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DUKE 
 
 UNIVERSITY 
 
 LIBRARY 
 
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LETTER 
 
 TO A 
 
 FRIEND. 
 
 WHO RECEIVED HIS THEOLOGICAL EDUCATION 
 UNDER THE INSTRUCTION OF 
 
 DR. EMMONS, 
 
 CONCERNING THE DOCTRINE WHICH TEACHES 
 
 THAT IMPENITENT SINNERS HAVE NATURAL 
 
 POWER TO MAKE THEMSELVES 
 
 NEW HEARTS. 
 
 BY NATHANIEL NILES, A. M. 
 
 , WINDSOR : 
 
 fRlNTED BY ALDEN SPOONER. 
 1809. 
 
A LETTER, &c. 
 
 DEAR SIR, 
 
 Wi 
 
 ERE it in my power, I lliould very freely 
 comply with your requell that I would inform you 
 of my opinion whether the Doctrine of the natural 
 power of impenitent fmners to renew their own 
 hearts, as it is taught by Drs. Emmons, Spring, and 
 Crane be founded in truth ; but I cannot do it, for 
 indeed I am wholly at a lofs as to their real meaning. 
 They are thought to agree with each other, refpecling 
 this doctrine, yet they do not, I think, agree in their 
 manner of ftating it j feveral of the terms they ufe are 
 ambigious, and I am not able to decide what the very 
 point is, to which they defign to direct their argu- 
 ments. 
 
 But although I cannot give an opinion on the point 
 you propofe, I will ftate fome of the occafions of mv 
 doubt, more diftinctly than I have already done. In do- 
 ing this, I will endeavor to explain fome of the terms 
 which are ufed by thofe who treat on this fubject — 
 remark on the manner in which thefe gentlemen 
 treat it-— on the arguments they employ, and on the 
 probable confequences of this doctrine as it is propof- 
 ed by thefe gentlemen. 
 
 I. I propofe to explain fom.e of the terms ufed in 
 the common difcuflion of this fubjeci. 
 
 I. By the term heart , as it is ufed in mor- 
 als, different writers feem to mean different things. 
 Some intend no more than a certain clafs of mental 
 
4 A LETTER TO A FRIEKD, 
 
 operations and exercifcs ; all the operations of that 
 faculty which they call the will and no other, are in- 
 cluded in this clafs. Others confider the heart as fomc- 
 thing antecedent to all thefe operations — as a prop- 
 erty or aptitude of the mind to become the fubjed, 
 or if you pleafe the agent in thefe operations. The 
 importance of this difference of meaning would fliow 
 itfelf, were we to debate the queftion whether men 
 have the power to make themfelves new hearts ; be- 
 caufe, if all the operations of this clafs arife from, 
 and therefore prefuppofe a heart, it is naturally impof- 
 fible that the heart fhould be made by any of thefe 
 operations. Effeds cannot produce their caufes. While 
 on fuppofition, that the heart is exercife and nothing 
 eU'e, it is poilible to conceive that we might be faid, 
 although improperly, to make our hearts by anteced- 
 ent exercifes. It is in the nature of things ms poilible 
 tor one to will to will, as it is to will to move. It 
 does not feem impofiible for God to make a law of 
 mental operation according to which willing to will, 
 fliouldas certainly be followed by willing, as willing 
 to move our hands is followed by the motion willed. 
 The heart we arc fpeaking of is termed new, be- 
 caufe it fupercedes a difl^erent kind of heart. The heart 
 which is common to all the natural defcendants of Ad- 
 am, as foon as they have a moral being, is wholly finful; 
 whereas that wliich fupercedes it when perfons un- 
 dergo a faving change, is holy, So that, if by heart, we 
 intend no more than fuch a general temper or ftate of 
 the mind, as prepares it to bring forth affections i^nd 
 volitions ; by a new heart will be meant, fuch an one 
 as prepares it to bring forth holy affections and voli- 
 tions. But if we mean by a heart, nothing befides 
 affections and volitions, then by a new heart we ftiall 
 intend no more than holy affections and volition. Ac- 
 cordingly the very firft holy exercife is called a new- 
 heart ; the perfon who is the fubject of this fingle 
 exercife is faid to have a new heart, and he hs^s no 
 
A LETTER TO A FSIEXS, 5 
 
 more than a new heart after he has been the fubjcct of 
 ever fo many holy exercifes. All thefe exercifes would 
 conilitute but one new heart. 
 
 Since then the very firft holy exercife is a new- 
 heart, and fmce many people feem to place the great 
 difficulty which they think there is in effecling a 
 change of character, from linful to holy, in the pro- 
 duction of this firtt exercife, we may, with both fafe* 
 ty and advantage, limit our notion of a new heart, 
 to this firft holy exercife, when we enquire whether 
 ilnners have power to make themfelvcs new hearts. 
 By doing this we may fave ourfclvcs from being mif- 
 led by a confufion and multiplicity of objc<5ls, 
 :ind fliow others that we are attending to the v^ery 
 qucftion which they wifli to feeiilucidaied. ^^8^ 
 
 3. The term 'vuill isfometimes ufed to cxprefs what 
 has been called the faculty of willing and fomctimes, 
 willing itfrlf. Some confider the faculty of will, as 
 the preparation, or fittedrefs of the mind to be the 
 iubjeft both of its various affections, and alfo of its ef- 
 forts to perform bodily actions, or to produce any 
 otlicr effect. Thofe who give it this extenfive figni- 
 ficaiion ufc it alfo in the fame extent, to fignify men- 
 tal exercifes, as well the various affections luch as lov- 
 ing, and hating, hoping and fearing, repenting and be- 
 jieving, as the efforts made by the mind to produce 
 effects, fuch as bodily motion, 8:c. I (hall at prefent fup- 
 pofe the term will to have fuch, and fo extenfive 
 a meaning. 
 
 4. The term tnake needs explanation. When one 
 is dire<^ed to make any thing, as the mechanic makes 
 his wares, he will confider himfelf as being directed 
 to produce it of defign. This fuppofes a preceding vo- 
 lition to produce the very effed required. Without 
 fuch volition he would not comply with the requifition, 
 nor if the event required fliould take place, without 
 his previous defign to produce it, would it be imput- 
 ed to him. So that the pcrfon 7?iak'mg, is faid to be the 
 
6 A LETTER TO A FRIEND. 
 
 caufe, and the thing made, an cfFed, caufcd by his wiL 
 ling it. The pcrfon, however, is not thought to be in 
 the higheft and moft proper fenfe the efficient caufe : 
 but he is fuch in the higheft fenfe in which creatures 
 are efficient caufes. Such feems to be the more com^ 
 mon meaning of this term. But, 
 
 There is another ufe of this term which ought to 
 be particularly noticed. God requires fmners to make 
 themfelves a new heart and a right %)irit. The thing 
 intended by this command feems to have been ex- 
 prelTcd by our Saviour when he faid be ye holy. Dr. 
 Crane, appears fometimes to have underftood the 
 command to make a new heart, in this fenfe, and not 
 to underftand the making required, to confift in pro- 
 ducing a new heart of previous defign, but in- V\s, ac- 
 ceptation, the having of thofe exercifes which he feems 
 to fuppofe, conftitute the new heart, is the very mak- 
 ing mX.tTid.cd. Of repentance, faith, and love to God, 
 he fays, " Thcfe exercifes are making a new heart." 
 Suppofing then that I underftand this reprefentation of 
 Dr^ Crane, and that he gives the true meaning of 
 the term make as it is ufcd in the conimand requiring 
 linners to make them new hearts, it feems highly 
 proper and needful that we fliould conftantly and 
 clearly diftinguifti this meaning from the former, both 
 when we enquire v^tiether, and in what fenfe linners 
 have power to make themfelves new hearts ; and when 
 we examine a multitude of paffages, which feem to be 
 of the fame import with that laft mentioned. The im- 
 portance of applying this diftinclion in thefe cafes will 
 appear in a ftrong light if we coniider that without 
 it we fhould be in danger of afcribing the fame iden-r 
 tical operation I and in the fame fenfe both to God and 
 man. 
 
 To make a new heart in the firft fenfe, is reprefent- 
 ed in fcripture as one of thofe works which are pecu- 
 liar to God ; while to have a new heart and holy ex- 
 ercifes and affedions, belongs to the renewed finneff 
 
A LErrER ro a frienb, y 
 
 6od indeed caufes them but he is not the fubject of 
 them. The renewed perfon is the fubjeft but not th« 
 caufe of them. 
 
 If we do not bear in mind this difference of mean- 
 ing, it is eafy to conceive that we are in danger of in- 
 fering from the fcriptures, either that God wills and 
 feels in us, that which he requires us to will and feel ; 
 or elfe, that he requires of us to caufe in ourfelves 
 what HE alone can caufe in' us. It is believed that thia 
 confuiion may be effeflually avoided by a due appli- 
 cation of this diftinction between the different fcnfes 
 of the term make, and of others of the fame import. 
 
 5. If any term employed by Metaphyficians need 
 explanation it muft be the term power, I fliall how- 
 ever attempt no further explanation of it than what 
 relates to the fuppofcd power of finners to make them- 
 fclves new hearts. 
 
 I conceive of but two kinds of power predicable of 
 the human mind, which can any way affedl the fub- 
 je<fl before us. One of thefe confifts in mental proper- 
 ties, or qualities. The other in a connexion eftabliflied 
 by our Maker between cur imperate acts of willing, 
 and their direcl objects. The diftinction between 
 thefe, is very obvious. The firft confift in what may 
 be confidered as going to conftitute each individual 
 mind fuch as it is in itfelf, the other is a mere relation 
 between two objects, namely, a volition to do a cer- 
 tain action, or to produce a certain effect, and the 
 confequent occurrence of fuch a<n:ion or effect. 
 
 I. One kind of human power confifts in the prop- 
 erties or qualities of the individuals of the fpecies. Our 
 faculties of underftanding, of feeling pleafure and pain, 
 and of willing are fo many properties of our minds. 
 By thefe we are fitted to become the fubje^ts of certain 
 operations and eft'eds. We are fitted to perceive under 
 given circumftances, external objects ; to feel pleafure 
 and pain ; and to will fuch and fuch bodily motions 
 and mental attention, and operations. Thefe facul- 
 
A LETTER TO A fRIEI^D* 
 
 tics are indeed called powers of the mind ; and a* 
 each has its diftincl: office each is diftinguiflied from 
 the other by a different denomination. The under^ 
 {landing is called tht power of perception^ underjianding 
 he. the faculty of feeling plcafure and pain, is the 
 power of feeling them, and xhc faculty of will is called 
 the power of willing. This laft is never called the 
 power of perceiving, knowing or underftanding ; nor 
 have we been ufed to call the firfl a power or ability 
 of willing. If then repenting, believing, and loving, be 
 fo many acls of willing, it feems hardly proper to call 
 the underftanding whether it be ftrong, or weak, a 
 power, of loving, repenting and believing, becaufe wc 
 Ihould in that cafe, call it a power of willing. 
 
 By thefc properties we are capable of becom- 
 ing holy. They are qualifications fitting us to be fub- 
 jects of holy operations, and they are indifpenfible 
 prerequifities to holinefs : But they are no otherwife 
 powers than are the properties of matter. The pro- 
 perties of every fpecies of animal, of each kind of ve- 
 gitable, and of each portion of dead matter, fit them 
 refpectively, to become fubjects of certain operations 
 and effe(5ts. So that in this refped, our faculties and 
 properties although they are of different fpecies, are of 
 the fame general nature with them. 
 
 As we cannot will an object without fome concep- 
 tion of it, fo perhaps, we could not be endowed with 
 the faculty of willing without the faculty of conceiv- 
 ing, which is the faculty of underftanding. This fa- 
 culty, although it conftitutes in part our fitnefs to will, 
 is not of itfelf enough. Its actual operations which 
 depend on and flow from the faculty, are additio- 
 nal and needful preparatories to willing. They pre- 
 pare us to become fubjecls of vt'illing, but they do not 
 cnfure it. They are indifpenfible prerequifites, but 
 they do not bring the object within our power. — 
 Other things are as effentialy prerequifites as thefe,but 
 we never call them powers. Our being, the act of 
 
 \ 
 
A LETTER TO A FRIENS, 9 
 
 our Maker in giving it, and his own being are each of 
 them as eflential prerequifites, as either the faculty or 
 operations of underftanding •, but this circumftance 
 would not juftify us in calling them our power of 
 loving, repenting, &c. Like the underftanding and 
 its operations ; the faculties of willing and feeling 
 pleafure and pain, and fome of their operations are 
 neceffarily preiiippofed, in ©ur power to perform the 
 ordinary adions ofdife, as the mechanical powers are 
 prefuppofed in fome of the effeds produced in confe- 
 quence of human volition. But even that volition 
 itfelf which aims direcflly at fome eftecf, and imme- 
 diately precedes it, is not the power by which it is pro- 
 duced. There muU be fomething more than this, 
 for we often find that the event does not follow upon 
 our willing it. The a6t of willing has indeed been 
 confidered as a particular kind, and has obtained the 
 name of power. And to diftinguiih it from other 
 powers, it has been termed moral power. It deferves 
 a more particular attention. # 
 
 Whatever there is in man of a moral nature 
 has been denominated ?noral power. Each moral quali- 
 ty or property ; each affection and volition has been 
 called a moral power, to do theife things toward which 
 they feverally point. Thus the holy quality or tem- 
 per of mind is a moral power in the perfon to become 
 a fubjecl of holy affedlions ; holy affedions, or imma- 
 nent acts of the will, as fome call them, are fo many 
 moral powers, to put forth, or exert, impcratc afts, 
 which are fuch as have for their obje(fis fome change 
 or eflfeft, fuch as bodily motion, and direction of the 
 attention to fuch fubje<5ts as we choofe ; and each of 
 thefeimperate ads of the will, which are more com- 
 monly called volitions, is denominated a moral power, 
 to produce the effed willed. 
 
 The epithet morale ufed in thefe inftances, is expref- 
 fivc of the morality of the thing which is called a pow- 
 er. The volitien, which is called a moral power, is 
 
 B 
 
10 A LETTLR TO A TRIENH. 
 
 denominated a power, to exprcfs fome relation it bears 
 to the occurrence of tlie event willed, as that of a 
 preparative, or prerequifite to the occurrence of the 
 event willed, or fome other relation. T his fame vo- 
 lition is called morale to indicate tliat it is of a moral 
 nature, — that it bears fome relation to the rule of 
 moral reclitude-^-that it is holy or fmful. The term 
 7noral is employed to diilinguiih the volition, affec- 
 tion or temper, from every thing which is not of a. 
 moral nature. It is not defigned as any mark of dif- 
 tinclion between that which conftitutes thefe voli- 
 tions, &c. fo many /Jczt'dT-f, and that which conftitutes 
 other natural powers, nor to diftinguifii the nature of 
 this power from the nature of other powers. Al- 
 though iht faculty of willing, is called the moral facul- 
 ty, and volition a moral power, yet this faculty, and 
 its operations, ftiil hold the fame rank in the fame 
 Ciafs of powers, with the faculty of underftanding and 
 its operations. The only difference between them, is 
 this. The heart and its operations are of a moral na- 
 ture, but the intelleft and its operations are not. Ev- 
 ery thing that could be properly intended by calling 
 volition a moral power, would be as fully obtained 
 by calling it a moral exercife. The morality of the 
 exercife, produces no change in the power which con- 
 fiftji in this exercife. Whether volition were or were 
 not of a moral nature, it would, under the notion of 
 a power, be ftill the fame. Some volitions are holy, and 
 Ibme fmful ; but this difference in their morality, oc- 
 cafions no difference either in the nature or extent of 
 the power. A good he^rt fends forth good ftreams — 
 bears good fruit. An evil heart fends out evil ftreams, 
 bears evil fruit. Each is equally adipted ro the produc- 
 tion of its proper fruit. Analogoufly,if the heart were 
 not of a moral nature, it would, neverthelefs, like the 
 good and evil heart, and with equal fpontanioufnefs, 
 bring forth its proper fruits. The morality of a voli- 
 tion neither ftrengthens nor marrs its connexion with 
 the objed at which it directly aims. 
 
A LETTER TO A FRIZXD. I I 
 
 From thcfe remarks it appears, that altlioiigli voli- 
 tion is a moral object, it is alfo a natural poiusr. J/: is 
 one of thofe prerequifites and preparatives which all 
 •taken together conltitute that difcription of natural 
 power to which we liave already attended. 
 
 If that kind of power which confifts in faculties and 
 capacities, means, preparatives, or prerequifites to 
 the efTecl, be natural power, the want of thefe is want 
 of naiural power. Since therefore the faculty of wil- 
 ling and its operations are of this difcription, the want 
 of them, or any one ©f them which is a neceffary pre- 
 requiiite, if it be needful to the production of any ef- 
 fed: according to the eftablifhed laws of nature, is an 
 inftance of natural impotency. I muft repeat, that 
 volition is not called a power becaufe of its moral na- 
 ture. It does not derive its quality of power from 
 this nature, nor does its morality arife from, nor de- 
 pend on its quality of power, (if indeed it be a quali- 
 ty.) It is, a tiling in its own nature moral ; it alfo 
 lerves as a mean to facilitate the production of ef- 
 fe<5ts, in the fame manner as knowledge, or any other 
 mean ferves this purpofe. Whether this power of vo- 
 lition be effectual or ineffectual, its moral nature is ftill 
 the fame, and whether it be virtuous or vicious, its 
 efficacy is the fame. A piece of gold has feveral very 
 different attributes. It has Intrinlic worth ; it has a 
 beautiful colour ; is remarkably heavy ; it anfwcrs 
 its proper ftandard ; it| ferves as a currency j it may be 
 employed as a itandard weight. It has then very dif- 
 ferent attributes and may be applied to very different 
 purpofes. We may not fay that iince it is money, it 
 cannot be a true weight in the fcale. But it would be 
 no more abfurd to lay thus, than it is to fay volition, 
 or any moral affection, cannot be a natural power, 
 becaufe it is a moral object. Whether they were pow- 
 ers or not, they would ftill be the fame moral objects, 
 equally approvable or cenfurable by confcienee and by 
 God, and equally proper objects of complacence or 
 
3 2 A LETTER TO A FRIEND. 
 
 averfion. From thcfe confidcrations, it feems to mc 
 evident, that afFe6lions, volitions, &c. may be called 
 natural powers in the fame fenfe in which perception, 
 knowledge, intelligence, memory, or any other pro- 
 perty of the foul may be fo called. Of courfc, the 
 want of them, where they are needful to an effed, 
 may as properly be pronouftced a defed, of natural 
 power, as may the want of underftanding or bodily 
 itrength. It alfo feems as evident that, conlidering 
 them in this light does not at all derogate from their 
 morality. 
 
 All things, whether agents, actions or patients, 
 have natural qualities, properties and attributes. Ac- 
 tions as well as fubftances have attributes, and influ- 
 ences which are not of a moral nature. Morality is 
 only a particular quality belonging to rational beings 
 and their exercifes only. 
 
 I have dwelt the longer on this fubjecl becaufeit 
 fccms to me not to have been fufEciently attended to. 
 
 It is no doubt a perfectly correct opinion that in 
 many cafes tkc want of competent underftanding or 
 bodily ftrength, ought to be received as agoodexcufc 
 for not having performed certain actions ; although 
 the want of heart orwill, would not furnifh even afha- 
 dow of excufe. The reafon of this difference docs not 
 appear to be what is often alledged, that in one cafe 
 the power which was v;anted was natural, and in the 
 Other moral ; but that in one cafe, there was a good, 
 and in the other a bad heart. Therefore the failure 
 in one was not imputed, while that of the other was. 
 The reafon is obvious. If the failure be in the will, 
 it is a moral failure, and not the lefs fo becaufe there is 
 alfo in the fame failure of the will a natural defed: of 
 power. But it there be no failure in the will, there is 
 no moral failure or defect. The will is prefent both 
 in its natural and moral capacity ; but as a power, is 
 deferted by other natural powers, without the accef- 
 Con of which, it is infuiScient. No blame therefore 
 
A LETTER TO A FRIEKB, l^ 
 
 ought to attach here. . It ought to attach only and 
 always to moral deie^, or wrong. 
 
 To account for the fad that impenitent finners do 
 not become holy, fome have thought it fuflicient to 
 fay, that they are deftitute of a moral power to become 
 holy. By this muft be meant thac they arc not wil- 
 ling, or, to exprefs it otherwife, that they have no vi- 
 lition to become holy; becaufe moral power to be 
 holy and volition to be holy, intend the fame thing. 
 Let us flop a moment to obfcrve fome of the bearings 
 of this opinion. 
 
 Moral impotency confifts in want of fome certain 
 volition. For what is this volition needful in the 
 prefentcafe ? To conftitnte Iiolinefs ? or to produce \t, as 
 I produce motion in my hand by a volition ? I fee no 
 need of any volition in this cafe, except to anfwer one 
 of thefe purpofes. 
 
 Is the meaning this ? If the {inner had the needful 
 volition, it would conftitutehim a holy perfon. If fo, 
 the volition is both a power to be holy, and the very 
 holinefs for which the power was needed. This is the 
 fame as to fay, the reafon why the man is not holy, is, 
 that he is not holy. It is to fay, the thing done is the 
 proper power of doing it. And the want of the thing 
 itfclf is the inability of the man to do it. 
 
 Is the meaning this ? If the fmner, while impeni- 
 tent, fhould have a volition to become holy, he would 
 in confequence, become holy. If fuch be the mean- 
 ing, then an unholy volition is fuppofed to be the ac- 
 tion by which holinefs is or may be produced. Ac- 
 cording to this opinion, the moral power of Calvini/is^ 
 leaps at a (ingle bound, over precipices and gulfs, to 
 pafs which, cofts \.\\q fclf-dctcrmhiing power oi Jnniniam 
 much time, many a tugging, weary ftep, and many 
 a dreadful plunge and painful bruifing. 
 
 According to the firft meaning fuppofed, the pow- 
 er comes too late j as it does not arrive until the eflPecl 
 propofed has taken place j or elfe there is at Icaft one 
 
14 yi LirtlR ro A FRIEND* 
 
 holy volition before the firft. According to the latter 
 meaning, moral power to produce liolinefs is a lin ; 
 becaufe all the volitions of the impenitent are fuppof- 
 €d to be fins. 
 
 Thefe remarks if correft, fliow, (ist.) that howev- 
 er proper it may be to call difpofition, affection or vo- 
 lition moral power ^ it ought not to be underflood, that 
 by giving them this name, we deny that they are nat- 
 ural powers of the fame general kind with other 
 properties, and operations of the mind. They are all 
 alike preparations, and prerequifites to our being fub- 
 jecls of certain operations and effects, and alfo for the 
 production of effects by us. (2d.) They fhow that it is at 
 onceaseafy and more familiar, literal and intelligible to 
 fay, one has a difpofition, or volition, or that he is wil- 
 ling to do a thing, than to fay he has moral power to 
 do it ; and to fay he is not willing, than to fay he is 
 morally unable, or that he labours under a moral im- 
 potence with refpect to doing it — to fay that a bad 
 heart is a wicked thing, than to fay that a bad heart 
 is moral inability to do right, and that a moral inabil- 
 ity to do right is a wicked thing. 
 
 Having attempted to explain why, and in what 
 fenfe mental faculties, capacities, and operations are 
 denominated powers, and why they are faid to be 
 natural, and alfo in what fenfe bodily ftrength is call- 
 ed a natural power, I will proceed, 
 
 2. To explain another and very different fort of 
 power, namely, that which confifts in a fure connex- 
 ion between thofe efforts of mind to produce fome 
 change, which arecommcnly called volitions, and thofe 
 changes or events which we will to produce. This 
 is that power by which we perform the ordinary ac- 
 tions of life, and produce the other ordinary effects 
 of willing. When an action or event takes place up- 
 on my willnig it, 1 fay I had power to perform it. If I 
 have willed it, and it does not take place, I fay I had 
 not power to do or effect it. When I believe it would 
 
, A LETTER TO A FHIEND, J^ 
 
 take place in confequence of my willing it, I fay I 
 have power to do or perform it : but if I believe it 
 would not take place although I fliould will it, I 
 fay I have not power to perform or effect it. We have 
 power over thofe events and thofe only, which are in 
 fuch a fenfe under the controul of our will, as that 
 they take place, or do not take place according as wc 
 will them to be or not to be. 
 
 This kind of power involves three diftincl and very 
 different ideas, or notions, namely of a volition, of 
 its dired: object, and of a fure connexion between 
 them. 
 
 The connexion may be thus defcribcd : The vo- 
 lition defigning the event, is an antecedent to the 
 event : The event is a confequent of the volition. 
 As antecedent and confequent they are fo bound to- 
 gether by the laws of nature that the antecedent can 
 never happen without being followed by the confe- 
 quent effed. But to explain this fubjecl more fully 
 it muft be remarked ; 
 
 ( I .) That the volition muft be attended with certain 
 circumftances. For the production of events agreea- 
 bly to the laws of nature, in many cafes, a variety of 
 means muft be called into operation. Thefe means 
 may be under the control of my will, and yet I may, 
 not apply them ; now, if omitting to apply them, I 
 will the event, it may not follow. Still the event may 
 be connected, in the fenfe intended with my wil- 
 ling it. It is in my option whether to apply the mean* 
 or not. If I apply them, the refult will prove that 
 there was a connexion between my willing and the 
 event willed. When it is faid that this kind of power 
 confifts in this connexion, it is fuppofed that all the 
 needful means are applied ; and that the application 
 of them is under the controul of my wlil : Otherwife 
 I may will an event which is, in the fenfe intended, 
 within my power, and yet it may not follow. All this 
 notwithftanding, the event may be dependent on, and 
 
1 6 A LsrrEJi TO a friend. 
 
 conne6lcd with my willing it : for if I really will it, 
 or choofe, all things confidered, to have it take place j 
 I fhall alfo choofe to apply all thofe means, which feem 
 to me to be needful. 
 
 (2.) An event which is not under the control of jny 
 will, may be brought about immediately after my 
 willing it, by fome other fecondary agent, and in fuch 
 a manner, as to appear to me to be the proper refult, 
 and effect of my own volition. But the connexion in 
 this cafe would be accidental, and not ftated and efta- 
 bliflied. Such a connexion would not be the power 
 fpoken of. 
 
 It has been already obferved that the power we arc 
 confidering is that which we have to perform the or- 
 dinary actions of life. I wifh this may be particularly 
 noticed, and that this opinion may be fairly canvafed. 
 I believe it is univerfally faid, where the Englifli lan- 
 guage is fpoTs:en, that one cannot do a thing when it 
 would not follow upon his willing it. Such a perfon is 
 faid either to have loft his power, or not to have any, 
 with refped to that event. Perfons frequently fay 
 they believe they can, or ha^'-e power to do fuch and 
 fuch things. What they mean is neither more 
 nor lefs than that they believe the propofed event 
 would follow, if they ihould will it. When children 
 are told that thev can do one thing, but that they can- 
 not do another ; they underftand the meaning to be 
 that the firft would follow upon their willing it, and 
 that the hll would not. Such, undoubtedly, is the 
 moft common and proper meaning, and acceptation 
 of the terms, power, want of power, ability, inability, 
 can, and cannot. 
 
 It is however obfervable that in order to judge 
 whether we can or cannot, we with more or lefs at- 
 tention confider what means are needful, and wheth- 
 er they are under the control of our wills : The reafon 
 of our attending more explicitly to the means, feems 
 to be a fettled aiTurance that if all the needful meanS 
 
A LETTER TO A FRIENB» 1 J 
 
 be applied, the connexion between our willing the 
 event and its occurrence, is afcertained. By know- 
 ing the means we have to effe6t the propofed object, we 
 find means of deciding whether the event would fol- 
 low upon our willing it. So that in all its prelimina- 
 ry inquiries, concerning means, the mind is ftill look- 
 ing forward to the queftion whether the event would 
 follow upon its being willed. 
 
 If the power I have now endeavored to explain, is 
 the object to which the attention of every one is na- 
 turally turned, when he is told, that he has power to do 
 this or that, thofe who tell him fo, furely ought to be 
 careful not to affix to it any different meaning. They 
 ought not to teach us that we have the/ame power to 
 produce any effect that we have to perform the com- 
 mon actions of life, if they mean any other power 
 than that which has now been explained ; becaufe this 
 is the power by which, mankind, generally, if not u- 
 niverfally, believe fuch actions are performed. 
 
 From the foregoing obfervations, it feems evident 
 that two very different kinds of power belong toman : 
 one of which confifls in properties, qualities, capacities, 
 faculties both of body and mind, together with their 
 feveral operations, and in fhort,all the neceffary means 
 of producing effe(fts ; the other, confifts in a fure con- 
 nexion between willing an event and its occurrence. 
 The powers of the firft kind, are prefuppofed in thelaft. 
 If any one of them be wanting, the connexion fails. 
 
 I affert mypoffeflionof two of thefirftkindof powers, 
 by faying, I have underftanding and bodily ftrength ; 
 but I do not in this way exprefs the latter power. To 
 exprefs //, I fay, if I will any propofed bodily adion, 
 or other event, it will follow. The firft powers arc 
 means, thelaft a mere relation between two objects. 
 
 The terms can,ab/e, ab'Jity^ feem to convey an idea of 
 that power which volition has over events, and not 
 any property, or means ; or, if they are expreffive of 
 thcfe, they comprehend all the means needful t« 
 
 C 
 
I 3 ' A LE7TER TO A fHIEI^D. 
 
 conftitute the complex or ccnecllve-power whkh Iia's 
 been noticed, and intimate that, rJI thefe means, be- 
 ing ready, the queltion, whether the event ihalltake 
 pluce, or not, lies to be decided by the will. 
 
 The phrafe, you ca?i if yon will, feems to delign two 
 things, (i.) that nothing but a volition to produce the 
 fuppofed event, is wanting. (2.) That fuch a volition 
 is aji indifpeniible link in the chain of thofe caufes 
 which muft precede the event. Hence, it feems im- 
 proper to fay, you can be holy, or repent, love, be- 
 lieve, he. if you willy when our meaning might be fully 
 expreffed by faying, if you had fuch volitions as con- 
 ftitute repentance, love, and faith, you would have 
 thefe graces. 
 
 II. I now proceed to make fome fuch remarks on 
 the manner in which the gentlemen you named, treat 
 the fubje6l of the power of finners to make themfelves 
 new hearts, as will, in fome meafure, account for the 
 doubts I entertain refpecling their real meaning. 
 
 I fiiall prefume thefe gentlemen, and others who 
 are generally tliought to agree with them in opinion 
 re^pecling the fubje6l in queftion, really agree, 
 although they do not ufe the fame phrafiology. On 
 this prefumption I ihall coniider what one fays, as ex- 
 preiimg the fentiments of the whole body. I fhall 
 not however, rak: this liberty in any inftance in which 
 I believe the lentiir.ent may not be fairly deduced from 
 what the gentlemen have advanced. 
 
 f . Ihefe gentlemen fay, almoft, in fo many words, 
 that hnpeniteat finners have the fame power to make 
 themfelves new hearts, and work out their own falva- 
 tion, which they have to perform the ordinary adions 
 of life, and that they can as eafily perform the one as 
 the other. Such pofitions, if taken by themfelves, 
 would lead us to believe that what they mean to ex- 
 prefs, is, that a new heart would as certainly follow 
 upon its being willed, as the motion of our hands fol- 
 lows a will to move them. Dr. Crane moft evidently 
 
A LET'TER TO .A FJilEXD* I^ 
 
 talks, throughout his two fermons on this fubjecl, in a 
 firain like this. Br. Spring, in his Difquifttions, gives 
 us two explanations of what he intends by natural 
 power. One of them is as follows. " For, natural 
 inability confitls in being unable to do a thing, when 
 we caimot do it if we will, bccaufe of foine imped- 
 ing defcft or obftacle that is cxtriniic to the will." 
 This is, indeed, rather an account of inability than of 
 power, but according to it, natural power mull be a- 
 bility to do a thing if we will. Says Dr. Crane, " All 
 the invitations of the gofpel evidently fuppofe that 
 linners can iftbey will, obey all the divine commands.'* 
 Again, fpeaking of finners he fays, '*• They are natu- 
 rally as able to make themfelves new hearts as the) are 
 to perform any fervice." Dr. Emmons fays in his 
 fecond fermon on Eph. ii,i2, 13, '* They (Unnert.) 
 are as able to work out their own falvation, as to per- 
 form the common actions of life.'* Again, " Thefe" 
 (fcripture) " limilitudes plainly fuppofe ihat every {in- 
 ner is as able to embrace the gofpel, as a thirily man 
 is to drink water, or an hungry man to cat the molt 
 delicious food." On thefe paflages I remark, that they 
 evidently fuppofe, and fome of them plainly exprefs, 
 that fmners are as able to be holy, and to come to 
 Chrill, as they are to perform any of the common 
 actions of life. When fmners arefaid to ht as able, I 
 conceive the meaning to be, that tli/ey have all the fame 
 powers and in as great perfection, to be holy, to love 
 God, and to embrace Chrift, which they have to eat 
 their food, and drink their liquors. Now, wich re- 
 fpect to the ordinary actions of life, fmners have fuch 
 a power over them, that if they will the actions, the 
 aciions certainly follow. This is that power which 
 we have to perform the common, voluntary, ex- 
 ternal, actions of Ufe. The quotation from Dr. Spring 
 is ot the fame import. He pleads, that fmners have 
 natural power to do their duty in all its parts, and 
 evidently places their power in a connexion between 
 
20 A LErrSR TO A TRIEtJt. 
 
 their willing to perform an adion, and the taking 
 place of the ad:ion willed. 
 
 In the arguments ufed by Dr. Crane, and Dr. Em- 
 mons, the lame notion of power is held up. Dr. 
 Crane's third argument is thus propofed. " All im- 
 penitent finners have as much natual power to per- 
 form any religious duty as they have to commit any 
 fin." Again he fays, " Every hnner is in pofleiTion of 
 ^^^the natural power which he needs, in order to look 
 to Chrift." Every linner then, has that power which 
 we have to perform the common actions of life. 
 
 Thefe gentlemen believe, that linners are criminal 
 for not repenting. No doubt they are ; but they 
 fuppofe that fmners could not be criminal for not re- 
 penting, if they had not the fame power to repent, 
 which a hungry man has to eat his food, or tq. per- 
 torm any other ordinary action of life. To eftablifli 
 this point they introduce the divine declaration that a 
 " man is accepted, according to what he hath, and not 
 according to what he hath not.*' By this they do fhow 
 that if a man has no feet, he is not criminal for not 
 ufmg them, and they 2Moatte?npt to fliow that if a man 
 have not all the natural power to love God, repent of 
 lin, and believe in Chrift, which we have to perform 
 the ordinary actions of life, he is not criminal for 
 not being the fubject of thefe holy ex.ercifes. Now 
 laying all this together, it is at firft blulh, very difficult 
 not to believe that by the power which they fay fm- 
 ners have to make themfelves new hearts, is intend- 
 ed that which confifts in a fure connexion between 
 willing an event and the event willed. But this pow- 
 er, if it does not conjiji in the connexion fo often men- 
 tioned, to fay the leatt, certainly hnplies it. This pow- 
 er is never found where the following things are not, 
 viz. a will to do fomething, and a view or conception 
 of the aftioa or thing to be done, and a connexion 
 between the wilHng, and the thing vi^illed. The pow- 
 er to raife my hand, can never be manifefted or real- 
 
A LETTER TO A FRIEKD, £1 
 
 ifed, untill I "will to raife it, and it rifes in confe- 
 quence of the volition. Wherever this power is, the 
 the willing,and the objed willed, (both which are fup- 
 pofed in the power,) are different from each other. I 
 know that one very great man feems, at an unlucky 
 moment, not to have adverted to this circumftance al- 
 though it is a very important one in confidering the 
 fubje<5t of the finners power to be holy. It alfo fecms to 
 me that many others have been mifledby not attend- 
 ing to it. 1 can hardly doubt but that fome have been 
 lb far deceived by the term uv/V as to pafs this diflinc- 
 tion without notice. When it is faid we can if we 
 -Tf/V/, move our limbs, they conclude that it may be faid, 
 in the lame fcnfe, that we can repent if we will. They 
 think of repenting under the notion of willing, and 
 give the fame meaninq; to both. According to their 
 conceptions, if I have that act of willing which they 
 call repentance, then I do repent, but to compare 
 'Lvilling 1 repent ^■wixh. willing to //)^^/(',the willing and re- 
 penting, ought to be as diftincl, and as clearly diftin- 
 guiflied irom each other, as ivil/ing to fpeak, is, from 
 fteaking. The repentance muft be the objeft of the 
 willing, and if 1 have the fame power to repent 
 which I have to perform the common actions of life, 
 i can by an antecedent volition, infure my confe- 
 quent repentance. Let us then fuppofe an impenitent 
 iinner to have this power to exert his firft aft of re- 
 penting. IJis ad: of willing to repent, muft precede 
 his firil act of repenting, as my willing to move my 
 hand precedes its motions. (3f confequence, his tuU- 
 ling to repent, is not repentance but an acl of his impen- 
 itent mind, and therefore wholly fmful. If then thefe 
 gentlemen mean as they fay, they muft believe that 
 the ftnner can, by his fmful volition, produce repen- 
 tance in the fame fenfc in which 1 produce motion in 
 my hand, that is, by willing it. 
 
 This is the conclufion to which we are conduded 
 by that part of what thefe gentlemen fay on this fub- 
 
a* A LsrriR ro a friind, 
 
 je<?l, which has been noticed above; and paying n4 
 attention to any thing elfe they may have faid, we 
 ihould ealily nndcrftand them. 
 
 But there are confiderations, befides thofe fuggefted 
 by the general opinions, and accurate powers of thofe 
 gentlemen, which weigh much againft our deciding 
 that they, underftandingly believe, fmners have the 
 fame power — as much power — that they are as able, and 
 can as eaftly make themfelves new hearts^ as perform 
 the ordinary actions of life. For 
 
 1. They do not pretend, fo far as I am informed, 
 that there is the leail fliadow of evidence of an eftab- 
 Hfhed connection between any volition of an impeni- 
 tent finner to renew his heart, and its confequent ren- 
 ovation. Yet had they underftood the fmner's pow- 
 er to be what their language fcems clearly to import, 
 we cannot conceive it poiTible that they fliould have 
 been lilcnt on this head. Had they feen the indifpen- 
 lible need which mankind generally fee, of fuch a con- 
 nexion, in order to the having of that power by 
 which we perform the common actions of life, they 
 would have endeavored to prove fuch a connexion 
 between the willing of the finner to be holy and his 
 confequent holineis ; or elfe they would have aban- 
 doned the doctrine which gives that power to fmners ; 
 and it feems incredible that they Ihould not have feen 
 the need of this connexion. 
 
 2. Dr. Spr 1 NG has explicitly told us what he means 
 by natural power, not incidentally but of fet defign. 
 He aiks, " What is natural ability ?'* and anfwers, 
 " Natural ability is the intelledual and bodily ftrength 
 of a man to perform every action which God requires 
 of him." Here we are plainly told what natural abil- 
 ity is. It confills of two kinds of itrength, intelledual 
 and bodily. In conlidering the natural power of a lin- 
 ner to make himfelf a new heart, we may, I think, 
 fafely lay afidc the bodily ftrength, and fuppofe the doc- 
 tor to confider intellectual ftrength as conftituting the 
 
A LETTLR rO A FRIEND* 23 
 
 power of the finncr. By this kind of ftrength, I iin- 
 derftand the doclor to intend a good undcrftanding. 
 Now if this be his meaning, the power which he at- 
 tributes to thefinner is as widely different from that 
 which we have to perform the common actions of life, 
 as is a property of the mind, from a connexion be- 
 tween volition and its diretft objed:. 
 
 I know not that the other two gentlemen have, 
 cither of them, profeffcdly explained what they 
 mean by natural power. Theyfeem to haveconiid- 
 cred the fubjecl as fufficicntly underftood by all their 
 readers ; yet from parts of what they fay refpecling 
 it, I believe it might be fairly inferred that they, like 
 Dr. Spring, intend no more than undcrftanding. I 
 am aware that they may reply that they have fakl 
 many things which imply much more than this ; ev- 
 en all that goes to conftitute our power to perform 
 the common actions of life ; but this, you will readily 
 perceive, tends rather toincreafe, than to remove my 
 doubts. 
 
 Since I cannot believe it to be an opinion of thefe 
 gentlemen that finners have that very power to make 
 themfelves new hearts, which we have to perform the 
 common aft ions of life ; and fmce I have their own 
 declaration either expreffed or impliedjthat they mean 
 no more than underftanding, faculties and capacities, 
 which are only fo many properties of mind, fhall I not 
 believe thefe to be the very things they intend by the 
 natural power of linners to make themfelves new- 
 hearts ? I doubt. 
 
 Firft. Becaufe, were they to prove, or fmners to 
 allow that we all have thofe faculties, capacities and un- 
 derftanding, it would not anfwer the purpofe to which 
 it is applied : It would not meet the argument ufed by 
 the fmner, to fhow that he would not be worthy of 
 blame for continuing impenitent, as it is defigned to 
 do. 
 
 The argument of the fmner is this. " You {liy, I 
 
24 A LETTIH ro A FA! END. 
 
 am criminal for not having a new heart, but you muft 
 be in the wrong, for it is a facl that I have not power 
 to make fuch a heart. It is alfo a facl, that God does 
 not deem men criminal for not doing what they have 
 not power to do. If one has no hands or feet, God 
 never blames him for not walking, or handling. If 
 he has no money to give, he is not obliged to give it. 
 If he has but a weak underftanding, God does not 
 blame him for not comprehending all the deep myfte- 
 ries of religion. In ftiort, with God, a man is accept- 
 ed according to what he hath, and not according to 
 what he hath not. Since therefore, I have not pow- 
 er to repent and make myfelf a new heart, I ihall nev- 
 er be condemned for not doing it.*' This is the argu- 
 ment to be met and invalidated. There are two very 
 different modes of attempting to obviate it t one, by 
 acknowledging the fmners impotency, and fhowing 
 him that it affords himnojuftifying excufe for remain- 
 ing impenitent ; the other, by acknowledging the 
 juflnefs of his reafoning, and maintaining that he 
 has power to repent and become holy. This laft is 
 the method taken by thefe gentlemen : and in or- 
 der to fucceed, it behoves them to fhow that finners 
 have that very power to make themfelvesnewhearts,to 
 repent and beHeve, which is needful in order to prove 
 them criminal, in neglecting fuch external actions 
 as are required of thofe who have this power ; or in 
 other words, that they have all the power in this 
 cafe, which they have to eat, and to drink, to walk 
 or to fpeak : But this is that power, which at Icaft, 
 invohes in it a fure connexion between willinor an 
 event, by a preceding volition, and the confequent 
 occurrence of ihe event willed. Let me have all the 
 powers, you may be pleafed to fuppofe, to read the 
 Bible, to repeat the Lord's prayer, or to relieve the dif- 
 trelfed ; yet, if thefe operations do not take place, 
 upon my willing them, I am excufable in neglecting 
 to perform them. Now, fince thefe gentlemen admit 
 
 I 
 
A LE'TTER TO A FRIEND, 2 3 
 
 the juftlce of the reafoning of the finncr, they muft, 
 to be confident with themlelves, fay, either, that the 
 the linner is excufable for remaining impenitent, 
 or elfe, that he has the fame power to make him- 
 felf a new heart, that he has to perform the ordina- 
 ry actions of life. To fuppofe, then, that thefe gen- 
 tlemen mean no more by the iinners power, than 
 natural faculties, capacities, underflanding &c. is to 
 fuppofe them to evade the reafoning of the fmner, 
 and to fay nothing to the purpofe. Tliinking along 
 in this way, I am forced to Hop, and doubt, whether 
 underflanding, natural powers, and faculties, are all 
 they mean by a fmner's power to make himfelf a new 
 heart. 
 
 Sinners, who are not very clearly informed as to 
 the meaningf of thefe gentlemen, muft believe they 
 mean fometliing more than any properties inherent 
 either in the body or mind. And, 
 
 Secondly, There is another circumftance which 
 feepis to render it highly improbable, that thefe gen- 
 tlemen mean no more than faculties, capacities, and 
 underftanding, by the power they afcribe to Iinners 
 to make themfelves new hearts. They evidently be- 
 lieve, that many deny the doctrine which they mean 
 to inculcate. Yet I cannot think they believe, any 
 man denies that any perfon, from the infant at the 
 breaft, to the infancy of old age — from the favage to 
 the philofopher, and from the pagan to the faint has 
 faculties and capacities, underftanding, will, and a de- 
 gree of bodily ilrengtl). The thing therefore, which 
 they would prove, muft be fomething elfe. But, if this 
 be all they mean, I think they may reft alfured that 
 no fort of proof is needful in the cafe. For all men 
 take for granted, the thing for which they contend. 
 It feems to me they mud be aware of this fact. What 
 occafion then for, ever mentioning this power ? 
 But if, thouc^h acknowledged, this truth is apt to be 
 
 D 
 
26 A LETTER rO A FRIEND,. 
 
 forgotten, there lurcly caivnced no rcafoning to prover 
 It : The mere mention of it is enoup;h. 
 
 While thinking on this fubjcct, I have fometimea- 
 queried thus with myfelF. Wh.u would thcfe trentle- 
 men tuink ? How would they feel? were they, upon 
 entering a place of public worHiip on the Sabbath, tO" 
 hear a grave man propofe from the deflc, as an impor- 
 tant docf rine, and which ought to be frequently and 
 forceably illucidated, argued, and confirmed, becaufc 
 very many erronioufly, and dangcrouUy deny it ; that 
 all men have menial faculties and capacities^ fuch as un- 
 derjianding^ and ■jxvV/, and, at leaft, fome degree oi bodily 
 ^(Irengtb ? I have conceived the preacher as going on 
 firfl, to explain, then to prove his doclrine ; firfl from 
 the fcriptures, and then from reafon— -that he then 
 proceeds to flate and anfwer the' objcclions of gain- 
 layers ; then, proceeding to his improvement, he con- 
 cludes his difcourfe by inferring from it, that finners 
 are highly culpable for continuing impenitent. It has 
 fcemed to me that while he ^vas ferioufly attending to 
 his doctrinal obfervations, they could not be ferioiis-y 
 and that when he came to infer the criminality of 
 finners, they would think his doclrine did not afford- 
 fuch an inference, although they would cordially ac- 
 quiefce in the truth inferred. I ccnfefs, I fiiould fay, 
 refpeciing the doctrinal part of the fubject, with them, 
 that " no man denies this doctrine, all men beheve it- 
 all this time and labor is loft, and worfe than loft." But 
 I fliould think the inference both correct and impor- 
 tant ; becaufe I believe that to be unfriendly and dif- 
 obedient, to a being fo lovely and fo worthy of obedi- 
 ence as God is, muit be wrong ; morally wrong, wor- 
 thy of extreme deteftation, whether the perfon could, 
 or could not have repented, as eafily as he could turn 
 l\is hand. It further feems to me that a fmner, truly 
 and deeply penitent, would have his attention and his 
 heart too much occupied about the y?;2/i^/odioufnefs. of 
 his own charadcr, to allow himlelf time, or to fmd 
 
yj LETTER TO A FRIEXD. 1"] 
 
 any difpoiitlon to go into a cold Inquiry, whether lie 
 had the fame power to repent, which he h.is to per- 
 form the common actions of lite, that fo he might de- 
 termine whether he were a fmner, and ought to re- 
 pent, or not. 
 
 For fuch reafons as thefe confiderations fuggeft, I 
 cannot underlland the c:entlemen to havefulivcx- 
 prcflcd what they mean, by the hnner's power to make 
 himfelf a new heart, when they fay it confifts in nat- 
 ural faculties and capacities, or in intellectual and bod- 
 ily flrength. I am therefore ftill at a lofs. 
 
 It has been fuggefted that their meaning, when 
 they fay that linncrs can, if they will, love God, 
 repent and make them new hearts, may, pofllbly, be 
 thus exprefled. If finncrs had wills prepared and dif- 
 pofed to love God &c. then they could love him, or, 
 otherwifc thus, if fmners had fuch a willing as coniii- 
 tutes love to God, they could love him. I do not 
 confiderthem to mean thus. Becaufe they know, 
 the fame might be faid with equal truth of a flump or a 
 flone, and they, no doubt, intend fomething by what 
 they fay, which gives a greater power to man than can 
 be afcribed to dead matter. 
 
 Thus, whatever way I turn myfelf, to come at the 
 meaning of thefe gentlemen, I ftill find myfelf at fault. 
 Whether this arifes from defect in me, or in their 
 manner of treating the fubjecl, is left for your confid- 
 eration. 
 
 I will now as was propofed, proceed, 
 
 III. To make fome remarks on the arguments which 
 have been adduced to prove that fmners have the 
 fame power to make themfelves ncwhearts, that they 
 have to perform the ordinary actions of l^fe. Thefe, 
 however multiform they appear, may, 1 believe be 
 reduced lo two. 
 
 1. The firft of them may be thus exprefled. When- 
 ever one labours under a natural inability to comply 
 with any divine command, he is not criminal, but 
 
28 A LETTER TO A FRIEND. 
 
 wholly excufable, for not performing it. God him- 
 felf has fandioncd this opinion, by declaring in his 
 word that he accepts men according to what they 
 
 have, and not according to what they have not. 
 
 That is, according to the natural power they pofTcfs. 
 If the blind do not fee his vifible works, or read his 
 v.ord — If the deaf do not liftcn to pious converfation, 
 and to the reading of the holy fcripturcs — If the man 
 who is fo weak or decrepit that he cannot go to help 
 his brother who has fallen — If a man has no money to 
 bellow on the neceflitous, thefe men are not charged as 
 criminal, for not having done thefe things ; and there 
 is the very fame reafon why impenitent linners fKould 
 not be blamed for not making themfelves new hearts, 
 if they want the fame power to do it, which was 
 wanting, to the perfons before fuppofed, to perform 
 the feveral duties enjoined by the divine law. In cafe 
 of this want of power, fmners would be wholly excu- 
 fable. But we know, God docs not excufe fmners for 
 continuing in impenitency, but holds them guilty, 
 and if they do not finally repent, they muft be con- 
 demned to everlalHng punilliment. Hence we may 
 conclude that every linner has power to repent, and 
 turn to God, to make himfelf a new heartjand to work 
 out his own falvation. Such is the argument. But 
 it is rather fpecious than folid. This will appear if 
 we confider how perfons may excufe or juftify them- 
 felves on different occafions. 
 
 Suppofe the fame divine command to perform 
 fome external aft, were given to two men, one of 
 whom is perfeclly able to perform it, and the other 
 wholly unable. They both negled to obey, and are 
 in heart, equally difobedient. Now I afk, is either of 
 them blamelefs ? Are they equally criminal ? I wifh 
 you to take this cafe in your hand- — go directly to the 
 bar of the judge of hearts, and afk him to folve it. 
 He judges, not, like man, by outward appearances. 
 He judges by the heart. As a man thinketh in his 
 heart fo is he. 
 
A LETTER TO A FRIEND. 
 
 29 
 
 Put another cafe. Both thefe men are of a perfect- 
 ly obedient fpirit. Kewho has the abihty dees as he 
 was directed, the other docs not. Which is the moft 
 acceptable ? To this queftion your anfvver is ready. 
 You fay, they are equally acce{)table. Why then, in 
 the former cafe, fhould they no" be equally unaccepta- 
 ble. In the lail cafe the omiilion is ellimatcd by the 
 heart alone. W^hy fhould it not be eftimated in the 
 former by the fame rule ? 
 
 In the firft cafe, the impotent man's natural inabi- 
 lity allbrds him no fubftantial excufe----not even the 
 lead paliation. It, however, furniflies a pretence. It 
 may aflift him to deceive his fellow men who cannot 
 look into his heart. But God fees the heart. He 
 cannot be deceived by the pretence, neither will he 
 fuffer himfclf to be mocked, by permitting it to be of- 
 fered as an txcufe. 
 
 Could men look intuitively into human hearts as 
 God looks into them, we fiiould not need to obfcrve 
 external conduct, in order to make an cftimate of 
 moral character and defert. God will bring our 
 works into view at the great day, not for the lake of 
 learning any thing concerning us, himfelf, but to 
 fliow others what we are. 
 
 I cannot omit obferving here, that in the firft 
 of the two cafes put above, the impotent man was 
 under both a natural and moral inability to obey his 
 maker ; but I prefume no one would ciicem him the 
 lefs guilty, becaufe of his natural inability. In one 
 inftance then, (and millions of others might be addu- 
 ced,) natural inability does not excufe. Is not this 
 equally true in all cafes in which natural and moral 
 inability concur ? In that palTage of the holy fcrip- 
 ture which teaches us that natural inability excufes, 
 it is pretty plainly intimated that it excufes in thofe 
 cafes only in which there is firft a willi?ig mind. This is 
 the firft and great queftion. Is there a willing mind ? if 
 there be, no feeming defect of obedience is noticed, 
 
3© A LETTER TO A FRIEND. 
 
 becaufe the only, ultimate queftion is, Is there fuch a 
 mind ? According to this principle, nothing can 
 excufe an impenitent fmner, becaufe he has not this 
 willing mind. His heart is not engaged in the love 
 and fervice of God. This being found, there is no 
 occafion to enquire whether he has or has not that 
 power to repent which he has to perform the common 
 actions of life. So long as the inquiry is, whether 
 there be a willing mind, it is of importance to know 
 how far conftraint and reftraint may have influenced, 
 that which, without them, would be fpontaneous fruits 
 of the heart; but once theftate of the heart is afcertain- 
 ed, all fuch enquiries feem to be nugatory. Once it is 
 afcertained that the impenitent finner's heart is wrong, 
 and to what degree it is fo, it feems perfectly ufelefs 
 todifpute whether he had or had not the fame pow- 
 er, to make it better, which he has to perform the 
 common actions of life. 
 
 All the affections, and paffions, like water included 
 in a caik, fpring out at every vent they find. — 
 When we fee a vent, but no water flowing, we con- 
 clude, that there is none within, or if there is, that it 
 is obllructed in its paflage. The latter may be the 
 fact, and yet the cafK may be found to be full. In 
 this cafe the contents will be meafured and eftimated 
 from the botto.n,not to the vent, but to the top. — 
 The all important enquiry is, What is the heart ? If 
 it does not flow forth in external action, there is rea- 
 Ibn for men to doubt whether it be good, unlefs fome 
 obftacle is difcovered. As foon as the obltacle is dif- 
 covered, the former caufe of doubt ceafes. 
 
 Every folid excufe, or juftification prefuppofes a 
 found heart. If the heart be unfound there is no 
 poflible foundation for julliiication or excufe. When 
 a man is called on for not giving to the poor, in obe- 
 dience to the general command,if he can truly fay, the 
 feem.ing delinquency was not owing to want of heart, 
 but to the want of what was directed to be given. 
 
I 
 
 A LETTER TO A FI^IEKD, 3 1 
 
 lie may well be cxcufed ; but when he Is queftioned 
 refpccting the biidnefs of his heart itfelf, he can rea- 
 fonably ofler nothing in excufe, befides the unworthl- 
 ncfs otthe objccl. Ilcnceour Lord makes the floth- 
 ful fervant Ibeak his heart and fay, " I knew that thou 
 art ^n hard man, reaping where thou haft not fowed 
 and gathering wliere thou haft not ftrewed," and 
 fpeaking thus, this fervant fpake the real fentiments 
 of every impenitent finncr. If it could be made man- 
 ifeft to the confcicnces of men, as it is felt in the hearts 
 of the (inner, that God is a hard maftcr, they would 
 excufe impenitence itfelf ; but till this is done, no ex- 
 cufr, whether it be d*i'awn from the temper of the fin- 
 ful heart, or from felf-named metaphyfical reafoning, 
 however fpecious it maybe, can have any real weight. 
 Of courfe, the friends of God are under no obligation 
 to grant to impenitent Ilnners, that in order to be 
 worthy of blame for their oppofition to God, they 
 muft be acknowledged to have the fame power to 
 renew themfelves, which they have to perform the 
 common aclions of life. 
 
 The reafon why we are not condemned for having 
 omitted a commanded external action,feems to be this. 
 All fuch aclions and omiffions 2VQ,pri?nafacie^ evidence 
 of a difobedient fpirit, becaufe they are fuppofed to 
 flow fpontaneoufly from the heart; fo that,unlcfs fome 
 evidence to the contrary appear, they are to be re- 
 garded as interpreters of the heart. But if it appear 
 that they do not flow fpontaneoufly from the heart, 
 
 they cannot be regarded as correct interpreters. 
 
 The heart then, only, fliows itfelf through external 
 actions and omiflions, when they are directed by the 
 will. Therefore, no bodily action is imputable to 
 me, if it did not take place in obedience to my wilk 
 The fame is true of all thofe operations of the mind 
 which take place in confequencc of having been or- 
 dered by the will. The heart cannot iiiwiediatcly ^ with- 
 out an exprcfs, imperate act of willing, produce any 
 
32 A LETTER TO A FRIEND. 
 
 of thefe. So that in all fuch cafes, if the will do not 
 direct, the confequenccs are not to be imputed. — 
 There are, however, many exercifes of the heart, fuch 
 as love, hatred, hope and fear, which fpring immediate- 
 ly from the hearty without any interpofition of the 
 will. Even thofe v/ho call love a volition, will not 
 fay that it is produced, like motion in my hand, by a 
 preceding imperate volition. Thefe affections flow- 
 ing as they do, fpontaneoufly, and immediately from 
 the heart, are, when known, fair expolitors of it. — 
 Whatever elfe be fuppofed, the language of thefe, ref- 
 pecting the heart, is conclufive. Hence, there is no 
 fuch occaiion for our having this power over our af- 
 fections of heart, as there is, that we fhould have it 
 over our hands. , 
 
 The morality of our actions is derived, from the 
 heart, but that of the heart itfelf, is underived ; it 
 conlifts in the heart alone. Now if the morality of 
 the heart confifts in the very nature of the heart itfelf, 
 a part from all conlideration of any antecedent, then 
 it will be ftill the fame, whether it were, or were not, 
 preceded by a power to manage our hearts by our 
 volitions, as we manage our bodies, in the perform- 
 ance of bodily anions : and if the morality of the 
 heart confifts in the very nature of the heart itfelf, 
 it cannot vary with the variations of any previous 
 power. 
 
 If there be no morality belonging to the heart itfelf, 
 nor to, either natural power, or the want of it, 
 then there is no morality in the cafe. No one will 
 fay that the morality lies either in power or in the 
 want of power, it muit then lie in the heart itielf, and 
 if it lies here, it muft remain as long as the heart re- 
 mains, whether tiiere be or be not the fame power o- 
 ver it that we have over our bodily actions. 
 
 Upon the whole, it feems to me highly improper 
 to conclude that God will excufe the ivant ot a ivUiitig 
 mind^ becaufe he excufes the want of external actions, 
 when there is a 'jjiUing mind. 
 
A LRrrER TO A JPRIEND, < ^T^ 
 
 2. There is another argument adduced to prove, 
 that impenitent fmners have the fame power to make 
 themfelves new hearts, which they have to perform 
 the common actions of life. This argument is found- 
 ed on the fuppofition that all the divine commands, 
 invitations, exhortitions, promifes, admonitions, c:c. 
 take for granted, and go on the fuppofition that men 
 have the fame power to make themfelves new hearts, 
 that they have to drink vrater and to eat bread. 
 
 I believe it will not be pretended, that the divine 
 law or any other part of the holy fcriptures, exprsjley 
 affer^that finners have fuch a power. So that what- 
 ever is to be learned from the law or gofpel, muft be 
 learned by inference. Let us then take a fummary 
 view of them, that we may be the better prepared to 
 judge whether they afford this inference or whether 
 they really imply that finners have the power con- 
 tended for. 
 
 The fpirit of the divine law, apart from the gofpel, 
 may, I think, be thus expreffed. It" you obey — if you 
 love God with your whole heart, and your neighbour 
 as yourfelf, you will be objects of divine complacence 
 and you Ihall be happy forever ; but if you fail in ei- 
 ther of thefe points, you will be proper objects of di- 
 vine wrath, and muft be forever miferable. The 
 fpirit of the invitations of the gofpel, and its promifes, 
 may be thus fummed up, whoever has a holy heart, be- 
 lieves in Jefus Chrift, and repents of his lins, (hall be 
 favcd, but who ever does not love, believe and repent, 
 Ihall be damned. 
 
 Now I afk, according to what rules can the pow- 
 er of fmners be inferred from this fummary ? For my- 
 fclf, I freely confefs, I fee no regular mode of making 
 this inference, until we have either proved or taken 
 for granted, that the law and gofpel would not be 
 good and binding on the confcicnces of linners, unlefs 
 they have the fame power to love, believe, and re- 
 pent, that they have to move a fmger. But I afk, 
 
54 -^ L£-TT££ TO A r^I£Xr. 
 
 Why is It not reafonable and proper for God to inform 
 Tas as he has done in his law, what is lovely, and what 
 hateful, in his fight ? What leads to future and eternal 
 felicity, and what to cndlefs and awful mifcry ? If a 
 Iieart oppofcd to God, be in iifeJf'A. hatelul thing, and 
 fuch as every confcience mull difjpprove, and. ifXjod 
 loaths fuch a heart, why may he not properly fay fo I 
 If fuch a hsart leads to ruin, and if God will feal that 
 ru'n by his awful fentcnce, why may he not declare 
 his determination to do fo ? If there he any unreafon- 
 ablenefs in the oppofition of God to fuch a heart, it 
 mufl be becaufe it is not in itfelf hateful. Some di- 
 vines when treating on the fubject of the {Inner's abili- 
 ty, too plainly, fuggeft that it would be unreafcna- 
 ble for God to condemn one, for having a bad heart, 
 if he had not the fame power to change it, that he has 
 to perform the common actions of life. How perfecl- 
 iy does this agree, not with the dictates of the awakened 
 finner's confcience^ but with the feelings of the hardened 
 ilnner's heart I 
 
 If however, the gentlemen mean no more by the 
 power which they afcribe to fmners, than faculties and 
 capacities of mind, fuch as underHanding— -of feeling 
 pleafurc and pain, and of willing, the argument is 
 wholly ufclefs ; becaufe it proves no more than what 
 has, not only, never been denied, by any one, but 
 what is coniidently affirmed by all men. No man 
 believes, that any one creature, if deflitute of thefe, 
 can poffibly commit any fm. Why then this labored 
 proof ? 
 
 Thefe remarks feem equally fuited to obviate the 
 argument drav/n from invitations, exhortations, &c. 
 unlefs indeed, it fliould be contended, as fome have 
 contended, that the divine invitations to liiinerSj im- 
 ply a defire on the part of God, at once Jhong and in- 
 fujjicient, that finners may become holy, and happy* 
 Hut, I think, this fentimcnt cannot, without great in- 
 iuflice, be charged on either of thefe gentlemen, or 
 their adherents. 
 
 i 
 
A LErTER TO A FJ^TEKD. 35 
 
 Such, in brief, are my remarks, on the arguments 
 adduced, to fnow that finners have p-nvcr to make 
 themfelv;!s new hearts. But it fecms proper to take 
 feme notice, in this place, of the manner in which it 
 has been atccmpted to invalidate, what, at firft light 
 feems to be pofitive proof, that impenitent fmners, 
 have not what is commonly called natural power to 
 make themlelves new hearts. 
 
 Many paffagcs of fcripturc, taken literally, fcem to 
 afiert the natural inability of fmners, to make them- 
 felves new hearts, without fome fpecial alliftance of 
 the moll high. I fliall confme myfelf to a fingle dec- 
 laration of our Saviour. iVb man can come to ;«<?, except 
 the Father \vho haibfcnt me draw him. If, when we 
 would decide on the meaning of this paflage, we muft 
 attend merely to the expreflion itfelf, without bring- 
 ing into view any other confideration, v/e fliould un- 
 doubtedly, efteem it a flat denial that linners have the 
 fame power to make themfelves new hearts, which 
 they have to perform the common a6lions of life : 
 But in conftruing it, fome feem to have firft decided 
 that fmners muft either have this power, or elfe be 
 inculpable for not becoming holy, and then, to make 
 fome ienfe of tlie paftage, they fuppofe it to intend no 
 more than that fmners are unwilling^ or morally unable. 
 
 It is true, that we often fay, we arc unable, or that 
 we cannoi, when we mean in reality no more than that 
 we are unwilling. This is done on different occafions. 
 Sometimes we mearr that our hearts are fo ftrongly 
 fet againft the propofal, that v/e cannot turn them, 
 as we can turn our hands. Thus when any perfon 
 is extremely difagrecable to uy, v/e fay we cannot be 
 pleafed with him. Sometimes, we only pretend 
 to be dcftitute, in this cafe, of that power which we 
 have to perform the common actions of life. To fay 
 wc '•ivill not, comply v, ith an invitation is afFrontive. 
 This may be avoided by falfely fliying, we cannot. 
 We mean to hide our unwiilingnefs under the pre- 
 
36 A LETTER TO A FRIEND, 
 
 tence of natural inability. But did our Lord, cm- 
 ploy words in this dclufive manner ? 
 
 At one time, Chrift fays of finners, that they can- 
 not, and at another, that they will not come to him : 
 but this by no means fhovvs that he intended the fame 
 thing, by thefe different modes of exprefTion. If it 
 be true of any perfon, in any cafe, that he is deftitute 
 both of power and will, why may not our Saviour 
 have intended to exprefs both, refpe6ling fmners ? 
 We are, in innumerable inftances, both unable and un- 
 willing. Perhaps thisis the truth, in the cafe before 
 us ; and were there no hypothefis to be maintained, 
 Ihould we not thus,underftand our Lord? If we fuppofe 
 this paflage to intend no more than want of will, for 
 the iake of accommodating it to any preconceived 
 opinion, wc furely ought firft to eftablifli that opinion 
 by unqueftionable proof. It feems, the opinion to be 
 accommodated, is, that fmners cannot be criminal for 
 not having holy hearts, unlefs they poffefs the fame 
 power to make them, which they have to perform the 
 ordinary actions of life. 
 
 In order to eftablifih tliis opinion, it muft be proved, 
 in dired; oppofition to the fettled belief, of thefe gen- 
 tlemen, if I underftand their fcheme, that God has 
 eftabliflied a fure connexion between a fuppofable vo- 
 lition of the unrenewed fmner to have a new heart, 
 and his having it in confequence. Until this is prov- 
 ed, it mud be allowed, (which is alfo contrary to 
 their fcheme) that there is no evidence that linners 
 are linners, for not being holy. Until one of thefe is 
 done, they themfelves, ought to regard this opinion, 
 as a mere affumption. 
 
 IV. I fhall clofe what I have to fay on this fubjed 
 at prefent, by mentioning fome of the natural tenden- 
 cies, and probable effe6ts,of the manner in which thefe 
 gentlemen treat the fubjecl of the finner's power t» 
 make himfelf a new heart. 
 
A LETTEJi TO A FRIEND, 37 
 
 I. This doflrine tends to lead finners to believe, they 
 can determine whether they are criminiil, by alccr- 
 taining whether they have the fame power to make 
 themfelves new hearts, that they have to perform the 
 common aclions of life. Although they fhould find 
 in themfelves, hearts altogether oppofed to God, they 
 could not, according to this doclrine, determine 
 whether they were criminal, until they fliould have 
 determined the former queftion. Following this 
 courfe, fliould they happen to determine according 
 to truth, that they have not the fame power, they 
 would feci that in reality, they were not worthy of 
 blame. This is the courfe which finners ought to 
 purfue, if their criminality depends on their having 
 this power. But the more aflidfoufly any one pur- 
 fues this courfe, the lefs will he attend to his heart it- 
 felf, which, if he would difcover his ill-defert, is the 
 moll important objecl that can be propofed for his 
 attention ; becaufe, in this alone, can he fee his re- 
 al finfulnefs. No rcafcning about his power, can 
 ever give him a proper view of fin. 
 
 If the doctrine of the finner's power, be an engine 
 of fo mnch importance, in an attempt to convince 
 liim of his criminality, for continuing impenitent, as 
 fome feem to fuppoie it, is it not furprifing that it 
 has not been even once employed by infinite wifdom, 
 in the whole of a large vohime, one of the mod im- 
 portant purpofes of which, was to convince finners 
 that they are criminal, not merely becaufe they omit 
 the performance of fuch duties as depend on their 
 wills, but alfo, becaufe their wills and hearts are fuch 
 as they are. The principal method which God takes 
 in the fcriptures to convince finners, is to difplay be- 
 fore them his own characler, as it is exhibited in his 
 works in general, and particularly in his wonderful 
 works toward the children of men, and to lead them 
 through their works, words and thoughts down into 
 their own hearts j and then to call their attention t® 
 
38 A LErrER to a i-riend, 
 
 the comparative equality of their ways and his own. 
 While he is doing this, he conflantly allures them, 
 that they are in his hand, as the clay is in the hand 
 of the potter, and that they have no more power to 
 renew themfelves, than the Ethiopean has to change 
 his colour, or the Leopard his fpots — that they are 
 V'ithout flrength — de^ in trcfpaffes and fms — and 
 that they muft be born again — new made — created 
 anew, and that they cajinot come to Chrift. 
 
 Is it evinced by the experience of chriftians them- 
 felves, that they can procure future holy exercifes, as 
 eafily as they can perform the common aclions of 
 life ? When, in any thing like a proper frame of 
 mind, they w/7/, theyy^rk'^" and />r(2)', that their pref- 
 ent holy affections may uninterruptedly continue and 
 increafe ; yet thefe affections do not obey their will — 
 they come not when called. Yet, they do not think 
 themfelves the lefs criminal on this account. 
 
 Repentance does not take place, like common acli- 
 tions, by being previoufly willed. So far as natural 
 caufes are concerned, it is the very fight of the heart 
 itfelf that produces the effect. 
 
 2. This doctrine is fuited to lead carelefs and fccurc 
 finners, to put off, as flir as pofliblc ; the day of their 
 repentance ; for, to ihem it appears to he an evil day. 
 The belief of this doctrine greatly diminifhcs their 
 fenfe of danger. If they can change their hearts at 
 plealure, they have nothing to fear, befide the dan- 
 ger of being fo fuddenly fnatched out of their ftate 
 of probation, as not to be able to advert to the one 
 thing needful. Thus they are led to indulge them- 
 felves in fin, and harden their hearts againft God. 
 
 3. Thofe fmners who are neither wholly fecure, 
 nor yet fully awakened, are in danger of being milled 
 and injured by this doctrine. They wifh, in their way, 
 to be renewed — they try to effect this change, but find 
 it does not take place. They impute their failure to 
 their own ignorance of the proper mode of working, 
 
A LETTER TO A FHIENO, 39 
 
 to eliecl it— -they apply to thofe who have fucceeded 
 in a like iittempt, for dircclions ; but do not receiv^e 
 them. The manner cannot be told. All they learn 
 is, that thofe of whom they enquire, did not change 
 themfelves- — that God alone can work this change. 
 Still they attempt but in vain to renew themfelves ; 
 till at length they ^row weary of difappointment, and 
 give up both the p^fuit, and their confidence in their 
 own llrcngth. But flill, retaining the opinion that 
 this power is cflential to blameworthincfs, they excufe 
 themfelves, by faying they have found by experience, 
 that they have not the power, and of courfe, that they 
 cannot be blamed. Such pcrfons are rapidly har- 
 dened in fm, and are among the moft fucccfsful -and 
 deftructivc teachers of the thoughtlefs and fecure. 
 
 I have now given you my views of this fubjed:, and 
 have to apologize for the length and minutenefs of it, 
 and for tranimitting it through the prefs : As I fre- 
 quently repeat, I hope you will difcover that the re- 
 petitions are not altogether in vain — they fhow the 
 I'ubjecl in views, at leail a little different. 
 
 1 have written thus lengthily and minutely, and 
 fent it through the prefs, for two reafons. One of 
 which is this. However clearly thofe gentlemen, you 
 mention, may underftand themfelves, and however 
 correct their real opinions may be, I believe that mul- 
 titudes of others belides myfelf do not underftand 
 them. This publication, will •! hope, help to awaken 
 the attention, both of thofe who believe this doclrine, 
 and thofe who doubt of the meaning of its advocates, 
 to the fubjecl, and fecond my lolicitation of fome fur- 
 ther explanations. The other reafon is this : 1 hope, 
 not long firft, to lay before the public a treatife of a 
 much more extenlive nature, which has already been 
 publicly propofed, and which will involve this fub- 
 jecl. In that, I wijQi to avoid as much as poilible, fuch 
 dry difquifitions,as this fubjecl: requires, in the pref- 
 cnt ftatc of opinions, among many, in our fecl:ion of 
 
4© A LETTER TO A FRIEND. 
 
 this country. Befides, I hope to draw out fuch ex- 
 planations as will remove any doubts I entertain as to 
 the beft manner of treating the fubjed:. 
 
 As to your query refpecling the character of the 
 Redeemer, I can only fay at prefent, that I unequivo- 
 cally, and without refervation, believe that Jefus 
 Chrill had a real human foul and human body, and 
 that thefe were united in him as are the fouls and bod- 
 ies of other men. I further firmly believe, that inthis 
 man dwelt the fulnefs of the Godhead bodily -—thTLt this 
 Godhead, or the felf-cxiftent God, was as truly and 
 intimately united to this man, as our fouls are united 
 to our bodies. I do not believe however, that the 
 divine and human nature of the Mediator were any 
 more mixed, mingled, and confounded together, than 
 are our mental and corporeal natures. I do not recol- 
 lect, nor believe, that I have for many years diredly, 
 or indiredtly, of defign faid any thing inconfiftent 
 with this fentiment. Yet, I confefs I have queftioned, 
 and may have, by that means, offended forne who ei- 
 ther cannot or will not explain themfelves on this 
 fubject in a manner which I can underftand. I con- 
 fefs I am Ihocked by any expreflions which I under- 
 lland to imply that in the Mediator, God btco?ncs man 
 — a creature ; and that man becomes God, who is crea- 
 tor of all things. 
 
 FINIS. 
 
 ERRATA. 
 
 Page 6, line 6 from bottom for : read , Page 9, line 
 24, for these read those. Page 1 1, line 28, for its read 
 tt. Page 1 6, line 3, for any read wy. 
 
'1^ 
 
 O CA'^^K (^ 
 
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