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NOTES ON 
 
 THE FOREIGN POLICY OF 
 THE UNITED STATES 
 
 SUGGESTED BY 
 THE WAR WITH SPAIN 
 
 BY 
 
 CARMAN F. EANDOLPH 
 
 AUTHOR OF "the LAW OF EMINKNT DOMAIN" 
 
 NEW YORK 
 THE DE VINNE PRESS 
 
 1898 
 
GIFT 
 
 MRSb WOOD ROW WlLSOJi 
 
 NOV. 25, 1939 
 

 NOTES ON THE 
 FOREIGX POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 Before the declaration of war against Spain closed debate in 
 this country as to the existence of a just cause it was asserted 
 that International Law did not admit a right of intervention, 
 under the circumstances, and it will be conceded that there is 
 no rule of law to which an intervener may in any case appeal in 
 justification. Nor is such a rule desirable, for the temptation to 
 profit by the domestic troubles of a neighbor should not be en- 
 couraged by adopting a rule so likely to be abused. But while 
 the law of nations consecrates the normal right of each State to 
 independence with all that independence implies, it is conceiv- 
 able that a State may so misconduct its internal affairs as to pro- 
 voke an intolerable situation, and lay itself open to intervention. 
 
 Upon consideration it may be said that intervention is not 
 unrighteous merely because it lacks formal recognition. Nor 
 would it be righteous because of such recognition. The propri- 
 ety of the act is to be determined in each case by the facts. 
 If, then, a State shall intervene in the internal affairs of another, 
 it does not necessarily commit a wrong, but, because indepen- 
 dence is the essence of nationality, it is heavily burdened with the 
 proof that it vindicates a right. 
 
 European interventions would be without present interest were 
 it not that because they have been undertaken usually by several 
 Powers, and sometimes on account of a violation of guarantees, it 
 has been suggested that a joint intervention possesses an author- 
 ity incommunicable to the action of a single Power, aud that 
 
intervention because of a broken pledge has a peculiar merit. 
 There is no Concert of Powers in America — there would be none 
 in Europe did a single Power occupy there the place held by the 
 United States in this hemisphere. 
 
 Nor has Spain contracted with the United States in respect of 
 the governing of Cuba. If, then, joint action or a broken pledge 
 is a condition precedent to a just intervention, the course of the 
 United States is unjustifiable. It is not perceived, however, how 
 the propriety of an intervention can be affirmed or denied accord- 
 ing as it is undertaken by several Powers or by one, for the 
 situation in the objective country is the crucial point. If that 
 situation does not call for intervention, a combination of all civ- 
 ilized States could not justify the act. If it does call for inter- 
 vention, any State with power may respond. Equally ill con- 
 ceived is the suggestion that intervention because of a violated 
 guarantee is especially meritorious. The exaction of the guar- 
 antee is itself an intervention, for when a State agrees with a 
 foreign Power to pursue a prescribed course in respect of its own 
 subjects or its internal affairs, it qualifies its independence and 
 must anticipate coercion if it breaks the agreement. 
 
 Obviously the critical question in respect of intervention is 
 whether the conditions in the objective country invite it. 
 
 Civil disorder may rouse in a neighbor country so reason- 
 able a fear for its own peace and safety that it may well inter- 
 vene in self-defense. The United States do not plead this justi- 
 fication for their intervention in Cuba. 
 
 The material interests of a people may be damaged by dis- 
 order in another country ; but intervention is not justifiable on 
 this score alone. The United States maintained this position 
 during the Civil "War, and it was respected by European Powers, 
 some of whom, and especially Great Britain, suffered severely 
 by the blockade of Southern ports. Our government alleges 
 very properly the ruin of our Cuban trade, and the destruction 
 of American property as reasons for our concern in the pacifi- 
 cation of Cuba ; but these are not the actuating motives of in- 
 tervention. 
 
 Tlicre remains the broadest of all justifications — humanity. 
 And upon this the American people rest their action, with a due 
 apprehension, it is to be hoped, of the errors, the crimes even, 
 into which a nation may be seduced by an exaggerated humani- 
 tarianism. 
 
The United States have committed themselves by inaction to 
 this limitation upon the impnlse to set a neighbor's house in 
 order — that, as a rule, it is better for a free people to work out 
 their own salvation, however painfully, than to be subjected to 
 foreign rule. 
 
 But a country hopelessly distracted because of a vicious po- 
 litical system imposed from without may present a case for 
 intervention. And this is the situation in Cuba. The attitude 
 of Spain toward Cuba is unique in its contempt of the principles 
 which are now presumed to govern a metropolitan State in deal- 
 ing with colonists of her own race or planting. Yet colonists 
 are but subjects after all, and shall not a State rule her subjects 
 in her own way ? But Cuba is not ruled. Spain has failed, and 
 it is her failure which invites the United States. Had Spain 
 ruled Cuba we would have continued to respect her power, but 
 we owe no duty in the premises to a government which does not 
 govern. And if Spain reply that she could have subdued Cuba 
 by the methods of Wej'ler, we retort that we do not recognize 
 the right of a government to secure peace through depopulation. 
 
 Apparently the situation in Cuba warrants intervention, but 
 Spain presses two charges against us which must weaken our 
 position if they are well founded. When a State has fomented 
 or connived at the disorder which provokes its intervention, its 
 action is scandalous, and Spain seeks to afl&x this stigma upon 
 the United States. Now the very existence of our republic en- 
 courages oppressed colonists to assert themselves, and we rejoice 
 that our example has led colonies to independence and moved 
 metropolitan States to reform colonial policies. Nor do we dis- 
 avow a natural sympathy vrith the rebellion in Cuba. But our 
 Government has duly exerted its powers to prevent illegal inter- 
 course with the insurgents, and although Spain denies this, it 
 cannot be doubted that had sympathy overcome our sense of 
 obligation, Cuba would have been free years ago. 
 
 The sense of obligation ruled our conduct until our Govern- 
 ment decided that Spain was powerless to maintain her authority 
 in Cuba by methods permissible to a civilized state. Here Spain 
 takes issue with us. She charges that the decision was so unrea- 
 sonable as to convict the United States of deliberately pervert- 
 ing facts in order to excuse a settled determination to dispossess 
 her. In this relation certain neutral Powers, indeed some of 
 our own citizens, appear to be impressed by the assertion of the 
 
Spanish Government that it has made concession upon conces- 
 sion, and that we have not allowed time for their effects to 
 develop, but have pressed demands of increasing weight culmin- 
 ating in the intolerable summons to evacuate Cuba forthwith. 
 The Spanish Government has made concessions. It recalled 
 General Weyler and revoked the order of reconcentration ; per- 
 mitted the United States to succor reconcentrados and appro- 
 priated money for the same purpose ; decreed a new regime of 
 limited acceptance and uncertain authority and declared that 
 Cuba was autonomous ; and in fine promised that Cuba should 
 become another Canada. If palliatives, decrees, and prophecies, 
 aU tendered under duress, had presaged the peace of Cuba, the 
 United States would have been culpable in disregarding them, 
 but in truth these must be viewed as devices to gain time, 
 or at best as well meant but impotent efforts. 
 
 II 
 
 The success of intervention can be demonstrated only by the 
 event, yet the United States have acted with assurance of power 
 to terminate Spanish misrule in Cuba. In abating this nuisance 
 they will have done all that is required by a strict construction 
 of their responsibility, but because the condition of Cuba almost 
 forbids the hope that order waits upon its evacuation by the 
 Spanish forces, they have proclaimed an active interest in 
 securing it. 
 
 When Cuba shall be freed from Spanish rule, we may expect 
 its people to mistrust the new Power which has driven out the 
 old. This mistrust cannot be allayed by a joint resolution. 
 Our conduct must convince the Cubans that we intend neither 
 to annex nor despoil, but to aid in establishing an independent 
 neighbor. 
 
 The peace of Cuba wiU be our first concern, but we must not 
 set up an unattainable standard of order for the Cubans, and 
 then annex their island on the plea that they cannot govern it. 
 Cuba may wait long for the order which we prescribe for our- 
 selves, and indeed the peace of a Spanish-American state of the 
 best type is not the peace of the United States. 
 
The early installation of a Cuban government is desirable not 
 only for the sake of the Cubans but because pending this event 
 the United States must undertake the provisional control of the 
 island. The undertaking will be sufficiently vexatious, even as- 
 suming, as I do, that it will be confided to trained soldiers and not 
 to uniformed politicians. Yet it will be better to prolong our 
 control than to recognize prematurely a Cuban government. 
 When the authority of Spain shall disappear, the authority of 
 the United States must replace it and prevail until a responsible 
 local government shall be ready to assume control. The govern- 
 ment of Cuba, which shall be definitely recognized by the United 
 States, and may thereafter claim recognition from other nations, 
 must be organized or ratified by the people of Cuba freely delib- 
 erating and acting under the protection of our impartial author- 
 ity. Although the United States will not assume to present 
 Cuba with a plan of government, they should condition recog- 
 nition upon the adoption of a plan which shall establish a new 
 nation upon principles of justice. 
 
 A further condition of recognition may be the ratification 
 of a treaty containing such engagements and guarantees as may 
 be necessary to secure the interests of the United States. 
 
 Territorial aggrandizement is so often the real purpose of in- 
 tervention that the United States are, not surprisingly, charged 
 with intending to appropriate Cuba, notwithstanding their for- 
 mal disclaimer. Nor has this disclaimer put away temptation. 
 The European Powers would either approve the act or view it 
 cynically as a result quite in harmony with their own theory of 
 intervention, and even Spain might prefer to have Cuba ruled 
 by the United States than by victorious rebels. Annexation 
 has never lacked prophets and advocates, and opportunity will 
 stimulate desire. An annexation party may appear in Cuba 
 itself. More importantly the condition of Cuba may suggest 
 that the humane impulse which prompted us to free the island 
 should carry us on to secure its peace by governing it. Against 
 the arguments for annexation must be opposed not merely the 
 disclaimer contained in the joint resolution of Congress and re- 
 peated in the ultimatum evaded by the Spanish Government, but 
 the sohd reasons which prompted it. These reasons are that the 
 interests of the United States will be better served by the inde- 
 pendence of Cuba than by annexation; and that the Cubans 
 ought not to pass from one master to another, however well dis- 
 
8 
 
 posed the latter might be, but should have a fair opportunity to 
 acquire the art of self-government, guided in their first steps bj-- 
 the firm hand of the United States. If the oj^portunity shall not 
 be embraced, the United States may be compelled eventually to 
 modify their position. 
 
 Ill 
 
 The war with Spain has revived the scheme to annex Hawaii. 
 It has been suggested that our forces should occupy the islands 
 with the consent of their rulers upon the plea of military neces- 
 sity, the intention being to force Congress to assume jurisdiction 
 in due form over territory practically abandoned to the United 
 States. The suggestion is intolerable. The seizure of Hawaii 
 by a coup d'etat would be a shameful abuse of executive power. 
 But, the question of method apart, the situation in respect 
 of annexation is really unchanged by the state of war. For 
 five years the ruling class in Hawaii have been trying to 
 break into the Union with the aid of powerful friends on the 
 inside, yet the most persistent efforts have failed to induce the 
 majority of the American people to let down the bars, although 
 a minority are honestly convinced that annexation is desirable. 
 Twice has a treaty of annexation failed in the Senate and the 
 expedient of a joint resolution promised the same result. The 
 project is now resurrected as a " war measure." 
 
 The exigencies of war do not demand the reversal of our atti- 
 tude toward Hawaii. Even if Spain had a Pacific fleet. Congress 
 should not be frightened into accepting the islands. But Spain 
 has no sea power in the Pacific. Her fleet has been destroyed ; 
 her chief port in the Philippines is dominated by the United 
 States. Honolulu would be a convenient base of supplies dur- 
 ing our control over Manila, but the perpetual obligation of an 
 annexation is not to be assumed in consideration of a temporary 
 convenience. 
 
 If the United States shall commit the blunder of annexing 
 the Philippines they must assume the burden of Hawaii. If, 
 however, the Philippines are held out as a lure for Hawaii, the 
 American people should clearly understand the true sequence of 
 these projects and pay no attention to the gnat until they have 
 swallowed the camel. 
 
IV 
 
 Admiral Dewey's achievement at Manila may present the 
 United States with the problem of dealing definitively with ter- 
 ritorj' in the other hemisphere. A proper solution is not sug- 
 gested by our experience, but it is well within our competency if 
 we shall be inspired by true conceptions of duty and interest. 
 
 Sharp practitioners assert that whatever moral obligation may 
 restrain us from appropriating Cuba, we have a free hand in the 
 Philippines because we have made no disclaimer in respect of 
 them. This distinction is immoral. "We have made war upon 
 Spain because of the intolerable condition of a neighboring 
 colon}', and prefaced our action by a disclaimer of grasping mo- 
 tives. The moral strength of this position will be impaired if we 
 unnecessarily appropriate a remote possession of Spain, the con- 
 dition of which was never the object of our concern, much less 
 of remonstrance. Yet the United States may be compelled even- 
 tually to treat the Philippines as divorced from Spain, without 
 evading any self-imposed restraint. Spain's authority over the 
 islands is vigorously disputed by rebels, and it is jeopardized by 
 our legitimate operations at Manila. In view of these facts and 
 the internal weakness of the metropolitan State, the close of the 
 war may find the Philippines irretrievably lost to Spain. The 
 active duty of the United States, in this event, cannot be fore- 
 casted, for the disposition of this great domain will depend upon 
 conditions not yet developed. Possibly the intense rivalry be- 
 tween the European Powers may suggest a government for the 
 islands modeled upon the lines of the Congo State ; or they might 
 be transferred to the Dutch, who are independent, yet not aggres- 
 sively strong, and have demonstrated their ability to administer 
 the Philippines by their long and successful rule in Java. 
 
 The passive duty of the United States is clearly foreshadowed. 
 The Philippines ought not to be annexed, because the considera- 
 tions which discourage the annexation of Cuba, Ijang at om* 
 very door, are absolutely prohibitive in the case of territory six 
 thousand miles over sea, and peopled by millions of barbarians. 
 
 Our passive duty in respect of the Philippines and other terri- 
 tory over sea is commended by our established policy — we neither 
 covet possessions beyond America nor permit foreign nations 
 to aggrandize their domains at the expense of American States. 
 
 Now in the heat of battle we are urged to dismember our 
 
10 
 
 policy and intrench ourselves abroad. The project should not be 
 dismissed merely because of its novelty. When the American 
 people balk at a momentous enterprise because it is novel, they 
 will have lost their courage; when they rush into one for the sake 
 of change they will have lost their balance. So this project must 
 be considered with minds free from timidity, yet intent to 
 determine its true bearings. 
 
 Publicists who approve the departure from the old ways, but are 
 not dazzled by the notion that the United States, after chastis- 
 ing Spain, will at once be able to guard America with one hand 
 and seize territory abroad at will with the other, are captivated 
 by the suggestion of an alliance which would bring to our aid 
 the mighty fleet of Great Britain, open coaling stations around 
 the globe, and enable us to launch a colonial policy under the 
 auspices of the great colonizing Power. This method of gaining 
 an end goes far to discredit the end itself. Alliances, save in 
 cases of emergency, are quite as repugnant to the interests of 
 the United States now as they were when Washington condemned 
 them, and the opportunity to seize land in Asia is not an emer- 
 gency, but a situation created by our deliberate act. 
 
 The alliance would not be without its price. What must we 
 pay Great Britain? It would be a threat to other nations. 
 Why should we menace States with whom we are at peace? 
 The history of alliances is a record of forced companionship, of 
 mutual distrust, of broken pledges. But it will be argued that 
 an Anglo-American alliance would be ennobled and perpetuated 
 by common ideals and interests. This argument is not without 
 attraction ; but a review of Anglo-American relations does not 
 inspire a belief in its soundness. The present situation fore- 
 casts a better understanding between the United States and 
 Great Britain than can be reached by entering into bonds. We 
 have the open sympathy of Great Britain in our contest with 
 Spain, and when I say that it were ill bestowed elsewhere, I pay 
 the highest compliment to her sagacity and her sense of justice. 
 We may believe that her friendliness is expressed by works as 
 well as by words. Unquestionably Americans and Englishmen 
 should hereafter prefer to dwell upon the common interests of 
 English-speaking people rather than to accentuate their circum- 
 stantial differences; and other Powers may be assured that 
 should their combined forces unjustly attack either guardian of 
 these interests, the other will come to the rescue. This emer- 
 
11 
 
 gency has not arisen, and nothing is so likely to prevent it 
 as the fear of a union between the English-speaking peoples. 
 We should be satisfied for the present, I think, with the whole- 
 some impression created by the talk of alliance. 
 
 An economic argument for the expansion of the United States 
 is fairly summed up in the following propositions: 1. Our 
 ability to produce so greatly exceeds our capacity to consume 
 that wider markets are necessary. 2. Other nations are over- 
 running vast fields of present and prospective commercial value 
 in order to monopolize their trade. 3. The United States must, 
 therefore, seize compensating fields, or at least acquire such 
 strongholds as will tend to check the advance of their rivals. 
 The first proposition is incontestable. The second depicts the 
 most striking movement of our time, but this movement does 
 not in its present stage forbode disaster to America, and should 
 not mislead the United States into reversing their policy in ac- 
 cordance with the suggestion of the last proposition. 
 
 The economic alignment has in view the question of the Far 
 East, and especially the future of China. Now, it is possible 
 that certain districts in China never opened to our trade will 
 remain closed although they have passed into the control of 
 European Powers, but, on the other hand, a large area has been 
 thrown open through British influence. As matters stand we 
 have the advantage of new fields without the loss of old ones, 
 and Great Britaiu, though not always successful in checking the 
 advance of her rivals, usually holds gained ground. Whether 
 more extended fields in China shall be opened to us is another 
 question, yet in this relation the action of Russia should be esti- 
 mated at its probable value. The building of the Siberian rail- 
 road is the most Anglo-Saxon work that Russia has ever done, 
 and the acquisition of a terminal on the Pacific crowns the en- 
 terprise. In mo\dng to an open sea on the line of least resis- 
 tance, Russia has simply followed the route of a virile people, 
 and the open sea means eventually commerce, and commerce 
 means exchange. 
 
 The protectionist dogma of the sufficiency of the home 
 market is weakening before the palpable necessity for wider 
 markets for our manufactures, and the outward impetus given 
 by a foreign war ought to demolish it. Yet we can expand our 
 commerce without abandoning our traditional and well founded 
 policy. 
 
12 
 
 The expedition to the Philippines itself opens a wider market 
 in Asia, and at the close of hostilities we will be in a position to 
 secure further advantages in that direction. But after all, is not 
 our sudden appreciation of Asia exaggerated ? Valuable as is the 
 trade of the Far East, great as are its possibilities, do we not 
 magnify its relative importance through a mistaken view of the 
 great struggle for China ? The commercial interests involved, 
 however great in themselves, are incidental to the larger political 
 question, the Balance of Power. Every advance made by Russia 
 in China brings her nearer to India. The real " Question of the 
 Far East " is not. Who shall sell the most goods to the Chinese, 
 but, Shall Russia rule Asia ? 
 
 "We need not seek commercial salvation by way of conquest in 
 the Far East. We may gain our share of the world's trade without 
 annexing an acre of land over sea. Our exports to South Amer- 
 ica, Africa, and to Europe itself can be vastly increased by the 
 enterprise of our merchants encouraged by a revision of tariff 
 laws. 
 
 The acquisition of territory in the Far East would involve the 
 United States as surely and perhaps as deeply in European poli- 
 tics as though they touched the fringe of Europe itself, for Asia, 
 and Africa as well, are for the most part appanages of Europe. 
 In full view of the consequences we are urged to intrench our- 
 selves in Asia. We are told that our political isolation, however 
 advantageous during the youth of the Republic, is now the sign 
 of a selfish and timid provincialism. 
 
 This is a perverse view of a really admirable position. "Iso- 
 lation " does not suggest provincialism. It can hardly be said to 
 express a policy. It simply depicts the situation of the United 
 States — a country without powerful and intrusive neighbors, 
 and wishing none. 
 
 We shall depreciate the Monroe Doctrine if we assume a con- 
 cern in the disposition of territory in the Old World which we 
 deny to European States in the New. Indeed, it may be argued 
 that as the doctrine expresses our repugnance to contact with 
 these States, we suggest its obsolescence if we seek contact 
 abroad. Why should we risk the prisiacy of a hemisphere 
 for a part interest in the Far East? 
 
 The abandonment of our normal attitude of impartial and 
 temperate friendliness toward the States of Eui'ope would pro- 
 voke discord at home. Millions of American citizens are of for- 
 eign birth or parentage, and should the Republic become involved 
 in the web of Euroj^ean intrigue and thus be led to favor or oppose 
 
13 
 
 now this Power and now that one, the instinctive sympathy and 
 prejudice of race would assert themselves. The bickerings of Old 
 World factions would disturb our politics and accentuate racial 
 differences which in the interest of American unity should dis- 
 appear. 
 
 Americans are not impelled to conquer by the need of mar- 
 kets or of new lands for an overcrowded people, though these 
 excuses are paraded ; nor will the hope of converting heathen to 
 Christianity and republicanism allure them. The sole motive 
 will be the imperial idea — the uugoverned impulse to conquer, 
 and the imperial idea is repugnant to our political creed. 
 
 The weapons of imperialism are force and intrigue, and these 
 must be wielded by an executive authority more strongly cen- 
 tralized and more powerful than the American people have 
 deemed to be compatible with their interests. We need not 
 apprehend anything like Russian autocracy or perhaps French 
 military republicanism, but our Administration must be assured 
 of support in any move that will advance the flag. This is sub- 
 stantially the situation in Great Britain, where Her Majesty's 
 Government hav^e carte blanche to enlarge the Empire by 
 treaty and, substantially, by occupation, and Parliament is ex- 
 pected to pass such measures as may be necessaiy to sustain 
 their action. 
 
 No advocate of the imperial policy has dared to guess at its 
 cost ; but when we remind ourselves that about one half of the 
 federal revenue is now expended on war account, including, of 
 course, pensions, that new war bonds will increase the interest 
 charge by millions, and that other millions must be added for 
 new pensions and an inevitable increase in the military estab- 
 lishment, we prefigure already a war budget vastly exceeding 
 that of either Great Britain, Russia, Germany, or France — the 
 great Military Powers. Add to this the expense of acquiring 
 and maintaining possessions thousands of miles over sea, and of 
 supporting the imperial estate, and the burden of taxation will 
 be far weightier than our people ought to bear in time of peace. 
 
 What strength shall be added to our institutions by acquiring 
 territory in the distant land toward which our eyes are turned ? 
 There is not a prospective State of the Union in Asia. Nor a 
 
14 
 
 prospective Territory where the people may govern themselves 
 under federal supervision until statehood shall be conferred. 
 Nor even a prospective colony in the best sense of the term — a 
 land peopled by emigrants from a mother country. There is 
 nothing for the United States in Asia but perpetual provinces, 
 and provincial government is nothing but the rule of force ap- 
 plied to subject peoples. 
 
 Whether or not the provincial relation is technically lawful 
 under our Constitution, it is plainly opposed to the true spirit of 
 an instrument designed to unite self-governing and indestructi- 
 ble States. 
 
 When a nation declares war, it should as a rule exert its 
 powers with sole regard to the avowed purpose, and this self-re- 
 straint is especially commended in a war undertaken in the 
 interest of humanity. Yet war may create or disclose situa- 
 tions justifying a successful aggressor in broadening its opera- 
 tions, and in conducting peace negotiations with a view to 
 heavier demands than the original purpose calls for. When 
 the aggressor is so manifestly the superior combatant that its 
 success is only a question of time, it may decide that resistance 
 prolonged in desperation after national honor shall have been 
 creditably defended is a distinct aggravation of the original griev- 
 ance, to be accounted for in the final settlement. These consid- 
 erations bear upon the policy of the United States in respect of 
 Spanish territory and of indemnity. 
 
 Spain's possessions in Asia are beyond the sphere of our legiti- 
 mate interest, and the operations against them are justified only 
 as they are calculated to bring her more speedily to terms in 
 Cuba. If then the campaign against the Philippines shall be 
 pressed to the extinction of Spanish sovereignty, the result will 
 be due to the prolongation of hopeless resistance in Cuba. 
 Porto Rico is in different case. This island lies within our 
 sphere of interest, and considerations of justice, no less than 
 policy, may warrant the United States in dealing with it as with 
 Cuba. 
 
 As to indemnity, not a life nor a dollar should be spent in 
 placing a mortgage on Spanish territory. Indeed, if Spain shall 
 sue for peace in due season let us pay our own bills and not 
 grind a beaten people. 
 
15 
 
 A victory over Spain will advance the position of the United 
 States in America. A few years ago we called the attention of 
 our most powerful neighbor to the Monroe Doctrine with satis- 
 factory results, and soon we may rid ourselves of our most 
 troublesome one. Thenceforth the United States will enjoy ac- 
 knowledged supremacy in the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean 
 Sea. Outposts in the West Indies will be the visible signs of 
 supremacy ; and it may appear that one or more of these may 
 be located in Cuba itself, as well to the advantage of the Cubans 
 as our own. 
 
 Let us reject the idea of acquiring territory abroad and a seat 
 in a Concert of Powers, and rely upon the strength of our inde- 
 pendent position, the wisdom of oui* laws, and the courage and 
 enterprise of our people to further our immediate interests in 
 foreign lands — the protection of our citizens, and the expan- 
 sion of our trade. 
 
 Let us welcome the prestige which the war confers upon the 
 Republic. The declaration of war in the interest of humanity, 
 the expeditions to the Philippines, the ability to shoot straight 
 from a rolling platform, mark the advent of a new force in the 
 world. This force may be exerted if need be in any righteous 
 cause, and if need shall arise the United States will see their 
 duty more clearly and perform it the better for being unem- 
 barrassed by possessions abroad or by complex relations with the 
 States of the Old World. 
 
 MoRRiSTOWN, New Jersey, June 10, 1898. 
 
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