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GEORGIA AND THE UNION 
 IN 1850 
 
 A THESIS 
 
 IN HISTORY 
 
 PRESENTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF THE 
 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT 
 OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE 
 OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
 RICHARD HARRISON SHJ£YOCK 
 
 5 0 ZO 
 
 PHILADELPHIA 
 
 1926 
 
 1 
 
COPYRIGHT 1926 
 BY DUKE UNIVERSITY PRESS 
 
 PRINTED BY 
 
 THE SEEMAN PRESS, INC. 
 
hro uSr- 
 
 To 
 
 zJlfC. H. S. and 6. Q. 
 
 •U020 
 
PREFACE 
 
 The present study was submitted in partial fulfill¬ 
 ment of the requirements for the degree of doctor of 
 philosophy at the University of Pennsylvania. It was 
 undertaken at the suggestion of Dean Herman V. 
 Ames, under whose direction it was carried out and to 
 whom I am primarily indebted. Professor St. George 
 L. Sioussat gave many valuable suggestions and he,, 
 with Professor A. E. McKinley, read and criticised 
 the proof. My colleague, Professor W. K. Boyd, and 
 Dean R. P. Brooks, of the University of Georgia, 
 were also kind enough to criticise the study in proof. 
 I owe much to the painstaking assistance of my col¬ 
 league, Professor W. T. Laprade, supervising editor 
 of The Duke University Press. 
 
 Professor Ulrich B. Phillips, of the University of 
 Michigan, generously placed at my disposal his unsur¬ 
 passed knowledge of the history of the ante-bellum 
 South, and his papers relating to Georgia. Professor 
 Arthur C. Cole, of the Ohio State University, made 
 helpful suggestions on the general theme of the study. 
 Professor Phillips, Professor Cole, and Professor J. S. 
 Bassett, on behalf of the American Historical Associa¬ 
 tion, gave permission to reproduce one of the maps in 
 Professor Phillips’ Georgia and State Rights (herein 
 listed as Map No. 5) and a portion of one of the maps 
 in Professor Cole’s The Whig Party in the South 
 (herein listed as Map No. 2). All maps, except Bon¬ 
 ner’s of 1849, and those noted, are copies of my own 
 originals prepared by Mrs. J. R. Chamberlain of 
 Raleigh. 
 
viii GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 Professor C. S. Boucher, of the University of 
 Chicago, kindly placed at my disposal such of the 
 unpublished Calhoun letters as related especially to 
 Georgia. Mr. Warren Grice, of Macon, permitted me 
 to examine several of his valuable papers relating to 
 Georgia history. I am indebted to Miss Margaret A. 
 Cosens, of Savannah, for permission to use the papers 
 of her grandfather, Dr. Richard Arnold. Mr. William 
 Harden and Mr. Alexander R. Lawton, of Savannah, 
 and other members of the Georgia Historical Society, 
 offered courteous assistance in the use of materials in 
 that city. Mr. Wymberley W. De Renne, of Savan¬ 
 nah, kindly permitted the use of valuable materials 
 in the De Renne Library of Georgia History. 
 
 R. H. S. 
 
 Sachems Head, Conn., 
 
 September, 1926. 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 PAGE 
 
 INTRODUCTION 
 
 3 
 
 CHAPTER 
 
 I 
 
 ECONOMIC FACTORS 
 
 9 
 
 CHAPTER 
 
 II 
 
 SOCIAL GROUPS 
 
 64 
 
 CHAPTER 
 
 III 
 
 PARTY CONFLICT AND CONFUSION 
 
 90 
 
 CHAPTER 
 
 IV 
 
 STORM CLOUDS, 1844-1848 
 
 126 
 
 CHAPTER 
 
 V 
 
 THE APPROACH OF THE STORM, 1849 
 
 178 
 
 CHAPTER 
 
 VI 
 
 WINTER WEATHER, 1849-1850 
 
 217 
 
 CHAPTER 
 
 VII 
 
 THE CLEARING, 1850 
 
 264 
 
 CHAPTER 
 
 VIII 
 
 THE AFTERMATH, 1851-1852 
 
 343 
 
 BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 - 
 
 365 
 
 INDEX 
 
 
 
 391 
 
LIST OF MAPS 
 
 Facing Page 
 
 MAP NO. 1 GEORGIA IN 1850 10 
 
 MAP NO. 2 DISTRIBUTION OF THE RACES 14 
 
 MAP NO. 3 DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH 22 
 
 MAP NO. 4 DISTRIBUTION OF ILLITERACY 24 
 
 MAP NO. 5 DISTRIBUTION OF POLITICAL PARTIES 
 
 (PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF 1848) 109 
 
 MAP NO. 6 CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS, 1850 171 
 
 MAP NO. 7 THE STATE CONVENTION VOTE, 1850 320 
 
 BONNER’S MAP OF 1849 (INDICATING COUNTIES AND 
 RAILROADS, AS WELL AS USUAL 
 
 FEATURES) back cover 
 
GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 The period of promise in the ante-bellum history of 
 the lower South was that of the generation following 
 the War of 1812. This was no doubt due to the simple 
 fact that the history of the lower South in this period 
 was in large measure a part of a still greater story— 
 the story of the growing West. It was the day of ex¬ 
 pansion, with dreams of still greater expansion just 
 ahead. In the South, however, this great era was 
 made possible only by the development of several insti¬ 
 tutions and circumstances peculiar to the section,—not 
 one “peculiar institution,” as is often stated, but sev¬ 
 eral; namely, the plantation system, the system of 
 slave labor and invested capital, and at last, but not 
 least, the race question. 
 
 To say that the development of the lower South was 
 made possible by these institutions—for even the 
 Negro was in his way an institution—is to say that 
 the very expansion of the section contained the germ 
 of its own decline. This relative decline, as compared 
 with the mounting prosperity of the North, may be 
 dated roughly from the thirties and was becoming in¬ 
 creasingly apparent through the forties. Far-sighted 
 southern leaders did not shut their eyes to the out¬ 
 standing economic phenomena of their time and made 
 strenuous efforts to revive the prosperity of their sec¬ 
 tion. Unfortunately there were other factors involved 
 in southern backwardness besides southern institu¬ 
 tions. It happened that, when the economic life of the 
 South was already threatened with ills from within, it 
 was also subjected to criticism and attack from without. 
 
4 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 First came the onslaught of the business men of; 
 the North, who demanded tariff protection for their 
 growing industries at the expense of southern agricul¬ 
 ture. Then came the attack of northern idealists, who 
 demanded that the entire labor system upon which a 
 large part of southern agriculture was based should be 
 abolished,—and with it the whole social system 
 with which that labor seemed inextricably associated. 
 Either of these attacks might have been expected, 
 under even the best of circumstances, to have elicited 
 serious protest in the South. Coming as they did, how¬ 
 ever, when the southern leaders were already conscious 
 of a relative economic backwardness, they were bound 
 to result in the most bitter antagonisms. It seemed to 
 southern men that the North, not content with its own 
 growing prosperity, was intent upon destroying not 
 only what prosperity there was in the South, but also 
 the very civilization of the section itself. The motives 
 of many northern antislavery idealists were of the 
 highest, and their moral principles were coming to 
 receive the commendation of the civilized world, but 
 these facts could hardly have been expected, under the 
 circumstances, to detract greatly from the resentment 
 and the apprehension which their criticisms aroused 
 in the South. 
 
 Now there were certain obvious remedies for the 
 tariff and antislavery attacks of the North—at least 
 there were expedients which seemed to promise a 
 remedy. There was nullification, and, if this did not 
 avail, there was secession from the union with the 
 offending section. Certain southern leaders began to 
 urge the employment of these expedients from 1828 
 on. It is at least a striking coincidence that the state 
 which was most retrogressive in the lower South; 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 5 
 
 namely, South Carolina, was also the one whose leaders 
 first and most insistently urged these radical remedies. 
 This suggests the view urged by some northern critics 
 at the time; namely, that the southern people who suf¬ 
 fered most from the ills of their economic position were 
 those most apt to blame all such ills upon northern 
 attacks and the least apt to realize that many of their 
 troubles might be inherent in their own insitutions. 
 
 This also suggests the significance of another fact 
 that is so obvious as sometimes to be overlooked. All 
 portions of the lower South were not equally back¬ 
 ward in their economic life. In general, the newer 
 lands, for obvious reasons, were more productive and 
 prosperous than the older. Mississippi was better off 
 than South Carolina. The outstanding prosperity of 
 the section in 1850 was, however, to be found in Geor¬ 
 gia, the “Empire State of the South”; which, after 
 sharing in the general depression of the early forties, 
 forged rapidly ahead towards the end of the decade, 
 and by 1850 was renowned for its railroads and manu¬ 
 factures as well as for its agriculture. Here the prop¬ 
 erty-holding classes tended to view their own pros¬ 
 perity as evidence that the South could yet make pro¬ 
 gress within the national Union. If Georgia could 
 prosper, despite northern tariffs and criticisms, then 
 the ills from which the neighboring “Palmettodom” 
 suffered must be latent in the latter’s own agricultural 
 system rather than in the machinations of the Yankees. 
 
 Northern attacks, felt the conservative Georgia 
 leaders, need not force the state to secede until they 
 showed signs of developing into an ultimate menace to 
 southern society. Until such time, so radical a measure 
 as secession would only involve the nation in the dan¬ 
 ger of civil war, a danger that all, and especially the 
 
6 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 property-holding classes, would wish to avoid as long 
 as possible. In a word, Georgians did not wish to run 
 a risk of civil war unless the risk involved in the main¬ 
 tenance of the Union proved an even greater one. 
 Sincere attachment to the “Union of the Fathers” 
 tended to strengthen this general attitude. 
 
 In 1847 came the first evidence which was apt to be 
 convincing to the mass of the people of the lower South 
 that the antislavery attack was about to become an 
 ultimate menace. In that year the antislavery forces 
 in Congress attempted to pass the Proviso denying to 
 the South what it considered its rightful share of the 
 territories of the new West. This seemed an earnest 
 of what was to come in the future—further restric¬ 
 tions and, finally, abolition and chaos. The lower South 
 as a whole began for the first time to think seriously of 
 secession. In 1850, however, the conservative North 
 rallied to the support of the conservative South, the 
 Proviso was finally defeated, and a “compromise” 
 achieved. 
 
 A serious secession movement, however, was by 
 this time under way, led as usual by South Carolina. 
 Georgia, it was hoped, would “lead off,” with the secret 
 prompting and backing of the sister state. This hope 
 was destined to dramatic disappointment, largely for 
 three reasons. In the first place, it happened that for 
 years a most unsisterly animosity had obtained between 
 Georgia and Carolina, a feeling based upon varied 
 economic and social circumstances and arising partly 
 from the simple fact of geographical propinquity. If 
 “Palmettodom” willed secession, that in itself tended 
 to make the Empire State cleave to the Union. 
 
 Second, it happened that Georgia was one of those 
 southern states whose territory extended well up into 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 7 
 
 the hill country of the Appalachians, and the people 
 of this section of the state displayed the typical moun¬ 
 taineers’ indifference to controversies concerning slav¬ 
 ery. They were not only indifferent to the interests of 
 slavery, but they were in addition devotedly attached 
 to the Union. The secessionists’ appeal, therefore, was 
 bound to be ignored in this part of the state. 
 
 Third, and doubtless most important, was the fact 
 that the secession appeal reached Georgia at a time 
 when she was enjoying the peak of her new prosperity. 
 Such a period was no time for revolution, unless it was 
 clear that revolution was necessary. Georgians looked 
 longingly for the slightest of signs that the North 
 would offer some compromise—some earnest of future 
 fair-dealing that would make secession unnecessary— 
 and they found it in the Clay compromise. Once this 
 compromise was offered, there was no serious danger 
 that Georgia would secede. 
 
 What would have occurred if the state had been, 
 like South Carolina, in a state of economic depression 
 and in a correspondingly depressed state of mind, is 
 another matter. So, too, is the question as to why 
 Georgia did secede ten years later, when prosperity (at 
 least so far as cotton prices were concerned) still ob¬ 
 tained. The answer to this last may lie in the fact that 
 in 1860 the election of a “black-Republican” president 
 did imply in unmistakable terms an ultimate menace to 
 southern institutions. The state would doubtless have 
 seceded in 1850 if the Proviso, also a final threat, had 
 passed at that time. The view here taken is not that 
 prosperity inclined Georgia to surrender, but simply 
 that prosperity did incline the state to compromise. 
 
 If this view of the matter seems to overemphasize 
 the significance of economic factors, the facts that 
 
8 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 follow must speak for themselves. It seemed desirable 
 to the writer that, in addition to the narration of the 
 political developments involved in the secession and 
 Union movements of 1844-1852, some examination 
 should be made of the economic and social bases of the 
 political phenomena concerned. 
 
 The decision of Georgia to hold to the Union in 
 1850 was one of the outstanding events of the national 
 crisis of that year. This decision was indeed a cardi¬ 
 nal factor in the salvation of the Union then, and per¬ 
 haps later, in that it gave check to both the northern 
 and the southern extremists. The significance of its 
 influence is perhaps not yet generally realized. The 
 state did much to check the extremists of the South 
 because of its acceptance of the compromise. It did 
 something to check the extremists of the North, al¬ 
 though in a more indirect fashion. The warning 
 given in the “Georgia Platform,” that thus far could 
 the North go and no farther, was heeded by northern 
 conservatives, who in turn were able to restrain to 
 some extent the activities of northern extremists. It 
 is hoped that the influence exerted by the Georgia deci¬ 
 sion in both sections will appear as the narrative pro¬ 
 ceeds. 
 
CHAPTER I 
 
 ECONOMIC FACTORS 
 
 For some years preceding the American Civil War 
 it was customary to speak of Georgia as the “Key¬ 
 stone” or “Empire State of the South.” Such phrases 
 were, to be sure, chiefly popular with Georgians, but 
 their use was by no means limited to native sons and 
 seems to have implied a consciousness that the state 
 held among its neighbors a position of unusual impor¬ 
 tance. When, therefore, a great political crisis arose 
 in 1850, which involved the relationship of the south¬ 
 ern states to the Union, it was quite natural that Geor¬ 
 gia should play a leading part in determining the atti¬ 
 tude of the lower South toward the Union. The 
 political preeminence of the state was in large part the 
 result of economic preeminence, and an understanding 
 of the one involves some knowledge of the other. In¬ 
 deed, all phases of the crisis of 1850 in Georgia, and 
 of the influence which Georgia exerted upon the lower 
 South, were intimately related to the economic and 
 social conditions obtaining within the state during that 
 period. 
 
 Georgia was the keystone of an arch formed by the 
 Seaboard states to the north and the Gulf states to 
 the west. The “Keystone State” reached from the sea- 
 coast on the east across a wide plain and piedmont area 
 to the hill country of the Appalachians in the north¬ 
 west. It was divided into several well defined sections, 
 running generally parallel with the coast from north¬ 
 east to southwest across the width of the state. 
 
10 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 The first of these sections was that of the coast 
 lands, including the “sea islands.” Along the shore of 
 the mainland stretched the “tide swamp lands,” which • 
 also reached inland along the banks of the rivers in the 
 tidewater area. Here, in the region of the sweeping 
 “Marshes of Glynn,” were the most valuable lands in 
 the state in 1850. 1 At no great distance inland, how¬ 
 ever, the fertile swamp was succeeded by the most 
 desolate belt in Georgia, the aptly named “Pine Bar¬ 
 rens,” where there was a poor, siliceous soil covered 
 with rank brush and “scrub pine.” 
 
 At about one third the distance from the shore to 
 the mountains the Pine Barrens merged gradually 
 into “Central Georgia.” This, the most important area 
 in the state in 1850, may be bounded on the south by 
 the fall line, crossing the state from northeast to the 
 southwest and marked by the cities that naturally de¬ 
 veloped upon the rivers along this line. Since the 
 Pine Barrens did not actually reach to the fall line, 
 however, the southern boundary of Central Georgia 
 is here considered as running somewhat below that 
 line and as extending downward to include the fertile 
 lands along the Savannah River. 2 The southwest 
 portion of the state, while similar in general character 
 to Central Georgia, was developed at a later period 
 and was sometimes spoken of distinctively as “South¬ 
 west Georgia.” On the north, a series of granite 
 ridges, crowned in DeKalb County by the famous 
 “Stone Mountain,” marked the limits of Central and 
 
 1 J. D. B. DeBow, Industrial Resources of the Southern and Western 
 States, I. 355; G. M. White, Georgia Statistics, pp. 37, 284. For pleasing 
 pictures of the coastal lands about 1850, see Georgia B. Conrad, Reminis¬ 
 cences of a Southern Woman, pp. 1-10; E. J. Thomas, Memoirs of a 
 Southerner, pp. 7-24. 
 
 1 For all of these areas, the river systems, etc., see Bonner’s map of 
 1849 and map No. 1, p. 10. 
 
MAP NO. 1 
 
ECONOMIC FACTORS 
 
 11 
 
 the beginning of “Upper Georgia.” This area includ¬ 
 ed, geologically speaking, the Upper Piedmont, the 
 Blue Ridge, the Valley, and the main ridges of the 
 Appalachians, which ran athwart the northwestern 
 tip of the state. 3 
 
 The soil of Central and Southwest Georgia was a 
 fairly rich loam resting upon a clay foundation. The 
 general fertility of these sections adapted them to the 
 cultivation of cotton, and they came to form the Geor¬ 
 gia “Black Belt.” When exhausted by cotton cultiva¬ 
 tion and left fallow, however, the “scrub pine” eventu¬ 
 ally appeared, and the country assumed an appearance 
 similar to that of the Pine Barrens. In Upper 
 Georgia the soils of the valleys were fertile, but 
 the cool climate of this region adapted it to the 
 cultivation of fruits and grains rather than of the 
 lowland staples. The hills afforded some mineral 
 wealth and an abundance of potential water power. 4 
 
 The settlement of the several Georgia sections had 
 progressed slowly until about 1800, when only the coast 
 lands and “Middle Georgia” along the Savannah river 
 had been occupied. After that date the extinction of 
 Indian titles and the adoption of a liberal land lottery 
 system 5 enabled Carolina and Virginia settlers to push 
 steadily across Central Georgia. The whole belt of 
 Central Georgia had been occupied by 1830, but South¬ 
 west Georgia remained a sparsely settled country until 
 
 3 For careful geographical descriptions of the Georgia sections see 
 R. M. Harper, “Development of Agriculture in Upper Georgia,” Georgia 
 ■Historical Quarterly , VI. No. 1, pp. 6, 7; R. P. Brooks, The Agrarian 
 Revolution in Georgia, pp. 69-80 (published as University of Wisconsin 
 Bulletin No. 639, History Series, III. No. 3). 
 
 4 DeBow, op. cit., pp. 356, 362, 363; White, op. cit., pp. 150, 151, 212, 
 439; A. Sherwood, Gaseteer of Georgia (fourth edition, 1860), p. 194. 
 
 6 For the history and legal details of Georgia land administration 
 see S. G. McLendon, History of the Public Domain of Georgia, pp. 
 122-129. 
 
12 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 the forties. Meanwhile, some scattered settlements 
 had been made in the Pine Barrens, and poor white 
 “squatters” had drifted in from no one knew where, 8 
 to occupy the “piney woods.” The soils of this region 
 began to give out under cotton cultivation as early as 
 1820, save on the alluvial bottoms along the larger 
 rivers. Here a few prosperous plantations were main¬ 
 tained as late as 1850. 7 
 
 The late expulsion of the Indians from Upper 
 Georgia left the Blue Ridge and Valley regions un¬ 
 settled by whites until the later thirties,, when the last 
 of the tribesmen abandoned fields and cabins and 
 trekked west across the Mississippi. Just before this 
 occurred, gold had been discovered in the hills, and the 
 first white settlers came in on the tide of a small 
 “gold rush” that suggests the California epic of the 
 next decade. 8 Squatters occupied old Cherokee cabins 
 or built new ones, wherein they were still living in 
 1850. This settlement was supplemented in the forties 
 by poor farmers, who moved up from Central Geor¬ 
 gia, and by an immigration of mountaineers from the 
 adjacent hill country of eastern Tennessee. 9 These 
 elements blended into a rough and ready yoemanry pos¬ 
 sessing the usual virtues and defects of that class. 
 Much of “Cherokee Georgia” was still in the frontier¬ 
 farming stage of development in 1850. 
 
 If a “gold rush” brought settlers to Upper Geor¬ 
 gia, then, by the same token, it was a “cotton rush” 
 
 * There was a tradition in Georgia that they were descendants of 
 Oglethorpe’s paupers, who had moved up the rivers from the coast. 
 Some of these squatters may have migrated across the Savannah from 
 similar pine barren districts in South Carolina. 
 
 ' F. L. Olmsted, The Cotton Kingdom, II. 385. 
 
 8 There are interesting pictures of the Georgia gold rush by G. An¬ 
 drews, Reminiscences of an Old Georgia Lawyer, pp. 73, 187. 
 
 ' Milledgeville Federal Union, October 24, 1847. 
 
ECONOMIC FACTORS 
 
 13 
 
 that had carried settlers across Central Georgia. The 
 extension of cotton cultivation in this area led naturally 
 to two other demands, in addition to the ever present 
 desire for more land. There was, first, the demand 
 for more labor to work the fields, and, second, the need 
 for better transportation facilities wherewith to market 
 their product. Both desiderata were destined to influ¬ 
 ence greatly the entire subsequent history of Georgia 
 and of the Gulf states, which were experiencing a 
 similar development in the same period. 
 
 There was never any doubt that the bulk of un¬ 
 skilled labor in Central Georgia would be supplied by 
 Negro slaves. It was customary for incoming whites, 
 to bring their slaves with them, and this custom was 
 the chief source of Negro immigration. Many were 
 brought in, however, via the domestic slave trade, par¬ 
 ticularly after about 1830, and an uncertain number 
 through the illicit foreign trade. 10 During the third 
 and fourth decades, when the percentage of the net 
 increase in population was greatest, both the absolute 
 numbers and the ratio of increase were slightly smaller 
 for the Negroes than for the whites. As the planta¬ 
 tion areas of Central Georgia developed between 1840 
 and 1850, however, the demand for labor also grew, 
 and the percentage of increase in the Negro population 
 exceeded that of the whites in this decade. The state 
 still possessed in 1850 a white majority of some one 
 hundred and thirty-seven thousand, in a total popula¬ 
 tion of about nine hundred thousand. 11 
 
 10 Slavery and the Internal Slave Trade, by the Executive Committee 
 of the American Anti-Slavery Society, (London, 1841), pp. 12, 13, 20; 
 W. H. Collins, The Domestic Slave Trade, pp. 42, 119, 120; W. E. B. 
 Du Bois, The Suppression of the African Slave Trade to the United 
 States-of America, p. 183; A. A. Taylor, “The Movement of Negroes 
 to the Gulf States,” Journal of Negro History, III. No. 4, p. 368. 
 
 u The percentage increase of population, 1840-1850, for the Negroes,, 
 was about 35%; for the whites, about 28%. Census of 1850. 
 
14 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 Since cotton could be best cultivated in Central 
 and Coastal Georgia, it was in these sections that the 
 Negro population became concentrated. They soon 
 came to have a Negro majority in population, though 
 this majority rarely exceeded seventy-five per cent, and 
 was often less than sixty-five per cent, of the total. 
 Hence the concentration of Negro population was 
 rarely as great in the Georgia Black Belt as it was in 
 those of South Carolina and Mississippi. Neverthe¬ 
 less, the Negro element was sufficiently large in the 
 Georgia plantation areas to create a race problem of 
 serious potentialities. 12 
 
 The second demand stimulated by the spread of 
 cotton culture was that for improved means of trans¬ 
 portation. The chief problem in this connection was 
 how to ship cotton from Central Georgia to the coast, 
 these two sections being separated by the desolate pine 
 belt. It was naturally most convenient at first to de¬ 
 pend upon water transportation, and steamboats were 
 introduced upon the Savannah about 1816 and upon 
 the Ocmulgee and Chattahoochee about 1830. Mer¬ 
 cantile towns naturally developed at the fall line on 
 these rivers to handle this trade, the most important 
 being Augusta on the Savannah, Macon on the Oc¬ 
 mulgee, and Columbus on the Chattahoochee. 13 Two 
 of these towns shipped down the rivers to Georgia’s 
 one important port, Savannah, but some of their cotton 
 was carried on to Charleston. The latter city was not 
 so well connected by waterways with the interior coun- 
 
 12 See Map No. 2, p. 14. For the development of the Black Belt coun¬ 
 ties; see R. P. Brooks, “A Local Study of the Race Problem,” Political 
 Science Quarterly, XXVI. 193-200. For the exact percentage of slave 
 population in the several Georgia sections in 1850, which varied from 
 58.2 in the Lower Piedmont to 2.3 in the Blue Ridge, see R. M. Harper, 
 “Development of Agriculture in Upper Georgia, 1850-1880,” Georgia 
 Historical Quarterly, VI. No. 1, p 14. The free Negro population was 
 negligible. 
 
 13 See map No. 1, p. 10. 
 
MAP NO. 2 
 
ECONOMIC FACTORS 
 
 15 
 
 try as was Savannah. This mattered little in colonial 
 days, but, when cotton culture spread to the Piedmont 
 area of both South Carolina and Georgia, 14 it became 
 imperative for Charleston to find some direct water 
 connection with the new region. This was attained by 
 securing control of the line of steamers running from 
 Augusta to Savannah upon the river of that name and 
 by extending the line on from Savannah to Charleston. 
 In this way the Carolina port inaugurated a long and 
 portentous rivalry with the port of Georgia for the 
 control of the interior trade. 15 
 
 The establishment of steamers upon the Ocmulgee 
 and the Chattahoochee was practically concomitant 
 with the early railroad movement. The demand for 
 railroads was augmented in Georgia and the neighbor¬ 
 ing states by a growing realization that the South was 
 falling behind the North in economic progress. It be¬ 
 gan to be apparent in the thirties that the South was 
 becoming increasingly dependent upon the other sec¬ 
 tion in finance, commerce, and industry. Some south¬ 
 ern observers, notably the South Carolina extremists, 
 were inclined to place the blame for this situation pri¬ 
 marily upon northern legislation and sought, there¬ 
 fore, political remedies in nullification and secession. 
 The bulk of well informed southerners of the thirties 
 and forties, however, blamed the plight of their section 
 upon economic conditions and sought, therefore, eco¬ 
 nomic remedies. The chief specific remedies proposed 
 in this period were, first, the increase of both the do¬ 
 mestic and foreign trade of southern ports by the es¬ 
 tablishment of railroad connections between them and 
 
 14 See Brooks, Agrarian Revolution in Georgia, pp. 83-85. 
 
 10 See map No. 1, p. 10. For the story of water transportation in 
 Georgia, see U. B. Phillips, A History of Transportation in the Eastern 
 Cotton Belt, pp. 72, 73, 76-78, etc.; Mary Lane, “Macon, An Historical 
 Retrospect,” Georgia Historical Quarterly, V. No. 3, p. 27. 
 
16 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 the Mississippi Valley; and, second, the development 
 of manufacturing industries. Georgia took the lead in 
 pushing each of these proposed moves in the interest 
 of economic progress. 16 
 
 Agitation for railroad development in Georgia be¬ 
 gan in Athens, Macon, and Savannah in the early thir¬ 
 ties, and the first railroad charters were issued at that 
 time. Plans were laid for roads to connect Upper 
 and Central Georgia with Savannah and to develop 
 in this connection “direct trade” between that port and 
 Europe. No fewer than three “direct trade” conven¬ 
 tions met in Augusta in 1837 and 1838, and a fourth at 
 Charleston in 1839. This movement to ship direct to 
 Europe—rather than via New York—proved fruit¬ 
 less at the time, but was revived again a decade later 
 in connection with the increasing sectional antagonism 
 of that period. 17 Meanwhile, the related railroad move¬ 
 ment proved more productive of immediate results. 
 The building of the roads was seriously delayed by the 
 financial panic of 1837 and the subsequent depression 
 of the early forties, but between 1840 and 1848 the 
 “Georgia Central” was built from Savannah to Macon, 
 the “Macon and Western” from Macon to Atlanta, and 
 the “Georgia Railroad” from Augusta to Atlanta. 
 Meanwhile, a road had long since been run across 
 South Carolina from Charleston to Hamburg, the 
 latter a village upon the Savannah river opposite 
 
 16 The best brief and general statement of southern efforts towards 
 
 economic development is in St. George L. Sioussat, “Co-operation for 
 the Development of the Material Welfare of the South,” in The South 
 in the Building of the Nation, IV. 173. For more detailed expositions 
 see Edward Ingle, Southern Sidelights: A Picture of Social and Eco¬ 
 nomic Life in the South a Generation Before the War, chapter vii; 
 R. R. Russel, Economic Aspects of Southern Sectionalism, 1840-1861, 
 passim, published in University of Illinois Studies in the Social Sciences, 
 XI. Nos 1 and 2. . 
 
 17 Sioussat, op. cit., pp. 173-179; Ingle, op. cit., pp. 123-126; Russel. 
 op. cit., pp. 17, 18, 29, 94. 
 
ECONOMIC FACTORS 
 
 17 
 
 Augusta. In this way Atlanta, in the Piedmont, was 
 connected by two direct rail routes with the sea, the 
 first running via Macon to Savannah, the second via 
 Augusta to Charleston. 18 
 
 At the same time the state of Georgia, urged on 
 by state railroad meetings and by the great southern 
 railroad convention held at Memphis in 1845, pro¬ 
 ceeded to build the “Western and Atlantic” north from 
 Atlanta to Chattanooga, Tennessee. This point was 
 reached in 1849, and from here it was hoped to make 
 river and rail connections with the entire Mississippi 
 Valley. 19 This accomplished, Atlanta would become 
 the terminus for all goods shipped from the West to 
 the southern seaboard, for once arrived at Atlanta, 
 merchandise could be shipped thence to the sea via 
 either Macon or Augusta. If the Erie Canal had made 
 a great port on the northern seaboard, then the “Wes¬ 
 tern and Atlantic” could create a similarly great port 
 on the southern seaboard. Which of Atlanta’s ports 
 however, was to become the great “emporium”— 
 Charleston or Savannah? In a word, the rivalry of 
 these two ports for the Piedmont trade was now ex¬ 
 tended, as a result of the new rail connections with 
 Chattanooga, into a potential rivalry for the trade of 
 the entire West. 
 
 18 For these railroad developments see Bonner’s map of 1849 and 
 map No. 1, p. 10. For the general history of the railroads see Phillips, 
 A History of Transportation in the Eastern Cotton Belt, passim; for the 
 details of financing and management see the annual reports of the roads, 
 e.g., Charter, Acts and Reports of the President, Engineer and Superin¬ 
 tendent of the Georgia Railroad, and Banking Company, passim. For 
 the complicated economic and political history of the South Carolina 
 railroad running from Charleston to Hamburg, see T. D. Jervey, The 
 Slave Trade-. Slavery and Color, pp. 87-99. 
 
 “ For the history of the ‘‘Western and Atlantic” see Phillips ‘‘An 
 American State Owned Railroad,” (The Western and Atlantic) Yale 
 Revieiv, XV. No. 3, pp. 260-272. For the connections planned between 
 the “Western and Atlantic” and Nashville, Memphis, etc., see Map No. 
 1; and R. S. Cotterill, “Southern Railroads and Western Trade, 1840- 
 1850,” Mississippi Valley Historical Review, III. 428-432. 
 
18 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 While the roads mentioned were being built, plans 
 were also laid for running lines across the state from 
 east to west. It was proposed to extend a road 
 from Atlanta to West Point on the Chattahoochee, or 
 to build a new line from Augusta to Columbus via 
 Macon, such roads to be connected in time with lines 
 to Montgomery and New Orleans. Columbus was par¬ 
 ticularly desirous of securing connection with Macon 
 and Augusta, in the hope of becoming the chief trade 
 center between Montgomery and Charleston. This 
 meant, incidentally, that Columbus “boosters” looked 
 forward to connections with Charleston rather than 
 with Savannah in their own state. This fact may con¬ 
 ceivably have had something to do with the pro-Caro¬ 
 lina feeling so noticeable in Columbus in the late for¬ 
 ties. 20 As a result of all its building activity, Georgia 
 possessed by 1850 over five hundred miles of railroads, 
 a mileage which made it at least the fifth state in the 
 Union in railroad development. 21 The immediate eco¬ 
 nomic advantages of these roads were obvious enough. 
 Later experience showed, to be sure, that their advent 
 was not an unmixed blessing, 22 but they gave Georgia 
 at the time a great reputation for prosperity and prog¬ 
 ress and contributed to the business optimism of the 
 Georgia people. 
 
 Most of the earlier railroads were joint banking 
 and transportation enterprises, the banking privileges 
 
 20 See the Columbus Times for January 4, February 1, March 28, 
 May 2, 1848. 
 
 21 There was a regular railroad “boom” in the state between c. 1846 
 and 1850; see the Savannah Georgian, for May 25, December 8, 16, 1847. 
 
 22 The development of the roads tended in the long run to increase 
 the quantity of cotton raised, to increase competition in this industry, 
 and to fasten the one-crop system upon the South, with all its attendant 
 evils. In Georgia the roads built up Atlanta at the expense of the ports. 
 See Phillips, “Transportation in the Ante-Bellum South: An Economic 
 Analysis,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, May, 1905, pp. 450, 451. 
 For the immediate effects of the roads upon Atlanta, see Augusta Chron¬ 
 icle, August 16, 1849. 
 
ECONOMIC FACTORS 
 
 19 
 
 having obvious advantages for corporations involved 
 in heavy initial expenditures leading to small immediate 
 returns. Lack of capital was a handicap to most early 
 corporate enterprises in the state, which, being a rela¬ 
 tively new one, was not possessed of such banking faci¬ 
 lities as were enjoyed at Charleston. Banks estab¬ 
 lished at Savannah and Augusta in 1810 having proved 
 a success, however, a State Bank was founded at Sa¬ 
 vannah in 1828. This bank served as a place of de¬ 
 posit for state funds and issued paper currency. The 
 Panic of 1837 and the mismanagement and legislative 
 interference, which were common phenomena with 
 many banks in the new states of this period, combined 
 to wreck the State Bank in 1841. Its liabilities were 
 met by a special bond issue to the amount of one mil¬ 
 lion dollars. This state debt was increased in 1847 
 and 1851, when almost a million more was borrowed 
 in order to finance the building of the state railroad. 23 
 
 The bond issue of 1841 was made at a time of 
 general business depression, when there was of course 
 no surplus in the state funds. As a consequence, the 
 bank’s currency depreciated, and the state bonds were 
 difficult to sell, even at “ruinous prices.” 24 This situ¬ 
 ation was most embarrassing to the business interests 
 of the state and led to strenuous efforts by the Whig 
 party, which represented those interests, to restore the 
 state’s credit. These efforts, profiting from the gen¬ 
 eral return of prosperity in the late forties, resulted in 
 the payment of all back interest and some of the prin¬ 
 cipal of the bonded debt by 1849. In that year the 
 state treasurer, after paying all expenses and deposit- 
 
 23 J. A. Flisch, “The State Finances of Georgia,” The South in the 
 Building of the Nation, V. 409; D. R. Dewey, “Banking in the South,” 
 ibid., V. 467. 
 
 24 Savannah Georgian, July 19, 1849. 
 
20 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 ing seventy thousand in the debt sinking fund, still 
 had a surplus of ten thousand dollars on hand. In the 
 same year the amount of the state debt was less than 
 one half that of South Carolina and only about one 
 seventh of that of Alabama. 25 So encouraging was 
 the outlook in the state’s finances by this time—only 
 five years after a period of serious depression—that 
 the editor of the nation’s chief commercial journal 
 remarked that “No state in the Union has stronger 
 claims upon the public faith than Georgia.” 26 
 
 The private banks of Augusta and Savannah shar¬ 
 ed in the return of financial prosperity in the late for¬ 
 ties. With this prosperity came an increasing desire 
 to compete with the older and stronger banks of Charl¬ 
 eston for the business of their own state. Indeed, fi¬ 
 nancial dependence upon Charleston was fast becom¬ 
 ing offensive to local state pride. “It is absurd,” ob¬ 
 served the Milledgeville Recorder , “that we now have 
 to borrow money from other states and send out of 
 Georgia our interest. . . . Thus far Georgia has been 
 only a great plantation for the benefit of the Charleston 
 banks.” 27 Thus some financial rivalry between inter¬ 
 ested parties in Georgia and South Carolina was added 
 to the trade rivalry already noted. The Georgia pro¬ 
 test against financial dependence upon Carolina, it may 
 be noted in passing, was analogous to the general south¬ 
 ern protest against financial dependence upon the 
 North, and it led to an analogous dislike for the section 
 in question. 
 
 One of the underlying reasons for the return of 
 financial prosperity by 1849 was the return of agricul¬ 
 tural prosperity at that time. Nearly a decade of de- 
 
 25 The American Almanac, for 1850, p. 218. 
 
 20 Hunt’s Merchants’ Magazine, XXI. 454. 
 
 27 Quoted in DeBow’s Review, VIII. 39 (January, 1850). 
 
ECONOMIC FACTORS 
 
 21 
 
 pression in cotton prices was then coming to a happy 
 end. 28 Since southern methods in agriculture were 
 generally of a wasteful character, 29 the period of de¬ 
 pression had been particularly hard upon those sections 
 of South Carolina and Georgia which had long been 
 under cultivation. Georgia, however, was the better 
 situated of the two states in this respect, since it still 
 possessed, in 1850, large areas of practically new land 
 in Southwest Georgia. 30 A strong movement for agri¬ 
 cultural reform was also inaugurated in Georgia in 
 the late forties by a remarkable agricultural monthly, 
 the Southern Cultivator, which possessed the largest 
 circulation of any periodical in the state. 31 Published 
 at Augusta by the publishers of the Chronicle, this 
 paper carried to planters throughout Georgia and the 
 neighboring states an insistent demand for more scien¬ 
 tific farming. As a result of this propaganda and that 
 of the agricultural fairs, 32 some signs of improvement 
 in farming methods were discernible by 1850. 33 
 
 The chief factors in the return of high cotton 
 prices by 1850 seem to have been short crops and an 
 increasing European demand, consequent upon good 
 
 28 This depression was variously ascribed to overproduction, and to 
 the influence of the tariff in limiting British exports and consequently 
 British purchasing power. See Russel, Economic Aspects of Southern 
 Sectionalism, pp. 37-39. 
 
 29 This was generally recognized at the time by progressive southern 
 editors, see, e.g., the editorial opinions quoted in the Augusta Chronicle, 
 April 4, 11, 1849; Savannah Georgian, April 25, 1849, etc. 
 
 30 See Augusta Chronicle, May 17, July 6, 1849. 
 
 31 J. C. G. Kennedy, Catalogue of Newspapers and Periodicals in the 
 United States, for 1850, in appendix to J. Livingston, Law Register for 
 1852, p. 291. 
 
 32 For a description of one of the large Stone Mountain fairs see 
 Augusta Chronicle, Sept. 15, 1849. 
 
 33 B,oston Courier (Savannah corr.), December 27, 1850. There was 
 a concomitant demand for agricultural reform in South Carolina; see 
 C. S. Boucher, The Ante-Bellum Attitude of South Carolina Toward 
 Manufacturing and Agriculture, pp. 264-266, (published in Washington 
 University Studies, III. Pt. II, Humanistic Series, No. 2). 
 
22 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 harvests in England and the return to “normalcy” 
 after the political disturbances of 1848. 34 As a result 
 of all these factors, the price rose rapidly late in 1849, 
 the average price of “middling upland” per pound at 
 New York City going from 7.55 cents in 1849 to 12.34 
 in 1850. 35 By October 23, 1850, “middling fair” was 
 selling at Savannah for 13.5, which, according to C. 
 F. M’Cays’ estimate, represented an advance of no 
 less than eighty-five per cent, over the average price 
 for the period of the five preceding years. The average 
 price per pound of exported cotton of all grades rose 
 from 6.4 in 1849 to 11.3 in 1850, and to 12.11 in 1851. 36 
 
 The cumulative result of increasing cotton prices, 
 of attempts at agricultural improvement, and of the 
 prospect of still unexhausted soils in Southwest Geor¬ 
 gia, was to render the Georgia planters a fairly pros¬ 
 perous and optimistic group by 1850. In addition to 
 this, and what is perhaps of greater psychological im¬ 
 port here, the planters expected a continuation of good 
 times with increasing prosperity in the near future. 
 
 There was one other cause for optimism among the 
 propertied classes of Georgia in the late forties; name¬ 
 ly, the belief that manufacturing enterprises, then 
 growing rapidly in the state, would soon become a 
 source of great wealth to its citizens. The depression 
 in cotton prices during the forties did more to foster 
 
 34 Russel, Economic Aspects of Southern Sectionalism, pp. 33-35. 
 
 35 F. J. Guetter and A. E. McKinley, Statistical Tables Relating to the 
 Economic Growth of the United States, Enlarged Edition, p. 44 (Phila¬ 
 delphia, 1924) ; see also, Russel, op. cit.. p. 35; U. B. Phillips. American 
 Negro Slavery, p. 370; R. B. Handy, “History and General Statistics of 
 Cotton,” The Cotton Plant, p. 42, published as United States Department 
 of Agriculture Bulletin No. 33. (Washington, 1896), also in House 
 Documents, 54 Congress, 2 Session, No. 267. 
 
 36 Hunt’s Merchants’ Magazine, XXIII. 598 (December, 1850) gives 
 M’Cay’s estimates. For average prices of exported cotton see report 
 of the U. S. Treasury Department for 1855, Senate Documents, 34 Con¬ 
 gress, Sessions 1 and 2, V. No. 32, p. 116. 
 
MAP NO. 3 
 
 Based upon the values of farm lands, farm equipment, farm stock, and slaves; estimating 
 the average value of slaves at $500. Urban property values are not included. 
 
ECONOMIC FACTORS 
 
 2 3 
 
 industrial development in the eastern cotton belt than 
 had the earlier protective tariffs. As returns on cotton 
 investments fell, while dividends on industrial invest¬ 
 ments continued high in the North, it seemed reason¬ 
 able that some southern capital should be diverted into 
 the more promising industrial field. A systematic 
 propaganda with this end in view was consequently 
 carried on in both South Carolina and Georgia during 
 the forties by progressive merchants and other men of 
 property. While the most distinguished individual 
 leader of the industrial movement was William Gregg, 
 of South Carolina, there is some reason to believe that 
 its advent in Georgia antedates the time of Gregg’s 
 activity and that it would have developed in Georgia 
 along much the same lines had Gregg’s influence never 
 been exerted. 37 
 
 The pro-industrial propaganda of the forties em¬ 
 phasized the promise of high dividends, the advan¬ 
 tages of location adjacent to the source of raw mater¬ 
 ials, and the abundant supply of potential power and 
 cheap labor 38 in the South. Did not all natural advan¬ 
 tages in the field of cotton textile manufacturing, in¬ 
 deed, lie with the South rather than with the North? 39 
 
 31 Gregg’s first essay appeared in 1844 and, as a matter of fact, 
 called attention to the “rapid progress” already being made in Georgia 
 manufacturing at that time; Russel, Economic Aspects of Southern 
 Sectionalism, p. 41. Gregg was himself the nephew of a Georgia fac¬ 
 tory owner who had built one of the early mills in that state; Ingle. 
 Southern Sidelights, p. 86. 
 
 38 While there was always uncertainty as to the availability of slave 
 labor for industries, the availability of “poor white” labor was well 
 recognized in Georgia in 1850. See the Augusta Chronicle, April 27, 
 May 27, June 1, 1849; cf. Broadus Mitchell, The Rise of Cotton Mills 
 in the South, p. 25, published in Johns Hopkins University Studies in 
 History and Political Science, XXXIX. No. 2. Cf., also, Boucher, 
 Ante-Bellum Attitude of South Carolina Towards Manufacturing and 
 Agriculture, p. 249. 
 
 39 The truth of this view, so well and so persistently expressed in 
 the forties, is being demonstrated today, nearly a century later, in the 
 steady transfer of cotton textile manufacturing from New England to 
 the Piedmont of the Carolinas and Georgia. 
 
24 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 Only the exclusive devotion of the South to cotton cul¬ 
 ture was preventing that section from achieving the 
 industrial supremacy to which nature had predestined 
 it. 40 
 
 Such propaganda, however, had to labor against 
 strong and persistent opposition. There was the tra¬ 
 ditional fear that manufacturing would lead to pro¬ 
 tective tariffs, the pet abomination of the South, and 
 a general suspicion that it would in various ways up¬ 
 set the whole dominant plantation and slave-labor sys¬ 
 tem. 41 There was, finally, the opposition to any change, 
 which resulted from general social inertia, an inertia 
 perhaps the stronger for the fact that many of the 
 native whites of the state were in this period ignorant 
 and illiterate. 42 
 
 Apparently undaunted by the many difficulties to 
 be met, the proponents of industrialism proclaimed 
 their views throughout Georgia persistently and with¬ 
 out fear. 43 The Whig papers of the larger towns, 
 which, as will be noted later, usually possessed a larger 
 circulation than did their Democratic rivals, were the 
 
 40 For the appeal for manufacturing in Georgia see, e.g., the files of 
 the Augusta Chronicle and the Savannah Republican for 1847-1850. 
 
 41 For the traditional opposition to industrialism and tariffs, as well 
 as the fear that the whole plantation and slave-labor system would be 
 upset by the new order, see A. S. Jones, Speed the Plow: An Essay on 
 the Tariff, By a Georgia Planter, pp. 16, 17. For tariff arguments pro 
 and con in Georgia, consult the debate between the Augusta Constitu¬ 
 tionalist and the Augusta Chronicle, as reported in the latter for May 
 16 and 18, 1849. 
 
 43 About 20% of the poorer whites were entirely illiterate, there being 
 no effective public school system in the state in 1850. See Map No. 4, p. 
 24, for the distribution of white illiteracy, which closely paralleled the 
 distribution of wealth, as shown in Map No. 3, p. 22. For a general 
 description of educational conditions in the state about 1850, see C. E. 
 Jones, Education in Georgia, pp. 24-31, published as Cnited States Bu¬ 
 reau of Education Monographs No. 5 (1889). Cf. W. H. Kirkpatrick, 
 “The Beginning of the Public School System in Georgia," Georgia His¬ 
 torical Quarterly, V. No. 3, p. 8. See also E. M. Coulter,_ “A Georgia 
 Educational Movement During the Eighteen Hundred Fifties.” ibid., 
 IX, No. 1, 1-33. 
 
 43 Cf. Channing, History of the United States, V. 76. 
 
MAP NO. 4 
 
 Per cert lapo of Adutt 1/1/hife 
 
 ////Terafes m re/of/on To the 
 Toted Cohite.population:IB50. 
 
 CThe ra.fi o To the. White 
 A cl u Tt Poput a Tion 
 would he. much hip he. r) 
 
 /5 % a not o ver _ □ 
 
 8 to/S % _ |=) 
 
 3% to 8% _ 
 
 Under 3 %- 
 
 D/str / (rut/o n of {//iteracy /n 
 
 GfORG'M in IS50. 
 

ECONOMIC FACTORS 
 
 25 
 
 chief media employed in urging the new point of view. 
 So persistent was the propaganda that it began to show 
 definite and, in some ways, remarkable results during 
 the fifth decade. In 1840 Georgia had possessed but 
 a few insignificant cotton mills with a product of 
 less value than that turned out in a number of the other 
 southern states. During the next ten years, the rela¬ 
 tive increase in the value of cotton goods produced in 
 Georgia was greater than that in any other state of 
 the Union which had done an appreciable amount of 
 manufacturing in 1840, and the value increase in abso¬ 
 lute figures was greater in Georgia than in any of the 
 states save Massachusetts and New Hampshire. Only 
 two southern states remained in any way her serious 
 competitors in 1850, Maryland and Virginia, and both 
 of these were surpassed by Georgia in that year in the 
 value of cotton textile products. Some seven northern 
 states continued, to be sure, to greatly outrank the 
 “Keystone” of the South in this respect, but the Geor¬ 
 gia cotton products came very close in value to those 
 of Maine and surpassed those of New Jersey. Woolen 
 manufactures remained on a very small scale in the 
 state, but made a relatively great advance in value 
 from three hundred dollars in 1840 to over eighty- 
 eight thousand dollars in 1850. 44 
 
 44 These statements are based upon official returns made to the 
 Treasury Department in 1855, published in House Executive Docu¬ 
 ments, 34 Congress, Session 1, IV. Nos. 17 and 18, pp. 93-96. See also 
 T. P. Kettrell, Southern Wealth and Northern Profits, p. 54. Some of 
 the comparative figures on cotton manufactures are as follows: 
 
 Value Produced 
 
 State 1840 1850 
 
 Massachusetts . $16,553,423 $19,712,461 
 
 New York . 3,640,237 3,591,989 
 
 Maine . 970,397 2,596,356 
 
 Georgia. 304,342 2,135,044 
 
 Maryland . 1,150,580 2,120,504 
 
 New Jersey . 2,086,104 1,109,524 
 
 South Carolina. 359,000 748,338 
 
 Alabama . 17,547 382,260 
 
26 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 There were, in 1850, some forty cotton factories 
 in Georgia, which ran more than sixty thousand spin¬ 
 dles and used more than forty-five thousand bales of 
 raw cotton per year. The number of textile employees, 
 so far as can be estimated, was at least twenty-three 
 hundred. There were mills in nearly all the chief 
 Piedmont towns, but the main centers of manufactur¬ 
 ing were Columbus and Augusta, whose situation at 
 the fall line on navigable rivers gave them peculiar 
 advantages. Most of the mills were small, but one in 
 Columbus was housed in a six-story building and em¬ 
 ployed over two hundred people, while another in Au¬ 
 gusta had four hundred employees. 45 
 
 It is true that some depression in Georgia textile 
 manufacturing ensued in the years immediately fol¬ 
 lowing 1850, though Georgia did not suffer so much 
 in this respect as did some other states. 46 The very rise 
 in cotton prices which so benefited the planters neces¬ 
 sarily tended to embarrass the manufacturers. This, 
 however, does not alter the fact to be remembered in 
 connection with the political crisis of 1850; namely, 
 that a small but influential group of Georgians believed 
 at the time that great industrial prosperity lay just 
 ahead for their state. “So we go,” observed the Col¬ 
 umbus Times at the end of that year of fateful politi¬ 
 cal development, “Columbus will be a Georgia Lowell 
 
 48 For an enthusiastic contemporary account of the relatively great 
 progress of manufacturing in Georgia, see the Scientific American, as 
 quoted in the Washington Republic, June 7, 1850; see also Richmond 
 (Va.) Whig, April 30, 1850. There are, of course, many accounts in 
 contemporary Georgia papers, e.g., Augusta Chronicle, May 2, 1849. For 
 numbers of operatives and other statistics see the Census of 1850; Ket- 
 trell, op. cit., pp. 54, 55; and A. Sherwood, Gazetteer of Georgia (4th 
 Edition, 1860) p. 193. For the general history of early manufacturing 
 in Georgia, see Ibid., p. 172, ff.; V. S. Clark, History of Manufactures, 
 pp. 556, 557. 
 
 Hunt’s Merchants’ Magazine, for May, 1852, gives comparative 
 capital invested in Georgia manufactures in 1850 and 1852. 
 
ECONOMIC FACTORS 
 
 27 
 
 before long, and some of these days will beat her. 
 Lowell never had, nor never can have, the advantages 
 with which Columbus is endowed by nature for manu¬ 
 facturing purposes.” 47 Thus it was that industrial 
 enthusiasm was added to agricultural enthusiasm as a 
 source of business optimism in Georgia. 48 
 
 If the several economic interests in Georgia were 
 prospering, or at least expected to prosper, as the end 
 of the decade approached, how did the state’s business 
 classes view the economic situation as a whole? As 
 one would expect, there was the same economic opti¬ 
 mism in general as was associated with the several 
 occupations in particular. All things seemed to work 
 together for the good of those who loved Georgia, and 
 the end of the decade promised to be as bright as the 
 beginning had been gloomy. Cotton planting was, to 
 be sure, still troublesome, and lands still persisted in 
 wearing out, but improvements in prices and lands 
 were in sight. Railroad building was booming, and 
 manufactures, though still on a small scale, had in¬ 
 creased at an unprecedented rate through the decade. 
 Manufactures seemed to supplement planting and 
 promised employment for the hitherto decadent 
 classes of the population. Banking facilities and the 
 state’s credit were improving, and minor occupations 
 were feeling the touch of general prosperity. Commer¬ 
 cial and manufacturing towns were growing. Was not 
 Georgia truly the Empire State of the South ? 
 
 So, at least, felt her optimistic capitalist class. 
 “Georgia,” wrote an enthusiast in 1849, “makes more 
 
 " In Philadelphia North American, December 29, 1850. This “booster” 
 prediction may yet be realised. 
 
 48 There has been a tendency to overlook the significance of the early 
 industrial revolution in Georgia, apparently because, in terms of absolute 
 figures, the output of the South as a whole was very small in com¬ 
 parison with that of New England; see Kettrell, op. cit., passim. 
 
28 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 cotton and corn—has more railroads—more manufac¬ 
 tures—more shipping (save perhaps for New Or¬ 
 leans)—pays less taxes—has more schools—has more 
 diversified mineral wealth—is nearly ready to furnish 
 her own citizens and those of sister states with flour to 
 eat, clothes to wear, iron to work—she has a smaller 
 public debt—a finer climate or climates (as she has 
 them by assortment)— . . . than most (may we 
 not say, than any) of her sister states of the South.” 49 
 True, she did not seem so prosperous when compared 
 with the northern states. Some Georgians claimed, 
 however, that the apparent economic superiority 
 of even northern states was illusory. Perhaps 
 the most dramatic expression of this claim was 
 given by Alexander H. Stephens, who engaged an 
 Ohio representative in debate in Congress in 1854 
 in an efifort to prove that his state was more wealthy 
 and prosperous than was Ohio. 50 
 
 Georgia’s economic leadership in the South was 
 often conceded in her sister states. “Georgia will 
 soon be a model state,” remarked the Knoxville (Ten¬ 
 nessee) Register . 51 Georgia has far outstripped any 
 Southern state in railroad improvements,” observed 
 the Mobile (Alabama) Register. 52 The Mobile Ad¬ 
 vertiser agreed with this view. 53 The Raleigh (North 
 Carolina) Star, in joining in this praise, recalled the 
 state’s earlier economic depression. “Ten years before 
 she was as low in natural character and individual 
 enterprise as ever was old Rip Van Winkle. Now, 
 
 49 De Bow’s Review, VII. 177. 
 
 M More of Georgia and Ohio, pp. 1-10. For the reply of the Ohio 
 representative, L. D. Campbell, with its critical examination of Stephen’s 
 statistics, see Campbell’s pamphlet, Kansas and Nebraska, pp. 4, 5. 
 
 61 In Augusta Chronicle, May 16, 1850. 
 
 “In Washington Republic, January 11, 1850. 
 
 63 Mobile (Ala.) Advertiser, November 28, 1850. 
 
ECONOMIC FACTORS 
 
 29 
 
 because of her press, factories and railroads, she is 
 indisputably in advance of any other southern state in 
 enterprise and success.” 04 A South Carolinian, writ¬ 
 ing from Charleston in 1849, remarked that “everyone 
 who has traveled through Georgia this year seems to 
 be struck by the energy, enterprise and go-ahead-itive- 
 ness of her people.” 55 ; 
 
 Such opinions sometimes reached the North. 
 James M. Crane, of Virginia, for instance, in speaking 
 before the American Institute of New York, claimed 
 that Georgia was “the New England of the South, 
 with $55,000,000 invested in railroads and manu¬ 
 facturing.” Immigrants were coming in, and it was 
 advancing more rapidly than any of the southern 
 states. 56 As a result of such addresses and of the trips 
 of northern business men and travelers to Georgia, the 
 northern papers began to comment on Georgia’s 
 leadership. 57 Olmsted, “the Yankee Peripatetic,” 
 declared: “It is obvious to the traveler and notorious 
 in the stock-market that there is more life, enterprise, 
 skill and industry in Georgia than in any other of the 
 Southern Commonwealths. It is the Yankee-Land of 
 the South.” 58 
 
 So much for opinion within Georgia and without 
 upon the subject of her prosperity. This brings us 
 naturally to a consideration of the one development 
 which seemed between 1847 and 1852 to threaten most 
 seriously the whole scheme of that prosperity. Every 
 
 64 In Augusta Chronicle, June 13, 1849. 
 
 55 Ibid., September 20, 1849; see also Charleston Courier, November 
 18, 1850. 
 
 58 De Bow’s Reviezv, VII. 177. (August, 1849). 
 
 57 See, e.g., the Boston Courier, January 23, 1850; the Washington 
 Republic, January 11, 1850; the Philadelphia North American, December 
 25, 1849. 
 
 68 Journey in the Seaboard Slave States, p. 530. 
 
30 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 factor but one in the dominant cotton planting system 
 seemed to be pleasing—land, prices, agricultural im¬ 
 provements—all these afforded a promising outlook. 
 Yet all the while that these had been improving in the 
 late forties, the other vital factor, that of labor, had 
 been threatened by a suddenly increasing menace—the 
 development of the antislavery movement in the North 
 and the political crisis which this precipitated in the 
 years mentioned. The antislavery attack upon the 
 Negro slave system loomed as a growing cloud upon 
 the political horizon and threatened, as the years 
 passed, to obscure the dawning light of economic optim¬ 
 ism and prosperity. The antislavery attack raised 
 many delicate and difficult problems concerning Negro 
 slavery, upon which Georgians and other southerners 
 were undecided or, when decided, often divided in 
 opinion. As the political crisis of 1850 was most di¬ 
 rectly concerned with these problems involved in 
 slavery, and as the attitude of the Georgia people 
 towards that crisis depended in some measure upon 
 their attitude towards slavery, it is well here to review 
 the nature of these difficulties. Much needs only to be 
 stated to be recalled; a few facts require new emphasis 
 or illustration. 
 
 Practically all native Georgians regarded the 
 northern antislavery movement as an unprovoked at¬ 
 tack upon southern institutions. It seemed to them 
 that the movement had become constantly more aggres¬ 
 sive during the fourth and fifth decades of the century, 
 first in the effort to prevent the extension of slavery; 
 secondly, to undermine it where it already existed. In 
 opposing this attack, the proslavery men had acted 
 upon the defensive and had often been conciliatory, 
 
ECONOMIC FACTORS 
 
 31 
 
 but all to no avail. 59 The conduct of the antislavery 
 Yankees seemed incomprehensible to many. While 
 some granted that the abolitionists were well-inten¬ 
 tioned but deluded men, most southerners saw in them 
 merely an incomprehensible fanaticism. 
 
 This view was, of course, exactly the opposite of 
 that held in the North by the antislavery men; namely, 
 that the proslavery southerners had been a united and 
 aggressive group, attempting to spread their institu¬ 
 tions across the country and to control the Federal 
 government in order to guarantee the success of this 
 and other proslavery movements. 60 
 
 Such views were unknown or ignored by the aver¬ 
 age Georgian. His interest was centered, if he were 
 an intelligent citizen, upon the refutation of the aboli¬ 
 tionists’ attack upon slavery. This attack, it will be 
 recalled, had three phases, slavery being condemned 
 upon theological, moral, and economic grounds. The 
 degree of time and effort expended upon these 
 phases usually seems to have been in inverse propor¬ 
 tion to their respective importance. 
 
 It was argued at some length that God’s “Higher 
 Law” forbade the holding of human beings as prop¬ 
 erty. In reply, the southerners labored at equal or 
 greater length, and with equal or greater conclusive¬ 
 ness, to show that scriptural authority approved the 
 institution. This discussion, while of considerable in- 
 
 59 Letters from Georgia to Massachusetts, pp. 1, 15-20. This pamph¬ 
 let, the work of A. B. Longstreet, while not entirely fair to Massachu¬ 
 setts, is very suggestive for southern thought on slavery in 1850. It was 
 largely ignored at the North. See Wade, A. B. Longstreet, pp. 286-287. 
 
 60 For the persistence of this view of a united and aggressive 
 Slavocracy, in modern scholarly work, see the first volume of Rhodes’ 
 History of the United States. For criticism of the same, see Boucher, 
 '“In Re That Aggressive Slavocracy,” Mississippi Valley Historical 
 -Review , VIII. 1 and 2, pp. 13-16. 
 
32 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 terest to a more or less theological age, did not often 
 touch upon practical points at issue. 
 
 Many of the moral charges made against slavery 
 met with flat denial in the South. There was, it was 
 held, no such breeding of slaves for sale as the aboli¬ 
 tionists claimed was the custom. Georgians admitted, 
 to be sure, that slaves were “reared” in the border 
 states for sale in the lower South, 61 but this was not 
 necessarily the same thing as “breeding.” It was gen¬ 
 erally admitted by abolitionists, moreover, that Georgia 
 itself was not even a “slave rearing” state. 62 If, on 
 the other hand, the abolitionist called attention to the 
 evils of miscegenation, the Georgians admitted the 
 charge, but retorted that the same evils existed to an 
 even greater extent at the North. Was not the ratio 
 of mulattoes to pure Negroes twenty times as great in 
 Ohio as in Georgia—to say nothing of prostitution? 63 
 In like manner, it was customary, when the antislavery 
 critics decried the overworking of the slave, to call at¬ 
 tention to the even more brutal treatment accorded the 
 “free” factory workers of Old and New England. 64 
 So the argument proceeded, controversial and unscien¬ 
 tific declarations being answered by pronouncements 
 of a like nature. 
 
 It is interesting to recall that some southern 
 writers attempted to stay the debate by appealing to 
 
 81 For description of a legislative debate based upon this point see 
 Savannah Georgian, November 13, 1849; Augusta Chronicle, September 
 12, 1849. Cf. The Plantation I. No. 2, p. 110. 
 
 82 Slavery and International Slave Trade, by the Executive Committee 
 of the American Anti-Slavery Society, (1841) pp. 12, 13. 20. For an 
 exception to this rule see the Boston Liberator, August 9, 1850. 
 
 M The Plantation, II. No. 2, p. 384. 
 
 01 Harper, The Pro-Slavery Argument, passim. For northern replies 
 to this argument, see, e.g.. Inquiry into the Condition and Prospects of 
 the African Race in the United States, By an American, (Philadelphia. 
 1839) passim; Paine, Six Years in a Georgia Prison, p. 16; Ohio State 
 Journal, (Columbus), October 18, 1850, etc. Cf. Dodd, The Cotton King¬ 
 dom, p. 61. 
 
ECONOMIC FACTORS 
 
 33 
 
 the common business interests of northern manufac¬ 
 turers and southern planters. Not the least interesting- 
 of such appeals was that made by a few sociologists, 
 who explained to the northerners that the abolitionists 
 hated capitalists as well as planters and would attack 
 the holdings of the one as well as of the other. Aboli¬ 
 tionists or Socialists—they were all the same, declared 
 Hundley. 65 
 
 The economic indictment of slavery was, other 
 things being equal, the one best calculated to command 
 the planter’s serious consideration. This indictment, 
 drawn up originally by such southern writers as Dr. 
 Thomas Cooper, was later taken over by such 
 critics as Olmsted and Helper. The analysis of slav¬ 
 ery as an expensive form of labor is a familiar one, 
 and much of the economic backwardness of the South 
 was explained by northern critics in terms of this 
 analysis. 66 While some southerners replied to this by 
 denying the assumption that the South was backward 
 —and it is of interest here that Alexander H. Stephens 
 cited the prosperity of Georgia to support such a denial 
 —most southerners admitted the backwardness, but 
 attributed it to factors other than slavery. The “Cal¬ 
 houn Democrats” in Georgia blamed it upon northern 
 legislation, while the Whigs usually ascribed it to the 
 plantation system and to the lack of manufacturing 
 enterprise. 
 
 Nevertheless, there were some signs of wavering 
 in the southern defence of the economic aspects of their 
 institution. At almost the very time that Fitzhugh 
 and others were urging the slave system as the best 
 
 05 D. R. Hundley, Social Relations in Our Southern States, pp. 279- 
 281. See also Fitzhugh, Cannibals All, pp. 54, 144, 356, 357. 
 
 60 See Boston Post and Boston Atlas for April and May, 1849, 
 passim. Cf. Phillips, American Negro Slavery, pp. 350, 394, 397, 399. 
 
34 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 system of labor per se, influential papers in Georgia 
 seemed just a little uncertain about the institution. 
 Though still courageous, they were apparently whis¬ 
 tling in the dark. When the Boston Atlas and Boston 
 Post proceeded in 1849 to condemn slavery upon eco¬ 
 nomic grounds, the Savannah Georgian and Augusta 
 Chronicle essayed to reply. The Georgian rejoiced 
 with apparent relief that the progress of manufactures 
 would now “demonstrate that slavery does not impede 
 progress,” the implication being clearly that a demon¬ 
 stration had hitherto been wanting. It admitted, how¬ 
 ever, that slave labor was “not as cheap as what is 
 styled ‘free labor’ at the North.” 67 The Chronicle re¬ 
 buked this admission, declaring that the Georgian 
 confused the system of slave labor with the planting 
 system of agriculture. “If all our slaves were replaced 
 by European immigrants,” it declared, “and the same 
 wasteful methods of planting were employed, condi¬ 
 tions would be just as bad.” 68 
 
 A week later, however, further thunders from Bos¬ 
 ton led the Chronicle to make a statement as remarkable 
 for its insight as for its frankness. “Slaveholders must 
 demonstrate in a large way,” it admitted, “and by visi¬ 
 ble results, that slave labor in Georgia is as profitable 
 to you and as useful to the world, as free labor is at 
 the North or can be at the South,—that it is not inimi¬ 
 cal to common schools, the improvement of the soil and 
 the progress of manufactures. . . . Our sectional 
 
 67 Savannah Georgian, May 11, 1849. 
 
 68 Augusta Chronicle, May 12, 1849. This distinction between slave- 
 labor and the plantation system was a significant one, since these two, 
 and a third factor, the race question, were often confused at the time, 
 and have been since. Indeed, the Chronicle itself seems, in the statement 
 quoted, to have overlooked the race factor. For a modern discussion of 
 the plantation system, as distinct from the slave-labor system, see 
 Phillips, “The Decadence of the Plantation System,” Annals of the 
 American Academy of Political and Social Science, XXXV. 37-41. 
 
ECONOMIC FACTORS 
 
 35 
 
 movements are taken for weakness in this regard. 
 The whole matter will turn in the end on the pivot of 
 dollars and cents. We can only prove our view by 
 attaining prosperity.” 69 
 
 It may be of some speculative interest here to raise 
 the question as to what the attitude of such a paper 
 would have been had the test it suggested failed in 
 later years to bring a satisfactory result. In terms of 
 its own analysis, this would have condemned slavery 
 upon economic grounds. It is logical to suppose that 
 the editors would then have favored some gradual 
 modifications of the institution, in the economic inter¬ 
 est of the planter class their paper represented. Wheth¬ 
 er so logical a course would have been followed, how¬ 
 ever, in view of all the conflicting circumstances in- 
 r volved, is difficult to say. 
 
 There had always been a divergence of opinion 
 among Georgians as to the chances of eventual emanci¬ 
 pation. Discussion of this question had been renewed 
 in the middle thirties by the abolitionist propaganda 
 of the time. At this time those who maintained the 
 older philosophic objections to slavery were already 
 becoming uncertain as to whether emancipation could 
 ever be accomplished. 70 Some men of idealistic temper 
 like Alexander H. Stephens maintained through the 
 forties that slavery was a moral evil, but gradually lost 
 faith that it would ever be abandoned. 71 Many Geor¬ 
 gians, in conformity with the spirit of the age, had 
 come by 1850 to hold that slavery was a good per se, 
 
 09 Augusta Chronicle, May 17, 1849. Italics my own. 
 
 70 Remarks upon. Slavery, Occasioned by Attempts to Circulate 
 Improper Publications in the Southern States, by a Citisen of Georgia, 
 (Augusta, Ga., 1835), p. 30. 
 
 71 Savannah Georgian, May 5, 1849. 
 
36 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 which “would be of perpetual duration and must be 
 preserved at all hazards.” 72 
 
 Nevertheless, there were observers both North and 
 South who believed that the test proposed by the 
 Chronicle would ultimately lead the South to emanci¬ 
 pation. One northerner suggested that progress in 
 machine inventions would make slave labor still more 
 unprofitable, when slavery would “die amid the ho¬ 
 sannas of both pro and anti-slavery men alike.” 73 
 Another held that “throughout the world abolition has 
 come naturally when increases in population and wealth 
 increased the value of land and labor, thus making the 
 price of slave labor high and unprofitable. The slave 
 in the United States is now passing towards freedom 
 by the natural road and any interference . . . will 
 hinder this process.” 74 
 
 In the South it was believed by at least a few that 
 the economic test had already convinced many that 
 slavery should be abolished. Heydenfeldt, an Ala¬ 
 bama citizen, stated in a long analysis of the slave prob¬ 
 lem addressed to the governor that “the South has the 
 germ of a special and unknown anti-slavery party.” 
 This included not only the poor whites, “who regard the 
 slave as a rival in production,” but also “those who are 
 wearied out with the struggle of unproductive labors 
 . . . and those who desire more populous white com- 
 
 72 Report of Chief Justice James H. Lumpkin to the Georgia legis¬ 
 lature, concerning the Slave Code, December 1849, in the Boston Lib¬ 
 erator, July 19, 1850, quoting the United States Law Magazine for 
 January, 1850. 
 
 73 T. Eubank, Inorganic Forces Affecting Slavery (N. Y., 1860), 
 pp._26, 27, 29. 
 
 74 Letter from a Philadelphian to a South Carolinian. Washington 
 Republic, June 17, 1850. For similar editorial opinion in the North, see 
 the Cleveland Plain Dealer, December 25, 1850. A Georgian observed to 
 Fanny Kemble, a decade before this, that there would be prompt abol¬ 
 ition if slavery proved definitely unprofitable; Fanny Kemble, Journal of 
 a Residence on a Georgia Plantation in 1838-1839, p. 77. 
 
ECONOMIC FACTORS 
 
 37 
 
 munities for the purposes of trade and education. This 
 combination of opinion against slavery has prodigously 
 increased within a few years, and is now increasing at 
 a rapid pace. Numbers are every day added to those 
 who long for the exodus of the slave.” 73 This state¬ 
 ment suggests exaggeration, but the fact that it was 
 reprinted in a strongly proslavery Georgia paper, 
 without denial, is of some interest. Such a view, even 
 if allowance be made for exaggeration, taken in con¬ 
 junction with the uncertain defense of slavery as an 
 economic order in the Georgia papers, would seem sug¬ 
 gestive. Some practical men, despite the prosperity of 
 1848-1850, were uncertain as to the economic desir¬ 
 ability of slave labor. And those who insisted upon it 
 were dogmatic in their conviction, offering little real 
 economic evidence to support their view. This leads 
 naturally to the question as to why intelligent south¬ 
 erners insisted upon the economic desirability of a 
 labor system whose value, when denied, could not be 
 well demonstrated. 
 
 The most obvious reason for the planter’s refusal 
 to view too critically the economics of slave labor was 
 the irritation aroused by the other types of criticism. 
 The reaction to scathing moral and theological attacks 
 was a general justification that tended to defend all 
 aspects of the institution. This psychological factor 
 doubtless played its part, along with economic factors, 
 in producing the general change in attitude towards 
 slavery which characterized the development of south¬ 
 ern thought between 1820 and 18 5 0. 76 Southern pride 
 
 75 Columbus Times, January 23, 1849. Cf. Ingle, Southern Sidelights, 
 pp. 326, 327. < 
 
 ™ For a statement of this change, see Dodd, The Cotton Kingdom, 
 pp. 49-59, 61-69. 
 
 t 
 
38 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 became involved in the defense of slavery, and the- 
 southerner of 1850 was apt to feel that the economic as 
 well as the moral value of slavery must be defended at 
 all costs. 7 ' Some Georgia observers were conscious 
 of this psychological factor and believed that, had the 
 abolitionists never spoken, voluntary emancipation 
 would have proceeded apace in the South. 78 The 
 second reason for the planter’s failure to be critical of 
 slave labor was the fear that such an attitude would 
 encourage the northern demand for immediate eman¬ 
 cipation and that this would raise the danger of large ' 
 property loss. This, of course, was in northern eyes 
 the chief reason for southern opposition to abolition. 79 
 It was, however, a business view and could have been 
 overcome, other things being equal, by proof of eco¬ 
 nomic advantages in gradual emancipation. 
 
 Other things, however, rarely were equal. The 
 planter feared that free labor would be less efficient 
 than slave labor and that this loss in efficiency might 
 counterbalance other advantages in a free system. To 
 be sure, northern men held that free labor was more’ 
 efficient than slave, but here they often failed to realize 
 the peculiar nature of southern labor. The slave was 
 not only a slave, he was also a Negro, and most south¬ 
 erners were convinced that the Negro would not work 
 as well a freedman as he did a slave. 
 
 It might have been urged in reply, and indeed was 
 expected by a few antislavery men, that the place 
 of the inefficient freedmen could be taken by white 
 
 " See, e.g., editorial of the Norfolk (Va.) Argus, in the Charleston 
 Mercury, January 1, 1851. 
 
 ,8 Jas. H. Lumpkin to Howell Cobb, January 21, 1848, Toombs, 
 Stephens and Cobb Correspondence, p. 94. 
 
 ” G. M. Weston, Progress of Slavery, p. 187. 
 
ECONOMIC FACTORS 
 
 39 
 
 laborers. 80 This seemed impossible to the planter, 
 however, not only because of the difficulty of ridding 
 the country of the Negroes, 81 but because he believed 
 the Negroes alone were physiologically adapted to 
 work in the rice and cotton fields. 82 
 
 It is but a step from the statement of this racial 
 factor affecting the labor system to the consideration 
 of the general significance of race in the whole slavery 
 controversy. It was this race problem which supplied 
 the planter with a third motive for refusing to judge 
 slavery simply upon economic grounds. Now it was 
 axiomatic in the South that the Negroes were of an 
 inferior race. This view needed no defense at home, 
 but, in reply to abolitionist attacks, it was substantiated 
 by quasi-scientific arguments concerning physiology, 
 anthropology, and the like. 83 When it had been estab¬ 
 lished that the Negro was inferior, it followed that he 
 needed guidance and control, both for his own sake and 
 for that of the whites associated with him in the com¬ 
 munity. Slavery supplied just what was needed as a 
 system of control. It kept the Negroes working, kept 
 them in their proper social position, and kept them con¬ 
 tented. 84 Hence, when abolitionism attacked slavery, 
 
 80 G. H. Hatcher to J. C. Calhoun, Jan. 5, 1848, Calhoun Papers, 
 quoted by Boucher, “In Re That Aggressive Slavocracy,” op. cit., 
 p. 43. 
 
 81 For Georgia opinion on the failure of the colonization movement, 
 see T. R. R. Cobb, Law of Negro Slavery, XIV and XV, (1858). 
 
 82 For the medical argument in favor of Negro slavery, see Dr. 
 Cartwright’s letter to Daniel Webster, De B ova’s Review, III. 53-62. 
 This contains an excellent resume of the several reasons for opposing 
 emancipation. See also Bryant Tyson, The Institution of Slavery in 
 the Southern States, pp. 14, 15. For a clear modern statement, see 
 Phillips, American Negro Slavery, pp. 400, 401. 
 
 83 For a standard discussion of this sort, see J. H. Van Evrie, Negroes 
 and Negro Slavery, Pt. I, passim. 
 
 84 When there was some talk in Alabama in 1850 about danger of 
 slave insurrection, the Savannah Republican, January 18, 1851, remarked 
 that “no man really believes there is any dissatisfcation among the 
 blacks.” Cf. W. H. Russell, Pictures of Southern Life, p. 27; Mitchell, 
 “Frederick Law Olmsted,” Johns Hopkins Studies, XLII. No. 2, pp. 
 127-129. 
 
40 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 it attacked three things simultaneously: a form of 
 property, a system of labor, and a scheme of social 
 control. 
 
 The fear that emancipation would disturb the 
 status quo in race relationships and bring on social 
 chaos was general and doubtless sincere in the cotton 
 states of 1850. Its sincerity is attested by its appear¬ 
 ance in letters of a most private character as well as in 
 papers and speeches intended for public perusal. “The 
 abolitionists,” wrote a Charlestonian to Governor Sea- 
 brook of South Carolina in 1850, “are every day rais¬ 
 ing up the pretentions of the blacks to equality with the 
 whites, and in the end, after we have conceded and 
 conceded, they will demand that too, and we will have 
 to quit the country . . . for lack of courage to main¬ 
 tain a right bequeathed by an illustrious ancestry.” 85 
 The need for slavery as a form of social control was 
 emphasized in all public manifestoes in the South 
 from this period to the Civil War. 86 That it was 
 emphasized may be explained by the assumption that 
 southerners found it a more effective argument than 
 the relatively selfish one concerning property loss. 
 But its sincerity and justice can hardly be questioned, 
 in view of the private expressions noted above and in 
 view also of subsequent events during the Reconstruc¬ 
 tion period. 
 
 85 Thos. Lehre to Seabrook, September 6, 1850, Seabrook MSS. 
 
 88 See, e.g., Address of the Hon. H. L. Benning, Commissioner from 
 Georgia to the Virginia State Convention. Feb. 18, 1861. (Richmond 
 1861), pp. 22-26. For other expressions of this general view in public 
 addresses, see the Resolutions of the Second Session of the Nashville 
 Convention of 1850, (Washington Republic, Nov. 26, 1850) ; J. C. Cal¬ 
 houn’s “Southern Address’’ of 1849; ( Address of the Southern Members 
 of Congress to their Constituents, Washington, D. C.. 1849) ; and the 
 preamble to the Resolutions of the Georgia State Convention of 1850, 
 (Proceedings of the Georgia State Convention, Milledgeville, 1850). 
 
ECONOMIC FACTORS 
 
 41 
 
 The precedents to which southerners pointed to 
 prove the reality of their race fears were, first, the sup¬ 
 posedly degraded character of those Negroes who had 
 been freed 87 and, second, the economic and social 
 decadence which, they claimed, had been caused by 
 emancipation in the French and British West Indies. 88 
 The southern literature concerning this West Indian 
 story was large and suggestive, though it rarely made 
 any allowance for environmental or other forces apart 
 from the racial factors involved. 
 
 The general race problem seemed so vital a part of 
 the slave problem that the phrase “the negro-politico 
 question” began to be used in Georgia as synonomous 
 with the “slavery problem.” 89 Some southerners de¬ 
 clared definitely that all other phases of the slave prob¬ 
 lem were of minor importance and that, were it not for 
 it, emancipation would be gladly granted by many. 90 
 Perhaps the clearest claim that the race problem was 
 the essence of the slavery question was not made by a 
 southerner, however, but by a Philadelphia scholar 
 writing just before the war. “There is too much talk,” 
 he declared, “of slavery in the abstract. Slavery im¬ 
 plies both a master and a servant. Here the servant 
 is a negro and the master a white man, and their racial 
 characteristics determine their mutual relationships. 
 What is called the slave question ought to he called the 
 
 87 Savannah Republican, Jan. 6, 1848; Free Negroism (New York, 
 n. d.). p. 6. 
 
 88 B. Tyson, The Institution of Slavery in the Southern States, p. 37; 
 Free Negroism, p. 7; J. Townsend, The Present Peril of the Southern 
 States (Charleston, 1850), p. 10; Slavery Indispensable Parallel to Civil¬ 
 ization, (Baltimore, 1855), p. 28; for British opinion on the islands, see 
 A Statement of Facts, illustrating the Administration of the Abolition 
 Law and the Sufferings of the Negro Apprentices in the Island of 
 Jamaica, (London, 1837) passim; The Case of the Free-Labor British 
 Colonies, etc. (London, 1852), passim. 
 
 88 Boston Courier (Savannah Corr.), Dec. 27, 1850. 
 
 co Tyson, op. cit., p. 37. 
 
42 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 negro question. On the inherent, unalterable qualities 
 of the negro hinges the whole question of slavery 91 
 . . . Slavery is an evil thing. But we have the negro 
 and therefore must have the slave.” 92 
 
 It was incomprehensible to some that so many 
 northerners could not see this aspect of the emancipa¬ 
 tion problem. “The economical effects of slavery have 
 usually been argued from an amazingly unreasonable 
 point of view,” wrote a Virginian after the Civil War. 
 “Our enemies persist in discussing it as an election to 
 be made between a system of labor by free yeomen of 
 the same race, and a system of labor of African slaves 
 on the other; as though the South had any such choice 
 in its power. If the social conditions in Virginia ex¬ 
 hibited inferiority in its system of labor, the true cause 
 of the evil was to be sought in the presence of the 
 Africans among us, not in their enslavement .” 93 
 
 In an effort to impress the North with the serious¬ 
 ness of the race problem, southern writers reminded 
 the northern people of the degree of their own race 
 feeling. Indeed, many Georgians were convinced that 
 northerners would not treat Negroes as well as they 
 did, free or slave. Race riots in Cincinnati and Phila¬ 
 delphia, northern refusal of economic opportunities to 
 Negroes, and opposition to free Negro immigration to 
 
 81 The italics are my own. This view has been revived in late years 
 with even greater force by writers on Negro history: “The slave ques¬ 
 tion,” says one of them, “was in a sense hardly more than an incident 
 in the Negro Problem” ; B. Brawley, A Social History of the American 
 Negro, p. 116. 
 
 82 S. G. Fisher, Laivs of Race as Connected with Slavery (1859), 
 pp. 8, 9. This is a remarkable essay, but seems to have attracted little 
 or no contemporary attention. Its viewpoint was ignored by all post- 
 bellum northern writers on southern history, and its existence was gen¬ 
 erally overlooked by the southern. Cf. Stone, “Some Problems of 
 Southern Economic History,” American Historical Review, XIII. 790. 
 
 82 R. L. Dabney, Defense of Virginia (N. Y., 1867), p. 296. 
 
ECONOMIC FACTORS 
 
 43 
 
 northern towns were cited to prove the point. 94 Aboli¬ 
 tionist admissions that there was intense race prejudice 
 in New York State 95 were received with some pardon¬ 
 able satisfaction in Georgia, and the feeling naturally 
 developed that either these Yankees were hypocrites, or 
 they would appreciate the southern point of view on 
 the race situation. 96 
 
 Southern warnings about racial troubles sometimes 
 did receive sympathetic attention in the North among 
 conservative circles. If abolitionism led to secession 
 and Civil War, it was admitted, that “would be terrible 
 and destroy southern prosperity. There would then be 
 no cotton supply for the North and this would be most 
 unfortunate.” 97 Another northern writer, in discuss¬ 
 ing the South, admitted that “the grand objection in 
 the community to abolition (and it is probably nearly 
 universal) is the belief that the negroes, if freed, would 
 be a pest of society, . . . would prey upon the 
 whites and live uncontrolled. Many, no doubt, think 
 the lives and property of the whites would be at their 
 disposal . . . This is serious and demands deliber¬ 
 ate attention.” 98 Weston, an able and moderate critic 
 of slavery, recognized the claim that “the question of 
 slavery in the United States is embarrassed by a ques¬ 
 tion of race and color.” He implied, however, that the 
 claim was unfounded and suspected it was largely 
 propaganda to mask the simple fear of property loss. 
 “There is no reason,” he wrote, “to suppose that even 
 
 94 Savannah News, Feb. 8, 1850. 
 
 95 New York Tribune, Dec. 16, 1850. 
 
 96 Savannah News, September 7, 1850. This is the general view which 
 has recently been emphasized in the work of southern writers on the 
 race question. See A. H. Stone, American Race Problem, passim. 
 
 97 Philadelphia North American, December 21, 1849; March 4, 1850. 
 
 88 Inquiry into the Condition and Prospects of the African Race 
 
 in the United States, by an American (Phila., 1839), p. 130. 
 
44 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 the liberation instantly and en masse of the slaves at 
 the South would be attended with peril, whatever losses 
 and inconveniences it might occasion. Negroes are 
 not beasts, but men—not caged, but at large, easily 
 governed, whether as free labor or as slaves.” He 
 insinuated that the moment the owners found slavery 
 unprofitable, they would suddenly discover that 
 Negroes were not at all socially dangerous and could 
 be freed with safety. “Moreover,” he declared, “as 
 soon as the race is thrust upon its own resources, it will 
 be unable to survive in the struggle for existence, will 
 gradually disappear, and thereby automatically remove 
 even the possibility of a race problem.” 99 
 
 Other northern observers denied the precedents 
 cited in the southern argument concerning the effects 
 of emancipation in the West Indies. Things were not 
 so bad there as they had been painted, and what was 
 bad was not necessarily due to the racial qualities of the 
 Negroes. 100 At times the whole argument that the 
 factor of race entered into the slavery question was 
 categorically denied and denounced by the more bitter 
 enemies of the slave apologists. “This southern claim 
 of a social danger in emancipation,” declared Senator 
 Benton of Missouri, “is but a pure and simple inven¬ 
 tion of John C. Calhoun, not only without evidence but 
 against evidence.” 101 Finally, it is probable that the 
 majority of northern men never quite appreciated the 
 force of the southern view concerning race, largely 
 
 "Weston, The Progress of Slavery, pp. 243, 244. Cf. Van Evrie, 
 Negroes and Negro Slavery, Pt. I, 309 ff. 
 
 100 Philadelphia North American (corr.), Dec. 22, 1849. For a care¬ 
 ful antislavery view of developments in the Indies, see the British 
 Anti-Slavery Advocate for Feb., 1857, quoted in W. Chambers, Ameri¬ 
 can Slavery and Color, (London, 1857), pp. 125-136. 
 
 101 T. H. Benton, Thirty Years’ View, II. 735. Cf. Jefferson Davis, 
 A Memoir, by His Wife, I. 456. 
 
ECONOMIC FACTORS 
 
 45 
 
 because they themselves were not in contact with the 
 problem. 102 
 
 The subject should not be dismissed until the last 
 and perhaps the most peculiar phase of its discussion is 
 noted. This is the fact that the writings of the most 
 intense proslavery advocates were used by antislav¬ 
 ery men to prove that the race problem was really 
 not important. Writers like Fitzhugh, who had de¬ 
 veloped the logic of slavery apologetics to an apotheosis 
 of the system, had logically concluded that slavery 
 should be established in all countries, regardless of 
 race or other factors. This, said some abolitionists, 
 proves that what the southerners want is not race con¬ 
 trol, but slavery as a labor system per se. No doubt 
 they have been forced to it by a realization that many 
 of their slaves are now largely white in blood and that 
 the old argument about “race control” will no longer 
 justify holding such people in servitude. 103 Such criti¬ 
 cism, of course, assumed for its own purposes that 
 extremists like Fitzhugh represented average southern 
 opinion. 
 
 The realization of the significance of the race 
 problem in Georgia and other cotton states led to two 
 divergent political attitudes towards the American 
 Federal Union, and it is this influence of the problem 
 upon political opinion that justifies its discussion in the 
 introduction to a political narrative. In the first place, 
 the fear of racial difficulties that might follow secession 
 was one reason that led Georgians to desire to postpone 
 hasty action against the Union so long as there was 
 
 102 For an instance of ignorance of the meaning of the problem, see 
 the New York Evening Post, Jan. 12, 1848. Cf. the Savannah News, 
 Jan. 21, 1848. 
 
 103 W. Chambers, American Slavery and Color, (London, 1857)^ 
 
 pp. 1, 2. 
 
46 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 hope that slavery could be preserved in the Union. 
 Secession, it was thought, would give the abolitionists 
 full control of the northern government. This would 
 mean more encouragement to fugitive slaves, and this, 
 in turn, would result in efforts in the border states to 
 sell all their remaining Negroes to the cotton states. 
 This region would then see hastened the day when a 
 surplus Negro population would become an economic 
 and social burden. Or, if secession led to civil war, 
 this might in turn lead to servile war with all its conse¬ 
 quences. Hence secession, instead of saving slavery, 
 would destroy it. 104 
 
 In addition to this, some Georgia planters felt that 
 a strong Union government would be a guarantee of 
 social safety to the planter when plantation life had 
 become more highly developed in the Black Belt, and 
 the rest of the poor whites had been forced to leave the 
 region. ‘‘Does it not become us as an intelligent 
 people,” asked a Georgia planter, “to anticipate that 
 period when so large a proportion of our population 
 will have become slaves, and ask whether we will not 
 want then the Federal Government to give us safety 
 and security?” 105 
 
 All of this relates, however, to the slavery question 
 in general. The specific phase of the general problem 
 which became most acute in the United States in the 
 forties was the question of the extension of slavery. 
 There had long been an economic question of slavery 
 extension, involving the migration of masters and 
 slaves from the old to the new slave-holding states. 
 The whole process had several effects. It usually left 
 the old states with wornout lands and at the same time 
 
 1<M Macon Journal, in the Natchez (Miss.) Courier, Oct. 29, 1850. 
 
 l “ Eli H. Baxter to the Committee, the Macon Union Celebration, 
 Feb. 19, 1851, Proceedings of the Macon Union Celebration, pp. 8, 9. 
 
ECONOMIC FACTORS 
 
 47 
 
 brought them into competition with the more prosper¬ 
 ous newer communities. It also increased the supply 
 of cotton and the demand for slaves, which meant, 
 other things being equal, a decrease in the price of cot¬ 
 ton and an increase in that of slaves. This, though it 
 might not have serious effects upon the newer and 
 more prosperous states, tended still further to the eco¬ 
 nomic embarrassment of the planters of the older 
 states. As Georgia was one of this latter group, the 
 immediate economic interests of her planters were apt 
 to be opposed or at least indifferent to the acquisi¬ 
 tion of more slave territory. 106 
 
 Slave extension, however, was attractive to some 
 Georgians, as to other southerners, as a political ex¬ 
 pedient. Since abolitionism was growing simultane¬ 
 ously with nationalism in the North, the control of the 
 Federal Government by antislavery men would proba¬ 
 bly mean forced abolition at the command of that gov¬ 
 ernment. Such control must therefore be avoided, and 
 the only way to avoid it was to extend slavery and 
 admit new slave states. Those who favored slave ex¬ 
 tension because it would give such political protection 
 to the ultimate interests of slavery, did not hesitate to 
 claim for it other and more immediate advantages. 
 Dire consequences were predicted in case there was no 
 outlet for the normal increase in the slave population 
 of the older states. If all the slaves were held in the old 
 states, where soils were exhausted, their natural in¬ 
 crease would soon render their numbers superfluous. 
 
 106 For an excellent contemporary analysis of this situation, see 
 Weston, op. cit., pp. 205-209, 217. This, to be sure, is a priori reasoning, 
 but it offers a partial interpretation that well fits the facts of the 
 average planter’s indifference or opposition to slavery expansion. There 
 is a mass of evidence concerning his indifference in Cole's Whig Party 
 and in Boucher’s “In Re That Aggressive Slavocracy,” Mississippi Valley 
 Historical Review, VIII. Nos. 1, 2. 
 
48 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 Even if their value fell greatly as a result of this (and 
 this was not always admitted), they would still become 
 “not worth their board and keep.” They would “eat 
 the master out of house and home.” This would, after 
 years of economic depression, force the owners to fail 
 completely or to emancipate. 107 But this process in¬ 
 volved the whole danger of the race problem, and 
 possibly race war, which has already been discussed. 
 “It is not unreasonable to believe that the time will 
 come,” observed a Georgia editor, “when the value of 
 slave property will have become so slight that the 
 owner will be more than willing to get rid of his slaves. 
 But what a horrible freedom that will be to the African 
 —proceeding from the worthlessness of his labor— 
 which will mean suffering and degradation.” This, in 
 turn, would mean social turmoil and race danger for 
 the whites. 108 
 
 It is typical of the confusion of opinion that existed 
 concerning slavery extension that, while some men 
 thus demanded it to save the old states from having 
 too many Negroes, others opposed it in order that too 
 many Negroes should not leave the old stages. “If the 
 extentionists have their way,” wrote a famous South 
 Carolinian, “our state will lose all her negro labor, 
 while her ague and congestive fever abide.” 109 In 
 other words, old slave states like Georgia and South 
 Carolina needed a large Negro population for labor, 
 but must avoid one that was too large, lest it become 
 an economic burden. Just how an extension of terri¬ 
 tory proposed at any particular time would affect this 
 
 1OT Milledgeville Federal Union, January 15, 1850; Jackson (Miss.), 
 Flag of the Union, February 14, 1851. 
 
 108 Savannah Georgian, January 5, 1848. 
 
 109 General James Hamilton to the Charleston Mercury, in the Wash¬ 
 ington Republic, December 2, 1850. 
 
ECONOMIC FACTORS 
 
 49 
 
 nice balance in Negro numbers was difficult to say; 
 and this difficulty may partially explain that confusion 
 of southern opinion that often existed when extension 
 seemed imminent. 
 
 It should now be possible to correlate what has been 
 said about prosperity in Georgia in 1850, about the 
 threat to that condition imminent in the antislavery 
 movement, about the attitude of Georgians toward the 
 institution of slavery so attacked, and about the special 
 question of slavery extension which involved all of 
 these and led to the political crisis to be studied. In 
 1850 the antislavery forces of the North attempted to 
 prevent all further slavery extension. They also at¬ 
 tacked other phases of slavery, such as its existence in 
 the District of Columbia. What should the attitude 
 of Georgians be towards this movement and this crisis? 
 Two divergent answers were given, one looking to¬ 
 wards compromise with the North, the other towards 
 separation from the North. Why was this divergence? 
 
 The answer may be given in the form of a rela¬ 
 tively simple hypothesis, so far as the dominating 
 planter classes were concerned. Their immediate eco¬ 
 nomic interests, a3 suggested, w&re-opposed to the 
 extension of slave territory. There was no economic 
 reason, then, for demanding secession from the Union 
 simply because the North insisted that there should be 
 no further slavery extension. There was, moreover, a 
 special reason for avoiding such a crisis; namely, the 
 desire of all propertied men to avoid danger of social 
 turmoil. The Union had permitted the development of 
 good business conditions; the same Union might be 
 necessary to preserve such conditions. Planters who 
 went no further than this in their analysis of the crisis 
 of 1850 were, quite naturally, insistent that compro- 
 
50 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 mise be made with the North in order that the preser¬ 
 vation of the Union might insure the preservation of 
 peace and prosperity. 
 
 The moment, however, that a planter was convinced 
 that the various northern attacks on slavery would lead 
 gradually but inevitably to abolition, he foresaw not 
 only the sudden ruin of prosperity, but all the other 
 social dangers that have been described. If this were 
 the case, the very Union that had seemed a protection 
 now appeared to him as a league with destruction. 
 Hence it must be abandoned at once. Thus the very 
 planter who had previously been the most ardent cham¬ 
 pion of the Union, would now become its most intense 
 enemy. In both cases his economic and social interests 
 were the same; the difference was due simply to a dif¬ 
 ference of opinion as to how far these interests were 
 in danger. 
 
 The tw r o views that resulted from this situation 
 were apparently most divergent. One planter argued 
 earnestly for the Union and the other against it. Each 
 was so sincerely desirous of defending the economic 
 interests of slavery that he could scarcely believe the 
 other sincere in the same desire. In reality, however, 
 their views were not so divergent after all. The 
 ‘‘Union man” was usually just one step behind the 
 secessionist, and that step was simply a matter of evi¬ 
 dence and conviction. Cite more convincing evidence 
 to prove that the Union would lead to abolition, and, 
 presto, he would become as violent a disunionist as the 
 other fellow. The manifestoes of the Union party in 
 Georgia in 1850 clearly recognized the truth of this 
 and carefully served notice upon the North that any 
 further evidence of a tendency towards emancipation 
 
ECONOMIC FACTORS 
 
 51 
 
 would make all Georgian secessionists. 110 The sudden 
 spectacular shift of such Georgia leaders as Toombs 
 and Stephens from a strong Union position to a 
 southern-rights position—and back again—may be 
 explained in part by these very circumstances. 
 
 Why, however, were a great majority of Georgians 
 of the planter and merchant classes satisfied in 1850 
 that the Union did not necessarily menace slavery? 
 Why was it so difficult to convince them that their ulti¬ 
 mate interests were in danger? One rather obvious 
 answer may be given, which is at least worthy of seri¬ 
 ous consideration. A class that prospers does not wish 
 to court danger before it is thrust upon it. The pros¬ 
 perity of the Georgia planters was a bird in hand; the 
 vague hopes held out by secessionists were two—but 
 in a bush. 
 
 This opinion is not merely a present hypothesis, but 
 one which was held consciously at the time by observers 
 of Georgia. Such critics were convinced that, had busi¬ 
 ness conditions been bad, the Georgia capitalist classes 
 would have been far more ready to see in the anti¬ 
 slavery movement a cause for extreme measures. Eco¬ 
 nomic ills and psychological depression would almost 
 certainly have been blamed, rightly or wrongly, upon 
 the Federal government. A Union that had brought 
 these things would have been no Union to preserve. 
 General James Hamilton, who was a rather keen critic 
 of economic factors in the drama of 1850, passed 
 through Central Georgia in the fall of that year, when 
 the political crisis over the secession movement was 
 supposed to be at its height. He found the state “in 
 
 110 See, e.g., the “Georgia Platform” of 1850, which is but this one 
 step removed from a southern-rights document, H. V. Ames, State 
 Documents on Federal Relations, pp. 271, 272. 
 
52 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 a condition of philosophic calm,” since “thirteen cents 
 a pound for cotton was a powerful contributor to make 
 civil war and revolution exceedingly distasteful to her 
 people.” 111 In like manner, observers in South Caro¬ 
 lina, who desired aid from Georgia in a secession 
 movement, feared that the good times there would de¬ 
 feat their purpose. “Dis-union feeling in Georgia,” 
 declared the Columbia South Carolinian, “is neutral¬ 
 ized by the high price of cotton.” Her prosperity will 
 make her unwilling to make anv sacrifice for the cause 
 of secession. 11 " Governor Seabrook, a leader of the 
 secession movement in South Carolina, declared pri¬ 
 vately to Quitman of Mississippi in 1850 that “pros¬ 
 perity makes the masses indifferent to the crisis.” 113 
 
 So, too, felt northern observers in Georgia. The 
 Savannah correspondent of the Boston Courier, al¬ 
 though taking the other side in the political controversy 
 from that held by the Carolina papers, reached exactly 
 the same conclusion as to the economic forces at work. 
 “It is very fortunate for this Union,” he observed, 
 “that cotton is thirteen to fourteen cents a pound, in¬ 
 stead of four to five. There is now a state of pros¬ 
 perity they do not care to disturb—but were it other¬ 
 wise, all the depression in trade and prices would have 
 been attributed to the burden of the Union and to 
 the baneful effects of national legislation and northern 
 agitation.” 114 Such hypotheses, while they probably 
 
 111 Letter to the Charleston Mercury, reprinted in the Washington 
 Republic, December 2, 1850. Hamilton wrote from Texas, November 11, 
 and must therefore have passed through Georgia not later than October, 
 i.e., in the early part of the Georgia convention campaign of that fall. 
 
 112 Columbia tri-weekly South Carolinian, June 21, 1849. The Mobile 
 Daily Advertiser made the same analysis of the situation in Alabama, see 
 National Intelligencer, Dec. 6, 1850. 
 
 113 Seabrook to Quitman, July 15, 1850, Seabrook MSS. 
 
 ui The Boston Courier, November 20, 1850; Cf. Richmond Whig, 
 March 5, 1851. 
 
ECONOMIC FACTORS 
 
 53 
 
 exaggerated the potency of purely economic factors, can 
 hardly be ignored in the light of all the circumstances 
 which have been and will be considered. 
 
 There is perhaps no better way of emphasizing the 
 potency of economic prosperity in preserving the pro- 
 Union feeling in Georgia than to consider the contrast 
 existing between that state and South Carolina. One 
 of the outstanding phenomena in the political history 
 of the period was the fact that the very planter class 
 which was conservative in Georgia and the Gulf States 
 was radical in South Carolina, for in the former it 
 was pro-Union in feeling, while in the latter it led the 
 secession movement. This relatively radical attitude 
 of the Carolina planters had prevailed there since the 
 early thirties, and it is suggestive that its development 
 had been concomitant with the economic decadence of 
 the state. 
 
 South Carolina, in the old colonial and early state¬ 
 hood days, had been a prosperous country, especially in 
 the plantation area along the coast, and this had made 
 possible the development in Charleston of an able and 
 highly cultured planter society. This society domi¬ 
 nated the economic, social, and political life of the state 
 to an extent that was unique even in the cotton country. 
 As the area of cotton cultivation extended westward, 
 however, and the old lands of the state wore out, Caro¬ 
 lina began to suffer all the typical ills inherent in the 
 slave and plantation systems. The worst of the situ¬ 
 ation seemed to be the impossibility of finding any 
 remedy. Agricultural improvement seemed hopeless, 
 for it was easier to take up new lands to the west than 
 to improve the old ones at home. “The soil’s slow 
 restoration cannot be made while Georgia and Ala- 
 
54 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 bama are to the west,” admitted a Charleston paper in 
 1838. 115 
 
 When this situation was apparently made more 
 difficult for South Carolina by the tariff policy of 
 northern manufacturers in the twenties, it was natural 
 that the planters should have laid many of their diffi¬ 
 culties at the door of Federal legislation. A distrust of 
 the economic advantages of the Union became at this 
 time a more or less permanent attitude in the state. 
 An apparent victory upon the tariff issue in 1833 led 
 to but a short-lived satisfaction in South Carolina, 
 since the next two decades saw the rapid development 
 in the North of the antislavery movement, which in a 
 new and perhaps more dangerous manner threatened 
 the state’s economic system. 
 
 Meanwhile, the lower tariff schedule had not 
 brought the state final relief from its difficulties. The 
 Whig tariff of 1842 was one of the causes of its 
 second serious political protest—the so-called “Bluffton 
 Movement.” South Carolina suffered even more than 
 Georgia, during the cotton depression terminating 
 about 1848, from lessened dividends and loss of both 
 white and Negro population. In like manner, its recov¬ 
 ery after 1848 was less certain than that in Georgia. 
 The latter had an obvious advantage in its newer lands ; 
 better facilities for water and rail transportation; the 
 presence of more northern capital and many energetic 
 northern tradesmen, teachers and mechanics; and, 
 finally, an advantage in that the inherent general dis¬ 
 advantages of the slave planting system had not as yet 
 developed through so long a period as they had in the 
 older state. As a result, there was by 1850 a distinct 
 contrast in the economic philosophy of the capitalist 
 
 1,6 Charleston Courier, March 16, 1838, in Jervey, Life of Robert Y. 
 Hayne, p. 456. 
 
ECONOMIC FACTORS 
 
 55 
 
 classes in the two sister commonwealths. Although in 
 Georgia the planters, merchants, and editors were in¬ 
 clined to be “boosters,” across the river there was much 
 pessimism. While Dr. Lee at Augusta was preaching 
 optimism through the Chronicle and the Southern Cul¬ 
 tivator, ex-Governor Hammond at Charleston was 
 warning of approaching decay. In addressing the con¬ 
 vention of the South Carolina Institute at that city in 
 1850, he reminded his hearers that returns on cotton 
 investments in the state since 1842 had averaged but 
 four and one-half per cent. “At such rates,” he con¬ 
 tinued, “our state must soon become utterly impover¬ 
 ished and of consequence wholly degraded. Depopu¬ 
 lation must take place rapidly. Our slaves will go first 
 and that institution from which we have heretofore 
 reaped the greatest benefits will be swept away. . . . 
 This process is already apparent around us. Since 
 about 1830 floating capital has continuously left the 
 state, about $500,000 annually. . . . Owners have 
 emigrated, taking an average of 8,300 slaves per an¬ 
 num, so that by 1840 South Carolina had 83,000 less 
 slaves than the average population increase should 
 have given her.” 116 
 
 At the same time that the capitalist class was thus 
 emigrating or facing decreasing dividends, the condi¬ 
 tion of the mass of poor whites was most depressing. 
 The yeomanry of South Carolina was a smaller group 
 and less independent economically and politically than 
 the same class in Georgia. 
 
 The need of doing something for this class and, 
 what was more important, of doing something for 
 capital, led to a demand for manufactures in Carolina, 
 as it had in Georgia. This movement, though led by 
 
 116 Quoted in De Bow’s Review, VIII. SOI (June, 1850). 
 
56 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 the able William Gregg, proved relatively less success¬ 
 ful in the older state. In addition to the same forces 
 that impeded the movement across the river, there was 
 in Carolina a conservative influence that displayed 
 more old-fashioned opposition to ‘‘associated capital.” 
 The almost complete disappearance of the Whig party 
 in the state, for the very reason that traditions there 
 were so opposed to the tariff and other views of that 
 party, severed that connection with a northern pro¬ 
 industrial party which was a factor in promoting a 
 tariff and industrial party in Georgia. In like manner 
 —it may have been because of the more intense anti¬ 
 northern feeling in Carolina or because of the more 
 aristocratic tone of government and society there— 
 fewer northern engineers, mechanics and tradesmen 
 went into the state than did into Georgia, the “Yankee- 
 land of the South.” Hence by 1850, when the first de¬ 
 pression in cotton manufacture set in, Carolina manu¬ 
 facturers, as well as planters, were rather depressed in 
 spirit. William Gregg drew such a dark picture of 
 industrial prospects that year, in writing for Dc Bow’s 
 Review, that the able editor thereof felt called upon to 
 deprecate his conclusions. 117 
 
 Meanwhile, the development of trade at the port of 
 Charleston had been disappointing. River connection 
 with the interior was poor for transportation purposes 
 within the state, and the attempt to control the river 
 trade up the Savannah, in rivalry with the port of that 
 name, had long since failed. The attempt to compete 
 with Savannah for the Augusta trade by running the 
 Charleston and Hamburg Railroad to a point across 
 the river from the Georgia city had also partly failed, 
 
 w De Bow’s Review, VIII. 134 (February, 1850); Cf. Boucher, 
 Ante-Bellum Attitude of South Carolina, pp. 256-261. 
 
ECONOMIC FACTORS 
 
 57 
 
 because of the refusal of Augusta to permit bridge 
 connection there. This also was a factor in discourag¬ 
 ing the great dream of attracting the bulk of the lower 
 Mississippi Valley trade to Charleston. 
 
 Thus all interests, planting, manufacturing, and 
 trade, seemed rather discouraging to the planter society 
 of South Carolina in the late forties. In this state of 
 mind, they were more inclined to see the worst in the 
 possible consequences of the northern antislavery 
 movement. The traditional distrust of the Union, the 
 heritage of the thirties, increased this inclination. Or, 
 to put the matter in another way, South Carolinians 
 were less inclined to hide from themselves the ultimate 
 menace of this movement to their institutions than 
 were the Georgians, whose prosperity inclined them to 
 conservatism and compromise. While a Union that 
 had been associated with decadence, and which now 
 threatened the very existence of Carolina’s economic 
 life, was no Union to preserve, there were, some at¬ 
 tractive possibilities in a Southern Confederacy. Free 
 trade, the panacea for Carolina’s ills, could be inaug¬ 
 urated. Then there was a hope that Charleston would 
 become the great port of such a Confederacy as soon 
 as the Augusta bridge was built and western connec¬ 
 tions made. But here again Charleston interests were 
 threatened by competition with Savannah. This riv¬ 
 alry was a factor in determining the relationships be¬ 
 tween the two states in 1850 and in determining their 
 respective attitudes toward the Union. These relation¬ 
 ships, therefore, merit special consideration. 
 
 Cultured Charleston had long looked upon Georgia 
 as a new and relatively crude western country. Geor¬ 
 gians, in return, made fun of the “dandies” of effete 
 
58 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 Charleston. 118 This feeling, typical of the eastern- 
 western sectional consciousness of the time, was not in 
 itself serious, but it prepared a psychological basis for 
 the support of any real political or economic antago¬ 
 nisms that might later develop. When the Nullifica¬ 
 tion crisis appeared in the thirties, such an antagonism 
 arose. Most Georgians had economic or political 
 reasons for standing by the central government in that 
 controversy. 119 From that time on, many Georgians 
 suspected Carolina as the home of reckless and self- 
 seeking radicalism. 
 
 Meanwhile, the feeling towards the sister state had 
 not been improved by the efforts of Charleston to re¬ 
 place Savannah in the control of Georgia’s up-country 
 trade. Savannah felt more strongly upon this matter, 
 to be sure, than did other parts of the state less directly 
 interested; indeed, towns like Columbus, which looked 
 more for trade connections to Charleston than to Sav¬ 
 annah, probably felt inclined to favor the former. Gen¬ 
 erally speaking, however, the sense of state pride was 
 as strong in Georgia as in the sister state, and, for 
 reasons noted above, the state pride of Georgia was 
 particularly sensitive in all matters pertaining to Caro¬ 
 lina. The obvious efforts to take Georgia trade from 
 Georgia’s port, therefore, aroused in many Georgians 
 economic antagonisms to “Palmettodom.” It has also 
 been noted that there was some feeling of financial 
 rivalry between the states. 
 
 Unfortunately for South Carolina’s political aspi¬ 
 rations, as it later developed, Charleston continued in 
 
 118 Andrews, Reminiscences, pp. 44, 45; Longstreet’s Georgia Scenes 
 also contains suggestions of this. 
 
 118 For a careful narration of the Nullification movement in Georgia 
 see the article of that title by E. M. Coulter, in the Georgia Historical 
 Quarterly, V. No. 1, pp. 3-39. 
 
ECONOMIC FACTORS 
 
 59 
 
 the forties the attempt to wrest the bulk of the upland 
 trade from Savannah. The trade of the whole West 
 seemed ultimately at stake, and Charleston sorely 
 needed it to retrieve her fallen fortunes. Savannah 
 began to complain in the late forties that at all the 
 railroad conventions Charleston spoke loud and long 
 concerning “the Charleston avenue to the west—via 
 the Georgia railroads.” Should not Georgia’s port be 
 the chief beneficiary of Georgia’s state railroad that 
 reached through the mountains to the West? 120 So 
 reasoned “Old Yamacraw,” but Charleston continued 
 zealously in her attempts. Her merchants were active 
 in Upper Georgia seeking trade connections, and the 
 people there sometimes criticized Savannah for not be¬ 
 ing equally energetic. Nevertheless, they showed a 
 sympathy for their own port and urged it on to greater 
 activity. Savannah, of course, was not inactive in 
 words. Her press carried on a running controversy 
 with that of her rival as to the respective merits of 
 their ports, their distance from the interior, their ship¬ 
 ping facilities, and the like. This sometimes even de¬ 
 generated into delightful quarrels over their respective 
 health conditions, each claiming that disease was more 
 general and more fatal with their rival than with them¬ 
 selves. 121 
 
 120 Boston Courier, January 1, 1850. See map number 1, p. 10. It 
 should be noted in fairness to Charleston that her citizens contributed 
 capital to the building of some of the Georgia roads and to those in 
 Tennessee with which it was hoped the Western and Atlantic would 
 connect. A recent writer declares that it was most unfortunate for 
 Charleston to have depended on its connection with the Georgia road to 
 Tennessee rather than upon a direct road to Cincinnati, which Hayne 
 had desired to build. See T. D. Jervey, The Slave Trade: Slavery and 
 Color, pp. 87-99. 
 
 m De Bout’s Review, VII. 558, 559 (December, 1849) ; VIII. 243-245, 
 (Mar., 1850). As a matter of fact the health conditions at Charleston 
 seem to have been better than those at Savannah. See Ingle, Southern 
 Sidelights, p. 129. 
 
60 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 The final and most exasperating effort on Charles¬ 
 ton’s part to eliminate competition from Savannah 
 came in 1847, just as the political crisis with the North 
 was becoming serious. When the Georgia legislature 
 met that fall, the merchants of Charleston petitioned 
 that body for the incorporation of a railroad to be built 
 from some point on the Georgia Central Railroad to 
 Silver Bluff on the Savannah River. Such a line would 
 have tapped the trade coming down from Atlanta and 
 Macon to Savannah, a little above the latter city, and 
 would have diverted it to the river, whence it could be 
 carried via a Carolina road to Charleston. This pro¬ 
 posal seemed the last word in arrogance. The Mil- 
 ledgeville Federal Union, usually friendly in its atti¬ 
 tude, now felt that there would naturally “be some 
 feeling on this throughout Georgia.” 122 When the 
 petition was considered in the House, it was made 
 the subject of bitter criticism, the most intense attack, 
 according to the Carolina papers, being made by a 
 representative from Augusta. This gentleman, a Mr. 
 Miller, thought the Charleston proposal so unreason¬ 
 able that “he hoped to live long enough to see an im¬ 
 passable gulf or Chinese Wall between Georgia and 
 South Carolina, that we may be forever separated 
 from her arrogant medlers.” The Federal Union ques¬ 
 tioned whether these words were actually used, but 
 adminished Charlestonians to show fair play if they 
 would avoid trouble. 123 The Charleston Evening News 
 felt, however, that “the Georgia press is now engaged 
 in the unworthy pursuit of provoking a feeling of state 
 jealousy, if not the passion of revenge, for imaginary 
 wrongs, in the people of Georgia towards the people of 
 
 m December 21, 1847. 
 
 " Ibid. 
 
ECONOMIC FACTORS 
 
 61 
 
 South Carolina. This nursing of state feud is un¬ 
 fortunate.” It then added the comment of particular 
 interest here, that, since the southern states were ap¬ 
 proaching a crisis over the slavery question, it was 
 “especially necessary, now that the North is attacking 
 us, that the two republics ... be friendly.” 124 
 
 The Evening News might have said with greater 
 truth that it was especially vital at this time to South 
 Carolina that the relations of the two “republics” be 
 friendly! Not only had the South Carolina leaders to 
 contend with the general ill feeling towards South 
 Carolina, but there was also the specific problem of the 
 port trade. If South Carolina were to secede in 1850, 
 and Charleston were to be cut off as a port by federal 
 interference, while Georgia remained in the Union, 
 could Savannah be trusted not to take advantage of 
 such a situation? Would she not secure the whole 
 trade at issue? This aroused some anxiety in Charles¬ 
 ton, where it was suspected Savannah favored the 
 Union partly for the express purpose of securing this 
 trade. “If South Carolina secedes,” wrote a famous 
 Carolinian that year, “the Union will establish floating 
 customs houses, and the mail will go direct from Wil¬ 
 mington [North Carolina] to Savannah. In the mean¬ 
 time the whole of our inland export trade will go to 
 Savannah, and our kind neighbors, after all their blus¬ 
 ter, will be reaping the full fruits of their patriotic 
 moderation.” 125 Other observers in South Carolina, 
 such as Bishop Capers of the Methodist Church, ex¬ 
 pressed the same opinion. Indeed, the belief that this 
 
 “* Charleston Evening News, December 14, 1847. 
 
 126 Gen. Jas. Hamilton, to the Charleston Mercury, in the Washing¬ 
 ton Republic, December 2, 1850. 
 
62 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 was the situation seems to have been held in widely- 
 separated parts of the South. 126 
 
 It was indeed a fact that the economic advan¬ 
 tages which would result for Georgia, if she remained 
 in the Union while “Palmettodom” seceded, were at 
 times calculated in the former state. The Marietta 
 Helicon pointed out the very possibility that Hamilton 
 and Capers had warned Carolina against and welcomed 
 the thought that political developments might now 
 throw all the Charleston trade to Macon and Savannah. 
 The Savannah News, although a southern-rights 
 paper, granted that ‘'there is something in this idea.” 127 
 
 The economic inferiority of South Carolina and 
 the rivalry with Georgia were matters of common com¬ 
 ment in the newspapers of both the northern and 
 southern states. Decadence in “Palmettodom” was usu¬ 
 ally ascribed to the aristocratic character of her society 
 and politics, little allowance being made for the un¬ 
 avoidable difficulties of her position. Georgia was 
 pointed to as “the land of promise,” in contrast with 
 Carolina, “the land of protest.” 128 A New Orleans 
 paper opined that “Georgia produces riches and South 
 Carolina revolutions.” 129 A Mobile journal believed 
 that Carolina was jealous of Georgia and discouraged 
 by her superiority. 130 Occasionally, even South Caro¬ 
 lina editors were sufficiently candid and courageous to 
 voice similar criticisms. 131 
 
 138 Jackson (Miss.) Flag of the Union, March 7, 1851; Richmond 
 Daily Whig, December 17, 1850. 
 
 m Savannah News, November 10, 1850. 
 
 ’“Philadelphia Public Ledger, November 13, 1850; Boston Liberator, 
 August 9, 1850; Washington National Intelligencer, January 4, 1851. 
 The latter granted that economic forces were against South Carolina. 
 
 139 Quoted in the Augusta Chronicle, September 3, 1849. 
 
 130 Mobile Daily Advertiser, November 30, 1849. 
 
 U1 See Boucher, Ante-Bellum Attitude of South Carolina, p. 250. 
 
ECONOMIC FACTORS 
 
 63 
 
 Georgia papers, of course, emphasized such opin¬ 
 ions. This was especially true of the Whig jour¬ 
 nals, which had no political associations across the 
 river, but it was not entirely limited to them. “Caro¬ 
 lina blamed all her troubles on the Union,” remarked 
 the Macon Journal, “but they are really due to her 
 undemocratic institutions. While South Carolina has 
 been blustering, Georgia has been toiling.” 132 The 
 Augusta Chronicle agreed and continued its scathing 
 criticisms of the sister state with more or less 
 regularity. 133 So it was that Georgia, the most pro¬ 
 gressive state of the lower South, was also the most 
 hostile towards “Palmettodom.” This was an attitude 
 with which South Carolina would have to reckon 
 when she essayed southern leadeship in 1850. 
 
 132 Quoted in Jackson (Miss.) Flag of the Union, January 17, 1851. 
 
 133 Augusta Chronicle, June 30, August 27, 1849. 
 
CHAPTER II 
 
 SOCIAL GROUPS 
 
 In the course of his discussion of wealth and pros¬ 
 perity in Georgia, Olmsted declared that this wealth 
 was confined to a small class. A large part of the 
 population, he believed, lacked both capital and energy. 1 
 This observation suggests the importance of con¬ 
 sidering the several economic and social groups which 
 entered into the state’s population. If wealth was 
 confined to the few, perhaps the political attitude it de¬ 
 veloped was also confined to the few, and, if so, what 
 was the attitude of the many? Again, in considering 
 the race problem as connected with slavery, it may be 
 that different elements in the white population felt 
 differently towards the Negro race. Here, too, if this 
 were true, a difference in social viewpoint might lead 
 to a different political attitude whenever the race prob¬ 
 lem was involved in political controversy. A brief 
 discussion of the social classes or groups, as they ex¬ 
 isted in Georgia in the forties, is pertinent, therefore, 
 by way of background to the political narrative. 
 
 The outstanding social type in Georgia and the 
 other cotton states was, of course, the planter-aristo¬ 
 crat. This class has been sung in song and story, 
 sometimes belittled, more often idealized. The first 
 thing concerning it that needs to be noted here is the 
 fact that it was a very small group. Just how many 
 slaves and how much land a farmer must own before 
 he became a “planter” was a rather uncertain matter, 
 
 1 Journey in the Seaboard Slave States, p. 530. For the distribution of 
 wealth in 1850, see Map No. 3, p. 22. 
 
SOCIAL GROUPS 
 
 65 
 
 but only a small number of Georgians were commonly 
 recognized as having attained this distinction. The 
 census of 1850, for instance, listed about nineteen hun¬ 
 dred planters in the state, as against some eighty-one 
 thousand “farmers.” 2 The great majority of slave¬ 
 holders in Georgia owned a small number of slaves, 
 more than one half of them owning less than five, and 
 belonged therefore to the small farmer group. 3 
 
 The planters, as the owners of lands and slaves, 
 were obviously the chief propertied men of the period. 
 As the evolution of the plantation system progressed, 
 it tended to increasing concentration of such capital in 
 their hands. The process had gone further in the black 
 belts of South Carolina and Louisiana than it had in 
 Georgia, but even in the latter state a super-planter 
 type was already appearing by 1850. General H. H. 
 Tarver of Twiggs county, for instance, was reputed 
 that year to be the owner of one thousand slaves and 
 fifty thousand acres of land, distributed among ten 
 plantations in four counties, and yielding him a net 
 annual income of about one hundred and ten thousand 
 dollars. 4 The planter was ordinarily an able man, to 
 begin with, or he would not have held his position in a 
 relatively new country like Georgia. Unless of a crude 
 noveaux riche type, he had usually had educational ad¬ 
 vantages, often in northern colleges, and opportunities 
 of travel at home and abroad. This enabled him to 
 give tone to the social circle he dominated, which, as 
 the self-appointed statistician of Georgia remarked, 
 “was no ordinary society.” 5 
 
 1 Census of 1850. 
 
 * De Bow, The Interest in Slavery of the Non-Slaveholder, 1860 
 Tract Association, Tract No. 5 (Charleston, 1860), p. 3. 
 
 4 Huntsville (Ala.) Advocate, January 29, 1851. 
 
 8 White, Georgia Statistics, p. 284. 
 
66 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 The possession of wealth and social prestige en¬ 
 abled the planters to dominate the political parties of 
 the state as well as its business and social life. The 
 more wealth and prestige was concentrated in their 
 hands, the greater became the degree of this domina¬ 
 tion. In South Carolina it was almost complete. In 
 Georgia, but a generation removed from frontier days, 
 the farmer classes remained more independent and the 
 democratic dogma more persistent than in the sister 
 state. These had been real forces in the Democratic 
 party of Georgia, as will be noted, but even that party 
 was by 1850 coming under the leadership of the planter 
 group. Its leaders in 1850, Howell Cobb, Lumpkin, 
 Holsey, Towns, McDonald, Arnold, and the rest, were 
 almost to a man planters or professional men associ¬ 
 ated with the planter class. 6 The Whig party, of 
 course, openly advocated the interests of the same class, 
 though it often expressed a politic reverence for the 
 traditions of equalitarianism. 
 
 In his attitude towards both economic and political 
 affairs, the planter was conservative, as befitted the 
 man of property. He advocated “sound” financing, 
 agricultural improvements, and, sometimes, the en¬ 
 couragement of railroads and industrial corporations. 
 His attitude towards the slaves was apt to be more 
 benevolent than that of the poorer whites. 7 He had a 
 direct economic interest in their welfare, and there was 
 
 6 When the Union party of 1850 insinuated that it contained all the 
 “people of consequence,” the editors of two of the most important 
 Democratic journals, the Federal Union and the Savannah Georgian, 
 proceeded to testify to their capitalistic interests. 
 
 7 A remarkable instance of this benevolence occurred in Georgia at 
 the height of the political crisis of 1850, when a Savannah planter con¬ 
 tributed fifty dollars to purchase the freedom of a run-away slave held in 
 New York City. Only a planter would have dared to so affront public 
 opinion for the sake of a Negro. For his explanations see Savannah 
 News, October 26, 1850. 
 
SOCIAL GROUPS 
 
 67 
 
 no possibility of social jealousy between them, as there 
 was between slave and poor white. He had less race 
 prejudice, therefore, than did the average “cracker.” 8 
 While ready to lead in the defense of his slave property 
 in any crisis, he was inclined, as was pointed out above, 
 to deprecate any excitement over the slavery question 
 that seemed unnecessary to its defense. Hence, he 
 was less responsive to appeals featuring intense race 
 prejudice than was the poor white in the same neigh¬ 
 borhood. For this reason also, the Black Belt, which 
 the planter dominated, did not respond to race appeals 
 as did the adjacent country of the Barrens. This atti¬ 
 tude was often misunderstood in the North, where it 
 was assumed that the “Oligarchs” must be the leaders 
 of the “Aggressive Slavocracy” ; 9 and in the South, 
 where the planters were sometimes accused of being so 
 calm and conciliatory as to be untrue to their own 
 interests. 10 1 
 
 We have noted that the great majority of Georgia 
 farmers had small holdings and owned few slaves. 
 The eighty thousand or more members of this class 
 were distributed through Central and Upper Georgia, 
 holding small farms on the poorer lands of the Black 
 Belt or good lands in the newer regions of Southwest 
 and Cherokee Georgia. Most of the original settlers 
 in Central and Upper Georgia had belonged to this 
 class, and it was still the dominating one in Upper 
 
 8 Jas. S. Hammond to Louis Tappan, September 1, 1850, Hammond 
 MSS. Hammond made this point very specific to his northern corre¬ 
 spondents. 
 
 8 See e.g., Philadelphia Public Ledger, February 26, 1850. 
 
 10 Augusta Republic, July 21, 1849; Augusta Constitutionalist, July 
 25, 1849; Savannah Georgian, July 31, 1849; Jefferson Davis expressed 
 the opinion in 1850 that the accumulation of plantation capital in a 
 man’s hands was very apt to make him incapable of defending it; D. 
 Rowland (ed.), Jefferson Davis, II. 76. 
 
68 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 Georgia in this period. Here they lived in the sim¬ 
 plicity of the frontier farmer, raising the hill country 
 fruits and grains, doing their work with their own 
 hands, and even making their own homespun clothes. 
 They were thrifty and self-reliant, but at the same time 
 ■crude, 11 provincial, and often illiterate. 12 A northern 
 resident in the state found Upper Georgia a country 
 generally similar to New England, but thought the 
 people “were all of one hundred years behind the times 
 in education and in all improvements.” Even some 
 wealthy men were illiterate. 13 Hundley, with his more 
 sympathetic viewpoint, also found the yeomanry of the 
 Cherokee country similar to the New England farmers, 
 but thought the former better educated upon important 
 political topics than were the Yankees. Although many 
 of the Georgians could not read, they generally at¬ 
 tended public discussions of political matters at court¬ 
 house gatherings and public barbecues and in this way 
 achieved a lively interest in current topics. He found 
 nothing in the North which corresponded to the public 
 barbecue as a source for political education and for the 
 development and expression of public opinion. 14 
 
 It has also been observed that a majority of the 
 Georgia farmers owned but a small number of slaves. 
 De Bow calculated, upon the basis of the Census of 
 1850, that about one half of the population of the cot¬ 
 ton states, exclusive of the cities, belonged to slave¬ 
 holding families, but that of these about one half 
 
 u For description of the customs and amusements of the Cherokee 
 country, see White, Georgia Statistics, p. 439; Longstreet, Georgia 
 Scenes, pp. 113-117. 
 
 u See Map No. 4, p. 24, for the extent of illiteracy in the several 
 sections of the state. 
 
 13 Emily Burke, Reminiscences of Georgia, p. 21. 
 
 “Hundley, Social Relations in Our Southern States, p. 207. 
 
SOCIAL GROUPS 
 
 69 
 
 owned less than five slaves. 15 In Central Georgia 
 many small farmers owned from one to fifteen slaves, 
 but in Upper Georgia the majority owned none at all. 
 Where a few were owned, the masters worked by their 
 side in the fields. 16 Here, therefore, where there was 
 a very small Negro population, the slave was generally 
 less restricted in his relations with the whites than was 
 the case in the Black Belt. 17 The Negroes were not 
 present in sufficient numbers in the hills to offer any 
 threat of economic competition with the poor whites, 
 nor did the latter have to fear any race problem in case 
 of abolition. Hence it is probable that the poor moun¬ 
 taineer, while he had no love for Negroes, was indiff¬ 
 erent to the race problem which was forced upon the 
 poor whites on the borders of the Black Belt. This 
 suggests the possibility that there was a less intense 
 racial consciousness in the hill country than with the 
 poor whites on the edge of the Black Belt. If this were 
 true, it would imply less response to political appeals 
 featuring the race problem than would have been ac¬ 
 corded such appeals in or near the plantation districts. 
 As a matter of fact, the “southern rights” appeal of 
 1850 did involve race appeal, and the strongest re¬ 
 sponse came from the poor farmers on the edge of the 
 Black Belt, while it was largely ignored by the poor 
 farmers in the hill country. 18 
 
 The small farmers of Central Georgia, however, 
 were in a different position from those of Upper 
 
 15 De Bow, The Interest in Slavery of the Non-Slaveholder, p. 3. For 
 more specific estimates in the case of Georgia see R. P. Brooks, The 
 Agrarian Revolution in Georgia, p. 85. 
 
 16 See Alfred H. Stone, “Free Contract Labor in the Ante-Bellum 
 South,” The South in the Building of the Nation, V. 143. 
 
 17 Burke, op. cit., p. 21; Hundley, op. cit., pp. 194, 195. This, of 
 course, is the rule in race relationships. See Stone, American Race 
 Problem, p. 13. 
 
 18 See Map No. 7, p. 320. 
 
70 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 Georgia. Many of the former owned a few slaves 
 and hoped to own more, while those who did not proba¬ 
 bly hoped to do so in the future. This tended to 
 identify the interests of the small slaveholder with 
 those of the large, to the advantage of the latter. The 
 poor farmer of the Black Belt also feared the racial 
 consequences of emancipation, and this intensified his 
 proslavery views. He was carefully reminded by pro¬ 
 slavery writers that while the planter might use accu¬ 
 mulated capital to escape a country turned over to free 
 Negroes, the poor farmer would have to stay and face 
 the freedmen. 19 
 
 The attitude of the Cherokee farmers towards 
 slavery is difficult to determine. It has already been 
 suggested that they probably felt less intensely on the 
 race question than the farmers in the lowlands, but 
 what was their attitude towards the vested interests of 
 the slaveholders? The corresponding class in Vir¬ 
 ginia, Tennessee, and the Carolinas, was usually op¬ 
 posed to these interests. One would expect, a priori, a 
 similar attitude on the part of the mountain people of 
 Georgia. Cherokee and Southwest Georgia, more¬ 
 over, were relatively newly settled sections, and this 
 meant that there had been less time for economic and 
 social stratification than had been the case in other 
 states. Farmers in such new country were apt to be 
 more hopeful and ambitious and more independent of 
 planter domination. Helper, in his protest against the 
 slaveocracy, declared that “in few other states are the 
 non-slaveholders so little under the dominance of the 
 oligarchy as in Georgia.” 20 This, under some circum- 
 
 18 De Bow, op. cit., pp. 11, 12. For northern interpretation of the 
 small farmers’ attitude, see Philadelphia Public Ledger, November 26. 
 1850. 
 
 20 Helper, Impending Crisis, Compendium, p. 111. 
 
SOCIAL GROUPS 
 
 71 
 
 stances, might have meant more open protest against 
 the vested interests than would have been expected 
 from the subordinated poor farmers of the Carolinas. 
 As a matter of fact, the evidence in the case is slight, 
 usually indirect, and difficult to secure. It is slight be¬ 
 cause the poor farmers were not an articulate class. 21 
 It is indirect for the same reason. What is known 
 about them is largely what the upper classes thought 
 fit to print concerning them, and this depended upon 
 political expediency. 
 
 There is some evidence that the up-country non¬ 
 slaveholders’ dislike for the vested interests of the 
 planters was a real force in 1850. When the po¬ 
 litical crisis over slavery extension arose in the late 
 forties, the Cherokee Georgians were apt to associate 
 the planter class with the slavery-extension group— 
 which of course was just the reverse of the truth 22 — 
 and, therefore, opposed the extension movement to the 
 extent of their latent dislike for that class. As this 
 played into the hands of the planter leaders of both 
 old parties, who led the compromising Union party, 
 these leaders had no protest to make, even though the 
 mountaineers talked heresy against the slaveocracy. 
 The protest came from the Southern Rights party, 
 which claimed most loudly to speak for planter inter¬ 
 ests and which the mountaineers therefore opposed. 
 
 Some southern-rights leaders believed the class 
 feeling against the slave owners was the chief obstacle 
 in the cotton states to the extensionist movement. Gov¬ 
 ernor Mosely of Florida, writing from Tallahassee, 
 whence he could presumably survey conditions in 
 
 21 Small town newspapers of Upper Georgia, which may have re¬ 
 flected small farmer opinion, have usually been lost. 
 
 22 Always excepting South Carolina 
 
72 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 nearby Georgia, Alabama, and Florida, declared that 
 “the chief obstacle to unity against the Wilmot Pro¬ 
 viso was the belief that it tended to promote the 
 prospective welfare of the poor or non-slaveholding 
 whites.” 23 In Georgia the protest of the nonslave¬ 
 holding whites against slavery extension varied from 
 statements of polite indifference to energetic objections 
 to fighting the slaveholders’ battles. The more con¬ 
 servative people of Upper Georgia, where the bulk of 
 the population belonged to the Democratic party, 
 wanted to know why they should join a movement to 
 protect the owners of Negroes, when they owned none 
 themselves. 24 
 
 When the critical year of struggle between the 
 Southern-rights and Union parties was reached, Union 
 leaders did not hesitate to proclaim to Cherokee farm¬ 
 ers that they had no interest in the slavery struggle; 
 that the extensionists were working for the selfish 
 interests of the planter class; and that if this led to a 
 conflict with the North, the small farmers, who had no 
 interest in the issue, “would have to fight the battles of 
 the lordly slaveholders.” 25 The extensionist group 
 protested vehemently about this heresy against the 
 peculiar institution, on the ground that by dividing 
 southerners it would “play right into the hands of the 
 abolitionists,” the common enemy. As a matter of fact, 
 as was observed, it played into the hands of the planters 
 themselves, who, opposed to slavery extension and to 
 anything threatening turmoil, were largely associated 
 with the non-extension Union party. They gladly co- 
 
 23 Mosely to Seabrook, May 18, 1849, Seabrook MSS. 
 
 ** W. H. Hull to Howell Cobb, January 26, 1849, “Toombs, Stephens, 
 and Cobb Correspondence,” American Historical Association Annual Re¬ 
 port, 1911, II. 142. 
 
 “Federal Union, April 9, 1850. 
 
SOCIAL GROUPS 
 
 73 
 
 operated with the mountaineers against the Southern- 
 rights, extension-at-any-price party, and were not 
 over critical of the motives which brought them this 
 up-country support. 
 
 A certain number of Georgia whites, who were 
 neither planters nor farmers, were the residents of the 
 larger towns. Here a small group of merchants and 
 professional men were associated with the planters in 
 business and society and in their general interests and 
 point of view. 26 Smaller merchants and professional 
 men tended to share the economic and social status of 
 the small farmers, and their views upon slavery were 
 apt to be those of the class into which they hoped to 
 rise. Some of the small merchants and professional 
 men, however—particularly the “ginger-pop lawyers” 
 —tended to favor secession. They read the local ex¬ 
 tremist papers and did not partake of the conserva¬ 
 tism that comes with the possession of wealth. 27 
 
 The attitude of Georgia mechanics towards slavery 
 and political matters probably did not vary much from 
 that of the small farmers in the same section of the 
 state. Occasionally, however, they came into competi¬ 
 tion with slave labor, in which cases they were apt to 
 become antagonistic to the institution. 28 Northern ob¬ 
 servers often claimed that this was the case. 29 There 
 is little evidence showing any general antagonism, 
 however, on the part of native mechanics against 
 slavery, though they opposed opening their trades to 
 
 28 Dr. Richard Arnold, a leading Democrat of Savannah, emphasized 
 his statement that all Savannah people of “respectability,” with the 
 exception of only one family, were conservative Unionists in 1850 ; 
 Arnold to Forney, December 18, 1850, Arnold MSS. 
 
 27 See Philadelphia Public Ledger, November 26, 1850. 
 
 28 For an interesting case of this kind in newspaper work, see the 
 Savannah Georgian, September 14, 1850. 
 
 29 Parsons, Tour Among the Planters, p. 17. 
 
74 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 Negroes. 30 As for the white laborers, many of them 
 were not native Georgians. Those who were natives 
 were an unimportant and inarticulate class. 
 
 At the bottom of the social and economic scale 
 among the whites were the “poor white trash” of the 
 Pine Barrens area. The term “cracker” was some¬ 
 times applied in Georgia to poor and middle-class 
 farmers in almost any part of the state, though to the 
 northern mind it probably connoted chiefly the poorer 
 type. Within the state, the latter were more distinc¬ 
 tively referred to as the “Piney-Woods People,” the 
 “Sand Hillers,” the “Clay Eaters,” and like euphe¬ 
 mistic terms. This class merits especial attention, 
 both because it had some political significance in a state 
 where all men could vote and because it was itself the 
 subject of much controversy involving the general 
 question of slavery. It should not be confused, as is 
 sometimes done, with the better type of poor farmers 
 in the hills. 31 
 
 The typical “Piney-Woods People” lived upon small 
 clearings in pine districts, or poor, worn-out soils upon 
 which they planted a little corn, cotton or garden truck. 
 A few pigs and chickens ran half wild about the place. 
 From such sources they supplied their immediate wants 
 in food, while the women spun the cotton into the cloth 
 necessary for clothing. For shelter they depended 
 upon one-room shacks, which were of the crudest char¬ 
 acter within doors and without. The men eked out 
 their miserable existence by hunting and fishing and 
 perhaps pilfering or illicit trading with the slaves of 
 nearby plantations. Occasionally they would ride into 
 
 30 See Russel, Economic Aspects of Southern Sectionalism, pp. 53, 219. 
 
 31 This confusion persists in recent writing. See, e.g., Russel, 
 Economic Aspects of Southern Sectionalism, p. 51. 
 
SOCIAL GROUPS 
 
 75 
 
 the nearest town in an ox-cart, if they owned one, to 
 barter poultry or a single bale of cotton for a few 
 necessary articles of trade. They were neither pro¬ 
 prietors nor laborers, but rather squatters upon the soil 
 that no one else would take. Lack of any free capital 
 and lack of energy made it impossible for them to 
 secure any better holdings. 
 
 They were an independent and taciturn people, but 
 necessarily led a life that was most primitive in charac¬ 
 ter. They were usually utterly ignorant and sometimes 
 depraved. 32 Drunkenness was general and often ex¬ 
 treme, as they indulged “in the vilest rot-gut rather 
 than the honest apple-brandy of the yeomen.” They 
 were also apt to be weak and sickly as well as lazy. 
 Indeed, from what is now known in medical science, it 
 would seem that some of their proverbial “laziness” 
 was due to chronic infection with hook-worm or other 
 diseases which were endemic in the community. 33 
 
 As a result of all these characteristics, the “poor 
 white trash” were despised by slaves as well as by the 
 more energetic and successful whites. The poor 
 whites returned the dislike of the slaves with interest. 
 Their very inferiority made them the more jealous of 
 their one claim to distinction; that is, their white blood. 
 
 32 For graphic representation of poverty and ignorance in the Pine 
 Barrens, see Maps 3 and 4, pp. 22, 24. 
 
 83 For contemporary descriptions of this class from the northern 
 viewpoint, see, Weston, The Progress of Slavery, pp. 39-42; and Poor 
 Whites, passim; Olmsted, Journey in the Seaboard Slave States, pp. 413, 
 415, 545, 507, 535-540; and The Cotton Kingdom, II. 385; Burke, 
 Reminiscences, pp. 205-209. For the southern view, see De Bow, Eco¬ 
 nomic Resources of the Southern States, II. 106; Governor Hammond’s 
 Address to the South Carolina Institute, in De Bow’s Review, VIII. 519; 
 Andrews, Reminiscences, p. 43; Hundley, Social Relations in Our South¬ 
 ern States, pp. 255-269; and the quotations from Augusta newspapers 
 given by Phillips in Plantation and Frontier Documents, II. 167 (Docu¬ 
 mentary History of American Industrial Society.) For comment on the 
 poor whites and hookworm disease see P. H. Buck, “Poor Whites of the 
 Old South,” American Historical Review, XXXI. 45, 46. 
 
76 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 They were, therefore, the class which most dis¬ 
 liked the Negro, which was probably most race-con¬ 
 scious, and which was most responsive to any political 
 appeal featuring the race problem. This was especially 
 true of those who lived on the edge of the plantation 
 areas and who there came into contact with the Ne¬ 
 groes. Conditions in this area were indeed ideal for 
 arousing race feeling, as the Negroes were too near 
 and numerous to permit of the indifference of the 
 mountains, and at the same time not sufficiently num¬ 
 erous to permit of the tolerance of the planter-domi¬ 
 nated Black Belt. Speaking of the poor whites across 
 the river in South Carolina, James H. Hammond de¬ 
 clared they “felt the distinction of race and color more 
 sensibly than any other and if emancipation could take 
 place would be the deadliest enemy of the free negro. 
 The negroes, on the other hand, fear and hate the 
 [poor] whites.” 34 
 
 In addition to being anti-Negro in feeling, the 
 “Clay-Eater” was ignorant and hence especially re¬ 
 sponsive to appeals involving provincial prejudices. 
 His dislike for the Yankee and the North could, of 
 course, be stimulated with much greater ease than 
 could any such feeling a planter might possess. 35 This 
 responsiveness to race and sectional prejudice probably 
 explains the fact noted that, in the test of 1850, the 
 people on the edge of the Pine Barrens supported the 
 southern-rights movement more generally than did 
 those of any other section of the state. 36 
 
 34 Hammond to Louis Tappan, September 1, 1850, Hammond MSS. 
 See also, for Georgia, the Savannah Republican, November 21, 1850, and 
 Jan. 4, 1851; Fanny Kemble’s Journal, p. 146; Oneida (N. Y.) Herald in 
 the Federal Union, Oct. 30, 1849; Weston, Progress of Slavery, p. 40. 
 
 35 This was the opinion of some critical northern observers. See 
 the Oneida (N. Y.) Herald, in the Federal Union, Oct. 30, 1849; 
 Weston, The Progress of Slavery, p. 40. 
 
 3,1 See Map No. 7, p. 320. 
 
SOCIAL GROUPS 
 
 77 
 
 It must be remembered, of course, that the poor 
 white population of the Barrens was small in relation 
 to that of the state as a whole. In 1850 it did not much 
 exceed forty thousand out of a total white population 
 of over five hundred thousand. Even this small esti¬ 
 mate makes no allowance for the presence of a few 
 planters and other superior individuals in the Pine 
 Barrens area. Nevertheless, the class was large enough 
 and obviously unfortunate enough to attract consider¬ 
 able attention from both northern and southern ob¬ 
 servers. The former believed that the class was the 
 direct result of the slave system. It was held that the 
 planters monopolized good lands, drove the poor whites 
 to the worthless tracts, and then did not even permit 
 them to escape from these to work as laborers. For 
 labor was given a race stigma, and most of the demand 
 for it was already supplied by the slaves. Thus there 
 was no place for the poor whites in the dominant eco¬ 
 nomic system of the cotton states. They were a class 
 without any economic raison d’etre and, as such, pre¬ 
 destined to become the parasites and pariahs of south¬ 
 ern society. Could there be any more damning indict¬ 
 ment of slavery than this, its effect upon the southern 
 whites themselves? So ran the northern indictment. 37 
 
 Georgia observers were quite read) 7 to admit the 
 degradation of this people, but felt the northern ex¬ 
 planation was partial and partisan in character. 
 Northerners blamed everything upon environmental 
 
 37 J. E. Cairnes, The Slave Power, pp. 78, 79. This was also the 
 thesis of Helper and many other northern and southern critics of the 
 institution. Cf. Phillips, American Negro Slavery, p. 355. For an 
 especially forceful expression, see Weston, Progress of Slavery, pp. 
 40-42. For a modern northern expression, which makes no allowance for 
 other factors, see Hammond, The Cotton Industry, pp. 62, 63. Northern 
 critics who blamed all upon slavery were blissfully indifferent to the fact 
 that a similar “poor white” class existed in some northern states, e.g., 
 the “Pineys” of New Jersey. 
 
78 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 influences and ignored some potent hereditary forces. 
 The “Piney-Woods People,” Georgians held, were 
 largely the descendants of Oglethorpe’s paupers and 
 indentured servants, or of similar people from the 
 Barrens of South Carolina. They had originally been 
 an inferior people and had passed their failings on to 
 their descendants. Only this hereditary inferiority 
 could explain their failure to take better lands in the 
 first place or to leave these lands, once they were ex¬ 
 hausted, to take better ones on the easy terms offered 
 early in the century. 
 
 It was even claimed by some extreme proslavery 
 writers that this lowly position of the poor whites, due 
 to hereditary influences, had been improved by the 
 existence of slavery in their environment. The planter, 
 it was claimed, was forced to treat all whites well in 
 the presence of the Negroes, in order that the latter 
 might not forget their position of racial inferiority. 
 In this way the slave system dignified the white race as 
 such, and this dignity was shared by the poorest whites 
 as well as by the wealthy . 38 
 
 The several classes which have now been noted 
 were those distinguishable by social and economic cri¬ 
 teria. There were three other groups in the state to 
 be distinguished by their geographical origins, each of 
 which possessed some political significance. These 
 were the South Carolinians, the “Yankees,” and the 
 European immigrants. 
 
 South Carolinians had moved over into Georgia 
 throughout the first half of the century. The economic 
 
 38 For an elaborate argument to this effect, see B S. Green’s preface 
 to his translation of A. G. de Cassagnac, History of the Working and 
 Burgher Classes. (Philadelphia, 1872). This preface is printed as a 
 separate pamphlet, a copy of which is in possession of the Georgia 
 Historical Society. Cf. Rowland, Jefferson Davis, II. 73, 74. 
 
SOCIAL GROUPS 
 
 79 
 
 ^decadence of the former state, already referred to, had 
 increased this tendency. They had been of all classes, 
 planters with their slaves, poor whites from the Bar¬ 
 rens, and merchants or professional men from the 
 towns. They seem usually to have settled in Georgia 
 in a region or town generally similar to that from 
 which they came. Many of those living in Georgia in 
 1850 had been adults at the time of immigration, and 
 therefore tended to maintain in Georgia the political 
 attitude towards the slavery question and the Union 
 which was peculiar to their old home. This was of 
 some significance, for, as newspaper editors, lawyers, 
 merchants and politicians, they helped to lead the 
 southern-rights movement in Georgia towards the 
 secessionist principles of South Carolina. It is im¬ 
 possible to estimate the numbers of this element in the 
 state, but it was taken for granted at the time that there 
 were “thousands of them.” 39 
 
 Meanwhile, an equally important immigration was 
 reaching the state during the forties from the North. 
 At that period, of course, the greater number of north¬ 
 erners emigrating to new country went west along 
 their own parallels of latitude in search of land. A 
 smaller number, however, saw in the cotton states, 
 especially in Georgia, opportunities for merchants, 
 tradespeople, and professional men. There were me¬ 
 chanics and engineers in the North, and they were 
 needed for the new railroads and factories in Georgia. 
 There were school teachers, both men and women in 
 plenty, and these were needed for the new schools in 
 Georgia. Finally, there were opportunities for trade 
 which the shrewd and energetic Yankee thought he 
 
 39 Savannah Georgian, September 17, 1849. 
 
80 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 could exploit more effectively than could some of the 
 natives. These were the opportunities that attracted 
 most of the northerners, although a few purchased 
 land, and others married heiresses to the same. Those 
 who held land usually merged with the native planter 
 class. But the bulk, coming for business or profes¬ 
 sional reasons, were apt to concentrate in the towns, 40 
 where this very fact in turn tended to preserve their 
 northern characteristics and point of view. Some 
 came as the representatives of business houses in the 
 North. Others arrived with letters from such firms 
 recommending their introduction to business oppor¬ 
 tunities or their employment as clerks. Some “came 
 down as mere peddlers but later set up as store¬ 
 keepers and merchants.” 41 Hand in hand with these 
 came the skilled mechanics. Even in the thirties, the 
 Yankees had found opportunities in special occupations 
 requiring training and skill. Olmsted notes the early 
 appearance of New England fishermen off the coast, 
 and by 1833 Maine lumbermen had found it profitable 
 to work the pine districts. 42 Journeymen printers 
 came down to work upon the presses in Savannah and 
 perhaps elsewhere. 43 But the chief demand for north¬ 
 ern mechanical skill arose in connection with the rail¬ 
 roads and the new factories. 
 
 It was natural that few Georgians in the early 
 forties had received any training as engineers, superin¬ 
 tendents, or mechanics in railroad and cotton mill in¬ 
 dustries. Hence, during that decade, most of the 
 
 40 Individual Yankees, however, established themselves even in the 
 hill country. See C. Lanman, Letters from the Alleghaney Mountains 
 (1849), p. 56. 
 
 41 [A. B. Longstreet], Letters from Georgia to Massachusetts, pp. 
 20 , 21 . 
 
 42 Niles’ Register, XLVII. 55, September 27, 1834. 
 
 43 Savannah Georgian, September 14, 1850. 
 
SOCIAL GROUPS 
 
 81 
 
 Georgia factories employed superintendents and me¬ 
 chanics who had received their training back home 
 in New England. In like manner, northerners were 
 employed upon the railroads. 44 Occasionally northern 
 capitalists came down to look after their investments 
 in new factories, though this type was apt to desire to 
 “get rich c)uick” and to retire—probably to the North. 45 
 At first a few factory operatives also arrived, but 
 there was no need for them. Olmsted states that 
 “New England factory girls were occasionally induced 
 to come to the Georgia mills but soon left because of 
 the degraded position of laborers.” 46 The native poor 
 whites could supply all the operatives desired. 
 
 Not a few Yankees came to the state to seek em¬ 
 ployment in educational work. The increasing pros¬ 
 perity towards the end of the fifth decade of the 
 century led to efiforts championed by churches and 
 newspapers to reform the educational system. 47 It was 
 a period of considerable interest in education, and 
 opportunities for teaching in new schools increased. 
 These opportunities were seized upon by northern 
 teachers, who had received their training in states 
 where the public school movement was already well 
 under way. As was the case with the Yankee me¬ 
 chanics, they were attracted especially to the more pro¬ 
 gressive towns, where they were most in demand. Here 
 New England schoolmasters or “schoolmarms” acted 
 
 44 For contemporary notices of such employment, see the Milledge- 
 ville Recorder, February 25, 1850; Savannah Republican, March 25, and 
 May 4, 1850; Augusta Chronicle, August 17, 1849; Cf. also, Dc Bow’s 
 Reviezv, XI. 311; Hundley, Social Relations in Our Southern States, p. 
 118; Paine, Six Years in a Georgia Prison, p. 14; etc. 
 
 45 De Bow’s Review, VI. 293. 
 
 46 Journey in the Seaboard Slave States, p. 536. 
 
 47 The Georgia papers of the period, especially the Whig, are full of 
 urgent appeals for educational reform. For the detailed educational 
 history of the decade, see Jones, Education in Georgia, passim. 
 
82 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 as tutors in the better families or taught in the 
 “Female Colleges” and other schools of secondary 
 grade. 
 
 How important an element were the Yankees in 
 the Georgia towns, and what was their attitude towards 
 the political problems of the period? Northern ob¬ 
 servers were inclined to claim all things for them. 
 Parsons observed that “many if not most of the suc¬ 
 cessful business and professional men in Georgia 
 were from the North.” 48 Olmsted went further and 
 claimed that “the better class, which gives Georgia its 
 reputation for prosperity is very largely composed and 
 directed in enterprise by persons born in the free 
 states. The number of these, proportionate to all the 
 white population, is much greater than in any other 
 Southern State.” 49 Olmsted, of course, was thinking 
 of industrial and mercantile prosperity rather than of 
 the basic agricultural interests. Yet there is no ques¬ 
 tion that industrial and trade prosperity was a most 
 important factor in creating Georgia’s excellent busi¬ 
 ness reputation, and that the energy of northern men 
 in these lines contributed largely to their success. 
 There is southern as well as northern testimony to this 
 effect. Hundley stated that the Yankees formed “no 
 inconsiderable part of the southern middle classes,” 
 and he testified to their energy and ability. 50 The edi¬ 
 tor of one of the strongest southern-rights papers in 
 Georgia granted that “most of the teachers who are 
 able have come from the North.” 51 
 
 48 Tour among the Planters, p. 26. 
 
 49 Journey in the Seaboard Slave States, pp. 530, 536. 
 
 60 Hundley, op. cit.. p. 104; “The older, steadier business men were 
 Yankees” comments a Georgia observer; L. B. Wylie, Memoirs of Judge 
 Richard H. Clark, p. 4. 
 
 61 Milledgeville Federal Union, August 10, 1847. 
 
SOCIAL GROUPS 
 
 83 
 
 Georgians, of course, would not have agreed with 
 Olmsted’s sweeping claim about the “better class” in 
 the state, but the South Carolinians, who most disliked 
 the Yankees, insisted that the chief business towns of 
 Georgia were largely populated and controlled by them. 
 In 1852, for instance, a Charleston gentleman traveling 
 through the eastern part of the state found Augusta 
 “nothing but a northern city on southern soil.” Upon 
 reaching Savannah, he found that here too “northern 
 influence is very potent,” though not quite so much so 
 as in Augusta. 52 Georgians sometimes joined in this 
 view. An up-country man even urged that trade be 
 sent from there to Charleston rather than to Savannah, 
 since the former town “was the only Southern city on 
 the entire coast. Savannah and New Orleans are off¬ 
 shoots from Yankeedom.” 53 Columbus, the second 
 chief manufacturing town, also had some Yankee 
 residents, though there are no reports of such large 
 numbers as in Savannah and Augusta. It is probably 
 not without significance in this connection to recall that 
 Columbus was never so inclined to compromise with 
 the North during the slavery controversy as was 
 Augusta. Northerners who lived in the latter city in 
 the early fifties recall it as one where most of the stores 
 and trades were handled by northern people. They 
 rarely met native Georgians, save in the churches, 
 where they came into formal contact with plantation 
 people from the surrounding country. 54 
 
 62 Incidents of a Journey from Abbeville, South Carolina, to Ocala 
 Florida (Edgefield, South Carolina, 1852), pp. 5, 11. A Georgia ob¬ 
 server, looking back after fifty years, recalled no less than seventeen 
 merchants of Savannah “and many others,” who were Yankees. See L. 
 B. Wylie, Memoirs of Judge Richard H. Clark, p. 4. 
 
 53 Marietta (Ga.) Cherokee Advocate, in Savannah Republican, Feb¬ 
 ruary 15, 1851. 
 
 64 Mrs. R. H. (Julia) Woodward, letter to author, Guilford, Con¬ 
 necticut, September 10, 1923. 
 
84 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 One activity of this group is of particular interest 
 here; namely, the connection of northern men with the 
 newspapers of Georgia. Three of the most important 
 conservative Whig papers of the state, the Macon 
 Journal, the Augusta Chronicle, and the Savannah Re¬ 
 publican , had in 1850 editors of northern origin. Some 
 minor papers, like the Macon Citizen and the Marietta 
 Helicon, also had editors of this class. Men like Dr. 
 Daniel Lee of the Chronicle and J. L. Locke of the 
 Republican were especially influential. It may be of 
 some significance that these journals were generally 
 conservative during the political controversy with the 
 North. On the other hand, several of the Democratic 
 journals, notably the Milledgeville Federal Union and 
 the Columbus Times, had editors of South Carolina 
 origin, and it may be equally suggestive that these 
 papers led in the southern-rights movement. So well 
 placed in such positions, indeed, were the representa¬ 
 tives of these two groups, that the Georgia press served 
 as an arena in which Yankees and Carolinians did 
 battle for their respective views. What was true of 
 the press, moreover, was true in some measure of other 
 urban institutions. The Georgia towns were the meet¬ 
 ing ground of “Yankey-Land” and “Palmettodom.” 
 
 The degree to which the presence of northern edi¬ 
 tors was of political significance would depend upon 
 the degree to which northern men in Georgia preserved 
 their original attitudes towards slavery and the Union. 
 Georgians were divided in opinion on this point, some 
 feeling that citizens from the North accepted entirely 
 the local view on these subjects, and others suspecting 
 that they always preserved “unsound” Yankee ideas. 
 Hundley was of the opinion that the traders, having 
 “set up in some permanent employment, then profess 
 
SOCIAL GROUPS 
 
 85 
 
 to be intensely pro-slavery,” though they seldom own 
 slaves unless acquired by marriage, preferring other¬ 
 wise to hire. This is because “they cannot entirely 
 overcome their anti-slavery prejudices, or else because 
 they hope to return North.” 55 There was probably 
 some truth in this statement. On the other hand, it 
 did not apply to that class of northerners who, coming 
 to the state in their early youth, had had time to merge 
 entirely their interests with those of their new home. 
 Indeed, it was notorious that some of this type, like 
 Judge Warner of Georgia and Governor Quitman of 
 Mississippi, became, as proselytes often have done, 
 veritable leaders of the extreme proslavery and pro¬ 
 southern view. 
 
 The natives were more suspicious of the views of 
 Yankee teachers, editors, and mechanics, than they 
 were of the merchants. Mechanics were suspected be¬ 
 cause they had no such obvious business motives for 
 defending slavery as had the last named class. 56 In¬ 
 deed, this group was occasionally threatened with slave 
 competition, as in the case of the printers already cited, 
 and their environment was therefore not liable to 
 render them more favorable to the institution. Some 
 of these men certainly held abolitionist views through 
 years of residence in Georgia towns and even confided 
 as much to slave-holders who had become their trusted 
 friends. 57 The same was true of some teachers, who 
 naturally held to theoretical ideals more tenaciously 
 than did the merchants, whose business was linked with 
 that of the planters. This fact was recognized by 
 Georgians, who sometimes felt that the presence of 
 
 65 Social Relations in Our Southern States, p. 105. 
 
 ""Olmsted, Journey in the Seaboard Slave States, pp. 511, 512. 
 
 67 Paine, Six Years in a Georgia Prison, pp. 36-51. 
 
86 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 even the able Yankee teachers was “unfortunate,” 
 since they were “not of our institutions and therefore 
 cannot arouse the state to the cause of education.” 58 
 
 Distrust of northerners increased, of course, in 
 proportion to the increase in southern-rights feeling 
 concerning the slavery controversy. Those who took 
 extreme southern views on this subject in the late 
 forties became less friendly to the incoming Yankee 
 traders in that period than had hitherto been the case. 59 
 In some cases, they even attempted to boycott the new¬ 
 comers entirely. 60 At the height of the political con¬ 
 troversy, all northern editors connected with Union 
 party journals became the subjects of general distrust 
 on the part of rival southern-rights papers. The Fed¬ 
 eral Union and Augusta Constitutionalist insisted that 
 Lee should be forced to resign from the Chronicle, as 
 a Yankee of antislavery and anti-state rights opin¬ 
 ions. His publishers backed him in a formal state¬ 
 ment, however, and his paper returned the compliment 
 by pointing the finger of suspicion at the radical Caro¬ 
 linians associated with the southern-rights press. 
 The Union party, as a general rule, rallied to the sup¬ 
 port of such members as were of northern origin, 
 claiming for them complete allegiance to southern 
 institutions and ideals. 61 
 
 In like manner, of course, feeling against the North 
 in general increased in proportion as the political storm 
 grew. “Our southern friends often abuse and de¬ 
 nounce the whole northern people as our enemies,” 
 
 59 Federal Union, August 10, 1847. 
 
 59 [A. B. Longstreet], Letters from Georgia to Massachusetts, p. 20. 
 
 Savannah Nezvs, Nov. 11, 1850. 
 
 91 See, e.g., the letter of General Eli Warner to the Committee, Feb¬ 
 ruary 14, 1851, The Macon Union Celebration, p. 15. 
 
SOCIAL GROUPS 
 
 87 
 
 declared a Georgia planter in 1851. 62 This feeling in 
 Georgia, however, was confined largely to the small 
 group of extreme southern-rights men. There is 
 every indication that, save in times of intense excite¬ 
 ment, the feeling in Georgia towns towards Yankees 
 was friendly, if not cordial. They were welcomed in 
 business, though not always in society. 63 The very 
 presence of so many able northern people in the cities 
 must have dispelled the more provincial forms of 
 prejudice, if these had existed in the beginning. The 
 correspondent of the Boston Courier in Savannah, 
 who had many suggestive observations to make, found 
 that there was “less sectional prejudice in Georgia 
 against the North than in any other truly southern 
 state.” 64 Individual Yankees, as was noted, were even 
 able to argue abolitionist ideals with urban friends 
 without fear of denouncement. 
 
 Feeling was strong against abolitionsists, yet even 
 here moderation was sometimes practiced. In 1848, 
 for instance, a man and woman lecturing upon “mes¬ 
 merism” in Savannah were found talking to the Ne¬ 
 groes, telling them that they worked too hard. The wo¬ 
 man told the Negro women that “if she were in their 
 position, she would not bear another child,” and the 
 like. It seemed a typical case of the abolitionist-on- 
 mission from the North and might have led to dire 
 consequences. They were simply ordered from the 
 county, however, no violence being offered. “Stern 
 measures” would be used only as a last resort. 65 In the 
 
 " Ibid. 
 
 “ Letter of Mrs. Julia Woodward, September 10, 1923. 
 
 M Boston Courier, January 23, 1850. A decade later W. H. Russell, an 
 English observer, noted that hatred of the North was much greater in 
 South Carolina than in Georgia; W. H. Russell, Pictures of Southern 
 Life, Social, Political and Military, p. 11. 
 
 65 Savannah Georgian, June 5, 1848. 
 
88 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 country districts, of course, where ignorance was com¬ 
 mon, the probabilities of provincial prejudice against 
 the Yankees was greater than it was in the towns. 66 
 
 The last group of whites that requires attention is 
 the European immigrants. The total number of Euro¬ 
 peans in Georgia was small, as compared with that in 
 the northern states, 67 but they were concentrated to 
 such an extent in the two mercantile towns of Sa¬ 
 vannah and Columbus as to have therein considerable 
 political and economic importance. 68 The Germans, 
 English, and Irish were all represented. Germans and 
 Englishmen came for much the same motives as actu¬ 
 ated the northerners, 69 while the Irish came to swell 
 the numbers of the state’s eleven thousand white 
 “laborers.” Some of the Irish worked in labor gangs 
 in connection with the railroads and on the plantations 
 as well as in the cities. 70 
 
 The Europeans of the laboring class disliked the 
 Negroes, or were at least jealous of them as possible 
 competitors. 71 At the same time, they were usually de¬ 
 voted to the American government, having sought 
 
 M For testimony to this effect, see Paine, op. cit., pp. 36-51. 
 
 61 This, of course, was often ascribed by northerners to the immi¬ 
 grants’ dislike for slavery. Southerners claimed it was due simply to 
 the lack of industries. ( Hunt’s Merchants' Magazine, XXI. 498.) There 
 is also the possibility that it was due to race feeling. 
 
 68 One third of the white population of Savannah in 1850 was foreign 
 born. This, of course, was a higher percentage than that of some north¬ 
 ern ports. See Stone, “Some Problems in Southern Economic History,” 
 American Historical Review, XIII. 779-797. 
 
 “ Thus an able German musician by the name of Brenner, who came 
 to Augusta about 1849, began there the first manufacturing of pianos 
 in the state. This attracted considerable attention. See Savannah 
 Republican, Feb. 14, 1851. 
 
 " Phillips, American Negro Slavery, pp. 301, 302. The actual number 
 of foreign born in the state in 1850 was given as 6452. Over one third of 
 these were resident in Savannah; C. E. MacGill, “Immigration to the 
 Southern States, 1783-1865,” The South in the Building of the Nation, 
 V. 600. 
 
 ” Olmsted, Journey in the Seaboard Slave States, p. 512. 
 
SOCIAL GROUPS 
 
 89 
 
 refuge under it from the depressing conditions obtain¬ 
 ing in Ireland and Germany in the late forties. They 
 were inclined, in 1850, therefore, to hold conservative 
 views concerning the Union government and voted 
 almost to a man with the Union party. In normal 
 times the Irish belonged generally to the Democratic 
 party and were associated in Savannah with the same 
 phenomena of political turbulence as were connected 
 with their countrymen in the northern ports. A 
 “large portion” of the voters in Savannah were said 
 to be Irishmen, and their allegiance to the Union party 
 in 1850 was an important factor in carrying that city 
 for the Union cause. 72 
 
 Each of these social groups was to play its part in 
 the political struggles of 1847-1852. The interests and 
 attitudes of each group were in large measure de¬ 
 termined by economic conditions, and these, in turn, 
 determined the make-up and policies of the parties. 
 Out of economic conditions, then, developed social 
 groups, and out of social groups, political parties. The 
 development of the parties from these underlying fac¬ 
 tors may now be considered. 
 
 "Columbus Sentinel, in the Natchez (Mississippi) Courier, December 
 6, 1850; Dr. R. D. Arnold to J. W. Forney, December 18, 1850, Arnold 
 MSS. There was a similar situation and result in Columbus. 
 
CHAPTER III 
 
 PARTY CONFLICT AND CONFUSION, 1824-1844 
 
 In the early days of the Federal Union a majority 
 of Georgians were associated with the Republican 
 party. This was the result of the frontier character 
 of the greater part of the state. The power of Feder¬ 
 alism was consequently slight, and the “Era of Good 
 Feeling” was ushered in at an earlier period in Georgia 
 than in most of the other states. As elsewhere, it was 
 attended by the usual “bad feeling” between Repub¬ 
 lican factions, out of which grew the first definite 
 division of the people into rival political parties. 
 
 It will be remembered that Middle Georgia was 
 settled largely by Carolinians and Virginians, each of 
 which groups preserved for some time its distinction 
 from the other. This distinction was based upon the 
 economic and cultural superiority of the Virginians, 
 and it was sometimes heightened by their success in 
 securing the better lands in the new country. Feelings 
 of personal friendship, based upon social solidarity, 
 prepared each of the groups for a projection of its 
 differences into the political field. This projection did 
 not depend for its realization upon the development of 
 any distinct class consciousness or real economic issue, 
 but merely upon personal rivalries, which would arouse 
 one man’s friends against another’s. 
 
 The particular question which first brought out the 
 latent antagonism seems to have been the political con¬ 
 troversy precipitated by the Yazoo frauds connected 
 with the state’s western land claims. The bitter local 
 
CONFLICT AND CONFUSION, 1824-1844 
 
 91 
 
 fight against the fraud and speculation involved was 
 led by the Virginia group, whose propertied interests 
 rendered them conservative in financial matters, while 
 the Carolinians were as a rule interested in defending 
 the project. 1 Group lines were drawn more definitely 
 as bitterness increased. Leaders appeared. Senator 
 James Jackson, who led the attack upon the Yazoo 
 cabal, was associated with two able politicians, George 
 M. Troup and William H. Crawford, while the Caro¬ 
 linians were marshaled by that most redoubtable cham¬ 
 pion, “General” John Clark. A personal quarrel en¬ 
 sued in 1803 between Troup and Clark, which increased 
 the bitterness between their partisans and well illus¬ 
 trates the rough and tumble personal character of the 
 politics of the period. 2 By 1820 the two groups were 
 fairly distinct throughout the state and had assumed 
 as political appellations the names of these two cham¬ 
 pions. The “Troup Party” and the “Clark Party” 
 struggled between that date and 1825 for the election 
 of the legislature, the governor, hitherto, being chosen 
 by that body. In 1825 the Clark group, displaying a 
 relatively democratic viewpoint based upon the char¬ 
 acter of its supporters, placed the election of the gover¬ 
 nor in the hands of the people. The first election under 
 this system showed clearly that the Troup party repre¬ 
 sented the planter interests of the coast and eastern 
 Central Georgia, while the other represented those of 
 the small farmers in the newer settlements in western 
 Central Georgia and the Pine Barrens. 3 
 
 l U. B. Phillips, “Georgia and State Rights,” American Historical 
 Association, Annual Report, 1901, II. 89-96, (hereinafter cited as Geor¬ 
 gia and State Rights). J. E. D. Shipp, Life and Times of Wm. H. 
 Crawford (Americus, Georgia, 1909), p. 46. 
 
 3 John Clark, Considerations on the Principles of William H. Craw¬ 
 ford (Augusta, 1819), pp. 1-6; Andrews, Reminiscences, p. 61. 
 
 3 Phillips, op. cit., pp. 89-96. 
 
92 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 Two interesting exceptions to this rule appeared. 
 In the Pine Barrens a tier of three counties, Laurens, 
 Tattnall, and Montgomery, went for Troup, apparently 
 because of the accident that this was Troup’s home 
 country,—a matter of some weight in personal poli¬ 
 tics. 4 On the other hand, a tier of counties running 
 athwart Central Georgia remained consistent sup¬ 
 porters of the Clark faction, even after they were com¬ 
 pletely merged in the Cotton Belt. These exceptional 
 areas are of interest, because they persisted throughout 
 the entire length of ante-bellum history and were quite 
 noticeable in the 1850 period. There seems to have 
 been no economic basis for this phenomenon, 5 which 
 must therefore be attributed to personal origin, though 
 leading to the formation of habits that persisted 
 through periods of economic and political crisis. 6 
 
 With the exception of these areas, the several sec¬ 
 tions of the state aligned themselves politically, from 
 this time on, in groups that generally had economic and 
 social bases. That lines were not always sharply 
 drawn was due to three circumstances. The first was 
 the fact that in the early days social distinctions be¬ 
 tween farmer and planter were not as marked as in the 
 later period of concentrated plantation capital and 
 resultant social stratification. The second was the 
 circumstance that in the early period there were few 
 issues other than the personal to heighten political dis¬ 
 tinctions. The third, of particular concern here, was 
 the fact that the constitutional issue concerning the 
 respective rights of the federal and state governments 
 
 4 Phillips, op cit. pp. 104, 105. 
 
 ‘See White, Georgia Statistics, pp. 116, 117, 332, 333, 363, 422, 534. 
 535, etc.; Olmsted, The Cotton Kingdom, II. 386-391; Savannah, Geor¬ 
 gian, September 13, 1849. 
 
 6 See Maps Nos. 5. 6, and 7, pp. 109, 171, 320. 
 
CONFLICT AND CONFUSION, 1824-1844 
 
 93 
 
 never entirely adapted itself to the political divisions 
 based upon economic foundations. Whenever it arose, 
 it tended to split the two parties and led to a regroup¬ 
 ing of political forces. As a result of these several 
 circumstances, the story of Georgia politics between 
 1830 and 1850 was often so void of real issues as to 
 seem meaningless, and at other times was so confused 
 as to defy analysis. 
 
 The first serious constitutional issue arose in the 
 late twenties, in connection with the question of Indian 
 lands in the state. The position taken by Governor 
 Troup against the Federal government, in his effort to 
 seize these lands, tended to identify his party with the 
 state-rights view, while in opposition the Clark party 
 defended the authority of the Union. Thus early, the 
 one became the Troup-State-Rights party and the 1 
 other the Clark-Union party. 7 In a search for a con¬ 
 stitutional theory justifying the state’s opposition to 
 the Federal government, the former was inclined to 1 
 hold that sovereignty was vested in the people of the 
 states or in the states themselves, while the latter held 
 that the rights of the state should be emphasized only 
 within the limits of the supreme law of the Federal 
 Constitution. 8 
 
 Late in the twenties, the constitutional issue was in¬ 
 tensified by the development of southern opposition to 
 the new protective tariffs and by the dramatic opposi¬ 
 tion of South Carolina to that legislation. The tariff 
 of 1828 led to serious protest in Georgia, as in 
 other states, and the legislature declared it unconstitu¬ 
 tional and suggested the calling of a “Southern Con- 
 
 7 Miller, Bench and Bar of Georgia, I. 261. These names were not 
 firmly fixed, however, until after 1833. 
 
 8 Phillips, op. cit., p. 123. 
 
94 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 vention” to devise “a suitable mode of resistance.” 9 
 The election of Jackson, a southern man trusted by 
 both Georgia parties upon the tariff and the Indian 
 questions, quieted agitation in Georgia from 1828 to 
 1832. In the latter year, the approach of the crisis 
 between South Carolina and the Federal government 
 again involved Georgia in the controversy. The ques¬ 
 tion which now faced the people was not the question 
 of the protective tariff, for to this there was general 
 opposition, but the question of the constitutional 
 remedy. Would Georgia support South Carolina in 
 the nullification of the Federal statute? 
 
 Excitement became intense in the state, as Carolina 
 nullified, and Jackson threatened. State-rights men 
 demanded a state convention to determine upon neces¬ 
 sary action; this demand was furthered by party cau¬ 
 cuses, debated, and finally approved in the legislature. 
 The action of the convention, however, was to be sub¬ 
 mitted to the people and to the legislature itself. 10 
 The public debate, which preceded and followed the 
 choice of the delegates, brought out the forces at work 
 in favor of both the Union and nullification positions. 
 As these forces were analogous to those in operation 
 in 1850, and as this analogy was consciously realized in 
 the later period, it is well to note it here. 11 
 
 The outstanding force favoring nullification was 
 the leadership and influence of South Carolina. Her 
 politicians were active in sending literature and 
 speakers across the river as apostles of the nullification 
 creed. Efforts were made to create a strong feeling 
 
 * H. V. Ames, State Documents on Federal Relations, pp. 153, 154. 
 
 10 Miller, Bench and Bar, II. 322. 
 
 For illustrations of contemporary comparisons of the two periods, 
 see The Macon Union Celebration (February 22, 1851), pp. 12, 19, 25, 41, 
 44, etc. 
 
CONFLICT AND CONFUSION, 1824-1844 
 
 95 
 
 ■of fraternity between the two states upon this common 
 doctrine. 12 Some Georgians became convinced that the 
 economic future as well as the sovereign rights of their 
 state were threatened by the tyrannical and unconsti¬ 
 tutional attempt to thrust a ruinous protective tariff 
 upon them. Such men became willing disciples of 
 the Charleston leaders. They condemned the tariff, 
 warned of federal usurpation, and villified the Union 
 men as “old federalists,” “modern consolidationists,” 
 and “submissionists” to northern oppression. 13 On the 
 other hand, they denied indignantly that they were 
 “agitators,” “traitors,” or “disunionists.” They loved 
 the Union, but they loved Georgia more. In addition 
 to urging the support of courageous Carolina, they 
 advocated economic pressure against the North. If 
 the Yankees would tax them through the tariff, then 
 let Georgia tax the Yankees’ goods when they were 
 offered in the^state for sale. 14 
 
 If the tariff policy was persisted in, the nullifiers 
 declared, Georgia might not only support the sister 
 state but should herself nullify the tariff law. Had 
 she not already nullified the decision of the federal 
 court in the case of the Indian controversy? Nullifi¬ 
 cation was, as Calhoun held, a purely constitutional 
 remedy which would save rather than destroy the 
 Union. As a program of action looking in this direc¬ 
 tion, the state convention should call or cooperate with 
 a general southern convention to decide upon joint 
 southern action. 
 
 “Augusta Chronicle, March 7, 1832; Macon Georgia Messenger, 
 March 10, 1832, etc., quoted in E. M. Coulter, “The Nullification Move¬ 
 ment in Georgia,” Georgia Historical Quarterly, V. No. 1, p. 11. 
 
 13 Proceedings of the States' Rights Party Convention, November 13, 
 1833, (Milledgeville, 1833), passim. 
 
 14 David Christy, Cotton is King, p. 93 (Cincinnati, 1855). It is pos¬ 
 sible that Christy confuses this matter of dating the first demand for 
 taxing northern goods. 
 
96 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 On the other hand, even as early as 1833, the very 
 fact that South Carolina led the state-rights movement 
 was in itself calculated to defeat it. It has been 
 pointed out in a previous chapter that there had long 
 been feeling between Georgia and Carolina based upon 
 economic and social rivalry. This had not been im¬ 
 proved by the political rivalry between Crawford and 
 Calhoun and by the latter’s unfriendly attitude toward 
 Georgia’s Indian policy. Georgia’s pride was, therefore, 
 incensed at the attempt of South Carolina to ‘‘lead her 
 by the nose” towards any political policy whatsoever. 
 This feeling was so strong that it would have been 
 wiser had the Carolinians concealed to some extent 
 their missionary efforts on behalf of nullification. In 
 addition to the dislike for “Palmettodom,” there ex¬ 
 isted in the minds of most Georgians a sincere and 
 traditional love for the “Union of the Fathers,” which 
 was a force of considerable potency in preventing the 
 average man from finally committing himself to an 
 anti-Union policy. Moreover, the average farmer was 
 not conscious of direct injury from the tariff. As it 
 happened, the political crisis came in a period of agri¬ 
 cultural expansion in the western part of Georgia, and 
 there were anticipations of prosperity that prevented 
 great economic discontent and brought aversion for 
 any disturbance that might possibly lead to civil war. 15 
 In addition to this, many looked to Jackson for sym¬ 
 pathy in the Indian difficulties and were anxious, for 
 this reason, not to break with the administration. In 
 other words, the economic forces were against a radical 
 state-rights stand in 1833. 
 
 ” R. D. Arnold, Oration Delivered to the Union and Southern Rights 
 Association of Chatham County, July 4, 1835, pp. 1-5. 
 
CONFLICT AND CONFUSION, 1824-1844 
 
 97 
 
 Those who for all these reasons opposed nullifica¬ 
 tion attacked its supporters as “traitors,” “agitators,” 
 and “disunionists.” The latter were accused of wish¬ 
 ing to make the state into a “mere dependency of Pal- 
 mettodom.” The tariff was bad, declared the Union 
 men, but it could be remedied within the Union and by 
 constitutional means. Calhoun’s theory of an indivis¬ 
 ible sovereignty resting in the state was a mere “meta¬ 
 physical entity” of his own creation. Sovereignty, as 
 Madison had held, was divided between the state and 
 the Federal governments, and nullification was not a 
 power reserved to the state. 16 If nullification was not 
 a constitutional remedy, any attempt to apply it was 
 sheer revolution. Union men would, therefore, shun 
 it until such a desperate time as might find them ready 
 for revolution. 17 The Union men were not “submis- 
 sionists,” but as good southerners as any others in the 
 community. Indeed, in their effort to save the state 
 from the Carolina heresy, they were better southerners 
 than their opponents. All good men and true were 
 urged to lay aside old party lines and stand by the 
 state and the nation. 
 
 As the debate preceding and following the nulli¬ 
 fication convention continued, it became increasingly 
 apparent that the nullifiers had thundered out of all 
 proportion to their numbers. 18 The radicals began to 
 tone down as the contest proceeded. Dislike for South 
 Carolina, love for the Union, economic prosperity and 
 consequent fear of civil disturbance—all the forces 
 
 16 Ibid., Arnold would have been interested in the recent works of Laski 
 and others denying the indivisibility of sovereignty. 
 
 17 This was analogous to the position taken by Georgia conservatives in 
 1851, that “the right of secession” was a revolutionary, not a constitu¬ 
 tional one. 
 
 “Miller, Bench and Bar, I. 40, II. 322; Coulter, op. cit., p. 29; Phil¬ 
 lips, Georgia and State Rights, pp. 130-132. 
 
98 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 mentioned disinclined the masses in Georgia to radical 
 political expedients. Then a compromise program 
 was adopted at the national capital, which made certain 
 the victory of the conservative forces in the home state. 
 
 The nullification controversy was analogous in 
 many ways to the slavery controversy of 1850. It 
 was more than a mere analogy, however. It was, to 
 some extent, related to the later crisis as cause to effect. 
 To begin with, it increased the political distrust of 
 South Carolina and the fear that this state wished to 
 dominate her neighbor. This feeling became so com¬ 
 mon that it even affected the attitude of the Georgia 
 delegation in Congress towards that of South Caro¬ 
 lina. “Georgia came,” wrote General James Hamilton 
 to Langdon Cheves nearly twenty years later, “to dis¬ 
 like us . . . more than the people of Massachusetts. 
 When in Congress I was often grieved and sometimes 
 amused by this jealousy.” 19 This attitude was to be a 
 potent force in Georgia when South Carolina once 
 again essayed southern leadership. 
 
 In addition to this, the necessity for defending the 
 Union acted as a stimulus to Union feeling in Georgia. 
 Seventeen years later, when faced with a similar ne¬ 
 cessity, many old Union men recalled with pride their 
 unswerving attachment to the Union in the days of 
 1833. The old battles were recalled, and the old tra¬ 
 dition of standing by the Union was effectively invoked 
 once more. 20 It is possible, to be sure, that with some 
 Georgians the reverse of this became true; that is, that 
 some ceased at this time to hold the same reverence for 
 a Union, whose value, having been calculated once, 
 might again be questioned. That this was not so true 
 
 1# Charleston Courier, in the Savannah Republican, January 16, 1851. 
 
 10 For such sentiments, see the letters in the Macon Union Celebration, 
 pp. 12, 19, 25, etc. 
 
CONFLICT AND CONFUSION, 1824-1844 
 
 99 
 
 as might logically have been the case was due to a 
 peculiar political shift of many of the southern-rights 
 men of 1833, which led them into the Union party 
 during the next decade. 
 
 The effect of the constitutional controversy upon 
 the political parties was, as has been suggested, to force 
 new alignments and consequent political confusion. 
 The issue did not fit itself perfectly to the old partisan 
 patterns. It is true that the Troup party, with some¬ 
 thing of a state-rights tradition inherited from the i/ 
 Indian episode, tended more to favor nullification, 
 while the Clark party tended to stand by the Union. 
 This party saw in Jackson the especial champion of its 
 small farmer interests and democratic principles and 
 was particularly loath to break with him over other 
 issues. They were, moreover, the class in Georgia 
 which had least in common, socially or economically, 
 with the planter-aristocrats leading the South Caro¬ 
 lina movement. Nevertheless, a few old Clark men did 
 become nullificationists and joined the State-Rights 
 party. On the other hand, the more conservative 
 Troup men, who opposed nullification, came to cooper¬ 
 ate with the bulk of the old Clark party against that 
 doctrine. The factors causing this last shift were, 
 apart from general conservatism, the political quarrel 
 which had been going on between Calhoun and the 
 Troup leader, Crawford, during the twenties and the 
 failure of Calhoun to support Troup’s Indian policy. 21 
 The transitional stage in this realignment was well in¬ 
 dicated by the use for some time of the appellations, 
 “Troup-Union” and “Clark-Union” parties. 22 
 
 21 J. A. Turner, “William C. Dawson,” in The Plantation, I. No. 1, 
 p. 80, (1860). 
 
 ” Phillips, Georgia and State Rights, p. 132. 
 
100 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 So far as the majority of the Union party of the 
 later thirties was made up of the old Clark men, it was 
 quite natural that this party should have continued to 
 be preeminently the party of the smaller farmers, con¬ 
 centrated in “Cherokee,” western Central Georgia, 
 and in parts of the Pine Barrens. To the extent that 
 the bulk of the State-Rights party was composed of old 
 Troup men, its strength was necessarily greatest in the 
 plantation areas of Central and Coastal Georgia. These 
 last two regions had at first been politically as well as 
 socially distinct, for the coastal planters represented 
 the oldest aristocracy in the state. The early section¬ 
 alism between the coast and the interior disappeared 
 gradually, however, as wealth increased in Central 
 Georgia and as transportation between the two areas 
 across the Pine Barrens improved. Economic and 
 social solidarity led to political solidarity. 
 
 The chief political phenomenon of the late thirties 
 was the alignment of the Union and State-Rights 
 parties with the existing national organizations. It 
 was to be expected, a priori, that the Clark-Union 
 party of small farmers would find itself in sympathy 
 with the Jacksonian Democracy. Their economic 
 status and democratic ideals naturally tended, other 
 things being equal, to bring a union with the adminis¬ 
 tration group. In other states, notably in North 
 Carolina, special circumstances nullified this economic 
 tendency, but in Georgia the force of local circum¬ 
 stances actually furthered it. The pioneers who settled 
 Upper Georgia were, on the one hand, indebted to 
 Jackson for his friendly attitude concerning the Indian 
 matter and, on the other, were a rugged and self-reli¬ 
 ant type, most suspicious of the South Carolina planter 
 
CONFLICT AND CONFUSION, 1824-1844 101 
 
 aristocracy and opposed to South Carolina leadership 
 in Georgia political affairs. When the election of 1840 
 came, therefore, it found the Georgia Union men sup¬ 
 porting the national Democrats, and the latter name 
 began to be used in the state at about this time. 
 
 Meanwhile, the local State-Rights party had fol¬ 
 lowed its Carolina leader, John C. Calhoun, into a 
 political alliance with the National Republicans of the 
 North. The alliance of southern anti-tariff and state- 
 rights men with northern pro-tariff nationalists was as 
 anomalous as anything in American party history 
 and was based largely upon the expediency of common 
 opposition to the Jackson administration. This “Whig” 
 party was, of course, an essentially unstable combina¬ 
 tion, whose equilibrium could be maintained only so 
 long as the two elements maintained an equal influence. 
 When the nomination of Harrison in 1840 showed the 
 National Republicans in control under Clay’s leader¬ 
 ship, Calhoun called upon the state-rights Carolinians 
 to leave the organization. The more moderate na¬ 
 tionalism of Van Buren having meanwhile succeeded 
 the militant policy of Jackson in the Democracy, it was 
 possible for the Calhoun men in South Carolina to 
 return, prodigal-like, to their original political home. 
 They were received there with rejoicing by the Demo¬ 
 cratic fathers, who bestowed upon them such political 
 fatted calves as aroused some jealousy among the more 
 faithful of the brethren. The return of the Calhoun- 
 ites was hastened by the growth of antislavery feeling 
 among the northern Whigs, as well as by the tariff 
 and nationalistic policies of the latter. It was also 
 aided at home by the gradual disappearance of the 
 nullification issue and a consequent reunion of the 
 
102 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 Union and nullification parties in Calhoun’s own 
 state. 23 
 
 The question in Georgia was whether this move¬ 
 ment back to the Democracy would carry with it most 
 of the local Whigs. The situation was complicated 
 when the presidential campaign of 1840 necessitated 
 action one way or the other. Several circumstances 
 had arisen which made it theoretically improbable that 
 the bulk of the Georgia Whigs would leave the party. 
 They were probably becoming more and more con¬ 
 cerned with the practical advantages of their new po¬ 
 litical alliance. The Georgia leaders, unlike the more 
 ambitious Calhoun, began to see a real place for them¬ 
 selves in the national organization. The fact that the 
 outstanding Georgia Whig politician of the period, 
 John McPherson Berrien, became the strong ally of 
 the northern Whigs at the very time that Calhoun had 
 to abandon them is probably illustrative of this op¬ 
 portunism. It was true, to be sure, that Clay was 
 committing the Whig party to the tariff and to the 
 nationalism of the old National Republicans. In¬ 
 teresting manufacturing possibilities, however, were 
 opening up before the bourgeoisie of the Black Belt, to 
 which group the majority of the Troup state-rights 
 Whig party leaders belonged. They, therefore, began 
 to be more favorable to moderate protective principles 
 for the same reason that Calhoun himself had favored 
 them some twenty years before; that is, because of the 
 hope that they might share in their benefits. It was 
 also true that the northern Whigs were beginning to 
 display suspiciously antislavery tendencies, but the 
 planter class, as has been observed, were usually not 
 
 ” A. C. Cole, The Whig Party in the South, pp. 28-30, 44-49; E. M. 
 Carroll, Origins of the Whig Party, chapter v. passim. 
 
CONFLICT AND CONFUSION, 1824-1844 103 
 
 anxious to agitate this issue. As for the nationalism 
 of the northern allies, this was probably not so objec¬ 
 tionable in 1840 as it had been in 1835, since the nulli¬ 
 fication question had, meanwhile, apparently become a 
 dead issue. All of these considerations would seem 
 sufficient, a priori, to explain what actually did finally 
 occur; that is, that the majority of the Georgia Whigs 
 were able to continue the political alliance with the 
 northern party, though it was an alliance which was 
 always of an inherently unstable character. 24 So 
 surely as a real issue like the slavery question should 
 arise, so surely would this alliance be threatened with 
 destruction. 
 
 Nevertheless, the return of Calhoun from the dry 
 husks of Whiggery was not entirely without influence 
 in Georgia. It was logically impossible for the more 
 extreme men of the old State-Rights party to remain 
 within the Whig camp after its control had passed into 
 the hands of the Clay nationalists. It was also highly 
 objectionable for the more extreme proslavery men to 
 remain in alliance with a northern party already so 
 tainted with antislavery associations. It was this last 
 objection which was most emphasized by the malcon¬ 
 tent Georgia Whigs, and this, the first appearance in 
 Georgia internal politics of slavery as a major issue, 
 
 24 For contemporary opinion in Georgia on this development, see 
 Johnston and Browne, Alexander H. Stephens, p. 140; for a description 
 of the national background see Cole, op. cit., pp. 48-51. Phillips is of 
 the opinion that the Whig leaders stayed with their party with the 
 “half conceived idea” of dominating it for southern interests, (op. cit.. 
 p. 148,) while Stephens, looking back after nearly thirty years, says that 
 as a State-Rights man in 1840 he disliked both Harrison and Van Buren, 
 but his objection to the northern principles of the former were out¬ 
 weighed by his objections to the financial principles of the latter. It 
 is possible that some such a view was in the minds of many of the 
 Georgia Whigs, rather than such a rational analysis as has been given 
 above. Yet this would not necessarily invalidate that analysis. 
 
104 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 was ominous of the coming storm. 25 A number of Whig 
 leaders who held these views, Colquitt, H. M. Mc¬ 
 Allister, Haralson, Cooper, Chappel, and others, bolted 
 to the Democratic party after the nomination of Har¬ 
 rison and proceeded to appeal energetically to the mass 
 of Whig voters to do likewise. The Whigs, they 
 claimed, were moving under northern influence 
 towards “consolidation” and “federalism.” They were 
 tainted with protectionism and antislavery principles 
 and were therefore essentially “unsound” upon all the 
 old principles of the true southern Whig party. The 
 Democrats, now that Jackson was out, were more to be 
 trusted than the changing Whigs. 26 
 
 It is difficult to say how many state-rights Whigs 
 bolted the party in answer to this appeal. Only a close 
 study of the elections between about 1836 and 1842 
 would reveal this with even approximate accuracy, and 
 this hardly falls within the plan of the present study. 
 The victory of the Whig party in Georgia in the na¬ 
 tional election of 1840 would seem to indicate that its 
 losses in the state had not been very extensive. This 
 evidence is not conclusive, however, because of the 
 fact that there was at the time a temporary swing of 
 the Democratic farmers to the “Tippecanoe” ranks. 
 Whig victories in the state elections in 1843 and 1845, 
 however, do show that the number of state-rights 
 Whigs who deserted in 1840 must have been small. 
 
 The lifting of the smoke of battle after the 1840 
 campaign, then, again revealed new alignments and 
 
 35 Slavery, of course, had been a matter of controversy in the colonial 
 period. 
 
 30 H. M. McAllister, Address to the Democratic-Republican Conven¬ 
 tion of Georgia, Milledgeville, July 4, 1840. (Milledgeville, 1840) ; 
 W. F. Colquitt, Circular to the States Rights Party of Georgia, (Milledge¬ 
 ville, 1840) ; J. A. Turner, op. cit., pp. 72-77, gives an able resume of 
 this story, written in 1860. 
 
CONFLICT AND CONFUSION, 1824-1844 105 
 
 new elements in the two parties. These remained sub¬ 
 stantially the same from this time until the political 
 struggle of 1850 again transcended old party lines. 
 
 Within the Democratic party were now two fairly 
 distinct, though temporarily harmonious, elements. The 
 first was the old Clark-Union party group, distributed 
 throughout Georgia, but concentrated as before in the 
 Cherokee section and weakest in the coastal area. 
 These men always had been and usually remained 
 Democratic, pro-Union voters. In the Cherokee sec¬ 
 tion, as has been previously observed, they had little 
 concern in slave-holding interests and probably less 
 intense racial consciousness than that obtaining in the 
 Pine Barrens area. The second element was that of 
 the one-time state-rights Whigs, led by Colquitt and 
 McAllister, who always had been and usually remained 
 consistent state-rights and proslavery voters. Subse¬ 
 quent events showed that this element was strongest 
 along the lower Savannah on the South Carolina 
 border, in the Democratic belt in Central Georgia, in 
 certain towns where the Carolina influence was strong, 
 (notably Columbus and Savannah), and in parts of the 
 Pine Barrens. 
 
 The presence in the old Union party of these “Cal¬ 
 houn Democrats,” as they came to be called, led to con¬ 
 cessions on the part of that party to the state-rights 
 views and leaders. Colquitt was sent to the Senate, 
 McAllister and McDonald were both nominated 
 for the governorship. The Calhounites’ persistence in 
 their principles created some friction, but also brought 
 results. One Union Democrat complained afterwards 
 that they “continued to maintain their state-rights 
 
106 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 principles on all occasions and at the expense of the 
 feelings of the old Union element.” 27 Some Union 
 men were influenced by this propaganda, which was 
 especially effective within the party so soon as sec¬ 
 tional issues again became acute about 1848. As a 
 result, there were notable conversions of old Union 
 Democrat leaders, such as ex-Governor Wilson Lump¬ 
 kin and Governor George W. Towns, to the particu- 
 larist creed. That the bulk of the Democrats had not 
 been converted to extreme “Calhounism” by 1850, 
 is indicated by the elections of that year. Yet it is 
 also true that the bulk of the party was more sensitive 
 to questions of state-rights and sectional interest in 
 general at this time than would have been the case fif¬ 
 teen years before. This is shown in the election of 1851, 
 when only about one fifth of the party maintained its 
 originally strong Union position. This change in 
 party teeling may be ascribed both to the intensification 
 of the issue that year and to the “boring from within” 
 by Calhoun Democrats, a process which by that time 
 had been going on for more than a decade. 
 
 The extent to which this “boring from within” had 
 been carried by the Calhounites was not fully realized 
 by the old Union Democrats until the crisis of 1850 
 made it obvious for the first time. Then there was 
 much indignation in the old Clark camp, and regret 
 was frequently expressed that the party had ever ad¬ 
 mitted the old state-rights Whig element to member¬ 
 ship. “As a Clark man,” wrote John B. Lamar at this 
 time, “as a Union man in 1833, and ever since as a 
 
 ”John H. Lumpkin, letter dated “Rome, April 27, 1851,” in the 
 Savannah Republican, May 5, 1851. He regrets that “his old uncle. 
 Governor Lumpkin, and other old Union men have accepted the states’ 
 rights view.” 
 
CONFLICT AND CONFUSION, 1824-1844 107 
 
 Democrat I have been associated with this party. . . 
 Its stern opposition to the dis-union of a former day 
 commended it to the favor of the people of the state.” 
 But the disunionists of 1833, “having failed to ac¬ 
 complish their baneful purpose over the heads of the 
 Union men, have resorted to the more subtle policy of 
 winning our confidence, insinuating themselves among 
 us . . . only to betray us. We believed and ac¬ 
 cepted them. Too bad! Now from within the Demo¬ 
 cratic party they shout their old Whig-Nullification 
 cries of 1833.” 28 
 
 The Whigs, meanwhile, retained after 1840 the 
 majority of the old State-Rights party of the planta¬ 
 tion areas (as was shown by the elections of the next 
 few years) save for the few extremists who had gone 
 over to trouble the Democrats. This very loss, 
 while not sufficient to affect seriously the voting 
 strength of the party, did purge it of its radical leader¬ 
 ship and thus facilitated its progress towards a con¬ 
 servative position upon constitutional and sectional 
 issues. The fact that the Whig party of Georgia re¬ 
 tained in 1840 a greater majority of the old state- 
 rights element than the same party succeeded in hold¬ 
 ing in the neighboring states has led to the suggestion, 
 to be sure, that the Georgia Whigs also retained a 
 greater degree of the particularist feeling than did 
 their brethren in the other states. 29 There seems to be 
 little evidence substantiating this view and much that 
 would uphold an opposing thesis. It is safe to say that 
 the Georgia Whigs became as strongly attached to 
 
 28 J. B. Lamar, February 27, 1851, to the Committee, The Macon 
 Union Celebration, p. 25. 
 
 29 R. R. Russel, Economic Aspects of Southern Sectionalism, 1840- 
 1861, pp. 73, 75, 76. 
 
108 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 Union principles as did their political brethren in other 
 parts of the Lower South. 30 
 
 There was, to be sure, a little group of Whigs in 
 Georgia who sided with the Calhoun Democrats in 
 1850 in urging radical state action, but this group was 
 so small as to be politically insignificant in the struggle 
 of that year. It was only as an omen of what was to 
 come that this element was of interest at that time. 
 The agitation of the fifties had to intensify greatly the 
 sectional controversy before the bulk of the Georgia 
 Whigs could realize that they too must swing to the 
 party that Calhoun and Colquitt had joined in 1840, 
 and to which a few Whigs like Berrien and Smythe 
 went over in 1850. 
 
 As the Whigs inclined more and more towards 
 nationalism as a result of all the circumstances noted, 
 and the Democrats inclined more and more towards 
 particularism as a result of the influence of the Cal- 
 hounites, it began to look as if each party had just 
 reversed its stand of nullification days. By 1846 it 
 was the Whig party that was talking “federalism” 
 and “protection,” while the Democratic party was more 
 apt to declare the “sovereign rights” of Georgia. The 
 old party names of “State-Rights” and “Union” had 
 not merely lost meaning, they had become essentially 
 
 30 Russel cites as evidence of what he considers the state-rights 
 attitude of the Georgia Whigs the fact that they failed, while in control 
 of the state convention of 1850, to deny formally the constitutionality of 
 secession. As a matter of fact, the Georgia Whigs did right strenuously 
 deny the constitutionality of secession only a few months after the state 
 convention met, when the state campaign of 1851 first made the “right of 
 secession” a paramount issue. See, c.g., Savannah Republican, May 25, 
 26 and 27; July 25, September 6, 1851. There could hardly have been a 
 paper in the lower South more strenuously opposed to the state-rights 
 dogma in 1850 than the Augusta Chronicle, one of the most influential of 
 the Georgia Whig papers, whose editor declared that a state could no 
 more secede from the Union than could a county from a state. Governor 
 Towns estimated in 1850 that “19-20ths of the old state-rights group are 
 submissionists,” Towns to Seabrook, September 25, 1850, Seabrook MSS. 
 
MAP NO. S 
 
 Reproduced, by permission, from map in U. B. Phillip’s Georgia and State Rights. 
 
CONFLICT AND CONFUSION, 1824-1844 109 
 
 false and misleading-. Each party, of course, was 
 quick to see the change which had come over the other 
 and was loud in its condemnation of its opponent’s 
 inconsistency, the while it ignored its own. The re¬ 
 versal of attitudes involved was, indeed, a curious and 
 remarkable one, and, coming as it did within the life¬ 
 time of one generation of leaders, it laid these gentle¬ 
 men open constantly to the charge of inconsistency. 
 Their past utterances, naturally embarrassing, were 
 ever at the beck and call of their enemies, and the 
 easiest defence was to return the compliment in kind. 
 Charges and counter-charges were complicated by the 
 fact that each party contained within itself a minority 
 element that had maintained consistency; namely, the 
 Union-Democrats and the small group of state-rights 
 Whigs, and these minorities voiced from within the 
 parties the same criticisms that the opposition hurled 
 from without. 31 
 
 Despite all these conflicting elements within the 
 parties and the shifts which led to them, the economic 
 basis of the two groups remained much the same in 
 1844 as it had been in 1834. The Democratic party, 
 like the old Clark-Union party, had the support of the 
 poorer whites. The Whig, like the old Troup party, 
 was the planters’ party and strongest in Coastal and 
 Central Georgia in the plantation areas. In other 
 words, the constitutional problem which has been de¬ 
 scribed was not the determining issue in the formation 
 or development of the parties, but a temporary ques¬ 
 tion which realigned minorities rather than the bulk 
 of the one party or the other. In any period of con- 
 
 “ For examples of these confused charges of inconsistency see e.g., 
 Savannah Georgian, May 23, 1848; Savannah Republican, May 25, 1848; 
 J. B. Lamar, February 27, 1851, to the Committee, The Macon Union 
 Celebration, p. 25. 
 
110 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 stitutional crisis, however, such a realignment of a 
 minority of one party with the other might be the de¬ 
 termining factor in an outcome of both economic and 
 political significance. This was especially apt to be 
 true of a state like Georgia, in which the two parties 
 were of about equal strength in normal years. 
 
 That the bulk of the two parties were distributed 
 in the areas noted is clearly shown in the results of the 
 elections between 1844 and 1849 ; 32 that within these 
 areas they represented the classes stated is amply 
 demonstrated by contemporary recognition. It is true 
 that the Georgia papers were not as extreme in their 
 statements on this subject as were some in the Gulf 
 states, but it was sometimes asserted that the majority 
 of the planters were Whigs and the poorer farmers 
 usually Democrats. While the Montgomery Alabama 
 Journal declared that the Whigs owned seven eights 
 ■of the slaves in the South, 33 the Columbus (Georgia) 
 Times modestly observed that “the Whigs of Georgia, 
 It is believed, hold more slaves than the Democrats.” 
 Again it remarked: “the Whigs of Georgia have the 
 property . . .” 34 The Times was a Democratic 
 journal and may have wished to minimize such state¬ 
 ments, lest they be used to prove the Whigs “sound” 
 upon slavery interests; hence its “confession,” as a 
 Whig journal termed it, was rather significant. 35 Yet 
 Whig statements were also modest in their estimates, 
 one declaring simply that they owned “as many 
 negroes” as the Democrats. 36 
 
 o 
 
 32 See maps in Cole, The Whig Party in the South. 
 
 33 September 2, 1850. 
 
 34 Columbus Times, July 13 and 27, 1849; see also the Federal Union, 
 October 30, 1849. 
 
 35 Augusta Chronicle, July 20, 1849. 
 
 39 Savannah Republican, June 23, 1849. 
 
CONFLICT AND CONFUSION, 1824-1844 111 
 
 On the other hand, Whig journals in Georgia 
 pointed with scorn to the fact that the poorest and 
 most ignorant whites were the mainstay of the Demo¬ 
 cracy. The belief that economic improvement and 
 education would make Whigs out of Democrats was 
 one motive behind the Whig clamor for educational 
 improvement. The Whigs cannot triumph, it was de¬ 
 clared, until “education dispells the darkness from the 
 sequestered regions, where common schools, churches, 
 newspapers and postoffices are far between. In these 
 is the home of unadulterated Democracy in Georgia.” 37 
 A northern Whig editor held the same opinion, claim¬ 
 ing that the greater number of Georgia Democrats 
 were the “corn-crackers” and “the inhabitants of the 
 uncultivated portions.” 38 During the political strug¬ 
 gle of 1850, the Whigs constantly insisted that the 
 majority of the Democrats, who were associated with 
 the southern-rights movement, were “people of no 
 consequence.” 
 
 In answer to this charge, the Democrats made a 
 reply which should be noted. While being proud of 
 their association with the good common people, they 
 hastened to point out what has been stated in a previ¬ 
 ous chapter; namely, that there were many individual 
 Democrats of wealth and influence. In their effort to 
 show this, indeed, they succeeded in proving almost 
 too much; that is, that most of their own leaders were 
 wealthy men like the Whigs. They were usually plant¬ 
 ers, or professional men associated with planters. 39 
 
 37 Augusta Chronicle, July 21, 1849. For proof of the truth of this 
 statement, cf. maps showing distribution of (1) illiteracy and (2) the 
 parties, pp. 24 and 109. 
 
 38 Oneida (N. Y.) Herald, in the Federal Union, October 30, 1849. 
 
 38 The list includes such leaders as the Cobbs, Colquitt, McAllister, 
 Towns, McDonald, Chappell, Judge Andrews, Judge Warner (of north¬ 
 ern origin), W. C. Daniell, R. D. Arnold, the editors of the Federal 
 Union and the Savannah Georgian, etc. Joseph E. Brown was an ex¬ 
 ception, he having come from the small farmer class. 
 
112 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 Their presence in the Democratic party can be ascribed 
 to political aspirations, to honest liberalism, and to the 
 state-rights issue. This last had brought in the small 
 group of planters led by McAllister and Colquitt, who 
 belonged to the type of planter Democrats then domi¬ 
 nant in South Carolina. Thus McAllister, the coastal 
 rice planter, although a leader of the Democrats, actu¬ 
 ally represented the most exclusive social aristocracy 
 in the state. Howell Cobb, on the other hand, repre¬ 
 sented a type of Democratic planter who merged politi¬ 
 cal aspirations with an apparently genuine sympathy 
 for the poorer farming classes. 
 
 The Democrats, of course, always claimed that they 
 represented the good common people. In the early 
 thirties the Clark party had shown in its political pro¬ 
 gram a real desire to democratize the state’s govern¬ 
 ment. When, for instance, it secured control of the 
 convention called in 1833 to amend the constitution, 
 its members voted in that body for an amendment pro¬ 
 viding the “white basis,” rather than the “federal 
 ratio” basis, for representation in the state legislature. 
 This was a move then in demand in the southern states 
 by the poorer whites, who desired to take from the 
 planter class its large representation based upon the 
 slave population in the plantation areas. The Whigs 
 opposed it on the specious ground that it was an 
 attack upon slavery and one that would tempt the na¬ 
 tional government also to abandon the “federal ratio,” 
 to the detriment of all southern representation in Con¬ 
 gress. Upon being submitted to a referendum, it was 
 defeated, the Whigs claiming that “fully 10,000 Demo¬ 
 crats” joined them in opposing the measure. 40 The 
 
 40 Augusta Chronicle, April 12, 1849; for the “white basis” issue in 
 the state constitutional conventions, see Journal of a General Convention 
 of the State of Georgia, 1833, p. 22; Journal of the Convention to Re- 
 
CONFLICT AND CONFUSION, 1824-1844 113 
 
 Clark party did, however, succeed in putting the elec¬ 
 tion of the governor in the hands of the people and in 
 establishing manhood suffrage for the whites. 
 
 In the forties, the Democrats continued to declare 
 themselves the peoples’ party, but there was little 
 evidence of serious effort towards further political 
 reform. The demand for the white basis of repre¬ 
 sentation was not often raised in the latter part of the 
 decade. A number of interesting and relatively radical 
 changes were sometimes advocated by Democrats, but 
 no serious effort was made to secure them. Some, for 
 instance, desired the popular election of judges and of 
 the national president. The Athens Banner, an ener¬ 
 getic Democratic journal, even suggested the abolition 
 of the state senate, on the ground that it was an 
 undemocratic feature of the machinery of legislation. 41 
 
 There was a continuous exchange of general 
 charges between the two parties concerning their re¬ 
 latively democratic and conservative positions. An 
 interesting illustration of this occurred in connection 
 with the local reaction to the French Revolution of 
 1848. The association of Louis Blanc and the social¬ 
 ists with this movement led northern Whig papers to 
 condemn it, the Newport (Rhode Island) News, for 
 instance, declaring that Louis Phillipe had been over¬ 
 thrown for “slight and transient causes” by the “worst 
 
 duce and Equalise the Representation of the General Assembly of the 
 State of Georgia, 1839, p. 44. While the convention of ’33 passed the 
 “white basis” resolution, 126 to 122, it was overwhelmingly defeated 
 when brought up again in that of ’39, by a vote of 192 to 83; i.e., the 
 Democracy had abandoned it by the end of the decade. For interesting 
 comment on the struggle over this issue in the convention see J. Living¬ 
 ston, “Judge Nisbet of the Supreme Court of Georgia,” Biographical 
 Sketches of Eminent American Lawyers, Pt. IV, 548-558. The “white 
 basis” demand emanated from Upper Georgia and the poorer white 
 counties in other sections. This situation was analogous to that obtain¬ 
 ing in Virginia and other southern states. 
 
 41 Augusta Chronicle, July 21, 1849. 
 
114 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 kind of radicalism—rank Dorrism.” 42 The Georgia 
 Whig press also found little to sympathize with in the 
 revolution. The Democratic papers, however, eulo¬ 
 gized it as a splendid republican achievement. The 
 Savannah Georgian agreed with the Philadelphia 
 Pennsylvanian that ‘‘Human rights and Whiggery— 
 Dorrism and despotism—are extreme opposites as are 
 the poles.” 43 Democratic journals advocated the theo¬ 
 retical right of revolution, while the Whigs condemned 
 this view, as making for dangerous radicalism. 
 
 One feels, however, that he is here dealing with a 
 useful tradition rather than with an issue. The Demo¬ 
 cratic party of necessity cherished this tradition in 
 appealing to its mass of small farmer supporters and 
 often used it effectively against the Whigs. Yet its 
 own leadership, as has been noted, had come largely 
 into the hands of the well-to-do class, which had no 
 intention in the late forties of any radical reforms. 
 The Whigs simply had to avoid any affront to this 
 tradition, lest it be used by the Democrats against 
 them. Occasionally a particularly courageous Whig 
 leader would openly challenge it. “The Terrible 
 Toombs,” usually more of a fighter than a philosopher, 
 was strongly criticised during the bitter campaign of 
 1851 for his wealth and apparent aristocracy. The 
 people of Elbert County, for instance, condemned his 
 display of horses and servants as he campaigned the 
 country. In reply, he admitted that he made more than 
 five thousand dollars a year in that county alone. 
 
 42 A reference to the “Dorr Rebellion” in Rhode Island for demo¬ 
 cratic political reforms. There is an obvious analog}' between the way 
 in which the Whig and Democratic papers reacted to this Revolution of 
 1848 and the manner in which Federalist and Republican ones had re¬ 
 acted to that of 1789-1800. 
 
 43 Georgian, May 7, 1849. 
 
CONFLICT AND CONFUSION, 1824-1844 115 
 
 “Who would say he had not earned it? He had a right 
 to spend it as he chose. Perish such demagoguery— 
 such senseless stuff!” 44 Toombs has also been cred¬ 
 ited with the remark, “We are the gentlemen,” made 
 in reference to the southern planter class. 45 Georgia 
 planters, however, were usually careful not to display 
 in political circles such notions of aristocracy as they 
 might possess. 
 
 Indeed, the Whig planters never abandoned the 
 claim that they themselves were the heirs of the demo¬ 
 cratic tradition. This had been a useful claim in the 
 “log cabin” campaign of 1840 in Georgia and else¬ 
 where. They even accused the Democrats of the taint 
 of aristocracy whenever the latter were careless 
 enough to lay themselves open to such a charge. 
 Democrats were accustomed, for instance, to claim that 
 the worst aristocracy in the state was that of the rice 
 planters of the old conservative seaboard. Yet, in 1845, 
 they ran McAllister, one of these same planters and a 
 Calhoun Democrat, for the governorship. The Whig 
 papers immediately attacked him as an aristocrat and 
 implied that their political enemies were dominated by 
 high snobbery. One of them referred to McAllister as 
 “an aristocrat who has no sympathy with the people. 
 He belongs to that class in Savannah known as 
 ‘Swelled Heads’ who think the up-country people no 
 better than brutes. . . . Why it will kill him to be so 
 far back in the woods as Milledgeville. He will never 
 stand the up-country crackers and the lack of his 
 favorite brands of wine.” There was a degree of truth 
 in this statement, and it well illustrates the embarrass¬ 
 ment under which the Democrats sometimes labored as 
 
 44 Quoted by Stoval, Robert Toombs, p. 90. 
 
 46 See Gamaliel Bradford, Confederate Portraits, p. 196. 
 
116 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 a result of admitting the Calhoun planters to the party 
 in 1840. 46 
 
 This social criticism may have been one factor in 
 McAllister’s defeat by Crawford in this campaign. 
 When the next election came, in 1847, however, the 
 Whigs nominated Clinch, another rice planter, and the 
 Democrats, in opposing him, simply duplicated the 
 Whig attack upon McAllister. 47 In other words, the 
 politicians of both parties saw in the Democratic 
 dogma little more than a popular shibboleth, to which 
 it was useful to render lip service upon appropriate 
 occasions. 
 
 This, at least, is the conclusion that one would gain 
 from the party press. In Georgia, as elsewhere, the 
 papers of the day were an important influence in politi¬ 
 cal life. The period between 1830 and 1850 saw the 
 first full blossomings of so-called “personal journal¬ 
 ism,” when, in a state like Georgia, the papers were 
 small affairs, whose owners, editors, and publishers 
 were often one and the same person. In a few of the 
 larger towns, however, such as Augusta and Savan¬ 
 nah, the editorial staffs were in 1850 differentiated 
 from the owners. This was true, for instance, of the. 
 Savannah Georgian and Republican and of the Aug¬ 
 usta Chronicle. 
 
 Each town of any size had two journals in 1850, 
 one Democratic and the other Whig, and in both Sa¬ 
 vannah and Columbus there were in 1850 two Demo¬ 
 cratic papers, 48 although these towns each numbered 
 under ten thousand population. In Augusta there were 
 
 44 In Savannah Georgian, July 7, 1847. 
 
 47 Federal Union, July 27, and August 10, 1847. 
 
 48 The Savannah News and Georgian; the Columbus Times and 
 Sentinel. The News was “independent” but it tended towards Democratic 
 views. 
 
CONFLICT AND CONFUSION, 1824-1844 117 
 
 two Whig papers, the Chronicle and the Republic, and 
 also two in Macon, the Journal and the Citizen. Under 
 these circumstances, circulations were usually not large 
 in the towns and were especially small in the Pine Bar¬ 
 rens and Upper Georgia, where illiteracy was com¬ 
 mon and the “newspaper habit” had never been gener¬ 
 ally formed. Most of the papers were weeklies, though 
 those in Augusta ran daily, tri-weekly and weekly 
 editions; the Columbus Times, a tri-weekly as well as a 
 weekly edition; and the Savannah papers, only daily 
 editions. Daily and tri-weekly editions had a very 
 much smaller circulation than the weekly. Thus the 
 daily Augusta Constitutionalist had a circulation of 
 about four hundred, the tri-weekly, of two hundred 
 and fifty, and the weekly, of three thousand. The 
 only daily in the state whose patrons exceeded one 
 thousand in number in 1850 was the Savannah News, 
 founded only in that year, but blessed with a rapid 
 growth because it represented a new business venture 
 —the cheap newspaper. 
 
 The Whig and Democratic weeklies were not evenly 
 balanced in their circulation, that of the Whigs in the 
 larger towns usually being slightly the greater, as 
 would be expected. Among them, the weekly Augusta 
 Chronicle had in 1850 by far the largest circulation of 
 any paper in the state, about fifty-four hundred, save 
 that of its own agricultural monthly, which reached 
 about eight thousand subscribers. The Augusta Re¬ 
 public, the other Whig paper, was taken by three thous¬ 
 and subscribers, which means that the Whig papers of 
 that city reached almost three times as many readers 
 as did the Democratic. In Macon, likewise in the heart 
 of the cotton belt, the Whig readers of the Journal and 
 the Citizen were more than twice the number of the 
 
118 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 Democratic readers of the Telegraph. In Columbus, 
 the Whig Enquirer had a larger circulation than either 
 of its Democratic rivals, and only in Milledgeville did 
 the Democratic Federal Union lead the Whig Southern 
 Recorder by a narrow margin, three thousand to 
 twenty-eight hundred. In Athens and Rome the party 
 papers were evenly balanced in circulation, although 
 the Democrats had the larger following in this north¬ 
 west section. The papers in the smaller towns reached 
 five hundred subscribers or less. There was a smaller 
 number of papers in proportion to total white popu¬ 
 lation in Georgia than was the case in the South as a 
 whole (there were not more than about thirty political 
 papers in the state in 1850), but this meant in some 
 cases a larger circulation per paper. The total circula¬ 
 tion of all the papers carrying political news in the 
 state in 1850 probably reached about twenty to twenty- 
 five thousand subscribers out of a total white popula¬ 
 tion of some five hundred thousand. These facts sug¬ 
 gest that scarcely half of the literate white men read 
 the newspapers, and that at least a slight majority of 
 these received the Whig version. 49 In the northwest, 
 the Democratic majority received its political educa¬ 
 tion as much through the barbecue and the court house 
 gathering as it did through the press. The fact that a 
 majority of the illiterate males were Democrats prob¬ 
 ably accounts for the smaller circulation of the Demo¬ 
 cratic journals. 
 
 48 The facts here stated are based upon J. C. G. Kennedy, Catalogue 
 of the newspapers and periodicals published in the United States, etc., 
 included as an appendix to J. Livingston, Law Register for 1850 (New 
 York, 1852). Kennedy is not entirely reliable, but can be checked to 
 some extent by current press data. See also Ingle, op. cit., p. 155. 
 George White listed thirty-one political papers in Georgia in 1851, 
 Augusta Chronicle, June 19, 1852. 
 
CONFLICT AND CONFUSION, 1824-1844 119 
 
 Personal journalism in Georgia, as elsewhere, in¬ 
 dulged in lurid rhetoric and flowing phrase. The rival 
 papers in each town kept up a running controversy 
 that in serious times assumed a very bitter tone. This 
 was true of even the best papers. The editors of the 
 Augusta Constitutionalist , for instance, publicly de¬ 
 manded in 1850 that those of the Chronicle be forced 
 to resign, while a number of Democratic papers in the 
 same year insisted that the Whig Macon Citizen be 
 suppressed and the owner run out of the state. The 
 Georgian was of the gentle opinion that the entire 
 Whig press was “absolutely corrupt” and “wholly and 
 purely a political thing.” 50 Not to be outdone by such 
 Democratic slanders, the Whig editor of the Recorder 
 denounced what he was pleased to term the “rampant 
 malignity and overleaping licentiousness” of his local 
 rival. 51 The very freedom of language indulged in by 
 opposing editors, however, was in a sense a measure of 
 the general liberty enjoyed by the press. A Georgia 
 editor of 1812 had lost his presses and had been tarred 
 and feathered for opposing the war of that year, 52 but 
 no Whig editor was in any danger of such treatment 
 for opposing the Mexican War. The editor of the 
 Macon Citizen was, however, threatened with mob 
 violence and his paper temporarily suspended in 1850 
 for assuming what was termed an antislavery at¬ 
 titude. 53 
 
 M Georgian, April 14, 1848. 
 
 61 Federal Union, April 27, 1847. 
 
 52 Ibid. 
 
 H Georgian. August 24; Chronicle, August 30; Boston Liberator, Sep¬ 
 tember 20, 1850. The Chronicle was also threatened, but the Federal 
 Union (April 27, 1847) assured it that there was now a greater freedom 
 of the press than there had been a generation earlier, and that it was 
 therefore in no danger. 
 
120 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 The Georgia press is, of course, important as an 
 indication of what public sentiment was in the state, 
 but it needs to be used with considerable caution in this 
 connection. The personal character of newspaper 
 management meant that editorials expressed primarily 
 the opinions of editors and party leaders rather than 
 those of the general public. It was true that 
 in normal times public opinion would follow that of 
 these same party leaders and would thus coincide with 
 the views expressed by the press. In times of crisis, 
 however, it was quite possible for politicians and edi¬ 
 tors to attempt to lead the masses in a direction they 
 were loath to follow. There was more mental inertia 
 among readers than among editors, and the latter were, 
 therefore, apt to be far out in front of thefcrQwd in a 
 period of mental transition. In such times, excited 
 editor-owners were quite capable of seeing public opin¬ 
 ion through their own eyes and of making the most 
 extravagant claims that the people were with them— 
 only to have subsequent events completely disprove 
 their statements. In the fall of 1850, for instance, a 
 few papers with a small circulation, like the Columbus 
 Sentinel, made the most bitter attacks upon the Union. 
 It does not at all follow from such evidence that these 
 attacks represented a sentiment prevalent in the state, 
 or even in Columbus. As a matter of fact, other 
 evidence shows that they represented no such thing. 
 
 The best checks upon the press as a measure of 
 public opinion would seem to be the circulation figures 
 of the particular papers being considered and the re¬ 
 sults of subsequent elections. Circulation figures 
 would also seem to be significant as a criterion of the 
 influence exerted by the press upon public sentiment. 
 It is at least fair to assume that the weekly Chronicle, 
 
CONFLICT AND CONFUSION, 1824-1844 121 
 
 with a circulation of over five thousand, exerted a 
 greater influence than any of the Democratic journals, 
 whose circulation never exceeded about three thousand 
 in this period. So, too, the Chronicle may have been 
 more influential than the daily Savannah Republican, 
 (whose circulation was less than one thousand), for the 
 Augusta paper had a daily edition which reached ap¬ 
 proximately five hundred subscribers in addition to its 
 large weekly one. 54 
 
 The chief influence exerted upon public political 
 thinking, other than that of the press, was that of the 
 discussions held at “county caucuses,” district conven¬ 
 tions, public barbecues, courthouse gatherings and 
 other political meetings. The influence of such meet¬ 
 ings must often have been more potent than that of the 
 press, since they were more dramatic and exciting and 
 must have appealed powerfully to a people who found 
 in partisan politics a natural diversion from monoton¬ 
 ous routine. “Small lawyers and still smaller poli¬ 
 ticians” thrived upon them, and there were few dis¬ 
 tricts in Georgia where, in times of excitement, there 
 were not several opportunities annually to attend such 
 gatherings. Their peculiar importance in illiterate dis¬ 
 tricts has already been noted, and indeed the great role 
 they played in Georgia politics generally can be attrib¬ 
 uted in part to the semi-frontier conditions obtaining in 
 parts of the state. 55 It has been observed, of course, 
 that the whole South “suffered from too much cam¬ 
 paigning,” which always involved such meetings, 56 
 
 “ Livington, op. cit. It is to be remembered in this connection that 
 the Whig papers with the largest circulation also reached the most 
 influential elements. 
 
 65 “Stump speaking,” it is claimed, had in the old days of “grocery 
 treats” been considered somewhat “common,” but was coming into vogue 
 by 1847 for even the most prominent politicians. See Andrews, Remin- 
 inscences, p. 22. 
 
 M Ingle, Southern Sidelights, pp. 39, 41, 42. 
 
122 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 and this is no doubt true. Yet it would have been a 
 cruel mentor who would have taken their politics from 
 these people. 
 
 The even balance of the parties in Georgia made 
 campaigning there an even more exciting diversion 
 than in some of the other southern states. Elections 
 were always closely contested and slight defections, 
 based, as was said, upon the appearance of superfluous 
 candidates or of some subtle constitutional issue, might 
 determine the final result. This fact, combined with 
 the temper of the voters, made the Georgia elections 
 unusually hot affairs. Arnold describes the way in 
 which the Irish lined up with their shillalahs at the 
 Savannah polls in order to encourage all “good” voters; 
 namely, Democrats—and Arnold was himself a Demo¬ 
 crat 1 Feeling became unusually tense during the 
 critical struggle of 1849-51. A Carolinian passing 
 through the state in the latter year observed that 
 “We in South Carolina talk about political excite¬ 
 ment but we do not know until we come here what 
 excitement is.” 57 
 
 Any discussion of public opinion in the state is 
 incomplete without some reference to the party leaders. 
 These leaders, it has already been observed, had ex¬ 
 cellent opportunities for moulding public opinion; first, 
 through their influence over a press which zealously 
 printed their speeches and other sayings, and, second, 
 through the political meetings which were the order of 
 the day. The population which concerned most poli¬ 
 ticians was relatively small, and leaders who traveled 
 widely through the counties could make a personal 
 appeal to most of their constituents. This was of con¬ 
 siderable potency with a people who had not entirely 
 
 "Incidents of a Journey from Abbeville to Ocola (1851), p. 11. 
 
CONFLICT AND CONFUSION, 1824-1844 123 
 
 outlived an age when politics had been almost purely 
 personal and who relished politics as a sport necessarily 
 involving intense loyalties if it was to be completely 
 enjoyed. In a word, conditions seemed rather ideal 
 for the political domination of the state by a few out¬ 
 standing personalities. It is doubtless a fair assump¬ 
 tion that under such circumstances leaders were bound 
 to arise; hence, in Georgia, Troup, Clark, and Craw¬ 
 ford appeared in the twenties, and Cobb, Toombs, and 
 Stephens flourished in the forties. 
 
 The influence of these leaders was so great that 
 there is, indeed, some danger of exagerating it, some 
 temptation to assume that they directed all things in 
 Georgia politics. Much the same caution needs to be 
 observed in estimating their influence upon public opin¬ 
 ion as is necessary in judging the influence of the press. 
 In times of crisis and transition, the individual leader 
 was apt to change opinions more rapidly than could the 
 relatively inert masses, not only because he was giving 
 more time and effort to the study of the new political 
 phenomena involved in the crises, but also because, if 
 he was an office-holder, he was apt to be subjected to 
 greater political stimulation and excitement than was 
 the man back on the farm. In such times, the poli¬ 
 tician, like the editor, might move so rapidly in his 
 advance to new viewpoints that he ceased to keep in 
 touch with, to guide, or to represent the masses. It 
 then became simply a question as to whether they would 
 eventually catch up with him, or whether he would have 
 to go back to them, if he was to maintain influence and 
 office. Examples of both types of action are to be ob¬ 
 served in the Georgia politics of the transition period 
 about to be considered. 
 
124 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 Party leaders, while influencing the viewpoints of 
 constituents, did not control the machinery of their 
 party organizations in Georgia to the extent that politi¬ 
 cal “bosses” have in many states during the post- 
 bellum period. Senators and representatives, to be 
 sure, directed the distribution of federal patronage in 
 the state, 58 and the governor naturally had some influ¬ 
 ence over the state patronage. The governors them¬ 
 selves, however, were usually men of ability and of 
 some political independence rather than the tools of 
 bosses behind the scenes. Crawford was a leader of 
 his party, and McDonald was not only a leader, but was 
 capable of carrying through measures condemned by 
 a majority of his political associates. The state legis¬ 
 lature was not dominated, as a rule, by the senators 
 sent to Washington; and these latter sometimes dis¬ 
 played, on the other hand, a remarkable independence 
 of the assembly at Milledgeville. Berrien’s successful 
 controversy with the latter, and his denial of “sena¬ 
 torial responsibility,” is an obvious illustration of such 
 independence. 59 Cobb’s influence in “Cherokee” and 
 the Upper-Piedmont and that of the “Two Insepara¬ 
 bles” in the Black Belt approximated most closely that 
 of the modern boss, but by no means fully equalled it. 
 
 The state, indeed, was still too young and its people 
 consequently too much attached to the individualism 
 of the frontier to permit of much machine control of 
 the political organizations. Party methods and organ¬ 
 ization were imperfect in the forties. As late as 1848, 
 for instance, there was still considerable opposition in 
 Georgia to the nomination of presidential candidates 
 
 68 There is considerable evidence of this in the Toombs, Stephens, and 
 Cobb Correspondence (as cited above, p. 72, n. 24), passim. 
 
 “ Remarks of R. D. Arnold on the Georgia Legislature’s Resolutions 
 Against Senator Berrien, passim. 
 
CONFLICT AND CONFUSION, 1824-1844 125 
 
 by national party conventions. Nominations for state 
 offices were, to be sure, made by local and state party 
 conventions; but, as will be noted, the control exercised 
 by these meetings over nominations was never a com¬ 
 plete one. 
 
 The nomination of candidates for the state House 
 of Representatives was made by county meetings open 
 to party members—by “county caucuses,” as these 
 gatherings came to be called. The same method was 
 used for the nomination and election of delegates to 
 senatorial district conventions, wherein nominations 
 for state senators were made, two counties usually 
 being combined to form such a district. State conven¬ 
 tions of each party were held annually, at which candi¬ 
 dates for governor were nominated and resolutions on 
 policy were adopted. Yet within the counties indi¬ 
 viduals continued to “come out” for office on their own 
 initiative, much to the distress of the party leaders, 
 as this often meant that two or more candidates of 
 the same party ran for the same office. Elections 
 sometimes hinged upon the extent to which each party 
 could dissuade such overzealous members from nomi¬ 
 nating themselves. When, for instance, the Demo¬ 
 crats won the control of the legislature in 1847, their 
 journal at the capital thankfully observed that “there 
 was an unusually small number of supernumerary 
 candidates this year.” 60 This tendency towards irreg¬ 
 ular candidacy was unusually common in Georgia; 
 “Father” Ritchie, of the Washington Union, observed 
 it with considerable astonishment. 61 
 
 '"‘Federal Union, June 15, 1847; see also issue for August 27, 1847. 
 For the details of nominating methods see the Columbus Enquirer, July 
 15, 1851. 
 
 61 Federal Union, September 28, 1847. 
 
CHAPTER IV 
 
 STORM CLOUDS, 1844-1848 
 
 The chief national issue in state politics during the 
 thirties had been that relating to the United States 
 Bank. During the forties this ceased to be an issue, 1 
 the renewal of tariff agitation pushing that problem 
 into the forefront of political controversy. 2 Before 
 the excitement over the tariff and National Bank ques¬ 
 tions had died down in Georgia, a new problem had 
 arisen which was destined to eclipse both of these 
 in importance; namely, the renewal of the desire for 
 the extension of slave territory in the west. When 
 Texas first requested annexation during the late thir¬ 
 ties, there was no opposition from either party in 
 Georgia, nor was there, on the other hand, any organ¬ 
 ized demand for its admission to the Union. It was 
 assumed that it should be annexed in the course of the 
 general westward movement. Tyler’s revival of the 
 matter in 1844 found both Whigs and Democrats in 
 favor of annexation. The presidential campaign of 
 
 1 The Whigs continued a sort of academic defence of the Bank through 
 the forties. Problems relating to banks and other corporations within 
 the state also divided the parties during that decade, the Whigs claiming 
 to be the best friends of incorporated business. The Georgia Democrats, 
 however, had come under conservative leadership to such an extent as to 
 prevent their offering any serious opposition to banks or other corpora¬ 
 tions. Indeed Democratic papers sometimes encouraged the formation 
 of manufacturing companies, though they opposed granting them the 
 .special privileges desired by the Whigs. See, e.g., the Milledgeville 
 Federal Union, November 30, 1847, January 4, 1848. 
 
 2 The state election of 1841 was won by the Democrats upon the tariff 
 issue, and the victorious party attempted unsuccessfully to prevent the 
 Whig Senator, Berrien, from supporting Whig tariffs in Congress. See 
 J. A. Turner, “William C. Dawson,” The Plantation, I. No. 1, 82; Re¬ 
 marks of R. D. Arnold on the Georgia Legislature’s Resolutions Against 
 Senator Berrien (Savannah, 1843), p. 3. 
 
STORM CLOUDS, 1844-1848 
 
 127 
 
 that year brought out clearly the opposition in the 
 North to any further extension of slave territory and, 
 as a result, aroused new desire for the same in the 
 South. 3 This was at first expressed in Georgia by 
 both parties, the Democrats supporting Polk, who was 
 openly for annexation, and the Whigs, in their state 
 convention of July, 1844, adopting Alexander Steph¬ 
 ens’ resolutions favoring future annexation. 4 
 
 Meanwhile, the agitation for annexation was pro¬ 
 ducing more serious feeling across the river in South 
 Carolina than it was in Georgia. It is to be remem¬ 
 bered that the middle forties was the period of great¬ 
 est cumulative economic depression in the South and 
 that South Carolina had suffered more than had the 
 newer states of the lower South. This economic de¬ 
 pression quite naturally expressed itself, as has been 
 noted in a previous chapter, in a corresponding depres¬ 
 sion of mind. Under these circumstances, leaders were 
 apt to seek an explanation of their difficulties in the 
 machinations of northern political enemies rather 
 than in weaknesses inherent in the local economic sys¬ 
 tem. When, therefore, northern antislavery men 
 attempted in 1844 to prevent the annexation of Texas, 
 and, to add insult to injury, other northerners at¬ 
 tempted to prevent any revision of the Whig tariff of 
 1842, it was natural that certain Carolina leaders 
 should see in these efforts an explanation of their own 
 difficulties. Early in 1844, for this reason, they inau¬ 
 gurated a militant campaign for Texan annexation and 
 tariff reform, and by June of that year they began for 
 
 3 For evidence against the view that the annexation of Texas was 
 originally demanded by the “Slavocracy” see C. S. Boucher, “In Re 
 That Aggressive Slavocracy,” Mississippi Valley Historical Review, 
 VIII. 23-25. 
 
 4 M. L. Avary, (Ed.), Recollections of A. H. Stephens, p. 17. 
 
128 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 the first time openly to advocate secession as the only 
 remedy in case these demands were not granted. South 
 Carolina, they held, should not preserve a union which 
 offered her nought but exploitation and insult. This 
 “Bluffton Movement,” as it came to be called, was led 
 by such capable spokesmen as R. B. Rhett and was 
 supported by such powerful papers as the ever zealous 
 Mercury. It met with opposition, however, from the 
 equally zealous Courier 5 and from the powerful Cal¬ 
 houn, and eventually it failed to receive the support of 
 a majority, even in the Palmetto State. 6 Its leaders, 
 it may be said in passing, then bided their time until 
 the opposition to the extension of slavery in the newly 
 acquired Southwest precipitated a sectional struggle 
 which lent their secessionist appeal a new potency 
 throughout the South. Calhoun then joined them and 
 led this more serious effort, which developed into the 
 secession movement of 1850. 
 
 The Bluffton Movement, so far as it aimed at im¬ 
 mediate secession, exerted little influence in Georgia, 
 where it was condemned by the Whigs and by many 
 of the Democrats. 7 Calhoun’s influence with the state- 
 rights element in the Georgia Democracy was such 
 that even this group did not generally support it. It 
 doubtless found individual sympathizers among this 
 latter group, and these individuals were to be heard 
 from when Calhoun took over and restimulated the 
 
 5 See, e.g., the Charleston Courier, June 29. 1844. 
 
 6 For general descriptions of the movement see C. S. Boucher, “The 
 Annexation of Texas and the Bluffton Movement in South Carolina," 
 Mississippi Valley Historical Review, VI. 9, ff.; N. W. Stephenson, 
 Texas and the Mexican War, pp. 168-176. 
 
 7 Milledgeville Federal Union, July 30, 1844; Columbus Enquirer. July 
 31, 1844. The Savannah Republican immediately indicted South Carolina 
 as “the center of all the heresies that disturb the nation,” and declared 
 that she wished to be “the center and focus of the new Southern Re¬ 
 public”; Republican, June 18, 1844. 
 
STORM CLOUDS, 1844-1848 
 
 129 
 
 movement in 1847. The chief influence of the Bluff- 
 ton movement itself was probably to increase the 
 prejudice already felt in Georgia towards South Caro¬ 
 lina as a center of political radicalism and disturbance. 
 
 As the summer of 1844 progressed, however, it 
 became apparent that the general agitation in favor of 
 the annexation of Texas, of which the Bluffton move¬ 
 ment was the most extreme expression, would affect 
 the presidential campaign in Georgia. While the 
 Whigs had expressed formal approval of annexation 
 in their July state convention, in response to what 
 seemed the general public sentiment of the state, some 
 of their leaders soon realized that this stand would 
 involve them in difficulties with the strong antislavery 
 element in the northern wing of their party. They 
 therefore refrained, in the fall of 1844, from empha¬ 
 sizing the issue. For this same reason, Clay, the Whig 
 presidential candidate, maintained a somewhat am¬ 
 biguous position upon the annexation question. Con¬ 
 versely, the Democrats in Georgia, who felt that they 
 had less to fear from their northern antislavery 
 brethren, emphasized the battle-cry of “southern 
 rights” in Texas. Polk, their national candidate, had 
 openly espoused annexation. In the course of the 
 campaign, a few of the more extreme Democrats, echo¬ 
 ing the Bluffton agitation, demanded that Texas must 
 be had with or without the Union. This effort to 
 exploit sectional loyalty led the Whigs to raise the ap¬ 
 peal to national loyalty, each party standing ready 
 then, as later, to make whichever appeal seemed 
 expedient. The Democrats, the Whigs declared, were 
 secretly harboring disunion sentiments. 8 This accusa¬ 
 tion, however, did not save the day for the Whigs. 
 
 * Savannah Republican, July 16, 1844. 
 
130 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 Clay’s ambiguity on the annexation question and his 
 lack of personal appeal in the small farmer sections 
 lost him the state in November, and Polk carried 
 Georgia, as he did all the other states of the lower 
 South. 
 
 When Congress convened in the winter of 1844- 
 1845, the southern Whigs found themselves approach¬ 
 ing a choice between continuing to favor annexation, 
 as the apparent desire of the southern people, or 
 opposing it in order to avoid an issue bound to alienate 
 their northern allies. 9 When, therefore, the annex¬ 
 ation question was brought up by the victorious Demo¬ 
 crats, it found the Georgia Whig members torn by 
 conflicting emotions and divided in consequence. Ber¬ 
 rien, in the Senate, had believed for years that any 
 attempt on the part of the South to keep pace with the 
 North in territorial expansion was hopeless. He saw 
 in the Texas movement, therefore, a matter which 
 could avail the South nothing and which might arouse 
 a storm over slavery that would divide his party. He 
 boldly opposed annexation in any form, arguing at 
 length against it upon technical constitutional 
 grounds. 10 Colquitt, his colleague, expressed the typical 
 enthusiasm of the Democrats for annexation and 
 found it difficult to believe in the sincerity of Berrien’s 
 technical objections. 11 In the House, the Democrats, 
 Cobb and Haralson, declared the recent election showed 
 that all Georgians favored annexation. 12 Stephens 
 admitted they all favored the principle, but expressed 
 
 9 Toombs to Stephens, February 16, 1845, Toombs, Stephens, and Cobb 
 Correspondence, p. 64. See also J. W. Burney to Howell Cobb, January 
 31, 1845, ibid., p. 62; Junius Hillyer to Cobb, February 15, 1845, ibid., 
 p. 63. 
 
 10 Congressional Globe, 28 Congress, 2 Session, pp. 343, 344. 
 
 11 Ibid., pp. 347 ff. 
 
 a Ibid„ pp. 176-180. 
 
STORM CLOUDS, 1844-1848 
 
 131 
 
 the typical Whig dislike for Tyler in declaring that 
 most of them opposed the President’s particular plan 
 of annexation. He warned the House, moreover, that 
 a serious struggle over slavery was apt to be precipi¬ 
 tated. Yet he supported annexation by joint reso¬ 
 lution and was followed in this by Clinch and the other 
 Georgia Whigs. 13 Thus Berrien led the way toward 
 Whig opposition to anything threatening a renewal of 
 the slavery controversy, while Stephens and Clinch 
 expressed the general opinion of both parties in Geor¬ 
 gia that Texas should be added to the Union. 
 
 When the War with Mexico followed annexation, 
 the dilemma in which the southern Whigs found them¬ 
 selves became more acute. The war was almost cer¬ 
 tain to mean further expansion and this, in turn, a 
 serious sectional quarrel over the status of slavery in 
 all new territory acquired. Such a quarrel would prob¬ 
 ably divide the Whig party along sectional lines. On 
 the other hand, any opposition to the war would be con¬ 
 demned by the Democrats as unpatriotic—a charge 
 that any party would ordinarily wish to avoid. 
 
 News reached Washington in May, 1846, of Zach¬ 
 ary Taylor’s fight on the Rio Grande, and war was 
 declared with almost no opposition in Congress. A 
 momentary patriotic impulse seemed to sweep southern 
 Whigs as well as Democrats into the war movement. 
 The Georgia press well demonstrated this feeling dur¬ 
 ing the weeks which followed the declaration of war. 
 Within a month, however, there was a definite reaction 
 in the local Whig press, and editorials attacking the 
 war began to appear. 14 Even the fear of opposing a 
 successful war was not so great as the fear of what 
 
 13 Ibid., pp. 190-194. 
 
 “John B. Lamar to Howell Cobb, June 24, 1846, Toombs, Stephens, 
 and Cobb Correspondence, p. 82. 
 
132 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 would happen to the Whig party, and perhaps to the 
 Union, if further territory were acquired. Stephens 
 and Berrien led the opposition to the war. The Demo¬ 
 crats, of course, made the most of this opportunity to 
 call the Whigs disloyal, thus returning the compliment 
 paid them in the election of 1844. Whig attacks upon 
 the war and the administration were termed “virulent 
 and loathsome.” 15 
 
 Meantime an interesting incident occurred at 
 Washington which might have warned the Whigs that 
 their worst fears were to be realized. On August 6 
 David Wilmot, of Pennsylvania, introduced, as an 
 amendment to a war appropriation bill, his famous 
 Proviso forbidding the extension of slavery into any 
 lands secured from Mexico. 16 In so doing he is sup¬ 
 posed to have expressed the chagrin of some northern 
 Democrats over the refusal of southern Democrats to 
 support them in securing all of the Oregon country 
 from England, 17 but this Proviso was enthusiastically 
 backed by the northern antislavery Whigs. On the 
 other hand, all the southern Whigs, including the Geor¬ 
 gians, voted against the proviso in August, 1846. 
 From this time on there was never any serious division 
 of opinion within Georgia regarding the Wilmot Pro¬ 
 viso. It was a measure which practically all Georgians 
 must oppose. The explanation of this attitude is 
 simple enough. The Proviso represented an open 
 attack upon what seemed to southerners their com- 
 
 15 Ibid. 
 
 l " Congressional Globe, 29 Congress, 1 Session, p. 1217. 
 
 17 This phase of the matter was realized by the Georgia Democrats, 
 see J. H. Lumpkin to Howell Cobb, Nov. 13, 1846; Toombs. Stephens, 
 and Cobb Correspondence, p. 86. Cf. C. E. Persinger, “The ‘Bargain 
 of 1844,’ as The Origin of the Wilmot Proviso,” American Historical 
 Association, Annual Report, 1911, I. 189-195. This does not mean that 
 Wilmot was personally motivated by such chagrin. See C. B. Going, 
 David Wilmot: Free Soiler, pp. 117-141. 
 
STORM CLOUDS, 1844-1848 
 
 133 
 
 mon rights in the territories. It was, therefore, 
 not only an insult to southern pride, but an earnest of 
 further and final attacks upon slavery, which would 
 surely follow were this one successful. Whig slave¬ 
 holders were certain to oppose an ultimate threat to 
 their institutions as energetically as would the small- 
 farmer Democrats. 18 If there was a small class in the 
 hill country which viewed all this as “a lordly slave¬ 
 holder’s battle” in which it had no interest, this class 
 was not articulate nor able to influence greatly the gen¬ 
 eral opposition to the hated measure. This did not 
 mean, however, that the Whig slaveholders would 
 court the issue. Both their economic and political 
 interests demanded that it be evaded. 
 
 The introduction of the Proviso attracted little 
 immediate attention in either South Carolina 19 or 
 Georgia. The adjournment of the Senate prevented 
 final action upon the measure, and the congressmen 
 who returned home in the fall apparently did not bring 
 it to the notice of their constituents. Indeed, there 
 was in Georgia in the fall of 1846 a curious lull before 
 the coming storm. John H. Lumpkin’s letter analyz¬ 
 ing the political situation at the time did not mention 
 the Proviso. 20 The same was true of Howell Cobb’s 
 other political correspondents, who apparently had 
 never heard of the measure; and even the Democratic 
 press was silent. The Democratic tariff of that year, 
 the Mexican War, the local elections—these monopo- 
 
 18 Washington National Intelligencer, October 21, 1847. See Cole, 
 Whig Party, p. 123. The fact that Waddy Thompson, late minister 
 to Mexico, had already announced in October, ’47, the worthlessness of 
 the new territories for slave interests, did not alter these essential con¬ 
 siderations to any great extent. 
 
 19 Phillip Hamer, The Secession Movement in South Carolina, pp. 1, 2. 
 
 20 Toombs, Stephens, and Cobb Correspondence, pp. 86, 87. Lumpkin 
 was Cobb’s chief political lieutenant in Upper Georgia. 
 
134 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 lized attention. 21 Abolitionists were occasionally be¬ 
 rated, but some felt that there was little cause for alarm 
 even in this quarter. “Abolitionist Efforts at Boston 
 are Below Par,” ironically announced a Democratic 
 journal. 22 So far as the introduction of the Proviso 
 was known, it was evidently considered a temporary 
 flare-up of no serious consequence. 
 
 The situation changed as soon as Congress con¬ 
 vened early in the winter. Polk recommended a war 
 appropriation bill, and, on January 3, 1847, King, of 
 New York, introduced such a bill, including a prohi¬ 
 bition of slavery in all territorial acquisitions which 
 might be secured. 23 This met with almost immediate 
 public approval in the North, resolutions favoring it 
 passing in the Pennsylvania legislature, January 22, 
 and in that of Ohio, February 8, 1847. 24 During the 
 course of the winter, most of the other northern states 
 took similar action. 
 
 This display of northern feeling alarmed the south¬ 
 ern delegations in Congress and the press of the south¬ 
 ern states. Members of the two parties, however, 
 reacted differently. The Whig congressmen were 
 greatly alarmed, realizing at once that the dangers 
 which threatened their party and the Union were now 
 imminent. Two days after King introduced his meas¬ 
 ure Alexander H. Stephens declared in a letter: 
 
 A storm is brewing over the slavery question. The North 
 is going to stick the Wilmot Amendment to every appropriation 
 and then all the South will vote against such a measure. Finally 
 
 M For typical topics of the day see the Savannah Georgian, August 
 20, 1846. 
 
 “ Ibid., November 26, 1846. 
 
 K Congressional Globe, 29 Congress, 2 Session, p. 424. 
 
 ** H. V. Ames, State Documents, pp. 243, 244. 
 
STORM CLOUDS, 1844-1848 
 
 135 
 
 a tremendous struggle will take place and perhaps Polk, in 
 starting one war, will find a dozen on his hands. I fear the 
 worst. 25 
 
 Toombs, his colleague, openly warned the House a few 
 days later that it was raising an issue which might 
 destroy the Union. Thus early in the debate, he told 
 northern members that the South would “stay in the 
 Union on a ground of perfect equality, or not stay 
 at all!” 26 
 
 Having issued their warning, the next step for the 
 Georgia Whigs was to find some method of avoiding 
 the issue. Stephens, like Toombs, spoke of the dan¬ 
 ger of southern resistance to the Proviso and “invoked 
 gentlemen not to put this principle to the test.” 27 
 Stephen’s plan for escaping the danger was soon 
 revealed. On January 22, he introduced resolutions 
 declaring that the United States had no intention of 
 acquiring territory as a result of the war. 28 While 
 some of his fellow Whigs discouraged this move, lest 
 it seem unpatriotic, 29 most northern and southern 
 Whigs could agree upon the policy and gave it their 
 votes in the House. It served to unify for the time 
 the two wings of the party. 
 
 Berrien followed a similar course in the Senate. 
 On February 2, he introduced resolutions of the same 
 character as those of Stephens 30 and, speaking a few 
 days later, appealed to the Senate to “exclude from 
 the national councils this direful question.” 31 The 
 
 25 Quoted in Johnston and Browne, Alexander Stephens, p. 218. 
 
 26 Congressional Globe, 29 Congress, 2 session, p. 140. 
 
 21 Ibid., p. 401. 
 
 28 Ibid., p. 310. 
 
 20 Johnston and Browne, op. cit., pp. 210, 211. 
 
 30 Congressional Globe, 29 Congress, 2 session, p. 222. 
 
 31 Ibid., p. 330. 
 
136 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 Georgia Whigs were clearly leading their section of 
 the party in the policy of evasion. 32 
 
 The Georgia Democrats, meanwhile, were ready 
 to face the issue for the same reason that they had 
 courted it during the fall campaign of 1844. They 
 feared less a break with their northern wing than did 
 their opponents and saw an opportunity to uphold 
 “southern rights” at the expense of the Whig evas- 
 ionists. Cobb, in the House, contented himself with 
 a condemnation of the Proviso, a demand that southern 
 territory be acquired, and an offer to extend the Mis¬ 
 souri Compromise line to the Pacific in order to com¬ 
 promise on the territory secured. 33 Colquitt, as a 
 Calhoun Democrat, went further, in that he con¬ 
 demned both northern members and his Whig col¬ 
 leagues. The Whig resolutions were “but a little 
 display of party tactics” to hold their party together. 
 He “deeply regreted” the position of his colleagues 
 “in opposing the acquisition of territory for fear of 
 agitating the question of slavery.” He protested, “as 
 a Georgian,” that the people of the South had no such 
 fear of protecting their rights, which they would con¬ 
 tinue to do at all hazards. 34 
 
 32 The opposition of the Whigs in general, and of Berrien in particular, 
 to the Mexican War has been severely criticised by Justin Smith, The 
 War With Mexico, II. 268-293. Berrien is condemned as inconsistent, 
 and as one who was willing to sacrifice not only California, but even 
 national self-respect, in order to preserve Whig solidarity. He was 
 ready, declared Smith (II. 288) to place the American nation in the 
 light of one “combining the villain, the ruffian, the simpleton and the 
 comedian.” A more severe indictment of the Georgia senator could 
 hardly have been penned by a contemporary opponent. Yet Berrien may 
 have sincerely believed that it was patriotic, in the long run, to prevent 
 territorial expansion and the sectional struggle bound to follow this. He 
 may also have been sincere in the belief that the War was an unjust one, 
 in which case his condemnation of the American government would have 
 been at least a partially justifiable one. 
 
 33 Congressional Globe, 29 Congress, 2 session, p. 362. 
 
 3< Ibid., p. 439. 
 
STORM CLOUDS, 1844-1848 
 
 137 
 
 On February 19, John C. Calhoun introduced in 
 the Senate his famous “Southern Platform” resolu¬ 
 tions, declaring federal prohibition of slavery in a ter¬ 
 ritory or incoming state unconstitutional. 35 Calhoun, 
 after holding back the more radical politicians of his 
 own state in 1844 and 1845, had now become convinced 
 by the Proviso agitation that there was no longer any 
 question of its ultimate threat to slavery. He became 
 at once an aggressive leader, who desired to force a 
 final decision upon the Proviso and wished to see 
 the South united upon that issue. The “Southern 
 Platform” was intended as a statement of principles 
 upon which the whole South could unite. 36 
 
 The appropriation bill, with the Proviso attached, 
 passed the House, but was defeated some days after¬ 
 wards in the Senate, which sent the bill back to the 
 House. That body then receded from its position 
 and accepted the unamended bill, abandoning the Pro¬ 
 viso. Congress then adjourned, postponing the whole 
 issue and leaving it to the states. Would the southern 
 states rally to the “Platform” as the northern had to 
 the Proviso? 
 
 The response showed the extent to which feeling 
 had already been aroused by the congressional debates. 
 On March 8, 1847, the Virginia legislature passed a 
 series of resolutions supporting Calhoun’s position and 
 threatening resistance to the Proviso to the last ex¬ 
 tremity. 37 The Governor of Mississippi, in his reply 
 to the Virginia resolutions, declared that the South 
 would resist even to secession and civil war. In Ala¬ 
 bama, appeals were made to the voters to unite against 
 
 33 Cralle, (Ed.), Works of J. C. Calhoun, IV. 339-349. 
 
 38 H. V. Ames, “John C. Calhoun in the Secession Movement of 
 1850,” University of Pennsylvania Public Lectures, 1917-1918, pp. 106, 107. 
 
 37 Ames, State Documents, pp. 244-247. 
 
138 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 the hated measure. 38 Calhoun, on his return to South 
 Carolina, was the subject of ovations and public reso¬ 
 lutions upholding his “Platform.” 39 In December of 
 the following fall, the Alabama legislature formally 
 approved the Virginia resolutions, and in February, 
 1848, Texas did the same. 
 
 In Georgia the opening of Congress had found the 
 party journals quarreling over their respective atti¬ 
 tudes towards the Mexican War. The Whigs con¬ 
 demned the evils of Polk’s administration and opposed 
 openly, or by implication, its war policy. The Demo¬ 
 crats proclaimed the Whigs’ disloyalty and promised 
 them the fate of the Federalists of 1815. 40 The news 
 of the renewed Proviso debate was received with re¬ 
 gret, even by the Democratic press, on the ground that 
 internal dissensions were unfortunate in war time. 41 
 As the debate in Washington proceeded, the party 
 papers tended to reflect the attitude taken there by the 
 state’s representatives. Whig papers blamed the crisis 
 upon the Democratic war policy and supported the 
 efforts of Stephens and Berrien to prevent the acquisi¬ 
 tion of Mexican territory. 42 The Democratic journals 
 supported Colquitt and condemned the Whig tactics 
 against territorial expansion as shameful and “un¬ 
 worthy of Georgians.” 43 All the papers opposed the 
 Proviso, and early in the spring it was declared that 
 the votes cast in the national House upon that measure 
 
 38 Niles’ Register, LXXII. 178, 179. 
 
 38 Hamer, The Secession Movement in South Carolina, p. 4. 
 
 40 Milledgeville Southern Recorder, in the Milledgeville Federal 
 Union, January 26, 1847. 
 
 41 Federal Union, January 26, 1847. 
 
 42 Augusta Chronicle, February 19; Savannah Republican, March 2, 
 1847. 
 
 43 Federal Union, February 16; Savannah Georgian, February 19, 
 1847. 
 
STORM CLOUDS, 1844-1848 
 
 139 
 
 “should arouse every southern man to a sense of the 
 danger.” 44 It was the opinion of even the Democratic 
 papers, however, that the issue was one which could 
 be compromised, and the extension of the Missouri 
 Compromise line to the Pacific was suggested as the 
 proper means to this end. 
 
 There was no body in session in Georgia during 
 the spring which could take official notice of the Cal¬ 
 houn “Platform” or the Virginia Resolutions. Late in 
 June was the time for the two parties to hold their 
 customary annual state conventions. Before these 
 met, however, there were interesting developments 
 across the Savannah river. When Calhoun returned 
 to Charleston he made a public address, March 9, 1847, 
 in which he emphasized his conviction that the Proviso 
 issue must be met promptly by unified southern oppo¬ 
 sition. A final decision in the sectional struggle must 
 be obtained, and any postponement of this decision 
 would be most dangerous for the South. 45 During the 
 months that followed, there matured in his mind the 
 plan for a southern convention as the best means for 
 securing the sectional unity he deemed essential. 46 The 
 next step was to urge this plan upon his friends in 
 Georgia and the Gulf States in the hope that they 
 could organize therein a public sentiment favorable to 
 it. His letters to be noted below indicated a belief that 
 the time was already ripe for a “Southern Movement” 
 in Georgia, an illusion that displayed considerable ig¬ 
 norance of the real conditions in that state. Yet his 
 opinions were to exercise some influence, a fact already 
 
 44 Federal Union, March 2, 1847. 
 
 45 Hamer, op. cit., pp. 3, 4. 
 
 48 This plan for a “Southern Convention,” of course, had been sug¬ 
 gested at various times before, e.g., during the Bluffton movement; see 
 Savannah Republican, July 8, 1844. 
 
140 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 apparent when the Georgia party conventions met 
 early in the summer. 
 
 The Democratic convention assembled at Milledge- 
 ville 47 on June 28 to consider the nomination of a can¬ 
 didate for the governorship, to discuss the possible 
 nominees for the presidential election in 1848, and to 
 consider the Proviso. G. W. Towns, then member of 
 the House of Representatives, secured the nomination 
 for the governorship in opposition to H. V. Johnson. 
 There was some debate upon presidential nominees, 
 and resolutions urging the war hero, Zachary Taylor, 
 were introduced. The Whigs were known to be con¬ 
 sidering Taylor, and it was suggested that the Demo¬ 
 crats should forestall them. A group led by Cobb 
 opposed him vigorously, since he was hardly a Demo¬ 
 crat, and his views were unknown. It was finally 
 decided to leave the matter to the party’s national con¬ 
 vention in the ensuing year. 48 
 
 As soon as the Proviso and the sectional contro¬ 
 versy were brought into the debate, ominous differ¬ 
 ences of opinion appeared. Cobb and the more militant 
 Union Democrats displayed a desire to avoid taking 
 any stand that might embarrass relationships with the 
 northern Democrats. He introduced resolutions de¬ 
 claring “confidence in our brethren of the Northern 
 democracy.” As some of these “brethren” had voted 
 for the Proviso, this met with a spirited protest from 
 the state-rights Democrats. This element, whose his¬ 
 tory has been discussed in a previous chapter, had re¬ 
 turned to the Democratic party with Calhoun in 1840 
 and had always maintained a strong state-rights and 
 pro-southern attitude. Hence it was inclined at once to 
 
 41 Then capital of the state. 
 
 48 For Democratic opinions of Taylor’s availability, see the Federal 
 Union, April 27, 1847. 
 
STORM CLOUDS, 1844-1848 
 
 141 
 
 sympathize with Calhoun’s position in 1847. Cobb’s 
 resolutions were withdrawn for the sake of preserving 
 party harmony, but they forecast the division of the 
 party which was certain to come if the sectional con¬ 
 troversy continued. 
 
 Edward J. Black, a state-rights Democrat, then 
 spoke in favor of the Virginia Resolutions, advocated 
 Calhoun’s move for southern party unity, and praised 
 that leader as the one destined to save his section. 
 This brought immediate opposition from the majority, 
 already suspicious of Calhoun’s intentions. Gardner, 
 editor of the Augusta Constitutionalist , recalled old 
 antagonisms when he warned the Calhounites that “a 
 defense of Calhoun is not the high-road to success in 
 the Democracy of Georgia.” 49 
 
 The sentiment against the Proviso, however, was 
 strong, and all could agree on resolutions generally 
 similar to those of Virginia. No Proviso legislation,, 
 it was declared, “could be recognized as binding”—a 
 statement that suggested the old idea of nullification. 
 The party pledged itself to vote for no presidential 
 candidate in 1848 who did not “unequivocally declare 
 his opposition to the Principles and Provisions of the 
 Wilmot Proviso.” It was said that slavery had a right 
 to enter all the territories, but the party was ready to 
 accept the Missouri Compromise line as a compro¬ 
 mise of fact rather than of principle. 50 Other resolu- 
 
 19 Edward J. Black to J. C. Calhoun, Jacksonboro, Ga., n.d.; (evi¬ 
 dently written in the fall of ’47), Calhoun Papers. (A collection of 
 unpublished letters, supplementing the Calhoun Correspondence, which 
 has been edited for publication by the American Historical Association. 
 The present writer is indebted to Professor C. S. Boucher, one of the 
 editors, for the use of the letters herein cited.) 
 
 60 Boucher, “In Re That Aggressive Slavocracy,” op. cit., pp. 44, 45, 
 observes that the acceptance of the Missouri Compromise line some¬ 
 times embarrassed southerners as “a complete admission” of the power 
 of Congress over slavery in the territories. This admission was usually 
 specifically denied in Georgia, as in the resolutions noted above. 
 
142 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 tions adopted related to the support of Polk and the 
 War and to the usual attacks upon a United States 
 Bank and a protective tariff. 51 The convention ad¬ 
 journed without airing in public the first divergences 
 over the sectional problem. 
 
 Meanwhile, the Whig convention met at Milledge- 
 ville on July 1. The Calhounites intended to appeal to 
 Whigs as well as to Democrats to drop their old party 
 affiliations for the sake of sectional unity. It should 
 be remembered that Calhoun had some grounds for 
 expecting Whig support, in that the Whigs had been 
 allied with him in their opposition to Polk and the 
 War. Toombs had given him direct encouragement 
 in this expectation. As late as April 30, he had written 
 to Calhoun: “Our policy towards the whole Mexican 
 question it is now evident will be in your hands. . . . 
 The people of the South are now anxiously waiting to 
 see which direction you will give it.” 52 The Caro¬ 
 linian had also been encouraged by the fact that reso¬ 
 lutions supporting his “Platform” had been adopted 
 in one or two local Whig conventions in Georgia which 
 preceded the state convention. 53 In his reply to one 
 of these, he took the opportunity to make a public 
 appeal to the Whigs of the state, which received wide 
 attention in both the North and the South at the time. 
 
 “I am happy,” he declared, “that my resolutions 
 have met with the approval of your meeting. ... I 
 hail it as an omen that the Whigs of Georgia are pre¬ 
 pared to do their duty in reference to the vital ques¬ 
 tion involved. ... I hope it is the precursor to the 
 
 51 Niles’ Register, LXII. 293 (July 10, 1847); Savannah Georgian, 
 July 1, 1847; Holsey to Cobb, Dec. 31. 1847, Toombs, Stephens, and Cobb 
 Correspondence, p. 93. 
 
 52 Toombs to Calhoun, April 30, 1847, Calhoun Papers. 
 
 53 Samuel A. Wales to Calhoun, Eatonton, Georgia, June 17, 1847, 
 Calhoun Papers. 
 
STORM CLOUDS, 1844-1848 
 
 143 
 
 union of all parties with us to repel an unprovoked 
 assault upon us—one that involves our safety and that 
 of the Union. We have the constitution clearly with 
 us. . . . We must not be deceived. The time has 
 come when the question must be met. It can no longer 
 be avoided, nor, if it could, is it desirable. The longer 
 it is postponed the more dangerous will become the 
 feelings between the sections. With union among our¬ 
 selves there is nothing to fear, but without it every¬ 
 thing. The question is far above the party questions 
 of the day. He who is not with us is against us.” 54 
 
 Three days after this appeal was written, the Whig 
 party convention met at Milledgeville. It was at once 
 apparent that the Whigs who would support Calhoun 
 were in such a minority as to be submerged in the 
 great body of typically conservative members. Any of 
 the latter who had, with Toombs, been “waiting anxi¬ 
 ously to see what direction” Calhoun would give to 
 “the whole Mexican question,” evidently did not desire 
 to follow the direction he had chosen. This led too 
 obviously to a split with northern party allies and to 
 the precipitation of a crisis in sectional relations. The 
 conservatives were in such complete control of the 
 gathering that the only evidence given of sympathy 
 with Calhoun was the passage of a resolution thanking 
 him for his opposition to the Mexican War. 
 
 The Wilmot Proviso was condemned as “unjust 
 and unconstitutional,” but no threats of resistance 
 were made. The convention then proceeded to the 
 nomination of candidates for governor and for the 
 presidency. Duncan L. Clinch, a coastal planter, de- 
 
 54 Niles’ Register, LXII. 323, 389 (Aug. 21, 1847). It was reprinted 
 in both northern and southern journals with appropriate comments. 
 The Boston Atlas, e.g., threatened that a solid South would be met by 
 .a solid North. 
 
144 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 feated William C. Dawson for the first honor. Reso¬ 
 lutions followed favoring Zachary Taylor as the next 
 presidential nominee. There was less opposition to 
 this proposal than there had been in the Democratic 
 conventions, presumably because the Whigs stood in 
 greater need of filching some glory from a war which 
 they had opposed. Governor Crawford’s admin¬ 
 istration was highly praised, especially for its financial 
 record. So far as all other issues, local or national, 
 were concerned, the resolutions merely observed with 
 modest brevity that “Whig principles are too well 
 known to need repetition.” 55 
 
 The declarations of the party conventions made it 
 plain that the Proviso issue would be injected into the 
 state campaign. The Democrats took the initiative, 
 since their position still enabled them to emphasize the 
 sectional appeal. Towns largely devoted his letter 
 accepting the Democratic nomination to an attack upon 
 the Proviso, which he termed “a strange amalgama¬ 
 tion of religious fanaticism and political knavery.” The 
 South must resist it, with nothing to concede or to 
 compromise. 56 In his speeches which followed and in 
 the Democratic press, it was emphasized that the party 
 had in its platform not only condemned the Proviso, but 
 had promised final resistance thereto. It had pledged 
 itself to back no presidential nominee who was not 
 clearly opposed to the measure and had nominated for 
 governor one whose principles were also clearly known. 
 The Democrats were not backward in proclaiming' 
 themselves, therefore, the party of “southern rights.” 
 
 65 Savannah Republican, July 2, 1847; Georgian. July 2, 1847; Niles’ 
 Register, LXII. 389 (August 21, 1847). Crawford, one of the state’s 
 Whig leaders, had been governor since 1843, i.e., during the period of 
 financial recovery described in chapter I. 
 
 M Federal Union, July 27, 1847. 
 
STORM CLOUDS, 1844-1848 
 
 145 
 
 On the other hand, the failure of the Whigs to dupli¬ 
 cate the Democratic resolutions was fiercely attacked. 
 They could not be trusted to defend the rights of their 
 own section. 57 
 
 The fact that Clinch issued no statement of prin¬ 
 ciples weakened his position upon the chief issue. The 
 Whigs had condemned the Proviso, and there was no 
 doubt that in this they expressed the views of their 
 constitutents. Yet they were necessarily more anxious 
 to evade the issue than were their opponents. When 
 urged to support only a clearly anti-Proviso presi¬ 
 dential nominee, they replied by pointing to “Old 
 Zach,” their choice, as one of whom no questions need 
 be asked. Indeed, the Whigs preferred to avoid na¬ 
 tional issues altogether and to emphasize matters of 
 state interest, such as the creditable financial record 
 of the Crawford administration. The Milledgeville 
 Southern Recorder openly held that, as this was a state 
 election, matters of national concern should not be 
 dragged in to confuse the contest. 58 The Augusta 
 Chronicle, however, ever the boldest of the Whig 
 papers, continued to discuss national issues, denounc¬ 
 ing Polk and the War, and Towns as a supporter of 
 both. The Democrats were held responsible for the 
 whole difficult Proviso problem, which they had thrust 
 upon the country, despite Whig warnings, because of 
 their war policy. 59 
 
 Both parties apparently maintained internal har¬ 
 mony in the face of the common political enemy 
 through the summer and fall. It has been noted, how¬ 
 ever, that the sectional issue was already disturbing 
 
 67 Federal Union, July 27; Georgian, August 11; Columbus Times, 
 August 17, 1847. 
 
 “In the Federal Union, August 3, 1847. 
 
 59 Augusta Chronicle, August 8, 10, 1847. 
 
146 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 this apparent good feeling. Calhoun’s efforts to 
 organize a southern movement in the state continued. 
 The response among the Whigs was so slight as to 
 make it almost negligible. The small Calhoun element 
 in the party had been submerged, though not elimi¬ 
 nated, in the June convention. Appeals to the masses 
 of the Democrats were also unsuccessful. Efforts 
 were at first made to swing even the old Union element 
 into the new movement. Isaac Holmes, South Caro¬ 
 lina congressman, wrote to Howell Cobb urging the 
 necessity for southern unity and for the abandonment 
 of the old parties. 60 The net result of such appeals 
 to Union Democrats, as will be noted below, was sim¬ 
 ply to increase their latent antagonism and suspicion 
 of the South Carolina movement. The response of 
 the state-rights element, which had existed in the party 
 since 1840, was certain to be more friendly. To the 
 leaders of this group Calhoun supplied inspiration, 
 and received in return confidential reports upon the 
 prospects facing his movement within Georgia. 
 
 His most regular and in some ways most interest¬ 
 ing correspondent was Wilson Lumpkin, ex-governor 
 and one-time Union Democratic leader, who had been 
 converted to the state-rights position. Lumpkin 
 agreed entirely with Calhoun in his analysis of the 
 national situation and on the need for southern unity 
 against northern aggression. At times, he seemed to 
 be urging Calhoun on rather than merely receiving 
 his suggestions. But in his comments on the political 
 situation in Georgia he warned him constantly that the 
 time was not yet ripe for the formation of a southern 
 party. “With but very few exceptions,” he wrote in 
 
 w Holmes to Cobb, August 21, 1847, Toombs, Stephens, and Cobb 
 Correspondence, p. 88. 
 
STORM CLOUDS, 1844-1848 
 
 147 
 
 August, 1847, “the people of Georgia are wholly un¬ 
 prepared to yield up their old party attachments. . . . 
 The press tries to lull their sense of danger.” It 
 would require further developments and agitation “to 
 produce a conviction of the utter corruption of both 
 the great parties.” 01 On November 18, in response to 
 further urgings from the Carolinian, Lumpkin re¬ 
 plied : “I concur with you that concert of action is the 
 first object to be obtained, and I can see no way of 
 effecting this but by a convention of the states inter¬ 
 ested.” But this plan for a southern convention, which 
 his friends desired, could not now be proclaimed in 
 Georgia. It would only stir up antagonisms and oppo¬ 
 sition within the Democratic party. Calhoun was 
 warned that he overestimated the chances for its suc¬ 
 cess in the state. Perhaps, however, some develop¬ 
 ments in the legislature about to convene or in the 
 coming session of Congress would supply the stimulus 
 necessary to arouse the state to a sense of its danger. 62 
 
 Similar warnings reached Charleston from other 
 Democrats in Georgia. One of them, however, had 
 some practical suggestions to offer. Edward J. Black 
 came from Scriven County, which, lying just across 
 the Savannah, had a large element of South Carolin¬ 
 ians in its population. He declared to Calhoun in the 
 fall: 
 
 I am writing you on the proposition you make of retaliation. 
 But how is it to be effected? I confess the attitude of the 
 Democratic party within this state, as I found them in the con¬ 
 vention of June last, was anything but satisfactory to me. I 
 
 01 Wilson Lumpkin to Calhoun, August 27, 1847, Calhoun Papers; 
 see ibid, for similar letters dated March 11 and December 20, 1847. 
 Wilson Lumpkin was an uncle of John H. Lumpkin, Cobb’s lieutenant. 
 
 “Wilson Lumpkin to Calhoun, November 18, 1847, “The Corres¬ 
 pondence of John C. Calhoun” (J. F. Jameson, Ed.), American Histori¬ 
 cal Association, Annual Report, 1899, II. 1138. 
 
148 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 found the great mass of the party inclining strongly to their old 
 ways of temporizing with principles and postponing necessary 
 and ultimately inevitable issues. . . . We have succeeded 
 
 in electing Mr. Lawton, 63 native of South Carolina and a 
 Democrat, from this senatorial district. He professes to be 
 your friend. [Lawton was ready to introduce resolutions in 
 the state senate favoring “retaliation.” Such prospective reso¬ 
 lutions would stand a better chance there than ones demanding 
 immediate or preemptory action.] If you think so and can 
 find time to draft a set of resolutions for me, with a succinct 
 preamble setting forth the states that have assailed us, and the 
 nature, manner and time of the assault, I will keep the original 
 strictly to myself and send a copy by Lawton to our friends 
 at Milledgeville. ... If you can send me anything let me 
 have it shortly. ... I would draw them up myself, but 
 know I cannot do as you can. 64 
 
 It is possible that Calhoun did send something to 
 Black and Lawton, as the latter was one of the first to 
 introduce resolutions upon the slavery question when 
 the legislature convened late in November. Two years 
 later, when the legislature of 1849 met, he was again 
 one of the leaders in introducing a series which were 
 later passed by that body and became nationally known 
 as the “Georgia Resolutions.” 
 
 The letters from Black and Wilson Lumpkin 
 show clearly why the Calhoun Democrats in Georgia 
 failed to come out in the open during the fall of 1847. 
 Such appeals for southern unity as were made were 
 unofficial and were made upon individual responsibility. 
 The most interesting of these was contained in a re¬ 
 markable pamphlet entitled Letters from Georgia to 
 Massachusetts and to the Southern States. The 
 anonymous author, in reality A. B. Longstreet, osten¬ 
 sibly desired to show the Old Bay State the error of 
 
 63 W. J. Lawton, of Scriven. 
 
 M Edward J. Black to Calhoun, Jacksonboro, Georgia, n.d. (c. Nov. 
 1847), Calhoun Papers. 
 
STORM CLOUDS, 1844-1848 
 
 149 
 
 its ways, but was actually appealing to the southern 
 people. He began by giving a vivid resume of the 
 comparative history of the two states with regard to 
 slavery, as seen from the Georgia point of view. His 
 indictment of Massachusetts was scathing and im¬ 
 pressive. He then proceeded to explain why Georgia 
 could not emancipate and predicted with remarkable 
 accuracy the course of the civil war which would 
 ensue if the abolitionist attack upon slavery was con¬ 
 tinued. 65 Having thus appealed to Massachusetts at 
 length in his first letters, he confessed to his southern 
 audience in the later ones that he had achieved nothing 
 but “trouble for his pains.” Let this be a warning to 
 the South! The section was about to be overwhelmed 
 by northern aggression, yet remained apathetic in the 
 face of the attack. People agreed that the Proviso 
 was an evil thing, but turned from its consideration to 
 the more interesting question, “What’s the price of 
 cotton?” For the sake of party harmony and office, 
 southern Democrats would suffer all things from 
 northern Democrats, and southern Whigs from north¬ 
 ern Whigs. These dangerous and degrading party 
 alliances must be abandoned if the South was to be 
 saved—if the Union was to be saved ! 66 
 
 Such an appeal, while anonymous and unofficial, 
 gave a detailed exposition of the views of the Calhoun 
 Democrats. It plainly hinted at the possibility of 
 secession and therefore was apt to arouse the very 
 suspicions and opposition among the Union Demo¬ 
 crats that Calhoun’s correspondents had warned him 
 must be avoided. 
 
 05 Voice from the South: Comprising Letters from Georgia to Massa- 
 chusettes and to the Southern States, (Baltimore, 1847), pp. 9-53. 
 
 63 Ibid., Georgia to the Southern States, p. 3 . 
 
150 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 Calhoun’s course on the War, which had attracted 
 the sympathy of Georgia Whigs, had correspondingly 
 repelled Georgia Democrats. This was especially true 
 of the Union Democratic element in the northwestern 
 part of the state, for here Calhoun had been opposed 
 and suspected since nullification days. 67 The Demo¬ 
 cratic press also condemned his attitude. When, in 
 the spring of 1847, he took the lead in southern oppo¬ 
 sition to the Proviso, some of the papers which had 
 opposed him on the war began to support him on the 
 Proviso. 68 However, as the summer proceeded, and it 
 became apparent that he was planning radical resist¬ 
 ance to the Proviso and was actually courting the issue 
 in a counter-offensive against the North, the Demo¬ 
 cratic journals again opposed him. The Federal 
 Union deprecated the idea of a “Southern Move¬ 
 ment,” 69 although it admitted that relationships were 
 becoming strained with the northern Democrats. 70 
 The Savannah Georgian, whose traditional attitude 
 was anti-Carolina, naturally condemned Calhoun. 71 
 Gardner, of the Augusta Constitutionalist, proclaimed 
 in July that the support of Calhoun would not be popu¬ 
 lar in the Georgia Democracy. 72 Indeed, Samuel J. 
 Ray, of the Macon Telegraph, seemed to be the only 
 Democratic editor of consequence who was ready to 
 support him when the southern movement was first 
 announced in 1847. 73 
 
 The Union Democrats quite naturally felt, there¬ 
 fore, that they had the bulk of the party with them in 
 
 67 W. H. Hull to Cobb, May 22, 1846, Toombs, Stephens, and Cobb 
 Correspondence, p. 79. 
 
 68 Federal Union, February 23, 1847. 
 
 66 October 26, 1847. 
 
 70 August 17, 1847. 
 
 71 Georgian, February 5, May 3, November 21, 1847. 
 
 72 E. J. Black to Calhoun, n.d. ( c. November, 1847), Calhoun Papers. 
 
STORM CLOUDS, 1844-1848 
 
 151 
 
 their opposition to the southern movement. Holsey, 
 of the Athens Banner, Cobb’s organ, was scornful of 
 the Calhounites. He wrote to Cobb of their “absolute 
 monomania.” 74 He showed a shrewd understanding 
 of the popular psychology, morever, in explaining why 
 it would be wise for the leaders of the party to maintain 
 a strong Union position. No party, he declared, could 
 succeed in Georgia which threatened the Union. The 
 love of the Union was too thoroughly implanted in the 
 minds of the masses of both parties. Should we do 
 anything “to weaken the bonds of the Union our own 
 shaft would recoil upon us.” 75 This was accurate 
 prophecy of what was to follow. 
 
 When the election for members of the legislature 
 was held early in October, the Whigs secured a slight 
 majority in that body; but in November the Democrats 
 succeeded in electing Towns governor by a majority 
 of thirteen hundred. 76 This was their first victory in a 
 gubernatorial election since McDonald’s last election in 
 1841. The vote for Towns in 1847 was twenty-five hun¬ 
 dred greater than had been that for the Democratic 
 candidate, McAllister, two years before. The Democrats 
 themselves were inclined to credit this gain largely to 
 Whig efforts to evade the slavery extension issue— 
 especially to their anti-annexationist policy during the 
 last congressional session and to their evasion of the 
 Proviso and “Platform” problems during the cam¬ 
 paign. 77 The small Whig majority in the legislature 
 (four members in the House and one in the Senate) 
 
 74 Holsey to Cobb, December 31, 1847, Toombs, Stephens, and Cobb 
 Correspondence, p. 91. 
 
 75 Ibid. 
 
 ,<J The vote was as follows: Towns, 43,220, Clinch, 41,931. See the 
 Federal Union, November 9, 1847, for the returns. 
 
 77 Savannah Georgian, October 8, 1847. 
 
152 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 was ascribed to a superfluous number of Democratic 
 candidates in the counties and senatorial districts. 78 
 The majority was so slight, however, that the presence 
 of a few members of uncertain attitude practically bal¬ 
 anced the parties. 79 
 
 The legislature convened as usual late in November 
 and plunged immediately into the several phases of 
 the slavery problem then before the country. The 
 Senate opened with a four day discussion of the Mexi¬ 
 can War and the Proviso. The opposition to the 
 latter was impressively unanimous. It happened that 
 resolutions from Connecticut and New Hampshire 
 supporting the Proviso were among the first business 
 presented, and there was a general feeling that the 
 reply from Georgia should make clear to the North 
 just how the state felt on this critical matter. Several 
 resolutions for this purpose passed without opposition. 
 Those of Harden, a Democrat, declared that Georgia 
 “viewed with solemn apprehension the approach of a 
 crisis menacing the annihilation of the Union. If the 
 Union is broken we will place the moral responsibility 
 upon the North where it belongs.” 80 This statement 
 of the defensive position of the state was followed by 
 an appreciation of such northern congressmen as 
 seemed to be cooperating with those from the South 
 in an efifort to avert the crisis, public thanks being ex¬ 
 tended to those who had voted against the Proviso. 81 
 
 Lest the northern people, however, persist in the 
 attempt to exclude slavery from the territories, under 
 a false impression of the attitude of the southern peo¬ 
 ple, a solemn warning was issued upon this matter. 
 
 ™ Federal Union, November 9, 1847. 
 
 78 Macon Telegraph in the Georgian, October 12, 1847. 
 
 80 Savannah Georgian, December 4, 1847. 
 
 81 Ibid., December 14, 1847. 
 
STORM CLOUDS, 1844-1848 
 
 153 
 
 The important standing committee on the state of the 
 republic was instructed to bring in “such a report upon 
 the Proviso as is a just exhibit of the feelings of the 
 people of Georgia,” The committee prepared an inter¬ 
 esting preamble to their resolutions in response to this 
 instruction. “The people of Georgia,” it declared, 
 “have for a series of years been divided and disturbed 
 by other questions, [than slavery] so much perhaps 
 as to induce the false hope that upon this vital question 
 there may now prevail discord and discension. This 
 is not true. Georgia has but one mind—is as one 
 man—all political parties are ready to plant them¬ 
 selves upon the same platform and join heart and 
 hand in the assertion and maintenance of their consti¬ 
 tutional rights in the territories.” 82 
 
 This preamble was adopted by the unanimous vote 
 of both Whigs and Democrats. There is no doubting 
 its sincerity or the solemn character of its warning to 
 the North. The statement that southern men were 
 often divided in this period is true, but for Georgia 
 it meant not a division upon the Proviso itself, but 
 only a difference of opinion as to whether this issue 
 should be cultivated or avoided. 
 
 The divergence between the parties on the question 
 of evading the Proviso had already been made clear in 
 the party conventions early in the summer and now 
 promptly reappeared in the legislature. The develop¬ 
 ments in the Senate illustrate this divergence. The 
 Democrats introduced resolutions which supported the 
 Mexican War at the same time that they opposed the 
 Proviso. Other resolutions, however, offered the 
 Missouri line as a compromise of fact on the question 
 of territorial expansion. The Whigs defeated the 
 
 82 Savannah Republican, May 23, 1848. 
 
154 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 latter with the assistance of Union Democrats, as 
 their aim was to avoid the whole issue by denying any 
 accession of territory. 83 They were simply following 
 the tactics determined upon by Berrien and Stephens 
 and other southern Whig leaders in the last session of 
 Congress. They denounced the effort to combine oppo¬ 
 sition to the Proviso (an opposition which all shared) 
 with approval of the war (an approval which was not 
 shared by the Whigs at all). “The Whigs took high 
 ground against the war,” declared a Democratic mem¬ 
 ber, “and denounced it as infamous. They also went 
 against any further acquisition of territory.” 84 The 
 resolutions introduced by Calhoun’s friend, W. J. 
 Lawton, were not even permitted to be printed, on the 
 ground that they did not represent majority opinion. 85 
 
 Nevertheless, the resolutions finally adopted con¬ 
 cerning the war were so framed as not to antagonize 
 the Democrats too greatly. They did not condemn the 
 Mexican War in particular, but held that war was 
 repugnant per se and should always be avoided when 
 possible. The present war should be terminated speed¬ 
 ily and in a liberal spirit, without the dismemberment 
 of Mexico. Polk was censured for casting aspersions 
 upon those who opposed his war policy. These reso¬ 
 lutions passed the Senate by a vote of twenty-three to 
 twenty-one—a strictly party vote. 86 They offer a final 
 refutation of the charge that the Georgia slavocracy 
 desired practical extension of slave territory. 87 Simi- 
 
 83 L. G. Glenn to H. Cobb, December 1, 1847. Toombs, Stephens and 
 Cobb Correspondence, p. 89. 
 
 84 Ibid. 
 
 85 Savannah Georgian, December 8, 1847. 
 
 88 Federal Union, December 7, 1847. 
 
 83 This mistaken charge, made directly or by implication, persists 
 even in scholarly works. See, e.g., W. E. Dodd, Expansion and Conflict, 
 p. 174. 
 
STORM CLOUDS, 1844-1848 155 
 
 lar resolutions were accepted in the House in the same 
 manner. 
 
 After December, the legislature abandoned the ter¬ 
 ritorial topic to Congress and proceeded with the dis¬ 
 cussion of state affairs. The scene of the sectional 
 drama shifted, therefore, to the national capital. The 
 Georgia delegation, which returned to Washington in 
 December, 1847, was evenly divided between the par¬ 
 ties; there being four Democrats—Howell Cobb, John 
 H. Lumpkin, Iverson, and Haralson; and four Whigs 
 —Stephens, Toombs, Jones, and Thomas B. King. 88 
 Colquitt and Berrien remained in the Senate. Colquitt 
 resigned in January, however, and went to Florida, 
 whereupon Governor Towns appointed Herschal V. 
 Johnson in his place. Colquitt and Towns were both 
 state-rights Democrats, and it was natural that John¬ 
 son, also of that group, should be given the appoint¬ 
 ment. 
 
 When Congress convened in December, 1847, the 
 most pressing topic of national interest was the con¬ 
 tinuation of the Mexican War. The Whigs renewed 
 their opposition, and Stephens took the lead in sup¬ 
 porting resolutions introduced in the House declaring 
 the war to have been begun “unjustly and unconstitu¬ 
 tionally” by the President. 89 A slight Whig majority 
 made it possible to pass these resolutions, and to this 
 condemnation of the War the Georgia leader ascribed 
 the subsequent efforts of the administration to arrange 
 peace with Mexico. 90 Early in February, Trist nego¬ 
 tiated the treaty which was later ratified and which 
 provided for that very extension of territory which 
 
 88 Congressional Globe, 30 Congress, 1 sess., pp. 1, 2. Iverson re¬ 
 placed Towns, who had resigned to become governor. 
 
 ™ Ibid,, p. 343. 
 
 80 Avary, Recollections of A. H. Stephens, p. 21. 
 
156 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 the Georgia Whigs had so steadily opposed. The 
 question of the extension of slavery into these new 
 territories had now to be faced by Whigs and Demo¬ 
 crats alike. The situation was complicated by the nec¬ 
 essity for the organization of a territorial government 
 in the Oregon country. 
 
 It must be remembered that even the actual acquisi¬ 
 tion of the new territories in the Southwest did not 
 make the question of slavery extension an entirely 
 practical one. It had been realized by many southern 
 as well as northern men ever since the return of 
 Minister Waddy Thompson from Mexico that the new 
 country was practically unfit for slavery. 91 The Geor¬ 
 gia political leaders were inclined to admit this directly, 
 or by implication, though some southern politicians 
 would not do so. 92 Toombs and most of the Whigs 
 were inclined to oppose the Proviso on the grounds 
 mentioned above; that is, that it was not only an insult 
 to southern pride, but an earnest of what was to 
 follow. If it was a “mere abstraction,” why were 
 northern men so anxious to adopt it? 
 
 A portion of the Democrats in Georgia, as else¬ 
 where in the South, had desired the annexation of 
 much larger areas in Mexico, into which slavery might 
 be extended in actual practice. 93 Hopes for a similar 
 extension into Cuba were shortly to be aroused. It 
 was feared that the “abstract” application of the Pro¬ 
 viso to New Mexico and California would be a prece¬ 
 dent for its “practical” application to other portions of 
 Mexico or Cuba. Because of these fears, H. V. John¬ 
 son declared he would vote against the “application of 
 
 91 National Intelligencer, October 21, 1847; see Cole, The Whig 
 Party, p. 122. 
 
 82 See Phillips, Robert Toombs, p. 55. 
 
 83 See, e.g., the Columbus Times, February 15, 1848. 
 
STORM CLOUDS, 1844-1848 
 
 157 
 
 the Proviso to the moon.” 94 The more radical Demo¬ 
 crats were to be joined in this position by Berrien and 
 the more radical Whigs. 95 
 
 Early in January, Senator Douglas, of Illinois, in¬ 
 troduced a bill providing territorial government for 
 Oregon, to which Hale, of New Hampshire, moved an 
 amendment prohibiting the introduction of slavery 
 therein. This at once raised the abstract issue of the 
 Proviso and so precipitated a tense debate in the Sen¬ 
 ate. In the course of this debate, Calhoun, in line with 
 his policy of forcing the issue and conducting a coun¬ 
 ter-offensive against the antislavery forces, claimed 
 that the Constitution “followed the flag” into all the 
 territories and consequently guaranteed the protection 
 of slavery therein. Johnson, of Georgia, supported 
 him in this contention, as might have been expected, as 
 did most of the Georgia congressmen save Stephens. 
 Both Berrien and Johnson voted against Hale’s amend¬ 
 ment, 96 which was defeated. Davis, of Mississippi, 
 then moved an amendment guaranteeing slavery in 
 Oregon while under the territorial government. 
 
 Here the issue was complicated by the receipt of a 
 message from Polk urging the territorial organization 
 of the vast regions of California and New Mexico. In 
 an effort to solve the whole problem, the question of all 
 the territories was finally referred, July 18, to a special 
 committee of which Clayton, of Delaware, was made 
 chairman. On July 20 this committee reported the bill 
 generally known as the “Clayton Compromise.” 97 
 This bill provided territorial government for the three 
 
 94 Speech of August 10, Congressional Globe, loc. cit., p. 1061. 
 
 95 Berrien’s views are noted below in connection with his “Address” 
 of 1849. 
 
 96 Congressional Globe, loc. cit., p. 1061. 
 
 97 Ibid., p. 956. 
 
158 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 territories, prohibited slavery in Oregon, and left the 
 question of slavery in the other two to the Federal 
 courts. Should the courts agree with Calhoun’s thesis 
 that slavery was protected by the Constitution in all 
 the “land,” then it must be protected in conquered 
 California and New Mexico; but should it decide that 
 the Constitution did not necessarily apply to the terri¬ 
 tories, or that the question of slavery was one relating 
 to private rather than public law, then the old Mexican 
 law prohibiting the institution must be maintained de¬ 
 spite the conquest. 
 
 This plan to refer the whole matter to the courts 
 was viewed by most southern men as a real compro¬ 
 mise. The mass of the Georgia Democrats had clearly 
 displayed in 1847 a desire for compromise, and while 
 they had suggested the Missouri line or “popular sov¬ 
 ereignty” as a means to this end, they could be ex¬ 
 pected to support the Clayton plan or any other that 
 seemed feasible. It was natural, therefore, that their 
 representatives in Congress should have supported it. 
 The more extreme Calhoun Democrats in Georgia 
 were opposed to compromise, to be sure, but none of 
 this type were in Congress. Johnson in the Senate and 
 Iverson and Haralson in the House, despite their Cal¬ 
 houn leanings, supported the Clayton plan. 
 
 The Georgia Whigs had evaded the issue in 1847, 
 now they must meet it. As was to be expected, they 
 displayed an immediate desire to compromise, an atti¬ 
 tude similar to that of the Democrats. Berrien led the 
 way in the Senate by working zealously for Clayton’s 
 plan. Toombs and King followed him in the House. 
 Then it was that Stephens did the unexpected and 
 apparently risked his career by joining with northern 
 members to defeat the proposed solution. His expla- 
 
STORM CLOUDS, 1844-1848 
 
 159 
 
 nation was simple. Like his colleagues, he desired the 
 preservation of southern rights in the territories, but 
 he feared a Supreme Court decision would hold that 
 the Mexican law against slavery still obtained there. 
 He himself was convinced that this was the case, and 
 he intended to save the South this humiliation even 
 though it brought him universal condemnation. 98 
 
 Meanwhile, the House had prepared its own Ore¬ 
 gon Bill, which prohibited slavery in that territory. In 
 the Senate the bill was amended to provide for the 
 extension of the Missouri line to the Pacific. This 
 Berrien and Johnson supported, the plan appearing to 
 them as a compromise in substitution for that of Clay¬ 
 ton. Upon its return to the House, the Senate amend¬ 
 ment was rejected by the northern majority, but every 
 member of the Georgia delegation voted to uphold it. 99 
 Upon its return to the Senate, on August 12, Berrien 
 and Johnson opposed any retreat by that body from its 
 position, 100 but on the last day of the session the House 
 bill was accepted. Polk signed it under protest. The 
 “Proviso” was thus applied to Oregon. 
 
 The adjournment of Congress left the status of 
 California and New Mexico still a matter of uncer¬ 
 tainty. Upon this question the struggle in Congress 
 was certain to be bitter, and there were reasons why 
 this crisis should be evaded or at least postponed by 
 both parties. It happened that 1848 was a presidential 
 year. A. crisis would divide parties along sectional 
 lines and would risk the control of the next adminis¬ 
 tration. Hence the Proviso problem must be shelved 
 
 ® 8 Ibid., p. 1055; Johnston and Browne, Life of Alexander H. 
 Stephens, pp. 229, 230; Stephens to the editor of the Federal Union. 
 printed in that paper September 12, 1848; and in the Toombs, Stephens, 
 and Cobb Correspondence, pp. 117-124. 
 
 98 Congressional Globe, loc. cit., p. 1062. 
 
 190 Ibid., p. 1078, 
 
160 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 again, and the territories must wait at least another 
 half year for organization. 
 
 The problem of nominations for the presidency had 
 now been in the air for some time. Within the Whig 
 ranks there were two serious possibilities, Clay and 
 Taylor. From the viewpoint of many southern Whigs, 
 the former was disqualified by his nationalism and 
 uncertain attitude towards slavery, as well as by his 
 ominous record of defeat. 101 Crawford, Toombs, and 
 Stephens had early opposed his nomination on these 
 grounds. 102 Taylor, on the other hand, was not only 
 a popular hero, but a southern planter, who could be 
 trusted to protect the South against the Proviso. 
 Stephens used his influence at home to secure Taylor’s 
 nomination by the Georgia Whig convention in June. 
 1847, which committed the state party to Taylor. 103 
 He was also a leader in promoting Taylor’s cause at 
 Washington at the close of the year. 104 The Georgia 
 Whig press was uncertain in the summer of 1847 which 
 of the two candidates to support. The Milledgeville 
 Recorder came out late in May as the first journal 
 clearly to support Taylor, which it continued to do con¬ 
 sistently throughout the campaign. 105 Some of the party 
 organs attempted to compromise by urging Clay for 
 president and Taylor for vice-president. 106 Until the 
 Democratic state convention met at the end of June, 
 1847, the Whig press was afraid the Democrats might 
 “kidnap” Old Zach for their nomination, since they 
 claimed him as their “own child.” 107 After this con- 
 
 101 Savannah Republican. March 10, 1848. 
 
 102 Cole, op. cit., pp. 127, 128. 
 
 103 Johnston & Browne, op. cit., p. 224. 
 
 1<M Avary, Recollections of Alexander H. Stephens, p. 21. 
 
 Federal Union, June 1, 1847. 
 
 109 Ibid., May 18, 1847. 
 
 107 Savannah Republican, May 23; Federal Union, May 25, 1847. 
 
STORM CLOUDS, 1844-1848 
 
 161 
 
 vention had adjourned without naming Taylor, there 
 was little discussion of candidates among the Whigs 
 until the caucus met at Millegdeville in December and 
 recommended that a party convention meet in June, 
 1848, simply to choose a Taylor electoral ticket. 
 
 Opposition developed in January, 1848, to the 
 nominations of Taylor by the June convention and by 
 the late Whig caucus, on the ground that such nomina¬ 
 tions followed antiquated methods of party procedure. 
 The Savannah Republican began to favor the recog¬ 
 nition of the party national convention and to urge that 
 a Georgia delegation be chosen thereto. 108 The “con- 
 solidationist” principles of the Augusta Chronicle at 
 the same time inclined that paper to a similar view. 
 Only the Recorder, among the important journals, held 
 out for ignoring the convention. 109 
 
 The press of the period was sensitive to the opin¬ 
 ions of party leaders, and it was probably their pres¬ 
 sure that swung the Whig papers into line for Taylor 
 during the winter of 1848. The one notable Whig 
 leader who held out for Clay was Senator Berrien. 
 He was supported in Augusta by the Republic , a paper 
 founded, perhaps for that purpose, at the beginning 
 of the year. The editor was James M. Smythe, a 
 former associate editor of the Chronicle, of “inde¬ 
 pendent” inclinations. 110 Berrien and Smythe led the 
 small band of Whigs who refused to join the rush for 
 Taylor. Berrien himself had long been a friend of 
 Clay and had been associated with that leader in advo¬ 
 cating such Whig principles as the protective tariff, 
 the Bank, and nationalism. These principles were now 
 apparently to be ignored in the effort to run a man who 
 
 108 Savannah Republican, February 6, 1848. 
 
 109 Savannah Georgian, February 8, 1848. 
 
 110 Ibid., January 15, 1848. 
 
162 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 had little to recommend him save southern origin and 
 military renown. The opposition of the Clay Whigs in 
 the South may perhaps be viewed as the protest of 
 those few conservatives who “viewed with alarm” the 
 substitution of personalities for traditional Whig 
 issues in the coming campaign. It was Berrien’s con¬ 
 tention that open loyalty to the traditional party prin¬ 
 ciples would improve the prospects for a successful 
 campaign. 111 
 
 As the spring approached, the press campaign for 
 recognition of the national Whig convention suc¬ 
 ceeded, and this made it incumbent upon the dominant 
 Taylor group to defend their favorite, now no longer 
 guaranteed the state’s support simply because of the 
 earlier nominations. The state convention was to 
 meet early in June to send delegates to the national 
 convention in Philadelphia. There followed a cam¬ 
 paign for Taylor against the almost isolated opposi¬ 
 tion of the Augusta Republic. 
 
 However, the contest was hopeless for the Clay 
 minority in the state. The party convention met at 
 Milledgeville early in May and was dominated by the 
 Taylor majority. Smythe spoke in favor of Clay and 
 offered resolutions declaring the party’s attitude to¬ 
 wards the tariff, the currency, and the war. These 
 resolutions were not accepted, but the majority sought 
 to soothe the Clay men by adopting the pretty declara¬ 
 tion that Clay was deserving of “the undying confi¬ 
 dence of the Whigs of Georgia.” None of the major¬ 
 ity opposed this lip-service to an abandoned chieftain 
 —and none believed it. The delegates chosen to go to 
 Philadelphia were understood to be Taylor men, though 
 
 m Berrien to J. S. Pendleton, September 6, 1848, Berrien MSS.; 
 Berrien to A. F. Owen; quoted in Miller, Bench and Bar, I. 78. See 
 Carroll, Origins of the Whig Party, chapter v. 
 
STORM CLOUDS, 1844-1848 
 
 163 
 
 they were not formally bound to any candidate. They 
 could vote for anyone “whose views on the Proviso 
 and Southern Rights accord with our own.” 112 
 
 The Whig national convention nominated Taylor 
 without serious opposition and, as was expected, 
 adopted no real platform. Fifteen antislavery north¬ 
 ern delegates bolted because of what they claimed was 
 southern domination of the meeting. These men 
 merged with antislavery Democrats and the abolition¬ 
 ists of the “Liberty Party” to form the “Free Soil 
 Party” of the North, which nominated Van Buren for 
 the presidency. In Georgia, the nomination of “Old 
 Zach” was received with great acclaim by all Whigs 
 save the small Clay element. Some of the latter, like 
 Berrien, acquiesced in the result and urged all to do 
 likewise. 113 The Whig leaders claimed during the 
 campaign, however, that most of the Clay men refused 
 all support to the party candidate. 114 
 
 Meanwhile, the Democrats were threatened with a 
 somewhat similar schism. To be sure, the Democrats 
 had no two outstanding rivals to decide between. In 
 Georgia the party convention of 1847 pledged them to 
 no candidate, but required simply that the nominee be 
 an anti-Proviso man. The moderate Democrats were 
 ready to accept a northern leader of such principles, 
 though they preferred a southerner. 115 In the late 
 spring of 1848, however, it became apparent that the 
 feeling among the Calhoun Democrats against the 
 North was rising, which meant trouble within a party 
 committed to a compromise policy. 
 
 112 Federal Union , May 16, 1848. 
 
 113 Berrien to Pendleton, September 6, 1848; Berrien MSS. 
 
 114 Toombs to Crittenden, September 27, 1848; Toombs, Stephens, and 
 Cobb Correspendonce, p. 128. 
 
 116 W. C. Daniell to Cobb, June 20; T. R. R. Cobb to Howell Cobb, 
 May 31, 1848, Toombs, Stephens, and Cobb Correspondence, pp. 106, 109. 
 
164 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 This was entirely natural. Another session of 
 Congress, with its attendant debates on the slavery 
 issue, had enabled the southern movement to make 
 further progress in the minds of state-rights Demo¬ 
 crats. The last Congress had seen not only the con¬ 
 troversies over the Oregon Bill and the Clayton Com¬ 
 promise, but had also witnessed the introduction of 
 another Proviso measure 116 and of a bill to abolish slav¬ 
 ery in the District of Columbia. 117 Even conservative 
 Whigs, like Toombs, 118 and Stephens, 119 and Demo¬ 
 crats, like John B. Lamar, 120 began this year to fear 
 that compromise might fail in the face of so persistent 
 a northern attack, in which case they felt that the 
 Union could not be preserved. It was in the spring and 
 summer of 1848 that the possibility of a dissolution of 
 the Union was first openly discussed in Georgia. 
 
 If conservatives began to have their doubts, it is 
 not strange that the temper of the state-rights Demo¬ 
 crats was rising. The outward and visible sign of 
 this spirit early in 1848 was the diversion of the 
 Augusta Constitutionalist to the support of the here¬ 
 tofore isolated Macon Telegraph in upholding the 
 “southern movement.” These two papers began to 
 demand the nomination of a southern candidate at the 
 coming national Democratic convention. The stand of 
 the Tclegraph in particular coincided with that of Cal¬ 
 houn and so threatened trouble for the moderate ma¬ 
 jority of the party. It pointed out that there were new 
 and dangerous tendencies in the northern Democracy 
 and went on to say: 
 
 lw Congressional Globe, 30 Congress, 1 Session, p. 391. 
 
 117 Ibid., p. 872. 
 
 173 Stoval, Robert Toombs, p. 61. 
 
 119 For Stephens’ fears see Johnston & Browne, op. cit., p. 231. 
 
 120 Lamar to Cobb, July 12, 1848, Toombs, Stephens, and Cobb Corres¬ 
 pondence, p. 116. 
 
STORM CLOUDS, 1844-1848 
 
 165 
 
 We should demand in the Baltimore Convention, that all 
 men be repudiated unless they support the rights of the South. 
 The admission of Wilmot Proviso delegates should be the signal 
 for the delegates of the Southern states to withdraw. Time¬ 
 serving politicians may counsel the South to slurr over this 
 great issue, lest the harmony of the party be broken, but we tell 
 our delegates from Georgia that unless the Herkimer delegates 
 are kicked out of the convention, the people of the South will 
 not feel bound by its action. . . . We tell our delegates to 
 
 Beware! In maintaining our rightful power in the Confeder¬ 
 acy ... we will sacrifice if need be, our old Party ties, 
 old Party favorites, and the older and dearer favorite, the very 
 Union itself ! 121 
 
 The Democratic press generally refrained from 
 attacking such sentiments for fear of alienating the 
 more radical journals on the eve of the convention. 
 There were a few exceptions. Holsey’s Athens Ban¬ 
 ner , the most pro-Union Democratic paper, did become 
 involved in controversy with the Constitutionalist. 
 Again, when the Telegraph deplored the Savannah 
 Georgian’s persistent attacks upon Calhoun, the latter 
 journal retorted that the Telegraph had denounced 
 Cass and was guilty of “an overweening devotion to 
 Calhoun.” 122 
 
 The moderation of the majority of the Democratic 
 journals, in refraining from attack upon the Calhoun 
 papers, bore fruit in the state convention and the cam¬ 
 paign. 123 McAllister and Judge Cone, state-rights 
 men, led the delegation that was sent to the Baltimore 
 convention. There they shocked the moderates at 
 home by voting for Yancey’s southern-rights resolu¬ 
 tions, but later returned the liberalism of the moder¬ 
 ates by supporting Cass, of Michigan, after the second 
 
 m Macon Telegraph, in the Savannah Republican, May 25, 1848. 
 
 123 Savannah Georgian, June 30, 1848. 
 
 123 H. L. Jackson to Cobb, June 21, 1848; James Jackson to Cobb, 
 July 9, 1848, Toombs, Stephens, and Cobb Correspondence, pp. 110, 116. 
 
166 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 ballot. 124 Cass was nominated, and a stand on the 
 slavery question avoided. 
 
 Both of the radical papers upheld Cass in the cam¬ 
 paign that followed. 125 Despite rising feeling on the 
 sectional issue, the exigencies of the presidential cam¬ 
 paign thus temporarily averted an open split in the 
 Democratic party. Yancey’s effort, upon his return 
 to Alabama, to repudiate the Baltimore nominations 
 was condemned by all the party journals in Georgia. 126 
 
 This conservatism left individual southern-rights 
 Democrats, who thought the situation too critical to be 
 subordinated to party, uncertain and discouraged. A 
 few abandoned their old newspapers in disgust. 127 
 Some may have considered voting for Taylor, as a 
 southern candidate, but there was no open movement 
 in this direction, and no real Calhoun Democrat would 
 have been likely to do so. Some of them, like Wilson 
 Lumpkin, continued to write Calhoun for advice and 
 encouragement. The old Georgia leader was almost in 
 despair at the apathy of his people. “United,” he 
 declared, “the South could conquer a peace. But it is so 
 un-united. Tens of thousands . . . are all against us. 
 Look at our little pigmy Stephens from Georgia. . . . 
 Like Van Buren, they can only hope for the distinction 
 of infamy, but they prefer that to obscurity. . . . 
 What shall we do?” 128 Senator H. V. Johnson be- 
 seeched Calhoun to send them “strong letters,” for 
 “it is believed that will be of much service to us in 
 
 1M Washington Daily Union, May 27; Savannah Georgian, June 6, 
 1848. 
 
 H. L. Jackson to Cobb, June 21, 1848, op. cit., p. 116. 
 
 129 Federal Union, June 19; Columbus Times, June 19; Georgian, 
 June 3, 1848. 
 
 m Columbus Times, February 15, 1848. 
 
 128 W. Lumpkin to Calhoun, August 25, 1848, Calhoun Papers. For 
 a similar letter from a Whig see B. F. Porter to Calhoun, July 17, 
 1848, Ibid. 
 
STORM CLOUDS, 1844-1848 
 
 167 
 
 Georgia, that it will go far to unite our people upon the 
 principles upon which the rights of the South ought to 
 be maintained.” 129 
 
 Harmony being temporarily preserved among the 
 Democrats, and most of the Whigs holding together 
 for Taylor, the order of the day now became the attack 
 upon the opposing party. Despite all the din and fury 
 of the presidential campaign, the tactics followed by 
 each party were in reality simple and obvious. Each 
 strove to prove that the other was not to be trusted to 
 defend the South against northern antislavery aggres¬ 
 sion. The other group was leagued with abolitionists 
 and, for the sake of party and office, would betray the 
 home land. Each claimed its own northern allies were 
 friends to southern interests and that it alone could, 
 therefore, save the section. In this way, the ominous 
 Proviso problem dominated the campaign, though it 
 had not as yet seriously divided the parties. 
 
 The Whigs, of course, eulogized Taylor as the 
 great hero of the war. After some lip-service to the 
 principle of keeping the Proviso issue out of the cam¬ 
 paign, 130 the Whigs hastened to occupy the vantage 
 point of “southern rights.” Taylor, the southern 
 planter, was the only candidate the South could trust. 
 He was not a “northern man with southern principles,” 
 but “one of ourselves.” Little was said of Fillmore, 
 of New York, the vice-presidential nominee, other 
 than that “he is well known for his efficient public ser¬ 
 vices.” The Democrats, on the other hand, had nomi¬ 
 nated Cass, a northerner of uncertain attitude towards 
 slavery. They were leagued with him and with Wil- 
 mot and other northern abolitionists and, therefore, 
 
 129 H. V. Johnson to Calhoun, August 25, 1848, Calhoun Papers. 
 
 130 Savannah Republican, May 25, 1848. 
 
168 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 could not take true southern ground. 131 Whig readers 
 were aroused by such startling headlines as the follow¬ 
 ing: 
 
 THE SOUTH BETRAYED 
 or 
 
 THE IDENTITY BETWEEN THE FRIENDS 
 OF GEN. CASS, THE FREE SOILERS AND 
 ABOLITIONISTS. EXPOSED AND PROVED 
 BY DOCUMENTS OF UNQUESTIONABLE 
 
 AUTHORITY.^ 
 
 The Milledgeville Recorder even claimed that Cass had 
 voted for the Wilmot Proviso. This the Democratic 
 press flatly contradicted and challenged the enemy to 
 prove. 133 
 
 To all such accusations the Democrats replied in 
 kind. In 1847 they had refrained from attacking Tay¬ 
 lor; indeed, they had defended him, even after the 
 Whig state convention had nominated him. 134 The 
 more conservative party organs, like the Georgian, 
 withheld attack until the fall of 1848, when Toombs 
 wrote that they still “refrained from opposing Taylor 
 in any way.” 135 This statement, however, was not en¬ 
 tirely true. Individual Democrats questioned the Gen¬ 
 eral’s opinions on slavery in 1847, and others ques¬ 
 tioned his eligibility early in 1848. The Columbus 
 Times, for instance, opened the year with a poetic 
 rhapsody beginning: 
 
 131 Savannah Republican, May 15, 21, 23, June 12, 1848; Augusta 
 Chronicle, April 7, June 12, 1848. 
 
 132 Macon Journal, in the Republican, October 14, 1848. 
 
 w Federal Union, June 20, 1848. 
 
 134 When a Democrat questioned Taylor’s “soundness” in the summer 
 of 1847 the Democratic Constitutionalist defended him. See T. W. 
 Thomas to Cobb, July 7, 1848, Toombs, Stephens, and Cobb Correspon¬ 
 dence, p. 115. 
 
 135 Toombs to Crittenden, September 27, 1848, Toombs, Stephens, and 
 Cobb Correspondence, p. 128. 
 
STORM CLOUDS, 1844-1848 
 
 169 
 
 Ungrateful Taylor! by the voice of Polk 
 Thou wast from naught into existence spoke! 
 
 More of King’s English thou had’st slain by far 
 Than Indians in the Seminole War. 
 
 Turn now and study what to thee is new— 
 
 The Constitution and the statutes too. 
 
 It concluded with the thrilling peroration: 
 
 Thy lofty deeds the nation still shall praise, 
 
 And wish thee better, longer, happier days, 
 
 O’er thy past errors it will still lament 
 But never, never, make thee President! 136 
 
 Early in the summer, suspicion of Taylor’s “sound¬ 
 ness” on the slavery issue began to be expressed, 137 
 although the more conservative Democratic press hesi¬ 
 tated till fall to declare this definitely. By that time, 
 the open claim of northern Whig papers that Taylor 
 would accept the Proviso, if it passed in Congress, 
 gave the Democrats opportunity for direct attack. 
 Taylor’s silence was now interpreted as a mask for 
 antislavery opinions, and the South was warned that 
 in voting for him as a true southron it was about to 
 be “betrayed.” 138 
 
 Each party appealed to the malcontents in the 
 other and emphasized dissentions among the enemy. 
 The Whig papers agreed enthusiastically with the Cal¬ 
 houn Democrats’ indictment of northern Democrats. 139 
 On the other hand, it has already been noted that the 
 Democrats encouraged the Clay Whigs. In addition 
 to this, they made the most of the apparent split be¬ 
 tween Stephens and Berrien upon the Clayton Com¬ 
 promise. The debate on this compromise was carried 
 
 138 Columbus Times, January 2, 1848. 
 
 137 Federal Union, May 30, 1848. 
 
 138 Savannah Georgian, September 27, October 2, 1848. 
 
 139 Milledgeville Recorder in the Columbus Times, January 1, 1848; 
 Savannah Republican, May 25, 1848. 
 
170 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 on during the summer in Congress and was certain to 
 echo in the state campaign. The dissension between the 
 two Whig leaders at Washington tended to emphasize 
 the divergence of Berrien and his Clay Whigs from 
 the rest of the state party. Berrien was supported, as 
 usual, by the Augusta Republic and mildly by the 
 Savannah Republican, while the other Whig journals 
 followed the Chronicle in defending Stephens. 140 
 Some Whigs wrote Stephens anonymous letters oppos¬ 
 ing him, and Berrien, while upon a flying trip to At¬ 
 lanta, was assured that many Whigs in that section 
 were with him. The Elder Statesman was convinced 
 that only sympathy for Stephens’ illness prevented 
 further attacks upon him, though he suspected that 
 Stephens would mistake this sympathy for political 
 support. 141 The Democratic journals promptly agreed 
 with Berrien, and their attack upon Stephens was the 
 most bitter move of the campaign. 142 Senator Johnson 
 carried it into Stephens’ own district, where the latter 
 was a candidate for reelection to the national House, 
 and even appealed to Calhoun for direct support in 
 annihilating the Whig leader upon the issue of the 
 Clayton Compromise. 143 
 
 Congressional elections were to be held in Georgia 
 early in October, a month before the presidential elec¬ 
 tion. Georgia was divided at the time into eight dis¬ 
 tricts. 144 The results in most of these could be pre¬ 
 dicted with fair certainty, as they corresponded 
 roughly with the geographical sections whose re- 
 
 140 Augusta Republic, August 25, in the Savannah Georgian, August 
 31, 1848; Augusta Chronicle, July 31, August 25, 1848. 
 
 141 Berrien to Major Harris, October 2, 1848; Berrien MSS. 
 
 142 Federal Union, August 1 and 29; Savannah Georgian, August 2, 
 25, and 31, 1848. 
 
 143 H. V. Johnson to Calhoun, August 25, 1848, Calhoun Papers. 
 
 144 See Map No. 6, p. 171. 
 
MAP NO. 6 
 
STORM CLOUDS, 1844-1848 
 
 171 
 
 spective economic interests determined political align¬ 
 ments. The fifth and sixth districts in Upper Geor¬ 
 gia were practically certain to go Democratic for 
 Cobb and Hackett, the latter replacing John H. Lump¬ 
 kin, who had been appointed judge of the superior 
 court for the Cherokee circuit. The first district, 
 which included the coast and Pine Barrens areas— 
 sometimes referred to together as “Lower Georgia”— 
 would probably go for the Whig, Thomas B. King. 
 The plantation region there was always Whig, as 
 were the counties of Tattnall and Laurens in the pines 
 area. The only uncertain factor was the city of Savan¬ 
 nah in Chatham. The third district in Central 
 Georgia was expected to go Whig by a small majority. 
 The presence therein of the exceptional Democratic 
 counties of Twiggs and Pike and the city of Macon 
 in Bibb promised a closer vote than in the seventh and 
 eighth districts of Central Georgia. These two were 
 dominated respectively by Stephens and Toombs, who 
 were almost certain to carry them by large majorities. 
 The second district, in Southwest Georgia, was the 
 most uncertain in the state. Here the population had 
 been until the forties largely made up of small farmers, 
 but it was now receiving planters as they moved down 
 to the new lands. 
 
 The certainty that the slavery issue would be the 
 chief one before the next Congress gave added im¬ 
 portance to the congressional election; but it was also 
 certain that the national presidential vote would be 
 close, and this gave zest to the more dramatic presi¬ 
 dential struggle. The feeling among the rank and file 
 of both parties, however, failed, as often before, to 
 keep up with that of politicians and editors. There 
 
172 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 were reports that the people were apathetic. 145 We 
 are in the midst of a bitter fight among editors and 
 candidates,” wrote Toombs, “but there is . . . little 
 excitement among the people. . . .” 146 This tendency 
 of politicians to overstate feeling and viewpoints 
 should always be recalled in estimating public opinion 
 in the state. There was no questioning the zeal of the 
 “editors and candidates.” 
 
 The feeling in both parties was not improved by a 
 vicious personal attack upon Stephens, which almost 
 cost him his life. In the course of the controversy over 
 his vote against the Clayton Compromise, Stephens 
 had been bitterly condemned by both Senator Johnson 
 and Judge F. H. Cone, the latter a leading Democratic 
 delegate to the recent Baltimore convention. Steph¬ 
 ens, whose personal courage was as pronounced as was 
 his physical weakness, challenged Johnson to a duel, 
 and met with a dignified refusal. Johnson was cred¬ 
 ited with the remark that he had “a soul to save and a 
 family to support, and Stephens has neither.” Cone 
 engaged in a number of verbal tilts with Stephens 
 which led to misunderstandings of a serious character. 
 The two happened to meet upon a railway platform in 
 Atlanta on September 3, where, after a brief alterca¬ 
 tion, Stephens struck Cone with his cane, and the latter 
 attacked him with a knife with apparent intent to kill. 
 Only good luck, some by-standers, and the skill of 
 Doctor Eve, a physician of the Georgia Medical Col¬ 
 lege, saved Stephens’ life. The attack seemed peculi¬ 
 arly brutal for the reason that Cone weighed over 
 two hundred, and Stephens but ninety pounds. 
 
 145 W. H. Hull to Cobb, July 22, 1848, Toombs, Stephens, and Cobb 
 Correspondence. 
 
 146 Toombs to Crittenden, September 27, 1848, ibid., p. 127. 
 
STORM CLOUDS, 1844-1848 
 
 173 
 
 The Whig press immediately claimed that the at¬ 
 tack was deliberate and political in character. 147 
 Stephens was to be “put out of the way,” at least for the 
 rest of the campaign. 148 Democratic journals regretted 
 the tragedy, but implied that Stephens shared the re¬ 
 sponsibility for it. 149 They feared that the martyrdom 
 of the Whig leader would lose Democratic votes in both 
 Georgia and nearby states and claimed that the Whigs 
 were deliberately attempting to make political capital 
 of the incident. 150 Cone was indicted, pleaded guilty, 
 and was fined eight hundred dollars. 151 He was later 
 entirely reconciled with Stephens and in 1860 was 
 honorably known in the state as the “Nestor of the 
 Ocmulgee bar.” 152 
 
 As the October congressional elections approached, 
 the Whigs expressed confidence, and the Democrats 
 some anxiety. Both realized that the vote would be 
 close. The Whigs were more confident of the Taylor 
 vote for November than they were of the congres¬ 
 sional results, yet Toombs claimed that five and per¬ 
 haps six of the eight men to be chosen would be 
 Whigs. The actual results of the elections fell short 
 of Toomb’s claims, but they were nevertheless encour¬ 
 aging to his party. The total Democratic vote in the 
 state in the congressional election was about forty 
 thousand, in excess of the total Whig vote by only two 
 hundred and sixty. This was another excellent indi- 
 
 147 Macon Journal, September 5; Savannah Republican, September 5 
 and 6; Chronicle, September 5, 1848. 
 
 148 Johnston and Browne, Alexander H. Stephens, p. 233. 
 
 148 Federal Union, September 19, 1848; Georgian, September 26, 1848. 
 
 160 Federal Union, September 19, 26, 1848; G. S. Houston to Cobb, 
 September 23, 1848, Toombs, Stephens, and Cobb Correspondence, p. 126. 
 
 151 Constitutionalist, September 24; Savannah Georgian, September 26 
 1848. 
 
 The Plantation, I. 82. 
 
174 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 cation of the nice balance of power that existed be¬ 
 tween the parties in the state. The October election 
 was more significant in this connection than the presi¬ 
 dential election in November, in which the personal 
 popularity of Taylor prevented typical results. As a 
 result of the almost evenly divided vote, four districts 
 elected Whig and four Democratic candidates. Any 
 slight Democratic excess in the total vote failed to af¬ 
 fect this equal division, perhaps because the districts 
 had been arranged by the Whigs with a view to just 
 such contingencies. 153 
 
 An analysis of the vote by districts shows, first, that 
 the vote was generally lighter in both parties in Octo¬ 
 ber 1848, than it had been in the state election of the 
 preceding year. The outstanding phenomena were 
 small Democratic gains in Lower Georgia and losses in 
 the fifth and sixth districts of L T pper Georgia. In 
 Lower Georgia, there were slight Democratic losses in 
 the interior counties of the Pine Barrens—Appling, 
 Tattnal, and Bulloch—but gains in those on the outer 
 areas of that region and the coastal counties. In Up¬ 
 per Georgia, there was a decided falling off in the 
 Democratic vote as well as a decrease in that of the 
 Whigs. 154 
 
 These results cannot be explained by the fact that 
 the vote for governor was sometimes larger than that 
 for representatives. There was in Upper Georgia a 
 lack of interest in the congressional situation, which 
 surprised and humiliated the Democratic leaders. 155 
 
 153 For the Whig gerrymander of the Democratic belt across Central 
 Georgia, see Map No. 6, p. 171, showing the congressional districts in 
 1848. 
 
 151 This analysis is based on the county returns in the Savannah 
 Georgian and Republican for October 13, 1848. 
 
 165 Iverson to Cobb, October 17, 1848; G. S. Houston to Cobb, October 
 23, 1848, Toombs, Stephens, and Cobb Correspondence, pp. 129, 130. 
 
STORM CLOUDS, 1844-1848 
 
 175 
 
 Apparently the impending struggle in Congress over 
 the slavery question was not of such interest to the 
 poor farmers of the hills as to bring out their votes. 
 On the other hand, an increased interest was mani¬ 
 fested on the coast and in the outer counties of the 
 Barrens, where the Calhoun faction was relatively 
 strong. 
 
 Frantic efforts by the leaders to bring out the full 
 Democratic vote in Upper Georgia for the November 
 presidential election were fairly successful, but led to 
 curious results. Thousands deserted Cass and voted 
 for Taylor. 156 This was not necessarily due to any 
 feeling against Cass upon the sectional issue. They 
 loved not Cass less, but Taylor more. The up-country 
 people were sturdy, but ignorant and, therefore, just 
 the type to whom the personal appeal of a military 
 hero was strong. This was as true in 1848 as it had 
 been in 1840. The logical superiority of the Demo¬ 
 cratic arguments against Taylor probably did not 
 reach a people who could not read the papers. 
 
 There was some defection in other parts of the 
 state, presumably for similar reasons. In Lower Geor¬ 
 gia, for instance, there was defection in the relatively 
 illiterate, interior counties, though the Democratic 
 vote in Savannah and the coast counties held its own 
 as compared with the congressional election. 157 This 
 was probably due, first, to the more critical attitude of 
 a literate population; second, to the usual appeal to the 
 foreign vote. “Irishmen,” proclaimed the Georgian, 
 “remember that the Whigs abuse General Cass because 
 he does not love the British.” 158 
 
 156 J. F. Cooper to Cobb, November 11, 1848, Toombs, Stephens, and 
 Cobb Correspondence, p. 137. 
 
 167 Savannah Georgian, September 13, 1849. 
 
 158 Ibid., November 7, 1848. 
 
176 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 One feature of the Democratic defection should be 
 especially noted. All the leaders were loyal to the 
 party candidate. In a day when newspapers so gen¬ 
 erally followed political leaders, it w T as natural that all 
 the papers were also loyal. The people, however, pur¬ 
 sued in some cases a course quite independent of poli¬ 
 ticians and editors. “Is it not extraordinary,” wrote 
 a friend to Cobb, “that so large a ring of the Demo¬ 
 cratic party has deserted without a solitary leader? 
 The rank and file have rebelled by regiments. . . .” 159 
 But this had occurred in 1840 and would occur again 
 in 1850, and the tendency to vote independently in im¬ 
 portant elections may be termed a characteristic of the 
 Georgia Democracy in this period. For this reason, 
 as has been noted, the estimates of politicians and edi¬ 
 tors were not always reliable guides to the state of 
 public opinion. 
 
 Democratic defection was great enough to give 
 Taylor a majority of twenty-eight hundred votes in 
 the state, which was about double that given Governor 
 Towns in 1847 and exceeded that of Polk in 1844 by 
 about eight hundred. The loss of a few Clay Whig 
 votes probably prevented the Taylor majority from be¬ 
 ing slightly greater than it was. 
 
 Meanwhile, Taylor had been supported by the 
 Whigs of other southern states and by the northern 
 Whigs, who viewed him as one likely to oppose slavery 
 extension. He received altogether a popular majority 
 of one hundred and forty thousand votes. His victory 
 in the electoral college was made certain by Whig suc¬ 
 cess in New York, where Democratic losses to the Free 
 Soil Party seriously handicapped the former party. 
 
 159 J. F. Cooper to Howell Cobb, November 11, 1848; Toombs, 
 Stephens, and Cobb Correspondence, p. 137. 
 
STORM CLOUDS, 1844-1848 
 
 177 
 
 The congressional elections throughout the country 
 resulted in a Whig majority of ten in the House, which 
 now also contained thirteen Free Soil members. 160 
 
 160 Rhodes, History of the United States, I. 97. 
 
CHAPTER V 
 
 THE APPROACH OF THE STORM, 1849 
 
 The effect of the election of 1848 on the position 
 of the parties in the South, as related to the slavery- 
 question, was marked and immediate. The Georgia 
 Whigs, whose emphasis upon Taylor’s southern origin 
 had rather accentuated the sectional appeal, now had to 
 avoid this appeal, lest it embarrass their incoming 
 administration. That administration would need the 
 support of both the northern and southern wings of 
 the party, and there was need for cooperation with 
 northern allies. So far as southern interests were 
 concerned, Taylor himself was a guarantee of their 
 protection; hence there was no cause for alarm or 
 agitation. The logical consequence of victory, there¬ 
 fore, was conservatism, a policy which harmonized 
 perfectly with Whig economic interests and traditions. 
 
 The Democrats, on the other hand, were now to 
 be in opposition and would have no scruples about 
 embarrassing the new government. Cass having been 
 defeated, there was no longer the same necessity for 
 southern men to defend northern leaders. It was to the 
 interest of Georgia Democrats to show that the Taylor 
 regime could not be trusted to protect the rights of 
 the South. Nor was there any lack of sincere belief 
 that the northern Whigs were bent upon attacking the 
 South and that southern Whigs, in attempting to 
 maintain their alliance with them, must needs be trait¬ 
 ors to their section. The logical consequence of 
 Democratic defeat, therefore, was more militant sec- 
 
THE APPROACH OF THE STORM, 1849 179 
 
 tionalism, a policy less objectionable to Democratic 
 interests and traditions than to those of the Whigs. 
 
 In Georgia the results of the vote were scarcely 
 known before this realignment on national issues be¬ 
 came apparent. Forsyth exaggerated the new con¬ 
 servatism among the enemy, but did not mistake its 
 general trend, when he wrote (November 10) : “The 
 Whigs in our streets are even now preparing excuses 
 for General Taylor, in the event that he ‘holds his 
 hand’ when ‘the Proviso’ is presented to him. The 
 party will uphold him in it.” 1 Shortly after this was 
 written, Toombs appeared in Columbus and, in speak¬ 
 ing on the Proviso, urged calmness and moderation. 
 He emphasized the fact that the South had no real 
 practical interest in the southwestern country. Such 
 statements were easily misconstrued by Democrats to 
 mean that the Georgia Whigs would now accept the 
 Proviso. 2 
 
 Meanwhile, the Democrats began to view with 
 an alarm which was doubtless sincere, as well as 
 politically expedient, the coming struggle in the new 
 Congress over the territorial problem. This struggle 
 had now been twice postponed, and feeling in both 
 sections (at least among politicians) rose with each 
 postponement and the consequent opportunity for fur¬ 
 ther agitation. The Georgian explained the whole 
 situation to its readers. There was real danger of the 
 passage of the Proviso now and uncertainty as to Tay¬ 
 lor’s action in such a case. The position of the South 
 was, therefore, a most dangerous one: 
 
 “Arrayed against her is [.mY] not only the Northern Proviso 
 men but the unenlightened moral opinion of the world.” The 
 
 'John Forsyth (of the Columbus Times ) to Cobb, November 10, 
 1848; Toombs, Stephens, and Cobb Correspondence, p. 136. 
 
 1 Columbus Times in the New Orleans Bee, December 16, 1848. 
 
180 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 South might temporarily secure peace by accepting the Proviso, 
 without immediate injury to Georgia or the other slave-holding 
 states, but the difficulty of the race situation would make such 
 a policy suicidal. Slave numbers would increase rapidly 
 therein until the slave labor system would become so burden¬ 
 some as to demand emancipation. And what then ? Experience 
 proved that the two races could not live together in a state of 
 social equality. The result of emancipation would, therefore, 
 be the ruin of both races. Would Taylor avoid all these dan¬ 
 gers by defeating the Proviso? “Will he save the South from 
 facing the alternative of the rights of the Union and the rights 
 of the South? No common hand can direct through the 
 storms that impend. God save the Republic !” 3 
 
 The Democratic journals of Augusta, Macon, Mil- 
 ledgeville, and Columbus were even more agitated 
 than was the Georgian. The Constitutionalist and 
 Telegraph had only restrained temporarily their sym¬ 
 pathy for Calhoun’s southern movement during the 
 recent campaign and now returned to their advocacy 
 of his policy. More ominous was the drift of the 
 Times and the Federal Union in the same direction. 
 The latter, which had condemned “Yanceyism” in 
 the fall, now openly approved resolutions of the 
 South Carolina legislature, which declared the time 
 for discussion of the Proviso passed and called 
 for southern unity in resisting it “at every hazard.” 4 
 Whig editors, in reply, asserted their confidence in 
 Taylor and denied that any crisis was at hand. 
 
 As a matter of fact, affairs were approaching a 
 crisis in Congress, and there were indications that 
 popular feeling was rising in some sections. Anti¬ 
 slavery agitation was increasing in the North, and 
 proslavery feeling was apparently growing in the 
 South. The fall campaign had given a decided im¬ 
 petus to the southern movement in South Carolina. 
 
 * Savannah Georgian, November 13, 1848. 
 
 * Federal Union, December 19, 1848. 
 
THE APPROACH OF THE STORM, 1849 181 
 
 In November, Governor Johnson’s message to the leg¬ 
 islature of that state urged southern political unity and 
 the call of a southern convention as the best means to 
 this end. Calhoun “happened in” while the legislature 
 was considering this message and influenced the reso¬ 
 lutions which that body passed supporting the Gover¬ 
 nor’s views. 5 Thus fortified by the support of the 
 legislature, Calhoun proceeded to Washington with 
 the determination to organize in Congress that unity 
 among southern delegates he had long desired. The 
 impending struggle there was bound to react favor¬ 
 ably in southern states other than his own. The time 
 seemed to him ripe at last for the open formation of a 
 southern party and for the final decision which such 
 a party would demand. 
 
 He did not have long to wait for an occasion justi¬ 
 fying his first move. President Polk, a moderate 
 southern Democrat, urged in his December message 
 that Congress adopt some compromise on the terri¬ 
 torial issue. The antislavery majority in the House 
 ignored this recommendation and proceeded with a 
 militant effort to adopt the Proviso. On December 13, 
 1848, the House instructed its territorial committee to 
 bring in bills providing territorial organization of Cali¬ 
 fornia and New Mexico excluding slavery. 6 In ad¬ 
 dition, resolutions were introduced forbidding slavery 
 in the District of Columbia. 7 On December 21 the 
 resolution of Giddings, of Ohio, was passed instruct¬ 
 ing the committee on the District to report a bill pro¬ 
 hibiting the slave trade therein. 8 This move created 
 
 5 Hamer, The Secession Movement in South Carolina, pp. 28-29. 
 
 6 Congressional Globe, 30 Congress, 2 Session, p. 39. 
 
 ' Ibid., pp. 38, 55. 
 
 8 Ibid., p. 84; J. R. Giddings, History of the Rebellion (1864), 
 p. 276^ 
 
182 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 intense indignation among southern members and led 
 immediately to a call for the meeting of a southern 
 caucus. The call was generally ascribed to Calhoun, 
 though this was denied in Georgia, when the conser¬ 
 vative Democrats used his name to discredit the 
 meeting. 9 
 
 The caucus was attended by some eighty members of 
 both parties. Most of the Whigs went with the sole 
 intention of thwarting any unified or radical action 
 which Calhoun and his friends might suggest. This’ 
 was also the motive of the conservative Democrats, 
 among whom Cobb was the outstanding leader. The 
 latter’s association with the Union Democrats in 
 Georgia and the conservative northern leaders of the 
 party strongly disinclined him to a “Southern Move¬ 
 ment.” He and his colleague, Lumpkin, conferred with 
 the President before going to the caucus, and Polk 
 naturally encouraged them in their intention to oppose 
 Calhoun. 10 
 
 The caucus first met in the Senate chamber on 
 December 23. All the Georgia members were present 
 and took a prominent part in its proceedings. Indeed, 
 it soon appeared that the three Georgians, Toombs, 
 Stephens, and Cobb, were the leaders of the conserv¬ 
 atives of both parties in opposing Calhoun’s program. 
 The Carolinian introduced a strong “Southern Ad¬ 
 dress” which the Georgia triumvirate boldly but un¬ 
 successfully denounced, this paper being adopted in a 
 final session of the caucus on January 22. Only two 
 Whigs were in favor of Calhoun’s address, but the 
 Democrats voted almost solidly for it. Cobb and 
 
 ’ H. V. Johnson to Calhoun, June 28, 1849, Calhoun Papers. 
 
 “Quaife, M. M. (Ed.), The Diary of James K. Polk, IV. 280. 281. 
 
THE APPROACH OF THE STORM, 1849 183 
 
 Lumpkin were followed by but two other Democrats 
 in voting against it. 
 
 Toombs, Stephens and Cobb were severely criti¬ 
 cized for their opposition, Iverson of Georgia joining 
 Calhoun in the attack on the triumvirate. Berrien 
 attempted to pour oil upon troubled waters by submit¬ 
 ting a proposed appeal to the nation, which he hoped 
 would be acceptable to both the conservatives and the 
 extremists and which, of course, was acceptable to 
 neither. Cobb then issued in self-defence an “Ad¬ 
 dress” of his own, which explained the position of the 
 conservative Democrats. 11 
 
 There issued from the caucus, therefore, three 
 separate addresses, those of Calhoun, Cobb, and Ber¬ 
 rien, though only the first was formally adopted. Out¬ 
 side of Georgia, of course, it was Calhoun’s address 
 which was of primary importance. This contained an 
 able restatement of his general sectional philosophy. 
 After reviewing the history of the antislavery move¬ 
 ment, it decared that the inevitable consequence thereof 
 was abolition. The South must, therefore, defend her¬ 
 self at all hazards. The specific remedy, however, was 
 left to the southern people. Postponement of the in¬ 
 evitable decision would but strengthen the North and 
 weaken the South against a final reckoning. 12 The 
 argument was perfect and, in the light of later events, 
 undoubtedly prophetic. 
 
 11 For general accounts of the southern caucus see Cole, The Whig 
 Party in the South, pp. 140, 141; Phillips, Robert Toombs, p. 62; for the 
 activities of Georgia members see Savannah Georgian, January 1, Febru¬ 
 ary 1; Charleston Mercury, February 2, 1849; Baltimore Sun, December 
 27, 1848; Toombs to Crittenden, January 22, 1849, Toombs, Stephens, and 
 Cobb Correspondence, p. 141, etc. 
 
 12 Calhoun, Works, VI. 290-313. 
 
184 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 The address written by Cobb followed lines already 
 laid down by him during the previous fall. 13 It was a 
 Democratic protest against the formation of a south¬ 
 ern party. Calhoun, in his effort to attract southern 
 Whigs to his movement, had, it declared, attacked 
 northern Democrats equally with northern Whigs. 
 This was unfair to the former, who had in their ranks 
 many more friends of the South than had the other 
 party. For this very reason, the national Democracy 
 could be trusted to protect the South, while, by the 
 same token, national Whiggery could not. The south¬ 
 ern Whigs, moreover, could not be expected to join a 
 southern party which would oppose an administration 
 they had just helped to put into office. Hence the 
 southern party could not possibly accomplish its pur¬ 
 pose, and, even if it could, its formation would endan¬ 
 ger rather than preserve the country. The Democracy 
 alone could save both the South and the Union. 14 
 
 Berrien’s address was a carefully worded appeal 
 to the American people to compromise the slavery 
 problem before it was too late. There was no phase 
 of it which could not be settled if the two sections 
 would but be fair to one another. The District prob¬ 
 lem could be adjusted, and the precedent of 1820 
 showed that the same was true of the territorial ques¬ 
 tion. If the South was contending for an abstraction 
 in the Southwest, the “Provisoists” were also pursuing 
 a phantom. There was a real possibility of the future 
 expansion of slavery in the tropics, however, and this 
 
 13 Cobb to a Committee of Citizens in Charleston, S. C., November 
 (4?), 1848, Toombs, Stephens, and Cobb Correspondence, pp. 134, 135. 
 
 14 To Our Constituents, By Messrs. H. Cobb, L. Boyd, B. L. Clark 
 and John H. Lumpkin, (Washington, D. C., 1849). Also printed in 
 Niles’ Register, LXXV. 231, 232; Savannah Georgian, March 14, 1849; 
 reprinted in the Cobb Papers, Georgia Historical Quarterly, V. No. 2, 
 39-52. 
 
THE APPROACH OF THE STORM, 1849 185 
 
 territorial problem must therefore be definitely settled. 
 A real compromise which was fair to the South could 
 be accepted by all and might be reached under the 
 coming administration. It was not to be achieved by 
 any one party. 15 
 
 Such was the substance of the three addresses 
 which issued from the southern caucus. Meanwhile, 
 the regular sessions of Congress continued, and with 
 them the further agitation of the slavery issue. No 
 solution of the territorial problem had been found, 
 however, when Congress adjourned for the inaugura¬ 
 tion of Taylor early in March. Congress had failed 
 to find any formula acceptable to the entire nation, 
 just as the caucus had failed to find any acceptable to 
 the entire South. 
 
 Once again the scene of the sectional drama shifted 
 from Washington to the states. What would be the 
 effects of the last session’s agitation, and especially of 
 the southern caucus, upon public sentiment “back 
 home”? The response in South Carolina to the early 
 developments in Congress had been the passage by the 
 state legislature of resolutions declaring readiness to 
 cooperate with other southern states in resistance 
 to the Proviso at any cost. Excitement there was so 
 intense that one faction led by R. B. Rhett was ready 
 for immediate and independent action, though the 
 majority were “cooperationists” and awaited the ac¬ 
 tion of the sister states. 16 Virginia was the first which 
 apparently responded to this appeal, for on January 20 
 
 “ “Address to the People of the United States, by John McPherson 
 Berrien,” in the Savannah Republican, February 5, 1849. This address 
 has received little or no attention, in comparison with the other two, but 
 it has significance in connection with Berrien's subsequent position in 
 Georgia. 
 
 “Hamer, Secession Movement in South Carolina, p. 27. 
 
186 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 its legislature reaffirmed its own resolutions of 1847, 
 promising resistance to the Proviso, and added new 
 ones requesting the governor to convene the legisla¬ 
 ture in case either the Proviso or laws abolishing 
 slavery or the slave trade in the District were passed 
 by Congress. 17 
 
 Between February and April, 1849, resolutions 
 were passed in the legislatures of Missouri and Ala¬ 
 bama upholding Calhoun’s address; in Tennessee de¬ 
 clarations calling for united southern resistance were 
 adopted. The most significant action, however, was 
 taken in Mississippi. The congressional delegation of 
 that state, unlike that of Georgia, had been united in 
 support of the “Southern Address.” This suggested 
 that Mississippi was to rank next to South Carolina in 
 the demand for a unified South. Events in the spring 
 seemed to substantiate this suggestion, for a call was 
 issued by prominent citizens of Jackson for a non-par¬ 
 tisan convention to meet in that city on May 7, 1849, 
 to consider northern aggressions and the proper rem¬ 
 edy for the same. The convention met as scheduled 
 and, after passing resolutions of a general character 
 concerning slavery and the rights of the South, itself 
 issued a call for a state convention to meet early the 
 next October, to be composed of an equal number of 
 Whigs and Democrats. This body, representing all 
 the people of both parties, was to be authorized to 
 express the state’s attitude towards the slavery con¬ 
 troversy. The harmonious cooperation of the two 
 parties in issuing the call was the first indication out¬ 
 side of South Carolina of the progress of a real 
 southern movement. 18 
 
 17 Congressional Globe, 30 Congress, 2 session, p. 441. 
 
 “ Cleo Hearon, Mississippi and the Compromise of 1580, pp. 46-50. 
 
THE APPROACH OF THE STORM, 1849 187 
 
 While the southern states were passing- resolutions, 
 the northern states were even more active in this re¬ 
 spect. Their legislatures proceeded through the win¬ 
 ter and spring, almost without exception, to declare 
 the right of Congress to exclude slavery from the ter¬ 
 ritories and the desirability of so doing. 
 
 Meanwhile, what of Georgia? The addresses is¬ 
 sued from the southern caucus reached the state at the 
 end of January. As two of them were the work of 
 Georgians, and the third that of the great leader across 
 the river, they were bound to arouse unusual interest. 
 Discussion of them had barely begun when word came 
 of the resolutions of Virginia, and then, as the year 
 progressed, of those of other states. These events of 
 the winter of 1849 introduced two new elements into 
 the situation in the “Empire State.” The first was an 
 echo of the demand in Congress for a more stringent 
 fugitive slave law. This may be viewed as a phase of 
 the growing militancy characteristic of the general 
 position of the southern Democrats. The second was 
 the secret conversion of a few able and extreme south¬ 
 ern-rights Democrats to a belief in the advisability of 
 immediate secession. The most obvious effect of the 
 winter’s agitation, however, was simply to emphasize 
 tendencies already noticeable after the presidential 
 election in the fall of 1848. 
 
 The Democrats of Upper Georgia tended, as would 
 have been expected, to support Cobb’s opposition to 
 Calhoun and approved his “Minority Address.” 19 Hol- 
 sey, of the Banner, did become somewhat alarmed by 
 
 19 T. W. Thomas to Cobb, February 16, 1849, Toombs, Stephens, and 
 Cobb Correspondence, p. 152; W. H. Hull to Cobb, January 26, 1849, 
 ibid., p. 142; Augusta Chronicle, March 28, April 4, 1849. 
 
188 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 adverse criticisms he had heard, 20 but the reports he 
 sent Cobb did not seem to worry that leader. The lat¬ 
 ter continued at Washington to cooperate with the 
 conservative northern Democrats and to maintain his 
 stand against Calhoun. “God grant that we may be 
 able to floor the old reprobate,” he wrote his wife, “and 
 thereby preserve the honor of the South and secure 
 the permanency of the Union. If it would please our 
 Heavenly Father to take Calhoun and Benton home I 
 should look upon it as a national blessing.” 21 On his 
 return to the state early in the summer he wrote Buch¬ 
 anan, who had begun to fear the Georgian might lose 
 his district in the contest with the Calhounites, that his 
 stand was entirely approved by his constituents. 22 
 
 The effect of the winter’s excitement upon the 
 Democrats of Central Georgia was another matter. To 
 this section returned Senator H. V. Johnson and Rep¬ 
 resentatives Iverson and Haralson, signers of the 
 “Southern Address.” They were full of fight and 
 desirous of backing the appeal for a sectional move¬ 
 ment, though it is probable that they still hoped such a 
 movement would redound to the advantage of the 
 Democracy. Calhoun’s address and the new Virginia 
 resolutions received immediate support from the 
 Democratic editors of the Black Belt even before the 
 congressmen returned. It has already been noted that 
 the election of 1848 had persuaded many of the Demo¬ 
 cratic editors to support the southern movement, and 
 the winter’s developments so furthered this tendency 
 
 20 Holsey to Cobb. February 13, 24, 1849; Toombs, Stephens, and Cobb 
 Correspondence, pp. 149, 154. 
 
 21 Cobb to his wife, February 8, 1849, “Cobb Papers,” Georgia His¬ 
 torical Quarterly, V. No. 2, p. 38. 
 
 22 Cobb to Buchanan, June 17, 1849, Toombs, Stephens, and Cobb Cor¬ 
 respondence, p. 164. 
 
THE APPROACH OF THE STORM, 1849 189 
 
 as to convert all of them outside of Upper Georgia to 
 the radical creed. Opinions became more decided and 
 aggressive, most of Calhoun’s ideas being incorporated 
 in the Georgia editorials. 23 The possibility of seces¬ 
 sion was more openly discussed than in the preceding 
 year, and a running controversy developed with certain 
 northern papers as to the probable consequences of this 
 “last resort.” 24 A politic silence was maintained, how¬ 
 ever, with regard to Cobb’s “Minority Address” in an 
 obvious effort to avoid further friction between the 
 Cobb and Calhoun factions in the state party. 25 
 
 A few extreme leaders in Central Georgia became 
 converted by the spring of 1849 to a belief in the in¬ 
 evitable necessity of secession—as it was put in those 
 days, they came to believe in “secession per se” Pro- 
 haps the most remarkable leader of this group was 
 Henry L. Benning, a lawyer of Columbus and then but 
 thirty-five years of age. 26 He wrote Cobb frankly of 
 his new convictions, which were remarkable in more 
 respects than one. Secession, he felt, was a necessary 
 but by no means a complete solution of the problem 
 facing the South. The new Southern Confederacy, he 
 declared, should be a “consolidated” republic, in order 
 “to put slavery under the control of those most inter¬ 
 ested in it.” 21 Such a secessionist was, indeed, like the 
 extreme Whigs, a “very Federalist” in his constitutional 
 
 23 See, e.g., Federal Union , April 3, 1849. 
 
 24 See, e.g., Philadelphia North American, January 3, 1849; cf. Colum¬ 
 bus (Ga.) Times, January 16, 1849. 
 
 25 Federal Union, January 30, 1849. 
 
 29 See, for his biography, the article by his daughter in Men of Mark 
 in Georgia, III. 259; A. R. Lawton, Judicial Controversies on Federal 
 Appellate Jurisdiction, Presidential Address, the 38th Annual Meeting of 
 the Georgia Bar Association, (Tybee, Ga., 1921), pp. 21, 22. 
 
 27 Benning to Cobb, July 1, 1849, Toombs, Stephens, and Cobb Corre¬ 
 spondence, p. 171. 
 
190 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 principles, and differed from them only with regard to 
 the expediency of having a national or sectional union. 
 Planter interests demanded a “consolidated” govern¬ 
 ment in either case. For such a secessionist as Ben- 
 ning, therefore, the state-rights plea was but a political 
 expedient—one useful in destroying the old Union, but 
 to be abondoned in creating the new. 28 
 
 Benning, however, could not speak for the mass of 
 the people of Central Georgia, although he did write 
 Cobb that he had personally met but one Democrat 
 about Columbus who supported Cobb’s position. 29 
 Other leaders of the Calhounites had resorted during 
 the winter and spring of 1849 to the usual expedient 
 of “getting up” popular meetings, both to stimulate 
 and to express public feeling. Some half dozen os¬ 
 tensibly non-partisan meetings were held, which the 
 Democrats claimed were large and enthusiastic, and 
 which the Whig press declared were attended only by 
 Democrats and by very few of them. Indeed the Whig 
 press was quite specific, publishing lists of meetings 
 and estimated attendance which do not seem to have 
 been definitely denied by the Democratic papers. 30 
 Whig editors in Central Georgia echoed the Demo¬ 
 crats of Upper Georgia in the statement that the 
 
 28 He has been described, indeed, as “an ardent States Rights man,” 
 and so he was, so far as relations with the actually existing Union were 
 concerned. As a member of the Georgia Supreme Court during the 
 fifties, his opinions voiced the most extreme views of that school. See 
 Lawton, op. cit., p. 21. Cf. F. L. Owsley, State Rights in the Con¬ 
 federacy, pp. 1-3. 
 
 29 Benning to Cobb, July 1, 1849, Toombs, Stephens, and Cobb Corre¬ 
 spondence, p. 171. Cf. H. D. Foster, “Webster’s Seventh of March 
 Speech and the Secession Movement, 1850,” American Historical Revieu\ 
 XXVII. 250. 
 
 30 For enthusiastic Democratic accounts of public meetings, see Federal 
 Union, January 23; Columbus Times, February 6; Charleston Mercury. 
 March 23, 1849. For Whig figures and criticisms see the Chronicle, 
 March 27, May 14; Republican May 28, 1849. 
 
THE APPROACH OF THE STORM, 1849 191 
 
 southern movement appealed only to editors and poli¬ 
 ticians, and that, despite all the fuss the latter were 
 creating, the masses were unmoved. 31 There was in¬ 
 deed little evidence in the few public meetings held 
 early in 1849 to indicate popular excitement. 
 
 In a word, the Democratic editors and politicians 
 were now engaged in the difficult task of arousing an 
 inert public opinion, prior to the actual commission of 
 any overt act by the North. Calhoun’s address may 
 have, as Holsey put it, “prepared men’s minds for 
 trouble,” but it can hardly be said to have aroused the 
 people of Central Georgia in 1849. What a persistent 
 press campaign might do by the end of the year re¬ 
 mained to be seen. 
 
 The reaction of the Whigs to congressional devel¬ 
 opments in the winter of 1849 is somewhat easier to 
 follow than is that of the Democrats, for the reason 
 that less division obtained among them, and that what 
 division did exist did not follow the sectional lines that 
 tended to divide the Democrats. The Whigs, like the 
 Democrats, had to face divergent action on the part 
 of their representatives in the southern caucus. There 
 was the embarrassing contrast between the efforts of 
 Toombs and Stephens to break up the caucus and the 
 desire of Berrien to have it publish some sort of an 
 “Address.” The Whigs avoided taking sides in this 
 divergence of opinion. The attitude of Toombs and 
 Stephens was generally praised, but in Savannah 
 there was also some moderate editorial approval of 
 Berrien’s address. Calhoun’s address was termed 
 “provocative,” while that of the Georgia Whig sen¬ 
 ator was “firm yet conciliatory.” 32 The Augusta 
 
 31 W. H. Hull to Cobb, January 26, 1849, Toombs, Stephens, and Cobb 
 •Correspondence, p. 142; Republican, May 28; Chronicle, May 14, 1849. 
 
 32 Savannah Republican, February 15, 1849. 
 
192 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 Republic was of the same opinion. The more con¬ 
 servative Whig journals, led by the Chronicle, were 
 generally silent on Berrien’s position. 
 
 The Whig attitude toward Cobb’s Address was 
 uncertain. Democratic minority factions should be 
 encouraged, of course, and Cobb’s views agreed with 
 those of the Whigs in opposition to the southern 
 movement. On the other hand, his address had 
 featured a denunciation of the northern Whigs and 
 the consequent condemnation of that party as “un¬ 
 sound.” This was not to be welcomed by the Whigs 
 so long as they still clung to Taylor and the national 
 organization. Hence there was some criticism of the 
 “Minority Address” on these grounds. 33 
 
 The Georgia Whig journals admitted that the 
 northern legislatures had passed many resolutions of 
 an insulting character, but these were but “words,” 
 and wise men would wait for deeds before stirring up 
 trouble. After all, observed the Chronicle, the Whigs 
 were the largest slave holders, and if they were not 
 alarmed for the safety of the institution in which they 
 had the greatest interest, why should others be so ? It 
 was, indeed, most kind of the Democrats to insist upon 
 “protecting” the Whigs’ economic interests, but would 
 it not be in better taste to await an invitation? 34 
 
 As was to be expected, the Whig leaders who op¬ 
 posed the southern movement featured its South 
 Carolina leadership and appealed to the traditional 
 Georgia feeling against the neighboring state. Their 
 newspapers had long been ironical and bitter at the 
 
 33 Augusta Chronicle, June 22, 1849. 
 
 34 Augusta Chronicle, April 25, 1849. This point did sometimes con¬ 
 fuse the Democrats, who had usually not clearly analyzed Whig motives 
 for conservatism. See, e.g., W. H. Hull to Cobb, January 26, 1849, 
 Toombs, Stephens, and Cobb Correspondence, p. 148. 
 
THE APPROACH OF THE STORM, 1849 193 
 
 mention of Calhoun’s name. First they ridiculed his 
 domination of the sister state. “Mr. Calhoun took 
 snuff yesterday, about 2 P. M.,” observed the Repub¬ 
 lican, “whereupon 129 members of the South Carolina 
 legislature sneezed .” 35 Then they condemned the 
 whole South Carolina movement under his leadership 
 and the effort to lead Georgia in its wake. Was it not 
 absurd that Georgia should allow Carolina to “inter¬ 
 fere” in her own affairs? These “mighty warriors of 
 Palmettodom” were but trouble-makers, and the “fuss 
 in Carolina” should be ignored. The Georgia Whigs 
 understood the real objectives of the Carolina move¬ 
 ment long before they were openly proclaimed by the 
 Calhounites. South Carolina, it was declared, did not 
 desire any compromise with the North, but, under 
 cover of the southern movement, was heading directly 
 for secession. The majority of Georgia Democrats 
 were not secessionists per se, said the Whigs, and did 
 not realize that this was the real purpose of their 
 friends across the river. They would discover this in 
 time, however, and refuse to be pulled along by radical 
 Palmettodom. “We wish it particularly understood,” 
 said the Republican, “that Georgia will not become an 
 appendage of this political comet—which is ever ready 
 to dash into the midst of our glorious constellation of 
 stars and destroy the harmony of their orbits. We are 
 not yet tired of the Union, and we mean to stand 
 by it.” 36 
 
 On the other hand, the small group of former 
 Clay Whigs displayed a tendency to accept the south¬ 
 ern-rights views held by a growing number of Demo¬ 
 crats. It seems curious that this small faction, which 
 
 36 Savannah Republican, November 8, 1848. 
 
 38 Ibid., November 19, 1848, January 1, 1849. 
 
194 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 had in 1848 stood for conservatism, and opposed the 
 sectional appeal emphasized by the southern Whigs in 
 Taylor’s campaign, should now have become the more 
 radical wing of the party. The change is well illus¬ 
 trated in the person of Berrien, who stood by Clay and 
 the old Whig principles in 1848, but who in the winter 
 following desired action in the southern caucus and 
 began to display some sympathy for the southern 
 movement. It must be remembered, however, that one 
 potent political force making for the conservatism of 
 the majority of the Whigs; namely, their loyalty to and 
 influence in the Taylor Administration, did not operate 
 at all upon the Clay minority. These were aggrieved 
 independents, who expected no favors from Taylor 
 and who did not trust him to protect the South against 
 the Proviso. Under such circumstances it was natural 
 that they were soon to break with the majority. In 
 this they represented the second secession of a body of 
 Georgia Whigs from the main party on the ground 
 that it could not be trusted to protect southern interests 
 —the first having been the famous secession of the 
 “State Rights Whigs” in 1840. The Clay faction 
 naturally rallied around Berrien’s address as the 
 formal expression of their principles. Unlike the Union 
 Democrats, however, the Berrien Whigs were very 
 few in number and were not concentrated in any one 
 particular section. Sectionalism in Georgia affected 
 the Democracy much more vitally than it did Whig- 
 gery. It is true that the strongest groups of the minor¬ 
 ity Whigs seemed to be in Savannah and Augusta, and 
 in those cities resided the popular leaders of the fac¬ 
 tion. These little local bodies, however, can scarcely be 
 said to have formed sectional groupings within the 
 state. 
 
THE APPROACH OF THE STORM, 1849 195 
 
 Each party attempted to drive a wedge between the 
 two factions in the other, just as they had during the 
 preceding year. In the spring of 1849 this effort was 
 largely concerned with demanding of the enemy press 
 which of its spokesmen in the southern caucus it up¬ 
 held. The Savannah Republican insisted that it had 
 attempted unsuccessfully for a month to discover 
 whether its local opponent preferred the address of 
 Calhoun or that of Cobb. The Georgian thereupon 
 made the retort courteous that it had tried unsuccess¬ 
 fully “ever since 1848” to learn the Re publican’s pref¬ 
 erence between Stephens and Berrien. 37 The Whigs 
 wished to know why Democrats condemned Stephens 
 in the caucus, but not Cobb; while the Democrats in¬ 
 quired why Whigs heaped such abuse on Calhoun, but 
 were so considerate of Berrien. 38 
 
 While these discussions were in progress, a new 
 and startling element was introduced into the national 
 situation by the discovery of gold in California and the 
 consequent rush of population thither. During the win¬ 
 ter and spring developments in that territory attracted 
 considerable attention in Georgia. Early indications 
 that the population of California would be of a char¬ 
 acter opposed to slavery were rather welcomed by the 
 Georgia Whigs, but regretted by the Democrats. The 
 former rejoiced at the prospect that California would 
 soon become a state with a constitution excluding slav¬ 
 ery, for the state-rights Democrats certainly could 
 not oppose the right of a state to decide this question 
 for itself. Thus statehood in California would accom¬ 
 plish just what the Whig leaders had long desired, i.e., 
 the evasion of the difficult constitutional issue concern- 
 
 37 Savannah Georgian, April 12, 1849. 
 
 38 Augusta Chronicle, April 11, 1849. 
 
196 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 ing the territories. 39 For such sentiments, however, 
 the Democrats rebuked them, on the ground that a free 
 constitution in California would be but the Proviso in 
 legal disguise. 40 
 
 Thus appeared the first sign that the advocates of 
 state-rights would abandon a strict adherence to their 
 cardinal doctrine in the case of California, denying 
 it the usual prerogative of a state to determine for or 
 against slavery. This was to be done on the ground 
 that the unusual character of its population of “forty- 
 niners” prevented it from being a truly American state. 
 A somewhat similar reason had already been urged 
 for abandoning the “popular sovereignty” compromise 
 plan for New Mexico, on the ground that here the 
 population was too largely Mexican to become truly 
 American. 41 
 
 Meanwhile, perhaps something could be done by 
 southern-rights men to prevent California from being 
 over-run by free-state adventurers. One way to avert 
 this fate was to encourage the settlement of southern 
 men with their slaves in the territory. Here, of course, 
 all the forces of nature were against the South, for 
 there was no demand for slaves in the new country. 
 Would Georgians sacrifice their economic and other 
 interests for the sake of political expediency in this 
 matter? At least one optimist, Robert R. Howard, 
 thought they would. Early in April he issued a call 
 for five hundred Georgians to accompany him to the 
 new Eldorado. The object of the expedition was, in 
 addition to finding gold, “to enjoy their rights in com- 
 
 39 Augusta Chronicle, January 14, 1849. 
 
 40 Columbia South Carolinian, January 16, 1849. 
 
 41 Holsey to Cobb, February 13, 1849, Toombs, Stephens, and Cobb 
 Correspondence, pp. 149, 150. 
 
THE APPROACH OF THE STORM, 1849 197 
 
 mon with other citizens in a territory.” 42 For this 
 purpose, presumably, each of the five hundred was to 
 come armed and to bring with him from one to four 
 male slaves. The company, which was to have a quasi¬ 
 military organization, would assemble at Milledgeville 
 on May 1, 1849. 
 
 The more extreme Democratic papers applauded 
 this call enthusiastically. The conservative ones ad¬ 
 vised against the movement, however, on the ground 
 that Georgia needed her men at home, though they 
 admired “the Southern spirit of the call.” 43 The mat¬ 
 ter attracted some attention in the North among the 
 antislavery papers, where it was spoken of as an 
 “armed immigration to California” which “looks 
 rather vapory.” 44 The Columbus Times replied that 
 it hoped it would actually take place and that thousands 
 of others from all over the South would go with them. 45 
 The expedition does not seem, however, finally to have 
 materialized. A few Georgians went to California as 
 individuals, with their slaves, and in some cases re¬ 
 turned with them years later. 46 
 
 The first test of party policy and the party factions 
 in 1849 came with the meeting of the Whig and Demo¬ 
 cratic state conventions early in July. Trouble was 
 threatening in the Democratic convention between the 
 Cobb and Calhoun factions, the latter being suspected 
 of a desire to have the party officially approve the 
 “Southern Address” and the southern movement. It 
 was essential to preserve party unity, however, if the 
 
 “Columbus Times, April 3, 1849. 
 
 43 Savannah Georgian, April 13, 1849. 
 
 44 New York Tribune, May 1, 1849. 
 
 45 May 8, 1849. This attitude suggests that which was later taken with 
 regard to Kansas. 
 
 46 C. A. Dunway, “Slavery in California After 1848,” American His¬ 
 torical Association, Annual Report, 1905, II. 245. 
 
198 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 state election for governor and the legislature was to 
 be won in the coming fall. Governor Towns there¬ 
 fore exerted himself to prevent too open an attack upon 
 Cobb. 47 When the state Democratic meeting was held 
 at Milledgeville, July 11, 1849, the Calhounites did 
 attempt to adopt the “Southern Address,” but Cobb 
 threatened them not only with a bolt of his Cherokee 
 delegates but also with the “uncompromising hostility” 
 of Polk’s administration. 48 The delegates thereupon 
 compromised for the sake of harmony, adopting the 
 relatively innocuous resolutions of Virginia in the 
 place of the “Southern Address,” and nominating 
 Towns for governor. 49 
 
 The convention had no sooner adjourned than a 
 chorus of derision arose in the Whig press. The Cal¬ 
 houn Democrats, it was pointed out, had condemned 
 as traitors to the South all who would not approve 
 Calhoun’s pronunicamento, yet now they had not so 
 much as mentioned that famous paper in their official 
 resolutions. Evidently, remarked the wily Whigs, the 
 Cobb faction controlled the Democracy, and as Cobb 
 represented the “submissionist” wing, the people of 
 Georgia might know what to expect from the Demo¬ 
 cratic party as the protector of southern rights- 50 
 In this way the Whigs attempted to ridicule the 
 Democratic claim to sectional preference; that is, they 
 
 47 G. W. Towns to J. H. Lumpkin, quoted in Lumpkin to Cobb, June 
 13, 1849, Toombs, Stephens, and Cobb Correspondence, p. 163. 
 
 48 Milledgeville Southern Recorder, in the Chronicle, August 2, 1849. 
 
 49 The only expression of “rising feeling” in the Democratic conven¬ 
 tion was the adoption of a resolution against “squatter sovereignty” in 
 the territories, a doctrine which the party had approved in 1847 and 1848. 
 This was probably motivated by a fear that the doctrine would play into 
 the hands of the Free Soldiers. See the Georgian, July 13, November 
 13, 1849; H. V. Johnson to Calhoun, July 20, 1849, Calhoun Corres¬ 
 pondence (as cited above, p. 147, n. 62), p. 1197. 
 
 50 Columbus Enquirer, in the Chronicle, August 11, 1849. 
 
THE APPROACH OF THE STORM, 1849 199 
 
 continued to play the game that both parties maintained 
 throughout the entire crisis of 1850—the game of 
 party advantage and expediency. The Democrats re¬ 
 plied as best they could, but many of the Calhounites 
 felt the force of Whig jibes and wished themselves 
 well rid of the incubus of Cobb conservatism. 51 
 
 The Whig state convention met at Milledgeville on 
 June 25. It was, the Whigs claimed, “the largest and 
 most harmonious ever held in Georgia.” The resolu¬ 
 tions adopted reasserted opposition to the Proviso as 
 violating all the compromises, asserted the necessity 
 for final opposition in case it should pass, but 
 expressed continued confidence in Taylor’s adminis¬ 
 tration. The platform was, generally speaking, a 
 recapitulation of the resolutions adopted by the Whig 
 majority in the last state senate, that of 1847-1848. 
 Judge Edward Y. Hill was nominated for the gover¬ 
 norship “with unaminity.” 52 
 
 The Whig platform was criticized by the Demo¬ 
 crats on much the same ground that they themselves 
 had been attacked. The Whig resolutions, said the 
 followers of Towns, were strong enough when passed 
 by the state senate in December of 1847, but were too 
 weak for 1849. They spoke of resistance, but called 
 for no definite action. The Whigs made much of 
 Democratic divisions, continued the Democrats, but it 
 was obvious that Whig leaders like Stephens and Ber¬ 
 rien had been forced to remain away from the party’s 
 state convention in an effort to hide their differences. 
 The Whigs would, no doubt, have liked to keep silence 
 on the slavery issue altogether, but “agitation on the 
 
 61 Columbus Muscogee Democrat, in the Chronicle, July 21, 1849. 
 
 “Savannah Republican, June 28, 30; Augusta Chronicle, June 28; 
 Columbus Enquirer, July 3, 1849. 
 
200 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 Proviso has reached such an extent” that “no conven¬ 
 tion dares adjourn at the present time maintaining 
 silence upon it.” 53 
 
 Throughout the campaign, each party strove—as 
 it had in 1848—first, to show itself “sound” and the 
 enemy “unsound” on southern-rights, and, second, to 
 prevent the development of faction in its own ranks 
 and to encourage it in those of the other. The Whig 
 attack on the Democratic convention had been directed 
 towards all these ends and had been relatively effec¬ 
 tive. It was more than neutralized, however, by 
 pointed Democratic attacks upon Taylor’s “sound¬ 
 ness,” 54 —now a matter of secret suspicion even among 
 the Whig leaders—by renewed denunciations of Fill¬ 
 more, and by a systematic effort to divide the Whig 
 factions. 
 
 This last move was well planned and effective. On 
 August 18 a “committee of citizens” addressed to the 
 gubernatorial candidates the following questions, to 
 which they requested the favor of public replies: (1) 
 “Is the Wilmot Proviso constitutional?” (2) “Did 
 you approve the Clayton Compromise?” (3) “What 
 should the South do if the Wilmot Proviso passes?” 
 Towns replied promptly to these queries. He an¬ 
 swered the first in the negative, the second in the 
 affirmative, and for the third repeated his statement 
 that there should be “resistance at every hazard.” 
 Hill failed to reply, which brought upon him a torrent 
 of Democratic denunciation. The Marietta Helicon 
 claimed in his defense that the questions never reached 
 him, but this the Democrats denied. 
 
 53 Savannah Georgian, June 30, July 13, 1849. 
 
 54 Columbus Times, May 8, June 5, 1849. 
 
 55 Federal Union, September 25, 1849. 
 
THE APPROACH OF THE STORM, 1849 201 
 
 The object of the questions was obviously to em¬ 
 phasize old Whig differences on the Clayton Compro¬ 
 mise and to accentuate new ones then developing with 
 reference to the constitutionality of the Proviso and 
 the best mode of resistance thereto. The bulk of the 
 Whig party probably agreed with the Savannah Re¬ 
 publican that the Proviso was unconstitutional, 56 inas¬ 
 much as they agreed with Calhoun and Berrien that 
 the constitution “followed the flag” into the territories 
 and prevented congressional interference with slavery 
 therein. The tendency of the Augusta Chronicle to 
 support Stephens’ denial of this thesis, in connection 
 with the Clayton Compromise, had already indicated 
 the presence of a conservative group of Whigs who 
 differed from the others in constitutional theory. Lee, 
 of the Chronicle, insisted that Calhoun had come to ac¬ 
 cept “an erroneous theory of the National Govern¬ 
 ment.” According to Lee, Calhoun claimed that sov¬ 
 ereignty was indivisible and resided in the state gov¬ 
 ernment. Lee, however, held to the good old Madison¬ 
 ian view, that sovereignty was divisible and that a large 
 share of it had been allotted to the Federal govern¬ 
 ment. 57 In the course of his remarks to this effect, he 
 came to the consideration not only of the constitution¬ 
 ality of the Proviso, but of “the right of secession” now 
 being uncritically assumed by some of the Democratic 
 editors. He was thus led to a denial of any legal right 
 of secession, a denial so strong as to be remarkable in 
 a journal having one of the largest circulations in 
 the lower South in this period. “A city might just as 
 
 68 The Augusta Republic “informed” the Georgia people in June 
 that the Whigs were opposed to the Proviso, and thereby insulted the 
 rest of the party, which resented the implication that there ever had 
 been any doubt about it; Savannah Republican, July 2, 1849. 
 
 57 Augusta Chronicle, July 20, 1849. 
 
202 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 well proclaim its independence of state authority, as a 
 state of the Union,” he declared. “The strength of 
 our national government has never been fully tested, 
 but anyone who supposes it will break easily knows 
 not of the character of the American people.” 58 
 
 This view implied, of course, that if there were any 
 “right” of secession it must be simply the moral “right 
 of revolution.” But here again the editor was too con¬ 
 servative to grant much. He was disinclined to recog¬ 
 nize even such a moral privilege and became involved 
 in a second controversy with the Constitutionalist 
 over the “right of revolution.” The latter, with other 
 Democratic journals, gloried in this right as a Jeffer¬ 
 sonian tradition and on that ground had welcomed the 
 revolutionary movements of 1848 in Europe. The 
 Chronicle looked askance upon this view and assured 
 its prosperous readers that “the right of revolution 
 must be qualified to avoid anarchy.” The Democratic 
 journals, led by the Washington Union, were “hot¬ 
 beds of Red Republicanism” and of “rank Dorism.” 
 Conservatives were reminded that “nearly 100,000 
 European democratic voters land every year, who are 
 used to revolution!” Those who listened to Democratic 
 demagogues should ask themselves whether they were 
 really yet ready “to abandon the system of Washing¬ 
 ton, Jefferson and Madison, for the more democratic 
 one of Rollin, Louis Blanc and Lamartine.” 59 
 
 Such views, said the Constitutionalist, displayed 
 the characteristic Whig tendency to deny the people 
 
 68 Ibid. This, of course, was the same view which such a Union leader 
 as Richard Arnold had urged in 1833. For the modern revival of the 
 theory of divisible sovereignty, which emphasizes division in terms of 
 “functions” rather than in terms of “territorial contiguity,” see, e.g., 
 H. J. Laski, Authority in the Modern State, pp. 74, 75; also the same 
 author’s The Problem of Sovereignty, p. 271. 
 
 “ Augusta Chronicle, July 23, 1849. 
 
THE APPROACH OF THE STORM, 1849 203 
 
 the right to choose their own form of government. 
 They amounted to a denial of the principles of Jeffer¬ 
 son’s immortal Declaration. Lee, entirely unabashed 
 by this thunder, replied that those Jeffersonian prin¬ 
 ciples would justify the very thing most dangerous to 
 southern institutions; namely, servile insurrection. 
 They were therefore incendiary conceptions, which 
 should be suppressed in southern society. 60 
 
 This was certainly “preaching federalism of the 
 purest water,” and the opportunity it afforded Demo¬ 
 cratic editors for criticism was relished by those 
 gentlemen. They had now succeeded in enticing con¬ 
 servative Whigs into an attack on the abstract prin¬ 
 ciples most dear to the heart of the Georgia people— 
 the traditions of state sovereignty and democracy. 
 A very torrent of denunciation descended upon the 
 Chronicle from the Democratic papers of Augusta, 
 Milledgeville, Columbia, and Charleston. These could 
 now place the conservative Whigs in an unpopular 
 position concerning abstract constitutional issues, and 
 they intended to exploit this advantage to the utmost. 
 This was especially true of the Chronicle’s denial of 
 the “right of secession” and its disapproval of the 
 “right of revolution.” The most effective Democratic 
 use of the first of these questions was to be made in 
 the next state campaign, that of 1851, but the begin¬ 
 nings of the issue are to be observed in 1849. 
 
 The most fortunate result of the constitutional 
 controversy, from the Democratic point of view, was 
 the bitter attack made by the radical Whigs upon their 
 conservative brethren. Smythe, of the Republic, who 
 represented what little remained of the old state-rights 
 traditions of the original Whig party of 1833, was par- 
 
 Ibid., August 30, 1849. 
 
204 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 ticularly incensed at the utter repudiation of these tra¬ 
 ditions by the neighboring party journal. “Where,” 
 he demanded, “is the great States Rights Party of 
 Georgia? With a change of names they have changed 
 their principles? . . . The doctrines of the Chron¬ 
 icle on a Consolidated Union would put us at the 
 mercy of the anti-slavery Northern majority.” 61 Lee’s 
 “open Consolidationism” was indeed too much for the 
 rank and file of the Whig party. 62 Lee’s publishers 
 continued to back him, however, and the party leaders 
 could not afford to offend the powerful Chronicle dur¬ 
 ing a critical campaign. It is small wonder that Judge 
 Hill, facing the running constitutional controversy be¬ 
 tween the two factions of his party in Augusta, hesi¬ 
 tated to answer the leading questions sent to him by 
 the Democrats. 
 
 The latter were having their own troubles, mean¬ 
 while, in a desperate attempt to keep the Cobb and 
 Calhoun factions together until after the election. 
 The Federal Union persisted in criticisms of the “non¬ 
 signers” of the Southern Address, while the Athens 
 Banner continued its condemnation of Calhoun and all 
 his works. Flournoy, of the Federal Union, warned 
 Holsey that the Carolinian had good friends in Geor¬ 
 gia and that the Athens editor must remember that 
 “his clique is not the whole party.” 63 If that clique 
 continued to stir up trouble in the Democracy, the 
 organ at the capital threatened to retaliate by refusing 
 “to support any anti-Calhoun men for place.” In 
 
 61 Augusta Republic, July 21, in the Savannah Georgian, July 31, 1849. 
 
 62 Alexander Stephens made an unsuccessful attempt to remove Lee 
 tactfully to Washington, by securing him a federal appointment. See 
 Stephens to G. W. Crawford, March 2, 1849, Toombs, Stephens, and 
 Cobb Correspondence, p. 155. 
 
 63 Federal Union, August 28, 1849. 
 
THE APPROACH OF THE STORM, 1849 205 
 
 Athens some subscribers wrote the Banner to discon¬ 
 tinue their subscriptions because of its anti-Calhoun 
 policy. 64 The Banner replied that it would retaliate 
 upon the “Calhoun Journals,” which would see that it 
 could “give as good as they send. These Calhoun men 
 are not the Southern men par excellence .” Holsey 
 dismissed Flournoy, who had particularly irritated 
 him, as “a contemptable trickster—a disgrace to the 
 Democratic party.” 65 It was becoming increasingly 
 apparent that the factions in each party could not long 
 maintain even the pretense of harmony or the cooper¬ 
 ation that went with it. Party loyalty would soon 
 break under the increasing strain of the sectional 
 issue. It had cracked in many places before the 
 campaign ended, but managed to hold together until 
 the election was past. 
 
 The usual local issues were injected into the state 
 campaign, although they were obviously overshad¬ 
 owed by the one great problem. The Whigs dis¬ 
 covered that Towns had been extravagant in admin¬ 
 istering the state penitentiary. He had pardoned a 
 dangerous criminal! The Democrats found that Hill, 
 like Berrien, had been too prominently connected with 
 railroad interests and “special privilege.” Both par¬ 
 ties, after assuring their supporters of their earnest 
 efforts to keep such matters below the surface, were 
 forced by conscience to point to the shocking personal 
 habits of the opposing candidate. In their respective 
 efforts, for instance, to prove that the opposition 
 leader was more given to drink than was their own 
 hero, the capacities of each were portrayed in an inter¬ 
 esting and impressive manner. 
 
 64 Athens Banner, in the Savannah Republican, August 23, 1849. 
 
 66 Banner, in the Chronicle, September 25, 1849. 
 
206 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 Calhoun and the Carolina leaders observed with 
 rising hopes the trend of events in Georgia and the 
 Gulf states through the fall of 1849. While the Jack- 
 son convention in Mississippi would be the most 
 important single event in the southern movement, the 
 outcome of the campaign in Georgia was also of vital 
 interest. The hope of South Carolina was pinned upon 
 the southern-rights Democrats of her sister state, 
 whose leaders and journals gave the impression that 
 they would cooperate in a “real Southern Movement” 
 in 1850. It was essential to this end that the majority 
 of the Georgia legislature and the governor be south¬ 
 ern-rights men. Calhoun maintained his personal 
 touch with a half dozen or more of his friends in 
 Georgia, his most systematic and valuable correspond¬ 
 ents being, as before, Wilson Lumpkin and Senator 
 Johnson. The latter reported in the summer that there 
 was “great excitement in the party in this state upon 
 the slavery question,” but that, “notwithstanding dem¬ 
 onstrations, I seriously feel that the people of the 
 South are not properly awake to the danger—not 
 thoroughly nerved to resistance.” Yet he agreed with 
 Calhoun that “now is the time for resistance.” Lump¬ 
 kin’s estimate of Georgia public opinion late in July, 
 1849, was even more pessimistic than that of Johnson. 
 He wrote: 
 
 I have to a great extent lost confidence in the virtue and 
 intelligence of our Southern people. Upon the slavery ques¬ 
 tion South Carolina is the only state in the Union prepared to 
 do her full duty. . . . With a single exception in Geor¬ 
 
 gia, 66 the Whig Press shrink from speaking out in a manly 
 tone, and the Democratic press is not entirely free from former 
 association with Van Buren and Benton. We have an office¬ 
 seeking faction in Georgia who feel but little of the true spirit 
 of Southern Patriotism. . . . Corruption has gotten too 
 
 M The Augusta Republic. 
 
THE APPROACH OF THE STORM, 1849 207 
 
 deep a hold upon the politicians and press of our country for 
 us to indulge the hope that we can unite the South in self- 
 defense, even upon this vital slavery question. And nothing 
 short of the union . . . can save us from degradation, and 
 
 from horrors which the strongest language can but faintly 
 depict. You and I may struggle on through our few remaining 
 days. But in our last hour I fear we will not be consoled with 
 the prospects which await posterity in this section of our 
 Union. It may soon be recorded that “the slave states were .” 67 
 
 This letter is interesting for several reasons. It 
 agreed with the private opinions of most of the ex¬ 
 treme Calhoun men in Georgia that the people of that 
 state, even the Democrats, were not prepared for 
 extreme measures. 68 Second, it expressed clearly the 
 despair of far-sighted southern nationalists over the 
 blindness of their people to the dangers lurking in old 
 loyalties to party and to Union. Third, it illustrates 
 the private and sincere expression of the fear of social 
 chaos following abolition. Finally, it offered a proph¬ 
 etic picture of the pathetic circumstances attending 
 Calhoun’s death within the next year, in the midst of 
 a crisis in which he could see but little hope for his 
 beloved Southland. 
 
 As the two parties neared the October elections, 
 both made final appeals upon the slavery issue. The 
 majority Democrats, with lessening regard for Chero¬ 
 kee sensibilities, proclaimed to the people that the 
 great question of the election was of submission or 
 resistance to the antislavery movement, and that the 
 Democracy stood for resistance “to the last extrem¬ 
 ity.” Town’s letters and speeches proved him the 
 “resistance candidate.” Hill’s silence and evasiveness 
 
 67 Wilson Lumpkin to Calhoun, August 27, 1849, the Calhoun Papers. 
 See also R. I. Moon to Calhoun, August 26, 1849, Calhoun Papers. 
 
 68 The significance of this private pessimism of the Georgia Cal- 
 hounites, and the contrast it offers to the optimism of their public proc¬ 
 lamations, will be commented upon in the next chapter. 
 
208 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 proved him the “Submissionist candidate.” 69 The 
 Whigs, for their part, claimed just as vehemently to 
 be the only genuine southern party. 
 
 Special efforts were made by the party machines 
 to prevent voting for irregular candidates for the leg¬ 
 islature and to bring out a full vote. The Democratic 
 executive committee, a body appointed by the July 
 convention, sent out secret circulars at the last moment 
 to the watchers at the county polls, with instructions 
 for getting out every possible vote. 70 In the last six 
 weeks of the campaign, the Democratic editors ex¬ 
 pressed increasing confidence of victory, and the 
 Whigs admitted the danger of defeat. 71 The growing 
 suspicion of Taylor’s attitude toward the Proviso; the 
 definite southern-rights stand taken by Towns, in con¬ 
 trast with Hill’s evasiveness; and the extreme conser¬ 
 vatism of the Chronicle wing of the Whig party—all 
 tended to strengthen the Democratic claim to sectional 
 preference. Signs of wavering in party loyalty 
 appeared here and there, even among the Taylor 
 Whigs. 72 
 
 The election was held on October 1. In the returns 
 from the first forty counties reported, Towns showed 
 a gain of about one thousand votes over his own record 
 for 1847. The final results gave him the election with 
 a majority of 3192, the vote standing: Towns, 46,514; 
 Hill, 43,322. The vote in 1847 had been Towns, 
 43.220; Clinch, 41,931. This meant that the Whig 
 
 08 Savannah Georgian, September 13, 1849; Federal Union, Septem¬ 
 ber 11, 18, 1849. 
 
 50 Augusta Chronicle, September 25, 1849. 
 
 71 Macon Telegraph, August 14; the Macon Journal, August 14; in 
 the Chronicle, August 25, 1849. 
 
 "Washington (Georgia) Gazette, in the Chronicle, July 21, 1849; T. 
 W. Thomas to Cobb, August 19, 1849, Toombs, Stephens, and Cobb Cor¬ 
 respondence, p. 174. 
 
THE APPROACH OF THE STORM, 1849 209 
 
 vote of 1849 was greater than that of 1847 by 1391, 
 while the Democratic was greater by 3294. 73 In 
 other words, there had been a slight but definite rela¬ 
 tive gain of about nineteen hundred votes in the 
 Democratic poll for governor in 1849, as compared 
 with that of 1847. In like manner, it became apparent 
 that there had been a small but definite Democratic 
 gain in the legislature—sufficient to change the control 
 of that body. The Democrats secured twenty-six seats 
 in the Senate, the Whigs twenty-two, while in the 
 House the former won sixty-seven seats, and the latter 
 sixty-three. The successful Democratic candidates 
 represented all three factions in their party, and their 
 small gains were not peculiar to any section of the 
 state. 74 
 
 Little was said by the Whig press in explanation of 
 the October defeat. The Democratic organs in Cen¬ 
 tral and Lower Georgia immediately hailed it as a vic¬ 
 tory for southern-rights over Whig “submissionism” 
 and pointed to concomitant Democratic victories in 
 most of the other southern states as indications of a 
 similar victory throughout the South. 75 The most 
 elaborate expression of this view was that given by 
 the southern-rights Whigs, who had steadily warned 
 their conservative brethren of impending defeat, and 
 who now felt no hesitancy in coming forward to the 
 old tune, “I told you so!” The election was lost by 
 
 73 Georgian, October 4; Chronicle, November 21; Philadelphia North 
 American, November 23, 1849. 
 
 74 Savannah Republican, October 10, 1849; Journals of the Georgia 
 House and Journals of the Senate, for 1849-’50, pp. 1, 2; Members of 
 the Legislature, (printed list showing party affiliations, for the Legis¬ 
 lature of 1850, in possession of U. B. Phillips) ; Iverson to Cobb, Octo¬ 
 ber 6; J. H. Lumpkin to Cobb, October 19, 1849, Toombs, Stephens, and 
 Cobb Correspondence, pp. 175, 176. 
 
 75 Savannah Georgian, October 4, 1849; Times, October 9; Federal 
 Union, October 9, October 16, 1849. 
 
210 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 the Whigs, said Smythe, primarily because they had 
 continued to support Taylor, while the southern people 
 were losing confidence in him. 76 
 
 This interpretation of the election implied a grow¬ 
 ing confidence in the Democracy as the southern-rights 
 party. Extreme Calhoun Democrats, however, in their 
 exasperation at the moderation displayed during the 
 compaign towards the Union Democrats, sometimes 
 denied this, and offered what was probably the most 
 critical analysis of the campaign. Both parties, they 
 held, failed to take a real stand on slavery for fear of 
 factional splits, hence there had been popular indiffer¬ 
 ence to the election, and its results could not be of great 
 significance. 77 
 
 The evidence in the case of Georgia does indicate 
 only an average interest in the election, the slight 
 increase in the votes of both parties over 1847 being 
 only such as could have been produced by the normal 
 increase in population. There is no evidence, more¬ 
 over, of any intense popular agitation outside the 
 parties, save for the statements of Calhounites, who 
 were themselves undoubtedly excited. On the other 
 hand, the small but definite relative gain in the Demo¬ 
 cratic vote can only be ascribed to some growth of 
 sectional feeling, since the slavery issue was the only 
 important one raised during the campaign. The Demo¬ 
 crats undoubtedly were most successful in urging the 
 sectional appeal. Some potential Whig votes were 
 probably given to Towns by the Clay Whigs, though 
 the exact number, which must have been small, cannot 
 be determined. The latter were, in all probability, 
 
 79 Republic, in the Federal Union, October 16, 1849. 
 
 77 J. R. Mathews to Calhoun, October 7, 1849, Calhoun Papers. 
 
THE APPROACH OF THE STORM, 1849 211 
 
 responsible for their party’s defeat. If so, the Whig- 
 organization was the first to suffer in Georgia because 
 of the sectional struggle. The Democrats, however, 
 were to have their turn within a year. 
 
 The effect of the election victory upon the majority 
 of the Democrats, so far as can be judged from the 
 press, was to increase their emphasis upon southern- 
 rights and to make for greater sympathy for the 
 extreme demand of southern political unity. In a 
 word, the Democratic editors, having espoused a gen¬ 
 eral sectional appeal as a result of the election of 1848, 
 were now ready to go further and definitely adopt the 
 southern movement as a result of the election of 1849. 
 Several forces were responsible for this change in atti¬ 
 tude. In the first place, the events of the past year 
 had doubtless persuaded some that sectional unity was 
 now essential, and editors who were watching the 
 northern press were apt to be peculiarly susceptible to 
 such persuasion. In the second place, those Democrats 
 who, as Calhounites, had held their peace during the 
 campaign for the sake of party harmony, were less 
 likely to keep silent now that a Democratic state ad¬ 
 ministration was safely in office. Finally, it was prob¬ 
 able that the southern movement, ostensibly a non¬ 
 partisan one, might be turned to partisan advantage in 
 Georgia. Some gain had apparently accrued to the 
 party as a result of urging the sectional appeal in the 
 recent election. More popular excitement would un¬ 
 doubtedly develop as a result of the coming struggles 
 in the legislature and in Congress. If the Whigs 
 maintained their conservatism, the Democrats could 
 appeal to the people for support as the only true 
 southern party. In fact the elections were no sooner 
 
212 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 over than the Democrats did appeal to all Whigs to 
 rally with them for southern unity. 78 
 
 The course of events in sister states through the 
 fall gave added impetus to the support of the southern 
 movement in Georgia. Since the spring agitation in 
 South Carolina, which had led to the appointment of 
 a Central Committee of Vigilance and Safety, there 
 had been a general silence in that state upon the sec¬ 
 tional issue. The general agreement upon national 
 topics there made further agitation unnecessary, pend¬ 
 ing developments in the other states. 79 Calhoun, 
 however, continuing his leadership of the whole south¬ 
 ern movement, had been duly informed of the coming 
 convention in Jackson, Mississippi, and his advice was 
 requested as to the course to be followed there. He 
 urged again his belief, expressed in private corre¬ 
 spondence as early as 1847, that the only way to save 
 the Union was to unite the South by means of a south¬ 
 ern convention. It seemed reasonable to suppose that 
 two years of excitement had now prepared the people 
 to respond to this appeal. Senator Foote, of Missis¬ 
 sippi, was assured by both Whig and Democratic lead¬ 
 ers in his state that the October convention would act 
 upon Calhoun’s advice, and the latter was notified to 
 this effect. 80 
 
 The prospects for the southern movement outside 
 of South Carolina seemed most favorable, then, in 
 Mississippi. The Jackson Convention met just at the 
 time the state election was being held in Georgia, and 
 the Carolinians had two interesting events to follow 
 at the same time. The Mississippi convention was 
 
 "Columbus Times, October 23, 1849. 
 
 ™ Hamer, The Secession Movement in South Carolina, pp. 45, 46. 
 
 80 Foote to Calhoun, September 25, 1849, Calhoun Correspondence. 
 p. 1204. 
 
THE APPROACH OF THE STORM, 1849 213 
 
 representative of both parties and all sections of the 
 state. “Among those present” was General Daniel 
 Wallace, envoy extraordinary from South Carolina. 
 As the secret emissary of Seabrook, the General had 
 to exercise great caution in approaching the members, 
 lest he arouse the latent hostility to South Carolina 
 which existed in Mississippi and other southern states 
 as well as in Georgia. 81 Wallace did succeed in hold¬ 
 ing private conversations with leading Mississippians 
 of both parties, who convinced him that their state was 
 ready to cooperate with his own, and these impressions 
 he sent back in detail to Seabrook. He had also to 
 report, however, his own surprise at the extent of anti- 
 Carolina feeling. 82 
 
 The policy of keeping Wallace and all he repre¬ 
 sented in the background made possible the harmonious 
 procedure of the Jackson convention. Resolutions 
 were adopted which even the Calhounites considered 
 “up to the mark.” These, besides making the usual 
 demands for resistance to the Proviso, to the prohi¬ 
 bition of the domestic slave trade, and to the abolition 
 of slavery in the District of Columbia, issued the long- 
 sought formal call for a southern convention. The 
 slave-holding states were urged to send delegates to a 
 meeting to be held at Nashville on the first Monday in 
 June, 1850, “with a view and the hope of arresting 
 the course of aggression,” and, if necessary, “to devise 
 and adopt some mode of resistance” to the same. 83 
 
 81 It is doubtful, however, whether the anti-Carolina feeling was as 
 strong in Mississippi or Alabama as it was in Georgia, where the 
 geographical contacts had led to trade rivalries, and the other usual 
 frictions resulting from proximity, which did not obtain in the Gulf 
 states. It is difficult to believe that a Georgia convention, with Whigs 
 and Union Democrats present, would ever have admitted a South Caro¬ 
 lina representative under any circumstances in 1849 or 1850. 
 
 “Wallace to Seabrook, October 20, 1849, Seabrook MSS. 
 
 83 Hearon, Mississippi and the Compromise of 1850, pp. 63-68; Ames, 
 State Documents, pp. 253-258. 
 
214 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 This call was hailed with hope in South Carolina,, 
 which had so long' awaited just such encouragement 
 from her western sisters. How would the others re¬ 
 ceive it? Calhoun watched this question closely and 
 urged his correspondents throughout the South to 
 respond to the Jackson call. 84 Meanwhile, Carolina 
 could lead in this response. When the legislature con¬ 
 vened late in November, Governor Seabrook urged 
 that provision be made for representation at Nash¬ 
 ville. The coming convention, he declared, was in¬ 
 tended to save the Union; but if this proved impossible, 
 it was to provide for the independence of the slave¬ 
 holding states. With this contingency in view, he 
 urged preparation for military defense. The legisla¬ 
 ture largely ignored this last request, but it did name 
 delegates-at-large to Nashville, provided for the local 
 election of other delegates, and authorized the governor 
 to call it in special session in case Congress passed the 
 Proviso or kindred measures. 85 
 
 In the course of the next few months, provision 
 for representation at Nashville was also made in Vir¬ 
 ginia, Alabama, Mississippi, Florida, Texas, Arkan¬ 
 sas, and Tennessee. In the first three of these states, 
 provision was also made for the calling, under certain 
 circumstances, of special state conventions. 86 The 
 long heralded southern movement was really begin¬ 
 ning to “move”! 
 
 The proceedings of the Jackson convention reached 
 Georgia at the same time that the state election results 
 were being made known. Southern-rights Democrats, 
 flushed with a victory ascribed to their own principles. 
 
 “There was a series of letters to this effect. See the Calhoun Cor¬ 
 respondence, pp. 762, 769, 773, 775, 778, 1195, etc. 
 
 85 Hamer, The Secession Movement in South Carolina, pp. 43-45. 
 
 M Ames, “Calhoun and the Secession Movement of 1850,’’ p. 121. 
 
THE APPROACH OF THE STORM, 1849 215 
 
 naturally welcomed the expression of similar prin¬ 
 ciples in Mississippi, and urged that the coming legis¬ 
 lature in Georgia accept the call to Nashville. Said 
 the Federal Union: 
 
 The position of the South has been weakened by a lack of 
 harmony. But Mississippi had designated the path which will 
 lead to union in counsel and harmony in action. . . . All 
 
 who love the South better than themselves are beginning to see 
 that, if her rights are maintained, she has none to look to but 
 herself. Before the Legislature of Georgia adjourns we hope 
 to see our gallant state standing among her sisters of the South 
 on the same platform now occupied by Mississippi. A united 
 front at this time will probably dispel the clouds that threaten, 
 and save the Union, but vaccilation and dissention now means 
 further Northern aggression, which will continue until the 
 South will finally be forced to destroy the Union. Now is the 
 time to act—to act cooly—calmly—resolutely—firmly. 87 
 
 A few of Calhoun’s friends in the state wrote him 
 in like manner that it was time to plan “seriously and 
 calmly” for a southern party in Georgia. 88 J. H. 
 Howard, one of the Columbus extremists, wrote that, 
 had he been elected to the legislature, he would have 
 worked for resolutions “pointing to some definite 
 action and sent them to all the states.” Would Cal¬ 
 houn please advise “in confidence” as to the right 
 course of a southern member of Congress at the com¬ 
 ing session, 89 and also as to “what preventive rem¬ 
 edy” the state’s legislature should adopt the mean¬ 
 while? 90 Calhoun’s guidance was thus sought by 
 the extremists for the Georgia legislature of 1849- 
 1850, as for that of 1847-1848; yet, even in the latter 
 body the origin of his advice had to be kept a close 
 
 87 Federal Union, November 20; see also the Columbus Times, Novem¬ 
 ber 20; the Georgian, November 18, 1849. 
 
 88 J. R. Mathews to Calhoun, October 7, 1849, Calhoun Papers. 
 
 89 This may have been intended for Alfred Iverson, of Columbus, 
 Representative from the Second Georgia District. 
 
 90 Howard to Calhoun, October 8, 1849, Calhoun Papers. 
 
216 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 secret. It seems quite possible, considering all the cir¬ 
 cumstances, that suggestions were sent by the Caro¬ 
 linian to his followers at Milledgeville in answer to 
 such requests (even as he sent suggestions to his 
 Mississippi supporters) and that the Georgia extrem¬ 
 ists hoped to secure action based upon his plan. The 
 Whigs, to be sure, could be expected to oppose any 
 such action, and so too could the Union Democrats, 
 but much was hoped from the Democratic majority. 
 Something could certainly be accomplished if Con¬ 
 gress precipitated the renewed and more bitter sec¬ 
 tional struggle, which now seemed well nigh inevitable. 
 
CHAPTER VI 
 
 WINTER WEATHER, 1849-1850 
 
 The Georgia Legislature convened in the little town 
 of Milledgeville on November 5, 1849, a month before 
 the Congress met in Washington. The state body 
 awaited no cue from the latter as to the course it should 
 take upon the slavery question, although it was bound 
 to be influenced by the debates at Washington, just as 
 Congress in turn was influenced by developments in 
 the states. There were twenty-six Democrats and 
 twenty-two Whigs in the state Senate, while in the 
 House there were sixty-six Democrats and sixty-three 
 Whigs. The Democratic lead was so slight that had 
 the Whigs held together on any vital national ques¬ 
 tion they could have defeated the other party with the 
 assistance of the Union Democrats from Cherokee. A 
 small number of the latter group, who split from the 
 rest of their party on such issues, can be identified by 
 their votes in both houses. 1 As the Whig members 
 themselves proved to be about evenly divided upon 
 national questions, however, no such defeat of the 
 Democrats was possible. 
 
 Having convened on November 5, the Assembly 
 met on the next day to receive the Governor’s mes¬ 
 sage. The greater part of this document dealt with 
 the usual economic and social topics of the time, and 
 his views on these matters revealed the moderate char¬ 
 acter of Democratic principles in this period. There 
 
 1 Georgia House Journal, 1849-1850, p. 487, ff. 
 
218 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 was little trace of the economic and social radicalism 
 of previous decades. 2 
 
 With regard to the pressing question of slavery, 
 Towns first recommended that better laws be passed 
 to protect the slaves from cruelty or misusage. While 
 this house-cleaning was in progress at home, the state 
 should take a strong stand against the antislavery 
 movement. It will be remembered that Towns was a 
 southern-rights Democrat and that he had been elected 
 the preceding October after openly declaring for final 
 resistance to further northern “aggressions.” He 
 claimed, therefore, that he had a mandate from the 
 people to take action against such attacks, and, as a 
 southern-rights man, he was anxious to use his posi¬ 
 tion as governor to further the southern movement. 
 His message proclaimed that, with the meeting in the 
 immediate future of the new Congress and the devel¬ 
 opment of the statehood movements in California and 
 New Mexico, the sectional crisis was at hand. Fur¬ 
 ther attempts to pass the Proviso, in open or disguised 
 form, were to be anticipated, and “further aggression 
 was not to be endured.” In proof that he desired 
 action as well as words, Towns now urged, as had the 
 Governor of Mississippi, that he be authorized “to 
 convoke a convention to take into consideration the 
 measures proper for . . . safety and preserva¬ 
 
 tion, in the event of the passage of the Wilmot Proviso, 
 or other kindred measures, by the Congress of the 
 United States.” 3 
 
 2 Most of the Governor’s views on economic matters were praised 
 by even the most conservative Whig papers, which again illustrates the 
 extent to which the state Democratic party had come under the control 
 of conservative leaders by 1850. See, e.g., the Chronicle, November 
 8, 1849. 
 
 3 Georgia House Journal, 1849-50, pp. 37-50; Debates and Proceedings 
 of the Georgia Convention, 1850, Appendix; Letter Books of the Georgia 
 Governor, 1850. 
 
WINTER WEATHER, 1849-1850 
 
 219 
 
 This message clearly placed Towns in the front 
 rank of those southern-rights leaders who were de¬ 
 manding action as well as words. It received wide 
 attention in the North, where it was regarded as a 
 serious move, 4 and was enthusiastically praised by 
 the Democratic press of Georgia and South Carolina. 
 In the latter state, it was received as the most hopeful 
 sign that the “cooperationists” had yet seen in the 
 sister state, and the South Carolinian was encouraged 
 to remark that it “had always trusted in Georgia.’’ 5 
 The Georgia Whig press did not welcome the sugges¬ 
 tion of a state convention, however, and the aggressive 
 Chronicle took occasion to raise again the cry against 
 “disunion.” Towns’ appeal for a special convention, 
 it opined, was “a confession that the Democratic state 
 government is weak,” and thus has to “call in a New 
 Power which is to do a thing which even Governor 
 ToWns has not presumed to intimate ought to be 
 done.” 6 
 
 The Governor’s message was at once referred in 
 both houses to the standing committees on “the state 
 of the Republic,” after which action most of the time 
 between November 6 and 12 was consumed by routine 
 business. There was considerable excitement in the 
 air, however, both because of the mutual exchange of 
 views between members and because the news coming 
 in on national affairs was disquieting. The southern- 
 rights men were particularly incensed by the news from 
 California. Here a proposed state constitution ex¬ 
 cluding slavery had been adopted a few weeks before. 
 The opinion expressed by Hopkins Holsey early in the 
 year now became general among this group; namely, 
 
 4 See, e.g., the Philadelphia Public Ledger, December 19, 1849. 
 
 5 Columbia Tri-Weekly South Carolinian, November 10, 1849. 
 
 8 Chronicle, November 8, 1849. 
 
220 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 that the mixed population there had no right to form 
 a state. It was held, moreover, that President Tay¬ 
 lor’s part in backing the statehood movement proved 
 it an effort to “apply the Proviso in disguise” to a 
 state so outrageously large that it would “swallow the 
 whole West.” 7 To cap the insult, it was now learned 
 that a Georgia Whig Representative, Thomas B. King, 
 had “deserted” his post in a critical Congress to be¬ 
 come the President’s agent in carrying out this unhal¬ 
 lowed design. King was reported to be urging his own 
 election as a senator from the proposed new free state. 
 
 On November 12 a series of resolutions on the 
 national situation was reported to the Georgia House, 8 
 and on November 15 a similar series was presented 
 to the Senate. 9 These resolutions, drawn up in re¬ 
 sponse to the Governor’s message, were of a more 
 radical character than any yet presented to those 
 bodies. They contained the usual declarations up¬ 
 holding slavery and asserting the unconstitutionality 
 of the Proviso. Those of the House contained in addi¬ 
 tion an eighth resolution providing for the calling of 
 a state convention in certain contingencies, and also 
 a ninth, which conveyed a veiled threat of secession. 
 This threat was contained in the statement that “noth¬ 
 ing short of persistence in the present system of en¬ 
 croachment upon our rights by the non-slaveholding 
 states can induce us to contemplate the possibility of a 
 dissolution” of the Union. 10 For the first time the 
 possibility of secession was thus given formal expres¬ 
 sion in Georgia, and the general reception accorded 
 
 ' Georgian, November 26, 1849. There had been talk of including 
 in California even the area now occupied by Nevada. 
 
 8 Georgia House Journal, 1849-50, p. 49. 
 
 “ Georgia Senate Journal, 1849-50, p. 63. 
 
 10 House Journal, p. 49. 
 
WINTER WEATHER, 1849-1850 
 
 221 
 
 this and the other resolutions at once indicated that 
 for the first time the Georgia assembly was in the con¬ 
 trol of a majority composed of southern-rights mem¬ 
 bers. 
 
 The cumulative effect of the agitation of the pre¬ 
 ceding year and of contemporary events at Washington 
 and throughout the nation was beginning to tell even 
 upon the Whig members. As a matter of fact, the 
 resolutions introduced in the House were written by 
 the Whig Gartrell. They were intended, the Savannah 
 Republican explained, “to set the Whigs right before 
 the public on slavery,”—thereby admitting by implica¬ 
 tion that there had been some doubt on this point 
 during the fall campaign. 11 It was the swing of about 
 half of the Whigs in the House and about one third 
 of those in the Senate to the southern-rights position 
 that placed the control of the Assembly from now on 
 in the hands of the leaders of that persuasion. The 
 number of Union Democrats who sided with the con¬ 
 servative Whigs was too small to overcome this com¬ 
 bination. 
 
 Late in November a conference of the Democratic 
 leaders of both houses resulted in the appointment of 
 a special joint committee on the state of the republic, 
 to which were referred all bills or resolutions relating 
 to the slavery controversy. This committee was domi¬ 
 nated by Gartrell and the militant Calhounite, W. J. 
 Lawton, of Scriven, and these two became the radi¬ 
 cal leaders of the Assembly during the weeks that 
 followed. 
 
 On December 19 the joint committee reported 
 again a series of resolutions generally similar to those 
 which Gartrell had originally submitted to the House. 12 
 
 11 Republican, November 13, 1849. 
 
 12 See House Journal, pp. 72, 100, 315; Senate Journal, pp. 309-312. 
 
222 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 Lawton had added meanwhile a long preamble and an 
 additional resolution, 13 which were acted upon separ¬ 
 ately and so may be considered as distinct measures. 
 
 The preamble reviewed the whole story of “North¬ 
 ern encroachments” and declared that abolition, “the 
 last dishonor that can be reserved for us,” was now at 
 hand. Only a final stand, it declared, could save the 
 South from this dishonor. In a word, the preamble 
 was a restatement of Calhoun’s “Southern Platform.” 
 It is interesting to recall that it was to Lawton that 
 Calhoun had been requested to send resolutions in 1847, 
 and that Lawton had shortly thereafter introduced 
 radical resolutions in the House of that year, only to 
 have them treated with scant courtesy by the Whig 
 majority. He had bided his time, however, had been 
 reelected from Scriven in 1849 and was now again 
 urging radical action—this time upon a House quite 
 willing to give ear to Calhoun’s philosophy. 
 
 Lawton’s preamble was followed by a new resolu¬ 
 tion, which urged the formal adoption of the southern 
 party movement. 14 The preamble and this solidarity 
 resolution were now adopted by the House, despite 
 opposition by a minority composed of members of both 
 parties. 15 A resolution was adopted at the same time 
 for printing and distributing five thousand copies 
 throughout the state. This measure meant in reality 
 nothing less than a state subsidy for southern-rights 
 propaganda. Fortunately for the conservatives, all of 
 Lawton’s proposals met with defeat in the Senate, 
 where strong opposition developed to the formal adop¬ 
 tion of a southern party. 16 
 
 13 Federal Union, February 12, 1850. 
 
 14 House Journal, p. 314. 
 
 15 Ibid., p. 315. 
 
 16 Senate Journal, pp. 285, 286. 
 
WINTER WEATHER, 1849-1850 
 
 223 
 
 The joint committee had submitted to both houses, 
 in addition to the solidarity resolution now defeated in 
 the Senate, a series of ten resolutions similar to those 
 originally introduced in the House of Representatives 
 by Gartrell. We have already noted that most of these 
 resolutions were of a general character, but that the 
 eighth provided for the calling of a state convention 
 as the Governor had suggested, and that the ninth 
 threatened secession. The original eighth resolution 
 indicated three events which would justify the calling 
 of a convention; namely, the passage of the Proviso, 
 the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia, 
 or the continued refusal of northern states to deliver 
 up fugitive slaves. When Gartrell had written, at the 
 beginning of November, these seemed the chief threats 
 to be warned against. Since that time, the news con¬ 
 cerning California had added a fourth. Hence the 
 joint committee added a phrase destined to become 
 the chief subject of controversy within the legislature 
 and later the cause of the actual meeting of the state 
 convention. This was a curt statement naming as an 
 additional contingency calling for a convention, “the 
 admission of California in its present pretended organ¬ 
 ization.” 17 
 
 At about the same time that the joint committee 
 was reporting the ten resolutions and Lawton was 
 attempting to add his preamble to them, separate bills 
 were introduced in both houses calling for the state 
 convention in case the same events named in the eighth 
 resolution occurred. Furthermore, Jenkins, Whig 
 leader of Augusta, introduced resolutions approving 
 the Mississippi call for a southern convention and pro¬ 
 viding a system for selecting state delegates to it. 
 
 17 House Journal, p. 485. 
 
224 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 Final consideration of all of these measures, however, 
 had to be postponed until after the Christmas recess; 
 when the legislature reconvened in mid-January, the 
 ten resolutions again received primary consideration. 
 
 The first seven, of a general character, were ac¬ 
 cepted without serious protest on January 26, but 
 opposition at once developed against the eighth resolu¬ 
 tion, which now read as follows: 
 
 That in the event of the passage of the Wilmot Proviso by 
 Congress, the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia, 
 the admission of California as a state in its present pretended 
 organization, or the continued refusal of the non-slave holding 
 states to deliver up fugitive slaves as provided in the constitu¬ 
 tion, it will become the immediate and imperative duty of the 
 people in this state to meet in convention to take into consid¬ 
 eration the mode and measure of redress. 
 
 When this was read again in the House on Janu¬ 
 ary 24, two plans of opposition at once developed. Jen¬ 
 kins, spokesman for the conservative Whigs, moved 
 that consideration of the entire resolution be postponed 
 until after the meeting of the proposed southern con¬ 
 vention. The obvious motive here was to delay plans 
 for decisive state action until there had been time for 
 a general compromise of the whole sectional struggle. 
 On the same day, W. T. Wofford, for the Union Demo¬ 
 crats, moved to amend the phrase, “the passage of the 
 Wilmot Proviso by Congress,” by inserting after the 
 word “Proviso” the phrase “over territory south of 
 36° 30', known as the Missouri Compromise Line.” 18 
 
 Jenkins’ motion for delay was lost by a large ma¬ 
 jority, but Wofford’s amendment received serious con¬ 
 sideration. This is of interest, because it shows that 
 at least a few conservative Union Democrats were 
 still standing by the original party platform of 1847 
 
 18 House Journal, pp. 485, 486. 
 
WINTER WEATHER, 1849-1850 
 
 225 
 
 and 1848, which had offered the Missouri line as a 
 compromise scheme. This offer the southern-rights 
 Democrats had officially held to as late as the election 
 of the preceding October in order to placate the conser¬ 
 vative faction; but they had abandoned it in spirit 
 since the early summer of 1849, when their temper 
 became less conciliatory and when it became increas¬ 
 ingly apparent that the North would not accept the 
 Missouri line anyway. Now safely in power, the sou¬ 
 thern-rights element need no longer suppress its oppo¬ 
 sition to the Missouri Compromise scheme. The con¬ 
 servative Whigs, however, were still anxious to secure 
 a compromise and could be counted on to back Wof¬ 
 ford’s motion more generally than they would the mo¬ 
 tion of their own leader. 
 
 Wofford’s proposed amendment was, therefore, 
 supported in debate by Jenkins and by J. A. Nesbit, of 
 Macon, another conservative Whig leader. This com¬ 
 bination of moderate Whig and Democratic elements 
 in the eighth-resolution debate was the first clear evi¬ 
 dence of the coming realignment of party forces in the 
 state, a realignment that became the basis for the sub¬ 
 sequent Union party; although there is no evidence 
 that such a party was consciously planned until about 
 a fortnight after this debate occurred. In like manner 
 the attack of Lawton upon Wofford’s amendment was 
 joined by the radical Whig, Gartrell, and this align¬ 
 ment was suggestive of the elements which were later 
 formally merged into the Southern Rights party. 
 
 The debate lasted through January 24, 25, and 26. 
 It was the most important one of the session and de¬ 
 rives additional interest from the fact that it was 
 concomitant with similarly stirring discussions in the 
 national Congress at Washington. Jenkins and Nes- 
 
226 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 bit claimed that the principle of the Missouri line would 
 unite the South and at the same time could be accepted 
 by the conservative North, thus forming the basis of 
 a compromise that would save the Union. Lawton re¬ 
 plied that it was inconsistent with the other resolutions 
 denying the right of Congress to interfere with slavery 
 in the territories. He proceeded to read the resolu¬ 
 tions of the Georgia Whig Senate of 1847 to prove 
 that that party had then opposed the Missouri line. 
 Wofford countered by recalling that Lawton’s party, 
 on the other hand, had then favored the line. It was 
 no more inconsistent with a denial of congressional 
 power over the territories in 1850, Wofford declared, 
 than it was in 1847, when all the Democrats had offi¬ 
 cially accepted it. Gartrell here came to the assistance 
 of his Democratic ally by making the pertinent point 
 that when the Missouri Compromise had been offered 
 to the North in 1847, it was hoped it would be accepted. 
 Now subsequent events, particularly the defeat of the 
 Missouri line amendment to the Oregon territorial 
 bill, had demonstrated conclusively that the North 
 would not accept that compromise. It was foolish to 
 offer the North a concession that would only lead to 
 the humiliation of a refusal. 
 
 Jenkins answered that it was even more foolish 
 to call a state convention for reasons which were in¬ 
 defensible. He pointed out that the admission of Cali¬ 
 fornia as a free state was entirely constitutional and 
 that a desire to protect slavery should not lead them 
 into the weak position of denying it. This would 
 be particularly unfortunate, because no act of theirs 
 could ever carry slavery into so unsuitable a country 
 anyway. Jones, of Paulding, denied this last point, 
 claiming that gold mines could be best worked with 
 slaves and that California was, therefore, well adapted 
 
WINTER WEATHER, 1849-1850 
 
 227 
 
 to the institution. He concluded with the usual Demo¬ 
 cratic protest against allowing a migratory population 
 there to form a state that “swallowed the whole west.” 
 Ramsey, of Harris, further stirred up the “Ultra” 
 members by proclaiming excitedly that slavery should 
 be everywhere “untrameled” and that he would “see 
 it carried to California at the point of the bayonette if 
 
 )J1 Q 
 
 necessary. 
 
 On January 26, the vote was finally taken in the 
 House on the Missouri line amendment to the eighth 
 resolution, eighty-one members voting against and 
 forty-two in favor of the measure. Twenty-seven 
 Whigs combined with southern-rights Democrats in 
 defeating it, while six Union Democrats joined the 
 conservative Whigs in supporting it. An equal num¬ 
 ber of Union Democrats from Cherokee failed to back 
 the amendment, perhaps because they had been con¬ 
 vinced by Gartrell that it was useless to offer the Mis¬ 
 souri principle to the North. 20 
 
 At this stage of the proceedings, southern-rights 
 feeling was further agitated by an incident that well 
 illustrates the character of some of the forces influenc¬ 
 ing the acts of the Assembly. A special message was 
 received from Governor Towns transmitting resolu¬ 
 tions on slavery lately received from the Connecticut 
 Assembly. These resolutions demanded the passage 
 of the Proviso, the privilege of jury trial for fugitives 
 claimed as slaves in the North, and concluded with the 
 announcement that “no threats of disunion” would de¬ 
 ter Connecticut from supporting these measures- 21 
 
 19 For these debates, see the chief Georgia papers for January 29 
 and 30, 1850. The summary here given is based upon the accounts 
 in the Federal Union and the Chronicle. 
 
 House Journal, p. 487. 
 
 “For these resolutions in full see Ames, State Documents, pp. 261, 
 262. 
 
228 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 The challenge in such statements was unmistakeable, 
 and Governor Towns was prompt to make the most of 
 it. His message made bold to say: 
 
 The absurd and insolent pretensions so generally set up and 
 advanced by the North are boldly set forth and insultingly re¬ 
 affirmed in these Resolutions. Believing that now is the time 
 for Georgia to act in a manner worthy of herself, I can but 
 repeat the opinion, expressed in my first message to the Legis¬ 
 lature on this subject; that your property, your honor, and the 
 Union itself will be lost forever if the South fails to assert its 
 rights and adopt measures to carry them out. 22 
 
 The response of both houses was the passage of 
 resolutions to return “under a blank cover” these and 
 any other resolutions on the subject that might subse¬ 
 quently be received from Connecticut. If Towns 
 hoped, however, that his message would so arouse sec¬ 
 tional ardor in the assembly as to discourage further 
 opposition to the eighth resolution and the state con¬ 
 vention bill, he was doomed to disappointment. 
 
 The amendment to the eighth resolution now hav¬ 
 ing been defeated in the House, the resolution was 
 there adopted by a vote of ninety-two to twenty-eight. 
 The ninth resolution, implying the possibility of seces¬ 
 sion, was then accepted without opposition, Linton 
 Stephens, of all the House, alone voting against it. 23 
 The “Georgia Resolutions” thus safely passed the 
 House. 24 
 
 The state convention bill was now in order in that 
 body. The first clause in this bill was similar in word¬ 
 ing to the eighth resolution, just passed, in that it 
 named the contingencies upon which the convention 
 should be called by the Governor. This fact gave the 
 
 a Ho-use Journal, pp. 488, 489. 
 
 23 House Journal, pp. 509, 510. 
 
 u For their final form see Acts of Georgia, 1849-50, pp. 409, 410; 
 Ames, State Documents, pp. 259-261. 
 
WINTER WEATHER, 1849-1850 
 
 229 
 
 conservatives an opportunity to repeat the opposition 
 just made to the resolution. As soon as this first clause 
 was considered, an effort was made to amend it by 
 adding the Missouri line to the phrases concerning 
 California and the Proviso. J. W. Anderson, of Sa¬ 
 vannah, the Democratic speaker, lost patience and ruled 
 the amendment out of order. The majority were fair, 
 however, and would not sustain his ruling. The 
 amendment was then lost, sixty-seven to forty-six, and 
 the convention bill passed, ninety-two to twenty-eight. 
 Numbers of Whigs and Union Democrats, who sup¬ 
 ported the proposed amendment, finally voted for the 
 bill to show that the state was behind the measure. 23 
 All of the twelve who finally opposed it were ultra¬ 
 conservative Whig followers of Jenkins and Linton 
 Stephens. 
 
 The conservative Whigs decided that here was the 
 time to record formally their opposition to the Cali¬ 
 fornia clause and to appeal to the people of the state 
 on this issue. Accordingly, the Whigs were asked to 
 sign a protest to be entered on the House Journal. The 
 twenty-five odd members who were voting with the 
 southern-rights Democrats would have nothing of 
 it, and a few of the Whigs who had supported the 
 amendments failed to sign the protest. Twenty-nine 
 conservative Whigs and one union Democrat finally 
 affixed their names. 26 The statement made by the 
 signers made clear the issue involved and the reasons 
 for their stand. They insisted that it was unjustifiable 
 to oppose California’s right to admission and “solemn¬ 
 ly protested” against calling a state convention for this 
 reason, as this was “a measure whose inevitable ten¬ 
 dency leads to a dissolution of this ‘most perfect 
 
 25 House Journal, pp. 510, 520; Federal Union, January 29, 1850. 
 
 20 House Journal, p. 547. 
 
230 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 Union.’ ” The bill, it was declared, was particularly 
 unfortunate at a time of crisis, which demanded calm¬ 
 ness and moderation rather than precipitate action. 27 
 
 Despite this protest, the convention bill was soon 
 made law by passage in the Senate 28 and by the ap¬ 
 proval of the Governor. As finally worded, it de¬ 
 clared that, should any of the contingencies named in 
 the eighth resolution occur, “it should be the duty 
 of the Governor to order, within 60 days, an election 
 in every county to a State Convention, to convene at 
 the capitol within 20 days after the election.” A fund 
 of thirty thousand dollars was to be appropriated for 
 the expenses of the convention. A clause requiring 
 members to take an oath of loyalty to the state was 
 struck out just before the passage of the bill. 29 
 
 The House had now passed the ten resolutions and 
 the convention bill. During January it had also pro¬ 
 ceeded with the consideration of the third measure of 
 primary importance to the southern movement; namely, 
 the resolutions pertaining to a southern convention. 
 These resolutions were originally written by Charles 
 J. Jenkins, of Augusta, and declared that “We 
 cordially concurr with Mississippi in the measure of 
 calling a Southern Convention.” They provided that 
 the Georgia delegates thereto should be chosen by an 
 electoral convention called for that purpose. Jen¬ 
 kins, the Whig leader in the House, proposed this reso¬ 
 lution in order to make it plain that the Whigs were 
 true to the South and would not oppose the Nashville 
 meeting. At the same time, the scheme he proposed 
 for choosing the Georgia delegates was such as to make 
 it doubtful whether the state would actually be repre- 
 
 21 Ibid. 
 
 28 Senate Journal, p. 493. 
 
 23 House Journal, pp. 513-517. 
 
WINTER WEATHER, 1849-1850 
 
 231 
 
 sented. Should a compromise be accepted in the na¬ 
 tional Congress prior to the meeting of a state elector¬ 
 al convention, it was quite possible that this latter body 
 would be disinclined to send any delegates to Nashville 
 at all. It seems likely that some such hope was in 
 the minds of the Whigs in the legislature when Jen¬ 
 kins’ plan was introduced. 30 
 
 Although the Senate accepted Jenkins’ plan, oppo¬ 
 sition developed among the House Democrats to the 
 idea of an electoral convention. Amendments were, 
 therefore, adopted in both Houses providing for the 
 election of the state’s representatives by the several 
 congressional districts. The voters were accustomed 
 to the machinery of electing representatives to the 
 national Congress from these districts, and this same 
 machinery was now to be utilized for the unusual 
 purpose of electing representatives to a sectional 
 congress. 31 
 
 It was provided, however, that the governor should 
 appoint the alternates in case any vacancies occurred 
 after the election, such appointments to be made from 
 the party among whose representatives the vacancy 
 had occurred. 32 This provision, because of circum¬ 
 stances that later developed, did give Towns a con¬ 
 siderable influence upon the personnel of the state’s 
 delegation. Since Towns was a strong Calhounite, his 
 appointments were not likely to be of a strictly non¬ 
 partisan character. All things considered, then, the 
 plan of selecting delegates to Nashville represented a 
 
 30 Explanation of Jenkins’ plan as given by his Augusta colleague, 
 A. J. Miller, Chronicle, April 12, 1850. 
 
 31 For the plan of election, see House Journal, pp. 350, 422, 494, 
 656; Senate Journal, pp. 494, 495. 
 
 32 Senate Journal, p. 648. 
 
232 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 tactical victory for the southern-rights majority in the 
 legislature. 33 
 
 By February 5 the Nashville convention bill, the 
 ten resolutions, and the state convention bill had all 
 been accepted by the Senate as well as by the House. 34 
 The program of the southern-rights group, how¬ 
 ever, was not entirely completed with the passage of 
 the three main measures. Several minor ones were 
 debated in February, which are chiefly interesting as 
 expressions of a generally excited state of mind upon 
 all matters pertaining to slavery and to the North. 
 Bills were introduced by the radicals, for instance, to 
 prevent northern men from collecting debts in Geor¬ 
 gia, 35 and to levy a sales tax upon northern goods. 36 
 A resolution was also introduced calling upon the Geor¬ 
 gia Congressmen to leave Washington immediately in 
 case the Proviso passed. Only the most extreme mem¬ 
 bers, however, would support these retaliatory meas¬ 
 ures, and they failed to pass. 
 
 A number of interesting bills were introduced 
 concerning Negroes and slavery. Perhaps the most 
 important was that which provided for a repeal of the 
 law against the interstate slave trade. Southern- 
 rights men held that it was not only difficult but un¬ 
 desirable to enforce the law. Jones, of Paulding, 
 claimed that more slaves were needed as plantations 
 expanded and that free admission of them to Georgia 
 would “increase • . . the raising of such property 
 in the sections of the Union best adapted to its cul¬ 
 ture.” McDougal, of Muscogee, reminded his hearers 
 
 33 For a summary of the methods of election adopted in the other 
 southern states, see D. T. Herndon, "The Nashville Convention,” Ala¬ 
 bama Historical Society Publications, V. 213-216. 
 
 34 Senate Journal, pp. 493, 509. 
 
 35 Philadelphia Public Ledger, February 6, 1850. 
 
 30 Philadelphia North American, December 7, 1849. 
 
WINTER WEATHER, 1849-1850 
 
 233 
 
 that an increase in the slave population would mean an 
 increase, under the “federal ratio,” of the state’s con¬ 
 gressional representation. Kennan, a conservative 
 Whig, denied that the repeal of the law would add to 
 the Negro population and declared it would only in¬ 
 crease the Negro transients, who would be sent on to 
 the Southwest; meanwhile, the slaves would be drained 
 out of the border states and leave them practically 
 northern states. Other Whigs added that an unlim¬ 
 ited slave trade would disgrace the state with the 
 “unmoral exhibition of slave markets” and would also 
 embarrass it by the presence of the vicious Negroes, 
 who were always the first to be sold. 37 The bill passed 
 both houses, however, prior to the Christmas recess. 
 
 On November 11, two days after the bill to repeal 
 the anti-slave-trade law was introduced, it was fol¬ 
 lowed by another to deport all free Negroes in the 
 state to Liberia at the state’s expense. This proposal 
 may have been suggested to the extremists by a simi¬ 
 lar measure then pending in the South Carolina 
 legislature. Southern-rights extremists insisted that 
 free Negroes were a dangerous racial element, that 
 they were a vicious lot and given to making trouble 
 with the slaves. This view was supported by an inter¬ 
 esting petition from an association of mechanics in 
 Augusta, which was doubtless motivated by a dislike 
 for free-Negro economic competition. These attacks, 
 however, elicited praise of the freedmen class by mem¬ 
 bers who insisted that the free Negroes were not at 
 all a vicious group and that they had rights as “Quasi¬ 
 citizens, with the status of infants,” which should not 
 be denied to them. The bill was finally defeated in the 
 
 37 The account of this debate is based on that given in the Chronicle, 
 November 15, 1849. 
 
234 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 House, sixty-nine to forty-five. A bill to sell outside 
 the state all free Negroes remaining in it on February 
 1, 1851, was likewise defeated. 38 
 
 In addition to the various measures mentioned, the 
 legislature considered and passed an unusually large 
 number of routine bills and resolutions. Upon some 
 of these the two parties divided in the traditional man¬ 
 ner, as when the Senate Democrats passed a resolution 
 upholding the tariff of 1846 by the strict party vote of 
 twenty-three to twenty. 39 As the session progressed, 
 however, and the measures pertaining to slavery were 
 considered, the tendency toward the party realignments 
 noted above became more apparent. The long threat¬ 
 ened split upon the sectional issue was soon to take 
 place between the Union and southern-rights factions 
 in each party. It will be remembered that the southern- 
 rights members had urged resolutions proclaiming the 
 abandonment of the old parties and had constantly 
 urged conservative members to join with them in com¬ 
 mon opposition to the North. They had even intro¬ 
 duced a bill in the House “to repeal the present Whig 
 and Democratic parties and in lieu thereof to establish 
 a Southern Independent Republican Party.” 40 Physi¬ 
 cians may indeed heal themselves, but politicians can 
 hardly be expected to “repeal” parties. Instead of 
 joining the southern-rights group, the conservative 
 Whigs and Union Democrats began to consider a 
 mutual alliance in a new “Union Party.” 
 
 The occasion of its formation was, curiously 
 enough, an incident that in normal times would have 
 but strengthened traditional party lines. It happened 
 
 38 Boston Liberator, January 11; Savannah Republican, February 4, 
 1850. 
 
 39 Vote of November 15, 1849, Senate Journal, p. 63. 
 
 30 For comment thereon, see the Boston Liberator, January 11, 1850. 
 
WINTER WEATHER, 1849-1850 
 
 235 
 
 that, as soon as the southern-rights group had passed 
 the state convention bill, the Democratic majority pro¬ 
 ceeded with a long desired measure; namely, the re¬ 
 arrangement of both the state senatorial and the con¬ 
 gressional districts so as to improve the chances of 
 Democratic nominees in these divisions. The Demo¬ 
 crats claimed that their intention was to correct the 
 injustice of the Whig gerrymander of 1843, 41 but they 
 admitted that their chief purpose was to put the 
 powerful Toombs and Stephens into one district, or 
 into “moderate Whig districts,” where they could not 
 roll up the majorities of thirteen to seventeen hundred 
 votes that now enabled them “to ignore the wishes of 
 the majority of the Georgia people.” 42 The Whigs op¬ 
 posed the scheme bitterly, and their friends, the Chero¬ 
 kee Democrats, whose own congressional districts were 
 not involved in the controversy, showed some inclina¬ 
 tion to side with them. Personal encounters occurred 
 on the floor of the House between Democrats of the 
 two groups, 43 and the Whigs finally carried things to 
 extremes by absenting themselves from the House in 
 a body, thereby preventing a quorum and all action for 
 four successive days. 44 Only Jenkins, of Augusta, re¬ 
 mained in his seat for a part of this time. 45 Hastily 
 summoned Democratic absentees finally restored a 
 quorum, whereupon the Whigs returned, and the ger¬ 
 rymander bill was passed, though it was later defeated 
 in the Senate. 
 
 41 Map No. 6, p. 171. This gerrymander had worried even the na¬ 
 tional leaders of the party. See Polk to Buchanan, October 3, 1844, 
 Moore (ed.), The Works of James Buchanan, VI. 72. 
 
 “There was usually a slight majority of Democratic votes in the 
 state. 
 
 43 Chronicle, February 20, 1850. 
 
 44 House Journal, pp. 437, 458, 480, 843, 855. 
 
 45 C. C. Jones, Life of Ex-Governor C. J. Jenkins, p. 12, says that 
 Jenkins never missed attendance. The Journals show, however, that 
 he was absent at times in this period. 
 
236 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 It was during this struggle, and while the Whigs 
 were spending the days in Milledgeville without at¬ 
 tending sessions, that the first conscious plans were 
 made for the organization of a Union party in Geor¬ 
 gia. This was the logical step to take under the cir¬ 
 cumstances. The gerrymander struggle supplied the 
 bitterness and the bolt from the House the leisure con¬ 
 ducive to its final execution. Union Democrats, as 
 well as Whigs, were named at the time as leaders of 
 the proposed organization. It was rumored, for in¬ 
 stance, that Wofford was to be the new party’s candi¬ 
 date for governor in 1851. Others spoke of bringing 
 Cobb back from Washington for this honor. 46 
 
 The move to form a Union party was certain, by the 
 mere process of elimination, to result in the formation 
 of a Southern-rights party. In fact, the attempt to 
 form such a party and to make it all-inclusive had been 
 going on all winter. When the legislature adjourned, 
 February 23, the members returned to their homes to 
 organize their constituents on the new issues and along 
 the new party lines. 
 
 These constituents had been watching the acts of 
 the legislature through the winter, but their attention 
 had also been focused, probably even to a greater de¬ 
 gree, upon the developments in Congress. It is now 
 well to recall the chief features of the dramatic Con¬ 
 gressional session of 1849-1850, with especial refer¬ 
 ence to the leading part taken therein by the Georgia 
 delegation. 
 
 The Georgia representatives and senators arrived 
 promptly in Washington for the opening of the thirty- 
 
 48 This account of the origin of the Union Party is based on that 
 given in the Federal Union. March 4, 1851. This paper was unfriendly, 
 but its editor was on the spot, and his story is consistent with the other 
 facts known. The formal organization of the Union Party, planned 
 from this time on, was not completed until the following December. 
 
WINTER WEATHER, 1849-1850 
 
 237 
 
 first Congress. The state’s delegation was about equally 
 divided between the parties; the 'Whigs being led as 
 usual by Toombs, Stephens and Berrien, the Demo¬ 
 crats by Cobb and H. A. Haralson. 47 Three mem¬ 
 bers of the Georgia delegation were destined to play 
 major roles in the coming sectional drama. 
 
 The situation in Congress was disquieting. In the 
 Senate the two major parties were well balanced, but 
 in the House, where the Democrats had a slightly 
 larger group than the Whigs, the balance of power 
 was held by thirteen radical Free-Soilers. The alarm 
 with which the Georgia Whig members viewed this 
 situation was suddenly intensified, soon after their 
 arrival, by the discovery that their growing distrust 
 of Taylor was well founded. The President had indeed 
 gone over to the enemy. 48 Toombs and Stephens im¬ 
 mediately interviewed the President and were given 
 frankly to understand that he would sign the Proviso 1 
 if it reached him. 49 
 
 Here was a truly alarming situation. The very 
 leader whom Toombs and Stephens had regarded as a 
 guarantor of southern rights would no longer defend 
 them. It seemed to the Georgians that, if the bulk 
 of the Whig party could also not be trusted, true 
 southerners must fall back on the final defence offered 
 
 47 The Georgia delegation included Senators Berrien and W. C. Daw¬ 
 son, the latter a Whig who had replaced H. V. Johnson, after the latter 
 had filled out the unexpired portion of Colquitt’s term. In the House 
 were the Whigs, Toombs, Stephens, and A. F. Owen; T. B. King, the 
 fourth Whig, resigned in order to represent the President in California. 
 In the House also were the Union Democrats, Cobb and T. C. Hackett 
 (the latter succeeded J. H. Lumpkin) and the southern-rights Demo¬ 
 crats, Haralson and M. J. Wellborn. 
 
 48 There were two versions as to why this had occurred. See, for the 
 southern accounts, Coleman, Crittenden, I. 364, 366; Phillips, Robert 
 Toombs, pp. 65. 66; for the northern account, Thurlow Weed, Auto¬ 
 biography, pp. 590, 591; Giddings, History of the Rebellion, p. 308. 
 
 4B Toombs to Crittenden, April 23, 1850, Crittenden MSS. 
 
238 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 by a unified southern party. They put the test at once 
 to the Whigs, assembled in caucus on December 1. 
 Their efifort to pledge the party against the Proviso 
 failed, even with the southern members, most of the 
 latter still desiring to evade the issue. Toombs, 
 Stephens, Owen and three others thereupon withdrew 
 from the caucus and, for the time being, from the 
 party. 50 The Georgia Whig congressmen, after tak¬ 
 ing an active part against the southern movement in 
 the state campaign during the fall, had apparently 
 joined that very movement immediately upon reaching 
 Washington. 
 
 The House and Senate met for organization on 
 December 3. The former was immediately involved 
 in a bitter struggle over the election of a Speaker, each 
 party being desirous of controlling the appointment of 
 committees dealing with matters relating to the sec¬ 
 tional controversy. In the course of this struggle 
 Toombs, supported by Stephens and Owen, became the 
 very leader of the “Fire-eaters” in the House, who de¬ 
 manded that no member unfriendly to the South should 
 secure the coveted position. He boldly demanded 
 compromise or disunion and startled the House with 
 perhaps the greatest display of oratorical fireworks 
 which that body had ever beheld. 51 After protracted 
 parliamentary procedure, however, the Democrats 
 finally secured the election, placing another Georgian, 
 Howell Cobb, in the chair. Cobb, true to his role as a 
 conservative, had remained calm, the while his Whig 
 colleagues became excited, and used his influence to 
 
 60 Ibid. 
 
 61 Congressional Globe, 31 Congress, 1 Session, pp. 27, 28; Phillips, 
 Robert Toombs, pp. 68-72. Toombs’ efforts were “magnificent” or 
 “boisterous,” as one wished to view them. Cf. Phillips, Toombs, p. 72, 
 and Giddings, History of the Rebellion, pp. 307, 308. 
 
WINTER WEATHER, 1849-1850 
 
 239 
 
 harmonize his party at the very time that Toombs and 
 Stephens seemed about to disrupt theirs. 52 
 
 Meanwhile, the Senate was being deluged with 
 bills, resolutions, and debates relating to all phases of 
 the slavery controversy. The friends of Taylor’s ad¬ 
 ministration were urging his general plan, which was 
 simply to close the whole controversy over the terri¬ 
 tories by the prompt admission of California and New 
 Mexico into the Union. 53 The southern-rights men 
 would oppose this as a “Proviso in disguise,” since 
 California had adopted a free-state constitution, but 
 the President hoped the southern Whigs would sup¬ 
 port the plan in order to end the struggle and quiet the 
 country. 
 
 The conservative Whigs back in the Georgia legis¬ 
 lature were indeed, as has been noted, actually favor¬ 
 ing the admission of California at that very moment, 
 on the terms that the President proposed; and the 
 Georgia Whig editors desired it for the same reasons 
 as those which motivated the President. The attitude 
 of southern senators at Washington, however, was 
 another matter; and it soon became apparent that 
 many of them, including Berrien and Dawson, would 
 not accept the President’s formula. Its very simplicity 
 now rendered it unacceptable. The excitement of the 
 early debates tended now to make the southern Whigs 
 ask more than the President offered. It was becom¬ 
 ing increasingly obvious that, if the Union was to be 
 saved, the entire slavery controversy must be settled. 
 
 62 Congressional Globe, 31 Congress, 1 Session, p. 67; Cobb to his 
 wife, December 22, 1849, Toombs, Stephens, and Cobb Correspondence, 
 
 p. 180. 
 
 “ For the defence of Taylor’s plan, see J. S. Pike, First Blows of the 
 Civil War, (New York, 1879), pp. 22, 53, 55, 64; also the daily issues 
 of the Washington Republic, e.g., that of April 24, 1850. 
 
240 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 California’s admission must be made contingent upon 
 some general solution of the whole problem. 
 
 This attitude led Clay to introduce in the Senate, 
 on January 28, 1850, his famous “Compromise” or 
 “Omnibus” bill, which provided for the admission of 
 California as a free state, the organization of terri¬ 
 torial governments (without mention of slavery) in 
 Deseret (Utah) and New Mexico, the compensation 
 of Texas for lands surrendered to the latter, and the 
 passage of a more stringent fugitive slave law. Most 
 of the Whigs and conservative Democrats came even¬ 
 tually to support this formula, although Berrien of 
 Georgia, as a southern-rights Whig, opposed it on the 
 ground that it did not offer enough to the South. He 
 called the attention of the Senate to the pending reso¬ 
 lution in the Georgia legislature relating to the admis¬ 
 sion of California and warned his colleagues that his 
 state would soon “take a tone much higher” in defence 
 of southern rights. 54 
 
 Proposals similar to those introduced by Clay were 
 in due time made in the House and received there the 
 support of the same conservative elements in both par¬ 
 ties that upheld them in the Senate. Cobb and Hack- 
 ett, of Georgia, naturally welcomed the proposal of a 
 general solution, although Haralson and Wellborn 
 opposed it. Toombs, despite his fierce oratory, and 
 Stephens, despite his pessimism concerning the out¬ 
 come of the whole issue, 55 displayed a willingness to 
 
 54 Philadelphia North American, February 13, 1850. 
 
 55 Stephens’ attitude in December and January was, in some ways, 
 more extreme than that of Toombs. He despaired of the preservation 
 of the Union, and decided that secession was inevitable, sooner or later. 
 Nevertheless, he refused to hasten the issue after the manner of Calhoun, 
 Rhett, Benning, et. al. He gave as his reason for not doing so the fear 
 that the radicals in Georgia, e.g., while capable of starting a revolution. 
 
WINTER WEATHER, 1849-1850 
 
 241 
 
 accept the compromise plan. As late as the middle of 
 February, Stephens organized in the House a series 
 of filibusters which prevented the separate admission 
 of California as a free-state, but he was already pre¬ 
 pared to vote for its admission, provided this was 
 coupled with other schemes of compromise he favored. 
 For this reason, he condemned the California resolu¬ 
 tion then pending in the Georgia legislature, since that 
 resolution made no allowance for any general compro¬ 
 mise to which the admission of California might be 
 attached. 56 
 
 The prospects for compromise improved as the 
 winter drew to a close. Progress on Clay’s plan was 
 slow because of administrative opposition and the 
 necessity for considering other proposed plans of com¬ 
 promise, plans such as that offered by Bell, of Tenn¬ 
 essee, which focused attention on Texas rather than 
 California. But early in March a series of great 
 speeches in the Senate culminated in Calhoun’s final 
 appeal for northern justice and southern solidarity 
 and in Webster’s great appeal for the Union. 
 Webster’s “Seventh of March Speech” seemed to as¬ 
 sure southern “moderadoes” of the support of north¬ 
 ern conservatives and was therefore the most encour¬ 
 aging sign of compromise which had yet been dis¬ 
 played. 57 The death of Calhoun, coming a few days 
 
 were not capable of building up a good government. See A. H. Stephens 
 to Linton Stephens, January IS, February 10, 1850, in Johnston and 
 Browne, Alexander H. Stephens, pp. 244, 245, 247; see also p. 265. Cf. 
 Pendleton, Alexander H. Stephens, pp. 95-99. 
 
 “A. H. Stephens to Linton Stephens, February 20, 1850, Johnston 
 and Browne, op. cit., p. 250; A. H. Stephens, War Between the States, 
 II. 201-205, 232. 
 
 " See H. D. Foster, “Webster’s Seventh of March Speech, and the 
 Secession Movement, 1850,” American Historical Review, XXVII. 
 255-264. For Bell’s compromise plan and comment thereon by the 
 Georgia Congressmen, see Sioussat, “Tennessee, the Compromise of 
 1850, and the Nashville Convention,” Mississippi Valley Historical 
 Review, II. 324-327. 
 
242 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 later, softened to some extent the asperities of per¬ 
 sonal feeling which had been so aroused in the course 
 of the debates. As the spring progressed the hopes of 
 the conservatives continued to rise. 
 
 It remained to be seen what effect the congres¬ 
 sional debates, and concomitant developments in the 
 legislatures of the southern states, would have upon 
 the country at large. In the North the press displayed 
 increasing apprehension of a real secession move¬ 
 ment, 58 though as late as February 4 one northern 
 observer complacently remarked that “Disunion, as a 
 remedy now for any governmental evil, has never en¬ 
 tered the minds of one half-dozen sane persons in the 
 United States.” 59 The tactics of “the Terrible Toombs” 
 particularly alarmed the northern conservatives, and 
 brought down upon his head and that of Stephens 
 the most bitter condemnation. 60 As a result of just 
 such alarm as the Georgians inspired, the northern 
 moderates became aroused to the danger of the situ¬ 
 ation and expressed themselves in a number of great 
 “Union Meetings,” which did much to reassure the 
 conservatives of the South. Curiously enough, the 
 chief northern editor who did not condemn Toombs 
 was the extreme abolitionist, Garrison, who welcomed 
 the Georgian’s warnings as indications that bloodshed 
 and civil war would soon begin at the capitol. 61 
 
 68 New York Herald, January 21; Washington Daily Union, January 
 23; Philadelphia Bulletin, February 1, etc. 
 
 59 Philadelphia Public Ledger, February 4, 1850; see also Philadelphia 
 North American, December 5, 1849; Columbus Ohio Statesman, March 
 1, 1850. 
 
 00 Cleveland Plain Dealer, March 27; Columbus Ohio State Journal, 
 July 20, 1850; Philadelphia North American, December 15, 1849. The 
 Boston Courier termed Toombs and Stephens “swaggering Boabdils— 
 mere bluffers,” and observed kindly that the “gasconading of such empty 
 headed brawlers is equalled only by their poltroonery when danger is at 
 hand.” (Courier, January 2, 1850). Cf. Benjamin Brawley, A Social 
 History of the American Negro, p. 128. 
 
 61 Boston Liberator, December 11, 21, 1849, March 29, 1850. 
 
WINTER WEATHER, 1849-1850 
 
 243 
 
 The southern Whig press, outside of Georgia, 
 tended to condemn the Georgia Whigs for deserting 
 their party, though such criticism was not so severe as 
 that voiced in the North. 62 Only in Georgia did the 
 Whigs tend to support Toombs and Stephens; 63 but 
 here, as elsewhere in the South, the southern-rights 
 Democrats rallied to them as new converts to the 
 Cause. 64 
 
 Press opinion in the North was unfavorable to 
 the Georgia legislature for the same reasons that it 
 was unfavorable to the Georgia congressmen. The 
 radical bills and resolutions debated by the legislature 
 were regarded by some of the northern Democratic 
 journals as so many serious warnings to the North. 
 The resolution calling upon Georgia congressmen to 
 leave Washington in case the Proviso passed was 
 viewed by the New York Herald as an indication of 
 what all southern congressmen would do in such an 
 emergency. 65 Northern Whig papers, however, con¬ 
 sidered the legislature violent and unrepresentative 
 of the mass of the Georgia people. It was accused of 
 planning secession in case California was admitted. 66 
 The retaliatory bill providing for the taxation of 
 northern goods was ridiculed with some bitterness. 
 This measure had included, when introduced, not only 
 a tax of fifty per cent, on all such goods sold in Geor¬ 
 gia, but also provisions that no Georgia taxpayer should 
 spend more than fifteen days in the North in any one 
 
 62 Washington (N. C.) Whig, December 12, 1849, in Washington (D. 
 C.) Republican, January 11, 1850; Mobile Daily Advertiser, January 1, 
 1850; New Orleans Bulletin, in Augusta Chronicle, December 25, 1849, 
 etc. 
 
 63 Columbus Enquirer, December 12; Augusta Chronicle, December 8, 
 11, 20, 1849, etc. 
 
 64 Georgian, December 20; Federal Union, December 18, 1849. 
 
 06 New York Herald, January 9, 1850. 
 
 6,1 Boston Courier, January 2, 1850; Philadelphia North American, 
 February 21, 1850. 
 
244 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 year 67 and that Georgia lawyers must not defend free- 
 state men in the state courts. 68 It was, therefore, a 
 general “non-intercourse” bill. The comment of the 
 Boston Courier was not such as to improve feeling in 
 Georgia. This bill, it declared: 
 
 was a remedy that would carry away the patient. How Geor¬ 
 gians will enjoy paying more than any one else for manufac¬ 
 tured goods. Then, too, it will help Georgia credit so much 
 in the North! As for not spending more than 15 days in the 
 North, what Georgian would want to go so many miles away 
 from mosquitoes and yellow fever, when there is so much tax¬ 
 ation and hard labor at home? Yea, let Georgia pass her law, 
 build a Chinese Wall and discover which end of the Union it 
 will hurt the most ! 69 
 
 Within Georgia the Democratic press, save for one 
 or two papers in Upper Georgia, such as the Athens 
 Banner, generally supported the southern-rights ma¬ 
 jority in the legislature. California, it was agreed 
 must not be admitted, and all good southerners should 
 join the Democrats in this struggle.' 0 The attitude 
 of the Georgia Whig press towards the legislature, 
 on the other hand, generally reflected that of the con¬ 
 servative Whig members of that body. The first seven 
 of the ten resolutions were approved, but there was im¬ 
 mediate and indignant disapproval of the California 
 clauses in the eighth resolution and in the state con¬ 
 vention bill. 
 
 The attitude of the Whig press underwent an inter¬ 
 esting evolution during the course of the winter. As 
 late as the beginning of December, the conservative 
 Chronicle, it will be recalled, had claimed that no crisis 
 was at hand and that excitement was dangerous and 
 
 67 Probably an expression of Democratic resentment against the cus¬ 
 tom of wealthy Whigs, of spending the summer in the North. 
 
 68 Boston Courier, December 28, 1849. 
 
 88 Ibid. 
 
 70 Federal Union, November 27; Georgian, December 27, 1849. 
 
WINTER WEATHER, 1849-1850 
 
 245 
 
 uncalled for. By the end of the month, however, 
 events in Congress seem to have convinced even this 
 journal that the House might be determined to pass 
 the Proviso. This was the signal for a potential unity 
 against the measure that was impressive. When even 
 the Chronicle admitted that the country might be “on 
 the eve of a great political convulsion and funds may 
 be necessary to protect our honor and our interests,’’ 71 
 it was certain that all Georgia, save perhaps some 
 mountain districts in Cherokee, was ready for final 
 resistance to the Proviso. At the same time that the 
 Whig papers took decided ground for final resistance 
 to the Proviso, they displayed a consistent desire for 
 any possible adjustment that was not dishonorable to 
 the South. Because of this general attitude, the Whig 
 editors seized with avidity upon any sign that the sec¬ 
 tional struggle could be adjusted. They continued not 
 only to approve Taylor’s statehood plan but to believe 
 that he would veto the Proviso if it reached him. 72 
 Reports began to reach Georgia as early as the first 
 week in February that Congress would probably pass a 
 compromise measure. The Chronicle was able by that 
 time to observe quite cheerfully that “the essential 
 differences between the North and the South are so 
 slight in view of ultimate consequences . . . that time 
 and the natural course of events are rapidly settling 
 the whole question.” 73 In all these opinions, the op¬ 
 timistic conservatism of the Georgia Whig editors was 
 in marked contrast to the pessimistic excitement dis¬ 
 played at Washington by the Georgia Whig congress¬ 
 men. 
 
 71 Chronicle, December 28, 1849. 
 
 ™News, January 22, 1850. 
 
 73 Chronicle, February 9, 1850. 
 
24 6 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 The reaction of the Whig papers to Clay’s “Com¬ 
 promise,” and to Webster’s conciliatory “Seventh of 
 March Speech,” was prompt and enthusiastic. Dr. 
 Daniel Lee, editor of the Chronicle, left Augusta for 
 Washington in mid-January to report directly upon 
 congressional developments, and his wire praising 
 Clay’s Omnibus scheme was the first news thereon to 
 reach Georgia. 74 When Webster’s speech was re¬ 
 ported, the Chronicle could not find words to express 
 its “high gratification.” The Proviso was now cer¬ 
 tainly dead. Calhoun’s speech urging a dual executive 
 scheme to protect the South, on the other hand, was 
 immediately condemned as “impracticable.” 75 “Great 
 Lhiion Meetings” in New York and Philadelphia also 
 offered assurance of the desire of northern conserva¬ 
 tives for compromise, and such assurance was perhaps 
 more potent than the speech of any one man, even 
 though that man was Webster. 76 
 
 The southern-rights papers, as would be expected, 
 praised Calhoun’s last great speech and continued to 
 deny that he was a disunionist. Calhoun, the Federal 
 Union observed, loved the Union, but “saw further 
 into the future” than did the southern conservatives, 
 a verdict with which posterity would probably agree. 77 
 Webster’s speech also received some moderate praise, 
 but the Clay Omnibus plan was immediately and em¬ 
 phatically condemned. It “yielded nothing to the 
 South” and was therefore “insulting” and “no com- 
 
 u Chronicle, January 30; Republican, February 1, 1850. 
 
 ,5 Chronicle, March 9, 12; Columbus Enquirer, March 12; Republican, 
 March 9, 1850. 
 
 78 Cobb later expressed the opinion that the northern “Union Meet¬ 
 ings” were the most potent factor in giving the Georgia conservatives 
 the necessary assurances early in the controversy; see Washington Union, 
 December 19, 1850. 
 
 77 Federal Union, March 19, 1850. 
 
WINTER WEATHER, 1849-1850 
 
 247 
 
 promise.” 78 The opinions of the New York Sun and 
 London Times, to the effect that the final destruction 
 of slavery was inherent in the plan, were quoted with 
 approval. If the South accepted a “Compromise” in 
 which she made all the concessions, it would be but 
 another step to the “final concession.” 79 The north¬ 
 ern “Union Meetings” were hailed as encouraging 
 signs, indicative of southern wrongs and southern 
 earnestness, but they were no excuse for accepting 
 the humiliating Omnibus plan. Indeed, these very 
 meetings offered evidence of the effectiveness of the 
 strong southern protest, which must not be abandoned 
 as soon as it began to prove of value. If even the 
 Yankees were beginning to appreciate southern claims, 
 then “palsied be the tongue within her borders that 
 would stifle her complaints.” 80 The knowledge that 
 Toombs and Stephens would probably accept the Omni¬ 
 bus, first suggested in Toombs’ letter of March 11 to 
 Governor Towns, was therefore a shock and a disap¬ 
 pointment to the southern-rights journals. The Au¬ 
 gusta Constitutionalist immediately condemned 
 Toombs as a hypocrite, who was “blowing hot and 
 by claiming that it was poorly attended. 86 
 
 In its confidence, expressed early in February, 
 that the difficulties between the North and the South 
 could be adjusted nicely within the Union, the Chron¬ 
 icle had depended upon “an abiding faith in the com¬ 
 mon sense of the Georgia people.” This was another 
 way of expressing a belief in the conservatism and 
 union-loving qualities of these people. After all, it 
 
 w Federal Union, February 5; Georgian, February 5, 1850. 
 
 ’"‘News, February 8, 1850. 
 
 80 Federal Union, March 5, 1850. 
 
 81 Constitutionalist, in the Federal Union, March 26, 1850. For 
 Toombs’ letter, which was in reply to Towns’ transmission of the Legis¬ 
 lature’s resolutions, see the National Intelligencer, March 26, 1850. 
 
248 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 was not what editors and politicians thought, but what 
 the masses thought, which would finally determine 
 whether Georgia would accept an adjustment or 
 whether she would take extreme measures. It is essen¬ 
 tial, then, to consider the real state of public opinion in 
 the state during the winter of 1850. The phenomena 
 to be considered are the county meetings, the estimates 
 made by contemporary editors and other observers, one 
 special election held in Georgia late in February, and, 
 most important of all, the Nashville convention elec¬ 
 tions. 
 
 Late in December, several county meetings, some 
 Whig and some non-partisan, were held, chiefly in the 
 coastal counties of Glynn and McIntosh. These were 
 called in order to support the stand taken by Toombs 
 and Stephens in Congress and to demand final resis¬ 
 tance to the Proviso should it pass. The Chronicle 
 opposed such meetings, but the Republican praised 
 them as a sign that both parties were united for ulti¬ 
 mate resistance to that measure. 82 
 
 After the December excitement in Congress had 
 passed, the press dispatches being less alarming for 
 the moment, there seem to have been few or no 
 county meetings in January. The people were either 
 indifferent or were waiting to see what Congress 
 and the legislature would do. Early in February, 
 after the eighth resolution had passed in the latter 
 body and Clay’s compromise had been introduced 
 at Washington, efforts were made to get up southern- 
 rights meetings in Bibb and Monroe Counties in Cen¬ 
 tral Georgia. These were intended to praise the ten 
 resolutions and to condemn the “Compromise.” The 
 Chronicle claimed that both of the attempted meetings 
 were failures. The evidence that the Monroe meet- 
 
 82 Republican, January 17, 1850. 
 
WINTER WEATHER, 1849-1850 
 
 249 
 
 ing proved a fiasco is indeed clear; it was so admitted, 
 even by the radical papers. The Forsyth Bee 83 gave 
 the following account of the situation in the heart of 
 Central Georgia in February: 
 
 With shame and mortification we have to record the humi¬ 
 liating fact that the Southern meeting advertised to come off 
 yesterday turned out to be an entire failure. No interest was 
 manifested by any one. When we take into consideration the 
 vast interests at stake ... we are overwhelmed with 
 astonishment at the apathy and indifference manifested by the 
 good citizens of Monroe. . . . Is it because they are want¬ 
 
 ing in patriotism?—we hope not. Is it because they are recreant 
 to their own interests? But talk will do no good. We have 
 tried it and are heartily sick of it. ‘Ephraim is joined to his 
 idols .’ 84 
 
 This popular indifference to southern-rights appeals 
 in Monroe must have characterized the men of both 
 parties, for Monroe had only a very slight majority of 
 Whig voters 85 and was surrounded on three sides 
 by the tier of Democratic counties that ran athwart 
 Central Georgia. 
 
 Early in March interest in public meetings was 
 transferred to Upper Georgia. On March 5 a gen¬ 
 eral non-partisan meeting of conservatives was held 
 at Cassville, Cass County, which adopted resolutions 
 condemning the Nashville convention and the proposed 
 state convention. These resolutions asserted the right 
 of California to admission and expressed a “strong 
 attachment” to the Union. “We pledge ourselves,” 
 they continued, “to support the President in using all 
 constitutional means in his power to protect it from 
 
 83 An independent journal of southern-rights sympathies. 
 
 81 Forsythe Bee, February 6, in National Intelligencer, February 23, 
 1850. 
 
 85 In the gubernatorial election of 1847 (the last one in Georgia 
 largely unaffected by national issues) Monroe gave 670 Democratic and 
 688 Whig votes; Georgian, October 13, 1848. 
 
250 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 violence for any cause now known to us.” This meet¬ 
 ing attracted wide attention in the North, where the 
 Whig papers viewed it as a sign of Georgia conser¬ 
 vatism. Some Democratic editors decried it, however, 
 by claiming that it was poorly attended. 86 
 
 Further evidence of strong Union feeling among 
 both parties in Upper Georgia was afforded early in 
 March by a pronunciamento from the grand jury of 
 the superior court in Gwinnet County, in the Cherokee 
 Circuit, which expressed an “abhorrence” of the idea 
 of disunion and exhorted all “not to give up the ship 
 of state.” 87 A correspondent of Cobb in Upper Geor¬ 
 gia wrote him March 10 that the whole slavery contro¬ 
 versy had been “perhaps less anxiously watched” in 
 that section of the state than elsewhere. 88 The Ma¬ 
 rietta Helicon listed counties which it was already 
 sure were certain to oppose disunion. 89 
 
 To cap the climax, reports began to come down 
 state that political leaders in the hill counties were tell¬ 
 ing the people there that, as non-slaveholders, they 
 had no interest in the general slavery controversy. 
 Such speakers declared that if the southern-rights men 
 brought on a conflict with the North, “they (the Up- 
 Country men) would have to fight the battles of the 
 lordly slave owners.” A certain Judge Wright was 
 particularly active along this line in meetings at Dah- 
 lonega and in Cumming. “These reports,” declared 
 the Federal Union in some alarm, “have been coming 
 in for some time.” 90 
 
 86 Resolutions printed in the Washington Republic, March 14; see 
 also National Intelligencer, March 15; Washington Union, March 24, 
 Philadelphia Public Ledger, March 15, 1850. 
 
 87 Chronicle, April 5. 
 
 88 G. D. Phillips to Cobb, Habersham County, March 10, 1850, 
 Toombs, Stephens, and Cobb Correspondence, p. 185. 
 
 89 Marietta Helicon, in Mobile Daily Advertiser, April 22, 1850. 
 
 90 Federal Union, April 9, 1850. 
 
WINTER WEATHER, 1849-1850 
 
 251 
 
 Such evidence convinced the Union Democratic and 
 Whig press in Georgia that Cherokee was strongly- 
 opposed to the southern movement in February and 
 March, 1850, just as it had been during the two pre¬ 
 ceding years. The reported failure of the radical 
 meetings in Monroe and Bibb led to similar conclu¬ 
 sions with regard to Central Georgia. The Republican 
 had declared in the preceding November that the peo¬ 
 ple were tired and sick of the slavery controversy, 91 
 and the Chronicle repeated this with emphasis even in 
 February 1850. 92 The Athens Banner (Union Demo¬ 
 crat) agreed with the Chronicle that “it is an unde¬ 
 niable fact that the people of Georgia will not support 
 the demagogery of the last Legislature.” 93 In like 
 manner, Whig papers outside the state were of the 
 opinion that the Georgia congressmen did not repre¬ 
 sent the masses of their constituents. “In Georgia,” 
 observed the Advertiser in April, “a conservative 
 spirit is manifesting itself in spite of Toombs and 
 Company .” 94 
 
 On the other hand, there was some evidence during 
 the winter of 1849-50 that the idea of secession, secret¬ 
 ly supported for years by extremists, was beginning to 
 be discussed more openly than ever before. The Griffin 
 Whig was “pained to hear the subject discussed in the 
 newspapers and in social circles with so much earnest¬ 
 ness and in such seeming indifference to its continu¬ 
 ance.” Nevertheless, it considered this the work of 
 some of the “old nullifyers” who had joined the Demo¬ 
 crats in 1840 and had been admitted to leadership. 
 
 91 Republican, November 2, 1849. 
 
 92 Chronicle, February 3, 1850. 
 
 93 Ibid., March 23; see also National Intelligencer, March 25, 1850. 
 
 94 Mobile Advertiser, April 21, 1850, italics my own. See, for simi¬ 
 lar opinions, the Philadelphia Public Ledger, January 24, February 26; 
 Baltimore American, January 17, 1850. 
 
252 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 It was not a spontaneous or popular movement, this 
 journal claimed, even among the Democrats. 95 
 
 Few, if any, estimates of popular opinion in the 
 state were made by southern-rights editors during the 
 winter. Those who did claim that Georgia was “ready 
 to peril everything” or “seek desperate remedies,” us¬ 
 ually based their opinion on developments in the legis¬ 
 lature. 96 The South Carolina papers expressed a be¬ 
 lief that Georgia “was moving,” but this also was 
 based upon the doings of the legislature. A few indi¬ 
 viduals expressed qualified opinions that secessionist 
 views were becoming popular. Benning, the seces¬ 
 sionist, wrote Cobb that Union sentiment in the South 
 in general was “very unreliable.” 97 G. D. Phillips, of 
 Habersham County, also wrote Cobb on March 10 
 that he personally was “for equality or disunion” and 
 that he was sure that this was the “predominant feel¬ 
 ing in Georgia.” 98 The significance of this statement 
 depends, however, upon what he meant by “equality,” 
 which, so far as can be judged from the text of his 
 letter, implied simply a demand for compromise. 
 
 A special election was held late in February in the 
 first congressional district to choose a successor to T. 
 Butler King, the Whig representative, who had re¬ 
 signed to undertake his California mission. The result 
 of the election reversed that of 1848, the district now 
 
 05 Griffin Whig, in National Intelligencer, March 23, 24, 1850. The 
 Washington Union said that these extracts from the southern papers 
 given in the Intelligencer “garbled” the news, and “that for one extract 
 it gives from the hesitating Southern press we might present a hundred 
 of the boldest character.” (February 19, 1850). It did not present 
 them, however. 
 
 96 Federal Union, February 12; Cf. Philadelphia Public Ledger, 
 February 4, 1850. 
 
 97 Benning to Cobb. March 29, 1850, “Cobb Papers.” Georgia Historical 
 Quarterly, V. No. 3. p. 39. 
 
 98 Phillips to Cobb, Toombs. Stephens, and Cobb Correspondence, 
 p. 185. 
 
WINTER WEATHER, 1849-1850 
 
 253 
 
 giving a small majority to James W. Jackson, the 
 Democratic candidate, over Fleming, the Whig." 
 This may have indicated, in view of the issues in Con¬ 
 gress at the time and subsequent developments in 
 Lower Georgia, some growth in radical southern- 
 rights feeling in this district. 
 
 Taking into consideration all the evidence that has 
 been suggested, it would seem probable that the desire 
 for an adjustment of the national issue was stronger, 
 in the minds of the masses of Georgia people, during 
 the critical winter of 1850 than was the desire for 
 secession or other extreme measures. Despite the 
 worry occasioned among Whig leaders by the defection 
 of the Clay Whigs in 1848 and 1849, there is no reason 
 to believe that any large group of Whigs wavered in 
 the desire for conciliation in 1850, if this could be had 
 without the Proviso and therefore with honor. 100 Nor 
 were there signs of wide-spread secessionist spirit in 
 Central Georgia, even among the masses of the Demo¬ 
 crats. The evidence concerning opinion in Central 
 Georgia prior to March is, to be sure, largely of a 
 negative character, save for the failures of southern- 
 rights meetings noted. That is to say, there being no 
 positive evidence of wide-spread “extremism” among 
 the people of Central Georgia (such as had already 
 been displayed, for instance, by public meetings “in 
 many parts of South Carolina”), 101 it is probable that 
 
 90 Washington Republic, March 4, 1850. 
 
 100 The two to four thousand followers of Smythe and the Augusta 
 Republic had largely lost their identity as Whigs after going with the 
 Democrats in October, 1849. Cole reaches this opinion for the mass of 
 the southern-rights Whigs in general; Whig Party in the South, p. 162. 
 
 191 C. S. Boucher, “The Secession and Co-Operation Movements in 
 South Carolina, 1848-1852,” Washington University Studies, Humanistic 
 Series, V. No. 2, pp. 78, 79. Cf. also the evidences of how popular 
 excitement did express itself in Georgia in 1860, as given in Phillips, 
 Georgia and State Rights, p. 196. 
 
254 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 there was no such widespread extremism in existence. 
 In Lower Georgia alone was there a suggestion of in¬ 
 creasing excitement, and this suggestion is not a very 
 conclusive one. In Upper Georgia, on the other hand, 
 there was evidence that the masses of the Democrats 
 as well as the Whigs continued their traditional oppo¬ 
 sition to extremism. 
 
 This blended conservatism and indifference of the 
 Georgia masses to the secession movement was due, 
 in large part, to the growing promise of the compro¬ 
 mise movement at Washington and to those influences 
 within the state which made its people so desirous of 
 accepting compromise. A more complete statement of 
 the nature of public opinion in the state must be post¬ 
 poned, however, until the positive evidence of the 
 Nashville convention elections is considered. 
 
 The Whig papers had attempted to discourage the 
 Nashville convention movement, or else had maintained 
 a discreet silence upon it, since the preceding Novem¬ 
 ber. The Chronicle continued to question whether it 
 would ever meet. When February came, the Whig 
 editors combined opposition to the southern convention 
 with opposition to the state convention, and the sug¬ 
 gestion was soon made that the only way to redeem 
 either affair was to infuse a conservative element into 
 their respective membership. 10 " 
 
 In the meantime, five of the seven chief Democra¬ 
 tic papers in the state had enthusiastically welcomed 
 the call to the southern convention and continued to 
 advocate it vehemently through the winter. They de¬ 
 nied that it was intended to plan immediate secession, 
 but they began to declare openly that unless it forced 
 
 102 Columbus Enquirer, April 2; Chronicle, November 17, 1849, Feb¬ 
 ruary 9, April 17, 1850. 
 
WINTER WEATHER, 1849-1850 
 
 255 
 
 real and immediate concessions from the North it 
 would mean secession by the South. 103 
 
 The Athens Banner, of course, did not back the 
 convention, but it was replaced by the erstwhile Whig 
 organ, the Augusta Republic, which had become one 
 of the most militant of the southern-rights organs. 
 Smythe, its editor, supported the Nashville conven¬ 
 tion, announcing in the best oratorical style of the 
 day: “We hope for the best, but if driven to choose 
 between the Union and dishonor we will look to the 
 streaks upon the eastern sky of the South, which prom¬ 
 ise her the refulgent sun of independence.” 104 
 
 The independent Savannah News , which had 
 favored a southern convention during the winter, 
 admitted in March that such a meeting might not be 
 needed. It believed, however, that “the movement 
 has now gone so far that honor requires it be carried 
 out. Even if a Compromise is reached the Nashville 
 Convention will be useful to ratify.” 105 This was the 
 only important southern-rights paper in the state which 
 may be said to have changed its attitude because of 
 the compromise movements in Washington. 
 
 While all the radical papers mentioned favored 
 both the southern and the state conventions as essen¬ 
 tial parts of the one general southern movement, one 
 paper, the Columbus Times, favored the latter to the 
 exclusion of the former. This journal mildly opposed 
 the calling of a general southern convention to redress 
 southern wrongs. It explained that “We had rather 
 risk the decision of our own state . . . than to be 
 mixed up with others.” 106 This opposition or indiff- 
 
 103 Federal Union, March 5; Columbus Sentinel, in National Intelli¬ 
 gencer, March 19, April 11; Georgian, March 5, 1850. 
 
 104 Augusta Republic, in National Intelligencer, March 11, 1850. 
 
 105 Savannah News, March 12, 1850. 
 
 106 Columbus Times, in National Intelligencer, February 17, 1850. 
 
256 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 erence to the Nashville movement in favor of the 
 state convention, however, was unique among the chief 
 southern-rights papers. 
 
 The legislature had provided, in planning elections 
 to Nashville, that preliminary meetings were to be 
 held in each county early in March to choose delegates 
 to congressional district conventions. These, in turn,, 
 were to nominate one or more candidates from each 
 party. Then, on April 3, the voters in each county 
 would vote for two of these nominees to represent their 
 district at Nashville, one from each party. Meanwhile,, 
 the legislature was to choose two delegates-at-large. 
 As the time for the preliminary March meetings ap¬ 
 proached, the southern-rights papers appealed to the 
 people to make certain that the counties send repre¬ 
 sentatives to the district meetings. 
 
 When the time came, very few county meetings, 
 were held. The Savannah Republican claimed that 
 not more than a dozen were held and that not more 
 than one thousand voters out of some ninety-five thous¬ 
 and participated. In most counties, so few men ap¬ 
 peared that no delegates were sent to the district con¬ 
 ventions. 107 The Athens Banner gave a realistic ac¬ 
 count of an attempt to “get up” a town meeting. “At 
 3 P. M. on Saturday last,” it said, “was the hour and 
 the day appointed for a meeting of the Democratic 
 party of this city at the Town hall . . . for the pur¬ 
 pose of sending delegates to a district convention . . . 
 There seemed to be not the least interest manifested. 
 On arriving at the Town Hall we found some half 
 dozen present, and in about fifteen minutes a few more 
 entered, making a total of sixteen. The town bell was 
 rung by the marshall, but all in vain. The People 
 Would Not Come and those present broke up without 
 
 101 Republican, March 23, 1850. 
 
WINTER WEATHER, 1849-1850 
 
 257 
 
 action.” 108 Such was the character of some of the 
 few preliminary meetings held. Nevertheless, the dis¬ 
 trict meetings were held towards the end of the month 
 and nominees named for each of the eight districts. 
 Needless to say, these district conventions were not 
 representative affairs. 
 
 The real test of popular sentiment towards the 
 Nashville Convention was to be made on April 3, 
 when the people voted for the nominees. A final 
 appeal was made by the southern-rights papers for a 
 large vote. “All Georgians,” urged the Macon Tele¬ 
 graphi, “should rally around the citadel of the South” 
 by casting their votes for the candidates. 109 
 
 The result of the April election was startling, even 
 to those who had partially anticipated it. After all 
 the months of preparation, after all the struggles in 
 the legislature, and after all the fan fares of southern- 
 rights trumpets to announce its coming, the southern 
 convention election simply did not arrive! It was a 
 complete and dismal failure for the plain reason that 
 the great masses of both parties ignored it. A con¬ 
 servative estimate, based upon the press figures for 
 the different counties, would place the total number of 
 votes cast in the state at about two thousand five hun¬ 
 dred out of a total voting population of about ninety- 
 five thousand. Many counties held no election what¬ 
 ever. 110 In some cases the voters proceeded on their 
 own initiative to vote such strange yet significant 
 tickets as “No Convention,” or “No Disunion.” The 
 vote in Columbus, for instance, was listed as follows: 
 
 108 Athens Banner, in National Intelligencer, March 28, 1850. 
 
 109 Macon Telegraph, in National Intelligencer, April 11, 1850. 
 
 Banner, there were 7 which had not even opened the polls; see National 
 
 110 Of the first 25 counties listed in the returns published by the Athens 
 Intelligencer, April 17, 1850. 
 
258 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 For candidates. 113 
 
 “No Convention”. 98 
 
 “No Disunion” . 78 
 
 The normal vote of Muscogee County, wherein Co¬ 
 lumbus was located, was about one thousand nine hun¬ 
 dred. 111 
 
 A noticeable feature of the returns was the fact 
 that the insignificance of the vote cast was due almost, 
 if not quite, as much to Democratic as to Whig in¬ 
 difference. 112 The vote in Coastal Georgia, both in 
 Chatham (Savannah) and other counties, was pro¬ 
 portionately higher than in the other sections, and 
 these were Whig counties. 
 
 The Whig and Union Democratic press was filled 
 for the next week with ironical accounts and com¬ 
 ments upon the indifference displayed towards the 
 convention. The election was a “farce,” a “flash in the 
 pan,” an “abortion”—and such other phrases as came 
 to the heads of triumphant and metaphorically- 
 
 111 A few county votes may be noted, which are illustrative of results 
 in the several sections of the state; for complete figures see National 
 Intelligencer, April 17, 1850. It may be noted that the vote in Coastal 
 Georgia was proportionately higher than in the other sections. 
 
 Votes Cast 
 
 Normal Vote 
 
 Usual 
 
 Majority Party 
 
 Upper Georgia 
 
 Floyd . 
 
 53 
 
 1,300 
 
 Dem. 
 
 Lumpkin. 
 
 27 
 
 1,500 
 
 Dem. 
 
 Paulding. 
 
 no polls 
 
 
 Dem. 
 
 Central Georgia 
 
 Jasper . 
 
 89 
 
 1,000 
 
 Dem. 
 
 Hancock . 
 
 42 
 
 800 
 
 Whig 
 
 Pike . 
 
 29 
 
 500 
 
 Whig 
 
 Troup . 
 
 14 
 
 1,500 
 
 Whig 
 
 Oglethorpe . 
 
 no polls 
 
 
 Whig 
 
 Coastal Georgia 
 
 Chatham (Savannah) 
 
 439 
 
 1,400 
 
 Whig 
 
 McIntosh . 
 
 43 
 
 165 
 
 Whig 
 
 Pine Barrens 
 
 Emanuel . 
 
 no polls 
 
 
 Dem. 
 
 Effingham. 
 
 18 
 
 260 
 
 Whig 
 
 lu Cf. Cole, Whig Party in the South, 
 
 p. 170. 
 
 
WINTER WEATHER, 1849-1850 
 
 259 
 
 minded editors. The southern-rights press was goaded 
 with ironical comment and inquiry. “The mountain 
 labored and brought forth a mouse,” observed the 
 Griffin Whig. “The whole affair fell still-born,” com¬ 
 mented the Washington Gazette. “We were told by 
 people abroad,” said the Cassville Standard, “that 
 there has been more excitement in this county (Cass) 
 than in any other part of the state. Yet 2,000 of our 
 2,300 voters staid at home and let the golden calf of 
 the new-light have its tinsel rubbed off! Oh, naughty 
 people !” 113 The Chronicle demanded that the Charles¬ 
 ton Mercury, which had declared “Georgia is moving,” 
 should “now inform its readers which way she has 
 moved.” The Nashville convention, all agreed, was 
 now a dead affair in Georgia, and it was doubtful if 
 the state would be represented therein. 114 
 
 The reaction of the southern-rights press was va¬ 
 ried. Several papers frankly recognized that the peo¬ 
 ple had defeated the whole convention movement and 
 that the vote indicated indifference or opposition to 
 the southern movement. “We could weep over the 
 divisions in the South if it would do any good,” ex¬ 
 claimed the Augusta Republic in considering the fail¬ 
 ures of the preliminary meetings. 115 The Savannah 
 News, silent for some weeks after the elections, finally 
 admitted that the elections were “humiliating” and 
 marvelled at the “strange apathy of the Georgia peo¬ 
 ple.” It came to feel that the southern convention 
 should never be held if it was to be unrepresentative. 116 
 
 113 Chronicle, April 11, 1850. 
 
 114 For these and other quotations from the Georgia press, see the 
 National Intelligencer, March 29, April 4, 7, 11, 13 and 18; the Wash¬ 
 ington Republic, April 15, and 16, 1850. The Washington Union again 
 claimed that the Intelligencer was “garbeling” the Georgia press, but 
 cited no evidence. {Union, April 7.) 
 
 115 Augusta Republic, in National Intelligencer, March 29, 1850. 
 
 116 News, May 20, June 13, 1850. 
 
260 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 In like manner, the Constitutionalist frankly admitted 
 that “the meager vote given for delegates ... is a 
 virtual defeat of the Southern Convention movement 
 in Georgia. So far as this state is concerned, we look 
 upon it as dead and buried.” 117 On the other hand, 
 the Charleston Mercury denied that the election had 
 much significance, 118 and the Georgian retorted hotly 
 to enemy taunts, appealing to its co-workers to carry 
 on for the Cause. 119 
 
 The fact that the southern-rights press had failed 
 to represent and had been entirely out of touch with 
 popular opinion was very obvious. The explanation 
 of the results made by these editors is interesting. 
 Some said, for example the News, that the results 
 were due to the inexplicable and incredible “apathy” 
 of the people. The Federal Union, however, admitted 
 on the morning of the election that the vote would be 
 light because of the following factors: (1) the con¬ 
 tinued faith of some Whigs in President Taylor and 
 hope for his favor; (2) the mistaken fear in both 
 parties that the convention was a secessionist move; 
 and (3) a belief that an adjustment could be reached 
 in Congress. A week after the election, it made the 
 added discovery that (4) the lack of opposition be¬ 
 tween the candidates deprived the election of interest 
 and therefore lessened the number of votes cast. 120 
 
 The only other factor suggested by journals of this 
 group at the time of the election was that stated by 
 the Montgomery (Alabama) Atlas, which blamed the 
 defeat in Georgia upon “the indifference of the ignor¬ 
 ant mass, who are illiterate or take no papers. Many 
 did not know there was to be a Nashville Conven- 
 
 m Constitutionalist, in National Intelligencer, April 18. 
 
 u8 Charleston Mercury, April 13, 1850. 
 
 119 Georgian, April 13, 1850. 
 
 120 Federal Union, April 2, 9, 1850. 
 
WINTER WEATHER, 1849-1850 
 
 261 
 
 lion.” 121 There was probably some truth in the belief 
 that many Democrats who did not take the papers 
 were, for this reason, out off touch with the pro-cor^ , - 
 vention propaganda and consequently indifferent to it. 
 A farmer in Forsyth County, for instance, who wrote 
 that people there did not “take the papers,” remarked 
 that they “could not see that Congress had yet done 
 anything against them, and until it did they would 
 behave themselves.” “We hope,” he concluded ironi¬ 
 cally, “that our city editors, who know everything 
 about ‘Southern Rights,’ and all that, will inform us 
 what the correct doctrine is.” 122 
 
 The conservative press interpreted the popular in¬ 
 difference to the election as being due primarily to “a 
 general conviction that the irritating questions will be 
 settled satisfactorily at the present session of Con¬ 
 gress.” As a secondary cause, they mentioned the be¬ 
 lief that in any case the Nashville meeting would be too 
 unrepresentative of the South to function successfully 
 as a southern convention. 
 
 It is an interesting fact that none of the chief 
 papers, not even the southern-rights journals, sug¬ 
 gested until some time after the election that the people 
 might have ignored Nashville because their interest 
 had been drawn exclusively to the state convention 
 project. 123 This silence, combined with the fact that, 
 prior to the election, the southern-rights papers asso¬ 
 ciated the state and the Nashville conventions together 
 as two great phases of the same southern movement, 
 would seem to indicate that the repudiation of the 
 Nashville convention was, at least to a large extent, a 
 repudiation of the southern movement in general. It 
 
 m Montgomery (Ala.) Atlas, in Chronicle, April 23. 
 
 ™ Chronicle, April 7, 1850. 
 
 123 The Columbus Times may have been an exception to this. No 
 files of this paper for 1850 have been examined by the author. 
 
262 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 is significant that the Federal Union itself blamed the 
 result of the April elections in part upon the popular 
 impression, which it said existed in both parties, that 
 the Nashville convention might lead to disunion. The 
 implication concerning the popular opinion of disunion 
 is obvious enough. 
 
 The evidence of the March and April elections, 
 then, would seem to corroborate other evidence already 
 considered in support of the conclusion that a majority 
 of both parties in Georgia either desired compromise, 
 or else were indifferent to the whole controversy, dur¬ 
 ing the winter and spring of 1850. There is evidence, 
 moreover, that during this period the masses of those 
 interested were confident that the compromise they 
 desired could actually be attained. 124 
 
 The indifference or opposition to the secession 
 movement was displayed, it is to be remembered, de¬ 
 spite the inflammatory speeches of the Georgia con¬ 
 gressmen, despite the radical measures of the legisla¬ 
 ture, and despite the excited appeal of the southern- 
 rights editors. The unrepresentative character of the 
 legislature is to be explained in part by the fact that it 
 was chosen during the fall of 1849, when the passage 
 of the Proviso in the coming Congress seemed immi¬ 
 nent and when feeling in the state was consequently 
 becoming warmer. Under these circumstances, an un¬ 
 usually large number of southern-rights men secured 
 election to office in the legislature. This body, having 
 worked itself up to a white heat in December, stayed 
 hot all winter, the while the people cooled off with the 
 progress of the compromise movement at Washington. 
 
 Cf. H. D. Foster, “Webster’s Seventh of March Speech and the 
 Secession Movement, 1850,” American Historical Review, XVII. 250, 251, 
 (January, 1922). The view is here taken that there was imminent dan¬ 
 ger of secession in Georgia throughout the year 1850, until the fall 
 campaign for the Union stemmed the secession tide. 
 
WINTER WEATHER, 1849-1850 
 
 263 
 
 Members of the legislature were by the very nature of 
 their position, moreover, more apt to be agitated by 
 each new development in the sectional controversy than 
 were the people back on the farms. So, too, were the 
 southern-rights editors, who followed each new phase 
 of that controversy with intense interest and who were 
 inclined to express the opinions of politicians there¬ 
 upon, rather than those of the masses. 125 
 
 It is small wonder that these editors “saw further,” 
 as they put it, than did many of their own readers— 
 small wonder that such men pushed so far out in front 
 of the southern-rights parade that they ceased to lead 
 those who were supposed to be following them. This 
 whole situation was to become more obvious as the 
 year progressed, and as the secessionists made their 
 final appeal to Georgia to “lead off.” 
 
 125 This tendency of the editors to express the views of politicians 
 rather than of the people, was realized and regretted by some of the 
 abler papers of the time; see, e.g., the citicisms of the press in the 
 Savannah Georgian, January 29; Charleston Mercury, January 26, 1848. 
 
CHAPTER VII 
 
 THE CLEARING, 1850 
 
 As a result of the insignificant vote cast in the 
 April election, the Whigs questioned whether any dele¬ 
 gation should be sent from Georgia to Nashville, and 
 most of their delegates proceeded to resign or failed at 
 the last moment to go. There was little or no inclina¬ 
 tion among the Georgia Whigs, as there was among 
 their brethren in Mississippi and Alabama, 1 to attend 
 simply in order to prevent mischief. Some of the 
 Georgia Democratic delegates also declined to attend. 
 When notice of resignation was given in time, Gover¬ 
 nor Towns exercised his power, granted by legislative 
 provision, to appoint a successor from the party to 
 which the delegate belonged. 2 
 
 The difficulties of securing a delegation is illus¬ 
 trated by the case of the first district. Here W. J. 
 Lawton was suggested as a Democratic delegate, but 
 declined the honor. Old Governor Troup, whose name 
 the Georgia Whigs had once used as their party appel¬ 
 lation, was then elected for this place, his letters to the 
 press having identified him with the extremist ele¬ 
 ment. At the last moment, however, he was prevented 
 from going to Nashville by illness in his family. J. H. 
 Cooper, who had been chosen as his Whig colleague, 
 also finally refused to attend. The first district 
 
 1 Cole, Whig Party in the South, p. 171. 
 
 2 Of the eight Whigs originally elected only one, M. P. Crawford, 
 of the second district, actually attended. The other seven resigned or 
 failed to appear. Two of the Whig substitutes appointed by Towns did 
 attend. In three districts, the sixth, seventh, and eighth, the Democratic 
 as well as the Whig delegates declined to go and had to be replaced 
 by Towns’ appointees. 
 
THE CLEARING, 1850 265 
 
 (Lower Georgia) was, therefore, entirely unrepre¬ 
 sented. 3 
 
 Prior to the election of the district delegates, the 
 legislature had chosen as delegates-at-large the south¬ 
 ern-rights Democrats McDonald and McAllister, typi¬ 
 cal Georgia “fire-eaters.” McAllister declined the 
 honor and was replaced by ex-Senator Colquitt. The 
 Georgia delegation that actually attended at Nashville, 
 then, consisted finally of eight southern-rights Demo¬ 
 crats and three Whigs, and was led by the able seces¬ 
 sionists, H. L. Benning and Charles J. McDonald. It 
 was, therefore, largely unrepresentative of the mass of 
 the Georgia people who had nominally chosen the 
 members. 4 
 
 Between the time of the April elections and the 
 date set for the meeting of the southern convention at 
 Nashville there was something of a lull in the general 
 controversy in Georgia. There was, indeed, nothing 
 to be done save to await the Nashville meeting and to 
 follow the debates still proceeding in Congress. 
 
 3 E. J. Harden, Life of George M. Troup (1859), pp. 528, 529; Na¬ 
 tional Intelligencer, March 19, 21, April 11; Augusta Chronicle, June 
 13, 1850. 
 
 4 The delegation was as follows: 
 
 Ex-Senator Walter T. Colquitt, (Democrat) 
 
 Ex-Governor Charles J. McDonald, (Democrat) 
 
 Delegates at Large. 
 
 M. P. Crawford, (Whig) 
 
 James W. Ramsey, (Whig) 
 
 Robert Bledsoe, (Whig) 
 
 H. L. Benning, (Democrat) 
 
 Obediah C. Gibson, (Democrat) 
 
 Judge Obediah Warner, (Democrat) 
 
 Simpson Fouche, (Democrat) 
 
 John G. McWhertor, (Democrat) 
 
 Andrew H. Dawson, (Democrat) 
 
 District Delegates. 
 
 List as given in Resolutions, Address and Proceedings of the Southern 
 Convention, Report of the Committee on Credentials, p. 25. Cf. D. T. 
 Herndon, “The Nashville Convention,” Alabama Historical Society 
 Publications, V. 214; Augusta Chronicle, June 19; Washington Union, 
 April 14, 1850. 
 
266 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 Through May and June, the struggle in Congress 
 over the specific items in Clay’s Omnibus plan con¬ 
 tinued to be acute and at times stormy, though the 
 general prospects for a final adjustment had been fair¬ 
 ly good since March. Toombs and Stephens continued 
 to warn the North that the South was in earnest when 
 it demanded that a compromise must be made. In 
 this effort to keep the North to the mark, Toombs was 
 doubtless successful, but he went, at times, so far as 
 to renew the impression that he was a true “fire-eater.” 
 It is small wonder that some of his more spirited ad¬ 
 dresses, such as his famous “Hamilcar speech,” 5 re¬ 
 newed among the Georgia extremists the hope that 
 Toombs was one of them in opposition to the com¬ 
 promise. The Whig press, however, decried their as¬ 
 sertions to this effect, 6 and some confusion continued 
 to exist as to his real attitude. Northern antislavery 
 editors, of course, renewed their dislike of Toombs 
 for the same reason that the secessionists had renewed 
 their hope in him. This was especially true after a 
 false report had been circulated claiming that Toombs 
 and Stephens had so threatened President Taylor, be¬ 
 cause of his attitude toward the “Galphin Scandal,” 7 as 
 to hasten his unexpected death on July 9, 1850. 8 
 His death, exclaimed the Boston Liberator, has been 
 partly induced by “the bullying of such desperate men 
 
 6 See Congressional Globe, 31 Congress, First Session, p. 1216. 
 
 * Chronicle, July 6, 1850. 
 
 1 The “Galphin Scandal” related to pre-Revolutionary land claims in 
 Georgia and chiefly concerned Crawford, of Georgia, then in Taylor’s 
 cabinet, who was accused of using his position to secure personal profit. 
 For a short account, see Rhodes, History of the United States, I. 203, 
 204. 
 
 8 Rhodes, op. cit., I. 176, credited this malicious story. Its fallacious¬ 
 ness is analyzed in Cole, Whig Party, p. 168, note 102; and in Phillips,. 
 Toombs, pp. 84, 85. 
 
THE CLEARING, 1850 267 
 
 as Toombs of Alabama (?) and Stephens of Geor¬ 
 gia.” 9 
 
 The death of Taylor, of course, removed the grow¬ 
 ing tension between the administration and the major¬ 
 ity of the Whigs, while the moderation of Fillmore, 
 his successor, brought the influence of the new admin¬ 
 istration to the compromise cause. The Omnibus plan 
 was now almost certain of adoption, even though it 
 was to be taken entirely apart in the process. 10 Since 
 February the majority of the Georgia delegation at 
 Washington had favored its passage. Owen, the third 
 Whig representative, had followed his two colleagues 
 in this, and Hackett, the second Union Democrat, fol¬ 
 lowed Cobb. Wellborn, a third Democrat, also came 
 during the summer to accept the adjustment. 11 Haral¬ 
 son alone, of the original delegation, maintained his 
 opposition, but he was joined in this attitude by Joseph 
 W. Jackson, the Democrat who had succeeded King as 
 a result of the special February election in the first 
 district. 12 
 
 Dawson continued in the Senate his consistent 
 course of moderation and his approval of Clay’s plan. 
 The position of Berrien, on the other hand, was a 
 peculiar one. Clay had appealed to him personally, as 
 an old Whig supporter, to accept the Omnibus, on 
 
 9 Liberator, August 2, 1850; see also the Columbus Ohio State 
 Journal, July 19, 1850. Some northern papers, however, praised Toombs ; 
 the New York Sun, e.g., considered Toombs as the ablest man “by far’’ 
 from the South, an opinion which was seconded by the Richmond 
 Times, quoted in the Chronicle, March 9, 1850. 
 
 10 Hodgson is of the opinion that, had Taylor lived, the southern 
 Whig party would have been broken up by the issue between the admin¬ 
 istration and the Clay supporters. This “would have precipitated in 
 1850 the revolution which the death of General Taylor postponed until 
 1860.” J. Hodgson, The Cradle of the Confederacy, or the Times of 
 Troup, Quitman and Yancey (1876), p. 276. 
 
 11 For Wellborn’s attitude, see his letter of September 16, published in 
 the Chronicle, September 27, 1850. 
 
 19 For Jackson’s attitude, see Savannah Nezvs, July 31, 1850. 
 
268 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 the ground that it would bring the country thirty years 
 of peace. 13 Yet Berrien could not bring himself to 
 accept Clay’s plan. How far his alienation from the 
 younger and more vigorous leaders of the Georgia 
 party and how far his declining influence since the 
 schism of 1849 were factors in his dissatisfaction, it is 
 difficult to say. He was beset by letters from Whig 
 friends at home who favored the Omnibus, but ex¬ 
 cused them on the ground that they were not present 
 in Congress to witness the “deadly hostility of the 
 North against slavery.” This, he explained to a 
 friend in Milledgeville, “makes my blood boil.” He 
 talked freely with Clay about his objections and 
 made the interesting statement that Clay agreed per¬ 
 sonally with some of his views, but admitted that he 
 could not openly say so, lest he “jeopardize” the 
 chances of his bill. 14 
 
 Yet Berrien was not a secessionist. When friends 
 told him he must accept Clay’s scheme or risk disunion 
 and civil war, he replied: 
 
 I have no such fear,—I know the attachment of our people 
 to the Union. If united we have ample means of resistance 
 within the constitution. Withdraw southern votes for “pro¬ 
 tected” northern commerce and industry, and slavery will not 
 be further interfered with . 15 
 
 In other words, Berrien desired to reject the com¬ 
 promise and at the same time to attempt to apply 
 economic pressure against the North as a means of 
 defense which would be safer and saner than seces¬ 
 sion. This was a half-way stand between Union and 
 
 13 Jefferson Davis, A Memoir by His Wife, (1890), I. 447. 
 
 "Berrien to Major Harris, July 19, 1850, Berrien MSS. 
 
 15 Ibid. The recipient evidently pondered this letter seriously, as 
 across the back in another hand are written the phrases: “The insuffi¬ 
 ciency of the Compromise measures”, “Hostility of the North”, “How to 
 resist them in the Union?” 
 
THE CLEARING, 1850 
 
 269 
 
 secession principles which was bound to place him and 
 any Georgians who followed him in an uncertain and 
 rather unsatisfactory position. 16 
 
 On June 3, while the situation at Washington was 
 still rather tense, the long heralded southern conven¬ 
 tions contained groups of Whigs who lent a moderate 
 Tennessee, which had a delegation of more than one 
 hundred, all but a few delegates came from the six 
 states of Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, South Caro¬ 
 lina, Florida, and Virginia. Most of the members were 
 Democrats, but the Mississippi and Alabama delega¬ 
 tions contained groups of Whigs who lent a moderate 
 character to the personnel from those states. The 
 delegations from South Carolina and Georgia were 
 the most radical, being dominated by the secessionists, 
 Hammond, Rhett, Barnwell, Benning, Colquitt, and 
 McDonald. 17 This group directed the efforts to make 
 the convention take extreme ground, though some of 
 them already realized that the meeting was not a rep¬ 
 resentative one and would probably exercise little in¬ 
 fluence. 18 Judge Sharkey, of Mississippi, was chosen 
 president and McDonald, of Georgia, vice-president of 
 the convention. 
 
 June 3 was taken up by President Sharkey’s mod¬ 
 erate address and the next day by the examination of 
 
 16 He voted for the bills referring to Utah and New Mexico and 
 to the Texas boundary, but against the California and District bills. 
 In rejecting the California bill he warned the Senate that it would 
 result in a call of the state convention in Georgia and that this might 
 mean extreme action. The Baltimore Sun could not understand his 
 position at all; see the Chronicle, July 15, October 6; Montgomery Daily 
 Alabama Journal, August 9, 1850. 
 
 17 D. T. Herndon, “The Nashville Convention,” Alabama Historical 
 Society Publications, V. 216-218; St. George L. Sioussat, “Tennessee, 
 The Compromise of 1850, and the Nashville Convention,” Mississippi 
 Valley Historical Review, II. 332-336. 
 
 18 Elizabeth Merritt, “James H. Hammond,” Johns Hopkins Univer¬ 
 sity Studies in History and Political Science, Series XLI. No. 4, p. 95 ; 
 hereafter referred to as Merritt, James H. Hammond. 
 
270 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 credentials and the appointment of a general com¬ 
 mittee to which all resolutions introduced were re¬ 
 ferred. Benning and McDonald were made members 
 of this body. The sessions of June 5 to June 8 were 
 occupied with the introduction of numerous resolutions 
 and by speeches concerning the same. 
 
 The Georgia delegation was quite active. On 
 June 5, A. H. Dawson introduced resolutions endors¬ 
 ing a plan for a southern-rights press at Washing¬ 
 ton ; 19 on the same day Benning introduced a veritable 
 “platform” in the shape of twenty-three resolutions. 
 These resolutions proclaimed the rights of slavery in 
 the Union, demanded that nothing less than the Mis¬ 
 souri line could be accepted by the South as a com¬ 
 promise of the territorial problem, urged southern 
 party unity as essential to the protection of southern- 
 rights in the Union, proclaimed the right to leave the 
 Union, and insisted that a continued refusal by the 
 North to enforce the fugitive slave law should be met 
 by retaliatory non-intercourse measures. 20 
 
 Benning’s resolution declaring the Missouri line a 
 sine qua non for compromise was interesting, as it 
 offered the first evidence that the Georgia secessionists 
 were about to adopt new tactics. The Missouri Com¬ 
 promise principle had been advocated by the southern- 
 rights Democrats of Georgia in 1847 and had then been 
 abandoned and refused by them in the Georgia legis¬ 
 lature of 1849-50, only to be reasserted in the sum¬ 
 mer of 1850. This reassertion of the principle by 
 the secessionists in June was, paradoxically enough, 
 probably motivated by the same reason which had led 
 the legislature to refuse it in January; namely, be- 
 
 18 Resolutions, Address and Journal of the Proceedings of the South¬ 
 ern Convention, p. 33. 
 
 20 Ibid., pp. 35-39. 
 
THE CLEARING, 1850 
 
 271 
 
 cause it was known the North would no longer accept 
 the Missouri Compromise. Leaders like Benning and 
 Hammond had long hoped, though they did not admit 
 it openly, even at Nashville, that no adjustment could 
 be reached. 21 They were therefore not averse to urg¬ 
 ing the South to demand a compromise which they were 
 convinced would not be granted. 
 
 On July 7, Fouche of Georgia introduced interest¬ 
 ing resolutions tacitly condemning the pending com¬ 
 promise schemes in Congress. These declared that 
 “compromises” made by a weaker party with a 
 “stronger” were in reality concessions made for the 
 sake of repose, and that such concessions made at 
 periodical intervals were bound eventually to con¬ 
 cede everything. A last resolution asserted the right 
 of a people to alter or abolish an oppressive govern¬ 
 ment. 22 
 
 These resolutions are of interest here in expressing 
 the temper of the Georgia delegation, but they were 
 not actually used as a basis for the resolutions finally 
 adopted by the convention. The latter were founded 
 upon proposals introduced by Judge Campbell of Ala¬ 
 bama, and the address which accompanied them was 
 said to have been the work of Rhett. 23 Twenty-eight 
 resolutions in all were adopted, relating chiefly to a 
 statement of the rights of slavery and the duties of 
 Congress in this connection. The most important were 
 
 21 For Benning’s early attitude, see his letter to Cobb, July 1, 1849, 
 Toombs, Stephens, and Cobb Correspondence, p. 171. On Hammond see 
 Merritt, James H. Hammond, pp. 97, 98. For a contemporary analysis 
 of the inconsistency of Benning’s resolution with the attitude of the 
 Georgia legislature, see the Washington Union, August 13, 1850. 
 
 23 Resolutions, Address and Journal of the Proceedings of the Southern 
 Convention, p. 50. For convenient telegraphic summaries of the pro¬ 
 ceedings see the Washington Union, June 6, 7, 8, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 1850. 
 
 23 Sioussat, “Tennessee, The Compromise of 1850, and the Nashville 
 Convention,” Mississippi Valley Historical Review, II. 336, 337. 
 
272 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 the eleventh resolution, which embodied Benning’s idea 
 of offering the Missouri line as the maximum conces¬ 
 sion of southern rights in the territories, and the twen¬ 
 ty-eighth, which provided that a second session of the 
 convention should meet about six weeks after the ad¬ 
 journment of Congress. 
 
 The “Address to the Southern People,” which ac¬ 
 companied the resolutions, reviewed northern aggres¬ 
 sions in the fashion then orthodox in southern “ad¬ 
 dresses.” It then proceeded to condemn the Clay Om¬ 
 nibus in general and in detail. The California bill, it 
 declared, applied the Proviso; the Texas Boundary 
 bill “partitioned” Texas; the abolition of the slave 
 trade in the District was a step towards the abolition 
 of slavery therein; and the Fugitive Slave bill was in¬ 
 efficient and not in any real sense a concession by the 
 North. In this way, the Address stated the chief ob¬ 
 jections to the Omnibus and supplied the southern- 
 rights men with an indictment which would be useful 
 in opposing that plan. 24 
 
 The attitude of most of the Georgia delegates to¬ 
 wards the Address was well expressed by Colquitt, who 
 remarked that “it was indeed tame enough” and added 
 that he would advise the southern states to prepare 
 munitions of war and to get ready for final resis¬ 
 tance. 25 A formal protest entered against the Address 
 by the Alabama Whig delegates was not signed by any 
 of the Georgia delegation. 
 
 24 For the Resolutions and Address see Resolutions, Address and 
 Journal of the Proceedings of the Southern Convention, p. 51 ff. See 
 also Ames, State Documents, pp. 263-269; M. W. Cluskey, Political Text 
 Book (1857), gives the first thirteen of the resolutions. For further 
 notes and references to the sources for the convention, see foot notes 
 to Sioussat, op. cit., especially note 64. 
 
 25 Washington Republic, June 17, 1850; see also Ames, “John C. Cal¬ 
 houn,” University of Pennsylvania Public Lectures. 1917-1918, p. 127. 
 
THE CLEARING, 1850 
 
 273 
 
 On June 12 the convention adjourned to await the 
 action of Congress. It had created some excitement 
 in the North, where it was accused of fomenting trea¬ 
 son, 26 and where a report had spread that President 
 Taylor would suppress it with troops. It was gener¬ 
 ally agreed, however, that the “Disunionists in Ses¬ 
 sion” had proved an unrepresentative group and had 
 accomplished nothing. 
 
 Apparently undisturbed by such opinions, the dele¬ 
 gates wended homeward to appeal for the support of 
 their own states. When the Carolinians reached home, 
 Rhett made a violent disunion speech, which openly 
 proclaimed the real purpose of the secessionists. This 
 was dangerous, as it was sure to bring violent condem¬ 
 nation from the Union-loving masses outside of South 
 Carolina. 27 It was apt to convince some in Georgia, 
 hitherto doubtful, that “secession per se” was indeed 
 the purpose of “Palmettodom.” 
 
 The Georgia delegation was more tactful upon its 
 return, but set to work with the other extremist leaders 
 to organize public sentiment in favor of the late con¬ 
 vention. Their problem was a difficult one, but they 
 were resourceful men, and a plan of campaign was 
 already at hand in the move proposed by Penning at 
 Nashville. The March elections had indicated that 
 not only almost all the Whigs, but the majority of the 
 Democrats as well, were either indifferent or opposed 
 to secession for any causes then known. This meant 
 that many Democrats who could be termed “southern- 
 rights” men in the sense that they favored southern 
 
 26 Many of the northern papers compared the Nashville proceedings 
 with those of the “Hartford Convention” of 1815. 
 
 27 For Rhett’s speech and Clay’s violent condemnation of it, see the 
 Washington Union, July 24, 25, 1850. Hammond, though sharing Rhett’s 
 views, bitterly condemned his indiscretion in openly proclaiming them, see 
 Merritt, James H. Hammond, p. 97. 
 
274 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 political unity against the North, were not yet pre¬ 
 pared to support a secession movement. This group, 
 however, as has been suggested, could probably be 
 counted upon to support the Missouri line principle, 
 in the belief that such support represented an honest 
 effort at compromise. If the secessionists could but 
 persuade the South to demand the Missouri line as an 
 ultimatum, the North was certain to reject it, and the 
 South would then have no alternative but to secede . 28 
 How soon it would be expedient for the extremists in 
 Georgia to come out for secession would then be de¬ 
 termined by circumstances. 
 
 At the same time that the secessionists were anxi¬ 
 ous to arouse sentiment in favor of the Nashville con¬ 
 vention and its Missouri-line ultimatum, they were na¬ 
 turally desirous that the Clay compromise should be 
 condemned. It was necessary, if the Georgia people 
 were ever to be aroused, that an energetic campaign 
 directed towards these ends be inaugurated immedi¬ 
 ately upon the return of the Nashville delegation. 
 
 This renewed radical campaign of the summer was 
 opened, naturally enough, by the southern-rights edi¬ 
 tors. The radical press did not immediately come out 
 openly for secession, but urged that the Clay plan was 
 “no compromise”; that it was insulting to the South; 
 that Congress should therefore adjourn; that the 
 South should unite on the Missouri-line ultimatum of 
 the late convention and then make this the chief issue 
 
 28 That this was probably the real intention of the secessionists is 
 indicated by the private views of such leaders as Benning and Hammond, 
 already noted; by the sudden shift in the policy of the Georgia extremists 
 in 1850 from opposing the Missouri line in the legislature, to favoring 
 it at Nashville, and later at home; and by the shrewd analyses of their 
 purpose made by the Union Democrats, especially those of John H. 
 Lumpkin and Dr. Richard Arnold, to be noted below. See, c.g., W. H. 
 Morton to Cobb. July 10; John H. Lumpkin to Cobb, July 21; Toombs, 
 Stephens, and Cobb Correspondence, pp. 194, 206; Arnold to Forney, 
 December 18, 1850, Arnold MSS., etc. 
 
THE CLEARING, 1850 
 
 275 
 
 in the coming congressional elections. There was gen¬ 
 eral agreement in approving the Nashville convention 
 and all its works. 29 
 
 Editorials were then supplemented by resort to 
 another traditional method of arousing public senti¬ 
 ment. Appeals were made to the people to “get up” 
 southern-rights meetings. The Federal Union was 
 able to list by July 10 some thirteen counties in which 
 southern-rights meetings had been held, most of them 
 in connection, however, with the usual celebration of 
 the Fourth of July. In nearly every case resolutions 
 were adopted condemning the Clay plan and demanding 
 the Nashville ultimatum. The chief speakers were 
 the erstwhile delegates to the southern convention, 
 McDonald, Colquitt, McWhertor, and A. H. Dawson, 
 who went from one meeting to another upholding their 
 cause. Associated with them, as before, was the vig¬ 
 orous “old Whig” editor, James Smythe, of Augusta. 
 There was no open advocacy of secession, but A. H. 
 Dawson revealed at Augusta the next step in the plan 
 for organizing the extremist movement. This was 
 that every county should form a “southern rights asso¬ 
 ciation” whose purpose would be to arouse local en¬ 
 thusiasm and to insure cooperation with similar asso¬ 
 ciations throughout the state. 30 This plan may have 
 been urged upon the Georgia delegates at Nashville 
 by their colleagues from South Carolina, where such 
 local associations had been formed more than a year 
 before. 31 The plan for local organization would pro¬ 
 bably have met with a general response, as it did in 
 South Carolina, had there been widespread and intense 
 
 29 Federal Union, July 10, 17, 24, 31 ; Georgian, July 24, 25, 1850. 
 
 30 Federal Union, July 10; Washington Union, June 24, July 17; 
 Columbus (Georgia) Times, July 18, in Washington Union, July 27, 
 1850; Georgian, July 10, 1850. 
 
 31 Hamer, The Secession Movement in South Carolina, p. 32. 
 
276 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 excitement. In fact, it was taken up by some of the 
 papers, but does not seem to have born much fruit in 
 the state during the summer. 32 
 
 The accounts of the July southern-rights meetings, 
 as given by their friends, were enthusiastic ones. That 
 held in Columbus on July 16 was the largest and prob¬ 
 ably the most important meeting, as Columbus was the 
 home of an unusual number of extremists. Those in 
 charge prepared, after the manner of the day, a large 
 barbecue in order to attract both the town and coun¬ 
 try-folk to an all-day political outing. There were to 
 be lots to eat and lots of excitement—food for both 
 body and mind. The streets were crowded early by 
 farmers coming into town, and it was claimed that by 
 ten in the morning a crowd of three thousand had 
 gathered at “Smith’s spacious warehouse.” Here hun¬ 
 dreds could not reach the long tables spread for the 
 feast and “ate their good Southern meat and bread 
 without knife, fork, or plate.” The affair lasted, with 
 intermissions for meals, until midnight. There were ten 
 speakers, most of them prominent local citizens, like 
 Major J. H. Howard, “to whom was assigned the task 
 of exposing the frauds of the Clay Compromise and 
 whose execution of his trust was masterly.” Some 
 were from nearby counties, such as Porter Ingram, of 
 Harris, “who, though a Northern man by birth, had 
 imbibed all of Georgia’s principles and boldly avowed 
 he would fight for her rights.” Three speakers came 
 across the Chattahoochee from Barbour County, Ala¬ 
 bama, and “the people seemed never weary of listen¬ 
 ing to them.” All of these speakers claimed that the 
 Clay compromise would lead to disunion “or to a result 
 
 33 See, e.g., the Georgian, July 10, 1850. An association was formed 
 in Camden County, and there may have been a few others which escaped 
 general notice in the press. 
 
THE CLEARING, 1850 
 
 277 
 
 still more deplorable—a servile war and the destruc¬ 
 tion of the white or black race throughout the South.” 33 
 Both the emphasis on the race problem and the failure 
 openly to advocate secession are worthy of note. 
 
 The accounts of southern-rights meetings as given 
 by Union Democrats, of course, took on quite a differ¬ 
 ent tone. “A meeting was held on the 4th day of July 
 in Cobb,” wrote John H. Lumpkin. “Fouche, Stiles, 
 McDonald and Joe Brown were the only persons in¬ 
 vited or who attended, and they had everything their 
 own way. They studiously concealed from the people 
 their ulterior purposes, and carefully arranged it so 
 that no one opposed to them should be heard on that 
 occasion.” 34 The Saundersville Central Georgian 
 made this charge general, stating that “almost all the 
 meetings that had been called to approve the Nashville 
 Convention were called only for those who favored 
 it—others being excluded. In some counties, after 
 general meetings proved moderate, a few radicals 
 would withdraw and pass southern rights resolutions. 
 No fair meeting in any city would favor the Nashville 
 meeting.” 35 
 
 The evidence to be had indicates that these meet¬ 
 ings were not usually the result of spontaneous popu¬ 
 lar demand, but were rather the result of studied effort 
 by the small and able group of enthusiasts, who had in 
 mind the ultimate purpose already discussed. 36 It was 
 very evident, however, that the radical leaders were 
 
 33 Columbus Times, July 18, in Washington Union, July 27, 1850. For 
 similarly enthusiastic accounts of Georgia meetings see the Columbia 
 South Carolinian, July 25, 1850. 
 
 34 Lumpkin to Cobb, July 21, 1850, Toombs, Stephens, and Cobb Cor¬ 
 respondence, p. 207. 
 
 35 In Chronicle, July 27, 1850. 
 
 36 See, e.g., the account of efforts to arouse excitement in Athens, as 
 described in a letter of W. H. Morton to Cobb, July 10, 1850, Toombs, 
 Stephens, and Cobb Correspondence, p. 194. 
 
278 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 thoroughly in earnest in their renewed effort to arouse 
 extremist feeling. 
 
 The most dangerous groups among the extremists, 
 from the Union Democrat’s viewpoint, were, first, the 
 “old nullifiers,” who had left the Whig Party in 
 1840 ; 37 and, second, those who were of South Carolina 
 origin and who had brought their Carolina views with 
 them into the Georgia Democracy. 38 This last group 
 was particularly strong in Savannah and in the coun¬ 
 ties “along the river.” The two groups together made 
 up the real “fire-eaters” of Georgia. In Savannah, 
 Dr. Richard Arnold, several times mayor of the city 
 and representative at Milledgeville, was convinced 
 that the South Carolinians were at the bottom of the 
 renewed radical agitation. Toward the end of June, 
 while there was much debating of Clay’s plan in Savan¬ 
 nah, Arnold happened to defend that plan at a “wine 
 party” he was attending. Much to his surprise, he was 
 jeered and told that “both parties at the North were 
 rotten on the subject of slavery—the South must look 
 out for herself.” He was indignant that Democrats 
 could say this, but found the explanation in the fact 
 that “half of those present were South Carolina 
 men.” 39 
 
 The opinions of some of the conservative observers 
 concerning public feeling in July are interesting and 
 suggestive in the light of what had already occurred 
 in the spring and what was to come later in the fall. 
 Lamar wrote Cobb, July 3, from Macon, criticising 
 severely the reckless and unrepresentative character 
 
 " See chapter iii. 
 
 38 See chapter ii. 
 
 38 Arnold to Forney, December 18, 1850, Arnold MSS. For notes on 
 Forney’s position in the northern Democracy see R. F. Nichols, The 
 Democratic Machine, 1850-1854, pp. 33, 48, 64, 70, published in the 
 Columbia University Studies, CXI, No. 1 (1923). 
 
THE CLEARING, 1850 
 
 279 
 
 of the extremist journals, which has already been com¬ 
 mented upon in connection with the April election. He 
 said: 
 
 The Democratic press in middle Georgia is in the hands of 
 those who are leading the party to the devil. Their audacious 
 assertions have heretofore been treated as idle and harmless 
 bravadoes; but as they are now doing mischief there seems to 
 be a spirit rising among the people to speak out and let their 
 representatives in Congress know what public sentiment really 
 is. . . . The game played by some of the Democratic presses 
 is to browbeat our representatives in Congress into the belief 
 that the people are opposed desperately to the Senate Compro¬ 
 mise. . . . It is queer how impudently they utter what 
 
 everybody knows to be untrue. As an example, a press in this 
 place 40 . . . italicized these words, “The Compromise has 
 
 no friends in the South and never had,” and a few hours after 
 the appearance of the above alluded to a call of a meeting of 
 the friends of the Compromise numbered over 100 highly re¬ 
 spectable names. I can say . . . pay no attention to what 
 
 the papers say. The noise and bluster of a few presses in 
 Georgia is no more the voice of the people than the delegates to 
 the Nashville Convention were their representatives , 41 
 
 Another gentleman in Macon wrote in mid-July, 
 “I am satisfied by a close observation of the opinions 
 of the people in both political parties in this section 
 that they are all for the Union is certain.” 42 In a 
 somewhat more cautious manner, the Macon Journal 
 had observed late in June that, “seven tenths of the 
 people are in favor of an adjustment and the action 
 of the Nashville convention is increasing the number 
 rapidly.” The Chronicle reminded it that the majority 
 which favored adjustment even before the convention 
 met had also been “very large.” 43 One conservative 
 observer in Central Georgia did fear that the majority 
 
 40 Probably the Macon Telegraph. 
 
 41 J. B. Lamar to Cobb, July 3, 1850, Toombs, Stephens, and Cobb 
 Correspondence, pp. 191, 192; the italics are my own. 
 
 43 Quoted in Republican July 24, 1850. 
 
 43 Chronicle, June 28, 1850. 
 
280 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 of the Democrats in that section were in danger of 
 being tricked into secession. This was Absolom H. 
 Chappell, who wrote Cobb on July 10, also from Ma¬ 
 con, that, 
 
 the Democratic party of this section of the state is becoming 
 rapidly demoralized in reference to the great question of the 
 preservation of the Union. The game of the destructives is to 
 use the Missouri Compromise principle as a medium of defeat¬ 
 ing all adjustment and then to make the most of succeeding 
 events ... to infuriate the South and drive her into meas¬ 
 ures that must end in disunion. 
 
 Chappell believed, however, that “the Whigs are more 
 united for ... a proper course than the Democrats 
 are against it,” and declared that the “Ultraists” did 
 not yet dare to come out openly for secession. 44 
 
 John H. Lumpkin, reporting to Cobb on conditions 
 in Upper Georgia in July, declared that all the Whigs 
 there were for the compromise and that, while a ma¬ 
 jority of the Democrats might favor the Missouri line 
 as a settlement of the territorial difficulty, they were, 
 nevertheless, “for a settlement in good faith.” The 
 only danger was that unless warned they might be 
 tricked by the “Ultraists” into an impracticable mode 
 of adjustment. The only real secessionists were the 
 “old Nullifyers” of 1832. 45 “You cannot imagine,” 
 wrote a friend in Eatonton to Cobb a month later, 
 “how perfectly quiet the people are on the subject of 
 all the stir and fuss at Washington, and they are heart¬ 
 ily sick and disgusted with the pretended excitement 
 there. Nobody at home, Whig or Democrat, believes 
 
 “Chappell to Cobb, July 10, 1850, Toombs, Stephens, and Cobb Cor¬ 
 respondence, pp. 193, 194. 
 
 46 J. H. Lumpkin to Cobb, Rome, July 21, 1850, Toombs, Stephens, and 
 Cobb Correspondence, p. 207. 
 
THE CLEARING, 1850 281 
 
 that any man there feels what he expresses of ultra- 
 ism.” 46 
 
 In Coastal Georgia there was little evidence of ex¬ 
 citement in July and August. The Whig planters who 
 dominated this region 47 may have been excited in 
 December, 1849, lest the Proviso pass, but they were 
 now willing to accept the compromise. Only in Savan¬ 
 nah was there some uncertainty, where the mixed na¬ 
 ture of the population, which included numbers of 
 South Carolinians, Yankees and European immi¬ 
 grants, 48 made an estimate of popular feeling difficult. 
 
 In spite of their optimism, the conservatives felt 
 that the southern-rights meetings called for an answer 
 which should both point out to the people the real 
 purpose of the secessionists and at the same time dem¬ 
 onstrate, as Lamar put it, the real feeling of the people. 
 Hence Union meetings were held in the chief towns 
 where the enemy had staged gatherings, and special 
 appeals to the people were issued by leading Union 
 men. In Macon the Citizen, a militant pro-Union 
 paper edited by a man of northern origin, asked the 
 opinion of ex-Congressman Absalom H. Chappell 
 upon the great question. Chappell, who believed 
 the spirit among the Democrats was dangerous, 
 replied in a veritable essay, which occupied no 
 less than seven columns in the Washington Union. 49 
 It was essentially an appeal to the southern Democrats 
 to accept the Clay compromise and a plea for the pre¬ 
 servation of “this glorious Union of ours, which now 
 overshadows America from ocean to ocean, like a very 
 
 49 J. A. Meriwether to Cobb, Aug. 24, 1850, Toombs, Stephens, and 
 Cobb Correspondence, p. 211. 
 
 47 The population of the shore area of these counties was from 
 75% to 90% Negro. 
 
 43 See chapter ii. 
 
 49 Macon Citizen, July 6, in the Washington Union, July 13, 1850. 
 
282 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 heaven sent down to us undeservers by a too benign¬ 
 ant God!” Similar efforts to warn the people against 
 disunion were now made in addresses to their consti¬ 
 tuents by the Democrats, Cobb and Wellborn, at Wash¬ 
 ington. 50 
 
 All the conservative meetings now began to em¬ 
 phasize, even more than had been the case in the 
 spring, this appeal for the Union, the power of which 
 in attracting the masses can hardly be exaggerated. 
 It may well have been an asset to those making the 
 Union appeal that a victorious war had been waged 
 but two years before with the usual accompaniment of 
 patriotic enthusiasm among the masses, though it was 
 the irony of fate that the very Whig leaders now em¬ 
 phasizing nation-wide patriotism had been opposed to 
 that war. 
 
 The Columbus Union meeting well illustrates the 
 appeal to traditional loyalties. It was held two days 
 after the radical Columbus meeting described, in an 
 effort to show that the majority of the people disagreed 
 w T ith the principles expressed in that first gathering. 
 According to the Enquirer, it was “a large and en¬ 
 thusiastic meeting without distinction of party.” 
 Strong resolutions were passed upholding the com¬ 
 promise as “fair and equitable” and declaring “that 
 the ultimatum of the Nashville convention is desperate 
 and revolutionary.” The “Honorable Jas. E. Belser 
 of Alabama addressed the meeting for one and one- 
 half hours in an eloquent and patriotic strain that fre¬ 
 quently brought forth long continued applause.” A 
 local glee-club then sang the Star Spangled Banner, 
 
 “Address of M. J. Wellborn, To the Voters of the Second Con¬ 
 gressional District; n.d., apparently August, 1850. It is notable that 
 Wellborn had displayed some sympathy for the southern movement and 
 that he represented Southwest, not Upper Georgia. For Cobb’s lengthy 
 address see the Toombs, Stephens, and Cobb Correspondence, pp. 196-206. 
 
THE CLEARING, 1850 
 
 283 
 
 and “the audience repaired to the warehouse of Ruse, 
 Patten and Brice, where a sumptuous barbecue was 
 prepared.” After dinner, the Reverend A. H. Speer 
 warned against the danger of political excitement and 
 controversy. The glee-club again appeared upon the 
 stage and sang the patriotic song, ‘The Red, White 
 and Blue,’ and with three cheers for the Union the 
 meeting adjourned sine die .” 51 
 
 The climax of the secessionist campaign promised 
 to come late in August. There were two reasons for 
 this; first, sufficient time would have elapsed by then 
 to count upon the cumulative effects of months of ener¬ 
 getic oratory and, second, the secessionists hoped to 
 persuade the people to support soon thereafter a call 
 for a state convention. As the prospects for the pas¬ 
 sage of the California bill in Congress improved, it 
 began to be assumed that Governor Towns would sum¬ 
 mon a convention the moment the bill passed. If this 
 body were called, Georgia would be the first southern 
 state to proclaim officially its attitude towards the Clay 
 compromise. This would mean that much of the suc¬ 
 cess of the whole secession movement would depend 
 upon her action at this critical moment. The “Ultraists” 
 throughout the lower South could be expected to join 
 in a desperate effort to prepare the Georgia people for 
 the great decision. 
 
 Southern-rights meetings were held on August 6 
 in eight or ten counties, chiefly in Central Georgia, 
 preparatory to a general state conclave, to be as¬ 
 sembled at Macon on August 22. This was to be the 
 grand demonstration at which Georgia would proclaim 
 to the nation her readiness for secession. The seces¬ 
 sionists of the lower South concentrated their atten- 
 
 51 Columbus Enquirer, July 20, 1850. 
 
284 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 tion upon it, and the nation was watching. Came Rhett 
 from Carolina and Yancey from Alabama for the good 
 of the cause. Elaborate preparations were made for 
 a great barbecue, and delegates were invited from all 
 over the state. The radical press called for an atten¬ 
 dance of fifty thousand and claimed up to the last mo¬ 
 ment that at least fifteen thousand would actually be 
 there. 
 
 Accounts varied widely, as usual, as to the number 
 who were present when the great day dawned and 
 as to the spirit that prevailed. Two of the Washing¬ 
 ton papers, the Southern Press (established in 1850 
 to represent the secessionists) and the Daily Union, 
 arranged for direct telegraphic reports from the meet¬ 
 ing. 52 The contrast between those received by the two 
 papers was interesting. In comparing them, it should 
 be remembered that the Union was itself a Democratic 
 journal which had been generally sympathetic with 
 the southern movement. The wire to the Southern 
 Press read as follows: 
 
 Our mass-meeting has just adjourned. It was one of the 
 largest and most enthusiastic ever held in this state. It was 
 addressed by Rhett, Yancey and Cochran of Alabama, and Col¬ 
 quitt, Stiles, Jones, Gibson, Raivley and Platt of Georgia. 
 Resolutions were passed urging that if a state convention is 
 called the Georgia delegates should at once leave Congress to 
 consult and act with the people. 53 
 
 The first wire to the Union was brief and to the 
 point and was followed shortly by a second of similar 
 tenor: 
 
 53 Through telegraphic connection between Macon and Washington 
 was first established in August, 1850, and was considered a very remark¬ 
 able achievement. 
 
 63 Southern Press, August 23, 1850. 
 
THE CLEARING, 1850 
 
 285 
 
 Macon, 10:30 P.M. 
 
 Aug. 22: 
 
 The mass-meeting held by the disunionists of Georgia proves 
 to be a failure. Not exceeding 1500 delegates at the meeting 
 all told. 
 
 Macon, 10:55 P.M. 
 
 Mass-meeting is a failure. Not more than 1500 men in 
 town, one-third Union men. Only 300 arrived by the railroads. 
 Rhett, Yancey, Colquitt, chief speakers. Disunion openly 
 avowed. Some delegates repudiate it. Rhett favors temporary 
 secession. 54 
 
 I 
 
 The question of the attendance at this meeting; 
 was considered important by the press of both sides, 
 as it was considered to be indicative of popular feeling; 
 in the state. The Southern Press, on the basis of the 
 telegram quoted, termed the affair a “tremendous out¬ 
 pouring of the people.” Nothing, it declared, could 
 now keep Georgia in the Union! The Savannah Re¬ 
 publican, on the other hand, completely disdained the 
 entire meeting and agreed with the report to the 
 Union that only from one thousand to fifteen hundred 
 attended. This was the estimate of the other conser¬ 
 vative papers in Georgia and was repeated by those of 
 the North. A friend of Cobb reported the number 
 present as eight hundred and termed the meeting “a 
 stupendous failure so felt and so acknowledged.” The 
 Georgian, speaking for the local “Ultraists,” went to 
 the other extreme and claimed that there were no less 
 than ten thousand present! No better illustration of 
 the chronic unreliability of the southern-rights press 
 in the state could be afforded than this exaggeration 
 by the Savannah daily. The editor of the Savan¬ 
 nah Nezvs, himself rather friendly to the southern 
 movement, admitted that a gentleman returning direct 
 
 64 Daily Union, August 24, 1850. 
 
286 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 from Macon told him that not more than three thou¬ 
 sand were present. Such reports toned the estimates 
 of the South Carolina papers down to “from three to 
 five thousand.” 55 
 
 The significant thing about the Macon meeting was 
 not only the relatively small attendance, but the fact 
 that here for the first time in Georgia the “Ultraists” 
 came out openly for secession. For this reason it rep¬ 
 resents one of the turning points in the secession move¬ 
 ment in the state. In the first place, it was bound to 
 further the division of the parties along the Union 
 and secession lines, now that the issue was made clear, 
 and to lead, therefore, to that practical realignment 
 of parties which had been planned in the legislature 
 as early as February. In the second place, the open 
 approval of secession was bound to withdraw from the 
 “Ultraists” the support of such Democrats as had been 
 backing them up to this time in the mistaken belief 
 that they were really seeking a compromise in the 
 form of the Missouri principle. This defection of 
 Democrats from the southern movement—once they 
 realized that it was really a secession movement—also 
 affected the Democratic press, notably in the cases of 
 the Savannah Georgian and the Savannah News. Rhett 
 had gone marching through Georgia only to spoil 
 everything, just as Hammond had feared he would. 
 
 A specific illustration of reactions to the Macon 
 meeting is afforded by the experience of Dr. Arnold, 
 who wrote Forney: 
 
 55 On the Macon mass-meeting see J. C. Butler, Historical Records of 
 Macon, Georgia, (1878), pp. 194, 195; Washington Southern Press, 
 Aug. 23; Daily Union, Aug. 24; National Intelligencer, Aug. 24; Phila¬ 
 delphia Public Ledger, Aug. 27; Milledgeville Federal Union. Aug. 28; 
 Savannah Georgian, Aug. 23, 24; Republican, Aug. 23, 24; News, Aug. 
 23, 24; Chronicle, Aug. 23, 24; Columbia South Carolinian, Aug. 29; 
 J. A. Meriwether to Cobb, Aug. 24, 1850, Toombs, Stephens, and Cobb 
 Correspondence, p. 210. 
 
THE CLEARING, 1850 
 
 287 
 
 At Macon the cry of dis-union was first raised, and the 
 new parties had therefore to be formed. I and Ward decided 
 that as all the Democratic papers had gone for the Ultras and 
 we knew the people would not support this, the Whigs would 
 swamp the Democrats unless those Democrats who were true 
 to the Union made this entirely clear. ... A meeting was 
 called in Savannah. . . . One of the leaders was a young 
 
 man, (drilled by a Carolina gentleman who was adjustant to 
 Mr. Cheves) introduced resolutions, but I threw cold water on 
 them. Some other ginger-pop lawyers drew up Southern rights 
 resolutions which they intended to cram down the throats of 
 the meeting. There was a great excitement when these were 
 refused, and a call was made for all friends of the South to 
 leave the hall! I was very angry and told one fellow that any 
 man who said I, born and raised on the spot, was not in favor 
 of Southern rights was a damned Liar! 
 
 The extremists then left the hall to adopt their own 
 resolutions. With them, added Arnold, were the 
 ‘‘Mayor and all twelve Aldermen. But four of these 
 were South Carolinians and you have had experience 
 with that kind of Democrats.” The rest of the origi¬ 
 nal body then adopted resolutions accepting the com¬ 
 promise but declaring it a last concession by the 
 South. 56 
 
 Arnold and his friend Ward now became active in 
 Lower Georgia, building up a common organization of 
 Union Democrats and Whigs. It may have been 
 through their influence that the Georgian began to 
 moderate its tone to such extent as to bring it into 
 conflict with the Federal Union. On the other hand, 
 the clarifying of the issue now made it possible for 
 two actual secessionist papers, the Macon Telegraph 
 and the Columbus Sentinel, to come out openly for 
 disunion. Other southern-rights papers, such as the 
 Federal Union, still refused to sanction disunion open- 
 
 58 Arnold to Forney, December 18, 1850, Arnold MSS. Cf. Georgian, 
 July 24, 25; News, July 31, 1850. 
 
288 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 ly at the same time that they condemned the compro¬ 
 mise. The editors of the Georgian, the News, and the 
 Federal Union were either honestly opposed to seces¬ 
 sion, or else they possessed too healthy a respect for 
 the feeling of the majority of the Democrats to demand 
 it openly. In some cases this hesitancy was doubtless 
 due to a sincere personal opposition to the final destruc¬ 
 tion of the Union, once the issue was divested of all 
 the suggestive draperies of a southern-rights appeal, 
 and there could be no question as to its real meaning- 
 
 The clarifying of the issue also made possible a 
 more frank discussion of the secondary questions con¬ 
 nected with secession. These were problems already 
 debated to some extent in 1849, such as “the right of 
 secession,” the danger of civil war, the advantages 
 and disadvantages of a southern confederacy, the 
 extent of the spirit of southern nationalism then 
 obtaining, and so on. The conservatives, Whigs 
 and Democrats, assumed that there was some “right 
 of secession,” but were not yet clear as to its 
 nature. The Whigs had already shown signs of a 
 belief that it was revolutionary rather than constitu¬ 
 tional in character, 57 while the Democrats were in¬ 
 clined to reverse this opinion 58 —a difference of view¬ 
 point that was to involve their common candidate for 
 the governorship in some difficulty during the ensuing 
 year. Neither, however, desired the occasion for the 
 exercise of the right, whatever its nature. The ex¬ 
 tremists usually viewed the right of secession as a con¬ 
 stitutional one and desired the necessary occasion. 
 
 The “Ultraists” were inclined to believe that seces¬ 
 sion could be carried out peacefully, though they were 
 
 57 Note the resolutions of the Columbus Union meeting, summarized' 
 above. 
 
 58 See, e.g., Rutherford to Cobb, April 16, 1850, Toombs, Stephens r 
 and Cobb Correspondence, p. 190. 
 
THE CLEARING, 1850 
 
 289 
 
 ready to force war if necessary. 59 The conservatives, 
 on the other hand, emphasized the danger of war and 
 appealed to the economic motives naturally averse to it. 
 The influence of the economic appeal for peace was 
 probably more powerful in prosperous Georgia, which 
 had much to lose by war and little to gain, than it was 
 in economically decadent South Carolina, which had 
 less to lose and—it was hoped—more to gain. 60 “Seces¬ 
 sion is bound to be followed by civil war if history 
 tells us anything,” wrote a Union Democrat, “and will 
 begin with the first gun fired, a scene of discord and 
 calamity the world before never beheld, involving our 
 children and our children’s children.” 61 “The great¬ 
 est blessings and unparalleled prosperity (we have 
 enjoyed) have been secured by the Union of these 
 states,” wrote another Democrat, “let us abandon this 
 Union only when it fails to secure a continuation of 
 this prosperity.” 62 A franker appeal to economic in¬ 
 terest and a better statement of the motivating idea 
 that may have been in the minds of many conservatives 
 at the time, can hardly be imagined. 
 
 Indeed, it was this discussion of the dangers of 
 civil war that brought out most clearly contemporary 
 opinions as to the conserving influences of economic 
 prosperity. It has been pointed out in a preceding 
 chapter that the year 1850 marked a high point in 
 prosperity in Georgia, a prosperity based upon rising 
 cotton prices, the possession of relatively unused and 
 promising soils in some parts of the state, a rapid in¬ 
 crease in cotton manufacturing, an extensive railroad 
 
 59 See, e.g., W. H. Trescott, The Position and Cause of the South 
 (Charleston, 1850), passim. 
 
 00 See chapter i for a general discussion of this theme. 
 
 61 Letter of James Clark, February 15, 1851, to the Committee, Macon 
 Union Celebration, p. 14. 
 
 '“Letter of Asbury Hull, February 15, 1851, ibid., p. 22. 
 
290 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 development, and the general stabilization of the 
 state’s finances. Most of these developments had been 
 achieved in the short period between 1845 and 1850, 
 and it was small wonder that the state had acquired a 
 preeminent reputation among its southern sisters and 
 that its own propertied citizens had become enthused 
 with a spirit of “booster” optimism. 63 It was entirely 
 natural, therefore, that the Georgian quoted above 
 should have referred to the “unparalleled prosperity” 
 that had been enjoyed, and that he should have added 
 the remark that the Union should be abandoned “only 
 when it fails to secure a continuation of this prosperi¬ 
 ty.” Some contemporary observers from without the 
 state reached the conclusion during the fall of 1850 
 that it was this desire of the propertied classes to 
 maintain a Union that had brought prosperity, and a 
 desire to avoid the threat to that prosperity involved in 
 the danger of civil war, which determined the state’s 
 conservative position in the crisis of 1850. 
 
 General James Hamilton of South Carolina, for 
 instance, passed through Central Georgia during the 
 fall of 1850, when the secession movement was sup¬ 
 posed to be at its height. He found the state “in a 
 condition of philosophic calm,” since “thirteen cents a 
 pound for cotton was a powerful contributor to make 
 civil war and revolution exceedingly distasteful to 
 her people.” 64 In like manner, observers in South 
 Carolina, seeking aid from Georgia, feared that the 
 good times there would defeat their purpose. “Dis¬ 
 union feeling in Georgia,” admitted the Columbia 
 South Carolinian, “is neutralized by the high price of 
 
 63 See chapter i for a discussion of this whole situation. 
 
 61 Letter to the Charleston Mercury, published in the Washington 
 Republic, December 2, 1850. Hamilton wrote from Texas, November 11, 
 and probably passed through Georgia some time in October, 1850, i.e., 
 in the midst of the state convention campaign. 
 
THE CLEARING, 1850 
 
 291 
 
 cotton,” 65 Governor Seabrook wrote Quitman of 
 Mississippi, with reference to the South in general, 
 that “prosperity makes the masses indifferent to the 
 crisis.” 66 So, too, felt northern observers in Georgia. 
 The Savannah correspondent of the Boston Courier, 
 although taking the other side in the general political 
 controversy from that held by the Carolina critics, 
 reached just the same conclusions as to the economic 
 forces at work. “It is very fortunate for this Union,” 
 he observed, “that cotton is thirteen to fourteen cents a 
 pound, instead of four to five. There is now a state 
 of prosperity they do not care to disturb—but were 
 it otherwise, all the depression in trade and prices 
 would have been attributed to the burden of the Union 
 and to the baneful effects of national legislation and 
 northern agitation.” 67 
 
 Other problems besides those relating to prosperity, 
 the right of secession, and the dangers of civil war, 
 were discussed in the course of the general debate that 
 was carried on through the summer and fall of 1850 
 and during the next year. The years 1850 and 1851, 
 indeed, constituted a time of education during which 
 
 66 Columbia South Carolinian, June 21, 1849. The Mobile Daily 
 Advertiser made the same analysis of the situation in Alabama; see the 
 National Intelligencer, Dec. 6, 1850. 
 
 66 Seabrook to Quitman, July 15, 1850, Seabrook MSS. 
 
 67 Such contemporary interpretations of the economic influences at 
 work can hardly be ignored, in the light of all attending circumstances, 
 even though the claims quoted may well have been exaggerated. Nor 
 is a partially economic interpretation of Georgia’s conservatism in 1850 
 necessarily inconsistent with the fact of Georgia’s radicalism in another 
 period of prosperity; namely, 1860-1861. Georgia did, to be sure, secede 
 despite prosperity in this later period. The election of 1860 was viewed 
 in the South as an ultimate threat to all prosperity based upon the slave- 
 labor system as well as a threat to the whole southern social order. 
 Such a threat obviously overbalanced any interest in the preservation 
 of the immediate prosperity of 1860. In like manner, and for like 
 reasons, the passage by Congress of the Proviso would probably have 
 resulted in the secession of Georgia in 1850, despite the prosperity of 
 that year. In a word, prosperity did not incline Georgia to surrender, 
 but it did incline her to compromise. 
 
292 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 the people of the South first went to school to study all 
 those problems which they later attempted to solve dur¬ 
 ing the tragic period of 1860-1865. There was, for in¬ 
 stance, the problem of a “southern confederacy”; if 
 the South did secede from the old Union, what sort of a 
 government should be set up in its place ? Some of the 
 Georgia secessionists believed, with Benning, that it 
 should be a “consolidated republic,” in order that it 
 should protect propertied interests and possess the sta¬ 
 bility necessary to survive. Others who would have de¬ 
 sired this, to be sure, did not believe that a “consolidat¬ 
 ed” government would ever be approved by a people de¬ 
 voted to “state rights.” Such men feared that, if the 
 old Union could not survive, neither could a “United 
 States South.” “Even if a Southern Confederacy 
 were well formed,” wrote a Georgia planter, “there 
 would come internal quarrels, a second disunion, and 
 we should exhibit the melancholy aspect of a parcel 
 of little pitiful republics.” 68 It was a similar fear, it 
 will be remembered, that Alexander Stephens said 
 kept him from advocating secession that year. 69 
 
 Some extremists thought it would be wise for the 
 South to cultivate economic independence of the North 
 by means of a non-intercourse policy prior to demand¬ 
 ing political independence, in case this economic 
 pressure brought no response from the North. This 
 was the opinion of Senator Berrien, as expressed in 
 his letters already quoted, and the same view was held 
 by a few other leading men, such as Governor Collier 
 of Alabama. 70 It never commanded a large popular 
 
 68 Letter of Eli H. Baxter to the Committee, February 19, 1851, The 
 Macon Union Celebration, pp. 10, 11. For similar opinion in South 
 Carolina, see Philadelphia Public Ledger, November 9, 1850. Cf. J. C. 
 Reed, The Brother’s War, p. 59. 
 
 " A. H. Stephens to L. Stephens, January 15, 1850, Johnston and 
 Browne, Alexander Stephens, p. 245. 
 
 70 Philadelphia Public Ledger, November 12, 1850. 
 
THE CLEARING, 1850 
 
 293 
 
 following- in Georgia. The more typical view ex¬ 
 pressed by the extremists was that a southern con¬ 
 federacy would become at once a great economic 
 .success at the expense of northern interests. 71 
 
 The conservatives predicted dire difficulties for a 
 “United States South,” and claimed that even the sla¬ 
 very problem would be complicated rather than solved 
 Ty political separation from the North. Slave prop¬ 
 erty, they urged, would be far more insecure in a 
 southern “unconsolidated republic” than in the present 
 Union. 72 
 
 It is difficult to say how far a spirit of “southern 
 nationalism” was developing in Georgia as a result of 
 the general controversy, and no estimate whatever can 
 be given without a definition of terms. It is no easy 
 task to mark the point whereat a consciousness of sec¬ 
 tional identity evolves into a consciousness of national 
 identity. There had certainly been a consciousness of 
 .sectional identity in the South since about 1820 and 
 probably even before that date. If the consciousness 
 •of national feeling is to be limited to those who, in 
 1850, desired immediate secession and a united south¬ 
 ern confederacy, the number in Georgia was confined 
 to a small group of able extremists, of whom Benning 
 was the best type. These men were talking openly in 
 1850 about the “United States South,” and, when they 
 said “patriotism”, they meant patriotism for the 
 South. 73 Between such men and the old Alabaman who 
 declared, “I do not wish to survive the Union!—My 
 Country Now! My Country Forever!”, 74 there was 
 
 "Augusta Constitutionalist, quoted in and approved by the Columbus 
 Times, January 30, 1849. 
 
 "Eli H. Baxter to the Committee, Macon Union Celebration, p. 11. 
 
 73 See Savannah News, February 2, 1850. 
 
 74 Montgomery Daily Alabama Journal, December 16, 1850. Simi¬ 
 larly passionate devotion in Georgia to the Union will be noted in con¬ 
 nection with the state convention of December. 
 
294 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 the great mass of the people, who held all shades of 
 opinion varying from one extreme to the other. The 
 sense of nationalism which animated the great majority 
 of Georgians in 1850, however, was the old loyalty for 
 the old Union. 
 
 One must remember that the majority of the Dem¬ 
 ocrats in Central and Lower Georgia were, as has been 
 noted, southern-rights men in the moderate sense that 
 they favored southern political unity and were often 
 excited in their denunciation of the North. That men 
 were not secessionists did not mean that they lacked 
 feeling in the whole matter. There was sectional feel¬ 
 ing in plenty. In Savannah, early in August, a north¬ 
 ern man expressed certain ideas “not altogether south¬ 
 ern in sentiment,” and handbills were promptly posted 
 announcing the hour at which he would be tarred and 
 feathered! The News cautioned against such senti¬ 
 ments “just now,” and advised the gentleman concern¬ 
 ed “to make a speedy return to his boasted clime of the 
 North.” 75 
 
 The most interesting expression of popular indig¬ 
 nation—or hysteria, as one wishes to view it—occurr¬ 
 ed at Macon in August, 1850. Here the Citizen, edited 
 by one, Dr. L. F. W. Andrews, and established March 
 28 of that year, had been a bitter opponent of the sou¬ 
 thern-rights movement. In the middle of August, it 
 greatly excited the people by publishing letters from a 
 certain Hanleiter, of Atlanta, in which he condemned 
 the domestic slave trade and expressed a hope that 
 the slave sales depot there would be “razed to the 
 ground.” This brought forth the serious charge that 
 the Citizen was an abolitionist paper, established se¬ 
 cretly in Macon and subsidized by the northern socie- 
 
 u South Carolinian, August 15, 1850. 
 
THE CLEARING, 1850 
 
 295 
 
 ties in connection with the political crisis then at hand. 
 Just at this time occurred the radical Macon mass 
 meeting of August 22, and the Citizen proceeded to 
 denounce that meeting most scathingly. This was too 
 much under the circumstances. A special nonpartisan 
 meeting was called, and a committee of thirteen waited 
 upon Andrews, the editor, demanding the name of his 
 Atlanta correspondent. Meanwhile, a crowd gathered 
 outside and threatened to lynch Andrews. Dr. Collins, 
 of Macon, saved him from the mob only by eliciting 
 the promise that he would close the paper and leave 
 Macon within ten days. The Chronicle declared this 
 episode a ‘"high handed outrage” against the rights of 
 a citizen and the freedom of the press, but the radical 
 editors applauded it and intimated that the Chronicle 
 itself should receive like treatment. 76 As a matter of 
 fact, the Citizen resumed publication just a fortnight 
 later. 
 
 Towards the end of August there was a temporary 
 lull in the controversy in Georgia, as all eyes turned to 
 Washington to watch the closing scenes of the con¬ 
 gressional drama. After a long summer of debates, 
 the separate bills of the “Omnibus” were now assured 
 of acceptance—“the passengers would all arrive.” Both 
 moderates and secessionists in Georgia desired this, 
 the first in order to have the compromise finally adopt¬ 
 ed ; the latter, because the passage of one of the bills, 
 that admitting California, would make it obligatory 
 upon the Governor to call a state convention. 
 
 Towns was ready. Indeed, he had sent a special 
 representative to Washington who was to bring him 
 post haste an official copy of the California bill as soon 
 
 70 The incident received much attention in both the North and the 
 South; see the Georgian, August 24; the South Carolinian, August 29; 
 the Chronicle, August 30; the Boston Liberator, September 20, 1850; etc. 
 
296 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 as it passed. Things now happened quickly at the 
 capitol, for the Texas and California bills passed Sep¬ 
 tember 7, the Utah measure September 9, and the fugi¬ 
 tive slave bill September 12. The news of the Cali¬ 
 fornia law reached Georgia on the tenth, and the Fed¬ 
 eral Union (generally viewed as Towns’ organ) an¬ 
 nounced on the seventeenth that the Governor would 
 issue a call for the convention as soon as his agent ar¬ 
 rived with the official copy. This gentleman reached 
 the Governor’s home in Milledgeville on September 
 23, and Towns promptly issued the long awaited sum¬ 
 mons. 
 
 The proclamation repeated Towns’ opinions on 
 northern aggressions and the need for calm but de¬ 
 termined action in Georgia. It called the convention, 
 as provided for by law, to meet at the capitol on Decem¬ 
 ber 10. The elections were to be held on November 25, 
 exactly as the usual elections for the legislature, save 
 that the representation of each county was to be 
 doubled. 77 “In the hour of danger,” read the gover¬ 
 nor’s appeal, “when your institutions are in jeopardy— 
 your feelings wantonly outraged; your social organiza¬ 
 tion derided; and the Federal Constitution violated by 
 a series of aggressive measures, all tending to the con¬ 
 summation of one object, the abolition of slavery . . . 
 it well becomes you to assemble, to deliberate, and coun¬ 
 sel together for your mutual protection and safety.” 78 
 
 This proclamation was the opening gun in the final 
 battle for secession, both in Georgia and in the lower 
 South as a whole, and it was naturally followed by a 
 volley from both sides. The entire proclamation of 
 
 " For text of the convention law see Debates and Proceedings of the 
 Georgia Convention, 1850, p. 27. 
 
 ™ Ibid., pp. 27, 28; Letter Books of the Georgia Governors, 1850; 
 for Towns’ plans for his proclamation, see Columbia South Carolinian, 
 September 10, 1850. 
 
THE CLEARING, 1850 
 
 297 
 
 over one thousand words was wired directly from 
 Macon to Washington, where it was being anxiously 
 awaited. The Southern Press immediately hailed it 
 as the harbinger of final action. Georgia now showed, 
 it declared, that “the point of endurance has been 
 passed. The destiny of the South is decided. She will 
 not submit. . . . The cotton states will all unite with 
 Georgia. So will the rest of the slave-holding states. 
 The North has a last chance to reconsider.” The radi ¬ 
 cal papers in South Carolina and the Gulf states re¬ 
 acted in a similar manner. The Columbia South Caro¬ 
 linian and the Charleston News believed that “the as¬ 
 sembling of the Georgia Convention will probably be 
 the first step in the vindication of Southern honor,” and 
 were sure that the conventions and legislatures soon 
 to be called in South Carolina, Mississippi, and Ala¬ 
 bama would follow her. 79 Rhett declared that Georgia 
 would “lead off,” while Hammond wrote Fouche that 
 he believed Georgia was “entitled to lead the South 
 because of her prompt action and because of her 
 strength and position.” 80 There was significant talk 
 about holding the next session of the southern conven¬ 
 tion at Milledgeville. 
 
 Whig papers in the North generally derided 
 Towns’ call, declared that “we do not tremble in our 
 boots in view of this new crisis got up by the Quattle- 
 bums of the South”; but some conservative Demo¬ 
 cratic papers were seriously worried and besought 
 Georgia to pause and contemplate before acting. 81 
 
 79 Southern Press, in Washington Union, September 25; South Caro¬ 
 linian, September 27, 1850. 
 
 80 Hammond to Fouche and Committee, Silver Bluff, South Carolina, 
 September 26, 1850, Hammond MSS. 
 
 81 Columbus Ohio Statesman, September 31; Washington Union, 
 October 1, 1850. 
 
298 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 Within Georgia, the more moderate of the south¬ 
 ern-rights editors welcomed the Governor’s call as a 
 means of securing either concession in the North or 
 secession in the South. The more extreme editors 
 openly welcomed the coming convention as a means 
 to disunion. “The continuance of the Union is no 
 longer problematical,” announced the Columbus Times, 
 “it is now virtually dissolved. There is no time to be 
 lost. Draw your swords and throw away your scab¬ 
 bards!” 82 
 
 The response of the Georgia Whig and Union 
 Democratic papers was vigorous and emphatic. The 
 convention should “never have been called”; “it would 
 be a farce”; “it would have nothing to do but ad¬ 
 journ”—such were the typical comments. 83 “The 
 proclamation,” declared Holsey in the Athens Banner, 
 “is but a solemn mummery under the existing calm of 
 public opinion.” 84 
 
 So in September, as during the preceding spring, 
 the opposing editors differed widely in their published 
 estimates of popular feeling in the state. The procla¬ 
 mation, which the Times announced had “virtually” 
 dissolved the Union, was dismissed by the Banner as 
 “a mummery under the existing calm of public opin¬ 
 ion.” The events of spring and summer had already 
 shown that the more radical papers had little influence 
 upon the public and were, therefore, not usually to be 
 trusted in their estimates of public opinion. The con¬ 
 servative journals had proved more reliable in this 
 respect and were, therefore, probably more to be trust¬ 
 ed in their estimates of popular feeling in September. 
 
 83 Columbus (Georgia) Times, in Washington Union, September 25, 
 1850. 
 
 83 Opinions of several prominent Whig journals, as given in the 
 Chronicle, October 29, 1850. 
 
 84 Quoted in the Chronicle, September 28, 1850. 
 
THE CLEARING, 1850 
 
 299 
 
 Since the editors in both camps, however, doubtless 
 shared a natural desire to appear confident before the 
 public, it is well to examine the estimates of public 
 opinion exchanged in confidence between the leaders 
 of each group. 
 
 In such private correspondence with others of their 
 own party the politicians had little or no motive for 
 exaggeration or distortion. The letters to Howell 
 Cobb, written from Upper Georgia between August 24 
 and October 5, the period before the convention cam¬ 
 paign had really begun, displayed complete confidence 
 in a coming Union victory. Writing as early as 
 August 24, Judge James Meriwether declared that if 
 Towns called the Convention the disunionists “would 
 not muster a corporal’s guard.” If they then attempted 
 violence, he was ready to fight against them, and he 
 was persuaded that this was “the sentiment of nine 
 tenths of the Whigs and three fourths of the Demo¬ 
 crats” 85 in his district. William Woods, of Dahlonega, 
 wrote on September 15: “I have bin mixen amongst 
 the people,” and “I think the majority of my section 
 . . . are willing to abide the action of Congress,” 
 though “nearly all the leading Democrats (are) op¬ 
 posed 88 . . . .” “The people are not ready to sacrifice 
 the best government ever established,” opined L. J. 
 Glenn of McDonaugh on September 21, “to redress 
 ‘imaginary evils’ existing in a distempered fancy at a 
 distance of three thousand miles or more.” 87 Cobb 
 himself, upon surveying the whole field immediately 
 after his return to the state, wrote Lamar that, while 
 “we shall have a most exciting and angry contest in 
 
 85 Meriwether to Cobb, August 24, 1850, Toombs, Stephens, and Cobb 
 Correspondence, p. 211. 
 
 86 Woods to Cobb, September 15, 1850, Toombs, Stephens, and Cobb 
 Correspondence, pp. 212-213. 
 
 87 L. J. Glenn to Cobb, September 21, 1850, ibid., p. 213. 
 
300 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 the state and in some sections a doubtful one ... I 
 entertain no doubt that we shall have a large majority 
 of the convention. . . .” 88 
 
 In contrast to this, there has been preserved an 
 interesting private correspondence between no lesser 
 leaders of the secessionist group than W. B. Seabrook, 
 governor of South Carolina, and G. W. Towns, gover¬ 
 nor of Georgia. South Carolina had come under the 
 control of the “cooperationists” by the fall of 1850, 
 and Seabrook was anxious to know just what chances 
 there were for assistance to his state in case she se¬ 
 ceded. His chief hopes lay in Mississippi and in Geor¬ 
 gia. On September 20, accordingly, Seabrook wrote 
 Towns asking what the prospects were that the coming 
 state convention would lead Georgia out of the Union 
 and declared that South Carolina was ready to go as 
 soon as her sister gave the sign. 89 The correspondence 
 was strictly secret. Towns replied from Milledgeville 
 on September 25, just two days after issuing his pro¬ 
 clamation, and at the very time that such papers as the 
 Sentinel and the Telegraph were declaring that the 
 convention would dissolve the Union. He explained 
 to Seabrook the great difference between South Caro¬ 
 lina and Georgia. “It is disgraceful,” he admitted of 
 his own state, “that probably 1 %o of the old states 
 rights group 90 are submissionists.” These men, he 
 added, appeal to the old Union men, 91 and hence it 
 can be seen “how fearful the odds against which we 
 are struggling.” Indeed, he had to confess that this 
 struggle in Georgia was “cheerless and discouraging.” 
 
 88 Howell Cobb to J. B. Lamar, Athens, October 10, 1850, ibid., 
 p. 215. 
 
 89 Seabrook to Towns, September 20, 1850, Seabrook MSS. 
 
 90 The old Whig or Troup party of the thirties; see chapter iii. 
 
 91 The old Democratic or Clark party of the thirties; see chapter iii. 
 
THE CLEARING, 1850 
 
 301 
 
 Under the circumstances, he could but suggest that no 
 action whatever be taken in South Carolina until after 
 the election to the Georgia convention. Such action 
 must be avoided, lest it increase the ever-present dis¬ 
 like of the Georgia people for their sister state and 
 thus destroy what hope the faithful still have of 
 cooperating with Carolina. 92 
 
 The contrast between the blatant boasting of the 
 radical papers at the time, and this private confession 
 by a central leader of the Georgia secessionist group 
 seems a significant one. It becomes even more signi¬ 
 ficant when one recalls all the associated circum¬ 
 stances—the unreliable record of the radical press, 
 the spring elections, the steady optimism of the con¬ 
 servatives, and, finally, the overwhelming victory of 
 the Union men, which lay just ahead in the convention 
 elections. The masses of the Georgia people continued 
 to oppose or to be indifferent to the secessionist appeal 
 during the summer and fall of 1850, as they had during 
 the preceding winter and spring. 
 
 The remainder of Seabrook’s correspondence relat¬ 
 ing to Georgia demonstrated not only his acceptance of 
 Towns’ estimate of sentiment there, but also the im¬ 
 portance of the position which Georgia might see fit 
 to take with regard to the whole sectional movement. 
 Seabrook replied on October 8, assuring Towns that 
 he would hold things back in South Carolina so as to 
 “conciliate” Georgia, the while he “stimulated” the 
 other states. He submitted to Towns his proposed 
 proclamation calling the South Carolina legislature, 
 desiring assurance before issuing it that it would not 
 hurt the cause in Georgia. 93 Meanwhile, he had just 
 
 “Towns to Seabrook, September 25, 1850, Seabrook MSS. 
 
 83 Seabrook to Towns, October 8, 1850, Seabrook MSS. 
 
302 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 heard from Governor Quitman of Mississippi, who re¬ 
 ported to headquarters, so to speak, that a convention 
 would probably be called in that state to move for 
 secession. 94 Prospects seemed good for Mississippi. 
 Georgia, then, was the stumbling block. Seabrook was 
 tactful and did not criticize in his letters to Towns, but 
 he wrote a confidant that action waited upon Georgia 
 and that she was most unreliable. “I shall wait the 
 movement in Georgia and one or two other slave-hold¬ 
 ing states,” he declared, “before I commit South Caro¬ 
 lina. ... As soon as it shall be known that our sister 
 state has been seconded by Mississippi and Alabama, 
 or Virginia and Florida, the period will have arrived 
 for the Palmetto state to do her duty.” But he added, 
 “my word for it, that Georgia acts indecisively or 
 makes a retrograde move.” 95 
 
 Seabrook had previously written Quitman in July 
 expressing a belief that, if Mississippi and South 
 Carolina both seceded, Georgia would be bound to 
 he drawn into the movement; 96 but his September 
 and October letters conveyed no such faith. Towns’ 
 fetters had clearly declared that precipitate action in 
 South Carolina would antagonize rather than invite 
 cooperation from Georgia. So while extremist papers 
 were loudly proclaiming that Georgia would “lead off,” 
 Georgia, as a matter of fact, seemed to the well in¬ 
 formed secessionists a stumbling block in the way of 
 those states already prepared to go. 97 
 
 M Quitman to Seabrook, September 29, 1850, Seabrook MSS. 
 
 95 Seabrook to T. A. Leland, September 18, 1850, Seabrook MSS. 
 
 96 Seabrook to Quitman, July 15, 1850, Seabrook MSS. 
 
 97 1. Seibels, of Montgomery, wrote Hammond to ask what South 
 Carolina would do if Georgia “backed out.” He thought that if Georgia 
 would act “that would at once determine the course of Alabama, Missis¬ 
 sippi and Florida.” Seibels to Hammond, September 19, 1850, Ham¬ 
 mond MSS. 
 
THE CLEARING, 1850 
 
 303 
 
 Meanwhile, the convention campaign was on in the 
 '“Empire State.” It was bound, as Cobb put it, to be 
 fierce and exciting, both because of the importance of 
 the issue and because the secessionists made up to some 
 extent in ability, energy, and vociferousness for what 
 they lacked in numbers. The conflict in Georgia be¬ 
 came the center for all eyes in the Union. There was 
 less interest taken in South Carolina, at least tempora¬ 
 rily, because no one doubted the feeling there; and, 
 while Mississippi shared with Georgia the critical and 
 decisive position in the lower South, a special conven¬ 
 tion was to meet in Georgia at a time when only the 
 regular legislature would be in session in the other 
 state. The position of Georgia, moreover, was con¬ 
 sidered peculiarly important because of her apparent 
 economic superiority to most of the other southern 
 states. 
 
 All public expressions of opinion in South Caro¬ 
 lina continued to declare great hope for the sister state 
 and ofttimes recognized her economic importance to the 
 southern movement. Uncertainty concerning her final 
 stand, however, was sometimes publicly admitted. 
 There was the Charleston official, for instance, who 
 proposed the following toast at a dinner to General 
 Hammond, at which Georgians were present: 
 
 Our noble sister, the state of Georgia, distinguished for her 
 statesmen, famed for her extended agriculture, equally cele¬ 
 brated for wide-spread internal improvements and manufac¬ 
 tures, foremost in advancing the mechanic arts : 98 —when called 
 on to stand up in defense of Southern rights, where will she 
 he found? 
 
 To which eulogy a Georgian present replied with the 
 somewhat ambiguous toast: 
 
 South Carolina: Ever true—she need never be hasty." 
 
 68 For the economic basis of this praise, see chapter i. 
 
 99 Washington Republic, November 28, 1850. 
 
304 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 While Carolina continued her efforts at concilia¬ 
 tion with the sister state, the old distrust of “Pal- 
 mettodom” persisted and grew in Georgia in propor¬ 
 tion to the growing intensity of the secession contro¬ 
 versy. This distrust continued to embarrass the seces¬ 
 sionists. Towns’ warning to Seabrook that South 
 Carolina must be kept below the level of Georgia’s 
 political horizon was a timely one. Conservative Geor¬ 
 gians strongly suspected, from articles appearing in 
 the Charleston Mercury, that South Carolina was at 
 the bottom of the whole secession movement, and they 
 warned the people, as usual, not to allow “insolent 
 Palmettodom” to “make a cat’s paw of Georgia.” In¬ 
 deed, the collusion of the governors was suspected at 
 the very time that they were exchanging the corres¬ 
 pondence noted. 100 The voters were reminded that 
 “our state has been treated habitually with the most 
 sovereign contempt by the chivalry, until they con¬ 
 curred recently in the idea of making a subordinate 
 use of us. Only then do they declare: ‘The South 
 hangs her hope upon her as the Keynote State.’ ” 101 
 Senator Butler of South Carolina urged Seabrook to 
 send representatives to the Georgia convention, and 
 added that “Surely, at this time, an unnatural jealousy 
 should not prevent these states . . . from acting to¬ 
 gether.” 102 Seabrook, however, was too well acquaint¬ 
 ed with the real situation in Georgia, by virtue of his 
 correspondence with Towns, to attempt to send such a 
 representative. South Carolina had indeed sent a rep- 
 
 100 See Macon Journal in the Chronicle, September 20, 1850. 
 
 101 Chronicle, October 12; see also Macon Journal in the same, Sep¬ 
 tember 20; Letter of Eli Warren, February 14, 1851, to the Committee. 
 Macon Union Celebration, p. 16. 
 
 101 A. P. Butler to Seabrook, October 22, 1850, Seabrook MSS. 
 
THE CLEARING, 1850 
 
 305 
 
 resentative to the state convention of Mississippi the 
 year before, but Georgia was another matter. Ham¬ 
 mond, who was a keener observer than Butler, refused 
 an invitation sent him by Samuel Ray to write articles 
 for the Macon Telegraph during the state convention 
 campaign. He based his refusal on the ground that 
 it was unwise for any South Carolinian to “interfere” 
 in Georgia politics. 103 
 
 It was unfortunate for Carolina that the old trade 
 rivalry between Charleston, on the one hand, and 
 Macon and Savannah, on the other, which was per¬ 
 haps the chief economic factor in the dislike for “Pal- 
 mettodom,” should have continued just at a time when 
 the latter’s political ambitions demanded conciliation 
 with Georgia. Less than three years before had come 
 the deliberate effort of Charleston to tap the Georgia 
 Central Railroad above Savannah, an episode which 
 had created considerable feeling in 1847. 104 Even at the 
 height of the crisis in 1850, a Charleston editor, in 
 reporting that Upper Georgia was warming up to his 
 radical political appeals, added significantly that “now 
 is the time for your direct tradesmen of Charleston to 
 take advantage of this feeling.” 105 Georgians returned 
 this compliment by deliberately planning in some 
 cases to divert most of the Charleston trade to Macon 
 and Savannah the moment that South Carolina se¬ 
 ceded. This could be done easily enough, it was be¬ 
 lieved, if the Carolina coast were to be blockaded by 
 the federal naval forces. It was also hoped that Caro¬ 
 lina currency could be driven out of the state, since 
 Georgians would presumably not wish to hold it after 
 
 103 Hammond to Ray, October 20, 1850, Hammond MSS. 
 
 10f See chapter i. 
 
 105 Charleston News, in the Columbia South Carolinian, August 31, 
 1850. 
 
306 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 the other state had seceded. 106 General James Hamil¬ 
 ton and Bishop Capers, of the Methodist Church, both 
 warned South Carolina of the seriousness of the inten¬ 
 tion to secure the Charleston trade. Indeed, the exis¬ 
 tence of this desire in parts of Georgia was generally 
 recognized throughout the South. 107 
 
 Editors outside of South Carolina and Georgia 
 were generally convinced that a Union victory in Geor¬ 
 gia was probable, if not certain. The importance of 
 the result was also generally recognized. “The anxi¬ 
 ous eyes of the whole nation,” declared the national 
 organ of the Democracy in October, “are fixed upon 
 Georgia and New York. These are the two great 
 battlefields of southern and northern excitement.” 108 
 The usual prediction as to the outcome in Georgia was 
 that there would be much talk but no action looking 
 towards disunion. “Georgia will cave in, back out, 
 and swallow her big words of treason,” wrote the 
 Washington correspondent of a New York daily. 109 
 
 Within Georgia itself, meanwhile, a number of in¬ 
 teresting developments had taken place during the 
 early fall. The beginning of the convention campaign 
 was concomitant with the return of the state’s congres 
 sional delegation. This brought Berrien and James W. 
 Jackson to Savannah to urge “non-intercourse.” It 
 
 108 Marietta Union, in Savannah News, December 17, 1850. The News 
 declared that the Union “gave some good hints.” 
 
 107 See, e.g., Jackson (Mississippi) Flag of the Union, March 7, 1851; 
 Richmond Daily Whig, December 17, 1850; Hamilton’s warnings are in 
 the Washington Republic, December 2, 1850. 
 
 108 Washington Union, October 16. 1850. Three large northern 
 dailies, the New York Express, the Baltimore Sun, and the Boston 
 Courier, considered the situation in Georgia important enough to justify 
 the maintenance of regular correspondents in Savannah through the fall. 
 
 109 New York Herald, September 17; see also New York Express and 
 New York Evening Post in Savannah News, October 2, October 10; 
 Philadelphia Public Ledger, September 19, November 27; Columbus 
 Ohio State Journal, November 5; Natchez (Mississippi) Courier, Sep¬ 
 tember 20, 1850, etc. 
 
THE CLEARING, 1850 
 
 307 
 
 also brought Wellborn to Southwest Georgia, Cobb and 
 Hackett to Upper Georgia, and Toombs and Stephens 
 to Central Georgia—all to defend the compromise and 
 to decry disunion. The districts represented by the 
 last four named, however, were practically certain to 
 remain conservative before they returned,—those of 
 Cobb and Hackett being dominated by Union Demo¬ 
 crats cooperating with the Whigs, and those of Toombs 
 and Stephens always having a safe Whig majority, no 
 matter what the Democrats might do. The only un¬ 
 certain areas in the state were those in the strip of 
 four or five Democratic counties lying athwart Central 
 Georgia, 110 several counties in the Pine Barrens, and 
 the cities of Columbus and Savannah. There was un¬ 
 certainty about the first because these Democratic 
 counties followed their leaders with a tenacity that 
 transcended all ordinary economic influences, 111 and 
 many of the leaders of the Democracy were seces¬ 
 sionists. There were one or two counties in the Pine 
 Barrens of which this also held true, and there was 
 some uncertainty as to how the degraded and ignor¬ 
 ant “piney-woods people” in this region would react to 
 the violent anti-Yankee and anti-Negro appeal which 
 would feature the radical campaign. There was un¬ 
 certainty about Columbus because of the unusual num¬ 
 ber of extremists resident there; and uncertainty about 
 Savannah because that city contained considerable 
 numbers of South Carolinians and European immi¬ 
 grants. The Berrien element might also prove to have 
 some strength in the Senator’s home county, Chatham, 
 which included Savannah. 
 
 110 See Map No. S, p. 109. 
 
 111 See chapter iii. 
 
308 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 Stated in terms of social classes, 112 an analysis of 
 the campaign and its results reveals that the groups 
 most apt to be swayed by the secessionist appeal were: 
 (1) Democratic partisans who had never outgrown the 
 old Georgia political habit of following personal leaders 
 regardless of issues; 113 (2) the lower middle classes in 
 the cities, who might own one or two slaves and who 
 read local secessionist papers; (3) able lawyers, edi¬ 
 tors and politicians in the cities, who either felt that 
 they “saw further” into the future than could the ma¬ 
 jority or, else, hoped to attain political prominence at 
 the head of the new movement; 114 and (4) the other 
 extreme in the social scale, the illiterate “poor whites” 
 of the Pine Barrens belt, who, even if they could not 
 read the papers, were apt to be most responsive to ap¬ 
 peals against “Yankee” or “nigger.” 115 The combined 
 numbers of these uncertain elements was but a small 
 fraction of the entire population. 
 
 The congressional leaders, Toombs and Stephens, 
 immediately set to work with C. J. Jenkins, E. A. 
 Nisbet and others already on the ground to organize 
 an energetic Union campaign. Cobb likewise began 
 to cooperate with Lumpkin and Judge Andrews in 
 the up-country and with Arnold and Ward in Savan¬ 
 nah. The Union leaders who really faced the most 
 difficult situation were these Democrats, Arnold and 
 
 113 See chapter ii. 
 
 113 See chapter iii. 
 
 lu It is a rather peculiar fact that, with the exception of Towns and 
 Haralson, every one of the secessionist leaders was out of office in 1850. 
 
 115 For a contemporary northern analysis of some phases of this situ¬ 
 ation, see, e.g., Philadelphia Public Ledger, November 26, 1850. “Singu¬ 
 lar as it may seem,” observed the Oneida (New York) Herald, “crowds 
 of those who do not and never expect to own a negro, are most influenced 
 by pro-slavery nonsense. The inhabitants of . . . the uncultivated por¬ 
 tions of Georgia, are the men whom the slavery champion can mould 
 to his will”; quoted in Federal Union, October 30, 1849. The Public 
 Ledger claimed that the urban classes were inclined to be radical. Cf. 
 Weston, Progress of Slavery, p. 40. 
 
THE CLEARING, 1850 
 
 309 
 
 Ward, who had to deal in Savannah with a combina¬ 
 tion of South Carolinians and Berrien Whigs ; and who 
 eventually triumphed largely by bringing to the sup¬ 
 port of the conservative “old Savannah families” the 
 assistance of the patriotically inclined German and 
 Irish immigrants. Thus the exigencies of the cam¬ 
 paign brought together strange political bedfellows in 
 Georgia,—the “poor white” cooperating with the city 
 lawyer secessionist, while the Irish laborer consorted 
 with “people of consequence.” 116 
 
 The Union campaign during the fall was featured, 
 as might have been expected, by county meetings and 
 addresses as well as by the confident appeals of the 
 press. It was marked, as usual, by a defence of Clay’s 
 compromise as acceptable, though far from perfect; 
 by a constant emphasis of the economic advantages 
 of the Union and the economic disadvantages of dis¬ 
 union; 117 and by the fervent appeal to old loyalties. 
 The call for the state convention was at times con¬ 
 demned. 118 
 
 The extremist orators, on the other hand, featured 
 news garnered from the abolitionist press in the North 
 in order to excite the people. Such news was sup¬ 
 plemented by direct appeals to race feeling. It was 
 declared, for instance, that the Yankees “preferred 
 niggers to poor white men” and that secession was the 
 only possible alternative to the social and economic 
 equality of the races. 119 
 
 116 There is an interesting analysis of this peculiar situation in 
 Savannah in Arnold's long report to Forney, December 18, 1850, Arnold 
 MSS. 
 
 111 See, e.g., Columbus Enquirer, in Chronicle, September 21, 1850. 
 
 318 For typical resolutions of a county Union meeting see those of the 
 Macon meeting early in October, in Washington Union, October 6, 1850. 
 
 118 Banners to this effect were displayed at extremist meetings; see, 
 e.g., Augusta Constitutionalist, in the Columbia South Carolinian, October 
 ■6, 1850. 
 
310 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 The secessionist campaign opened with violent 
 condemnations of the Union, elicited from a few of 
 the more extreme of the radical editors by the excite¬ 
 ment attending the Governor’s proclamation. These 
 editorials have been much quoted, particularly the 
 statements of the Columbus Times and the Columbus 
 Sentinel that “we hate the Union as we do hell it¬ 
 self,” and that “we are for open, unqualified secession, 
 for war upon the government.” The Times worked it¬ 
 self up to an extremely hysterical mood, urging the 
 leaders to “Form clubs, enlighten the people, put arms 
 in their hands ... do anything and everything to 
 save this state from recreancy and the eternal dis¬ 
 grace to herself from backing out.” 120 
 
 Other southern-rights papers hesitated, however, 
 to advocate immediate secession, and by the latter part 
 of October there was a noticeable moderation in the 
 opinion of all the radical papers save one or two. At 
 the same time, the southern-rights leaders ceased to 
 counsel “secession” and came to speak only of “resis¬ 
 tance to oppression.” This “swing to the right” was 
 the most noticeable and significant feature of the en¬ 
 tire campaign. The secessionists at last had their 
 ears to the ground, or—to mix the metaphors—they 
 had at last seen the Union writing on the wall. It 
 was patent to all that the extremists admitted at last 
 that the masses were against them and that it would 
 have been wiser never to have come out openly for 
 secession. Papers which advocated secession in Sep¬ 
 tember were ready by the end of October to accept the 
 
 120 Quoted in the Chronicle, September 20, 1850. The papers openly- 
 urging secession were the Times, the Sentinel, and the Macon Telegraph. 
 The exact attitude of the Augusta Constitutio>ialist and the Augusta 
 Republic has not been ascertained. 
 
THE CLEARING, 1850 
 
 311 
 
 compromise. 121 Practically no speakers were advo¬ 
 cating secession by the time November arrived. In 
 traveling the road from secessionist to compromise 
 positions, some of the papers stopped at the half-way 
 point of “non-intercourse” or the demand for another 
 southern convention, but many went all the way to 
 the compromise. 122 By the beginning of 1851, the 
 Federal Union was calmly announcing to the people 
 that “there never was an organized disunion party in 
 Georgia.” There were “only a few who believed that 
 the rights of the South will never be secure in the 
 Union,” and few or no disunionists per se. It an¬ 
 nounced truthfully enough that at the time of the elec¬ 
 tion to the state convention “there was not among the 
 southern-rights candidates a single one who was not 
 opposed to or pledged against disunion.” 123 
 
 The Union men met this retreat at times with 
 irony and scorn, at other times with great caution. 
 At one meeting an extremist advocating “resistance” 
 was forced to say what he meant by the term. He 
 finally declared that when he said he would “resist” 
 he meant that he would “petition.” “Great God!” said 
 a bystander, “who ever heard of such a mode of resis¬ 
 tance.” Another turned away with the significant 
 comment: “Barnum ought to have him!” On the other 
 hand, Cobb and others steadily warned the people 
 against the secessionist wolves who had now donned 
 the sheep’s clothing of the compromise. 
 
 It is difficult to ascribe the “back down” of the 
 secessionists to any one particular factor that entered 
 into the fall campaign. The energy infused into the 
 
 121 Especially the Columbus Times; see the Washington Union, 
 October 27, 1850. 
 
 %a See the Georgian, October 31; News, October 25, November 8; 
 Federal Union in Washington Union, November 5, 1850. 
 
 Federal Union, January 21, 1851. 
 
312 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 Union appeal by the returning congressional delega¬ 
 tion may have been one factor involved, though just 
 what potency this had it is difficult to say. There 
 had been little favorable public response to the -call 
 for secession from the moment of the first open appeal 
 at the Macon mass meeting in August. There had, on 
 the other hand, been definite evidences of hostility and 
 indifference to this appeal from that moment on. It is 
 probable that these reactions convinced many of the 
 secessionists that the August appeal had been prema¬ 
 ture—that the Georgia people were not yet prepared 
 for secession and that a return to the ambiguous and 
 less radical appeals of the spring and early summer was 
 indicated under the circumstances. It is doubtful if 
 the return of the congressmen altered this situation in 
 any fundamental manner. 124 
 
 Indeed, one of the returning Union leaders was, 
 in certain respects, a liability rather than an asset to 
 the Union cause. In the course of their campaign the 
 Georgia extremists evinced great bitterness against 
 “Hamilcar Toombs,” who—having declared that “This 
 cry of Union is the masked battery from which the 
 rights of the South are to be assailed”—was now 
 sounding that very cry himself. When Toombs, ag¬ 
 gressive as usual, challenged the radicals to a joint 
 debate at Columbus, they failed to respond, though 
 there was some talk of bringing Yancey over from 
 Alabama to meet him. When Toombs came to Colum- 
 
 121 Cf. R. P. Brooks, “Howell Cobb and the Crisis of 1850’’, Mississ¬ 
 ippi Valley Historical Review, IV. 289; Brooks, History of Georgia, 
 pp. 243, 244; A. C. Cole, Whig Party in the South, pp. 180, 181; H. D. 
 Foster, “Webster’s Seventh of March Speech and the Secession Move¬ 
 ment, 1850,” American Historical Rcviciv, XXVII. 250, 251; L. L. 
 Knight, Reminiscences of Famous Georgians, pp. 107, 211; U. B. Phil¬ 
 lips, Georgia and State Rights, p. 164; Phillips, Robert Toombs, pp. 
 95-99. 
 
THE CLEARING, 1850 
 
 313 
 
 bus, however, the secessionists made thing's as unpleas¬ 
 ant as possible. The Times declared that: 
 
 Toombs and Stephens have operated like sparks on a tinder 
 box in this community. They have raised the very dander of 
 our people. Toombs had not been in town two hours before he 
 was hanged in effigy. This was not proper in the boys but the 
 boys will get excited in exciting times. The crowd was a very 
 firey one that sat under Toombs and Stephens—we deem it for¬ 
 tunate there was no serious accident to report. 125 
 
 Toombs denied emphatically the charge of inconsis¬ 
 tency, pointing out that none of the three measures he 
 had declared would justify secession had been incor¬ 
 porated in the compromise, and reminded everyone 
 that he had “always denounced this California Re¬ 
 bellion.” 126 
 
 One incident occurred during the campaign that 
 temporarily raised the hopes of the “Ultraists.” It 
 happened that two slaves belonging to the same Dr. 
 Collins of Macon who had saved the editor of the 
 Citizen of that city, escaped during October to Boston. 
 He thereupon sent friends to Boston to reclaim them. 
 These agents, upon arriving at that city, were threat¬ 
 ened with mob violence by the abolitionists, and there 
 was much excitement. The incident might have made 
 trouble for the Union cause in Georgia, as the moder¬ 
 ates had accepted the compromise only in the belief 
 that it would be observed in good faith by the North. 
 The “Boston Excitement” implied that the fugitive 
 slave law might not be enforced. The Macon Journal 
 solemnly warned Boston that, “while we yield to the 
 compromise measures of the late Congress, we are de¬ 
 termined to require a faithful compliance with the 
 Fugitive Slave Act, and in case of refusal shall take 
 
 125 Times, in Columbia South Carolinian, November 12, 1850. 
 
 Chronicle, October 9, 1850. 
 
314 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 our redress in what manner we think best.” 127 Some 
 fear was expressed in the North that the episode might 
 turn the tide in Georgia back to secession. 128 
 
 Fortunately for the Union cause, President Fil- 
 more seized the opportunity to make clear his own 
 position and the status of the fugitive slave law by 
 writing personally to Dr. Collins, assuring him that 
 the law would be enforced by the federal authorities. 
 This “Collins Letter” was printed all over the country 
 as well as in Georgia. The conservative papers in the 
 latter state expressed great satisfaction with it, while 
 the radical papers condemned it as a presidential at¬ 
 tempt to interfere in the struggle in the state. 129 
 
 This incident, therefore, did not react unfavorably 
 upon the Union cause. It did, however, serve to bring 
 out what the conservatives always claimed; namely, 
 that they were in no sense the “submissionists” the 
 enemy accused them of being. Practically from the 
 time the compromise was clearly outlined, the feeling 
 had prevailed among the Unionists that it was unsatis¬ 
 factory and should be accepted only as a last conces¬ 
 sion to the antislavery power. The first able and 
 formal expression of this feeling was given at a meet¬ 
 ing in Savannah in October, over which Arnold and 
 Ward presided and from which the extremists had 
 been forced to withdraw. The “rump” meeting 
 adopted resolutions drawn up by Cuyler, a Savannah 
 Union man, which declared that the compromise should 
 be accepted as a last full measure of conciliation, but 
 that no further concessions would be made. The South 
 should now draw finally the line beyond which the 
 
 121 Macon Journal, in the Washington Union, November 12, 1850. 
 
 128 Baltimore Sun, November 9; Columbus Ohio Statesman, Novem¬ 
 ber 23, 1850. 
 
 128 See the Washington Republic, November 23; Columbus Ohio 
 Statesman, November 23; Savannah News, November 12, 1850, etc. 
 
THE CLEARING, 1850 
 
 315 
 
 North should not go. These resolutions were widely- 
 quoted in the state and elsewhere as the “Chatham 
 Platform,” a platform upon which southern men could 
 well unite to preserve at one and the same time the 
 integrity of the Union and the rights of the South. 
 Cuyler’s resolutions were practically identical with 
 those subsequently adopted by the state convention 
 and which became nationally known as the “Georgia 
 Platform.” 130 
 
 To the extent that the Union men were now mak¬ 
 ing clear their opposition to further concessions, they 
 made it somewhat easier for the extremists to accept 
 the compromise position. In a sense, the two parties 
 approached one another during October and Novem¬ 
 ber to agree upon the common basis of the “Chatham 
 Platform.” This involved the extremists, however, 
 in some inconsistency and humiliation, whereas with 
 the Union men it meant only a greater emphasis upon 
 the ultimate character of the compromise they had ad¬ 
 vocated from the beginning. 
 
 There was one other group besides the Union men 
 and the extremists to be heard from during the fall 
 campaign. This was the Berrien following, which 
 advocated economic resistance to the North. The 
 movement for “non-intercourse” never commanded 
 a large popular following in Georgia, probably be¬ 
 cause it was considered an impracticable, middle-of- 
 the-road position that could not be long maintained 
 between the Union on the one hand and secession on 
 the other. Because of this, there was always some un¬ 
 certainty as to the real meaning of “non-intercourse” 
 
 130 For the “Chatham Platform” see Savannah News, October 24; 
 Republican, October 24, 1850. The general view taken therein was be¬ 
 coming common in the South at the time. See, e.g., Mobile Daily Adver¬ 
 tiser, October 15; Savannah Republican, October 22; Columbus (Geor¬ 
 gia) Times, in Washington Union, October 27, 1850. 
 
316 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 and as to whether its advocates should be classified as 
 southern-rights or Union men. 131 Generally speaking, 
 they were claimed by the former, but the “non-inter¬ 
 course” men themselves always opposed immediate 
 secession. Senator Berrien continued to be the leader 
 of this group in Georgia through the fall compaign, 
 and his chief press support came from the Savannah 
 News, 132 though he was encouraged by all the south¬ 
 ern-rights journals. 
 
 Berrien’s main thesis was that already noted in 
 his summer letters ; 133 that is, that there must be resis¬ 
 tance within the Union and the Constitution—but that 
 there must be resistance. Secession would, he held, 
 be “impracticable” and “the worst of evils.” “Non¬ 
 intercourse,” on the other hand, would encourage 
 the economic life of the South and would bring pres¬ 
 sure upon northern conservative business interests 
 that might lead to further concessions, or, if this did 
 not happen, would prepare the South for the final 
 stand that would then be necessary against the North. 
 In defining “non-intercourse,” he admitted, as a con¬ 
 stitutional lawyer, that some of the measures in the 
 recent legislature looking towards that policy were un¬ 
 constitutional, but he believed that the Supreme Court 
 would permit a tax on goods entering the state. Such 
 taxes should therefore be levied; only southern ports 
 should be used in trading with Europe; the state should 
 subsidize steamship companies and encourage local 
 
 131 Senator Foote and the Jackson (Mississippi) Southron claimed 
 that Berrien, the leader of the non-intercourse men in Georgia, was for 
 the compromise. The Federal Union and the Jackson Mississippian 
 denied this; see the Mississippian, November 22, 1850. 
 
 132 See the News, November 6, 7, 1850. 
 
 133 “Tybee”, correspondent of the Baltimore Sun, thought that Ber¬ 
 rien came home “hot” and was “cooled off” by Georgia opinion; see 
 Baltimore Sun, October 19, 1850. 
 
THE CLEARING, 1850 
 
 317 
 
 manufactures; and, in general, the South should make 
 itself economically independent of the North. 134 
 
 Such was the “Berrien Platform,” as it came to be 
 known in Georgia, when its author became active in 
 the fall campaign. He received some support from the 
 “old Whig” element which had bolted that party the 
 year before and from some of the extremists, especi¬ 
 ally in the lower counties “along the river,” where the 
 South Carolina element was strong. One of the few 
 “Southern Rights Associations” which had been 
 formed was reported to have adopted the interesting 
 resolution that: 
 
 The members of this Association will not hereafter hold any 
 intercourse, social or commercial, with any Northern man or 
 foreigner from any non-slave-holding nation, or the children or 
 grandchildren, or any collateral relation of such Northern man 
 or foreigner, however remote. 135 
 
 This was indeed building the “Chinese Wall” about 
 the state, of which the Boston Courier had spoken the 
 previous winter, but few Georgians desired to help in 
 its construction. One or two merchants in Savannah 
 declared they would cease trading with the North 
 at once, but the movement was not general. As a mat¬ 
 ter of fact, when the state convention elections were 
 held, just one county chose delegates pledged to the 
 “Berrien Platform.” 136 
 
 334 For the general economic background to such principles, see St. 
 George L. Sioussat, “Co-operation for the Development of the Material 
 Welfare of the South,” The South in the Building of the Nation, IV. 
 173-179. 
 
 135 Chronicle, October 8, 1850. 
 
 138 This was Burke, on the Savannah river; see Macon Journal, No¬ 
 vember 29, in Philadelphia North American, December 7, 1850. For 
 data on Berrien’s part in the campaign (which practically ended his 
 career) see Jackson Mississippian, November 22; Augusta Constitution¬ 
 alist, in Washington Republic, November 16; Mobile Daily Advertiser, 
 November 26; Chronicle, October 2, 6, November 6; Tallahassee Flori¬ 
 dian, November 9, 1850; Natchez (Mississippi) Courier, November 22; 
 
318 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 The elections to the state convention were to be 
 held November 25, in the manner usual for elections 
 to the legislature. Nominations had been made by each 
 party in most of the counties, usually by a committee 
 appointed by “county caucuses,” which meetings also 
 endorsed the committees’ recommendations after they 
 were made. 137 In some ten counties the extremists fail¬ 
 ed to make any nominations. As the great day ap¬ 
 proached when Georgia should proclaim her attitude to 
 the nation, the press on each side made final statements 
 and appeals. The appeal of most of the radical papers 
 was in line with their recent moderation and was often 
 nominally a plea for, rather than against, the Union. 
 “Submission now,” said the Federal Union on Novem¬ 
 ber 19, “is abolition and ultimate disunion. Resistance 
 now, with the rights of the South, may save the 
 Union.” The Union papers, on the other hand, dis¬ 
 played great confidence in coming victory and were 
 inclined to ridicule the “backsliding” southern-rights 
 party. “Tybee,” the able Savannah correspondent of 
 the Baltimore Sun, estimated that of the ninety-three 
 counties not more than eighteen would go for the 
 extremists. 138 Much ridicule was heaped upon the al¬ 
 ready fallen foe, of which the following quotation is a 
 fair and suggestive example, taken from Holsey’s 
 Athens Banner. The substance may have been in¬ 
 tended as a mockery of Governor Towns’ proclama¬ 
 tion : 
 
 Boston Courier, November 26; Philadelphia Public Ledger, November 
 25; Baltimore Sun, November 16; Savannah News, November 6, 20, 
 1850. 
 
 13: See description of nominating methods in Chronicle, October 12, 
 1850. 
 
 138 Baltimore Sun, November 20. “Tybee’s” accounts of the cam¬ 
 paign are the best-connected ones to be found, and contain valuable 
 observations on public opinion; see the Sun for October 3, 19, 28, 
 November 4, 1850. 
 
THE CLEARING, 1850 
 
 319 
 
 PROCLAMATION OF ABSOLOM TRICKUM 
 Attention, Invincibles! To the rescue, Chivalry! Fire-eaters 
 to your tents! Up with your new lights and down with the 
 Union! You are ordered to muster at once in revolutionary 
 style, and with your appearance touched off with a tint of the 
 terrible,—your mustaches 18 inches long, your finger nails 3 
 inches long and pointed for gouging, knapsack of the shape and 
 capacity of a coffin 139 . . . For regimental flag: “United 
 
 we fall—Divided we standand for company flags: “Cats- 
 paws for South Carolina.” Col. Hydrogen Gass will take com¬ 
 mand with Rhett-orical flourish, and lead you: 
 
 Where hills and dales 
 And Brooks that fail 
 And Senator Hale so merrily sail 
 On the ocean of wild disunion. 
 
 Finally each man will kill twenty Yankees apiece, and capture 
 New York . . . where they will seize Barnum & Jenny 
 
 Lind—and then for the spoils of a real ridotto ! 140 
 
 When the election was held, on November 26, the 
 result was to a large extent a repetition of the April 
 election fiasco. The “Ultraists” were swept off their 
 feet by a Union majority greater than any party had 
 ever rolled up in the history of the state. Of the ninety- 
 three counties, but ten chose southern-rights delega¬ 
 tions to the convention, which meant that the Union 
 party would have complete control of that body. 
 The popular vote was about forty-six thousand for 
 the Union candidates to some twenty-four thousand 
 for their southern-rights opponents. 141 This meant 
 that less than half of the Georgia Democrats 142 had 
 been willing to vote for the southern-rights candidates 
 even when these men were strenuously denying seces¬ 
 sion and claiming that they would save the Union. The 
 
 139 The extremists had said they would “march up to the Missouri 
 line with their coffins on their backs.” 
 
 140 Athens Banner, in the Boston Bee, November 26, 1850. 
 
 141 For election results see Chronicle, November 24; Georgian, No¬ 
 vember 29; Republican, December 17, 1850. 
 
 142 The normal Democratic vote at this time was about 50,000. 
 
320 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 Union press claimed, with apparent justice, that had 
 the radical leaders not “backed down’’ and disclaimed 
 secession, they would have sent scarcely a man to the 
 convention. An analysis of the county results, as 
 given in the press and compared with the voting policy 
 of the delegates when present later in the convention, 
 reveals that only two sections of the state held to the 
 extremist cause. These were the tier of Democratic 
 counties in Central Georgia and the ring of counties 
 around the outer edge of the Pine Barrens. 143 The ex¬ 
 planation in the case of the Democratic tier has already 
 been suggested; that is, the incurable habit therein of 
 following leaders rather than principles. The explana¬ 
 tion in the case of the Pine Barrens is not so simple. 
 In the case of Bulloch county, it may have been due to 
 the same factors that affected the Democratic tier in 
 Central Georgia, while counties on the Savannah river 
 may have been influenced by their contacts with Caro¬ 
 lina. It is suggestive, however, that these Lower Geor¬ 
 gia counties which went for the “Ultraists” did form a 
 partial ring around the edge of the Pine Barrens area. 
 It is probable that a large percentage of the “poor 
 whites” living on the fringe of the plantation country 
 voted extremist. It is also possible, though it cannot 
 be proved, that this was due to their responsiveness to 
 appeals against the Yankees and the Negroes. It has 
 been pointed out that their degraded economic and 
 mental condition made them particularly responsive 
 to these very appeals, which had been featured in the 
 southern-rights campaign. 144 
 
 In several of these Pine Barrens counties a di¬ 
 vided delegation was chosen, which the Macon Jour- 
 
 143 See Map No. 7, p. 320. 
 
 144 See chapter ii for a description of the “poor whites” and their 
 prejudices. 
 
MAP NO. 7 
 
THE CLEARING, 1850 
 
 321 
 
 nal said was due to the claim of the southern-rights 
 candidates that they were as strongly for the Union as 
 were their opponents. 145 In ten counties the “Ultra- 
 ists” offered no resistance whatever, but these were 
 not concentrated in any one section. In the one county 
 already noted, Burke, a delegation pledged to the “Ber¬ 
 rien Platform” was selected. 
 
 There were close contests in Columbus and Savan¬ 
 nah, as had been anticipated. In both cities the Union 
 party was saved by the help of northern men and the 
 foreign-born. In Savannah the influence of the mayor 
 and council was with the extremists, yet one hundred 
 members of the city guards, most of whom were natur¬ 
 alized citizens, voted the Union ticket, despite threats 
 from the local administration. The same was true 
 of the foreign shopkeepers. 146 As it was, the Union 
 men carried Savannah by a vote of only nine hundred 
 and thirty to seven hundred and seventy. Meanwhile 
 in Columbus, declared the Times, “the Yankees, For¬ 
 eigners and Traitors carried the Union ticket.” 147 
 
 In all other parts of the state, the Union forces won 
 sweeping victories. There was naturally great jubila¬ 
 tion in the Union press of Georgia 148 and neighboring 
 states, and also in the North. 149 “Tybee” wrote North 
 that “The Union men are astonished at the vastness 
 of their victory. They have carried the state by a 
 majority that has no parallel in the history of this 
 
 145 Macon Journal, in Mobile Daily Advertiser, December 10, 1850. 
 
 146 Arnold to Forney, December 18, 1850, Arnold MSS. 
 
 147 Columbus Times, in the Chronicle, December 6, 1850. 
 
 148 Chronicle, November 27, 28; Republican, November 28, 1850. 
 
 149 Mobile Advertiser, November 29; Montgomery Daily Alabama 
 Journal, November 30; Jackson Flag of the Union, December 6; Natchez 
 Courier, December 3; Aberdeen (Mississippi) Independent, December 
 7, 1850, etc. 
 
322 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 country .” 150 The conservative press in all sections 
 teemed with such phrases as “Pleasant Surprise”— 
 “Glorious News,” “Happy Omen,” “Georgia has ‘led 
 off’ nobly for the Union,” and the like. The result 
 was bound to influence all the lower South, it was 
 thought, and thus play a great part in the national 
 salvation. 
 
 The southern-rights press in Georgia, Alabama, 
 and Mississippi varied in its reactions to the crushing 
 defeat sustained. The Savannah Nezvs was moderate; 
 it regretted the result, but “did not doubt the fidelity 
 of the Union delegates to the South.” The Georgian 
 was bitter, declaring “we are beaten, but never was an 
 election carried with such corruption.” The Columbus 
 Times was defeated, but not disheartened. “The South¬ 
 ern-Rights ticket is beaten,” it declared, “but Southern 
 rights are not conquered. From the thistle of defeat 
 we will pluck the flower of victory! We entered the 
 canvass under the banner of secession and Southern 
 Liberty. We have kept it flying, and now nail it to 
 the mast !” 151 
 
 The effect of the election upon South Carolina was, 
 of course, most important. Towns’ fears and Sea- 
 brook’s prediction had now been realized. Georgia had 
 led off backwards, and, if South Carolina was to await 
 cooperation, the opportunity for secession had ceased 
 to exist. The day after the Georgia election Sea- 
 brook addressed the newly assembled South Carolina 
 legislature, urging against precipitate action without 
 
 150 Baltimore Sun, November 30; see also National Intelligencer, 
 December 14; Philadelphia Public Ledger, November 29; New York 
 Tribune, December 13, 1850; Columbus Ohio State Journal, December 
 2, 1851. 
 
 151 News, November 27; Georgian, November 30; Columbus Times 
 in the Columbia South Carolinian, November 29; see also the Talla¬ 
 hassee Floridian, November 30; Montgomery Advertiser in the Georgian, 
 November 30, 1850. 
 
THE CLEARING, 1850 
 
 323 
 
 the cooperation of the sister states. 152 It is clear from 
 his secret letters to Towns that, had the Georgia 
 election resulted in a southern-rights victory, his 
 action would have been very different. Georgia had 
 checked South Carolina. 
 
 It is true that some hope was expressed in the latter 
 state that the Georgia convention could still be counted 
 upon to take extreme action. 153 The more typical 
 view of the Carolina cooperationists, however, was 
 that expressed in the speech of B. F. Perry, repre¬ 
 sentative from Greenville, in the South Carolina 
 House. A fortnight after the elections in Georgia, 
 Perry urged Carolina to await cooperation before 
 seceding from the Union, and, in this connection, it 
 was necessary to warn his colleagues of the situation 
 in the sister states: 
 
 Mississippi (he declared) is more with South Carolina than 
 any other state. But her interests are with the Mississippi Val¬ 
 ley. I doubt very much whether Georgia and South Carolina 
 can ever agree on anything, much less on the formation of an 
 independent Republic. Two-thirds of Georgia is now opposed 
 to the action of South Carolina. They would not support us 
 even if we started the ball rolling. 154 
 
 While the state convention campaign was still un¬ 
 der way in Georgia, there had occurred a curious inter¬ 
 lude that under other circumstances might have led to 
 serious consequences; namely, the meeting of the sec¬ 
 ond session of the southern convention at Nashville, on 
 November 11. This assembly had been robbed of all 
 raison d’etre by the passage of the compromise and the 
 unmistakable tendency in the South to accept that ad- 
 
 152 Savannah News, November 29, 1850. 
 
 153 Charleston News, December 7, in the Washington Union, Decem¬ 
 ber 12, 1850. 
 
 154 Speech of B. F. Perry in the South Carolina House, December 11, 
 1850, (pamphlet, Charleston, 1851). 
 
324 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 justment. Hence there was probably less interest tak¬ 
 en in it than there was in the Georgia election itself. 
 Many delegates to the first session failed to attend the 
 second. Only four of the original Georgia delegation 
 returned to this meeting, Benning, McDonald, Mc- 
 Whertor, and Bledsoe, but the Governor appointed new 
 representatives to take the places of those who refused 
 to go. 153 Since Sharkey of Mississippi did not return, 
 McDonald of Georgia was honored with the chair. 
 
 The Georgia delegation, like most of the others 
 except that from Tennessee, was now purged of all 
 but the most extreme members, and the secession¬ 
 ists therefore had things all their own way. Presi¬ 
 dent McDonald opened the session with an appeal 
 for action, and various resolutions were introduced 
 by members from several of the states, includ¬ 
 ing Georgia, looking towards secession. McWhertor 
 expressed the feelings of the Georgia delegation 
 in the words: “Union and Slavery cannot exist to¬ 
 gether,” while Cheves of South Carolina announced 
 to a complacent nation: “Even now the Union is di¬ 
 vided.” After further oratory of this nature, the 
 convention adjourned, leaving its members to wend 
 their way southward once more, unhonored and un¬ 
 sung. 
 
 It is worthy of note, however, that the conservative 
 Tennessee delegation adopted, in protest to the radical 
 resolutions of the majority, the so-called “Tennessee 
 Resolutions,” which were of a conciliatory character. 
 These declared the Clay compromise unsatisfactory, 
 but accepted it with the distinct understanding that no 
 
 155 For typical reasons for refusal to attend the second session, see 
 the letter from ex-Governor Troup of Georgia, October 10, 1850, quoted 
 in Harden, G. M. Troup, p. 529, note 1. For the list of actual Georgia 
 delegates see the Nashville Banner, November 19, in Philadelphia Public 
 Ledger . November 29; Washington Republic, November 26, 1850. 
 
THE CLEARING, 1850 
 
 325 
 
 further concessions to the North were to be made. 
 This was the same view which had been proclaimed 
 in the “Chatham Platform” at Savannah on October 
 23, and which was being expressed elsewhere in the 
 South at the same time. It received, of course, scant 
 consideration at the Nashville meeting. 156 
 
 The Georgia state convention assembled at Mil- 
 ledgeville on December 10, 1850. There were present 
 some two hundred and sixty-four delegates, and, of 
 these, a remarkably large number were able and in¬ 
 fluential men. More than half were slaveholders, own¬ 
 ing from thirty to four hundred slaves each, and many 
 were men of culture and education. 157 It was obvious¬ 
 ly a body representing the educated, propertied, and 
 conservative classes, regardless of party. Among the 
 delegates were such conservative leaders as Toombs, 
 Alexander Stephens, Jenkins, Miller, W. B. Wofford, 
 W. C. Dawson, Meriwether, Ward, and Arnold. The 
 delegation from Chatham alone was sufficiently promi¬ 
 nent to have afforded leadership for the whole body— 
 Arnold, Ward, F. S. Bartow, and Cuyler, the last the 
 author of the “Chatham Platform.” Very few of the 
 delegates had been members of the last legislature, 
 whose personnel had been markedly inferior to that 
 of the convention. Indeed, the contrast between legis¬ 
 lature and convention in this respect recalls the con¬ 
 trast between the Congress of 1787 and the Consti¬ 
 tutional Convention of that year. The only prominent 
 leader among the handful of southern-rights delegates 
 
 lse For descriptions of the second session, see Herndon, “The Nash¬ 
 ville Convention”, Alabama Historical Society Publications, V. 229-233; 
 Sioussat, “Tennessee, the Compromise of 1850, and the Nashville Con¬ 
 vention,” Mississippi Valley Historical Review, II. 343-346. For the 
 opinion held by the Georgia southern-rights group of the second session, 
 see Federal Union, June 17, 1851. 
 
 157 Macon Journal in the Chronicle, December 12, 1850. 
 
326 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 was W. J. Lawton, who was assisted, however, by two 
 relatively unknown extremists, J. L. Seward and R. 
 W. McCune. The overwhelming majority of the 
 Union members, numbering some two hundred and 
 forty to twenty-three of the southern rights group, 
 was impressive. The disproportion was so great that 
 the convention served to all intents and purposes as 
 the first Union party meeting in Georgia, deriving a 
 peculiar significance from the fact that it represented 
 the entire population. 
 
 On motion of Meriwether, the Honorable Thomas 
 Spaulding, of McIntosh, was chosen president, that 
 honor being accorded him as the last living signer of 
 the state constitution. 158 Spaulding made a brief ad¬ 
 dress upon taking the chair, thanking the convention 
 for the honor which he felt was “perhaps a fitting ter¬ 
 mination for my long life. Perhaps,” he continued, 
 “the members may expect from me some expression of 
 opinion on this occasion. ... I must say that rather 
 than have the Union under which we have enjoyed 
 repose and happiness for sixty-three years destroyed, 
 —rather than have the states separated—I should pre¬ 
 fer to see myself and mine slumbering under the load 
 of monumental clay.” 159 This was hardly an auspici¬ 
 ous beginning for the secessionists. 
 
 The state senate rules were then adopted as a basis 
 of procedure, and a committee of thirty-three—three 
 from each state judicial district—was appointed by the 
 president to consider and report “action appropriate 
 for the occasion.” All the thirty-three appointed were 
 Union men save two, W. J. Lawton, of Scriven, and 
 J. M. Smith, of Camden. This brought an immediate 
 protest from the southern-rights delegates, who felt 
 
 158 Chronicle, December 20, 1850. 
 
 159 Debates and Proceedings of the Georgia Convention, p. 2. 
 
THE CLEARING, 1850 
 
 327 
 
 that the twenty-four thousand men who had voted 
 their ticket were entitled to more than two out of 
 thirty-three members on the committee. 160 These del¬ 
 egates considered it especially objectionable, moreover, 
 that the only southern-rights men named were both of 
 South Carolina origin, it being suspected that Spauld¬ 
 ing thought this fact would discredit their party. 161 
 In other words, the feeling against South Carolinians 
 was such that even the extremists in Georgia did not 
 wish to be identified with them. 
 
 On December 11, a number of pro-Union resolu¬ 
 tions were presented without being read and referred 
 to the committee of thirty-three. Among them were 
 those proposed by Bartow of Savannah, which in sub¬ 
 stance were probably like the “Chatham Platform.” 
 
 On the next day the “Ultraists,” apparently un¬ 
 deterred by their small numbers, took the initiative. 
 Seward, of Thomas, began by introducing resolutions 
 thanking Senator Berrien for his attitude on the Cali¬ 
 fornia bill. The president thought that such matters 
 should be referred at once to the committee, which, in 
 view of the personnel of that body, would have been a 
 simple way of burying all radical resolutions. It thus 
 appeared that the Union majority was not even in¬ 
 clined to let the extremists be heard. This brought 
 forth an energetic protest from McCune, of Butts, 
 who had seconded Seward’s resolution. McCune began 
 to give his frank opinion of the whole convention: 
 
 100 The lack of “proportional representation” meant, of course, that 
 the southern-rights vote of twenty-four thousand was not represented 
 in the convention in anything like a proportionate manner, i.e., propor¬ 
 tional representation, in the modern sense of the phrase, would have 
 entitled them to about eighty-five seats. This lack of proportionate 
 representation was typical of all American institutions, however. 
 
 181 Federal Union, December 24, 1850. 
 
328 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 I came here (he said), as a member of no particular party. I 
 came here for the purpose of taking into consideration the 
 action of the last Congress; and if possible of harmonizing the 
 body for these matters. From what I have seen and heard 
 since I have been here, I have come to the conclusion that there 
 is a disposition in the majority not to harmonize, but to build 
 up a great party. There should be no party in Georgia on this 
 question, none in the South. As before remarked, I came here 
 for the purpose of harmonizing . . . but, sir, I see a dis¬ 
 
 position to drive off members who are called “fire-eaters”—. 
 
 Here the President called him out of order. The Union 
 “steam-roller” had begun to work ! 162 
 
 Seward, not dismayed, immediately followed Mc- 
 Cune with new resolutions accompanied by a long 
 preamble. This preamble contained quotations from 
 some of Toombs’ most fiery utterances in the last Con¬ 
 gress, an indictment of his want of fidelity to those 
 utterances, and a declaration that his present policy 
 was dangerous to the South and to the Union. 163 The 
 resolutions repeated the demand made by the second 
 Nashville meeting, that there should be no political 
 cooperation with the North, and concluded with the 
 declaration: “We are called upon to defend our honor, 
 our property, and our country from the lawless rule 
 of the North.” 164 Seward read these statements in an 
 excited manner, the while Toombs gazed upon him 
 with what a reporter was pleased to call “the dignity 
 of a lion.” 165 
 
 A motion to print these resolutions was lost amid 
 some confusion. Seward was offended at the demon¬ 
 stration asrainst him when the convention also refused 
 
 o 
 
 182 Debates and Proceedings, p. 3. 
 
 183 How far this solicitude for the Union was sincere it is difficult 
 to say. It was typical of the new attitude assumed by the extremists 
 during the fall. 
 
 184 Debates and Proceedings, p. 4. 
 
 185 Macon Journal, in Chronicle, December 29, 1850. 
 
THE CLEARING, 1850 
 
 329 
 
 even to “take up” his resolutions. A Union member 
 then demanded fair play, and votes were finally taken 
 on the motion to take up the resolutions. Dr. Arnold 
 of Savannah remarked that, “as the gentleman wishes 
 to speak to Buncombe I will vote aye.” The motion 
 was defeated, one hundred and twenty-seven to fifty- 
 seven. The extremists had gained nothing for their 
 pains and felt, perhaps with some justice, that they 
 were not receiving a consideration proportionate to 
 the votes cast by their party. 
 
 On the thirteenth C. J. Jenkins presented to the 
 convention the “Exposition and Resolutions” prepared 
 by the committee of thirty-three. They had “carefully 
 considered the papers referred to them,” he reported, 
 “and freely interchanged opinions” and now submitted 
 the results of their deliberations. The “Exposition” 
 was a remarkable document, and the resolutions ap¬ 
 pended were to become nationally famous as the 
 “Georgia Platform.” Authorship has usually been 
 ascribed to Jenkins, who was chairman of the com¬ 
 mittee, 166 although Alexander Stephens later claimed 
 that he wrote them, 167 and it has already been noted 
 that the resolutions really followed in principle the 
 “Chatham Platform” penned by Cuyler, the Savannah 
 Union Democrat. The Georgia Platform owed its 
 origin in principle, therefore, though not in exact 
 wording, to the Union Democrats as well as to the 
 Whigs. 168 
 
 Jenkins, in reporting the preamble, was permitted 
 to read it from the desk, which he did “in a clear, dis- 
 
 166 C. C. Jones, Life of Charles J. Jenkins, (Pamphlet, Atlanta, 1884), 
 p. 3; Stoval, Toombs, p. 93. 
 
 167 Avary, Recollections of A. H. Stephens, p. 27. 
 
 168 Cf. Cole, “The South and the Right of Secession,” Mississippi 
 Valley Historical Review, I. 382. 
 
330 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 tinct, and manly tone.” A Union party reporter, who 
 was present, declared that 
 
 language would fail to describe the effect it produced. Many, 
 many eyes were suffused with tears at one moment and all 
 seemed to feel as if Georgia ought to be alike proud of her 
 position and of her noble sons who framed such a report. 169 
 
 The preamble began with a resume of the difficul¬ 
 ties in the last Congress and proceeded to the prac¬ 
 tical questions: “May Georgia consistently with her 
 honor abide by the general scheme of pacification? If 
 she may, then does her interest lie in adherence to it, 
 or in resistance?” The answer was then given that 
 it was consistent with Georgia’s honor, for only the 
 California law in any way violated even the demands 
 of the last legislature. It was to Georgia’s interest, 
 moreover, to accept the Compromise, since the only 
 conceivable form of resistance was secession, and 
 secession would increase rather than decrease the 
 state’s difficulties. Georgia should therefore accept 
 the adjustment. “To this course,” it was added, “she 
 is impelled by an earnest desire to perpetuate the 
 American Union.” 
 
 Here ended the first lesson of the preamble—that 
 addressed to the people of Georgia. There followed 
 one addressed to the “people of the sovereign states”— 
 which meant, in large part, to the people of the North. 
 This began with a review of the history of slavery 
 and ended with a solemn warning to the northern con¬ 
 servatives. Georgia would say to the moderate nor¬ 
 thern patriots who were tolerating abolitionism in 
 their midst: 
 
 169 Milledgeville Recorder, in a special night extra, December 14. 
 containing the resolutions and preamble, quoted in the Washington 
 Republic, December 20, 1850. See also Debates and Proceedings, pp. 
 5-8; Journal of the Georgia Convention, 1850, pp. 11-19. For the Reso¬ 
 lutions alone see Ames, State Documents, pp. 271, 272. 
 
THE CLEARING, 1850 
 
 331 
 
 Be not deceived, the destiny of the Union is in your hands. 
 Awake from your fatal dream of security. In the integrity of 
 your patriotism rise up against this disorganizing heresy. As¬ 
 semble in the venerated halls where your forefathers and our 
 forefathers together signed the Constitution, and redeem the 
 City of Brotherly Love from the reproach of nourishing its 
 foe . . . Everywhere . . . decree its (abolitionism’s) 
 
 banishment from the high places of power. You owe the coun¬ 
 try this lustration. As for Georgia, her choice is fraternity and 
 Union, with constitutional rights—her alternative self-preserva¬ 
 tion, by all the means which a favoring Providence may place at 
 her disposal. 170 
 
 The resolutions that followed the preamble were 
 similar to it, in that they added to the acceptance of 
 the compromise a warning to the North to maintain it. 
 The resolutions, it was declared, were adopted in 
 order “that the position of this state may be clearly 
 apprehended by her confederates of the South and 
 North, and in order that she may be blameless of all 
 future consequences.” The first three were general 
 in character, declaring the necessity for the compro¬ 
 mise and announcing that Georgia, “whilst she does 
 not wholly approve, will abide by it as a permanent 
 adjustment of this sectional controversy.” 
 
 The fourth and fifth resolutions were the most 
 vital ones, in that they clearly drew the line, beyond 
 which the North must not go if the compromise was 
 to be maintained: 
 
 The state of Georgia (declared the fourth resolution), will and 
 ought to resist even (as a last resort) to a disruption of every 
 tie that binds her to the Union, any action of Congress upon 
 the subject of slavery in the District of Columbia, or in places 
 subject to the jurisdiction of Congress, incompatible with the 
 safety, and domestic tranquility, the rights and honor of the 
 slave holding states, or any refusal to admit as a state any ter¬ 
 ritory hereafter applying, because of the existence of slavery 
 therein, or any act, prohibiting the introduction of slaves into 
 
 1,0 Debates and Proceedings, pp. 7, 8. 
 
332 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 the territories of Utah and New Mexico, or any act repealing 
 or materially modifying the laws now in force for the recovery 
 of fugitive slaves. 
 
 The fifth resolution declared, “That it is the deliberate 
 opinion of this Convention that upon a faithful execu¬ 
 tion of the Fugitive Slave Law by the proper authori¬ 
 ties depends the preservation of our much beloved 
 Union.” 
 
 Several statements in these resolutions are nota¬ 
 ble : first, that the compromise was viewed as “final”; 
 second, that any infringement by the North might lead 
 to the secession of Georgia; and, third, that each of a 
 number of specific encroachments would be regarded 
 as just cause for such secession. 
 
 As soon as the resolutions had been reported by 
 Jenkins for the committee, Toombs moved that the en¬ 
 tire report be accepted; but the “Ultraists” secured the 
 right to consider the preamble and each resolution 
 separately. As each resolution came up, the small op¬ 
 position group usually attempted amendments and 
 was as promptly voted down. When accused of “keep¬ 
 ing up the agitation in this manner,” Seward made 
 the pointed retort that Toombs and Stephens had de¬ 
 layed the organization of the national House for weeks 
 over the speakership, and “having got the people of 
 Georgia to the point of resistance, they come home and 
 ask [them] to submit to the injustice done them.” 171 
 
 The preamble was adopted on December 13, by two 
 hundred and thirty-seven votes to twenty-three. On 
 the same day, the first three resolutions were accepted 
 without opposition. In other words, after all the 
 condemnation heaped upon the compromise during 
 the summer and fall campaign, not a single voice was 
 
 1,1 Debates and Proceedings, p. 9. 
 
THE CLEARING, 1850 
 
 333 
 
 raised in the convention against the resolutions accept¬ 
 ing that compromise. On December 14, a long debate 
 occurred on the fourth resolution, which dealt with 
 the powers of Congress over slavery in the District 
 of Columbia. Some differences developed between 
 members of the Union party as to whether the con¬ 
 sent of the slaveholders in the District would give 
 Congress the right to abolish slavery therein. The 
 question was also raised, whether the mere emancipa¬ 
 tion of four or five hundred slaves there would be a 
 good cause for secession. The debate was notable for 
 the statement of Bailey, an extremist, that, while the 
 majority might ridicule them, the minority of twenty- 
 three would again appeal these issues to the people. 
 The end of the struggle was not yet ! 172 
 
 This discussion of the fourth resolution also eli¬ 
 cited the most fervent eulogies of the Union which the 
 convention was to hear. An interesting illustration 
 of this loyalty to the Union was afforded by the 
 speech of Bartow, of Chatham. In a moment of haste 
 he referred inadvertently to “our Southern confeder¬ 
 acy,” but immediately checked himself and exclaimed: 
 
 “I ask pardon, sir, of, you and this House for using the ex¬ 
 pression, ‘Southern Confederacy.’ It inadvertently escaped my 
 lips, for if there is any feeling of my heart more cherished than 
 another it is that the day may never come when’ we shall have 
 in this land a Southern Confederacy, or a Northern Confeder¬ 
 acy, or any other Confederacy than the glorious Union in which 
 we now live. May God preserve the Union of these states 
 forever.” 
 
 The fourth and fifth resolutions were finally adopt¬ 
 ed by the usual overwhelmnig majorities. New and 
 radical resolutions proposed by W. J. Lawton, the 
 same who had proposed similarly radical resolutions 
 
 112 Ibid., p. 17. 
 
334 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 in the legislatures of both 1847 and 1849, were then 
 promptly defeated. After accepting a resolution to 
 inscribe the Georgia stone for the Washington Monu¬ 
 ment with the words “Georgia Convention, December, 
 1850,” 173 and brief congratulatory addresses by the 
 presiding officers, the convention adjourned December 
 14, sine die. 17i 
 
 The assembling of delegates from all over the 
 state, divided between the Union and the southern- 
 rights groups, was naturally the occasion of the final 
 organization of these groups into new political par¬ 
 ties. Arnold, for instance, upon arriving as a dele¬ 
 gate at Milledgeville, was surprised by the extent to 
 which the new party lines had drawn fast. There was 
 already, he found, an “impassable gulf” between the 
 southern-rights and the Union Democrats. Campbell, 
 an editor of the Federal Union, minimized this separa¬ 
 tion, remarking to Arnold, “Oh, we will all fall back 
 into line”; but Arnold denied this. Upon taking dinner 
 with Towns, he and Ward had a long, “personally 
 friendly talk” with the Governor, but told him frankly 
 that they and the other Union Democrats could no 
 longer support him politically. Towns seemed “aw¬ 
 fully cut” by the results of the late election and the 
 character of the convention. 175 
 
 During the sessions of the convention the Union 
 men took advantage of their practical monopoly of the 
 membership to meet several times in general caucus. 
 The chief meeting held formally to organize the Union 
 
 173 This resolution was never carried out, and as a result the radical 
 inscription prescribed by Governor Towns (“The Constitution as it is, 
 the Union as it was”) was inscribed and remains on the Georgia stone 
 to this day. See A. C. Cole, “Inscribed Stones in the Washington Monu¬ 
 ment,” History Teachers’ Magazine, III. 49. 
 
 171 Debates and Proceedings, p. 25. 
 
 175 Arnold to Forney, December 18, 1850, Arnold MSS. 
 
THE CLEARING, 1850 
 
 335 
 
 party met in the House chamber on the evening of the 
 eleventh, and Toombs made a great Union speech ap¬ 
 propriate to the occasion. 176 He proclaimed the prin¬ 
 ciples of the new Union party and made an inspiring 
 appeal for its support. 177 Plans were subsequently 
 made for a state-wide organization and for the usual 
 machinery of party. 
 
 On the other hand, the Southern-rights party re¬ 
 quired no such spectacular manner of organization, as 
 the elimination of the Union Democrats had left to 
 the southern-rights group the majority of the leaders 
 who controlled the old Democratic machine. In the 
 course of the year that followed, the moderate policy 
 of these leaders attracted back into the party some of 
 the Democrats who had failed to support the Southern- 
 rights ticket in the convention election. Hence the 
 Southern-rights party was practically created by the 
 negative process of eliminating the more conservative 
 Union element rather than by the state-wide forma¬ 
 tion of the southern-rights societies, which had been 
 originally suggested. 
 
 The new parties had now been finally formed; the 
 convention had met; and the Union party, which con¬ 
 trolled it, had declared for the compromise as a last 
 
 1,6 For Toomb’s speech and the other proceedings of the Union party 
 caucus see Washington Republic, December 30, 1850. Toomb’s opening 
 words are suggestive of those of Lincoln’s famous Gettysburg Address 
 of later years. Toombs began with the declaration: “Sixty-three years 
 ago our fathers joined together to form a more perfect Union, and to 
 establish justice. . . . We have now met to put that government on trial. 
 ... In my opinion judgment the verdict is such as to give hope to the 
 friends of liberty throughout the world.” 
 
 177 Toombs closing words in this great address were tragic ones in the 
 light of his later irreconcilable attitude towards the Union government. 
 “No man”, he exclaimed, “rejoices more in the prosperity of his native 
 state than I do, no man can be more jealous of her honor. But I am 
 also an American. I am proud of every battlefield of the Revolution 
 that reflects honor on my country—it is all, all my country! Let us 
 then bind ourselves together and take counsel how we may best pre¬ 
 serve our rights and the integrity of the Republic, now and forever 1” 
 
336 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 concession. Now that Georgia had taken official 
 action, what response would that action meet with 
 throughout the nation? 
 
 The chief significance of the convention, so far as 
 Georgia itself was concerned, lay not only in the deci¬ 
 sion against disunion, but in the formal organization of 
 the Union party. Two distinct reactions were to be 
 noted in the southern-rights press of the state, the one 
 from the moderate and the other from the more ex¬ 
 treme papers. The moderate journals immediately ac¬ 
 cepted the “Platform” adopted. This was easy for 
 them to do, because, as the Federal Union had early 
 pointed out, the Union men had come to take a stronger 
 stand against the North than had been anticipated. 178 
 The difference between the secessionist position and 
 that of the Georgia Platform was only that the first 
 meant secession at once; the second, secession upon 
 the next serious provocation. This meant a vital dif¬ 
 ference in immediate action, but little variation in prin¬ 
 ciple. The reaction of the Georgian was typical, when 
 it declared it would accept the new Platform, but that 
 all its pledges must be sacredly observed. 179 
 
 The few out and out secessionist papers condemned 
 the Georgia Platform. The Macon Telegraph declared 
 it had “no spirit—it is too prudent to mean any¬ 
 thing. A more objectionable paper was never written 
 in Georgia.” 180 “Georgia has backed down from her 
 lofty resolves,” observed the Columbus Times. 181 These 
 same papers also sneered at the convention as having- 
 met only to form a Union party—a “Whiggery in dis¬ 
 guise” that would provide offices for its leaders. Simi- 
 
 3,8 Federal Union, November 12, 1850. 
 
 179 Savannah Georgian, December 23, 1850. 
 
 180 Macon Telegraph, in Savannah News, December 19, 1850. 
 
 181 Columbus Times, in Charleston Mercury, February 27, 1851. 
 
THE CLEARING, 1850 337 
 
 lar reactions obtained in the more extreme papers of 
 the sister states. 
 
 The Union press in Georgia, of course, praised en¬ 
 thusiastically all three phases of the convention’s work; 
 first, the repudiation of disunion and the Georgia ex¬ 
 tremists; second, the warning to the North and the 
 antislavery extremists; and, third, the foundation of 
 a state Union party to carry on these excellent poli¬ 
 cies. 182 
 
 The reaction in the Union press throughout the 
 rest of the South was also an enthusiastic one. It was 
 the general opinion that the “Georgia Platform” af¬ 
 forded the South a safe position between the ’’Ultra- 
 ists” on the one hand and the abolitionists on the other 
 —one upon which all conservative patriots, North and 
 South, could unite to preserve the Union. The unani¬ 
 mity of these opinions was impressive. 183 
 
 This reaction throughout the South led many ob¬ 
 servers to the conviction that the South would now 
 unite on the Georgia Platform, and that to Georgia, 
 therefore, belonged the credit for having saved the 
 Union. The Union men of Georgia were sure of this. 
 “Georgia was the first state that would accept or reject 
 the Compromise,” wrote Colonel John Milledge, of 
 Augusta. “The eyes of the world were upon her, 
 but calm and inflexible she came forth in the midst of 
 unparalleled excitement, holding in her hands the des¬ 
 tiny of this Empire. . . . Pier voice was for peace and 
 the Union. She joined it in i776 and she saved it in 
 1850 .” 184 Commenting on the state’s geographical 
 
 183 For typical praise see the Chronicle, December 15, 1850. 
 
 183 See, e.g.. Mobile Daily Advertiser, December 20; Richmond En¬ 
 quirer, December 13, 24; Jackson Flag of the Union, December 27; 
 Natchez Courier, January 14, 31, 1851; New Orleans Picayune, Decem¬ 
 ber 16, 1850; etc. 
 
 184 John Milledge to the Committee, February 20, 1851, Macon Union 
 Celebration, p. 20. 
 
338 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 position, Washington Poe of Macon observed that: 
 
 Georgia was the connecting link between South Carolina and 
 Alabama, so that a fire kindled in South Carolina would have 
 spread to Alabama and Mississippi. But the Georgia State 
 Convention stands firm. May not Georgia henceforth be 
 termed the preserver of the Union? 185 
 
 In the North, the press was convinced that the 
 Georgia Platform was being accepted all over the South 
 and that this meant the Union was to be preserved. 
 The Philadelphia Pennsylvanian declared the Platform 
 was “splendid,—a rallying ground for all friends of 
 the Union.” 186 “We have never hailed a victory with 
 more satisfaction,” exclaimed the New York Express 
 of the Georgia Convention elections, “the Georgia vic¬ 
 tory, together with the Northern Union movement and 
 the Texan acceptance of the Congressional proposal, 
 show the Union is probably saved.” 187 “The princi¬ 
 ples of the Platform,” observed the New York Tri¬ 
 bune, “are held throughout the South with great un¬ 
 animity.” 188 
 
 Prominent political leaders at Washington were 
 also of the opinion that the Georgia Platform would 
 unite the South and save the Union. Senator Dawson 
 wrote from Washington: “Her [Georgia’s] Platform, 
 as it has been called, will command the support of the 
 majority of the people in the Union; ... by it har¬ 
 mony has been in a great measure restored.” 189 James 
 Brooks, congressman from New York, wrote to the 
 Georgia conservatives: 
 
 185 Ibid., p. 40. 
 
 188 Philadelphia Pennsylvanian, in Washington Union, December 28, 
 1850. 
 
 187 New York Express, in the Savannah News, December 4, 1850. 
 
 138 New York Tribune, December 6, 1850. (Referring to the “Chat¬ 
 ham Platform”). 
 
 189 W. C. Dawson to the Committee, February 17, 1851; Macon Union 
 Celebration, pp. 8, 9. 
 
THE CLEARING, 1850 
 
 339 
 
 I look upon your stand, considering the crisis, as the most 
 important ever taken in the country, for while you resisted and 
 overwhelmed disunion, you also marked out the true chart of 
 the Union. Had Georgia taken the lead that was proffered I 
 should have despaired of shutting the flood-gates of passion 
 that were sure to open. 190 
 
 Indeed, all the conservative leaders at the capital 
 were greatly relieved and encouraged by Georgia’s 
 stand. “The name of Georgia is in everybody’s 
 mouth,” wrote the correspondent of the Savannah 
 Republican, “all praise the industry and patriotism 
 that have placed her in her present proud position. 191 
 General Cass can scarcely talk of anything else. It is 
 believed that Georgia has fought and won the battle 
 at the South if the friends of the Union will only 
 follow up her victory.” 192 Probably the most inter¬ 
 esting testimony to this effect, finally, was that given 
 by the Great Compromiser himself. Writing to the 
 Macon Union meeting during the following February, 
 Henry Clay declared: 
 
 When the calm judgment of the people was to be passed upon 
 the Compromise all eyes were turned to Georgia, and all hearts 
 palpitated with intense anxiety as to her decision. Ultraism 
 had concentrated its treasonable hopes upon that decision. I 
 never doubted it. ... I knew many of the prominent citi¬ 
 zens and . . . their devotion to the Union. ... At 
 
 length Georgia announced her deliberate judgment. ... It 
 diffused inexpressible joy among the friends of the Union 
 throughout the land. It crushed the spirit of discord, disunion 
 and Civil War. 193 
 
 190 James Brooks, February 17, 1851, quoted in the Savannah Repub¬ 
 lican, March 7, 1851. 
 
 191 The tendency to couple references to Georgia’s “prosperity” with 
 references to her “patriotism” is suggestive. 
 
 192 Republican, January 3, 1851. 
 
 193 Henry Clay, February 13, 1851, to the Committee, Macon Union 
 Celebration, p. 3. 
 
340 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 Such opinions suggest that the Union victory in 
 Georgia was a prime factor in the preservation of the 
 Union in 1850. This becomes clearer, when it is re¬ 
 called that the decision of Georgia left but two states 
 likely to secede, South Carolina and Mississippi. It 
 was highly improbable that any combination of these 
 twain could become effective so long as conservative 
 Georgia and Alabama lay between. The secessionists 
 thought at one time, as was pointed out in connection 
 with Seabrook’s correspondence, that if South Caro¬ 
 lina only started, Georgia would follow. That illusion 
 was well dissipated by December, 1850. The attitude 
 of the conservatives in Georgia toward an independent 
 secession movement in South Carolina was not to be 
 mistaken. “If South Carolina secedes,” declared the 
 Macon Journal, “we must stand by the Union. . . . 
 If a conflict of arms comes . . . we owe no allegiance 
 to South Carolina but we do to the Union. It would 
 be treasonable even for individuals to cooperate with 
 South Carolina.” 194 
 
 Georgia was fairly credited, then, with having 
 done much to save the Union. It was also credited with 
 having done much to unite the South. There were some 
 capable observers who believed this to be the case 
 months and even years after the opinions already quot¬ 
 ed had been expressed. Thus Bishop Capers, of the 
 Methodist Church in South Carolina, warned that 
 state in 1851 that the Georgia Platform voiced the 
 opinion of the South. 195 No less an “Ultraist” than 
 Yancey, of Alabama, expressed five years later the 
 opinion that the South became almost united upon the 
 
 “‘Macon Journal, in Boston Courier, December 18, 1851. The fear 
 that this would be the Georgia attitude was expressed in the South 
 Carolina legislature that was deciding that state’s final position. 
 
 185 Columbia South Carolinian, March 7, 1851. 
 
THE CLEARING, 1850 
 
 341 
 
 Georgia Platform, once the extremists had failed to 
 carry immediate secession. 196 Within Georgia itself, as 
 will be seen, many of the southern-rights group ac¬ 
 cepted it and considered themselves as well as the 
 North to be bound by its principles. Not only did Cobb, 
 the Union party governor from 1851 to 1853, hold to 
 the Platform, but Herschel V. Johnson, Democratic 
 governor from 1853 to 1857, continued to consider 
 himself bound by it as late as I860. 197 
 
 Any evaluation of the influence exerted by the 
 Georgia Platform in uniting the South must, of course, 
 consider two facts limiting its significance. In the 
 first place, the principles it embodied can hardly be 
 said to have been peculiar to Georgia in 1850. To 
 some extent, at least, the Platform simply expressed, 
 rather than determined, feeling in the lower South. 
 In the second place, the degree of unity achieved upon 
 this Platform was limited by the fact that the sec¬ 
 tional issue might eventually take forms which those 
 who built the Platform did not and, indeed, could not 
 anticipate. In case such unforeseen contingencies 
 arose, southerners who agreed upon the Georgia reso¬ 
 lutions might well disagree upon new problems. 
 
 Yet those who felt that the Platform had “unified” 
 the South were probably correct in a measure. The 
 very fact that it did give forceful expression to the 
 half-formed convictions of many southern people, and 
 the spectacular circumstances attending the formation 
 of the Platform, were both calculated to exert some in- 
 
 M6 W. L. Yancey to W. H. Worthington, June 23, 1855, quoted in 
 DuBose, Yancey, p, 295. 
 
 197 Johnson, although he had been a leader of the state-rights ele¬ 
 ment in the Georgia Democracy in 1849, held as late as 1860 that the 
 state was “bound” by the Georgia Platform; see “From the Autobio¬ 
 graphy of Hershel V. Johnson,” American Historical Review, XXX. 
 314, 318. The portions of this autobiography relating to the years prior 
 to 1856 are, unfortunately, not yet available for examination. 
 
342 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 fluence upon southern opinion. That there were con¬ 
 tingencies in the future which the Platform could not 
 be framed to meet, moreover, did not entirely divest 
 of significance the fact that there were a number of 
 specific contingencies for which it did provide. To 
 the extent that the South accepted the Georgia Plat¬ 
 form, it was united in proclaiming to the North that 
 there were at least four specific acts which must not 
 be attempted if the Union were to be preserved. These 
 acts were the ones which the South most feared in 1850 
 would mark any further northern “encroachments” 
 upon “southern rights.” The measure of the influence 
 of the Platform in the South was thus the measure of 
 a defensive unity against such specific dangers as were 
 then apprehended. 198 
 
 The Georgia Union victory had done much to 
 check the extremists of South Carolina. It had done 
 something to unify the South against the extremists of 
 the North. In the one way, as in the other, it played 
 an important part in saving the Union of the states. 
 There was some truth in Colonel Milledge’s heroic de¬ 
 claration: “She joined it in i776 and she saved it in 
 1850” 
 
 188 Cf. C. S. Boucher, “In Re That Aggressive Slavocracy,” Missis¬ 
 sippi Valley Historical Review, VIII. 58, 59. 
 
CHAPTER VIII 
 
 THE AFTERMATH, 1851-1852 
 
 The advent of the year 1851 found the political 
 situation in Georgia unique in every respect but one; 
 namely, that the new party alignments were as usual 
 more or less unstable. The decision of the people to 
 stand by the Union had apparently been proclaimed 
 beyond question, but it was by no means certain just 
 what turn political developments would take. To all 
 appearances the party which had suffered the most 
 as the result of the sectional storm was the Democratic, 
 which had lost at least half its potential vote in the 
 elections for the state convention; while the Whigs 
 not only held to the new Union party most of their own 
 vote, but had added to it a goodly share of that which 
 normally belonged to their opponents. There was some 
 poetic justice in this situation, to be sure, in view of 
 the fact that the Democratic leaders had been the prime 
 movers in demanding new party formations and had 
 doubtless intended that the realignment should redound 
 to their own advantage, in case it did not actually carry 
 the state out of the Union. In a word, those Demo¬ 
 cratic leaders who had not so completely dedicated 
 themselves to “secession per se” as to be truly above 
 party had hoped that the Democracy, under the guise 
 of “southern-rights,” would swallow Whiggery. The 
 actual outcome, however, had been that Whiggery, 
 under the guise of the Union party, had nearly swal¬ 
 lowed the Democracy. 
 
 The obvious remedy for this was for the latter to 
 withdraw from the position which had so weakened it. 
 
344 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 The Georgia people were evidently opposed to secession 
 and just as evidently in favor of the Georgia Platform. 
 Democratic editors, therefore, hastened during the 
 winter that followed the state convention to deny that 
 the southern-rights group ever had favored secession. 1 
 In addition to this, they promptly accepted the Plat¬ 
 form as the will of the people—an acceptance which 
 could be granted with a good countenance in view of 
 the “southern spirit” of its resolutions. 2 Having ac¬ 
 cepted the convention resolutions and vehemently de¬ 
 nied any intention to urge secession, the southern- 
 rights Democrats next declared that, in view of these 
 moves, there was no raison d’etre for a Union party in 
 the state. Why a party in favor of the Union when no 
 one was against it? They consequently invited all 
 Union Democrats to return to the party fold. As the 
 year progressed some of the editors even dropped the 
 party appellation of “Southern-rights” and reassumed 
 that of “Democratic.” 3 This move was doubtless has¬ 
 tened by a desire to maintain contacts with the conser¬ 
 vative northern Democracy. 
 
 The small group of out-and-out secessionists within 
 the Georgia Democracy was, to be sure, disinclined to 
 reestablish the old party name and organization. The 
 events of the fall could not change their conviction that 
 the struggle between the sections was inevitable and 
 that the sooner the South organized to meet it the 
 better. “As was to have been expected,” observed the 
 Columbus Sentinel, “the storm which has just passed 
 over our state has been succeeded by a calm. It is the 
 calm of preparation, and not of peace; a cessation, not 
 an end of the controversy. The recent election deter- 
 
 1 Federal Union, January 14, 21, 1851. 
 
 3 Federal Union, February 4; April 1, 1851. 
 
 s See, e.g., Savannah News, December 3, 1850. 
 
THE AFTERMATH, 1851-1852 
 
 345 
 
 mines only a question of time. . . . The elements of 
 that controversy are yet alive and they are destined yet 
 to outlive the government. There is a feud between 
 the North and the South which may be smothered, but 
 never overcome.” 4 
 
 It was to such sentiments that the Whigs pointed 
 when the Democrats inquired their reasons for main¬ 
 taining the Union party. The small but active group 
 of secessionists had not been converted by the fall elec¬ 
 tions, declared the Union men, but had been merely 
 driven under cover; and some organization of the con¬ 
 servatives was necessary to keep them there. There 
 was some truth in this declaration, and there is no 
 question that it was made in all sincerity by the Union 
 rank and file. 5 
 
 On the other hand, it is to be remembered that the 
 Georgia Whig leaders had no such hope of maintaining 
 old contacts with the northern wing of their party as 
 had the Georgia Democrats, and that it was therefore 
 to Whig interests to maintain the new and popular 
 Union party rather than to revert to the now impossible 
 Whig organization. This situation lent at least some 
 truth to the Democratic indictment of the Union party 
 as “a mere Whiggery in disguise.” 6 
 
 The Union Democrats, meanwhile, were no more 
 in a mood to reassume old party lines than were the 
 Whigs. They distrusted the Southern-rights group 
 for the same reasons as did the Whigs and were indeed 
 inclined to feel more strongly in this matter than were 
 
 ‘Columbus Sentinel in the Charleston Mercury, January 23, 1851. 
 
 5 For a typical statement of the Union position see Savannah Repub¬ 
 lican, January 6, 1851. See also Columbus Enquirer in the Republican, 
 April 17, 1851. 
 
 4 When the Macon Journal boasted that the Georgia Union party 
 had the approval of the Fillmore administration, the Federal Union re¬ 
 plied (February 11, 1851) that this proved that said party was simply 
 the old Whig organization. 
 
346 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 the latter. The years of intra-party strife which had 
 preceded the final break in Democratic ranks had not 
 inclined the conservative element to a hasty reconcilia¬ 
 tion, once the separation had been accomplished. 7 The 
 Union Democrats had no intention of allowing their 
 separation from the rest of the state party to cut them 
 off from the national body. They naturally had to con¬ 
 sider, however, the possibility of finding some national 
 affiliation which would be acceptable to their new asso¬ 
 ciates within the state. The obvious solution to this 
 difficulty seemed to lie in the formation of a national 
 Union party, which the conservative northern Demo¬ 
 crats could join simultaneously with conservative 
 Whigs and southern Democrats. The large Whig 
 element in the Georgia Union party was more than 
 willing to work for such a national organization be¬ 
 cause of that impossibility of a reunion with northern 
 Whiggery, which has already been mentioned. There 
 was much talk early in the winter of 1851, therefore, 
 of the formation of a great national Union party. 8 
 This move received some support from northern con¬ 
 servatives, who still feared the danger of secession and 
 civil war. 9 
 
 As the months passed, however, it became apparent 
 that the Union Democrats of Georgia were less inter¬ 
 ested in the projected national Union party than they 
 were in preserving their old contacts with the safe 
 northern Democracy. While Toombs and Stephens, 
 for instance, were working in Congress for the form¬ 
 ation of the new party, Cobb took the position that if 
 both the old parties could be dominated by conserva- 
 
 7 Athens Banner, in the Savannah Republican, March 13, 1851. 
 
 8 See, e.g., Macon Journal, in the Chronicle, December 28, 1850. 
 
 9 See R. F. Nichols, The Democratic Machine, 1850-1854, pp. 26, 27. 
 
THE AFTERMATH, 1851-1852 
 
 347 
 
 tives, there was no necessity for a third organization . 10 
 
 The lack of interest displayed by conservative 
 Democrats of both sections in the proposed national 
 coalition party was an important factor in the failure 
 of the southern Whigs, led in Congress by Clay, 
 Toombs, Stephens, and Foote, to establish a successful 
 organization. The Georgia Whigs greatly regretted 
 this failure, ostensibly and perhaps sincerely because 
 they feared the reversal to the old parties would mean 
 the reappearance of sectional strife . 11 It is no doubt 
 fair to assume, however, that their regret was also due 
 in no small measure to the failure of the proposed or¬ 
 ganization to afford them a place of safe national at¬ 
 tachment. 
 
 This situation, while most embarrasing to the Geor¬ 
 gia Whigs, was not without its difficulties for the 
 Union Democrats. They, to be sure, could trust the 
 northern wing of their party, but would that wing 
 trust them? In a word, if the national Democracy was 
 sufficiently conservative to be maintained, which fac¬ 
 tion of the old Georgia Democracy would this national 
 organization recognize as comprising the legitimate 
 state party? The Southern-rights party was certain 
 to claim exclusive legitimacy, basing its claim on the 
 undeniable fact that it possessed the majority of the 
 members of the old state organization. This claim was 
 bound to receive sympathetic consideration in some 
 quarters. Indeed, the winter had barely begun before 
 efforts were being made in the inner circles of the 
 national Democracy to reinstate the southern-rights 
 element throughout the South to full fellowship . 12 
 
 10 Cf., e.g., the letters of Cobb and Toombs in the Macon Union Cele¬ 
 bration, pp. 6, 7. 
 
 11 Savannah Republican, January 16, 1851. 
 
 12 For an interesting letter illustrating this effort, see Duff Green to 
 L. S. Coryell, November 21, 1850, Coryell MSS. 
 
348 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 The Georgia Union Democrats accordingly prepared 
 to combat this claim of their local enemies to national 
 recognition and to remind the party chieftains that it 
 was but a few months since that the Southern-rights 
 group in Georgia had urged the abandonment of both 
 the old parties. The conservative Democrats, they 
 claimed, were the only real Democrats. 13 
 
 Such was the general party situation in Georgia 
 during the winter of 1851. The Union and Southern- 
 rights parties 14 were evidently organized to meet the 
 exigencies of the state and sectional situation and just 
 as obviously were not adapted to the national situa¬ 
 tion, once the conservative Whigs and Democrats had 
 failed to expand their state organization into a national 
 Union coalition. It was inevitable, therefore, that the 
 state parties born of the 1850 struggle should be short¬ 
 lived, their decease being certain as soon as the pres¬ 
 sure of national political interests became greater than 
 that of the local. 
 
 It happened, however, that no national campaign 
 was due in 1851. This left the infant state parties this 
 one year, during which the election of the governor 
 and legislature were again in order, and when, there¬ 
 fore, state issues would be emphasized and the parties 
 based thereon temporarily preserved. 
 
 The refusal of the Union Democrats to accept im¬ 
 mediately the invitation for reunion extended by the 
 southern-rights element was the first sign that the 
 new parties were to persist throughout the year. The 
 
 13 R. D. Arnold to J. W. Forney, June 17, 1851, Arnold MSS. 
 
 14 These relatively simple names will be used here as a matter of con¬ 
 venience. As a matter of fact the formal names employed by the two 
 organizations were confusingly (and deliberately) similar, made so by 
 respective efforts to steal the thunder of one another’s slogans. The 
 Union party, e.g., referred to itself at times as the “Union and Southern 
 Rights Party,” see Savannah News, December 3, 1850. Its more com¬ 
 monly used name was the “Constitutional Union” party. 
 
THE AFTERMATH, 1851-1852 
 
 349 
 
 second was to be observed in the determination of the 
 Whig element in the state Union party to maintain that 
 organization, despite the failure to connect it with a 
 similar national machine. The two conservative groups 
 openly proclaimed their intention to “carry on” for the 
 Union at an elaborate affair held at Macon on Wash¬ 
 ington’s birthday. This “Macon Union Celebration” 
 proved a happy love-feast for the new allies. Many 
 able Georgia men attended, and the national leaders 
 who could not be present supplemented the speeches of 
 the day with elaborate letters which were read to those 
 assembled. 15 Perhaps the most significant of the num¬ 
 erous toasts drunk upon this exhilarating occasion was 
 that which declared in the following words the new 
 coalition’s attitude toward the old parties: 
 
 The Old Parties: The hot-beds in which are grown Aboli¬ 
 tionists in the North and Ultraism in the South. It is vain for 
 a rational people to quarrel about Whiggery and Democracy 
 when they are in danger of having no government to which to 
 apply their favorite theories. 16 
 
 The southern-rights Democrats having failed to 
 break up the Union coalition, 17 it was necessary for 
 
 15 See Union Celebration in Macon, Georgia, on the Anniversary of 
 Washington’s Birthday, February 22, 1851, (herein cited as Macon Union 
 Celebration), passim. See also U. B. Phillips, Robert Toombs, p. 100. 
 The southern-rights press declared the meeting “a miserable failure”; 
 Federal Union, February 25, 1851. 
 
 16 Other typical toasts were the following: “The Union Party of 
 Georgia: It has blotted out all party distinctions”; “Robert Toombs, 
 Howell Cobb and Alexander Stephens, the rising statesmen of the 
 South: A noble triumvirate of talent and true chivalry,” etc. Not the 
 least interesting was one which called attention to the importance of 
 Georgia’s economic position in connection with the general political 
 controversy: “Georgia, the Empire State of the South: Her railroads 
 and manufactures speak to the northern states in arguments . . . 
 louder than the cannon's roar.” 
 
 17 The only exception to this statement is to be found in the fact that 
 the Democrats did poll nearly their normal vote, running under their 
 old name, in certain local elections, as e.g., in that held in Savannah. 
 December 2, 1850. See Savannah News, December 3, 1850. 
 
350 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 both these groups to hold state conventions early in 
 the summer of 1851 in order to nominate a ticket and 
 to formulate a platform for the coming state campaign. 
 The Southern-rights conclave assembled on May 28, 
 and was naturally made up largely of Democrats. The 
 little group of old state-rights Whigs was quite active, 
 however, and James M. Smythe, their leader, served 
 as president of the meeting. 18 State-rights resolutions 
 were passed, but proved on the whole to be of a gen¬ 
 erally moderate character. The most significant resolu¬ 
 tion adopted was one proclaiming the “sovereign” ( i.e 
 the constitutional) right of a state to secede from the 
 Union, when its people were acting in their “sovereign 
 capacity.” No desire to exercise this right in the imme¬ 
 diate future, however, was expressed. Charles J. Mc¬ 
 Donald, sometime fire-eating president of the second 
 session of the Nashville Convention, was nominated 
 for the governorship without serious opposition. 19 
 
 The resolutions adopted clearly indicated that the 
 party’s strategy would be characterized by a return to 
 the policies of 1849. These policies had been success¬ 
 ful in the latter year for the reason that they had fea¬ 
 tured the appeal for southern-rights—which proved a 
 popular one—at the same time that they avoided the 
 appeal for immediate secession—which proved in 1850 
 to be an unpopular one. The resolution declaring the 
 merely abstract constitutional right of secession afford¬ 
 ed an especially good illustration of this return to old 
 policies, for it was one which would appeal to the 
 people’s southern sentiment and which at the same time 
 would not offend their love of the Union. This self- 
 
 18 Berrien, the other leader of this old Whig group, “accepted” the 
 Georgia Platform, but refrained from active cooperation with the Union 
 party. 
 
 19 Savannah Georgian, May 30, 31 ; Federal Union, June 3, 1851. 
 
THE AFTERMATH, 1851-1852 
 
 351 
 
 same abstract right had indeed been urged by the 
 southern-rights Democrats in 1849 to the embarrass¬ 
 ment of the Whigs, who were inclined to deny it, but 
 who feared popular disapproval for so doing. The 
 extremists now revived it in 1851 with hopes of even 
 greater success, since the Union Democrats were likely 
 to disagree in this matter with the Whigs; and it was 
 hoped that the allies could be split upon the issue. 20 
 
 The Union party, meeting in convention early in 
 June, was immediately confronted by this question of 
 the right of secession. Some of the Union Democrats 
 were inclined to defend the abstract “sovereign right,” 
 while most of the Whigs denied it and took the view 
 that, if there were any “right,” it was a revolutionary 
 rather than a constitutional one. The convention at 
 once realized that here was a divergence of opinion 
 which could only redound to the advantage of the 
 enemy, and, as a consequence, the subject was avoided 
 in the resolutions adopted for the campaign. These 
 declared that the Southern-rights party was still at 
 heart a secession party which, having been defeated 
 in the open, was continuing by divers and underhand 
 methods to seek its disloyal ends. The fight to save the 
 Union must be maintained. To lead this fight the 
 convention then nominated Howell Cobb for the gov¬ 
 ernorship. 21 
 
 Both gubernatorial candidates issued formal letters 
 of acceptance, which in each case anticipated the gen- 
 
 20 The Southern-rights party also had other schemes for dividing the 
 allies, e.g., they demanded that the Union convention declare its prin¬ 
 ciples on the bank, the tariff, etc.—points upon which Whigs and Union 
 Democrats would certainly have disagreed. The Union party press, 
 however, would not walk into so obvious a trap. The reply was given 
 that all such matters were now dead issues. Cf. the Savannah Georgian, 
 June 18, with the Republican, June 19, 1851. 
 
 21 Republican, June 10; Federal Union, June 10, 1851; Toombs to 
 Howell Cobb, June 9, 1851, “Cobb Papers,” Georgia Historical Quar¬ 
 terly, V. No. 3, pp. 45, 46. 
 
352 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 eral positions that their parties were to take during" 
 the summer campaign. Cobb emphasized the achieve¬ 
 ments of the Georgia Platform, but did not declare him¬ 
 self definitely upon the delicate subject of the right of 
 secession. 22 McDonald condemned the Clay compro¬ 
 mise and specifically upheld the “sovereign right” of 
 secession. He did not make it clear that he approved 
 the Georgia Platform, though most of his party’s jour¬ 
 nals had done so. 23 
 
 Most of the essential features of the campaign that 
 followed have already been suggested. The Southern- 
 rights party exploited their advantage upon the right 
 of secession issue, profiting by their experience of 
 1849 and by the inability of the Union party allies to 
 agree upon the matter. Cobb, as spokesman for the 
 conservatives, was forced to straddle both views of 
 the nature of the right, and, while his utterances upon 
 the subject were marvels of sophistical ingenuity, they 
 were not entirely convincing. 24 The Union men, for 
 their part, continued their old appeal to “save the 
 Union,” profiting by their experience of the preceding 
 year and practically repeating each argument which 
 they had urged at that time. 25 Thus the campaign 
 tactics of 1849, which had brought victory to the ex- 
 
 22 Republican, June 30, 1851. 
 
 23 Federal Union, June 17, 1851. The Clay compromise was never 
 approved by the Southern-rights group, even though they had usually 
 accepted the Georgia Platform which was itself an acceptance of the 
 compromise. The Savannah Georgian, e.g., declared (June 7, 1851) that 
 the compromise was the “most outrageous wrong ever perpetrated in 
 legislation.” Cf. Arnold to Forney, September 19, 1851, Arnold MSS. 
 
 24 For Southern-rights ridicule of Cobb’s inconsistencies see Federal 
 Union, July 8, August 19; Georgian, August 21, 1851. For his defence 
 see Republican, July 25, August 6, 1851. For constitutional arguments 
 pro and con, consult A. C. Cole, “The South and the Right of Seces¬ 
 sion,” Mississippi Valley Historical Review, I. 388, ff. See also R. P. 
 Brooks, “Howell Cobb and the Crisis of 1850,” ibid., I. 291, ff. 
 
 25 See. e.g., issues of the Chronicle and Republican for July and Aug¬ 
 ust, 1851. 
 
THE AFTERMATH, 1851-1852 
 
 353 
 
 tremists, were pitted against the tactics of 1850, which 
 had brought triumph to the conservatives. 
 
 McDonald, as spokesman for the radicals, was 
 handicapped by his record as a secessionist leader in 
 the Nashville convention sessions. This record was 
 somewhat inconsistent with the fact that his party’s 
 editors were now denying that the southern-rights 
 movement had ever been a secession movement. Here 
 was a situation of which the Union men hastened to 
 take advantage. Whenever their enemies embarrassed 
 Cobb by asking what he believed with regard to the 
 right of secession, the conservatives rejoined by ask¬ 
 ing McDonald what he desired to do about secession. 
 The one question was almost as embarrassing, under 
 the circumstances, as the other. 26 
 
 The campaign was one of sound and fury. Toombs 
 and Stephens, who had given their chief interest in 
 Congress during the winter to the unsuccessful effort 
 to organize a national Union party, returned during 
 the summer to lend their support to Cobb in the state 
 struggle. Stephens was kept out by illness, but Toombs 
 outdid himself, filling both his own and some of 
 Stephens’ engagements. “Wherever the fire-eaters 
 have a chance,” he wrote, “they fight like the devil— 
 though we shall whip them out all over the state.” 27 
 Feeling was increased because southern-rights Demo¬ 
 crats felt rather bitterly towards the Union Democrats 
 as “deserters,” while the mass of the Whigs felt simi¬ 
 larly towards the old southern-rights wing of their 
 party. 28 
 
 29 See e.g., Athens Banner in Savannah Republican, July 1, 1851. The 
 Federal Union denied that McDonald “had ever desired secession now.” 
 
 27 Toombs to General Eli Warren, August 19, 1851; letter in posses¬ 
 sion of Mr. Warren Grice, of Macon. 
 
 28 R. D. Arnold to J. E. Ward, Savannah, September 1, 1851, Arnold 
 MSS. 
 
354 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 Throughout the year conservatives continued to 
 point to the economic prosperity enjoyed within the 
 Union as a cogent reason for maintaining that Union. 29 
 This economic appeal, in addition to the more senti¬ 
 mental arguments for preserving the old government, 
 proved effective in maintaining the alliance of the con¬ 
 servatives, despite Cobb’s difficulties in the constitu¬ 
 tional debate. The preservation of the alliance, in 
 turn, made inevitable a Union victory in the fall, for 
 it meant that the Southern-rights party would remain 
 but a part of the old Democratic machine. It also 
 meant that the real issue of the campaign remained 
 the Union issue, despite the efforts of the extremists 
 to avoid it and to substitute for it that of the right of 
 secession. 
 
 The state election was held early in October, 1851, 
 and resulted in an overwhelming Union victory. Cobb 
 carried all but twenty-one of the ninety-five counties 
 in the state and had a majority in the popular vote of 
 about eighteen thousand. His party also secured an 
 unprecedented majority in the legislature and elected 
 six out of the eight congressmen. 30 The county re¬ 
 sults indicated that as a rule only such counties in 
 Central and Lower Georgia as habitually went Demo¬ 
 cratic had supported McDonald. 31 He received prac¬ 
 tically no support in any of the other sections of the 
 state. 
 
 29 See e.g., Dr. Robert Collins (of Macon) to the Committee, Feb¬ 
 ruary 22, 1851, Macon Union Celebration, p. 44; Columbus Times, in 
 Charleston Mercury, February 27, 1851. The Milledgeville Southern 
 Recorder declared in September that Georgia’s prosperity demanded the 
 cessation of all agitation. See Savannah Republican, September 25, 1851. 
 
 30 Federal Union, October 14; Republican, October 16, 1851. 
 
 31 Cf. Maps nos. 5 and 7, pp. 109, 320, showing elections of 1848 and 
 1850, with map of election of 1851 given in Cole, Whig Party in the 
 South. 
 
THE AFTERMATH, 1851-1852 
 
 355 
 
 Generally similar results obtained in the state elec¬ 
 tions held at about the same time in Alabama and Mis¬ 
 sissippi. In the former state the Union group, led by 
 Hilliard, won a definite victory in the congressional 
 election over the Southern-rights party led by the re¬ 
 doubtable Yancey. 32 In Mississippi, where the gov¬ 
 ernor had duplicated Towns’ procedure in summoning 
 a state convention, the elections to this body were held 
 in 1851 and resulted in a Union party victory, much 
 as had the analogous election in Georgia during the 
 preceding fall. As a result of all these circumstances, 
 the state convention which met in South Carolina in 
 the spring of 1852—the last of the state conventions 
 called in the South to consider secession—decided that 
 the Palmetto State would have to remain in the Union 
 as a matter of expediency. 33 
 
 The Union victories in Georgia and the Gulf states, 
 were therefore hailed by conservative papers through¬ 
 out the country as final evidence that the Union was 
 saved. This verdict was also accepted by the more 
 moderate of the southern-rights papers, although some 
 of these expressed both regret and bitterness at the 
 undeniably decisive character of their defeat. 34 “The 
 last two elections in Georgia,” observed the Federal 
 Union, “have twice definitely settled all practical ques¬ 
 tions in reference to the Compromise measures. . . - 
 The South has pretty plainly shown that she will not 
 secede from the Union.” 35 
 
 The fact that the election of 1851 finally confirmed 
 the Union victory of 1850 did not mean, however, that 
 
 32 G. F. Mellen, “Henry W. Hilliard and W. L. Yancey,” Sewanee 
 Review, XVII. 32-50. 
 
 33 Federal Union, May 18, 1852. 
 
 34 Mobile Register, in Mobile Advertiser, October 14, 1851. 
 
 35 Federal Union, October 21, 1851. 
 
356 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 the efforts of McDonald’s supporters had been made 
 entirely in vain. They had at least continued the edu¬ 
 cation of the Georgia people upon the various prob¬ 
 lems involved in the sectional controversy—a process 
 which they had now carried on for several years, and 
 which was to show results in the not very distant 
 future. Indeed, it is quite possible that they were suc¬ 
 cessful in persuading a large part of the state’s popu¬ 
 lation of the truth of their chief contention; that is, 
 that the state had a legal right to secede if it so desired. 
 The Union leaders had not succeeded in defeating this 
 contention, they had only succeeded in subordinating it 
 to their own more practical demand; namely, that the 
 Union must be maintained at the time. In a word, the 
 extremists, in the process of losing the election of 1851, 
 had prepared the way for victory in 1861. 
 
 The very finality of the Union victory in the state, 
 moreover, foreordained the disintegration of the Union 
 party. As the Federal Union observed, no one could 
 believe that any large body of citizens still desired 
 immediate secession, and, if there was no such group 
 opposed to the Union, there was no longer any raison 
 d’etre for a party whose prime purpose had been to 
 defend it. Democratic editors therefore resumed in 
 1852, with an even greater gusto than they had dis¬ 
 played the preceding year, the invitation to the Union 
 Democrats to return to the old organization. This de¬ 
 sire to reestablish a unified state Democracy actually 
 led the southern-rights editors to emphasize their ac¬ 
 ceptance of the Georgia Platform and to decry any 
 further agitation of the sectional issue. 36 
 
 This attitude immediately alarmed the Whigs of 
 the Union party, who feared that the return of their 
 
 38 Federal Union, December 16, 1851. 
 
THE AFTERMATH, 1851-1852 
 
 357 
 
 Union Democratic associates to the old allegiance 
 would leave Georgia Whiggery isolated, without party 
 allies either in the North or in the state itself. It 
 seemed a cruel irony of fate that, the agitation of the 
 slavery issue having alienated the Whigs from their 
 northern associates, the subsidence of that very agita¬ 
 tion should now alienate them from their state asso¬ 
 ciates. Whig editors, therefore, found themselves 
 tempted to assume an attitude exactly the reverse of 
 that which they had maintained for two years; that is, 
 they actually began a mild agitation of the slavery 
 issue. This seemed the only way in which to maintain 
 that state of alarm among Union Democrats which 
 would insure their continued allegiance to the conserva¬ 
 tive coalition. Southern-rights editors countered by 
 reversing their attitude in turn. When the Milledge- 
 wille Recorder, for instance, displayed alarm over the 
 discussions of slavery that arose in Congress in Decem¬ 
 ber, 1851, the Federal Union scoffed at its fears, held 
 that all was well, and declared that the Whigs were 
 simply agitating in order to remain in power. 37 Once 
 again, at the call of party expediency, the state parties 
 had reversed their fundamental attitudes towards the 
 whole sectional controversy. 
 
 Meanwhile, 1852 was to be a presidential year, and 
 bere again fate favored the apparently defeated Demo¬ 
 crats. The state parties must now adjust themselves 
 to the national situation—an adjustment that had only 
 been put off temporarily in 1851, and which, for rea¬ 
 sons that have already been noted, was bound to re¬ 
 dound to the benefit of the Democracy. There was 
 only one national party which Georgians of any party 
 could afford to support, and that was the Democratic. 
 
 31 Federal Union, December 16, 23, 1851. 
 
358 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 Northern Whiggery was “unsound” on the all-im¬ 
 portant slavery issue, and no national Union party had 
 ever been organized. Both the Georgia Whigs and 
 Union Democrats must choose between supporting the 
 national Democracy and throwing their votes away 
 upon some improvised and hopeless third-party ticket. 
 The Union Democrats were not likely to abandon 
 the national Democracy, in view of their persistent 
 claim to recognition as the legitimate state branch of 
 the party. It remained to be seen whether the Whigs 
 would go with them into the Democracy, or whether 
 they would prefer even isolation to such political 
 apostasy. 
 
 The Whigs and Union Democrats had cooperated 
 in the state legislature of 1851-52, the latter even sit¬ 
 ting on the same side of the chambers with their asso¬ 
 ciates. 38 They had combined with the Whigs to defeat 
 the candidacy of Berrien for reelection to the national 
 Senate 39 and to grant that honor to Toombs. 40 As 
 the winter waned, however, and the question of na¬ 
 tional presidential nominations loomed on the political 
 horizon, it became increasingly difficult to maintain 
 this cooperation. 
 
 The Union Democrats insisted upon sending dele¬ 
 gates to the coming Democratic convention at Balti¬ 
 more, for to abstain from representation therein would 
 have simply meant the surrender of their claims to 
 national recognition. There was talk of persuading 
 the Whigs to join with them in sending a general 
 Union party delegation, and some Whigs encouraged 
 
 38 Federal Union, January 27, 1852. 
 
 39 Berrien, after denying his candidacy, later indicated that he would 
 accept re-election. His age, and his alienation from his party in 1850 
 and 1851, combined at this point to terminate his career. 
 
 10 See Phillips, Robert Toombs, p. 105. 
 
THE AFTERMATH, 1851-1852 
 
 359 
 
 the suggestion. The Macon Journal, for instance, 
 admitted that there was not much further need for a 
 Union party in the state and advocated that its mem¬ 
 bers affiliate with the Democracy and be represented 
 at Baltimore. 41 This may be viewed as one of the first 
 steps in the process that was to carry most of the Whigs 
 over into the other party before the end of the decade. 
 
 It was a premature step, however, so far as most 
 of the Whigs were concerned in 1852. The Union 
 party met in state convention on April 22 and was 
 promptly involved in a controversy between the Union 
 Democrats, who wished to send a delegation to Balti¬ 
 more, and the Whigs, who opposed such action. The 
 debate ended in deadlock, whereupon the Union Demo¬ 
 crats—nicknamed the “Tugalo Democrats” from the 
 Tugalo river region in Upper Georgia—independently 
 chose their own delegation to Baltimore. A small 
 group of conservative Whigs then met at Milledgeville 
 on June 7 and elected a delegation to the Whig national 
 convention. 
 
 The southern-rights Democrats had, meanwhile, 
 met in convention on March 31 and had duly chosen a 
 delegation to the Democratic convention. When that 
 body assembled, both this delegation and that selected 
 by the Tugalo faction arrived to claim recognition as 
 the legitimate representatives of Georgia. Neither 
 group could be ignored, since the Tugalo element had 
 strong support among the northern conservatives, who 
 felt that it had been loyal to the national party when 
 the southern-rights group had bolted in 1850 ; 42 while 
 
 41 Macon Journal, January 14, 1852; cf. Federal Union January 20, 
 1852. 
 
 42 Cobb’s influence at Washington had helped to retain the support of 
 the Washington Union for the Union Democrats; and Arnold had used 
 
360 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 the latter could not be snubbed in view of the simple 
 fact that it now included nearly three fourths of the 
 Democratic voters in the state. 43 The convention 
 solved this seeming dilemma by the simple expedient of 
 admitting both delegations. Spokesmen for both the 
 state factions approved this action, and cheers greeted 
 the apparent reconciliation within the Georgia De¬ 
 mocracy. 44 The convention nominated Franklin 
 Pierce as a candidate who was sufficiently safe and 
 sane to appeal to both sections. 
 
 Throughout the summer, however, both the Whigs 
 and Union Democrats in Georgia showed signs of a 
 lingering attachment to the fast disintegrating Union 
 party organization. When the state’s southern-rights 
 delegates at Baltimore, for instance, invited the Tuga- 
 loes to join with them in calling a general Pierce rati¬ 
 fication meeting in Georgia, the latter declined, evi¬ 
 dently in the hope that they could still persuade the 
 Whigs to go with them in an independent support of 
 the same candidate. 
 
 Meanwhile, the Whig national convention nomi¬ 
 nated General Scott, who was considered entirely 
 “unsafe” by many of the Georgia members of the 
 party. The fact that this convention, like the Demo- 
 
 his influence with Forney to secure the support of so important a party 
 paper as the Philadelphia Pennsylvanian. See Arnold to Forney, Sep¬ 
 tember 1, 1851, Arnold MSS. 
 
 43 In the election of 1850 the southern-rights Democrats polled less 
 than half of the normal Democratic vote. The moderation of the 
 Southern-rights leaders in the campaign of 1851, however, attracted back 
 many Democrats who would not vote for them when they had been 
 stamped with the stigma of secessionism. As a result their party polled 
 about three-fifths of the normal Democratic vote in 1851. They claimed 
 by the spring of that year to have the support of three-fourths of the 
 original party, i.e., that the Southern-rights party numbered some thirty- 
 nine thousand voters, and the Tugalo element only thirteen thousand. 
 See Federal Union, May 22, 1852. 
 
 44 Federal Union, June 15, 1852. 
 
THE AFTERMATH, 1851-1852 
 
 361 
 
 cratic, formally approved the Clay compromise did not 
 reassure such Whigs. While the more conservative 
 Whigs, led by Senator Dawson and supported by such 
 papers as the Chronicle , 45 accepted Scott’s candidacy, 
 the more radical members, led by Toombs and Steph¬ 
 ens, supported a separate ticket headed by Daniel 
 Webster. 
 
 This left the Tugaloes in an isolated position, since 
 they had refused to go with the rest of the Democrats 
 for Pierce; and now the Whigs were refusing to go 
 for Pierce with them. In a last effort to hold the 
 Union party together, they called a meeting of the 
 same at Milledgeville on July 15. The Tugaloes com¬ 
 prised a majority of its membership, and, when they 
 attempted to approve the nomination of the Pierce 
 ticket, the Whig delegates bolted. The Tugalo rump 
 was then forced to nominate an independent ticket of 
 Pierce electors. The Union party had finally suc¬ 
 cumbed to the pressure of national issues, and the 
 executive committee shortly thereafter declared its 
 official dissolution. 46 
 
 When the election was held in the fall, the south¬ 
 ern-rights (now claiming to be the “regular”) Demo¬ 
 cratic Pierce electors received 33,843 votes and were 
 elected, while the Tugalo Pierce electors polled only 
 5733 votes. 47 The Scott ticket, which may be viewed as 
 representing what was left of the “regular” Whig or¬ 
 ganization, received 15,789 and the Webster ticket 
 5289 votes. A ticket of the die-hard secessionists, who 
 
 45 Chronicle, July 20, 1852. 
 
 46 Federal Union, July 13, 20, 1852; Phillips, Robert Toombs, pp. 109, 
 110 . 
 
 47 This probably does not represent the normal strength of the Tuga¬ 
 loes, as there was little incentive for this group to vote when there was 
 no possibility of election of their ticket. 
 
362 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 had nominated Troup and Quitman, polled only 119 
 votes. This last was the first vote taken in the state 
 which could be viewed as indicating specifically the 
 number of secessionists, yet it was not a reliable test 
 for the same in view of the fact that some secessionists 
 may have not thought it worth voting under the 
 circumstances. 
 
 The subsequent history of the state parties need not 
 be pursued here. When the state election of 1853 was 
 held, the Union Democrats cooperated with the south¬ 
 ern-rights group in electing Herschel V. Johnson as 
 governor, 48 and the reunited factions polled the normal 
 party vote. The Whigs, still retaining the now mean¬ 
 ingless appellation of the “Union party,” also polled a 
 normal vote and were consequently defeated by a nar¬ 
 row margin. 49 The crisis of 1850 was past; the events 
 which led to the greater crisis of 1860 were yet to be. 
 
 Within Georgia the lull between the two storms 
 was mistaken by many for the reality of permanent 
 peace and calm. The “Empire State of the South” 
 could now devote itself undisturbed, they felt, to the 
 cultivation of progress and prosperity. Governor 
 Cobb’s final executive message, written just before he 
 left office in 1853, was of the most optimistic character 
 —a veritable benediction to a happy people. “The gen¬ 
 eral character of our Federal relations,” he declared, 
 “presents a flattering prospect. Since the happy termi¬ 
 nation of those annoying sectional strifes, which for a 
 time threatened our peace and quiet, the country has 
 returned to a state of calm and repose, and all indica- 
 
 48 There were, of course, some signs of lingering feeling between the 
 two elements, especially of the extremists’ dislike for Howell Cobb. See, 
 e.g., W. H. Hull to Cobb, August 16, 1853, Toombs, Stephens, and Cobb 
 Correspondence, pp. 334, 335. 
 
 " Phillips, Georgia and State Rights, pp. 168, 169. 
 
THE AFTERMATH, 1851-1852 
 
 363 
 
 tions of the present point to a happy, peaceful and 
 prosperous future.” 50 Perhaps, after all, it was well 
 for the Georgia people that they could not know what 
 this future really was to be. 
 
 50 Message of Governor Howell Cobb to the Legislature, November 8, 
 1853, (pamphlet in the De Renne Library collection.) 
 

BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 I—Guides 
 
 Brooks, R. P., A Preliminary Bibliography to Georgia His¬ 
 tory, Athens, Ga., 1910. 
 
 Flisch, Julia, “Records of Richmond County” (Augusta), 
 American Historical Association, Annual Report, 1906, II. 
 159, ff. 
 
 Harden, William, “Georgia Newspaper Files in the Library 
 of the Georgia Historical Society,” Gulf States Historical 
 Magazine, I. 348, ff. 
 
 Hull, A. E., “Georgia Newspaper Files in the Library of the 
 University of Georgia,” Gulf States Historical Magazine, 
 I. 205, ff. 
 
 Jack, T. H., “Historiography in Georgia,” Georgia Historical 
 Association, Annual Proceedings, I. 21-31. 
 
 Jack, T. H., “Files in the Emory College Library, Oxford, 
 Georgia,” Gulf States Historical Magazine, II. 194, ff. 
 
 Knight, L. L. and Cobb, M., “The Condition of Georgia’s 
 Archives,” Georgia Historical Association, Annual Proceed¬ 
 ings, I. 32-35 (1917). 
 
 Kennedy, J. C. G., “Catalogue of the Newspapers and Period¬ 
 icals Published in the United States, 1850.” (Included as 
 appendix to John Livingston’s Law Register for 1852, New 
 York, 1852. Gives lists of papers in each state, with party 
 affiliations and circulation figures.) 
 
 Mackall, L. L., “The W. J. De Renne Georgia Library,” 
 Georgia Historical Quarterly, II. 63, ff. (June, 1908.) 
 
 Owen, T. M., “Georgia Newspaper Files in the Carnegie Li¬ 
 brary, Atlanta,” Gidf States Historical Magazine, I. 423, ff. 
 
 Phillips, U. B., “Public Archives of Georgia,” American His¬ 
 torical Association, Annual Report, 1903, I. 439, ff. 
 
 Phillips, U. B., “Georgia Local Archives,” American Histor¬ 
 ical Association, Annual Report, 1904. 
 
 “State Histories, Check List of, in the New York Public Li¬ 
 brary,” New York Public Library Bulletin, No. 5 (New 
 York, 1901). 
 
366 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 Weglein, O., Materials for Georgia History in the Library of 
 
 IV. J. De Renne, Savannah, 1911. 
 
 II— Unpublished Sources 
 
 Unless otherwise noted the manuscripts listed below are in 
 the Library of Congress. 
 
 Arnold MSS. A collection of the letter-books of Dr. Rich¬ 
 ard Arnold of Savannah, containing correspondence from c. 
 1840 to 1870, in possession of his granddaughter, Miss Mar¬ 
 garet Cosens, of Savannah. (Letters from the Savannah 
 Democratic leader, dealing with personal, professional, and 
 political matters. Those of a political nature are valuable here, 
 as they contain periodical analyses of political conditions in the 
 state from the viewpoint of the union Democrats. These were 
 sent by Arnold to his friend Forney, the Pennsylvania Demo¬ 
 crat. The letters give especially vivid details of party strug¬ 
 gles in Savannah. They contain material for the history of 
 Georgia in the Civil War and Reconstruction periods, but this 
 has not as yet been examined.) 
 
 Berrien MSS. A few letters of Senator John McPherson 
 Berrien. (Important for Berrien’s political position in 1848- 
 1850.) 
 
 Calhoun Papers. Unpublished letters of J. C. Calhoun, in 
 possession of the American Historical Association, preparatory 
 to publication. (Contain c. 15 letters from Georgia extremists 
 to Calhoun, 1847-1850. Important for the connection between 
 Calhoun and the secession movement in Georgia.) 
 
 Crittendon MSS. A large collection of 28 volumes of great 
 value for the general history of the Southern Whigs. (Useful 
 here in connection with Toombs and Stephens, though most of 
 this material has been printed in the Toombs, Stephens, and 
 Cobb Correspondence. A calendar by C. N. Feamster (1913) 
 makes the manuscripts readily accessible.) 
 
 Hammond MSS. (A large collection of the letters of the 
 South Carolina Governor, James H. Hammond, dealing with 
 personal and political matters, slavery, etc.) 
 
 Stephens MSS. (About twenty papers of Alex. H. Steph¬ 
 ens, including a few Toombs letters.) 
 
 Seabrook MSS. (Political letters to and from Governor W. 
 B. Seabrook of South Carolina, 1849-1850. Valuable for the 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 367 
 
 relationship between South Carolina and the secession move¬ 
 ment in Georgia and Mississippi. Contains several letters from 
 Governor G. W. Towns of Georgia to Seabrook, in 1850, which 
 are of great importance.) 
 
 Georgia Executive Department, Letter Books of: in the 
 Department of Archives, Atlanta. (Relate largely to routine 
 matters, but are occasionally suggestive.) 
 
 Georgia Executive Department, Minutes of: in Department 
 <of Archives, Atlanta. (Contains executive proclamations.) 
 
 Ill— Contemporary Writings 
 
 Brooks, R. P. (Ed.), “The Howell Cobb Papers,” Georgia 
 Historical Quarterly, V. Numbers 1, 2 and 3. (March, June, 
 September, 1921.) 
 
 Jameson, F. P. (Ed.), “The Correspondence of John C. Cal¬ 
 houn,” American Historical Association, Annual Report, 
 1899, II. 
 
 Johnston, R. M. and Browne, W. H., Life of Alexander H. 
 Stephens, Philadelphia, 1878. (Largely a collection of ex¬ 
 cerpts from Stephens’ letters.) 
 
 Phillips, U. B. (Ed.), “Toombs, Stephens, and Cobb Cor¬ 
 respondence,” American Historical Association, Annual Re¬ 
 port, 1911, II. 
 
 Quaife, M. M. lEd.), The Diary of James K. Polk, Chicago, 
 
 1910. 
 
 Rowland, Dunbar (Ed.), Jefferson Davis, Constitutionalist: 
 His Letters, Papers and Speeches, Jackson, 1923. 
 
 IV— Memoirs and Reminiscences 
 
 Andrews, Garnett, Reminiscences of an old Georgia Lawyer, 
 Atlanta, 1870. 
 
 Avary, M. L., Recollections of Alexander H. Stephens, New 
 York, 1910. (Contains Stephens’ letter reviewing his own 
 career.) 
 
 Benton, T. H., Thirty Years View, New York, 1854, 1856. 
 Burke, Emily, Reminiscences of Georgia, Oberlin, Ohio, 1850. 
 (Interesting observations on social and economic life, from 
 a northern point of view.) 
 
 T)avis, Mrs. V. H., Jefferson Davis, A Memoir, New York, 
 1890. (Interesting observations on the slavery issue in 
 1850.) 
 
368 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 Felton, Mrs. W. H. (R. L.), Country Life in Georgia in the 
 Days of My Youth, Atlanta, 1919. 
 
 Giddings, Joshua R., History of the Rebellion, New York, 
 1864. (Largely a memoir useful for the abolitionist point of 
 view in 1850.) 
 
 Kemble, Frances A., Journal of a Residence on a Georgia 
 Plantation in 1838-1839, New York, 1863. 
 
 Lumpkin, Joseph H., “Memoirs,” United States Law Maga¬ 
 zine, July and August, 1851 (Chiefly legal). 
 
 Mallard, R. Q., Plantation Life Before Emancipation, Rich¬ 
 mond (Va.), 1897. (Accounts of slavery in Georgia.) 
 
 Pike, J. S., First Blows of the Civil War, New York, 1879. 
 (Recollections and opinions of a Taylor Whig.) 
 
 Stephens, A. H., A Constitutional View of the Late War be- 
 tween the States, Philadelphia, 1868-70. 
 
 Scot, W. J., Seventy-One Years in Georgia: An Autobiogra¬ 
 phy, Atlanta, 1897. 
 
 Wylie, L. B., Memoirs of Richard H. Clark, Atlanta, 1898. 
 (Relates chiefly to Savannah.) 
 
 V— Biography 
 
 Ames, H. V., “Calhoun and the Secession Movement of 1850,” 
 University of Pennsylvania, Public Lectures, 1917-1918. 
 (An excellent brief account of Calhoun’s leadership.) 
 
 Boykin, Samuel, A Memorial Volume of Hoiuell Cobb, Phila¬ 
 delphia, 1870. (Brief biography, eulogistic and unsatisfac¬ 
 tory.) 
 
 Candler, A. D. and Evans, C. A., Cyclopedia of Georgia, At¬ 
 lanta, 1907. (Contains laudatory biographical sketches.) 
 
 Chappell, A. H., Miscellanies of Georgia, Atlanta (Ga.), 
 1874. (Miscellaneous collection of biographical and his¬ 
 torical sketches.) 
 
 Cleveland, H., Alexander H. Stephens, Philadelphia, 1866. 
 
 Fielder, Herbert, Life and Times and Speeches of Joseph E. 
 Brown, Springfield (Mass.), 1883. (Contains interesting 
 comments on Georgia politicians.) 
 
 Gilmer, G. R., Sketches of Some of the First Settlers of Upper 
 Georgia, New York, 1855. 
 
 Harden, E. J., The Life of George M. Troup, Savannah, 1859. 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 369 
 
 Holsey, Hopkins, “George W. Towns,” in the Milledgeville 
 Federal Union, July 13, 1847. 
 
 Johnston, R. M. and Browne, W. H., Life of Alexander H. 
 Stephens, Philadelphia, 1878. 
 
 Jones, C. C., John McPherson Berrien, Atlanta, 1891. (Ad¬ 
 dress before the Georgia Bar Association, 1891—eulogistic.) 
 
 Jones, C. C., Life and Services of Ex-Governor C. J. Jenkins, 
 Atlanta, 1884. (Memorial Address to the Georgia Legis¬ 
 lature, 1883—laudatory.) 
 
 Knight, L. L., A Standard History of Georgia and Georgians, 
 New York, 1917. (Of the 6 volumes, volumes IV-VI. in¬ 
 clusive, are biographical.) 
 
 Knight, L. L., Reminisences of Famous Georgians, Atlanta, 
 1907-08. 
 
 Memoirs of Georgia, the Southern Historical Association, At¬ 
 lanta, 1895. (Contains convenient biographical sketches.) 
 
 Merritt, Elizabeth, James Henry Hammond, 1807-1864 , 
 Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1923. 
 
 Miller, S. F., Bench and Bar of Georgia, Philadelphia, 1858. 
 (Contains valuable biographical sketches, by a contemporary 
 politician, of both Whig and Democratic leaders.) 
 
 Mitchell, B., “Frederick Law Olmsted,” Johns Hopkins Uni¬ 
 versity Sudies in Political and Social Science, Series XLII, 
 No. 2, Baltimore, 1924. 
 
 Northern, W. J., Men of Mark in Georgia, Atlanta, 1907-12. 
 
 Norton, F. H., Life of Alexander Stephens, Alden, N. Y., 
 1883. (An early biography, superseded by Pendleton.) 
 
 Pendleton, L. B., Alexander Stephens, Philadelphia, 1907. 
 
 Phillips, U. B., The Life of Robert Toombs, New York, 1913. 
 
 Shurz, Carl, Henry Clay, Boston, 1887. 
 
 Stovall, P. A., Robert Toombs, New York, 1892. (Super¬ 
 seded by Phillips’ Toombs, but contains some interesting 
 material.) 
 
 Turner, J. A., “William C. Dawson,” The Plantation, I. No. 
 1, pp. 71-100 (1860). 
 
 Turner, J. A., “Herschel V. Johnson,” ibid., pp. 62-70. 
 
 Waddell, J. D., Linton Stephens, Atlanta, 1877. 
 
 Wade, John D., Augustus Baldwin Longstreet, New York, 
 1924. (Useful for the social history of Georgia in the ante¬ 
 bellum period.) 
 
370 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 VI— Newspapers 
 GEORGIA 
 
 Athens, Clark County 
 
 Southern Whig, Weekly, Whig. Library of Congress— 
 June-December, 1849. (Typically conservative Whig 
 Journal, not of great value. Circulation—700. )* 
 
 Southern Banner, Weekly, Democratic. Library of Uni¬ 
 versity of Georgia, 1833-1846. (Most militant journal of 
 the Union Democrats. Hopkins Holsey, Editor. Usually 
 considered the organ of Howell Cobb. Circulation—700.) 
 
 Agusta, Richmond County 
 
 Constitutionalist, Daily, tri-weekly and weekly, Democratic. 
 Office of the Augusta Chronicle. Complete files to 1860. 
 These damaged by fire, 1921. Present condition con¬ 
 fused. (Militant Democratic journal. Became a south¬ 
 ern-rights paper in 1849. Gardner, J. R., Editor. Cir¬ 
 culation, weekly edition—3,000.) 
 
 Chronicle and Sentinel, Daily, tri-weekly, and weekly, Whig. 
 
 (1) Library of Congress, March, 1849-December, 1854. 
 
 (2) Complete files in the Chronicle office, damaged by fire, 
 1921. Present condition confused. (3) Library of the 
 Western Reserve Historical Society, Cleveland, Ohio— 
 1855, 1857, 1859. (Conservative Whig organ, expressing 
 remarkably independent views of the most conservative 
 Whig group. Especially interesting for its constitutional 
 principles and views on slavery. Strongly anti-Carolina. 
 Dr. Daniel Lee, Editor. Largest circulation in the state— 
 among political papers. Weekly edition, 5,350.) 
 
 Republic, Tri-weekly and weekly, Independent Whig. No 
 files located. (A vigorous independent Whig paper; fav¬ 
 ored Clay in 1848 and southern-rights in 1850. Founded 
 1848, perhaps to back Clay. Smythe, J., Editor. Circu¬ 
 lation, weekly edition—2,950.) 
 
 Columbus, Muscogee County 
 
 Enquirer, Weekly, Whig. (1) Office of the Enquirer, 1828 
 to date. (2) In possession of Mr. J. J. Gilbert, of Colum- 
 
 1 Facts given are for 1850, unless otherwise stated. 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 371 
 
 bus—1874 to date. (3) Office of the Ordinary, Harris 
 County, Georgia, 1856-1860. (Conservative Whig. No 
 circulation figures.) 
 
 Times, Tri-weekly and weekly, Democratic. (1) Library of 
 Congress—January, 1847-May, 1848; January-June, 1849. 
 
 (2) In possession of J. J. Gilbert, Columbus, 1847 to 1860. 
 (An able Democratic journal, became favorable to south¬ 
 ern-rights, 1849, after James N. Bethune was replaced by 
 John Forsyth as editor. No circulation figures.) 
 
 Muscogee Democrat, Weekly, Democratic. No files found. 
 (A consistently southern-rights paper. In 1850 became the 
 Sentinel, and advocated “secession per se.” Radical state¬ 
 ments attracted attention in the North, but no indication 
 in Georgia press that it was so important as the Times. 
 Circulation probably small. No figures.) 
 
 Daily Sun, Daily, Whig. In possession of J. J. Gilbert, 
 Columbus—1853-1874, when it merged with the Enquirer. 
 (Of value for years just prior to the Civil War.) 
 
 Macon, Bibb County 
 
 Georgia Messenger, Weekly, Whig. Emory College Li¬ 
 brary (Oxford, Georgia), 1830-1847, when it merged 
 with the Journal and Messenger. (Conservative Whig.) 
 
 Georgia Journal and Messenger, Weekly, Whig. (1) Geor¬ 
 gia Historical Society, 1847-1849. (2) Files in the office 
 
 of the Macon Telegraph, partly destroyed by fire, 1910— 
 files preserved relate largely to the Reconstruction period. 
 
 (3) Emory College Library—1851-1857, 1858-1860. (4) 
 
 Western Reserve Historical Society, 1856-1857, 1858. (A 
 typically conservative Whig paper. Circulation—3,200.) 
 
 Georgia Telegraph, Weekly, Democratic. (1) Files in its 
 own office largely destroyed by fire, 1910. (See above.) 
 (2) Office of the Court of Ordinary of Jones County 
 (Grey, Georgia), complete from May, 1852, on. (3) 
 Western Reserve Historical Society—1856. (An interest¬ 
 ing and militant southern-rights journal. Was the first in 
 Georgia to assume this position, after Sam J. Ray suc¬ 
 ceeded O. H. Prince as editor in 1847. See Savannah 
 Georgian, April 15, 1847.) 
 
372 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 Georgia Citizen, Weekly, Whig; No files found. (A mili¬ 
 tant pro-Union paper, expressing the most violent con¬ 
 demnation of the southern movement offered in the state. 
 Its editor, L. F. W. Andrews, was seriously accused of 
 being an abolitionist, and the paper temporarily suppressed, 
 July, 1850, after he was driven from Macon. Circulation 
 —1,000; in 1851 became the Macon Union Banner. For 
 reference to latter see Pendleton, A. H. Stephens, p. 109.) 
 
 Southern Tribune, Weekly, Democratic. No files found. 
 (Character unknown. For reference to, see Savannah 
 Georgian, July 9, 1850.) 
 
 Milledgeville, Baldwin County 
 
 Federal Union, Weekly, Democratic. (1) Complete files in 
 the Union Recorder office, Milledgeville. (2) Library of 
 Congress—January, 1847-November, 1849. (3) Office of 
 
 the Court of Ordinary, Jones County (Grey, Georgia), 
 May, 1852, on. (4) The De Renne Library. (The central 
 organ of the Georgia Democracy; an able and vigorous 
 journal. Favored the southern movement after 1848. R. 
 W. Flournoy, Editor. Circulation—3,000.) 
 
 Southern Recorder, Weekly, Whig. (1) Library of Con¬ 
 gress, 1851. (2) In private possession, Milledgeville, 
 
 1820-1868. (The central organ of Georgia Whiggery, but 
 not so important a paper as the Augusta Chronicle or the 
 Savannah Republican. A typical conservative, pro-Union 
 journal. Circulation—2,705.) 
 
 Savannah, Chatham County 2 
 
 Daily Georgian, Daily, Democratic. (1) Library of Con¬ 
 gress—1847-August, 1849. (2) Georgia Historical So¬ 
 
 ciety—1818-1854. (An able Democratic daily. Strongly 
 anti-Calhoun and anti-Carolina. Mildly favored south¬ 
 ern-rights movement, but tended generally towards con¬ 
 servatism. Circulation—650. Daily circulation always 
 
 much smaller than weekly. W. H. Bulloch and H. R. 
 Jackson, editors.) 
 
 Daily Republican, Daily, Whig. (1) Library of Congress— 
 
 2 There is a collection of scrap-books prepared by Dr. Richard Arnold, 
 containing valuable excerpts, chiefly from the Savannah newspapers be¬ 
 tween 1840 and 1870, in possession of Miss Margaret Cosens, of 
 Savannah. 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 373 
 
 Complete files for this period. (2) Georgia Historical 
 Society—1844-1846. (Ranked with the Augusta Chronicle 
 as an able, conservative Whig newspaper. Less independent 
 and original, however, than the Chronicle. Strongly anti- 
 Calhoun and anti-Carolina. Francis Winters and J. W. 
 Locke, Editors. Circulation—900.) 
 
 Daily News, Daily, independent. Office of the News, 
 1850 to date. (An independent paper, with mild leanings 
 toward southern-rights. Established 1850 as the first 
 cheap newspaper, and had a phenomenally rapid growth. 
 One month after establishment claimed to have largest cir¬ 
 culation in Savannah. See Savannah News, January 30, 
 1850. Well conducted by Col. W. T. Thompson, its 
 first editor, and the only ante-bellum Savannah paper sur¬ 
 viving today. Circulation—-1,020. For its history see the 
 Savannah News, its History. Pamphlet, Georgia His¬ 
 torical Society, n.d., apparently written 1880-1890.) 3 
 
 Other States 
 
 Alabama 
 
 Mobile Daily Advertiser, Daily, Whig. 4 
 
 Montgomery Daily Alabama Journal, Daily, Whig. 
 
 District of Columbia 
 
 Daily National Intelligencer, Daily, Whig. 
 
 Daily Union, Daily, Democratic. 
 
 Daily Republic, Daily, Whig. 
 
 Niles’ Weekly Register, Weekly, Whig. 
 
 Southern Press, Weekly, “Southern-rights.” 
 
 Florida 
 
 Pensacola Gazette, Daily, Whig. 
 
 3 For a nearly complete list of all the remaining papers in the state, 
 with their political affiliations and circulations, see Kennedy, J. C. J., 
 Catalogue of the Newspapers and Periodicals Published in the United 
 States (See Guides.) The following papers are not listed therein: 
 
 Marietta Helicon, Weekly, Whig. 
 
 Graffin Whig, Weekly, Whig. 
 
 Griffin Georgia Jeffersonian, Weekly, Democratic. 
 
 Eufaula Democrat, Weekly, Democratic. 
 
 Dahlonega Watchman, Weekly, Democratic. 
 
 Dalton Eagle, Weekly, Whig. 
 
 4 Type of edition used is here given, e.g., weekly, daily, etc. 
 
374 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 Louisiana 
 
 New Orleans Picayune, Daily, Whig. 
 
 Maryland 
 
 Baltimore Sun, Daily, Democratic. 
 
 Massachusetts 
 
 Boston Bee, Daily, Democratic. 
 
 Boston Courier, Daily, Whig. 
 
 Boston Liberator, Weekly, Abolitionist. 
 
 Mississippi 
 
 Aberdeen Independent, Weekly, Whig. 
 
 Jackson Mississippian, Weekly, Democratic. 
 
 Jackson Southron, Weeky, Whig. (Became Flag of the' 
 Union in 1850.) 
 
 Natchez Courier, Weekly, Whig. 
 
 New York 
 
 New York Herald, Daily, Democratic. 
 
 New York Tribune, Daily, Whig (antislavery). 
 
 Ohio 
 
 Akron Summit Beacon, Weekly, Whig. 
 
 Cincinnati, Enquirer, Daily, Democratic. 
 
 Cleveland Plain Dealer, Daily, Democratic. 
 
 Columbus Ohio State Journal, Daily, Whig. 
 
 Pennsylvania 
 
 Philadelphia Evening Bulletin, Daily, Independent. 
 Philadelphia Pennsylvanian, Daily, Democratic. 
 
 Philadelphia North American, Daily, Whig. 
 
 Philadelphia Public Ledger, Daily, Independent. 
 
 South Carolina 
 
 Charleston Daily Courier, Daily, “Southern-rights.” ■ 
 Charleston Mercury, Daily, “Southern-rights.” 
 
 Columbia South Carolinian, Tri-weekly, “Southern-rights.”' 
 
 Virginia 
 
 Richmond Daily Whig, Daily, Whig. 
 
 Richmond Enquirer, Daily, Democratic. 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 375 
 
 VII— Periodicals 
 
 American Whig Review, New York, 1845-1852. 
 
 DeBow’s Commercial Reviezv, New Orleans, 1846-1864. 
 
 Hunt’s Merchants’ Magazine and Commercial Review, New 
 York, 1839-1870. 
 
 Harpers New Monthly Magazine, New York, 1850, on. (Use¬ 
 ful for monthly summaries of current news.) 
 
 The Plantation, Elberton, Georgia, 1860. (A literary and 
 political periodical. Its few numbers contain some interest¬ 
 ing descriptions of Georgia politics and politicians.) 
 
 Southern Cultivator, Augusta, Georgia, 1848, on. (Important 
 for agricultural conditions in Georgia. Had the largest cir¬ 
 culation of any periodical in the state.) 
 
 ■ United States Magazine and Democratic Review, Washington, 
 D. C., 1838-1859. 
 
 VIII— Pamphlets 
 
 (Unless otherwise noted these pamphlets are in the De Renne 
 
 Library, or the Georgia Historical Society Library, in Savan¬ 
 nah.) 
 
 Address of the Executive Committee to the Constitutional 
 Union Party of Georgia, Milledgeville, 1852. (Sent out in 
 July, 1852, chiefly by Whig members, advising a dissolution 
 of the Union party.) 
 
 Address of a Portion of the Executive Committee of the Con¬ 
 stitutional Union Party , to the Union Democrats and Union 
 Whigs, Friends of Pierce and King. (Sent out in July, 1852, 
 chiefly by Democratic members, advising the preservaion of 
 the Union party, and its support of Pierce and King.) 
 
 Arnold, Richard D., Remarks on the Report of the Commit¬ 
 tee on the State of the Republic (Georgia Senate) in Relation 
 to the Honorable John McPherson Berrien, Savannah, 1843. 
 (Speech in the Georgia Senate, December 19, 1842, con¬ 
 cerning Berrien’s attitude towards the tariff and senatorial 
 responsibility.) 
 
 Campbell, L. D., Kansas and Nebraska, Washington, 1855. 
 (Reprint in.pamphlet form of speech made in House of 
 Representatives, December 14, 1854. Contains Campbell’s 
 analysis of A. H. Stephen’s economic comparison of Georgia 
 and Ohio.) 
 
376 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 Chappell, A. H. (Editor), Pamphlets of Georgia History. 
 Columbus, Georgia, 1873, and Atlanta, 1896. (Of miscel¬ 
 laneous character and indirect value. Pennsylvania Histor¬ 
 ical Society.) 
 
 Clark, John, Cotisiderations on the Principles of William 
 Crawford, Augusta, Georgia, 1819. (Clark’s own account 
 of the personalities which precipitated the differentiation of 
 the Clark and Troup parties.) 
 
 Cobb, Howell, Message to the Georgia Legislature, November 
 8, 1853, Milledgeville, 1853. (Urging political harmony in 
 the state and declaring the crisis of 1850 safely past.) 
 
 Cobb, Howell, To Our Constituents, Washington, D. C., 1849. 
 (The “Minority Address,” of 1849, signed by Cobb, John H. 
 Lumpkin, B. Boyd, and B. L. Clark.) 
 
 Colquitt, W. T., Circular to the People of Georgia and espe¬ 
 cially to the States Rights Party, Milledgeville, 1840. (Ap¬ 
 peal to the party to abandon the national Whigs and unite 
 with the Democrats.) 
 
 DeBow, J. D. B., The Interest in Slavery of the Southern Non- 
 Slaveholder, 1860 Association, Tract No. 5, Charleston, S. C., 
 1860. LTniversity of Pennsylvania Library. (Written to 
 prove the antithesis of Helper’s argument. Contains inter¬ 
 esting conclusions based upon the census of 1850.) 
 
 Eubank, Thomas, Inorganic Forces, Ordained to Supersede 
 Human Slavery, New York, 1860. Included in Democratic 
 Opinions of Slavery, 1776-1863. (A volume of pamphlets, 
 New York Public Library. That by Eubank gives an eco¬ 
 nomic interpretation of the history of slavery, predicting 
 peaceful emancipation for economic reasons.) 
 
 Fisher, Sidney G., The Laws of Race as Connected with 
 Slavery, Philadelphia, 1860, University of Pennsylvania 
 Library. (Interesting as an early effort to prove the slavery 
 question incidental to the race problem.) 
 
 Fisher, Elwood, The North and the South, Address to the 
 Young Men’s Mercantile Association of Cincinnati; Charles¬ 
 ton, South Carolina, 1849. (An economic comparison of 
 the two sections, denying northern superiority. Popular in 
 the South in 1850.) 
 
 Free Negroism, (n.d.) Included in Democratic Opinions on 
 Slavery, New York Public Library. (Apparently written 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 377 
 
 by a southerner, 1860-1863. Interesting opinions on slavery 
 and emancipation.) 
 
 Green, G. E., Translator’s Preface to A. G. de Cassagnac’s 
 History of the Working and Burgher Classes, Philadelphia, 
 1872. (An unusual essay claiming that the interests of 
 southern capital and northern labor were identical, that 
 northern capital forced the Civil War to divide these two, 
 and that slavery greatly improved the social status of the 
 poor, non-slaveholding whites.) 
 
 Incidents of a Journey from Abbeville, South Carolina, to 
 Ocola, Florida, by an Observer of Small Things, Edgefield, 
 South Carolina, 1852. New York Public Library. (Inter¬ 
 esting observations upon political conditions in Augusta and 
 Savannah.) 
 
 Inquiry into the Condition and Prospects of the African Race 
 in the United States, by an American, Philadelphia, 1839, 
 University of Pennsylvania Library. (Candid, fair, and dis¬ 
 cerning. Deals with the race problems in slavery.) 
 
 Jones, A. Seaborn, Speed the Plough: An Essay on the Tariff, 
 by a Georgia Planter, Athens, Georgia, 1845. (Expresses 
 opposition of the conservative Georgia planter to the pro¬ 
 tective tariff and the introduction of manufacturing.) 
 
 King, John P., Letter to a Whig Planter, September 15, 1844. 
 (Able argument by Georgia Democrat against the tariff.) 
 
 Longstreet, A. B., Voice from the South, or Letters from 
 Georgia to Massachusetts and to the Southern States, with 
 an appendix containing an article from the Charleston Mer¬ 
 cury on the Wilmot Proviso, together with the fourth article 
 of the Constitution, the Law of Congress, the Nullification 
 Law of Pennsylvania, the Resolutions of Ten of the Free 
 States, the Resolutions of Virginia, Georgia and Alabama, 
 and Mr. Calhoun’s resolutions in the Senate of the United 
 States, with an introduction by the editor of the Baltimore 
 Western Continent, Baltimore, 1847. (Copy in Yale Univer¬ 
 sity Library, in the Pennsylvania Historical Society, in pos¬ 
 session of Dr. U. B. Phillips. An interesting and valuable 
 resume of the history of Georgia and Massachusetts with 
 relationship to slavery, from the Georgia point of view. Some 
 comment on current conditions in Georgia. An appeal to the 
 south to join the southern movement. The pamphlet was 
 
378 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 probably the first important bit of propaganda literature fav¬ 
 oring that movement in the state. Notes on authorship, in¬ 
 fluence, etc. are in Wade, J. D., Longstreet, pp. 286, 287; 
 Phillips, U. B., “Literary Movement for Secession,” W. A. 
 Dunning Studies in Southern History, p. 35.) 
 
 McAllister, M. H., Address of, of Georgia, to the Georgia 
 Democratic-Republican Convention, July 4, 1840. Milledge- 
 ville, 1840. (Made upon joining the party in 1840. Largely 
 an appeal by the former Whig leader to the rest of the State- 
 rights men to abandon the national Whig party.) 
 
 Perry B. F., Speech in the South Carolina House, December 
 11, 1850, on Federal Relations, Charleston, S. C. (The co- 
 operationists’ attitude towards Georgia.) 
 
 State-Rights Party of Georgia, Proceedings of, November 13, 
 1833, Savannah, 1833. (Favoring nullification and South 
 Carolina.) 
 
 Stephens, Alexander H., More of Georgia and Ohio, Wash¬ 
 ington, D. C., 1855. (Speech in national House, continuing 
 his reply to Campbell of Ohio, and comparing the economic 
 condition of the two states, to the advantage of Georgia.) 
 
 Townsend, John, The Southern States, Their Present Peril, 
 Charleston, South Carolina, 1850. (Able statement of the 
 secessionist view and a detailed calculation of the possibilities 
 concerning civil war.) 
 
 Treascott, W. H., The Position and Cause of the South, Char¬ 
 leston, 1850. (A secessionist reply to Toombs and the Geor¬ 
 gia advocates of compromise.) 
 
 The Union, Being a Condemnation of Mr. Helper’s Scheme, 
 With a Plan for the Settlement of the Irresistable Conflict, 
 n.d. (Included in Democratic Opinions on Slavery, 1776- 
 1860. New York Public Library. Title descriptive.) 
 
 Union Celebration in Macon, Georgia, February 22, 1851; 
 Macon, 1851. (Copy in possession of Mr. Warren Grice, 
 Macon, Georgia. Copy in possession of Dr. U. B. Phillips. 
 A valuable pamphlet, containing important letters sent the 
 local committee of the Georgia Union party, especially by 
 Union Democrats, but also by Whigs and northern political 
 leaders of both parties. Contains important comments on the 
 history of political parties in Georgia, on the slavery prob- 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 379 
 
 lem, and on the significance of the Union victory in the 
 state.) 
 
 Weston, G. M., Poor Whites of the South, Washington, 1856. 
 (Harvard University Library.) 
 
 Wellborn, M. J., To the Voters of the Second Congressional 
 District, n.d., probably August or September, 1850, copy in 
 the Library of the University of Michigan, Pamphlets on 
 American Slavery, IV. No. 18. (Address by the Demo¬ 
 cratic congressman from the second district of Georgia urg¬ 
 ing his constituents to accept the Clay Compromise.) 
 
 Yeadon, Richard, Speech of Mr. Richard Yeadon of Charles¬ 
 ton to the Madison Georgia Whig Convention, July 31, 1844. 
 Charleston, S. C., 1844. (Relations between Georgia and 
 South Carolina Whigs.) 
 
 IX— Public Records and Proceedings 
 
 Congressional Globe, for 1847-1851, inclusive, especially for the 
 twenty-ninth Congress, second session, and the thirty-first 
 Congress. 
 
 Journal of a General Convention of the State of Georgia, 1833. 
 (A constitutional convention which considered the problem 
 of the “white basis” of representation in the state legisla¬ 
 ture. Copy in Columbia University Library.) 
 
 Journal of the Convention to Reduce and Equalise the Repre¬ 
 sentation of the General Assembly of the State of Georgia, 
 1839. (Copy in Columbia University Library.) 
 
 Journals of the Georgia Senate, 1847-1848, and 1849-1850. 
 
 Journals of the Georgia House of Representatives, 1847-1848, 
 and 1849-1850. 
 
 Acts of Georgia , 1847-1848, and 1849-1850. 
 
 Cobb, T. R. R., Digest of the Statute Laws of Georgia, in Force 
 Prior to 1851, Athens, Georgia, 1851. 
 
 Cobb, T. R. R., Reports of the Georgia Supreme Court. (Vol. 
 XIV. 499, ff. contains account of the important case of Padel- 
 ford, Fay, and Co., v. City of Savannah, which throws much 
 light on the constitutional theories of Judge H. L. Benning, 
 the Georgia secessionist leader, and upon Georgia’s relations 
 with the federal Supreme Court.) 
 
 Debates and Proceedings of the Georgia Convention, 1850, Mil- 
 ledgeville, 1850. (Copies in Georgia Historical Society 
 
380 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 Library, University of Pennsylvania Library, University of 
 Chicago Library, Yale University Library, also in Federal 
 Union, issues of December 17, and December 24, 1850. Re¬ 
 ported by A. E. Marshall, of that journal, and printed by its 
 press. Essential for the study of the state convention of 
 1850. Also contains executive proclamation calling the con¬ 
 vention.) 
 
 Journal of the Georgia Convention, 1850, Milledgeville, 1850. 
 (University of Pennsylvania Library.) 
 
 Resolutions, Address and Journal of Proceedings of the South¬ 
 ern Convention, Nashville, 1850. (Copy in Harvard Univer¬ 
 sity Library. Directly useful for its record of the Georgia 
 members of the “Nashville Convention.”) 
 
 Resolutions and Address of the Southern Convention, Published 
 by Order of the Convention, Nashville, 1850. (Copy in 
 Georgia Historical Society Library. A useful pamphlet, 
 since the complete resolutions are difficult to find elsewhere.) 
 
 X —Source Collections 
 
 Ames, H. V., State Documents on Federal Relations, Phila¬ 
 delphia, 1911. 
 
 Cluskey, M. W., The Democratic Hand Book, New York, 
 1856. (Material on party platforms, etc., largely for 1851 - 
 1856.) 
 
 Cluskey, M. W., The Political Text Book, Philadelphia, 1859. 
 (Useful for sources not available elsewhere.) 
 
 Democratic Textbook, The, By “G. H. H.,” New York and 
 Philadelphia, 1848. (Copy in New York Public Library. 
 Much material concerning the attitude of both major parties 
 toward the Mexican War.) 
 
 Greely, H. and Cleveland, J. F., A Political Text Book for 
 1860, New York, 1860. (Includes national platforms, etc., 
 1850-1860. New York Public Library.) 
 
 Phillips, U. B., Plantation and Frontier. (Vols. I and II in 
 Commons, J. R. [Ed.] A Documentary History of American 
 Industrial Society, Cleveland, 1910-1911.) 
 
 XI —Statistical Collections 
 
 American Almanac , Boston, 1830-1861. 
 
 The Seventh Census of the United States, Washington, D. C., 
 1850. Bancroft, J., Census of the City of Savannah, Savan¬ 
 nah, 1848. DeBow, J. D. B., Historical View of the United 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 381 
 
 States, Compendium of the Seventh Census, Washington, 
 1854. 
 
 DeBow, J. D. B., The Industrial Resources of the Southern and 
 Western States, New Orleans, 1852. (Valuable collection 
 of contemporary essays and surveys containing statistical 
 data.) 
 
 Georgia, Statistics of, an abstract of the State of Georgia, com¬ 
 piled by authority of the Legislature, from the Census of 
 1850, Milledgeville, 1851. (Copy in Pennsylvania Historical 
 Society.) 
 
 Sherwood, Adiel, A Gazetteer of the State of Georgia, Wash¬ 
 ington, D. C., 1829, 1837, Atlanta, 1860. (Some interest¬ 
 ing statistical and historical data. Sherwood preceded White 
 in the statistical study of his state, and regarded the latter 
 as an interloper.) 
 
 White, G. M., Statistics of the State of Georgia, Savannah, 
 1849. (Contains some statistics, as well as much contem¬ 
 porary description, and map of the state for 1849. Useful 
 surveys of the counties.) 
 
 White, G. M., Historical Collections of Georgia, New York, 
 1854. (A work difficult to classify, containing statistical, 
 biographical, and historical data. Not so useful as the 
 above.) 
 
 XII— Geographical Descriptions and Maps 
 
 Sherwood, Adiel, Gazetteer of Georgia, Washington, 1837, 
 2nd edition. Contains four maps for the fourth decade. 
 (For others in this decade see those of Wellborn, Tanner 
 and Mitchell, listed by Phillips, U. B., Georgia and State 
 Rights, p. 218.) 
 
 Tanner, H. S., Map of Georgia and Alabama, 1846. (Copy 
 in Georgia Historical Society. Shows roads and railroads.) 
 
 Bonner, W. G., Map of Georgia, 1861. (A large wall map.) 
 
 Neueste Karte von Georgia mit seinem Strassen, Eisenbahnen,. 
 u. Entfermmgen, 1845, Bibliographischen Instituts zu Hild- 
 burghavsen, Amsterdam, Paris u. Philadelphia. (Copy in 
 Pennsylvania Historical Society. A German equivalent of 
 Tanner’s map of 1846.) 
 
 Williams, W. T., Map of Georgia, with its Geological Fea¬ 
 tures, in White, G. M., Statistics of Georgia, 1849. (Shows 
 the usual as well as the geological features.) 
 
382 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 XIII —Special Studies—Contemporary and 
 Non-Contemporary 
 
 For practical convenience a distinction is made between 
 ■“Contemporary” and “Non-Contemporary Studies.” For this 
 purpose the date 1880 is arbitrarily selected as a dividing 
 point, those titles published prior to that year being listed as 
 “Contemporary.” The supposition is that most of such works 
 were written by those who participated in the activities of 1847- 
 1852. 
 
 CONTEMPORARY STUDIES 
 
 Adams, Nehemiah, A Southside View of Slavery, 2nd edi¬ 
 tion, Boston, 1855. (Favorable view of slavery in Georgia, 
 by a Massachusetts man.) 
 
 Cobb, T. R. R., Law of Negro Slavery, Philadelphia, 1858. 
 (Contains historical sketch of slavery from the viewpoint of 
 a Georgia planter-lawyer.) 
 
 Christy, David, Cotton Is King, Cincinnati, 1855. (An eco¬ 
 nomic analysis of slavery and the tariff.) 
 
 Cairnes, J. E., The Slave Power, London, 1862, 1863. (The 
 anti-slavery view.) 
 
 Fowler, W. C., The Sectional Controversy, or Passages in the 
 Political History of the United States, New York, 1863. 
 (Written in the fifties. Critical and well documented.) 
 Fitziiugh, George, Cannibals All, Richmond, 1857. (The 
 apotheosis of slavery.) 
 
 Fitziiugh, George, Sociology for the South, Richmond, 1854. 
 (See above.) 
 
 Giddings, J. R., History of the Rebellion, New York, 1864. 
 (The abolitionist view of the Congressional struggle, 1849- 
 1850.) 
 
 Goodloe, D. R., An Inquiry Into the Causes which have 
 Retarded the Accumulation of Wealth and Increase in Popu¬ 
 lation of the Southern States, Washington, 1846. 
 
 Helper, H. R., The Impending Crisis of the South, New 
 York, 1860. 
 
 Hundley, D. R., Social Relations in our Southern States, New 
 York, 1860. (A rare and valuable study of social classes in 
 the South by a southerner familiar with both the North and 
 the South.) 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 383 
 
 Kettell, T. P., Southern Wealth and Northern Profits as 
 exhibited in Statistical Facts and Official Figures, New York, 
 1860. 
 
 Lyell, Sir Charles, A Second Visit to the United States, New 
 York, 1849. (Incidental observations on Georgia society.) 
 
 Lanman, Charles, Letters from the Allegheny Mountains, 
 New York, 1849. 
 
 Olmsted, F. L., The Cotton Kingdom, 2nd Ed., New York, 
 1862. 
 
 Olmsted, F. L., Journey in the Seaboard Slave States, New 
 York, 1856. 
 
 Parsons, C. G., Inside View of Slavery or Tour among the 
 Planters, with an introduction by Mrs. H. B. Stowe, Bos¬ 
 ton, 1855. (Impressions of Georgia by a professional man 
 of strong anti-slavery opinions.) 
 
 Paine, L. W., Six Years in a Georgia Prison, Boston, 1852. 
 (Personal narrative of a Northern mechanic and teacher of 
 abolitionist views. Interesting comment on social and eco¬ 
 nomic conditions.) 
 
 Ruffin, Edmund, The Political Economy of Slavery, Rich¬ 
 mond, 1857. 
 
 Russell, Robert, North America, Its Agriculture and Climate, 
 Edinburgh, 1857. (Includes a study of slavery economics.) 
 
 Van Evrie, J. H., Negroes and Negro Slavery, New York, 
 1853. (Pro-slavery Anthropology.) 
 
 Weston, George M., The Progress of Slavery in the United 
 States, Washington, D. C., 1857. (A keen contemporary 
 analysis of the economic and political phenomena associated 
 with slavery. Calls attention to the often unrecognized con¬ 
 servatism of the planter class in the sectional struggle. Mod¬ 
 erately anti-slavery in opinion.) 
 
 RECENT STUDIES 
 
 Ames, H. V., “Calhoun and the Secession Movement of 1850,” 
 University of Pennsylvania Public Lectures, 1917-1918. 
 
 Boucher, C. S., “The Ante-Bellum Attitude of South Caro¬ 
 lina Towards Manufacturing and Agriculture,” Washington 
 University Studies, III. Pt. II. Humanistic Series, No. 2. 
 
384 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 Boucher, C. S., “The Secession and Cooperation Movements 
 in South Carolina, 1848-1852,” Washington University- 
 Studies, V., Humanistic Series, Pt. II, No. 2. 
 
 Boucher, C. S., “In Re That Aggressive Slavocracy,” Missis¬ 
 sippi Valley Historical Review, VIII. Nos. 1 and 2 (June- 
 September, 1921). (An emphatic refutation of the tra¬ 
 ditional northern thesis.) 
 
 Brawley, B., A Social History of the American Negro, New 
 York, 1921. (Considers the slavery question incidental to 
 the race problem.) 
 
 Brooks, R. P., “Howell Cobb and the Crisis of 1850,” Missis¬ 
 sippi Valley Historical Review, IV. No. 3 (December, 1917). 
 Also printed as Bulletin of the University of Georgia, XVIII. 
 No. 2. (A brief study by the best informed student of Cobb’s 
 career. Especially good for the events of 1851.) 
 
 Brooks, R. P., “A Local Study of the Race Problem, Race 
 Relations in the Eastern Piedmont Region of Georgia,” 
 Political Science Quarterly, XXVI. 193-221. 
 
 Brooks, R. P., “The Agrarian Revolution in Georgia,” Bul¬ 
 letin, University of Wisconsin, No. 639, History series, V. 
 3, No. 3, Madison, Wis., 1914. 
 
 Brown, G. W., The Lower South in American History, New 
 York, 1903. 
 
 Clark, V., History of Manufactures in the United States r 
 Washington, D. C., 1916. 
 
 Cole, A. C., The Whig Party in the South, American His¬ 
 torical Association Prize Essay, 1912. 
 
 Cole, A. C., “The South and the Right of Secession in the 
 Early Fifties,” Mississippi Valley Historical Review, I. No. 
 3 (December, 1914). 
 
 Collins, W. H., The Domestic Slave Trade of the Southern 
 States, New York, 1904. 
 
 Cotterill, R. S., “Southern Railroads and Western Trade, 
 1840-1850,” Mississippi Historical Review, III., 427-441. 
 
 Coulter, E. M., “The Nullification Movement in Georgia,” 
 Georgia Historical Quarterly, V. No. 2 (March, 1921). (An 
 able account.) 
 
 Coulter, E. M., “A Georgia Educational Movement During 
 the Eighteen Hundred Fifties,” Georgia Historical Quarterly , 
 IX. No. 1, pp. 1-33. (December, 1924.) 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 385 
 
 Embry, M. A., A Study of the Secession Movement in Georgia, 
 M. A. Thesis, University of Chicago, 1916 (bound manu¬ 
 script, University of Chicago Library. Relates to both 
 the 1850 and 1860 periods. Useful only as a summary of 
 several secondary accounts.) 
 
 Fleming, W. L., “Immigration to the Southern States,” Politi¬ 
 cal Science Quarterly, XX., 276-297. 
 
 Foster, H. D., “Webster’s Seventh of March Speech and the 
 Secession Movement, 1850,” American Historical Rveiew, 
 XXVII., 250 ff. (January, 1922). (Able presentation of 
 the influence of Webster and the Compromise in averting 
 danger of secession in the South. Exaggerates, however, the 
 degree of secessionist spirit in Georgia prior to March 4, 
 1850, and the danger of actual secession thereafter.) 
 
 Garner, J. W., “The First Struggle Over Secession in Missis¬ 
 sippi,” Mississippi Historical Society Publications, IV., 89 
 ff. (Superseded by Miss Hearon’s study.) 
 
 Hamer, P. M., The Secession Movement in South Carolina, 
 Allentown, (Pa.) 1918. 
 
 Hammond, M. B., “The Cotton Industry,” Ithaca, N. Y., 1897,. 
 American Economic Association Publications, New Series , 
 
 No. 1. 
 
 Harper, R. M., “Development of Agriculture in Upper Geor¬ 
 gia, 1850 to 1880,” Georgia Historical Quarterly, VI., No. 
 1, 1-27. 
 
 Herndon, D. T., “The Nashville Convention,” Alabama His¬ 
 torical Society Publications, V. 203, ff. (1904). (Based upon 
 newspapers but generally reliable.) 
 
 Hearon, Cleo, Mississippi and Compromise of 1850, Oxford, 
 Miss., 1913. 
 
 Ingle, Edward, Southern Sidelights, A Picture of Social and 
 Economic Life in the South a Generation before the War, 
 New York, 1896. 
 
 Tervey, T. D., The Slave Trade, Slavery and Color, Charles¬ 
 ton, S. C„ 1925. 
 
 Jones, C. E., Education in Georgia, in Contributions to Ameri¬ 
 can Educational History, ed. H. B. Adams. United States 
 Bureau of Education Monographs, No. 5, 1889. (Not based! 
 on extensive research but gives a general account of the 
 main features of educational evolution.) 
 
386 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 Lawton, Alexander R., Judicial Controversies on Federal 
 Appellate Jurisdiction, President’s Address, 38th Annual 
 Meeting of the Georgia Bar Association, Tybee, Ga., 1921. 
 (A valuable survey of the relations of Georgia to the Fed¬ 
 eral Supreme Court, which is especially useful for its study 
 of the constitutional theories of H. L. Benning, the Georgia 
 secessionist leader.) 
 
 Macy, Jesse, Political Parties in the United States, 1846-1861, 
 New York, 1900. 
 
 McLendon, S. G., History of the Public Domain of Georgia, 
 Atlanta, 1924. 
 
 Meyer, B. H., History of Transportation in the United States 
 before 1860, Washington, 1917. 
 
 Merritt, Elizabeth, “James H. Hammond,” Johns Hopkins 
 University Studies, Series XLI., No. 4 (1923). 
 
 Mellen, G. F., “H. W. Hilliard and W. E. Yancy,” Sewanee 
 Review, XVII. 32-50. 
 
 Mitchell, Broadus, “The Rise of Cotton Mills in the South,” 
 Johns Hopkins University, Studies in History and Political 
 Science, XXXIX. No. 2, Baltimore, 1921. (An able study. 
 Exhibits somewhat unsympathetic attitude towards the ante¬ 
 bellum South, and misunderstands certain phases of ante¬ 
 bellum manufacturing. Contradicts Clark’s thesis that there 
 was continuity between the ante- and post-bellum industries.) 
 
 Newberry, F., “The Nashville Convention,” South Atlantic 
 Quarterly, XI. (1912), No. 3, p. 259, ff. 
 
 Nichols, R. F., “The Democratic Machine, 1850-1854,” Col¬ 
 umbia University Studies in History, Economics and Public 
 Law, CXI., No. 1, Whole No. 248, 1923. 
 
 Persinger, C. E., “The Bargain of 1844 as the Origin of the 
 Wilmot Proviso,” American Historical Association Report, 
 1911, II. 
 
 Phillips, U. B., American Negro Slavery, New York, 1918. 
 
 Phillips, U. B., “The Decadence of the Plantation System,” 
 Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social 
 Science, XXXV. 37-41. 
 
 Phillips, U. B., “An American State Owned Railroad” (The 
 Western and Atlantic), Yale Review, XV., No. 3, pp. 259- 
 282 (Old Series). 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 387 
 
 Phillips, U. B., “The Economic Cost of Slave-Holding,” 
 Political Science Quarterly, XX. 257-275. 
 
 Phillips, U. B., “Georgia and State Rights,” American His¬ 
 torical Association Report, 1901, II. 
 
 Phillips, U. B., “The Literary Movement for Secession,” in 
 W. A. Dunning Studies in Southern History and Politics , 
 Chapter II, Columbia University Press, 1914. 
 
 Phillips, U. B., “The Origin and Growth of the Southern 
 Black Belts,” American Historical Review, XI. 798-816. 
 
 Phillips, U. B., “Plantations with Slave Labor and Free,” 
 American Historical Review, XXX. 738-753. 
 
 Phillips, U. B., “The Southern Whigs,” in the Turner Es¬ 
 says, New York, 1910. 
 
 Phillips, U. B., “Transportation in the Ante-Bellum Souths 
 An Economic Analysis,” Quarterly Journal of Economics,. 
 XIX. 434-451. 
 
 Phillips, U. B., A History of Transportation in the Eastern 
 Cotton Belt to 1860, New York, 1908. 
 
 Powell, Edward P., Nullification and Secession in the United 
 States: A History of the Six Attempts During the First Cen¬ 
 tury of the Republic, New York, 1897. 
 
 Reed, J. C., The Brother’s War, Boston, 1905. 
 
 Russel, R. R., “Economic Aspects of Southern Sectionalism, 
 1840-1861,” University of Illinois Studies in the Social Sci¬ 
 ences, XI. Nos. 1-2. 
 
 Sioussat, St. G. L., “Cooperation for the Development of the 
 Material Welfare of the South,” The South in the Building 
 of the Nation, IV. 173-179. 
 
 Sioussat, St. G. L., “Tennessee, the Compromise of 1850, and 
 the Nashville Convention,” Mississippi Valley Historical 
 Review, II. 259 ff., December, 1915. 
 
 Smith, Justin, The War With Mexico, 2 Vols., New York* 
 
 1919. 
 
 Stone, A. H., “Some Problems of Southern Economic His¬ 
 tory,” American Historical Review, XIII. 779-797. 
 
 Stone, A. H., “The Cotton Factorage System of the Southern 
 States,” American Historical Review, XX. 557-565. 
 
 Stone, A. H., Studies in the American Race Problem, New 
 York, 1908. 
 
388 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 Taylor, A. A., “Movement of Negroes to the Gulf States,” 
 Journal of Negro History, III, No. 4, pp. 367-383. (Nov¬ 
 ember, 1923.) 
 
 Tillinghast, J. A., The Negro in Africa and America, New 
 York, 1902. 
 
 Wagstaff, H. McG., “State Rights and Political Parties in 
 North Carolina, 1776-1861,” Johns Hopkins University 
 Studies in History and Political Science, XXIV, (1906). 
 
 White, M. J., The Secession Movement in the United States, 
 1847-1852, New Orleans, 1916. (Of relatively little value 
 for Georgia.) 
 
 XIV — State Histories 
 
 State Histories : Like most American states, Georgia lacks a 
 ■critical and comprehensive history. Few of the state histories 
 come down so far in time as 1850. As exceptions to this, note: 
 The History of Georgia, in The South in the Building of the 
 Nation, II. 122-242. (The only critical survey of the state’s 
 entire history. It is necessarily brief and contains chapters 
 of varying merit.) 
 
 Avery, I. W., History of Georgia, 1850-1881, New York, 1881. 
 (Suggestive but uncritical. Only chapter iii is pertinent 
 here.) 
 
 Brooks, R. P., History of Georgia, Chicago, 1913. (A brief 
 text book, but written from the modern critical point of 
 view.) 
 
 Knight, L. L., A Standard History of Georgia and Georgians, 
 New York, 1917. (Vols. I-II, inc., deal with state history, 
 Vols. IV-VI, inc., with biography.) 
 
 Smith, C. H., The Story of Georgia and the Georgia People, 
 1736-1860, Macon, 1900. 
 
 XV— Local Histories 
 
 Georgia local histories, like the majority of such works, are 
 usually laudatory and uncritical, and reflect the interests of the 
 antiquarian rather than of the historian. Note as exceptions: 
 Butler, J. C., Historical Records of Macon, Georgia, Macon, 
 1879. (Shows interest in important historical developments 
 and contains some source material.) 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 389 
 
 Chappel, A. H., Miscellanies of Georgia, Atlanta (Ga.)» 
 1874. (Contains miscellaneous collections of facts concern¬ 
 ing towns and counties which are occasionally useful.) 
 
 Dutcher, S. and Jones, C. C., History of Augusta, Syracuse, 
 New York, 1890. (Rather superior to the ordinary local 
 history and deals with an unusually interesting city.) 
 
 Fort, Kate H., The Fort and Fanin Families, Chattanooga, 
 Tenn., 1903. (A reliable picture of social life in Middle 
 Georgia.) 
 
 Gamble, Thomas, Jr., A History of the City Government of 
 Savannah, Georgia, From 1790-1901, Savannah, 1901. 
 (Drawn from the Savannah archives, important for social 
 and economic conditions.) 
 
 Wylly, C. S., Annals of Glynn County, Georgia, Brunswick, 
 Georgia, 1897. (Deals with an unusually interesting county, 
 the only one in Georgia in 1850 which possessed a very large 
 majority of Negro population). 
 
 XVI— General Histories 
 
 Channing, Edward, History of the United States, VI. New 
 York, 1925. 
 
 Dodd, William E., The Cotton Kingdom, New Haven, 1921. 
 (The Chronicles of America, Vol. 27.) 
 
 Dodd, William E., Expansion and Conflict, New York, 1915. 
 (Riverside Historical Series, III.) 
 
 Garrison, G. P., Western Extension, New York, 1906. (The 
 American Nation: A History, Vol. 17.) 
 
 McMaster, J. B., A History of the People of the United 
 States, VII. and VIII., New York, 1914, 1919. 
 
 Smith, T. C., Parties and Slavery, New York, 1906. ( The 
 
 American Nation: A History, Vol. 18.) 
 
 Stephenson, N. W., Texas and the Mexican War, New 
 Haven, 1921. ( The Chronicles of America, Vol. 24.) 
 

INDEX 
 
 Abolitionists, see also Antislavery; 31 fF., 
 45, 134, 167, 168; identified with social¬ 
 ists, 33; activities in Georgia, 87 f.; ac¬ 
 cused of subsidizing Georgia newspaper, 
 294 f. 
 
 Agriculture, southern methods poor, 21; 
 reform movement in Georgia, 21. 
 
 Alabama, 72, 138, 166, 186, 269, 272, 276, 
 284, 297, 302, 322, 340, 355. 
 
 American Almanac, The, cited, 20. 
 
 Ames, H. V., “Calhoun and the Secession 
 Movement of 1850,” cited, 137, 214, 272; 
 Slate Documents, cited, 51, 94, 134, 137, 
 213, 227, 228, 272, 330. 
 
 Anderson, J. W., Speaker, Georgia House, 
 229. 
 
 Andrews, G., Reminiscences, cited, 12, 58, 
 75, 91, 121. 
 
 Andrews, L. F. W., editor, Macon Citizen, 
 threatened, 119, 395; accused of aboli¬ 
 tionism, JH94 
 
 Antislavery Movement, see also Abolition¬ 
 ists; 54, 218; Georgia reaction to, 30 f., 
 37 f.; aggressive character, 49; prin¬ 
 ciples held by northerners in Georgia, 
 84-86; among northern Whigs, 101 ff.; 
 attempt to block Texan annexation, 127; 
 to adopt Proviso, 134, 137, 181. 
 
 Appling County, 174. 
 
 Arnold, Richard D., 202 n., 274, 308, 314, 
 359 n.; declares respectable Savannah 
 families Unionists, 73 n.; on violence at 
 polls, 122; on South Carolina radicals in 
 Savannah, 278, 287; reaction to Mass 
 Meeting, 287; on Savannah meeting, 
 1850, 287; in state convention, 325, 329; 
 tells governor Union Democrats will not 
 follow him, 334. 
 
 Arnold MSS, cited, 73, 89, 274, 278, 287, 
 309, 321, 334, 348, 352, 353, 360. 
 
 Arnold, R. D., Oration Delivered to Union 
 and Southern Rights Association, 1835, 
 cited, 96 f.; Remarks of, on the Georgia 
 Legislature’s Resolutions against Senator 
 Berrien, cited, 124, 126. 
 
 Athens (Ga.), 16, 118. 
 
 Athens Banner, 187, 244, 298; suggests 
 abolition of state senate, 113; leading 
 Union Democratic organ, 165; attacks 
 Calhounites, 204 f.; on “demagogery” of 
 legislature, 251; opposes Nashville Con¬ 
 vention, 255; describes failure to hold 
 preliminary Nashville Convention election, 
 256 f.; gives burlesque of governor’s 
 proclamation, 318 f. 
 
 Atlanta, 172, 294; railroad connections, 
 
 16 ff.; effect of early railroads upon, 
 18 n. 
 
 Augusta, 21, 116 f., 121, 161, 180, 203; 
 trade to Charleston and Savannah, 14 f., 
 17, 56 f.; railroad connections, 16 ff.; 
 banking in, 19 f.; manufacturing in, 26; 
 a “northern city” in 1852, 83; state- 
 rights Whigs in, 194. 
 
 Augusta Chronicle, see also Lee, Daniel; 
 21, 36, 120 f., 161, 192, 208, 246, 248, 
 259, 279; debates slavery economics, 
 
 34 f.; declares future of slavery a matter 
 of profits, 35; criticises South Carolina, 
 63; northern editor of, 84; editor’s resig¬ 
 
 nation demanded, 86, 119; declares seces¬ 
 sion impossible, 108 n.; owners distinct 
 from editors, 116; largest newspaper cir¬ 
 culation, 117; attacks Polk and Mexican 
 War, 1 4L - conservative constitutional 
 theories oY, 201-203; denies “right of 
 revolution,” 202 f.; attacked by Demo¬ 
 crats, 202-204; claims Democrats desire 
 secession, 219; fears need of secession, 
 Jan., 1850, 245; optimistic about compro¬ 
 mise, Feb., 1850, 245; condemns suppres¬ 
 sion of Macon * Citizen, ( 295; supports 
 Scott, 1852, 361J V 
 
 Augusta Constitiaionalist, 165, 260; de¬ 
 
 mands dismissal of Lee of the Chronicle, 
 86, 119; circulation of different editions, 
 117; joins southern movement, 164, 180; 
 defends “right of revolution,” 202 f.; at¬ 
 tacks Toombs, 247. 
 
 Augusta Republic, 192, 259; circulation, 
 117; supports Clay, 1848, 161 f.; attacks 
 the Chronicle, 203 f.; supports Nashville 
 Convention, 255. 
 
 Avary, M. L., A. H. Stephens, cited, 127, 
 155, 160, 329. 
 
 Baltimore Sun, maintains correspondent at 
 Savannah, 306 n.; gives best reports on 
 1850 campaign, 318 n. 
 
 Banks, in Georgia, 18-20; attitude of 
 Democrats towards, 126 n., 217 f., 218 
 n.; issues concerning, declared dead in 
 Georgia, 1851, 351 n. 
 
 Barbecues, Public, and politics, in Upper 
 Georgia, 68; general political significance, 
 118, 121; southern-rights barbecue, Col¬ 
 umbus, 1850, 276 f. 
 
 Barnum, P. T., 311, 319. 
 
 Bartow, F. S., of Savannah, in state con¬ 
 vention, 325; introduces “Chatham” reso¬ 
 lutions, 327; appeals for Union, 333. 
 
 Bell, John, compromise plan of, 1850, 241. 
 
 Penning, H. L., 269, 273, 274, 293, 324; 
 state-rights ideas and ideal of “consolid¬ 
 ated” southern republic, 189 f., 292; de¬ 
 clares southern Union sentiment unreli¬ 
 able, 252; leader of delegation to Nash¬ 
 ville, 265; resolutions at Nashville, 270 f.; 
 significance of his Missouri line ulti¬ 
 matum, 270 f.; Address of, Commissioner 
 from Georgia to the Virginia State Con¬ 
 vention, 1861, cited, 40. 
 
 Benton. T. H., 188, 206; denies race danger, 
 44; Thirty Years’ View, cited, 44. 
 
 Berrien, John McPherson, 108, 132, 138* 
 154 f., 157, 159, 163, 191 f., 194 f., 201* 
 205, 237, 239, 292, 306; holds to Whig 
 party, 102; denies “senatorial responsi¬ 
 bility,” 124; opposes Texan annexation, 
 130 f.; opposes all extension, 135; criti¬ 
 cism of, by Justin Smith, 136 n.; supports 
 Clayton Compromise, 158, 169 f.; backs 
 Clay and old Whig principles, 1848, 161, 
 162; versus Stephens, 169 f., 199; in 
 “Southern Caucus,” 183; his “Address,” 
 184 f.; opposes Clay Compromise, 240 r 
 267-269; warns Senate Georgia will act, 
 240; Clay’s appeal to, 267 f.; seeks eco¬ 
 nomic defence against North, 268 f., 315- 
 317; votes on Omnibus bills, 269 n.; only 
 
392 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 one county supports, 1850, 317, 321; reso¬ 
 lutions thanking, in state convention, ig¬ 
 nored, 327; accepts Georgia Platform, 
 350; defeated for Senate, 358. 
 
 Berrien, J. M., “Address to the People of 
 the United States,” cited, 185. 
 
 Berrien MSS, cited, 162 f., 170, 268. 
 
 Bibb County, see Macon. 
 
 Black Belt, 102; location of, 11; Negro 
 population in, 14, 46; fear of race prob¬ 
 lem in, 46, 67; attitude towards Negroes 
 and slavery in, 69 f., 76. 
 
 Black, Edward J., praises Calhoun’s “south¬ 
 ern movement,” 1847, 141; warns Cal¬ 
 houn of Georgia conservatism, 147 f.; 
 secretly requests resolutions for Georgia 
 legislature, 148. 
 
 Bluffton Movement, 139 n.; nature of, and 
 results, 127-129. 
 
 Bonner’s Map of Georgia, 1849, cited, 10, 17. 
 
 Boston, fugitive slaves from Georgia in, 
 313; agents threatened in, 313; Georgia 
 papers warn, 313 f. 
 
 Boston Atlas, debates slavery economics, 34; 
 on a “solid North,” 143 n. 
 
 Boston Courier, ascribes Georgia conserva¬ 
 tism to prosperity, 52, 291; notes Geor¬ 
 gians are friendly to North, 87; personal 
 attack on Toombs and Stephens, 242 n.; 
 attacks Georgia non-intercourse bill, 244; 
 maintains correspondent at Savannah, 
 306 n. 
 
 Boston Liberator, hopes for civil war, 242; 
 accuses Toombs and Stephens of Taylor’s 
 death, 266 f. 
 
 Boston Post, debates slavery economics, 34. 
 
 Boucher, C. S., on Missouri line, 141 n.; 
 “The Annexation of Texas and the Bluff- 
 ton Movement,” cited, 128; “The Ante- 
 Bellum Attitude of South Carolina toward 
 Manufacturing and Agriculture,” cited, 
 21, 23, 56, 62; “In Re That Aggressive 
 Slavocracy,” cited, 31, 39, 47, 127, 141, 
 342; “The Secession and Co-Operation 
 Movements in South Carolina,” cited, 253. 
 
 Bradford, Gamaliel, Confederate Portraits, 
 cited, 115. 
 
 Brawley, Benjamin, views slavery as inci¬ 
 dental to race equation, 42 n.; A Social 
 History of the Americayx Negro, cited, 
 42, 242. 
 
 Brenner, German musician, begins piano 
 making in Georgia, 88n. 
 
 Brooks, James, New York congressman, de¬ 
 clares Georgia saved Union, 338 f. 
 
 Brooks, R. P., The Agrarian Revolution in 
 Georgia, cited, 11, 69; History of Georgia, 
 cited, 312; “Howell Cobb and the Crisis 
 of 1850,” cited, 312, 352; “A Local Study 
 of the Race Problem,” cited, 14. 
 
 Brown, Joseph E., Ill n., 227. 
 
 Buchanan, James, 188, 235 n.; Works, cited, 
 235 n. 
 
 Buck, P. H., “Poor Whites of the Old 
 South,” cited, 75. 
 
 Bulloch County, 174, 320. 
 
 Burke County, only one in state to support 
 “non-intercourse” ticket, 1850, 317, 321. 
 
 Burke, Emily, Reminiscences, cited, 68 f., 
 75. 
 
 Butler, J. C., Historical Records of Macon, 
 cited, 286. 
 
 Cairnes, J. E., The Slave Power, cited, 77. 
 
 Calhoun, John C., 95 f., 103, 108, 128, 149, 
 158, 164 f., 184, 188 f., 191, 195, 204 f., 
 222; his theory of sovereignty attacked by 
 
 Arnold, 97; quarrel with Troup, 99; joins 
 Whigs, 101; returns to Democracy, 101 f.; 
 opposes Bluffton Movement, 128; intro¬ 
 duces “Southern Platform,” 1847, 137; 
 inaugurates “Southern Movement,” 139; 
 hopes for Georgia, 139; unpopular with 
 Georgia Democrats, 1847, 141, 150; appeal 
 to Georgia Whigs ignored, 142 f.; appeals 
 to Georgia Democrats, 146 f.; warned of 
 Georgia conservatism, 146-148; advice 
 secretly requested for Georgia legislature, 
 1847, 148; 1849, 215 f.; declares consti¬ 
 tution follows flag, 157; and the “South¬ 
 ern Caucus,” 182; “Southern Address,” 
 183; growing influence with Georgia edi¬ 
 tors, 189; ridiculed by Whigs, 192 f.; 
 pessimistic reports to, by Georgians, 1849, 
 206 f.; death, 207, 241 f.; relation to 
 Jackson convention, 212 f.; last great 
 speech, 241; reaction to, 246; Works, 
 cited, 137, 183. 
 
 Calhoun Correspondence, cited, 198, 212, 
 214. 
 
 Calhoun Papers, cited, 141 f., 148, 150, 
 166 f., 170, 182, 207, 210, 215. 
 
 California, 12, 157, 218, 239, 243 f., 247, 
 252, 272, 283, 313, 327; status of slavery 
 in, 158 f., 181; gold discovered, 195; 
 population, 195; Georgia opinion of state¬ 
 hood for, 195 f., 219 f.; Georgia slavery 
 expedition to, 196 f.; free constitution 
 adopted in, 219; Georgia Whig as agent 
 to, 220; statehood issue in Georgia As¬ 
 sembly, 1849-1850, 223-227, 229 f.; de¬ 
 clared adapted to slavery, 226; and Clay 
 Compromise, 240-242, 295 f.; California 
 bill passes, 296; Georgia governor there¬ 
 fore calls state convention, 295 f. 
 
 Camden County, 326; southern-rights Asso¬ 
 ciation in, 276 n. 
 
 Campbell, L. D., Kansas and Nebraska, 
 cited, 28. 
 
 Capers, Bishop, warns South Carolina 
 secession will deliver trade to Savannah, 
 61, 306. 
 
 Carroll, M. C., Origins of the Whig Party, 
 cited, 102, 162. 
 
 Cass, Lewis, 165; runs for president, 166 ff.; 
 vote for, in Georgia, 175 f.; praises Geor¬ 
 gia, 1850, 339. 
 
 Cass County, Union meeting in, 249. 
 
 Cassville Standard, 259. 
 
 Census of 1850, cited, 13, 26, 65. 
 
 Central Georgia, 12 f., 51, 191, 307; limits, 
 10; fertility, 11; early settlement of, 11; 
 attitude towards slavery in, 69 f.; Demo¬ 
 cratic belt across, 92, 249, 307, 320; old 
 Clark-LTnion party in, 91 f., 100; Troup 
 State-Rights party in, 91, 100, 109; state- 
 rights element in Democratic belt, 105; 
 third, seventh, and eighth districts in, 
 usually Whig, 171; reaction in, to Con¬ 
 gress of 1849, 190 f.; failure of extremist 
 meeting in, 1850, 248 f.; little secession 
 spirit in, winter, 1850, 253; Nashville 
 election, county votes in, 258 n.; press of, 
 unrepresentative, 1850, 279. 
 
 Chambers, W., American Slavery and Color, 
 cited, 44 f. 
 
 Channing, E., History of the United States, 
 cited, 24. 
 
 Chappell, A. H., on Democratic demoraliza¬ 
 tion, 1850, 280; appeal for Union, 281 f. 
 
INDEX 
 
 393 
 
 Charleston (S. C.), 95, 139, 203, 303; riv- 
 airy with Savannah for interior trade, 
 14 f., 17, 56-61, 305 f.; railroad connec¬ 
 tions, 16 ff.; banking in, 19 f.; disease 
 conditions in, 59 n. 
 
 Charleston Courier, opposes Bluffton Move¬ 
 ment, 128. 
 
 Charleston Mercury, 259 f.; supports Bluff- 
 ton Movement, 128; leads Georgians to 
 suspect Carolina secession leadership, 304. 
 
 Charleston News, 297; deplores rivalry with 
 Georgia, 60 f. 
 
 Chattanooga, railroad connections with, 17. 
 
 Chatham County, see Savannah. 
 
 ‘‘Chatham Platform,” 327; principles of, 
 314; probable basis of “Georgia Plat¬ 
 form,” 315; becomes program of both 
 parties in state convention campaign, 
 1850, 315; and “Tennessee Resolutions,” 
 324 f. 
 
 Cherokee Georgia, see Upper Georgia. 
 
 Cheves, Langdon, 98, 324. 
 
 Christy, D., Cotton is King, cited, 95. 
 
 Civil war, 40, 43, 272; danger of, discussed, 
 1850, 288 f.; and relations between South 
 Carolina and Georgia, 340. 
 
 Clark, John, 123; and Clark Party, 91 f.; 
 Considerations on the Principles of Wil¬ 
 liam H. Crawford, cited, 91. 
 
 Clark Party, origins of, 91; distribution of, 
 91 f.; becomes “Clark-Union” party, 93; 
 attitude towards Indian question, 93; to¬ 
 wards Nullification, 99. 
 
 Clark, V. S., History of Manufactures, 
 cited, 26. 
 
 “Clay-Eaters,” see Poor Whites. 
 
 Clay, Henry, 101 ff., 193 f., 210, 246, 248, 
 274, 276, 278, 281, 283, 309, 324, 347; 
 in election of 1844, 129 f.; supported by 
 Georgia state-rights Whigs for president, 
 1848, 160-162; his Compromise introduced, 
 1850, 240-242, southern reaction to, 246 f.; 
 debate on, continues, 266; attitude of 
 Georgia delegation towards Compromise, 
 240 f., 267-269; Georgia Democratic 
 
 press condemns, 274; Compromise passes, 
 295 f.; declared unsatisfactory and “last 
 concession” by Georgia Unionists, 314 f.; 
 accepted by state convention, 330; de¬ 
 clares Georgia Union victory prevented 
 civil war, 339; Southern-rights party con¬ 
 demns Compromise, 1851, 352, 352 n. 
 
 Clayton Compromise, 164, 169 f., 172; intro¬ 
 duced, 157 f.; supported by all Georgia 
 congressmen save Stephens, 158 f.; 
 causes friction between Stephens and 
 Berrien, 169 f., 199; issue in state cam¬ 
 paign, 1849, 200 f. 
 
 Cluskey, M. W., Political Text Book, cited, 
 272. 
 
 Coastal Georgia, 174, 248, 287; description 
 of, 10; Troup State-Rights party in, 91, 
 100, 109; old aristocracy of, 100; relation 
 to Central Georgia, 100; included in first 
 district, usually Whig, 171; southern- 
 rights meetings in, 1850, 248, 283-286; 
 relatively large vote for delegates to 
 Nashville, 258, 258 n.; unrepresented at 
 Nashville, 264 f.; conservatism of, 1850, 
 281 
 
 Cobb,' Howell, 66, 111 n., 123, 130, 133, 
 136, 146, 155, 176, 189, 192, 195, 236, 
 237, 250, 252, 267, 278, 280, 285, 307, 
 311, 341, 349, 359 n.; democratic planter, 
 112; influence in Upper Georgia, 124; 
 supports slavery extension, 130, 136; con¬ 
 fidence in northern Democracy, 1847, 140; 
 
 leader of Union Democrats, 140; in 
 “Southern Caucus,” 182 f.; his “Minority 
 Address,” 184; supported in Upper Geor¬ 
 gia, 188; prevents state convention from 
 adopting “Southern Address,” 1849, 198; 
 elected speaker national House, 238 f.; 
 supports Compromise, 240; believes north¬ 
 ern “Union Meetings” most reassuring to 
 South, 246 n.; addresses constituents, 
 
 1850, 282; predicts large Union majority, 
 
 299 f.; his return not primary influence 
 on public opinion, 311 f.; indifferent to 
 national Union party, 346 f.; Union 
 
 nominee for governor, 1851, 351; troubled 
 by “right of secession” issue, 352 f.; 
 elected, 354; predicts happy relations with 
 Union, 1853, 362 f.; Message of Gov¬ 
 ernor, to the Legislature, 1853, cited, 363. 
 
 Cobb, Howell, et al. To Our Constituents, 
 cited, 184. 
 
 Cole, A. C., “Inscribed Stones in the Wash¬ 
 ington Monument,” cited, 334; “The 
 South and the Right of Secession,” cited, 
 329, 352; The Whig Party in the South, 
 cited, 102 f., 110, 133, 156, 160, 183, 253, 
 258, 264, 266, 312, 354. 
 
 Coleman, C., Crittenden, cited, 237. 
 
 Collins, Robert, saves editor of Macon 
 Citizen from lynching, 1850, 295; slaves 
 of, escape to Boston, 313; his agents 
 threatened there, 313; Fillmore’s letter to, 
 promising enforcement of fugitive law, 
 314. 
 
 Collins, W. H., The Domestic Slave Trade, 
 cited, 13. 
 
 Colquitt, W. F., 108, 111 n., 237 n., 269; 
 leads State-Rights Whigs into Democracy, 
 104; senator, 105; planter-aristocrat, 112; 
 demands Texan annexation, 130; and 
 slavery extension, 136; resigns from Sen¬ 
 ate, 155; leader of delegation to Nash¬ 
 ville, 265; advises South to prepare for 
 war, 272; in summer debates, 1850, 275. 
 
 Colquitt, W. F., Circular to the State 
 Rights Party of Georgia, cited, 104. 
 
 Columbia South Carolinian, 203; ascribes 
 Georgia conservatism to prosperity, 52, 
 290 f.; hopes for Georgia, 219, 297. 
 
 Columbus (Ga.), 14, 116, 118, 120, 179 f., 
 189 f., 215, 312 f.; railroad connections, 
 18; pro-Carolina feeling in, 18, 307; 
 
 manufacturing in, 26 f.; northerners in, 
 83, 321; foreigners in, and political in¬ 
 fluence, 88, 89 n., 321; state-rights ele¬ 
 ment in, 105; vote for Nashville Con¬ 
 vention delegates, 257 f.; southern-rights 
 barbecue in, 1850, 276 f.; Union meeting 
 in, 282 f.; carried by Unionists, 321. 
 
 Columbus Enquirer, 118, 282. 
 
 Columbus Sentinel, 116 n., 300; attacks 
 Union, 120; unrepresentative character of, 
 120; openly avows secession, 287, 310; 
 declares conflict with North inevitable, 
 
 1851, 344 f. 
 
 Columbus Times, 116 n., 117; South Caro¬ 
 lina editor of, 84; poetic satire of Taylor, 
 169; joins southern movement, 180; 
 urges slavery expeditions to California, 
 197; alone prefers state convention to 
 Nashville Convention, 255 f.; declares 
 Union will be dissolved, 298; demands 
 secession and preparation for war, 1850, 
 310; defiant after convention election, 
 322; condemns “Platform,” 336. 
 
 “Compromise of 1850,” see Clay. 
 
 Cone, F. H., delegate to Baltimore, 165; 
 assaults Stephens, 172, 173. 
 
394 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 Congressional Districts, see Map No. 6, 
 171; 92, 170 f., 174; gerrymander in 
 Central Georgia, 174, 235 n.; struggle 
 over, in Assembly, 1850, 235 f.; special 
 election in first, 1850, 252 f.; southern- 
 rights feeling in first, 252-254; feeling in, 
 eve of state convention campaign, 306 f. 
 
 Congressional Globe, cited, 130, 132, 134 flf., 
 155, 157, 159, 164, 181, 185, 238 f., 266. 
 
 Connecticut, Proviso resolutions of, 1847, 
 152; new Proviso resolutions sent to 
 Georgia, 227 f.; Georgia governor’s mes¬ 
 sage on, 228. 
 
 Conrad, Georgia B., Reminiscences, cited, 10. 
 
 Cooper, Thomas, 33. 
 
 Coryell MSS, cited, 347. 
 
 Cotterill, R. S., “Southern Railroads and 
 Western Trade, 1840-1850,” cited, 17. 
 
 Cotton, 14, 26 f., 75; “cotton rush” across 
 Georgia, 12 f.; rise and fall in price of, 
 20-22; relation to manufacturing in South, 
 23; relation to slavery extension, 47; 
 high prices produce pro-Union feeling, 
 1850, 52, 289-291. 
 
 Cotton Belt, see Central Georgia. 
 
 Coulter, E. M., “A Georgia Educational 
 Movement During the Eighteen Hundred 
 Fifties,” cited, 24; “The Nullification 
 Movement in Georgia,” cited, 58, 95, 97. 
 
 Clinch, D. L., runs for governor, 1847, 116, 
 143-145. 
 
 “Cracker,” see also Farmers, “Poor 
 Whites”; meaning of term, 74; form 
 “corn-cracker” used. 111. 
 
 Crawford, G. W., 160, 204; governor, 116, 
 124, 144 n.; administration praised, 144 f.; 
 and “Galphin Scandal,” 266 n. 
 
 Crawford, William H., 91, 96, 123. 
 
 Crittenden MSS, cited, 237 f. 
 
 Cuyler, of Savannah, draws up “Chatham 
 Platform,” 314 f.; in state convention, 
 325. 
 
 Dabney, R. L., views slavery question as a 
 race question, 42; Defense of Virginia, 
 cited, 42. 
 
 Dahlonega, Slavocracy attacked in, 250. 
 
 Davis, Jefferson, on planters’ conservatism, 
 67 n.; for slavery in Oregon, 157. 
 
 Davis, Jefferson, A Memoir by His Wife, 
 cited, 44, 268. 
 
 Dawson, Andrew H., Democratic delegate 
 to Nashville, 265 n., 270; plan for 
 
 “southern-rights” associations,” 275 f. 
 
 Dawson, W. C., 144, 239; replaces Johnson 
 in Senate, 237 n.; supports Compromise, 
 267; in state convention, 325; on “Georgia 
 Platform,” 338; leads conservative Whigs 
 for Scot, 1852, 361. 
 
 De Bow, J. D. B., Economic Resources of 
 the Southern and Western States, cited, 
 10 f., 75; Interest in Slavery of the Non- 
 Slaveholder, cited, 65, 69 f. 
 
 De Bo7u's Review, cited, 20, 28 f., 39, 55 f., 
 59. 75. 81. 
 
 De Cassagnac, A. G., History of the Work¬ 
 ing and Burgher Classes, preface to, by 
 B. S. Green, cited, 78. 
 
 De Kalb County, 10. 
 
 Democratic Party, see also Clark party, 
 Political parties; 156, 164, 167, 173, 182, 
 190, 192 f., 195 f., 206 f.; controlled by 
 planters and associates, 66, 111 f.; orig¬ 
 ins in old Union party, 100 f.; joined by 
 state-rights Whigs, 101, 103 f., 194; com¬ 
 position after 1840, 105-107, 109-112; re¬ 
 verses constitutional position, 107-109; 
 
 party of the uneducated and poor, 111, 
 118; attitude towards democracy, 112-116; 
 journals, 116-118; growing economic con¬ 
 servatism, 126 n., 217 f., 218 n.; demands 
 Texan annexation, 129-131; Georgia 
 Democrats demand extension, 136, 138; 
 supports Mexican War, 131, 138, 142, 
 152-154; suggests extension of Missouri 
 line to Pacific, 1847, 139, 141, 153; Geor¬ 
 gia state convention, 1847, 140-142; fric¬ 
 tion between Union and southern-rights 
 factions, 105-107, 109, 115 f., 140 f., 164, 
 197 ff., 204 f., 234 ff., 278 f.; attacks 
 Whigs on Proviso issue, 1847, 144 f.; 
 majority of, oppose Southern movement, 
 1847, 146-151; elects Towns governor, 
 
 151; factions hold together, 1848, 164- 
 166; campaign tactics, 167-170; slight 
 majority in congressional election, 173- 
 175; loses presidential election, 175-177; 
 voters show independence of leaders, 176; 
 emphasizes southern-rights after election 
 of 1848, 178-180; in “Southern Caucus,” 
 182 f.; encourages Whig factionalism, 
 195; state convention, 1849, 198; ridi¬ 
 culed by Whigs, 198 f.; campaign tactics, 
 198-201, 205, 207 f.; reelects Towns, 208- 
 211; wins legislature, 209, 217; gains in 
 southern-rights sentiment in, 211 f.; 
 majority ignores Nashville Convention 
 elections, 257 f.; press interpretations of 
 elections, 259-262; divided into Union and 
 extremist groups, 1850, 286 ff.; voters 
 fail to support latter for state conven¬ 
 tion, 319-323; Union Democrats join 
 Union party, 334 f.; majority rump be¬ 
 comes southern-rights party, 335; net 
 effect of 1850 campaign on, 343; divided 
 in Georgia campaign of 1851, 354; only 
 national party Georgians could support, 
 
 1852, 357 f.; two Pierce tickets in state 
 party, 360 f.; state factions reunited, 
 
 1853, 362; elects Johnson governor, 362. 
 
 Dewey, D. R., “Banking in the South,” 
 
 cited, 19. 
 
 “Direct Trade,” conventions for, 16; Sen¬ 
 ator Berrien favors, 1850, 316. 
 
 District of Columbia, 49, 181, 184, 213, 232, 
 269, 272, 282, 297; effort to abolish slav¬ 
 ery in, 164, 181, 223; effort to abolish 
 slave trade in, 181; item in “Georgia 
 Platform,” 331; debate on slavery in, 
 Georgia convention, 333. 
 
 Dodd, W., The Cotton Kingdom, cited, 32, 
 37; Expansion and Conflict, cited, 154. 
 
 Domestic Slave Trade, 13; debated in Geor¬ 
 gia Assembly, 1850, 232 f. 
 
 “Dorrism,” 202; supported by Georgia 
 Democrats, 114. 
 
 Du Bois, W. E. B., The Suppression of the 
 African Slave Trade, cited, 13. 
 
 Du Bose, J. W., W. L. Yancey, cited, 341. 
 
 Dunway, C. A., “Slavery in California,” 
 cited, 197. 
 
 Economic interpretation, of Georgia’s con¬ 
 servatism, 1850, 22, 26-29, 51-55, 289- 
 291, 291 n. 
 
 Education, see also Illiteracy; lack of, in 
 Georgia, 24 n.; northern teachers in state, 
 81 f. 
 
 Election of 1840, Whig victory in Georgia, 
 104. 
 
 Election of 1843 (state), Whig victory in 
 Georgia, 104. 
 
 Election of 1844, Democratic victory in 
 Georgia, 130. 
 
INDEX 
 
 395 
 
 Election of 1845 (state), Whig victory in 
 Georgia, 104. 
 
 Election of 1847 (state), 125; results in 
 election of Towns and a balanced Assem¬ 
 bly, 151 f. 
 
 Election of 1848, 252; presidential nomina¬ 
 tions, 160-166; campaign tactics in Geor¬ 
 gia, 167; campaign preceding, 167-170; 
 affected by Cones’ assault upon Stephens, 
 173; Georgia congressional election re¬ 
 sults, 173-175; presidential results, 175 f.; 
 national results, 176 f.; effect upon party 
 attitudes in Georgia, 178 f. 
 
 Election of 1849 (state), nominations, 
 198 f.; campaign tactics, 198-201, 205, 
 207 f.; Proviso issue in, 200 f.; “right of 
 secession,” issue in, 201, 203; factional 
 friction in, 203-205; personalities in, 205; 
 importance of, to southern movement, 
 206; Towns elected, 208; Democrats win 
 legislature, 209; results analyzed, 208-211; 
 effects of, 211 f.; viewed as giving south¬ 
 ern-rights mandate to Towns, 218; tactics 
 of, revived by Democrats, 1851, 350 f. 
 
 Election of 1850 (state convention), 106; 
 governor calls convention, 295-298; cam¬ 
 paign preceding, 303-319; secession appeal 
 abandoned, 310-312; election results, 319- 
 321; reactions to, 321-323; issues of, 
 abandoned by southern-rights party, 1851, 
 350 f. 
 
 Election of 1851 (state), 106; nominations, 
 350 f.; southern-rights tactics, 350 f.; 
 Union party tactics, 352 f.; “right of 
 secession” issue in, 350 ff.; Bank and 
 tariff declared dead issues in, 351 n.; 
 secession issue in, 351-354; economic ap¬ 
 peal in, for Union, 354, 354 n.; results 
 in Union victory, 354; Union victories in 
 Alabama and Mississippi, 355; lasting in¬ 
 fluence of southern-rights efforts in, 356; 
 foreordains end of Union party, 356. 
 
 Election of 1852, causes disintegration of 
 Union party, 357 f., 360 f.; divided tick¬ 
 ets in both Georgia parties, 361; results, 
 361 f.; secessionist ticket a failure, 361 f. 
 
 Election of 1853 (state). Democratic fac¬ 
 tions reunited in, 362; elect Johnson gov¬ 
 ernor, 362. 
 
 England, 32, 175; cotton demand in, 21 n., 
 22; immigrants from, 88. 
 
 “Empire State,” see Georgia. 
 
 “Era of Good Feeling,” 90. 
 
 Eubank, T., Inorganic Forces Affecting 
 Slavery, cited, 36. 
 
 Eve, saves Stephen’s life, 172. 
 
 Extremists, see Southern-rights Democrats. 
 
 Farmers, 92, 133; numbers in 1850, 65; dis¬ 
 tinguished from “planters,” 64 f.; dis¬ 
 tribution of, 67; characteristics, 68; 
 dominate Upper Georgia, 67; political 
 education of, 68; as slaveholders, 68 f.; 
 attitude towards Negroes and slavery, 
 69-72. 
 
 “Father” Ritchie, 125. 
 
 Federal Government, see Union, The; 95, 
 97; and abolitionists, 47; blamed for eco¬ 
 nomic depression, 51 f.; opposed by Geor¬ 
 gia in Indian controversy, 93; sovereignty 
 of, asserted in Georgia, 201 f.; peaceful 
 relations with, predicted by Governor 
 Cobb, 1853, 362 f. 
 
 Federalist Party, 90, 114 n., 138 f. 
 
 Fillmore, Millard, vice-presidential nomi¬ 
 nee, 167; denounced by Democrats, 200; 
 becomes president, 267; influence helps 
 
 compromise, 267; his “Collins Letter” 
 assures Georgia fugitive slave law will be 
 observed, 314. 
 
 “Fire-eaters,” see Southern-rights Demo¬ 
 crats. 
 
 Fisher, Sidney G., views slavery question as 
 a race question, 41 f. 
 
 Fisher, Sidney G., Laws of Race as Con¬ 
 nected with Slavery, remarkable essay, 
 cited, 42. 
 
 Fitzhugh, G., Cannibals All, cited, 33; ex¬ 
 treme proslavery views of, 45. 
 
 Flisch, J. A., “The State Finances of Geor¬ 
 gia,” cited, 19. 
 
 Florida, 71, 155, 302. 
 
 Flournoy, R. W., editor Federal Union, 
 204; attacks Union Democrats, 204 f. 
 
 Foote, H. S., 316 n., 347. 
 
 Forney, J. W., 278 n., 359 n. 
 
 Forsyth Bee, deplores failure of Monroe ex¬ 
 tremist meeting, 249. 
 
 Forsyth County, 261. 
 
 Forsyth, John, of Columbus Times, 179. 
 
 Foster, H. D., “Webster’s Seventh of 
 March Speech,” cited, 190, 241, 262, 312; 
 on danger of secession in Georgia, 1850, 
 262 n. 
 
 Fouche, Simpson, 277, 297; delegate to 
 Nashville, 265 n.; resolutions at Nash¬ 
 ville, 271. 
 
 Free-Labor British Colonies, The Case of, 
 cited, 41. 
 
 Free-Negroes, numbers negligible in Geor¬ 
 gia, 14 n.; character of, 41; debate on, in 
 Assembly, 1850, 233 f. 
 
 Free-Negroism, cited, 41. 
 
 Free Soil Party, 168, 198 n.; origins of, 
 163; nominates Van Buren, 163; in elec¬ 
 tion of 1848, 176 f.; holds balance of 
 power in House, 1850, 237. 
 
 Fugitive Slave Law, 187, 223, 272; flouted 
 in Boston, 313; Macon Journal declares 
 compromise depends upon observance of, 
 313 f.; “Georgia Platform,” declares pre¬ 
 servation of Union depends upon, 332. 
 
 “Galphin Scandal,” 266, 266 n. 
 
 Gardner, J. R., editor, Augusta Constitu¬ 
 tionalist, 141; opposes Calhoun, 1847, 141. 
 
 Garrison, W. L., welcomes Toombs’ threats, 
 242. 
 
 Gartrell, 222, 225; radical Whig leader in 
 Assembly, 221 ff.; in Missouri line debate, 
 226. 
 
 Georgia, State of, 49, 72, 151 f., 164, 166 f., 
 182, 186, 204; chief sections, 9-11; white 
 and Negro population in, 1850, 13; leads in 
 plans to improve South, 15-16; early rail¬ 
 road development in, 16-18; trade rivalry 
 with South Carolina, 17, 56-61, 305 f.; 
 early banking in, 18-20; state debt, 
 19 f.; excellent credit, 20, 27, 290; 
 
 financial rivalry with South Carolina, 20, 
 58, 305 f.; new lands in, 1850, 21, 289; 
 agricultural reform, 21; prosperity and 
 business optimism, 22, 26-29, 54 f., 289 
 f.; rapid increase in cotton manufacturing 
 in, 1845-1850, 25-27, 289; little economic 
 interest in slavery extension, 47; political 
 interest in extension, 47; need of Negro 
 population, 48 f.; supports Union because 
 of prosperity, 51-53, 289-291, 291 n., 339, 
 339 n., 354, 354 n.; economic contrast 
 with South Carolina, 53-57; feeling be¬ 
 tween South Carolina and, 57-63, 96, 98, 
 129, 192 f., 213 n., 304-3p6, 319, 327; 
 northern and southern praise of, 62 f., 
 
396 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 303, 339; social groups in, and their at¬ 
 titude towards Negroes and slavery, 64- 
 89; South Carolinians in, and their influ¬ 
 ence, 79; northerners in, and their in¬ 
 fluence, 79-85; feeling in, towards North¬ 
 erners, 85-88, 294; German and Irish 
 immigrants in, 88 f.; political influence 
 of immigrants in, 89; origin of parties in, 
 90 f.; early party history, 93, 99-116; 
 Nullification movement in, 94-98; attach¬ 
 ment to Union in, 96-98, 151, 268, 273, 
 281 f., 293, 293 n., 326, 333; party press 
 in, 116-118; general political conditions 
 in, 119-125; forces influencing public 
 opinion in, 120-123; even balance of par¬ 
 ties in, 110, 122; party leaders in, 122 f.; 
 political organization in, 124 f.; Bluffton 
 Movement in, 128 f.; Democratic Con¬ 
 vention, 1847, 140-142; Whig Convention, 
 1847, 142-144; Longstreet’s defence of, 
 149; united against Proviso, 153, 245; and 
 alignments in congressional districts, 
 170 f.; reaction in, to election of 1848, 
 178-180; to Congress of 1848-1849, 187- 
 194; sectionalism in, true of Democracy, 
 but not Whiggerv, 196; opinion in, of 
 California and New Mexico, 195-196; 
 campaign of 1849 in, 198-212; parties in 
 Assembly, 217; governor’s messages, 
 217-219, 227 f.; Assembly of 1849-1850, 
 217-236; first signs of new parties in, 
 235 f.; delegation in Congress, 1850, 237; 
 activities of, 237-241, 266-269; Georgia 
 reaction to Clay compromise, 246 f.; to 
 northern Union meetings, 246 f.; public 
 opinion, winter of 1850, 247-254, 260- 
 263; Nashville Convention elections in, 
 256-262; delegation to Nashville, 264- 
 271; secessionist efforts, summer 1850, 
 275-277, 283-286; conservative spirit in, 
 277-281; Union propaganda, 281-283; 
 governor calls convention, 296-298; gov¬ 
 ernor reports state not ready to secede, 
 300; South Carolina governor promises to 
 “conciliate,” 301; blocks Carolina’s seces¬ 
 sion plans, 302, 322 f., 340; becomes 
 critical center of secession movement, 
 303, 306; state convention campaign in, 
 1850, 303-319; elections to, 319-323; 
 
 delegation in second session, Nashville 
 Convention, 323-325; state convention, 
 1850, 325-334; Union and southern- 
 
 rights parties formed, 334 f.; party situ¬ 
 ation, 1851, 343-348; “manufactures speak 
 louder than cannons’ roar,” 349 n.; cam¬ 
 paign of 1851 in, 348-354; Union party 
 victory, 354; campaign of 1852 breaks 
 up Union party, 356-361; Southern-rights 
 Pierce ticket carries, 360; Democracy re¬ 
 united in, 1853, 362; Democrats elect 
 Johnson governor, 1853, 362; Governor 
 Cobb predicts happy future for state, 
 1853, 362 f. 
 
 Georgia, Acts of, cited, 228. 
 
 Georgia Central Railroad, 16; effort to di¬ 
 vert traffic from, to Charleston, 60, 305. 
 
 Georgia, Convention of the State of, 1833, 
 Journal of, cited, 112. 
 
 Georgia, Convention to Equalize the Repre¬ 
 sentation of the General Assembly of, 
 1839, Journal of, cited, 112. 
 
 Georgia Convention of 1850, 344; governor 
 urges convention, 1849, 218; convention 
 resolution and bill in Assembly, 220-230, 
 232; prospect of, noted in national Sen¬ 
 ate, 240; governor calls convention, 1850, 
 295 f.; reaction to call, 296-298; cam¬ 
 
 paign preceding elections to, 303-319; 
 elections to, 319-323; membership of, 
 325 f.; fervent Union appeals in, 326 f., 
 
 333 f.; extremists lack proportional repre¬ 
 sentation in, 327, 327 n.; extremist efforts 
 in, 327-329, 332-334; accepts Compromise, 
 330; warns North against further aggres¬ 
 sions, 330-332; debate on slavery in D. 
 C., 333; Union party finally organized in, 
 
 334 f.; Georgia reaction to, 336 f.; esti¬ 
 mates of its influence on South and the 
 Union, 336-342. 
 
 Georgia Convention of 1850, Proceedings of, 
 cited, 40, 218, 296, 326, 328, 330 ff. 
 
 Georgia Convention of 1850, Journal of, 
 cited, 330. 
 
 Georgia, House Journals, cited, 209, 217 f., 
 220 ff., 227, 229 ff., 235. 
 
 Georgia Legislature, abolition of Senate de¬ 
 sired by Democrats, 113; not dominated 
 by national senators, 124; Whigs win 
 slight majority in, 1847, 151 f.; Proviso 
 and Mexican War issues in, 152-154; 
 declares North threatens Union, 152; de¬ 
 clares Georgia united against Proviso, 
 153; Democrats win control of, 1849, 
 209; Calhouns relation to, 215 f.; com¬ 
 position, December, 1849, 217; governor’s 
 message urges state convention, 218; 
 “Georgia Resolutions” introduced, 220j 
 ninth threatens secession, 220, 228, 232; 
 eighth (convention) resolution, debated, 
 220-228; adopted, 228, 232; convention 
 bill passes, 229 f., 232; California state¬ 
 hood clauses protested by Whigs, 229 f.; 
 text of convention bill, 230; Nashville 
 convention measure in, 230-232; authorizes 
 inter-state slave trade, 232 f.; defeats 
 bills against North, 232. 243 f.; and 
 against free-Negroes, 232-234; gerry¬ 
 mander struggle in, 235 f.; northern criti¬ 
 cism of, 243 f.; attitude of Georgia 
 press towards, 244, 251; unrepresentative 
 character of, 1850, 262 f.; Union party 
 majority in, 1851, 354; Union party holds 
 together in, 1852, 358. 
 
 Georgia, Letter Books of Governors, cited, 
 218, 296. 
 
 “Georgia Platform,” 344; probably based on 
 “Chatham Platform,” 315; authorship, 
 329; in state convention, 329-333; accepted 
 by all but secessionists, in Georgia, 336 f., 
 344, 356; praise of, 337-339; general 
 
 adoption in South, 337-341; its influence 
 estimated, 341 f.; McDonald not clear 
 upon, 352. 
 
 Georgia Railroad, 16. 
 
 “Georgia Resolutions” of 1850, introduced, 
 1849, 220; ninth resolution threatens sec¬ 
 ession, 220; adopted, 228; eighth (con¬ 
 vention) resolution, 220; California clause 
 added to, 222; text of, 224; Whig motion 
 to delay lost, 224; Missouri line amend¬ 
 ment to, debated, 224-227; amendment de¬ 
 feated, 227; resolution adopted, 228, 248; 
 Lawton’s preamble and solidarity reso¬ 
 lution defeated, 222; first seven adopted, 
 224. 
 
 Georgia, Senate Journals, cited, 209, 220 ff., 
 230-232, 234. 
 
 Germans, immigrants in Georgia. 88 f.; as 
 Unionists in Savannah, 1850, 309. 
 
 Gerrymander, see Congressional Districts. 
 
 Giddings, J. R., abolitionist congressman, 
 181; History of the Rebellion, cited, 181, 
 237 f. 
 
INDEX 
 
 397 
 
 Glynn County, “Marshes of,” 10; large 
 Negro population of, map No. 2, 14; 
 meetings in, 248. 
 
 Going, C. B., David Wilmot, cited, 132. 
 
 Gregg, William, 23, 23 n., 56. 
 
 Griffin, Whig, 259. 
 
 Guetter, F. J., and McKinley, A. E., 
 Statistical Tables, cited, 22. 
 
 Gulf states, 9, 13, 53, 139, 297. 
 
 Hackett, T. C., Union Democratic repre¬ 
 sentative, 171, 237, 240, 267, 307. 
 
 Hamburg (S. C.), railroad connections, 16. 
 
 Hamer, Phillip, The Secession Movement in 
 South Carolina, cited, 133, 138 f., 181, 
 185, 212, 214, 275. 
 
 Hamilton, General James, ascribes Geor¬ 
 gia’s conservatism to economic prosperity, 
 51 f., 290 f.; warns South Carolina 
 
 secession will deliver trade to Savannah, 
 61, 306; on feeling between Georgia and 
 South Carolina, 98. 
 
 Hammond, J. H., 271, 274, 286, 303; warns 
 South Carolina of economic decline, 55; 
 declares “poor whites” worst enemies of 
 Negroes, 76; at Nashville, 269; declares 
 Georgia potential leader of South, 297; 
 refuses to “interfere” in Georgia politics, 
 305; “Address to the South Carolina In¬ 
 stitute,” cited, 75. 
 
 Hammond, M. B., The Cotton Industry, 
 cited, 77. 
 
 Hammond MSS, cited, 67, 76, 297, 302, 305. 
 
 Handy, R. B.,. “History and General 
 
 Statistics of Cotton,” cited, 22. 
 
 Haralson, H. A., Democratic representative', 
 104, 130, 155, 158, 188, 237; opposes 
 Clay Compromise, 240. 
 
 Harden, E. J., resolutions in Assembly, 
 152; George M. Troup, cited, 265, 324. 
 
 Harper, The Pro-Slavery Argument, cited, 
 32. 
 
 Harper, R. M., “Development of Agriculture 
 in Upper Georgia,” cited, 11, 14. 
 
 Harrison, W. H., 101, 103 f. 
 
 Hearon, Cleo, Mississippi and the Compro¬ 
 mise of 1850, cited, 186, 213. 
 
 Helper, H. R., 33, 77 n.; on Georgia non¬ 
 slaveholders, 70; Impending Crisis, cited, 
 70. 
 
 Herndon, D. T.. “The Nashville Conven¬ 
 tion,” cited, 232, 265, 269, 325. 
 
 Heydenfeldt, on southern desire for eman¬ 
 cipation, 36. 
 
 Hill, Edward Y., 207 f.; Whig nominee for 
 governor, 1849, 199; evades issues, 
 
 200 f., 204; personal habits attacked, 205; 
 and “special privilege,” 205; defeated, 
 208-210. 
 
 History Teachers ’ Magazine, cited, 334. 
 
 Hodgson, J., on effect of Taylor’s death, 
 267 n.; Cradle of the Confederacy, cited, 
 267 n. 
 
 Holsey, Hopkins, 187 f., 191, 219; of 
 
 Athens Banner, 151; declares no disunion 
 party can succeed in Georgia, 151; attacks 
 Calhounites, 204 f.; declares public opin¬ 
 ion calm, September, 1850; burlesques 
 governor’s convention proclamation, 318 f. 
 
 Hook-Worm Disease, endemic among Geor¬ 
 gia “poor whites,” 75. 
 
 House of Representatives (national), 170 f., 
 180, 211, 218, 225, 262, 274; feeling m, 
 between Georgia and South Carolina dele¬ 
 gations, 98; Georgia members, 1847-48, 
 155; Proviso problem and Clayton Com¬ 
 promise in, 1848, 155-159; membership, 
 
 1849, 177; antislavery majority in, 181; 
 antislavery measures in, 181; fails to 
 solve territorial problem, 1849, 185; Cal¬ 
 houn’s advice requested for Georgia 
 member of, 215; suggested Georgians 
 leave, if Proviso passes, 232; interstate 
 slave trade advocated, to increase Georgia 
 representation in, 232 f.; Free-Soilers 
 
 hold balance of power in, 1850, 237; 
 speakership contest in, 238; Cobb elected 
 speaker, 238; compromise move pro 
 gresses in, 241 f., 266 f. 
 
 Howard, J. H., requests Calhoun’s advice 
 for Georgia Assembly, 215. 
 
 Howard, R. R., plans Georgia slavery ex¬ 
 pedition to California, 196 f. 
 
 Hundley, D. R., on barbecues and politics 
 in South, 68; on importance of north¬ 
 erners in South, 82; on their antislavery 
 views, 84 f.; Social Relations in Our 
 Southern States, cited, 33, 68 f., 75, 81 f., 
 85. 
 
 Hunt’s Merchants’ Magazine, cited, 20, 22, 
 26, 88. 
 
 Illiteracy, see also Education; extent of, 
 24 n.; makes for mental inertia, 24; re¬ 
 lation to politics, 121; factor in Georgia 
 indifference to Nashville Convention and 
 southern movement, 260 f. 
 
 Immigrants, see also Irish; 29, 281; num¬ 
 bers and distribution in Georgia, 88,* 
 political influence, 89. 
 
 Incidents of a lourney from Abbeville to 
 Ocola, cited, 83, 122. 
 
 Indians, 95 f., 99; leave Georgia, 12; ex¬ 
 pulsion controversy, 93. 
 
 Ingle, Edward, Southern Sidelights, cited, 
 16, 23, 37, 59, 118, 121. 
 
 Inquiry into the Condition and Prospects of 
 the African Race, cited, 32, 43. 
 
 Irish, immigrants in Georgia, 88 f.; political 
 influence, 89; anti-British appeal to, 175; 
 as Unionists in Savannah, 309. 
 
 Iverson, Alfred, 155, 158, 183, 188. 
 
 Jackson, Andrew, 94, 96, 99 ff., 104. 
 
 Jackson, James, 91. 
 
 Jackson, James W., 306; elected congress¬ 
 man from first district, 1850, 252 f.; op¬ 
 poses Compromise, 267. 
 
 Jamaica, A Statement of Facts in, cited, 41. 
 
 Jefferson, Thomas, 202 f. 
 
 Jenkins, C. J., 229, 235, 308; resolution on 
 southern convention, 223; in Missouri 
 line debate, 226; plan to delay Nashville 
 convention defeated, 230 f.; in state con¬ 
 vention, 235; reported author, “Georgia:. 
 Platform,” 329. 
 
 “Jersey Pineys,” similarity to “Piney- 
 Woods People” of Georgia, overlooked by 
 northern critics, 77 n. 
 
 Jervey, I. D., The Slave Trade: Slavery and 
 Color, cited, 17, 59; Robert Y. Hayne,. 
 cited, 54. 
 
 Johnson, H. V., 140, 156 ff., 188, 237;; 
 appointed senator, 1848, 155; asks aid of 
 Calhoun, 166 f., 170; campaigns against 
 Stephens, 170; quarrel with Stephens, 
 172; for “resistance,” 206; views “Geor¬ 
 gia Platform” as binding, 341; elected 
 governor, 1853, 362; “From the Auto¬ 
 biography of,” cited, 341. 
 
 Johnston and Browne, Alexander H. Steph¬ 
 ens, cited, 103, 135, 159, 160, 164, 173, 
 240 f., 292. 
 
 Jones, A. S., Speed the Plow, cited, 24. 
 
398 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 Jones, C., Education in Georgia, cited, 24, 
 81; C. J. Jenkins, cited, 235, 329. 
 
 Kemble, Fannie, Journal, cited, 36, 76. 
 
 Kennedy, J. C. G., Catalogue of Newspapers, 
 1850, cited, 21, 118, 121. 
 
 Kettrell, T. P., Southern Wealth and 
 Northern Profits, cited, 25 f. 
 
 King, T. B., 155, 158, 171; leaves Con¬ 
 gress as Taylor’s agent to California, 
 220, 237 n.; succeeded by J. W. Jackson, 
 252 f. 
 
 Kirkpatrick, W. H., “The Beginning of 
 the Public School System in Georgia,” 
 cited, 24. 
 
 Knight, L. L., Famous Georgians, cited. 
 312. 
 
 Lanman, C., Letters from the Alleghaney 
 Mountains, cited, 80. 
 
 Lamar, J. B., 281, 289; accuses old state- 
 rights Whigs of betraying Union Demo¬ 
 crat associates, 106 f. 
 
 Laski, H. J., Authority in the Modern State, 
 cited, 202; The Problem of Sovereignty, 
 cited, 202. 
 
 Laurens County, 174; usually Whig, 92, 
 171. 
 
 Lawton, Alexander R., Judicial Controver¬ 
 sies on Federal Appellate Jurisdiction, 
 cited, 189 f. 
 
 Lawton, W. J., 225, 264; from South Caro¬ 
 lina, 148; suggested as Georgia agent tor 
 Calhoun, 148; introduces “Georgia Reso¬ 
 lutions,” 1849, 148, 222; resolutions of, 
 ignored, 1847, 154, 222; radical leader of 
 Assembly, 1849, 221 ff.; his preamble 
 and solidarity resolution defeated, 222; 
 in Missouri line debate, 226; extremist 
 leader, state convention, 1850, 326; his 
 resolutions in convention defeated, 333 f. 
 
 Lawyers, “Ginger-pop” type favor secession, 
 73; thrive on politics, 121; some able 
 ones support secession, 308. 
 
 Uee, Daniel, see also Augusta Chronicle ; 
 55; editor of Chronicle, of northern 
 origin, 84; dismissal demanded by ex¬ 
 tremists, 86; asserts divisibility of sov¬ 
 ereignty, 201; denies “right of secession,” 
 
 201 f.; denies “right of revolution,” 
 
 202 f.; attacked by Democrats, 202-204; 
 by state-rights Whigs, 204; Stephens 
 fails to remove, 204 n.; wires Webster’s 
 speech, 246. 
 
 Lincoln, Abraham, similarity of his “Gettys¬ 
 burg Address” to Toombs’ address of 
 1850, 335 n. 
 
 Livingston, J., Law Register, 1850, cited, 
 118, 121; “Judge Nisbet,” cited, 113. 
 
 Locke, J. L., editor of Republican, of north¬ 
 ern origin, 84. 
 
 London Times, on Clay Compromise, 247. 
 
 Longstreet, A. B., Georgia Scenes, cited, 58, 
 68; criticises Massachusetts record on 
 slavery, 148 f.; appeals for southern unity, 
 148 f. 
 
 [Longstreet, A. B.], Letters from Georgia 
 to Massachusetts, cited, 31, 80, 86, 149. 
 
 Lower South, 9, 32, 127, 201, 283, 296, 
 303, 322, 341. 
 
 Lumpkin, James H., report, as Chief Jus¬ 
 tice of Georgia, on slave code, 1849, 36 n. 
 
 Lumpkin, John H., 133, 155, 237 n., 274, 
 308; regrets his uncle has become ex¬ 
 tremist, 106 n.; member Congress, 155; 
 judge of Cherokee circuit, 171; in 
 
 “Southern Caucus,” 182 f.; on southern- 
 rights meetings, 1850, 277; on “bluster” 
 of extremist press, 278 f.; finds Upper 
 Georgia for Union, 280. 
 
 Lumpkin, Wilson, 148; becomes southern- 
 rights Democrat, 106; warns Calhoun of 
 Georgia conservatism, 146 f., 166, 206 f. 
 
 MacGill, C. E., “Immigration to the South¬ 
 ern States, 1783-1865,” cited, 88. 
 
 Macon, 117 f., 180, 248, 278, 281, 297; 
 trade to Charleston and Savannah, 14 f., 
 17, 305 f.; railroad connections, 16-18, 60; 
 the Citizen called abolitionist paper and 
 suppressed, 294 f.; secessionist Mass 
 
 Meeting, 1850, 283-286; through wire to 
 Washington established, 284 n.; slaves 
 escape from, 313; “Union Celebration” 
 in, 349. 
 
 Macon Citizen, 117 f., 281; northern editor 
 of, 84; editor threatened, 119, 294 f.; 
 temporarily suppressed, 295. 
 
 Macon Journal, 117 f., 321, 345; criticises 
 South Carolina, 63; northern editor of, 
 84; claims great majority for Union, 279; 
 warns Boston to obey fugitive slave law, 
 313 f.; declares Georgia will support 
 Union if war follows Carolina’s secession, 
 340; first Whig paper to advocate joining 
 Democracy, 1852, 359. 
 
 Macon Telegraph, 118, 165, 180, 300; first 
 to support southern movement, 150; de¬ 
 mands Democracy expel antislavery north¬ 
 erners, 165; threatens secession, 1848, 
 165; urges votes for delegates to Nash¬ 
 ville, 257; openly avows secession, 1850, 
 287; offers its columns to Hammond dur¬ 
 ing state convention campaign, 305; con¬ 
 demns “Georgia Platform,” 336. 
 
 Macon Union Celebration, Proceedings of, 
 cited, 46, 86 f., 94, 98, 104, 109, 289, 
 292 f., 304, 337 ff., 347, 349, 354. 
 
 Macon and Western Railroad, 16. 
 
 Madison, James, 97, 201 f. 
 
 Maine, 25; lumbermen in Georgia, 80. 
 
 Manufacturing, in Georgia, 22, 27, 289; 
 independent origin of, 23; propaganda 
 for, 23-25, 316 f.; surpasses that in 
 
 southern and some northern states, 25 f.; 
 northerners engaged in, 80 f.; “speaks 
 louder than the cannon’s roar,” 1850, 
 349 n. 
 
 Marietta Helicon, 200, 250; northern editor 
 of, 84; predicts South Carolina secession 
 will throw trade to Savannah, 62. 
 
 Maryland, surpassed in cotton textiles by 
 Georgia, 25. 
 
 Massachusetts, 25, 98; Longstreet’s indict¬ 
 ment of, 148 f. 
 
 McAllister, H. M., Ill n.; leads state- 
 rights Whigs into Democracy, 104 f.; 
 runs for governor, 105, 115; planter- 
 
 aristocrat in Democracy, 112; condemned 
 as aristocrat, 115; defeated for governor, 
 116, 151; delegate to Baltimore, 165; de¬ 
 clines election to Nashville, 265; Address 
 to Democratic-Republican Convention of 
 Georgia, 1840, cited, 104. 
 
 McCune, R. W., extremist leader, state con¬ 
 vention, 1850, 326; condemns majority in, 
 327 f. 
 
 McDonald, C. J., Ill n., 124, 151, 269, 
 277; leader of Georgia delegates to Nash¬ 
 ville, 265; in summer debates, 1850, 275; 
 president, second session Nashville Con¬ 
 vention, 324; nominated for governorship 
 
INDEX 
 
 399 
 
 "by Southern-rights party, 1851, 350; 
 
 handicapped by record as secessionist, 
 353; defeated, 354. 
 
 McIntosh County, 248, 258 n., 326. 
 
 McKinley, A. E., and Guetter, F. J., Sta¬ 
 tistical Tables, cited, 22. 
 
 McLendon, S. G., History of the Public Do¬ 
 main of Georgia, cited, 11. 
 
 McWhertor, J. G., 265 n., 275, 324. 
 
 Mechanics, attitudes towards slavery, 73 f. 
 
 Mellen, G. F., “Hilliard and Yancey,” cited, 
 355. 
 
 Memphis, railroad convention of 1845, 17; 
 rail connection with Georgia, 17. 
 
 Men of Mark in Georgia, cited, 189. 
 
 Merchants, in Georgia towns, 73. 
 
 Meriwether, James A., on public opinion, 
 Aug., 1850, 281, 299; ready to fight dis- 
 unionists, 299; in state convention, 325 f. 
 
 Merritt, Elizabeth, James H. Hammond, 
 cited, 269, 271, 273. 
 
 Mexican War, 133, 138, 142, 150; declared, 
 131, Whig opposition to, 131 f., 152-154; 
 Democratic support of, 142, 152-154; 
 
 treaty ending provides territorial exten¬ 
 sion, 155 f.; possible influence upon pro- 
 Union feeling, 1850, 282. 
 
 Middle Georgia, 11; settled by Carolinians 
 and Virginians, 90. 
 
 Milledge, John, declares Georgia saved the 
 Union, 337, 342. 
 
 Milledgeville, 118, 124, 142 f., 148, 161, 
 180, 197, 203, 216, 268, 278, 296; referred 
 to as “back in the woods,” 115; capital of 
 state, 140 n.; suggested as meeting-place 
 for southern convention, 297. 
 
 Milledgeville Federal Union, 296, 336, 356; 
 warns South Carolina, 60; praises north¬ 
 ern teachers in Georgia, 82; South Caro¬ 
 lina editor of, 84; demands dismissal of 
 Lee of the Chronicle, 86; circulation, 118; 
 termed “licentious” by Recorder, 119; op¬ 
 poses Calhoun, 1847, 150; joins southern 
 movement, lS-fB, 180; supports Nashville 
 Convention call, 215; on origin of Union 
 party, 236, 236 n.; sees Calhoun as 
 
 prophet, 246; alarmed by Upper Georgia 
 criticisms of slavocracy, 250; analyzes re¬ 
 sults of Nashville Convention elections, 
 260; refuses to avow secession, 288, 318; 
 denies that an organized secession party 
 ever existed, 311; declares South will 
 stay in Union, 355 ; accuses Whigs of 
 agitating slavery issue, 1851, 357. 
 
 Milledgeville Southern Recorder, 145, 160 f., 
 168; circulation, 118; on “licentiousness” 
 of Federal Union, 119; alarmed over 
 slavery, 1851, 357. 
 
 Miller, A. J., conservative Whig, 231 n.; 
 in state convention, 325. 
 
 Miller, S. F., Bench and Bar of Georgia, 
 cited, 93 f., 97, 162. 
 
 Miscegenation, extent of in Georgia and 
 Ohio compared, 32. 
 
 Mississippi, 14, 216, 218, 223, 269, 291, 297, 
 322, 340; Jackson meeting calls state con¬ 
 vention, 186; Jackson convention, 206, 
 212 f.; response to its call for southern 
 convention, 214 f.; chief hopes of Caro¬ 
 linians center in, 300, 302; shares with 
 Georgia the critical position in secession 
 movement, 302 f.; Union victory in, 1851, 
 355. 
 
 Missouri Compromise line, extension to 
 Pacific suggested by Georgia Democrats, 
 1847, 139, 141, 153; 1849, 224 f.; incor¬ 
 
 poration in Oregon bill defeated, 1848, 
 159; application to California moved by 
 Union Democrats, 1849, 224 f.; aban¬ 
 doned by southern-rights Democrats, 225; 
 debate on, in Assembly, 225-227; revived 
 by southern-rights Democrats at Nashville, 
 270, 272; significance of revival, 270 f., 
 273 f., 274 n. 
 
 Mitchell, Broadus, “The Rise of Cotton 
 Mills in the South,” cited, 23; “Frederick 
 Law Olmsted,” cited, 39. 
 
 Mobile Advertiser, 28; terms Georgia con¬ 
 servative despite Toombs and Stephens, 
 1850, 251. 
 
 Monroe County, failure of extremist meet¬ 
 ing in, 1850, 248 f. 
 
 Montgomery Atlas, blames Georgia indiffer¬ 
 ence to Nashville Convention upon illiter¬ 
 acy and ignorance, 260 f. 
 
 Mosely, Governor of Florida, believes poor 
 whites favor Wilmot Proviso, 71 f. 
 
 Mountaineers, see Upper Georgia. 
 
 Mulattoes, numbers of in Georgia and Ohio 
 compared, 32; race-control arguments held 
 not applicable to, 45. 
 
 Muscogee County, see Columbus. 
 
 Nashville Convention, 273 ff., 282, 351; 
 call for, 213; response to, in South, 214; 
 in Georgia, 215; measure supporting, in¬ 
 troduced in Assembly, 223, 230; Whig 
 effort to postpone defeated, 230 f.; Demo¬ 
 cratic method of choosing delegates 
 adopted, 231 f., 256; Whig press opposes, 
 254; Democratic press supports, 255; re¬ 
 lation to Georgia state convention, 255 f., 
 261 f.; preliminary election farce, 256 f.; 
 final election analyzed, 257 f.; conserva¬ 
 tive press reaction to election, 258 f.; 
 extremist interpretations of election, 259- 
 262; repudiation of Nashville a repudi¬ 
 ation of southern movement, 261; Georgia 
 delegation to, 264 f., 265 n.; personnel of, 
 269; Dawson’s resolution in, 270; sig¬ 
 nificance of Benning’s resolutions in, 
 270 f.; Fouche’s resolutions in, 271; 
 resolutions adopted, 271 f.; address is¬ 
 sued, 272; Democratic press approves, 
 275; second session, 323 f., 328; “Ten¬ 
 nessee Resolutions” in, and “Chatham 
 Platform,” 324 f. 
 
 National Republicans, 101 f. 
 
 Nationalism, in Whig party, 102 f.; south¬ 
 ern, 206 f., 293 f. 
 
 Negroes, see also Slavery, Race Problem, 
 Free-Negroes; 46, 64, 277, 320 f.; rapid 
 increase, of, in Georgia, 13; numbers of, 
 in 1850, 13; in the Black Belt, 14; in 
 other sections, 14 n.; slave breeding, 32, 
 232; work as freedmen and slaves, 38; 
 control of, under slavery, 39 f.; viewed 
 as contented in Georgia, 39; treatment of, 
 in North, 42 f.; Weston’s opinion of, 
 43 f.; population problem and slavery ex¬ 
 tension, 46-49, 180; attitude of planters 
 towards, 66 f.; attitude of small farmers 
 towards, 69 f.; of “poor whites” towards, 
 75 f.; of immigrants towards, 88; bills 
 to deport Free-Negroes defeated in As¬ 
 sembly, 1850, 233 f.; anti-Negro appeal in 
 state convention campaign, 307, 309. 
 
 Nesbit, J. A., 308; Macon Whig Leader, 225. 
 
 New England, 32; manufacturing in, and 
 the South, 23 n.; similar to Upper Geor¬ 
 gia, 68; fishermen off Georgia, 80; factory 
 girls in Georgia, 81; engineers in Georgia, 
 81; teachers in Georgia, 81 f. 
 
400 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 New Hampshire, 25, 157; Proviso resolu¬ 
 tions of, 1847, 152. 
 
 New Jersey, surpassed in cotton textiles by 
 Georgia, 25. 
 
 New Mexico, 156 ff., 181, 218; Georgia 
 opinion of statehood for, 196; and Clay 
 Compromise, 240. 
 
 New Orleans, 18, 83. 
 
 New York City, 246, 319; trade with, 16. 
 
 New York Express, maintains correspondent 
 in Savannah, 306 n.; declares Georgia 
 helped save Union, 338. 
 
 New York, Herald, warns North, 243; pre¬ 
 dicts Georgia will not secede, 306. 
 
 New York State, 43, 167, 176. 
 
 New York Sun, on Clay Compromise, 247. 
 
 New York Tribune, declares South united 
 on “Georgia Platform,” 338. 
 
 Newspapers, “personal journalism,” 116, 
 119; distribution of, in Georgia, 116 f.; 
 larger circulation of Whig, 117 f.; types 
 of editions, 117; total circulation in 
 Georgia, 118; total number, 118 n.; free¬ 
 dom of press, 119; influence on public 
 opinion limited, 120 f.; failure to take, 
 leads to indifference to southern move¬ 
 ment, 260 f.; radical ones unrepresent¬ 
 ative of public opinion, 1850, 260, 263; 
 contemporary criticism of extremist press, 
 262, 263 n., 279, 285. 
 
 Nichols, R. F., The Democratic Machine, 
 cited, 278, 346. 
 
 “Non-Intercourse,” see South, The. 
 
 North, The, see also Northerners; 23, 49, 
 163 f., 180, 184. 191, 215, 222, 247, 270, 
 273 f., 293, 313 f., 328, 331; plans for 
 southern economic independence of, 15 f., 
 268 f., 315-317; attitude in, towards Ne¬ 
 groes, 42 f.; attitude of Georgia planters 
 towards, 49-51; emigrants from, to Geor¬ 
 gia, 79-88; approves Wilmot Proviso, 134, 
 187; declared responsible for disunion 
 danger, by Georgia Assembly, 152 f.; 
 gains by delay. 183; abandons Missouri 
 line principle, 225 f.; bills to limit trade 
 with, defeated in Assembly, 232; begins 
 to fear secession, 242; holds “Union 
 Meetings,” 242; attacks upon Toombs and 
 Stephens in, 242, 242 n.; Georgians to 
 stay out of, 243 f.; opinion of Nashville 
 Convention, 273; given “last chance” by 
 Southern Press, 297 ; conflict with South 
 declared inevitable, 1851, 344 f.; Geor¬ 
 gia’s “manufactures speak louder to, than 
 cannon’s roar,” 349 n. 
 
 North Carolina, 70; peculiar political 
 alignment in, 100. 
 
 Northerners, 31, 68, 247, 281, 319 f.; atti¬ 
 tude towards, in Georgia Barrens, 76; 
 Yankees in the hills, 80 n.; motives for 
 moving to Georgia, 79 f.; employments 
 adopted there, 80-82; distribution and in¬ 
 fluence of, 82-84, 321; contacts with 
 
 South Carolinians in Georgia towns, 84; 
 as Georgia editors, 84; attitude towards 
 slavery and the Union, 84-86, 276; feel¬ 
 ing towards, in Georgia, 85-88; anti- 
 Yankee appeal in state convention cam¬ 
 paign, 307, 309. 
 
 Nullification movement, 58; in South Caro¬ 
 lina, 93 f.; in Georgia, 94-98. 
 
 Oglethorpe, descendants of his paupers, 
 12 n. 
 
 Ohio, 134, 181; compared with Georgia, 
 
 28, 32. 
 
 “Old Yamacraw,” see Savannah. 
 
 “Oligarchs,” see Planters. 
 
 Olmsted, F. L., 33, 64, 80 f.; notes im¬ 
 portance of northerners in Georgia, 82; 
 The Cotton Kingdom, cited, 12, 75, 92; 
 Journey in the Seaboard Slave States^ 
 cited, 29, 64, 75, 81 f., 85, 88. 
 
 “Omnibus,” see Clay. 
 
 Oneida (N. Y.) Herald, declares those who 
 never expect to own Negroes the strong¬ 
 est supporters of slavery, 308 n. 
 
 Oregon, 156 f., 164; Proviso applied to, 159. 
 
 Owen, A. F., 238 f., 267; Whig represent¬ 
 ative, 1850, 237 n. 
 
 Owsley, F. L., State Rights in the Confed¬ 
 eracy, cited, 190. 
 
 Paine, L. W., Six Years in a Georgia 
 Prison, cited, 32, 81, 85, 88. 
 
 “Palmettodom,” see South Carolina. 
 
 Parsons, C. G., Tour Among the Planters, 
 cited, 73, 82; notes importance of north¬ 
 erners in Georgia, 82. 
 
 Pendleton, L. B., Alexander H. Stephens, 
 cited, 240. 
 
 Perry, B. F., Speech in South Carolina 
 House, Dec. 11, 1850, cited, 323. 
 
 Persinger, C. E., “The ‘Bargain of 1844’ as 
 the Origin of the Wilmot Proviso,” cited, 
 132. 
 
 Philadelphia, 41 f., 162, 246; cited in pre¬ 
 amble to “Georgia Platform,” 331. 
 
 Philadelphia Pennsylvanian, 359 n.; praises 
 “Dorrism,” 114; praises “Georgia Plat¬ 
 form,” 338. 
 
 Phillips, G. D., on secession spirit, 252. 
 
 Phillips, U. B., American Negro Slavery, 
 cited, 22, 33, 39, 77, 88; “An American 
 State Owned Railroad,” cited, 17; “The 
 Decadence of the Plantation System,” 
 cited, 34; Georgia and State Rights, cited, 
 91 ff., 97, 99, 103, 253, 312, 362; Plant¬ 
 ation and Frontier, cited, 75; Robert 
 Toombs, cited, 156, 183, 237, 238, 266, 
 312, 349, 358; 361; “Transportation in 
 the Ante-Bellum South,” cited, 18; Trans¬ 
 portation in the Eastern Cotton Belt t 
 cited, 17. 
 
 Piedmont, The, 9, 11, 15. 
 
 Pierce, Franklin, two tickets for, in Geor¬ 
 gia, 360 f.; carries Georgia, 361. 
 
 Pike, J. S., First Blows of the Civil War, 
 cited. 239. 
 
 Pine Barrens, 174; section described, 10; 
 early settlement, 12; “Poor White*”' 
 population of, 74-78; race feeling in, 
 75 f., 105, 307; attitude in towards north¬ 
 erners, 76, 307; Clark-Union party in, 
 91, 100; exceptional Troup counties in, 
 92; state-rights element in, 105; Nash¬ 
 ville election county votes in, 258 n.; un¬ 
 represented at Nashville, 264 f.; ring of 
 counties around, carried by extremists, 
 1850, 320. 
 
 “Piney-Woods People,” see “Poor Whites.” 
 
 Plantation, The, cited, 32, 99, 104, 126, 173. 
 
 Plantation system, 24, 33; distinction be¬ 
 tween, and slave-labor system, and race 
 problem, 34; Irish labor in connection 
 with, 88. 
 
 Planters, 92; their attitude towards the 
 Union, 46; attitude towards slavery exten¬ 
 sion, 47, 49; towards secession, 49-53; 
 unusual attitude in South Carolina, 53; 
 general description of, 64-67; influence in 
 parties, 66; attitude towards Negroes, 
 66 f.; attitude misunderstood, 67; polit¬ 
 ically democratic in Georgia, 115; oppo¬ 
 sition to Wilmot Proviso, 133. 
 
INDEX 
 
 401 
 
 Political Parties, origin of, in Georgia, 
 90 f.; causes of party confusion, 92; 
 parties reverse constitutional positions, 
 107-109; significance of constitutional is¬ 
 sues, 109 f.; class basis of, 110-112; 
 democracy as an issue between, 112-116; 
 distribution and circulation of party 
 journals, 116-118; partisan editorials, 119; 
 influence of party press, 120 f.; criteria 
 for same, 120 f.; political influence of 
 public meetings, 121; politics as sport, 
 121 f.; even balance of Georgia parties, 
 and consequences, 110, 122, 173 f.; char¬ 
 acter of elections, 122; influence of lead¬ 
 ers of, limited, 122 f.; organization of, 
 in Georgia, 124 f., 152, 161 f.; movement 
 for southern political unity begun, 137 f., 
 146-151, 180, 189, 194, 206, 211, 212; 
 Assembly refuses to adapt southern party, 
 222; Democratic party splits, Aug., 1850, 
 286 ff.; Union and Southern-rights par¬ 
 ties formed, 334 f; effects of 1850 cam¬ 
 paign on, 343; new parties adapted only 
 to state politics, 348; disintegrate in 1853, 
 357-362; old alignments reestablished, 362. 
 
 Polk, James IC., 134, 138, 142, 157, 169, 
 176, 181, 235 n.; supports Texan an¬ 
 nexation, 127, 129; carries Georgia, 1844, 
 130; urges organization of southwest ter¬ 
 ritories, 181; encourages Cobb to oppose 
 Calhoun, 182; Diary, cited, 182. 
 
 “Poor Whites” of Pine Barrens, local 
 names for, 74; their importance, 74, 77; 
 characteristics of, 74 f.; degeneracy and 
 disease among, 75; attitude towards Ne¬ 
 groes, 75 f., 308 f.; towards northerners, 
 76, 308 f.; numbers, 77; northern ex¬ 
 planation of their degeneracy, 77; simi¬ 
 larity to northern groups overlooked by 
 northern critics, 77 n.; southern explana¬ 
 tion of their degeneracy, 77 f.; their 
 status improved by slavery, 78. 
 
 Public Opinion, in Georgia, and newspa¬ 
 pers, 116-121; and public meetings, 121; 
 criteria for judging, 120 f., 172; influ¬ 
 ence of leaders upon, 122 f., 171 f., 175; 
 apathy of, 1848, 171 f., 174 f., 1849, 
 190 f.; conservatism of in winter of 
 
 1850, 247-254, 260-263; legislature of 
 
 1850 unrepresentative of, 262 f.; radical 
 press unrepresentative of, 262 f., 279, 
 285; secessionists attempt to influence, 
 summer, 1850, 275-278, 283-286; apathy 
 and conservatism of, summer, 1850, 277- 
 281; Union propaganda, 281-283; estimates 
 of, Sept., 1850, by conservatives, 298-300; 
 these agree with secret opinions of seces¬ 
 sionists, 300-302; attitude of social groups, 
 1850, 308, 308 n.; not changed funda¬ 
 mentally by returning congressmen, 311 f.; 
 shown by elections overwhelmingly pro- 
 Union, 319-323, 344. 
 
 Quitman, John A., 85, 291; reports seces¬ 
 sion prospects good in Mississippi, 302; 
 nominated for vice-president by secession¬ 
 ists, 1852, 361 f. 
 
 Race Problem, see also Negroes, Slavery; in 
 Georgia Black Belt, 14, 67, 70, 76; dis¬ 
 tinction between, and slave-labor, and 
 plantation system, 34; relation to slavery, 
 39-46, 180; riots in North, 42; in West 
 Indies, 41, 44; relation to secession, 45 f.; 
 fear of race strife, 40, 46, 48, 203, 277; 
 in Upper Georgia, 69, 76; in Pine Bar¬ 
 rens, 75 f.; domestic slave trade brings 
 vicious Negroes, 233; Assembly debate on 
 free-Negroes, 233 f. 
 
 Railroads, 27; rapid development of, in 
 Georgia, 1845-1850, 15-18, 289 f.; capital 
 invested in, in Georgia, 1850, 29; involve- 
 trade rivalry between South Carolina and 
 Georgia, 56-61, 305; northern engineers 
 upon, 81; Irish laborers upon, 88; “speak 
 louder than the cannon’s roar,” 1850, 
 349 n. 
 
 Ramsey, of Harris, threatens to extend 
 slavery by bayonette, 227. 
 
 Ray, S. J., of Macon Telegraph, 150; first 
 editor to support southern movement, 
 150; asks Hammond for editorials, 1850, 
 305. 
 
 Reed, J. C., The Brother’s War, cited, 92.. 
 
 Retnarks Upon Slavery, Occasioned by At¬ 
 tempts to Circulate Improper Publications, 
 cited, 35. 
 
 Republican party, 90, 114 n. 
 
 Revolution, “right of,” asserted by Demo¬ 
 crats, denied by Whigs, 113 f.; in reso¬ 
 lution at Nashville, 271. 
 
 Revolutions of 1848, 89, 202; influence on. 
 cotton prices, 22; attitude of Whigs and 
 Democrats towards, 113 f. 
 
 Rhett, R. B., 185, 286; leads Bluffton 
 Movement, 128; at Nashville, 269, 271; 
 secession speech of, 273; acclaims seces¬ 
 sion at Macon, 1850, 284-286; declares 
 Georgia will “lead off,” 297; burlesque 
 on name, 319. 
 
 Rhodes, T. F., History of the United States, 
 cited, 31, 177, 266. 
 
 Rome (Ga.), 118. 
 
 Rowland, D., (Ed.), Jefferson Davis, cited, 
 67, 78. 
 
 Russel, R. R., Economic Aspects of South¬ 
 ern Sectionalism, 1840-1861, cited, 16, 
 21-23, 74, 107; on state-rights principles 
 of Georgia Whigs, 108 n. 
 
 Russell, W. H., Pictures of Southern Life, 
 cited, 39, 87. 
 
 “Sand-Hillers,” see “Poor Whites.” 
 
 Saundersville Central Georgian, 277. 
 
 Savannah, 116, 175, 307, 327, 329; rivalry 
 with Charleston for interior trade, 14 f., 
 17, 56-61, 305 f.; railroad connections, 
 16-18; banking in, 19 f.; disease condi¬ 
 tions in, 59 n.; northern printers in, 80; 
 northerners in, 83, 321; Irish in, and 
 their political influence, 88 f., 309, 321; 
 state-rights element in, 105; “Swelled 
 Heads” (aristocrats) of, 115; usually 
 Democratic, 171; state-rights Whigs in, 
 194; Nashville Convention election vote 
 in, 258 n.; South Carolina radical ele¬ 
 ment in, 278; Berrien support in, 307, 
 309; Union meeting in, draws up “Chat¬ 
 ham Platform,” Oct., 1850, 314 f.; mer¬ 
 chants in, cease trade with North, 317; 
 carried by Unionists, 321. 
 
 Savannah Georgian, 165, 168, 288; debates 
 slavery economics, 34; praises “Dorrism,” 
 114; owners distinct from editors, 116; 
 on Whig press, 119; opposes Calhoun, 
 1847, 150; appeals to Irish, 175; warns 
 the South, 1848, 179 f.; on Macon Mass 
 Meeting, 285; begins to moderate, 287; 
 declares convention election corrupt, 322; 
 accepts “Platform,” 336. 
 
 Savannah News, 116 n., 259, 287, 294; on 
 South Carolina secession, and trade, 62; 
 independent Democratic, 116 n.; first 
 
 cheap paper in Georgia, 117; gives quali¬ 
 fied support to Nashville Convention, 255; 
 on Macon Mass Meeting, 285 f.; sup¬ 
 ports Berrien’s “Non-intercourse” plan, 
 316; on convention election, 322. 
 
402 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 Savannah Republican, 121, 161, 221; north¬ 
 ern editor of, 84; owners distinct from 
 editors, 116; attacks South Carolina, 
 128 n., 193, 248; on preliminary Nash¬ 
 ville Convention elections, 256; on Macon 
 Mass Meeting, 285; declares all praise 
 Georgia, 1850, 339. 
 
 Scot, Winfield, Whig nominee, for presi¬ 
 dency, 360; supported by conservative 
 Georgia Whigs, 361; receives bulk of 
 Whig votes, 361. 
 
 •Scriven County, 148 n., 222, 326. 
 
 Seabrook, W. B., governor of South Caro¬ 
 lina, 40, 213; ascribes southern conser¬ 
 vatism to prosperity, 52, 291; writes 
 
 Georgia governor declaring South Caro¬ 
 lina ready to secede, Sept., 1850, 300; is 
 warned Georgia is not ready, 300; prom¬ 
 ises to hold Carolina back, “conciliate” 
 Georgia, and “stimulate” other southern 
 states, 301; predicts Georgia will not 
 secede, 302; abandons belief Georgia can 
 be “drawn into” secession movement, 302; 
 fears to send representatives to Georgia 
 convention, 1850, 304 f. 
 
 Seabrook MSS, cited, 40, 52, 72, 108, 213, 
 291, 300 ff., 304. 
 
 ."Secession, see also Union, The; 43, 49, 180, 
 268, 269, 276 f.; relation to race prob¬ 
 lem, 45 f.; attitude of Georgia planters 
 towards, 49-53; first advocated in South 
 Carolina, 1844, 128; first openly discussed 
 in Georgia, 164, 251; converts to, 1849, 
 201 f.; in 1850, 288; in 1851, 350 ff.; 
 official threat of, in Assembly, 1849, 
 220 ff.; Connecticut ignore’s threats of, 
 227; Georgia Whigs threaten, 238; grow¬ 
 ing fear of, in North, 1850, 242; greatest 
 danger of, Jan., 1850, 245; opposition to, 
 in Georgia, spring of 1850, 249-251; and 
 the Nashville Convention, 254 f.; “No 
 Disunion” ticket voted in Georgia Nash¬ 
 ville election, 257 f.; Nashville repudi¬ 
 ated lest it lead to, 262; “right of,” in 
 Nashville resolutions, 270 f.; plan to use 
 Missouri line demand to bring about, 
 270 f., 273 f., 274 n.; “southern-rights” 
 men not all secessionists, 273 f.; first 
 openly acclaimed, Macon Mass Meeting, 
 283-286; South Carolina waits for Geor¬ 
 gia to “lead off,” 300; is informed Union¬ 
 ists in majority, 301; Georgia an ob¬ 
 stacle to secession of Carolina, 302; 
 radical papers demand, 310; southern- 
 rights leaders disavow, 310-312; no can¬ 
 didates for state convention advocate, 311; 
 threatened in “Georgia Platform,” 331; 
 Southern-rights party denies ever having 
 intended, 344; small minority declares in¬ 
 evitable, 1851, 344 f.; “right of,” urged 
 successfully, 1851, 355 f.; ticket favor¬ 
 ing, fails in Georgia, 1852, 361 f. 
 
 Senate (national), 171, 180, 211, 218, 225, 
 262, 274; Georgia members not con¬ 
 
 trolled by state legislature, 124; Georgia 
 members, 1847-48, 155; Proviso problem 
 and Clayton Compromise in, 1848, 183; 
 fails to solve territorial problem, 1849, 
 185; parties balanced in, 1850, 237; Tay¬ 
 lor’s territorial plans opposed in, 239 f.; 
 Clay’s “Compromise” introduced in, 240; 
 warned that Georgia will act, 240; Bell’s 
 compromise plan in, 241; compromise 
 move progresses in, 241 f., 266 f. 
 
 Seward, J. L., extremist leader, state con¬ 
 vention, 1850, 326 f.; introduces radical 
 resolutions, 328; condemns Toombs, 328, 
 332. 
 
 Sharkey, W. L., 269, 324. 
 
 Sherwood, Adiel, Gazetteer of Georgia, cited, 
 11, 26. 
 
 Shipp, J. E. D., William H. Crawford , 
 cited, 91. 
 
 Sioussat, St. George L., “Co-operation for 
 the Development of the Material Welfare 
 of the South,” cited, 16, 317; “Tennessee, 
 the Compromise of 1850, and the Nash¬ 
 ville Convention,” cited, 241, 269, 271 f., 
 325. 
 
 Slave-labor system, see also Slavery; 24; 
 distinction between, and plantation sys¬ 
 tem, and race problem, 34. 
 
 Slave Trade (domestic), 13, 32; debate on, 
 in Georgia Assembly, 1850, 232 f. 
 
 Slavery, see also Negroes, Race Problem; 
 13, 30, 104 n., 131, 171, 180, 271, 296; 
 religious indictment of, and defence, 31; 
 moral indictment and defence, 32; slave¬ 
 breeding, 32, 232; economic indictment 
 and defence, 33-37; emancipation, 35 f.; 
 a good per se, 35 f., 45; change in south¬ 
 ern attitude towards, 37; medical argu¬ 
 ment for, 39; complicated by race prob¬ 
 lem, 39-45; identified with race problem, 
 41; as a system of social control, 40 f.; 
 in West Indies, 41, 44; extension prob¬ 
 lem, 46-49, 227; slave prices, 47; Geor¬ 
 gia farmers as slaveholders, 68-70; atti¬ 
 tude of Upper Georgia towards, and its 
 political results, 70-73, 250 f.; first appear¬ 
 ance as major political issue in Georgia, 
 1840, 103 f.; demand for extension cf, 
 126; impossibility of introducing in South¬ 
 west, 133 n., 156; governor recommends 
 protection of slaves, 218; issue in Georgia 
 Assembly, 1849-1850, 224 ff.; California 
 declared adapted to, 226 f.; threat to 
 extend by bayonette, 227; extension item 
 in “Georgia Platform,” 331 f.; slave 
 markets condemned in Georgia Assembly, 
 1850, 233; non-slaveholders declared 
 
 strongest supporters of, 308 n. 
 
 Slavery and the Internal Slave Trade, cited, 
 13, 32. 
 
 Slavery Indispensable Parallel' to Civiliza¬ 
 tion, cited, 41. 
 
 Slavocracy, The, northern idea of, 31; 
 northern and southern misconceptions of, 
 67; mountaineers’ attitude towards, 70-73, 
 
 Smith, Justin, criticism of Senator Ber¬ 
 rien’s opposition to Mexican War, 136 n.; 
 War with Mexico, cited, 136. 
 
 Smythe, James M., 108; editor Augusta 
 Republic, 161; backs Clay, 1848, 161 f.; 
 attacks the Chronicle, 203 f.; on election 
 of 1849, 209 f.; threatens secession, 255; 
 in summer debates, 1850, 275; president, 
 Southern-rights state convention, 1851, 
 350. 
 
 Socialists, identified with abolitionists, 33. 
 
 South, The, 149, 152, 156, 159 f., 164, 167, 
 169, 178-180, 184 ff., 194, 206 f., 222, 
 247, 255, 270, 274, 277 f., 328, 331; eco¬ 
 nomic decline of, 15; plans for improve¬ 
 ment, 15 {.; trade with West, 17; manu¬ 
 facturing advantages in, 23; suffers from 
 political campaigning, 121 f.; desire in, for 
 Texan annexation, 127; in danger, 137, 
 139; declared betrayed, 167 f.; warned in 
 Georgia, 179 f.; warned by Calhoun, 183; 
 reaction in, to “Southern Caucus,” 185 f.; 
 dismal future of, 207; call for southern 
 convention, 213; response to, 214 f.; de¬ 
 serted by Taylor, 237; offered little in 
 Clay “Compromise,” 240; reassured by 
 northern “Union Meetings,” 242; urged 
 
INDEX 
 
 403 
 
 to use economic “non-intercourse” against 
 North, 268 f., 315-317; advised to pre¬ 
 pare for war, 272; declared united on 
 “Georgia Platform,” 337-341; conflict with 
 North declared inevitable, 1851, 344 f.; 
 immediate danger of secession ends, 1851, 
 355. 
 
 South Carolina, 14, 21 52, 70, 101, 105, 133, 
 139, 146, 180, 185 f., 233, 273, 275, 289, 
 303; early settlers from, in Georgia, 11, 
 90 f.; trade rivalry with Georgia, 17, 56- 
 61, 305 f.; banking in, 19; financial riv¬ 
 alry with Georgia, 20, 58, 305 f.; need of 
 Negro population, 48 f.; economic decline 
 and comparison with Georgia, 53-57, 127; 
 and the tariff, 54; manufacturing in, 
 55 f.; feeling between, and Georgia, 57- 
 63, 96, 98, 129, 192 f., 213 n., 304-306, 
 319, 327; northern and southern criticism 
 of, 62 f.; dislike of poor whites in, for 
 Negroes, 76; South Carolinians move to 
 Georgia, 79; their influence in Georgia, 
 79, 278, 309; as Georgia editors, 84; nul¬ 
 lification movement in, 93 f.; attempts to 
 influence Georgia, 94-96; Bluffton Move¬ 
 ment in, 127-129; supports “Southern 
 Platform,” 138; urges southern unity, 
 181; ridiculed by Georgia Whigs, 192 f.; 
 hopes for Georgia, 206, 219, 252, 297, 
 303; leads response to southern conven¬ 
 tion call, 214; delegation to Nashville, 269, 
 271, 273; governor declares ready to 
 
 secede, 300; Georgia an obstacle to, 300- 
 302; chief hopes in Mississippi, 302; re¬ 
 action to Georgia Union victory, 322 f.; 
 her secession blocked by Georgia, 323, 
 340; state convention decides against 
 secession, 355. 
 
 South Carolina Railroad, 16. 
 
 “Southern Address,” 186, 188, 197 f., 204; 
 contents, 183; Georgia Democracy fails to 
 adopt, 198. 
 
 “Southern Caucus,” 195; origin of, 181 f.; 
 activities of Georgia members of, 182 f.; 
 “Addresses” issued, 183-185. 
 
 Southern Confederacy, ideas of, 189 f., 
 292 f.; state .convention speaker hopes 
 never to see a, 333. 
 
 Southern Convention, see also Nashville 
 Convention; early suggestions for, 93 f., 
 139 n.; Calhoun’s plan for, 139; call is¬ 
 sued by Mississippi, 213. 
 
 Southern Convention, Resolutions, Address 
 and Proceedings of, cited, 265, 270 ff. 
 
 Southern Cultivator, The, demands agricul¬ 
 tural reform in Georgia, 21, 117; largest 
 circulation in Georgia, 21, 117. 
 
 Southern Members of Congress, Address to 
 their Constituents, 1849, cited, 40. 
 
 Southern Movement, see also Secession; 
 197; led by Calhoun, 137; early response 
 to, 137 f.; only Calhoun Democrats re¬ 
 spond to, in Georgia, 1847, 146-151; aided 
 in Georgia by Congress of 1848, 164 f.; 
 gains strength in Democracy after 1848, 
 180; the “Southern Caucus,” 182 f.; 
 “Addresses” issued from, 183-185; Geor¬ 
 gia Democratic papers join, 1849, 189; 
 joined by state-rights Whigs, 193 f.; im¬ 
 portance to, of Georgia election of 1849, 
 206; pessimistic reports from Georgia, 
 1849, 206 f.; Democratic victory in 
 Georgia stimulates, 1849, 211 f.; progress 
 in Mississippi, 212 f.; call for southern 
 convention, 186, 213; response in South, 
 214 f.; Assembly refuses to formally ap¬ 
 prove, 222; elections to Nashville, 256- 
 265; Nashville Convention, 269-273; reac¬ 
 tion to, 275; plan to develop southern 
 
 into secession movement, 270 ff., 274 n.; 
 propaganda for, summer, 1850, 274-277, 
 
 283- 286; propaganda against, 281-283 r 
 first proclaimed as secession movement, 
 
 284- 286; Macon meeting a turning point 
 in, 286; checked by Georgia Union vic¬ 
 tory, 1850, 336-342; ended for decade by 
 Union victories, 1851, 355; relation tO’ 
 1861, 355 f., 356. 
 
 “Southern Platform,” 139, 142, 222; intro¬ 
 duced by Calhoun, 137; response to in 
 South, 137 f.; issue in state campaign,. 
 
 1847, 151. 
 
 Southern-rights, see Southern Movement; 
 69; Democrats claim to be party of, 144,. 
 198, 207, 208, 211 f.; issue in 1848, 167- 
 170; Whigs claim to be party of, 167 f., 
 198 f., 207 f.; issue in 1849, 200, 208; a 
 doctrine of editors, not masses, 261. 
 
 Southern-rights Democrats, 115, 136, 163 f., 
 188, 198; influence among, of old state- 
 rights Whigs, 105 f., 251 f., 278, 280; 
 friction with Union Democrats, 105-107, 
 109, 115 f., 140 f., 164, 197 ff., 204 f.,. 
 225 ff., 234 ff., 278 f.; appeal to Whigs, 
 142 f.; respond to Calhoun’s southern 
 movement, 1847, 146-151; discouraged,. 
 
 1848, 166 f.; encouraged by Whigs, 167, 
 169; joined by Georgia Democratic edi¬ 
 tors, 188 f.; “get up” meetings, 1849, 
 190 f.; view “right of secession” as con¬ 
 stitutional, 201 f., 288; pessimistic corre¬ 
 spondence with Calhoun, 206 f.; analysis 
 of election of 1849, 210; gain by this 
 election, 211; prospects, 216; control As¬ 
 sembly, 221 ff.; abandon Missouri line, 
 225-227; plan for representation at Nash¬ 
 ville adopted, 230 f.; condemn Compro¬ 
 mise, 246 f.; attack Toombs, 247; domi¬ 
 nate delegation to Nashville, 265; activi¬ 
 ties there, 270 f.; plan to force seces¬ 
 sion, 271-274; attempt to reach public 
 opinion, summer, 1850, 274-277, 283-286; 
 press unrepresentative, 262, 263 n., 279; 
 leaders out of office, 1850, 308 n.; appear 
 to race and sectional prejudices, 309; 
 abandon advocacy of secession, 310 ff., 
 318 ff.; return of congressmen not pri¬ 
 mary factor in this change, 311 f.; ridi¬ 
 culed by conservatives, 318 f.; defeated 
 in state convention election, 319-323; pro¬ 
 tests of, in state convention, 327-329, 332- 
 334; become Southern-rights party, 335; 
 invitations to Union faction to reunite 
 Democracy refused, 344, 360; run inde¬ 
 pendent Pierce ticket, 360; join Union 
 faction in reunited Democracy, 1853, 362. 
 
 Southern-rights Party, 71, 73; Assembly 
 alignments suggestive of, 1850, 225 f.; 
 first origins of, in gerrymander struggle, 
 235 f.; formed by elimination of Union 
 Democrats, 335; invites all Democrats to 
 join, 344, 356; all but small minority of, 
 disavows secession, 344 f.; claims recog¬ 
 nition by national Democracy, 347;; 
 adapted only to state politics, 348; state 
 convention, 1851, 350; nominates Mc¬ 
 
 Donald, 350; revives “right of secession” 
 issue, 350-353; schemes for dividing Union 
 party fail, 351 n.; defeated, 1851, 354;. 
 lasting influence of its efforts, 355 f.; 
 reverses attitude towards slavery issue, 
 357; delegation to national convention 
 seated with “Tugalo” delegation, 359 f. r 
 invitation to “Tugaloes” to join, refused, 
 1852, 360; numbers of, 1850-1852, 360 n.; 
 runs independent Pierce ticket, 360; car¬ 
 ries election, 361; joins Union faction in 
 reunited Democracy, 362. 
 
404 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 Southwest Georgia, 10 f.; early settlement, 
 11 f.; new land in, 21 f.; second district 
 in, politically uncertain, 171. 
 
 Sovereignty, Calhoun’s conception of, 97, 
 201; divisibility of, asserted by Arnold, 
 1833, 97; by Daniel Lee, 1849, 201 f.; 
 modern theories of divisibility, 202 n. 
 
 Spaulding, Thomas, President state con¬ 
 vention, 326; Union sentiments of, 326 f. 
 
 '“Squatter Sovereignty,” Georgia Demo¬ 
 crats approve, 1848, reject, 1849, 198 n. 
 
 State-Rights Party, see also Troup Party; 
 204; origins, 93; attitude towards Indian 
 and Nullification questions, 93, 99; 
 
 merges with Whig party, 101-103; revolt 
 of state-rights Whigs, 101, 103 f. 
 
 States’ Rights Party Convention, 1833, Pro¬ 
 ceedings of, cited, 95. 
 
 State-rights Democrats, see Southern-rights 
 Democrats. 
 
 State-rights Whigs, 157, 199; small group 
 remains in Georgia Whiggery after 1840, 
 108, 203 f.; criticise majority, 109; sup¬ 
 port Clay for Whig nomination, 1848, 
 160 f.; encouraged by Democrats, 167, 
 
 169 f.; in election of 1848, 163, 176; 
 
 join southern movement, 193 f; attitude 
 explained, 194; in Savannah and Augusta, 
 194; support Clayton Compromise, 201; 
 support rights of secession and revolution, 
 203 f.; large number in Assembly, 1849- 
 1850, 217, 221; extremist moves of, in 
 Assembly, 225 ff.; lost in Democracy, 
 1849, 253 n.; support “Berrien Plat¬ 
 form,” 1850, 317; in Southern-rights 
 
 party, 1851, 350. 
 
 Stephens, Alexander H., 123, 132, 138, 
 
 154 f., 164, 191, 195, 307, 349, 354; claims 
 Georgia more prosperous than Ohio, 28, 
 33; moral objections to slavery, 35; ex¬ 
 planation of varying attitudes in 1850, 
 50 f.; explains joining Whigs, 1840, 
 103 n.; influence in Central Georgia, 124; 
 supports Texan annexation, 127, 130 f.; 
 warns against Proviso and civil war, 
 134 f.; opposes Mexican War, 155; op¬ 
 poses Clayton Compromise, 158 f., 169, 
 170; backs Taylor for president, 160; 
 versus Berrien, 169 f., 199; quarrel with 
 Cone and Johnson, 172; assaulted by 
 Cone, 172 f.; in “Southern Caucus,” 
 182 f.; tries to remove Lee, 204 n.; move 
 to change his district, 235; joins “Fire- 
 eaters” in Congress, 237 f.; accepts gen¬ 
 eral compromise, 240 f.; reasons for not 
 urging secession, 240 n., 292; opposes 
 California resolution, 241; alarms North, 
 
 242, 266; press criticism of, 242, 242 n., 
 
 243, 247, 251; and Taylor’s death, 266 f.; 
 returns to Georgia, 1850, 307 f.; his re¬ 
 turn not primary factor in public opinion, 
 311 f.; condemned by extremists, 313, 
 332; in state convention, 325; claims 
 authorship of “Georgia Platform,” 329; 
 fails to form national Union party, 346 f.; 
 leads Whig minority for Webster, 1852, 
 361; More of Georgia and Ohio, cited, 28; 
 War Between the States, cited, 241. 
 
 Stephens, Linton, conservative leader, As¬ 
 sembly, 1850, 328 f. 
 
 Stephenson, N. W., Texas and the Mexican 
 War, cited, 128. 
 
 Stone, A. H., American Race Problem, cited, 
 43, 69; “Free Contract Labor in the 
 
 Ante-Bellum South,” cited, 69; “Some 
 Problems of Southern Economic His¬ 
 tory,” cited, 42, 88. 
 
 Stone Mountain, 10, 21 n. 
 
 Stoval, P. A., Robert Toombs, cited, 115, 
 164, 329. 
 
 Supreme Court (national), and Clayton 
 Compromise, 159; and Georgia “non-inter¬ 
 course” bills, 316. 
 
 Tariff, The, 95, 133, 142; opposition to, in 
 South, 24; Georgia opposition to, 1828, 
 93 f.; leads to nullification in South 
 
 Carolina, 94; nullification urged in Geor¬ 
 gia, 95; protection advocated by Georgia 
 Whigs, 102; in Georgia politics, 126 n.; 
 leads to Bluffton Movement, 127; de¬ 
 clared dead issue in Georgia, 1851, 351 n. 
 
 Tattnall County, 174; usually Whig, 92, 
 171. 
 
 Taylor, A. A., “The Movement of Negroes 
 to the Gulf States,” cited, 13. 
 
 Taylor, Zachary, 131, 166 f., 173, 178 f., 
 185, 192, 194, 210, 273; considered by 
 Georgia Democratic Convention, 1847, 
 140; acclaimed by Georgia Whigs for 
 president, 144, 160-163; nominated, 163; 
 proclaimed the “southern candidate,” 167; 
 attacked by Democrats, 168 f.; poetic 
 satire of, 169; vote for, in Georgia, 
 175 f.; his “soundness” suspected, 200; 
 California policy attacked, 220; Proviso 
 attitude alienates Georgia Whigs, 237; 
 territorial plans of, opposed in Senate, 
 239 f.; death, 266; results of, 267. 
 
 Tennessee, 70, 186, 269; early settlers 
 
 from, in Georgia, 12; rail connection with, 
 17; resolution of delegation from, in sec¬ 
 ond session, Nashville Convention, 324 f. 
 
 Texas, 138. 272, 296; annexation of, de¬ 
 sired in Georgia and South Carolina, 126- 
 129; and Clay Compromise, 240; and 
 Bell’s Compromise, 241. 
 
 Thomas, E. J., Memoirs of a Southerner, 
 cited, 10. 
 
 Thompson, Waddy, 113 n., 156. 
 
 Toombs, Robert, 123, 143, 155 f., 158, 160, 
 164, 168, 172 f., 191, 307, 349; explana¬ 
 tion of varying attitudes in 1850, 50 f.; 
 criticism of his wealth, 114 f.; influence 
 in Central Georgia, 124; on danger of 
 secession, 135; encourages Calhoun, 1847, 
 142; urges moderation, 1848, 179; opposes 
 Calhoun in “Southern Caucus,” 182 f.; 
 move to change his district, 235; joins 
 “Fire-eaters” in Congress, 237 f.; ac¬ 
 cepts Compromise, 240; alarms North, 
 
 242, 266; press attacks upon, 242, 242 n., 
 
 243, 247, 251, 266 f., 332; writes governor 
 he will accept Compromise, 247, 247 n.; 
 “Hamilcar speech” of, 266; and Taylor’s 
 death, 266 f.; utterances cause confusion, 
 266; praised by New York Sun, 267 n.; 
 returns .to Georgia, 1850, 307 f.; return 
 not primary factor in public opinion, 
 311 f.; attacked by extremists, 312 f., 
 328; in state convention, 325; addresses 
 first Union party meeting, 335, 335 n.; 
 fails to form national Union party, 346 f.; 
 in campaign of 1851, 353; elected sen¬ 
 ator, 358; leads Whig minority for Web¬ 
 ster, 1852, 361. 
 
 Toombs, Stephens, and Cobb Correspondence, 
 cited, 38, 72, 124, 130 ff., 142, 146, 150 f., 
 154, 159, 163 ff.. 168, 172 ff., 179, 183 f., 
 187 ff., 196, 198, 204, 208 f., 239, 250, 
 252, 271, 274, 277, 279 ff., 286, 288, 
 299 f., 362. 
 
 Towns, G. W., Ill n., 155, 207 f., 223, 
 247, 283, 324, 334, 355; becomes south¬ 
 ern-rights Democrat, 106; on old state- 
 rights group in 1850, 108 n., 300; mem- 
 
INDEX 
 
 405 
 
 Fer national House, 140; runs for gov¬ 
 ernor, 1847, 140, 144; elected, 151; pre¬ 
 serves party harmony, 1849, 198; runs 
 again for governor, 198; strong southern- 
 rights stand, 200; personal habits at¬ 
 tacked, 205; reelected, 208-211; message 
 to Assembly, 217 f.; urges state conven¬ 
 tion, 218; reaction to message, 219; spe¬ 
 cial message on Connecticut resolutions, 
 227 f.; given power to fill vacancies at 
 Nashville, 231; appoints delegates to Nash¬ 
 ville, 2’64 f.; calls state convention, 295 f.; 
 reaction to call, 296-298; asked by South 
 Carolina governor if Georgia will “lead 
 off,” 300; warns him Georgia Unionists 
 in great majority, 300; requests Carolina 
 to “hold back” and not antagonize Geor¬ 
 gia, 301; assured Carolina will “hold 
 back,” 301; gives advance approval to 
 Carolina governor’s proclamation, 301; 
 burlesque of his convention proclamation, 
 318 f.; “awfully cut” by convention elec¬ 
 tions, 334. 
 
 Townsend, J., Present Peril of the Southern 
 States, cited, 41. 
 
 Trescott, W. H., Position and Cause of the 
 South, cited, 289. 
 
 Troup, G. M., 123; and “Troup party,” 
 91 f.; elected delegate to Nashville, 264; 
 refuses to attend second session, 234 n.; 
 nominated for presidency by secessionists, 
 1852, 361 f. 
 
 Troup Party, origins of, 91; distribution 
 of, 91 f.; becomes State Rights party, 93. 
 
 “Tugaloes,” see Union Democrats. 
 
 Turner, J. A., “William C. Dawson,” cited, 
 99, 104, 126. 
 
 “Tybee,” Savannah correspondent of Balti¬ 
 more Sun, on Berrien, 316 n.; predicts 
 Union victory in Georgia, 318; gives best 
 accounts of state convention campaign, 
 318 n.; calls Union victory unprecedented 
 triumph, 321 f. 
 
 Tyler, John, 126, 131. 
 
 Tyson, Briant, The Institution of Slavery 
 in the Southern States, cited, 39, 41. 
 
 “Ultraists,” see Southern-rights Democrats. 
 
 Union, The, see also Federal Government, 
 Secession; 9, 45 f., 51, 90, 95, 126, 149, 
 180, 184, 193, 215, 221, 232, 247, 268, 
 270, 291, 309, 316, 328, 344; attitude of 
 Georgia planters towards, 49-53; South 
 Carolina’s attitude towards, 53 f., 57; 
 supported by immigrants in Georgia, 89; 
 traditional love for, in Georgia, 96, 98, 
 151, 268, 273, 281 f., 293, 293 n., 326, 
 333; threatened by the North, 152 f.; 
 fear for, in South, 152, 180, 219; need 
 for general compromise to save, 29, 249; 
 fear for, in North, 242; northern “Union 
 Meetings,” 242; Georgia reaction to, 246, 
 246 n.; southern-rights men claim to pre¬ 
 serve, 310-312, 318, 344 f.; saved by 
 Georgia Union victory, 337-342; finally 
 preserved for decade, 1851, 355 f. 
 
 Union Democrats, see Clark Party; 149, 190, 
 217; origin in old Clark party, 105; dis¬ 
 tribution of, 105; friction with southern- 
 rights Democrats, 105-107, 109, 115 f., 
 140 f., 164, 182 f., 197 ff., 204 f., 225 ff., 
 244 ff., 278 f., 386 ff.; in “Southern 
 Caucus,” 182 f.; termed “submissionist 
 wing,” 198; view “right of secession” as 
 constitutional one, 201 f., 288, 351; 
 
 minority of party in Assembly, 1849, 
 217; support Missouri line, 224-227; plan 
 Union party, 236, 287; break with ex¬ 
 
 tremist group, 386 ff.; view Compromise 
 as unsatisfactory and “last concession,” 
 314 f.; help to form Union party, 334 I.; 
 fail to support national Union organiza¬ 
 tion, 345-347; claim recognition by na¬ 
 tional Democracy, 347 f.; delegation to 
 national convention seated with Southern- 
 rights delegation, 359 f.; refuse to join 
 Southern-rights party, 1852, 360; numbers 
 of, 1850-1852, 360 n.; last effort for 
 
 Union party fails, 361; run independent 
 Pierce ticket, 361; join Southern-rights 
 party in reunited Democracy, 1853, 362. 
 
 Union party, of 1833, see Clark Party. 
 
 Union Party, 71 f., 362; supported by Irish 
 and Germans, 89; new Assembly align¬ 
 ments suggestive of, 225 f.; first origins 
 of, in gerrymander struggle, 1850, 235 f.; 
 impetus given to, by Macon Mass Meet¬ 
 ing, 286 f.; Union victory in state con¬ 
 vention election, 319-323; state conven¬ 
 tion practically a meeting of, 326; finally 
 organized in convention, 334 f.; called 
 “Whiggery in disguise,” 336; Whigs’ 
 need of, 345; approved by Fillmore ad¬ 
 ministration, 345 n.; projected national 
 organization fails, 346 f.; adapted only to 
 state politics, 348; names used by, 348 n.; 
 holds “Macon Union Celebration,” 349; 
 state convention of, 1851, 351; evades 
 “right of secession” issue, 351; declares 
 old Whig principles dead issues, 351 n.; 
 nominates Cobb for governor, 351; main¬ 
 tains pro-Union issue, 351-354; makes eco¬ 
 nomic appeal for Union, 354, 354 n.; 
 wins great victory, 1851, 354; victory 
 leads to distintegration, 356; Whigs fear 
 for, 356 f.; agitates slavery issue, 1851, 
 357; holds together in Assembly, 1852, 
 358; state convention of, 1852, divided, 
 359; lingering attachment to, summer, 
 1852, 360; last effort to preserve, fails, 
 361. 
 
 United States Bank, in Georgia politics, 
 126 n., 142. 
 
 United States Law Magazine, cited, 36. 
 
 United States Treasury, Report of, 1855, 
 on prices of exported cotton, cited, 22; 
 on textile manufacturing, cited, 25. 
 
 Upper Georgia, 174; divisions of, 11; climate 
 and resources of, 11; gold rush to and 
 early settlements, 12; trade with Charles¬ 
 ton and Savannah, 14 f., 17, 56-61, 305 f.; 
 character of people of, 67 f.; similar to 
 New England, 68; race problem in, 69, 
 76, 105; attitude towards slavery and the 
 “slavocracy,” 69-72, 105, 250; political 
 
 results thereof, 72 f.; old Union party in, 
 100; favors Jackson, 100 f.; illiteracy 
 and politics in, 121; fifth and sixth dis¬ 
 tricts in, Democratic, 171; supports 
 “Minority Address,” 1849, 187 f.; oppo¬ 
 sition to Proviso uncertain, 245; Union 
 feeling in, 1850, 249-251, 254; Nashville 
 election county votes in, 258 n. 
 
 Van Buren, Martin, 101, 103, 206; Free- 
 Soil nominee, 1848, 163. 
 
 Van Evrie, J. H.j Negroes and Negro Slav¬ 
 ery, cited, 39, 44. 
 
 Virginia, 25, 70, 187 f., 269, 302; early set¬ 
 tlers from, in Georgia, 11, 90 f.; resolu¬ 
 tions against Proviso, 137, 139, 141, 185 f., 
 198. 
 
 Wade, J. D., Augustus Baldwin Longstreet, 
 cited, 31. 
 
 Wallace, Daniel, 213. 
 
406 
 
 GEORGIA AND THE UNION IN 1850 
 
 War of 1812, Georgia editor mobbed for 
 opposing, 119. 
 
 Ward, J. E., Savannah Union Democrat, 
 287; sees governor, 334. 
 
 Warner, Judge Obediah, 111 n.; of northern 
 origin, 85; delegate to Nashville, 265. 
 
 Washington, see District of Columbia. 
 
 Washington Monument, Georgia stone for, 
 334, 334 n. 
 
 Washington National Intelligencer, accused 
 of “garbeling” southern press extracts, 
 252 n., 259 n. 
 
 Washington Southern Press, advocated by 
 Georgia delegate at Nashville, 270; reports 
 Macon Mass Meeting successful, 284; as¬ 
 serts Georgia will secede, 285; and all 
 South will follow her, 297. 
 
 Washington Union, 202, 359 n.; claims 
 National Intelligencer garbled southern 
 press extracts, 252 n., 259 n.; reports 
 Macon Mass Meeting failure, 284 f. 
 
 Webster, Daniel, “Seventh of March 
 Speech,” 241, 246. 
 
 Weed, Thurlow, Autobiography, cited, 237. 
 
 Wellborn, M. J., 307; Democratic repre¬ 
 sentative, 237 n.; opposes Clay Compro¬ 
 mise, 240; finally accepts it, 267; ad¬ 
 dressee constituents, 282, 282 n. 
 
 West, The, trade with southern seaboard, 
 17, 57, 59. 
 
 West Point (Ga.), 18. 
 
 Western and Atlantic Railroad, plans for, 
 17. 
 
 Weston, G. M., Poor Whites, cited, 75; 
 Progress of Slavery, cited, 38, 44, 47, 
 75 f., 308. 
 
 Whig Party, see State-Rights Party, Polit¬ 
 ical Parties; 173, 177, 180, 189 f., 195 f., 
 
 206 f.; papers urge manufacturing, 24 f.; 
 origins in Georgia and nation, 101; Geor¬ 
 gia Whigs hold to party, 1840, 102 f.,; 
 revolt of state-rights Whigs, 101, 103 f., 
 278; composition of, in Georgia, 107 ff.; 
 reverses constitutional and tariff princi¬ 
 ples, 107-109; the planters' party, 110, 
 
 •192; attitude towards democracy, 112-116; 
 Journals, 116-118; supports Texan annex¬ 
 ation, 127; evades annexation issue, 129- 
 131; unity threatened by extension issue, 
 131, 134-136; opposition to Mexican War, 
 131, 138, 152-154; northern Whigs sup¬ 
 port Proviso, 132; Georgia Whigs op¬ 
 pose extension, 134-136, 138, 154; state 
 convention, 1847, 142-144; evades national 
 issues, 145, 154; opposes southern move¬ 
 ment, 146; wins slight Assembly major¬ 
 ity, 1847, 151 f.; backs Taylor for nomi¬ 
 nation, 1848, 160-62; state-rights minority 
 holds to Clay and old principles, 161 f . ; 
 agrees to recognize national party con¬ 
 vention, 161 f.; nominates Taylor, 163; 
 tactics in 1848, 167-170; elects Taylor, 
 175 f., 176; urges conservatism after elec¬ 
 tion of 1848, 178-180; in “Southern 
 Caucus,” 182 f.; reaction to Caucus, 191, 
 192; encourages Democratic factionalism, 
 195; ridicules Democratic claim to sec¬ 
 tional preference, 198 f.; state convention, 
 1849, 199; campaign tactics, 198, 201, 205, 
 
 207 f.; views “right of secession” as 
 revolutionary, 201 f., 288, 351; defeated, 
 1849, 208-211; minority in Assembly, 209, 
 217; Assembly Whigs swing to southern- 
 rights position, 1849-1850, 221 ff.; splits 
 in Assembly, 225 ff.; conservatives oppose 
 California clauses in resolutions and con¬ 
 vention bill, 227-230; conservatives bolt 
 
 Assembly in gerrymander struggle, 235; j 
 lay plans for Union party, 236; Georgia 
 Whigs bolt in Congress, 237 f.; prepares 
 for trouble, 245, 248; welcomes signs of 
 compromise, 245; contrast between Geor- % 
 gia editors and congressmen, 245, 251; 
 ignores Nashville Convention elections, 
 
 257 f.; reaction to elections, 258 f.; at¬ 
 tendance at Nashville, 264 f.; views Com¬ 
 promise as unsatisfactory and “last con¬ 
 cession,” 314 f; conducts pro-Union cam- \ 
 paign, July-Nov., 1850, 281-283, 303-319; 
 helps to form Union party, 334 f.; net 
 effect of 1850 campaign on, 343; need for 
 Union party alignment, 345; fails to form 
 national organization, 1851, 345-347; fears 
 for Union party, 356 f.; agitates slavery 
 issue, 1851, 357; national party impos¬ 
 sible for many Georgians, 1852, 357 f.; 
 sends delegation to national convention, 
 1852, 359; finally splits with Union Demo¬ 
 crats, 361; divides between Scot and 
 Webster tickets, 1852, 361; defeated, 361; 
 defeated, 1853, 362. 
 
 “White basis” of representation, adopted by 
 Georgia constitutional convention of 1833, 
 
 112; defeated in referendum, 112; de¬ 
 feated in state convention of 1839, 112 n.; 
 abandoned as issue by Georgia Democracy, 
 
 112 n. 
 
 White, G. M., Georgia Statistics, cited, 10, 
 
 65, 68, 92. 
 
 White Race, 64, 74; forms majority of L 
 Georgia population, 1850, 13; lowest so- k 
 cial groups in, 74 78; race pride of “poor % 
 whites,” 75. 
 
 Wilmot, David, 167; motive for introducing * 
 Proviso, 132, 132 n. 
 
 Wilmot Proviso, 138 ff.,149 f., 160, 163 ff., 4 
 168, 179 f., 185 f., 194, 199, 201 n., 213, / 
 218, 220, 223, 232, 237, 243, 245 f., 262; 9 
 favored by southern poor whites, 72; in- 1 
 troduced, 132; motive of introduction, 9 
 132; united southern opposition to, in « 
 Congress, 132 f.; early indifference to, in ■ 
 Georgia, 133 f.; reintroduced, 1847, 134; 
 northern support of, 134; reaction of I 
 Georgia congressmen to, 134 136; de- ■ft 
 feated, 1847, 137; condemned by Georgia J 
 parties, 141, 143; issue in state campaign, 1 
 
 1847, 144 f., 151; in Assembly. 152-154; 1 
 Georgia united against, 153, 245; termed #i 
 “abstraction,” 156; Georgian’s reasons for j 
 opposing, 156, 157; principle of, applied A 
 to Oregon, 159; issue in state campaign, 
 
 1848, 167; effort to adopt, 1849, 181; I 
 issue in state campaign, 1849, 200 f.; I 
 issue in Assembly, 1850, 223-227. 
 
 Wofford, W. T., Union Democratic leader, I 
 224; Missouri line resolution of, debated ||Q 
 in Assembly, 224-227; suggested for gov- I 
 ernor, 236; in state convention, 325. 
 
 Woodward, Mrs. R. H. (Julia Brooks), let- I 
 ter from, cited, 83, 87. 
 
 Wright, Judge, attacks slavocracy, in Upper j 
 Georgia meetings, 1850, 250. 
 
 Wylie, L. B., Memoirs of Judge Richard H. 
 Clark, cited, 82 f. 
 
 Yancey, W. L., 180, 312; southern-rightaf V 
 leader, 165; repudiates Democratic nomijl 
 nations, 1848, 166; at Macon Mass Meetlk 
 ing, 1850, 284 f.; declares South unitecfl 
 on “Georgia Platform,” 340 f.; defeated,* 
 1851, 355. 
 
 “Yankees,” see Northerners. 
 
 Yazoo frauds, and origin of Georgia parties, 
 
 90 f. 
 
■ 
 
 ' , V 
 

975.8 S561Gr 0.3 
 
 95020 
 
 Shryock 
 
 
 Georgia and the 
 
 Union in 
 
 1850 
 
 
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 95030