MALEBRANC H's
S E ARC Hi
AFTER 1
TRUTH.
O R A
%
Treatife of the Nature
OF THE
AND
Of its Management for avoiding Error
in the Sciences.
VOL. 1.
>
Done opitof French/row the la ft Edition,
LONDON,
Printed for % SDlintOll at the Raven in the
Poultrey, and ©. at the Shif in
Cornkil^ 1694.
•■•• -^£l.
TO THE
Marquefs of NORMANBT.
My Lord,
'TT^ His Learned Treatlfe of theFamous
fl Makbranch begs theFavour of your
Lordfhips Patronage, and if any
thing could do fb, would almoft deftrve
it. All great Genius's are nearly related t6
one another, at leafl: there is a fort of
Sympathy between them 5 and the Wits
of frunce have never faiPd of a kind Re^
ception from thofe in England^ which the
moft Cruel Wars cannot hinder, nor does
Love to our Country forbid us from doing
Juftice to theirs. The Tranflation of
good French Books into our Tongue, is a
Reprifal on their Nation, who have taken
the lame way by fuch Writings as are
Famous in Antiquity, doing all that was in
their Power for an Univerlal Language,
perhaps to make way for Univerlal Enl-
pire.So that Tranflation from them again,
is only a Countermining them,and Fencing
with them at their own Weapons ; And
. this perhaps might fuceeed as well in our
Language as any in Fjihpe^ fince 'tis much
A 2 fuller
The Epijik Dedicatory.
fuller and ftronger, and confequently capa-
ble of mending an Original; and indeed no-
thing can hinder it, but rva^t of Encou-
ragement from Men in Poivery or Weak-
mfs in the Performance, For the Firfj
there is no one that can jufHy complain of
it, who has the Ambition of placing the
Name of Normanhy before his Writings, it
gives him a new Soul, and he ought nei-
ther to think or write meanly when he con-
fiders at whole Altars his Labours are of-
fer'd. For thtSecond, I have as little to fay
for it,asl could wifhour Criticksmay have
to fay againft it : The Errors that have
efcap'd thePrefsin the Original, the Diffi-
culty of the Subjefl:, the Confinement of
Language for fear of fpoiling the Philofo-
pher to gratifie the Gentleman, my own
neceffary Avocations, and the very little
time I did it in, cannot promifefbccrreQ: a
Tranflation, as perhaps it otherwife might
have been,yet lam willing to believe,it may
in fbme meafure be ufeful to fuch as can
read it without Prejudice; and it being de-
fign'd by the Author, only for fiich as arc
willing to know the Errors of their Senfes
and Imagination, and the Weakneftof the
Humane Mind, in order to difcover Truth
and Happinefs, I cannot be very uneafie
about anticipating its Fateamongft others,
elpecially under your LordlhipsProteflion.
I
The Epijlk Dedicatory,
Indeed I may very well be Ambitious
and Proud of fuch a Proteftion , when
the Government begins to be fo very
Senfible of the Happy Influences of your
A great Abilities and Intereft. 'Tis a rare
of Happinefs to have Prudence in Coun-
to cil, joyn'd with Bravery in AGion: Nay
)|t the lame Man may be a Politick-General,
and Mafter of much Perfbnal Valour, yet
n* be far enough from an Accomplilhd
Statefman: But to think coolly, yet aft
warmly , to fcize and improve every
lave Advantage, and yet pierce into the Depths
aave ofFuturuy, and difintangle intricate and
diftant Caules and Effefts,are only Accom-
ntof plifhment^for fuch a King as ours,and fuch
iofo a Minifter of State as your Lordfhip.
own Nor are your great Abilities toferw the
jliitk Publick Good,without particular Infiances
rrech of your Perfbnal Hazards and Signaf Zeal
iiiljlit for its Prefervation in the late Dutch Wars^
jtEi} when your Lordihip was plcafed to Com-
ascai! mand the Royal Catherine^ a Poft that was
iD^Je- the greateft Evidence of your Lordfliips
aasait Loyalty and Bravery.
5f[ifes ThehigheftMilitary andCivil Honours,
ofrte which require great Application,hinder not
Trot! your LordiTiip from excelling in the lefs
ceafc Severe Studies, a great Genius will do beft
oihei5) upon whatever Employment it fixes it fftf,
witnefs your Lordfhips Ejfay on Poetry
I that admirable Produft of your Youth,
A 31 the
The Epifile Dedicatory,
the Temple of Death^ with feveral other
Mifceilany Pieces of your Lordfhips,
which like our great RofcommonsVJovkSy
have a particular noble Air, that is not
only the Efteft of a great Genius, but
alfb of a Genteel and Happy Education,
and therefore unimitable by our befl: Wits,
who can only plead- the former Qualifi-
cation: Nor is it any Wonder that fb
great a Matter fhould Patronize others
who have excell'd in the fame Divine Art,
which requires that force of Spirit and fine-
neft of Thought, that are neceflary to all,
that even in Profe lhall do any thing ex-
traordinary, or worthy the Perufal of fiich
Judges asyourLordfhip; t\\iSjMalebranch is
allowed by all to have in his Native Langu-
age,and therefore if he gives your Lordfhip
no EntertainmentjtheDefefi mutt be in the
Tranflation, not the "Original; the very
Faults of this great Man have fomethingin
them extreamly Beautiful, and the Jewel is
fbdazling,that the flaws are fcarce difcern'd.
The infcribing thefe Papers to your Lord-
fhips moft honorable Patronage,is the occa-
fionof this Addrefs,wherein I have the Ho-
nor to tettifie both toyourLordihipand the
World,with how profound aDeference and
Relpecl, I am. My Lorp,
Your Lordlhips moft Humble
' and moft Obedient Servant
/ Richjtrd Sank,
THE
PREFACE.
The Mind of Man is by its Natnre^ as it
mre^ ftnated between its Creator and Cor-'
poreal Creatures \ fince according to
* St, Auflin there is nothing above ^ * Nihil eft potentlus
it bat God alone^ and nothing below it ina Creatura,quasmen9
not hinder it from being united to them. Creator eft, Tmyupm
and from depending in fome meafure John.
upon a Portion of Matter \ fo the infi'
nite difiance that is between the Sovereign Being
and the Mind of Man, does not hinder it from
being immediately and in a very firi[i manner
united to him. This lafi Vnion raifes it above all
thingsit gives it Life^ Tight^ and all its Feli'
city ^ and * 5r. Auftin fpeaks of this Vnion in ra-
many Pajfages of his IVorks ^ as of that which tionali a-
is the mofi Natural and the. mofl EJfential to the^}^^^^'
Mind: On the contrary^ the Vnion of the Mind
with the Body^ debafes Man exceedingly^ and ^confenti-
the Principal Caufe of all our Errors and Miferies, entibus
/ do not wonder that the common fort of Men^ or
that the Heathen Philofophersjlho;//^ only conjider
in the Soul^ its Relation and Vnion with the Body^
v^ithout difiinguifnng its Relation and Vnion with
A 4 Cod:
The Preface.
God: Bnt I am farprifed that Chriflian Fhilo^
jophers^ who jhonldprefer the Mind of God to the
Mind of Man^ Mofes to Ariftotle, St, Auftin
to fame wretched Commentator upon a Heathen Phi'
lofopher ^ fhoald lo'ok^ upon the Soul rather as the
Form of the Body, than 06 being made after the
i ^ ^ ' Image J and for the Image of God^ that
Ad ipfam fimih- according to ^ St,for Truth^
tudinem ndfi omnia i - i , . . - ?• i -7
fafta funt fed fola fiib- t'^hich alone tt ts mmedtately untted^
ftantia rationalisiQ^iare It is true the foul is united to the
omnia peripfamTtd ad Body^ and is naturally the Form of it j
ipfam non-nifl-anirna ^ true, that it is united to
rationalis. Itaque fub- 1 rt i
ftanria rationalis &: per ^^ much StrtUer and more
ipfam fa£la eft,& ad ip- Efftnttal manner. The relation it
fam: Non enim eft ulla xq \xs Body might not be\ but the
naturainterpofiM L/i. ^ ; to God is fo EfTemiaL
Imp/deGen. aa Litt. . ... , ■! y ^ \
that tt ts mpojjwle to conceive that Cod
could create a Spirit without that Relation.
It is evident that God can only Alh for him-
M; that he can only Create Spirits to Know and
Love him ^ that he can neither give them any
Knowledge^ nor imprint any Love in them^ but
what is for him,^ and what tends towards him: But
he was not obliged to unite Spirits to
* Rectiftime dlcitur Bodies OS he has d6ne Therefore the * Re*
faftus ad imaginem & tation which our Minds have to God^
f.miIitudinemDei,non JSfaturaL NecefarV, and abfolutdy
enim aliterincommu- , ri 7 i i -n , r ' <
tabilem veritatem pof- Jndijpenfthlebut the Relation of our
fet mente confpicere. Spirits to our Bodies., though Natural^
De vera Rel. is neither ahfolutely JSfeceJfary^ nor In^
* ■' difpenfihle. '
This is not a proper place to fet forth all the
jiuthorities and Reafons^ which may induce us to
believe, that it is more fuitable to the Nhture of
our Miud to be united to God , than to a Body 5
'' ' ' • '• • thofe
The Preface.
thefe things would lead us too far. To place -
this Truth in a jufl Light^ it would be necejfary
to deftroy the Principal Foundations of Hea*
then Philofophy, to explain the Diforders of Sin^
to engage what is falfly called Experience^ and to
argue againfl the Prejudices and Illujions of the
Senfes. Therefore to make the common fort of
Mankind ,apprehend this Truth perfe^ly ^ is too
hard a Taskjo attempt in a Preface.
Neverthelefs it is not difficult to prove it to
attentive Minds^ which are acquainted with true
Philofophy; for it is enough to put them in mind^
that fnce the Will of God regulates the Nature of
every things it is more fuitahle to the Nature of
the Soul to be united to God by the Knowledge of
Truth^ and the Love of Good^ than to be united
to a Body ^ < Jince it is certain, as above^ that
God has created Spirits to Know, and Love him^
rather than to Inforcn Bodies. This Proof is able at
firfi fght to ftartle Ingenious Minds^ then to render
them attentive.^and laflly to convince them: But it is
morally Impojfible^ that Senfualit'd Spirits^ who van
know nothing but what is felt ffiould ever be convinced
by fuch Arguments. Thefe fort of Men mufl have
grofs fenfible Proofs^ becaufe nothing feems real to ^
them^ unlefs it mak^s an Imprejfion upon their Senfes.
The Fall of the firfl Man, has fo
much weakjjed the * Union of our Mind *_Mens quod non
with God., that none but thofe are fen- punf^
/-I I r ' f r n • -r J i ^ bcatilma eft,
/ihk of ft whofe Heart u purified, and nui,j Cohxret, nifi ipfi
whofe Min'd is inlightnedfor this veritati,quaD fimilirudo
Union feems Imaginary to all thofe who ^ Irnagq patris, & fa-
blindly follow the Judgments of the
Senfes.^ and the Motions of the Pajfions.
On
The Preface.
On the contraryy it has fo much firengthned the
Union of our Soul with our Body^ that thefe two
farts of our felves feem to hs to be no Lngcr hut
one and the fame Subfiance \ or rather it ha4
made vu fuch Slaves to our Senfes and PaJfionSy
that we are inclind to believe our Body is the
Principal of the two Parts of which we are com-
pofed.
When we confider the dijferent Employments of
Mtn^ we have a great deal of reafon to believe^
that they have a mean and low Opinion ofthem^
felves ^ for as they all love Felicityy and the Per^
feBlon of their Being, and only labour to mak§
themfelves Happier or more Perfect y have we not
reafon to believe^ tljar they have a greater Value
for their Body^ and the Goods of their Body, than
for their Mind^ and the Goods thereof ^ when we
fee them commonly imploy*d about things that have
a Relation to the Body^ feldom or never thinking on
thofe which are abfolutely necejfary for the Perfeciion
of the Mind?
The greatef fart of Men labour with fo much
Indufiry and Toil^ only to maintain a miferable
Life y and to leave their Children fome necejfary
Convenkncks for the Prefervation of their Bodies.
Thofe^ who by the good Fortune., or Chance of
their Birth, are not JubjeB to this Necefftyy do
not (heTV better by their Bufinefs and ImploymentSy
that they look upon their Soul as the nohlefi part of
their Being: Hunting, Dancing, Gaming, Enter^
tainments are their common Imployments, their
Soul being a Slave to their Body, EJleems and
Cheriflies all thofe Divertifements, though altogC"
ther Unworthy of it, but becaufe their Body has a
relation to all Senfhk Things, the Soul is not only
inflavfd
The Preface.
injlav'd to the Body^ hut alfo to all fenfihle th'wgi
by the Body, a7jd for the Body \ for 'tis by the
Body that Men are united to their Relations^ their
Friends^ their Country^ their Imployments, and to
all fenfihk Enjoyments, the Prefervation of which
feems to them as necejfary and as valuable as the
Prefervation of their own Being, Thm the Care
of their Efiates ^ and the Defire of increafwg
them ^ the Paffion of Glory and Grandeur agitates
and imploys them infinitely more than the perfeEling
of their SouL
Moreover the Learned^ and thofe who pretend
to Wity fiend more than half their Life in AEiions
purely Animal^ or fuch as incline us to thin\^ that
they value their Healthy their EjtatCy and their
Reputation, more than the Perfection of their
Mind. They fludy more to attain a Chimerical
Crandeur.^ in the Opinion of other Mcn.^ than in-
creaje the Power and Capacity of their Mind,
They make their Heads a kind of JVardrobe^ in
which they Store up.^ without choice or order.^ what-
ever bears any CharaEler of Learning ^ I mean,^
whatever may appear Rare and Extraordinary.^
and excite the Admiration of other Men, They
are proud of being like thofe Cabinets of Curiofity
and Antiquity.^ which have nothing Rich or Solid
in them^ the Vdue whereof only depends on Fancy
Pajfion and Chance ^ and they feldom labour to
improve their Mind^ and to regulate the Motions
of their Heart,
Tet it is not that Men are wholly
hnorant they have a * SouL and that . horni-
y. r> 7 • ) 7 • r r I • T, ■ "'s portio, led totius
thts Soul tithe chtef part of their Seiitg. Humnna Univeifitatis
They have alfo been convinced a thou- fubftantia eft. uimb, 6,
fand times by Reafon and Experience^ 7*
' that
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The Preface.
U
that it is no very confiderahle Advantage^ to have
fame Reputation, Riches , and Health for fome
Tears *, and generally that all the Advantages of
the Body ^ and fach as are only pojfe/s'^d by the
Body^ and for the Body, are Imaginary and pe-
ripjable Goods: Men are fenfible that it is better
to be Jiifl than Rich 5 to be Reafonahle than
Learned •, to have a lively penetrating Mind^than a
cpHick^and aEtive Body. Thefc Truths can never
be effaced out of their Mind-^ and they difcover
them Infalliblywhenever they are pleased to think
on them. Homer, for inflance., who praifes his
Hero for his Nimblenefs in Running.^ might have
cbferv d (if had fo pleas'd ) that it is a Praife
fit for Horfes and Grey-hounds. Alexander, fo
Famous in Hifiory for his IlluJErious Thefts^ had
fometimes the fame Reproaches from his Reafon, as
Murtherers and Thieves have^ notwithfianding the
coffiufed Noife of the Flatterers that were about
him. ^WCefar, at the pajfage of the Rubicon,
could not forbear difcovering that thefe Reproaches
terrified him , when he re/olv'd to Sacrifice the
Liberty of his Country to his Ambition,
The Soul.^ though JlriEtly united to the
Ubiq; Veritas pras- Body.^ is neverthelcfs united to * God.^
fides omnibus confu- at that very time, when it receives
lentibuste, rimulq;re- . . , irrii r rj
fpondes omnibus etiam v Body thoje lively but conjujed
diverfa confulentibus. Senfations^ which the Pajfions Jnjpire^
fLiquide tu refpon- it receives from the Eternal Truth
omnesaudfun^dmnw
unde volunt confulunt, Icdge of its Duty and Diforders. When
fed non femper quod the Body deceives it^ God undeceives it
volunr audaiint. Conf. jf. platters it.. God Mortifies it •
S.yiug. Book 10. C.io.f;. , , . _ 1^11-
Cur: Book when it Praifes and Applauds tt.^
God Reproaches it feverely.^ and Con"
demns
I
!
The Preface.
danns it by the Manifeflation of a more Pure and
Holy Law , than that of the Flejb which it has
foUowed,
There was no need for the Scythians to come to
Alexander, to teach him his Duty in a forreign
Tongue'^ he knew from him^ who infirn^s the Sc^-
thians, and the mofi Barharom Nations, the
Rales of Jafiice which he ought to foU
low: * The Light of Truths which * Intus in domicilio
Iwhtens all the World enlt^hten'^d him , nee He-
11 •rr-' CT.r I ■ t braca, nec Grxca, nec
alfo'^ and the roKC of A at are, which ^ ^arharz
jpeaks neither Gv^tktJorScylhhn^&c, Veritas, fine oris 3c
fpoke to him as to the reft of Mankind^ Lingua organis, fine
in a very Intelligible Tongue, IVhat^ Syll^arum.
_/ r u- ij CoTif. s.^ug.B, 11.
ever Reproaches the Scythians could
faft en upon him about his Conduit^ they only (poke
to his Earshecaufe God fpok^ not to his Heart ;
or ratherGod fpok§ to his Heart, hut he only
hearkning to the Scythians, who did nothing but
exafperate his Pajfwn^ and unman d 'him^ fo that he
heard not the f^oice ofTruth^ although it thunder d
within him.^ nor did he fee her Eighty although it
pierc'^d him thorough.
It is true our Vnion with God diminiftes and
weakens by degrees , according as that which we
have with fenfible thingsftntreafts and Strengthens ^
but it is impojfible that that Vrnon fhould be ivholiy
broken.^ without the Dijfolution of our Being, for
though fuch as are plung*d in Vice^ and indulge their
Pleafure., are Infenfible of Trstth.. they ^ ^
\i I r ■ J * V ^7 J Vidtrurquafi iple
4re neverthelefs united to it. ^ It does ^ occiderejcum ru ab
not forfake thm y but they forfait it. 'jpilocdd^s./Ju.mPf.z^
Nam etiam Ibl ifie,Sc
videntis faciem illuftrar& caefi ; ambobus fol prxfenseil, fed prxfcnte
fok unus abfcns eft. Sic & lapientia Dei, Dominus J.C.ubique prxfens
eft, quia ubique eft Veritas ubique fapientia. /itug. it? 'joayi.Tra^, 3^.
Its
The Preface.
Its Light pntjes in Darkfjefs^ but it does not always
expel it: Jnfl as the light of the Sun encompajjes
the Blind^ and thofe that clofe their Eyes^ though
it enlightens neither,
* The Union of our Mind with our
* X fay in this Body is the fame: This Union dimi"
of^h^Mind wUh God' h '"'y
and with the Body, is with God increafes ; hut it is never qutte
to be underftood accor- dijfolv^d but by our Death: For though
ding to the common were as much enli^htned ^ and as
things.^ FoHtlircer- above the Fleafures of Senfe as
tain the Mind can only the j4poftles wereytt it is necejfary
be immediately united Jlfjce the Fall ^ that our Mind fhould
' I mean, the Body, and that wejhould
Mind only depends -m n • n
truly on God; and if of our Flejh^ conttnually
it be united to the refifiing and oppofing the Law of our
Body, or if it depends ji^j„d,
©n it, it is becaufe the ^
Will of God efficacloufly caufes that Union or that Dependance. This
will be eafily apprehended by the Sequel of this Work.
\
The Mind becomes Purer , Stronger , more
Perfpicuous, and more inlarged^ proportionably as
its Union with God increafes ^ for 'tis he from
whom it derives all its PerfeSlion. On the con--
trary,^ it becomes Corrupted Blind ^ IVeakj and
is contraHed by degrees^ as the Union which it has
with its Body Increafes and Strengthens; becaufe
that Union alfo caufes all its ImperfePiions. There-
fore a Man who judges of all things by his Senfes^
who follows the Motions of his Pajfions in all
things J Ti^ho perceives nothing but what he feels
and who loves nothing but what flatters him^ ts in
the mofl wretched Difpofltign of Mind that he can
pojfibly be in: In that condition he is at a vaji
diflanee from Truth, and from his Good, But
when
The Preface/
when a Man only judges of things by ^ * Quis emm hem fe
the Vure * Jdea*s of the Mwd^ when infpiciens nonexperts
he cMefutly avoids the eonjafed noife
of Creatures, and looking within him- removere, atqj
felf hearkens to his Sovereign Mafier fubducere intentionem
in the Silence of his Senfes and Fafftons^ mentis a corporis fen-
j,, »,.#«, U.fM i-
Error*
God never deceives thofe who interrogate him
by a ferious j^pplication^ and by an entire Conver-
jton of their Mind towards him^ though they do
not always hear his Atifwers but when the Mind^
removing from Cod, dtjfufes it felf Externally ,
when it only Interrogates the Body to learn Truth^
hearkning only to its Senfes^ its Imagination and
Tajfions which continually (peak, to it^ it mufi needs
jbe deceived, Wifdom , 2 ruth, Ferfeliion, and
Felicityy are not Goods that can be exfeBed from
the Body'y he alone who is above us^ and from
whom we have a Beings can give it PerfeBion,
This is what * St, Auftin teaches . ...
r r* I 1-^ Pnncipium Crea*
us tn ttttfe fine words. Eternal Wif- M!eL«lh eft
dom, fays k, is the Principle of all terna Japientia, quod
Creatures that are capable of In- prindpium manms infe
telligence and this Wifdom always ^"^ommutahiter nu^n
f. modo ce Jat occulta in^
. remaining the fame, never ceafes to fp.rathne r.ocaThni: /«.
fpeak to his Creatures in the fecret qui ei Crcatura, cui
RecelTes of their Reafon, that they prindpium eji, ut con-
may turn towards their Principle;
, ir-1 Ai eft: quodaliter fortnata
becauie nothing but the fight of the j, p.rfeda effe mn pof
Eternal Wifdom gives a Being to /r. S.deGen. adLitt.
Spirits ^ and can, as it were, finifh
them, and give them the laid Perfedlion they
are capable of.
* When
The Preface.
* When we fee God as he is,
i-nm we fhall bc like hiiTi, fa>p the
cum apparuenc limiles - \ t ' r
ci erimus, quoniam vi- John I By that ContemplattOJi of
debimuseum ficutieft. Eternal Tra h^ we fhall he elevated to
Joan. Ep. I. c. 3. V. 2. decree of Greatnefs, to which all
ruS-'itur agfraL ani- Creatures tend by the necejftty
mam. Sa^. 9. 10. of their Nature. But while we are on
Earthy the weight of the Body Stupifies
the Mind 3 it removes it continually from the Pre-
fence of God.^ or of that Internal Light which Illu^
minates it 3 it makes continual Efforts to firengthen
its Vnion with Senfihle Objects 3 and obliges it to
reprefent to it felf all things.^ not as they are in them-
felves.^ but according to the relation they have to-
wards the Prefervation of Life.
. 1 , • * Wife Man.^
tlo delimit'Vnfum Pj with fo great a number
multa cogitantem , Zc of Senfations., that it becomes incapable
difficile aeffimamus quae of knowing thofe things that are hut a
in terra fum, & qux in conceald ; The fight of the Body
mus wm labore!""™]! dijftpates that of theMnd,
15. and it is difficult to perceive Truths
clearly by the Eyes of the Soul^ while,
we make ufe of the Eyes of our Body to difcover it.
This fhews that it is only by the Attention of the
Mind that Truths are difcover'd ^ and that all
Sciences are Learned 3 for the Attention of the
Mind is nothing hut its Return and Converfion to-
wards God.^ who is our only Mafler., and who only
can teach us Truth^ by the Manifeflation of his
in-Sub fiance^ as * St. Auflin fpeaks.
telligibilis
lux, in quo, & a quo, & per quern intelligibiliter lucent omnia. S.SoL
Infinuavic nobis (Chriftus) animam humanam non vegetari, non
illuminari, non beatificari, nili ab ipfa Subflantia. Dei Ati^. in Joan*
h
The Preface.'
• It is flain by all thefe things^ that we mufl con^
titiHally refifi the. Effort which the . Body makes
againfi the :Mind'^ and by degrees accuflom oar
felves to disbelieve the Teftimonies of oar Senfes.
in reffcB of all Bodies which are about us^ and
which they always reprefent to us as worthy our
Application and Efleem ^ becaufe we ought never
to fix upon any thing that is Senfible y nor imploy
our felves about it, 'Tis me of the Truths which
the Eternal Wifdotn. feems to have been willing
to reveal to us by his Incarnation ^ for after having
raifed a fenfihle Body to the highefi Dignity that
can be apprehended^ he hits fhevd.d us by the deepejt
Humiliation of the fame Body (which was thd
greateft of all fenfible things^ how much we ought
to defpife all the Objt^is of our Senfes. It is per^
haps for the fame reafon St. Paul [aid that he
l^ew not Jefus Chrift according to the Flefh: For
it is not-the Flejlo of Chrifi. we mufi refi upcn^ d
is the Spirit which is conceal'd under that Flefls.;
Garo vas fuit, quod habebat attende,-nonquod
erat, fays St. Auftin. That which is * vifible or " Ilia aiitc-.
fenfible in Jefus Chrifi, only deferves our Adorar:^^^^^P'^^'^'
tion becaufe it is united with the Word^ which can
only be the Objelt of the Mind. , . honfolum
infenfibili"
bus (ignis tranfqendit omnem humanam facultatem, fed 8c ipfum ho-
minem agens, oftenditeiquo ufque fe propter ipfum deprederit, 8c.
non teneri fenilbus quibus videntur ilia miranda ; fed ad intelleftum'
fubet evolare, (Imul demonftrans & quanta hie pollit, ■& cur htec
faciat, 8c quam parvi pendac. y^ug. i.deOrd.'). Ec (I cognovimus
fecundum carnem Chriftum, jam non fecundum carnem
2 ad Cor. Tr. in Joan. 27.
It is abfolutely neceffary for thofe who aim
at Wifdom and Happinefs .^ to be fully convinc'^d
and affelied with what I have faid : It is nor
a enough
The Preface.
enough to believe it upon my word^ nor to he per"
fwaded of it by the Lujhre of a Tranfitory Light ^
they muft know it by many Experiences^ and many,
mdeniable Demonf rations: Thefe things mufi never
be in danger of being effaced out of their Mind^
they mujt ever be prefent to it in aU their Studies^
and other Imployments of their Life.
Thofe who win give themfelves the Trouble to
read the IVbrk. with fome Application which is here
publifh^dy will J if I am not deceiv*d^ commence fuch
a Difpofition of Mind ^ for we have demonjlrated
in it the different ways wherein our Senfes^ Ima-
gination^ and Paffwns^ are ahfolutely ufelefs^ to the
difcovery of Truth and Good t On the contrary.^
that they daTLle and feduce us on all occafions ^ and
generally that all the Knowledge the Mind receives
by the Body, or by fome inward Motions of the
Body^ are all falfe and confufed^ in refpeB of the
Obje^s they reprefent; although they are very ufe-*
ful towards the Prefervation of the Body^ and of
the Goods which have relation to the Body.
Several Errors are engaged in it^ and parti-
cularly thofe that are mofl univerfally received y
or that occafion the greatefi Diforder of the Mind ^
and we fhew that moft of them proceed from the
Union of the APind with the Body. We dejign in
feveral places to mal^e the Mind fenfble of its
Servitude y and of the Dependance it has on
all fenfble things^ that it may awak§ from its
Trowfinejs y and make fome Efforts for its Deli-
verance.
We do not only make a bare Expoftion of our
ErrorSy but alfo explain the Nature of the Mind:
We do noty for infiancCy infift upon a great Enu- '
meration of all the particular Errors of the Senfes
or
The Ereface/
or I Imagination^ hut ftpon the Caufes of thofe Errors.
Wt jhevp at once {in the Explanation of thefe
Facnlties and general Errors^ to which we are
fabjeB^ an almofi infinite Number of thofe parti^
calar Errors into which Men fall. Thns the
fabjeEh of this Work is the whole Mind of Man ;
we confider it in it felf^ in relation to the Body^
and in relation to God-, we examine the Nature
. . '''
of all its Faculties.^ and obferve the ufes we ou^ht
to make from hence to avoid Error. Lafily.^ We
explain mofi of thofe things we thought ufeful to
^ advance in the Knowledge of Man.
The finefithe mojb agreeable., and mofi ne^
cefiary Knowledge, is mdoubtedly the Knowledge
td of our felves. Of all Humane Sciences, the Set-
cnce of Man is the mofi worthy of Man : Never'
ik thelefs that Science is not the mofi cultivated or ac-
compHJh'd Science we have: The common fort of
] vjt' Mankind negleCts it wholly even among thofe that
isi (| value themjelves upon Sciences, there are but few
that apply themfelves to it, and there are yet fewer
ip who fuccefsfully apply themfelves to it, Mofr of
rfi, thofe who are efieem'd Learned in the Worldy have
but a confufed Knowledge of the Ejfential Diffe-
jros h rence that is between the Mind and Body. 5^'. Aultin Conf.
i(ji;n f himfelf, who has difiinguifipd thofe two Beings fo
jf;; well, confeffes that it was a long time before he
y I could know it. And though it mufi be grvtnted,
fr0 j' ^hat he has explain d the Properties of the Soul and
ilj /}»■ Body better than any of thofe that were before him,
and who have fucceeded him, until our Age , yet
it were to be wijh'd, that he had not attributed to
External Bodies, all the Senfible Qualities which
we perceive by their meansfor indeed they are
.jjj not. clearly contain d in the Idea he had of Matter .
f 3 2 So
The Preface."
So that one may confidently fay^ That the Diffe^
rence between the Mind and the Body has not been
known dearly enough till of late Tears.
Some fancy they know the T^ature of the Mind :
Others are ferfwaded that it is imfojfible to know
any thing about it^ The greatejl fart of Men
are infenfible of the 'Vfefulnefs of that KnoW'
ledge^ and for that reafon they defpife it. But
all thefe common Opinions are rather EffeEls of
the Imagination and Inclination of Men, than
the Confequences of a clear and dtflinB Sight of
their Mind: It is becaufe they are loath to look
within themfelves^ there to difcover their Wtakneffes
and Infirmities^ but they delight in curious Difco-
verks and fine Sciences *, never looking within
themfelves, they are infenfible of the Diforders
that happen there ; they think, they are wellj be^
caufe they are infenfible ^ they find fault with
thofe^ who knowing their own Difiemper apply Re-
medies to it •, and fay,^ that they make themfelves
Sick^^ becaufe they endeavour to cure themfelves.
But thefe great CeniptPs^ who penetrate into the
moji myfterious Secrets of Nature ; who in their
Mind afcend into the Heavens^ and who defcend
even into the ^byfs,^ ought to remember what they
are: Thefe great ObjeBs perhaps dnly ferve to
daz,le them: The Mind mufi- go out of it felf to
attain to fo many things^ but it cannot do it without
being dijfipated.
Men are not born to become AflronomerSy or
Chymifisy to fpend all their Life in gating through
a Telefcope,^ or in Sweating at a Furnace in order
to infer little infignificant Confequences from their
Laborious Obfervations. I grant that an jiflro-^
nomer was the firfi- that difcovered Lands^ Seas,''
The Preface.
and Mountains in the Moon ^ that he was the firfi
that ohfervd Spots in the Snn^ and exaElly calcu-
lated their Motions : I grant that a Chymifi hath
at lafl found the Secret of fixing Mercury, er
making the Alkaifl, by which V2inhQlmont boafied
he could dijfolve all Bodies ; but are they become
the Wifer or the Happier for this ? 1 hey may
have got fome Reputation by it in the World ; but
if they have confider'^d it^ that Reputation has only
increafed their Servitude,
Men may look^ upon Aflronomy^ Chymifiry^ and
mojk Sciences^ as proper Divertifements for aCen*
tleman; but they ought not to fuffer themfelves to
be deluded by them^ nor-to prefer them to the Scu
ence of Man ^ for the Imagination fixes a certain
Idea of Grandeur upon Ajlronomy^ becaufe that
Science confiders great OhjtEbs , glorious OhjeSls^
ObjeSls which are infinitely above all that are about
us; the Mind ought not blindly to embrace that
Idea : We Jhould make our felves Judges and
Mafiers of it^ anddivefi^ it of that fenphk Great-
nefs which afionifijcs our Reafon. The Mind ought
to judge of all things according to its Internal
Knowledge, without hearkning to the falfe and
confufed Teflimony of the Senfes and Imagination ;
and if it examines all Humane Sciences by the
pure Light of Truth which guides it, we dare
uffirm^ that it will defpife mofl of themy and will
have more refpeEh for that which teaches us what we
arCy than for all others whatever.
Therefore we chufe to advifethofe who are Lovers
of Truthy to judge of the SubjeEt of this Work^ ,
according to the Anfwers they will receive from the-
Sovereign Maflers of all Men y^after having made
their Application to him by ferious RefltEi.iony rather
a 3 than
The Preface.
than to prevent them by a hng Difconrfe^ whicht
they might perhaps look^ upon as common Places^ or
the vain Ornaments of a Preface, If they thinly
this SnhjeCt worthy their ^application and Study,
they are defird again not to judge of the matter it
contains^ by the good or ill manner in which they
are exprefs'^dy but to lookwithin themfelvesy to hear
there the Decifions they are to followy and according
to which they ought to jttdge,
Becaufe we are perjwaded that Men cannot
teach each other; and thofe that hear us do not
learn the Truths we fpeak^ to their EarSy unlefs he
that has difcover'd them to uSy reveal them at the
fame time to their Mindy we find our felves obliged
to advife thoje who will profitably read this Work^y
not to believe us upon our word out of Inclinationy
nor to oppofe what we fay out of Averfion : For
"^Nolite though we ^ think^we have advanced nothing but
putarc "what we have learrtd by MeditatioUy we fioould be
quem- very forry that others Jhould content themfelves to
t|uam ho- yetain and believe our Sentiments without knowing
liqdd^if- dcceiv'dy either for
cere ab tvant of underftanding themy or becaufe we are de^
homine, ceiv d.
admonere
pofTumus per ftrepitum vocis noftrsp,, fi non fit iiitus qui dpceat in
anis fit Crepitus nofter. ^ug. ni Joan. Auditus-per me faftus, in-
tellefhis per quern ? Dixit aliquis & ad eos veftrum, fed non.cum
videtis. Si intellexiftis fratres, diftum eft Sc cordi veftro. Muiius
Dei eft Intelligentia. " ^ug. in Joan. Tr. 40.
. >
rhe Book * The Pride of fome of the Learnedy who will
^^^tev'd upon their Wordy feems infupportable
r to us: They will not allow m to confult God after
they have fpokeny becaufe they do not confult him
themflives : They are angry as joon as any body
ofpofes
The Preface.
ofpofes their Sentiments^ and they will needs force
Men to prefer the Ohfcnrity of their Imagina^
tionj to the pure Light of Truth which guides the
Mind.
We are y Thanhs he to God ^ far from being
guilty of this way of proceeding^ though we are often
accufed of it: We defire^ indeed^ that Men flwuld
believe the FaBs and Experiences we relate^ be^
caufe thofe things cannot be learned by the Appli-
cation of the Mind to the Sovereign and Vniverfal
Reafon. But as for all Truths that are difcoverd
in the true Ideas of thofe things^ which Eternal
Truth reprefents in the Receffes of our ^ Reafon^ * Noli pu-
we exprefly advife them not to rely upon what we
thinks of them ^ for we judge it no fmall Crime for jucem.- '
a Man to compare himfelfto God^ by thm ufurping j^uf. in
Authority over the Mmd.
The chief reafon that we have for defiring thofe
who fhall read this Work^^ to apply themfelves feri-
oufly to it^ is^ That we are willing to he made fenfi-
hie of the Faults we may have committed in it^ for
we do not pretend to Infallibility. The Mind has
fo JiriB a relation to the Body^ and has fo great a
Dependance on it^ that we may reafonably fear we
have not always clearly diflinguijlfd the confufed
Noife of the Imagination^ from the pure Voice of
Truth which fpeaks to the Mind.
Did God only fpeak^^and did we only judge accor^
ding to what we hear^ we might perhaps
iife thefe words of. Jefus Chrifl: 1 " Si<^t audio fic ;u-
Judge according to what I hear^and ^ico,&jucicium meum
myjudgmentisjuft and True. £m q"sravoluntTmme"
we have a Body which fpeaks lowdcr am. Joan. Ch. 5. 30.
than God himfelf and that Body never
fpeaks Truth: We have Self dove, which corrupts
a 4 the »
The Preface.
the Words of him who always [peaks Truth: And
pe have Pride^ which infpires m with Boldnefs^ to
^ judge without hearkning to the Words of Truth^ ac^
cording to which only we ought to judge: For the
principal Caufe of our Errors That our Judg-
ments extend themf elves further than the clear prO"
fpeEi of our Mind. Therefore I dejire thofe to
whom God Jhall difcover my Mifiakes.^ to mak^ me
fenfible of them.^ that this Workjy which I only give
04 an EJfay.^ (whofe fuhjeB is very worthy of Mens
Appiicationj may be ferfehled by degrees.
/ had only undertaken it at firjh with a defign to
inftruB my felf.^ but fame Terfons having thought
that it might be ufeful for the Publick^j I willingly
confented to publijh itthe rather becaufe one of the
chief redfons they gave me for it.^ did fuit with the
dejire I had to be ufeful to my felf. The real way^
[aid they.) to be inJlruBed in any Matteris to prO'
pofe our Sentiments about it to fome Learned Men.
It exciteTour Atte'rition and theirs: Sometimes
they have Truths which are unknown to usand
fometimes they go through certain Difcoveries
which we have negleEied out of Inadvertency, or
have abandon d for want of Courage and Power.
'» It was vpon this Profpeli of my particular Bheft^
and that of fome otherSj I venture to be an Au^
thor ^ but that my hopes 'may not prove vain^ I
give this Advice.) that Men jlwuld not be' difgujied
at firfi.) if they find things that contradiEt the com-
tnon Opinions that are generally approved of by all
Men and in all Ages. The Errors I endeavour to
deflroy., are thofe that are mojl general: If Men
were very much enlightetj'^d, Vniverfal Approba-
tion would he a reafon.) but 'tis quite contrary. There-
fore let it be well remembred.) that Reafon only ought
' tQ
The Preface.
to frefide in the judgment of all Humane Opinions^
which have no relation to Faith^ which God only
inflruPls w in after a very different manner from
-that hy which heidifcovers natural things to
Let Men look^ within themfelves^ and draw near
unto the Light which fhines there continually^ that
their Reafon may be the more illuminated. Let
them carefully avoid the Senfations which are too
livelyand ad the Emotions of the Soul which take
up the Capacity of the Mind: For the leafi Noife,^
the leaft Appearance of Light^ often diffipates the
fight of the Mind: It is good to avoid all thofe
thingsy though it is not ahfolutdy neceffary. And
if in ufing our utmcfi * Endeavours^ we cannot * Qyj
refift the continual Impreffions which our Bodies,^ viderenoa
and the Prejudices of our Infancy make upon our poteft,o-
Imagination,^ we muft have recourfe to Prayer,^ to ^
receive that from God which we cannot have by our mereatur,
own Polwer j but ftill without ceafing to refitfl our nee ad ho-
Senfes ; for that ought to be the continual Employ-
ment of thofe who in Imitation of St, Aufl"in, have rem"pul°"
a great Love for Truth. fet, ut
quod non
legit legaf, fed ad Deum Salvatorem ut quod non. valet velear,
£p. 112. c, 12. Suplexque illi qui lumen mentis accendit attendat,
. ut intelligat. ConP. Ep, Fund, C. 3 3.
THE
The CONTENTS.
BOOK I,
Of the Errors of the Senfes]
Chap.i, tht Nature andVrdperties tf the Vnderliand-
ing, II. Of the Nature and Properties of
the Will, and wherein its Liberty confills. Page i
Chap. 2. I, Of Judgments and Reafonings. II. *that they^ de-
fend upon the Will. III. What ufe muft be' made of its
Liberty in refpe^ of them. IV. Two General Rules to avoid
Error and Sin. V, Necejfary Refledlions upon thefe Rules, p.p
Chap.g. I. Anfwers to fome Obje^iions, II. Remarks upon
what hath been faid about the necejjity of Evidence. p.
Ghap.4. I. Of the Occafional Caufes of Error, and that of thefe
there are five Principal ones. II. Lhe General Defign of the
whole Wor^, and the particular Befign of the fir(i Bofl^.p.22
Chap. 5. Of the Senfes. I. Two ways of Explaining how they
are corrupted by Sin. II. That *tis not our Senfes^ but our
Liberty, which is the true Caufe of our Errors. III. A 'Rule
fist to be deceivd in the Vfe of our Senfes. p. 2$
Chap.6, I. Of the Errors of the Sight, in rtfpeU of Extenfm,
confidef d in it felf. II. An Enumerate,n'of thefe Errors^ as
to invifible Obje£ls. III. Of the Errors of the Sight, con*
cerning relative Extenfm. p. gg
Chap. 7. I. Of the Errors of Sight in refpeil of Figures, II. We
have no knowledge of the leafi things. III. The RnoW'
ledge we have of the greateft things is not exa6l. IV. An
Explication of certain Natural Judgments which l^etp us
from being deceiv'd. V. That thefe very Judgments deceive
us in particular Occurrences. p. 44
Chap.8. I. That our Eyes do not inform us of the greatnefs or
fwiftnefs of Motion confidef d in it felf. II. That Duration^
which is necefjary to be underjiood to l^ow what Motion U\
is^unknown. III. Examples of the Errors of Sight, in re-
fptTi of Motion and Reft. ' p. 49k
/ Chap.
The CONTENTS.
Chap. 9» A Continuation of the fame Suhje5f. I. A General
proof oj the Errors of our Sight dbout Motion, II. that it's
neCtSary to\^ow the dijlance oj Obje5iSj to judge of the
frpiftnefs of their Motion, III. An Examination of Means
to \now their diliances, p. 54
Chap. JO. Of Errors about SinfibU Qualities' I. A diJlin5iion of
Soul'ahd tody, ,11. An Explication of the Organs of the
Strifes, in. to'what part of the Body the Soul is immedi'
aiely Unhed, IV. Hoiiv Ob]efis'a6l upon Bodies. V. How
upon the Soul \ with Reafbns why the Soul does not perceive
the Motions of the Fibres of the Body. VI. Four things
which are Confounded in every Senfation, p. 64
Chap.ii. 1. Oj the Error we an fubje^ to in refoecf of the
AHUn of Objiaisfupbn the External fibres of our Senfes,
II. The Caufe ofth^t'Error, An Obje^ion and Anfwer,
p. 71
Chjp:r2. I.Oj the Errors concerning the Motions of the Fibres of
our Sen ft s, , II. That eithtr we perceive not thefe Motions y or
elfe confound them with our S£nfations. III. Experience
which, proves it, IV. Three forts of Senfation;, V. The
. Errors which accompany them, P-75
Chap.i 3. I. of the Nature of Stnfations, II. That .we l^now
them better than we believe we do. HI. An Objeflion and
Anfwer. IV. H^by we imagine we l^now nothing of our
Senfitions. V. That we deceive our felves in believing
that all Men have the fame Senfations of the'fame Objefis,
,. VI, Ohjcfiion and Anfwer. p. 80
Chap.14. h Of thefalfe Judgments that accompany our Sen-
' ■ faliensy and which we confojind with them. II, Reafons
.of thefe falfe Judgments. . IIL That Error is not in our
Senfations y but only in thefe Judgments, V'9^
'Chap.i An Explanation of the particular Errors of Sigbty
which may ferve us as an Example of the General Errors of
our Senfes. , P«95
Chzp. 16.' I. Jhat the Errors of our Senfes are the mdjl.generat
and fruitful Frinciptesy whence'we draw all thefalfe Con^
clufionSy which in their turns.affo ferve us for Principles,
•If. The Origine of Effenti'al Differences. III. Offubftantial
Forms. IV, Of fomi other Errors in the Philofophy of the
Schools. ' V' 97
Cliap.f7. I. Another Example drawn from Morals y which
fhows that our Senfes only offer us falfe Goods, 11. 'That *tis
God only who is our true Good. III. The Origine of the
Errors oj the EpicvitceLas'and Stokku p. 102
Cjj • Chap.
chap, 18. I. Our Senfes deceive us in things which are not
Senfible* 11. An Example drawn from the Converfation of
Men* III. IVe mu(i not confide in Senfible Habits^ p. io$
Chap, 19. ilwo other Examples* I. the firfi of our Errors
concerning the 'Nature of Bodies* II. The fecondy of thofe
that relate to the Qualities of thefe Bodies. P-*^9
Chap. 20. 7he Conclufion of this firfi Booi^* I. That our Senfes
are only given us for our Bodies, II, That wt mufi doubt
of their Tefiimony, III. That it is not an inconfiderable
thing to doubt as we ought to do* P» ''3
BOOK I L
Of the Imagination,
The Firft Part.
Chap.r. I. \ General idea of the imagination* II. That
l\. it includes two Faculties, the one A6tive,
and the other PaJJive. III. The general Caufe of the Changes
which happen to "the imagination of Many and the defign of
this fecond Booi^* p. 117
Chap. 2, I. Of the Animal Spirits, and the Changes to which
they are fubjeCi in general, II. That the Chyle goes to the
Hearty and thereby produces fome change in the Spirits,
III. That Wine'has the fame effeCt. p. 122
Chap. 5. That the Air one breaths, caufes lil^ewife fome
change in the Spirits, p. 125
Chap. 4. I, Of the Change wrought in the Animal Spirits, bj
the Nerves that go to the Lungs and Heart. II. Of that
which is casfed by the Nerves, that pafs-from the Liver to the
Spleen, and fo into the Bowels. III. That'all this is done
without the afii(iance of our vAU, but cannot be tffeCled with^
out a Providence. p. 128'
Chap. $. I* 6f the Memory, 11, Of Habits, P* *84
Chap. 6. I. That the Fibres of the Brain are not fubjebl to fush
quic^ changes as the Spirits are, II, Three different Changes
in the three different Ages, p. 139
Chap. 7. I. Of the Communication which is between the Brain
of a Mother, and that of her Child, II. Of the Communi-
cation that is between our Brain, and the other parts of our
Body, which carries us to Imitation and Compaffion. III. An
Explanation of the Generation of Monflrous Children, and of
the Propagation of the -Species, IV. Some Irregularities of
the Mind, and fome Inclinations of the Will explained, V. Of
Co/t'
The CONTENTS.
Concupfmct and Onginil Sin, VI. Objxdions and An-
fwers, ^ P* '41
Chap. 8. I. TheCbangis that happen to the Imagination of a.
Child after it U Born^ by the Converfation it has with its
Nurfe, its Mother y and other Per fans. II. Advice how to
Educate it well, p. 160
The Second Part.
Of the Imagination,
Chap.i, I./^F the imagination of mmen, 11.0/ that of Men,
III. Of that of Old People, p.i6j
Chap. 2, That the Animal Spirits ufually dbferve the Traces of
ideas which are moji Familiar to us; which U the Keafon
that we never ma\e a found Judgment of things', p. 1(58
Chap. 5. Of the Mutual Connexion between the idea^s of the
Mind, and the Traces of the B^ain, and of the Mutual Con-
nexion between Traces and Traces, and between ideals and
Idea's, ' p. 172
Chap. 4. 1. that Studious Men are the mofi fubjedl to Error,
II. The Reafon why they rather choofe to follow Authority^than
ma\e uftof their Judgment, ' p. 182
Chap. 5. Of the lU Effebis that Reading has upon the Imagina-
tion, p- 187
Chap. 6, That Studious Verfons are ufually prejudic'd in favour
offome Author,fo that their Principal Aim U to \now whathe
believd, without mindirig what he ought to believe, p. 190
Chap. 7. Of the Prejudices of Commentators, p. 195
Chap. 8. I. Of the Jnventers of Hew Syflems, II. The lafi Error
of Studious Perfons, p. 204
Chap.p. I. Of Effeminate tfits- II. Of Superficial }Pits^ll. Of
'0 Perfons of Authority. W, Of thofe that mal^e Exp^ments,
'p.! P- 209
I The Third Part.
Of the Contagious CorkmUnication of Strong Imaginations,
Chap. I. I-/^F tiur inclination to imitate others in all things',
iiH which it the Original of the Communication,
if Errors that depend upon the Power of imagination, II Trvo
Principal Caufes that increafe this Inclination, III. vthat a
Strong imagination is. IV That there are feveral forts of
it: Of Mad Men, and offuch Who have a Strong imagina-
tion according to the Senfe which is here meant. V. Two con-
fiderabU Defedis of thofe that have a Strong imagination,
■ Vf. Of the Power they have to Pefwacis and impofe, p:219
Clwp,
The CONTENTS.
Chap.2 GimralExamples of ths Force of the imagination,p.^^2
Chap. I. Of the Force of the imagination of eertain
thors. II. Of Tertullian. p. 241
Chap. 4. Of Seoeca*i Imagination. p. 244
Chap. 5. Of Montagne'j Boo!^, ^ p. 25?
Chap. 6. I. Of imaginary wi'^ards, and Lycanthropi orwolf-
Men, II> AConcltifmojf.tkeTvpo FirllJBook^. P* 2^3
BOO K ' III.
Of the Vnderfi^anding or Ture Mind*
Chap,I. I. Nought only is Ejfential to the Mind : Sen'
X fat ion and Imagination are. only its Mo-
difcations. II, We J^onv not all the Modifcatibns our Souls
are capatle of. III. they are different jrdm our Kno^ltdge and
Lovii and are not always the Effelis 'of them. p. i
Chap, 2, I. The Mind being limited cannot comprehend any
thing that relates io Infinity. If; its limitdtion is the
Original oj rnany Errors. III. And. chiefly of Herefies.
IV. We muh fubmit oicf Minds to Faith. " P* 9
Cliap. 3. l.TioatPhilofophers dijjlpate their Mind by applying
it to Subjtffs which include tod many Relations^ and which
depend upon'too many things y without l^eeping any Order'ii
their Studies. II. An Example drawn from Ariflotle.
III. That Geometricians^ on the contrary, proceed weU in an
Enquiry after truth, efpeciaUy thofe who mai^e ufe of Algebra.
IV. That their method incrcafes the power of the Mind \ and
that Ari(iotIt"'j Vogic\ weaJ^ens it, V. Another dejeli of flu-
dioiis Ptrfonsi p. i $
Chap. 4, J. the Mind cannot lorlg apply it felf to any Objell,
which neither relates to it felf, nor to Infinity, IF. The Iri-
con(lancy, and confequently the Error of the WiU, proceeds from
this De feci of Application. III. Our Senfations affeB m more
than the Pure ideals of the Mind. IV. What is the Original
Caufe of the Corruption of Manners. V. And the Ignorance of
the Generality of Mankind. p. 2 6
1 ————« till I
The Second Part of the Pure llnderflanding.
Of the mature of IDEA'S.
Chap.i. I. w meant by Ideals ; That they truly
V y Exifi, and that they are necejfary to pet'
cetve all material ObjeBs. IL A divifion of all the Modes by
which Ext ernal Ob jells may be feen. p. sp
Chap.
The CONTENTS.
Chap.2. That material Ohjt^j do not emit Species which rtfe»'
ble them. ^ p.5|
Chap. 3. That the Soul has no power of producing Idea's,
IheCauftof Mens Errors in reference to this Subje^i, p. 3$
Chap. 4. That we do mot fee Ohje6is by the means of idea's
which were created with us. And that God does not produce
them in us fo often as we have occafion for them, P» 41
Chap. 5, That the Mind neither fees the E[fences nor Exigence
of bb]e5lSi in confidiring its own Verft^ions. That none but
God fees them in that manner. • p.44
Chap.6. That we fee aU things in God, p.45
Chap.7. I. Four different ways of feeing things* 11. How we
l^ow God. III. How we i^ow Bodies. IV. How we \now
our Soul. V. How we \now the Souls of other Men, and pure
Spirits. , p,5$
Chap. 8. I. Tfje Intimate PrefenCe of the Wandering idea of
Bfing in General, is the Caufe of all the Irregular AbflraCli'
ons oj the Mind, and of the gr eate(i part of the Chimera''s of
common Philofophy, which hinder many Philofophers from dif-
covering the Solidity of the True Principles of Moral Philcfo'
phy, II. Example concerning the Effence of Matter. p. 61
Chap.'p. I. The la[l General Caufe of our Errors, II. That the
ideals of things are not always prejent to the Mind, as foon
as ^tisde(ir*d. III. That all Finite Minds are liable to Error,
and why. IV. jfe ought not to judge that there are only Bodies
or Spirits, nor that God is a Spirit, as we conceive Spirits,
p. 71
Chap. 10. Examples of fome Phy(ical Errors, into which Men
faU, becaufe they fuppofe that things which differ in their
_ Nature^ Qualities, Exttnfm, Duration and Proportion, are
alH^etn all things. P- 77
Chap.n. Examples of fome Errors of Morality which depend
on the fame Principle. P* 87
ThoConclufion of theToree fir(l Boo^s. P«pi
fXi —
P BOOK IV.
0/ the Inclinations and Natural Motions of the Mind.
Chap. I. Z. TT*s neceffary the Mind have lulinationsyas well
X as the Body Motions. IT. God aHs the Humane
Mind only for himfelf. III. Mens Minds a^e only inclined to
Particular Good, through the Motion they hate to Good in
General, IV.TheOrigine of the Chief Natural inclinations,
which will ma\e up the Divifon §f this Fourth Bookj P* i
Chap.
the CONTENTS.
Cliap. 2. I. The Inclination for Good'in General^ is'the Prii'
ciple of the Difquiet oj our will. If. And conftquently of
our Negligence and ignorance. III. Fir(l Example^ Mora'
lityy little l^nown to many Men, IV. Second Exampley The
immortality of the Soul difputed kyfome Men. V. That our
Ignorance is exceeding great in refpe6i of ahjlrailed things^
or fuch as have but little Relation to us. p* 7
Chap. 5. I, Curiofty is natural andneceffary, ,11. three Kules
to moderate it. III. Explanation of the firft of thefe Rules, p.20
Chap. 4. A Continuation of the fame Sub jell. I. Explana-
tionoj the Second Rule of Curiofty, II. Explanation of the
' Third. P« 27
Chap. 5. I. Of the Second Natural inclinationy or oj Self'
Love, II. It is divided into the Love oj Being and well'
' Beingy or of Greatnefs andPleafure. P-
Chap. 6. I. of the inclination rve have for every thing that
raifes us above other Perfons, II. Of the falfe Judgments of
fome pious Perfons. III. Of the falfe Judgments of the SU'
pirfiitious and Hypocrites, IV. Of Voctiu^ an Enemy to
'Monfteur Vcfcmte,. ' ' P' 3$
Chap. 7. of the deftre of Sciencty and of the Judgments of
pretenders to ^earning, p.42'
Chap. 8. I. Of the De(ire of being thought Learned, II. of the
Converfation of pretenders to Learning. III. Of their worlds,
■ • ' ; , p-48
Chap. 9. How thd Inclihation we have for Honours and Riches
lead us to Error. P* 5^
Chap. 10. Of the Love of Plea fur t in relation to Morality,
I. We mufl fhun Pleafure-though it mal^e us Happy. II. It mufl
not incline us to the Love of Senfible Delights, p. 58
Chap. 11. Of the Love of Pleafure, in relation to Speculative
Sciences. I. How it hindtrs lis from difcovering Tiuthi
11. Some Examples. ' ; p.
Chap. 12. Of the Effells which The thought of Future BlifS
• and Sufferings is capable of producing in.the ffdindp p^79
Chap. 15. I. Of the Third Natural inclination^'which is the
Frimijhip we have for other Men. II. It induces us to approve
OHT friends Thought Sy and to deceive them by Fdlfe Prdifes,
P- 8s
A
SEARCH
AFTER
TRUTH-
BOOK I. T.
Of the Errors of the Senfes.
f
C H A R L
i. Of the Nature and Properties of the V N D E %
STANDING,
II. Of the Nature and Properties of the WIL Li
and wherein its Liberty confifls,
Error is the Ciufe of Man s Mifery,
the corrupt Principle that has produced
Evil in the World j 'tis this, which begets
and cherilhes in our Souls all the Evils that
afl3i(5l us, and we can gcver exp€(il a true and folid
B Hapt
4
m
if'*';
■ ■■■11 ■, ,
■"-!■ .1'
V w
. ■'■■ii'Mi
— >-
r i-iii'i
• . iT-lllI,' .
;;4:':'
'.' t
f' ■^.I'^l''!;
iiiiiiii i(^. _
A Search after Truth.
Book L
Happinefs, but by a ferious Endeavour to avoid it.
iMy Scripture teaches us, that Men are mi^efable,
only becaufe they are Sinners and Criq;iinals, and
they would be neither, if they did not make them-
felves the Slaves of Sin by ajfenting to Error.
If it be true then, that Error is the Origin of
Men's Mifery, how very juft is it, that they Ihould
eadeavgur their Deliverance from it ? and certainly
Etibrt towards it would not be vain and unro-
• Book VI.
^ ''Pr
an
warded tlx)ugh perhaps it might not have all the
effeiit that could be defired; admit we could not ar-
rive at Infallibility, aod accomplift an abfolute Vi-
(Sory, yet we fhould be lefe deceiv*d, and fubjet^ to
fewer Evils ; We are not to expedf an entire Felicity
in this Life,becaufe we cannot pretend toInfallMity ;
but our Endeavours to avoid Error muA be asconti-
nual as are our Averfions for Mifery. In a word, as
we earneftly defire Happinefs without Hopes of at-
raining it here, fo we muft vigoroufly purfue Infal-
libility without any prefent Prerenfions to it.
We ought not to imagine aay great Toyl in an
Enrjuiry after Truth, 'tis but opening our Eyes, be-
coming attentive, and exadly obferving the * fol-
lowing Rules. Exadnels of Thought has not that
Trouble and Slavery in it,that the Imagination repre-
fonts j Nay, though we fhould meet fome little Un-
eafinels at firfi, yet the attending Satisfodion will
abundantly recompence our Pains j for, in fine, 'tis
that which produces Light, and difoovers Truth.
But to fpend no more rkne in preparing the Rea-
ders mind to a Search after Truth, which we are wil-
ling to believe is already iufficiently difpos'd thereto,
let us examine the Caufes and Nature of our Errorsi
And fince the Method ctf examining things in their
Original is more regular and clear, and helps us to
a deeper Knowledge of them than any other Procefs,
let us Effoy to put it in pradke here.
The Mind of Man having nothing of Matter or
Rxtenjion in it, is, undoubtedly, a fimple and indi-
«/ the Un- vifjble Subftance, and wiihouc any Compofition of
it has been ufuaL to.make a diftindion of
two
I. of the
Nature and
Pro^'rtres
Chap. I. A Search after Truths
two Faculties in it, XJnder(landing and (which we
lhall foon explain) for it feems the Notions or Idea's
that Men have of them, are not fo clear and diftintft,
as they ought to be.
But becaufe thefe Idea's are very abftradl, and
not the proper Objedfs of the Imagination, perhaps
it will not be amifs to exprefs them by their Relation
to thofe Properties, which are agreeable to Matter,
which being eafie to be imagined, will render the
Notions,which tis fit to apply to thefe ExprefIions,Z^w-
derfianding and tViH, more diftindt and familiar to us i
We muft only take heed to remember, that thefe Re-
lations betwixt Mind and Matter are not truly ade-
quate, and that the Comparifon of thefe different
kinds of Beings ferve only to make the Mind more
attentive, and, as it were, fenfible of the Subjedf we
Difcourfe upon.
Matter or Extenfion includes in ir two Properties,
of different Figures, and Capability of Mo-'
t*on; even fo the Mind of Man has two Faculties,
Underfianding^ which is receptible of ditferent Ideas,
and fVill, which is capable of different Inclinations,
or of willing different things. We lhall explain in
order the Relation that the firft Property of Matter has
to the firft Faculty of the Mind.
Extenfion is capable of receiving two forts of Fi-
gures, External, as Roundnefs in a piece of Wax,
ternal, as that which is proper to all the Particles
whereof the Wax is composed ; for 'tis certain, that
all the Particles which make up a piece of Wax, are
very different in Shape from thofe which compofe a
piece of Iron ; I call then, for diftindfion fake, that
limply a Figure, which is External, and that Cofifigura"
tkn, which is Internal, and which is neceffary to all the
Particles whereof the Wax is coinpos'd, lb as to be
what it is. Thus alfo the Idea's of the Soul are of
two Sorts, (taking the name Idea in general for every
^ thing that the Mind hnmediately perceives) the firft
reprefents fomething without us, as that of a Square,
i' a Hoafe,&e. the fecond, that which paftes within us,
as Senlacion, whether of Grief, Pleafuie, And
B 2 We
A Search after truth. Book I.
we fhall fee hereafter, that thefe laft Idea's are nothing
elfe but a Manner of the Mind's Exiftence, and there-
fore I (hall call them the Modifications of the Mind.
We might alio call the Inclinations of the Soul the
Modifications thereof > For *cis evident, that the Incli-
nation of the Will is a Marnier of the Souls Exiftence,
and therefore it might be calfd the Modification of
Soul, as motion in Bodies, being a Manner of their
Exiftence, might be calfd a Modification of Matter.
However I neither call the Inclinations of the Will,
nor Motions of Matter, Modifications ; fince thefe In-
clinations and thefe Motions have, ordinarily, relation
to ibmething External; for the Inclinations have re-
lation to Good, and Motions have relation to Jome Ex-
tern at Body, But the Figures and Configurations of
Bodies, and the Senfations of the Soul, have no necef-
lary relation to any thing without ; For even as a
Figure is round, when all the External parts of a
Body are equally diftant from the Center without any
relation to things External, fo all the Senfations, of
which we are capable, could fubfift, if there were no
Objedl without us, their Exiftence includes no necef-
lary rektion to Bodies which feem to caule them, as
lhall be proved eliewhere; and they are nothing elfe
but the Soul modified after fuch orfuch a manner, fo
that they are properly the Modifications of the Soul;
I fhall then take the Liberty to call them fo, to explain
my fclf.
The firft and principal agreement betwixt that Pro-
perry, that matter has of referving different Figures
and different Configurations, and that Faculty which
the Soul has of receiving different Idea's, and different
Modifications,is this, even as the Property of receiving
different Figures and different Configurations is entirely
paflive and includes no adlion, fb alfo the Faculty of
receiving different Idea's and different Modifications
in the Mind is entirely paftive and includes no adfion:
I call this Faculty or Capacity, which the Soul has of
receiving all things, VNDEf^STylNDING,
Whence we inuft conclude, that 'tis iheZJnderftafid'
ing which perceives, fince there is nothing elfe that
receives
p
,Chap. I. A Search after Truths
receives the Idea s of Objedls, for 'tis the fame thing
for the Soul to perceive an Objeff, as to receive the
Idea which reprefents it. 'Tis alio the Underftand-
ing which perceives the Modifications of the Soul 5 for
I mean by the word, Vnderftanding^ that paflive Fa-
culty of the Soul, by which it receives all the different
Modifications whereof it is capable 1 For 'tis the fame
thing to the Soul to receive that manner of Exiftence>
which is caird Pain, as to perceive Pain ; fince it can
receive Pain no other way but by perceiving it;
whence we muft conclude, that 'tis the Underftanding
which imagines abfent Objedts, and perceives thofe
that are prefent, and that the Senfe and Imagination
are only the Underftanding, perceiving Objedts by |j
the Organs of the Body, as fhall be explain'd here-
after.
Becaufe, when Men feel Pain, or any thing elfe,
they perceive it ordinarily, by the means of the Or-
ItU
gans of Senfe, they commonly fay, that 'tis the Senfes |
which perceive it, without knowing diftindfly what
I
they mean by the Term Senfe ; they fancy there's
fomeFaculty, diftindl from the Soufwhich makes it,or
the Body capable of feeling, for they believe the Or-
gans of Senfe do really participate of our perceptions.
They imagine, that the Body does fo far affift the
Mind to perceive, that if the Mind was feparated
from the Body it could perceive nothing at all: Bur i!
thefe thoughts are the effedts of Prejudice, and of [J
judging according to our prefent State of Life, in :f
which we perceive nothing without the Help of the f
Organs of Senfe, as fhall be explain'd more at large. • |
'Tis to accommodate my feif to the common way of I
fpeaking, that I fhall fay hereafter the Senfes perceivey p
but by the word Senfe I only mean that paftive Faculty ^
of the Soul juft raention'd ; that is, the Underftand- |j
ing perceiving fomething by means of what paftes in |
in the Organs of the Body according to the Infticution I
of Nature, as fhall be elfewhcrc cxplaiifd.
Another agreement between the paiTive Faculty of
jjjj the Soul and that of Matter, is, that as Matter is
ppt truly ch^ng'd by an alceraricn of its Figure i for
B i hr
'
i"
I
A Sear eh etfter truth. Bookl.
Inftance, Wax receives no confiderable Change for be-
ing round or fquare, fo the Mind receives no Change
by the Diverhty of Idea's which it has; I mean, the
Mind receives no confiderable Change, although it re-
ceives an Idea of a Square, or a Circle, in perceiving a
Square, or a Circle.
Farther, as it may be faid, that Matter undergoes
confiderable Changes, when it loofes the Configuration
proper to the parts of the Wax, to receive that which
is proper to Fire and Smoke, when the Wax is chang'd
into Fire and Smoke; fo it may be (aid, that the
Soul receives very confiderable Alterations, when it
changes its Modifications,and fuffers Pain,after having
felt Pleafure. Whence we muft conclude, that Idea's
are to the Soul very near,what Figures are to Matter;
and that Configurations are much the fame to Matter,
that Senfations are to the Soul.
There are yet other agreements betwixt the Fi-
gures and Configurations of Matter, and the Idea's
and Modifications of the Mind, for it foems that Matter
is an Image of the Mind ; I only mean, there are Pro-
perties in Matter, which have betwixt themfelves Re-
lations, much like thofe which are found amongft the
Properties belonging to the Mind, although the Na-
ture of the Mind is very different from that of Matter,
as fhall be clearly fhewn hereafter.
From all that I have faid, I would have it well re-
membred, that by the Underflanding, I mean that
pafHve Faculty, which the Soul has of perceiving, that
is, of receiving not only different Idea's, but alfo in-
numerable Senfations, even as Matter is capable of re-
ceiving all Manner of External Figures and Internal
Configurations.
The other Property of Matter is, that 'tis capable
of receiving feveral Motions, and the other Faculty of
the Soul is, that 'tis capable of receiving feveral In-
clinarions, let us compare thcfe together.
As the Author of Nature is the Univerfal Caufe of
all Motions, which are found in Matter, fo is He alfo
the General Caufe of all the Natural Inclinations in
our Minds, and even as all Motions are made in a
Streight
Cha{>. I. A Search afkrTrutL 7
Streight Line, if they do not meet with fome f articular
t and foreign Caufes,which determine and change them
s into Curve Lines, fo all the Inclinations we receive
^ from God, are right, and could not haVe any other
i End but the polTeflion of Good and Truths were
there not fome Extraneous Caufe which determines
ts the Impreflion of Nature towards evil ends: Now
oc ^is this foreign Caufe, which is the Origin of all our
d Evilsi and which Corrupts all our Inclinations,
fd To underftand this well. We muft know, that there
lie is a Very confiderable Difference betwixt the Imprefli-
it on or Motion, which the Author of Nature produces
in Matter, and the Impreffion or Motion towards
tos Good in General, which the fame Author of Nature
Tteri continually ImprelTes on the Mind 5 for Matter is
m, wholly unadfive, it has no power to Hop it s Motion,
or to determine or tUrn it felt, one way rather than
lePr another: Its motion, as I have laid before, is made
Idea's always in a Strait Line, and when diverted from this
to motion, it defcribes a Curve, the ncareft to a right
ePro- line that*s poflible, becaufe 'tis God that inipreffes on
es^f it its Motion, and regulates its Determination. But
*tis not fo with the Will; * it may be laid in one # Seethe
ih- fenfe to be adtiVe, and to have in it felf a Power of Explana-
Marr determining differently the Inclination or Impreffion
that God gives it, for tho' it cannot ftop this Im-
welliT preflion, it may in a fenfe be laid to turn it which
taoik way it pleafes,and thereby caufe all the diforders, that
1^1% are in its Inclinations, and all the Miferies, which are
jiir the certain and neceffary Confequences of Sin.
So that by the Word ff^lLL, I wou d be un-
derftood to mean, the Natural Imprefficn or Motion^
which carries us towards indetermiri'd and uni-cerfal
.jjtle Goodt And by the Word LIB E I{^TT, I only un-
ol derftand the Power which the Mind has of turning that
Impreffion towards agreeable ObjeSls^ and fo fixing our
natural Inclinations on fome particular Ohjeci, which he-
Jj'jfert indetermin d to %.)nivcrfai G'^od; that
n j[|5 is, to God, who comprehends in himfelf all that's
sot"
-n
\ Whence
'A Setnh after Truth. Book I.
Whence 'tis eafie to difcover, that the* our Nam-
ral Inclinations are voluntary, yet they are not al-
ways free with that liberty of Indifference, thap I
am fpeaking of, which includes the Power of Pf^Uing
or not fVilling, or of Willing the contrary to what
our Natural Inclinations carry us; for tho* 'tis vo-
iuntarily and freely that Men love Good in General,
iince they can t love againft their Will, and 'tis a
ContradidHon to fuppofe the Will Ihould eyer fiiffer
Conftraint, however they love it not freefy in the fenfe
that I have juft explained, fince 'tis out of the Pow-
cr of our Will not to wifh to be Happy.
But it muft be well obferv'd, that the Mind con-
(ider'd as pufli'd on towards Good in General, can't
determine its Motion towards a particular Good, if
the fame Mind, confider'd as fufceptible of Idea's, has
not the Knowledge of this particular Good; that is, in
the common way of fpeaking, the Will is a blind
power, which can only defire thofe things that the
Underftanding reprefents to it: So that the Will can't
differently determine the Impreflion it has for Good,
and all its Natural Inclinations, but by commanding
the Underffanding to reprefent to it fome particular
Objedl. The Power then that the Will has of deter-
mining its Inclinations, neceflarily includes an ability
of carrying the Underftanding towards agreeable Ob-
3e(5ts. I will explain by an Example, what 1 have
faid concerning and Liberty, A Man reprefents
to himfelf a Preferment under the Notion of a Good,
which he can hope for ; immediately the Will will^
this Good, that is, the Impreflion, that the Mind con-
rinually receives towards Indetermin'd and Univerfal
Good, inclines it to this Preferment; But as this Pre-
ferment is not the Univerfal Good, and is not confi-
der'd in a clear and diftind: view Ojf the Mind, as Uni-
verfal Good, (for the Mind never fees clearly that
which is notj the Impreffion, that he had received of
Vniverfal Good, is not wholly fiopt by this particular
Good, the Mind has fbme motion to go yet farther, it
is not neceflarily nor invincibly in Love with this
pignity, but is at Liberty in refped thereof
Chap* n. A Stirch after Truth.
Now its Liberty coniifts in this, that being not fully
convincd that dis Dignity includes all the GW,which
he is capable of loving, he may fufpend his Judgment
and Love, and afterwards fas Ihall be explained in the
third Book J he may, by the Union which he has
with the Univerfal Being, or that which includes
every Good, think of other things, and confequently
love other Goods^ In fine, we may compare all other
Goods, love 'em according to the Order and Degree
hi which they are lovely, and refer em to him, which
includes them all, and which is only worthy to limit
our Love, as being only able to fill all our Capacity of
Loving.
Almoft the fame thing may be faid of the Know-
ledge of Truth, as pf the Love of Good j We love the
Knowledge of Truth as the Enjoyment of Good, by a
Natural Impreflion ; and this Impreflion, as well as
that which carries us towards Good, is not invincible,
its only fo by the evidence, or by the perfe(i;l: and ab-
folute knowledge of the Objedf: And we are as free
in our falfe Judgments, as in our irregular Affedlions,
as (hall be (hown in the following Chapter,
!1T
f
ir
1
i;.'.
1
|i
CHAP. IL
L Of Judgments and Tieafonings, II, That they depend
upon the Will. III. Wioat ufe muft he made of its
Ziherty in rejpehi of them. IV. Txoo General {{ules to
avoid Error and Sin. V. Necejfary ^flehiions upon
tkofe I^des,
TT might well be concluded, from what has been Ofjudg-
f faid in the preceeding Chapter, that the Under-
(landing never judges, (ince it only perceives ^ or
fince Judgments and Reafonings, even in refped: of the
Underftanding, are only pure Perceptions: Tis the
Wdl ^lonj which propedy Judges in acquiefcing in
^hat
Li'
if
It
I
i
rt
IfX
■'»/
A Sinnh Mfi& Tff^. * Bddk f.
that which the Underftanditig fiejjrefefltS Id it, tmi in
voluntarily rcfting there, *tis this lilfo which deceives
us j but thefe things muft be explaift'd more at
large.
I fay then, there is no Difference in re§)edl of the
Underftanding, between a fimple Perception, and a
Judging and Reafoning, fave, that the Underftanding
perceives a fimple thing by a fimple Perception,
without any relation to any thing whatever > that it
fierceivcs the relation betwixt two or more things in
udging 5 that, in fine, it perceives the relations that
are betwixt the relations of things in reafoning. So
that ail the operations of the Underftanding are fwre
Ferceptiofis,
When we perceive, for Example, twice i Or 4,
this is only a Simple Perception: When we Judge
that 1 times a are 4, or that 1 times 2 are not 5, the
Underftanding does only yet receive the relation
of Equality which is between i times i and 4, or the
relation of Inequality that is between 1 times 1 and 5.
Thus the Judgmenty in refpetft of the Underftanding,
is only the Perception of the P^lation hetvpeen ttoo or more
things; but Reafoning is the Perception of the Relation
that is found (not between two or more things, for
this would be Judgment,but) between two or more Pelar
tions of two or more things. Thus, when I conclude
that 4 is lefs than 6, and that 2 times 2 making 4, is
alio confequently lefs than 6, I perceive not only the
Relation of Inequality between 2 times 2 and 6, for
then this would be only Judging, but the Relation of
Inequality which is betwixt the Relation of 2 times
2 and 4^ and the Relation between 4 and 6, which is
Reafoning. The Underftanding then only perceives,
and the Will only judges and reafbns by refting it felf
voluntarily in what the Underftanding reprefents to
it 'y as we faid before.
Neverthelefs, when thofe things that we confider
are felf evident, it appears to us, that it is not then vo-
luntarily that we alleiit to them ; fo that we are in-
cliffd to believe, that 'tis not our Will, but Under-
ftanding which judges of them.
But
Cbs^* ^ after Truth.
But to be convinced of our Error, we muft know,
that things which we confider, are only then entirely
evident, when the Underftanding hath exatnin'd them
on all fides, and all their neceflary relations, in order
to judge of them ; whence it happens, that as the
Will can will nothing without knowing, fo it cannot
adf on the Underftanding : 1 mean, it can't defire
that it Ihould rcprefent any new thing in its Objedf,
bccaufe it has already confidefd it in every relpe(ft,
by which it has any Relation to the propoled Queftionr
the Will is then oblig'd to acquiclce in that,which the
Underftanding has already reprefented, and to trouble
or agitate it no fanher ; and this acquiefcing is that,
which is properly call'd Judgment and Realbning.
And thus, this Acquiefcence or Judgment not being
free, when things are in their utmoft evidence, ap-
pears to us to be involuntary.
But fo long as there is any thing obfcure in the Sub-
jetft that we confider,or that we are not entirely aflur'd
that we have difcover'd all,that is neceflary to relblve
the Queftion, as it frequently happens in fuch as are
very difficult, and include many Relations 5 we are at
eur Liberty not to confent, and the Will can yet com-
mand the Underftanding to apply it felf to a new
Enquiry ; hence we are not lb far from believing,
that the Judgments, we form upon thefe Subjed:s, are
voluntary.
Neverthelel^ the greateft part of Philofophers pre-
tend, that even thefe Judgments, which we form upon
obfcure things, are involuntary, and will generally
have it, that a confent to Truth is an acftion of the
Underftanding, which they call Ajfenfus, to diftinguiih
it from a Confent to Good, which they attribute to the
Will, and which they call Covfenfus. But the Caiife
of their Diftintftion and Error is this. That in this pre-
fent State of Life, we often fee evident Truths wirh-
out any reafon of Doubt, and fo the Will is not indif-
ferent in the Confent that it gives to them, as we have
explain'd above : But 'tis not the fame thing as to
Good,we know nothing of it,without having Ibme reafon
of doubting whether we ought to love it 5 our Pa/fi-
■ ' ^ ons,
A Search after Truth. Book I.
ons, and the Inclinations which we Naturally have
for fenfible Pleafures, are confiis'd Reafons, yet very
ftrong, becaufe of the Corruption of our Nature, and
they make us cold and indifferent even in the Love
of God. And thus, we evidently perceive our Indiffe-
rence, and are inwardly convinc'd that we make ufe
of our Liberty, when we love God.
But we do not in like manner perceive that we
ufe our Liberty, when we confent to Truth, efpecially
when it appears Self-evident; and this makes us be-
lieve that our Confent to Truth is involuntary, as if it
were neceffary that our ad:ions were indiflferent to be
voluntary, and as if the Blejfed did not love God vo-
luntarily without being interrupted by fomething elfe,
Gsomitri. juft as we confent to this evident Propofition, twice
dans love 2 is 4, without being hindred from believing it by
Tut appearance of a contrary Reafon.
knowledge ^^at we may diftindlly perceive the Difference
ef Trnth, that there is betwixt the Wills confent to a and
alt ho' the jj-j confent to Goodnefs, we muft know the Difference
%mmonlf^ that is betwixt Truth and Goodnefs,taken in the com-
ajferted. mon acceptation, and in relation to us. The Difle-
rence confifts in this, Goodnefs concerns and affedfs us,
but Truth affe(3:s us not, for Truth confifts only in the
relation that two or more things have between them-
felves, but Goodnefs confifts in the relation of Agree-
ablenefs that things have with us. Hence there s but
one Adlionof the Will in refpedf of Truth, which is
its Acquiefcence,or Affentjto the Reprefentation of the
relation that is between things ; But in refpedl of
Goodnefs there are two, its Acquiefcence or Affent to
the relation of Agreement that things have with us,
and its Love or Motion towards fuch a thing ; which
adfions are very different, altho* they are ordinarily
confounded, for there's much difference betwixt fimply
acquiefcing in, and being carry'd by Love to what
the Mind reprefents, fince Men often acquiefce
in things, which they could wiih were not, and which
they do.
Now, if we confider well of things, we fhall plainly
pcrceiye that 'tis the Will always that aifents not to
things
leics
chap. II. A SeArch after Truth. 13
things, unlefs they be difagreeable to it, but to the
Reprefentation of things,and the Reafon why the Will
acquiefces in things, which are in their utmoft Evi-
dence, is, (as we have already laid) becauie there is
not in thofe things any Relation which ought to have
been coniiderM, that theUnderftanding hath not per-
ceiv'd. So that it is, as it were, neceflary for the
Will to leave off Debating, and unprofiiably Fatiguing
it felf, and reif in full Affurance, that it is not de-
ceiv'd, lince there's nothing yet farther, upon which it
can exercife its Underftanding.
We muft chiefly remark, that in the State we now
are, we have only an imperfedf Knowledge of things ;
and by confequence, 'tis abfolutely neceilary that we
have this Liberty of Indiffere'nce, by which we may
forbear giving our Aflent.
To fee the Neceffity of it, we muft confider that we
are carry'd by our Natural Inclinations towards Truth
and Goodnefs, fo that the Will inclining it felf only
to fuch things, as the Mind has fome knowledge of, it
muft carry it felf to that, which has the appearance of
Truth and Goodnefs; but becaufe every thing, which
has the appearance of Goodnefs, is not always what it
appears to be, its evident that if the Will were not
free, and if it were infallibly and neceflarily carry'd
to every thing, that has thefe appearances of Goodnefs
and Truth, it would very often be deceiv'd ; whence
it feems we might conclude, that the Author of its
Being was alio the Author of its Wandrings and
Errors.
God has then given us Liberty^ that we might keep ni. Of the
our felvesfrom being deceiv'd, and from all the Evils Ufethatwe
which are the effedt of our Errors, by never yielding
a full Affent to appearances of Truth, but only to
Truth it felf, that is, in continually applying the Mind, mtty newf
and commanding it to Examine, till it has cleafd and
refolv'd every thing that was to be Examin'd ; For
Truth is fcarce ever without Evidence, and Evidence
coniifts only in a clear and diftincft view of all the
Parts and Relations of the Objecf, which are necelia-
ry to give an affur'd Judgment.
The
I
A S^arcJi after Truth. Book I.
The Ufa then, that we muft make of oar Ubertyy
is. TO USE IT AS MUCH AS WE CAN j that
is. Never to confent to any thing whatever, till wc
are compeird to it, as it were by the inward Re-
preaches of our Reafon.
To fubmic to falfe Appearances of Truth, is to en-
Have our felves againft the Will of God, bat to fub-
mit our felves fairly to the fecret Reproaches of our
* Reaibn, which follow our not aflenting to Evidence,
this is to obey the Voice of Eternal Truth. Here
are then the two eftablilh'd Rules, which I fjx)ke of,
which are very necdfary in all Speculative and Mo-
ral Sciences, and which we ought to look upon,as the
Foundation of all Humane Sciences.
The firft, which relates to Sciences, is this; Nwiey
to give an entire ajjent, but to Propofitions that appear
Jo evidently trucy that we cant refufe them without feel'
ing an inward regret, and fecret reproaches of our 5
that is, without we knew clearly that we fhould
make an ill ufe of our Liberty, if we would not aflenr,
or would extend our Power to things, over which we
have none.
The fecond, which refpedls Morality, is this ; Nc
vcr to iove any Good, abjolutely, if we can without re-
morfe forbear. Whence it follows, that we ought to
love nothing abfblutely, and without relation to any
thing elfe, but God, for 'tis he only, from the Love of
whom we can't abftain without this fort of Remorle ;
that is, without an evident knowledge of our doing
ill, fuppofing him known by Reafon and Revela-
tion.
But we muft obferve here, that when thofe things
that we perceive do appear very probable to us, we
find our felves extreamly inclin'd to believe them ;
nay, we are uneafie, when we are not perfwaded of
them ; lb that if we are not very cautious, we are in
much danger of aflenting to them, and confecjuently
of deceiving our felves; for 'tis a great chance that
7'ruth is exaiftly like to Probability. Hence it is that
I have exprefsly laid down in thefe Rules, that we
muft confent to nothing but what we fee evidently,
iinlcfs
Ch»p. HI. ^ i Semk after Truth.
uokis we ihottld cqake aa ill ufe of our Liberty, if we
did not confent.
Nowialchp* we perceive our felves extreamly inclined
to allent to aq appearance of Truth,yet if we take care
to examine whether we evidently fee our felves ob-
Hg*d to confent thereto, we fliall find the contrary j
for if appearance of Truth is grounded upon the Im-
prefiioQ of our Secies, X fay, an appearance of Truth,
falfely fo called, then we ftiall be ftrongly inclin'd to
comply therewith, not perceiving any other Caufe
tlan feme PaUion, or (general Affection, that we have
for that which pleafes the Senfes, as will fully appear
hereafter.
But, if an appearance of Truth arifes from feime
Confortniiy with Truth, as commonly all probable
Knowledge, taken in a certain fenfe> is true, then if
we refled: upon oar felves, we (hall perceive that we
are incUn'd to two things, to Belk'uey and to
Bxojmne farther^ but we Ihall never find our felves
lb ranch perfwaded, as to think we do ill, if we do
not abfolutely aflent.
Now thefe two Inclinations, which we find in us,
in reference to Probabilities, are very good, for we
can, and muft affent to apparent Truths, fo far as they
bear the Image of Truth; however, we muft not
yet intirely allent, according to the Rule before laid
down, but tho"Owly examine the Ohjed, that we
may have a perfed knowledge of its Nature, truly di-
ftinguilh between Truth and Fallhood, and after-
wards intirely fiibmk, if ETideace compells us there-
to.
We ought much to accuftom ©ur felves to diftin-
guilh between Truth and appearance of Truth, by an
inward Examination of our leives, as I have already
faid; for 'tis for want of this fort of Examination,
that we perceive our fe4vss toudi't after the feme
manner with two things fo difierenr. For indeed 'tis a.
matter of the greateftConfequence to makeGood ufe of
our Liberty, by denying always our Afient to things,
or loving them, till we find our felves compel I'd there-
to by the powerful Voice of the Author of Nature,
which
m
16 A Search after truth. Book 1.
which I before call'd the Reproaches of our Reafbriy
and the Regret of our Confcience.
All the Duties of Spiritual Beings, as well of An-
V gels as of Men, confifts chiefly in this Pradfcice, and
it may pofltively be affirm'd, that, if they carefully
ufe their Liberty, and not blindly enflaVe themfelves
to Lies and Vanity, they are in the way to the greatefl:
perfection, that they are capable of; provided they
iuffer not their Underftanding to lie idle, but carefully
and continually excite it to new Knowledge, rendring
it capable of the greateft Truths, by conftant medi-
tations upon fuch Subjedts as are worthy their appli-
cation.
To perfect our Minds, it's not fufficient to ufe our
Liberty always, fo as to aflent to nothing, as fome Per-
fbns do, who pride themfelves in knowing nothing,
but doubting all things; nor muft we fo aflent to
eveiy thing, as many others, who fear nothing fo much
as being ignorant of fbmething, and pretend to know
all things, but we muft make a Good ufe of our Vn-
derflanding by continual Meditations, fo that we may
have frequent Opportunities of being able to aflent to
what it propofes without fear of being deceived.
CHAP. in.
I. Anfmrs to fome OhjeBions, 11. Remarks upon what
hath been faid about the necejfity of Evidence.
TT is not very difficult to divine, that the pra(ftice of
"*■ the firft Rule, which I fpoke of in the preceeding
Chapter, will not pleafe all the World, but efpecially
thole imaginary Learned, who pretend to know all
things, and yet know nothing at all, pleaflng them-
felves in fpeaking confidently of the moft difficult
things, and who certainly arc ignorant of the moft
eafic.
They
chap. in. Search after Truth. 17
They will not fail to lay with Artiftotic^ that Cer-
tainty is only to be found in Mathematicks, but in
Morality and Phylics Probability fuffices; That Def
^ cartes was very much out in treating of Phylics, as he
\ did of. Geometry, which was the reafon he fail'd in
^ the attempt; That 'tis impolTibie for Man to know
^ Nature, That it's Springs and Secrets are impenetrable
^ to the Humane Mind ; and many other fine things,
which they fet off with a great deal of Pomp and Mag-
i®! nificence, maintaining it from the Authority of a
multitude of Authors, and value themfelves much upon
pJj* knowing their Names, and being able to cite fome
Paflages from them.
1 would intreat thefe Gentlemen to talk no more of
what they profefs they do not know, and put a Check
to the ridiculous Motions of their Vanity, in forbear-
faitR ing to compole fuch great Volumes upon thofe Sub-
je&s, which, according to their own Confeflion, they
oto are ignorant of.
owV But let thefe Perfons ferioully Examine, whether it
weo be not abfolutely necellary either to be deceiv'd, or
£eni never to give our entire Confent,except to things fully
a evident ? Whether Truth does not always accompany
Geometry, becaufe Geometricians obferve this Rule ?
And if the Errors, into which fome are fallen, con-
cerning the Quadrature of the Circle, the Duplication
of the Cube, and fome other very difficult Problems,
proceed not from fome Precipitation, or Prejudice,
, which made 'em take an appearance of Truth for
Truth it felf?
Let 'em confider alio on the other hand, if Falfenefs
and Confufion does not reign in common Philofdphy,
becaufe Philofophers content themfelves with fuch an
eafie Probability as is convenient for their Vanity and
biiiJ? Interefts. Do we not find every where an infinite Di-
Verfity of Opinions, even upon the fame Subjeds, and
pleafinJj confequently an Infinity of Errors ? Yet a great num-
ber of Difciples fuffcr themfelves to be feduc'dj,
and blindly fubmit to the Authority of thefe
Philofophers, without even comprehending their O-
pinions,
5 - C 'Tis
A Search after Truth. Book I.
Tis true,there are fome who perceive after twenty or
thirty years Lofs of time, that they have learnt nothing
in their Lecftures, but they are alham'd to make ^
fincere Confeflion of it. They firft prove after their
own way, that no certain Knowledge can be attained
and afterwards they acknowledge, that they know
nothing, becaufe they believe they may then fafely do
it without any Jeft upon their Ignorance. It would
be fufficienc matiei^of Diverfion and Laughter, to
hear them give an account of their fine progrefs in
Learning, and to get them in a humour of declaring
all the Fatigues they have endur'd to acquire it; but
altho this Learned and profound Ignorance deferves our
Raillery, it's much better to forbear it, and to pity
thofe who have thus fpent fo many years, only to
Learn this falfe Propofition, J kpovp nothing, which is
an Enemy to all Science and Truth.
Since the Rule then, which I have eftablifh'd, is fb
ncceflary in a Search after Truth, as we have feen it is,
lb that nothing can be objed:ed againft thofe that pro-
pofe it; Let fuch as will not take pains to oblerve it,
at leaft, not condemn fo Illuftrious an Author as Mon-
fieur Dcfcartes was, becaufe he followed, or endea-
vourM, as near as he could, to follow it j They would
not Cenlure him fo raflily, if they knew him, nor
would they read his Works, as Fables and Romances,
which Men read for their Diverfion, not Inflruc^ion ;
if they throughly confider'd this Author, they would
llill find in themfelves fbme Notions, and Principiesof
Truth that he teaches, which would undeceive em
in fpight of the Prejudices of their Falfe Learning.
I'hat Mafter which inwardly Didfates to us, would
have us hear him rather than the Authority of the
greateft Philofophers, He is pleafed when He Inftruds,
provided we apply our felves to what He faysj 'tis by
Meditation, and a very exadl Attention, that we in-
rerrogate him; and 'tis by a certain inward Con-
vidlion, and the fecret Reproaches of thofe that do
not confent to it, by which Ffe anfwers.
We fhould fb read the Works of Men, as not to
hope to be inftruded by Man, but' interrogate Him
that
Chap. III. A Search after Truth,
that is the Light of the World, fo that we may be
'§ enlightn'd with the reft of the World, if He does not
? enlighten us after we have Enquir'd of Him, no doubt
® we Enquir'd amifs.
Whether therefore we read Ariftotle or Defcartes^ we
^ muft not prefently believe either, but meditate as they
did, or ought to have done, with all the attention
whereof we are capable, and afterwards obey the
I ® Voice of our Common Mafter, and honeftly fubmit
?lsiii our felves to the inward Convictions and Motions
which we feel in Meditation,
but After this we are permitted to Judge for or againft
ssour Authors ; And thus having firft digefted the Principles
of Defcat'tes's and Ariftotle^s Philofophy, we may re-
jecft the one, and approve the other; and may be even
ffliidt allur'd, that the laft Ihall never explain any Phoenome-
non of Nature by his own Principles, which have been
ufelefs for thele Two thoufand years, although his
'ietni: Philofophy has been Studied by the Learned in almoft
[eibitf all parts of the World, and that on the Contrary,
icbfe we may boldly fay of the other, that he hath pene-
borasli rrated into that which appeared moft obfcure in the
i,ot d Eyes of Men, and hath ftiew'd 'em a fure way to dil-
jheifw cover ail Truths that a limited Underftaading can
new lib comprehend.
jniRoK But without relying on the Opinion that we may
3tlntofe have of thefe two Philofophers, and of all others, let
us ifill look upon 'em as Men, and let not the Arifto-
tdians be difpleafed, if, after having walkM fo many
andeaji' Ages in Darknefs, without being able to make any
ilfeleaib. further Advancement, we are willing to fee without
restotH." having been led like blind
' Men, we now remember that we have Eye's, and eifay
^pjelcfc'. to Conduct our felves.
Let us then be fully convinc'd of this Rule, Never
• entire ajjent hut to things that are evident^
This is the moft neceifary of all Rules in a Search after
Truth, and let us not admit any thing into our Minds
^ as Truth, but what appears with the Evidence that
\ffn 25^ demands. We muft be perfuaded thereof,
^ hay by our Prejudices, and it's abfolutely neceiTary
; C » tha!
20 A Search after Truth. Book IIJ.
that we be deliver d frogi our Prepofleflions to enter
into the Knowledge of Truth, becaufe the Mind muft
be Purified before it can be Enlightened. Sapentia
prima eft Stiilitia caruiffe.
\\.Remarks before we finifli this Chapter, we muft Remark
upan rohat Three Things : The firft is, that I fpeak not here of
about Faith, which admit not the fame Evidence
the neJ^ity Natural Sciences do, becaufe we cannot perceive
if Evi- things, but by the Idea's which we have of them, for
^ acnce. God hath only given us thole Idea's, which are necel-
fary to condud: us in the Natural Order of Things
according to which we are created, lo that the My-
, fteries of Faith being of a Supernatural Order, we
muft not be furpriz'd if we have not the fame Idea's
^ of them ; for out Souls are created by Virtue of a
General Decree, by which we have all the Notions
1: SettheEx- that are necclfary for us ; But the Myfteriesof Faith
planations. i^ave been eftablilh'd only by the Order of Grace,
which, according to our Ordinary way of Conception,
is a Decree coniequent to that Order of Nature.
We ought then to diftinguifli the Myfteries of Faith
from Natural Things, We muft equally fubmit to
Faith and Evidence, but in Matters of Faith we muft
not look for fuch Evidence as is in Natural Things;
we muft not rely upon the Faith, that is, upon the
Authority of Philolbphers. In a word, to be Faithful,
we muft believe things not comprehended by Reafon;
but to be Philofophers, we muft take nothing upon
Truft.
'Tis univerlally agreed upon, that there are other
Truths beiides thofe of Faith, in which it vyould be
unjuft to demand inconteftible Demonftrations, fuch,
for Inftance, as- relate to Hiftory, and other things
depending upon Mans Will. For there are two forts
of Truth, Keccjfary and Contingent^ I call them Ne-
celfary Truths, that are Immutable in their Nature,
and have been Decreed by the unchangeable Will of
God, all others arc Contingent Truths; Mathematicks,
Phylicks, Mcraphyficks, and even a great part of Mo-
rality, contain Neceilary Truths | Hiftory, Gram-
mar, particular Laws or Cuftoms, and many other
things
Chap. III. A Search after Truth. xi
things, which depend upon the uncertain Will of Man,
include only Contingent Truths.
'Tis requir'd then, that the Rule, which I have be-
fore eftablifli'd, be exadtly obferved in a Search after
Neceflary Truths, whofe Knov^Iedge may be call'd
Science 5 and we muft content our felves with the
greateft probability of Truth in Hiftory, which con-
tains the Knowledge of Contingent Things, for one
may generally call by the name of Hiftory the Know-
ledge of Languages, Cuftoms, and even that of the
Different Opinions of Philofophers, when they aie
only iearffd by Memory, without having had any Evi^
dence or Certainty of them.
The fecond Thing to be Remark'd, is, that in Mo-
rals, Politicks, Medicine, and in all Pradfical Sciences,
we areoblig'd to content our felves with Probabilities,
not always, but for a time, not becaufe it fatisfies the
Mind, but becaufe there is a neceility for it, and be-
caufe, if we fhould defer adting, till we were fully
affur'd of fuccefs, we fhould often loofe the opportu-
nicy. But though there's a neceffity of our Adting,
yet we (hould doubtfully rely upon the event of thefe
things we execute, and endeavour to make fuch a
progrefs in thefe Sciences, as that we may in our Af-
fairs adf with more certainty ; for this ought to be
the ordinary end of the Study and Employ of all
Thinking Men.
In fine, the third Obfervation is, that we muft not
abfolutely defpife Probabilities, becaufe it ordinarily
happens, that many of 'em being join'd together, can
as ftrongly convince us, as the moft evident Demon-
ftrations. Of this there are infinite Examples in Phyfick
and Morality. So that oftentimes 'tis of ule to col'-
ledl a fufficient number of thern, for Matters which
can't be orherwife demonftrared.
I muft confefs here, that the Rule which I have im-
pos'd is very rigorous, that many would rather defire
not to Realon at all, than to Reafon upon thefe Con-
ditions, that they will not move very faft under iuch
Jncommodious Circumfpedfions; yet they muft agree
witfi m.e, that they Ihould proceed furely in following
C ^
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A Search after Truth. Book I.
this Rule, and that hitherto, for having made too much
hafte, they have been obliged to turn back again; and
even a great many Men will agree with me, that fince
Moniftur Defcartes hath difcover'd more Truths in
thirty years than all other Philofophers, becaufe he
fubmitted to this Law: therefore, if many Men would
Philofophize as he did, they might in time know the
greateft part of thofe things, which are neceflary for as
happy a Life, as can be had upon an Earth,which God
hath Curled.
I. Of the
OccMjional
Caufes of
thefe there
sre Five
prireipal
mes*
i'■, ■ '
CHAP. IV.
I. Of the Occajional Caufes of Error, and that of thefe
' there are Five Principal ones. 11. The General Dejign
of the TVhole VV^rk^ and the Particular Defign of the
Firft Bool(.
have feen, that Men are only deceiv'd, becaufe
' ' they make not that ufe of their Liberty which
they ought to do, and becaufe they do not moderate
the hafte and eagernefs of the Will for bare appea-
ranees of Truth ; that Error conlifts only in a Con-
font of the Will, which is more capacious than the
Perception of the Underftanding ; fince Men would
not be deceived, if they only judg'd of what they un*
derftand.
' But though, properly fpeaking, 'tis only an ill Uie
of Liberty which is the Caufe of Error, yet it may
be faid, that we have many Faculties, which are alfo
the Caufes thereof, not true Caufos, but fuch as may
be caird Occafwnnl ones. All our Modes of Perceiving,
are fo many Occafions of Deceiving us, for fince our
falfe Judgments include two things, the Confentof
the Will, and the Perception of the Underftanding,
it is very evident, that all our Modes of Perception
may occafionally deceive us, fince they are able to in-
dine us to precipitate and ralh Alfents,
, .. - .. Now
chap. IV. A Search after Truth,
Now, fince 'tis neccflary, firft to convince the 5oul
of its Weaknefs and Errors, to create in it jnft defires
of being delivered from them, and that it may more
ealily lay afidc its Prejudices, we ihall endeavour to
make an exad: Divifion of all its Modes of Percepti-
on, which will be as fo many Heads, to every one of
which we lhall hereafter refer the different Errors we
are fubje^ to.
The Soul can perceive things three v^^ays, by the pure
Vndcrfianding, by the Imagination^ and by the Senfes,
It perceives by the pure Underdanding, Spiritual
and Uniyerfal Things, common Notions, the Idea of
Perfedtion, and of an Infinitely perfedf Being, and
generally all its Thoughts, when it knows them by
Self-reheiflipn. It alfo perceives fome Material Things
by the pure Understanding, as Extenfion with its Pro-
parties, for 'tis only the pure Underftanding which
can perceive a Circle, a perfedl Square, a Figure with
a thoufand Angles, and inch like things, Thefe kinds
of Perceptions I call pure/wfe//i?S/o«j,Qr pure Ferceptionsy
becaufe'tis not neceffary for the Mind to form Corpo-
real Images in the Brain to reprefent all thofe things,-.
The Soul perceives only Material Things by the
Imagmationy which reprefents them when abfent, as if
they were prefenr, by forming Images of them in the
Brain. 'Tis thus that we imagine ail forts of Figures,
as a Circle, a Triangle, a Face, a Horfe, Cities, Cam-
paignes, e§c, whether we have ever feen them or nor.
Thefe forts of Perceptions I call Imaginationsy becaufe
the Soul reprefents thefe things by forming Images of
them in the Brain; and becaufe we cannot form Images
of Spiritual Things, it follows, that the Soul cannot
imagine them, which ought to be well obferved.
In fine, the Soul only perceives fenfible and grofs
Objedls by the Senfcsy which, when prefent, make au
Imprefifion upon the External Organs of its Body ;
Thus it fees Plains and Rocks, when prefented to
its Eyes, and feels the hardnefs of Iron, the point of
a Sword, and fuch like things, and thefe forts of Per-
Cjeptions I call Scnthmnts or Sen/atims.
23
'|L
sl!
iii
My
C X
The
A Search after truth. Book I.
The Soul then only perceives things after thefe
three ways, which is evident, if we confider that all
things we perceive are either Spiritual or Material j
if they are Spiritual, 'tis only the/«re Vnderflanding
which can know them ; but if they are Material, they
will be either prefent or abfent; if they are abfenr^
the Soul perceives them only by the Imagination ; if
prefent, by the Impreflion which they make upon its
Senfes j and thus, as we faid before, our Souls only
perceive things after three ways, by the pure ZJnder"^
fla^dingy by the Imaginanon, and by the Senfes.
We may then look upon thefe three Faculties, as
certain Heads, to which we may refer Mens Errors,
and the Caufes of thefe Errors, and fo avoid the G^n-
fufion wherein their great number would infalliblyin-
volve us, if we Ihould Ipeak of 'em without any
Method.
But our Inclinations and Paflions adl alfo very
fttongly upon us, they dazle our Minds by their falle
lights, they cover and fill it with darknefs; Thus our
Inclinations and Paflions engage us in an infinite num-
ber of Errors, when we follow this falfe light which
they produce in us. We muft thfen confider them,
with the three Faculties of the Mind, as the Sources
of our Errors and Mifcarriages, and to the Errors of
the Senfesy Imaginatioriy and pure Underfiandingy alio
join thefe that may be attributed to the Paflions and
Natural Inclinations. Thus we may refer all the Errors
of Men, and the Caufes of thefe Errors, to Five Heads,
of which we Ihall Treat as follows.
Firft we fhall fpeak of the Errors of the SenfeSy fe-
condly of the Errors of the Imaginationy thirdly of the
Errors of the fure Underflandingy fourthly of the Errors
bf the Inclinations^ fifthly of the Errors of the Paffions.
In fine, after having effayed to free the Mind from
thefe Errors, to which it is fubjetff, we (hall give a
General Method to condudf it in a Search after
Truth.
Let us firft Explain the Errors of our'Senfes, or
gather, tlie Errors which we fall into for want of
Enakipg a Ufe of our Senfes. Wo fhall not itifift
/i f I. /J i * V-r
f
Chap. V. ASurch after Truth.
fo much upon panicuhr Errors, which are aJmoft in-
finite, « upon the General Caufes of thefe Errors
and of fuch things as we believe necelTary for the'
jknowledge of the Nature of Mans Mind.
CHAP. V.
OF THE SEiiSES,
I. Tcpo vpays of Explaining how they axe corrupted hy Sin.
II. That not our Senjes^ hut our Liberty, which k
the true Caufe of our Errors. III. A t{iile not to he
deceivd in the *Ufe of our Senjes,
WHen we ferioufly Exat»ine the Senfes and Paflions
of Man, we find 'em fo proportioned to the end
for which they are given us, that we are not of their
Opinion, who fay, they are wholly corrupted by Ori-
ginal Sin ; But to fhew that 'tis not without Reafon
that we diffent from them, 'tis neceflaiy to explain in
what Order the Faculties and Paflions of our firft Pa-
rent were, whilft in a State of Righteoufnels, and
the Changes and Diforders which happen'd in them
after his Sin • Thefe things may be conceivM two
ways, the firft of which is this;
It appears, if we confider the Genuine Order of
things, that the Soul is fenfible of greater pleafure, the Corrup-
proportionably to the greatnefs of the GWj which it tionof'the
enjoys. Pleafure is an Inftincft of Nature, or to fpeak
more intelligibly, 'tis an Impreftion of God himfelf
inclining us towards fome Good, which muft be fb
much the ftronger, astiicGood is greater. According
to this Principle, I think we cannot doubt, but that
our firft Parent coming out of the Hands of God,
and before his Sin, found the greateft pleafure in the
moft foiid Goods. Since therefore he was Created to
^ove God, and fince Gqd was his true Good, it may
A Search after Truth. Bcxrft 1.
faid, that he was inclined to delight in God, who in-
duc'd him to his Love by a Senlation of Plealiire,
and gave him fuch Internal Satisfactions in his Duty,
as counterbalanced the greateft Pleafures of Senfe, and
fuch as, fince the Fall, Men are infenfible of, without
a particular Grace.
Neverrhelefs, as he had a Body, which God would
have him preferve, and look upon, as part of himfelf,
he alfo made hirn perceive fuch Pleafures by his Sen-
fes, as we tafte in the ufe of things, that are proper
for the Prefervation of Life.
We dare not decide, whether the firft Man, before
his Fall, could avoid agreeable, or difagreeable Sen-
fations, in the very moment that the Principal part of
his Brain was mov'd by the Actual ufe of Senfible
Things 5 perhaps, he had this Command over him-
felf, becaufe of his Submiiiion to God, yet the con-
trary appears more probable, for tho' Adam could ftay
the Emotions of the Spirits and Blood, and the
Shaking of the Brain, which Objects excited in him,
l^ecaufe not being yet difordered, his Body was necef-
farily fubject to his Mind : Yet 'tis not likely that he
could forbear having Senfations of Objects, at fuch
time as he had not ftopt the Motions which they pro-
duc'd in fome part of his Body, to which his Soul
was immediately United j for the Union of the Soul
and Body, confifting chiefly in a Mutual Relation
between the Senfations of the Soul, and the Mo-
tions of the Organs of the Body, it appears that
it would have been rather Arbitrary than Natural, if
Adam could have been Infenflble, when the chief pari
of his Body receiv'd fome Impreflion from External
Ob)ed:s ; but I forbear making my felf a Parry in
thele two Opinions.
The firft Man then took Pleafure in that which
added Perfecftion to his Body, even as in that which
did fo to his Soul; and becaufe he was in a perfecft
State, he found the Pleafure of the Soul much greater
than that of the Body ; fo that it was much eafier for
him to preferve his Righteoufnefs, without the Grace
of Jefus Chrift, than it is for us, fince without it we
feel
chap. V; A Search after Truth. xjr
feel but little latisfadlion in our Duty ; yet he fufFer'd
^ himfelf unhappily to be Seduc'd, and 1(^ his Righte-
oufnels by his Difobedience; and the principal
^ Change which happened to him, and which caus'd all Gofpeh,
^ the Diforder of his Senfes and Paflions, is, That God
forfook him by way of Punifliment, and would no
longer be his Good, or, rather, would not any Ion-
ger make him feniible of that Plealiire which afliir'd
him that he was his Good: So that Seniible Pleafures,
per which do but incline a Man to Corporeal Good,
remaining only, and being no longer Counrerballanc'd
pre by thefe, wluch formerly carry'd him to his true
^ Good, the ftridt Union which he had with God is
ftrangely weaken'd^ and that which he had with his
Body is much ftrengthned 5 Seniible Pleafure reigns
iih* in his Corrupted Heart, by enllaving him to all Sen-
cco- lible Objedls, and the Corruption of his Heart hath
iifc] darkned his Mind, by turning it afide from that Light
kI tb which Enlightens it, and inclining it to Judge only
D hie of Things, as they can have any Relation with Bo-
necef dies.
But after all, we cannot fay that there was any
t k great Change in refpedf of the Senfes, 'tis as if two
Weights hang'd in ^quilibrio in a Ballance, and I
ifeiiia fliould take fomething from one of them, the other
iiki would weigh down, without any Change in its felf,
\l^ in Relation to the firft Weight, fince it is ftill the
[ tjul fame. Thus after the Fall of Adam, the Pleafures of
the Senfes have Senfualiz'd the Soul, for want of thole
Internal Delights, which before Counterballanc'd the
Inclination we have for Seniible Goods, but without
fuch a conliderable Change in the Senfes as is com-
. monly imagined.
But to come to the fecond way of Explaining the
Diforders of Sin, and which is certainly more Rea-
fonable than the preceeding : 'Tis very different from
the former, becaufe it depends upon a difierent Prin-
ciple, however they both agree in what reipedts the
jsisl Senfes.
Becaufe we are ComposM of Mind and Body, we
have two forts of Casds to enquire after, vi:^. Thole
:s ' ' of
A Search after Truth. Book Ij
of the Mind, and thofeof the Body. We have alfb
two ways of knowing whether a thing is good or bad
for us, by the Help of the Mind only, or by the
Afliftance of the Mind and Body together ; We can
know what is Good for us, by a clear and evident
Knowledge, as alfo by a Confus'd Senfation. I know,
by Reafbn, that Juftice is Amiable; I alfo know, by
Tafte, that fuch Fruit is Good: The Beauty of
Juftice is not Tafted, the Goodnefs of Fruit is not
known by Reafon, the Goods of the Body deferve not
the application of a Mind, which God has made only
for himfelf ; the Mind then muft receive fuch kind of
Goods, by a Ihort and Inconteftable Proof of Senfa-
tion, without examining any further: Stones are im-
proper for Nourilhment, Experience proves it, and
Tafte alone will convince all Men of it.
Pleafure and Pain are therefore Natural and Indu-
bitable Characters of Good and Evil, I confefs it, but
'tis for fuch things only, as in their own Nature are
neither good nor bad, nor can be known for fuch, by
a clear and diftinct Knowledge; and'tis only for fuch
things, that, being below the Mind of Man, can nei-
ther Reward nor Punifh it: In fine, his for fuch
things only, as are unworthy the Application of the
Mind ; and about which, God being unwilling our
Mind fhould be imploy'd, inclines us to them only by
a certain Inftinct; I rpean^ by agreeable or difagree-
able Senfations.
But as for God, who is only the true Good of the
Mind, and who only is above it, who only can Re-
ward it a thoufand'different ways, who is only wor-
thy its Application, and who is not afraid, that thofe
that Love him, fhould not find him Amiable ; He is
not content to be lov'd with a Blind Love, or a Lov?
of Inftincft, but will be lov'd with a Rational Love,
and a Love of Choice.
If the Mind faw only thofe things in Obje(5l:s, that
are truly there, with adding other things to them by
the Imagination, which really are not, it would find
much difficulty to Love, or make Ufe of them ; fq
that it is, as it \vere, necelfary for them to appear
agreeajDle^
chap. V. A Search after Truth,
agreeable, by caufing Senfations which they have nor,
but 'tis not fo with God, it's fufficient to fee him as
he is, to incline us to him, and it is not neceflary that
he makeufeof this Inftind of Pleafure, as a kind of
Artifice, to draw our Love to him, .without his defer-
ving it.
Hence we muft conclude, that Adam was not car-
ried to the Love of God, and his Duty, by * pre- *
poflefled Pleafure, becaufe the Knowledge which he
had ©fGod, as his Good, and the Joy that he conti-
nually felt, as a necelfary confequent of feeing his ab ini-
Happinefs, in bang United to God, might fuffice to
keep him to his Duty, and make him moreDe- Screliquic
fervingly, than if he had been, as it were, Determin'd Ulum in
by a prepoflefs'd Pleafure. After this manner he en-
joy'd full Liberty ; and, perhaps, 'twas in this Con- cit"iTnn^^
dition that the Holy Scripture would Reprefent him ra&prc-
by thefe Words, God made Man in the beginnin^-^ and
after hamng profos*dim Commandments to him^ he left
him tohimfelf^ that is, without determining him by
theSenfeof fome Prepoflefs'd Pleafure, only keeping
him clofe to a clear Light of his Happinefs and Duty.
But Experience hath fliown the frailty of Adam, in fo
Regulated and Happy Eftate, as that he was in before
his Fail, to the Shame of Free Will, and the Glory
of God alone.
But it cannot be (aid that Adam was inclin'd to feek
after, and make ufe of Senfible Things, by an exadt
Knowledge of the Relation they might have with his
Body, for if he had, he muft have Examin'd the Con-
figurations of the parts of fome Fruit, with all the
parts of his own Body, and the Relation refuItiHg
from both, to be able to Judge, whether in the heat
of his Blood, and a thoufand other Difpofitions of his
Body, this Fruit would be proper for his Nourifli-
ment; 'tis plain, that his Mind was intirely imploy'd
upon things that were unworthy its application, and
even unprofitably enough, becaufe he was not long
preferv'd after this manner.
If we conflder then, that the Min4 of Adam was
[tfSi not Infinite, we may fafely fay, that He knew not all
1 ic ' the
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A Search after Truth. Bo5k I,
the Properties of Bodies that were about him, fincP
'tis manifeft that they are Infinite j and if it be granted,
^A^hich cannot reafonably be deny'd, that his Mind
was not made to Examine the Motions and Gonfiga-
rations of Matter, but for the Contemplation of God,
no one can be difpleas'd, if we aflert, that it was
biafs'd and difordefd in that time, wherein all things
Ihould have been perfcdlly well order'd, if he had
been obliged to turn his Mind from the Confideration
of the Perfevflion of his true Good, to Examine the
" Nature of feme Fruit for his Nourilhment.
Adam then had the fame Senfations as we havt,
which fuggefted to him what was neceflary for his
Body, without being diverted from God j he was
Senfible of Pleafures as we are, and even of Pains, of
prepoflefs'd and indeliberate Averfions, but thefe Plea-
fares and Pains could not Enflave him, or render him
Unhappy like us, becaufe that being Ablblute Mafter
of all the Motions which were excited in his Body, he
immediately put a ftop to them, if he only wifh'd
they might ceafe, and certainly he always wilh'd it, in
relpecft of Pain. How happy had he been, and we
alfo, if he had done the fame in refpedl of Pleafure,
and if he had not voluntary ftrayed from the prefence
of his God, by fufFering his Mind to be taken up
with the Beauty, and expedled Sweetnefs of the For-
bidden Fruit, or, perhaps, with a Prefumptuous Joy
that was excited in his Soul, at the Confideration of
his Natural Perfed:ions.
But after he had Sin d, thofe Pleafures w^hich be-
fore only modeftly Accofted him, and thofe Pains,
which without difturbing his Felicity, only put him in
mind that he might Fall, and become Miferable, were
not any longer under his Command, his Senfes and
Pafiions Revolted againft him, they became Irregular,
and made him, like us, a Slave to all Senfible Things.
Thus the Senles and Pafiions, do not derive their
Origination from Sin, but only the Power they have
of Tyrannizing over Sinners ; and this Power has not
fo much diforder'd the Senfes, as the Mind and Will
of Men, wnich ceafing to be fo ftridfly united to God,
do
fi!
Chap* V. A Smcb sfur Truth, 31
do not any longer receive that Light and Vigour, by
which they might preferve their Liberty and Hap-
pinefs.
From tfaefe two ways of Explaining the Diibrders A Remedy
of Sin, we may ealily gather, that there are two things for that
neceifery for our Recovery. whuh*'ori.
The firft is, That we muft leffen that Load we fink ginal Sin
under, and which drags towards Senfible Goods, by kath cmfed
continually Retrenching our Pleafures, and Mortify-
ing our Senfuality with Repentance and Circumcifion the fomda-
of Heart. uonff
The fecond is, That we muft beg the Afiiftance
of God's Grace, and that prepoflefs'd Delight which
*Jefus Chrift hath particularly Merited for m i See the Ex-
without which, whatever we retrench from that firft
load, will ftill opprefs us, and however fmall it
is, it will Infallibly draw into Sin and Dilbrder.
Thefe two things are abfolutely Neceflary for us,
to begin and perfeVere in our Duty ; Reafon, as we
have fliow'd, does perfedlly agree with the Gofpel in
this, and from both we learn, that Humility, Self-
denial, and the Diminution of the Power of Sin, are
necelfary Preparations for our Recovery, by the Power
of Grace, and Re-union with God.
But in our prefent State, tho' we are continually
oblig'd to drive againft our Senies, yet we muft not
thence conclude, that they are abfolutely corrupted
and deprav'd 5 for if we confider that they are giVen
us for the Prefervation of our Bodies,we fhall find th^t
they admirably well perform their Duty, and con-
du(ft us, after fo juft and faithful a manner, for the
end we received them>that it feems very injurious fo to
accufo them of Corruption and Diforder ; they fo rea-
dily inform the Soul by Pain and Pleafure, by agree-
able and difagreeable Senfations, of what is neceflary
to be done or omitted, for the Prefervation of Life,
that we have little reafon to fay, this order and exacft-
nefs is the Confequence of Sin.
Our Senfes then are not fo deprav'd as is imagined, Senfes, buc
but theirtward Conftitution of our Soul; 'tis our Li-
berty that is Corrupted s 'tis not our Scafes, but our
Will ceives us*
jx A Semh after Truth. . Book L
Will that deceives us, by its precipitate Judgments-
For Example, when wc fee the Light, 'tis certain that
we fee it; when we feel Warmth, we are not dc-
ceiv'd, if we believe we feel it, whether before or after
Siriy but we are deceived, when we judge that the
Heat we feel is out of the Soul that feels it j as diail
be Explained hereafter.
The Senfes then do not deceive us, if we make a
good u(e of our Liberty, and if we accuftom not our
felves, upon their account, to Judge of things with
too much precipitation ; but fince it is very difli-
cult to refrain from it, and we are, as it were, con-
ftrain'd thereto, becaufe of the Union between
our Soul and Body, I (hall lay down a Method to
condudl us in our ufe of them, ib ^ to avoid
Error,
AKiaU to We muft exacftly oblerve this Rule, Never to Judge
avoid Error by the Senfes^ of things as they are in theinfelves^ but only
tn ufing our fjjg Relation that ^sey have between themfelves ; for,
indeed, they are not given us t© know the Truth of
Things in themfelves, but only for the Confervation
of our Body.
But that we may be wholly delivered from that
eaiinefs and inclination we have of following our Sen-
fes, in a Search after Truth, we (hall particularize, in
the following Chapters, fome of the chief, and ge-
neral Errors which we are liable to; whence the
Truth, of what we have advanc'd, will be more Evi-^
dent.
CHAP.
Chap. VL A Search after Truth,
3?
CHAP. VI.
I. Of the Errors of the Sighti in reffeB of Extenjion,
confider'd in it felf. II. An Enumeration of thefe Ev
rors^ as to trrvifihie OhjeBs. HI, Of the Errors of
the Sights concerning I at he Extenjion,
eight is the firft, the moft Noble, and moft Exteh-
^ live of all the Senfes, if then they were given
us for a Difcovery of Truth, this alone would aflift
us more than ali the others together j So that if we
can deftroy that Authority, which our Eyes have over
our Reafon, there's little need of any thing elle to
undeceive us, and to create in us a General Diffi-
dence of all our Senfes.
We Ihall then /how, that we muft not rely upon
the Teftimony of our Sight, to Judge of the Truth
of things, as they are in themfelves, but only to dif-
cover what Relation they have to the Prefervation of
our Body ; that our Eyes generally deceive in all they
reprefent to us, in the Greatnefs of Bodies, in their
Figures and Motions, in Light and Colours, which
are the only things we fee 5 that all thefe things are
not what they really appear to be; that all the World
is deceived in them, and by this Error led into innu-
merable others. We /hall begin with Excenfion, and
produce thofe Proofs which incline us to believe, that
we never fee any thing as it is.
We commonly fee Animals with Microfcopes, much
lefs than a Grain of Sand, that is almoft Invifible to
the naked Eye ; * we have even feen fome a thou-
fand times yet lefs. Thefe living Atoms walk as well
as other Animals. Then they have Legs, and Feet,
and Bones in thefe Legs to uphold them, Mufcles to
move them. Tendons, and an infinite Number of
Fibres in each Mufcle j and laftly, Blood, or Animal
D Spirits,
th4 Er^
rors tf Sight
in refpe3 »f
Extenjim,
con/fderd ili
itfdf.
* JournaT
desScavans
du iz. Nov.
i^lS.
Ill
A Search after" Truth, Book I,
Spirits, extreamly fubtile and fine, to fill and contri-
bute fucceflive Motion to thefe Mufcles- It's impofii-
ble, without this, to conceive that they Live, are
Nourifli'd, and Tranfport their little Bodies into dif-
ferent Places, according to the.djifFerent Impreflion of
Objec3:s ; or, rather, 'tis impoflible that even thofe,
who have employ'd all their Life time in Anatomy,
and an Enquiry into Nature, Ihould reprelent the
number, diverfity, and finenefs of all the parts where-
of thefe little Bodies are neceflarily Composed, to
make them live, and execute all thofe things, that
we (ee them do.
The Imagination is loft and aftonilh'd, at the fight
of fo fiirprizing a Smallnefs; it cannot apprehend, nor
take hold of fuch Parts that have no hold for it ; and
altho' Reafon convinces us of the Truth of what we
have faid, yet the Senles and Imagination oppofe it,
and often compel us to doubt of it.
Our Sight is extreamly limited, but we mtsft not
limit its Objedl, the Idea which it gives us of Exten-
lion hath very narrow Bounds, but we muft not thence
conclude, that Extenfion hath the fame Bounds; k
is, doubtlefs, Infinite in one Senfe, and this little part
of Matter, that is hid from Eyes, is capable of con-
raining a World, in which there are as many things,
tho* much lefs in Proportion, as in this great World
we Inhabit.
The little Animals we fpoke of, have, perhaps,
other little Animals, which they devour, that are
Imperceptible, becaufe of their Stupendious Smallnefs.
That which is a Handworm, in refpedl of us, theft
Animals are fo in refpecft of it ; and, perhaps,there are
in Nature yet lefler and leifer,^^ infinitum^ in fo ftrange
a Proportion as this, betwixt a Man and a Handworm.
We have Evident, and Mathematical Demonftra-
tions, of the infinite Divifibility of Matter, and this
is fuflicient to incline us to believe, that there may
be Animals lefler and lefler, ad Infinitum, altho* our
Imagination is loft in the Thought. God made Mat-
cer only to form Admirable Works thereof, and fincc
we are certain there are no Particles, whofe Small-
nefs
Chap. VI. A Search after Truth. j ^
ne£s is capable of limiting his Power in the formation
of thofe little Animals, why do we unrealbnably li-
mit and diminifh the Idea we have of an Infinite Crea-
tor, by meafuring his Power and Operations by our
Finite Underftanding }
Experience has already undeceived us in part, by
(hewing us Animals a thoufand times lefs than a Hand-
worm, why would we have them to be the laft and
leaft of all i for my part I fee no reafon to imagine
it, on the contrary, it's much more probable to be-^
lieve, that there are feme yet much lefTer than thofe we
have difcovered; for indeed thofe little Animals are
not fo much wanting for Microfcopes, as Microfcopes
for them.
When we examine the * Germ {in the midft of Win- * Princifk]
ter) taken out of the Bole of Tulip, either by the
Naked Eye, -or a Convex Glafs, we very eafily dif-
cover leaves in it that will become green, thole that
are to compofe the Flower of the Tulip, that little
Triangular part which enclofes the Seed, and the fix
little Columns which encompafs it at the bottom of
the Tulip ; fo that we eannot doubt but the Germ in
the Bole of the Tulip cmtains a whole Tulip.
It is reafonable to bejieve the fame of the Germ of
a Grain of Muftard, that of the Kernel of an Apple,
and generally of all forts of Trees and Plants, al-
though undifcoverable by the Naked Eye, nor even
with a Microfcope ; and it may be confidently faid,
that all Trees are contained in little in the Germ of
their Seed.
It does not appear unreafonable to think that there
are an infinite number of Trees in one fingle Gc?
fince it does not only contain the Tree wliofe Seed it
is, but alfo a great number of other Seeds, which
may alfo include in rhemfelves new Trees, and new
Seeds of Trees, which laft alio may contain other
Trees and Seeds as fruitful as the firft, and thus on
ad infinitum. So that according to this Opinion,
which cannot appear impertinent or ridiculous to any,
but thofe who meafure the Wonders of the Aimighry
Power of God after the Idea's of their own Senfes
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A Search after Truth. Book I.
and Imaginations, one might fay, that in one Kernel only
of an Apple there might be AppIe^Trees, Apples, and
Seeds of Apple-Trees for almolt infinite Ages, in the
proportion of a perfe(5l Apple-Tree to an Apple-Tree
in its Seed j and that Nature does only unfold thele
little Trees by adminiftring a fenfible growth to that
which is out of its Seed, and an infenfible, but real
growth, proportionable to their bignefs, to thole which
we may conceive to be their Seeds; for we cannot
doubt but that there may be Bodies fmall enough
to infinuate themfelves in the Fibres of thele Trees,
which we may conceive to be their Seeds, and by that
means to nourifli them.
What we have laid of Plants and their Germsy may
be alfo applied to Animals, and the Germ of which
they are produc'd ; We fee in the Gerrri of a Tulip s
* rkGcrm Bole, an entire Tulip ; * we alfo fee in the Germ of a
or pnnctfie ^ Chicken perhaps entirely formed,
u'efof^fiM although it has not been hatch'd. Wedifcover Frogs
ErjTy is a in the Eggs of Frogs,' and other Animals befides, even
iisUj -white Ger»2, upon a Curious Inquifition ; but when
^he Eyes of the Body can pierce no deeper, the Eyes
* K hb. De of the Mind muft not be limited, being much more
pnnatione extended. We fuppofe then, that all the Bodies ef
^M^Malp^g- Animals, which lhall be produc'd till the
Confiimmation of Ages, have probably been produc'd
from the Creation of the World j I mean, the firft Fe-
male Animals were perhaps Created with all thofe of
the fame Species which they have, and lhall Engender
to the end of the World.
We might carry this Thought yet farther, and pof-
fibly with much Reaion and Truth, but we think it
not fatb to fearch too deep into the Works of God,
which are altogether infinite ; not only our Senfes and
Imagination are limited in their Comprehenfion, but
alio the pure Alind wholly difengag'd from Matter,
is too grois and feeble to penetrate into the leaft of his
^Vorks, 'tis loll and diiiipated, dazled and affrighted
at the fight of what we call an Atome, according to
the Language of the Senfes ; bpt the pure Mind has
r.Ivvays this advantage abave^ the Imagination and
Senfes,
hii.
* V. Mir a-
c 11 lam Njt-
ture de M.
bwiimmcr-
dam.
Ghap.VI. A Search after Truth,
Senfes, that it knows its own weaknels, and the great-
nefs of God ; that it perceives the infinity in which it
is loft, whereas our Imagination and Senies debafe
the Works of God, and raife in us a foolilh Confidence,
which blindly precipitates us into Error. Our Eyes
beget in us no Idea of all thefe things that we difcover
by Microfcopes or by Reafon ^ we fee no lefs a Body
with our Eyes than a Worm in the Skin or a Mite,
the half of which is nothing, if compar'd with our
felves: A Mite is but as a Mathematick Point in refpedt
of us, it cannot be divided, but it muft be annihi-
lated ; Our Sight then does not reprefent Extenfion to
us, as it is in it felf, but according to what it is in pro-
portion to our Body, and becaufe the half of a Mite
bears no proportion to our Body, and can neither pro-
fit nor injure it, therefore we can't fee it.
But if our Eyes were made as Microfcopes, or ra-
ther, if they were as fmall as thofe of Hand-^jforms
or Mites, we ftiould judge otherwife of the magnitude
of Bodies, for without doubt thefe little Animals have
Eyes qualified to fee all that is about them, as alio
their own Body in a much larger proportion tliah we
fee it, if not they would not receive thofe impreffions
that are necelfary for the prefervation of themfelves,
and then their Eyes would be wholly ufelefs.
To explain thele things thoroughly, we muft con-
fider, that our own Eyes are indeed nothing elfe but
Natural Spedfacles, that their Humours produce the
fame Effecft, as the Glaffes in Spedfacles, and that ac-
cording to the Figure of the Chryftaline Humour,
and its diftance from the Retina, we lee Objecfts very
differently ; infomuch, that we are certain there are
no;; two Men in the Wo-ld,who lee things in the fame
bignefs, unlefs their Eyes were in all refpeds alike.
This is a Propofition that muft be received by all
thofe that ftudy Opticks, vi:{. That Equidiftant Ob-
jeds appear io much the greater, by how much the
_ Image of them is painted greater in the inward part
of the Eye. Now 'tis certain, that thofe Eyes whofe
Cryftalitie Humour is more Convex,have lelfer Images
depainted in 'em, in proportion to their Convexity;
D ^ Thofe
38 A Semh after truth. il^06K l,
Thofe then who are the neareft fighted, having the
Chryftaline Humour more Convex, fee Objedls in a
lefler proportion than old Men who have occafion for
Spedacles in Reading, or thofe who have common
Convexity, and fee very well at a diftance.
Ail ihefe things are eafily demonftrated Geometri-
cally, and if they were not commonly known, we
Ihould infift the longer upon them; but becaufe many
have treated upon thefe Matters, thofe that would be
better informed are defir'd to confult Authors upon it.
the Since *tis certain that there are not two Men in the
mlde! fee Objecfls in the fame bignefs, and that
^ commonly the * fame Perfon fees the fame things
;/er, greater with one Eye than another ; *ris plain that we
are not to truft to the proportion of things which our
Eyes rcprefent to us, we muft rather confult pur Rea-
fon, which proves, that we cannot determine the ab'
folute bignefs of Bodies that are about us, nor what
Idea we ought to have of the Extenfion of a Foot
Square, or of that of our own Body, fo as that this
Idea Ihould truly reprefent it to us; for Reafon tells
us, that the leait of all Bodies, confider'd in it felf,
would not be little, fince it is composed of an infinite
number of parts, out of every one of which God
could form a World, which would be but as a Point
in refpedl of all the reft joined together. Thus the
Mind of Man is incapable of forming an Idea great
enough to comprehend the leaft Extenfion in the
World fince it is limited, but the Idea of Matter is
infinite. It is true, the Mind can very near apprehend
the proportions,that are betwixt thefe Infinites whereof
the World is Composed, that one, for Inftonce, is the
double of another, that a * Toife contains 6 Feet,
yet we cannot form an Idea that reprefents what thefe
things are in themfelves.
We'll fuppofe, that the Mind is fufceptible of thofe
Idea's, which are equal to, or which meafure the Ex-
tenfion of Bodies that we fee, for it would be very
difficult to perfwacie Men to the contrary; Let us
examine then what may be concluded from this Sup-
pofition 5 This doubtlefs, that God does not deceive
us.
Chap. VI. A Search after Truth*
us, that he has not given us Eyes like Convex Glafles
to enlarge or diminiin Objeds, therefore we muft be-
lieve that our Eyes reprelents things as they are.
It is true 6od never deceives us, but we often de-
ceive our feives in judging of things with too much
precipitation; for we often judge that Objeds,whereof
we have Idea s, do exift, and that they perfedly re-
femble our Idea's; yet it frequently happens, that the
Objeds are either unlike our Idea's,or elfehave noExi-
ftence at all; fo that if we have an Idea of any thing,
it does not follow from thence, that fuch a thing exilts,
much lefs, that it Ihould wholly relemble the Idea we
have of it; for altho' God produces in us fuch a fen-
(ible Idea of Magnitude, when a Toife is before our
Eyes, it follows not from thence, that this Toife hath
only the Extenfion, which by this Idea is reprelented
to us. For, firft, all Men have not the Senfible Idea
of this To//e, (ince all have not their Eyes difpos'd af-
ter the fame manner. Secondly, even the fame Per-
fon has not the fame Senfible Idea thereof, when it is
feen with one Eye, and then with the other, as we
Jnftanc'd before. Laftly, it often happens that the
fame Perfon, hath very different Idea's of the fame
Objeds at different times, according as he believes
them to be nearer, or farther off him; which lhall
be elfewhere Explaiifd. 'Tis then an unreafonable
Prejudice, to believe that we fee Bodies according
in their juft bignefs, for our Eyes being only given
us for the Prelervation of our Body, they very well
difcharge their OfEce, when they caule thofe Idea's
of Objeds in us, that are proportionate to the big-
nefs of it. But that we may the better comprehend
how we ought to Judge of the Excenfion of Bodies,
jn Relation to the Teftimony of our Eyes, let us
imagine, that God had created a Heaven, and an
Earth, of a Portion of Matter as little as a Hand
Ball ; and Men, upon this Earth, in the fame Pro-
portions with thofe in our Great World : Thefe little
Men would fee one another, and the parts of their
own Bodies, as alfo the little Animals, which would
be capable of incommoding them, or elfe their Eye$
P 4 would
A Search after Truth. Book I.
would be ufelefs as to their Prefervation. Upon this
Suppofition it is Evident, that thefe little Men would
have Idea's, as to the bignefs of Bodies, very diff(^
rent from thofe that we have of them, fince they
would have Relation to their Little World, which,
tho' as a Ball, in refpecil: of ours, they would look
upon as furrounded with infinite Spaces, fiich as
we imagine about ours.
Or, if it may more eaiily be conceiv'd, let us fup-
pofe that God had made a World infinitely greater
than ours, fo that this New World fiiould be, in re-
fpedf of ours, as ours was in comparilon of that which
we fuppos'd before. Let us alfo fuppofe, that God
had obferv*d the fame Proportion, in all the Parts of
this New World, as he had done in ours; It's mani-
feft, that the Men of this laft World would be great-
er than is the Space betwixt our Earth, and the moft
diftant Stars that we fee i this being fuppos'd, if they
had the fame Idea of the Extenfion of Bodies as we
have, they could not diftinguilh even fome parts of
their own Body, and would fee fome others of pro-
digious greatnefs: So that 'tis ridiculous to think,
that they would fee things of the fame bignefs as we
fee them.
'Tis evident, from thefe two Suppofitions, that the
Men of the Great, or Little World, would have very
different Notions, about the greatnefs of Bodies, to
what we have, fuppofing only, that their Eyes gave
them Idea's of the Objects, that were about them,
proportionably in bignefs to their own Bodies ; Now
if thefe Men were much aflur'd, upon the Teftimony
of their own Eyes, that Bodies were as big as they
faw them, it s evident they would be deceiv'd, and
no body can doubt of it; yet, it's certain, they would
have full as much reafon as we, to defend their Opi-
nion. Jet us therefore, at leaft, by the Example of
this Error, apprehend our felves to be very uncer-
tain of the greatnefs of thofe Bodies that we fee, and
that all we can know by fight, is the proportion that
they have to our Bodies. In a word, that our Eyes are
ppt giveti us to Judge of the T^th of things, but
i. Chap. VI. A Search after Truth.
^ only to difcorn thofe things that may either Profit, or
Injure us.
& But Men do not only truft their Eyes in Judging
iq of Vifible, but alfo of Invifible Objeds ; they
icii, even conclude, that nothing exifts which they fee
aok not,thus arrogating to their Sight a certain infinite per-
has ipicacity. 'Tis this which hinders them from knowing
the true Caufes of many Natural Effeds : If they at-
fup- tribute them to certain Faculties, and imaginary Qua-
aier lities, the common Reafon is, becaufe they do not fee
re- the real ones, which confift in the different Configu-
tiicii rations of thefe Bodies.
H For Example, They fee not the Particles of Air
artsd and Flame, much lefs thofe of Light, or of other Mat-
Diaei" ter yet more Subtile; and this inclines them to be-
pt- lieve they do not exifi:, or at leaft, to judge they have
eml neither Power nor Adion; they have recourfe to
'ik occult Qualities, or imaginary Faculties, to explain
asw! all the effeds whereof thefe imperceptible Particles
parts t are the Natural Caufe.
of pro They choofe rather to have recourfe to the Hor-
rour of a Vacmm-, for explaining the Elevation of the
"Water in Pumps, than to the Weight of the Air j to
the Qualities of the Moon> for the Flux and Reflux
5^ ilai of the Sea, than to the prelfure of the Air which en-
[jjvfr virons the Earth 5 to attradive Faculties in the Sun,
gojjig for the Elevation of Vapours, than to the Simple Mo-
tion or Impulfion, caus'd by the parts of Subtile Mat-
ij ter, which are continually dilpers'd by the Sun.
They look upon that as an Impertinent Opinion,
which has recourfe to Flefli and Blood, to folve the
^ Motions of Animals, their Habits, or the Cor-
poreal Memory of Man, which is owning, in parr, to
this, that they conceive the Brain to be very little, and
confequently, infufficient to conferve the traces of an
' ^5 almoft infinite number of things, which are there ;
they are willing to believe, tho' they know not how
to conceive it, that Beafts have a certain Soul which is
neither Body nor Mind ; as alfo, that there are Qua-
^ .g, lities, and Intentional Species, to folve the Habits and
' u Alemory of Alen, and fuch other like things, of which
th&y have no particular Notion in their Minds, It
4^
A Search after Truth Book
It would take up too much time to enumerate the
Errors which this prejudice begets in us, almoft all
the Errors in Phyhcks are owing to it, and whoever
attentively confiders it, will be amaz'd thereat.
Alcho' Tm unwilling to infift much upon this head,
yet I can t but take notice of the Contempt which
Men commonly have for Infedb, and other little Ani-
mals, which are generated, as they fay, out of Cor-
rupted Matter; this is an unjuft Contempt, which is
founded only upon the Ignorance of the thing defpis'd,
and the prejudices already mentioned. There is no-
thing Contemptible in Nature, all the Works of
God are worthy our refpedt and admiration, efpecially
if we confider the admirable ways by which God
makes and prelerves them. The leaft FKes areas per-
fed Animals as the biggeft Creatures, the proportion
of their Members is asjult as thofe of the others, and
it even feems, that God has given them more Orna-
ments to recompence the littlenefe of their Bodies; they
have Crowns, Helmets, and other Curiohties, on their
Heads, which outdo the moft Luxuriant Fancies of
Men ; and I may confidently aver, that they who
have never feen any thing but with their naked Eye,
have never beheld any thing fo fine, fo exad, and
even fo magnificent, in the Houfes of the greateft
Princes, as what we difcover with Microfcopes upon
the Head of a filly Fly.
It's true, thefe things are very fmall, but yet the
more furprizing, becaule there are fo many Beauties
crouded in fo fmall a Space, and altho' they are very
common, yet they are not the lels valuable, nor lefs
pcrfcd in themfelves ; on the contrary, the Wifdom
of God is more apparent, who hath with fo much
Magnificence and Profufion, perform'd almoft an in-
finite number of Miracles in Creating them.
Neverthelefs, our Sight reaches not thefe Beauties,
but makes us defpife the Works of God, fo worthy oiuf
admiration; ancl becaufe thefe Animals are little, in
comparifon of our Bodies, it makes us confider them
as abfolutely little and contemptible, becaule of their
Im llnefs, as if Bodies could be Iktle in themfelves.
Chap. VI. A Search after 'Truth. 4 j
Let us then endeavour to diftruft the Impreflions
of otirSenfes, in Judging about the bignefs of Bodies ;
andi when we fay, for Example, that a Bird is little,
let us not abfolutely underftand it to be fo, becaufe
nothing is either great or little in it felf. Even a
Bird is great, in comparifon of a Fly, but little in re-
Ipedf of our Bodies, but it does not follow that it is
fo abfolutely, for our Body is not the Standard Mea-
fure of other Bodies, it's but veiy fmall in relation to
the Earth, and that in relation to the Circle, which
the Sun or the Earth defcribes, one about the other,
and this Circle, in comparifon of the Space betwixt
us and the fixt Stars; and thus we may ftill imagine
Spaces larger and larger, ad Infinitum.
But we muft not think that ourSenfes give us the m. cf the
juft proportion that Bodies have to one another, for of om
exadfneis is not elfential to Senfible Knowledge, which
is only ufeful for the Prefervation of Life : It s true, Bodies"m
we know precifely^ enough the proportion that Bodies relation to
have one with another, if they be near us, but we another,
know little of the proportion that diftant Bodies have,
becaufe they have little relation to our Body. The
Idea of bignefs which we have at the fight of fome
Body, diminifties in proportion, to the condition that
this Body is in of hurting us, and this Idea is pre-
fently enlargM as Bodies approach us, or rather, as
the relation they have with our Body, encreafes.
Laftly, this Relation wholly ceafs, I mean, if any
Body is fo little, or diftant from us, that it cannot
hurt us. we have no more any Senlation of it. So
that by the Eye, ^ye may fometimes judge very near
of the proportion that fome Bodies have with ours,
as alfo, of that they have among themfelves, but we
muft never believe them to be of that bignefs which
they appear to us.
Our Eyes, for Example, reprefent the Sun and
Moon about the bignefs of one or two Feet over, but
we muft not imagine, as Epicurus and Lucretius did,
that they are really of this bignefs i the Moon appears
much greater to the Sight than the fix'd Stars, tho'
it's certain, that in compai ifon of them, it is very fmall,
Thu^
A Search after Truth. Book I.
Thus, likewife, we fee every day, upon the Earth,
two or more things, whofe bignefe we cannot truly
difcover, becaufe it's neceflary to have their true
diftance before we Judge of them, which is very diffi-
cult to know.
We have the fame trouble to make a certain Judg-
ment of the Proportion of two Bodies, which are
clofe to us, they muft be taken in our hands, and
compared together ; and after all, we frequently re-
main doubtful about them. This is evident, when
,we would examine two pieces of Money, which ar^
almoft equal, for then we are oblig'd to place them
one upon another, to try, by a furer way than the
bare fight, whether they are equal or not. Hence
we conclude, that our fight- does not only deceive us,
in refpedt of the bignefs of Bodies, as they are in
themfelves, but alfo in the Proportion which they
have when compar d together.
CHAP. VII.
I. Of the Errors of Sight, in reJpeB of Figures, II. JVe
have no Knowledge of the leafl Things. III. The
Knovolcdge voe have of the great eft Things is not exaEi,
IV. An Explication of certain Natural Judgments
which keep us from being deceiv d. V. That thefe
very Judgments deceive us in particular Occur"
tcnces.
iheEr ^ ^ Sight deceives us lefs in the Rcprefentation
fsight Figures, than of all other things, becaufe a
ntng Figure, confider'd in it felf, is abfolutely nothing, and
bccaule its Nature confifts only in the Relation that
is betwixt the Parts which terminate fome Space,
and a Point which is conceiv'd in this Space, and
which may be calfd, as in a Circle, the Centrepf
f he Figure i jQt we are dpceiv'd a thou fa nd ways in
Figures,
Chap.Vn. A Search after Truth.
4f
Figures, and we have never any exac5l Knowledge of
them by the Senfes.
We liiall now prove, that our Sight reaches not all n. rhaf x»t
fort of Extenlion, but that only which hath a very w®
confiderable Relation with our Body ; and for this
realbn, we lee not all the parts of the lealt Animals, eji tkingi*
or thofe that compofe hard or liquid Bodies. So
that being unable to perceive all thefe Parts, becaufe
of their fmallnefs, it follows, that we cannot perceive
their Figures, fince the Figure of a Body is only the
Term that limits it. There are then an infinite
number of Figures, and even of the greateft, which
our Eyes difcover not to us, and therefore they incline
the Mind, which relies too much upon their Capa-
cioufnefs, and which does not fufficiently examine
things, to believe that thefe Figures do not Exiff.
As for Bodies, that are accommodated to our Sight, \\\.Thsttthe
which are very few in number in comparifbn of Km-poledge
others, we difcover their Figure very near, but we
never know it exadfly by the Senfes, we can't even
be afliir'd, by the Sight, whether a Circle or a
Square, which are two of the mod Simple Figures,
are not an Ellipfe or a Parallelogram, altho' we had
thefe Figures in our Hands, and as near our Eyes as
we pleas'd.
Moreover, we can't exadlly diftinguifh whether a
Line is right or not; efpecially, if it be pretty long,
we muft have a Rule for that. But why ? We know
not whether the Rule it felf is fuch as we fuppofe it
Ihouldbe, and we cannot abfolurely affure our felves
thereof: Yet without the Knowledge of a Line, ano-
ther Figure can never be known, as is evident to all
that know what Figures are.
This is what may in general be laid of Figures that
are in our Hands, and before our Eyes, but if they
are fuppofed at a diftance from us, how great a
Change fhould we find in the Projection they make
upon the bottom of our Eyes I'm unwilling to dc-
fcribe them here, they are eafily Learn'd in any Book
of Opticks, or by examining Figures in Picture :
For fince Painters rre oblig'd to change them almoffc
every
1^
5 I
•t'
1
fi
4^ A Search after Truth. I.
every where that they may appear Natural,, apd to
Paint, for Example, Circles like Ellipfcs, *tis an In-
fallible Mark of our Errors, in leeing Obje<5ls which
are not Painted ; but thefe Errors are corredfed^by
new Senfations, which may be look'd upon as a kind
of Natural Judgments, and which might be call'd the
Judgments of the Senfes.
IV. An Ex- "^hen we behold a Cube, for Example, 'tis cer-
plication of tain that all the fides, or Images of equal bignefs with
certain Na- them, are never Projedled on the bottom of our Eyes,
ments^^^^' Image of every one of thefe fides which is
vhich Painted upon the Retina, or Optic Nerve, is exadlly
us like a Cube Painted in Perfpedtive > neverthelels, we
prom Error, them all equal, and are not deceiv'd.
Now it may be faid, that this happens by a kind pf
Judgment which we make Naturally, vi:{. that the
mott diftant Faces of a Cube muft not Projedl fuch
great Images, upon the bottom of the Eye, as thofe
Faces which are nearer, as the Senfes only Perceive,
but never Judge, to fpeak properly: 'Tis certain
that this Judgment is nothing but a compounded
Senfation, which confequently may be fometimcs
falfe.
V That However, that which is nothing elfe but Senfation
thele Judg. in US, may be confider'd in refped: of the Author of
ments d(- Nature, who excites it in us as a kind of Judgment.
%mepartZ ^ fometimes of Senfations as of Natural Judg-
cular oc- menrs, becaufe this way of fpeaking ferves to give
eurrences. a reafon of Things, as may be feen here, in the Ninth
Chapter towards the end, and in many other pla-
CCS.
Altho' thefe Judgments, which I have fpokeof, are
ufeful to corred our Senfes very many ways, and
that without them we Ihould very frequently be de-
ceiv'd, yet they are alfo occafions of Error. For In-
ftance. If it happens that we fee the top of a high
Steeple, behind a great Wall or a Mountain, it will
appear very near to us, and very little, but if after-
wards we Ihould fee it, at the fame diftance, yet
with many Fields and Houfes betwixt, it would,
doubtlefs, appear the greater, and at a farther diftance,
altho',
Chap.Vn. A Search after Truth. ^7
alcho% in €ach Station, the Projection of the Rays of
the Spire, or its Image, which is Painted at the hoc-
torn of our Eyes, would be altogether the fame.
Mow, it may be faid, that we fee it greater, be-
canle of a Jud^ent that we Naturally make,
fhat fince there is fo much Land betwixt us and the
Steeple, it muft be further, and confequently
greater.
But on the contrary, if we faw no Fields betwixt
us and the Steeple, altho* we even knew there were
many, and that it was a great way off, which is very
remarkable, k would always appear very near, and
very little, as I have laid. And it may alfo be fup-
pos*d, that this is done by a Natural Judgment of our
Soul, which thus fees this Spire, becaufe it Judges it
about five or fix hundred paces diftant ; for, common-
ly, our Imagination does not reprefent a greater di-
ftance, between ObjeCIs and us, if it be not afillted
by a Senfible view of other interjacent ObjeCls, be- •
yond which it can yet imagine farther.
*Tis for this caufe, that when the Moon Rifes or see the
Sets, we fee it greater, than when it is elevated above Chapter to-.
the Horizon, for when it is very high, we fee no
ObjeCfs betwixt it and us, whofe greatnels we know,
to Judge of that of the Moon, by comparing them to-
gether ; but when it is near Setting, we fee betwixt
it and us many Fields, whole breadth we know very
near, and lb we Judge it at a greater diftance, be-
caufe we fee it at a greater.
Ifs obfervable, that when the Moon is Rifen above
our Heads, altho' our reaion aifures us that it is at
a very great diftance, yet it feems to us to be very
little, and very near; for, indeed, thefe Natural
Judgments of Sight, are only built upon the Percep-
til tions of the lame Sight, and Reafon cannot correct
jiii them : -So that they very often deceive us, in caafing
jjt? us to form free Judgments, which perfeCtly agree
jil'jj with them ; for when we Judge by our Senfes, we
0 ] are always deceived, but we are never deceiv'd when
f fpj we conceive, for a Body only InftruCts as a Body,
but God afvyays teaches us Truth, as I lhali fhow
hereafter, Thefe
A Semh after Truth. Book L
Thefe falfe Judgments deceive us, not only as to
thd diftance and bignefs of Bodies, but alio in making
us fee their Figure other than it is: We lee, for Ex-
ample, the Sun and Moon, and other Spherical Bo-
dies, very diftant, as if they were Plains and Circles,
becaufe, at this great diftance, we cannot diftinguifli
whether the oppofice part is nearer to us than the
others; and, becaufe of this, we Judge it at an equal
diftance. 'Tis for the fame reafon, we Judge that all
the Stars, and the blue which appears in the Heaven,
are at the fame diftance, and, as it were, a perfe(ftly
Convex Vault, becaufe our Mind fuppofes an Equa-
lity where it fees no Inequality, altho* it ought not
pofitiVely to conclude but where it fees evidently.
I lhall not tarry here, to Explain at large the Er-
rors of the Sight, as to the Figures of Bodies, be-
caufe any Book of Optics will fave me that Labour .*
This Science, indeed, does only Ihow how the Eyes
' are deceived, and all its direction confifts but in help-
ing us to make thofe Natural Judgments we have
fpoke of, at flich time as we ought not to make them ;
and this may be done after fo many ways, that there
is not one Figure in the World which may not be
Painted after a thoufand different manners, fo as that
the Sight willlnfallibly be deceived thereby. But this
is not a place to Explain thefe things thorowly: what
has been faid, is fufficient to fhow, that we muft not
truft to our Eyes, when they reprelent the Figure of
Bodies to us, altho* we are not fo fubjedl to be de-
ceiv'd by Figures as other things.
CHAP.
Chap. VIII. A Search after Truth.
CHAP. VIII.
X That our Byes do not inform us of the greatnefs or fvoift"
nefs of Motion cotfider d in it felf II. That duration^
which is necejfary to be underflood to l^now what Motion
isy is unkriovpn. III. Examples of the Errors of Sight
in refpehi of Motion and %/?.
VJ^E have difcover^d the principal and moft general
Errors of the Sight about the Exterrfion of Fi-
gures, we muft now correcSf thofe in which it deceives
us about the Motion of Matter; and this will not be
a very difficult performance, after what we have faid
about Extenfion; for there is lb great a relation be-
twixt thefe two things, that if we are deceived about
the bignefs of Bodies, we muft unavoidably be de-
ceiv'd in their Motion.
But to offer nothing except what is clear and di-
ftintft, we muft firft take away the Equivocation of
the word Motion > for this Term commonly fignifics
two things, the firft is a certain power that is ima-
gin'd in a moV'd Body, which is the Caufe of its Mo-
tion j the fecond is a continual removal of a Body
that is departing from, or approaching to another, that
is, confider'd as in a State of Reft.
• When we fay, for Inftance, that a Bowie hath com-
municated its Motion to another, the word Motion is
here taken in the firft fignification, but if it be faid
limply, that a Boul is in Motion, it is taken in the
fecond Senfe. And indeed this term Motion fignifies
both the Caufe and Effetft together, which yet are in
themfelves two different things.
They feem to me to be in the grofleft and moft dan-
gerous Error concerning force, who attribute to it Mo-
tion, and the tranfportation of Bodies; thefe fine terms
of hiatfire^ and imprejfed ^haalities^ feem to me to be
E only
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yo A Search after Truth, Book I.
S<« the id only a proper Subterfuge for the Ignorance of the
theSeZn^ falfly Learn d, and impious Libertines, as may be
Part, 5. /, very eafily proved , but this is not a fit place to treat
of this force which moves Bodies, it is not vifiblcj
and I am here Ipeaking only, of the Errors of our
Eyes, though I will not omit it where it is neceflary.
Motion taken in the fccond fenfe, and for the re^
moving of Bodies which is dilfant one from another,
is lometfiing that is viifible, and a fit Subjed: for this
Chapter.
I. Wat our I have, I think, in the Sixth Chapter, demonftrated
that our Sight doe^ not diftinguilh the Magnitude of
formus'of bodies among themfelves, but only in relped to the
the great' proportion they have one to another, and particularly
« to ours. From whence I conclude alfo, that vie can-
rfMnioTf know the true and abfolute greatnefs of their
con/tdered Motions, vi:^, of their Swifinefs, or Slownefsi but
tn itfelf. only the proportion thefe Motions have one to another,
and chie% with that which generally happens to our
Bodies, which I prove thus;
It is certain that we cannot judge of the grearneis
of the Motion of a Body, but by the length and
Ipace that the fame Body has run through > fb that
fince our Eyes do not difcover to us the true Length
of the Space the Body pafles, it follow.s, that ttey
cannot difcover the true greatnefs of this Motion to
us.
This Proof is only a Conlequence of what I have
faid of Extenfion, and is evident from what Ihave
there demonftrated; but berfi is one that depends
upon no previous Suppofiticns; I fay then, thdt al-
though we cou'd. certainly know the true greatnefs
of the Space it palfed, it wou'd not from ihgnce (ol*
11 That the know that of its Motion.
duratim, ^ The greatnefs or fwifcnels of Motion includes two
which is ne- things. The firft is the removing of a Body from one
o^e7to%e another, as from Parti to St. Germains; the
difc^ering f^cond is the time tharis neceflary to remove it in J
Now it is not fulKcient to be exadlly aflur'd bow
much fpace there is between Parti and St, Germains,
to know if a Man went thither by a quick or flow
Motion ;
the great-
ncp of Mo-
Hon,is un-
known t9
m.
\
Oiap. VIII. A Search after Truth. y I
Motion 9 but it is alfo neteflary to know how tnuph
time he ipent in going thither. I grant then that the
true Length of this way is known, but abfolutely deny
that we can exadly know by Sighc,Qr any other way
whatfoever, the time he was in going ; and the true
greaiheisof duration.
It is evident, that at certain times one hour
appears as long as four, and on the contrary, at ano*
ther time, four hours will pafs infeufibly. As for In-
Aancev when we are filfd with Joy, the time feems
ihort, becaufe it pafles without our thinking of it;
but when we are oppreft with grief, or fufFer any
pain, the days then feem as long as whole years : Th«
realon of it is, that then the Mind is tired with its
duration, bccaufe it is troublefome to it, as if it ap-
plied it felf thereto the more for knowing it better >
and fo it thinks it longer tlian when it is taken up
with Joy, or fome agreeable Imploy, which makes
it as it were, go out of it felf to poUels the Obje<fI of
its Joy ; for even as a Perlbn thinks a Pid:ure fo much
the larger, as he confiders more attentively the leaft
things that are reprefented thejein; or, as we Ihall
think the Head of a Fly Very great, if we diftinguifti
all the parts tbejeof with a Microfcope. Thus the
Mind thinks its duration fo much the greater, as it
con^ders it with more attention, and is fenfiblc of all
Tibe parts thereof.
$0 tliat I doubt oot but God can, after fuch a man-
ner, apply our Minds to the parts of Duration, by pro-
ducing in us a great number of Senfations in a very
liicle time, as that an hour may appear as long as many
Ages 9 for, in fine, there is not an Inftant in Duration,
as tliere is nor an A tome in Bodies, and even as the leaft
particle of Matter may be divided ad infinitum, Co
we may likewifeadlgn lefs and lefs parts of Dtiratioa
to Iniinky, as may eafiiy be demonitraced. If there-
fore tlie Mmd was attentive to thefe little parts ©f
Duration, by fuch Senfations as Ic.ave fome Traces in
the Brain, which it can remember, it wou'd think
it without doubt io"gcr then they other wife ap-
pear to be.
E 2 But
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5't A Search after Truth. Book I
. But indeed the ufe of Watches fufEciently prove
that we have no exadl knowledge of Duration, and
that is as much as I require ; for as we cannot know
the greatnefs of Motion in it felf, fo we can no more
know that of Duration, as \ve have fnew'd : It fol-
lows then, that if we cannot exadlly know the abfb-
Jute greatnefs of Duration, we cannot precifely un-
derftand the abfolute greatnefs of Motion.
But becaufe we may know fome proportions of
Durations, or of the times one to another, we may
alfo know fome proportions that Motions bear to one
another, even as we can know that the Solar year is
longer than the Lunar; thus we may alfo know that
a Cannon Bullet moves fafter than a Bomb; fo that if-
the ufe of our Eyes is not to diftinguifli the abfolute
greatnefs of Motion, yet by their help we can know
very near the relative greatnefs, that is, the proportion
which one Motion bears to another and this is all that
is neceffary to be known for the prefervation of our
Bodies.
ULE^ampk • There are many Occurrences in which we clearly
f/oiir ^yes Sight deceives us about the Motion of
ahutthe Bodies; It frequently happens, that thofe which ap-
Motion or pear to move, do nor move, and on the contrary, thofe
aifs w^hich feem to be in reftjUre in motion ; for Example,
when we fit in a VefTel that Sails very faft and very
fteadily, diilant Fields and Towns appear to move,
and the Velfel to iland fiill.
Thus if a Man were plac'd in the Planet Mars^ he
would judge by his Sight that the Sun, Earth, and
the other Planets, with all the fix'd Stars, revolve
about him once in about 24 or 25 hours, in which
time Mars turns round upon his own Axis, yet the
Sun, Earth, and Stars do not turn about this Planet,
fo that this Man would fee things as in motion which
movM nor, and would believe himielf to be in reft
whilft he was in motion.
I will nor ftay to explain here, how the Man fitr
ting in the Veftel might corredl: the Error of his Eyes,
and how he, whom we have fuppos'd in the Planet
Mars, would obftinarely ptafift in his Errcr; becaufe
It
Chap. VIII. A Search after Truths-
it is Very eafie to know the reafbn thereof, efpe-
cially if we fliould refled: upon what would hap-
pen to a Man fleeping in a VelTel, and who being
fuddenly awaked, and looking about him Ihould only
fee the top of theMaftof fome other Vcflfel coming
towards him, certainly if he faw no Sails fill'd with
Wind, no Seaman at Work, and perceiv'd no-agita-
tion of his Veflel, nor any thing elfe of this naturer
he would abfolutely doubt whether of the two Vef-
fels were in Motion, in vain would he Confulc his
Eyes, and even his Reafon, to difcover where the
Motion lay.
E 3 CHAP.
A ScArch after Trnth* Book I.
CHAP. IX.
A Cantinmtim of the fame SuhjeSi. I, A General Proef
of the Errors of our Sight about Motion. II. That it^s
necejfary to the diftance of OhjeBs, to judge of
the fmftnefs of their Motion. Ill,- An Examination
of Means to htow their diflances.
Ake this General Proof of all the Err(*-s we are
Let A be the Eye of the Beholder, C the Objecfl
which I fuppole at a confiderable diftance from A, I
fay that though the Objecft remains immovable in C,
he may believe it as diftanc as D, or as near him as B;
and though the Obje(ft fhould recede to D, or ap-
proach to B, he might believe it immovable in C;
on the contrary, although it approach towards B, he
may believe it immovable in C, or receding towards
D ; And although the Objecft advances from C, to £,
H, Got he may believe that it's only mov'd from
liable to, in refped of Motion,
o
B C IY M
C CO
Ch^. IX. A Search after Truth. yj-
C to F, or 1 i On the contrary, although the Objed
were remov'd from C to F or J, he might believe that
it was mcv'd to F, or H, or elfe to G or But if
the Objedl be mov'd in a line equally diftant from
the Beholder, that is by a Circumference,whole Center
fhould be the Eye of the Behdlder> although the Ob-
je(ft move from C to P, he may believe that it moves
only from B to O; and on the contrary, if it moves
from B to O, he may believe it moves from C to P.
If beyond the Objedt C, there be another Objed:
M which he believes immovable, although it moves
towards N ; or if C moves more llowly towards F,
than M towards N, it will appear to move towards
Ti and on the contrary, if,
It's evident that the Proof of all thefe Propofitions,
except the laft, in which there's no difficulty, depends
only upon one thing, that is, we can't always make di^ance of
a certain Judgment of the diftance of Objeds, and
if fa, it follows, that we cannot know whether C
advanc'd towards D, or whether it approaches to- the Motion.
wards B 5 and thus alio of the other Propofitions.
Now to fee whether the Judgments We form about
the diftance of Objeds are certain, we are only to
examine the Means wt are to make ufe of in judg-
ing ; and if thefe Means are uncertain, we cannot in.
judge infallibly, there are many of them, and they mination of
mult be explain'd. tht Means
The firlt, the moft general, and fometimes %e^dif7nce
mcft certain way, that we have to judge of the di- of objehfs.
ftance of Objeds, is, the Angle, which the Rays of* The Soul
our Eyes make, whofe point of Concurrence is, or
meafures, the Objed ; When this Angle is very great, the fud^-
we fee the Objed very near ; on the contrary, when
it is very little, we fee it very diftant ; And the
Change which happens in the Situation of our Eyes, thefe Natu-
according to the Changes of this Angle, is the means ralfudg-
whereof our Soul makes ufe, to judge of thh di-
ftance br nearnefs of Objeds; for even as a blind
Man, who ftiou'd have ih his Hands two ftreighc I only fpeak
Sticks, whofe length he did not know, rhight by a ^
Mnd of Natural Geometry, judge very near of the
E 4 diftance
1*1
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A Semh after Truth. Book L
diftance of fome Body, in touching it with the
end of thefe two Sticks, by the difpofition and
ddtance of his hands : So it may be faid,
that the Soul Judges of the diftance of an Ob-
jedl by the dilpofition of its Eyes, which is not the
lame, when the Angle by which he fees, is fometimes
greater, and fometimes lefs, when the Objecff is
nearer, and when it is farther off.
We lhall be eafily perfwaded of this, if we take the
pains to make this very eafie Experiment: Hang a
Ring upon a Thread with the edge towards you, or
elfe thruft one Stick into the Earth, and take another
in your Hand, which lhall be crooked at the end, go
back two or three iteps from the Ring or the Stick,
wink with one Eye, and try to put the Stick in your
Hand through the Ring, or to touch the other in the
Ground traverfly, about the height of your Eyes;
you will be furpriz'd, not to be able to do that once
in an hundred times, which you believe is lb eafie to
be done. Now if you even lay by the Stick, and at-
tempt to put your Finger into the Ring, hanging with
the edge towards you, you will find it difficult alt ho
you were juft at it.
But it muft be well obfervVl, that what I have faid
about putting a crooked Stick through a Ring, or
touching another Stick traverfiy, will not hold, if the
Eye be in a right Line with the opening of the Ring,
for then there would be no difficulty in it ; but it
would be eafier to elfedl: it with one Eye Ihut, than
with both the Eyes open, becaufe that would guide us.
Now it may be faid, that the difficulty which is
found in hitting the hole of the Ring traverfiy, with
but one Eye open, is owing to this, that the Eye be-
ing fiiut, the Angle, which I have fpoken of, is un-
known i for to know the bignefs of the Angle at the
Eye, it is not fufficient to know the length of the Bafe,
and one of the Angles at the Bafe, funlefs the other be
right; but we muft alio know the other Angl^ at the
Bafe, or the length of one of the fides, which can't
exatftly be known, bur by opening the other Eye:
And thus the Soul cannot make ufe of its Natural
Geometry,to Judge of the diftance of the Ring, The
Cbap. IX. A Search after truth.
The difpofition • of the Eyes, which accompanies
the Angle, form'd by the Vifual Rays that meet in the
Objedt, is then one of the beft, and mgft Univerfal
Methods, which the Soul makes ufe of, to Judge of the
diftance of Things : If this Angle then, does not ad- .
mit of any Senfible Change, when the Objedt is near,
if we approach to it, or recede from it 5 it will follow
that the Method is falfe, and that the Soul cannot
make ufe of it, to Judge of the diftance of that
Objed.
Now 'tis very eafie to know, that this Angle
changes remarkably, when an Objed that is but one
Foot from our Eyes, is remov'd to four , if it be on-
ly remov'd from four to eight, the change is much
lefs fenfible, it from eight to twelve, 'tis ftill lefs ;
if from a thoufand to a hundred thoufand,'tis yet lefs.
Laftly, the change will be wholly infenfible, if the
Objed were remov'd into the Imaginary Spaces ; fo
that if there were a confiderable Space betwixt A and
C, the Soul could not, by this means, know whether
the Objed is nearer to B or D.
'Tisfor this rcafon, that we fee the Sun and Moon
as if they were wrapt up in Clouds, altho they arc
tifc extrcamly diftant behind thefn, and that we Natural-
iiE ly believe all the Stars are at an equal diftance, and
holii: that the Comets are fix'd, or almoft without any mo-
q{^|; tion, towards the latter end of their Courfe : As alfo,
that they wholly diflipate after fome Months, becaufe
J they remove from us, in very near a right Line, to our
ulljK' and lofe themfelves in the great Spaces, whence
,„ ti thev return not till after many Years, or even after
iity A
many Ages.
To explain the fecond way, which the Soul makes The fecond
ufe of, to Judge of the diftance of Objeds, we muft wayofjudg^
, I,, know, that ftis ablblutely neceffary that the Figure
' the Eye be different, according to the different diftance
of the Objeds that we fee ; for when a Man fees an
Objed near him, it's neceffary that his Eyes were
more extended than if the Objed were farther off,
''J J,, becaufe, that to the end the Rays of thj? Objed may
fncet upon the Optic Nerve, (which is neceflary for
® Vifion)
A Semh after Truth. Book I.
VifionJ the diftance between this Nerve and the
Chryftaline Humour, muft be the greater.
It is true, that if the Chryftaline Humour became
more C'onvex, when the Objed is near, it would
have the fame cffed as if the Eye was more extended;
but it's incredible, that the Chryftaline Humour can
eafily change its Convexity, and yet, on the other
^de, we have a very fenfible Proof, that the Eye is
extended, or drawn out in length : for Anatomy
teaches us, that there are Mufcles which encompaft
the middle of the Eye, and that one may perceive the
Effort of thefe Mufcles in comprefllng, or extending
it when any Objed is to be feen very near.
But 'tis not neceffary to know here, after what mam
ner this is done, it's enough that it happens from the
change of the Eye, whether it be, that the Mufcles,
that environ it, comprefs it, or whether the little
Nerves, that anfwer to the Ciliary Ligaments, which
keep the Chryftaline Humour fufpended among the
other Humours of the Eye, do relax, to encreale the
Convexity cf the Eye, or contrad themfeJves to dj-
mu iih it.
For, in fine, the change which happens, be it what
it will, is only to caufe, that the Rays of Objeds
may exadly meet together juft qpon the Optic Nerve.
Now 'tis manifeft, that when the Objed is five hun-
drcd Paces, or ten thoufand Leagues diftant, we fee
it with the fame difpofition of the Eye, without any
fcnfible change in the Mufcles which encompafs it, or
in the Nerves which anf\*'er to the Ciliary Ligaments
of the Chryftaline Humour ; and the Rays of pbjeds
meet very exadly upon the Rethiay or Optic NerVe,
Thus the Soul xVould fudge that Objeds, ten thou-
fand, or a hundred thoufand Leagues diftant, afe on-
ly five or fix hundred Paces off, if it Judg'd only of
their diftance by the difpofition of the Eyes, which I
have fpoken of.
However, 'tis certain that the Soul make^ ufe of
this means when the Objed is near : If, for Example,
an Objed is but half a Foot from us. We diftingiiift
well ejio /gh its diftance, by the difpofition of the
Mufcles,
' Chap. IX. A Semh After Truth,
" Mufcles, which comprefs our Eyes, fo as to extend
ihetn a little j and even this difpofition is painful: If
® the Obje(fI is at the diftance of two Foot, we yet di-
ftinguilh it, becaule the difpolition of the Mulcles is a
^ little fenfible, altho it is not any longer painful, bu|
^ f if we remove the Objedl to fome confiderable diftartce,
^ this difpolition of the Mufcles becomes fo infenfible,
that it does not in the leaft affift us in Judging of the
diftance of the Objedt.
Thefe are twp Means that the Soul ufes to Judge
of the diftance of Objedls, which ate very ufelels
when the Objetft is five or fix hundred Paces diftant
from us) and which, alfo, are not c-ertain, altho the
Objedl were nearer.
The third Means conlifts in the bignefs of thelmage, The third
which is Painted at the bottom of the Eye, and which
reprefents the Objedts as we fee them. 'Tis granted, ^
. u . ^ ♦ 1' ■ ' ■ I i-n aijtaficeif
' that this Image diminilhes in pfopoftion to the diftance objeSls,
of the Objedl, but by how much the Objedt, that
changes its diftanccs removes farrhet off, by fo much
is the diminution lefs fenfible: Fot when an Objedl is
at fome teafonable diftance, fuppofe five or fix hun-
M dred Paces, more or lefs, in proportion to its magni-
tude, there arifes VCfy conlidefable alterations in its
Elongation, without any fenfible Change in the Image
ftsi'' which reprefents it, as is eafie to be Ibowed. Thus,
bet,' alfo, this third Means has the fame defedt as the two
,w:iB preceding.
sf It may be further obferv'd, that the Soul judges
ffjlM tK)tof diftantObjedls, wbofe Image is Painted vety
fmall upon the Retina. For Example, when I fee a
Ojirjt Man, or a Tree, at the diftance Of a hundred Paces, or
elfe many Stafs in the Heavens, I judge nOt that the
Man is more diftant than the Tfee, or that little Stars
are farther off than the great ones, altho the Images
of the Man, and little Stars, are Painted lefs upon
the Retina than the Tree, or the gfeat Stafs.
1,^^: Mofeevef, the bignefs erf the Objedf muft be' kiiovtm
to judge near of its diftance ; and becaule I know that
yjjiii!! a Houfe is greater than a Man, alfho' the Image
0i thereof be lefs than that of a Man, yet I do ncft there-
Hi ' fore
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A Search after Truth. Book I.
fore judge it nearer, imagine the fame of the Stars,
our Eyes reprefenting them all at the fame diftance,
alcho it be very reafonable to believe feme more di-
ftant from us than others. Thus there are an Infinity
of Objedls, whofe diftance we cannot know, fince
there's an Infinity of them whofe greatnefs we are ig'
norant of.
We alfo Judge of the diftance of the Objedt, by the
power whereby it adts upon our Eyes, becaufe a di^
ftant one adts more weakly than another y alfo by the
diftindfion and clearnefs of the Image which is form'd
in the Eye ; becaufe, when an Objedt is diftant, its
neceflary that the Eye-fight dilate, and confequently,
the Rays meet together a little confufedly: Hence it
is, that Objedls which are but a little diftindl, or
fuch as we fee confufedly appear diftant from us j and
on the contrary, clear and diftindf Objedls appear to
be near us. It's evident enough, that thefe laft means
are not proper to Judge of the diftance of Objedls
with any certainty : I fliall not infift upon the laft of
all, which is that that helps the Imagination, and
which eafily carries the Soul to Judge of very diftant
Objedls.
"The fixth and principle Means confifts in this, That
the Eye does not exhibit to the Soul an Objedl by it
felf, and diftindl from others, but alfo all Objedls ly-
ing betwixt us and that, which we confider.
When, for Example, we look upon a diftant
Steeple, we commonly fee, at the fame time, many in'-
terjacent Fields and Houfes, and becaufe we judge
of the diftance of thele Fields and Houles, and fee the
Steeple is beyond them, we judge alfo that it is very
diftant, and alfo greater, than if we faw it alone:
However, the Image thereof, which is traced at the
bottom of our Eye, is always of an equal bignefs,
whether there are Fields and Houfes betwixt us or
nor, provided we fee it at an equal diftance, which
is fuppos'd. Thus we judge of the bignefs of Objedls
by their imagin'd diftance, and the Bodies betwixt us
and the Objedl do much aflift our Imagination in it,
even as we judge of Duration, orthelengh of Time,
after
i
chap. IX. A Search after Truth. 6i
after fome Adlion done by the remembrance of a con-
fefs'd Series of Things, which we have done, or of
Thoughts which we have fucceflively had after this
Adlion, for 'tis all thefe Thoughts and Adfions which
have fucceeded one another, that affift our Mind in
judging of the length or duration of Ibme Time 5 or,
rather, a confus'd remembrance of all the fucceflive
Thoughts about the fame thing, is nothing elfe but
our Judgment of Duration, even as a confus'd fight
of the Fields, which are betwixt us and the Steeple,
is the fame thing as our Judgment of the diftance
thereof.
Hence ^tis eafie to know, the true Reafon why the
Moon appears greater when it rifes, than when it is
much elevated above the Horizon, for when it riles it
appears many Leagues diftant from us, and even be-
yond the Senfible Horizon, or the Earth which ter-
minates "Our fight, whereas we judge it to be but
about half a League from us, or (even or eight times
as high as our Houfes, when it is molt elevated above
the Horizon. Thus we judge it much greater when
it is near the Horizon, than when it is very diftant
from it, becaufe we imagine it much more diftant
from us, when it rifes, than when is it very high.
It s true, there are a great many Philolbphers, who
attribute what I have faid to the Vapours which rife
out of the Earth ; I agree with them, that Vapours,
refradting the Rays of Objecfts, make them appear the
greater. I know there are more Vapours betwixt us
and the Moon, when it rifes, than when it is rifen
very high, and confequently, it muft appear feme-
thing greater, than if it were always equally diftant
from us: However, it cannot be laid that this re-
fradfion of the Rays of the Moon, is the caufe of thefe
apparent Changes of its greatnefs, for this refracftion
hinders not, but that the Image which is traced in the
bottom of our Eyes, at the riling of the Moon, is not
lefs than that which is formed there when it has been
rifen a conliderable time.
Aftronomers, which MeSfure the Diameters of the
Planers, obferve, chat that of the Moon grows larger
in
A Stitch afier Tmh. Book I.
ia proportioa tg its diftance frorn the Horizon, and
eonfequently, in propotcjon to its appearing lefs to us i
fo that the Piameter of the Image, Painted at the
hgtcom of our Byes, is lefler when we fee it greater*
Indeed, when the Moon ariies, it's more diftant from
us, by the Semi-diameter of the Earth, than when it is
perpendicularly over our Head, which is the reafon
that its Diameter is greater than when it ariies above
the Horizon, hecaufe then it approaches to us.
That then, which is the oaufe of our feeing it
greater when it rifes, is not the refradfion of its Rays,
made by the Vapours coming out of the Earth, Ence
the Image, which is form'd by thefe Rays, is then lefs,
hut it is the Natural Judgm,eat that we make of its
diftance, hecaufe it appears beyond the Earth, whkh
we fee very diftant from us, as was explain'd before,
and I'm furpriz'd that Philolbphers fliould look upoe
the reafon of this appearance, and deceit of our Eyes,
to be raore di^culc to find out, than thegreateft
Equations ot Algebra.
This meaus of Judging of the diftance of any Ob'
jedl, by the Knowledge of the diftance of Things,
lying betwixt us and it, is of great ufe to us, when
the other ways, which I have fpoken of, fail us, for
by this we can Judge, that certain Objetfts are diftant
from us many Eeagues, which we camagt by any of
the others, however, if we Examine, we fhaU find
many defedls in it-
For, firft^ this way ferves only to Judge of Objeds
which are upon the Eartb and but very rarely, and
for the moit, very unprofitably, of Things that are ia
the Air, or in the Heavens. Secondly, we can't make
life of it upon the Earth, hut in things that are a very
few Leagues diftant from us. Aod thirdly,, we muft
he aftur'i that there are betwixt us and theObjetft,
neither V^ailies, Mountains, or any fuch thing, which
hirtders u^ from making ufe of this means. Laftly,
I believe there are none who have not had Experi-
ence enough, in this fubjcdt, to be perfwaded that k
is extreamly dilficult, to make a certain Judgment of
the diftance of Objedls, by a fenfible view of Things
il C3jap, A after Truth^
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Thefe are the Means, by wjiich we Judge of the
diftance of ObjeAs, we have obferv'd cqnfiderable de-
feAs in them, and may conclude, that the Judgments:
which are form'd upon them mull be very uncertain.
Hence I can eahly Ihow the Truth of the Propoli-
tions which I have advanced. I have fuppos'd the
ObjeA at * C, conliderable diftant from jiy then it
may by many fteps advance towards D or J5, with- pr7cedi^^>
out my knowing it, iince I have no certain means Figure.
to judge of its diftance j it may even be fuppos'd to
recede towards D, when 'tis knagin'd to approach to-
wards B, becaufe the Image of the ObjeA is Ibme-
times Painted greater upoi>the Optic Nerves, whether
becaufe the Air, which is I^twixt the Objedl and the
Eye, caufes a greater refradlion one time than ano-
ther, or whether it happens, lometimes, from the little
tremblings of this Nerve; or, laftly, whether the Im-
predion which the imperfed: uniting of the Rays, up-
on the Optic Nerve, are difpers'd and communicated
to the parts which ought not to be alFeded with them,
for it may happen from many different Caufes. Thus
the Image of the fame Objed^, being enlarged on
thelo op^aljons, inclines the Soul to believe the Objed,
is. near*: Spppofe as much be faid about the other Pro-
politions.
Before I conclude this Chapter, I mull obferve,
that k much concerns us, for the pre.fervation of our
Life, to know well tlic Motion and Reft of Bodies,
in proportion to their nearnefs to us ; and that it fig-
little, to itav-ean exad Knowledge of the Truth
of thele Things, when they are remov'd to a great,
djftance from us. This will evidently ihow, that
wliat.Iihave advanc'd in gejieral about all the Senfes,
as that they do not help us to the Knowledge of
Things but in refped to the prefcrvation of our Bo-
dy, and not according to what they are in themfelves,
i? exadly true in this cafe ; fince we have a more
exad Knowledge of the Motion, or Reft of Bodies,
in proportion to ihdr nearnefs : and which we couM
examine
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H Search afteflTruth. Book I.
examine by the Senfes, than\Af^fJi they are fo diftant*
That the Relation they have to our Bodies ceafes, as
when they are five or fix hundred Paces from us, if
they are of an ordinary bignefs, and even nearer than
that if they are lels; or, in fine, farther off, if they
are greater.
CHAP. X.
Of Errors ahout Senfihle Qualities^
I, A diftinHion of Soul and Body. 11. An Explication
of the Organs of the Senfes. Ill, To vohat fart of
(he Body the Soul is immediately United, IV, Hov9
Ohje&s aH ufon Bodies. V. How upon the Soul;
with Beafons why the Soul does not perceive the M(r
tions of the Fibres of the Body, VI. Four things
which are Confounded in every Senfation,
"l^E have feen in the preceding Chapters, that the
Judgments we form by thefe means of our Eyes,
about Extenfion, Figure and Motion, are never
exadlly true; yet, we muft confefs, they are not ab-
folutely falfe, they include, at leaft, this Truth,
That Extenfion, Figure and Motion, whatever they
are, are without us.
It's true, we often fee things which are not, and
vehich never were ; and we ought not to conclude,
that a thing is without us, from hence only, that we
fee it without us; there is no necelfary connexion be-
tween an Idea that is prelented to the Mind of Man,
and the Exiftence of a thing which this Idea repre-
fents. That which happens to thofe who fieep, or are
delirious, fufficiently proves this ; however, we can
ordinarily be afliir'd, that Extenfion, Figures and
Motions, which we fee, are without us : Thefe are
not
chap. X, ^ Search after Truth.
not meet imaginary things, they are real; and we
are not deceived if we believe they have a real Exi-
ftence, and which is independant of our Mind, though
it s very * difficult to prove it. ^
It is then evident, that the Judgments we make
about the Extenfion, Figures, and Motions of Bodies,
contain fome Truth ; but the fame cannot be faid of
thofe things that belong to Light, Colours, Sapors,
Odours, and all oiher fenfible Qualities; for Truth
is never to be found there, as we have fhown before.
We do not here diftinguilh Light from Colours,
becaufe we believe they are not very different, nor
can be feparately explain'd. We fhall be oblig'd to
fpeak of other fenfible Qualities in General at the
fame time that we treat of thefe two, becaufe they
might be explain'd from the fame Principles. We
ought to be very attentive to the things that follow,
for they are of the moft important Confequence, and
much more ufeful than thofe things we have yet
fpoken of.
I fuppofe firft, that the Reader has made fome Re-
flexion upon the two * Idea's which are found in our
Soul, one which reprefents the Body to us, and the
other the Mind ; that he is able to diftinguilh them
by the pofirive Attributes which they include ; in a
word, that he be well perfuaded that Extention is
different from Thought. Or elfe, I fuppofe him to
have Read and Confider'd fome Places of Augufiin-,
as the I oth Chapt. of the i oth Book of the Trinity^ the
4th and 14th Chap, of the Book of the ^iantity of the
Souli or the Meditations of Dcfiartes, elpecially that
which refpedfs the Diftindfion of the Soul and Body ;
Or, laftly, the Sixth Difcourfe of M. de Cordemoy^ du
difcernement de Came dii Corp* ■
I fuppofe alfo, chat he knows the Anatomy of the
Organs of the Scnfes, and that they are compos'd of
fmall Branches, which have their Original in the
middle of the Brain, whence they difperfe themfelves
through all the Members of Senfation, and that at
laft, without any interruption, terminate at the Ex-
rreine parts of the Body ■ That whilft we are Awake
F 0r
* See the
Explana-
tiom.
DifinBion
of the Soul
and Bcdy.
* Ihete call
Idea, tvery
thing that
is the itiZ'
mediate
ObjeB of
the Mind.
II. Explica^
ft on of the
Organs of
the Senfes,
•J.
1
66 A Search after Truth. Book L
or fa Health, one of their Extremities cannot be
tnov'd but the other is alfo mov'd, becaufe of their
perpetual Intenfion ; juft as an extended Cord cannot
be mov'd in one part, without communicating motion
to another.
The Reader muft alfo know, that thefe little Strings
or Branches, may be affedled after two ways, either
at the end, which is at the extremity of the Body,
or at that which is in the Brain ; If ihefe little Strings
are fliaken by the Adlion of External Bodies upon
them, and this Motion is not communicated to the
Brain, as it often happens in fleep, then the Mind re-
ceives no new Senfation by that AcSlion ; but if thefe
Strings are mov'd in the Brain by the Courfe of the
Animal Spirits, or by fome other Caufe, the Soul
perceives fomething, although the parts of thefe Strings,
which are out of the Brain, and which are difpers'd
through all the parrs of our Bodies, be in perfedi reft,
as it often happens in fleep.
III. The Soul It is not amifs to obferve here by the by, how Ex-
is tmmedi- pefience teaches us, that we do fometimes feel pain in
uVharpart parts of our Bodies as have been cut off, be-
sftheUratn caufe the Strings of the Brain which belong to thofe
vhere the refpecftive parts being fhaken after the fame manner
th7o//Ins efiec5lually hurt, the Soul feels a very
efthe Serifes real Pain in thefe Imaginary Parts ; Now all thefe
things fhew vifibly, that the Soul immediately refides
in that part of the Brain where all the Organs of
Senfe meet ; I mean, it perceives all the Changes,
which pafs there by means of Objedfs which Caufe,
or have been accuftom'd to Caufe them j and pet-
ceives nothing that paffes out of this part, but by the
inrerpolition of the Fibres which terminate there;
This Pohcion being well conceiv'd, it will not be
very dilKcult to fhew how Senfation is made, which
muft be explain'd by fome Example.
IV. An Ex. When I thruft the Point of a Needle into my Hand,
Point removes and feparates the Fibres of the
fe^^Bodtes. Fibres are continued from this place to the
Brain, and when one fleeps they are extended enough
not to be fhaken, unlefs thofe of the Brain be alfo
fhaken ;
Chap. X. A Scmh after truth. 67
(haken ; it follows, then that the Extremities of thefe
Fibres which are in the Brain are alfo moved. If
the Motion of the Fibres in my Hand is moderate,
that of the Fibres of the Brain will be fo alio •, and
if the Motion is violent to break foinething upon my
Hand, it will be much ftronger and more violent in
the Brain.
Thus alio, if I come near the Fire, the fmall parts
of Wood, which it continually, in great number, and
with much violence, difperfes, (as may be prov'd by
Reafon, thojigh oar Sight fails us in it) fliake thefe
Fibres, and ceinmumcate a part of their Motion ; If
this Motion, I fay, is moderate, that of the extremity
of the Fibres of the Brain which anfwer to the Hand,
will be moderate ; but if this Motion is violent
enough in the Hand to feparate fome parts, as it hap-
pcr^s when a Man burns, the Motion of the Internal
Fibres of the Brain will be proportionably more vio-
lent. This is what happens to our Body when Objedfs
npon it i We mull now conlider what happens to
the Soul.
It refides principally, if I may be permitted to lay V. Th' if-
fo, in this part of the Brain where all the Strings of/^'^.
-our Nerves meet together, 'tis placed there to che-
riHi and conferve all the parts of our Body, and con- the Soul-,
Icquently it's neceffary that it be advcrtis'd of all the
Changes which happen thereto, and that it can
iftinguifli tiioic which are Conformable to the Confti- -not peraivt
tuciofi of its Body from the others, becanfe it would the Motions
be very ufelefs to know 'em abiblutely, and without of the Fibres
any relation to its Body. Since therefore all thefe
Changes of our Fibres, which have no other real Exi-
Ihcnce but in the Motions which commonly clider only
as to the f?iore or lefs, it's necelfiry that the Soul look
upon 'em as Changes eflentialiy diderent; forahhough
in themfelves they dider but little, yet we muft al-
ways conlider'cm as ehenrialiy diderenr in rcToedt of
.1 r • r I rj - " Re J-
the preiervation of the Body. fj?unF,or
Motion, for Fxample, which cauies Pain, very f Fanr-jI
often differs but a little from that which caufes Titil-
Ution, it is not necelfary that there be an EiTential
F 2 dif- SenlAffSV.
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63 A Search after Truth. Book I.
differenee between thefe two Motions ^ but it's ne-
ceflary that there be an Eflential difference between
Titillation and Pain, which thefe two Motions caufc in
the Soul; for the fhaking of the Fibres which accom-
See vhat I Ponies Titillation, informs the Soul of the good Con-
haw [aid ititution of it's Body, that there is power enough to
b^o'-^e of relift the impreflion of the Objedf, and that it muft
'judfments ^pp^chend it felf hurt ; but the Motion which
mCh.x. accompanies Pain being a little more violent, is ca-
Lib. I. pable of breaking fome Fibre of the Body, and the
Soul muft be advertis'd by fome difagreeable Senfa-
tion to take care thereof; Thus, although the Motions
which pafs in the Body differ only as to mors or left,
between themfelves, yet it they are confider'd in re-
fpecft to the prefervation of our Life, it may be faid
that they differ effentially.
Hence our Soul is fenfible only of the Ad:ion of
Objedfs upon the Fibres of our Flelh ; it would be
no ufe at all to it to know them, nor could it receive
from them fufficient light, to judge whether the
things about us were capable of deftroying or che-
riiking the Occonony of our Body ; but it perceives
it felf touch'd by thefe Senfations which differ effcn-
tially ; and prccilely obferving the Qualities of Ob-
jecfts, as they ftand related to the Body, they make it
to perceive very diftindlly whether or no thefe Objeds
are capable of hurting it.
Befidcs this, we muft confider, that if the Soul
only perceives that which paffes in its Hand, when
burnt; if it only fees the Motion and Reparation of
fome Fibres, it would not be at all concern'd, and it
might even fbmetimcs out of Fancy and Caprice take
a fatisfadion in it, like thofe Madmen that divert
themfelves by breaking every thing to pieces in their
Fury.
Cr elle, even as a Prifoner would not be uneafieto
fee one demolilh the Walls that confin'd him, but
would even rejoyce in hopes of being deliver'd very
foon ; fo if we only perceive the feparation of the
parts of our Body, when we arc burnt, or receive
any hurt, we fhould foon be perfuadcd that our Hap-
pinefs
Chap.X. A Search after Truth.
pinefs is not confin'd in the Body, which rather ob-
ftru(f^s it, and therefore we fliould be very glad to fee
it deltroy^d.
Hence it is obfervable, that the Author of the
Union of our Soul and Body hath, with great Wif-
dona, ordain'd, that we fhould be fenfible of pain,
when there happens a change to the Body which is
capable of hurting it ; as when a Needle pierces the
Flelh, or Fire feparates fome parts thereof, and that
we Ihould be fenlible of Titillation or an agreeable
Heat when thefe Motions are moderated; without
perceiving either the truth of what palfes in our
Body, or the Motions of thefe Fibres of which we
have already fpoke.
Firft; Becaufe in perceiving Pain and Pleafure
which differ otherwife than in the more and le/s, we
more eafily diftinguilh Objedis which are the occafion
of them ; Secondly, becaufe this way of informing
us, whether we ought to unite or feparare from Bodies
which are about us, is more fliort, and does lefs im-
ploy the Capacity of the Mind which was made for
God. Laftly, Becaufe Pain and Pleafure being Mo--
difications of the Soul, which it perceives by means
of its Body, and which affe(5f more than the know-
ledge of Motion or fome Fibres, which belong there-
to, this obliges the Adind to be much concern'd, and
ftrengthens the Union betwixt the Soul and Body of
Man ; From all this it is evident, that our Senfes were
not given us to teach us truth, but for the preferva^-
tion of our Body.
What we haye faid of Titillation and of Pain muft
be generally underftood of all other Senfations, as
will be better fecn hereafter ; We began with thefe
two Senfations rather than with others, becaufe they
are more lively, and help us to conceive more fen-
libly what was to be faid.
It is now Very eahly fhcwn how we fall into an
Infinity of Errors about Light and Colours, and ge-
neraiiy about all ienfible Qualities, Co'd, Heat, O-
dours. Sapors, Sound, Pain, TitillatiDn, &c. Aiid
ii 1 wcuy ftay to particularize every one belonging
f 3 IQ
yo A Search after Truth. Book I,
to every Objed: of the Senfes, whote years would
not luffice to enumerate them, becaufe they are al-
moft infinite, I fhall therefore content my felf to fpeak
of 'em in General.
VI. Four Jii almoit all Senfations there are four different
whchare which are confounded, becaufe they are done
confounded all together, and as it were in an Inflant, and this is
in every the Principle of all the other Errors of oiir Senfes.
Smfation. •pj.jg AHion of the Objed ; that is, iO
Heat, for Example, the Impulfion or Agitation of
the Particles of Wood againft the Fibres of the
Hand.
The lecond is the Pajficn of the Organ of Senfe,
that is, the Agitation of the Fibres of the Hand
caus'd by that of the Particles of Fire, which Agi-
ration is communicated to the Brain, becaufe other-
wife the Soul would perceive nothing.
The third is the Pajpon, Senfation, or Perception
of the Soul, that is, what every one feels who is near
the Fire.
Tne fourth is the Judgmejit that the Soul makes,
as to that which is in the Hand or in the Fire: Now
this Judgment is Natural, or rather it is a Com-
pounded Senfation : But this Scnfition, or this Natu-
ral Judgment,is almoft always foiiow'd by another free
Judgment, which the Soul is fo accuftom'd to, that
it can fcarce refrain from it.
Thefe four things are very different, as may be
fhewed) however Men do not carefully diftinguifh
them, but arc iiiclin'd to confound them by reafon of
the Itrid union betwixt the Soul and Bodv, which
hinders us from fcparating the Properties of Matter
from thofc of the Mind.
Yet it is eafic for any Man to know, that of thefe
four things which pafs in us when we [x?rceive lome
Obj d, the two firid are proper to the Body, and the
two lad to the Soul, provided he confider a little the
N-' tu' c of the Soul and Body as he ought to do,which I
have leppos'd j But thefe things muft be explaiifd in
Particulars. ' n-,-' .
CHAP.
Chap. XI. A Search after Truth, yx
:r;eii
CHAP. XI.
I. Of the Error we are fuhjeci to in reJfeB of the Aclion
of Obje^s tifon the Extertial Fibres of our Sen/es.
11. The Caufe of that Error, III. A?^ Obje^ion and
Anfwer,
TN this and the three following Chapters we (hail
"*• Treat of thele Four Things which are confounded
and taken for pure Senfation ; and fhall only in ge^
neral explain the Errors we are fubjed: to i becaule,
if we ifiould enter into particulars, it would be
endlefs. Yet, I do not doubt, but I may fo aifift the
Mind of fuch as u^ill ferioufly Meditate upon what
lhall be faid, as to make them capable of dilcovering
with great facility all the Errors that are caufed froin
our Senfes; but it will be requilite then, that they
flm'd think with fome application both upon the pre
ceding and following Chapters.
The firft of thefe things which wc confound in all I. Of tke
our Senfations, is the Adion of Objeds upon the
ternal Fibres of our Body. It is moft certain that
there is hardly any diftindion made between the Sen- to the oh,
fation of the Soul, and this Adion of the Objeds; aBivg
of which there needs no proof5 for Example, almoft
all Men imagine, that the heat they feel is in the Fire Serfs.
which caufes it j that Light is in the Air, and Co-
lours upon Coloured Objeds; they have no thoughts
upon the Motions of fome imperceptible Bodies which
caufe thefe Scnfttions.
It is true, that they do not imagine that pain is in wpheCatife
the Necdic that pricks them, as they judge heat to be of the Eryor,
in the Fire j the reafon is, bccaufe the Needle and its
Adion are vifible, but the Particles of the Wood
tvhich go out from the Fire, and their Alotion againft
cur Hands are nqt feen 5 fo that teeing nothing that
F 4 ftrikes '
X
72. A Search after Truth, Book I.
ftrikes our Hands when we warm our felves, and
feeling heat, we naturally judge this heat to be in the
Fire, becaufe we fee nothing elie there.
So that 'tis commonly true, that we attribute our
Senlations to Objedts, when the Caufes of thefe Sen-
fations are unknown to us, and becaufe Pain and Titi-
tation are produced by fenfible Bodies, as with a
Needle, a Feather which we fee and touch, and there-
fre we do not judge that there is any thing like to
thefe Sentiments, in thofe Objedls that caufe them
in us.
ObjeSi- It is certain indeed, that we do not imagine that
the burning is in the Fire, but only in the Hand, al-
though it is caufed by Particles of the Wood as well
as the Heat, which we always attribute to the Fire.
But the reafon of it is, the burning is a kind of Pain,
and having many times judged that Pain is not in the
External Body which Caufes it, we are induced alio
to make the fame Judgment of Burning.
What further perfuades us to judge after this man-
ner, is, that Pain or Burning does ftrongly apply our
Soul to the affedfed parts of our Bodies, and that
diverts us from thinking on other things. Thus the
Mind unites the Senfation of burning to that Objedl:
that is neareft to it. And becaufe we foon after per-
ceive that the burning hath left fome vifible Marks in
that part where we felt the Pain, this confirms us in
the Judgment we haye made that the burning is in
the Hand.
But this muft not hinder us from receiving this ge-
neral Rule, that vce uje to attribute our Scnfations to
OhjeSis, every time they aFi upon us by the Motion of
fome invifible Particle, This is the reafon that we ge-
neraliy believe that Colours, Light, Odours, Tafte,
Sound, and fome other Senfations, are in the Air, or
• in the External Objedfs which caufe them, becaufe all
Senfations are produced in us by the Motion of fome
Imferceptibk Bodies.
CHAR
chap. XII. A Search after Truth. jrj
CHAP. XII.
I. Of the Errors concerning the Motions of the Fibres of
our Senjes. II. That either xve perceive not thefe
Motions, or elfe confound them with our Senfations.
III. Experience-) which proves it. IV. Three forts of
Senfations, V. The Errors which accompany them,
H E fecond thing that may be obferved in each I. Erms
of our Senfations, is the ihaking of the Fibres concerning
of our Nerves, which is communicated unto the faking'
Brain ; and we deceive our felves in this, that we con- of the Fibres
found this Hiaking with the Senfation of the Soul, and "/ cur
judge there is none when we perceive it not by the
Senfes. ^ confound
We confound, for inftance, the Motion that the them with
Fire excites in the Fibres of our Hands with the Sen- Senfau-
fation of Heat, and we fay that the Heat is in our 50^7
Hand. But becaufe wc feel not the fhaking that vi- femetime
hble Objeds produce in the Optick Nerve, which cio
is in the bottom of the Eye, we think that this Nerve
is not Ihaken, and that it is not cover'd with the
Colours that appear to us; on the contrary, we judge
that 'tis only r.xternal Objeds upon which thefe Co-
lours are difperfed, yet we may fee by the following
Experiment, that Colours are almoft as ftrong and
lively in the bottom of the Optick Nerve, as upon
yifible Objeds.
Take the Eye of an Ox that is newly killed, and III. Expe^
ftrip the Skins from it that are pppolite to the Apple of *'tence,
of the Eye, in the place where the Optick Nerve is,
and put in their room a little bit of Paper that is very
thin ; and place this Eye in the hole of a Window, lb
that the Apple be in the Air, and the back part of the
Eye be in the Chamber, which muft be fliut clofe fo
that it may be very dark ; and then all the Colours
pf the Objeds whdch are without the Chamber, will
appear
,,.1.
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7^^ A Search after Truth. Book L
appear upon the bottom of the Eye, but reprefented
upfide down. And if thefe Colours fliou d happen not
to be very lively, if the Objeifls which are painted at
the bottom of the Eye are too near, the Eye muft be
lengthned by prefTing the fides clofer together, and
on the contrary, it muft be compefs'd, if the Ob-
jedts are too far off.
By this Experiment, 'tis plain, that we ought to
judge, or be fenfible of the Colours at the bottom of
our Eyes, after the fame manner as we judge the
Heat to be in our Hand, if our Senfes were given us
to difcover the truth, and if we were guided by Rea-
fon in the Judgments we make upon the Objedts of
Our Senfes.
But to be able to give a Rea fon for the variety of
our judgments upon fenfible Qualities, 'tis neceffery
that we confider how ftridfly the Soul is united to the
Body, and that it is fo fenfualized fince Original Sin,
that many things are attributed to it which belong to
the Body, and that it is now hardly to be diftinguiSied
from it; fo that it afcribes to it not only all its Senfa-
tions, which we are fpeaking of, but alfo the force
of Imagining, and even fometimes the power of Rea-
foiling. For there has been a great number of Philo-
fophers that have been ignorant and foolilh enough to
believe, that the Soul was only a more fine and fub-
tile part of the Body.
If we read TertuHian^ we lhall foon foe too many
proofs of what I fay, fince we fhall find him of the
lame Opinion, with a great number of Authors
whom he Cites. It is true in the Book of the Soul he
endeavours to prove, that Faith, Scripture, and even
particular Revelation oblige us to believe that the Soul
is Corporeal. I will not refqte thefe Opinions, be-
caufo I have already fuppofod that we ought to have
read fome of St. Auguftin qt D^efcartes^^ovks-, which
wou'd have fufficiently iliewn the extravagancy of thefe
Thoughts ; and alio wou'd have conhrm'd the Mind
in the diftincfion betwixt Extentfon and Thought, be-
twixt the Soul and Body,
■%
The
y
Chap. XII. Search after Truths 75
The Soill is then fo blind that fhe is ignorant of her
felf, and does not fee that her own Senfations belong
to her. To explain this we n:iuft diftinguilh three forts II. M Ex-
of Senfations in the Soul, fome ftrong and lively, o-
thers weak and languifliing, and fome again in the ^fjg
medium between both. Senfations
The ftrong and lively Senfations are thofe which
furprizfe the Mind, and awaken it with fome force,
becaufe they are either very agreeable, or very trou-
blefome, fuch as are Pain or Pleafure, Heat or Cold^
and generally all fuch as are not only accompanied
with Impreflions in the Brain, but alfo with fome Mo-
tions of the Spirit, fuch as are proper for the exciting
the Paflions, as fhall afterwards be explained.
The Weak and Languifliing Senfations are thole /
which very little affedl: the Soul, and which are nei-
ther very agreeable, nor very troublelbme, as a Mo-
derate Light, all Colours, Ordinary Sounds, which
are very weak, e3c.
And the Medium between both I call thofe fort of
Senfations which indifferently touch the Soul, as a
great Light, a violent Sound, (£c. Now it is to be
obferved, that a Weak and Languifliing Senfation may
become indifferent, and afterwards ftrong and lively.
For Example, the Senfation that we have of Light is
weak, when the Light of a Flambeau is weak and
languifliing, or very far from us, and afterwards this
Senfation may become indifferent, if the Flambeau be
brought near enough to us; and at laft it may be-
come very ftrong and lively, if the Flambeau be
brought fo near our Eyes that they be da'zled with it,
or ell'e, when Vv^e look upon the Sun. Thus the Sen-
dation of Light may be ftrong, weak, or moderate,
according to its different degrees.
Thefe are then the Judgments that our Soul makes
of thefe three forts of Senfations, v./herein we may
perceive, that it alrnoft always blindly follows the Smjatunt.
ienfible Impreflions, or Natural Judgments of our
Senfes, and that it is plea fed, if we may fo fay ^ in
dilpcriing it felf over all the Objecrs that itconfiders,
and by divcfting it ielf to cloath ihem.
'■ ' The
m;5 V;a
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f
bli'l'S
pi|«'
I'll!*'
yg A Search after Truth' Book I.
The firft of thefe Senfations is fo lively and mo-
ving, that the Soul can fcarce hinder it felf from ac-
knowledging, that in fome refpedl they belong to it,
fo that it docs not only judge them to be in the Ob-
jedf, but alio believes them to be in the Members of
the Body, which it confiders as a part of it lelf. Thus
it judges that Cold and Heat are not only in the Ice
and Fire, but that they are alfo in its own Hands.
The Languhhing Senfations fo little affed: the Soul,
that it does not believe them to belong to it j nor that
they are either within it felf, or the Body, but only in
the Obje6fs: 'Tis for this reafon that we take away
Light and Colours from our Soul and Eyes, thereby
to adorn External Objedfs with them, although Rea-
fon teaches us, that they are not in the Idea we have
of Matter. And Experience fhews us we ought to
judge them in our Eyes, as well as upon Objedls, lince |
we fee them as well there as in the Objedts, as I have
proved by the Inflance of an Oxe's Eye placed at the
hole of a Window.
Now the Reafon why all Men do not immediately
fee that Colours, Odours, Tafte, and all other Sen-
fations are only Modifications of their Soul; is, be-
caufe we have no clear Idea of our Soul: For when
we know any thing by the Idea which reprefents it, |
we clearly know all the Modifications it can have.
All Men agree, for Example, that Roundnefs is a
Modification of Extenfion, by a clear Idea which re-
SeeCh^p.j. prefents it. Thus not knowing our Soul by its Idea,
as I fhall explain hereafter, but only by the Internal
f es Book. 5ontirncnt we have thereof, we know not by a fimple
Sight,but only by Reafoning,whether Whirencfs, Light,
Colours, and other Weak and Langnilhing Senfations,
are not Modifications of our Soul ; but for the lively
Scnfatinns, fiich as Pain and Pleaiiire, we eafily judge
rhey arc within usBecaufe we are very fenfible that they
afFcd: us; and have no need to know them by their
Idea s, to perceive they belong us.
As for Indifferent Senfations the Soul is very much
perplexed with them, for on the one hand it wou'^
follow the Naiifal Judgments pf the Senfes apd
ther^ i
V
chap. XII. A Search after Truth. 77
therefore it removes from it, as much as pofTible,
thefe fort of Senfations, to attribute them to the
Objeds; but on the other fide, ii cannot avoid feel-
ing within felf that they belong to it, efpecialJy when
thele Senfations come near thole that I call ftrong and
lively > fo that 'tis after this manner that it guides ft
felf in the Judgment it makes of them 5 if a Senfa-
tion affedls it very much, it concludes it to be in its
own Body, as well as in the Objedf , and if it
touches it but a little, the Soul believes it only in the
Objedt. And if this Senfation is exadfly in the Me-
dium between the Strong and "Weak, then it knows
not what to determine, if it Judges by theSenfes.
For Inftance, if one looks upon a Candle at a little
diftance, the Soul judges that the Light is only in the
Objedl; but if the Candle is brought nearer, it
judges it to be not only in the Candle, but alfo in the
Eyes. But if we draw back about a foot from it, the
Soul continues fometime without judging whether or
no the Light is only in the Objedt ; never thinking,
as it ought to do, that this Light is or can be, only
a Propriety, or Modification of Matter, and that it
is only within it felf; becaufe it does not think it ne-
ceflary to make ufe of its Rcafon to difcovcr the
Truth of what appears therein, but only of the Senfes,
which never difcovers it, and are only given us for the
prefervation of our Bodies.
Now why the Soul makes no ule of her Reafon,
that is, of her Underftanding, when Ihe confiders an
Objedt which may be perceived by the Senfes, is, be-
caufe Ihe is not affedted by things that flie perceives
by the pure Underftanding ;and rhat,on the contrary,
ihe is moft: lively touched by Senfiblc things; for the
Soul applies it felf much to what affedts it much,,
and negledts applying it felf to things that do not
touch it. Thus Ihe almoft always conforms her free
Judgments, to the Natural Judgments of her Senfes.
To be able to Judge rightly of Light and Colours,
as well as all other Senfible Qitalities, we inuft care-
fully diftinguiih the Senfation of Colour, from the
Motion of the Optic Nerve, and by Reafon, difcovcr
that
A Search after Truth. Book I.
that Motions and Impulfions, are Proprieties of Bodies,
and that thus they may meet in Objecfls, and in the
Organs of our Senfes; but that Light and Colours
which we fee, are Modifications of the Soul, very dif-
ferent from others, and of which alfo we have as diffe-
rent Idea's. ;
It is certain, for inftance, that a Country M^n fees
Colours very plainly, and diftinguifhes them from eve-
ry thing that has no Colour. It is alfo as certain, th^t
he perceives no Motion cither in Coloured Objedts,
or in the bottom of his Eyes 3 and that therefore he
concludes, Colour is not Motion.
Likewife, a Country man is as fenfible of Heat, and
hath a fulEcienc Knowledge to diftinguifh it from all
things which are not Hear, and yet he does not think
that 'tis only becaufe the Fibres of his Hands are mo-
ved I he thinks the Heat therefore, that he feels, is
not Motion, fince his Idea's of Heat and Motion are
very different, and he can have the one without the
other: For there is no reafon to be given, that a
Square is not round, but only becaufe our Idea of a
Square, is different from that we have of a Circle,
and that we can think of the one, without thinking
of the other.
There's only a little attention requifite, to be able
to know, that 'tis not neceflar}', that the ftiufe,
which makes us feel fuch or fuch a thing, contains it
in it felf. Thus it is not needful, that I have Light
in my Hand, that I might fee it, when I ftrike my
Eyes ; nor is it neceffary, that there fhou'd be Heat
in the Fire, to make me feel it, when I hold my
Hand to it , or, that any other Senhble Quality,
that I perceive, ihou'd be in the Gbjcdf ; it is fuffi-
cienr, that they caufe feme Motion in the Fibres of
my Flefh, fo that my Soul, which is united thereto,
be Modified by fome Senfation. There is no Rela-
tion, between Motions and SeD-fations, it is true, but
there is none alio between the Body and Mind ; and
fince Nature, or the Will of our Creator, has joined
thefe two Subftances together, how oppofite loever
they are in their Nature, it mufl not fcem furprizing 1
if
CHap.XII; A Search after Truth.
k if their Modifications are Reciprocal; it is neceflary
(i that they fliou*d be fo, that rhey may together make
k' an entire Being.
We muft obferve, that our Senfes being given us
di for the Prefervation of our Bodies, it is very proper
that they ihou'd incline us, to mike fuch Judgments
fiilK as we do of Senfible Qualities. It is much more ad-
m vantageous to us, to feel Pain and Heat, as being in
i,i our Bodies, than if we Judg'd them only to be in the
3jed Objeds that caule them, becaufc, that Pain and Heat
re i being capable of prejudicing our Members, it is fit
we Ihou'd be advertized when they are affeded there-
with, fo as to prevent their being hurt by
them. ,
mk But it is not fo with Colours, they cannot eafily
iarei hurt the bottom of the Eye where they meet together,
tee',; and it is of no ufe for us to know they are Painted
m there. Thefe Colours are only neceflary to difcover
^ Objeds more diftindly, and that is the reafon our
en, Senfes induce us to attribute them only to the Ob-
• ha jeds. So the Judgments, to which the impreflion of
our Senfes carry us, are more Juft, if we confider
ijih them with relation to the Prefervation of our Bodies;
but neverthelefs, they are various, and very far from
juIk; the Truth, as has already been Ihown, in parr, and
(j will more evidently appear hereafter.
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ji Search after Truth. Book 1.
I. A Defini"
tim of Sen-
fatfonS'
II. That xpe
know our
own Sen fa-
tions,better
than we be-
lie ve wi do.
CHAP. XIII.
I. Of the Nature of Senfations. II. That we k^ow them
better than we believe we do. III. An Objefiion and
■ Anfwer, IV. tVhy we imagine we know nothing of
our Senfations, V. That we deceive our felves in be'
lieving that aU Men have the fame Senfations of the
fame Obje^s. VI. Objetiion and Anfwer.
H E third thing that is in each of our Senfations,
or in what we feel, for Example, when we are
near the Fire, is, a Modification of our Soul in relation
to what fajfes in the Body to which it is united. This
Modification is agreeable, when what pafles in the
Body is proper to aflift the Circulation of the Blood,
and the other Fundlions of Life, which is called by
the Equivocal Term of Heat ; and this Modification
is painful, and perfedlly different from the other,
when what palfcs in the Body is capable of incommo--
ding and burning it, that is, when the Motions that
are in the Body, are capable of breaking any of its
Fibres, and this is generally called Pain or Burning,
and fo of other Senfations; but thefe are the common
thoughts Men have upon this fubjecff.
The firft Error is, that we unreafonably imagine
we have no knowledge of our Senfations. We fee a
great many Men every day who much concern them-
lelvcs to know what Pleafure, Pain, and the other
Senfations are j they grant that they are only in the
Soul, and that they are but the Modifications of it.
'Lis true thefe fort of Men are very much to be ad-
mired at,for being willing to learn what they cannot but
know already, for it is not polTible that a Man fliou'd
be entirely ignorant what Pain is, when he feels it.
A Perfon, for Inftance, that burns his Hand, diftin-
guifhes very well the Pain he feels from Light, Colour,
Sound, Tafte, S.meli, Pleafure, and from all other
Pain
4^.
|:
Ch^p. XIII. A Search after Truth. 8i
Pain than what he feels j He very well diftinguilhes
it from Admiration, from Defire, and Love, from
a Scjuare, a Circle, and Motion : in fine, he difcerns
it very different from all things which are not this
Pairi that he feels. Now, if he had nD knowledge
of Pain, I Wou'd fain know how he can have any
certainty, that what he feels is none of thefe
things.
We have fonle kndwledge therefore of what we
immediately feel, when we lee Colours, or when we
haVe any other Senfation j and even 'tis moft certain,
that if we knew it not, we cou'd know no fenfible
Objedt; for 'tis evident we coif d not diftinguilh Wa-
ter from Wine, if we did not know that the Senfa-"
tionswe hafe of one of them, is different from thofe'
we have of the other, and fo of all things we knpw
by bur Senfes.
It is true, that if I was preffed and requited to. ex-
plain what Pain, Plea lure, and Colour is, I
cou'd not do it as it ought to be done by Words; but
it follows not from thence, that if I fee Colour; or
burn my felf, I do not know, at lea ft, after feme
manner, what I abtually feel. . .
Now the reafon why all Senfations canhcft be well jjj o^e^i
explained by Words, as all other things are, is, be- on and An
caufe it depends upon the Will of Man! to affix the
Idea's of Things to fuch Names as they pleafe j they
may call Heaven Ouranos^ Schamajim^ &c. as the
Greeks and Hebrews did ; but even thole Men cannot,
at their pleafure, affix their Senfations to Words, or
even to any other thing ; they fee not Colours, altho'
they fpcak of them, if they open not'their Eyes:
They reli/h not Taftes, if no change happens in the
order of the Fibres of their Tongue or Brain. In a
word, Senfations depend not upon Mans Will, and it
is only he who hath made them, that preferves them
in the mutual Correfpondt^itce that is between the Mo-
dificatiohs of the Soul, and thofe of the Body; fb
fl at if any one fiiou'd defire me to reprefent to hirh
Heat or Colour, 1 cannot find Wotds for that, but 1
muft imprels in the Organs of his Senfes, the Mo-
G tions
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Sjif A Search after Truth, Book I.
lions to which Nature unites thefe Senfations; I muft
take him to the Fire, and /how him fome Pi(5hires.
This is the Reafon, why 'tis impofTiblo to give the
Blind the leaft Knowledge of what we mean by Red*
Green, Yellow, (3c. For fince we cannot make our
felves be underftood, when he that hears us, has not
the fame Idea's as we that fpeak 5 It is manifeft, that
Golours not being united to the found of Words, or
to the motion of the Nerve of the Ear, but to that of
the Optic Nerve, they cartnot be reprefented to the
Blind, fince their Optic Nerve cannot be fluken by
coloured Objedfs.
We have then fome Knowledge of our Senfations,
let us now fee from whence it is, that we fcek yet to
know them, and believe our felves ignorant thereof i
this is, without doubt, the reafon.
The Soul, fince Original Sin, is become, as it were,
Corporeal, by its inclinations its love, forSenfibfe
*linew7Z Things, continually diminifhes the Union, or Rela-
mt knsv tion, that it hath to Intelligible Things : It is with
9w«iph great difgu^ that it conceives Things which do not
gtufattw, fbme Senfations in it, and it immediately cet-
les to conlider them: It does all that is in its power,
to prodace fame Images in its Brain, which reprefent
them ; and it is fo much accuftomed to this kind of
Conception from our Infancy, that it even thinks it
cannot know, what it cannot imagine. Yet there are
many things, which not being Corporeal, cannot be
reprefented to the Mind by Corporeal Images, as our
Soul, with all its Modifications : But when our Soul
wou'd reprefent to it felf its own Nature and Senfa-
tions, it does all it can to form a Corporeal Image
thereof; It feeks it felf in all Corporeal Beings, and
takes it felf fbmetimes for one, and fbmetimesfor ano-
ther ; one while for Air, and then again for Fire, or
for the Harmony of the parts of its Body. Thus be-
ing willing to find it felf amongft Bodies, and ima-
gining its own Modifications, which are its Senfa-
tions, to be the Modifications of Bodies, we muft not
wonder if it Errs, and is intirely Ignorant of it
What
chap. Xlli. ^ Starch afierTrutk S j
What yet induces it further to be wiUing to imagine
its Sen^tions, is, that it Judges them to be in the
Objedb) and that they are even Modifications there-'
of; and confequently, that \is fomething Corporeal,
and which can be Imagin'd. It Judges therefore,
that the Nature of its Seniations confifts only in the
Motion that caufes them, or in fome other Modifica-
tion of a Body; but when it finds that which is difFe-
rent from what it feels, which is neither Corporeal,
nor can be reprefented by Corporeal Images, this em-
barafles it, and makes it believe that it does not
know its own Senfations.
As for thofe, who do not make thele vain Efforts, See the Ex-
to reprefent the Soul, and its Modifications, by Cor-
pofeal Images, and yet are Solicitous to know the chapter of
Nature of their Senfations, they muftconfider, that theidParh
neither the Soul, or its Modifications, are to be known I*
by the Idea*s, taking the word Idea in its true fenfe,
as I have determui'd, and explained it in the Third
Book, but only by an inward Senfation : So that
when they defire the Soul, and its Senfations, to be
explained by fome Idea's, they require what is im-
poflible for all Mankind to give tbemi fince Man can-
not Inftrudl us in giving us Idea's of Things, but only
in making us refledt upon thofe we already have.
The fecond Error we are fubjedf to, in refpedl to
our Senfations, is our attributing them to Objedls,
as has already been explained in the i ith and i 2th
Chapters.
The third is, our Judging that every one has the v. Tkatwi
fame Senfations of rlie fame Objecfts. For Example, daeiw our
We believe all Mankind that fees the Sky, takes it to
be Blue, and the Fields to be Green, and all Vifible Ihut^all
Objedfs to be after the fame manner as they appear Mm kum
tons ; and fo of all other Senfible Qualities of the relt
of our Senfes, Many perfons will wonder, that 1
ihou'd bring fuch things in queftion as they have
thought Indifputable, yet I dare affirm, they have
never had any reaibn to Judge of them after the man-
#*er they have done ; and altho' I cannot Machema-
ticalJy demonftrate to them that liiey are deceived,?
G i yet
A Semh after Truth. • ^ Bo6k I.
yet I Can demonftrate, 'tis by the greateft Chance in
the World if they are not deceived. Nay, I have
filfficient Reafons to be aflur'd, that they certainly,
are in an Error. - '
To know the Truth of what I advance,we muft re-
member what I have already proved, that there is
a great difference between Senfations,and the caufes of
them ; for from thence we may Judge, that its pofii-
ble, abfolutely fpeaking, that the fame Motions of
the Internal Fibres of the Optic Nerve, do not caufe
the fame §enfations in different perfons, that is, to fee
the fame Colours ; and that fuch a Motion may hap-
pen, which fhall caufe in one theSenfation of Green,
or Gray in another, or even a new Senfation, which
no body before ever had.
It is certain that this may be, and that Reafbn does
not demonffrate the contrary to us, yet 'tis generally
agreed, that 'tis not probable it Ihould be fo > It is
much more reafonable to believe, that God a(5ts al-
ways after the fame manner, in refpedf to the Union
he hath created between our Souls and Bodies, and
that he hath tyed the fame Idea's, and the fame Sen-
fations, to like Motions of the Internal Fibres of the
Brain, altho' in different Perfons,
Let us take ic for granted then, as the fame Mo-
tronsof thofe Fibres, which end in the middle of the
Brain, are accompanied with the fame Senfations in all
Men ; fo if ic happens, that the fame Objedfs produce
not the fame Motions in their Brain, by confequence
they do not excite the fame Senfations rn their~SouI.
Now it appears indifpurable to me, that all Mens
Organs of their Senfes, not being difpofed after the
fame manner, they cannot receive the lame knprel-
lions from the fame Objed:s.
For inftnnce. The blows a Porter hits himfelf over
the fides, to warm himfelf, wou'd be fufficient to" lame
a-^grear many Men : The fame blow wou'd produce
many difforcnt Motions, and by confcqiience, as ma-
iiy diffei'enr Senfations, in a Man of a ftrong Confti-
tution, and in a Chtid, or a Woman, that is of a Weak
Conftit-utionV - So that there not being two Perfons in
. ' the
V
lae
Chap. XIII. 4 Search after Truth,
the World, who we can be certain have the Organs of
their Senles in a perfecl: conformity, we cannot affirm
that there is two Perfons in the World who have ex-
acJlly the fame Senfations of the fame Objed:s.
This is the Original of that ftrange variety which
we meet with in- the Inclinations of Meri. There
^re fome who love Mulick excreamly, and others who
are infenfible of it; and even amongft thofe that4e-
light in it, fome love one kind of Mufick, and others
another, according to the almoft infinite diverfity that
is found in the Fibres of the Nerve of the Ear, in the
Blood, and in the Spirits. For inftance, how great
a difference there is between the Mufick of France^
that of Italji, of Chinefe, and other places ; and by
confequence, between the Taftes that different Pec-
<|)le have of different kinds of Mufkk. Nay, it even
happens, that at different times, by the fame Confort^y
we receive different Iinpreffions ; for if the Imagin.a-'
tion is heated by a great quantity of ag|tateclSpirjts,wc
are much more pleafed with a bold and difiqnant
Mufick, than with one that is more fw.eer, and more
agreeable to Mathematical Rules and Exadlnefs.
This Experience proves, and it is not very difficult to
give a reafon of it.
It is the fame alio of Odours, he that loves to fmell
of the Flower of an Orange, it-may be cannot .endure
a Rofe, and the contrary.
There is likewife as nauch diverfity- in Taftes, ,a,> in
any other of the Senfations; Sauces,muft be very dif-
ferent equally to pleafe different Perfons, nay, to
pleafe the fame Peiibn at difierent times. One loves
that which is fweet, another that which is fowre ;
one thinks Wine agreeable, another hates it ; and the
fame Pei'ion who liked it when he was well, thinks
i: bitter and unpleafant when he's in a Fever; and fo
of the reft of the Senfes : Yet all Men love Pleafure,
they all delight in agreeable Senlations, and have all,
in rcfpetft to that, the lame Inclination ; they receive
not then the lame Senfations of t le fame Objeifts, iince
tjiey love them not cqnaliy.
8?
I
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'I
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,1
'iir-
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i
A Search after Truth. Book I.
Thus, wluc makes one Man fay he loves that
which is fweet, is, becaufe the Senfation he has there^
of is agreeable 9 and that which caufes another to fay
he does not love what is fweet, is, that indeed he has
not the fame Senfation as he that loves it: And when
he fays he loves not that which is fweet, he does not
pean he does not love to have the fame Senfation with
the other, but that he has it not: So that he fpeaks
improperly, when he fays he loves not that which
IS fweet, he ought to fay he does not love Sugar, Hony,
&c. that every one elfe thinks to be fweet and agree-
able, and that he has not the fame Tafte as others
have, becaufe the Fibres of his Tongue are otherwife
di^fed.
This is a very Senfible Example: Suppofe that of
twenty Perfbns, there was one amongft them who
had his Hands Very cold, and knew not the Words
that are made ufe of to explain the Senfations of heat
and cold j and that on the contrary, all the reft had
their Hands extreamly hot. If in Winter, cold Water
was carried to all of them to Wafh in, thofe whole
Hands were very hot, would immediately, upon
walking one after another, fay this Water is very cold,
i don*t love it ; but when the other, whole Hands
were extreamly cold, fhould come at laft to walh his
Hands, he wou d fay, on the contrary, I don't know
why you don't love cold Water, for my part, I take
a great deal of pleafqre in feeling the cold, and walh-
ing my Hands in in
From this Inftance 'tis very clear, that when this
laft lliou'd fay I love cold, it Ihou'd fignifie nothing
elfe but that he loves heat, and feels it, whereas the
others feel the contrary.
And fo when a Man fays, I love what is bitter, and
cannot abide fweet things, it is pnly to be underftood,
that he has not the fame Senfations as thofe who fay
they love fweet Things, and have an averfion for
whatfoever is bitter.
It is then certain, that a Senfation which is agree-
able to one Pcrfon, is alfo to all thofe who feel the
fame * bu» that the fame Objecfts caufc not the fame
' - ' Senfation
dik
Chap. Xni« A Search afier Truth. 87
Senfation in all the World, becaufe of the different
4ifpo(itions of the Organs of the Senfes, which is of
the higheft confcquence to be obferv d; both in re-
Iped to Philofophy and Morality.
Tis true, an Objetiion may here be raised, but
'twill be very eafily lolved, It fometimes hap-
pens, that perfons who extreamly love certain forts
of Food, come afterwards to have an averfion for
them, either becaufe in Eating they have found (bme
Dirt in them, or have been Sick, becaufe they have
Eat to excels of them j or elfe for feme other reafons,
Thefe fame Perfons fay, they no longer love the fame
Scnlations that they loved formerly, for tliey have
themftill when they Eat the fan>e Food, and yet they
^re not agreeable tp theip.
To anfwer to tl^is Objecflion, it muft be obferved,
^hat when thole Perfons tafte any Food that they
have fo n>uch averfion to, they have two very differ
rent Senfations at the fame time ; they have that of
the Food they Eat, according to the Objedion, and
they have alio another Senmtion of Diilike, which,
for inftance, proceeds from the ftrong fmaginaiion
they have of the Dirt in what they Eat: The reafbn
of it is, that when two Motions are made in the Brain
at the fame time, the one is never excited after
the other, except it be after a confiderable time.
Thus, becaufe the agreeable Senfation never comes
without this other difguftful one, and becaufe we
confound things that are produced at the fame time,
we imagine that this Senfation that was formerly
agreeable to us, is now no longer fo j Yet if it is al-
ways the fame, it is neceflary that it Hiould always
be agreeable. So that if we imagine it is not agree-
able, 'tis becaufe it is join'd and confounded witli
pother, that caufes more diftafte rban the otber does
of agrccablenefs.
There is more difficulty to prove that Colours,
and feme other Senfations, which I have called weak
and languifhing, are not the fame in all Men, be-
caufe all thofe Senfations fo little affed the Soul, that
>Vf cannot diftinguifh them fo well as we can Taftcs,
C 4 Of
A Scmh after Truth. ' ^ Bopi. I,
Of Qther Seniations mqro ftrong and liyely, the one,
being more agreeable than the other ; and thus to
difcoyer thediverhty of Senfations that are found in
different Perfons, by the variety of their pleafure or
djflikeiReafon,which always (hows that the other Senfa-
lions are not the fame in different Perfons, tells us
aifo, that there will be a variety in the Senfations
they have of Colours. And indeed, there is no
doubt but there is much diyerfity in the Organs of
Sight in different Perfons, as well as in thofe of the
Ear, or the Tafte ; for there is no reafon tp fuppofe
a perfedt refemblance in the difpofitipn of the Optic
Nerve in all Men, (ince there is an infinite variety in
^yery thing in Nature, and chiefly in thofe that are
Material, 'tis therefore very probable that all Mei^
fee not the fame Colours in the fame Objedb.
Yet I believe itneyer, or very rarely happeqs,
that Perfons fee White or Black to be of any other
Colour than we do, altho' they do not fee it equally
White or Black : But for mixt Colours, as Red,
Yellow, and Blue, and chiefly fuch as are compound-
ed of all three, I believe there are few Perfons who
have perfedfcly the fame Senfation of them. For In-
(lance, there are foine Perfons, who when they look
upon cettain Bodies with one Eye, take them to be
Yellow, and when they behold them with the other,
fee thern to be Green or Blue ; yet if we fuppos'd
thefe Perfons Born blind of one Eye, or with both
their Eyes fo difpos'd, to fee that Blue which we call
Green, they wou'd believe they faw Objedls of the
fame colour as we fee them, becaufe by Creep or
Blue, they wou'd alw^ays have underflopd what they
fee Yellow or Red.
We may further prove, that all Men fee not the
fame Objedls of the fame Colour, becaufe, according
to the obfervarion of feme, the fame Colours do nop
equally pleafe all forts of Perfons, and if thefe
Senfations were the fame, they wou'd be equally
agreeable to. a|I Men; but becaufe very weighty
douhrs may be raifed againff the Anfwer I have given
to the precedent Objecffipn, I do not believe it folid
enough to inflft upon it. ' ' " ' Indeed,
fifter-Tnuth.
Indeed, it is very feldom that we are as much
more pleafed with one Colour than another, even as
we are much more pleafed with one Tafte than
another: The reafon is, the Senfations of Colours
are not given us to Judge, whether or no Bodies are
proper for our Nourilhment, ^th^t.is diftinguilhed by
Pleafure and Pai^,i-which'are the Natural Charadlers
of Good and Evil; Objedls, in refpedl to their Co-
lour, are neither good nor bad to Eat. If Objeds
appear agreeable, or difagreeable to us, in refpedl
to their Colour, their fight wou d be always follow-
ed with the courfe of thofe Spirits which excite, and
accompany the Paflions, fince the Soul cannot be
tpuched without moving it, and we fliou'd often hate
good Things, and Jove bad, fo that we fhou d hot
long preferve our fives. In fine, the Senfafions of
Colours are only given us to diftinguifh Bodies from
one another, and. therefore it does as well, if we lee
Herbs Red, as if we fee them Green^ provided the
Perfon that fees, them Red or Green, fees them air
ways after the fame naanner.
But we have faid enough of thefe Senfations, let
us now fpeak of Natural Judgments, a^d the free
Judgments which accompany them j whicli is the
fourth thing that we confound with the three others,
that we have already mention'd. , ,
90 A Search after Tmth. Book 1.
/
\f
CHAP. XIV.
1. Of the falfe judgments that accomfanjt oter Sen/kticntp
and which we confound with them. IL l^ajons of
thefe falfe Judgments, IIL That Error is not in omt
- Sedations, hut only in thefe Judgments,
f Gf the "T J S eafiiy forcfeen, that we fliall not meet with
ft'i i Judg- ^ many Perfons that will not be offended with thi|
ments that General Proportion that I here advance, vis^. That
tt^*SenJa- Senfation of External Obje(^, which w-
tions, and cliide not one, or many Judgments ; we know, very
which we well, that the generality of the World do not he-
^i^thti that there is fo much as one Judgment in our
Senfations, either true or falfe ; fp that thefe Perfons,
being furprized with the Novelty of this Propofition,
will fay, without doubt, in themfelves. But how can
it be ? I do not Judge this Wall to be white, I fee
very well what it is: Nor do I Judge Pain to be in
my Hand, I moft certainly feel it to be there: And
who can doubt of things fo certain, if they do not feel
Objedis otherwife than I do ? Indeed, their Inclina-
tions for the Prejudices which they have imbib'd
from their Infancy, carries them much further, and
if they do not Reproach and Condemn thofe, whom
they believe to be perfwaded of a contrary Opinion
to their own, without doubt they deferve to be pla-
ced in the Number of Moderate Perfons.
But we muft not here ftay to Prophefje of the il|
fucctfs of our Thoughts, it will be more to the pur-
pofe, to endeavour to produce thern with • the
ftrongefl Proofs, and fo clearly difcpvef them, that
they may be no fooner well examin^, or attentively
conlider'djbut they muft be fubmirted to. Since 'tis ne-
ceflary to prove that we have no Senfation of External
Qbje<^s,
jChap.XlV; ^ Semh after Truth. pj
pbje^s, which does not include feme falUb Judgment,
talce it thus:
It feems Indirputable to me, that our Soirisdonot
fill thofe vad Spaces which are between us and the
fixr Stars, altho' it (hou*d be granted that themffelves
are extended ; lb likewife, it is not reafonable to
believe that our Souls are in the Firmament, when
r. they behold the fixt Stars there: Nor is it Credible
f* that they Ihould go out of their Bodies a thoufand
. ^ Paces, to fee Houfes at that diftance : It is therefore
neceffary, that our Souls fee Houfes and Stars where
they are not, fince it goes not out of the Body where
it is, and yet lees them out of it felf. Now as the
^ ^ Stars, which are immediately united to the Soul,
fiM which are thofe only that it can fee, are not in the
Tit Heavens j it from thence follows, that all Men who
fee Stars in the Heavens, and afterwards voluntarily
Judging that they are there, make two falfe Judg-
3 Ml ments, whereof the one is Natural, and the other Free,
tntt One is a Judgment of the Senles, or a Compounded
cPr Senfation, according to which we ought not to Judge,
'ro[a the other is a Free Judgment of the Will, which W.e
lib cannot hinder our felves from making 5 and by con-
'fe: quence, which we ought not to do, if we would
]tot avoid Error.
ersii But the reafon that we believe that thefe Stars,
[oDit which we fee immediately are out of the Soul, and in II- TheKea-
liflb the Firmament, is, becaufe it is not in the power of
the SquI to fee them when it pleafes, for it cannot ments,
iigr,8 perceive them, when the Motions, to which the Ideas
; 0 of thefe Obje(S^s are Naturally tyM, happen in its
■ysix Brain. Now becaufe the Soul perceives nqr th^ Mo-
tions of its Organs, but only its own Senfations, and
that it knows thefe fame Senfatioqs are not produced
tljcii in it by its own power,' it is induced to Judge that
epir they are without, and in the caufe which reprefents
;|i ti! them to it ; arid it hath fq often made thefe kind of
n.tltf Judgments, in the fame tirne it perceived theObjedfs,
Ptivel that it can fcarcely hinder it felf from riiaking them.
'[isof It will be very neceifary to explain the founda-
jjfri ticn of what I have laid, to fhew the ufeful-
' ■ ' ■ " "■ «d5
A Search after Truth.. / ? Book I
fiefs of this infinite number of little Beings, that we
call Species and Idea's, which are as nothing, and
which feprefent all things > that we create and de-
ftroy- when we pleafe, and that our Ignorance hath
made us imagine to render a Reafon for things that
we underftand not. We Ihou'd fliow the folidity of
their Opinion, who believe God is the true Father of
Light) Who only Inftrudls all Men, without whom
the moft fimple Truths cou'd not be Intelligible, and
the Sun, tho' never fo bright, wou'd not be fo much
as Vifible to us; who acknowledge no other Nature
than the Will of God, and who, upon thefe Re-
flexions, have confefled that the Idea's, which repre-
fent the Creatures to us, are only the Perfed:ions of
God, which anfwer to thele fame Creatures, and re-
' prefent them to us.
It wou'd be requifite alfo, to Ihow the Nature of
Idea's, and then it wou'd be eaiie to fpeak more
clearly of what I have mentioned, but that it wou'd
carry us too far. In the third Book, thefe things j
fhallibe more fully explained, and order requires it
fhou'd be referred till then. It fuffices, for the pre-
lent, that I bring a moft Senfible and Indifputable Ex-
♦ample, wherein we Ihall find many Judgments con-
founded, with one and the fame Senlation.
I believe there is no body in the World, who looks
upon the Moon, but fees it about a thoufand Paces
from' himfelf, and who thinks it not greater, when
it Rifes or Sets, than when it is very high above the
Horizon; and it may be alfo, that we only believe
we fee it greater, without thinking that we make
any Judgment in its Senfation, Yet it is Indifputa-
ble, that if there was not ibme kind of Judgment in-
eluded in the Senfation, we fiiou'd not fee the Moon
in thediftanceit appears to be : And befides, it wou'd
appear left ro us when it rifes,-than when it is got a
great w^ay above the Horizon ; fince we fee it great
when it rifes, onlv bccaufe we believe it farther off,
by a Natural Judgment, which I have fpoken of in the j
6th Chapter : But befides our Natural Judgments,
which we may look upon as compounded Scniations,
there
Chap. XIV. -A Search after Truth.
there is almoft in all our Senlations a free Judg^
ment 9 for Men not only determine by a Natu-
ral Judgment, that Pain, for inftance, is in
their Hand, but they alfo make a free Judgment
thereof, they not only feel it there, but likewife be-
lieve it fo, and have fo habituated themfelves to form
fuch Judgments, that they find it very difficult to
avoid it t Yet thefe Judgments are very falfe in them-
felves, altho' very ufeful for the prefervation of Life,
for our Senfes Inltrud: us only for our Bodies, and
all our free Judgments, which are conformable to our
Senfes, are very far from the Truth.
But that we may not leave all thefe things, without
giving fome Means to difcover the Reafons thereof,
we muft know that there are two forts of Beings 9
fuch as our Soul lees immediately, and others that
it knows only through the Means of the firft. For
Inftance, when I perceive the Sun rifing, I firft per-
ceive that which I fee immediately, and becaufe 1
perceive that firft Sun only, by realbn there is fome-'
thing without me, which produces certain Motions
in my Eyes and Brain, I Judge that this firft Sun, which
is in my Soul, is without, and that it Exifts.
It may further happen that we fee this firft Sun,
which is intirely united to our Soul, rho* the other be
not upon the Horizon, and even whether it exifts or
no; fo we may fee this firft Sun greater when the
other rifes, than when it is very high, and altho' it
be true, that this firft Sun that we immediately fee,-
be greater than the other rifes, it follows not from
thence that this other be greater, for 'tis not properly
that which rifes, that we lee, fince it is diftant from
us many Millions of Miles, but it is that firft that is
truly greater, and fuch as we fee it, becaufe all
things that we immediately fee, are always what we
fee them to be, and we deceive our Iclves only be-
caufe we Judge, that what we immediately fee is in
the External Objecft, which caules that Viiion^ia
us.
So when we fee Light, in feeing this firft Sun,
v^hich is immediately united to our Mind, we do not
- deceive.
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9<l A Search after Trutk Book h
deceive our felves in believing we iee it, it is not
pdiiible to doubt thereof: But our Error is, our Wil-
ling without any Reafbn, nay* againii all Reaibn,
that this Light, that we immediately fee, exifts in th6
Sun, which is without us : *Tis alio the fame thing
in. if in refped: to other Objeds of our Senfes.
not in our If we obferve carefully, what has been laid in the
Senfatiom, beginning and continuation of this Work, we /hall
Mr jual "* things that happen in each Sen-
nofnts, ^ fationjError proceeds from the Judgments we make,by
which we think that our Senfations are in the Objeds.
Firft, it is not an Error to be ignorant, that the
Adion of Objeds confifts in the Motion of Ibme of
their parts, and that this Motion communicates it felf
to the Organs of our Senfes, which are the two
firft things to be obferved in each Senfation j
for there is a great deal ©f difference, between being
ignorant of a thing, and having a fal/e Notion of it*
Secondly, we deceive our felves not in the third,
which is properly Senfation ; when we feel Heat, fee
Light, Colours, or other Objeds, it is true that we
fee them, altho* at the fame time we fhou'd be Mad;
for there is nothing more certain, than that all the
Vifionaries fee what they think they do, and their
trror confifts only in this, that they Judge what they
fee, to exift truly without them, becaufe they fee it fo.
It is this Judgment that includes aConfent of our
Liberty, and by confequence, that which is fubjed to
Error; and we ought always to hinder our felves from
making it, according to the Rule we have laid down
in the beginning of this Book : that we ought never
to Judge of any thing, when we can hinder our
felves from it, and where Evidence and Certainty does
not conftrain us thereto, as it happens here; for altho*
we feel our felves extreairrfy inclined, by a ftrong
Habit, to Judge that our Senfations are in the Objeds,
as that Heat is in the Fire, and Colours in Pidures,
yet we fee not that certain Evidence and Reafon,
which preiles, and obliges us, to believe it ; and thus
we voiuntarily fiibmic to Error, by the ill ufe that t/e
make of our Liberty, when we freely form fuch
Judgments. CHAP.
Chap. XV. Search after Truth.
li lijiini* Tin
CHAP. XV.
'An Explanation of the particnlar Errors of Sight, xohich
nutf ferve us as an Example of she General Errors
if our Senfes,
TH E Way, I believe, is now made plain, for the
difcovery of the Errors of our Senfes in general,
as they have any Relation to Senfible Qualities, which
have been treated on, upon the occafion of Light and
Q)iours, which in order ought to be firft explained.
It feems necellary now to come to particulars, and to
examine feverally, the Errors into which every one of
our Senfes betray us ; but we Ihall not now enlarge
upon thefe things, becaufe from what has been already
faid, a little attention will ealily fupply a long Dif^
courfe, which we Ihould be obliged to make: We
(hall produce only the general Errors, into which our
Sight betrays us, in reference to Light and Colours ;
and we doubt not, but this Example alone, will be
fuficient to inform us, of the Errors of all the other
Senfes.
When we have look'd fome time upon the Suni, this
is what pafles in our Eyes and Soul; and thefe are the
Errors we fall into. Thofe who know the hrft Ele-
ments of Dioptrics, and any thing of the admirable
Strudhire of our Eyes, are not ignorant that the Rays
of the Sun are refradfed in the Chryftaline, and other
Humours, and that they meet afterwards upon the
Retina, of Optic Nen*e, which, as it were, furnilhes
with Hangings^ all the bottom of the Eye, even as
the Rays of the Sun, which pals through a Convex
Glafs, meet together in the/cow, at two, three, or
four Fingers breadth diftant, in proportion to its Con-
vexity : Now Experience (hows, that if one pur at
the focus of the Convex-Glafs, a little piece of SiulF,
or
A Search after Trhk fioofc f J
• Black Pa- or black Paper *, the Rays of the Sun make fo great
?'»• an impreflion upon this Stuff, or Paper, and agitate
tTere'muJi fmall Particles thereof, with fo great a violence,
h a great' that they break and feparate,them from one another.
er Convexi' a word, they burn them, or reduce them into
mite^P^a- Smoak and Afhes. Thus we muft conclude, from
per in the this Experience, that if the Pupil, through which the
lame time. Light paffes, were fo dilated, that it would permit an
eafie paffage for the Rays of the Sun, or on the con-
trary, was fo contracted as to obftruct them, our
Retina would fuffer the fame thing as the piece of
Stuff, or black Paper, and the Fibres would be fo
Very much agitated, that they would foon be broken
and burnt. It is for this reafon, that moft Men are
fenfible of a Pain, if they look upon the Sun but for
one moment, becaufe they cannot fo well clofo up the
Orifice of the Pupil, but that there Will enter fulfi-
cient Rays, to agitate the Strings of the Optic Nerve
with much violence, and not without danger of break-
ing them.
The Soul has no knowledge of what we have fj^ke,
and when it looks upon the Sun, it neither perceives
its Optic Nerve, nor any Motion in it j but that's
not the Error, 'tis only a fimple Ignorance: The firft
Error it falls into, is, that it Judges the Pain it feels,
is in its Eye.
If immediately, after looking upon the Sun, we go
into a dark place, with our Eyes open, the Motion
of the Fibres of the Optic Nerve, caus'd by the Rays
of the Sun, diminifhes, and changes by little and lit^
tie. This is all the Change that can be perceived in
the Eyes, however, 'tis not what the Soul perceives
there, but only a White and Yellow Light: Itsfecond
Error is, it Judges that the Light it fees is in the Eyes,
or upon the next Wall.
In fine, the agitation of the Fibres of the Retina,
always diminifhes, and ceafes by little and little j for
when a Body has been fhaken, nothing can be percei-
ved in it but a diminution of its Motion, but 'tis ncft
that which the Soul perceives in its Eyes, it fees the
White become an Orange colour, afterwards Red,
.. and
Ch^p. XV L A Search after Tritthi ^ jr
and then Blue; And the reafon of this Error is,
that we Judge there are changes in our Eyes, of
'upon the next Wall, that differ miich, as to the
more or lefs, becaufe the Blue, Orange, and Red
Colours, "which we fee, differ much otherwife among
themfelves belides in the more and left.
Thefe are fome Errors which we are fubjedl to in
reference to Light and Colours; and thefe Errors be-
get many others, which Ihall be explain'd ih the fol-
lowing Chapters.
CHAP. XVI.
i. lihat the Errors of our Senfis are the mofl gene^
ral and fruitful PrincifleSy whence we draw
all the falfe conclujions^ which in their turns
alfiy ferve us for Principles, II. The Origine ofEjTen-
tial Dijferences, III. Of fubfiantial Forms, IV. Of
Jonte other Errors in the Philojophy of theSchoolst
T Suppofe I have fufiiciently explain'd, to unpreju-
died Perfons, aridfuch ^s are capable of any atten- Phe Ef"
tion of Mind, in what our Senfatioris confirt, and *smfe!
the general Errors which are fourid In them. It refts us the
now to Ihow, that Men ufe thefe general Errors as
inconteftable Principles, by which they will explairi
all things, that they draw an Infinity of falfe Confe- pies/odr!^
quences from them, which alfo, in their turns, ferve f^lfe
for Principles to draw Other Confequences ; and that
thus, Iw little and little, they have composed Imagi- theW turns
nary sciences, that have nothing of fubftance or alfojervefof'
reality in them, and which they follow with a blind
impetuofity; but which, like Phanrafitis, exhibit to
thofe that embrace theni only confufion, and the
lhame of being feduc'd, or that Character of Folly,
which makes us take pleafure in feeding upon IIlu-
" H " fim
c8 ~ A Sejtnh after Trmh.. Book I.
fipQS and Chiinpra's. But chis;i^ft be. particuJariz'd
in fome Examples.
It has been already faid, tjiat w£ are accuftom'd to
attribute our own Senfatioos to Qbje>^s,, and that we
Judge Colours, Odours, Sapours, ^and other Senfible
Qiialities, to be in Objedls that^iare Colourd, Qdi-
ferous, We have difcoverd, that this is an ;Er-
tor 5 We muft npvv Ciow jthat we make ufe of , this
Error, as a Principle whence we draw our falfe
Confequences, which Confequences we alfo elieem; as
other Principles, upon which we build our Reafonings.
In a word, we muft here explain/in what order the
Mind proceeds, in fearching out Ibmelpecial Truths;
where this'falte Principle, vl^. Our Senfations 'are in
ObjeBs, is once lb imbib'd, that it looks upon it as in-
dubitable. . / - ; X.'i
But to render this more ^enfible, 'let us take Ibme
particular Body, whofe Nature we would enquire
into, and let iis lee, for Example, what a Man would
do, that Ihould apply himfelf to know the Nature of
Money and Salt: The firft thing, would be to confi-
der tlieir Colour, Smelh Tafte,^and other Senlible
Qualities ; what thofe of the Money are, and what
thofe of the Salt; in what they agree, and in "what
they differ ; and what Relation they can have with
the Qyaliries of. other Bodies; This being done, I
believe he would reafon much aftpr, .this mannet>,fiip-
\ pofing he beiiev'd it an inc9nce{j:^ble Principle, that
'Schlations^'.werein Objebb^
' Whatever I perceive by taftihg, foeingr^d fed":
rericestljt fog tbis. Hony aifo Salt, are- in,thisH€ttiy..and Sat
a^eattribtf-^ No^y, 'tis Gef'tafo,''',that what I per^ive fo this Hony,
differs ellentialiy from what 11 perceive in, this Salt ;
ile/e 'diff- ^be vyliitenet' of tlie Salt 'does,^ without.doub£j.,dj^er
rencci are luo-Ce from .Q^pjQqlgur of the I^fmy than in the more or
- the Hony, from the pun-
, tafte of tpe-Salt; and confeqiuently, there mull
be ani dlentiati^efence betwixt Hony and Sat, fincc
aU tlrnt of in both,". does not only diifter ^
as"^ the niqr^.'W-' but aifo ^nti^ly, • „
Chap. XVI. Search after Truth,
This would be the firft ftep this Man would miil6«5rary
for doubclcrs, he cannot judge that Hony 4nd Salt
differ eflentially, but becaufe there are fome appear-
ances in the one, eflentially different from the other i
I mean, the Senfations that he has of Hony, differ ef-
fentially from chofe ©f Salt, fjnce he only judges there-
of by the Impreflions they majce upon the Senfes; he
then lop.ks upon this Confequence as a new Princi-
pie, from whence he draws other condufiong after this
manner.
Since then the Hony and Salt, and other natural Bo- T^e OrigL
dieSj differ effentially from one another, it ^)llows
that thofe are grpfly deceiv'd, who would perfwade
us, that all the difference, betwixt thefe Bodies confifts
only in the different Configuration of the Particles
which compofe them ; For finee Figure is not eflential
to different Bodies, let the Figure of thofe Particles,
which are imagin'd to be in the Hony, be changed,
the Hony will remain ftill Hony, alcho* its parts
fhou'd receive the Figure of the Parts of Salt. So
that it's neceffary there fhoud be fome fubftance,
which being join'd to the firft common Matter of all
different Bodies, conftitutes their eflential difference
from one another.
This is the fecond advance which this Man would
make, and this is the happy difcovery of fithftantid
Forms : Thefe arc the fruitful fubftances which pro-
duce every thing in Nature, altho' they only lublift in
the Imagination of our Philofophers. But let us fee
the Properties which ht will liberally beftow upon
this Entity of his Invention, for no doubt but he will
difpoil other Subftances, of their eflential Properties, to
Cloath this* ■.
Since then, there are in every Natural Body -two QrigU
Subftances which compofe it one which iscoininpn of aU
to Hony, Salt, and other Bodies i . the other
makes Hony to be Hony, Salt, Salt, and other Bo- ^he?\ix
dies to be what they are. It follows that the. firft, iicsofthe
which is Matter, having no contrariety, and being in-
different to all Forms, muft reft without any force or
aiifion, becaufe it has no need of defending it felf; .
H 2. but
100 'A Search after Truth. Book I.
but for others, which are fubftantial Forms, they have
need of being always accompanied with Qualities and
Faculties to defend them; they muft always be upon
their Guard, for fear of being furprized j they muft
perpetually look to their own Prefervation, extend
their Empire over their Neighbouring Matter, and
pulh their Conquefts as far as they can, for if they
were weak and adlionlefs, other Forms would fur-
prize them, and foon annihilate them 5 they muft then
always fight, and nouiifti thefe Antipathies, and Irrc-
concileable Hatreds, againft other Hoftile Forms
which endeavour to deltroy them.
If it happens that one Form Ihou d take the Mat-
rer of another Form; As if, for Example, the form
of a Carcafs feize the Body of a Dog, this form muft
not be barely contented to annihilate the form of a
Dog, its hatred muft alio extend to the dcftrudtion of
all thofe qualities which its Enemy had 5 the hair of
the Carcafs muft forthwith wax white, with a white-
nefs of a new creation ; the Blood muft be red after
fuch a manner, as we cannot fufpedt it to be coun-
rerfeit, and the whole Body muft be covered with
qualities that are faithful to the new form, and defend
it according to the little power which the qualities of
a dead Body have, which muft alfo be deftroy'd in
their turn; But becaufe they cannot always fight, and
becaufe all things feek reft, it's certainly neceflary
that the Fire, for inftance, have its Center, whether
it always tends by its lightnefs, and natural Inclina-
tion, that it may once be at reft, and burn no more,
and that it may even lay by its hear, which it only
kept here below for its defence.
Thefe are a few of the Confequences which refult
from this- laft Principle, that there are Subftantial
Forms, which we have made our Philofopher conclude
with a little too much liberty, for thefe are ufually
deliver'd with a graver Air.
There are yet an Infinity of other Confequences,
which every Philofopher is continually making ac-
cording to his Humour and Inclination, according to
the Fruitfulncfs or Barrennefs of his Imagination; for
thefe
■f
Chap. XVL ^ Search after Truth.
thefe are the only things which make them differ from
one another. We mult not Itop here, to overthrow
thefe Chimerical Subftances, other Perfons have fuffi-
ciently examined them, and Ihown that there are no
fuch things in Nature, and that they ferve only to
afford a very great number of ridiculous, and even
contradictory Confequences. We are fatisfyM that
we have difcover'd their Original in the Mind of Man,
and to have fhow'd that they are all owing, at this
time, to the common Prejudice, That Senfations are in
the OhjeSis perceived: For, if what has been faid, be
confiderM with little attention, vi:(. That it's necefla^
ry, for the prefervation of our Body, to have Senfa-
tions that are cfTentially different, altho* the Imprefll-
ons, which Objects make upon our Bodies, differ very
little 5 We lhall dearly fee, that 'tis a fault to ima-'
gine fo great differences in the Objecfls of our Senfes.
But I muft here mention, by the by, that there's
nothing to be objeCfed againft thefe Terms, Fortn and
EJJential difference. Hony is certainly Hony by its
form, and 'tis thus that it effentially differs from Salt,
but this form, or this eflential difference, confifts
only in the different Configuration of its parts ;
'tis this different Configuration which caufes Hony to
be Hony, and Salt, Salt: And altho' its only acci-
dental to Matter in general, to have the Configura^
tion of the parts of Hony, or Salt, and fo to have the
form of Hony or Salt, it may, neverthelefs, be. faid,
that it is effential to Hony or Salt, to be what they
are, to have fuch or fuch a Configuration of Parts.
Even as Senfations of Cold, Heat, Plcafure, and Pain,
are not eflential to the Soul as a Soul, but becaufe it
i§ by thefe Senfations, that it's faid tp fenflble of
Heat, Cold; Pleafure, and Pain,
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A Search after Truth. Book I,
CHAP. XVIL
L Another Example drawn from Morals, which fhovps
that our Senfes only offer us falfe Goods, II. That ^tis
God only who is our true Good. III. The Origine cf
the Errors of the Epicureans and Stoics.
F
wLi »]
I. An Ex-
ample
has been fufficiently proved, in my Opinion> that
this Prejudice, Our Senfations are in OhjeHs, is a
very fruitful Principle of Error in Phyfics; it muft
now be fhown, from Reafons drawn from Morals,
that the fame Prejudice join'd with this, That ObjeEls
are the only, and true Caufes of our Senfations, is alfb ve-
fy dangerous.
There's nothing fb common in the World, as to fee
Men who are Wedded to Senfible Goods : Some love
arawn front ]viufick. Others good Eating, and others are paffio-
Morals,that r l l- xt l u r
our Senfes Other things. Now thus they realon, to
only offer us perfwade themfelves that all thefe Objeifis are Goods,
falfe Goods. thefe agreeable Tafles which picafe us in
Banquets, thefe Sounds which afFedl the Ear, and
thefe other Pleafures which we perceive upon other
oCcafions, are certainly included in Senfible Objects,
Of, at leaff, 'tis thefe Objedls that are the occafion
of them i or, in fine, we cannot have Senfations
without them. Now 'tis impoflible to doubt, whe-
ther Pieafure be Good, whether Pain be Evil ^ we
are inwardly convinced thereof, and confequenrly,
the Objedfs of our Senfes are very real Goods, which
we ought to enjoy that we may be happy.
JfhaUex- " This is the Reafoning that we ordinarily, and in-
confiderately make ; and this is that, which inclines us
wiatfen/e" to believe that our Senfations are in Objeds, that
ObieEfs Objeds have in themfelves the power of making us
vork upon Senfible ^ that we look upon things as our Goods,
^ which are infinitely below us, which can only ad up-
on our Bodies, by producing feme Motions in their
Fibres,
Chap, XVII. A Search after tiirtk 103
Fibres, but c^ti tiever aifl upon our Souls, or make
lis fenflble of Pfeafui-e or Pain.
Certainly, if it is not the Soul which ads upon it
felf, upon occafion of whatpaffes in the Body, nothing
elfe but Cod can clo it ; and if it is not the SouJ which
caufes Pleafure, or Pain, according to the different
fliaking of the Fibres of its Body, as it s very likely
it does not, tince it often perceives Pleafure and Pain
without its confent: I know no other Hand that is
povVerfui enou^ to produce this Senfatio'n in it, but
that of the Author of Nature.
Indeed, there's none but God that is otir true Good, p,
Ms he only that can affed us with all thefePleafures
we are capable of, and who, in his Knowledge and
Love, hath Decreed to excite them In us. Andthefe
Pleafures, which he hath link'd to the Motions which fible objecis
pafs in our Body, to make us careful of ohr own Pre- can't make
iervkrion, are very little, very weak, and very Ihort, ^fpSrc.
altho' we are enflav'd to them in this State whereirito
Sin has reduc'd us 5 but the Pleafures which he will
excite in his Eled in Heaven, are infinitely greater,
fince he made us to know and loVe him ; for accord-
ing to \he Order of Nature, greater Goods alfed us
with greater Pleafure, and fince God is infinitely above
all things, the Pleafure of thofe that fhall enjoy him
will certainly furpals all Pleafures.
"What we have fald of theCaufe of our Errors, in llirheOn^
reference to Good, does fulflciently inform us. of the of the
falfneft of the Opinions of the Stoics and Epicureans ^7%^
about the Supream Good : The Epicureans placed it
in Pleafure, and becaufe they felt it as well in Vice Sro r;.
aS in Vertue, and eVen more commonly in the fi'rd
than the fecond, they gave themfelves up to all forts
of Voluptuoufne fs.
Now the firfi: Caufe of their Ertorwas, thatjudg-
ing falfely there was fo.nething agreeable in the
Objeds of their Senfes, or that they were the true
Caufes of the Pleafures they felt, and being, befides
this, convincVi by an inward Senfation which they had
in themfelves, that Pleafure was a Good for them,
or, at lead, for the time they eujoy'd it, they gave
H 4 thenilelves
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104 A Search after Truth. , Book l^
theijirelyes up to the Government of all the Paflions,
which they apprehended would not incommode them
afterwards; whereas, they ought to have coniider'd,
that the Pieafure vvhich is felt in Senfibie Things, canr
not be in thefe things as their true Caufes, nor after
any other manner; and conlequently, that Senfible
Goods cannot be fuch in refpedt pf our Soul. They
Ihould alfo have confider'd the other Things which
jve have explain'd.
The Stoics, on the contrary, being perfwaded that
Senfible Pleafures were only in the Body, and for fhe
Body, and that the Soul ought to haye its particular
Good, placed its Happinefs in Vertue. Now this is
the Origine pf their Errors, they believed that Senfi-
ble Pain and Pleafures were not in the Soul, but only
in the Body; they made ule of thisfalle Judgment as
a Principle for other falie Conclufipns, as that Pain is
pot an Evil, nor Pieafure a Good; That the Plea-
fures of Senfe are npt good in themfelyes, but that
they are common to Men and Beafts ; And, never-
thelefs, it is eafie to (how, that altho' the Epicureans
and Stoics vverp deceiy'd in many things, yet they
were in the right in fome, for the happinefs of the
Happy confifts in an accomplilh'd Vertue ; I would
fay, in the Knowledge and Love of Gpd, and is a
very great Pieafure which continually attends them.
Let us then well remember, that external Qbjeds
include nothing, neither agreeable nor difagreeable,
that they are not the Caufes of pur Pleafures, and
that we have no reafon either to fear or love them,,
but that God only is to be fcar'd and lov'd, becaufp
he only is ablC to Punilh or Reward us, to make us
Senfible of Pain or Pieafure. In fine, 'tis only in God,
'a'*d from God, that we can expecft Pleafures, fo^
which we liaye fo ftrpng, fp natural, and fo juft an
Inclination.
Bstu*. k 1''»P Wjt,' I'
If"
CHAP
,„v i-ii;,.,!'-;.
l\ |i< ..If J
Chap. XVIII, A Search after Truth. 105*
CHAP. XVIII.
I. Our Senfes deceive us in things which are not Senfihle,
II. An Example drawn from the Corrverfation of Men,
III. Pf^e muft not confide in Senfible Habits,
TX7E have fufficienily explaind the Errors of our
^ ^ Senfes, in refpedi: of their Objeifb, as of Light,
Colours, and other Senfible Qiialities; we muft now
(how how they feduce us about Objedls, to which
they have no relation, by obftruding our ferious atren-
tion, and inclining us to Judge of them upon their
Teftimony. This is what deferves very well to be
Explained.
Attention and Application of Mind, to the clear and I. That our
diftinift Idea's we have of Objedfts, is the moft ne-
ceflary thing in the World to know their Nature ;
for as it is impoflfible to fee the Beauty of any Work, -mhich are
without opening our Eyes, and looking earneftly upon not Senfible^
it, fo the Mind cannot evidently lee the greateft part
of Things, with the Relations they have to one ano-
ther, unlels it confiders them attentively. Now 'tis
certain, that nothing diverts us more from attending
the clear and diftinSl Idea's of our Senfes, and confe-
quently, from removbg us farther from the Truth,
and alfo deceiving us.
' To apprehend this Truth it's neceflary tq know,
that the three Ways of perceiving, vi:(, by the Senfes,
Imaginations and Pure Vnderjianding, do not all equal-
ly affecft the Soul, and confequently, not afford the
fame equal attention to every thing it perceives by
their means, for it is much affedled with what touches
it much, and lefs with that which touches it little.
Now that which it perceives by the Senfes, touches
ard engages itextreamly, but that which it knows by
the Imagination affecfts much lefs 5 but what the Ur\-
derftanding
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106 - A Stmh Aptr Truthi'' ^ -"^dok T;
derftanding reprefencs to it, I mean, what it perceives
of it lelf independent of the Senfes and Imagination*
does very feldom excite it. No body can doubt, but
that the leaft pain of the Senies is more prelent to the
Mind, and re^er^ ii» mor^iatifenclv^, than the Medb
ration of a thing of much greater corxfequence.
The reafon of this is, that the Senfes reprefent Ob*
jeds as prefent, but the Imagination as abfent: Now,
according to the Laws of Order, amonglt many Goods
or Evils propofed to the Soul, thofe which are prefent
touch and affeCl: the Soul more than all the others
Which are ibfent, becaufe it's neceflkry for the Soul
to dfcterttiine headily upon What is to be done in this
OCcurrerrce. Thus it is nAich itiofe a^(3:ed with a lie
tie Pricking, than with the fhoft elevated Speculations;
and the Pleafures and Evils of this World, make a
greater itnpreflion upon ity than the terrible PainS,
or infinite Pleafures of Eternity. ' '
The Senfes then extreamly affe^ the Soul with
what they reprefent to it j now as it is limited, and
cannot clearly conceive many things at a time, lb it
cannot clearly apprehend what the Underftanding re-
prefents to it, at the fame time as the Senfes offer
Ibmething to its confideratibn ; it then forfakes the
clear and diftin(51: Idea s of the Underftanding, how*
ever proper they are to difcover the Truth of things
as they are in themfelVes, and applies it felf only to
the confus'd Idea's of the Senfes, which afteift it more,
and which reprefent things unto it, not as they are in
ihemfelves, but only according to the Relation they
have with its Body.
II. Ex- ^ Man, for Example, would explain feme Truth,
'ample ii's neceftary that he make ufe of Speech, and that he
Hra'ppnfrcm exprefs his internal Motions and Sentiments in fenfi-
ble Motions and Ways: Now the Soul cannot, at the
M n. lame time, perceive diftindfly many things. Thus
having always a great attention for what comes by the
Senfes, it v^ry feldom confiders the reafens propos'd to
it, but it is much affVcftcd with the fenfible PJeafure,
which depends upon the Meafure of Periods, upon
the Relations ofGeftures with Words, upon the Beau-
tics
XVIII. A Search after Truth, ioj
ties of a Face, iip6fj the Air and Mmnet of one that
fpeaks 5 however, after it ha^ heard, it muft Judge^
this is the Cuftom. Thus its Judgments muft be
different, according to the diveffky of Impreftions
which it fhall receive by the Senfes.
If, for. Example^ he that fpeaks, delivers himfelf
eafily; if he keeps an agreeable Meafure in bis Pe-
riods, if he has the Air of a Gentleman, and a Man
of Senfe, and if he is a Ferfon of Quality, if he has
a great Retinue, if he fpeaks with Authority and
Gravity, if Others hear him with Refpe<ft and Silence,
if he Converfes with Wits of the ftrft Claflis 5 in fine,
if he is happy enough to pleafe and to be efteemed,
be lhali have Reafon in Whatever he advances, his
very I>refs lhall pais for Demonftration.
But if he is ib unhappy, as to have the contrary
Qualities, however, concludingly he demonftrates,^
he (hall prove nothing at all: Let him fpeak the fineft
things in the World, they lhall never be taken notice
of, the attention of his Auditors being only to that
which touches the Senfes; the difguft they ihall enter-
tain to fee a Man appear defpicably, fhall wholly take
them up, and divert that application which is due to
his Thoughts ; his attire fhall make its Mafter, and
every thing that he fays, contemptible ; and his way
of fpeaking being that which is peculiar to a Thought-
ful Philofopher, lhall incline his Auditors to believe,
that thefe fublime Truths he treats of, being above
their ordinary Capacity, are only delirious and extra-
yagant Notions.
Thefe are the Judgments of Men, their Eyes and
Ears Judge of Truth, and not of Reafon, even in
thefe very things which depend only on Reafon, be-
caufe Men are only affetfted with fenfible and agree-
able Objecfts, and fcarce ever bring with them a
ftrong and ferious Attention for the difcovery of
Truth. •
Neverthelefs, it is very unjuft to Judge of things notreftZpon
after that manner, and to defpife Truth, becaufe it a jenjibh
wants thofe Ornaments which pleafe and flatter our
Senfes: Philofophers, and difcerning Perfons, fhould
be things
i
Id
m
'm
. itUH
I H
. ASearch after Truth. Book I.
be afham*d to enquire more Induftrioufly into agree"'
able Matters than into Truth it felf, and to feed their
Mind with the Vanity of Words/ rather than the Truth
of Things. Tis common to the unthinking part of
the World, to Souis of Flelh and Blood, to fufTer
themfelves to be won by the fine Periods, Figures and
Motions, which excite the Padions.
Omnia enim ftolidi magis admirantur, amarUque
Inverfisqua fuh verbif latitantia cernunt,
Veraqi conftitumty qu<e beUe tangere fojjunt
AureSy ^ lefido qua funt fucata fonore.
But Wife men endeavour to Guard themfelves againft
the Malignant Power, and prevailing Charms of thefe
fenfible liners, of doing things; their Senies impofe
upon them, as well as other Mens, for, indeed, they
are Men, but they generoufly defpife their Teftimo-
nies; they imitate the famous Example of the Judges
of AreopaguSy who forbad the Advocates to m^e ufe
of deceitful Words and Figures, and would never
hear them but in a dark place, left their agreeable
Geftures Ihould perfwade them in prejudice of Truth
and Juftice : And laftly, that they might apply them«
felves the better to coniider the folidity of theft
ReaCons.
CHAP.
\
Chap. XIX. A Search after truth.
log
G H A P. XIX.
Two other EXAMVLES.
I. Iht firfi of our Errors concerning the Nature of Bo^
dies, II. the fecond^ of thofe ibat relate to the {^a-
lities of thefe Bodies,
TITE have Ihow'd that there are a great number of
Errors, whole firft Original is owing to the
ftrong application of the Soul for whatever comes by
the Senfes, and the inadvertence for things which the
Underftanding reprefents to it. We have given an
Example of it, drawn from the Converfation of Men,
which is of very great confequence in Morals : Here -
are now others, deduc'd from the Nature of Things,
which its very necelfary to obferve in Phylics.
One of the principal Errors that refpecfis Phylics, j Errors
is, that Men imagine a much greater fubftance in Bo- toutthel^a^
dies, which fall under the Cognizance of their Sen^ ofBo-
les, than others which they perceive not i the greateft
part of Men believe, that there is much more Matter
in Gold and Lead than in Air or Water : And even
Children, who only obferve by their Senfes the effedfs
of Air, commonly imagine that there is nothing real
in ir. Gold and Siver are very heavy, very hard and
fenlible; Water and Air, on the contrary, are infen-
(ibie : From thence Men conclude, that the firft have
more reality than the laft; they judge of the Truth of
Things, by the fenlible Impreflion which always de-
ceives us, and negleift the clear and diftincft Ideals of
the Mind which never deceive us, becaufe what is
JSenlible affedfs and touches us more, but what is in-
telligible ftupifies us. Thefe falfe Judgments relpedt
the fubftance of Bodies ; here's another which relates
to the Qualities of thefe fame Bodies,
Men
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iio ^ Search after Trathf 6o^>I.
II Errors a- Men frequently Judge, that Objedls, which excite
^aiuus agreeable Senfations, are the moft
and Per- pefle^ and^ pure, without knowing in what Per-
je^ion. fedion, and the Purity of Matter confifts, and even
without being eoqeerned abpuc k. ^
They fay, for Bxam'ple, that Dirt is impure, and
that Water js ye^y, clear an4 pur^, but Camels who
love muddy Waters, and thofe Animals that delight
in Dirt, are not of their Opinion. Thefe are Beafts,
'tis true, but Men that love the Entrails of a Wood-
CQck, the Excrements of a Polcat, fay not that this
is impurity, altho' they fay the fame of all other kinds
of Animals. Laftly, Musk and Amber are generally
cfteemed of ajl Men, tho' they are nothing elfe; but
Excrements. ,
Certainly, Men never Judge of the Per^dion pf
Matter and its Purity, but only in relation to thejr
own Senfes i and thence it happens, that the Senles
being different in all Men, as has been fufficipntly
explain'd, they muft judge very differently of tije
Perfedion and Purity of Matter. Thus the Books,
which are daily Compos'd upon the Imaginary Per-
fedions, that are attributed to certain Bodies, are ne-
ccifarily filfd with Errors, and variety of ftrange Fan-
cies, fince the Reafbnings, which they contain, are
grounded only upon the falfe, confus'd and irregular
Idea's of our Senfes.
Philofbphers muft not fay, that Matter is Pure or
Impure j they know not what they precifely mean ty
the Words Pure and Impure; they fhould net fpeak
\vithout knovying^ what they fay: I mean, without
having clear and diftind Idea's, which anfwer to the
terms they make ufe of, for if they had join'd clear
and diftind Idea's to each of thefe Words, they would
fee, that that which they call Pure, would very often
Be Impure ; and that which appears to them tg be
Impure, would oftentimes be found very Pure.
If they would, for Example, that that Martc^
Ihould be the moft Pure and Perfcd, whofe Parts are
moft thin and apt for Motiou, Gold, Silver, and pre-
cious Stones, would be very imperfed Bodies j Air
and
; lV*l
eic
13111
.S£ar^_ ^fur Truth.
and Fire> cqprrwiwifc woiUd be very perfed : FJeft
beginning XQ ^o^rupc, Jfeell ill, woii^d* be tend^
ixiglb^erffS;jp^ anj.anollpm^ would be
l[j, more perfe4 £Hancotpi»pn,flefl?.
" Buc Iff pn the coqf^^fy', they would have it, that
e, J. the qioft perfet^l: Bodies are they, -whofe- parts were
mod grofsand' ibiid, and 'mbre unapt Tor Wotibh, the
£j{V. Barth would.be more pei'fedl than Gold, an^d.the Air
^ and 'Fire,_W!®uld be'tjae, .moft imperfefa of all Bq-
dies. ^ ^ -•• •
But if jKey^ would not, affi^^ thefe cjear and'diftind:
Idea's, tp the terms P«re aud whjcK, I have
mentioned, they -are at liberty^to fubftitute^others in
their fopna j .but if they only pretend to define thefe
' Words by fenfible Notions* they will eternally con-
^ found all things, fince they will never fijt'a fignifica-
tion to the terms whioh thfm. Men, as
I have alreaoy proy'df^j have very different Seniatipns
of the fame. Objedis; w;e;^ui| not* therefbre,fdefine
Objeds by the ^nfations'.r^hieh we have , of them,
except we deligb|C in obRur^ty' and confuliorj.
But, in fhort I cannot "fee" that "there is any Mat-
ter, not excepting even that which the very Heavens
are compos'd of, that is more perfed than another :
All Matter feems only capable of Figure and Motion,
and 'tis the fame thing to it, to have regular or ir-
regular Figures and Motions. Rcafon does not fell
., us, that the Sun is more Perfed or Luminous than
^ Dirt, nor that the Beauties of our Romances and Po-
ets, have any advantage over corrupted Carcafles,
? 'tis our falfe and delufive Senfes winch thus didate
to us. Whatever is objeded againft this, all Raille-
ries, Exclamations, ^c. will certainly appear ridi-
culous and cold to any one, which fiiall attentively
examine the Reafbns that I have brought.
Thofe who perceive, or only have Senfations, be-
lieve the Sun full of Light, but thole who know how
to perceive and reafon, do not believe ir, provided
they ufe as much Reafon as Senfation. I am venly
nsi'^ perlwaded, that all thofe vvho differ the moft, as to
the Teftimony of their Senfes, would change their
i ^ . Opinion,
sirJ
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iqIX
iii A Semh after fruth, 606k k
Opinion, if they would ferioufly meditate upon what
has been faid, but they love much to indulge the 11-
lufions of their Senfes i they fubjecft ihemfelves a great
while to their Prejudices, they too much forget their
Mind, to know that all the Perfediipns, which they
feem to fee in Bodies, are only Inch in' relation to
'it-
Tis not thefe fort of Men that I i^ak to, I anH
not concern'd for their Approbation or Efteem, they
will not hear, therefore they cannot Judge; it's
enough that Truth is defended and approved, by
thofe who ferioufly endeavour to be deliver'd from
the Errors of their Senles, and to make a good ufe of
the Light their Mind; 'Tis thefe Perfons only,
would defire to Meditate upon thefe Thoughts, witli
the greateft attention they are capable of, in order to
judge of them. I leave the Caufe to them, to con-
demn or approve it as Judges, becaufe that, by their
Meditation, they have acquir'd to themielves fuch a'
Right of judging of the Merit, or Demerit of the
Caufe, that it cannot but in Juftice be fubmitted to
them.
■U
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ri
CHAP.
U\ Chap. XX. /i Search after Truths
lis
CHAP. XX.
The Conclufion of this frfl BooL
I. That our Series are only given us for our Bodys.
II. That we muft doubt of their Teftimony. III. That
it is not an inconfidcrahle thing to doubt as we ought to
do.
Tlj^E have, in my Opinion, fuflidently difcover'd j.
' * the General Errors into which our Senfes be- Senfes are
tray iis, both in refped: of their proper Objed:s, as
alfo of thofe things which are not perceiv'd but by pefgrnja^
the Underftanding. I believe there is no Error we tionojoar.
are fubjedl to upon their occafion, whofe Caufe may
not be difcover'd in fome of thofe things which have
been already mention'd, if they be well examin'd.
We have alf© feen, that our Senfes are very faith-
ful and exact to Inftrucft in the Relations, which all
Bodies, that are about us, have to one another, but
that they are incapable of informing us, what Bodies
are in themfelves ; that, a right ufe of them,
tends only to the Prefervation of our Health and
Life ; that we cannot fufficiently delpife them, when
they arrogate Dominion over the Mind. This is the
chief thing which I wiih may^-be well'remembred in
all this firft Book, vi^^. That we conceive well,
that our Senfes are only giVerTuTTor the prefervation
of our Body, that we fix this Thought in our Mind j
and that to be deliver'd from the Ignorance We are
now involvM in, we feek for other alTiftanccs befides
thofg which our Senfes aftord us^
I
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n. IVe mufi
the
Tejlimony 0^
tur Senfes. ^
\\\,Thattt
is not an in-
eenfiderable
tkmg to
doubt as one
4ugkt to do.
A Search after Truth, Book I.
But if there are fome Perfons fas certainly there
will be too manyj who are not perfwaded of thefe
laft Propofitions from what I have here advanced, I
would, at leaft, defire this of them, That they would
only learn a little to diftruft their Senfes y and if they
will not wholly rejed their Teftimony, as falfe and
deceitful, that they will not refule to doubt of
it.
And indeed, it appears to me, that enough has been
faid, to create, at lead, fome fcruple in the Mind of
reafonable Perfons; and confequently, to excite them
to make ufe of their Liberty, otherwife than they
have yet done : For if they begin to doubt, whether
the Teftimony of their Senfes are true, they will more
ealily refrain their aftent, and fo keep themfelves out
of thofe Errors unto which they have hitherto been
fubjed. Efpecially, if they well remember that Rule
in the beginning of this Treatife, Never to give an
entire ajjent hut to things intirely evident, and to which
they cannot refrain confenting, without knowing certainly^
that they Jhoidd mal(e an ill ufe of their Liberty, if
they did not confent.
Befides, let no one imagine that he has made but a
fmall advancement, if he has only learn'd to doubt.
To doubt with Judgment and Reafon, is not fo fmalla
thing as People imagine, for here it may be faid,
that there's a great difference betwixt doubting and
doubting, we doubt through PafTion and Brutality,
through Blindnefs and Malice ; and laftly, through
Fancy, and only becaufe we would doubt. But we
doubt alfo with Prudence and Caution, with Wif-
dom and Penetration of Mind. Academics and
Atheifts, doubt upon the firff grounds, true Philofo-
phers on the lecond : The firft: doubt is a doubt of
darknefs, which does not conducfl us into light, but
always removes us from it. The fecond doubt is
begot of Light, and aflifts us in fome manner to pro-
duce it in its proper place.
Thofe who doubt only after the firft manner, do
nor apprehend what it is to doubt with Judgment,
they laugh at what Defcartes teaches us about doubt-
ing,
j
1^
llliitir
Chap. xX. ^ Search after Truthi
ing, in the firft of his Metaphyfical Meditations, be-
caufe it appears to them that he would only have
them doubt but of fancy j that he would only have
them fay, in general, that our Nature is infirm, our
Mind is full of blindnefs, that we muft take great
care to deface thefe prejudices, and Other like things.
It is not fufficient to fay, the Mind is weak, we
muft be fenfible of its weakneffes. It is not enough
to fay, it is fubjcd: to Error, we muft difcover in
what our Errors confift. This is what I believe has
been begun in this firft Book, by explaining the Na-
ture and Errors of our Senfes 5 I lhall, in the fecond,'
profecute the fame defign, by explaining the Nature
and Errors of our Imagination.
the End of the firji Book;
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Chap, II, i
S E A'R C H
AFTER
TRUTH.
BOOK II.
▼
Of the Imagination.
The Firfi Part.
CHAP. I.
1. A general Idea of the Imagination. II. That it includes
two faculties.^ the one AclivCy and the other PaJJive.
III. The general Canfe of the changes which hafpen to
the Imagination of Man^and the defign of thj]fecond Book*
IN the preceeding Book we have treated of the
Senfes, and have endeavoured to explain their
Nature, precifely obferving what ufe ought to be
made of them. We have difcovered the chief,
and mod general Errors which they make us fubjedt
to, and have attempted fp to limit their power, that
we may exped: much, and fear nothing from them, if
they are always kept within chefe limits we have pre-
fcribed. In this lecond Book, we fhali treat of the
Imagination, Natural Order obliging us to it, for there
being fo.great a Relation between the Senfes and the
Imagination, we ought not to feparatc ihem. It will
afterwards appear, that theie two Powers diner a-
mongft themrelves only as to mors or lef^
I 3 Tiiii
J18 A Semh after Truth, Book II.
This is the order we fhall obferve in this following
Treatife : It is divided into three Parts. In the firit
we fhall explain the PhyfiC^ Caufes of the diforder
and Errors of the Imagination. In the fecond, we
fhall make fome application of thefe Caufes to the
mqft general Errors of the Imagination 5 and fhall
alfo fpeak of what may becali'd'the Moral Caufes of
thefe Errors. In the third, we fhall fpeak of the con-
tagious Communication of flrong Imaginations.
If the generality of thofe things that are contain'd
in this Treatife, are not fo New, as what has been
already faid in explaining the Errors of the Stnfes,
they will not hpwever be of lefsufe."^ Thinking Per-
fons are ienfible enough both of the Errors, and even
of the Caufes of the Errors whereof I treat j but ve-
ry few make a fufEcient reflexion thereon. I pretend
not to inffrud: all the World, 'tis the Ignorant I
wou'd teach, and only inform others, or rather I en-
dt:avour here both to inftrud: and inform my felf
I. ^ gms- have faid in the firft Book, that the Organs of
ral Idea of our Seufcs were ccmpofed of little Fibres, which on
terminate in the outward pans of the body
and skin,' and oh the other, the middle of the
Brain. Now thefe little Fibres may be moved tw'o
ways, either by beginning at the ends which termi-
rate in the Brain, or thofe that terminate in the Ex-
terior parts of the bcdy. The agitation of thefe Fi-
bres cani^ot be communicated unto the Brain j but
the Soul muft perceive fomcthing ; If this Motion be-
gins by an impreffion that the objecfis make upon the
extremity of the Fibres of bur Nerves, is fo com-
municated to the Brain, then the Soul perceives and
Bj a judges that what it feels, is without, that is, it per-
tu^al ceives an objedf as prefent. But if it is only the in-
ward Fibres which arc agitated by the courfe of the
Animal Spirit, or by fome other way, the Soul ima-
in tnany gincs and judges that what it imagines is not without,
yUius. within the Brain, that is, it perceives an objedl as
abfenr. This is the difference there is between Senfa-
tibn and Imagination.
But
chap. II. A Search after Truth.
Bat it is requifice to obferve, that the Fibres of th^
Brain, are much more agitated by the imprefiion of
Objeds, than by the courfe of the Spirits 5 and that,
that is the reafon why the Soul is made more ienhble
by external Objeds, which it looks upon as prcfenr,
and, as it were, capable of making it immediately feci
either pleafure or pain, than by the courfe of the Ani-
mal Spirits. Neverthelefs, it fometimes happens in
Perfons who have their Animal Spirits very much agi-
rated by Fading, Watching, a high Fever, or by fome
violent Painon, that thefe Spirits move the internal
Fibres of the Brain, with as much force as outward
objeds could do, fo that thefe Perfons perceive what
they ought only to imagine, and think they fee thofe
objeds before their Eyes, which are only in their
Imagination. From whence it plainly appears, that
in refped to what pafles in the Body, the Senfes and
Imagination differ only as to More or Lefsy as I have
htibre advanced.
But to give a more particular and diftind Idea of
Imagination, We muft know, that every time there
happens any change, in that part of the Brain where
the Nerves meet, there likewife happens fome change
in the Soul, that is, as v/e have already explain'd, if
in this part there is any Motion that changes the or-
der of its Fibres, there alfo happens fome New per-
ception in the Soul, and it feels or imagines fome New
thing ; and the Soul can never perceive or imagine a-
ny thing anew, except there be fome change in the
Fibres of this fame part of the Brain.
So that the faculty of Imagining, or the Imagina-
tion» confifts only in the power that the Soul has of
forming to its felf Images of objeds, in producing a
change in the Fibres of this part of the Brain, which
may be called the principal part, fince it anfwers to all
the parts of our bodies, and is the place where our
Soul immediately relides, if we may be permitted to
fay fo.
That Ihews us very evidently,that this power which
the Soul hath of forming Images includes two things,
tljs one depending upon the Soul it felf, and the other
I 4 upon
I20 A Search after Truth. Book II,
II. Tvo fa- upon the Body. The firft is Adlion, and the Com-
tn niand of the Will, The fecond is the Obedience that
natHm^Vne given to it by the Animal Spirits, which trace thefe
Minje, and Images, and to the Fibres bf the Brain, upon which
the^her they muft be imprinted. In this dilcourfe the name
PaJltve, Imagination is indifferently given to either of thefe
two things, nor are they diftinguiflied by the words
AHive and Paffive which might be given to them i
becaule, by the fenfe of what we (hall fpeak, may
eafily be underftood which of the two we mean, whe-
ther it be of the 'alfive imagination of the Soul, or
-paffvc imagination of the Body.
We have not yet determined in particular, what
that jrhicifal part is, which we have juft (poke of,
Firft, becaufe we believe it very unneceffary. Second-
ly, becaufe we have not a certain knowledge of it.
And in fine, we think it better to be filent in a matter
whofe truth cannot here be demonftrated to others,
altho it were manifeft to us what that principal
part is.
Let it be then according to the opinion of M^illts^
that common Senfe refides in thole two Corpufcles he
calls Corpora Striata i Let the linuolity of the Brain
preferve the Species of the Memory ; and let the Cal-
lous body be the feat of the Imagination ; or follow-
it;g the Opinion of FcrneHius^ let us fuppofe it in the
Via Mater which involves the fubftance of the Brain,
or with D'Cartes in the Glandufa Pinealps; or, in fine,
let it be in fome other part, hitherto unknown,that our
Soul cxercifes its principal fiincftions, 'twill will be
very indifferent to me. It fuifices, that there is a
principal part i Nay, it is ablblutely necellary there
Ihou'd be fuch an one, as alfo that the foundation of
D''Cartes fyffem fhould fubfift ; for it ought to be well
obferved, that altho he were deceived when he affures
us that the Soul is immediately united to the Giandu-
la Pinealis^ that ought not neverthelefs to injure the
foundation of his Syftem, from which we lhall alv^^ays
gather all the ufefulnefs that can be expedfed froni
Truth, to improve our felves in the knowledge of
Man. '
Since
Chap. I. A Semh after Truth. 121
Since then the Imagination confifts only in the power III. The ge:
that the Soul has of forming to it felf Images of Ob- ^
jeds, by imprinting them, if we may fo fay, in the ^
Fibres of its Brain; the more diftind and larger the that hafptn
footfteps of thefe Animal Spirits be, which are the ;t
traces of thefe Images, the more ftrongJy and diftind-
ly the Soul will imagine thefe Objects. Now even as fign of the
breadth, depth, and clearnefs of the traces of any Boik,
Graving, depend upon the force wherewith the Inftra-
ment is aded, and on the Obedience that the Copper
renders to the Workman j fo the depth, and clearnels
of the Impreflions made on the Imagination depend
upon the force of the Animal Spirits, and the Confti-
tution of the Fibres of the Brain; 'tis the variety that
is found in both thefe, which makes almoft all this
great difference that we obferve in Perfons Minds.
For 'tis no difficult thing to give a reafbn for all i
the different Charaders which we meet with in the \
Mind of Man. On the one fide, through Abundance [
and Want, Agitation and Slownefs, or largenefs and ■
fmalnefs of the Animal Spirits, and on the other fide, '
through the Delicatenefs and Courfenefs, Humidity
and Drynefs, Flexibility or Inflexibility of the Fibres ;;
let'ikl; of the Brain; and in fine, through the relation that
thefe Animal Spirits may have with thefe Fibres.
And it would be very reafonable for every one, firft 'ft
to endeavour to reprefent to himfelf the different ;
Combinations of thefe things, and to apply them to |
all the different Difpofitions they meet with ; becaufe it i ai,
is always more ufeful,nay,even more agreeable to make * ^
ufe of our own Wit, and fo accuftom it of it felf to
difcover truth, then to fuffer it to be fpoiled with ,
idlencfs, by only applying it to fuch things as are al- V'j;
ready well known and difcovefd. Befides, there are ll
fome things to be obfcrved in the difference of Peoples 5!|
Genii that are fo fine and fo delicate, that altho we 't
may be able to difcover and perceive them well our ' j ■
lelves, yet we cannot repreftat them to, i^or make o-
thers fenfible ofchem. - i
But
aiiHlivi' if'
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111 A Search after Truth. Book II.
But to explain as much as poflible, all thefe difFe"
rences that are to be obferved in Difpofitions 5 and that
very one may the more eafily obferve in himfejF the
Caufe of all the changes that he feels at different
times, it feems Very proper in general to examine the
Caufe of thefe Changes which happen in the Animal
Spirits, and in the Fibres of the Brain ; becaufe there-
by we (hail difcover all that are found in the Ima-
gination.
Man never continues vei7 long in the lame Mind ;
every one hath fufScient inward proofs of his own
inconftancy, he judges of the fame Subjedl fometimes
after one manner, and fometimes after another. Iq a
word, the Life of Man confifts only in a Circulation
of Blood, and in another Circulation of Thoughts
and Defires 5 and it feems the beft way of imploying
his time would be, in feeking after the Caufe of thele
Changes which happen to us, fo that way to know
our fejyes.
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■S-
I. Of the
yemmal
Spirits-
CHAP. II.
I. Of the Animal Spirits, and the Changes to which
they are fuhjeSi in general- 11. That the Chyle goes to
the Heart, and thereby produces fome change in the
Spirits. III. That CHtne has the fame effe^,
"TIS agreed by every on, that the Animal Spirits
■ are only the moft fubtile and adtive parts of
the Blood, which fubtililes and agitates it felf chiefly
by the Fermentation that it receives in the Hearr,
and by the violent Motion of the Mufcles, whereof
this part is compofed ; that the Spirits are condudled
with the moft of the blood through the Arteries into
the Brain j and that there they are feparated by fome
parts that are deftined to this ufe, which are not yet
agreed upon.
From
C}iap» 11. A Search After Trutk nj
From hence may be concluded, that where the
Blood is very fubtile, there are much Animal Spirits,
but where it is grofs there are but a few; that if the
Blood is comgoled of fuch parts as are eafily received
into the Heart, or very proper for Motion, the Spi-
rits which are in the Brain, will be extreamly heated
or agitated and if on the contrary the Blood ferments
not fufiiciently in the Heart, the Animal Spirits will
be languilhing without adion, and without ftrength:
lb that according to the lolidity which (hall be found
in the parts of the Blopd, the Animal Spirits (hall be
more or lefs folid, and confequently have more or
lefs ftrength in their Motion. But thefe things muft
be explained more at length, by Examples and in-
conteftible Experiments, to make the truth evident.
The Authority of the Antients has not only blinded ,
the Minds of^ fome Men, but we may fay it has (hut ciyle\o£s
their Eyes alfo. For many Perfons have ftill fuch a to the he^rt
refpecft for their opinion, or it may be, fo opiniona- caufet
rive, that they will not fee fome things, which they
could no longer contradibl, if they would only pleaie
to open their Eyes. We may fee every day Perfons
that are "much efteemed for their Learning, who
write Books and publifh Conferences ^gainft the vi(i-
ble and fenfible Experiences of the Circulation of the
Blood, againft that of Weight, the Exaftick power
of the Air, and others of the like Nature. The dif-
covery that Mr. Pecquet has made in our time, which
w e make ufe of here is in the Number of thofe that
are unfortunate only, becaufe he difcover 4 it before
he had grey Hairs and a venerable Beard. But we
ftiall neverthejefs make ule of it, not fearing but
there will be fome Judicious Perfons who will not
find fault with ir.
According to this difcovery the Chyle goes not im-
mediately from the Bowels into the Liver by the Me-
faraick^Vems, as the Antients believed,but paffesfrom
the Bowels into the La^eal Veinsy and afterwards in-
to certain receptacles where they meet, and from
thence it goes by the Thoraick Du-ft or Canal along
the Vertebres of the Back, and fo mingles it fclf with
y|-i: -?■
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[A Search after Truth. Book If.
the Blood in the Axillary Vein^ which enters into the
upper part of the Vena Cava ; and thus being mingled
with the Blood it meets in the Heart.
From this Experiment may be concluded that the
Blood thas is mingled with the Chyle, being very
different from the other Blood, which has already
Circulated many times through the Heart, the
Animal Spirits which are only the moft fubtile
parts thereof, will be alfo very different, in Perfons
that are Fafting, and others who have juft Eat. More-
over, becaufe that amongft Meats and Drinks which
are generally ufed, there is great variety, and even
thole Perfons that ufe them have bodies diverfly dif^
pofed; two Perfons that have juft Dined, and at the
lame Table, will feel in their faculties of Imagina-
tion fo great a variety of changes, that k would be
impoflible do defcribe.
It is true, that thofe who are in perfedt health di-
geft fo quick, that the entring of the Chyle into the
Heart, Icarcely augments or diininiflies any of its
heat, and hinders not the Blood from fermenting there
almoft the fame manner, as if it entered only by it
felf; fo that their Animal Spirits, and by confequence
their faculty of imagining, receives very little, if any
change. But for Old and infirm People, they obferve
in themfelves very fenfible changes after they have
Eat, they grow very dull and fleepy, or at leaft their
imagination becomes very Languilhlng, and they have
neither Vivacity or quicknefs left; they no longer con-
ceive any thing diftindfly, nor can they apply them-
felves to any thing whatfbever ; in a word, they are
perfed:ly altered from what they were before.
But that the moft healthful and ftrongeft may alfo
have fenfible proofs of what we have already laid,
they need only refled: upon what happens to them .
when they hare drunk more Wine then they are ac-
cuftomed to, or elfo by obferving what vvould be
the effeds if they drink Wine one Meal, and Water
another. For 'tis certain, that if they are not entirely
ftupid, or if their bodies are not compofed after a
very extraordinary manner, they fhall foon perceive
chap. 111. Search t^er truth. izf
a gayeiy of temper, fome little drowfincls, or Ibme
otber like sccident.
Wine is fo Spiricous>that it ccjmes near the nature of
our Animal Spirits ; but are thefe a little too luxuri-
ous to fubmit to the command of the Will, becaufe
ef their Solidity and exceffive Agitation. Thus even
in the ftrongeft and moft vigorous Men, it produces
greater changes in the Imagination, and in all the
parts of the body, then Meat or any other Liquors
do. It gives us the Foil, to fpeak with Plautus, and ^ater ddn-
produces many effcds in the Mind, which are not fo [us ejl.
advantageous as thofe that Horace defcribes in thefe
Verfes.
non ehrietas dejignat ? Operta recludity
Sfes jubet ejje ratas: in pralia tendit inermes :
SoUicitK animis onus eximit: addocet artes,
Facundi Calices quern non fecere diferttm ?
Contra^a quern non in paupertate folutum ?
It would be eafie enough to give a reafbn of the
principal effeds, that the mingling of the Chyle with
the Blood produces in the Animal Spirits, and after-
wards in the Brain, and even in the Soul it feif. As
why Wine rejoyces us, and gives a certain Vivacity
to the Wit, when it is taken with Moderation } and
for fomerime befots Men, when 'tis drank to Excefs ?
From whence proceeds the heavinefs after Meals, and
many other fuch things, for which generally very ri-
diculous reafons has been- given. But though we
lhall not here make a Book of Natural Philofophy,
yet it will be neceffary to give fome Idea of the Ana-
tomy of the Brain, or make fome Suppolitions as
Mr. D*Cartes has done ia his Treatile of Man, with-
out which 'twill be impolTible to explain our felves.
But if one reads this Trearife of Monfieur D'Car-
tes with attention, we may fatishe our felves upon
thefe queftions, becaufe he explains all thefe things, or
at lealt, gives a fufScient light to difcover them, as he
has done by Meditation, provided one has fome
Knowledge of his PRINCIPLES,
CHAP.
:eiT!
2
'a Search uftefYruth. Book 11.
CHAP. III.
HhAt the Air one breathst canfes Uk^xvife fome change
in the Sprits^
H E fecond general Caiife of the chihges which
^ happehs in the Animal Spirits, is the Air we
breath for, altho"' it does immediately make as fenh-
ble imprefTions as the Chyle, neverthelefs, in fome
lime, it produces the fame ededl as the Juice of our
Food does prefently. This Air enters from Branches
of the Wind-pipe into that of the Venctis Artery^ and
from thence it mingles it felf, and ferments with the
reft of the Blood in the Heart; and according to its
particular difpolition, and that of the Blood, it pro-
duces great changes in the Animal Spirits, and by
confequence, in the faculty of Imagining.
1 know that there are fome Perforis, who do not
believe that the Air mingles it felf with the Blood, in
the Lungs and Heart, becaufe by their Eyes they
cannot difcover, in the branches of the Wind-pipe
and thofe of the Venous Artery, the paifageS whereby
the Air is communicated. But we muft not confine
the Adlion of the Mind to that of the Senfes, it can
penetrate what is impenetrable by them, and apply it
lelf to fuch things which they cannot. 'Tis certain,
that feme parrs of the Blood continually pafs from
the branches of the PWiOus Artery, into thofe of the
Wind-pipe, as the fmeli and moiftnefs of the breath
fiifficiently proves, and yet the pafiages of this com-
municarion are imperceptible ; why, therefore, can-
not the fubtile parts of the Air pals from the branches
of the Wind-pipe into the P''ertous Arterf, altho' the
pafiages of this communication are not fo vifiblc.
In fhort, more humours are evacuated by tranfpira-
lion, from the imperceptible Pores of the Arteries and
Skin,
Cliap.Ill; A Search after Truth.
Skin, than by any other pafTages of the Body ; and
even the Pores of the moft lolid Metals are not fo
fnaall, but that there are Bodies in Nature fmall
enough to find a free paflage, lor otherwife thefe
Pores would be clos'd up. lti&4;^e, that the Grofs,
and branchy partf of • xh^^i pafs through
the ordinary Pores and that even Water,
altho' very grofs, can '^i3bv through thOfe paffages,
where this Air is fometime forced to ftop. But we
are not Ipeaking here of thofe grbfs and branchy
parts of the Air j they are, it feems, unufeful enough
for fermentation, 'tis only of the fmalleft parts, fuch
as are fwift and fliarp, that we fpeak of, and which
have none, or very fmall branches, to ftop them, be-
caufe they are the moft proper for the fermentation of
the Blood.
I might, neverthelefs, affirm, upon the Relation of
Silvlus, that even the grofieft part of the Air pafs from
the Wind-pipe into the Heart, fince he affures us,
that he hath feen it pafs thither by the help of M. de
Sxiciamerdam-y for it is more reafonable to believe a
Man, who fays he has feen it, than a thoufand others,
who only fpeak of it by chance. It is then certain,
that the moft fubcile parts of the Air, which we
breath, enters into our Heart, and with the Blood
and Chyle^ maintains there that fire which gives Life
and Morion to our Bodies > and that, according to
their different Qualities, they produce great changes
in the fermentation of the Blood, and in the Animal
Spirits.
The truth of this is every day made evident, by
the divers Humours, and different Charatfters of Per-
fons difpofitions that are of different Countries. For Ex-
ample, the Gnfcons have a more lively Imagination
than the Normans ; thofc of ^oan^ Diep, and Picardyy
differ very much among themfelves, and that much
more from the Lovoer Ncrmans^ altho' they be very Nuvqmd
near together ; But if we confider Men, whofe Coun-
tries are at a greater diftance, we fhall meet with dif-
ferences ftill more ftrange, as an Italian^ and German', jgr. c. 49,
or a Dnnhman^ In fine, there has in all times been 7*
fome
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A ^earc^ after Truth. Book It
fome places that have been renowned for the Wildom
of their Inhabitants, as Teman and Athens j and
others for their Stupidity, as Thebes, Abdera, and feme
others,
Athenis tenue ccelum^ ex guo acutiores etidtn pit ant U¥
^Atticii craffum Thebis, Cic* de fato.
Abderitante peSiora plebis habes. Matt.
JBoeotum in crajfo jurares aere natunii Hor.
I. ef the
change of
the Sprits,
earned by
the Nerves,
Tphtchgif to
the Lungs
and Hsstrt,
CHAP. IV.
I. Of the Change wrought in the Animal Spirits, by the
Nerves, that go to the Lungs and Heart. II. Of that
which is caujed by the Nerves, that pafsfrom the Liver
to the Spleen, and fo into the Bowels, III. That all
this is done without the ajjijtance of our Will, but can-
not he effeted without a Providence.
H E third Caufe of thofe changes that happen
to the Animal Spirits, is the moft general and
moft atflive of all, becaufe it is that which produces*
maintains, and fortifies all the Paflions. To appre-
hend which well, it's necefTary that we know that
the fifth, fixth, and eighth pair of the Nerves, have
moft of their branches extended through the Breaft
and Belly, where they are very ufeful for the pre-
fervation of the Body, but extreamly dangerous to
the Soul, bccaufe the aiftion of thefe Nerves do not
depend upon the Will, as thofe do, which ferve to
move the Arms, Legs, and other external parts of the
Body, for they atft much more upon the Soul, than
that does upon them.
It muft therefore be confidef d, that rtiany branches
of the eight pair of the Nerves, caft themfelves
amongft the chief Fibres of all the Mufcks, which k
th$
1^1 Chap. V. A Starch after Trutlt,
the Heart ; that they encompafs irs OnSces, AuricleSj
> ul and Arteries j that they , fpread themi'elyes even in
its the fubftaice of the Lur gs, and fo^ by their difFeren|
motions, produce very confiderable^ .changes in the
BlOod ; Fprthe Nerves, which are difperild through
itinti the Fibres of the Heart, caufe ,ic fometimes to extend,
and then again to contrad, with too much force and
precipitancy, pufhing, with much violence, a great
quantity of Blood towards the Head, and all the ex^
ternai pans of tlie Body ; yer,, fometimes, thefe
Nerves produce an etfedl diredily contrary. And
the Nerves, vvhich eqcompafs the QriHces, x\uricles,
^ and Arteries of the Heart, caufc very near the fame
etfedl with thbfe Spiracles, or breathing Holes, with
which the Chymifts moderate the heat of their Fur-
naces ; and as the Spouts do, which are made u(e of
in Fountains, to diminilh or ena-cafe the iprce of the
1, ilream : For the ule of theie Keryes is divcrlly to
,()[fc contract, or dilate the Orifices of the ^^nd Id
itttl to haften or retard the filling, and evacuation of the
I, Tii Blood, and, thereby to augment or diminiih its hean
b Thus the Nerves, which dijlperfed through the
Lungs, have alfo the fanae ufe j for the Lungs ore
composed only of the Branches of the Wind-pipe, of
jjijjj the Venous Artery, and .Arteriotis Vein, inLcnvovcri
wit 0^2 with another; it is vihble that the NerveS, which
jp are extended throughout the whole fubilance, by con-
tradting of them, hinders the Air from paiFing .witli
lb much liberty through the branches of the Wjnci-.
rveiSfv pjp2> 2nd likewiie impedes the motion of .the Blood
through the Venous Artery ii^to the Arteridus V^ein,
and fo into the Heart. Thus .tbelB Nerves, accoiicK
,011} ^beir difier.enc agirauon, ftiil augment and di-
minifii the heat and maption of the Blood.
JO In all pur Pafilons, we have very fenfible Exp.eri-
ments of thefe difFcrem degrees of heat in our Hearts
Sometimes we feel ,it manifeftly encreafe ^nd diapnilh,
all of a fudden ; and as vve falfely judje ihaf our
iarions arc in the parts of our Bodies, and fo.-by that
means excite our Soul, as it w^s explained in the fiTft'
0i{ fo almoft rd.I cur Fluiofaphers have iningirledj,
' k "K' ■ tfiat
ijo
\l Of the
chav^e of
the Spirits
caused by
the Nerves
which go to
th- Livery
to the
Spleen, and
the rCjQ of
the Be in els.
A Search after Truth, Book H ^
that the Heart was the principal feat of the PaiBons of
the Soul s and this is ftill the moft cotemonry received
Opinion.
Now, becaufe the faculty 'of Imagming receives
great changes by what happens to the Animal Spirits,
and that the Animal Spirits dilfer very much, according
to the different fermentation of the Blood which is
made in the Heart, it is very eafie to difcover why
pafTionaie Perfons imagine things quite after another
manner, from thofe who confider them in cold
Blood.
The other Caufe, vv'hich contributes very much
either to the augmenting, or ditriinifhing thele extra-
ordinary fermentations of the Blood in the Heart,
coilfifts in the acSfion of' many other branches of the
Nerves, which we have already fpoke of.
Tbcfc branches fpread themlelves in the L/W,
which contains the moft fubtile part of the Blood, or
what is commonly called the ; and in the Sfleett,
which contains the more grofs or hieUnchdly in the
Pancreas-, which contains an acid Juice very proper
for fermentation ; In the Stomach, Bowels, and other
parts which contain the Chyle : And indeed, they are
difperfcd tlTrough every place w hich can contribd'te
any thing to the varying the fermentation of the Blood
in the Heart. Alfo, the Arteries and Veins are uni-
ted to thefe Netves, as WilUs has difcovered of the
lower Trunk of the great Artery, which is ty*d to
them near the Heart, of the Axillary Artery on the
right fide the P7nidge7it Vein, and of fome others.
Thus the ufe of the Nerves, being diverfly to a(fl
thofe parts to which they arc join'd, it is eafie to con-
ceivc how the Nerve,- which environs the Liver, may,
in contracting ir, caufe a great quantity of Bile to run
into the Veins, and into the Duif of the B;7e, which
being mingled with the Blood in the V^eins, and with
the Chyle, enters into the Heart through the Duct of
the Bile-, and there produces a more violent heat than
ordinary. :
' Thits, when we are mov'd with certain Paftions,
the Blood boils in the Arteries and Veins, and this
' heat
i§a
1
Chap. IV. A Search after Truth. 13 t
heat fpreads it felf through the whole Body ^ the Head
is inflamed, and filled with fo great a number of
Animal Spirits, which being too brisk, and too much
agitated by their impetuous courlbj hinder the Ima-
ginacion from reprefenting any (»thcr things, than
ihofe whofe Images they form in the Brain i that is,
from thinking of any other Objeds, befides thofe of
the Paffion which Rules.
It is the fame of the little Nerves that go to the
S/to, or to other parts, which canrain' a thicker
Matter, and lefs fulceptible of Heat and Motion ; it
renders the Imagination altogether languifhing and
dull, in cauling fome grofs Matter, and fuch as is
difScult to be put in Motion to run into the Blood.'
As for thpfe Nerves .whicH environ the Arteries and
Veins, their ufe is to hinder the Blood from paffing,
and by contradfing them, compel it to run into fuch
places as it finds the freeft paflage to: So that part of
the great Artery, which fuppjies all the parts above
the Heart with Blood, being connedled and corn-
prefTed by thefe Nerves, the Blood muft neceflarily
enter into the Head in great quantities, and this way
produce a change in the Animal Spirits; ^d, by con-
lequence, in the Imagination.
But it muft be well obferved, that all this is per- jjp
formed meerly by Mechanifm : I mean, that all the thefe
different Morions of thefe Nerves, in all the different hap-
Paflions, are not produced by the Command of the Concur ^
Will, but, on the contrary, are made without, nrry, rente of our
even contrary to its Orders: So that a Body, whofe ('y
Soul is not fo well difpofed as that of a hcakhful
Man, fhall be capable of all the Motions which ac-
company our Pa/Tions. Thus even Beafts may have
the like, altho' they Ihould be only"pure Machines."'
And, indeed, this ought to make us admire the
incomprehenfible Wifdom of him, whQ' hat^^ fo well
ordered all thefe Springs, that it. is fufjicient for an
Objecft to move the Optick Nerve after fuch and fugh
a manner, to produce fo many different Morions in
the Hegrtjthe other parts of the Body, and even in the
Face it felf j for it hath lately been difcotered} that
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jz A Search after Truth. Book II,
the kmc Nerve, which extends fome of its branches
inro the Heart, and into the other interior parts ; alfo
communicates feme of its branches to the Eye, to the
Mouth, and to the,other parts of the Face: So that it
cannot raifeany Paflion within us, but it alfo appears
outwardly, becaufe there can no motion happen to
the branches which go to the Heart, but it alio com-
municates it felf to fome one of thofe which are dif-
perfed through the Face.
The Correfpondence and Sympathy which is found
between the Nerves of the Face, and fome others
that anfwer to other parts of the Body, and which
wa.nt a Name, is yet more remarkable, and that
'which produces this great Sympathy, is, that (as in the
.other Paflions) the little Nerves that go to the fact,
are only branches of that which defcends lower.
When we are furprized with any violent Pa/!ion,
• if we carefully refledt upon what we feel in our Bow-
els, and the other parts of the Body, where thefp
Nerves infold them (elves, as alfo upon the changes
which accompany it in the face, and if we confider
that all thefe diverfe agitations of our Nerves are
wholly involuntary, and that they happen notwith-
Handing all the refiftance our Will can make againft
them, we lhall not find it fo difHcuIt, to fuffer oni*
felves to be perfwaded of this plain Expofition that
has been made, of all thofe Relations the Nerves have
one to another.
But if we examine the reafons.and end of all thefe
things, we fiiall find therein lo much Order and Wif-
dom, that but a little ferious attention will be requi-
- ' lite to convince thofe Perfons,that are the moft Wed-
ded to Ej)lcuru$ and LiicretiuSy that there is a Provi-
"dence which rules the World. When I fee a Watch,
I have reafon to conclude that there is an Intelligence,
"fince it is impofiibie that Chance fhou'd have produc'd
' and difperfed all its Wheels inro order. How then
can it be poflible, that Chance, and the meeting to-
\gerherof Atoms, (hoifd be able fo juftly, and proper-
'tionably, todifpofeali thofe divers Springs, as appear
^ both in Man, and other Animals ? And xhat Man,
■ / —
N..
! ull
•4 r -
Chap. 1, A Search after Truth. i j 5
and all other living Creatures, ftiou'd beget others,
which bear fuch an abfolute refemblance to them ?
So it is ridiculous to think, or fay, with Lucretm^
that tis Chance that has formed all the parts whereof
Man is compofed; that the Eyes were not made to
fee, but Men were induced to fee, becaufe they had
Eyes, and fo of the other parts of the Body. Thele -
are his Words:
Lumina ne facias oculortim clara creata
Profpicere ttt pojjimm^ (3 tit proferre viai
Procerat fajfus, idea fafiigia ppffe
S»r| r$m ac femimm pedibm fundata plicari.
Brachia turn pcrro validis cxapta lacertu ^
EJfy manuf(piic dam titraqiie ex parte minijlras
Ut facere ad vitam poffmuu ^uxforet ufu;
Ccetera de genere hoc inter qiueciimque pretantur
Omnia perverfa prccpoflera funt ratione.
Nil idea natidejl in nojiro corpore ut uti
PcJJimuSi fed quod natum eft id procreat ufum.
Muft not one have a ftrange averfion for a Provi-
dence, thus voluntarily to be blinded for fear of
kiiowjedging it, and endeavour to render our felveS
infenfible to proofs fo ftrong and convincing, as thofe
that Nature has furnifhed us with ? It is true, that if
once we come to afFedf being thought great Wits, or
rather Impious, as the Epicuhans have done, we fliall'
immediately find our felves furrounded with darknefe,
and perceive only by falfe Lights, boldly deny thofe
things that are moil clear, and arrogantly and ma-
gifterioufly affirm what is moft falfe and obfcure.
This Poet may ferve for a proof of the blindnefs of
thefe mighty Wits, for he boldly determines, tho*
contrary to all appearance of Truth, upon the moft
difficult and obfcure Queftions; and it feems, that he
did not perceive even thofe Idea's that are mofi: clear
and evident. If I Ihou'd (lay to relate fome more
paffages of this Author, to juftifie what I fay, I ihou'd
make too long and tedious a digrefidon ; altho' it may
be permitted to make fuch reflediOhsf as may for a
^ K 3 moment
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Plt:-::l3
134
I. Of the
Mimory,
A Search after Truth. Book II.
moment divert the Mind from more cflential Truths,
yet is it never permihed to make Inch digrefiibns, as
for a confiderable time take off the Mind from giving
attention to the moft important Subjcdfs, to apply it
to trivial thinns.
CHAP. V.
I. of the Memory, II. Of HahitK"
*
\1^E have already explained the general Caufes, as
well external as internal, which produce any
change in the Animal Spirits 5 and by cohfequence, in
the faculty of Imagining, wt have (how'd that the
external are the Food Which nounfhes us, and the Air
we breath j and that the internal confifts in the invo-
luntary agitation of chrtaih Nerves. "We know of
no other general Caufes, and even dare affirm there
are none. So that the faculty of Imagining depending,
in relpecf to the Body, only upon thefe two things,
the Anirhal Spirits, arid the difpofition of the Brain
upon which they adl, there remains nothing more, in
order to the giving a perfe(51: knovt ledge of the Irna-
gination, but ohly to fheW th,e different changes thaf
can happen in the fubftance of the Brain.
We wnll examine them, after we have given feme
Idea oFVhe Merriory, and of Habits 5 that is, of the
faculty that we have of chinking of thofe things that
we have Before thought of, and of ading things over
again which we have already done. Order requires
this Method. .
For the Explanation of the Memory, 'tis hecelfary^
to remember what has already beeh repeated fo ma-
ny times i. that all du'r (different Pefceptfons depenid
upon the changes that hi^pen''to thofe Fib]^es that are
in that paVt of flie Brain in Which the SquI more
pkfticuiarly fe^des.
' ■" This
chap- V. A Search after TrutL
This only fappofed, the nature of the Memory is
explained j far even as the Branches of a Tree, which
liave continued fometime bent in a certain term, ftili
preferve an aptitude to be bent anew after the fame
manner : So the Fibres of the Brain, having once re-
chived certain inapredions by the courfe of the Animal
Spirits, aPid by the adlion of Objedls, along.time re^
tain fame facility to receive thefe fame difpoiitions.
Now the Memory confifts only in this facility, fince
we think on the fame things, when the Brain receives
the fame impreifions.
As the Animal Spirits adl fometimes with more,
and fometimes with lefs force, upon the fubftance of
the Brain, and that fenfible Objedls make a much
greater impreiHon than the Imagination alone, it is
eafle, from thence, todifcaver why we do not equally
remember all things we perceive. For example, why
what one often perceives, is commonly reprefented
more lively to the Soph than what one perceives but
once or twice; why we remember more diftindliy
whfit we have feen, than what we have only ima-
ginedand fo likewife, why one fliou'd know better
how the Veins are difperfed through the Liver, after
having but once feen a diiTedlion of this part, than af-
ter having many times read in a Book of Anatomy,
and other like things.
But if We Ihou'd reded: upon what hath been be-
fore laid of the Imagination, and the (hort difcourfe
made on the Memory, fuppoGng us once delivered
from this prejudice, that our Brain is too fmall to
prefer-ve a very great number of traces and impref-
ixons, we fliall have the pleafure to dilcovcr the
caufe of all thefe furprizing effeds of the Memoryj
whereof St. Aufiine fpeaks with lb much admiration in
his tenth Book of Confeflions. We (hail not explain
thefe things more fully, becauie'twill be more proper
for every one to examine th:m himfelf with fame ap-
plication of Mind, becaufe fuch things as we difcov^r
by this Method, are always more agreeable, ^nd make
a deeper impredSon on us, than what we leacn from
' others. .'
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136' A Search after Truth, . Bocyk 11^
il. Of the 1(1 order to explain Habits, it is neceflary to
U,ibi,s, I^novv the manner how we believe the Soul moves
thofe pans of the Bodies to vvhkh it is united.
According to rdl appearance, there is always in
cenain places 01 the Btain, be they where they will,
af great number of Animal Spirits, much agitated by
the heat or tne Heart from whence they come,and are
ready toruninco thole plactgmto which they find free
pafiage. All th-6 Nerves end in the receptacle of
tiideSpirits, and the. Son 1 bath, the * power of deter-
mining their Alotion, and conducting them by thefc
fowtr con- Netves into ail the Muicles oi the Body; thefeSpi-
Jijis, fits being entered there, they fwell ihem up, and by
cpnlequence contraCi: them.' Xhus they move thole
parts to which the Aiulclcs are united.
VvX Ihrdl not . find it lb di^cuit to be perfwadedj
that the Soul moves the Body after the fame manner
already explained, if weobierve, that when we have
been a lo.ng time without Eating, and are willing to
give certain motions to our Bodies, we cannot eSedi
it, and even feel it very trouhlefomc to ftand npon
Qur feet. But if we find the means to make any thing,
that is very fpiritous, run into our Heart, as Wine,
Or fome other like Nourilhment, we are fbon fcnfible
that the Body, obeys with much more facility, and
moves It felf after what manner we deiirerFor this Ex-
perimeht alone makes it fecm very plain to me. That
the Soul could - not, give Motion to the Body through
the defcd: of Animrai Spirits, and that his by their
means that it hdh recovered its Fmpire over it.
Now the infations of the Muicles are fo vilible,
and fo fenfible, in the agitation of our Arms, and all
, the parts of our Bbd'y, and it is fo reafcnablc to be-
.Jieve that thefe .Muicles cannot be blown up, but be-
cahfe fome body ehVers into them, even as a Foor-bail
• ijannct grow big and turgid, except by the Admiirion
-of Air, ox foiuefvch 1 ike-thing : E feems, I fay, that
'.there can remain ho doubt, but that the Animal Spi-
'jTiti are pudied.from the Brain, through the Nerves
in^b the,MufcIeSi to Blow them..up, and to produce
there all the Alotions that we can wjfh; for a Mufcle
Dein
, l!
Chap. "V. A Search after Truth.
being full it is necciTarily fhorter then if it was enipty,
fo it draws and moves the part to which it is united,
as we may Ice more at large in b'Cartes Book of the
PaJJions. We don't give this Explanation as perfe(flly
demonftrated in all its parts: For to make it entirely
evident, there are Itill many things to be wifh'd,which
'tis aJmoft impoflible to explain. But it is alio ufeful
enough in our lubjedt to know them ; for whether
this Explanation be true or falfe, it remains however
equally ufeful to difcover the Nature of Habits: Be-
caufe if the Soul does not move the Body after this
manner, it nccelfahly moves it fome other way which
is very like it, from whence we may draw fuch con-
fequences as we fhall make ufe of.
But in order to the purfuing our Explanation, it
muft be obferved, that the Spirits do not always find
the ways fo open and free by which they fhouid pals,
and that makes us, for example, fometimes have fo
much difficulty in the moving our Fingers fo quick as
is necelTary for the playing upon Mliucal Inftruments^
or the Mtifcles that ferve for pronounciattooi to pro-
nounce the word of a ftrange tongue. But by little
and little the Animal Spirits by their continual courfe
open and clear thefe paflages, fo that in time one
finds no longer refinance. Now Habits confift in this
facility, that the Animal Spirits have to pafs through
the Aiembers of our Bodies.
It is very cafe, according to this Explanation, to
refolvc an infinite Number of queftions which refpedl
Habits : As for Example, why Children are more
capable of acquiring new Habits then older Perfons
are ? Vv'hy it is fo difficult to break our felves of long
habits ? Why Men by much fpeaking have acquired
fo great a facility to it, that they pronounce their
words with an incredible fwiftnels, and even without
thinking thereof. As it too often happens to thofc
that lay the Prayers which they have been accuftomcd
to many years, and yet to pronounce one word only,
many Mufcles muft moVe together, in a certain rime,
and order, as ihofc of the Tongue, the Lips, Throat,
aiid Diaphragme, But one cannot with a little Mer
ditation
*37
iP:
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m
1
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ft.
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fKi
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I jSr A Search after Tritth. Book II.,
dkation fatisfie ones felf about thefe quefti^and manY
others very curious and ufeful, but it is not necchatY
to inlift upon thefe things here.
It is vihble from what has been faid, that there is
much relation between the Memory and Habits, and
that in one fenfe the Memory may pafs for a kind
Habit. For even as Corporeal Habits conlift in the
facility that the Spirits Iiave acquired to pafs through
certain places of our Bodies, fo the Memory confiits
in the traces that the fame Spirits liave imprelled on
the Brain which are the caufes of the facility we have
in recalling things again to our Mind : That if there
were no perceptions that depended upon the Courfe
of the Animal Spirits, nor on thefe traces, there would
be no difference between the Memory, and the other
Habits. It is not alfo more diflicult to conceive that
Beafts, although without a Soul and incapable of any
perception, after their manner remember fuch things
as have . made an imprclfion in their Brain, then to
conceive they are capable of acquiring different Ha-
See the^ Ex- • A^i-ftfter what I have faid of Habits, I don't
uponZTtL- difficulty in reprefenting to our felvcs
ry and Sw- how the Members of their Bodies may. by degrees ac*
ritual Ha- quire different Habits, then in conceiving how a Ma-
chine firft made is not fo fitly difpofed for Action, as
after k has been ufcd for Ibme time.
I- ' '/I ^ . U ■' IJ" I'l' I j I.
CHAP,
chap. V. A Search after Truth.
CHAP. VI,
I. That the Fibres of the 'Brain are not fithje^ to fuch
^uick^Changes as the Spirits are. II. Three differ en f
Chstnges in the three different Ages,
A LL the Parts of Living Bodies are in conrinyal
Morion, both the Solid and Fluid parts, the Flelh
as well as the Blood; there is only this difference
between their Motiohs, that that of the parts of the
Blood is vi(ible and lenfible, and that of the Fibres of
our Flelh is wholly imperceptible. There is then this
difference between the Animal Spirits, and tlie fub-
ftance of the Brain, that the Animal Spirits are very
much agitated, and very fluid, and the fubftance
of the Brain hath fome Solidity and G)nliftence; lb
that tlie Spirits divide themfelves into little parts, and
in a few hours are didipated by tranfpiration through
the Pores of thole Veffels that contain tiiem, and it
very often happens that others fucceed which do nor
perfectly refemble them ; but the Fibres of the Brain
are not fo ealily diiTipated, there does not often hap-
pen any confide table Change in them, and their whole
iubftance cannot be changed bur after many years.
The molV confiderable differences that are found
in a Man's Brain, during the whole Courfe of his
Life, are in Infancy, at his full Strength, and in Old
Age.
The Fibres of the Brain in -Children are loft, flexi-
ble, and delicate, in pcrfcdf Age they become more
dry, hard, and ftrong bur in Old Age, they become
wholly inflexible, grols, and fometimes mingled with
fuperfluous humours, that the feeble heat of this Age
cannot be any longer diliipated.For as we fee theFibres
which compofe the flelh harden in time, and that the
Fkft
it
110:!!#
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146 Search after Truth. Book If.
Flefh of a young Partridge is without difpute more
tender than that of an old one, fo the Fibres of the
Brain of a Child or Youth, wiJI be much more fofc
and delicate, than thofe of Peribns that are more ad-
vanced in years.
We ihalt foon fee the rcafon of thefe Changes, if
we but confider how thefe Fibres are continually agi-
tated by the Animal Spirits which run round about
thpni ill rnany different ways. Fgr as the Wind drys
the Earth by blowing upon it, lb the Animal Spirits,
through their continual agitation, by little and little
render the greateft part of the Fibres of Man's Brain
more dry, compreiled, and folid; fo that Perfons a
little advanced in Years will almofl always have them
more inflexible, then thpfe that are Younger. And
for thofe that are of the fame Age, as Drunkards
who for many years have ufed Wine to Exccis, or
fuch Liquors as have been able to flupifie them,
will alfb have them more folid and more inflexible
then fuch as are deprived of thofe Drinks during their
whole Lives.
Now the different Conftitutions of the Brain in
Children, Men at full growth, and old Men, are very
confiderable Caufes of the difference that is obferved
in their faculty of Imagining, of which we fhall af-
tcrwards fpeak.
' r. 'J'-fh
■ \'n -r, ' ; •
hfM ^ -'
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.itflir 't:
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CHAP.
ii.r'-
chap. VII. A Search after truth.
141
CHAP. VII.
L Of the Communication which i between the Brain of
a Motheri and that of her Child, IL Of the Corrr
munication that is between our $rain^ and the other
farts of our Body^ which carries us to Imitation and
Comfajfwn. III. An Exflandtion of the generation
of Monjlrous Childreny and of the Profagaticn of the
Species. IV. Some Irregularities of the Mind., and
Jome Inclinations of the Pf^ll explained. V. Of Conr-
cupijcence and Original Sin, VL Ohje^ions and
Anfwers.
i
TT is fufficicntly cvinlcnt to me, that we incline to
all things, and that we have a Natural relation to
every thing about us that is moft ufeful for the Pre-
fervation and convenicncy of Life. But thefe relati-
ens are not equal , we are mofe inclined to France
than to China., to the Sun, than to any Star, and to
our own Houfe more than to our Neighbours. I'hero
are invfible ties which unite us more ftridly to Alen
than to Beafts j to our Relations and Friends than to
Strangers; to thole we depend upon for the prefer-
ration of our Lives, than fuch from whom we neichei:
fear nor hope any thing.
What is chiefly to be obferved in this Natural U-
nion which is between us and other Men is, that 'tis
fo much the greater as we have more need of ihem.
Relations and Friends are ftridtly United one to ano-
ther, we may fay their Griefs and Miferies are Com"^
mon, as vveil as their Joys and Happinels; for all
the Paflions and Scnfations of our Friends are com-
municared to us by the impredion of their afpedl and
air of their Face. Yet becaufe we cannot abfolutely
live without them, there is alfo another ftridler Oni-
On then that Natural and Alutual one which is be-
twixt us and thern*
GHildreR
I. of the
Com muni'
sat ion
vohichif he
ttoeen the
•• --jr-T w -
ji Search after Truth. Boc^^ H.
Children in their Mothers Bellies, whofe Bodies
are not yet entirely formed, who are of themfelves
in as weak and helplefs a condition as can be con-
ceived, muft alio be united :wiuh their Mothers in the
MotLrand manner that can be imagined. And altho
that of a ■ their Souls are feparated from their Mothers, yet
Child, their Bodies being linked together, we muft think
they have the fame Senfations and Paffions ; and in-
deed the fame thoiighcs which are excited in the Soul
by the motions that are produced in the Body.
Thus Infants lee what their Mothers fee, they hear
, the fame Crys, receive the fame impreftions of Ob-
jedls, and are agitated with the fame Pajlions. For
,hnce the air of a palTionate Mans face, penetrates thole
who look upon him, and naturally imprints in them
a palTion like that which agitates him, although the
Union of the Man with thofe that conlider him is
'hot fo great; it feems reafbnable to me to think that
''Mothers are capable of impreffing upon their Chil-
dren ail the fame Senfations they are alfeifled with,
and all the fame paffions by which they are agitated.
For the body of an Infant makes but one with that
of the Mothers, the Blood and Spirits are common to
'both, and Senfations and Paffions are the Natural
Conlequence of the Motion of the Spirits and Blood,
which Motions ncceffirily Communicate themfelves
from the Mother to the Child. Therefore the paffi-
ons'fenfations, and generally all the thoughts which
proceed from the body, are common both to the
Mother and Child.
Thefe things appear unqneftionable for many rea-
fbns, and I advance them only here as a fuppolition
agreeable to my thoughts, but lhall fuSiciently de-
monftrate them hereafter: For whatloever hypothe-
hs can refolve all difficulties that can be brought a-
gainft it, ought to pals for an unqneftionable prin-
tiple.
The invilible bonds, by which the Author of Nature
unites all thele Works, are worthy the Wifdom of
Cod, and admiration of Men, there is nothing that's
both more furprizir.g and inftru(51:ive together; but we
think
t
[lU-
r-,!:
Vll. IA Search after Truth.
think not of it; we fufFer our felves to be condu(^ed
without confiderihg who it is that condu<3:s «s. Na-
iure is hidden frOm us as well as its Author, and we
feel the Motions which Ihe produces in tis, without
confidering the Caufes of 'em ; yet are there few
things more neceffary to be known, for 'tis upon their
knowledge that the Explanation of whacfoever be-
longs to Man depends.
There are certainly fprings in Our Brain which Na-
rurally incline iis io Imitation, for it is very neceffaiy
to Civil Society. It' is not only requifite that Chil-
dren (hould belie^^e their Fathers, Difciptes ^iheir
Mafters, and Inferiors thofewhich ate above them;
for all Men muft hate Ibme difpolition to take the
fame manners, and^to do the fame adiions with thofe
they live with. To unite Men together there muft be
a refemblance both of Body and Mind; this'is the
principle of an infinite Number of things that we fhall
afterwards treat of, but for what we ftall f^ak bf in
this Chapter, it is neceffary that we know there is
Natural difpolitions in the'Brain which incline trs to
CompafiTion as well as Imitation.
' We muft then confider, that not only the Animal
Spirits carry themfelves Naturally into the parts of
our Bodies, to caufe the fame Adlions arid Morions
we lee in others, but alfo in Ibme manner to receive
their Injuries, and to take part in their Miferies; for
Experience teaches us, that when we very arrenrrVely
confider any one that is rudely hurt, or that hath any
great wound, the Spirits are carried with great force
into fuch parts of our Bodies as anfwer to thole'that
we fee hurt in another: Provided that we do not
turn the courfc of the Animal Spirits otherways, by
an indnftrious and voluntary ti'tillation of fome other
part of the body; Or except their Natural courfero
the Heart and Bowels, which is wont to happen*in
fudden Motion<s, draw them along wich it felfi or
change that courfe which We fpeak of: Or kftlyV-ex-
cept fome extraordinary connedfion with the rraces of
the Brain, and Motions of the Spirits produce the
fame elfed,
The
'43
1)1
II. 0/ the
ComwMnt-
cation ther€
is betxoeen
our Brain
and the
other parts
of our bodies
which in-
(lines us tt
Imitation
and Com-
pajjion.
/.!
A Search after Truth, Book If-
The Spirits being thus carried into the parts of ths
Body whuch anfwer to thofe that we fee hurt in o-
others, make a very fenfible ImprefTion in delicate
Perfons who have a lively Imagination, and very ten-
dcr.and ibfc flelh; for they very often feel a kind of
trembling in their Legs, if they attentively look upon
any one chat hath an Ulcer, or that has atftually re-
ceived fome blow there. This that one of my Friends
writ me an account of, confirms my Opinion. An
Old Man that lived at one of my Sifters being Jick^-, a
young Maid-Servant of the Houje held the Candle whilft
he was let blood in the Foot^ and when floe faw the Sur-
geon give the pricks with the La?icet^ fhe was fei:{ed with
fueh an apprehenftoni that fte felt fo lively a pain in the
fame place of the Foot for three cr four days afterwards^
that foe was forced to keep her Bed all that time. The
realbn of thefe accidents is, that the Spirits forcibly
dilfufing themfelves into thofe parts of our body,which
anfwer to what we fee hurt in others, being kept
more bent they make the Soul more fenfible, and put
it upon its guard, to avoid thofe evils that it ikes
happen to others.
This CompafiTion in the Body, produces one in the
Mind, it excites us to help and aflift others, becaule
in that we relieve our felves; and it alfo flops our
Malice and Cruelty ; for the horrour of Blood, the
fear of Death, and in a word, the fenfible imprefil-
on of CompafTion, often hinders thofe from killing of
Beafts, who even are much perfwaded that they are
only Machines, bectufe the generality of Mankind
cannot kill rhem without hufttng themfelves by the
counterftroke of Gompafilon.
What is chiefly to be obferved here, is, that the fen-
fible fight of a wound that any Perfbn receives, pro-
duces in thofe that fee it another hurt, fo much the
rnore fenfible as .the beholder is more weak and deli-
cate, becAufe this fenfible fight pulhes the Animal Spi-
nts with more violence into thofe parts of the .body
which anfwer to what they fee hurt, and fb make a
greater ImpreiTion in the Fibres of a delicate body,
than in one that is more flrong and robuft*
-iSLliliV'
' 'A'V o'"
_ - 4 ^ *r>-% ■• . •. .»...,♦ ^ _
Chap.VIL A Search after Truth*. 14^
>
So Men, who are ftrong and vigorous, are not hurt
by the light ot a Mui der, thc^' are not fo much in-
clined to CompaiTion, becaule this fight offends their
Bodies,but becaufe it offends their Realbn. Thele Per-
louS have no pity for Criminals, they are immoveabie
and inexorable. But Women and Children fufiermuch
Pain by the Wounds they fee others receive ^ they
have a Mecanical Compairion for the Miferable j Nay,
they cannot fee a Dog beat, or hear him cry, with-
out being difturbed at it.
As for Infants who are yet in their Mothers Belly,
the delicacy of the Fibres of theif Flefli, being infi-
nitely greater than that of Women or Children, the
Courfe of the Spirits will produce more confiderable
changes in ihetp, as we Ihail afterwards obferve.
Let what I have faid be look'd upon as a fimplc
Suppolition, if it is defired j yet we muft endeavour
to comprehend it well, if we will diftindfly conceive'
what I would explain in this Chapter. For the two
Suppolicions that I have made are the principles of
an inlkiire Number of things, which have been gene-*
. rally believed very hidden and myfterious, and which
appear impoffibleto me to be explained, without re-
ceiving thefe Suppofitrons; Of which here are ibnri^
Examples.
About Seven or Eight years ago I faw in the * Tnr * m Hojpis
curables a young Man who was born a Fool, and liis
body broken after the fame manner as Criminals are
broke on the Wheel. He had lived near twenty p^fi Cure.
Years in this condition, many Perfons havefcen him, ^If fix-
and the late Qnecn-Mother going to vifit this Hofpi-
tal had the Curiofity to fee him, and to touch the
Arms and Legs of this young Man in the fame places Chih
where they were broke. dyn and
According to the principles that I haVe efta- pf^tiTn^of
blilhed, the Caiife .of this fad Accident was, that the Species^
his Mother, wht) heard a Criminal was to be
broken, went to fee him executed^ all the blows
that this miferable Man received, fo llrongly fmore »jc(;oydtf*
the Imagination of this Mother, and by a kind to the firfl
4>f Go»nt§r~blovv the tender delicate Brain of her Shppofihe?i;
M-i'- «
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14(5 A Semh ^kr 7ruth, Book II.
Child. The Fibres of this Womans Brain were
ftrangely fhaken, and it may be broke in ibme places
by the impetuous Courfe of the Animal Spirits, caufed
by the fight of fo terrible an Adion, but Ihe was
ftrong enough to hinder their abfolute ruine;
though on the contrary, the Fibres of this Child's
Brain, being not able to refill the torrent of thefe
Spirits, were entirely dilTipared, and the Ihock was
great enough to make him wholly lole his Wits 5 and
this was the reafon he came into the World deprived
of his Underftanding, this was likewife the caule that
the fame parts of his body was broken as thofe of
the Criminal, whom his Mother faw executed.
At the fight of this Execution, which was fo capa-
ble of frighting a Woman, the violent courfe of the
Mothers Animal Spirits, went impetuoully from her
Brain to all the parts of her Body, which anfwer'd
* Acceding to thofe of the Criminal, * and the fame thing paffed
tothejecond in the Infant. But becaufe the Bones of the Mother
Suppofi, on, a[)]e rgfift the Violence of thefe Spirits, they
received no hurt; Nay, it may be, Ihe did feel no pain,
nor the leaft trembling in her Legs, when the Crimi-
nal was broken; but the rapid itream of the Spirits
was capable to feparate the foft and tender Booes of
the Infant, for the Bones are the laft parts of the Body
that are formed, and they have very little confillence
in Infants, while they are in the Womb : And it mufl
be obferved, that if this Mother had determined the
Motion of thefe Spirits to any other part of her Body
by fome violent titilation, her Child would not ha.ve
had his Bonels broken,butthat part which had anfwer'd
to that to which the Mother determined thefe Spirits,
had been much hurt, as I have already faid.
The Reafons of this accident may ferve to explain
in general how Women, who during their being with
Child, upon feeing Perfons with certain Marks in
their Faces, imprint the fame on their Children, and
in the. fame part of the Body, And from thence we
may judge that advice very reafonable, which bids
'em touch ibme hidden part of the Body, when they
perceive any thing which furprizes 'em, and when
' * ' they
It
T
• 3 'HJB, ^
Chap. VII. A Search after Truth.
they are agitated with any violent Pa/Ilon, .for that
may caufe the Marks to be traced rather upon theie
hidden parts, than upon the Face of their Infants.
We Ihould often have inftances like to what I have
now related, if Infants could live after having re^
ceived fuch great Wounds, but generally it caufes
Abortions. For we may conclude, that almoft all
Infants who dye before they are born, except they be
(ick, have no other caufe of their Death than a fright,
fome ardent delire, or feme other violent paffion of
their Mothers. Here is alfo another very particular
inftance.
*Tis not above a Year fince, that a Woman having
with too much application conlidef d the Pidlure of
Saint P/«f (when the Feaft of his Canonization was
celebrated,) was brought to bed of a Child which
was perfedly like the Reprelentation of this Saint.
He had the Face of an Old Man, as much as it was
poflible in an Infant that has no Beard, his Arms were
eroded upon his Breaft, his Eyes turned towards Hea-
Ven, and he had a very low Forehead, becaufe the
Image of this Saint being raifed towards the Vault
of the Church, and looking towards Heaven, had ab
moft no Forehead like wife. He had a kind of a con-
fufed Miter upon his Shoulders, with many round
marks in the places where Miters are covered with
Stones : And indeed this Child very much refembled
the Pi(5lure by which his Mother had formed him
through the power of her Imagination. *Tis a thing
that all might have feen as well as I, becaufe
'twas a long time preferved in Spirits of Wine.
This inftance is the more particular, becaule there
was not the light of *a Man living, and agitated with
fome palfion, who moved the Spirits and Blood of the
Mother to produce fo ftrange an effedf, but only the
fight of a Pidture i which yet was very fenfible and
accompanied with a great emotion of Spirits, caufed
either through the Zeal and application of the Mo-
ther, or through the agitation that the noife of the
Feaft had produc'd in her,
147
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'•''.Hi'
148 A Search after Truth, Book II.
This Mother therefore looking upon this Pidure
with lofiic application and emotion of Spirits, the
Child, according to the hrft fuppolition, faw it as (he
did with the fame application and emotion of Spirits.
The Mother being lively affeded imitated him at
leaft in the Poiture, according to the lecond Suppofi- '
tion, for her body being entirely formed, and the Fi-
bres of her Fleih hard enough to relift the courfe of
the Spirits, (he could not imitate or make her felf
like to him in all things ; but the Fibres of the In-
fant's Fkfh being extreamly foft, and conlequently
fulceptible of all forts of impreflions, the violent
courfe'of the Spirits, produced in his Fk(h whatfoe-
ver was neceflary to make him entirely like the Image
that he faw, and the imitation to which Children are
much more dil'pofed, perfeded it as much as jx)(riblei
,but this imitation having given to the body of this
Child a figure fo very extraordinary, it was alfo the
caufe of its Death.
There are* many other Examples in xAiUthors, of the
power of the Imagination of Mothers, and there is no-
thing (b fantaitical but has caufed Abortions fome-
times. For they not only make Children deformed,
but alfo marked with fuch Fruits as they have longed
for, as Plumbs, Pears, Grapes, and fuch like things.
For inifance, fome Mothers having a ftrong Inclina-
tion to eat Pears, the Children imagine and delite them
with the fame ardour, and the courfe of the Spirits
excited by the image of this defired fruit, diipofing it
felf through the little body, is able to change its
figure, becaufe of its ibfcneis: So that tbefe poor
Children become like thole things they wi(h*d for
Vvith fo much ardour. But the Mothers fuffer no In-
jury, becaufe their bodies are not loft enough to take
the figure cf fuch things as they imagine: Thus they
cannot imitate them, or render themfelves entirely
like 'em.
Now, it muft not be imagined that this Correfpoir-
dence that I have explained, and which is fometimes
the caule of fuch great diforder, is ulelefs or ill or-^»
dered by Nature > for on the contrary, it feeins very
ufeful
chap. VII. J Search after Truth,
ufeful in the Propagation of Humane Bodies, or in
the formation of the Iccstm i and it is ablolutely ne-
cclfary to the tranfmitting certain difpofitions of the
Brain, which ought to be ditferent, at different times>
and in different Countrys. For inhance, it is rcqui-
fite in fome Countrys that Lambs Ihould have their
Brainrfb'dirpored as to hy at the fight of a WoJf, be-
caule there are many of 'em there, and they have a
great deal to fear from them.
'Tis true, that this Communication of the Mothers
Brain with her Infants, has fometimes illconfequences,
when the Mothers fuffer themfelves to be furprizcd
by any violent pafiion. Yet it feems to me, that
without this Communication Women and Animals
could not eafily beget young ones of the fame kind i
for although fome realon might be given of the for-
mation of the Foetm in general, as D'Cartes has hap-
pily enough attempted : However 'tis very difficult,
without this Communication of the Mothers Brain
with the Childs, to explain how a Mare fiiould not
beget an Ox, or an Hen lay an Egg which contains a
little Partridge, or lome Foul of a new kind ; I be-
lieve thofe that have confidered the formation of the
FcptuSy will be of this opinion.
The moft reafonable thought, and that which is
moft conformable to experience about this difficult
qiieftion of the formation of the is, that Chil-
dren are perfedfly formed, even before the adlion by
which they are conceived, and that their Mothers only
contribute to their groavth whilft they continue in the
Womb. However, this Communication of Animal
Spirits, and of the Mothers Brain with the Spirits and
Brain of the Child, feems ftill ferviccable to regulate
this growth, and determine the parts which fervc far
its Nourilfimenr, and by little and little to dii'pofc the
Child like the Mother, or elfe like lome of the lame
Species. This appears plain enough by the accidents
which happen when the Imagination ot the Mother
is dilbrdered, and the Natural Dilpontion of her
Brain is changed by fome violent paffio i, fir then, as
we have already exphin'd, this ccmmiini auonch.rges
L 3 the
149
Fl
ilil
• r I* ■
4 • 1
A Search after Truth. Book II.
the conformation of the body of the Child, and the
]\lother is fo much the more apt to miicarry of the
the Fcem^ as it has more refemblance to the defired
Fruits, and as the Spirits find lefs reliflance in the Fi-
brcs of the Infants body. *
Now it cannot be deny'dj but that God, without
this Communication, was able to have difpofed ail
things in fo exadt and regular a manner, as Vv^ould have
been neceiiary for the Propagation of the Species for
infinite Ages, that Mothers ihould never have Mifcar-
ried, and even that they lliould always have had
Children of the fame bignefs, of the fame Colour,
and that would have refembled in all things: For we'
muft notmeafure the power of God by our weak Ima-
gination, and we know not the Reaibns he had in the
conftrudhion of his work.
We fee every day that without the help of this
Communication, Plants and Trees produce their kinds
regularly enough, and that Fowls and many other
Animals have no need of it to cherilh and bring forth
other Animals, when they fit upon Eggs of different
kinds, as when a tien fits on a Partridges Eggs. For
although we.may rcafonably conclude that the Seeds
and Eggs contain in themfelvcs the Plants and Birds
which proceeds from 'em; and that they may produce
the little bodies of thefe Birds, having received their
Conformation by the Communication we have fpoke
of, and the Plants theirs by another Equivocal Com-
munication, yet we cannot be certain of it. But al-
though we cannot difcover the reafons why God has
made every thing as it is, wemuft not conclude from
thence, that he could make 'em no othcrwirc.
If we confider further, that Plants who receive
their growth by the adlion of the Female Plant, re-
feinble her much more thaji thofe which come from
the feed, as Tuleps for inftance, which come from
the Root, are of the fame Colour as the Tulep it felf,
and yet thofe that proceed from the Seed thereof, are
almoit very different, we cannot doubt, that if the
Communication of the Female Plant with the Fruit, is
nor abfolutelj' neceffary to form the fame kind, yet it
Cliap.VlI. A Search after Truth.
is always requifite to make the Fruit intireiy like
her.
So that although God forefaw that this Commu-
nicarion of the Mothers Brain with that of the
Infants, would fometimcs delfroy the Foetus, and pro-
duce Monfters, becaiife of the Irregularity of the Mo-
thers imagination ; yet this Communication is fo ad-
mirable^, and fo necelfary, for the Reaibns before-
mentioned, and for many others that I could yet add,
that this knowledge,that God had of thefe incoavencies,
ought not to have hindred him from executing his
deiign. We may fay in one fenfe, that God never
had a defign to make Monfters, for it appears evident
to me> that if God Ihould create one Animal enly, it
would not be Monftrous. But defigning to produce
an admirable w^ork by the moft limplc ways, and
unite all thefe Creatures one to another, he forefaw
certain effedts that would necelTarily follow from the
Order and Nature of things, and this hath not diverted
him from his defign: For,although a Monfter, fimply
confidered,be an imperfedt work, yet when it is joyn'd
with the reft of the creatures, it does not render the
World imperfedl.
We have fufEciently e:^plain'd what power the Ima-
gination of a Mother has over the body of her Child,
let us now examine the power it hath over its Mind,
and that way difcover the firft Irregularities of the
Mind and Will of Men in his Original: For this is
our chief defign.
It is evident that the traces of the Brain are accom- IV. Ex-
panied with Sentiments and Ideas of the Soul, and
that the emotion of the Animal Spirits have no effedl ties"of
in the Body, but what the Motions in the Soul anfwer the Mind,
to ; and in a word, it is certain that all the Senfations
and Pafiions of the Body are accompany'd with true
Sentiments and Paflions in the Soul. Now according
to our firft fuppofition, Alothers firft communicate the
traces of their Brain to their Children, and afterwards
the Motions of their Animal Spirits, and fo produce
the fame pafiion in the mind.of their Children, with
which they themfelves are affecfted, and by confe-
L 4 quence
. 57. .
A Search after Truth, !pook II.
qnence they coniipt both their afFct^lions and reafoh in
icveral reipeds.
If fo many Children are obferved to bear upon
their Faces the Marks and Traces of the Idea that
affeded their Mother, although the Fibres ol the skin
make much more rehftarice againft the cotirfe of the
Spirits than the foft parts of the Brain, and tho the
Spirits are much more agitated in the Brain than to-
wards the Skin ; we cannot reafonably poubt but
that the Animal Spirits of the Mother produce in tiie
Brain of the Infant many traces by their irregular emo-
rions. Now the great traces of the Brain, and the
emotion of the Spirits which anfwer to them, conti-
nuing a long time, and fometimes all the life; it
is certain, that as there are few Women who have
not fome weaknedes, and who have not been moved
with fome Paflion during their being with Child, k
cannot be expeded but that tnere will be very few
Children, w lio are not ill inclined to fomething, and
who have nor fome predominant pafBon.
We have only too much experience of thefe things,
and all the World is fenfible that there are whole Fa^
inilies who are afflided with great weaknefs of Ima-'
gination, which they have drawn from their Parents;
but it is not neceffary here to give any particular
Examples thereof. On the contrary, 'tis more proper
for the confolation of fome Perfons to ailiire 'em, that
thofe weaknefies of the Parents not feeing Natural, or
proper to the Nature of Man, the traces and impreili-
ons of the Brain, which are the caufe of them, may be
effaced by time.
We may yet add here the Example of King James I.
of Enghnd, of whom Sir K^nelm Dighy fpeaks in bis
Book which he writ of the SympatlKtic Powder, He
rells us, that Mary Sttiart being with Child of King
James^ fome Scotch Lords entred her Chamber, and
in her pre fence killed her Secretary, who was an Ira-
Fan, ahho' fhe caft her felf before him to hinder
them, that this Princefs received fome flight hurts by
rhcm, and the frights fbc had,, made fo great an im-
v\ her Imaginarionj ibat Ike cc-mmunicared
Chap. VII. A Search after Truth, i f 3
to the Child in her Womb: So that King James cou'd
never endure to fee a Naked Sword. He lays that
he himfelf was a wdtnefs of it, for when he was
Knighted, this Prince coming to lay the Sword upon
his shoulder run it ftrait at his Face, and had woiin-
ded him, if fome body had not direded it aright
where it ought to be. There are fo many inltances of
the like Nature, that 'twould be needlefs to fearch
Authors for them. I believe there is no body that
will difpute thefe things ; for we fee a great number
of Pcrfons that can't iufter the fight of a Rat, of a
Moufe, a Cat, a Frog, and particularly creeping Ani-
mals, as Serpents, and Adders j who know no other
caufe of thele extraordinary averfions, but the fear
their Mothers had of thefe feveral Animals whiift they
were with Child of them.
But what I chiefly dcfire Ihould be obfervedj is, Ejcpl^
that there is all pofiible probabilities, that Men re-
tain in their Brain to this day the traces and imprefii- fcevce and
ons of our firft Parents. For as Animals produce Originate
their own likenels, and with the like traces in their
Brain, which is the caufe that Animals of the fame
Species, have the fame Sympathies and Antipathies,
and that they perform the fame adions in the fame
occurrences. Thus our firft Parents, after their Sin,
received fuch great imprefiio^is, and profound traces
of fenfible things in their Brain, as they might very
well communicate to their Children ; fo that this great
propenfity we have from the Womb to ail fenfible
things, and the great djftance from God we are in,
by our prefent ftate, may in fome manner be explained
by what has been faid.
For as it is neceflTary, according to the eftablilhed
order of Nature, that the thoughts of the Soul fhoujd
be conformable to the traces that are in the Brain. We
may fay, that as foon as we are formed in the '^mb,
we are polluted with Sin, and infeded with the Cor-
ruption of our Parents, fince from that time we are
ftrongly inclined to the pleafures of our Senfe'ss having
in ou»' Brain traces refembling thefe of the Perlbns
who hath given us being, it is neccfiary alfe, that we
fliQu'd
A Search after Truth. Book II,
IhouM have'the fame thoughts, and the fame inclina-
tions which have any relation to fenhble objed:s.
Thus it is impoffible but that we fliould be born with
Concupifcence, and Original Sin. We muft be born
with Concupifcence, if Concupifcence is only the
Natural effort that the traces of the Brain make upon
the Mind to engage it to fentible things; and we muft
be born in Original Sin, if Original Sin is nothing elfe
but the Dominion of Concupifcence, and that thefe
efforts become Vidforious and Mafters over the Mind
and Heart of the Child. Now it is very probable,
that the dominion or vidfory of Concupifcence, is what
we call Original Sin in Children, and adfual in Men.
This difficulty feems only to recur, that contrary
to Experience we might conclude from the principles
I have eftablifhed, that the Mother would always
communicate to her Child Habits and Inclinations re-
fembling her own, and a facility of imagining and
learning the fame things as llie knows ^ for all thefe
things depend, as has been already faid, only upon the
traces and impreftions of the Brain j and it is certain
that the imprelfions and traces of the Mothers Brain
are communicated to the Child. This has been
proved by the Examples that has been brought con-
cerning Men, and is alfo confirmed by the Example
of Animals, whofe young ones have their Brains filled
with the fame impreflions, which is the reafon that -
all thofe that are of the fame kind have the fame
Voice, the fame manner of moving their Members,
and alfo the fame craft to take their Prey, and de-
fend themfelves from their Enemies : Therefore it
muft from thence follow, that fince all the traces of
the Mothers Brain are imprinted in that of the Childs,
that the Children muft be born with the fame Habits,
and all the-other qualities that the Mothers are pof-
felfed of ; and even commonly fo to preferve them all
their Lives, fince the Habits they have from their
Infancy, are thofe that are the longeft kept; which
neverthelefs is contrary to experience.
To anfwer this Objection, it is requifite it Ihould
be knowm that there are two forts of traces in the
Brain i
Chap.VII. A Search after Truth,
Brain; the one Natural, or proper to the Nature of
Man, the other acquired. The Natural are very deep
and it is iinpoiTible to efface them perfedly, but on
the contrary the acquired may be ealily loft, becaule
commonly they are not deep ; Now although the Na-
tural and acquired differ only as to the More- or Lefsy
and that often the firft have lefs force than the fecond,
fince we every day accuftom Apimals to do things per-
fedly contrary to what they are inclined by rheie
Natural traces (for Example, we ufe a Dog not to
touch Bread, nor to run after a Partridge, although
be fees and fmells it.) Yet there is this difference
between thefe traces, that the Natural ones have,
if we may fo fay, fecret alliances with the
other parts of the body; thus all the Springs of
our Machines affift one the other to preferve them-
felves in their Natural ftate. All the parts of our
bodies mutually contribute to all neceffary things for ■
the prefervation, or re-eftablifhment of thele Natural
traces. Thus we cannot wholly efface them, and they
begin to revive when we believe wc have deftroyed
them.
On the contrails the acquired Traces, although
greater, more ^ofound, and ftronger than the Natur
ral, are loft by little and little, if they are not care-
fully preferved by a continual application of thole
things that produced them, becaufe the other parts of
the body contribute nothing to their prefervation, but
on the contrary continually endeavour to efface and
loofe them. We may compare thefe traces to the
common Wounds of the body, they are wounds tbac
our Brains receive which heal of themfelves, as thefe
wounds of the body do, by the admirable conftru-
(ftion of the Madiine.
As then there is nothing in all the body which is
not conformable to the Natural traces, they tranimit
themfelves into Children with all their force:
So Parrots hatch little ones, which have the fame
or Natural voices with themfelves ; but be-
caufe acquired traces gre only in the Brain, and
not dilperfed through the reft of the body, except
' ' ' fomc
A Search after Truth. Book If.
lome few of 'em, as when they hare been imprinted
by the Motions that accompany violent Paflions, they
muft not be tranfmitted into Children. Thus a Par-
rot who gives the good Morrowj and good Night to
his Mafter, will not make his little ones as Learned
as hinifelf; and fo Wife ahd able Perions will not
have Children which refemble them.
Thus although it be true, that all which pafles in
the Mothers Brain, pafles alfo in the lame time into
that of the Child, and that the Mother can lee nothing,
feel noriiing, imagine nothing, that the Child does
not likewife fee, feel, and imagine, and that all the
falfe traces of the Mother corrupt the Imagination of
the Child : Yet thofe traces not being Natural in the
fenfe before explained, it muft not be wonder'd at, if
they are commonly effaced as foon as the Child is
born ^ for then the cauie that formed and maintained
thele traces, no longer fublifts, the Natural Confti-
tution of the body contributes to their deftrucftion;
and lenlible objetfts produce in their room others that
are new, deeper, and in greater Number, which efface,
almoft all thofe that the Child had whiift in the Womb,
For lince it eVery day happens that a great pain caufes
us to forget thofe that preceded it, it i^ not poflible
but that fuch lively Senfations, as Children receive
the firft time the impreflion of objedts is made upoii
the delicate organs of their Senfes, fhould efface the
greaceft part of the traces that they have received from
the fame objecfls, only by a kind of Counter-ftroke,
when rhey were, as it were, covered in their Mothers
Womb.
Yet when thefe traces are formed by a ftrong paf-
fjon, and accompanied with a violent agitation of the
Blood and Spirits in the Mother, rhey acft with fo
much force on the Child's Brain, and on the reft of
its body, that they imprint there Traces as deep and
lafting as Natural ones: As in the Example of Sir
Kenelm Digby-, in the Child that became a Fool, and
all broken in the Brain, and all the A-lembers in which
the Imagination of the Mother had produced fuch
great diforders, and likewife in the example of the
g<jneral corruption of Mau's Nature. Nor
chap. VIL ^ A Search after 7ruth. 15-7
Kor is it to be wondered, if the Children of King
Jamti had not the lame weaknels as their Father y
Firft, becaule theie iort of Traces are never imprint-
ed lb far into the reft, of the Body as the Natural ones
are : Secondly, becaule the Mother not having the
fame weaknefs with the Father, Ihe hinder'd its hap-
pening through the goodnefs of her Conftitution, and
becaule the Mother ads intinitely more upon the Brain
than the Father does, as is evident by what has been
already faid.
But it muft be obferved, that all thefe realbns,
which prove that the Children of King James cou'd
not participate of the weaknefs of their Father, prove
nothing againft the Explanation of Original Sin, or
this powerful Inclination for Senlible Things, nor this
great diftance from God, which we hold from our
firft Parents; becaufe the Traces,that fenfib/e Objeds
have imprinted in the Brain of the firft Alan,were very
deep, and were accompanied and augmented with
violent Paftions, and fortified by the continual ufe of
fenfible Things, and fuch as were neceflary to the
prefervation of life, not only in yldam and Eve, but
alfo, which muft be well obferved, in the greateft
Saints, in all Men and all Women from whom we
defcend, fo that there is nothing which can put a ftop
to this corruption of Nature. So far are thefe Tra-
ces of our firft Fathers, from being effaced by little
and little, that, on the contrary, they are augmented
daily, and without the Grace of JESVS CH£{ISTy
which continually oppofes this torrent, what this Hea-
then Poet has faid, wou'd be abfolutely true.
uEtas Parentum fejor avis tulit
Nioj nequiores, mox daturos
Progeniem vitiofiorem.
For it muft be well obferved, that thofe imprefHons
that ftir up Sentiments of Piety in the moft Devout
Mothers, do not communicate it to their unborn In-
fants j and that, on the contrary, the Traces which
excite the Idea of fenfiblfc Things, and which are fol-
lowed
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iy8 ^ Search after Truth. Book II.
lowed with PafTions, fail not to communicate to th^
Infants the Senfation and Love of Senhble Things.
A Mother, for Inftance, who is excited to love God
by the Motion of the Spirits, which accompany the
Trace of the Image of a venerable Old Man, becaufe
this Mother has united the Idea of God to this Trace
of the Old Man ; for, as we lhall foon fee in the
Chapter of the connexion of Idea's, that it may eafily
be done, altho' there is no relation between God and
the Image of an Old Man. This Mother, I fay, can
only produce in the Brain of her Child the Trace of
an Old Man, and an inclination for Old Men, which
is not the love of God wherewith Ihe was affedted :
For, indeed, there is no Traces in the Brain, which
can of themfelves ftir up any other Idea's than thofe
of Senfible Things, becaufe the Body is not made
to Inftrudl the Mind, and fpeaks not to the Soul as
to it felf
Thus a Mother, whofe Brain is filled with Traces,
which by their nature relate to fenfible things, and
which file cannot efface, fince concupifcerxe Rill re-
mains in her, becaufe her Body is not brought under
fubjedfion, necelfarily communicates them to her
Child, and begets it a finner altho' fhe be righteous.
This Mother is righteous, becaufe acSlually loving, or
having loved God by a love of choice, this concupi-
fcence makes her no longer criminal, altho' fhe fhou'd
follow the Motions thereof in her fleep: But the Child
ihe begets not loving God by a love of choice, and
' its heart not being turned towards God, it is evident
that it is fubjedf to diforder and irregularity, and thai
there is nothing in it which deferves not the wrath
of God.
But, when they are regenerated by Baptifin, and
have been juftified either by a difpofition of heart,
like to that which remains in righteous Perfons du-
ring the illufions of the Night, or it may be by a free
adt of love to God, as they have made, being deli-
vered fome moments, from the dominion of the Body
through the power of this Sacrament 5 (for, as God
hath made them to love him, we cannot conceive that
they
Chap.Vli. A Search afier Truth, rjp
they are actually in the righteoufnefs and order of
God, if they love him nor, or have not loved him ;
or, at leaft, if their heart is not difpofed after the
fame manner, as it wou'd be if they acflualJy loved
him) Then, altho' they fubmit to concupifcence du-
ring their Infancy, their concupifcence is no longer
Sin; it makes them no longer guilty and worthy of
wrath ; they ceafe not to be righteous and agreeable
to God, by the fame reafon as we do not lofe Grace,
altho* in our fleep we Ihou'd follow the Motions of
concupifcence ; for the Brain of Infants is fo foft, and
they receivp fo lively and ftrong impreilions of the
weakeft Objedls, as they have not fufficient freedom
of Mind to refill them. But I ftay . too long upon
thefe things, which do not ablblutely belong to the
fubjedl I treat of. 'Tis enough, that I may conclude
here from what I have explained in this Chapter, that
all thefe falfe Traces, that Mothers imprint in the
Brain of their Children, make their Minds falfe, and Explantt-
corrupt their Imagination ; and that thus the gene-
raliry of Men, are fubjedl to imagine things other-
wife than they are, in giving fome falfe colour, or
irregular draught to the Idea's of thofe things Aey
perceive.
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CHAP. VIII.
I, The changes that hajfpen to the Imagination of a Child
after it is Born, by the Converfation it has with its
Nurfi, its Mother, and other Perfins, 11. Advice
bow to Educate it well,
T.N the precedent Chapter, we have confider*d the
Brain of an Infant whileft in the Womb ; let us
now examine what happens to it as foon as it is Bor/i.
In the fame time that it quits Darknels, and firlt fees
Light, the cold of the outward Air feizes it; the
tendereft embraces of the Woman that receives it, of-
fends its delicate Members all external Objedts fur-
prize it ; they are all Subjedls of fear to it, becaufe
it does not yet know them, nor has it any power of it
felf, to defend it felf, or to fly from them j the Tears
'and Cries by which it condoles it felf, are infallible
marks of its pains and fears j for they are, indeed,
the Prayers that Nature makes to procure it alTiftance^
to defend it from the evils it luffers, and thofe it
apprehends.
To be able to conceive well the perplexity of its
Mind in this condition, we muft remember that the
Fibres of its Brain are very foft and delicate; and by
confequence, all external Objedls make very deep
imprellions upon them: For fince the leaft things are
Ibmetimes capable of hurting a weak Imagination, fo
great a number of fiirprizing Objedls muft certainly
injure <KTd perplex that of a Child.
But to have a more lively apprehenfion of the agi-^
rations and pains of Infants, at the time of their firft
coming into the World, and the prejisdioes which their
Imaginations muft receive, let us reprefenc to our felves
what woud be the aftonifliment of Men ^ if they law
Giants five or fix times higher than themfelves ap-
proach near them, Without Rowing, any thing (A
r*
11!
rfi-
Chap. VIII. A Search after Truth,
their defign; or if they faw any new kind of Animal,
which had ho refemblance to thofe they have already
feen ; or only, if a Flying-Horfe, or fome other Chi-
mera of our Poets, Ihou'd fuddenly defcend from the
Clouds. Thefe Prodigies wou'd make deep Traces
in the Spirits, and the Brain woud be confukd, only
to have feen them oiice.
Unexpe(5led and frightful events fall out every day,
which makes even Men lole their Wits, whofe Brains
are not very fufceptible of new imprellions, altho*
they have fome Experience, and can defend them-
felves; or, at leaft, are able to make ufe of feme
refolution. Children, when firftcome into the World,
fuffer fomething from every ObjetSE that ftrikes their
Senfes, to which they are not accuftomed : All the
Animals they fee, are of a new kind to them, lince
they have feen nothing before like to them ; they
have neither ftrength nor experience ; the Fibres of
their Brain are very delicate and flexible ; How then
is it poflible, but that their Imagination fhou'd be
injured by fo many different Objedfs ?
It is true, that Mothers have already a little ac-
cuftomed their Children to the impreflTions of Objects,
fince they have already traced them in the Fibres of
their Brain, before they were born, and fo they are
much lefs hurt, when they fee with their own Eyes
what they had before in fome manner perceived by
thofe of their Mothers. It is alfo true, that falfe
Traces, and the injuries that their Imagination re-
ceives at the fight of fo many frightful Objedls, are
effaced and cured by time ; becaufe not being Na-
rural, all Bodies are contrary to them, and extir-
pate them, as we have feen in the precedent Chap-
ter. And this is the reafon that generally all Meri
are not Fools from their Infancy, yet it does not
hinder, but that there is always fome Traces fo ftrong
and deep, that cannot be effaced all our Lives.
If Men wou'd but ferioufly refled: upoii what
paifes within themfelves, and upon their own thoughts,
they wou'd twt want Experience to prove What I have
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i 6z A Search after Truth. Book II,
faid ;. They wou*d commonly difcover in themfelves
inclinations, and iecret averlions, which others have
not, for which there can be no other caufe afcribed
than thefe Traces ot our Infancy. For fince the can-
fes of thefe inclinations and averfions are particular
to us, they are not founded in the Nature of Man ;
and fince they are unknown to us, it muft be that
they have adled in a time, wherein our Memory was
not capable to retain the circumftances of things, fo
as to make us able to remember them ; and this time
can only be that of our moft tender Infancy.
Mr. h'Cartes hath told us in one of his Letters, that
he had a particular kindnefs for all fquinting Perfons,
and that in having carefully examined the caufe of it,
he at laft found 'twas a defedl he had met with in
a young Maid whom he had loved, whileft he-was
yet a Child, and the afFedrion he had for her, made
him love all perlbns that refcmbled her in any
thing.
But it is not thefe little Irregularities of our Incli-
nations which modly deceive us j it proceeds from
this, That, all our Minds are weak in fome refped or
other, and we are all fubjed to fome kind of Folly,
altho' we are not fenfible of it. When we carefully
examine the Genius of thofe with whom we converfe,
we eafily perfwade our lelves of this, altho* we are
our felves an Original of fome particular Folly, and
may be fo accounted by others , yet we fhall alio
find others that have Follies peculiar to themfelves,
and who difier only as to the more and /ejs.
Now one of the caufes of the different Charaders
of Difpofirions, and without doubt, the difference of
the impreffions that we receive at our Birth, (as we
have fhown of the particular and extraordinary Incli-
nations,) is, becaufe thefe kinds of folly being common-
ly conftant and durable, they can only depend upon
the Conftitution of the Animal Spirits, which very
eafiiy change ; and by confequence, it is neceflary
that they proceed from falfe Impreffions, which are
made in the Fibres of the Brain, when our Memory
was
Chap.VnL A Search after Truth,
was not capable of pi eferving the Idea's thereof ; that
is, from the beginning of our Life. A general fource
of the Errors of Man, is the great diforder of their
Brain, caufed by the impreilion of external Objedls
when firft they come into the World ; but this caufe
ceafes not fo foon as may be imagined.
The common Converfation that Children are obli-
gcd to have with their Nurfes, or even with their
Mothers, who often have no Education, does preju-
dice, and entirely corrupts their Difpoficion ; thefe
Women entertain them only with filly things, as ridi-
culous Stories, or luch as are only fit to fright thenio
They never (peak to them but of fenfible things, and
after fuch a manner as is too fure to confirm them in
the falfe Judgments of their Senfes. And, in a word,
they caft into their Minds the Seeds of all the weak-
neffes they themfelves have, as of their extravagant
apprehenfions, ridiculous fuperftitions, and other the
like prejudices; by which means, they neither being
accuftomed to fearch after Truth, nor to have any
guft of it, they become at laft incapable ofdifcerning
it, or of making any ufe.of their reafon^ upon which
account, a certain fearfulnefs and weaknels of Spirit
feizes them, which continues with them a long time ^
for there are many perfons, who at the Age of fifteen
or twenty, that perfedily retain the Spirit of their
Nurfe.
It is true, that Children don't appear very proper
for the Meditation of Truth, and for abftraiffed and
elevated Sciences, becaufe the Fibres of their Brain,
being vefy delicate, they are eafily agitated, even by
the weakeft and leaft fenfible Objedls ; and their
Soul necelfarily having Senfations proportionated to
the agitation of thefe Fibres, fhe lets go her Metar
phyfical Thoughts, and pure Intelie(5fions, to apply
her felf only to her own Senfations. Thus, it feems.
Children cannot confider the pure Ideals of Truth
with fufiicient attention, being fo often and eafily di-^
flurbed by the confufed Idea's of their Senfes.
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^ Search after Truth. Book II.
Yet we may anfwer, firft, that it is more eafie fpr
a Child of feven years to be delivered from the Er-
rors whereinto the Senfes lead it, than for a perlon
of Sixty, who has all his life time followed the pre-
judices of Infancy. Secondly, that if a Child is not ca-
pable of the clear and diftinift Idea's of Truth, it is
at leaft, capable of being advertifed, that its Senfes
deceive it upon every occafion ; and if we do not
teach it the Truth, we ought not, at leaft, to enter-
tain, or fortify it in its Errors. And, laftly, that thp
youngeft Children, how wedded foever they may be
to agreeable and painful Senfations, learn foon what
grown Perfons can*t do in much more time > as the
^ Knowledge of the Order and Relations that there is
between all Words, and all Things, which they fee
and hear: For altho* thefe Things depend chiefly on
the Memory, yet it is plain enough, that they muft
make great ufe of their Reafon in the manner where-
by they learn tsheir Tongue.
ft. Mvice ' facility that the Fibres of Cbildrens
for the we it Brains have for the receiving the impreflflons of fenfl-
ble Objecfts, is the reafon why they are incapable of
9jLhiclren. J^c^ging (^^ abftradted Sciences, it is very eafie to rer
medy it. For 'tis certain, that if Children were ta-
/ ken without fear, without defires, and without hopes;
if we did not make them fuffer pain, and if we kept
them as much as pofTible from their little pleafures,
we might, as foon as they cou'd fpeak, teach them
the moft difflctilt, and moft abftracfted, or, at leaft,
the moft fenfible parts of the Mathematics, Mecha-
nics, and other things of the like Nature, which are
neceflary in the fequel of life ; Bur their Minds are
not fit to be applied to abftracfted Sciences, when they
are agitated by defires, and troubled with frights,
which is requifice to be well confidered.
For, as an ambitious Man, ivho fhoti'd lofe his
Riches and Honour, or who fhou'd haye been raifed,
all of a fudden, to a gfeat Dignity, which he cou'd
nor hnve hoped for, wou'd not be in a condition to
»■ ■ ■ ■ }
fefolye Metaphyfical Queftions, or Algebraick Equa-
tions.
Oxx^.VVI\. A Stmhifier frmk x6f
lions, but only to do fuch things as his prefent paflion
infpired him with. So Children, in whofe Brain an
Apple, and Sugar-plumb, make as deep impreilions,
. as Oflfices and Grandeurs do in that of a Man of Forty,
are not in a condition of hearing fuch abftracfted
Truths as we teach them. So that it may be affirm-
ed, there is nothing more contrary to the advance-
ment of Ghiliiren in the Sciences, than the continual
Divertifements wherewith they recompence them,
and the continual Puniihments they threaten them
with.
But what is infinitely more confiderable, is, that
thefe fears of Chaftifement, and thefe defires of fen-
(ible Recompence, with which they fill Childrens
Minds, extreamly diverts them from Piety. Devo-
tion is yet more abftracfled than Science, it is lefs re-
lilhed by corrupted Nature. The Mind of Man is
very much inclined to Study, but it is not fo to Piety.
If, therefore, great agitations permit us not to ftu-
dy, alrho* we naturally have fome pleafure in it,
how is it poflible that Children, which are taken up
with fenfible Pleafures wherewith they recom-
pence them, and with the Pains they fright them with,
Ihou'd preferve a fufficient freedom of Mind, to give
them any inclination to Piety ?
The capacity of the Mind is very much limited,
many things are not requifite to fill it, and when it is
full, it is incapable of new Thoughts, except it emp-
ries it felf of fome it had before: But when the
Mind is filled with fenfible things, it cannot part with
them when it will; to conceive this, we muft confi-
der we are all naturally inclined to Good, and Plea-
fure being the Character whereby we diftinguifii it
from Evil, it is neceflary that Pleafures fhou'd afiect
us, and employ us more than all the reft. Pleafure
then being united to the ufeof fenfible things, becaufe
they are the Goods of Mans Body, there is a kind of
neceflity that thefe goods Ihoud fill the capacity of
pur Minds, until God by imbittering them, gives us
^ diftafte and horror pf tficm, and by his Grace,
makes
A Search dfier Truth, Book IF,
makes ns feel the fweetneft of Heaven, which effaces
all the Pleafures of this Wotld. Dando menti caslefiem
deleBationem.^ua omnnterrend dekBtatiofupretur,
Bat becaule we are as much inclined to Ihun Evil
as to love Good, and Pain is the Character that Na-
tore has united to Evil, ill that we have (aid of Plea-
Eire, muft, in a contrary fenfce, be underffood of Pain.
Since thofe things, therefore, that make us feel
Pleafure and Pain, fill the capacity of the Mind, and
that it is not in our power to quit, or not to be affeifl:-
cd with them, when we pleafe ; it is plain, that we
cannot make Children be inclined to Rety no more
than Men, if we do not begin with them according to
the Precepts of the Gofpel, by a privation of all
things that touch the Senfes, and which excite great
defires and great fears, (ince ail the Paffions darken %
and extinguifh Grace, and that inward love to our
Duty, which God has implanted in us.
The leaft Children have reafon as well as Men, al-
tho' they have not experience, they have alio the iame
natural inclinations tho' theyare carried to very different
Objedfs; they muff, therefore, be accuftom'd to guide
themieives by reafon, fince they have it, and excited to
their Duty by rightly managing their good Inclinations.
It deftroys their reafon,and corrupts their beft inclina-
tions, to eng'^ge them to their Duty by fenfiWe im-
preflions. They appear then to be in their Duty, but
'tis only an appearance ; Virtue is neither engraven
in their Mind nor Heart they fcarcely know it, and
they love it much lefs. Their Mind is full of fears
and defires, of averfions to, and love of fenfibie
things, which they cannot difingage thcmfelves from
£0 gain their Liberty, and to make ufe of their Rea-
fon. Thus Children, who are educated after this
bafe and fervile manner, accuffom themfelves by lit-
tie and little, to a certain infenfibility of all the
Sentiments of honeft Men, and good Chriitians, which
continues with them all their Lives ; and when they
think themfelves freed from Chaftifements, either by
their Authority or Craft, th^ abandon themfelves
[ chap. Vm. A S earcf^ after Truth. i Sf
I to whatever flatters their Concupifcence and their
a Senles, becaufe, indeed, they know no otJier good
than what is fenflble.
It is true, there are fome occurrences wherein it
is necellary to inftrudi Children by their Senfes, but
it muft only be done when Reafcn is not fufficient*
They muft firft be perfwaded to their Duty by Rea-
fan, and if they are not capable of acknowledging
their obligations to it, it will be beft to let them alone
for lome time ; for to force them to da outwardly,
what they did not believe their Duty, wou'd not be
to inftrudt them, fince 'tis the Mind muft be taught
and not the Body: But if they refufe to do what
Realon tells them they ought to do, it muft never be
fuffered, feme fort of feverity muft rather be ufed,
for in fuch a cafe, according to the Wife man, He um,
that Jfares the B^d hates his Son, Pra.13.24.
If Chaftilements neither Inftrucfl the Mind, nor
incline us to love Virtue, yet at leaft, in fome mea-
fure, they correcff the Body,and hinder it from relilh-
ing Vice, and by conlequence, prevent it from being
aflavetoit. But what muft chiefly be obfeived, is,
that Punifliments fill not the capacity of the Mind as
Pleafures do, for they are no fooner at an end, and
we free from the danger of fuffering them again, but
we are eafiiy induced tofiarget them,, becaufe then
they neither foheit the ftnkginationx ^iior esrcite the
Paflions; nor prd^iokr. "the CoQCupifcence. In
fine, they leave the Mind wholly at liberty to think
on what it pleafes, fo that we may exercife it to"
wards Children, to keep them in their Duty, or, at
leaftj in the appearance of it.
But the' it is fometimes neceflary to deter and
punifli Children by fenfible Chaftifemenrs, yet it
muft nor from thence be concluded, that we ought to
perfwade them by fenfible rewards ; we mulf never
make ufe of any thing that very much affedis the
Senfes, but when the utmoft neceflity requires it :
And there is no need of affecfting them with fenfible
rewards, by reprefenting Pleafures to them as the
end
fSi
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■b- irkJ-t:.
168 A Search i^er Truth.' Book It
end of their Labours. For, on the contrary, it wou'd
corrupt their beft Actions, and rather incline them to
Senfuality than Virtue.
The Impreiiions of thofe PJealures we have once
tafted, continue very ftrongly toaffed: the Imaginatb
on,and often revive in us the Idea s of fenfible Goods,
always exciting importunate defires which difturb the
peace of the Mind : And, in fliort, they ftir up the
Concupifcencc upon every occafion,and it is as Leaven
that corrupts the whole lump. But this is not a
proper place to explain thefe things as they ought to
be.
The End of the Eirft Part of the
Setond Book:
iul'
t€i
iifai
II
t
The Second Part.
Of the Imagination.
C H A E L
1. Of the Imagination of iVomen. II. Of that of Men,
in» Of that of Old Peophk
\
WE have given feme Idea in the other Part,
of the Phyfical Caufes, that occafion the
Irregularity cf the Itn^ination of Men.
In This, we fhall endeavour to make
ibme Application of thofe Caufes, to the General Er-
rors of the Imagination, and we lhall likewife Treat
of the Caufes of thofe Errors, which may be term'd
Moral.
It may be feen, by what has been laid in the fore-
going Chapter, that the extream finenefs of the Fibres
of the Brain is one of the Principal Caules that hin-
der us from applying our felves with fo much thpught
and ftudy as we ought, to the Difcovery of Truths
that are but a little Myfterious.
I. This extream fmallnefs of Fibres is ufually met oftheMa^
with in Women ; and thence it is that their Under- gmamn^i
ilanding is fo great in every thing that ftrikes the
Senfes. 'Tis for Women to determine Fafliions, to
judge of Language, to diftinguilh Beauty, and Genteel
M Manners.
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/i Search after Truth. Book II.
Manners, In fuch things as thefe their Knowledge,
Capacity, and Acutenels lurpafles that ofMen» Whi-
ever depends upon the Senfes is under their Jurifdi(fli-
tion ; but ufually they are unable to dive into Truths,
that are any thing difficult to be dilcover'd. What-
ever is Abftradted, to them is incomprehenfible.
They cannot make ufe of their Imagination to unfold
intangl'd and intricate Queftions. They only confider
the outfide of things 5 nor has their Imagination either
Strength or Extent enough to penetrate to the Bottom,
or to Compare all the Parts without diftradling them-
lelves. A Trifle puts them out of the way ; the leaft
noife affrights 'em ; the flighteft Motion finds em
work. In fliort, the Manner and not the Reality of
things, is lufficient to fill the whole Capacity of their
Mind 5 becaufe the linalleft Objedb producing vio-
lent Motions in ^he Delicate Fibres of the Brain,raife
in the Soul tttofe Sentiments" which are adive and
large enough to poflefs it wholly.
If it be certain that this delicacie of the Fibres of
the Brain is the Prmcipal Caufe of thefe Effeds, 'tis
not j(b fure however that 'tis to be met with in all
Women; but adinit it be, their Animal Spirits have
Ibme times fuch a proportion with the Fibres of their
Brains, that there are fome Women who have more
Solidity of Judgment then fbme Men. For the ftrength
of Wit confifts in a certain Temperament of thegrofi-
nefs' and Agitation of the Animal Spirits with the
Fibres of the Brain 5 and Women fometimes have tins
fame juft and Equal Conftitution. There are fome
Women fh'ong and conftant, others feeble and incon-
ftanr. There are fome Women Learned, Courageous,
and Capable of every Thing. On the other fide,
there are fome Men unadive and Effeminate, uncapa-
ble of undcrftanding or doing any Thing. In Ihort,
when we attribute any Defeds to this or that Sex, to
certain Ages, or fuch and fuch Conditions, we mean
it with a provifo, for the moft part; fuppofing always,
that there is no general Rule without an Exception,
For it is not to be imagin'd, that all Men, or all
Women, of the fame Age, Country, or Family, have
Brains
ngtilt
; f'w> k
Cfiapl t. A Search after Truthl
Braia of the fatile Conllitution. 'Tis more proper to
believe, that aS we cannot meet with two Faces that
refemble each other in every Lineament, fo we cannot
iheet with two Imaginations that are abfolutcly alike j
and that ail Men, Wonnen, and Children, ditier one
from another in the grolfer or more refin'd delicacy of
the Fibres of the Brain. For as we are not over hafti-
ly to fuppofe an Elfential Identity between Things,
atnongft which we fee no Difference, fo neither are
^e to make Elfential Differences, where we do not
fihd a Per fed Ideintity^ fot thefeare the Errors into
Which we ufuaily fall.
Th^t which is then to be faid concerning the Fibres
of the Brain, is this, that they are very folt, and very
Imali in Children; that with Age they harden and
get ftrength ; that neverrhelhfs they are extreamly
fmall in the generality of Women, and in fbme Men,
all their Life-time. Tlie're is nothing more to be de-
termin'd- And this may fulfice to be laid of Women
ahd Children, that aS they make it not their Buhnefs
tb fearch after Truth, and inftrud others, fo their
Errors are not very prejudicial f for they are feldom
believ'd in thofe things which they advance. Let us
thdefore fpeakof Men full grown ; whofe Wit is in
its full ftrength and vigor; and Who may be thought
capable to fihd our the Truth and teach it to Others.
n. The ufUal time that the Mlhd and Underftand- Ofthelma^
ihg of Man are in thdr greateft perfed'on, is from ^
Thirty to fifty years; At that Age the Fibres of the prTme*of ^
Brain have gene'rally acquir'd a moderate confiftence. their jms.
The Fiealures and Pains of the Senfes for the moft
part make no fkrther Impreffion upon 'em ; fo that
th^y need no more then to defend them felves from
violent Paffions, which rafely happen, and this they
may do, prdvicfed they carefully avoid all occafions
that excite 'em; fo that the Soul being no longer
diftradfed with fuch kind of Interruptions, may with
more eafe apply it felf to the Contemplation of
Truth.
A Man in fuch an Eftate, and Who has quitted
the prejudices of his Infancy, who from his Youth'
M % has
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164 ^ Search after Truth. Bookll.
has acquir'd a Promptnefs to Meditation, who not
only retains a clear and diftin(5i: Notions of the
Mind, and carefully rejed:s all the confus'd Idea's of
the Senfes, and who has both leifure and a Wit to
meditate, fuch a Man will hardly fall into Errors.
But 'tis not of fuch a Man that we are now to Dif-
courfe; 'tis of the common fort of Men, who for
the moft part are of another Conftitution.
The Confiftence then, which we meet with at the
years of Difcretion in the Fibres of Mens Brains, is
the caufe, if it may be fo faid, of the Solidity and
Confiftence of their Errors: 'Tis the Seal that Seals
their Prejudices, and all their falfe Opinions, and
fhelters 'em from the ftrength of Reafon. In a word,
the more Advantageous this Conftitution of the Fibres
of the Brain is to Perfons well Educated, the more
Difadvantageous it is to the greateft part of Men,
fince it confirms both the one and the other in their
Prefent Thoughts and Opinions.
But Men are not only confirm'd in their Errors,
when they are arriv'd at the Age of Forty or Fifty
years; they are alfo more fubjecft to fall into new
ones ; becaufc, that believing themfelves at that time
able to judge of every thing, as indeed it would be-
come 'em to be fb, they decide with prefumption, and
only confult their own PrepofleiEons ^ for Men never
argue upon things, but in fomc relation to thofe Idea's
which are moft familiar to 'em. When a Chymift
would Argue about fome Natural Body, prefently his
Three Principles come into his Mind. A Peripatic
immediately thinks of the four Elements, and the four
firft Qualities ; another Philofopher refers every thing
to other Principles. So that nothing can enter into
the Mind of Man, which is not immediately infedled
with the Errors to which it is fubjecft, or which does
not augment the number of its Errors.
This Confiftence of the Fibres of the Brain pro-
duces another very bad EfFecft, elpecially in Perlbns
more advanced in years, which is, to make 'em un-
' capable of Meditation: They cannot fet themfelves
to the Confidcrarion of thofe Things which they de-
fire
Fis?
L
Chap. VI. A Search after Truth. i6f
fire to know; and fo they can never penetrate into
thofe Truths which are but a little conceal'd. They
cannot reliih the molt Kational Sentiments, when they
are fupported by Principles which appear new to
them j though they are otherwife very intelligent in
things of which their years have given 'em great Expe-
rience. But all that I have here faid extends no lar-
ther, than only to fuch as have fpent their Youth
without making ufe of their Wit or applying them-
ftlves to Study.
To clear thefe things, 'tis requifite to know, that
we cannot learn any thing whatever it be, without
giving our minds to it, and that we cannot be atten-
tive upon any thing, if we do not imagine, and ad-
mit a lively reprefentation of it into the Brains. Now,
that we may imagine Objetfls, 'tis neceflary that Ibme
fome part of the Brain give way, or that there
Ihould be imprinted on it lome other Motion, that fo
it may be able to form the Traces which are affix'd
to the Idea's that reprefent thofe Objedts to us ; fo
that if the Fibres of the Brain are bat a little harden'd,
they will admit no Inclinatioris or Motions, but what
they were formerly accuftom'd to. Whence it comes
to pafs, that the Soul can never imagin, nor confe-
quently be attentive upon what it deiires, but only
upon things that are familiar to it.
From hence we muft conclude, that it is of g: eat
advantage for a Man to Exercile himfeir in meuitai-
ing upon all forts of Subjedfs, that fo he may be able
to acquire a Readinefs to think upon what he pleafes;
]For as we acquire an extraordinary facility to ftir our
Fingers after yarious manners, and with a fwifcnefs
even to wonder, by frequent ufe in playing upon In-
ftruments; fo the Parrs of the Brain, the Morion of
which is rcquihte to imagine what we delire, do by
ufe and cuftom acquire a certain eahnefs and dexibiliiy ;
which is the realbn that Things are imagin'd more
eafily, more readily, and more diftindfly.
Now the beft way to acquire this Habirnde, vi'hich
makes the chief diilindfion betwixt a Wi:e Man and
gnother Perfon, is to accuitom our felves in our youth
M 3 to
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m. Of Old
Men. ■ ' -■■
A Search after Truth. S^ok IL
to fearch after the truth of fuch things as are very
difficult, becaufe at that Age the Fibres are more
pliable and apt to give way.
Neverthelefs 1 do not pretend that this Facility k
to be acquired by thofe who are calPd Men of Study,
yet make it their buiinefs only to read without me-
ditating, and without fearching of themfelves, the
Decifion of a Queltion before they read it in an Au-
thor: For 'tis viable, that by that means only a Man
acquires a facility to remember things that he has read.
*Tis every day oblervable, that they who read much,
can never apply their Minds to new things that are
told 'em, and that the vanity of their Learning hur-
pying 'em to judge of thofe things before they have
conceiv'd 'em in their Minds, throws 'em into thofe
Errors, which other Men avoid.
But though the want of Application be the princi-
pal Caufe of their Errors, there is one that is peculiar
to em, That in regard they always carry in their
Memories an infinite number of confus'd Species, they
prefently choofe put fome one which they look upon
to be the Subjed: of the Difpute, and becaufe the
Things that are told 'em do not agree therewith, they
judge ridiculoufly that their Opponent is deceiv'd. If
you make it out to 'em, that they themfelves are de-
ceiv'd, and that they do not fo much as underftand
the Staip of the Queftion, then they are mad, and not
able to apprehend what is faid to 'em, and they ftill
keep ftedfaft to the firft falfe Species which their Me-
mory prefented to 'em. If you Ihew 'em their Mj-
ftake too apparently, they will ftart a Second and a
Third, which they will defend fometimes ^gainA all
Appearance of Truth ; nay, even againft their own
Confciences; becaule they have no refped or love for
Truth, and becaule they are alham'd to acknowledge,
that there are fome things which others knovy better
than themfelves.
' What ever has been faid concerning Perfons of
Forty or Fifty years of Age,'with more Reafon ought
to be underfiood of Old Men, becaufe the Fibres of
their Brain are ftill more inflexible, and that for want
-
Chap. I. A Search after Trvth. t
of Animal Spirits to trace out new Footfteps, their
Imagination becomes altogether languilhing. And
becaule the Fibres of their Brain are ufually inter-
mixt with many fuperfluous Humours, therefore they
loofe by little and little the memory of things paft,
and fall into Infirmities that are common to Children.
So that in their decrepit Age they Jiaye thofe Defeds
which depend upon the Conftitution of the Fibres of
the Brain, which are to be met with both in Children
and grown Men 5 though it may be faid that they are
Wifer than either, becaufe they are no longer fo fub-
jed to their Paflions, which proceed from the vehe-
ment Agitation of the Animal Spirits.
We Ihall not undertake any farther Explanation of
thefe things, becaufe it is eafie to make a judgment
of this Age, by the others that we ba^e Ipoken of,
before, and to conclude from thence, that Old Men
with much more difficulty conceive what is faid to'em,
than thofe that are younger, that they are more ob-
fth^tely tied to their Prejudices and long received
Opinions, and confequently that they are more har-
den d and confirm'd in their Errors and 111 HaHts.
Though this ought to be obferved, that the State of
Old Age does not happen precifely at Sixty or Seventy
years; that all Old Men do not doat 5 nor are all
thofe, who are paft Sixty, always free from the Paf-
fions of young People, and that we ftiould proceed
too far to draw General Confequences from EftabliQi'd
Principles.
M 4 CHAR
'A Search after Truth. Book H
CHAP. 11.
^ That the Animal Spirits ufually ohferve the Traces of
Ideals which are moft familiar to us > which is the
I{eafin that we never mal(e a found Judgment of
things,
ISuppofe I have fufficiently explain d in the foregoing;
Chapters the various alterations that are to be met
with in the Animal Spirits, and in the Conftitution of
the Fibres of the Brain, according to the feveral Ages
of Man. So that but a little Meditation upon what
has been laid, will help us to a diftin(fl Knowledge of
the Imagination, and of the moft common Natural
Caufes of the Differences that are to be obferv'd a-
mong Wits, fince all the Alterations that befall the
Imagination and the Mind, are but Confequences of
thofe in the Animal Spirits, and in the Fibres of which
the Brain is compos'd.
But there are feveral Particular Moral Caufes of
the Alterations that befall the Imagination of Man,
vi3[. their different Conditions, Employments, and
manner of Living ; to the Confideration of which we
muft oblige our ielves, fince thefe forts of Alterations
are the Caufes of almoft an infinite number of Errors,
every one judging of Things according to the relation
they have to his Condition. We do not think it neceflary
to fpend rime in Explaining the Etfecfts of fome in-
different Caufes, as great Sicknelles, furprifing Mif-
fortunes, and other unexpected Accidents, which
make moft violent impreflions upon the Brain, and
cxtreamly difturb ir, becaufe thefe things but rarely
ha ppen ; and for that the Errors, into v^ hich fuch fort
of Pw rfons fall, are fo palpable, that they are no way
^ti'genus, feeing they are fo ca(ily found out and
jeje^td by all the World.
Now
Chap. II. A Search after Truth.
Now for the more perfe<ft apprehending all the
Alterations,which Different Conditions produce in the
Imagination, 'tis abfolutely neceifary to remember that
we never imagine Objeds but by firft forming Images
of 'em > and that thefe Images are nothing elfe, but
the Traces which the Animal Spirits delineate in the
Brain, that we imagine things fo much the more
ftrongly, the deeper and more plainly thefe Traces are
imprefs'd, and the oftner and more violently the Ani-
mai Spirits have paft through them; and that when the
Spirits have paft through feveral times, they enter in
more eafily than into other parts adjoining, through
which they never paft, or at leaft not fo often. This
is the moft ufual Caufe of the Confufion and Falfhood
•f our Idea's. For the Animal Spirits, that are di-
reded by the Adion of External Objeds, or elfe by
the Orders pf the Soul, to produce certain Traces in
the Brain, many times produce others, which in truth
refemble 'em in fomething i but which are not alto-
gether the Traces of the fame Objeds, nor thofe
which the Soul defired to reprefent to it felf > for
that the Animal Spirits finding fome Refiftance in
thofe parts of the Brain, through which they ought to
have paft, readily turn afide and croud into the deeper
Traces of thofe Idea's which are more familiar to us.
And here we fhall produce very manifeft and fenfible
Examples of thefe Things.
When they who are not extreamly fhort lighted,
" behold the Moon, they fee two Eyes, a Nofe, and a
Mouth ; in a word, it feems to them as if they faw a
Face ; Neverthelefs there is nothing at ail in
the Moon of what they imagine there. Many Per-
fons behold there quire another Thing. And they,who
take the Moon to be fuch as Ihe feems to be to them,
may be eafily undeceived, if they look upon her with
a fmall Profpedive Glafs j or if they confult the De-
fcriptions which HevciiuSy and others have
publifh'd. Now the Reafon why Men generally be-
hold a Face in the Moon, and nor the Irregular Spots
which are there, is this hecaufe the Traces of the Face,
which are in the
Brain are very deep, for that we
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J 70 ASeanh ^ter Tmtk Book II.
frequently and with great Attention look upon Faces,
So that the Animal Spirits hnding feme Re/iftance in
other parts of the Brain, e^ly turn afide from the
Diredfion which the Light of the Moon imprints, and
enter into thofe Tiaces to which the Idea's of a Face
are naturally afct. Beiides, that the Appearing Big-
nefs of the Moon, not being much different from the
largenels of an ordinary Head at a certain diftance,
the Impreflionbf it forms thofe Traces which have a
great Affinity with thofe that reprefent a Nofe, a
Mouth, and Eyes; and by that means determines the
Spirits to take their Courfe in the Traces of a Face.
Some there are who lee a Man a Horfeback in
the Moon, or any thing elfe, which is not a Face,*
becaufe their Imagination having been ftrongly af-
fedted by certain Objedfs, the fame Traces are open'd
by the leaft things to which they have any Relation.
For the fame Reafon it is, that we imagine we be-
hold Chariots, Men, Lions, and other Animds in the
Clouds, when there is the leafl refemblance between
thofe Creatures and their Figures 5 and that a/i Men,
but chie.^y they who are accuftomed to Defigning and
Drawing, many times fee Heads of Men upon the
Walls, where there are feveral Irregular Spots.
'Tis for this Reafon alfo, that the Spirits of Wine,
cntring without any diredfion of the Will into Traces
moft familiar to us, help to difcover Secrets of the
greateft Importance; and that in our fleep we moft
commonly dream of thofe Objedls which we have
feen in the day time, and which had form'd tlie largeft
Traces in the Brain; for that the Soul always repre-
fents to her felf thofe things of which fhe has the
largeft and deepeft Traces. To theft W^ tn^y sdc}
other Examples more Composed.
A Diftemper is a Novelty, it makes fuch Havock
as furprizes the World. This imprints fuch deep
Traces in the Brain, that the Diftemper is always pre-
fent to the Mind. Suppoft this Diftafe^ for Ex-
^mple, be call'd the Scurvy, all Diftempers will be
the Scurvy. The Scurvy is new, therefore all Di-
ftempers faall be the Scurvy. The Scurvy is attended
widi
(JJiajj. IJ. 4 Truth.
with feverd Symptoms, many of which are cooamoa
to pther Difeafes^ That's nothing to the purpofe; ^
It happen that the Sick Perfon has any one of thole
$ympton:«, he lhall be fick of the Scurvy, and they
^all not fo much as think of other Difteaipers th^
axe accompanied with the fame Symptou^jthey will ex-
that all the Accidents that they have known Scor-
putic Perfons labour under, befal them alfo. They
fhali prefcribe the fame Remedies, and lhaU wonder
why they do not work the fame EfFeds, as they have
wrought in others.
An Author applies himfelf to one fort of Study ;
upon which the Traces of the Subjed of his Employ-
ment make fo ^eep an ImprejEon, ^ and irradiate fo
vigoroully over all the Brain, that many times they
confound and deface the Traces of fuch things as are
very different one from another. There was one, for
Example, who compifd feveral Volumes upon the
Crofs j this made him fee Crofles where ever he
came: Nor was it without reafon, that Father Morin
derides him for believing that a Medal reprefented a
Crofs, when it reprefented quite another thing. And
by Vertue of fuch ^ foyt of Imagination as this it
was, that Qilber^^ and feveral others, after they had
ftudy'd the Loadftone, and admir'd its Properties,
WOUI4 needs apply, to Magnetkk^ Qualities, a great
Number of Natural Effeds, which have not the leaft
Correfpondence with them.
The Examples here cited, are fufScient to prove,
that (from this extraordinary eafinefs of the Imagina-
tipn, to reprefent to it felf the Objeds which are
moil familiar to it, and the difficulty which it under-
goes to imagine thofe which are new and unufual.) it
come to pafs, that Men are always forming Ideas,
which may be call'd Mix'd and Impure, and th^t the
Mind never Judges of things, but with reference to it
felf, and its firft Thoughts. Thus the different
Paffions of Men, their Inclinations, their Condi-
tions, their Employments, their Qualities, their Srn-
dies 5 in ^ worcf, all their various Manners of Li-
yjng, producing very great differences in their
' ( ' V - o
tyx A Search after Trutk Book
Idea's : And this it is, that makes them fall into an
Infinite number of Errors, of which we ftall difcourfe
more at large hereafter. This was it that made the
Lord Chancellor Bacon utter thele Judicious Expref-
Hons: All Perceptions^ as voell of the S enfe as of the
Mind, are. Ex andogia Hominis^ not ex anaiogia Vni"
verjiy eft que intelledlm humanus inftar fpeculi inequalis ad
radios return^ qui fuam naturam naturae rerum immifcet,
eamqi deftorquet inficit.
CHAP. III.
Of the Mutual Connexion hetxeeen the Ideas of the
Mind-, and the Traces of the Brain ; and of the
Mutual Connexion hetxoeen Traces and TraceSy and
between Idea s and Idea's.
A Mong all Material Things, there is none more
worthy the ferious Study of Men, than the
Stru(5ture of their Bodies,, and the Correfpondence
between all the Parts that Compofe it ; and of all
Spiritual Things, there is none of which the Know-
ledge is more Neceflary than that of the Soul, and
how it is Related indifpenfably to God, and naturally
to the Body.
'Tis not lufficient to perceive, or know confufedly,
that the Traces of the Brain are united one to another,
and that they are attended by the Motion of the Ani-
mal Spirits ; that the Traces being ftirred up in the
Brain, likewife ftir up the Idea's in the Mind, and
that the Motions excited in the Animal Spirits, excite
the Paflions in the Will. *Tis requifire therefore, as
much as may be, to underftand diftindlly the cau'fe
of all chofe difierent Unions, and chiedy the EfFedfs
which they are capable of producing.
We muft underftand the caufe of them, to the end
we may attain to the Knowledge of Him who is on-
Ghap.Vn. A Search after Tratk i J7J
ly able co a(^ within us, and to make us Happy or
Miferable ; and it becomes us to undetftand the £f-
fetiis, becaufe we fliould know our lelves as mucb as
in us lyes, and other Men, with whom we Converfe :
For then, we lhali underftand the ways'and means
of Concluding, Governing, and Prefecv ing our felves,
in the moft Happy and Perfed condition, to which ic
is poffible for us to attain, according to the Order of
Nature, and the l^les of the Gofpel ; and we fliall be ilj
able to live with other Men, when we know how to
make ufe of them in our NecelTities, and aflift thenir
in their Mileries. i||i
I do not pretend to explain in this Chapter, a Sub- :tj
jed of fo vaft and fo large an Extent: Nor do I pre-
tend to it altogether in the whole Work. There are
many things of which I am Ignorant as yet, and which
I never hope to underftand exadly j there are other \\
things which I believe I know, but which I cannot j!
for all that Explain : For there is no Wit, how mean ij
Ibever it be, that by Meditation cannot difcover more
h.'
■f
Ir
; J
!»•
Truths, than the moft Eloquent Man in the World •
can relate.
I. We are not to imagine, as the greateft part of oftheUnion
Philofophers do, that the Soul becomes CoTpotQal, of ihe SohI
when it is united with the Body,and that the Body be-
comes a Spirit when it is united with the Soul. The
Soul is not diffused into all the Parts of the Body, to n
give it Life and Motion, as the Imagination fan- ji
cies ; nor does the Body become capable of ,■
Senfation by its union with the Soul, as our deluding ij
Senfes would feem to convince us. Every Subftance
remains what it is, and as the Soul is not capable of
Extenfion and Motion, neither is the Body capable of
Senfation and Inclinations. All the Alliance of the Bo-
dy and Soul, which is known to us, confifts in a Na-
rural, and Mutual correfpondence of the Thoughts
of the Soul, with the Traces or Phantoms of the
Brain, and the Emotions of the Soul with the Motions
of the Spirits. . *1
So foon as the Soul receives fome new I^eas^ it im- ;
prints new Traces in the Brain i and fo loon as the I
Cbjedb ?
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union be^
tveen the
Idea's 4nd
Traces.
A ^ _..--_r_,-i—s
A Seafch aftit "frmh. •
Objects produce new Traces, the Sotil'receives ne#
Idea's: Not that it confiders thofe Traces, fat it Hii
no knowledge of them ; nor that thofe Traces include
thofe Idea's, becaule they have no Relation one with
another : Nor, laftly, that the Sbul receives her Idea's
from thofe Traces; for, as we lhall fliow in another
place, it is not to be conceiv'd that the Soul can re*
ceive any thing from the Body, or that it becomes
more Knowing, or more Enlightned, by adverting to
iti as the Philofophers pretend, who would haVe it,
chat the Soul Ihould perceive all Thihgs, per cbHvefjio*
nem ad Phantafmata, by Converfion to the Phantafihes,
Of'Traces of the Bfain.
So foon as the Soul would have the Arm to thoVe,the
Arm ismovedi tho* it does not fomuch as kno# what
ic ought to^ do to make it movcj'and fo foon as the Anb
mai Spirits are agitated, the Soul finds irfelf moVdj
rho' it does not fo much as know there are Ahithal
Spirits in' the Body.
When'I come to treat of the Paflions, I lhall fpeak
of the Connexion between the Traces of the Brhiri,
and the Motions of the Spirits, and of that between
die Idea's and Emotions of the Souh for that all the
Pafiions depend upon it. My bufinefs here, is ortiy
to treat of the affinity between Idfea's and'Trace^,- and
the Connexion of thtf Traces one With another.
There are three very oonfiderable Caufes of thh
Gonfnexion of the Idea's with the Traces; the firft,
and moft general, is the Identity of Titne. For fre-
quently it' fuffices, that we had certain Thoughts, at
fuch time as fome new Traces came into our Brain,
fo that thole Traces cannot be produced again,'
without renewing the fame Thoughts. If the Id^
of God prefent it lelf to my Mind, at the fame time
that my Brain was ftruck with the fight of thele three
Characters, la/y, or with the found of the Wofd4r
felf, 'tis enough if the Traces, which thofe Charaxflers'
have produced, be excited to make me think of God.
And I cannot think of God, but there will be produc'd
in my Brain forrte confufed Traces of the Characfters,
or Sounds, which accompany'd the Thought, which I
had
■ UJ'-fr
iL>
111; A Searcn afttr Tmh.
had of God y for the Brain,, being never without
Phantafines, there are always fuch, as have fome Re-
lation to what we think, the* many times thefe Phan-
tafmes are very imperfe<$f, and very confus'd.
The fecond Caufe of the Gonnexiori of the Idea's
with the Traces, and which always fuppofes the firft,
is the Will of Man; This Will is neceirary,that this con-
irexiort of the Idea's, with the Traces,may be.regulated
and proper for Ufe. For if. Men had not Naturally
an Ihclinaiion, to agree between thcmfelves, to affix
their Idea's* t» Senfible Signs, hot only this Connexion
of Idea's wou'd be abfolutely unprofitable for Society,
but it would be alfo very Irregular and Imperfedf.
Firft, becaufe Idea's are never ftrongly united with
the Traces, but when the Spirits being agitated, they,
render thofe Traces deep and durable. So that the
Spirits being never agitated but by the Paffions, if
Men had no fuch Union to communicate their Senti-
mcnts, and participate of thofe of others, 'tis evident
that the exaift Union of their Idea's with certain Tra-
ces, would be very weak, becaufe they do not fub-
je(3: themfelves to thofe Exadf and Regular Con-
nexions, but to render thaufeives Intelligible.
Secondly, the Repetition of the Meeting of the-
fame Idea's, with the fame Traces, being neceflary to
form a*Connexion, that may. be of long continuance,
lince the meeting, unlefS it be accompany'd with
violent Motion of the Animal Spirits, fuffices not to
make ftrong Gonnexions > 'tis clear, that if Men
Ihould refule to alTeat, it would be the greaceft-
Ghance in the World, if the fame Traces, and
Idea's, Ihould meet together j fo that the Will of
Man is necelTary to regulate the Connexion of the fame
Idea's with the fame Traces, tho' this Will of Agree-
ment be not-fo irrach an effedf of their Choice and
Reafon, as an Impreflion of* the Author of Nature,whQ
has made us altogether one for another, and with a
ftrong Inclination to unite in Mind, as well as in Body.
The third Caufe of the- Connexion of the Idea's
with the Traces, is theConftarrt and Immutable Na-
cure or Will of the Creator... For Examples There is
j Search after Truth. Book II<
a Natural Connexion, and which depends not upon
our Will 5 between the Traces produc'd by a Tree or
Mountain^ which we behold, and the Idea's of a Tree
or Mountain j between the Traces which the Cries
of a Man or Beaft, that fuffer Pain, beget in our
Brain, the Air of one who threatens us, or of whom
we Itand in fear, and the Idea's ^f Grief, of Strength,
or Weaknefs; as alio between the Sentiments of Com*
paflion, of Fear, and Courage, which are excitedin US,
Thefe Natural Bands are the ftrongeft of all j they
are generally alike in all Men, and they are abiblutely
neceflary for the Prefervation of Life: For which
reafon it is that they depend nor upon our Will; for
if the Band or Connexion of Idea's, with certain
Sounds and Chara(5Iers, be but feeble, and very dif-
ferent, in feveral Countries, 'tis becaufe it depends
upon the weak and changeable Will of Men* And
the realbn why it depends upon it, is, becaufe this
Connexion is not abfolutely neceflary for Life, but
only for living like Men that are to form, among
themfelves, a Rational Society.
Here we muft obferve, that the Connexion of Idea's
that reprefent to us Spiritual Things, and fuch as are
diftincft from us, with the Traces of our Brain, is
not, nor can be Natural; and by confequence, it is,
or may be different in all Men, for that it has no
other Caufe than their Will, and the Identity of
Time, of which I have fooken before. On the
other fide, the Connexion of the Idea's of all Mate-
rial Things, with certain particular Traces, is Natu-
ral ; and hence there are certainTraces that ftirup the
fame Idea in all Men. For Example, there is no
queftion but that all Men have the Idea of a Square,
upon the fight of a Square, becaufe that Connexion is
Natural, but 'tis to be doubted whither all Men have
that Idea, when they hear the Word Square pronoun-
ced, becaufe that Connexion is entirely voluntary.
The fame thing may alfo be thought of all Traces,
that are tyed to the Idea's of Spiritual Things.
But becaufe the Traces, which have a Natural Con-
jtiexion with Idea s, do affect the Mind, and confc-
quently
chap. III. A Search after Triuk i ^7
quencly render it attentive, the greateft part of Men
do eaiily enough comprehend and retain Senfible
Truths j that is, the mutual Relations that are between
Bodies. On the other fide, becaufe the Traces that
have no other Connexion with the Idea's then what
is voluntary, do never vigoroully ftrike the Mind,
'tis not without a great deal of trouble that all Men
Cbmprehend, and with much more difficulty retain
abftradled Truths ; that is, the mutual Relations be-
tween things that fall not under the Imagination.
But when thefe Relations are never fo little com-
pounded, they appear abfolutely Incomprehenfible,
efpecially to thole that are not accuftomed to them,
in regard they have not fortify'd the Connexion of
thofe abltrad:ed Idea's with their Traces, by continu-
al Meditation ; and tho' others have perfedfly com-
prehended them, they forget them in a Ihort time, be-
caufe this Connexion is leldom or never fo ftrong as
the Natural one.
It is fo true, that all the trouble Men have to com-
prehend, and retain Spiritual and Abftradled Things,
proceeds from the difficulty of fortifying the Con-
nexion of their Idea s with the Traces of their Brain,
that when they find a way to explain the Analogies
of Spiritual Things, by the Relations of Material
Things, they are eaiily apprehended, and imprinted
after fuch a manner in the Mind, that we are not on-
ly ftrongly convinced of them, but they are alfo
much more eafily retain'd. The General Idea which
we have given of the Mind, in the firft Chapter of
this Work, is, perhaps, a lufficient Proof of this.
On the contrary, when the Relation between Mate-
rial things are exprefs'd in fuch a manner, that there
is no Connexion requir'd between the Idea's of the
Things, and the Traces of their Expreflions, 'tis ^
difficult matter to apprehend them, and they are eafi^
ly forgot.
For Example t They, who begin the Study of Alge-
hra, or theAnalytic Art,cannot but with great difficulty
apprehend the Algebraic Demonftrations ; and Wheri
they have once underftood them, they never remem-
N bef
A Search after Truth. Book li,
ber ihem long, becaufe the Squares, for Example,
the Parallelograms, Cubes, Solids, CSc. being ex-
prefs'd by aa^ 43, ahc, See. whofe Traces have no
Natural Connexion with their Idea's, the Mind is not
able to fix the Idea s of: them, and examine their Re-
lations.
But they who begin plain Geometry, do prelcntly,'
and clearly, conceive the Demonftrations that are
explained <to them, provided they diftindlly under-
ftand the Terms that are made ufe of, becaufe the
Idea's of a Square, a Circle, C3c, are Naturally ty'd
to Traces of the Figures which they fee before their
Eyes. It alfo frequently happens, that the Expofition
of the Figure alone, which ferves for the Demonftra-
tion, caufes them fooner to apprehend it, than the
Difcourfes that explain it, becaufe the Words not
being united to the Idea s, but by an Arbitrary Infti-
tution, they do not excite thofe Idea's with fufficient
quicknefs and clearnefs, to afford a ready apprehen-
fion of their Relations , for this is the principal Rea-
fon, why it is fo hard a matter to underftand the
Sciences.
It may be ©bferv'd by' the By, and from what has
been already faid, that thofe Writers who Coyn a
great many new Words, and new Figures, to explain
their Sentiments, many times fpend their time to lit-
tie or no benefit; they think to render themfelves In-
telligible, when indeed they make themfelves Incom-
prehenfible. We define all our Terms, and Cha-
raders, fay they, and others ought to agree to them.
'Tis true, others agree to them in their Will, but their
Nature is repugnant thereto. Their Idea's are not
joyn'd to thofe new Terms, becaufe there isrequir'd
both Ufe and great Pradlice for that. The Authors,
perhaps, have been Qccufhom'd to that Pradtice, but
the Readers have nor. When a Man goes about to
Inftrud: the Mind, 'tis requifite to underftand it, be-
caufe he ought to follow Nature, and not to pro-
voke or hurt it.
Neverthelefs, we ought not to condemn the Care
that Mathematicians take in defining, their Terms,>
for
Chap. III. A Search aftcrTrutk 175
for *ds evident they ought to define them, to .prevent
the trouble of Equivocal Words. But, as much as
may be, they ought to make ufe of Terms
that are received, or whole fignification is not very
remote from that which they go about to introduce 5
and this is that which Mathematicians do not always
obferve.
Nor do we pretend, by what we have faid, to con-
demn Algebra ; more efpecially, that which M. De-
fcartes has re-eftablifli'd. For tho* the Novelty of a
few Expreflions, in that Science, gives the Mind fome
little trouble at firft, yet there is fo little variety and
confufion in the Expreflions; and the Afliftance, which
the Mind receives by them, fo far furpafles the diffi-
culty it meets with, that we can hardly think it pofli-
ble to find a better way of exprefling his Reafon-
ing, or which better iiiits with the Nature of the
Mind, fo as to carry it farther into the Difcovery
of unknown Truths. The terms of that Science have
no fhare at all in the Capacity of the Mind, they do
not burthen the Memory ; they wonderfully abridge
all our Idea's and Realbnings, and render them in
{brae meafure fenlible by Practice. In fiiort, their Be-
nefit is much greater than that of Expreflions, tho*
Natural, or of Figures defign'd by Triangles, Squares,
and the like, which cannot be ferviceable to the learch-
ing after, and unfolding Truths, which are but a lit-
tie Myfterious. But let this fufiice, for the connexion
of Idea's with the Traces of the Brain. 'Tis necefla-
ry now to fay lomething of the connexion of the
Traces one with another, and by cbnfequence, of
that agreement which is between the Idea's that an-
fwer to the Traces.
This connexion confifts in this, that the Traces of n. of ths
the Brain are fo well united together, that they can mutual can-
no longer be excited, but all thofc that Were im- ^
printed at the fame time will be alfo excited. For
Example, when a Man happens to be at fome pub-
lick Ceremony, if he obferves all the circumftances of
it, and all the principal Perfons that were prcfent,
the Time, the Place, the Day, and all other particu-
N i lars.
^ 'A Semh after truth. Book E.
lars, 'twill be enough that he remembers the Day, or
fbme other circumitance of the Ceremony lels remark-
able, to repreient to himfelf all the reft. For this
reafon it is, that when we cannot call to mind the
principal Name of a Thing, we fulHciently defign it
by making ufe of the Name, that fignifies foriie cir-
cumftance of that Thing. As when we cannot call
to mind the proper Name of a Church, we may
make ufe of another Name, which fignifies a Thing
that has foine Relation to it. We may fay, 'tis that
Church where there was fuch a Croud, where
Mr. Preaches, or whither we went laft Sunday.
And not being able to remember the proper Name of
a Perfon, or it being more convenient to defign it af-
ter another manner, we may denote it by faying,
fuch a one that has a Face pitted with the Small-Pox,
fuch a tall Man well Proportioned, or a little Crook-
back'd Man, according to the Inclinations we have
for the Man, tho' he is to blame that makes ufe of
Scornful Expreftions,
Now the Mutual Connexion of the Traces, and
confequently, of the Idea's one with another, is not
only the foundation of all the Figures of Rhetorick,
but of an infinite number of other things of greater
Importance, as in Morality, Politicks, and generally
in all Sciences, which have any Relation to Man,
and by confequence, of many things which we lhall
treat of in the fequel of this Difcourie.
The caufe of this Connexion of feveral Traces, is
the Identity of Time, when they were imprinted in
the Brain for 'tis fafficient, that feveral Traces were
produc'd at the fame time, to renew them altogether:
For the Animal Spirits, finding the way of all the
Traces open, that are made at the fame time, they
continue their way, becaufe they pals more eafily
through it than other parts of the Brain. This is the
caufe of Memory, and of the Corporeal Habits which
are common to us with Beafts.
. Thefe Connexions of the Traces, are not always
accompanied with the Emotions of the Spirits, be-
caufe ail things which we fee, do not appear to us
always
Ghap. HI. A Search after Truth, igj
always either Good or Evil. Thefe Connexions alfo,
may alter and break off, becaufe not being always
requifite for the Prefervation of Life, they ought not
always to be the fame.
But there are Traces in our Brains, that are Natu-
rally united one with another, as alfo with certain
Emotions of the Spirits, becaufe fuch a Connexion is
neceflary for the Prefervation of Life j and their Con-
nexion cannot be broken off, or at leaft, not very
eafily, becaufe it's convenient that it fhould be always
the fame. For^ Example, the Trace of a Precipice
which a Man fees under bimfelf,' and from which he
is in danger of falling, or pf fome great Body w hich
is ready* to fall upon us, and crufh us to Death, is
Naturally joined to the Trace which reprefents Death,
as alfo to an Emotion of the Spirits, which difpofes
us to fly, or defire an Efcape. This Connexion of
Traces'never changes, becaule it is neceflary that k
Ihouid be' always the lame i and it conlHts in a Dif-
pofition of the Fibres of the Brain, which we have
from our Birth.
xMl thofe Connexions which are not Natural, may,
and ought to be broken, becaufe the various Circum-
ftances of Time and Place ought to alter them, fo
that they may be ufetul to the Prelervation of Life.
'Tis convenient, for Example, that Partridges fl:ould
fly from Men with Birding-Pieces in their Hands,
elpecially at fuch times, and in fuch places, where
Men are accuftomed to Hunt after them ; bur it is
not neceflary that they fhould fly at other times, and
in other places. Thus, for the Prefervation of all
Creatures, 'tis neceflary that there ihouid be certain
Connexions of Traces, which may be eaflly fonn'dand
deftroy'd ; and that there fhcsuld be others, which
may not be broken without great difficulty. And
laftly, others whxh are never to be broken.
'Fisvery ufeful, to enquire carefully into the diffe^
rent Etfevfls, which thefe different Connexions are ca-'
pable of producing ; for they are very numerous, and
of great importance for the Underftanding of Man,
^Mid of ail things, between him and \vbich there is
N 3 »ny
A Search after Truth. Book D,
any Relation. We lhall find in the fequel of this Dif-
courfe, that thefe Things are the Principal Caufe of
our Errors; But 'tis time to return to what we pro-
mis'd to treat of, and to explain the different Changes
that befal the Imagination of Men, by reafon of their
various Manner of Living.
II. The ^eafons why they rather choofe to foUow Author
thority, than mak^ ufe of their Judgments
H E Differences that are in the various Manners
of Mens Living, are almoft Infinite. There are
a great Number of different Conditions, Employ-
ments, and Societies. Thefe Differences are the rea-
fon, that almoft all Men purfue different Defigns,
and argue upon different Principles. It would be
very difficult to meet with feveral Perfons, who have
abfolutely the fame Profpecfts in one, and the fame
Community, wherein particular Perfons ought to
be all of the fame Spirit, and have the fame Defigns:
Their different Employs and Converfation, do necef-
farily give a different Turn and Humour in the way
of Managing the Execution of thofe Things in
which they agree : This fhews, that it would be an
impoflible Undertaking to particularize the Moral
Caufes of Error. But beiides, it would i be of no
ufe to do it here, 'tis our bufinefs only to fpeak of
fiich Manners of Living, as betray Men into the
greateft Number of Errors, and to fuch as are of the
higheft Importance. When we lhall have Explained
thofe, we fhali have open'd a Way fufficient to ena-
blethe Mind 13 proceed farther, and every body may
be able to Surv y, at once, and very eafily, the moft
hidden Caufts of feveral particular Errors, _which
. ' cannot
Chap. IV. A Search after TrutL 183
cannot be explained but with a great deal of Time and.
Labour. When the Mind fees clearly, it delightslc
felf with purfuing Truth, which it dqes with an in-
exprelfible fwiftnefs. The Employment which feems I. That stu-
moft neceflary to be treated of in this.place, becaufe
it produces the moft conliderable changes in^ the Ima- ^JffubjeS
ginationpf Men, and which lead"us moft-into Error, toKrrQKf
is the Employment of Studious Perfons, who make
more ufe of their Memory than Wit. For Expe-
rience always Ihews us, that they who apply them-
felves moft eagerly to the Reading of Books, and to
Search after'Truth, are thofe who have lead us into
the greateft number of Errors.
*Tis the fame thing with thofe that Study, as with
thofe that Travel. When a Traveller, by misfortune,
has taken the wrong Road, the farther he advances,
the more remote he is from the Place whither he de-
figns to go; and the more diligent and hafty lie is to
arrive to the end of his Journey, the more he wanders,
out of the way. In like manner, thofe ardentjde-
fires which Men have for Truth, caufe'em to preci-
pitate themfelves into the Reading of Books, where
they think to find it, or to frame to themfelves m
Chimerical Syfteme of things which they defire to
know, for which they have a ftrong fancy, and which
they endeavour by the vain Efforts of Wit to make
others relifii, to the end they may receive the Honour
which is ufually due to the Inventors of Syftemes;
Now let us explain thefe two Defedls.
'Tis a diificult thing to apprehend, how it comes to
pafs, that Men of Senle Ihould rather choofe to make
ule of other Perfons Judgment in the Search of Truth,
than of that which God has beftowM upon em.
Without doubt, there is infinitely much more plea-
fure and honour for a Man to guide him felf with his
own than other Men's Eyes; nor does any Man who
has good Eyes ever dream of Ihutting'em, or of put-
ting 'em our, in hopes of one to guide him; never-
thelefs 'tis the fame thing with the ufe of Judgment
as with the ufe of the Eyes ; for as the Judgment is
infinitely above the Eyes, the ufe of it is accompa-
N ^ nkd
184 A Search after Truth, Bookll,
nied with fatisfacflions far more folid, and which con-
tent it after another manner,than Light andCoIours do
the Sight. However Men always make ufe of their
own Eyes to be their Guides ; but they feldom or
never make ufe of their own Judgment to difcover
the Truth.
Reafm But there are feveral Caules which contribute to
this fame Perturbation of the Mind. Firft, the Na-
^choje to Sloath of Men, that will not give themfeives the
follow Au^ Trouble of Meditation.
Secondly, Their Inability of Meditating, into which
ufk^ftheir fallen, for want of applying themfeives to it
own Judge- their Youth, as has been fliew'd in the Ninth
pient. Chapter.
In the third place, the little Love Men have for
Abftradled Truths; which are the foundation of every
thing that is to be known here below.
In the fourth place, the Satisfadlion that Men re-
ceive from the Knowledge of Probabilities, which
are very agreeable and very fenfible, becaufe they are
built upon Taking Notions.
In the fifth place, that foolilh Vanity which makes
^ us covet to be efteem'd Learned : For we call thofe
Learned who have Read moft. The knowledge of
Opinions is of more ufe in Converfation, and to be able
to puzzle the Minds of the Common Sort, than the
knowledge of true Philofophy which is attained by
Meditation.
In the fixth place, becaufe Men, without any Rea-'
fbn, imagine, that the Ancients were more enlightened
than we can be; and that there is nothing farther for
us to Search after, but what they have already been
fuccef ful in finding out.
In the feventh place, a certain falle Refpetff, inter-
mix'd with foolrfii Curiofity, caufes us more to ad-
mire Things that are moft remote, the moil ancient,
and that come from Countreys unknown ; and even
the molt obfcure Books. Thus was Her act it us here-
objcuram tofore admir'd for his Obfcurity. Men enquire for
old Medals, though all defac'd with Rult, and pre-
" ' " ferve, as the Apple of their Eye, the Lanthorn, or
Slipper,
Chap. IV. A Search after Truth, jgj
Slipper of feme ancient Philoropbers, though almoft
eaten up with Worms; their Antiquity enhaunces
their Price. Some apply themfelves to Read the Rab-
bies, becaufe they wrote in a ftrange Language, very
corrupt and very obfcure. Men have a high Efteem
for Ancient Opinions, becaufe Time has removed em
at a great diftance from us. And doubrlefs, had
liimrod wrote the Hiftory of his own Reign, all the
moft refin'd Politicks, all the Sciences, had been con-
tain'd in it; even as there are fome who difcover,
that Homer and Virgil had the Knowledge of all the
Secrets of Nature. Antiquity is to be relpedled, they
crie. How I could Arifiotle, Plato, Epicurus, thofe
Great Men, be deceiv'd ? They never conlider that
Ariftotle, Plato, and Epicurus, were Men as we are,
and of the fame Mould and Shape; and that now the
World is grown Two thouland years older, that it Veritai
has more Experience, that it ought to be more en-
lighten'd i and that it is the Age of the World and
Experience that enable us to dilcover the Truth. tis.
In the Eighth place, becaufe that when a new Opi-
nion or an Author of the time is cried up, it feems
that their Fame ecclipfes ours, becaufe it ihines too
near it; but they are afraid of no fuch Injury from
the Honour which they pay the Ancients.
In the Ninth place, becaufe Truth and Novelty
can never concur together in Matters of Faith. For
Men not being willing to make a diftindfion between
Truths that depend upon Reafon, and thole that de-
pend upon Tradition, never conlidcr that they ought
to be apprehended after a very different manner.
They confound Novelty with Errors, and Antiquity
with Truth. Luther, Calvin, and others have intro-
duc'd Innovations, and have been miftaken, therefore
Galileo, Harvey, and Defcartes are miftaken in their
Difcoveries. The Impannation of Luther is new, and
likewife falfe ; therefore the Circulation of Harvey
is falfe, becaufe it is new. For this Realpn it is, that
they indifferently, beftow that Odious name of Inno-
yators, both upon Hereticks and new Philolbphers.
The Idea's and Words of Truth and Antiquity, of
Fa'Jhood
f.| ^, ... ■ , . ■
, „ :4v:*/ -., i ■>.
""K '
'.;.;[' li-j
iii--
^step
,, ... !'^.
II?'
V'''
. 4i;:;^h'f:?5!k.
is-l'i 'yj- ";<'
.. -'r
'mm
h 1
r'-'j^i-',''i\i ,»,1 I '
fii
186
A Search after Truth. . /Book II.
Fal/hood and Novelty have been joined together
There's no remedy ; the Common fort never fepa*
rate em, and Men of Senfe find difficulty enongh in
it.
In the Tenth place, becaufe we live in a Time
wherein the Knowledge of the Ancient Opinions is
ftill in vogue ; and becaufe there are none but thofe
that make ufe of their Judgment, who can by Force
of their Reafon wreft themfelves from the Contagion
of Depraved Cuftoms. When we are in the Throng
and the Croud, 'tis a hard matter not to give way to
rhe Impetuofiry of the Torrent that carries us along
with it.
In the laft place, becaufe Men adl only upon the
fcore of Intereil; and this is the Reafon, that even
they who deceive themfelves, and who perceive the
vanity of thefe forts of Studiess ceafe not, to apply
themfelves to em for all that j becaufe Honours^
Dignities, and Benefices are annexed to 'em 5. and for
that they are always more capable of 'em, who excel
in thofe forts of Studies, than thofe that are ignorant
of em.
All thefe Reafons, in my Opinion, fufficiently
Ihews us why Men blindly follow the ancient Qpi-
nions, as True ; and why, without any Judgment,
they rejedl the new ones, as Falfe: In a wordj why
they make none or very little ufe of their Judgment.
There are, without queftion, a great number of Rea-
fons more particular which contribute to it y but if
thofe which we have produced, be but attentively
conlidefd, there will be no caufe of furprize to fee
how fome People are prejudic'd with the Auchoi^ty of
the Ancients.
CHAP.
rfj
h
Timiis
Chap.V:
N——■ I ■ I ■ '»' ■
CHAP. V.
Cf the 111 EjfeBs that Reading has ufm thelmagination^
'^His fame Falfe and unworthy Refpedl, which Men
have for the Ancients, produces a great number
of moft pernicious EfFeds, which it is convenient to
obferve.
The firft is, that want of uling their own Judg-
ment, does, by little and little, really difable Men from
making any ufe of it at all. For it is not to be ima-
gin'd, that they who grow old over the Volumes of
Plato and Ariflotle, make ufe of their Judgment ;
they commonly fpend fo much time in the Reading
of thofe Books, only to endeavour to know the Sen-
timents of their Authors ; and their principal aim is,
to know certainly what Opinions they held, without
ever troubling themfelves much, whither they be
confentaneous to Reafon or np, as we lhall prove in the
following Chapter, Thus th.e Science, and Philofophy
which they learn, is properly a Science of Memory,
and not^ Science of Judgment : They only under-
ftand Hiftories, and Matters of Fad, not evident
Truths ; and they are rather Hiftorians than true Phi-
lofophers.
The fecond Eifed, which the Reading of the An-
cients produces in the Imagination, is, that it puts a
ftrange confufion into ail their Idea's who apply
themfelves to it. There are two different ways to
read Authors j the one very good, and vh-y profita-
ble ; the other very ufelefs, and even dangerous. 'Tis
very profirabJe to read, when we medicare upon what
we read : When Men endeavour to find out, by fome
effed of their Wit, how to refoive the Qneftions
which they meet with in the Titles of the Chapters,
before they begin to read them: When they digeff,
and compii're the Idea's of things one with another:
In
A Search after Truth, 'Book IL
In a word, when they make ufe of their Reafon. On
the other fide, there is no Profit in Reading, when
Men underftand not what they read ; but 'tis dan-
gerous for Men to read, and conceive what they read,
when they never examine it fufficiently, to make a
good Judgment of it j efpecially, if they have Memo-
ry enough to retain what they have conceiv'd, and
do not unwarily affent to what they have read and
underftood. The firft way enlightens the Mind, it
fortifies it, and enlarges its Capacity : The fecond
contradls its Extenfion, and by little and little,
renders it both weak, obfcure and confus'd.-
Now the greateft part of thofe who boaft of know-
ing the Opinions of others, never Study but after the
fecond Manner j and lo the more Reading they have,
the more their Judgment becomes Feeble and Con-
fus'd. The Realbn is, becaufe the Traces of their
Brains are confounded one with another, being very
numerous; and becaufe Reafon has not digefted em
in order; which hinders the Mind from imagining
and reprefenting clearly to it felf the Things which
it ftands in need of. When the Mind goes about to
open certain Traces, meeting with others more fa-
miliar, it never feeks ahdther Paflage. For the Ca-
pacioufnefs of the Brain not being Infinite, 'tis impol-
(ible but the great number of Traces form'd irre-
gularly, muft interfere one with anothej*, dhd caufe
a Confufion among the Idea's: 'Tis for this very Rea-
fon, that Perfons that have great Memories are in-
capable of judging fuch things as require much at-
tenrion.
But that which is chiefly to be obferved is thiSy
that the Knowledge they acquire, who Read without
Meditation, are only to retain the Opinions of o-
thers. In a word, that all Sciences that depend upon
the Memory, are properly thefe kinds of Knowledge
that puff Men up, becaufe they make a great noife,
and infufe a World of Vanity into thofe that polfels
them. Thus, they who are learned after that man-
ner, being tifually full of Pride and Prefumption, pre-
tend they have a Right to Judge of every thing, tho'
chap, V. A Search after Truth, 185
they are very iincapable ; which caufes fhem to fall
into a great number of Errors.
But this falle Knowledge does more mifchief ftill i
for thefe Perfons fall not alone into Error, they draw
along with them almolt all the Minds of the Vulgar
fort, and a very great Number of young People,
who believe all their Decifions as fo many Articles of
Faith. Thefe fallely Learned, having often prevaifd
over them, with the weight of their profound Learn-
ing, and having deafned them, as well with extraor-
dinai7 Opinions, as with the Names of ancient and
unknown Authors, have gain'd fo powerful an Autho-
rity over them, that they re pedf and admire, as Ora-
cles, whatever they utter, and no lefs unadvifedly,
embrace all their Sentiments Perfons alfo, much
much Ingenious, and more Judicious, who had never
known them before, or could not be inform 'd by
others what they are, hearing them talk at fuch a
rate, and with fo haughty, (o imperious, and grave
an Air, would have much ado to refrain their refpecff
and efteem for what they fay, becaufe it is a difficult
thing to forbear paying lomewhat to Air and Deport-
ment: For, as it often happens, that a Man who is
fierce and daring, abufes others who are ftronger, but
more prudent and moderate than himfelf; lb they,
who maintain Things which are neither true nor pro-
bable, put their Adverfaries to Silence, by fpeaking
after an imperious, haughty, and grave manner,
which furprizes them. Now thefe People, of whom
wefpeak, have a high Conceit of themfelves, and de-
J223. fpife other Men, as being fortify M with a certain. Air
of Pride, intermix'd with Gravity, and a Counterfeit
'jt'k Modefty, which prepofleiles, and wins thole that hear
* them.
For it is to be obferv'd, that all the different Airs
of Perfons of different Conditions, are only the Naru-
ral confequences of that Elteem which every Man has
of himfelf, in reference to others, as it is eaiie to per-
ceive, if we never fo little confider it. Thus the Air
of Fiercenefs and Brutality, is that of a Man, that
magnifies himfelf, and little values the Merit of others.
The
i^Q A Search after Truth. Book II.
The Modeft*Air, is that of a Man, who has a low
Conceit of himfelf, a high Efteetn for others. The
Grave Air, is that of a Man, who has a high Conceit
of himfelf, and greatly Ambitious of others Efteem,
And the Simple Air, is that of one who has no great
Conceit either of himfelf, or of any body elfe. So
that all the different Airs, which are almoft Infinite,
are only the Effedts which the different Degrees of
Efleem that Men have of themfelves, or of thofe with
whom they Converfe, naturally produce in our
looks, and over all the Exterior parts of our Bo-
dies. We have in the Fourth Chapter, explain d the
Correfpondence between the Nerves that raife the
Paffions within us, and thofe which demonftrate them
outwardly, by the Air which they Imprint upon the
Face.
c H A p. vi.
Studious Perfons arc ufually prejudic'd in favour of
fame AuthorJo that their Principal Aim is to l(now
what he believ d^ without minding what he ought to
believe.
■* ' 5
^"pHere is another fault of great confequence, where-
into great Students ufually fall ; which is, That
they Dote upon fome certain Author. If there be
any thing true and good in the Book, they cry it
up even to excels; every thing is true, the whole is
good, every thing in it is to be admir'd. They pleafe
themfelves with admiring what they underftand not,
and they would have all the World admire it
as well as themfelves. They afliime Honour to
themfelves, from the Praifes which they give to thofe
obfcure Authors, becaufe thereby they perfwade others
that they underftand them perfectly well ; and this
affords them no fmall occafion of Vanity, They va-
lug
Chap* VI. A Search after Truths
!ue themfelves above other Men, becaufe they believe
they underftand a Piece of Impertinency in an Old
Author, or in a Man that, perhaps, never underftood
himfelf How many Learned Men have Sweated, to
lUuftrate fome obfcure Paflages of the Ancient Philo-
fbpfaers and Poets y and how many great Wits are
there, who make it their whole delight to Critici2e
upon a Word, or the Sentiment of an Author : But
'tis convenient to bring fome Inftance for what I
alledge.
The Queftion concerning the Immortality of the
Soul, is, without all doubt, a Queftion of great Im-
portance. The Philofophers are not to be blam'd, for
uiing all their endeavours to refolve it; and tho'
they compile large Volumes, to prove, tho' weakly
enough, a Truth that may be demonftrated in a few
Words, or in a few Pages at moft, yet they are excu-
lable. But who can refrain from laughing, to lee
them put themfelves to fuch a World of Trouble,
to decide what Ariflotle thought of it: 'Tis, in my
Opinion, a thing of little benefit to thole that live
now, to know whether there were ever fuch a Man
who was cali'd Ariflotle ; whether that Man ever
wrote thofe Books which go under his Name ; whe-
ther he meant fuch or fuch a thing, in fuch a part of
his Works; it can neither make a Man more Wife,
or more Happy: But 'tis of great Importance to
know, whether what he has faid be true or falfe in
it felf.
'Tis to no purpofe then, to know what Ariflotle be-
liev'd touching the Immortality of the Soul, tho* it be
of great moment to know that the Soul is Immortal.
However, we arc not afraid to aflert, that leveral
Learned Men have put themfelves to more trouble, to
know the Opinion of Ariflotle, upon this fubjedt, than
the Truth of the Thing in it felf, fince tirere are Ibme
who have compos'd whole Folio's, on pur pole to un-
fold what that Philcffopher bdiev'd of it, but never
did lb much to know what he ought to have believ'd
of it,
But
191
I
ill
II
is
ii
I
n
;^li, ., ,'V • r Ititii .'
ItSj''> ■
St^ v^lil^i',!: .
Stf- i,i
ifsa
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wy'iK^yl y
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, B.. M.k.^
i'!
>'jjj J V".
rfltiinvi'TS
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t
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1 ; ■■
'-■ -jP':' ■
■f'Alpfrt.
ill
fi|"?ii
iiip:
ItiiVit
ipi A Searc%. after Trtlfk Book Hi
But tho' fo great a number of People have cir'd
their Brains, to refolve what was Ariflotle^s Opinion,
they laboured all to no purpofe, fince they cannot as
yet agree about this trihing Queftion i which Ihews,
that the Followers of Ariftotie are very Unfortunate,
to have a Man fo obfcure to enlighten them j and
who himfeif affedted obfcurity, as he teftifies in a
Letter which he wrote to Alexander.
The Opinion then, of Ariftotie, touching the Immor-
tality of the Soul, has been at leveral times a very
great Qnertion, and very conhderable among Studi-
ous Perlons 5 but becaufe it may not be thought that
I talk at Random, and without any Foundation, I am
oblig'd to recite in this placea paffageout o^La Cerdaf
fomewhat long,and fomewhat tedious,wherein thatAu-
thor has heap'd together as many different Authorities
upon that fubjed:, as upon a Queftion of great mo-
ment- Flis words are thefe that follow, upon the
lecond Chapter of TertuUian.^ de ^efwrre&ione Carnis.
Quceftio h<ec in fcholK utrimque validis Jufpicionitus
agitatur, num anlmam immortalem, mortalemve fecerit
Arifloteles. Et quidem Philofofbi baud igmbiles ajfeve^
ravenint Ariftotelem pofuiffe noftros mimos ab interitu
alienos* Hi funt e Gracis & Latinis interfretibus Am-
monius uterquey OlymfiodoruSy Philoq>onuSy SimfliciuSy
Avicenna, uti memorat MiranduU 1. 4. de examine va-^
nitatis Ca^. 9. IbeodoruSy Metocbytes, Themifiiufy S. Tho'
mas 2. contra gentes cap, 79. C2? Pb^f* leB, 12. fS? pr.^te*
rea 12. Metap, leH. 3. & quodlib. lo. qu. 5. art. I. Ah
hertuSy tra^. 2. de anima cap, 20. G? "TraH, 3. cap, 13.
.^Egidim lib. 3. de anima ad cap, 4. Durandus in 2. difl„
I S. qu, 3. Ferrarius loco citato contra gentety ^ late Ew
guhinus i 9. de perenni Philofophia cap, 18. quod plw
ris efly difcipulus Ariftotelis TheopbrafluSy mngijtri meu'
tern & ore & calamo novijfe peritus qui poterat.
In contrariam faBionem ahiere nonnuUi Patres, nec in"
fir mi Pbilofophi; Jufiinm in fua Parainefiy Or igenes in
(pi}^Q(roqns!jjfay ut fertur Na:{iam{, in dijp. contra Ew
rom, Nyjfmus I, 2. de anima cap, 4. Tbeodoretus de cu-
rartdu Gracorum aJfcBibus I. 3. Galenus in hiftoria Pbh
Icfophicaj Pompdnatiui I. de immortaiitate anim,Vy Simon
PortiuS
Ch^. YI. A Inarch afitr Truth.
Portius L de mente bumana; Caietanus 3. de anima
2,. In eum fit^utn^ ut caducum animum ncfjirum futaret
AriJhteleSt funt fartim adduHi ah Alexi^ndro AfbodK
auditiffei pc folittis erat interpretari Ariflqtilicam
Tnentem > quamvis Pugubinus cap 21. ^ 22. eum excw
Jet, Et quidem unde coUegiJJe videtur Alexander mortar
litatem^ nemps ex 12. Metaph, inde S, Thomof, Tjoeodq'
rufi Metoch)tes immortalltatem coUegerunt*
Pom PertuBaimm neutram banc oplnionem amplexum
credo ; fed putaffe in hac parte amhiguum Arifiotelenf,
Itaque it a citat ilium pro utraque. Nam cum hie adfcri-
bat Ariftoteli mortalitntem animae-, tamen I. de anima c, 6.
pro cmtrario opinione imrmrtalitatis citat. Eadem rr^en^
te fuit Plutarchm, pro utraque opinione advocans eundem
Philofophum in I. de placitis Philofop. Nam cap.
mortalitatem tribuity cap. 25. immortalipatem. Ex
Scholafticis etiaWt qui in neutram partem Ariflotelem con-
ftantem judicanty fed dubium ^ ancipitemy funt Scotus in
4.difl. ^^.qu. %. art.Z.Harveus quodlib. i. qu. 11.& i.
fenten.4ift. i- qu.i. Niphyf inOpufiuloAe immortalitati
animise cap. i. & rScentes alii interpretes : qyam mediam
exiftimationem credo verier em y fed fcbolii lex vet at y ut
autmtatum pondere librato illud fuadeam.
We give ye all thefe Citations for true, upon the
Credit of the Commentator, believing it would be
lols of time to juftihe them ; and becaule we have
^aot all tke Books from whence they were Extrai^ed*
Nor do we add any new ones, becaufe we do not
envy faim the Honour of having well colle(5ted theoij
and for that it wou.ld be (till more lofs of time, had
we a delire to do it, tho' we fliould only, for that pur-
pofe, turn over the Indices erf" the Coinmentators up-
on Arifiotle.
We lee then, by this paffage of La Cerday that
Studious Menj who pafs for able S*.holars, have put
themfelves to the Trouble to know what Arifiotle be-
liev'd of the Immortality of the Soul, apd that there
Were fome of them that never fcrupled to Write
Books on purpofe, upon this fubjedl; among whom
Was Pomponatius : For the principal Aim of that Au-
thorj in his Booh> is to Ihew that Arifiotle believ'd the
O Soul'
A Searclj after Truth. Book II,
Soul to be Mortal. Ai^d, perhaps, there are fome
People, who do not only enquire what Ariftotle be-
liev'd upon this lubjed, but alio, look upon it as a
Queftion of great Importance to know, whether, for
Example, Tertuliian, Plutarch, or others, believ'd or
not, that the Opinion of Ariftotle was, that the Soul j
voas Mortal, as we have great reafon to believe of La
Cerda himfelf^ if we confider the laft part of the ^
PalTage which we have cited, vis[. Porro Tertuliianum, i
See,
If it be not very Profitable to know what Ariftotle
thought, concerning the Immortality of the Soul, nor
what Tertullian and Plutarch thought what Ariftotle be- '
liev'd, however, the main of the Qiieftion about the
Immortality, or Mortality of the Soul, is, at leaft, a
Truth very neceffary to be known. But there are an
infinite number of things, the knowledge of which is
very unnecellary, and of which, by confequenee, 'tis
to yet lefs purpofe to know what the Ancients thought |
of them: Neverthelefs, they put themfelves to a
World of trouble, to guels at the Sentiments of Philo-
fophers upon fubjedls of the like Nature. We meet
with Books full of thefe Inquifitions, and thefe are the
Trifles that have rais'd fo many Wars among the ^
Learned. Thefe vain and impertinent Queftions, '
thefe frivolous Genealogies of unprofitable Opinions, |
are the Important liibjedls of the Criticifms of the |
Learned: They imagine themfelves the Abfoiute
Mailers of the Genealogical Hiftory of fubftantial |
Forms, and the World is Ingrateful if it does not ac- i
knowledge their Merit. How do thefe things dif- j
play the Weaknefs and Vanity of Human Wit! When I
Reafon does nor, that regulates our Studies; our Stu- |
dies not only grow incapable of perfediing Reafon, j
but even darken, corrupt, and abfoluteiy pervert it.
But 'tis neceflary here to obferve, that in Queftions
concerning Faith, they are no way to blame, who |
iearch what St. Auftin, for Example, or any other Fa- |
thers of the Church, have believ'd concerning thofe |
things; as neither are they, who enquire whither f
St. Anftiii believ'd what they believ'd who preceded '
him, I
il®
Chap. VI. A Search after Truth.
him, becaufe we cannot attain to Matters of Faith,
but by Tradition, Reaibn not being able to difcover
them. The moft Ancient Belief being the moft true,
'tis requifite to know what was that Belief of the An-
dents, which cannot be done but by examining the
Opinions of feveral Perfons, who fucceeded each other
at different times. But in things that depend upon
Reafon, the cafe is alter'd, and there is a neceflity
for Men to trouble themfelves what the Ancients be-
liev'd, that we may know what is needful for our
felves to believe concerning them : Neverthelefs, I
know not through what confufion of the Mind, cer-
tain People are affrighted, if we fpeak otherwife in
Philofophy than Ariftotle; but are never mov'd, if we
fpeak otherwife in Divinity than the Gofpel, the Fa-
thers, and the Councils. It feems to me, that they
who make the loudeft noife againft the Novelties of
Philofophy, which ought to be efteem'd i are they that
favour and defend Innovations in Divinity, with the
greateft obftinacy, and which ought to be derefted.
For 'ds not their Language which we blame, as being
Authorized by Cuftom, tho* altogether unknown to
Antiquity, but the Errors which they difperfe abroad,
or which they maintain under the Protedion of their
confused and equivocal Terms.
In Matters of Divinity, we Ihou'd follow Antiquity,
becaufe we ought to love Truth, and becaufe Truth
is found in Antiquity: 'Tis neceflary that all Curiolity
Ihou'd ccafe, whence once we have found out the
Truth, but in Matters of Philofophy 'tis quite the con-
trary : we ought to love Novelty, for the fame reafon
that we ought always to love the Truth ,* we muft
fearch after it, and have an unceflant Curiofity for it.
If we thought that Ariflotle^ and Plato^ were Infal-
lible, it wou'd be fufficient for us to apply our felves
to underftand them, but Reaibn will not permit us to
believe it; for, on the contrary, it requires that we
fhou'd believe them more ignorant than the New Phi-
lofophers, lince the World is now grown older by two
thoufand Years, and has more Experience than it had
in Ariflotk\ and Plato's Days, as we have already
O z laid f
t9f
t^6 'A Search after Truth. Bodk. It
faid ; and becauie the New Philofophers may not on-
ty know all the Truths which the Ancients have left
behind them, but may likewife difcover many others:
Neverthelefs, Reafon forbids us to believe thefe New
Philofophers upon their own Words, rather than the
Ancients. It requires, ontbecontraryj that we (hould
diligently examine their Thoughts, and refule our
Aflent, till it is impoffible for us, any longer, to doubf
the certainty of their Truth ; without being ridicu-
loufly prepolfod with their great Learning, or other
Qiialiiies of their Wit.
CHAP. vri.
Of the Prejudices of Commentators.
^THis excels of Prejudice, appears much mure
-*■ ftrange in thofe who Comment upon any Author,
becaufe they, who undertake that Work, which
feems in it felf beneath a Man of Senfe, imagine that
their Authors deferve -to be admir'd by all Men.
They alfo look upon themfelVes, as making but one
Perlon with their Author ; and with this Conceit,
Self-love moft admirably plays it's part. They are
cunningly profole in the Praifcs of their Authors;
they let them olF with the beft advantage, and heap
Honours upon them, well knowing that this Honour
will re^ed: upon themfelvcs. And this Idea of Gran-
dear, does not only magnifie Ariftotle or Plato, in the
Minds of many Perfons, but it imprints alfo aRelpcd
for all thofe that have Commented upon them : And
fuch a one v/ould never have Deify''d his Author, but
that he imagiu'd himfelf, as it were, comprehended
in the fame Glory.
I do not believe, however, that all Commentators
praife their Authors in hopes of a Return ; many
vvou d abhor it, if they conlider'd k 5 they Praifo
ihem
Chap. VII. A Search Trtah.
them fincerely, and don't think they do it in refpecSlj
to themfelves, but Self-love docs it for them, without
their perceiving it^. Men are not fenfible of the Heat
which is in their Hearts^ tho* it gives Life and Mo-
tion to all the other parts of their Body ; 'tis necefla-
ry that they feel it, by laying their Hands upon their
Breaft, to be convinc'd of it, becaufe that Heat is
Natural. Tis the lame thing with Vanity; 'tis lb
Natural to Man, that he is not fenlible of it, tho* k
be that, which, as I may lb lay, gives Life and Mo-
tioft to the greateft part of his Thoughts and Defigns;
it does k naany times, in fuch a manner, as is imper-
ceptible to him. A Man muft feel, handle, audi
fearck himfelf^ to be convinc'd that be is Vain. There's
no Man yet, has fuflfkiently been fenlible, that 'tis
this Vanity which fets the firft Wheel of the greateft
part of our Adfions a going j for tho' Sfclf-Iove, in-
deed, knows k welt enough, yet is that Knowledgs
to no other end^ than to conceal it from all Man-
kind.
A Commentator then, having fome Relation and
AMnity with the Author, upon whom he Comments,
his Self love fails not to difcover to him the great
fubjet^s ol Praife in that Author, to the end he may
reap the benefit of them himfelf: And this is done
fo dexteroully, fo fubtikly, and fo delicately, that it
is not to be perceived. But this is not a place to dif
cover the Artifices of Self-love.
Commentators not only Praife their Authors, be-
caufe they are prepoflefied with an Eftcem for them,
and becaufe they Honour themfelves in Praifing them,
but alfo, becaufe it is the Cuftom, and for that it
feems as if there were a necefifity of doing it. There
are feme Perfons, who not having any great value for
certain Authors, forbear not, however, to Comment
upon them, and that with great ^'^application too, be-
caufe their Employment, Chance, or their own Ca-
prieious Fancy, engages them to undertake the Work.
And thefe People believe themfelves oblig'd, to extol,
afrer a Hyperbolical manner, the Sciences, and Au-
thors upon which they Comment, the* the Authors
O 5 ^re
pp
^6'' V'" "
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198 A Search after Truth. Book 11.
• are Impertinent, and the Sciences mean and ufe-
lels.
And, indeed, it would be a very ridiculous thing
for a Man to Comment upon an Author, whom he
believes to be Impertinent, and ferioudy to apply
himfelf to write, in fuch a manner, as he thought to be
of no ufe. He muft therefore, for his Reputation's
fake, praife thofe Sciences, and thofe Authors, altho*
both were Contemptible, and tho' the fault, which he
has committed in undertaking an ill Work, may be
repaired by another fault as bad. This is the Rea-
fon that Learned Men, who Comment upon different
Authors, frequently contradict themfelves.
For this Reafon alfo it is, that almoft all Prefaces
are fcarce ever agreeable to Truth or good Senle. If
the Comment be upon Ariftotlcy he is the Genius of
'Nature : If they Write upon Plato, he is the Divine
Plato, They never Comment upon the Works of
Men without Additions to their Names. They are
always the Works of Men wholly Divine y of Men
who are the Admiration of their Age 5 or fuch as have
received from God particular Gifts. 'Tis the fame
thing alfo, with the Matter which they treat of; 'tis
always the moft Noble, the moft Sublime, and the
moft uleful of all other fubjecfls.
But that I may not be thought to fpeak upon my
own word, fee here, after what manner a famous
Commentator among the Learned, writes of the Au-
thor upon which he Comments. 'Tis Averroes fpeak-
ing of Ariftotlc : He fays, in his Preface to the Phyfics
of that Philofopher, that he was the Inventor of Lo-
gic, Ethics, and Metaphyfics, and that he brought
them to Perfe(5Iion. Complevit, fays he, quia nullm
^ eorum, qui fecuti funt eum ufq', ad hoc tempm, quod eft
mille quingentorum annorum, quidquam addidit ;
nec invcnies in ejus verbis errorem aficujus quantitatis;
Et talem effe virtutem in Individiio uno, miraculofum,
(3 extraneum exiflit y ^3 hac difpojitio cum in uno Ho-
mine reperitur,dignus eft effe divimis magis quam Huma'^
nns. And in other places, he gives him far more
*cneStione and Magnificent Praifes Laudemus De-
laimal. ^
Chap. VII. A Search after Trutk 199
UYHy ^ui fefaravit hunc virum ab aliis in ferfcEiione :
appropriavitq') ei ultimam dignitatem humanam-, quam
rum omnis homo pot eft in quacunqi at ate attingere. The
fame Author alfo fays. Comm. L i. deft rue. difp,-^,
Ariftotelis Dohirina eft SUMMA VEftlTAS, quoniam
ejus IntelleBus fuit Finis Humani IntelleBus: quare bene
dieitur de illo-, quod ipje fuit creatus & datus nobis di-
vina Providentiuy ut non ignoremus pojftbilia fciri.
Was not this a Mad-man for talking at this rate ?
Was not the Dotage of this Author degenerated into
Extravagance and Phrenzy ? The DoBrine of Ariftotle
is SOVEHftlGN TI^THy hecaufe no body had Vnder'
ftandinglikf to hiSi or which came near to his. ^Twas
he who was created by Gody to teach us what it is
pojftble for us to ktiow. ' Fis he who makes all Men
CF^fe ; and they are fo much the more Learned, the
deeper they enter into his lijoughts. And in another
fjice, Ariftoteles fuit FrincepSy per qiiem perftciuntur
omnes fapientes qui fuerunt pcft curay licet differ ant inter
fe in intelligend'j verba ejuSy in eo quod feqiiitur ex
eis, Neverthelels, the Works of this Aithor are dif-
pers'd all over EwopCy as alfo over Countries far
more remote. They have been Tranflated out of
Arabic into Hebrew, out of Hebrew into Latin, and
it may be into many other Languages, which fulfi-
ciently fliews the Efteem which the Learned had of
him: So that we could not have produced a more ma-
nifeft Example than this, of the Prejudic'd Opinions
of Studious Perfons; for it fhews us, that they are
not only many times Prejudic'd with an Author, but
alio, their Prejudice is communicated to others, pro-
portionably to the Efteem which they have in the
World : So that the falfe Praifes which Commentators
gives him, arc the reafon that Perfons of meaner Parts,
and lefs Education, who are addidled to Reading, be-
come prepofTefs'd, and fall into an infinite number of
Errors. But here's another Example :
A certain Doclor, famous among the Learned, who PideSIi
has founded Lcdluresof Geometry and Aftronomy in prin
the Univerfity of Oxford, begins a Book, which he p
ip.ade upon the Eight firft Propoficions of Enclidy ^vith ^
O 4 thefe
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%oo A Search after Trt^i Bocrifclt.
thefe Wor^§: ConfiUtim meum, Audi tores j ft litres &
'valetudo fuffecerit, explicare defifiitiones, petitiones, com-
tnunes fententias^ OHo priores Propofitiones primi Li-
hri Elementorum) cetera, poft me venientibm relinquere.
And he concludes thus, Exolvi per dei gratiam, Bomi-
ni Auditores^ promiffum, liberavi fidem rmam-, expii-
cdvi pro modulo meo, defimtioneSi petitioneSy commuiies
fententiast (3 oBo priores propofitiones Elementorum Eu-
clidis. Hie amis jeffus, cyclos artemq; repono. Succe-
dent in hoc munus alii fortaffe magis vegeto corpore, vivi'
do iitgenioy See, Certainly one hour would be enough
for a very mean Capacity to learn of himfeif, or with
the help of the moft ordinary Geometrician^ the De-
fihitions, the Poftulates, Axioms, and the eight firft
Propofitions of Euclid j they have hardly need of any
Explanation: Yet here's an Author, that talks of this
Enttrprife as if it were extreamly hard and difficult.
He is afraid left his ftrength (hould fail him, fi virefs
e3 valetudo fuffecerint. He leaves it to his SuccefR)ils
to perfedt what he has left undone, Caster a pofi me ve-
nientibus relinquere. He thanks God, for that by his
particular favour, he has performed what he promis'd,
Exolvi per dei gratiam premiffitm 5 liberavi fidefn me-
dm ; explicavi pro modulo meo ; What ? The Quadra^
ture of a Cirde ? The Duplication of a Cube }
This great Man has explaih'd, pro modulo fuoy the
Definitions, Poftulates^ Axioms, and the eight firft
Propofitions of the fitfl Book of Euclids Elements.
It may be, that among tbofe Vhat are to fucceed him,
there will be Ibme that will have more health and
ftreiigrh than himfeif, to continue this Noble Work.
Sue cedent in hoc munus alii PORTA SSE magis vegeteiS
corpore (3 vivido ingenio. But as for his part, 'tis time for
him to take his reft, his annisfeffus, cyclos artemp, rcponit.
Euclid, certainly, never thought of being fo ob-
fcUre, or of fpeaking things fo extraordinary, when
he composd his Elements, that there fliould be a ne-
^n^iarte. cefllty of making a Book of near three hundred Pa-
' *' i . ges, to explain his Definitions, his Poftulares/his Axioms,
and his Eight firft Propofit'ons'.Bu't this learned Gen-
.de-mahV well knows how td magnify the Science
t!-'? •. r; . V;- ; - -.i
i
iCtt
chap. Vn. A Simh after Trmh.
S of Ettcft'i, and had Age peitnitted him, and his
Strength not faifd him, we fhould have had, by this
time, twelve or fifteen large Folio's only upon the
Elements of Geometry, which would have been very
ufeftil to thofe that are delirous to learn that Science,
and much to the Honour of Euclid,
Thefe are the odd Dcfigns which falfe Learning
qualifies us for : This Man underftood the Greek Lan-
guage, for we are beholding to him for a Greek Edi-
tion of Si,Chryfoftomestorks. He had alio read,
perhaps, the Ancient Geometricians: He knew, hifto-
ricaliy, their Propofitions, as well as their Genealogy.
He had all the fame Refped for Antiquity that Men
ought to have for Truth : And what does this fame
Qualification of Wit produce ? A Commentary upon
the Definitions, Poftulates, Axioms, and the eight
firft Propofitions of Euclid, much more difficult to Un-
derftand and retain ; I do not fay, than the Propo-
litions upon which he Comments, but than all that
EudHd has Writ upon Geometry.
There are many People, whofe Vanity caufes rhem
to Ipeak Greek, and lometimes a Language which
they do not underftand ; for D«3:ionaries, as well as
Index's, and Common Places, are a great help to ma-
ny Authors, but there are few Men that caution
themfelves, about heaping up Greek upon a fubje*^
where it is litde to the purpofe to make ufe of it.
And this it is, which makes me bdieve 'twas a pre-
judic d Opinion, and an irregular Efteem for Euclid,
which fonn'd the defign of that Book in the Ima-
gination of its Author.
Had this Man made as much ufe of his 'Reafon as
of his Memory, in a fubjedf where Reafon ought iq
be employ'd; or had he had as much Love and Re-
fpedl for Truth, as Veneration for the Author upon
wber. whom he Comments, 'tis very probable, that having
fpent fo much rime upon fo little fubjetif, he would
have acknowledg'd, that the Definitions which Euclid
gives of a Plain Angle, and Parallel Lines, arc de-
fedfive, and that they do not fiifficiently explain the
Nature of them s and that the fecond Pnopofirion is
' ■ ' ■ " ■♦< - ........ Xmperd.ienr,
toi
S a:
zoz A Search after Truth. Book II.
Impertinent, fince it cannot be proved but by the third
Poftulate, which cannot be granted, unlefs you like-
wife grant the fecond Propolition. For in granting
the third Poftulate, which is. On any Centre^ and at
any Diftance-t to defcrihe a Circle, they not only grant,
that one Line equal to the other, may be drawn from
a Point, which Euclid demonftrates by great Circum-
locutions in his fecond Propofition, but alio, that an
infinite number of Lines, of any length, may be
drawn from every Point.
But the Defign of the moft part of Commentators
is not to illuftrate their Authors, and to enquire after
Truth, but to (hew their Learning, and inconfiderate-
ly to defend the faults themfelves, of thofe upon
whom they Comment: They fpeak not fo much to
be underftood themfelves, or to make their Authors
to be underftood, as to procure Admiration to them-
felves and them. Had not the Perfon, whom we have
mentionM, ftuft his Book with Greek Paftages, feve-
ral Names of Authors little known, and other Re-
marks of the fame Nature, of little ufe to the Under-
ftanding of Common Notions, Definitions of Names,
and Poftulates in Geometry, who would have read
his Book? Who would have admir'd him ^ And who
would have given the Author of it, the Title of a
Learned Man, or a Man of Senfe ?
After what has been laid, I do not believe it can
be doubted, that the indifcreet Reading of Authors
often prepoffelfes the Mind. Now fo foon as the
Mind of a Man is prepofiefs'd, he ceafes to be owner
of what we call Common Senie: He can no longer
give a found Judgment upon any thing, that has Rela-
tion to the lubjed: of his Prejudic'd Opinion, it in-
feds every thing he thinks on ; he can apply himfelf
but very little to any thing, befides what he is Preju-
dic'd in favour of. Thus a Man that admires Ariflo-
tie, can never relifh any body but Ariflotle; he
Judges of everything as it relates to Ariftotlc ; what-
ever is contrary to his Philofophy, is in his Opinion
falfe, he will have always fome Paifigc of Ariflctle in
his Mouth > he will Quote him upon all occafions.
Chap.Vn. A Search after Truth.
and upon all forts of fubjecls j to prove things ob-
fcure, which no body underftands, to prove things
as clear as day, and which are known to every Child
i'th* Street; 'tis all one, becaufe that Ariftotle is to him
what Reafon and Evidence are to others.
In like manner, if a Man Dote upon Eticlid^ and
Geometry, he ihall refer to the JJnes and Propoli-
tions of his Author, whatever you fay to him : He
will not talk to ye, but his Words lhall have fome de-
pendence upon his Science. The whole lhall qot be
greater than a part, only becaufe Euclid fays it, and
he will not be alham'd to Quote him to prove it, as
I have obferv'd. But this is much more ufual with
thofe who adhere to other Authors than thofe of Geo-
metrj' I and we frequently find large Greek, Hebrew,
and Arabic Pailages in their Books,to prove things that
are perfe(5lly evident.
All this befalls them, becaufe the Traces^ which the
Objedls of their Prejudic'd Opinion have imprinted
on the Fibres of their Brains, are fo deep, that they
always remain open, and for that the Animal Spirits,
palling continually quite through them, will not per-
mit them to clofe: So that the Mind, being con-
ftrain'd to have always thofe Thoughts that are an-
nex'd to the Traces, Ihe becomes, as it were, their
Slave, and is always troubled and difquieted by them,
when knowing her Errors, fhe endeavours to apply
a Remedy to them. Thus the Mind is continually in
danger of falling into a great number of Errors, if
Ihe does not always ftand upon her Guard, and, v,;ith
an unalterable Refolution, obferve the Rule wfiich
we have fpoken of at the beginning of this Work;
that is to lay, never to njjcnt hut to Things that are hi-
tirely evident.
I fpeak not here of the ill choice of thofe Studies
to which they apply them leives, that is a fubjed:
to be handled in Ethics, cho' it might be referred to
what has heea faid concerning Prejudic'd Opinions:
For when a M.^.n throws himielf defperately upon the
ftudy of the Rabbins, and other Books in all forts of
languages, and confenucntly the moil unprofitable.
A Search after Truth. Booit IL
ancf waftes his whole Life therein, he does it, doubt-
le&, out of a Prejudic'd Opinion, and an Imaginary
hope of becoming Learned, tho* he will never be able
to acquire any real Knowledge by this way of Study,
But becaufe this Application to an unprofitable Study,
does not fb much lead us into Error, as it waftes our
Time, and fills us with a fooiifh Vanity, we fhall not
here difcourfe of thofe, who take pains to become
Learned in all forts of mean, or unprofitable Scien-
ces, whofe Number is very great, and who, for the
moft part, Study with too much Paflion.
CHAP. VIIL
I, 0/ the Inventors ef New Syflems, XL The laft Error
of Studious Perfons.
'inn'E have fhew'd the State of the Imagination of Stu-
dious Perlbns, who abandon themfeives wholly
to the Authority of certain Authors : There are others,
who are very much oppofite to them. Thefe are a
fort of Perfons that never refpe(5l any Authors, what-
ever efteem they have among the Learned: If they
had a Value for them once, they have fince chang'd
their Minds, and now they fet up themfeives for Au-
thors. They would fain become the Inventors of feme
New Opinion, thereby to acquire fome Reputation
in the World and they aflure themfeives, that if
they can but fay fomething that has not been faid al-
ready, they fhaU not fail of Admirers.
Thefe fort of Men have iifually a ftrong Imagina-
tion, the Fibres of their Brain are of fuch a Nature,
that they preferve a long time, the Traces that are im-
printed in them. Thus, when they have once ima-
gin'd a Syilem that has fbme Probability, 'tis impofli-
ble to undeceive them of their Error ; They retain,
and tenderly preferye all things, that may be fer-
viceable,
Chap^ Vm. A Search Tmth.
vice^le, in any manner, to confirm it. On the otber
fide, they never take notice jof the Objed:ions which
are made a^inft it, or elk they evade them by fijme
frivolotts diftindion. Inwardly they pleale them-
&lves witfa the fight of their Work, and with the Re-
putadon which they hope to get by it. They only ap-
ply themfelves to coiner the Image of Truth, which
th^ probable Opinions carry: They keep that Image
fix'd before their Eyes, but they never ftedfaftly bi^
hold thole other fides of their Sentiments, which
would dilcover the fallhood of them.
Great Endowments are required for the framing of
any true Syftem 5 it's neceflary that there be a ^great
vivacity and fiiarpnefs, befides a certain fublimenefs
and extenfion of Judgment, able to furvey a great
number of things at the lame time. Men of mean
parts, with all their vivacity, and all their delicacy,
are too (hort-fighted, to lee what is neceflary for the
Compofing of a Syftem j they ftoop at Ibme little dif-
fictilties that difcourage them, or at feme glimmerings
that dazlethem : They have not a fight lharp enough
to furvey the whole Body of a large fubjed, all at a
time.
But let the Extent and Penetration of the Mind, be
never fo great, if it be not withal exempt from
Paflion and Prejudice, there is little to be expeded
from it; Prejudices poflefs one part of the Mind,
and i^sd the reft ; Palfions confound the Idea's a
thoufand ways, and reprefent to us, in Objeds,
whatever we defire to find there. That Paflion alfo,
which we have for Truth it ft If, fometimes deceives
us, when it is too vehement ; but the defire of ap-
pearing Learned, is that which drives us fartheft off
from attaining true Knowledge.
There is nothing more rare, than to meet with
Perlofls capable of making new Syftems ; but it is not
fo rare a thing, to meet with fuch as have compos'd
Syftems after their own Tancies. There are few
People, that Study much, who argue accorciing 10
Common Notions, there is always Ibme Irregularity
in their,Idea's; and this ft^ciently raevvs, thatth«y
rely
2o6 a Search after Truth. Book IL
rely upon feme particular Syftems, which is not
known to us: *Tis true, that all the Books which
they Compofe do not make it manifeft ; for when we
fettle our felves to Write any Book, which we defign
to Publirti, we take heed, as near as is podltble, of
what is to be faid j and this Attention alone, is oft-
times fufficient to convince us of our Error, Never-
thelefs, we fee from time to time, fome Books which
prove fufficiently what we have faid ; for there are
Authors, who pride themfelves in obferving, at the
beginning of their Book, that they have invented fome
new Syftem.
The Number of Inventors of New Syftems, is alio
very much augmented, by Prejudices conceived againft
fome Authors i for it often happens, that becaufe
they have not met with any thing true or folid, in the
Opinions of thofe Authors which they have read, they
fall, in the firft place, into a great diflike and fcorn
of all forts of Books, and afterwards imagine a new
Opinion, that carries fome Probability, which they
greedily embrace, and which becomes more deeply
rooted in them, in fuch manner as we have fet
forth.
But when this extraordinary Zeal, which they
have for their Opinion, grows cool, or the defign of
tranfmitting it to the Publick, has oblig'd them to
examine it more exatftly and ferioufly, they dilcover,
and quit the falihood ; but with this condition, that
they will never embrace any others, and will con-
demn all thofe who pretend to have difcover'd any
Truth.
IT. J confi. Therefore the laft, and moft dangerous Error of
dernbk Er^ Studious Pcrfons, is this, that they believe there is
tor «f stu- nothing can be certainly known : They have read ma-
fon^ "y ^ooks, both Ancient and Modern, wherein they
could not meet with Truth ; they have had feveral
curious Thoughts, which, upon a more ftridl Exami-
nation, they have found falfe. From whence they
conclude, that all Men are like them, and that if they,
who believe they have confiderM fome Truths, would
but a little more ferioufly confider them, they would
be
ht
Chap. VII. A Search after Truth,
be convinc'd of their Errors, as well as themfelves.
This to them, is fufficient to condemn em without
cntring into any farther particular Examination j
fince, if they did not condemn *em, it would in fome
mealhre be an acknowledgment, that they had more
Wit than themfelvesj which they are not apt to think
very probable.
Therefore they efteem, as obftinate, all thofe that
hold any thing for certain ; nor will they by any
means hear talk of the Sciences as EvidentTruths, which
are beyond all contradiction, but only as Opinions of
which it is not convenient to be ignorant: However
thefe Perfons ought to conhder, that though they have
read a great number of Books, yet they have not
read all, or at leaft with that attention which is re-
quifite for the right underftanding 'em ; or if they
had many curious thoughts which they found falfe in
the conclufion, it does not follow they had all the
thoughts they might have had; and fo it's poflible
that others have done better than they. For all this,
it is not neceflary that the others (hould have more
Senfe than they, if that be the bulinefs that offends
'em, for it's enough that they were only more Fortu-
nate ; Nor is there any wrong done *em by thofe who
profefs to know evidently what they are ignorant of,
iince they fay at the fame time, that feveral Ages have
been ignorant of the fame Truths; not for want of
good Wits, but becaufe thefe good Wits did not firft
light upon them.
Let 'em not then be offended, if others fee more
clearly than they, and fpeak as they fee. Let 'em ap-
ply their Minds to what is propos'd to *em, fif their
Wit be more capable of Application, after all their
Wandrings) and let 'em then judge: there's no body
will hinder 'em ; but let 'em be patient and hold their
Tongues, if they refolve to examine nothing. Let
'em confider a little, whether the Anfwer, which they
ufually give to moft Queftions that are ask'd 'em,
they kyioxo nothhig of the matter^ no Body has hitherto
attain d it^ be a Judicious Anfwer } fince that when
they make that Anfwer, they muft believe they know
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A Search after Truth. Boqk If^
all that other Men know, or all that other Men can
know. For if they had not thefe thougbcs o| thein-
felves, theiir Anfwer were ftUl more impertiaent.
And why do they think it lb di0iculc a thing to con-
fefs they know nothing of it, when upon certain Oc-
ealions they grant that they knew nothing at all ?
And wherefore muft they conclude that all other Men
are ignorant, becaule they are inwardly eonvinc*d that
idiey them (elves are ignorant ?
There are thefe three forts of Perfons who apply
ihemielves to Study. The firfl: dgat to little purpole
upon feme Author, or feme falfe unuleful Science.
The lecond are prepofleft in their own Fancies. The
laft, which partake of the Qualification? of both the
former, are they who imagine they know all that can
be known ; and who being perfuaded that they know
nothing, of certainty, conclude in general, that np-
thing can be evidently known ; and look upon ail
things that are proposed to 'em as meer Opinions.
*Ti6 ealie to fee that ail the Defeds of thele three
forts of Perfons, depend upon the Properties of the
Imagination, which we have explaind in the Tenth
and Eleventh Chapters, but chiefiy in the Firft, that
all this befalls 'em only through Prejudices, in Opi-
nions that blind their Minds, and will permit 'em
to apprehend any other Obje<5b than thofe of their
Ppe^xjfiefiSofis. It may be faid that their Prejudices
a<5l their Minds, as the Minifters of Princes do in re-
ferencc to their Mailers. For as tho(e Perfons, dp,
as much as in 'em lies, never permit any but fuch as
are devoted to tlieir Interdls, or fuch as they are no
way afraid of, to fpeak to their Mailers ; fo the Pre-
judices of thefe Men will not permit the Alind to
behold wkh a fixed Eye the Idea s tk" Objects that
are wholly pure and unmix'd; but they dilguife 'cm;
they ■ cover em with their Liveries, and prefent 'em
in that manner all mafqu'd; fo that 'tis a difficult thing
for 'em to undeceive tbemfelves, and acknowledge
their Errors.
CHAP.
p
la C H A P. IX.
L Of Effeminate Wits. IL Of Superficial WttSc
III. Of Perfons of Authority. IV. Of thofe tha^
mal^e Experiments.
"liy Hat we have faid, is fufficient, in my Opinion,
i'i Vf
to fee forth in general what are the Defects of
ae.} the Imagination in Studious Perfons, and the Errors
ikti to which they arc moft fubjedl. Now in regard there
ill Mi are none but thefe Perfons who trouble themfelves
kfm with Searching after Truth, and becaufe all the reft
iitf of Mankind depends upon them for it, it might be
thought that we fhould here conclude this Second
m Part. Neverthelefs, *tis convenient to fay fomething
mt more concerning the Errors of other Men, becaufe it
m will not be amifs to know what they are. Whatever qfthe
fft flatters the Senfes, extreamly affedb us j and to what- minate ^
tkai ever affetfts us, we apply our felves proportionably
5(^1^ to the pleafure we take in it. Thus they, who givo
themfelves up to all manner of the moft lenlible and
jjtar pleafing Divertifements, are incapable of penetrating
Pfjg Truths that include any confiderable difficulty; be-
iosr caufe the Receptacle of the Mind, which is not infi-
jfjijfli nite, is wholly taken up with their Pleafures, or at
leaft they have a very great (hare therein.
The generality of Great Men, Courtiers, Rich
Men, young People, and they that are calfd by the
name of fine Wits, being taken up with continual
Jfiiat Paftimes, and only Studying the Art of flattering their
'm\ Concupilbence and Voluptuous Appetites, by degrees
ii'eii acquire fucfa a Delicacy of Skill in theft things, or
rather fuch a Softneis,that they may be often faid to be
vled^i rather Effeminate than fine Wits, as they pretend to
be. For there is a great difference between Finenefs
and Softnels of Wit, though they are generally con-
founded one with another,
P Fine
zio A Search after Triad. Book IL
Fine Wits are they who difcern> by the Condudt
of Re^fon, the moft minute differences of things^
who forefee the uncommon and almoft imperceptible
Effedls that depend upon Hidden Caufes : In Ihort,
thefe are they who penetrate^ into the Subjedls which
they confider. But fofc Wits have nothing but a
falfe Delicacy ; they are neither lively nor pierceing;
they difcern not the EfFe(5ls from the Caufes, even of
the moft grofs palpable thing: Laftly, they neither
apprehend nor penetrate into any thing, but are ex-
treamly nice as to Manners 5 A Clownilh Word, the
Accent of a pa^rticular County, a little Grimace, pro-
vokes 'em more than a torrent of confus'd and frivo-
lous Arguments; they cannot know the Defed: of
Reafoning, but are immediately very fenfibJe of a falfe
Meafure, or an irregular Gefture: In fhort, they un-
derftand fenfible things perfectly, becaufe they keep
their Senfes in continual Exercife j but they want the
true underftanding of things that depend upon Rea-
fon, becaufe they feldom or never make ufe of their
own.
Neverthelefs, thefe are the Perfons who are moft
efteemed in the World, and eafily acquire the Repu-
ration of Curious Wits. For when a Man fpeaks
with a free and difengag'd Air ; when his Expreflions
are pure and well chofen, when he makes ufe of Si-
mile's that flatter the Senles, and move the Affedions
after an imperceptible manner, though he utter no-
thing but trivial things, though there be nothing
found, nothing true in all his fine Words, He, accord-
ing to the Common Opinion, fhall be cried up for a
Curious Wir, a Refin'd Wit, a Polifh'd Wit. They
never perceive that he is only a Soft Effeminate Wit,
and fhines only by falfe Lights^ that never enlighten
the Mind; and that his perfuafions prevail only be-
caufe we have Eyes, but not becaufe we have Reafon.
Laftly, We do not deny but that all Men are in
fome meafure guilty of this weaknefs, which we have
obfervM in fome. There is not any Man whole
Mind is not touch'd by the Impreflions of his Senfes
and Affedions, and who by confequence is not a little
fway'd
chap. IX. A Search ^^rTmk iri
Is •
? fway'd by outward Formalities and Language. As to
7 this, all Men diflfer but in the more or the lels. Buc
^ the reafon why this defedl is attributed to fome par-
ticularly, is this; becaufe there are fome who ac-
! knowledge it to be a fault, and ftrive to reform it,
' Whereas they, who have been mentioned by us, look
upon it as a very advantageous Accomplilhment. Far
from acknowledging this fame falfe Delicacy to be
the E&dl of an Effeminate Softnefs, and the Original
of an InSnite number of the Difeafes of the Mind i
imagine it to be an Etfedl and Mark of the Beauty
of tlieir Genius.
To thefe, of whom we have fpoken, we may join OfSuperfi^
a very great number of Superficial Wits, who never
dive into any thing, and who never apprehend, unlefs
it be confufediy, the differences of things; Not
through their own fault, as in rfaofe before mention-
m\l for their IVlinds are neither fiU'd up^ nor con-
tjojl' tra<fl:ed by their Divertifements, only they have natu-
ii! rally Slender Wits. However this fame Slendernels
of Wit, proceeds not from the Nature of the Soul,
'bi as may be well imagin d ; but it is caus'd fometimes
by the great fcarcity, or the more than ordinary
flownefs of the Animal Spirits, fometimes through
(hid® the Inflexibility of the Fibres of the Brain ; fometimes
alfo through an immoderate abundance of Spirits and
eMf® Bloodjor for fome other Reafon which it is not worth
leottciJ while to examine.
ie oi)3[ There are then two forts of Wits. Some readily
obferve the difference of things; and theie are True
Wits. Others imagine and luppofe a Refemblance
I between 'em, and thefe are Superficial Wits. The
firft have a Brain proper to receive clean and diftindf
jigbten Traces of the Objects which they confider ; and be-
nlybe* caufe they are very attentive to the Idea's of the
eaion. Traces, they fee thofe Objedls, as it were, near at
narein hand, and nothing efcapes'em. But Superficial Wits
sjveba?? receive none but feeble or confus'd Traces of their
[1 wlioif Objedts. They fee 'em only, as it were, currorily,at
a diftance and very confufediy ; fo that they feem
lOjalittif alike to 'em, like the Faces of thofe which we fee
fway'ii P 2 afar
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ziz A Search after Truth, Book II,
afar off, becaufe the Mind fuppofes always Likened
and Equality, for the Reafons which I fliall give in the
Third Book.
The greateft part of thofe chat fpeak in Publick,
all thofe that are calfd great Talkers, and many of
thofe who are fluent of Speech, though they fpeak
but little, are of this fort. For they who medicate
fenoufly and accurately, are very rarely known to
have a Copious Utterance of their own Medications#
Ufually they hefitate when they begin to fpeak, be-
caufe they are fomewhat cautious of making ufe of
Terms that excite in others a falfe Idea, being alham'd
to fpeak meerly for Talkings lake, like many that
fpeak boldly of every thing that comes next *emj they
are therefore concern'd to find out Words proper to
exprefs, as they ought to do, their thoughts, which
are not common.
Though we have a great Veneration for Perlbns of
Piety, Divines, Old Men, and generally for all thofe
who have juftly acquit'd great Authority over other
Men, neverchelefs we thought our felves objig'd to
fay this of 'em, it often happens that they be-
lieve them felves infallible, becaufe all other Men
hearken to 'em with Refpe(5i:; becaufe they make little
ufe of their Reafon in the difcovery of Speculative
Truths, and for that they condemn with too much
freedom, whatever they diflike, before they have fe-
rioufly confider'd it. Not that they are to be blam'd
for not applying themfelves to many Sciences of little
ufe ; for they are allow'd both to let 'em alone, and
to defpife them if they think convenient; but they
are not to judge of 'em raflily as their fancies lead
'em, nor upon ill grounded fufpitions. For they
are to confider, that the Gravity of their Delivery,
the Authority which they have acquir'd over the Minds
of Men, and their common cuffcom of cdfifirming
what rhey^^fay by fome Paffage of the Holy Scripture,
will infal'ibly lead into Error all thofe that liften to
'em out ofRefpec5f, and who being incapable throughly
to examine things, fuffer themfelves to be furpriz'd by
Manners and Appearances,
When
rJ
Chap. IX. ^ Search after Truth. zi^
When Error the appearance of Truth, it is
oftimes more refpe^d than Truth it felf ; and this
£alfe Refpecfl is attended with dangerous Inconveni-
encies. PeJJima res eji errorum Apotheojis, & pro pefie
intellePiui habendd eft j fivanis accedat veneratio. Thus,
when certain Perfons, either our of falfe Zeal, or out
of a Love for their own thoughts, have made ufe of
Scripture to eftabliih falfe Principles of Natural Phi^
lofophy, or any other Science, they have oft been li-
ften'd to as Oracles by Men that have believ'd 'em
upon their Words, becsufe of that Veneration which
they owe to Sacred Authority ; but it has iikewile
happened fo, that Vicious and Corrupted Minds have
hence taken an occafion to defpife Religion : So that
by a ftrange Inverfion, the Holy Scripture has been
the Caufe of Error to fome, and Truth has been the
Motive and Original of Impiety to others. We
ought therefore to be careful, as the Author above
cited well oblerves, how we feek for dead things a-
mong the Jiving, and never to pretend by the ftrength
of our own Wits to difcover in Sacred Scripture what
the Holy Ghoft hath not thought fit to reveal. Ex
divinorum & humanorum malefma admixtione.coniwwxts
he, non folum educittir Philofophia Phanpaftica, fed etiam
Ppligio Hdretica. Itaque falutare admodum eft, ft msiite
fobria fidei tantum dentur, quae fidei fimt. All Perfons
then who have Authority over others, ought to be fo
much the more cautious in their Decifions by how
much they find ''em to be moft adher'd to. Divines
efpeciaily ought to take care how they bring Religion
into contempt through their falfe Zeal, out of vain
glo-y either to exalt themfelves, or difleminate their
Opinions. But becauie it is not for me to tell 'em
their Duty, let'em hear Sz.lhomas, who being inter- 5'.
rogared by his General, what he thought of fome Ar-
tides, anfwered him out of Sr. Aiftin in the following
manner.
Multnm atitem meet, alia, quae ad pietatis DoFtrinam
mn /pecia?it, vet ajferere vel negate, quafi pcrtinentia ad
facrayn doHrinarn. Dicit enim in 5. Confejf. cum audio
Chriftianum aliquern fratrern ifta quce Philofophi de cede,
P 3 ant
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XI4 A Search after Truth, Book II.
am fleUiSj de Solts CS? Lurn^ motibus dixenmt^ nefckntem^
aliud -pro alio fentienmn-) patienter intueor opinan-
tem hominem j nec iUi ohejjfe videOy cum de tCy Domincy
Creator omnium noftrorumy non credat indignuy Ji forte
fitus C3 habittis Creatur<e Corporal^ ignoret. Ohe§i autem
Ji hcec ad ipfam doSlrinam Pietatu pertinere arbitretUTy
fertinacitts affirmare audeat quod igmrat. Quod autem
objity manifejiat Auguft. in i. Juper Genefin ad Littc
ram, Turpe ejiy inquity nimis & perniciofumy ac maxv-
ine cavendumy ut Chriflianum de his rebus veluti Jecurf
dum Chriftianas literas loquentemy ita delicare quilibet
Ififidelis audeaty ut quemadmodum dicitur toto Ccelo errare
cbnfpicienSy rijum tenere vixpojjit. Et non tamen Mok'
pum eil quod errans homo videatur ; Sed quod Auditores
nojiriy ab eis qui for is fimt, tafia fenjijfe creduntuty
cum magno eorum Exitio, de quorum falute fatagimuSy
tanquam indoHi reprehenduntur e3 rejpuuntur. Unde mi-
hi videtttr tutius effcy ut hac qua communes Philofophi fen-
ferunty & nojira Fidei non repugnanty neqi cjfe Jic affc
renda ut dogmata Fideiy licet aliquando fub nomine Philo-
Jophorum introducanttWy neqi fc ejfe neganduy tanquam Pi-
dei contrariuy ne Sapi^j^tibus hujus Mundi contemnendi
Do&rinam Fidei occajio praheatur. It's very dangerous
to /peak decifively upon Matters which do not belong
to Faith, as if they did. Sr. Aujiin tells us in his 5th
Book of Confejfionsy When I fee, fays he, a Chriftian
that is not acquainted with the Opinions of Philofo-
phers, concerning the Heavens, the Stars, and the Mo-
tions of the Sun and Moon, and would take one thing
for an other, I let 'em alone in thele Opinions and
Doubts: For I don't fee that Ignorance in the lituation
of Bodies, the different ordering of Alatter, can injure
'em, provided he has not unworthy Sentiments of thee
our Lord, who art the Creator of us all. But it does
him an Injury, if he is perfuaded that thefe things con-
cern Religion, and if he is fo bold as obftinately to
affirm what he knows not. The fame Saint explains
his Thoughts yet more clearly upon this Subjed: in the
firft Book of the Literal Explication of Genefis in thefe
Terms: A Chriftian muft take a great deal of Care
that he does not fpeak of thefe Things, as if they
Chap. IX. A Search after Truths 21 j'.
were Holy Scripture, for an Infidel who Ihould hear:
him fpeak Extravigances that fiiould have no appea-
ranees of Truth could not forbear laughing at hinii
fo the Chriftian is only Confounded, and the Infidel
would be very little Edified. Yet what is more rfiift
chievous in thefe Encounters than a Man's being de-
cdv*d, is, that thefe Infidels that we endeavour to
Convert^ imagine falfely, and to their inevitable mine,
that our Authors have very extravigant Sentiments ;
lb that they condemn and defpife 'em as ignorant
Men ; it is therefore in my Opinion more proper, not
to affirm the common receiv'd Opinions of Philofo-
phers, as Matters of Faith, which are not contrary to
our Faith, although we may fometimes make ufe of
the Authority of Philofophers to make 'em be receiv'd.
"We muft not alfo rejed: thefe Opinions as contrary tq
our Faith, that we may give no occafionto the Wife
Men of this World to Difpute the holy Truths of the
Chriftian Religion.
The greateft part of Mankind are fb negligent and
void of Reafon, that they make no diftindtion between
the Word of God and that of Men, when they are
joined together, fo that they fall into Error, while
they approve both, and into Impiety while they defpife
both indifterently. Nor is it a difficult thing to fee
the Caufe of thefe laft Errors ; They proceed from
the Connexion of Idea's explain'd in the Eleventh
Chapter; nor is it necelfary to inlift any farther upon
the Explanation of 'em here.
However it feems worth our v^^hile to fay foinething Of thofe
of Chymifts, and generally of all thole that fpend
their time in making Experiments. They are People
that Search after Truth ; and their Opinions are ufu-
ally follow'd without anyExamination.Therefore their
Errors are fo much the more dangerous, becaufe they
are imparted to others with fo much the more eafe.
'Tis better, without queftion, to Study Nature
than Books. Vilible and fenfible Experiments arecer--
tainly much more evident Proofs than the Arguments
of Men. Nor are they to be bla ivd, who, be ng cr^
gag'd by their Profeftion in the Study of Natural.
P 4 lofophy,
A Search after Truth, B<x>kII.
lofophy, endeavour to improve their Skill by conti-
nual Experiments, provided they apply their Labours
to the Improvement of the moft neceflary Sciences. -
Therefore Experimental Philofophy is not to be found
fault with, nor they who make it their pradife^ but
only their Defeds.
The firft is, that they are feldom guided, in mak-^
ing their Experiments by the Light of Realboj but
by Chance. From whence it comes to pafs that they
become but little more Learned or Knowing, after
they have fpent much time and Money.
The fecond is, becaufe they are more Sedulous in
Curious and Extraordinary Experiments, than fuch as
are moft common and familiar. Neverthelels the moft
Common Experiments are the moft Simple; and there-
fore they ought firft of all to apply themfelves to
thofe, before they fettle to fuch as are more com-
pounded, and which depend upon a greater number
of Caufes.
The third is, becaufe they profecute thole Experf-
ments that bring in Profit, and negled thofe that ferve
to illuminate the Mind.
The fourth is, becaufe they do not accurately
enough obferve all the particular Circumftances of
Time, Place and Quality of the Drugs which they
make ufe of; though the leaft of thefe Circumftances
is fufficient to fruftrate the Effed which they defire.
For it is to be obferv'd, that all the Terms of which
the Phylicians make ufe of are Equivocal: For Ex-
ample, Wine, has as many various lignifications as
there are varieties of Soil, different Sealbns, different
Manners of making Wine, and different Manners of
preferving it j fo that in general we may fay, that
there are not two Tuns of Wine altogether alike.
Therefore when a Phylician, in order to the making
fuch an Experiinenr, feys, take Wine, no body knows,
but very confufedly, what he means. Therefore there
is ve y great Caution to be us'd in Experiments ; nor
ought they to attempt Compounded ones, till they
know th^ Reafon of the more Simple and Com-
rnon.
Tte
Ch^P* IXt A Search after Truth. 217
The fifth arifes from hence, that too many Confe-
quences are drawn from one Experiment: Whereas,
on the contrary, we want feveral Experiments to in-
fer one true Conclufion.
Laftly, the greateft part of Phyficians and Chymifts
confider only the Particular EfFedb of Nature j they
never return to the firft Notions of Things, that com-
pofe Bodies ; Neverthelefs, 'tis moft certain, that no
Man can clearly and diftindtly underftand the parti-
cular Phenomena of Natural Philofophy, unlels he be
Matter of the more General Principles, and unlefs he
alfoknow fomething in Metaphyfics. In a word, they
often want Courage and Conftancy ; they are terri-
fied and tired with the Labour and Expence. There
are many other Defects in the Perfons before mention-
ed I but it is not our bufinels here to enlarge.
The Caufes of thefe Defedts are little Application,
and the Properties of the Imagination explained in the
Tenth and Eleventh Chapter 5 and becaufe we never
judge otherwile of the difference and alterations of
Bodies, than by the Apprehenfiqns we have of *em, as
has been {aid in the Firtt Book.
The
Clhap.t ^ Sean^ afier Truth.
The Third Part.
Of the contagious Communication
of Strong Imaginations,
CHAP. I,
I, Of our Inclination to imitate others in aU things 5
which is the Original of the Communication of Errors
that defend upon the Power of Imagination, 11. Two
Principal Caufes that increaje this Inclination,
III. H^jat a Strong Imagination is, IV. That there
are feveral forts of it ; Of Mad Men^ and of Juch
who have a Strong Imagination according to the Senfe
which is here meant. V. Two confiderable DefeSis of
thofe that have a Stro7ig Imagination, VL Of the
Power they have to Perfwade and Impofe.
HAving Explain'd the Nature of Imagina-
tion, the Defeats to which it is fubjedf,
and how our own Imagination leads us
into Error, there nothing more remains
for us to Difcourfe of in this Second Book, but of
the Contagious Communication of Strong Imaginati-
ons, and that is, of the Prevailing Power which lome
Men have to engage others in their Errors,
i' i a ■ - ' ' . , . . . ^ " . <
< Strong
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lic^ :// Search after Truth. Book 11.
Strong Imaginations are extreamly Contagious j
they prevail over thofe that are weak i they make 'em
ftoop to their own Laws, and imprint upon 'em their
own Characflers. Therefore, becaufe Men that have
particular Idea s, and a Strong and Vigorous Imagina-
tion, moft commonly exceed the Bounds of Reafon,
there are few more General Caufes of Error, than
this pernicious Communication of the Imagination,
- For the better underftanding what this Contagion
is, and how it is tranfmitted from one to another, we
muft confider that all Men have need of one another,
and that they are made to compofe, among themfelves,
feveral Bodies, of which the Parts Ihould have a mu-
tual Correfpondence one with another ; for the up-
holding of which Union it is, that God has command-
ed 'em to be Charitable one toward another j but be-
caufe Self-Love might by little and little extinguilh
Charity, and by that means dilfolve the Bond of Civil
Society, the Almighty judg'd it convenient that Men
Ihould be united together by Natural Ties, which
might fubfift when Charity fail'd, and which might
delend it againft the Efforts of Self-Love.
Thefe Natural Ties which are common to us with
Beafts, confift in a certain Difpofition of the Brain,
with which all Men are endued, to imitate thofe with
whom they Converfe, to make the fame Judgments
which they do, and to be fubjecff to the fame PafTions
of the Mind to which they are fubjed:. And this
fame Difpofirion ufuaily unites Men together much
more clofe and firmly than Charity grounded upon
Reafon, which fort of Charity is very rare.
Unlefs a Man be endu'd with this fame Difpofition
of the Brain,to partake of our Sentiments and our Paf-
fions, he is incapable of his own Nature to unite him-
felf with us, and compofe one Body. He is like thofe
Stones of an irregular form, for which there is no
room in a Building, becaufe they cannot be joined to
the reft.
Oderunt hilarem trifles^ trijlem^; jocoji,
$edatum ceteres, agilem gnavumqj remtjji.
It
chap. I. A Search after truth. xzi
It requires a larger Portion of Vertue than Men
are aware of, not to break with thofe that no way
fympathize with our Paflions, but whofe Sentiments
are in all things contrary to ours. Nor is it akoge-
iher without Reafon: For when a Man has good
caufe to be Sad or Joyful, 'tis in fome meafure an Af-
front not to correfpond with him in his Sentiments.
If he be Sad, 'tis not proper to appear before him
with a brisk and jolly Air, which argues Giadnefs,
and which ftrongly imprints the Motions ot it in his
Imagination i for this is to put him out of that Con-
dition which is moft convenient and pleafing to him,
Sadnefs being the moft delightful of all the Paflions to
a Man in Mifery.
All Men therefore have a certain Difpofition of the Two Princi-
Brain, which naturally inclines em to be affeded after
the fame manner as fome of thofe with whom they creajeottr
Converfe. Now there are two Principal Caufes that hcunatton
foment and increafe this Difpolition, the firft is in the
Soul, the iecond in the Body ; The firft confifts in the '
Natural Propenfity of Men to Grandeur and Advance-
ment. This Propenfity it is,which imperceptibly ex-
cites us to imitate Perfons of Quality, in their manner
of Speaking, Walking, Drefs, and Outward Air.
This is the Original of New Modes, of the Inftability
of living Languages, and of certain general Cor-
ruptions of Manners. This is the chief Origine of
all Extravagant and Fantaftick Novelties, which are
not fupported by Reafon, but Human Fancy and
Pleafure.
The other Caufe which much incline to imitate
others, and which we ought chiefly to Difcourfe
of here, confifts in a certain Imprelfion which
Perfons of a Strong Imagination make upon Feeble
Minds, and upon Tender and Delicate Brains. I un- IVkat a
derftand by a Strong and Vigorous Imagination that
Conftimtion of the Brain which makes it capable of ^
Traces extreamly deep, and fill the Receptacle of the
Mind in fuch a manner, that it cannot attend to other
things than fuch as the Images themfelves reprefent
to if.
There
tl07l
1
I
2%% A Search after Truth* Book It
Tvi forPs There are two forts of Perfbns who have a Strong
Itnagination in this Senfe. The firft receive thefedeep
Traces by an Unvoluniary and Irregular Impreflion
of the Animal Spirits; and the others, of whom we
intend principally to Difcourfe here, receive 'em from
a certain Dilpofition which is dbferv'd in- the Sub-
ftance of the Brains.
'Tis vifible that the firft are abfolute Mad Men,
feeing they are conftraind by the Natural Connexion
which is between their Idea's and their Traces, to
think upon things not thought of by others withwhom
they Converfe ; which renders em incapable of fpeak-
ing to the purpofe, and aniwering diredfly to Q^efti-
ons that are ask'd 'em.
' There are an infinite number of this fort of People
who only differ in the more or the lefs ; and it may be
faid, that all fiich as are agitated with fome violent
Paffion are of their number, fince at the* time of
their Emotion, the Animal Spirits fo forcibfy imprint
the Traces and Images of their Pailion, that they
are incapable of thinking upon any thing elfe.
But 'tis to be obierv'd, that all thefe fort of Per^
fons are not capable of corrupting the Imagination of
any Man, let his Mind be never lb weak, and his
Brain never fb fofc and delicate ^ and this for two
Realons. The firft, Becaufe they are not able to an-
fwer conformably to the Idea's of others, they can
periwade *em to nothing ; And fecondly, Becaufe the
Difturbance of their Mind being altogether manifeft-,
whatever they fay is hearken'd to with contempt.
NevertheJefs, 'tis true that Paflionate Perlons put
us into Paf?ions,and make Impreflions in our Imagina-
tion like thofe with which they themfelves are
But in regard their Tranfports are manifeftly vifible,
we refift thofe Impreftions, and get rid of 'em fooa
after. They rub out of themfelves, when they are
not fomented by the Caufe that produc'd 'ern, that is
to lay, when the Tranfported Peribns are departed
out of our preftnce, and when the lenfible ligiat of
the Characfters, which Paffion form'd in the Counte-
nance, produces no farther Alteration in the Fibres of
our
Chap* L A Search 4fm Tmk
our Brain, nor any Agitation in our Animal
Spirits,
{ I only Examine here chat Ibrt of Strong and Vigo-
rous Imagination which confifts in a Diiixjfition of the
Brain proper to receive very deep Traces of more feeble
and lefe adive Objeds.
'Tis no defed:, to have a Brain proper for a Strong
Imagination of Things, and for the Reception of the
moft diftindt and lively Images of the moft inconfi-
derable Objedls, provided that the Mind be always
Miftrefs of the Imagination, that thefe Images be
imprinted by her Orders, and that they may be de-
fac'd when Ihe pleafes; for hence arifes fagacity and
ftrength of Wit. But when the Imagination over-
rules the Soul,' and thefe Traces form themfelves by
the Difpofition of the Brain, and by the Adivity of
the Objeds and Spirits, without expeding the Or-
ders of the Will, this is a moft Mifchievous Vice, and
a kind of Madnefe. We ihall therefore endeavour to
fet forth the Charader of thofe who have a Strong
Imagination of this fort.
To that purpofe it behoves us to remember that the
Receptacle of the Mind is confined to narrow limits.
2. That it is fill'd with no Objed more eafily than
with the Senfatiqns of the Mind, and generally with
the Perceptions of Objeds that affed us very much.
3. That the deep Traces of the Brain are always ac-
companied with Senfations, or other Perceptions that
vigoroufly affed us. For thereby 'tis eafie to know
the Genuine Charaders of their Wit who have a
Strong Imagination.
The firft is, that thefe Perfons are not capable of Tm covji.
giving a found Judgment of things that are a little
difficult and perplext, be^aufe the Receptacle of the
Mind being filfd^with Idea s that are by Nature con- have a
nex'dwith thofe very deep Traces, they have no^the Stronghva*
Liberty to think of feveral things at the fame time.
But in Compound Qiieftions, 'tis requihte that the
Mind fhould furvey with one quick and fuddain mo-
tion the Ideas of many things, and difcover, at one
lingle view, the Correfpondencies and Connexions that
are
I
f
\
f
i Ik
"ji
m
ix4 A Se4rd after Trutk Book IL
are neceflary for the refolving of thofe Queftions.
5 lit All Men know by their own Experience, that they
are not capable of applying themfeJves to the Search
I of any Truth, at fuch time as they are afflidfed with
any violent Pain, becaufe then, there are in the Brain
f!, thofe deep Traces which take up the Capacity of the
\ Mind. Thus, thofe Perfons of whom we fpeak, ha-
ving deeper Traces of the fame Objedls, fas we fup-
pofe) they cannot have fo great an Extenfion of Mind^
nor comprehend fo many things together as the others.
The firft Defedt of thefe Perfons is to have a narrow
,!j Wit, and how much the narrower it is, fo much the
deeper Traces their Brain receives of inconfiderable
w Objedls.
The fecond Defedt is, they are Vifionaries, yet
after a Delicate Manner, and difficult to be dif-
cover d. The Vulgar fort of Men believe *em not to
be fuch jfthere are none but juft and clear Wits that
perceive their Vifions, and the Deviations of their
Imagination.
Now that we may be able to conceive the Original
of this Defedf, 'tis neceffary to remember what we
have faid at the beginning of the fecond Book : That
as to thofe things which are ad:ed in the Brain, the
Senfes and Imagination differ only in the more and
lefs y that it is by reafon of the largenefs and deepnefs
of the Traces, that the Mind becomes fenfible of
Objedfs; that it judges of'em as prefent, and capable
of affedf ing it, and fo near it as to make it fenfible of
Pain and Pleafure. For when the Traces of an Ob-
jedl are fmall, the Soul imagines only that fame Ob-
jedl y it does not judge it to be prefent, nor does it
look upon it to be very great or very confiderable j
but as the Traces become deeper and greater, the
Mind alfo judges that the Object becomes greater and
more confiderable, approaches nearer to us, and laftly
is more apt to affect and injure us.
Thofe Vifionaries of whom we here diftourfe, are
not arriv'd to that Excefs of Folly, to believe they fee
prefent before their Eyes thofe Objeds which are Ab-
fent. The Traces of their Brain are not yet deep
enough j
Chap. I. A Search after Trmh.
enough; they are but half Mad ; were they ablblure-
ly fo, 'twere in vain for us to talk of em here. See-
ing that all Men being fenfible of their Errors, they
would not fuffer themfelves to be deluded by 'em.
They are not Vifionaries in refped: of the Senfes, but
only in reference to the Imagination. Madmen are
Visionaries in reference to the Senfes, becaule they fee
not Things as they are, and many times believe they
fee thofe Things which are not. However 'tis evi-
dent that Vifionaries in reference to the Senfes, and iri
reference to the Imagination, differ only in the more
and kjs; neither is the Faffing from one Condition to
the other very difficult. Whence it comes to pafs, that
the Diftemper of Mind in the latter, ought to be re-
prefented by comparing it with the Diftemper of the
former, which is more manifeft, and more flrongly
affeds the Mind ; fince in things which differ no o-
therwife than in the more or lefs^ thofe things tharlefs
fenfibly affed us are always to be explain'd by thofe
things that affed us more vehemently.
The fccond Defed of thofe who have a ftrong and
vigorous Imagination, is, that they ^re Vifionaries as
to the Imagination, or barely Vifionaries; for we call
thofe Madmen, that are Vifionaries in reference to the
Senfes. And thus we have enumerated the Vices of
Vifionary or Fantaftick Wits.
Thefe People exceed their Bounds in every thing ;
ihey extol mean and abjcd things; they magnifie fmall
things, and bring remote things near to the fight. No-
thing appears to 'em what it really is. They admire
every thing ; they exclaim againft every thing with-
out Difcreticn. If they are naturally difpos'd to be
fearful; I mean, if their Animal Spirits are in fmall
quantity, without vigor, without motion, they are
afraid of every thing, they tremble at the fhaking of
a Leaf. But if they abound in Blood and Spirits,
which is moft ufual, they feed themfelves with vain
Hopes, and give themfelves up to their Imagination
which is fruitful in Idea's, and according to the Pro-
verb, they build Caftles in the Air, with extraordi-
nary joy and fatisfadion, They are vehement in their
FalTions,
2.^0 jfSearcWajier'Truth, Book II.
Pafiions, obftinace in their Opinions, always full of,
and highly fatisfied in the Contemplation of them-
lelves. When they have a fancy to be accounted fa-
mous Wits, and to fet up for Authors, (for there are
Authors of all forts, as well Vifionaries as others ;)
What Extravagancies, what Deliriums, what Ravings
are they not guilty of! They never imitate Nature,
^very thing is affedled, forced, and rapturous; they
rather Skip and Leap than Walk, they fpeak in Mea-
fure, they utter nothing but Figures and Hyperboles.
If they addid: themfelves to Godlinefs, and to follow
it according to their own Fancies, they put on a Spi-
rit of Judaifm and Pharifaic Hypocrifie ; their Minds
are altogether intent upon the outfide of things. Ex-
ternal Ceremonies, and performances of no moment:
They become fcrupulous, fearful, and fuperftitious.
If you will believe them, every thing belongs to
Faith, and every thing is Eflential, except what really
belongs to Faith, and what is truly Elfential. For
many times their Minds being taken up with Duties
of little moment, they negled: the more ufeful and
more important Precepts of the Gofpel, in reference
to Juftice, Mercy, and Faith. What needs any more ?
They that defire to be convinced of thefe Defedls,
and many others, need only to confider what pafles in
their daily Converfations.
But they that have a Strong and Vigorous Imagi-
nation are endu'd with other Qualities, which 'tis very
neceflary for us to explain in this Place. We have
only fpoken hitherto of their Defedls, we are now to
Difcourfe of their Vermes and Prerogatives; among
which they have one that principally regards our fub-
jedf; for by means of that Prerogative they rule over
the Minds of the Vulgar, obtrude their Idea's upon
'em, and communicate to 'em all thofe falfe Impref-
lions with which they are alFec^fed.
That they This Prerogative confifts in a ftrong and vigorous
expreding themfelves, though it be not na-
gm^ion^' tural. They who have a ftrong Imagination of things,
eafiiy exprefs 'em vigoroully, and perfwade all thofe who
Juade convinc'd, rather by outward Ihew, and fenlible
others, ■' T
Im-
.Ghap. I. • A Search after Truth.
Impreflion, than by the force of Reafon. For the
Brains of thole who excel in Strength of Imagination,
admitting deep Traces of the Subjedfs^vhich they
imagine, as we have faid before, thofe Traces for the
moft part are not imprinted without a great Com-
motion of the Animal Spirits, which difpofe the whole
Body after a quick and lively manner to exprefs the
Cogitations of the Mind. Thus the Air of their Facb,
the Tone of their Voice, and Elegancy of Speech en-
livening their Expreflions, they gain Attention of their
Spectators and Hearers, and prepare 'em to receive
Mechanically the Imprelfion of the Image that vio-
lently moves 'em. For in fhort, thofe things that are
deeply infus'd into our Mind, are ufually as deeply
infus'd by us into the Minds of . otheiSt, He that as
mov'd by a vehement Paflion, ftill moves others with
the fame Paflion 5 and, though» his Rhetoric be often
Irregular, yet -for all fhat, 'tis vei^ perfwalive: Be-
caufe the External Air and Gefture, as being moft fen-
iible, aCts more vigorcufly upon the Iniagination of
Men, than the moft folid Arguments, that are fe-
dately pronounced, becaufe thofe Ratiocinations iiei-
ther flatter the Senfes, nor ftrike the Imagination.
Perfons then, who excel in Imagination, have the
advantage to pleafe, to alfeCf, and perfwade, becaufe
they form the moft lively and fenfible Images of their
thoughts. But there are other Caufes that contribute
to their eafie gaining upon the Mind : For they never
Difcourfe but upon cafie SubjeCfs, and fuch as are
within the reach of Vulgar Apprehenfions: They
never make ufe of other Expreflions and Terms than
fuch as only excite the Confus'd Notions of the Senfes,
which always moft vehemently afFcCt us: They never
talk of Sublime and Diflicult Matters but after a Ram-
bling manner, and by way of Common Places: For
they dare not venture themfelves to dive into Parcicu-
lais, and ftick clofe to Principles ; whither it be, be-
caufe they do not underftand thofe Matters ; or whe-
ther they are afraid left they Ihould for want of Terms
inrangle themfelves, and tire the Minds of thofe that
arc not accuftom'd to a ferious Attention.
From
^ A Search after Truth. Book 11.
From what has been faid, it is eafie to judge, that
the Vices of an Irregular Imagination are extreamly
Con'-agious, and that they very eafily infinuate and
di j'ki ie thfm felves into the Minds of moft People.
But they wiio have a Strong Imagination, being ufu-
ally Enemies to Reafon and go^ Senfe. becauie of
their want of Wit, and the Phantomes of their Brain,
to which they are fubjeCt, it may be thence readily in-
ferr'ti, that there are few Caufes of our Errors more
univerfal, than the Contagious Communication of the
Diforders and Diftempers of the Imagination. But
we ought to prove thefe Truths'by Examples and. Ex*
periments Familiar to all the World.
CHAP. 11.
General Examples of the Force of the Imagination,
'^Here are frequent Examples of this Communica-
^ tion of the Imagination in Children, in refpedl of
their Parents,more efpeGially in Girles,in refpecff of their
Mothers; in Men Servants in refped: of their Mailers;
and Maid Servants in refj ed of tbek Miftrefles j in
Scholers in refped of their School-mafters j Courtiers in
refped of their Princes, and generally in all Inferiors
in refped of their Superiors. Provided that Parents,
Mailers, and other Superiors be endued with fome-
thing of a Strong Imagination ; otherwife the Weak
Imagination of Parents or Mafters will make no con-
Ederable Impreilion in Children or Servants.
The Effeds of this Communication are alfo to be
obierv'd in Peribns of Equal Conditions j but that is
not fo uiiial; becauie there is not that Veneration
among them, which diipofes the Mind in fuch a man-
ner as to admit the Impreilion of Strong Imaginations
without any Examination. Lailiy, theie Effeds are
to be met with in Superiors in refped of their Infe-
riors: For many times Inferiors are endu'd with an
Ima-
Chap. II. A Search after Truth.
Imagination fo lively and imperious, that they bend
the Minds of their Mafters and Superiors which way
they pleafe themfelves.
It will be an eafie thing to apprehend how Fathers
and Mothers make very ftrong Impreflionsupon the
Imaginations of their Children, if we confider, that
thefe Natural Difpofitions of our Brain, which in"
dines us to imitate thole with whom wc Converfe,
and to be affeded with the fame Sentiments and Paf-
fions, are far ftronger in Children, in refped of their
Parents, than in other Men : For which feveral Rea-
Ions may be given; and the firft is, becaufe they are
of the fame Blood ; For as Parents frequently tranf-
mit to their Children a Difpolirion to certain Here^
ditary Diftempers, as, the Gout, the Stone, Madnels,
and generally all thole Difeafes which do not come
by accident, or from Ibme extraordinary Ferrnenta-
tion of the Humours, as Fevers, Agues, &c, for it is
vilible, that as thole Difeafes cannot be communi-
cated, fo they imprint the Difpolitions of their own
upon the Brains of their Children,and bend their Ima-
ginations in fuch a manner, as to render *em capable
of the fame Sentiments with themfelves.
The fecond Reafon is, becaufe that Children have
very little Familiarity with other Men, who might
Ibmetimes elfe imprefs other Traces in their Brains,
and in fome meafure fruftrate the continual ElFort of
Paternal Impreffions. For as a Man that never ftirr'd
out of his own Country ufually imagines the Manners
and Cuftoms of Foreign Nations to be altogether con-
trary to Reafon, fo a Child that never ftirr'd out of
his Fathers Houfe, imagines the Sentiments of his Pa*
rents and their manner of living to be the Standard
of Univerfal Reafon ; or, rather he doe^ nor Relieve
there are any other Principles of Reafon or Vertue,
than what he has imbibM from his Parents : He there-
fore believes whatever he hears his Parents fay, ani
conforms himfelf in whatever they do.
But this Imagiiiarion of Parents is fo llrong, that
it not only ads upon the Imagination of Children, but
alfo upon other parts of the Body. A Son imitates
0^3 ihe
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234
A Search after Truth, Book 11.
the Gate, the Speech, and Geftures of his Father.
A Daughter imitates the Drefs, the Pace, and Voice
of her Mother : If the Mother Lilps, the Daughter
Lifps; if the Mother have an ill Habit of holding
her Head awry, the Daughter does fo too. Laftly,
Children imitate their Parents ip every thing, in their
Defeats and their ill Geftures, in their Errors and their
Vices.
There are feveral other Caufes which augment the
Effecft of this Impreflion : Of which the chiefeft are
the Authority of Parents, the Dependency of Chil-
dren, and the mutual Affedlion both of the one and
the other. But thefe Caufes are common to Courtiers,
and Servants, and generally to all Inferiors as well as
to Children. We fhall now Explain the Matter by
the Example of Courtiers.
There are fome People who judge of what they
fee, by what is conlpicuous before their Eyes j as of
Sublimnefs, Power, and Capacity of Mind, which lie
conceafd from their Knowledge, by that Nobility,
thofe Dignities, and that Wealth which is known to
em. They frequently meafure one by the other.
And our dependam:e upon Great Men fo much above
us, our defire to participate of their Grandeur, and
the vaft Splendour that environs em, incline us fre-
quently to pay Divine Honours to Mortal Men, if it
may be lawful for me to lay fo. For if God confer
Authority .upon Princes, Men afcribe Infallibility to
xm ; an Infallibility fo univerfal as not to be circum-
fcrib'd within any bounds in any thing, or upon any
occafion, nor tied to any Ceremonies. Great Men
know all things naturally : Though they decide Que-
ftions of which ,they have no knowledge, yet they
have always Reafon on their fide.. He that dares ad-
venture to Examine what they fay, is ignorant, and
knows nothing j Fie that raifes any doubts, derogates
from that Veneration which is. due to 'em j He that
condemns 'em, is guilty of Rebellion ; or at leaft is a
Sort, a Madman^ and he for nothing but to be made
a Laughing Stock to all the World, '
But
bi
chap. II. A Search after Truth,
But if Great Men vouchfafe us their Favours, then,
if we do not approve alJ their Sayings, we are not
only Obftinate, Headllrong, and Rebellious, but Un-
grateful and Perfidious i this is a fault beyond repai-
ration, that renders us unworthy of their Favours,
which is the Reafon that Courtiers, and by a neceflary
Confequence, almoft all other People without any
Confideration, fwear to the Sentiments of their So-
vereign, and frequently furrender themfelves, even
in Matters of Religion, to their Humours and Ca-
pricio's.
France and Germany furnilh us with too many Ex-
amples of thefe Irregular Submififions to the Impious
Commands of their Princes, The Hiftories of later
Ages are full of 'em. Nor were there wanting fome
Perlbns well advanced in years, who chang'd their
Religion 4 or 5 times in compliance with the Incon-
ftancy of their Princes in that Particular.
The Revolutions of Religion in Svoeden and Den-
marf{, may lerve us for a Proof of the Dominion
which fome Minds have over others. But there were
alio other very conliderable Caufes of thefe Revolu-
tions. And thefe furprizing Changes are fo many
Proofs of the Contagious Communication of the Ima-
gination. But thefe Proofs are too general and great,
they rather aftonilh and dazle the Mind, than illumi-
nate it, becaufe there are too many Caufes that concur
to produce thefe great Events.
If Courtiers and other Men many times abandon
Truths that are Effential, and not to be forfaken, but
with the hazard of Eternity, 'tis vifible that they will
venture lefs to uphold abftradied Truths, lefs certain
and of little ufe. If the Religion of the Prince be
the Religion of his Subjedls, the Reafon alfo of the
Prince muft be the Reafon likewiie of his Subjedis-
And fo the Sentiincnrs of the Prince, will be always
AUmcde, His Plealures, hisPalTions, his Words, his
Habit, and generally all his Adions, will be/imitated.
For the Prince is himlelt the Efiential Rule of Man-
nets: And it rarely happens that he does any thing
but what is abfolurely mouilh. Now as al| the Alt.-
rations
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A Search after Truth, Book II.
rations of the Mode are no more than fo many vari-
ous Ornaments and Graces, 'tis no wonder that rrinces
ad fo ftrongly upon the Imagination of other Men.
If Alexander hangs his Head on one fide,all his Cour-
tiers do the fame. If Dionyfius tke Tyrant applies
himfelf to Geometry, upon the arriyai of Flato at
Syracufci Geometry prefently becomes Alamode, and
the Kings Palace, fays Plutarch^ is immediately co-
ver'd with a Mift of Dull, through the great number
of thofe that draw Figures upon the Ground. But
fo foon as Plato is offended with the Prince, and that
the Prince indulging his Pleafures, begins to be weary
of Geometry, the Courtiers alfo lay it quite afide,
A Man would think, (continues the fame Author) that
they were inchanted, and that fprne Circe had tranf-
form'd *em into other Men; They pafs from their
Love of Philofophy, to their Inclination to Debau-
chery, which before they abhorr'd- Thus 'tis in the
Power of Princes to change Vertues into Vices; be-
caufe they are able to change all Idea's with a Word
only y There needs no more than the leaft Nodd of
their Heads, or the leaft motion of their Bodies, their
Eyes, or their Lips, to make Knowledge and Learn-
ing pals for contemptible Pedantry; Rafhnefs, Bru'
tilhnefs, and Cruelty, for greatnefs of Courage j and
Impiety and Libertinifm for Strength and Liberty of
Wit.
But in this, as well as in other things, I would have
it prefuppos'd, that Princes excell in Strength and
Vigor qjf Imagination : For had they an Imagination
Weak and Languilhing, they could never enliven 'em
with that Turn, and Energie, that invincibly fubdues
and vanquifhes feeble Minds.
If the force of Imagination alone, without the af-
fiftance of Reafon, be able to produce fuch wonder^
ful Etiecfts, there is nothing fb Fantafiick or Extrava-
gant which is not fufiiciently powerful to perfwade,
let it be only fupported by fome Appearance of Rea-
fon. I thus prove it by Examples.
An Ancient Author reports, that in Btbiopia the
Courtiers made themfelves Lame, and Deformed,
nay,
iilfo
I
Chap. II. s A Search after Truth,
nay, that they even difmember'd, and laid violent
hands upon themklves, that they might refemble their
Princes: They lookM upon it as Ignominious ro ap-
pear with two Eyes, or to walk upright in the Train
of a Prince that was blind of one Eye, or halted of
one Leg ; in like manner, they durit not appear at
Court but with a little indented Hat, with White
Buskins, and Gilt Spurs : That Falhion of the Ethio^
pans was very Fantaftical and Inconvenient, never-
thelefs it was the Mode ; They followed it with a
World of Joy, and defying the Pain which they were
to endure, minded only the Honour which they did-
themfelves, in fhewing their Generofity and AfFi^ion
for their King. Laflly, this Falfe Argument of Friend-
Ihip fupponing the Extravagance of the Falhion, has
mile it pals jnto a Cuftom and a Law that has been
a long time obferv'd.
The Relations of thofe who haveTravelPd into the
Eaft, inform us that this Cuftom is ftill obferv'd in fe-
vcral Counrreys : But what neceflity of twice croP
fing the Line to fetch from thence the Religious ob-
fervation of unreafonable Laws and Cuftoms, or to
find out People that follow inconvenient and Fantafti-
cal Modes ; we need not go any farther than France i
For wherefbever Men are indulgent to their Pailions,
wherever the Imagination is Miitrefs of Keafon, there
is alfo a prodigious Fantafticalnefs and Inconftancy of
Manners : What think you of our Women, that dur-
ing the moft bitter Frofts and Snow in Winter, difplay
their Kaked Breafts, but in the Exceftive Heats of
Summer they hide their Necks and Boioms, and go
lb ftreight Lac'd that they can hardly Breath ? Cei-
fainly if by that Cuftom they fuffer not fo much Pain
as the Ethiopians-, they ought at leaft to be more a-
lham'd: The IJain is not fo great, but their Reafon
for enduring it is not fb apparent, and there is at leaft
an equal Fantafticalnefs. An Ethiopian may alledge,
that 'tis out of Generofity that he digs out one of his
Eyes ; but what can aChriftian Lady fay for her felf,
that makes a vaunting fhew of that which Nature
and Religion oblige her to conceal Only that *tis the
Mode,
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1,3 8 'Search after Truth, Book II.
Mode, and nothing more. But this Mode is Fan-
taftick, Inconvenient, Undecent, and Unworthy the
Manners^ of a Chriftian. It has no other Original,
but a Realbn manifeftly depraved, and a lecret Cor-
ruption of the Heart; 'tis fcandalous to obferve it ;
'tis openly to fide with the Irregularities of the Ima-
gination againft Reafon ; to revolt from Purity to Im-
purity, from the Spirit of God to the Spirit of the
World*: In a Word, 'tis a violation of the Laws of
Realbn and^ the Gofpel, to follow this Mode. 'Tis
no matter,— 'tis the Mode,— that is to fay a' Law
more Sacred and Inviolable than that which God him-
felf wrote upon the Tables of Mofes, or which he en-
grav'd by his Holy Spirit in the Hearts of Chri-
ftians. .
In truth, I know not whether the French have any
Reafon to Laugh at the Ethiopians and Savages : 'Tis
true that the firft time a Man Ihould happen to fee a
Lame and One-Eyed Prince, attended by a Company
of Cripples and Single-Eyed Perfons, 'twould be a
hard matter to abftain* from Laughter: However
time would familiarize the Sight, and the greatnels
of their Courage and Friendfhip would be more ad-
mirM, than the weaknefs of their Judgment would
be derided : But 'tis not the fame thing with the Modes
of France ; their Fantafticalnefs is not fupported by
any Probable Reafon ; fo that if they are not lb
troublefome, they are ftill the more Ridiculous. In
a word,they wear the Charaililer of a moft Corrupted
Age, wherein there is nothing fufficiently powerful
to moderare the Irregularity of the Imagination.
What we have faid of Courtiers is to be underftood of
the greatefl: part of Men Servants in reference to their
Mafters, and Maid Servants in reference to their Mi-
ftrelfes, and that we may not fpend too much time,
I would have it to be underftood of all Superiors 5
bat chiefiy of Children in reference to their Parents :
becaule Children are under a particular Dependency
upon their Parents, bccaiife their Parents have a par-
ticular Love and Tendernefs for 'em,
which other
« Perfons
-V/
Chap. 11.^ A Search after Truth.
Perfons have not 5 Laftly, becaufe Children are in-
duc'd by Reafon to that Submifliqn and Obiequiouf-
nefs, that many times exceed the Bounds of Realbn.
But 'tis not always neceflary, that other Men (houid
have Authority over us, or that we ihould depend in
fome meafure.upon 'em, to enable em to work upon
the Imagination: For the only power of the Imagina-
tion iSi fometimes fuficient for that purpofe, feeing it
frequently falls out, that Perfons, fuch as are unknown,
of no Reputation, and for whom we are not prepof-
fefs'd with any Efteem, are endu'd with fuch a force
of Imagination, and by Confequence fo lively and
moving, that they perfwade us we neither know
which way, nor how. Tis true, it feems very ftrange,
but there is nothing fo common.
Now this Imaginary Perfuafion can only come from
the power of a Vifionary Perlbn, who fpeaks with-
out underftanding what he fays, and by that means
inclines the Minds of thofe that hearken to him to
believe ftrongly without knowing what they believe
For moft Men are fo ftupified with the Effort of a
Dazling Expreflion, that they judge as their Paflion
leads 'em, of thofe things which they underftand but
very confufedly. And I defire the Readers of this
Treatife to obferve fuch Examples as they meet with
in their daily Converfations, and to revolve in their
Minds what paffes upon thofe Occafions ; for I make
no queftion but they will find more Benefit by it than
they can imagine.
But it is farther to be obferved, that there are two
things that wonderfully contribute to the Operations i
of the Forcible Imagination of others over us: The?
firft is an Air of Piety and Gravity ; The fccond, ant
Air of Libertinifm and Confidence. For according;
to our Propenfity either to Devotion or Licentioulnefs ,
Perfons that fpeak with a Grave and Pious Air, or at 1
Air of Confidence, and Libertinifm work very difie -
rently upon us.
'Tis true, that oi^ thefe there are fome more dar r
gerous than others. However have a care of beir g
deluded by the oatward fhews either of the one < )r
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X4C) Search after Truth, Book If.
the other \ or of fubmitcing to any thing but the force
of folid Arguments, To this may be urter'd after a
Grave and Modeil: manner, and Impiety and Blaf-
phemy may be cover'd with the Cloak of Piety. It
behoves us to Examine according to the Precept of
St. whether the Spirits are of God or no^ and not
confide in every Spirit. The Devils fometimes tranE
form themfelves into Angels of Light. Nor are there
wanting fome Perfbns, who having, as it were, aNa-
tural Air of Piety, are look'd upon as Men endu'd
with true Devotion, and under that Mask are fo dar-
ing as to pronounce Men free and exempted from their
Eflential Obligations, and even from the Love of God
and their Neighbours, on purpofe to enflave em to
fome Pharifaical Pradice or Ceremony.
But the Imaginations, whofe Impredion and Conta-
gion we ought moft chiefly to avoid, are thofe of cer-
tain Perfbns in the World who affecfl the Title of Great
Wits, which they acquire with little difficulty : For
now there needs no more than with a certain Air of
Impudence to deny Original Sin, the Immortality of
the Soul, or to fcolF at fome receivM Opinion of the
Church, to acquire the Rare Title of a Great Wit
among the Common fort of Men.
Thefe flender Wits are iifually full of Fire, and I
know not by what Air of Licenfe and Boldnefs they
impioufly impofe upon other Mens Minds, and incline
weak imaginations to furrender to Lively and Plaufi-
Me Words, but fuch as fignifie nothing to thofe which
duely weigh and confider *em. They are very happy
in their Expreflions, though very unfortunate in their
Reafons. But becaufe even Men, how rcafonable lo-
ever they are, rather choofe to be aflVdicd with the
lenfible Plcafnre of Gefture and Expreflions, than to
tire themfelves with the difficult Examination of Rea-
fon; therefore 'tis vifible that thofeWits are preferrkl to
others, and by that means communicate their Errors
and Malignity through the Power which they havii
over the Imaginations of other Men.
CHAP.
0'
it,
J.
chap. III. A Search afttr 'Truth*
411
CHAP. III.
I. Of the Force of the Imagination of certain Authors.
II. Of Tertulliani
ONE of the greateft and moft Remarkable Proofs
of the Power which fome Imaginations have over
others, is the Power that certain Authors have to per-
fuade, though they bring no Realoas for what they
fay* For Example, TertulUany Seneca^ Montaigne^ and.
fome others give a Turn to their Words, that have
lb many Charms, and fuch a Luftre as dazles the
Minds of moft People, though in their Writings the^
Imaginations of rhofe Authors be but imperfedllyj
painted and Ihadow'd. Their Words, though theyj
want Life, have a greater Efficacy in em, than the:]
Reafonsof fomePerfons: They enter, they penetrate J
and command the Mind after lb imperious a manner
that they force it to a blind Obedience, and tyranni-'.
cally compel it to an unthoiight of Siibmiftion. The5(
Mind is willing to believe, bur knows not what to be-|
Jieve -y for when it fiin would know what it defires to'
believe, and approaches near thole Phantomes, to di-
ftinguifh what they are, they vanilh into Air with all
their Pomp and Splendour.
Though the Writings of the Authors above men-
tion'd arc very proper to demonitrate the Force of
Imagination, and though I propofe 'em for Exampli;
fake, yet do I not go about to condemn Vm in all
things: There are fome certain Beauties in 'em that .1
cannot but applaud i nor is it my defign to inveigh
againft the Univerfal Approbation of many Ages. I
proteft that I have a high Refpeift for fome of Tei -
tuilian% Works ; more efpeciaUy for his Apo/ogjf againfl
the GentileSy and his- Book of Prcjcripdons againft He
retickj y I alfo admire Semca in fome parrs of h!$
Writings ;
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Writings; but as for Montaigne\ whole Book, I very
little value it,
Tertullian was in truth a Man of profound Learn-
ing 5 but he had a better Memory than Judgment;
he had more of Penetration and Extent of Imagina-
tion, than of Wit: Nor can it be denied but tha^ he
was a Vilionary in thatfenfe which I have already ex-
plain'd, and that he was infecf^ed with all thofe Vices
which I have attributed to Vilionary Wits. The Re-
fpedl which he had for Mont anus and his Prophetefles,
is an undeniable Proof of the Weaknefs of his Judg-
menr. That Heat, thofe Tranfports, thofe Enthuli-
afms of his upon Petty SubjetSfs, palpably demonftrate
the Diforder of his Imagination. How many irre-
gular Ceremonies are there in his Hyperbohsy and his
Figures ? How many Pompous and Magnificent Ar-
guments, that only force Perfualion and Proof by
aftonilhing and dazling the Mind ?
Of what ufe, for Example, is it to that Author,
when he would juftifie himfelf for having put on the
Philclbpher's Gown, and not the Garment he was
wont to wear, to tell us, that the Gown had formerly
been in falhion at Carthage ? Would it be a fuffideat
Excufe for a Man now to wear a Cap and a Ruff,
becaufe our Fore-fathers made ufe of them ? And
would it look decent for the Women in this Age to
wear Fardingales and French Hoods, unlefs it were
in Carnaval time, when they had a mind to difguife
themfelves ?
What could he infer from thofe Pompous and Mag-
nificent Defcriptions of the Revolutions and Cafua-
licies that happen in the World, or what could they
contribute to his Juftification ? The Moon varies in
her Afpedls ; the Year in the Seafbns of it; the Fields
look of another Hue in the Winter, than in Sum-
mer. There happen Inundations that drowm whole
Provinces, and Earthquakes that fwallow up entire
Cities. New Cities are built, new Colonies fettled ;
we have heard of Inundations of People that have
over-runand fubdu'd Kingdoms: in a Word, all Na-
ture is fubjedl to change, Therefore Tertullian lays
afide
111? Ac-
4
alidf
Chap. Ill; A Search after Trtitb.
afide his common Garment to put on his Gown.
Whatj I would fain know, have ail thofe various Mu-
rations, and others without number which he anxi-
oufly enquires into, and defcribes with forc'd, ob-
fcure, and wrefted Exprefllons, to do with his Mat-
ter ? The Peacock cannot move his Foot, but he
ch^ges colour; the Serpent creeping through fome
narrow Hole ftrips off his Skin and renews his Age;
therefore Tertullian had reafon to change his Habit.
"Who, in cold Blood, and with a Sedate Mind, but
would draw thefe Conclufions j or, who would not
laugh at the Author himfelf, to hear him make fuch
Inferences ; Did he not trouble and dizzy the Brains
of his Reader with the noife of his Rhetorick ?
Almoft all the reft of his Little Book Lk Pallio, is
full of Reafbns as remote from his Subjedt, as Thefe,
which certainly could prove nothing at all, if the
Mind did not fuffer it felf to be ftupified ; but 'tis to
no purpofe to ftay any longer upon thefe Thing-s.
'Tis fufficient to fay thus much farther only, that if
Exacftnefs of Mind, as alfo Perfpicuity and Clearnefs
in Words ought always to appear in every thing we
Write, feeing we Write to no other end but to be un-
derftood ; If this, I fay, be true, then is Tertullian
never to be excus'd, who, by the ConfelTion of Sal-
majius himfelf, the greateft Critick of this Age,
did all he could to render
himfelf obfcure,. and fb Midtos etiarn vidi, pod
well accomplilh'd his de- (juamhene ccftuajjentut eum
fign, that the Commenta- ajjeqmrentur nihil frceter
tor himfelf is not afraid fudorem-, (3 inancm animi
to fwear, that he was ne- fatigationem l^cratos, ab
ver as yet perfectly un- ejus'leSimie difceffijfe. Sic
derftood by any Man. qui Scotinos haheri videri-
But though the Genius of que, digtnis qui hcc cogno-
that Nation, the Cuftom menttim haberet^ vo/uit^
then in fafliion, or the Na- adeo quod voluit a femetigfo
ture of Satyr and Raillery impetravit, (3 officere id
at that time in ufc, might quod optnhat valuit^ ut li-
in fome meafure juftitie quido jurare aufim, nimi-
his defign of Studying uem ad hoc tempn extitiffie
Ob-
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244 A Semi after Ifrut 'h. Book If.
Obfcurity , and fetting qui pojjit jurare hmc libeh
himfelf above the Reach lum a capite ad calccm uf-
of Human Underftand- que totum a fe non minus
ing» all this can never be bene IntelleElum quam le^
able to excufe the Idle Hum, SalmJnEpift. dedt
Reafonst and Deviations Comm, in Textum,
of an Author, who in fe-
vera! other of his Works» as well as in This, adven-
tured to utter whatever canie into his Mind, provided
it were fome ,extraordinary Thought, or (bme bold
Expreflion by which he was in hopes to make a vaunt-
ing (hew of the power, or to fay better, of the irre-
gularity of this Imagination.
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CHAP. IV.
Of SenecaV Imagination.
VEnecas Imagination is fometimcs no better regulated
^ than that of TertuUian. His Impetuous Commo-
t ons frequently hurry him into Countreys unknown
to him, where neverthelefs he Travels with the fame
afliirance, as if he had known where he was, and
whither he was going. Provided he make large Steps,
and adorn his Periods with Figures and juft Caden-
cies, he thinks he has gone a great way : But he is
like your Dauncers, who always end at the fame place
where they began.
It behoves us to diftinguifli rightly between the
Force ond' Beauty of Words, and the Force and
Beauty of Reafons. 'Tis true there appears much of
Efficacy and Elegancy in Seneca s Words, but there is
little of Strength or Clearnefs in his Reafons. By the
Strength of his Imagination he gives fuch a certain
Turn to his Words, as to render *em moving, ftirring^
and perfuaiive by Impreflion, but he does not afford
'em that perfpicuiry, nor that pure Light, whereby
the
Chap. IV. A Search after Trmh.
the Mind may be enllghren'd and perfiiaded by Evi-
dence. He convinces becaufe he moves, and plcafcs;
but I can hardly believe that they ate convinced by
him that read him fedately, and who being aware
of furpnzal, never yield but when vanquifh'd by per-
Iprcuity, and demonftrations of Reafon. In a w^ord,
provided hefpeaks and fpeaks well, he is not very Ibl-
licitous what he fays; as if a Man could fpeak well,
yet not know what he faid. And thus he convinces
by a blind perfuafion, which they who admit, do not
well apprehend after what manner they came to ad-
mil; as if the Mind ought to fuffer it felf to be con-
vinc'd, unlefs it diftinc5tly underftand the Mancr after
due Examination.
What is more Pompous and Magnificent than his
Idea of a Wife Man, yet at the Bottom, what more
Vain and Imaginary ? His Ponraiture of Cato is too
Illuftrious to be accounted Genuine : They are Adiil-
terations and Paintings that only impofe upon fuch as
never ftudy or know the Nature of Man. <2ato was
a Man fubjed: to ail the Miferies that befall Mankind i
and therefore to fay he was invulnerable was an eg re-
gious Miftake: They that
ftrike him, hurt him. He Itaque non refert, quam
had neither the Hardnefs muita in ilium tela cdtiH-
of an Adamant, which 'ciantur^ cum Jit nulli pcnc-
Iron cannot bruife; nor trabilis. Qmmodo quorum-
the Firmnefs of Rocks, dam lafidum iriexpugnahi-
which the Waves cannot Us ferro duritia ejl^ necfe-
fhake, as Seyieea pretends, cari adamas, aut c<edi vel
In a word, he was not in- teri ptejl^ fed incurrer.tia
fenfible. And the fame nltro retundit: quemadmo-
Seneca finds himfelf o- dum fojecli in altiimfccpi-
blig'd to grant it, when li marc fravgimt^ nec ifji
his Imagination was a ulla fevitia: veftigia tot -
little coofd, and he be- berati f^cidis Djicruant, It a
gan to refled upon what fa-pientis animus Jolidus eji,
he had faid. If id rchcris collegit^ ut tarn
But will he not agree tutus fit ab injuria,qtinm ilia
that his Wife-man may be qute extuli. Sen. c. 5. Trad
rediic'd to Miferv, fince Qtiod in fapienrem,
* - T* t.
241
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he grants him not to be infenfible of Pain: No, with-
out queftion, Pain does not affedl his Wife-man ; the
fear of Pain does not diflurb him: He is above the
Frowns of Fortune, and the Malice of Men; they
are nor able to difquiet him.
There are no Walls or Adfiim hoc vohisfhha'
Towres in the Itrongeft turns : fuh ifto tot civita-
Places, which the Ramins turn everfire munimentu in-
and other Engines do not curfu arietis labefieri, ^
caufe to ihake > or which turrium altitudinem cuni-
are not overturned by time, culis ac Utentihus fojjis rer
But there arc no Engines -pente re/idere, & aquaturum
fo ftrong, as to be able to editijjimas arces aggerem
fbake the Conftant Mind crefcere. At nulla machi-
of a Wife-man. You muft 77amenta pojjh reperiri^ quce
not compare him to the henefundatum animum agi-
Walls of Bahilon that A- tent,kndi a little lower,
Icxander forc'd, nor rhofe Bahylonis muros illi contule-
of Carthage or Numa^itia^ ris^quos Alexander intravit i
which the fame Arm over- non Cartaginis^ aut Kuman-
threw, nor the Capitol and ti^e mcenia una manu capta j
Citadel; they ftill retain non Capitolium arcemve ;
the Marks of the Enemies hahent ifla hofiile veftigium.
havitig been Mafter of Chap. 6.
'cm.
Thofe Arrows which Qmd tu put as cum fioli-
are iliot againft the Sun, dus ille Bex multitudine te-
never mount fo high as lorum diem ohfcuraffet^ td-
to come near it. The 5"a- lam fagittam in folem inci-
criledges that are com- dijfe. Ut ccelejlia humanas
milted in deftroying ^naniis effugiunt^ & ah his
Temples , and melting qui templa diruunt, aut fi-
down the Images, never mulachra confiant, nihil di"
injure the Deity : The vinitati nocetiir-t ita quid-
Gods themfelves may be quid fit irifapientemyproter-
overwhelm'd under the 've,petulantcr->fuperhe^fru'^
Ruine of their Temples, ftratentatur^ chdip. Inter
but his Mhfe-man fliall ne- fragorem templorum fuper
ver be overwhelm'd, or if Deos fuos cadentium mii
he be, he lhall receive no homini pax fiat. chap. 5,
harm.
But
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to
Chap. IV. A Search after Truth.
But never think, (fays ^on eft tit dicatita ut fo-
Seweait) that this Wile-man les^ huncfanient em noftrum
whom I defcribe to thee, nufqtiam imeniri. Non fin-
is no where to be found, gimus iftum humani ingenii
'Tis not a vain fidtion to vanum decus, nec ingentem
raife the Mind of Mart, imaginem rei falfie concipi-
It is not a great Idea with- mus: fed qualem confirma-
out Reality and Truth, musy exhibuimusy (3 exhi-
It may be alfo that Cato bebimus. Ceeterum hie ipfe
furpafles this Idea, M, Cato vereor ne fupra no-
ftrtim exemplar fit. ch. 7.
But methinks, continues Videor mihi intutxi ani-
hcy that 1 fee your Spirit mum timm incenfumy ef-
mov'd and in a heat. You fervefcentem ; paras accU-
will fay perhaps that this mare, Hcec funty qu£ auHo-
is a way to make a Man ritatem pfceceptis veftri^ de-
contemptible, to promife trahant. Magna promitti-
things that can neither be tisy qu£ ne optari qui-'
believed nor hop'd for, and demy ne diim credi pofiimt,
that the Stoicks only And a little lower, Itafub^
change the names of lato alte fupercilio in eaderriy
things, to fpeak the fame quce cxteriy defeendetisy rnu-
things after a more mag- tatis rerum mminibusi talc
nificent and pompous itaque aliquid (3 in hoc
manner. But you are de- ejfe fufpicory quodprima fpe-
ceiv'd. I do not go about to cie pulchrum atque magnifi-
extol a Wife-man by thele cum efty nec injuriamy nec
magnificent and pJaufible contumeliam accepturumejfe
words: I only pretend, fapientem. And a little
that he is in an inaccefli- lower. Ego vera fapientem
ble place, where he can noti imaginario honore ver-
receive no injury. horum exornare conftituiyfcd
eo loco ponerCy quo nulla per
veniat injuria.
Thus you fee hovV Sense as ftrong Imagination pre-
vails over his weak Reafon. But is it pofiible that
Men, continually fenfible of their Miferiesand Weak-
nefles, can admit into their Breaft fuch Vain and foar-
ing Thoughts ? Can a Rational Man ever be con*
vinc'd in himfelf, that his Pain never affedts or hurts
him ? But wherefore does he force Cato upon us ?
^ ' For
'H
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5ff P' ','■
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244 Search 'aftir Truth. Book tf.
For certainly let him attribute as much fortitude and
Wifdom to him as he t)Ieafes, he never arrived at that
hei'ght as to endure Without any commotion ; I will
hot fay, the hainous Injuries of'Men falling upon him,
Beating and Robbing him, ^lit the very Sting of 'a
File. What can there be more weak againit fiidi
Ifiong and convincing ProOfs, as chofe of our own
Eitpe'riehce, than this Egregious ^eafon of Senccd^s }
and yet *ti^ on'e of his Principal Proofs.
He that \Vourtds, (fays Validius debet cjfe quod
he) onght to be ftronger Udityeo eftiodUditur, Non
than he that is wOunded ; ejl autem fortior neqiiitia
Vice is not ftiohger than virtute. Non qofefl ergo Icc-
* Vertue. Therefhre a Wife- di fapiens. Injuria:, 'in bones
rnarj cannot' be injiir'^d t 'nm tcntatur nifi a malisf o-
For thhfe need's no mo'fe nis inter fepax eft. Quod
than to ahfwe'r, either that ft Ixdi nifi inftrm'ior nbn 'po'
all Men are Sinners, and left., mains autem bono in-
confequ'ently deferve the ftrfnior eft,nec ihjiirialponis
Mifery which they fuffer 5 nift a difpari verenda eft ;
Which Religion teaches injuria in fapieritem virum
us: Or if Vice be ftronger non cadit, chap. 7,
than Vertiie, the Vicious
may be • ft'roiVger fome-
times than good Men, as
Experience fhews us.
Epcuriiu Epicurus had reafon to lay, that Injuries voere tole-
ent mjunas yahle to a iVife Man. But Seneca was in the wrong to
^ejftftpieL that pVife Men could riot he injur d. The Ver-
ttie of the Stoics could not render 'em Invulnerable,
lince true Vertue does not hinder us from being Mi-
ferable, nor from being fit Objedls of Pity when we
fnfter any Mifchief. Sr.P^«/and the Primitive Chri-
ftians had more Vertue than Cato and ail the Stoics ;
neverthelefs they confefs'd, that the Pains which they
fufi'er'd reduc'd *em to mifery, though they were happy
in the hopes of Eternal Reward. Si tantum in hac
vita fperantes, fmnus, miferahiliores fumiis omnibus Homi-
nibus., fays St, Paid.,
God alone by his Grace can endue us with true and
folid Vertue 5 and therefore he alone can brfng us to
true
tiy nas IK-
juntas mn
C.
Chap!. IV. A Search after Trttfh.
true and folid Happinels. But he neither promiles
nor bellows it in this Life- 'Tis in the other Life
that we mull hope for it from his Juftice, as the
ward of thole MUeries which we luffer'd for Loye of
him. We m'e nptac prefenc in poflellxon of that Re-
pofe which nothing can trouble. Neither does the
Grace of our Lord Jefus Chrift alford us invincible
Hrength, it leaves us to the feeling of our own weak-
nefs, that being conyinc'd of our frttilty, we may un-
dedtand that there is nothing in this World where-
with we may not be injur'd y and that we rpay be en-
abled to bear thofe injuries which are oflfer'd us, vyith
that true Patience>which arifes from phrillian Humi-
lity and Modefty, not with a lofty haughty Patience,
that appear'd in the Conftancy of proud Cato,
Cato took in good part a Box of the Ear that was
given him j he never reveng'd himfelf; nor did he
pardon it, but he arrogantly deny'd that he had any
injury done him. He would have it believ'd that he
was abpve thofe that ftruck him: His Patience vyas
npthing but Pride and Infolency : It was injurious to
thofe that affronted: For by that fame Stoical Pa-
tience did Ca^o {hew, that he look'd uppn his Enemies
as Beafts, that are not worth the anger of a Wife-
man, and therefore he takes no notice of em. 'Tis
this fame Scorn of his Enemies, and high Efteem of
himfelf, that Seneca calls greatncfs of Pourage. Ma-
jori animo^ fays he of the injury done to Cato^ nm
agnovit quam ignoviffet. How madly does he conr
found Magnanimity with Pride, and feparare Patienpe
from Humility,to join it with infufferable Arrogancy I
But how delightfully does this fame Madnefs fiactev
the Vanity of Man, who always refufes to fubmit
and debafe himfelf } And hovy dangerous is it, efpe-
cially for Chrillians, to imbibe the Dod:rine ot a
Mailer fo Indifcreet and void of Judgment as Seneca j
but whofe Imagination is fo llrong, fo vigorous, and
fo impetuous, that it dazles, and like a Torrent bur-
ries along with it People of weak Underftanding, and
fuch as are prone to the Flatteries of Pkafure and
Concupifcence.
R 3 Rather
-ii.i
446
1 •'•'^ jj ^
f. W 'r '< :i'.'.,. !_ ;•.
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A Search after Truth. Book IL
Rather let Chriftians learn from their Mafter, that
the Wicked are they who are able to hurt em, and
that Good Men are fometimes liable to the Injuries
of the Impious by the permillion of Providence.
When one of the Officers belonging to the High-
Prieft fmote J ejus Chriji upon the Face, He, the Wifeft
of all the Wifeft among Chriftians, infinitely Wife,
and likewife as Powerful as he is Wife, does not deny
but that he was injurVi by the Officer ; however ho
was not angry ; he does not, as Cat^o did, revenge him.,
felf, but he pardons, as one that had fuffeFd a real
Injury ; He could have reveng'd himfelf, and de-
ft toy'd his Enemies; but he fuffeFd with an humble
and modeft Patience, which was no way injurious to
any body; no, not to the Mifcreant that did him the
Mifchief. Cato on the other fide, neither being able,
nor daring to take a real Revenge for the Injury he
had receiv'd, feigns at leaft an Imaginary Vengeance
that flatters lus own Vanity and Pride j he raifes him-
felf in his own mind above the Clouds; from thence
he beholds poor Mortals as fmall as Flies, and he con-
temns em as Infecfts uncapable of hurting him, and
unworthy of his Anger. This is a Ficftion becoming
the Wife Cato, From this Ficftion arifes that Magna-
nimity and Conftancy of his Courage that refembles
him to the Gods, It is this that renders him invul-
nerable, (ince it advances him above all the Strength
and Maligaity of other Men. Poor Cato ! who by
thy Vertue think'ft thy felf fuperior to all other Mor?
tals I Thy Wifdom is but Madnefs, and thy Magna-
nimity an* Abomination in the fight of God, what-
ever the Wife Men of the World thinks of it; There
. , , are Vifionaries of feveral forts; fome imagine them-
diefiji^l^i' |-Q transformed into tocks and Hens j others
%^ee. ^ttod believe themfelves to be Kings or Emperors ; others
hominibus in imitation of the Deity, arrogate an abfolute Inde-
altum eji, pendency to themfelves. But though Men are al-
ways looked upon as Madmen who believe themfelves
Deum. to be transform'd into Cocks or Kings, yet are they
hue. \6. not always number'd among the Frantick Vifionaries,
who believe that their Vertue refembles em to God,
and independent from all Authority and Command,
The
Sapient i a
fsujus Tffun-
.It^
chap. IV. A Search after Truth.
The Reafon of it is, that it is not enough to have
Raving Thoughts to be counted a Madman j they
muft DC accounted Phrentick and Ridiculous by o-
thers: For Madmen never pafs for what they are a-
mong fuch as referable themfelves, but only among
Men of Senfe and Wifdom, as Wife-men are never
look'd upon to be fuch by thofe that are Mad : Men
then acknowledge thofe to be Fools who conceit them-
felves to be turned into Cocks and Kings, becaufe all
Men of Senfe believe that it is not fo eafie for any
Body to become a Cock or a King. But Men in all
Ages have thought they might be equal to the Gods.
Their Vanity has iufus'd this Opinion into *em as a
thing probable enough: They learn't it from their
firft Parents: For without doubt our firft Parents
were of that Opinion, when they obey'd the Devil,
who tempted *em with a Promife that they Ihould be
like to God, EritK ficut Dii. The moft pure Intelli-
gences endu'd with Celeftial Precepts and Clear Un-
derftandings, were fo blinded by their own Pride,
that they thought they might throw off the Yoak of
Divine Authority,and feat themfelves upon tlae Throne
of God. So that his no wonder, if Men, who are
inferior to Angels in Purity and Underftanding, aban-
don themfelves to the fame Motions of their Vanity
which blinds and feduces em.
If the Temptation of Grandeur and Independency
be the ftrongeft of all, 'tis becaufe it feems to us, as
it did to our Forefathers, more comformablc to our
Reafon as well as to our Inclination; for we are not
always fenfible of our own Weakneffes and Wants
that caufe us to ftand in need of every thine. Had
the Serpent menac'd our hrff Parents by telling 'cm.
That unlefs they eat of the Fruit which God had for-
bid 'em to ear, they lliould be transform'd, the one
into a Cock, the odicr into a Hen, I oueftion veheiher
they y ould no': have derided fo foaliili a Teirpration ;
have derided it our fdvcs. But the
::f others by himfelf, well knew, 'ihac
cfirc of Independency wtrc the
x.icii he wa^ :o plant his
247
for w;. ihould
Devil judging
Ambition an.i c
againft
iii
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248 A Search after 7ruth. Book II.
The Second Reafon why we look upon thofe to be
Madmen that believe themfelves to be transform'd
into Cocks and Kings, and yet have not the fame
thoughts of thofe who believe that no Body can hurt
'em, as being above all Pain, is this> becaufe they who
are Hypochondraical difplay their Miftakes vifibly
to nil People, fo that every body may be an Eye-wit-
nefs of their Error. But when Qato affufes us, that
they who ftruck him never hurt him, he allerts it, or
may alferc it, with fo much Confidence and Gravity,
that a Man may juftly quettion whether he be really the
fame as he appears to be: And we may be inclin'd to
think, that his Soul is not to be fhaken, becaufe his
Body feems to be immovable. For the outward Air
of the Body is generally a mark of the inward dif-
pofition of the Mind. So that a daring and undaunt-
ed Lyar perfwades us fometimes to believe things
incredible j becaufe their talking with fo much
Confidence, is a Proof that alfedts the Senfes ; and
therefore a moft effed"ual Argument that ftrongly con-
vinces the generality of People. Few there are there-
fore, who look upon the Stoicks as Vifionaries, or as
Audacious Lyars, becaufe we have no fenfible Proof
of that which lies referv'd in their Breaft, and be-
caufe the Air of the Face is a moft fenfible Proof that
eafily impofcs upon us ; befidcs that our innate Vanity
readily induces us to believe, that Man is capable of
that Grandeur and Independency to which he pre-
tends.
Hence it is apparent, that thofe Errors which abound
in Seneca's Writings are of all others the moft Perni-
cious and Contagious; .becaufe they are a fort of De-
licate, Infinuating Errors, proportioned to the Vanity
of Mankind, and like to chat wherein the Devil en-
gag'd our firft Parents. They are likewife array'd
with thofe Pompous and Magnificent Ornaments,
which make way for 'em into moft Mens Minds,
They enter, take poffeflion, ftupifie, and captivate
'em, not with a Blindnefs that inclines thofe miferable
Mortals to Humility, a fenfiblenefs of their own Ig-
norance, and an acknowledgment of it before others,
but
-ife:.
Chap^ IV. A Search after Truth,
hut with a Haughty dazling Blindnefs, and a Blind-
nets accompanied with fome falfe Glimmerings. And
when once Men are fmkten with this blindnels of
Pride, they preiently rank themlelves in the number of
fine and great Wits. Others alfo reckon 'em in the
fame Order, and admire 'em. So that there is no-
thing that can be thought more Contagious than this
Blindnefs, becaufe the Vanity and Senfuality of Men,
the Corruption of their Senfes and Paflions, difpole
them to be known thereby, and puts 'em alfo upon
infeding others with it,
I believe then there is no Author more proper than
SenscAy to demonftrate how contagious the Imagination
of feme Men is, who are calfd fine and great Wits;
and what a Command ftrong and vigorous Imagina-
tions have over Weak and more Illiterate People i
not by the ftrength or evidence of their Arguments,
which are the produdions of Wit; but by a certain
turn and livelinefs of Exprellion, which depends upon
the Force of Imagination.
I know well that this Author is highly efteem'd
in the World, and that I lhall be accus'd of more than
ordinary ralhnefs, for having fpoken of him, as of a
Man that had a Strong Imagination, but little Judg-
menr. But it was chiefly by reafon of this Elteem,
that I undertook to fpeak of him 3 not out of Epvy
or any Morofe Humour, but becaufe his great Repu-
ration will excite many to confider more attentively
thofe Errors of his which I have hinted. We ought,
as much as in us lies, to produce famous Examples for
the confirmation of things that we afiert, when they
are of Confequence, and he that Criticizes upon a Book
fometimes does it an honour. However it be, if I
find fault with any thing in Seneca's Writings, I am
■ not fingle in that Opinion ; For not to fpeak of fome
Illuftrious Perfons in this Age, 'tis about 1600 years
ago that a certain Judicious Author obferv'd ;
I. That there was little i. In Philo/opbia Jjarum
Exadnefs in his Philofo- diligens. i.Velles eumdixif-
phy. 2. Little Judgment fe fuo ingenio^ alieno judi-
or Exadnefs in his Elocit- do, 3* aliniiaContemp'
tion
i JO ^ Search after Truth. Book It
tion. 3. That his Repu- JiJfety &c. confenfii fotius
tation was more grounded Eruditorum, ^uam puero'
upon the Imprudent Heat rum amore comfroharctyx,
of Young Men, than con- L 10. c. i.
firm'd by the confent of
the Wife and Learned.
'Tis in vain to Encounter palpable Errors with Pub-
lick Writings, becaufe they are not Contagious, 'Tis
ridiculous to admonifli Men that Hypochondraical Per-
fons are in fome meafure mad ; they know it well
enough: But if they, for whom they have a high
value, miftake, 'tis neceflary to bid 'em have a care of
fuch, for fear left they adhere to their Errors. Now
it is manifeft that Senecals Spirit is a Spirit of Pride
and Vanity. Therefore lince Pride, according to the
Scripture, is the Original of Sin, Initium feccati Su-
pcrhia, the Spirit of Seneca cannot be the Spirit of the
Gofpel: Nor can his Morals have any alliance with
Chriftian Morals, which are only true and folid.
'Tis certain, that all Seneca's thoughts are neither
falfe nor dangerous: They who being endu'd with a
found Wit, have attain'd the Dodlrine of Chriftian
Morals, may read him to good advantage. Great
Men have made a profitable ufe of him ; neither is it
my intention to blame thofe, who being willing to
comply with the weaknefs of other Men, who had fo
high an eftecnt for him, have drawn Arguments from
the Writings of that Author to defend the Morals of
jefusChrift, and tg engage the Enemies of the Gofpel
with their own Weapons.
There are fome good things in the Alcoran, and
we find feme true Prophecies in the Centuries of
'Noftra Damns. We make ufe of the Alcoran to con-
found the Religion of the Tmkj , and the Prophecies
of Ncjtra Damns may be ferviceable to convince fome
Whimfical Perfons. But it does not follow, becaufe
there is Something good in the Akoran, that the Aico-
ran is to be calfd a good Book j as feme true Expla-
nations of Nojlra Damm's Centuries will not make
Noftra Da?miS a Right Prophet; and t^cy who make
uleof rhefe Books to the ends aforefaid/cannor be faid
to have a real Eltcem for 'em. h
Chap. IV. A Search after Truth. 25-1
It would be in vain for any Man m oppole what I
have faid concerning Seneca^ by bringing a great num-
ber of Palfages out of that Author conformable to
the folid Truths of the Gofpel. I agree that there
are fome fuch, as there are alfo in the Alcoran., and
in other Impious Books: And they would do me
wrong, to overwhelm me with the Authority of an
infinice number of People that have made ule of Se~
neca ; becaufe we may fometimes make ufe of a Book
which we believe to be impertinent, provided they
with whom we have to deal, have not the fame Opi-
nion of the Author as we have.
To mine all the Philofophy of the StoicJ^ there needs
but only one thing, fufficiently provM by Experience,
as alfo by what we have already faid : That we ihould
be bound to qur Body, our Parents, our Friends, our
Prince, our Country, by thofe ties that we neither
can, and which it would be a ihame for us to endea-
vour to break. Our Soul is united to our B^y, and
by means of our Body to all things vifible, by a
Hand fo powerful, that ir is impoflible for us to break
that Union. 'Tis impoflible to prick our Body, but
the whole Individuum muft be prick'd and huft: Be-
caufe we are in that condition, that this mutual Har-
mony between us and the Body is ablolutely necefla-
ry. In like manner it is impoffible for us to be at-^
tack'd with Injuries and Contumelies, but we muft
be offended at *em. For that God, who has made us ]
to maintain Society with other Men, has endu'd us
with a Propeniity to all that can join us together,
which can never be vanquifh'd by our felves. *Tis
meerly chimerical to fay, that Pain does not hurt us,
that Words of Scorn and Contempt do not offend us,
becaufe we are above all this. No Mortal Man was
ever above Nature, unlefs by an acceffion of Grace,
and never any Stoic defpis'd Honour and the Efteem
of Men by the Strength and Conftancy of his Mind
only.
Men may overcome their Paffions by contrary Paf-
Eons : They may vanquifh Fear or Pain by Vanity ;
that is, they may fcorn to fly, or to complain ; when
per-
I"
I
i'
1
3-j
- •
ir
• a. ,
1 ', -
Search afier 'truth. Book If.
perceiving the of many People upon 'em, delire
of Honour fup^rts 'em, and ftops thpfe Corporeal
Motions that would induce'em to iiy. This is their
Vidtory, if it may be call'd a Vidlory ; but this is no
delivering themfelves from Servitude ; it may perhaps
be laid, that they have only chang'd their Malter for
fome time, or rather enlarg'd their jBondage r Such
Men are only wife, happy, and free in outward ap-
pearance, but in reality undergo a moft fevere and
cruel Servitude. We may relift our Natural Union
with our Body by the help of our Union with Men.
We may relift Nature by the Strength of Nature :
We may relift God by the Strength that he has given
us : But no Man can relift God by the Strength of his
own Wit; nor can Nature be overcome but by Grace,
becaufe God cannot be overcome, if I may be per-
mittcd to fay lb, without the fpecial AlTiftance of
God.
Thus jhat Magnificent Divifion of all things, into
thole things that have no dependence upon us, and upon
which we ought not to depend, feems to be conien-
raneous to Realbn, but not conformable to that difor-
derly condition to which Sin has reduc'd us. We are
united to all Creatures by the Appointment of God,
but we ablblutely depend upon 'em through the Dif-
order of Sin. So that fince Felicity cannot fublift
with Pain and Anxiety, we can never hope to be happy
in this Life by imagining with our felves, that we do
not depend upon thofe Things to which we are na-
turally enllav'd. All our Felicity in this Life is
grounded upon a Lively Faith, and a Strong Hope,
which afford us Ibme Ibrt of Enjoyment of our fu-
ture Blifs by way of Anticipation; and we may live
according to the Precepts of Vertue, and vanquilh Na-
ture, if iiipported by that Grace which Jeliis Chrift
has merited for us.
CHAP,
chap. V. ^ Swch after iruth.
^51
CHAP. V.
Of Monragne J 'Book;
lAil
yi^OntagTte's Elfays may ferve for another Proof cf
* ^ the Power which Ibme Imaginations have over
others. For that Author has a certain Free Air, and
gives fuch a natural and fo lively a Turn to his
Thoughts, that it is a difficult thing to read him with-
out being entangled in his Snares. The Carelefnels
which he affet^ becomes him fo well, that it renders
him belov'd of all Men, but defpis'd of none ; and
his Haughtinefs is the Haiightinefs of a worthy Good
Man, that procures him all Veneration, but no Ha-
rred. The Genteel and Free Air, fiipported by fome
Learmng,WOrks lb prodigious effedls uponMens Minds,
that they often admire him, and furrender to his De-
cilions, without daring to examine him, and fome-
times before they underftand him. His Reafons ne-
ver convince, becaufe he never produces any, but
what are Weak and without any folidity ; And indeed
he has no Principles upon which to ground his Argu-
inents ; nor does he obferve any Order in drawing
his Conclufions from Principles. For a Paflage out of
fome Hiftory proves nothing: a Ihort Fable demon-
ftrates nothing ; two Verfes out of Horace; an Apo-
thegme out of Clebmertes's or Cafars, are not fufficient
to convince any Rational Man : Neverthelefs his Ef-
fays are no more than a Rapfody of Hiftories, Fables,
Sentences, Elegant Words, Difticks, and Apothegms.
'Tis true that Kldnfagne is not to be look'd upon in
his Eflays as a Alan that argues, but only writes to
divert himfelf, he indulges "his Genius, and m.akes it
his Bufinefs to pleafe, but not to inftrudf ; fo that if
all his Readers rcad him only to divertife themfelves,
his Book would not be fo dangerous, But 'tis alir.oft
,1^
ill
■ if*"'
pRWi^'-
hv_/V:'aiitvf;:
piWf ,'■■ ■
I?i':]i!. i ,;::
WH'*-
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I;
ill' -I
ki* 'f'-
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i'fvil::',,
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54 A Sear^ ^er TrMh. Book II.
as impoffible nor to have that which delights us, as to
refrain from Meats that pleafe our Tafte. The Mind
can take no delight in reading an Author without im-
bibing his Sentiments, or at leaft without receiving
fome Tindure, which, intermixing with his Idea's,
render 'em confus'd and obfcurc.
'Tis not only dangerous to read Montagne for di-
verfion fake, becaufe the pleafure Men take in read-
ing him, engages them inieniibly in his Opinions, but
becaule thatPleafure is more capital than it is vulgarly
thought to be : For certain it is, that Pleafure arihng
principally from an eager Appetite, does but fermenc
andfortifie the PafTions; and the Style of that Author
therefore pleafes us, becauie it afteds us and awakens
our PafTions after an imperceptible manner.
It would be much to the purpofe to prove what we
have faid in particular of Mo7itagnes Eflays, and ge-
nerally that the delight we take in all the variety of
Sty les proceeds only from a fecret Corruption of the
Heart j but it is not here our defign, it would carry
us too far from our fubjed: Neverthelefs, if we
would but relied upon the Connexion of the Idea's,
and the PafTions already meniion'd, and upon what
pafTes in our felves, at the fame time we read a Piece
that is well writ, we fhall eafily difcover our felves to
be mod: delighted with that Author that is moft ac-
commodated to our Affedions and Difpofitions ; if
we are delighted with a fublime, noble, and free Style,
it is becaule Vanity afpires to Rule and Empire; if
^with a Soft and Effeminate Style, 'tis becaufe we are
prone to Softnefs and Pleafute. In a word, 'tis a
certain Perception of Senfible Things, and not from
any Perception of Truth, that we are even in fpight of
our Wills cherilh'd and afTeded with certain Authors.
But to return to Montagne, I am of Opinion his
chiefeft Votaries give this reafon for their admiring
him, becaufe he is an Author judicious and free from
Pedantry, and for that after a diligent Scrutiny he
in a wonderful manner deteded the Nature and In-
hi mitics of Mans Reafon. If I then make it out that
Mofjao^j.e, as much a Gentleman as he was, yet for
-1!
Mlt
\A Search after Truth,
all that, was as much a Pedant as many others, and
that he had a very mean knowledge of iduman Reafon,
certainly I Ihall then make it evident that his Ad-
mirers were not compeird into an Admiration of him
by Convincing Realons, but by th,e Strength of that
Authors Imagination.
The Word Pedant is very Equivocal, but in my
Opinion Cuftoin and Reafon require that we fhoujd
call thofe Pedants, who to make a fair fhew of their
falfe Learning, quote at random all forts of Authors;
who, to gain a Popular Applaufe, talk only for talk-
ing's fake, and to make themfelves admir'd by Fools ;
who rake together without Judgment or Difcrexion
JVpothegms and Paifages of Hiftory, to prove, or
make a Ihew of proving Things that cannot be prov'd
but by Reafons.
pedants are oppos'd to Men that make ufe of their
Reafon, and that which renders'em odious to Men of
Worth and Senfe is this, that Pedants are Enemies to
Reaibn. For Men of true Ingenuity love naturally
found Arguments, nor can they endure the Converfa-
tion of Men that will not admit of the ufe of Reafon.
Now thofe Perfons whom w'e have defcrib'd can never
argue truly, becaufe their Brains are very fliallow,
and ftuffd with falfe Learning befides. Nor will
they argue, becaufe they find that fome Men admire
'em more when they cite any unknown Author,
or any Sentence of an ancient Xf'riter, than when they
pretend to Reafoning : So that their Vanity Congra-
lulating it felf for the Veneration that is paid em,
caufes 'em to apply themfelves to the Study ol all thofe
Obfolete and unufnal Sciences, that proem e the gaping
aftonifhment of the Vulgar.
Pedants then are Vain and Arrogant, Men of great
Memories, but of little Judgment, quick and abound-
ing in Quotations, unfortunate atid weak in their Ar-
guments; endu'd with a vigorous and fpacious Ima-
gination, but volatile, irregular, and no ways able to
contain it felf within the bounds of ExaCthefs.
After all this, it will be no difficult thing to prove,
McTitagne was as much a Pedant as feveral others,
according
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A Search after Truth, Book V
according to the Notion of the WordPfi^;?^, which feetas
ilioft conformable to Reafbn and Cuftom. I fpeak not
here of Gown'd Pedants, or Schoolmafters j 'tis not the
Gown that makes a Pedant. Montagne, who had fuch an
averfion for Pedantry, might never wear a iong Gown,
but he could not lb eafily difcharge himfelf of his
peculiar Vices. He has labour'd to acquire a Gen-
reel Air, but he never ftudied how to be Mafter of
a Ju'ft Mind, or at leaft his Studies prcv'd indfedruai:
And therefore he adorn'dhis Wit with a fort of Learn*
ing that did not tafte of the School, but was empty,
vain, and trivial; while he negledled to culrivare his
"Keafon, to corroborate his Judgment, and acquire to
himfelf the Vermes of a Worthy Man.
Montague's Book is ftuff'd with fo many Proofs of
the Pride and Vanity of the Author, that ic would
be a needlefs thing perhaps to fpend time in the par-
ticular enumeration of em. For he muft be a Mat\
extreamly conceited to believe, that People would read
fitch a large Book on purpofe to underftand the Gfe-
nius and Humour of the Author. Ceminly he muft
think himfelf feparated from the Vulgar, and locrk
upon himfelf as fome extraordinary Petlbn. All Men
are eflcndally oblig'd to turn the Mind of thofe that
are prone to reverence 'em, towards him who alone
defervcs to be ador'd : And Religion teaches, that the
Mind and Heart of Man, which were only made for
God, fnoLiId never be taken up with our ftlves, nor
ftep at felf'admiration and fclf-Iove. When Sr. John
fell proftrate at the Feet of the Angel of God, the
Angel bid him rife, J am thy Felhw-fervant, faid he,
and of thy Brethren, worjhip Gcd. Only the Devils,
and_ thofe that partake of their Impious Pride, afpire
Adoration. But to exacft^ that other Men fhould
employ themfelves .in meditating upon our AfFedlions
and Cogitations, What is this bur to feek after not
qnly an External, but an Internal and Real Adorati-
on ? and ardently to defire the fame Worlhip which
Gcd requires to be paid to himfelt in Spirit and
Truth
Mcn^
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10. Confer-
njus tuus
uu
Gliap. V. after TrutK
Montagne wrote his Eflays, to no other end but to
paint forth his own Humours and Inclinations; he
iiimfelf confefles as much in his Advertiiement to the
Reader inferred in all the Editions, 'Trs my feif that
I faint fcrthy *tis I that am the SubjeH rf my own Bool{,
And this is apparent enough to them that read it.
For there are very few Chapters wherein he does
not make feme Digreflion or other to fpeak of him-
felf. And there are fome whole Chapters which he
confumcs in talking of no body ell'e but himleJf.
Wherefore, though he compos'd his Book to make the
Portraiture of himfelf, yet he publiih'd it for others
to read. *Twas therefore his defign to turn theGaz-
ing Eyes and Attentions of all Men upon himfelf^
though he fays, he J^ew not any rcafon he had to imflcy
hfs Leifurc ufon a SubjeB fo vain andfrivokus. Thus
his own words condemn him. For if he thought
there was no reafm why Men Ihould employ them-
felves in reading his Book, certainly he adied againft
Common Senfe in caufing his EJJays to be publiih'd :
Whence we are oblig'd to believe, that either he fpoke
one thing and thought another, or that he did amifs
to Print his Book.
'Tis alfb a very pleafant Excufe of his Vanity, to
lay, that he bad never written but for the fake of his
Triends and l{elations: For if that were true, where^
fore did he fuffer three Impreflions ? Would not one
have been enough tor his Friends and Relation ? Howt
came it to pals that he enlarg'd his Book in the laft
Impreflions, and never expung'd any thing out of it,
unlefs it were becaufe Fortune favour d his Intentions:
I add, fays he, but I never correH, for he that has once'
mortgaged his PPorh^to the Publick, in my Opinion, has nC
farther right to it. Let him fay better if he can in ano"
ther Book, But let him not corrupt the work, that he has
fold. At this rate nothing is to be purchased from fuch Men
till after they are dead. Let Men confider well before they
appear in publiek.' TdFloo bids Vwj make fuch hafle ? My
, Book, is always one and the fame. And therefore he
morrgag'd and [tiblifh'd his Book as well topleafure
Other Men, as his B^lations and Friends, But though
■ § ■ he
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he had endeavour'd to oblige his Friends and Rela-
tions only, and to have turn'd their Minds and Hearts
upon his Pidlure made by himlelf, ail the time that
was to be Ipent in reading his Book, certainly his Va-
nity was ne're the more to be excused.
If it be a fault for a Man to fpeak often of him-
felf, certainly 'tis a piece of Impudence, or rather a
kind of Madnefs for a Man to be always making
Panegyrics upon him felf as Montagne does ; for it is
not only a Sin againft Chriftian Humility, but againft
Right Reafon.
Men were made to live together, and to form Ci-
vil Bodies and Societies ; but it is to be obferv'd, that
the Private Members which compofe thofe Societies,
would not take it well to be accounted the meaneft
Member of the Body which they conftitute. No
wonder then if thole Men, that praife and extol them-
felves above others, looking upon the reft as the
meaneft Members of the Society, and confidering
themfelves the chiefeft and moft Honourable, incur
the Hatred of all Men, inftead of procuring their
Love and Efteem. . ,
Therefore 'tis a Vanity, an Indifcreet and Ridicu-
lous Vanity for Montagne continually to fpeak in
Praife of himfelf; and it is a Vanity ftill more ex-
travagant in the fame Author to defcribe his own
Faults: For, if you obferve it, you lhall find, that he
only difcovers thofe Vices, which through the Cor-
ruption of the Age Men pride themfelves in being
guilty of; that he willingly afcribes to himfelf thofe
that he thinks will procure him the Honour of a
good Wit, and the Air of a Gentleman. And all
this, that by a feeming ingenuous Confeftion of his
Vices, he may gain the more ealie- Belief when he
L. 3.M3. flies out into his own Praifes. And therefore he
might juftiy lay. That Self-Praife and Self-Scorn arofi
from the fame Air of Arr&gance, This is always a cer-
tain Sign that a Man is pufPd up with a high Conceit
of himfelf; and, in my Opinion, Montagne feems
more Haughty and Vain when he difplays his Vices,
than when he cries up his Vertues j for who would
bear
Cliap.V. A Search after Truths 2. f 9
bear with fuch an unranc51:ified Pride, that glories in
thole Vices which (hould rather be an occalion of
Humility. I Ihould lefs impatiently brook a Alan
who is alham'd to confels his faults, than another
who is not afraid to make open proclamation of 'em.
And, in my Opinion, there is no Alan but ought
to have a jull diidain of that over-free and unchri-
ftian-Iike way wherein Montagne difplays hi$ Vices.
But let us examine the other Qualities of his Alind.
If we may believe Montag?ie u^on his own Word,
a little thing will ptriiiade us, that he was a Alan of L.i.f.24.
no intention, thai his Memory vpas capable of nothings
unfaithful and treacherotiSy but that he wanted neither L. 2. c. i fi
Senfe nor Judgment. Nevertheleis, if we may be-
lieve the Portraiture of his own Wit, I mean, his
own Book, we muft be of another Opinion. J ca?i-
not receive a Command-, fays he, without my Pocket-^
Book: or if I have any Dijcourfe to remember^ if it he
very long-, I am reduced to that miferahle neceffty to
learn by Hearty Verbatim, what I have to fay 1 otherwife
both behaviour and ajfurance would fail me, as being
afraid led my Memory fhould fail me. A Man that
can get by Heart a long Diicourfe, Word for Word,
and to a tittle, that he may the better be enabled
to compofe his outward Gelture, and for the em-
boldning his Delivery, does he feem to want rather
Memory than Judgment? Or may a Man believe
Montagne when he fays this of himfelf ? I am forc d
to call my Servants by the Names of their Employmen'Sy
err of the Coimtreys where they were born ; for I cafi
hardly remember their Proper Names • and if I fhould
live long, I queflicn whether I fhould remember my own
Name. Can a Lord of a fmali Village have fuch a
Croud of Servants, that he cannot remember their
Names, and yet get by Heart a long Oration ? A
Man, who was born and bred in the Country among Pea- if^
fants and Hinds, who has his Head and Hands full of
Family Cares and Bufinefs, and who confelTes, that 'tis
his Opinion, that we ought not to negleSi thofe things
which lie tinder our Feet^ whatever we have in our Hands
nor what i< of moft concernment to m for the Necsjfties of
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Search after TruW. Eook IJ;
L. iz.c. 17. Life ; Can he, I fay, forget the Names of his Do-
nieitick Servants ? Can he he ignorant fas he lays him-
feif) of the great eft -part of the Coyns i of the difference
of one Grain from another ■, either growing-, or in the Barn,
tmlcfs they he fuch as he fees every day, or fuch things at
every Child h>wws, as the ufe. of Leaven in making
Bread, or why People Tun up their iVine, and yet have
a Memory ftuff'd with the Names and Principles of
the Ancient Philofophers, the Ideas of Plato, Epicu-
rusV A tomes, Leucippus and Democratus^j Vacuiiin,
Thales'j Heater, AnaxiamanderV Infinite Nature, Dio-
L.z c. 12. genes'j Air, Pythagoras'j Numbers and Symmetry, Par-
menides'j Infinity, Mufclus'j'L'w/ft, Apollodorus'j PVater
and Fire, Anaxagoras'j Similar Parts, Empedodes'^
Sympathy and Antipathy, Heraclitus^j Fire, &c. Can
a Man that within the fpace of three or four Pages
cites above Fifty Names of leveral Authors, with their
different Opinions;, who has fill'd his whole Work
with Fragments of Hiftories, and indigefted Apo-
thcgms, who fays, that Hiftory and Poetry are his £)/-
L^'C.is. verjion in Bocks; who contradidfs himfeJf every mo-
menr, and in the fame Chapter, evenjn things which
he pretends to have the moft certain knowledge of,
as the Endowments of his Mind and Affedtions; Is
It for fuch a Man, I fay, to boaft a Judgment fuperior
to his Memory ?
IvCt us confels then, that Montagne excelfd in lor-
getfiihiefs; fince he alfures us, that he wiflies we had
the fame Opinion of him, more efpecially fince it is
no way repugnant to Truth. But we are unwilling
to believe him upon his Word, or by the Applaufes
vehich he beftows upon himfelf, that he was a Alan
of Great Judgment, and extraordinary Sagacity of
Alind. For being led by fuch a prejudic'd Opinion,
we might too eafily affent to thofe falfe and dange-
rc us Opinions which he obtrudes upon the World
with an Impious Confidence and Boldnefs, which only
ftapifics and dazles weak Minds.
. Another thing for which Mcntagm is in the fccond
place lb highly commended, is, that he had a perfccfi
knowledge of the Alind of Alan, that he penetrated
into
CHap. V. A Search after Truth, 26
into the moft hidden Receffes of ir, the Nature and
Properties, the Strength and Weaknefs of its and in
a Word, that knew all that could be known of ir.
Let us now fee whether he merits thefe Elogies, and
whence it comes to pafs that they are lb liberaiiy be-
ftow'd upon him.
They who have read Montagne^ well know that he
affeded to be thought a Pyrrijonim-, and that he rook
a pride in doubting of everything. The Belief of
Ccrtamty^ fays he, is a Certain Tedimony of Ext ream
Folly and Uncertainty ; nor are there any greater Fools,
or lefs PhilofopherSi than the Pbilodoxes of Plato. On
the other fide, he beltows fuch large Encomiums up-
on the Pryrhonians in the fame Chapter, that 'tis im-
pofiible to queftion but that he was one of the fame
Sedf. 'Twas neceffary in his time for one that would
be accounted an able and accomplilh'd Man, to doubt
of every thing : And the Title of a great V/ir, of
which he was ambitious, engag'd him farther in thole
his Opinions. Suppofing him therefore to be an Aca-
demic alio, we might, at once, convince him to be
one of the moft ignorant among Men ^ not only in
what concerns the Nature of the Mind, but in every
thing elfe. For fince there is an Elfential Dilference
between Knowing and Doubting, if the Academics
fpeak what they think, when they alfure us they
know nothing, we may juftly fay they are the molt
ignorant of all Men.
Nor are they only the moft ignorant of all Men,
but they are alfo the moft obftinate Aifertors of the
moft Irrational Opinions: For they not only rejecf
whatever is moft certain, and moft univerfally re-
ceived, that they may be accounted great Wits; but
by the lame violence of the Imagination, they pleale
themfelves with talking after a dccilive manner of the
moft uncertain and improbable things. Montagne ap-
patently labours under this Diftemper ; and therefore
cf nccelfity we muft conclude, that he was not only
ignorant of the Nature of Mans Mind, but alfo that
he was inrangled in many grofs Errors in reference to
that Subjedf, granting that he fpoke what he thought,
as it beoune him to do. S3 Fc/
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'^A Search after Truths Book 11,
For what may we fay of a Man, Who confounds
Mind and Matter tocether, who recites the moft ex-
travagant Opinions of the Philofophers upon the an-
tureof the Soul yet fo far from condemning 'em, that
he rather, approves em, though moft repugnant to
Reafon ; who fees not the Neceility of the Immorta-.
lity of our Souls; who believes that Human Reafon
is not capable of underftanding it; and looks upon
all the Proofs that are brought to confirm it, as fo
many Dreams which the defire of, Immortality pro-
duces in us. Somyna aon decentisy fid optantis; who
is angry with Men ; hecattfi they fiparate tbemfelves
from the Croud of other Creatures^ and diftinguifh them-
filves from B:afts, which he calls, our Fellow Brethreriy
and our Companions; and which, as he believes, dil-
courfe together, underftand one another, and laugh
at us, as we fpeak, underftand each other, and de-
ride them , who believes there is a greater difference
between a Man and a Man, than between a Man and
a Beaft ; and who attributes even to Spiders, Delihe-
ration. Thought, and Conclufion i and who after he has-
afterted that the Frame of Mans Body has no ad van-
tage over that of Beafts, willingly embraces the fol-
lowing Sentiment, That it is net l^afon, nor Batioci-
nation, nor the Soul, that renders Men more Excellent
than Beafts, but our Beauty, our Complexion, and the
StruBure of our Limbs ; above which Prerogatives we
ought not to prefer cur Underftanding, our Prudence, and
other Vertues, &c. Can a Man, who relying upon
ihefe Whimfical Opinions, conclude. That 'tis not for
bis Baticcinaticn, hut his Pride and Obftinacy that Man
ExtoHs hi7nfilf above Beafts ? Canfuch a Man,! fay,have
an exacTr know ledge of the Mind of Man, or is it to be
thought that he can perfuade others he has it ?
But we muft do Juftice to all the World, and give
a faithful Charader of Montagne^s Parts. He had a
bad Memory, and a worfc Judgment, 'tis true, but
thofe tw'o Qualities together do not compofe that
which iifually the World calls the Beauty of the
Mind. 'Tis the Elegancy, the Vivacity, the Extenri-
on of the Imagination, that procures a Man the Re-
putation
chap. V. A Search after Trtith,
putation of being a good Wit. The Common fort
of People admire that which glitters, not that which
is folid, becaufe they have a greater value for that
which affeds their Senfes, than for that which informs
their Reafon. And therefore miftaking Elegancy of
Imagination for Elegancy of Wit, it may be laid that
Montagne had an Elegant and Extraordinary Wit.
His Idea's are falfe, but fplendid ; his Expreilions ir-
regular or bold, but pleafant; his Difcourfes ill fup-
ported by Reafon, but well imagin'd. There is
throughout his Book a Charader of an Original
which pleafes infinitely : Though he be an Ufurper
of others Mens Draughts, it may be faid that his Bold
and Strong Imagination gives the Turn of an Origi-
nal to every thing he Copies. Laftly, he has all thofe
things ready at hand, which are neceffary to pleafe
and allure ; nor have I obfcurely demonftrated, as I
am apt to believe, that he has acquired Admiration
among lb many Men, not by convincing their Realbn
by Evident Arguments, but by fubduing their Minds
by the Commanding and Vidorious power of his Ima-
gination. ' -
CHAP. VI.
I. Of Imaginary lVi:{ards^ and Lycanthrofi cr Wolf-^
Men. II. A Conclujion of the Two Firfi Books.
'THere is nothing wherein the force of the Imagi-
nation more prodigioufly Ihews it felf, than in
the hideous number of Goblins, Apparitions, Witch-
crafts, Charaders, Inchanrments, Charms, and gene-
rally of all thofe things which are thought to depend
upon the Power of the Devil.
There is nothing -more terrible, or formidable to
the Mind, or which produces in the Brain deeper
Traces, than the Idea of an Invifible Power, which
we are not able to refift, and which meditates nothing
S 4 bus
A Search after Truth. Book 11,
but to do us Mifchief: All Difcourfes which revive that
Idea are liften'd to with Fear and Curiolicy. Men
adhering to every thing that is extraordinary, take a
Phantaltic delight to tell furprizing and prodigious
Stories of the Power and Malice of Wizards, as well
to frighten others, as to terrific themfelves. So that
'tis no wonder that Wizards are ib common in fome
Countreys, where the Belief of thofe Nodlurnal
Meetings of Wizards called Sabbaths^ has too much
prevail'd s where all the moft extravagant Tales of
Witchcrafts are heard as fo many Authentic Hiftories,
and where real Madmen and Vifionaries, whofe Ima-
gination was at firft difordered as well by the rehear-
ial of fuch Tales, as by the Coriuption of their own
Hearts, are burnt for Wizards. I know that many
People will blame me for attributing the greateft pare
of Witchcrafts to the force of Imagination, becaufe
there are fome Men who delight in terrifying
things, and are angry with thofe that go about
to diiabufe 'em , and who are like thole that are lick
through the power of Imagination, who liften moft
awfully to their Phyficians, that foretell fome difmd
thing that is to befall 'em, and obey their Prefcripti-
ons exatftly. Superftition is not eafily deftroy'd, and
when ever it is attacqued, it finds a great number of
Champions 5 and this fame proneneTs to believe all
the Dotages of D^emonographers, is produc'd and
cherilh'd by the fame caufc that renders the Superfti-
|ious obftinate, as may be eafily prov'd. However
it will not be amifs to let down in few Words, how,
in my Judgment, fuch Opinions as thefe came to get
footing in the World.
A Shepherd in his Cottage, after Supper, tells his
Wife and Children what was done at the Convention
of Wit^ards called the Sabbat. Now when his Ima-
gination cpmes to be heated by the Vapours
of the Wine, and that he begins to believe
himfeJf to have been prefent at that Imaginary Af-
fembly, he fails not to fpeak of it after a ftrong and
vigorous manner. His Natural Eloquence, together
with the Pronenefs of his. Fainily to give Ear to fo
chap. VI. 'A Search after truth. \
new and terrible a Story, could not but produce
ftrange Traces in their weak Imaginatiots : Nor is it
otherwife naturally poflible, that a Woman and little
Children being frightened, fhould be able to penetrate
and refift what they hear him fay. 'Tis a Husband,
'tis a Father that talks of what he has feen, of what
he has done; he is beloved and relpedled j why
fliould they not believe him ? The Shepherd alfo re-
peats his Story feveral days one after another. The
Imagination of the Mother and the Children, admit
by degrees much deeper traces of it: they are ac-
cuftomed to it; the fear vanilhes, but the convidlion
remains ; and by and by their Curiofity will not be
at quiet till they go and anoint themfelves; they lay
ihemfelves in their Beds in fuch a pofture, and the
fame difpofition of their Mind, ftili heats their Ima-
gination more and more ; the traces which the Shep-
herd has form'd in their Brain, are lb very much
open'd, as to caufe 'em in their Sleep to fee as prefent
all the Motions of the Ceremony, the defcription of
which they had heard. They rile, ask one another,
and tell each other what they have feen 5 by this
means they confirm the traces of their Vilion; and
they that have the ftrongeft Imagination more eafily
perfwading the reft, they fail not in a few Nights to
make a formal Story of this Imaginary Nocfturnal
Convention. Thus has the Shepherd made compleat
Wizards i and they in a fhort time will make a great
many others, if being endu'd with a ftrong and vigO'
rous Imagination, fear does not hinder them from
telling fuch like Stories.
There have been fometimes Wizards in good ear-
neft, that is, fuch as thought themfelves really fo, and
believed they went to Nocfturnal Conventions; and
who were fo convinc'd of it, that though feveral Per-
fons wak'd them, and alTufd them that they never
ftirr'd out of their Beds, they would not believe their
Teftimony.
All the world knows, that ftories of Hobgoblins
being told to Children, affright 'em to that degree,
that they vyill not be alone in the dark or witbouc
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Compauy, Becaufe, when the Brain admits no Tra"
ces of any prelent Objedt, that which was imprinted
in their Brain by the help of the ftory, opens it feif
afreih, and many times vehemently enough, to repre-
fent before their Eyes the Apparitions they were to Id
of; neverthelefs thefe ftones are not told em other-
wife then as Fables. They that tell 'cm, do not re-
late them with the fanae Air, as if they were convinced
of the Truth of them, and many times the Relation
it felf is cold and languilhing. No wonder then, that
a Man who believes he has been at a Nodfurnal Con-
vention, and by confequence talks with a ftedfaft and
confident utterance, eafily perfwades fome Perfons,
that hear him with a kind of refpedtjof all the Circum-
ftances which he particularizes, and tranfmits traces
into their Imagination like to thole by which he him-
felf was received.
When Men difcourfe with us, they imprint traces
in our Brains like to thofe which they have themfelves.
If they are deep, then they talk to us after fuch a
manner, as imprelles *em deep: for they cannot talk
to us, but they muft make us in fome meafure like
themfelves. Infants in the Mothers Womb fee nothing
but what the Mother lees; and when they come in-
to the World, they imagine very few things, of which
their Parents are not the caufe; lince the wifeft of
Men, are goveru'd rather by the Imagination of others,
that is, by Opinion and Cuftom, than by the Rules
of Reafon. Therefore in places where Wizards are
burnt, there we find a great number of them, be-
caufe in the places where they are condemn'd to the
Fire, 'tis really believed that they are Wizards, and
that Opinion is more and more confirm'd by the va-
rious difcourfes concerning them. Let 'em but ceafe
to punilh them, and deal with 'em as Mad Folks, and
you fhall fee that in a little time there will be no
Wizards ; becaufe they who are only fo by the force
of Imagination, and who are doubtlefs the Greareft
Number, would return from their Errors.
Moft certainly real Wizards deferve death; and
they who are only fo through the power of Imagina-
tion
Ch^ip'V. A Search after Truths
tion ought not to be reputed altogether Innocents for
^ they uiually believe themfelves to be Witches becaule
they find in themfelves a difpofition to frequent No-
ffpf? dturnal Conventions, and for that reafon anoint them-
felves with certain Drugs, in order to accomplilh
^^^8" their wicked defign, But while we punilh without
diftindion all thele Criminals, the Vulgar Opinion is
'incj confirm'd, Wizards multiply through the ftrengch of
3t;o!i Imagination, atid thus an Infinite number of People
are loft and condem'd to Eternal Damnation: Which
Cofl- is the reafon that feveral Parliaments never punilhing
Id Wizards, there are fewer- or hardly any to be found
in places under their JurifdidHon, where the Envy,
iiTE- Hatred, and Malice of .wicked People cannot make
5® ufe of that pretence to deftroy the Innocent,
kir The apprebenfionof Lycanthrofiy or Men whofup-
pofe themfelves chang'd into Wolves, is a Chimera
Biiiffl no lefs Ridiculous. A Man, through an Irregular
1^3 effort of his Imagination falls into fuch a Phrenzie,
3 that he believes himfelf transform'd into a Wolf every
tflk Night. This diforder of his Mind difpfes him to all
the Adlions that are natural to Wolves, or whatever
BOiliK he has heard reported of them. Away he goes then,
cocjr out of his Haute at Midnight, runs about the Streets,
oiffic falls upon the next Child he meets, bites him and
vlieii u handles him very rudely : Alfo ftupid and fuperftki-
ofoite: ous People believe this Madman to be a real Wolf ;
lie Ri: becaufe the Poor unfortunate Fellow believes it him-
ard'ffi felf; and for that he told it in priv^e to fbme Perfons
iar, k that told it again.
Were it eafie to form in the Brain thofe Traces that
i'J perfwade Men they are chang'd into Wolves j or were
Kva- it as eafie to run about the Streets, and commit the
tceale Ravages which thefe Miferable Wolf Men commit
without being abfolutely^ Mad, as it is to go m a
be tif Dream to a Nocfturnal Convention, thele ftories of
jefora Men transform'd into Wolves, would not fail to pro-
Greats duce the fame effedfs as the Tales of Noifturnal Con-
ventions, and we fhould have as many Wolf-men as
irj.-ami Wizards. But the belief of being transform'd into a
.Wolf fuppoks a great-difordcr of the Brain, which is
♦ more
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more difficult to be produc d, then the Delirium of a
Man chat only believes his going in the Night to a
Nocturnal Convention; that is, who believes he fees
in the Night-time things that are not, and who when
he wakes, cannot ditiinguifli his Dreams from his
Thoughts in the day time.
'Tis a ufual thing for fome People to Dream fuch
lively Dreams in the Night time, as to remember 'em
exadfly when they wake, though the Dream in it felf
be not very terrible: therefore 'tis no' difficult thing
for fome Men to pel fwade themfeives that they were
at a Nodfurnal Convention} for tis fufficient to that
end, that the Brain preferve the Traces that were
made in it by the Dream it felf.
The chief thing that hinders us from taking Dreams
for Realties is, becaufe we cannot unite our Dreams
to thofe things which we did when we were awake ;
for thereby we find they were only Dreams. Now
Imaginary Wizards cannot judge from thence whe-
ther their Noc^rnal Convention were nothing but
a mecr Dream. ^ For they never go to their Conven-
tion but in the Night, and what palfes in the Aflem-
bly cannot be united to their other AcSiions in the
day time : So that 'tis Morally impollible that way
to undeceive 'em. Nor is it nece&ry, that what
Imaginary Wizards think they fee in their Nodfurnal
Aflemblies Ihould be united together in any Natural
Order: for the more confufed and Extravagant they
are, fo much the more real they appear to be. *Tis
therefore fufficient that the Idea's of things done in
the Aflembly Ihould be Lively and Terrible; which
will of neceffity happen, becaufe that always unu-?
fual news, and extraordinary things,are there believed
to be performed.
But it requires fb great a difturbance of the Ima-
gination for a Man to believe himfelf to be tranform'd
into a Cock, a Goat, a Wolf, or an Ox, that it can-
not happen but very rarely ; though thefe great dif-
orders of the Brain do fbmetimes fall our, either as a
Punilhment inflidled from Heaven, as the Scripture
relates of N€huchadne:{:{iW, or through a Natural
trarv?
Ch«ip« VI. A Search after Truth,
^ranf^rt of Melancholly in the Brain; of which we
find ieveral Examples among Phyfical Writers.
Although I am perfwaded that real Wizards are
very rare, that thefe Nodturnal Conventions are
meer Dreams, and that the Parliaments who difmifs
thole accufations of Witchcraft, are the moft jaft and
Equitable: Neverthelefs, 1 doubt not but that there
are any Wizards Charms, Inchantments, e3c* or that
the Devil does fometimes thus exercife his Malice up-
on Men by a particular permiflion of God, For the
Scripture teaches us that the Kingdom of Satan is de-
ftroyed ; that the Angel of God has thrown the De-
vil bound in Chains into the deep Abyfs, from whence
he (hall not be releaied till the end of the World:
that Jefus Chrift has defpoil'd him of his Weapons,
and that the time fhall come, when the Prince of the
World lhall be Expell'd out of the World.
He had Reign'd indeed till the coming of our Sa-
viour, and he Itill Reigns in fuch places where our
Saviour is not known : but he has no longer any
Right or any Power over thofe that are regenerated
in Chrift. He cannot tempt them but by the per-
miflion of God ; or if God gives him leave, 'tis be-
caufe they are able to vanquifli him : Therefore they
too much honour the Devil, who relate Stories
as Arguments of his Power, as fomc of our Modern
Dimonographers do ; fince fuch kind of ftories render
him formidable to weak People.
Devils are to be defpifed, as we defpife Hangmen.
For we ought to tremble only before God. His Power
only is to be fcar'd. We ought to be afraid of his
Juigrreits and Wrath, and not provoke him by
the Contempt of his Laws and Golpel. He de-
ferves our Attention when he fpeaks, or when Men
fpeaks to us concerning him. But when Men fpeak
to us concerning the Power of the Devil, 'tis a ridi-
culous thing to be troubled and difmay'd : OurTer-
ror is an Honour to him : He loves to be refpedfed
and fear'd, and his Pride is fatisfy'd, when we hum""
ble our felves before him.
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IjQ A Search after Truth. Book II.
*Tis now time to conclude this Second Book, and
only to obferve Irom what has been laid in this and
the preceding, i. That all our thoughts which
the Mind has by means of the Body, or by depcn-
dance upon the Body, are only for the ufe of the
Body it felf. x. That they are all faife and Obfcure.
9. That they ferve to no other ufe then to unite us
to fenlible Good, and to ail things that can procure
'em for us ; and that this Union leads us into infinite
Errors, and very great Miferies. Though we are not
always fenfible ot them, no more then we know the
Errors from whence they arile, Of this we lhall give
the following remarkable Example.
Our Union with our Mothers in the Womb, which
is far more ft ride then any we can have with Men, is
the caufe of our greateft Mifehiefs; that is to fay, of
Sin and Concupifcence, which are the Original of all
our Miferies. Neverthelefs, there was a NecelTity
that this Union Ihould be fo ftridt as it is to compofe
the ftrudfure of Bodies.
This Union which was broken by our Birth is fuc-
ceeded by another, whereby Children are joyn'd to
their Parents and Nurfes. This Union is lefs ftridf
than the firft, and therefore does lefs mifchief. It
only enclined us to believe and imitate our Parents
and Nurfes in all things. 'Tis vifible alfo, that this
Second Union was necefiary for us, not as the firft for
the Forming but the Prefervation of the Body > to the
end we might underftand all things that conduce to
the Benefit of it, and to difpofe the Body to thofe
Motions which are necellary for the procuring thofe
Things.
Laftly, The Union which we have at prefent with
all Men does us a great deal of Mifchief though it
be not fo ftridt, as being lefs neceflary for the Prefer-
vation of the Body. For by reafon of this Union it
is, that we live by Opinion, that we love and efteem
what other Men love and value, though contraiy to
our Confciences, and the true Idea's which w^e have
of things. I fpeak not here of that Union which
ctnjoyns us with the Minds of other Men 5 for that
Union
■T I.
Chap. VI; ^ SeafcW after Truth.
Union may prove ferviceable for our Inftrucftion : I
fpeak of the Senfible Union between the Imagination,
and the Air and Manner of thofe with whom we con-
verfe. Thus it is plain, that all our thoughts that we,
have by way of dependency npon the Body, are falfe,
and fo much the more pernitiousto the Mind, as they
are more ufeful to the Body.
Let us therefore endeavour by degrees to free our
felves from the Delufions of our Senfes from the Vi-
(ions of our Imagination, and the ImprelTion which
the Imagination of other Men makes upon our Minds;.
Let us carefully rejed all thefe confufed Idea s, which
we have drawn from that Servitude wherein our
. Body detains us; and let us only admit the clear and
manifeft Ideas which the Mind receives from that
Union which it neceflarily has with the D, or
IVISDOM and ETERNAL TB^VTH; as we fliall ex-
plain in the following Book, which treats of the Un-
derftanding, or Pure Mind.
The End of the Third Part of
the Second Book,
THE
S-E- a"RWU
r AFTER
truth::
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Of the Vnderjlanding or Pure Mind^
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C H A P. I.
L Thought only is Ejfmial to the Mind: Sen ft-'
tion and Imagination are only its A^dificationsi
II, IVe know not all the Modifications our Souls
are capable of. III, They are different from
our Knowledge and LovCy and are not always
the E ffeEls of them,
The Subjei5t of tbis Third Treatife is a little
Dry and Barren: We here examine the Mind
conlidered in it felf, and Independent of the
Body, to know the Weaknefles which are peculiar to
it, and the Errors which it has Only from it felf The
Senfes and Imagination are Fruitful and Inexhatiftible
Sources of our Errors and IlluEons ^ but the Mind
A a a adling
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A Search after Truth, Book III.
adling of it felf is not To fubjedl to Error. We were
troubled tofnini the two preceding Trearifes, and wo
areuneafie to begin this'; it is not becanfe the Nature
or Properties of the Mind is a barren Subjedf, but
becaule we enquire not fo much here into its Pro-
perties as Weaknefies. Let no one be Surprifed if
this Treatife is not fo large, nor difcovers fo many
Errors as the preceding Books; 'nor let any one com-
plain if the ^ubjed: is a little dry, abftrac^ed and difii-
cult. The Senfes and Imagination cannot always be
moved, nor is it neceffary they ftiould. When a Sub-
jedf is abftradfed, he that would render it Senfible,
will obkure it, it's enoi^^h to make it ImeUigible:
There is nothing fb Unfjuft,' as the commoh Com-
plaints ^qf t^fe, who would know every thmg, but
would apply their Mind to nothing; they are angry
if we deiire them to become Attentive; they would
always have us Affed: and Flatter their Senfes and
PafTions. But why.^ We know we cannot fatistie
them. Thofe who make Romances and Comedies,
are oblig-'d to pleafe and captivate the Attentioh^ 'tis
enough for us to inftrud thofe who endeavour to be-
come Attentive.
The Errors of the Senfes and Imagination depend
upon the Nature and CDnftitiition of the Body, and
are difcover'd by confidering the Power they have over
the Soul; but the Errors of the Pure Underftanding
cannot be difcover'd, but by confidering the Nature of
the Mind it felf, and of the Idea's which are neceffary
to it, in order to know Objeds. So that to penetrate
into the Caufes of the Errors of the Pure Underftand-
ing, it will be neceffary for us to inCft in this Book,
upon the Conlideration of the Nature of the Mind,
and of Intelledual Idea's.
We fliall firlt fpeak of th*e Mind as it is in It felf,
and without any relation to the Body to tvhich it is
united : So that what we-lhall fay of it, might be faid
of Pure Intelligences, and with greater Reafon, be-
caufe we here call it the Pure Underftanding: By the
word Pure Vnderjiandirig, we pretend not to defign
that Faculty which the Mind^has of knowing Objeds
without
X'''>
Chap.I. A Search after Truth. 3
without us, without framing Corporeal Images of
them in the Brain to reprefent them : We iball after-
wards treat of Intellediual Idea's, by whole means
the Pure Underftanding perceives Objecfls with-
out us.
I do not believe, that after having thought Serioufly, I. Thought
we can doubt, that the ElTence of the Mind conlilts
only in Thought, even as the Elfence of Matter
lifts in Extenfion : And that according to the different
Modifications of Thinking, the Mind can now
then Imagine, and laftly Participate of itiany other '
particular Forms; fo that according to the different^^, ^
Modifications of Extenfion , Matter is now dificationsi
then Fire, and is capable of infinite other particular
Forms.
By the word Thought, I do not here underftand ^he Ef'
particular Modifications of the Soul, that is, Such or/^^f^"/^
fuch a Thought, but a Thought that is capable
all kinds of Modifications or Thoughts, even as by
Extenfion, I do not underftand fuch or fuch a fort of
Extenfion, as Round, Square, ^c, but an Extenfion
capable of all forts of Modifications or Figures: And thing^upn
there was no need of this Comparifon, but becaufe Tgiji^h all
we have not fo clear an Idea of Thought as of Exten- f}jg uodifi-
fion; for Thought is only knovi^n by an interior
Sentiment or by Cotifcience^ as itiall hereafter be ex- ferved in
plained. thatthlng^
I do not believe it poflible, to conceive a Mind depend.
which cannot Think, although it's eaiie to conceive * Second
one which neither Thinks, Imagines nor Wills ; even P^rt of the
as it's impoflible to conceive Matter that is not ex- ^^eMmdj
tended ; though one may eafily conceive it to be 1°
neither Earth, Metal, Square, Round, and even with-
out Morion. Hence we may conclude. That as there
may be Matter, which is neither Earth, Metal, Square,
Round, or without Motion ; fo there may alfo be a
Mind, which is neither Senfible of Heat or Cold, which
neither Rejoyces, is Sad, Imagines or Wills any thing:
So that all thefe Modifications are not Eftential to it |
Thought only is of the Elfence of the Mind, as Extent
fion only is of the Elfence of Matter.
A a a ^ But
4 A Search after Trnt h, Book III
But even as if Matter or Extenfion were without
Motion, it would be wholly ufelefs, and incapable of
this Variety of Forms for which it was defign'd : And
as it would be impofTible to conceive an Intelligent
Being to Will fuch a Creation, ("that is, Matter with-
out Motion, or incapable of Form,3 fo, if the Mind
or Thought were without Will, it's evident that it
would be wholly ufelefs, fince it would be fometimes
carried towards the Objedfs of its Perceptions, and
would not love the Good for which it was made;
fo that it is impofTible to conceive that an Intelligent
Being would create it in this Eftate. Neverthelefs, as
Motion is not EfTential to Matter, as Extenlion is,ro to
IVill is not EfTential to the Mind, fince IVilling fuppofes
Perception.
Therefore Thought only is properly Conftitutive
of the ElTence of the Mind, and the different Manners
of Thinking, as Perceiving and Imagining, are only
the Modifications of which it is capable, and with
which it is no.t always modified : But to tVilly is a
Property which always accompanies it, whether it be
united to, or f^arated from the Body ; which never-
thelefs is not EfTential to it, fince it fuppofes Thought,
and we may conceive a Mind without Will, even as a
Body without Motion.
The Power of Willing is always Infeparable from
the Mind, although it is not EfTential to it ; for even
as it is impofTible to conceive Matter that cannot be
moved, fo it is impofTible to conceive a Mind which
cannot Willy or which is incapable of any Natural
Inclination ; but as we conceive Matter can exift
without Motion, fo we can conceive a Mind to exift
without any ImprefTion from the Author of Nature
towards Good, and confequently without Will, for
the Will is nothing elfe but an Impreflion of the
, Author of Nature, which carries us towards Good
II. We 0 general, as we have more largely explain'd in
"Jf the firft Chapter of the Treatife upon the Senfes.
What we faid before in the Treatife upon the
of which Senfes, and what we have juft now faid of the Nature
ourSoulis of the Mind, does not fuppofe that we know all the
eatable. Modifications
chap. I. A Search after Truth,
Modifications whereof it is capable; we do not fup-
pofe fuch things, but rather believe that there is in ,
the Mind of Man a Capacity of receiving SuccefTively
an infinite Number of different Modifications which
the Mind it felf is Ignorant of.
The leaft Portion of Matter can receive a Figure
of three, fix, ten, or Ten Thoufand fides, era Cir-
cular or Ecliptick Figure, which may be confider'd as
made up of an Infinity of Angles and Sides. There is
an infinite number of different Species of each of thefe
Figures ; an infinite number of Triangles of different
kinds; befides other Figures of four, fix, ten, or Ten
Thoufand fides, and infinite Poligons. For the Circle,
the Ellipfis, and generally every regular or irregular
curve-lin'd Figure, may be confider'd as an infinite
Poligone. The Ellipfis, for example, as an infinite
Poligone, but whofe Angles or fides are unequal, being
greater towards the leficr Diameter than the other.
And thus of infinite other Poligones more compounded
and irregular.
A fimple piece of Wax is capable of infinite> or ra-
ther infinitely infinite different Modifications which no
Mind'can comprehend. What reafon then is there
to imagine, that the Soul which is more noble than
the Body, is not capable of more Modifications befides
thofe which it has yet receiv'd.
If we had never felt Pain nor Pleafure, if we had
never feen Colour or Light, or if we had been as
Blind or Deaf in relation to Colours and Sounds, ought
we thence to conclude, that we were incapable of all
the Scnfations which we now have of Objedls, fince
thefe Senfacions are only Modifications of our Soul, as
we have proved in the Treatife of theSenfes.^
We muft then grant, that the Capacity which the
Soul has of receiving different Modifications, is' pro-
bably greater than the Capacity which it has of con-
ceiving; I mean, as the Mind cannot draw out, or
conceive all the Figures whereof Matter is capable ;
fb it cannot comprehend all the different Modinca-
tions, which the powerful Hand of God can produce
in the SouL even though we fhould as diftindly know
A a a 3 the
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^ A Search after Truth, Book III,
the Capacity of the Soul, as that of Matter: Which is
Abfurd from the Reaibns brought in the Seventh Chap-
ter of the Second Part of this Book.
Our Soul therefore receives very few Modifications
here, becaufe it is united to the Body upon which it
depends : All its Senfations carry it to its Body; and
whereas it cannot enjoy God, it can have no other
Modifications befides what the other Enjoyments pro-
duce. Matter, which our Body is compofed of, is
capable of very few Modifications in this Life ; this
Matter cannot be refolv'd into Earth and Vapour till
after Death; it cannot now become Air,Fire,Diamond,
Metal; it cannot be Square, Round, Triangular, it
muft be Flefh, and have the Figure of Man, that the
Soul may be united to it. It is even fo with our Soul,
it is neceffary that it have Senfations of Hear, Cold,
Colour, Light, Sounds, Odours, Sapors, and many
other Modifications, that it may be united to its Body.
All thefe Senfations engage it to the Prefervation of its
Machine, they agitate it and terrific it fo foon as the
leaft Spring is loofed or broken: And thus the Soul
muft be fubjedt thereto, as long as the Body fhall be
lubjedf to Corruption; but as foon as it fhall be in-
veiled with Immortality, and there (hall be no farther
Fear of a Diflblution of its Parts, it's reafonable to
believe, that it will no longer be affedled with thefe
Incommodious Senfations which we unwillingly feel,
but with an Infinity of all other different Things, of
which we have now no Idea; whiph fhall furpafs
all our Thoughts, and be worthy of the Greatnefs and
Goodnefs of God, whom we fhall enjoy.
'Tis therefore againft all Reafon, that Men imagine
m penetrate fo into thp Nature of the Soul, as to be
well aifur'd , that it's only capable of Knowing and
Loving. This indeed might be mainrain'd by thofe
who attribute their Senfations to External Objedls, or
to their own Body, or who pretend that their Paflions
are in their Heart: For indeed, if we retrench from
the Soul,' all its Pafftons and Senfations, whatever can
^ knowp in that which is left behind, is only a Chain
pf Know,ledge and Love. But I cannot apprehend
how
ChapiL A Starch after Truth. , 7^
how tbofe who have taken their leave of the Iljufions
of their Senfes, can be pcrfwaded that all our Senfa-
tions and PafTions are cnly^ Knowledge and Love ;
I mean, the confufcd kinds of Judgments which the,
Soul draws from Objedls relating to the Body which it
Animates.
I do not apprehend how it may be faid, ThatLight,
Colours, Odours, are Judgments of the Soul, for
on the contrary it feems to me, that Colours, Odours,
and other Senfations, are Modifications very different
from. Judgments.
Let us choofe fome of the quickeft Senfations which
molt affedt the Mind, and let us fee what thefe Men
can fay of Colour or of Pleafure: They think ac-
cording to many very Famous * Authors, that thefe * St. Aug.
Senfations are only Confequences of the Faculty,
which we have of Knowing and Willing ; and that
Pain, for Example, is nothing elfe but a certain Solli-
citude, Repugnancy and Averfion of the Will, againft
things which it knows to be Hurtful to its Dear Body: ^
But it's evident to me, that this is to confound Pain
with Sadnefs, and make Pain a Confequcnce of the
Knowledge and Adfion of the Will, whereas on the
contrary it precedes both.
For Example, If a hot Coal was put into the Hand
of a Perfbn that was afleep, or fhould hold his Hands
behind his Back, no one, I believe, with any proba-
bility of Truth, would affirm, that this Perfon would
forthwith know, that there were fome Motions in his
Hands contrary to a good Conftitution of Body, that
afterwards his Will would oppofe it, and that this
Pain would be a Confequence of this Knowledge of
his Mind, and this Oppolition of his Will: But ra-
ther on the contrary, the firlt thing that this Perfon
would conceive, when the Coal touch'd his Hand,
would be pain; and this Knowledge of the Mind,
and Oppolition of the Will, would be only Confe-
quences of Pain, though indeed they were the Caufe
of Sadnefs which followed the Pains.
But there is much difference between the Pain and
the Sadnefs which it produces, Pain is the firlt thing
A a a 4 which
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X
8 A Search after Truth, Book III.
which the Soul feels, it precedes Knowledge, and
can never be agreeable in it felf: Bur on the contrary,
Sadnefs is the lait thing which the Soul feels, Know-
ledge always precedes it, and it is always pleafant in
it felf: This is evident from the Pleafure we perceive
at the Lamentable Reprefenrations of Tragedies, for
this Pleafure increafcs with the Sadnefs, but Pleafure
never increafcs with Pain. Comedians, who ftudy
the Art of Pleafing, know well that the Stage is not
to be imbru'd with Slaughter, becaufe the Image of
a Murder is rather Terrible than Pleafant: But they
are not afraid to affed: the Spectators with too great
a Sadnefs, becaufe indeed Sadnefs is always agreeable,
when there is a proper SubjeCl of Sadnefs ; there is
then an Effential Difference betwixt Sadnefs and Pain,
and one cannot fay that Pain is only a Knowledge
of the Mind joyn'd to an Oppolition of the Will.
As for other Senfations, fuch as Odours, Sapours,
Sounds, Colours, (^c, the greateff part of Men do
not think them to be Modifications of the Soul, but
on the contrary, that they are difperfed upon Objedfs ;
or at leaft, they are in the Soul as the Idea of a Square
or Circle, that is. They are united to the Soul, but
are not Modifications thereof: They judge thus of
them, becaufe they are not more a&eded by them,
as was fhown in the Explanation of the Errors of the
Senfes.
We muff therefore agree, that we know not all the
Modifications whereof our Soul is capable; and be-
fides, thofe which it has by the Organs of the Senfes,
it may have innumerable more which it has not yet
try'd, nor fhall know, till it be delivcr'd from the
prifon of its Body.
However we muft confefs, that even as Matter is
capable of infinite Configurations, becaufe of its Ex-
cenfion, fb it's vifible that the Soul would not be in-
capable of the Modiiications of Deafure, Pain, nor
even of all others which are indifferent to it, if it were
incapable of Perception or Thought.
It IS fufficient therefore to know, that the Principle
of all thefe Modif cations is Thought; and if any one
will
chap. IT- ^ St Arch after Truth,
will have it, that there is any thing in the Soul ante-
cedent to Thought, I (hall not difpute it; but as I am
certain tha.t no one has any knowledge of his Soul
but by Thought, or by an internal Sentiment of what-
ever pafles in his Mind, fo I am alfo aflfurd, that if
any one will reafon upon the Nature of the Soul, he
muft confult this internal Sentiment, which will al-
ways reprefent him to himfelf fuch as he is ; and he
muft not imagin againft his own Confcience, that the
Soul is an invifible Fire, a fubtii Air, a Harmony, or
other like thing.
CHAP. 11.
1. The Mind being limited cannot comprehend any
thing that relates to Infinity. \\, Its limitation is
the Original of many Errors. III. And chiefly of
Herefies. IV. IVe muli fabmit our Minds to Faith,
difcover at firft fight, that the Human Mind l.Thewind
^ ^ is very much limited ; from whence two very hdng Umi*
important Confequences may be drawn. The firft, cazmt
That the Soul can have no perfedt Knowledge ofcotnpre-
Infinity. The fecond, That it can't know diftindtly
many things at the fame time. For as a piece of Wax
is not capable of having many different Figures at the f
fame time; fo neither is the Soul capable of having
the knowledge of many things at the lame time. Like-
wife a piece of Wax cannot be Square, and Round at
the fame time, but only part Square and part Round ;
and fo many more different Figures it (hall have, they
will be fomuch the lefs perfedf, anddiftindl: Thus
the Soul cannot perceive many things at once, and its
Thoughts are fo much the more confufed as they are
greater in Number.
■pie If a piece of Wax (hould have a Thoufand Side?,
one and in each Side a different Figure, it would be nei-
will ' ' iher
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lo j4 Search after Truth. Bocklll,.
ther Square, Round, nor Oval, and we could not fay
of what Figure it would be; fo it happens fometimes,
that we have fo great a number of different Thoughts,
that we imagin we think nothing at all, as haj^ns to
thofe that are in a Swound. The Aniuial Spirits turn-
ing irregularly in the Brain, ftirs up fo great a number
of Traces, that they do not fufficiently open any one
of em, to excite a particular or diftincft Idea in the
Mmd; fo that thefe perfons perceive fo great a number
things at once, that they perceive nothing diftindf,,
which induces them to think, they have perceived
nothing at all.
There are fome who fometimes Swound away for
want of Animal Spirits; but then the Soul having
only thoughts of pure Intellecflion, which leave no
Traces in the Brain, they remember nothing when
they come to themfelves again j which makes them
believe they thought of nothing. I have faid this by
the by, to fhew thofe are miftaken, who believe the
Soul does not think always, becaufe it fometimes ima-
gins that it thinks on nothing,
n. The //- Every one that does but refledl a little upon their
piitatim own Thoughts, have experience enough, that the
•/the mind. Mind cannot apply it felf to many things at the fame
is the Ori. time, and much more, that it cannot penetrate into Infi-
ginal p/ nity.Yetl know not by what Caprice fome perfons,who
many Er- are not ignorant of this, bufie themfelves more about
the ftudy of infinite Objecfts, and fuch Qp^ftions as
require an infinite Capacity of the Mind, than about
what better fuits the Capacity of their own Minds;
and alfo why there are a great number of others
that are defirous to know every thing, and apply them-
felves to fb many Sciences in the fame time, that it
confounds them, and makes them uncapable of know-
ing any Science truly.
How many Men are there who would comprehend
the infinite Divifibility of Matter, and how a little
Grain of Sand contains as many parts as the whole
World, although much lefs in proportion. How many
Queftions are formed upon thefe Subjedls which are
never refolved j and u^n many others which include
any
Chap.II. A Search after Truth, % I
any thing of Infinity, which yet they would find a
Solution of in their own Minds. They apply them-
felves to it with all poflible Attention: But at laft all
they gain is this, they are prejudic'd with Ibme Extra-
vagance,^ and Error.
Is it not a plea fan t thing to fee fome Men, who de-
ny the infinite Divifibiliuy of Matter, from hence only,
becaufe they cannot comprehend it ^ Although they
very well comprehend the demonftrations that prove
it, and at the fame time confefs, that the Human
Mind cannot comprehend Infinity. The Proofs which
are brought for the infinite Divifibility of Matter, are
as Demonftrative as any thing elfe in Nature, and
thefe Men confefs it when they leriouGy confider them ^
however, if we propofe to them fuch Objedlions as
they cannot Solve, their Mind leaves that Evidence*
which juft before they perceived, and they begin to
doubt of it; they are ftrongly poffelt with the Ob-
jedtion they cannot Refolve, and invent fome frivolous
diftindfion againft the demonftrations of the Infinite
Divifibility of Matter ; and at laft they conclude they
were deceived, as alfo the World with them ; and fo
embrace the contrary Opinion. This they defend
with Chimerical Atoms, and other like Abfurdities
with which the Imagination always furnifhes them :
Now the Original of all their Errors is this, they are
not inwardly convinc'd, that the Mind of Man is Fi-
nite, and that to be perfwaded of the infinite Divilibili-
ty of Matter, it is not necelfary to Comprehend it j be-
caufe all Objedions that cannot be refolv'd without
Comprehending it, are Objedions which its impolTible
to Refolve.
If Mens Curiofity would be terminated by Quefti-
ons of this Nature, we (hould have no great reafon
to be concern'd; for if fome Men were prepofleiled
with fuch Errors, they are Errors of little Confe-
quence ; As for others, they have not wholly loft
their time, in thinking of things which they cannot
comprehend ; for they are at leaft convinc'd of the
weaknefs of their Mind. It is good, fays a very Ju- * The Art
dicious Author, thus to fatigue the Mind with thefe of think-
Winding'
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1 i j4 Search after Truth. Book III.
kind of Subtilties, to tame its Prefumption, and abate
its Arrogance in oppofing its little Light to the myfte-
ries of Religion, which it cannot comprehend. For
fince all the Vigour of Mans Mind is conftrained to
fubmit to the leaft Atom of Matter, and to confels,
that it fees clearly that it is infinitely Divifible, with-
out being able to comprehend how it may be done, Is
not this to Sin againft evident Reafon, to refufe an
Aflent to the marvellous Effecfts of Divine Omnipo-
tence ( which is incomprehenfible in it felf) for this
reafon, becaufe our Mind cannot comprehend them ?
ni. £fnd Xhe mort pernicious EfFedk of Ignorance, or rather
fhiify ff inadvertency, wherein the weaknefs and limitation of
Htrefies. Mans Mind is Notorious, and confequently, of his
incapacity to comprehend whatever relates to infinity,
is Herefie. Thefe prefent times gives more .inftances
than the former, of a great number of Men who are
the Authors of a particular Theology, which is only
founded upon their own Mind, and the Natural
Weaknels of Reafon, they will not believe what they
cannot comprehend.
The Socinians cannot comprehend the Myfteries of
the Trinity, nor of the Incarnation. This is fufficient
for them not to believe them, and to Cenfiire others
with a fierce and libertine Air that do believe them, as
Men born for Slavery.
A Man who is convinced in himlelf that he is free,
if he troubles his Head very much in endeavouring
to reconcile the Knowledge of God and his Decrees
with that Liberty: Such a Man I fay, is very likely
to fall into their Error, who believe that Men are not
free. For on the one hand, being unable to conceive
how the Providence of God can confift with the Liber-
ty of Man ; and on the other, a refpec^ for Religion
will hinder him from denying a Providence, he will
believe himfclf conftrain*d to Abridge their Liber-
ty; not fufficiently r^fiedfing upon the Weaknefs
of his own Mind, he will imagine that he can pene-
trate into the means that God has to reconcile his De-
crees with our Libert}'.
But
X
Chap. 11. j4 Search after Truth*
But they are not only Hereticks which are not at-
tentive enough to confider the Weaknefsof their Mind,
and which take too great a liberty of judging thin^
out of their Jurifdidtion ; ainioft all Men have this
defed, particularly Tone Divines of thefe laft Ages ;
for feme of them do (d often make ufe of their Hu-
mane Reafonings, to piove or explain My(feries which
furpafs Reafon, althoi^h they may do it out of a
good defign, and to defend Religion againft Hereticks,
that they often give ocafion to the fame Hereticks to
perfift obftinately in ther Errors, and to treat ot My*
iheries of Faith as Humin Opinions.
The Motions of the Mind, and the Subtilties of the
Schools, are improper t( inform Men of their Weak-
nefs, and to infpire then with a Spirit of Humility,
which is fo neceflfary n the Myfteries of Religion,
But all thefe Human aid Subtle Reafonings may, on
the contrary, ftir up tieir fecret Pride, and incline
them to make an ill ufe^f their judgment, and lb to
form a Religion agreea»Ie to their own Capacity.
We do not fee Hereticktfubmit themfelves to Philo-
fophick Arguments, or tht the reading of Scholaftick
Books purely does infornthem, or condemn their Er-
rors: But on the contrary they continually take occa-
(ion from the weaknefs o fome Scholaftick Reafon-
ings, to Ridicule the moft icred Myfteries of our Re-
ligion, which indeed are nc eftablilh'd upon all thefe
Human Reafonings and Exlanations, but only upon
the Authority of the writtenWord of God.
Indeed Human Reafon des not teach us that there
is one God in three Perfos; j^or how can it be,
that the mind of Man is ree, although God knew
from Eternity all that Man vould do : The Reafons
that are brought to prove :nd explain thefe things,
are fuch only as prove them o thofe, which will admit
them without examining tlem , but which often
feem extravagant to thofe vho will oppofe them,
denying the foundation of tlefe Mylienes. It may
be laid on the contrary, thai the Objecftions which
are form'd againft the principa Articles of our Faith,
and ^efpecially againft the M^liery of the Trinity
are
Search after Truth. Book III.
are fo ftrong, that its impoflible to give clear and evi^
dent Solutions of them, and which do not in the
feaft fliock our weak Reafon ; becaule indeed thefe
Myfteries are incomprehenlibk.
'Tis a better way to Conveft Hereticks, not to ac*
cuftom them to make ufe of their Reafon, by propo-
fing to them fuch uncertain Arguments as are drawn
from Philofophy ; becaufe the Truths in Which we
fhould inftru(ii: them do not depend upon Reafon ;
nor is it always neceflary to nake ufe of thefe Rea-
fonings in Truth that may !>e prov'd by Reafon, as
well as by Tradition ; as thetmmortality of the Soul,
Original Sin, the neceflity ol Grace, the diforder of
Nature, and fome others; br fear left their Mind
having once talted the Evidejce of Reafon in thefe
Queftions, Ihould not afterwirds be content to fub-
mit to thofe that cannot othcwife be proved but by
Tradition : We muft on the ontrary, oblige them to
diftruft their own Mind, by fiewing them its weak-
nefs, limitation, and difpoportion to myfterious
Truths ; and when the Prid of their Spirit (hall be
abated, they will be more elily brought over to Re-
veafd Religion, by fhewin? to them its Authority,
and explaining the Traditin of all Ages if they are
capable of it.
But if Men continually dvert themfelves from fee-
ing the weaknefs and lintation ot their Mind, an
indifcreet prefumption wil lift them up, a deceitful
Light will dazle them, nd the Love of Glory will
blind them : Thus Herecks will be Eternally Here-
ticks; Philofophers, opironativeand prejudic'd; and
there will never be any ed of Difputation fb long as
we lhali be willing to Difute with them.
CHAP.
ChapJII* A Search after Truth.
15
C H A P. nr.
' . y a ■ *
I. That FhUqJhphers Mjfifate their Mind hy apply^
ing it to SnhjeBs which include too many Relati"
ons.^ And which defend upon too many things ;
without keeping any Order in their Studies,
11, J^n Example drawn from Ariftotle. III. That
Geometricianson the contrary^ proceed well in
an Entjuiry after Truth ^ efpecially thofe who
make ^e of Algebra. IV. That their method
increafes the power of the Mind^ and that Ari-
ftotleV Logick, weakens it, V. Another defeat
of fiudioHs Ferfons, '
ly^EN do not only fall into a great number of I. phhfo-
Errors, becaufe they profecute fuch Q^eftions as
relate to infinity, their Mind being finite, but alfo be- Order in
caufe they advert to thofe that have much Extenfion, their Stu^
their Mind being very narrow.
We have laid already, that a piece of Wax is in-
capable of receiving many dift'erent and diftindt Fi-
gures at the ^me time ; and thus the Mind is incapa-
ble of receiving many diftindt Idea s, that is, of per-
ceiving many things, and very diftindfly, at the fame
time ; whence it's eafie to conclude, that we muft not
at firft apply our felves to an Enquiry into hidden
Truths, whofe knowledge depends upon too many
things, and whereof fome are not familiar enough to
us. For We ought to Study methodically, and make
ufe of what we know diftindlly, to apprehend what
we know not, or what we know but confufediy:
HoweVery the greateft part of ihofe who Study do
not take this Courfe ; they make no EfTay uiX)n their
own Strength ; they confulc not themfelves, to know
what they are capable of. *Tis a fecret Vanity, and
an irregular defire of knowing; and not Reafon which
rules their Studies: They begin inconliderately to en-
" - ; - quire
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16 \A Search after Truth, Book 111.-
quire into the moft fecret and impenetrable Truths >
and to refoIveQueftions, which depend upon fo grea^
number of Relations, that the moft quick and penetra-
ting Mind cannot difcover them with any abfolute
certainty, but after many Ages, and almoft an infinity
of Experiments.
There arc a great number of Queftions of this
Nature in Phyficks and .Morality. All Sciences of
Bodies and their Qualities, (as of Animals, Plants,
Metals, and of their refpedtive Qualities ) are Sci-
ences which can never be fufficiently evident nor cer-
tain, efpecially if they be not manag'd after another
"Method than heretofore; or if we begin not by the
moft Simple and leaft compounded Sciences upon
which they depend. But ftudious Perfonf will not
give thcmfelves the trouble of Philofophizing in Or-
der ; they do not agree upon'the Certainty of Ph'yfi-
cal Principles, they know not the Nature of Bodies
in General, nor their Qualities, but confels fc. them-
felves. However, they imagin they can give a t-ealbn,
why, for Example, the Hairs of Old Men wax White,
and yet their Teeth grow Black; which depends upon
fo many Caufes, that it*s impoffible to give any cer-^
tain reafon for it. To know this, it's neceCfary to
underftand in what confifts the Whitenels of. Hairs in
particular, the Humours with which they are nourifli-
ed, the Philtres through which thefe Humours pafs,
the Conformation, and the Root of the Hairs, or the
Skin through which they pafs, and the difference of
all thefe things in a Young and an Old Man, which
it's abfolutely impoffible, or at leaft very difficult to
know. : L '
11 An ex- Arijlotle^ for example, hath pretended to know the
ample of Caufe of this Whitenefs which happens to Old Mens
roant of Hairs; he hath given many realbns in different places
Order in of his Books: But becaufe he is the Genius of Nature,
Ariftotle. he ftays not there, he enquires deeper: He hath dif-
cover'd that the Caufe, which makes Old Mens Hairs
White, was the fame which made fome Perlbns, and
fome Horfes, have one Eye Blew, and the other of
another Colour : Thefe are his words^
p
Chap. Hi. A Search after Truth, 17
Q fjL<t^tftLyiPoyrtti jyti apSfaTo/ 01 "iTTTrot c^at rfu? Book V.
ewitiu euTieLV J^i nPTTif IJSJ) ApBfaTT^ Tro^ivTcu fjLOPop.
This is fufficiently Surprifing, but there is nothing hid
from this great Man; and he gives reafons of fo great
a Number of things in almoft all places of his Phy-
licks, which the lharpeft Perfons of this Age believe
Impenetrable; that it was defervedly faid of him,
That God gave him to us, that we might be Ignorant
of nothing that was to be known. Ariftotelis DoBrina
eft Summa Veritas {juoniam ejus intelkBus fiih finis
Humani IntelleBus. ^tare bene dicitur de illo^ cjuod
ipfe fuit creatus datus nobis Divina Providentia ut non
i^noremus pojjibilia Sciri. Averrces ought to have added,
TThat Divine Providence gave us Ariftotle, to teach us
what was imDoflible to be known. For it's true, that
this Philofopher does not only teach us things which
may be known, but if, lince he muft be believ'd upon
his word, his Dodhrine be the SoveraignTruthy Summa,
VeritaSy he alfo teaches us thofe things which are im-
pollible to be known.
Certainly one muft have much Faith, thus to be-
lieve Ariflothy when he gives us only Logical Reafons,'
and only explains the Effects of Nature, by the Con-
fus'd Notions of the Senfes ; efpecially lince he boldly
decides Queftions which will never be refolv'd by
other Men. Thus Arijiotle takes a particular Care to
inform us, that we muft believe him upon his word f
^ for 'tis an inconteftable Axiom with this Author, that
qI ' the Difciple muft believe, Aw 'yri^veip r fxaSdvopTa,.
It is true, that Dikiples are fometimes oblig'd to
vjj believe their Mafter, but their Faith ought to be ex-
tended only to Experiments and Matter of Fad:; for
^ if they intend to becorne true Philolbphers, they mult
^ examine the Reafons of their Mafters, and then re-
25 ceive them only when they difcover the Evidence of
them by their own Judgment. But to be a Peripa-
tetick, it is abfolutely necelfary to believe and to re-
tain j and the fame Difpofition of Mind ought to be
had at the reading of that Philofophy, as at the read-
ing of an Hiftory j for if any one takes the Liberty of
?!tiaking ufe of his Judgment and Reafon, he muft not;
j B b b
'S j4 Search aftefTruTh, Book III.
cxped ever to be a great Philofopher. Aw
^ /uaySecyoyTa.
But the reafon why Arijlctle, and many other Phllo^
fophers, have pretended to know what can never be
known, is, That they have never known the diffc-
rence betwixt Knowing and Knowing;betwixt having
a certain and evident Knowledge, and having but a
probable one: And the reafon why they never under-
ftood this difference, is, That the Subjedts to which
they applied themfelves, being beyond the perfed:
reach of their Mind, they faw but a part of them
without being able to comprehend them all together ;
which indeed is enough to difcover many Probabi-
liticE, but not to difcover Truth evidently. Befides,
they feeking after Science meerly out of Vanity, and
Probabilities being more apt to gain the Efteem of Men
than Truth it felf, becaufe they are more proporti-
onated to the common reach of the Mind^ they have
negleded to feek after neceflary Means to increafe the
Capacity of the Mind, and to give it more Extenfion
than it has; fo that they have not been able to pene-
trate the bottom of Truths that are but a little hidden.
Ceometri' Geometricians have well known how little Exten-
cians be- fion the Mind has, at leaft they behaved themfelves in
have their Studies after fuch way, as fliews they know it
themfelves perfedly y efpecially thofe that have made ufe of
TXfeU in Algebra, which Vieta and Defcartcs have renewed and
i t r improv'd in this Age. What I fay appears from this,
tlr^Truth Pcrfons have not undertaken the Rcfolu-
' tion of very compound Difficulties, before they knew
clearly the more Simple on which they depend. They
did not apply themfelves to theConfideration of Lines,
as Conick Secflions, until they were Mafters of com-
mon Geometry,
IV. Their But that which is particular to Algebraifts, is. That
Method in- they fee their Mind cannot be at the fame time applied
larges the to many Figures, they cannot imagine Solidb that
Capacity more than three Dimenfions, although it's often
the Mindy neceffary to conceive they may have more; they make
that of A' jjfe of Common and very Familiar Letters to exprefs
riftotle abridge their Ideas: Thus the mind not being
embarrafled
Ch^p.III. A Search after Truth. 19
embarrafled nor impIoyM upon any Reprefentatioh
which ic would be oblig'd to make upon many Figures
andLities, it may perceive at one view, alJ that it is
capable of feeing ocherwife. And thus the Mind can
penetrate deeper, and extend it felf much farther
when its Capacity is well manag'd.
The Art of rendring the Mind more penetrating
and Extenfive, con lifts, as v/e have elfewjiere ex-
plain'd, in a good Managenient of its Powers and
Capacity, not in imploying it to no purpole upon
things which are not neceirary to difcover the Truth
it feeks after, which ought to be well obferv'd. For Second
this only fhows, that common Logicks are fitter to of
leflen the Capacity of the Mind than to inlarge ic ; Method*
becaufe it is evident. That if in a Search after any
Truth, weufe the Rules they prefer ibe us, theCapa-
city of the Mind is divided, fo that it will be unfit to
be attentive, and to apprehend all the Extenlion of
the Subjedf it examines.
It is therefore fufficiently evident from what I have
faid. That the greateft: part of Men make but little
Reflecftion upon the Nature ot the Mind, whilft they
apply themfelves to a Search after Truth j for indeed
they have never been well convinc'd of its little Ex-
tenfion, and the neceflity there is of well managing
and enlarging it. And this is one of the molt confi-
derable Caufes of their Errors, and from hence it is
that they have fo unhappily perfedled their Studies.
But we do not pretend that there were ever any
Men, which were not confcious of their own Limita-
tion, and their little Capacity and Extenfion of Mind ;
all the World confeffes it, but the Generality of them
only know it confufedly, and confeftit only with their
Mouths. The Method they take in their Study, gives
the Lye to their Confeflion, fince they adt as if they
truly thought their Mind had no Limits; and they
would penetrate into things that depend upon a great
many Caufes, whereof generally they do not know one.
There is alfo another Defeti which is very coxti-V'Another
ifion in thefe Studious Men, which is the applying
themfelves to too many Sciences at once, -and it they
B b b a Study
A Search after Truth. Book III.
Study but fix Hours in a day, they will fometimes
liudy fix different things: 'Tis plain, this Defedfc pro-
ceeds from the fame Caufe as the reft that I have
before mention'd : For 'tis very probable, tha,t if thofe
that ftudy after this manner, know certainly that it
was not agreeable to the Capacity of their Minds ,
and that it was more likely to fill them with Errors
and Confufion, than with true Science, they would
not fufier themfelves to be hurried away by the irre-
gular Motions of their Paflions and Vanity j for in-
deed that is not the way to fatisfie the Mind, fince
'tis not the proper Means to know any thing.
CHAP. IV.
I. The Mind cannot long apply it felf to any OhjeBj
which neither relates to it felf ^ nor to Infinity,
II. The Inconjlancy^ and confeqaently the Error
of the Will^ proceeds from this Defeh of Appli-
cation. III. Oar Senfations affeEl us more than
the Pure Idea's of the Mind. IV. What is the
Original Caufe of the Corruption of Manners.
V. And the Ignorance of the Generality of
Mankjnd.
'^HE Mind of Man is not only fubjedl to Error
becaufe it is Finite, or more limited than the
Objedfs they confider, as has been explained in the
two precedent Chapters ; but alfo becaufe it is In-
conftanr, and has no Firmnefs in whatfbever it does,
and cannot keep it felf fix'd long enough upon any
Subjedf, to examine it entirely.
To conceive the Caufe of this Inconftancy and
Levity of our Minds, it is neceffary to know, that its
Action is directed by the Will; which applies it to fuch
Objedts as it loves, and is of it felf continually Incon-
itanc and unfettled, of which this is the Caufe,
I »
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tliantii!
Ill ffi
iiisk
ai\i
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We
Chap. IV.' j4 Search after Truth. 21
We cannot doubt but God is the Author of all
things, that he hath made them for himfelf, and has
inclined the Heart of Man towards him, by a Natural
and Invincible Impre/Tion that he continudly imprints
upon him. God cannot Will the Exi(^ence of any
Mind which cannot love him, or whicfrlhould love
him lefs than any other Good, if any other beiides
himfelf could be found ; becaufe he cannot Will that
any Mind fhould not love that which is moft Amiable,
or love it more than that which is lefs Amiable.
Thus it is requifite that a Natural Love fhould
carry us to God, fince it comes from him; and that
there is nothing that can ftop the Motions of it, only
God himfelf who imprinted them. Every bodies Will
therefore neceffarily follows the Motions of this Lovei
The Righteous and Wicked , the Happy and the
Damned, Love God with this Love; for the Natural
Love which we have for God, being the fame thing
as the Natural Inclination that carries us to Good in
General, to the Infinite and Soveraign Good, it is evi-
dent that all Minds Love God with this Love, fince he
only is the Univerfal, Infinite, and Soveraign Good.
For indeed all Spirits, and even the Devils, have an
Ardent Defire to be Happy, and to poflefs the Chief
Good: And they defire it without Choice, without
Deliberation, without Liberty, and by a NecefTity of
their Nature. Being therefore made for God, for an
Infinite Good, for a Good which comprehends all others
in it, our Hearts can never be fatisfied but by the
PoflefTion of this Good.
Thus our Will always labouring under an eager IE The hu
Thirit, always agitated with E>efires, Anxieties, and confiancy
full of Inquietudes for the Good that it does not poflefs, WiUy
cannot without much Pain fuffer the Mind tor any
time to ftop at abftradled Truths, which affedf it nor,
and which it judges uncapable of making it Happy.
Thus fhe Inceffantly pulhes it forwai-d to fearch after confem^ent*
other Objedts, and when in this Agitation, which the ^ caufes
Will communicates to it, it meets with any Objedf, Error,
that has the Appearance of a Good, I mean, fuch as
makes the Soul Senfibte of any Pleafure, or inward
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22
A Search after Truth. Book IH»
Satisfafflion at its approach ; then this Thirft is ex-
cited anew ; thefe E)efires, thefe wiihes, and ihefe
Ardours, take new Life ; and the Mind being oblig'd
to obey them, engages it felf only to that Objed:,
which caufes or feems to caufe them, to draw it nearer
to the Soul which taits it, and feeds on it for fome
time. But the Emptinefs of Creatures cannot fill the
Infinite Capacity of Man's Mind ; thefe little Pieafures
irritate its Thirft rather than allay it, and give the
Soul a vain fort of a Hope of being fatisfied in the
Multiplicity of the Pieafures of this Life ; which alfo
produces an Inconftancy and an inconceivable Levity
in the Mind, which was to diicover to it all theie
(Goods.
^ It's true, that when the Mind accidentally meet$
with any Ohjed which is related to Infinity> and
which includes in it felf fome great thing, its Incon-
ftancy and Agitation ceafes for fome time ; for dif*
covering this Objedt to bear the Character of whai; the
Soul defires, it joyns and adheres to it for a long time.
But this Adhefion, or rather this Prejudice of the MM,
to examine Subjeds that are Infinite or very great, is
as ufelefs to it, as that IfCvity with which it confiders
things that are propoi'tion'd to its Capacity ; it is too
weak to finilh fo difficult an Enterprife, and it is vain
to force it felf to accomplifli it. The Comprehenfion
of an Infinite Gbjed, if I may fo fay, cannot render
the Soul Happy, it is incapable of it, bur the Lpve a;nd
Enjoyment of an Infinite Good may do it, wher^^f the
"Will is capable, by the Motion of that Love which God
continually impreiles upon it.
After this we mult not be fiirprifed at the Ignorance
and Blindnefs of Men, lince their Mind being fubjed
to the Inconftancy and Levity of their Heart, which
renders it incapable of conlidering any thing with a
Serious Application, it cannot penetrate into any thijig
which includes fome confiderabie Difficulty. For,
in fine, the Attention of the Mind to the Obj.eds of
the Mind, is the fame thing as fixing our Eyes upoti
the Objeds of our Eyes; even as a Man who cannot fioc
his Eyes upon Objects ^hat arc about him, cannot fee
clearly
ChapJV. A Search 4ftcr Truth, 25
dearly enough to diftinguifh theDifTerenccs of their leaft
Parts, and to know all the rdadons rhefe little parts
have with each other: So a Man who cannot fix the
Eyes of his Mind upon things which he would know,
cannot fufHciently know them to diftinguifh all their
Parts, and to know all the Relations which they may
have among themfelves, or to other Subjcds.
However 'tis evident. That all Knowledge confifis
only in a clear View of the Relations that things have
to one another: Therefore when it happens, as in
difficult Queftions, that the Mind muft fee at one
view, a great Number of Relations which two or
more things have amongft themfelves, it's evident, That
if it has not confider'd thele things with much Atten-
tion, and only knows them confufedly, it will be im-
poflible for it to perceive diftindly their Relations,
and conCequently to form a Iblid Judgment of them.
One of the chief Caufes of the Want of Application III. Our
of Mind to ab^raded Truths, is, That we lee them Senfations
at a diftance; and things which are nearer, are con- us
tinually reprefented to our Mind; a great Attention
of Mind approaches, if I may fo fay, to the Idea's of^^^
Objedts with which it is affedted. But it often hap-
pens, that when we are Attentive upon Metaphyfical *
Speculations, we are diverted from them , becaufe
Ibme Senfation comes upon the Soul which is nearer
to it than thofe Idea's, the leaft Pain or Pleafure is
fufficient to efiedl this ; the reafon of it is, Pain and
Pleafure, and generally all Senfations, are within the
Soul it ielf, they modifie and aftedl it, mucH nearer
than the fimple Idea's of Objects of Pure Intelledlion,
which though prefenc to the Mind do not moduie it.
Thus the S)ul being on the one hand very narrow,
and on the other, not being able to hinder Pain, Plea-
lure, and other Senfations, its Capacity is fiil'd with See Ch. 7
them ; and it cannot at the fame tin^e be Senlible of Second
any thing, and think freely of other things of which Part of
it cannot be Senfible. The Buzzing of a Fly , or this Book
fame other little Noife, fuppofing it to be communi-
cated even to the chief part of the Brain, fo that the
Soul perceives it, is capable, notwithftanding ail our
B b b 4 Efforts
?4 A Search after Truth, Book III.
Efforts to the contrary, of hindering us from confi-
dering abffradled and elevated Truths, becaufe all
abflradfed Idea's do not modifie the Soul, though all
Senfations do.
'Tis this that caufes a Stupidity and DuIInefs of
JMind, in refpedl of the great Truths of Chriftian
1/ ^ Morality; hence it is that Men only know them after
Speculative and Unfruitful Manner, without the
Grace of JeJus Chrift. All the World knows that
there is a God , that he mulf be Ador'd and Wor-
Ihipped ; but who is it that Serves and Worfhips him
without Grace, which makes us tafte a Sweetnels
and Pleafure in all our Duties ? There are very few
who are not Senfible of the Emptinefs and Inftability
of the Goods of this World , and even who are not
touch'd with an abftradfed, yet always with a very
certain and evident Convidfion, that they deferve
not our Application and Concern. But where are
rhofe that Pradtically Defpife thefe Goods and who
are not Anxious and Careful to obtain them } 'Tis
thofe only who perceive fome Bitternefs and Difguft
in their Enjoyment, or elfe by the Grace of God are
made Senfible of Spiritual Good by an inward De^
light which God hath joyn'd to them, who overcome
the Impreffions of their Senfes and the Efforts of Con-
cupifcence. The bare Contemplation of the Mind,
does not therefore make us ever refift the Efforts
of Concupifcence ^as we ought to do ^ an Internal
Motion of the Heart muft alio fccond it. This Light
of the Mind only is, as fome fay , a Sufficient Grace^
which enables us to Condemn our felves, and informs
us of our Weaknefs, and that we ought to have re-
courfe by Prayer to him who is our Power. But
this inward Sentiment of Heart is a Lively Grace
which operates, 'tis this which affedls and fills us,
which perfwades the Heart, and without there is
no one can thick heartily. Nemo eft qui cogitct corde.
All the moft conltant Truths of Morality lie hid
in the Secret Receffes and Windings of the Mind ,
and lb long as they ftay there, are Barren, and with-
out any Power, lince the Soul does not talte rhemt
But
Chap. IV, A Search after Truth, 25
But the Pleafures of the Senles are hearer the Soul,
and it being impoflible that it Ihould not be fcnfible
of, and love its * Pleafure, it's impoflible to be freed * With »
from the World, t and (hake off the Charms of its Natural
Senfes by its own Power. l^ove^for
However I do not yet deny that the Righteous ,
whofe Heart hath been livelily turn'd towards God
by prepoflefled Delight, cannot without this parti-
cularGrace, do fome deferving Actions, aad refift
the Motions of Concupifcence ; there are fome that | Bec 'aufe
are Generous and Conitant in the Law of God, by ^ ^
the Power of their Faith, by an aifiduous Privation choice can-
of fenfible things, and by a Contempt and Difguft of
all Temptations. There are fome who adt for the frain from
molt part without rafting preventing and unthought conforming
of Pleafure; the only Joy which they find in adting to a Natu-
Pioufly, is the Pleafure alone they are fenfible oi, ralLovs.
and this Pleafure is fufficient to ftay them in that
Eftate, and to confirm the Difpofition of their Heart.
Thofe who begin their Converfion, have commonly
need of a prepoflefled and an indeliberate Pleafure,
to free them from their Senfible Goods, to which
they are united by other preventing and indeliberate
Pleafures. Sadnels and Remorfe of Confcience is not
'enough, and they do not yet tafte any Joy : But the
Juft can live by Faith and in Want; and it's even in
this Condition that they deferve more j becaufe Men
being reafonable, God will be lov'd by them with
a Love of Choice, rather than with a Love of In-
ftindt, and an indeliberate Love; like that by which
they love Senfible things, without knowing them to
be Good, otherwife than by the Pleafure which they
receive from them. However, the greateft part of
Men have little Faith , and being continually led to
fafte Pleafure, they cannot long preferve their eledtive
Love for God, againft a Natural Love for Senfible
Goods, if their Delight in Grace..does not uphold
them againft the Efforts of Pleafure; for a Delight in
Grace,- begets, preferves, and increafes Charity, as
Senfible Pleafures do Defire.
1;
A Search after Truth. Book III.
f It is evident from what has been faid, That Men
being never without fome Paflion, or agreeable or
difagreeablc Senfations; much of the Capacity and
Extenfion of their Mind is taken up with them;
And when they are willing to employ the reft of their
Capacity to examine fome Truth, they are often di-
verted by fome new Senfations, or by a Difguft which
they find in this Exercife; and by an Inconftancy of
the Will, which agitates and runs the Mind from one
Objedt to another; fo that unlefs they have ac-
cuftom'd themfelves to overcome thefe Oppofitions
from their Youth, as has been explain'd in the Second
Part, they will ac laft be incapable of penetrating intq
any thing that is a little Difficult, or which requires a
little Application.
We muft then conclude. That all Sciences, efpe-
cially thofe that include Queftions very difficult to
be reiblv'd, are full of an infinite Number of Errors ; j ^
and that we ought to fufpecft all thofe great Volumes,
which are every day compofed upon Phylicks, Natu-
ral Philofophy, and Morality; and elpecially upon
the particular Propofitions of thele Sciences, which
are much more compounded than general ones. We
ought even to judge, that thefe Books are fo much
the more to be Contemned, as they are better re-
ceived by the generality of Men; I mean, thofe who
are but little capable of Application, and who know
not how to make a good ule of their Judgment; be^-
caufe the Applaufe of the Vulgar, in any difficult
Matter, is a certain Argument m the Fallity of that
Opinion, and that it is only maintained upon the de-
lulive Notions of the Senfes, or fome falle Lights of
the Imagination.
Yet it is not impoffible, but that a Man may of
himfelf difcover a greater Number of Truths which
have been conceafd from former Ages, provided
he does not want a good Judgment, but lives in
iome retired place, where nothing can divert him,
if he Serioully apply himfell to an enquiry into
Truth,
3iiy,
rjers.
2 Fhiiol
(
Where-
ffk:
Chap.IV. A Sear eh after Truth,
Wherefore thofe are very unreafonabk, who dc-p
fpife ihe Philofophy of Defiar^s without kpowing
it J only for this reafon, becaufe it appears impoflible,
that one Man ol himfelf fhouki be able to difcover
the Truth in fo Myfterious a Subjedt as that of
Nature: But if they knew the Manner how this
Philofopher lived 5 the Method he took in his Studies^
to prevent the Capacity of his Mind from being
diverted by any other Objedts, befides thofe whole
Truth he would difcover; the Ciearnefsof the Ideas
upon which he eftablilh'd his Philofophy, and gene-
rally all the Advantages he had over the Ancients
by new Difcoveries: I fay, If they confider thefe
things, they would doubrlefs receive a more reafon-
able Prejudice in favour of Defcartes than of Anti-
quity, which Authorizes Ariftotle^ Plato, and many
others.
Yet I advife them not to ftop at this Prejudice,
nor to believe that Defcartes is a great Man, and that
his Philofophy is good, becaufe he may be advan-
tageoufly fpoke of: Defcartes was a Man fubjedt to
Error, and millakes like others: There are none
of his Works, even not excepting his Geometry,
wherein there are not feme Footfteps of the Weak-
nefs of the Humane Mind : He muft not therefore be
believ'd upon his Word , but be read with Precau-
tion, as he himfelf advifes us to do; examining if
he was not deceivM , and believing nothing of what
he fays, but what Evidence, and the Secret Re-
preaches of our Reafon oblige us to believe ; for in-
deed the Mind knows nothing truly, but what it fees
evidently.
We have Ihown in the preceding Chapters, that
our Mind is not infinite; but on the contrary, that
it had a very mean Capacity, which is commonly
filed with the Senfations of the Soul. And laftly,
That the Mind receiving its Diredlion from the
Will, cannot firmly confider any Objedl, without
being foon diverted from it, through its Inconitancy
and Levity. Thefe things are certainly the moft
general
=■. • .«.' I?f 4 IV ... ||. ■-■
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28
ji Search after Truth. Book III.
general Caufes of our Errors, and we might longer
infift upon them here, but what I have faid, is fuffi-
cient to difcover the Weaknefs-of the Humane Mind,
to Perfons that are capable of any Attention. In the
Fourth and Fifth Book we (hail treat more largely of
the Errors which our Inclinations and Paflions lead
us into, and of which we have already faid fonaething
in this Chapter.
THE
J
Ghap» I. Search after Truth*
THE
SECOND PART
OF THE
Pure Underftanding.
Of the Nature of IDE A'' S.
CHAP. I.
I. What is meant by Idea's ; That they truly Ex^
and that they are necejfary to perceive all
material ObjeEls. II. A divifion of all the
Modes by which External ObjeBs may be feen,
I Think every one will confefs, that we do nor
perceive External Objedlsby themfelves. We fee
the Sun, the Stars, and many ObjecSts without
us; and it is not probable that the Soul Ihould
go out of the Body, and walk as it were, through the
Heavens, to Contemplate all thofe Obje(5ts there. She
does not then fee them by themfelves,and as the imme-
diate Objed: of Mind j when it lees the Sun, for
inftance, it is not the Sun, but fomething which is
nearly united to our Soul; and it is that which I call
Idea: So here by this word Ideat I mean only what
A Starih after Truth. Book IIL iP'
is the immediate Objedl:, or the neareft the Mind
when it perceives any thing.
It muft be obferved, that to make the Mind per-
ceive any Objedt, it is abfolutely neceflary that the
Idea of this Objedt (hould be adiually prefent, of
which we can have no doubt; but it is not requifite |!^
that there (hould be iome external Objecft which refem-
bles this Idea ; for it often happens, that we perceive
things which are not, and which never had a being. So
that we often have in our Mind's real Idea's of things
which never were. For inftance, when a Man imagins jjci to
a Mountain of Gold> it is abfolutely aeceffary that the
Ideanf this Mountain (hould be fedly pre(ent to his
Mind: When a Mad Man, a Man in a high Fever, or
a Man that is afleep, fees any terrible Animal before iieli
his Eyes, it is certain that the Idea of this Animal truly Jberan
Exitts ; and yet this Mountain of Gold, and this Ani- is for til
mal, never wer^. iey saj
However, Men being Naturally inclined to believe liea's, ao
that there is none but Corporeal Objedls which Exift, [fiKteiii
they Judge of the Reality and Exiitence of things quite k
after another manner than they ought to do; for as ifwinliiii
loon as they are fenfible of any Objed, they will cer- siriiaii
tainly have it that thisObjed Exifts, although it often
happens, that there is nothing without: And further, &ii
ihey affirm, that this Objed is exadly the fame as rkifira
they fee it, which never happens. But in refped to f&k
the Idea which neceflarily Exifts, and which can be lAjfom
nothing elfe befides what it appears to be, they with- ramsifa
out any refledion, commonly Judge it to be nothing ;
as if Idea's had not a very great number g£ Proper- nHjsyj,
tics: As if the Idea's of a Square, for inftance, was
not vei7 different from that of fome nUnaber, and did ^
not reprefent things perfedly diftind; which could ,
never happen to nothing, (ince nothing has no Pra-
priety. It is therefore indilputable, that Idea'« have
a real Exiftence. But let us examine their Nature
and Elfence, and fee what it can be in the Soul that is
capable of reprefenting all things.
Whatever things the Soul perceives, are either in, 4^,
or out of its felf, thofe which are in the Soul, are its
own
Chap.L A Search after Truth,
own thoughts; that is, all its different Modifications';
for by thefe words, Thought^ manner of Thinkings or
modification of the Soul, I underftand in general all -
things, that can be in the Soul without her perceiv-
ing them, as her own Senfations, Imaginations, pure
Intelledbons, or fimple Conceptions, even her Pafli-
ons, and Natural Inclinations. Now our Soul has no
need of Idea's to perceive all thefe things, becaufe
they are within the Soul ; or rather, the &ul it felf,
after fuch or fuch a manner: Even as the real round-
nefs of fome Body, and its Motion, are only this Body
Figured, and moved after fuch or fuch a manfier.
But as for things that are out of the Soul, we can
perceive them only by the means of Idea's, fuppofing
that thefe things cannot be intimately united to it.
There are two forts of them, Spiritual, and Material:
As for the Spiritual, there is fome probability that
they may difcover themfelves to the Soul without
Idea's, and by themfelves. For although Experience
teaches us, that we cannot immediately, and of our
felves, declare our Thoughts to one another, but only
by words, or fome other fenfible Sign, to which we
have affixed our Idea's: We may fay, that God has
ordained it fo only during this Life, to hinder thofe
Diforders that would foon happen, if Men could make
themfelves be underftood as they plea fed. But when
Juftice and Order (hall Reign, and we (hall be deli-
vered from the Captivity of our Bodies, we (hall per-
haps make our felves mutually underRood by an inti-
mate Union of our felves, as its probable the Angels
do in Heaven ; fo that it does not feem abfolutely ne-
ceifary to admit Idea's to reprefent fpiritual things to
the Soul, becaufe it may be, we may fee them by
themfelves, although after a very imperfecfi: manner.
I examine not here how two Spirits can he united one
to the other, and if they can after this manner mutually
difcover one anothers Tlhctights. I believe however, that
there is no Subftance purely intelligible, hut that of God;
nothing can be evidently known but in his Light ; and
that the Union of Spirits cannot make them Vijible: For
although we are moji Jiribily united to our felves, we are.
n,'!-
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32 jI Search after Truth. Book III.
and /hall he mintelligihle to our felves^ until we fee our
felves in God ; and that he rejnrefents to us the -perfeEi in-'
telligible Idea that he hath of our being included in his.
So that although I may feem here to grants that Angels
can manifeji one to another what they are^ and what they
thinh,; ^tis only hecaufe I will not diffute of it^ -provided
I am granted what is not to be doubted^ viz. That we can-
not Jee material things by themfelves, and without Idea's,
I (hall explain in the Seventh Chapter, my Opinion
how we know Spirits ; and will (hew, that at prelenc
we cannot abfolutely know them by themfelves, al-
though it may be they are united to us. But I fpeak
here chieQy of material things, which certainly cannot
be united to the Soul, in fuch a manner as is necelfary
for us to perceive them: Becaufe being extended, and
the Soul not, there is no proportion between them,
Befides, our Souls go not out of our Bodies to meafure
ihegreatnefsof the Heaven,and confequently, they can-
not fee External Bodies, but by the Idea's which repre-
fent them. This is what all the World ought to grant.
ll.Adivi' We are alTured then, that it's abfolutely neceffary,
fo?i of the that the Idea's we have of Bodies, and of all other
fe'ueral Objedls which we perceive not by themfelves, pro-
ceed from thefe Bodies, or thefe Objedfs ; or elfe that
our Soul has the power of producing thefe Idea's, or
that God Created them with our Souls ; or that he
produces them every time that we think of any Ob-
jedl; or elfe that the Soul has all thofe Perfections in
it felf that it fees in thefe Bodies: Or in fine, that it
is united with a perfeCt Being, which in general in-
eludes all the Perfections of Created Beings.
We cannot fee Objedts but after one of thefe ways:
Let usexamin without prejudice, and without fright-
ing our fclves with the difHcuhy of the Queftion,
which of them feems moft probable : It may be we
may refolve it very clearly, although we do not pre-
tend here to give fuch Demonftrations as will fatisfie
all forts of perfons ; but only convincing Proofs to
thofe at lead, as will meditate with ferious Attention
upon them j for perhaps it would be thought tod
talh if we (hould pretend otherwife,
CHAP,
ways
whereby
External
Object
may be
Jee?i»
Chap. II. J Starch after Truth.
CHAP. XL
That material OhjeEis do not emit Species tt?hich
refemble them,
THe moft common received Opinion is that of the
Peripateticks, who think that External Qbjedls
emit Species which refemble them, and thatthofe Spe-
cies are carried by the External Senfes to the Com-
mon Senfe or tjnderftanding. They call thefe Species
imprejfedy becaufe the Obje^St imprints them on the
External Senfes. Thefe impreffcd Species being Ma-
terial and Senfible, are render'd intelligible, by means
of the aEiive, or aSiive intelleei ; and are fit to be re-
ceived in the paffive intelkSi, Thefe Species thus fpi-
ritualiz'd, are called exprefsd Species, becaufe they
are exprefs'd by the imprefs'd ones ; and 'tis by them
that the PafEve Intellecfl knows all material things.
We fliall not ftay to explain at large thefe fine
things, and the divers manners in which different Phi-
lofophers conceive them ; for although they do not
agree as to the number of Faculties which they attri-
bute to the Interior Senfe, and the Underftanding;
and though there are not a few, who doubt whether
they have need of any aHivs IntelieSt, to know fenfible
Objetfls, yet however they generally agree, that Ex-
ternal Objedls emit the Species or Images which re-
prefent them. And *tis only upon this Foundation
that they multiply their Faculties, and defend their
atiive intelleEi; So that this Foundation having no So-
lidity, as (hall foon be fhewn, it will be unneceflary
to fpend any time to overturn the Superftrudture.
We are ailiirM then, that it is improbable that Ob-
jedls (hould emit their Images, or Species which re-
prefent them, for thefe reafons. i. From the impe-
netrability of Objecffs: All Objedls, as the Sun, Stars,
and all fuch as are near the Eyes, cannot emir Species
which are different from their refpedfive Natures :
Wherefore Philofophers commonly fay, that thefe
C c c Species
r:" ;
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34 ^ Search after Truth. Book III,
Species are Grofs and Material, in which they differ
from exprefs^d Species which are Spiritualifed. Thefe
imprcfs'd Species of Objedls then are little Bodies,
they cannot therefore be penetrated, nor all the Spaces
which arc betwixt the Earth and the Heaven, which
muft be full of them. Whence it's eafie to conclude,
they muft be bruis'd and broken, in moving every
way ; and thus they cannot render Objetffs vifible.
Moreover, one may fee from the fame place or
point, a great number of Objet^ls in the Heavens, and
on the Earth ; therefore the Species of thefe Obje/dbs
can be reduc'd into a Point. But they are impene-
trable fince they are extended. Therefore, ^c.
But one may not only fee a multitude of very great
and vaft Objedfs: There is no Point in all the great
Spaces of the World, from whence we cannot difco-
ver an almoft infinite number of Objecfls, and even
Objedts as large as the Sun, Moon, and the Heavens,
there is therefore no Point in all the World where the
Species of all thefe things ought not to meet; which
is againft all appearance of Truth.
Such as The Second Reafon is taken from the Change which
wouUknow happens in the Species ; it's evident, that the nearer
hwadim-zny Objed; is, the greater its Species ought to be,
present of fjnce we fee the Objed's greater. But what is yet
f^ifible Ob' more difKcuIt to conceive, according to their Opinion,
je^s» That if we look upon thisObjed with aTclefcope,
ever oppo- ^ Microfcope, the Species immediately becomes
fte^maj e Hundred times as great as it was before ; for 'tis
catedwith difficultly conceiv'd from what Parts it can
«»/w 8'"°"' sreac in an inltant.
-aoeakend', Third Reafon is, when we look upon a per-
Tnay read Cube, all the Species of its Sides are unequal ^
Monjieur neverthelefs, we fee all the Sides equally Square.
Defcartes So when we confider Ellipfes and Parallelograms in a
his Diop- Pidure, which cannot but emit like Species, yet we
tricks, fee Circles and Squares : This manifeltly (hews, that
it is not neceifary that the Objed beheld, Ihould emit
Species like it felf, that it may be feen.
In fine, it cannot be conceiv'd how it can be, that
a Body, which does not fenfibly diminilh, Ihould al-
ways
Chap.III. A Search after Truth.
ways emit Species on every Side, which (hould conti-
nually fill all the great Spaces about it, and that with
an inconceivable fwiftnefe. For an Objedl: that was
hidden, in that Inftant that it difcovers it felf may be
feen many Millions of Leagues on all Sides ; and
what appears yet more ftrange is, that Bodies in great
Motion, as Air, and fome others, have not that power
ot pufhing outwards thefe Images which relemble
them ; as the more grofs and quiefcent Bodies, fuch
as the Earth, Stones, and generally all hard Bodies
have.
But I (hall not ftay any longer to enumerate all the
contrary Reafons to their Opinion, there would be no
end, a very ordinary Judgment would raife innume-
rable Objedlions. Thofe that we have brought are
fufficient, though they were riot fo neceffary after
what has been faid upon the Subjed of the Fifft Book,
where the Errors of the Senfes were explain'd. But
there are fo great a number of Philofophers wedded
to this Opinion, that we believe it will be neeelTafy
to fay fomething to encline them to refledt upon their
own Thoughts.
CHAP. HI.
Tloat the Soul has no power of prodncpig Jdeas^
The Canfe of Mens Error^ in reference to this
Snhje^,
'^He Second Opinion is that of thofe who betieve
our Souls have any power of producing the Idea's
of luch things as they will think upon, and they are
excited to produce them by the Imprefiions which Ob-
je(fts make upon Bodies, although thefe Imprefifions
are not Images like the Objecfts which caule rheiii;
they believe that 'tis in this, that Man is made after
the Image of God, and participates of his Power,
That even ^ God Created all things out of d6t)iing>
C c c 2 ^ and
A Search after Truth. Book III.
and can reduce them to nothing again, and then Cre-
are them anew ; fo Man can Create, and Annihilate
the Idea's of all things as he pleafes. But there is
great Reafons to diftruft all thefe Opinions which ex-
to! a Man, thefe are the Common Thoughts v^hich
arife trom a vain and proud Original, and which the
Father of Light hath not infpir'd.
This participation of the power of God which Men
boaft of having, to reprefent Objedfs, and of doing
many other particular adtions, is a participation
which feems to relate to fomething of independance,
as independance is commonly explained ; it is alfo a
Chimerical Participation, which Mens Ignorance and
Vanity make them to imagine. They depend much
more than they think, upon the Goodnels and Mercy
of God: But this is not a place to explain thefe things.
It's enough if we endeavour to fhew, that Men have
not the Power of forming the Idea's of things which
they perceive.
No one can doubt that Idea's are real Beings, fince
they have teal Properties, fince they differ from one
another, and reprelent all different things; Nor can
we realonably doubt that they are Spiritual, and very
different from the Bodies which they reprefent. But
it feems reafonable to doubt, whether Idea's, by whofe
means we fee Bodies,are not more Noble than the Bo-
dies themfelves: for indeed the Intelligible World muft
be more perfedt than the Material and Earthly, as we
fhall fee hereafter. Thus when we affirm that we
have the Power of Forming fuch Idea's as we pleafe,
we fiiall be in danger of perfwading our felves, to
make more Noble and Perfecft Beings, than the World
which God hath Created. However, fome do not re-
flcdt upon it, becaule rhcy imagin that an Idea is
Nothing,. finCe it is not to be fck; or elfe if they
look upon it as a Being, 'tis a very mean, contempt!-
ble one, becaufe they imagin it to be annihilated as
foon as it is no longer prcfent to the Mind.
But fuppofing it true, that Idea's were only little
contemptible Beings, yet they are Beings, and Spiri-
tual Ones j and Men not having the power of Be-
lieving,
IIE
Chap. III. A Search after Truth. 37
lieving, it follows that they cannot produce them ;
for the produiftion of Idea's after the manner before
explain'd, is a true Creation ; and although Men en-
deavour to palliate and mollifie the hardnefs of this
Opinion, by faying, that the produdlion of Idea's pre-
fuppofes fomething elfe, but Creation nothing ; yet the
difficulty is not folv'd by this Subterfuge.
For we ought to confider, that it is not more diffi-
cult to produce fomething out of nothing, than to pro-
duce one thing out of another; which cannot at all
contribute to its Produdlion. For example, it is not
more difficult to Create an Angel, than to ptx)duce
him from a Stone ; becaufe a Stone being of another
fort of Being wholly different, it cannot in the leaft
be ufeful to the Produdlion of an Angel. But it may
contribute to the Produdfion of Bread, Gold,
for a Stone, Gold, and Bread, are but the fame thing
differently configur'd, and are all Material.
It is even more difficult to produce an Angel of a
Stone, than to pronuce him out of nothing ; becaufe
to make an Angel out of a Stone; ( fo far as it can be
done) the Stone muft be annihilated, and afterwards
the Angel Created ; But (imply to Create an Angel,
nothing is to be annihilated. If therefore the Mind
produces its Idea's from the material ImpreiTions
which the Brain receives from Objedfs, it muft always
do the fame thing, or a thing as difficult, or even more
difficult than if it Created them ; (ince Idea's being
Spiritual, they cannot be produc'd of material Images,
which have no proportion with them.
But if it be laid, that an Idea is not a Subflance, I
confent to it, yet it is always fomething that is Spiri-
tual ; and as it is impofTible to make a Square o( a
Spirit, although a Square be not a Subftance, fo it is
alfb impolTible to Form a Material Subftance from a
Spiritual Idea, although an Idea was no Subftance.
But although we (hould grant to the Mind of Man
a Soveraign Power to Annihilate, and Create the
Idea's of things, yet it would never make ufe of that
Power to produce them; for even as a Painter, how
skilful foever he be, could not reprefent an Anirnal
C c c 3 which
38 A Search after Truth, BookllL
which he had never feen, and of which he never had
any Idea : So that the Pidure which he (hould make,
fhould be like to this unknown Animal. Thus a Man
cannot form the Idea of an Objed, if he knew it
not before, that is, if he has not already had fome
Idea of it, which does not depend upon his Will; and
if he already had an Idea of it, he certainly knows
this Qbjed, and it would be unneceflary for him to
Form ir anew. It is therefore in vain to attribute to
the Mind of Man the Power of producing his Idea's*
It might be laid perhaps, that the Mind of Man hath
general and confufed Idea's which it does not pro-
duce ; and that thofe which it produces are particular,
more clear and dittind; but it is always the fame
thing. For even as a Painter cannot draw thePidure
of a particular Perfon, fo as to be fure that he hath
perfeded it, if he had had no diitind Idea of him ;
and even if the Perfon had not been prefent: Thus the
Mind, for example, which could only have the Idea
of a Being, or an Animal in general, could not re-
prefent to its felf a Horfe, nor Form a didind Idea
of one, and be affured that it is perfedly like a Horfe,
if it had not already the firft Idea with which it might
compare this lecond : Now if it had a firft, it is un-
ufeful to Form a fecond; and the Queftion refpeds
ihishrft. Therefore, ^c.
It s true, that when we conceive a Square by pure
Intelledion, we can alfo imagin it, that is, perceive
it in our felves, by tracing an Image of it in the Brain ;
yet it muft be firft obferv'd, that we are not the true
nor principal Caufe of this Image ; But it will be too
long to explain it here. Secondly, So far is the fe-
cond Idea which accompanies this Image, from being
more diftind and more exad than the other, that on
the contrary, it is not fo Exad, becaufe it refembles
the firft, which was only a pattern for the fecond.
For indeed we muft not believe that the Imagination
and Senies reprefent Objeds more diftindly to u?
than the pure Underftanding ; but only that they ap-
ply them more to the Mind ; for the Idea's of the
Senfes and Imagination are not diftind, but only fo
far
iglnatio:
to 2
hey if
c
01
Chapill. Search after Truth, 39
far as they are conformable to the pure Intelletf^ion :
The Image of a Square for example, which the Ima-
gination Traces in the Brain, is not exadi and perfeift,
but only lb far as it refembles the Idea of the Square,
which we conceive by pure Inrelledlion. It is this Idea
which regulates this Image, 'tis the Mind which Con-
dudls the Imagination; and which Obliges it, if we
may fo fay, to behold from time to time, whether the
Image it Paints, be a Figure of four right and equal
Lines, whofe Angles are alike. In a word, whether
what it Imagins, is like to what it Conceives.
After whar has been faid, I do not believe it can be Tatito mc
doubted, but thofe are deceived, who affirm, the Mind liora ejje
is able to Form the Idea's of Objedts ; lince they TLl-judico qu<$
tribute the Power of Creation to the Mind, and even oculis cev
of Creating with Wifdom and Order, although it hasquanta
no knowledge of what it does ; for that is not Con-P^^
ceivable: But the caufe of their Error is, that Men
always Judge that a thing is the Caufe of fome Effedf,
1 1 1 --J L r r L iisQua ant"
when both are joined together, iuppoiing the true .
Caufe of this Effedl be unknown to them. That
makes all the World conclude, that a Bowl put in Mo-
tion, and meeting another, is the true and principal Religione.
Caufe of the Motion that it communicates to it; as
the Will of the Soul is the true and principal Caufe of
the Motion of the Arm, and other the like prejudices ;
becaufe it always happens, that a Bowl is lhaken when
it is met by another that runs againif it: As our Arms
are moved almoft always when we Will, and we do
not fee any other apparent Caufe of this Morion.
But when an Effedh does not fo often follow fome-
thing which is not the Caufe of it, there is never the-
lels a great many Men, who believe this thing is the
Caufe of theEffedt which happens; yet every Body is
not guilty of the fame Error. For inftance, if a
Comet appears, and after this Comet a Prince Dies ;
Some Scones lie expofed to the Moon, and they are
eaten with Worms: The Sun is joined vv^ich Mars at
the Nativity of a Child, andfomething extraordinary
oftk iiappens to this Child : All this is enough to perfwade
ijjrfj ^ great many Men, that the Comet, the Moon, and
jjj O c c
A Search after Truth, Book III.
the Conjundtion of the Sun with Mars, are the Caufes
of thefe Effedts, and others like them ; and the tea-
fbn why all the World does not believe it, is, that they
do not always fee thefe EfTedis follow thefe Caufes.
But all Men having commonly the Idea's of Ob-
jedls prefent to their Minds as foon as they wife it,
and it happening many times in a day, almoft all con-
dude, that the Will which accompanies the produdfi-
on, or rather the prefence of Idea's, is truly theCaufe
of them: Becaufe they fee nothing in the fame time
that they can attribute it to; and they imagin the
Idea's no longer ExifV, when the Mind fees them no
longer ; and that they revive again anew, when they
are again reprefented to the Mind.
'Tis for thefe Reafons fome Judge, that External
Objedls emit Images which refemble them, as we
have mention'd in the precedent Chapter: For it being
impoflible to fee Objedls by themfelves, but only by
their Idea's, they judge the Objedl produces the Idea;
becaufe as foon as it is prefent they fee it; and as foon
as abfent they fee it no longer; and becaufe the pre-
fence of the Objedl almoft always accompanies the
Idea which reprefents it to us.
Yet if Men were not prejudiced in their Judgments
from this, that the Idea's of things are prefent to their
Mind as foon as they Will them, they fhould only con-
dude, that according to the Order of Nature, their
Will is commonly neceflary for them to have thofe
Idea s. Not that the Will is the true and principal
Caufe which prefents them to the Mind, and much
lefs, that the Will produces them from nothing, or after
the manner they explain it. Nor ought they to con-
dude, that Objedls emit Species refeinbling them, be-
caufe the Soul commonly perceives them only when
they are prefent, but only that the Objedl is for the
moll part neceffary, in order to the Idea's being pre-
font to the Mind. And laftly, that a Bowl put into
Motion, is the principal and true Caufe of the feaking
of another Bowl that it meets in the way, fince the
firft had not the power of Morion in its felf. They
can only determin, that the meeting of two Bowls is
an
Chap. IV. A Search after Truth, 41
an occafion to the Author, of the Motion of Matter to
execute the Decree of his Will, which is the Univerfal
Caufe of all things, in communicating to the other See Ch. 3.
Bowl a part of the Motion of the firft ; that is, to 0/ the Se-
fpeak more clearly, in willing that the laft Ihould ac-
quire fo much more Motion as the firft loft; for the
moving force of Bodies can proceed only from the
Will of him who preferves them, as we fliall (hew elfe-
where.
CHAP. IV.
That we do not fee OhjeBs by the Means of Idea s
which were created with us- And that God does
not produce them in m fo often as we have occa^
fion for them,
'TH E Third Opinion is. That of thofe who fay all
■*' Idea's are created with us.
To difcover the Improbability of this Opinion, it
will be neceffary to confider that there is many diffe-
rent things in the World of which we have Idea's.
But to fpeak only of fimple Figures, it is certain that
the Number of them is Infinite: Nay, even if we con-
fider but one only, as the Ellipfis, we cannot doubt
but the Mind conceives an infinite Number of diffe-
rent Kinds of them, when it confiders that one of the
Diameters may be lengthened out to Infinity, and the
other always continue the fame.
So the heighrh of a Triangle may be augmented
or diminifhed infinitely, the bafe being always the
fame, we may conceive there is an infinite Number
of different Kinds of them: And alfo, which I defire
may be confidefd here. The Mind in fome manner
perceives this infinite Number, although we can ima-
gine but very few of them ; and that we can at the
^me time have particular and diftintft Idea's of many
Triangles of different Kinds. But what muft chiefly
be
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42 ^ Search after Truth. Book III.
be obfefved is, That this general Idea that the
Mind has of this Number of Triangles of diffe-
rent Kinds is fufficient to prove, That if we do
not conceive each of thefe different Triangles by
particular Idea's: And in (hort. If we comprehend
not their Infinity, 'tis not the Defed: of the Idea's, or
that Infinity is not reprefented to us, but only the
Defed of the Capacity and Extenfion of the Mind.
If a Man (hould apply himfclf to coniider the Pro-
perties of all the diverfe Kinds of Triangles, although
he fhould eternally continue this fort of Study, he
would never want new and particular Idea's, but his
Mind would be unprofitably fatigued.
What I have faid of Triangles, may be applied to
five, fix, a hundred, a thoufand, or ten thoufand fided
Figures, and lb on ad infinitum. Now if the fides ot
a Triangle, which have infinite relations one with the
other, make Triangles of infinite Kinds, it is plain
that four, five, or a thoufand fided Figures are capable
of admitting much greater Differences, fince they
are capable of a greater Number of Relations and
Combinations of their fides, than fimple Triangles
are.
The Mind then fees all thefe things; it hath Idea's
of them ; and thefe Idea's would never fail it, although
it fhould employ infinite Ages in the Confideration of
one Figure only: And if it perceived not thefe infinite
Figures all of a fudden, or comprehended not their
Infinity, 'tis only becaufe its Eictenfion is very much
limited. It hath then an infinite Number of Idea's :
Do I fay an infinite Number P It hath as many infinite
Numbers of Idea's, as there are different Figures to
be confider'd: So that fince there is an infinite Num-
ber of different Figures, it's neceflary that to know the
Figures, the Mind have an infinitely infinite Number
of Idea's.
Now I ask, If it's probable that God fhould Create
lb many things with the Mind of Man ? For my part
it does not appear fo to me ; chiefly, fince that might
be made in a more fimple and eafie manner, as we (hall
foon fee. For as God always abis by the moft fimple
ways.
Chap-IV. A Search after Truth,
ways, it does not feem reafonable to explain how we
know Objedls, by admitting the Creation of an in-
finite Number of Beings, fince we can refolve this
Difficulty in a more Eafie and Natural way.
But although the Mind Ihould have a Magazine of
all the Idea's, which are neceiTary for it to fee things,
ir would be yet more difficult to explain how the Soul
fhould make choice of them to reprefent them: For
inftance, how it can reprefent the Sun to it felf, whilft
it is prefent to the Eyes of its Body ?
For whereas the Image which the Sun imprints in
the Brain, refembles not the Idea we have thereof,
as has been elfewhere proved ; and fince the Soul per-
ceives not the Motion that the Sun produces in the
bottom of the Eyes, and in the Brain, it's inconceiva-
ble how it fhould exadly guefs, amongft thefe infinite
Number of Idea's that it has, which it muft reprefent
to it felf, to imagine or to fee the Sun : We cannot
therefore fay. That the Idea's of things were created
with us, it is fufficient that we fee the Objeds that are
about us.
Nor can we fay that God produces as many of
them every Moment, as we perceive different things ;
this has been fufficiently refuted from what has been
faid in this Chapter. Befides it is neceffary that at all
times we adually have in our felves the Idea's of all
things, fince we are always able to think of all things;
which we could not if we perceiv'd them already con-
fufedly; that is, If an infinite Number of Idea's were
not prefent to our Mmds; for we cannot will to
think ot Objeds, of which we have no Idea.
CHAP.
■in iii.r,,
^rr. ii;
•» II *
liill!'';;-, vi'
II;
ri.ijgfl
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h
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44 A Search after Truth. Book IIL
CHAP. V.
That the Mind neither fees the Ejfence^ nor Ex^
ifience of ObjeBs, in confidering its own Per-
feBions, That none hut God fees them in that
manner,
I 'HE Fourth Opinion is, That the Mind ftands in
"** need of nothing befides it felf, to perceive Ob^
Jed's; and that it can, in confidering it felf and its
own Perfedions, difcover all things that are with-
out it.
It is certain that the Soul fees within it felf, and
without Idea's, all the Senfations and Paflions it is
capable of, as Pleafure, Pain, Cold, Heat, Colours,
Sounds, Odours, Sapors, its Love, its Hatred, Joy
and Sadnefs, C^c. becaufe all the Senfations and
PafHons of the Soul reprefent nothing External which
is like them ; and becaufe they are only Modifications,
which nothing but the Mind is capable of. But the
Difficulty is, to know whether the Idea's which repre^
fent fomething that is without the Soul, and which
refembles them in fome meafure, as the Idea's of a
Sun, a Houfe, a Horfe, a River, e3c. are only Modi-
iications of the Soul; infomuch that the Soul cannot
Band in need of any thing befides it felf, to reprefent
Xo it felf all External Things.
There are Perlbns who make no Scruple to affirm.
That the Soul being made to think, it has in it felf,
I mean, in confidering its own Perfedions, whatever
is necefiary to perceive Objeds; for indeed the Soul
being nobler than all the things it conceives diftindly,
it may be faid, that it contains them in fome meafure
Eminently^ according to the Notions of the Schools 3
that is, after a Nobler and more Sublime Manner than
they are in themfelves. They pretend, that thus
Superior things comprehend the Perfedions of thole
that are Inferior. And thus being the Nobleft of the
Crea-
-J
Chap. V. A Search after Truth* 45
Creatures they know; they fancy they have in them-
felves,after a Spiritual Manner,all that is in the vifible
World. In a word. They will have the Soul to be
like an Intelligible World, which comprehends in it
felf> whatever the Material and Senfible World com-
prebends j nay, Infinitely more.
But in my Opinion it is a great Prefumption to
maintain that Thought: If I am not miftaken, it is
Natural Vanity, the Love of Independence, and the
Defire of refembling him who comprehends all Beings
in himfelf, which Confounds the Mind, and inclines us
to believe, we poflefs what we have not: Do not fay
that you are a Light to your felf fays St. Auftin ; for
there is none but God who is a Light to himfelf, and Serm.8.Dtf
who can, in confidering himfelf, fee whatever he has f^erbis Do-
produced, or can produce.
It is certain that there was none but God alone
before the World was Created, and he could not pro-
duce it without Knowledge and without Idea's: Con-
fequently thofe Idea's which God had of the World,
are not different from himfelf 5 and thus all Crea-
tures, even the moft Material and molt Terrcftrial, are
in God, though in a manner altogether Spiritual,
which we cannot apprehend. God therefore lees all
Beings in himfelf, in confidering his own Perfections
which reprelent them to him. He alfo knows their
Exiltence perfectly, for fince the Exigence of all
things depend on his Will, he cannot be Ignorant of
his own Will; it follows then, that he cannot be Igno-
rant of their Exiltence. And thus God does not only
fee in himfelf the Elfence of all things, but alfo their
Exiltence.
But the cafe is dirferent as to Created Spirits, they
can neither fee the Elfence of things, nor their Ex-
iltence within themfelvcs: They cannot fee their
Elfence within themfelves, becaufe being very much
limited, they do not contain all Beings, like God whom
we may call the Univerfal Being, or plainly He that is,
as he calls himfelf. Since therefore the Humane
Mind may know all Beings and Infinite Beings, and
yet nor contain them, it is a certain Praof, that it does
iis
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/^6 ^ Search after Truth. Book IIL
not fee their Eflence in it felf. For the Mind does not
only fee fometimes one thing, and fometimes another
fucceffively, it alfo adlually perceives Infinity though
it does not comprehend it. 00 that not being adlually
Infinite, nor capable of Infinite Modifications at the
lame time, it is abfolutely ImpolTible that it fhould
fee within it felf what is not there. Therefore it does
not fee the Eflence of things in confidering its own Per-
fedlions, or by modifying it felf diverfly.
Neither does it fee their Exiftence within it felf,
becanfe the Exiftence of Beings do not depend upon
its Will; and becaufe the Idea's of thofe Beings may
be prefent to the Mind, though they do not Exift j
for every body may have the Idea of a Mountain of
Gold, though there be no Mountain of Gold in
Nature: And though we rely on the report of the
Senfes to judge of the Exigence of Objedls; neverthe-
lefs Reafon does not afliire us, that we fhould always
believe our Senfes, fince we find clearly that they de-
ceive us. When a Man's Blood, for inftance, is very
much inflam'd ; or barely when he Sleeps, he fome-
times beholds Fields, Combats, and the like, which
neverthelefs are not prefent, and which perhaps never
were. Therefore it is certain that it is neither within
it felf, nor by it felf, that the Mind fees the Exiftence
of things, but that in this cafe it depends upon fome
other things.
CHAP. VI.
That we fee all thwgs w God.
\]W E have examin'd in the preceding Chapter four
dift'erent Manners in which the Humane Mind
may lee External Objecfts, which do not appear pro-
bable to us: There only remains the Fifth, which alone
appears confonant to Reafon, and the molt proper to
(hew the Dependence that Spirits have on God in all
their Thoughts,
In
■<p
y
Chap.VI. ^ Search after Truth.
In order to apprehend it rightly, we muft remem-
ber what has been (aid in the preceding Chapter, that
h is abfolutely neceflary that God ftiould have in him-
felf the Idea's of all the Beings he has created, fince
otherwife he could not have produced them ; and ihac
thus he fees all thofe Beings, by_ confidering the Per- i
fedions which he includes in himfelf, and to which aU
Beings are related. Moreover, it is neceflary to know
that God is very ftridly united to our Souls by his
Prefence, fo that we may fay that he is the place of
Spirits, as Space is the place of Bodies. Thefe two
things being luppofed, it is certain that the Mind may
fee what there is in God, which reprefents Created
Beings, flnce that is very Spiritual, very Intelligible,
and moft prefent to the Mind. Thus the Mind may
fee in God the Works of God, fuppofing God be will-
ing to difcover to it what there is in him which re-
prefents them. Thefe are the Realbns which feem to
prove, that he rather Wills than Creates an Infinite
Number of Idea s in every Mind.
Firft, Although we do not abfolutely deny, that
God was able to produce an Infinitely infinite Num-
bcr of Beings, which reprefent Objedls with every
Mind he Creates ; yet we ought not to believe that
he does fo. For it is not only confbnant to Reafbn,
but it alio appears by the Oeconomy of Nature, that
God never does by very difficult means, what may
be done by a plain eafie way: God does nothing in
vain and without Reafon: That which ffiews his
Wifdom and his Power, is not to do little things by
difficult Means; for that is repugnant to Reafon, and
fliews a limited Knowledge: But on the contrary, it
is to do great things by plain eafie Means. 'Tis thus
that out of Extenfion only he produces whatever we
fee that is admirable in Nature, and even that which
gives Life and Motion to Animals. For thofe who
will needs have Subftantial Forms, Faculties, and
Souls in Animals, different from their Blood, and from
the Organs of their Body, in order to perform their
Fundfions, at the fame time feem to argue that God
wants Underftanding, or that he cannot do thofe ad-
mirable
48 A Search after Truth. Book III.
mirable things by Extenfion only. They meafure
the Power of God, and his Soveraign Wifdom, by the
fmallnefs of their oWn Capacity. Then fince God
ttiay make Humane Minds fee all things, by willing
barely that they Ihould fee what is in them (elves;
that is, what is in him that has a relation to thofe
things, and which reprefents them, there is no pro-
bability that he would do it otherwife ; and that
he (hould produce, in order thereunto, as many In-
finities of Infinite Numbers of Idea's, as there are
Created Spirits.
But we muft obferve, that we are not to conclude,
that Spirits fee the EflfenCe of God, becaufe they can
fee all things in God in that naanner: Since what they
fee is very Imperfed; but that God is very Perfedl:
They fee Matter Divifible and Figured, and there iiedw
is nothing in God that is Divifible or Figured; for ^plaio
God is all Beings, becaufe he is Infinite and Compre- no
bends all; but he is no Being in particular. Never- M;
thelefs that which we fee is but one, or feveral Beings w ii
in particular, and we do not apprehend that perfedl •](!.
Simplicity of God which includes all Beings. Befides litkt
that it may be faid, that we do not fo much fee the slB;
Idea's of things, as the things which thofe Idea's re-
prelent; for when we fee a Square , for inftance, iriioi
we do not fay that we fee the Idea of that Square, iljsi
which is united to the Mind, but only the Square which i ^
is without us. ;Cf5>;
The Second Reafon which may induce us to be-
lieve, that we fee all Beings, becaufe God Wills, that ..21s ^
that which is in him, which reprefents them, (hould j,
be di(cover\l to us; and not becaufe we have as many :qs;
Idea's created with us as we can fee things; for this |jjj
puts all created Spirits in an abfolute Dependence
upon God , and the greateft that can be : For this
being fo, we cannot only fee nothing, but what God
is willing we (hould fee, but we can alfo fee nothing,
2 ad Cor. unlefs God himlelf (hews it us. Non fumus fufficientes
3.5. cogitare ali^uid a nobis^ tanqiiam ex nohts^ fed fufficientia.
nojira ex Deo eft. 'Tis God himfelf which inftrudls
and enlightens Philofophers in that Knowledge which
ungrateful
X Chap. VL ^ Search after Truths 4^
k Ungrateful Men call Natural, although it is an imme-
diate Gift from Heaven : Detts enim illis mtnifefiavit. Rom. 1.19
It is he that is properly the Light of the Mind, and
^ the Father of Light or Knowledge. Pater Luminum. t- '7
cte It is he that teaches Wifdom to Men: docet homi'^ Pfa. 53.
wmjcientUm. In a word. He is the true Light,
3 p!" which enlightens all thofe that come into this World :
dtk Lux vera ejuce illurninat orhnem horhinem venientem injoanh.^.
I)' 1: hunc Mimdum.
:eart For in fine, It is pretty difficult diftindlly to appre-
hend the Dependence which our Minds have on God
xliide, in all their particular Adions, fuppofing they have all
fflat that which we diltindlly know to be neccffary for
liauif them in order to Ad, or all the Idea's of things pre-
fifiM fcnt to their Mind, and triily that general and con-
jslk fufed word Concurrence, by which Men pretend to
artljfo explain the Dependence that Creatures have On God,
C®pX' does not awaken any dilbnd Idea in an attentive
, fc Mind y and yet it is very neceffary Men fhould
nlk^! know diftindly, that they can do nothing without .
tpjrfed God.
Eefidw But the ftrongeft of all Reafons, is the manner how
the Mind perceives all things. It is certain, and every
ilim body knows by Experience, that when we have a
lioftanc! mind to think on any thing in particular, we firft calt
our Eyes on all Beings; and in the next place we
niKifliict apply our fclves to the Conlideratlon of the Objedt
we defign to think on. Now it is moft certain that
vvefee it already, though confuledly and in general :
So that as we may defire to fee all the Beings, fome-
Ion. fitnes one and fometimes another, it is certain that
all Beings are prefent to our Mind ; and it appears
that all Beings can only be prefent to our Mind, be-
.^deace caufe God is prefent to it, that is. He who includes
all things in the Simplicity of his Being.
jhaiGoE It feems moreover, That the Mind would not be
capable of reprefenting to it lelf univerfal Idea's of
iifB:! Kinds and Species, ^c. unlefs it law all Beings in-
rxjfdf, eluded in one. For every Creature being a parti-
^ cular Being, we cannot fay that we fee any thing
dgs initancc, a Triangle itr '
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50 j4 Search after Truth. Book III.
general. In fine, I am of opinion, that it is impofli-
ble to give a good Reafon of the Manner how the
Mind comes to know feveral abftradled and general
Truths, unlefs it be by the prefence of him that can
diredl the Mind in a World of different Manners.
In fine, The Beff:, the moft Sublime, the moft Solid,
and the chief Proof of the Exiftence of God, or that
which fuppofes the feweft things, is the Idea we have
of Infinity, though it does not comprehend it; and
that it has a very diifind: Idea of God, which it can
only have by the Union it has with him; fince it
cannot be conceiv'd that the Idea of a Being infinitely
perfedt, as that we have of God, fiiould be any thing
that is Created.
But the Mind has not only the Idea of Infinity, it
has it even before that of Finite. For we conceive
the Infinite Being, from this alone that we conceive
a Being, without confidering whether it is Finite or
Infinite. But in order to conceive a Finite Being, we
muft needs retrench fomething of that general Notion
of a Being, which confequently muft precede. Thus
the Mind perceives nothing but in Infinity ; and that
Idea is lb far from being form'd by the confufed Mix-
ture of all the Idea's of particular Beings, as Philo-
fophers imagine ; that on the contrary all thofe parti-
cular Idea's are only Participations of the general
Idea of Infinity : As God does not derive bis Being
from the Creatures, but all Creatures only fubfift by
him.
The laft Proof, which perhaps will be a Demon-
ftration to thole that are ufed to abftrabfed Arguments,
is this, It is impolTible that God ftiould have any
other principal End of his Acftions but himfelf: It
is a Notion that is common to all Men that are capa-
ble of any Refledtion ; and Holy Writ does not allow
us to doubt, but that God has made every thing for
himfelf. Therefore it is neceffary, that not only our
Natural Love, I mean the Motion he produces in
our Mind, Ihould tend towards him: But more-
over,, That the Knowledge and the Light which he
beftows upon it, (hould make us know any thing that
is
Chap.VI. A Search after Truth, 5 ^
is in him ; for whatever comes from God can only be
for God.ShouId God Create a Spirit,and give it for an
Idea, or for the immediate Obje(5l of its knowledge
the Sun : In my Opinion, God would Create that Spi-
fit, and the Idea of that Spirit, for the Sun and not
for him.
God cannot therefore Create a Spirit to know his
Works, unlefs that Spirit fees God in fome meafure,
by beholding his Works. So that we may fay, that
unlefs we do fee God in fome meafure, we fliould fee
nothing: In like manner, unlels we do Love God, I
mean, unlefs God did continually Imprint in us the
Love of Good in general, we Ihould Love nothing.
For that Love being our Will, we can Love nothing,
nor Will any thing without him j fince we cannot Love
particular Goods, without determining towards thofe
Goods,the motion of Love,which God gives us towards
him. So that as we Love nothing but by the necelTa-
ry Love we have for God, fo we fee nothing but by the
Natural Knowledge we have of God: And all the
particular Idea's we have of Creatures, are only Limi-
rations of the Idea of the Creator, as all the Morions
of the Will for the Creatures, are only determinations
of the motion for the Creator.
I believe there are no Divines but what will grant,
that the Impious Love God with that Natural Love I
fpeak of: And St. Aiijiin and fome other Fathers af-
firm as an undeniable thing, That the Impious behold
in God the Rule ot Manners, and Eternal Truths.
So that the Opinion I explain ought not to trouble any
Body. Thus St. Atijim fpeaks: Ab ilU incommutahili ^ ^
luce veritatis^ etium impiuSy dum ah ea avertitiir^ quo-
dammodo tangitur. Hinc eji quod ctiam impii eogitant * '
aternitatem^ ^3 mult a reBe riprehendunt rcBcque laudant
in hominum moribtts. J^dbus ea tandem regulis judicant,
niji inquibus vident^ quemadmodum qiiifquevhcre debeat^
etiam Ji nec ipji eodem modo vivant ? 'Vbi autem eas vi-
dent } Neque enim in fua natura. Nam cum procul dii-
hio mente ijia videanturj corumque mentes conjict ejjc mil-
tabilcSj has vero regulas immntabiles^ videat quifqtm in
eft (3 hoc videre potuerit ubinam ergo funt ijl^e rcgiiLe
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^2 J Search after Truth* Book III.
Scriptce, 7nfi in lihro Iticis illittu rjtwe verltcts dicitur, tinde
lex omnis jnjladcfcrihitur— in tjuavidet quid operandum
fit J etiam qui operatur injufitiam., ipje eji qui ah ilia
luce avcrtitur a qua tamcn tangitur.
There are many palTages in St. Auftin like unto this,
by which he proves, that we fee God even in this Life,
by the knowledge we have of Eternal Truths. Truth
is uncreated, Immutable, Immenfe, Eternal, above all
things. It is true by it felf. It derives its Perfedlion
from nothing: It makes Creatures more perfedt; and
all Spirits naturally endeavour to know it. Nothing
but God can have all thofe Perfedfions. Therefore
Truth is God. We fee fome of thofe Immutable
Eternal Truths. Therefore we fee God. Thefe are
St. Auflin's Reafons, ours differ a little from them ;
and we are unwilling to ufe the Authority of fo great
a Man unjuftly, to fecond our Sentiment.
We believe that Truths, even thofe that are Eter-
nal; as that twice two are four,are not fo much asab-
'folate Beings: So far are w^e from believing that they
are in God. For it is vifible, that that Truth only
confilts in a relation of Equality, which is between
twice Two and Four. Therefore we do not fay that
we fee God in feeing Truths, as St. Auflin fays, but
in feeing the Idea's of thofe Truths: For Idea's are
real, but the Equality between the Idea's, which is
Truth, has no reality. When for example. Men fay
that the Cloth they meafure contains Three Yards ;
the Cloth and the Yards are real : But the Equality
between Three Yards and the Cloth is not a real Be-
ing i it is only a relation that is between the Three
Yards and the Cloth. When we fay that twice Two
are Four, the Idea's of the Nurr;bers are real; but the
Equality there is between them is only a Relation.
Thus according to our Sentiment we fee God, when
we fee Erern.al Truths; not that thofe Eternal Truths
are God, but becaufe the Idea's on which thofe Truths
depend are in God ; perhaps Sr. Auflin underltcod it
'ib. We alfo believe, that we know in God Change-
able and Corrubtible things, although St. Auflin only
fpeaks of Immutable and Incorruptible things; be-
" . : ' caufe
p
■■ireif
I Chap. vr. A Search after Truth,
caufe ic is not neceflTary for that to place any Imper-
rjrit fedtion in God ; fince it fuffices, as we have already
iili. ^aid, that God (hould fliew us what there is in him
that has a Relation to thefe things,
not though I fay, we fee in God the things that are
]i?[; Material and Senfible, it muft be obferv'd, that I do
7rr. not fay we have a Senfation of them in God, but only
OTet that it is from God who Adfs in us ; for God Knows
fe^io: fenfible things, but he does not Feel them. When we
[• j[](| perceive any thing that is fenfible, Senfation and pure
is in our Perception. Senfation is a Modification
[ttjeiK of our Soul, and it is God that Caufes ic in us: And
he may Caufe it, though he has it riot, becaufe he
fees tn the Idea he has of our Soul, that ic is capable
of it. ;As for the Idea which is joyn'd to Senfation,
Qfjjjj; it is in God, we fee ic, becaufe it is his pleafure to
difcover it to us : And God joins Senfation to the Idea,
when Objedls are prefent, to the end that we may be-
lieve them as they are ; and that we may have fuch
Senfations and Paflions as we ought to have in rela-
tion to them.
Laftly, We believe thai: all Spirits fee the Eternal
Laws as well as other things in God, but with fome
difference: They know the Eternal Order and Eter-.
nal Truths, and even the Beings which God has made
according to thofe Truths, or according to the Order
, (jy by the Union which thofe Spirits have neceffarily with
^e'hraS ^ tVora, or tVifdom of God which diredls them, as
fhewn ; But 'tis by the Impredion they re-
itall ceive continually from the Will of God, which inclines
them to him, and endeavours, as ic were, to render
their Will abfolutely like unto his ; that they know
Order is a Law, I mean, that they know the Eternal
jflaion. Laws: How we muft love Good, and fiy from Evil:
^ That we muft love Juftice more than all Riches : That
ic is better to Obey God than to Command Men, and
J many other Natural Laws. For the knowledge of all
p.. thofe Laws is not different from the knowledge of that
ImprefTion, which they always feel in themfelves,
^ ^ "j, though they do not always follow ic by the free
" 1 choice of their Will ; which ihev know to be
Ddd:? Cora-
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54 A Search after Truth. Book III.
Common to all Spirits, though it is not equally
ftrong in ail.
It is by that Dependance, Relation, and Union of
our Mind to the PVordo^ God, and of our Will to his
Love, that we are made after the Image and Likencfs
of God : And although this may be very much defac'd
by Sin, yet it is neceflary that it (hould fubfift as long
as we do. But if we bear the Image of the tVord
humbled upon Earth ; and if we follow the Motions
of the Holy Ghoft, that Primitive Image of our firft
Creation, that Union of our Mind with the iVord of
the Father,and to the Love of the Father and of the Son,
will be re-eftabli(hed, and render'd indelible. We (hall
be like God, if we are like the Man God, In fine, God
will be all in us, and we all in God, in a far more per-
fe(fl manner than that by which it is neceflary for us to
fubfift, that we (hould be in him, and he in us.
th Ex' fome reafons which may perfwade us,
r J' Spirits perceive all things by the immediate Pre-^^
p an ions, Comprehends all in the Simplicity'
of his Being. Every one will Judge of it according
to the Internal Convicflion he (hall receive of it, after
having ferioufly confider'd it. But 'tis thought that
there will be no probability in all the other ways of
explaining thefe things; and that this laft will appear
more than probable. Thus our Souls depend on God
in all refpedfs. For as it is he who makes them feel
Grief, Pleafure, and all other Senfations, by the Na-
tural Union he has Eftablifh'd between them and our
Body, which is no other than his Decree and general
Will. Thus it is he, who by the Natural Union which
he has made between the Will of Man, and the Re-
prelentation of the Idea's which the Immenliiy of the
Divine Being includes, that makes them know what-
ever they do know ; and that Natural Union is al(b
nothing elle but his general Will. So that none but
he can diredt us, by reprefenting all things to us; as
cone bur he can make us Happy, by making us tafte
all manner of Pleafures.
Let us therefore keep to this Opinion,- That God is
the Intelligible World, or the place of Spirits, as the
material
Chap,VlL A Search after Truth. 55
material World is the place of Bodies. That they
receive all their ModiHcarions from his Power: That
they find ail their Ideas in his Wifdom : And that it is
by his Love that rhey arc adred in all their regular
Motions; and lince his Power and Love are nothing
buthimfelf, let us believe with St. P^w/, that he is not
far from every one of us ; and that it is in him we
have Life, Motion, and a Being. Kon longc efl ab una- Aft. A-
(juo^ue ziqfirumj in if Jo cnim vivimus, movemur^ dS>poft. c.iy*
[umm.
CHAP. VII.
1. Tohy Jiffisrent ways of feeing things, IL How
we k*iOw God. IIJ. How we know Bodies.
IV. How we ktiow oHr SohL V. How wek^ow
the SohIs of other Men^ and fare Spirits,
TN order to Abridge and Illuftrate the Opinion I have
fet down, concerning the manner how the Mind
perceives the different C&jefts of its Knowledge, it is
neceffary to diftinguifh in it four ways of knowing.
The Firft is, to know things by themfelves.
The Second, to know them by their Idea's; that
is, in the Senfe I take it here, by fomething that is dif-
ferent from them.
The Third, to know them by Confcience, or by
Internal Sentiment.
The Fourth, to know them by Conjedlure.
Things are known by themfelves, and without
Idea's, when being very Intelligible, they are able to of feeing
Penetrate the Mind, or Difcover themfelves to it. things.
Things are known by their Idea's, when they are not
Intelligible of themfelves, either beciufe they are Cor-
poreal, or becaufe they cannot penetrate the Mind,
or difcover themfelves to it. We know all thofe things
by Confcience which are not diftinguifh'd from us.
Laltly, we know thofe things by Conjedture which
D d d 4 are
5^ A Search after Truth. Book III.
are different from us, and from thofe that are known
of themfelves, and by Idea's, when we think that
Ibme things are like unto others which we know.
II. How we God only is known by himfelf: for though
know God. there are other Spiritual Beings befides hiinfelf, which
feem to be Intelligible by their Nature, there are none
at prefent but he only, which penetrate the Mind,
and difcover themfelves to it. We only fee God with
a dircdt and immediate Sight. Perhaps he only can
diredt the Mind by his own Subftance. Laftly, in this
Life it is only by the Unipn we have with him that
we are capable of knowing what we know, as we
Humanis Ihewn in the preceding Chapter: For he is our
mentibus Matter, that prefides in our Mind, according to
nulla inter- without the Mediation of any Creature.
pofita na- can never conceive, that any thing that is Cre-
tura ated Ihould be able to reprcfent Infinity ; that the un-
de. Aug. 1. limited Being, the immenfe Being, the univerfal Being
de Vera can be perceiv'd by an Idea; that is, by a particular
Religione, Being, by a Being different from the Univerfal and
d'55- Infinite Being. But as for particular Beings, it is not
difficult to conceive, that they may be reprefented by
the Infinite Being which includes them, and which in-
eludes them after a Spiritual and contequently very
intelligible manner. Therefore it is neceffary to fay,that
we know God by himfelf, notwithftanding the know-
kdge we have of^ him in this Life is very imper-
fedt; and that we know Corporeal Things by their
Idea's, that is, in God ; fince God only includes the
Intelligible World, in which we find the Idea's of all
things.
But though all things may be feen in God, it
does not follow that we fee them all in him: We
only fee fuch things in God of which we have
Idea's ; and there are things which are feen with-
Out Idea's.
in How things that are in this World, of which we
T^e know have foine Knowledge, are either Bodies or Spirits ;
Bodies. proprieties of Bodies, or proprieties of Spirits. No
body can queftion but that we fee Bodies with their
Proprieties by their Idea's i becaufe not being Intelli-
gible
Chap. VII, ^ Search after Truth. 57
gible in themfelves, we can only fee them in the Be-
ing whichlhcTudes them after an intelligible manner.
Thus it is in God, and by their Idea's that we lee Bo-
dies with their Proprieties ; and for that reafon the
knowledge we have of them is very perfedl: I mean
the Idea we have of Extenlion is fulficient to make
us know all the Proprieties which Extenlion is capa-
hie of; and we can never delire to have a more
diftind: and fuller Idea of Extenlion of Figures and
Morions than that which God gives us of them.
Whereas the Idea's of the things which are in God,
include all their Proprieties, whoever fees their Idea'sj
may fucceflively have all their Proprieties: For when
we fee things as they are in God, we fee them always
after a very perfedl manner ; and it would be inli-
nitely perfect, if the Mind that fees them there were
Infinite. That which is wanting in the knowledge we
have of Extenlion of Figures and Motions, is not a
defe(51: of the Idea which reprefents it, but of our Mind
which conliders it.
It is not fo with the Soul, we do not knoWj^.
it by its Idea : We do not fee it in God; we only^^'
know it by Confcience; and therefore the know-
ledge we have of it is imperfecT. We know no more
of our Soul, than what we feel palfes within us.
Had we never felt Pain, Heat, Light, (3c. we could
not know whether our Soul would be capable of them,
becaufe we do nor know it by its Idea. But did we
fee in God the Idea which anfwers to our Soul, we
Ihould know at the fame time, or might know, all the
properties it is capable of: As we know all the Proper-
ties that Extenlion is capable of ^ bccaufe we do know
Extenlion by the Idea of it.
It is true, we know by our Confcience, or by the
Internal Senfe we have of our felves, that our Soul is
lomething that is Great : But it may be, that which
we do know of it is hardly any thing of what it is
initfelf. If we had no more knowledge of Matter
than that of Twenty or Thirty Figures it had been
modified into, certainly we Ih.ould hardly know any
thing of it, in comparifon of what we do know by
A Search after Truth. Book 111.
the Idea which reprefents it. It is not therefore
fufficient to have a perfecfl: knowledge of the Soul,
to know what we do know of it by the Internal
Senfe alone; fince the Confcience we have of our
felves, perhaps only (hews us the leaft part of our
Being.
It may be concluded from what has been faid, that
though we know the Exiftence of our Soul more di-
ftindtly than the Exiftence of our Body, and of thofe
that are about us, yet we have not fo perfedl a know-
ledge of the Nature of the Soul, as of the Nature of
Bodies ; and may ferve to reconcile the different Opi-
nions of thofe that fay nothing is better known than
the Soul; and of thofe that maintain, there is nothing
of which they have lefs knowledge.
It may alfo ferve to prove, that the Idea's which
reprefent fome External thing to us, are not ModiSca-
tions of our Soul. For if the Soul faw all things in
confidering its own Modifications, it would know its
Effence or Nature more clearly than that of Bodies ;
and all the Senfations or Modifications it is capable
of, than the Figures or Modifications which Bodies are
capable of. Neverthelefs, it does not find that it is
capable of fuch a Senfation by the fight it has of it
ielf, but only by Experience: Whereas it knows,
that Extenfion is capable of an infinite number of Fi-
gures, by the Idea ic has of Extenfion. Moreover,
there are certain Senfations, as Colours and Sounds,
which moft Men cannot difcover, whether or no they
are Modifications of the Soul; and Men know all
manner of Figures by the Idea they have of Extenfi^
on to be the Modification of Bodies.
What I have faid, alfo (hows the Reafon.why it
is ImpoiTible to give a Definition that may explain
the Modifications of the Soul; for fince we neither
know the Soul, nor the Modifications of it by Idea's,
but only by Senfations; and that fuch Senfations of
Bleafure, for inftance, of Pain, of Heat, C2?c. are not
tied to words 5 it is evident, that if a Man had never
feen Colours, nor felt Heat, it would be impoflible
to make him Senfible of thofe Senfations, by what-
ever
chap. V11. -A Search after Truth, 59
ever Definitions we could give him in order thereunto.
Now Men having only their Senfations upon the ac-
count of the Body, and their Bodies not being difpos*d
in the fatrie manner in all of them, it often happens
that words are Equivocal; that thofe which are ufed
to expreis the Modifications of our Souls, fignifie
quite contrary to what we defign; and we often
make Men think on Birternefs, for Example, when
we defign to make them think on Sweetnefs.
Although we have not a full Knowledge of our
Soul, that which we have by Confcience fufiices to
demonftrate the Immortality, Spirituality, Liberty and
fome other Attributes of it, which it is neceCfary we
(hould know: And for that reafon God does not give
us the Knowledge of it by its Idea, as he gives us the
Knowledge of B^ies. 'Tis true, The Knowledge we
have of our Souls by our Confcience is Imperfedt,
but it is not Faife: The Knowledge, on the contrary,
which we have of Bodies by Senfation or Confcience,
(if we may call the Senfation of what palfes in our
Body ConfcienceJ is not only Imperfedt, but Fal/e.
Therefore it was necelfary we (hould have an Idea
of Bodies to corredf the Senfations we have of them :
But we do not ftand in need of the Idea of our Soul,
fince the Confcience we have of it does not engage us
into Error: And not to be deceiv'd in the Knowledge
of it, it is fufficient not to Confound it with the Body,
which our Reafon might induce us to do. In fine.
Had we bad a clear Idea of the Soul, like unto that
we have of the Body, that Idea would have made us
confider it too much, as feparated from it. And thus
it would have leflen'd the Union of our Soul with
our Body, by hindering us from looking upon it, as
being difiiis'd through all our Members, which I (hall
explain no farther. V.Ho
Of all the Obj€<fts of our Knowledge, there only ^"9®
remains the Souls of other Men, and the Pure Intelli-
gences; and it is evident that we only know them by
Conjedlure. We know them now neither in them-
felves, nor by their Idea's; and as they are diftin<ft
fcom us, it is impofiTible that we (hould know them
by
A Search after Truth. Book III.
by Gjnfcience: We conjedlure that the Souls of other
Men are of the fame Species with ours ; we think
they feel what we feel in our felves ; and even when
thofe Senfations have no relation to the Body, we,are
certain that we are not deceivM : Becaufe we fee in
God certain Idea's, and certain Immutable Laws, ac-
cording to which we know certainly that God adls
equally in all Spirits.
I know that two and two are four, that it is better
to be Juft than Rich ; and I am not miftaken in be-
lieving that others know thofe Truths as well as my
felf. I love Good and Pleafure, I hate Evil and Pain,
I would be Happy; and I am not miftaken in be-
lieving that Men, Angels, and even Devils, have thefe
Inclinations. I know moreover, that God will never
Create any Spirits, but what will defire to be Happy,
or that can ever defire to be Unhappy: But I know
it with Evidence and Certainty, becaufe God tells me
fb: For who but God could give a Knowledge of the
Defigns and Will of God} But when the Body has
any Share in what pafTes within me, I am for the
moft part miftaken, in judging of others by my felf.
I feel Heat, I fee fuch a Magnitude, fuch a Colour ;
I relifh fuch a Tafte at the approach of certain Bodies:
I am deceiv'd, when I judge of others by my felf.
I am fubjetft to certain Paflions, I have a Kindnefs or
Averfion for fuch or fuch things; and I fancy that
others are like me; my Conjedfure is often Falfe.
Thus the Knowledge we have of other Men, is very
liable to Error, when we judge of them by the Senfa-
tions we have of our felves.
If there be any Beings different from God, from
our felves, from Bodies, and from Pure Spirits, it is
unknown to us: We have much ado to perfwade our
felves that there are any fuch: And after having ex-
amin'd the Reafons of certain Philofophers who pre-
tend the contrary, we have found them Falfe ; which
has confirm'd us in our former Opinion, that being
all Men of the fame Nature, we had all the fame
Idea's^ becaufe it behoves us all to know the fame
things.
CHAP.
chap. VIII. A Search after Truth*
CHAP. VIII.
I, The Jntmate Trefence of the Wandering Idea
0/Being in General^ is the Caufe of all the
Irregular AhflraWions of the Mind^ and of the
greateft part of the Chimera's of common Philo-
Jophy^ which hinder many Thilofophers from dif-
covering the Solidity of the True Principles of
Moral Philofophy, II. Example concerning the
Ejfence of Matter.
E clear, intimate, neceflary Prefence of God ,
fl mean the Unlimited, Infinite, and General
Beingj with the Mind of Man, adts with more Force
upon it, than the Prefence of all Finite Objedfs.
It is impoflible that it fhould abfolutely lay afide that
general Idea of Being, becaufe it cannot fubfift out of
God. Perhaps fome might urge, that it may wander
from it, bccaufe it may think on thofe particular
Beings; but they would be miftaken : For when the
Mind confiders any Being in particular, it is not fo
far from removing from God, that it rather draws
near, if I may lb fpeak, to fome of his Perfedtions, in
removing from all others: However it removes from
them in fuch a manner, that it never wholly lofes the
fight of them, and it is for the moft part in a Condi-
tion to feek them out, and to draw near to them.
They are always prefent to the Mind, but the Mind
only perceives them in an inexplicable Confiifion,
becaule of its fmallnefs, and the greatnefs of its Idea
of Being. We may chance fometimes not to think on
our felves; but I believe we cannot fubhlt one Mo-
ment without thinking on Being ; and even at that
very time when we fancy we think on nothing, we
are of neceiTity full of the wandering and general
Idea of Being. But whereas thofe things that are
very ufual in us, and which do not concern us, do
nor excite the Mind with any force; nor -Cfblig-s
it
62 ^ Seirch after Truth. Book IIL
it to make any Reflecflion upon them; this Idea of
Beings fo Great, fo Vaft, fo Real, and fo Pofitive as
it is, is yet familiar to us, and touches us fo little,
that we almoft believe we do not fee it; that we do
not refledf upon it; that we afterwards judge there is
but little Reality in it; and that it is only form'd by
the confus'd mixture of all particular Idea's: Though
on the contrary, it is in that alone, and by that alone,
that we perceive all Beings in particular.
Although that Idea, which we receive by the im-
mediate Union we have with the TVord of God, does
never deceive us in it felf, like thofe which we receive
from it by means of the Union we have with our
Body, which reprefent things to us different from
what they are: Yet I am not afraid to fay, that we
make fo ill a ufe of the beft things, that the indelible
Frefence of that Idea is one of the principal Caufes
of all the Irregular Abftradfions of the Mind; and con-
fequently of that Abftradfed and Chimerical Philo-
fophy, which explains all Natural Effedts by general
Terms of Adl, Power, Caufe, Effedl, Suftantial
Forms, Faculties, occult Qualities, Sympathy, Anti-
pathy, for it is certain that all thofe Terms, and
many others, never excite any Idea's in the Mind, but
fuch as are Wandering and General; that is, of thofe
Idea's which prefent themfelves to the Mind of their
own accord, without Pain, or any Application on our
part.
Let Men read with all Attention imaginable, all the
Definitions and Explications which are given of Sub-
ftantial Forms: Let them carefully inquire wherein
the Eflence of all thofe Entities does confift, which
Philofophers fancy as they pleafe, and in fo great a
Number, that they are oblig'd to make feveral Divi-
Eons and Sub divifions of them ; and I am confident
that they will never ftir up any other Idea's in their
Mind of all thofe things, than that of Beings and of
Cmfe in General.
For this is what commonly happens to Philofophers:
They fee fome new EfFedf j they immediately ima-
gine a new Being to produce it. Fire warms j there-
fore
Chap.VIIL A Search after Truth.
fore there is fome Being in the Fire which produces
that Effedh that is different from the matter which
compofes the Fire : And whereas Fire is capable of
feveral different Effeds ; as of feparating Bodies, of
reducing them to Afhes and into Earth ; of drying
them, hardning them, foftning them, dilating them,
purifying them, ^c. they liberally allow Fire as many
Faculties or real Qualities, as it is capable of producing
different Effeds.
But thofe that refled on the Definitions they give
of thofe Faculties, will eafily difcover that they are
only Logical Definitions, and that they excite no other
Idea's than that of Being, and of Caufe in General,
which the Mind compares with the Effed which is
produced: So that Men are not the more Learned,
after having ftudied them very much; for all they get
by that kind of Study, is, that they imagine they
know better than others, what they notwithftanding
do not know near fo well^ not only becaufe they
admit many Beings which never were, but alfo be-
caufe being prejudiced, they make themfelves incapa-
ble of conceiving, how it can be poffible that matter
alone, as that of Fire, being moved againff Bodies
differently difpofed, fliould produce all the different
Effeds which we fee Fire does produce.
It is Notorious to all thofe that have read a little,
that moft of the Books of Sciences, particularly thofe
that treat of Natural Philofophy, Phyfick, Chymiftry,
and all the particular things of Nature, are full of
Arguments grounded upon Elementary Qualities, Se-
cond Caufes, as Attradive , Retentive , Digeftive,
Expulfive , and fuch like; upon others they call oc-
cult; upon Specifick Virtues, and upon feveral Beings
which Men compofe out of the General Idea of Being,
and that of the Caufe of the Effed which they fee ;
which feems not poffible to happen, unlefs by the
Faculty they have of confidering the Idea of the Being
in General, which is ever prefent to their Mind ,
by the Infinite Prefence of him that includes all
Beings,
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64
j4 Search after Truth. Bookllf.
If common Philofophers would content themfelves
with publifliing their Natural Philofophy barely as a
Logick, which would fiirnilh proper Terms to fpeak
of the things of Nature ; and if they would let thofe
alone that fix diftincSt and particular Idea's to thofe
Terms in order to be underftood, no body would
find fault with their proceeding. But they even pre-
tend to explain Nature by general and abftradfed
Idea's, as if Nature were Abftradled. And they will
needs have it, that their Mader Ariftotles Natural
Philofophy is a real Natural Philofophy,which through-
ly explains things, and not meerly a Logick ; though
it contains nothing that is tolerable, befides fome wan-
dering Definitions, and fome Terms that are fo general,
that they may ferve for all forts of Philofophy. Laftly,
They are fo ftrangely conceited with all thofe Ima-
ginary Beings, and wandering undetermined Idea's,
which naturally arife within their Mind, that they
n. Of the ure Incapable of fixing their Mind long enough to
EJfence of confider the real Idea's of things, fo as to difcover the
Matter. Solidity and Evidence of them. And this is the true
Jf thatDe- Caufe of the extream Ignorance they are in, as to the
fmition is true Principles of Natural Philofophy. It is convenient
recei'v^d of g^ye fome Proofs of it.
^emrd Philofophers do partly agree. That we ought
thereff^^ to look upon that as the Efience of a thing, which we
abfoluteh acknowledge to be the firft in that thing, that which is
demonjlra- lufoparable from it, and on which the Properties that
ted: 7/="/r2gree to it do depend. So that to difcover wherein
he not re- the Efifence of Matter does confilt, we muft look upon
ceinjd, it all the Properties that are agreeable to it, or which are
9nly re- included in the Idea we have of it; as Hardnefs, Soft-
7nains a nefs, Fluidity, Motion, Kelt, Figure, Divifibility ,
quefiion o/Impenetrability and Extenfion, in order to confider
Name, to which of all thefe Attributes is Infeparable from it.
f, • Therefore lince Fluidity, Hardnefs, Softnefs, Motion,
^ ra" 7 Reft, may be feparated from Matter, fince there are
^Mmce ^of Several Bodies that are without Hardnefs, Fluidity,
theMatier Softnefs, that are not in motion ; or laftly, that are
ratheri\ R^ft • It follows dearly, that all thofe Attributes
are not Eflential to it.
or
cannot be
tptefio'iid.
But
":frc
u
Chap. VIII. ^ Search after Truth, 65
But there ftill remains four which we do conceive
to be Infeparable from Matter, Figure, Divi-
fibility. Impenetrability and Extenfion: So that in
order to fee which is the Attribute that is to be taken
for the Eflence, wemult no longer think of dividing
them,bur only to examine which is the hrft, and which
fuppofes ho other. It is eahiy apprehended, that
Figure, Divifbility, and Impenetrab lity, fuppofes Ex-
tenfion, and that Extenfion fuppofes nothing; but as
foon as it is given, Divilibility, Impenetrability> and
Figure are given. Therefore we mulf conclude, That
Extenfion is the Eflence of Matter, fuppofing it has
only the Attributes we have mentioned , or others
like them ; and 1 do not believe that any body
in the World can queftion it, after ferious Confide-
ration.
But the Difficulty is to know, whether Matter has
not fome other Attributes different from Extenfion,
and from thofe that depend on it: So that Extenfion
it felf is not Effential to it, but fuppofes fomething
that may be the Subjedt and Principle of it.
Several Perfons, after having attentively confider'd
the Idea they had of Matter by all its known Attri-
butes; and after having likewife meditated on the
Effeds of Nature, as much as the Powers and Capa-
city of the Mind will permit, have been ftrongly per-
fwaded that Extenfion fuppofes nothing in Matter
whether it be that they have not had a diftindf and
particular Idea of that thing which naay be believed
to precede Extenfion, or whether they have feen no
Effed to prove that thing.
For, as to be perlwaded, that a Watch has no being
different from the Matter whereof it is compofed, it
is fufficient to know, how the different difpoficion of
ihe Wheels, can produce all the Motions of a Watch,,
without having any diftind Idea of that which might
bethecaufe of thole Motions, though feveral Logical
ones might be given: So becaufe thofe Perfons have
no diftind Idea of that thing which might be in mac-
ter, if Extenfion were taken from it s becaufe they
Ifc no Attribute to difcover ir 3 and becaufe, if Ex-
E e e ' lenuou
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66 j4 Search after Truth, Book III,
tenfion be given, all the Attributes which we con-
ceive to belong to Matter, are given; and alfo that
Matter is the caufe of no Effed, but fuch as we may
conceive Extenfion differently configur'd, and diverfly
agitated may produce ; from whence they perfwade
themfelves that Extenfion is the EfTence of the Matter.
But whereas "Men have no certain Demonftration,
that there is no Intelligence or new Being created in
the Wheels of a Watch : So no body can, without a
particular Revelation, aflert as a Geometrical Demon-
ftration, that there is nothing in a Stone befides Ex-
tenfion diverfly configufd: For Extenfion may abfo-
lutely be joyn'd with fomething elfe which we do not
conceive, becaufe we have no Idea of it: Though it
feems very unreafonable to believe and affirm it; fince
It is unreafonable to affirm what we neither know or
conceive.
Ne\'erthclefs though we fhould fuppofej that there
is fomething befides Extenfion in Matter, that would
not hinder fif rightly obferv'd) Extenfion from being
the EfTence of it, according to the Definition we have
given of that Word. For it is abfblutely neceffary that
whatever is in the World, fhould be either a Being,
or the manner of a Being ; an attentive Mind cannot
deny it. Now Extenfion is not the manner of a
Being ; therefore 'tis a Being. But whereas Matter
is not a Compofition of feveral Beings, like Man,
who is compofed of Body and Mind ; fince Matter
is but one Being only, it is evident that Matter is only
Extenfion.
Now to prove that Extenfion is not the manner of
a Being, but that it is really a Being, we muft ob-
ferve that the manner of a Being cannot be conceiv'd,
unlefs the Being, of which it is the manner, be con-
ceiv'd at the fame time : It is impofifible, for Example,
TO conceive Roundnefs without conceiving Extenfion,
becaufe the manner of a Being, is nothing but the
Being it felf To modified : The roundnefs of Wax, for
inftance, being nothing but the Wax it felf fo modified,
it's evident that we cannot poffibly conceive the man-
uer whhouj ^ Being, Therefore if Extenfion were
the
y
Chap.VIIt. A Search after Truth,
the manner of a Being, we could not conceive this
Exrenfion Without that Being, of which this Excenhon
(hould be the manner. Neverthelefs it is ealily con-
ceiv'd by it felf. Therefore it is not the manner of
any Being, and confequently it is a Being it felf.
Thus it proves the Eiience of Matter, fince Matter is
only one Being, and not a Coriipound of divers Beings
as abovefaid.
But many Philofophers are fo wedded to general
Idea's, and Logical Entities, that their Mind is more
taken up with them, than with thofe that are Parti-
cular, Diftindt and Phyhcai. This is fulHciently appa-
rent, in that their Arguments upon Natural Things,
are only grounded upon Notions of Logick, A(^ and
Power, and of an Infinite Number of Imaginary
Entities, which they do not diftinguiih from thofe that,
are Real. Therefore thole Men finding a wonderful
Eacility of feeing according to their own way, what
they have a mind to fee, fancy that they fee better
than others; and that they fee diitindfly that Exten-
Eon fuppoles fomething, and that it is only a Propriety
of Matter, of which it may even be divelted.
Neverthelefs, when they are defir'd to explain that^
thing, which they pretend to fee in Tvlatter belides
Extenfion, they do it in different ways, which all
fhew that they have no other Idea of it than that of
Being, or of Subftance in General. This appears
clearly to thole that ob'ferve, that the faid Idea in-
dudes no particular Attributes which are proper to
Matter. For in removing Extenfion from Matter,
they take away all the Attributes and all the Pro-
prieties which we diftindlly conceive do belong to it,
although one Ihould leave that thing which they fancy
to be the ElTence of it: It is vifible that they could
neither make a Heaven nor Earrh of it, nor any thing
that we fee. And on the contrary, in removing what
they fancy to be the Effence of Matter, provided Ex-
tenlion be left, we leave all the Attributes and all the
Proprieties, which we conceive to be dilfirKSfly in-
duded in the Idea of Matter : For it is certam, that
with Exteiilioh done may be form'd'a'Heaven,' an
S € e 2;
Search after Truth. Book III.
Earth, and all the vihble World, befides an infinite
Number of others. Therefore, that fomething which
they fuppofe befides Excenfion, having no Attributes,
which can be diftindlly conceiv'd to belong to it, and
which are clearly included in the Idea we have of it,
is nothing real, if we believe Reafon ^ and it can be
of no ule to explain Natural Effcdls. And what they
urge, that it is the SuhjeH, and the Prmcifle of Ex-
tenfion is fpoken at random, without conceiving di-
Itindfly what they fay ; that is, without having any
other Idea thereof, than a General or Logical one, as
of SuhjeH and Principle.
So that one might ftill imagine a new SuhjeEi, and a
new Principle of that Subjedf of Extenfion, and thus on
ad Infinitum ; becaufe the Mind reprefents to it felf
general Idea's of SubjeB^ and of Principles^ as it
pleafes.
Indeed it's very probable, that Men would never
have obfcur d the Idea they have of Matter fo much,
unlefs they had had feme Reafons for it ; and feVeral
maintain Sentiments contrary to ours, through Prin-
ciples of Divinity. Without doubt Extenfion is not
the Elfence of Matter, if that be contrary to Faith,
we grant it. We are. Thanks be to God, fully per-
fwaded of the Weaknefs and Limitation of the Hu-
mane Mind. We very well know, that it has too
little Extent to mealure an Infinite Power; That God
can do Infinitely more than we can conceive; That
he only gives us Idea's to know things that happen
according to the Order of Nature, but he conceals the
reft from us. Therefore we are ever ready to fubmit
our Mind to Faith; but there muft be better Proofs
than thofe that are commonly alledg'd, to deftroy the
Reafons abovefaid, becaufe the manner of Explaining
the Myfteries of Faith, is not of Faith, and they are
believ'd, even without apprehending that the manner
of them can ever be clearly explain'd.
We believe, for Example, the Myftery of the
Trinity, though the Humane Mind cannot conceive it;
and neverthelefs we believe, that things which do not
differ from the fame Thirds do not differ among them-
" -. fejyes ;
Chap.VlII. A Search after Truth,
felves; though this Propofition feems to deftroy ft.
For we are perfwaded that we muft never make ufe
of our Mind, unlefs on Subjedls that are proportioned
to its Capacity ; and we muft not look fixedly on
Myfteries, for fear of being dazled by them, according
to this Advertifement of the Holy Ghoft: fcru-
tutor eji Majefiatis opprimetur a Gloria.
Neverthelefs, if it were thought proper, for the
Satisfacftion of (ome Men, to explain how far the
Opinion we have of Matter, agrees with what Faith
reaches us about Tranfubftantion, we might perhaps
do it clearly and diftindlly enough , and without
offending the Decifions of the Church; but we are of
Opinion, that we may very well forbear making that
Explication, efpecially in this Work.
For we muft obferve, that the Holy Fathers have
mortly fpoken of that Myftery, as of an Incomprehen-
fible Myftery; that they have not Philofophis'd to
explain it; and that commonly they have only us'd
Comparifons that have not much Exatftnefs in them j
fitter to difcover the Docftrine, than to give an Expla-
nation that might fatisfie the Mind : So that Tradi-
tion is for thofe who do not Philofophife upon that
Myftery, and who fubmit their Mind to Faith, with-
out puzzling themfelves to no purpofe in thofe difficulc
Queftions.
Therefore it would be unreafonable to defire Philo-
fophers to give clear and eafie Explanations of the
manner how the Body of Jefm Cbriji is in the Eucha-
rift; for that would be to defire them to tell No-
velties in Divinity. And fhould Philofophers Impru-
dently anfwer that Queftion, they could not avoid the
Condemnation either of their Philofophy, or of Divi-
nity : For if their Explanations were Obfcure, the
Principles of their Philofophy would be defpis'd ; and
fhould their Anfwer prove clear or eafie. Men would
reafosably fufpedf the Novelty of their Divinity.
Since then Novelty, in Point ofDivinity> bears the
Charadter of Error, and that Men have a Right to
defpife Opinions, only becaufe they are new, and have
no Foundation in Tradition 5 we ought not to under-
E e e 3 take
A Search after Truth, Booklfi-
take to give eafie and intelligible Explanations of
things, which the Fathers and the Councils have not
fully explain'd ; and it is fufHcient to believe the
Do<^rine of Tranfubftantiation, without pretending
to explain the manner of it. For otherwife we (bould
fpread Seeds of new Difputes and Quarrels, of which
there are but too many already ; and the Enemies of
Truth would not fail to make a malicious ufe of it to
opprefs their Adverfaries.
Difputes in Point of Explanations of Divinity, feem
to me to be the moft Ufeiefs and the molt Dangerous ;
and they are the more to be feafd, by reafon that even
Pious Perfons think themfelves obliged to break the
Bonds of Charity with thofe that are not of their Opi-
nion. "We have but too many Inftances of it, and the
reafon of it is plain enough. Therefore it is always
the belt and fafeft way, not to be over-hafty in fpeak-
ing of things of which we have no Evidence, and
which others are not difpofed to conceive.
Neither mull obfcure and uncertain Explanations qf
the Myfteries of Faith, ferve us as a Rule and Prin-
ciple to reafon in Philofophy, in which nothing but
Evidence ought to perfwade us. We miift not change
the dear and diftind: Idea s of Extenfion, Figure, and
Local Motion, for thefe general and confufe Idea's of
Princifies, or of ihtSubjet} of Extenfion, of Form, and
of Quiddities, ot real ^lalities, and of all thofe Mo-
tions of Generation, of Corruption, of Alteration, and
the like, which differ from Local Motion. Real Idea's
produce a Real Science, but the general Idea's of Lo-
gick will never produce any thing but a rambling,
fuperficial and barren Science. Therefore it behoves
us to confider attentively, thofe diltind and particular
idea's of things, in order to difcover the Proprieties
they include; and thus to ftudy Nature, initead of
lofing our felves in Chimera's, which only cxift in the
Opinion of feme Philofophers, - '
CHAP
Chap.IX. A Starch After Truth, 71
CHAP. IX.
L Tht lafi General Cuptft of oar Errors, IL That
the Ideas of things are not always prefent to the
Mind ^ as foon as 'tis defr^d. III. That ail'
Finite Minds are liable to Error, and why.
IV. IVe ought not to judge that there are only
Bodies or Spirits^ nor that God is a Spirit^ as we
conceive Spirits.
\A7 E have.hitherto fpoken of Errors, for which we I. The Uji
can affign (bme occafional Caufe in the Nature General
of the Pure Underftanding, or of the iflind coahder'd, Caufe of
as abfing of it felf, and in the Nature of Idea's, that is, Error»
in the manner how the Mind perceives External
Obje^s. There now remains only to explain a
Caufe, which may be cali'd a Univerfal and General
Caufe of all our Errors, becaufe we conceive no
Error, but what depends in fame meafure on it.
That Caufe is, That Nothing having no Idea to
reprefent it, the Mind is induc'd to believe, that
things it has no Idea of, do not Exift.
It is certain, that the general Source of our Errors,
as we have already often declared, is, becaufe our
Judgments have more Extennon than our Perceptions.
For when we confider feme Object, we commonly
behold it only on one fide, and we are not contented
with judging of fo much as we have confider d, bur
we aifo judge of the whole Objedt. Therefore it
often happens that we are decciv'd, becaulb, though
the thing be true on that part we have examin'd it,
it commonly prbves falfe on the other, and that which
we believe to be true only proves likely. Moreover
it is evident, that we Ihould not judge abfolutely of
things as We do,, if we did not think we had confi-
der'd them ori ail fides, or if we did not fuppofe them
anlwerable to thofe we have examin'd. Therefore the
E e e 4 general
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7^ A Search after Truth. Book III,
general Caufe of our Errors, is, That having no Idea
of the other fides of our Objed:, or of their difference
from that which is prefent to our Mind; we fancy
that thofe other fides are not, or at leaft we fuppofe
that they have no particular difference.
This manner of proceeding feems pretty reafonable
to us: For Nothing forming no Idea's in the Mind,
we have Ibme reatbn to believe, that thofe things
which form no Idea's in the Mind, while they are
examined, refemble Nothing. And that which con-
* firms us in this Opinion, is. That we are perfwaded,
by a kind of Inftind, that the Idea's of things are due
to our Nature, and that they are fubmitted to the
Mind in fuch a manner, that they ought to prefent
themfelves before it, as foon as it defires it.
II. The Neverthelefs-if we did but refied: on the prefent
Ueas of State of our Nature, we fiiould not be fo ready to
things are believe, that we have all the Idea's of things as fix)n
not prefent as we defire them. Man, as I may fay, is only Flefh
xo theMind and Blood fince the Fall. The leaft Impreflion of
his Senfes, and of his PalFons, breaks the ftrongeft
tis dejlra. Attention of his Mind ; and the Courfeof the Spirits,
and of the Blood, draws it away, and drives it con-
nnually towards Senfible Objeds. It often ft rives
in vain againit the Torrent which drives it along;
and 'tis but feldom that it makes any Oppofition ;
for there is too much Delight in following it,
and too much Fatigue to oppole it. Therefore the
Mind is difgufted and finks as foon as it makes the
leaft ElTort to take hold of, and to fix upon
fbme Truth: It is abfolutely Falfe in the State in
which we are, that the Idea's of things are pre-
fent to our Mind whenever we have a Mind to
confider them. Therefore we ought not to judge
that things are not, only becaufe we have no Idea's
of them.
III. AU Ft- But though we ftiould fuppole Man to be ab-
"■ire Minds iblute Matter of his Mind and of his Idea's, he
are L -ble would neverthelefs be lubjecft to Error by his Na-
to Error, tm-g; for the Mind of Man is limited , and a
Mmd
Chap. IX, J Search after Truth. 75
Mind that is lin:iited, is Naturally liable to Error,'
The reafon of it is, the leaft things have many
Relations among themfelves, and nothing but an
Infinite Mind can apprehend them. Therefore a
limited Mind not being able to imbrace, or to
apprehend all thofe Relations, whatever Effort it
makes, is induced to believe, that thofe which it per-
ceives not, do not exift, particularly when we do
not refled on the Weaknefs and Limitation of our
Mind, which is very ufual. Thus the Limitation
of the Mind alone, infers a Capability of falling into
Error.
Neverthelefs, if Men, even in the State of Weak-
nefs and Depravations in which they are , did al-
ways make a good ufe of their Liberty, they would
never be deceiv'd. And therefore all Men that fall
into Error, are juftly blam'd, and deferve to be
punifliM: For if we would not be deceiv'd, we
muft only judge of what we fee, and never make
entire Judgments, but on fuch things which we are
fure we have examin'd in all their parts, which we
can do. But they had rather fubmit to Error, than
to the Rule of Truth ; They will decide without
much difficulty and Examination. Therefore we
need not wonder if they fall into many Errors,and very
often make uncertain Judgments.
Men, for Example, have no other Idea's of Sub- IV. We
ftance, than that of the Mind and Body ; that is,
Of a Subftance that Thinks, and of a Subftance that
is Extended. And from thence they pretend to have ^
a Right to conclude, that whatever Exifts is ®ody
or Spirit: Not that I pretend to affirm, that there
is any Subftance that is neither Body nor Spirit: f gated
For we ought never to affirm, that things Exift fj^at
which we have no Knowledge of ; fince it is to be Q^d is a
thought, that God who does not conceal his Works Sfirit as
from us, would have given us fome Idea's of them.iv^ con-
Neverthelefs I am of Opinion, that we ought uox. ceive
to determine any thing about the Number of Spe-
eies of Beings which God has Created, by the Idea's
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A Semh after Truth, Book III,
we have of them ; fince it is abfolutely pofTible that
God may have Reafons to Conceal them from us,
which we do not know; if it were only becaufe
thofe Beings having no Relation to us, it would be
ufelefs for us to know them : By the fame realbn as
he has not given us Eyes good enough to tell the Teeth
of a Hand-worm, becaufe it is not very material for
the prefervation of our Body, to have fuch a piercing
Sight.
But though we think uo body ought to Judge rafli-
ly, that ail Beings are Spirits or Bodies ; we think ne-
verthelefs, that it is directly contrary to Reafon, that
Philofophers in order to explain Natural EfFedtSjfliould
ufe other Idea's, than thofe that depend on Thought
and Extenfion, fince indeed they are the only we have,
that are diftindl or particular.
Nothing can be more unreafonable, than to imagin
an Infinity of Beings upon bare Idea s of Logick ; to
impute an Infinity of Proprieties to them ; and thus
to endeavour to explain things we do not underhand,
by things which do not only conceive, but which is not
polfible for us to co«ceive. *Tis juft as if the Blind
having a mind to fpeak of Colours among themfelves,
and to maintain a Thefis about them, Ihould in order
thereunto, make ufe of the Definitions which Phiio-
fophers give them, and draw feveral Conclufions from
the fame. For as thofs Blind could only give plealant
and ridiculous Arguments upon Colours, becaufe they
could have no pertcdl Idea's of them, and yet would
argue about them upon General and Logical Idea's :
So Philofophers can never argue folidly upon the Effedls
of Nature, when to that end, they only make ufe of
general Logical Idea's, of Adfc, Power, Being, Caufe,
Principle, Form, Quality, and the like. It is abfolutely
neceflary for them only to rely on diltind: and particu-
lar Idea's of Thought and Extenfion, and thofe they in-
dude, as Figure, Motion, (3c. For it is in vain to pre-
tend to underhand Nature, but by the Confideration
of the diftind Idea's we have of it ^ and it is better
never to meditate, than upon Chimera's,
Never-
kt
Chap.IX. A Search after Truth,
Neverthelefs we cannot affirm that there are only
Bodies and Spirits, Beings that think, and that are ex-
tendedjbecaufe we may be deceived in it. For though
they are fufficient to Explain Nature, and confe-
quently we may conclude without fear of being de-
ceiv'd, that the Natural Things we have fome know-
ledge of, depend on Extenfion and Thought; yet
it is certainly poflible, that there may be others of
which we have no Idea, and of which we fee no
Effedis.
Men therefore Judge ralhly, when they Judge as an
Infallible Principle, that all Subhances are Bodies or
Spirits. But they alfo infer a ra(h Conclufion from
thence, when they conclude by the bare Teftimony
of Reafon that God is a Spirit. It is true, that fince
we are Created after his Image and Likenefs, and that
Holy "Writ teaches us in feveral Places that God is a
Spirit, we ought to believe it, and to call him fo:
But Reafon alone cannot teach it us. That tells
us only that God is a Being infinitely Perfedt; and
that he is rather a Spirit than a Body, fince our
Soul is more perfedl, than our Body: But it does not
affure us that there are no Beings befides more perfedt
than our Spirits ; and more above our Spirits, than
our Spirits are above our Bodies.
Now fuppofing that there were fuch Beings, ( as it
undeniably appears that it was in the power of God
to Create fuch ) it is clear that they would participate
more of the likenefs of God than we do. The fame
Reafon teaches us, that God would fooner have the
Perfedfions of their Beings than ours, which would
only be Imperfedlions compar'd to them. Therefore
we muft not Judge ralhly, that the word Spirit which
we ufe to exprefs what God is^ and what we are, is
an Equivocal Term, which fignifies the fame things,
or things that are very like. God is more above Cre-
ated Spirits, than thofe Spirits are above Bodies; and
we ought not fo much to call God a Spirit to (hew
pofitively what he is, as to (ignifie that he is not Mate-
rial. He is a Being infinitely Perfedt, no body can
que-
A Search after Truth. Book III.
queftion it. But as we tnuft not imagiti with the Ati'
thropomorphites^ that he muft have a Human Figure,
becaufe it feems to be moft perfecfl, although we fliould
fuppofe him Corporeal, neither muft we imagin that
the Spirit of God has any Human Thoughts: And
that his Spirit is like unto ours, becaufe we know no-
thing that is more perfecft than our Spirit. We muft
rather believe, that as he poflefles the Perfedtions of
Matter without being Material, fince it is certain that
Matter has a relation to fome Perfedtions that are in
God; he alfo poflefles the Perfedfions of Created Spi-
rits, without being a Spirit in the manner as we con-
ceive Spirits: That his Name is. He that is ; that is,
the unlimited Being, the All-Being, the Infinite and
Univerfal Being.
CHAP.
Chapi X. j1 Search after Truth*
CHAP. X.
Examfles of feme Phyjtcal Errors^ into which 7l/fen
fall J becanfe they fupfofe that things which
differ in their Nature^ Qualities^ Extenjion^
Ear at ion, and proportion , are alike in all
things.
"I/^E have feen in the preceding Chapter, that Mcr
Judge raflily, when they judge that all Beings
are only of two forts, Spirits or Bodies. "We will (hew
in the following, that their Judgments are not only
rafh, but alfo very falfe, which are the principles of
an infinite number of Errors, when they Judge that
Beings are not different in their Relations nor Man-
ners, becaufe they have no Idea's of thofe diffc-
fences.
It is moft certain, that the Mind of Man only looks
for the relations of Things; firft thofe which the Ob-
jeds it confiders may have with it; and in the next
place, thofe they have towards one another. For the
Mind of Man only feeks its Good and Truth. In
order to find its Good, it carefully confiders by Rea-
fon, and by Tafte or Senfation, whether Obrjeds
have a Relation of agreement with it. To difcover
the Truth, it confiders whether Objeds have a Rela-
tion of Equality, or of Likenefs one with another, or
what is the exadt meafure of their Inequality. For
as Good is only the good of the Mind, becaufe it is
convenient for it: So Truth is only Truth by the
Relation of Equality, or of Likenefs that is found be-
tween two or many things: Whether between two or
many Objeds, as between a Yard and Cloth ; for it
is true that this Cloth holds out a Yard, becaufe there
h an Equality between the Yard and the Cloth: Whe-
ther between Two, or many Idea's, as between the
two Idea's of Three and Three, and that of Six ; for
it
X'
A Search after Truth. Book lij.
it is true that three and three are Six, becaufe there
is an Equality between the two Idea's of Three and
Three, and that of Six: Laftly, Whether between •
Idea's and Things, when the Idea's reprefent what the
Things are: For when I fay that there is a Sun, my
propofition is True ; becaufe the Idea's I have of Ex-
iftence, and of the Sun, reprefent that the Sun does
leally Exift. So that all the Adlion, and all the
Attention of the Mind upon Objed:s , is only in
order to endeavour to difcover the Relations of
them, fince Men only apply themfelves to Things,
that they may difcover the Truth or Goodnefs of
ihem.
But as we have already noted in the preceding'
Chapter, Attention Fatigues the Mind. It is foon
rir'd with refilting the Impreflion of the Senfes which
removes it from its Objedt, and leads it to others,
which the LoVe it has to its Body renders agreeable to
it. It is extreamly limited ; and thus the differences
which are between the Subjecfls which it Examins,
being Infinite, or almoft Infinite, it is not capable to
diffinguifh them. The Mind therefore fuppofes Ima-
ginary Refemblances, in which it obfetves no pofirive
and real differences : The Idea's of Refemblance be-
ihg more prefent to it, more familiar, and plainer than
others. For it is plain, that Refemblance includes
but one Relation; and that one Idea is fufficient to
Judge that a Thoufand Things are alike: Whereas
in order to Judge without fear of being deceiv'd, that
a Thoufand Objedfs are different among therrifelves,
it is abfolutely necelfary to have a Thoufand different
Idea's prefent to the Mind.
Therefore Men imagin that things of a different
Nature are of the fame Nature ; and that all things
ot the fame Species Icarce differ from one another.
They Judge that unequal things are Equal; that thole
that are Inconftant are Conftant; and that thofe that
are without Order and Proportion, are well order'd
and proportion'd. In a word, they often think that
Things i^at are different in Nature, Qualityj Exten-
f, t
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I Chap.X. A Search after Truth,
K? fion> Duration, and ProportioB, are alike in all thofe
'a things. But that deferves to be explain'd more at
^ large by fome Examples, becaufe it occafions many
ji: Errors.
3,: The Mind and Body, the Subftance which Thinks,
H and that which is Extended, are two kinds of Being
altogether different, and diredly oppofite: What is
II2 proper for the one, is improper for the other. Never-
ijy; thelefs, moft Men refleding but little on the Idea they
li I have of Thought, and being continually atfeded with
tijjj Bodies, look upon the Soul and Body as one and the
iff fame thing : Imagining a Refemblance between
two things that are different.. They fancy the Soul
^ to be Material, that is, Extended throughout the
whole Body, and Figufd like the Body. They
1,1^ impute that to the Mind, which only fuits with the
jV. Body.
Moreover, Men being fenfible of Pleafure, Pain,
Odours, Taftes, and their Body being more pre-
fent to them than their Soul: That is, eafily imagin-
ing their Body, and not being able to imagin their
/jjj. Soul, they attribute to it the faculties of Feeling,
Imagining, and even fometimes of Conceiving ; which
can only belong to the Soul. But the following Exam-
fnh more fenfible.
Qjg It is certain that all Natural Bodies, even thofe that
arecaird Species, differ one from another ; that Gold
is not abfolurely like Gold ; and that one drop of Wa-
j ter is different from another. It is with all Bodies of
the fame Species, as it is with Faces. All Faces have
Eyes, a Nofe, a Mouth, they are all Faces, and Mens
Faces; and yet there never were two perfedhly alike.
So a piece of Gold has parts like unto another piece
^ of Gold; and a drop of Water has undoubtedly a
great Refemblance with another drop of Water : Ne-
vcrtheleis one may alfirm, that it is impoffible to give
eih: two drops of it, though taken out of the fame River,
ideiu psrfedly alike. And that Philofophers inconfiderably
i ds: i^ppofe Eflential Refemblances betweeo Bodies of the
lame Species, or Refemblances which confiif in Indi-
\ ' -■ - -- yiftbiUty;
A Sednh after Truth, Book IlL
vifibility 5 for the Eflences of Things confift in an In-
divifjhie, according to their Falfe Opinions.
The Reafon of their falling into (6 grofs an Error,
is, becaufe they will not confider thofe things carefully,
upon which they neverthelels COmpofe large Volumes.
For as Men do not allow a perfecfi Refemblance be-
tween Faces, becaufe they obferve them nearly ; and
the habit of diftinguilhing them, makes us obferve the
ieaft differences in them: So, if Philofophers would
conffder Nature with feme Attention, they would dif-
cover a fufHcient number of Caufes of Diverfity in
thofe very things, which produce the fame Senfations
in us, and which for that reafon we fay> are of the
fame Species ; nor would they fo eafily fuppofe Eflen-
tial Refemblances. Blind Men would be to blame,
in fuppofing an Eflential Refemblance between Faces
which ffiould confift in Indivifibility, becaufe they do
not fenCbly perceive the differences of them : There-
fore Philofophers ought nor to fuppofe fuch Refem-
blances in Bodies of the fame Species, becaufe they
obferve no difference in them,' by the Senfations they
have of them.
The Inclination we have to fuppofe a Refemblance
in Things, inclines us alfo to believe, that there is a
determin'd number of Differences and Forms ; and
that thofe Forms are neither capable of more or lefs.
We Fancy that all Bodies differ one from another, as
it were by degrees: That thofe very Degrees obferve
certain Proportions among them: In a word, we
Judge of Material Things as of Numbers.
It is clear, the Reafon of all this is, that the
Mind lofes it felf in the Relations of Inccmmenfura-
ble Things, fuch as Infinite Differences are, which are
not within Natural Bodies, and that it pleafes it felf
when it imagins fome Refemblance, or fome Proper-
tion among them ; becaufe then it reprefents feveral
things to it felf with a great deal of Eafe. For as I
haue already faid, one Idea is fufHcient to Judge that
feveral things are alike, and there muft be feveral to
Judge that they are different from one another. For
inftancCj
m
Chap. X. \A Search after Truth,
• • < \
inftance, if the Number of Angels be known, and
there are Ten Arch-Angels for every Angel ; and
Ten Thrones for every Arch-Angel; and thus for-
ward, keeping the fame proportion from One to Ten»
unto the laft Order of Intelligences; the Mind
may eafily know the Number of thofe Biefled Spirits ;
nay, even Judge of them partly at one Profped: by a
ftrong Attention, which delights it inSnitely. And
perhaps it is that which has indued tome Perlbns to
Judge thus of the Numbers of Celeftial Spirits :
Which is the Cafe of feme Philofophers, who have
put a Decuple proportion of Weight and of Light-
nefs among the Elements, fuppofing Fire to be Ten
times Lighter than Air, and fo of the reft.
When the Mind finds its felf oblig'd to admit dif-
ferences between Bodies by the different Senfations
it has of them, as alfo by fome other particular
Reafons, it always puts the leaft it can. For that
reafon it is eafily perfwaded that the Efienccs of
Things confift in an Indivifibile, and that they are like
Numbers,- as we faid before ; becaufe one Idea is
fufficient to Reprefent to us all the Bodies which are
call'd of the fame Species. For example, if you put
aGlafs of Water in an Hoglhead of Wine, Philofo-
phers will have it, that the Effence of the Wine ftill
remains the fame ; and that the Water is converted
into Wine. That as between Three,and Four there
can be no Number, fince true Unity is Indivifible >
fo it is neceflary that the Water be Converted into
the Nature and Effence of the Wine, or that the
Wine lofe its Nature ; That as all Quaternary Num-
bers are perfedly alike , fo the Effence of the Water
isperfedly alike in all Waters. That as the Num-
her of Three differs Effentially from the Number of
Two, and that it cannot have the fame Proprieties
as that has , fo two Bodies of different Species
differ Effentially, and in fuch a manner, that they
have never the fame Proprieties which proceed from
Entity, and other like things. Neverthelefs, if Men
would conflder the true Idea's of things with fome
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Attention, they would foon difcover* that all Bodies ii
being Extended, their Nature or Elfence has nothing
refembling Numbers; and that it cannot confift in
an Indivifible. f
Men do not only fuppofe Identity, Refemblan^,
or Proportion in the Nature, Number, and Eflential
Differences of Subftances, they alfo fuppofe them in fjr
all things they fee. Moft Men Judge, that all the
fix'd Stars are fattened to the Heavens, as to a Roof
at an Equal Diftance from the Earth. Attronomers ^vU
did pretend for a long while, that the Planets mo-
ved in perfectt Circles; and they have invented a great
number of them, as Concentriguesy Excentrigueiy Eft
cycles, ^c, to Explain the Phoenomena which contra- ;^|
dialed their Opinions.
It is true, that in thefe later Ages, the moft
Learned have Corrected the Errors of the Ancients, • jj ^
and believe that the Planets defcribe Ellipfes by
their Motion. But if they pretend that the Ellipfes
are Regular, as People are inclined to believe ; be-
caufe the Mind fuppofes Regularity , whe-re it
fees no Irregularity ; they fall into an Error which
is more difficult to be Correitted, becaufe the Obfer-
vations that can be made on the Courfe of the Pla- ^ ^ r
nets, cannot be fo Exadt, and fo Juft, as to (hew the
Irregularity of their Motions. Nothing but Natural
Philolbphy can Corredt that Error ; for it is infinitely
lefs remarkable, than that which we find in the Syftem
of perfedt Circles,
But foKiething particular has happened about the
Dittance and Motion of the Planets. For Aftrono-
mers not having been able to find an Arithmetical ^
or Geometrical Proportion in the fame, that being
abfolutely repugnant to Oblervations feme ima- ^
gin'd , that they obferv'd a kind of Proportion, i
which is called Harmonical in their pittances and
Motions. From thence it is that an * Altronomer of
this Age , in his New Almageftey begins the Sedti-
on which is Entitled , De S^Jiemate Mundi Hanno'
mcoy with thefe words;
There
Chap.X. A Search after Truth,
There is no Aflronomer ^ though never fi litthNemo efi
acquaintedinxohat relates to Aflronomy^ hut ackriowkdgtsP'^f ^
a kind of Harmony in the Motions and Intervals efdittor in
?lanets , if he confiders the Order of the Heavens At' Aflronomi-
. , cisyquitce"
tentively. , 7 f/^*.
Nor is this the only Author that is of this Opi- ^g^con-t
nion : Foi^ Obfervations have made him
ently fenfible of the Extravagancies of that agnof
ginary Harmony , which has neyertheiefs been ad- cat har-
mir'd by feveral Ancient and Modern PiMthovs ^moniam >
whofe Opinions Father RjccioH E.elates and Refutes; quamdam
Moreover , fome affirm Pythagorasand his Fol- in Plane
lowers, to have believ'd that the Heavens, by their tarum in-
Regular Motions, made a moft Wonderful Con- tervallis^
cert ^ which Men do not hear, becaufe they aye ^ moUhus
ufed to it; juft like thofe that Inhabit near the
Fall of the Waters of Hile, do not hear the
Noife of it. But I only relate that particular Dpi-
nion of the Harmonica I Proportion of the Diftances
and Motions of the Planets, to Ihew that the Mind is
delighted with Proportions, and that it often Fancies
them where they are not.
The Mind alfo fuppofes Uniformity^ in the dura-
tion of things, and imagins they are not liable
to Change and Inftability, when it is not in fome
meafure forced by the Relation of the Senl^, to
Judge otherwife.
Ail Material Things being Extended are capable
of Divifion, and confequently of Corruprion: Thofe
who refledt on the Nature of Bodies-, difcover
Vifibly that they are Corruptible. Yet there Has
been a great number of Philofophers who fancied
that the' Heavens though Material; were Incorrupt
tible.
The Heavens are at too great a Diftance froni
us, to difcover the Revolutions that happen there ;
and 'tis very rare that any happen there fo great,
is to be difcovered here. That alone has been
fufficient to perfwade many that they were-really
Incorruptible. And which- has' the more Cohiiiiri'd
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A Search after Truth* Book III. j
their Opinion, is, that they attribute to the Con* ^
trariety of Qualities, the Corruption to which
Sublunary Bodies are fubjed:. For as they have
never been in the Heavens to fee what paffes ' j
there, fo they have had no Experience that this Con- ^ |
trariety of Qualities is there; which' has indu-
ced them to believe that there is really no fuch
thing there. Therefore they have coticluded that "
the Heavens were free from Corruption ; becaufe ^
that which Corrupts all Bodies here below, accord-
ing to their Opinion, is net above.
IS
It is Vifible that this Argument has no Solidity ;
for I cannot fee , why there ftiould be no other ®
Caufe of Corruption , than thofe Contrarieties of ,
C^alities which they imagin ; nor upon what Foun-
dation they can affirm , That there is neither ® ^
Heat, nor Cold , nor Drought, nor Moifture in
the Heavens ; That the Sun is not Hot, and that Sa-
/um is not Cold. ■
There is fome appearance of Reafon to-fay,
-that, very hard. Stones, Glals, and other Bodies of
that Nature do not Corrupt, fince we fee they
fubfift long in the fame State; and though we
arc near :enough to fee the Alterations that fhould
happen to them. But being at fo great a diftance
as we are from the Heavens, it is diredly con- ^^Jiorsrt
.trary to Reafon to conclude, that they do not
Corrupt , becaufe we feel no contrary Qualities in
them, nor fee that they Corrupt. Neverthelefs, Judte:
fome not , only fay that they Corrupt nor, but they ntkcodi-
affirm abfolutely , that they are Unalterable and iniitiieni:
Incorruptible. And the Peripateticks want but little Moves,
of laying, that the Celeftial Bodies are fo many 4proaii
Divinities ; as Arijiotle their Maitcr did believe of a: iiis Hi
them. ' I Novell
The Beauty of the Univerfe does not confift in ieaioodei
the Incorruptibility of its Parts, but in the Va- i"y contra
riety that is found in them : And this great Work iience,
of the World would not be fo admirable without
that Vicilfitude of things which, we obierve in it.
Ivlat- jii I
chap. X. A Search after Truth,
ni Matter infinitely Extended, without Motion
j\{ and confequently without Form and Corruption,
la would indeed difcover the Infinite Power of its
Author; but it would give no Idea of his Wif-'
dom. This is the reafon that all Corporeal Things
ii are Corruptible; and that there is no Body , but
ife what receives fome Change , which Alters and Cor-
2i]|'t rupts it in Time. God Forms even in the Bofom
jDfij. of Stones and Glafs, Animals more perfedt and
admirable than all the Works of Men. Thofe
Bodies though very hard and dry, are Corrupted
(yjier in time : The Air and Sun to which they are ex-
ssjd pofed, alter fome of their Parts ; and fome Worms
jrjjij Feed upon them, as Experience has (hew'd.
There is no other difference between thbfe Bo-
Ikii; dies that are very hard and dry, and others, un-
lefs it be that they are compos'd of very grofs
1 and folid Parts; and confequently lefs capable of
l being agitated and feparated one from another, by
yjsof the Motion of rhofe that hit againft them; for
which reafon they are looked upon as Incorrup-
^ tible: Neverthelefs, they are not fo by their
itocii Nature , as Time, Experience, and Reafon fuffi-
ciently (hew us.
^ But as for the Heavens, they are Compos'd of
the moft Fluid and fubtle Matter, and particular-
itasia iy is being void of
Heat and Incorruptible, as Ariftotle's followers fay,
that on the contrary, he is the hotteft of all Bo-
^ dies, and the moft liable to Change. It is he that
|.j^ Heats , Moves , and Changes all things: For it
[gm] produces by his Adlion, which is no-
q[ thing but his Heat , or the Motion of his Parts,
all the Novelties we fee in the Change of Sea-
onfift ii demonftrates thefe things: But though
fome may contraditft Reafon , yet no Body can re-
lift Experience. For fince fome have difcovered
\sidict i^'^^he Sun by means of Telefcopes, Spots as large
• J as the whole Earth, which have been form'd in
i<j. it, and have been diflipated in a little time: It
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is no longer to be deny'd, but that he is more fubjedb
to Change than the Earth we inhabit.
All Bodies are therefore in a continual Motion and
Change, and particularly thofe that are the moft
Fluid, as Fire, Air and Water; next the parts
ojf Living Bodies , as Flelh, and even the Bones,
and laftly, thole that are the moft folid : The Mind
ought not to fuppofe a kind of Immutability in
things , becaufc it fees no Corruption or Altera-
tion in them j for it is not a proof that a thing is
always like unto it felf, becaule no difference is ob-
ferv'd iri it; or that things are nor, becaufe we have
no Idea or Knowledge of them.
* >
CHAP.
Chap.XL A Search after Truth.
CHAP, XI.
Examples of fame Errors of Morality which de-
fend on the fame Trinciple,
'THe Faculty of the Mind imagining and fuppo-
fing Refemblances where-ever it perceives no
Vifibie Differences, alfo engages moft Men into
Errors, which are yet more dangerous in Points of
Morality. Here are fome Examples of them.
A French Man meets an Englijh Man, or an Ita-
Uan; That Stranger has peculiar Humours: He has
a Nicenefs of Mind ; or if you pleafe, he is Haugh-
ly and Troublefome. This will at firft induce this
French-man to Judge, that all Engli/h-men, or Ita-
Hans, have the fame Chara(5ter of Mind with the
Perfon they have convers'd with. He will Praife,
or Blame them all in General: And if he meets
with any other, he will fancy at firft that he is like
unto him he has already feen ; and therefore will fuf-
fer himfelf to be inclined to fome Affecftion or fecrec
Averfion towards him. In a word, he will Judge
of all the Individuals of thofe Nations by this famous
proof, that he has feen one or many that had cer-
tain Qualifications of Mind : Becaufe he knew not
whether the reft were different, fuppofing them all
alike.
A ^ligious of fome Order commits a fault: This
is a fuificient Reafon for thofe who know it to Con-
demn all the Individuals of that Order indifferent-
ly. They all wear the fame Habit, and have the
fame Name, they are alike in that: This is e-
nough for the Common Sort of Men to Fancy
that they are all alike. They fuppofe that they are
all alike , becaufe not being able to fearch into
their Hearts, they cannot fee pofitively whether they
differ,
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Calumuiarors , who ftudy how to Blaft the Repu-
tation of their Enemies, commonly make ufe of
this, and Experience teaches us that it fucceeds for
the moft part. And indeed it is very fuitable to the
Capacity of the Common Sort of Mankind. For
it is not difficult to find in numerous Communities,
though never lo Eloly, fome irregular Perfons, or fuch
as have 111 Sentiments j hnce in the Company of
the Apoftles, of which Jcfiis Chrijt himfelf was the
Head, there was a Thief, a Traitor, an Hypocrite;
in a word, a Judas.
The Jews without doubt, would have been very
much to blame, to pafs an 111 judgment againit
the moft Holy Society that ever was , becaufe
of the Avarice and Fault of Judas; and if they had
Condemned them all in their Hearts, becaufe they
fuffered that III Man among them; and Jefus Chrifl
himfelf did not punifh him, though he was fenfible
of his Crimes.
Therefore it is a manifeft Fault againft Reafon,
and Breach of Charity to pretend, That a Commu-
nity is in fome Error, becaufe fome of their Members
were fo, although the Heads Ihould diffemble it, or
were the promoters of it themfelves. It is true, that
when all the Members will defend an Error, or Fault
of their Brother, the whole Community may be thought
Guilty; but that feldom or never happens ; for it
feems morally impoftible that all the Members of an
Order fhonld have the fame Sentiments.
Men therefore Ihould never conclude thus from Par-
ticulars to Generals ; but they cannot Judge (imply
of what they fee, they always fiy out into Excels. A
Religious of fuch an Order is a Great Man, an Honeft
Man; they conclude that all the Order is compofed
of Great Men, of Good Men. Likewife a Religious
of an Order has III Sentiments : Therefore all that
Order is Corrupted, and has 111 Sentiments. But
thefe laft judgments are far more dangerous than the
firft; becaufe it is a Duty to Judge well of our Neigh.-
hours, and the Malignity of Man occafions that Hi
Judg.
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Chap. XI. A Sedrch after Truth,
Judgments, and Dilcourfes held againft the Reputa-
Mon of others, make a ftronger ImprefTion upon the
Mind than advantageous Judgments and Difcourfes
do.
When a Worldly Man, who indulges his Paflions,
fixes ftrongly upon his Opinion, and pretends in the
heighth of his Inclination, that he is in the right to in-
dulge it, Men Judge reafonably that he is obftinate,
and he owns it himfelf as foon as his Paflion is over.
So when a Pious Perfon, who is perfwadcd of what
he fays, and who has difcover'd the Truth of Religi-
on, and the Vanity of Worldly Things, endeavours
according to that Knowledge to reform the Vices
of others, and reprehends them with feme Zeal,
Men of the World alfo take him to be an obftinate
Man; and therefore they conclude that Devout Men
arc obftinate. They Judge moreover, that Good Men
are far more obftinate than Vain, III Men ; becaufe
the latter only defending their III Opinions according
to the different Motions of the Blood , and Pafli-
ons, they cannot continue long in their Sentiments:
They come to themfelves again. Whereas perfons of
Piety remain fteddy ; becaufe their Foundation is un-
alterable, and does not depend on a thing fo inconftant
as the Circulation of the Blood.
Therefore ordinary Men conclude, that Pious Men
are obftinate as well as the Vicious: Becaufe they
are as Paftionate for Truth and Virtue, as III
Men are for Vice and Falfhood. Both fpeak almoft in
the fame manner, to maintain their Sentiments ; they
are alike in that, though they differ in the main.
This is fufficient for thofe who do not weigh the dif-
ference of Reafons, to Judge that they are alike in all
things, becaufe they are alike in that manner, which
every Body is capable to Judge of.
Devout Perfons are not then obftinate, they are
only fteddy^ as they ought to be; But the Vicious and
Libertines are always obftinate, though they fhould
not periift one Hour in their Sentiments: Becaufe
Men are only obftinate when they defend a Falfe
Opinion,
A Search after Truth. Book III^
Opifliont although they (iK^uld only defend it a little
Wflllc
This is the Cafe of fome Philofophers, who have
maintainM Chimerical Opinions, which they lay afide
at laft. They would have thofe who defend conftant
Trutl^, whofe certainty they fee evidently, to p^t
with them as bare Opinions, as they have done with
thofe they had foolilhly been prejudiced with. And
becaufe it is difficult to have a deference for them in
prejudice of Truth; as alfo becaufe the Love we have
&turally for it, inclines us to defend it earneftly, they
Judge us to be obitinate.
Thofe Men are to blame to defend their Chimera's
obftinately ; but the others are in the right to defend
Truth with Vigour and Steddinefs of Mind. The
manner of both is the fame, but their Sentiments are
different; and it is that difference of Sentiment, which
ttij^kes the one conftant, and the others obftinate.
THE
[ Chap*XI. A Search after Truth, 51
k,
t
^^1 _ • •
__—
%
C THE
H
:: CONCLUSION
iliey
«v 0 F T H E
Li Three Firft Books.
i,wki
IN the beginning of this Book I have diftinguiflied
two Parts in the Simple and Indivifible Being
of the Sou], one purely PafTive, and the other '
both PafBve and Adiive. The firit is the Mind or
Underftanding, the fecond is the Will. I have attri-
buted three Faculties to the Mind, becaufc it receives
its Modifications and Idea's from the Author of Na-
ture after three different ways.
I have called it Senfe, When it receives from God
its Idea's that are confounded with Senfations, vi:{.
Senfible Idea's occafion'd by certain Motions which
pafs in the Organs of its Senfes at the Prefencc of
Objects.
I have called it Imagination and Memory, When
it receives from God Idea's that are confounded with
Images, which are a kind of Weak and Languilhing
Senfations that the Mind receives only through fomc
Traces that are produc'd, or are ftirr'd up in the Brain
\ E by the Courfe bt the Spirits.
Laftly, I have called it Pure Mind or Underftand-
ing> when it receives from God pure Idea's of
Truth, vi/itboui any mixture of Senfations and Images
i with
IS
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92 j4 Search after Truth. Book III.
with it. Not by the Union it hath with the Body,
but through that it hath with the ti^ord or tVifdom
of God; not becaufe it is in the Material and Sen-
fible World, but becaufe it fubfifts in the Immaterial
and Intelligible one: Not to know Mutable things
fit for the Prefervation of the Life of the Body, but
10 difcover unchangeable Truths which preferve the
Life of the Mind.
I have fhown in the firft and fecond Book, that
our Senfes and Imaginations are very ufefui to difi-
cover to us the Relation betwixt External Bodies
and our own ; that all the Idea's which the Mind
receives through the Body, are for the ufe of the
Body; that it is impofiible clearly to difcover any
Truth whatfoever by the Idea's of our Senfes and
Imaginations; that thofe confus'd Idea's ferve only
to engage us to our Body, and through our Body
to all Senhble things: And lafily. That if we would
avoid Error, we ought not to truft to them. I alfo
concluded it Morally Impofiible, to know by the
pure Idea's of tne Mind, the Relations that are be-
twixt External Bodies and ours : That we muft not
argue according to thefe Idea's, to know if an Apple
or a Pear a^^e good to eat, but we muft judge it by
our Tafte. And although we may make ufe of our
Minds, to difcover after home contufed manner, the
Relations that are betwixt External Bodies and our
own ; yet it is always the fureft way to make ufe
of our Senfes. I will give another Example, for we
cannot imprefs too much on the Mind, things that are
fo EfTential and Neccftary.
Suppofing I would examine which is moft Advan-
tageous, to be Religious or Rich; if I open the
Eyes of my Body, Juftice appears a Chimera, I fee
no Attradlives in it; I fee the Juft are Miferable,
Abandoned, Perfecuted, Defencelefs, and without
Confolation; for he that Comforts and Upholds
them, does not appear to my Eyes; and indeed I do
not fee of what ufe Juftice or Virtue can be ; but
if I turn my Eyes upon.Riches, I foon perceive their
Luftre
itLwe.
Chap.XI. j4 Search after Truths
Luftre, and am dazled with it: PoWer, Grandeur,
Pleafures, and all Senhble Goods, accompany Riches;
I cannot doubt but Riches are neceflfary to make one
Happy. So likewife if I make ufe of my Ears,
I hear that ail Men efteem Riches; they fpeak
of nothing but the ways of getting them ; and they
always Praife and Honour thofe that poflefs them.
Thefe two Senfes, and all the reft tell me. That
to be Happy I muft be Rich: And if I ihut my
Eyes and Ears, and ask my Imagination, it conti-
nually reprefents to me what my Eyes have feen,
and my Ears heard, as to the Advantage of Riches ;
but yet it will reprefent thefe things to me quite
after another manner than my Senfes did, for the
Imagination always enlarges the Idea's of thofe
things that have any relation to the Body, or which
we Love. If I will but permit it, my Imagination
will foon conducft me to an inchanred Palace, like
thofe of which Poets and Romances have made fuch
Magnificent Defcriptions of; and there I (hall fee
fuch Beauties, which would be ufelefs for me to
defcribe: This would convince me , that the God
of Riches, who inhabits it, is only capable of making
me Happy : This is what my Body is able to per-
fwade me to, for it fpeaks only for it felf, it is ne-
ceflTary for its Good , that the Imagination fhould
ftoop before the Grandeur and Splendor of Riches :
But if I confider that the Body is infinitely below
the Mind , that it cannot be Mafter of it, that it
cannot inftrudt it in the Truth, nor produce Light
in it; and that recolleCfing my felf, 1 ask my felf;
or rather (fince I am neither my own Mafter, nor
Lightj if I draw near to God, and, in the Silence
of my Senfes and Paffions, ask him whether I ought
to prefer Riches to Virtue, or Virtue to Riches, I
(hall bear a clear and diitindf Anfwcr of what I
ought to do; an Eternal Anfwer which has al-
ways been given , is now given , and will always
be given ; an Anfwer which it is not neceilary I
(hould explain , becaufe all the World kno\vs it;
either
^ SedrcF after Truth. Book IIL
either thofe who read this Book, or thofe who
read it not; which is neither Gr^^, Latin, French,
or German, and which is conceived by ad Nations.
Laftly, An Anfwer which Comforts the Juft in
their Poverty , and which difturbs Sinners in the
midft of their Riches; I (hail hear this Anfwer
and be convinced of it: I (hall laugh ar the Fan-
cies of my Imagination, and the Illufion of my Senies.
The Inward Man, which is in me, will deride
the Animal and Earthly one which I carry about
me. Laltly, The New Man (hall increafe, and the
Old Man (hall be deftrby'd, provided I always
obey the Voice of him who fpeaks fa clearly to
me in the mod Secret Receifes of my Reafon ; and
who having made himfelf Sen(ible to condefcend to
my Wcaknefs and Infirmity, and to give me Life
by thofe very means by which he gave me Death,
fpeaks yet to me through my SenfeSj after a" very
ftrong, lively and familiar manner, I mean, by the
preaching of his Gofpel. And if I interrogate him
in all the Metaphy(ical, Natural and pure Philofoi
phical Queftions, as well as thofe which regard the
Regulation of Manners, I fhall always hate a Faith*
ful Mafter which will never deceive me. t (hall
not only be a Chriftian but a Philofopher: I (hall
make a good Judgment of things; and in a word,
I (hall follow both by Grace and Nature, the way
which will guide me to all the Perfecdion I am capa-
ble of.
It mufl then be concluded, from what I have
faid. That to make the bed ufe that we can of the
Faculties of our Soul, our Senies, Imagination, and
Mind, we mud only apply them to thofe things
for which they have been given us. We ought
carefully to diltinguifh our Senfations and Imagina-
tions from our pure Idea s; and judge according
to our Senfations and Imaginations, of the relation
that External Bodies have to ours, without making
ufe of them to difcover Truths , which they al-
ways confound : And we mud make ufe of the
pure
Chap.XL A Search after
pure Idea's of the Mind to difcover Truths, with-
out ever attempting to judge by them of the rela-
tion that External Bodies have to ours; becaufe thefe
Idea's never have Exrenfon enough to reprefent them
perfedly to us.
It is impoflible that Men Ihould have a fufficient
Knowledge of all the Figures and Motions of the
little Particles of their Body and Blood, and of thofe
of a certain Fruit in a certain time of their Sicknefs,
to be able to difcover the relation of Agreement be-
twixt this Fruit and their Body, and that if they
fliould eat of it,it would recover them. Thus our Senfes
alone are more ufeful to the Prefervation of our
Health, than the Rules of Experimental Phyfick, and
Experimental Phyfick than the Theoretick. But Ex-
perimental Phyfick, which allows much to Experience,
and ftill more to the Senfes, is the belt, becaufe all
thefe things ought to be joyn'd together.
"We may then ufe our Reafon in all things, and
'tis the Privilege which it has above the Senfes and
Imagination, which are limited to Senfible Things ;
but we ought to ufe it with Circumfpe(5lion ; for
though it is the chief part of our felves, it often hap-
pens that we are deceiv'd when we permit it to go
too far ; becaufe it cannot adt fufficiently without
wearying it felf; I mean it cannot know fufficiently
how to make a good Judgment, and yet it will not
forbear Judging.
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JL
SEARCH
AFTER
TRUTH.
BOOK IV.
Of the Inclinations and Natural Motions of
the Mind.
CHAP. I.
I. It^s necejjary the Mind have Inclinations ^ as
well 04 the Body Motions, II, God alls the
flamane Mind only for himfelf 111. Mens
Minds are only inclined to Barticular Good^
through the Motion they have to Good in General.
IV. The Origine of the Chief Natural Inclina-
tions^ which will make up the Divifion of this
Fourth Book,
I
T would not be neceflary to Treat of Natural
Inclinations, as we are going to do in this Fourth
Book ; nor of the Paffions, as we lhall do in the
following; in order to difcover the Caufes ot the
Errors-of Mankind, if the Underftanding did not de-
pend on the Will in the Perception of Gfcje(5ts ; Bnc
A a a a whereas
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A Search after Truth. Book IV.
whereas it is the Will that diredls it, which makes it
refolve, and applies it to feme Objeds rather than
others; it is abfolutely neceflary to apprehend its
Inclinations well, to penetrate into the Caufes of the
Errors to which we are liable.
I. It's ne- ^ If God, when he Created this World, had produced
cejfary the Matter infinitely extended, without giving it any Mo-
Mindhaye tion, there would have been no difference in Bodies.
Inchnati- World would ftill have been a meer
Mafs of Matter, or of Extenfion, which indeed might
^^^ferve to difeover the Grandeur and Power of its Au-
" thor; but there would not be that Succeffion of
Forms, and that Variety of Bodies, which compofe all
the Beauty of the Univerfc, and which incline Mens
Minds to admire the Infinite Wifdom of the Governour
thereof.
Therefore I am of Opinion, That the Inclinations
of the Mind are in the Spiritual World, what Morion
is in the Material World ; and that if the Mind were
without Inclinations, or if it never had any Defire,
we fhould not meet with that Variety in the Order of
Spiritual Things; which not only makes the World
admire the Profoundnefs of the Wifdom of God, ap-
prove the Variety of Material Objedls ; but alfo his
Mercy, his Juftice, his Goodnefs, and generally all
his other Attributes. Thus then the Difference of In-
clinations produces, in the Mind, an Effe(5l much like
unto that which the Difference of Motions produces
in the Body; and the Inclinations of Mens Minds,
and the Motions of Bodies together, conftitute all the
Beauty of Created Beings. Thus all Spirits muft
have lome Inclinations, as well as Bodies have diffe-
rent Motions. But let us endeavour to difeover what
Inclinations they ought to have.
Were not our Nature Corrupted, it would not be
neceffary to feek out by Reafon, as we are going to
do, what the Natural Inclinations of Created Spirits
ought to be: It would be fufficient, in order there-
unto, to Gonfult our felves, and we Ihould difeover,
by the Inward Sentim.ents we have of what pafles
within us, all the Inclinations we ought Naturally to
hap3
3
have. But, whereas we know by Faith, that Sin has
deftroy'd the Order of Nature, and that Reafbn in-
forms us, that our Inclinations are Irregular, as it will
appear in the Sequel, we are obliged to go another
way to work: Since we cannot trult to what we feel,
we are obliged to explain things in a more Sublime
Manner; but which, without doubt, will feem to
have but little Solidity m it, to thofe who only efteem
what relates to the Senfes.
It is an undeniable Truth, that God can have no II, 7*^5^
other Principal End for his Operations but himfelf; Principal
and that he may have feveral Ends lefs Principal,
which tend all towards the Prefervation of the Beings ABhns of
which he has created. He can have no Principal End Godishim-
but himfelf, becaufe he cannot Err; nor place his Final/^^.andht
End in Beings which are not Perfed:. But he may
propofe as a lefs Principal End the Prefervation ofCre- r
ated Beings; becaufe as they all participate of his
Goodnefs, they are necelfarily Good, and even very
Good according to Scripture, VaUc bojta. Therefore
God Loves them, and moreover it is his Love which
preferves them; for all Beings only fubfift becaufe
God Loves them. Diligts omnia qtue funt, fays the
Wife Man, Nihil odifii eorum cjtijs fecifti: Nec enim
odiem aliquid conftituifii fecifti. .^Mmodo autem
foffet aliquid permanerCy niji tu voluiJfeSy aut quod d
vocatum non ejfet conferveretur. In efted it is not pofli-
ble to conceive, that things which do not pleafe a
Being which is infinitely Perfed and Powerful, (hould
1 fublilt, fince all things only fubiiftby his Will. There-
M fore God wills his Glory as his principal End, and the
i Prefervation ot his Creatures for his Glory.
The Natural Inclinations of Humane Minds, being
certainly continual ImprelEons of the Will of him that
has created them, and does preferve them: It is, in
my Opinion, necelfary that thofe Inclinations Ihould
^ be intirely like unto thofe of their Creator and Pre-
ferver. Therefore Naturally they can have no prin-
cipal End but his Glory ; nor no other Second End
but their own Prefervation and that of others 5 but
always in relation to him from whom they have their
A a a a a
Being,
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Goody
through
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dency they
have to
Good in
General,
A Search after Truth, Book IV".
Being. For it feems undeniable to me, that fince God
cannot defire that the Will he has created Ihould Love
an Inferior Good more than a Greater, that is. That
it fliould Love that which is lefs Lovely, more than
that which is more Lovely: He can create nothing
without inclining it towards himfelf, or command-
ing it to Love him above all things; though he may
create it Free, and with a Power to withdraw and to
ftray from him.
Whereas there is properly but one Love in God,
which is the Love of himfelf: And that God can
Love nothing but by that Love, fince he can Love
nothing but in relation to himfelf: So God likewife
Imprints but one Love in us, which is the Love of
Good in General; and we can Love nothing but by
that Love, fince we can Love nothing but what is,
or feems to be Good. It is the Love of Good in Ge-
neral, which is the Principle of our particular AfFe-
dlions, fince that Love really is nothing but our Will:
For as I have faid already in another place. The Will
is nothing but the continual Imprellion of the Author
of Nature, which inclines the Mind of Man towards
Good in General. Certainly we muft not imagine
that this Power we have of Loving proceeds from us,
or is at our Difpofition. Nothing but the Power of
not Loving well, or rather of mifplacing our Affedtions,
is at our own Difpofition ; by reafon that being Free,
we may apply, and adlually do apply to particular
Objedls, and confequently to falfe Objedfs, the Good
Love which God does not ceafe to imprint in us,
while he does not ceafe to preferve us.
But not only our Will, or our Love for Good in
General, proceeds from God j but Inclinations for
pai ticular Goods which are common to all Men, though
not equally ftrong in all Men, as our Inclination for
the Prefervation of our Being, and of thole that are
united to us by Nature, are alfo Imprefiions of the
Will of God upon us; for in this place I gtvepromif-
cuoufly the Name of Natural Inclinations to all the
Impreifions of the Author of Nature, which are com-
men to all Minds,
I faid
■5.
Chap.I. J Search after Truth, 5
I faid but even now, that God loved his Creatures, IV. The
and alfo that it was his Love which gave them to Source f
exift, and did preferve their Being: Therefore as Chef
God continually imprints in us a Love like unto his,
.fince it is his Will which makes and which regulates
ours; he likewife gives us all thofe Natural Incli-^f^^J/
nations which are not at our Choice, and which in-
dine us of neceflfity to the Prefervation of our Being, of
and of thofe we live with. thif fourth
For, though Sia has Corrupted all things , it has Book,
not deftroy'd them. Although our Natural Inclina-
tions do not always propofe God as their End by the
Free Choice of our- Will^' God is always their Objed:
in the Inliitution of Nature : For God who produces
and prelerves them in us, only produces and preferves
them for himfelf. All Sinners tend towards God by
the Impreflion they receive from God, though they
withdraw from him by the Error and Diftradion of
their Mind. They love Good, for we can never love
otherwife, fince God makes us Love; but they Love
ill Objeds, 111 only, becaufe God, who gives even
Sinners the Power of Loving , forbids their Loving »
them , bocaufe fince the Fall they withdraw their
Affedion from him. For Men imagining that Crea-
tures occafion in them the Pleafure they injoy upon
their account, incline their Affcdions violently to-
wards the Body , and fall into an abfolute Forget-
fulnefs of God, who does not appear before their
Eyes.
We have ftill then the fame Natural Inclinations ,
or the fame Imprefiions of the Author of Nature
which Adam had before the Fall. We have even the
fame Inclinations which the BleiTed have in Heaven,
for God neither Creates nor Preferves any Creatures,
without giving them a Love like unto his. He Loves
himfelf, he Loves us, he Loves all his Creatures:
Therefore he Inclines all Humane Minds to Love
him, to Love themlelves, and to Love all Creatures.
But wereas all our Inclinations are only ImprefiTions
of the Author of Nature, which incline us to Love
him and all things for his fake ; they cannot be right
A a a a 3 unlefs
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A Search after Truth. Book IV,
unlefs we love God with ail onr Power, and all things
for his fake, by the Free Choice of our Will: For we
cannot, without Injuftice, abufe the Love God gives
us for himfelf, by applying it to any thing but himfelf,
or which has no relation to himfelf.
Thus we are now fenfible, not only what our Na-
rural Inclinations are, but alfo what they ought to be ;
in order to be well regulated, and according to the
Inftitution of their Author. For all the Diforder of
our Inclinations confiits, in that we place our final End
in our felyes ; and that inltead of doing all things
in relation to God, we do all things in relation to our
felves.
We have then, in thp firH: place, an Inclination for
good in General, which is the Principle of all our
Natural Inclinations, of all our Paflions, and of all the
Free Actions of our Will.
Secondly, We have an Inclination for the Preferva-
tion of our Being, and of our Happinels.
Thirdly, We have all an Inclination for the other
Creatures, when they are of ufe to us, or to thole
we Love. Moreover, we have feveral other parti-
cular Inclinations which 'depend on thefe ; but we
(hall fpeak of them elfewhere. We only defign in
this Fourth Book, to refer the Errors of our Incli-
nations to thefe three Heads, To the Inclination
we have to Good in General, To Self-Love, And to
the Love of our Neighbour.
CHAP.
*5'
Chap.II. A Search after Truth.
7
CHAP. ir.
I. The Inclination for Good in General^ is the
Principle of the Difquiet of our Will. II. And
confequently of our Negligence and Ignorance,
III. Firjt Example.^ Morality^ little known to
many Men. IV, Second Example.^ The Immor-
tality 'of the Souf difputed by fome Men. V. That
our Ignorance is exceeding great in refpeU: of
abfiraHed things.^ or fuch as have hut little Re-
lation to m. .
' I 'Hat vaft Capacity which the Will has for all I. The In*
Good in General, becaufe it is only formed by ^cUnation^
Good which includes all Good in it felf, cannotGood in
be fatisfied by all the things which the Mind repre- is
fents to it; and yet that continual Motion which God
imprints in it towards Good cannot ftand ftill. This f r
Motion never ceafing, puts the Mind, of neceflity, f
into a continual Agitation. The Will which feeks
what it defires, obliges the Mind to reprefent all forts
of Objects to it felf. The Mind accordingly does it,
but the Soul does not relilh them ; or if it does, is not
fatisfied with them. The Soul does not relilh them,
by reafon that often the Perception of the Mind is not
accompanied with Pleafure; for it is through Plea-
fure that the Soul relilhes its Good: And the Soul is
not fatisfied with it, by reafon that nothing can Itop
the Motion of the Soul but him that gives it. What-
ever the Mind repref^nts to it felf as its Good, is
Finite; and whatever is Finite, may withdraw our
Love for a while, but it cannot fix it. When the
Mind confiders very new and uncommon Objedfs, or
that Itave fome relation to Infinity, the Will permits
the Mind to examine them a while with fome Atten-
tion, in hopes of finding what it is in fearch of,
becaufe whatever appears Infinite , bears the Cha-
rader of its real Good; but in time it grows weary^
A a a a 4 of
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'A Search after Truth. Book IV.'
of it, as well as of the reft. Therefore the Will is
always dilquieted, becaufe it is inclin'd to feek for
that which it can never find, and which it always
hopes to find: It Loves whatever is Great and Extra-
ordinary, arjd refembles Infinity ; for not having
found its real Good in Common and Familiar things,
it hopes to find it in fuch as are unknown to it.
We will demonftrate in this Chapter, that the Dif-
quiet of our Wills is one of the principal Caufes of
our Ignorance, and of the Errors into which we fall
in many things: And in the two following we will
explain what it is that produces in us the Inclination
we have for every thing that has fomething Great or
Extraordinary in it.
ll.Anitconm is fomething evident by what has been faid, Firft,
fequently That the Will feldom makes ufe of the Underftand-
of our Ne- ing, unlels on Objecffs that have fome Relation to us,
gligence and that it very much negledls all others ^ for being
and Igno' evcr carneftly defirous of Felicity, by the Impre/Tion
of Nature, it only turns the Underftanding towards
fuch things as feem to be of ufe to us, and which do in
Ibme meafure pleafe us.
Secondly, That the Will does not permit the Un-
derftanding to apply it felf long even to fuch things
as it is delighted with: Becaufe, as we have already
faid, all things that are created may indeed pleafe us
for a while, but we are loon difgufted with them ;
and then our Mind lays them by, to feek for that which
can fatisfie it elfewhere.
Thirdly, That the Will is excited thus to make
the Mind run from Objecft to Objecft, becaufe it never
ceales to reprelent confufedly to it, or as at a diftance,
that which includes all Beings in it felf, as we have
declared in the Third Book. For the Will being de-
firous, as it were, to draw its real Good near to it
felf, to be plealed with it, and to receive from it the
Motion which animates it, it excites the Underftand-
ing to reprefent that Good in fome meafure. But
then it is no longer the General, the Univerfal, the
Infinitely Perfedf Being which the Mind perceives; it
is fomething that is Bounded and Imperfecft, which
pot
iKilif'^|l I
Chap.II. Search after Truth. 9
not being able to ftop the Morion of the Will, nor
to pleafe it long, it forfakes it to turn after fome other .
Objedt.
And whereas the Attention and Application of the
Mind are abfolutely neceflary to difcover abftradled
Truths, it is evident that the common fort of Man-
kind muft live in a grofs Ignorance, in refped: even of
fuch things as have fome relation to them ; and that
it is impoflible co exprefs their Blindnefs in what re-
lates to abiiradted Truths, and which have no fenfible
relation to them. But we muft endeavour to prove
thefe things by Examples.
Amongft all Sciences Morality has moft relation to III. Firji
us: It teaches us all our Duty towards God,, towards Example^
our Prince, towards our Friends and Relations, and Morality
generally towards all that are about us. Moreover
it teaches us the way to be Eternally Happy; and
all Men lie under an Eftential Obligation , or rather
Indifpenfible Neceflity , to apply themfelves wholly
to it: And yet though there have been Men on Earth
thefe Six Thoufand Years, that Science is ftill very
Imperfed.
That part of Morality which relates to our Duty
towards God, and which undoubtedly is the chief,
fince it relates to Eternity, has hardly been known by
the moft Learned ; and even in our days we find
Men of Sence who are unacquainted with it; and yet
it is the eafieft part of Morality. For in the firft place,'
Where lies the Difficulty to difcover that there is a
God ? Whatever God has made proves it: Whatever
Men or Beafts do, proves it: Whatever we think,
whatever we fee, whatever we feel, proves it. In a
word, There is nothing but what proves the Exiftence
of God, or that may prove it to attentive Minds, who
apply themfelves ferioufly to the Knowledge of the
Author of all Things.
Secondly, It is evident, that there is a Neceflity to
follow the Commands of God to be Happy ; for as
he is Powerful and Juft, we cannot difobey him with-
out being Punifti'd, nor obey him without being Re-
warded. But what is it he exadts from us} That
we
a.
lo A Search after Truth. Book IV, Jlp
we fhould Love him ; That our Mind fliould be taken i). i
up with him ; That our Hearts (hould be turned to-
wards • him. For wherefore has he Created our q
Minds > Certainly he can do nothing but for him-
felf: Therefore he has made us for himfelf only; and pnjpoj
we are Indifpenfibly obliged not to apply elfewhere
the Imprellion of that Love which he continually pre-
ferves in us, in order that we fhould continually Love
him. ^ 0^
Thefe Truths are eafily difcovered with little Appli- pi
cation : And yet this only Principle of Morality, which (-[fai
teaches us, that to be Vertuous and Happy, it is ab- j
folutely necelfary to Love God above all Things and ^
in all Things, is the Foundation of all Chrittian Mora-
lity. Neither does it require an extraordinary Appli-
cation of Mind, to draw from thence all the Conle-
quences we ftand in need of, to fettle the general
Rules ofourCondudt; though there are but very few
that do it j and Men continually difpute upon Qp^-
ftions of Morality, which are the Immediate and Ne-
ceflary Confequences of a Principle which is fo evident
as that is. _ ,[ ||,'[
The Profeflbrs of Geometry daily makes new Dif
coveries, but if they do not bring it to a greater Per-
fetftion , it is becaufe they have already drawn the y l
moft Ufeful and Neceflary Confequences out of their
Principles. But moft Men feem Incapable of con-
eluding any thing out of the firft Principle of Morality. -
All their Idea's vanifli, and are diflipated as foon as
they begin to think upon it; becaufe they will not
do it as they fliouId do; and they will not do it, be-
caufe they do not reliih it, or becaufe they are too
foon tired with it after their having relifti'd it. That
Principle is abftradted, Metaphyfical, meerly Intelligi-
ble ; it is not obvious, it is not to be imagined ; and
therefore it does not appear folid to Carnal Minds,
or to Minds that only fee with the Eyes. Nothing is
found in that Principle capable of putting a ftop to
the Difquiets of their Will, and afterwards to fix the
Eyes of their Mind to confider it with fome Attention.
What Hopes then of their feeing it as they fliould
do,
neb
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:C0!1C£
sSwi
Chap.IL A Search after Truth*
do, of their apprehending it rightly , and of their
concluding diredlly from thence what they (hould
Conclude ?
If Men had but an Imperfed: Apprehenfion of that
Propofition of Geometry: That the fides of Tri-
angles that are alike, are proportionable one to an-
other 'y certainly they would not be great Geometri-
cians. But if befides the Confufed and Imperfed
Idea of that Fundamental Propoficion of Geometry,
they alfo had fome Intereft to willi , that the fides
of Triangles that are alike were not proportion-
able; and that falfe Geometry were as convenient
for their Perverfe Inclinations as falfe Morality ,
they might very well be guilty of Paralogifms as ab-
furd in Geometry as in Morality, becaufe their Errors
would pleafe them, and that Truth would only Puzzle,
Difturb and Vex them.
Therefore we need not wonder at the Blindnefs
of thole that lived in the former Ages, whilft Ido-
latry reigned in the World, or of thofe that live in
our Days, and that do not as yet enjoy the Benefit
of the Light of the Gofpel. It was neceflary for
Divine Wifdom to make it felf lenfible at laft, to
inftrud fuch Men as only confult their Senfes. Truth
had fpoken to their Minds for above the fpace of
Four thoufand Years, but whereas they never look'd
Inwardly they did not underftand it: It was ne-
cefiary that it Ihould fpeak to their Ears. The Light
which diredfs all Men, did fhine in their Darknefs,
without being able to expel it; they could not fo
much as look upon it. It was neceflary that the
Intelligible Light Ihould put on a Veil to make it
felf vifible: And that the iVord ftiould cloath it felf
with Flefli; and that the Wifdom of God which
lay conceafd, and was inacceflible to Carnal Men,
(hould inftrudl them in a Carnal way, Carnalitery
fays St. Bernard, The Majority of Men, and parti-
cularly the Poor (which are the moft worthy Objedls
of the Mercy and Providence of the Creator,) who
are obliged to work for their daily Bread, are very
Ignorant and Stupid. They only Hear becaufe they
have
A Search after Truth, BooklV^
have Ears, and they only fee becaufe they have Eyes.
They are incapable of looking Inwardly by an Effort
of Mind, there to Interrogate Truth in the Silence
of their Senfes and Paffiofis. They cannot apply
themfelves to Truth, by reafon that they cannot relifh
it: Moreover they feldom think of applying them^
felves to it, becaufe Men feldom have any Thoughts
of applying themfelves to things that do not con-
cern them. Their unquiet and unfettled Will turns
their Minds continually towards all the Objedts that
Pleafe and Divert them by their Variety: For the
Multiplicity and Diverfity of Senfible Goods, hinder
Men from difcovering the Vanity of them, and ftill
keep them in hopes of finding the real Good theydefire
in them.
Thus though the Councils which Jejus Chrijl as
Man, as the way, as the Author of our Faith ,
gives us in the Gofpel, are much more fuitable to
the Weaknefs of our Underfianding, than thofe
which the fame Jefus Chrift, as Eternal Wifdom,
as Inward Truth, as Intelligible Light Infpires into
the moft fecret Receffes of our Reafon: Though
JeJus Chrift renders thofe Councils Agreeable by
his Grace, Senfible by his Example, Convincing
by his Miracles, yet Men are fo ftupid , and ib in-
capable of Refledfion, even upon things which are
abfolutely Neceffary for them to know well, that
they hardly ever think on them as they ought. Few
Men obferve the Beauty of the Gofpel; Few Men
conceive the Solidity and NecefTity of the Coun-
cils of Jefus chrift, Few Meditate upon them j
Few efteem them as their Neceffary Food, or
fortihe themfelves with them; the Continual Agi-
•ration of the Will, which is in fearch of the Tafte
of Good, not permitting the Mind to be intent upon
IV. Xruths which leem to deprive it thereof. Take ano-
jher Example.
tdity »f concerns the Impious highly to make a very ftridt
the Soul, enquiry, whether their Soul is Mortal, as they appre-
mftutedh^ hend it, or whether it is Immortal, as Faith and Rea-
fame Per- fon tells us. It is a thing of the utmoft Confequence
for
Chap. 11. Search after Truths
for them to know ; their Ererniry is concerned in it,
and the very Quiet of their Mind depends upon it.
Why is it then they do not know it, or that they re-
main in doubt, unlefs it be that they are not capable
of the leaft ferious Application ; and that their unfe-
date and corrupted Will does not allow their Mind to
look ftedfattly on the Reafons which are contrary to
thefe Opinions, which they defire (hould be true ?
For in fine, is it fo difficult a task to diftinguifli the
difference there is between the Soul and the Body, be-
tween what thinks, and what is extended ? E)o*s it
require fo great an Attention of Mind to difcover that
a Thought is neither Round nor Square : That Ex-
tent is only capable of different Figures and different
Motions, and not of Thought and Reafoning: And
confequently, that what Thinks, and what is Extend-
ed, are two Beings dire<5lly oppofite to one another ?
Yet that alone is fufficient to demonflrate that the
Soul is Immortal, and that it cannot Perifh, even though
the Body were Annihilated.
When a Subffance perifhes, it is true that the Modes
or Manners of Exiftenceof that Subffance perifh with
it. If a piece of Wax were annihilated, it is certain
that the Forms of that Wax fhould alfo be annihi-
fated with it; becaufe the Roundnefs for Example of
the Wax, is in Effed: nothing but the Wax it ielf of
fuch a Shape, and therefore it cannot fubfift without
the Wax. But though God fhould deffroy all the
Wax in the World, it would not therefore follow,
that any other Subffance, nor that the Modes of any
other Subffance were Annihilated. All the Stones for
example, would fubiiff with all their Modes; becaufe
Stones are Subffances or Beings, and not Modi-
fications of the Wax.
In like manner, though God fhould Annihilate one
half of fome Bodies, it would not follow, that the
other half fhould be Annihilated. This laff half is
United with the other, but it is not one with it. Thus
one half being Annihilated, it follows indeed accord-
ing to Reafon, that the other half has no longer any
relation to it; but it do's not follow that it ceafes to
be:
I?
I, e, 12^
J I- liip
mm
'I '-T
,.ii t » •
iinRlJIl
j(i Search after Truth. Book IV.
be; becaufe as its Being is different, it cannot be An-
nihilated by the Annihilation of the other. Therefore
it is clear, that the Thought not being the Modification ^
of Extenfion, our Soul is not Annihilated, though we
fliould fuppofe that the Body were Annihilated by
Death.
But there is no reafon to believe, that even the Bo-
dy is Annihilated when it is deft toy'd. The parts
which Compofe it are diflipated into Vapours, and
reduc'd to Powder : They are no longer feen, nor are
they any longer known; this is true, but it is no rea*
fon to conclude, that they are no longer in Being;
for the Mind perceives them ftill. Dividing a Grain of
Muftard into Two, into Four, or Twenty parts, it
would be Annihilated to our fight, becaufe it would .
be no longer feen: But it would not be Annihilated in
it felf, nor yet to the Mind ; for the Mind would fee
it, though it were divided into a Thouland, or an
Hundred Thoufand Parts.
'Tis a common Notion among Men who confult their
Reafon more than their Senfes, that nothing can be
Annihilated by the common force of Nature ; for as
Naturally, nothing can be ttiade out of nothing, nei-
ther can a Subftance or Being become nothing. Bo-
dies may be corrupted, if we may call the Alterations
they are liable to, Corruption ; but they cannot be
Annihilated. What is Round may become Square,
What is Flefh may become Earth, Vapour, and what
you pleafe ; for all forts of Extenfions are capable of all
manner of Configurations: But the Subftance of what
is Round, and of what is Flefh, cannot perifh. There
are certain Laws Eftablifh'd in Nature, according to
which Bodies change their Forms fucceflively , for
thofe Succefiive Forms Compofe the Beauty of the
Univerfe, and Create an Admiration in us for its Au-
ihor : But there is no Law in Nature for the Annihi-
lation of any Being, becaufe Annihilation has nothing
of Beauty or Good in it felf, and becaufe the Author
of Nature loves his Work. Therefore Bodies may
Alter, but they cannot Perifh,
Biit
Ch3.p< II. A Search after Truth,
But if relying on the Teftimony of the Senfes, Men
would maintain obftinately that the Redudion of Bo-
dies is a real Annihilation, by reafon that the Parts
into which they are reducM are Imperceptible: Let
them remember at leaft, that Bodies can only be di-
vided into thofe Imperceptible Parts, becaufe they are
Extended. But if the Mind is not Extended, it will
not be Divifible; and if it be not Divifible, it muft be
granted, that in that Senfe it will not be Corruptible.
But how could any Body imagin that the Mind were
Extended and Divifible? "We may by a right Line
cut a Square into two Triangles^ into two Paralelo'
grammesy or long Squares, into two : But by
what Line can it be conceiv'd, that a Plealure, a Pain,
or a Defire can be Cut ? And what Figure would re-
fult of thatDivifion? Trulyl cannot think, that Ima-
gination can be fruitful enough in falfe Idea's, to fatisfie
it felf upon that Subjedf.
The Mind then is not Extended, confequently it is
not Divifible: It is not liable to the fame Alterations as
the Body : Neverthelefs, it muft be granted that it is not
Immutable by its Nature. If the Body is capable of an
infinite number of different Figures,and ot different Con-
figurations,the Mind is capable of an infinite number of
different Idea's, and different Modificaiions. As after our
Death the fubftance of our Flelh will be reduc'd to Earth,
to Vapours, and to an infinite number of other Bodies
without being Annihilated : So our Souls without be-
ing again reduc'd to nothing, will have Thoughts, and
Sentiments very different from thofe they had in Life.
It is alfo neceffary while we are alive, that our Body
(hould be Compos'd of Flefh and Bones: It is alio ne-
ceffary in order to Live, that our Soul fhould have the
Idea's and Sentiments it has, in relation to the Body to
which it is united. But when the Soul Ihall be fepa-
rated from its Body, it will be at full Liberty to re-
ceive all forts of Idea's and Modifications, very diffe-
rent from thofe it has at prefent; as our Body on its
part, will be capable of receiving all forts of Figures
and Conjurations, very different from thofe it is ne-
ceflary it jS^ould have, to be the Body of a Living Man.
- ■ - - - - What
t6 A Search after Truth. Book IV.' Cliai
What I have faid, does in my Opinion, fufficiently lertc
(how, that the Immortality of the Soul is not a thing if the
fo difficult to be apprehended. What then is the rea- m ^
fon that fo many quelfion it, unlefs it be, that they Mi
arc unwilling to apply themfelves as-much as may be, :isoi
to examin the Reafons which prove it, in order to be mno
Convinced ? And why is it that they are unwilling to ivoidl
do it, unlefs it be that their Will, being uneafie and i)eisd
inconftant, keeps their Underftanding in a continual
Agitation; infomuch that it is not at leifure diftin(5lly fixn'
to perceive thofe.very Idea s which are moft prefent to 'ifall
it, as thofe of Thought and of Extenfion .> Juft like
a Man agitated by fome Pallion, turning his Eyes ;d m
continually on all fides , for the moft part does
not diftinguifli the neareft Objecfts, and the moft Ex- jpil
pos'd to his Sight. For indeed the Queftion about the iat tin
Immortality of the Soul, is one of the eafieftQuefti-
ons to refolve, when without Confulting our Imagi-
nation, we confider with fome Attention of Mind, the (o^r
clear and diftindt Idea of Extenfion, and the Relation ionwi
it can have to Thought. Bntp
If the Inconftancy and Levity of our Will does not
permit our Underftanding to penetrate into the Bot-
tom of things which are prefent to it, and which we atfe
are highly concern'd to know ; it is eafie to judge, that
it will be more averfe to let us meditate on thofe that
are diftant, and which have no relation to us. So that
if we are very Ignorant of moft of thofe things which t jj,J;
it is very neceflary for us to know, we (hall not have jjfji
a great Infight into thofe which feem abfolutely vain
and ufelefs to us. ^ IjfJ
It will not be neceflary for me to endeavour to .Hqj,
prove this by tedious Examples, which have no con-
fiderable Truths in them ; for if we may be allow'd
to be Ignorant of any thing, it is of thofe things which
are of no Ufe. And I had rather not be believed,
than to make the Reader lofe his Time in reading ^',
things that are wholly ufelefs.
Though there are not many perfons who apply
themfelves ferioufly to things abfolutely Vain and Ufe- ^
lefs, yet the number of them is but too great: But
Acre
\
Chap. II. A StAYch after Truth. 17?
there can never be too many of thole who do not ap-
ply themfelves to them, and who defpife them, pro-
vided they do not pretend to Judge of them. It is no
defe(51: in a limited Mind, not to know certain things;
it is only a defedt to pretend to Judge of them. Ig-
norance is a necelTary Evil, but we may, and ought to
avoid Error. Therefore I do not condemn Men for
being Ignorant of many things, but only for giving
ralh Judgments about thofe things.
When things have a great relation to us, are fenfible, VThat our
and fall eafily within the Compafs of our Imagination, Ignorance
we may fay, that the Mind applies it felf to them, exceed-.
and may have fome knowledge of them. For when
we know that things have a relation to us, we think «
upon them with fome Inclination ; and when we find "jf
that they concern us, we apply our felves to them
with pleafure. So that we Ihould be more Learned
than we are in many things, if the uneafinefs and tofling
of our "Will did not Diftiirb and Fatigue our Atcen- tiontow.
tion continually.
But when things are abftradV, and not very fenfible,
it is difficult to attain any certain knowledge of them:
Not that abftradled things are very intricate, but be-
caufe the Attention and Sight ot the Mind begins, and
Ends commonly with the fenfible Profpedl ot Objed:s;
for we feldom think on any thing but what we fee
and feel, and only as long as we fee and feel it.
It is moft certain, that if the Mind could eafily ap-
ply it felf to clear and diftind Idea's, without being
any-wife byafs'd by Opinion ; and if the uneafinels of
the Will did not continually difturb its Application,
we (hould meet no great difficulties in many Natural
Queftions, which we look upon, as not to be Explain'd,
and we might eafily be delivered of our Ignorance and
Errors in relation to them.
' For Example ; It is an undeniable Truth to any
Man of Senle, tfiat Creation and Annihilation are
things which furpafs the common force of Nature.
Therefore it Men did remain Attentive to that pure
Notion of the Mind and Reafon, they would ncrt fo
eafily admit the Creation and Annihildion of an infi-
B b b b nite
A Search after Truth. Book IV.
nite Number of New Beings, as of Subftaniial Forms,
real Qualities and Faculties. They would look into
the diftincff Idea's we have of Extenfion, Figure, and
Motion, for the realon of Natural Eifedts ; which is
not always fo difficult as People imagin ; all things in
Nature are fo connedted together,and prove each other.
The Effedls of Fire, as thofe of Canon and of
Mines, are very Surpriling ; and their caufe not very
well known. Neverthelefs, if Men inftead of rely-
ing on the Impreflions of their Senfes, and on fome
falfe or deceitful Experiments, did firmly fix on that
bare Notion of the Mind alone: That it is not pofli-
ble for a Body that is very little agitated to produce a
violent Morion, fince it can communicate no more
moving Power than it has its felf, it would be eafie
from that alone tc conclude, that there is a Subtle and
Invifible Matter, that it is very much agitated, and
difpers'd inth all Bodies, and feveral other like things
which would teach us the Nature of Fire, and alfo be
of great ufe to us to difcover other Truths yet more
conceal'd.
For, fince Canons and Mines have fuch great Mo-
tions, and all the Vifible Bodies about them, are not
in a fufficient Agitation to produce them j it is a cer-
tain proof that there are other Invifible and Infenfible
Bodies, which have at leaft as much Agitation as the
Canon Ball; But with being very Subtle and Thin,
may alone freely pals, and without breaking through
the Pores of the Canon before it is Fir'd ; that is, as
'Mcnfimr Defcartes has explain'd it more at large, be-
fore their having furrounded the hard and grofs parrs
of the Salc-petre, of which the Powder is Compos'd.
But when the Fire is put to it, that is, when thofe
fubtleand extreamly agitated Particles, have furround-
ed the grofs and folid Parts of the Salt-petre, and have ^
thus Communicated their very ftrong and violent Mo-
tion to them, then all does Burft of neceflity j becaufe
the Pores of the Canon, which left an open paflage on ^ r
all fides for the fubtle Parts before mention'd, while
they were alone, are not large enough to make way
for the grofs Parts of the Salt-petre, and fome others •
of
Chap. II. A Search after Truth,
of which the Powder is Compos'd, when they have
received into themfelves the Agitation of the Subtle
Parts which furrounds them.
For as the Water of Rivers which flows under
Bridges does not fhake them, by reaibn of the fmall-
nefe of its Particles : Thus the very fubtle and very
thin Matter I have mention'd, pafles continually through
the Pores of all Bodies without making any fenfible
Alterations in them. But then likewife, as the faid
River is capable of breaking down a Bridge, when
carrying along with it fome great Flakes ot Ice, or
fome other more fblid Bodies, by forcing them againft
it with its own Motion ; fo fubtle Matter is capable of
producing the furprifing Effedts we fee in Canons and
in Mines; when having communicated to the Parts
of the Powder which Float in the midft of it, its
Motion which is infinitely more Violent, and more
Rapid than that of Rivers and Torrents; the faid Parts
of the Powder cannot freely pafs through the Pores
of the Bodies which enclofe them, by realon they are
too grofs ; lb that they violently break them to force
them a free Palfage.
But Men do not caflly apprehend thofe fubtle fmall
Particles, which they repute Chimera's, becaufe they
do not fee them. Contemplatio fere definit cum afpeBu^
fays Bacon, The greater part even of Philofophers,
invent fome New Entity, rather than not to talk upon
thofe matters which they are Ignorant of: And if any
Body objedfs againft their falfe and incomprehenlible
Suppolitions, that Fire muft needs be compos'd of
Parts that are in very great Agitation, fince it produces
fuch Violent Motions, and that a thing cannot Com-
municate that which it has not; which is undoubtedly
a moft clear, and moft folid Objedfion : They con-
found all by fome frivolous Imaginary diftindtion, as
that of Equivocal and Univocal Caufes, in order to
feem to fay fomething, though in reality they fay no-
thing. For it is a general Notion among Men of Senfe
and Learning, that there can be no real Equivocal Caufe
in Nature j and that it has been'invented meerly by the
Ignorance^
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A Search after Truth. Book IV.
Therefore Men muft apply themfelves more to the
confideration of clear and diftind Notions, if they
have a mind to underftand Nature; They muft check
and ftop the Inconftancy and Levity of their Will a
little, if they defign to penetrate deeply into things ;
for their Mind will ever be weak, fupeificial and dif-
curfive, while their Will remains Light, Inconftant
and Roving.
It is true, it requires fome Fatigue, and Men muft
conftrain themfelVes to become Attentive, and to fearch
into the bottom of things; for there is nothing to be
got without pains. It is fliameful for Men of Senfe,
and Philofophers, who are obliged by all manner of
reafons to enquire into, and to defend Truth, to fpeak
without knowing what they fay, and to be fatisfy^d
with what they do not underftand.
CHAP. III.
I. Curiofity is natural and neceffary, II. Three
Eules to moderate it. III. Explanation of the
firfi of thefe Rules,
to.
liif
'ii-
I "y I
fA
Ki
I. Curiojlty A S long as Men have an Inclination for a Good
is natural which furpafles their Power, and do not poflefs
and necef'ii^ they will have a fecret propenfion for whatever
f*^J* looks new and extraordinary: They will ever run
after fuch things as they have not as yet confidered,
in hopes of finding what they enquire after ; and their
Mind not being able to fatisfie it felf wholly without
the enjoyment of that Good for which they are made ;
they will ever remain uneafie, and in a continual
Agitation, until it appears to them in its Glory.
This difpofition of Human Minds is certainly very
fuitable to their Condition 5 for it is infinitely better
to be unealie, and in fearch of the Happinefs one does
not poflefs, than to remain in a falfe Repofe, and to
be pleas'd with falfhood, and a deluflve Happinefs,
where-
Chap. III. A Search after Truth. 21
wherewith Men are commonly deluded. We ought
to have a fenfe of Truth, and of our Happinefs :
Therefore thofe Things that are new and extraordi-
nary muft excite us : There is a certain kind of Cu-
riofity which is not only allowable, but abfolutely ne-
ceCfary 5 for whereas common and ordinary things can
never afford true Felicity, and the ancient Opinions of
Philofophers are very uncertain: It is neceffary we
(hould be curious for New Difcoveries, and always
uneafie in the Enjoyment of common Felicities.
Should a Geometrician give us New Propofitions
contrary to thofe of Euclide, Should he undertake to
prove, that that Science is full of Errors, as Hobhs en-
deavour'd to do in a Book, written agalnft the Pride
of Geometricians, I own that there would be no rea-
fon to complain of that kind of Novelty ; becaufe,
that when we have found out the Truth we ought to
ftick to it, fince we are only endu'd with Curiofity in
order to find it out ? Neither are Geometricians often
guilty of being Curious of New Opinions of Geome-
try. They would fbon be tir d with a Book contain-
ing nothing but Propofitions contrary to thofe of Eu-
elide ; for-being fully convinced of the Truth of thofe
Propofitions by unanfwerable Demonftrations , our
Curiofity ceafes in that Point: Which is an infallible
Argument, that the only reafon of the Inclination of
Men after Novelty, is becaufe they do not evidently
fee the Truth of thofe things they naturally defire to
know, nor poffefs Infinite Felicity, which they are na-
turally defirous to poflefs.
Therefore it is neceffary that Novelty fhould Excite ifjree
Men, and that they fhould Love it: But however. Rules tn
there are Exceptions to be made, and they mufl ob- moderate
ferve certain Rules which it is eafie to infer from what Curiofity.
we have been faying, that the Inclination we have for
Novelty is only given us in order to feek out Truth,
and our real Felicity.
There are Three, the firft of which is, That Men
muft not be fond of Novelty in things relating to Faith
which are not fubmitted to Reafon
Bbbb 3
The
20 A Search after Truth. Book IV.
The Second, That Novelty is not a fuflicient Rea-
fon to induce us to believe that things are Good or
True : That is. We muft not fancy that Opinions are
true becaufe they are new; nor that any thing can be
capable to content us, becaufe it is new or extraordi-
nary, or becaufe we have not poflefs'd it before.
The Third, That when we are fatisfy*d that Truths
arefo conceal'd that it is morally impoffible todifcover
them, and that BeneHts are fo little, and fo inconfide-
rable that they cannot fatisfie us, we muft not fuffer
our felves to be excited by the Novelty of them, nor
to be feduc'd by falfe hopes. But it is necelfary to ex-
plain thefe Rules more at large ; and (hew how by a
negled: of cm we fall into an infinite number of
Errors.
IL Varti' Minds of very different Hu-
cular ex- "^ours: Some believe every thing blindly: Others
flanathn will never believe without feeing evidently. The firft
of the fiyji having hardly ever made any ufe of their Underftand-
of thofe ing, do without confidering, believe whatever isfaid to
them ; the others, who will truft to nothing but their
Uuderftanding, indifferently condemn all forts of Au-
thorities. The firft are commonly ftupid and weak
Perfons, like Children and Women ; the others are
proud and profane Difpofitions, like Hereticks and
Philofbphers.
It is very difficult to find Perfons who keep a Me-
dium between thofe two Extreams, and who never
look for Evidence in matters relating to Faith through
a vain Agitation of Mind, or who fometimes believe
falfe Opinions without Evidence, in things relating to
Nature, through an , indifcreet Deference \ and low
Submiifion of Mind. If they are Perfons of Piety,
who fubmit to the Authority of the Church in all things,
their Faith extends fometimes, if I may ufe the Ex-
predion, even to Opinions that are meerly Philofophi-
cal; and they often look upon them with the lame
Refpedl: as is only due to the Truths of Religion. A
falfe Zeal makes them too eafily condemn thofe that
are not of their Opinion. They harbour injurious
Sufpicions againft thofe that make New Difcoveries.
It
]P
Chap.111. A Search after Truth.
It is fufficient to be efteem'd by them as Libertines,
to deny that there are fubftanrial Forms, that Animals
are fenfible of Pain and Pleafure, and other Philofo-
phical Opinions, which they look upon as Truth with-
out any evident Reafon, only becaufe they imagin
there are neccflary Relations between thofe Opinions
and the Truths or Faith.
But if they are Perfons that are too bold, their Pride
induces them to defpife the Authority of the Church ;
they never fubmit willingly to it. They delight in
difficult ralh Opinions: They affed to pafs for migh-
ty Wits ; and upon that account they fpeak of Divine
Myfteries without Refped, and with a kind of Haugh-
tinefe: They defpife all as Credulous, who fpeak mo-
deftly of certain receiv'd Opinions. Finally, they are
very much inclin'd to doubt of every thing, and are
diredly oppos'd to thofe who are too eafily inclin'd
to fubmit to the Authority of Men.
It is obvious, that thefe two Extreamsare bad,and
thofe who will not admit Evidence in Natural Quefti-
ons are blameable, as well as thofe who would have
Evidence in Myfteries of Faith. But yet thole who
Expofe themfelves to be miftaken in Philofophical
Queftions in being too Credulous, are without doubt
more exculable than the others who run the hazard of
falling into fome Herefie or other in doubting Ralhly,
For it is lels dangerous to fall into a World of Errors
in Philofophy for want of examining them, than to
fall into one Herefie for want of lubmitting with Hu-
mility to the Authority of the Church.
The Mind is at quiet when it meets Evidence, and
is in continual Agitation when it finds none. Becaufe
Evidence is the Charader of Truth. Thus the Error
of Libertines, and of Hereticks, proceeds from their
doubting of the Truth of the Dccilions of the Church,
becaufe they are not Evident, and they hope that the
Truths of Faith may be demonftrated. Now their
Love for Novelty is Irregular, fince that polfefting the
Truth in the Faith of the Church, they ought not to
feek farther : Befides, the Truths of Faith being far
above the reach of their Underftanding, they would
B b b b 4 not
23
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j4 Search after Truth. Book IV, W'
not be able to difcover them, fuppofing that accor- wiioF
ding to their Falfe Opinion, the Church were guilty 0;^
of Error.
But if there are many who deceive themfelyes in
refufing to fubmit to the Authority of the Church , ^
there are as many who are deceiv'd in fubmittingto
the Authority of Men. We muft fubmit to the Au-
thority of the Church , becaufe it can never fubmit
Blindly to the Authority of Men, becaufe they are
always liable to Miftakes. What the Church teaches
us, is Infinitely above the reach of Reafon: What
Men teach us, is fubmitted to our Reafon: So that
as it is a Crime, and an Infupportable Vanity, to en-
deavour to find out the Truth in Matters of Faith by biui
our Reafon, without regarding the Authority of the '
Church: So it is a great Indifcretion, and a defpicable iouglili'
poornefs of Spirit, to rely blindly on the Authority of appofe
Men, in Things which relate to Reafon.
Neverthelels, moft of thofe that are efteem*d Isjuoiii
Learned Men in the World, have only acquir'd that Imi
Reputation, by knowing the Opinions of Ariflotle^ of 3%/if
Plato^ of Epicurus^ and of feme other Philofophers by :kras
Heart, by lubmitting blindly to their Sentiments, and iWl
by defending them with Obftinacy. In order to ob- Oriai^
tain the Reputation of Learning in the Univerfities,
it is fuificient to be acquainted with the Sentiments ¥ojisa
of fome Philofopher : Provided they will Swear J» -Jhe
Verba Magiftri^ they foon become Dodlors. Moft
Communities ftick to a peculiar Dodfrine, which the
Members are not allow'd to deviate from. What is iwiJiajJ
True in fome, is often Falfe in others. They are jdtlm
fometimes Proud of defending the Dodlrine cf their rfenieri
Order, againft Reafon and Experience ^ and they '
think themfelves oblig'd to wreft the Truth, or their
Authors to reconcile them: This produces a World of
Frivolous Diftindtions, which are fo many by ways,
that lead Infallibly to Error.
If any Truth is difcover'd, even in our days, Ari-
muft have feen it; or if AriftoHe bt
theDifcovery mult be Falfe. Some make thft Philo-
fopher fpeak one way, others another ; for all thofe ^
who
C-
Chap.III. A Search after Truth.
who pretend to Learning, make him fpeak their Lan-
guage : He is made the Author of all forts of Imper-
linencies, and few Difcoveries are made, whrch are
not found Enigmatically in fome corner or other of hfs
Books. In a word, he is ever contradidting himfelf,
if ndt in his Works, yet at leaft in the Mouths of thofe
that teach him. For though Philofophers proteft, and
even pretend to teach his Dodlrine, it is difficult to
i meet two that agree about his Sentiments: For indeed
AriflotJes Books are fo Obfcure, and filfd with fuch
rambling general Terms, that one may with fome
Appearance of Truth, impute to him the Opinions of
thofe that are moft oppofite to his. It is ealie to make
him fay whatever one has a mind to in fome of his
Works, becaufe he hardly fays any thing in them,
though he makes a great deal of Noife ; as Children
fuppofe the Sounds of the Bells to fay what they
pleafe, becaufe they make a great deal of Noife and
fay nothing.
I muft confefs that it T ems very Rational to fix and
to ftop the Mind on fome particular Opinions,to hinder
it from running out into Extravagancies. But what
then ? Muft it needs be done by FaKhood and Error ?
Or rather can any one believe that Error can fix the
Mind Let Men examine how difficult it is to find
Perfons of Senfe pleafed with the reading of Ariflotle^
and that can pcrfwade themfelves they have acquired
any true Science, even after having grown old on his
Books; and it will appear plainly, that nothing but
Truth and Evidence can fix the Agitations of the Mindj
and that Difputes, Averfions, Errors and even Herefies,
are entertain'd and encourag'd by an 111 Manner of
Study. Truth confifts in Individuality, it is not capa-
ble of Variety ; and nothing befides it can reconcile
Peoples Minds: FaKhood and Error only ferve to di-
vide and agitate them.
I do not queftion but there are fome who do verily
believe, that he they call the Prince of Philofophers,
is no-wife in an Error, and that Real and Solid Philo-
fophy are only to be found in his Works. There are
fome who fancy, that though it is Twothoufand
Years
'fc?
36
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Aug. de
Magiftro.
A Search after Truth. Book IV,
Years Gnce Arlftotle wrote, no body has yet been able
to difcover that he was guilty of any Error j and con-
lequently being in fome refpecflrs Infallible, they may
boldly follow him, and quote him as fuch. But I do
not think it worth my while to anfwer fuch Perfons,
becaufe their Ignorance is fo grofs, that it only deferves
Contempt. I only defire them to tell me, whether
Arijlotle, or any of his Difclples, have ever deduced
any Truths from the Principles of Natural Philofbphy
which may be called his ; or if they, or any of them,
have done it themlelves, let them declare it, let them
explain it, and let them prove it j and we do engage
our felves, never more to Ipeak of Ariftotle without
an Elogy ; we will no longer fay, that his Principles
are Ufelefs, lince they have ferved to prove one
Truth; but there is no reafbn to expedt it. They
were long fince challenged to do it, and particularly by
Monfieur Defcartes in his Metaphyfical Meditations
about Forty Years ago, even with a Promife to demon-
Urate the Falfity of that Pretended Truth: And there
is no great likelihood to believe, that any body will
ever prefume to do, what Monfieur Defcartes greateft
Enemies, and the raoft 2^aIous Defenders of Ari^
ftotle's Philofophy, have not hitherto dar'd to under-
rake.
Therefore I hope I may prefume to fay, that it is a
ftrange Blindnefs, Poornefs of Mind, and Stupidity of
Spirit, thus to fubmit to the Authority of Arijiotle, of
Plato, or of any other Philofopher whatever: That
People lofe their time in reading them, when their
only Defign is to get their Opinions by Heart; and
thole that teach them make their Difciples lofe theirs
Iikewife.Therefore give me leave to fay with SuAuJlin,
* That thofe are Poolijhly Curious, who fend their Sons to
the College, in order to learn the Sentiments of their
Mafter, That Philolbphers cannot inftrudl us by their
Authority, and if they pretejid to do it they
own
are Unjuft : That it is a kind" of Folly and Impiety
to Swear their Defence Solemnly: And finally,
thofe Injuftly confine Truth, who out of Intereft
oppofe the new Opinions of Philofbphy which may be
True,
,iie,
Chap.IV. Search after Truth.
True, to preferve thofe which are fufiiciently known
to be Faife or Ufelefs.
27
CHAP. IV.
\
A Cofttimation of the fame SuhjeB:. I. Exflana-
tion of the Second Rule of Curiofiy. II. Exfla-
nation of the Third.
T^HE Second Rule that muft be obferv'd, is, That I, Second j
Novelty muft never ferve as a Reafon to believe Ru/e of
that things are True. We have already faid fevera! Curhftj.
times, that Men muft not reft in Error, and in the
FalTe Felicities they enjoy : Thar it is neceflary they
Ihould Search after the Evidence of Truth, and the
real Felicity they do not poflfefs; and confequently
that they fliould look after fuch things as are New and
Extraordinary. But therefore it does not follow that
they Ihould always ftick to them, nor believe, with-
out reafon> that Opinions are True, becaufe they are
Mew; and that thofe are real Felicities which they
have not as yet enjoy'd. Novelty fliould only induce
them to examine new things with care; they muft
not defpife them, becaufo they do not know them ;
nor raflily believe that they contain what they wifti and
hope for.
But this often comes to pafs: Men after having ex-
amin'd the Ancient and Common Opinions, have
not difcover d the Light of Truth in them: After
having had a Tafte of the ufual Felicities of the World,
they have not found that Solid Satisfatftion in them,
which (hould accompany the PoCfeflion of a real Good:
So that their Defires and their Eagernefs are not allay'd
by the ufual Opinions and common Felicities. For
which reafon, when they hear any thing that is New
and Extraordinary, the Idea of Novelty puts them in
hopes at firft. That it is the thing they are in Search of.
And whereas it is Natural to Flatter our felves, and
to
A Search after Truth. Book IV.
. 'dot®)"
to believe that Things are as we wi(h they might be >
their Hopes increafe proportionably to their Defires'
And in fine, they Infenfibly change into Imaginary
Aflurances. In the next place, They joyn the Idea of iJun;
Novelty, and the Idea of Truth, fo clofe together, Jjjjjjjji
that the one never offers it felf without the other ;
and that which is moft New, appears to them to be
more True, and better than thaf which is more
Ufual and Common; in which they are very
different from thofe, who out of Averfion to Herefie,
have joyn'd the Idea of Novelty to that of Falfe-
nefs, imagining that all New Opinions are Falfe and ««
Dangerous. j
Therefore we may fay that this ufual Difpofition '
of the Mind, and of the Heart of Men, in relation to
that which bears the Charadier of Novelty, is one of i u
the moft general Caufes of Errors, for it feldom leads
them to Truth; whenever it does, it is by Chance
and good Luck: And finally. It always direcfts them
from their real Happineis, by engaging them in that
Multiplicity of Divertifements and Falfe Felicities
that the World abounds with : And this is the moft
Dangerous Error into which they can fail. ® ®
The Third Rule againft the Exceflive Defires of
Novelty is. That when we are certain that fome
Truths are fo Myiierious, that it is Morally Impoffible ® ^
to difcover them, and that fome Felicities are fo In- '
eonfiderable that they can never make us Happy, we
ought not to fuft'er our felves to be Excited by the
Novelty of them.
Everybody may know by Faith, by Reafon and
Experience, that ci*eated Goods can never fill the In-
finite apacity of the Will. Faith teaches us, That
all the Things of this World are only Vanity; and
that our Happinefs neither confifts in Honours or
Riches. Reafon affures us, That fince it is not in our
Power to bound our Defires, and that we are Natu-
rally inclin'd to Love all Felicities, we can never be
Happy, without PoffelEng that which Includes them
all. Our own Experience makes us Senfible, that we '^^ii
are not Happy in the PolfelEon of thofe Goods which
we
X
.V,
k
138
Chap.IV. A Search after Truth' 29
we do enjoy, fince we ftill wifli for more. Finally,
We daily fee that the Great Felicities which the mo(t
Powerful Princes and Kings enjoy on Earth, are not
apable to fatisfie their Defires; that they are even
more Uneafie and more Unhappy than others; and
that being Seated on the highelt Spoke of the Wheel
of Fortune, they are the more liable to be precipitated
and fhook by its Motion, than thofe that are under-
neath them, or nearer to the Center. For they never
fall but from on high; their Wounds are always
great; and all the Grandeur they are attended with,
and which they annex to their own Being, ferves only
to Swell and Aggrandize them , to make them more
SenGble of a greater number of Wounds, and expofe
them the more to the Strokes of Fortune.
So that Faith, Reafon and Experience, convincing
us that the Delights and Pleafures of the Earth, which
we have not as yet tafted, could not make us Happy
^ though we Ihould enjoy them: We muft be very care-
fill, according to that Third Rule, not to fufler our
felves to be Foolilhly Flatter'd with vain Hopes of
Happinefs, which increafing by degrees proportionably
toourPafiion and to our Defires, would change at
iaft into a Falfe Aifurance : For when we have a
Violent Paffion for any Good, we always look upon
it to be very great, and we perfwade our felves
Infenfibly, that the PoflefTion of it will make us
Happy.
Therefore we muff refift thofe Vain Defires, fince
our Endeavours to fatisfie them would be in vain.
But particularly, becaufe that by abandoning our
felves to our Paflions, and by employing our time to
gratifie them, we lofe God and all things with him.
We only wander from one Falfe Felicity to another ;
We always live in Falfe Hopes; We difTipate our
Spirits, and are agitated a Thoufand different ways ;
We meet Oppofitions every where, becaufe the Advan-
tages we feek for are defired by many, and cannot be
poflelfed by many. For as St. Paul teaches us, Tfjofe Ch.-ip. 6,
^ that have a mind to grovo ^ich, fall into Temptations
^ t and into a Snare t>f the Devil, and mto divers ujelefsper'
,0CD . . nieious
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A Search after Truth. Book IV.
nicious Dejires, which -precipitate Men into the Ahyfs
Perdition and Damnation ; for Covetoufnefs is the ^ot of '0 '
all Evil.
And as we ought not to feek after the Goods of
"World which are new, becaufe we are affur'd that i? ^
we (hall not find the Happinefs we look for^ neither
ought we to have the leaft Defire of knowing newi^^'
Opinions upon a great number of difficult Quettions,
becaufe we are informed , that the Mind of Man
not capable of difcovering the Truth of them.
of the Queftions that are treated of in Morality, andfl®^.
particularly in Natural Philofophy, are of that kind
and therefore it behoves us to be very diffident
many Books that are daily written upon thofe Obfcurei»^
Intricate Matters. For though abfolutely fpeaking theJf ^
Queftions they contain may be refolv'd, there areip^®^^'
ft ill fo few Truths dilcover'd, and fo many others
know, before we can come to thofe the faid Books
treat of, that we cannot read them without advcn-**!
taring to lofe confiderably. tfijwi
Yet Men do not regulate themfelves thus, they doilwap^
quite the contrary: They do not examine whether
what is faid to them is poflible: Do but promife
them extraordinary Things, as the Reparation of —
Natural Heat, of B^adical Moijiure, of Vital Spirits^
or other things they do not underftand, and you will
ftraight excite their Vain Curiofity. It is fufficient in
order to blind and to gain them to propofe Paradoxes nfiL
to them ; to u(e obfcure Words, Terms of Influencej'/
and the Authority of fome unknown Authors ; or elfe '
to perform (ome very fenfible and extraordinary Ex-
periment, although it has no manner of relation to the
thing propofed, for it is enough to Surprife them, in
order to Convince them. peSi
If a Phyfician, a Chyrurgion, an Empirick, quote
Paffages in Greel^^ and Latin, and make ufe of new and
extraordinary Terms, they pafs immediately for great
Men J Men give them a Power over Life and Death; j
they are believ'd like Oracles; they fancy themfelves
far above the common Level of Mankind, and think
ihey penetrate into the bottom of things. And when \
lome
Chap.V. Search after Truth.
fome are fo Indifcreec as to intimate, that they are not
fatisfied with five or fix words which really fignifie
and prove nothing ; they fancy that thofe People have
not commom Senfe, and that they deny firft Prin-
cipies. And indeed the firft Principles of thofe Men,
are four or five Scraps of Latin out of feme Author,
or fome Greek Paflage, if they are better Scholars.
Moreover, It is necelfary that Learned Phyficians
(hould fometimes fpeak a Language which their Patients
do not underftand, in order to gain fome Reputation,
and to be obey'd.
A Phyfician who only underftands Latin, may be
efteem'd in a Village; becaufe Latin is both Greeks
and Arabick, to Peafants: But unlefs a Phyfician can
at leaft read Greek,, to learn fome of Hypocrates^s
Aphorifms, he muft not expecft to pafs for a Learned
Man in Cities where moft People underftand Latin,
For which reafon even the moft Learned Phyficians
knowing this Humour of Men, are oblig'd to fpeak
like Quacks and Illiterate Men; and one muft not
always judge of their Capacity and Senfe, by what
they fay in their Vifits.
31
CHAP. V.
I, of the Second Natural Inclination^ or of Self-
Love, II. It is divided into the Love of
Being and of Well-Being^ or of Greatnefs and
Pleajure,
'He Second Inclination which the Author of Nature I. Of tli?.
imprints continually in our Will, is the Love of Second
our felves, and of our own Prefervation.
We have already faid, That God loves all bis chnatjon.
Works; and that it is only the Love he bears them®'* of Self-
that preferves them ; and which Wills, That all ere-
ated Spirits fliould have the fame Inclinations with
bim, Therefore it is his Will, that they Ihould ail
~ ^ ^ have
A Search after Truth. Book IV^.' uli<
have a Natural Inclination for their Prefervation, and W
that they fliblild Love themfelves. Thus it is lawful ibinj
and reafonable to Love our felves, (ince we are Ami- Adi
able, fince God himfelf Loves us, and fince it is his bji
Pleafure that we fliould Love our felves: But this is T1
no reafon that we Ihould Love our felves more than Imot
God, fince God is Infinitely more Amiable than we lure;
are. It is Unjuft to place our Final End in our felves, 0
and not to Love our felves in relation to God ; be-
caufe, as we have no Goodnefs, nor any Subfiftance |tli
of our felves, but only what we participate of the
Goodnefs and Being of God, we are not Amiable of lof
our felves, but only in relation to him. M
Neverthelefs, The Inclination we fhould have for
God is loft by Sin ; and ail that remains of it is an M
Infinite Capacity in our Will for all Felicities, or for ilepem
Good in General, and a ftrong Inclination to polfefs jiepe
them which can never be deftroy'd: But the Inclina- iieirl
tion we ought to have for our Prefervation or Self- tlie
Love, has increafed it felf to that degree, that it is at ht 1
laft become abfolute Matter of the Will. It has more-
over chang'd and transformed into its own Nature the ail
Love of God , or the Inclination which we have tor
<jood in General, and the Love which we ought to
have for other Men. For we may fay now, That we iylii(j|
only Love our felves, fince we Love nothing but in jjpj
relation to our felves; whereas we ought only to Love ;[|0
God, and all things in relation to God. ajj/j
If Faith and Reafon teach us, that God is the only
Sovereign Good, and that he alone can make us per-
fedlly Happy; we may eafily conclude that we mutt
Love him, and we are eafily enough inclined to it;
But without Grace it is ftill Self-Love that Induces
us to Love him. Pure Charity is lb much above our
Strength, that we are fo far from Loving God for 3^]^^
himfelf, that Humane Reafon cannot eafily conceive, L /
that we can Love him otherwife than in relation to our ^
felves, and that we have any other Final End but our
own Satisfadlion. Self-love then is the abfolute Matter <
of our Will, fince the Diforder of Sin, and the Love
of God and of our Neighbour, are now only the
chap. V. A SeArch kfter Truth. 5^
Confequences of it; fince we no longer Love any
thing, but b^caufe that in Loving it, we expert fome
Advantage, or that we adhially receive fome Pleafure
by it.
This Self-love may be divided into two Kinds, 'vi:{,XLSeIf'love
Into the Love of Greatnefs, and into the Love of Plea- is divided
fure; orelfeinto the Love of our Being, and of'thef^^o
Perfe(ffion of our Being ; and into the Love of our
Well-being, or of Felicity.
By the Love of Greatnefs we afFedf Power, Pre-
ferment, Independehcy, and that our Being fliould fub-'^''^
of it felf. We dedre in fome refpedt to have a
Neceflary Being: In one Senfewe are defiroiis to be
like Gods; for none but God has properly a Being
which is neceflarily Exiftent; fince that whatever is
Dependent exifts only by the Will of him on whom
it depends. Therefore Men wifliing the Neceflity of
their Being, alfo defire a Power over others. But
by the Love of Pleafure they defire not only a Being,
but a Well-being; becaufe Pleafure is a manner
of Being, which is beftandmoft Advantageous to the
SouL
We niuft note, that Greatnels, Excellence and In-
dependence of the Creature, are not kinds of Being
which make us Happy of thenhfelves; fince it often
happens, that Men become Miferable in proportion
to their growing Great. But as for Pleafure, it is a
kind of Being which we cannot receive adlually, with-
out a(^ually becoming more Happy. Greatnefs and
Independence for the moft part are not in us, and
commonly they only confift in the relation we have
to thofe things which are about us. But Pleafures are
in tjfe very Soul, and they are real Modes by which'
it is mckiified, and which by their own Nature are
capable of fatisfying it. Therefore we look upon Ex-
cellence, Greatnefs and Independence, as things that
are proper for the Prefervadon of our Being, and even
fometimes as very ufeful, according to the Order of
Nature, for the Prefervation of the Well-being: But
pleafure is always a manner of Being of the Mind,
which by it felf makes it Happy and fatisfies it; fp
^ Cccc that
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34 Search after Truth. Book IV.
that Pleafure is a Well-being, and the Love of Plea-
fure the Love of Well-being.
Now the Love of Well-being is fo Powerful,'
that it fometimes proves Stronger than the Love of
Being ; and Self-Love makes us fometimes defire not
to be, becaufe we have not a Well-being. This is
the Cafe of all the Damned , who according to the
Word of Jefus Chrifty had better not to be, than to be
fo Unhappy as they are; becaufe thefe Wretches
bping declar'd Enemies to him in whom all Goodnefs
inters, and who is the Sole Caufe of Pleafure and
of Pain which we are capable of j it is impoflible they
(hould enjoy any Satisfaction ; they are and will be
Eternally Unhappy, becaufe their Will will ever re-
main in the fame Difpofition, and in the fame Irre-
gularity. So that Self-Love includes two Loves, the
Love of Greatnefs, of Power, of Independence and
generality of all things which leem to be proper for
the Prefervation of our Being ; and the Love of Plea-
fure, and of all things that are neceflary for our Well-
being, that is. To be Happy and Satisfied.
Thofe two Loves may be divided feveral ways:
Whether becaufe we are compofed of two different
partsof Soul and Body, according to which they may
be divided ; or becaufe they may be diftinguifti'd or
fpecified by the different ObjeCfs that are ufeful for our
Prefervation. However we will not inlarge upon thar,
becaufe, as we do not defign to make a Treatife of
Morality, it is not neceffary to make an Inquiry into,
and an exaCt Divifion of all the things we look upon as
our Felicities. It was only neceifary to make this
Divifion, to relate the caufe of our Errors in fome
order.
Therefore we fliall firft fpeak of thole Errors wMch
are caufed by our Inclination for Greatnels, and for all
thofe things that makes our Being Independant of
others: And afterwards we lhall treat of thofe which
proceed from the Inclination we have for Pleafure, and
for all thofe things which render our Being the belt it
can be for us, or that contents us mod,
CHAP,
Ghap. VL A Search after Truth*
CHAP. VI.
35
'.'X i
■ ■ "if ■
I. Of the Inclination we have for every thing that
raifes us above other Perfons. H. Of the falfe
Judgments of fome Pious Perfons, III. Of the
falfe Judgments of the Superftitious and Pdypo-
crites, IV. O/Voetius^w Enemy to Monfeur
Defcartes.
\y^Hatever raifes us above oihers by making us t of the
^ ^ more Perfe(ft, as Science and Virtue; or that inclinati-
gives us an Authority over them by making us mote onwe have
Powerful, as Dignities and Riches, leem in fome mesL'for aHthat
fiire to make us Independent. All thofe that are be- raifes us a'
neath us, have a Refped for us and fear us; they
are always ready to do what pleafes us for our Prefer- ^trjons.
vation ; and they dare neither Prejudice us, nor op-
pofe our Defires. Therefore Men conftantly endea-
vour to poffels thofe Advantages which raife them
above others. For they never confiderthat both their
Being and Well-being in Truth only depend on God
above, and not on Men; and that the true Greatnefs
which will make them Eternally Happy, does not con-
fill in that Rank which they hold in the Imagination
of other Men, as Weak and as Miferable as them-
lelvesj but in an hiiinble SubmilTion to the Will of
God, who being Juft, will not fail to reward thofe
who remain within the Order he hath prefcribed.
But Men do not only delire EfFe(ftively to poflefs
Learning and Vertue, EHgnities and Riches ; they alfo^
ufe their utmoft Efforts, in order to perfuade others
that they do really poffefs them. And if it may be
faid, that they endeavour lefs to appear Rich than to
be realiy fo ; it may alfo be faid, that they often take
lefs care to be Virtuous, than to appear lo; For as the'
Author of the'Book Entituled,. B^fleBiones Morales^ fa^'s
agreeably, Virtue voouid not go far, tintefs it were accom-
panied with Vanit)%
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j6 A Search after Truth. BookIV»
The Reputation of being Rich» Learned and Vir-
tuous, produces in the Imagination of thofe that are
about us, or that are more nearly related to us, very
convenient Difpofitions for us: It makes them fall at
our Feet; it makes them adf in our Favour ; it In-
fpires them with ail the Motions that tend to the Pre-
fervation of our Being, and to the Increafe of our
Grandeur. Thus Men preferve their Reputation, as
a Good which is neceffary for them to Live with Eafe
in the World.
All Men then have an Inclination for Virtue, Learn-
ing. Dignities and Riches, and for the Reputation of
pofleffing thofe Advantages. We will now endeavour
to (how by fome Examples, how thofe Inclinations may
engage them into Error. Let us, begin by the Inclina-
tion that Men have for Virtue, or for the Appearance
of Virtue.
Thofe who apply themieJves Serioufly to become
Virtuous, commonly imploy their Mind and Time to
underftand Religion, and to excrcife themfelves in
good Works: They only defire with Sr. Paul^ to be
acquainted with Jeftis Chrifl Crucified, to find out a
Remedy for the Diftemper and Corruption of their
Nature. They defire no other Knowledge than that
which is neceflary for them to live Chriftianly, and to
know their Duty ; after which they apply themfelves
to fulfil them with Zeal and Exacftnefs. And there-
fore they feldom trouble themfelves about Sciences,
which appear Vain and Barren in reipedl to their
Salvation.
No Fault can be found with that Conducfl, it is In-
H. Of the finitely to be valued; Men would Efteem themfelves
falfeJudg'Ug^^ipy to oblerve it cxadlly; and they often repent
merits of not having followed it more. But this is un-
fome Pious approvable, that fince it is certain that there are Sciences
Perfons. ^Liblutely Humane, very Certain and Ufeful, which
difingagc the Mind from SenfiBle Things, and ufe it
by degrees to relilh the Truths of the Gofpelj fome
Pious Perfons, without having cxamin*d them, con-
demn them too freely, either as being Ufelefe^ or Un-
certain.
Chap^ VI. A Search after Truth,
It is true, that moft Sciences are very ancertafn and
very wielefs: Men are partly in the right, to believe
that they only contain Truths which ^re of little ufe.
No body is obJigM to ftudy them ; and it is better to
defpife them, than to fuffer ones (elf to be deceiv'd or
blinded by them. Neverthelefs we may affirm, That
it is very necefifary to know feme Meraphyfical Truths:
The Univerfal Knowledge, or the Exiftence of a God,
is abfoiutely neceflary, (ince even the Certainty of
Faith depends on the Knowledge which Realon gives
of the Exiftence of a God. It is neceflary to know,
that it is his Will which makes, and which regulates
Nature ; That the Force or Power of Natural Caufes
is only bis Will: In a word. That all things whatever
depend on God.
It is alfo neceffary to know what Truth is, the
means to diftinguifh it from Error, the Diftindtion be-
tween the Mind and Body, the Confequences that may
be drawn from it, as the Immortality of the Soul, and
feveral other things of that kind which may be known
with certainty.
The Knowledge of Man, or of ones felf, is a Science
that cannot be reafonably defpis'd; it contains a World
of things which are abfoiutely neceffary to be known
to jiave fome Juftnefs and Penetration of Mind: And
we may fay. That if a Stupid Ignorant Man is Infi-
nitely above Matter, becaufe he knows that he is,
which Matter does not know; thofe who know Man,
are far above Stupid Ignorant Perfons, by reafon that
they know what they are, which the others do not
know.
But the Knowledge of Man is not only Valuable,
becaufe it raiies us above others; it is much more
fo, becaufe it humbles us before God. - That Know-
ledge makes us perfedlly Senfible of the Dependence
we have on him in all things, and even in our mo(t
common Adions: It plainly difcovers the Corruption
of our Nature: It difpofes us to apply our felves to
' him who alone can cure us ; to rely wholly on him,
and not to truft or rely on our (elves: And thus
it gives many Difpofitions of Mind, which are
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A Search after Truth. BooklV,
very proper ,to fubmit our felves to the Grace of the
Gpfpel.
"We ought at leaft to have a Superficial Tindure,
and a general Knowledge of the Mathematicks*- and
pf Nature. We ought to learn thofe Sciences in our
Youth; they difingage the Mind from Senfible
Things, and hinder it from becoming Weak and
Effeminate: They are ufeful enough in Life ; they
incline us towards God ; the Knowledge of Nature
does it of it felf; and that of the Mathematicks by the
Difgutt it Infpires in us of the Falfe Impreffions of our
Senfes.
Virtuous Perfons muft not defpife thofe Sciences,
nor look upon them as Uncertain and Ufelefs, unlefs
they are certain that they have ftudicd them enough
to judge Solidly of them: There are many others
which they may boldly Defpife ; Let them Cbndemn
the Poets to the Flames , Heathen Philofophers,
Rabbies, fome Hiftorians, and a great Number of
Authors, which make the Pride and Knowledge of
fome of the Learned ; we (hall be little troubled at it.
But let them not Condemn the Knowledge of Nature,
as being contrary to Religion; fince Nature being
regulated by the Will of God, the true Knowledge
of Nature teaches us how to admire the Power,
Grandeur and Wifdom of God. For it feems that
God has form'd the Univerfe in order, th;^t wefhould
Study it, and that by that Study we (hould learn
to Know and: to Refped: the Author of it. So that
thofe who Condemn the Study of Nature, feem to
oppofe the Will of God; unlefs they pretend that
Sin has rendred Man Incapable of that Study. It is
alfo Vain for tliem to tell us , That the Knowledge
ol Men only ferves to make them Proud and Vain,
becaufe thofe who have the Reputation of having
a perfed Knowledge of Man , 'though they often
know him 111, are commonly Intolerably Proud :
For it is evident, That no Man can know himfelf
well, without being Senfible of his Weaknefe and
Miferies,
Neither
'■k \ H
Chap.VI. ^ Semh after Truth. 39
Neither are they Perfons of a real and Iblid Piety, V
that ufually condemn what they do not underftand
but rather Superftitious and Hypocrites. The Super-
ftitious out of a fervile Fear, and through a bafenels l.f
and weafcnefs of Mind areftartled at the fight of
lively penetrating Wit. Do but, for Example, give
them Natural Reafons for Thunder, and for its Ef-
fc<^, and they look upon you ftrait as an Atheift,
But the Hypocrites out of a Hellifli Malice, transform
themfelves into Angels of Light. They make ufe of
the appearances of holy Truths which are reverenc'd,^
by all the World to oppofe Truths, which are but
little known, and little valu'd, out of private Intereft.
They Combat Truth with the Image of Truth ; and
often in their Hearts, Laugh at what all the World
Refpeds; they eftablifh in the Opinion of Men, a
Reputation, which is fo much the more folid and to
be fear'd, as the thing they abtife is the more
Sacred.
Therefore thofe Perfons are the ftrongeft, and moft
formidable Enemies of Truth. Indeed, they are
pretty rare, but a fmall number of them is capable of
doing a great deal of harm. The appearance of Truth
and of Virnie, often does more milchief, than Truth
and Virtue do good ; for one cunning Hypocrite is
capable to overthrow what feveral truly Wife and
Virtuous Perfons have rais'd with a great deal of Pain
and Labour.
Monfieur Drfcartes^ for inftance, has demonftrative-
ly proved the Exiftence of a God, the Immortality of
our Souls, feveral other Metaphyfical Queftions, a
great number of Phyfical Ones; and this Age is infi-
nitely oblig'd to him for the Truths he has difcover'd.
Yet here ttarts up an * inconfiderable Man, a hot and *Voetius,
vehement Exdaimer, refpedfed by fome People for the
Zeal he exprelfes for their Religion; He Writes In Jit-
rious Books againft him, and accufes him of the high-
eft Crimes. Defcartes is aCatholick^^ he has fttidied
under the ^efuits; he has often mention d them with 1^-
verence. That is fufficient for that malicious Man to
perfwade People that are Enemies to our Religion,
C ccc 4
40 A Search after Truth. Book IV#
and cafily mov'd in matters (b Nice as thofe of Religion,
that he is an Emi0ary of the JefuitSj.and has dange-
reus E)efigns: Becaufe the leaft appearances of Truth
upon matters of Faith, have more Force upon Peoples
Mnds, than real and effecftive Truths of Phyfical or
Metaphyfical things have, which are little valued.
Monneur Defcartes has written about the Exiftence of
God. That is matter enough for that Calumniator to
^xercife his falfe Zeal upon, and to oppofe all the
Truths his Enemy defends. He accufes him of being
an Atheift, and of teaching Atheifm cunningly and fe-
Cretly, like that infamous Atheift call'd Vaninoy who
was Burnt at Thouloufe ; who Cloak'd his Malice and
Impiety by Writing for the Exiftence of a God ; for
one of the Reafons urg'd by him to prove his Enemy
an Atheift, is, That he did Write againft AtHeifts, as
Vanino did, in order to cover his Impiety.
Thus it is eafie for a Man to opprefs Truth, when
he is feconded by the appearances of Truth, and has
acquir'd a great Afcendent over weak Minds. Truth
delights inMildnefs, and in Peace; and asftrongas it
is, it yields fometimes to the Pride and Haughtinefs of
Fallhoods, which Dreffes and Arms it felf with her
Appearances. Truth is very fenfible that Error can
never harm it; and if it remains fometimes as if it
were prefcrib'd and in Obfcurity, it is only to wait
for more favourable occafions to lliow its felf ; for at
laft it appears, for the moft part, ftronger and brighter
than ever, in the very place where it is opprefe'd.
I do not wonder that an Enemy of Monfieur Defcar-
tes, that a JVIan of a different Religion from his, that
an Ambitious Man, who defign'd to rife upon the
Ruins of Perfons that are above him, that a Railer
without Judcment, rhat Voettus ftiould l^ak with
Contempt of what he neither did, nor could under-
ftand. But lam furpris'd to find, that Perfons who
are neither Enemies to Monfieur Defcartes^ nor to his
Religion, IhouIJ entertain Sentiments of Averfion and
Contempt againft him, upon the account of the Ca-
lumnies they have read in Books written by the Ene-
mies of his Perfon,^ and ci his Religion.
Cbap.VI. J Search after Truth.
The Book written by that Heretick in titled, Defpe-
rata caufa PapatuSy fujfidently (hews his Impudence,
his Ignorance, and his Paflion, and his defire to appear
Zealous, in order thereby to acquire fomie Reputation
among thofe of his Party. Therefore he is not a Man
to be credited upon his Word. For as there is no
reaibn to believe all the Fables he has Colleded in
that Book againft our Religion, fo neither is there
any to Credit the Injurious Accufations be has invented
againft his Enemy.
Rational Men will not fuffer tbemfelves to be peri
fwaded, that Monfieur Defcartes is a dangerous Man,
becaufe they have read it in (ome Book or other, or
becaufe they have been told fo by Perfons, whofe Pie-
ty they have a Refpedf for. It is not lawful to believe
Men upon their bare Word, when they accufe others
ot the moft Enormous Crimes. It is not a fufEcient
proof to believe a thing, becaufe we hear it alfirm'd
! by a Man who fpeaks with Zeal and Gravity. For it
is impoflible for any Perfon to relate Falfities, and
Foolilh Stories, in the fame manner as he would relate
good things, particularly if he has fuffer*d himfelf to
be imposd upon out of Simplicity and Weaknefs.
It is ealie to difcover the Truth or Falfity of the
Accufations that are form'd againft Descartes ; his
! Writings are Extant, and eafte to be underftood, by
thofe that are capable of Attention. Therefore I
would advife People to Read his Works, in order to
get better Proofs againft him than bare Report, and I
do not queftion but after they have read and exa-
min'd them, they will no longer Accufe him of Atheifm ;
' and that on the contrary, they will pay him the Refpedf
that is due to a Man, who has plainly and evidently
demonftrated, not only the Exiftence of a God, and
the Immortality of the Soul, but alfo a World of other
Truths, which were unknown until his time.
CHAP,
ji Search after Truth. Book IV.
CHAP. VII.
Of the defire of Science., and of the Judgments of
fretenders to Learnings
'I 'He Mind of Man has without doubt, very little
Capacity and Extent, and yet he dehresto know
every thing. All Human Sdences cannot fatifie his
Defires ; and yet his Capacity is lb coi^fin'd, that he
cannot perfectly apprehend any one particular Science.
He is in a continual Agitation, and defires always to
know; whether he be in hopes of finding what he
looks for, as we have faid in the preceding Chapter ;
or whether he perfwades himfelf that his Soul and
Mind are extended by the vain pofleflion of fome ex-
traordinary Knowledge. The unruly defire of Hap-
pinels and Grandeur, makes him ftiidy all manner oi
Sciences, hoping to find his Felicia in the Science of
Morality ; and looking for this falfe Greatnefs in fpe-
culative Sciences.
What is the reafon that fome Perfons fpend all their
Life in reading of Rabbi's, and other Books Written
in Foreign, Obfcure, and Corrupted Languages j and
by Authors without Judgment and Knowledge: But
that they perfwade themfelves, that when they are
skiird in the Oriental Languages, they are greater
and higher than thofe who are Ignorant of them ?
And what is it that can encourage them in their in-
grateful, painful, ufelefs Labour, unlefs it be the Hope
of fome Preferment, and the Profpedl of fome new
Grandeur ? Indeed they are look'd upon as extraor-
dinary Men ; they are Complimented upon their pro
found Learning'; Peo|Je are better pleas'd to near
them than others: And though it may be faid, that
they are commonly theleaft Ji^icious, if it were only
for employing all their Life in a very ufelefe Study,
which can neither make them Wifer nor Happier:
Neverthelefs, moft People fancy that they have a great
deal
Chap.Vn. ^ Search after Truth.
deal more Senfe and Judgment than others: And as
they are more Larn'd in the Etymology of Words,
they alfo fancy that they are Learned in the Nature of
Things.
The fame reafon induces Aftronomers to fpend all
their Tkne and Eftate to get an exadf Knowledge of
Things; which are not only ufelefs, but alio impofli-
ble to know. They endeavour to find an exacff Regu-
larity in the Courfe of the Planets, which is not in
Nature; and to Form Aftronomical Schemes to fore-
tel Eflfedts, of which they do not know the Caufes.
They have made the Selenography.or Geography of the
Moon, as if People defign'd to Travel thither : They
have already divided it among thofe that are Famous
in Affronomy : There are few of them that have not
already fome Province or other in that Country, as a
Recompence for their great Labour; and I queftion
whether they are not Proud of having been in Favour
with him that has fo magnificently diftributed thofe
Kingdoms among them.
What is the reafon that Rational Men apply them-^
felves fb much to this Science, and yet remain in grofe
Errors, in re^dt to Truths which they ought to know,
unlefs they Fancy, thas it is a great thing to know
what pafles in the Heavens ? The knowledge of the
Vaft Things that pafles above, feems to them more
Noble, Greater, and more worthy of their great Wit,
than the knowledge of Vile Abjedfs, Corruptible
Things, as Sublunary Bodies are in their Opinion.
The Noblenefs of a Science is deriv'd from the No-
blenefs of its Objedfs : It is a great Principle I There-
fore the knowledge of the Motion of unalterable and
incorruptible Bodies, is the higheft and mofl fublime
of all Sciences. And for that reafon, it appears to
them worthy of the Greatnefs and Excellency of their
Mind.
Thus Men fiiffer themfelves to be blinded by a
falfe Idea of Grandeur, which pleafes and moves them.
As foon as their Imagination is ftruck by it, tb^ fall
down before that Phantafm, they Reverence it 9 it
deftroys and blinds their Reafon, which Ihould be the
Judge
A Search after Truth. Book III.
the Conjundlion of the Sun with Mars, are the Caufes
of thefe Effe(5ls, and others like them ; and the rea-
Ibn why all the World does not believe it, is, that they
do not always fee thefe Effebis follow thefe Caufes.
But all Men having commonly the Idea's of Ob-
jedfs prefent to their Minds as foon as they wife it,
and it happening many times in a day, almoft all con-
dude, that the Will which accompanies the produdi-
on, or rather the prefence of Idea's, is truly theCaufe
of them: Becaufe they fee nothing in the fame time
that they can attribute it to; and they imagin the
Idea's no longer Exifl:, when the Mind fees them no
longer ; and that they revive again anew, when they
are again reprefented to the Mind.
'Tis for thefe Reafons fome Judge, that External
Objeds emit Images which refemble them, as we
have mention'd in the precedent Chapter: For it being
impofTible to fee Objcds by themfelves, but only by
their Idea's, they judge the Objed produces the Idea j
becaufe as foon as it is prefent they fee it; and as foon
as abfent they fee it no longer; and becaufe the pi e-
fence of the Objed almoft always accompanies the
Idea which reprefents it to us.
Yet if Men were not prejudiced in their Judgments
from this, that the Idea's of things are prefent to their
Mind as foon as they Will them, they feould only con-
elude, that according to the Order of Nature, their
Will is commonly neceflary for them to have thofe
Idea s. Not that the Will is the true and principal
Caufe which prefents them to the Mind, and much
Icfs, that the Will produces them from nothing, or after
the manner they explain it. Nor ought they to con-
elude, that Objeds emit Species refembling them, be-
caufe the Soul commonly perceives them only when
they are prefent; but only that the Objed is for the
moft part neceffary, in order to the Idea's being pre-
fent to the Mind. And laftly, that a Bowl put into
Motion, is the principal and true Caufe of the feaking
of another Bowl that it meets in the way, fince the
firft had not the power of Motion in its felf. They
can only determin, that the meeting of two Bowls is
m
chap. IV. A Search after Truth. 41
an occafion to the Author, of the Motion of Matter to
execute the Decree of his Will, which is the Univerfal
Caufe of all things, in communicating to the other See Ch, 3.
Bowl a part of the Motion of the frft 3 that is, to 0/ the Sg'
[peak more clearly, in willing that the laft Ihould ac-
quire fo much more Motion as the iirft loft; for the
moving force of Bodies can proceed only from the
Will of him who preferves them, as we ftiall Ihew eJfe-
where.
CHAP. IV.
That we do not fee OhjeBs by the Means of Idea s
which were created with us. And that God does
not produce them in us fo often as we have occa^
fion for them,
T^H E Third Opinion is, That of thofe who fay all
Idea s are created with us.
To difcover the Improbability of this Opinion, it
will be neceffary to confider that there is many diffe-
rent things in the World of which we have Idea's.
But to [peak only of fimple Figures, it is certain that
the Number of them is Infinite: Nay, even if we con-
lider but one only, as the Ellipfis, we cannot doubt
but the Mind conceives an infinite Number of diffe-
rent Kinds of them, when it confiders that one of the
Diameters may be lengthened out to Infinity, and the
other always continue the fame.
So the heighth of a Triangle may be augmented
or diminifhed infinitely, the bafe being always the
fame, we may conceive there is an infinite Number
of different Kinds of them: And alfo, which 1 defire
may be confidefd here. The Mind in fome manner
perceives this infinite Number, although we can ima-
gine but very few of them ; and that we can at the
fame time have particular and diftindt Idea's of many
Triangles of different Kinds, But what muft chiefly
• be
iiij. ?
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A Search after Truth. Book III.
• J
be obfefved is. That this general Idea that the
Mind has of this Number of Triangles of difFe-
rent Kinds is fuificient to prove, That if we do
not conceive each of thefe different Triangles by
particular Idea's: And in (hort. If we comprehend
not their Infinity, 'tis not the Defed: of the Idea's, or
that Infinity is not reprefented to us, but only the
Defedl of the Capacity and Extenflon of the Mind.
If a Man fhould apply himfclf to confider the Pro-
per ties of all the diverfe Kinds of Triangles, although
he fhould eternally continue this fort of Study, he '0^^^
would never want new and particular Idea's, but his
Mind would be unprofirably fatigued.
What I have faid of Triangles, may be applied to
five, fix, a hundred, a thoufand, or ten thoufand fided porofflO^
Figures, and lb on ad infinitum. Now if the fides ot i4owii
a Triangle, which have infinite relations one with the 'iamtec
other, make Triangles of infinite Kinds, it is plain ukltti
that four, five, or a thoufand fided Figures are capable iuaiorji
of admitting much greater Differences, fince they itii
are capable of a greater Number of Relations and 'mi
Combinations of their fides, than fimple Triangles feoc
are.
The Mind then fees all thefe things; it hath Idea's abi
of them ; and thefe Idea's would never fail it, although jfeO
it fhould employ infinite Ages in the Coniideration of iweadi
one Figure only: And if it perceived not thefe infinite
Figures all of a iudden, or comprehended not their
Infinity, 'tis only becaufe its Extenfion is very much ^ iiuj
limited. It hath then an infinite Number of Idea's : ;
Do I fay an infinite Number P It hath as many infinite
Numbers of Idea's, as there are different Figures to
be confider'd: So that fince there is an infinite Num-
ber of different Figures, it's neceffary that to know the
Figures, the Mind have an infinitely infinite Number
of Idea's.
Now I ask, If it's probable that God fhould Create —
lb many things with the Mind of Man ? For my part
it does not appear fo to me ; chiefly, fince that might
be made in a more fimple and eafie manner, as we (hall
foon fee. For as God always adis by the moft fimple
ways.
chap J V. A Search after Truth,
v/^ySy it does not feem reafonable to explain how we
know Objedls, by admitting the Creation of an in-
finite Number of Beings, fince we can refolve this
Difficulty in a more Eafie and Natural way.
But although the Mind Ihould have a Magazine of
all the Idea's, which are necelTary for it to fee things,
ir would be yet more difficult to explain how the Soul
(hould make choice of them to reprefent them : For
inftance, how it can reprefent the Sun to it felf, whilft
it is prefent to the Eyes of its Body?
For whereas the Image which the Sun imprints in
the Brain, refembles not the Idea we have thereof,
as has been elfewhere proved ; and fince the Soul per-
ceives not the Motion that the Sun produces in the
bottom of the Eyes, and in the Brain, it's inconceiva-
ble how it (hould exadily guefs, amongft thefe infinite
Number of Idea's that it has, which it muft reprefent
to it felf, to imagine or to fee the Sun : We cannot
therefore fay. That the Idea's of things were created
with us, it is fufficient that we fee the Objedls that are
about us.
Nor can we fay that God produces as many of
them every Moment, as we perceive different things ;
this has been fufficiently refuted from what has been
faid in this Chapter. Befides it is neceffary that at all
times we adfually have in our felves the Idea's of all
things, fince we are always able to think of all things;
which we could not if we perceiv'd them already con-
fufedly ; that is. If an infinite Number of Idea's were
not prefent to our Minds; for we cannot will to
think ot Objedfs, of which we have no Idea.
CHAP.
A Search after Truth.
Book III,
CHAP. V.
That the Mind neither fees the EJfence^ nor Ex^
ifience of Objects, in confidering its own Per-
feBions, That none but God fees them in that
manner.
' I 'HE Fourth Opinion is. That the Mind ftands in
need of nothing befides it (elf, to perceive Ob-
Jed's; and that it can, in confidering it felf and its
own Perfedions, difcover all things that are with-
out it.
It is certain that the Soul fees within it felf, and
without Idea's, all the Senfations and PafTions it is
capable of, as Pleafure, Pain, Cold, Heat, Colours,
Sounds, Odours, Sapors, its Love, its Hatred, Joy
and Sadnefs, e3c. becaufe all the Senfations and
Paflions of the Soul reprefent nothing External which
is like them ; and becaufe they are only Modifications,
which nothing but the Mind is capable of. But the
Difficulty is, to know whether the Idea's which repre^
fent fomething that is without the Soul, and which
refembles them in fome meafure, as the Idea's of a
Sun, a Houfe, a Horfe, a River, are only Modi-
tications of the Soul; infomuch that the Soul cannot
Band in need of any thing befides it felf, to reprefent
to it felf all External Things.
There are Perlbns who make no Scruple to affirm.
That the Soul being made to think, it has in it felf,
I mean, in confidering its own Perfedions, whatever
is neceflary to perceive Objeds; for indeed the Soul
being nobler than all the things it conceives diftindly,
it may be faid, that it contains them in fome meafure
Eminently^ according to the Notions of the Schools ^
that is, after a Nobler and more Sublime Manner than
they are in themfelves. They pretend, that thus
Superior things comprehend the Perfedions of thole
that are Inferior. And thus being the Nobleft of the
Crea-
'!fe'
Chap. V. A Search after Truth* 4$
Creatures they know; they fancy they have in theni-
felves,after a Spiritual Manner,all that is in the vifible
"World. In a word, They will have the Soul to be
like an Intelligible "World, which comprehends in it
felf) whatever the Material and Senfible World com-
prebends; nay, Infinitely more.
But in my Opinion it is a great Prefumption to
maintain that Thought: If I am not miftaken, it is
Natural Vanity, the Love of Independence, and the
Defire of refembling him who comprehends all Beings
in himfelf, which Confounds the Mind, and inclines us
to believe, we polfefs what we have not: Do not fay
that you are a Light to your felf, fays St. Aufltn ; for
there is none but God who is a Light to himfelf, and Serm.S.D^
who can, in confidering himfelf, fee whatever he has Verbis Do-
produced, or can produce.. fnini.
It is certain that there was none but God alone
before the World was Created, and he could not pro-
duce it without Knowledge and without Idea's: Con-
fequently thofe Idea's which God had of the World,
are not different from himfelf; and thus all Crea-
tures, even the moft Material and molt Terrcftrial, are
in God, though in a manner altogether Spiritual,
which we cannot apprehend. God therefore lees ail
Beings in himfelf, in confidering his own Perfedlions
which reprefent them to him. He alfo knows their
Exiftence perfedly, for fince the Exigence of all
things depend on his Will, he cannot be Ignorant of
his own Will; it follows then, that he cannot be Igno-
rant of their Exiftence. And thus God does not only
fee in himfelf the Elfence of all things, but alfo their
Exiftence.
But the cafe is different as to Created Spirits, they
can neither fee the Elfence of things, nor their Ex-
iftence within themfelves: They cannot fee their
Elfence within themfelves, becaufe being very much
limited, they do not contain all Beings, like God whom
we may call the Univerfal Being, or plainly He that is,
as he calls himfelf. Since therefore the Humane
Mind may know all Beings and Infinire Beings, and
yet not contain them, it is a certain Proof
that it does
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A Search after Truth. Book IIL
ftot fee their Eflence in it felf. For the Mind does not
only fee fometimes one thing, and fometimes anothef
fucce/Tively, it alfo adlually perceives Infinity though
it does not comprehend it. So that not being adtually
Infinite, nor capable of Infinite Modifications at the
fame time, it is abfolutely ImpofTible that it Ihould
fee within it felf what is not there. Therefore it does
not fee the Elfence of things in confidering its own Per-
fedlions, or by modifying it felf diverfly.
Neither does it fee their Exiftence within it felf,
becanfe the Exiftence of Beings do not depend upon
its Will; and becaufe the Idea's of thofe Beings may
be prefent to the Mind, though they do not Exift ;
for every body may have the Idea of a Mountain of
Gold, though there be no Mountain of Gold in
Nature: And though we rely on the report of the
Senfes to judge of the Exigence of Objeds; neverthe-
lefs Reafon does not afliire us, that we fiiould always
believe our Senfes, lince we find clearly that they de-
ceive us. When a Man's Blood, for inftance, is very
much inflam'd ; or barely wiien he Sleeps, he fome-
times beholds Fields, Combats, and the like, which
neverthelefs are not prefent, and which perhaps never
were. Therefore it is certain that it is neither within
it felf, nor by it felf, that the Mind fees the Exiftence
of things, but that in this cafe it depends upon fome
other things.
CHAP. VI.
That we fee all thwgs in God,
E have examin'd in the preceding Chapter four
dift'erent Manners in which the Humane Mind
may lee External Objed:s, which do not appear pro*
bable to us: There only remains the Fifth, which alone
appears confonant to Realbn, and the molt proper to
(hew the Dependence that Spirits have on God in all
their Thoughts.
In
[,1 Chap.VL A Search after Truth. 47
w, In order to apprehend it rightly, we muft ren:iem-
kIb ber what has been laid in the preceding Chapter, that
^ it is abfolutely neceflary that God fhould have in him-
^ felf the Idea's of all the Beings he has created, (ince
oiherwife he could not have produced them ; and that
Ikj!: thus he fees all thofe Beings, by_ confidering the Per- i
'fiio! fedions which he includes in himlelf, and to which all
iPt Beings are related. Moreover, it is necefTary to know
that God is very ftridly united to our Souls by his
if/f] Prefence, fo that we may fay that he is the place of
upon Spirits, as Space is the place of Bodies. Thefe two
SMy tWngs being luppofed, it is certain that the Mind may
tnft; fee what there is in God, which reprefents Created
Beings, fince that is very Spiritual, very Intelligible,
GoUj! and moft prefent to the Mind. Thus the Mind may
101% fee in God the Works of God, fuppofing God be will-
iJTdie i ing to difcover to it what there is in him which re-
lilwfij prefents them. Thefe are the Realbns which feem to
aeyi'-i prove, that he rather Wills than Creates an Infinite
jr/ry Number of Idea's in every Mind,
fke- Firft, Although we do not abfolutely deny, that
ffliidi God was able to produce an Infinitely infinite Num-
s never her of Beings, which reprefent Objeds with every
imilic Mind he Creates ; yet we ought not to believe that
^xilleiic he does fo. For it is not only conlbnant to Reafbn,
xsim but it alfo appears by the Oeconomy of Nature, that
God never does by very difficult means, what may
be done by a plain eafie way: God does nothing in
—- vain and without Reafon: That which (ficws his
j Wifdom and his Power, is not to do little things by
difficult Means; for that is repugnant to Reafon, and
Ihews a limited Knowledge: But on the contrary, it
is to do great things by plain eafie Means. 'Tis thus
that out of Extenfion only he produces whatever we
rrfour ^hat is admirable in Nature, and even that which
iMii Motion to Animals. For thofe who
ir pro needs have Subftantial Forms, Faculties, and
j Souls in Animals, different from their Blood, and from
■operti) Organs of their Body, in order to perform their
Fundions, at the fame time feem to argue that God
wants Underhand ing, or that he cannot do thofe ad-
J,, mirable
A Search after Truth, Book III.
mirable things by Extenfion only. They meafure
the Power of God, and his Soveraign Wifdom, by the
fmallnefs of their own Capacity. Then fince God
may make Humane Minds fee all things, by willing
barely that they (hould fee what is in themlelves;
that is, what is in him that has a relation to thofe
things, and which reprefents them, there is no pro-
bability that he would do it otherwife ; and that
he (hould produce, in order thereunto, as many In-
finities of Infinite Numbers of Idea's, as there are
Created Spirits.
But we muft obferve, that we are not to conclude,
that Spirits fee the ElTenCe of God, becaufe they can
lee all things in God in that manner: Since what they
fee is very Imperfedl; but that God is very Perfedl:
They fee Matter Divifible and Figured, ^c. and there
is nothing in God that is Divifible or Figured; for
God is all Beings, becaufe he is Infinite and Compre-
bends all; but he is no Being in particular. Never-
thelefs that which we fee is but one, or feveral Beings
in particular, and we do not apprehend that perfedl
Simplicity of God which includes all Beings. Befides
that it may be faid, that we do not fo much fee the
Idea's of things, as the things which thofe Idea's re-
preient; for when we fee a Square , for inftance,
we do not fay that we fee the Idea of that Square,
which is united to the Mind, but only the Square which
is without us.
The Second Reafon which may induce us to be-
lieve, that we fee all Beings, becaufe God Wills, that
that which is in him, which reprefents them, (hould
be difcover'd to us; and not becaufe we have as many
Idea's created with us as we can fee things j for this
puts all created Spirits in an abfolute Dependence
upon God , and the greateft that can be : For this
being fo, we cannot only fee nothing, but what God
is willing we (hould fee, but we can alfo fee nothing,
unlefs God himielf (hews it us. Non fumus fufficientes
cogitare ali^uid a nobis^ tanqiiam cx nobis^ fed fuffcientia.
nojira ex Deo eft. 'Tis God himfelf which inftrudrs
and enlightens Philofophers in that Knowledge which
ungrateful
m
Chap. VL Search after Truth. 4O
Ungrateful Men call Natural, although it is an imme-
diate Gift from Heaven : Dem enim illis m tnifeflamt. Rom. 1.19
It is he that is properly the Light of the Mind, and
the Father of Light or Knowledge. Pater Luminum,^^^- '7*
It is he that teaches Wifdom to iMen: docet homi" Pfa, 53.
vemfcientiam. In a word, He is the true Light,
which enlightens all thole that come into this World :
Lux vera {juce illurninat omnem horhlnerri venientem in Joan a.
hunc Mimdum.
For in fine. It is pretty difScult diftin^hly to ap}3re-
hend the Dependence which our Minds have on God
in all their particular AdionS, fuppoling they have all
that which we diltindly know to be neccifary for
them in order to Ad, or all the Idea's of things pre-
fent to their Mind, and truly that general and con-
fufed word Concurrence, by which Men pretend to
explain the Dependence that Creatures have On God,
does not awaken any dillind Idea in an attentive
Mind y and yet it is very necelTary Men fhduld
know diftindly, that they can do nothing without -
God.
But the ftrongeft of all Reafons, is the manner how
the Mind perceives all things. It is certain, and every
body knows by Experience, that when We have a
tnind to think on any thing in particular, we firft calt
our Eyes on all Beings j and in the next place we
apply our fclves to the Conlideration of the Objedt
we defign to think on. Now it is molt certain thai
we fee it already, though confuledly and in general :
So that as we may delire to fee all the Beings, fome-
times One and fometimes another, it is certain thai
all Beings are prefent to our Mind ; and it appears
that all Beings can only be prefent to our Mind, be-
caufe God is prefent to it, that is. He who includes
all things in the Simplicity of his Being.
It feems moreover, That the Mind would not be
capable of reprefenting to it ielf univerfal Idea's ot
Kinds and Species, ^c. unlefs it law all Beings in-
eluded in one. For every Creature being a parti-
eular Being, we cannot fay that we fee any thing
treated, when we fee, for inltance, a Triangle in- '
. .. J) general
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50 ^ Search after Truth. Book III.
general. In fine, I am of opinion, that it is impoflfi-
ble to give a good Reafon of the Manner how the
Mind comes to know feveral abfiradled and general
Truths, unlefs it be by the prefence of him that can
diredl the Mind in a World of different Manners.
In fine. The Befi, the mott Sublime, the moft Solid,
and the chief Proof of the Exiftence of God, or that
which fuppofes the feweft things, is the Idea we have
of Infinity, though it does not comprehend it; and
that it has a very diftindl Idea of God, which it can
only have by the Union it has with him; fince it
cannot be conceiv'd that the Idea of a Being infinitely
perfecft, as that we have of God, (hould be any thing
that is Created.
But the Mind has not only the Idea of Infinity, it
has it even before that of Finite. For we conceive
the Infinite Being, from this alone that we conceive
a Being, without confidering whether it is Finite or
Infinite. But in order to conceive a Finite Being, we
muft needs retrench fomething of that general Notion
of a Being, which confequenrly muft precede. Thus
the Mind perceives nothing but in Infinity ; and that
Idea is (b far from being form'd by, the confufed Mix-
ture of all the Idea's of particular Beings, as Philo-
fophers imagine ; that on the contrary all thofe parti-
cular Idea's are only Participations of the general
Idea of Infinity : As God does not derive his Being
from the Creatures, but all Creatures only fubfift by
him.
The laft Proof, which perhaps will be a Demon-
ftration to thofe that are ufed to abttracfted Arguments,
is this. It is impollxble that God ftiould have any
other principal End of his Adtions but himfelf: It
is a Notion that is common to all Men that are capa-
ble of any Reflection ; and Holy Writ does not allow
us to doubt, but that God has made every thing for
himfelf. Therefore it is neceflary, that not only our
Natural Love, I mean the Motion he produces in
our Mind, (hould tend towards him: But more-
over,, That the Knowledge and the Light which he
bcftows upon it, (hould make us know any thing that
is
Iff®
Chap. VI. A Search after Truth, 5^
is in him ; for whatever comes from God can only be
for God.ShouId God Create a Spirit,and give it for an
Idea, or for the immediate ObjeAof its knowledge
the Sun : In my Opinion, God would Create that Spi-
rit, and the Idea of that Spirit, for the Sun and not
for him.
God cannot therefore Create a Spirit to know his
Works, unlefs that Spirit fees God in feme meafure,
by beholding his Works. So that we may fay, that
unlefs we do fee God in fome meafure, we (hould fee
nothing; In like manner, unlets we do Love God, I
mean, unlefs God did continually Imprint in us the
Love of Good in general, we fhould Love nothing.
For that Love being our Will, we can Love nothing,
nor Will any thing without him; fince we cannot Love
particular Goods, without determining towards thofe
Goods,the motion of Love,which God gives us towards
him. So that as we Love nothing but by the neceffa-
ry Love we have for God, fo we fee nothing but by the
Natural Knowledge we have of Ged: And all the
particular Idea's we have of Creatures, are only Limi-
rations of the Idea of the Creator, as all the Morions
of the Will for the Creatures, are only determinations
of the motion for the Creator.
I believe there are no Divines but what will grant,
that the Impious Love God with that Natural Love I
fpeak of: And St. Aiijiin and fome other Fathers af-
firm as an undeniable thing, Thau the Impious behold
in God the Rule ot Manners, and Eternal Truths,
So that the Opinion I explain ought not to trouble any
Body. Thus St. Attflm fpeaks: Ah ilia, incommutabili ^ ^
luce veritatisy etiam itnpm, chirn ah ea avertinir^ qw ^rin c "
ddmmodo tangitur. Hinc ejl quod etiam impii Qogitant * ^
aternitatem^ ^ mult a re^e riprehendunt rccldque laudant
in hominum morihiis. ^uihus ea tandem regtilis judicant,
niji inquihus videnty qiiemadmodutn quifque vivcre deheaty
etiam ji nec ipji eodem modo vivant ? 'Uhi autem eas vi-
dent ? Neque enim in fua natura. Nam ciirn procul dii-
hio imnte ijla videantury corumque mentes conjlet cjfc mih
tahiies, has vera regulas immutahileSy videat quifqtin in
eis hoc videre potucrit •— uhinam ergo funt ij}^ regtiLe
D d d z Scriptcs
ijfe f-
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'-''s ( :
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A Search after Truth, Book III.
... ...
Scriptce^ tiifi in lihro hicis illitis^ rjiLc veritcti dtcitur^ tinde
lex omntijiijla defcrihitur — in qua videt quid opCrandum i
fit, etiam qui operatur injujiitiam., ^ ipjc eji qui ah ilia
luce avertittir a qua tamcn tangitur. ^
There are many paffages in Sr. Auftin like unto this,
by which he proves, that we fee God even in this Life,
by the knowledge we have of Eternal Truths. Truth
is uncreated, Immutable, Immenfe, Eternal, above all
things. It is true by it felf. It derives its Perfedlion
from nothing: It makes Creatures more perfedt; and *.
all Spirits naturally endeavour to know it. Nothing „
but God can have all thofe Perfedfions. Therefore ^ /
Truth is God. We fee feme of thofe Immutable
Eternal Truths. Therefore we fee God. Thefe are
St. Attflins Reafons, ours differ a little from them ; '
and we are unwilling to ufe the Authority of fo great
a Man unjuftly, to fecond our Sentiment.
We believe that Truths, even thofe that are Eter-
nal; as that twice two are four,are not fo much as ab-
'folate Beings: So far are tve from believing that they
are in God. For it is vifible, that that Truth only
confifts in a relation of Equality, which is between 4
twice Two and Four. Therefore we do not fay that
we fee God in feeing Truths, as St. Auftin (zys, but
in feeing the Idea's of thofe Truths: For Idea's are
real, but the Equality between the Idea's, which is
Truth, has no reality. When for example. Men fay
that the Cloth they mcafure contains Three Yards ;
the Cloth and the Yards are real : But the Equality
between Three Yards and the Cloth is not a real Be- siaaiiji
ing ; it is only a relation that is between the Three
Yards and the Cloth. When we fay that twice Two
are Four, the Idea's of the Nurr;bers are real; but the ;tLaw,
Equality there is between them is only a Relation, iwwe
Thus according to our Sentiment we fee God, when ttuaiHo
we fee Eternal Truths; not that thofe Eternal Truths ®ioO[
are God, but becaufe the Idea's on which thofe Truths rrNt
depend are in God ; perhaps Sr. Aufiin underftcod it
*fb. We alfobelievc, that we know in God Change- ^
able and Corrubtible things, although St. Atftin X)n\y
fpeaks of Immutable and Incorrnpcible things; be-
^ ' ' caufe
Chap. vr. A Search after Truths 55
caufe it is not neceflary for that to place any Imper-
fedion in God ; fince it fuffices, as we have already
faid, that God (hould (hew us what there is in him
that has a Relation to thefe things.
But though I fay, we fee in God the things that are
Material and Senfible, it muft be obferv'd, that I do
not fay we have a Senfation of them in God, but only
that it is from God who Ads in us ; for God Knows
fen/ible things, but he does not Feel them. When we
perceive any thing that is fenfible, Senfation and pure
Idea is in our Perception. Senfation is a Modification
of our Soul, and it is God that Caufes it in us: And
he may Caufe it, though he has it not, becaufe he
(ees in the Idea he has of our Soul, that it is capable
of it. ;As for the Idea which is joyn'd to Senfation,
it is in God, we fee it, becaufe it is his pleafure to
difcover it to us : And God joins Senfation to the Idea,
when Objeds are prefent, to the end that we may be-
lieve them as they are ; and that we may have fuch
Senlations and Pailions as we ought to have in rela-
tion to them.
Laftly, We believe that all Spirits fee the Eternal
Laws as well as other things in God, but with fome
difference: They know the Eternal Order and Eter-.
nal Truths, and even the Beings which God has made
according to thofe Truths, or according to the Order
by the Union which thofe Spirits have necelfarily with
the H^ord, or Wifdom of God which direds them, as
we have (hewn ; But 'tis by the Impredion they re-
ceive continually from the Will of God, which inclines^
them to him, and endeavours, as it were, to render
their Will abfolutely like unto his ; that they know
Order is a Law, I mean, that they know the Eternal
Laws: How we mutt love Good, and fly from Evil:
That we muft love Juftice more than all Riches : That
it is better to Obey God than to Command Men, and
many other Natural Laws. For the knowledge of all
thofe Laws is not different from the knowledge of that
Impreffon, which they always feel in themfelves,
though they do not always follow it by the free
choice of their Will j which they know to be
D d d Com-
54 ^ Search after Truth. Book III*
Common to all Spirits, though it is not equally
ftrong in all.
It is by that Dependance, Relation, and Union of
our Mind to the God, and of our Will to his
Love, that we are made after the Image and Likencfs
of God : And although this may be very much defac'd
by Sin, yet it is neceflary that it (hould fubfifl as long
as we do. But if we bear the Image of the fVord
humbled upon Earth ; and if we follow the Motions
of the Holy Ghoft, that Primitive Image of our firft
Creation, that Union of our Mind with the tPhrd of
the Father,and to the Love of the Father and of the Son,
will be re-eftabli(hed, and render'd indelible. We (hall
be like God, ifwe are like the Man God, In fine, God
will be all in us, and we all in God, in a far more per-
fecfl manner than that by which it is neceflary for us to
fublift, that we ihould be in him, and he in us.
th Ex fome reafons which may perfwade us,
r ft' Spirits perceive all things by the immediate Pre-',
p tn ions. Comprehends all in the Simplicity'
of his Being. Every one will Judge of it according
to the Internal Convicflion he (hall receive of it, after
having ferioufly confider'd it. But %is thought that
there will be no probability in all the other ways of
explaining thefe things; and that this laft will appear
more than probable. Thus our Souls depend on God
in all refpedfs. For as it is he who makes them feel
Grief, Pleafure, and all other Senfations, by the Na-
tural Union he has Eftablifh'd between them and our
Body, which is no other than his Decree and general
Will. Thus it is he, who by the Natural Union which
be has made between the Will of Man, and the Re-
prelentation of the Idea's which the Immenfity of the
Divine Being includes, that makes them know what-
ever they do know ; and that Natural Union is al(b
nothing elle but his general Will. So that none but
he can diredi: us, by reprefenting all things to us; as
none bur he can make us Happy, by making us tafte
all manner of Pkafures.
Let us theretore keep to this Opinion,* That God is
the Intelligible World, or the place of Spirits, as the
marcriai
■tti
:nil
Chap.VIL A Search after Truth, 55
material World is the place of Bodies. That they
receive all their Modihcations from his Power: That
they find all their Idea's in his Wifdom : And that it is
by his Love that rhey arc adred in all their regular
Motions ; and lince his Power and Love are nothing
buthimfelf, let us believe with Sr. that he is not
far from every one of us ; and that it is in hirn we
have Lift, Motion, and a Being. Kon longc eft ab mo- Aft. A-
/juo^ue z^rum^ in iffi cnim vivimus^ movsmur^ ^ poft. c. 17*
yw»«x.
CHAP. VII.
I, loHY different xcays of feeing things. 11. Hoxo
we k^ow God, IIJ. How we' know Bodies,
IV. How we know ohvSohL V. How we know
the Sonlsof other Men^ and fare Spirits.
TN order to Abridge and Illuftrate the Opinion I have
■*' fet down, concerning the manner how the Mind
perceives the different Objefts of its Knowledge, it is
neceffary to diftinguifli in it four ways of knowing.
The Firft is, to know things by themfelves.
The Second, to know them by their Idea's; that
k, in the Senfe I take it here, by fomething that is dif-
ferent from them.
The Third, to know them by Confcience, or by
Internal Sentiment.
The Fourth, to know them by Conjedhure.
Things are known by themfelves, and without
Idea's, when being very Intelligible, they are able to of feeing
Penetrate the Mind, or Difcover themfelves to it. things*
Things are known by their Idea's, when they are not
Intelligible of themfelves, either beciufe they are Cor-
poreal, or becaufe they cannot penetrate the Mind,
or difcover themfelves to it. We know all thofe things
by Confcience which are not diftinguifh'd from us,
liltly, we know thofe things by Conjedture which
D d d 4 are
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n. How we
know God.
$6 A Search after Truth. Book III.
are different from us, and from thofe that are known
of themfelves, and by Idea's, when we think that
Ibme things are like unto others which we know.
God only is known by himfelf: for though
there are other Spiritual Beings befides himfelf, which
feem to be Intelligible by their Nature, there are none
at prefent but he only, which penetrate the Mind,
and difcover themfelves to it. We only fee God with
a dircdt and immediate Sight. Perhaps he only can
diredt the Mind by hisowhSubftance, Laftly, in this
Life it is only by the Unipn we have with him that
we are capable of knowing what we know, as we
have (hewn in the preceding Chapter: For he is our
only Matter, that pre fides in our Mind, according to
St. Atijliriy without the Mediation of any Creature.
We can never conceive, that any thing that is Cre-
ated Ihould be able to reprcfent Infinity ; that the un-
limited Being, the immenfe Being, the univerfal Being
can be perceiv'd by an Idea; that is, by a particular
Being, by a Being different from the Univerfal and
Infinite Being. But as for particular Beings, it is not
difficult to conceive, that they may be reprefented by
the Infinite Being which includes them, and which in-
eludes them after a Spiritual and contequently very
intelligible manner. Therefore it is neceffary to fay,that
we know God by himfelf, notwithttanding the know-
ledge we have of^ him in this Life is very imper-
fectt; and that we know Corporeal Things by their
Idea's, that is, in God ; fince God only includes the
Intelligible World, in which we find the Idea's of all
things.
But though all things may be feen in God, it
does not follow that we fee them all in him: We
only fee fuch things in God of which we have
Idea's ; and there are things which are feen with-
Out Idea's.
HI. How All the things that are in this World, of which we
■ws know have fome Knowledge, are either Bodies or Spirits ;
Bodies. proprieties of Bodies, or proprieties of Spirits. No
body can queftion but that we fee Bodies with their
Proprieties by their Idea's i becaufe not being Intelli-
gible
Humanis
mentibus
null a inter-
pofita na-
tura p"<efi-
de. Aug. 1.
de Vera
Religione,
c. 55:.
f
Vll
S'.!l
Ke(
■a
ih
1
chap. VII, Search after Truth. 57
gible in themfelves, we can only fee them in the Be-
ing which^ndudes them afrcr an intelligible manner.
Thus it is in God, and by their Idea's that we fee Bo-
dies with their Proprieties ; and for that reafon the
knowledge we have of them is very perfed:: I mean
the Idea we have of Extenhon is fufficient to make
us know all the Proprieties which Extenfion is capa-
ble of; and we can never defire to have a more
diftind and fuller Idea of Extenfion of Figures and
Motions than that which God gives us of them.
Whereas the Idea's of the things which are in God,
include all their Proprieties, whoever fees their Idea's,
may fuccefTively have all their Proprieties: For when
we fee things as they are in God, we fee them always
after a very perfed manner ; and it would be infi-
nitely perfed, if the Mind that fees them there were
Infinite. That which is wanting in the knowledge we
have of Extenfion of Figures and Motions, is not a
defed of the Idea which reprefents it, but of our Mind
which confiders it.
It is not fo with the Soul, we do not know jy
it by its Idea : We do not fee it in God; we only^^*
know it by Confcience; and therefore the know-
ledge we have of it is imperfed. We know no more
of our Soul, than what we feel paffes within us.
Had we never felt Pain, Heat, Light, (3c. we could
not know whether our Soul would be capable of them,
becaufe we do not know it by its Idea. But did we
fee in God the Idea which anfwers to our Soul, we
(hould know at the fame time, or might know, ExplajiMii*'
properties it is capable of: As we know all the Proper-
ties that Extenfion is capable of j bccaufe we do know
Extenfion by the Idea of it.
It is true, we know by our Confcience, or by the
Internal Senfe we have of our felves, that our Soul is
fomething that is Great : But it may be, that which
v/e do know of it is hardly any thing of what it is
in it felf. If we had no more knowledge of Matter
than that of Twenty or Thirty Figures it had been
modified into, certainly we fhould hardly know any
thing of it, in comparifon of what we do know by
j;'» -.i:-,!'*. ■ ; ; ■ i!;
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58
A Search after Truth. Book III.
the Idea which reprefents it. It is not therefore
fufficient to have a perfed: knowledge of the Soul,
to know what we do know of it by the Internal
Senfe alone; fince the Conlcience we have of our
felves, perhaps only (hews us the leaft part of our
Being.
It may be concluded from what has been faid, that
though we know the Exiftence of our Soul more di-
ilindly than the Exiftence of our Body, and of thofe
that are about us, yet we have not fo perfed a know-
ledge of the Nature of the Soul, as of the Nature of
Bodies ; and may ferve to reconcile the different Opi-
nions of thofe that fay nothing is better known than
the Soul; and of thofe that maintain, there is nothing
of which they have lefs knowledge.
It may alfo ferve to prove, that the Idea's which
reprefent fome External thing to us, are not ModiSca-
tioDS of our Soul. For if the Soul faw all things in
confidering its own Modifications, it would know its
Eftence or Nature more clearly than that of Bodies ;
and all the Senlations or Modifications it is capable
of, than the Figures or Modifications which Bodies are
capable of. Neverthelefs, it does not find that it is
capable ol fuch a Senfation by the fight it has of it
ielf, but only by Experience: Whereas it knows,
that Extenfion is capable of an infinite number of Fi-
gures, by the Idea it has of Extenfion. Moreover,
there are certain Senfations, as Colours and Sounds,
which moft Men cannot difcover, whether or no they
are Modifications of the Soul; and Men know all
manner ol Figures by the Idea they have of Extend^
on to be the Modification of Bodies.
What I have faid, alfo (hows the Reafon, why it
is ImpoiTible to give a Definition that may explain
the Modifications of the Soul; for fince we neither
know the Soul, nor the Modifications of it by Idea's,
but only by Senfations; and that fuch Senfations of
Flcafure, for inftance, of Pain, of Heat, (3c. are not
tied to words 5 it is evident, that if a Man had never
feen Colours, nor felt Heat, it would be impoflible
iQ make him Senfible of thofe Senfations, by what-
ever
chap. V11. ^ Search after Truth. 59
ever Definitions we could give him in order thereunto.
Now Men having only their Senfations upon the ac-
count of the Body, and their Bodies not being difpos^d
in the fame manner in all of them, it often happens
that words are Equivocal; that tbofe which are ufed
to exprefs the Modifications of our Souls, fignifie
quite contrary to what we defign; and we often
make Men think on Birternefs, for Example, when
we defign to make them think on Sweetnefs.
Although we have not a full Knowledge of our
Soul, that which we have by Confcience fufiices to
demonftrate the Immortality, Spirituality, Liberty and
fome other Attributes of ir, which it is necefoy we
ihould know: And for that reafon God does not give
us the Knowledge of it by its Idea, as he gives us the
Knowledge of Bodies. 'Tis true, The Knowledge we
have of our Souls by our Confcience is Imperfedt,
but it is not Falfe: The Knowledge, on the contrary,
which we have of Bodies by Senfation or Confcience,
(if we may call the Senfation of what paffes in our
Body ConfcienceJ is not only Imperfedt, but Fal/e.
Therefore it was neceifary we (hould have an Idea
of Bodies to corretSf the Senfations we have of them :
But we do not ftand in need of the Idea of our Soul,
fince the Conlcience we have of it does not engage us
into Error: And not to be deceiv'd in the Knowledge
of it, it is fulHcient not to Confound it with the Body,
which our Reafon might induce us to do. In fine.
Had we had a clear Idea of the Soul, like unto that
we have of the Body, that Idea would have made us
confider it too much, as feparated from it. And thus
it would have leflen'd the Union of our Soul with
our Body, by hindering us from looking upon it, as
being difius'd through all our Members, which I lhall
explain no farther. V.Hot
Of all the Objedfs of our Knowledge, there only
remains the Souls of other Men, and the Pure Intelli-
gences; and it is evident that we only know them by
Conjedture. We know them now neither in them-
felves, nor by their Idea's; and as they are diftindk
from us, it is impoflible that we (hould know them
by
^
60 A Search after Truth. Book III.
by Gjnfcience: We con jedlure that the Souls of other
Men are of the fame Species with ours ; we think
they feel what we feel in our felves ; and even when
thofe Senfations have no relation to the Body, we are .
certain that we are not deceivM : Becaule we fee in
God certain Idea's, and certain Immutable Laws, ac-
cording to which we know certainly that God adls
equally in all Spirits.
I know that two and two are four, that it is better
to be Juft than Rich ; and I am not miftaken in be-
lieving that others know thofe Truths as well as my
felf. I love Good and Pleafure, I hate Evil and Pain,
I would be Happy; and I am not miftaken in be-
lieving that Men, Angels, and even Devils, have thefe
Inclinations. I know moreover, that God will never
Create any Spirits, but what will defire to be Happy,
or that can ever defire to be Unhappy: But I know
it with Evidence and Certainty, becaule God tells me
fo: For who but God could give a Knowledge of the
Defigns and Will of God} But when the Body has
any Share in what pafTes within me, I am for the
moft part miftaken, in judging of others by my felf.
I feel Heat, I fee fuch a Magnitude, fuch a Colour ;
I relifli fuch a Tafte at the approach of certain Bodies:
I am deceiv'd, when I judge of others by my felf.
I am fubjed: to certain PalTions, I have a Kindnefs or
Averfion for fuch or fuch things; and I fancy that
others are like me 5 my Conjedure is often Falfe.
Thus the Knowledge we have of other Men, is very
liable to Error, when we judge of them by the Senfa-
tions we have of our felves.
If there be any Beings different from God, from
our felves, from Bodies, and from Pure Spirits, it is
unknown to us: We have much ado to perfwade our
felves that there are any fuch: And after having ex-
amin'd the Reafons of certain Philofophers who pre-
tend the contrary, we have found them Falfe ; which
has confirm'd us in our former Opinion, that being
all Men of the fame Nature, we had all the fame
Idea's^ becaufe it behoves us all to know the fame
things.
CHAP.
:i!bi
chap. VIII. A Search after Truth*
CHAP. VIII.
1. The Intimate Trefence of the Wandering Idea
o/Bein^ in General^ is the Caufe of all the
Irregular AhflraUions of the Mind^ and of the
greateft part of the Chimera*s of common Philo-
Jophy^ which hinder many Thilofophers from dif-
covering the Solidity of the True Principles of
Moral Philofophy, II, Example concerning the
Ejfence of Matter.
dear, intimate, neceflary Prefence of God ,
fl mean the Unlimited, Infinite, and General
Beingj with the Mind of Man, ads with more Force
upon it, than the Prefence of all Finite Objeds.
It is impoffible that it Ihould abfolutely lay afide that
general Idea of Being, becaufe it cannot fubfift out of
God. Perhaps fome might urge, that it may wander
from it, becaufe it may think on thofe particular
Beings; but they would be miftaken : For when the
Mind confiders any Being in particular, it is not fo
far from removing from God, that it rather draws
near, if I may lb fpeak, to fome of his Perfedions, in
removing from all others: However it removes from
them in fuch a manner, that it never wholly lofes the
fight of them, and it is for the moft part in a Condi-
tion to feek them out, and to draw near to them.
They are always prefent to the Mind, but the Mind
only perceives them in an inexplicable Confufion,
becauie of its fmallnefs, and the greatnefs of its Idea
of Being. We may chance fometimes not to think on
our felves; but I believe we cannot fubfiit one Mo-
ment without thinking on Being ; and even at that
very time when we fancy we think on nothing, we
are of neceiTity full of the wandering and general
Idea of Being. But whereas thofe things that are
very ufual in us, and which do not concern us, do
nor excite the Mind with any force; nor -obligee
It
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it to make any Refledlion upon them; this Idea of
Being, fo Great, fo Vaft, fo Real, and fo Pofitive as
it is, is yet familiar to us, and touches us fo little,
that we almoft believe we do not fee it; that we do
not refled: upon it; that we afterwards judge there is
but little Reality in it; and that it is only form'd by
the confus'd mixture of all particular Idea's: Though f,
on the contrary, it is in that alone, and by that alone,
that we perceive all Beings in particular.
Although that Idea, which we receive by the im-
mediate Union we have with the Word of God, does
never deceive us in it felf, like thofe which we receive
from it by means of the Union we have with our
Body, which reprefent things to us different from
what they are: Yet I am not afraid to fay, that we
make fo ill a ufe of the beft things, that the indelible
Prefence of that Idea is one of the principal Caufes
of all the Irregular Abftradions of the Mind; and con-
lequently of that Abftraded and Chimerical Philo-
fophy, which explains all Natural Effeds by general
Terms of Ad, Power, Caufe, Effed, ouftantial
Forms, Faculties, occult Qualities, Syrnpathy, Anti-
pathy, for it is certain that all thofe Terms, and
many others, never excite any Idea's in the Mind, but
fuch as are Wandering and General; that is, of thofe
Idea's which prefent themfelves to the Mind of their
own accord, without Pain, or any Application on our
part.
Let Men read with all Attention imaginable, all the
Definitions and Explications which are given of Sub-
itantial Forms: Let them carefully inquire wherein
the Eflence of all thofe Entities does confift, which
Philofophers fancy as they pleafe, and in fo great a
Number, that they are oblig'd to make feveral Divi-
Eons and Sub divifions of them ; and I am confident
that they will never ftir up any other Idea's in their
Mind of all thofe things, than that of Being, and of
Caufe in General.
For this is what commonly happens to Philofophers:
They fee fome new EfFed; they immediately ima-
gine a new Being to produce it. Fire warms; there-
fore
Ah,,
Chap.VIII. A Starch after Truth.
W there is fome Being in the Fire which produces
that EfTed: that is different from the matter which
cotnpofes the Fire : And whereas Fire is capable of
feveral different Effeds; as of feparating Bodies, of
reducing them to Afties and into Earth ; of drying
them, hardning them, Ibftning them, dilating them, ,
purifying them, ^c. they liberally allow Fire as many
Faculties or real Qualities, as it is capable of producing
different Effeds.
But thofe that refled on the Definitions they give
of thofe Faculties, will eafily difcover that they are
only Logical Definitions, and that they excite no other
Idea's than that of "Being, and of Cau[e in General,
which the Mind compares with the Effed which is
produced: So that Men are not the more Learned,
j after having ftudied them very much; for all they get
I by that kind of Study, is, that they imagine they
i know better than others, what they notwithftanding
do not know near fo well; not only becaufe they
admit many Beings which never were, but alfo be-
caufe being prejudiced, they make themfelves incapa-
ble of conceiving, how it can be poffible that matter
alone, as that of Fire, being moved againft Bodies
differently difpofed, ftiould produce all the different
Effeds which we fee Fire does produce.
It is Notorious to ail thofe that have read a little,
that moft of the Books of Sciences, particularly thofe
that treat of Natural Philofophy, Phyfick, Chymiftry,
and all the particular things of Nature, are full of
Arguments grounded upon Elementary Qualities, Se-
cond Caufes, as Attradive , Retentive , Digeftive,
Expulfive , and fuch like; upon others they call oc-
cult; upon Specifick Virtues, and upon feveral Beings
which Men compofe out of the General Idea of Being,
and that of the Caufe of the Effed which they fee ;
which feems not poffible to happen, unlefs by the
Faculty they have of confidering the Idea of the Being
in General, which is ever prefent to their Mind ,
by the Infinite Prefence of him that includes all
Beings,
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64 Search after Truth. Book lit
If common Philofophers would content themfelves
with publilhing their Natural Philofophy barely as a
Logick, which would furnifh proper Terms to fpeafc
of the things of Nature ; and if they would let thofe
alone that fix diftindt and particular Idea's to thofe
Terms in order to be underftood, no body would
find fault with their proceeding. But they even pre-
tend to explain Nature by general and abftra(fted
Idea's, as if Nature were Abftradled. And they will
needs have it, that their Mafter Arijiotles Natural
Philofophy is a real Natural Philofophy,which through-
ly explains things, and not meerly a Logick; though
it contains nothing that is tolerable, befides fome wan-
dering Definitions, and fome Terms that are fo general,
that they may ferve for all forts of Philofophy. LafiJy,-
They are fo ftrangely conceited with all thofe Ima-
ginary Beings, and wandering undetermined Idea's,
which naturally arifo within their Mind, that they
n. Of the are Incapable of fixing their Mind long enough to
Ejfence of confiderthe real Idea's of things, fo as to difcover the
Matter. Solidity and Evidence of them. And this is the true
JfthatDe- Caufoof the extream Ignorance they are in, as to the
fmitim is true Principles of Natural Philofophy. It is convenient
receiD d of gjyg fome Proofs of it.
^^word ^ Moft Philofophers do partly agree. That we ought
there^*'' Upon that as the ElTence of a thing, which we
abfoluteh acknowledge to be the firft in that thing, that which is
demonftra- Infoparable from it, and on which the Properties that
ted: ^'/V^gree to it do depend. So that to difcover wherein
be not re- rhe Eflence of Matter does confift, we mutt look upon
ceiv'd, it all the Properties that are agreeable to it, or which are
enfy re- included in the Idea we have of it; as Hardnels, Soft-
mains a nefs, Fluidity, Motion, Rett, Figure, Divifibility ,
^uejiion <»/Impenetrability and Extenfion, in order to confider
Name J to which of all thefe Attributes is Infeparable from it.
. Therefore lince Fluidity, Hardnefs, Softnefs, Motion,
^ ^cft, may be feparated from hdatter, fince there are
of Several Bodies that are without Hardnefs, Fluidity,
theMatter Softnefs, that are not in motion ; or laftly, that are
or rather it : It follows dearly, that alkhofe Attributes
cannot be ^rc uot Eflential to it,
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Ghap. VIII. ji Search after Truth.
But there ftill remains four which we do conceive
to be Infeparable from Matter, Figure, Divi-
fibility. Impenetrability and Extenfion: So that in
order to fee which is the Attribute that is to be taken
for the Eflence, we mult no longer think of dividing
them,but only to examine which is the firlt, and which
fuppofes ho other. It is eaiily apprehended, that
Figure, Divifibility, and Iinpenetrab lity, fuppofes Ex-
tenfion, and that Extenfion tuppofes nothing; but as
foon as it is given, Divilibility, Impenetrability> and
Figure are given. Therefore we mult conclude, That
Extenfion is the Eflence of Matter, fuppofing it has
only the Attributes vve have mentioned, or others
like them ; and 1 do nor believe that any body
in the World can queftion it, after ferious Confide-
ration.
But the Difficulty is to know, whether Matter has
not fome other Attributes different from Extenfion,
and from thofe that depend on it: So that Extenfion
it felf is nor Elfential to it, but fuppofes fomething
that may be the Subjedt and Principle of it.
Several Perfons, after having attentively confider'd
the Idea they had of Matter by all its known Attri-
butes; and after having likewife meditated on the
Effedfs of Nature, as much as the Powers and Capa-
city of the Mind will permit, have been ftrongly per-
fwaded that Extenfion fuppofes nothing in Matter
whether it be that they have not had a diftindb and
particular Idea of that thing which may be believed
to precede Extenfion, or whether they have feen no"
Effed to prove that thing.
For, as to be perlwaded, that a Watch has no being
different from the Matter whereof it is compofed, it
is fufficient to know, how the different difpofition of
xhe Wheels, can produce all the Motions of a Watch,,
without having any diftind Idea of that which might*
bethecaufe of thole Motions, though feveral Logical
ones might be given: So becaufe thofe Perfons have
no diftind Idea of that thing which might be in mac-
tcr, if Extenfion were taken from it; bscaufe they
no Attribute to difcover it; and becaufe, if Ex-
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A Search after Truth, Book III.
tenfion be given, all the Attributes which we con-
ceive to belong to Matter, are given; and alfo that
Matter is the caufe of no Effedf, but fuch as we may
conceive Extenlion differently configur'd, and diverfly
agitated may produce ; from whence they perfwade
themfelves that Extenfion is the Effence of the Matter.
But whereas Men have no certain Demonftration,
that there is no Intelligence or new Being created in
the Wheels of a Watch : So no body can, without a
particular Revelation, affert as a Geometrical Demon-
ftration, that there is nothing in a Stone befides Ex-
tenfion diverfly configur'd: For Extenfion may abfo-
lutely be joyffd with fomething elfe which we do not
conceive, becaufe we have no Idea of it: Though it
feems very unreafonable to believe and affirm it; fince
it is unreafonable to affirm what we neither know or
conceive.
Nwerthelefs though we Ihould fuppole^ that there
is fomething befides Extenfion in Matter, that would
not hinder (if rightly obferv'd) Extenfion from being
the Eflence of it, according to the Definition we have
given of that Word. For it is abfolurely neceffary that
whatever is in the World, fhould be either a Being,
Of the manner of a Being ; an attentive Mind cannot
deny it. Now Extenfion is not the manner of a
Being ; therefore 'tis a Being. But whereas Matter
is not a Compofition of feveral Beings, like Man,
who is compofed of Body and Mind ; fince Matter
is but One Being only, it is evident that Matter is only
Extenfion.
Now to prove that Extenfion is not the manner of
a Being, but that it is really a Being, we muft ob-
ferve that the manner of a Being cannot be conceiv'd,
unlefs the Being, of which it is the manner, be con-
ceiv'd at the fame time : It is impofifible, for Example,
ro conceive Roundnefs without conceiving Extenfion,
becaufe the manner of a Being, is nothing but the
Being it felf fo modified : The roundnefs of Wax, for
inftance, being nothing but the Wax it felf fo modified,
it's evident that we cannot poffibly conceive the man-
Uer without the Being, Therefore if Extenfion were
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Chap.VIIt. A Search after Truth,
the manner of a Being, we could not conceive this
Extenfjon without that Being, of which this Extenfion
fhould be the manner. Neverthelefs it is ealily con-
ceiv'd by it felf. Therefore it is not the manner of
any Being, and confequently it is a Being it feJf.
Thus it proves the Edence of Matter, Ence Matter is
only one Being, and not a Cotripound of divers Beings
as abovefaid.
But many Philofophers are fo wedded to general
Idea s, and Logical Entities, chat their Mind is more
taken up with them, than with thofe that are Parti-
cular, Diftindl and Phyfcai. This is fufticiently appa-
rent, in that their Arguments upon Natural Things,
are only grounded upon Notions of Logick, Ad and
Power, and of an Infinite Number of Imaginary
Entities, which they do not diftinguilh from thofe that,
are Real. Therefore thofe Men finding a wonderful
Eacility of feeing according to their own way, what
they have a mind to fee, fancy that they fee better
than others ,• and that they fee diltindly that Excen-
fion fuppoles Ibmething, and that it is only a Propriety
of Matter, of which it may even be divelted.
Neverthelefs, when they are defir'd to explain that^
thing, which they pretend to fee in IVlatter belides
Extenfion, they do it in different ways, which all
lliew that they have no other Idea of it than that of
Being, or of Subftance in General. This appears
clearly to thofe that obferve, that the faid Idea in-
eludes no particular Attributes which are proper to
Matter. For in removing Extenfion from Matter,
they take away all the Attributes and all the Pro-
prieties which we diftindly conceive do belong to it,
although one Ihould leave that thing which they fancy
to be the Effence of it; It is vifible that they could
tieither make a Heaven nor Earth of it, nor any thing
that we fee. And on the contrary, in removing what
they fancy to be the Effence of Matter, provided Ex-
tenlion be left, we leave all the Attributes and all the
Proprieties, which we conceive to be diilindly in-
duded in the Idea of Matter: For it is certam, that
Ex'teiiEoh alone may be foriii'd' a' Heaveriv an
E e e
A Search after Truth. Book III.
Earth, and all the vifible World, befides an infinite
Number of others. Therefore, that fomething which
they fuppofe befides Excenfion, having no Attributes,
which can be diftindlly conceiv'd to belong to it, and
which are clearly included in the Idea we have of it,
is nothing real, if we believe Reafon j and it can be
of no ufe to explain Natural Effeds. And what they
urge, that it is the SuhjeH, and the Prirtciple of Ex-
lenfion is fpoken at random, without conceiving di-
llindlly what they fay ; that is, without having any
other Idea thereof, than a General or Logical one, as
of SuhjcEi and Principle.
So that one might ft ill imagine a new Suhje^^ and a
new Principle of that Subjedf of Extenfion, and thus on
ad Infinitum ; becaufe the Mind reprefents to it felf
general Idea's of Subjeli, and of Principles^ as it
pleafes.
Indeed it's very probable, that Men would never
have obfcur'd the Idea they have of Matter fo much,
unlefs rhey had had feme Reafons for it ; and feveral
maintain Sentiments contrary to ours, through Prin-
ciples of Divinity. Without doubt Extenfion is not
the Elfence of Matter, if that be contrary to Faith,
we grant it. We are, Thanks be to God, fully per-
fwaded of the Weakncfs and Limitation of the Hu-
mane Mind. We very well know, that it has too
little Extent to mealure an Infinite Power; That God
can do Infinitely more than we can conceive; That
he only gives us Idea's to know things that happen
according to the Order of Nature, but he conceals the
reft from us. Therefore we are ever ready to fubmit
our Mind to Faith; but there muft be better Proofs
than ihofe that are commonly alledg'd, to deftroy the
Reafons abovefaid, becaufe the manner of Explaining
the Myfteries of Faith, is not of Fairh, and they are
believ'd, even without apprehending that the manner
of them can ever be clearly explain'd.
We believe, for Example, the Myftery of the
Trinity, though the Humane Mind cannot conceive it j
and neverthelefs we believe, that things which do not
differ from the fame Tbird, do not difter among them-
Chap. VIII. A Search after Truth, 6^
felves; though this Propofition leenis to deftroy ir.
For we are perfwaded that we muft aever make ufe
of our Mind, unlefs on Subje(5i:s that arc proportioned
to its Capacity ; and we muft not look fixedly on
Myfteries, for fear of being dazled by them, according
to this Advertifement of the Holy Ghoft: fcru'
tator efi Majcftatis opprimetur a Gloria.
Neverthelefs, if it were thought proper, for the
Satisfacftion of fome Men, to explain how far the
Opinion we have of Matter, agrees with what Faith
reaches us about Tranfubilantion, we might perhaps
do it clearly and diftindtly enough , and without
offending the Decifions of the Church; but we are of
Opinion, that we may very well forbear making that
Explication, efpecially in this Work.
For we muft obferve, that the Holy Fathers have
moftly fpoken of that Myftery, as of an Incomprehen-
fible Myftery; that they have not Philofophis'd to
explain \t; and that commonly they have only us'd
Comparifons that have not much Exacftnefs in them i
fitter to difcover the Dodlrine, than to give an Expla-
nation that might fatisfie the Mind : So that Tradi-
tipn is for thofe who do not Philofophife upon that:
Myftery, and who fubmit their Mind to Faith, with-
out puzzling themfelves to no purpofe in thofe difficult
Quettions.
Therefore it would be unreafonable to defire Philo-
fophers to give clear and eafie Explanations of the
manner how the Body of Jefm Chriji is in the Eucha-
rift; for that would be to defire them to tell No-
velties in Divinity. And Ihould Philofophers Impru-
dently anfwer that Queftion, they could not avoid the
Condemnation either of their Philofophy, or of Divi-
mty : For if their Explanations were Obfcure, the
Principles of their Philofophy would be defpis'd ; and
Ihould their Anfwer prove clear or eafie. Men would
reafosably fufpedt the Novelty of their Divinity.
Since then Novelty, in Point of Divinity> bears the
Charadfer of Error, and that Men have a Right to
defpife Opinions, only becaufe they are new, and have
no Foundation in Tradition 5 we ought not to under-
E e e 3 take
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take to give eafie and intelligible Explanations of
things, which the Fathers and the Councils have not
fully explained ; and it is fufficient to believe the
DoArine of Tranfubftantiation, without pretending
to explain the manner of it. For otherwife we fbould
fpread Seeds of new Difputes and Quarrels, of which
there are but too many already ; and the Enemies of
Truth would not fail to make a malicious ufe of it to
opprefs their Adverfaries.
Diiputes in Point of Explanations of Divinity, feem
to me to be the moft Ufelefs and the molt Dangerous ;
and they are the more to be fear d, by realbn that even
Pious Perfons think themfelves obliged to break the
Bonds of Charity with thofe that are not of their Opi-
We have but too many Inltances of it, and the
nion.
realbn of it is plain enough. Therefore it is always
the belt and fafelt way, not to be over-hafty in fpeak-
ing of things of which we have no Evidence, and
which others are not difpofed to conceive.
Neither muft obfcure and uncertain Explanations of
the Myfteries of Faith, ferve us as a Rule and Prin-
ciple to reafon in Philofophy, in which nothing but
Evidence ought to perfwade us. We muft not change
the clear and diftind: Idea s of Extenfion, Figure, and
Local Motion, for thefe general and confufe Idea's of
or of ihcSubjetl ofExtenlion, of Form, and
of Quiddities, ot real ^lalities, and of all thofe Mo-
tions of Generation, of Corruption, of Alteration, and
the like, which difier from Local Motion. Real Idea's
produce a Real Science, but the general Idea's of Lo-
gick will never produce any thing but a rambling,
liiperficial and barren Science. Therefore it behoves
us to conlider attentively, thofe diftind and particular
Idea's of things, in order to difcover the Proprieties
they include; and thus to ftudy Nature, inltead of
lofing our felves in Chim»era's, which only exift in the
Opinion of feme Philofophers, v
CHAP
\
ChaplX. A Search^fter Truth, 7®
«
C H A p. IX.
I, The laji General Caufe of oar Errors. IL That
the liieas of things are not always preftnt to the
Mind as foon as 'tis defir^d. III. That all'
Finite Minds are liable to Error, and rtfhy.
IV. IVe otf^ht not to judge that there are only
Bodies or Spirits^ nor that God is a Spirit^ as we
conceive Spirits.
"Y/\7E have.hitherto fpoken of Errors, for which we I, Tlje laji
can affign (bme occafional Caufe in the Nature
of the Pure Underftanding, or of the ijjind coalider'd, of
as a(5ling of it felf, and in the Nature of Idea's, that is,
in the manner how the Mind perceives External
Obje<fls. There now remains only to explain a
Caufe, which may be call'd a Univerfal and General
Caufe of all our Errors; becaufe we conceive no
Error, but what depends in feme meafure on it.
That Caufe is. That Nothing having no Idea to
reprefent it, the Mind is induc'd to believe, that
things it has no Idea of, do not Exift.
It is certain, that the general Source of our Errors,
as we have already often declar'd, is, becaufe our
Judgments have more Exteniion than our Perceptions.
For when we confider • fome Object, we commonly
behold it only on one fide, and we are not contented
with judging of fo much as we have confideFd, but
we aifo judge of the whole Objedt. Therefore ic
often happens that we are deceiv'd, becaule, though
the thing be true on that part we have examin'd it,
it commonly prdves falfe on the other, and that which
we believe to be true only proves likely. Moreover
it is evident, that we (hould not judge abfolutely of
things as We doj. if we did not think we had confi-
der'd them ori ail fides, or if we did not fuppole them
anfwerable to thofe we have examin'd. Therefore the
E e e 4 general
1
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7^ ^ Search after Truth, Book III,
general Caufe of our Errors, is, That having no Idea
of the other fides of our Objedf, or of their difference
from that which is prefent to our Mind; we fancy
that thofe other fides are nor, or at leaft we fuppofe
that they have no particular difference.
This manner of proceeding feems pretty reafonable
tp us: For Nothing forming no Idea's in the Mind,
we have lome realpn to believe, that thofe things
which form no Idea's in the Mind, while they are
examined, refemble Nothing. And that which con-
♦ firms us in this Opinion, is, That we are perfwaded,
by a kind of Inftindf, that the Idea's of things are due
to our Nature, and that they are fubmitted to the
Mind in fuch a manner, that they ought to prefent
themfelves before it, as foon as it defires it.
II. The Neverthelefs*^if we did but refiedt on the prefent
Idesis of State of our Nature, we fiiould not be fo ready to
things are believe, that we have ail the Idea's of things as foon
not prefent as we defire them. Man, as I may fay, is only Flefh
So theMind and Blood fince the Fall. The leaft Impreffion of
,^ foon as Iii5 Senfes, and of his PalFions, breaks the ftrongeft
tis defrd. Attention of his Mind ; and the Courfeof the Spirits,
and of the Blood, draws it away, and drives it con-
rinually towards Senfible Objedls. It often ft rives
in vain againft the Torrent which drives it along;
and 'tis but feldom that it makes any Oppofition ;
for there is too much Delight in following it,
and too much Fatigue to oppofe it. Therefore the
Mind is dilgufted and finks as foon as it makes the
leaft Effort to take hold of, and to fix upon
Ibme Truth: It is abfolutely Falfe in the State in'
which we ■ are, that the Idea's ot things are pre-
fent to our Mind whenever we have a Mind to
confider them. Therefore we ought not to judge
that things are not, only becaufe we have no Idea's
of them.
III. All Fl- But though we fhould fuppofe Man to be ab-
nite Minds ioXuiG Maiter of his Mind and of his Idea's, he
are liable would neveithelefs be fubjecft to Error by his Na-
to Error, ture:
For the Mind of Man is. limited , and a
Mind
1.
Jijspi
n
Chap. IX. A Search after Truth.
Mind that is limited, is Naturally liable to Error."
The reafon of it is, the leaft things have many
Relations among themfelves, and nothing but an
Infinite Mind can apprehend them. Therefore a
limited Mind not being able to imbrace, or to
apprehend all thofe Relations, whatever Efibrt it
makes, is induc'd to believe, that thofe which it per-
ceives not, do not exift, particularly when we do
not refled: on the Weaknefs and Limitation of our
Mind, which is very ufual. Thus the Limitation
of the Mind alone, infers a Capability of falling into
Error.
Neverthelefs, if Men, even in the State of Weak-
nefs and Depravations in which they are , did al-
ways make a good ufe of their Liberty, they would
never be deceiv'd. And therefore all Men that fall
into Error , are juftly blam'd, and deferve to be
punilh'd: For if we would not be deceiv'd, we
muft only judge of what we fee, and never make
entire Judgments, but on fuch things which we are
fure we have examin'd in all their parts, which we
can do. But they had rather fubmit to Error, than
to the Rule of Truth ; They will decide without
much difficulty and Examination. Therefore we
need not wonder if they fall into many Errors,and very
often make uncertain Judgments.
Men, for Example, have no other Idea's of Sub- IVig
ftance, than that of the Mind and Body ; that is,
Of a Subftance that Thinks, and of a Subftance that J^*^g^
is Extended. And from thence they pretend to have ^
a Right to conclude, that whatever Exifts is Body ,
or Spirit: Not that I pretend to affirm, that there sp/rks^^
is any Subftance that is neither Body nor Spirit: treated
For we ought never to affirm, that things Exift
which we have no Knowledge of ; fince it is to be QqcI is a
thought, that God who does not conceal his Works spirit as
from us, would have given us ibme Idea's of them.^^ con^
Neverthelefs I am of Opinion, that we ought v\oi ceive Spi'
to determine any thing about the Number of Spe- ri't.
cies of Beings which God has Created, by the Idea's
we
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^ Search after Truth. Book III.
we have of them ; fince it is abfolutely poflible that
God may have Reafons to Conceal them from us,
which we do not know; if it were only becaufc
thofe Beings having no Relation to us, it would be
ufelefs for us to know them : By the fame realbn as
he has not given us Eyes good enough to tell the Teeth
of a Hand-worm, becaufe it is not very material for
the prefervation of our Body, to have fuch a piercing
Sight.
But though we think no body ought to Judge rafii-
ly, that all Beings are Spirits or Bodies ; we think ne-
verthelefs, that it is diredfly contrary to Reafon, that
Philofophers in order to explain Natural Effedfs.fhould
ufe other Idea's, than thofe that depend on Thought
and Extenfion, fince indeed they are the only we have,
that are diftindl or particular.
Nothing can be more unreafonable, than to imagin
an Infinity of Beings upon bare Idea s of Logick ; to
impure an Infinity of Proprieties to them ; and thus
to endeavour to explain things we do not underhand,
by things which do not only conceive, bur which is not
polfible for us to cotceive. 'Tis juft as if the Blind
having a mind to fpeak of Colours among themfelves,
and to maintain a Thefis about them, fhould in order
thereunto, make ufe of the Definitions which Philo-
fophers give them, and draw feveral Conclafions from
the fame. For as thofe Blind could only give plealant
and ridiculous Arguments upon Colours, becaufe they
could have no perrcdl Idea's of them, and yet would
argue about them upon General and Logical Idea's :
So Philofophers can never argue folidly upon the Edecls
of Nature, when to that end, tbey only make ufe of
general Logical Idea's, of Ad:, Power, Being, Caufe,
Principle, Form, Quality, and the like. It is abfolutely
neceffary for them only to rely on diitind and particu-
lar Idea's of Thought and Extenfion, and thofe they in-
elude, as Figure, Motion, For it is in vain to pre-
tend to underhand Nature, but by the Confideration
of the diftind Idea's we have of it j and it is better
never to meditate, tharj upon Chimera's,
Never-
* i
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r
Chap.IX. ^ Search after Truth,
Neverthelefs we cannot affirm that there are only
Bodies and Spirits, Beings that think, and that are ex-
tended,becaufe we may be deceiv'd in it. For though
they are fufficient to Explain Nature, and confe-
quently we may conclude without fear of being de-
ceiv'd, that the Natural Things we have fbme know-
ledge of, depend on Extenfion and Thought; yet
it is certainly poflible, that there may be others of
which we have no Idea, and of which we fee no
Effedfe.
Men therefore Judge ralhly, when they Judge as an
Infallible Principle, that all Subdances are Bodies or
Spirits. But they alfo infer a rath Conclufion from
thence, when they conclude by the bare Teftimony
of Reafon that God is a Spirit. It is true, that fince
we are Created after his Image and Likenels, and that
Holy Writ teaches us in feveral Places that God is a
Spirit, we ought to believe it, and to call him fo:
But Reafon alone cannot teach it us. That tells
us only that God is a Being infinitely Perfedt; and
that he is rather a Spirit than a Body, fince our
Soul is more perfedt, than our Body: But it does not
affure us that there are no Beings befides more perfedt
than our Spirits ; and more above our Spirits, than
our Spirits are above our Bodies.
Now fuppofing that there were fuch Beings, ( as it
undeniably appears that it was in the power of God
to Create fuch ) it is clear that they would participate
more of the likenefs of God than we do. The fame
Reafon teaches us, that God would fooner have the
Perfedions of their Beings than ours, which would
only be Imperfedlions compared to them. Therefore
we muft not Judge ralhly, that the word Spirit which
we ufe to exprefs what God is^ and what we are, is
an Equivocal Term, which fignifies the fame things,
or things that are very like. God is more above Cre-
ated Spirits, than thofe Spirits are above Bodies; and
we ought not fo much to call God a Spirit to (hew
pofitively what he is, as to fignifie that he is not Mate-
rial. He is a Being infinitely Perfedt, tio body can
que-
75
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76 A Search after Truth. Book III.
queftion it. But as we muft not imagm with the An'
thropomorphites, that he muft have a Human Figure,
becaule it feems to be moft perfecfl, although we fhould
fuppofe him Corporeal, neither muft we imagin that
the Spirit of God has any Human Thoughts: And
that his Spirit is like unto ours, becaufe we know no-
thing that is more perfecft than our Spirit. We muft
rather believe, that as he poflefles the Perfedlions of
Matter without being Material, fince it is certain that
Matter has a relation to fome Perfecftions that are in
God; he alfo poiTefles the Perfections of Created Spi-
rits, without being a Spirit in the manner as we con-
ceive Spirits: That his Name is. He that: is ; that is,
the unlimited Being, the All-Being, the Infinite and
Univerfal Being.
fei
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CHAP.
Chap> X. A Search after Truths
CHAP. X.
txatnfles of fome Thyjical Errors^ into which Men
fall^ hecanfe they fupfefe that things which
differ in their Nature^ jQualities^ Extenfion^
Dm at ion, and proportion , are alike in all
things,
have feen in the preceding Chapter, that Men
^ ^ Judge ralhly, when they fudge that all Beings
are only of two forts, Spirits or Bodies. We will (hew
in the following, that their Judgments are not only
ra(h, but alfo very falfe, which are the principles of
an infinite number of Errors, when they Judge that
Beings are not different in their Relations nor Man-
nets, becaufe they have no Idea's of thofe diffe*
rences.
It is moft certain, that the Mind of Man only looks
for the relations of Things j firft thofe which the Ob-
jeds it confiders may have with it ; and in the next
place, thofe they have towards one another. For the
Mind of Man only feeks its Good and Truth. In
order to find its Good, it carefully confiders by Rea-
fon, and by Tafte or Senfation, whether Obrjedts
have a Relation of agreement with it. To difcover
the Truth, it confiders whether Objeds have a Rela-
tion of Equality, or of Likenefs one with another, or
what is the exad meafure of their Inequality. For
as Good is only the good of the Mind, becaufe it is
convenient for it: So Truth is only Truth by the
Relation of Equality, or of Likenefs that is found be-
tween two or many things: Whether between two or
many Objeds, as between a Yard and Cloth ; for it
is true that this Cloth holds out a Yard, becaufe there
h an Equality between the Yard and the Cloth: Whe-
ther between Two, or many Idea's, as between the
two Idea's of Three and Three, and that of Six ; for
' ~ it
77
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A Semb after Truth. Book lit
it is true that three and three are Six, becaufe there
is an Equality between the two Idea's of Three and
Three, and that of Six: Laftly, Whether between
Idea s and Things, when the Idea s reprefent what the
Things are: For when I fay that there is a Sun, my
propofition is True ; becaufe the Ideas I have of Ex-
iftence, and of the Sun, reprefent that the Sun does
leally Exift. So that all the AcSfion, and all the
Attention of the Mind upon Objed:s , is only in
order to endeavour to difcover the Relations of
them, fince Men only apply themfelves to Things,
that they may difcover the Truth or Goodnefs of
them.
But as we have already noted in the preceding
Chapter, Attention Fatigues the Mind. It is foon
rir'd with refilting the Impreflion of the Senfes which
removes it from its Objedr, and leads it to others,
which the LoVe it has to its Body renders agreeable to
it. It is extreamly limited ; and thus the differences
which are between the Subjects which it Examins;
being Infinite, or almoft Infinite, it is not capable to
diftinguifh them. The Mind therefore fuppofes Ima-
ginary Refemblances, in which it obferves no pofitive
and real differences : The Idea's of Refemblance be-
ing more prefcnt to it, more familiar, and plainer than
others. For it is plain, that Refemblance includes
but one Relation; and that one Idea is fufficient to
Judge that a Thqufand Things are alike: Whereas
in order to Judge without fear of being deceiv'd, that
a Thoufand Objedfs are different among therhfelves,
it is abfolutely neceffary to have a Thouland different
Idea's prefent to the Mind.
Therefore Men imagin that things of a different
Nature are of the fame Nature ; and that all things
ot the fame Species fcarce differ from one another.
They Judge that unequal things are Equal; that thole
that are Inconftant are Conftant; and that thofe that
are without Order and Proportion, are well order'd
and proporcion'd. In a word, they often think that
Things i^ai are different in Nature, Quality, Exren-
«>
ji
;5:i
t uT
Chap.X. A Search after Truth,
fion, Daration, and Proportion, are alike in all tfaofe
things. But that deferves to be explain'd more at
large by fome Examples, becaufe it occafions many
Errors.
The Mind and Body, the Subftance which Thinks,
and that which is Extended, are two kinds of Being
altogether different, and diredly oppofite: What is
proper for the one, is improper for the other. Never-
thelefs, moft Men refleding but little on the Idea they
have of Thought, and being continually affeded with
Bodies, look upon the Soul and Body as one and the
fame thing : Imagining a Reiemblance between
two things that are different.. They fancy the Soul
to be Material, that is, Extended throughout the
whole Body, and Figur'd like the Body. They
impute that to the Mind, which only fuits with the
Body.
Moreover, Men being fenfible of Pleafure, Pain,
Odours, Taftes, and their Body being more pre-
fent to them than their Soul: That is, eafily imagin-
ing their Body, and not being able to imagin their
Soul, they attribute to it the faculties of Feeling,
Imagining, and even fometimes of Conceiving; which
can only belong to the Soul. But the following Exam-
pies will be more fenfible.
It is certain that all Natural Bodies, even thofethat
are call'd Species, differ one from another ; that Gold
is not abfolutely like Gold ; and that one drop of Wa-
ter is different from another. It is with all Bodies of
the fame Species, as it is with Faces. AH Faces have
Eyes, a Nofe, a Mouth, they are all Faces, and Mens
Faces \ and yet there never were two perfedlly alike.
So a piece of Gold has parts like unto another piece
of Gold; and a drop of Water has undoubtedly a
great Refemblance with another drop of Water : Ne-
vcrthelefs one may alfirm, that it is impoffible to give
two drops of it, though taken out of the fame River,
perfecftly alike. And that Philofophers inconfiderably
fuppofe Effential Refemblances betweeu Bodies of the
Species, or Refemblances which confilt in Indi-
vifibility 5
ji Search after Truth. Book IlL
vifibility 5 for the Eflences of Things confift in an J«-
divifible^ according to their Falfe Opinions.
The Reafon of their falling into fo grofs an Errot,
is, becaufe they will not confider thofe things carefully,
upon which they neverthelefs CDmpofe large Volumes.
For as Men do not allow a perfeA Refemblance be-
iween Faces, becaufe they obferve them nearly ; and
the habit of diftinguilhing them, makes us obferve the
leaft differences in them : So, if Philofophers would
confider Nature with fome Attention, they would dif-
cover a fufficient number of Caufes of Diverfity in
thofe very things, which produce the fame Senfations
in us, and which for that reafon we fay> are of the
fame Species ; nor would they fo eafily fuppofe Effen-
tial Refemblances. Blind Men would be to blame,
in fuppofing an Effential Refemblance between Faces
which ftiould confift in Indivifibility, becaufe they do
not fenfibly perceive the differences of them : There-
fore Philofophers ought nor to fuppofe fuch Refem-
blances in Bodies of the fame Species, becaufe they
obferve no difference in them, by the Senfations they
have of them.
The Inclination we have to fuppofe a Refemblance
in Things, inclines us alfo to believe, that there is a
determin'd number of Differences and Forms ; and
that thofe Forms are neither capable of more or lefs.
We Fancy that all Bodies differ one from another, as
it were by degrees: That thofe very Degrees obferve
certain Proportions among them: In a word, we
Judge of Material Things as of Numbers.
It is clear, the Reafon of all this is, that the
Mind lofes it felf in the Relations of Incommenfura-
ble Thinp, fuch as Infinite Differences are, which are
not within Natural Bodies, and that it pleafes it felf
when it imagins fome Refemblance, or fome Propor-
tion among them ; becaufe then it reprefents feveral
things to it felf with a great deal of Eafe. For as I
baue already faid, one Idea is fufficient to Judge that
feveral things are alike, and there muft be feveral to
Judge that they are different from one another. For
inftanccj
liisa;
ieiiJiio
Chap. X. A Search after Truth.
♦ * ■ «
iHiiilvi inftance, if the Number of Angels be known, and
there are Ten Arch-Angels for every Angel ; and
Ten Thrones for every Arch-Angel; and thus for-
carefcl^l ward, keeping the fame proportion from One to Ten,
Voloiel unto the laft Order of Intelligences; the Mind
lanc£5(.j uisy eafily know the Number of thofe Bieflcd Spirits ;
rlyjix uay, even Judge of them partly at one Profpecfl by a
fcrFetk! ftrong Attention, which delights it iilSnitely. And
s woiilj perhaps it is that which has indue d feme Perfons to
Judge thus of the Numbers of Celeftial Spirits :
Which is the Cafe of fome Philofophers, who have
taianons put a Decuple proportion of Weight and of Light-
m{\k ncfs among the Elements, fuppofing Fire to be Ten
times Lighter than Air, and fo of the reft.
When the Mind finds its felf oblig'd to admit dif-
ferences between Bodies by the different Senfations
it has of them, as alfo by fome other particular
Reafons, it always puts the leaft it can. For that
reafon it is eafily perfwaded that the Eflences of
Things confift in an Indivifibile, and that they are like
jowiff 1 Numbers, as we faid before ; becaufe one Idea is
fufficient to Reprefent to us all the Bodies which are
IraHaiice Species. For example, if you put
' aGlafs of Water in an Hoglhead of Wine, Philofo-
onns ani^ phci'S will have it, that the Effence of the Wine ftill
xiitorifi 5 3ud that the Water is converted
Wine. That as between Three.and Four there
fsoklie Number, fince true Unity is Indivilible >
fo it is neceffary that the Water be Converted into
the Nature and Effence of the Wine, or that the
Wine lofe its Nature ; That as all Quaternary Num-
bers are perfectly alike , fo the Effence of the Water
isperfecftly alike in all Waters. That as the Num-
Three differs Effentially from the Number of
Two, and that it cannot have the fame Proprieties
as that has, fo two Bodies of different Species
differ Effentially, and in fuch a manner, that they
have never the fame Proprieties which proceed from
Entity, and other like things. Neverthelefs, if Men
would conflder the true Idea's of things with fome
i
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5 feveral
For asl
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82
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Search after Truth. Book III.
Attention, they would foon difcover^ that all Bodies
being Extended, their Nature or Effence has nothing
relembling Numbers j and that it cannot confift in
an Indivifible.
Wen do not only fuppofe Identity, Refemblance,
or Proportion in the Nature, Number, and Eflential
Differences of Subftances, they alfo fuppofe them in
all things they fee. Moft Men Judge, that all the
fix'd Stars are fattened to the Heavens, as to a Roof
at an Equal Diftance from the Earth. Attronomers
did pretend for a long while, that the Planets mo-
ved in perfedt Circles; and they have invented a great
number of them, as Concentriques^ Excentriques, Ef t-
cycles, to Explain the Phoenomena which contra-
di(tt:ed their Opinions.
It is true, that in thefe later Ages, the moft '
Learned have Correttted the Errors of the Ancients,
and believe that the Planets dettribe Ellipfes by
their- Motion. But if they pretend that the Ellipfes
are Regular, as People are inclined to believe ; be-
caufe the Mind fuppofes Regularity , whe-re it
fees no Irregularity ; they fall into an Error which
is more difficult to be Corre(tted, becaufe the Obfer- J
vations that can be made on the Courfe of the Pla-
nets, cannot be fo Exadt, and fo Juft, as to (hew the
Irregularity of their Motions. Nothing but Natural
(f 1)| b
CTCVtt,
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of tlx
m.
Philofbphy can Corredt that Error ; for it is infinitely
lefs remarkable, than that which we find in theSyftem ,
tit
of perfedt Circles.
But fomething particular has happened about the
Dittance and Motion of the Planets. For Aftrono- ®®"
mers not having been able to find an Arithmetical
or Geometrical Proportion in the fame, that being ai
abfolutely repugnant to Obfervations feme ima-*™'^^
gind , that they obferv'd a kind of Proportion,
which is called Harmonical in their pittances and'^^^fns
^Riccioli Motions. From thence it is that an * Attronomer of
2 Vol. this Age , in his New Almagefiey begins the Sedfi- ra
on which is Entitled , De Syjiemate Mmdi Hamuh ^ ib
nicot with thefe words: H
There
|X1
tSf
Chap.X. A Search after Truth.
There is no Aflronomer, though never fo littU h7et»o efi
acejaaintedinvohat relates to Ajlronomy^ hat acknowh'^esP^^l^
a kind of Harmony in the Motions and Intervals efdittor in^
Tlanets , if he conjiders the Order of the Heavenf At- Aflrommi-
f ctSyqutLa^^
tentively. , / -.y-
Nor is this the only Author that is of this Opi-
nion : Foi^ Obfervations have made hiiiv
ently fenfible of the Extravagancies of that agnof-
ginary Harmony, which has neyerthelefs been ad- cat har-
mir*d by feveral Ancient and Modern kuthors^moniam
whofe Opinions Father F^jccio/i Relates and Refutes; quamdam
Moreover , fome affirm Pythagoras, and his Pol- in Plane'
lowers, to have believ'd that the Heavens, by thek tarum in'
Regular Motions , made a moft Wonderful Con- tervalUsf
cert ^ which Men do not hear, becaufe they ate ^ mouhus
ufed to it; juft like thofe that Inhabit near the
Fall of the Waters of Nile, do not hear/ the
Noife of it. But I only relate that particukr Dpi-
nion of the Harmonical Proportion^ of the Diftances
and Motions of the Planers, to Ihew that the Mind is
delighted with Proportions, and that it often Fancies
ibem where they are not.
The Mind alfo fuppofes Uniformity^ in the dura-
tion of things, and imagins they are not liable
to Change and Inftabiiity, when it is not in fome
meafure forced by the Relation of the Senfes, to
Judge other wife.
All Material Things being Extended are capable
, of Divifion, and confequently of Corruption: Thofe
who refle(fl: on the Nature of Bodies-, difcover
Vifibly that they are Corruptible. Yet there Has
been a great number of Philofophers who fancied
that the' Heavens though Material; were Incorrub-
tible.
The Heavens are at too great a Diftance from
us, to difcover the Revolutions that happen there ;
and 'tis very rare that any happen there fo great,
is to be difcovered here. That alone has been
xii Hi"'! fuficient to perfwade many that they were- really
.! Incorruptible. And which- has' the more CodHim'd
^ Fffi their
A Search after Truth, Book III.
their Opinion, is, that they attribute to the Con*
trariety of (Qualities, the Corruption to which
Sublunary Bodies are fubjed:. For as they have
never been in the Heavens to fee what palfes
' there, fo they have had no Experience that this Con-
trartety of Qualities is there; which' has indu-
ced them to believe that there is really no fuch
thing there. Therefore they have concluded that
the Heavens were free from Corruption ; becaufe
that which Corrupts all Bodies here below, accord-
ing to their Opinion, is not above.
It is Vilible that this Argument has no Solidity ;
for I cannot fee , why there Ihould be no other
Caufe of Corruption , than thofe Contrarieties of
Qualities which they imagin ; nor upon what Foun-
dation they can affirm , That there is neither
Heat , nor Cold , nor Drought, nor Moifture in
the Heavens ; That the Sun is not Hot, and that Sa-
turn is not Cold.
There is fome appearance of Reafon to fay,
•that, very hard - Stones, Glals, and other Bodies of
that Nature do not Corrupt, fince we fee they
fubhft long in the fame Stare; and though we
arc near enough to fee the Alterations that fhould
happen to them. But being at fo great a diftance
as we are from the Heavens, it is diredlly con-
vtrary to Reafon to conclude, that they do not
Corrupt .V becaufe we feel no contrary Qualities in
them , . nor fee that .they Corrupt. Neverthelefs,
ibme not, only fay that they Corrupt nor, but they
affirm abfolutely , that they are Unalterable and (Cdtlii
Incorruptible. And the Peripateticks want but little Mc
of faying, that the Celeftial Bodies are fo many tbpi
Divinities ; as Arijiotle their Maiter did believe of a: li
them.
The Beauty of the Univerfe does not confift in
the Incorruptibility of its Parts, but in the Va-
riety that is found in them : And this great Work
of the World would not be fo admirable without
that Viciditude of things which, we oblerve in it.
Mat-
chap. X.' A Search after Truth,
Matter infinitely Extended, without Motion ^
and confequently without Form and Corruption,
would indeed dilcover the Infinite Power of its
Author; but it would give no Idea of his Wil^'
dom. This is the reafon that all Corporeal Things
are Corruptible; and that there is no Body , but
what receives fome Change , which Alters and Cor-
rupts it in Time. God Forms even in the Bofom
of Stones and Glafs, Animals more perfedt and
admirable than all the Works of Men. Thofe
yj Bodies though very hard and dry, are Corrupted
^ in time : The Air and Sun to which they are ex-
jo(; pofed, alter fome of their Parts ; and fome Worms
® Feed upon them, as Experience has (hew'd.
Jjff There is no other difference between thbfe Bo-
dies that are very hard and dry, and others, un-
lefs it be that they are compos'd of very grofs
' and folid Parts; and confequently lefs capable of
being agitated and feparated one from another, by
sflf the Morion of thofe that hit againft them; for
which reafon they are looked upon as Incorrup-
tible: Neverthelels, they are not fo by their
Nature, as Time, Experience, and Reafon fuifi-
^ ciently (hew us.
^ But as for the Heavens, they are Compos'd of
jjijr the moft Fluid and fubtle Matter, and particular-
jj,] ly the Sun : And he is fo far from being void of
Heat and Incorruptible, as Ariftotles followers fay,
that on the contrary, he is the horteft of all Bo-
dies, and the moft liable to Change. It is he that
Heats, Moves , and Changes all things: For it
is he who produces by his Adtion, wrhich is no-
thing but his Heat , or the Motion of his Parts,
all the Novelties we fee in the Change of Sea-
fons. Reafon demonftrares thefe things: But though
fome may contradidt Reafon , yet no Body can re-
fift Experience. For fince fome have difcovered
in-the Sun by means of Telefcopes, Spots as large
as the whole Earth, which have been form'd in
it, and have been diflipated in a little time: It
F f f 5 13
A Search after Truth, Book IlL
is no longer to be deny'd, but that he is more fubjedb
to Change than the Earth we inhabit.
All Bodies are therefore in a continual Motion and
» V • I. i.
Change, and particularly thofe that are the moft
Fluid, as Fjre, Air and Water; next the parts
of Living Bodies , as Flefli, and even the Bones»
and laftly, thole that are the moft folid : The Mind
ought not to fuppofe a kind of Immutability in
things, becaufe it fees no Corruption or Altera-
tion in them 5 for it is not a proof that a thing is
always like unto it felf, becaule no difference is ob-
ferv'd in it j or that things are not, becaufe we have
no Idea or Knowledge of them.
CHAP.
\
Chap.XL A Search after Truth.
CHAP, XI.
Examfles of fame Errors of Morality which de-
fend on the fame Principle.
'T^He Faculty of the Mind imagining and fuppo-
fing Refemblances where-ever it perceives no
Vifible Differences, alfo engages moft Men into
Errors, which are yet more dangerous in Points of
Morality. Here are fome Examples of them.
A French Man meets an Englifh Man, or an Ita-
lian; That Stranger has peculiar Humours: He has
a Nicenefs of Mind ; or if you pleafe, he is Haugh-
ty and Troublefome. This will at firft induce this
French-man to Judge, that all Englifh-tnen, or It a-
lians^ have the fame Character of Mind with the
Perfon they have convers'd with. He will Praife,
or Blame them all in General: And if be meets
with any other, he will fancy at firff that he is like
unto him he has already feen ; and therefore will fuf-
fer himfelf to be inclined to fome Affedtion or fecrec
Averfion towards him. In a word, he will Judge
of all the Individuals of thofeNations by this famous
proof, that he has feen one or many that had cer-
tain Qualifications of Mind : Becaufe he knew not
whether the reft were different, fuppofing them all
alike.
A Religious of fome Order commits a fault: This
is a fufficient Reafon for thofe who know it to Con-
demn all the Individuals of that Order indifferent-
ly. They all wear the fame Habit, and have the
fame Name, they are alike in that: This is e-
noTjgh for the Common Sort of Men to Fancy
that they are all alike. They fuppofe that they are
ail alike , becaufe not being able to fearch into
their Hearts, they cannot fee pofitivelv whether they
differ.
Ff f 4
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88 ASearch after Truth. Book III,
Calumuiarors , who ftudy how to Blaft the Repu-
tation of their Enemies, commonly make ufe of
this, and Experience reaches us that it fucceeds for
the moft part. And indeed it is very fuitable to the
Capacity of the Common Sort of Mankind. For
it is not difficult to find in numerous Communities,
though never io Floly, fome irregular Perfons, or fuch
as have 111 Sentiments j fince in the Company of
the Apoftles, of which Jrfns Chriji himfelf was the
Head, there was a Thief, a Traitor, an Hypocrite;
in a word, a '^tidas.
The Jews without doubt, would have been very
much to blame, to pafs an 111 judgment againlt
the moft Holy Society that ever was, becaufe
of the Avarice and Fault of '^tidas; and if they had
Condemned them all in their Hearts, becaufe they
fuffered that III Man among them; and Jefiis Chriji
Eimfelf did not punilh him, though he was fenfible
of his Crimes.
Therefore it is a manifeft Fault againft Reafon,
and Breach of Charity to pretend, That a Commu-
nity is in fome Error, becaufe fome of their Members
were fo, although the Heads Ihould diffemble it, or
were the promoters of it themfelves. It is true, that
when all the Members will defend an Error, or Fault
of their Brother, the whole Community may be thought
Guilty ; but that feldom or never happens ; for it
feems morally impoftible that all the Members of an
Order fhonld have the fame Sentiments.
Men therefore Ihould never conclude thus from Par-
ticulars to Generals F^ut they cannot Judge limply
of what they fee, tfiey always fiy our into Excels. A
Religious of fuch an Order is a Great Man, an Honeft
Man j they conclude that all the Order is compofed
of Great Men, of Good Men. Likewife a Religious
of an Order has III Sentiments : Therefore all that
Order is Corrupted, and has III Sentiments. But
thefe laft Judgments are far more dangerous than the
firft - becaufe it is a Duty to Judge well of our Neigh-
hours, and the Malignity of Man occafions that III
Judg.
Chap.XI. A Search after Truth,
Judgments, and Dilcourfes held againft the Repura-
^ion of others, make a ftronger Impreflion upon the
Mind than advantageous Judgments and Difcourfes
do.
When a Worldly Man, who indulges his Paflions,
fixes ftrongly upon his Opinion, and pretends in the
heighth of his Inclination, that he is in the right to in-
dulge it, Men Judge reafonably that he is obftinate,
and^ he owns it himfelf as foon as his Paflion is over.
So when a Pious Perfon, who is perfwaded of what
he fays, and who has difcover'd the Truth of Religi-
on, and the Vanity of Worldly Things, endeavours
according to that Knowledge to reform the Vices
of others, and reprehends them with feme Zeal,
Men of the World alfo take him to be an obftinate
Man; and therefore they conclude that Devout Men
arc obftinate. They Judge moreover, that Good Men
are far more obftinate than Vain, III Men j becaufe
the latter only defending their 111 Opinions according
to the different Motions of the Blood , and Pafli-
ons, they cannot continue long in their Sentiments:
They come to themfelves again. Whereas perfons of
Piety remain fteddy ; becaufe their Foundation is un-
alterable, and does not depend on a thing fo inconftanc
as the Circulation of the Blood.
Therefore ordinary Men conclude, that Pious Men
are obftinate as well as the Vicious: Becaufe they
are as Paffionate for Truth and Virtue, as 111
Men are for Vice and FaKhood. Both fpeak almoft in
the fame manner, to maintain their Sentiments 5 they
are alike in that, though they differ in the main.
This is fufficient for thofe who do not weigh the dif-
ference of Reafons, to Judge that they are alike in all
things, becaufe they are alike in that manner, which
every Body is capable to Judge of.
Devout Perfons are not then obftinate, they are
only fteddy^' as they ought to be j But the Vicious and
Libertines are always obftinate, though they ftiould
not periift one Hour in their Sentiments: Becaufe
Men are only obftinate when they defend a Falfe
Opinion,
89
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Opioion, although they (hould only defend it a little
while.
This is the Cafe of fome Philofophers, who have
maintained Chimerical Opinions, which they lay afide
at laft. They would have thofe who defend conftant
Truths, whofe certainty they fee evidently, to p^t
with them as bare Opinions, as they have done with
thofe they had foolilhly been prejudic'd with. And
becaufe it is difficult to have a deference for them in
prejudice of Truth; as alfo becaufe the Love we have
Naturally for it, inclines us to defend it earneftly, they
Judge us to be obitinate.
Thofe Men are to blame to defend their Chimera's
obftinately ; but the others are in the right to defend
Truth with Vigour and Steddinefs of Mind. The
manner of both is the fame, but their Sentiments are
different; and it is that difference of Sentiment, which
sn|kes the one conftant, and the others obitinate.
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Chap*XI. A Search after Truth.
• ( f liVil i| I I
THE
51
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CONCLUSION
0 F T H E
Three Firft Books.
IN the beginning of this Book I have diftinguiflied
two Parts in the Simple and Indivifible Being
of the Soul, one purely Paflive, and the other
both Pallive and Adlive. The firft is the Mind or
Underftanding, the fecond is the Will. I have attri-
buted three Faculties to the Mind, becaufe it receives
its Modifications and Idea's from the Author of Na-
ture after three different ways.
I have called it Senfe, When it receives from God
its Idea's that are confounded with Senfations, vi^.
Senfible Idea's occafion'd by certain Motions which
pafs in the Organs of its Senfes at the Prefence of
Objedts.
I have called it Imagination and Memory, When
it receives from God Idea's that are confounded with
Images, which are a kind of Weak and Languilhing
Senfations that the Mind receives only through fomc
Traces that are produc'd, or areftirr'd up in the Brain
by the Courfe bt the Spirits.
Laftiy, I have called it Pure Mind or Underftand-
ing> when it receives from God pure Idea's of
Truth, without any mixture of Senfations and Images
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A Search after Truth. Book III.
with it. Not by the Union it hath with the Body,
but through that it hath with the H^ord or tVifdom
of God 5 not becaufe it is in the Material and Sen-
lible World, but becaufe it fubfifts in the Immaterial
and Intelligible one: Not to know Mutable things
£t for the Prefervation of the Life of the Body, but
to difcover unchangeable Truths which preferve the
Life of the Mind.
I have fhown in the firft and fecond Book, that
our Senfes and Imaginations are very ufeful to di£-
cover to us the Relation betwixt External Bodies
and our own ; that all the Idea's which the Mind
receives through the Body, are for the ufe of the
Body; that it is impolTible clearly to difcover any
Truth whatfoever by the Idea's of our Senfes and
Imaginations; that thofe confus'd Idea's ferve only
to engage us to our Body, and through our Body
to allSenhble things: And laitly. That if we would
avoid Error, we ought not to truft to them. I alfo
concluded it Morally Impodible, to know by the
pure Idea's of tne Mind, the Relations that are be-
twixt External Bodies- and cars : That we muft not
argue according to thefe Idea's, to know if an Apple
or a Pear a''e good to eat, but we muft judge it by
our Tafte. And although we may make ufe of our
Minds, to difcover after Ibme confufed manner, the
Relations that are betwixt External Bodies and our
own ; yet it is always the fureft way to make ufe
of our Senfes. I will give another Example, for we
cannot imprefs too much on the Mind, things that are
fo Eflential and Neceftary.
Suppofing I would examine which is moft Advan-
tageous, to be Religious or Rich; if I open the
Eyes of my Body, Juftice appears a Chimera, I fee
no Attradlives in it; I fee the Juft are Miferable,
Abandoned, Perfecuted, Defencelefs, and without
Confolation, for he that Comforts and Upholds
them, does not appear to my Eyes; and indeed I do
not fee of what ufe Juftice or Virtue can be ; but
if I turn my Eyes upon.Riches, I foon perceive their
Luftre
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■X
Chap.XI. ^ Search after Truth*
Luftre, and am dazled with it: PoWer, Grandeur,
Pleafures, and all Senhble Goods, accompany Riches ;
I cannot doubt but Riches are neceflfary to make one
Happy. So likewife if I make ufe of my Ears,
I hear that all Men efteem Riches; they fpeak
of nothing but the ways of getting them ; and they
always Praife and Honour thofe chat poilefs them.
Thefe two Senfes, and all the reft tell me. That
to be Happy I muft be Rich: And if I ihut my
Eyes and Ears, and ask my Imagination, it conti-
nually reprefents to me what my Eyes have feen,
and my Ears heard, as to the Advantage of Riches ;
but yet it will reprefent thefe things to me quite
, after another manner than my Senfes did, for the
Imagination always enlarges the Idea's of thofe
things that have any relation to the Body, or which
I we Love. If I will but permit it, my Imagination
i will loon condudf me to an inchanred Palace, like
thofe of which Poets and Romances have made fuch
Magnificent Defcriptions of; and there I (hall fee
► fuch Beauties, which would be ufelefs for me to
defcribe: This would convince me , that the God
of Riches, who inhabits it, is only capable of making
me Happy : This is what my Body is able to per-
fwade me to, for it fpeaks only for it felf, it is ne-
ceffary for its Good , that the Imagination fhould
ftoop before the Grandeur and Splendor of Riches :
But if I confider that the Body is infinitely below
the Mind , that it cannot be Mafter of it, that it
I cannot inftrudt it in the Truth, nor produce Light
i in it; and that recolleCfing my fclf, I ask my felf;
or rather (fince I am neither my own Mafter, nor
Light) if I draw near to God, and, in the Silence
of my Senfes and Paflions, ask him whether I ought
to prefer Riches to Virtue, or Virtue to Riches, I
fhall bear a clear and diiiioA Anfwcr of what I
ought to do; an Eternal Anfwer which has al-
ways been given , is now given , and will always
! be given ; an Anfwer which it is not neceilary 1
Ihould explain , becaute all the World knows it;
either
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Sedub Afier Truth. Book IIL
either thofe who read this Book, or thofe who
read it not; which is neither Gr«?^, Latin, French^
or German, and which is conceived by ail Nations.
Laftly, An Anfwer which Comforts the Juft in
their Poverty, and which difturbs Sinners in the
midft of their Riches: I (hall hear this Anfwer
and be convinced of it: I fhall laugh ar the Fan-
cies of my Imagination, and the Illulion of my Senfes.
The Inward Man, which is in me, will deride
the Animal and Earthly one which I carry about
me. Laltly, The New Man (hall increafe, and the
Old Man (hall be deftrby'd, provided I always
obey the Voice of him who fpeaks fa clear4y to
me in the moft Secret Recelfes of my Reafon ; and
who having made himfelf Senfible to condefcend to
my Wcaknefs and Infirmity, and to give me Life
by thofe very means by which he gave me Eleath,
Ipeaks yet to me through my Senfes^ after a' very
ftrong, lively and familiar manner, I mean, by the
preaching of his Gofpel. And if I interrogate him
in all the Metaphyfical, Natural and pure Philbfoi
phical Queftions, as well as thofe which regard the
Regulation of Manners, I ftiall always have a Faith*
ful Mafter which will never deceive me. J (hall
not only be a Chriftian but a Philofopher: I (hall
make a good Judgment of things; and in a word^
I (hall follow both by Grace and Nature, the way
which will guide me to all the Perfeblion I am capa-
ble of.
It muft then be concluded, from what I have
faid. That to make the beft ufe that we can of the
Faculties of our Soul, our Senfes, Imagination, and
Mind, we muft only apply them to thofe things
for which they have been given us. We ought
carefully to diitinguifh our Senfations and Imagina-
tions from our pure Idea's; and judge according
to our Senfations and Imaginations, of the relation
that External Bodies have to ours, without making
ufe of them to difcover Truths , which they al-
ways confound : And we muft make ufe of the
pure
Chap.XI. A Search after Truth. ^
pure Idea's of the Mind to difcover Truths, with-
out ever attempting to judge by them of the rela-
tion that External Bodies have to ours; becaufe thefe
Idea's never have Extenfon enough to reprefent them
perfedlly to us.
It is impoflible that Men (hould have a fufficienc
Knowledge of all the Figures and Motions of the
little Particles of their Body and Blood, and of thofe
of a certain Fruit in a certain time of their Sicknefs,
to be able to difcover the relation of Agreement be-
twixt this Fruit and their Body, and that if they
(hould eat of it,it would recover them. Thus our Senfes
alone are more ufeful to the Prefervation of our
Health, than the Rules of Experimental Phyfick, and
Experimental Phyfick than the Theoretick. But Ex-
perimental Phyfick, which allows much to Experience,
and ftill more to the Senfes, is the beft, becaufe all
thefe things ought to be joyn'd together.
We may then ufe our Reafon in all things, and
'tis the Privilege which it has above the Senfes and
Imagination, which are limited to Senfible Things ;
but we ought to ufe it with Circumfpedlion ; for
though it is the chief part of our felves, it often hap-
pens that we are deceiv'd when we permit it to go
too far ; becaufe it cannot adt fufficiently without
wearying it felf; I mean it cannot know fufficiently
how to make a good Judgment, and yet it will not
forbear Judging.
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TRUTH.
BOOK IV.
Of the Inclinations and Natural Motions of
the Mind,
C H A p. I.
1. It^s necejfary the Mind have Inclinations ^ as
well as the Body Motions. 11. God aUs the
humane Mind only for himfelf III. Mens
Minds are only inclined to Barticular Good^
through the Motion they have to Good in General,
IV. The Origine of the Chief Natural Inclina-
tions, which will make up the Divifion of this
Fourth Book.
IT would not be neceflary to Treat of Natura:!
Inclinations, as we are going to do in this Fourth
Book ; nor of the Paffions, as we (hall do in the
following; in order to difcover the Caufes ot the
Errors-of Mankind, if the Underftanding did not de-
pend on the Will in the Perception of C)bje(5ts: But
A a a a whereas
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2 Search after Truth. Book IV.
whereas it is the Will that diredls it, which makes it
refolve, and applies it to feme Objeds rather than
others; it is abfolutely neceflary to apprehend its
Inclinations well, to penetrate into the Caufes of the
Errors to which we are liable.
I. If's ne- If God, when he Created this World, had produced
cejffary the Matter infinitely extended, without giving it any Mo-
Mind have tion, there would have been no difference in Bodies.
Inchnati- World would ftili have been a meet
ons,^ roeU of Matter, or of Extenfion, which indeed might
ostheBady difeover the Grandeur and Power of its Au-
otims. jjjor; but there would not be that Succeflion of
Forms, and that Variety of Bodies, which compofe all
the Beauty of the Univerfe, and which incline Mens
Minds to admire the Infinite Wifdom of the Governour
thereof.
Therefore I am of Opinion, That the Inclinations
of the Mind are in the Spiritual World, what Motion
is in the Material World ; and that if the Mind were
without Inclinations, or if it never had any Defire,
we fhould not meet with that Variety in the Order of
Spiritual Things; which not only makes the World
admire the Profoundnefs of the Wifdom of God, ap-
prove the Variety of Material Objeds ; but alfo his
Mercy, his Juftice, his Goodnefs, and generally all
his other Attributes. Thus then the Difference of In-
clinations produces, in the Mind, an Effedl much like
unto that which the Difference of Motions produces
in the Body; and the Inclinations of Mens Minds,
and the Motions of Bodies together, conftitute all the
Beauty of Created Beings. Thus all Spirits muft
have lome Inclinations, as well as Bodies have diffe-
rent Motions. But let us endeavour to difeover what
Inclinations they ought to have.
Were not our Nature Corrupted, it would not be
neceffary to feek out by Reafon, as we are going to
do, what the Natural Inclinations of Created Spirits
' onght to be: It would be fufficient, in order there-
unto, to Gonfult our felves, and we Ihould difeover,
by the Inward Sentim-ents vye have of what pafles
within us, ail the Inclinations we ought Naturally to
Chap. I. A Search after Truth, 5
have. Bur, whereas we know by Faith, that Sin has
deftroy'd the Order of Nature, and that Reafon in-
forms us, that our Inclinations are Irregular, as it will
appear in the Sequel, we are obliged to go another
way to work: Since we cannot trult to what we feel,
we are obliged to explain things in a more Sublime
Manner but which, without doubt, will feem to
have but little Solidity m it, to thofe who only efteem
what relates to the Senfes.
It is an undeniable Truth, that God can have no II. Tfie "
other principal End for his Operations but himfelf; Principal
and that he may have leveral Ends lefs Principal,
which tend all cowards the Prefervation of the Beings Anions of
which he has created. He can have no Principal End Godtshim'
but himfelf, becaufe he cannot Err; nor place Ms Final/^^.andht
End in Beings which are not Perfedl. But he may
propofe as a lefs Principal End the Prefer vation ofCre- -
ated Beings; becaufe as they all participate of his r.'/J''
Goodnefs, they are neceflarily Good, and even very
Good according to Scripture, VdUc bona. Therefore
God Loves them, and moreover it is his Love which
preferves them; for all Beings only fubfift becaufe
God Loves them. Diligts omnia qua funt, fays the
Wife Man, Nihil odifii eorum qua fecijii: Nec enim
odiens aliquid confiituijii fecijii. ^uomodo autem
fojfef aliquid fermanere^ niji tu voluijfes, aut quod a te
Docatum non ejfet conferveretur. In eftedl it is not pofli-
ble to conceive, that things which do not pleafe a
Being which is infinitely Perfect and Powerful, (hould
fubfift, fince all things only fublift by his Will. There-
fore God wills his Glory as his principal End, and the
Prefervation ot his Creatures for his Glory.
The Natural Inclinations of Humane Minds, being
certainly continual Impreffions of the Will of him that
has created them, and does preferve them: It is, in
my Opinion, necelfary that thofe Inclinations ftiould
be intirely like unto thofe of their Creator and Pre-
ferver. Therefore Naturally they can have no prin-
cipal End but bis Glory ; nor no other Second End
but their own Prefervation and that of others 5 but
always in relation to him from whom they have their
A a a a a Being,
. "'I' 1.;,^
f iiiij
i
■ f K -'l -
riX,;
. iT;,.!,
V-
if,,,, v'ii'''
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[*,:■,' ji/.'';.>■• ■
I'... ■..! ■■ - in*
" t
III .Human
Minds are
meerly
■prone to
particular
Goodf
through
the Ten-
dency they
ha<ve to
Good in
General,
A Search after Truth, Book IV,
Being. For it feems undeniable to me, that fince God
cannot defire that the Will he has created Ihould Love
an Inferior Good more than a Greater, that is. That
it fliould Love that which is lefs Lovely, more than
that which is more Lovely: He can create nothing
without inclining it towards himfelf, or command-
ing it to Love him above all things; though he may
create it Free, and with a Power to withdraw and to
ftray from him.
Whereas there is properly but one Love in God,
which is the Love of himfelf: And that God can
Love nothing but by that Love, finee he can Love
nothing but in relation to himfelf: So God likewife
Imprints but one Love in us, which is the Love of
Good in General; and we can Love nothing but by
that Love, fince we can Love nothing but what is,
or feems to be Good. It is the Love of Good in Ge-
neral, which is the Principle of our particular Affe-
dlions, fince that Love really is nothing but our Will:
For as I have laid already in another place. The Will
is nothing but the continual Impreflion of the Author
of Nature, which inclines the Mind of Man towards
Good in General. Certainly we muft not imagine
that this Power we have of Loving proceeds from us,
or is at our Difpofition. Nothing but the Power of
not Loving well, or rather of mifplacing our Affedtions,
is at our own Diipolition ; by reafon that being Free,
we may apply, and adlually do apply to particular
Objedls, and confequently to falfe Objedfs, the Good
Love which God does not ceafe to imprint in us,
while he does not ceafe to preferve us.
But not only our Will, or our Love for Good in
General, proceeds from God ; but Inclinations for
particular Goods which are common to all Men, though
not equally ftrong in all Men, as our Inclination for
the Prefervation of our Being, and of thole that are
united to us by Nature, are alfo Impreflions of the
Will of God upon us ; for in this place I givepromif-
cuoufly the Name of Natural Inclination? to all the
Impreiiions of the Author of Nature, which are com-
mon to all Minds,
Jfaid
V
Chap.I. Search after Truth, 5
I faid but even now, that God loved his Creatures, IV. The
and alfo that it was his Love which gave them to Source 0/
exift, and did preferve their Being: Therefore as Chief
God continually imprints in us a Love like unto his,
.fince it is his Will which makes and which regulates
ours; he likewife gives us all thofe Natural Incli-
nations which are not at our Choice, and which in- ^
dine us of necelTity to the Prefervation of our Being, njijion of
and of thofe we live with. thii fourth
For, though Sia has Corrupted all things, it hasso(?L
not deftroy'd them. Although our Natural Inclina-
tions do not always propofe God as their End by the
Free Choice of our- Willi,' God is always their Objed:
in the Inliitution of Nature : For God who produces
and preferves them in us, only produces and preferves
them for himfelf. All Sinners tend towards God by
the ImprefTion they receive from God, though they
withdraw from him by the Error and Diftradion of
their Mind. They love Good, for we can never love
otherwife, fince God makes us Love; but they Love
ill Objeds, 111 only, becaufe God, who gives even
Sinners the Power of Loving , forbids their Loving »
them , bocaufe fince the Fall they withdraw their
Affedion from him. For Men imagining that Crea-
tures occafion in them the Pleafure they injoy upon
their account, incline their Affedions violently to-
wards the Body , and fall into an abfolute Forget-
fulnefs of God , who does not appear before their
Eyes.
We have Hill then the fame Natural Inclinations ,
or the fame Imprefiions of the Author of Nature
which Adam had before the Fall. We have even the
fame Inclinations which the Blelfed have in Heaven,
for God neither Creates nor Preferves any Creatures,
without giving them a Love like unto his. He Loves
himfelf, he Loves us, he Loves all his Creatures:
Therefore he Inclines all Humane Minds to Love
him, to Love themielves, and to Love all Creatures.
But wereas all our Inclinations are only Imprefifions
of the Author of Nature, which incline us to Love
him and all things for his fake ; they cannot be right
A a a a 3 unlefs
'rljl''-
mm^'
il '
fe.f!'
f'i* It.*' i
A Search after Truth. Book IV,
unlefs we love God with all our Power, and all things
for his fake, by the Free Choice of our Will: For we
cannot, without Injuftice, abufe the Love God gives
us for himfelf, by applying it to any thing but himfelf,
or which has no relation to himfelf.
Thus we are now fcnfible, not only what our Na-
rural Inclinations are, but alfo what they ought to be ;
in order to be well regulated, and according to the
Inftitution of their Author. For all the Diforder of
our Inclinations confilts, in that we place our final End
in our felyes ; and that inftead of doing all things
in relation to God, we do all things in relation to our
felves.
We have then, in th^ firO: place, an Inclination for
good in General, which is the Principle of all our
Natural Inclinations, of all our PafiTions, and of all the
Free Actions of our Will.
Secondly, We have an Inclination for the Preferva-
tion of our Being, and of our Happinels.
Thirdly, We have all an Inclination for the other
Creatures, when they are of ufe to us, or to thole
we Love. Moreover, we have feveral other parti-
cular Inclinations which 'depend on thefe ; but we
fhall fpeak of them elfewhere. We only defign in
this Fourth Book, to refer the Errors of our Incli-
nations to thefe three Heads, To the Inclination
we have to Good in General, To Self-Love, And to
the Love of our Neighbour.
CHAP.
.1
Chap.IL A Search after Truth.
7
CHAP. IT.
I. The Inclination for Good in General^ is the
Principle of the Difquiet of our Will, II. And
confequently of our Negligence and Ignorance,
III. Firft Example^ Morality^ little known to
many Men. IV, Second Example^ The Immor-
tality 'of the SohI^ difputed by fome Men. V. That
our Ignorance is exceeding great in refpeH of
ahflraBed thingsor fuch as have hut little Re-
lation to us. .
' I 'Hat vaft Capacity which the Will has for ail I. The In-
Good in General, becaufe it is only formed by a clination ^
Good which includes all Good in it felf, cannot/^'* Good in
be fatisfied by all the things which the Mind repre-
fents to it; and yet that continual Motion which God ^
imprints in it towards Good cannot ftand ftill. This • f r
Motion never ceafing, puts the Mind, of neceTity,
into a continual Agitation. The Will which feeks
what it defires. obliges the Mind to reprefent all forts
of Objedfs to it felf. The Mind accordingly does it,
but the Soul does not reliih them ; or if it does, is not
fatisfied with them. The Soul does not relilh them,
by realbn that often the Perception of the Mind is not
accompanied with Pleafure; for it is through Plea-
fure that the Soul relifiies its Good: And the Soul is
not fatisfied with it, by reafon that nothing can (top
the Motion of the Soul but him that gives it. What-
ever the Mind reprefents to it felf as its Good, is
Finite; and whatever is Finite, may withdraw our
Love for a while, but it cannot fix it. When the
Mind confiders very new and uncommon Objedts, or
that liave fome relation to Infinity, the Will permits
the Mind to examine them a while with fome Atten-
tion, in hopes of finding what it is in fearch of,
becaufe whatever appears Infinite , bears the Cha-
racSler of its real Good; but in time it grows weary
A a a a 4 of
. ^
8 'A Search after Truth, Book IV.'
of it, as well as of the reft. Therefore the Will is
always dilquieted, becaufe it is inclin'd to feek for
that which it can never find, and which it always
hopes to find: It Loves whatever is Great and Extra-
ordinary, and refembles Infinity ; for not having
found its real Good in Common and Familiar things,
it hopes to find it in fuch as are unknown to it.
We will demonftrate in this Chapter, that the Dif-
quiet of our Wills is one of the principal Caufes of
our Ignorance, and of the Errors into which we fall
in many things: And in the two following we will
explain what it is that produces in us the Inclination
we have for every thing that has fomething Great or
Extraordinary in it.
11. And con, ft is fomething evident by what has been faid, Firft,
fequently That the Will feldom makes ufe of the Underftand-
of our Ne- ing, unlefs on Objeds that have fome Relation to us,
gligence and that it very much neglecfts all others ; for being
and igno' ever earneftly defirous of Felicity, by the Imprellion
ranee. of Nature, it only turns the IJnderftanding towards
fuch things as feem to be of ufe to us, and which do in
fome meafure pleafe us.
Secondly, That the Will does not permit the Un-
derftanding to apply it felf long even to (uch things
as it is delighted with: Becaufe, as we have already
faid, all things that are created may indeed pleafe us
for a while, but we are loon difgufted with them ;
and then our Mind lays them by, to feek for that which
can fatisfie it elfewhere.
Thirdly, That the Will is excited thus to make
the Mind run from Objedf to Objedf, becaufe it never
ceales to reprelent confufedly to it, or as at a diftance,
that which includes all Beings in it felf, as we have
declared in the Third Book. For the Will being de-
firous, as it were, to draw its real Good near to it
felf, to be plealed with it, and to receive from it the
Morion which animates it, it excites the Underftand-
ing to reprefent that Good in fome meafure. But
then it is no longer the General, the Univerfal, the
Infinitely Perfedl Being which the Mind perceives; it
IS fomething that is Bounded and Imperfecft, which
not
Chap.ll. ji Search after Truth, 9
not being able to ftop the Motion of the Will, nor
to pleafe it long, it forfakes it to turn after fome other ■
Objedh.
And whereas the Attention and Application of the
Mind are abfolutely necellary to difcover abftradted
Truths, it is evident that the common fort of Man-
kind muft live in a grofs Ignorance, in refpcdh even of
fuch things as have fome relation to them ; and that
it is impoffible to exprefs their Blindnefs in what re-
lates to abilradted Truths, and which have no fenfible
relation to them. But we muft endeavour to prove
thefe things by Examples.
Amongft all Sciences Morality has moft relation to III. Firji
us: It teaches us all our Duty towards God,, towards Example,
our Prince, towards our Friends and Relations, and Morality
generally towards all that are about us. Moreover
it teaches us the way to be Eternally Happy; and
all Men lie under an Eflential Obligation , or rather
Indifpenfible Neceflity , to apply themfelves wholly ^ *
to it: And yet though there have been Men on Earth
thefe Six Thoufand Years, that Science is ftill very
Imperfedt.
That part of Morality which relates to our Duty
towards God, and which undoubtedly is the chief,
fince it relates to Eternity, has hardly been known by
the moft Learned ; and even in our days we find
Men of Sence who are unacquainted with it; and yet
it is the eafieft part ofMorality. For in the firft place.
Where lies the Difficulty to difcover that there is a
God .> Whatever God has made proves it: Whatever
Men or Beafts do, proves it: Whatever we think,
whatever we fee, whatever we feel, proves it. In a
I word. There is nothing but what proves the Exiftence
of God, or that may prove it to attentive Minds, who
! apply themfelves ferioufly to the Knowledge of the
Author of all Things.
Secondly, It is evident, that there is a Neceflity to
follow the Commands of God to be Happy ; for as
he is Powerful and Juft, we cannot difobey him with-
out being Punilh'd, nor obey him without being Re-
warded. But what is it he exatfts from us.> That
we
X
A Search After Truth. Book IV, ;lil
we fiiould Love him , That our Mind (hould be taken jo,
up with him ; That our Hearts (hould be turned to- jnd
wards • him. For wherefore has he Created our Ooix
Minds ? Certainly he can do nothing but for him- I
felf: Therefore he has made us for himfelf only; and ^
we are Indifpenfibly obliged not to apply elfewhere logle
the Impredion of that Love which he continually pre-
ferves in us, in order that we (hould continually Love
him. ^ ^ ^ i0i
Thefe Truths are eafily difcovered with little Appli- pjK
cation : And yet this only Principle of Morality, which .
teaches us, that to be Vertuous and Happy, it is ab- jj^.
folutely necelfary to Love God above all Things and ^
in all Things, is the Foundation of all Chriftian Mora- ^
lity. Neither does it require an extraordinary Appli- yj,
cation of Mind, to draw from thence all the Conie-
quences we ftand in need of, to fettle the general
Rules of our Conduct; though there are but very few
that do it; and Men continually difpute upon Qne-
ftions of Morality, which are the Immediate and Ne-
celiary Confequences of a Principle which is ib evident
as that is.
The Profeffors of Geometry daily makes new Dif-
coveries, but if they do not bring it to a greater Per- j„|j|
fedlion , it is becaufe they have already drawn the y j
moft Ufeful and Neceflary Confequences out of their
Principles. But moft Men feem Incapable of con-
eluding any thing out of the firft Principle of Morality.
All their Idea's vanifli, and are diflipated as foon as ,j^y
they begin to think upon it; becaufe they will not
do it as they (hould do; and they will not do it, be-
caufe they do not reliih it, or becaufe they are too
foon tired with it after their having reliih'd ir. That j-J
Principle is abftradled, Metaphyfical, meerly Intelligi- ^ j;
ble; it is not obvious, it is not to be imagined ; and
therefore it does not appear folid to Carnal Minds, y
or to Minds that only fee with the Eyes. Nothing is
found in that Principle capable of putting a ftop to 1
the Difquietsof their Will, and afterwards to fix the
Eyes of their Mind to confider it with fome Attention. ^
What Hopes then of their feeing it as they (hould t
Cliap.IL A Search after Truth*
do, of their apprehending it rightly, and of their
concluding diredly from thence what they ftiould
Conclude ?
If Men had but an Imperfcdf Apprehenfion of that
Propofition of Geometry: That the fides of Tri-
angles that are alike, are proportionable one to an-
other ^ certainly they would not be great Geometri-
cians. But if befides the Confufed and Imperfed:
Idea of that Fundamental Propoficion of Geometry,
they alfo had fome Intereft to wifli , that the fides
of Triangles that are alike were not proportion-
able; and that falfe Geometry were as convenient
for their Perverfe Inclinations as falfe Morality,
they might very well be guilty of Paralogifms as ab-
furd in Geometry as in Morality, becaufe their Errors
would pleafe them, and that Truth would only Puzzle,
Difturb and Vex them.
Therefore we need not wonder at the Blindnafs
of thole that lived in the former Ages, whilft Ida-
latry reigned in the World, or of thofe that live in
our Days, and that do not as yet enjoy the Benefit
of the Light of the Gofpel. It was neceflary for
Divine Wifdom to make it felf lenfible at laft, to
inftrud: fuch Men as only confult their Senfes. Truth
had fpoken to their Minds for above the fpace of
Four thoufand Years, but whereas they never look'd
Inwardly they did not underiland it: It was ne-
celTary that it fhould fpeak to their Ears. The Light
which directs all Men, did Ihine in their Darknefe,
without being able to expel it; they could not fo
much as look upon it. It was neceflary that the
Intelligible Light fliould put on a Veil to make it
felf viiible: And that the PPird Ihould cloath it felf
with Flelh; and that the Wildom of God which
lay conceal'd, and was inacceflible to Carnal Men,
(hould inftrudl them in a Carnal way, Carnaliter,
fays St. Bernard, The Majority of Men, and parti-
cularly the Poor (which are the moft worthy Objedfs
of the Mercy and Providence of the Creator,) who
are obliged to work for their daily Bread, are very
Ignorant and Stupid. They only Hear boiaufe they
have
M
•I
iip
iifel
|ii!|
iiii
v^'jj ffijifn
i>r:f
Vf' ^.
iiiiiftift
ilHf«:-.^v.
ri 'lit':;™-'
B 4 r »' ''l L' l'
iilfii'l
W|
iii^#
m
I2t
IV. Seetmd
Examplct
Hke Iwmor-
tsditf »f
the Soul,
difputed
fmie Per'
jit&s.
ji Search after Truth. Book IV,
have Ears, and they only fee becaufe they have Eyes.
They are incapable of looking Inwardly by an Effort
of Mind, there to Interrogate Truth in the Silence
of their Senfes and PafTiofis. They cannot apply
themfelves to Truth, by reafon that they cannot relifh
it: Moreover they feldom think of applying them^
felves to it, becaufe Men feldom have any Thoughts
of applying themfelves to things that do not con-
cern them. Their unquiet and unfettled Will turns
their Minds continually towards all the Objed:s that
Pleafe and Divert them by their Variety : For the
Multiplicity and Diverfity of Senfible Goods, hinder
Men from difcovering the Vanity of them, and ftill
keep them in hopes of finding the real Good they delire
in them.
Thus though the Councils which Jefus Chrijl as
Man, as the way, as the Author of our Faith ,
gives us in the Gofpel, are much more fuitable to
the Weaknefs of our Underltanding, than thofe
which the fame Jefm Chrifl, as Eternal Wifdom,
as Inward Truth, as Intelligible Light Infpires into
the moft fecret Receffes of our Reafon: Though
'Jejus Cbriji renders thofe Councils Agreeable by
his Grace, Senfible by his Example, Convincing
by his Miracles, yet Men are fo ftupid , and fo in-
capable of Refledfion, even upon things which are
abfolutely NecelTary for them to know well, that
they hardly ever think on them as they ought. Few
Men obferve the Beauty of the Gofpel; Few Men
conceive the Solidity and NecelLity of the Coun-
cils of JeJiis Chrijl; Few Meditate upon them ;
Few efteem them as their NecelTary Food, or
fortilie themfelves with them; the Continual Agi-
tation of the Will, which is in fearch of the Taite
of Good, not permitting the Mind to be intent upon
Truths which ieem to depriv^e it thereof. Take ano-
ther Example.
It concerns the Impious highly to make a very ftrid:
enquiry, whether their Soul is Mortal, as they appre-
hend it, or whether it is Immortal, as Faith and Rea-
ion tells us. It is a thing of the utmoft Confequence
for
Chap. 11. A Search after Truth* I j
for them to know ; their Eternity is concerned in it,
and the very Quiet of their Mind depends upon it.
Why is it then they do not know it, or that they re-
main in doubt, unlefs it be that they are not capable
of the leaft ferious Application ; and that their unfe-
date and corrupted Will does not allow their Mind to
look ftedfaftly on the Reafons which are contrary to
thefe Opinions, which they defire (hould be true ?
For in fine, is it fo difficult a task to diftinguifli the
difference there is between the Soul and the Body, be-
tween what thinks, and what is extended ? E)o*s it
require fo great an Attention of Mind to difcover that
a Thought is neither Round nor Square : That Ex-
tent is only capable of different Figures and different
Motions, and not of Thought and Reafoning: And
confequently, that what Thinks, and what is Extend-
ed, are two Beings diredtly oppofite to one another ?
Yet that alone is fufficient to demonftrate that the
Soul is Immortal, and that it cannot Peri(h,even though
the Body were Annihilated.
When a Subffance perifhes, it is true that the Modes
or Manners of Exiffenceof that Subftanee perifh with
it. If a piece of Wax were annihilated, it is certain
that the Forms of that Wax (hould alfo be annihi-
lated with it; becaufe the Roundnefs for Example of
the Wax, is in Effedf nothing but the Wax it lelf of
fuch a Shape, and therefore it cannot fubfift without
• the Wax. But though God (hould deft toy all the
Wax in the World, it would not therefore follow,
that any other Subftance, nor that the Modes of any
other Subftance were Annihilated. All the Stones for
example, would fubfift with all their Modes; becaufe
Stones are Subftances or Beings, and not Modi-
fications of the Wax.
In like manner, though God (hould Annihilate one
half of fome Bodies, it would not follow, that the
other half (hould be Annihilated, This laft half is
United with the other, but it is not one with it. Thus
one half being Annihilated, it follows indeed accord-
ing to Reafon, that the other half has no longer any
relation to it; but it do's not foliow that it ceafes to
. - be 5
A Sedrch after Truth, Book IV.
be; becaufe as its Being is different, it cannot be An-
nihilated by the Annihilation of the other. Therefore
it is clear, that the Thought not being the Modification
of Extenfion, our Soul is not Annihilated, though we
fliould fuppofe that the Body were Annihilated by
Death.
But there is no reafon to believe, that even the Bo-
dy is Annihilated when it is deftroy'd. The parts
which Compofe it are diflipated into Vapours, and
reduc'd to Powder : They are no longer feen, nor are
they any longer known ; this is true, but it is no rea-
fon to conclude, that they are no longer in Being;
for the Mind perceives them ftill. Dividing a Grain of
Muftard into Two, into Four, or Twenty parts, it
would be Annihilated to our fight, becaufe it would
be no longer feen: But it would not be Annihilated in
it felf, nor yet to the Mind ; for the Mind would fee
it, though it were divided into a Thoufand, or an
Hundred Thoufand Parts.
Tis a common Notion among Men who confult their
Reafon more than their Senfes, that nothing can be
Annihilated by the common force of Nature i for as
Naturally, nothing can be made out of nothing, nei-
ther can a Subftance or Being become nothing. Bo-
dies may be corrupted, if we may call the Alterations
they are liable to. Corruption j but they cannot be
Annihilated. What is Round may become Square,
What is Flefh may become Earth, Vapour, and what
you pleafe; for all forts ofExtenfions are capable of all
manner of Configurations: But the Subftance of what
is Round, and of what is Flefh, cannot perifn. There
are certain Laws Effablifh'd in Nature, according to
which Bodies change their Forms fucceflively , for
thofe Succefiive Forms Compofe the Beauty of the
Univerfe, and Create an Admiration in us for its Au-
thor : But there is no Law in Nature for the Annihi-
lation of any Being, becaufe Annihilation has nothing
of Beauty or Good in it felf, and becaufe the Author
of Nature loves his Work. Therefore Bodies may
Alter, but they cannot Pcrifh,
Slit
Cha^p' II. ^ Search after Truth,
But if relying on the Teftimony of the Senfes, Men
would maintain obftinarely that the Redudtion of Bo-
dies is a real Annihilation, by reafon that the Parts
into which they are reducM are Imperceptible: Let
them remember at leaft, that Bodies can only be di-
vided into thofe Imperceptible Parts, becaufe they are
Extended. But if the Mind is not Extended, it will
not be Divifible; and if it be not Divifible, it muft be
granted, that in that Senfe it will not be Corruptible.
But how could any Body imagin that the Mind were
Extended and Divifible? We may by a right Line
cut a Square into two Triangles^ into two Paraleio'
grammes^ or long Squares, into two Trape:{a''s: But by
what Lim can it be conceiv'd, that a Plealure, a Pain,
or a Defire can be Cut ? And what Figure would re-
fuit of thatDivifion? Truly I cannot think, that Ima-
gination can be fruitful enough in falfe Idea's, to fatisfie
it felf upon that Subjedf.
The Mind then is not Extended, confequently it is
not Divifible: It is not liable to the fame Alterations as
the Body : Neverthelefs, it muft be granted that it is not
Immutable by its Nature. If the Body is capable of an
infinite number of different Figures,and ot different Con-
figurations,the Mind is capable of an infinite number of
different Idea's, and different Modifications. As after our
Death the fubftance of our Flelh will be reduc'd to Earth,
to Vapours, and to an infinite number of other Bodies
without being Annihilated : So our Souls without be-
ing again reduc'd to nothing, will have Thoughts, and
Sentiments very different from thofe they had in Life.
It is alfo neceffary while yve. are alive, that our Body
fliould be Composed of Flefh and Bones : It is alio ne-
ceffary in order to Live, that our Soul fliould have the
Idea's and Sentiments it has, in relation to the Body to
which it is united. But when the Soul fliall be fepa-
rated from its Body, it will be at full Liberty to re-
ceive all forts of Idea's and Modifications, very diffe-
rent from thofe it has at prefent; as our Body on its
pare, will be capable of receiving all forts of Figures
and Configurations, very different from thofe it is ne-
ceffary ic ff^ould have, to be the Body of a Living Man.
J Search after Truth. Book IV".' !js
What I have faid, does in my Opinion, fuffidently n
fliow, that the Immortality of the Soul is not a thing jfji
fo difficult to be apprehended. What then is the rea- ita
fon that fo many quehion it, unlefs it be, that they M
arc unwilling to apply themfelves as^much as may be, ;is
to examin the Reafons which prove it, in order to be m
Convinc'd And why is it that they are unwilling to ivoii
do it, unlefs it be that their Will, being uneafie and fe
inconftant, keeps their Underftanding in a continual r/1
Agitation; infomuch that it is not at leifure diftindlly fx
to perceive thofe.very Idea s which are moft prefent to i\i\
it, as thofe of Thought and of Extenfion Juft like (fm
a Man agitated by fome Paffion, turning his Eyes
continually on all fides, for the moft part does sd
not diftinguilh the neareft Objedfs, and the moft Ex-
pos'd to his Sight. For indeed the Queftion about the ar i
Immortality of the Soul, is one of the eafieft Quefti- rith
ons to refolve, when without Confulting our Imagi- jjoi
nation, we confider with fome Attention of Mind, the )[oi
clear and diftind: Idea of Extenfion, and the Relation iosc
it can have to Thought.
If the Inconftancy and Levity of our Will does not sdii
permit our Underftanding to penetrate into the Bot- iotit
tom of things which are prefent to it, and which we ^
are highly concern d to know; it is eafie to judge, that Ms
it will be more averfe to let us meditate on thofe that
are diftant, and which have no relation to us. So that jfff;
if we are very Ignorant of moft of thofe things which [ jj
it is very necefiary for us to know, we lhali not have :i[(
a great Infight into thofe which feem abfolutely vain
and ufelefs to us. f ^
It will not be neceffary for me to endeavour to
prove this by tedious Examples, which have no con-
fiderable Truths in them ; for if we may be allow'd
to be Ignorant of any thing, it is of thofe things which
are of no Ufe. And I had rather not be believed,
than to make the Reader lofe his Time in reading
things that are wholly ufelefs. ^
Though there are not many perfons who apply
themfelves ferioufly to things abfolutely Vain and Ufe-
lefs, yet the number of them is but too great: But
there '
Chap. IL A SeArch after Truth.
there can never be too many of thofe who do not ap-
ply themfelves to them, and who defpife them, pro-
vided they do not pretend to Judge of them. It is no
defed: in a limited Mind, not to know certain things;
it is only adefed: to pretend to Judge of them. Ig-
norance is a necelTary Evil, but we may, and ought to
avoid Error. Therefore I do not condemn Men for
being Ignorant of many things, but only for giving
rafli Judgments about thofe things.
When things have a great relation to us, are fenfible, VThat our
and fall eafily within the Compafs of our Imagination, Ignorance
we may fay, that the Mind applies it felf to them, exceed"
and may have fome knowledge of them. For when^."<^
we know that things have a relation to us, we think
upon them with fome Inclination ; and when we find
that they concern us, we apply our felves to them
with pleafure. So that we ftiould be more Learned
than we are in many things, if the uneafinefs and toflfing
of our Will did not Diftiirb and Fatigue our Atten- to
tion continually.
But when things are abftrad, and not very fenfible,
it is difficult to attain any certain knowledge of them:
Not that abftraded things are very intricate, but be-
caufe the Attention and Sight ot the Mind begins, and
Ends commonly with the fenfible Profped: of Objeds;
for we feldom think on any thing but what we fee
and feel, and only as long as we fee and feel it.
It is moft certain, that if the Mind could eafily ap-
ply it felf to clear and diftind: Idea's, without being
any-wife byafs'd by Opinion ; and if the uneafinefs of
the Will did not continually dittuib its Application,
we fliould meet no great difficulties in many Natural
Queftions, which we look upon, as not to be Explain'd,
and we might eafily be deliver'd of our Ignorance and
Errors in relation to them.
For Example ; It is an undeniable Truth to any
Man of Senle, tfiat Creation and Annihilation are
things which furpafs the common force of Nature.
Therefore if Men did remain Attentive to that pure
Notion of the Mind and Reafon, they would not fo
eafily admit the Creation and Annihilation of a^n infi-
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nite Number of New Beings, as of Subftantial Forms,
real Qualities and Faculties. They would look into
the diftindf Idea's we have of Extenfion, Figure, and
Motion, for the reafon of Natural Effedts ; which is
not always fo difficult as People imagin ; all things in
Nature are fo connedted together,and prove each other.
The Effedfs of Fire, as thole of Canon and of
Mines, are very Surpriling y and their caufe not very
well known. Neverthelefs, if Men inftead of rely-
ing on the Impreflions of their Senfes, and on fome
falfe or deceitful Experiments, did firmly fix on that
bare Notion of the Mind alone: That it is not pofli-
ble for a Body that is very little agitated to produce a
violent Morion, lince it can communicate no more
moving Power than it has its felf j it would be eafie
from that alone tc conclude, that there is a Subtle and
Invifible Matter, that it is very much agitated, and
difpers'd inth all Bodies, and feveral other like things
which would teach us the Nature of Fire, and alfo be
of great ufe to us to difcover other Truths yet more
conceal'd.
For, fince Canons and Mines have fuch great Mo-
tions, and all the Vifible Bodies about them, are not
in a fufficient Agitation to produce them ; it is a cer-
tain proof that there are other Invifible and Infenfible
Bodies, which have at leaft as much Agitation as the
Canon Ball; But with being very Subtle and Thin,
may alone freely pals, and without breaking through
the Pores of the Canon before it is Fir'd ; that is, as
IsdoitJjettr Defcartes has explain'd it more at large, be-
fore their having furrounded the hard and grofs parrs
of the Salt-petre, of which the Powder is Compos'd.
But when the Fire is put to it, that is, when thole
fubtleandextreamly agitated Particles, have furround-
ed the grofs and folid Parts of the Salt-petre, and have
thus Communicated their very Itrong and violent Mo-
lion to them, then all does Burft of neceflity ^ becaufe ^
the Pores of the Canon, which left an open paflage on ^ J
all lides for the fubtle Parts before mention'd, while .
they were alone, are not large enough to make way
for the grofs Parts of the Salt-petre, and fome others
Chap. II. A Search after Truth,
of which the Powder is Composed, when they have
received into themfelves the Agitation of the Subtle
Parts which furrounds them.
For as the Water of Rivers which flows under
Bridges does not (hake them, by reaibn of the fmall-
nefe of its Particles : Thus the very fubtle and very
thin Matter I have mention'd, pafles continually through
the Pores of all Bodies without making any fenfible
Alterations in them. But then likewife, as the faid
River is capable of breaking down a Bridge, when
carrying along with it fome great Flakes ot Ice, or
fome other more folid Bodies, by forcing them againft
it with its own Motion ; fo fubtle Matter is capable of
producing the furprifing Effedts we fee in Canons and
in Mines; when having communicated to the Parts
of the Powder which Float in the midft of it, its
Motion which is infinitely more Violent, and more
Rapid than that of Rivers and Torrents; the faid Parts
of the Powder cannot freely pafs through the Pores
of the Bodies which enclofe them, by realon they are
too grofs; lb that they violently break them to force
them a free Palfage.
But Men do not cafily apprehend thofe fubtle fmall
Particles, which they repute Chimera's, becaufe they
do not fee them. Contemplatio fere definit cum afpeBu^
fays Bacon, The greater part even of Philofophers,
invent fome New Entity, rather than not to talk upon
thofe matters which they are Ignorant of: And if any
Body objedfs againft their falfe and incomprehenfible
Suppofitions, that Fire muft needs be compos'd of
Parts that are in very great Agitation, fince it produces
fuch Violent Motions, and that a thing cannot Com-
municate that which it has not; which is undoubtedly
a moft clear, and moft folid Objection : They con-
found all by fome frivolous Imaginary diftindtion, as
that of Equivocal and Univocal Caufes, in order to
feem to fay fomething, though in reality they fay no-
i thing. For it is a general Notion among Men of Senle
vit and Learning, that there can be no real Equivocal Caufe
in Nature j and that it has been'invenred meerly by the
Ignorance'of M^n,
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A Search after Truth. Book IV.
Therejfore Men nnuft apply themfelves more to the
confideration of clear and diftindl Notions, if they
have a mind to underftand Nature; They muft check
and flop the Inconftancy and Levity of their Will a
little, if they defign to penetrate deeply into things ;
for their Mind will ever be weak, fuperficial and dif-
curfive, while their Will remains Light, Inconftant
and Roving.
It is true, it requires fome Fatigue, and Men muft
conftrain themfelves to become Attentive, and to fearch
into the bottom of things; for there is nothing to be
got without pains. It is (hameful for Men of Senfe,
and Philofophers, who are obliged by all manner of
reafons to enquire into, and to defend Truth, to fpeak
without knowing what they fay, and to be fatisfy'^d
with what they do not underftand.
CHAP. HI.
I. Cnriofity is natural and neceffary, 11. Three
Rules to moderate it. III. Explanation of the
firfi of thefe Rules,
I. Curiofity A S long as Men have an Inclination for a Good
is natural which furpafles their Power, and do not poftefs
and necef' they will have a fecret propenfion for whatever
looks new and extraordinary: They will ever run
after fuch things as they have not as yet confidered,
in hopes of finding what they enquire after ; and their
Mind not being able to fatisfte it felf wholly without
the enjoyment of that Good for which they are made ;
they will ever remain uneafie, and in a continual
Agitation, until it appears to them in its Glory.
This difpofition of Human Minds is certainly very
fuitable to their Condition 5 for it is infinitely better
to be uneafie, and in fearch of the Happinefs one does
not poftefs, than to remain in a falfe Repofe, and to
be pleased with falfhood, and a deluftve Happinefs,
where-»
.' t
Chap.III. A Search afierTruth. 21
wherewith Men are commonly deluded. We ought
to have a fenfe of Truth, and of our Happinefs :
Therefore thofe Things that are new and extraordi-
nary muft excite us: There is a certain kind of Cu-
riofity which is not only allowable, but abfolutely ne-
celfary 5 for whereas common and ordinary things can
never afford true Felicity, and the ancient Opinions of
Philofophers are very uncertain: It is neceflary we
(hould be curious for New Difcoveries, and always
uneafie in the Enjoyment of common Felicities.
Should a Geometrician give us New Propofitions
contrary to thofe of Euclide, Should he undertake to
prove, that that Science is full of Errors, as Hobbs en-
Geavour'd to do in a Book, written agalnft the Pride
of Geometricians, I own that there would be no rea-
fon to complain of that kind of Novelty ; becaufe,
that when we have found out the Truth we ought to
ftick to it, fince we are only endu'd with Curiofity in
order to find it out ? Neither are Geometricians often
guilty of being Curious of New Opinions of Geome-
try. They would foon be tif d with a Book contain-
ing nothing but Propofitions contrary to thofe of Eu-
elide ; for-being fully convinced of the Truth of thofe
Propofitions by unanfwerable Demonftrations , our
Curiofity ceafes in that Point: Which is an infallible
Argument, that the only reafon of the Inclination of
Men after Novelty, is becaufe they do not evidently
fee the Truth of thofe things they naturally defire to
lyiow, nor poffefs Infinite Felicity, which they are na-
turally defirous to poffefs.
Therefore it is neceCfary that Novelty fhould Excite jj^ jhree
Men, and that they fhould Love it; But however,
there are Exceptions to be made, and they mufl ob- moderate
ferve certain Rules which it is eafie to infer from what Curiofity*
we have been faying, that the Inclination we have for
Novelty is only given us in order to feek out Truth,
and our real Felicity.
There are Three, the firft of which is. That Men
muft not be fond of Novelty in things relating to Faith
which are not fubmitted to Reafon
Bbbb 3
The
22 A Search after Truth. Book IV.
The Second, That Novelty is not a fufficient Rea-
fon to induce us to believe that things are Good or
True : That is. We muft not fancy that Opinions are
true becaufe they are new; nor that any thing can be
capable to content us, becaufe it is new or extraordi-
nary, or becaufe we have not poflels'd it before.
The Third, That when we are fatisfy*d that Truths
arefo conceal'd that it is morally impoflible todifcover
them, and that Benefits are fo little, and fo inconlide-
rable that they cannot fatisfie us, we muft not fuffer
our (elves to be excited by the Novelty of them, nor
to be feduc*d by falfe hopes. But it is neceffary to ex-
plain thefe Rules more at large ; and (hew how by a
negledf of cm we fall into an infinite number of
Errors.
n. Varti' Minds of very different Hu-
cular eX' J^^ours: Some believe every thing blindly: Others
flanation will never believe without feeing evidently. The firft
of the frft having hardly ever made any ufe of their Underftand-
of thofe ing, do without confidering, believe whatever is faid to
Rules* them ; the others, who will truft to nothing but their
Uuderif anding, indifferently condemn all forts of Au-
thorities. The firft are commonly ftupid and weak
Perlbns, like Children and Women ; the others are
proud and profane Difpofitions, like Hereticks and
Philolbphers.
It is very difficult to find Perfons who keep a Me-
dium between thofe two Extreams, and who never
look for Evidence in matters relating to Faith through
a vain Agitation of Mind, or who fometimes believe
falfe Opinions without Evidence, in things relating to
Nature, through an , indifcreet Deference i and low
Submiflion of Mind. If they are Perlbns of Piety,
who fubmit to the Authority of the Church in all things,
their Faith extends fometimes, if I may ufe the Ex-
preflion, even to Opinions that are meerly Philofophi-
cal; and they often look upon them with the lame
Rei^dl as is only due to the Truths of Religion. A
falfe Zeal makes them too eafily condemn thofe that
are not of their Opinion. They harbour injurious
Sufpicions againft thofe that make New Difcoveries.
It
Chap.III. A Search after Truth.
It is fufficient to be efteem'd by them as Libertines,
to deny that there are fubftantial Forms, that Animals
are fenfible of Pain and Pleafure, and other Philofo-
phical Opinions, which they look upon as Truth with-
out any evident Realbn, only becaufe they imagin
there are neceflary Relations between thofe Opinions
and the Truths or Faith.
But if they are Perfons that are too bold, their Pride
induces them to defpife the Authority of the Church ;
they never fubmit willingly to it. They delight in
difficult ralh Opinions: They affed to pafs for migh-
ty Wits ; and upon that account they fpeak of Divine
Myfteries without Refped, and with a kind of Haugh-
tinefs: They defpife all as Credulous, who fpeak mo-
deftly of certain receiv'd Opinions. Finally, they are
very much inclin'd to doubt of every thing, and are
diredly oppos'd to thofe who are too eafily inclin'd
to fubmit to the Authority of Men.
It is obvious, that thefe two Extreamsare bad,and
thofe who will not admit Evidence in Natural Quefti-
ens are blameable, as well as thofe who would have
Evidence in Myfteries of Faith. But yet thole who
Expofe themfelves to be miftaken in Philofophical
Queftions in being too Credulous, are without doubt
more exculable than the others who run the hazard of
falling into fome Herefie or other in doubting Ralhly,
For it is lels dangerous to fall into a World of Errors
in Philofophy for want ot examining them, than to
fall into one Herefie for want of fubmitting with Hu-
mility to the Authority of the Church.
The Mind is at quiet when it meets Evidence, and
is in continual Agitation when it finds none. Becaufe
Evidence is the Charader ot Truth. Thus the Error
of Libertines, and of Hereticks, proceeds from their
doubting of the Truth of the Decifions of the Church,
becaufe they are not Evident, and they hope that the
Truths of Faith may be demonftrated. Now their
Love for Novelty is Irregular, fince that polfefting the
Truth in the Faith of the Church, they ought not to
feek farther : Befides, the Truths of Faith being far
above the reach of their Underftanding, they would
B b b b 4 not
J Search after Truth» Book IV.
not be able to diCcover them, fuppofing that acpr-
ding to their Falfe Opinion, the Church were guilty
of Error.
JBut if there are many who deceive themfelyes in
refufing to fubmit to the Authority of the Church ,
there are as many who are deceived in lubmitting to
the Authority of Men. We muft fubmit to the Au-
thority of the Church , becaufe it can never fubmit
Blindly to the Authority of Men, becaufe they are
always liable to Miftakes. What the Church teaches
us, is Infinitely above the reach of Reafon: What
Men teach us, is fubmitted to our Reafon: So that
as it is a Crime, and an Infupportable Vanity, to en-
deavour to find out the Truth in Matters of Faith by
our Reafon, without regarding the Authority of the
Church: So it is a great Indifcretion, and a defpicable
poornefs of Spirit, to rely blindly on the Authority of
Men, in Things which relate to Reafon.
Neverthelels, moft of thofe that are efteem'd
Learned Men in the World, have only acquir'd that
Reputation, by knowing the Opinions of Arijiotle^ of
Plato^ of Epicurusy and of fome other Philofophers by
Heart, by iubmitting blindly to their Sentiments, and
by defending them vyith Obftinacy. In order to ob-
tain the Reputation of Learning in the Univerfities,
it is fulKcient to be acquainted with the Sentiments
of fbme Philofopher: Provided they will Swear In
Verba Magiftri, they foon become Dodlors. Moft
Communities ftick to a peculiar Dodlrine, which the
Members are not allow'd to deviate from. What is
True in fome, is often Falfe in others. They are
fometimes Proud of defending the Dodlrine cf their
Order, againft Reafon and Experience j and they
think themfelves oblig'd to wreft the Truth, or their
Authors to reconcile them: This produces a World of
Frivolous Diftin^ions, which are fo many by ways,
that lead Infallibly to Error,
If any Truth is difcover'd, even in our days, Ari^
flotle muft have feen it; or if Ariftotle be againft it,
the Difcovery muft be Falfe. Some make that Philo-
fopher fpeak one way, others another ; for all thofe
who
o
chap .III. Search after Truth.
who pretend to Learning, make him fpeak their Lan-
guage : He is made the Author of all forts of Imper-
tinencies, and few Difcoveries are made, whtch are
not found Enigmatically in fome corner or other of hfs
Books. In a word, he is ever contradidling himfelf,
if ndt in his Works, yet at leaft in the Mouths of thofe
that teach him. For though Philofophers proteft, and
even pretend to teach his Dodtrine, it is difficult to
meet two that agree about his Sentiments: For indeed
AriftotJes Books are fo Obfcure, and filfd with fuch
rambling general Terms, that one may with fome
Appearance of Truth, impure to him the Opinions of
thofe that are moft oppofite tc his. It is ealie to make
him fay whatever one has a mind to in fome of his
Works, becaufe he hardly fays any thing in them,
though he makes a great deal of Noife; as Children
fuppofe the Sounds of the Bells to fay what they
pleafe, becaufe they make a great deal of Noife and
fay nothing.
I muft confefs that it i^ems very Rational to fix and
to ftop the Mind on fome particular Opinions,to hinder
it from running out into Extravagancies. But what
then ? Muft it needs be done by Falihood and Error ?
Or rather can any one believe that Error can fix the
Mind ? Let Men examine how difficult it is to find
Perfons of Senfe pleafed with the reading of Ariflotlcy
and that can pcrfwade themfelves they have acquired
any true Science, even after having grown old on his
Books; and it will appear plainly, that nothing but
Truth and Evidence can fix the Agitations of the Mind;
and that Difputes, Averfions,-Errors and even Herefies,
are entertain'd and encourag'd by an 111 Manner of
Study. Truth confifts in Individuality, it is not capa-
ble of Variety ; and nothing befides it can reconcile
Peoples Minds: Falfliood and Error only ferve to di-
vide and agitate them.
I do not queftion but there are fome who do verily
believe, that he they call the Prince of Philofophers,
is no-wife in an Error, and that Real and Solid Philo-
fophy are only to be found in his Works. There are
fome who fancy, that though it is Twothoufand
Years
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a6 A Search after Truth. Book IV,
Years (Ince Ariftotle wrote, no body has yet been able
to difcover that he was guilty of any Error; and con-
lequcntly being in fome refpecSfcs Infallible, they may
boldly follow him, and quote him as fuch. But I do
not think it worth my while to anfwer fuch Perfons,
becaufe their Ignorance is fo grofs, that it only deferves
Contempt. I only defire them to tell me, whether
Ariftotle, or any of his Difciples, have ever deduced
any Truths from the Principles of Natural Philofbphy
which may be called his; or if they, or any of them,
have done it themfelves, let them declare it, let them
explain it, and let them prove it; and we do engage
our felves, never more to fpeak of Ariftotle without
an Elogy ; we will no longer fay, that his Principles
are Ufelefs, fince they have ferved to prove one
Truth; but there is no reafon to exped: it. They
were long fince challenged to do it, and particularly by
Monfieur Defcartes in his Metaphyfical Meditations
about Forty Years ago, even with a Promife to demon-
Urate the Falfity of that Pretended Truth: And there
is no great likelihood to believe, that any body will
ever prefume to do, what Monfieur Defcartes greateft
Enemies, and the moft 2iealous Defenders of Ari^
ftotles Philofophy, have not hitherto dar'd to under-
take.
Therefore I hope I may prefume to fay, that it is a
ftrange Blindnefs, Poornefs of Mind, and Stupidity of
Spirit, thus to fubmit to the Authority of Ariftotle, of
Plato, or of any other Philofopber whatever: That
People lofe their time in reading them, when their
only Defign is to get their Opinions by Heart; and
'^Sluis ram ihofe that teach them make their Difciples lofe theirs
Stulte cu- likewife.Therefore give me leave to fay with St.Auftin,
Tidftts eft * That thofe are Fooliftoly Curious, who fend their Sons to
College, in order to learn the Sentiments of their
juunt Mafier. That Philofophers cannot inftrud us by their
tat in c 0- Authority, and if they pretend to do it they
Ma- Unjuft : That it is a kind of Folly and Impiety
giftercQgi-^^ Swear their Defence Solemnly: And finally,
tet difcat ? Injuftly confine Truth, who out of Intereft
Aug. de oppofe she new Opinions of Philolbphy which may be
Magifiro. True,
Chap.IV. Search after Truth. 2?
True, to preferve thofe which are fufficiently known
to be Falle or Ulelefs.
CHAP. IV.
A Continuation of the fame SnhjeEl. I. Exftana^
tion of the Second Rule of Curiofity. II. ExfU-
nation of the Thirds
THE Second Rule that muft be obferv'd, is, That I. Second j
Novelty muft never ferve as a Reafon to believe Rule of
that things are True. We have already faid feveral CurhJltj*
times, that Men muft not reft in Error, and in the
FalTe Felicities they enjoy : That it is neceflfary they
(hould Search after the Evidence of Truth, and the
real Felicity they do not polfefs; and confequently
that they fliould look after fuch things as are New and
Extraordinary. But therefore it does not follow that
they (hould always ftick to them, nor believe, with-
out reafon> that Opinions are True, becaufe they are
New; and that thofe are real Felicities which they
have not as yet enjoy'd. Novelty fliould only induce
them to examine new things with care; they muft
not defpife them, becauie they do not know them ;
nor ra(hly believe that they contain what they wi(h and
hope for.
But this often comes to pafs; Men after having ex-
amin'd the Ancient and Common Opinions, have
not difcover'd the Light of Truth in them: After
having had a Tafte of the ufual Felicities of the World,
they have not found that Solid Satisfaction in them,
which fliould accompany the PoCfeflfion of a real Good;
So that their Defires and their Eagernefs are not allay'd
by the ufual Opinions and common Felicities. For
which reafon, when they hear any thing that is New
and Extraordinary, the Idea of Novelty puts them in
hopes at firft. That it is the thing they are in Search of.
And whereas it is Natural to Flatter our felves, and
to
28
u4 Search after Truth, Book IV,
to believe that Things are as we wilh they might be »
their Hopes increafe proportionably to their Defires'
And in fine, they Infenfibly change into Imaginary
Aflfurances. In the next place, They joyn the Idea of
Novelty, and the Idea of Truth, fo clofe together,
that the one never offers it felf without the other ;
and that which is moft New, appears to them to be
more True, and better than thap which is more
Ufual and Common; in which they are very
different from thofe, who out of Averfion to Herefie,
have joyn'd the Idea of Novelty to that of Falfe-
nefs, imagining that all New Opinions are Falfe and
Dangerous.
Therefore we may fay that this ufual Difpofirion
of the Mind, and of the Heart of Men, in relation to
that which bears the Characffer of Novelty, is one of
the moft general Caufes of Errors, for it feldom leads
them to Truth; whenever it does, it is by Chance
and good Luck: And finally. It always diredls them
from their real Happineis, by engaging them in that
Multiplicity of Divertifements and Falfe Felicities
that the World abounds with : And this is the moft
Dangerous Error into which they can fall.
The Third Rule againft the Exceflive Defires of
Novelty is, That when we are certain that fome
Cuyhjlty. Truths are fo Myiterious, that it is Morally Impoflible
to difcover them, and that fome Felicities are fo In-
confiderable that they can never make us Happy, we
ought not to fufi'er our felves to be Excited by the
Novelty of them.
Every body may know by Faith, by Reafon and
Experience, that ci*eated Goods can never fill the In-
of the Will. Faith teaches us. That
all the Things of this World are only Vanity ; and
that our Happinefs neither confifts in Honours or
Riches. Reafon affures us, That fince it is not in our
Power to bound our Defires, and that we are Natu-
rally inclin'd to Love ail Felicities, we can never be
Happy, without Poffeiling that which Includes them
all. Our own Experience makes us Senfible, that we
are not Happy in the Pofteliion of thofe Goods which
forms-
■fsiior
mtki
Sdtliari
ktlie
:hiieiic
'sm
fs tob
wli,'
IT. Third
Rule ef
to Pi
mkf
A
#'
'IJ'
Wore
'I panic!
■BtOOB
ilwajs
KJvi,
'«Wi'
we
Chap.IV. A Search after Truth'
we do enjoy, lince we ftill wifli for more. Finally,
We daily fee that the Great Felicities which the mo(t
Powerful Princes and Kings enjoy on Earth, are not
capable to fatisfie their Defires ; that they are even
more Uneafie and more Unhappy than others; and
that being Seated on the higheit Spoke of the Wheel
of Fortune, they are the more liable to be precipitated
and (hook by its Motion, than thofe that are under-
neath them, or nearer to the Center. For they never
fall but from on high; their Wounds are always
S Grandeur they are attended with,
and which they annex to their own Being, ferves only
to Swell and Aggrandize them , to make them more
Senhble of a greater number of Wounds, and expofe
them the more to the Strokes of Fortune.
So that Faith, Reafon and Experience, convincing
us that the Delights and Pleafures of the Earth, which
we have not as yet tafted, could not make us Happy
though we (hould enjoy them: We muft be very care-
ful, according to that Third Rule, not to fufler our
felvcs to be Fooliflily Flatter d with vain Hopes of
Happinefs, which increafing by degrees proportionably
to our Paflion and to our Defires, would change at
iaft into a Falfe Affurance : For when we have a
Violent Paflion for any Good, we always look upon
it to be very great, and we perfwade our fehes
Infenfibly, that the Pofleflion of it will make us
Happy.
Therefore we muft refift thofe Vain Defires, fince
our Endeavours to fatisfie them would be in vain.
But particularly, becaufe that by abandoning our
felves to our PafiTions, and by employing our time to
gratifie them, we lofe God and all things with him.
We only wander from one Falfe Felicity to another ;
We always live in Falfe Hopes; We diflipare our
Spirits, and are agitated a Thoufand different ways ;
We meet Oppofitions every where, becaufe the Advan-
tages we feek for are defired by many, and cannot be
polfelfed by many. For as Sc. Paul teaches us, Ti^ofe
that have a mind to grovo pich, fall into Temptations^
and into a Snare tf the Devilj and into divers ufilefs per-
\A Search after Truth. Book IV.
nicious Dejires, which precipitate Men into the Ahyfs of"^
Perdition and Damnation j for C&vetoufnefs is the ^ot of '^'
all Evil.
And as we ought not to feek after the Goods of the^ ^
World which are new, becaufe we are aflur'd that P:
we (hall not find the Happinefs we look for ^ neither s ^
ought we to have the leaft Defire of knowing newi
Opinions upon a great number of difficult Queftions,
becaufe we are informed , that the Mind of Man isH
not capable of difcovering the Truth of them. MoftJ^®
of the Queftions that are treated of in Morality, andii®^
particularly in Natural Philofophy, are of that kind
and therefore it behoves us to be very diffident
many Books that are daily written upon thofe Obfcurct^^ ^
Intricate Matters. For though abfolutely fpeaking thei^ ^
Queftions they contain may be refolv'd, there
ftill fo few Truths difcoverd, and fo many others tom^[
know, before we can come to thofe the laid Books (cr wlii
treat of, that we cannot read them without advcn-^i^^
taring to lole confiderably.
Yet Men do not regulate themfelves thus, they do^sj
quite the contrary: They do not examine whether
what is faid to them is poflible: Do but promife
them extraordinary Things, as the Reparation of—
Natural Heat, of B^dical Moifture, of Vital Spirits^
or other things they do not underftand, and you will
ftraight excite their Vain Curiofity. It is fufficient in
order to blind and to gain them to propofe Paradoxes nffL
to them ; to ule obfcure Words, Terms of Influence^'/
and the Authority of fome unknown Authors ; or elfe '
to perform fome very fenfible and extraordinary Ex- %
periment, although it has no manner of relation to the FI4
thing propofed, for it is enough to Surprife them, in
order to Convince them.
If a Phyfician, a Chyrurgion, an Empirick, quote ' iupi
PafTages in Greel^ and Latin, and make ufe of new and
extraordinary Terms, they pais immediately for great
Men ; Men give them a Power over Life and Death;
they are believ'd like Oracles; they fancy themfelves
far above the common Level of Mankind, and think
they penetrate into the bottom of things. And when ^
fonw
Chap.V. A Search after Truth. 31
fome are fo Indifcreec as to intimate, that they are not
fatisfied with five or fix words which really fignifie
and prove nothing ; they fancy that thofe People have
not commom Senfe, and that they deny firfl Prin-
ciples. And indeed the firft Principles of thofe Men,
are four or five Scraps of Latin out of fome Author,
or fome Greek Palfage, if they are better Scholars.
Moreover, It is neceffary that Learned Phyficians
fhould fometimesfpeak a Language which their Patients
do not underftand, in order to gain fome Reputation,
and to be obey*d.
A Phyfkian who only underftands Latin^ may be
efteem*d in a Village; becaufe Latin is both Greek,
and Arabick to Peafants: But unlefs a Phyfician can
at leaft read Greedy to learn fome of Hjpocrates^s
Aphorifms, he muft not expedt to pafs for a Learned
Man in Cities where moft People underftand Latin.
For which reafon even the moft Learned Phyficians
knowing this Humour of Men, are oblig'd to fpeak
like Quacks and Illiterate Men; and one muft not
always judge of their Capacity and Senfe, by what
they fay in their Vifits.
CHAP. V.
I. Of the Second Natural Inclination^ or of Self-
Love, II. It is divided into the Love of
Being and of Well-Being^ or of Greatnefs and
Tleafure.
'^He Second Inclination which the Author of Nature I. Of
imprints continually in our Will, is the Love of Second
our felves, and of our own Prefervation. tur^l in-
We have already faid, That God loves all his clmationy
Works; and that it is only the Love he bears them®''
that preferves them ; and which Wills, That all ere-
ated Spirits fhould have the fame Irwilinations with
bim» Therefore it is his Will, that they ftiould all
- V _ - ^
A Search after Truth. Book IV^.*
have a Natural Inclination for their Prefervation, and Con^
that they flibtild Love themfelves. Thus it is lawful ib^
and reafonaBIe to Love our lelves, fince We are Ami- Adw
able, fince God himfelf Loves us, and fince it is his bj't
Pleafure that we fhould Love our felves: But this is Ti
no reafon that we fliould Love our felves more than Inrod
God, fince God is Infinitely more Amiable than we liirej
are. It is Unjuft to place our Final End in our felves, PeriS
and not to Love our felves in relation to God ; be- tba
caufe, as we have no Geodnefs, nor any Subfiftance |tb(
of our felves, but only what we participate of the jiuhw
Goodnefs and Being of God, we are not Amiable of lof
our felves, but only in relation to him.
Neverthelefs, The Inclination we Ihould have for [ki
God is loft by Sin ; and all that remains of it is an wHii
Infinite Capacity in our Will for all Felicities, or for ^epeiK
Good in General, and a ftrong Inclination to polfefs idepe
them which can never be deftroy'd: But the Inclina- lidiB
tion we ought to have for our Prefervation or Self- k
Love, has increafed it felf to that degree, that it is at ;
laft become abfolute Mafter of the Will. It has more- ikni
over chang'd and transformed into its own Nature the
Love of God , or the Inclination which we have tor
Xjood in General, and the Love which we ought to
have for other Men. For we may fay now. That we wlii
only Love our felves, fince we Love nothing but in
relation to our felves ; whereas we ought only to Love
God, and all things in relation to God. ajofj
If Faith and Reafon teach us, that God is the only
Sovereign Good, and that he alone can make us per-
fecftly Happy; we may eafily conclude that we muft
Love him, and we are eafily enough inclin'd to it;
But without Grace it is ftill Self-Love that Induces
us to Love him. Pure Charity is lb much above our
Strength, that we are fo far from Loving God for
himfelf, that Humane Reafon cannot eafily conceive, L ^
that we can Love him otherwife than in relation to our
felves, and that we have any other Final End but our 5?
own Satisfadfion. Self-love then is the abfolute Mafter |
of our Will, fince the Diforder of Sin, and the Love
of God and of our Ndghbour, are now only the
m
chap. V. A Search after Truth. 5^
Confequences of it; fince we no longer Love any
thing, but bccaufe that in Loving it, we exped: fome
Advantage, or that we adfually receive fome Pleafiire
by it.
This Self-love may be divided into two Kinds, vi:{,Ti.SeIf-love
Into the Love of Greatnefs, and into the Love of Plea- is divided
fure; orelfeinto the Love of our Being, and of the'^^o
Perfedlion of our Being ; and into the Love of our
Well-being, or of Felicity.
By the Love of Greatnefs .we afleft Power, Pre-
ferment. Independency, and that our Being fliould fub- ''''^
lift of it felf. We defire in fome refpedl to have a
Neceflary Being: In one Senfewe are defirous to be
like Gods; for none but God has properly a Being
which is neceffarily Exiftent; fince that whatever is
Dependent exifts only by the Will of him on whom
it depends. Therefore Men wilhing the Neceflity of
their Being, alfo defire a Power over others. Biic
by the Love of Pleafure they defire not only a Being,
but a Well-being; becaufe Pleafure is a manner
of Being, which is beft and moft Advantageous to the
Soul.
We muft note, that Greatnefs, Excellence and In-
dependence of the Creature, are not kinds of Being
which iiiake us Happy of therhfelves; fince it often
happens, that Men become Miferable in proportion
to their growing Great. But as for Pleafure, it is a
kind of Being which we cannot receive adlually, with-
out actually becoming more Happy. Greatnefs and
Independence for the moft part are not in us, and
commonly they only confift in the relation we have
to thofe things which are about us. But Pleafures are
in tj^e very Soul, and they are real Modes by which
it is modified, and which by their own Nature are
capable of fatisfying it. Therefore we look upon Ex-
cellence, Greatnefs and Independence, as things that
are proper for the Prefervation of our Being, and even
fometimes as very ufeful, according to the Order of
Nature, for the Prefervation of the Well-being: But
pleafure is always a manner of Being of the Mind,
which by ft felf makes it Happy and fatisfies it; fp
^ ^ Cccc that
r» 1^'
ll'A
il.j
",f!:;!f
H
fe'lH
lfi.j!il ■■
Ji* - ^
34 ^ Search after Truth. Book IV.
that Pleafure is a Well-being, and the Love of Plea-
fure the Love of Well-being.
Now the Love of Well-being is fo Powerful,'
that it Ibmetimes proves Stronger than the Love of
Being ; and Self-Love makes us fometimes defire not
to be, becaufe we have not a Well-being. This is
the Cafe of all the Damned , who according to the
Word of Jefus Chrifl, had better not to be, than to be
fo Unhappy as they are; becaufe thefe Wretche$
bping declar'd Enemies to him in whom all Goodnefs
Centers, and who is the Sole Caufe of Pleafure and
of Pain which we are capable of j it is impoflible they
(hould enjoy any Satisfadion ; they are and will be
Eternally Unhappy, becaufe their Will will ever re-
main in the fame Difpofition, and in the fame Irre-
gularity. So that Self-Love includes two Loves, the
Love of Greatnefs, of Power, of Independence and
generality of all things which leem to be proper for
the Prefervation of our Being ; and the Love of Plea-
fure, and of all things that are neceflary for our Well-
being, that is. To be Happy and Satisfied.
Thofe two Loves may be divided feveral ways:
Whether becaufe we are compofed of two different
parts of Soul and Body, according to which they may
be divided ; or becaufe they may be diftinguilh'd or
fpecified by the different Objeds that are ufeful for our
Prefervation. However we will not inlarge upon thar,
becaufe, as we do not defign to make a Treatife of
Morality, it is not neceffary to make an Inquiry into,
and an exad Divifion of all the things we look upon as
our Felicities. It was only neceifary to make this
Divifion, to relate the caufe of our Errors in fome
order.
Therefore we fhall firft fpeak of thole Errors wWch
are caufed by our Inclination for Greatnefs, and for all
thofe things that makes our Being Independant of
others: And afterwards we fhall treat of thofe which
proceed from the Inclination we have for Pleafure, and
for all thofe things which render our Being the beft it
can be for us, or that contents us moff,
CHAP.
Ghap. VL A Search after Truths
CHAP. VI.
I. Of the Inclination we have for every thin^ that
raifes us above other Perfons. 11. Of the falfe
Judgments of fome Piotu Perfons, III. Of the
falfe Judgments of the Suferftitious and Nyfo-
crites, IV. O/Voetius^w Enemy to Monfeur
Defcartes,
\y^Hatever raifes us above others by making u$i, of the
' ^ more Perfedl, as Science and Virtue; or that inclinati"
gives us an Authority over them by making us mote on we have
Powerful, as Dignities and Riches, (eem in fome mtzr for aUthat
(iire to make us Independent. All ihofe that are be- raifes usa^
neath us, have a RefpeA for us and fear us; they
ate always ready to do what pleafes us for our Prefer- ^trjons,
vation ; and they dare neither Prejudice us, nor op-
pofe our Defires. Therefore Men conftantly endea-
vour to poflefs thofe Advantages which raife them
above others. For they never confiderthat both their
Being and Well-being in Truth only depend on God
above, and not on Men; and that the true Greatnefs
txdiich will make them Eternally Happy, does not con-
lift in that Rank which they hold in the Imagination
of other Men, as Weak and as Miferable as them-
lelves 9 but in an humble SubmilTion to the Will of
God, who being Juft, will not fail to reward thofe
who remain within the Order he hath prefcribed.
But Men do not only defire Effedtively to poflefs
Learning and Vertue, Dignities and Riches ; they alfo
uie their utmoft Efforts, in order to perfuade others
that they do really poCfefs them. And if it may be
faid, that they endeavour lefs to appear Rich than to
be realiy fo ; it may alfo be faid, that they often take
lefs care to be Virtuous, than to appear fo: For as the
Author of the Book Entituled,. ^fleEiiones Morales^ fa'ys
agreeably, Virtue veouid not go far^ ilnl^fs it rptre accom"
fdTiicd wi^b
Cccc X The
prt
life . X; .1. rH
litr-et • :
i 4lV i'
m?
iij «•■!';;
If t|;:i
[f K V ; ^ ■',
5"V V-ti'"' '■ -'
It ?!'' !t
rhtiW:
fc;ii
te|i: *
f > ^
I V '. ! i • •.
pi
ill
fell
A Search after Truth, BookIV»
The Reputation of being Rich, Learned and Vir-
tuous, produces in the Imagination of thofe that are
about us, or that are more nearly related to us, very
convenient Difpofitions for us: It makes them fall at
our Feet; it makes them adf in our Favour ^ it In-
fpires them with all the Motions that tend to the Pre-
fervation of our Being, and to the Increaie of our
Grandeur. Thus Men preferve their Reputation, as
a Good which is neceflary for them to Live with Eafe
in the World.
All Men then have an Inclination for Virtue, Learn-
ing, Dignities and Riches, and for the Reputation of
polTelTing thofe Advantages. We will now endeavour
to (how by fome Examples, how thofe Inclinations may
engage them into Error. Let us begin by the Inclina-
tion that Men have for Virtue, or for the Appearance
of Virtue.
Thofe who apply themfetves Serioufly to become
Virtuous, commonly imploy their Mind and Time to
underftand Religion, and to excrcife themfelves in
good Works: They only defire with St. Paul^ to be
acquainted with Jefus Chrifl Crucified, to hnd out a
Remedy for the Diftemper and Corruption of their
Nature. They defire no other Knowledge than that
which is neceflary for them to live Chriftianly, and to
know their Duty ; after which they apply themfelves
to fulfil them with Zeal and Exadtnefs. And there-
fore they feldom trouble themfelves about Sciences,
which appear Vain and Barren in reipedl to their
Salvation.
No Fault can be found with thatCondudl, it is Inr
U. Of the finitely to be valued; Men would Efteem themfelves
falfe Judg' Happy to obferve it cxadlly; and th^ often repent
•merits of not having followed it more. But this is un-
fame Pious approvable, that flnce it is certain that there are Sciences
Perjons. abfolutely Humane, very Certain and Ufeful; which
difingage the Mind from Senfi^le Things, and ufe it
by degrees to relifli the Truths of the Gofpelj fome
Pious Perfbns, without having examined them, con-*
demn them too freely, either as being Ufelefs^ or Un-
certain.
Ir
!fa
ChapfVI. A Search i^ter Truth, 37
It is true, that moll Sciences are very uncertain and
very ufelefs: Men are partly in the right, to believe
that they only contain Truths which ^re of little ufe.
No body is obliged to ftudy them; and it is better to
defpife them, than to fulFer ones felf to be deceiv'd or
blinded by them. Neverthelefs we may affirm, That
iris very neceflary to know fome Meraphylical Truths:
The Univerfal Knowledge, or the Exiftence of a God,
is abfoiutely neceflary, fince even the Certainty of
Faith depends on the Knowledge which Reafon gives
of the Exiftence of a God. It is neceflary to know,
that it is his Will which makes, and which regulates
Nature ; That the Force or Power of Natural Caufes
is only bis Will: In a word. That all things whatever
depend on God.
It is alfo neceflary to know what Truth is, the
means to diftinguilh it from Error, the Diftindlion be-
tween the Mind and Body, the Confequences that may
be drawn from it, as the Immortality of the Soul, and
feveral other things of that kind which may be known
with certainty.
The Knowledge of Man, or of ones felf, is a Science
that cannot be reafonably defpis'd; it contains a World
of things which are abfoiutely neceflary to be known
to bave fome Juftnefs and Penetration of Mind: And
we may fay. That if a Stupid Ignorant Man is Infi-
nitely above Matter, becaufe he knows that he is,
which Matter does not know; thofe who know Man,
are far above Stupid Ignorant Perfons, by reafon that
they know what they are, which the others do not
know.
But the Knowledge of Man is not only Valuable,
becaufe it raifes us above others; it is much more
fo, becaufe it humbles us before God. - That Know-
ledge makes us perfectly Senfible of the Dependence
we have on him in ail things, and even in our mod
common Acflions: It plainly difcovers the Corruption
of our Nature: It difpofes us to apply our felves to
him who alone can cure us ; to rely wholly on him,
and not to truft or rely on our lelves: And thus
it gives many Difpofitions of Mind, which are
Cccc 3 very
9? A Search after Truth» Book IV,
very proper to fubmit our felves to the Grace of the
Gpfpel.
We ought at leaft to have a Superficial Tincflure,
and a general Knowledge of the Mathematicks and
pf Nature. We ought to learn thofe Sciences in our
Youth; they difingage the Mind from Senfible
Things, and hinder it from becoming Weak and
EfiTeminate: They are ufeful enough in Life ; they
incline us towards God ; the Knowledge of Nature
does it ot it felf i and that of the Mathematicks by the
Pifguit it Infpires in us of the Falfe Impreflions of our
Senies.
Virtuous Perfons muft not defpife thofe Sciences,
nor look upon them as Uncertain and Ufelefs, unlefs
they are certain that they have ftudied them enough
10 judge Solidly of them: There are many others
which they may boldly Defpife ; Let them Condemn
the Poets to the Flames , Heathen Philofophers,
Rabbies, fome Hiftorians, and a great Number of
Authors, which make the Pride and Knowledge of
fome of the Learned ; we lhall be little troubled at it.
But let them not Condemn the Knowledge of Nature,
as being contrary to Religion; fince Nature being
regulated by the Will of God, the true Knowledge
of Nature teaches us how to admire the Power,
Grandeur and Wifdom of God. For it feems that
God has form'd the Univerfe in order, th^^t we Ihould
Study it, and that by that Study we ftiould learn
to Know and; to Refped: the Author of it. So that
thofe who Condemn the Study of Nature, feem to
oppofe the Will of God; unlefs they pretend that
Sin has rendred Man Incapable of that Study. It is
alfo Vain for rliem to tell us , That the Knowledge
of Men only ferves to make them Proud and Vain,
becaufe thofe who have the Reputation of having
a perfed Knowledge of Man , "though they often
know him III, are commonly Intolerably Proud :
For it is evident, That no Man can know himfelf
well, without being Senfible of his Weaknefe and
Miferies.
Neither
Chap.VI. ^ Search after Truths 59
Neither are they Perfons of a real and Iblid Piety,
that ufually condemn what they do not underftand
but rather Su^ftitious and Hypocrites. The Super- 9f
ftitious out of a fervile Fear, and through a bafenefs
and wealtnefs of Mind areftartled at the fight of
lively penetrating Wit. Do but, for Example, give
them Natural Reafons for Thunder, and for its Ef-
fedb, and they look upon you ftrait as an Atheift,
But the Hypocrites out of a Hellifli Malice, transform
themfelves into Angels of Light. They make ufe of
the appearances of holy Truths which are reverenc'd^
by all the World to oppofe Truths, which are but
little known, and little valu'd, out of private Intereft.
They Combat Truth with the Image of Truth ; and
often in their Hearts, Laugh at what all the World
RefpetSts; they eftabliih in the Opinion of Men, a
Reputation, which is fb much the more folid and to
be fear'd , as the thing they abufe is the more
Sacred.
Therefore thofe Perfons are the ftrongeft, and moft
formidable Enemies of Truth. Indeed, they are
pretty rare, but a fmall number of them is capable of
doing a great deal of harm. The appearance of Truth
and of Viruie, often does more milchief, than Truth
and Virtue do good ; for one cunning Hypocrite is
capable to overthrow what feveral truly Wife and
Virtuous Perfons have rais'd with a great deal of Pain
and Labour.
Monfieur Defcartes^ for inftance, has demonftrative-
ly prov'd the Exiftence of a God, the Immortality of
our Souls, feveral other Metaphyfical Queftions, a
great number of Phyfical Ones; and this Age is infi-
nitely obliged to him for the Truths he has difcover'd.
Yet here ttarts up an * inconfiderable Man, a hot and *Voetius.
vehement Exclaimer, refpecffed by fome People for the
Zeal he exprefles for their Religion; He Writes Injii-
rious Books againft him, and accufes him of the high-
eft Crimes. Defcartes is a CatholkJi, he has Jludied
under the 'Jefuits; he has often mention d them with
verence. That is fufficient for that malicious Man to
perfwade People that are Enemies to our Religion,
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A Search after Truth. Book IV#
and eafily mov*d in matters fo Nice as thofe of Religion,
that he is an Emi0ary of the JefuitSj.and has dange-
rousDefigns: Becaufe theleaft appearances of Truth
upon matters of Faiths have more Force upon Peoples
Mnds, than real and effedkive Truths of Phyfical or
Metaphyfical things have, which are little valued.
Monlieur Defcartes has written about the Exiftence of
God. That is matter enough for that Calumniator to
fexercife his falfe 2^al upon, and to oppofe all the
Truths his Enemy defends. He accufes him of being
an Atheift, and of teaching Atheifm cunningly and fe-
icretly, like that infamous Atheift call'd Vaninoy who
was Burnt at Thouloufe ; who Cloak'd his Malice and
Impiety by Writing for the Exiftence of a God ; for
one of the Reafons urg'd by him to prove his Enemy
an Atheift, is, That he did Write againft AtHeifts, as
Vanino did, in order to cover his Impiety.
Thus it is eafie for a Man to opprefs Truth, when
he is feconded by the appearances of Truth, and has
acquir'd a great Afcendent over weak Minds. Truth
delights inMildnefs, and in Peace; and as ftrong as it
is, it yields fometimes to the Pride and Haughtinefs of
Fallhoods, which Drelfes and Arms it felf with her
Appearances. Truth is very fenfible that Error can
never harm it; and if it remains fometimes as if it
were prefcrib'd and in Obfcurity, it is only to wait
for more favourable occafions to (how its felf ; for at
iaft it appears, for the moft part, ftronger and brighter
than ever, in the very place where it is opprefs'd.
I do not wonder that an Enemy of Monfieur Defcar-
tesj that a ^an of a different Religion from his, that
an Ambitious Man, who defign'd to rife upon the
Ruins of Perfons that are above him, that a Railer
without Judgment, that Voetim ftould f^ak with
Contempt of what he neither did, nor could under-
ftand. But I am furpris'd to find, that Perfons who
are neither Enemies to Monfieur Defcartes^ nor to his
Religion, Ihould entertain Sentiments of Averfion and
Contempt againft him, upon the account of the Ca-
Ipmnies they have read in Books written by the Ene-
mies of his Perfon^^ and of his Religion.
The
Chap.VI. J Search after Truth. 41
The Book written by that Heretick intitled, Defpe^
rata caufa Papatus^ fuffidently (hews his Impudence,
his Ignorance, and his Paflion, and bis defire to appear
Zealous, in order thereby to acquire fomiC Reputation
among thofe of his Party. Therefore he is not a Man
to be credited upon his Word. For as there is no
reaibn to believe all the Fables he has Colledled in
that Book againft our Religion, fo neither is there
any to Credit the Injurious Accufations be has invented
againft his Enemy.
Rational Men will not fuffer tbennfelves to be peri
fwaded, that Monfieur Defcartes is a dangerous Man,
becaule they have read it in (ome Book or other, or
becaufe they have been told fo by Perfons, whofe Pie-
ty they have a Refpedt for. It is not lawful to believe
Men upon their bare Word, when they accufe others
of the moft Enormous Crimes. It is not a fufficient
proof to believe a thing, becaufe we hear it affirm'd
by a Man who fpeaks with Zeal and Gravity. For it
is impoflible for any Perfon to relate Falfities, and
Foolifli Stories, in the fame manner as he would relate
good things, particularly if he has fuflfer'd himfelf to
be impos'd upon out of Simplicity and Weaknefs.
It is eafie to difcover the Truth or Falfity of the
Acculations that are form'd againft Defcartes ; his
Writings are Extant, and eafie to be underftood, by
ihofe that are capable of Attention. Therefore I
would advife People to Read his Works, in order to
get better Proofs againft him than bare PvCport, and I
do not queftion but after they have read and exa-
min'd them, they will no longer Accufe him of Atheifm ;
and that on the contrary, they will pay him the Refpedt
that is due to a Man, who has plainly and evidently
demonftrated, not only the Exiftence of a God, ana
the Immortality of the Soul, but alfo a World of other
Truths, which were unknown until his time.
CHAP,
\
A Search after Truth, BooklV.
CHAP. VII.
Of the defire of Scietice,^ and of the Judgments of
fretenders to Learnings
Mind of Man has without doubt, very little
•*' Capacity and Extent, and yet he defiresto know
every thing. All Human Sdences cannot fatiHe his
Defires; and yet his Capacity is (b co^fin'd, that he
cannot perfecflly apprehend any one particular Science.
He is in a continual Agitation, and defires always to
know; whether he be in hopes of finding what he
looks for, as we have laid in the preceding Chapter ;
or whether he perfwades himfelf that his Soul and
Mind are extended by the vain poflefifion of fome ex-
traordinary Knowledge. The unruly defire of Hap-
pinels and Grandeur, makes him ftuay all manner of
Sciences, hoping to find his Felici^ in the Science of
Morality; and looking for this falie Greatnefs infpe-
culative Sciences.
What is the reafon that fome Perfons fpend all their
Life in reading of Rabbits, and other Books Written
in Foreign, Oofcure, and Corrupted Languages j and
by Authors without Judgment and Knowledge: But
that they perfwade themfelves, that when they are
skilFd in the Oriental Languages, they are greater
and higher than thofe who are Ignorant of them ?
And what is it that can encourage them in their in-
grateful, painful, ufelefs Labour, unlefs it be the Hope
of fome Preferment, and the Prolpecft of fome new
Grandeur ? Indeed they are looked upon as extraor-
dinary Men ^ they are Complimented upon their pr<^
found Learning ; People are better pleased to hear
them than others: And though it may be faid, that
they are commonly theleaft Ji^icious, if it were only
for employing all their Life in a very ufolels Study,
which can neither make them Wifer nor Happier:
Neverthelefs, moft People fancy that they have a great
deal
Chap.Vn. A Search after Truth.
deal more Senfe and Judgment than others: And as
they are more LarnM in the Etymology of Words,
they alfo fancy that they are Learned in the Nature of
Things.
The fame realbn induces Aftronomers to fpend all
their Tkne and Eftate to get an exadl Knowledge of
Things; which are not only ufelefs, but alfo impofli-
ble to know. They endeavour to find an exac5l Regu-
larity in the Courfe of the Planets, which is not in
Nature; and to Form Aftronomical Schemes to fore-
tel Effedts, of which they do not know the Caufes.
They have made the Selenography<,ot Geography of the
Moon, as if People defign d to Travel thither: They
have already divided it among thofe that are Famous
in Aitronomy : There are few of them that have not
already fome Province or other in that Country, as a
Recompence for their great Labour; and I queftioa
whether they are not Proud of having been in Favour
with him that has fo magnificently diftributed thofe
Kingdoms among them.
What is the reafbn that Rational Men apply them-*
felves fb much to this Science, and yet remain in grofe
Errors, in re^df to Truths which they ought to know,
unlefs they Fancy, thas it is a great thing to know
what pafles in the Heavens ? The knowledge of the
Vaft Things that pafles above, feems to them more
Noble, Greater, and more worthy of their great Wit,
than the knowledge of Vile Abjedls, Corruptible
Things, as Sublunary Bodies are in their Opinion.
The Noblenefs of a Science is deriv'd from the No-
blenefs of its Objedfs*: It is a great Principle 1 There-
fore the knowledge of the Motion of unalterable and
incorruptible Bodies, is the higheft and molt fublime
of all Sciences. And for that reafon, it appears to
them worthy of the Greatnefs and Excellency of their
Mind.
Thus Men fuffer themfelves to be blinded by a
falfe Idea of Gxandeur, which pleafes and moves them.
As foon as their Imagination is ilruck by it, tb^ hill
down before that Phantafm, they Reverence it $ it
deftroys and blinds their Reafon, which Ihould be the
Judge
A Search after Truth. Book IV.
■jjp.'d!
Judge of it. Men feem to Dream when they Judge
of the Objedts of their Paflxons, to have no Eyes,
and to want Common Senfe. For in fine, whefedies
the Excellenq^ of the knowledge of the Motions of
the Planets ; and have we not a fufficient knowledge
of it already, fince we know how to regulate our
Months and our Years ? What does it concern us to
know, whether Saturn is iurrounded by a Ring, or by
a great number of little Moons; and why (hould we
Difpute about it Why fhould any one be proud of
having foretold the greatnefs of an Eclipfe; which
perhaps he has hit better upon than another, becaufe
he has had more Luck } There are perfons appointed
by the King s Order to obferve the Srars^ let us rely
upon their Obfervations. They may reafonably apply
themfelves to it; for they do it out of Ehiiy : It is
their bufinefs. They do it with Succefs ; for they
employ all their Time about it with Art, Application,
and all the Exadfnefs imaginable: They want nothing
in order to fucceed in it. Therefore we ought to be
fully iatisfy'd upon a matter which concerns us lb little,
when they impart their Difcoveries to us.
Anatomy is a very good Study, fince it is a thing of
great ufe, and fince we ought to delight in the Know-
ledge of things that are neceffary. We may and
ought to apply our lelves to whatever may contribute
any thing towards our Happinefs, or rather to Eafe
our Infirmities and Miferies. But to pafs whole
Nights in peeping th' ough a Telefcope to difcover fome
Spot, or fome new Plane: in the. Heavens, to the pre-
judice of our Health, to the impairing our Eftate, to
the negledling the Care of our Affairs, only to Vifit
the Stars Regularly, and to meafure their Size and Si-
tuation ; is in my Opinion, abfolutely to forget what
we are at prefenr, and what we ftiall be hereafter.
Let no,!^dy urge, that it is in order to difcover the
Greatnefs of him that has formed all thefe great Ob-
jedls. The leaft Fly difcovers more the Power and
Wifdom of God to thofe that confider it with Atten-
tiori, and without being prejudiced by its fmallneft,
than all what the Aftronomers know of the Heavens.
Never-
itheriifl''
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Tsa to bn
Tkm
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MSttit
4
I Chap.VII. A Search after Truth'
Neverthelefs, Men are not made to confider Flies,
neither do 1 approve the Pains feme People have ta-
ken to inftrudt us how Lice, and all kinds of Animals
are Form'd ; and how the Transformations of dilfe-
rent 'W'orms into Flies, and Butterflies, are efred:ed»
It is lawful for Men to amule themfelves about thefe
things, when they have nothing elfc to do, to divert
themfelves: But Men ought not to employ all their
time about it, unlefs they are infenfible of their Mi-
feries.
They ought continually to apply themfelves to
ch the knowledge of God and of themfelves; to labour
Serioufly to overcome their Errors and Prejudices»
their Paflions and Inclinations for Sin; earneftly to
fearch after the Truths that are moft neceflary for
them to know. For thofe are the moft Judici-
ous, that take moft Care to difcover the moft folid
Truths.
The main Caufe which engages Men in faife Stu-
dies, is, that they have fix'd the Idea of Learning to
a Vain, Ufelels Knowledge, inftead of fixing it to
folid and neceflary Sciences. For when a Man re-
folves upon Learning, and when the Spirit of Poly-
mathy begins to move him ; he feldom examins what.
Sciences are moft neceflary for him, either to behave
bimlelf like an Honeft Man, or to improve his Rea-
fon; He only looks upon thofe that pafs for Learned
Men in the World, and examins what renders them
conflderable. All the moft folid and neceflary Sciences
being pretty Common, the Perfons that poflefs them,
are neither admired nor rcfpedbed for them ; for Com-
mon things are looked upon without Attention or
Emotion, though never fo excellent and admirable in
themlelves. So that thofe who aim at Learning, fel-
dom fix on thofe Sciences that are neceflary for the
Condutft of this Life, and for the Perfedlion of the
Mind. Thofe Sciences do not Excite in, them that
Idea of Sciences which they have FormM to them-
felves ; for thofe are not the ScietKCs they have ad-
mir*d in others, and which they defire others Ihculd
admire in theiRt
The
;
46 A Search after Truth. Book IV.
The Gofpel and Morality, are Sciences that are to^
Common, and too Ordinary ; they defire to learn the
Criticifms of fome Terms that are met with in Anci-
enr Philofophers, or in Grecian Poets. Languages,
and particularly thofe that arc not in ufe in their
Country, as Arabicl^, and that of the ^abbies, or the
like, appear to them moft worthy of their Applica*
tion, and of their Study. If they read the Bible, it
is not to learn Religion or Piety : Points of Chrono-
logy, of Geography, and the difficulties of Grammar,
take up all their Minds: They defire the knowledge
of thole things with more Zeal, than the wholfome
Truths of the Gofpel: They are defirous to poflefs
that Science themfelves which they have foolilhly ad-
mir'd in others, and which Fools will not fail to ad-,
mire in them.
The fame appears in "things that relate" to the Know-
ledge of Nature, they feldom Study that which iS
moft ufeful in it, but that which is leaft Common,
Anatomy is too mean for them, but Aftronomy is a
more exalted Study. Common Experiments are not
worthy their Application ; but thofe extraordinary
and furprifing Ei^riments, which can never Improve
us, are what they moft carefully obferve.
The moft Obfcure and Ancient Hiftories are thofe
they are Proud to be acquainted with. They are Ig-
noraht of the Genealogy of the Princes that Reign at
this time; and they make it their bufinefs to ftudy the
Defcent of thofe that have been Dead Four Thoufand
Years ago. They negledl the moft Noted Hiftories
of their time, and apply themfelves carefully to the
Study of the Fables and Fidions of the Poets. They
hardly hnow their own Relations ; but if you pleafe,
they will quote you many Authorities to prove, that a
Bfiman Citizen was Related to an Emperor, and other
like things.
They hardly know the Names of the Dreftes that
are worn in their days, and yet lofe their time in ftu-
dying thofe of the Greeks and ^pmans. The Animals
of their own Country are little known by them, and
yet they will lavilhly employ whole Years in the Com-
pofurc
0^
jo'diJ'
I
ehap.VH. A Search after Truth.
pofureof large Volumes, about the Animals menti-
on d in the Bible ; to feem to have guels'd better than
others what unknown Terms fignifie. Such a B(X)k
is the delight of its Author, and of the Learned that
Read it; for being full of Greeks, Hebrewy and
hick Paiges. (§c, of Quotations of Rabbi's, and other
obfcure and extraordinary Authors, it fatisfies theVa-
nity of the Author, and the Foolilh Curiofity of the
Readers; who will think ihemfelves more Learned
than others, when they can proudly affirm, that there
are Six different Words in Scripture which fignifie a
Lion, or the like.
They are often Ignorant of the Map of theic.own
Country, or of the City where they are Born, while
they ifudy the Map of Ancient Greece, of of
the Ga$tls in Julius Cafars Time, gr the Streets and
publick Places of Ancient I{pme, Labor Stultorum, fays
the Wife Man, ^igef eos^ijui nefciunt in urhem fergere.
They do not know the Way to their own Town, and
they Fatigue themfelvesFoolifhIy inufelefs Difcoveries.
They neither know the Laws, nor Cuftoms of the
Places where they Live; but they carefully Study
Ancient Rights, the Laws of the Twelve Tables, the
Cuftoms of the Lacedemonians, or of the Chtnefe, or
the Ordinances of the Great Mogol. Finally, they
are defirous to know all Extraordinary diftant things,
which others do not know, becaufe they have Fool-
iihly fix'd the Idea of Learning on thofe things; and
that it is fufficient to be thought Learned, only to
know what others are Ignorant of, though at the fame
time they are Ignorant of the molt necelfary and moft
excellent Truths. The Truth is, that the Knowledge
of all thofe things, and the like, is call'd Science,
Learning and Dodrin ; Ufe will have it fo : But
there is a Science which is only Folly and Vanity ac-
cording to Scripture ; DoEirina Shiltorum fatuitas, I
have not hitherto obferv'd, that the Holy Ghoft,
which gives fo many Elogies to Science in holy Writ,
iays any thing to the advantage of that falfe Science,
which I have now mention'd,
CHAP.
48
.JSSBSBSMS^^ "
A Search after Truth. Book IV»
L Of the
Dejtre of
being
thought
Ltamed.
Ili of the
Converfa.
tions of
pretenders
toLenming
CHAP. viir.
I. of the Dejlre of being thought Learned, II, Of
the Converfation of Pretenders to Learnings
III. Of their Works,
the irregular Defire of becoming Learned> bfteri
renders Men more Ignorant, then the Defire of be-
ing thought Learned does not only increafe their Ig-
norance, but it feems to turn their Brains: Many
Men ftray from Common Senfe, by endeavouring to
furpafs it, and talk at randonij being only delighted
with Paradoxes. They keep at liich a diftance from
Common Thoughts, in order to be thought extraor^
dinary Perfons, that they really fucceed in it, and
that no Body looks upon them without Admiration,
or without Contempt.
They are look'd upon fbmetimes with Admiration;
when being preferred to fome Dignity which conceals
their Ignorance, they are thought to be as much above
others by their Genius and Learning, as they are by
their Rank, or by their Birth. But for the moft part
they are look'd upon with Contempt, and fometimes
as Mad Men, when they are more ftridfly examin'd,
and that their Greatnefs does not conceal them from
the Eyes of others.
The pretenders to Learning evidently difcover
what they are in the Books they Write, and in their
ufual ConVerfations. Perhaps it will be proper to fay
fomething about it.
As it is only Vanity, and the defire of appearing
more than others, which ingages them to Study, as
fbon as they are ingag'd in Converfation, the Pafiion
and Defire of Greatnefs awakens them anew, and
Tranfports them. They take their Flight fo high of
a fudden, that we lofe fight of them ; and very often
they know not where they are themfelves. They are
fo much afraid of not being above ihofe that hear
them, that they are offended if they think they follow
others.
Chap. VIII. A Search after Truth.
others. They are ftartled as fobn as any body defires
the leaft Explanation, and fly into a Pa^on upon the
leaft Oppofition; In fine. They fay things that are
fo New, and fo Extraordinary , but fo far from
common Senfe, that the moft Prudent have much ado
to forbear Laughing, while the reft are Amaz'd.
Their firft Heat being over, if any Man that hasfo
much G)nftancy and Firmnefs of Mind, as not to
have been confounded by them, fliows them that they
are miftaken ; they neverthelefs perfift obftinately in
their Errors. The Air of thofe they have Confounded
Confounds them: The Sight of fo many Approvers,
whom they have convinc d by ImpreflRon, Convinces
them by a rebound: Or if that Sght does not Con-
vince them, yet it Influences them to that degree ,
that they ftill maintain their Falfe Sentiments. Vanity
does not allow them to Retradl. They always feek
out fome Reafon to defend themfelves: Moreover,
they never fpeak with fo much Heat and Eagernefs,
as when they have nothing to fay : They imagine that
People defign to Affront them, and to make them
Defpicable, whenever they urge any Reafons againft
them 5 and the more Convincing and Judicious
they are, the more they Exafperate their Pride and
Averfion.
The beft way to Vindicate Truth againft them,
is not to Difpute ; fince it is better both for them and
for us, to leave them in their Errors, than to gain
their Averfion. We muft not wound their Heart in
order to cure their Mind , fince the Wounds of the
Heart are more Dangerous than thofe of the Mind:
Befides, It happens fometimes, that we have to do
with Men of true Learning, which we might defpife
for want of conceiving their Thoughts. Therefore
the beft way is, to defire thofe who fpeak in a deci-
five manner, to Explain themfelves as diftindtly as
they can, without allowing them to change the Sub-
jedt, or to ufe obfcure equivocal Terms ; and if they
are Perfons of Sence and Learning fomething will be
learn'd by them j but if they are only Pretenders to
Learning, they will loon Confound themfelves by
■ D d d d their
A Search after Truth. Book IV.
their own Words, and have no reafon to blame any
body befides themfelves. Perhaps it may inftrudfc us
in fome Refpedls , and may alfo fcrve to divert us,
if we may be allow'd to divert our lelves with the
Weaknefs of others, when we endeavour to remedy it.
But that which is moft confiderable, is, That thereby
we may hinder the Weak who hearken'd lo them with
Admiration, from fubmitting to Error in following
their Decifions.
For it is obfervable. That the Number of Fools,
or of thofe that fuffer themfelves to be guided like
Machines, and by the Impreiiion of the Senfes, being
Infinitely greater than that of thofe who have an In-
telligible Mind, and who are perfwaded by Reafon:
When one of thofe Learned Men Ipeaks of and decides
any thing, there are always a greater Number of
thofe that Believe him upon his Word, than of thofe
that Sufped: him. But whereas thofe Pretenders to
Learning, remove themfelves as far as they can from
common Thoughts, both out of a Defire to meet fome
Oppofers to Impofe upon, in order to be cry*d up and ® ^
to appear Learned, and out of a Spirit of Contradidli- ™
on ; their Decifions are commonly Falfe and Obfcure,
and it is difficult to hearken to them without falling
into fome Error.
Now this Method of difcovering the Errors of
others, or the Solidity of their Sentiments, is pretty
Difficult to be put in Pradice: The Reafon of it is
this, That Pretenders to Learning are not the only
Perfons who would feem to be Ignorant of nothing,
moft Men have that Defed, particularly thofe that
have fome Reading, and that have Studied, which is
the reafon that they will always fpeak and ex-
plain their Sentiments, without giving a fufficient kiC
Attention to others. The moft Complaifanc and
moft Reafonable among them, defpifing the Senti-
ments of others in their Hearts, only feem to be
Attentive, while People may eafily difcern in their
Eyes, that they do not obferve what is faid, and that
their Mind is wholly taken up with what they defign
to prove to us, without thinking . of anfwering us.
This
Chap. VIII. A Search after Truths
This is what often makes Converfations very dull ;
for as nothing is more Pleafing, and becaufe the
greateft Honour People can do us, is to confider our
Reafons , and approve our Opinions, fo nothing
can be more Offenfive , than to fee that People
do not apprehend them ; nor fo much as take the
leaft care that they may do it. For in fine, There
is no Pleafure in fpeaking to and converfing with
Statues ; and who are only Statues in relation to us,
becaufe they have no value for us, and who have no
thoughts to pleafe us, but only to pleafe themfelves in
endeavouring to fhow their Parts. But if Men knew
how to give a handfom Attention and anfwer well,
Converfation would not only be very Agreeable, but
alfo very Ufeful; whereas every body ftriving to be
thought Learnedj they only hear one another j they
adt fometimes Uncharitably, and feldom or never dit
cover Truth.
But the Blunders that are committed by the faid
Pretenders to Learning in Converfation, are excufable
in fome Refpedts. It may be urg'd in Favour of
them, That Men are but little attentive to what is
fpoken at that time; That the moft Exadl are fome-
times guilty of it; and that they do not defire their
Words (hould be colledted like thole of ScaHger^ and of
Cardinal dit Perron,
There is fome Reafon in thefe Excufes, and we are
willing to believe, that fuch kind of Faults deferve
fome Indulgence. People are defirous to fpeak in
Converfation, but there are unhappy days in which
they do not hit things right. We are not always in
a Humour to think and to exprels our felves well 5
and Time is fo (hort on certain Occafions, that the
ieaft Cloud, and the leaft abfence of Mind, makes
thofe which have the greateft Intereft and Penetration
of Mind, ftumble unluckily into Extravagant Abfur-
dities.
But if the Faults which the Pretenders to Learning
commit in Converfation are excufable, the Faults
they are guilty of in their Books, alter mature Deli"
beration, are by no means pardonable, efpecially if
Dddd 2. they
52 A Search after Truth, Book IV.
they are frequenr, and are not aton'd by feme good
thing. For thofe who write an ill Book, make abun-
dance of People lofe their time in reading of it; be-
fides their falling into the fame Errors they are guilty
of; and this occafions many more, which is a thing of
very ill Confequence,
But though it be a greater Fault than People
imagine, to compofe an ill Book, or only an uTelefs
one, it is a Fault that fooner meets with Reward
than Punifhment: For there are Crimes which Men
do not punilh, whether it be that they are in Faftiion,
or becaufe their Reafon is not commonly fo fteady,
to condemn as Criminals, whom they look upon
to be Men of better Senfe than they are them-
felves»
Authors are commonly look'd upon as Extraordi-
nary Men, who foar much above others ; and fo they
are refpeded initead of being punifli'd. Therefore
there is no likelihood that Men Ihould ever trecSt a
Tribunal, to Examine and Condemn all fuch Books
as only ferve lo Corrupt Reafon.
So that we muft never expedt to fee the Repub-
lick of Letters better regulated than other Repub-
licks are, fince both are composed by Men. More-
over it is very necelTary, in order to remove Error,
to allow the Republick of Letters more Libeny
than others, in which Novelty is always very Dan-
gerous: For (hould the World Incroach upon the
Liberty ot Learned Men, and Condemn all Novelties
without Difcernment, it would confirm us in our
Errors.
Therefore there is no reafon to find fault with
my Ipcaking againif the Government of the Repub-
lick ot Letters ; and with (my endeavouring to rtiow,
that often thofe great Men which are admir'd by
others for their Profound Learning, are at the bottom
only Vain Proud Men, without Judgment, and with-
out any true Science. I am oblig'd to Ipeak thus of
them, leaft People fhould blindly iubmit to their Deci^
(ions, and follow their Errors,
The
Chap.VIII. Ji1 Search afterTruth, 55
The Proofs of their Vanity, of their Want of Judg- III. Of tht
ment, and of their Ignorance, are apparent in their f
own Works. Thofe who will give themfelves the Pratenaers
Trouble to examine them, with an Intent to Judge Learn'
them by the Rule of Common Senfe, and without
Prejudice of Efteem for thofe Authors, will find that
moft of the Defigns of their Study are grounded upon
an unjudicious Vanity ; and that their principal End
is, not to perfedl their Reafon, and much lefs to
regulate the Motions of their Heart; but only to
Confound others, in order to appear more Learned
than they.
This is the Reafon, as we have already obferved,
that they always fix upon odd extraordinary Subjedfs ;
and that they only ule odd and extraordinary Ex-
preflions to explain themfelves j and quote none
but odd and extraordinary Authors. They feldom
explain themfelves in their own Language, it is too
common ; nor yet with a clear, plain, ealie Latin ;
they do not fpeak to be underftood, but to be admir'd.
They feldom apply themfelves to Subjects which are
ufeful for the Condudt of Life, that feems too com-
mon to them: They neither endeavour to be ufeful to
others, nor to themfelves, but only to be thought
Learned. They give no Reafons for what they lay,
or elfe they are fuch Myfterious and Incomprehen-
lible ones, as neither themfelves nor any body elfe
conceives with Evideifce: They have no clear Reafons;
and if they had they would not ufe them. Thofe
Reafons do not furprife the Mind, they look too plain
and too common, qyery body is capable of them.
They rather chufe to relate Authorities to prove, or
to feem to prove their Thoughts ; for often the Au-
thorities they alledge, prove nothing by the Senle
they contain ; they only prove becaufe they are Greek,
or Arabick; But it will not be amifs to fpeak of their
Quotations, it will in fome refpedt difcover the Difpo-
lition of their Minds.
It is very evident, in my Opinion, that notliing
but Falfe Learning, and the Spirit of Polirnathy, could
make Quotations fo much in vogue as they have
Dddd 3 been
A Search after Truth, Book IV.
been hitherto, and as they are ftill among fome of
the Learned; for it is not very difficult to find Au^
thors, who quote large Paflfages every Moment with-
out any reaion for it; either becaufe the things they
advance are fo clear that no body doubts them;
or becaufe they are fo Obfcure, that the Authority of
their Authors cannot prove them: Or laftly, Becaufe
the Quotations they alledge, can add no Ornament to
what they fay.
It is repugnant to Common Senfe, to introduce a
large GreeiJ;, Paffage, to prove that the Air is Tranfpa-
rent, becaufe it is a thing that is known by every
body; To ufe the Authority of Ariftotle to perfuade
us that there are Intelligences which move the Hea^
vens, becaufe it is evident that Arijlotle could know
nothing of it: Or to mix Forreign Languages., Arabick.
and PerJjan Proverbs in French and Latin Books, com-
pos'd for every bodies ufe , becaufe thofe Quotations
can add no Ornaments to them, or elfe they are Fan-
raftical Ornaments, which difoblige a great many
people, and can oblige but very few.
Neverthelefs moft of thofe that would be thought
Learned, take fo much delight in thofe kind of Quo-
rations, that they are not afham*d fometimes to in-
troduce them in Languages they do not underftand ;
and they ftrain hard to force an Arabick^ Paflage into
their Books, which perhaps they cannot read. Thus
they puzzle themfelves to compafs a thing which is
contrary to Common Senfe, yet pleafes their Vanity,
and makes them cry'd up by Fools.
They have alfo another Defedl which is very
confiderable, and that is. They take little care to
Ihow, they have read with Choice and Judgment,
they only defire to appear to have read much,
and particularly Obfcure Books, in order to be thought
great Scholars; Books that are Scarce and Dear, leaft
People fhould think they want any thing; Wicked
and Impious Books which Honeft Men dare not read:
Juit like thofe that brag of Crimes which others dare
not commit. Therefore they will rather quote you
very Dear, very Scarce, very Ancient, and very
Obfcure
Chap. VIII. A Starch after Truth,
Obfcure Books, than fuch as are more Common and
more Intelligible ; and Books of Aftrology, of the
Caballay and of Magick, than good Books ; as if they
were not Senfible, that Reading being the lame thing
as Converfation, they Ihould endeavour to Ihow that
they have taken care to read good Books, and fuch
as are moft Intelligible, and not fuch as are bad and
Obfcure.
For as it would argue a Depravation of Mind, to
be fond of Converfing commonly with Men we do
not underhand, without an Interpreter, when it is
in our Power to inform our felves otherwile of what
we defire to know: So it is Ridiculous to read only
fuch Books as cannot be underftood without a Did:i-
onary, when the fame things may be learn'd in thofe
that are more Intelligible. And as it is a Sign of
Madnefs, to affecft the Company and Converfation of
Impious Perfons; fo it is the Charadler of a corrupted
Heart, to delight in the reading of ill Books. But it
is an Extravagant piece of Pride, to be willing to
perfwade, that one has read even thofe that one has
not read, which neverthelefs is pretty frequent: For
there are Perfons that are but Thirty Years of Age,
that quote more 111 Books in their Works, than they
could have read in feveral Ages; and yet they will
perfwade others, they have read them with great
Exadlnefs. But moft of the Books of certain Learned
Men, are only compil'd by dint of Dictionaries, and
they have hardly read any thing beyond the Contents
of the Books they quote, or lome Common Places
collected out of different Authors.
I dare not particularly enlarge upon thofe things,
nor give Examples of them, for firar of offending Per-
Ions fo Haughty and fo Splenatick as thofe Pretenders
to Learning are ; tor there is no Delight in being
abus'd in Gree^ and Arabick^. Moreover, It is not
very Material, in order to render what I fay the
more Senlible, to give particular Proofs of it; Men
being naturally enough inclined to find Fault with the
Conduct of others, and to apply what has been faid.
in the mean time leu them pleafe themfelves with
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56 A Semh after Truth. Book IVJ
that vain Phantafm of Grandeur; and let them give
each ptherthe Applaufes which we refufe to give them.
We have perhaps already difturb'd them too much in
p Injoyment, which Teems To Sweet and To Delightful
to them.
CHAP. IX.
How the Inclination we have for Honours and
Riches leads its to Error*
trOnours and Riches, as well as Virtue and Sciences,
, which we have been fpeaking of, are the Prin-
cipal things that raile us above other Men ; for our
Being Teems to Agrandize and become Independent
by the Pofleilion of thefe Advantages. So that the
Love we bear our Telves, carrying it Telf naturally to
Honours and Riches, we may affirm at leaft, that
all People have Tome Inclination towards them. Let
us explain in few words, how thefe Inclinations hinder
us from finding out Truth, and engage us into Falfe-
hood and Error.
We have fhown in divers Places, that a great deal
of Time, Pains, Affiduity, and Induftry of Mind, are
required to difcover Truths that are composed and
furrounded with Difficulties, and which depend on
many Principles. From thence it is eafie to conclude.
That Publick PerTons, who have great Imployments,
great Eftates to govern, and great Affairs to manage,
and who much Covet Honours and Riches, are not
very fit to Search after thefe Truths; and that they
often are guilty of Error, in relation to Things that are
not eafily known, when they Tet up for Judges of
them.
I . Becaufe they have but very little Time to imploy
in Search of Truth,
z. That commonly they do not delight in it.
Since
Chap.TX. Jl Search after Truth.
3. Since they are not very capable 'of Attention,
becaufe the Capacity of their Mind is divided by the
multitude of the Idea's of fuch things as they defire,
and to which they are oblig'd to apply themfelves.
4. Becaufe they think they know every thing, and
are not eafily perfwaded that their Inferiours can have
a greater (hare of Reafon than they have ; for though
they are willing to learn feme things of them, they
are iinwilling to be inftrudled by them in folid and
neceffary Truths: They fly out into a Pailion when
any Body contradidls and undeceives them.
5. Since all their Imaginations are commonly ap-
plauded, though neyer fo falfe and oppoflte to Com-
men Senfe; and that Men Laugh at thofe that are not
of their Opinion, though they maintain undeniable
Truths. The fordid Flatteries of thofe that are about
them confirm them in their Errors, and in the falfe
Efteem they have of themfelves, and fo encourages
them to judge boldly of all things.
6. Becaule they leldom fix on any but fenfible No-
tions, which are fitter for Common Converfations,
and to preferve the Etteem of Men, than the pure
Idea's of the Mind, which ferve to difcover Truth.
7. Since thofe who afpire to any Dignity, endea-
vour as much as they can to fuit thenafelves to the Ca-
pacity of others ; becaufe nothing Excites the Envy
and Averfion of Men fb much as too uncommon Sen-
timents. It is very difficult for thofe whofe Mind and
Heart is taken up with the Thoughts and Defires of
making their Fortune, to difcover difficult Truths ;
and when they do find out any, they often abandon
them out of Intereft, becaufe the Defence of thofe
Truths does not fuit with their Ambition. Men muft
otten Wink at Injuftice to become Magiftrates; a fo-
lid and uncommon Piety often hinders a Man from
obtaining the Goods of Fortune ; and the generous
Love of Truth often deprives Men of the Pulpit 3
where Truth ought to be Taught.
All thefe Realons joyn'd together, «make Men that
are much above others by their Dignities, Nobility,
and Riches, or fuch who only think of rifing and ma-
king
A Search after Truth• Book IV.
king their Fortune, very liable to Error, and little ca-
pable of difcovering hidden Truths. For among thofe
things that are neceflary to avoid Error in Queftions
that are fomewhat difficult, there are two principal
ones that are not commonly met with in the perfons
we are fpeaking of, vit. Attention of Mind to Pene-
trate into the Bottom of Things; and Wifdom enough
not to Judge of them Raflily. Even thofe that are
chofen to Teach others, and whofe Bufinefs it is to
Inform themielves, in order to inftrudt thofe that are
committed to their Care, commonly become liable to
Error, as foon as they become Publick Perfons: Either
becaufe that having very little time, they are incapa-
ble of Attention, and applying themfelves to things
which require a great deal of time ; or becaufe that
being earneftly defirous to appear great Scholars, they -
boldly decide all things without the leaft Coniiderati-
on, and will hardly fuffer any Body to Oppole, and to
Inftrud them.
CHAP. X.
Of the Love of Pleafare in relation to Morality,
I. We mufl jhm Pleafure though it make us
Happy. II. It muft not incline us to the Love
of Senfible Delight:,
\^"^E have fpoken in the three preceding Chapters
' ^ of the Inclination we have towards the pre-
fervation of our Being, and how it occafions our
falling into many Errors: We will now fpeak of that
which we have for Well-being, that is for Plea-
fure, and for all things that make us happier and more
contented, or that we think capable of doing fo 3 and
we will endeavour to difcover the Errors that pro-
ceed from that Inclination,
There are Philofophers who do what they can to
perfwade Men, that Pleafure is not a Good, and that
Pain
m
Chap.X. ^ Search after Truth, 59
Pain is not an Evil: That we may be Happy in the
midft of the mod violent Pains, and Unhappy amidd
the greated Pleafures. As thefe Philofophers are very
Pathetick and Fanciful, they without much difficulty
prevail upon the Minds of Weak People, who eafily
receive the Imprellion which thofe that Ipeak produce
in them : For Stoicks are a little Vifionary, and Vifio-
naries ate Vehement; and fo they cafiiy Imprint in
others the falfe Sentiments they are poCfefs'd with.
But whereas there is no Convidtion againd Experi-
ence, and our Inward Sentiments, thofe pompous
rnagnificent Reafons vanifli, with all their Luftre, as
foon as the Soul is affecded with fome lenfible Plea-
fure or Pain: And thofe who have plac'd all their Con-
fidence in that falfe perfwafion of their Mind, are de-"
priv'd of Wifdbm and Power at the lead Attack of
Vice ; arid find that they have been deceiv'd, and that
they are vanquifh'd.
Since Philofophers cannot give their Difciples the I.
power of overcoming their Paflions; at lead, they Jhun VUa^
(hould not (educe or perfwade them that they have nofureihough
Enemies to Encounter. They fhould fpeak the Truth ; it make us
Pleafure is always a Good, and Pain ever an Evil;
But it is not always advantagious to enjoy Pleafure ;
(or it is fometimes profitable to fuffer Pain.
But in order the better to Explain my meaning, it
is fit to know,
I. That God only is powerful enough to adl in us,
and to make us fenlible of Pleafure and Pain. For it
is evident to all Men that confult their Reafon, and
defpife the Tedimony of their Senfes, that it is not
the Objecds which we feel, that A(d Efi'e(dively in us,
and that it is not our Soul neither which caufes plea-
fure and pain in it felf in refpecd to them.
■ i. That Good is commonly to be given, only in
order to the performance of fome good Atdion, or to
reward it; and that commonly Evil is only to be in-
fiidled in order to prevent an III Adlion, or to punilh
it: And therefore iince God always acds agreeable to
Order, and according to the Rules of Judice, all Plea-
fures cither Incline us to fome good Action, or reward
us
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A Search after Truth. Book IV,
us for it; and all Pains ferve to prevent fome ill Adli-
on, or to punifli us for the Committing of it.
3. That there are A(3:ions that are good in one fenfe,'
and bad in another. For inftance, it is an III Adlion
to expofe ones felf to Death, when God forbids it.
But it is a Good One when God Commands it. For
all our Adtions are Good or 111, becaufe God has Com-
manded, or forbidden them by his tirft general Will,
which is the Order and InlHtution of Nature; or by
his other particular Will and Commandments, which
are neceflary for the re-eftablifliment of Nature.
Therefore I fay that Pleafure is always Good; but
that it is not always advantageous to enjoy it.
1. Becaufe that inftead of engaging us to him who
is only capable of caufing it, it weans us from him to
Unite us to that which feeuis falfly to caufe it. It fets
us at a Diftance from Goi,* to Unite us to a Vile
Creature. For although true Philofophers fometimes
think that Pleafure is not occafion'd by outward Ob-
jedfs, and that that may in fome meafure Incline them
to Acknowledge and Love God in all things ; never-
thelefs fince the Introdudtion of Sin, the Reafon of
Man is fo Weak, and his Senfcs and Imagination have
fo much Power over his Mind, that they foon Corrupt
his Heart, when we do not lay afide, according to
the Advice of the Golpel, all things that do not of
themfelves incline us to God. For the beft Philofophy
cannot Cure the Mind, nor relift the diforder of Vo-
luptuoufnefs.
2. Sinc^ Pleafure is a Reward, it is a piece of In-
juftice to produce Motions in our Body which oblige
God, in confequence of his firft Will, to make us feel
Pleafure, when we do not deferve any; either becaufe
the Adtion we do is Ufelefs or Criminal, or becaufe
that being full of Sin, we ought not to delire a Re-
ward of him. Man before the Fall might juftly en-
joy fenfible Pleafures in his regular Adlions: But fince
the Fall there are no fenfible Pleafures altogether In-
noceuc, nor any but fuch as are capable of injuring us
when we enjoy them; for often the bare tafting of
them is fufficient to make us Slaves to -them.
9, Be-
Chap. X. A Search after Truths
3. Becaufe God being Juft, he muft needs at fbme
time or other punifli the Violence that is offer d to him,
when Men oblige him to recompence with Pleafure
the Criminal Acffions which they Commit againft
him. When our Soul fhall be no longer united to our
Bodies, God will no longer lye under the Obligation
which he has laid upon himfelf, to give us Senfa-
tions to anfwer to the Motions of the Mind; and he
will ftill remain under the Obligation of fatisfying
his Juftice: And therefore that will be the time of
his Vengeance and Wrath. Then without changing
the Order of Nature, and remaining always Immuta-
ble in his fir ft Will, he will punKh the unjuft plealj^es
of the Voluptuous, with Pains that never will have
an End.
4. Becaufe that the certainty we have in this Life
that the faid Juftice muft be performed, agitates the
Mind with mortal Difquiets, and fiings it into a kind
of Defpair, which renders the Voluptuous miferable,
even in the midft of the greateft Pieafures.
5. Since commonly difmal Remorfes accompany the
moft Innocent Pieafures, becaufe we are convinc'd that
we deferve none ; and thofe Remorfes deprive us of
a certain Inward Joy, which is found even in adions
of Penitence.
Thus though Pleafure is a Good, it muft be granted
that it is not always advantageous to enjoy it for thefe
Reafons; and for others like thefe, which it is very
neceftary to know, and which are eafily deduced from
thefe; and it is always very advantageous to fuffer
Pain, though it be really an Evil.
Neverthelefs, all Pleafure is a Good, and adually
makes thofe Happy that enjoy it, while they enjoy it,
and as long as they enjoy it; and all Grief or Pain is
an Evil, and adually makes the perfon that fuffers it
unhappy, while he fuffers it, and as long as he fuf-
fers it. It may be faid that the Righteous and Holy
are the moft unhappy Men in this Life, and the
moft worthy of CompafTion. Si in vita, tantum in
Chrifto fperamuSy miferabiliores fumus omnibus hominibuSy
(ays Saint ^aul j for ihofe that Weep, and fuffer
Petfe-
62 A SemJj^ter Truth, Book IV,
Perfecution for Jufti'ce, are not Happy becaufe they
fuffer Perfecution for Juftice ; but becaufe the King-
dom of Heaven is theirs, and a great Reward is in
ftore for them in Heaven ; that is, Becaufe they (hall
be Happy. Thofe that fuffer Perfecution for Juftice
are thereby Juii, Virtuous, and Perfedt, becaufe they
are in the Order that God has prefcrib'd, and Per-
fedlion confifts in following him : but they are not
Happy becaufe they Suffer. A time will come when
they will Suffer no more; and then they will be Hap-
py, as well as Juft and Perfecff.
However, I do not deny but that the Righteous
itiay be Happy in fome meafure even in this Life, by
ifie ftrength of their Hope and Faith, which render
thofe future Felicities, as it were, prefent to their
Mind. For it is certain, that when the Hope offome
Happinefs is ftrong and lively, it draws it nearer to
the Mind, and gives it a tafte thereof before-hand :
And thus it makes us Happy in fome meafure,, fince
it is the tafte and poffeflion of Good and of Pleafure,
which makes us Happy.
Therefore it is unreafonable to tell Men that fenfible
Pleafures are not Good, and that thofe that enjoy
them are never the Happier; fince it is not true, and
at the time of Temptation they djfcover it to
their misfortune. We muff tell them, that thofe Plea*
fures are good in themfelves, and capable to make
them Happy in fome meafure: Neyerthelefs, they
ought to avoid them for the Reafons beforementi-
oned; but they cannot avoid them of themfelves:
Becaufe they defire to be Happy through an Inclinati-
on which they cannot overcome, and thofe tran-
fitory Pleafures which they ought to avoid, fatisfie it
in fome meafure: Thus they are in a miferabJe Ne-
ceflity of lofing themfelves, unlefs they are affifted.
It is neceffary to tell them thefe things, that they may
diftincffly know their Weaknefs, and the want they
have of a Redeemer. j
We muft fpeak to Men like Jefus Chrifl^ and not
like the Stoicks, who neither underhand the Nature
nor Diltemper of Human Minds. They muft conti-
nualiy
Chap.X. A Search after Truth. 65
nually be told, that they muft hate and defpife them-
felves, and not look for an Eftablifhment or Happi-
nefe on Earth : That they muft daily carry their Crofs,
or the Initrument of their fuffering, and that they
muft lofe their Life at prefenr, in order to preferve ic
Eternally. They muft be taught, that they are ob-
lig'd to ad: contrary to their defire, to make em fen-
fible of their inability to good. For Men wou'd be
invincibly Happy, and they cannot be adually fo,
unlefs they do what they pleafe. Perhaps being con-
vinced of their prefent Evils, and knowing their fu-
ture fufferings, they may humble themfelves on Earth:
Perhaps they may invoke the Afliftance of Heaven,
and feek a Mediatour ; be afraid of fenfible Objeds,
and timely abhor whatever flatters their Senfes and
Concupifcence. And it may be they may thus ob-
tain that Spirit of Prayer and Repentance which is
fo neceflary to obtain Grace, and without which
there is no Power, no Health, nor no Salvation to be
cxpeded.
We are inwardly convinced that Pleafure is Good,and j
that the inward Convidion thereof is not Falfe, for Plea- incline
fore is really Good. We are Naturally Convinced, that ^
Pleafure is the Charader of Good, and that Natural 2.01;^ ef
Convidion is certainly true ; for.' that which Caufes fenfible
Pleafure is certainly very Good, and very Lovely, lights.
But we are not convincM, that either fenfible Ob-
jeds, or our Souls themfelves, are capable of pro-
diicing Pleafure in us ; for there is no reafon to be-
lieve it, and there are a Thoufand againft it. There-
fore fenfible Objeds are neither Good, nor Lovely.
Were they neceifary toward the Prefervation of Life,
we ought to ufe them : But as they are not capable
of Ading in us, we ought not to Love them. The
Soul muft only Love him that is Good, who only is
capable to make it Happier, and more perfed. There-
fore it (hould only Love that which is above it, fince
it can receive its Perfedion from nothing that is either
below, or equal to it.
But whereas we judge that a Thing is the Caufe of
feme Effed, \yhen it always attends it, we fancy
• ~ that
A Search after Truth. Book IV.
that they are Serifible Objedls which adl in us, be-
caufe at their approach we have new Senfations,
and becaufe we do not fee him that produces them
really in us. We tafte a Fruit, and we find a Sweet-
nefs ; we impute that Sweetnefs to that Fruit; we
conclude that it caufes ir,and even that it contains it.We
do not fee God as we fee and as we feel that Fruit;
we do not fo much as think on him, nor perhaps on
our felves: Therefore we do not conclude that God is
the real Caufe of that Sweetnefs, nor that the faid
Sweetnefs is a Modification of our Soul; we impute
both the Caufe and the Effedl, to that Fruit which
we eat.
What I have faid of Senfations which have a tela-
tion to the Body, is alfo to be underftood of thofe that
have no relation to it, as thofe which are found in
pure Intelligences.
The Mind confiders it felf; it fees that nothing is
wanting to its Happinefs and Perfedlion; or elfe it
fees that it does not polTefs what it defires. At the
fight of its Happinefs it feels Joy ; at the fight of its
Misfortunes it endures Sorrow. It ftraight fancies,
that it is the fight of its Happinefs which pro-
duces in it felf that Sentiment of Joy, becaufe the
faid Sentiment always attends that fight. It alfo
imagines, that it is the fight of its Misfortune which
produces in it felf that Sentiment of Grief, fince the
faid Sentiment is the Confequence of this fight. The
real Caufe of thofe Sentiments, which is God alone,
does not appear before it: It does not fo much as
think on God j for he ad:s in us without our know-
ing it.
God rewards us with a Sentiment of Joy, when we
know that we are in the Condition in which we ought
to be, that we may remain in it, that our Difquiec
may ceale, and that we may fully enjoy our Happi-
nefs, without luffering the Capacity of our Mini to
be filled with any thing elfe. But he produces a
Sentiment of Grief in us, when we are Senfible that
we are not in the State in which we ought to be, fo
that we may not remain in it, and that we might
earneltly
Ghap. XL A Search after Truth, 6$
earneftly feek after the Perfecflion that is v/anting in
lis. For God pulhes us continually towards Good,
when we are Senfible that we do not poflefs it; and
he fixes us powerfully upon it, when we find that we
poflefs it fully. So that it feems evident to me, that
the Intellecflual Sentiments of Joy or of Grief, as well
as the Senfible ones, are no voluntary Produdlions of
the Mind.
Therefore we ought continually to acknowledge by
our Reafon, that Invifible Hand which fills us with
Blifs, and which dilguifes it felf to our Mind, undei*
Senfible Appearances. We mult Adore it, we mult
Love it; but we muft alfo Fear it, for fince it fills us
with Pleafures, it may alfo overwheliii us with Grief.
We ought to Love it by a Love of Choice, by a Senfi-
ble Love, by a Love worthy of God, when we Love
him becaufe we know that he is Amiable : And that
Love is worthy of us, becaufe that being Reafonable,
we ought to Love that which Realbn informs us to be
worthy of our Love. But we Love Senfible Things,
by a Love that is unworthy of us, and which they
are alfo unworthy of: For being Reafonable, we Love
them without any Realbn to Love them, fince we do
not clearly know that they are Lovely; and on the
contrary, we know they are not fo. But Pleafures
Seduce us, and make us Love them j the Blind and
Irregular Love of Pleafure, being the real Caufe
of thofe Falfe Judgments of Men in Subjects of
Morality.
CHAP. XL
Of the Love of Fleafarej in relation to Speculative
Sciences, I. How it hinders us from difco-
vering Truth, II. Some Examples,
^HE Inclinatmi we have for Senfible Pleafures
being diforder'd , is not only the Source of the
Dangerous Errors we fall into in cafes of Morality,
E e e e • and
, .'jn: ■ ' •* " "
j4 Search after Truth. Book IV.
and the general Caufes of the Depravation of our
Manners ; it is alfo one of the Principal Caufes of
the Dilbrder of our Realbn, and it engages us Infen-
fibly into very grofs Errors, but lefs dangerous upon
Subjedts that are rneerly Speculative ; becaufe the
faid Inclination hinders us from having a fufficient
Attention for things that do not affedtus, to apprehend
them, and to judge well of them.
We have already fpoken in feveral places, of the
Difiiculty Men find in applying themfelves to Sub-
jeds that are a little uncommon, becaufe the Matter
we treated of then requir'd it. We fpoke of it to-
wards the end of the firft Book, in Ihowing that the
Senfible Idea's affeding the Soul more than the Pure
Idea's of the Mind, it often applied it felf more to the
Manner than the Thing it felf. We fpoke of it in the
Second, becaufe in treating of the Delicacy of the
Fibers of the Brain, we fhow'd whence the Softnefs of
certain Effeminate Minds did proceed. Finally, We
fpoke of it in the Third, in mentioning of the Atten-
don of tlie Mind, when we were about proving, that
our Soul had but little Attention to Things that
were meerfy Speculative ; but a great deal more
to fuchas affed it, and make it Senfibfe of Pleafure or
Grief.
Our Errors have commonly feveral Caufes which
contribute all to their Rife: So that we muft not
imagine, that it is for want of Order that we fome-
times repeat almoft the fame things, and that we im-
pute feveral Caufes to the fame Errors; it is becaufe
there are really many. I fpeak ftill of occafional
Caufes; for we have often declar'd, that there are
no other Real and True, but the ill ufe of our Liberty,
which we do not always make ufe of fo much as we
might, as we have explain'd at the beginning of this
Work.
No body ought to blame us, if in order to make
Men plainly conceive, how for Example the Senfible
Manner in which things are cover'd, does Surprife
and makes us liable to fall into Error; we have been
oblig'd to fay before-hand in the other Books, that we
had
Chap. XI. A Search after Truth. 67
had an Inclination for Pleafures, which leems neceflkry
to be repeated in this, which treats of Natural Indi-
nations, and the fame of fome dther things in other
places. All the Harm it will occafion is, that there
will be no neceflity to fay many things here, which w*
(hould have been oblig'd to explain, if it had not been
done elfewhere.
All things that are in Man, are fo dependant on
one another, that we find our felves often oVer-
whelm'd, under the number of things we are to treat
of at one and the fame time, to explain perfetffly what
we conceive. We are fometimes neceflitated not to
divide things that are joyn'd by Nature one to ano-
ther, and to proceed contrary to the order we had pre-
fcribM, when that order occafions nothing but Con-
fufion, as it happens of neceflity on fome occafions.
Yet for all this it is impolTible to give others an Idea
of all we think of: All that we can commonly pre^
tend to, is to put others in a way to difcover with
Pleafure and Eafe, wha» wehave difcoverM with great
Labour and Pains. And whereas it is Impofiible to
difcover any thing without Attention, we muft par-
ticularly ftudy the Means to make others Attentive.
Tis what we have endeavour'd to do, though we ac-
knowledge we have performed it weakly, and we own
our Faults the more willingly, to the end that the faid
Confeflion may excite thofe who (hall read this, to
render themfelves Attentive of their own accord, m
order to remedy the fame , and to penetrate td the
bottom of thefeSubjedls, which without doubt deferve
to be well confider d.
The Errors, into which the Inclination we hav«
for Pleafure, and generally for all things that affedi:
us, engages us, are Infinite ; becaufe the faid Indina-
tion difiTipates the Sight of the Mind, and it applies
it continually on the confus'd Idea's of the Senfes,
and th» Imagination; and it inclines us to judge
of all things ralhly , by the bare relation they have |
^ hinders ue
We never fee Truth, until we fee things as ihey^,.^^ dif- ^
are j and we never fee them as they are, unlefs -we covering
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E e e e
fee Truth.
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ij/ir
A Search after TrutR BooklV^
fee them in him that contains them after an Intelligible
manner. When we fee things our felves, we only
fee them very Imperfedlly, or rather we only fee
our own Sentiments, and not the Things we are
defirous to fee, and which we falfely imagine we
do fee.
It requires a great deal of Application to fee things
as they are in themlelves; becaufe it is now impollible
for Man to unite himfelf to God without Pain and
Labour: To fee things in our felves, requires no
Application on our part, fince we feel what touches
us even againft our Will. Naturally we find no ami-
cipating Pleafure in the Union we have with God,
the pure Idea's of things do not move us. < Therefore
the Inclination we have for Pleafure, does neither
apply nor unite us to God ; on the contrary, it weans
and removes us from him: For that Inclination in-
duces us continually to confider things by .their Senfibie
Idea's, becaufe thofe Falfe and Impure Idea's aflfedt
us. The Love of Pleafure, and the adlual Injoy-
ment of Pleafure, which revives and increales our Love
for it, removes us continually from Truth, to call us
into Error.
Therefore thofe that are defirous to draw near to
Truth, to be guided by its Light, mull begin by lay-
ing afide Pleafure: They muit carefully avoid what-
ever affedls and agreeably divides the Mind ; for the
Senfes and Paflions muft be filenc'd, in order to hear
the Word of Truth ; it being necelfary to withdraw
our AfFe(5fions from the World, and to condemn all
Senfibie Things, as well for the Perfedlion of the:
Mind, as for the Converfion of the Heart. When
our Pleafures are great, when our Sentiments are
lively, we are not capable of the plained Truths,
and we do not fo much as grant common Notions ,
unlefs they contain fomething that is Senfibie. When
our Pleafures, or other Senfations are moderate,
we can dilcover feme plain ealie Truths : But if it
were pofiible for us wholly to lay afide Pleafures and
Senfations, we Ihould be capable of difcovering with
eafe the moll conceal'd Truths, and the mod dilficulc
that
I Chap. XI. A Search after Truth, 6^
that are known: For the more we remove from that
which is not God, the nearer we draw to God himfelf,
we avoid Error, and we difcover Truth. But fince
the Fall, fince the unrulj^ Love of anticipating Plea-
fures, which rules predominantly, the Mind is become
fo weak, that it can penetrate into nothing, and fo
Material arid Dependant on the Senfes, that it cannot
reach difficult things which do not affedl it. It does
nor even perceive common Notions, and often con-
I eludes for want of Attention, that they are Falfe and
Obfcure. It cannot diltinguilh the Truth of things
from their Ufefulnefs, the relation they have among
one another, from the relation they have to us; and
it often believes that thofe are the Trueft that are the
moft Uleful, the moft Agreeable, and that affedb it
moft. In fine. That Inclination Infedls and Con-
founds all the Perceptions xve have of Objedfs, and
confequently all the Judgments we make of them.
Here are Tome Examples.
" It is a common Notion that Virtue is preferable to II. Some
Vice; that his better to be Chafte, than Intemperate Examples.
and Voluptuous. But our Inclination for Pleafure,
confounds that Idea to that degree on fome occafions,
that we have but a glimpfe of it left ; and that it is
impoflible to draw the Confequences from thence,
which are neceflary for the Condudl of Life. The
Soul is fo taken up with the Pleafures it hopes for,
that it luppofes them Innocent, and aims at nothing but
the Means to enjoy them.
'Every body knows, that it is better to be Juft
than Rich: That Juftice exalts a Man more than
the PoCfeflion of the moft Sumptuous Buildings,
which often ferve lefs to difcover the Grandeur of the
Owner, than -the Greatnefs of his Injuftices and
Crimes. But the Pleafure which Inadvertent People
receive in the Vain Oftentation of their Falfe Gran-
deur, fufficiently fills up the fmall Capacity of their
Mind, to conceal and obfcure To evident a Truth
from them.They foolilhly imagine that they are great
Men, becaufe they have great Houfes.
E e e e 5
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A Search after Truth, Book IV.
Specious Algebra is certainly the fineft, I mean the
moft Fruitful and moft Certain of all Sciences ; with-
out it the Mind has neither Penetration nor Extent;
and with it, it is capable ot knowing almoft every
thing that can be known with Certainty and Evi-
dence. As Imperfedt as that Science has been, it
has made all thole Famous that have learn'd it, and
that have known how to Pradlice it: They have
thereby difcover'd Truths which feem'd almoft In-
comprehenlible to other Men. It is fo well projpor-
tion'd to Humane Minds, that without diftrading
their Capacity with ufeleft things in what they feek
after, it condutfts them Infallibly to what they aim at.
In a word. It is an Univerfal Science, and as it were
the Key of all other Sciences ; yet as valuable as it
is in it felf, it has nothing in it that is taking in order
to Charm Men, by this reafon only, that it is not
Senlible, It has been buried abfolutely in Forgetful-
nefs for feveral Ages. There are at this very time,
m.any Men who do not know the name of it; and
among a Thouland Perfons, you will hardly meet one
or two who underftand any thing in it: The moft
Teamed that have revived it in our days, have not
carried it very far, and have not handled it with that
Order and Clearnefs it deferves. Being Men as well as
others, they have at lalt been difgufted with thofe
]pure Truths which are not attended by Senfible Plea-
fure; and the Difquietnefs of their Will being Cor-
rupted by Sin, the Inconftancy of their Mind, which
depends on the Agitation and Circulation of the
Blood, has not allow'd them to conlider any longer
thofe Great, thofe Vaft, and thofe Plentiful Truths,
which are the Immutable and Univerfal Rules, of all
Tranfitory and particular Truths, that may be known
with Exadlnefs.
Metaphyfics is alfo an abftracfted Science, which
does not affedl the Senfes, the Study thereof affords
fhe Soul no manner of Plealure; for which reafon
the faid Science is very much negledfed; and we
often meet Men that are fo Stupid, as boldly to deny
common Notions, There are fome that deny that
" '■ one
^ kii
Chap.XL A Search after Truth,
one may, or ouehr to affirm a thing is, by what is in-
eluded in the dear and diftind Idea one has of it :
That Notblno has no Proprieties ; That a thing can-
not be reciuc'd to nothing without Mirade; That no
body can move it felf by its own Force j That an
Adlive Body can communicate no more Motion to any
Body it encoonters, than it has of it felf, and the like.
They have never confider'd ihofe Axioms with Stedi-
nels and Clearnefs enough, to difcover the Truth of
them diftindfly ; and they have fometinaes made Ex-
periments, which have fallely convinc'd them, that
fome of thofe Axioms were not true. They have feen
on fome occafions, that two Vihble Bodies meeting
each other, ceased both to move after the Blow: They
have feen in others, that the Bodies which were hit,
had more Morion than the Vifible Bodies that did hit
them : And this Senfible Sight of fome Experiments,
whofe reafons they fee not, makes them decide
things againlt certain Principles, which pafs for com-
mon Notions in the Minds of all thofe that are capable
of any Attention. Ought they not to connder, that
Motions may be communicated from Vilible Bodies to
Invilible ones, when the Bodies that are in motion
meet; or from the Invilible to the Vilible on other
occafions ? When a Body is Sulpended by a Cord,
the Knife wherewith that Cord is cur, does not give
the Motion to that Body, it is an Invilible Matter
that does it. When a Coal of Fire is flung into a heap
of Gun-powder, it is not the motion of the Coal, but
an invilible Matter, which fcatters all the parts of
that Powder, and which gives it a motion capable of
blowing up a Houfe. There are a Thoufand ways by
which invilible Matter communicates its Motion to
grols vifible Bodies: At leaft it is not evident that
it cannot be done, as it is evident that the moving
force of Bodies can neither be increasM nor diminilh'd
by the ufual force of Nature.
So Men fee that the Wood that is flung into the
Fire, ceafes to be what it is; and that all the Senfible
Qualities they obrer\'e in it diflipate themleives ; aud
from thence they think they are in the right, to con-
E e e e 4 elude,
j4 Search after Truth. Book IV.
dude , that it is poflible for a thing to return to its
former nothing: They do no longer fee the Wood,
and they only fee a few Alhes which fucceeds it ;
and from thence they judge that the major part of
the Wood ceafes to be, as if the Wood could not be
reduced to invifible parts. At leaft it is not fo evident
that this cannot be done, as it is evident that the force
which gives a Being to all things, is not fubjedt- to
change; and that by the ordinary force of Nature,
what is, cannot be reduced to nothing, as what is not,
cannot begin to be. But few Men know what Tt is
to look within themfelves, there to hear the Voice-of
Truth, according to which they ought to judgC'ofall
things; their Eyes regulate their Decifions: They
judge according to what they feel, and not according
to what they conceive, for they feel with Pleafure, and
conceive with Pain.
Ask all Men in the World, Whether one may
affirm, without fear of being deceived, that the whole is
greater than a part, and I am confident that there is
not one, but will anfwer immediately as he ought to
do. Ask them in the next place. Whether we may
likewife, without fear of being deceiv'd, affirm of a
thing, that which we conceive clearly to be included
within the Idea which reprelents it; and you will
find, that few will grant it without Hefitation, that
more will deny it, and that the major part of them
will not know what to anfwer. Yet this Metaphyfical
Axiom, That we may affirm of a thing, which we
conceive clearly to be included in the Idea which
reprefents it, is more evident than this Axiom, That
the whole is greater than its part; becaufe this laft
Axiom is not an Axiom , but only a Conclufion in
refpedt to the firft. One may prove that the whole
is greater than part by this firft Axiom; bur this firffc
can be proved by no other : It is abfolutely the firft,
and the Foundation of all clear and evident Know-
ledge. Why then does no body hefitate upon the
Conclufion, and yet many queftion the Principle
from which it is deriv'd; unlefs it be becaufe the
Idea's ot the whole and of part are Senfible; and
that
Chap.XI. j4 Search after Truth,
that our Eyes inform us, that the whole is larget
than part of it; and that our Eyes do not fee the
Truth of the firlt Axiom of all Sciences ?
As there is nothing in this Axiom, that naturally
fixes or applies the Mind, we muft be willing to con-
fider it conftantly and willingly; in order to make an
evident Difcovery of the Truth thereof. But Men
feldom think on Objects which do not affecH: .their
Senfes; and when they do, it has no Prevalency with
them.
' For to continue our faid Example, they think it
evident, that the whole is greater than its part; that
a Mountain of Marble is poflible, and that a Moun-
tain without a Vale is impoflible; and that it is not
equally evident that there is a God. Neverthelefs we
may lay, that the Evidence equal in all thofe Pro-
pofitions, fince they are all equally diftant from the firft
Principle.
This is the firft Principle: We muft attribute that
to a thing which we conceive clearly to be included
in the Idea which reprefents it! We clearly conceive
that there is more Extent in the Idea we have of the
whole, than in the Idea we have of its part: That
a poflible Exiftence is contained in the Idea of a
Mountain of Marble, the Impoflible Exiftence in
the Idea of a Mountain without a Vale; and the ne-
ceflary Exiftence in the Idea we have of God, I mean,
of an Infinitely perfed: Being. Therefore the whole is
larger than part of it: Therefore a Mountain of
Marble may be Exiftent: Therefore a Mountain
without a Vale cannot be Exiftent: Therefore God
or an Infinitely Perfedt Being does necelfarily Exift.
It is vifible that thefe Conclufions are equally diftant
from the firft Principle of all Sciences : They are then
equally evident in themfelves: It is then as evident
that God does Exift, as that the whole is greater
than its part. But whereas the Idea's of Infinite,
of Perfediqns, of neceftary Exiftence, are not Sen-
fible, like the Idea's of the whole and of its part. Men
fancy they do not perceive what they are not fenfi-
ble of j and -though rhefe Conclufions are equally
evident
A Search after Truth. Book IV,
Evident in themfelves, they are nor however equally
receiv'd.
There are Men who endeavour to perfwade us, that
they have no Idea of an infinitely perfedl Being. But
I do not know what induces them to anfwer pofitive-
ly, when they are ask'd whether an infinitely perfedl
Being is Round or Square, or fomething like it: For
they ought to anfwer, that they know nothing of it,
if it be true that they have no Idea of it.
There are others who grant, that thofe Reafon well
who conclude, that God is not an Impofjible Being,
fi*om this, that we fee the Idea of God includes no
Contradidlion, or an impofTible Exiftence; and they
will not allow us to conclude in the fame manner,
that God Exifts neceflarily, from this that we conceive
a neceflary Exiftence in the Idea we have of him.
Finally, There are others who pretend that this
proof of the Exiftence of God is a Sophifm ; and
that the Argument only concludes, fuppofing it is true
that God Exifts, as if it were not prov'd. This is
our proof: We ought to attribute that to a thing which
we conceive clearly to be included in the Idea which reprc'
fents it. This is the general Principle of all Sciences.
Neceffary Exiftence is included in the Idea which re-
^efents a Being infinitely Perfedl; they grant it. And
Confequenrly we muft: &y, that the infinitely perfedt
Being Exifts. Yes, fay they , fuppofing that he
Exifts.
But let us make fuch an Anfwer to fuch an Argu-
ment, to the End that the World may Judge of the
Solidity of their Anfwer. Here is an Argument like
it. We ought to attribute that to a thing which we
conceive clearly to be included in the Idea which re-
prefents it: That is the Principle. We clearly con-
ceive four.Angles included in the Idea which reprefents
a Square, or we conceive clearly that poflible Ex--
iftence is included in the Idea pf a Marble Tower :
Therefore a Square has Four Angles: Therefore a
Marble Tower is pofTible. I lay thofe Conclufions
are true, fuppofing that the Square has Four Angles;
iuft as they anfwer that God Exifts, fuppofing he does
Exift;
Chap.XI. A Search after Truth,
Exift: That is to fay in a word, The Conclufions
of ihofe Dempnftratiops are true, fuppofing they arc
true.
I own, that if I (hould make fuch an Argument as
this, 'we muft attribute that to a thing which we con-
ceive clearly to be included in the Idea which repre-
fents it, for we clearly conceive the neceflary Exi-
ftance included in the Idea of a Body infinitely Perfedf,
confequently a Body infinitely Perfed: Exitts. It is
true, I fay, that (hould I make fuch an Argument,
People would be in the right to anfwer, that it would
not conclude the Aifual Exiftence of a Body infinite-
ly Perfe(^ ; but only fuppofing that there were fuch a
Body, it would have its Exiftence in it felf. The rea-
Ibn of it is, that the Idea of a Body infinitely Perfect
is a Ficftion of the Mind, or a Compounded Idea ;
which confequently may be Falfe or Contradidlory, as
indeed it is: For we cannot clearly conceive a Body
infinitely Perfedf; (ince a particular Finite Being, as
a Body is, cannot be conceiv'd to be Univerfal and
Infinite.
But the Idea of God, or of a general Being, of
an unlimited Being, of an infinite Being, is not aFidH-
on of the Mind. It is not a Compounded Idea which
includes any Contradicftion; nothing can be plainer,
though it Comprehends all that is, and whatever may
be. Now that plain and natural Idea of Being or In-
finity, includes a neceffary Exiftence j for it is evi-
dent, that Being (I do not fay fuch a Being ) has Ex-
iftence in it felf; and that jfcing cannot adfually
not be Being, fince it is impofifible and eontradidlo-
ry, that Real Being (hould be without an Exiftence;
It may chance that Bodies may not be, becaufe Bodies
are fuch Beings as participate of Being, and depend on
it. But unlimited Being is neceflary ; it is Indepen-
dent ; it derives what it is from it felf. All that is
proceeds from it. If there is any thing, it is, (ince
all proceeds from it: But though there were nothing
in particular, it would be; becaufe it is of it felf,
and we cannot conceive it clearly as not Being, un-
lefs we lookj upon it as Being in particular, or like
Jl Senrch After Truth. Book 1V.
^eh a-Bemg', kr\d that we thus conhder all other
Idea s befides that of Being. For thole that do not* fee
that God is, commonly do not conlider Being,'but
fkch a Being; and-eonfequently a Being that may te,
and may not be.
"Moreover, that we may yet more diftindlly apwe-
fiend this proof of the Exiftence of God, and anfwer
fome Objedkions that might be made^ more clearly,
we muft remember that when we fee a Creature, we
do not fee if init felf, norby itfelf; for we only fee
it, as it has been proved in the'^ Third Book, by the
%hc of ibrhe Perfedions that are in God, which re-
prefent it. Thus we may fee the Elfence of that
Creature^ without Teeing its Exiftence ; we may fee
in God that which reprefents it, without its Exifting,
Therefore neceflary' Exiftence is not included in the
idea which reprefents it, it not being neceffafy that it
fliould be, to the End it may be feen. But the Cafe
is-very different in the infinitely perfcd Being ; It^ean
only be feen init felf ; for nothing that is Finite can
reprefent Infinity. So that we cannot fee God, unlefe
he Exifts: It is impoffible to fee the Eflence of a Be-
ing infinitely Pcrfecft, without feeing the Exiftence of
it-: We cannot fee it barely as a poffible Being : No-
thing Comprehends it j and if we think on it, it muft
be.- ■ ' •
But it is ufelefs to propofe theiekind of Demonftra-
tions to the common fort of Mankind. Thefe De-
monftrations may be calfd Perfonal, by reafon that
they do not generally convince all Men. We muft ufe
more fenfible ones in order to Convince theni j and
indeed they are not wanting: For no Truth has more
Proofs than that of the Exiftence of God. This was
only urg'd to Ihew, that refiffd Truths making hardly
any Impreftiohs on our Senfes',- are taken for Illu-
lions and Chimera's ^ whereas, when grofs palpable
Truths affecft the SCnfes, forcing the Soul to confider
them, we are eafily perfwaded that they have a great
deal of reality; for lince the Fall they make ftrong
Impreflions on our. Mind.
'Tis
Chap XI. A Search after Truths fj
'Tisfor the fame reafon, that there is no profpecSi
to-hopeT that the common part of Mankind will ever
fubmit to this Demonftration.to prove^ that Animals
are not fenfible, vi:^. that being Innocent, which: all
the World grants, and I fuppofe it, if they werecapa^
ble of SenfatioH, it would happen that under a God-"
infinitely Juft and Almighty, an Innocent Ihould fuff'et
Grief, which is a pain, and the punilhment of Sin.
Men are commonly incapable of leeing the Evidence
of this Axiom, Sub jujio Deo^ ^uifijuam nifi mereafjiry
mifer ejjh non foteji ; which St. Atijiin makes ufe' of
with a great deal of Reafon againft to prOve
Original Sin, and the Corruption of our Nature. They
Fancy that there is neither Force nor Solidity in this
Axicfoi, and in fome others which prove, that Beafts
are not fenfible, becaufe as we have already faid,
thole Axioms are refin'd, and include nothing that is
fenfible or palpable, or make any ImprefiTion upon our
Senfos.
The fenfible Adlions and Motions of Beafts, towards
the prefervation of that Life, are Reafons, which
though only probable, afied: us more; and which
confequently , incline us much more powerfully to
believe that they are fenfible of Pain or Grief, when
they cry out being ftruck, than that refin'd Reafon of
the pure Mind, though molt certain and evident in it
felt. For it is certain, that molt Men have no other
reafon to believe that Animals have Souls, but the j ^
fenfible Sight of all what Beafts do for the preferva- cording '^to
tion of their Life. the Com-
That is apparent enough from this, that moft Peo- man Opinh
pie do not imagin there is a Soul in an Egg, although -which
the Transformation of an Egg into a Chicken, is in- isdhat the
finitely more difficult than the bare preiervation of the^^^^^^«
Chicken, when it is ablolutely form'd. For as
Ingenuity is requird to make a Watch out of a piece^
of Iron, than to make it go when it is finilh'd, it would
be more reafonable to admit a Soul in an Egg, in
der to Form a Chicken, than to make that Chicken its
live when it is perfedly Form'd. But Men do noi j^^ariment
fee the admirable manner how a Chicken is Form'd, it.
■'14,
[A Semh after Truth. Book IV.
as they always fenfibly lee in what manner they feek
for thofe things that are neceflary for their prefervati-
on. Therefore they are not inclin'd to believe that
there are Souls in Eggs, by fome fenfible Impreflion
of neceflary Motions to Transform Eggs into Chickens;
blit they allow Animals Souls, by reafon of the fenfi-;.
ble Impreflion of the External Adlions of thofe Ani-
mals for prefervation of their Life ; although the rea-
fbn I have here alledg'd, is ftronger to give Souls to
Eggs than to Chickens.
The fecond Reafon, which is. that Matter is inca-
pable of feeling, and of defiring, is certainly demon-
llrative againlt thofe who fay, that Animals are
lenfible, notwithftanding their Soul is Corporeal.
But Men will Eternally Confound and Intangle thofe
Reafons, rather than own a thing contrary to Proofs
that are not only probable, but very fenfible and feel-
ing; And there is no way to convince them abfolutely,
but in oppofing fenfible proofs to their fenfible proofs ;
and in fliewing them vifibly, that all the parts of Ani-
mals are only Machinal; and that they may move
without a Soul by the meer Impreflion of Objedfs,
and by their peculiar Conftitution; as Monfieur Def-
cartes has begun to do it in his Treatife of Man. For
all the moft certain and evident reafons of the Under-
ftanding alone will never perfwade them the contrary
of the obfcure Proofs they have by the Senfes: And
we only expofe our felves to the Laughter of Perfons
of a fuperticial Underftanding, that are not capable
of much Attention, when we undertake to convince
them by Reafons above the common Level, that Ani-
mals have no Feeling.
Therefore it behoves us Well to remember^ that the
Violent Inclinations we have for Diveriifements, Plea-
fures, and generally, for all that does affedl us, throws
lis into a great number of Errors: Becaufe the Capa-
city of our Mind being Bounded, that Inclination
withdraws our Mind continually from the Attention
we fhould give to the clear and diftindt Idea's of the
Underftanding, which are proper to difcover Truth,
to apply it to the falfe, obfcure, and deceitful Idea's
of
Chap.Xn. A Search after Truth,
of our Senfes ; which Influence the Will more by the
hope of Good and Pleafure, than rhey Inftrucff the
Mind by their Light and Evidence,
CHAP. XII.
Of the EjfeEis which the thought of Future Blifs
and Sufferings is capable of producing in the-
Mind,
TF k happens often that the little Pleafures and flight
^ Pains which we adtually feel, nay more, which we
have a ProlpecSf of, ftrangely difturb our Imagination,
and hinder us from judging of things according to
their true Idea's ; we have no reafon to believe that
the profpecfl of Eternity cannot ad: upon our Mind.
But it will be neceflary to confider what it may be ca-
pable of producing there.
We muft obferve in the Firft Place, that the hopes
of an Eternity of Pleafures does not Ad fo powerfully
upon the Mind, as the fear of an Eternity of Tor-
ments. The Reafon of it is, Men do not Love
Pleafure lb much, as they Hate Pain. Moreover, by
the Internal Knowledge they have of their EHforders,
they are fenfible that they deferve Hell; and they fee
nothing in themfelves to Merit fuch great Rewards, as
to participate of the Felicity of God himfelf. They
are fenfible when they pleafe, and even fometimes
againft their Will, that far from deferving Rewards,
they are worthy of the greateft Chaftifements ; for
their Confcience never leaves them ; but they are in
the like manner continually convinced, that God is
willing to (hew his Mercy upon Sinners, after having
fatisfy'd his Juftice upon his Son, Therefore the Jutt
themfelves have more Lively Apprehenfions of the
Eternity of Torments, than Hopes of an Eternity of
Pleafures. The profped of Pain then confequently,
is more prevailing than the profped of Reward ; and
here
I'LI
4''•if''
(Ml
fv;< 2T If"
'a'^i
Ill
frnkii^
So u4 Search after Truth. Book IV.
here is partly that which it is capable of producing, not
alone, but as a principal Caufe.
It produces an infinite number of Scruples in the
Mind, and confirms them fo much, that it is almoft
impoflible to get rid of them. It Extends, as it were,
even Faith to prejudices, and makes us pay the Wor-
(hip which is only due to Godj to Imaginary Powers,
it obftinately fixes the Mind on vain or dangerous Su-
perftitions. It makes Men earneftly and zealoufly
Embrace Human Traditions, and Pra^ices that are
ufelefs for Salvation, Judaick and Pharifaick Devoti-
ons, which have been invented by lervile Fear. Finak
ly, it fometimes throws Men into a blindnefs of De-
fpair ; Infomuch, that looking confufedly on Death as
an Annihilation, they foolilhly haften to make away
with themfelves, to be freed of the Mortal Difquiers
which poflefs and frighten them.
There is often more Charity than Self-Love, in the
Scrupulous, as well as in the Super ft itious; but there
is nothing but Self-love in the defperate: For taking
the thing rightly, thofe muft needs Love themfelves
extreamly, who chufe rather not to be, than to be un-
cafte. Women, Young People, and Weak Minds are
the moft fubjed: to Scrtiples and Superftitions, and
Men are more liable to Delpair.
It is ealie to know the reafon of thefe things. For
it is Vifible, that the Idea of Eternity being the great-
eft, the moft terrible, and the moft frightful of all
thofe that furprife the Mind, and ftrike the Imagina-
tion, it is neceflary it fhould be attended \vith a long
Train of Acceflbry Idea's, to make together a conft-
derable Efiecft upon the Mind, becaufe of the Rela-
tion they have to that great and terrible Idea of Eter-
nity.
Whatever has any relation to Infinity cannot be
Little, or if it is Little in itfelf, it receives an immenfe
greatnefs by that Relation, which cannot be compar'd
to any thing that is Finite. Therefore whatever has
any relation, or even what we fancy to have any
relation, either to an unavoidable Eternity of Tor-
ments, or Delights which is propos'd to us, muft needs
frighten
Chap. XII. A Search after Truth, 8l
frighten thofe Minds that are capable of any Refledion
or Thought.
The Fibers of the Brains of Women, or young
People, and of weak Minds, being, as I have fa id
elfewhere. Soft and Flexible, receive deep Marks of
one of thefe two: And when they have abundance of
Spirits, and are more capable of Thought and Juft
Refledfion, they receive by the Vivacity of their Ima-
gination a very great number of falfe Impreflions
andAcceffary Idea's, which have no Natural Rela-
tion to the Principal Idea. Nevcrthelefs that Rela-
tion, though Imaginary, maintains and fortifies thofe
Falfe ImprefTions, and Acceflary Idea's which it has'
created.
When two Lawyers are ingag'd in fome great
Caufe, which wholly takes up their Mind, and yet
do not underftand the Cafe, they often have vain
Fears, being in dread that certain things may Pre-
judice them which the Judges have no regard to, and
which experienced Lawyers do not fear. The Affair
being of very great Confequence to them, the Motion
it produces in their Brains diffufes it felf, and is com-
municared to diftant traces which have naturally no
relation to it. It fares juft in the fame manner with
the Scrupulous, they unreafonably form to themfelve^
Subjedls of Fear and Difquiet; and inftead of examin-
ing the Will of God in the Holy Scriptures, and of
relying on thofe whofe Imagination is not tainted ;
their Mind is wholly taken up with an Imaginary
Law, which diiorderly Motions of Fear imprefs on
their Brains. And though they are inwardly con-
vinc'd of their Weaknefs, and that God does not re?^
quire from them certain Duties which they prefcribe
to themfelves, fince they hinder them from ferving
him; they cannot forbear preferring their Imagination
to their Underftanding, and from fubmitting rather
to certain Confufed Sentiments which frighten and
plunge them into Error, than to the Evidence of Rea-
fon, which gives them Aifurance, and leads them again
into the right way to Heaven.
Ffff
A Search after Trnth, Book IV.
We meet often with a great deal of Charity and
Virtue in Perfons that are afiiidfed with Scruples;
but there is not near fo much in thofe that are addidted
to fome Superditions, and who imploy themfelves
chiefly about fome Judaick or Pharifaick Pradfices.
God will be ador'd in Spirit and in Truth ; He is not
fatisfied with Gefturcs and External Civilities, as kneel-
ing in his Prelence, and being Praifed by the Motion
of the Lips, when the Heart has no (hare in it. Men
indeed are fatisfied with thofe Marks of Refpedt, but
'tis becaufe they cannot fearch into the Heart; for
even Men would be ferv'd in Spirit and in Truth.
God requires our Mind and our Heart; he has only
made it for himfelf, and he only preferves it for him-
felf: But there are many People, who unfortunately
for themfelves refufe him thofe things, over which he
has abfolute Right. They harbour Idols in their
Hearts, which they adore in Spirit and in Truth, and
to whom they Sacrifice themfelves. But whereas the
True God threatens them in the Secret of their Con-
fciences, with an Eternity of Torments to punifli the
Excefs of their Ingratitude ; yet they will not quit
their Idolatry ; they bethink themfelves of performing
fome good Works externally : They Faft like others,
they give Alms, they fay Prayers, they continue for
fome time in the like Exerciles j and whereas they are
troublefom to thofe that want Charity , they leave
them commonly to imbrace certain little Pradices or
ealie Devotions, which agreeing with Self-Love, ne-
ceflarily and infenfibly overthrows all the Morals of
JeJiisChrifi, They are Faithful, Earned aud Zealous
Defenders of thofe Humane Traditions, which Igno-
rant Perfons perfwade them to be very Ufeful,
and fuch things as the Idea of Eternity that frightens
them, does continually reprefent, they eagerly defend,
as abioliitely neceflary for their Salvation.
It is not lb with the Juft: They hear the Threat-
nings of their God, as well as the Impious ; but the
confufed Noife of their Paflions » does not hinder
them from hearkning to his Counfels. The falfe Rays
of Humane Tradition do not blind them fo far, as to
make
Chap.XII. A Search after Truth, J
make them Infenfible of the Light of Truth. They
put their Confidence in the Promifes of JeJiis Chrift^
and they follow his Councils; for they know that
the Promifes of Men are as Vain as their Counfels.
Neverchelefs we may fay, That that Fear which the
Idea of Eternity creates in their Mind, produces
fometimes fo great a Diforder in their Imagination,
that they dare not abfolutely Condemn thofe Humane
Traditions; and that fometimes they approve them
by their Example, becaufe they have fome Appearance
of iVifdem in their Superflition^ and in their Faffe Humi^
lity ; like thofe Pharifaical Traditions mentioned by
St. PauL CoL
But that which is particularly worthy of Confidera- 23.
tion, and which does not fo much relate to the Cor-
ruption of Manners, as to the Diforder of the Mind,
is, That the Fear we have before mentioned, extends
to the Faith, as well as the Zeal, of thofe that are
affedfed with it; even to Things that are Falfe, and
Unworthy the Holinefs of our Religion. There are
many People who do believe, and that with an Ob-
ftinate Faith , That the Earth is Immovable in the
Center of the World : That Animals are Senfible
of real Pain: That there are Forms or Accidents
really diftinc^ from Matter: And a World of the like
Falfe or Uncertain Opinions, becaufe they fancy that
they fhould oppofe the Faith in denying it. They are
frighten'd by the ExprefTions of the Holy Bible, which
fpeaks to our Capacity, and confequently makes ufe
of the common Manner of Speaking, without any
Deilgn to Inftrudf us in Natural Philofophy, They
do not only believe what the Spirit of God will teach
them, but alfo all the Opinions of the Jews. They
do not fee, for Example, that Jofhua fpeaks before his
Soldiers, as Copernicus himfelf, Galilem and Defcartes
would fpeak to the Vulgar part of Mankind; and
that though he had been of the Opinion of thefe lalt
Philofophers, he would not have commanded the
Earth to ftand ftill, becaufe he could not have made
his Army Senfible, by unintelligible words, of the
Miracle which God pcrform'd for his People, Thofe
F f f f 2 who
A Search after Truth. Book IV.
who are of Opinion that the Sun is Immovable, never-
theleis tell their Servants, their Friends, and even
thole that are of their Opinion, that the Sun Rifes or
Sets: They always fpeak like other Men , when
their Principal Delign is not to Philofophife. Did
Jofhua perfedfly underftand Aftronomy ; or if he did,
did his Souldiers underftand it ? Or if both he and
his Souldiers were skill'd in it, can any body think that
they defign'd to Philofophife while they only thought
of Fighting ? Therefore Jofl^ua fpoke as he ought to
do, although both he and his Souldiers had believ'd
what the moft Eminent Aftronomers believe at this
time. Neverthelefs thofe words of that great Captain,
Sun, Jiand thou fiill upon Giheon; and what is faid
afterwards, that the Sun ftood ftill according to his
Command, perfwade many People, that the Opinion
of the Motion of the Earth , is not only a dangerous
Opinion, but that it is alfo abfolutely Heretical, and
not to be maintained. They have heard that fome
Pious Peribns, for whom we ought to have a great
deal of Refped: and Deference, condemn'd that Opi-
nion. They have a confufed Knowledge of fome-
thing that happened upon that Subjed to a Famous
Aftronomer of our Age, and that feems fufficient for
them to believe ObftinateIy,that Faith extends even to
that Opinion. A certain confus'd Sentiment, excited
and cntertain'd by a Morion of Fear, which they
hardly perceive, makes them harbour Diffidences
againft thofe that follow Reafon in things which relate
to Reafon. They look upon them as Hereticks :
They are Uneafie and Troubled whenever they hear
them Ipeak ; and their Secret Appreheniions create
in their Minds the lame Refped, and the lame Sub-
miflion for their own vulgar Opinions, and for many
other Notions of Philofophy, as for Truths which are
the Qbjeds of Faith.
CHAP.
Chap.Xni.
A Search after Truth, 8s
CHAP. XIII.
I. Of the Third Natural Inclination^ which is the
Friendjlnp we have for other Men. II. It Induces
us to approve our Friends Thoughts^ and to de-
ceive them by Falfe Praifes.
all our Inclinations taken in General, and in the
Senfe I have explain'd it in the firft Chapter,
there only remains that which we have for thole we
Live with, and for all the Objeds that are about us;
of which I (hall hardly fay any thing, becaufe that
relates more to Morality and Policy, than to our Sub-
jedt. As that Inclination is always joyn'd with the
Pallions, it would perhaps be fitter to fpeak of it in
the following Book : But Order is not of fo much
Confequence in that Point.
In order rightly to apprehend the Caufes and Effedls j, q/
of that Natural Inclination, it is fit to know that God Third Na^
Loves all his Works, and that he Unites them ftridtly tural in^
one to another for their Mutual Prefervation. For con- clination^
tinually loving the Works he produces, lince they are -i&hich is
produced by his Love, he alfo continually Imprints in the Friend"
our Hearts a Love for his Works, fince he continually Ai?
produces a Love in our Hearts like unto his. And to
the end the Natural Love we have for our felves
may not Annihilate it felf, and,overmuch weaken
that which we have for the Things that are not in us:
And on the contrary, That thole two Loves which
God puts in us, may maintain and ftrengthen each
other, he has united us in fuch a manner to all things
that are about us, and particularly with the Beings
of the fame Species with us, that their Sufferings Afflidt
us Naturally, their Joy Rejoyces us, and their Gran-
deur, their Fall, their Diminution, feems to Augment
or to diminilh our own Being. The new Dignities of
our Relations and Friends, the new Acquifitions of
thofe that have mbft relation to us, the Conquefts and
F f f f 3 'Vidlories
^ Search after Truth, Book IV,
Vidories of our Prince, and even the new Difcoveries
of the new World, feem to add fometbing to our Sub-
fiftance. Being united to all thefe things, we rejoyce
at their Grandeur and Extenfion ; we could even wilh
that this World had no Limits; and that thought of
fome Philolbphers, that the Works of God have no
Bounds, does not only feem worthy of God, but alfo
very agreeable to Man, who feels a Secret Joy at his
being a part of Infinity, becaufe as little as he is in
himfelf, he fancies that he becomes as it were Infinite,
by defufing himfelf into the Infinite Beings that are
UTOUt him.
It is true, that the Union which we have with all
the Bodies that move in thofe great Spaces, is not very
It rid, and therefore it is not Senfible to moft Men:
And there are fome who matter the new Difcoveries
that are made in the Heavens fo little, that one might
believe they are no-wife united to it by Nature ; if
it were not known that it is either for w^nt ofKnow-
ledge, or becaufe they are too much engag'd to other
things.
The Soul, though united to the Body it Animates,
does not always feel the Motions of it; or if it does,
it does not always apply it felf to them. The PafTioii
which moves it, being fometimes greater than the Sen-
fations which afleds it, it feemsto be more powerfully
engaged to the Objed ot its Paflion than to its own
Body : For it is principally by the Paflions that the
Soul defufes it felf upon External Objeds, that it feels
it is really united to eyery thing about it as it is
chiefly by Senfation that it defulb it felf in its own
Body, and is Senfible that it is united to all the Parts
that Compofe it. But whereas one cannot conclude
that the Soul of a Paflionate Perfon is not united to his
Body, becaufe he is prodigal of his Life, and takes
no Care for the Preiervation of it: So there is no
reafon to imagine, that we are not naturally engaged
to all things, becaufe there are fome for which we are
not concern'd.
Would you for Example know, whether Men are
united to their Prince, or their Country ? Seek out
fame
Chap.XIII. A Starch after Truth,
fome who underftand their Intereft-, and have no parti-
cular Affairs to take up their Mind : Then you will
fee how Earneft they are for News, their Difquiec
for Battles, their Joy for Vitflories, their Afflid:ion in
Defeats: There you will clearly fee, that Men are
ftridfly united to their Prince and their Country.
In like manner, Would you know whether Men are
united to China^ Japan, or the Planets and fix'd Stars ?
Seek out fome, or elie imagine fome, whofe Country
and Family enjoy a profound Peace, that have no
particular PalTions, and that do not adlually feel the
Union that unites them to things that are nearer us
than the Heavens; and you will find, tliat if they
have any Knowledge of the Greatnefs and Nature of
thofe Stars, they will rejoyce at the Difcovery of any
of them ; they will confider them with Pleafure; and
if they are Ingenious, they will willingly take the
Trouble to oblerveand Calculate their Motions.
Thofe who are bulled with Affairs, feldom mind
whether any Comet appears, or whether there is an
Eclipfe: But thofe who are not lo clofely united to the
things that are near them, are very fond of theie fort
of Events ; becaufe there is nothing to which we are
not united, though we do not always feel it; as we
do not always feel that our Soul is united, I do not
lay to^our Arm, or to our Hand, but to our Heart, and
to our Brain.
The ftrongeft Natural Union which God has put
between us and his Works, is that which unites ns
with thofe Men we live with : God has commanded
us to Love them like our felves; and that the Love
of Choice, by which we love them, may be Firm and
Conftant, he upholds and Itrengchens it continually,
by a Natural Love which he imprints in us. In order
thereunto he has laid upon us fome Invifible Tyes
which necellarily oblige us to Love them j to watch
their Prefervation like our own 5 to look upon them
as necelfary parts to the whole which we compofe
with them, and without which we cannot Subfift.
There is nothing more Admirable than thofe Na-
tural Relations which are found betwixt the Inclina-
Ffff 4 dons
A Search after Truth. Book IV.
tions of the Minds of Men, between the Motions of
their Bodies, and between thefe Inclinations and Mo-
tions. All this Secret Chain is a Wonder which can
never be fulficiently admir'd, and which can never
be apprehended : At the fight of any Pain which Sur-
prifes, or that is felt, for example, we cry out , that
Cry which often comes out before we are aware of it,
by the Dilpofition of the Machine, Infallibly ftrikes
the Ears of thofe that are near enough to aflbrd ijs the
AiTiltance we (land in need of: It penetrates through
them, and makes it felf underftood to People of all
Nations, and of all Qualities whatever ; for that Cry
is of all Languages and of all Qualities, as indeed it
ought to be : It moves the Brain, and in a Moment
changes the whole Difpofition of the Body of thofe
that are ftruck by it: Moreover, it makes them run
to afifift before they are aware of it: But it is not long
without adling upon the Mind, and without obliging
them to be willing to relieve them, and of thinking of
Means to fecure thofe that have made that Natural
Prayer ; provided always the faid Prayer, or rather
this prefTing Command be Juft and according to the
Rules ot Society: For an Indifcreet Cry, made with-
out a Caufe, or out of a vain Fear, produces Indigna-
tion and Scorn in the AfiTifiants, inftead of Compafifion,
becaufe in crying without a caufe , we abufe things
eftablifh'd by Nature for our Preferyation. That In-
difcreet Cry naturally produces Averfion, and the
Defire of revenging the Abufe that has been ofFet'd to
Nature, I mean to the Order of things, provided he
that made it, did it voluntarily : But it ought only to
produce the Paffion of Laughter,mix'd with Ibme Com-
pafiTion, without Averfion and a Defire of Revenge y
when it proceeds from Fear, that is, from a falfe
Appearance of a preifing NecefTiiy, which has induced
any one to cry out: For Laughter or Jeff is neceflary
to repel their Fear, and to correbf them ; and Com-
pa/rion is ncccffarv to Succor them as Weak : It is
impolTible to conceive any thing better order'd.
I do not pretend to explain by Example, which are
the Springs, and the Relations which the Author of
Nature
Chap.XIir. A Search after Truth.
Nature has placed in the Brains of Men and all
Animals, to maintain the Confenc and Union which
is neceffary for their Prefervation. I only make fome
Refledlions upon thofe Springs that People may think
upon them, and may carefully inquire, not how thofe
Springs move, nor how their Motion is communicated
by the Air, by the Light, and by all the little Bodies
that furround us, for that is almoft Incomprehenfible
and is not neceifary, but at leaft to know what are
the Effedb of it: One may by different Obfervations,
difcover the Bonds that unite us one to another, but
it is impoffible to know how that is done; We eafily
fee how a Watch points out the Hour; but it requires
time to difcover the Reafons of it; and there are
fo many different Springs in the Brain of the leaft
Animal, that nothing can equal it in the moft ftudied
Machines.
If it is not poffible perfedlly to apprehend the
Springs of our Machine, neither is it abfolutely ne-
ceffary; but it is abfolutely neceffary in order to
govern our felves, to know the Effedts which thofe
Springs are capable of producing in us. It is not ne-
ceffary to know how a Watch is made to ufe it j but
if Men will ufe it, to regulate their time , it is at
leaft neceffary to know that it points at the hours.
Neyerthelefs there are fome fo little capable of Re-
fledlion, that one might almoit compare them to in-
animated Machines; they do not fed in themfelves
the Springs which flacken at the fight of Objedts ;
they are often agitated without perceiving their own
Motions ; they are Slaves without feeling their Bonds:
Finally, They are guided a Thoufand different ways,
without knowing the Hand of him that guides them :
They think themfelves the only Authors of all their
Morions j and not diftinguifhing what paffes within
them, as a Confequence of a Free Adt of their Will,
from that which is produced there by the Impreirion
of the Bodies which are about them, they think they
guide themfelves while they are guided by fome other.
Bur this is not a proper place to explain thele things.
The
■SMSM
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90
A Search after Truth. Book IV.
The Relations which the Author of Nature has
put between our Natural Inclinations, in order to
Unite us together, feems yet more worthy of our
Application and Enquiries, than thofe that are between
Bodies, or between Minds in relation to Bodies. For all
things are regulated there in fuch a manner, that the In-
clinations which feem to be moft oppofite to Society, are
the moft ufeful, when they are fomewhat moderated.
The defire, for Inftance, which all Men have for
Grandeur, tends to the Diflblution of all Societies.
Neverthelcfs, that defire is temper'd in fuch a man-
ner, by the Order of Nature, that it ferves more
for the good of the Publick, than many other feeble
Languifhing Inclinations. For it gives Emulation,
it Excites Men to Vertue, it Buoyes up their Cou.
rage in the Services they do their Country ; and fo
many Vidfories would not be won, did not Soldiers,
and particularly Officers afpire to Glory, and to Im-
ployments. Thus all thofe who Compofe Armies,
defigning only their own Inrereft, do notwithftand-
ing procure the Good of their Country. Which
fhews, that it is very advantageous for the Publick
Good, that all Men (hould have a fecret delire of
Grandeur, provided it be moderated.
But Ihould all private Perfons appear to be what they
really are ; fnould they freely tell others that they de-
fign to be the principal Parts or Members of the Body
they Compofe, and never to be the leaft, it would not
be the way to Unite them together. All the Members
of a Body cannot be the Head and Heart of it:
There muft be Feet and Hands, little ones as well as
great ones. Men to Obey as well as to Command;
and ffiould every Body fay openly, that they will Com-
mand and never Obey, as indeed every Body wiflies
Naturally, it is vifible that all Bodies Politick would
deftroy themfelves, and Diforder and Injuftice would
Reign every where.
Therefore it was neceflary, that thofe who have
moft Senfe, and are the fitteft to become the Noble
Parts of that Body, and to Command the reft, fliould
be Naturally Civil 5 that is, they (hould be in-
duc'd
If
Chap.XIII, A Search after Truth. 91
duc'd by a fecret Inclination, to fhew others by their
Behaviour, and Afiable and Gentile Expreddons, that
they think themfelves unworthy of being thought on,
and that they believe they are the leaft of Men: But
that thofe they fpeak to are worthy of all forts of Ho-
nours, and that they have a great Efteem and Vene-
ration for them. In fine, to fupply the defetfl of Cha-
rity, and the Love of Order, it has been necelTary
that thofe who Command others, (hould have the Art
of deceiving 'em by an Imaginary Humiliation, which
only confifts in Civilities and Words, in order to enjoy
that preheminence without Envy which is necedary in
the whole Body. For thus all Men do in fome mea-
furepoflefs the Grandeur they defire : The great ones
podefs it in reality, * and the little ones, and the weak * /
only podefs it in Imagination ; being perfwaded \x\^ * Man-,
fome meafure by the Compliments of others, that i\\Qyfo^iketrue
are not look'd upon as they are, that is, as the lead of
Men. J • „/ the
iiiif/* 1 (^0€S
It is eahe to conclude by the by, irom what we ' confift
have faid, That it is a great Breach of Civility to fpeak f ^
often of ones felf, efpecially, advantageoudy, though ofimagi-
one did poifefs all forts of good Qualifications ; fince nation,
it is not allowable to fpeak to thofe we Converfe with
as if we were above them, unlefs it be on certain oc-
cafions, and when there are External and Senfible Cha-
radlers which Elevate us above them. For Contempt
is the greateft of all Injuries : It is that which is molt
capable of deftroying Society ; and we muft not ex-
peed, that a Man to whom we have given a hint, that
we look upon him to be below us, will ever join
with us, becaufe Men cannot endure to be thought
the meaneft part of the Body they Compofe.
The Inclination of Men for Compliments, is there-
fore very proper to Counterpoife that which they have
for Efteem aixl Preferment, and to foften the Internal
Pain which thofe feel that are the meaneft parts of the
Body Politick; and it is moft certain, that the mijc-
ture of thofe two Inclinations does produce very good
fift'edts to maintain Society.
But
92 A Search after Truth. Book IV.
But there is a ftrange Corruption in thofe Indina-
tions, as well as in the Friendfhip, Compaflion and
Good Will of the others, which tend to Unite Men
together. That which ought to maintain Civil Socie-
ty, often caufes the Communication and Eftabliftiment
of Error.
W.Thatln- Of all the Inclinations that are neceflfary for Civil
elination Society, thofe which throw us moft into Error are
induces m Friendlhip, Favour, Gratitude, and all the other In-
to ap' dinations which induce us to fpeak too advantageoufly
pr<yv8 the of others when they are prefent.
thoughts fjQj- our Love to the Perfons ot our
«/ our Friends, but we alfo Love whatever does any way be-
' long to them : And as they commonly exprefs fome
to e- Defence of their Opinions, they infenfi-
ceivethem X. - i i- i ^ j
h UlCe y incline us to believe them, to approve them, ana
VraiCes. defend them with more Obltinacy and Paflion
than they do themfelves: Becaufe it would often look
ill in them to maintain their own Opinions with Heat j
But no Body can find fault with us if we defend them.
In them it would be Self-Love, in us 'tis Generofity.
We have an AfFedtion for other Men upon feveral
accounts ; for they may pleafe and ferve us in feveral
ways. The refemblance of Humours, of Inclinations,
of Imployments; their Air, their Behaviour, their
Virtue, their Eltate, the Affedlion or Efteem they ex-
prefs for us, the Services they have done us, or that
we expedl from them, and leveral other particular
reafons, do determin us to Love them. Therefore
when any of our Friends, I mean fome Perfon that
has the fame Inclinations that appears well, thatfpeaks
agreeably, whom we think Virtuous, or of great
Quality, who exprelles an Affedlion and Efteem for us,
that has done us fome Service, or from whom we ex-
pedf any; or finally, whom we Love for fome other
particular reafon : If any fuch Perfon, I fay, chances
to advance fome Propofition, we fuffer our felves ftrait
to be perfwaded by them, without confulting our
Reafon. We maintain his Opinion without ex-
amining whether it be Confonant to Truth, and often
even
Chap. XIII. A Search after Truth*
even contrary to our own Confcience, according to
the Obfcurity and Confufion of our Mind, according
to the Corruption of our Heart, and according ro the
advantage we exped: to derive from our falfe Gene-
rofity.
It is not neceflary to bring particular Examples of
thofe things in this place ; for People are feldom an
hour in any Company without obferving feveral, if
they will refled a little upon them. Favours and
Laughters, according to the old faying, do but feldom
fide with Truth ; but almoft always with thofe they
Love. He that fpeaks is Obliging and Civil: There-
fore he is in the right. If what he fays is barely like-
ly, it is look'd upon as True ; and if what he urges,
is abfolutely ridiculous and impertinent, it will at
leaft become very probable. If it is a Man that Loves
me, who has an Efteem for me, who has done me
feme Service, and is defirousand capable of doing me
more, who has maintain'd my Opinion on other Oc-
cafions, I fhould be ungrateful and imprudent in op-
pofing his, or even in failing to applaud him. Thus
Truth is abus'd, and is made fubfervient to Intereft ^
and thus we embrace each others falfe Opinions.
An honeft Man can never be offended when any one
that inftruds and informs him, provided it be done
cording to the Rules of Civility : And when our
Friends take Offence at our reprefenting modeftly ro
them, that they are dcceiv'd, we muft allow them to
Love themfelves and their Errors ; lince they will have
it fo, and becaufe we have not the Power to Command
them, nor to change their Mind.
But a real Friend muft never approve the Errors of
his Friend, For we ought to confider, that we do
them more harm than we are aware of, when we in-
judicioufly defend their Opinions. Our Applaufes
fwell their Hearts, and confirm their Errors ; they be-
come Incorrigible ; they Ad and Decide as if they
were become Infallible.
Whence comes it that the Richeft, the moft Power-
ful, the Nobleft, and generally all thofe that are Ele-
vated
ji Search after Truth. Book IV.
vared above others, think themfelves very often In-
fallible; and behave themfelves as if they had a great
deal more Reafon than thofe that are of a mean and
low Condition, unlefs it be becaufe all their thoughts
are indifferently and bafely approved ? So the Appro-
bation we give our Friends, perfwades them by de- s®'
grees that they have more Senfe than others; which
makes them Proud, Bold, Imprudent, and capable of ^
falling into the prefent Errors without perceiving it.
Therefore our Enemies are often kinder to us, and
inform our Underftanding more by their Oppofitions, '•®^!
than our Friends by their Approbations ; becaufe our
Enemies oblige us to ftand upon our Guard, and to be
Attentive to what we urge ; which alone is capable to
make us fenlible of our Errors. But our Friends Lull dfi
us afleep, and gives us afalfe Confidence, which makes
us vain and ignorant. Men therefore mult never ad- sslii
mire their Friends, and fubmit to their Sentiments out ; fe
of kindnefs, as they mult never oppofe thofe of their eie
Enemies out of Malice , but mult lay afide the Spirit Itm
of Flattery or Contradi(5tion to become fincere, and il%i
approve Evidence and Truth where-ever they find it.
We ought alfo to be fully perfwaded, that molt ifrB't
Men are inciin'd to Flatter and Compliment us, out isio
of a kind of Nauiral Inclination, to appear Witty, to sio,p
gain the good Will of others, and in hopes of feme serw
return ; or finally, out of a kind of Scorn and Rail* iief
lery ; and we ought never to fuffer our felves to be :5|al)(
imposed upon, by whatever can be faid to us. Do we
not daily fee that Perfons who know not each other, ciiu
neverthelefs extol one another to the Skies, the very ii
fir ft: time they fee and fpeak to one another? And '
what is more common than to fee fome who give hy-
perbolical praifes, and exprefs extraordinary motions
of admiration to a Perlbn that has fpoken in publick ; ^ ]
even in the prefence of thofe with whom they have ttije
laugh'd at him a little before. Whenever People Cry torl|
out, and grow Pale with admiration, and feem as it jtii
were aftonilh'd at what they hear, it is not a good
proof that h« that fpeaks fays Wonders ^ but rather
that "
Chap-Xm. A Search after Truth,
that he fpeaks to Flatterers, that he has Friends^ or
perhaps Enemies who Laugh at him. It is becaufe he
fpeaks in an engaging Way, that he is Rich and Pow-
erful, or if you will have it fo, it is a pretty good
proof that what he iays is grounded upon the Ccm-
lufed and Obfcure Notions of the Senfes, but very
moving and very agreeable, or that he has a Lively
Imagination, lince praifes are given to Friendlhip,
Riches, Dignities, Probabilities, and very feldom to
Truth.
It may be expedfed perhaps, that having treated in
general of the Inclinations of the Mind, I (hould de-
fcend to an exadl Account of all the particular Moti-
ons they refent at the fight of Good and Evil, vIt^.
That I fliould explain the Nature of Love, Hatred,
Joy and Sadnefs, and of all Intelledlual Paflions both
general and particular, as well Simple as Compound-
ed. But I have not engaged to Explain all the diffe-
rent motions the Mind is capable of.
I am willing it ftiould be known that my principal
Defign in all that I have written hitherto about a
Search after Truth, has been to make Men fenfible of
their Weaknefs and Ignorance ; and that we are all
liable to Error and Sin. I have faid it, and fay it
again, perhaps feme will remember it; My Defign
never was to give a particular Account of the Nature
of the Mind ; But I have been obliged to fay fome-
thing about it, to explain Errors in their Original, and
in order ^ in a word, to make my felf more Intelligi-
ble : And if I have gone beyond the Bounds I had pro-
pos'd, it is becaufe I thought I had fome new things
to fay, which feem'd to me of Confequence, and
which I thought might be read with Pleafure. Per-
haps I was miftaken ; but that prefumption was ne-
cellary to encourage me to write them. For how
can one fpeak, without hopes of being hearken'd un-
to ? The Truth is, I have faid many things which do
not feem to belong fo much to the Subjedt I am treat-
ing of, as that particular of the Motions of the Soul:
I own it, but it is not my Intention to oblige my felf
g(5 A Search after Truth. . Book IV^
to any thing, when I prelcribe a Method to my felf.
I lay down a Rule to guide me, but I referve to my
lelf the power of turning afide from it as I walk, if I
meet with any thing that deferves to be confider'd.
I may leave the way fometimes to reft my felf, pro-
vided I do not lofe my felf. Thofe who have not a
Mind to ftop with me, may go on, if they pleafe, 'tis
but turning over the Leaf: But if they are oftended at
it, let them know there are many who believe thofe
places which I have pitched upon to reft in, make them
lind the Way the eafier and more delightful.
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Uorfh'^csfcrn TJntiPersiiy Library
LiPansfon, Illinois
Resrorarion ofrhis Bookprovided by the
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Northwestern University-1926
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