vide separate letter). 
 
 Serjeant-Major Taylor, Colonial Contingent, for gallantry and general 
 good work in the Brickfields, scouting, blowing up a kiln occupied by the 
 enemy, &c. 
 
 This non-commissioned officer was killed in action. 
 
 Conclusion. 
 
 I should like to add that the conduct of the rank and file of the garrisons 
 throughout the 31 weeks’ siege, was beyond all praise. In all the long strain 
 of privations, due to short rations and to the entire absence of all luxuries, as 
 well as to living in the trenches month after month, there was no complaining, 
 and the men took their hardships smiling. When there was fighting to be 
 done they showed unexceptionable pluck and steadiness. 
 
 Q 
 
 ( 17 ) 
 
122 
 
 The Town Guard, formed of all the civilians capable of bearing arms, took 
 to their duties as soldiers, and submitted themselves to military discipline with 
 most praiseworthy readiness and success. 
 
 The self-devotion and good work of the ladies who acted as nurses in the 
 hospitals, have already been alluded to, but the bravery and patience of all the 
 women and elder children, under all the cruel dangers, anxieties, and privations 
 to which they were exposed, were most exemplary. 
 
 The natives took their share in the defence of their Stadt, and showed 
 great patience under their trials. 
 
 The notable feature ot‘ the siege was that the whole community was 
 pervaded by a spirit of loyal endurance and cheery goodfeeling, under which 
 all the usual local and private differences were sunk in the one great idea of 
 maintaining Her Majesty's supremacy to the end. AVith such spirit to work 
 on, the task of conducting the defence was an easy one. 
 
 E. S. S. BADEN-POWELL. 
 
 From Major-General Baden Powell, Commanding North-West Frontier Forces, 
 to the Chief Staff Officer to Field-Marshal Lord Roberts, V.C. 
 
 Ottoshoop, 
 
 Sir, 6th June 1900. 
 
 With reference to the recommendations of Officers for good service in the 
 siege of Mnfeking, as submitted in my report on the operations, I venture to 
 recommend for special recognition, the following from among those Officers:— 
 
 Major Godley. 
 
 Major Yyvyan. 
 
 Captain Eyan. 
 
 Major Lord E. Cecil. 
 
 Lieut.-Colonel Walford. 
 
 Major Panzera. 
 
 All of whom did exceptionally good service. 
 
 Captain FitzClarence, for personal gallantry, recommended for the Y.C. 
 Captain Marsh, good service in action. 
 
 Captain Ashley-Williams, good service in action. 
 
 Lieutenant Lord C. Bentinck, good service in action. 
 
 Major Anderson, medical services. 
 
 Major Goold-Adams, civil and political services. 
 
 Mr. C. C. H. Bell, civil and political services. 
 
 Mr. F. Whiteley (Mayor of Mafeking), eminent civil services. His 
 reward would be highly appreciated by the townspeople, as 
 recognition of their share in the defence. 
 
 In addition to the above, the following ladies for hospital services, viz.— 
 
 Miss Hill. 
 
 Mother Teresa, 
 
 Lady Sarah Wilson. 
 
 Miss Craufurd. 
 
 The latter also for attending wounded Boers under fire on the 12th May. 
 
 I have the honour to be, 
 
 Sir, 
 
 Your Lordship’s most obedient Servant, 
 
 E. S. S. BADE2J-POWELL, Major-General 
 
123 
 
 No. 14 
 
 From Field-Marshal Lord Roberts to the Secretary of State for War. 
 
 Army Head-quarters. South Africa, 
 
 My Lord, Pretoria, 5th July 1900. 
 
 I have the honour to forward, for your Lordship’s information, a letter, 
 dated 19tli June 1900, from Lieut.-General T. Kelly-Kenny, C.B., Com¬ 
 manding Line of Communication from the Orange River to Kroonstad, 
 submitting a report on the action at the Zand River on the 14th idem. 
 
 2. The troops engaged behaved in a very creditable manner, and I desire 
 to bring to your Lordship’s favourable notice the services rendered on this 
 occasion by Lieut.-Colonel J. E. Capper, R.E., Commanding Railway Pioneer 
 Regiment, who was senior Officer, and Lieutenant W. Mitchell, Railway 
 Pioneer Regiment, who showed conspicuous coolness and gallantry. 
 
 I have the honour to be. 
 
 My Lord, 
 
 Tour Lordship’s most obedient Servant, 
 
 ROBERTS, Field-Marshal , 
 
 Commanding-in-Chief, South Africa. 
 
 From Lieut.-General T. Kelly-Kenny , C.B., Commanding Line of Communication 
 from the Orange River to Kroonstad, to the Commander-in-Chief, 
 South Africa. 
 
 Bloemfontein, 
 
 My Lord, 19th June 1900. 
 
 I have the honour to transmit Lieut.-Colonel Capper’s report of the action 
 at Zand River on the 14th instant. 
 
 I hope your Lordship will agree with me in considering the behaviour of 
 the troops engaged very creditable, and that the conduct of Lieutenant 
 W. Mitchell, Railway Pioneer Regiment, deserves special recognition. 
 
 I have only to add to the report that, previous to the attack on the post, 
 during the action, and since, Lieut.-Colonel Capper, R.E., Commanding 
 Railway Pioneer Regiment, has been untiring in his duties. 
 
 I have the honour to be, 
 
 My Lord, 
 
 Your obedient Servant, 
 
 T. KELLY-KENNY, Lieut.-General. 
 
 Military Secretary, 
 
 Referring to my forwarding minute on Lieut.-Colonel Capper’s report of 
 the action at Zand River on the 13th instant, and in support of the recommen¬ 
 dation I made on behalf of Lieutenant Mitchell, R.E., I send the following 
 extract from a note written to me by Lieut.-Colonel Capper:— 
 
 Lieutenant Mitchell, Railway Pioneer Regiment. 
 
 “No veteran could have been steadier, and no one pluckier : he never let 
 on to his men he was wounded for fear of discouraging them, but sat there 
 as cheery as possible for 6 hours.” 
 
 T. KELLY-KENNY, Lieut.-General 
 
 2 5th June 1900. 
 
 Q 2 
 
 ( 47 ) 
 
124 
 
 From Major-General C. E. Knox, Commanding Kroonstad, to Lieut.-General \ 
 Kelly-Kcnny, Commanding Lines of Communication. 
 
 gi r< 16th June 1900. 
 
 I have the honour to forward report from the Officer Commanding detach¬ 
 ment of troops stationed at Zand River, describing an attack made on his post 
 yesterday. 
 
 I am glad to say that owing to the careful arrangements made for defence 
 of the post by Lieut.-Coionel Capper, Commanding Railway Pioneers, and 
 Colonel North, Commanding 3rd Bn. Royal Lancaster Regiment, the attack 
 failed. 
 
 I beg to bring both these Officers to your favourable notice. 
 
 I have the honour to be, 
 
 Sir, 
 
 Your obedient Servant, 
 
 CHARLES E. KNOX, Major-General, 
 
 Commanding Kroonstad. 
 
 To General Knox, Virginia, loth June 1900. 
 
 We were attacked at daybreak yesterday by Muller and Boerman’s com¬ 
 mandoes, said to be 800 men with one or two pompoms, one Maxim, and, I 
 think, one field gun, but this is uncertain. We had to hold rather an extended 
 position, our left being in trenches on very broken ground, and in thick scrub, 
 which there was no time to clear. The enemy got in this scrub, and gave some 
 trouble by sniping. The garrison consisted of four companies, 3rd Bn. Royal 
 Lancasters, under Colonel North (about 250 fit for duty), and four companies. 
 Railway Pioneer Regiment, under Major Seymour (about 300 fit for duty), 
 together with 25 men, Royal Irish Regiment (Mounted Infantry), under 
 Lieutenant Davenport (16 fit for duty). The attack was most pressed and 
 determined on our left, and was held most steadily by No. 3 Company, Railway 
 Pioneer Regiment, under Lieutenant IV. Mitchell, Railway Pioneer Regiment. 
 Fighting was continued on all sides until about 11 a.m., when it quieted down, 
 and the enemy had practically retired by the time a body of 170 Yeomanry, 
 under Lieutenant Crane, arrived from the south at about noon. We had no 
 opportunity of making a counter attack, being practically surrounded in a very 
 extended position, and 1 did not consider it advisable to attempt to follow up 
 the enemy with the Yeomanry alone. The troops behaved very well and 
 steadily. The Railway Pioneer Regiment in the advanced trenches on the left 
 especially were most cool and collected, engaging the enemy at very close 
 quarters. They were for part of the morning surrounded by the enemy in the 
 scrub, but never lost their heads, and the enemy were ultimately driven out of 
 the scrub by an advance through it of a line of reserve, Railway Pioneer Regi¬ 
 ment, aided by | company of Militia. 
 
 I regret to report that our losses were— 
 
 Killed. 
 
 Major Seymour, Railway Pioneer Regiment. 
 
 250 Lance-Corporal A. E. Smith, No. 3 Company, Railway Pioneer 
 Regiment. 
 
 56 Private A. Miller, No. 3 Company, Railway Pioneer Regiment. 
 
 366 Lance-Corporal A. Mathew, No. 3 Company, Railway Pioneer 
 Regiment. 
 
 •632 Private H. Dant, No. 3 Company, Railway Pioneer Regiment. 
 
 386 Private T. B. Yarker, No. 3 Company, Railway Pioneer 
 Regiment. 
 
 Dangerously Wounded. 
 
 Lieutenant J. Clement, No. 2 Company, Railway Pioneer Regiment. 
 (Since dead). 
 
125 
 
 Company Serjeant-Major H. Pitt, No. 3 Company, Railway Pioneer 
 Regiment. 
 
 6845 Serjeant Gray, 3rd Bn. Royal Lancaster Regiment. 
 
 Seriously Wounded. 
 
 Lieutenant W. Mitchell, No. 3 Company, Railway Pioneer Regiment. 
 
 G39 Private Ross, No. 3 Company ,, „ 
 
 4733 Lance-Corporal Jackson, 3rd Bn. Royal Lancaster Regiment. 
 
 1898 Private Montgomery, Royal Irish Rifles Mounted Infantry. 
 
 1632 Private Ruddy ,, ,, ,, 
 
 Missing. 
 
 (Prisoners, believed to be uninjured.) 
 
 731 Private Bourne, Royal Irish Rifles Mounted Infantry. 
 
 5420 Private Driscol „ „ 
 
 I cannot speak too highly of Lieutenant W. Mitchell, a young Officer, who 
 was wounded in both thighs about 6 a.m., in going from one trench to another 
 to encourage the men, and remaining throughout the day in the most exposed 
 trench, keeping his men (22 in number, scattered among several small 
 trenches) calm, and cheering them up, ordering them not to waste ammunition, 
 &c. I attribute to his example, and the very steady conduct of the men of his 
 company in the advanced trenches, who suffered severely (one holding three 
 men had one killed, and one holding five men had two killed), the fact that our 
 losses were so comparatively small. 
 
 I especially deplore the death of Major Seymour, whose loss will not only 
 he felt by us as a regiment, but by the whole of South Africa. He was killed 
 while advancing with the extended line through the bush, to clear out the 
 snipers. Four dead Boers were found in a donga, within 40 yards of No. 3 
 Company’s advanced trenches, and two were found on our right outside the 
 Militia trenches. 
 
 The enemy‘8 loss is known to be these six, and it is probable that some 
 more were hit. We took nine prisoners, of whom one was wounded. I sent 
 off a son of the wounded man with a letter to Commandant Boerman, asking 
 him and advising him to give up his arms. It is thought that the commando 
 is retiring on Senekal. I sent an engine down last evening to try and open 
 communication with the south, hut up to the present, 7.30 a.m., have not 
 heard of it. The telegraph wires were broken. I am sending to Doornspruit 
 this morning, to ascertain if the party there are all right. I regret to report 
 that most of my men w'ere killed w ith explosive and soft-nosed bullets, and I 
 have in my possession a number of explosive and soft-nosed bullets taken from 
 the dead, and from the bandoliers of prisoners who have surrendered. 
 
 I have the honour to inquire if the prisoners in whose possession they 
 were found should he shot, as 1 am unaware of the orders of the Field-Marshal 
 Commanding-in-Chief on the subject. 
 
 J. E. CAPPER, Lieut.-Colonel, 
 
 Officer Commanding Troops, Virginia. 
 
 No. 15. 
 
 From Field-Marshal Lord Roberts to the Secretary of Slate for War. 
 
 Army Head-quarters, South Africa, 
 
 My Lord, Pretoria, 9th July 1900. 
 
 I have the honour to submit for your Lordship’s information a report, 
 dated 23rd May 1900, from Brigadier-General B. T. Mahon, D.S.O., 
 describing the march of the Flying Column under ris command from Barkly 
 West to Mafeking, and the relief of the latter place, in conjunction with the 
 force under Colonel Plumcr. 
 
126 
 
 2. The operation entrusted to Brigadier-General Mahon was conducted by 
 him with conspicuous ability and energy, and I would draw special attention to 
 the skill which he displayed in evading the enemy, who had arranged to dispute 
 his advance along the main road, by deflecting his line of march to the west. 
 Credit is also due to Brigadier-General Mahon for the dispositions which 
 resulted in the defeat of the Boers on 13th and 16th May, and opened the 
 way into Mafeking. 
 
 The admirable behaviour of the troops during the march and in action 
 contributed most materially to the successtul issue. 
 
 3. I would especially bring Colonel Plumer’s name to your notice; his hearty 
 co-operation at the right moment was of immense value to Colonel Mahon. 
 
 I am also informed that Mrs. Abrams, an Englishwoman living at Taungs, 
 rendered valuable assistance by giving information to Lieut.-General Hunter 
 and Colonel Mahon, and I would add that the native chief Molala of Taungs 
 did excellent work by supplying horses and runners during the siege of 
 Mafeking. 
 
 I have the honour to be, 
 
 My Lord, 
 
 Your Lordship’s most obedient Servant, 
 
 ROBERTS, Field-Marshal, 
 
 Commanding-in-Chief, South Africa. 
 
 From Colonel B. Mahon to Lieut.-General Sir Archibald Hunter, K.C.B.. 
 
 Commanding 10 th Division. 
 
 In accordance with orders received from you I left Barkly West on 4th 
 May 1900, in command of Flying Column for relief of Mafeking. We 
 reached Spitz Kop on 5th May and from the top of a hill there I could see 
 your engagement to the east near Rooidam, a party of the Boers you were 
 engaged with seemed to be moving north-west in the direction of our road, I 
 moved the Imperial Light Horse and Royal Horse Artillery so as to intercept 
 them, but they turned east and we did not come in contact. 
 
 I despatched Captain Rickman with one squadron Kimberley Mounted 
 Corps to join you. 
 
 The next Boers we came across Mere at Taungs, where a patrol of ours 
 chased them as they were leaving and picked up a portfolio, which one of them 
 dropped, with their latest telegrams, one of which stated that Young Cronje 
 with his commando was moving north to intercept us at Pudimoe. 
 
 From Pudimoe there was a Boer commando marching parallel to us on 
 our right flank. 
 
 In the Pudimoe district we arrested several rebels and seized a number 
 of rifles, also sheep, cattle, and some horses; between Pudimoe and AYyburg 
 no Boers were seen, but we made some more prisoners and seized several rifles 
 and some stock. 
 
 At Yryburg I left Mr. C. St. Quintin in charge and gave him powers of 
 acting magistrate, and Mr. P. Gethin as his assistant. I left our sick at 
 Yryburg under charge of Dr. Yugent. 
 
 I also left the live stock we had captured and our sick horses and mules 
 under charge of Mr. P. Gethin. Yo Boers were encountered until the 13th 
 May between Brodie’s and AYright’s Farms, north-west of Koodo’s Rand ; the 
 Boers here had an ambush in thick scrub, which w r as strongly supported from 
 Koodo’s Rand (at Koodo’s Rand Nek they had several guns in position); they 
 made a determined attack, but we beat them off after 45 minutes fighting ; all 
 troops behaved excellently. 
 
 From what I have since heard there were 900 Boers there with 4 guns, 
 
127 
 
 viz., 500 who had marched up parallel to us, and 400 which had come from 
 Mafeking to intercept us; the two forces joined on the 12th. 
 
 We crossed the Marotzani at Dr. Smart’s Farm and had difficulty in 
 watering, as we had to dig in the dry bed of the river for it; but, although it 
 took 8 hours to water the force, we managed it all right; we marched from 
 Marotzani direct to Jan Masibi on the night of the 14th and reached the 
 Molopo (lots of running water) at Jan Masibi at 5.-30 a.m. on the 15th, and 
 there met Colonel Plumer's column, which had also just arrived after a night 
 march. 
 
 We all rested on the 15th, as both men and animals required it. 
 
 I formed the force into two brigades, 1st Brigade under Lieut.-Colonel 
 Plumer, 2nd Brigade under Lieut.-Colonel Edwardes. 
 
 We advanced at 6.30 a.m. towards Mafeking, along the north or right 
 bank of the Molopo, in two parallel columns at ^ a mile interval, the convoy 
 in the centre and slightly in rear. 
 
 Plumer’s brigade on the right and Edwardes’ on the left. At Sani’s Post, 
 about 12.30 p.m., firing was heard on the left front, and I advanced Edwardes’ 
 brigade; Plumer’s at the same time advancing along the river; the convoy 
 following on the road in rear of and between the two brigades. As we advanced 
 I found that the Boers had taken up positions all around us, and had five guns 
 and two pompoms in positions in different places. 
 
 The convoy rather impeded my movements, as it was under shell fire, and 
 the Boers were trying to attack it from both flanks and also from the rear, so 
 I had to strengthen both my flank and rear guards, at the same time I 
 continued my advance on Mafeking; the Boers retiring from our front 
 and keeping up with us on the flanks. Our Artillery, especially the Royal 
 Horse Artillery, were making very good practice. At 4.40 p.m. I ordered 
 Colonel Edwardes to bring up his left and turn the Boer right flank, this move¬ 
 ment was entirely successful. At 4.40 p.m. I had a message from Colonel 
 Plumer to sav his advance was checked on the right by a gun and pompom fire 
 from the White Horse (Israel’s Farm). I ordered the Royal Horse Artillery to 
 shell the house. They soon silenced the gun, but not the pompom. I then 
 sent Captain Carr with the Infantry to take the house, which they did, and cap¬ 
 tured one wagon and a lot of pompom ammunition. It was by this time getting 
 dark, or I think they would have got the pompom. 
 
 At 5.45 p.m. all firing, except stray shots of the rear guard, had ceased, 
 and the Boers had retired from all parts. I advanced two miles nearer 
 Mafeking, and formed up the force, with the exception of the infantry, which 
 T reinforced with 50 New Zealand Infantry, and left holding the White 
 House. The Boer fire was very heavy at times, and their guns very accurately 
 laid. I attribute the smallness of our casualties to our very wide front and 
 loose formation, and to the excellent way in which our Artillery was served, 
 especially the Royal Horse Artillery, as they never gave the Boers an oppor¬ 
 tunity of getting fixed tenure in any positions which allowed them a close 
 range fire, and partly to the defectiveness of the Boer shells, very few of 
 which burst. 
 
 At 11 p.m. after first ascertaining by patrol that the road was open, I 
 ordered an advance on Mafeking. We started at 12.30 a.m., and marched 
 7 miles to Mafeking, which place we entered at 3.30 a.m. on the 17th of May 
 1900. Shortly after daylight it was reported that the Boers were clearing out 
 of all their laagers on the east of the town. At 8 a.m. Colonel Baderi-Powell 
 ordered out the troops, and we shelled and pressed for a short way, but the 
 horses were too beat to do much. However, we captured one gun and a large 
 quantity of ammunition and other stores, and by 11 a.m. there was not a Boer 
 near Mafeking. 
 
 1 cannot say what the Boer losses were in either engagement, but from 
 what I have since heard I believe they were fairly heavy. I saw one man at 
 Kraaipan who assisted in burying 22 Boers on the 14th May. 
 
 T estimate the number of Boers engaged against us on the 17th of May 
 atjabout 2,000. 
 
 2 cannot speak too highly of the behaviour of all ranks, more especially the 
 Royal Horse Artillery and Imperial Light Horse, both during the march, which 
 was jong and tiring, and during both engagements. The march was rendered 
 the more fatiguing by having an active enemy on our flank always looking for 
 
128 
 
 an opportunity to delay and harass us, and thus rendering scouting more 
 necessar}’, and extra work on men and horses. 
 
 The following farmers were very useful to us and rendered us every 
 assistance, viz., Mr. Keely, Mr. Lamb, Mr. Brodie, and Mr. Wright. The 
 latter had our wounded ( 25) from the engagements on the 13th May 1900 in 
 his house, and was most kind in many ways to them. All the above live in 
 the Marotzani district. 
 
 I brought into Mafekinsr five wagon loads of provisions and hospital stores, 
 equalling 10,500 lbs.; also 17 bags of flour and 81 head of cattle (these latter 
 viz., flour and cattle, we T e captured on the march), and handed them over to 
 Ordnance Corps Stores, Mafeking. I at the same time sent for 200 more 
 cattle and 1,000 sheep to Vryburg, they duly arrived, and I handed them over 
 about the 23rd May. 
 
 Mafeking, 
 
 23 rd May 1900. 
 
 B. MAH027, Colonel, 
 
 Commanding Mafeking Belief Column. 
 
 N o. 16. 
 
 From Field-Marshal Lord Roberts to the Secretary of State for War. 
 
 Army Head-quarters, South Africa, 
 
 My Lord, Pretoria. 1st August 1900. 
 
 I have the honour to forward, for your Lordship’s information, a despatch, 
 dated 29th June 1900, from Lieut.-General Sir Charles Warren, describing the 
 operations in the vicinity of Faber’s Put on 30th May. 
 
 2. I consider that the force under Lieut.-General Warren’s command was 
 ably handled, and that the troops displayed great steadiness and gallantry 
 when attacked by the Boers. 
 
 3. I support Sir Charles Warren’s recommendations on behalf of the 
 Officers, non-commissioned officers and men whose names he has brought to 
 special notice. 
 
 I have the honour to be, 
 
 My Lord, 
 
 Your Lordship’s most obedient Servant, 
 
 ROBE RTS, Field-Marshal. 
 
 Commanding in Chief, South Africa. 
 
 From Lieut.-General Sir Charles Warren, Military Governor of Cape Colony 
 North of Orange River, to Chief of Staff, Head-quarters, Pretoria. 
 
 Attack on Faber’s Put. 
 
 Sir, Blickfontein, 29th June 1900. 
 
 1. After having occupied Douglas, on 2ist May, I found that the whole 
 country west of Vaal River was occupied by rebels, encamped in a great 
 number of laagers, and frequently shifting from place to place, so that it was 
 difficult to obtain anj T clear estimate of their numbers, the estimate of the 
 Intelligence Branch varying from 700 to 2,000 within a 50-mile radius : it has 
 since been apparent that the numbers are not less than 1,000. 
 
2. Our objectives were the townships of Campbell and Griquatown, which 
 stand on a raised plateau, about 400 or 500 feet above the level of the Yaal 
 River; this plateau is terminated on the east by a steep ridge, about 400 feet 
 high, running 50 or 60 miles north-east and south-west, at a distance of about 
 10 to 12 miles from the Yaal River. Roads pass up from the river on to the 
 high lands through various deep kloofs, which a few resolute men could 
 defend against a considerable number, and the only point where I considered 
 we could attack without a very heavy loss was at Tweefontein, where the 
 position could be turned by a flank movement; but this position was very 
 difficult of access on account of the thick thorn bush covering its front, as 
 well as the dense bush on the plateau between it and Campbell. The whole 
 country for miles round is covered with bush, more or less thick, with kopjes 
 every here and there presenting excellent positions for defence and ambuscade. 
 
 3. The only good position that could be selected as a base for an attack 
 on Tweefontein was that of Faber’s Put, where there was plenty of water, and 
 a hollow surrounded by hills where horses could be kept more or less secure 
 from musketry at long ranges. 
 
 4. I began to concentrate my force at this place on the 27th May, about 
 10 miles east of Tweefontein, and was unable to move forward owing to delay 
 in transport of food which did not arrive until the night of 29th of May 
 accompanied by an escort of 50 Infantry. This convoy must have arrived 
 shortly before the enemy, on their way to attack us at Faber’s Put, passed 
 across the road. 
 
 5. Ridges encircle Faber’s Put to the north-east and west, while a shallow 
 valley runs from the water through the garden to the south. The north and 
 north-west is the front of the position, and the south is the rear, facing on the 
 Vaal River, There are two farm houses about 800 yards apart at north-east 
 and north-west, and the Infantry picquets occupied the whole of this front, 
 the Infantry being bivouacked near the north-east farm house, where were 
 also my head-quarters; the men of the Intelligence Branch and Warren’s 
 Scouts and some Infantry were at the north-west farm house, while the 
 Yeomanry and Artillery were in the hollow occupying the kraals around the 
 water and northern portion of the garden, providing the picquets on the ridges 
 south-east and south-west. 
 
 Daylight tvas at this time at G a.m., reveille being at 5.30 a.m. 
 
 6. On the night of the 29th the rebels collected at Campbell from 
 several points, and arranged for an early morning attack on Faber’s Put, in 
 three parties, under De Yilliers, Yentner, and Forster. One party, under 
 Forster, to attack the Infantry camp and head-quarters farm house, composed 
 of men from the northern part of Hay and Barklv AYest districts; the second 
 party of crack shots, under Commandant-General De Yilliers, from the 
 country about Campbell and Griquatown, to steal into the garden and attack 
 the Yeomanry and Artillery; and a third party, under Yentner, composed of 
 men from the country about Postmasberg, who were to take possession of the 
 western ridge and fire into the kraals and Artillery. 
 
 7. Their scheme, so far as I can ascertain, was as follows:—• 
 
 .No. 1 party was to go direct upon the Infantry and take possession of 
 the farm house where I and my Staff were, and the firing of No. 1 party was 
 to be the signal for a simultaneous attack on the Yeomanry from the gardens, 
 and on the kraals and Artillery from No. 3 party, the rebels being quite 
 satisfied that the attack would be successful. No. 3 party took possession of 
 some old diamond diggings on the crest of the hill, about 200 yards from our 
 picquet, where they could fire upon the kraals and upon our Infantry at a range 
 of about 1,700 yards. 
 
 8. I was up that morning at reveille, making up a good fire, as the 
 thermometer was below freezing ; and some minutes before 6 a.m., heavy 
 firing commenced from the east upon our Head-quarters and the Duke of 
 Edinburgh’s Own YAlunteer Rifles’ camp. The Duke of Edinburgh’s Own 
 Yolunteer Rifles were all on the alert, and at once moved out two companies 
 in the direction of the firing. I stopped one company to act as reserve, and 
 the fourth company went off to hold our front and north. Some of the enemy 
 crept up through the bush to within 250 yards of my Head-quarters, which 
 could not be prevented in this very thick bush by any number of picquets, and 
 
 R 
 
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130 
 
 were driven back by the Maxim Gun Detachment and the two companies, 
 under Captain Twycross, moving’ out to meet them. These two companies 
 drove the enemy right back to the eastern ridge and thence, in an easterly 
 direction, right away over the bushy plain. This took about half an hour, and 
 the fire from this quarter was over about 6.30 a.m., but while it lasted it 
 was exceedingly heavy and well directed, the equipment of the Duke of 
 Edinburgh’s Own Volunteer Rifles being smashed to pieces by the bullets in 
 all directions. A portion of this party, some of the rebels have informed me, 
 were stationed at long ranges with instructions simply to fire into the kraals 
 and camp. 
 
 9. After placing a company of the Duke of Edinburgh’s Own Volunteer 
 Rifles in readiness in reserve, I mounted and went across with my Staff close 
 to the main farmhouse to see that the Yeomanry were on the alert and the 
 Artillery were getting ready to come into action whenever it was necessary, 
 for it was still dark and it was impossible to conjecture the exact point where 
 the fire was coming from. Major F. Heath, C.S.O., and my two Aides-de- 
 Camp were with me, and in returning across the open space when it was 
 almost daylight we were subjected to an exceedingly heavy fire, which w T as 
 directed with such precision that I came to the conclusion that it must be at 
 very short ranges ; it proved to be less than 400 yards. Both Major Kelly, 
 A.D C., and Lieutenant Paton, A.D.C., were wounded, and Major Heath had 
 his horse shot under him. 
 
 10. It was now daylight, and I dismounted to direct the fire of the reserve 
 company, Duke of Edinburgh’s Own Volunteer Rifles, who were now under a 
 very hot fire from the south-west, and, just as I arrived, Colonel Spence who 
 had sat up to give a direction was mortally wounded, 1 now saw some of our 
 troops moving out to the south-west hill to support their picquets, and being 
 sure that part of the fire came from the continuation of the ridge to their left, 
 I directed the Duke of Edinburgh’s Own Volunteer Rifles to fire at the ridge 
 at 2,000 yards so as to keep down the enemy's fire and support on - advance. 
 
 11. I had felt certain on coming across the open that it would be quite 
 impossible we could be followed with such accuracy by bullets, if the range was 
 more than 500 yards, and now I found with the Duke of Edinburgh’s Own 
 Volunteer Rifles, that whenever any movement was made by a superior Officer, 
 there were at once a shower of bullets all round him, making me feel certain 
 that the hot fire upon us for the most part must be from the gardens at 
 about 600 yards. Several men of the Duke of Edinburgh’s Own Volunteer 
 Rifles also told me that they saw flashes of firing from the garden, and 
 although I knew that we had men in the garden and had seen some of the 
 south-east picquets retiring into the garden, I made sure that it must be 
 occupied by a large number of Boers, and directed the reserve company to fire 
 on to it at a range of 500 yards, and I then went on to a kraal near the head¬ 
 quarters where the Maxim gun was, and ordered the fire of all the Infantry 
 there and of the Maxim gun to be directed on it and to be distributed along 
 the nearer edges of it. After about 10 minutes I collected half of Captain 
 Sirnkin’s company together and directed him to charge the gardens by a route 
 I pointed out, but while doing so the enemy were seen to be running away 
 from the gardens. The Artillery came into action beyond the gardens, and in 
 a few minutes the whole attack was over. Throughout this part of the action 
 the Duke of Edinburgh’s Own Volunteer Rifles acted with all the steadiness of 
 well-seasoned troops. 
 
 12. No. 2 party, who went to the garden, appear to have arrived there in 
 the early morning, and their numbers as given to me by a considerable 
 number of Boers from different parts was 56, out of which they say only four 
 returned unwounded. Many of these were known to be among the noted shots 
 of Griqualand West, many of whom were killed ; they were under Commandant 
 De Villiers, who is stated to have threatened that he would shoot any man 
 who attempted to retire from the gardens; they were mostly men who knew 
 the farm intimately, which alone accounts for their being able to occupy and 
 line the edge of the garden without being seen, as men of the Yeomanry were 
 constantly in and out of the garden during the night where there was a 
 latrine and a 1 eomanry guard in the kraal and a sentry walking between the 
 garden and the blockhouse at the northern end of the garden. It seems 
 
probable that they effected the entry of the garden unheard during the noise 
 made by the convoy coming in. 
 
 13. They appear to have commenced their fire from this garden at about 
 6 a.m.; they commenced their fire upon a kraal where the Colt gun was with 
 a party of Yeomanry, and upon some of Paget’s Horse who were exposed on 
 the left. Two or three of their men got into the block house, but the Artillery 
 and a great part of the Yeomanry were quite secure in their bivouacs from fire 
 from the garden ; subsequently they fired on a party of the Yeomanry under 
 Colonel Crawley moving out to the ridge towards the west to support the 
 picquet at that point, while another party in the gardens fired on anybody 
 moving on the open space between the gardens and upon the reserve company 
 of the Duke of Edinburgh’s Own Volunteer Rifles in position near their camp. 
 
 14. When the firing commenced, Colonel Crawley, Commanding 8th Bn. 
 of Yeomanry (not knowing that the enemy 7 were in the garden close to him), 
 finding firing from four different directions and having seen his horses 
 stampeded, judged the best defence would be to make an offensive movement, 
 south-west to reinforce his picquet on the ridge, and from there direct a fire 
 into the garden, or on to the enemy further along on the ridge. He took 30 
 men with him, and 30 followed shortly afterwards ; it was during this advance 
 across the open that nine men of the Yeomanry were killed. This detachment 
 under Colonel Crawley reinforced the picquet, and forced No. 3 party, under 
 Ventner, to retire from the diamond diggings on the ridge. 
 
 While Colonel Crawley was making this advance, Lieutenant Huntingdon, 
 23rd Company, Imperial Yeomanry, whose bivouac was close to the garden, 
 covered his left flank by firing at close range into the garden while under a 
 heavy fire. This, no doubt, saved Colonel Crawley from suffering heavier loss. 
 
 15. This rebel party under Ventner had the duty of occupying the 
 diamond diggings so as to fire at long ranges into our camp, and some of the 
 more daring of the men were directed to occupy a stone cemetery about 
 600 yards from the large kraal and to go right down to the kraal itself, fire 
 into it, and stampede the English horses of the Yeomanry which Colonel 
 Crawley had placed there and which he had omitted to ring. It is not 
 certain whether two or more rebels got so far as the kraal, but it is certain 
 they fired into the kraal in the dark and that the English horses at once 
 surged up against the wall of the kraal, pushed it over, and stampeded in all 
 directions. 
 
 16. Lieut.-Colonel Hughes, who was at the main farmhouse with the 
 scouts, on hearing the firing anti seeing the horses stampede got together a 
 few of his men and rushed into the kraal, opening a brisk fire on the ridge 
 where the Boers w'ere in the diamond washings, until they were obliged to 
 
 • cease fire, by the Yeomanry advancing out in front of them. At the same 
 time Captain Parkin and a troop of 23rd Yeomanry took possession of the 
 south end of the same kraal, and acted under the orders of Colonel Hughes. 
 By holding this kraal they prevented the rebels getting hold of it from the 
 direction of the cemetery. At this time the rebels began to run away from 
 the south side of the garden and were in doing so exposed to our fire, but 
 Colonel Hughes supposing them to be our own men ordered Captain Parkin 
 and party to cease fire and they thus escaped. Colonel Hughes then decided 
 to outflank the enemy, and with some of the Yeomanry and some good shots 
 of various corps, he drove the enemy up beyond the direction of the ceme¬ 
 tery, thus getting in line with Colonel Crawley and bringing his right 
 shoulder up he took Ventner’s men on their flank and drove them away to 
 the south. 
 
 17. The picquet on the hill which Colonel Crawley went to reinforce 
 under Corporal Wilson, 23rd Company, gallantly held its own against a 
 superior force until relieved. A section of Yeomanry, with two Colt guns 
 under Lieutenant Brocklebank, 23rd Company, Imperial Yeomanry, in the 
 kraal near the garden, were under a heavy (ire for a considerable time and the 
 shields to the guns were smashed t to pieces: they were joined by a party of 
 Yeomanry under Serjeant Fawkes and made a most gallant defence at close 
 range. 
 
 IS. The whole attack did not take more than an hour, and as soon as the 
 enemy cleared off I pushed out the available mounted men, two guns, and two 
 companies of Infantry across the veldt to the north to endeavour to intercept 
 ( 47 ) R 2 
 
132 
 
 the enemy, but there were not sufficient horses left to do more than scouting, 
 and though some shells were fired very close to the retreating enemy, both 
 east and west, I was unable to intercept them. I then proceeded to collect 
 together the stampeded horses, but some of them stampeded for over 20 miles, 
 and they have not yet been all got together. 
 
 Several acts of gallantry occurred during the attack, mostly in cases 
 where the firing was at very short ranges, which I will bring forward. 
 
 Since the action of Faber’s Put, the rebels in all directions have 
 continued to surrender in increasing numbers, and with one consent the whole 
 of the rebels say that the repulse at Faber’s Put and great loss they sustained 
 there caused a sudden collapse of the rebellion. 
 
 19. I consider that this attack was a very fortunate occurrence, as with the 
 very splendid shooting of so many of the rebels in this part of the country it 
 would have been impossible to have attacked and taken the position about 
 Campbell and Griquatown without a far greater loss than was sustained at 
 Faber’s Put, and with our small force we could not have hoped to have killed so 
 many of the enemy in any attack we could make, as their mobility is so 
 immeasurably superior to ours. It was fortunate that our troops were not taken 
 by surprise in this attack as otherwise the loss would have been far greater. 
 The whole of the troops behaved with remarkable steadiness and carried out 
 their movements under fire with the greatest coolness. 
 
 I have not been able to estimate the number that attacked us, but from 
 general information they cannot have been less than five to six hundred. 
 
 20. The troops engaged were :— 
 
 Duke of Lancaster Yeomanry, 23rd Company. 
 
 Westmoreland and Cumberland Yeomanry, 24th Company. 
 
 Paget’s Horse, small detachment, 
 
 4 guns “ E ” Battery, Royal Canadian Artillery. 
 
 4^ Companies Duke of Edinburgh’s Own Volunteer Regiment, 
 
 Warren’s Scouts. 
 
 21. The main farm house was rapidly cleared out and turned into a 
 hospital under the directions of the Senior Medical Officer. All the medical 
 arrangements were most satisfactory, the following Officers having done very 
 excellent work, not only in the hospital, but also in the field dressing the 
 wounds under heavy fire, viz. :— 
 
 Major McLaughlin, Senior Medical Officer. 
 
 Major Cox, Officer Commanding Cape Field Hospital. 
 
 Major Worthington, attached Canadian Artillery. 
 
 Captain C. Smith, attached 8th Bn. Imperial Yeomanry. 
 
 22. An attack of this kind in South Africa is almost unprecedented, and 
 would test to the utmost the vigilance and arrangements of well seasoned troops; 
 but the whole of the troops were equal to the occasion and stood their ground 
 in a most magnificent manner. 
 
 23. Although the Officers and men were acting in a most gallant way all 
 over the field, there are a feAV special instances which I would more specially 
 particularize, viz.:— 
 
 The bringing in of Lieutenant Lethbridge, Paget’s Horse, and Trooper 
 Park, both severely Avounded, under a very heavy fire, by— 
 
 Lieutenant Claude Louther, 24th Company, 8th Bn. Imperial 
 Yeomanry. 
 
 Trooper Hurst, 24th Company, 8th Bn. Imperial Yeomanry. 
 
 Trooper Elce, 23rd Company, 8th Bn. Imperial Yeomanry. 
 
 Trooper Mather, Paget’s Horse. 
 
 Trooper Looker, 23rd Company, Imperial Yeomanry, A\ r ko was seriously 
 wounded in the groin, refused to be taken to the ambulance, but continued to 
 fire into the garden until the enemy retired. 
 
 The determination and courage of Lieutenant Brocklebank, Commanding 
 Colt Gun Section, 8th Battalion, Imperial Yeomanry, and his gun party, 
 assisted by Serjeant FaAvkes, 24th Company, Imperial Yeomanry, Avith 17 men, 
 in holding kraal and fighting his Colt guns, is beyond all praise. 
 
133 
 
 These guns were within 100 yards of the enemy’s firing line, and one of 
 the shields was shattered to pieces. 
 
 I have to name the following Officers and men as being particularly worthy 
 of mention for the excellent services they performed in their respective spheres 
 during the day :— 
 
 Personal Staff. 
 
 Major Kelly, R.A., A.D.C., severely wounded. 
 
 Lieutenant Paton, A.D.C., wounded. 
 
 Staff. 
 
 Major P. C. Heath, A.A.G., horse shot under him. 
 Lieut.-Colonel Hughes, Intelligence Officer. 
 
 “ E ” Battery, Royal Canadian Artillery. 
 Major Ogilvie. 
 
 8th Bn. Imperial Yeomanry. 
 
 Colonel Crawley, Commanding, Imperial Yeomanry. 
 
 Captain Kemp, Commanding, 23rd Company, Imperial 
 Yeomanry. 
 
 Captain Parkin, Commanding, 24th Company, Imperial 
 Yeomanry. 
 
 Lieutenant Huntington, 23rd Company, Imperial Yeomanry 
 (wounded). 
 
 Lieutenant Williams, 24tli Company, Imperial Yeomanry 
 (wounded). 
 
 Lieutenant J. Brocklebank, Officer Commanding Gun 
 Section, Imperial Yeomanry. 
 
 Lieutenant C. Lowther, 24th Company, Imperial Yeomanry. 
 Serjeant Fawkes, 24th Company, Imperial Yeomanry. 
 Corporal Wilson, 24th Company, Imperial Yeomanry. 
 Trooper Looker, 23rd Company, Imperial Yeomanry. 
 
 Duke of Edinburgh’s Own Volunteer Regiment. 
 Colonel Spence (killed in action). 
 
 Major T. Lewis (who commanded the regiment on death of 
 Colonel Spence). 
 
 Captain G. Twycross. 
 
 Captain W. Simkins. 
 
 Lieutenant W. Prince. 
 
 Lieutenant B. H. Thorne. 
 
 Serjeant-Major Pearson, in charge of Maxim gun. 
 
 Warren’s Scouts. 
 
 Captain Mackie, Royal Candian Artillery. 
 
 I regret very much the loss of Colonel Spence, Commanding Duke of 
 Edinburgh’siOwn Volunteer Rifles, a most gallant and efficient Commanding 
 Officer. 
 
 I have the honour to be, 
 
 Sir, 
 
 Your obedient Servant, 
 
 CHARLES WARREN, Lieut.-General, 
 
 Military Governor of Cape Colony, North of Orange River. 
 
134 
 
 No. 17. 
 
 From Field-Marshal Lord Roberts , Commanding-in-Chief, South Africa, 
 to the Secretary of State for War. 
 
 Army Head-quarters, Pretoria, 
 
 My Lord, 25 th September 1900. 
 
 I have the honour to forward for your Lordship’s information a report, 
 dated 4th August 1900, with enclosure and plans of engagements, from Lieut.- 
 General Sir A. Hunter, K.C.B., D.S.O., describing the operations carried out 
 under his command from the 25th June to the 1st August 1900, which 
 resulted in the unconditional surrender of Generals Prinsloo and Crowther with 
 4,140 of their men and three guns, besides many horses and rifles and a large 
 quantity of ammunition. • i 
 
 2. I am of opinion that the operations under reference were conducted by 
 Lieut.-General Hunter with marked ability and judgment, and that the 
 behaviour of the troops, both on the march and when engaged with the enemy, 
 merits high commendation. 
 
 3. While it is to be regretted that the commandos under Generals 
 C. De Wet and Olivier contrived to break through the British force 
 surrounding the Brandwater Basin, it must be remembered that the country 
 was extremely difficult, and that owing to their intimate knowledge of the 
 ground the Boer leaders could move at night along routes which our OAvn 
 Officers were at the time imperfectly acquainted with, and which, therefore, 
 were not blocked in sufficient strength to preclude the escape of a portion of 
 the enemy from the invested area. 
 
 I have the honour to be. 
 
 My Lord, 
 
 Your Lordship’s most obedient Servant, 
 
 ROBERTS, Field-Marshal, 
 Commanding-in-Chief, South Africa. 
 
 From Lieut.-General Sir A. Hunter, K.C.B., D.S.O., Commanding Operations in 
 the Eastern Districts of the Orange River Colony, to the Chief of the Staff, 
 South Africa. 
 
 Fouriesburg, 
 
 Sir, 4th August 1900. 
 
 I have the honour to report that on 25th June, in accordance^with your 
 orders, I assumed command of Lieut.-General Ian Hamilton’s 1-force at 
 Heidelburg. ^--v 
 
 2. The force consisted at the time of the 2nd and 3rd Cavalry Brigades, 
 the 2nd Mounted Infantry Brigade, the 21st Infantry Brigade, Rimington’s 
 Guides, and Divisional Artillery, whilst two squadrons of Scottish Yeomanry 
 were also added to it from the loth Division, making a total effective strength 
 ol 416 Officers, 7,312 men, 3,942 horses, and 30 guns. 
 
 3. Leaving Heidelburg on 27th June,I marched, preceded by the Cavalry 
 under Brigadier-General Broadwood, by Villiersdorp, Frankfort, and Reitz to 
 Bethlehem, which place I reached on 9th J uly. 
 
 I cleared the country I marched through of all horses and supplies. 
 
 4. At Frankfort, on 3rd July, I was joined from Heilbron by Major- 
 General MacDonald with the following troops: three battalions Highland 
 Brigade, 12th Company, Imperial Yeomanry, Eastern Province Horse, Lovat’s 
 Scouts, and the 5th Battery, Royal Field Artillery, a total strength of 4,008 
 men, 1,801 horses, and six guns. 
 
135 
 
 5. At Reitz I left Major-General Bruce Hamilton with the 21st Brigade’ 
 two batteries, Royal Field Artillery, and the 7th Mounted Infantry with orders 
 to send a convoy of all empty wagons, with escort of one battery and a 
 battalion, to Heilbron to fetch further supplies. 
 
 Major-General Bruce Hamilton rejoined me at Bethlehem on 14th July 
 with the remainder of his troops. 
 
 G. I found that Bethlehem had been occupied on 7th July after two days’ 
 fighting by the troops under command of Major-Generals Clements and 
 Paget. 
 
 Major-General Clements’ Brigade left again for Senekal on 9th July to 
 bring up supplies. 
 
 7. On 11th July I detached the 3rd Cavalry Brigade to Heilbron, via 
 Reitz, and the same day received your instructions placing the troops of 
 Lieut.-General Sir L. Rundle and Major-General Clements under my orders. 
 
 8. The enemy, whose strength was estimated at 6,000 to 8,000 men with 
 20 guns, had retired through the mountains to the south of Bethlehem into the 
 basin of the Brandwater, and were holding positions of great natural strength 
 at Naauwport, Retiefs and Slabbert’s Neks, Witnek, and Commando Nek, 
 positions which appeared to mark the only possible points of ingress and 
 egress into and from the mountainous district which lay before me. I 
 subsequently learnt that, in addition to several bridle paths over the hills, 
 there was yet another exit available for the enemy in the pass of Golden Gate, 
 which lies at the north-eastern extremity of the basin in the direction of 
 Harrismith. 
 
 9. The task imposed upon me by the instructions of the Field-Marshal 
 Commanding-in-Chief was to block the enemy into the enclosed district into 
 which he had retired, to prevent his escape, bring him to action, and it possible 
 force him to surrender. 
 
 10. At the date of the assumption by me of command of the whole of the 
 troops in the eastern districts of the Orange River Colony, the disposition of 
 the investing line was as follows :— 
 
 The 8th and Colonial Divisions, under Lieut.-General Sir L. Rundle, 
 distributed upon a general line Ficksburg— Biddulphsberg, were charged with 
 watching Witnek, Rooikranz, Moolman’s Kloof, and Commando Nek, and 
 preventing any outbreak of the enemy in a south-easterly direction. 
 
 Major-General Clements’ 12th Brigade, awaiting supplies from Senekal, 
 was at Biddulphsberg, whilst at Bethlehem were Brigadier-General 
 Broadwood’s 2nd Cavalry Brigade; Brigadier-General Ridley’s 2nd Mounted 
 Infantry Brigade ; the Highland Brigade, under Major-General MacDonald; 
 the 21st Brigade, under Major-General Bruce Hamilton; and the 20th 
 Brigade, under Major-General Paget. 
 
 11. On 13th July, fighting occurred between a party of Mounted Infantry 
 and some Boers entrenched at Meyer’s Kop, 10 miles to the west of Bethlehem, 
 which resulted in Lieutenant Robbins (Imperial Yeomanry) and 11 men being 
 wounded, and on the following day I despatched Brigadier-General Ridley 
 with 1,300 Mounted Infantry; the oth Battery, Royal Field Artillery; two 
 sections, “R” Battery, Royal Horse Artillery; and the 1st Bn. Highland 
 Light Infantry to the scene of the skirmish. Brigadier-General Ridley found 
 Meyer’s Kop now unoccupied, and at 4 p.m. he returned to Bethlehem. 
 
 12. As the southern portion of the investing line now seemed to me to be 
 the weakest, and constant rumours reached me of an intention on the part of 
 the enemy to break out in that direction, I detached Brigadier-General 
 Broadwood on 15th July with the 2nd Cavalry Brigade along the Bethlehem— 
 Senekal road, and Major-General Paget's 20th Brigade with eight guns, and 
 the 14th and 15tli Companies, Imperial Yeomanry, also proceeded the samg 
 day in that direction. 
 
 13. During that night, as I learnt later, a force consisting of from 1,500 
 to 2,000 Boers, with four guns and 100 wagons under General C. De Wet, 
 and accompanied by ex-President Steyn, broke out from Slabbert’s Nek, and 
 was engaged throughout the 16th with the troops of Generals Paget and 
 Broadwood towards Klipscheur and Bultfonteiu. 
 
 In the afternoon of the 16th the enemy's wagons were seen moving in the 
 direction of Witklip towards Bindley, and his main body, followed as it moved 
 
136 
 
 to the north by Brigadier-General Broadwood. arrived at Sterkfontein at 3 a.m. 
 on ] 7 th July. 
 
 14. At 3 p.m. on 16th of July, the wires being cut, on receiving news of 
 this outbreak of the enemy, I despatched Brigadier-General Ridley with 
 800 Mounted Infantry to reinforce General Broadwood, and sent Lieut.-Colonel 
 Donne with the 1st Bn. Royal Susses Regiment and 81st Battery, Royal Field 
 Artillery, to occupy Meyer’s Kop. I also directed Major-General Clements to 
 relieve Sir Leslie Bundle’s troops at AYitnek with a portion of his force. 
 
 I failed, therefore, in giving effect to the first part of the Commander-in- 
 Chieffs instructions. 
 
 15. On 19th July I was joined by the convoy under Lieut.-Colonel Ewart 
 from Heilbron, for which I had waited at Bethlehem. 
 
 16. On 20th July I detached Major-General Bruce Hamilton with the 
 1st Bn. Cameron Highlanders, Lieut.-Colonel Bainbridge’s Mounted Infantry, 
 and the 82nd Battery, Royal Field Artillery, to occupy Spitzkop, 9 miles south¬ 
 east of Bethlehem, a kopje said to overlook and command the approaches to 
 Naauwport Nek. 
 
 Major-General Hamilton was engaged throughout the day with a force of 
 the enemy, estimated at 400 men, and succeeded in establishing himself on 
 two headlands 1^ miles short of Spitzkop. He reported casualties to the 
 number of two Officers and seven men wounded. His operation were resumed 
 the following morning and resulted in the occupation of Spitzkop, in which 
 three men were killed, three Officers, and 16 men wounded. 
 
 17. On 20th July Major-General Clements reported to me that Colonel 
 Hacket Pain with a battalion and a half and two guns had occupied AYitnek, 
 relieving Major-General Campbell, who now commanded the troops of 
 Lieut.-General Sir L. Rundle’s Division at Rooikranz. 
 
 18. On 22nd July, having ordered a concentration of the troops of Major- 
 Generals Clements and Paget, with a view to a simultaneous assault on 
 23rd July upon Slabbert’s Nek, and a demonstration by Sir Leslie Rundle’s 
 forces along their whole front, I left Bethlehem at 11 a.m. with the intention 
 of attacking Retief’s Nek, taking with me the Highland Brigade under Major- 
 General MacDonald, two 5-in. guns, the 5th and 76th Batteries, Royal 
 Field Artillery, Lovat's Scouts, and Rimington’s Guides. At the same time I 
 directed Lieut.-Colonel Donne to join me the next morning from Meyer’s Kop 
 with the 1st Bn. Royal Sussex Regiment and Slst Battery, Royal Field Artilley. 
 AVith the idea of deceiving the enemy, my force started, in the first instance, 
 as if going to Naauwport Nek, but changing direction, it moved to Boshofs 
 Farm under Yaal Kranz, about 3 miles to the north of Retiefs Nek. where it 
 bivouacked. My mounted troops were engaged towards the close of the day 
 with some 200 Boers who retired into the nek as dusk fell. 
 
 19. Major-General Bruce-Hamilton was again engaged with the enemy on 
 the 22nd near Spitzkop, the casualties incurred being one man killed and 
 three wounded. 
 
 20. The following morning, 23rd July, soon after daybreak my force 
 moved out of its bivouacs, the 2nd Bn. Seaforth Highlanders being left to 
 furnish an outpost line round Boshof’s Farm to protect the convoy. 
 
 At 8 a.m. my artillery opened fire shelling the nek and the kopjes on 
 either side of it, and at 9 a.m. the 2nd Bn. Black AVatch (under Lieut.-Colonel 
 Carthew-Yorstoun) moved forward to occupy a prominent hill to our left front, 
 which seemed to he a starting point from which the enemy’s position might be 
 turned. My direct advance, however, upon the nek was delayed until 1.40 p.m., 
 awaiting the arrival of Colonel Donne’s troops from Meyer’s Kop, but at that 
 hour the Slst Battery, Royal Field Artillery, opened fire to the west of the 
 road leading up into the nek, the Sussex Regiment advanced towards a high 
 conical hill overlooking the right side of the nek, whilst the Highland Light 
 Infantry moved forward to try and gain the precipitous height commanding the 
 nek to our left. 
 
 These hills, and an intervening shelter trench connecting the two within 
 the nek itself, were heavily bombarded by my field batteries and the two 5-inch 
 guns. At dusk the Sussex Regiment, unable to gain ground, was compelled to 
 fall back on the Slst Field Battery, Royal Field Artillery, the Highland Light 
 Infantry had gained a footing, albeit not a very firm one, on the lower spurs and 
 kloofs oi the rocky height to our left of the nek, whilst the Black AVa'tch, wRq 
 
had been heavily fired at throughout the day, and whom I supported with two 
 guns of the 5th Battery, Royal Field Artillery, had not only obtained possession 
 of the conical hill already alluded to, hut a further crest which practically turned 
 the enemy’s position in the nek, and gave access to the wide valley lying heyond 
 and within the mountains. 
 
 21. My casualties during the day were 1 Officer and 11 men killed; 
 0 Officers and 68 men wounded. 
 
 22. During the night a portion of the Highland Light Infantry, guided by 
 several men of Lovat’s Scouts, succeeded in gaining possession of the highest 
 peak of the hill on the east of the pass, a point of vantage whence a succes>ful 
 occupation of the whole height was made the next day. 
 
 23. At daybreak on the 24th July, I pressed the success already achieved 
 overnight. Bringing the Sussex Regiment and 81st Battery, Royal Field 
 Artillery, back to Boshof’s Farm to act as escort to the convoy, I ordered 
 Major-General MacDonald to bring up the Seaforth Highlanders in a wide- 
 turning movement to my left, and beyond the Black Watch, who had come at 
 daybreak under fire of a Boer gun at the foot of the hills beyond Bamboehoek 
 Farm. This turning movement was completely successful, the Seaforth 
 Highlanders, supported by the 76th Battery, Royal Field Artillery, advancing 
 with quiet gallantry and seizing the edge of the kloof which runs down by 
 Bamboehoek, whence a heavy fire was poured upon the retiring Boors. The 
 seizure of this point at 11.40 a.m. enabled the Black Watch and Seaforth 
 Highlanders to descend into the valley beyond, thus completely turning the 
 enemy's position already compromised by tbe footing gained by the Highland 
 Light Infantry on the height overlooking the nek. 
 
 I then, at 1.10 p.m., directed the whole of my artillery and baggage to 
 move upon the now evacuated nek, and, by 3 p.m., bivouacked at Retief’s Nek 
 Farm, about a mile beyond the position previously held b} r the enemy. 
 
 24. There l learnt the complete success of the simultaneous attack which 
 I had ordered upon Slabbert’s Nek by the force under Major-General Clements, 
 whose troops also bivouacked in the valley, 4 miles beyond my own head¬ 
 quarters. 
 
 25. Major-General Clements having marched himself from Bester’s Kop, 
 had effected a junction between his own troops and those of Major-General 
 Paget, about 2^ miles north of Slabbert’s Nek at 10 a.m. on 23rd July. 
 
 He at once proceeded to secure a position for his artillery, w hence the 
 enemy’s trenches within the nek were bombarded and his guns silenced. Then, 
 whilst he held the enemy in front with the Royal Munster Fusiliers, he directed 
 Lieut.-Colonel Grenfell with Brabant’s Horse (2nd Regiment) to seize a ridge 
 which ran down from the high ground to his right of the nek. Lieut.-Colonel 
 Grenfell was unable to make much progress, but wider turning movements still 
 more to the right by portions of the 2nd Bn. Wiltshire Regiment (Lieut.-Colonel 
 Carter) and the Royal Irish Regiment (under Lieut.-Colonel Guinness) gave a 
 footing on the high ground which paved the way for success next day. 
 
 26. Major-General Clements directed his troops to bivouac on the night 
 of the 23rd in (he positions they had gained, and at 4.30 a.m. on the 24th, 
 Lieut.-Colonel Guinness with four companies Royal Irish Regiment and two 
 companies 2nd Bn. Wiltshire Regiment, favoured bv some clouds which 
 obscured the crest, was able to gain a ridge to the west of, and overlooking the 
 enemy s position. 'Phis ridge had previously been reconnoitred and occupied 
 by a portion of 2nd Regiment, Brabant’s Horse, under Captain Clwdmondeley, 
 who found it unoccupied by the enemy. Having gained this commanding 
 ground, Lieut.-Colonel Guinness was directed by Major-General Clements to 
 clear the intervening space between it and the nek, which was evacuated by 
 the enemy when he saw that his position was turned. 
 
 27. At 11 a.m., Major-General Clements ordered a general advance into 
 the now vacated nek, sending the mounted troops and artillery of Major-General 
 Paget’s force, under Lieut.-Colonel Burn, in pursuit of the retiring Boers. 
 
 28. Major-General Clements reports that the position occupied by the 
 Boers, who brought several guns and pompoms into action, was one of great 
 strength, and the fact that his turning movement was directed over ground 
 from 1,500 to 2,000 feet high is sufficient to explain the arduous nature of the 
 operation. His casualties during the two days’ lighting amounted to one Officer 
 and seven men killed, and three Officers and 39 rank and file wounded. 
 
 S 
 
 G7) 
 
29. On the evening of 24th July, having apprised Lieut.-General Sir 
 Leslie Rundle of the success of these operations and directed him to push on 
 and effect a junction with me towards Fouriesburg, and having detailed Lieut.- 
 Colonel Donne with the 1st Bn. Royal Sussex Regiment and 2nd Bn. Bedford¬ 
 shire Regiment and six guns to remain in occupation of the captured neks, I 
 ordered Major-General MacDonald to start at daybreak next morning, with 
 the Highland Brigade, two 5-inch guns, Lovat’s Scouts, and the 5th Battery, 
 Royal Field Artillery, and join Major-General Bruce Hamilton now at Heilbron 
 Farm ; assigning to him the important task of occupying or blocking the 
 enemy’s possible exits at Naauwport Nek and Golden Gate. Major-General 
 MacDonald bivouacked on the night of the 25th at Middelvlei. I also ordered 
 Colonel Hacket Pain with the garrison of Witnek to Slabbert’s and Retiefs 
 Neks. 
 
 30. At 7 a.m. on the 25th July, taking with me the 81st Battery, Royal 
 Field Artillery, and Rimington’s Guides and effecting a junction with the 
 troops under Major-Generals Clements and Paget beyond Slabbert’s Nek, I 
 pushed on with them for 9 miles in the direction of Fouriesburg, upon which 
 place the Boers had retired on the previous day, executing a reconnaissance 
 with my mounted troops to within 3 miles of the town. 
 
 I was not anxious to press too closely on the enemy’s rear, so as not to 
 drive him out towards Naauwport Nek and Golden Gate till General MacDonald 
 had blocked those exits. 
 
 31. The following day the 26th, I entered Fouriesburg with my mounted 
 troops and found that the town had already been occupied by a portion of Sir 
 Leslie Rundle’s Division, headed by Driscoll's Scouts, after a forced march 
 from Commando Nek of 25 miles. 
 
 The enemy had retired from the town in the direction of Naauwport Nek 
 and Golden Gate, where 1 trusted that they would be anticipated by Major- 
 Generals MacDonald and Bruce Hamilton, whose casualties on this day in an 
 action fought outside the former pass amounted to one man killed, two Officers 
 and 10 men wounded. 
 
 To strengthen the force at his disposal I now ordered Lieut.-Colonel 
 Donne, on being relieved by Lieut.-Colonel Pain’s troops (the Worcestershire 
 Regiment, ^ Bn. Wiltshire Regiment, four guns), now set free from Witnek by 
 our occupation of Fouriesburg, to push on with his two battalions and guns 
 from Retiefs Nek, and effect a junction with the Highland Brigade towards 
 Naauwport Nek; I also strengthened Donne by two squadrons Scottish 
 Yeomanry under Lieut.-Colonel Burn from Fouriesburg. 
 
 This he did and on the 27th Major-General MacDonald informed me that 
 having left Lieut.-Colonel Hughes Hallett with the Seaforth Highlanders, 
 2nd Bn. Bedfordshire Regiment, and one 5-inch gun opposite to Naauwport, 
 he was moving on with the remainder of his force to establish Major-General 
 Bruce Hamilton, towards Golden Gate. 
 
 32. On the morning of the 28th July, I followed up the enemy beyond 
 fouriesburg with the troops now at the disposal of Lieut.-General Sir L. 
 Rundle and Major-Generals Paget and Clements; the latter Officer com¬ 
 manding my advanced guard, being soon engaged with the Boers, who fought 
 a tenacious rear guard action throughout the day in the vicinity of Slaapkranz 
 Ridge, which was only occupied by the Scots Guards under Major Romilly, 
 D.S.O., after midnight. 
 
 33. Our casualties during the day amounted to 4 men killed, 3 Officers 
 and 27 men wounded. 
 
 34. I established my head-quarters for the night at Schoonzicht Farm, 
 where at 7.15 a.m. on the morning of the 29th, I received a written request 
 from General Prinsloo for a four days’ armistice. This request I refused to 
 accede to, demanding unconditional surrender, a demand which hacked as it 
 was by a further advance towards the enemy during the day, led at 4.30 p.m., 
 to a promise of compliance for the following morning. 
 
 35. During the 29th Major-General Bruce Hamilton was engaged with 
 the enemy in the vicinity of Stephan us Draii’s Farm (Erste Geluk), his 
 casualties being one Officer killed, one Officer and 22 men wounded. 
 
 36. At 9 a.m. on 30th July, Generals Prinsloo and Crowther surrendered 
 personally, their surrender being followed during the day by that of the 
 
139 
 
 Ficksburg and Lady brand Commandos; 879 men with one 9-pr. Krupp gun 
 under Commandants De Villiers and Ferreira. 
 
 37. On 3lst July, the Senekal and Winburg Commandos (Commandants 
 Van der Merwe and Rautenbacb) with a total strength of 354 came in to 
 Slaapkranz, and the same day Major-General Bruce Hamilton reported that 
 1,298 men with one Armstrong gun (under Commandants Crowder, Duploy, 
 Potgieter, and Joubert) had surrendered to him near Erste Geluk. 
 
 On 1st August, I ordered General MacDonald to pursue General Olivier in 
 the direction of Loskop, and be occupied Harrismith on 4th August. Since 
 then he has been recalled to Bethlehem, Sir Leslie Rundle being instructed to 
 move on Harrismith as directed by the Field-Marshal Commanding-in-Chief. 
 
 38. Although the Field - Marshal Commanding - in - Chief has kindly 
 expressed his satisfaction at the final result gained by Hunter’s force, 
 which it truthfully deserves and highly appreciates, 1, as its commander, am 
 sensible that in two points I have failed to carry out my orders; in that, 
 firstly, General C. De Wet, accompanied by Mr. Steyn, formerly President of 
 the Orange Free State, and a force of men and guns, escaped on loth July 
 from Brandwater Basin, and secondly, General Olivier from outside Golden 
 Gate on 30th July, with a force of men and guns, escaped towards Vrede. 
 As regards this second case T regard it as a dishonourable breach of faith on 
 the part of General Olivier, for which 1 hold General Olivier personally 
 responsible. He admitted that he knew that Commandant-General Prinsloo 
 had included him in the unconditional surrender. 
 
 39. My operations extended over a vast area. The country is a perfect 
 network of mountains and precipices. I had no information from local forces, 
 except from Basutoland. As I neared Fouriesburg this information proved 
 very valuable, but so long as I was outside the Brandwater Basin I could learn 
 practically nothing to point to the dispositions and numbers of the enemy or 
 their plans. 
 
 Our maps are worse than useless; they are a positive danger and delusion. 
 The constant cutting of our telegraph wires upset communication with my 
 distant Generals. The feeding a large force away from the railway, and 
 protecting convoys to and fro constituted an ever present anxiety, and depleted 
 the fighting strength of the investing troops. Cloudy weather and grass fires 
 limited the use of heliographs. 
 
 These were my difficulties. I do not claim that they furnish a sufficient 
 excuse for the failure to block the whole hostile force inside the Wittebergen. 
 
 40. As 1 have enlarged on my difficulties I also gratefully acknowledge 
 that to meet them the Commander-in-Chief gave me command of as tine a 
 fighting force as ever stood to arms. I had a good staff and was backed up 
 throughout by all ranks of the force. In spite of hardships there was no 
 crime; no grumbling. Officers and men are stouthearted, cheerful, and full of 
 fight. I have only one fault to find and that is the callous indifference of 
 many Officers and men to the danger of grass fires, and the necessity of at 
 once putting them out. 
 
 41. As regards the tactical employment of the various arms under me, 1 
 submit a few remarks with some general observations on Boer warfare:— 
 
 Cavalry Brigade, General Broadwood commanding.—On the march to 
 concentrate outside the perimeter of the Brandwater Basin and Wittebergen 
 District, across the open rolling downs both sides of the Vaal, on the line 
 Heidelburg—Villiersdorp—Frankfort—Reitz—Bethlehem the Cavalry brigades 
 were properly employed to scout for and guard my column. At Bethlehem and 
 towards the theatre of subsequent operations the topography changes and is 
 unsuited to the action of Cavalry. I, therefore, detached the 3rd Cavalry 
 Bri gade (Brigadier-General Gordon) to Heilbron. 
 
 On loth July, L sent the 2nd Cavalry Brigade and 5th Corps, Mounted 
 Infantry under Brigadier-General Broadwood towards Senekal, and, when 
 General C. De Wet broke out on loth July, reinforced him with Mounted 
 Infantry, S00 strong, under Brigadier-General Ridley, to assist in the pursuit. 
 TCo more Cavalry were now left with me. I assume General Broadwood will 
 report on ms action direct to you. 
 
 Yeomanry and Mounted Infantry.—The excellent work by this arm is so 
 fully understood that I will confine myself to discussing certain corps which I 
 saw at work. 
 
140 
 
 The Yeomanry is daily gaining experience in actual warfare, which is all 
 they ask for and all they require to make them rank with the best. This they 
 now do. 
 
 Rimington’s Guides, Major Rimington commanding.—-Major Rimington 
 has gathered a body of men whose virtues are like his own. They can ride, 
 see, fight, and shoot straight. They are in the forefront when there is danger. 
 They have never disappointed me, let alone failed me. 
 
 Lovat’s Scouts, Major Hon. A. D. Murray, Cameron Highlanders, 
 commanding, Captain Lord Lovat second in command.—I paused at Bethlehem 
 from 9th July to 22nd July, to regulate the supply question and gain news.. 
 The mountain range in my front acted as a screen, behind which I could not 
 penetrate, and it concealed forces whose numbers and whereabouts were a 
 mystery. It possessed ins and outs, paths, and shepherd tracks, even 
 occasional cart roads ; none marked on maps but known to local experts who 
 were dumb so far as I was concerned. To get news Lovats’ Scouts were used. 
 The idea w r as General MacDonald’s instigated by Lord Lovat. In ones, twos, 
 and threes, these men crept, climbed, and spied; were absent for days at a 
 time, but always came safely back with the truth discovered. Major Hon. 
 A. D. Murray who commands them, Captain Lord Lovat who raised them, each 
 Officer and man in the corps is a specialist and picked man. As scouts, spies, 
 guides, on foot or pony, as individual marksmen or as a collective body in the 
 fighting line, they are a splendid band of Scotchmen, which is the highest 
 compliment I can pay them. 
 
 Artillery.—Our gunners are not at fault, but our guns. 
 
 Boers seldom offer a target within the limited range of British Field 
 Artillery. When they do the accuracy of our fire leaves nothing to be desired 
 as a rule. 
 
 The quality of the 5-inch guns are well known. 
 
 General Paget speaks in high praise of the range and shooting of the 
 City Imperial Volunteers’ 12^-prs. 
 
 Infantry. —Everybody knows how Napoleon appraised British Infantry. 
 Since then they have not changed except to improve. 
 
 Generals, Regimental Officers, and men have learnt how to minimize 
 losses against magazine rifles and smokeless powder in defensive positions; 
 now they threaten flanks and turn positions. 
 
 General remarks.—Boer artillery fire is accurate in aim but contemptible 
 in effect. 
 
 Some Boers are crack shots; man for man their shooting is not so good 
 as ours. Their mobility is the main point where they excel us. By reason of 
 superior mobility they can hold on till turned, when instead of being beaten 
 they take up a fresh position or reinforce their flank, and so convert our flank 
 attack into a frontal one with all its drawbacks to us. Their local knowledge 
 and power of getting over the country, their being masters of three languages 
 in use here to our one, their sources of news from all men and women, their 
 not wearing uniform and so posing one moment as a peaceful farm dweller and 
 the next proving an active enemy, their secret supplies of arms, ammunition, 
 and food, their hardihood and physical training, their expert and universal skill 
 with horses and transport, with every resource of the country in their favour 
 and denied to us; these are some of the advantages to the Boers in this 
 warfare. 
 
 I have the honour to be. 
 Sir, 
 
 Your most obedient Servant, 
 
 ARCHIBALD HUNTER, Lieut.-General 
 
SOUTH AFRICA DESPATCHES 
 
 YOL. II. 
 
 NATAL FIELD ARMY. 
 
 Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of His Majesty, 
 
 FEBRUARY, 1901. 
 
 LONDON: 
 
 PRINTED FOR HIS MAJESTY’S STATIONERY OFFICE, 
 BY HARRISON AND SONS, ST. MARTIN’S LANE, 
 
 PRINTERS IN ORDINARY TO HER LATE MAJESTY. 
 
 And to be published, either directly or through any Bookseller, from 
 EYRE & SPOTTISWOODE, East Harding Street, Fleet Street, E.C., 
 and 32, Abingdon Street, Westminster, S.W.; 
 or JOHN MENZIES & Co., Rose Street, Edinburgh, 
 and 90, West Nile Street, Glasgow; 
 or HODGES, FIGGIS, & Co., Limited, 104, Grafton Street, Dublin. 
 
 Cd. 458.] 
 
 Price One Shilling and Twopence. 
 
South Africa Despatches. 
 
 Vol. ir. 
 
 NATAL FIELD ARMY. 
 
 No. 1. 
 
 From General Sir Redvers Buller to the Secretary of State for War. 
 (Through the Field-Marshal Commanding-in-Chief, Cape Town.) 
 
 Spearman’s Hill Camp, 
 
 Sir, 2nd February, 1900. 
 
 I have the honour to forward a despatch from Lieut.-General Sir George 
 White, which I have only just received by runner. It is in continuation of his 
 despatch of the 2nd November, 1899, # and it’will be seen by paragraph 12 that 
 it deals only with his operations up to 30th October, 1899. 
 
 It may, therefore, I think, be inferred that the services of the Officers, 
 non-commissioned officers and men which he brings to notice were rendered by 
 them prior to that date. 
 
 I have the honour to be, 
 
 Sir, 
 
 Your obedient Servant, 
 
 REDYERS BULLER, General. 
 
 Secretary of State for War. 
 Forwarded. 
 
 Jacobsdal, 
 
 18th February 1900. 
 
 ROBERTS, Field-Marshal, 
 
 Commanding-in-Chief South Africa. 
 
 From Lieut.-General Sir George White, V.C., G.C.B., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., 
 Commanding the British Forces in Natal, to the Secretary of State for War. 
 
 (Through the General Officer Commanding in South Africa.) 
 
 Sir, Ladysmith, Natal, 2nd December, 1899. 
 
 In continuation of my despatch of 2nd November, 1899, I have now the 
 honour to report the occurrences of 24th October, referred to briefly in the last 
 paragraph of my above-mentioned despatch. On that date I marched out of 
 Ladysmith at dawn with the 5th Lancers, 19th Hussars, Imperial Light Horse, 
 Natal Mounted Volunteers, 42nd. and 53rd Batteries, Royal Field Artillery ; 
 No. 10 Mountain Battery, Royal Garrison Artillery ; 1st Bn. Liverpool 
 Regiment, 1st Bn. Devonshire Regiment, 1st Bn. Gloucesterskii’e Regiment, 
 and 2nd Bn. King’s Royal Rifle Corps. The mounted troops were sent on in 
 advance, and, after going about G miles along the Newcastle Road, came under 
 rifle fire from the hills on their left on Rietfontein Farm. The 19th Hussars 
 pushed on over the Modder Spruit and seized and held a ridge about 2 miles 
 beyond that stream by dismounted fire, while watching the country to the 
 front and flanks with patrols. The 5th Lancers similarly seized and held 
 ridges south of the Modder Spruit, as also did the Imperial Light Horse. By 
 this disposition of the mounted troops my right flank was entirely protected 
 during the subsequent action. 
 
 2. At 8 a.m. I arrived at Rietfontein at the head of the main body. At 
 this moment the enemy opened artillery fire on my advanced Cavalry from a 
 point high up on the Intintanyone Mountain, and about 5,000 yards to the west 
 
 (762-2) 
 
 Already published. 
 
 A 2 
 
4 
 
 of the main road, at which he had apparently posted four guns. My Artillery 
 was at once ordered to wheel off the road and come into action against these 
 guns, which opened fire on them, but were quickly silenced. Leaving the 
 2nd Bn. King’s Royal Rifle Corps with the baggage wagons, I moved the 
 remainder of the Infantry under the shelter of a high ridge, parallel to the 
 road, and facing the Intintanyone Mountain. The 1st Bn. Gloucestershire 
 Regiment on the left, and the 1st Bn. Liverpool Regiment on the right were 
 then advanced to the crest of this ridge, the Artillery also advancing and 
 coming into action on the crest line between these two regiments. The 
 position thus attained was one most suitable to my purpose, 'which was to 
 prevent the enemy moving to the east, across the Newcastle Road, and 
 attacking Brigadier-General Yule’s force during its retirement from Dundee. 
 
 3. Our Artillery was entirely successful in preventing the enemy from 
 making any further use of his guns, but a severe fire fight gradually developed 
 between my troops and the enemy’s infantry, and it became necessary to push 
 the 1st Bn. Devonshire Regiment also to the crest of the ridge, half the 
 2nd Bn. King’s Royal Rifle Corps being brought up from the wagons to take 
 their place in reserve. In this Infantry fight our Artillery rendered great 
 assistance, searching out the crest line and reverse slopes of the opposing 
 ridges most effectively, and thus keeping dowm the enemy’s rifle fire. Mean¬ 
 while the Natal Mounted Volunteex’S, who had been with the Cavalry, had 
 been recalled, and, as the enemy showed some disposition to work round my 
 left flank, as if to cut me from Ladysmith, I sent this force, under 
 Colonel Royston, to work round the Boer right and cover my left flank, a 
 movement which was most successfully performed. It was no part of my plan 
 to deliver an attack on the enemy, posted as he was in ground exceptionally 
 well suited to his tactics, and especially difficult for our troops ; I contented 
 myself, therefore, with maintaining the position I had gained. The Boers, on 
 the other hand, were unwilling to attack us except by fii'e at long ranges, and, 
 as they could not approach Bi’igadier-General Yule’s force without doing so, 
 they gradually withdrew to the westward. By 2 p.m. firing had ceased, and as 
 time had now been afforded for the Dundee column to pass the point of 
 danger I returned with my troops to Ladysmith. Our casualties consisted of 
 one Officer and 11 non-commissioned officers and men killed, six Officers and 
 97 non-commissioned officers and men wounded, and two non-commissioned 
 officers and men missing. The enemy’s loss was heavy, particularly from 
 artillery fire. 
 
 4. On 25th October I sent out a force, under Lieut.-Colonel Coxhead, R.A., 
 to meet and, if necessary, to assist Brigadier-General Yule. This force got 
 touch with the Dundee column that afternoon, and, as already reported, both 
 columns reached Ladysmith next morning (26th October) without any 
 interference fi'om the enemy. 
 
 5. On 27th, 28th and 29th October the enemy gradually approached 
 Ladysmith from the west, north, and north-east. These days were spent by 
 us in reconnaissances with a view to finding a favourable opportunity to strike a 
 blow at him. On 29th October our Cavalry located a considerable Boer force, 
 with ai’tillery on Long Hill, north-east of Ladysmith, and well within striking 
 distance. I accordingly issued orders for an attack next day, which resulted 
 in the action of Lombard’s Kop. 
 
 6. My object was, in the first instance, to carry Long Hill, and, in the 
 event of success, to similarly carry Pepworth’s Hill, sending, at the same 
 time, a considerable mounted foi'ce round over Nicholson’s Nek to cut the 
 enemy’s line of retreat and endeavour to captui’e his laagei’S. To gain these 
 objects I employed the entire force assembled at Ladysmith. 200 Natal 
 Mounted Volunteers were sent out the evening befox-e to hold Lombard’s 
 Kop and Bulwana Mountain. The 5th Lancers, 19th Hussai’s, and the 
 remainder of the Natal Mounted Volunteers were ordered to move out, under 
 Major-General French, at 3 a.m. on 30th October, cross Lombard’s Nek 
 and the Modder Spruit and cover my right flank during the operations. A 
 Brigade Division of Royal Field Artillery, the Natal Field Battery, 1st and 
 
5 
 
 2nd Bns. King’s Royal Rifle Corps, 1st Bn. Leicestershire Regiment, 1st Bn. 
 Liverpool Regiment, and 2nd Bn. Royal Dublin Fusiliers, the whole under 
 Colonel Grimwood, King’s Royal Rifle Corps, were detailed for the attack on 
 Long Hill, moving at night so as to be ready to commence the attack at dawn. 
 An infantry Brigade, under Colonel Ian Hamilton, C.B., D.S.O., consisting of 
 2nd Bn. Gordon Highlanders, 1st Bn. Manchester Regiment, 1st Bn. 
 Devonshire Regiment, and 2nd Bn. Rifle Brigade, together with the Divisional 
 Troops, consisting of a Brigade Division, Royal Artillery 5 th Dragoon 
 Guards, 18th Hussars, Imperial Light Horse, and two companies, Mounted 
 Infantry, were directed to rendezvous at the railway crossing on the Newcastle 
 Road, and proceed to take up a position under cover of Limit Hill. This 
 latter Brigade Division was directed, in the first instance, to assist in shelling 
 Long Hill, the Infantry being intended for the attack on Pepworth’s Hill. To 
 cover my left flank and open a way for the action of the Cavalry after the 
 position had been carried, No. 10 Mountain Battery, the 1st Bn. Royal Irish 
 Fusiliers, and the 1st Bn. Gloucestershire Regiment, the whole under Lieut. - 
 Colonel F. Carleton, Royal Irish Fusiliers, with Major W. Adye, D.A.A.G., 
 for Intelligence, as Staff Officer and Guide, were directed to fall in, at 11 p.m., 
 on 29th October, and make a night march up Bell’s Spruit to seize as strong a 
 position as could be obtained towards Nicholson’s Nek ; if possible, the Nek 
 itself. 
 
 7. The troops moved out in accordance with these instructions. The 
 mounted troops, under General French, passed between Lombard’s Kop and 
 Bulwana Mountain, but failed to penetrate further than the line of kopjes 
 north-east of the Nek, where at daybreak they came under the fire of the 
 enemy’s guns and rifles. They held the enemy in check here but could not 
 advance further. The Infantry Brigade, under Colonel Grimwood, reached 
 their appointed position, and the Artillery opened on Long Hill, which, 
 however, was found to have been evacuated by the enemy during the night. 
 At this moment Colonel Grimwood’s force was attacked by guns and mounted 
 infantry in large numbers from beyond the Modder Spruit, and had to change 
 front to the right to meet this development, as the Cavalry, having been 
 unable to get beyond the kopjes north-east of Lombard’s Nek, were not in a 
 position to cover that flank. Gradually the enemy’s numbers increased, and 
 made continual efforts to turn both flanks of the position occupied by Colonel 
 Grimwood’s force, necessitating a constant prolongation of his fighting line, 
 and thus using up his supports and reserves, which, by 10 a.m., had all been 
 absorbed in the firing line. Meanwhile artillery fire had been opened by the 
 enemy from Pepworth Hill, one of the guns employed being a 15-cm. gun, 
 throwing a shell of about 100 lbs. weight, which commenced firing on the 
 town of Ladysmith at a range of 8,000 yards. These guns were silenced by 
 our Field Artillery, which also drove the enemy from the crest of Pepworth 
 Hill. It was now about 8 a.m. At this period Major-General French 
 reported that he was holding his position with difficulty against superior forces 
 of the enemy, and I detached the 5th Dragoon Guards and 18th Hussars, 
 under Brigadier-General Brocklehurst, to his assistance ; the 69th and 21st 
 Field Batteries being also moved to his support, and with this assistance he 
 easily held his own till the end of the action. Of the remaining batteries, 
 the 13th and 53rd were engaged in supporting Colonel Grimwood’s force, 
 while the 42nd and 67th were still firing on Pepworth Hill, from which the 
 enemy had reopened fire, while he had also brought fresh guns on to Long 
 
 Hill. 
 
 8. About 10 a.m. I withdrew the Manchester Regiment from Colonel 
 Hamilton’s force and placed it in a position to support Colonel Grimwood. 
 The fight now became stationary, our troops holding their positions without 
 anv great difficulty, but being unable to advance. The Boers, on the other 
 hand, were unable to make any headway. This condition of affairs continued 
 until 11.30 a.m., when, finding that there was little prospect of bringing the 
 engagement to a decisive issue, I determined to withdraw my troops. I 
 accordingly moved the 2nd Bn. Gordon Highlanders from my left to a strong 
 position on Flag Hill, and sent Major-General Sir A. Hunter, K.C. B., my Chief of 
 the Staff, to arrange a retirement in echelon from the left, covered by the fire of 
 
6 
 
 •our Artillery. This was most successfully carried out, the Artillery advancing 
 in the most gallant manner and covering the Infantry movement with the 
 greatest skill and coolness. 
 
 9. Meanwhile the Naval Brigade landed from H.M.S. “ Powerful,” which 
 had reached Ladysmith that morning, under Captain Hon. H. Lambton, R.N., 
 had moved out with their long 12-pr. guns on improvised field mountings, 
 drawn by oxen, and had engaged the enemy’s artillery on Pepworth Hill, 
 directing their special attention to the heavy gun mounted there, which they 
 temporarily silenced. The enemy did not follow up our retirement, and the 
 whole force employed on this side returned to camp at 1.30 p.m. 
 
 10. Turning now to this force, consisting of No. 10 Mountain Battery, 
 Royal Irish Fusiliers, and the Gloucestershire Regiment, under Lieut.-Colonel 
 F. Carleton, Royal Irish Fusiliers, which proceeded by a night march up Bell’s 
 Spruit towards Nicholson’s Nek to cover my left flank, I regret that, owing to 
 the circumstances about to be related, I have no official report of their 
 movements. My information has been obtained from subordinate Officers, 
 who, being severely wounded, were sent into my camp here by General Joubert. 
 From this information it appears that the force moved off, as ordered, at 
 11 p.m. on 29th October, and proceeded for some distance without seeing 
 signs of the enemy. When passing along the foot of a steep hill, known as 
 Cainguba, stones were suddenly rolled down on them and some shots were 
 fired. The Infantry at once fixed bayonets and carried the hill without 
 difficulty, but unfortunately both the Mountain Battery mules and those 
 carrying the Infantry ammunition took fright and stampeded. Mules carrying 
 two guns eventually returned to camp, one was retained with the force, but no 
 trace has been found of the other three, which presumably fell into the 
 enemy’s hands. 
 
 The force took up a position on Cainguba, which they strengthened with 
 breastworks to some slight extent, and remained unmolested till daybreak. It 
 was then found that the position was too large for them to adequately occupy, 
 and that only the most pronounced salients could be held. The Boers appear 
 to have gradually surrounded the hill, and after a fight extending over several 
 hours, our men’s ammunition began to fail owing to the ammunition mules 
 having stampeded, as already described. The advanced parties holding the 
 salients were driven back on the main body in the centre of the plateau, and 
 the Boers gained the crest line of the hill, whence they brought a converging 
 fire to bear from all sides on our men crowded together in the centre, causing 
 much loss. Eventually it was seen that this position was hopelessly 
 untenable, and our force hoisted a white flag and surrendered about 
 12.30 p.m. 
 
 11. Including under the head of “ missing ” those thus taken prisoners, 
 our losses this day amounted to six Officers and 63 non-commissioned officers 
 and men killed, 10 Officers and 239 non-commissioned officers and men 
 wounded, and 37 Officers and 917 non-commissioned officers and men missing. 
 
 12. Next day, 31st October, General SirRedvers Buffer, V.C., G.C.B., &c., 
 arrived at Cape Town, and assumed the command in the whole of South Africa. 
 My independent command in Natal consequently came to an end, and I there¬ 
 fore close this Despatch with the events of 30th October. Subsequent events 
 will be reported to the General Officer Commanding in South Africa in the 
 ordinary course. 
 
 13. I desire to place on record my gratitude to the Government of Natal, 
 and to all departments under the Government, for the most willing and 
 hearty assistance which they have afforded me in every matter in which their 
 co operation was required. 
 
 14. I desire to bring the following Officers very specially to your notice 
 as eminently deserving of reward for the services rendered by them :— 
 
 The late Lieut.-General Sir W. Penn Symons, K.C.B.—I cannot too 
 strongly record my opinion of the energy and courage shown by this 
 
7 
 
 distinguished General Officer in the exercise of his command, until he was- 
 mortally wounded in the action on the Talana Hill, near Dundee, on the 
 20th October last. In him the country has lost an Officer of high ability and 
 a leader of exceptional valour. 
 
 Major-General Sir A. Hunter, K.C.B., D.S.O., Chief of the Staff.—The 
 services of this Officer have been of the very highest value to the State. His 
 zeal is indefatigable, and he has carried out the business of the force under 
 my command so as to relieve me of all anxiety. He is equally good in the 
 field, and has the gift of carrying with him all with whom he is brought in 
 contact. I have every confidence in recommending this Officer for advance¬ 
 ment as one fitted for the highest commands. 
 
 Major-General J. D. R. French, commanding the Cavalry, rendered me 
 most valuable assistance. He commanded the troops engaged at Elandslaagte, 
 where his dispositions resulted in the most decisive victory. I consider his 
 services have merited very special recognition. 
 
 Brigadier-General J. H. Yule succeeded to the command of the Dundee 
 force when Major-General Sir W. Penn Symons was wounded, and had a 
 difficult duty to carry out. He conducted the retirement of the force from 
 Dundee to Ladysmith with marked success. 
 
 Brigadier-General J. Wolfe Murray, commanding Lines of Communication, 
 is an Officer of great administrative ability, and has done his work excellently 
 well. He has been specially selected for this most important post from the 
 confidence felt in him, and, as it is one that entails hard work and is not as- 
 popular as employment in the front, I think the value of the service should be 
 exceptionally recognised. 
 
 Colonel Ian Hamilton, C.B., D.S.O., has acted as Brigadier-General in 
 command of a brigade since my head-quarters have been established at 
 Ladysmith. I have made a special recommendation in favour of this Officer 
 for the manner in which he led the Infantry at the action of Elandslaagte on 
 the 21st October, and consider him an Officer of special ability who is well 
 fitted for higher rank and command. 
 
 Colonel B. Duff, C.I.E., Indian Staff Corps, has been my Assistant 
 Military Secretary, and has discharged the duties of the office with marked 
 ability and success. His advancement will be a benefit to the Service, and he 
 is well fitted for the highest staff appointments. 
 
 Brevet-Colonel E.W. D. Ward, C.B., A.S.C., A.A.G. (B).—I cannot speak 
 too highly of this Officer. His forethought in collecting supplies in Ladysmith 
 while railway communication was open with the sea at Durban has enabled me 
 to occupy the position here with perfect confidence that the garrison could not 
 be starved out. When the force originally at Dundee was thrown back on 
 Ladysmith, having had to abandon the supply provided for it, Colonel Ward’s 
 provision was ample, even for the extra strain thus thrown upon the supply, as 
 well as to meet the necessity of finding rations for the civil population. His 
 power of work and resources are most marked, and he has won the confidence 
 of all. I consider him an Officer of the highest administrative ability, and 
 recommend him most strongly for recognition of his exceptionally valuable 
 service with this force. 
 
 Colonel C. M. Downing, B.A., Commanding Loyal Artillery, has been 
 my adviser on all artillery matters in my command, and 1 count myself fortunate 
 in having had the assistance of such an experienced and highly-educated 
 Artillery Officer. I cannot speak in too high terms of the behaviour of the 
 Roval Artillery on all occasions on which I have had to call upon them, or of 
 the value of their services to the State. 
 
 Colonel W. G. Knox, C.B., Colonel on the Staff’, Ladysmith, has, from the 
 appointment he holds, been left in command of Ladysmith on all occasions 
 when the Field Army has gone out. His services have been very valuable. 
 
 Colonel W. Royston, Commanding Natal Volunteer Force.—The services 
 which Colonel Royston and the forces under his command have rendered to the 
 State and Colony have been of the very highest value. In him I have found a 
 bold and successful leader, and an adviser whose experience of the Colony and 
 of the enemy has been of great value to me. Employed on arduous duty, 
 from the commencement of the campaign in touch with the enemy, I have 
 found him prompt and ready for every emergency. He and his force reflect 
 the highest credit on the Colony of Natal. 
 
8 
 
 Colonel J. G. Dartnell, C.M.G., Chief Commissioner, Natal Police, 
 rendered valuable service to the late Lieut.-General Sir W. Penn Symons and 
 to Brigadier-General Yule when the Dundee column fell back on Ladysmith. 
 His advice and experience were of the highest value, and I found him always 
 ready and willing to help me in any way in his power. 
 
 Brevet-Colonel Sir H. Rawlinson, Bart., Coldstream Guards, D. A.A.G., has 
 acted as A.A.G. since this force was formed, and has proved himself a Staff 
 Officer of very high ability. He has great power of work, and carries out his 
 duties pleasantly and thoroughly. He is also a most valuable Staff Officer in 
 action, and possessed of a quick eye and great dash. I recommend him for 
 advancement. 
 
 Lieut.-Colonel R. Exham, R.A.M.C., Principal Medical Officer, has had an 
 anxious time in the charge of the sick and wounded of this force, and has done 
 everything in his power to meet the medical requirements of the various phases 
 of the present campaign. His zeal and assiduity are worthy of recognition. 
 
 The services of the Royal Artillery have been so valuable that I have 
 special pleasure in recommending Lieut.-Colonels J. A. Coxhead and E. H. 
 Pickwoad, Commanding Brigade Divisions with this force, and the conduct of 
 the individual batteries has been so good, anchthe services of each so valuable 
 that I consider the following Majors have well earned special mention :— 
 
 Royal Field Artillery— 
 
 Major J. W. G. Dawkins, 13th Battery. 
 
 Major W. E. Blewitt, 21st Battery. 
 
 Major C. E. Goulburn, 42nd Battery. 
 
 Major A. J. Abdy, 53rd Battery. 
 
 Major J. F. Manifold, 67th Battery. 
 
 Major F. D. Y. Wing, 69th Battery. 
 
 Major S. R. Rice, R.E., acting as Commanding Royal Engineer, has been 
 indefatigable in the discharge of his duties, and his services have been most 
 valuable in preparing the entrenched positions occupied by the garrison of 
 Ladysmith, and in other matters connected with this particular branch. 
 
 Major E. A. Altham, Royal Scots Regiment, A.A.G., Field Intelligence, 
 has had a very difficult office to fill. I consider he has done all that was 
 possible. He has kept me informed of the enemy’s movements, as well as 
 changes in his strength and dispositions. I have a very high opinion of his 
 ability and aptitude for the particular branch in which he is employed. 
 
 Major D. Henderson, Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, D. A.A.G., Field 
 Intelligence, is a most painstaking and reliable Intelligence Officer. He 
 possesses boldness, discretion, and reticence, and is an Officer of high promise. 
 
 Major W. Ad ye, Royal Irish Rifles, D. A.A.G., Field Intelligence, has 
 proved himself an Officer of a most adventurous spirit in reconnoitring and re¬ 
 porting upon the enemy’s positions, and his services have been valuable to me. 
 
 Major H. G. Morgan, D.S.O., A.S.C., Assistant Director of Supplies, 
 rendered most valuable service in disembarking and entraining the first 
 reinforcements that arrived in Natal, and hurrying them on to the front. 
 
 The following Officers have also carried out the duties of their depart¬ 
 ments with advantage to the State and credit to themselves :— 
 
 Veterinary Lieut.-Colonel I. Mathews, P.Y.O. 
 
 Major W. C. Savile, II.A., Army Ordnance Department. 
 
 Major A. J. Murray, Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers, who acted as Staff 
 Officer to Brigadier-General Yule during the retirement from 
 
 o o 
 
 Dundee. 
 
 Brevet Lieut.-Colonel H. M. Lawson, R.E., A.A.G., Lines of Com¬ 
 munication and Commanding at Durban. 
 
 Major S. C. N. Grant, R.E., Special Service. 
 
 Commander Holland, Royal Indian Marine, Disembarkation Officer 
 at Durban. 
 
9 
 
 The railway administration, under David Hunter, Esq.,C.M.G., was most 
 excellently carried out, and was worked most harmoniously and successfully in 
 concert with the military and naval Officers. 
 
 15. I also desire to bring to your notice the following Officers, &c., who 
 have rendered excellent services :— 
 
 Colonel C. E. Beckett, C.B., A.A.G. 
 
 Lieut.-Colonel R. W. Mapleton, R.A.M.C. 
 
 Major C. de C. Hamilton, R.A., who has been acting throughout as 
 D.A.A.G. on my Head-quarter Staff. 
 
 Major H. Mullaly, R.E., D.A.A.G. 
 
 Brevet-Major A. J. King, Royal Lancaster Regiment, A.D.C. to 
 Major-General Sir A. Hunter, K.C.B., D.S.O. 
 
 Captain F. Lyon, R.F.A., A.D.C. 
 
 Captain J. R. Young, R.E., Railway Staff* Officer. 
 
 Captain F. S. Tatham, Natal Mounted Rifles. 
 
 Rev. E. J. Macpherson, B.A., Senior Chaplain, Church of England. 
 Rev. O. S. Watkins, Acting Wesleyan Chaplain. 
 
 T. R. Bennett, Esq., Resident Magistrate, Ladysmith. 
 
 D. G. Giles, Esq., Resident Magistrate, Upper Tugela Magistracy. 
 Conductor W. C. Ashmore, Indian Unattached List. 
 Quarter-Master-Serjeant E. H. Morton, Corps of Military Staff Clerks. 
 No. S.C./227, Serjeant P. Burke, Staff Clerk Section, A.S.C. 
 
 Guide A. B. Allison, Natal Corps of Guides. 
 
 ,, T. Loxton ,, ,, 
 
 ,, P. Greathead 
 
 16. The following Officers, Warrant and non-commissioned officers, and 
 men, have been brought to my notice by General Officer Commanding and 
 Officers Commanding units. (The names are arranged in the order of 
 precedence of corps) : — 
 
 Officers. 
 
 4th Dragoon Guards (attached to 5th Dragoon Guards). 
 Captain G. F. Mappin. 
 
 5th Lancers 
 
 Major A. C. King. 
 
 Lieutenant and Adjutant H. H. Hulse. 
 
 7th Hussars. 
 
 Major D. Haig. 
 
 Capiain R. G. Brooke, D.S.O. 
 
 lltli Hussars. 
 
 Lieutenant P. D. Fitzgerald. 
 
 53rd Battery, Royal Field Artillery. 
 Captain W. Thwaites. 
 
 Royal Engineers. 
 
 Captain G. H. Fowke. 
 
 ( 762 - 2 ) 
 
 B 
 
10 
 
 1st Bn. Devonshire "Regiment. 
 
 Major M. C. Curry. 
 
 Captain W. B. Lafone. 
 
 Captain and Adjutant H. S. L. Ravenshaw. 
 Lieutenant J. E. I. Masterson. 
 
 Lieutenant H. N. Field. 
 
 Somersetshire Light Infantry. 
 Captain J. M. Yallentin. 
 
 1st Bn. Leicestershire Regiment. 
 
 CJ 
 
 Lieutenant B. de W. Weldon. 
 
 1st Bn. Scottish Rifles (attached to 2nd Bn. King’s Royal Rifle Corps). 
 Lieutenant N. M. Tod. 
 
 1st Bn. King’s Royal Rifle Corps. 
 
 Lieut.-Colonel R. H. Gunning (killed in action). 
 
 Captain and Adjutant H. R. Blore (killed in action). 
 
 2nd Bn. King’s Royal Rifle Corps. 
 
 Major H. E. Buchanan-Riddell. 
 
 1st Bn. Manchester Regiment. 
 
 Major J. E. Watson. 
 
 Captain A. W. Marden. 
 
 Lieutenant H. Fisher. 
 
 2nd Bn. Gordon Highlanders. 
 
 Major W. A. Scott. 
 
 Captain C. F. N. Macready. 
 
 Captain and Adjutant E. Stretfeild. 
 
 2nd Bn. Ro}^al Dublin Fusiliers. 
 Major S. G. Bird. 
 
 Captain G. A. Weldon (killed in action). 
 Captain and Adjutant M. Lowndes. 
 
 Army Service Corps. 
 
 Captain A. Long. 
 
 Royal Army Medical Corps. 
 
 Lieut.-Colonel P. H. Johnston. 
 
 Major H. Martin. 
 
 Major M. W. Kerin. 
 
 Captain G. S. Walker. 
 
11 
 
 Indian Staff Corps. 
 
 Major W. J. R. Wickham. 
 
 Imperial Light Horse. 
 
 Colonel J. J. Scott-Chisholme (killed in action). 
 
 Major A. Wools-Sampson. 
 
 Major W. Karri Davis. 
 
 Captain J. E. Orr. 
 
 Captain C. H. Mullins. 
 
 Captain J. C. Knapp (killed in action). 
 
 Natal Volunteer Force. 
 
 Permanent Staff, Natal Volunteer Force. 
 
 Major H. T. Bru-de-Wold (Senior Staff Officer, Natal Volunteer 
 Force). 
 
 Volunteer Medical Staff. 
 
 Captain H. T. Platt. 
 
 Warrant and Non-Commissioned Officers and Men. 
 
 Royal Engineers. 
 
 No. 21916, Corporal H. Rawlinson. 
 
 No. 28457, Sapper S. Hudson. 
 
 No. 27735, Sapper C. Spurling. 
 
 1st Bn. Devonshire Regiment. 
 
 No. 2034, Colour-Serjeant G. Palmer. 
 
 1st Bn. King’s Royal Rifle Corps. 
 
 Bandmaster F. Tyler. 
 
 1st Bn. Manchester Regiment. 
 
 No. 2699, Serjeant R. Lloyd. 
 
 2nd Bn. Gordon Highlanders. 
 
 No. 3747, Serjeant H. Shepherd. 
 
 Army Service Corps. 
 
 No. 4709, 1st Class Staff-Serjeant-Major T. Curtis. 
 
 Royal Army Medical Corps. 
 
 No. 7598, Serjeant E. J. Cadogan. 
 
 Indian Commissariat—Transport Department. 
 
 Conductor H. Young. 
 
 Sub-Conductor M. W. Tyler. 
 
 I have the honour to be, 
 
 Sir, 
 
 Your obedient Servant 
 
 GEORGE S. WHITE, Lieut.-General 
 
 Commanding Natal Field Force 
 
 B 2 
 
 (762-2) 
 
12 
 
 No. 2. 
 
 From Field-Marshal Lord Roberts to the Secretary of State for War. 
 
 Army Head-quarters, South Africa, 
 
 Government House, Bloemfontein, 
 
 My Lord, 28th March, 1900. 
 
 In continuation of my Memorandum of the 18th ultimo, I have 
 the honour to submit for your Lordship's information a despatch, dated 23rd 
 March, 1900, from Lieut.-General Sir George White, Y.C., G.C.B., G.C.S.I., 
 G.C.T.E., describing the defence of Ladysmith, which was invested by the 
 enemy from 2nd November, 1899, until 1st March, 1900, and including the 
 operations of the two days preceding the siege. 
 
 2. In the second and third paragraphs of the despatch, Sir George White 
 gives his reasons for deciding to remain at Ladysmith, instead of falling back 
 on the line of the Tugela River. If the question were regarded from an 
 abstract point of view, arguments might be advanced in favour of the latter 
 course ; but the existing state of affairs when Sir George White landed in 
 Natal, political exigencies, and the estimate then current of the resources and 
 fighting strength of the Boers must be taken into consideration. Sir George 
 White arrived at Durban on the 7th October, 1899, where he was met by 
 the late Major-General Sir A. P. Symons. He found most of the troops in 
 Natal already distributed between Glencoe and Ladysmith, Major-General 
 Symons being confident that he could drive back any hostile force which might 
 cross the frontier. Sir George White proceeded at once to Maritzburg, and 
 on 10th October discussed the military and political situation with the 
 Governor of Natal. At this interview he expressed his disapproval of the 
 forward position which had been taken up near Glencoe, the force at his 
 disposal being, in his opinion, too weak to admit of its defence, together with 
 that of Ladysmith, against superior numbers, and the troops being liable to 
 be cut off, should the Boers advance from the Orange Free State through the 
 passes of the Drakensberg Range. The Governor deprecated a voluntary 
 withdrawal from the position, as being almost certain to lead to a rising among 
 the Dutch, and possibly the native population, not only in Natal, but in Cape 
 Colony. In face of this objection, Sir George White resolved to postpone the 
 concentration of his force at Ladysmith. 
 
 On 11th October Sir George White proceeded to Ladysmith, Major- 
 General Symons going on to Dundee. That evening the Boers crossed the 
 frontier, but beyond a slight affair of outposts in the direction of the 
 Drakensberg, no fighting took place until the 20th. The interval was occupied 
 by Sir George White in organising his troops and examining the Ladysmith 
 position. On 20th October a Boer force, which had entered Natal from the 
 Vrvheid district of the Transvaal, and crossed the Buffalo River, was attacked 
 near Glencoe by Sir A. P. Symons. The General was mortally wounded, and, 
 though the enemy’s advance was checked for a time, reinforcements came up 
 which necessitated a retirement. Our troops fell back first in the direction of 
 Helpmakaar to Beith, and thence to Ladysmith, which was reached on 
 27th October. 
 
 On the 19th October the enemy, advancing from Newcastle, cut the 
 railway line at Elandslaagte, on the 20th the ground was reconnoitred from 
 Ladysmith, and the next day an action was fought in which the Boers were 
 signally defeated. But here again no permanent advantage was gained, as 
 the reported arrival of a strong column of the enemy from the Orange Free 
 State at Bester’s Station led to the immediate withdrawal of our troops to 
 Ladysmith. On the 24th Sir George White moved out some 7 miles to the 
 north-east of Ladysmith in order to cover the march of the force returning from 
 Glencoe, under the command of Major-General Yule, and engaged the enemy at 
 Rietfontein, returning to Ladysmith the same evening. He again attacked 
 the Boers on the 30th at Lombard’s Kop, the action being without decisive 
 
13 
 
 result. By the 2nd November Ladysmith had been invested, and railway 
 communication between it and Colenso interrupted. 
 
 3. From the foregoing narrative it is apparent that Sir George White was 
 placed in an extremely difficult position in being called upon to decide, imme¬ 
 diately after his arrival in Natal, whether he should concentrate his whole force 
 at Ladysmith, and, subsequently, ’when the enemy had shown their strength, 
 whether he should attempt to withdraw that force behind the Tugela. 
 
 As regards the first question, I think that he would have clone better had 
 he ignored the political objections which were urged by the Governor of Natal 
 and concentrated at Ladysmith. The retention of a portion of his force at 
 Glencoe at once involved him in military complications which he foresaw and 
 ought to have avoided. Nor, indeed, was the political situation improved by 
 his being eventually compelled to order a retirement which could have been 
 effected without risk or loss before the enemy had arrived within striking 
 distance. 
 
 As regards the second question, I am of opinion that under the existing 
 circumstances, and having regard to the information then available, Sir 
 George White’s decision to make a stand at Ladysmith was correct. A 
 position on the Tugela would to some extent have been more secure, as the 
 country is more open, and the reinforcement of the troops holding the river 
 alignment would have presented fewer difficulties. But, as Sir George White 
 explains in his despatch, the Tugela, at the time of the year, was not a 
 formidable defensive obstacle, and if Ladysmith had been evacuated, the Boers 
 would have pressed on, enveloped the British force, and cut off its communica¬ 
 tion by rail with Maritzburg. The same process might have been repeated 
 if Sir George White had fallen back on Maritzburg. Moreover, a withdrawal 
 to the Tugela would have enabled the enemy to over-run a much larger 
 portion of the Colony, and so encouraged the disloyal Dutch population 
 throughout South Africa that a general rising might not improbably have taken 
 place. 
 
 Undoubtedly the protracted siege of Ladysmith caused grave anxiety, 
 and the necessity for its relief diverted a large body of troops from Cape 
 Colony, and thus delayed the concentration of a force sufficient to undertake 
 offensive operations in the enemy’s country. But for these consequences Sir 
 George White cannot justly be held responsible, his main obligation being to 
 defend Natal against a Boer invasion. They may be ascribed to several 
 causes. First, the enemy greatly out-numbered the British force available 
 in Natal when Ladysmith was invested. Secondly, the sharp salient angle 
 formed by the frontier line along the north of Natal, and the convergence on 
 Ladysmith of the railways from the Orange Free State and Transvaal, gave 
 the invaders a decided strategical advantage. This advantage was increased 
 by the general configuration of the country, consisting of a series of rocky 
 terraces sloping gradually downwards from the Drakensberg to the sea. 
 Thirdly, although Ladysmith had been selected as our advanced military 
 station and depot of supplies in Northern Natal, its liability to attack does 
 not seem to have been recognised, and no steps had been taken before the 
 war began to construct the works and provide the armament which would 
 have materially facilitated its defence. 
 
 The foregoing review of the situation, as it must have presented itself to 
 Sir George White, shows that he had strong grounds for deciding not to with¬ 
 draw behind the Tugela, his decision was approved by General Sir Redvers Buffer, 
 and though the relief of Ladysmith was an arduous operation which cost many 
 lives, the presence of a strong British garrison at this point prevented the 
 enemy from penetrating further south than Estcourt, and protected the capital 
 and southern portion of the Colony. 
 
 4. The behaviour of the Ladysmith garrison through the four months during 
 which it was exposed to continual bombardment, as well as to the privations of 
 a protracted siege, reflects the greatest credit on all ranks. I have much 
 pleasure in bringing to the favourable notice of Her Majesty’s Government the 
 resolution and resource displayed by the General Officer in Chief Command, and 
 the cheerful spirit which pervaded the troops, in spite of repeated failures to 
 relieve the town from the south ; and I cordially support Sir George White’s 
 
14 
 
 recommendations on behalf of the Officers (naval and military), the Warrant, 
 non-commissioned, and petty officers, and the men, whose names he has brought 
 forward as specially deserving of recognition. 
 
 Praise is also due to the civilians and nursing sisters, who rendered valuable 
 assistance. 
 
 5. It is gratifying to observe that, in his account of what occurred on 
 6th January, when the enemy’s determined attack on Ladysmith was gallantly 
 repulsed, a Colonial corps, the Imperial Light Horse, has been singled out by 
 Sir George White for special commendation. By their conduct on this and 
 other occasions during the present war our Colonial kinsmen have proved their 
 readiness to share with their comrades in Her Majesty’s Regular Forces the 
 honourable duty of upholding the rights and furthering the interests of the 
 British Empire. 
 
 I have the honour to be, 
 
 My Lord, 
 
 Your Lordship’s most obedient Servant, 
 
 ROBERTS, Field-Marshal, 
 
 Commanding-in-Chief, South Africa. 
 
 From Lieut.-General Sir George White, V.C., G.C.B., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., late 
 
 Commanding the Ladysmith Garrison, to the Chief of the Staff to the 
 
 Field-Marshal Commanding-in-Chief in South Africa. 
 
 Cape Town, 
 
 Sir, 23rd March, 1900. 
 
 In my despatch dated 2nd December, 1899, addressed to the Secretary of 
 State for War, and forwarded through you, I brought down the history of 
 events relating to the force under my command to the evening of 30th 
 October, 1899. On the morning of the following day, General the Right 
 Honourable Sir Redvers Buller, V.C., G.C.B., K.C.M.G., arrived at Cape Town 
 and assumed command of the whole of the forces in South Africa. On the 
 10th January, 1900, Field-Marshal Lord Roberts took over the chief command. 
 I have now the honour to report, for his Lordship’s information, the events 
 which have taken place from that date until the 1st March, 1 900. on which day 
 Sir Redvers Buller arrived in Ladysmith, having successfully carried out the 
 relief of this long besieged town. 
 
 2. It will be remembered that during October, 1899, the forces of the 
 Orange Free State and the South African Republic had been gradually 
 converging on Ladysmith from west and north, and that, although my troops 
 had successfully encountered portions of the enemy’s armies at Talana, 
 Elandslaagte, and Rietfontein, the battle of Lombard’s Kop on 30th October 
 had proved that the numbers and mobility of the Boer forces, when once 
 concentrated, were too great to admit of any prospect of victory should I 
 continue with inferior numbers to oppose them in the open field. The task 
 before me was the protection from invasion by the Boers of as large a portion 
 as possible of the Colony of Natal, and especially of Pietermaritzburg, the 
 capital of that Colony and the seat of its Government; and I had now to 
 consider how this could be best insured. On 31st October General Sir 
 Redvers Buller telegraphed to me as follows :—“ Can you not entrench and 
 await events, if not at Ladysmith then behind the Tugela at Colenso ? ” On 
 the same date I replied, stating my intention to hold on to Ladysmith, and on 
 1st November I received Sir Redvers Buller’s approval of this course in a 
 telegram which commenced as follows :—1 agree that you do best to remain 
 at Ladysmith, though Colenso and line of Tugela river look tempting.” 
 
 3. It may be well to state here shortly the reasons which governed my 
 choice of this position. Ladysmith is the most important town in Northern 
 Natal, and there was reason to believe that the enemy attached very great 
 and perhaps even undue importance to obtaining possession of it. It was 
 
suspected then, and the suspicion has since been confirmed that the occupation 
 of that town by the Boer forces had been decided on by the disloyal Dutch 
 in both Colonies as the signal for a general rising ; as, in fact, a material 
 guarantee that the power of the combined Republics was really capable 
 of dealing with any force the British Empire was able to place in the field 
 against them. Our withdrawal would, therefore, have brought about an 
 insurrection so widespread as to have very materially increased our difficulties. 
 Strategically the town was important as being the junction of the railways 
 which enter Natal from the Transvaal and the Orange Free State, and until 
 the Republics could gain possession of that junction their necessarily divergent 
 lines of supply and communication prevented their enjoying to the full the 
 advantages of combined action. Tactically the place was already partially 
 prepared for defence and offered a natural position of some strength; and 
 although the perimeter which must be occupied was very great for the number 
 of troops available, yet it afforded a possibility of maintaining a protracted 
 defence against superior numbers. On the other hand, the mere fact of a 
 retirement behind the Tugela would have had a moral effect at least equal to 
 a serious defeat, and would have involved the abandonment to the enemy of a 
 large town full of an English population, men, women, and children; and of 
 a mass of stores and munitions of war which had been already collected 
 there before my arrival in South Africa, and had since been increased. 
 The line of the Tugela from the Drakensberg to the Buffalo River is some 
 80 miles long, and in a dry season, such as last November, can be crossed 
 on foot almost anywhere. Against an enemy with more than double my 
 numbers, and three times my mobility, I could not hope to maintain such a 
 line with my small force, and any attempt to prevent their turning my flanks 
 could only have resulted in such a weakening of my centre as would have led 
 to its being pierced. Once my flank was turned on the line of the river the 
 enemy would have been nearer Maritzburg than I should have been, and 
 a rapid withdrawal by rail for the defence of the capital would have been 
 inevitable. Even there it would have been impossible to make a prolonged 
 defence without leaving it open to the enemy to occupy the important port 
 of Durban, through which alone supplies and reinforcements could arrive, 
 and for the defence of which another retreat would have become eventually 
 essential ; thus abandoning to the enemy the whole Colony of Natal from 
 Lang’s Nek to the sea. On the other hand, 1 was confident of holding out at 
 Ladysmith as long as might be necessary, and I saw clearly that so long as 
 I maintained myself there I could occupy the great mass of the Boer armies, 
 and prevent them sending more than small flying columns south of the 
 Tugela, which the British and Colonial forces in my rear, aided by such 
 reinforcements as might be shortly expected, could deal with without much 
 difficulty. Accordingly, I turned my whole attention to preparing Ladysmith 
 to stand a prolonged siege. 
 
 4. With this object in view, I employed my troops during 31st October 
 and 1st November in improving and strengthening the defences of the various 
 positions surrounding Ladysmith, which together enclosed the area which I 
 had determined to hold. During these days the Boers gradually pushed 
 round from north and west to the south and east of the town, which under¬ 
 went a slight bombardment on 1st November. On 31st October, General 
 Koch, of the Army of the South African Republic, who had been wounded 
 and taken prisoner at Elandslaagte, died,and his widow was permitted to remove 
 his body for burial in the Transvaal. Before leaving she expressed her 
 gratitude for the courtesy and kind treatment which both her late husband 
 and herself had received at our hands. On the same date, I despatched the 
 2nd Bn. Royal Dublin Fusiliers and Natal Field Battery by rail to Colenso 
 to assist in the defence of the bridges over the Tugela. During the night of 
 lst-2nd November, the Boers brought several new guns into position, 
 and although the Naval Brigade, under Captain The Hon. H. Lambton, R.N., 
 opened fire from one of the naval 4'7-inch guns on the morning of 
 2nd November, the bombardment of the town became much more severe than 
 on the previous days. At about 4 a.m., the 5th Dragoon Guards, 5th Lancers, 
 18th Hussars, Natal Mounted Volunteers, and 69th Battery, Royal Field 
 

 1G 
 
 Artillery, moved out south into the Long Valley to reconnoitre the enemy and 
 to endeavour to surprise one of his camps in the direction of Onderbrook. 
 Major-General French, who was in command, left Colonel Royston with fhe 
 Natal Mounted Volunteers and two guns to hold the Nek between Wagon Hill 
 and Middle Hill, and with the remainder of his force passed round the 
 southern end of End Hill (where he left a squadron of the 5th Lancers to 
 hold a ridge, dismounted), and gaining the plateau pushed on about 3,000 
 yards and opened an effective fire on the Boer camp. The enemy evacuated 
 their camp and took up a position on a ridge to which they brought up field 
 guns. Major-General French, having fulfilled his mission, withdrew his force, 
 reaching camp by 10 a.m. Our casualties were one man wounded. 
 
 As he returned to Ladysmith a telegram was received from General Sir 
 Bed vers Buffer, desiring that Major-General French and his staff might be 
 sent to the Cape. Communication by wire and rail were stiff open, and 
 although trains were constantly fired upon, advantage had been taken of the 
 fact to send southward as many of the civil population of Ladysmith as were 
 willing to depart. Major-General French and his staff left by train about 
 noon on 2nd November, and a telegraphic report was received here that, 
 although the train had been heavily fired on near Pieter’s Station, it had 
 reached Colenso in safety. Immediately afterwards the wires were cut by the 
 enemy, and railway communication was interrupted. Ladysmith was thus 
 isolated from the world outside it, and from this date the siege may be held 
 to have commenced. 
 
 5. On 3rd November, four squadrons, Imperial Light Horse, under 
 Major Karri Davies, who were reconnoitring to the south, found a body of the 
 enemy, with one gun, on Lancers Hill, and asked for reinforcements to drive 
 them off. The 5th Dragoon Guards, 18th Hussars, 19th Hussars, and 
 21st Battery, Royal Field Artillery (the whole under Brigadier-General J. F. 
 Brocklehurst, M.V.O.), were accordingly sent down the Long Valley to then- 
 assistance. The 19th Hussars seized Bifleman’s Ridge and endeavoured to 
 turn the enemy’s left, while the 18th Hussars covered the right rear; two 
 companies of Infantry, detached from Caesar’s Camp, occupied Wagon Hill, 
 and a Mounted Infantry company seized Mounted Infantry Hill to protect the 
 left rear; while the 5th Dragoon Guards and 21st Field Battery were moved 
 straight down the Long Valley. Meantime two squadrons, Imperial Light 
 Horse, were holding Middle Hill, while the remaining two squadrons were 
 facing the enemy on Lancer’s Hill. The squadrons on Middle Hill were 
 opposed to a considerable body of the enemy, who were moving up from the 
 east. The 21st Field Battery opened fire on Lancer’s Hill and quickly 
 silenced the enemy’s gun. Believing that the enemy were evacuating the hill 
 the two squadrons, Imperial Light Horse, made a gallant but somewhat 
 ill-advised attempt to occupy it. but though they seized and held a portion of 
 the hill the enemy was in too great strength for further progress. In the 
 meanwhile I had sent out the Natal Mounted Volunteers and the 42nd and 
 53rd Field Batteries to join Brigadier-General Brocklehurst, and to cover his 
 retirement, if necessary. General Brocklehurst sent the Natal Mounted 
 Volunteers to reinforce the Imperial Light Horse squadrons on Middle Bill, 
 and brought both batteries into action in the Long Valley. Finding, however, 
 that the numbers of the enemy in his front and on both flanks were continually 
 increasing, and that he could not hope to press his reconnaissance further 
 without serious loss, he determined to withdraw. With the assistance of a 
 dismounted squadron, 5th Dragoon Guards, under Major Gore, the squadrons, 
 Imperial Light Horse, on Lancer’s Hill were retired under cover of Artillery 
 fire tiff they reached the main body, when the whole force engaged was 
 gradually withdrawn to camp. Our loss was two Officers and two non-com¬ 
 missioned officers and men killed. Three Officers and 23 non-commissioned 
 officers and men wounded, and one man missing. The enemy’s loss is reported 
 to have been considerable, chiefly from our Artillery fire. 
 
 In the afternoon the enemy made demonstrations of an attack in force 
 on Devonshire Post, which was reinforced as a measure of precaution, but 
 the attack was not seriously pressed, and was repulsed with ease. The 
 bombardment this day was very heavy, a large number of shells falling into 
 
the town, and especially in and around the hospitals, which were in various 
 churches and public buildings near the centre of the town. In the evening a 
 deputation of civilian residents of Ladysmith waited on me with the request 
 that permission might be obtained for them to pass through the enemy’s lines 
 and proceed to the south. The Principal Medical Officer of the Force also 
 represented that the effect of the bombardment on the large number of 
 wounded in his hospitals was very bad, and asked that, if possible, an 
 agreement might be arrived at for the hospitals to be placed outside the town. 
 Next morning I sent Major Bateson, R.A.M.C., under flag of truce, with a 
 letter to General Joubert, asking that these requests might be agreed to on 
 grounds of humanity to sick, wounded, and non-combatants. In reply. 
 General Joubert agreed to my hospitals being moved out of Ladysmith to a 
 point on the flats, 4 miles down the railway and close to the Intombi Spruit. 
 He refused to allow the civil inhabitants to go south, but permitted them to 
 accompany the sick and wounded to the Intombi Camp. Food and all other 
 requisites for this camp were to be supplied from Ladysmith, and, for this 
 purpose, one train was to be allowed to run each way daily, and by daylight 
 only, under flag of truce. On this same day General Joubert sent into 
 Ladysmith six Officers of the Royal Army Medical Corps, 10 Assistant 
 Surgeons, and 98 of our wounded from Dundee; together with a number of 
 Indian hospital attendants. There was a threatening of attack on Cfesar’s 
 Camp on this night, 4th November, but it was not pressed. Our first 
 communications by pigeon post to Durban were sent off on this date. 
 
 6. 5th November was Sunday. Throughout the siege Sundays have 
 generally been observed by both sides, as far as possible, as days of rest from 
 fighting. There has been no special arrangement on the subject, but a kind 
 of tacit understanding came into existence that neither side would fire unless 
 specially provoked to do so by the construction of fortifications or other signs 
 of movement on the opposite side. 5th November was no exception to this 
 rule, and advantage was taken of the day to send our sick and wounded and 
 all such civilians, men, women, and children, as elected to go, to the Intombi 
 Camp. 
 
 7. The defences of Ladysmith were, for the purposes of command, 
 divided into four sections, “A,’ “ B,” “C” and “ D.” “A section, 
 under Colonel W. G. Knox, C.B., commenced at Devonshire Post and 
 extended to the point where 
 Junction Hill and Gordon Hill, 
 from Gordon Hill round to 
 by Major-General F. Howard, 
 under Colonel Ian Hamilton, C.B., D.S.O., comprised the ground 
 
 from Flagstone Spruit to the eastern extremity of Caesar’s Camp. “ D ” 
 section, under Colonel Rovston, Commandant of the Natal Mounted 
 Volunteers, included the thorn country north of Caesar’s Camp and the Klip 
 River Flats. The troops, which were allotted to these sections, and to the 
 general reserve, and the variations in these arrangements which were, from 
 time to time, found necessary. 
 
 the Newcastle Road 
 “ B ” section included 
 Flagstone Spruit, and 
 C.B., C.M.G., A.D.C. 
 
 passes between 
 all the defences 
 was commanded 
 “C” section, 
 
 8. On 6th November, 2nd Lieutenant R. G. Hooper, 5th Lancers, 
 reached Ladysmith with despatches. Arriving in Natal too late to join his 
 regiment before communication was cut off, he most gallantly made his way 
 through the Boer lines at night, and on foot, accompanied only by a Kaffir 
 guide. All the provisions in the shops and stores in the town were taken over 
 on this date and administered as part of the general stock, all civil residents 
 being placed on rations which were issued free or on payment according to 
 their means. 
 
 9. Next day, 7th November, Caesar’s Camp was subjected to a heavy 
 fire of shells and long range musketry. Although no actual attack was made, 
 it was found advisable to send the Imperial Light Horse to reinforce this 
 point ; while the 42nd Battery, Royal Field Artillery, under Major Goulburn, 
 was placed in position on the plateau during the night, the horses returning 
 to camp. A number of natives of India were sent into Ladysmith by the 
 Boers. 
 
 (762-2) 
 
 Q 
 
18 
 
 10. On 8th November a 6-inch gun opened fire from the top of the 
 Bulwana Mountain. Throughout the siege this gun has proved most trouble¬ 
 some to the defence. On the same day a number of refugees from Dundee, 
 both English and Indian, were sent into Ladysmith by the Boers, and were 
 located by us in the Intombi Camp. 
 
 11. 9th November was ushered in by a very heavy fire at dawn on all 
 sides of our defences from the enemy’s artillery, which included several new 
 guns, which now opened for the first time, and whose exact positions it was 
 very hard to locate. This was followed by a general advance of their infantry 
 and the development of a severe musketry action at Caesar’s Camp, in the 
 thorn bush north of that ridge, at Devonshire Post and Observation Hill. 
 The steady front shown by our troops prevented the enemy from trying to 
 close, and although on Caesar’s Camp, where the 1st Bn. Manchester Regiment, 
 under Lieut.-Colonel A. E. R. Curran, rendered very valuable service, the 
 action lasted until darkness set in, yet elsewhere it had mostly died away at 
 12 noon. At that hour I proceeded, with my Staff, to the Naval Battery on 
 Gordon Hill, whence a salute of 21 shotted guns, in honour of the birth¬ 
 day of the Prince of Wales, was fired at the enemy by Captain the Hon. 
 H. Lambton, R.N., and three cheers were given for His Royal Highness, which 
 were taken up by the troops both in camp and on the defences. A message of 
 congratulation, to be telegraphed to His Royal Highness, was despatched by 
 pigeon post to Durban. Our casualties during the day amounted to 4 men 
 killed, 4 Officers and 23 men wounded. It is difficult to form any accurate 
 estimate of the enemy’s losses, but they certainly considerably exceeded 
 our own. 
 
 12. From 10th to 13th November, inclusive, very little of importance 
 occurred, the fire both of guns and rifles being much less severe than usual. 
 An Irish deserter from the Boers gave himself up on the 12th November. 
 From him we learnt that the total force then surrounding us here numbered 
 about 25,000 men, that they were mounting more guns, and expected to he 
 reinforced shortly. 
 
 13. On 14th November, 1 sent Brigadier-General J. F. Brocklehurst, 
 M.V.O., with two regiments of Cavalry, two batteries of Artillery and detach¬ 
 ments of the Imperial Light Horse and Natal Mounted Volunteers, across 
 the Klip River, to try and work out on one or both sides of Rifleman's Ridge 
 into the more open country beyond, to find out the enemy's strength in that 
 direction, and, if possible, to capture one of their wagon convoys, of which 
 several had recently been seen passing at a distance of some miles. The 
 Natal Mounted Volunteers and Imperial Light Horse seized Star Hill, but 
 after shelling Rifleman’s Ridge for some time General Brocklehurst decided 
 that it was too strongl}’ held for him to leave it in his rear, while an attempt 
 to storm it would have been more costly than the occasion would justify. 
 He, therefore, returned to camp. On this night the Boers commenced for the 
 first time to shell the town and camps at night, opening fire from their heavy 
 guns about midnight for a few minutes, a practice which they maintained 
 nightly for about a week, and then discontinued. 
 
 14. From this time nothing worth record took place until 19th November, 
 when the Boers sent into Intombi Camp six privates of the 2nd Bn. Royal 
 Dublin Fusiliers, who had been wounded in the attack on an armoured train 
 near Colenso, on 15th November. 
 
 15. 2uth November was marked by an unusual number of casualties from 
 shell fire, chiefly among the 18th Hussars and Gordon Highlanders. 
 
 16. Next day General S. Burger sent in a letter under a flag of truce, 
 complaining that we had been running trains at night to the Intombi Camp, 
 contrary to our agreement with General Joubert—a complaint for which there 
 was no foundation whatever. He also inquired why a Red Cross flag was 
 flying on the Town Hall although our hospital was at Intombi. I replied, on 
 22nd November, by giving my personal assurance that trains never had been, 
 
19 
 
 and never would be, run to Intombi at night, and explaining that the Red 
 Cross flag was hoisted on the Town Hall because that building was in use as a 
 hospital for ordinary cases of sickness, and for slightly wounded men whom it 
 was not worth while to send to Intombi. Before my answer could reach him 
 the Boer guns were deliberately turned on the Town Hall, which was several 
 times struck. 
 
 17. On 23rd November the enemy endeavoured, under flag of truce, to 
 send into Ladysmith 230 Indian coolies. It became evident that the 
 intention was to send in here as many non-combatants as could be collected 
 who would be useless for defence, but would help to consume our supplies. 
 For this reason I refused to receive them, and requested that they might be 
 sent to the Officer commanding our forces south of the Tugela. I understand 
 that this course was eventually adopted. Copies of the correspondence attached 
 as Appendix B. The same evening an attempt was made to wreck the only 
 engine which the enemy possessed on the Harrismith line. With this object 
 an old locomotive was selected from those in the railway yard here and was 
 sent off down the line, at night, with a full head of steam and with the safety 
 valve screwed down. The Boers had, however, provided against such an 
 
 * attempt by destroying a culvert on our side of their temporary terminus, and 
 here our engine was derailed and upset. The enemy evidently feared that it 
 carried a cargo of explosives, as they did not approach it next morning until 
 they had sent a number of shells into it from their artillery. 
 
 18. On the 24th November we had the misfortune to lose 228 oxen, 
 which were captured by the enemy. Owing to lack of rain the grazing within 
 our lines had become insufficient for all our animals, and a number of our 
 cattle had to be grazed outside our defences, wherever a re-entrant gave them 
 some protection from capture. Owing to the carelessness of certain civilian 
 conductors, these oxen were allowed to stray too far out and seeing this the 
 Boers commenced bursting shells on our side of the cattle in order to hasten 
 their movements. In this they were successful, the Kafirs in charge abandoning 
 their animals in order to seek shelter. As soon as the occurrence was noticed, 
 the Mounted Infantry Company of the 1st Bn. Leicestershire Regiment, under 
 Captain C. Sherer. was sent out to try and head them back, but it was then too 
 late, and though Captain Sherer did. all that was possible and drove back a 
 considerable number, under a heavy musketry fire from the enemy, yet, as 
 already mentioned, the enemy obtained possession of 228 head. 
 
 19. Beyond the usual daily bombardment nothing worth recording took 
 place till 27th November, which was marked by the unmasking of a new 6-inch 
 gun on Middle Hill, and a very evident increase in the number of Boers in 
 our immediate vicinity. An attack on our positions seemed likely, and all 
 precautions were taken accordingly, but next day news arrived of Major-General 
 Iiildyard’s fight at Mooi River, and the consequent withdrawal of the Boers to 
 the north of the Tugela, which fully explained the increased numbers visible 
 from Ladysmith. 
 
 20. On the 28th November, two 6‘3-inch howitzers were sent to occupy 
 emplacements which had been prepared for them on the reverse slope of 
 Wagon Hill; a naval 12-pr. was also placed on Caesar’s Camp. From this 
 position they opened fire next day, and proved able to quite keep down the 
 tire from the enemy’s 6-inch gun on Middle Hill, which some days afterwards was 
 withdrawn from that position. I arranged an attack on Rifleman’s Ridge for 
 the night of 29th November, but was compelled to abandon it, as just at sunset 
 the enemy very strongly reinforced that portion of their line. There can, 1 
 think, be no doubt that my plan had been disclosed to them, and indeed 
 throughout the siege I have been much handicapped by the fact that every 
 movement, or preparation for movement which has taken place in Ladysmith, 
 has been at once communicated to the Boers. The agents through whom 
 news reached them, I have, unfortunately, failed to discover. I have sent away 
 or locked up every person against whom reasonable grounds of suspicion could 
 be alleged, but without the slightest effect. 
 
 (762-2) ‘ C 2 
 
20 
 
 21. Two civilians, who had volunteered to blow up the Sunday’s River 
 railway bridge, started on their perilous journey on 29th November, and 
 returned here on 1st December. They reached the bridge without mishap, 
 and duly placed the charges, but owing to not fully understanding the use of 
 the fuze, only one out of four charges exploded. 
 
 22. On 29th November also we observed Hashing signals on the clouds at 
 night from Estcourt and were able to read a portion of a message. At a later 
 period of the siege no difficulty was experienced in reading such messages, but 
 we were without the means of replying in similar fashion. 
 
 23. 30th November was a day of very heavy bombardment, a new 6-inch 
 gun opening fire from Gun Hill and doing much damage. One shell in 
 particular entered the Town Hall which we had hitherto used as a hospital, 
 killing and wounding 10 persons. It was found necessary to evacuate the 
 building and place the hospital under canvas in a gorge where the protection 
 from shell fire was better. This severe bombardment continued throughout 
 1st and 2nd December, but fortunately proved comparatively harmless. On 
 the latter date heliographic communication rid Weenen was restored after 
 having been interrupted for a long period. 
 
 24. On 3rd December General Joubert sent me a letter alleging that we 
 had made unfair use of the Intombi Camp, and proposing that it should be 
 broken up. In reply, I dealt in detail with the points raised, none of which 
 had any foundation in fact, and as a result the breaking up of the camp was 
 not pressed. 
 
 25. On 5th December, at 1.30 a.m., two companies of the 2nd Bn. Rifle 
 Brigade moved out, under Captain J. E. Gough, to surprise Thornhill’s Farm 
 which the enemy were in the habit of occupying with a picket at night. The 
 enterprise was very well conducted, but the farm was unfortunately found 
 unoccupied. 
 
 26. On the night of 7th December, Major-General Sir A. Hunter, 
 K.C.B., D.S.O., made a sortie for the purpose of destroying the Boer guns on 
 Gun Hill, which had been giving us much annoyance. His force consisted of 
 500 Natal Volunteers, under Colonel Royston, and 100 men Imperial Light 
 Horse, under Lieut.-Colonel A. H. M. Edwards, wuth 18 men of the Corps of 
 Guides, under Major D. Henderson, D.A.A.G. for Intelligence, to direct the 
 column, and four men Royal Engineers and 10 men No. 10 Mountain Battery, 
 Royal Garrison Artillery, under Captain Fowke and Lieutenant Turner, Royal 
 Engineers, with explosives and sledge hammers for the destruction of the guns 
 when captured. Sir A. Hunter’s arrangements were excellent throughout, and 
 he was most gallantly supported by all his small force. Gun Hill was taken, 
 a 6-inch Creusot arid a 4‘7-inch hovbtzer destroyed, and a Maxim captured and 
 brought into camp. Our loss v r as only one Officer and seven men wounded. 
 1 consider that Major-General Sir A. Hunter deserves the greatest credit for 
 this very valuable service for which he volunteered. He brings to my notice 
 specially the gallant beha viour of Colonel W. Royston, Commanding Volunteers, 
 Natal, Lieut.-Colonel A. H. M. Edwards (5th Dragoon Guards), Commanding 
 Imperial Light Horse, Major D. Henderson, D.A.A.G. for Intelligence 
 (vmunded), Major A. J. King, Royal Lancaster Regiment, Major Karri Davis, 
 Imperial Light Horse, Captain G. H. Fowke, R.E., and Lieutenant E. V. 
 Turner, R.E., whose names 1 have much pleasure in bringing forward for 
 favourable consideration. 
 
 27. The same night three companies of the 1st Bn. Liverpool Regiment, 
 under Lieut.-Colonel L. S. Mellor, seized Limit Hill, and through the gap in 
 the enemy’s outpost line thus created, a squadron 19th Hussars penetrated 
 some 4 miles towards the north, destroying the enemy’s telegraph line and 
 burning various kraals and shelters ordinarily occupied by them. No loss was 
 incurred in this enterprise. At the same time five companies 1st Bn. Leicester¬ 
 shire Regiment, under Lieut.-Colonel G. D. Carleton, visited Hyde s and 
 
21 
 
 McPherson’s farms, usually occupied by the enemy as night outposts, hut found 
 them evacuated. 
 
 28. The slight opposition met with by these various operations of the 
 night of 7th—8th December made it appear probable that the enemy had 
 unduly weakened his force to the north of us in order to strengthen that 
 opposing Sir Red vers Buller on the Tugela. Recognising that if this proved 
 to be the case there might be an opportunity for my Cavalry to get far enough 
 north to damage the enemy’s railway, I ordered Brigadier-General J. F. 
 Brocklehurst, M.V.O., to move out at dawn with 5th Lancers, 5th Dragoon 
 Guards, and 18th Hussars and 53rd Battery, Royal Field Artillery, along the 
 Newcastle Road, to feel for the enemy and discover his strength and dispositions. 
 The reconnaissance was carried out in a very bold and dashing manner by the 
 5th Lancers and 18th Hussars, the 5th Dragoon Guards being in reserve. 
 The enemy, however, proved to be in considerable strength, and having 
 obtained the information I required I directed Brigadier-General Brocklehurst 
 to withdraw his brigade. The effect of these various enterprises was shortly 
 evident in the return from the line of the Tugela next day of some 2,000 Boers. 
 
 29. On the 10th December, Lieut.-Colonel C. T. E. Metcalfe, Commanding 
 2nd Bn. Rifle Brigade, volunteered to carry out a night enterprise against 
 a 4'7-inch howitzer on Surprise Hill. The undertaking was one of very con¬ 
 siderable risk, as to reach that hill it was necessary to pass between Thornhill’s 
 and Bell’s Kopies, both of which were held by the enemy. Lieut.-Colonel 
 Metcalfe moved off about 10 p.m., with 12 Officers and 488 men of his 
 battalion, together with a destruction party under Lieutenant Digby Jones, 
 R.E., and succeeded in effecting a complete surprise, his advance not being 
 discovered until he was within 4 or 5 yards of the crest line, which was at 
 once carried, and the howitzer destroyed. The retirement, however, proved 
 more difficult, since the enemy from Bell’s and Thornhill’s Kopjes, consisting 
 apparently of men of various nationalities, closed in from both sides to bar 
 the retreat. Lieut.-Colonel Metcalfe, however, fixed bayonets, and the com¬ 
 panies, admirably handled by their captains, fought their way back to the 
 railway line, where a portion of the force had been left in support, and from 
 which point the retirement became easy. A number of the enemy were 
 killed with the bayonet, and his total casualties must have been very consider¬ 
 able. Our own loss amounted to 1 Officer and 16 men killed, 3 Officers and 37 
 men wounded, and 6 men missing. The affair reflects great credit cn Lieut.- 
 Colonel C. T. E. Metcalfe and his battalion, and I have much pleasure in 
 bringing to your notice, in a subsequent portion of this despatch, the names 
 of the Officers who particularly distinguished themselves on this occasion. 
 
 30. My attention was now chiefly directed to preparations for moving 
 out a flying column to co-operate with General Sir Redvers Buller. All 
 these preparations, including the movement of a 4'7-inch and a 12-pr. gun, 
 both belonging to the Royal Navy, were completed by 15th December. 
 Meanwhile the enemy had moved his 6-inch gun from Middle Hill to Telegraph 
 Hill, and on 12th December I moved down the 6'3-inch howitzers to near Ration 
 Post to oppose it. 
 
 31. The firing of Sir Redvers Buller’s guns from the direction of Colenso 
 had been audible for some days, and was especially heavy on 15th December. 
 On 16th, Sir Redvers heliographed that he had attacked Colenso on the 
 previous day, but without success. Although this news was naturally disap¬ 
 pointing to the hopes of immediate relief which they had entertained, yet it 
 was received by both soldiers and civilians without any discouragement, and 
 with a cheerful readiness to wait until the necessary reinforcements should 
 arrive. From this time up to the close of the year few other events of im¬ 
 portance occurred, but on Christmas day a telegram was received from Her 
 Majesty and most gratefully appreciated by the garrison of Ladysmith. At 
 this period a few of the many shells daily fired into our camps were especially 
 destructive, one shell, on the 18th December, killed and wounded 10 men and 
 12 horses of the Natal Volunteers. Another, on 22nd December, killed 8 and 
 
22 
 
 wounded 9 of the Gloucestershire Regiment, and, on the same day a single 
 shell wounded 5 Officers and the serjeant-major of the 5th Lancers. On 
 27th December, again, one shell killed 1 Officer of the Devonshire Regiment 
 and wounded 8 Officers and 1 private of that regiment. During this period, 
 also, fresh complaints regarding the Intombi Camp were made by the enem}^ ; 
 and, by agreement with General S. Burger, Major-General Sir A. Hunter was 
 sent to that camp to hold an enquiry. A few minor irregularities were dis¬ 
 covered and corrected, and a copy of Sir A. Hunter’s report was sent to 
 General Burger, who was apparently satisfied that the complaints were without 
 serious foundation. 
 
 32. At the close of the year my chief source of anxiety lay in the heavy 
 and continuous increase in the number of the sick, which had risen from 475 
 on 30th November to 874 on 15th December, and to 1,558 on the last day of 
 the year. Enteric fever and dysentery were chiefly responsible for this 
 increase, there being 452 cases of the former, and 376 of the latter under 
 treatment on 31st December. 
 
 33. The Boers opened the new year by a fire of heavy guns at midnight, 
 but beyond the daily long-range bombardment, nothing of importance 
 occurred until 5th January, when we shelled, by indirect fire, two Boer 
 camps, one behind Bell’s Kopje, and one near Table Hill on the Colenso 
 Plateau. In the latter case the fire probably had little effect, as the range 
 was too great even for the naval gun employed, and the only possible 
 observing station was verv inconveniently placed. It was subsequently 
 ascertained from the Boers themselves that the shells falling into the camp 
 behind Bell’s Kopje had been very effective, stampeding the horses and 
 compelling the enemy temporarily to vacate the camp and seek shelter 
 elsewhere. 
 
 34. On the 6th January the enemy made a most determined but 
 fortunately unsuccessful attempt to carry Ladysmith by storm. Almost 
 every part of my position was more or less heavily assailed, but the 
 brunt of the attack fell upon Caesar’s Camp and Wagon Hill. On 
 the night of the 5th—6th January, Caesar’s Camp w r as held by its 
 usual garrison, consisting of the 1st Bn. Manchester Regiment; the 
 42nd Battery, Royal Field Artillery; a detachment of the Royal Navy, 
 with a 12-pr. gun ; and a detachment, Natal Naval Volunteers. Wagon Hill 
 was held as usual by three companies, 1st Bn. King’s Royal Rifle Corps, and a 
 squadron, Imperial Light Horse. A detachment, Natal Naval Volunteers, 
 with a 3-pr. Hotchkiss gun, had been sent there on the evening of the 5th 
 January, and two naval guns, one a 47-inch and the other a 12-pr., were in 
 process of transfer to the hill during the night. These guns were accom¬ 
 panied by naval detachments and a working party of Royal Engineers and 
 Gordon Highlanders, who w 7 ere consequently on Wagon Hill when the attack 
 commenced at 2.30 a.m. on the morning of 6th January. This attack was 
 first directed on the centre of the southern face of Wagon Hill, whence it 
 spread east and west. It fell directly on the squadron of Imperial Light 
 Horse, under Lieutenant G. M. Mathias, and the Volunteer Hotchkiss 
 Detachment, under Lieutenant E. N. W. Walker, who clung most gallantly 
 to their positions, and did invaluable service in holding in check till daylight 
 the Boers who had gained a footing on the hill within a few yards of them. 
 The extreme south-west point of the hill was similarly held by a small 
 mixed party of Bluejackets, Royal Engineers, Gordon Highlanders, and 
 Imperial Light Horse, under Lieutenant Digbv Jones, R.E. The remainder 
 of the hill was defended by the companies of 1st Bn. King’s Royal Rifle 
 Corps. Shortly after 3 a.m. an attack was developed against the south-east end 
 of Caesar’s Camp (which was garrisoned bv the 1st Bn. Manchester Regiment), 
 and on the thorn jungle between that hill and the Klip River, which was 
 held by the Natal Mounted Volunteers. As soon as the alarm reached me, I 
 ordered the Imperial Light Horse, under Lieut.-Colonel A. H. M. Edwards, 
 to proceed as rapidly as possible to Wagon Hill, and the Gordon Highlanders 
 to Caesar’s Camp. Shortly afterwards, four companies, 1st Bn. King’s Royal 
 Rifle Corps, and four companies, 2nd Bn. King’s Royal Rifle Corps, were 
 
23 
 
 ordered to march at once on Wagon Hill, and the 2nd Bn. Rifle Brigade on 
 Caesar’s Camp. This section of my defences Mas under the command of 
 Colonel Ian Hamilton, C.B., D.S.Q., who, judging that Wagon Hill was the 
 point most seriously threatened, proceeded there himself, where he arrived 
 about dawn, bringing with him a company of the 2nd Bn. Gordon Highlanders 
 under Major Miller Wallnutt. Perceiving that the close and deadly nature 
 of the fighting made it impossible for one Officer to adequately command on 
 both hills, I directed Colonel Hamilton to devote his attention to Wagon Hill, 
 while 1 entrusted the defence of Caesar’s Camp to Lieut.-Colonel A. E. R. 
 Curran, 1st Bn. Manchester Regiment, who had been stationed there with 
 his battalion ever since the commencement of the siege, and was specially 
 acquainted with the locality. I ordered Major W. E. Blewitt’s battery of 
 Royal Field Artillery, escorted by the 5th Dragoon Guards, to move out by 
 Range Post and endeavour to prevent reinforcements reaching the enemy from 
 the west. Major A. J. Abdy’s battery of Royal Field Artillery I sent to Colonel 
 Royston, Commanding Natal Mounted Volunteers, to take up position on the 
 Klip River flats and shell the south-eastern corner of Caesar’s Camp, where the 
 enemy had effected a lodgment. 
 
 The Imperial Light Horse reached Wagon Flill at 5.10 a.m., and were at 
 once pushed into action. They pressed forward up to and over the western 
 edge of the fiat crest of the hill to within a few yards of the enemy, who held 
 the opposite edge of the crest. They thus afforded a most welcome relief to 
 the small garrison of the hill, but they themselves suffered very severely in 
 occupying and maintaining their position. The company of 2nd Bn. Gordon 
 Highlanders, which arrived with Colonel Hamilton, was sent under cover of the 
 western slopes to reinforce the extreme south-west point of the hill, and to 
 endeavour to work round so as to outflank the enemy, but were unable to do so 
 owing to the extreme severity of the fire kept up by the Boers from Mounted 
 Infantry Hill and from every available scrap of cover in Bester’s Valley, which 
 they occupied in great numbers. At 7 a.m., four companies 1st Bn. King’s 
 Royal Rifle Corps and four companies 2nd Bn. King s Royal Rifle Corps 
 arrived, and about 8 a.m., one of these companies, follow 7 ed shortly afterwards 
 by another, was sent to reinforce the extreme south-western point of the 
 lull, but although gallantly holding their own under a rain of shells and bullets, 
 no progress could be made either there or on the main ridge. Meanwhile the 
 21st and 42nd Batteries, Royal Field Artillery, and the naval 12-pr. on 
 Caesar’s Camp, were in action against Mounted Infantry Hill and the scrub 
 on either side of it, and were of great assistance in keeping down the violence 
 of the enemy's fire. Colonel Hamilton, seeing plainly that the only way of 
 clearing out those of the enemy’s marksmen who were established on the 
 eastern crest of Wagon Hill, within a few yards of our men, was by a sudden 
 rush across the open, directed Major Campbell to tell off a company of the 
 2nd Bn. King’s Royal Rifle Corps to make the attempt, which however failed, 
 Lieutenant N. M. Tod, who commanded, being killed, and the men falling 
 back to the cover of the rocks from behind which they had started. 'The 
 fighting continuing stationary and indecisive, at 10 a.m. I sent the 5th Lancers 
 to Caesar’s Camp and the 18th Hussars to Wagon Hill, two squadrons 10th 
 Hussars having been previously posted on the ground near Maiden Castle to 
 guard against any attempt of the enemy to turn Wagon Hill from the west. 
 
 For some time the fighting slackened considerably, the Boers being 
 gradually driven down below the crest line, except at a single point where they 
 were favoured by excellent cover, with a flat open space in front of it. At 
 i pan., however, a fresh assault was made with great suddenness on the extreme 
 south-west point of the hill, our men giving way for a moment before the sudden 
 outburst of fire and retiring down the opposite slope. Fortunately the Boers 
 did not immediately occupy the crest, and this gave time for Major Miller 
 Wallnutt, 2nd Bn. Gordon Highlanders, Lieutenant Digby Jones, R.E., 
 Lieutenant R. 1). Fitzgerald (11th Hussais), Adjutant Imperial Light Hoise, 
 Gunner W. Sims, R.N., and several non-commissioned officers, Imperial Light 
 Horse, to rally the men ; while Major E. C, Knox, Commanding 18th Hussars, 
 brought up a portion of his regiment, which was in reserve at the foot of the 
 hill, to act dismounted. 
 
 The top was reoccupied just as the three foremost Boers reached it, the 
 
24 
 
 leader being shot by Lieutenant Digby Jones, R.E., and the two others by 
 No. 459 Trooper H. Albrecht, Imperial Light Horse. Had they survived 
 I should have had great pleasure in recommending both Lieutenant Jones and 
 Trooper Albrecht for the distinction of the Victoria Cross. I regret to say that 
 both were killed before the conclusion of the action. 
 
 At 3.30 p.m., a storm of wind and rain of extraordinary severity set in and 
 lasted for 3 hours. During its continuance the 5th Dragoon Guards, 5th 
 Lancers, and 1|- squadrons 19th Hussars reinforced Wagon Hill, acting dis¬ 
 mounted. About 4.45 p.m., when the storm was at its worst, the portion of 
 our troops holding the extreme south-west point of the hill were again driven 
 from their position, but were rallied and reoccupied it; 2nd Lieutenant 
 R. E. Reade, 1st Bn. King’s Royal Rifle Corps, rendering himself conspicuous 
 by his gallant service at this period. 
 
 At 5 p.m., Lieut.-Colonel C. W. Park arrived at Wagon Hill with three 
 companies 1st Bn. Devonshire Regiment, which I had ordered up as a reinforce¬ 
 ment, and was at once directed by Colonel Hamilton to turn the enemy off the 
 ridge with the bayonet. The Devons dashed forward and gained a position 
 under cover within 50 yards of the enemy. Here a fire fight ensued, but the 
 Devons were not to be denied, and, eventually, cheering as they pushed from 
 point to point, they drove the enemy not only off the plateau but cleared every 
 Boer out of the lower slopes and the dongas surrounding the position. 
 Lieut.-Colonel Park went into action with four Officers, but he alone remained 
 untouched at the close. The total loss of the Devons was nearly 28 per cent, 
 of those engaged, and the men fired only 12 rounds per rifle. Captain 
 A. Menzies, 1st Bn. Manchester Regiment, with a few of his men, accompanied 
 the Devons throughout. He also was wounded. 
 
 I desire to draw special attention to the gallantry displayed by all 
 ranks of the Imperial Light Horse, some of whom were within 100 yards of 
 the enemy for 15 hours exposed to a deadly fire. Their losses were terribly 
 heavy, but never for one moment did any of them waver or cease to show a 
 line example of courage and determination to all who came in contact with 
 them. 
 
 I have already mentioned that about 3 a.in., the south-east end of Caesar’s 
 Camp was also attacked, as well as the pickets of the Natal Volunteers in the 
 thorn scrub to the north of that hill. During the darkness the enemy succeeded 
 in establishing themselves on part of that end of Caesar’s Camp, but the 
 precise details of what occurred have not been made clear, as nearly all the 
 defenders of this portion have been killed. It is believed, however, that taking- 
 advantage of a general similarity of dress to that of the Natal Volunteers and 
 Police, and many of them having a perfect command of the English language, 
 the Boers succeeded in deceiving the pickets as to their identity, and were thus 
 able to effect a surprise. As already stated, I sent the 53rd Battery, Royal 
 Field Artillery, under Major A. J. Abdy, to Colonel Royston, Commanding- 
 Natal Volunteers; and these guns, most ably handled, came into action on the 
 Klip River flats, and, though exposed to the Are of several Boer guns (including 
 a 6-inch Creusot gun on Bulwana Mountain), to which they had no means of 
 replying, shelled the south-east portion of Caesar’s Camp with great effect, and 
 inflicted very heavy losses on the enemy. The 2nd Bn. Gordon Highlanders 
 and 2nd Bn. Rifle Brigade were sent to Lieut.-Colonel A. E. R. Curran, who 
 was in command here, and were gradually pushed into the fight, company by 
 company, wherever their services were most required. Gradually the Boers 
 were pushed back over the crest line, but held on most stubbornly to the 
 slopes, being continually reinforced or relieved from the dongas below and 
 from the adjacent hills, whence a fire of very great intensity was kept up, while 
 the whole of the plateau was swept by the Boer long-range guns from distant 
 eminences. At last, after f 5 hours of stubborn resistance by our men, and of 
 continual effort on the part of the Boers, the enemy were driven off at all 
 points during- the same storm in which Wagon Hill was also cleared as already 
 described, their retreat being hastened by the heavy fire poured on them as 
 they retired. 
 
 Another attack was made before dawn on the 6th January on Observation 
 Hill West, occupied by ^ battalion 1st Bn. Devonshire Regiment, under 
 Major M. C. Curry. ’The enemy gained some dead ground near our works 
 Juring the darkness, and at 9.30 a.in., and again at a later hour, they 
 
attempted to storm the works under cover of the fire of these men and of guns 
 and l’ifles from all the surrounding kopjes. These, however, were repelled 
 with no great difficulty by the wing 1st Bn. Devonshire Regiment, and the 
 Artillery allotted to this portion of the defence, consisting of Royal Field 
 Artillery and naval guns. The enemy, however, held on to the dead ground 
 originally occupied all day, and only withdrew during the storm in the after¬ 
 noon. The remainder of Section “ B ” and the whole of Section “ A ” of the 
 defences were subjected to a heavy fire of guns and rifles all day, but no other 
 attempt to press home an attack was made on these portions of our line. 
 
 Our losses, I regret to say, were very heavy, consisting of 14 Officers and 
 135 non-commissioned officers and men killed, and 31 officers and 244 men 
 wounded. I have not been able to ascertain the actual loss to the Boers, but 
 79 bodies found within our lines were returned to them next day for burial, 
 and native spies report that their total casualties could not be less than 700. 
 
 35. On 8th January a thanksgiving service in commemoration of the 
 repulse of the enemy on 6th idem was held by Archdeacon Barker, and very 
 largely attended by such officers and men as could be spared from duty. 
 From this time until the end of the siege, no further effort to carry Ladysmith 
 by assault was made by the Boers, whose attention was fully occupied by the 
 various attacks made by Sir Red vers Buffer on the line of the Tugela, though 
 the town and camps were exposed to a daily bombardment from the enemy’s 
 guns, and skirmishing between our outposts and those of the Boers went on 
 all day and every day, and caused us small but continuous losses. During this 
 period I shall only refer to a night enterprise undertaken by 2nd Lieutenant 
 H. C. W. Theobald, and 15 non-commissioned officers and men, 1st Bn. 
 Gloucestershire Regiment. The object was to set fire to the abbattis which 
 the enemy had constructed at the foot of Gun Hill, and was carried out in a 
 manner reflecting credit on the young Officer in command, and without loss; 
 while creating a considerable scare among the Boers who fired heavily in the 
 darkness for a considerable time. 
 
 36. On 1st March I sent Colonel W. G. Knox, with the 1st Bn. Liverpool 
 Regiment, 1st Bn. Devonshire Regiment, 2nd Bn. Gordon Highlanders, 5th 
 Dragoon Guards, and the 53rd and 67th Batteries, Royal Field Artillery, to 
 move out along the Newcastle Road to harass as much as possible the enemy 
 whom we could see retiring before the successful advance of Sir Red vers 
 Buffer’s force. Colonel Knox carried Long Hill and Pepworth Hill and opened 
 fire with his guns on Modder Spruit Railway Station and the large Boer camp 
 there, which the enemy at once evacuated. Both men and horses were too 
 weak for rapid or prolonged operations, but several of the enemy’s camps were 
 captured, and the force returned after having very successfully carried out 
 their object to as great a distance as their weakness permitted them to pursue. 
 Our casualties were 2 officers and 6 non-commissioned officers and men 
 wounded. 
 
 37. Colonel Lord Dundonald with a body of Colonial troops rode into 
 Ladysmith on the evening of 28th February, and on 1st March General Sir 
 Redvers Buffer himself arrived, and the siege came to an end. 
 
 38. During the period from 6th January to 1st March, our struggle became 
 one against disease and starvation even more than against the enemy. Our 
 worst foes in this respect were enteric fever and dysentery, the former especially 
 committing great ravages among the young soldiers of the garrison. Our deaths 
 by disease from 2nd November, 1899, to 28th February, 1900, amounted to 12 
 officers and 529 non-commissioned officers and men. The officers of the 
 Royal Army Medical Corps, the Army Nursing Sisters, the many ladies who 
 voluntarily offered their services as nurses, and the hospital staffs of all ranks, 
 maintained throughout the siege a brave and protracted struggle against sick¬ 
 ness under almost every possible disadvantage, their numbers being most 
 inadequate for the work to be done, and the supplies of drugs and of suitable 
 food for invalids being entirely insufficient for so many patients for sp long 
 a period. 
 
 (762-2) D 
 
26 
 
 39. Even more important was the regulation and augmentation of the 
 food supplies, as will be realized from the simple statement that 21,000 
 mouths had to be fed for 120 days; and the admirable manner in which all 
 arrangements were made and carried out by the Officers of the Army Service 
 Corps and Indian Commissariat Department under the able and untiring 
 superintendence of Colonel E. W. D. Ward, C.B., my A.A.G. (B), will be 
 evident from the fact that at the date of the relief we still possessed resources 
 capable of maintaining this great number on reduced rations for another 
 30* days. 
 
 At the commencement of the siege, it became necessary to augment as 
 far as possible all food supplies, and, with this view, one mill and subsequently 
 two, were taken over and worked under military supervision and with labour 
 and mechanics obtained from the employes of the Natal Government Railway, 
 who remained voluntarily with the garrison. From these mills we produced 
 during the siege mealie flour, mealie bran and crushed mealies. The mills 
 were worked under the personal supervision of Lieut.-Colonel Stonernan, A.S.C., 
 D.A.A.G., assisted by Major D. M. Thompson, Assistant Commissary-General, 
 Indian Commissariat Transport Department. 
 
 When grazing and forage became scarce and the supply of cattle 
 approached within a measurable distance of extinction, it was necessary to 
 utilize for food the horses which would otherwise have died from exhaustion 
 and weakness. From these slaughtered horses very considerable additions to 
 the food supply were made, bv the establishment of a factory from which 
 were made : (i.) “ Chevril,’' a strong meat soup issued nightly to the troops ; 
 (ii.) a condensed form of “Chevril’’ which took the place in the hospitals of 
 various meat extracts which had been expended; (iii.) a jelly similar to calf- 
 foot jelly for the sick and wounded; (iv.) “Chevril paste” made of boiled 
 meat and jelly and issued as a ration to the men, and which being similar to 
 the potted meats manufactured at home was much appreciated by the troops ; 
 and finally (v.) “ neats-foot oil,” which was used for lubricating the heavy 
 Naval Ordnance. The boiled meat was given to the soldiers at the rate of 
 ^ lb. per man. 
 
 The whole of this factory was under the management of Lieutenant 
 C. E. J. MacNalty, A.S.C., whose untiring energy, ingenuity, and intelligence 
 are deserving of high commendation. Captain J. It. Young, R.E., R.S.O., 
 converted a railway locomotive shed into a factory, and displayed very great 
 skill in improvising the various appliances necessary for the manufacture of 
 the different foods. 
 
 With the object of still further improving the rations a sausage factory 
 was established which converted the horse-flesh into excellent sausages, issued 
 to the men at the rate of £ lb. per head. This factory was most efficiently 
 worked under the supervision of Mr. R. Beresford Turner. 
 
 As a safeguard against any serious loss of animals by disease or from 
 other causes with a consequent reduction of our power of continuing the 
 defence, a reserve of “ biltong ’ was prepared, under the superintendence of 
 Captain A. Long, A.8.C., who undertook it in addition to his onerous duties 
 of Local Transport Officer. 
 
 The very large number of enteric and dysentery patients rendered it 
 necessary to utilise all available sources of milk supply. All milch cows were 
 requisitioned, and a dairy system established which provided milk, on medical 
 certificate, for the sick, both military and civilian. 
 
 The feeding of the civil population was carried out by the Army Service 
 Corps, a staff of civilian assistants being organised for distribution, and a 
 large shed specially converted for the purpose. The two foregoing duties 
 were carried out under the direction of Lieut.-Colonel Stonernan, D.A.A.G., 
 and Major Thompson, A.C.G. 
 
 40. On the investment of Ladysmith, the main was broken by the 
 enemy, and the water supply for the camp and town became dependent upon 
 the Klip River. A system of filtration by Berkefeld filters was commenced, 
 which answered well so long as the limited supply of alum lasted ; as soon 
 ns it was expended the muddy condition of the water clogged the filters, and 
 this method became unreliable. Three condensers were then constructed out 
 ol improvised materials by Mr. Binnie, Maintenance Manager, Natal Govern- 
 
27 
 
 ment Railway, under the able direction of Engineer C. C. Sheen, R.N., H.M. 
 Ship “ Powerful.” As a further means of obtaining pure water, apparatus for 
 clearing’ water was constructed out of barrack sheeting placed on wooden 
 stands, and having a deposit of wood ashes, through which the water was 
 strained. It thus became possible to use the filters and also to provide all units 
 with clearing arrangements. It was possible, so long as the coal lasted, to 
 supply at least 12,000 gallons of condensed or filtered water daily. The 
 management of the water supply was carried out by Lieutenant H. B. Abadie, 
 11th Hussars, who performed the duties of Staff Officer for Water Supplies, 
 and whose work is deserving of much praise. 
 
 Mr. W. King, District Inspector, Public Works Department, Mr. R. 
 Brooke and the officials of that department, rendered most valuable assistance 
 in every way possible. 
 
 41. With the object of reducing the number of orderlies employed in the 
 conveyance of letters, a postal system, which included all the defences and the 
 camp and town, was organised and most efficiently carried out by Captain 
 P. C. J. Scott, A.S.C. 
 
 42. In order to supply the deficiency of hay, a corps of grass-cutters was 
 formed and placed under the charge of Major W. J. R. Wickham, Assistant 
 Commissary-General, Indian Commissariat Transport Department. This corps, 
 which consisted of Indian refugees and Kaffirs, did excellent work, and collected 
 grass under conditions of considerable difficulty. 
 
 43. I take this opportunity of publicly expressing my deep sense of the 
 gallantry and patient endurance of hardships displayed by all ranks of all 
 corps under my command. 
 
 The Naval Brigade of H.M. Ship “ Powerful,' under Captain the 
 Honourable Hedworth Larnbton, R.N., have rivalled the best of our troops in 
 gallantry and endurance, and their long-range guns, though hampered by a 
 most serious want of sufficient ammunition, have played a most prominent 
 part in the defence, and have been most successful in keeping the enemy from 
 bringing his guns to the ranges at which they would have been most efficient. 
 
 The Cavalry have not only performed their regular duties, but when 
 their horses became non-effective have served as infantry, being re-armed 
 with rifle and bayonet, and taking their regular share in holding the 
 fortifications. 
 
 The Artillery have displayed their usual skill and gallantry, whether as 
 mobile batteries or when used as guns of position in fixed emplacements as 
 became increasingly necessary during the latter portion of the investment. 
 
 The Royal Engineers, both Officers and men, have sustained the grand 
 traditions of their corps, and whether engaged on the defences, in maintaining 
 telegraphic and telephonic communication between all sections of the defences, 
 in ballooning, or in any other work required of them, have done everything 
 which they were called upon to perform in a manner which has afforded me 
 the highest satisfaction. 
 
 The work of the Infantry especially, exposed day and night to all weathers 
 on our lines of defence, almost continually under fire, and living latterly on a 
 ration consisting of little more than a proportion of horse flesh with T lb. per 
 man of inferior and scarcely eatable mealie bread, has been of the most severe 
 and trying nature, and has been carried out without a murmur and with the 
 most cheerful steadfastness. 
 
 Of the Imperial Light Horse, specially raised in Natal at the commence¬ 
 ment of the war, I have already expressed my opinion. No praise can be too 
 great for the gallantry and determination which all ranks of this corps have 
 invariably displayed in action. 
 
 The Natal Yolunteers have performed invaluable service. Their know¬ 
 ledge of the country has been of the very greatest use to me, and in every 
 action in which they have been engaged they have shown themselves most 
 forward and daring. The Natal Naval Volunteers have proved themselves 
 worthy comrades of the land forces of the Colony. 
 
 (762-2) D 2 
 
28 
 
 44. The civil inhabitants of Ladysmith, of all ages and both sexes, have 
 uncomplainingly borne the privations inseparable from a siege, and have 
 endured the long-continued bombardment to which they have been exposed 
 with a fortitude which does them honour. 
 
 45. In conclusion, I trust I may be allowed to give expression to the deep 
 sense of gra titude, felt not only by myself but by every soldier, sailor and 
 civilian who has been through the siege, to General Sir Red vers Buller and his 
 gallant force, who, after such severe lighting, so many hardships, and notwith¬ 
 standing very severe losses, have triumphantly carried out the relief of my 
 
 beleaguered garrison. 
 
 © © 
 
 46. Finally, I desire to bring prominently to your notice the following 
 Officers, Warrant Officers, non-commissioned officers, sailors, soldiers, volun¬ 
 teers, and civilians, who have rendered specially good service during the four 
 months of the siege. 
 
 Major-General Sir Archibald Hunter, K.C.B., D.S.O., who acted as my 
 Chief of the Staff, is an Officer of well-known reputation. I cannot speak 
 too highly of him, whether for the performance of Staff duties or for bold 
 leading in the field. He is a most loyal and efficient Staff Officer, and I 
 recommend him for advancement with the utmost confidence, being well 
 assured that such a step would be for the good of the State. 
 
 Captain the Honourable Hedworth Lambton, R.N., commanding the 
 Naval Brigade, reached Ladysmith in the nick of time, when it became 
 evident that I was not strong enough to meet the enemy in the open field. 
 He brought with him two 4’7-inch and four 12-pr. guns, which proved to be 
 the only ordnance in my possession capable of equalling in range the enemy’s 
 heavy guns. Although the ammunition available was very limited, Captain 
 Lambton so economised it that it lasted out to the end of the siege, and under 
 his direction the naval guns succeeded in keeping at a distance the enemy’s 
 siege guns, a service which w r as of the utmost importance. Captain Lambton 
 personally has been the life of the garrison throughout the siege. 
 
 Maior-General F. Howard, C.B., C.M.G., A.D.C., Commanding the 8th 
 Brigade and in charge of Section B of the defences, has proved himself a 
 cai'eful and able administrator. The works constructed in his section were 
 exceptionally strong and well maintained. 
 
 Colonel I. S. M. Hamilton, C.B., D.S.O., Commanding 7th Brigade 
 and in charge of Section C of the defences, has, during the whole of the 
 operations of the defence, been in charge of the most exposed and most 
 extended front, including the immense position of Caesar’s Camp and 
 Wagon Hill, over 4 miles in perimeter. I cannot speak too highly of his 
 indefatigable zeal in organising the defence of his front, and in keeping up 
 the hearts of all under him by his constant and personal supervision. His 
 leadership on 6th January was the most marked factor in the success of the 
 defence. 
 
 Colonel W. G. Knox, C.B., Colonel on the Staff in charge of Section A 
 of the defences, exercised the command entrusted to him with great zeal and 
 skill. The works constructed on his front were models of semi-permanent 
 entrenchment, laid out from the commencement on a plain which enabled him 
 to strengthen them day by day until they became practically impregnable. 
 He is an Officer of fine nerve and a strong disciplinarian. I trust his services 
 may be adequately rewarded. 
 
 Colonel W. Royston, Commanding Natal Volunteer Forces and in 
 charge of Section I) of the defences. I can only repeat the high praise 
 which I had the pleasure to bestow on Colonel Royston in my despatch of 
 the 2nd December, 1899. He commanded Section D of the defences in 
 an admirable manner, and with his force, though much reduced in numbers 
 by casualties and disease, continued to the end to perform invaluable service. 
 He is an Officer exceptionally suited to his important position as Commandant 
 of the Natal Volunteer Forces, and I trust that he may receive some suitable 
 reward. 
 
 Major-General J. F. Brocklehurst, M.V.O., continued to command the 
 Cavalry Brigade until the horses became useless from starvation. In all 
 Cavalry actions round Ladysmith his personal gallantry was conspicuous. 
 
29 
 
 Colonel C. M. H. Downing, Commanding Royal Artillery, did all that a 
 highly-trained specialist could do to assist me in the defence, both as regards 
 the employment of his batteries as mobile units, and also in their distribution 
 and action when it became necessary to demobilise them, and place the guns 
 in fixed epaulments. He is an Officer in whose knowledge and judgment in 
 artillery matters I have every confidence. 
 
 Major S. It. Rice, Commanding Royal Engineers, was indefatigable in 
 his exertions both by day and night, and showed considerable skill in laying 
 out works and in giving to the Commanders of Sections of the defences that 
 advice and assistance in their construction which the trained Officers of the 
 Royal Engineers can so ably afford. 
 
 Brevet-Colonel E. W. D. Ward, C.B., Army Service Corps, Assistant- 
 Adjutant-General for “ B ” duties. As the siege continued and the supply 
 difficulties constantly increased, Colonel Ward’s cheerful ingenuity met every 
 difficulty with ever-fresh expedients. He is unquestionably the very best 
 Supply Officer I have ever met, and to his resource, foresight, and inventive¬ 
 ness the successful defence of Ladysmith for so long a period is very largely 
 due. He is exceptionally deserving of reward, and I trust that he may receive 
 the advancement which his services have merited. 
 
 Colonel B. Duff, C.I.E., Indian Staff Corps, Assistant Military Secretary, 
 performed the duties of his office with his characteristic ability and zeal. He 
 also took a prominent part in the general Staff duties of head-quarters, in 
 which his services were equally valuable. This Officer is fitted for the highest 
 posts. 
 
 Colonel R. Exham, Royal Army Medical Corps, did all that a Principal 
 Medical Officer could do in organising the medical services under circum¬ 
 stances of exceptional difficulty, and with personnel and materiel both 
 inadequate for a siege of such long duration, accompanied by such a great 
 amount of sickness. 
 
 Lieut.-Colonel R. W. Mapleton, Royal Army Medical Corps, in charge of 
 Intombi Hospital Camp, was placed in a most exceptional position, in charge 
 of a neutral camp where the maintenance of discipline in the ordinary way 
 was impossible, but in the face of all difficulties he did everything possible to 
 maintain the sanitation of the camp, and to ensure the well-being of the sick 
 and wounded. 
 
 Veterinary Lieut.-Colonel I. Matthews, Army Veterinary Department, 
 Principal Veterinary Officer, did excellent work in maintaining, so far as the 
 want of proper forage would admit, the efficiency of all animals belonging to 
 the Force. He was a very valuable adviser on veterinary matters both to 
 myself and to the General Officer Commanding the Cavalry Brigade. 
 
 Brevet Lieut.-Colonel Sir Henry S. Rawlinson, Bart., Coldstream Guards, 
 Deputy-Assistant Adjutant-General, who officiated throughout the siege 
 as Assistant Adjutant-General (A), is a Staff Officer of great ability and 
 activity, with a wonderful eye for the topography of the country. His 
 constant observations of the enemy’s positions and movements were of much 
 value to me in forecasting their intentions. He is an officer well worthy of 
 advancement. 
 
 Brevet Lieut.-Colonel H. M. Lawson, R.E., additional Assistant Adjutant- 
 General (A), is a Staff Officer of the highest ability and the soundest judg¬ 
 ment, and rendered me most valuable service throughout the siege. 
 
 Major E. A. Altham, Royal Scots, Assistant Adjutant-General for 
 Intelligence, has had to contend with all the difficulties inseparable from 
 intelligence work under the limitations imposed by siege conditions. Ail that 
 was possible under these conditions he has done, and 1 consider him an 
 excellent Intelligence Officer in every respect. 
 
 Brevet-Major H. Henderson, Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, Deputy- 
 Assistant Adjutant-General for Intelligence. Towards the latter end of the 
 siege, Major Altham was attacked by enteric fever, and Major Henderson 
 assumed charge of the Field Intelligence Department. He is a bold and 
 accurate reconnoitrer, and the intelligence he brought back was always 
 reliable. Whether as a subordinate or as head of the Field Intelligence 
 Department, he has always afforded me the greatest assistance. I recommend 
 him for reward. 
 
 Major C. de C. Hamilton, R.A., Deputy-Assistant Adjutant-General (A) 
 
30 
 
 lias done a good deal of most useful work and has shown himself a’Stall 
 Officer of high promise. ■ • 
 
 Major W. F. Hawkins, R.E., Director of Army Telegraphs, was in¬ 
 defatigable in maintaining electric communication between my head-quarters 
 and all portions of the defence. The service thus rendered was of the highest 
 value, and conduced greatly to the successful defence of Ladysmith. 
 
 Major G. M. Heath, R.E., in charge of Balloon Section, is a bold and 
 enterprising aeronaut, and rendered useful service during the siege ; the 
 constant watch which he kept on the enemy's movements being a source of 
 much disquiet to them. 
 
 Major W. 0. Savile, R.A., Senior Ordnance Officer, conducted the duties 
 of his department with zeal and ability. 
 
 Colonel J, G. Dartnell, C.M.G., Chief Commissioner, Natal Police, 
 possesses an exceptional knowledge of the Colony of Natal and of native 
 character. I am greatly obliged to him for the advice and assistance which 
 he has always been ready to afford me, of which I have availed myself freely, 
 and which I have found of the highest value. 
 
 Mr. T. R. Bennett, Resident Magistrate of Ladysmith, was placed by me 
 in charge of the Civil Camp at Intombi, and performed much good service in 
 strictly enforcing the conditions on which I was permitted by Commandant- 
 General Joubert to maintain that camp. 
 
 Mr. D. G. Giles acted as Resident Magistrate at Ladysmith during 
 Mr. Bennett’s absence, and was of great assistance in maintaining discipline 
 amongst the civil population, both European and Native. 
 
 The Reverends E. J. Macpherson, 0. S. Watkins, T. Murray and Father 
 Ford, the senior chaplains of the Church of England, Wesleyan, Presbyterian 
 and Roman Catholic denominations respectively, showed the greatest zeal and 
 self-sacrifice in their attention to the sick and wounded, as well as in their 
 ministrations to those in health. I regret that the calls on them for aid and 
 comfort by the dying were only too constant. 
 
 My especial thanks are due to the following Commanding Officers of 
 Units :— 
 
 Lieut.-Colonel St. J. C. Gore, Commanding 5th Dragoon Guards. 
 
 Major E. C. Knox, Commanding 18th Hussars. 
 
 Lieut.-Colonel J. A. Coxhead, Commanding 2nd Brigade Division, 
 Royal Field Artillery. 
 
 Lieut.-Colonel E. H. Pickwoad, Commanding 1st Brigade Division, 
 Royal Field Artillery. 
 
 Major J. W. G. Dawkins, Commanding 13th Battery, Royal Field 
 Artillery. 
 
 Major W E. Blewitt, Commanding 21st Battery, Royal Field 
 Art’fiery. 
 
 Major C. E. Goulburn, Commanding 42nd Battery, Royal Field 
 Artillery. 
 
 Major A. J. Abdy, Commanding 53rd Battery, Royal Field 
 Artillery. 
 
 Major J. F. Manifold, Commanding 67th Battery, Royal Field 
 Artillery. 
 
 Major F. D. V. Wing, Commanding 69th Battery, Royal Field 
 Artillery. 
 
 Lieut.-Colonel C. W. Park, Commanding 1st Bn. Devonshire 
 Regiment. 
 
 Lieut.-Colonel A. E. R. Curran, Commanding 1st. Bn. Manchester 
 Regiment. 
 
 Lieut.-Colonel C. T. E. Metcalfe, Commanding 2nd Bn. Rifle 
 Brigade. 
 
 Major (local Lieut.-Colonel) A. H. M. Edwards, 5th Dragoon Guards, 
 Commanding Imperial Light Horse. 
 
 47. I also desire to bring to your notice the following Officers, &c., who 
 have rendered excellent service :— 
 
 Lieutenant A. W. Heneaae, R.N. 
 
 Lieutenant L. Halsey, R.N. 
 
31 
 
 Lieut.-Colonel J. Stoneman, Army Service Corps, Deputy-Assistant 
 Adjutant-General. 
 
 Major J. R. Dick, Army Pay Department. 
 
 Major F. H. Treherne, Royal Army Medical Corps. 
 
 Major S. C. N. Grant, Royal Engineers. 
 
 Major J. F. Bateson, Royal Army Medical Corps. 
 
 Major H. Mullaly, Royal Engineers, Deputy-Assistant Adjutant- 
 General. 
 
 Major A. J. Murray, Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers, Deputy-Assistant 
 Adj utant-General. 
 
 Brevet-Major A. J. King, Royal Lancaster Regiment, A.D.C. to 
 Major-General Sir A. Hunter. 
 
 Major E. R. O. Ludlow, Army Service Corps, Deputy-Assistant 
 Adjutant-General (B). 
 
 Captain J. R. Young, Royal Engineers, Railway Staff Officer. 
 
 Captain F. Lyon, Royal Field Artillery, A.D.C. 
 
 Captain F. S. Tat ham, Natal Mounted Rifles. 
 
 Lieutenant J. D. G. Walker, Royal Highlanders, Divisional Signalling 
 Officer. 
 
 Conductor W. C. xlshmore, Indian Unattached List. 
 
 Mr. J. Farquhar, Mayor of Ladysmith. 
 
 Mr. A. Henderson, in charge of Native Guide Establishment. 
 
 4S. The following Officers, Warrant Officers, non-commissioned and petty 
 officers and men have been brought to ray notice by General Officers Com¬ 
 manding, Heads of Departments, and Officers Commanding Units, and I 
 cordially endorse their commendations. (The names are arranged in order of 
 precedence of corps): —- 
 
 Officers. 
 
 Royal Navy. 
 
 Lieutenant M. H. Hodges. 
 
 Lieutenant E. Stabb, Royal Naval Reserve (died of enteric fever, 
 15th January). 
 
 Fleet Paymaster W. H. F. Kay. 
 
 Engineer C. C. Sheen. 
 
 Midshipman Hon. I. F. A. Carnegie. 
 
 Cavalry. 
 
 4th Dragoon Guards. 
 Lieutenant B. H. H. Mathew-Lannowe. 
 
 5th Dragoon Guards. 
 
 Lieutenant and Adjutant W. Q. Winwood. 
 
 5th Lancers. 
 
 Major A. C. King. 
 
 ] 1th Hussars. 
 
 Lieutenant P. D. Fitzgerald. 
 
 16th Lancers. 
 
 Captain G. P. Wyndham, Brigade-Major, Cavalry Brigade. 
 
32 
 
 18th Hussars. 
 
 Major H. T. Laming. 
 
 19 th Hussars. 
 
 Major H. D. Fanshawe. 
 
 Lieutenant and Adjutant M. Archer-Shee. 
 
 Royal Artillery. 
 
 Staff. 
 
 Captain A. L. Walker. 
 
 Captain E. S. E. W. Russell. 
 
 21st Battery, Royal Field Artillery. 
 Lieutenant R. E. Ramsden. 
 
 42nd Battery, Royal Field Artillery. 
 Lieutenant S. W. Douglas. 
 
 1st Brigade Division Ammunition Column. 
 
 Major E. S. May. 
 
 Captain H. W. A. Christie. 
 
 Royal Engineers. 
 
 Lieutenant R. J. T. Digby-Jones (killed 6th January). 
 
 23rd Field Company. 
 
 2nd Lieutenant G. B. B. Denniss (killed 6th January). 
 
 Infantry. 
 
 1st Bn. Royal West Surrey Regiment. 
 Brevet-Major D. Mackworth (killed 6th January). 
 
 1st Bn. The King’s (Liverpool Regiment). 
 
 Lieut.-Colonel L. S. Mellor. 
 
 Lieutenant and Adjutant L. M. Jones. 
 
 1st Bn. Devonshire Regiment. 
 
 Major M. C. Curry. 
 
 Captain W. B. Lafone (killed in action 6th January). 
 
 Captain and Adjutant H. S. L. Ravenshaw. 
 
 Lieutenant J. E. I. Masterson. 
 
 Lieutenant H. N. Field (killed in action 6th January). 
 Somersetshire Light Infantry. 
 
 Captain J. M. Vallentin, Brigade-Major, 7th Infantry Brigade. 
 Lieutenant C. E, M. Walker (killed in action 6th January), 
 
 
33 
 
 1st Bn. Leicestershire Regiment. 
 
 Major E. R. Scott. 
 
 Captain L. C. Sherer. 
 
 1st Bn. Scottish Rifles. 
 
 Lieutenant N. M. Tod, attached to 2nd Bn. King’s Royal Rifle Corps 
 (killed in action 6th January). 
 
 1st Bn. King’s Royal Rifle Corps. 
 
 Lieut.-Colonel W. P. Campbell. 
 
 Captain E. Northey. 
 
 Captain and Adjutant H. R. Blore. 
 
 2nd Bn. King’s RoyaLRifle Corps. 
 
 Major H. E. Buchanan-Riddell Acting Deputy-Assistant Adjutant- 
 General, Divisional Troops. 
 
 Major H. S. Bowen (killed in action 6th January). 
 
 1st Bn. Manchester Regiment. 
 
 Major J. E. Watson. 
 
 Captain A. W. Marden. 
 
 Lieutenant H. Fisher. 
 
 2nd Bn. Gordon Highlanders. 
 
 Lieut.-Colonel W. A. Scott. 
 
 Major C. C. Miller Wallnutt (killed in action 6th January). 
 
 Rifle Brigade. 
 
 Brevet-Lieut.-Colonel Hon. C. G. Fortescue, C.M.G., Brigade-Major. 
 8th Brigade. 
 
 Captain H. E. Vernon, D.S.O., A.D.C., to General Officer Com¬ 
 manding, 8th Brigade. 
 
 2nd Bn. Rifle Brigade. 
 
 Captain H. M. Biddulph. 
 
 Brevet-Major G. H. Thesiger. 
 
 Captain J. E. Gough. 
 
 Captain G. Paley. 
 
 Lieutenant and Adjutant Hon. H. Dawna} 1- . 
 
 Army Sei'vice Corps. 
 
 Captain A. Long. 
 Captain A. K. Seccombe. 
 
 Indian Commissariat—Transport Department. 
 
 Major D. M. Thompson. 
 
 ( 762 - 2 ) 
 
 E 
 
34 
 
 Royal Army Medical Corps. 
 
 Lieut.-Colonel S. H. Carter. 
 
 Major H. Martin. 
 
 Major It, L. Love. 
 
 Major M. W. Kerin. 
 
 Major S. Westcott. 
 
 Major I). Bruce. 
 
 Captain G. S. Walker (died of enteric fever, 23rd February) 
 
 Indian Medical Service. 
 Major W. H. W. Elliot. 
 
 Nursing Sisters. 
 Army. 
 
 Superintendent Elizabeth Ann Dowse 
 Nursing Sister Elizabeth Treacher Noble. 
 Nursing- Sister Alice Sweeting Bond. 
 Nursing Sister Jane Idoadley. 
 
 Nursing Sister Mary Greenfell Hill. 
 
 Civilian. 
 
 Elizabeth Ludlow.. 
 
 Sophia Margaret Patterson. 
 Joan Charleson. 
 
 Jessie Edith Borlase. 
 
 Sophie Lees. 
 
 Bose Lina Shappere. 
 
 Harriet Maud Campbell Boss. 
 Amy Blake Keightly. 
 
 Maud Brice. 
 
 Ellen Philipson Stowe. 
 
 Dorothy Belton. 
 
 Katherine Louisa Hill. 
 
 Isabella Jessie Philipson Stowe. 
 Lucy Alice Yeatman. 
 
 Susan Margaret Gertrude Otto. 
 Ethel Margaret Early. 
 
 Margaret Nicolson. 
 
 Chrissie Emma Thompson. 
 
 Kate Driver. 
 
 Kate Matilda Champion. 
 
 Maud Mary Tentney. 
 
 Bhoda Davies. 
 
 Santjie Buiter. 
 
 Elaine Bromilon. 
 
 Imperial Light Horse. 
 
 Major D. E. Doveton (died of wounds, 14th February). 
 Surgeon-Major W. T. F. Davies. 
 
 Captain C. H. Fowler. 
 
35 
 
 Natal Volunteer Force. 
 
 Lieut.-Colonel E. M. Greene, Commanding Natal Carbineers. 
 Major It. W. Evans, Commanding Natal Mounted Rifles. 
 Major F. J. Rethman, Commanding Border Mounted Rifles. 
 Major H. T. Bru-de-Wold, Chief Staff Officer. 
 
 Major J. Hyslop, Principal Medical Officer. 
 
 Natal Volunteer Medical Staff. 
 Captain H. T. Platt. 
 
 Warrant, Non-commissioned, Petty Officers, and Men. 
 
 Royal Navy. 
 
 1st Class Petty Officer W. C. Lee. 
 
 1st Class Petty Officer P. Sisk. 
 
 1st Class Petty Officer A. G. Withers. 
 
 Leading Seaman A. C. Pratt. 
 
 Leading Seaman S. E. Hemming. 
 
 Cavalry. 
 
 18 th Hussars. 
 
 4751 Lance-Serjeant W. Howard. 
 
 Royal Artillery. 
 
 21st Battery, Royal Field Artillery. 
 
 48523 Battery Serjeant-Major W. Crouch. 
 75845 Serjeant T. Brace. 
 
 78313 Serjeant C. Ellis. 
 
 79706 Serjeant G. J. Randall. 
 
 65438 Farrier-Serjeant J. Nunn. 
 
 9850 Trumpeter G. J. Will. 
 
 42nd Battery, Royal Field Artillery. 
 
 270 Battery Serjeant-Major W. Hull. 
 
 9035 Battery Quarter-Master-Serjeant F. C. Stannard 
 91253 Serjeant D. Heriot. 
 
 77666 Serjeant C. Grant. 
 
 90400 Gunner S. Gawtry. 
 
 Balloon Section. 
 
 21299 Corporal W. Burtenshaw. 
 23362 Corporal W. H. Pearce. 
 
 53rd Battery, Royal Field Artillery. 
 
 27041 Battery Serjeant-Major J. Vevers. 
 
 18247 Battery Quarter-Master-Serjeant T. Fogarty 
 69323 Serjeant J. Boseley. 
 
 69165 Serjeant H. Gill. 
 
 87672 Bombardier A. Cook. 
 
 93729 Acting Bombardier W. Thomas. 
 
 13775 Gunner J. Bourne. 
 
 (762-2) E 2 
 
36 
 
 69th Battery, Boyal Field Artillery. 
 
 34483 Battery Quarter-Master-Serjeant W. H. Viney. 
 
 No. 10 Mountain Battery, Royal Garrison Artillery. 
 
 77236 Serjeant J. Roxburgh. 
 
 50538 Serjeant J. Lyons. 
 
 93330 Serjeant G. French. 
 
 5832 Gunner E. Greenfield. 
 
 95011 Gunner W. Shields. 
 
 94013 Gunner B. Greenwood. 
 
 99298 Gunner E. Holtham. 
 
 93165 Gunner T. Woods. 
 
 1st Brigade Division Ammunition Column. 
 
 Regimental Serjeant-Major E. J. Ellard. 
 64914 Serjeant H. Wilson. 
 
 2nd Brigade Division Ammunition Column. 
 
 38803 Battery Quarter-Master-Serjeant E. Strange. 
 82601 Corporal H. Gray. 
 
 Royal Engineers. 
 
 23rd Field Company. 
 
 21027 Serjeant C. Jackson (killed). 
 
 20367 Serjeant F. Land. 
 
 22182 Serjeant E. Piggott. 
 
 20426 Serjeant H. Herrington. 
 
 21916 Corporal H. Rawlinson. 
 
 17632 Corporal W. G. Rich. 
 
 28955 2nd Corporal J. Stewart. 
 
 25054 2nd Corporal A. Melvin. 
 
 27130 2nd Corporal W. H. Berry. 
 
 28144 Lance-Corporal F. Hockaday. 
 26046 Lance-Corporal H. Bailey (killed). 
 28687 Lance-Corporal J. Denniss. 
 
 27232 Lance-Corporal J. Trebett. 
 
 1986 Sapper C. Catchpole. 
 
 28753 Sapper H. Rutt. 
 
 536 Sapper G. Sausum. 
 
 2022 Sapper A. Snow. 
 
 25049 Sapper J. H. Cooper. 
 
 28274 Sapper H. G. Guyatt. 
 
 1859 Sapper J. Geraghty. 
 
 28457 Sapper S. Hudson. 
 
 2193 Sapper J. Higgins. 
 
 29206 Sapper C. Jacobs. 
 
 25270 Sapper C. McKenzie. 
 
 27046 Sapper L. Shaw. 
 
 27735 Sapper W. Spurling. 
 
 27758 Sapper J. Yardy. 
 
 Telegraph Battalion. 
 
 16048 Troop Serjeant-Major W. Shaw ^ 
 24168 2nd Corporal H. Bleach. 
 
 25758 Sapper F. J. Hedges. 
 
37 
 
 Infantry. 
 
 1st Bn. Devonshire Regiment. 
 
 2034 Colour-Serjeant G. Palmer. 
 
 4161 Lance-Corporal A. Young. 
 
 Lance-Corporal F. J. Rowe. 
 
 4302 Private T. H. Brimmicombe. 
 
 4288 Private R. G. Hansford. 
 
 3852 Private E. Norman. 
 
 1818 Private H. Cox. 
 
 1st Bn. Leicestershire Regiment. 
 
 4609 Private C. J. Hickinbottom. 
 
 4566 Private C. Willars. 
 
 4842 Private F. J. Green. 
 
 2nd Bn. Royal Irish Regiment. 
 4535 Private M. Healey, Nursing Orderly. 
 
 1st Bn. Scottish Rifles. 
 2362 Private A. McKay, Nursing Orderly. 
 
 2nd Bn. West Riding Regiment. 
 3549 Serjeant C. H. Sims. 
 
 1st Bn. King’s Royal Rifle Corps. 
 
 Bandmaster F. Tyler. 
 
 5634 Serjeant F. Curtis. 
 
 7186 Lance-Serjeant W. Beck. 
 
 5518 Lance-Corporal J. T. Mitchell. 
 
 2025 Lance-Corporal T. Edmondson. 
 
 2nd Bn. King’s Royal Rifle Corps. 
 
 1412 Colour-Serjeant T. Maple. 
 
 5644 Serjeant G. Hoad. 
 
 7708 Corporal A. E. Green. 
 
 9386 Corporal F. Maclachlan. 
 
 9190 Lance-Corporal A. Hoare. 
 
 9289 Private T. Cross. 
 
 1st Bn. Manchester Regiment. 
 
 4620 Serjeant M. Gresty. 
 
 4839 Serjeant E. Grant. 
 
 2699 Serjeant R. Lloyd. 
 
 4467 Lance-Corporal J. McDowall. 
 
 4701 Lance-Corporal G. Roberts. 
 
 4535 Private R. Scott. 
 
 4858 Private J. Pitts. 
 
 4824 Private E. Newton. 
 
 4628 Private A. Horribin. 
 
 4881 Private D. Coyle. 
 
 3201 Private A. M. Smith (dead). 
 
 4304 Private H. Stones. 
 
 5047 Private E. Van Ryne. 
 
 3983 Private E. H men ns. 
 
38 
 
 2nd Bn. Gordon Highlanders. 
 
 2468 Colour-Serjeant W. Pryce. 
 
 3225 Serjeant R. Milne. 
 
 3747 Serjeant H. Shepherd. 
 
 4929 Serjeant J. Morrice. 
 
 5378 Corporal H. Gordon. 
 
 4449 Lance-Corporal H. Smith. 
 
 1st Bn. Royal Irish Fusiliers 
 
 Colour-Serjeant T. Linnane. 
 
 2736 Colour-Serjeant J. Hayes. 
 
 2nd Bn. Rifle Brigade. 
 
 8053 Colour-Serjeant G. Hodder. 
 
 9919 Colour-Serjeant J. Archer. 
 
 908 Serjeant W. Danton. 
 
 2105 Serjeant F. Williams. 
 
 109 Serjeant F. Lewis. 
 
 4296 Serjeant A. Wombwell. 
 
 1733 Serjeant W. Dickenson. 
 
 5338 Serjeant Master-Tailor G. W. Simpson. 
 
 Army Service Corps. 
 
 S. 4709 1st Class Staff Serjeant-Major T. Curtis. 
 
 S. 9083 Staff Quarter-Master-Serjeant J. Blay. 
 
 S. 2163 Staff-Serjeant B. Bartholomew. 
 
 S. 9356 Staff-Serjeant W. S. Banning. 
 
 T. 6173 Company Serjeant-Major T. Bennett. 
 
 T. 6179 Company Quarter-Master-Serjeant A. Grainger. 
 S. 10977 Serjeant J. Baker. 
 
 246 Serjeant H. J. Jordan, Staff Clerk Section. 
 
 Indian Commissariat Transport Department. 
 
 Conductor H. Young. 
 
 Sub-Conductor M. W. Tyler. 
 
 Sub-Conductor W. Calvert. 
 
 Staff-Serjeant W. T. Kee. 
 
 Staff-Serjeant W. Lloyd. 
 
 Staff-Serjeant W. Hayman. 
 
 Staff-Serjeant B. T. Harding. 
 
 Army Ordnance Corps. 
 
 2226 Sub-Conductor H. Rees. 
 
 2705 Serjeant W. H. Hall. 
 
 2298 Serjeant W. Ford, 
 
 Royal Army Medical Corps. 
 
 Serjeant-Major F. Bruce. 
 
 6591 2nd Class Staff-Serjeant Burrows. 
 8040 Serjeant L. Jones. 
 
 7598 Serjeant E. J. Cadogan. 
 
 It. 8268 Serjeant G. B. Walker. 
 
 10871 Private F. G. Bright. 
 
39 
 
 Indian Subordinate Medical Department. 
 
 1st Class Assistant-Surgeon J. Moore. 
 
 1st Class Assistant-Surgeon J. B. Farrell. 
 
 1st Class Assistant-Surgeon A. D. McIntyre. 
 
 2nd Class Assistant-Surgeon E. St. Iiomaine. 
 
 2nd Class Assistant-Surgeon V. Y. Chiodetti. 
 
 Imperial, Light Horse. 
 
 185 Corporal C. H. Bussell. 
 
 148 Corporal W. A. Weir. 
 
 Civilians. 
 Corps of Guides. 
 
 Guide T. Allison. 
 
 Guide L. Ashby. 
 
 Guide H. Thornhill. 
 
 Attached to Army Service Corps. 
 
 Head Conductor Macfarlane. 
 
 Conductor Bell. 
 
 Conductor Inglethorpe. 
 
 Attached to Army Ordnance Corps. 
 
 Storeholder J. Keefe. 
 
 Fo» eman W. T. Blake. 
 
 Volunteers serving with Bearer Company. 
 
 Mr. J. Taylor. 
 
 Mr. B. H. Coven ton. 
 
 Mr. W. Jackson. 
 
 Mr. F. Ellis. 
 
 Mr. P. J. Smythe. 
 
 I have the honour to be, 
 
 Sir, 
 
 Your most obedient Servant, 
 
 GEO. S. WHITE, Lieut.-Genera', 
 
 Late Commanding Ladysmith, Garrison. 
 
40 
 
 No. 3. 
 
 From Field-Marshal Lord Roberts to the Secretary of State for War. 
 
 Army Head-quarters, South Africa, 
 
 Government House, Bloemfontein, 
 
 My Lord, 28th March, 1900. 
 
 I have the honour to submit for your Lordship’s information a despatch, 
 dated 14th March, 1900, from General Sir Redvers Buller, Y.C., G.C.B., 
 K.C.M.G., describing the operations of the force under his command from the 
 29th January up to the 1st March, 1900, the day succeeding that on which the 
 relief of Ladysmith was effected. 
 
 2. I concur with Sir Redvers Buller in his admiration of the courage and 
 tenacity displayed by the troops. Undeterred by previous failures, and regard¬ 
 less of fatigue, exposure, and the heavy losses which decimated their ranks, 
 they gallantly assaulted one position after another until they found or made a 
 way into Ladysmith. I trust that Her Majesty’s Government will agree with 
 me in thinking that credit is due to the General Officer in Chief Command, to 
 the subordinate General and other Officers, and last but not least, to the 
 brave soldiers who marched and fought almost without cessation from the 
 15th January to the 28th February. 
 
 3. I observe that the account given by Sir Redvers Buller of what 
 occurred on 1st March differs in one respect from that contained in paragraph 
 36 of Sir George White’s despatch of 23rd March, which was forwarded to 
 your Lordship with my letter dated 28th idem. Sir Redvers Buller 
 states that the whole country round for 10 miles was clear of the 
 enemy, and that, as they had moved their laagers between the 20th and 24th 
 February, pursuit was useless. On the other hand, Sir George White reports 
 that he sent out along the Newcastle Road a force consisting of one Cavalry 
 regiment, two Field Batteries, and three battalions of Infantry to harass the 
 enemy who could be seen retiring in that direction. From enquiries which I 
 have made, I am led to believe that Sir R,edvers Buller must have been 
 misinfoi*med. The principal Boer laagers do not appear to have been broken 
 up until the 28th February, and many of the enemy’s wagons were within a 
 few miles of Ladysmith on the morning of the 1st March. 
 
 I have the honour to be, 
 
 My Lord, 
 
 Your Lordship’s most obedient Servant, 
 
 ROBERTS, Field Marshal, 
 
 Commanding-in-Chief South Africa. 
 
 From the General Officer Commanding, Natal, to the Secretary of State 
 
 for War. 
 
 (Through the Field-Marshal Commanding in South Africa.) 
 
 The Convent, Ladysmith, 
 
 Sir, 14th March, 1900. 
 
 1. Ever since the enemy occupied positions round Ladysmith they have 
 always maintained a very strong force on the south bank of the Tugela, east of 
 Colenso, about the Hlangweni Mountain. 
 
 2. I examined this position several times in December, as, had I been able 
 to take it, it was evident its possession would confer great advantages. I 
 decided that its capture was a task altogether beyond the powers of the force 
 I then commanded. 
 
41 
 
 3. On the 20th January, after the engagement round Spion Kdp, I told my 
 men that their efforts, though unsuccessful, had found for me the key of the 
 Ladysmith road. In these days of lighting I had learned to estimate, at its full 
 value, the extraordinary tenacity of British Infantrv, and the manoeuvring 
 power that tenacity gave me, and thoughts of a possible chance at Hlangweni 
 occurred to me. 
 
 4. But before leaving the Upper Tugela I resolved to try an attack on Yaal 
 Krantzor Mongers Hill, as it was evident that if I could succeed in advancing 
 on Ladysmith from the west such a success would be far more disastrous to the 
 enemy than anything that could be obtained from an advance from the south. 
 The position, according to my then information, offered a fair prospect of 
 success, and, moreover, I hoped that, even if 1 did not succeed, I should, by an 
 attack near Doom Kloof, and by leaving a force behind at Springfield, be able 
 to tie a very considerable number of the enemy to the Upper Tugela. 
 
 5. On the 7th, finding the position at Vaal Krantz too strong, I telegraphed 
 to Sir George White that I was moving to attack Hlangweni, and if fortunate 
 there should advance on Umbulwani Mountain. 
 
 6. I left an entrenched force of Infantry, two naval 12-prs., a brigade of 
 Cavalry, and a battery of Horse Artillery at Springfield. I have reason to 
 think that this force retained nearly 4,000 of the enemy about Potgieter’s and 
 Skiet Drifts. The rest of my force was concentrated at Ohieveley by the 11th 
 February. In the meanwhile I obtained, by the kindness of Admiral Sir R. 
 Harris, a reinforcement of heavy guns, in one naval 6-inch, mounted on tra¬ 
 velling carriage by Captain Scott, R.N., and two naval 4'7-inch mounted on plat¬ 
 form carriages, and Lord Roberts sent me two more 5-inch guns from the Cape. 
 
 7. On the 12th I reconnoitred the Hlangweni position, which I found 
 occupied by the enemy. The 13th was so intensely^ hot that I did not move 
 the troops. 
 
 8. On the 14th February I moved out from Chieveley with the force 
 detailed in Annexure “ A,” and after slight opposition, occupied Hussar Hill, 
 opposite the centre of the enemy’s position. 
 
 9. On the 15th I extended my position to the right by the occupation, 
 after some opposition, of Moord Kraal, and commenced an Artillery tire. 
 
 10. On the 16th my Infantry outposts were pushed down to the line of 
 the Gomba Stream, and the eastern end of Cingolo Hill was occupied by the 
 2nd Cavalry Brigade. 
 
 11. The 14th, 15th, and 16th were so hot that no Infantry movements on 
 any scale were possible, but a steady bombardment was kept up ; the enemy, 
 who were being reinforced, replying with some six guns. 
 
 12. On the 17th the 2nd Division, under General Lyttelton, advanced to 
 the Gomba Valley, and the 2nd Brigade moved up and occupied Cingolo Hill 
 with the Royal West Surrey Regiment, who bivouacked that night on its 
 northern crests ; the 4th Brigade occupiel a position about half-way up between 
 the Gomba Spruit and the Nek, and two batteries of Rival Field Artillery 
 were, with some difficulty, got into position between the brigades. 
 
 13. The whole country is thick bush intersected by deep dongas studded 
 with precipitous kopjes dividing large underfeatures of the Cingolo and Monte 
 Cristo Hills. 
 
 14. On the 18th the 2nd Cavalry Brigade moved forward along the eastern 
 slopes of Cingolo and the 2nd Brigade crossed the Nek and assaulted Monte- 
 Cristo, the steep crags of which were brilliantly carried after considerable 
 resistance by the West Yorkshire and Queen’s Regiments. Captain T. H. 
 Berney, West Yorkshire Regiment, a most gallant Officer, led the assault and 
 was the first man up. He was, I regret to say, shot through the head as he 
 got to the top. As soon as Monte Cristo was gained General Lyttelton 
 advanced the 4th Brigade, and the Rifle Brigade worked forward along the 
 western slopes of Monte Cristo to the back of the left of the enemy s position, 
 and General Warren throwing the 6th Brigade forward, the position was well 
 carried by the Koval Scots Fusiliers and abandoned precipitately by the 
 enemy, who left a large quantity of material, many dead and wounded, and a 
 few prisoners behind them. 
 
 15. Through this attack, which was made in echelon from the right, the 
 naval guns, under Captain Jones, R.N., and Royal Artillery, under Colonel 
 
 (762-2) F 
 
42 
 
 Parsons, B.A., rendered the greatest possible service, shelling the successive 
 positions till the Infantry closed on them. 
 
 16. By half-past four we had taken the main position and had three 
 .'brigades and two batteries right across its centre, but there was a very strong 
 
 position on Hlangweni Mountain facing us, about 2^ miles to our front, and 
 on our right the river bank, a very difficult country. 
 
 17. The troops wanted water, roads had to be made, and owing to the 
 nature of the country, intercommunication between units was very difficult. 
 The troops, therefore, bivouacked as they stood, the rest of the force and the 
 guns being brought up during the night. 
 
 18. On the 19th, General Hart advanced from Chieveleyon Colenso, and 
 the 2nd and 5th Divisions moved forward up the south bank of the Tugela 
 against Hlangweni, which was taken by the 6th Brigade ; our heavy guns 
 moved to the northern end of Monte Cristo. The enemy made considerable 
 opposition, but was gradually forced back. 
 
 19. On the 20th, we found that the enemy had, during the night, 
 abandoned all his positions south of the Tugela, and also his main position in 
 Colenso. We occupied Hlangweni, and Thorneycroft’s Mounted Infantry swam 
 the river, and entered the Colenso position, but were driven out. 
 
 20. On the 21st we threw abridge across the Tugela (the river was very 
 rapid, the bridge 98 yards long), and after a rather severe opposition from the 
 north, the Colenso position was occupied by General Coke and the 10th Brigade. 
 
 21. On the 22nd, the 11th Brigade, supported by the 2nd Division, took 
 possession of the hills which covered the railway bridge over Onderbrook 
 Spruit, and commanded the country between that and Langerwachte Spruit- 
 The fighting was very severe. Our principal objective was a long hog-backed 
 hill running north and south, which completely commands the valley of the 
 Langerwachte Spruit. It was taken, but our men were driven off by severe 
 enfilade and reverse fire ; they managed, however, to get and retain a lodgment 
 at the south end, which, though it did not give us the hill, completely denied 
 it to the enemy. 
 
 22. The fire, which made the hill untenable, came from some sangars on a 
 low ridge, the continuation of and about 150 yards in front of the right of the 
 hill we had taken in the Onderbrook Valley. These were taken, but were 
 found untenable, as they were exposed to enfilade and reverse fire from some 
 sangars about 1,200 yards off, and 500 yards in front of our left; these were 
 then taken, but could not be held, as they were completely commanded by the 
 -slopes of Grobelaar’s Hill, about 1,400 yards to the west. 
 
 23. Tins rendered it impossible for us to obtain full command of the 
 ■Onderbrook Valley, but at the end of the day we had obtained a footing upon 
 the two cnost important hills in it, and had made these positions as secure as 
 was possible against enfilade fire by hastily-erected sangars and traverses. 
 
 24. The positions thus won, after hard fighting, covered the line of 
 railway across Onderbrook Spruit up to the Langerwachte Valley. This valley 
 is full of dongas and small isolated kopjes, more or less covered with bush ; in 
 
 . fact, an ideal place for the methods of defence employed by the enemy. Its 
 •eastern side is closed by a high steep hill, which was evidently the enemy’s main 
 position, and which was very strongly fortified and protected by extremely 
 •strong flank defences. 
 
 cj 
 
 25. It was now clear that this hill must be taken before we could advance 
 further. During the night of the 22nd, the 11th Brigade were relieved in the 
 positions about Onderbrook by the 2nd Brigade and two battalions of the 
 <jfh Brigade, and the sangars were improved as much as was possible. 
 
 26. But, even then, the men had to lie crouched on the hill sides, sheltered 
 by hastily-piled stones, with an active keen-sighted enemy within 150 yards 
 of one flank and 500 yards of the other. During the day the front line could 
 scarcely move, for anyone who exposed himself was shot. They were under 
 constant fire, both rifle and artillery, both night and day, and they were three 
 times heavily attacked ; but for 5 days and nights they unflinchingly main¬ 
 tained this position. It was wonderful ! 
 
 27. During the afternoon of the 22nd and morning of the 23rd, the enemy’s 
 postions near the Langerwachte, and all the dongas leading thereto, were 
 thoroughly searched by shell fire, and on the afternoon of the 23rd, General 
 Hart advanced with the 5th Brigade, supported by two battalions of the 
 4th Brigade, to attack the position east of the spruit. 
 
43 
 
 28. It had been my intention that this attack should be made by five 
 battalions, but the advance up the railway was necessarily slow, and, in some 
 places, the enemy brought a heavy fire upon it, both rifle and Maxim - 
 Nordenfelt, causing many casualties and checking the advance considerabty. 
 It was getting late, and General Hart attacked the hill when two battalions 
 only were up, thinking his supports would follow. For the reason I have 
 mentioned, the supports arrived but slowly, and the attack was made by two 
 battalions, supported by a 4 battalion only—the Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers,- 
 the Connaught Rangers, and 4 the Royal Dublin Fusiliers. 
 
 29. The attack was delivered with the utmost gallantry, but the men 
 failed to reach the top of the hill. The regiments suffered severely, but their 
 loss was not unproductive, their gallantry secured for us the lower sangars and 
 a position at the foot of the hill, which ensured our ultimate success. 
 
 30. That night the enemy made a heavy attack on our left. There was ■ 
 hard fighting, a good deal of it hand to hand, prisoners being taken and 
 retaken, and several bayonet charges being delivered. The Rifle Reserve 
 Battalion, a scratch regiment made up by combining the drafts for the three 
 rifle battalions in Ladysmith, under command of Major Stuart-Wortley; 
 behaved very well. The men withheld their fire, and, waiting in their sangars 
 till the enemy were within 20 yards, went in with the bayonet. 
 
 31. The enemy also attacked in the evening the position taken during, 
 the day by General Hart, but in both cases our positions were held and the 
 enemy repulsed. 
 
 32. We had now been fighting continuously for 72 hours, had obtained a 
 position in front of Onderbrook Spruit, which divided the enemy, and forced 
 him to make a long detour if he wished to reinforce his forces to the east of' 
 us from those on Grobelaars Kloof and the Ladysmith road, while the advance 
 of General Hart’s Brigade gave us a position in front of the enemy’s extremb 
 left. I saw that if I could effect a crossing nearer to the east of the position 
 occupied by General Hart, I should be able to turn the enemy’s left and drive 
 him from his positions. 
 
 33. On the 24th, the rugged crests of the south bank of the Tugela from 
 Hlangweni to Monte Cristo were searched for a roadway, and a Kaffir path was 
 found by Lieut.-Colonel Sandbach, R.E., which gave access to the river 
 below the cataract, exactly at the back of General Hart’s position. Road 
 making was at once commenced on both sides of the river. I withdrew the 
 garrison from Frere, reduced that at Chieveley, and called up every gun and 
 man I could muster for the final assault. 
 
 34. After the fighting of the 23rd, which continued on both flanks long 
 into the night, we brought in all the dead and wounded we could find in the 
 dark, but as soon as it was light the enemy fired upon our stretcher bearers, 
 and also upon Medical Officers who bravely went out to tend the wounded, 
 and we were obliged to leave them lying unattended the whole day in the 
 sun. Among them were also some of the enemy’s own men. 
 
 35. During the 24th the Artillery duel continued, the enemy constantly 
 bringing guns into position, and removing them directly our guns found their 
 position. They also kept up a constant and annoying long-range rifle fire 1 
 upon our position. 
 
 36. On the 25th, Sunday, I directed my guns not to fire unless attacked, 
 and proposed to the enemy a cessation of hostilities to bury dead and bring in- 
 wounded, many of whom on both sides had been lying unattended for 40 hours • 
 or more. This the Commandants, M T ho were, I believe, Botha and Lucas 
 Meyer, at length assented to, but they insisted on taking as prisoners all the 
 men not very badly wounded. I attach a copy of a statement made by one- 
 of our men, “ B.” 
 
 37. Throughout the 25th work at the new roads w r as being pressed, and 
 the baggage of the 11th Brigade, and all the heavy guns were passed over the 
 pontoons back to Hlangweni. At 8 p.m. the enemy emphasised the recom-- 
 mencement of hostilities by opening a tremendous rifle fire from all hfo 
 positions, but little damage was done. The rest of the night was quiet. 
 
 38. During the 26th the guns were got into position, and a slow bombard-' 
 ment was kept up, so that every battery and every gun got the exact ranges of' 
 all the targets within their respective zones. 
 
 39. By 6 p.m. the approaches to the new bridge were complete, and during 
 
 (762-2) F 2 
 
44 
 
 the night of 26th—27th, the pontoons were taken up, brought round, and by 
 10.30 a.m. the 27th, the new brdofe was ready for traffic. At this moment I 
 received from Lord Roberts a “clear the, line” telegram, announcing the 
 surrender that mornino* of General Cronie and his force. The good news was 
 communicated to the troops as they were moving to attack and, received with 
 loud cheers, added an extra fillip to their already intense desire for victory. 
 
 40. On the lefr, General Coke and the loth Brigide occupied the Colenso 
 kopjes, and had the 73rd Battery, Royal Field Artillery, in position firing 
 north-west, commanding the Ladysmith road, and the avenues by which any 
 force could approach our left. 
 
 41. General Lyttelton, with the Royal Fusiliers and Royal Welsh Fusiliers 
 of the Gth Brigade, and the Devonshire Regiment, Royal West Surre} r , two 
 companies West Yorkshire, and two companies East Surrey, of the 2nd 
 Brigade, with four companies Scottish Rifles of the 4th Brigade, under General 
 Hildyard, held the hills between the Onderbrook and Langerwachte Valleys. 
 These Brigades were sadly mixed, but the necessity of supporting General 
 Hart’s advance, and the impossibility of withdrawing men from the firing line 
 during daylight, had rendered this unavoidable. 
 
 42. General Lyttelton was supported by the 28th and 78th Batteries, 
 Royal Field Artillery, placed on the south side of the Tugela, on the western 
 spurs of Hlangweni, the 28th Battery firing west up Onderbrook Spruit, and the 
 78th north up Langerwachte. On the high crest of the northern spur of Hlang¬ 
 weni were the 64th Battery, Royal Field Artillery, two naval 4‘7-inch guns and 
 four naval 12-pr. Q.F. guns. East of them were four guns of the 4th Mountain 
 Battery, then two naval 4'7-inch on platform mountings, then “ A ” Battery, 
 Royal Horse Artillery, the 63rd Battery, Royal Field Artillery, then on Green 
 Hill the 19th Battery, Royal Field Artillery, under cover of Green Hill the 
 61st Howitzer Battery, and behind them on Fussy hill four 5-inch guns of the 
 16th Company Royal Garrison Artillery. On the extreme left were two 
 Mountain Battery guns and four 12-pr. naval guns mounted h’gh up on the 
 northern slopes of Monte Cristo. There was thus a battery of 76 guns on a 
 front of about 4|- miles. Every sangar and important point of the enemy’s 
 position had been given a name, the gun positions were connected up by 
 signallers, and special observers were posted at the principal points. At 
 Chieveley were one naval 6-inch Q.F. gun, three naval 4‘7-inch and two naval 
 12-prs. These guns covered the Colenso-Ladysmith road and the deep kloofs 
 on each side of it which were very strongly held by the enemy, who, I think, 
 really expected us to attack on that side. 
 
 43. The whole south bank of the Tugela from opposite the junction of the 
 Onderbrook Spruit to Monte Cristo was lined by the Border Regiment and the 
 Rifle Reserve Battalion with all the machine guns we could muster, to keep 
 down sniping, and to prevent any of the enemy being able to watch our move¬ 
 ment to the right. 
 
 44. The attacking party consisted of the Royal Welsh and Royal Scots 
 Fusiliers and the Royal Dublin Fusiliers under General Barton ; the Royal 
 Lancaster, the South Lancashire, the York and Lancaster, and the West 
 Yorkshire under General Kitchener, and the 4th Brigade, the whole under 
 command of General Warren. 
 
 45. General Hart held the tele du ponton the north bank of the Tugela with 
 the Connaught Rangers, the Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers and the Imperial 
 Light Infantry. 
 
 46. The position occupied by the enemy consisted of three rocky hills 
 rising abruptly from the Tugela to a height above it of about 600 feet. The 
 westernmost hill, called by us Terrace Hill, is separated from the middle hill 
 and from the rugged crests of the north bank of the Tugela, by a valley 
 which, r sing steeply from the Langerwachte, ends in a shallow nek between 
 the two hills over which the Colenso-Nelthorpe track passes. The middle 
 hill, called by us Railway Hill, is separated from the eastern, called Pieters 
 Hill, by a deep ravine along the western side of which the railway to Pieters 
 winds through deep cuttings. Pieter’s Hill rising steeply on the west from 
 this ravine, falls by gentler gradients to the north-east towards the Klip River, 
 the valley of which is intersected by dongas clothed in thick mimosa and 
 camel thorn scrub. 
 
 47. Terrace Hill was a formidable position, it was strongly fortified with 
 
v4 5 
 
 three tiers of trenches and flanked by trenches running down the Langerwachte 
 Spruit on one si le, and up almost to the crest of Hail way Hil! on the other. The 
 crests of these hills were about 1.700 yards distant from the river, which here 
 flows through a deep gorge, the sidesof which on the north a"e almost precipitous 
 to about 400 feet, the ground from the crest of this gorge to the crest line of 
 the hills presenting an excellent field of fire for a force occupying the crests. 
 .Within this field of fire sangars had been constructed in every suitable spot. 
 Pieter’s Hill was not so strongly held, but a vary consi lerable force was, as we 
 found out later, concealed in the ravine between it an 1 Railway Hill. Our 
 approaches to the position were of the worst possible description ; there was no 
 road, and the attacking column had to scramble up an aim >st precipitous rocky 
 cliff to gain the crest of the ravine. We had, though, one great advantage, 
 our Artillery positions were excellent, and from the length of our line the 
 enemy’s positions were in almost all cases partly enfiladed as well as met by 
 frontal fire. 
 
 48. At 10.30 a.m. General Barton’s force crossed the pontoon bridge, and 
 scrambling about Id miles down the edge of the Tugela, ascended the steep 
 cliffs of Pieter’s Hill unopposed, the rifle ai d machine gun fire from the south 
 bank having cleared the north bank. 
 
 49. As toe troops passed over the crest they were met by a heavy fire in 
 front from the enemy in the ravine between Pieter's and Railway Hills, and also 
 in flank from a reinforcement which came from Bulwana into the ravine on the 
 east. These last were, to some extent, kept back by our guns on Monte Cristo, 
 but owing to the fact that General Kitchener’s advance was somewhat delayed, 
 General Barton’s force had to bear a heavy attack for a considerable time 
 single-handed. His dispositions were extremely good ; his three regiments 
 were very well handled ; his men fought most gallantly, and stubbornly 
 maintained their position. 
 
 50. General Kitcheners Brigade followed General Barton over the pontoon 
 bridge, and diverting slightly to their right, scaled the shoulder of the ravine, 
 and gained the railway cutting. General Kitchener then directed the West 
 Yorkshire and the Royal Lancaster Regiments to attack Railway Hill, but the 
 men of the latter seeing the main position, Terrace Hill, on their left front 
 went straight at it, and were stopped by a heavy fire from the sangars in the 
 valley. General Kitchener at once remedied the mistake, and directed the 
 South Lancashire on the right of the Royal Lancaster, between them and the 
 West Yorkshire, who were then gaining the crest of Railway Hill. 
 
 51. Dui ing the delay thus caused General Barton’s force was, as has been 
 said, left exposed, but directly the West Yorkshire took Railway Hill, they 
 dislodged the enemy from the ravine and captured a Maxim gun. Meanwhile 
 the South Lancashire pressed forward, and, aided by the Artillery fire, captured 
 the sangars in the valley, taking a few prisoners and killing many of the 
 enemy, who were practically confined to their trenches by the severity of the 
 Artillery fire. 
 
 52. The fire of the naval guns here was particularly valuable, their shooting 
 was admirable, and they were able to keep up fire with common shell long 
 after the Royal Field Artillery were obliged to cease their shrapnel. Indeed, 
 Lieutenant Ogilvy, H.M. Ship “Terrible,” kept up fire on the largest sangars 
 till the Infantry were within 15 yards of them. His guns must have saved us 
 many casualties. No one who watched the operations can have the slightest 
 doubt that Artillery, co-operating with Infantry in an attack on a prepared 
 position, ought to have a considerable proportion of common shell. 
 
 53. The sangars in the valley were soon taken, though 1 regret to say, at the 
 cost of the life of Colonel McCarthy-O’Leary, who fell while gallantly leading 
 his regiment, and the Royal Lancaster and South Lancashire pressing on, 
 well supported by the York and Lancaster on the right, and the 4th Brigade 
 on the left, soon gained the summit of the hill, and the day was won. 
 
 54. The enemy fled in all directions, but as they were driven off’the hills to 
 the west they were able to keep up so strong a fire from the broken ground in 
 the Langerwachte Valley, that it was impossible that evening to bring up the 
 Cavalry and Artillery. 
 
 55. By 8 p.m. firing had ceased, and at daylight the enemy had disappeared 
 from our front and flanks. 
 
 56. On the28th,General Lyttelton’s Division marched unopposed along the 
 
46 
 
 railway line and Boer road to the position captured the previous day, and the 
 Cavalry and Artillery were sent forward. 
 
 57. I assigned the frontal advance to Lord Dundonald, as I was anxious the 
 Colonial troops should, if possible, be the first to enter Ladysmith. He was 
 opposed by some 200 of the enemy near Nelthorpe, but a few rounds of 
 shrapnel dispersed them, and, pushing forward, he entered Ladysmith about 
 6 p.m. The 1st Cavalry Brigade went to the right across the southern slopes 
 of Bulwana, and found the enemy’s rearguard posted in a strong position in a 
 very rugged country, with three guns. 
 
 58. On the 1st March, I was moving to attack Bulwana, when I found it had 
 been evacuated in the night, so I moved the force to Nelthorpe and rode into 
 Ladysmith. 
 
 59. The whole country round was absolutely clear of the enemy for 10 miles. 
 They had retreated in the greatest haste, but as they had moved their laagers 
 between the 20th to the 24th, pursuit was useless. 
 
 60. During the whole of these 14 days, the 1st and 2nd Cavalry Brigades 
 had kept our rear and flanks, their patrols extending from Greytown to 
 Hongers Poort and GourtoD. 
 
 61. So was accomplished the relief of Ladysmith. It was the men who did 
 it. Danger and hardship were nothing to them, and their courage, their 
 tenacity and their endurance, were beyond all praise. 
 
 62. During the period from the 15th January to the 28th February, this 
 
 force has been engaged over 30 days, and during that period many Officers and 
 men have distinguished themselves. I propose to make them the subject of 
 another despatch, as I thought this, already over long, would be less oonfused 
 if that course were adopted. - ■ 
 
 63. I enclose a sketch of the ground, I regret to say that Captain Kenney - 
 Herbert was seriously injured before he could finish it. i 
 
 64. I also enclose a summary of casualties, which of itself, shows the 
 
 severity of the fighting. . . » >■ i. .n A 
 
 I have the honour to be, 
 
 Sir, 
 
 Your obedient Servant, 
 
 REDVERS BULLER, General 
 
 A. 
 
 LIST OF FORCE SENT FORWARD FROM CHIEYELEY ON 
 
 14th FEBRUARY. 
 
 2nd Mounted Brigade. (Colonel the Earl of Dundonald.) 
 
 South African Light Horse. 
 
 Thorneycroft’s Mounted Infantry. 
 
 Composite Regiment— 
 
 2nd Bn. King’s Royal Rifle Corps, Mounted Infantry Company. 
 
 2nd Bn. Royal Dublin Fusiliers, Mounted Infantry Section. 
 Detachment Natal Police. 
 
 One squadron, Natal Carbineers. 
 
 One squadron, Imperial Light Horse. 
 
 2nd Division. (Major-General Hon. N. G. Lyttelton, C.B.) 
 
 Divisional Troops 
 
 One troop, 13th Hussars. 
 
 17th Company, Royal Engineers. 
 
 Brigade Division, Royal Field Artillery. 
 
 7th, 63rd, and 64th Batteries, Royal Field Artillery, Divisional Ammunition 
 , .-Column. 
 
47 
 
 2nd Brigade. (Major-General Hildyard, C.BA 
 
 2nd Bn. West Surrey Regiment. 
 
 2nd Bn. Devonshire Regiment. 
 
 2nd Bn. West Yorkshire Regiment. 
 
 2nd Bn. East Surrey Regiment. 
 
 4th Brigade. (Colonel Norcott, 1st Bn. Rifle Brigade, Commanding.) 
 
 2nd Bn. Scottish Rifles. 
 
 3rd Bn. King’s Royal Rifle Corps. 
 
 1st Bn. Durham Light Infantry. 
 
 1st Bn. Rifle Brigade. 
 
 5th Division. (Lieut.-General Sir Charles Warren, G.C.M.G.. K.C.B.) 
 
 Divisional Troops. 
 
 One troop, 1st Royal Dragoons. 
 
 37th Company, Royal Engineers. 
 
 Brigade Division, Royal Field Artillery. 
 
 28th, 73rd and 78th Batteries, Royal Field Artillery, Divisional Ammunition 
 Column. 
 
 10th Brigade. (Major-General Talbot Coke.) 
 
 2nd Bn. Somersetshire Light Infantry. 
 
 2nd Bn. Dorsetshire Regiment. 
 
 2nd Bn. Middlesex Regiment. 
 
 11th Brigade. (Major-General A. S. Wynne, C.B.) 
 
 2nd Bn. Royal Lancaster Regiment. 
 
 1st Bn. South Lancashire Regiment. 
 
 Rifle Reserve Battalion. 
 
 6th Brigade. (Attached 5th Division—Major-General Barton, C.B.) 
 
 2nd Bn. Royal Fusiliers. 
 
 2nd Bn. Royal Scots Fusiliers. 
 
 1st Bn. Royal Welsh Fusiliers. 
 
 2nd Bn. Royal Irish Fusiliers. 
 
 Corps Troops. 
 
 61st Howitzer Battei*y, Royal Field Artillery. 
 
 Two 5-inch guns (16th Company, Southern Division, Royal Garrison Artillery). 
 Four naval 12-pr. guns. 
 
 Detachment Section, Telegraph Division, Royal Engineers. 
 
 Corps Troops, Ammunition Column. 
 
 Reinforcements Despatched after 14th February. 
 
 17th February.—Two 5-inch guns (16th Company, Southern Division, Royal 
 Garrison Artillery). 
 
 18th February.—19tli Battery, Koval Field Artillery. 
 
 19th February.—Two IT-inch naval guns (travelling carriages). 
 
 20th February— 
 
 Four naval 12-prs. 
 
 4th Mountain Battery. 
 
 Pontoon Troop, Royal Engineers. 
 
 Balloon Section, Royal Engineers. 
 
48 
 
 22nd February, 5th Rrigade-- 
 
 Inniskilling Fusiliers. 
 
 Connaught Hangers. 
 
 Royal Dublin Fusiliers. 
 
 Imperial Light Infantry. 
 
 22nd February, 1st Cavalry Brigade— 
 
 1st (Royal) Dragoons. 
 
 13th Hussars. 
 
 Head-quarters and two squadrons, 14th Hussars. 
 “ A ” Battery, Royal Horse Artillery. 
 
 25th February.—Two 4‘7-inch naval guns on platform mountings. 
 
 26th February.—1st Bn. Border Regiment. 
 
 27th February.—1st Bn. York and Lancaster Regiment. 
 
 B, 
 
 ]. 
 
 Evidence of No. 6418 Private F. Ayling, 3rd Bn. King’s Royal Rifles. 
 
 Near Colenso, 
 
 25th February, 1900. 
 
 I was taken prisoner about 5 a.m. on 23rd instant by the Boers, being too 
 far in front of my company to retire. I was allowed to go about 10 a.m. on 
 the 25th, and rejoined my regiment. 
 
 During this time I was kept in the Boer trenches without food or drink. 
 There were quite 20 of our wounded lying close to the trenches, and asking 
 for water all the time, which was always refused. If any of the wounded 
 moved they were shot at. Most of them died for want of assistance, as they 
 were lying there two days and two nights. The Boers (who seemed to be all 
 English) said, “ let them die, and give them no water.” 
 
 There were six or seven dead Boers lying near, which, I suppose, were 
 killed when we charged them. 
 
 F. Ayling, Private, 
 
 F Company , 3rd Bn. King's Royal Rifles. 
 
 2 . 
 
 Camp Tugela, 
 
 Assistant Adjutant-General, 2nd Division, 25th February, 1900. 
 
 Forwarded. I obtained permission for Captain Campbell, R.A.M.C., to go 
 to the wounded yesterday morning, under cover of a large Geneva Cross flag, 
 but the Boers at once fired at him and wounded him. 
 
 I was, therefore, obliged to wait for an opportunity when fresh lives would 
 not be sacrificed, and to-day learn from the bearers that nearly all our missing 
 viz., 35, are killed or wounded, and they have been accounted for owing to 
 the cessation of hostilities under an armistice. 
 
 A. BEWICKE-COPLEY, Major, 
 
 Commanding 3rd Bn. King's Royal Rifles . 
 
 Chief of Staff, 
 Forwarded. 
 
 3. 
 
 25th February, 1900. 
 
 B. HAMILTON, Colonel, A.A.G., 
 
 for General Officer Commanding 2nd Division. 
 
49 
 
 No. 4. 
 
 From Field-Marshal Lord Roberts to the Secretary of State for War. 
 
 Army Head-quarters, South Africa, 
 
 My Lord, Kroonstad, 15th May, 1900. 
 
 I have the honour to submit for your lordship’s favourable consideration, 
 letters Nos. Mil. Sec. 455 and 457, dated 30th March, 1900, from the 
 General Officer Commanding in Natal, recommending certain Warrant Officers, 
 non-commissioned officeis and men for the medal for distinguished services in 
 the field, and bringing to notice the names, not previously mentioned, 
 of Officers, non-commissioned officers and men, whose services in connection 
 with the operations for the relief of Ladysmith deserve special mention. 
 
 2. The gallant behaviour of the troops during the period adverted to is 
 known to your Lordship, and I have much pleasure in supporting the recom¬ 
 mendations on their behalf put forward by General Sir Redvers Buller. 
 
 I have the honour to be, 
 
 Sir, 
 
 Your Lordship’s most obedient Servant, 
 
 ROBERTS, Field-Marshal, 
 
 Commanding-in-Chief, South Africa. 
 
 From the General Officer Commanding, Natal, to the Secretary of State 
 
 for War. 
 
 (Through the Field-Marshal Commanding the Forces in South Africa.) 
 
 The Convent, Ladysmith, 
 
 Sir, 30th March, 1900. 
 
 I have the honour to bring to your notice the cases of distinguished con¬ 
 duct in the field which are detailed in the enclosed list, and to recommend 
 that the Warrant Officers, non-commissioned officers and men therein men¬ 
 tioned, may each be awarded the medal for distinguished conduct in the field. 
 
 I regret that I am not in a position to render the returns, &c., referred 
 to in paragraph 2049, Queen’s Regulations. 
 
 I have the honour to be, 
 
 Sir, 
 
 Your obedient Servant, 
 
 REDVERS BULLEB, General. 
 
 ( 762 - 2 ) 
 
 G 
 
50 
 
 List of Warrant Officers, non-commissioned officers and men recommended 
 for the grant of the medal for distinguished conduct in the field. 
 
 Royal Artillery. 
 
 20014 Bombardier Knight, 14177 Gunner Gilberry, and 25553 Gunner 
 Billingham, 66th Battery, Royal Field Artillery.—Gallant conduct at Battled 
 Colenso, 15th December, in the attempt to extricate the guns of the 14th and 
 66th Batteries. 
 
 29925 Gunner Charles Colton, 66th Battery, Royal Field Artillery, 
 15th December, Colenso.—Conspicuous bravery in continuing to perform his 
 duties as No. 5 at his gun until ammunition was exhausted, though shot 
 through the ankle very early in the day. 
 
 Driver Bodill and Driver Parmenter, 14th Battery, Royal Field Artillery.— 
 Conspicuous gallantry in attempting to rescue the guns of their battery on 
 15th December at Colenso. 
 
 R.A./23289 Driver N. Harding, 7th Battery, Royal Field Artillery.—For 
 coolness and gallantry on 22nd February, when almost the whole gun team was 
 killed by a shell, he extricated the wheel horses single handed, and drove his 
 gun into action with a single pair of horses. 
 
 Royal Engineers. 
 
 22123 Troop-Quarter-Master-Serjeant J. Newnham, 22864 Serjeant S. 
 Grist, and 22442 Corporal J. Wilson, “ A ” Pontoon Troop.—Conspicuous 
 bravery and coolness when laying and working at pontoon bridge under fire on 
 several occasions, especially at Hunger’s Drift on 5th February. 
 
 17858 Company-Serjeant-Major J. H. Smith and 1528 Sapper Trash, 
 17th Company, Royal Engineers, 23rd February.—Coolness and gallant 
 behaviour when making sandbag wall across railway bridge at Langerwachte 
 Spruit under heavy fire. 
 
 2nd Bn. Royal West Surrey Regiment. 
 
 3406 Lance-Serjeant J. Knight.—Conspicuous bravery on two occasions— 
 first, 23rd February, carrying wounded man of East Surrey Regiment under 
 heavy fire; second, 23rd February, carrying important message 600 yards 
 over fire swept plateau. 
 
 5853 Private G. Cawson.—Consistent bravery in the field. 
 
 4834 Corporal E. Smith.—Constant and conspicuous gallantry under fire. 
 
 2nd Bn. Royal Lancaster Regiment. 
 
 5194 Lance-Serjeant G. McLeod and 2982 Private McGovan (since killed), 
 24th January, Spion Kop.—Conspicuous gallantry in carrying wounded men to 
 the rear when no stretcher bearers were available, and the number of wounded 
 in firing line was so great as to interfere with the men who were firing. 
 
51 
 
 2nd Bn. Royal Fusiliers. 
 
 6830 Lance-Corporal W. Bell, 5802 Private W. O’Keefe, and 5708 Private 
 A. Benton, 24th to 27th February.—Great gallantry as stretcher fearers in 
 removing wounded. 
 
 2nd Bn. Devonshire Regiment. 
 
 3285 Lance-Corporal E. A. Stebbing and 3059 Lance-Corporal G. Robbins, 
 23rd February.—Conspicuous gallantry in carrying wounded men from firing 
 line under very heavy fire. 
 
 5041 Lance-Corporal McDonald (killed in action), Colenso, 15th December, 
 1899.—Conspicuous gallantry. 
 
 2nd Bn. Somersetshire Light Infantry. 
 
 1555 Colour-Serjeant H. French, 21st February, near Colenso.—Gallant 
 conduct when in command of his company, after both company Officers had 
 been killed. 
 
 707 Private H. Hutchins, 21st February, Onderbrook Spruit.—Con¬ 
 spicuous gallantry in distributing ammunition to firing line, and twice volun¬ 
 teering to carry ammunition from mules under very heavy fire. 
 
 2nd Bn. West Yorkshire Regiment. 
 
 1939 Serjeant E. Ford, Monte Cristo, 19th February.—When both his 
 company Officers were shot, he commanded his company with cool judgment 
 and courage. 
 
 1750 Serjeant F. H. Poplar (killed in action, 27th February).—Through¬ 
 out operations, 14th to 27th February, he always showed conspicuous coolness 
 and courage. 
 
 c 1 
 
 4778 Private J. Moran, 21st January.—Volunteered to carry back a 
 message from Lieutenant Boyall under very lieavj r fire, and was wounded whilst 
 doing so. 
 
 4560 Private H. Goodyear, 24th January, Spion Kop.—Conspicuous 
 gallantry as signaller, in signalling all day under very heavy fire. 
 
 2nd Bn. Lancashire Fusiliers. 
 
 5283 Private F. Lomax and 4684 Private J. Turner, 24th January, Spion 
 Kop.—Conspicuous gallantry as signallers, in signalling all day under very 
 heavy fire. 
 
 2891 Colour-Serjeant R. T. Potter (since killed) and 5001 Serjeant T. J. 
 Farrell, 24th January, Spion Kop.—Conspicuous gallantry in covering Major- 
 General Woodgate when being carried wounded to the rear. 
 
 4761 Private J. Royle, 24th January, Spion Kop, ammunition carrier.— 
 Conspicuous gallantry in carrying several wounded men from firing line. 
 
 2nd Bn. Royal Scots Fusiliers. 
 
 6149 Serjeant-Major John Steele, 27th February.—Conspicuous coolness 
 and devotion in building up stone sangar under heavy cross fire round 
 Lieut.-Colonel Carr who was lying wounded, and protecting his Commanding 
 Officer until he was removed after dark. 
 
 958 Serjeant Taylor, 3406 Lance-Corporal Shields, 318 Private Farr, 
 27th February.—Conspicuous gallantry in attack on Pieter s Hill. 
 
 (762-2) G 2 
 
52 
 
 1st Bn. Royal Welsh Fusiliers. 
 
 4085 Corporal W. Roberts, 24th February.—Conspicuous gallantry in 
 bringing machine gun into action by hand, and remaining in action until 
 foresight shot away, and gun rendered useless. Wounded. 
 
 2nd Bn. Scottish Rifles. 
 
 3433 Serjeant W. Langrish, 3365 Private A. Howe, 24th February.— 
 Conspicuous gallantry in rescuing wounded man under heavy fire. 
 
 1st Bn. Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers. 
 
 Serjeant-Major Martin, 15th December, 1899.—Colenso, and all other 
 actions in which he was engaged, he valiantly kept up the ammunition supply. 
 
 3640 Private Thompson, 23rd February.—He volunteered to rescue 
 Private Nesbitt, a heavy wounded man, and laboriously brought him to cover 
 through hot fire. 
 
 5019 Drummer Fitzgerald, 15th December, 1899.—Colenso. Accompanied 
 his Colonel and valiantly carried messages for him exposed to very heavy fire. 
 
 3108 Lance-Corporal Cleland, 23rd-24th February.—Rendered very 
 valuable assistance to the wounded under heavy fire. 
 
 2nd Bn. East Surrey Regiment. 
 
 2425 Lance-Corporal G. Fisher, 23rd February.—Worked machine gun all 
 day under heavy fire in a most determined manner until severely wounded. 
 
 5676 Lance-Corporal R. Parris, 23rd February.—Carried letter to Com¬ 
 manding Officer under very heavy fire when told it was next to impossible to 
 do so. Was severely wounded. 
 
 5228 Private E. Brady, 27th February.—Conspicuous gallantry in charge 
 on Railway Hill. 
 
 1st Bn. Border Regiment. 
 
 3589 Serjeant Sparke, and 2652 Lance-Serjeant Munro, 15th December.— 
 Colenso. Displayed great gallantry and excellent management of their men 
 under severe fire. 
 
 1196 Serjeant-Instructor of Musketry Allen, 15th December.—Colenso. 
 When the Officer of the Maxim was shot down, took charge and worked the 
 gun to the end of the day with remarkable address. 
 
 1st Bn. South Lancashire Regiment. 
 
 2573 Serjeant Price, 24th January.—Spion Kop. Conspicuous bravery in 
 controlling his section under very heavy fire, and, as a volunteer, traversed 
 200 yards under a very heavy fire to assist a signaller. 
 
 2494 Private Brighouse, 27th February.—Displayed great coolness and 
 resource under heavy fire, and, when severely wounded in the side, insisted on 
 removing his own accoutrements, and attempted to dress his own wound whilst 
 remainder kept up rifle fire. 
 
 2nd Bn. Middlesex Regiment. 
 
 2574 Private J. Gilmore, 24th January.—Spion Kop. Conspicuous 
 gallantry and coolness, he collected some men together and formed them into 
 a section, personally took command, supervising their action for over 2 hours. 
 
 3493 Private W. Boyd, 24th January.—Spion Kop. Conspicuous gallantry 
 in constantly exposing himself, under very heavy fire, in order to obtain a 
 better view of the enemy at whom he was firing. 
 
53 
 
 1st Bn. King's Royal Rifle Corps. 
 
 52G5 Lance-Corporal Hendrick, 23rd February.—Carried wounded Officer 
 under very heavy fire to place of safety. 
 
 3rd Bn. King’s Royal Rifle Corps. 
 
 2248 Serjeant F. Clay.—Conspicuous coolness and valour on the 20th and 
 24th January, and 22nd February. 
 
 Serjeant-Major A. H. Hill, 24th January.—Bringing up ammunition mules 
 under heavy fire up very steep hill in advance on Spion Kop. 
 
 7209 Private J. Patrick, 24th January.—Attack on Spion Kop. Con¬ 
 spicuous bravery and coolness. 27th February.—Conspicuous bravery and 
 coolness. 
 
 1st Bn. York and Lancaster Regiment. 
 
 1453 Serjeant J. Millar, 27th February.—Colonel Kitchener, Commanding 
 Brigade, reports that “ he did excellent work under my personal observation. 
 “ His gun was under heavy lire and he never slacked off or made a mistake, 
 “ its coming into action on our right rendered advance possible.” 
 
 1st Bn. Durham Light Infantry. 
 
 4154 Private G. Bennett, 2792 Private J. Cottle, and 5754 Private 
 J. S. Parker.—On the 24th February, when the enemy would not allow us to 
 remove our wounded, and fired heavily on any one who tried to do so, these 
 three men all brought in wounded men. 
 
 2nd Bn. Royal Irish Fusiliers. 
 
 6039 Lance-Corporal O’Neill, 27th February (killed).—Conspicuous 
 gallantry in attack on Pieter’s Hill. His body was found by the side of a dead 
 Boer, transfixed by his bayonet, he himself having been shot dead. 
 
 1st Bn. Connaught Rangers. 
 
 5826 Private Livingstone. Colenso, 15th December.—His Colonel being 
 severely wounded, he removed him through a hot fire, and though receiving a 
 bullet in the neck, continued till he had put Colonel Brooke under cover 200 
 yards back. 
 
 3309 Lance-Corporal Parslow. Colenso, 15th December.—He pluckily 
 placed a wounded man under cover, and in a similar attempt was severely 
 wounded. 
 
 3465 Private Kenny, 23rd February.—Gallantry rescued a wounded man 
 of the Imperial Light Infantry, who lay exposed to a heavy fire. 
 
 2nd Bn. Rovai Dublin Fusiliers. 
 
 1664 Serjeant Sheridan, 4290 Serjeant Hunt. 3861 Lance-Corporal Kellv 
 and 5628 Lance-Serjeant Church. —Distinguished b} T their great coolness, 
 ability, and pluck, in fighting and in commanding their men at Battle of 
 Colenso and in other engagements. 
 
 3892 Private Kelly, 27th February.—Conspicuous gallantry in going 
 forward under fire to carry out an Officer who was wounded, and again in going 
 to the rear for ammunition which he brought and distributed under heavy fire. 
 
 1st Bn. Rifle Brigade. 
 
 8395 Serjeant-Major W. Monish.—Conspicuous coolness under fire and 
 when supplying battalion with ammunition. 
 
 2052 Serjeant J. Brooke, 5th February.—Conspicuous coolness under fire, 
 and dressing two men’s wounds at Vaal Krantz under heavy fire. 
 
 2017 Corporal L. Covne, 27th February.—Carried in two woundcv. men 
 under heavy fire into shelter. 
 
54 
 
 2nd Bn. Rifle Brigade. 
 
 9893 Private J. Brown and 9520 Private T. Adams, 23rd February.— 
 Gallantry in repeatedly carrying wounded to dressing station under very 
 heavy fire. 
 
 Imperial Light Horse. 
 
 101 Lance-Corporal A. B. Duers.—Conspicuous gallantry on several occa¬ 
 sions in carrying out dangerous reconnaissances. 
 
 Thorneycroft’s Mounted Infantry. 
 
 7139 Serjeant J. H. Jeffries, 15th December, 1899, Colenso.—Con¬ 
 spicuous gallantry; 24th January, Spion Kop.—Conspicuous gallantry. 
 
 5355 Serjeant J. Mason, 24th January, Spion Kop.—Conspicuous 
 gallantry. 
 
 7492 Private G. E. Ackland and SI Private J. B. Fischer, 21st February.— 
 Crossing Tugela under heavy fire to see if there w r ere barbed wire in the drift. 
 
 South African Light Horse. 
 
 1096 Corporal T. Tobin, 20th January.—Conspicuous gallantry in attack 
 on Conical Hill. 
 
 Natal Carbineers. 
 
 Trooper F. C. Farmer, 15th December, Colenso.—Conspicuous gallantry 
 in rescuing Lieutenant Mackay, who was wounded under very heavy fire. 
 
 Imperial Light Infantry. 
 
 565 Corporal P. Weldon, 24th January, Spion Kop. — Conspicuous 
 gallantry, when, surrounded by enemy, he refused to surrender. He fought 
 with bayonet until killed by blow on the head. 
 
 929 Private Tom Hughes, 24th January, Spion Kop. — Conspicuous 
 gallantry. After having a wound dressed, returned to firing line, and was 
 then wounded in right shoulder. He continued to fire from left shoulder, 
 and was successively wounded in left arm, throat, wrist, hand and chest. 
 
 792 Private R. Hunter, 24th February, action near Pieter’s Hill.—Con¬ 
 spicuous gallantry. While under a heavy fire, twice built walls round wounded 
 comrades. 
 
 195 Private G, Reed, 24th February, action near Pieter’s Hill.—While 
 under a heavy fire, carried a wounded man of the Connaught Rangers to the 
 shelter of a kraal, and remained with him after the other men had retired. 
 
 From the General Officer Commanding , Natal , to the Secretary of State 
 
 for War. 
 
 {Through the Field-Marshal Commanding the Forces in South Africa.) 
 
 The Convent, Ladysmith, 
 
 Sir, 30th March, 1900. 
 
 Ladysmith having been relieved on the 28th February, this seems to be a 
 period in the South African campaign at which I may suitably bring to your 
 notice the names, not previously mentioned, of Officers, non-commissioned 
 officers and men whose services, in contributing to that result, deserve special 
 mention. 
 
 2. The first attempt to relieve Ladysmith was made on the 15 th December. 
 It failed, and, after waiting for reinforcements, operations for the relief were 
 
55 
 
 continued from the 15bh January to the 27th February. During this period 
 the troops were seriously engaged on 30 days out of the 43, and there were 
 skirmishes, minor operations, or affairs of outposts, on most of the others. 
 From the 14th to the 27th February the fighting was continuous. 
 
 3. I mention the Officers on the line of communications first, the work 
 there is harder and certainly less congenial than with troops at the front, but 
 it is of the first importance. 
 
 So long as work on the communications is looked down upon, it is hard 
 to keep at it a good Officer who is pining for employment at the front, and 
 yet nothing disturbs the working of communications more than constant 
 changes in the Staff. I think the ruling given 3,000 years ago by a warrior king 
 should be openly accepted in the Army, and that good work on the com¬ 
 munications should be given equal credit with good work at the front. 
 
 Having regard to the large number of troops employed, the severity of 
 the fighting, and the great number of clays on which they were actually 
 engaged, the list I now forward will not, I hope, be deemed excessive. 
 
 4. His Excellency the Hon. Sir W. Hely Hutchinson, Governor of Natal, 
 deserves my first thanks ; he has helped me in every way in his power. My 
 thanks are also due to Colonel the Hon. A. H. Hime, Prime Minister, and all 
 the members of the Government of Natal. 
 
 Pear-Admiral Sir R. H. Harris, K.C.M.G., has been most helpful to me, 
 and has met my many demands with ready support. 
 
 5. I desire to bring the following Officers and Warrant Officers especially 
 to your notice, as having performed exceptionally valuable service in their 
 several departments, and as specially worthy of your consideration :— 
 
 Captain P. Scott, C.B.,H.M. Ship “ Terrible,” has discharged the difficult 
 duties of Commandant of Durban with the greatest tact and ability, and has 
 been most helpful in every way. 
 
 Captain E. P. Jones, H.M. Ship “Forte,” as Senior Officer of the Naval 
 Brigade he has earned my most heartfelt thanks. The assistance they have 
 rendered to me has been invaluable ; the spirit of their leader was reflected in 
 the men, and at any time, day or night, they were always ready, and their 
 work was excellent. 
 
 Commander A. H. Limpus and Lieutenant F. C. A. Ogilvy, H.M. Ship 
 “ Terrible,” and Lieutenant H. W. James, H.M. Ship “ Tartar.”—-These three 
 Officers were indefatigable. There never was a moment in the day that they 
 were not working hard and well to advance the work in hand. 
 
 Lieutenant N. W. Chiazzari, Natal Naval Volunteers, was in charge of a 
 detachment who were associated with the Naval Brigade, and took their full 
 share of the good work done by the Naval Brigade. 
 
 Brigadier-General J. Wolfe Murray has been in charge of the Line of 
 Communications throughout. Possessing great capacity for work, singular 
 abilitv, tact, and discrimination, the amount of work he gets through is as 
 remarkable as the careful manner in which it is done. 1 cannot speak too 
 highlv of him. 
 
 Major (local Lieut.-Colonel) H. N. C. Heath, Assistant Adjutant-General, 
 has satisfactorily performed the duties of Senior Staff' Officer on the Line of 
 Communications, which have entailed hard and constant work. He has shown 
 good knowledge of detail, is clear headed, reliable, and hard working. 
 
 Major T. J. O’Dell, Army Service Corps, did exceptionally good work on 
 the Line of Communications. His knowledge of Army Service Corps duties, 
 and of matters connected with transport by sea, are much above the average. 
 
 Lieut.-Colonel G. Stanley, Army Service Corps, as Director of Transport 
 was most successful. The transport has always been where it was wanted, and 
 has worked without a hitch. 
 
 Major H. G. Morgan, D.S.O., Army Service Corps, as Director of Supplies 
 has discharged his duties admirably. I have to speak most highly of him. 
 
 , »•,. Lieut.-Colonel E. B. Appelbe, Chief Ordnance Officer, is an Officer of 
 exceptional capacity and almost unbounded resource. The foresight which he 
 has displayed in providing for the wants of the force is deserving of every 
 commendation. 
 
56 
 
 Commander G. E. Holland, Indian Marine.—An excellent Officer. Besides 
 discharging his own duties, has given the greatest assistance in the preparation 
 of hospital ships. 
 
 Colonel (local Major-General) A. S. Wynne, C.B., was my Chief of the 
 Staff until, on General Woodgate being wounded, he was transferred to 
 command a brigade. In both appointments he has given me the highest 
 satisfaction. 
 
 Colonel H. S. G. Miles, M.V.O.—A thoroughly capable Officer, with the 
 power of making work go pleasantly ; possessing a thorough knowledge ot 
 detail as well as a sound knowledge of theory. He is very valuable in any 
 position. As my Chief Staff Officer, he has been of the greatest assistance 
 to me. 
 
 Colonel the Hon. F. W. Stopford, C.B.—The reputation of this Officer is 
 well established. I have found him all he was said to be and more. His 
 services have been of the greatest value to me. 
 
 Major-General (local Lieut.-General) Sir C. F. Clery, K.C.B. —A thoroughly 
 capable divisional commander. His dispositions are always good, and he has 
 a thorough knowledge of tactical and technical detail. 
 
 M ajor-General Hon. N. G. Lyttelton, C.B.—A sound capable commander 
 who has done well He now has a division, and is worthy of the advancement. 
 
 Major-General H. J. T. Hildyard, C.B.—A valuable Officer: combines 
 great professional knowdedge with coolness underfire and readiness of resource. 
 
 Colonel (local Major-General) the Earl of Dundonald, C.B., M.V.O.—Has 
 commanded a brigade of irregular Cavalry to my entire satisfaction. His out¬ 
 post work and scouting are excellent. 
 
 Colonel (local Brigadier-General) F. W. Kitchener.—A very capable 
 Commanding Officer, who leads his men well in the field, and looks after them 
 in quarters. He is now a Brigadier, and is doing equally well in chat position. 
 
 Colonel C. D. Cooper, 2nd Bn. Royal Dublin Fusiliers.—A thoroughly 
 good Officer, who has led his regiment thoroughly well. 
 
 Lieut.-Colonel L. W. Parsons, Royal Artillery, a first rate Artillery 
 Officer, who, in the absence ot an Officer Commanding, Royal Artillery, has 
 rendered me the greatest assistance. 
 
 Lieut.-Colonel J. F. Burn-Murdoch, 1st Dragoons.—Since the 1st February, 
 he has commanded the first Cavalry Brigade in a very efficient manner. He is 
 an excellent regimental Commanding Officer, and takes the greatest trouble to 
 train his men. 
 
 Lieut.-Colonel R. H. W. H. Harris, 2nd Bn. East Surrey Regiment, a good, 
 painstaking Commanding Officer. On the 22nd February, he received 10 
 separate wounds. 
 
 Lieut.-Colonel E. 0. F. Hamilton, 2nd Bn. Royal West Surrey Regiment, 
 an excellent Commanding Officer. His battalion has done conspicuously well 
 in action, in camp, and on the march. He has always handled his battalion 
 in action with marked coolness and judgment. 
 
 Lieut.-Colonel A. E. Sandbach, Royal Engineers, as head of the Intelli¬ 
 gence Department has been untiring, and has been of the greatest assistance 
 to me. 
 
 Lieut.-Colonel E. Cooke, 2nd Bn. Scottish Rifles, an excellent Com¬ 
 manding Officer, who commands an admirably trained battalion. 
 
 Malor (local Lieut.-Colonel) E. C. Betiiune, 16th Lancers, raised and 
 commanded Bethune’s Mounted Infantry. Has proved himaelf to be an 
 excellent Commander of Irregular Horse. He has acted with great skill and 
 judgment when in command of a detached force. 
 
 Major (local Lieut.-Colonel) A. W. Thorneycroft, Royal Scots Fusiliers, 
 raised and commanded Thorneycroft’s Mounted Infantry, for which he pos¬ 
 sesses, in a marked degree, the necessary qualifications. I have already 
 brought to notice the gallantry and ability he displayed at Spion Kop, 24th 
 January. 
 
 Major (local Lieut.-Colonel) Hon. J. H. G. Byng, 10th Hussars, has com¬ 
 manded the South African Light Horse with marked ability and succ'ess, and 
 has done very good service with them. 
 
 Major (local Lieut.-Colonel) W. F. Nash, Border Regiment, commanded 
 the Imperial Light Infantry. The extremeiy good work done by the battalion 
 
57 
 
 is due to the excellent manner in which it was commanded by Lieut.-Colonel 
 Nash. 
 
 Major E. J. Montagu-Stuart-Wortley, C.M.G., D.S.O., 4th Bn. King's 
 Royal Rifle Corps.—I was much struck by the wav in which a battalion, made 
 up of' the drafts of three regiments, and officered chiefly by Second Lieutenants, 
 worked under his command. 
 
 Major C. R. R. McGrigor, Brigade-Major, 5th Brigade, has shown 
 exceptional capacity as a Staff Officer. He has a thorough knowledge of his 
 duties, and has performed them with great ability. 
 
 Major W. Apsley Smith, Royal Artillery, did very good work in command 
 of a Brigade Division, Royal Field Artillery. 
 
 Major A. G. Chichester, Royal Irish Regiment, performed with marked 
 energy, tact, and discretion, the duties of Provost-Marshal, which were of an 
 exceptional character, owing to the number of rebels and suspected persons 
 who had to be dealt with. 
 
 Major A. W. L. Bayly, D.S.O., Indian Staff Corps.—An excellent Staff 
 Officer : very hardworking, cool and courageous. 
 
 Major H. Batson, 2nd Bn. Devonshire Regiment, has commanded his 
 battalion since 15th December, when Colonel Bullock was taken prisoner. He 
 has proved himself well qualified as a Commanding Officer. 
 
 Major J. L. Irvine, Rojal Engineers.—I cannot speak too highly of this 
 Officer. Our pontoon work was very heavy, and the Pontoon Troop much 
 under strength, but, capable, quiet, persistent and indefatigable. Major Irvine 
 was remarkable for the amount of work he got through, the speed at which it 
 was done, and the manner in which his men worked for him. 
 
 Major W. Kays, 3rd Bn. King’s Royal Rifle Corps.—The gallant behaviour 
 in action of Major Kays has more than once been brought to my notice. He 
 led the assault of the right half battalion on Sugar Loaf Hill, Spion Kop, and 
 was wounded in doing so. 
 
 Major N. D. Finlay and Captain F. R. Patch, Royal Artillery, did excellent 
 work in command of an ammunition column and ammunition park respectively. 
 However heavy the engagement, and however difficult the means of communi¬ 
 cation every battery was complete with ammunition every evening. 
 
 Major W. L. H. Paget, Royal Artillery, showed great energy and resource 
 in reforming , his battery, which was shipwrecked in the “ Is more,” and has 
 commanded it with conspicuous ability. 
 
 Major A. Hamilton-Cordon, Royal Artillery.—The manner in which this 
 Officer commanded the 61st Howitzer Battery is worthy of the highest praise. 
 He has rendered excellent service. 
 
 Major G. F. Ellison, Deputy-Assistant Adjutant-General, 2nd Division.— 
 The General Officer Commanding, 2nd Division, speaks in the highest terms 
 of the way in which Major Ellison carried out his duties as Deputy-Assistant 
 Adjutant-General (B). He has shown great administrative capacity, and has 
 proved his value in the field. 
 
 Captain (local Major) G. S. St. Aubyn, King’s Royal Rifle Corps, was 
 conspicuous both at Colenso on 15th December, 1899, and Spion Kop, 24th 
 January, for great gallantry. Has been an excellent Second in Command to 
 Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft. 
 
 Major McKenzie, Natal Carbineers.—A Colonist of great experience, and 
 marked ability as a leader of irregular horse. Has rendered excellent service 
 throughout. 
 
 Captain H. H. Wilson, Brigade-Major, 4th Brigade.—An excellent 
 Brigade-Major, capable, keen, cool, and bold. 
 
 Captain H. Be la P. Gough, 16th Lancers, showed great capacity for 
 scouting work, in which he rendered very good service. Has also commanded 
 a composite regiment of horse with skill and judgment. 
 
 Captain H. D. White-Thomson, Royal Artillery, showed great ability in 
 the discharge of his duties as Adjutant of his Brigade Divisiou. He showed 
 great gallantry at the Battle of Colenso in rendering assistance to the wounded 
 of the 14th and 66th Batteries, Royal Field Artillery. 
 
 Captain W. R. Birdwood, Indian Staff Corps, has proved himself to be a 
 valuable Staff Officer, and has done very good work both in “ B ” duties and as 
 Brigade-Major to a Mounted Brigade. 
 
 (762-2) " H 
 
0 
 
 Captain H. E. Gogarty, Brigade-Major, 2nd Brigade, has shown very- 
 special aptitude for Staff duties under trying conditions. Quick, good power 
 of observation, and a thoroughly determined Officer. 
 
 Captain J. S. Cayzer, 7th Dragoon Guards, did excellent work as Director 
 of Signalling. He established, and satisfactorily maintained, constant com¬ 
 munication with Ladysmith under very exceptional difficulties. 
 
 Captain H. Cleeve, Army Service Corps, did exceptionally good work in 
 charge of the Corps Troops Supply Column. 
 
 Captain R. N. Smythe, 21st Lancers {attached to 13tli Hussars), has done 
 excellent service with Cavalry Scouts. He has proved himself thoroughly well 
 qualified for this important work, which he has carried out with daring, skill, 
 and judgment. His reports are very clear and to the point. 
 
 Lieutenant R. J. Jelf, Royal Engineers, has been indefatigable in charge 
 of the Field Telegraph, and has constantly had to work day and night. No 
 difficulty was too great for him. 
 
 Lieutenant G. E. S. Salt, 1st Bn. Royal Welsh Fusiliers, showed 
 conspicuous gallantry on the 24th February, in bringing the machine gun into 
 action by hand under great difficulties. He remained in action until the 
 foresight was shot away, and the gun rendered useless. 
 
 Lieutenant J. A. Innes, 4th Bn. Rifle Brigade.—A very capable and 
 promising young Officer. When under a heavy fire on Yaal Krantz, he made 
 for his own information a sketch of the surrounding country, which was after¬ 
 wards of great service to me. 
 
 Second Lieutenant J. L. Buxton, 3rd Bn. Rifle Brigade.—A very young 
 Officer, who was specially brought to my notice for the capable manner in 
 which he took command of his company when the Captain and Lieutenant 
 were both wounded. 
 
 Second Lieutenant C. H. Marsh, 1st Bn. South Lancashire Regiment.—- 
 The gallant conduct of this young Officer on 27th February was brought 
 specially to my notice. After his company commander was wounded he 
 behaved in a most gallant manner, encouraging his men, who were exposed 
 to a heavy shrapnel, machine gun, and rifle fire. A wound which he had 
 received on the 23rd January had broken out and was bleeding. 
 
 Superintending Clerk F. J. Grimbly, Royal Engineers, and Staff Serjeant- 
 Major W. H. Savage, Army Service Corps.—The work of these two Warrant 
 Officers has been specially deserving of consideration. 
 
 fi. The following gentlemen have earned my gratitude for the services 
 they rendered. I desire to recommend them for your consideration :—- 
 
 The Hon. T. K. Murray, C.M.G.—When all the Staff where shut up in 
 Ladysmith, kindly undertook the formation of an Intelligence Department, 
 and the enlistment of a Corps of Guides who did much good and gallant work. 
 
 Mr. D. Hunter, C.M.G., General Manager, Natal Government Railways, 
 and Mr. W. G. Hamilton, Postmaster-General.—Both these gentlemen have 
 given me ready assistance at all times. 
 
 7. I also recommend the following Officers for your consideration ;— 
 
 Lieut.-General Sir C. Warren, G.C.M.G., K.C.B 
 
 Major-General G. Barton, C.B. 
 
 Major- General A. Fitz Roy Hart, C.B. 
 
 Colonel (local Major-General) J. T. Coke. 
 
 Head-Quarter Staff. 
 
 Lieut.-Colonel C. h, Court, Deputy-Assistant Adjutant-General. 
 Major P. J. T. Lewis, Army Service Corps, Deputy-Assistant 
 Adjutant-General. 
 
 Major W. D. Jones, Wiltshire Regiment, Press Censor. 
 
 Major L. E. Kiggell, Royal Warwickshire Regiment, Deputy- 
 Assistant Adjutant-General. 
 
 Major Hon. F. Gordon, Gordon Highlanders, Deputy-Assistant 
 Adjutant-General. 
 
 Cffonel Lord Gerard, Lancashire Hussars, A.D.C. 
 
59 
 
 Lieutenant Edgar Lees, Royal Navy, Naval A.D.C. 
 
 Captain H. N. Schofield, Royal Artillery, A.D.C. 
 
 Captain C. J. Sackville-West, King’s Royal Rifie Corps, A.D.C. 
 
 Lieutenant A. R. Trotter, 2nd Life Guards, A.D.C. 
 
 Lieutenant W. M. Kington, Royal Welsh Fusiliers, Acting Director 
 of Signalling. 
 
 .Reverend A. A. L. Gedge, Senior Chaplaiu. 
 
 Lines of Communication. 
 
 Colonel R. Stevenson, Remount Department. 
 
 Lieut.-Colonel H. E. Rawson, Commanding Royal Engineers. 
 
 Major A. A. Weldon, 4th Bn. Leinster Regiment, Railway Staff 
 Officer, Pietermaritzburg, and afterwards assisting Director of 
 Supplies. 
 
 Lieutenant C. Toogood, Border Regiment, Disembarking Officer, 
 Durban. 
 
 Lieutenant C. G. Fuller, Royal Engineers, Railway Staff Officer, 
 Durban. 
 
 1st Cavalry Brigade Staff. 
 
 Major H. W. G. Graham, D.S.O., 5th Lancers, Brigade-Major. 
 
 2nd Division Staff. 
 
 Colonel B. Hamilton, Assistant Adjutant-General. 
 
 Captain W. G. Boyce, Army Service Corps, Deputy-Assistant 
 Adjutant-General. 
 
 5th Division Staff. 
 
 Major T. Capper, East Lancashire Regiment, Assistant Adjutant- 
 General. 
 
 Brevet-Major H. N. Sargent, Army Service Corps, Deputy-Assistant 
 Adjutant-General. 
 
 6th Infantry Brigade Staff. 
 
 Captain J. MacBean, D.S.O., Royal Dublin Fusiliers, Brigade-Major. 
 10th Infantry Brigade Staff. 
 
 Captain H. G. C. Phillips, Welsh Regiment, Brigade-Major. 
 
 11th Infantry Brigade Staff. 
 
 Captain W. P. Braithwaite, Somersetshire Light Infantry. Brigade- 
 Major since 24th January, 1900. 
 
 1st Dragoons. 
 
 Major Lord Basing. (In Command since 1st February.) 
 
 13th Hussars. 
 
 Lieut.-Colonel H. J. Blagrove. 
 
 14th Hussars. 
 
 Lieut.-Colonel G. H. C. Hamilton. 
 
 Mounted Infantry. 
 
 Captain C. R. Eustace, King’s Royal Rifle Corps 
 
 Imperial Light Horse. 
 
 Captain H. Bottomley. 
 
 (762-2; * H 2 
 
GO 
 
 Royal Engineers. 
 
 Lieut.-Colonel G. H. Sim. 
 
 Lieut.-Colonel C. K. Wood. 
 
 Roval Lancaster Regiment. 
 
 Q. 
 
 Major F. B. Matthews. 
 
 2nd Bn. Royal Fusiliers. 
 
 Lieut.-Colonel C. G. Donald. 
 
 2nd Bn. Somersetshire Light Infantry. 
 Lieut.-Colonel E. J. Gallwey. 
 
 2nd Bn. West Yorkshire Regiment. 
 
 O 
 
 Major W. Fry. 
 
 2nd Bn. Royal Scots Fusiliers. 
 Lieut.-Colonel E. E. Carr. 
 
 1st Bn. Border Regiment. 
 
 Colonel J. H. E. Hinde. 
 
 Major J. S. Pelly. 
 
 2nd Bn. Dorsetshire Regiment. 
 Lieut.-Colonel C. H. Law. 
 
 2nd Bn. Middlesex Regiment. 
 Lieut,-Colonel A. W. Hill. 
 
 3rd Bn. King’s Royal Rifle Corps. 
 Major R. C. A. B. Bewicke-Copley. 
 
 1st Bn. York and Lancaster Regiment. 
 Lieut.-Colonel W. J. Kirkpatrick. 
 
 1st Bn. Durham Light Infantry. 
 Lieut.-Colonel A. L. Woodland. 
 
 2nd Bn. Royal Irish Fusiliers. 
 
 */ 
 
 Colonel J. Reeves. 
 
 1st Bn. Connaught Rangers. 
 Colonel L. G. Brooke. 
 
 1st Bn. Rifle Brigade. 
 
 Lieut.-Colonel A. E. W. Colville. 
 
61 
 
 Army Service Corps. 
 
 Lieut.-Colonel F. A. Le P. Trench. 
 
 Major G. M. V. Hunt. 
 
 8. On other papers I am bringing forward recommendations for awards of 
 the Victoria Cross to one Officer, Captain C. Mansel-Jones, West Yorkshire 
 Regiment, and of the Medal for Distinguished Conduct in the Field to certain 
 Warrant Officers, non-commissioned officers, and men. 
 
 9. The names of the following Officers, Warrant Officers, non-com¬ 
 missioned officers, and men, have been brought to my notice for gallant or 
 meritorious services by General Officers and Officers Commanding units :— 
 
 Officers—Naval Brigade. 
 
 Lieutenant C. P. Hunt, H.M. Ship “ Forte.” 
 Lieutenant C. R. N. Burne, H.M. Ship “ Philomel.” 
 Staff-Surgeon F. J. Lilly, H.M. Ship “ Forte.” 
 
 Surgeon 0. C. Macmillan, H.M. Ship “Terrible.” 
 Surgeon E. C. Lomas, H.M. Ship “ Terrible.” 
 
 Acting Gunner J. Wright, H.M. Ship “ Terrible.” 
 Midshipman R. B. Hutchinson, H.M. Ship “ Terrible.” 
 Midshipman H. S. Boldero, H.M. Ship “ Terrible.” 
 Midshipman G. L. Hodson, H.M. Ship “ Terrible.” 
 Clerk W. T. Hollins, H.M. Ship “ Philomel.” 
 
 1st Cavalry Brigade Staff. 
 
 Captain A. IT. M. Taylor, 13th Hussars. 
 
 Captain The Marquis of Tullibardine, D.S.O., Royal Horse Guards. 
 
 2nd Infantry Divisional Staff. 
 
 Major F. IT Cooper, Royal Artillery, A.D.C. 
 
 Captain L. Parke, Durham Light Infantry, A.D.C. 
 
 Lieutenant A. E. McNamara, 2nd Bn. Rl. West Surrey Regt., A.D.C. 
 Captain E. St. G. Pratt, Durham Light Infantry, Assistant Provost- 
 Marshal. 
 
 Lieutenant J. E. Cavendish, 1st Life Guards, Divisional Signalling 
 Officer. 
 
 5tli, Infantry Divisional Staff. 
 
 Major R. M. B. F. Kelly, Royal Artillery, A.D.C. 
 
 Lieutenant I. V. Paton, Royal Scots Fusiliers, A.D.C. 
 
 Captain C. B. Levita, Royal Artillery, Deputy-Assistant Adjutant- 
 General. 
 
 Brevet-Major E. C. J. Williams, East Kent Regiment, Assistant 
 Provost-Marshal. 
 
 Captain A. A. Hardy, Royal Artillery, Divisional Signalling Officer. 
 Reverend R. F. Collins, Chaplain. 
 
 Reverend W. F. Sorsbie, Chaplain. 
 
 2nd Infantry Brigade Staff. 
 
 Lieutenant A. Blair, King’s Own Scottish Borderers, A.D.C. 
 
 Major H. H. Prince Christian Victor of Schleswig-Holstein, G.C.B., 
 G.C.V.O., King’s Royal Rifle Corps, Assistant Staff Officer. 
 Lieutenant R. P. H. Monro, 2nd Bn. Devonshire Regiment, Signalling 
 Officer. 
 
 4th Infantry Brigade Staff. 
 
 Captain Hon. H. Yarde-Buller, Rifle Brigade, A.D.C. 
 
62 
 
 5th Infantry Brigade Staff. 
 
 Captain Hon. St. L. H. Jervis, King’s Boyal Rifle Corps, A.D.C. 
 Second Lieutenant R. Y. O. Hart, 2nd Bn. East Surrey Regiment 
 Acting A.D.C. after Captain Hon. St. L. Jervis was wounded. 
 Major B. J. C. Doran, Royal Irish Regiment, Assistant Staff Officer. 
 Captain A. G. Dallas, 16th Lancers, Assistant Staff Officer. 
 
 6th Infantry Brigade Staff. 
 Captain N. R. McMahon, Royal Fusiliers, A.D.C. 
 
 10th Infantry Brigade Staff. 
 
 Captain C. B. Jervis-Edwards, Duke of Cornwall’s Light Infantry, 
 Brigade-Major. 
 
 11th Infantry Brigade Staff. 
 
 Captain F. M. Carleton, D.S.O., Royal Lancaster Regiment, A.D.C. 
 Captain N. H. Vertue, East Kent Regiment, Brigade-Major (killed). 
 Lieutenant H. K. Woods, 1st Bn. South Lancashire Regiment, 
 Signalling Officer. 
 
 1st Dragoons. 
 
 Captain and Adjutant G. F. Steele. 
 Captain J. M. Rogers. 
 
 Lieutenant T. M. S. Pitt. 
 
 Lieutenant C. A. Calvert. 
 
 Lieutenant and Quarter-Master F. Burch. 
 
 13th Hussars. 
 
 Major W. C. Smithson. 
 
 Major C. Williams. 
 
 Captain and Adjutant J. H. Tremayne. 
 
 14th Hussars. 
 
 Lieutenant and Adjutant F. R. Lawrence, D.S.O. 
 Lieutenant T. E. L. Hill-Whitson. 
 
 South African Light Horse. 
 
 Captain H. K. Stewart. 
 
 Lieutenant E. Marshal. 
 
 Lieutenant W. F. Barker. 
 
 Lieutenant C. A. Walker-Leigh. 
 
 Lieutenant R. S. Thorold. 
 
 Lieutenant G. Marsden. 
 
 Lieutenant W. P. Pearse. 
 
 Lieutenant T. H. Carlisle. 
 
 Imperial Light Horse. 
 
 Lieutenant J. Bridges, Royal Artillery (attached). 
 
 Bethune’s Mounted Infantry. 
 
 Captain W. E. D. Goff, 3rd Dragoon Guardsjattached). 
 Captain H. C. Erskine. 
 
 Lieutenant C. J. Collopy. 
 
 Lieutenant L. Lanham. 
 
63 
 
 Thorneycroft’s Mounted Infantry. 
 
 Captain Hon. J. Petre, Suffolk Hussars Yeomanry, attached (killed). 
 Captain C. H. Knox-Gore (killed). 
 
 Captain E. Molyneux. 
 
 Captain R. A. Bettington. 
 
 Lieutenant P. Newnham, Indian Staff Corps (attached). 
 
 Lieutenant H. G. Sargent, Indian Staff Corps (attached). 
 Lieutenant J. H. Baldwin. 
 
 Lieutenant A. Bensusan. 
 
 Lieutenant M. G. Farquhar. 
 
 Composite Mounted Infantry Regiment. 
 
 Lieutenant G. N. Cory, Royal Dublin Fusiliers. 
 
 Natal Mounted Police. 
 
 Inspector Fairlie. 
 
 Inspector Abraham. 
 
 Royal Horse and Field Artillery. 
 
 Major E. A. Burrows. 
 
 Major D. C. Carter. 
 
 Major A. Stokes. 
 
 Major C. E. Coghill. 
 
 Captain R. F. Fox. 
 
 Captain W. M. Grover. 
 
 Captain G. H. W. Nicholson. 
 
 Captain R. W. Boger. 
 
 Captain J. E. James. 
 
 Lieutenant C. B. Schreiber (killed). 
 
 Lieutenant H. E. Street. 
 
 Lieutenant J. B. Grylls. 
 
 Lieutenant J. D. B. Fulton. 
 
 Royal Engineers. 
 
 Major H. H. Massy (killed), 17th Company. 
 
 Captain R. W. H. Buckland, Royal Engineer Stafl. 
 
 Captain G. M. Harper, 37th Company. 
 
 Captain G. E. Phillips, Balloon Section. 
 
 Captain W. C. Hedley, 17th Company. 
 
 Captain G. M. Hutton, Royal Engineer Staff. 
 
 Lieutenant J. W. Skip with, Pontoon Troop. 
 
 Lieutenant R. Ommaney, Pontoon Troop. 
 
 2nd Bn. Royal West Surrey Regiment. 
 
 Major W. S. Burrell. 
 
 Captain and Adjutant G. G. Whiffen. 
 
 Lieutenant H. W. Smith. 
 
 Second Lieutenant L. D. Wedd. 
 
 Second Lieutenant C. F. Watson. 
 
 Second Lieutenant R. G. Clark. 
 
 2nd Bn. Royal Lancaster Regiment. 
 
 Lieutenant F. C. D. Davidson (died of wounds). 
 
 Second Lieutenant C. W. Grover. 
 
 2nd Bn. Devonshire Regiment. 
 
 Major T. A. H. Davies, D.S.O. 
 
 Major J. McN. Walter. 
 
 Captain and Adjutant L. J. Bols. 
 
 Captain P. U. W. Vigors. 
 
 Captain N. J. Goodwyn. 
 
64 
 
 Captain J. F. Radcliffe. 
 
 Captain C. C. Maynard. 
 
 Lieutenant W. F. Bonham, 2nd Bn. Essex Regiment (attached). 
 Lieutenant R. F. Meildejolin, 1st Bn. Royal Warwickshire Regiment 
 (attached). 
 
 Lieutenant G. N. T. Smyth-Osbourne. 
 
 2nd Bn. Somersetshire Light Infantry. 
 
 Major R. B. Williams. 
 
 Lieutenant Y. F. A. Keith-Falconer (killed). 
 
 Lieutenant C. B. Prowse. 
 
 Second Lieutenant C\ H. Little. 
 
 2nd Bn. West Yorkshire Regiment. 
 
 Major H. E. Watts. 
 
 Captain T. H. Berney (killed). 
 
 Lieutenant and Acting Adjutant L. Spry. 
 
 Lieutenant H. S. Pennell, V.C., 2nd Bn. Derbyshire Regiment 
 (attached). 
 
 Lieutenant 0. H. L. Nicholson. 
 
 2nd Bn. Lancashire Fusiliers. 
 
 Captain J. N. Whyte. 
 
 Captain H. V. S. Ormond. 
 
 Lieutenant E. Fraser (killed). 
 
 Lieutenant V. H. Awdrey. 
 
 Lieutenant A. J. Allardyce. 
 
 Lieutenant D. F. Campbell. 
 
 2nd Bn. Royal Scots Fusiliers. 
 
 Brevet-Major Y. Lewis (killed). 
 
 Captain and Adjutant C. P. A. Hull. 
 
 1st Bn. Royal Welsh Fusiliers. 
 
 Major H. J. Arch dale. 
 
 Captain and Adjutant W. G. Braithwaite. 
 
 Captain A. P. G. Gough. 
 
 Captain P. R. Mantell. 
 
 Captain H. Delme-Radclifle. 
 
 2nd Bn. Scottish Rifles. 
 
 Captain and Adjutant G. T. C. Carter-Camp bell. 
 
 Captain R. Wanless-O’Gowan. 
 
 Lieutenant and Quarter-Master T. Finn. 
 
 1st Bn. Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers. 
 
 Major F. A. Sanders (killed). 
 
 Captain and Adjutant E. J. Buckley. 
 
 Captain F. G. Jones. 
 
 Captain W. F. Hessey. 
 
 Lieutenant R. A. B. Young. 
 
 2nd Bn. East Surrey Regiment. 
 
 Major H. L. Smith. 
 
 Captain H. S. Tew. 
 
 Lieutenant and Adjutant F. W. King-Church. 
 
 Lieutenant A. C. S. Barchard. 
 
 Lieutenant R. A. B. Chute. 
 
 Lieutenant V. H. M. de la Fontaine. 
 
 Lieutenant J. C. May. 
 
65 
 
 1st Bn. Border Regiment. 
 
 Major R. H. G. Hey gate. 
 
 Captain J. E. S. Probyn. 
 
 Lieutenant and Adjutant C. L. McNab. 
 
 1st Bn. South Lancashire Regiment. 
 
 Major R. H. Hall. 
 
 Captain S. Upperton. 
 
 Captain E. T. James. 
 
 Lieutenant A. T. Beckwith, 1st Bn. Hampshire Regiment (attached). 
 Lieutenant H. R. Kane. 
 
 3rd Bn. King’s Royal Rifle Corps. 
 
 Lieutenant G. A. P. Rennie. 
 
 Second Lieutenant A. F. C. Maclacldan. 
 
 1st Bn. York and Lancaster Regiment. 
 
 Major F. P. Lousada. 
 
 Major H. S. Scholes. 
 
 Lieutenant and Adjutant M. F. Halford. 
 
 Lieutenant W. E. Sykes. 
 
 Lieutenant P. E. Vaughan. 
 
 Second Lieutenant A. H. C. Kearsev. 
 
 Second Lieutenant J. D’E. Fitz E. Coke. 
 
 1st Bn. Durham Light Infantry. 
 
 Major T. R. Johnson Smyth (killed). 
 
 Major C. C. Mansel. 
 
 Captain L. E. C. Elwes. 
 
 Second Lieutenant C. L. Matthews. 
 
 Lieutenant and Quarter-Master J. H. Liebrecht. 
 
 2nd Bn. Royal Irish Fusiliers. 
 
 Major F. F. Hill. 
 
 Lieutenant and Adjutant C. Dick. 
 
 Lieutenant H. L. Mourilyan, 1st Bn. Royal Warwickshire Regiment, 
 attached (killed). 
 
 1st Bn. Connaught Rangers. 
 
 Captain A. W. II. Bell. 
 
 Lieutenant and Adjutant J. L. H. Conry. 
 
 Lieutenant W. A. White. 
 
 2nd Bn. Royal Dublin Fusiliers. 
 
 Brevet-Lieut.-Colonel C. G. H. Sitwell, D.S.O. (killed). 
 
 Major English. 
 
 Captain and Adjutant Fetherstonhaugh. 
 
 Captain W. J. Venour. 
 
 Captain C. A. Hensley (died of wounds). 
 
 Captain H. M. Shewan. 
 
 Lieutenant T. B. Ely. 
 
 Second Lieutenant A. H. D. Britton. 
 
 1st Bn. Rifle Brigade 
 
 Captain and Adjutant S. C. Long. 
 
 Captain L. F. Green-Wilkinson. 
 
 Lieutenant S. H. Rickman. 
 
 Second Lieutenant R. E. Solly-Flood. 
 
 (762-2) T 
 
GO 
 
 Army Service Corps. 
 
 Major G. A. French. 
 
 Major E. A. Bramhall. 
 
 Captain P. O. Sandilands. 
 
 Captain A. E. Longden. 
 
 Captain St. J. W. T. Parker. 
 
 Captain A. Phelps. 
 
 Captain C. S. Dodgson. 
 
 Captain G. Conway-Gordon. 
 
 Captain W. A. C. Denny. 
 
 ^. 1 , i,Gap tain F. Hunnard, D.S.O. 
 
 Lieutenant E. W. Brooke. 
 
 Lieutenant G. F. Davies. 
 
 Lieutenant H. S. Wright. 
 
 Lieutenant O. Striedingrer. 
 
 Lieutenant C. H. Fanshawe. 
 
 [lieutenant N. G. Anderson. 
 
 Lieutenant E. Gibb. 
 
 Lieutenant P. A. T. Jones, 8th Hussars (attached). 
 Lieutenant and Quarter-Master A. Barron. 
 
 Indian Staff Corps. 
 
 Captain Hennessy, Deputy-Assistant Commissary-General. 
 
 Lines of Communication. 
 
 Colonel W. H. Mortimer, Army Pay Department, Chief Paymaster. 
 Major E. S. C. Kennedy, Station Officer, Pietermaritzburg. 
 
 Major R. L. Sandwith, Officer Commanding Depot, Pietermaritzburg. 
 Lieutenant C. H. Harrington, R.S. Officer, Pietermaritzburg. 
 
 Second Lieutenant Robison, R.S. Officer, Frere. 
 
 Warrant Officers, Non-commissioned Officers and Men, Naval Brigade. 
 
 Chief Petty Officer T. Baldwin, H.M. Ship “ Terrible.” 
 
 Chief Petty Officer W. Bate, H.M. Ship “ Terrible.” 
 
 Chief Petty Officer B. Stephens, H.M. Ship “ Terrible.” 
 
 1st Class Petty Officer P. Cashman, H.M. Ship “ Philomel.” 
 
 2nd Class Petty Officer C. Challoner, H.M. Ship “ Terrible.” 
 
 2nd Class Petty Officer J. J. Frennett, H.M. Ship “ Philomel.” 
 Master-at-Arms G. Crowe, H.M. Ship “ Terrible.” 
 
 Armourer Ellis, H.M. Ship “Terrible.” 
 
 A.B. F. Moore, H.M. Ship “Forte.” 
 
 1st Dragoons. 
 
 •3677 Serjeant Reimers. 
 
 .2551 Serjeant Cook. 
 
 13th Hussars. 
 
 3376 Corporeal F. Smith. 
 
 3335 Corporal E. Servey. 
 
 4311 Private A. Levey. 
 
 J 
 
 Imperial Light Horse. 
 174 Corporal E. W. Warby. 
 
 231 Corporal H. Savory. 
 
 555 Lance-Corporal W. H. Norton. 
 
 491 Trooper H. London. 
 
 167 Trooper W. Francis. 
 
 572 Trooper F. H. Metcalfe. 
 
67 
 
 Bethune’s Mounted Infantry. 
 
 104 Corporal F. Horroyd. 
 
 587 Corporal H. Schott. 
 
 121 Private P. Kilcullen. 
 
 142 Private A. E. Partridge. 
 
 565 Private E. G. Brown. 
 
 713 Private H. Edwards. 
 
 367 Private A. McNeilage. 
 
 Thorneycroft’s Mounted Infantry. 
 
 737 Colour-Serjeant P. Myall (died of wounds). 
 8155 Corporal P. Hetherington (killed). 
 
 6081 Corporal E. C. Lithie (killed). 
 
 719 Private A. Withers. 
 
 2611 Private T. Dolan. 
 
 1831 Private J. E. Mac Adam. 
 
 South African Light Horse. 
 
 822 Serjeant-Major J. Mudford (East Kent Yeomanry, attached). 
 1054 Serjeant R. Turner. 
 
 1000 Corporal W. J. Cox. 
 
 995 Corporal G. Barkly. 
 
 1061 Trooper J. Collingwood. 
 
 1015 Trooper C. Godden (since dead). 
 
 1024 Trooper It. Howell. 
 
 Royal Artillery Depot. 
 
 79124 Serjeant A Collins. 
 
 14th Battery, Royal Field Artillery. 
 
 70833 Bombardier-Wheeler T. Kirkwood. 
 
 28th Battery, Royal Field Artillery. 
 
 8674 Serjeant G. Brierly. 
 
 30886 Driver W. Rose. 
 
 78th Battery, Royal Field Artillery. 
 
 94388 Serjeant W. Parke. 
 
 Royal Engineers. 
 
 16787 Serjeant A. Spurdle. 
 
 23943 Serjeant Hawker. 
 
 22874 Serjeant Wake. 
 
 16023 Serjeant G. Browne. 
 
 22100 2nd Corporal Leary. 
 
 27279 2nd Corporal W. T. Hayman. 
 
 18650 Lance-Corporal Adams. 
 
 25529 Sapper F. A. Cox. 
 
 28293 Sapper Laste. 
 
 2nd Bn Royal West Surrey Regiment. 
 
 2054 Colour-Serjeant H. Sellicks. 
 
 787 Serjeant W. Ewer. 
 
 3382 Lance-Serjeant J. Clifford. 
 
 4343 Corporal H. Alderslate. 
 
 (762-2) I 2 
 
68 
 
 2633 Private J. Greener. 
 
 3321 Private H. Elmer. 
 
 2097 Private Westcombe. 
 
 368 Private J. Carney. 
 
 3246 Lance-Corporal G. Hillier. 
 
 2933 Lance-Corporal J. Smith. 
 
 *2858 Private H. Madox. 
 
 2nd Bn. Royal Lancaster Regiment. 
 
 3607 Colour-Serjeant J. W. Whithead (killed). 
 1586 Colour-Serjeant J. Crowe. 
 
 5180 Lance-Corporal Clarke. 
 
 5454 Private Aid red. 
 
 3094 Private S. Brooke. 
 
 5439 Private A. Browne. 
 
 2714 Private W. Brien. 
 
 2646 Private R. Mason. 
 
 4525 Private E. Gethin. 
 
 2504 Private A. Henderson. 
 
 2698 Private E. Ashton. 
 
 3540 Private J. Hardwick. 
 
 5665 Private D. W. Clements. 
 
 2nd Bn. Royal Fusiliers. 
 
 771 Serjeant B. King. 
 
 3038 Private A. Cooper. 
 
 3804 Private J. Clare. 
 
 5721 Private A. Mann. 
 
 7224 Private W. Short. 
 
 3890 Private P. Hackett. 
 
 3819 Private A. Lavers. 
 
 2nd Bn. Devonshire Regiment. 
 
 1711 Colour-Serjeant Smith. 
 
 4441 Serjeant Boyd. 
 
 1947 Serjeant Wade. 
 
 3576 Serjeant Holland (died of wounds). 
 
 1983 Serjeant Easterbrook. 
 
 2243 Corporal Perkins. 
 
 1094 Private Hayes. 
 
 5047 Private Kitson. 
 
 2206 Private Wren. 
 
 1964 Private Allen. 
 
 4495 Drummer Ellacott. 
 
 2nd Bn. Somersetshire Light Infantry 
 
 1592 Serjeant P. Hewlett. 
 
 3208 Private C. Woods. 
 
 5040 Private F. Cutland. 
 
 4180 Private F. Marsh. 
 
 2nd Bn. West Yorkshire Regiment. 
 5665 Lance-Corporal T. Lambe. 
 
 2nd Bn. Lancashire Fusiliers 
 
 5116 Corporal G. White. 
 
 5681 Private J. Moody. 
 
 4136 Private R. Hodson. 
 
 3182 Private A. Jordan. 
 
 4376 Private G. Pearson. 
 
 * Name previously sent home as “ H. Maiden.' 
 
69 
 
 3961 Private J. Ormesher. 
 
 3510 Private M. Lome (killed). 
 
 4711 Private J. Cold well. 
 
 4959 Private A. Ford. 
 
 4254 Private J. Mockeridge. 
 
 3519 Private T. Brennan. 
 
 2nd Bn. Scottish Rifles. 
 
 3686 Corporal Carr. 
 
 5543 Corporal Balk well. 
 
 3641 Private E. Banks. 
 
 3006 Private Wade. 
 
 3514 Private J. Welding. 
 
 2nd Bn. East Surrey Regiment. 
 
 2685 Colour-Serjeant H. Clay. - 
 1703 Colour-Serjeant W. Ladd. 
 
 2089 Colour-Serjeant F. Robinson. 
 
 3046 Acting Pay-Serjeant H. J. Percy. 
 
 3606 Serjeant F. Hillyard. 
 
 3857 Serjeant W. Line. 
 
 4005 Serjeant A. G. Joiner. 
 
 2400 Private D. Connor. 
 
 4790 Private J. Diamond. 
 
 5308 Private G. Ashcroft. 
 
 2260 Private A. Thurston. 
 
 3451 Private W. Humphrey. 
 
 1st Bn. South Lancashire Regiment. 
 5497 Private P. Coulter. 
 
 3rd Bn. King’s Royal Rifle Corps. 
 
 2281 Quarter-Master-Serjeant Humphries. 
 
 3600 Colour-Serjeant Watkins. 
 
 973 Colour-Serjeant A. Harman. 
 
 1950 Serjeant J. Baker. 
 
 7611 Serjeant H. Pope. 
 
 9283 Corporal E. Wenham. 
 
 6713 Corporal W. Soames. 
 
 6129 Corporal J. Knight. 
 
 9553 Lance-Corporal A. Grindley. 
 
 6832 Private R. Goodman. 
 
 5762 Private Smith. 
 
 7324 Private A. Benn. 
 
 6133 Private T. Moss. 
 
 8951 Private W. Tipson. 
 
 6277 Private J. Finlay. 
 
 1st Bn. York and Lancaster Regiment. 
 
 2010 Private T. Salford. 
 
 2549 Private G. Pitchfork. 
 
 1st Bn. Durham Light Infantry. 
 
 4037 Lance-Corporal A. Bultitude. 
 
 3333 Private W. Baker. 
 
 3585 Private F. Lucking. 
 
 3560 Private J. Horton. 
 
 6486 Private A. Franklin. 
 
 5053 Private A. Swann. 
 
 2942 Private M. Williams. 
 
 6566 Private J. Crawford. 
 
 6484 Private W. Hibbert. 
 
 6290 Private F. Davies. 
 
70 
 
 2nd Bn. Royal Irish Fusiliers. 
 
 1796 Colour-Serjeant Daly. 
 
 2346 Serjeant Kingston. 
 
 3857 Serjeant Devlin. 
 
 3795 Private McNally. 
 
 2nd Bn. Royal Dublin Fusiliers. 
 
 4441 Lance-Serjeant Merry. 
 
 4666 Private Bryan. 
 
 1st Bn. Rifle Brigade. 
 
 4651 Colour-Serjeant H. Lacey. 
 
 7855 Serjeant J. Wingate. 
 
 3262 Acting-Serjeant J. Alderson. 
 
 9221 Corporal H. Hughes. 
 
 673 Private J. Trineman. 
 
 1025 Private H. Nightingale. 
 
 2769 Private B. Naylor. 
 
 Imperial Light Infantry 
 
 Quarter-Master-Serjeant Hillstead. 
 Pay-Serjeant G. Pirie. 
 
 Pay-Serjeant R. C. Geddes. 
 
 Army Service Corps. 
 
 1st Class Staff-Serjeant-Major E. Moore. 
 Staff-Serjeant-Major F. Derbyshire. 
 
 S. 4546 Staff-Quarter-Master-Serjeant A. W. Galley. 
 S. 11604 Staff-Serjeant T. Jones. 
 
 S. 5462 Staff-Serjeant E. H. Josephson. 
 
 T. 6794 Company-Serjeant-Major Baker. 
 
 SC. 187 Staff-Serjeant Ramsden. 
 
 T. 6838 Serjeant F. W. Stanton. 
 
 T. 10782 Serjeant C. C. Crispin. 
 
 T. 9103 Serjeant H. Blunden. 
 
 S. 13146 Serjeant A. E. Warren. 
 
 S. 12952 Corporal H. H. Mills. 
 
 S. 12002 2nd Corporal F. Oliver. 
 
 S. 12655 2nd Corporal N. Petty. 
 
 S. 7452 Private C. Glaysher. 
 
 Indian Commissariat and Transport. 
 
 Sub-Conductor M. Mayer. 
 
 Staff-Serjeant H. O. Calversbert. 
 
 Royal Army Medical Corps. 
 
 Serjeant-Major A. H. Niblett. 
 
 Serjeant-Major J. Saunders. 
 
 Serjeant-Major T. Exton. 
 
 Serieant-Major J. Wall. 
 
71 
 
 Serjeant-Major H. Lunney. 
 
 7397 Staff-Serjeant C. H. Cooper. 
 
 5641 Staff-Serjeant T. Moody. 
 
 7649 Serjeant T. M. Leonard. 
 
 8777 Serjeant J. E. Landon. 
 
 7828 Serjeant J. Bright (killed). 
 
 9088 Serjeant C. Parnell. 
 
 9484 Serjeant F. G. Lovall. 
 
 9006 Serjeant G. J. Smith. 
 
 5671 Corporal W. H. Sevey. 
 
 9691 Corporal G. Arnold. 
 
 12326 Private S. B. Burford. 
 
 10605 Private R. N. McGregor. 
 
 10681 Private A. Nunns. 
 
 10175 Private Bowers. 
 
 7398 Private McAllen. 
 
 6992 Private G. Taylor. 
 
 10542 Private A. Layt. 
 
 12056 Private E. Winton. 
 
 3476 Private W. G. Gabb, 1st Bn. Gloucestershire Regiment, 
 attached (mortally wounded). 
 
 4139 Private T. Green, 1st Bn. Gloucestershire Regiment, attached. 
 5020 Private M. McKenzie, 1st Bn. Gloucestershire Regiment, 
 attached. 
 
 5083 Private F. Cook, 1st Bn. Gloucestershire Regiment, attached. 
 
 Naval Volunteer Ambulance Corps. 
 
 Private J. Domingo. 
 
 Private F. Clark. 
 
 Private G. H. Howard. 
 
 Private G. G. Smith. 
 
 10. The medical arrangements have been everything that could be desired. 
 1 am sure that I only express the feelings of the whole force when I say every 
 one is grateful to Sir William McCormac, Mr. Treves, and Sir William Stokes, 
 whose skill has saved several lives and mitigated much suffering, and whose 
 knowledge and experience have been a blessing to the sick and wounded. 
 
 Colonel T. J. Gallwey, C.B., Principal Medical Officer, has devoted himself 
 to his work with marked success, and it is largely due to his great adminis¬ 
 trative powers and forethought, that everything has worked so smoothly. 
 
 Colonel J. A. Clery, who has been in charge of the general hospital at 
 Mooi, has displayed great powers of organisation and readiness to overcome 
 difficulties. His hospital is a source of admiration to all who have visited it. 
 
 Lieut.-Colonel W. B. Allin has been Principal Medical Officer of the force 
 in the field, and has had to make all the arrangements for the evacuation of 
 hospitals, and the removal of the wounded, which have, under great difficulties, 
 been performed with great regularity, and yet with the greatest consideration 
 for the wounded. 
 
 Lieut.-Colonel' P. H. Johnston has been most successful in his manage¬ 
 ment of the general hospital at Pietermaritzburg. 
 
 Colonel Gallwey mentions in the highest terms the assistance he has 
 received from his Secretary, Major W. Babtie. I have already recommended 
 this Officer for the Victoria Cross, in recognition of his gallantry at Colenso 
 on 15th December. 
 
 Lieutenant E. T. Inkson’s name has been specially mentioned to me for 
 having habitually distinguished himself in action, and for his care of the 
 wounded under lire. 
 
 Where all have worked so well, it is difficult to discriminate, but the 
 names of the following Officers have been specially brought to my notice :— 
 
72 
 
 (a.) Medical Officers attached to Regiments and Corps. 
 
 Major S. Butter worth. 
 
 Maj or H. B. Hinde. 
 
 Major A. S. Rose (wounded). 
 
 Captain M. L. Hughes (killed). 
 
 Captain R. H. E. Holt (killed). 
 
 Captain N. Tyacke. 
 
 Captain J. H. Campbell (wounded). 
 
 Captain C. Dalton (dangerously wounded). 
 
 Lieutenant H. B. Onraet (killed). 
 
 ( b .) Medical Officers with Bearer Companies. 
 
 5th Brigade, Major S. Townsend. 
 
 10th Brigade, Captain C. Martin, 
 
 4th Brigade, Major E. O. Milward. 
 
 2nd Brigade, Major J. E. T. Reckett. 
 
 6th Brigade, Major T. B. Winter. 
 
 11 tli Brigade, Major Haywood. 
 
 5th Brigade, Captain E. M. Morphew. 
 
 6th Brigade, Captain J. D. Alexander. 
 
 (c.) Medical Officers with Field Hospitals. 
 
 2nd Field Hospital, Major J. T. Culling. 
 
 2nd Field Hospital, Captain H. J. Parry. 
 
 4th Field Hospital, Major G. T. Goggin. 
 
 4th Field Hospital, Major F S. Henston. 
 
 4th Field Hospital, Lieutenant and Quarter-Master R. Adams. 
 5th Field Hospital, Major G. H. Younge. 
 
 5th Field Hospital, Captain E. M. Pilcher. 
 
 5th Field Hospital, Lieutenant and Quarter-MasteFJ. 1 Hirst. 
 6th Field Hospital, Major J. B. W. Buchanan. 
 
 6th Field Hospital, Captain N. Faichnie. 
 
 10th Field Hospital, Major E. R. Cree. 
 
 11th Field Hospital, Major J. D. Moir. 
 lltli Field Hospital, Captain F. G. Faichnie. 
 
 11th Field Hospital, Major A. Fitzgerald. 
 
 2nd Division Field Hospital, Major A. Baird. 
 
 5th Division Field Hospital, Major J. G. Black. 
 
 ((/.) Volunteer Ambulance Corps. 
 
 Major H. Wright, Gordon Highlanders. 
 
 Captain Lord R. Manners, King’s Royal Rifle Corps. 
 Lieutenant E. M. Baker, Manchester Regiment. 
 
 Lieutenant C. W. McD. Findlay, Gordon Highlanders. 
 Second Lieutenant J. R. E. Stansfield, Gordon Highlanders. 
 Second Lieutenant P. D. Stewart, Gordon Highlanders. 
 
 (e.) Indian Ambulance Corps. 
 
 Mr. Clarence, Superintendent. 
 
 Mr. Ghandi, Assistant Superintendent. 
 
73 
 
 ( f ) Line of Communications Hospitals. 
 
 No. 4 Stationary Hospital, Major B. Kirkpatrick. 
 No. 4 Stationary Hospital, Major 11. Mallins. 
 
 No. 1 Stationary Hospital, Major F. A. B. Daly. 
 Estcourt Hospital, Major W. S. Dovvman. 
 
 (g.) General Hospitals. 
 
 No. 4 General Hospital, Major T. It. Lucas. 
 
 No. 4 General Hospital, Major S. F. Treyer. 
 
 General Hospital, Pietermaritzburg, Major A. Dodd. 
 General Hospital, Pietermaritzburg, Major T. Browning. 
 
 (A.) Hospital Trains. 
 
 Major Brazier-Creagb. 
 
 Captain Leumann, Indian Medical Service. 
 
 (i.) Base Depot Medical Stores. 
 Major 11. J. MacCormack. 
 
 (/.) Hospital Ships. 
 
 Lieut.-Colonel F. Hodder (retired pay). 
 Major T. P. Woodhouse. 
 
 Civil Surgeon Brodie. 
 
 Civil Surgeon Hamilton. 
 
 The Volunteer Ambulance Corps, under Major II. Wright, Gordon 
 Highlanders, have shown great devotion and gallantry, and the India); 
 Ambulance Corps, under Superintendent Clarence, have been most careful of 
 the wounded—the conditions of their enlistment did not allow them to go 
 under tire. 
 
 11. I cannot close this despatch without referring to the great loss 
 which the country has sustained by the death in action, or of wounds, of the 
 following Officers :— 
 
 Major-General Sir E. It. P. Woodgate, K.C.M.G., C.B. 
 Lieut.-Colonel C. C. IT. Thorold, 1st Bn. Boy a l Welsh Fusiliers. 
 Lieut.-Colonel W. McCarthy-O'Leary, 1st Bn. South Lancashire 
 Be giment. 
 
 Lieut.-Colonel T. M. G. Thackeray, 1st Bn. Boyal Inniskilling 
 Fusiliers. 
 
 Lieut.-Colonel B. G. Buchanan-Biddell, 3rd Bn. King’s Royal Bilie 
 Corps. 
 
 1 have the honour to be, 
 
 Sir, 
 
 Your obedient Servant, 
 
 BEDVEBS BULLED, General. 
 
 (7G2-2) 
 
 K 
 
74 
 
 No. 5. . r 
 
 From Field-Marshal Lord Roberts to the Secretary oj Stale for War. 
 
 Army Headquarters, South Africa, 
 
 MyJLord, Kroonstad, 16th May, 1900. 
 
 I have the honour to submit for your Lordship’s favourable consideration, 
 letter No. Mil. Sec. 317, dated 3rd February, 1900, from the General Officer 
 Commanding in Natal, enclosing reports from Lieut.-General Sir Charles 
 Warren and Major-General the Hon. N. G. Lyttelton, in which these Officers 
 bring to notice the conduct of the troops, and the individual services of 
 Officers, non-commissioned officers and men under their command, during the 
 operations from the 17th to the 24th January, 1900, including the attack on 
 Spion Kop. 
 
 A3fq 2. I concur with General Sir Redvers Buller in his high appreciation of 
 the behaviour of the troops throughout the period in question. 
 
 I have the honour to be, 
 
 Mv Lord, 
 
 Your Lordship’s most obedient Servant, 
 
 ROBERTS, Field-Marshal, 
 
 Commanding-in-Chief South Africa. 
 
 From, the General Officer Commanding, Natal , to the Secretary of State 
 
 for War. 
 
 (By the Field-Marshal Commanding-in-Chief, Cape Town.) 
 
 Spearman’s Hill Camp, 
 
 Sir, 3rd February, 1900. 
 
 I have the honour to forward the enclosed report from Lieut.-General 
 Sir Charles Warren, in which he brings to notice the conduct of the troops, 
 and the individual services of Officers, non-commissioned officers and men 
 under his command, during the operations from the 17th to the 24th January, 
 1900, and I gladly endorse his recommendations. The behaviour of the troops 
 throughout what was a most trying time, was all that a soldier could desire. 
 
 I also forward with this report, two reports from Major-General the Hon. 
 N. G. Lyttelton, Commanding the 4th Brigade, relative to the operations of 
 the 2nd Bn. Scottish Rifles and the 3rd Bn. King’s Royal Rifle Corps on the 
 24th January, as these battalions, although not forming part of the troops 
 under Sir Charles Warren’s command, took part, together with those troops, 
 in the attack of Spion Kop. 
 
 The advance of these two battalions was extremely well performed, and 
 they attacked the heights with the greatest possible gallantry. 
 
 I have the honour to be, 
 
 Sir, 
 
 Your obedient Servant, 
 
 REDVERS BTJLLER, General. 
 
75 
 
 From Lieut.-General Sir Charles Warren, G.C.B., &c., Commanding Forces 
 north of Tugela, to the Chief of the Staff , South Natal Field Force. 
 
 Hatting’s Farm, 
 
 Sir, 1st February, 1900., 
 
 I have the honour to bring to the notice of the Commander-in-Chief the 
 exemplary manner in which the Force under my command behaved from the 
 16th January, 1900, when the night march commenced until the morning of 
 the 25th, when he assumed direct command. During this period a great 
 portion of the Force was continuously engaged with the enemy, many of 
 them were in the firing line night and day, and others were employed in 
 bringing up provisions and water under a heavy fire ; they were in the lightest 
 marching order, without tents, blankets, or waterproof sheets, and a large 
 number of them were unable to obtain their great coats ; but, both in fighting 
 the enemy and in enduring privations, they showed, on all occasions, the best 
 spirit attributable to the British soldier. 
 
 The night march to Trikkard’s Drift, which took the enemy by surprise, 
 was performed with the least possible noise, even the native drivers were mute 
 throughout the operation, and the large force, nearly equal to an Army-Corps 
 with its enormous train of wagons, arrived at their position without any 
 mishap, except the overturning of one pontoon wagon. The wagons, for 
 supply and regimental purposes, alone occupied 11 miles if extended in one 
 line, and if the mule wagons and ambulances were added the whole length 
 would be 15 miles. 
 
 To get this enormous mass of wagons over the Tugela without injury 
 from the enemy was a matter which required considerable forethought and 
 care, but it was accomplished successfully by occupying the adjoining hills 
 north of the Tugela, and passing the wheeled vehicles over by means of two 
 pontoon bridges, and, subsequently, over Trikkard’s Drift, when the river had 
 fallen. 
 
 During the operations from the 17th to the 24th, although the troops 
 were continuously in action, there was no one special exploit of any large body 
 of men which requires mention, except the fortitude with which the troops 
 retained their hold on Spion Kop, from morning till nightfall, on the 24th, and 
 I will proceed to mention individual actions of Officers and men, corps by 
 corps. 
 
 Royal Dragoons. 
 
 1. The dispositions of the Royal Dragoons throughout the operations were 
 carried out in a most skilful way by Colonel J. F. Burn-Murdoch, and he, 
 himself, with Captain the Hon. A. Hamilton Russell, and 3729 Private W. 
 Barnard and 3591 Private A. Holds worth ascended Spion Kop after its 
 evacuation, on the morning of the 25th, at great personal risk to ascertain 
 whether it had been re-occupied by the Boers. 
 
 South African Light Horse. 
 
 2. On the 20th a detachment of the South African Light Horse, under 
 Major Childe (since killed) did gallanc service in the capture of Sugarloaf 
 Hill. Corporal Tobin was the first man up, and was subsequently killed by a 
 shell. 
 
 3. Lieut.-Colonel A. W. Hill, 2nd Bn. Middlesex Regiment, reports, with 
 reference to the action on Spion Kop, that Lieutenant and Adjutant H. 
 McEwan, of that Regiment, went out, under a heavy fire, and brought in a 
 wounded man of the Scottish Rifles, who had fallen exhausted, the fire of tjiat 
 portion of our line having to be suspended to admit of the act. 
 
 2574 Private J. Gilmour collected some men together and formed them 
 into a section, personally took command, supervising their action for over two 
 hours ; his conduct was specially commended at the time by Major Berners, 
 Dorsetshire Regiment. 
 
 (762-2) " K 2 ■ 
 
7G 
 
 3493 Private W. Boyd set a conspicuous example of bravery and coolness, 
 frequently standing up to find out where the enemy were. 
 
 2178 Private E. Wischusen picked up a live shell and threw it over the 
 rocks before it exploded. 
 
 4. Lieut.-Colonel W. F. Nash, 1st Bn. Border Regiment, Commanding 
 Imperial Light Infantry, reports, with regard to the same action, that— 
 
 565 Corpora. Fack Weldon refused to surrender till compelled to do so ; 
 he was killed outside the trenches. 
 
 280 Private Chambers showed conspicuous bravery under fire when 
 leading men in the firing line. He was killed. 
 
 929 Private T. Hughes, wounded five times, and wished to return to the 
 firing line, but was prevented by those dressing his wounds. 
 
 Major-General Talbot-Coke, commanding right attack, reports that the 
 2nd Bn. Dorsetshire Regiment rendered great service in carrying down a large 
 quantity of ammunition in the dark, which would otherwise have fallen into 
 the hands of the enemy ; and on the 27th a detachment of this regiment 
 showed admirable discipline when acting as a burial party under trying 
 circumstances at Spion Kop. 
 
 5. Colonel M. E. Crofton, Commanding 2nd Bn. Royal Lancaster 
 Regiment, reports, with regard to the same action, that— 
 
 Second Lieutenant J. R. E. Stansfield, 2nd Bn. Gordon Highlanders, 
 attached to Ambulance Company, was conspicuously energetic throughout the 
 whole day under fire, and doing splendid work for the wounded. 
 
 5375 Private Moore, H Company, 2nd Bn. Royal Lancaster Regiment, 
 worked hard under a heavy fire, distributing ammunition, which rendered him 
 a conspicuous mark to the enemy. 
 
 3308 Private Roberts moved about bandaging wounded men under a 
 heavy fire, and saved at least one mans life. 
 
 3529 Private M. McConnell and 2568 Private W. Tatton, doctor’s 
 orderlies, behaved especially well under fire, helping the wounded. 
 
 6. The Officer Commanding 2nd Bn. Lancashire Fusiliers reports, with 
 regard to the action of the 20th, that— 
 
 Captain O. C. Woolley-Dod, though severely wounded in the hand at 
 5.30 p.m., continued with his company till the end of the action, and did duty 
 under fire on the following day till 10.30 a.m. 
 
 With regard to the action on Spion Kop, he reports that— 
 
 Captain G. H. B. Freeth, when in a trench rushed by the enemy, though 
 wounded in both arms, refused to surrender till forcibly removed. 
 
 Lieutenant L. E. O. Charlton, though severely wounded at 9 a.m., con¬ 
 tinued 9 hours in the firing line, until ordered to leave by his Captain. 
 
 The following privates assisted to form a signalling station under a very 
 heavy fire, and were of great service :— 
 
 5283 Private F. Lomax, 4684 Private J. Turner, 3819 Private F. Pomer, 
 and 4601 Private J. Thomas. 
 
 This regiment suffered very severely, and was brought out of action by 
 ■Captain C. M. Brunker, the senior Officer present. 
 
 7. Lieut.-Colonel W. McCarthy O’Leary, Commanding the 1st Bn. South 
 Lancashire Regiment, reports, with regard to the action on Spion Kop, that— 
 
 2573 Serjeant Price showed conspicuous bravery in controlling his section 
 under the hottest fire, and, as a volunteer, traversed 200 yards under a very 
 heavy fire of shells and bullets to assist a signaller. On his return through 
 the same fire he formed one of the party employed in covering the removal of 
 General Woodgate when wounded. 
 
77 
 
 The following men were also engaged in the same proceeding under the 
 immediate command of Captain M. W. Lynch :— 
 
 2499 Corporal Norton, 5541 Private Ludlow, 3174 Private Lawson, 
 3G78 Private Philbin, 3166 Private Frost, 2887 Private Healy, 4304 Private 
 Brown, 3686 Drummer Johnson (armed with a rifle). 
 
 8. Lieut.-Colonel W. J. Kirkpatrick, Commanding 1st Bn. York and 
 Lancaster Regiment, reports, with regard to the action of the 20th, that — 
 
 Lieutenant L. Brandreth, 2nd Bn. Welsh Regiment, attached and 4671 
 Private W. Savage, carried a wounded man to a place of safety under a heavy 
 fire. 
 
 1659 Colour-Serjeant J. Stewart stayed for three hours in the firing line 
 with Second Lieutenant Kearsey, who was wounded, till he got him on to a 
 stretcher. 
 
 5101 Lance-Corporal A. L. Grove carried out a wounded man under a hot 
 fire to a place of safety, he, himself, being wounded. 
 
 9. With regard to the Medical Staff, they are deserving of all praise, and 
 I do not like to pick out of the Principal Medical Officer's report any particular 
 case when the reports show that all behaved so well. 
 
 10. I must call particular attention to the good services rendered by 
 Lieutenant O. Schwikkard, “ A ” Squadron, Colonial Scouts, who was employed 
 upon a variety of duties, and whose remarkable knowledge of the ways of the 
 country, and extraordinary powers of resource, contributed, in a great measure, 
 to expedite the progress of the force on many occasions. 
 
 I have received the following reports from the General Officer Com¬ 
 manding, 2nd Division :— 
 
 11. Colonel E. M. Wood, C.R.E., reports with regard to the action on 
 Spion Kop, that he would have specialty mentioned Major E. M. Massy, 
 Commanding No. 17 Company, Royal Engineers, for his gallant conduct, had 
 he lived. This Officer was killed in the firing line while he was personalty 
 superintending the entrenchment. 
 
 12. Lieut.-Colonel L. W. Parsons, C.R.A., brings to notice the conduct of 
 Major J. Hanwell, R.A., who went up to the top of Spion Kop during the 
 heaviest firing to reconnoitre as to the possibility of placing guns upon it, and, 
 subsequently^, went up with a naval gun, prior to the abandonment of the hill. 
 
 13. Lieut.-Colonel E. 0. F. Hamilton, 2nd Bn. Queen’s, mentions that—• 
 
 Lieutenant H. W. Smith, on the 21st January (who had advanced to a 
 “donga” in front of the Boer position), after being shot through the chest 
 (the bullet coming out through his back), continued to lead his men till he fell 
 exhausted, and took cover above the “ donga ” till 3 p.m., when he managed 
 to get into it. He remained there till dark, after his company had letired, 
 accompanied by one man, and had sufficient strength to walk down the 
 “ donga,” almost to the hospital. He set his men a splendid example of 
 coolness, courage, and endurance. 
 
 He also mentions the following stretcher bearers : — 
 
 Nos. 3242 Private J. Burgess ; 2858 Private II. Maiden; 4504 Private 
 A. Penfold; 3055 Private J. Phister, who, with Major Hinde, R.A.M.C., 
 volunteered to go to the top of Sugar Loaf Hill and bring down the body of 
 Major Childe. On the plateau they were exposed to heavy fire. 
 
 14. Colonel F. W. Kitchener, Commanding 2nd Bn. West Yorkshire 
 Regiment, reports that— 
 
 Lieutenant A. M. Boyall conducted a patrol to within 500 yards of the 
 Boer trenches to examine ground for an advance. Out of 16 men, he had only 
 
78 
 
 one man killed and two wounded, although exposed all day to the full view of 
 the enemy on open ground on a grass slope. His conduct showed exceptional 
 coolness and intelligence. 4788 Private J. Morant, carried back a message 
 from Lieutenant Boyall under very heavy fire and was wounded. 
 
 2924 Private Powell twice carried water to wounded men lying out in 
 the open, under very heavy fire. 
 
 Colour - Serjeant Kingsley, when his company was unexpectedly 
 caught by a very heavy cross fire which wounded both his Officers, showed 
 coolness and intelligence in withdrawing his men steadily to cover, and 
 gallantry in bringing his Captain under cover when mortally wounded. His 
 case is an exceptional one, worthy of recommendation for the medal for 
 distinguished conduct. 
 
 In conclusion, with reference to the supplies to Spion Kop, I must call 
 attention to the indefatigable energy shown by those engaged in carrying 
 water and provisions to the top of the mountain, in making the roads, and in 
 other services connected with rendering assistance to the force on the top. 
 
 I must also call particular attention to the admirable arrangements made 
 for the retirement of the 5th Division, which resulted in its being accomplished 
 without a hitch of any kind. Great credit is due to Major T. E.. Capper, 
 D.A.A.G., for this. 
 
 I have the honour to be, 
 
 Sir, 
 
 Your obedient Servant, 
 
 CHARLES WARREN, Lieut.-General, 
 Commanding 5th Division , South African Field Force . 
 
 From the Officer Commanding 2nd Bn. Scottish Rifles to the Brigade-Major, 
 
 Ath Brigade. 
 
 Spearman Hill, 
 
 The Brigade-Major, 4th Brigade, 27th January, 1900. 
 
 I would ask the General Officer Commanding if I may be permitted to 
 mention the following names of Officers and men who rendered special valuable 
 assistance on the 24th :— 
 
 Major Twyford, who was in the most advanced position with his company, 
 and who rendered me valuable assistance after the death of Major Strong in 
 conducting the retreat from the hill. 
 
 Captain Murray, who was killed when initiating an advance in the face of 
 a heavy fire. 
 
 Lieutenant Green, who, to encourage his men, rushed forward to an 
 advanced trench, and was immediately followed by the men near him. 
 
 Lieutenant Wood, on the retreat being ordered, volunteered to search for 
 Captain O’Gowan (wounded), and carried him, with assistance, to the bottom of 
 the hill. 
 
 The following non-commissioned officers and men were mentioned to me 
 as doing special good work during the day :— 
 
 1255 Colour-Serjeant Waters, 4012 Serjeant Alexander Macdonaldj 
 Corporal George Godfrey, Serjeant G. Cole, 3286 Private Lewis, 280S Corporal 
 Eawcett, 6186 Private E. Brown. 
 
 I have the honour to be, 
 
 Sir, 
 
 Your most obedient Servant, 
 
 E. COOKE, Lieut.-Colonel, 
 
 2nd Bn. Scottish Rifles. 
 
79 
 
 Potgieter’s, 
 
 Chief ol Staff, 30th January, 1900. 
 
 Forwarded. From what I have heard from Officers engaged on the 
 Spion Kop, I am sure that this battalion did excellent service at a critical 
 time. 
 
 N. G. LYTTELTON, Major-General, 
 
 Commanding 4th Infantry Brigade. 
 
 Potgieter’s Drift, 
 
 The Brigade-Major, 4th Brigade, 26th January, 1900. 
 
 I have the honour to report, for the information of the General Officer 
 Commanding 4th Brigade, that the battalion, now under my command 
 marched from Spearman Hill, at 10 a.m. on the 24th instant, vid Kafir Drift, 
 across the Tugela, to take the two peaks on the north of the Spion Kop. 
 
 After passing Kafir Drift the Colonel advanced, with the right half 
 battalion, to take the more northerly of the two peaks known as Sugarloaf 
 Hill, and ordered me, with the left half battalion, to take the centre hill of 
 the range, which was between Sugarloaf hill and the main hill, which had 
 already been occupied by our troops since early morning. 
 
 At about midday each half battalion advanced to the attack, from Kafir 
 Drift, with two half companies, in firing line, the left half companies of each 
 being in local support, one company finding right and left support, and one 
 company in reserve, all at wide intervals and distances. 
 
 The Boers were holding both hills, and the crest line between them, also 
 the trenches, rocks, and trees from about halfway up right to the top. 
 
 On the hill, which the left half battalion was ordered to attack, there was 
 a machine gun in action. The hillside was almost perpendicular in places, so 
 the ascent was made very slowly. 
 
 The supports fired over the heads of the attacking line advancing up the 
 spur, the reserves took up the fire when the supports became merged into the 
 fighting line. 
 
 The trenches on the right hill were turned, one after another, under a 
 heavy flanking fire, Captain R. H. Beaumont and Lieutenant D. H. Blundell, 
 of “ A ” Company leading the assault until the former was wounded. 
 
 When the right half battalion neared the top the left half directed its 
 fire entirely in support of the final charge of the right half, who rushed the 
 top, led by Major W. S. Kays and Lieutenant R. F. Manley-Sims, of “ B ” 
 Company, at 4.45 p.m., the Boers only leaving as the men’s swords came over 
 the crest line. 
 
 The left hill was taken a quarter of an hour later by the naif battalion 
 under my command, “ F ” Company leading, under Lieutenants The Hon. R. 
 Cathcart and H. Wake, closely supported by “ H ” Company, under Captain 
 H. C. Warre. 
 
 Though still under a galling fire from both flanks we were able to stop 
 the fire of the machine guns 150 yards on our front, and also to keep down 
 the fire of the Boers which was being directed on to the right flank of 
 Sir Charles Warren’s troops, holding the main ridge of Spion’s Kop. 
 
 About 6.30 p.m. the order came to retire after dark, and the battalion, 
 with the exception of a few men killed and wounded, whom we were unable to 
 bring in that night, recrossed the Tugela by midnight practically unmolested. 
 
 The Boer trenches were skilfully constructed by blasting and pick, about 
 4 feet 6 inches deep. Their fire was directed principally at the Officers. 
 From the summit a Boer camp behind each hill could be seen, and a certain 
 number of Boers retiring. 
 
 I have already furnished a list of casualties, and deplore the loss of the 
 Commanding Officer, gallantly cheering on his men close to the top of the hill. 
 
 I can only attribute the comparatively small number of casualties to the 
 steepness of the hill, and to the skill with which ti^ Company and Section 
 Commanders worked their men. 
 
 Had Lieut.-Colonel Buchanan-Riddell lived I feel sure he would have 
 liked to have brought to notice the good work done by Captain and Adjutant 
 
80 
 
 Wilson, and to have mentioned the names of the Officers which occur in the 
 above report. The following men were either noticed by me personally, or 
 named to me by their Officers, for coolness and gallantry in the advance :— 
 
 Serjeant-Major Hill. 
 
 Colour-Sergeant McLoughlin (dangerously wounded). 
 
 Serjeant F. Clay. 
 
 ,, Keenes (severely wounded). 
 
 Corporal Allen (wounded). 
 
 8209 Private Rowley, “ A ” Company. 
 
 6232 Private Limbrick, “F” Company (dangerously wounded). 
 
 7170 Private Ashworth, !< B” Company (killed). 
 
 Lance-Corporal Muntzer, “ F ” Company. 
 
 I have the honour to be, 
 
 Sir, 
 
 Your most obedient Servant, 
 
 A. BEWICKE COPLEY, Major, 
 
 Commanding 3rd Bn. King's Royal Rifles. 
 
 Potgieter's, 
 
 Chief of Staff, 30th January, 1900. 
 
 Forwarded. The Commander-in-Chief saw as much of this gallant action 
 as I did. 
 
 N. G. LYTTELTON, Major-General, 
 
 Commanding 4 th Infantry Brigade. 
 
 No. 6. 
 
 From Field-Marshal Lord Roberts to the Secretary of State for War. 
 
 Army Head-quarters, South Africa, 
 
 My Lord, Pretoria, 3rd July, 1900 
 
 I have the honour to forward, for your Lordship’s information, a despatch 
 No. Mil. Sec. 565, dated 24th May, 1900, from the General Officer Com¬ 
 manding in Natal, describing the operations of the force under his command 
 from the 3rd March to its concentration at Newcastle on the 18th May, 1900. 
 
 2. I consider that the advance from Ladysmith to Newcastle was ably 
 directed by Sir Redvers Buller, while the behaviour of the troops was all that 
 could have been desired, and I support the recommendations of the General 
 Commanding on behalf of the Officers mentioned in paragraphs 19 and 20 of 
 the despatch. 
 
 I have the honour to be, 
 
 My Lord, 
 
 Your Lordship’s most obedient Servant, 
 
 ROBERTS, Field-Marshal, 
 
 Commanding-in-Chief j South Africa. 
 
 From the General Officer Commanding , Fated, to the Secretary of State 
 
 for War. 
 
 (Through the Field-Marshal Commanding the Forces in South Africa.) 
 
 Newcastle, Natal, 
 
 Sir, 24th May, 1900. 
 
 1 have the honour to report that, having on the 3rd March received orders 
 from Field-Marshal Lord Roberts to act strictly on the defensive, the force 
 under my command took up positions on the line Tugela River—Sundays River 
 —Elandslaagfe—Surprise Hill—Smith’s Crossing—Acton Homes, and, except 
 for a few affairs of outposts, remained inactive. On the 2nd May, I received 
 instructions from the Field-Marshal Commanding-in-Chief to occupy the 
 attention of the enemy in the Biggarsberg. 
 
81 
 
 2. During our period of inaction the enemy had entrenched himself 
 strongly in all the principal passes of the Biggarsberg and Drakensberg. About 
 the middle of March I calculated that we had about 12,000 men in front of us. 
 These gradually decreased, and on the 3rd May my calculation was that I was 
 opposed by about 7,000 men, and I may here remark that, from information I 
 have since obtained from the inhabitants of Dundee and Newcastle, I find that 
 this calculation was an accurate one, but that the actual number was 8,000, as 
 there were about 1,000 at Normandien of whom 1 had no knowledge. 
 
 3. Difficulties with lung sickness and want of grass and water had forced 
 me to send most of my transport oxen south of Ennersdale, and it was 4 days 
 before I could collect my transport. On the 7th May we commenced moving, 
 but partly to deceive the enemy, and partly to meet an attack upon my right 
 which he was then threatening, I advanced at first upon Elandslaagte. 
 
 4. On the 9th May the columns changed direction, and on the evening of 
 the 10th, the following force was concentrated at Sundays River Drift on the 
 Ladysmith—Helpmakaar road :— 
 
 3rd Mounted Brigade. 
 
 “ A ” Battery, Royal Horse Artillery. 
 
 2nd Division (complete) with two squadrons, Divisional Cavalry. 
 
 Two 4’7-inch guns, No. 6 Company, Western Division, Royal 
 Garrison Artillery. 
 
 Four 12-pr. guns, No. 2 Company, Western Division, Royal 
 Garrison Artillery. 
 
 61st Howitzer Battery. 
 
 Three Vickers-Maxim. 
 
 No. 4 Mountain Battery ; and a 
 
 Supply Column of 10 days’ supply. 
 
 5. On the 11th May the force marched from Sundays River Drift to 
 Waschbank River. The first 6 miles the road was extremely bad through a 
 mountainous country ; for the last 3 miles the road was open, and descended 
 by easy slopes to the wide valley of the Waschbank. Marching continuously, 
 22 hours were occupied in the passage of the whole force over the 9 miles 
 between Sundays River and the Waschbank. On this day, General Hildyard 
 moved a battalion of the 5th Division from Elandslaagte to the summit of the 
 Indodo Mountain, thus covering the left flank of our advance. 
 
 6. On the 12th May a post was formed at Waschbank, and the 2nd Bn. 
 Scottish Rifles : two field guns, Royal Field Artillery ; two naval 12-prs., Royal 
 Garrison Artillery; a detachment of the 3rd Mounted Brigade, and the whole 
 of the Supply Park was left there ; the remainder of the column turned in a 
 southerly direction, and marched across country to Vermaak’s Kraal. This 
 diversion from the road was necessary in order to avoid coming under fire 
 from the enemv’s guns on the high ridges of the Biggarsberg, parallel to which 
 we were marching. 
 
 7. At Vermak’s Kraal we were within 7,300 yards of the crest line of the 
 Berg, but it was the only place at which we could obtain water, and, as it was, 
 we had to send our oxen 3 miles further, as there was not sufficient there for 
 us all. During the afternoon the enemy was seen mounting a gun on the top 
 of the spur nearest to our bivouac. 
 
 8. During the night, 12 — I3th May, I placed two 4‘7-inch guns in 
 epaulements fronting the enemy’s gun. On the 13th, at da\ light, we marched 
 off in the direction furthest away from the line of fire of the enemy’s gun, 
 which, at 8 a.m., opened on the tail of the column, and two men of the 
 Durham Light Infantry were slightly wounded. Our 4'7-inch guns replied, 
 and by the 5th round the gun was silenced, hiving, as we afterwards- 
 ascertained, been badly damaged. The detachment of No. 6 Company, 
 Western Division, Royal Garrison Artillery, deserve much credit for the work 
 done during the night, and for the accuracy of their lire, as this was the first 
 occasion on which they had used these guns. Striking the Helpmakaar road 
 
 (762-2) " L 
 
82 
 
 at the entrance of the defile, the baggage and supply columns were parked 
 under a guard of one battalion, one battery, Royal Field Artillery, and the 
 two divisional squadrons. 
 
 9. We were here opposite the left flank of the enemy’s position and just 
 under Uithoek Mountain, a lofty outlier of the south-west corner of .the 
 Biggarsberg, which commands the Helpmakaar plateau, but is separated from 
 it b}^ a narrow nek. It was declared to be unclimbable, but a few of 
 Thorneycroft’s Mounted Infantry rode up half-way, and then scrambled to the 
 top. It was found unoccupied, and I directed General Hamilton, with three 
 battalions of the 2nd Brigade, to scale the mountain and assault the south¬ 
 western crest of the main plateau. 
 
 10. While we were at Ladysmith, a force* under Colonel Bethune had been 
 holding Greytown and the line of the Tugela. This force I had directed to 
 advance concurrently with our advance on Vermaak’s Kraal, and we estab¬ 
 lished connection with it at 11 o’clock. Colonel Bethune’s arrangements had 
 been very good. He had seized during the night, with his left, the hills which 
 commanded the southern sides of the pass up which we had to approach. At 
 11.20 we advanced up the pass, the 3rd Mounted Brigade seizing each 
 successive hilltop, and the 4th Infantry Brigade and the Corps Artillery 
 moving by the road. Colonel Bethune advanced at the same time by the 
 Pomeroy road, whilst the 2nd Infantry Brigade attacked the plateau from the 
 nek of Uithoek Hill. The enemy, who had a force on the plateau, did not 
 stand, but retired hastily, leaving a very long line of deep trenches unoccupied, 
 and at about 1 o'clock we had gained the plateau, our loss being one man 
 wounded. The enemy retired to the high ground immediately in front of 
 Helpmakaar village, and there made a stand, bringing into action three guns. 
 As soon as we could get our guns up the pass, the enemy’s position was shelled 
 from both flanks and the front by two 12-prs., 2nd Company, Western Division, 
 Royal Garrison Artillery ; three Vickers-Maxims ; 4th Mountain Battery ; and 
 the 64th and 67th Batteries, Royal Field Artillery. The practice was very 
 good, and we heard the next day that two of the enemy’s guns were injured. 
 
 11. We were obliged to leave the plateau that evening, on account of 
 want of water, and bivouac in the bottom of the pass, but it was held by 
 detachments, and on the following morning the force again advanced. The 
 enemy were found to have evacuated the extremely strong position they had 
 been holding the night before, and the 3rd Mounted Brigade was at once 
 directed to pursue. 
 
 12. They caught up the enemy's rearguard at Zwart Kop, at Spion Kop, 
 and at Blesboklaagte, at the latter of which the enemy brought three guns 
 into action, but at all three places they were forced from their strong positions 
 by the fire of “A” Battery, Royal Horse Artillery, in front, and the Natal 
 < arbineers, Composite Regiment, and South African Light Horse, one or the 
 other of which invariably succeeded in working round their flank. 
 
 13. The day was a very hot one ; the enemy, as they retired, set fire to 
 the grass on both sides of the road, which made the march very difficult for 
 the Cavalry and extremely trying for the Infantry. 
 
 I had ascertained that the enemy’s transport had been sent to the rear 
 during Saturday night, so considering we had nothing to gain by a further 
 pursuit, and a risk of considerable loss if we attacked the difficult pass of 
 Blesboklaagte with Cavalry alone, I directed Lord Dundonald to halt, and 
 halted the Infantry about Beith. 
 
 14. On the 13th May some of the 5th Division had occupied the next 
 ridge of hills north of the Indoda Mountain, and on the 14th others occupied 
 Wessel’s Nek. On the night of the 14th the troops bivouacked as follows :— 
 3rd Mounted Brigade at Meyer’s Farm, Bethune’s Mounted Infantry at 
 
 * Five squadrons, Bethune’s Mounted Infantry; one squadron, Unwoti Mounted Rifles; two 
 ’! 2-prs., Royal Garrison Artillery; two 7-prs. Natal Field Artillery; two Hotchkiss, Natal Field 
 Yrtillery; six companies. Imperial Light Infantry. 
 
S3 
 
 Kemp’s Farm ; Major Mackenzie, with an advanced squadron of Natal 
 Carbineers, on the Plateau west of Fort Pine; the 2nd Bn. Devonshire 
 Regiment at Beith, and the remainder of the 2nd Brigade and 2nd Brigade 
 Division, Royal Field Artillery, near Cronje’s Farm ; 4th Brigade Corps 
 Ammunition and Supply Columns by Pieter’s Farm. Orders were sent to 
 the Supply Park at Waschbank to march, at once, on Beith, by Van Tonder’s 
 Pass, which the enemy had evacuated when they lefo Helpmakaar. 
 
 15. On the 15th May the whole force entered Dundee, and the right of 
 the 5th Division advanced on Waschbank, encountering no opposition. 
 
 16. On the 16th May the Cavalry occupied Dannhauser and Glencoe, 
 and the Supply Columns, which had retilled at Beith from the Supply Park, 
 rejoined the Column. 
 
 17. On the 17th May, it having been ascertained that the enemy had 
 evacuated the Biggarsberg, the 3rd Mounted Brigade, the 2nd Division, and 
 Corps Artillery advanced to Dannhauser, and the Cavalry occupied Newcastle. 
 
 18. On the 18th May the whole force was concentrated at Newcastle.' 
 On the 19th May the Cavalry advanced on Laing’s Nek, and the 4th Brigade 
 to the Ingogo. Laing’s Nek was found occupied in some force, and the 
 troops were halted to give time for closing up the supply and the repair of the 
 railway. 
 
 19. Thus, in 10 days, the whole of Natal north of Ladysmith, with the 
 exception of Laing’s Nek, had been cleared of the enemy. The behaviour of 
 the troops throughout was excellent, and their marching very good. 
 
 The dispositions made by General Hamilton, General Lord Dundonald, 
 and Colonel Bethune, on the 13th, were most creditable to those Officers, and 
 were, I think, the cause of our almost bloodless victory. Our total casualties 
 were seven wounded. We captured 47 prisoners and several wagons, and a 
 good many Natal rebels, in consequence of the operations, have returned to- 
 their allegiance, and this movement seems to be growing in strength. 
 
 20. I cannot close this report without referring to the excellent work 
 done by the Telegraph Section, under Major Hawkins and Captain Kennedy, 
 and by the Army Service Corps, under Colonel Stanley and Major Hunt, and 
 to the good work done by General Hildyard and the 5th Division. 
 
 I have the honour to be, 
 
 Sir, 
 
 Your obedient Servant, 
 
 REDVERS BULLER, General 
 
 No. 7. 
 
 From Field-Marshal Lord, Roberts to the Secretary of State for War. 
 
 Army Head-quarters, South Africa, 
 
 My Lord, Pretoria, 9th July, 1900. 
 
 In continuation of my letter, dated 3rd July, 1900, I have the honour to 
 orward, for your Lordship’s information, a despatch, No. Mil. Sec. 587. 
 dated 4th June, 1900, from the General Officer Commanding in Natal, 
 describing the operations of the force under his command from the 19th 
 May to the 2nd June, and his interview with Assistant Coinmandant-Geneful 
 C. Botha on the latter date. 
 
 2. I append a copy of the telegraphic correspondence between Sir Redvers 
 Buller and myself, regarding the points discussed at the interview. 
 
 I have the honour to be, 
 
 My Lord, 
 
 Tour Lordship's most obedient Servant, 
 
 ROBERTS, Field-Marshal, 
 
 Commanding- in- Chief South Africa. 
 
 (7G2-2) 
 
 L 2 
 
84 
 
 From the General Officer Commanding in Natal to the Secretary 
 
 for War. 
 
 (Through the Field-Marshal Commanding the Forces in South Africa.) 
 
 Newcastle, Natal, 
 
 Sir, 4th June, 1900. 
 
 In my letter of the 24th ultimo, 1 reported that on reaching Laing’s Nek 
 on the 19th, 1 found it too strongly occupied for me to force it with the troops 
 then at my disposal. 
 
 2. I have since ascertained that the Wakkerstrom Commando, which had 
 left the foice opposing Lord Roberts’ advance, reached Laing’s Nek just in 
 time to rally sufficient of the fugitives L was pursuing to stop our pursuit. 
 
 3. For the next few days the enemy were able to concentrate on and 
 about Laing’s Nek quicker than I could bring my force forward, and on the 
 28th T calculated that they had about 8,000 men distributed in very strong 
 positions in Keteni Nek, Laing’s Nek, Molls Nek, and the defiles of the 
 Utrecht—Wakkerstrom road, with some 13 to 15 guns in well-selected 
 positions, while some 6,000 Free Staters were in the north-east corner of the 
 Free State, of whom at least 3,000 were holding Botha’s Pass and the tracks 
 adjoining it on my left. 
 
 4. On the 28th May I sent a force under General Hildyard across the 
 Buffalo at Wools Drift with instructions to march on Utrecht, and another 
 under General Lyttelton at Ichanga Drift, with orders to turn south and clear 
 the Dornberg, which was at the time held by the enemy in some force. 
 
 5. The enemy evacuated the Dornberg on General Lyttelton crossing the 
 Buffalo River, and he then turned north and came up on the left flank of 
 General Hildyard, who, on the 29th, had occupied the Belelas Berg, south 
 and in front of the town of Utrecht. 
 
 Commandant Grobelaar, who was commanding the 1,500 men holding the 
 Wakkerstrom—Utrecht road, withdrew from the town, giving a promise that 
 no armed men should enter the town while we were there. On the following 
 day, the Landrost surrendered the town, had several copies of attached 
 Proclamation posted, and asked for more for distribution. 
 
 6. On the 30th May, I heard that Lord Roberts had occupied Elandsfon- 
 tein Junction, and I at once sent a flag of truce to the Commandant at 
 Laing’s Nek, asking him, now his communications were cut, whether it was 
 worth his while to continue the struggle. He replied that he had referred 
 the question to his Commandant-General. 
 
 7. On the 2nd June, I met Assistant Commandant-General Chris. Botha 
 between our outposts. I attach notes of the conversation that ensued. I may 
 add that my Staff elicited from his Staff that at least half the burghers are 
 anxious for peace, that they have telegraphic communication with Lydenburg 
 through Standerton and Middelburg, and that their supplies also now come by 
 wagons by the same route. 
 
 8. With regard to the terms I offered the troops on Laing’s Nek, viz., 
 that their homes should be unmolested, provided they now dispersed, taking 
 their small-arms but leaving their artillery, I may mention that even if 1 
 attack and take the position, I cannot hope to get any result better than these 
 terms involve. The position admits of such facilities for escape that 1 cannot 
 hope to make any prisoners, or indeed capture many guns, and I reserved the 
 •right of further disarmament. 
 
 In these circumstances, should my terms be accepted (though this is I 
 fear unlikely), I shall have obtained the occupation of Laing’s Nek without 
 loss of life and without prejudice to our position. 
 
 1 have the honour to be, 
 
 Sir, 
 
 Your obedient Servant, 
 
 REDYERS BULLER, General 
 
 of State 
 
85 
 
 Notes on interview between Sir Redvers Bailer and Assistant Commandant- 
 General C. Botha, near Laing’s Nek, 2nd June, 1900. 
 
 Sir R. Buller told Botha that he had asked him to meet him with a view 
 to avoid, if possible, the useless sacrifice of brave lives. Lord Roberts was in 
 Johannesburg. There was a large army with many guns in Natal, and he 
 hoped Botha would see that to go on lighting here was only throwing lives 
 away to no purpose. 
 
 Commandant Botha asked Sir Redvers to give him his proposals in 
 writing so that he could lay them before his Government. He cannot take 
 upon himself not to fight any more ; if he did so he would be a traitor 
 to his country. 
 
 Sir R. Buller replied that Botha had received, four days ago, a letter 
 laying the case before him. 
 
 Commandant Botha admitted that he did receive Sir Redvers’ letter, hut 
 the information given in it was not so definite as this conversation was. 
 
 Sir R. Buller said that he had stopped all firing since he sent the letter, 
 but in the meantime the Boers had gone on digging trenches. This state of 
 things cannot continue. 
 
 Commandant Botha replied that he also had not fired. He then asked 
 Sir Redvers to make a proposal. 
 
 Sir R. Buller said he expected the proposal from Botha. He had done 
 the best he could, but he cannot wait long, and he understands that the Boer 
 Government has moved to Lydenburg. 
 
 Commandant Botha said he had no proposition to make. 
 
 Sir R. Buller said he hates war—it is a miserable thing. A brave man 
 knows when the time comes when to continue fighting means only useless loss 
 of life, and slaughter. 
 
 Commandant Botha said it was not for him but for his Government to 
 decide such a question. 
 
 Sir R. Buller said he had not asked Lord Roberts about it; but he had 
 many friends in the force opposed to him, and he wished them well. He has 
 so many men that Botha must see it is useless to go on fighting. 
 
 Commandant Botha said if he gave in now, Sir Redvers would have a big 
 advantage and he would have great loss. 
 
 Sir R. Buller said that on the contrary if war goes on, the Boers’ stock 
 would he lost, their homes destroyed, and their property would suffer a great 
 deal of damage, and he wants to avoid that. 
 
 Commandant Botha replied that all they have to tight for is their inde¬ 
 pendence. Their stock, &c., is only a secondary consideration to them. 
 
 Sir R Buller said “ But behind independence is life.” 
 
 Commandant Botha said he would deserve to be hated by his country if 
 he gave in. 
 
 Sir R. Buller said that the Boer Government has been telling the burghers 
 that the English wish to destroy their farms. This is not true. 
 
 Commandant Botha said he knows it is not true, and that it is only a 
 rumour and a fiction. 
 
 Sir R. Buller said that he was afraid that there was nothing more to be 
 said, and if Botha must go on fighting it could not be helped. 
 
 Commandant Botha replied, “If it has to be, it must be.” He would 
 heartily welcome a peace if possible, but in present circumstances he would 
 rather not be there to see it made. 
 
 The conference was then on the point of breaking up, when— 
 
 Commandant Edwards asked Sir Redvers for a definite proposition. 
 
 Sir R. Buller replied that the burghers should disperse home, leaving 
 their artillery behind; they might take their small-arms with them. Tne 
 question of the ultimate surrender of these arms would have to be settled 
 
86 
 
 afterwards. Sir Redvers does not want to take away their arms now, that 
 would be a question for Lord Roberts and Mr. Kruger to settle. He, 
 personally, had no power to make peace. He has met the deputation because 
 he deplores the war. He has had many friends in the Transvaal, and he would 
 like them to live happily and peacefully for the remainder of their lives. 
 
 Commandant Botha said he had the same wish, but it was impossible for 
 him to accept or offer terms ; he would be a traitor if he did. 
 
 Commandant Edwards asked whether Sir Redvers could not make definite 
 proposals for peace. 
 
 Sir 11. Buller asked whether the commandos here would authorise him to 
 ask Lord Roberts to offer terms. 
 
 Commandant Botha agreed, on condition that they retained their 
 independence. 
 
 Sir R. Buller replied that he was not in communication with the Govern¬ 
 ment and he could not speak officially, but he had reason to believe that the 
 present Government will not be allowed to continue, that there will be some 
 English form of government, and that the burghers will come in time to 
 participate in the government of the country. 
 
 Commandant Edivards said that if the burghers knew what they are to 
 expect, it would facilitate matters, and suggested that Sir Redvers should com¬ 
 municate with Lord Roberts, and ask definitely what the terms of peace are 
 to be. 
 
 Sir R. Buller said he would telegraph to Lord Roberts and enquire as to 
 whether he was now in a position to formulate terms of peace. 
 
 Commandant Edwards said that his Government knew of this meeting, 
 and they would inform it of Sir Redvers 5 proposals. 
 
 Sir R. Buller said he could not wait long, but on being told that a reply 
 could be received in three days, he agreed to an armistice up till Tuesday 
 evening, 5th June. 
 
 Commandant Botha said that if he entered into this agreement the English 
 
 O O 
 
 forces must remain where they are. 
 
 Sir R. Buller said he could not agree to this as he cannot stop movements 
 now in progress, but he will not fire, nor will he advance his troops in front 
 line beyond their present outposts. 
 
 Commandant Botha replied that all he wanted was an assurance that no 
 forces will advance to attack his forces. 
 
 It v/as then agreed that Commandant-General Botha will communicate 
 with his Government as to whether Sir Redvers 5 proposal should be accepted, 
 and Sir Redvers said he would ask Lord Roberts whether he was yet in a 
 position to formulate his terms of peace. 
 
 The meeting then ended. 
 
 PROCLAMATION. 
 
 The troops of Queen Victoria are now passing through the Transvaal. 
 Her Majesty does not make war on individuals, but is on the contrary anxious 
 to spare them as far as may be possible-the. horrors of war. The quarrel 
 England has is with the Government, not with the people of the Transvaal. 
 
 Provided they remain neutral no attempt will be made to interfere with 
 persons living near the line of march, every possible protection will be given 
 them, and any of their property that it may. be necessary to take will 
 be paid for. 
 
 But on the other hand those who are thus allowed to remain near the line 
 of march must respect and maintain their neutrality, and the residents of any 
 locality will be held responsible, both, in their persons and their property, if 
 any. damage is done io railway or telegraph, or any violence done to any 
 member of the British Forces in the vicinity of their homes. .. 
 
From General Boiler, Newcastle, to Lord Roberts, Front. 
 
 2nd June, 1900. 
 
 On the 30th May I sent to Commandant on Laing’s Nek, and told him 
 that Lord Roberts had crossed the Yaal and that further fighting was useless. 
 This eventually produced a meeting between our out posts to-day of Assistant 
 Commandant-General Chris. Botha and myself. He asked me what terms of 
 peace you would offer, and I undertook to make no advance for three days 
 while he was communicating to his Government. Can you let me know your 
 terms of peace for individual and separate commandos ? I told him that my 
 terms were that his men should surrender all guns and return to their farms, 
 and if they did that they could take their rifles with them, subject to the 
 understanding that Lord Roberts will later probably order their disarmament. 
 
 I thought this would not be wrong, as they can at this moment, if the}' 
 wish, run away and take both guns and rifles with them. I said that to talk 
 about independence was nonsense, if hereafter they behave themselves they 
 might become an independent colony, that was the only chance they had. 
 
 I think they are inclined to give in, and that I have in front of me about 
 half the Transvaal forces now in the field. 
 
 If you think it worth while, please let me know if I may mention any 
 terms of peace to them. I think that even if assisted from the Orange Free 
 State it will cost me about .500 men killed and wounded to get out of Natal. 
 
 From Lord Roberts, Johannesburg, to General Bidder, Newcastle. 
 
 3rd June, 1900. 
 
 Your telegram of yesterday. My terms with the Transvaal Government 
 are unconditional surrender. With regard to troops, those who deliver up 
 their arms and riding: animals are allowed to gfo to their homes on signing: 
 pledge that they will not fight again during present war. The exceptions to 
 this rule are those who have commanded portions of the Republican forces, or 
 who have taken an active part in the policy which brought about the war, or 
 who have been guilty of or been parties to wanton destruction of property, or 
 guilcv of acts contrary to the usages of civilised warfare. Principal Officers 
 should remain with you on parole, until you receive instructions regarding 
 their disposal. 
 
 i 
 
88 
 
 No. 8. 
 
 From Field-Marshal Lord Roberts to the Secretary of State for War. 
 
 Army Head-quarters, South Africa, 
 
 My Lord, Pretoria, 10th July, 1900. 
 
 In continuation of my letter, No. C. in C./126/97, dated 9th July, 1900,1 
 have the honour to forward, for your Lordship’s information, a despatch, No. 
 Mil. Sec./620, dated 19th June, 1900, from the General Officer Commanding 
 in Natal, describing the operations of the Force under his command from 5th 
 June to 13th June, inclusive of the action of the 11th in front of Allemann’s 
 Nek and the occupation of Laing’s Nek on the following day. 
 
 2. I consider that the turning movement over the Drakensberg, which 
 resulted in the withdrawal of the Boers from their strong and carefully 
 prepared position at Laing’s Nek, was ably directed by Sir Redvers Buller, 
 while as usual nothing could be more satisfactory than the behaviour of his 
 troops. 
 
 3. I have much pleasure in supporting the recommendations put forward 
 by Sir Redvers Buller on behalf of the Officers and petty officers of the 
 Royal Navy, and the Officers, non-commissioned officers, and men of Her 
 Majesty’s military forces, whose services he has brought to special notice. 
 
 I have the honour to be, 
 
 My Lord, 
 
 Your Lordship’s most obedient Servant, 
 ROBERTS, Field-Marshal, 
 
 Commanding-in-Chief, South Africa. \) 
 
 From the General Officer Commanding in Natal to the Secretary of State 
 
 for War. 
 
 (Through the Field-Marshal Commanding the Forces in South Africa.) 
 
 Laing’s Nek, Natal, 
 
 Sir, 19th June, 1900. 
 
 The armistice that I reported in my letter of the 4th June ceased on the 
 5th, as Assistant Commandant-General Chris. Botha wrote on that day 
 declining the terms I had offered. 
 
 The railway had been repaired to Newcastle by the 28th May, and trains 
 had been running regularly since the 29th, and I had been, therefore, able to 
 complete in Newcastle a reserve of 21 days’ supply for the force to the north 
 of it. 
 
 On the 5th, I moved to Schains Hoogte, and directed General Hildyard, 
 who, with the 5th Division, was encamped at De Wet’s Farm, to occupy, on the 
 6th, the height south of the Botha’s Pass road, marked on the map as Van Wyk. 
 
 At this time I had reason to believe that Laing’s Nek was occupied by 
 from 4,500 to 5,000 men, that about 3,000 more were occupying the passes to 
 the east ol it, and that Botha’s Pass was held by some 2,000 men, consisting, 
 chiefly of the Lydenberg and Carolina Commandos, with a few Free Staters ; 
 the remainder of the Free Staters who had been there, having, during the 
 last few days, withdrawn to the westward. 
 
89 
 
 On the 6th, General Hildyard occupied Van Wyk with the South African 
 Light Horse, the 13th Field Battery, and the 2nd Bn. Middlesex Regiment, the 
 whole under the command of General Talbot Coke. The occupation was well 
 carried out, the few enemy that held the hill retiring; but later in the day 
 they were reinforced and made a rather resolute attack upon General Coke’s 
 force. Our positions were however maintained, though under considerable 
 discomfort to the troops, as the enemy fired the grass in all directions, and 
 following up the fire so created, were able to get to rather close quarters 
 unobserved under cover of the smoke. 
 
 Our casualties on this day were— South African Light Horse, four men 
 wounded ; 10th Brigade, one man killed, five wounded. 
 
 During the night of the 6th—7th the two remaining battalions of the 
 10th Brigade and two 4'7-inch guns and two 12-prs. of the Naval Brigade 
 were sent to reinforce General Coke. 
 
 The ascent of the hill, for which a road was made as far as possible by the 
 37th Company, Royal Engineers, was very difficult, and it was due to the 
 energy of Captain Jones, Royal Navy, and the Officers and men of the Naval 
 Brigade, that one 12-pr. was in position on Van Wyk at daylight. The other 
 12-pr. lost a wheel in the bad ground, and it was found impossible to get the 
 two 4'7-inch guns up that night. To support General Coke’s right flank two 
 4’7-inch guns and two 12-prs. Royal Artillery, with one battalion of the 
 11th Brigade, took up a position near point 4 600 (1-inch map), about 1 mile 
 to the west of the junction between Botha’s Foss main road and the Newcastle 
 high road. 
 
 A commencement was also made towards placing two 5-inch guns, Royal 
 Artillery, on the south-western spur of the Inkweloane Mountain. On the 
 7th, the following troops were concentrated at Yellowboom Farm 
 
 2nd Cavalry Brigade. 
 
 South African Light Horse. 
 
 11th Brigade. 
 
 13th and 69th Batteries, Royal Field Artillery. 
 
 Two 4'7-inch guns and two 12-prs, Royal Artillery. 
 
 Divisional troops, 5th Division. 
 
 Divisional Head-quarters, 5th Division. 
 
 Orders were also issued for the 2nd Infantry Brigade, with two batteries 
 Roya Field Artillery of that division, the 61st Howitzer Battery and two 
 pompoms, to march on the morning of the 8th from their camp at Schains 
 Hoogte Heights, and to report to the General Officer Commanding 5th Division 
 for orders, and also for the 3rd Mounted Brigade under Lord Dundonald, 
 with “A” Battery, Royal Horse Artillery, to march from Ingogo Drift, bv 
 De Wet’s Farm, on Spitzkop. This force was also under the orders of 
 the General Officer Commanding 5th Division. 
 
 On the 8th, General Hildyard assembled the Brigadiers and Artillery 
 Commanders on Van Wyk at daylight, and explained the dispositions he 
 intended to adopt in the assault on Botha’s Pass. About 5 miles from the 
 summit of Botha’s Pass the Ingogo River runs in a gorge between Van Wyk 
 and a hill marked Spitzkop, and through this gorge the road is carried in a 
 heavy cutting. General Hildyard ordered the South African Light Horse to 
 occupy Spitzkop, and so clear the way for the columns which, debouching from 
 the gorge, would be able to extend in the more level ground between Van 
 Wyk and the foot of the berg. Due west of Spitzkop there was a well-marked 
 track down the berg, and this was selected as the dividing line between 
 the attacks of the 2nd and 11 th Brigades. 
 
 About 10 o’clock the South African Light Horse occupied Spitzkop with¬ 
 out opposition, and then crossing the front of the advancing Infantry columns, 
 they formed a screen in their front and covered the left of the advance. 
 
 About 10.45 a.m., the 11th Brigade advanced, covered by the fire of the 
 11th and 69th Batteries, the Naval guns on Van Wyk, the heavy Royal 
 Artillery guns which had been brought forward to one of the spurs of Van Wyk, 
 and the two 5-inch guns on the spur of Inkweloane, the 3rd Mounted Brigade 
 advancing at the same time on the right of the attack. 
 
 The advance of the 2nd and 11th Brigades was extremely rapid, the meg 
 
 ( 7 62 - 2 ) M 
 
90 
 
 ascending the very steep slopes with great resolution and rapidity. The 3rd 
 
 Mounted Brigade joined in the assault, and scrambled up oil the right of the 
 
 2nd Brigade. 
 
 © 
 
 By 3 p.m. our troops were in possession of the whole crest line of the 
 Drakensberg, from Inkweloane to Botha’s Pass. Very little opposition had, so 
 far, been encountered, which was probably due to the enemy not being pre¬ 
 pared to face our Artillery fire on the exposed crest of the mountain range. 
 
 After crossing the crest, the troops of the 2nd and 11th Brigades met 
 with a considerable amount of rifle, shell, and pompom fire, but this fire was 
 inaccurate and evidently hurried. The 2nd Brigade found themselves in face 
 of the enemy’s entrenchments, south-west of Inkweloane. The action of the 
 advanced company of the 1 lth Brigade, on the left of these entrenchments, 
 cleared the enemy out of them, but under cover of a grass fire, which drove 
 our men back, they reoccupied the ti’enches, to some extent, to cover the with¬ 
 drawal of their guns and wagons. The 3rd Mounted Brigade had by this time 
 got up its Colt guns and two guns Boyal Horse Artillery, and one pompom ol 
 the 2nd Brigade having also been got up the steep slope into action, the 
 enemy were soon driven out. 
 
 The 11th Brigade had meanwhile advanced to a low grassy ridge about 
 11 miles from the crest, driving the enemy before them, but the grass fires 
 which they lighted as they retreated stopped our further action. 
 
 The moment that the head of Botha’s Pass was seized by the 11th Brigade, 
 the 2nd Cavalry Brigade and Artillery were brought up it, but the last mile 
 of the road is desperately steep and very stony, and by the time the horse¬ 
 men and guns had got to the top, the grass fires lighted by the enemy were 
 causing so much smoke that they were unable to get on terms with them. 
 They did, however, pursue about 4 miles and fired a few shots at long range. 
 
 The enemy pursued their usual tactics, and the moment there appeared a 
 chance of our attacking, had sent their wagons back in advance. 
 
 The South African Light Horse got up the berg to the left of Botha’s 
 Pass, and pursued for some miles, though they were not able to come up with 
 a party of the enemy who retired to the westward. 
 
 It was now night, and the Infantry bivouacked on the position they had 
 gained, the mounted troops returning to the valley to be near water. 
 
 The baggage was ordered up at once, but the road was so steep, and the 
 Pass so difficult, that few of the troops got either their blankets or coats. 
 The night was bitterly cold and misty, so the Infantry, especially the 2nd 
 Brigade suffered very considerable discomfort, but showed the same spirit 
 of readiness to undergo hardship that they have always evinced. 
 
 The casualties during the day had amounted to two men killed, one 
 Officer and 12 men wounded. 
 
 The position was a very strong one, nearly 2 miles of 4-ft. 6-in. trenches 
 and several gun positions having been prepared. But it was visible from the 
 top of Inkwelo, and General Hildvard had so directed his attack that the 
 centre of the attack exactly came on the flank of the position, which was thus 
 rendered practically untenable from the first. 
 
 The Naval guns and the 10th Brigade were brought down from Van Wyk 
 during the night. 1 may here remark that hard and well as Captain Jones 
 and the men of the Naval Brigade have worked during this war, I do not 
 believe they ever had harder work to do or did it more willingly than in 
 getting their guns up and down Van Wyk. They had to work continuously 
 for 36 hours. 
 
 On the 9th the force halted, as it took the whole day to get our wagons 
 up the berg, but during the afternoon the 11th Brigade moved some 5 miles 
 along the road towards Gans Ylei. Nothing was seen of the enemy. 
 
 On the 10th the whole force moved on the junction of Gans Ylei with 
 the Klip River. Nothing was seen of the enemy until the advance guard of 
 the force reached Uys Farm, about 2 miles south of Gans Ylei, where a high 
 mountain on the right bank opposite the farm was found to be held by the 
 enemy. The heavy guns had been assigned a forward position in the column 
 <*nd came rapidly into action, and under cover of their fire, the South African 
 Light Horse cleared the enemy off the mountain without difficulty. 
 
 The 9th having been a hard day for the oxen, the force was directed to 
 bivouac at Gans Ylei Spruit. While bivouacs were being taken up. the South 
 
African Light Horse reported a strong movement of Boers across our front 
 fi'om east to north. In order to check this movement the Llth Brigade and 
 the Artillery were at once ordered forward. The post on the mountain on the 
 right of the bivouac was reinforced, the 2nd Cavalry Brigade were moved to 
 the left front, and the South African Light Horse pushed forward about 2 
 miles to some kopjes to the north of our position. The fire of our Artillery 
 checked the movement of the enemy, who returned to the hills on the east, 
 but three squadrons of the South African Light Horse were closely engaged with 
 a party of them until dusk. Our casualties during the day were six killed and 
 seven wounded, all of the South African Light Horse. 10 of the enemy were 
 buried on the ground, and 12 more on the following day. 
 
 The force had now reached the extreme northern point of its turning 
 movement, being on the northern spurs of the Iketini or Long Krantz Mountain, 
 and the route to be followed turned to the east, and after passing about 6 miles 
 of rolling ground crossed Allemann’s Nek bevond which 3 more miles would 
 bring it into the Volksrust Plain. 
 
 On the llth the llth Brigade first occupied the low hills on the left and 
 front of our bivouac, thus covering the right wheel which the force had to 
 make ; the 2nd Cavalrv Brigade covering the extreme left flank. 
 
 The baggage was moved forward and parked under cover of the llth 
 Brigade. At 11 a.m. the heavy guns moved forward to the Artillery position 
 in front of Allemann’s Nek, the 2nd and 10th Brigades on the left and right, 
 respectively, moving with them. While this movement was in progress, the 
 3rd Mounted Brigade, which was covering the right of the advance, became 
 engaged with the enemy on the hills south of the Nek. and the 2nd Cavalry 
 Brigade, which was operating on the extreme left, were also engaged with 
 the enemy. 
 
 W T e were thus engaged on both flanks at a distance of about 7 miles apart. 
 
 At 1.30 p.m. as we were taking up a position with the main force in front 
 of Allemann’s Nek, the enemy opened fire with a high-velocity gun, but it 
 was soon silenced by our heavy guns. 
 
 At 2.30 p.m. our Infantry advanced to the attack, covered by the fire of 
 our heavy and field guns. The enemy opposed the advance with n rapid shell, 
 pompom, and rifle lire, but in spite of this the advance was steadily main¬ 
 tained ; the 10th Brigade being directed against the hills on the right of the 
 Pass, the 2nd Brigade against those on the left of the Pass. The action of 
 our Artillery soon reduced the enemy’s fire, and the 10th Brigade pressed 
 rapidly forward, led bv the 2nd Bn. Dorsetshire Regiment, but the 2nd Brigade, 
 who were led by the Queen's, being in more open ground and with higher and 
 steeper hills, were not able to maintain the same speed. 
 
 By sunset the 2nd Bn. Dorsetshire Regiment, supported by the 2nd Bn. 
 Middlesex Regiment, and the 10th Brigade under General Talbot Coke, had 
 secured the crest of all the hills south of the Pass, while the 2nd Brigade had 
 effected a secure lodgment on the hills to the left, and the enemy had retired. 
 Meanwhile, on the right front a severe tight took place between the advanced 
 troops and the 3rd Mounted Brigade and the enemy s left wing, into w 
 the right battalion of the 10th Brigade (1st Bn. Royal Dublin Fusiliers) was 
 drawn. The combined action of the Dublin Fusiliers and the 3rd Mounted 
 Brigade drove it from its position on the right, and by 8 p.m. the whole force 
 was established in bivouac on Allemann’s Nek. Our casualties in the day’s 
 fighting were as follows : — 
 
 Killed — Officers, 2 ; men, 17. Wounded—Officers, G (1 since dead) ; men, 
 117 (3 since dead). 
 
 On the 12th, the force pressed forward towards Volksrust. We learned 
 on the wav from our sc aits that the enemy had evacuated Laing's Nek, and 
 that it was being occupied by General Clerv. This was shortly aftc wards 
 confirmed by a telegraphic message from that Officer. 
 
 As we advanced, a considerable force of Boers crossed our front, moving 
 northward. Our guns and Cavalry were at once pushed forward, but were 
 unable to catch up the enemy who retired partly round the spur at Zandspruit 
 Station and partly by Hout Nek. 
 
 We bivouacked for the night about 4 miles from Volksrust, and dining 
 the next day occupied Zandspruit Station, Volksrust and (. harlestown, while 
 General Clery occupied Laing’s Nek. 
 
92 
 
 During this period the 2nd Division had remained in occupation of Ingogo 
 Heights and Mount Prospect. Their heavy guns opened daily on Laing’s Nek 
 and Pogweni, being replied to by the enemy’s 6-inch gun on that hill. This 
 gun has now a fuze which enables it to fire an effective shrapnel at a range of 
 9,600 yards, and during the four days of its fire caused the following 
 casualties :—Two Officers and four men wounded. 
 
 By the operations thus described, the enemy were compelled to abandon 
 the position at Laing’s Nek, to the retention of which they attached the 
 greatest importance, and on the preparation of which they had expended a 
 vast amount of labour and energy. The position, immensely strong by nature, 
 extending as it does along a series of hills for 3 miles with its western flank 
 secured by Majuba, and its eastern flank by the deep gorge through which 
 the River Buffalo flows, and beyond the river by the lofty mountain, Pogweni, 
 was so skilfully and thoroughly entrenched as to be almost impregnable. 
 
 The trenches were so arranged as to be invisible from the front, and yet 
 were so placed that there is hardly a foot of ground in front of the position 
 which does not come under cross and enfilade fire. On the bastion-like hill in 
 the centre of the position, close under which passes the road over the Nek, 
 were two, and in some places three, rows of entrenchments, and on this and 
 on the other commanding crests, gun emplacements with bombproof case¬ 
 ments for ammunition had been dug out of the solid rock. The slopes of 
 Majuba were all entrenched, and the mountain itself was a mass of entrench¬ 
 ments, every possible approach to it being protected by them. On Pogweni 
 was a very strong and carefully constructed emplacement for a 6-inch gun. 
 
 Covered ways had been dug to enable the defenders of the trenches 
 to get into them out of sight of the attack, and all the approaches to the 
 position had been burnt so as to show up khaki clothing distinctly. It is evident 
 that these preparations were not the work of a few days, but they had been 
 most carefully finished in every particular, in fact no pains had been spared 
 to render the position perfectly secure against attack. All this labour, 
 however, was in vain, for it was impossible for the enemy to retain the 
 position when once our troops were in possession of Volksrust, as, had they 
 done so, they would have been in a cul de sac ; the Buffalo gorge pre¬ 
 venting any escape to the east. 
 
 I accompanied the troops during the operations I have been describing, 
 but entrusted the tactical dispositions to General Hildyard, who carried them 
 out to my thorough satisfaction, and whose arrangements were, I thought, 
 extremely good. 
 
 1 desire to bring to notice the following Officers :— 
 
 Captain E. P. Jones, Royal Navy, Naval Brigade.—It was due to the 
 energy and perseverance of the Officers and men alike, following the excellent 
 example set them by their commander, Captain Jones, that it was possible to 
 place the Naval guns in position on the 8th, and get them forward subsequently 
 in time to accompany the advance on the 10th. The excellent marksmanship 
 of the Naval Brigade, and the skilful distribution of their fire, contributed 
 materially to the successful result of the attack on Allemann’s Nek on the 11th 
 June. 
 
 Colonel L. W. Parsons, Royal Artillery, commanded the Corps Artillery. 
 His arrangements were, as usual, exceedingly good, and he was of the greatest 
 assistance. 
 
 Major E. S. May, Royal Artillery (Corps Artillery).—The heavy Royal 
 Artillery guns that accompanied the force were placed under the direction of 
 Major May. He displayed energy and zeal. 
 
 Major A. Hamilton-Gordon, Royal Artillery. — As usual, the fire of the 
 61st Howitzer Battery was admirably directed. 
 
 Colonel (local Major-General) J. F. Brocklehurst, M.V.O.—The 2nd 
 Cavalry Brigade had no opportunity of combined action, but General Brockle- 
 hurst’s dispositions contributed to the general success. On the 10th June, the 
 1 8th Hussars gave valuable assistance and well-timed support to the South 
 African Light Horse ; on the 11th June, a valuable reconnaissance, through a 
 difficult country occupied by the enemy, was made by Captain E. C. Haag, 
 
93 
 
 18th Hussars, and on the 12th the occupation of Volksrust by Captain E. S. E. 
 Harrison, 11th Hussars, attached to the 19th Hussars, with a small party of 
 that regiment, was very well effected, and the measures he took for the 
 seizure of archives and telegraph instruments were well considered, and proved 
 of value. 
 
 Colonel (local Major-General) the Earl of Dundonald, C.B., M.V.O., 
 3rd Mounted Brigade.—This brigade gave most valuable assistance on the 
 right at the capture of Botha's Pass on the 8th June. Their ascent of the 
 mountain and their getting up machine guns and two guns, Royal Horse 
 Artillery, was most valuable, and it is largely due to Lord Dundonald’s action 
 that our casualties were so small. 
 
 On the 11th June, the action of the 3rd Mounted Brigade on our right 
 flank was excellent, and owing to Lord Dundonald’s good dispositions, he first 
 contained and eventually drove off a force of the enemy far exceeding his own 
 in number. 
 
 In connection with this action of the 3rd Mounted Brigade, I have 
 had the honour to recommend that 4240 Private A. Budworth, 1st Bn. Rifle 
 Brigade, and 4048 Private J. Robson, Durham Light Infantry, both of the 
 Mounted Infantry Regiment, be granted the Distinguished Service 
 
 Major (local Lieut.-Colonel) the Hon. J. H. G. Byng (10th Hussars), 
 South African Light Horse.—This regiment acted as an independent unit, and 
 performed its duties exceedingly well throughout. Lieut.-Colonel Byng proved 
 himself, as usual, a valuable commander. 
 
 Lieut.-Colonel E. O. F. Hamilton, 2nd Infantry Brigade.—This brigade 
 was employed in the front both in the attack of Botha’s Pass and at Allemann’s 
 Nek, and did well. 
 
 Colonel (local Major-General) J. Talbot Coke, 10th Infantry Brigade.— 
 This brigade occupied Van Wyk on the 8th June successfully, and formed the 
 right of the attack on Allemann’s Nek on the 11th. I was much pleased with 
 their action. 
 
 Colonel (local Major-General) A. S. Wynne, C.B.—The 11th Brigade 
 formed the left of the attack on Botha’s Pass on the 8th, and General Wynne’s 
 dispositions were entirely satisfactory. 
 
 Captain (local Major) R. G. Brooke, D.S.O. (7th Hussars), South African 
 Light Horse.—Was especially commended to me for the manner in which he 
 commanded the left of our line on Van Wyk on the 6th June. 
 
 The following names are mentioned by commanders as having performed 
 good services, in addition to those previously mentioned :— 
 
 Royal Navy. 
 
 Lieutenant G. P. Hunt, H.M. Ship “ Forte.” 
 
 Lieutenant F. W. Melville, H.M. Ship “ Forte.” 
 
 Lieutenant C. R. N. Burne, H.M. Ship “ Philomel.” 
 
 Lieutenant A. Halsey, H.M. Ship Philomel.” 
 
 Midshipman W. R. Ledgard, H.M. Ship “Philomel. ’ 
 
 John Restal, Chief Armourer, H.M. Ship “Tartar.” 
 
 Alexander Monro, C.P.O., H.M. Ship “Tartar.” 
 
 J. Weatherhead, P.O., H.M. Ship “ Philomel.” 
 
 E. Waring (Yeoman of Signals). 
 
 2nd Cavalry Brigade. 
 
 Captain M. S. Wellby, 18th Hussars. 
 
 Royal Horse Artillery. 
 
 Major E. A. Burrows. 
 
 Royal Field Artillery. 
 
 Major W. L. H. Paget. 
 
 Major F. D. V. Wing. 
 
 Captain and Adjutant J. A. Tyler. 
 
 62271 Serjeant-Trumpeter J. H. M. Watts, 
 
 Composite 
 
 Medal. 
 
94 
 
 Koval Garrison Artillery. 
 
 Captain T. R. C. Hudson. 
 
 3rd Mounted Brigade (Staff ). 
 
 Major W. R. Bird wood, lltli Bengal Lancers. 
 
 Lieutenant F. D. Murray, Royal Highlanders. 
 
 Thorneycroft’s Mounted infantry. 
 
 Major (local' Lieut.-Colonel) A. W. Thorneycroft, Royal Scots 
 Fusiliers (Commanding). 
 
 Captain’H. Mann (killed in action). 
 
 Composite Regiment. 
 
 Captain (local Major) H. De la P. Gough, 16th Lancers (Commanding). 
 Lieutenant N. M. Johnstone, lltli Hussars (killed in action). 
 
 2nd Infantry Brigade (Staff’). 
 
 Captain H. E. Gogarty, Royal Scots Fusiliers. 
 
 Lieutenant A. W. Tufnell, The Queen’s. 
 
 Lieutenant II. P. H. Mup.ro, 2nd Bn. Devonshire Regiment. 
 Captain J. A. T. Tredgold, Army Service Corps. 
 
 2nd Bn. Queen’s Royal West Surrey Regiment. 
 
 Major W. S. Burrell (Commanding). 
 
 Captain L. S. De la Mare (1st Yol. Bn. The Queen’s). 
 
 839 Colour-Serjeant J. Robinson. 
 
 3159 Private T. Hatherall. 
 
 2nd Bn. Devonshire Regiment. 
 
 Major (temporary Lieut.-Colonel) H. Batson (Commanding). 
 
 2nd Bn. West Yorkshire Regiment. 
 
 Major W. F ry (Commanding). 
 
 Major H. E. Watts. 
 
 3325 Serjeant J. Walmesley. 
 
 5054 Private T. Dodd. 
 
 2nd Bn. East Surrey Regiment. 
 Major H. W. Bepson (Commanding). 
 
 Captain L. G. lonides. 
 
 Captain H. S. Tew. 
 
 Royal Army Medical Corps. 
 
 Major J. D. T. Reckitt. 
 
 6269 2nd Class S.taff-Serjeant Nor worthy. 
 Company Leader Russell (Imperial Bearer Corps). 
 
 10th Infantry Brigade (Staff'). 
 
 Captain H. G. C. Phillips, Welsh Regiment. 
 
 Captain C. B. Jervis-Edwards, Duke of Cornwall s Light Infantry. 
 4902 Serjeant W. A. Sharp, West Riding Regiment. 
 
 2nd Bn. Dorsetshire Regiment. 
 
 Lieut.-Colonel C. H. Law (Commanding). 
 Captain C* A. Rowley. 
 
 3050 Colour-Serjeant A. Brown. 
 
 3950 Private J. Newsham. 
 
95 
 
 1 ' *'fy 
 
 1st Bn. Royal Dublin Fusiliers. 
 
 Lieut.-Colonel G. A. Mills (Commanding). 
 
 6642 Private J. Wallace. 
 
 6215 Private T. Dowling. 
 
 Royal Army Medical Corps. 
 
 Major E. R. Cree. 
 
 11th Infantry Brigade (Staff). 
 
 Captain W. P. Braithwaite, Somersetshire Light Infantry. 
 
 Captain F. M. Carleton, D.S.O., King’s Own (Royal Lancaster 
 Regiment). 
 
 1st Bn. York and Lancaster Regiment. 
 
 Lieut.-Colonel W. J. Kirkpatrick (Commanding). 
 
 Major F. P. Lousada. 
 
 Captain T. T. Gresson. 
 
 2nd Bn. Lancashire Fusiliers. 
 
 Lieutenant and Adjutant D. F. Campbell. 
 
 I have to add to these certain Officers of my Staff who assisted General 
 Hildyard in every manner in their power : — 
 
 Lieut,-Colonel W. B. Allin, Royal Army Medical Corps, Principal 
 Medical Officer Field Force, who was in charge of all the 
 medical arrangements, which were carried out to iny entire 
 satisfaction. 
 
 Major J. D. Moir, Royal Army Medical Corps, in charge of 11th 
 Brigade Field Hospital, did excellent work after the action at 
 Allemann's Nek. fries* 
 
 Captain C. B. Martin, Royal Army Medical Corps, Commanding 
 10th Bearer Company. 
 
 Colonel H. S. G. Miles, M.Y.O., Chief of the Staff. 
 
 Lieut.-Colonel II. M. Rawson, Royal Engineers. 
 
 Major P. J. T. Lewis, Army Service Corps, Deputy-Assistant Adjutant- 
 General. 
 
 Major L. E. Kiggell, Royal Warwickshire Regiment. Deputy-Assistant 
 Adj utant-General. 
 
 Major the Hon. F. Gordon, Gordon Highlanders, Deputy-Assistant 
 Adjutant-General. 
 
 Captain the Hon. E. S. St. Aubyn, Reserve of Officers, Deputy- 
 Assistant Adj utant-General, 
 
 who worked extremely well throughout. 
 
 Also the following Officers of General Hildyard’s Staff :— 
 
 Brevet-Major T. Capper, East Lancashire Regiment, Assistant 
 Adjutant-General. A careful, indefatigable, able Staff Officer. 
 
 Major H. N. Sargent, Armv Service Corps, Deputy-Assistant 
 Adjutant-General. Superintended the whole of the transport 
 with marked success. 
 
 Major E. C. J. Williams, East Kent Regiment, Deputy-Assistant 
 Adjutant-General. A valuable Staff’Officer. 
 
 Major H.H. Prince Christian Victor of Schleswig-Holstein, King’s 
 Royal Rifle Corps ; Lieutenant A. Blair, King’s Own Scottish 
 Borderers, Aide-de-Camp ; and Captain H. C. T. Hildyard, Royal 
 Artillery, Aide-de-Camp, who worked hard and well throughout. 
 
 Lieut.-Colonel G. II. Sim, Commanding Royal Engineer, who was 
 most useful, 
 
96 
 
 Lieut.-Colonel O. Todd, Royal Army Medical Corps, Senior Medical 
 Officer, 5th Division. 
 
 Captain J. S. Cayzer, 7th Dragoon Guards, and Captain A. A. 
 McHardy, Royal Artillery, Signalling Officers, whose arrange¬ 
 ments were very complete. 
 
 I desire also specially to mention Mr. Otto Schwikkard (Honorary 
 Major), Assistant-Director of Transport, who, as Guide, Interpreter, and 
 Transport Official, was indefatigable, and whose services were most useful. 
 
 Brevet Lieut.-Colonel A. E. Sandbach, Royal Engineers, Assistant 
 Adjutant-General, and Brevet-Major D. Henderson, Argyll and Sutherland 
 Highlanders, Deputy-Assistant Adjutant-General, and the Intelligence Depart¬ 
 ment generally, whose information was accurate, early, and ample. 
 
 I have to add that, on the morning of the 13th June, I sent back the 
 Telegraph Detachment under an escort of 150 men of Thorneycroft’s Mounted 
 Infantry, under Captain C. F. Minchin (Indian Staff Corps), Thorneycroft’s 
 Mounted Infantry. They were attacked by superior forces south of Gans 
 Vlei, whom they drove off, and the wagons were brought safely back, via 
 Botha’s Pass and Schains Hoogte, with the loss of only about 7 miles of their 
 line, which they were unable to pick up. 
 
 I consider that Captain Minchin’s dispositions were good, and lie brings 
 to notice the names of —• 
 
 Lieutenant Green, Thornevcroft’s Mounted Infantry. 
 
 Corporal Teadall ,, ,, ,, 
 
 Private McGregor ,, ,, ,, 
 
 On the 13th June, Major-General the Hon. N. G. Lyttelton, who had been 
 covering the right of our position, pushed a reconnaissance through Moll’s 
 Nek to Wakkerstrom, under Captain H. K. Stewart (Reserve of Officers) 
 Commanding 4th Division Mounted Infantry, accompanied by Major Mullaly 
 Royal Engineers, Deputy-Assistant Adjutant-General for Intelligence. The 
 reconnaissance was completely successful, as Major Mullaly received the 
 surrender from the Landrost of the town and district of Wakkerstrom. 
 
 I have the honour to be, 
 
 Sir, 
 
 Your obedient Servant, 
 
 REDYERS BULLER, General 
 
 No. 9. 
 
 From Field-Marshal Lord Roberts to the Secretary oj State for War. 
 
 Army Head-quarters, South Africa. 
 My Lord, Pretoria, 20th July, 1900. 
 
 I have the honour to forward, for your Lordship’s consideration, a 
 despatch, No. Mil. Sec./632, dated 27th June, 1900, from General Sir Red vers 
 Buller, describing the advance of the troops under his command, from Laing’s 
 Nek to Standerton, which was occupied without opposition on 22nd June. 
 
 I have the honour to be, 
 
 My Lord, 
 
 Your Lordship’s most obedient Servant, 
 
 ROBERTS, Field-Marshal , 
 
 Commanding-in-Chief, South Africa. 
 
97 
 
 From the General Officer Commanding Natal Army to the Secretary of State 
 
 for War. 
 
 (Through the Field-Marshal Commanding-in-Chief, South Africa.) 
 
 Standerton, Transvaal, 
 
 Sir, 27th June, 1900. 
 
 In continuation of my letter of the 19th instant, I have the honour to 
 report that on arrival at Laing’s Nek on the 13th, my first care was to repair 
 the railway, which had been badly damaged in many places between the Ingogo 
 Bridge and the tunnel, while the tunnel itself was blown in for over 200 feet 
 at each end. The reconstruction party of the Natal Government Railway pro¬ 
 ceeded with the repairs of the railway, while the two ends of the tunnel were 
 taken over respectively by “A” Pontoon Troop Royal Engineers, under Major 
 J. L. Irvine, R.E., and by the 17th Company, Royal Engineers, under Major 
 F. M. Glubb, the whole under Lieut.-Colonel J. B. Sharpe, R.E. These men 
 worked admirably ; the face of the work was necessarily small, some of the 
 masses to be removed were very large, and no mechanical appliances were 
 available, but the work was completed in 24 hours’ less time than the civil 
 engineers had thought possible. 
 
 At 3 p.m. on the 18th June the first train passed through to Volksrust. 
 
 On the 16th June, having reason to believe that if slight pressure were 
 applied, most of the Wakkerstroom Commando would surrender, I despatched 
 General Hildyard with a force to Wakkerstroom. The mission was completely 
 successful, 193 burghers surrendering in the first two days, with 197 rifles and 
 over 80,000 rounds of ammunition. Up to date some 150 more of the 
 burghers have surrendered, and with the exception of about 140 men, who 
 remained with the commando, the whole district is reported to be practically 
 peaceful. 
 
 Judging from their action, I am of opinion that the names of Mr. Kleyn- 
 lians, Landrost of Wakkerstroom, Mr. De Jager, Public Prosecutor, and Mr. 
 Schonegral, Accountant, with their subordinate officials, are worthy of being 
 borne in mind in the permanent settlement. 1 reappointed the whole of them 
 to continue the local administration. 
 
 On the evening- of the 18th June I received two telegrams from Lord 
 Roberts, dated 14th and 16th respectively, impressing on me the great 
 importance of an early occupation of the town of Standerton. I at once 
 ordered General Clery’s Division to march from Laing’s Nek. It was joined 
 at Zandspruit on the 20th by the 11th Brigade returning from Wakkerstroom, 
 and Standerton was occupied without incident on the 22nd bv the mounted 
 troops, and on the 23rd by the Infantry. 
 
 About midday on the 21st, I had noticed from Paardekop an explosion, 
 which I felt sure must have indicated the destruction of the railway bridge. 
 
 On arrival at Standerton on the 23rd, 1 found that the bridge over the 
 Yaal had been blown up, and an immense quantity of railway stores belonging 
 principally to the Railway Extension Works from Dundee to \ ryheid, which 
 had been removed from Dundee to Standerton by the enemy, had been de¬ 
 stroyed by fire. 
 
 Having obtained proof that this damage had been effected by the officials 
 of the Netherlands Railway Company in Standerton, I have made all those 
 who are proved to have been active participators in this wanton destruction 
 prisoners of war and the rest of the officials prisoners at large. These latter 
 1 am giving the option of returning to their own country, or of being treated 
 as prisoners of war. They are nearly all Hollanders, but there are a few 
 Russian and German subjects among them. 
 
 The bridge over Zandspruit had been damaged; the girder of the 164-ft. 
 span being broken by its having been used as a target for the practice of 
 a 4‘7-inch gun. In other respects the line was not much damaged, and the 
 first train of supplies reached Standerton yesterday, but we have to make 
 some sidings here, and put in points at Kromdraai, before any bulk of supplies 
 can be delivered, 
 
 I have the honour to be, 
 
 Sir, 
 
 Your obedient Servant, 
 
 REDYERS BULLER, General 
 
 N 
 
 ( 702 - 2 ) 
 
P8 
 
 No. 10. 
 
 From Field-Marshal Lord Roberts to the Secretary of State for War. 
 
 Army Head-quarters, South Africa, 
 
 My Lord, Belfast, 1st September 1900. 
 
 I have the honour to forward herewith a report from General the Eight 
 Honourable Sir Redvers Buller, G.C.B., V.C., &c., giving- a resume of the 
 operations carried out by the force under his command during the period from 
 the 7th to 15th August, inclusive. 
 
 I have the honour to be, 
 
 My Lord, 
 
 Your Lordship’s most obedient Servant, 
 
 ROBERTS, Field-Marslial , 
 
 Commanding-in-Chief, South Africa 
 
 From the General Commanding the Natal Army to the Field-Marshal 
 Commanding-in-Chief the Forces in South Africa , Pretoria, 
 
 Head-quarters, Natal Army, 
 
 Twyfelaar Camp, Transvaal, 
 
 Sir, 20th August 1900. 
 
 1. I have the honour to inform you that, in accordance with the 
 instructions contained in your No. C 3131 of 29th Julv to move a force 
 northwards towards Middleburg, I assembled the 4th Infantry Division, the 2nd 
 Cavalry Brigade, and such of the 3rd Mounted Brigade as could be spared, 
 with a proportion of corps troops, about Meerzicht, North of Paardekop, on 
 the 7th August. (For detail of the Force, see Appendix “A”). 
 
 2. I selected the 4th Division as, with the exception of the 1st Bn. Royal 
 Inniskilling Fusiliers who took the place of the 2nd Bn. King’s Royal Rifle Corps 
 en route to Ceylon, it is composed entirely of troops which had formed the 
 garrison of Ladysmith, who are now in excellent health, and I wished to give 
 them an opportunity of active operations. 
 
 3. The following gives a summary of our daily progress :— 
 
 August 7th.—The enemy occupied successive hills on the south-west of 
 Amersfoort, from which they retired as we advanced. They made some stand 
 on a strong position west of the to\yn from whence they opened fire from field 
 guns and pompoms. 
 
 Their guns were speedily silenced by our Artillery and Amersfoort was 
 occupied at 5.15 p.m. by the 1st Bn. King’s Royal Rifle Corps, who during 
 their approach to the town were met by considerable rifle fire from the 
 houses. Our casualties were two Officers and 23 men w r ounded. 
 
 The enemy retired in a northerly direction leaving a few dead and 
 wounded in the town and neighbouring farms. 
 
 The troops, who had to cover a great deal of ground, did extremely well. 
 
 Lieut.-General Hon. N. G. Lyttelton brought specially to my notice the 
 manner in which Major-General F. Howard directed his Brigade, on which 
 most of the work fell, and on the excellent leading of the 1st Bn. King’s 
 Royal hiflc Corps by Lieut.-Colonel W. P. Campbell. 
 
99 
 
 August Stb.—Halted at Amersfoort owing 1 to the dense fog which 
 prevailed. 
 
 August 9th.—Advanced to Riet Spruit on the Ermelo Road. The 
 3rd Mounted Brigade cleared Eolfontein of the enemy after a sharp skirmish, 
 Strathcona’s Horse doing good execution with their pompom. 
 
 August 10.—Advanced to Beginderlyn and halted north of the Vaal 
 River. The enemy moved north,, parallel with our advance, but, beyond 
 offering slight opposition to the 3rd Mounted Brigade, did not come into 
 contact with our troops. 
 
 August 11th.—The Cavalry occupy Ermelo without opposition and took 
 possession of the public offices there and secured a considerable amount of 
 forage. The main body halted at Klipfontein. 
 
 August 12.—The force concentrated at Ermelo, the enemy retiring to 
 Lake Chrissie. 
 
 Telegraphic communication was opened with Pretoria, via Standerton. 
 
 August 13th.—Advanced to Klipstapel, near the source of the Yaal. 
 The 3rd Mounted Brigade came into contact with the enemy, who fell back 
 before them after a slight skirmish, in which we had one man wounded, and 
 the enemy lost several wounded, six horses killed or captured. 
 
 August 14th.—The mounted troops entered Carolina, driving out about 
 40 Boers who offered some resistance. The remainder of the enemy had 
 retired down the Komati River. 
 
 The 2nd Cavalry Brigade advanced to Twyfelaar and the main column 
 halted at Iv ran span. 
 
 Communication by heliograph was opened with General French’s force, 
 of which the Inniskilling Dragoons were at Goedchoop. 
 
 August 15.— Advanced (o Twyfelaar and halted on the north bank of 
 the Komati River. The 3rd Mounted Brigade found the enemy in some 
 strength about 5 miles north-east of Twyfelaar with whom they were 
 engaged. They had two men severely wounded. The enemy retired to a 
 strong position from which they fell back during the night. 
 
 I here received your instructions to halt until the 22nd. 
 
 I have the honour to be, 
 
 Sir, 
 
 Your obedient Servant, 
 
 REDVERS BULLER, General. 
 
100 
 
 APPENDIX A. 
 
 Head-Quarter Staff. 
 
 2nd Cavalry Brigade. 
 
 Brigade Head-quarters (Major-General J. F. Brocklehurst, M.Y.O.). 
 
 5th Lancers (2 Squadrons). 
 
 18th Hussars (24 Squadrons.) 
 
 19th Hussars (3 Squadrons). 
 
 Supply Column. 
 
 2nd Cavalry Brigade Field Hospital. 
 
 3 rd Mounted Brigade. 
 
 Brigade Head-quarters (Major-General Lord Dundonald, C.B.,M.V.O.). 
 
 “ A Battery, Royal Horse Artillery. 
 
 No. 2 Field Troop, Royal Engineers. 
 
 South African Light Horse. 
 
 Strathcona’s Horse. 
 
 Supply Column. 
 
 3rd Mounted Brigade Field Hospital. 
 
 Colt Gun Detachment. 
 
 4th Division. 
 
 Divisional Head-quarters (Lieut.-General Hon. N. G. Lyttelton, C.B.). 
 4th Division Mounted Infantry Battalion. 
 
 Brigade Division, Royal Field Artillery. 21st Field Battery, 
 42nd Field Battery, 53rd Field Battery, and Ammunition 
 Column. 
 
 23rd Field Company, Royal Engineers. 
 
 7 th Brigade. 
 
 Brigade Head-quarters (Brigadier-General F. W. Kitchener). 
 
 1st Bn. Devonshire Regiment. 
 
 1st Bn. Manchester Regiment. 
 
 2nd Bn. Gordon Highlanders. 
 
 2nd Bn. Rifle Brigade. 
 
 Supply Column. 
 
 7th Brigade Bearer Company. 
 
 7th Brigade Field Hospital. 
 
 Sth Brigade. 
 
 Brigade Head-quarters (Major-General F. Howard, C.B., C.M.G.). 
 
 1st Bn. Liverpool Regiment. 
 
 1st Bn. Leicestershire Regiment. 
 
 1st Bn. Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers. 
 
 1st Bn. King's Royal Rifle Corps. 
 
 Supply Column. 
 
 8th Brigade Bearer Company. 
 
 8th Brigade Field Hospital. 
 
 4th Divisional Supply Column. 
 
 4th Divisional Field Hospital. 
 
 Section No. 6 Field Veterinary Hospital. 
 
101 
 
 Corps Troops. 
 
 No. 16 Company, Southern Division, Royal Garrison Artillery 
 (2—5-inch guns). 
 
 No. 6 Company, Western Division, Royal Garrison Artillery 
 (2—4 - 7-inch guns.) 
 
 No. 2 Company, Western Division, Royal Garrison Artillery 
 (2—12-pr. guns). 
 
 No. 10 Mountain Battery (2—12-pr. guns.) 
 
 61st Howitzer Battery, Royal Field Artillery (6—5-inch 
 howitzers.) 
 
 Nos. 3 and 4 pom poms. 
 
 Corps Troops Ammunition Column. 
 
 Movable Remount Depot. 
 
 Supply Park. 
 
 Indian Mule Train. 
 
 No. 11. 
 
 from Field-Marshal Lord Roberts to the Under Secretary of State 
 
 for War. 
 
 Pretoria, 
 
 Sir, 15th October, 1900. 
 
 I have the honour to submit herewith a despatch from General Sir 
 Redvers Buller, V.C., &c., dated the 13th September, 1900. 
 
 I have the honour to be, 
 
 Sir, 
 
 Your obedient Servant, 
 
 ROBERTS, Field-Marshal. 
 
 From the General Commanding the Natal Army to the Field-Marshal 
 Commanding-in-Chief the Forces in South A frica, Machadodorp. 
 
 Headquarters, Natal Army, 
 
 Spitzkop, Transvaal. 
 
 Sir, 13th September, 1900. 
 
 As I have already reported, the troops under my command were concen¬ 
 trated on the night of the 26th August at Vogelstruispoort Farm, about 
 5 miles due south of Bergendal, which occupies a prominent position on the 
 Belfast-Dalmanutha ridge. This latter is the watershed of the Crocodile 
 and Komati Rivers, and is the highest point of the high veldt. 
 
 Bergendal Farm itself is situated at the junction ot the Carolina and 
 Dalmanutha-Belfast roads, at almost the highest point of the ridge. About 
 300 yards to the west of the farm a peculiar kopje, formed of a conglomera¬ 
 tion of immense stones covering about 3 acres in extent, rises suddenly from 
 the smooth grassy slopes which prevail over the rest of the ridge. The 
 formation is an unusual one, as, except at the kopje itself, which, with its 
 immense stones and rocky crevices, forms a sort of natural fortress, the ground 
 for 2,000 yards round affords no shelter of any sort to advancing troops. The 
 slopes within 500 yards of the kopje being gentle and easy. We could see 
 that the kopje was occupied in some force ; we were able to locate 2 guns 
 posted on the ridge to the east of it, and it was evident that several trenches 
 had been dug, and that the ridge itself was held in considerable force. 
 
 Early in the morning of the 27th August, the 2nd Cavalry Brigade, under 
 Colonel (local Major-General) J. F. Brocklehurst, M.V.O., “A” Battery, 
 Royal Horse Artillery, under Major E. A. Burrows, the 53rd Battery, R.F.A., 
 under Major L. G. F. Gordon, two pompoms, and the 4th Division Mounted 
 
102 
 
 Infantry, under Captain (local Major) H. K. Stewart (Reserve of Officers), 
 were sent forward with directions to cover the front of the advance, and at 
 the same time to throw their left forward across the Belfast-Dalmanutha 
 ridge, and obtain Artillery positions whence they could shell from the north 
 Bergendal and the northern slopes of the ridge, thus attacking in reverse any 
 of the enemy who might attempt to reinforce Bergendal and the ridge behind 
 it from the north while we were attacking it from the south. This duty was 
 remarkably well carried out by General Brocklehurst. Excellent gun 
 positions were selected by Major Burrows. Royal Horse Artillery, and the 
 4th Division Mounted Infantry were extremely well placed, and General 
 Brocklelmrst’s dispositions generally indicted great loss upon the enemy, and 
 contributed considerably to the success of the day’s operations. 
 
 The 7th Brigade, under Colonel (local Major-General) F. W. Kitchener, 
 moved forward along the ridge from Vogelstruispoort towards Bergendal, the 
 1st Battalion Manchester Regiment being detached to the right, were directed 
 to entrench themselves on the eastern crests of the ridge, and under cover of 
 this regiment the following guns were brought into action against Bergendal 
 from right to left :— 
 
 Two 12-prs., No. 10 Mountain Battery ; 
 
 Two 4‘7" guns, No. 6 Coy., Western Division, R.G.A. ; 
 
 Two 5" guns, No. 16 Coy., Southern Division, R.G.A. ; 
 
 Two 12-prs., No. 2 Coy., Western Division, R.G.A. ; 
 
 61st Howitzer Battery ; and 
 
 21st Battery, Royal Field Artillery. 
 
 The 42nd Field Battery were entrenched on the right of the Manchesters, 
 where they were able to command the valley and prevent any movement 
 of the enemy from south to north. 
 
 The other guns at 11 a.m. began to shell Bergendal Farm and the rocky 
 kopje, and for about three hours’ continued their tire. The howitzer fire 
 was particularly effective, especially, as we heard afterwards from prisoners, 
 the combination of a salvo from the howitzers with a salvo of shrapnel from 
 a Field Battery directed on the same target, the latter being fired as the first 
 shell of the howitzers’ salvo exploded on the target. The guns, under a 
 fire throughout of a pompom at short range, a Long Tom and several high 
 velocity guns, made excellent practice, and fortunately suffered no loss. 
 
 The bombardment was much assisted by a 4‘7" gun posted at Belfast, 
 which the Commander-in-Chief, who was watching the operations, at once 
 directed to co-operate with us. 
 
 After three hours’ shelling, as the enemy still clung to the kopje, the 
 Infantry were ordered to assault it. General Kitchener directed Lieut. - 
 Colonel Metcalfe to move the 1st Bn. Rifle Brigade under cover of the ridge 
 from which our guns were firing, and place his battalion across the main 
 east and west ridge on which the kopje of the farm stands, and to assault in 
 front from the west; Lieut.-Colonel Payne to move the Inniskilling Fusiliers 
 down the face of gun ridge and to assault the flank of the position from the 
 south; the 1st Bn. Devon Regiment supporting the left centre, and the 2nd 
 Gordon Highlanders supporting the right attack. At the moment of starting 
 to descend gun ridge, the leading companies of the Inniskilling Fusiliers were 
 met by a very accurate and heavy pompom fire which staggered them for a 
 moment, but the men re-formed themselves and pressed onward with hardly 
 any delay. Both regiments were admirably led by their Commanding Officers. 
 The enemy stood their ground with great gallantry, and only left their positions 
 when the Rifles were among them and the Inniskilling Fusiliers on their flank, 
 between 20 and 30 of them keeping up fire until actually made prisoners. The 
 attack, which, as I have described, was made without the assistance of any 
 cover, was a most gallant one ; the moment the kopje was carried, the Rifle 
 Brigade, although they had lost their Colonel who, to our great regret, was 
 wounded while gallantly leading the advance, at once re-formed and swept on 
 on their own initiative up the plateau carrying all before them, supported by 
 the Devons, who had got up on the left, and the Gordons and Inniskillings 
 who joined in on the right. 
 
 The honours of the assault belong to the Rifle Brigade as they had to 
 at,tack that part of the kopje which had been most protected from our 
 Artillery lire, but all the troops did splendidly, and the carrying of such a 
 
ion 
 
 position held as it was by resolute men, will always remain present to 
 the minds of those who witnessed it as a most gallant feat of arms. 
 
 One very noticeable incident in the attack was the great tactical skill with 
 which the maxims of the Gordons, Inniskillings, Rifle Brigade and Devons were 
 handled by their respective detachments. The fire of these guns contributed 
 materially to the successful result of the assault. General Kitchener especially 
 brings to notice the conduct of No. 2860 Corporal William Macdonald, 
 Gordon Highlanders, and of Lieutenant A. C. Jeffcoat, of the Inniskilling 
 Fusiliers, while in command of gun detachments. 
 
 Lieutenant-General Lyttelton’s dispositions for the day were excellent, 
 and the manner in which his instructions for the assault were carried out by 
 General Kitchener was most praiseworthy. 
 
 The dispositions throughout (he day of Colonel L. W. Parsons, Officer 
 Commanding, Royal Artillery, were excellent. 
 
 Lieutenant-Colonel C. T. E. Metcalfe, Rifle Brigade, Lieutenant-Colonel 
 R. L. Payne, D.S.O., Inniskilling Fusiliers, and Major T. A. H. Davdes, 
 D.S.O., 1st Devon Regiment, showed conspicuous ability, and Major G. Cock- 
 burn, D.S.O., Rifle Brigade, deserves the greatest credit for the manner in 
 which, on Ins Colonel being wounded, he assumed command, and the moment 
 the assault was successful, re-formed his regiment, and pushed on in pursuit. 
 
 The 2nd Cavalry Brigade galloped up immediately the kopje was taken, 
 and with them and the 7th Brigade, the pursuit was carried for over 
 three miles towards Dalmanutha, when it was checked by the rocky nature 
 of the low ground which afforded admirable cover to the retreating parties of 
 the enemy. 
 
 Except one pompom which we captured, the enemy only had long- 
 range guns in action, and these were so scattered and at such distances from 
 the position, that there was no hope of reaching them. General Kitchener, 
 therefore, wisely checked the pursuit and bivouacked just overlooking 
 Dalmanutha Station. 
 
 The enemy left 14 dead and 19 prisoners—8 of whom were wounded— 
 at Bergendal Farm, but the importance of this successful action does not 
 depend upon the enemy’s dead found by us. The loss of the post at 
 Bergendal led to the enemy abandoning in great haste the whole of their 
 immensely strong position about Dalmanutha, and forced them to withdraw 
 in great confusion beyond Machadodorp ; in fact the capture of Bergendal by 
 the Rifle Brigade and the Inniskilling Fusiliers cleared the whole of the high 
 veldt of the enemy. 
 
 Our losses were serious, and amounted to :—Officers : 1 kdled, 7 wounded 
 (of whom 2 since dead), all of the Rifle Brigade. Men : 12 killed, 96 wounded, 
 and 4 missing. 
 
 I much regret the death of Captains Lysley, Steward and Campbell of 
 the Rifle Brigade, each of whom led their Companies most gallantly. 
 
 In addition to those whose names I have incidentally mentioned in this 
 Despatch, the following Officers, non-commissioned officers and men have 
 been brought to my notice by General Lyttelton as specially deserving- 
 consideration :— 
 
 Staff. 
 
 Captain H. d’E. Vallancey, Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, Brigade 
 Major. 
 
 Captain L. H. Spry, 2nd Bn. West Yorks Regiment, Staff Officer. 
 Lieutenant A. W. F. Baird, 2nd Gordon Highlanders, Signalling 
 Officer. 
 
 Rifle Brigade. 
 
 Captain R. B. Stephens. 
 
 Captain and Adjutant J. D. Heriot-Maitland. 
 Lieutenant C. Baker-Carr. 
 
 Lieutenant W. E Davies. 
 
 Colour-Serj eant East wood. 
 
 Colour-Serj eant Archer. 
 
 Serjeant (Acting Colour-Serjeant) Ellis. 
 
104 
 
 Serjeant Dwyer. 
 
 Corporal Macauley. 
 
 Private Preston. 
 
 Private South. 
 
 Private Durrant. 
 
 (Note. —The Officer Commanding’, 2nd Rifle Brigade, from [whom I am 
 separated, has sent in these names without numbers or initials. I 
 will forward them later direct to England.) 
 
 Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers. 
 
 Major C. J. L. Davidson. 
 
 Captain A. St. Q. Ricardo. 
 
 Captain R. W. Johnston. (Reserve of Officers.) 
 Captain and Adjutant W. F. Hessey. 
 Serjeant-Major W. Martin. 
 
 No. 357 Colour-Serjeant A. R. Lee. 
 
 No. 3968 Serjeant W. A. Craig. 
 
 No. 4621 Private Gardiner. 
 
 No. 3960 Private Carroll. 
 
 No. 3092 Private S. McCormick. 
 
 No, 3141 Drummer J. Swann. 
 
 1st Devonshire Regiment. 
 
 Lieutenant N. Z. Emerson. 
 
 Lieutenant Cowie. 
 
 All of these individuall}’ distinguished themselves, but the dash and 
 courage of the whole force is worthy of high praise. 
 
 It may not be here out of place to state that on arriving at Machadodorp 
 we heard on good authority that the enemy estimated their loss in the 
 operations against us from the 22nd to the 27th August at 500 killed and 
 wounded. 
 
 1 should also add that, though not actively engaged on the 27th, the 
 dispositions of Colonel (local Major-General) F. Howard, C.B., C.M.G., A.D.C., 
 Commanding 8th Brigade, and Colonel (local Major-General) Lord Dundonald, 
 C.B., M.V.O., Commanding 3rd Mounted Brigade, contributed materially to 
 our success, while we learnt from Commandant Oosthuizen, whom we took 
 prisoner at Bergendal. that he attributed the loss of his position to the fire of 
 the Manchester Regiment and the 42nd Battery, Royal Field Artillery, 
 which kept back the reinforcements he had depended on to assist him in 
 holding it. 
 
 I have the honour to be, 
 
 Sir, 
 
 Your obedient Servant, 
 
 RED VERS BHLLER, General 
 
105 
 
 No. 12. 
 
 From the Commander-in-Chief to the Forces to the Under Secretary of State . 
 
 War Office, 
 
 Sir, 12th January, 1901. 
 
 I have the honour to submit herewith despatches from General the 
 Right Hon. Sir Redvers Buller, Y.C., &c., dated the 9th November, 1900. 
 
 I have the honour to be, 
 
 Sir, 
 
 Your obedient Servant, 
 
 ROBERTS, Field-Marshal. 
 
 From General Right Hon. Sir Redvers Buller, V.C., G.C.B., K.C.M.G., to Field 
 Marshal Right Hon. Lord Roberts, V.C., c$'c., War Office, London, S.JV. 
 
 ss. “ Dunvegan Castle,” 
 
 Sir, 9th November 1900. 
 
 During the advance of a portion of the Natal Field Force under my 
 immediate command from Zandspruit to Lydenburg, the remainder of that 
 force was employed in safeguarding the Line of Communications from Lady¬ 
 smith to Heidelburg. This line was at the time divided into three sections, 
 which were respectively under the command of Colonel (local Major-General) 
 J. VYolfe Murray, who had the section from Ladysmith to Newcastle; Major- 
 General (local Lieut.-General) H. J. T. Hildyard, C.B., who commanded the 
 section from Newcastle to Platrand; and Major-General (local Lieut.-General) 
 Sir C. F. Clery, K.C.B., who commanded the section from Flatrand to 
 Heidelburg. 
 
 During the months of July, August, September and October, the troops 
 protecting these sections were almost constantly engaged with the enemy, 
 and performed good and valuable work. By the activity of the troops and 
 their leaders, the enemy were successfully prevented from doing any serious 
 damage to the line of railway, or from seriously interfering with the regular 
 running of the trains, but the nature of the operations was such that I have 
 not received any full reports which enable me to forward an accurate 
 description of the work that has been done. 
 
 I can, however, report that the arduous duties entrusted to the troops 
 have been most satisfactorily performed, in many instances with extreme 
 gallantry, and always with great courage and determination. In the various 
 operations, the mounted troops naturally bore the brunt of the work, and I 
 report therefore on them separately, dealing in another despatch with the 
 Officers, non-commissioned officers and men of the other corps concerned. I 
 have the honour to submit their names for your consideration. 
 
 Lieut.-Colonel (local Brigadier-General) J. F. Burn-Murdoch.—Com¬ 
 manded throughout the mounted troops employed in the defence of Newcastle 
 and the surrounding district. His excellent arrangements and rapidity of 
 movement secured the town and district from invasion, though it was, on many 
 occasions, seriously attacked by superior forces, and notably on the 20th, 
 21st, 22nd and 29th August. 
 
 General Burn-Murdoch brings the following Officers and men to notice:— 
 1st Cavalry Brigade Staff. 
 
 Captain A. H. M. Taylor, 13th Hussars, Brigade Major.—A thoroughly 
 good Staff Officer of a Cavalry Brigade in the field. 
 
 Captain R. N. Smyth, 21st Lancers, Intelligence Officer, and Lieutenant 
 Hon. C. H. C. Guest, Royal Dragoons, Assistant Provost Marshal.— Both 
 these Officers have done excellent work. 
 
 (762-2) O 
 
106 
 
 1st (Royal) Dragoons. 
 
 Major Lord Basing (Commanding).—Has done very good work through¬ 
 out, and has, on several occasions, handled the regiment in the field against 
 superior forces with considerable skill. 
 
 Major J. M. Rogers.—Has shown great military ability on all occasions, 
 as has also Captain H. D. McHeile. 
 
 Captain G. F. Steele.—Has been adjutant of the regiment throughout the 
 campaign, and has done good work. 
 
 The following Officers of the regiment are favourably mentioned for good 
 individual work:— 
 
 Lieutenant R. FitzG. Glyn. 
 
 Lieutenant W. D. Grant. 
 
 Lieutenant C. A. Calvert. 
 
 Captain T. M. S. Pitt. 
 
 The latter, as Regimental Transport Officer, has done thoroughly good work. 
 
 Regimental Serjeant-Major C. W. Parsons is also mentioned, as are Ho. 
 3829 Serjeant Linnane, Ho. 4156 Lance-Corporal Lock, and Ho. 3525 Lance- 
 Serjeant Elliott, Ho. 4517 Lance-Corporal Grace, and Ho. 3516 Private Lloyd. 
 
 5th Dragoon Guards. 
 
 Lieutenant-Colonel St. J. C. Gore (Commanding).—Has worked very hard 
 to secure the success of his regiment. 
 
 Captain P. G. Reynolds, 3rd Dragoon Guards (attached to 5th Dragoon 
 Guards).—Has done excellent service throughout, especially on the night of 
 the 15th August, when, with a party of 20 men of the 5th Dragoon Guards, he 
 surprised and routed a commando of 400 men of the enemy. This service has 
 already been specially reported. 
 
 Captain C. H. Stuart and Lieutenant and Adjutant W. Q. Winwood are 
 highly spoken of. 
 
 Ho. 3413 Serjeant W. F. Berry, No. 3352 Serjeant H. Harris, and Ho. 
 4101 Private R. Mills deserve special mention. 
 
 13th Hussars. 
 
 Brevet Colonel H. J. Blagrove.—Has commanded the regiment well 
 throughout. 
 
 Major W. C. Smithson.—Has, on more than one occasion, shown much 
 courage and determination, and Lieutenant F. H. Wise has, on several 
 occasions, shown himself to be an Officer of resource when in command of a 
 squadron. 
 
 Captain and Adjutant J. H. Tremayne, Captain E. A. Wiggin, and 
 Lieutenant E. W. Denny.—Are also deserving of mention, as are Squadron 
 Serjeant-Major Prentice, Ho. 3408 Private J. B. Pritchard, Ho. 3897 
 Private T. Farrance, and Ho. 3931 Private S. Herbert. 
 
 “C” and “D” Sections of Ho. 11 British Field Hospital acted as Field 
 Hospital to the 1st Cavalry Brigade throughout these operations. The 
 arrangements of Captain K. M. Cameron, M.B., Royal Army Medical Corps, 
 gave every satisfaction, and he specially brings to notice the services of 3rd 
 Class Assistant Surgeon, R. H. W. Hart, 1 S.M.D., as an excellent Medical 
 Warrant Officer, well worthy of advancement, and of Ho. 2362 Private A. 
 McKay, 1st Bn. Scottish Rifles, who has acted as nurse in special hospital 
 cases throughout, and done most consistently good work. 
 
 In the area commanded by Lieut.-General Hildyard, the mounted work 
 of guarding the communications was performed by Bethune’s Mounted Infantry 
 and the Composite Regiment of Mounted Infantry. 
 
 Bethune’s Mounted Infantry. 
 
 Lieut.-Colonel E. C. Bethune, 16th Laucers, raised this regiment and 
 commanded it most efficiently throughout the campaign. I strongly recom¬ 
 mend him to your favourable consideration. 
 
107 
 
 The following Officers and non-commissioned officers are brought to 
 notice:— 
 
 Captain C. J. Collopy, 
 
 Captain A. E. Capell, 
 
 Lieutenant H. Norman Packer, and 
 Lieutenant M. Prior, 
 
 all mentioned as having distinguished themselves on more than one occasion. 
 Captain J. M. Ford, 
 
 Captain and Adjutant J. H. A. Annesley (3rd Dragoon Guards), 
 Lieutenant A. A. Slatter, and 
 Lieutenant G. Webster, 
 
 are mentioned as having performed continuous good work throughout, as are — 
 
 Regimental Serjeant-Major G. W. Mortiboy (18th Hussars, 
 attached). 
 
 Squadron Serjeant-Major J. H. Macbeth, 
 
 Squadron Serjeant-Major H. E. Saunders, 
 
 Serjeant A. G. Nichol, 
 
 Serjeant A. H. Ball, 
 
 Serjeant H. H. Shackle, 
 
 No, 104 Serjeant F. Howroyd, 
 
 No. 30 Private A. S. Reeves, 
 
 No. 142 Private A. S. Partridge, 
 
 No. 121 Private P. G Kilcullen. 
 
 Composite Regiment of Mounted Infantry. 
 
 Captain (local Major) H. De la P. Gough, 16th Lancers, has commanded 
 this regiment with most satisfactory results. An excellent Cavalry Officer, he 
 has shown great merits as a leader of Mounted Infantry, and I strongly 
 recommend him for your favourable consideration. 
 
 The following Officers are brought to notice:— 
 
 Captain C. L. E. Eustace, 2nd Bn. King’s Royal Rifle Corps, 
 Lieutenant F. S. Mott, 2nd Bn. King’s Royal Rifle Corps, 
 
 Captain G. N. Cory, 2nd Bn. Royal Dublin Fusiliers, 
 
 Lieutenant A. R. Mildmay, 3rd Bn. King’s Royal Rifle Corps, 
 
 are mentioned as having done excellent work throughout and shown great skill, 
 courage and ability in leading and handling their men. 
 
 The following five subalterns deserve special mention :— 
 
 Lieutenant M. E. Manningham-Buller, 4th Bn. Rifle Brigade. 
 Lieutenant H. A. F. Watson, 1st Bn. Royal Dublin Fusiliers. 
 Lieutenant G. Grice, 2nd Bn. Scottish Rifles. 
 
 Lieutenant L. A. E. Price-Davies, 2nd Bn. King’s Royal Rifle Corps. 
 Lieutenant E. B. Thresher, 1st Bn. Durham Light Infantry. 
 
 In the attack on De Lange’s laager on the 4th of August both Lieutenants 
 Manningham-Buller and Price-Davies specially distinguished themselves. 
 
 The undermentioned non-commissioned officers and men are brought to 
 notice for continuous good service throughout the campaign and merit special 
 mention:— 
 
 No. 4978 
 No. 3813 
 No. 7121 
 No. 8671 
 No. 7738 
 No. 4582 
 No. 8351 
 No. 655 
 
 No. 873 
 No. 850 
 (762-2) 
 
 Serjeant J. Chambers 
 
 Serjeant W. Jones , . 
 Corporal Bailey 
 Lance-Corporal F. Watson 
 Private W. Bonsor .. 
 
 2nd Bn. Scottish Rifles. 
 
 * 
 
 2nd Bn. King’s Royal 
 > Rifle Corps. 
 
 Serjeant S. Pidgeon.. 
 Corporal Slade 
 Lance-Corporal A. McCarthy 
 
 Corporal C. Allen 
 Private H. Jackson .. 
 
 O 2 
 
 3rd Bn. King’s Royal 
 Rifle Corps. 
 
 1st Bn. Rifle Brigade. 
 
108 
 
 JSTo. 4G39 Private Hanrathy 
 No. 4067 Private Gregory 
 
 No. 3423 Serjeant Connor 
 No. 5020 Corporal Smith 
 No. 4490 Private Fitzgerald 
 No. 4701 Private Kelly 
 No. 5433 Private Holmes 
 No. 6056 Private Reid . . 
 
 1st Bn. Royal Irish 
 Fnsiliers. 
 
 1 
 
 I 
 
 '2nd Bn. Royal Dublin 
 Fusiliers. 
 
 i 
 
 J 
 
 
 In the area commanded bv Lieut.-General Sir C. F. Clerv, the mounted 
 work was done by Thorncycroft’s Mounted Infantry, under the command of 
 Major (local Lieut.-Colonel) A. W. Thorneycroft, Royal Scots Fusiliers. This 
 Officer merits the highest commendation I can bestow. His talents, both as 
 an organizer and as a leader of men, are ol' the highest order. 
 
 Thorneycroft’s Mounted Infantry. 
 
 The following Officers are specially brought to notice:— 
 
 Captain (local Major) G. S. St. Aubyn, King’s Royal Rifle Corps (second 
 in command).—A leader of high ability and courage, much above the average 
 of his rank, and has shown great tact in dealing with Colonial troops. 
 
 Captain M. G. Farquhar.—Has performed exceptionally good service 
 throughout. This gentleman only joined for the war, and I recommend him 
 for special consideration. 
 
 Captain E. M. J. Molyneux, 12th Bengal Lancers.—A dashing and 
 capable leader of men. Has distinguished himself on several occasions. 
 
 Captain E. M. Morris, Devonshire Regiment.—Has acted as Adjutant of 
 the regiment throughout the whole 12 months. Has been distinguished for 
 his power of organization, his tact and management of men in camp, and his 
 ability and courage in the field. 
 
 Captain A. D. Green, Worcestershire Regiment.—An excellent Officer, 
 who has shown great ability as a scout, and has dash, pluck, and good 
 judgment. 
 
 Captain C. F. Minchin, 1st Punjaub Cavalry.—An Officer of many 
 acquirements. Has done specially good service throughout the campaign. 
 
 Lieutenant Reginald Villiers.—Joined the regiment as a private, having 
 been in the Ceylon Mounted Infantry. Has done specially good work 
 throughout the campaign. 
 
 Major W. E. Peyton, D.S.O., 15th Hussars.—Succeeded Captain (local 
 Major) G. S. St. Aubyn as second in command on the 23rd July, when that 
 Officer was invalided. With a quick grasp of the situation, he is a leader of 
 high ability, and is also a valuable Officer in matters of interior economy. 
 
 No. 6203 Private A. Neilson and No. 4557 Private AV. Strong, Thorney¬ 
 croft’s Mounted Infantry, are brought specially to notice for gallant conduct. 
 
 In bringing the foregoing names to your notice, I specially mention the 
 mounted corps separately from the other regiments, because in the protection 
 of a line of railway the duties which fall to them are so much more onerous 
 and dangerous than those which fall to the members of other corps, that I 
 thought it but fair to mark, by reporting upon them separately, my sense of 
 the really excellent work that has been done by the regiments above mentioned. 
 Work so good and so constant is, though very difficult, less likely to be 
 appreciated at its full merits than work done on one hard fought day which 
 culminates in a general engagement. 
 
 The Officers, non-commissioned officers and men of the other regiments 
 concerned I deal with in a general despatch. 
 
 [ &C« 
 
 REDVERS BULLER, General. 
 
From General Right Hon. Sir Redvers Bailer, V.C., G.C.B., K.C.M.G., to Field- 
 Marshal Right Hon. Lord Roberts, V.C., &c., War Office, Tmndon, S. W. 
 
 ss. “ Dunvegan Castle/’ 
 
 Sir. 9ih November 1900. 
 
 After the relief of Ladysmith, I addressed to you on the 30th March 
 (No. Military Secretary 457) a despatch, in which 1 brought to notice the 
 services of the Officers and men who had served under my command up to that 
 date. About the same period, General Sir George White also addressed to 
 you a despatch, bringing to notice the services of the Officers and men under 
 his command who had taken part in the defence of Ladysmith. I considered 
 it at that time possible that the Natal Field Force would have been broken up. 
 
 Such was not, however, the case. That force, with the addition of the 
 troops who had been defending Ladysmith, but with the loss of the 10th 
 Division and 14th Hussars, was retained as a unit until the 10th of October, 
 and, on that date, I had the honour of seeing you in Pretoria, and received 
 your directions to write a final despatch, bringing to notice the names of the 
 Officers, non-commissioned officers and men whom L considered worthy of 
 special mention. 
 
 In now carrying out your wishes, I have the honour to request that this 
 despatch may be read as part of my despatch of the 30th March. In some 
 cases, I may have had to repeat the names mentioned in the former letter, but 
 I wish that my recommendations should be considered as a whole, although they 
 reach you in the form of two letters dated at a considerable interval. 
 
 In my despatch of the 30th March, I placed first in order the services of 
 the Officers who had served on the Lines of Communication. I again pursue 
 the same course, not only because I feel the debt owed by the Natal Field 
 Force to those Officers to be a very heavy one, but because, as in the interest 
 of that force, I have kept them doing the onerous and somewhat uncongenial 
 work of the Lines of Communication, and have not allowed them to come to 
 the front, it is due to them to show that I adopted this course, not from any 
 lack of confidence in them, but because I attached so much importance to the 
 organization of our Lines of Communication, that I conceived it my duty to 
 employ on it, continuously, some of the best and most experienced Officers. 
 Throughout the campaign, Colonel (local Major-General) J. Wolfe Murray has 
 commanded the Lines of Communication in Natal. Ilis services have been 
 invaluable. He has maintained, throughout, a perfect military organization, 
 and the best possible relations with the civil authorities. He is an Officer of 
 great military value, and I know of no position he could be allotted in which T 
 should not feel with perfect confidence, that he would distinguish himself. I 
 most earnestly recommend him for your favourable consideration. 
 
 Head-Quarter Staff, Lines of Communication. 
 
 Major (local Lieut.-Colonel) H. N. C. Heath, Yorkshire Light 
 Infantry, Assistant Adjutant-General. —Has been Chief Staff Officer to General 
 Wolfe Murray, throughout. Possessed of great power of work, thorough 
 knowledge of his duties, and shrewd common sense, be has contributed much 
 to the efficiency of the services be had charge of. I recommend him strongly 
 for advancement. 
 
 Lieut.-Colonel T. J. O’Dell, Army Service Corps, A.A.G. (B).—Has been 
 of the greatest possible assistance. He has a thorough knowledge of all the 
 duties pertaining to his branch ot the staff, and especially those relating to the 
 transport of troops by sea and their movement by land. I cannot speak too 
 highly of his work. 
 
 Captain T. H. Shoubridge, D.S.O., Northumberland Fusiliers, Staff 
 Captain.—Has worked most creditably. He is well deserving of notice, 
 and of promotion. 
 
no 
 
 Captain C. E. Southey, Royal Irish Fusiliers, Aide-de-Camp to General 
 Wolfe Murray.—He has taken his share of the work. He is a smart, promising 
 Officer, with an acute knowledge of military detail. 
 
 Staff Serjeant-Major C. F. Williams, Staff Clerk Section, Army Service 
 Corps.— Has been Chief Clerk throughout. A capable worker, he thoroughly 
 understands the management of an office, and has done most excellent work. 
 I regret to say that when I left Hatal I thought him suffering from overwork. 
 
 Durban. 
 
 Colonel A. W. Morris succeeded Captain Percy Scott, C. B., R.N., as 
 Commandant at Durban. He has had a difficult and onerous position to fill, 
 and has shown great tact and ability in dealing with the numerous and delicate 
 questions that have presented themselves in connection w ith the administration 
 of Martial Law at this most important seaport. The best testimony I can bear 
 to his work is that when I was leaving Durban I was asked by the Mayor not 
 to relieve the town from Martial Law', as it was, he said, working admirably 
 under Colonel Morris. 
 
 Major Bousfield, Hatal Volunteers.—Has devoted his local knowledge, his 
 professional skill, and his singular personal influence to making the administra¬ 
 tion of Martial Law easy. 1 owe him a deep debt of gratitude. 
 
 Captain C. Toogood, Manchester Regiment.—Has acted as Military 
 Landing Officer throughout. Practically the whole of the military embarka¬ 
 tion and disembarkation work at Durban has devolved upon this Officer. 
 He was very junior for so important a position, which was one of great 
 responsibility, and proved himself fully equal to the occasion. I strongly 
 recommend him for advancement. 
 
 Pietermaritzburg. 
 
 Brevet Colonel R. H. Martin, C.B., Commandant of Pietermaritzburg.— 
 Has worked steadily and well in a position which was not, I think, at all in 
 accordance with his tastes, but he accommodated himself to his duties, and has 
 carried them out to my entire satisfaction. 
 
 Major E. S. C. Kennedy, West India Regiment, Station Staff Officer, 
 Pietermaritzburg.—Has proved himself a hard-working, painstaking and reliable 
 Officer. I can confidently recommend him to notice. 
 
 Captain H. A. Coddington, Royal Irish Fusiliers, Baggage Master, Pieter¬ 
 maritzburg.—Has had a very difficult task to carry out. He has shown great 
 energy and considerable power of organization. I trust his labours may be 
 rewarded. 
 
 Army Schoolmaster A. B. Arthur.—Has done excellent work while 
 employed as a Clerk in the Pietermaritzburg office. 
 
 Depots. 
 
 Major (local Lieut.-Colonel) R. L. Sandwith, Leicestershire Regiment.— 
 Has commanded the General Depot almost throughout the campaign. With 
 no permanent staff, and at one time 3,000 men in the depot, the duty has been 
 a difficult one, and has been discharged in a manner that t can commend. 
 
 Lieut.-Colonel B. C. Quill.—Organized and has commanded the Con¬ 
 valescent Depot formed after the relief of Ladysmith with great success, He 
 is an energetic Officer, who takes much interest in the welfare of the men 
 under him. 
 
 Major T. G. P. Glynn, Liverpool Regiment.— Has done excellent work as 
 Adjutant and Quarter-Master of the Convalescent Depot. Lieut.-Colonel Quill 
 speaks most highly of the work and capacity of this Officer, and I agree that 
 much of the success which has attended this depot must be attributed to 
 Major Glynn, whose work I commend to notice. 
 
Ill 
 
 Corporal S. V. Mackenzie, 5th Dragoon Guards.—Has done very good 
 work as Orderly Room Clerk of the Convalescent Depdt. 
 
 Station Staffs. 
 
 The following Officers have also done very useful service at various 
 stations on the Lines of Communication :— 
 
 Lieut.-Colonel G. A. Mills, 1st Bn. Royal Dublin Fusiliers, as Commandant 
 at Estcourt. 
 
 Brevet Lieut.-Colonel J. R. M. Dalrymple-Hay, West India Regiment, as 
 Commandant at Railhead and Yolksrust. 
 
 Lieut.-Colonel T. McGubbin, Durban Light Infantry, as Commandant at 
 Mooi River, Estcourt, and Dundee. 
 
 Major (local Lieut.-Colonel) M. C. Curry, Devonshire Regiment, as 
 Commandant at Ladysmith. 
 
 Major C. N. Watts, Derbyshire Regiment, as Station Staff Officer, Mooi 
 River and Yolksrust, and latterly as Commandant, Yolksrust. 
 
 Royal Engineers. 
 
 Lieut.-Colonel H. E. Rawson, Commanding Royal Engineer.—Has had 
 charge of the whole of the Engineer works on the Lines of Communication. 
 He has been indefatigable. His technical knowledge, his vigour of mind and 
 body, and his tact have overcome every difficulty. I can confidently recom¬ 
 mend him for your most favourable consideration. 
 
 Major J. H. Cowan, Staff Officer, Royal Engineers. Has done much good 
 work. A good Engineer, with a cool head, and full of resource. I trust hi# 
 good work and abilities will not be lost sight of. 
 
 Colonel Rawson mentions, as specially deserving of consideration, Quarter- 
 Master-Serjeant E. Plowright, R.E. ; Serjeant-Major Foreman of Works 
 A. Carmichael, R.E. (since deceased); Quarter-Master-Serjeant Y. Knowles, 
 R.E.; and Staff Serjeant R. Chiicott, R.E.; all of whom have done excellent 
 work, and, in the absence of superior Officers, work of higher quality than 
 would, under ordinary circumstances, have been expected from them. 
 
 Censors’ Department. 
 
 The following Officers and gentlemen employed in the Censors’ Depart¬ 
 ment deserve special mention and thanks. Their work, which is, at any time, 
 unpleasant and difficult, has been carried out efficiently, and with, I think, the 
 least possible friction : — 
 
 Major W. D. Jones, Wiltshire Regiment, Principal Press Censor. 
 
 Major H. A. Vowel 1, West Yorkshire Regiment. 
 
 Major S. G. Bird, Royal Dublin Fusiliers. 
 
 Major W. F. Walter, Lancashire Fusiliers. 
 
 C. R. Glyn, Esq. (late 32nd Foot). 
 
 T. O. Fraser, Esq. 
 
 Of these, Major Jones, Mr. Glyn and Mr. Fraser have been employed 
 throughout the campaign, and I specially recommend them for favourable 
 consideration. 
 
 Supply. 
 
 Major (local Lieut.-Colonel) H. G. Morgan, D.S.O., Army Service 
 Corps.—Has been throughout in charge of the Supply of the Natal Field 
 Force. In addition to undertaking the extremely onerous duties of supply, he 
 also charged himself with the supervision of the “Natal Field Force Canteen,” 
 an institution which proved the greatest possible boon to all Officers and men. 
 
! 
 
 112 
 
 and which, under his able direction, supplied the best possible goods at the 
 lowest possible rates. Colonel Morgan’s arrangements for it were admirable, 
 and will, I hope, be made a model for use on any future campaign. The 
 advantage to the soldier of being able to spend his money regularly on 
 luxuries which afford him a change from his daily ration, however good that 
 ration may be, are indescribable. Colonel Morgan has shown himself to be 
 possessed of great talent for administration and power of work, and of that 
 appreciation of responsibility which enabled him not only to accept but to 
 discharge in the most responsible way every difficulty with which he was faced. 
 No work has been too severe for him, and in my judgment no reward would be 
 too good for him. 
 
 Lieut.-Colonel F. A. le P. Trench, Army Service Corps, Assistant 
 Director of Supplies.—He is accurate, painstaking, of good judgment and 
 great business capacity. I recommend him very favourably to notice. 
 
 Major G. M. V. Hunt, Army Service Corps.—Has rendered good service 
 throughout the campaign. He works hard, and gets good work out of his 
 subordinates. He is a valuable Staff Officer. 
 
 Major N. A. D. Barton, Connaught Bangers, attached to Army Service 
 Corps.—Has been in charge of the Supply Duties at Durban, a post of 
 great responsibility. With no previous experience of such duties, he has 
 fulfilled them with remarkable success, and developed business aptitude of a 
 very high character. I recommend him strongly as a most deserving Officer. 
 
 The work of the Army Service Corps employed on the Lines of 
 Communication has been of a most arduous nature. The following Warrant and 
 non-commissioned Officers and men have been brought to my notice as having 
 performed especially good work, but the whole Corps merits the highest 
 commendation :— 
 
 T 
 
 T 
 
 T 
 
 S 
 
 s 
 
 s 
 
 s 
 
 T 
 
 T 
 
 S 
 
 S 
 
 S 
 
 s 
 
 s 
 
 s 
 
 s 
 
 s 
 
 1st Class Staff Serjeant-Major J. Fisher. 
 
 1st Class Staff Serjeant-Major F. Walsh. 
 
 1st Class Staff Serjeant-Major W. Bateson. 
 
 Staff'Serjeant-Major E. G. Singleton. 
 
 4994 Staff Serjeant-Major J. Sinister. 
 
 5119 Staff Serjeant-Major Hinton. 
 
 6763 Staff Serjeant-Major Reed. 
 
 8704 Staff Serjeant-Major W. J. Harris. 
 
 8320 Staff Quarter-Master-Serjeant H. Harris. 
 
 15487 Staff Quartcr-Master-Serjeant S. J. Lea. 
 
 5890 Staff Quarter-Master-Serjeant Ashle}*. 
 
 5349 Farrier Quarter-Master-Serjeant Shaw. 
 
 6838 Company Quarter-Master-Serjeant F. W. Stanton. 
 10676 Staff-Serjeant H. G. Sharpe. 
 
 10817 Staff-Serjeant J. Connor. 
 
 7565 Serjeant H. J. Allen. 
 
 6977 Corporal T. Hamer. 
 
 13110 Corporal F. G. Siddle. 
 
 12952 Corporal If. H. Mills. 
 
 13659 Private Harris. 
 
 8720 Private Fish. 
 
 Indian Commissariat Department. 
 Sub-Conductor P. Lowry. 
 
 Quarter-Master and Hon. Lieutenant T. Doherty and Quarter-Master and 
 Hon. Lieutenant H. G. Beaumont, Army Service Corps, have performed 
 excellent work in connection with Supply and Reserve Depots, and arc 
 deserving of recognition. 
 
 Transport. 
 
 Lieut.-Colonel G. Stanley, Army Service Corps, has been Director of 
 Transport throughout. He has been conspicuously successful in meeting all 
 requirements, and his resource and forethought are only equalled by his 
 
113 
 
 unfailing cheerfulness. In ray opinion. Colonel Stanley's services have been 
 of immense value, and no reward which can he given to him would be too 
 great. 
 
 Captain G. Conway-Gordon, Army Service Corps, Assistant Director of 
 Transport, has filled a responsible position most successfully. Of varied 
 attainments and good ability, he has done first-rate ivork. 
 
 The following Officers are brought to notice by Colonel Stanley :— 
 
 Major G. E. Hamnett, Army Service Corps, on whom the work of prepara¬ 
 tion of the transport has chiefly fallen. 
 
 Captain C. S. Dodgson, Army Service Corps, has commanded the 
 Transport Remount Company throughout. His work has been very heavy. 
 
 Captain H. G. Burrard, Army Service Corps, and Captain J. P. C. 
 Hennessy, T.S.C., have done excellent work. 
 
 The following Officers have been attached to the Army Service Corps, and 
 have all done excellent work : — 
 
 Captain Cecil Yonge, Natal Volunteers. 
 
 Captain E. Vaughan, 1st Bn. Manchester Regiment. 
 
 Lieutenant J. N. F. Livingstone, 3rd Bn. Argyll and Sutherland 
 Highlanders. 
 
 Lieutenant I. G. Sewell, Royal Fusiliers. 
 
 Riding-Master .and Hon. Lieutenant T. J. Kearns and Quarter-Master and 
 Hon. Lieutenant C. W. Bamford, Army Service Corps, have done good service 
 and deserve recognition. 
 
 S [ 5494 Staff Serjeant-Major F. Derbyshire, Army Service Corps, has 
 performed the duties of chief clerk most efficiently, and is deserving of 
 promotion. 
 
 S j 8671 Staff Serjeant-Major F. J. Kennedy, Army Service Corps, is a 
 capable and energetic Warrant Officer, and S | 12862 Serjeant J. Buckley, 
 Army Service Corps, has worked exceptionally well. 
 
 Conductor M. Maher, Indian Staff Corps, has done good work in connec¬ 
 tion with the Indian Pack Mule Train. 
 
 Remounts. 
 
 Colonel R. Stevenson, Inspector of Remounts, discharged his duties most 
 satisfactorily. Of unbounded energy, he exercised great foresight in providing 
 for possible requirements. I trust his exertions will be recognized. 
 
 Captain R. Sparrow, 7th Dragoon Guards.—Has acted as Deputy-Assistant 
 Adjutant-General, Remounts, throughout. A steady, conscientious hard¬ 
 working Officer, he has done right well. 
 
 Quarter-Master and Hon. Lieutenant R. Pillinger, Remount Establish¬ 
 ment,—Has performed arduous duties with the utmost zeal. 
 
 Farrier-Major Stroud, 1st (King’s) Dragoon Guards. — Has worked 
 throughout with great energy and success, and has performed his duties in an 
 admirable manner. 
 
 Medical Department. 
 
 Colonel T. J. Gallwey, M.D., C.B. — Has been Principal Medical Officer 
 of the Natal Field Force throughout. I believe that he has succeeded in 
 maintaining on the Lines of Communication, and at the front, a higher 
 standard of comfort in General, Stationary, and Field Hospitals, and a better 
 service in bearer companies than has ever before been attained with a force- 
 in the field. His unbounded energy and his unrivalled powers of organization 
 have aided him in this work, but beyond this he has shown a devotion to his 
 work, a grasp of the situation, and a capacity of forethought that justifies me 
 in saying that I consider his services eminently deserving of the highest con¬ 
 sideration that can be given to them. 
 
 (762-2) 
 
 P 
 
1L4 
 
 Colonel J. A. Clery, M.B., Principal Medical Officer of the Lines of 
 Communication.—Is an Officer of sound judgment, common sense and high 
 administrative power. In his hands the hospital at Mooi river became remark¬ 
 able as a model of what a hospital should be, and since that he has done most 
 valuable service in supervising the hospitals and medical work along the Lines 
 of Communication in Natal. I trust his services may be rewarded. 
 
 Lieut.-Colonel P. H. Johnston, M.D.—Did admirable work at a time of 
 great pressure at the commencement of the campaign, showing much foresight 
 and good powers of organization. 
 
 The following Medical Officers deserve mention for the excellent duties 
 they performed in connection with general and. stationary hospitals :— 
 
 Lieut.-Colonel J. G. MacNeece, No. 7 General Hospital. 
 
 Lieut.-Colonel H. Martin, M.B., No. 14 General Hospital. 
 
 Major T. R. Lucas, M.B., Secretary and Registrar, No. 4 General 
 Hospital. 
 
 Major F. A. B. Daly, M.B., No. 1 Stationary Hospital. 
 
 Major H. H. Johnston, M.D., Mooi River General Hospital. 
 
 Major G. W. Brazier-Creagh, excellent service with ambulance train. 
 
 Major S. Westcott. 
 
 Major R. J. McCormack, M.D., Base Depot, Medical Stores. 
 
 Lieutenant and Quarter-Master G. H. Painton, No. 4 General 
 Hospital. 
 
 Lieutenant and Quarter-Master F. W. Hall, Howick General Hospital. 
 
 With the Lines of Communication such a great length, the number of 
 warrant and non-commissioned Officers of the Royal Army Medical Corps who 
 have, in different places, performed work that was locally considered worthy of 
 special mention, is naturally very large, and the same remark applies to the 
 Militia and Volunteer Medical Staff Corps and St. John’s Ambulance Brigade, 
 to the Army nursing sisters, to the personnel of the Indian Medical Service 
 (who were attached), to the men of the Imperial Irregular Corps and the Natal 
 Volunteers, to the large numbers of civil surgeons engaged in England and 
 locally, and to the Colonial nurses engaged locally, and from colonies over sea. 
 I am quite unable to make a selection of the names that have been forwarded 
 to me, and have forwarded the list to the Director-General, Army Medical 
 Service, begging him to obtain, later, your permission to publish such names as 
 he may think desirable, but I wish to record here my thanks to all the members 
 of those organizations. 
 
 In dealing with the Medical Service of the Lines of Communication, I 
 should fail in my duty if I did not express the gratitude of the whole Force to 
 the following:— 
 
 H.R.H. Princess Christian of Schleswig-Holstein for the gift of a hospital 
 train, which has been the greatest blessing to our sick and wounded ; 
 
 The Red Cross Society, under Sir .1. Furley; 
 
 The Durban Women’s Patriotic League ; 
 
 The Army Hospital Aid, Pietermaritzburg ; 
 
 Mr. A. Mosely for his munificent donation of the Princess Christian 
 Hospital, Pinetown ; 
 
 Mr. F. Stevens, who gave the use of his house and grounds for the 
 Princess Christian Hospital; 
 
 Mr. Coope, who gave his yacht " Sunrise ” for the use of sick and 
 wounded Officers; 
 
 Sir Samuel Scott, who similarly took sick and wounded Officers on board 
 the “ Golden Eagle.” 
 
 These cases stand out, but there were many other instances too numerous 
 to mention in which private individuals generously contributed to alleviate the 
 sufferings of the sick and wounded, and in the name of the Natal Field Force 
 I express our most grateful thanks to all of them, 
 
itfl 
 
 Ordnance. 
 
 Lieut.-Colonel (local Colonel) E. B. Appelbe, Chief Ordnance Officer, 
 deserves the highest praise. Hard-working., resourceful, with a thorough 
 knowledge of his subject, he has worked at very high pressure throughout. He 
 has made no difficulties, foreseen every want, and kept the Field Force 
 thoroughly well supplied. I strongly recommend him for reward. 
 
 The Ordnance Department has, I think, been short-handed throughout, 
 and consequently an unusual amount of work has fallen upon individuals, who 
 have had to make up deficiency of numbers by undertaking extra work and 
 extra responsibility. In these circumstances, I find a good many names 
 deserving of mention, and I submit the following as specially deserving :— 
 
 Captain G. H. Stoyle. 
 
 Captain A. V. Barton. 
 
 Major AY. C. Savile. 
 
 Sub-Conductor AY. Dickson. 
 
 Sub-Conductor G. E. Longstaffe. 
 
 No. 1919 Staff Quarter-Master-Serjeant E. Sydney. 
 
 No. 3601 Private J. Armstrong. 
 
 No. 3451 Private E. H. Stupple. 
 
 No. 3290 Corporal AY. H. Bunt. 
 
 No. 3030 Corporal A. Passaway. 
 
 No. 358,2 Private J. H. Wallace. 
 
 No. 672 First Class Armourer-Serjeant G. AYoodhall. 
 
 No. 145 First Class Armourer-Serjeant J. Hepburn. 
 
 Note. —The names of the above-mentioned Officers, Warrant and non¬ 
 commissioned officers, and men arc enumerated in order of merit. 
 
 Army Pay Department. 
 
 Colonel AY. H. Mortimer, Chief Paymaster, has rendered most valuable 
 assistance. Of great experience and sound judgment, his advice has been 
 most valuable, while his energy and knowledge have, I hope, been proved by 
 the regularity with which he has rendered his accounts. I recommend his 
 good work for favourable consideration. 
 
 Lieut.-Colonel R. Ireland.— Has been Senior Field Paymaster through 
 the whole Campaign, and has rendered good and valuable service. 
 
 Major F. G. Hamley.—Has done excellent work as Colonel Mortimer's 
 Senior Assistant. 
 
 Captain J. O’Hara.—Has been Chief Cash Officer throughout, and has 
 discharged his duty in a throughly good and business-like manner. 
 
 1st Class Staff-Serjeant-Major H. A. Yates and Staff-Serjeant-Major 
 H. S. George deserve consideration. 
 
 Yeterinary I )epartment. 
 
 Veterinary-Major (local Lieut.-Colonel) C. Rutherford was, for a time, 
 Senior Veterinary Officer on the Lines of Communication. Of high 
 professional attainments and good business capacity, he is deserving of 
 promotion. 
 
 Veterinary-Captain R. AY. Raymond, Senior Veterinary Officer Lines of 
 Communication.—Has held a position of considerable responsibility, and has 
 proved himself equal to the occasion. I believe him to be above the average, 
 professionally, and recommend him for promotion. 
 
 Veterinary-Lieutenant G. M. Williams, 
 
 Veterinary-Lieutenant F. W. Wilson, 
 
 Veterinary-Lieutenant R. C. Cochrane 
 
 Have done good work, as have— 
 
 (762-2) P 2 
 
116 
 
 No 3614 Farrier Quarter-Master-Serjeant Padfield. 18th Hussars, 
 
 Staff Corporal-Farrier Hives, Royal Horse Guards, 
 
 Farrier Quarter-Master-Corporal R. Peacock, 2nd Life Guards, 
 Staff Corporal-Farrier 1). McKenzie, 2nd Life Guards. 
 
 Civil Veterinary Surgeon D. J. Quinlan, attached to Army Veterinary 
 Department.—Has been in charge of the Veterinary Hospital, Remount 
 Depot, Mooi River, and given every satisfaction and done much good work. 
 
 I cannot close this mention of Officers who have been employed on the 
 Lines of Communication, without alluding to the great assistance that has 
 been rendered to them, to myself, and to the Natal Field Force, by His 
 Excellency, the Honourable Sir VC. F. Hely-Hutchinson, G.C.M.G., Governor 
 of Natal, and by Colonel Hon. Sir A. Hime, K.C.M.G., Prime Minister of 
 Natal, both of whom have spared no time, labour or forethought to help us. 
 To them, the Natal Field Force owes a deep debt of gratitude, and it is due, 
 possibly, to their efforts that all the Officials of the Natal Government have 
 assisted us in the most noble manner. Among these officials I must 
 mention :— 
 
 Colonel (local Brigadier-General) J. G. Dartnell, C.M.G. who has com¬ 
 manded the Natal Police and the Natal Volunteers, and been unwearying in 
 his efforts. 
 
 Mr. David Hunter, C.M.G., General Manager of the Natal Government 
 Railways. 
 
 Mr. Shaws, Chief Engineer, and the Engineer Staff of that railway. 
 
 Mr. Barnes, Chief Engineer, and Mr. P. Harrison, District Engineer of 
 the Public Works Department. 
 
 All these officials have always ungrudingly, promptly and willingly, given 
 us every assistance in their power, I fear often at some inconvenience and loss 
 to their own departments. Mr. Hunter, besides meeting all our demands for 
 railway transport in the most prompt manner, has also placed the workshops at 
 our disposal, and in those workshops most of our heavy gun mountings and 
 fittings for hospital trains and hospital ships have been constructed. 
 
 The military part of the railway administration has been under the 
 direction of Major G. S. McD. Elliot, R.E., Assistant Director of Railways. 
 He is an Officer of unbounded energy and thorough knowledge of construction. 
 His services have throughout been important. 
 
 Captain H. A. A. Livingstone, R.E., Deputy-Assistant Director of 
 Railways, has shown good sense and tact, and done good work as our military 
 representative with the Natal Government Railways. 
 
 Lieutenant C. G. Fuller, R.E., has proved himself a capable and promising 
 young Officer in a responsible position. 
 
 Captain C. H. Harington, Liverpool Regiment, has acted as Railway 
 Staff Officer at various stations with conspicuous success. He is an Officer 
 of first-rate ability, business capacity and tact. I strongly recommend him 
 for promotion. 
 
 The following Officers have done good service as Railway Staff Officers:— 
 
 Captain S. F. Reeves, East Kent Regiment. 
 
 Lieutenant Sir W. Dick-Cunyngham, Bart., Royal Highlanders. 
 
 2nd Lieutenant T. P. Wingate, King’s Own Scottish Borderers. 
 
 The naval transport work at Durban has been throughout under the 
 charge of Captain Van Koughnet, R.N. I desire to take this opportunity of 
 bringing to notice the excellent service which he has rendered. Owing to his 
 tact and ability, the difficult and oft-times very heavy work of embarkations 
 and disembarkations has passed smoothly and well. 
 
 Commander G. E. Holland, D.S.O., Indian Marine, has also been 
 employed at Durban throughout. His genius for organization, and his 
 knowledge of transport requirements is, I should say, unrivalled. He under¬ 
 took the alteration of the transports which were fitted at Durban as hospital 
 
117 
 
 ships, and the result of his work has been universally admitted to have been 
 a conspicuous success. I strongly recommend him to your consideration. 
 
 Warrant Officer Carpenter S. J. Lacey, R.N., has rendered valuable 
 service in supervising the fitting of hospital ships and in transport work 
 generally. I recommend him to your favourable notice. 
 
 Head-Quarter Staff. 
 
 Personal Staff. 
 
 Colonel the Hon. F. W. Stopford, C.B., has acted as my Military 
 Secretary throughout. His services have been invaluable to me. Early in 
 the year he was offered the command of a brigade, the duties of which he 
 would, 1 am certain, have discharged with distinction. He refused, thinking 
 that at the moment it would be difficult for me to replace him. I trust that 
 his loyalty to myself may not act to his loss, and I confidently recommend him 
 to your consideration. 
 
 The following Officers acted as my Aides-de-Camp, and I submit their 
 names for your favourable consideration. Each and all of them are thoroughly 
 capable and deserving Officers, and rendered me great assistance:— 
 
 Colonel Lord Gerard, Lancashire Hussars. 
 
 Commander Edgar Lees, Royal Navy. 
 
 Major H. N. Schofield, Royal Artillery. 
 
 Captain C. J. Sackville-West, Kings’ Royal Rifle Corps. 
 
 Captain A. R. Trotter, 2nd Life Guards. 
 
 Colonel H. S. G. Miles, M.Y.O.—Acted as my Chief of the Staff. A 
 thorough technical knowledge of all military matters, supported by a sound 
 constitution, great energy and singular tact, combine to render him a most 
 valuable Staff Officer, and his services were of great value. 
 
 Brevet Lieut.-Colonel H. M. Lawson, R.E.—Is a thoroughly trained, 
 accurate and most efficient Staff Officer. 
 
 Lieut.-Colonel P. J. T. Lewis, Army Service Corps, acted as D.A.A.G. (B). 
 —He had sole charge of all executive supply and transport arrangements, and 
 usually commanded the Baggage Column on the line of march. Both on the 
 staff and in the field he was admirable, and I strongly recommend him for 
 promotion as an Officer of great promise. 
 
 Major L. E. Kiggell, Royal Warwickshire Regiment, and Major Hon. 
 F. Gordon, Gordon Highlanders, worked well and wisely throughout, and arc 
 deserving of advancement. 
 
 Lieut.-Colonel C. aCourt was, until invalided, Commandant of Head¬ 
 quarters, and did thoroughly good service. He was succeeded by Captain the 
 Hon. E. S. St. Aubyn, Reserve of Officers, whose services also deserve special 
 mention. 
 
 Major A. G. Chichester, (18th) Royal Irish Regiment, acted as Provost- 
 Marshal.—I have, in another report, specially brought his services to the 
 notice of the Secretary of State for War. T recommend him for advancement. 
 
 Colonel L. W. Parsons, R.A.— Has, throughout the campaign, discharged 
 the active duties of Officer Commanding the Royal Artillery on the Head¬ 
 quarter Staff. A true Artilleryman, with a great knowledge of Artillery drill, 
 he has the power of applying that drill to circumstances not described in the 
 drill book. Ilis services have been of the greatest possible value, and I highly 
 commend them for consideration. 
 
 Captain R. AY. Boger, R.A. — Has acted throughout as Staff Officer to 
 Colonel Parsons and done excellent work. 
 
 Lieut.-Colonel (local Colonel) C. K. Wood, R.E., Chief Engineer. — Has 
 done thoroughly well and been of great assistance to me. He lias initiated 
 and formed companies of Mounted Engineers and companies of natives to 
 assist Engineers, and succeeded in employing the small number of trained 
 
engineers available to the greatest possible advantage. His services well 
 deserve commendation. 
 
 Captain G. M. Hutton. R.E.—Has acted as Staff Officer to the Officer 
 Commanding Roval Engineers, and deserves high commendation. 
 
 Major W. F. Hawkins, R.E.—As Director of Army Telegraphs with the 
 Force, he has given the greatest satisfaction. With a thorough knowledge of 
 technique and unwearying perseverance, the Telegraph service has been main¬ 
 tained in the highest state of efficiency. 
 
 Captain R. H. H. Boys, R.E.—Has ably assisted Major Hawkins. 
 
 There may be others whom I should mention, as Major Hawkins has been 
 too fully employed to render me a report; but I cannot omit a reference to 
 the late Lieutenant R. J. Jelf, R.E. A young Officer of singular talent 
 and promise, he lost his life from devotion to his duties. All Officers, 
 non-commissioned officers and men of the Telegraph Department have done 
 exceptionally well. The only fault I have had to find with them has been that 
 they have been sometimes too anxious to keep their line up, and have incurred 
 undue risk. 
 
 Lieut.-Colonel W. B. Allin, M.B., Royal Army Medical Corps.—Acted as 
 Principal Medical Officer of the Field Army, and superintended, with unusual 
 ability and energy, the removal of the wounded from the field and the evacua¬ 
 tion of field hospitals. 
 
 Captain J. S. Cayzer, 7th Dragoon Guards, Director of Signalling.—Has 
 spared nothing to make his service efficient. He has been of great assistance 
 and done excellent work. 
 
 The Intelligence Department has been under the charge of Brevet Lieut.- 
 Colonel A. E. Sandbach, R.E. This Officer possesses energy, enterprise, 
 and system, and has devoted himself to his work. 
 
 Brevet Lieut.-Colonel S. C. H. Monro, Seaforth Highlanders, Brevet Major 
 D. Henderson, Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, and Captain S. H. Pollen, 
 Wiltshire Regiment, have most ably assisted in the Intelligence work, as has 
 Lieutenant N. St. C. Campbell, Royal Artillery, a young Officer of great 
 intelligence and energy. I commend both these Officers to your consideration. 
 The department has been highly successful; and in connection with it I would 
 specially allude to the work done by the men of the Corps of Guides, whose 
 services were secured to the Force by the Intelligence Department. 
 
 Early in the war a Corps of Guides was formed in Natal from colonists 
 with local knowledge of the districts in which our forces were operating. These 
 gentlemen rendered the greatest possible assistance. Foremost in every fight, 
 always ready to undertake difficult or dangerous duties, they helped me equally 
 in field operations, with Supply, with Transport, and in dealing with the Dutch 
 inhabitants. 
 
 To the Hon. T. K. Murray, C.M.G., at first, and latterly to Mr. F. Struben, 
 who were in charge, my principal thanks are due; but I am equally indebted 
 to many others, among whom I must mention Mr. F. Knight, the brothers 
 Loxton, the brothers Alison, the brothers Whipp, the brothers Robinson, 
 Mr. Foster, Mr. Macfarlane, Mr. Godson, and to Mr. Otto Schwikkard, whose 
 wonderful energy and great knowledge of Transport details were invaluable. 
 
 The various Intelligence Officers I have mentioned with their respective 
 Divisions. 
 
 The follow ing non-commissioned officers merit special consideration :— 
 
 S j 12595 Serjeant F. C. Keller, Army Service Corps. 
 
 No. 1G6S Lance-Serjeant O. J. Taylor, 1st Bn. Grenadier Guards. 
 
 Corporal Northeast, Military Mounted Police. 
 
 Corporal Jones, Military Foot Police. 
 
 Lance-Corporal Ashley, Military Mounted Police. 
 
 Lance-Corporal Farquhar, Bethune’s Mounted Infantry. 
 
119 
 
 2nd Cavalry Brigade. 
 
 Colonel (local Major-General) J. F. Brocklehurst, M.V.O., Commanding'.— 
 A good Commander, handicapped somewhat by the fact that his first four 
 months of experience in the field were in command of a Cavalry brigade 
 confined in Ladysmith during- the siege. He was, with further experience, 
 rapidly improving, and I can confidently recommend him for further 
 employment. 
 
 Major G. P. Wyndham, 16th Lancers, Brigade-Major.—An excellent 
 Staff Officer, and a good soldier. He appeared to me to show indications of 
 all the qualities that would fit him for high command. 
 
 Captain E. S. E. Harrison, 11th Hussars, Intelligence Officer.—Bold, 
 steady and methodical, with plenty of dash. He is a good soldier and a good 
 Intelligence Officer. 
 
 Captain Viscount Crichton, Royal Horse Guards, Aide-de-Oamp.—Has a 
 good head on his shoulders, and thoroughly knows his work. 
 
 Captain A. K. Seccombe, Army Service Corps.—Discharged the Supply 
 and Transport duties of the brigade most satisfactorily. 
 
 5tli Lancers. 
 
 Major A. C. King.—Took a great interest in his regiment, which he com¬ 
 manded carefully. 
 
 The following Officers are brought to notice : — 
 
 Captain A. Parker.—An all-round good Officer. 
 
 Captain J. B. Scriven. — An all-round good Officer. 
 
 Lieutenant A. V. L. Wood.—Very good at reconnoitring. 
 
 Lieutenant J. B. Jardine.—A thoroughly good Officer. 
 
 Lieutenant and Adjutant R. C. Browne-Clayton.—Has done excellent 
 
 work. 
 
 19th H ussars. 
 
 Lieut.-Colonel C. B. If. Wolseley-Jenkins.—A good commander, with 
 considerable initiative and quick grasp of the situation. 
 
 Major H. D. Fanshawe (now 2nd Dragoon Guards).—An excellent Officer. 
 
 Captain A. Jennings-Bramly. — An excellent Officer in every way. He is 
 old for his position, and I strongly recommend him for advancement. 
 
 Captain P. W. Chetwode.—A capital squadron leader, whose reconnais¬ 
 sance work I had occasion more than once to commend. 
 
 18th Hussars. 
 
 Lieut.-Colonel E. C. Knox.—A thoroughly capable commander, worthy of 
 advancement. 
 
 Major H. T. Laming.—A very good squadron leader. 
 
 Captain and Adjutant C. Iv. Burnett.—A thoroughly capable Officer. 
 
 Captain E. C. Haag.—An excellent squadron leader, and one who well 
 understands South African warfare. 
 
 Lieutenant C. D. Field.—Very good at reeonnaisance, and rendered 
 excellent work as Brigade Provost-Marshal. 
 
 Lieutenant C. .T. Thackwell.—An excellent, promising young Officer. 
 
120 
 
 3rd Mounted Brigade. 
 
 This brigade, formed of irregular troops, has performed most arduous 
 duties. The whole brigade deserves the highest praise that I can give. 
 
 Colonel (local Major-General) the Earl of Dundonald, C.B., M.V.O.— 
 Commanded the brigade throughout. Careful and cautious in reconnaissance, 
 he showed dash and determination when occasion required. I strongly recom¬ 
 mend him for consideration as having performed admirable and arduous service 
 in a most efficient manner. 
 
 Lord Dundonald brings to notice his Aide-de-Camp, Captain H. G. de 
 Pledge. 19th Hussars, as hardworking, energetic, and reliable. 
 
 Captain (local Major) W. R. Birdwood, 11th Bengal Lancers.—Has served 
 as Staff Officer of the 3rd Mounted Brigade since November 1S99. He is an 
 admirable Staff Officer from every possible point of view. I desire to 
 give him, as he well deserves, the highest possible commendation- His duties 
 during this campaign have been exceptionally difficult and severe, and have 
 been discharged with exceptional skill. In the interests of the Army, I strongly 
 recommend him for advancement. 
 
 Lieutenant F. D. Murray, Royal Highlanders, Signalling Officer.—Has 
 great ability and energy. Cool in danger, he possesses enterprise and organiz¬ 
 ing power. I recommend him for advancement. 
 
 Lieutenant P. D. FitzGerald, 11th Hussars.—As Intelligence Officer of the 
 Brigade, has been most energetic and successful. His work is worthy of 
 reward. 
 
 Captain AY. A. C. Denny, Army Service Corps.—An excellent, energetic 
 Supply and Transport Officer. Has done admirable service. 
 
 South African Light Horse. 
 
 Major (local Lieutenant-Colonel) Hon. J. H. G. Byng, 10th Hussars.— 
 Has commanded the South African Light Horse from its formation in 
 November last. A Cavalry Officer of the highest qualifications, he has shown 
 singular ability in the command of irregulars. His regiment has done splendid 
 service, and I attribute this in a great measure to Colonel Byng’s personal 
 influence. I strongly recommend him for reward and advancement. 
 
 Captain AY. H. L. Allgood, King’s Royal Rifle Corps.—An admirable 
 squadron commander. 
 
 Captain A. Solly-Flood, South Lancashire Regiment.—Has rendered 
 excellent service, and been of great value as Adjutant. 
 
 Captain (local Major) R. G. Brooke, 7th Hussars.—Has proved himself an 
 excellent second in command. 
 
 The foregoing are Imperial Officers. 
 
 Of the Colonial Officers, Captains S. Tucker, S. Chapin, Grant-Thoroid. 
 and Lieutenant G. Marsden, have done invaluable service throughout the 
 campaign. 
 
 The following non-commissioned officers and men have rendered 
 continuous good and valuable service:— 
 
 T j 713 L Lance-Serjeant .J. M. Burrows, Army Service Corps 
 (Trumpet-Major, South African Light Horse). 
 
 No. 3675 Corporal F. Filling, 5th Dragoon Guards (acting Serjeant- 
 Major, Colt gun detachment). 
 
 No. 5397 Lance-Corporal P. D. Melia, Royal Dublin Fusiliers. 
 
 No. S22 Squadron Serjeant-Major C. T. Mudford, East Kent 
 Yeomanry. 
 
 Note.— These four non-commissioned officers were attached to the South 
 African Light Horse 
 
121 
 
 ''x 
 
 No. 158 Squadron Serjeant-Major J. Hopper 
 No. 805 Squadron Serjeant-Major G. A. Mitchell 
 No. 62 Serjeant F. L. Battershill .. .. 
 
 No. 5 Serjeant A. Sanson . . .. .. }> 
 
 No. 1160 Serjeant J. Liddell ... .. .. j 
 
 No. 1715 Private D. Cochrane .. .. .. | 
 
 No. 398 Private T. Dow . . . . . . .. J 
 
 South African ' 
 Light Horse. 
 
 In a corps like the South African Light Horse, it will he difficult to 
 reward good work except by public notice. I do not know whether it may be 
 found possible to do so, but in case it should be, I append a list of those 
 Officers and men who, during the 12 months’ work, have performed special acts 
 of bravery, or have been selected for, and successful}’ carried out, arduous 
 reconnaissances or dangerous duties :— 
 
 Lieutenant R. Turner. 
 
 Lieutenant W. F. Barker. 
 
 Lieutenant P. H. Goodair. 
 
 Lieutenant J. S. Churchill. 
 
 Lieutenant W. L. Edmunds. 
 
 Lieutenant J. M. O’Brien. 
 
 Lieutenant R. Johnstone. 
 
 Lieutenant T. S. Wickham. 
 
 Lieutenant C. M. Dansey. 
 
 Lieutenant E. M. Garrard (Colt gun detachment) 
 
 No. 103 Serjeant John McSorley. 
 
 No. 824 Serjeant H. H. Clarke. 
 
 No. 426 Serjeant D. Bennett. 
 
 No. 572 Serjeant C. Green. 
 
 No. 411 Serjeant J. C. White. 
 
 No. 719 Serjeant E. Prowse. 
 
 No. 808 Serjeant C. O. Taylor. 
 
 No. 879 Serjeant C. Baker. 
 
 No. 820 Serjeant W. H. Wesley. 
 
 No. 1096 Serjeant H. Tobin. 
 
 No. 984 Serjeant R. C. Alexander. 
 
 No. 1000 Serjeant W. J. Cox. 
 
 No. 1216 Serjeant T. Marriott. 
 
 No. 1116 Serjeant R. Holroyd. 
 
 No. 1264 Serjeant J. W. Weckes. 
 
 No. 1115 Serjeant J. Dudgeon. 
 
 No. 220 Corporal F. P. Erdmer. 
 
 No. 352 Corporal AC. McArthur. 
 
 No. 1618 Corporal C. H. Wallis. 
 
 No. 272 Corporal II. Moore. 
 
 No. 734 Corporal R. Gifford. 
 
 No. 996 Corporal C. II. Cotterill. 
 
 No. 932 Corporal J. McEwen. 
 
 No. 106S Corporal J. R. Arrowsmith. 
 
 No. 1654 Corporal W. Hudson. 
 
 No. 355 Lance-Corporal F. .1. Murray. 
 No. 382 Lance-Corporal J. P. Kelleher. 
 No. Ill Lance-Corporal H. W. Crane. 
 No. 1753 Lance-Corporal D. J. Stewart. 
 No. 1583 Lance-Corporal J. Howard. 
 
 No. 864 Lance-Corporal I 1 . J. Braund 
 No. 53 Lance-Corporal E. E. Constable. 
 No. 802 Lance-Corporal C. Flick. 
 
 No. 1093 Lance-Corporal J. Banks. 
 
 No. 1010 Lance-Corporal G. W. Earle. 
 
 No. 1011 Lance-Corporal W. Desfountain. 
 No. 1211 Lance-Corporal H. Campbell. 
 
 No. 1169 Lance-Corporal F. W. Stringer. 
 No. 1696 Lance-Corporal W r . Bruyn. 
 (762-2) Q 
 
122 
 
 No. 1236 Lance-Corporal Y. O’Connor. 
 
 Xo. 1099 Lance-Corporal AY. H. Sliddolph. 
 No. 1089 Private F. A. Crowle. 
 
 No. 107 Private E. T. Dobson. 
 
 No. 1537 Private i\ O. Siegfield. 
 
 No. 198 Private J. Turner. 
 
 No. 294 Private A. Galloway. 
 
 No. 209 Private AY. H. Haylett. 
 
 No. 633 Private W. H. Hccley. 
 
 No. 140 Private D. A. McColl. 
 
 No. 9 Private C. AV. A T an Schade. 
 
 No. 367 Private G. Warren. 
 
 No. 1800 Private B. Pinks. 
 
 No. 1'2 Private H. B. Bickley. 
 
 No. 1757 Private D. J. Blurton. 
 
 No. 1537 Private G. AY. Dumsden. 
 
 No. 459 Private W. D. Gibbon. 
 
 No. 576 Private A. C. Grant. 
 
 No. 1771 Private F. J. Holmes. 
 
 No. 1565 Private T. Kidd. 
 
 No. 1504 Private J. A. Morrison. 
 
 No. 1503 Private G. AY. Murgatroyd. 
 
 No. 251 Private P. Murgatroyd. 
 
 No. 850 Private AY. Collins. 
 
 No. 807 Private G. J. Lively. 
 
 No. 604 Private J. J. Pinch. 
 
 No. 457 Private J. Purkis. 
 
 No. 994 Private J. M. Broun. 
 
 No. 989 Private E. Brophy. 
 
 No. 1585 Private AV. Meadows. 
 
 No. 1644 Private A. Pirie. 
 
 No. 1003 Private AY. Thomas. 
 
 No. 1046 Private H. T. Smith. 
 
 No. 1161 Private S. M. Barnes. 
 
 No. 1691 Private H. H. Carroll. 
 
 No. 1178 Private O. F. Fielding. 
 
 No. 1629 Private J. Gibson. 
 
 No. 1109 Private T. AT Hansen. 
 
 No. 1526 Private E. H. Campbell. 
 
 No. 1706 Private K. M. Smith. 
 
 No. 1209 Private E. St. John. 
 
 No. 1176 Private F. H. A’allecarde 
 Private E. Cook. 
 
 f Bethune’s Mounted Infantry, 
 < attached with Colt gun 
 (_ detachment. 
 
 Lord Strathcona’s Horse. 
 
 Joined the Force in June, and from the moment of their arrival, they 
 served with marked success. I can hardly speak too highly of the value 
 Strathcona’s Horse have been to the Natal Field Force. 
 
 Lieut.-Colonel S. B. Steele, Commanding.—Has great influence with all 
 ranks in his regiment. Having a thorough knowledge of frontier work, his 
 services have been most valuable. 
 
 Major A. M. Jarvis, Major E. Belcher, Captain and Adjutant E. F. Mackie, 
 and Lieutenant R. H. B. Magee.—Have done excellent service throughout, 
 
 o o' 
 
 and proved themselves most useful soldiers in every duty they were called 
 upon to perform. 
 
 The following AYarrant and non-commissioned officers and men have been 
 brought to my notice as having specially distinguished themselves:— 
 
123 
 
 Regimental Serjeant-Major J. Hynes. 
 
 No. 517 Serjeant H. W. Nelles. 
 
 No. 87 Armourer-Serjeant J. R. Brigham. 
 
 No. 457 Corporal A. K. McLellan. 
 
 No. 35 Private C. TV. Rooke. 
 
 No. 476 Private G. Gamsby. 
 
 No. 362 Private W. P. Graham. 
 
 No. 98 Private A. C. Garner. 
 
 The remark I have made about the South African Light Horse applies 
 equally in this case, and I subjoin a list of names— 
 
 Major A. E. Snyder. 
 
 Captain G. TV. Cameron. 
 
 Captain F. L. Cartwright. 
 
 Lieutenant F. Harper. 
 
 Lieutenant J. A. Benyon. 
 
 Lieutenant P. Fall. 
 
 Lieutenant J. F. Macdonald. 
 
 Lieutenant J. E. Leekie. 
 
 Lieutenant T. E. Pooley. 
 
 Lieutenant A. E. Christie. 
 
 Surgeon-Lieutenant C. B. Keenan. 
 
 Lieutenant TV. Parker (Quarter-Master). 
 
 Lieutenant J. R. Snider, (Transport Officer). 
 
 Lieutenant E. J. Steele (Paymaster). 
 
 Lieutenant A. McMillan (Veterinary Officer). 
 
 Lieutenant A. H. L. Kyle (attached). 
 
 Civil Surgeon A. E. Houseman. 
 
 No. 459 Squadron Serjeant-Major Richards, 
 
 No. 462 Serjeant-Trumpeter J. Farmer. 
 
 No. 49 Serjeant R. H. Moir. 
 
 No. 260 Farrier-Serjeant A. Gillies. 
 
 No. 458 Serjeant J. S. Lambert. 
 
 No. 49 Serjeant G. Clarke. 
 
 No. 269 Serjeant C. A. TV. Whitehead. 
 
 No. 315 Serjeant S. A. Kelly. 
 
 No. 314 Serjeant P. G. Routh. 
 
 No. 15 Corporal E. H. Clarke. 
 
 No. 102 Corporal Alex. Norquay. 
 
 No. 207 Corporal TV. M. Lafferty. 
 
 No. 492 Corporal F. Mulligan. 
 
 No. 337 Corporal C. R. McDonald. 
 
 No. 328 Corporal R. N. Grogan. 
 
 No. 457 Corporal Read. 
 
 No. 85 Private J. E. V. Carpenter. 
 
 No. 204 Private C. E. Kindrew. 
 
 No. 292 Private R. Hammond. 
 
 No. 155 Private H. D. Saxhy. 
 
 No. 135 Private A. TV. Stewart. 
 
 No. 490 Private J. T. Waite. 
 
 No. 506 Private J. Devine. 
 
 No. 264 Private S. A. White. 
 
 No. 286 Private R. Dearing. 
 
 No. 346 Private T. M. L. Pym. 
 
 4th Division Mounted Infantry. 
 
 Captain (local Major) H. K. Stewart (Reserve of Officers) was entrusted by 
 me with the formation of this corps. He is an Officer of great dash and 
 gallantry, and singular capacity for the instruction ot men in Mounted Infantry 
 duties. The whole corps was thoroughly efficient in attack, defence 'and 
 reconnaissance. 
 
 (762-2) Q 2 
 
Captain R. J. Bridgford, Manchester Regiment; Captain V. H. S. 
 Seratchley, 4th Bn. King’s Royal Rifle Corps; and Captain F. R. Ewart, 
 Liverpool Regiment; distinguished themselves as commanders of companies 
 on every opportunity that presented itself. 
 
 The names of Lieutenant H. C. Johnson, 1st Bn. King’s Royal Rifle Corps, 
 and Lieutenant J. R. A. H. Paul, Leicestershire Regiment, have also been 
 brought to my notice for constant good service. The latter was an excellent 
 Adjutant of Mounted Infantry, 
 
 The following non-commissioned officers also deserve recognition :— 
 
 No. 1S86 Serjeant Knight, Liverpool Regiment. 
 
 No. 2845 Serjeant Hampton, Liverpool Regiment. 
 
 No. 5022 Colour-Serjeant G. Rowat, King’s Royal Rifle Corps. 
 
 No. 3558 Lance-Serjeant A. Robins, King’s Royal Rifle Corps. 
 
 No. 1520 Serjeant-Major Burke, Manchester Regiment. 
 
 No. 5394 Corporal Bassett, Manchester Regiment. 
 
 No. 4184 Lance-Corporal Geinner, Leicestershire Regiment. 
 
 No. 2793 Serjeant Berridge, Leicestershire Regiment. 
 
 “ A” Battery, Royal Horse Artillery. 
 
 Was attached to the 3rd Mounted Brigade throughout, and did excellent 
 service. 
 
 Major E. A. Burrows, Major H. D. White-Thomson and Captain 
 W. R. Eden all merit recognition. The battery Avas in a high state of 
 efficiency, and the non-commissioned officers and men were, among other brave 
 men, especially noticeable for their extreme coolness under fire. 
 
 The following non-commissioned officers deserve recognition : — 
 
 No. 51179 Battery Serjeant-Major A. J. Chowne, 
 
 No. 49300 Battery Quarter-Master-Serjcant J. Upfold, 
 
 No , 50643 Serjeant T. J. Harkness, 
 
 No. 62170 Serjeant F. W. Dean, 
 
 No. 94473 Corporal J. Donohue, 
 
 No. 93478 Bombardier B. Longman. 
 
 No. 3 Field Troop, Royal Engineers, did excellent service. It was raised, 
 organized and well commanded by Major G. M. Heath, R.E, who was ably 
 assisted by Lieutenant R. S. Walker, R.E. 
 
 The name of No. 209444 Serjeant C. Mew, R.E., is mentioned as 
 particularly deserving. 
 
 Captain R. M. Limond and No. S | 11604 Staff Serjeant T. Jones, Army 
 Service Corps, have both done excellent service, as have— 
 
 S | 5462 Staff Serjeant E. Josephson, Army Service Corps, 
 
 S | 10936 Private W. Martin, Army Service Corps, 
 
 S | 11523 Private C. Kettle, Army Service Corps. 
 
 Major J. F. Donegan, Royal Army Medical Corps, in charge of No. 18 
 British Field Hospital, has served with the brigade throughout. His work and 
 arrangements have been excellent, and the conduct of Lieutenant 
 E. E. Trimble, Royal Army Medical Corps, is also deserving of special 
 recognition. 
 
 Major Donegan brings specially to notice the excellent services rendered 
 by Assistant-Surgeon Moore, I.S.M.D., with the 3rd Mounted Brigade Field 
 Hospital. 
 
 2nd Infantry Division. 
 
 AVith the exception of a short interval, during which he was in hospital, 
 Major-General (local Lieutenant-General) Sir C. F. Clery, K.C.B., has 
 commanded this Division throughout. AVith a thorough knowledge of his 
 profession, he thoroughly understands how to lead troops in the field, and to 
 
125 
 
 look after them in camp. His services have been most valuable, and I strongly 
 recommend him to your consideration. 
 
 Lieut.-General Sir F. Clery speaks highly of Lieutenant E. J. F. Vaughan, 
 Devonshire Regiment, his Aide-de-Camp. 
 
 Brevet-Colonel B. M. Hamilton, East Yorkshire Regiment.—Performed 
 the duties of Assistant-Adjutant General of this Division until appointed to 
 the command of a brigade. His promotion was a gain to the Service, but a 
 loss to the Division. 
 
 Major G. F. Ellison, Royal Warwickshire Regiment.—Has been on the 
 Staff of this Division from the moment of its landing in Natal. Before leaving 
 England he had proved his value as a Staff Officer indoors; in Natal he lias 
 shown that he is as excellent a Staff Officer in the field. Untiring in the 
 performance of his duties, and with remarkable powers of physical endurance, 1 
 cannot speak too highly of His merits. 
 
 Captain W. G. B. Boyce, Army Service Corps.—Has been Supply and 
 Transport Officer of the Division throughout. Attentive, zealous, and untiring, 
 he thoroughly knows his duty, and is a most valuable Officer. 
 
 Captain E. St. G. Pratt, Durham Light Infantry, has acted as Provost- 
 Marshal of the Division, and performed various Staff duties. With a good 
 eye for the country, he is a good draughtsman; has tact, temper and judg¬ 
 ment, and is a valuable Officer. 
 
 Captain L. Parke, Durham Light Infantry, was Aide-de-Camp to Lieut.- 
 General Clery until his health gave way. He performed his duties remarkably 
 well. 
 
 Lieutenant A. E. McNamara, Queen’s (Royal West Surrey Regiment 
 \vas an excellent Aide-de-Camp until severely wounded and invalided t<. 
 England. 
 
 Colonel A. A. Garstin, Assistant Adjutant-General, succeeded Colonel 
 Bruce Hamilton as Assistant Adjutant-General, and has worked hard and well. 
 He felt at first the want of previous staff training, but he has done his best 
 to qualify himself for the position he now fills with credit. 
 
 Lieutenant W. Northey, Durham Light Infantry, worked hard and well 
 as Divisional Signalling Officer. 
 
 Major W. H. Bycroft, 11th Hussars, has been attached to the Division 
 since the 13th June as Intelligence Officer. He is an Officer of great 
 intelligence, energy and ability, and is deserving of advancement. 
 
 Lieut.-Colonel J. B. Sharpe, Commanding Royal Engineer. Painstaking 
 and thorough in all his work, he has done excellent service with the Division. 
 
 Lieut.-Colonel G. T. Goggin, Royal Army Medical Corps, has performed 
 the duties of Principal Medical Officer most satisfactorily, and the following 
 Medical Officers deserve recognition:—Captain J. H. Campbell, Royal Army 
 Medical Corps, for meritorious work in charge of the 3rd Bn. King’s Royal 
 Rifle Corps; and Lieutenant J. J. \Y. Prescott, Rojal Army Medical Corps, 
 for meritorious work while in charge of the Durham Light Infantry. 
 
 Captain W. C. Hedley, R.E., has done very good service, as has 
 No. 2S092 2nd Corporal A. G. Brabbin, 17th Company, R.E. 
 
 Major W. L. H. Paget, R.H.A., commanded the 2nd Brigade Division, 
 Royal Field Artillery, most creditably to himself. He speaks highly of Major 
 H. G. Sandilands, R.F.A., his Adjutant. I recommend both Officers for your 
 consideration. 
 
 2nd Brigade Division, R.F.A. 
 
 7th Battery. R.F.A? 
 
 Major C. G. Hensnaw. — A good horsemaster. Commanded its battery 
 satisfactorily. 
 
126 
 
 63rd Battery, R.F.A. 
 
 Major R. F. Fox, 109th Battery.—Was placed in command of the 63rd 
 Battery, and proved himself a thoroughly good Officer. 
 
 2nd Lieutenant E. W. M. Cuninghame promises exceedingly well. 
 
 64th Battery, R.F.A. 
 
 Major C. E. Coghill is a sound, capable, Battery Commander, and can be 
 relied on in any position. 
 
 2nd Division Ammunition Column. 
 
 Captain W. G. H. Nicholson.—Has shown marked ability in this difficult 
 duty. 
 
 2nd Infantry Brigade. 
 
 Lieut.-Colonel (local Brigadier-General) E. 0. F. Hamilton, 2nd Queen’s 
 (Royal West Surrey Regiment), Commanding.—Was appointed to the Com¬ 
 mand on Major-General Hildyard’s promotion. He has discharged the duties 
 to my entire satisfaction, and will make a valuable Officer. He speaks highly 
 of his Aide-de-Camp, Lieutenant A. W. Tufnell, 2nd Queen’s (Royal West 
 Surrey Regiment). 
 
 Captain H. E. Gogarty, Royal Scots Fusiliers.—Has acted as Brigade- 
 Major during the whole campaign. His services have been most valuable, and 
 I stronglv recommend him for advancement. 
 
 O 
 
 2nd Queen’s (Royal West Surrey Regiment). 
 
 Major W. S. Burrell.—Has commanded the regiment since 20th April. 
 He is a thoroughly capable commander, and has performed his duties to my 
 entire satisfaction. 
 
 The services of the following Officers deserve recognition :— 
 
 Captain and Adjutant G. G. Whiffin. 
 
 Captain H. C. Pillcau. 
 
 Captain A. F. Sillem. 
 
 Lieutenant H. W. Smith. 
 
 Lieutenant C. F. Watson. 
 
 The following non-commissioned officers and men merit special mention 
 for specific acts of gallantry during the campaign :— 
 
 FA. 839 Colour-Serjeant T. A r . Robinson. 
 
 No. 3159 Private T. Hatherall. 
 
 No. 406S Lance-Corporal M. Regan (killed). 
 
 No. 2430 Private H. Mileman. 
 
 No. 2902 Colour-Serjeant J. Hawkes. 
 
 No. 3741 Private F. King. 
 
 2nd Bn. Devonshire Regiment. 
 
 Lieut.-Colonel G. M. Bullock (Commanding).—A gallant, fighting soldier, 
 who was taken prisoner through no fault of his own, and has distinguished 
 himself in the Orange River Colony since his release. 
 
 Major H. Batson.—Has commanded the battalion since the 15th December 
 1899, with complete success. I strongly recommend his services for recognition. 
 
 Major F. C. Briggs, Captain and Adjutant L. IT. Pols, Captain P. U. V. 
 Vigors, and Captain C. C. M. Mavnard, are all most favourably spoken of; and 
 No. 1103 Colour-Serjeant A. Grubb and No. 951 Colour-Serjeant G. Trivett 
 deserve special mention. 
 
 2nd Bn. East Surrey Regiment. 
 
 Major II. A\ . Pearse.—Has commanded the battalion since the 23rd 
 February, when Lieut.-Colonel R. H. AY. H. Harris was dangerously wounded, 
 and has proved himself a good Commanding Officer. 
 
127 
 
 Major H. W. Benson.—Commanded the battalion at Allemann’s Nek 
 exceedingl}' well. 
 
 Major H. L. Smith, Captain IT. S. Tew, and Captain A. C. S. Barchard 
 have done well throughout, as has also Lieutenant J. C. May, in charge of the 
 Maxim gun. 
 
 The following non-commissioned officer and men merit special mention:— 
 
 No. 3046 Colour-Serjeant H. J. Percy. 
 
 No. 3091 Private W. Boxer. 
 
 No. 3659 Private IT. Camp. 
 
 No. 4220 Private E. Robbins. 
 
 The 2nd Bn. West Yorkshire Regiment were, after the promotion of 
 Colonel Kitchener, commanded by Major W. Fry, who proved himself a most 
 capable commander, and the regiment well maintained its high character. The 
 following Officers and non-commissioned Officers merit special mention:— 
 Major IT. E. Watts; Captain C. E. W r ood (1st Volunteer Battalion); Lieutenant 
 S. G. Francis, an excellent Transport Officer; Second Lieutenant C. J. H. 
 Lyster; No. 3147 Pioneer-Serjeant A. E. Bridle; No. 721, 1st Class Armourer 
 Serjeant H. Southern ; No. 3325 Lance-Serjcant J. Walmsley, who distinguished 
 himself in charge of the Maxims of the battalion; and No. 2430 Corporal P. 
 Conroy, who proved himself a most gallant and trustworthy soldier. 
 
 Captain J. W. Jennings, D.S.O., Royal Army Medical Corps.—Rendered 
 good service in charge of the 2nd Brigade Field Hospital, as did Captain 
 J. A. T. Tredgold, Army Service Corps, in charge of the Supply Column. 
 
 No. 7790 Lance-Serjeant W. G-. Eicombe and So. 6269 Staff-Serjeant G-. J. 
 Norworthy, Royal Army Medical Corps, have rendered excellent service with 
 the 2nd Brigade Field Hospital and Bearer Company respectively, as has Siaff- 
 Serjeant Payne, Indian Commissariat, with the Supply Column. 
 
 4th Infantry Brigade. 
 
 Brevet Colonel (local Major-General) C. D. Cooper (Commanding).—Was 
 appointed to the command of the brigade on General Lyttelton’s promotion. 
 An excellent regimental Commanding Officer, he has proved himself equally 
 valuable in command of a brigade, and shown himself to be a resolute, capable 
 commander. He speaks highly of his Aide-de-Camp, Lieutenant L. F. Renny, 
 Royal Dublin Fusiliers. 
 
 Captain II. H. Wilson, Rifle Brigade, acted throughout the campaign as 
 Brigade-Major of this brigade to my entire satisfaction until a few days 
 before I left, when he was promoted to a higher position on the Staff at 
 Pretoria. He is an admirable Officer, who deserves any reward that can be 
 given to him. 
 
 Lieutenant Sir T. A. A. M. Cuninghame, Bart., Rifle Brigade, proved 
 himself a thoroughly efficient and active Signalling Officer. 
 
 Major .A. E. Longden, Army Service Corps, has done excellent work as 
 Supply and Transport Officer of the brigade and thoroughly deserves mention. 
 
 Major F. S. Houston and Major E. O. Milward, Royal Army Medical 
 Corps, in charge, respectively, of the 4th Brigade Field Hospital, and Bearer 
 Company, have discharged their duties in a thoroughly efficient manner and 
 deserve mention. 
 
 2nd Bn. Scottish Rifles. 
 
 Lieut.-Colonel E. Cooke.—A capable and zealous commander. Takes a 
 great interest in his work in the battalion, which he had admirably trained. 
 Bold in the field and careful of his men in camp, I have formed a very high 
 opinion of him. 
 
 Captain and Adjutant G.T. C. Carter-Campbell.—Capable and cool under 
 fire, he has done excellent work. 
 
 3rd Bn. King’s Royal Rifle Corps. 
 
 Lieut.-Colonel R. C. A. B. Bewicke-Copley has commanded the battalion 
 well. A. capable Officer, thoroughly in touch with his battalion, he has well 
 earned commendation. 
 
128 
 
 Captain C. AY. AYilson.—Has proved himself a good Adjutant, and has, 
 -when occasion offered, done good work on the Staff. 
 
 The following non-commissioned officer and men merit special mention:— 
 Colour-Serjeant Harman, No. 6232 Private F. Limhrick, and No. 8999 Private 
 AY. Kibhy. Both of these two last men have, I fear, been very severely 
 wounded. 
 
 1st Bn. Durham Light Infantry. 
 
 Lieut.-Colonel A. L. Woodland.—Devoted to his battalion. Brave and 
 resolute, he has commanded it thoroughly well. 
 
 Brevet Lieut.-Colonel H. S. FitzGerald, Major G. C. Mansel, Captain and 
 Adjutant B. AA T . L. McMahon, and 2nd Lieutenant A. AA r . B. Wallace have 
 done excellent work throughout the campaign ; and Lieutenant A. H. Bridges, 
 
 I. S.C., 16th Bombay Infantry, and Captain J. Turnbull, 4th Y T ol. Bn. Durham 
 Light Infantry, have been attached to the battalion, and their work is well 
 worthy of mention. 
 
 1st Bn. Bifle Brigade. 
 
 Lieut.-Colonel A. E. AV. Colville.-—Is a very capable Officer, has great 
 zeal in his profession, and takes a keen interest in his battalion. Having given 
 him a detached command on more than one occasion, I have found him an 
 Officer in whom I could place entire confidence. 
 
 Captain C. E. Eadclyffe, Captain L. F. Green-AYilkinson, and Lieutenant 
 
 J. A. lnnes have distinguished themselves throughout the campaign. 
 
 The names of Serjeant-Major AY. Morrish and Colour-Serjeant Finney are 
 also deserving of mention. 
 
 4th Infaktky Division. 
 
 Major-General (local Lieutenant-General) Hon. N. G. Lyttelton, C.B. 
 (Commanding).— With great coolness under fire, and considerable tactical 
 knowledge and resource, this Officer is an excellent commander in the field. 
 He is also very careful of his men in camp and quarters. General Lyttelton 
 has been of the greatest assistance to me throughout, and 1 recommend him 
 as an Officer of high military attainments, whose services deserve the fullest 
 recognition, and whose military advancement will be in the interests of the 
 Army. 
 
 Major (local Lieutenant-Colonel) C. P. R. McGrigor, King’s Royal Rifle 
 Corps, Assistant Adjutant-General.—An excellent Staff Officer in every 
 respect. He has been unlucky in his regimental promotion, and I have already 
 recommended him for unattached promotion, llis advancement would be for 
 the good of the Army. 
 
 Lieut .-Col on el A. AAL L. Bayly, D.S.O., I.S.C., D.A.A.G.—An excellent 
 Staff Officer, and a bold leader of men. Has done exceptionally good service, 
 and I strongly recommend him for consideration. 
 
 Captain W. S. Bannatyne, Liverpool Regiment.—Has done extremely 
 good service as Divisional Provost-Marshal. 
 
 Major AA . J. Bonus, Dorsetshire Regiment.—Has discharged his duties as 
 Deputy-Assistant Adjutant-General to my entire satisfaction. 
 
 Captain Hon. H. Y 7 arde-Buller, Rifle Brigade.—Originally Aide-de-Camp 
 to General Lyttelton, but was appointed Divisional Intelligence Officer, for 
 which work he has shown great aptitude. He is active, ca[ able, and energetic. 
 
 Lieutenant J. H. Davidson, King’s Royal Rifle Corps.—Has acted as 
 Divisional Signalling Officer throughout, and has discharged his duties 
 extremely well. 
 
129 
 
 Lieut.*Colonel R. A. G. Harrison, R.F.A. — Commanded the 4th Brigade 
 Division throughout the latter part of the campaign to my entire satisfaction ; 
 and Captain H. L. Reed, Y.C., his Adjutant, proved himself an excellent 
 Artillery Staff’ Officer. 
 
 No. 27041 Battery Serjeant-Major J. A 7 evers (Acting Regimental Serjeant- 
 Major) has proved himself a thoroughly reliable, cool, and brave non-commis¬ 
 sioned officer, and worthy of notice. 
 
 Major S. R. Rice, R.E.—Acted as Commanding Royal Engineer of the 
 Division, and did thoroughly good service ; and Lieutenant E. E. Ricketts. 
 Gloucester Engineer Volunteers (attached to the 23rd Company, Royal 
 Engineers), proved himself a valuable Officer, and has done good service. 
 
 No. 27130 Corporal W. H. Berry, R.E., is brought forward as an excellent 
 sapper and a man of exceptional gallantry. 
 
 Lieutenant C. E. 1. McNalty, Army Service Corps, merits special mention 
 for excellent work in charge of the Divisional Troops Supply Column. 
 
 Lieut.-Colonel S. H. Carter, M.B., Royal Army Medical Corps, Principal 
 Medical Officer.—Has discharged his duties to my entire satisfaction. 
 
 4tii Brigade Division, R.F.A. 
 
 21st Battery, R.F.A. 
 
 Maj or H. Corbyn.—Has only been a short time in command of the 
 battery. He will, 1 think, do well. 
 
 Lieutenant F. Rainsford-Hannay. — A young Officer, who has, on several 
 occasions, proved himself to be cool and reliable. 
 
 No. 65438 Staff Serjeant-Farrier J. Nunn, No. 78313 Battery Serjeant- 
 Major C. Ellis, and No. 51822 Serjeant W. H. Harding, are specially com¬ 
 mended. 
 
 42nd Battery, R.F.A. 
 
 Major C. E. Goulburn.—A good Battery Commander, whom l recommend 
 for consideration. 
 
 The following non-commissioned officers are mentioned:—No. 55271 
 Serjeant E. Evans and No. 77666 Serjeant C. Grant, as having done excellent 
 work with the battery throughout the campaign. 
 
 53rd Battery, R.F.A. 
 
 Major L. G. F. Gordon.— In every sense, an excellent Battery 
 Commander. A good horsemaster, cool in action, and has a good battery. 
 
 The following non-commissioned officers both deserve special mention :— 
 No. 69165 Serjeant H. Gill and No. 87672 Corporal A. Cook. 
 
 Ammunition Column. 
 
 Captain R. G. Ouseley, R.F.A., has practically commanded the 4th 
 Division Ammunition Column since its arrival from India, and has discharged 
 the difficult duties connected therewith to the satisfaction of everyone. I 
 strongly recommend him for consideration. 
 
 7tii Infantry Brigade. 
 
 Brevet-Colonel (local Major-General) F. W. Kitchener, West Yorkshire 
 Regiment (Commanding).—An Officer of great military attainments, in whom 
 I learned to place implicit confidence. I strongly Recommend him as eminently 
 deserving of advancement. 
 
 (762-2) 
 
 R 
 
130 
 
 General Kitchener recommends Captain A. W. Speyer, 4th Bn. West 
 Yorkshire Regiment, his aide-de-camp, for consideration. He is a thoroughly 
 efficient Officer, and has rendered exceptionally good service. 
 
 Captain H. d’E. Yallancey, Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, discharged 
 the duties of Brigade-Major efficiently. 
 
 Captain L. H. Spry, West Yorkshire Regiment, proved himself a 
 thoroughly good Officer, and I recommend him for advancement. 
 
 Lieutenant A. W. F. Baird, Gordon Highlanders, was an excellent 
 Signalling Officer. 
 
 1st Bn. Devonshire Regiment. 
 
 Major T. A. H. Davies, D.S.O., commanded the battalion well. 
 
 Captain M. G. Jacson.—An excellent Officer in every respect. One of 
 the senior Captains in the Army, and I strongly recommend his case for con¬ 
 sideration, as he would be a loss to the Army if he left. 
 
 Captain H. S. L. Ravenshaw and Lieutenant N. Z. Emerson deserve 
 special mention, as do Lieutenants A. M. Tringham, 1st Bn. Royal West Surrey 
 Regiment, and H. N. R. Cowie, 1st Bn. Dorsetshire Regiment, who have been 
 attached for several months to the battalion, have done remarkably well. 
 Also— 
 
 No. 1143 Colour-Serjeant J. T. Payne. 
 
 No. 20-34 Colour-Serjeant G. Palmer. 
 
 No. 1977 Colour-Serjeant J. Horswell. 
 
 No. 2412 Lance-Serjeant W. Poulter. 
 
 No. 3S52 Bandsman E. Norman. 
 
 1st Bn. Manchester Regiment. 
 
 Lieut.-Colonel A. E. R. Curran has commanded his battalion thoroughly 
 
 well. 
 
 Major J. E. Watson and Major R. D. Yizard merit special mention. The 
 latter Officer has been Divisional Baggage Master throughout, a position of 
 considerable difficulty, and has discharged the duties thoroughly well. 
 
 2nd Bn. Gordon Highlanders 
 
 Lieut.-Colonel AM. A. Scott has commanded this battalion throughout to 
 my entire satisfaction. He is a first-rate Commanding Officer. 
 
 The following Officers deserve recognition:— 
 
 Major C. F. N. Macready. 
 
 Captain J. A. L. Haldane, D.S.O. 
 
 Captain and Adjutant H. A. Bethune. 
 
 Captain the Hon. R. F. Carnegie. 
 
 Also — 
 
 No. 2569 Colour-Serjeant J. Allen. 
 
 No. 4732 Private W. Macrae. 
 
 No. 2860 Corporal W. Macdonald.—This non-commissioned officer was in 
 charge of the machine gun of the battalion, and his conduct on all occasions 
 was specially worthy of commendation. 
 
 2nd Bn. Rifle Brigade. 
 
 Lieut.-Colonel C. T. E. Metcalfe.—Commanded this battalion to my 
 entire satisfaction until the fight at Bergendal on the 27th August, when he 
 was, unfortunately, severely wounded. The command then devolved upon 
 Major G. Cockburn, D.S.O., whose conduct on the 27th August I have brought 
 to notice in a previous despatch. I commend both these Officers for your 
 consideration. 
 
1.31 
 
 The following- have been brought to notice as worthy of special mention :— 
 
 Captain J. E. Gough. 
 
 Captain H. M. Biddulph. 
 
 Captain R. B. Stephens. 
 
 Captain and Adjutant .T. D. Heriot-Maitland. 
 
 No. 8514 Colour-Serjeant J. Eastwood. 
 
 No. 8131 Colour-Serjeant W. Barnes. 
 
 No. 2595 Lance-Corporal J. Hatch well. 
 
 8th Infantry Brigade. 
 
 Colonel (local Major-General) F. Howard, C.B., C.M.G., A.D.C.— 
 Commanded this brigade with conspicuous success throughout the campaign. 
 With a thorough knowledge of detail, he is careful of, and most attentive to, 
 his men, and is in all respects a good Brigadier. 
 
 General Howard brings to notice the services of Captain J. E. Gough, 
 Rifle Brigade, who acted as his Aide-de-Camp, and also as BrigadeJSignalling 
 Officer. 
 
 Brevet Lieut.-Colonel Hon. C. G. Fortescue, C.M.G., Rifle Brigade. — 
 Discharged the duties of Brigade-Major with great success; and Captain 
 H. E. Vernon, D.S.O., Rifle Brigade, and Captain P. C. Scott, Army Service 
 Corps, were excellent Brigade Staff' Officers. 
 
 Lieut.-Colonel R. L. Love, M.D., Royal Army Medical Corps, and Major 
 O. II. A. Julian, Royal Army Medical Corps, deserve mention for the manner 
 they respectively looked after the Brigade Field Hospital and Brigade Bearer 
 Company. 
 
 1st Bn. (King's) Liverpool Regiment. 
 
 The following Officers have been brought to my notice as worthy of 
 mention:— 
 
 Captain and Adjutant L. M. Jones. 
 
 Captain C. L. Parmiter. 
 
 Lieutenant and Quarter-Master B. J. Finch. 
 
 Captain W. R. Pinwill. 
 
 Also— 
 
 No. 2420 Colour-Serjeant Lees. 
 
 No. 5441 Private W. Henton, and 
 No. 5034 Private Roberts. 
 
 This battalion did excellent work during the siege of Ladysmith, but that, 
 I understand, has been already reported on by General Sir George White. 
 
 1st Bn. Leicestershire Regiment. 
 
 Lieut.-Colonel G. D. Carleton.—Has commanded this battalion thoroughly 
 
 well. 
 
 The following have been brought to my notice as deserving of mention :— 
 
 Also— 
 
 No. 
 
 No. 
 
 No. 
 
 No. 
 
 No. 
 
 No. 
 
 No. 
 
 Captain JI. M. Welstead. 
 
 Captain F. E. Glossop. 
 
 Captain C. G. Blackader. 
 
 Captain and Adjutant L. Croker, and 
 Lieutenant T. N. Puckle; 
 
 144 Serjeant-Major F. Arculus. 
 
 4183 Lance-corporal J. Bradshaw. 
 
 3215 Private R. Allen. 
 
 (3678 Private H. Oakes (Volunteer Con pany). 
 5268 Corporal M. P. Gillespie. 
 
 4390 Corporal C. Harris. 
 
 1599 Corporal J. F. Kell}*. 
 
 R 2 
 
132 
 
 1st Bn. Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers. 
 
 This battalion suffered very severely during the fighting on the way into 
 Ladysmith. Lieut.-Colonel R. L. Payne, D.S.O., who joined after that, deserves 
 great credit for the manner in which he brought the battalion, after its heavy 
 losses, again into the field. There can, I think, be but few instances in history 
 in which a battalion, after such heavy losses, has returned a perfect machine 
 into the fighting line within so short a time. Colonel Payne brings to notice 
 the name of Captain W. F. Hessey. Nearly all the senior Officers are absent, 
 wounded, and I specially brought to notice the names of Officers, non-commis¬ 
 sioned officers and men in my despatch of 13th September on the action at 
 Bergendal. 
 
 1st Bn. King’s Royal Rifle Corps. 
 
 Lieut.-Colonel W. P. Campbell is one of the best regimental commanders 
 that have served under my command, and I very strongly recommend him for 
 your most favourable consideration as an Officer whose advancement w r ould be 
 in the interests of the Service. 
 
 The following Officers, Warrant and non-commissioned officers have been 
 brought to my notice as worthy of mention:— 
 
 Major F. A. Fortescue, 
 
 Captain and Adjutant H. R. Blore, 
 
 - Captain Lord R. W. 0. Manners, 
 
 Captain G. Y. Hordern, 
 
 Lieutenant and Quarter-Master T. C. McNally, 
 
 Bandmaster F. Tyler, 
 
 Quarter-Master-Serjeant A. E. Williams, and 
 No. 407w Lance-Corporal J. W. C. Strange. 
 
 2nd Bn. King’s Royal Rifle Corps. 
 
 This battalion was removed from my command. Major Hon. E. J. 
 Montagu-Stuart-Wortley, C.M.G., D.S.O., who commanded it, remained. He 
 is an able Officer and commanded the battalion to my satisfaction. He also 
 commanded the Rifle Reserve Battalion, as reported in my despatch of the 
 30th March, but the names of the following Officers which should then have 
 been mentioned were, I find, omitted :— 
 
 Captain AY. F. G. Wyndham . . "j 2nd Bn. King’s Royal Rifle 
 2nd Lieutenant G. C. Kelly .. J Corps. 
 
 Lieutenant S. E. Hollond . . . . d 
 
 2nd Lieutenant H. AY. Dumaresq.. >lst Bn. Rifle Brigade. 
 
 2nd Lieutenant M. B. White . . J 
 
 The following Officers have been brought to my notice : — 
 
 Lieutenant D. H. Blundell-Hollingshead-Blundell, 4th Bn. King’s Royal 
 Rifle Corps, and Lieutenant H. AYake, King’s Royal Rifle Corps. 
 
 5th Infantry Division. 
 
 Major-General (local Lieutenant-General) H. J T. Hildyard, C.B.-- 
 Succeeded to the command of the Division after the relief of Ladysmith. An 
 excellent brigade commander, he has proved himself equally good in command 
 of a division. A thoroughly well-read soldier, thoughtful and careful of his 
 men, lie is a good leader in the field, and I strongly recommend him for your 
 consideration. 
 
 General Hildyard brings to notice the names of Captain A. Blair, King’s 
 Own Scottish Borderers, and Captain H. C. T. Hildyard, R.A., his Aides-de- 
 Camp. Both these Officers are capable and energetic, and have discharged 
 their duties well. 
 
133 
 
 Brevet-Major T. Capper, East Lancashire Regiment.—Has acted as 
 Assistant Adjutant-General to the Division, and won the good opinion of 
 everybody who has observed the manner in which he has performed his duties. 
 I strongly recommend him for advancement in the interests of the Service. 
 
 Major E. C. «J. Williams, the Buffs (East Kent Regiment), and Major 
 H. N. Sargent, Army Service Corps, have acted as Deputy Assistant Adjutant- 
 Generals, and have both proved thoroughly capable Staff Officers, and 
 deserving of advancement. 
 
 Captain A. A. McHardy, R.A., Divisional Signalling Officer.—Worked 
 well and efficiently. 
 
 Captain K. J. Kincaid-Smith, R.A., Divisional Provost-Marshal.—Has 
 performed his duties well and with considerable tact. 
 
 Lieut.-Colonel G. H. Sim, R.E.—Has been indefatigable in his work, and 
 proved himself a most valuable Commanding Royal Engineer. 
 
 Lieut.-Colonel E. S. May, R.F.A.—Has commanded the 1st Brigade 
 Division, R.F.A., since the relief of Ladysmith. He is an Officer who has 
 devoted much time to the study of his profession with considerable success. 
 
 Captain J. A. Tyler, R.F.A., Adjutant, 1st Brigade Division.—Deserves 
 special mention. A thoroughly good Officer, and untiring in the discharge of 
 his duties. 
 
 Lieut.-Colonel (local Colonel) O. Todd, M.B., Royal Army Medical Corps* 
 —Has discharged the duties of Principal Medical Officer of the Division 
 thoroughly well. 
 
 Mr. O. Watkins, Wesleyan Minister.—Merits special mention for the 
 zealous way in which he has discharged his duties with the Division. 
 
 1st Brigade Division, R.F.A. 
 
 13th Battery, R.F.A. 
 
 Major J. W. G. Dawkins.—Has commanded his battery throughout the 
 war. He is a thoroughly capable Battery Commander. He can be depended 
 on in any position. 
 
 67th Battery, R.F.A. 
 
 Major J. F. Manifold.—A zealous, active Officer. Has served with his 
 battery through the whole campaign. 
 
 Captain J. H. W. Tapp merits special mention. 
 
 69th Battery, R.F.A. 
 
 Major F. D. Y. Wing.—An excellent Officer. Keen, zealous, willing and 
 capable, he commands his battery thoroughly well, and gets the best work out 
 of his men. I strongly recommend him to your consideration. 
 
 2nd Lieutenant F. M. C. Trench deserves special mention. 
 
 5th Division Ammunition Column. 
 
 Captain H. W. A. Christie.—Has served throughout] the war with the 
 5th Division Ammunition Column, and tor a considerable time in command of 
 it. His services merit consideration. 
 
 Lieutenant R. T. Hill also merits special mention. 
 
 Captain G. M. Harper, R.E., and Lieutenant S. L. Owen, R.E., merit 
 special mention for their work with the 37th Field Company, Royal Engineers. 
 
 Lieutenant J. A. C. Hamilton, 1st (King’s) Dragoon Guards.-—Has 
 performed Army Service Corps duties throughout the campaign with the 
 Division, and is specially mentioned by General Hildyard for his good work. 
 (762-2) R 3 
 
134 
 
 The following non-commissioned officers of the Divisional Staff merit 
 mention :— 
 
 S.C. | 161 Staff Quarter-Master-Serjeant G. Craig, Staff Clerk Section, 
 Army Service Corps, for his work as Chief Clerk, and No. 4744 Serjeant W. 
 Howard, 18th Hussars (attached to Military Mounted Police), for his work as 
 Provost Serjeant. 
 
 10th Infantry Brigade. 
 
 Colonel (local Major-General) J. T. Coke.—Has commanded the brigade 
 since its formation. He has a thorough knowledge of military detail, and 
 takes immense pains with the instruction of his Officers and the care of his 
 men. 
 
 General Coke brings forward the name of Captain C. B. Jervis-Edwards, 
 Duke of Cornwall’s Light Infantry, as an excellent Aide-de-Camp. This 
 Officer also acted as Intelligence Officer, and proved his value.J 
 
 Captain H. G. C. Phillips, Welsh Regiment.—Has proved himself a 
 valuable Brigade-Major, whose advancement will be for the benefit of the 
 Army. 
 
 Captain C. B. Martin, Royal Army Medical Corps.—Is specially brought 
 to notice for the way in which he has commanded the 10th Brigade Bearer 
 Company. 
 
 2nd Bn. Dorsetshire Regiment. 
 
 Lieut.-Colonel C. H. Law.—Has commanded this battalion with great 
 zeal and discretion. He is a thoroughly trustworthy, capable Commander. 
 
 The following Officers and men deserve special mention :— 
 
 Captain C. A. Rowley. 
 
 Captain and Adjutant R. H. K. Butler. 
 
 Lieutenant F. W. R. Hill. 
 
 Captain H. L. Kitson.—This Officer belongs to the Volunteer Company of 
 the regiment. He has proved himself to be thoroughly capable of taking any 
 position his rank requires. 
 
 Ho. 663 Colour-Serjeant B. Verdon came out as Serjeant-Instructor of 
 the Volunteer Company, and the excellence of that company must, in a 
 measure, be credited to him. 
 
 Ho. 2152 Colour-Serjeant M. Ralph. 
 
 2nd Bn. Middlesex Regiment. 
 
 Brevet Colonel A. AY. Hill.—Has commanded this battalion to my 
 satisfaction. 
 
 The following Officers and non-commissioned officers and men have been 
 specially brought forward for notice :— 
 
 Major G. W. W. Savile. 
 
 Major G. B. Lempriere. 
 
 Lieutenant C. S. D. Fisher. 
 
 No. 656 Quarter-Master-Serjeant F. Allam. 
 
 Ho. 1404 Quarter-Master-Serjeant E. H. Amor. 
 
 Ho. 2587 Colour-Serjeant J. Glass. 
 
 Ho. 3658 Lance-Serjeant E. Barton. 
 
 Ho. 4028 Private J. Askin. 
 
 Ho. 2444 Private E. Kingham 
 Ho. 2854 Private F. Goff. 
 
135 
 
 1st Bn. I!oyal Dublin Fusiliers. 
 
 Lieut.-Colonel G. A. Mills.—A capable, zealous Officer, who has not been 
 fortunate in having chances offered to him, but will, I think, prove worthy of 
 the first chance that comes. 
 
 The following are specially mentioned : — 
 
 Major W. H. S. O’Neill. — Commanded the battalion well at Allemann’s 
 Nek after his Colonel was wounded. 
 
 Captain and Adjutant P. Maelear. 
 
 Lieutenant E. A. A. de Salis. 
 
 No. 796 Armourer-Serjeant T. Ford (Corps of Armourers). 
 
 No. 4419 Corporal G. Frost. 
 
 Lieutenant L. N. Lloyd, Royal -Army Medical Corps, attached to this 
 battalion, has been specially mentioned for his gallantry and devotion to the 
 wounded. 
 
 Imperial Light Infantry. 
 
 This battalion, which was raised at a time when Natal was short of troops, 
 has done good service. It has latterly been well commanded by Major (local 
 Lieutenant-Colonel) M. C. Curry, Devonshire Regiment. 
 
 The following Officers also performed their duties in a manner that calls 
 for special notice :— 
 
 Captain C. C. M. Maynard, 2nd Bn. Devonshire Regiment 
 (second in command, Imperial Light Infantry). 
 
 2nd Lieutenant (local Captain) G. H. N. Jackson, 1st Border 
 Regiment (Adjutant). 
 
 Captain H. R. Bousfield, Imperial Light Infantry. 
 
 2nd Lieutenant Gregorie, Imperial Light Infantry. 
 
 First Class Staff Serjeant-Major W. J. Wade, Army Service Corps, is 
 reported as having done particularly good work with the 10th Brigade Supply 
 Column. 
 
 11th Infantry Brigade. 
 
 Colonel (local Major-General) A. S. Wynne, C.B.—Has commanded this 
 Brigade since the 25th January. He well deserves advancement. 
 
 General Wynne speaks deservedly highly of Captain F. M. Carleton, D.S.O., 
 Royal Lancaster Regiment, his Aide-de-Camp. He has, in addition to the 
 duties of Aide-de-Camp, discharged throughout those of second Staff Officer to 
 the Brigade. 
 
 Captain W. P. Braithwaite, Somersetshire Light Infantry.—Has shown 
 great capacity for staff work as Brigade-Major. I strongly recommend his 
 services for consideration. 
 
 Captain A. Phelps, Army Service Corps.—Has been in charge of the 
 11th Brigade Supply Column throughout, with marked success. 
 
 Major J. D. Moir, M.B., Royal Army Medical Corps.—Has commanded 
 the Brigade Hospital exceedingly well. 
 
 Major T. B. Winter, Royal Army Medical Corps.—Has carried out his 
 duties in command of the Bearer Company to everyone’s satisfaction. 
 
 The following Medical Officers—Captain N. Tyacke, Royal Army Medical 
 Corps, in medical charge of the Royal Lancaster Regiment, and Captain 
 R. J. W. Mawhinny, Roval Army Medical Corps—are worthy of honourable 
 mention. Also the following men : — 
 
 No. 8687 Private W. H. Yendall ~] 
 
 No. 9995 Private H. J. Waldron V Royal Army Medical Corps, 
 
 No. 9160 Private S. G. Murdoch J 
 of the 11th Brigade Field Hospital. 
 
io6 
 
 2nd Bn. Royal Lancaster Regiment. 
 
 Major F. B. Matthews.— Commanded the battalion from 24th February 
 until invalided home. He is a valuable Officer, of considerable influence, 
 which he exercises for the best interest of those under his command. 
 
 The following Officers, non-commissioned officer, and men are brought to 
 notice :— 
 
 Captain W. Sandbach. 
 
 Captain and Adjutant A. R. S. Martin. 
 
 Captain R. G. Parker. 
 
 Lieutenant J. A. Nixon. 
 
 No. 5226 Lance-Serjeant J. Donald (severely wounded). 
 
 No. 3156 Private C. Sach (wounded). 
 
 No. 2967 Private W. Fahy (killed). 
 
 2nd Bn. Lancashire Fusiliers. 
 
 Lieut.-Colonel C. J. Blomfield, D.S.O.—Has proved himself an excellent 
 Commanding Officer. 
 
 The following Officers merit special mention :— 
 
 Major F. Amber. 
 
 Major C. M. Brunker. 
 
 Major E. C. Tidswell. 
 
 Captain J. N. Whyte. 
 
 Captain and Adjutant A. J. Allardyce 
 Lieutenant D. F. Campbell. 
 
 As do— 
 
 No. 2308 Serjeant-Major W. Moss, and 
 No. 5880 Colour-Serjeant H. K. Coucliman 
 
 1st Bn. South Lancashire Regiment. 
 
 Lieut.-Colonel R. H. Hall.—Succeeded to the command of the battalion 
 when Lieut.-Colonel McCarthy-CfLeary was killed, and has commanded it 
 since. 
 
 The following Officers and men are specially mentioned :— 
 
 Major T. Lamb. 
 
 Major F. A. Adam. 
 
 Captain E. T. James. 
 
 Lieutenant and Adjutant A. H. Bailey. 
 
 Lieutenant H. R. Kane. 
 
 No. 1745 Colour-Serjeant T. A. Simon. 
 
 No. 3624 Private H. Bracken. 
 
 1st Bn. York and Lancaster Regiment. 
 
 Lieut.-Colonel W. J. Kirkpatrick has been at the head of this battalion 
 during the whole period of my command, and I have always felt the utmost 
 confidence in him. I strongly recommend him for consideration. 
 
 Major (now Lieut.-Colonel) E. P. Lousada has been promoted to another 
 battalion, but he merits mention as an excellent 2nd in Command. 
 
 The following merit special mention :— 
 
 Major H. S. Scholes. 
 
 Captain M. F. Halford. 
 
 Lieutenant H. R. Headlam. 
 
 Lieutenant A. H. C. Kearsley. 
 
Also the following non-commissioned officers 
 
 No. 1021 Colour-Serjeant F. Hulley. 
 
 No. 191 Quarter-Master-Serjeant J. Birch, and 
 
 No. 2777 Colour-Serjeant (Serjeant Instructor) D. Duff, 1st 
 Volunteer Battalion, who has set an excellent example. 
 
 Corps Troops. 
 
 Lieutenant A. Halsey, R.N., H.M.S. “ Philomel,” commanded the last 
 detachment of the Naval Brigade which was left with the Natal Field Force, 
 and. like all the rest of the Brigade, their services were most valuable. 
 
 Corps Artillery. 
 
 19th Battery. R.F.A. 
 
 Major R. D. Gubbins commanded this battery well. Through no fault of 
 his it had not the same number of opportunities that other batteries obtained. 
 The battery was a good one. 
 
 61st (Howitzer) Batter}', R.F.A. 
 
 Major A. Hamilton Gordon.—He is an exceptionally able Battery Com¬ 
 mander, and has an exceptional knowledge of howitzers. Cool and resourceful 
 in action, he is most careful of the comfort, both of his men and his horses. 
 I desire to commend his sendees in the strongest manner possible. 
 
 Lieutenant J. G. Dooner.—A very promising young Officer, and very cool 
 under fire. 
 
 The following non-commissioned officers deserve special mention :— 
 No, 78962 Serjeant E. Wilson, and No. 9981 Serjeant-Major W. Ayling. 
 
 Position Batteries. 
 
 Major F. A. Curteis, R.G.A., commanded the Brigade Division of Position 
 Batteries. An Officer of high professional attainments, he rendered valuable 
 assistance in organizing and equipping the heavy guns of position. I commend 
 him for your consideration. 
 
 Captain A. J. Budd acted as Adjutant, and proved himself a thoroughly 
 reliable Staff Officer. 
 
 Captain T. R. C. Hudson, 10th Mountain Battery, R.G.A., was in charge 
 of 12-pr. Q.F. guns, and did very well. 
 
 The work of No. 67391 Battery Quartcr-Master-Serjeant R. W. Richardson, 
 10th Mountain Battery, merits special mention. 
 
 Major C. E. Callwell, 16th Company, Southern Division, R.G.A., com¬ 
 manded a battery of 5-inch guns throughout. Major Callwell and his battery 
 rendered admirable service. 
 
 Captain R. E. Home showed considerable ability when detached in charge 
 of a section of 5-inch guns. 
 
 The following non-commissioned officers deserve special mention :— 
 No. 42609 Company Quarter-Master-Serjeant J. C. Greig and No. S7680 
 Bombardier T. Mahoney, 16th Company, Southern Division, R.G.A. 
 
 The 2nd Company, Western Division, R.G.A., did good service in the 
 field with guns of position. 
 
 2nd Lieutenant E. N. Tandy, No. 2 Company, Western Division. R.G.A., 
 was specially mentioned to me for his services when detached with two 12-pr. 
 Q.F. guns with a column under Lieut.-Colonel E. C. Bethune, 16th Lancers. 
 
 The 10th Company, Western Division, R.G.A., also did good service, and 
 Captain G. V. Davidson was always noticeable for the excellent manner in 
 which he handled his 12-pr. Q.F. guns. 
 
138 
 
 The 6th Company, Western Division, R.G.A., were in charge of 4'7-inch 
 guns and did very good service. The health of Major G. J. F. Talbot 
 unfortunately broke down, and he was succeeded by Captain F. Prendergast, 
 R.G A. (attached to the Company), who, with a capital knowledge of 
 practical gunnery, is cool and full of resource. I strongly recommend him 
 for consideration. 
 
 Corps Troops Ammunition Column 
 
 Major R. D. Findlay, R.F.A. — I consider Major Findlay one of the best 
 Officers I met. He was an admirable commander of an Ammunition Column, 
 loaded with ammunition of many different natures. His batteries were 
 complete every night, and he never made a mistake. He has all the qualifica¬ 
 tions for the Staff and for high command, and I desire to bring his name most 
 prominently to your notice as deserving of all consideration. 
 
 The following Officers who served in the Ammunition Column deserve 
 mention : — 
 
 Captain F. C. Poole. 
 
 Captain J. Byron. 
 
 Lieutenant H. W. Rewcome. 
 
 Divisional Ammunition Park. 
 
 Captain F. E. Patch, R.A.—Organized this Park in January, and up to 
 the relief of Ladysmith was the only Officer with it. He has commanded it 
 throughout, and there has never been a hitch in the supply, notwithstanding 
 the great difficulties of transport. He is an exceptionally able Officer, and his 
 services are deserving of special recognition. 
 
 Captain C. E. Hill, R.G. A. — Commanded a detachment of Vickers-Maxims, 
 and proved himself an able Officer. 
 
 Captain H. Cleeve, Army Service Corps, commanded the Corps Troops 
 Supply Column very satisfactorily throughout the campaign, and Lieut.-Colonel 
 J. A. W. Falls, Army Service Corps, has been nearly the whole time command¬ 
 ing the Supply Park, and has carried out this difficult duty well, and has shown 
 considerable tact in managing the strange mixture of individuals he has had 
 to deal with. 
 
 The Supply Park has been always up when due and never given any 
 trouble. The credit of this is due to Lieut.-Colonel Falls. 
 
 I cannot close this Report without alluding to the great assistance I have 
 received throughout the war from the Colonists in Ratal. Colonel (local 
 Brigadier-General) J. G. Dartnell, C.M.G., will, no doubt, report through the 
 proper channel upon the Ratal Volunteers. I can only say that their services 
 were invaluable to the Empire; that they took part in every engagement in 
 Ratal and willingly remained in the field, though at great inconvenience to 
 themselves, until they knew that their services could be spared. 
 
 I have dealt with the 1st Cavalry Brigade and some of the Irregular 
 Corps in a separate despatch of even date with this. 
 
 I have, &c., 
 
 REDVERS BULLER, General, 
 
 Late Commandimj Natal Army.