€(Cap0 ^
j Wherein fome of
I Mr. LOCKS
AND
Monfi'^" Malbranch's
•Opinions arc briefly examined,
Together with an
ANSWER
To feme CHAPTERS in the.
Ora^Ks of REASON
CONCERNING
DEISM.
By Ja. i^wdc, Keltor of Scttrington it York'
ftiirc.
YORKy Printed by J White for fr*. Hi/dyard-
and arc to be fold by Br^b Aylmertt the Thf'
Pidgcons in Cornhilly and Tha. Bennet at th
H*lf Moon in Sc. Panis Churchj London,
r.nBUMVHVR-ePi
n /iT.nU YTl('fi5l'ir,M
T,R.
n\
L9Qm
To the Right Honourable,
John Earl of Bridge-water, Vifcomt
Brackicy, 'Baron 0/Ellcfmere, Lord
Lieutenant of the County of Bucks,,
to be fo; Gold has an intrin-
fick value in it, even before
the Stamp; thus the Hon-
ours of your Family, and
the Favours and Smiles of
your Prince, which yet are
very great HappinelTes, are
not the eflential Ingredients
and one of His Majejltts mofl Honout^-
rable Br ivy'Council,
My LorJy
A z
of
EfijVe T>edicatory»
of your more folid and intrin-
fick Nobility. Vertue and
Piety are the great Orna-
ments and Stability of the
Throne it fclf; nor is it a lefs
Happmefs to a Kingdom,
v^hen Nobles inherit their
Fathers Vertues together
with their Fortunes: Thus
fhould I have look'd upon
that long Train of Vertues,
which your Lordfhip takes
more pleafure in pradifing,
than in having them recoun-
ted, alraoft as hereditary to
you, if thereby I might not
feem to leflen your perfonal
Title to 'em; and I hope
you will give others leave to
ex-
Epijlle T)edicatorj,
exprefs what they are fo inti-
mately fenfible of, the great
Benefit and Advantage they
receive by fuch benigne In-
fluences.
My Lordy
I fliall not here attempt a-
ny thing by way even of
your Lordfhips juft. Charail-
er, becaufe the greatnefs.
thereof, and your own native;
averfenefs from all fuch. Pane-
gyricks, do wholly difcou-
ipage me herein, fo that this,
will be the peculiar Cl' aradler.
of this Epiitle Dedicatory
that it comes as far fhort.oC:
the real worth of its Patro%,
as others ufnally exceed it.
Onfyj
Epifile Dedicatory,
Only your Lordfhip muft
pardon me and otherSj if in
this declining ftate of Religion
and Piety in the World , vre
call in the Aids and Affiftan-
ces of fuch Examples as arc a-
blc, not only to recommend
the pradlice of Vertue to o-
thers, but alfo to render it,
even Honourable in the
midft of a pcrverfe Age.
But I am afraid that I am
injurious to the Publick,
whilft I thus employ pre-
cious Minutes; if perhaps
vouchfafe to give this fliort
Addrefs the reading. Ifhall
now only take this Opportuni-
ty^ gratefully to acknowledge
thofe
1
• Efijlle Dedicatory,
thofe many Favours, which by
the long Experience of many
I have received from
you; it is toYour Lordfhip and
Noble Familyy that I owe thefc
haffy Retiremenrs, wherein I
lhall not be wanting to this
part of my Duty, to pray for
your long Health and Happi*
nefs, and that God would long
continue your Lordfhip to usj
a great Example of all Ver-
tues, and a great inftrument
of publick and private Good.
This is, and fhall be the con-
ftant Prayer of,
My Lord, your Lordftiips
moft obliged, and moft
obedient Servant,
fa, Lovpde,
asr' ■'
PREFACE.
PRefaces are noiv grown Co cnjiomarj, that
Readers generally thmkjhemfelves negleU-
ed without 'ent, otherwife I fjould not have
concerned my felf herein, the fubjeU matter of
thefe Papers not affording any great occajion for
fuch an Addrefs. I hope thou wilt not impute it
to any pragmatical conceitednefs, if I thus fill
npfome vacant Minutes, not wholly taken up
in the employment of a Country Cure, with fuch
Meditations as thefe.
Befides^he Civility of Mr. Locks Anfwer on
the one Hand, and the concerns of Truth on the
other, did in a great meafure, call for famefui-
fable Reply ^ 1 did not indeed, for fame time,
thinks the Controverfie betwixt him and me, con'
fiderable enough to trouble either him or my felf
with thefe difputes, (^and f&meperhaps may think,
fo fiill) but jo it happen d,that a friend of mine
lately asl^d me, whether I was really fatisfied
and convlnod with what Mr. Lock had writ
in his Preface in anfwer to my former Treatife,
I told him I was not ^ whereupon he reply d,
that then Mr. Lock had taught me in his late
Controverfie with the learned Bifijop of W orce--
The Preface to the Reader.
ftcr, thdtgood munmrs requird me to
ledge the honour he did me^ in taking notice of
what I formely vority and that I was bound in
Civility toreprejent theReaJbns why I cannot'
bring my Sentiments wholly to agree with hh^
for itfeems apiece ofjuUennefs and dijrefpeH to
remain dijfatisjiedy and not acquaint thofefrom
whom they may moji reafcnably expeH in forma-
tion why they are fo.
And further, when I confderd that feve-
ral others, viz. J. S. and Mr. Becconfall had
varioujly dijputed thofe little Controverjies be-
twixt Mr. Lock aud me, I humbly conceived
I might be allow'd more fully to explain my
Senfe and Meaning therein, and then leave
the whole with the judicious and impartial
Reader, where it mujl rejl at laji.
Another dejign of theje Papers k to few the
weaknefs of the Pretences, and the inconcln-
fvenefs of the Deijis Arguments 5 I mean fuch
as they themfelves have of late made ufe of in
their own Defence, and 1 have the rather cho-
fen to anjwer fome of thofe fort Letters in the
Oracles of Reafon, both becaufe I hope thk
may he done without any great tedioujhefs to the
Reader, and alf becaufe thk k not liable to
any of thofe ObjeHions, that the dry method
of the Scholajlic\ Ob. and Sol, (jss it k fome-
times call'df k liable uuto.
The Deijis here plead their own catfe, and
The Preface to the Reader.
if it prove f/ot fo Jirovg ns voas expelled, they
have no Body to blame but themfelves for it,and
if they think^it has fufferd by any perjonal fail'
tires, they may at their oven pleafure employ bet'
ter Advocates.
I do not here pretend to advance any nero
Notions, but only with as much Jlrength and
elearnefs as I can to defend the old, and
therefore I know what I here write, is not like
to meet with any general good reception in
fuch a curious Age as thk, only I hope there
may be fame in the World who will not think,
the worfe of Truth becaufe it is gray- headed.
Truth being always of the elder noufe ^ for
though Antiquity has not been fo fuccefsful in
finding out Hypothefes of Natural Philofophy,
yet I thinkft has been more happy in fetling lAo'
I rality npon its true Foundations : I am not for
I venerable Nonfenfe being preferfd before new
^ Senfe, nor yet am I for venerable Senfe being
flighted in refpeld of new Nonfenfe, it is the
greatejl injiance of folly imaginable, to runout
J of one extream into another, and though the
former Ages have been too mnch led by Aw
thority, and addiBed to antient Errors, yet
it will not hence follow, that all new Notions
are true.
f I am apt to believe, that fome Opinions now
prevailing in the World owe their reception
f therein to the poftivenefs of their Patrons, and
1 U
.1
I
LjHiHaasle
The Preface to the Reader.
f to the flence of thofe of the contrary perfwaJtoH^
f rather than to any firength of Reafon that
would he found in W, were they duly examind^
there arefome whofeNotions are fo intricate,and
their exprejjions fo much out of the common
» Road^ that many times they do facere intelli-
I gendo, ut alij faltem nihil intelligant: what I
i here dejsgn^ therefore in thefe Papers is clear'
ne's and perfpicuity 5 for however deep the pit
In might he wherein the Ancients plac'd Truth,yet
w I never heard that it was muddy, fo that what is
faid of the method of Salvation by the Gof-
d, pel, Rom. 10. 8. may be apply d generally
% to all things of a moral Nature, the word is
in nigh thee, even in thy Mouth, and in thine
ij, Heart.
^ The learned and judicious Author of the
ir Occajional Papers, Paper i. Pa. 4. tells us,
» that it would be of great Service both to Re-
ligion and good Manners, to have ill Books
k as they are publifla'd, confider'd calmly by
Men of Temper. I would only propound it
It further to Confideration, whether it might not
II. be convenient alfo fbmewhat to enlarge the de-
lUl ^ot only takg notice of ill Books as
ut he calls them, juch as either direHly, or by na-
tural and eafle confequence tend to undermine
0 our Faith, or corrupt our Manners ^ not only
^ 1 fay to take notice of fuch, but alfo of the
1 more material mijiakes, even of good ones, the
\t heji
I The Preface to the Reader.
I he^ and wi^eji Men ?nay fometintes be mijiaken
■ in their principles or deductions from thenty
' and it k no dijparagement for uny one to ac-
; hnovoledge it.
i There is one thing further wherein I mujl
beg thy pardon 5 the e Difcour'es want one
great ornament of all Cempojurcs (Ejfays them-
felves not being excepted) that k^ my tranji-
tions are notfofoft and well connected as they
I ought to be 5 this I am very fenjlble of what
' the Reafon hereof may be^ I kyiow not, whe-
ther it be my want of Sk^lf which I rather
thinks, nobis non licet cfle tam difertis, or
want of leifure, my other employments notfuf-
fering me to *pply niy Self to thefe thoughts,
but at certain intervals, or my natural Cbut I
confefs, very culpable) indifferency both as to
Style and Method 5 however it is, if this be
any fatisfa&ion to thee, I do willingly ac-
knowledge my fault herein.
Nor mujl thou expeH full and jujl Dijcour-
fes upon Each of thofe Points I here mention,
neither my Ability nor Inclination concurring
herein fully to exhaujl a SubjeH.
I have no other end or dejign in thefe
Papers, but only the fearch and defence of
Truth, and if in any thing I be mijlakgn,(and
who can fecvre himfelf from mijiakes) Ijhall
thinks my felf oblig'd to any one, who fall
with candour and calmnefs fow me my Error,
()
Mr, Lock's Epijlle to Reader
examind, [o far as cone ernes the
Lars? of fafluon and in nate no-
tions in bis fecond Edition of his
Effay of humane underit-
anding.
WHAT benefit or advantage, as to the
'Concernes of truth and ufefull
knowledge, the World may receive
by that little difference in Difpute betwixt
Mr. Lock^ and me, I know not, yet herein I
hope, we have given an inftance of the pofli-
bility of manageing a controverfie without
hard words, or unhanfome Refledions^ and
if even this was more generally obferved, it
would very much advance the intereftof truth,
however of Love and Friendffiip in the World
among perfons of different Opinions. I do
not in the lead queftion the truth and fin-
cerity of what he there profefles, that he is
always ready to renounce his own and receive
the opinion of others, according as truth ap-
pears on either fide 5 yet I hope he will par-
don me, if I take the freedom to fay, that the
B Inffancc
Tnftancehe there gives of altering of his o-
, .pinion in reference to the laft determination
, of the will of Man, doth not feem to come up
lb fully to his purpofe, feeing he doth not
there fo much quit any Opinion of his own
to embrace that of anothers, as to renounce-
the common opinion of moft, thothen be-
lieved by him to entertain an Opinion, J
think, purely his own.
Mr. Lock, there complains, that his mean-
ing is often mijlakeft-, that he has f7ot
always the good Luck, to be rightly uriderjlood :
This is a common complaint in fuchcircum-
ftances, and 1 think, I may alfo lay a juft
claime to a Qiare therein,but if 1 have miftaken
his meaning in any thing, whatever the caufe
. might otherwife be, I doirifift upon this in my
^ own vindication, that it was not out of any
' wilful defigne.'And I further affure that Learn-
ed Man, that I never did think my felf, nor
went about to iniinuate to others, that it was
my Opinion of him,that he abfolutely held no
reall difference or diftindion betwixt Vice and -
Vertue: I did only ask this queftion there,
Whether if Men Jfmdd place their commenda-
tion or blame on that fiide which defervd it
not, whether that would alter the nature of
things ? This I conceiv'd, might either fet the
'thing in a clearer light in it felf, or give him'
occalion fo to do. I there alfo farther ap-
peafd
....
jasMBasai^
peal'd to hiinfelf Pa. ij. of hisi^. Edition,
where I fiippofe he did not only declare the
fenfe of the Heathen Phylofophers, but his own
too upon this Subjed, when he grounds the
reafon of Mens keeping their word, not upon
the approbation of the place, Men live in.
But upon the honejly and dignity of the thing it
I did alfo read and confider thofe other
places, where he doth pofitively aflert the*
unchangeable Rules of right and wrong, on-,
ly I muft confefs, I did much wonder how
fo Learned a Man Ihould go fo near, 'as I
thought to contradiei: himfelf in other pla-
ces, where his expreffions feem^, at leaft, to
rae then, to infer the the Rules of Vice and
Vertue to be of a more changeable Nature,
perticularly in that place I quoted Pa. 159,
Vertue n every where that which is thought
praife-worthy, and nothing elfe hut that which
has the allowance of publique ejleem, if vertue.
Bnt inftead of k Virtue, in the iji. Edi-
tion, it is now k called Vertue, in the Se-
cond, therefore, I fuppofe, he fay's That the
2d. Edition will give me fatisfaSlion in the
point, and that this matter is now fo exprejs'd,
as to fsow, there was no canfeoffcruple. It may
be fo expreft now perhaps that there is no
caufe of fcruple (tho that I much queftion )
but it will not follow hence, that there was
.<B 2 none
^lone, but rather the contrary, becaufe he has
alcer'd his Expreffion in I'uch a raateriall
point.
But he tells us, That he was there, not lay-
ing doivn rnorall Rules, hut Plowing the Qri-
gin at and nature of morall Ideas. For my part
I dare Icarce truft my own eyes againtl: his
v/ord^ 1 lhall here quote part of the Para-
graph, which he here refers to, P.157. § d.
Of thefe moral Rules or Laws , to which Men
generally refer, and which they judge of the relii-
tude or pravity of their aUions, there feeme
to me to he three forts. Here he feemes to me
to call em morall Rules, but whether he
meanes the fame thing by morall Rules here,
that he meanes in his Epifl'e,t\\dX hehimfelf
is beftableto refolve. Pld,Mv. Becconfall,P.
,199. 200. &c. But I muft confefs, that if
I was milfaken in any thing, it was in what
^he tells us immediately after 5 that in that
'place I there quoted, (and if fo, then by con-
iequence in all thofe other places, which in
.the fame Chapter may feem liable to the fame
exception ) That he only reported as matter of
faH, what others call Vertue and Fice, &c.
I Qiall therefore here briefly lay down the
reafons, why I did not fo apprehend him, and
then leave it to Mr. Loclfs own candour to
pafs judgment.
I (hall not need, to Premife, that it is on-
}r
. , 5 >
- lythe ijl. Edition of his Book, that I am
I concern d in, without taking notice of any
i alterations, or explications he has made iii
his 2d. my difcourfe being writ, before his'
I . ad. Edition was Printed, and therefore,
^ iji. Befideswhat I have already mentioned,-
there are fome other pafTages in that Chapter,
wherein he feemes to fpeak his own opinion
rather then mere matter, of fad what others
call vice or virtue 158. P. § 7. Bj the re-
• lation our aUions hear to the Diviue Law,
* Wee judge, whether they be fns or dutys, by the'
2d. The Civil Law, whether they be criminal^
or innocent. By the ^d. By the Philofohhicall'
Law, whether they be Virtues or Vices. So P,
ido. baying
j ' Idea, we fignifie by the word Man her y
its Jtmple ^Ideas, he proceeds, this Couechldn'-b'f '
fimple Ideas being found by me to agree or dip
agree, with the efeem of the Country, I have
been bred in, and to be held by wofi Men
. there, worthy praife or blante 5 I call the adi-
on vertuons or vicious. Now I had thought
that Wee and I, efpecially being joyned with
fuch Words as thefe, Wee judge and I call'
together with this expreflion found by me; .
had included a Mans lelfe (Chap, of IdentV -
^ ty § 20. )
ZJrbent, mam dicunt Romam Mclib£e,putavi, .
Stultus Ego, hunc nofhrse jimilem..
B 3., / Truly^
^ ^ .
Truly I imagin'd that, in tilings of this na"
ture. Men had generally fpoken after the fame
manner all EMgUnd over.
About the Year 1284. There werefome
Crammaticall herefies, that is, feme falfe Lat-
in and falfe Crammer condemn'd, by Arch
Epifcopal Authority, fuch as thefe, Ego cur-
rit, nHllnm notnm eji terti£ perfou£. far be it
from me to impute any fuch Sollaecifmes to
this Learned Author ^ however I think, that
I had very good reafon to apply thefe ex-
preliions to the iji. Perfon, rather than to any
third, ilji. Tisobferveable that he pleads for
tliis Law, and that with all the force of
perhauSj that the thing is capable of,
now when Men relate tningS, ffiSfe mat-
ler of faft, what others either do or fay, they
ufually leave em to hand or fall by their own
evidence ^ I queftion whether ever any did
fo much towards the giving Mens adings act
cording to cuftorae or opinion, the forma-
lity and grandeur of. a Law before, and as
for the fandion, with all the Elaborate cir-.
cumftances he has annext to it, I think it
is perfedly his own. P. 159. 160. §. 12.
But I muft beg leave here to fay that the
moft Hetrodox writer (abfit verba invidia)
might perhaps thus take upon him only the
fame charader of a Relator, after he had
afed and urged all the Arguments that either
reafon
reafon or Authority could afford him for his
particular opinion.
I do not here fay he fo far pleaded for
this Law of cuftom or opinion, as to make
it the handing Rule of Vice or Vertue truly '
fo caird, or of right and wrong, as hefome
times calls 'era, but only that he efpous'dthe
caufe and pleaded for that Law further than
the thing would well bear. And thefe are
the reafons that did more efpecially induce
me to think, that he did not there take up-
on him the bare Office of a Relator.
To which I might alfo add, if it was ne-
ceffary, what he fays. P. 159. §. 12. If any
one fhall imagin that I have forgott my own
notion of a Law, when I the Law
n'herehj Men f^^ttue and Vice, to be
nothing elje, but confeni of
This is not fpoken like one, who barely re-''
lates matter of fad: Others indeed may, and
that juftly too, ad in obedience to that rule of
decency and common repute, yet I think he
was one of the firft that made it a Law,
efpecially fuch,where by Men judge of Vertue'
and Vice.
I (hall only add one or two confiderations
more upon this Subjed, before I leave it.
iji. Itfeemes a peculiar way of fpeaking,
not yet grown common in the World, when
heaflignes the-Names of vice and vertue to
B 4 . fuek'
fuch actions^ as arc agreeable or diflagreeable
to common reputation, and for that reafon,
becaiife they are fo, whereas it always was,
and ftill is the more ufual way, not only of
iaJging what things are in their own nature,
but alio of denominating actions vertuous or
•VICIOUS rather from theirc agreeablenefs or
difagreeablenefs to the dictates of reafon, and
the law of Nature,rather than from the cuftom
of the Place. I grant indeed, that what ever is
truly vertuous, is generally counted lauda-
ble, but it is not therefore vertuous, becaufe
laudable, but therefore laudable becaufe
vertuous.
Now I think that neither Names, nor the
grounds and reafons of 'em ought more to
be alter'd, than the Ancient Landmarks in
Publick Fields, ought to be remov'd 5 fornor
thing bat diforder, confufion and needlefs
difputes will arife from both.
I cannot pretend to be acquainted with all
the perticular Modes of fpeaking throughout
the World, yet I much queftion, whether
this be the moft common and general accepta-
tion of that word VerUte^ that it is taken mo(l
commonly for thofe aBiOns^ which.according to
to the different opinions offeveral Countrys ar^
accounted laudable, pag, 25. § i8. or how-
ever, not under that formality, becaufe they
were, fo counted.. I do not here difputeconT
cerning
^ ' . (9 ^
f cerning the true and proper acceptation of tHc ■
wovdVertuey as Mr. has rightly" ftatedit
in the very next period, but only as to matter
of faft, even what apprehenfions other Na-
• • - tions generally had of ft.
_ I grant indeed that we (hall fometimes find
different practices in different places about
the fame thing, and all abounding in their
own fenfe ard pleading for the htnefs and'
decency of their ownperticular way; Thus
■' fome thought it the moft Decent and Ho-
j nourable way of burying their Dead by eat-
' ing of em, others by Burning, others by
Enterring, and no doubt all thought their
own Method the beft: But thefe are mat-
ters of mdifferency, and fo do not ftridly'
come up to our prefent cafe, but however
1 * it may 'be further ask'd whether or no
thefe feveral forts of People did count them-
felves only Vertnous herein, and all the refi
Viciof^.
■ , ' ^takers are very rude and uncivil in Thu-
ing People, as we call it, efpecially thofe that
^ are not of their own Club, but I wilb they had'
j no greater Vices to anfwer for than this. I have
heard of a King that was both blind and
Lame, whereupon it was grown in fafhion,'"
' and a laudable cuftom in that Gourt, not to'
appear but with one Eye cover d, and witht
fome counterfeiting at leaft alaaienefs.' Thefe*
B y : "vvere^
were indeed very complaifant Courtiers, but
why they (hould be call'd Vertuam for their
thfliraulation I know not, nor whether they
were accounted fo, even in that Place, where
the thing was grown fo fafhionable.
Thieves live in good Repute and Credit
among themfelves, and no doubt applaud
their own Exploits in their own Clubs, but
yet I much queftion whether they think vio-
lence and rapine to be Vertues or no, or do in-
deed call 'em fo. They may perhaps employ
their wits and fancy's to excufe their way of
living, but not to juftifie it, nor to raifeitto
a degree of Vertue y or if we ftiould fuppofe
one among the reft more modeft in his appre- -
henfions and not retain fuch Heroick thoughts
of Theft and Murder as the others did, yet
Tfancy his Life would not be fo uneafie
to him^as Mr. Locks Sandtion would feemto
•make it. 159, I fcarce think that any
Chriftian Nation (and the Chriftian World is
a .^Scene large enough for this difpute) doth
•call that a vertxe^ which either is in it felf, or
•by any other Chriftian Nation is called a vice,.
Whoredome, tho' in fome Countries permit- -
ied and but too much in faftiion, yet it is not
there call'd a vertue^ tho' perhaps it may
be counted a leffer vice. And why fliould we
hete in EngUndh^gmto unhinge andunfet-
tie Uie fignification of wQtds, efpecially fuch
whofe
^ X )
'' whofe fenfe and riieahing always was and ftill
ought to be more fix'd and conftant.
2. this Law of Opinion and Reputation, as
it is made to Confldtuteadiftind Law, is not
well grounded, for a Law is always fuppos'd
to bring men under- an obligation, now the
things in faftiion among men, if they be con-
trary to the Law of Nature, let mens opinions
of 'em be what they will, yet they are no
Law to any one, and if they be agreeable
to the Law of Nature, then they do fo far
coincidere with the Divine Law, and do not
conftitute a new Species of Law.
But I muft remember what Mr. Lock, te-
minds me of, that he only relates what others
. fay, not what he defends. But if fo, then I
can mention feveral other rules, which men
fometimes make Lawes to themfelves, viz..
their refpedive tempers and humours, and
the prejudices of Education: which are as
much Laws to thefe men in their refpedive
Clubs,'as opinion and re|)utation arc to o-
thers in theirs.
But he goes on, whatfomer Authority, he
fays, I pi ace in my old Englilh Dl&ionary, it
no where tells me, that the fame aUion k not in
credit, call'd and reputed a vertue in one place,
which being in difrepute pajfes for and under the
name cfvice in another. But with fubmifiion
I- muft teil him, that what ever Authority he
places
places in his new way of fpeaking, yet, tho*
our Englifh Dictionarys (his as well as mine)
no where fay, that the fame adions are not
variouOy reputed, fo or fo in various places
(for that is not their bufinefs) yet they no
where fay, that they are. For both our Die-
tionarys and Moral Philofophers (I appeal to
both) tell us, that vice and vertue are much
what the fame with good and evil, fin and
duty, and by confequence, that theydid not,
at leaft in thofe times fo much as receive their
denomination from Cuftom, but if he had
inftanc'd in one perticular adion in the whole
Chriftian World, which in one Place was
counted a vertue and in another a vice, it
would have added much light to the whole^
and better explained his meaning.
ThQtai^if^g notice that Me» bejiovp the names
&f vertue and vice, according to the rule of re-
putation, k all I have done^ or can be laid to my
charge to have done, towards the making of vice
vertue, and vertue vice.
Here I would only ask whether-^ this, of
Mens beftowing the names of vertueand vice;
■according to the rule of reputation,be in it felf
ajuft well grounded and reafonable adion, if
it he, why doth he not aflertand defend it,
if.it bfe not, why doth he found a Law viz.
"Ofi cpinidn and reputation, upon the un-
warrantable and ill grounded actions of Men.
But
( )
But he feemcs to commend me, (upon
what account I know not) for taking the
alarm, as he calls it, even at exprejfions, which
Jlanding alone by themfelves might Jonnd ill and
be fujpe&ed I know not what he means by ex-
prejjions jlanding alone by themfelves, I hope
he will grant, that feveral expreffions, hand-
ing alone by themfelves, that is at certain dif^
tances, yet all upon the fame account juftly
exceptionable, may betaken notice of^ and
I fuppofe he now underftands, that it was not
only one fingle exprelTioii, dropt as it were
by chance from his Pen, that I found fault
with but with his whole way of arguing up-
on that perticular.
'Tk to thk zeal,allowable in- hk FnnBton.
Some think this to be a refledion upon my
Function, as if its proper bufinefs was to be
employ'd in impertinencies;, but I am willing,
according to my Fundion, to put the moft
favourable interpretation upon things that
they are capable of bearing, I forgive his
Citing my words, as he there does, &c. Tis
my happinefs, that I find, that fonie Men, as
they are great,fo they are alfo merciful. I alfo
thank him for the refped he feems to (how
to the Function, but Zeal without know-
ledge ( as he muft fuppofe mine to be, for o-
therwife I fhould never have found fault,
where, there was no ground for it) is no
more
( ho . ^ .
Elore pardonable in my Fuhction, than m e-
thers, perhaps left. But no one they fay re-
fufes Gods and the Kings Pardon. I will go
a little further, and not on ly accept, but hum-
bly beg his Pardon too if I be in the wrong,
but I hope I may conteflari litem. He blames
me for not taking notice of thofe words imme-
diately preceding thofe of his, The exhortati-
onsof injured Teachers, See. But it wds not
much material to ray Purpofe, nor any way
Prejudkiil to his Caufe, whether I did or no,
as I hope will appear in the Sequel. He alfo -
blames me for quoting that Place of St. Taut,
Vhil. 4. 8. Whatfoever things are lovely, what-
foever things are of good report, if there he any
vertue, if there he any Praije, &c. In a lenfe -
heus'd it not. Truly I am not yet convin-
€ed, that I quoted it in any other fenfe, than
the Apoftle fpoke it, and if he us'd it in
any other, I cannot tell how to help it, he
iHuft look to that, but he fays, ht brought this
paffage of St. Paul, to'fhow that for reafons '
be there gives. Men in that way of denominat-
ing their aUions, do not for the tnof part
much vary)from the Law of Nature, which is
that Jianding and nnalterahle rule, hy which they
ought, &c.
I am of his opinion too in this perticular,
vi%. that in fo doing, they do not for the
moji part much vary from, &c»
And
( 15 )
And yet not for this reafon becaufc St. Paul
fays watjbever things are of good report^ if there
be any vertue, if there he any praifey think^ of^
. thefe things. For indeed St. P<i«/here fuppofes
feme things either in themfelves of good re-
port, or in their own natures indifferent, and
by the Innocent and laudable cuflom of that
place made fo, and then they are thefubjed
matter of a Command, thinks of thefe things:
' but then by bare mentioning things of good
report, he does not concern himfelf in that
queftion, howfar Men in denominating their
aftions according to common repute, may
or may not vary from the Law of Nature;
Tho' by the way it feems but a very
humble commendation of this Law of opini-
on or reputation, which is attended with
all thefe diminutions. That it k fuch as
C only) for the mojipart doth not much vary
from the Law of Nature. That is, it may
foraetimes, nay frequently too, and in fome
degree vary from it.
But St. Pauly being an infpired Teacher,
certainly would not appeal to common repute
under thofe Formalitys and difedvantagious
circumftances, feeing he .was there laying
down Rules for the guidance of all fucceeding
Ages of the Church So that the things of
good report, which the Apoftle appeals to,
were fuch, as did not only for the mojlparty
but
(M ^
but alwayes agree with the Law of Nature, i
or at leaft were not contrary to it. ' (
Exhortations of Indirect Teachers have
not feared to appeal to common repute^ dt^c. By i
this muft be underftood fuch an appeal, as -
refers to Pradice, thinks of thefe things ^ now I ^
durft appeal to Mr, Lock, hinifelf whether
the Apoftle would exhort Men to the practice
of things of good report, without any re- |
ftridion or limitation 5 fince he himfelf doth '
acknowledge that Men, in denominating *
their adions according to this Law, do (only) f
Tor the mcji part not much vary from tht I
Lavp of nature. Whereby, even in the Corrupt I
tion of mannert, the true Boundarys of the
Law of naiure, rrhioh ought to be the Rule
of VertHC and Vice, were pretty well prefer^ ' j
ved. ■ '^
Thefe are the Words, upon"'account of ■
which he blam'd me, becaufe I did omit i
em ^ but doth he indeed think, that the A-
poftle in this cafe would have appealed to . j
fuch a ftate of things without exception, I
wherein the true Boundarys of the Law of
Nature were, C only ) pretty well preferv'd.
Tis granted on all hands, that the Law of
Nature ought indeed to be the Rule of ver-
tue and vice 5 but it feemsit is not always * •
adually fo: If this be not the meaning of
that expreHion pretty well preferved^ I- know
not
( 17 )
not what is. And what advantage is this
to his caufe ? I hope Mr. Locl{_ is not one
of thofe, who would here tell us, that the
rule, which the Apoftle here layes down,
is not abfolutely certain and infallible, but
only fuch, as for the moft part, and more
generally is true; For this would ill com-
port with the Carafter of an Infpired Teach"
er:
Nor do I fee, what tolerable Senfe can be
made of thefe words. If there he any vertue^ If
there be any prayfe , Or why they are intro-
duc'd, according to Mr. Locl(s wzy of inter-
preting the Place.
I have infifted the longer upon this Sub-
)eft, and reprefented my thoughts the more
varioufly, that if poflible I might the more
certainly hit the Authors meaning , for I
muft confefs, that fuch is either the obfcu-
rity of his Expreflion, or of his way of Ar-
guing here, or fuch the dulnefs of my capa-
city, that I cannot be alfured, that I fully
apprehend his meaning in this perticular.
But then as to Naturall notions, he fays, we
are better agreed than I thought of 5 if fo,
I am glad of it, for I can alTure him, I take
no pleafure in having any difference with
any one: But I am afraid, there will, up-
on examination,befound fome fmall difference
betwixt us, in this particular alfo.
In
( rS )
In dating the Queftion, he fays, I have
fiothing in it contrary to what he had faid. I
{hall here firftTranfcribe my dating of it, fo
far as is necelfary in this perticular, thatfo
the Reader may be the better able, to judge
betwixt us. P. 52. Thefe Natural I notions,
are not fo Imprinted upon our Soules, as that
they naturally and necejfarily exert themfelves
( even in Children and Ideots) without any
ajfijlance from the outward Senfes, or mthout
the help of fame previous cultivation, for thus
reafon it felf, which yet, we fay, k natural
to a Man k not fo horn with him, hut that it
requires fome Supervenient ajjifances, before it
arrive at the true exercife of it felf, and it k
Of much as I here contend for, if thefe notions
he in the fame fence connaturaUto th^Soul, as
Reafon it filfk.
And farther , the ufe of our underfanding
being Firji fuppofed that k, our faculties laho-
ring of no naturall defe&, nor deprived of thofe
other advantages, that God and Nature have
made neceffary there unto, then our Souls have
a natural power of finding, or framing fueh
principles or propoftions, the truth or k^iow-
ledge whereof no wayes depends upon the evi-
dence of fence or ohfervation. And now doth
Kir. Lock, indeed fay, that thefe notions are
in the fame fenfe Connatural to the Soul,
as reafon it felf is} Doth he indeed grant
to
r 19;
to our Soub a native power of finding of
fr^meing fuch principles or propofitions ,
the truth or knowledge whereof noways
depends upon the Evidence of fenfe or
Obfervation? and yet, methinks he muft
grant this too, if he hold tohis intuitiue cer-
tainty 3 and if fo then we are better agreed,
than I thought of: But then what becomes
of that pompous principle, that fenfation and
reflexions upon fenfible Impreffions,are the O-
riginals of all our knowledge ^ but he pro-
ceeds. All that he fays for innate^ imprinted
or inpreffd notions ( for of innate ideas he
fays nothing at all) amounts only 6cc. Here
he feemes to blame me for not fpeaking of
pinnate ideas.- But ift. What reafon had I.
to enter upon any fuch difcourfe, feeing that
neither he believes any fu h, nor do I Uni-
verfally affert em, nor did my fubjedf natu-
rally lead me hereunto. For I cannot be
convinced of the force of his argument P.
27. That if there be innate notions, that then
there muft be innate idea s. I doe indeed
aflert innate notions, in the fenfe before ex-
plain'd, but yet I do not fay, that all the
refpedive ideas, viz. Ample ideas relating
to thofe notions are innate: I ftiall only
* inftance in one or two, Cogito^ ergo fum^ bare
nothing cannot produce any real Being. P,
312. Of his Ejfayj of thefe Mr. Lock, fays,
he
_ C 20 J
he has an itttuitiue ki^orvledge or certainty ,
and yet I do not believe, that there are any
innate ideas of Cogitation, Exiflence, Produc
tion, nothing, &c. The refpedive ideas, that
thefe notions are compofed of.
2. I had no mind to ingage in a dif-
courfe of that nature, becaufe I looked up-
on the Dodrine of idea s, as it is now ge-
nerally mannag'd, to be a very intricate,
and perhaps not altogether fuch an ufefull
fpeculation.
The old way of refolving knowledge, was
into thefe three operations of the mind,
Simple apprehenfion. id, Compofition and
Divifion. 3^^. Difcourfe from both the for-
mer. Now if this ideal Scheme, with all its
various Divifions, and Sub-divifions, be ei-
ther the fame, or do in a' great meaure
concidere with the former, why (hould the
World be amufed, either with making new
Words, or ullng Old ones in a new Signifi-
cation. I know Mr. Lock^ tells us, P. 73. J
4. That it is unavoidable in Difcourfes differ-
ing from the ordinary received notions, either
to make new Words, or ufe Old ones, in fame-
what a new jignification. But then !uch Men
ought to Gonfider, whether thefe Notions,
which appear different from the Ordinary
reccieved ones, do not in a great meafure owe
their extrordinarinefle, if I may fo fpeak, ra-;
ther
( 21 )
ther to the Authors exprefllng them in new
words, or words of a new fignification, ra-
ther than to any newnefs in the notion it
•felf.
Nor do I fee how this way of refolveing
' knowledge into tl efe ideas conveyed into our
minds, by Sejffatiou avd Reflexion there up-
on, doth any way more efectually tend to
the reall advancement of ufefull know-
ledge, than the other, for it rather fuppofes
us already to have attain'd to that knowledge,
which we thus refolve into thefe ideas,
than to enable us to make any further ad-
vances in it.
Thus I have a generall notion of a Book,
for example 5 at the firft fight, now if I ftiould
refolve this notion into its ideall principles,
' into all its fimple ideas, d^c. I believe. I
(hould at.lafthave no better notion or idea
of it than I had before.
I fliall only inftance in another of his own
P, 160. §. 14. For example. Let us confider,
the complex idea we fignify hy the word, Mur-
ther, and when we have taken it ajunder, and
examind all the particulars' we fljall find them
to amount to a ColleBion of fimple ideas, de-
rived from fenfation or reflexion. Firfl, from
Refle&^ion on the operation of our own minds,
we have the ideas of willing, confidering, pur-
pojing b^ore-band malice, or wijbing ill to ar
not her
i"
t
( 22 )
another, and alfo of life or perception and felf
motion. 2ly. From Senfation, we have the Col-
leliion of the fmple fenjible ideas of a Man,
and cf jome aBion hj which we put an end to
that perception and motion in the Man ^ all
which fimple ideas are comprehended in the,
word Murther. I fuppofe, he defign'd here
more particularly to explain to us the na-
ture of Murther, according to his ideall
way, by fenfation and retieftion. Now if we
fhould thus explain the Wor-d or go about to
inftruitan honeft CoHntrj-Jury-mait in the na-^
ture of the thing, Fiz. Of Murther, he would
certainly ftare at us, and perhaps think that
we were not much overgrown, either with
Law or Reafon ^ but never underhand the
nature of Murther one jot the better for
it. I never yet obferv'd that Lnfoingtons' .
LogicF which is either a new way of think-
ingor a new way of expreffing old thoughts
ever made that improvement of knowledge
in the World, which the Author at firft per-
haps promifed himfelf it would do.
P. 44. §. 24. The imprejjions then that are
made upon our jelves by 0 Hi ward ObjeCls, that [are
extrinfecall to the mind, and its own operati- \
t ons about thefe imprejjions refle&ed on by its felf,
as proper Obje&s to be contemplated by it, are,
I conceive the original of all knowledge. Here.
tis obferveable, that the refledtion is made
'i upon
( 23 )
upon the operations of the mind,as employed
and exercifed about thefe outward imprefll-
ons, now one might have thought, that the
ftreames would not have rifen above the
Fountains head, and that the refledions up-
on thefe outward imprellions would not have
producd idea's of a quite different nature
from the reft. So that that which Mr. Norrk.
P. 61. Of his remarks upon the Athenian
Society, puts upon thefe ideas, feemes to be the
moftnaturall and obvious fenfe and meaning
of 'em, Viz^. That thefe ideas of reflexion
are but a fecandary fort of ideas, that refultfrom
the various compoftions, and modifications of
thefe primary ones of fenfation. Otherwife this
notion of his, which he feems to advance
with fome kind of pompous traine of
thought, as if fomething out of the com-
mon road of former methods, will, at laft
dwindle into this, which hath been the com-
rtion and generall opinion of all the confide^
ring part of Mankind herein, that all know-
ledge proceeds either from the fenfes, or
from the underftanding, in itsmoft extenfive
capacity, however qualified and difjxjfed
for that purpofe. But by retleftion among
other things he includes the power of negati-
on: Thus from conception of fome thing
by negation hereof he forms an idea of
,nothing; But now methinks we are got far
aboue
#
C 24 ) .
abouc the fphere of fenfation, for nothing
cannot be the object of fenfe, nor make any
imprellion upon the outward organs, and yet
the Soul can frame propofitions of as great
truth and evidence from this nothing 5 as it
can from fowethingB.x.gr.bare nothing cannot
produce a reall being, but to proceed.
He fayes that I make innate notions condi-
t tonal I things depending upon the concurrence of
fever all other circumjiances^ in order to the Souls
exerting them x, and fo leave nothing in the
fating of the ^tefion, contrary to what he had
faid before. But I (hall quit the place, upon
which he grounds this, and then leave it to
the Pveader to judge, whether he hath done
me right orno, P. 78. Of my former dif-
courfe. I was there complaining of feme Men
who will put fuch a fenfe upon thefe Words,
innate or natural f as if a thing could not be
thus naturall or innate to the Soul, unlefs it
did fo immediately and neceffarily fare Children
and Fools in the face, that they n/uji neceffa-
rily ajfent thereto, even before, ly the common
courje of nature, they are capable of ajfenting
to any thing ^ whereas thofe who defend this
F^Jiefion, make thefe naturall or innate notions
more condition all things, depending on the con-
currence of j-everall other circumfances, 8ec.
J i '• Now I appeal to the Reader, whether thefe
notions may not be more conditionall things,
or
,
' or not fuch abfolute ones, as necefiarily to
ftare Children or Fools in the Face, and yet
not fuch as Mr. makes em, and yet not
Jiich as owe their origionall to fenfation, or rejiec-
tion uponfenjible imprejjtons. But he fiys, that
»all I fay for innate notions amounts only
to this, that there are certain propojitions, which
tho the Soul J from the beginning, or when a.
Man is born , does not k?ow, yet by ajjijiance
from the outward fenfes, and the help of fame
previous cultivation, it may afterward corns
'certainly to know the truth of
ijl. I do not fay that Infants have that
aduall knowledge of thefe propofitions, any
more than they have the aduall exercife
of reafon 5 Tet by ajjijiance from the outward,
fenfes, Scc. Here I cannot but take notice,
now induftriouflyhe endeavous to fix his own
feufeupon my Words, tho 'indeed they will
not bear it 5 but certainly here muft be fome
miftake, either in him or me, as to this par-
ticular, for in the ftating of the Quehion, I
faid 3 that the truth and ft'owledge of thefe
propoftions did no way depend upon the evi'
dence of fenfe or objervation, therefore me-
thinks, I fbould not prefendy fay, that by
the affiftance of the outward fenfes we af-
terward come to the certain knowledge of
'them, in the fame fenfe wherein he feems to
intimate it; But what if I never f id any fuch
6 " 'thing
( 2^ )
thing at all, or what I faid will not amount
to any fach fenfe,as he put there upon it > He
might have done well to have quoted the
place, then might we better have examined
the fenfe and meaning of it: But I think
thofe expreffions ( nor any thing like 'em "j
do no where occur in my Book, what comes
the neareft is P. 52. I (hall tranfaibe the
Words, and let the Reader judge; Thefe
uaturall notions are not fa imprinted n^n the
Sard^ as that they naturally, and necejfarily exr
ert thentj elves (even in Children and ideots )
without any ajjijlance from the outward fenfes,
or without the help of fome previous cultiva-
tion : For thus reafon it felf which yet we fay,is
natural I to a Man is not fo born with him 5 but
that it requires, 8cc. I do not underhand-,
that there is any fuch thing aflerted in this
place, as that which he feemes to make my
meaning in the former: But I (hall have
occafion to examine this place again, upon
the like account.
But he feemes not to like that cxpreffion
..of the Soules exerting of notions, as being a
very unintelligible and unfit one in this cafe,
m 'lfleading Mens thoughts by an infinuation as
if thofe notions were in the mind, before the
Soul exerts 'em.
%
But I have already told him, that I do not
fay, .that thefe notions ase in the mind from
,the
the beginning, any other ways than rcalbn
it felf is ^ and if I did, ( as Mr. Norris very
pertinently asks the queftion ) How does the
Author knovo^ but that thefe Koitirdl imprejji'
0J2S, may he fo ordred, that they JJjall not be-
come legible before ftich a period of' time^l knew
not how he wonld-confute it.
id. I was there defending innate notionir,
and he oppofing em, it was his part there-
fore to prove my ailertion faife, but when
•he barely finds fault with this exprefiion of
the Souls exerting of notions, as if it mift-
ed Mens thoughts, &c. This is only to
fuppofe it falfe, but not to prove it fo.
He further feems to charge me withTome
contrariety or inconfiftency of expreliion.
P. 52. There he charges me with faying,
that thefe naturall notions exert themfelves »s
P. 78. That the Soul exerts 'em.
As to the iji. P. 52. That thefe notions e-
xert themfelves;: Truly in that placed fay no
fuch thing, but rather the contrary, my Words
are thefe ^ Thefe natural notions are not fo
imprinted upon the Souf as that they naturally
and necejfarily exert themfelves ( eveti in Chil-
dren and ideots)
Here we may obferve, that the period is
negative, and the negative particle exerts its
infiuence, if I may fo ^eak, upon the whole
fentence: But however,, I fay, They doc aiot
C 2 exert
(^8) .
^txert themfelves Tpithout My ajfijtMce from,
-See. Which fuppofes that with fuch affift-
ances, they do exert themfelves, but this
perhaps is the only inftance, wherein Mr.
I^ck_ doth not feem to deal fo ingenioudy
with me, Vi-L. To charge me with an in-'
confiftency or impropriety of fpeech only by
implication ^ but fuppofe one, who aflerts
innate notions (liould fay fometimes , that
they exert themfelves, fometimes, that the Soul
exerts 'em, I think it would not be any fuch ^
great inconfiftency, unlefs Men would be'
- toofeverely criticall, yet this I fay, that thefe
naturall notions may require or fuppofe fome
. afliftance from the outward fenfes or fome
previous cultivation, and yet the truth and
Knowledge of 'em, not depend upon the.
^£vidences of fenfe or obfervation any more
than intuitive knowledge doth. But he
v/ould have me to explain to my felf or o-
thers what I mean by the Souls exerting
thefe notions, and what that previous cul-
tivation, or thofe other circumftances in'
order to their being exerted, are.
I. By the Souls exerting them as it is an
aft or operation of the Soul, I mean the fame
that I do by all other its afts or operations,
only the ^ul here afts upon different mo-
tives and principles, and upon different oc-
,cafions, ex. gr. When the Soul exerts this
ncH
( 29 ) _
notion or propofition, Skow is white, the truth"^
of this (he has from fenfe or experience, but
in this, nihili nnUte funt affeUiones, there * ■
(he afts in a more abftrafted way of fpecu-
^ lation, without any notices or affidances,
immediatly drawn from the fenfes; And
this I conceive, is the way of his intuitive
certainty. If he fays, that this is what he
meanes by his fenfation and reflexion, I am
very glad of it, and (hall no ways oppofe
, him.
And then as to what I mean by that pre-'
vioHs cultivation, or thoje other circumjiances,
&c. He may obferve, that 1 always intro-.ir
duce^ th^e expreffions with relation or ,re-"^^-
fpe£t to Children going before. And fa it
• was P. 52. and 78. So that by that previ-
ous cultivation or other circumftances I mean
all the previous difcipline the Child un- "
derwent at School, orelfewhere, all the be-'
nefits and advantages of Education, which
are commonly requifite in order to rea-
" fons coming to a competent exercife of it
felf.
So that, if I (liouJd fay, that the Soul be-
ing fo, and fo qualify'd exerts thofe notions,
fo, as to fuppofe fonie footfteps of thefe
. truths imprinted or interwoven in the very
eilentiail conftitution of the Sool, as'fnch
that is, as rational, I think it an ailertion'
C ^3
♦ \ •
( 30 )
a?Dt unrcafonabk in it felf, however not
poffible to be difprov'd, or confuted by any
one.
Tho' this is not my way of afferting
innate Notions, wz.. intelleftual Notions, ex-
clulively of the other, which I (hall here
fubjoyn.
Therefore, 2dly. If I fay that thefeNo-
tions are of fueh a frame or bear fuch a na-
tural or neceffiiry agreement to the facultys
of our Soules, in the free ufe and exercife of
*em that they cannot but alTent to em,' when
fairly proposed.
I think this is much what the fame with
the former, efpecially if we confider, that I
do not here fuppofe the intermediation of
any Notices or Ideas drawn from fenfe, in
the ad: of producing them, any more than
in any ad of reafon, or Speculation what-
Ibever.
Now if either of thefe two ways (if^r-
haps they be different) prove teneable,then I
fhall be able to maintain my ground, for in
hating the queftion, I did not confine my
felf to either of 'em particularly, for Ifaid
that fuppofing the Soul fo and fo quallify'd,
it then has- a native fmver of finding or framing
finch Principles or propofit.i on s J he truth or hnovo-
ledge rrhereof no ways depends upon the evi-
de.vce of fienje.^ or obfiervafion* .
I.
(31 )
I hate hitherto been upon the explain-
ihg Part, in obfervance of his demand, 1
hope he will now give me leave to defire '
him to explain fome things in his aflertions,
which feem not fo eafy and obvious to ap-
•prebend.
Pa. 318. The hfu^ledge of our own being we
have by Intuition ^ the Exijience of a Gody reu"
fon clearly makes, known to the knowledge
of the exijience of other things^ we can have
only by fenfation, here he aliignes 3 feveral
' ways of acquiring Knowledge, and in the
ftme Pa. he fays, the notice we have by our
ftnfes of the exijience Qfibing^'WdhQWl W;^ tM,
it be not altogether fo certain as our intuitive
knowledge y or the dedu&ions of our reafon See.
.Pa. 312, ][Ian knows by an intuitive IqiaW"
ledge that bare nothing cannot produce any
real being. Now intuitive knowledge waS'
never fuppos'd to be acquired by fenfation,
or by- any reflexion upon materiall mprefli--
ons, and indeed here he himfelf acknow-'
♦ ledges the fame.
Now that which I would defire him to
explain to himfelf or others is,
1. How this intuitive Knowledge thus
aflerted is reconcileable with what he fay.J
P<?. 44 8c 24, where fenfation and reflexioi\
* are made the Originals of all Knowledge.
2. I would defire him to explain how anf
C 4 in^
<
<" ' ''
_ C 32 )
i4»prejJio}is frem ontMurd ohje^s, or tiny opt-
Tuitions of the mind abojit thefe imprejjions re-
flexed on by it felf can produce in Man any
knowledge or fenfe of Moral good or evil
or of the difference betwixt them 5 I know
he tells us that fuppofing a God, and fuch
a creature as Man is, from the relation
that one bears to the other, honour will ne-
ceffarily be due to God, from Man. I grant
this,- but I do not fee, how he can come to
this knowledge from any fenjible imprejjions
from Tcithonty or by rejiexions of the mind
hereupon.
When he has a litlemore fully explain'd
thefe things, 1 fuppofe there will be very
iitle difference betwixt him and me in this
particular, and that he will, in fome mea-
fare be forc'd to acknowledge with me. P<?.
53. that the Soul, the free ufe of ourun-
derftandings firft fuppos'd, has a native pow-
er of finding, or framing fuch Proportions the
truth, or knowledge whereof no way depends
upon the evidence of fenfe, or obfervation.
But I muft remember that what that
Learned Man writ,was only by way of Effay,
and I would defire the Reader to look upon
what I write too here, in the fame manner:
Only I think, that an Effay, dike a Town
or Eortrefs once attempted or befieg'd ought
either
either to be well defended or fairly given up,"
and thus much in Anrwer to Mr. Loc/i.
I fhall here further take notice of a.Cayil of
the Atheifts,who make it an Objeftion againff-
• the being of a God,that' they do not dilcover
him without any application, in fpight orf
their corrupt wills and debaucht under-
handings 5 if fuch a Cod (fay they) as we
are told of, had Created and Form'd us,
iufely he would have, left upon our minds.a
'native and indelible infcription of himrelf)
whereby we muft need have felt him, even
without feeking, and believ'd inhim, vvh^>
ther we would or no.
I (hall firft confider this as a_merc:CaYil
of the Atheihs, tho' as it is manag'd -by
Vfome, it feems rather to be made ufe
^asan Argument againft the natural impref-
fion of Cod upon our minds, than any
proof againft his being.
And here we may obTerve.
r I. Thatif theconfeffion of Atheifts will
add any thing to the Ca'ufe in hand, .they
thenifelves do grant, that it was.a thing
rcafonable and becoming, .that G.od..fliould
leave fome Natural Charaher of himfelf
upon the Souls of Men, ;but the unreaCo-
• nablenefs of the Cavil , confifts not in the
impreilion it felf, jbut in the .fuppcsMnn-
.dehblenefs and Irrefihibihty of at, ,but 1
C 5 ihppe
hope we fliali be able to account for that
by and by.
2. Atheifts themfelves are fonietimes
forc'd, more efpecially at their Death, to
acknowledge a God whether they-^ill or
no, and this is a fair probable Argument
at lead: of this natural infcription ^ 'tis true,
God may more imediately v/ork fuch cffeds
upon Mens mind, but his ordinary and re-
gular way of ading is by means, viz, by
leftoring Confcienceto its Natural freedom,
which before was debauch'd and blinded
by bad. Principles and worfe Pradices;
thefe Natural notions of good and evil, and
the fence of our Obligation hereunto, being
now more at liberty, and their conlciences .
:fnore freely excufing or accufing them, tho' ^
•I !;do. not here exclude the influences of
Cods -Holy Spirit.
But 'tis here Reply'd, that God has en-
dued Mankind with powers and abilitys of
Natural light and reafon, by which he can- "*
net mifs of the difcovery of a God, and
this is fufRcient, and therefore fuch an Ori- \
ginalV impreflion would not.be neceflary, .
But what if there be other Arguments ta
prove the being of a God, mulf we then * ^
rejeft this as ufelefs? Suppofe an Atheiftical
Perron flioiild ob^ed againft fuch a particular
Fprflle or, Chapter in Holy -Writ, that it is •
not
♦ »
. , r $ 5 :)
not Canonical Sdripture, mnft we therefore
give up the Point, becaufe perhaps there
is Scripture fuffieient to Salvation without
it}
But they fay-, that fuch an impreihon
would have rendred the belief of a God
irreliftibic and necelfary, and thereby be-
reav'd it of all that is good and acceptable
in it. But how do they prove, that this
imprelEon would make the belief of a God
irrefiftible and necelfary ? niay there not be
fuch animpreffion uporr cur minds, as may
rather gently incline, than forcibly con drain
to belief? May it not be fuch, as that the
power and efficacy of it may be, in a great
meafure rebated by wilful wickednefs and
vicious Praftices ? May thcare not be
fuch a thing as Divine Grace, tho' at the
lame lime we do not believe it to be irri-
liftible ? But they tell us that fuch a radical
truth that God k, and fpringing up with
the very Ehenee of our Souls, is not pre-
tended to by Religion. But doth Religi-
on pretend any thing to the contrary > But
fuppofing (which yet will not be eafiiy
granted) that the Scripture doth not ekiier
fuppofe or alfert this naturall inlcriptionor
fignature of God upon our minds 3 yet doth
Religion forbid us to make ufc of any Argu-
inent
(
(i
C-jS)
ment that may be piouilyor rationally crc-
dible, for the proof of a God ?
Scripture doth not go about to prove the
being of God by Philolpphicall arguments,
this was not ^ the defign of or the
Prophets, or the Apoftles, any other ways,
than as the Hiftory of the one, and the Pro-
phefies and Miracles of the others do fuffi-
cicntly demonftrate it 5 and theaefore tis no
argument againft fuch a Naturall im.prefll-
on or idea of God, becaufe the Scripture
doth not particularly infift upon it, for that
- purpofe. The Scripture doth argue as ftrong-
ly, as any the nklft accute Phylofopher
can do, but then it is rather to prove the
atributes, than, the being of God^ this is.
rather fuppofed, than gon about to be prov'd
in Scripture.
But then I would only aske thefeoppo-
fers of this Naturall character of God upon
our mindes, whether they do grant any
Naturall notions of good or evill 5 if they
do, 1 know not why they fhould deny this
of Cod, upon which the other do depend:
If they do not, they then muft make mo-
I rality.. a more Mechanicall and Faftitious
■'i thing than God and Nature ever defign'd to
iiiil make it.
I So that I humbly conceive, that thefe
; Men, whileft they thus goe about to anfwer
the
I"
li'!l
tj .1 =
the Cavill, do indeed rather cut, than lofc
the knot, by granting the truth of this con--
fequence, that if God hath made any ori-
ginal impreilion of himfelf upon the minds
of Men 5 then itmuft beneceflary and irrefi-
ftible as to the produceing fuch and fuch ef-
feds upon all Men, and at all times: For
by this meanes they lay a necefliity upon
themfeLves of denying any fuch thing, as
this natujall Charader or idea of God,
whereas they might fufficiently have anfwer-
ed this Cavill of the Atheifts, by granting
the being of fuch a Haturall impreffion,
and by denying the confequence, that then
it muft be irrefiftible, in the fenfe they aflert
it 3 and I beleeve it would require more wit,
then the Atheift either is, or ever will be
fnafter of, to prove it.
Jddenda
( 38 >
Addenda to the former Chapter^ Concern-^
ing the Law- of Cujlom^ and Innate
notions,
Mr, Lock^ in his Preface fays, he was
in the Chapter there mentioned, not
laying down morall Rules, hut enumerating
Rules Men made ufe of in tnoraU rela:
tiens, whether thofe Rules were true or falfe
but certainly it is not fo well confident
with that great Charafter that Mr. Lock^
bearesin the World, to fpend time inlay-
ing down Rules in things relating to mor-
ality, without any refped to their bein^
cither true or falie, confidering the bad ufe
the vulgar and inconfiderate People may,
and frequently do make of fuch doubtfnil
difcourfes^ Men may thus write for ever,
and yet the World never the better, but
poffibly much worfe for their Writeing:
But the Rules he there takes notice of are
thefe three: iji. The Divine Law. 2d,
Humane Law. 9/y. The Law of Opinion,
or Reputation. Now the Divine Law is
always true. Humane Law always Obliga-
tory, but the -Law of Faftiion or Opinion,
which
which is neither always true, nor always
Obligatory, feeraesto beveryunjuftlyjoynd
with the two former.
But I muft doe Mr. Lock^ that right, as to
i ' take notice of what he fays in the laft
of that Chapter. There he tells us, that
iho* the Rfde he erromous^ and I in
it, yet the agremeent or difagreement of that,
"which I compare with it, is evidently kytown
by me:, wherein confijis my knowledge of re
laiion: But what an infignificant piece of
knowledge is this, thus to know Relation,
for when I fee a Pedler meafuring me off fo
much Stuffe by a falfe Yard, I fee indeed
the relation, that one bears to the other, and
. that agreement betwixt *em but what fatis-
fadion is that to me, for the Cheat that is put
upon me by the falfe meafurer. But tho ntear
firing by a wrong Rule IJImU thereby be brought
to judge amifs of it's morall reUitude, becaufe
I have tryed it by that, which is not the true
' rule. Sic. Here Mr. jL?c4confeh€^ that mor-
all reditude confifts in the truth of the rule,
^ not in the agreement of any adion to a
rule, whether thatrule be true or falle. Now
let us compare fuch or fuch an adion to the
Law or Rule of Fafliion or reputation ^ I
find it agreeable thereunto: What then
follows ? Why, then it follows, that it is
agreeable thereunto 5 nothing further can
follow
V
c 40 y
follow hence, becaufe as yet I know-not
whether that Law of Cuftome or reputation
be true or no.
So that MY.LoekhevQ feems to makeufeof
his own authority in a great meafure to re-
peal that Law of Cuftom or faftiion, which in
the former part of that Chap.he feems to enafti
But now in his Preface he fays, he never
endeavoured to make it a Law , if fo, then
what meanes the 12th. §. Wherein he
feems to affume to himlelf the honour of
making it fuch, and further adds a Sandtion
thereunto, I think perfectly of his own Ela-
boration: Tho' indeed the Sandiion doth
not feem to ftand good, even upon his own
principles. Forg,. 5. He tells us, t6af/^or-
all good and evill is the conformity or dif-
agreement of our voluntary anions to fome Lara,
whereby good and evill is drawn on us from
the will and power of tfk Law-makgr, and
by the Decree of the Law maker. Now I
fiippofe no particular Society or Glub of
Men ever met together to conftitute fuch
rtfpedfive fandfions to adfions agreeable or
difagreeable toFaftiion or Reputation ^ for
he tells us. 10. That this approbation
or dijlike, doth by a fecret and tacit confent,
( which certainly is forae thing different
from the will, power and Decree of the
Diw-maker) ejiablijh it felf in the fever all
aU
F
C 4O
Societies^and \Clubs^ of Mett in the World:
And J. 6. It would be in vain for one itf
telligent being to fet a rule to the aUion of
another, if he had it not in hk power to re-
ward or punifi the compliance with, or devia-
tion from thk Rule, by fome good and evill,
that k not the natural produH, and confe-
qnence of the aHion it Jelf, for that being
a naturall convenience or inconvenience,
would operate of it felf without a Law. Now
. if an aftion be truly morally good, praife
and approbation is the natural produdand
confequence of fuch an aftion 5, and if it be
really bad, then blame and eenfure^ but
now thefe do not come up to the rewards
and puniihments above mentioned, fuch as
- are extrinfick to the nature of the aftion, and
hot the natural and necellary refults of it.
But Mr. Becconfall hath in a great, mea-
fure prevented me o« this Subjed, for which
I thankliim.
But J.S.P.2 71./». 19 9.2oo.Of his reflections
upon Mr. Loch, there fpeaking of this lit-,
tie Controverfy betwixt Mr. Loch^-tid me,
fays, that Mr. Lock has fo perfeHly clear d
that point in hk Preface' that none can now
remain unfatisfd, for who can hinder Men
^ from fancying and nameing things, as they liji.
none indeed can hinder Men from doing
thus, but this they ought not to do, unlets
they
they think and Write without any refpeft"
cither to truth or goodnefs, and when Me»
fancy and name things, as they lijl, if this
be done without any ground of reafon,and
contrary to the generall praftice of Mankind,
I humbly conceive, there is noreafon, that -
this (hould fatisfy any one; But then pa.
He fays, Ithink^ithad been better and
more unexceptionable, to have called Jitchgood
and bad dijpoftions ( Reputed vertues and
vices ) than to joyne thofe qualities in an Uni-
vicall appellation, &C. Here he feemes to '
caft the Caufe on niy fide againe: But we
are all partys here, and lo muft appeal
to the impartiall and juditious Reader,
the only fupreme Judge in things of this
nature.
Here tis very well worth the Obferva-
tion, what the Learned Bp. of Worcefier
fays, pa. 25. Of his Anfwer to Mx. Locks
id. Letter. lam utterly againji any private
Miuts of Words, and 1 think, thofe Perfons'
ajfume too much Authority to themfelves, who *
will not fuffer common words to pafs in their
generall acceptation, but will fet fuch Bounds
and Limits to 'em, as fuit beji with their own
peculations.
And here I cannot but take notice of a
certain kind of noveil affefted way of fpeak-
ing of late prevaiin^ in the World, even
among
among great Phylofophers, whether it be
to gratify their own curiofity of fpeaking,
or that they pretend to advance fome new
notion by this new way of expreffing them-
felves, I know not 5. but this is certain, that
vicious and ill minded Men do make ufc
hereof, efpccially when tis apply'd to mat-
tcrs of Morality, to worfe purpofes, than
our modern Philofophers probably ever in-
tended it.
Mx.Malbrafteh, pa. 15. Paragraph, j.Of
his late Treatife of Morality, It is certain
that miverfall reafon is always the fiune, or-
der is immutable, and yet morality changes
according to places and times. Bad Men from
fuch inftances, as thefe, take occafion to
.undermine the very Fundamentals of all
Religion, and wholly to refolve morality
into mere cuftome and Education. Mr. Lock,
indeed did fay, in his ij?. Edition of his Ef-
fay, that nothing elfe but that which has the al-
lowanct of puhlick^ ejieem, is vertue. But he
altred it in his 2<^.and prolwbly Mx.Malbranch
if be have the fame candor and ingenuity,
will doe the fame too. Mens apprehenfir
ons concerning fome points of Morality-
may vary and alter, but the things them-
felves never do. It is a vertue, he fays, a-
tnong the Germans to drinks hard. But this is
is an alferhoa both faife and fcandalous,
for-
C 44 )
for who ever faid that the perfonal fail-
lures of private Perfons can make that a
vertue any where which is not fo in it
felf, neither do I think, that this of Drink-
ing hard, I fuppose, he meanes to excefs,
is generally counted a vertue, even in
Germ Any: Thus fome Men ftick not to
violate all the Rules of order, truth and
juftice, only to advance a notion falfe in
it felf, and dangerous in its confequences,
Vt%. That Morality changes according to
times and places.
Vice and Errour are of a ProgrelCvc na-
ture, thus Men firft live as if there were
no G)^, then they" wilh there was none,
then they fet their undetftandings to defend,
what their Vicious and Corrupt affeftions
firft prompted them to defire; Thus from
Atheifme in pradtife they proceed to Atheifme
in fpeculation. So alfo fome Men fpeak,as if
there were no fixt and handing rules of
morality, 5 others, being prompted thereun-
to by their vicious humours, take the hint,
and hence boldly aflert that there are no
fuch things ^ thus taking away the very foun-
dation of all natural Religion.
"I (hall here beg leavetorefled upon one
or two paflages more in his Treatife 414.
X)e inqmrenda veritate. He tells US, that
God has inftituted a Natural Union betwixt
the
C 45 ^
the Tp'tU of Man and the repre/entation of
Idea's. But now in the ^th. Chapt. of his
Treatife of Morality, being confciousper-
haps that the Will of Man willnot fo well
do the bufinefs, he now (huffles betwixt
Mans Tcnll and hps attention^ as if thefe two
were the fame thing. In the heads of that
'^th. chap, we find this, our defires are the
occajtonal caufes of our Knowledge. But in
the id. Paragr: he tells us that God by a
general Law hath annexed the prefence
of Idea's to the attention of our mind, and
Ibme few lines after, having an inward fenfe
of his own attention and no knowledge of the
operation oiCod. he looks M^on the endeavour
of hk defires, as the true caufe of thofe Ideas,
, that accompany that endeavour. What he
means by the endeavour of hk defires, we
fhall know, when his Illuftrations come
out: I fuppofe he does not make Mens de-
fires and their endeavours the fame thing, on-
ly becaufe Men defires commonly put em up-
on endeavours. But Parag: \th. he tells us,
that attention of the mind then k a kind of
natural Prater, he might as well have faid
that Prayer is a kind of Natural attention,
and fo made quidlibet ex quolibet, merely to
avoid a frank acknowledgment of his for-
raer errour.
In the beginning of his 2 he fays,
the
<•40 . ■
the love of wder k not only the chief of
moral Vertues, but the only vertue, and
-thro' that whole Chapt. and in other places
he fpeaks very great things of this love of
order, as if there was no other vertue be-
■lides it, .and yet Ch. ^d. Paragr: ijl. tho* I
have not exprefs'd the Principal or Mother
Vertue by the Authentich^ name of Charity, I
would not have any one imagine that Ipre-
tend to deliver to Mm any other Vertue, than
that which Chrifl KvmPdii hath eftablifh'd in.
.thele words. Thou fjalt love the Lord thy
God, 8cc. on thefe two depend the Law and the
Prophets. Mat. 22.37,40. i Cor. 13. i. But
then why did he not retain the fame name,
that our Saviour and his Apoftles madeufe
of, does he think that the love of order ex- -
prehes it better > Or is not this fomething
of the humour before taken notice of, viz.
an affefted way of fpeaking. By the love
of order then he only means a true inward
principle of all vertuous aftions, and if fo,
then itisfo far from being the only Vertue, *
that it is not one, that is, compleat, entire,
perfeft vertue of it felf, there are other
things requif d to the compleating of vertue
befides a right principle tho' perhaps this is
the firft and principal ingredient 5 bonum ex,
caufa Integra, malum ex quolibet defeifu, fo
■that a difpofition or facility of performing
fuch
—
(« )
fuch dutys is not properly vertue, without
the love of orderPail^. neither is the
love of order properly a vertue, without the
performing mch duty's when we have ability
and opportunity of performing 'em.
&
Then asto Innate Notions I would add.
That I take thefe ( efpedally Intelleftual
Notions ) to be call d fo, rather in oppoliti-
on to their being the refult of mere fence
and obfervation or of any mere reflexions
on fenfible impreflions, rather than that
they are imprinted from the beginning up-
on the Soul in any fuch grofs Charadlers,
as fome perhaps may imagine them 5 tho' I
do not here recal any thing, that I had faid
before upon that SubjeCi.
We feem to have as clear a Notion of
the thing, when we fay, nihili mtU£ funt
affe^iortes^ as we have, when we are told
P^. 139 oi Mr. Locks Letter to the Bifhop
of Worcejler .<? that the Idea of nothing has
a. neceffary connexion with no poroer, no opera-
tion^ no caufality, no effell, that is, with no-
thing. This propofition indeed, nothing
has a neceflary connexion with nothing, is
certainly true ^ but then it feems to border
too near upon thofe Propofitions, which add
no light to the nnderjianding which bring no
en-
: <
C 48 ) . .
e^crtafe to our knowledg, that is, trifleing
Propofitions. P<z. 307. of Ehay. Mx.Norrk
blames Mr. Lock^^ becaufe he has not given
us a juft and real difinition of an Idea, and
may not Mr. Lock, blame Mr. Norrk his di-
finition Pa. 30 of his reflexions upon Mr.
Locl(s Eflay, when he tells us that an Idea
is a partial reprefentation of the Hivine omni-
formitj^ or the omniform Ljfence of God, par-
tially reprefented, either as in it felfe unin-
telligible, or as not fo agreeable to the ho-
nourand dignity of the Divine Eflence.
I could have wifli'd, that Mr. Lock, had
further explain'd, what relation thofe op-
perations of the mind, which he calls Ideas
of reflexion, have to the precedent impref-
lions made upon the fenfe Pa.j\^. J 24.
That feems to fuppofe fenfible impreflions al-
wayes to preceed the reflexions of the mind.
But on the other hand. Intuitive knowledge,
viz. of the exiftence- of our Souls doth nei-
ther fuppo fe, nor is it felf any operation of ,
the mind about any fenfible impreflions going
before.
Mr. Lock, charg'd me with fome kind of a
inconfiftency of expreflion in one place fay-
ing, that the Soul exerted thofe notions, in one
another,they exerted themjelves: But tis
a great fign, that matter and Argument run
Jow, when Men thus meanly carp at words:
I hope
f 49 ) .
I hope I have fufficiently vindicated my felf,
as to that particular 5 but if I fhould follow
the example of fo great a Mafter, and be
thus feverely critical, it perhaps would be
difficult for himfelf to avoid the like cen-
'fures. 323. of his Ellay, §. 14. iji.
Edit. Knowledge is the confequence of the
ideas, that are in our minds, what ever they are^
and produce generall certain pi^opojitions. I dare
not be over confident that I rightly under-
ftand the period, but if this & the fenfe
'of it, which feemes to be fo, that the ideas
-produce thefe generall certain propofitions,
I humbly conceive it the more proper way
of fpeaking, to fay, that the Soul by the
aids and affiftance of thefe ideas produce^
,thofe propofitions, than that the ideas them-
felves fhould do it. I do not fpeak this
as if there was here any juft occafion of ex-
ception, but only to (how, how eafily men
may.be ilLnaturd, if they pleas'd. 1
I am forry I have not the concurrence of
'Mr. Becconfall's opinion in this point too
of innate notions, I fhall therefore brief-
ly examine fome paflages of his, relat-
ing to this fubjeft, firft I do not well un-
derftand, why he fhould grant the Law
of nature to be innate, or implanted in the
«ninds oflMen, as he tells us. Pa, '2d. That
the Gentiles had a Law of a&^ion impla?!ted in
D the
^ .
( 5®. ).
the very frame and LonjlittUion of their Natures, j
land Pa. 6. The Law of Nature is implan- I
4ed in the minds of Men, as rationaU be-
ings: And yet at the fame time to rejed the |
IDodrine of innate infcriptions, as he calls i
"em. Pa. 75. Whereas I humbly conceive^
that the Law of Nature is either the ikne
with thefe naturall infcriptions, or innate
notions, or the one fo Founded, in the o-
ther, that they muft both ftand, or fall to-
gether, if by being implanted in the minds
of Men, he mean only a power or faculty
in the ^ulof colleding thofe truths byra-
tional difquifitions, then I think, he has nt^
rione right neither to himfelf, nor his Read-
cr by fo exprelfing it.
But he fays, Pa. 75. that frame, and
crder of things both within, and without us,
rnth the^ercije of our own facultys upon 'em
trill prefent us with a Scheme of moral du-
ty, and a true meajureof aUion, and that too
as clearly, as if it was imprinted upon the
onind, with the frji lineaments of its being*.
1 do not deny the great ufe, and advantage
of our naturall faculties, in order to that
end, that is, to thofe whofe circumftances
are fuch, that they have abilitys, and oppor-
j turiities to employ em fo, that is, Chriftians
may poffibl'y do it, but a great part of the
Pentile world cannot.
But
I
I
, r 50
But how does he prove, that this Scheme
of duty will thus be as clearly prefented ro
us, as if it was imprinted with the Firft li-
ncaments of our oeings: This feemes to
be barely aflerted without proof: Where-
• as the contrary feemes more probable, that
the double evidence of natural infcriptioti
and Rationall dedudion would add to the
clearenels of the thing.
And therefore he fays. There feemes to he
no vijible necejjlty for haveing recourfe to
' note ideas, or iafcriptions. Thole who aflbt
innate infcriptions juftly fuppole themfelves
on thedefenfive part, and they who write
againft era can challenge no other, than that
of opponents. Now barely to plead the no
, neceflity of a thing is no neceflary argument
againft him, who pofitively aflerts the mat-
ter of fad, that it is fo, for many things
may be, and are fo, of which perhaps there
is no neceliity, that they Ihould be lo:
And this feemes fufficient to abate the force
• of the Argument: If nothing further could
be added 5 for what if God has given us
greater alliftances, than perhaps were abfo-
'lutely neceftky^ in a thing of fo great
concernment 3 we have no reafon to take it
ill.
But then why may we not affert, if not
a neceliity, yet a great conveniency of thefe
D 2 na-
fiaturall notions, v'vl. In refped of that part
of the Gentile world, who have neither a-
bility nor inclination to make fuch profoand
difquifitions into the nature of Man, and .
the reafon of things, as are necefiary to attain
to the naturall knowledge of duty: And if
Mr. Beccoft/aU had more fully confider'd the
Barbarous ftate of the greateft part of the
Heathen World, tis probable he would have
found em fubjefts not capable of fuch rati-
onall enquiry's , as his way of Arguing fup- ^
pofes 'em. But he goes on, j
If rnttdU ideas be ferviceable to Manl^nd^
they mujlbe fo in order to fnpply the defects
reafon, and confequently they feem to be
exempt from the difquifitions of reafon. Thefe
natural notions Of truthy and goodnefs are .
fome of the greateft ftrokes,, wherein con-
fifts the Image of God, imprinted upon the 1
minds of Men, in order to make them what
they are, rational and Religious 5 now if
this Learned Author, or any- elfe call this
a fupplying the defefe -^of- Reafonj I (hall '
not much oppofe it ^ Only I ftiould rather call
em the fundamental principles of all Rea^ ^
Ibning: And confequently they feem to hte
exempt from the difquifitions of Reafon. I j
do not underftand tlae neceflity of this i
confequence at all, for how can thefe things
be fit and proper aids to fupply the
de-
1
dcfeds of reafon, if they thcmfelves can-
not, or dare not undergoe the moft exa(i
trialls and difquifitions of reafon.
He gives his reafon in the following
, words. For if innate ideas are to be exami-
ned and judged on by the working of reafon.
What then ? We might have imagined,
that the inference from hence would have
been, either ijl. That then there are no
fuch things as thefe Native Infcriptions , or
■ ily. That they are not ferviceable in order
^ to fupply the defeats of reafon, or ^ly. That
they were exempt from the difquifitions of
reafon, but its none of thefe, but only this,
' Then reafon it felf will anfwer all the ends
and dejignes of a reafonable being : But if
, * it does, this feemes only to extend to the
i, Chrijfi^ World 3 reafon dqe^ but very in-
differently perform this, among the Hea-
thens. But he fays. It does it as effebluallj,
as if a digejl of Laws were originally re-'
corded on the mind. But how doth he
prove, that the Heathens may not thank
thofe Native impreffions, that they are not
funk lower into Barbarifme than indeed they
are; or fuppofing, that they did enjoy
1 a greater and freer ufe of reafon, than I am
! . afraid they do, yet how doth he prove ,
that they owe the light of truth and obli-
gation to duty merely to their rationall en-
i
I - ' •
qiiirys in contradiftindiion to/or feperation
from thefe innate notions, or not rather to
the benign influence that thefe later ( how-
ever in conjunction with the former ) have
upon them, hut pa. 76. He fays, That the
TioUrine of innate ideas muf be laid ajide^
fnce we cannot conceive^ that a wife Creator
fould ejiablijh any ordinance without fome
Jpecial ends,, and ufe annex d to it, I mean,
fuch, as are not ferved' any other way. But
to this I anfwer, ifi. That what he there
fuppofes, is not yet fufficiently demonftrated,
vi%. That Men generally may as well come
to the knowledge of their Duty, by fuch
rational cnquirys, as they may by thefe
native infcriptions. 2/7. How doth he
prove, that it is inconfiftent with the wif-
aom of Divine providence to appoint the
joint concurrence of two things, as in this
ofe, nature 11 infcription and rational de-
du(flion, as meanes in order to the fame end,
they mutually fupporting,defending,and con-
firming each other.
Pa.' 77,. In a word then, thd thefacred Ian-
guagc feems to favour the notion ofnativeinfcrip'
tions, yet it may be jujlly refolved wto metaphor
and figure, &c, But it is fome advantage
to the notion, that the facred Language
favours it, efpecially fince the affertors there-
qI" are defenders of that Text, and found
their
their opinion upon it: And therefore 'tis
not fuffident for him to fay, that the Sacred
Language may be refolved into a Metaphor,
but he muft prove, that it muft neceflarily
be fo interpreted 5 and here the aflertors
of thefe Infcriptions may more juftly
fey, that the Text may be underftood in
the plain, obvious, and literal fenfe of the
woids, therefore there is no need, no oc-
cafion of a; Metaphor.
I do not here fpeak any thing to de-
rogate from the excellency, and ufeful-
nefs of thofe powers, and facultys that
Cod has endued us with in order tO' dife
cover a rule: of adion, yet I can fcarce be
perfwaded, that the mere exercife of rea-
. fon in thofe circumftances of time, and place
before mentioned, will do it as. akar^y and^M
efeHnally, as if a digeft of Laws were origi-.
nally recorded on. the, mind, tho' I do not.
fey that any fuch digeft is thus recorded;,
qnlyfbme of the primary, original and ftin-
Omental Laws of Nature, or fome greatec
ftroaks thereof are originally communicated^
to the Soul, yet in a way futeable to the
nature of the things thus communicated,
and to. the nature of the Soul, the.Subje!^
of 'em.
But here if I may fpeak my own prit*
Tate conjeduifi; I. think, thefe rational enr
D ^ onirv^
(5^)'
quirys by the ufe of our facultys may bet-
ter ferve the defignes of truth, than they
can thofe of goodnefs, and be more avail-
able for the founding of intelledual, and
notional, rather then Moral, and praftical
Principles upon.
Pa. 75. He fays, thsit iiit he al/orv that
probabilitys may determine our judgments in
thk matter, the do^rine of innate Ideas is
rather to be rejeHed, than retain d.
But if probabilitys will avail any thing,
I doubt not but the Dodrine of innate
Ideas has its probabilitys too, as i. Since
this Dodrine of native Ideas or infcriptions
(he means the fame by both) is not mat-
ter of mere indifferency, but has a very
ufeful influence both upon natural and
Reveafd Religion, is it not therefore the
more probable to be true ? And further, is
it probable that the Apoftle, Ro. 2.1'^.
would pofitively and plainly fay that this
Imvp of Nature toas written upon the hearts of
the Gentiles, if it really and truly was not
fo? 2. Is it probable, that God would
leave the Gentile World to the guidance of
that reafon, which in their circumftances,
could not be any tolerable diredion to em,
either in the ways of truth or holynels,
without fome other (at leaft more probable,
means
w r 57 J
means )jto keep em, if poiSblc, from finking
much below themfel'ves ? 3^/. This is
t^e moft that can be faid againft the Doftrine
of flnnate Ideas, or ratural infcription, that
there is no need, they fay, of having recourfe
hereunto, reafon it felf fufficiently ferving
for thofe purpofes without it: Now this is
fuch an argument, as may perhaps be urg'd
with equal force againft all the Moral (that-
is, no fmall) part of the Gofpel 5 for may
not, nay, do not feme Men fay, that there
was no need of any fuch Revelation, rea-
fon it felf, they fay, liad done that with-
out it.
But perhaps it may feem too much a re-
ceding from the Divine Authority of Scrip-
ture, to plead that over again by probabi-
litys, wliich 'tis granted on all hands, is fa-
vourd by plain expreflions of Scripture.
But Mr. Becconfal in his C^dpt. of Parental
love, and aflfcftion: Pa. 122. fpeaking of the
lower Order of Creatures, fays, tkey.,asToell
as 2PC, muji conclude., that Parental Love ir
the effe5l of fonte peculiar propenfian., wove itr
rpit h the Frame,and Conjiitution of our beings..
andP<^. 126. For a Man to love and cherijh
hk Offering k centainly the refult of an in^
ward Propenfon. Now I do not know, that
the alfeftors of Innate Principles do under-
ftand any ttung more by them, then what is
0 5
C 58 ) ^ ^
here granted : Tis true indeed, it followt,
huf the exercife of it from the conjtderation of
the clofe a^jity it bear/ to his oven fiejh ana.
blood, is a work^ of reafon. But is it die lefs
. Innate, becaufe itisalfo radonal? Or-may?
not a Man adually love his. Child out of
that inward propenfion. fo to do, tha'- at
^e fame time he doth not confider that aflS-.
nity, it bears to his own fleih, and bipod:?
But, the ground,and reafon ofthe.differencp
betwixt Mr. Becconfal, and me in this partici?-.
lar feems to be this, Ba, 74. that he thir>k&
the Doftrine of Innate Ideas, or pra^cal
J|rinciples ferves not any real purpofes^ pf
I^eligion, and I think it does.
Mr. Lock, in his Reply to vi^bat I had
faid concerning Innate Notions, imploys the
moft of his difcourfe upon that, which is
leaft confiderable, he skirmilhes about the
outworks, but never enters into the merits
of the caufe, nor comes to difpute that
which was moft material in the Contror
vfrfy.
I wonder, why he ftiould lay fo much ftrefs
upon Children, and Fcob,anddebauGht Per-
fpns, to make their aflent or diflent fo
availeable one way, or other: I am no
friend, to Dogmatiziug, yet I. humbly con-
ceivej that no one' has any iuft reafon to
think
tfiihft die worfe of any- Opinion merely
Becau(e fuch Perfons do not aflent unto it.
Neither do they who plead for this'ge^
neral conlent, make it lb univerfal, a? to ior
dude every particular;.
Pa. 24. §. 20i I defin thefe "bJien ta /aj^
Tfihether bj EAucation, and Cufloni thefe Noti*-
ons can or cannot be bUtrrd and blotted, out^
Since he is fo Pofitive in his deumd, why
may not we be as pofitive in our aniwer^
andjSy, that they can: And what then>
Why, then truly he drops that part of the-
disjundion and only fays; If they may fufer
vtariation by adventitioMf Ndtionr (which
i^a very gentle* way ot blotting, out) bur
whatth^ follows? Why then wemiijijind
tPem cleareji] and mofl} perj^icuauSj neareji the-
Fountain^ in Children^ &c. Wi nmji, he lays,
but iie: never yet prov'd the neceflity of
that sonlequence: And then as for Illite-
rate Perfons, if he mean, plain ,.honeft illi-
terate Heathens, fuch as are lefs Learned,,
but lefs corrupted by falfe Principles and
wicked Praftii^ I doubt not, but thefe No-
tions^will appear clearer in fuch : But how-
ever we ftill remain in'thefuH-and undifturbd
jpflefFion of that fide of the disjunction, that
tnefe notions may by bad Cuftom,and Educa^
tibn be. blotted out,which ground thus gain'di
will of great difadv^tageto hi^taufc-
(TSo)
As for what he fays, i8. ofthe wick-
cd Practices, and Atheiftical Opinions of
forae Heathen Nations, fome think that his
Authors were not fo exaft in their obfer-
rations, as they might have been, but fupr
pofe they were, it makes nothing to the
advantage of his caufe, unlefs he had prov'd
before, that thefe Notions cannot be blotted
out of the minds of Men.
Neither will it follow hence, that th^
are of no ufe to Mankind, if they may be
thus defac'd. For, iji. It may in fon^e
meafure oweing to thefe, that ail the Na-=
tions of the Heathen World are not funk
lower into wickednefs than indeed they are,
Qclly. 'Tis probable thefe Innate Notion^
will be inftrumental in the Convidion and
Converfion of thefe People, when God in
the wifdom of his Providence, ftiall think
fit to do it 5 and I doubt not but the
Apoftles in their Preaching did appeal to
thefe, and make ufe of em, for thas pur-
pofe. Rom, 2.14,15.
Pa. 21. 14. Here (peaking of thefe
• Moral Rules, he is very urgent with us, to
tell, which they are^ if he means, that we
(hould give the exad determinate number
of *em, 1 think tliis is a very unreafonable
demand, however I (hall at prefent inftance
in tJaofc, which Mr. Nje mentions Pa. ^6. of
bk
()
Hff natrndil Religion, ijl, A tendemefs for
and care ©Jfour Children. 2d. k commi-
^ration of the oppreffions and wants of
wch, as are. diftrefied, and not by their own
fault, butt tiuo' mifliap, or the iniquity of
others. ^dJ. A propenfity to favour wor-
^hy Perfons and actions: And here,I would
pnly give him this caution, that in his reply,
he do not draw his Anfwer and Arguments
from Children, and Fools 5 for fuch Evi-
deuce will be excepted againft-^ nor from
fuch as by Vicious cuftomes have blotted
thefe notions out of their minds ^ for nd>
one thinks the worfe of the Belief of a God,,
becaufethe whole Clubofprofeffed AthieftSi
denys it.
Here give me leave to add one thing;
further, tho* out of its proper place, as for
thofe that aflert thefe innate notions J
know not how they can well otherwife ex-
prefs it, than by faying, that the Soul up-
on occafion exerts *em, and as for that o-
ther way, of exerting themfelves, if it want-
ed any defence, I have very good autho-
rity for it, Mr. Lock; P. 13. of his Eiiay.
J. 27.
*Tis a great prejhmption that thefe ge-
nerall maximes are not innate, fnce they
are leaji k^own to thofe, in whom, if they
were
< )
VjET^ innatCy, they muft needs exert
filvgSy^ with moft fojee and.vigour.
That there is a reall, and unalterable
dif^inftion betwjict good^ and evilly is a ve-
ly. great, and important truth, and fuch as
ohght to be fixt upon the beft and fureft
ifeujidations,, but I. cannot think, Mr.
McfonfaJls Argument pa, 194^ fo cogent,
as the nature of the.thing requires.
Moral gpjodi he fa^f^ alvpays includes, a
n^t^jcaU.gpo^^ and-nhnrAUgood kt evidently \
e^ailijh*d,, in the, jfame ^'created nature y
confe<ptently^^ if the from of nature
uvalterabde,^. mral getsd ntujij he fo
too.
Here, if by moral^ood alwaysjncludihg
^bnaturall goodo he^meanes, that moral
^K)d is alw^. attended with fome real <
3yant^e naturally accruing from the prac-
tree ofit,. this,!- grant, is generally true, but
then may we not fay here , as he fays of
_|icafure, , 1&8. In refpe^l: of Natural
good, that, it.feems to he a conjequence, ra"
iber then a tneafure, and^ confiituent prin- i
eiple of ntorall good, fb this natural |
good, which, he. fays, is always.included
in morall go^, feemes to be the confe-
q^Hce, rather then the meafure^ and con-
ftituent principle of moral good: But then
if he makes moral good only a part of.
as indeed he feems to make it, the
with^ n^nrall goc4» (onlx by
the aceefli^ ot a free choice, pj^.
and fq inpluded m thefrapie of created nar
ture, ^iswijiqnlygrqve, that mQr4.gQC)4
is \yh^ Gqd ^reaiioji tpade it, asdi^,
i^in ^ebi^^.^nfe
Dl% afe "perejy. wprj, God% to
and Ai^jtcajy/ Wlb a^d, pofito;4PtfiJtoi{b'
tion, ^ t^u^t|i.is,I<ear;ied„ ^udtofwijl fell'
with P. ^oiretts. qpjniqna in, this, paWQir
lai;, 7^'^ dj'fqpufife pf hmAnin^mjs^
95?
WhereaSj I willing, tp. thft
fmt of-gQod, W. h#er, fpiyidjogthe^
HI that todpn they, tp tfec^n!^
isjfdom, gyrity, andhplin^ of ijie PiyiaC
paturi^ whiRh mi^fipn ift) ij? fp®p meafytfi,
made. knPM^. to usk by thpffi patiyp nptices^
and natural! i^prelTiPnsrsUpc^.the ndnd^ o^
Men.
And whereas he tpllSj us, pa, 192 ^ Thai
the proper meajures: of fwraU^i good, mnf bf
fro/H the orfgin4» fram^ ^pds: Oftd inr
irejls ofourhpings, I am afraidj that ah, theib
in refpeft to each individual, and abftraft-
ed from all Law to direft us, would be
found lb variable, and uncertain, thatmor-
all good would, upon this hypothefis, prove
a much more unhxt and unfetto thing, then
( ,
Cod, and Nature ever made it. vide. pf. j2.
Of humane Nature.
So that I humbly conceive, it w661d'not
be a fufficient aflerting the eternall, and im-
mutable nature of moral good, to fay, that
it is as immutable^^ as the frame of created
nature, for we }6iow, that this has, in fome
particuiar^iSlkhces, been changed, and may
De fo againe, but the-^^afons of good and
cvill never were, never tan be changed. • ^
I iball conclude this with a judicious obler-
vation of Mr. Becconfalls^ in another cafe.
pa. 107. The notions I have contended for^
are founded in things, that fall in roith the
^ablijh'd fentimeuts of Mankind. And as
the arguments fuggejied are, at leaf, as cogent
and fatisfa&ory, as thofe on the other fide, it
is not prudent to leave the common Road,
and put things of moment, and importance up-
an an ijfue, that, it may he, wants Evidence ,
or at leaf contradi&s fome received truths or
notions.
But as for, the*'a|)olo^ he makes1S6.
I think no apology can be fufficient for
makeing ufe of hew modes of expreflions
in matters of a tnox^ concernment.
Short
C«s)
?ihort Kemar^ upon tnpo Chapters
in the Oracles of Keafon.
IT is the worft ufe, that any can make
of the beliefofaGood, or natural Re-
ligion, from thence to infer the no ne-
ceffity of future Revelation, whereas on
the contrary 5 both from the nature of
God-and the Dilhenfations of Divine pro-
vidence ki the World, we may rather in-
fer, if not the neceffity, yet ' at leaft the
great conveniency of a further Revela-
tion
For fuppofing the Corruption, and de-
pravation of Mankind, which yet the very
Heathens did acknowledge, and were inti-
mately confcious of, it feemes raore^agree-
able to the benignity of the Divine na-
ture to pity, and relieve the mifery of that
ftate, by fome new methods of Revealed
mercy.
The difpenfations of Divine providence
do alfo feem to require it, thus the general
pra^he
(65)
praftife of Saaificeing, and the generall be-
liefe of the neceffity of a Mediator, even
in the firff ages of the World 5 do either
fuppofe-or at leaft infer the great conveni-
ency of fuch a thing, the better to. in forme
the World with the true nature, end and de-
fign of both thofe.
A Learned Phyfitian thought it necefla-
17, as a preparatory vindication of his fa-
cirity, Firft, to ftate that queftion, an ter-
minus vit£ fit mobilis, the profeffion of
Phyfiek being a very vaine, aM idle thing,
if all things come to pafe by blind chance
or f^l meceflky. In hke manner it would
be in vain for Divines to talk of the grace
of Cod made known to us by the Golj^l,
if there never was any fuch thing, as
Divine fupematurall Revelation in the
Worlds
It were to be wifht that Difcourfes of
this nature, to prove the very principles
of Chriftianity, were neither feafonable nor
neceflary, Ixtf fuch is the iniquky' of the
age we live in, that deifrae appears bare-^
fec'd in a Chriftian State, th^ k bears
k felf high upon the pretended ftrength
of its own caufe, and acknowledges na.
Oracles, but thofe of its own, 1^%, Of
is onQ nightveikuretague&atthecau&s
of
UilWk-,., w
of their miftakes (to omit that unfixednefe
of mind, and that afifeftationof popularity,
hereby to gain to themfelves the reputati-
on of Men of more than ordinary parts )
, they perhaps might be firftoccafion'd by fiieb
fteps and methods, as thefe,
1. Reafon being both a name and thing,
which always was, and ever will be juftjy
valued, and efteemed in the World, and
there being a time, when reafon, or Phy'
' ' lofophy was the great, if not the only guide
to Man in things relating either to this
World, or the other, that being the on-
ly rule, that we know of, that God
gave the Heathens to direct 'em to a fu-
ture happinefsj this perhaps might be
one occafion of the prelent Deifine of the
' age.
2. It has been the misfortune, that re^
vektion has laid under, in the opinion of
fome Men, the' without any juft ground,
. that it bears a dirett oppofition, and con-
trariety to reafon, now thefe Men im-
proveing and pro^gateing this opinion,
as much as waspofl^le in EWorld, they
built themfelves a Reputation by advanc-
ing Reafon, which was once a fofficieitf
' guide to Men, even above, and in contradi-
ftinftion to Revelation.
^dly, Tis notffiiprobablc, but that thefe
Men
C^)
Men may be offended at thefeverity of the
Chriftian Religion, not that I here go about
toaccufe 'emofiramoralitys, no! Their Li-
beral Education, ;,their Candid temper, and
their true and juft fenie of things,, which ,
otherwife they entertain, forbid me to bar-
hour any fuch thoughts of 'em,yet I wouldap-
peal here even to their own private fentiments
whether there be not fomthing of truth in
what I here intimate, and that they could
be willing to purchafe Heaven at feme eafier • +
rate, or more agreeable to their particular '
humors or inclinations,than that prefcrib'd by
the Gofpel. .
4. Perhaps the Severe Apprehenfionsj I
which fbme Chriftians entertain concerning
the defperate eftate of all Heathens may make * •
fome run into the other extream, Fi'z. That
Natural Religion is fuffident for all, in order
to Eternal Happinefs, which is fo unreafo-
nably, as they think, deny'd to fome for
fuch. But to palfe by thefe Conjeftures.
Now in order to the clearer dating of
the queftion betwixt us, we muft conhder.
I. That fince we have been now above
16. hundred Yeass in pofleffion of our
Chriftian Religion in particular, and much .
longer of a reveal'd Religion in general,
therefore the deift caneUiip no other part
in
. C ^9 ) ^
in this difpute, than that of an opponent,
and here he muft prove the Hiftory of the
Gofpel, as to matters of fad, to be falfe,
and thofe ancient Apologys, for, and thofe
more Modem defences of Chriftianity in-
fufficient.
If it be reply'd, that Natural Religion
preceded Revelation, and fo was the more
Ancient. I anfwer. i. Some are of Opi-
nion that God immediately after the Crea-
tion of Adam^ did give him either an in-
ward or outward revelation or both, of
things covenient or neceffary for him to be
known then, tho' perhaps they werefuch,
as in progrefs of time, and long 'ftudy and
obfervation might have been found out af-
, terwards.
Here L muft confefs, we have no certain
Rule to guide us, but muft only go by con-
jedures, fuch - as are more rationally and
pioufly credible. But if after all any one
will pofitively fay, that fuch was the per-
• fedion of Natural reafon before theHFalil,
that all thofe things relating more particu-
^ darly to that prefent State of affairs, might
have been found out by it felf, I (hall not
much oppofe it ^ however this is certain,
that God immediately after the fall of Adam,
did reveal the Gofpel to him in Para-
dife, by the Promife of the Mefliah, and
■ this
C 7» )
this the Deift muft acknowledge, unlefs
he can prove the Hiftoiy of Mofes to be
falfe.
2. Inthofe firft Ages of the World God
did convey his will and pleafure to Men
by Angels upon extraordinary occafions, fo
that they could not be even then, faid to
be abfolutely without Divine Revelation.
5. They had Tradition, which was bet-
ter grounded'and of more Authority then^
than it can pretend to now, becaufe of the
long life of the Patriarchs, Co that it did
not go through To many hands, and confe-
quently not fo liable to be corrupted ^ tho*
I do nothere fuppofe this Tradition to extend
J! to Moral Dutys.
I 4. Notwithftanding all thefe helps, and
afliftances, they felt the fad want of a ftand-
ing Rule to dired em, for thofe firft Ages
of the World foon degenerated into Idolat-
ry, andthisand worfe would be the Fate
of the prefent Age if God in judgment
(hould removethe Gofpel from us.
But to return, the Deift muft 2dlj/ prove,
I that it is a thing contrary £0 the Divine
I Nature to make any further Declaration of
I his will, than what he has made known
by the light of Nature, he cannot fay, that
j this is contrary to the free, and pofitive
i de-
determination of the Divine Will, for how
can he know this, feeing he doth not fup-
pofe any outward Declaration of Cods will
ever made to Man. If he fay that God
never made any but only this, viz. That
he would make no more, but what he had
difcovered to Man by the Light of Na-
ture: I hope he will prove what he fays,
and (how where ever God made any fuch
Declaration: If he fay that there was no
need of any further: This is a very weak
way of argueing againft matter of fad: If
I fhould fay, that there is nothing writ in
a certain Book calfd the Oracles ofReafon^ in
defence of Deifme, becaufe there was no need
of it, there was enough writ of that before,
I believe he would not grant the Argument
to be of any force.
Some are of Opinion, that that Book
calfd the Oracles of Reafon is not worth the
taking notice of by way of Anfwer, it be-
ing, they fay, fuch as would foon dye of it
felf 'j I muft confefs I have no great opini-
on of the performance therein, viz. Of the
Letters of thofe Gentlemen one to another,
(I do not fpeak of the Tranflations) not
that I here refled upon the abilitysofthe
Perfons, but of the weaknefs of the caufe,
that was not capable of a better defence.
i
Per
mm
^72)
Si Pergama dextrh
iDefend fojjint, Etiam kac.
But becaufe fome are apt.;^ look upon
this as an argument of the.ftrength of a caufe,
when no one^ youchfafes an anfwer to it,
tho* perhapf, the true reafon is, becaufe
they think it "Hoes not deferve any, I {hall
therefore briefly confider that part of it,
which is writ in favour of Dcifme, if not
' for its own fake, yet for the fake of thofe,
who are too apt to overvalue every thing,
that may feem to gratify their own pri-
inclinations, and if fome think as
meanly of this, as others do of that, I am
very well fatisfy'd, if thej Jhodd dye both
iogether.