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 CORfRIGIfr DEPoSir. 
 

The American-Spanish War 
 
 THE WAR LEADERS 
 
 ILLUSTRATED 
 
 With numerous original engravings, maps and diagrams 
 
 w 
 
 Norwich, Conn 
 CHAS. C. HASKELL & SON 
 
 •3 Bedford Street, Strand, London, England 
 
 GAY & BIRD 
 
 1899 
 

 TV/O 
 
 COPIES RECEIVED. 
 
 Library of Congre«% 
 Office of th« 
 
 NOV 18 1899 
 
 Register of Copyright* 
 
 Copyright, 1899, by 
 CHAS. C. HASKELL & SON. 
 
 REGISTERED AT STATIONERS'' HALL, LONDON, ENGLAND. 
 
 A// rights reserved. 
 
 Half-tone Plates by 
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c 
 
INTRODUCTION. 
 
 Gen. STEWART L. WOODFORD, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to 
 
 the Court of Spain. 
 
 IT is an honor which I deeply appreciate to be asked to 
 write these introductory words to such a noteworthy col- 
 lection of papers as this volume contains. 
 
 The island of Cuba suffered during many years from unrest, 
 disorder and civil war. For about half the time between 1868 
 and 1898 it was the theatre of struggles which wasted its 
 resources and destroyed nearly one quarter of its population. 
 So continuous had been these struggles and so dreadful their 
 results that in our last Presidential canvass both our great 
 political parties practically pledged themselves to such action 
 by our Government as should restore order and compel peace 
 in Cuba. Spain was three thousand miles distant and Cuba 
 was less than one hundred miles from our coast. The burden 
 and the duty of humanity were upon us, and our people of 
 all sections and all parties recognized this duty and accepted 
 this burden. 
 
 In March, 1897, President McKinley was inaugurated. As 
 soon as the more pressing needs of internal administration 
 and revenue legislation had been met, he addressed himself to 
 the settlement of the Cuban question. He recognized that it 
 was, in the largest and broadest sense, a national question and 
 was not to be considered and solved upon partisan considera- 
 tions or through party agencies alone. He retained at Havana 
 as Consul-General a distinguished Democrat, appointed to 
 
4 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 that pivotal post by President Cleveland. This was Fitzhugh 
 Lee, who had been a gallant soldier of the Confederacy during 
 our own Civil War and after that war a Governor of Virginia. 
 He sent as Minister to Madrid a citizen of New York, who 
 had served in the Union Army and who was in his personal 
 politics a Republican. The new American Minister started 
 for his post on the 28th of July, 1897. Shortly after his arri- 
 val at London, he learned of the assassination of the Spanish 
 Prime Minister, Senor Canovas. There were short delays at 
 London and Paris, and on the 1st of September the American 
 representative reached San Sebastian, where the Queen 
 Regent of Spain was holding her summer Court. His formal 
 presentation to Her Majesty soon followed, and his negotia- 
 tions with the Spanish Government in relation to Cuba were 
 promptly begun. Those negotiations, whether oral or written, 
 were, from the beginning to the end, straightforward, open and 
 direct and were conducted on the lines of what has come to 
 be known as the " New American Diplomacy." At the out- 
 set the American Minister authorized the Spanish Govern- 
 ment to publish freely and fully whatever communication he 
 should make to them. 
 
 The instructions of the President were firm, yet friendly, 
 and were sincerely in behalf of justice and peace. Those 
 instructions the American Minister sought to carry out to 
 the best of his ability. When war at last came, it was 
 because war was inevitable. The President had done all that 
 a strong and wise man could do for peace, with justice to 
 Cuba and with due regard to the great American interests in 
 that island. At the beginning the President sought the estab- 
 lishment of those conditions in Cuba which should make per- 
 manent peace possible and tendered to Spain the good offices 
 of the United States for securing this result. That offer was 
 unfortunately never accepted. 
 
INTRODUCTION. 5 
 
 The first formal note from the American Minister was 
 delivered on the 23rd of September. Within a few days 
 thereafter the members of the Spanish Conservative Cabinet 
 resigned. They were succeeded early in October by a Liberal 
 Ministry under the presidency of Senor Sagasta. This seemed 
 a distinct gain for the cause of peace. 
 
 General Weyler had been in absolute command of Cuba 
 since the spring of 1896. It was generally understood that 
 he had received assurance from the Spanish Government 
 that he should be given at least two years, or until the 
 spring of 1898, within which to work out his own policy of 
 suppressing the Cuban insurrection. His administration as 
 Captain-General in Cuba was not acceptable to the conscience 
 of the American people and was disapproved by American 
 public opinion. His well-known baiuios or military decrees, in 
 regard to the rccouccntrados and the export of tobacco, were 
 believed by our people to be directly responsible for much of 
 the horrible suffering then known to exist in Cuba. I did not 
 then believe and I do not now believe that it would have been 
 possible to keep peace between Spain and the United States 
 until Christmas, 1897, had General Weyler remained in com- 
 mand of Cuba until that Christmas. The change of Ministry 
 therefore seemed to me at the time a distinct gain in the 
 interest of peace. 
 
 Senor Sagasta during the preceding month of June, before 
 the assassination of Senor Canovas and while Sagasta was 
 only the leader of a party out of power, had issued a procla- 
 mation or manifesto in the name of the Liberal Party. In 
 this document he had discussed very freely and fully the con- 
 dition of affairs in Cuba and had promised, if the Liberal 
 Party were again entrusted with the Government of Spain, 
 that General Weyler should be recalled and that an enlarged 
 and ef^cient system of autonomy should be established in 
 
6 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 Cuba. The Sagasta Ministry came in. General Weyler was 
 recalled. Decrees granting enlarged autonomy were prepared 
 and promulgated. 
 
 The President dwelt upon these things in his message to 
 our Congress when that body met in December, 1897, and 
 expressed his earnest hope that humane methods of warfare 
 and sincere and effective autonomy might bring rest, order 
 and enduring peace in Cuba. 
 
 The American Government and people waited with patient 
 benevolence. Meanwhile the war continued. Order was not 
 restored in the rural districts. The disease was too deeply 
 rooted. It was the result of methods four centuries old, and 
 mutual distrust and hatred could not be eradicated or even 
 assuaged in weeks or months. Possibly they may not be in 
 years. The camps of the reconcentrados were not broken up. 
 Disease and starvation kept on in their deadly work of deci- 
 mating the people. Peace did not come, and the necessity 
 for action by the United States grew each day more evident 
 and more imperative. 
 
 Then occurred an incident which had immediate, serious 
 and far-reaching effect. Some time during the winter, a pri- 
 vate letter from the then Spanish Minister at Washington to 
 a prominent Spaniard, who was visiting Cuba, was dis- 
 covered at Havana. It was published by the American press 
 and its authenticity was admitted by its writer. It con- 
 tained expressions of opinion with regard to autonomy and 
 concerning our President which caused natural, immediate 
 and widespread doubt among many of our most conservative 
 people, whether Spain was acting with sincerity and in good 
 faith in this vital matter of autonomy. These suspicions may 
 have been unjust, but they were natural and even inevitable. 
 So far as the Sagasta Ministry and her Majesty the Queen 
 Regent were concerned I am sure that they were unjust. I 
 
INTRODUCTION. 7 
 
 believe that both the Ministry and the Queen Regent tried 
 loyally and in good faith to grant and enforce such autonomy 
 as they thought would secure peace and order. This state- 
 ment is due to them and to history. In practice the autonomy 
 which they offered proved insufficient. Revolutions never go 
 backward, and events in Cuba were not to be an exception to 
 this historic rule. But if the trusted representative of Spain at 
 Washington thought what he wrote about autonomy, it was 
 natural and inevitable for all Americans to fear that the Span- 
 ish authorities in Cuba might think the same and that thus in 
 practice autonomy might prove a delusion and a snare. The 
 mischief had been done, and a grave element of doubt and 
 distrust had been added to a situation already very tense and 
 difficult. One private letter from a public man seems a little 
 matter but there is large truth and enduring application in 
 the old adage that " it is the last straw which breaks the 
 camel's back." 
 
 The Spanish Minister at Washington at once telegraphed 
 his resignation to his Government at Madrid. He did this 
 before any communication had been received by our Minister 
 at Madrid from our Government at Washington. Imme- 
 diately on receiving a communication from our Government, 
 the American Minister sought an interview with the Spanish 
 Foreign Office, but before such interview was accorded, the 
 Spanish Government had accepted the resignation of the 
 Spanish Minister at Washington. Serious interviews and cor- 
 respondence followed, and finally the Spanish Government 
 made representations and explanations of such a character 
 that they were accepted as being full and ample reparation, 
 and this unfortunate and untimely incident was diplomaticall\- 
 declared to be satisfactorily closed. But the mischief had 
 been done and its evil effect remained to the end. 
 
 Meanwhile there had been a second and far more serious 
 
8 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 matter, and one whose seriousness was aggravated by what had 
 just occurred. The United States Steamer Maine had gone 
 on a friendly visit to the Harbor of Havana. The Spanish 
 cruiser Vizcaya had been ordered on a return visit of cour- 
 tesy to the Port of New York. On the night of February 
 15, while anchored in the Harbor of Havana, at a buoy, 
 indicated by the Spanish authorities, and while under 
 the protection which the ships of a friendly Government 
 are entitled to enjoy from the Government in whose 
 waters they lie, the steamer J/^/;/^ was blown up and destroyed 
 with the loss of 266 of our sailors. In the excited and tense 
 condition of public opinion there came at once the horrible 
 suspicion of foul play and of an external cause for the awful 
 catastrophe. With a wisdom that cannot be too highly com- 
 mended. Captain Sigsbee at once telegraphed the Navy Depart- 
 ment reporting the loss of his vessel and asking suspension of 
 judgment as to its cause. The American people are just and 
 waited to know the facts before they should form a final 
 opinion and fix the responsibility. A Naval Court of 
 Inquiry was ordered, and the report of that body was that 
 the explosion of the ill-fated Maine was due to external 
 causes. If any doubt still remained, that doubt was finally 
 and forever removed when the phenomena of the internal 
 explosions of iron-clad war-vessels were so clearly shown in 
 the Spanish ships which were run ashore in the sea fight off 
 Santiago Harbor and which, having been set on fire, were 
 destroyed by the explosion of their own magazines. The ribs 
 of these vessels were bent outward, while the ribs of the 
 Maine were bent inward. 
 
 Negotiations continued, but the end was drawing nigh. 
 Patriotic people and thoughtful people sought peace. The 
 Queen at Madrid and the President at Washington were alike 
 earnest in their desire and in their efforts for peace. The 
 
INTRODUCTION. (g 
 
 Spanish Government had recalled General Weyler, and had 
 offered as large autonomy to Cuba as military and political 
 opinion in Spain would permit. It was the misfortune of 
 Spain that Spanish statesmen did not believe that they could 
 do or ought to do the only things that would have assured 
 peace. Those things were the declaration and enforcement 
 of an immediate armistice and the prompt taking of steps 
 looking to the removal of the Spanish flag from Cuba. Ac- 
 cording to the best judgment I could then form, the leaders 
 of Spanish opinion believed that the granting of independence 
 to Cuba meant immediate and possibly successful revolution 
 in Spain. They chose between war with us and the over- 
 throw of the Alphonso Dynasty, It might be possible to 
 have war with us and thereby lose Cuba and yet save the 
 Dynasty. While, should Spain grant freedom to Cuba, she 
 must lose the Island and possibly her King. It is not for 
 me, a stranger to Spain and an American, to decide as to tlie 
 wisdom or unwisdom of this judgment. Whatever any may 
 have thought then, it is now evident that no compromise as 
 to Cuba was possible. The forces bred and born of four 
 centuries of Spanish rule and of nearly three centuries of 
 American neighborhood and example were at work. Cuba 
 could not remain Spanish. She must become independent or 
 American, and war was the last and only possible solution. 
 
 As I look back I can see that the incident of the JA?/av, 
 coming close on the heels of the discovered letter, created 
 conditions which made peaceful solution practically impossi- 
 ble. I did not then so believe. I did then believe that 
 immediate and efTective armistice would be followed by such 
 negotiations as would secure local independence and the final 
 and peaceful removal of the Spanish flag from Cuba. 
 Whether this belief was right or wrong I did not succeed in 
 obtaining such armistice in time to be of any effect. The 
 
lo INTRODUCTION. 
 
 wishes of the American Government, as finally presented on 
 March 29, did not receive satisfactory reply in the final and 
 formal interview with Ministers Sagasta, Gullon and Moret on 
 March 31, and, in accordance with the directly expressed 
 purpose of our President, the entire Cuban question was 
 shortly laid by him before Congress. 
 
 What was done thereafter is matter of public history. On 
 the nineteenth of April, 1898, Congress took final action. Its 
 resolutions were approved by the President on April 20, 
 and a copy was at once communicated by our Secretary of 
 State to the Spanish Minister at Washington. This latter 
 ofificial immediately asked for his passports and left Washing- 
 ton en route for Canada. A copy of these resolutions with 
 appropriate instruction was telegraphed in open English and 
 not in cipher to the American Minister at Madrid. He 
 received this telegram at half-past two o'clock on the morn- 
 ing of April 21. At half-past seven o'clock on that morn- 
 ing he received the following note from the Spanish Foreign 
 Of^ce. As this note has been published by the Spanish 
 Government in their ofificial Red Book of April, 1898, it can 
 be given here without any violation of diplomatic usage or 
 courtesy. 
 
 Extract from Spanish Red Book, page 198: — 
 
 El Ministro de Estado 
 
 Al Ministro Plenipotenciario 
 
 DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS. 
 
 Palacio, 21 de Abril de 1898. 
 
 ExcMO SeNor : 
 MuySeNorMio: 
 
 En cumplimiento de un penoso deber, 
 tengo la honra de participar a V. E. que, sancionada por el 
 Presidente de la Republica una Resolucion de ambas Cama- 
 
INTRODUCTION. n 
 
 ras de los Estados Unidos que, al negar la legitima soberania 
 de Espafla y amenazar con una immediata intervencidn 
 armada en la Isla de Cuba, equivale a una evidente declara- 
 cidn de guerra, el Gobierno de S. M. ha ordenado a su 
 Ministro en Washington que se retire, sin perdida de tiempo, 
 del territorio norte-americano, con todo el personal de la Lega- 
 cidn. 
 
 Por este hecho quedan interrumpidas las relaciones diplo- 
 mdticas que de antiguo existian entre los dos paises, cesando 
 toda comunicaci6n oficial entre sus respectivos Representan- 
 tes, y me apresuro d ponerlo en conocimiento de V. E. a fin de 
 que adopte por su parte las disposiciones que crea conve- 
 nientes. 
 
 Ruego al propio tiempo d V. E. se sirva acusarme recibo de 
 esta Nota, y aprovecho, etc. 
 
 Firmado : Pio GULLON. 
 It is translated as follows : — 
 
 The Minister of State : 
 
 To THE Minister Plenipotentiary 
 OF the United States. 
 
 Palace, April 21, 1898. 
 
 Most Excellent Sir: 
 My Dear Sir : 
 
 In fulfilment of a painful duty, I have the honor 
 to make known to Your Excellency that, a resolution of both 
 Houses (Chambers) of the United States, having been approved 
 by the President of the Republic, which, by denying the 
 legitimate sovereignty of Spain and by threatening with an 
 immediate armed intervention in the island of Cuba, is equiva- 
 lent to an open (evident) declaration of war, the Government of 
 his Majesty has ordered his Minister in Washington to with- 
 draw without loss of time, from the North American terri- 
 tory, with all the members of the Legation. 
 
 By this fact the Diplomatic relations, which from of old 
 have existed between the two countries, are found to be 
 interrupted, all official communication between their respec- 
 
12 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 tive representatives ceasing, and I press myself to put this 
 in the knowledge of Your Excellency to the end that you 
 may adopt on your part the arrangements which you may 
 believe convenient, 
 
 I ask at the same time that Your Excellency may be 
 pleased to acknowledge to me the receipt of this note, and I 
 avail, etc. 
 
 (Signed) PlO GuLLON. 
 
 Spain had thus deliberately decided that the passage of the 
 resolutions by Congress and their approval by the President 
 constituted an Act of open war (evidente guerra) and had 
 broken ofT diplomatic relations between the two countries. 
 As it had been the duty and the desire of the American 
 Minister to do for peace all that was possible, so long as any- 
 thing was possible, so now it was his duty to act promptly as 
 the honor of his country required. He accepted at once the 
 challenge to arms which the Spanish Government had ten- 
 dered ; asked for his passports; received them at one 
 o'clock that afternoon, and at four o'clock started by express 
 train for Paris. The Spanish authorities showed him all pos- 
 sible courtesy on leaving and furnished him with an efficient 
 military escort to the French frontier. Except for slight 
 ' disorders by a mob at Valladolid and an unsuccessful attempt 
 to arrest his chief clerk before reaching the frontier, his journey 
 from Madrid to Paris was pleasant and free from annoying 
 incidents. 
 
 The war which followed lasted but little more than a hun- 
 dred days. It has sometimes been compared to Napoleon's 
 hundred days in Italy. But the resemblance is only in dura- 
 tion of time. Napoleon did not greatly change the map of 
 Europe for more than twenty years. The war with Spain has 
 changed the map and the future of the world forever. 
 
 That the final results of this war will be of real blessing to 
 
INTRODUCTION. 
 
 13 
 
 Spain, I firmly believe. She has marvelous opportunities. 
 Her area embraces many varieties of soil and climate. Indian 
 maize and the potato grow in the Basque Provinces and 
 the orange and the olive on the shores of the Mediter- 
 ranean while grapes are abundant everywhere. Her hills 
 are rich with iron, quicksilver, silver and gold. Her wheat 
 fields w'ere the granary of Rome centuries ago and are, 
 with like irrigation, as fertile to-day. On the Bay of Biscay, 
 the Atlantic and the Mediterranean she has a coast line of 
 nearly three thousand miles with sufficient and good harbors. 
 The peasant population are singularly patient, industrious, 
 frugal and even abstemiously temperate. When they shall 
 secure actual freedom and just opportunities for general edu- 
 cation, Spain should again become one of the most productive 
 countries of Europe. She ought also to be a successful 
 manufacturing and commercial nation. 
 
 I shall never forget the many acts of kindness and courtesy 
 everywhere and always received, alike from the Court and 
 from the plain people of Spain, and now that the war is over 
 and peace has come, I pray most earnestly that happiness 
 and prosperity may be and abide upon the people and the 
 land of Columbus. 
 
CONTENTS, 
 
 Shatter. Page. 
 
 Introduction, 
 
 GeiL Steivart L. Woodford. .... 3 
 I. History of Forimer Cuban Wars, 
 
 Brig.-Gen. Car/os Garcia. . . . .17 
 
 II. Cuba A(;ainst Spain. 1895 to 1898, 
 
 Brig.- Gen. Carlos Garcia. . . . „ 45 
 
 III. The Destruction of the Maine, 
 
 Lieut. Geo. F. //'. Ho! man., U.S. N. . . 91 
 
 IV. The Navai, Hai tle of Manila Bay, 
 
 Lic/ii. C. G. Calkins, U. S. N. . . . .103 
 
 V. StA'IEMICNI- of the SlNKlNO OF IHE MeRRIMAC, 
 
 Francis Kelly, U. S. S. New York, Flagsliip. . 129 
 VI. The Story of the Texas, 
 
 Cyrus S. Radford, Lieut. U. S. Marines. . 
 R. K. Crank, Asst. Engineer, U. S. N. . .143 
 VII, The Naval Battle of Sanitago, 
 
 Capt RobleyD. Evans, U. S. N. . . .155 
 
 VIII. The Voyage of the Oregon, 
 
 Lieut. IV. H. Allen, U. S. N. . . . .165 
 
 IX. The Santiacjo Campaign, 
 
 Maj.-Gcn. Wni. R. Shafter, U. S. V. . . 179 
 
 X. Miles's Campaign in Puerto Rico, 
 
 Capt. LLenry H. Whitney, A. A. G. . . . 199 
 
 XI. The Blockade of Cuba, 
 
 Capt. H. C. Taylor, U. S. N. . . . .219 
 
 XII. The Annexation of Hawaii, 
 
 Lion. Shelby M. Culloni. ..... 239 
 
 XIII. The Manila Campaign, 
 
 Maj.-Gen. Wesley Merritt, U. S. A. , . 263 
 
i6 
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 Chapter. Page. 
 
 XIV. The Work of the President, 
 
 Hon. Perry S. Heath. . . . , ,281 
 
 XV. War Legislation of the Senate, 
 
 Hon. J. IV. Daniel. . . . , . .297 
 
 XVI. Providing the " Sinews of War," 
 
 Hon. Nelson Ding ley. . . , , .325 
 XVII. The Navy Department in the War, 
 
 Hon. John D. Long. ..... 339 
 
 XVIII. Work of the Treasury Department, 
 
 Hon. Lyman J. Gage. . „ . . •367 
 XIX. U. S. Military Government of Santiago, 
 
 Maj.-Gen. Leonard Wood., U. S. V. . -393 
 
 XX. The Work of the Cuban Delegation, 
 
 Gen. T. Estrada Palnia. ..... 403 
 
 XXI. The Secret Service in the War, 
 
 Hon. John E. Wilkie. 423 
 
 XXII. Woman's Work in the War, 
 
 Mrs. Amos G. Draper 437 
 
 XXIII. Army and Navy Christian Commission, 
 
 Maj.-Gen. 0.0. Harvard. 457 
 
 XXIV. The Treaty of Peace, 
 
 Lion. John B as sett Moore. . . . . 47 1 
 XXV. What England Feels, 
 
 Hon. Justin McCarthy, M.F 487 
 
 XXVI. The Work of the Army as a Whole, 
 
 Maj.-Gen. Nelson A. Miles 509 
 
 Addendum, 
 
 Speech of Senator Redjield Proctor. . . .541 
 
 Appendix, 
 
 Messages, State Papers, etc. . . . .555 
 
 Chronological Table , 599 
 
^fi^-t^^-^^^^i^^^^ '^/y^^T^s^ 
 
 
 
CHAPTER I. 
 HISTORY OF FORMER CUBAN WARS. 
 
 BY 
 
 CARLOS GARCIA VELEZ, Brigadier-General 
 
 SINCE Columbus discovered Cuba, in October, 1492, that 
 beautiful Island of the world has been unceasingly the 
 arena of a wonderful struggle for freedom. 
 
 It is strange that Spain should have treated the natives of 
 all her extensive colonies with equal cruel barbarism, since 
 the Spanish people are not prejudiced against marrying and 
 mingling with all sorts of races. All the famous Spanish 
 captains married native women, regardless of birth or color, 
 as soon as they arrived at the colonies, and certainly tlie sol- 
 diers followed their example. Thus the colonies, after some 
 generations, were composed of Indians, Creoles and Spaniards. 
 The first of these people. Aboriginals, were the real owners of 
 the land; the second, descendants of native women and 
 Spaniards; the third, new employees and officials, mostly 
 adventurers of the worst class, who kept coming from Spain. 
 
 In Cuba the native Siboney Indian was a good type of a 
 physically well-developed race, with amiable and innocent 
 character, hospitable and graceful. In i 51 1, Columbus's son 
 sent 300 men, with Velazquez commanding, to take possession 
 of the Island. The Spaniards never employed kindness or di- 
 plomacy to gain control over the natives, but by brutal force 
 established Spanish sovereignty, trampling on their natural 
 rights and slaughtering those who resented their domination. 
 The Indian Siboney Chief Hatuey preferred to die at the 
 stake rather than submit to Velazquez's tyranny. When 
 Hatuey was dying, a Catholic priest approached him and 
 talked about the Almighty in Heaven, and urged him to pre- 
 
i8 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 pare his soul for the other workl. The noble Chief had lis- 
 tened attentively to the priest's exhortation, but suddenly he 
 asked him if in Heaven he would find any Spaniards? To 
 which the priest replied — " Oh, yes! " "Then, father," Hat- 
 uey said, " I would rather go to Hell." 
 
 The Indian slave trade was, from the outset, established in 
 the markets of Spain. Thousands were carried away from 
 their country to distant climes, and thousands were butchered 
 in the Island, to plunder them of their property. It is esti- 
 mated that over half a million perished thus in a short term 
 of years, and Cuba was rapidly depopulated. About this 
 time, Philip the second, the great monster and tyrant of the 
 Escorial, issued, through his counsel, fourteen laws for the 
 government of the Indians. To augment the decreasing pop- 
 ulation of Cuba, it was determined to take Africans there, and 
 the barbarous slave trade was established and carried on until 
 the latter part of the fifties of this century. Otherwise there 
 was no intercourse between Cuba and other parts of the world. 
 She was kept intellectually and commercially isolated under 
 the absorptive power of colonizing Spanish of^cers. 
 
 In the last third of the sixteenth century, a Captain-Gen- 
 eral was ordered to the Island. From that time until recent 
 years, the most despotic military rule has prevailed. According 
 to the personal characters of the different Spanish command- 
 ers, so was it governed well or ill, as it happened. 
 
 What marks a great change in Cuba's inhabitants is the 
 opening of the port of Havana to foreign trade in 1762. The 
 English attacked and captured the city from the Spanish and 
 immediately opened its port to commerce. This brought the 
 Cubans in contact with the world, particularly with the 
 United States ; and although the city was a year later surren- 
 dered to the Spaniards, who lost no time in re-establishing the 
 old system, the seed had been sown, and the well-to-do na- 
 tives began to send their children to American schools and 
 colleges, for in Cuba there were no suitable ones. The Gov- 
 ernment of Madrid, advised of this tendency among the rich 
 classes to educate their children in foreign countries of differ- 
 ent institutions and customs from the effete Castilian type, 
 published in the Gaceta of Madrid, in 1799, a Royal Decree 
 
HISTORY OF FORMER CUBAN WARS. 19 
 
 ordering that all Cuban parents should be advised and per- 
 suaded not to send their children away, on the ground that 
 only evil consequences could be expected from it. 
 
 Charles IV, King of Spain, busy with his hunting parties at 
 El Pardo, did not believe that the people should be taught 
 anything to their benefit, and his obliging and perfidious Min- 
 isters took good care to encourage his hunting mania, so as to 
 be more at ease in managing government affairs. In 1808, 
 Spain was invaded by the armies of Napoleon and the King 
 and Royal family were held prisoners in France. The Span- 
 ish people named a National Junta that should take the place 
 of their sporting King, and, in 18 10, the Junta issued a decree 
 convening the Cortes, authorizing and directing the people of 
 Spanish possessions in America to elect deputies to represent 
 them. 
 
 Cuba sent two representatives. A Constitution was adopted by 
 the Cortes of Cadiz, in 18 12, the first article of which declared 
 that the Spanish nation was composed of all the Spaniards of 
 both hemispheres and that all the inhabitants of those coun- 
 tries were entitled to representation in the Cortes. The war 
 to liberate themselves from the French was waging, and the 
 Spanish people fought hard and bravely for their Independ- 
 ence. It could hardly be expected that such people should 
 deny to the Cubans what they so dearly cherished for them- 
 selves ! The cynical and treacherous Fernando VII was put 
 on the throne in 18 14, and his first act of sovereignty was to 
 abolish the Constitution. Six years later he was compelled 
 to re-establish it, and then Cuba elected and sent to the Cor- 
 tes four deputies. 
 
 Again Fernando suppressed the Constitution in 1823. Nat- 
 urally, all the provinces and colonies became irritated because 
 of the King's despotism, and conspiracies began to be the 
 Cubans' only hope for throwing off the yoke of such a ruler. 
 Local passions were greatly excited also on account of the un- 
 conditional partiality and extremely unjust policy observed by 
 the Government, protecting, as it did, the corrupted Spanish 
 monopolists against the interests of the people. In that same 
 year, 1823, a conspiracy was betrayed to the Spanish authori- 
 ties at Santiago, and the famous Cuban poet Heredia, one of 
 
2G THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR, 
 
 the conspirators, was exiled for life, sentenced by the Audien- 
 cia of that city. 
 
 The King trusted only in coercive power to maintain the in- 
 tegrity of the Spanish dominions. On the 28th of March, 
 1825, the Gaceta de Madrid '^\x\i\\'^\Q.A the following Royal 
 Decree : 
 
 " His Majesty the King, our Seflor, desiring to obviate the 
 inconveniences which might result in extraordinary cases 
 from a division of command and from the interference of pow- 
 ers and prerogatives of the respective ofificers, for the import- 
 ant end of preserving in that precious Island his legitimate 
 sovereign authority and public tranquillity through proper 
 means, has resolved, in accordance with the opinion of his 
 Council of Ministers, to give to your Excellency the fullest 
 authority, bestowing upon you all the powers which by the 
 Royal Ordinances are granted to the Governors of besieged 
 cities. In consequence of this, his Majesty gives to your Ex- 
 cellency the most complete and unbounded power, not only 
 to send away from the Island any persons in office, whatever 
 be their occupation, rank, class or condition, whose conduct, 
 public or private, may alarm you, replacing them with persons 
 faithful to his Majesty and deserving of all the confidence of 
 your Excellency; but also to suspend the execution of any 
 order whatsoever, or any general provision made concerning 
 any branch of the Administration, as your Excellency may 
 think most suitable to the Royal Service." 
 
 Thus Fernando VII placed in Cuba a man invested with 
 power to dispose of life and property, — that is, his representa- 
 tive ; for in Spain, although the Royal Decree was not en- 
 forced, still the King put to death thousands of people 
 arbitrarily and without the knowledge of the courts of justice. 
 And, consider, such an infamous document as that Decree 
 has been in full force in the Island of Cuba until these very 
 civilized days, for it had not been revoked when the late war 
 broke out on the 24th of February, 1895. It seemed as if in 
 issuing the Decree, the Crown predicted the loss of the ever- 
 faithful Island forever to Spain, for in that same year, the 
 United States of America refused to guarantee Spain the 
 perpetual possession of Cuba in exchange for commercial 
 concessions. 
 
 In 1826, Francisco Aguero revolted with a small number of 
 
HISTORY OF FORMER CUBAN WARS. 21 
 
 men. All were captured and paid with their lives the pen- 
 alty of daring to repulse the Captain-General's despotism. 
 From that date, the Cubans have not rested one moment 
 from working and fighting for their independence ; uprisings, 
 revolts, conspiracies and revolutions have year after year 
 burst out, to be quenched in a bloody, barbarous manner 
 by the Spaniards. 
 
 The higher classes were greatly annoyed in 1828 with 
 another Decree, issued by the King, ordering that all students 
 then abroad should be at once called back to Cuba, that pa- 
 rents disobeying it should be punished, and that all those 
 having received education in the North should be held in 
 surveillance by the police and a careful record be kept of their 
 opinions and movements. That year there was an uprising : 
 in 1830 another, and in 1834 the Madrid Government sent, 
 as Captain-General of Cuba, General Tacon, a man of ener- 
 getic temper. He proved to be a despotic and brutal ruler, 
 who did his utmost to establish differences of classes. He 
 made two divisions of the inhabitants ; those that were born 
 in the Peninsula he called Espanolcs and those born in the 
 Island, he termed Cubafws. He sustained the idea that these 
 Cubafios were inferior people to the Spanish born, and con- 
 sequently treated them as such, and behold the real masters 
 of the country, the heirs and descendants of the conquerors 
 and founders of Cuba, converted into an inferior race, with- 
 out civil privileges of any kind and deprived of the personal 
 consideration due to them! The adventurer from Spain, 
 the new-comer fresh from the mother-land, the starved office- 
 seeker or the degraded and reckless member of an aristocratic 
 Spanish family was invariably considered and treated as of 
 a superior race, enjoying always the most prominent positions 
 and receiving the highest honors, in payment, no doubt, for 
 complicity in the numberless crimes perpetrated and sanc- 
 tioned by the Administration. 
 
 In 1835, General Narciso Lopez matured a conspiracy to 
 overthrow Spanish power in Cuba, attempted a revolt and 
 as unsuccessful. He was born in Venezuela; had been first 
 under Bolivar, but afterwards joined the Spanish Army and 
 f.Hight in the Carlist war; there he was made General of 
 
 w 
 
22 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 Division and sent to Cuba, where he resigned his commis- 
 sion and revolted. 
 
 In 1836, the Constitution of 1812 was revived and Cuba 
 was allowed to elect four deputies to the National Cortes. 
 In the following year, three of the deputies presented to the 
 Cortes at Madrid certificates of election, but they were not 
 recognized. General Tacon had informed the Government 
 that if the laws were to be changed in the Island, it would be 
 the loss of Cuba to Spain. The Spanish Treasury was very 
 poor and the Colonies were badly needed to build it up. 
 Besides, a Cuban representation in Cortes meant that the 
 level of the Cuban people must be raised higher and neces- 
 sarily the deputies, after being admitted to the Cortes, would 
 open the eyes of their people, candidly informing them what 
 was expected of Cuba and what would be done with it. The 
 Minister of Finance, in the Cortes on March 25, 1837, pro- 
 tested against any change " that may endanger the consider- 
 able contributions with which those countries are helping the 
 mother-land." The Cuban deputies received the following 
 reply from the Spanish representative, Sefior Sancho, on 
 April 3 : — 
 
 " It is said that the Government has changed its opinion. 
 Some of the deputies may believe that such a change has 
 taken place. I believe that it is not so, and no one is better 
 informed than I am. The Government never entertained the 
 opinion that the American deputies should be called. On the 
 contrary, it has always looked upon this as an evil which should 
 be remedied as soon as possible." 
 
 The Government was consulted and decided that the Con- 
 stitution should not be extended to those countries, and that as 
 few deputies as possible should come from them. The Cuban 
 deputies filed a protest against their exclusion, and the 
 Cortes appointed a Committee to look into the matter; its 
 report was as follows : — 
 
 " In future, the American and Asiatic provinces should be 
 governed by special laws, and their deputies should not be 
 admitted into the Cortes." This resolution was adopted by 
 the Cortes, and Cuba was deprived of her right of representa- 
 tion in them. 
 
HISTORY OF FORMER CUBAN WARS. 23 
 
 Placido, colored, the most popular Cuban poet, was arrested 
 in 1845, tried and accused of conspiracy. He pleaded inno- 
 cent of the charge — he really was not implicated in the affair 
 — but the Spanish sentenced him to die by garrote. His 
 celebrated and well-known " Plegaria," composed just before 
 his death, proves his innocence. He was executed on the 
 27th of June, 1845. 
 
 Cuban refugees in the United States had greatly increased 
 in these years, owing to the active persecution of the Spanish 
 authorities in the Island. All the uprisings were secretly 
 aided by the refugees, and when General Narciso Lopez, in 
 1849, went to the States, he was received by many sympa- 
 thizers and was helped effectively alike by Cubans and 
 Americans. 
 
 This fact gave occasion for the issuing of a Proclamation 
 by President Taylor, on the nth of August of that year, 
 which read as follows : 
 
 By the President of the United States : 
 
 A PROCLAMATION. 
 
 There is reason to believe that an armed expedition is about 
 to be fitted out in the United States with an intention to 
 invade the Island of Cuba or some of the provinces of Mexico. 
 The best information which the Executive has been able to 
 obtain points to the Island of Cuba as the object of this 
 expedition. It is the duty of this government to observe the 
 faith of treaties and to prevent any aggression by our citizens 
 upon the territories of friendly nations. I have, therefore, 
 thought it necessary and proper to issue this proclamation, to 
 warn all citizens of the United States who shall connect 
 themselves with any enterprise so grossly in violation of our 
 laws and our treaty obligations, that they will thereby subject 
 themselves to the heavy penalties denounced against them by 
 our acts of Congress, and will forfeit their claim to the protec- 
 tion of their country. No such persons must expect the 
 interference of this government, in any form, on their behalf, 
 no matter to what extremities they may be reduced in conse- 
 quence of their conduct. An enterprise to invade the territo- 
 ries of a friendly country set on foot and prosecuted within 
 the limits of the United States, is, in the highest degree, 
 criminal, as tending to endanger the peace and compromise 
 
1^4) THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 the honor of this nation; and, therefore, I exhort all good 
 citizens, as they regard our national reputation, as they 
 respect their own laws and the laws of nations, as they value 
 the blessings of peace and the welfare of their country, to 
 discountenance and prevent, by all lawful means, any such 
 enterprise ; and I call upon every of^cer of this government, 
 civil or military, to use all efforts in his power to arrest, for 
 trial and punishment, every such offender against the laws 
 providing for the performance of our sacred obligations to 
 friendly powers. 
 
 Given under my hand the eleventh day of August, in the year 
 of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and forty-nine, and 
 the seventy-fourth of the independence of the United States. 
 
 Z. Taylor. 
 By the President : 
 
 J. M. ChAYTO^S, Secretary of State. 
 
 General Lopez sailed from New Orleans in 1850, with an 
 expedition composed of 400 Americans and 200 Cubans, and 
 landed and captured the city of Cardenas, a port on the north- 
 ern coast of the Island. The Governor of the city was taken 
 prisoner and Lopez proceeded on his march inland, where he 
 was defeated and driven back by the Spanish. The Cubans 
 had not been fully prepared for the movement, and it was ru- 
 mored throughout the Island that Lopez was an annexation- 
 ist to the United States, which kept many revolutionists from 
 lending him valuable aid in the field. The great enthusiasm 
 roused by Lopez in the States, the constant applications of 
 men wanting to enlist with him and the protests of the Span- 
 ish Minister, caused President Fillmore to give the following 
 proclamation : — 
 
 Bj' the President of the United States of A nierica : 
 
 A PROCLAMATION. 
 
 Whereas, there is reason to believe that a military expedition 
 is about to be fitted out in the United States with intention 
 to invade the Island of Cuba, a colony of Spain, with which 
 this country is at peace ; 
 
 And, Whereas, it is believed that this expedition is instigated 
 and set on foot chiefly by foreigners who dare to make our 
 shores a scene of their guilty and hostile preparations against 
 a friendly power, and seek by falsehood and misrepresenta- 
 
HISTORY OF FORMER CUBAN WARS. 25 
 
 tion to seduce our own citizens, especially the young and in- 
 considerate, into their wicked schemes — an ungrateful return 
 for the benefit conferred upon them by this people, in permit- 
 ting them to make our country an asylum from oppression, — 
 and in flagrant abuse of the hospitality thus extended to 
 them ; 
 
 And, Whereas, such expeditions can only be regarded as ad- 
 ventures for plunder and robbery, and must meet the condem- 
 nation of the civilized world, whilst they are derogatory to 
 the character of our country, in violation of the laws of na- 
 tions, and expressly prohibited by our own ; our statutes de- 
 claring "that if any person shall, within the territory of juris- 
 diction of the United States, begin or set on foot, or provide 
 or prepare the means for, any military expedition or enterprise, 
 to be carried on from thence against the territory or domin- 
 ions of any foreign prince or state, or of any colony, district, 
 or people, with whom the United States are at peace, every 
 person, so offending, shall be deemed guilty of a high misde- 
 meanor, and shall be fined not exceeding three thousand dol- 
 lars, and imprisonment not more than three years ; 
 
 Now, Therefore, I have issued this, my Proclamation, warn- 
 ing all persons who shall connect themselves with any such 
 enterprise or expedition in violation of our laws and national 
 obligations that they will thereby subject themselves to the 
 heavy penalties denounced against such offenses, and will for- 
 feit their claim to the protection of this government, or any 
 interference in their behalf, no matter to what extremities 
 they may be reduced in consequence of their illegal conduct. 
 And therefore, I exhort all good citizens, as they regard our 
 national reputation, as they respect their own laws and the 
 laws of nations, as they value the blessings of peace and 
 the welfare of their country, to discountenance, and, by all 
 lawful means, prevent any such enterprise ; and I call upon 
 every officer of this government, civil or military, to use all ef- 
 forts in his power, to arrest for trial and punishment every 
 such offender against the laws of the country. 
 
 Given under my hand, the twenty-fifth day of April, in the 
 year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and fifty-one, 
 and the seventy-fifth of the independence of the United 
 States. 
 
 Millard Fillmore. 
 By the President : 
 
 W. S. Derrick, Acting Secretary of State. 
 
 General Lopez went to Key West after his defeat and set 
 to work immediately on the organization of another rc\o!u- 
 
26 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 tionary movement. On the I2th of August, 185 1, he disem- 
 barked at Las Pozas, Pniar del Rio. The Spanish General 
 eno-ao-ed him in a fight shortly after and a fierce battle took 
 place. Lopez fought bravely, but was again defeated and cap- 
 tured. He was executed as a common outlaw by the garrote. 
 On the scaffold, he cried out these words, that are still ring- 
 ing in every Spaniard's ears: "Tyrants! My death in noth- 
 ing changes the destinies of Cuba ! " 
 
 In 1854, an American, General Kitman, attempted to lead 
 an expedition to Cuba, aided by Betancourt, but was not suc- 
 cessful. The conspiracies continued to work their way, and 
 occasionally some one captured would be plunged into an 
 African dungeon or banished to the insalubrious island of Fer- 
 nando Poo, or publicly executed as an outlaw. But heedless 
 of banishment or death, the desire for independence was 
 clearly manifested throughout the country and the Cubans 
 felt it deeply rooted in their hearts. With hopes for the fu- 
 ture, they persevered in their great ideal. 
 
 Much worriment was produced in the guilt}^ consciences of 
 the Spanish Ministers, when it was asserted that the symptoms 
 of a near-coming revolution in Cuba were plainly seen and 
 felt by every one. To appease their own discomfort, more 
 than with intentions of yielding to a suffering people's entreaty, 
 the Spanish Government ordered that the Cubans should 
 elect Commissioners to go to Madrid, and recommend there 
 to the Government such reforms and laws as, in their judg- 
 ment, would satisfy the people. In 1866, the Minister of 
 Ultramar, Don Antonio Canovas del Castillo, called to Madrid 
 the Committee of Information, as it was termed, composed of 
 sixteen prominent Cubans chosen by election. The Committee 
 reached Madrid and gave the report of their people's wants. 
 The Cabinet dismissed the Committee, with the promise that 
 due study would be given to the claims presented. In 1867, 
 taxes were largely increased, so much so that the farmers and 
 land-owners, unable to pay the exorbitant dues, presented 
 themselves in a body to the authorities for the purpose of giv- 
 ing up their property instead. The Government never an- 
 swered one word to the petitions made by the Committee of 
 Information, and at last the Cubans realized the fact that, if 
 
HISTORY OF FORMER CUBAN WARS. 27 
 
 they wanted their rights, they must fight for them. Members 
 of the principal Cuban famiHes began to conspire against the 
 Government throughout the Island, the following being the 
 names of the principal conspirators ; from the province of 
 Oriente : 
 
 Francisco Vicente Aguilera, of a distinguished family and a 
 wealthy land and slave owner of Oriente. 
 
 Francisco Maceo Osorio, of a distinguished family and a 
 man of uncommon intellectual ability (not connected with 
 Generals A. and J. Maceo, afterwards so famous as leaders). 
 
 Manuel de Jesus Calvar, planter. 
 
 Tomas Estrada Palma, of a distinguished family and a rich 
 land proprietor. 
 
 Bartolome Maso, of a prominent family and a rich land 
 proprietor. 
 
 Luis and Pedro Figueredo, of a rich and distinguished 
 family. 
 
 Calixto Garcia Yniguez, of a prominent family of merchants 
 and a rich land proprietor. 
 
 Vicente Garcia, rich proprietor of Tunas, and 
 
 Carlos M. de Cespedes, of a prominent and rich family. 
 
 All these were native-born Cubans. 
 
 Besides these well-known gentlemen, others no less distin- 
 guished took part in the secret meetings held in Bayamo, 
 namely, Juan Hall, Luis Marcano, Elijio Yzaguirre, Julio 
 Grave de Pcralta and Manuel Codina. At a secret meeting 
 held at the plantation El Rosario, it was decided that the 
 revolutionary movement should take place on the 14th of 
 October, and Cespedes was elected leader. The plot was 
 betrayed to the Governor of Manzanillo and the conspirators 
 were compelled to anticipate the day of the uprising. Orders 
 were hastily issued to that effect everywhere, and although 
 the opportunity was considered hopelessly lost, Carlos M. de 
 Cespedes, at Vara, on the 10th of October, 1868, with about 
 120 men, badly armed and equipped, revolted against the 
 tyrannical oppressors. He was quickly followed by Cubans 
 from every part of the country, regardless of class or standing, 
 and the heroic struggle for independence was commenced 
 between Cuba, the beautiful little Island, the most noble an 1 
 
28 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 generous country on earth, driven to frantic desperation, and 
 the powerful, cruel and surly Spain. History does not regis- 
 ter in its pages a more heroic struggle with such great odds. 
 On one side a handful of patriots, unarmed and unskilled in 
 warfare, foodless and nude, with all the weight of interna- 
 tional laws applied against whatever help they might expect 
 to receive from foreign countries ; and on the other, an army 
 of veterans, well armed and equipped with all the resources 
 that money could secure, backed by ly, 000,000 of people and 
 honored by all the nations of the world. 
 
 An idea of the noble character of the men of the revolution 
 can be obtained by considering that Francisco V. Aguilera, 
 one of the leaders, after refusing a foreigner, shortly before 
 the uprising, six hundred thousand dollars for his slaves on 
 the plantation Santa Gertrudis, when the war broke out, sum- 
 moned all his blacks and spoke to them thus: 
 
 " Until this glorious day, you have been my slaves. From 
 now hence you are to be my friends. I give to each of you 
 your liberty, so that you may choose the mode of life that 
 may suit you best, and by so doing I relinquish all dominion 
 over you ; but those that would accompany me to battle are 
 welcome; you, to struggle for your civil liberty, and we for 
 our political rights." 
 
 Those six hundred slaves followed Aguilera to the revolu- 
 tion and fought and perished for Cuba's freedom. 
 
 On the 4th of November, 1868, the province of Camaguey 
 seconded the Yara movement, Ignacio Agramonte, a rich and 
 distinguished gentleman of Puerto Principe, commanding the 
 revolted party. The revolution abolished slavery with the de- 
 cree of the 27th of December, 1868. More than half of the 
 Island joined the revolution. Old and young, women and 
 children, all swarmed to the country, to fields and woods, and 
 fled from towns and villages held by the Spaniards. They 
 carried but scanty garments with them; they left everything be- 
 hind, abandoning comfort and luxury for the sake of being near 
 their sons, husbands and brothers. What these families suf- 
 fered during the ten years war, is difficult to describe, even if it 
 be done hurriedly and in a condensed manner. Thousands per- 
 ished from famine, disease and exposure ; many were barbar- 
 
HISTORY OF FORMER CUBAN WARS. 29 
 
 ously sacrificed by the Spanish guerrillas. At times they 
 were a great benefit to the patriots, but afterwards were a bur- 
 den to them. At any rate, it was preferable to know^ that 
 they died of famine, honorably, in the country of the noble 
 and brave, rather than to live in the prostituted garrisoned cit- 
 ies where honor had to be traded for bread. 
 
 It has been unjustly said by some writers, that the revolu- 
 tion did not succeed because it was the product of the plans of 
 a few gentlemen, and that it had not risen from the lower 
 classes of the inhabitants. The fact is, that the revolution 
 was felt and yearned for by the majority of Cubans in the Is- 
 land, long before the uprising. The Guajiro in his character 
 and habits is a model of the conservative, old-fashioned farmer ; 
 but he loves dearly the independence of his country, never 
 hesitates to give up his peaceful occupation to lead the roam- 
 ing and dangerous life of the soldier and to die fighting for 
 Cuba Libre. He has been the constant sufferer in Cuba's re- 
 volts and he feels very proud to be able to say so. 
 
 The ten years war was not successful, not only because all 
 the Cubans did not go to the field, many being bribed by the 
 Spanish to remain during all the struggle with them, directly 
 or indirectly harming the success of the revolution — but other 
 important features besides those mentioned have to be con- 
 sidered, to appreciate fully the situation. 
 
 The conspiracy was not suf^ciently extended and organized 
 throughout the Island, with appointed leaders in each locality 
 or zone, to rise powerful and menacing from the very first 
 day. Nearly every one was a partisan, individually, of the rev- 
 olutionary movement, but he had no understanding or connec- 
 tion on the subject with his neighbor. The conspiracy was 
 betrayed before the necessary arrangements had been made. 
 When Cespedes, fearing that all was lost, anticipated the 
 plans and revolted in Yara, the news took the majority of the 
 initiates by surprise. 
 
 It must be remembered, too, that Cuba is a narrow strip of 
 land, without the necessary war resources and conveniences. 
 It has never had manufactures of any kind. Being an island 
 with numerous ports and harbors which have to be defended 
 or protected by ships and sailors, it has not had artillery and 
 
30 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 ammunition, and provisions to feed the army. True, the Cu- 
 bans could have obtained all these, if they had been recog- 
 nized as belligerents by one or more of the strong powers ; but 
 they failed to get recognition, and it may be said with aston- 
 ishment and admiration, that they have fought gallantly and 
 tenaciously, the largest colonial war on record, to obtain their 
 independence. 
 
 A few battles of that war, which will be mentioned in the 
 course of this narrative, will show that the Cubans, besides be- 
 ing good, enduring patriots, were plucky, intelligent, self-made 
 soldiers, with many good commanders to lead them to vic- 
 tory. 
 
 A garrison of over 300 Spanish regulars held the City of 
 Bayamo when the war broke out. Cespedes marched toward 
 the city with about 500 men, mostly unarmed, their weapons 
 being shot guns, revolvers, machetes and farming tools. The 
 revolutionists made their way into the city and drove the 
 Spaniards to a fort, where the defeated garrison took refuge. 
 The inexperienced patriots were thronging the streets in wild 
 joy at their success, when suddenly the Spanish cavalry, pro- 
 tected by infantry, made a sally which caused considerable 
 confusion ; the commanders, however, promptly checked it 
 and a hand-to-hand fight took place. The Spaniards were de- 
 feated with heavy loss; nearly all their casualties were 
 made with the machete. 
 
 The first town liberated from the Spanish was Jiguany, sit- 
 uated inland about seventy-five miles from Santiago; it was 
 captured by the patriots, under Calixto Garcia and Donato 
 Marmol. 
 
 Another important victory was reported on the 27th of Oc- 
 tober, 1868, for the Cuban forces. Donato Marmol, at Baire, 
 had had a successful engagement with the enemy. Marmol 
 from that time became very popular, singularly so with the 
 colored Cuban troops. He deserved the popularity because 
 the Baire victory gave much prestige to the Yara Revolution. 
 Thousands of patriots followed and obeyed him and called 
 him their general, and the leader became the principal fight- 
 ing figure of the war. He commanded about 4,000 poorly 
 armed men, blacks being in the majority. Prominent officers 
 
HISTORY OF FORMER CUBAN WARS. 31 
 
 have subsequently stated that Marmol's command was con- 
 sidered in those days the only hope for the success of the rev- 
 olution. He was ordered to occupy an advantageous and 
 strategic position on the Bayamo bank of the Cauto river, at 
 Cauto Embarcadero, about eighteen miles from that city, 
 whence any approach of the enemy could be readily seen and 
 checked, whether it came from Holguin, Tunas or Manzanillo. 
 Furthermore, it was known that the Spanish General Val- 
 maceda was marching toward Bayamo, 2,000 men strong, for 
 the purpose of attacking and routing the revolutionary forces 
 before they had time and opportunity to become organized. 
 Cauto Embarcadero was the best position imaginable to fight 
 with advantage a strong, well-armed, disciplined foe. The river 
 was not passable without the aid of pontoons or canoes. The 
 position held by Marmol was therefore impregnable, having, 
 as he had, the enemy on the other side of the river. Valmaceda 
 had camped between the rivers Salado and Cauto, being har- 
 assed by General Modesto Diaz, with another Cuban column, 
 from the opposite bank of the Salado river^ — a very tight 
 place for the Spaniards indeed, considering that they could 
 not retreat or proceed witliout suffering positive defeat. 
 General Marmol had strict orders not to move from Cauto, 
 but having been informed that General Diaz might at any 
 moment make a formal attack on the Spanish, and ambitious 
 not to lose an opportunity to rout the enemy, not stopping to 
 consider the disadvantages of a reckless attack and its probable 
 fatal consequences, he abandoned his Cauto camp, advanced 
 and attacked the Spanish lines at Saladillo with extraordinary 
 vigor and bravery. The Cubans had their few archaic fire 
 arms, machetes and spears of Yara ; the Spaniards, modern 
 rifles, plenty of ammunition and artillery. The result was 
 easy to imagine. Marmol's first line advanced furiously 
 against Valmaceda's force, which met tlie advance steadily, 
 and after a bitter contest the Spaniards brought their artillery 
 fire to bear so successfully upon the Cubans that they fell 
 back in confusion. The second line then entered the fray and 
 stood its ground more determinedly than the first. Some of 
 the Cubans were pierced with bayonets just when they had 
 reached the enemy's artillery pieces. But the effect of 
 
32 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 Spanish musketry fire and the accuracy with which it was 
 delivered caused the assailants to fall back in utter dismay. 
 Assault upon assault was repelled and the day ended, giving 
 the victory to Valmaceda, while Marmol, badly defeated, 
 made his retreat with heavy losses. 
 
 Valmaceda then proceeded unchecked to Bayamo, where 
 the news of the disaster had spread. The inhabitants deter- 
 mined to burn every house in the city and join the Cubans, so 
 that the Spaniards should find only ashes as they entered. 
 When Valmaceda arrived at Bayamo, he marched through the 
 streets blocked by ruins and ashes, and decided to camp amid 
 them. At one end of the city an antique structure named 
 Torre de Zarragoitia lay untouched by fire, having escaped the 
 conflagration. Valmaceda, in order to take vengeance on the 
 fleeing inhabitants, erected over it a fort which became famous 
 during the war for the crimes that were perpetrated from it. 
 
 The disaster of Saladillo was the severest blow that the 
 struggle for freedom could receive. Marmol's defeat was the 
 defeat of the rising revolution. After that it rallied several 
 times, but never again recovered the probabilities of success 
 that it had prior to the battle of Saladillo. 
 
 Then Valmaceda issued that inhuman Bando, giving to 
 his soldiers full power to kill and plunder all those that 
 should be captured about the country, and ordering the perse- 
 cution of families in order to compel the inhabitants to return 
 to the towns under his rule. A period of terror in the Island 
 was inaugurated by the Spanish. All prisoners were shot and 
 the property of the revolutionists or suspects was confiscated 
 without right of appeal. Caballero de Rodas, Montaner, 
 Weyler and Gonzalez Boet, all of fiendish character, were 
 Valmaceda's satraps. The narrative of their crimes and 
 victims would cover many hundred pages. All these infamies 
 were committed with the knowledge and approval of the 
 Spanish Peninsular Revolutionary Government, who professed 
 to be fighting for freedom and citizenship in Spain. 
 
 The representative' of the Cubans in the United States, 
 Senor Jose Morales Lemus, protested against the Bando of 
 Valmaceda and the arbitrary confiscation of property. Al- 
 though he was not recognized in his official capacity, the Ad- 
 
HISTORY OF FORMER CUBAN WARS. 33 
 
 ministration took notice of the Spanisii general's Ukase, and 
 the Secretary of State, Mr. Hamilton Fish, wrote to the Span- 
 ish Minister to the United States, Senor Lopez Roberts, the 
 following letter: 
 
 " In the interest of Christian civilization and common hu- 
 manity, I hope that this document is a forgery. If it indeed 
 be genuine, the President instructs me, in the most forcible 
 manner, to protest against such mode of warfare." 
 
 But the Spaniards continued their villainies, and old and 
 young were slaughtered every day. The attitude of indiffer- 
 ence observed by the nations during this special period of 
 terror in Cuba, can be qualified only as cowardly, mean and 
 criminal. The poor families suffered greatly without food or 
 shelter, pursued across fields and woods, and lacking garments 
 to cover their naked bodies. The patriots too, were suffering 
 from lack of food and ammunition to cope with the enemy, 
 being compelled to eat their horses and mules. When these 
 gave out, they lived on fruits and herbs. The lack of salt to 
 season their frugal and unwholesome food caused disease to 
 spread, with fatal results, all over Bayamo, Holguin and San- 
 tiago. More than forty per cent of the population died of 
 fevers, smallpox and cholera. It seemed as if all the calami- 
 ties of the world had agreed to strike simultaneously at the 
 patriots, but they continued to fight hard, notwithstanding 
 their great suffering. 
 
 On the loth of April, 1869, a Constitution was proclaimed 
 at Guaimaro, and was signed by : 
 
 Carlos M. de Cespedes, Arcadio Garcia, i 
 
 Miguel Gutierrez, Eduardo Machado, 
 
 Salvador Cisneros, Antonio Lorda, i 
 
 Manuel Valdez, Antonio Alcala, 
 
 Honorato Castillo, Jesus Rodriguez, 
 
 Miguel Betancourt, Francisco S. Betancourt, 
 
 Jose M. Yzaguirre, Ignacio Agramonte, 
 Antonio Zambrana. 
 
 The American Confederate General, Thomas Jordan, gives 
 a very interesting report of an engagement. Nobly and dis- 
 interestedly he had come from the States to help the Cubans 
 
34 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 by his experience as a soldier, which he had gained during 
 the American Civil War, under General G. T. Beauregard, 
 the brave and skillful defender of Charleston. The report is 
 transcribed to show what he thought of the patriots as 
 soldiers : 
 
 the number of our forces did not 
 
 exceed 548 men all told, with one artillery piece. Circum- 
 stances beyond my power to control prevented me from 
 concentrating more men in time for the battle. The enemy 
 had a trifle less than 2,000 troops of infantry, cavalry and 
 artillery. 
 
 there were at least 100 cavalry and three artillery pieces. On 
 the battlefield were found 200 dead, many of^cers amongst 
 them, and 45 horses. The engagement lasted seventy-five 
 minutes, and in that time, one after the other, three assaults 
 of the Spanish regulars were repulsed. They advanced in 
 compact columns of 500 metres. Then a thicker column 
 charged on us, and it would have been defeated also had the 
 reserve ammunition been at hand ; unfortunately it was not 
 there, and from lack of cartridges I was compelled to with- 
 draw my force from the position. The retreat was performed 
 with a coolness and precision that would have done honor to 
 veterans of a hundred battles. 
 
 All the line of trenches that measured 490 paces was under 
 my view, and I did not see one single case of reproachable 
 conduct on the part of any officer or private. On the con- 
 trary, I remarked that they displayed superb spirit and 
 gallantry. 
 
 By request of the officers and soldiers, I ordered a machete 
 charge against the sharpshooters of the enemy at our left 
 flank. It was made in a brilliant manner and with great 
 effectiveness, yielding some booty to those that took part in it. 
 
 With twenty rounds more of cartridges the enemy would 
 have been stampeded ; they rallied only when our ammunition 
 eave out. 
 
 I am proud of having had the opportunity to command 
 such troops ; their noble example has given great enthusiasm 
 to all those that have joined us, and all are equally anxious 
 to engage the enemy. This will be very soon, and I am sure 
 the most satisfactory results will be obtained. After the 
 battle the enemy were so down-hearted that, not daring to 
 
HISTORY OF FORMER CUBAN WARS. 35 
 
 advance towards Camaguey, they have countermarched three 
 miles on the road and have entrenched themselves there, 
 never moving from camp more than a few hundred yards, and 
 even then with not less than 300 men. 
 
 Certainly this situation cannot last long and the column 
 will have to move in one direction or another, burdened with 
 300 wounded, besides their arms and those of the dead. 
 
 The enemy has been reduced one-third of its total effective 
 force, for the dead and wounded cannot be less than 500. 
 
 Thomas Jordan, Major-GcncrarCoviuinnding. 
 General Headquarters, San Augustin, Jan. 12, 1870. 
 
 The Revolutionary Congress, in session April 11, 1869, at 
 Guaimaro, passed a resolution presented by a member, 
 Eduardo Machado, for the adoption of the Cuban flag : 
 ground, red triangle with a white five-pointed star in the 
 center; three longitudinal blue stripes and two white ones. 
 It was the same flag that Gen. Narciso Lopez raised. Con- 
 siderable discussion went on before its adoption. Antonio 
 Lorda had proposed that the triangle be blue with red and 
 white stripes. In the same session Carlos M. de Cespedes 
 was elected President, Manuel Quesada Commander in Chief, 
 and Francisco V. Aguilera Secretary of War of the Republic. 
 Mexico, Chile, Bolivia and Peru extended recognition of 
 belligerency to the Republic of Cuba almost immediately 
 after. Unfortunately, these republics were weak and poor, 
 and their sympathy, although greatly esteemed, did not aid 
 the patriots. 
 
 In 1869 the Secretary of State offered the intervention of 
 the United States to General Prim, representative of the 
 Spanish Government, on the basis of a purchase by the 
 Cubans of their independence, under a guarantee by the 
 United States, to which the General replied : 
 
 "We can better proceed in the present situation of things 
 without even this friendly intervention. A time will come 
 when the good offices of the United States will be, not only 
 useful, but indispensable in the final arrangements between 
 Spain and Cuba. We will ascertain the form in which they 
 can be employed and confidently count upon your assistance." 
 
 The United States answered that its good offices for that 
 
"^6) THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 object would be at any time at the service of the parties to 
 the conflict. 
 
 A long and interesting diplomatic correspondence, treating 
 of Cuban affairs, was kept up between the two Governments, 
 the Americans tendering their good ofifices to stop the war, 
 the Spaniards cunningly deferring a definite answer — the 
 diplomacy of Rome foiling Anglo-Saxon diplomacy. The 
 following document issued in the next year proves it: 
 
 Bj/ tJie President of the United States of America : 
 A PROCLAMATION. 
 
 Whereas, divers evil-disposed persons have, at sundry times, 
 within the territory or jurisdiction of the United States, 
 begun, or set on foot, or provided, or prepared the means for 
 military expeditions or enterprises to be carried on thence 
 against the territories or dominions of powers with whom the 
 United States are at peace, by organizing bodies pretending 
 to have powers of government over portions of the territories 
 or dominions of powers with whom the United States are at 
 peace, or by being or assuming to be members of such bodies, 
 by levying or collecting money for the purpose, or for the al- 
 leged purpose of using the same in carrying on military enter- 
 prises against such territories or dominions, by enlisting and 
 organizing armed forces to be used against such powers, and by 
 fitting out, equipping, and arming vessels to transport such or- 
 ganized armed forces to be employed in hostilities against 
 such powers ; 
 
 And, Whereas, it is alleged, and there is reason to appre- 
 hend, that such evil-disposed persons have also, at sundry 
 times, within the territory and jurisdiction of the United 
 States, violated the laws thereof by accepting and exercising 
 commissions to serve by land or by sea against powers with 
 whom the United States are at peace, by enlisting themselves 
 or other persons to carry on war against such powers, by fit- 
 ting out and arming vessels with intent that the same shall 
 be employed to cruise or commit hostilities against such pow- 
 ers, or by delivering commissions within the territory or juris- 
 diction of the United States for such vessels to the intent 
 that they might be employed as aforesaid ; 
 
 And, Whereas, such acts are in violation of the laws of the 
 United States in such case made and provided, and are done 
 in disregard of the duties and obligations which all persons re- 
 siding or being within the territory or jurisdiction of the 
 
HISTORY OF FORMER CUBAN WARS. .zi) 
 
 United States owe thereto, and are condemned by all right- 
 minded and law-abiding citizens: — 
 
 Now, Therefore, I, Ulysses S. Grant, President of the 
 United States of America, do hereby declare and proclaim 
 that all persons hereafter found within the territory or juris- 
 diction of the United States committing any of the afore-re- 
 cited violations of law, or any similar violations of the sover- 
 eignty of the United States for which punishment is provided 
 by law, will be rigorously prosecuted therefor, and, upon con- 
 viction and sentence to punishment, will not be entitled to 
 expect or receive the clemency of the executive to save them 
 from the consequences of their guilt ; and I enjoin upon every 
 officer of this government, civil or military or naval, to use all 
 efforts in his power to arrest, for trial and punishment, every 
 such offender against the laws providing for the performance 
 of our sacred obligations to friendly powers. 
 
 In testimony whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and 
 caused the seal of the United States to be affixed. 
 
 Done at the City of Washington, this twelfth day of Oc- 
 tober, in the year of our Lord one thousand 
 (Seal) eight hundred and seventy, and of the independ- 
 ence of the United States of America the ninety- 
 f^fth. 
 
 U. S. Grant. 
 By the President : 
 
 Hamilton P'ish, Secretary of State. 
 
 The United States of Colombia, in February, 1870, ex- 
 tended to the Cubans belligerent rights. What a noble ex- 
 ample of disinterestedness did those little, poor. South and 
 Central American Republics give to the other nations of the 
 world ! 
 
 The Government employed the most stringent coercive 
 methods in the course of this ten years struggle, to prevent 
 demonstrations of sympathy towards the patriots by the in- 
 habitants of the cities. The most ridiculous measures were 
 taken to that end, and in a good many instances the proceed- 
 ings were savage and barbarous. A mob of volunteers threw 
 the city of Havana into consternation by forcing a court-mar- 
 tial, and passing capital sentence on eight innocent youths, 
 students of the University there, on the suspicion that they 
 had scratched somebody's tomb in the graveyard. 
 
38 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 Dozens of prisoners from a filibustering expedition, the Vir- 
 ginias, were shot unmercifully at Santiago, notwithstanding 
 the protestations of the American Consul, and only by the 
 firm intervention of one of Her Majesty's warships did the 
 Spanish General Burriel stop the executions. 
 
 President Grant, through his miserable money expectations 
 from the Alabama claims, and also through the sudden and 
 unaccountable change effected in Mr. Hamilton Fish's atti- 
 tude towards the patriots, lost the best opportunity of his 
 civil career to give a noble example to the civilized world of 
 what a great, free nation would generously do for a suffering 
 people and for the love of liberty. Had the President granted 
 to Cuba the rights of belligerency, all the savagery of the 
 Spanish would have been stopped and Cuban Independence 
 secured, unstained by the innocent blood of aged men, women 
 and children. 
 
 In April, 1875, Guatemala recognized the Cuban Govern- 
 ment. 
 
 The revolution weakened considerably, ravaged by disease 
 and battle ; the communications with the outer world were 
 difificult and even extremely dangerous. With canoes made of 
 the trunk of the seiba, a gigantic tree of Cuba, trips were con- 
 stantly made to Jamaica with the most remarkable luck 
 attending the improvised sailors, who would start out to sea 
 without a compass or a sail. Still this was carried on during 
 all the war, and it is not known that a mishap overtook any 
 of them. 
 
 The most important battles of the ten years war were : 
 Guasimas, Palo Seco, Punta Gorda, Melones, Copo del Chato, 
 siege and capture of Tunas. The leaders who distinguished 
 themselves the most were : — Maximo Gomez, Antonio Maceo, 
 Calixto Garcia, Ignacio Agramonte, Modesto Diaz and Vicente 
 Garcia, although this leader's attitude was the cause of losing 
 the revolution its unity, respect and obedience to authority, 
 absolutely necessary for the regulation of an army. The 
 Civil Government of the revolution proved to be absolutely 
 worthless. 
 
 Many expeditions with arms and ammunition were sent 
 to the patriots by refugees in the United States, but they were 
 
HISTORY OF F0RMF:R CUP.AN WARS. 39 
 
 not su-fficient to meet the necessities, and many were cap- 
 tured by the Spanish, on the sea or ashore. 
 
 In 1878, General Martinez Campos, who had conquered in 
 Sagunto, was sent to subdue, at any cost, the revoki- 
 tion, and after offering to the patriots reforms and liberties 
 of all kinds, the compact of Zanjon was made. General 
 Maceo, at Mangos de Baragua, protested against it and left 
 the Island without having anything to do with the treat}'. 
 General-Commander Gomez put himself aside on the pretext 
 that he was not a Cuban — that the Cubans should decide. 
 And so ended the ten years struggle. 
 
 After four years of imprisonment in dungeons and cells of 
 different fortresses of Spain, when the Zanjon compact was 
 made and General Calixto Garcia Yniguez was giv^en his lib- 
 erty, he proceeded directly to Paris, where, in company with 
 Dr. Betances and other prominent Cubans, he commenced 
 the organization of new plans for a conspiracy. The long 
 captivity he had suffered, instead of exhausting his vigor and 
 enthusiasm, had only served to increase them. It was aston- 
 ishing to all, to see the man who had wasted perhaps the 
 best years of his manhood boxed up between walls waiting 
 patiently for his liberty, instead of being downhearted and 
 disappointed, come out strong and enthusiastic, ready for 
 another struggle, of which no one dreamed, in Cuba or else- 
 where. He sought and obtained the co-operation of nearl)- 
 all the commanders and officers of the war living at that 
 time in the Island or abroad. Among others were Antonio 
 Maceo, Gregorio Benitez, Pio Rosado, Roloff, Fonseca, etc., 
 who answered, offering their services. General Ma.ximo 
 Gomez and General Vicente Garcia never definitely gave 
 their approval, and consequently General Calixto Garcia 
 Yniguez did not have their help. Suddenly the leaders of 
 the conspiracy in the Santiago province were arrested. 
 Brigadier Flor Crombet and Colonels Pedro Martinez Freire, 
 Jose Maria Rodriguez (Mayia) and Beola were sent to Spain 
 as prisoners of war ; they had had General Calixto Garcia's 
 unbounded confidence. The three prisoners arrived at 
 Madrid, where they were put in communication with the 
 other members of the conspiracy in Oriente, through General 
 
40 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 Garcia's special revolutionary envoy, Dr. Ensebio Hernandez, 
 who undertook to carry letters of the said leaders, which he 
 delivered to General Moncada and to Colonels Jose Maceo, 
 Silverio del Prado and Santos Perez, the last, commanding 
 a band of Spanish guerrillas, and approving of the uprising. 
 In these letters the prisoners warned them not to wait any 
 longer, lest they too be discovered and arrested. It was 
 agreed by the Committee of Santiago, in several meetings 
 held, not to wait any longer but to revolt, which they did on 
 the night of the 26th of August, 1879, easily taking posses- 
 sion of the city of Santiago. But General Moncada, senior 
 oflficer commanding, incensed because of the intrigues of the 
 autonomists, who characterized the movement as a war of 
 races (the three principal chiefs, whites, as stated above, 
 having been made prisoners and deported to Spain), hesitated 
 at the last moment, when it was most important to exert 
 promptness and pluck, and instead of surprising and seizing the 
 barracks, he marched out of the city with the revolutionists 
 and began to organize his force in the country. The garrison 
 was so taken by surprise that they did not even fire a shot, 
 and if they had been attacked, would have surrendered imme- 
 diately. Dr. Hernandez carried to Havana orders to the lead- 
 ers of Las Villas and the Western province. The delegate 
 and sub-delegates of Gen. Garcia, in Havana, were Jose Anto- 
 nio Aguilera and Jose Marti, in conjunction with whom Dr. 
 Hernandez set to work and sent arms and ammunition to 
 Francisco Carrillo, Emilio Nuflez, Arias and other leaders of 
 Las Villas. They were soon discovered, and Aguilera and 
 Marti were arrested. Dr. Hernandez escaped to the States 
 in a boat. Carrillo and Nunez revolted and were seconded by 
 Arias and Cecilio Gonzalez, who landed with a small expedi- 
 tion sent from New York by Gen. Garcia, and the new revolu- 
 tion became formidable in a short time. But this did not 
 last long. Gen Garcia battled against the lack of sufificient 
 funds to continue the war. 
 
 The people were fatigued from the ten years struggle and 
 felt skeptical in regard to the results of the present one ; their 
 contributions for the cause were scanty ; the policy of suavity 
 employed by the Government since the Zanjon compact did 
 
HISTORY OF FORMER CUBAN WARS. 41 
 
 much to prevent the undecided from joining; the revolution- 
 ary propaganda had not been accepted by the phmtation dis- 
 tricts of the West that were making good harvests ; the rich 
 Vegas of Vuelta Abajo were producing delicious tobacco, sold 
 at heavy prices; the laborers received fair wages and work- 
 was plenty everywhere ; and then the absence from this 
 movement of Gen. Gomez and Vicente Garcia, who dodsfed 
 all proposals to engage themselves in it, were reasons of suffi- 
 cient weight to prevent the revolutionists from succeeding. 
 
 When Gen. Calixto Garcia, in despair, failing to obtain the 
 necessary funds to equip an expedition for the aid of those 
 that were in the field fighting, flung aside his patience, and 
 with 15 men risked his life thrice, in the attempt to land in 
 Cuba, he did it, not because he had faith in the success of 
 the struggle, but because he was bound to get there even 
 though he perished in the attempt. 
 
 About the same time that he landed in Cuba with his staff, 
 the two most prominent men of the uprising, Moncada and 
 Jos6 Maceo (mysterious and complicated event ! ) surrendered 
 with all their men to the Spanish authorities, and Gen. Garcia 
 and his 15 followers were left to battle in the Oriente alone, 
 the battle for the independence of 1,500,000 inhabitants, while 
 they were all enjoying the blessings of a dishonorable truce, 
 in shameful association with the .Spaniards. All the available 
 troops were detached in operations against the small party of 
 revolutionists. Only Carrillo and Nunez remained in arms, 
 the rest having surrendered. 
 
 Gen. Benitez, who had arrived successfully at the Puerto 
 Principe province, seeing the failure of the revolution, at- 
 tempted to escape by boat to Jamaica and was murdered by 
 some men bought with Spanish gold. 
 
 Abroad, only three leaders upheld their convictions in those 
 cruel days of defeat: — Gen. Roloff, Col. Jose M, Aguirre and 
 Dr. Hernandez, who prepared an expedition to aid the re\'o- 
 lutionists. Gen. Garcia suffered horribly for several months. 
 Bullets, famine and disease reduced his party to four men, 
 who, at last, exhausted and without ammunition, were com- 
 pelled to surrender to Gen. Valera, near Bayamo. This hap- 
 pened in the latter part of the year 1880. 
 
42 THE AMERlCAN-SPANIStl WAR. 
 
 Then came what may be justly called the anaesthetic period 
 of Cuba. Autonomy was the powerful drug employed. Its 
 effect was produced simply by smelling of the bottle where 
 it was carefully kept. Generally a lecture on the therapeu- 
 tics and materia medica of Autonomy was quite suflficient a 
 dose to produce a profound slumber. Without administering 
 the drug, anaesthesia would be produced, and it was prolonged 
 with marvelous precision. The Autonomists claimed that 
 they were versed on the subject, that the Cuban people were 
 pathological cases and that only Autonomy could keep them 
 on their feet. This period lasted but a fewyears, fortunately. 
 
 Meantime the leaders of the Cubans were scattered and 
 discouraged all over the world : — Gen. Calixto Garcia, a pris- 
 oner of the enemy ; Gen. Gomez, shunned by the Cubans 
 since the Zanjon compact, more for what he wrote than for 
 what he did ; A. Maceo, unsuccessful, in Turk's Island, where 
 he was driven, pursued by Spanish gun-boats; Roloff also un- 
 successful. There remained only one senior leader with suffi- 
 cient prestige to take command, but he became so indolent 
 that he was not fit for the place — Vicente Garcia (no connec- 
 tion with Calixto). 
 
 Here Hernandez appeared again, persuading the men of 
 Yara to reunite. He reconciled Maceo and Roloff, and later 
 on Roloff and Gomez. 
 
 The four mentioned and Generals Crombet, Ruis Rivera, 
 R. Rodriguez, J. Calvas and Tomas Estrada Palma, sought 
 hospitality in Honduras, where they were well treated and 
 held important positions of official capacity. 
 
 Gen. A. Maceo well understood that he could not be the 
 leader of the next revolution, and in accord with others, sup- 
 ported by Dr. Hernandez, suggested Gomez as their future 
 leader. This was difficult to arrange, because the Cubans had 
 taken a great dislike to him for certain things he had said 
 about them. So the work of reconciliation lasted from i88i to 
 1884. 
 
 Crombet and Hernandez were detailed to collect funds. 
 This they did, from President Bogran of Honduras and from 
 numerous Cubans who had settled at the Panama Canal and 
 were working there. 
 
HISTORY OF FORMER CUBAN WARS. 43 
 
 In August, 1884, Gomez, Maceo, Crombet, Marti, Zambrana, 
 Salvador Cisneros and a majority of the officers were in agree- 
 ment and accepted the leadership of Gomez, excepting Gen. 
 Bonachea, Panchin Varona and Limbano Sanchez. The first 
 of these fitted out an expedition. He was made prisoner with 
 his men and shot at Santiago. Col. Limbano Sanchez fitted 
 up another, landed, was captured and killed. Marti disagreed 
 with Gomez's and Maceo's methods and separated from the 
 commission. 
 
 Dr. Hernandez was sent to collect funds, and, aided by gen- 
 erous patriots, raised $40,000. This sum was received on 
 deposit by F. Lamadriz to deliver to Gen. Gomez. The 
 movement was planned but the plot failed. The authorities 
 of St. Domingo confiscated $10,000 worth of war material 
 and distributed it to their soldiers. Gomez became unpopular 
 again. He had done his best, no doubt, but all his plans 
 failed. 
 
 Maceo too lost the chance of combining in a plot to send 
 war material from the United States to Colon, made by Drs. 
 Hernandez and Tomas Padro. Carrillo, Hernandez and 
 Crombet attempted to get to Cuba in an open boat, but 
 failed. These manoeuvres lasted from 1884 to 1886. 
 
 In 1887, Juan Fraga, a noble-hearted refugee, aided by 
 Angel Garcia, a good patriot and man of action, founded the 
 club, " Los Independientes." Among the founders were Ca- 
 lixto Garcia and Hernandez. This club continued work for 
 the cause with the purpose of not compromising more lives 
 or money uselessly, as had been done, and agreed not to set 
 out on any uprising without half a million dollars. 
 
 Marti appeared again : he wanted to go to Cuba. 
 
 Then the Sartorius Brothers made an uprising at Purnio 
 (Holguin), but it all vanished in a few days. 
 
 Then came the last of the Fernandina expeditions, which 
 was Marti's first experience and cost Cuba dear. 
 
 S'a^^^^^Y tf^ ^^--j^ ^''w^ yfe^>^-o . 
 
;^^^^v<^ 
 
CHAPTER II. 
 CUBA AGAINST SPAIN. 1895-1898.* 
 
 BY 
 
 CARLOS GARCIA VELEZ, Brigadier-General. 
 
 IT is a hazardous, as well as a very difficult task to under- 
 take, as I do in this chapter, to narrate the principal 
 events of the Santiago Campaign from a point of view 
 unknown as yet to the world, after so much has been said 
 about the subject by different writers with whom I differ 
 essentially in the course of this narration. 
 
 The author of this chapter, a member of Calixto Garcia's 
 staff, having taken an active part in that campaign, believes 
 that he is qualified to give his opinion, together with impor- 
 tant data, based on original and authentic documents, fac- 
 siviiles of which are not displayed here because of the limited 
 dimensions of this chapter. The facts are so plain and com- 
 prehensive that they will be sufficient proof of the author's 
 assertion when he states that all the official reports are decid- 
 edly unjust to General Calixto Garcia's army of Cuban 
 patriots, as to the active and undeniable part taken by them 
 in that wonderful success, the surrender of Santiago. On the 
 other hand, it was to be expected that some one would come 
 forward to vindicate the Cubans, so praised at first, so slandered 
 afterward by the war correspondents and some military com- 
 manders. 
 
 The author will demonstrate the many things accomplished 
 by the Cubans if it only be with the object of answering the 
 
 *Gen. Calixto Garcia responded very enthusiastically to our invitation to write this chap- 
 ter. He wrote us : 
 
 " I will gladly undertake the work you propose to me for the history of the war with 
 Spain. This work will be very dear to my heart.' 
 
 His untimely death cut short his preparations for writing. Ilis son has prepared the 
 chapter from his father's memoranda and papers. 
 
 The Publishers. 
 
46 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 gratuitous charges heaped on the brave allies of the Ameri- 
 cans, The writers who have done this might be pardoned if 
 they had contented themselves with magnifying their own 
 feats, having, as I freely admit, accomplished so much in 
 behalf of Cuban independence. But when they go beyond 
 this and claim for the Americans exclusively, what pertains 
 rightfully and equally to both armies, they do a great and 
 perhaps irreparable injustice to a whole allied army. In so 
 doing they attempt to belittle and, what is worse, ignore 
 deeds of men, in no respect — be they nude and starving as 
 they were— inferior as generals or soldiers. The harmless 
 vanity of victorious commanders and unscrupulous correspon- 
 dents becomes the criminal wrong of the false historian. 
 Some have erred from lack of proper and impartial investiga- 
 tion of the campaign as it was conducted by both armies; 
 others, because their sole object, for some unaccountable 
 reason, was to misrepresent and belittle the cooperation of the 
 Cubans. 
 
 Fortunately, history is not made b}^ a dozen writers or from 
 the reports of only one of the nations engaged in a war, — no 
 matter if these reports are made by reputable military writers. 
 The history of the American-Spanish War has not yet been 
 written because the facts revealed in this chapter have not as 
 yet been published. As a contribution to do justice and to 
 honor the grave of the dead, the author of this work relates 
 the truth, and in it the living and the dead find just defence 
 and credit. 
 
 The misrepresentation of facts in this war, especially by the 
 American writers, is only a repetition of what has happened 
 under similar circumstances with all other auxiliary armies of 
 invasion. The victory has been invariably claimed by the 
 army whose country is larger and more powerful. History 
 presents numberless instances and although I could furnish 
 the reader many well-known examples, I shall cite only two 
 that will suffice to show the accuracy of the statement. 
 
 Lafayette, with a well equipped and disciplined army, aided 
 the Americans in their war for independence. The French 
 army came from a rich and powerful country, its officers and 
 soldiers retaining fresh in their remembrance the luxurious 
 
CUBA AGAINST SPAIN. 1895-1898. 47 
 
 European life which they had enjoyed at home. They had 
 formed an ideal, purely imaginative, of the American patriot, 
 having seen only those who had gone to Paris, commissioned 
 by the Continental Congress. Their surprise was great when 
 they beheld masses of poor and ragged men, worn and haggard 
 from long privations, in a terrible struggle of which the new- 
 comers had no conception. Then a sensation of disgust 
 overpowered them, derived from a selfish and unfair com- 
 parison of their own polished and glittering appearance with 
 that of the sombre Am.erican patriots, shabbily attired and 
 care-worn. The victory achieved by both parties was claimed 
 by the French in those days as due entirely to them, although 
 the French never thought of taking back with them to 
 France, as trophies, the guns, which they had helped the 
 Americans to capture from the English, and which are to-day 
 admired at West Point with patriotic and legitimate Ameri- 
 can pride. 
 
 The English sent their army in aid of the Spanish whose 
 independence was at stake. The whole peninsula was burn- 
 ing with sacred and noble patriotism and in many a battle 
 tiie Spaniards had proved to the world how dearly they cher- 
 ished liberty. Although not equal either to their opponent 
 or to their ally as a disciplined army, Spanish valor and 
 tenacity were never questioned. Nevertheless, the English 
 have always claimed that the Spaniards were only bands of 
 unorganized guerrillas and that victory was solely due to 
 Great Britain's soldiers. 
 
 It appears that humanity, in this respect, does not change 
 as years roll by. 
 
 Primero j'o, dcspiics yo, y sicuiprc yo. 
 
 A fearful war, with destruction of life and property, had 
 been waging in the Island of Cuba for three years ; three hun- 
 dred thousand victims had already fallen to the ferocious war 
 yell of the Spaniards: "■ Extcriniiiio dc los Cubanos\ " Many 
 able Cuban commanders had been killed in battle, of whom 
 the foremost figures were Antonio Maceo, Flor Crombet, 
 Ducasse, Jose Maceo, Zayas, Serafin Sanchez, Aranguren and 
 the great Jose Marti ; and of these dying of disease contracted 
 
48 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 in the campaign, Guillermo Moncada, Jose M. Aguirre, and 
 Juan Ruz. 
 
 In the Eastern Department (from the Jucaro-Moron trocha 
 east), in point of organization of troops, and farming zones 
 and cattle-herding, the military condition of the Cubans can 
 be classified as excellent. The Spaniards were kept constantly 
 at bay within the fortified cities and towns, never daring to 
 venture out of them without forming columns of not less than 
 four thousand men, and then only to accompany the convoys 
 of rations to the different garrisons. The city of Tunis had 
 been stormed with artillery and carried by the Cuban forces, 
 taking several hundred prisoners who were delivered back to 
 the Spaniards. The towns of Guaymaro and Guisa had like- 
 wise been captured. Other numerous smaller towns and 
 villages had also been taken and the enemy was compelled to 
 evacuate many others on account of the impossibility of 
 rationing them with regularity. The Spaniards were kept 
 constantly busy within those fortified precincts which allowed 
 them to remain entirely on the defensive. It was no difficult 
 thing to do, as may be inferred, to travel about the whole 
 Department without fear of being surprised by the enemy, 
 for, as has been already stated, they were shut up in block- 
 houses, forts and, invariably, within walls. 
 
 The Jucaro-Moron trocha was of no military value when the 
 American-Spanish War broke out because it was not suffi- 
 ciently garrisoned to prevent the passage of the Cuban forces 
 from one department to another. The line of block-houses 
 along the Cauto River (navigable 75 miles) up to Cauto 
 Embarcadero Village, which General Pando had two months 
 previously completed, kept twelve thousand Spanish troops 
 inactive and exposed to malaria and yellow fever, without any 
 positive effectiveness against the plans of the Cuban General, 
 Calixto Garcia, Commander of the Department. 
 
 The Western Department extended from the Jucaro-Moron 
 trocha to the west, being cut by another trocha, the Mariel- 
 Majana, and was in command of General J. M. Rodriguez. 
 War in this part of the island was conducted on different 
 principles by the Spaniards. There the towns and cities with 
 excellent harbors were more numerous, richer, larger and far 
 
CUBA AGAINST SPAIN. 1S95-1S9S. 49 
 
 better. Plantations and railroads traversed the whole Depart- 
 ment, and for centuries the site of the supreme authority of 
 the Island had been situated there. Havana the capital, and, 
 as such, under the old system of centralization, the head and 
 the stomach of Cuba, had absorbed all that was important for 
 itself and had a larger proportion of Spanish inhabitants than 
 any other city. Capital was accumulated consequently in the 
 Western Department of Cuba and naturally the Spaniards 
 gave more attention to fighting the rebellion there than in 
 the east, considering too that the nature of the country was 
 better adapted to develop their so-called strategic movements. 
 Moreover that part had never before been in a serious revolt 
 and it was believed by the Spanish that the Revolution could 
 be more easily checked there than in the east. Besides, since 
 the invasion of Maceo and Gomez, the world's attention had 
 been fixed exclusively on the war events of the west, as this 
 invasion was an extraordinary raid, the results of which the 
 world was anxious to see. The movements of these com- 
 manders in that famous march were so rapid that they had 
 time only to fly through towns and villages. Notwithstand- 
 ing great destruction of property, as the invaders had no time 
 to pause, what was conquered one day had to be abandoned 
 the next, leaving it again in the possession of the Spaniards. 
 
 After the surprise came the reaction and the Spaniards 
 immediately fortified the towns and plantations and divided 
 Gen. A. Maceo's army from that of General Gomez, by build- 
 ing a trocha which was formidable, considering our lack of 
 well-armed troops and of artillery. One hundred and fifty 
 thousand men were thrown upon the Cubans and active ope- 
 rations were constantly carried on. The result of it was that 
 General Maceo was daily compelled to fight desperately, 
 while General Gomez failed to organize his forces properly to 
 relieve Maceo from such enormous odds. Maceo, fighting the 
 most brilliant battles in Pinar del Rio, was abandoned by 
 Gomez to his fate. Seeking to organize the forces east of the 
 trocha he went by sea to Havana province where he was 
 killed in a skirmish. The Revolution was greatly weakened, 
 but notwithstanding the activity and great number of the 
 Spanish troops and General Gomez's incapacity to direct the 
 
50 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 campaign, it continued, thanks to the extraordinary ability of 
 Rius Rivera,* Betancourt, J. M. Gomez, Gonzalez, Arango, 
 Cardenas, Lacret and other leaders who with notable skill 
 kept the Spanish columns busy with their small fragments of 
 veteran regiments, till the American-Spanish contest put an 
 end to such an unequal struggle. 
 
 This, in a few words, was the state of the Cuban Revolution, 
 when, on April 13, 1898, Gen. Calixto Garcia camped at 
 Jaguey, near Baire, received news from several Cuban com- 
 manders that the enemy had hoisted flags of truce in the 
 cities, towns and forts throughout the Eastern Department 
 and that the fire of our troops was unanswered by the Span- 
 ish. Orders were issued by the General to investigate the 
 cause of such a change and it was promptly learned that Gen- 
 eral Blanco had given orders for a suspension of hostilities. 
 As General Garcia had not received any such order from his 
 government, he suspected the measure to be a strategem of 
 the enemy to gain time for some unknown object and immedi- 
 ately directed that all his troops move towards the fortified 
 towns to harass them with musketry day and night. It 
 appeared clear to us that the Spaniards, fearing a declaration 
 of war from the United States and finding themselves involved 
 in a rather complicated affair for which they were totally 
 unprepared, had decided to prevent intervention by seeking, 
 through conference with the Cubans, a prompt solution of 
 the war. After some days we received a copy of Captain- 
 General Blanco's Manifesto and a proclamation ordered by 
 the Queen Regent suspending hostilities in the Island of Cuba, 
 which read as follows: — 
 
 " His Majesty's Government, yielding to the reiterated 
 wish expressed by His Holiness the Pope, has been pleased 
 to decree a suspension of hostilities with the object of pre- 
 paring and facilitating the restoration of peace on this Island, 
 in virtue whereof I believe it convenient to order: 
 
 "Article i. — From the day following the receipt in each 
 locality of said proclamation, hostilities are ordered to be sus- 
 pended in all the territory of the Island of Cuba. 
 
 "Article 2. — The details of the execution of the above arti- 
 
 * Taken prisoner by the enemy after an engagement in Pinardel Rio subsequent to Maceo's 
 death. 
 
CUBx\ AGAINST SPAIN. 1895-1898. 51 
 
 cle will be the object of special instructions that will be commu- 
 nicated to the several commanders-in-chief of the army corps for 
 easy and prompt execution according to the situation and cir- 
 cumstances of the case. 
 
 Havana, April 11, 1898. BLANCO. 
 
 " The General Government of the Island of Cuba to the 
 inhabitants of the Island of Cuba: — ■ 
 
 "Without any reason or legality, without the least offense 
 on our part, and at a time when they received from us only 
 proofs of friendship, the United States are forcing us into war 
 just at the moment when quietude began to settle over the 
 country, when production was flourishing, commerce taking 
 courage and peace approaching, with the cooperation of all 
 classes and all parties under the new institutions granted by 
 the mother country. 
 
 " Such a proceeding is without precedent in history. It 
 evidently manifests the bogus politics of the Republic, 
 demonstrating the tricky plans and purposes that have always 
 been nourished against Spain's sovereignty in Cuba, which 
 the enemy has been conspiring for nearly a century to destroy. 
 Our foes now carry their hypocrisy and falsehood to the extent 
 of demanding immediate peace in a war provoked and sus- 
 tained by themselves ; her prudence and moderation have 
 been of no avail to Spain, though she has carried her conces- 
 sions to the extreme limit of toleration in order to avoid a 
 rupture. She still deplores the state of affairs but she accepts 
 it with all the energy of a glorious national history and the 
 pride of her people, a pride which will never yield to the 
 stranger's haughtiness, nor consent to see Spain's right and 
 reason trampled upon by a nation of nobodies. 
 
 " If the United States wants the Island of Cuba, let them 
 come and take it. Perhaps the hour is not far distant in 
 which the Carthaginians of America will find their Zama in 
 this Island of Cuba, which Spain discovered, peopled and civ- 
 ilized and which will never be anything but Spanish. 
 
 " It is our turn to have the honor of defending her and we 
 shall know how to do it with decision and an effort many a 
 time put forth. I count upon you for this with absolute cer- 
 tainty. I believe there is no sacrifice you are not 
 prepared to make in defense of the national territory, 
 whose integrity is sacred to all Spaniards of whatever 
 origin. I am sure that every one in whose veins runs 
 Spanish blood will respond readily to the call, which, in these 
 solemn moments, I address to all, and that all will group 
 themselves around me to contribute as much as they can to 
 
52 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 repel a foreign invasion, without allowing dangers, sufferings 
 or privations to weaken the heart of courage. 
 
 "To arms, then, fellow countrymen, to arms! There will 
 be a place for all in the fight. Let all cooperate and contri- 
 bute with the same firmness and enthusiasm to fight the eter- 
 nal enemy of the Spanish name, emulating the exploits of our 
 ancestors, who always elevated high their country's fame and 
 honor. To arms! Cry a thousand times 'Viva Espana,' 
 'Viva el Rey Alfonso XIII,' 'Viva la Regente,' 'Viva Cuba, 
 always Spanish.' 
 
 Your Governor-General, 
 
 Ramon Blanco." 
 
 Of course the armistice, thus proclaimed by the Spanish, 
 without consultation or agreement with our Government, was 
 not even considered by any Cuban commander. On the con- 
 trary, all simultaneously attacked or feigned to attack the 
 towns, especially those of the interior, and it was done to 
 such an extent that the Spanish soldiery exclaimed, " Would 
 to God that the suspension, of hostilities had not been decreed, 
 because nozu tve have to fight day and night and be on the alert 
 every nionienty 
 
 The Autonomists endeavored to send commissioners to the 
 Revolutionists with propositions of peace, but as they were 
 not based upon the absolute independence of the Island the 
 commissioners did not even dare to approach our lines, fear- 
 ing to meet the death penalty in accordance with the Spotorno 
 law of the revolution. Blanco soon convinced himself that 
 the Cubans would not enter with him into any understanding 
 whatever, that was not based on the absolute independence 
 of Cuba. Then the Spaniards, losing all hope of securing 
 peace, made several unsuccessful attempts to concentrate 
 forces in different cities. While crossing the country, pro- 
 tected by a flag of truce, several columns were severely 
 attacked by our forces and compelled to stop and turn back. 
 This happened to a column that marched out of Jiguani and 
 was beaten so badly that it fell back to the town. 
 
 The ruse that the Spaniards employed was promptly 
 frustrated by General Garcia's circular which, condensed, 
 was : — 
 
 1st. That the suspension of hostilities was not to be con- 
 
CUBA AGAINST SPAIN. 1895-1898. 53 
 
 sidered unless our Government should order it, at the same 
 time stating Spain's agreement to proclaim peace on the 
 basis of absolute independence of Cuba. 
 
 2nd. To harass the enemy continually and lay siege to 
 their fortified towns. 
 
 3rd. To prevent by all means the concentration of the 
 enemy's troops, which they would surely try to effect should 
 war be declared between Spain and the United States. 
 
 4th. To be in readiness to aid and support the Americans 
 by land should they attack the Spaniards by sea. 
 
 In a letter of General Garcia to the Government dated at 
 La Ratonera (Baire) April 18, 1898, he said :— 
 
 "In view of the last events, I first thought of going where 
 the government was, so as to second its orders with more ra- 
 pidity, but as I receive news daily from the exterior and as I 
 desire to be in position to direct personally the operations of 
 the 1st and 2nd Army Corps, I have at last determined to stay 
 in Oriente. I shall give you, notwithstanding, my views of 
 the situation. The armistice proclaimed by the enemy, with- 
 out stipulating previously its terms or bases with our Govern- 
 ment, moreover, v/ithout counting with our Government, may 
 be qualified as a sarcastic mockery, if, besides gaining time 
 with the Americans, as we at first believed, it had not the 
 principal object, as we clearly see now, of providing with rations 
 all the towns of the interior and reconcentrating with impunity 
 its forces in points of the coast of their convenience. I inclose 
 copies of the orders issued to the commanders of the corps 
 under my command and the great crisis in which they were is- 
 sued will demonstrate that if it had not been for them a large 
 column would not have been attacked, as it was on its march 
 from Holguin to Bayamo.* I have the artillery ready to take 
 advantage of the first chance, which I do not doubt will come 
 as soon as war between Spain and the United States is declared. 
 
 "I propose to aid the Americans in every way I can, even if 
 this American intervention takes place without a previous rec- 
 ognition of our Republic, and I tell you this, for, in case my 
 purposes should not merit the approbation of our Government, 
 
 * Col. Carlos Garcia, with part of liis flying brigade, six hundred infantry, composed of 
 Baracoa, Guantanamo and Jiguani battalions, at El Tamarindo, near Babiney, fought a large 
 Spanish column commanded by Gen. Tejeda as it was en route from Holguin to Bayamo, 
 attempting to cross the country unmolested under a flag of truce. This same column some 
 days before had sought to cross the province of Holguin also and was heavily chastised by 
 Gen. Menocal's division and the explosion of dynamite mines at Aguacatones. Several days 
 later, Col. Garcia fought another column from La Mula to Cautillo en route from Holguin to 
 Bayamo commanded by the Spanisli Geneial, S. K. Marina, on whom he inflicted serious loss. 
 
54 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 it may be able to give me contrary orders which I shall, of 
 course, obey. I have just received telegrams from Santiago 
 of which I inclose copies. They confirm more and more my 
 belief that a war between Spain and the United States is on 
 the verge of breaking out, and my plans are to aid the Ameri- 
 cans unconditionally and to take advantage of the first oppor- 
 tunity the Spaniards may give me to attack them in the towns. 
 
 April i8, 1899. Calixto Garcia, 
 
 Maj.-Gcn. Coninianding Eastern Dcpai'tinentr 
 
 In the letter transcribed. Gen. Garcia exposed clearly to 
 the Government of Cuba the sentiment prevalent among the 
 Cuban troops in favor of cooperating with the Americans 
 against the eternal enemy of Cuba's independence. It was 
 logical for them to feel in this way, and I may say without 
 fear of being contradicted that it would not have been pru- 
 dent and upright to have our army refused a frank and 
 decided cooperation in fighting the common foe. I do not 
 enter into the analysis of the legal point, as to whether our 
 Government conducted the diplomatic negotiations through 
 proper channels to draw from the American administration 
 under President Cleveland, in those critical days, a compact 
 or promise in which some sort of official recognition be 
 accorded our Government. Anyway, it would have been 
 folly, to say nothing of the grave complications which would 
 have ensued, in addition to the world's bitter criticism, if we 
 had refused outright to cooperate in a war which we had been 
 waging alone for three years. The nature of this work does 
 not allow me to dwell on this special subject which is of vital 
 importance. 
 
 All efforts of the Spanish commanders to accumulate pro- 
 visions in the inland fortified towns met with the energetic 
 resistance of the Cuban troops, who were largely reenforced 
 by thousands of new soldiers who joined the patriots, aban- 
 doning the towns where they had been during the war. This 
 stubborn resistance of our troops caused Captain-General 
 Blanco some days later to order the evacuation of all the 
 inland fortified towns, some excellent ports of Oriente and 
 towns of minor importance of the west. 
 
 The heliographic turrets of the Eastern Department were 
 
CUBA AGAINST SPAIN. 1895-1898. 55 
 
 likewise abandoned. One after the other — from April 20 to 
 the first week of May — La Piedra, Jiguani, Santa Rita, 
 Bayamo, Cauto Embarcadero, Bueycito, Veguita, Guamo, 
 San Agustin, San Andres, Brenosa, Maniabon, San Manuel, 
 Puerto Padre and other villages and fortifications were 
 abandoned by the Spanish troops after plundering and des- 
 troying all the valuable private and official property, as it was 
 impossible to carry it with them on account of the constant 
 harassing by our troops. The Spaniards tried to induce the 
 families to abandon the towns also and accompany them to 
 the cities,, telling them that if they stayed, the insurgents 
 would abuse them and plunder their households, but the 
 majority did not heed the advice and remained in their 
 homes. In the Eastern Department, as the villages and 
 towns were evacuated by the Spanish under Cuban musketry 
 fire, our forces entered them in perfect order. General Garcia 
 issued orders for each locality to elect by suffrage its ci\'il 
 officials, and these first elections can be cited as comparable 
 with any in the most civilized countries. Utmost order pre- 
 vailed in all the towns that the enemy had abandoned, and 
 their inhabitants were satisfied to see their persons and pro- 
 perty so well respected by that army of ragged men, who had 
 been long misrepresented to them by the Spaniards. It must 
 not be forgotten that those people who remained in the 
 towns were families of our own soldiers, but many were 
 loyal Spanish subjects. Still others, although native Cubans, 
 had fought against us throughout the war in the guerrillas. 
 
 On the 28th of April, General Garcia moved his headquarters 
 to Bayamo, where he received the visit, on May i, of Lieut, 
 (now Lieut.-Col.) A. S. Rowan, with credentials from Mr. T. 
 Estrada Palma introdu-cing him as a representative of the 
 War Department. Lieutenant Rowan told the General that 
 the American Government was ready to aid the Cubans and 
 that his errand to Cuba was to ascertain what quantity of war 
 material and other supplies were wanted by General Garcia 
 in order to send it immediately to him. General Garcia dis- 
 patched Gen. E. Collazo and Lieut.-Col. Chas. Hernandez to 
 accompany Lieutenant Rowan to the United States with 
 instructions as to his opinion on the coming campaign : — - 
 
56 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 " To THE Secretary of War, U. S. A. 
 
 Dear Sir : — I have had real pleasure in receiving to-day 
 the visit of Mr. A. S. Rowan, who affirms himself to be the 
 bearer of verbal instructions of your department. 
 
 After answering through him the questions you ask me, I 
 send Gen. E. Collazo, perfectly authorized to represent me 
 near you. Mr. A. S. Rowan has accomplished his mission 
 entirely to my satisfaction and I should be very glad if you 
 could put him under my command. 
 
 I profit by this opportunity to express to you the heartfelt 
 thanks of the Army of the East under my command. 
 
 Yours truly, 
 
 Bayamo, May i, 1898. Calixto Garcia." 
 
 The party started that same day and embarked at the 
 northern coast of Tunis, on May 3, for the United States, 
 where they arrived, after a perilous voyage in an open row- 
 boat, some days later. Gen. E. Collazo was favorably greeted 
 in Washington and received marks of great consideration 
 from Secretary Alger and Gen. Nelson A. Miles. 
 
 On May 10, the Cuban Government issued orders to Gen- 
 erals Gomez and Garcia to cooperate with the American army 
 and for them to obey the orders and second the plans of the 
 American Generals. 
 
 A close lookout was recommended to the coast-guards, and 
 Col. Thomas Collazo, Chief of the Staff of General Garcia, 
 was directed to embark on the Holguin coast and in a sailboat 
 proceed outward and lie in wait for some vessel of the Ameri- 
 can Navy to send letters to the War Department. In the 
 latter part of May a large expedition of arms, munitions and 
 rations arrived at the port of Banes ; it was the Florida, 
 escorted by the American dispatch-boat Osceola. In this ex- 
 pedition Gen. Julio Sanguilly and Jose Lacret arrived with a 
 small regiment of Cuban volunteers. The war material was 
 safely deposited in charge of Gen. L. Feria, but the provisions 
 were distributed by General Lacret among the many starving 
 families that flocked to Banes praying for food. This circum- 
 stance caused great suffering, a fortnight later, to three 
 thousand men who were obliged to march to the vicinity of 
 Santiago, through a territory absolutely devoid of victuals. 
 
ClDA against SPAIN. 1895-1898. 57 
 
 without rations which otherwise would have served for that 
 toilsome march in which so many Cuban soldiers died from 
 fatigue and lack of food. 
 
 On the sixth of June, Lieut.-Col. Chas. Hernandez arrived 
 aboard the U. S. S. Gloucester at the Bay of Banes. He 
 brought important orders and news from the War Depart- 
 ment relative to the role the Cuban army was to play in the 
 coming campaign against the Spaniards. General Garcia 
 promptly answered the communications on the same niglit, 
 and the next day the Gloucester steamed out of the bay back 
 to the United States to convey the final arrangements 
 decided upon between Generals Miles and Garcia before the 
 American troops should leave their country for the attack 
 on Santiago. With what throbbing anxiety were those papers 
 of General Garcia expected. The military commanders did 
 not try to conceal their joy when the Gloucester arrived and 
 the documents were read at headquarters. 
 
 Meantime, what had happened on the other side of the 
 Jucaro-Moron trocha ? The War Department had also sent 
 to General Gomez an envoy, Mr. Somerford, a newsjaaper 
 correspondent, asking Gomez for some information about 
 that part of the island and also offering him necessary assis- 
 tance. The American Vice-Consul at Cardenas, Sr. Juan 
 Joba, proposed to furnish Gomez, in the name of the Admin- 
 istration, with all the war supplies for which he should ask. 
 It appears that General Gomez was too low in his estimate of 
 the needs of his army for he asked only for three small expe- 
 ditions to be embarked respectively in the provinces of 
 Cienfuegos, Remedios and Sancti Spiritus. Afterwards he 
 changed his order and instructed that one of these expedi- 
 tions should approach the coast of Camaguey, where it was to 
 embark a brigade and transport it to Matanzas Province. 
 The Administration, however, after conferring with Mr. T. 
 Estrada Palma, sent several well-equipped expeditions of 
 arms and provisions and several hundred Cuban volunteers 
 that were put ashore at different points of the Western De- 
 partment, to the great disgust of General Gomez, who feared 
 that they would be seized by the enemy as he did not have 
 at his disposal a sufficiently large force to protect the landing 
 
58 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 of the war material. In one of these expeditions, the " Maine," 
 a company of American cavahy commanded by Captain 
 Johnson, arrived and was attached for several days to General 
 Gomez's escort, passing them under the orders of Gen. Jose 
 Miguel Gomez* the hero of Jibaro and Arroyo Blanco, 
 towns which this General captured with the aid of artillery 
 admirably directed by Col. J. Estrampes. 
 
 I beg the reader to return to the events that occurred in 
 the Eastern Department after the arrival of the Florida expe- 
 dition at Banes, where about five thousand men had been con- 
 centrated by General Garcia to arm themselves with Spring- 
 field rifles and two hundred rounds per soldier. On June 13, 
 all these forces had arrived at Mejia (Holguin) already armed 
 and prepared for the operation that was contemplated. Next 
 day, camp was struck and one of the most wonderful efforts 
 of the whole war was performed by the bare-footed, ragged, 
 Cuban infantry ; a long and toilsome march under heavy rains, 
 through knee-deep muddy trails, fording or swimming swollen 
 rivers, climbing and sl-iding mountains while loaded with 
 heavy rifles and two hundred cartridges each ; without pro- 
 visions of any kind whatever till Juan Baron was reached, 
 where for the first time since their departure from Banes the 
 troops got something for their empty stomachs, quinine for 
 their malaria, and rest for their bodies ; this two days' stop 
 enabled them to continue their march across the Sierra Maes- 
 tra to Aserraderos, where they arrived in excellent spirits on 
 the 22nd and the rear guard on the 23rd. General Garcia 
 arrived at Aserraderos, early on the morning of the 19th, where 
 Generals Rabi, Cebreco and L.ora were camped with two 
 divisions of the 1st and 2nd army corps. A few hours after 
 his arrival General Garcia paid a visit to Rear-Admiral Samp- 
 son on board the New York, with whom some agreements 
 were made as to the manner in which the campaign was to be 
 developed. 
 
 On June 20, Major-General William R. Shafter went ashore 
 to meet and confer with General Garcia. At this council the 
 Cuban Generals Rabi, Lora, Castillo (D. and J.) and the chiefs 
 of staff of both armies were present. General Garcia's plan of 
 
 * Gen. Jose Miguel Gomez is not related to Gen. Maximo Gomez. 
 
CUBA AGAINST SPAIN. 1895-1898. 59 
 
 disembarkation was accepted by General Shafter and it was 
 resolved that a demonstration of Cuban forces and of the 
 U. So Navy be made on the western part of Santiago in order 
 to facilitate the landing of the American troops on the east- 
 ern coast at Daiquiri ; this landing to be protected by Gen. 
 Demetrio Castillo's brigade, which was composed of troops 
 perfectly familiar with the mining district east of Santiago. 
 It was agreed also to transport 3,000 Cubans from Aserraderos 
 to Siboney to aid the American troops in the attack on the 
 city. The Cuban troops were rationed by order of General 
 Shafter at Aserraderos with hardtack, bacon, canned beef, 
 coffee and sugar. The rations were good and plenty. 
 
 Gen. Agustin Cebreco, in compliance with orders from 
 General Garcia, marched with his division on the 21st to 
 Manacal, whence he was to feign an attack on the enemy, west 
 of Santiago ; on the same day Col. Carlos Gonzalez embarked 
 with a small brigade of the second division of the second army 
 corps. He was to receive orders from Brig.-Gen. Demetrio 
 Castillo, who was in charge of the forces that were to aid the 
 landing of the American troops at Daiquiri. Brig.-Gen. Fran- 
 cisco Estrada was ordered to take charge of Col. Carlos 
 Garcia's flying brigade that was distributed at Cauto Abajo 
 and on the Holguin-Santiago highway in expectation of fight- 
 ing the reinforcements that might endeavor to reach Santiago. 
 Col. Carlos Garcia was ordered to General Garcia's staff to 
 assist in the conferences between his father and the American 
 commanders. 
 
 Orders had been given since the first days of June to Gen. 
 Salvador Rios, Gen. Luis de Feria and Gen. Pedro Perez, 
 commanders of the Manzanillo, Holguin and Guantanamo 
 Divisions, respectively, to keep a sharp watch on the enemy in 
 case they should try to make a sally towards Santiago in aid 
 of the blockaded city. These orders were repeated several 
 times. Sufficient forces were left to embarrass, harass and 
 delay the enemy on the roads to Santiago, in proximity to 
 Guantanamo, Manzanillo and Holguin. 
 
 Gen. Pedro Perez of Guantanamo had, since the arrival of 
 Admiral Sampson's fleet in Cuban waters, rendered most 
 valuable services. To his measures it was due that General 
 
6o THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 Correa's order (Spanish Minister of War) to reinforce Santiago 
 was not obeyed by the commander of the Guantanamo troops, 
 who was compelled to remain shut up in the city, blockaded 
 by the Navy off Caimanera and on land by the Cubans. 
 Commander McCalla can testify to the valor and discipline of 
 Lieut,-Col. E. Thomas and his battalion and to the fortunate 
 assistance which our soldiers rendered to the Marines in the 
 Caimanera engagements. 
 
 The Spanish commander of Holguin was General Luque, 
 who had 12,000 men. Next to General Linares, he was consid- 
 ered the most daring Spanish commander of the department, 
 although his campaign in Oriente does not register one single 
 victory. Nevertheless, everybody expected from him a bold 
 sally with a strong colu.mn, and General Garcia, fearing it, 
 gave General Feria a large force with instructions to prevent 
 by all means the advance of Luque toward Santiago and if 
 possible inflict upon him severe loss. He was to follow on 
 the heels of the Spanish column, sending couriers ahead at full 
 speed to headquarters, in case that column should break 
 through the Cuban lines. General Feria, ably aided by his 
 officers and brave soldiers at El Pason River, repulsed Brig.- 
 Gen. Nario, who was in command of the reinforcements, and 
 compelled him to fall back within that city's line of fortifica- 
 tions. If General Luque's pluck had been equal to the height 
 of his fame (for he was called by the Spanish press the Hero of 
 Paso Real), General Linares might have given a little trouble 
 to General Shafter. As it was, he preferred to remain quietly 
 in Holguin while the sovereignty of his country in the new 
 world was being shattered to pieces. Moreover, if he had in- 
 tended to retreat towards Puerto Principe, as was whispered in 
 the city during those critical days, he would have met Gen, 
 Lope Recio, commander of the Camaguey forces, with a cav- 
 alry brigade ready to oppose him. General Garcia had in- 
 structed Recio to advance towards Holguin with the cavalry, 
 leaving the infantry camped near the Tunas boundary line in 
 readiness to take into their hands the fleeing enemy. 
 
 Of the three commanders to whom General Garcia entrusted 
 the checking of reinforcements, the only one that deserves 
 any criticism is Gen. Salvador Rios, commander of the Man- 
 
CUBA AGAINST SPAIN. 1S95-1898. 61 
 
 zanillo division. It is true that Rios was baffled by Colonel 
 Escario's sudden sally and due credit is given to this Spanish 
 commander for his ability to avoid engagements with the 
 Manzanillo infantry. In excuse for General Rios it may be 
 stated that although his infantry was not able to engage the 
 enemy on account of the impossibility of covering all the roads 
 properly, his cavalry, marching out of Manzanillo at dusk, 
 rather unexpectedly fought the enemy incessantly, as will be 
 explained later in this chapter. 
 
 On June 21, Col. Carlos Gonzalez with his brigade was 
 taken to Daiquiri on one of the American transports. Gen- 
 eral Shafter ordered Gen. W. Ludlow, chief of the Engineer 
 Corps, to build pontoons at the beach of Aserraderos, for the 
 embarkation which was accomplished wnth considerable 
 trouble. 
 
 The landing of Cuban troops at Daiquiri was a wise and 
 able manoeuvre that gave the key to the whole invasion of 
 the territory and gave perfect security to the disembarkation 
 of the American troops. The Spanish were menaced by the 
 navy from Punta Cabrera to Punta Berracos, being fired upon 
 along nearly the whole line. Colonel Cebreco was feigning 
 an attack on the west of Santiago. The Spaniards were scat- 
 tered, holding forts in all the iron-mining region, covering 
 very feebly an extensive territory which they were unable to 
 protect against an enemy already in it and perfectly familiar 
 with every trail, and the powerful fleet that constantly swept 
 the coast with its guns. The assistance of the Cubans in the 
 operation, clearing the way and attacking by land, while the 
 fleet bombarded the fortifications, gave success to the disem- 
 barkation of General Shafter's army. This has been passed 
 over in silence by all writers and is one of the facts that I 
 distinctly wish to impress upon the reader. To illustrate the 
 dashing attack of the Cubans by land, it may be well to re- 
 collect that at Siboney they entered under the fire of Spanish 
 musketry and of the bomb-shells of the American fleet, com- 
 pelling the enemy to retreat to Firmeza, and from there to 
 Savilla. In this attack General Castillo suffered a number of 
 casualties, some of them inflicted by the fleet's artillery, prov- 
 ing that the navy did not expect that the Cubans could carry 
 
62 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 the village so quickly and under such a hail of bullets from 
 the ships. 
 
 At 7 A. M. of the 25th, the Cuban troops began to embark 
 in boats towed by launches of the U. S. N. to the transports 
 that lay a mile and a half ofT. General Sanchez commanded 
 the forces that were taken on the Leona, General Capote those 
 on the Seiuxa, and General Cebreco those on the Orizaba. 
 Col. Candelario Cebreco was left in command of the forces on 
 shore at Aserraderos and of those that were detached on duty 
 west of Santiago. 
 
 General Garcia, his staff, and Generals J. Rabi, S. Lora and 
 R. Portuondo were invited aboard the Alamo by Gen, William 
 Ludlow, who showed himself a perfect gentleman in the high- 
 est acceptance those words have ; we all knew he was an able 
 engineer and a good West Point scholar before we had the 
 pleasure of meeting him. After that trip, strong ties of warm 
 friendship united us all to General Ludlow, which tightened 
 each day during the campaign, for he was our neighbor in the 
 trenches. During all that period, General Garcia's army 
 happened to be on the right of General Lawton's division, 
 of which Ludlow's brigade was the extreme right. 
 
 On the afternoon of the 25th, General Sanchez landed at 
 Siboney and the other Generals with their forces on the morn- 
 ing of the succeeding day. General Garcia established his 
 headquarters in the village and awaited General Shafter's 
 orders. When we jumped out of the surf, an ofBcer ap- 
 proached General Ludlow and informed him hurriedly of 
 what had occurred during his absence. I saw the General look 
 suddenly grave when he learned that Captain Capron had 
 been killed the day before, and he quickly inquired how the 
 fight had begun. The officer could not tell exactly; so many 
 contradictory versions were given that he hardly understood 
 how it came. Later on we heard from our own men and from 
 some correspondents the details of the Guasimas fight, with 
 words of praise on every lip as to the bravery of the Rough 
 Riders and their commanders. But one could hear some 
 criticisms, for the movement ordered by General Wheeler, 
 the gallant old soldier hero of a hundred battles, was consid- 
 ered reckless because such a comparatively small force had 
 
CUBA AGAINST SPAIN. 1895-1898. 63 
 
 advanced upon a position held by the enemy, whose number 
 no one could exactly tell. It was logical to think that at that 
 point a large force must be camped, considering that all the 
 garrisons of the fortifications of the mining zone had retreated 
 to that point and to Aguadores. The criticisms grew sharper 
 when it was ascertained that General Castillo's forces, after 
 driving the enemy out of Siboney and vicinity, had attacked 
 the retreating Spaniards on the 23rd and skirmished all that 
 day at Las Guasimas, meeting with a strong defense. When 
 this fight of the Rough Riders was referred to General Garcia, 
 he said : — ■ 
 
 " It is always of good moral effect to soldiers that have 
 never fought a battle to win the first one and it produces, 
 naturally, an opposite effect on the one that is defeated. The 
 Americans have done well if they have rushed to the front 
 and carried the enemy, even if it was executed in a reckless 
 way. By this time the Spanish soldier is perfectly satisfied 
 that the Yankees are men of pluck. And if, in a couple of 
 more fights, the Americans advance in the same manner, rest 
 assured that as soon as the Spaniards see the blue shirts 
 moving towards them, they won't wait a minute and will 
 take to their heels terror-stricken." 
 
 Our General knew the Spaniards well. He had sized them 
 up accurately in those few sentences, as was demonstrated at 
 the end of the campaign, when the Spanish soldiers were heard 
 to exclaim ; — " Oh, those Americans are devils : when they ad- 
 vance one must get out of their way, and d quickly too ! " 
 
 Gen. D. Castillo has been accused of not keeping his ap- 
 pointment on the morning of the 24th to advance on Las 
 Guasimas, and he in defense says that he made no such 
 appointment with any American commander. He also states 
 that he had sent to headquarters ample information of the 
 enemy's position and had put at the disposal of the Ameri- 
 cans all the men that as guides and scouts were to aid in the 
 operation, and that he had distinctly informed General Young 
 that he could not go because there would be left in Siboney 
 no senior Cuban commander to receive orders from General 
 Shafter and General Garcia. The latter, with three thousand 
 men, was to disembark that day from Aserraderos. As I 
 have already stated, the forces were not able to embark on the 
 
64 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 24th because the pontoon bridge had not been completed, but 
 they were expected to arrive at Siboney on that date. 
 
 I firmly believe that General Wheeler did right in pushing 
 forward to Las Guasimas the van of the invading army, but 
 the movement ought to have been combined with another 
 column that should have previously advanced, taking the other 
 trail. If there was a mistake in this fight, it certainly was 
 due only to the lack of a flanking force that would have facil- 
 itated the advance of the main column. Col. Leonard Wood 
 did what a good level-headed soldier would have done in sim- 
 ilar circumstances — push forward. 
 
 In Cuba, a flanking force must always have excellent guides, 
 with a section of chapeadores, armed with machete only, to 
 open the way through the thick undergrowth, bejiico, and 
 tangled bushes ; otherwise the manigiia — as it is called by the 
 Cubans — is absolutely impenetrable, and deploying in such a 
 country without men that know how to handle the machete 
 is absurd. 
 
 The Spanish official report of the engagements sustained on 
 the twenty-third and twenty-fourth of June against the 
 Cubans under Col. C. Gonzalez and the Rough Riders 
 commanded by Col. Leonard Wood, is as follows: — 
 
 " Santiago de Cuba, June 24th, 1898. 
 
 " General Rubin's column under orders of the commander- 
 in-chief of the Fourth Army Corps was attacked yesterday at 
 noon and again in the evening. 
 
 "This morning considerable forces with artillery guns 
 made a resolute attack and were repulsed, losing many men. 
 
 *' On our side we had, in the two days, seven dead, Jose 
 Lances, Captain of the provisional battalion of Puerto 
 Rico, and Zenon Borregon, second Lieutenant of the same 
 battalion, seriously wounded ; Francisco las Tortas, first 
 Lieutenant of the regiment of Royal Artillery, slightly 
 wounded ; two privates seriously wounded and two slightly 
 wounded. Various contusions. 
 
 " General Rubin had on the heights of Sevilla three com- 
 panies of the provisional battalion of Puerto Rico, three of 
 San Fernando, all the detachments from the forts gathered 
 the day before, and two Plasencia guns. Rubin had divided 
 his force in three echelons — as Lieut. Jose Miiller * af^rms, — 
 
 * Battles and Capitulation of Santiago de Cuba, translated and published by the Navy 
 Department, 1S99. 
 
CUBA AGAINST SPAIN. 1S95-1898. 65 
 
 the foremost one under Commander Alcaniz, formed of three 
 companies of Puerto Rico troops and one mobilized com- 
 pany. 
 
 " On the 23rd, this echelon alone checked the enemy's 
 advance in the morning and again in the evening, the echelon 
 having been reinforced by one company from San Fernando, 
 half engineers, and two guns. When the battle was over the 
 forces withdrew to their former positions, the echelon remain- 
 ing on the same site. 
 
 "At daybreak on the 24th, the echelon was reinforced by 
 two companies from Talavera, and not only resisted a strong 
 attack of the enemy but also forced the latter to retreat. 
 
 " In spite of this advantage, they received orders to with- 
 draw because the enemy was approaching the Morro by rail, 
 and, as there were not forces enough to oppose him, it would 
 have been surrounded. In compliance with the order 
 received, the column withdrew to the city." 
 
 If Lieutenant Miiller's statement be correct, the enemy had 
 about five hundred men at Las Guasimas on the first echelon, 
 and now it does not appear queer that the Cubans should not 
 be able to carry the position, as they were a much smaller 
 force than their opponents. 
 
 General Shafter continued on board the Scguranca till tiic 
 road to La Redonda had been opened by the engineers. It 
 was quite difificult to carry him any dispatches when the sea 
 was rough, because the boats could hardly approach the 
 pontoon bridge, and then there was no launch ready to take 
 you to where the Scgura)ua was lying, by no means near 
 shore. All the launches were busy landing the regiments and 
 only as a courtesy of the midshipmen in charge could you get 
 aboard the floating headquarters of the 5th Army Corps. 
 
 Our troops were ordered to camp on the outskirts of the 
 village and General Cebreco's force on the road to La 
 Redonda. Gen. D. Castillo had organized a good system of 
 receiving daily information from the city and we were pretty 
 well posted on what was going on in Santiago. It was 
 through this channel that General Garcia received and after- 
 ward presented to Rear-Admiral Sampson a map of the har- 
 bor, with important data of the fortifications, showing where 
 the torpedoes and ships were lying. All this valuable service 
 was performed by Cubans willingly and without rcmuncra- 
 
66 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 tion, risking their lives in the city, where, if detected, a 
 summary court-martial would have deprived us of their valu- 
 able and much needed assistance. 
 
 On the twenty-seventh a dispatch was received at the 
 Cuban Headquarters stating that a large Spanish column had 
 marched out of Manzanillo late in the afternoon of the 
 twenty-second, and as General Pando some days before left 
 Havana via Batabano, — it was supposed for Manzanillo, — 
 gathering first some forces at Jucaro, we inferred that the 
 reinforcements were under his command. How mistaken 
 were we ! General Pando, far from coming with these, was 
 travelling through Central America and Mexico incognito 
 \\\ pursuit of a wild plan of Spanish colonization. To think 
 that when Spain was about to lose her colonies, literally 
 kicked out of them by an American nation, the chief of staff 
 of Captain-General Blanco should be seeking land concessions 
 for colonies, particularly in America, where Spain's sovereignty 
 was forever doomed ! 
 
 General Garcia, fully realizing the importance of such news 
 and thinking with foundation that the reinforcements were 
 much larger than they really were, ordered Gen. D. Castillo 
 and Col. C. Garcia to General Shafter's headquarters to give 
 liim the details of the dispatch and General Garcia's views of 
 what could be done against the advancing column. We 
 accordingly started out for a voyage to the Seguranca, that was 
 fully three miles off. By a lucky coincidence we found at the 
 beach a good soul willing to steam us alongside of the flag- 
 ship. We were politely greeted by the General and after 
 saluting him we informed him of our mission. We 
 stated that General Garcia suggested to him the advisability 
 of sending a strong Cuban force to Aguacate that same day, 
 the twenty-seventh, under Gen. J. Rabi's command. Agua- 
 cate was the junction of all the roads from Manzanillo, and he 
 was confident that the enemy would pass through those posi- 
 tions which were unique for checking the enemy and routing 
 him. General Garcia was sure to get his forces there in time 
 to engage the enemy, for the column would certainly be 
 delayed at the passage of the Contramaestre River by General 
 £,strada, to whom orders were to be sent immediately to 
 
CUBA AGAINST SPAIN. 1895-1898. 67 
 
 make a desperate fight and hold his own till General Rabi 
 should arrive at Aguacate. 
 
 General Shafter consulted the maps before him and ascer- 
 tained through General Garcia's representatives that from 
 /\serraderos the Cuban infantry would be at El Aguacate on 
 the twenty-ninth by making a forced march, if they could be 
 transported that same afternoon to Aserraderos. Meanwhile, 
 General Garcia had given orders to General Rabi to be ready 
 and near; two thousand men were rationed for four days and 
 formed in the streets of Siboney, only waiting for General 
 Shafter's order to embark. 
 
 General Shafter suddenly changed his mind, without 
 any apparent cause to justify such change, and said to 
 Castillo and Garcia that he would rather not send any troops 
 to meet the reinforcements, that he needed all the Cubans 
 with his troops, as they were a valuable aid to him ; that it 
 was not wise to divide the army now ; that if the reinforce- 
 ments should enter Santiago, he would have thirty-one thou- 
 sand men to bottle them all up in the city, and that he 
 certainly would not move a single man from the bulk of the 
 army. As he was saying this, Colonel McClernand came in 
 from the salon of the steamer where the typewriters were 
 working incessantly, carrying a printed list of transports with 
 all the important data concerning accommodation and other 
 particulars. When the General saw him, he said, " Never 
 mind it, sir, I don't need that list now." 
 
 We dropped the conversation and begged the General's per 
 mission to withdraw, but he detained us asking our opinion as 
 to a proposed advance to Aguadores and as to the strength of 
 Santiago's fortifications. Then the General sent word to 
 General Garcia not to worry about the reinforcements and 
 that next day he (Shafter) would go ashore. 
 
 Had the Cuban forces been allowed to go and meet the 
 enemy — either by sea to Aserraderos or by land, cutting 
 through the Spanish line of fortifications — Colonel Escario 
 would have been routed or captured and then at least a part 
 of the glory that the Americans monopolized with the sur- 
 render of Santiago would have gone to the credit of the 
 Cubans. As it was, we were slandered bitterly by the war- 
 
68 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH AVAR. 
 
 correspondents (with very few exceptions) who, in their wrath 
 against us for not furnishing them servants and horses as they 
 expected we would, wrote down statements that only existed 
 in their excited imaginations. 
 
 We had left our packs, saddle-horses and tents at Aserra- 
 deros, whence they were to go all around to Juan Baron, 
 Cauto Abajo, Sabanilla and Ramon de lasYaguas, to Siboney. 
 Nearly all of our generals and officers were afoot, from the 
 time of their arrival at Daiquiri and Siboney till the eighth of 
 July, when they arrived at our camp at Quintero Hill. Col. 
 F. Dieguez arrived at Siboney on the twenty-seventh with 
 one hundred cavalry, and as soon as the horses were seen the 
 petitions from the excursionists increased to such an extent 
 that there was one who asked me to dismount some of the 
 cavalry, so as to lend them the horses till the campaign was 
 over. It was difficult to make them understand that we could 
 not do such things. Some of them would ask an officer to 
 let him hire one of the soldiers of his company, stating that 
 the man would receive good pay. There was no end to these 
 and other requests. 
 
 Miss Clara Barton had arrived at Siboney with a large cargo 
 of provisions which had been intended to be distributed in 
 the western part of Cuba. She sent word to General Garcia 
 that the Red Cross would gladly aid his army in every possi- 
 ble way and that she desired to know if there were any indi- 
 gent families near Siboney, so as to distribute food amongst 
 them. General Garcia ordered an aide-de-camp of his to 
 express in his name to Miss Clara Barton that he appreciated 
 dearly and accepted the aid of the Red Cross and that he 
 would be glad to give Miss Barton any information regarding 
 indigent Cubans, who were many but lived far away from 
 Siboney. That same day some nurses landed and took charge 
 of the Cuban Hospital which was under the direction of the 
 Cuban surgeon Dr. F. Veranes. These nurses performed won- 
 derfully good service during thedays that we were in Siboney, 
 and all said in their favor is little compared to what they 
 deserve. Soon, all the inhabitants of the mountains flocked 
 down to Siboney, as they had been told that the Red Cross 
 was distributing food and clothes to everybody. Hundreds 
 
CUBA AGAINST SPAIN. 1895-1S98. 69 
 
 of poor settled down permanently in the village or its vicinity, 
 giving to the streets a strong oriental aspect and odor, which 
 made the most indifferent man shrink from the scene, besides 
 causing some Americans to think that such an unfortunate 
 collection were a fair representation of the Cuban people and 
 members of Garcia's Army. 
 
 What seems to have caused considerable comment and 
 unjust criticism by the many jolly excursionists that accom- 
 panied the Shafter expedition to Cuba was the personal 
 appearance of our soldiers. The sad and weary gaze of these 
 unfortunate men of the tropics, tired and worn out from pri- 
 vations of all sorts during months and years of toil, so differ- 
 ent from the bold, defiant look of the free citizen of the north, 
 a happy possessor of physical and moral energies accumulated 
 during a lifetime of welfare, their calm and unconcerned atti- 
 tude—not indolent as has been erroneously supposed — toward 
 men and things that surrounded them, compared to the busi- 
 ness-like, inquisitive brand-new and glory-seeking soldiers of 
 optimistic inclinations just out from the land of liberty, caused 
 those incipient war-critics to draw an unfair parallel without 
 stopping to consider that the skeptical and unconcerned 
 appearance of the first was a logical result of a rough cam- 
 paign of numberless hardships, as was the optimistic and 
 brilliant disposition of the others, the product of a charming 
 civilized life of liberty, love and relative prosperity. 
 
 On the twenty-ninth. General Shafter came ashore and 
 ordered General Garcia to move his troops next morning 
 towards Santiago. On the thirtieth, at 6 A. M., we broke camp 
 and three hours later we pitched it at El Salado. General 
 Shafter moved all his army excepting Sheffield's division, and 
 camped at La Redondita. Col. Carlos Gonzalez continued in 
 the van where he had been since the first days, and his force 
 was the foremost and nearest to the enemy. Scouting parties 
 from this column went out daily to reconnoiter the enemy 
 and the nature of the ground. General Chaffee accompanied 
 them, once obtaining valuable knowledge that served him 
 later. A council presided over by General Shafter at his 
 headquarters, was held on the thirtieth at three o'clock P.^ M. 
 attended by nearly all the American commanders, in addition 
 
70 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 to Gen. Demetrio Castillo and Colonels Collazo and Garcia, 
 representatives of Gen. Calixto Garcia. The combined move- 
 ments of the next day's attack were discussed. General Law- 
 ton was to take El Caney, and General Wheeler, San Juan 
 Hill block house. General Garcia was to move to Marianage 
 and wait until Lawton should capture the village and then 
 cross to Ducourau and keeping on Lawton's right flank 
 advance to Santiago. The most optimistic views were 
 expressed by those that took part in the discussion of the 
 proposed attacks, and when we left the council we were quite 
 satisfied that the next day's fight would not amount to any- 
 thing worth considering. 
 
 Early on the morning of the first of June, complying with 
 the orders above mentioned. General Garcia occupied Marian- 
 age, while General Lawton's division moved towards El Caney 
 and General Sumner's towards San Juan. General Garcia 
 distributed his forces, with orders to be^ ready for any emer- 
 gency, in the following manner: — Two companies of the 
 " Santiago " regiment under Col. F. Dieguez were ordered to 
 the Masonry Bridge on the Caney-Santiago road with pickets 
 at Santa Cruz and Ducourau. The infantry was stationed at 
 the bottom of the Marianage plateau on the trail leading to 
 San Juan, and in these positions the Cuban forces remained 
 during the attacks of San Juan and Caney. Marianage is the 
 ruins of a plantation, magnificently situated on a hill that 
 commands all the territory facing Caney, Ducourau and San 
 Juan. From the plateau we could clearly see both battles as 
 they were fought simultaneously, and the incidents of both 
 were eagerly followed by Generals Garcia and Rabi and their 
 staffs. Col. Evan Miles, who was also awaiting orders at 
 Marianage with his colored regulars, soon received instructions 
 to move down to Caney, which he promptly did. At our left, 
 facing San Juan, was E*l Pozo, where Grimes's battery was situ- 
 ated, and a detachment of Cubans had been left with it ; the 
 battery was soon quieted by the accurate shots of the Spanish 
 artillery, which did some damage to our men, amongst whom 
 may be mentioned Lieutenant-Colonel Paneque, who was 
 badly wounded by a bomb-shell. 
 
 The advance on San Juan was brilliant but of the most reck- 
 
CUBA AGAINST SPAIN. 1895-1898. 71 
 
 less character. We could see the men climb the hill slowly, 
 steadily, but without losing an inch of ground so dearly 
 gained, and we could see bunches of five stand their own 
 without flinching, and advance half way up the hill without 
 firing a shot, while the Spaniards behind the trenches were 
 blazing away at them. Turning our eyes towards El Caney 
 we could see two horse-shoe formed clouds of smoke, which 
 denoted that the battle there was raging furiously, both the 
 defenders and the assailants manifesting, for hours of incessant 
 fighting, unsurpassed bravery. Charge after charge was 
 made, only to be again and again repulsed. Our anxiety had 
 no limits as we watched those fights go on. We expected to 
 be utilized in some way, and every Cuban heart was beating 
 for envy and disappointment, being compelled to wait there 
 between the two fights, inactive, while the men who came to 
 aid us in our struggle were being killed in heaps by on?' enemy, 
 who opened immense lanes into the serried ranks of our allies. 
 They fought admirably, regardless of the losses to which they 
 were thus being subjected, and they well deserved the vic- 
 tory so dearly won. 
 
 Those fights reminded us how the Cubans under Antonio 
 Maceo used to attack. He would throw his infantry against 
 an intrenched enemy regardless of the consequences. He did 
 not possess artillery to shake the foundations of a fort or to 
 clear a line of trenches, preparing thus for the infantry's 
 attack. He counted only upon the pluck and stubbornness 
 of his men, for he could not count on anything else. His 
 self-reliance was supreme, and we believed unique, till we 
 beheld the battles of San Juan and El Caney. 
 
 Meantime our infantry was receiving a hail of bullets from 
 the enemy of San Juan Hill, and at four o'clock P. M., when 
 roster was called, before moving to Ducourau it was learned 
 at headquarters that we had over a hundred casualties with- 
 out firing in return a single shot at the enemy. 
 
 Colonel Gonzalez, who with his men entered the Caney engage- 
 ment with General Lawton's division, was warmly congratulated 
 by his commanders for his behavior during the day, and 
 especial praise was accorded Major Victor Duany, who with a 
 Cuban Company had flanked the Spanish position and ably 
 
72 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 assisted in the victory of the American troops. Brig.-Geno Vara 
 del Rey made a heroic defense of the village, and, had he had 
 double the number of men at his disposal, the victory of the day 
 would unquestionably have been his. 
 
 The Americans had abandoned, all along the trail, haver- 
 sacks, blanket-rolls and all sorts of objects. Cubans, as well as 
 Americans, who needed any of these articles freely helped 
 themselves. Col. Evan Miles took a little more care with the 
 property of his soldiers, and as he went down from Marianage 
 to Caney, when the firing burst out, he ordered his men to lay 
 their impedimenta alongside the Caney main road, leaving a 
 man from each company to watch over the heaps of haver- 
 sacks and blanket-rolls. In either case the surprise of our 
 soldiers was great to see how unconcernedly the American 
 soldier would throw aside these things so important in war. 
 A mambi never parts from his jolongo (haversack) ; he fights, 
 eats and sleeps with it. There is nothing more wearisome 
 and discouraging to a soldier, after a battle in which his ner- 
 vous system has been greatly strained by the work and emo. 
 tions undergone, than to find himself at the end, when he 
 most needs to repair his energies, without those articles so indis- 
 pensable. Whoever has had any sort of practical war training 
 fully appreciates the value and necessity of clinging to his 
 jolongo and blanket, through thick and thin. 
 
 At nightfall our forces marched to Ducourau, where head- 
 quarters were established. Gen. A. Cebreco was ordered to 
 camp at Sabana Ingenio. 
 
 I beg the reader to remember that General Lawton was to 
 advance to Santiago after taking El Caney. But in General 
 Shafter's plans it was not calculated what was going to 
 happen. Lawton had suffered considerably in the assault of 
 the village and was in no condition to continue that same day 
 toward the beleaguered city. Next day before daybreak we 
 marched from Ducourau and advanced towards Santiago, our 
 van skirmishing with some Spanish detachments of the forti- 
 fied zone (all the mountains back of Santiago) who were 
 already in retreat to Santiago. We took possession of La Cari- 
 dad Hill where General Garcia pitched his tent, while General 
 Lora captured the San Miguel blockhouse, the village of Cua- 
 
CUBA AGAINST SPAIN. 1895-1898. 73 
 
 bitas and the water works ; Generals Capote, Cebreco and 
 Sanchez destroyed the raUroad of San Luis, lifting and bend- 
 ing the rails, and burning the bridge named Purgatorio. 
 
 As we appeared on the height of La Caridad and Quintero 
 facing the city, the Spaniards opened a heavy musket fire on us. 
 During all that day it continued and General Garcia ordered 
 Cebreco to deploy a line of sharpshooters that should keep 
 an intermittent and effective fire on the Spanish trenches, 
 especially at two batteries that had opened fire on us and were 
 causing considerable damage. Col. F. Dieguez was detached 
 with his cavalry on a reconnoitering tour towards the river 
 Gascon and the Cobre road. Immediately afterwards the 
 Spaniards sent from the fleet some Marines and disem- 
 barked them near Matadero. A considerable force could be seen 
 moving to and fro at the Cobre entrance and about the Plaza de 
 Toros, expecting no doubt an attack at those points. General 
 Garcia never left the saddle until we were in possession of all 
 the points mentioned. 
 
 At noon, Monsieur E. Cheux came out from the city, stat- 
 ing to General Garcia that the French consul was about to leave 
 the city with all the foreign subjects. The General informed 
 M. Cheux that the consul would be cordially welcomed within 
 our lines. At 3 o'clock P. M. the consul, followed by about 
 four hundred persons of both sexes, left the city by the Cua- 
 bitas road and were conducted far beyond the range of the 
 Spanish fire. 
 
 When night came strong pickets were detached on our 
 flanks to avoid a surprise from our enemy, as we were abso- 
 lutely isolated from the American Army, which was at least 
 one mile to our left. Captain A. Escalante carried an order 
 to General Cebreco that evening to harass the enemy during the 
 night with guerillas, which was done at about half past nine 
 with a very unfortunate and unexpected result ; the Spaniards, 
 believing that they were assaulted, broke out with a heavy fire, 
 and the Americans, in their turn, mistaking it for an advance 
 of the enemy to recover the positions they had lost the day 
 before, opened fire also, and in a few minutes there was such a 
 thundering that the Cubans themselves concluded to blaze 
 away in the direction of the city. This general alarm caused 
 
74 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 Shafter to issue an order to General Garcia not to repeat the 
 night harassment thereafter, for while it had the desired effect 
 on the enemy it disturbed his own troops in their slumber. 
 
 Next day was the memorable third of July. General Lawton 
 with other generals visited General Garcia and they all rode 
 around to the positions held by the Cubans. While they 
 were at La Caridad Hill, whence an excellent view of the city 
 and harbor could be had, the Spanish fleet stupidly steamed 
 out of the harbor to their inevitable doom, leaving the city 
 without the protection of those floating, impregnable fortresses 
 whose mighty guns were sufificient to clear the hills of an 
 enemy far inferior in strength. 
 
 At 1 1 A. M. General Garcia received information that the 
 enemy were landing forces by rail at Dos Bocas and along the 
 line. He ordered General Sanchez's column to march immedi- 
 ately and reinforce General Lora, who was occupying the rail- 
 road. General Garcia himself started out towards the enemy 
 with his staff and infantry escort and took command of both 
 forces, advancing with them to San Vicente. This village was 
 carried by a detachment of said escort under Lieutenant Arcia, 
 who occupied it until General Lora, after taking the heliograph 
 turret of Boniato, advanced to the village. When General Gar- 
 cia returned he changed the headquarters toCuabitas leaving in 
 the trenches of Caridad and Ouintero Hills the forces of 
 Generals Capote and Cebreco. 
 
 That afternoon General Garcia was visited by Generals Law- 
 ton, Ludlow, Chaffee and Col. E. Miles, and a very important 
 conference took place, in which very pessimistic views as to 
 the situation were advanced by the visitors again and again. 
 General Garcia as often gave assurances to the American gen- 
 erals that his army and he were greatly indebted to the Ameri- 
 can nation, and that the latter could positively count on the 
 unconditional support of the Cubans. The American generals 
 withdrew, feeling that they had done their full duty in behalf 
 of the army under their command and satisfied that the practi- 
 cal knowledge of Spanish warfare and procedure possessed by 
 the Cuban general was a satisfactory guarantee to them. 
 
 That day Colonel Escario with his column from Manzanillo 
 arrived at the city. General Garcia has been held responsible 
 
CUBA AGAINST SPAIN. 1895-1898. 75 
 
 for the entrance of these reinforcements to the beleaguered 
 city on the ground that he did not check their advance to 
 Santiago, as it noiv appears that General Shafter expected he 
 would do. I respectfully refer the reader to the conference 
 held on board the Seguraiifa the twenty-seventh of June, 
 when General Garcia showed to General Shafter the necessity 
 of sending General Rabi and troops to El Aguacate to inter- 
 cept the above-mentioned reinforcements, a proposition that 
 General Shafter refused. 
 
 Late in the afternoon of the third of July, our troops (Gen- 
 eral Lora) occupied the village of Dos Bocas on the railroad 
 to San Luis. As may be observed, Lora's forces were grad- 
 ually moving towards this town and the railroad was abso- 
 lutely ours. All communications from the city to the fortified 
 zone were cut. On the fourth of July we received the official 
 report of the destruction of Cervera's fleet, also the news of 
 the entrance and occupation of El Cobre, Bartolon, Monte 
 Real, Coleto, Mazamorra and San Miguel, and the news that 
 General Shafter had prolonged for twenty-four hours the 
 truce which had been granted to the city the day before, 
 allowing the families to evacuate. Before 6 o'clock A. M. of 
 the fifth they began to leave the city. As they walked out 
 they formed a column more than three miles long. Men, 
 women and children flocked to Cuabitas, terror-stricken, fear- 
 ing that the cannonade would commence at any moment and 
 they would not have time to escape therefrom. The major- 
 ity of them went out of Santiago without any other garments 
 besides those they wore, and very few had the foresight to 
 provide themselves with enough food for a few days. Every- 
 body thought that in a couple of hours the fortifications 
 Santiago w^ere to be a mass of ruins, figuring that the Am 
 cans were to open fire with no less than sixty enormous 
 bre siege guns, that being the story prevalent amor ^~ 
 Of course we did not dare to inform them of the ♦" 
 affairs, as that would tend towards increasiu'' 
 great distraction. General Garcia did h' 
 their many wants and desires; notwithst' 
 from want of food, disease and expo'" 
 eral Shafter ordered rations to be 
 
76 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 hardly enough pack-trains to attend to the transportation of 
 the rations for the troops. When the much-needed rations 
 could finally be delivered them, alas, it was too late, for starva- 
 tion had played its part. 
 
 As pack-trains have been incidentally mentioned, I venture 
 to say that they were not suf^cient in number to provide for 
 the entire attacking forces, and as may be supposed, the 
 Cuban troops were the ones to suffer. Lieut.-Col. J. M. 
 Galdos, Chief Commissary of the Cuban Army, pitched his 
 tent alongside of Major Gallagher's, Chief Commissary of the 
 5th Army Corps, at La Redondita, close to General Shaffer's 
 headquarters. It was fully nine miles from the Cuban trenches 
 to the Commissary's camp, and daily the Cuban troops had to 
 tramp that distance for rations, or go without. This neces- 
 sary grub-parade caused the ever thoughtful and economical 
 American correspondents to open their eyes in astonishment 
 and exclaim that the Cuban allies, instead of fighting, were 
 plundering Shafter's depots, thereby inconsiderately exhaust- 
 ing the war fund. 
 
 On the sixth of July, General Cebreco received an offlcial 
 report that Lieutenant-Colonel Vaillant, commander of the 
 Cuban forces at Aserraderos under Colonel Cebreco, had cap- 
 tured Rear-Admiral Cervera and nearly all the survivors of the 
 destroyed Spanish fleet, others escaping probably to Santiago. 
 The prisoners were delivered to olTicers of the American fleet 
 and receipts given the Cuban officers in exchange for them. 
 It has possibly not been known into whose hands Cervera and 
 his men first fell upon reaching the shore, so the above will 
 explain. 
 
 As General Lawton had manifested to General Garcia his 
 
 le to move the artillery batteries to La Caridad, where our 
 
 "* *. had dug out rifle-pits during four days of constant 
 
 ^' ■" moved to Loma Quintero the forces that held La 
 
 ■^ those of Quintero along the crests of the hills as 
 
 'o. On the seventh of July, General Estrada 
 
 ^antry and all the impedimenta of our army 
 
 '^en we embarked at Aserraderos to go 
 
 1 Estrada, as may be remembered, 
 
 "g brigade which was to engage 
 
 \ 
 
CUBA AGAINST SPAIN. 1S95-1898. 77 
 
 the enemy, should it come from Manzanillo, as actually hap- 
 pened. 
 
 The report that Col. Rafael Montalvo gave [he was in com- 
 mand at the Aguacate engagement] says very little that the 
 reader does not already know. But it is convenient and just 
 to afifirm that Colonel Montalvo fought tenaciously with his 
 800 recruits at El Aguacate, and that he did his best to check 
 the enemy, who outnumbered him four to one. 
 
 Colonel Escario entered Palma Soriano with a large quan- 
 tity of stretchers, leaving all his dead unburicd on the field. 
 In that town he gathered fresh troops from the garrison, and 
 leaving all the wounded marched to Santiago after having 
 given his men ample time to recuperate their energies. Lieut. - 
 Col. Alfredo Lora with a cavalry troop, and Lieut. -Col. Carlos 
 Poey with General Garcia's cavalry escort, skirmished with 
 Escario's column between Baire and Palma Soriano, both sus- 
 taining heavy loss. 
 
 A painful errand took the author a few months ago to 
 Washington, where he accidentally met some good old friends 
 of the Santiago campaign. Naturally their conversation 
 turned upon the events of the war in which the deceased Gen. 
 Calixto Garcia had so actively and ably cooperated with his 
 army. An old veteran with a big, noble heart, a very dear 
 
 friend of the writer, introduced him to General — •, who 
 
 at once was recognized as one of his friends of the campaign. 
 Through the courtesy of this gentleman a copy was received 
 of Lieut. Jose Miiller's Battles and Capitulation of Santiago 
 dc Cnba, then just off the press, published by the Office of Na- 
 val Intelligence. From the introduction to this ofificial edition 
 the following words are quoted : 
 
 " Among the newly translated chapters, the one giving the 
 diary of General Escario's march, with 3,752 men, from Man- 
 zanillo to Santiago, a distance of 52 leagues through the 
 enemy's country, is one of great interest. Considering the 
 nature of the country, which forced them generally to march 
 single file, the heavy rains and the continual harassment of the 
 Cubans, the effectiveness of which is shown by the large num- 
 ber of killed and wounded on both sides, it may be classed as 
 one of the most noticeable military feats of the war. It shows 
 what the Cubans did towards the fall of Santiago, and a study 
 
78 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 of the situation will be interesting, considering what would 
 have been the temporary effect if Escario's march had been 
 unopposed and he had arrived at Santiago with his force un- 
 impan-ed a day or two before that critical period — July 2 — 
 just previous to the departure and destruction of Cervera's 
 fl<-'t-^t- Richardson Clover, 
 
 December 31, 1898. Chief Intelligence Offieer. 
 
 We herewith furnish a complete copy of the Spanish Col- 
 onel's diary, which, as Mr. Richardson Clover says, will be of 
 great interest to study. The broad views and good sense of 
 the American reader will, naturally, make due allowance for 
 the bombastic style of the document, appreciating that it 
 comes from a soldier of Spanish schooling. Ample conclu- 
 sions can be drawn as to the credit due the Cuban troops, and 
 the loss inflicted upon Escario's column during the march 
 towards Santiago. 
 
 (Diary of the operations of campaign of the forces of the 
 Manzanillo division from June 22 to July 3, 1898.) 
 
 " From Manzanillo to Bayamo. 
 
 " In compliance with orders from the lieutenant-general, 
 commander-in-chief of the fourth army corps, in his cablegram 
 of the twentieth inst., ordering that the forces of the Manza- 
 nillo division should proceed to Santiago de Cuba, Colonel 
 Frederico Escario, for the time being commander-general of 
 said division, having made the necessary preparations for such 
 a long journey, having properly equipped the troops and 
 rationed them for six days, commenced the march on the 22d 
 at the head of a column composed of the first and second 
 battalions of the Isabel la Catolica regiment of infantry, No. 
 75 ; the first battalion of the Andalusia regiment. No. 52 ; the 
 Alcantara Peninsular battalion, No. 3 ; the battalion of 
 Puerto Rico chasseurs, No. 19; the second section of the first 
 battery of the fifth mountain regiment ; part of the eighth com- 
 pany of the first regiment of sappers ; mounted guerillas from 
 Calicito, Bayamo and Manzanillo; five medical ofificers and 
 thirty men of the medical department destined for the Santi- 
 ago hospitals, and the tenth company of the transportation 
 column in charge of thirty rations of hard-tack (galleta), 
 15,000 extra rations loaded on 148 mules and 50 private beasts 
 of burden properly loaded. 
 
 " This column, comprising a total of 3,752 men, left Manza- 
 nillo at five o'clock p. M. and at nightfall reached Palmas Altas, 
 
CUBA AGAINST SPAIxM. 1S95-1S98. 79 
 
 where its commander gave orders to encamp for the night, 
 which, however, did not afford the soldiers the rest that was 
 intended, owing to a steady downpour so that only a few could 
 lie down. 
 
 "The twenty-third dawned more brightly than the preced- 
 ing day; the camp was struck, the column reorganized, and 
 the difficult march recommenced at 5:30. High weeds had 
 to be cut down to open a road on the left bank of the Yara 
 River, which route the commander chose in order to obviate 
 passing through towns which might be occupied by the enemy, 
 thereby complying with the order to avoid encounters, con- 
 tained in the cablegram of the twentieth above referred to. 
 
 " The column passed through the Don Pedro plain and 
 arrived at dark at the ford of the Yara river, near the town of 
 the same name. Orders were given to encamp there. The 
 column had been harassed all day, especially while preparing 
 to occupy the camp, when the enemy opened a steady, lively 
 fire, which lasted ten minutes, killing one of our men and 
 wounding three. The fire was answered by the vanguard of 
 the column. The usual reconnoissance having been made by 
 the mounted force, which reported that the enemy had with- 
 drawn, the column encamped and the night was spent without 
 further events an,d under more favorable conditions than the 
 previous night. A clear sky and a dense grove allowed our 
 soldiers comparative rest until daybreak of the twenty-fourth, 
 when the column, rising at the sound of reveille, after drink- 
 ing coffee, was again formed and organized by six o'clock, when 
 it continued its march through Arroyo Pavon, Ana Lopez 
 and Sabana la Loma, sustaining slight skirmishes in which 
 the column had one man killed and one man wounded. The 
 column encamped on the banks of the Canabacoa River. 
 
 "On the twenty-fifth, at the usual hour, the camp of the 
 preceding day was struck and the column reorganized while 
 heavy showers were falling. The march was continued 
 through Las Peladas, Palmarito and across the Buey and Yao 
 Rivers. The camp was pitched at Babatuaba. The same as 
 yesterday, the column was harassed all day, always repulsing 
 and dispersing the enemy. One man was killed during the 
 skirmishes. 
 
 " The night passed quietly, and at 6 : 30 A. M. of the twenty- 
 sixth the march was resumed. The day was eventful and of 
 excellent moral and material results for the Spanish cause, as 
 will be seen from the fact that our forces entered the city of 
 Bayamo after a long march and pursued and scattered hos- 
 tile detachments through the heights of San Francisco, 
 Peralejo, across the Maybay River, and at Almirante, where 
 the camp was pitched, not without some resistance from the 
 
8o THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 enemy, who was severely punished by the accurate fire of the 
 column, without causing us the least damage. 
 
 " The diary of those days would not be complete without 
 an account of the entrance into Bayamo above referred to. 
 This manoeuvre was undertaken, contrary to the orders to 
 avoid encounters contained in said cablegram of the twentieth 
 from the commander-in-chief of the fourth army corps, for the 
 reason that the commander of the column thought it would 
 be discouraging to the soldiers to be so near said city without 
 entering it and that their spirits would rise, on the other hand, 
 if they were allowed to do so and to show the enemy and the 
 ungrateful people of Bayamo that there were Spaniards left in 
 Cuba. For this purpose there was strength and time enough 
 left that day. The commander therefore decided to explain 
 these reasons to the commander-in-chief and ordered that 
 Col. Manuel Ruiz, second commander of the column, should 
 occupy the city with the cavalry and 600 infantry, the latter 
 to be divided into two columns and the cavalry to form the 
 third. Interpreting faithfully the wishes and orders of 
 Colonel Escario, Colonel Ruiz left the camp at Almirante at 
 3 o'clock P. M. after the troops had taken their first mess, and 
 divided his forces into the three groups mentioned, himself 
 taking command of one of the groups of infantry, placing 
 the other in charge of Lieut.-Col. Baldomero Barbon, the first 
 commander of the Alcantara battalion, and the mounted 
 force in charge of Luis Torrecilla, commander of the first bat- 
 talion of the Isabel la Catolica regiment. These three 
 columns of attack, advancing steadily on three difTerent points, 
 succeeded in approaching the city without disturbance or 
 interruption. Evidently the enemy was desirous of saving 
 his fire, for alarm signals were heard and groups were seen 
 running from one place to another of the precinct, leaving no 
 doubt that the enemy was near. 
 
 "The columns in the meantime continued to advance rap- 
 idly and in silence, deployed in perfect order of battle and 
 thus arrived at the banks of the Bayamo River, where hostile 
 forces tried to check them by a steady niusketry fire from the 
 city. But this attempt became futile when the signal of 
 attack was given. At the sound of it, our soldiers, arms in 
 hand and without firing a single shot, crossed the river at a 
 run. With only one casualty and without further resistance, 
 they triumphantly entered the stronghold of the enemies of 
 Spain. In disorderly and precipitate flight that savage tribe 
 retreated. Our forces went to occupy the forts and principal 
 avenues, and in separate groups they reconnoitered the whole 
 city, gathering up at the military commandancia of the insur- 
 gents several packages of their records and correspondence. 
 
CUBA AGAINST SPAIN. 1S95-1S9S. Si 
 
 The station and part of the telegraph line which the rebels 
 had established with Jiguani afid Santa Rita were wrecked. 
 
 " No information concerning the enemy could be obtained 
 from the people of Bayamo, who, as usual, kept silent ; a few 
 only opened their doors from sheer curiosity, plainly showing 
 in their faces the disgust they felt at the presence of Spanisli 
 soldiers on that soil where it had been believed that they 
 would never again set foot. 
 
 "Our forces then returned to the camp at Almirante. The 
 result of that day's work was not known at first, but it was 
 afterwards learned that the enemy had 19 casualties, 10 killed 
 and 9 wounded. The night at Almirante passed without 
 further incidents, and thus ended the first part of what may 
 be called the glorious march from Manzanillo to Santiago. 
 
 " From Bayamo to Baire. 
 
 "At daybreak of the twenty-seventh, the camp at Almi- 
 rante was struck and the column continued its march across 
 the plain of Guanabano, through Chapala and across the 
 Cautillo River, destroying on their way the enemy's telegraph 
 line from Bayamo to Santa Rita, where the camp was pitched 
 for the night, which was spent without any further incidents. 
 
 " At 6 A. M. of the twenty -eighth, the march was resumed, 
 the column proceeding to Baire via Cruz Alta, Jiguani River, 
 Upper Jiguani, Piedra de Oro, Granizo, Cruz del Yarey and 
 Salada. The enemy, in greater number than on preceding days 
 and in control of the heights which overlook the ford of the Jig- 
 uani River, tried to prevent our forces from crossing, but their 
 intention was foiled by timely flank attacks ordered by the 
 commander of the column, protected by accurate artillery 
 fire. After the river had been forded, the march was contin- 
 ued without interruption to Cruz del Yarey, where the rebels 
 appeared again, offering less resistance, and we defeated them 
 once more. They seemed inclined, however, to continue to 
 impede the march, which was apparent upon the arrival of our 
 column at the ruins of what was formerly the town of Baire. 
 They were waiting there, and as soon as they espied the 
 column they opened a galling musket fire, which was silenced 
 by the rapid advance of our vanguard, who compelled them to 
 retreat in shameful and precipitate flight. In this encounter, 
 Col. Manuel Ruiz, second commander of the column, was 
 wounded and his horse killed under him ; four soldiers were 
 killed and five wounded. The column encamped and spent 
 the night at Baire. 
 
 " The high weeds which during almost all those days com- 
 pletely covered the soldiers and hampered their progress, 
 
82 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 causing at the same time a suffocating heat, which made it 
 ahnost impossible to breathe, and cutting off the road, which 
 had to be opened by dint of hard work, rendered the march 
 extremely laborious and often made it necessary to proceed 
 in single file. The sickness caused by the inclement weather 
 and the hard work of these operations ; the ever increasing 
 convoy of stretchers; the consideration that one-half of the 
 journey had been accomplished; and the further very impor- 
 tant consideration that the column had arrived at a place 
 where it would be easy to throw the enemy off the track, as 
 they would not know what direction our forces might take 
 (there being three roads leading from here to Santiago) ; all 
 these were reasons which the commander of the column took 
 into consideration when he decided to suspend the march and 
 rest during the day of the twenty-ninth. It was so ordered 
 owing to fatigue, but the enemy kept harassing us and we had 
 three more wounded. 
 
 " La Mantonia. 
 
 " At daybreak of the thirtieth, the camp at Baire was 
 struck and the column proceeded to Palma Soriana, where the 
 wounded and dead were left, and continued its march via Ra- 
 tonera, Doncella Creek and the Contramaestre River to La 
 Mantonia, where the camp was pitched and the night spent. 
 
 " Before the column was deployed on the road to Ratonera, 
 the enemy from intrenched positions opened fire, which was 
 answered and silenced by the first forces leaving the camp. 
 The commander of the column foresaw that such an attack 
 would be repeated, and in order to obviate the casualties, thus 
 further complying with the order of the aforesaid cablegram 
 from the commander-in-chief of the fourth army corps, he 
 changed the route, and our forces, thus eluding the ambus- 
 cades, arrived at the slopes of the Doncella Creek, the ford of 
 which was reached by a narrow pass and difficult ravine. The 
 rebels occupied positions here. Our vanguard brought them 
 out without answering their fire. When the column had 
 been reconcentrated after fording the Doncella, they prepared 
 to ford the Contramaestre River, where the enemy was await- 
 ing us, which fact they had announced themselves by written 
 challenges and threats which they had left along the road. 
 Lieut.-Col. Baldomero Barbon of the Alcantara battalion, who 
 since Colonel Ruiz was wounded had been in command of one- 
 half of the vanguard brigade, deployed his forces in perfect 
 order of battle and advanced resolutely. Commanding posi- 
 tions overlooked the clear and unobstructed road which the 
 column had to follow, after coming out of the mountains 
 
CUBA AGAINST SPAIN. 1895-1898. 83 
 
 through the narrow valley of the Contramaestre, and more- 
 over they had to scale the steep and tortuous ascent of the 
 opposite bank. Without other shelter than the high weeds, 
 which, as usual, impeded the march, without other trenches 
 than their own hearts, these brave soldiers with their com- 
 mander at their head, advanced calmly and in perfect order, ac- 
 cepting the challenge which had been addressed to them. The 
 enemy had told the truth. There they were in large numbers 
 occupying those favorable positions which would have been 
 impregnable if they had been held by any one who knew how 
 to defend them. But not expecting that we would accept the 
 challenge, they allowed themselves to be surprised by a lively 
 musket fire and effective artillery discharges, which demoral- 
 ized and dispersed them, and the rapid advance of our forces 
 rushing upon them arms in hand did not give them a chance 
 to rally. The enemy, being unable to do much firing, retreated 
 with little resistance and having suffered a number of casualties 
 left the field and their positions to those who, understanding 
 the sacred duty imposed upon honor, had known how to pick 
 up the glove that had been thrown to them. Regardless of 
 danger and without measuring their strength they had marched 
 on unflinchingly in search of the death with which they had 
 been threatened. Having crossed the Contramaestre and 
 passed through extensive pastures, the column arrived at a 
 farm (finca) known as La Mantonia, where a number of huts 
 of all sizes and many recent tracks indicated the proxim- 
 ity of a large hostile force. And indeed, soon after the first 
 forces of the vanguard had entered that large encampment, 
 the enemy tried to check our advance by a galling fire from 
 the slope of a mountain where they were intrenched, controll- 
 ing a line of 1,200 meters. Through this it was necessary 
 for us to pass unprotected, as the high weeds made any de- 
 ployment of the column and advance of cavalry impossible. 
 By order of Lieutenant-Colonel Barbon, the two companies 
 of the vanguard of the Alcantara battalion in command of 
 Francisco Gonzalez, who himself rendered an exact account of 
 the hostile position, advanced steadily and without answering 
 the fire, following the only passable trail, and engaged the hos- 
 tile position on the left flank, compelling the enemy to aban- 
 don the trenches, leaving us a great deal of ammunition, mostly 
 of the Remington type. 
 
 " In the fierce battles of that day Captain Jenaro Ramiro, of 
 the Alcantara battalion, and nine privates were wounded and 
 five killed. 
 
 " Aguacate. 
 
 "At daybreak of July i the column resumed the march and 
 
84 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 reached the ford of the Guarinao river, after passing through 
 Las Lajas, where the enemy held the advantageous positions 
 from which our vanguard routed them without much resistance. 
 After crossing the Guarinao, small detachments sent out sur- 
 prised two ambuscades; the column sustained insignificant 
 skirmishes with outposts and small reconnoitering parties, 
 which indicated that large hostile forces were not far off. Sub- 
 sequent events showed that this theory was correct. When the 
 column arrived at a rugged place dominated by steep heights 
 forming an amphitheatre, they discovered in its center a camp 
 of recent construction, sufficiently large to accommodate 2,000 
 men. A rapid glance convinced us that the site was specially 
 adapted for an ambuscade. Colonel Escario, realizing this and 
 taking precautions accordingly, gave orders for the column to 
 proceed in its advance and for the artillery to take positions. 
 The enemy did not wait to be surprised, but opened fire at 
 once from Aguacate Hill, the station of our heliograph, and 
 adjoining hills to the right and left in an extensive intrenched 
 line. Our soldiers manoeuvred as though on drill, and ad- 
 vancing steadily two-thirds of the column entered the battle, 
 and that hail of lead which strewed death in its path was not 
 sufficient to make them retreat or even to check them. Calmly, 
 with fearless heroism, they advanced, protected by the fre- 
 quent and sure fire of the artillery and skillfully guided by 
 their chiefs and by the cry " Long live Spain ! " and, charg- 
 ing with bayonets, they simultaneously took these heights 
 which were so difficult and dangerous to scale, driving the en- 
 emy into precipitate retreat, so that they could not gather up 
 their dead and wounded. Seventeen dead were left on the 
 field, also ammunition of various modern types. There were 
 moments during that battle when the tenacity of the enemy 
 and the order with which they fought gave the impression 
 that they might belong to our own column. This report spread 
 rapidly and reached Colonel Escario's ears. Fearing that 
 this might really be the case, he gave orders to suspend the 
 fire and tried to make himself known by bugle signals. But 
 this precaution was useless, and the commander becoming 
 convinced that he was fighting rebel forces, ordered the attack 
 to be renewed and the hostile positions to be taken. To do 
 the enemy justice it must be stated that they defended those 
 well-chosen positions with persistency and in good order, and 
 that they rose to unusual heights mat day, making this the 
 fiercest battle which we sustained on the march from Man- 
 zanillo to Santiago and one of the most remarkable ones of 
 the present campaign. Our casualties consisted of seven dead, 
 and one lieutenant and forty-two privates wounded. Large 
 nools of blood on the battle-field showed the severe chastise- 
 
CUBA AGAINST SPAIN. 1895-1S98. 85 
 
 ment which the enemy had suffered at our hands. When the 
 column had been reorganized, the march was continued to 
 Arroyo Blanco, where the night was spent. 
 
 " From Arroyo Blanxo to Santiago. 
 
 " From Arroyo Blanco, where the column had encamped 
 during the night, it proceeded to Palma Soriano, fighting the 
 enemy all along the road, on both sides of which the latter 
 occupied good positions and endeavored to detain the column 
 at any price. Engaging the enemy in front and on the flank, 
 a passage was forced and the column reached Palma Soriano 
 at 3 o'clock P. M. The battle of that day caused us four dead 
 and six wounded. 
 
 " From Palma Soriano, the commander of the column, by 
 heliogram sent to San Luis, announced his arrival to the 
 commander-in-chief of the fourth army corps at Santiago, and 
 in reply he was notified that large United States forces had 
 landed and were surrounding a part of the city, and that it 
 was, therefore, of urgent necessity to reinforce the place, the 
 defenders of which were few, and to force the march as mucli 
 as possible. Desirous of complying with this order, Colonel 
 Escario, who realized that the soldiers must be prepared to 
 accomplish the rest of the journey with the greatest speed 
 possible, had the following order of the column, dated at 
 Palma Soriano, July 2, 1898, read to the companies : — 
 
 'Soldiers: — •We left Manzanillo because the enemy was 
 threatening Santiago de Cuba. We must hasten to the assist 
 ance of our comrades ; our honor, which is the honor of our 
 fathers, calls us there. 
 
 ' I, who am proud of having been able to be with you in 
 these days when our country requires of us twofold energy 
 and courage, address these few words to you in order to tell 
 you that I am highly pleased with your behavior and to point 
 out to you the necessity of making a supreme effort to save 
 the honor of our beloved country, as we have done so far. 
 
 ' Then say with me, Long live Spain ! and let us go in 
 search of these who are desirous of finding out what each one 
 of you is worth. The victory is ours. 
 
 'Your Colonel, 
 
 ' Escario.' 
 
 " After a plentiful and nourishing meal the troops were 
 ordered to rest. At 2 o'clock in the night the reveille was 
 sounded, and the column, organizing immediately, resumed 
 it., march, which the soldiers tried to hasten as much as pos- 
 sible, with no other stimulus than that imposed by duty, of 
 
86 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 which they were constantly reminded by the cannonades that 
 could be heard in the distance, in the direction of Santiago. 
 With slight skirmishes, and without eating or resting, these 
 brave soldiers reached the pass of Bayamo, where they had 
 the first view of the city of Santiago. Here it was learned 
 that on the same day our fleet, forcing the entrance of the 
 channel which was blockaded by the American ships, had 
 gone out in search of death, which is the fate reserved for 
 heroes. 
 
 " It was now between ten and eleven o'clock in the morn- 
 ing of the third, and when Colonel Escario noted the intense 
 cannonade in the direction of the city, he organized a flying 
 column which was to march as fast as possible, leaving the 
 rest of the column with the train, in command of Col. Ruiz 
 Ranoy, to follow at once. 
 
 "The flying column was formed of the first battalion of the 
 Isabel la Catolica Regiment in command of Commander Tor- 
 recilla, w ith thirty of the strongest men of each company, the 
 whole cavalry and two artillery pieces. The command of this 
 column was placed in charge of Lieut-Col. Baldomero Barbon 
 of the Alcantara battalion. 
 
 " This column advanced towards Puerto Bayamo, from 
 which point Colonel Escario proceeded to the city with a sec- 
 tion of cavalry, arriving there at 3 o'clock P. M. The rest of 
 the flying column reached Santiago between 4 and 4:30, and 
 the nucleus of the column with the train between 9 and lO 
 o'clock P. M. 
 
 " Those worthy chiefs, officers and long-suffering soldiers, 
 that handful of brave men, constantly defeating the enemy 
 who persistently tried to check them, rising superior to the 
 inclement weather, to sickness and fatigue, had arrived at the 
 post of honor after a supreme effort and after victoriously 
 crossing the Alps of Cuba. It is not to be wondered at that 
 when they came in sight of the city, they took off their hats 
 and with tears in their eyes opened their lips in a unanimous 
 shout of ' Long live Spain ! ' which rose spontaneously from 
 those noble hearts. 
 
 " The casualties during the whole march were i colonel, 2 
 officers and 68 privates wounded and 27 killed. 28,670 Mauser 
 cartridges had been used and 38 rounds of artillery fired. 
 
 "At 10 o'clock the last rear guard entered the city of Santi- 
 ago de Cuba, and the battalions at once repaired to the differ- 
 ent trenches assigned to them by the chief of staff, and from 
 that time on they formed part of the forces defending the 
 city. 
 
 Santiago de Cuba, July 3, 1898." 
 
CUBA AGAINST SPAIN. 1S95-1898. 87 
 
 On the tenth of July we were again asked to leave our posi- 
 tions to allow them to be occupied by part of General 
 Lawton's division, and we accordingly pushed our forces to 
 San Pedrito, San Pedro and Gascon. 
 
 At Dos Caminos and upon the Jesus Maria Hill, Spanish 
 cavalry and infantry held intrenched positions. General 
 Garcia ordered a flank movement down from the left of the 
 Jesus Maria intrenchments. The movement caused consider- 
 able panic among the enemy, who immediately abandoned 
 both positions and retreated to the city, fearing to be isolated. 
 Two infantry battalions with two twelve-pound Hotchkiss 
 guns under Col. Carlos Garcia occupied the Jesus Maria Hill 
 and a cavalry detachment was sent to Dos Caminos. On 
 June 12 our forces were again compelled to abandon then- 
 positions at San Pedrito and San Pedro to leave them ready 
 and very well intrenched, too, for the American forces. 
 
 General Garcia transferred his headquarters to Casa Azul 
 (Gascon). At every new position that the Cubans would 
 occupy, new trenches had to be dug, only to give them up to 
 the Americans a few days later ; it so happened that all the 
 trenches made from La Caridad along the crests of the hills 
 to the right, as far as Caimanes, were made by our men ; and 
 very painfully at that, for the hard earth had to be dug with 
 sharpened sticks, as they had no shovels. As I was directing 
 the construction of a line of trenches, an officer of the transit 
 survey commission came along and was so shocked at seeing 
 my men working with such tools that he offered to send me 
 promptly next day picks and shovels. I am yet waiting for 
 them. On the thirteenth General Garcia received a note 
 from Major-General Miles, who had arrived and wished to see 
 and confer with him. A most cordial meeting was that of the 
 commanders of the American and Cuban armies, and the 
 most exquisite courtesy and consideration was shown by the 
 former to the latter, who esteemed those attentions highly. 
 
 Purposely I have not said a word in this chapter about the 
 numberless times the flags of truce appeared on the tops of 
 trenches and forts. 
 
 A dispatch was received at headquarters in which General 
 Garcia was informed of the proposed sally of a Spanish 
 
88 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 column from Mayari to Holguin. Col. Luis Marti was ordered 
 to march immediately with his regiment and some forces of 
 Colonel Enamorado's Tunas brigade. Colonel Marti, making 
 forced marches, arrived in time to rout and stampede the 
 enemy, winning one of the last battles of the war and certainly 
 the luckiest and most brilliant of all. He captured two field 
 pieces, a rapid-fire gun and all the convoy of ammunition that 
 the Spanish commander in his evacuation of Mayari was taking 
 to Holguin. Great slaughter was inflicted on the enemy in 
 this engagement. Had it not been for the opportune march- 
 ing of Colonel Marti's column from the Gascon heights near 
 Santiago to Mayari, the enemy would not perhaps have suf- 
 fered as severely as it did. The fleeing enemy was again 
 attacked and defeated by Colonels M. Rodriguez and F. Sal- 
 azar before entering Holguin. 
 
 On the fourteenth, the news of the capitulation of Santiago 
 spread about the camps and was greeted with shouts of joy. 
 Two days later, General Garcia visited the American head- 
 quarters, where he learned of the terms accepted by General 
 Toral. We were absolutely excluded from all participation in 
 the surrender of the city. General Garcia's interview with 
 General Shafter was short and of imposing character. Gen- 
 eral Garcia did not go back to his camp of Casa Azul after 
 the embarrassing and painful conference he had held with the 
 American general. His grief and disappointment were 
 such that he remained that night at Cuabitas, fearing we all 
 should detect in him his great chagrin. 
 
 The fact, coming suddenly, utterly stunned him for a time, 
 and the most sinister and cruel apprehensions for the future 
 overpowered him. How was he to reveal to his army the 
 cruel and awful truth? How was he to tell his men that our 
 allies of yesterday with whom we had so willingly and nobly 
 cooperated to overthrow the enemy, not needing our services 
 further, had pushed us aside with contempt and away from 
 the laurels and glory of a victory that was common to both 
 armies, the Cuban and the American? 
 
 It is impossible to describe the first effect of the intelligence 
 upon our troops. The rumors were received with general 
 incredulity. Official confirmation of Shafter's order followed, 
 
CUBA AGAINST SPAIN. 1895-1898. 89 
 
 and disbelief gave place to excitement. Speculation as to 
 what General Garcia would do covered a wide range. 
 
 In any case, never has an event come at a more critical 
 moment. It caused such agitation that only General Garcia's 
 extraordinary diplomacy and the great influence he exerted 
 over his troops dominated the dangerous situation. The 
 Ifjfty spirit that inspired his famous letter to General Shafter 
 reveals his genius. The American people acknowledged Gen- 
 eral Shafter's mistake some months later, showing marks of 
 esteem and admiration for the commander of the Cubans, who 
 had been so unjustly wronged. 
 
 General Garcia left the vicinity of Santiago for the interior 
 on the twentieth of July, with all the forces that had assisted 
 in the surrender of the city, leaving near the city only General 
 Cebreco with a small force, in order to facilitate public inter- 
 course between the inhabitants of the city and those that re- 
 sided in the country. General Garcia immediately gave orders 
 to these forces to continue the attack on the towns and cities 
 held by the Spaniards. A very interesting and important com- 
 munication from General S. Rios was received on the twenty- 
 sixth of July, in which this general asked the commander of 
 the department what he was to answer the Spanish forces of 
 Manzanillo, who asked General Garcia's permission to leave the 
 city and cross the country to Holguin, unmolested. General 
 Garcia denied the petition, point blank. As the attacks on 
 Holguin were increasing every day, the Spanish General 
 Luque resolved to abandon the port of Gibara and concen- 
 trated all the forces of his division at Holguin. General Garcia 
 occupied the city immediately and the good behavior of the 
 Cuban troops there can be testified to by all the Spanish 
 inhabitants, who were in a great majority, and by Commander 
 Washburn Maynard, U. S. N., of the gunboat Nashville, one of 
 the most able and distinguished ofificers of the American fleet. 
 
 On the sixteenth of August, General Luque attempted to 
 capture Gibara but was compelled to desist from such an 
 insane scheme, after a serious engagement with Generals 
 Capote and Feria, at Auras, that lasted five hours. In the 
 event of an attack on the city. General Garcia placed two 
 brigades as a reserve, holding the mountain passes of 
 
90 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 Embarcadero and Cupercillo, under Colonels M. Rodriguez 
 and C. Garcia and in cooperation with Captain Maynard. 
 Thus the Nashville could shell the enemy in combination 
 with our attack on the advancing Spaniards. 
 
 On the seventeenth the Spanish gun-boat Infanta Ysabel, 
 flying a flag of truce, entered the port with orders from 
 Captain-General Blanco announcing a suspension of hostili- 
 ties. A commission composed of three officers — American, 
 Cuban and Spanish — was sent to General Luque with the 
 orders of General Blanco. 
 
 On the eighteenth of August, an American transport 
 arrived with the of^cial news that the Protocol of Peace had 
 been signed by President McKinley on the twelfth of August. 
 General Garcia gave orders to all our forces to suspend hostili- 
 ties. 
 
 This chapter is an exact narration of the events that 
 occurred from the time when the rumors fo an American-Span- 
 ish war were received at General Garcia's headquarters, up to 
 the date when, ofificially, it was learned that the war between 
 Spain and the United States had ended. 
 
 Habana, April 29th, 1899. 
 
 
^ 
 
 
 'C]A/\^ 
 
CHAPTER III. 
 THE DESTRUCTION OF THE AT A /iVE, 
 
 EY 
 
 Lieut. GEO. F. \V. HOLMAN, U. S. N. 
 
 THE destruction of the Jlfaine in the harbor of Havana, 
 Cuba, on February 15, 1898, is an event occupying a 
 middle place between the long series of incidents con- 
 nected with the struggles of the Cubans for release from the 
 galling rule of Spain and the beginning of the actual war in 
 which, as a result of the Cuban struggles, the United States 
 finally became involved. Spain strenuously disavowed hav- 
 ing caused, either officially or ultra-officially, the annihilation 
 of' this powerful battleship, and indeed, claimed, through its 
 Court of Inquiry investigating the circumstances, that the 
 Mame was destroyed by causes entirely internal, namely, the 
 accidental explosion of one or more of her magazines. The 
 United States, on the other hand, after a most thorough inves- 
 tigation of twenty-three days of patient labor by a Court of 
 Inquiry composed of some of the most scientific men of the 
 Navy, presided over by Captain Sampson, who soon after be- 
 came the Admiral of glorious victories in the East, reached the 
 conclusion that the loss of the battleship was due, not to in- 
 ternal causes, but to the springing of a mine planted in close 
 proximity to the moorings which had been assigned her, in 
 the harbor, by the Spanish officials. This finding of the 
 Court of Inquiry of the United States was most conclusively 
 substantiated by the condition of the wreck above and below 
 water, which gave evidence that, although one or more maga- 
 zines had exploded, throwing upward and outward heavy 
 masses of the decks and sides of the ship, the primary source 
 of damage originated from a mine exploded beneath the ves- 
 sel's bottom, as manifested by the principal fact that the keel 
 
92 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 had been thrown upward in an inverted V shape and broken 
 in two with the break remaining about thirty feet above its 
 normal position ; by the further principal fact that the out- 
 side bottom plating was bent inward from outward in a re- 
 versed V shape ; by the still further principal fact that the 
 outer shell of the ship, on the port forward side, had been 
 thrown upward to a point about thirty-four feet above its 
 normal position ; and by many other facts impossible to have 
 been produced save by a submarine mine. A full report of 
 the Court of Inquiry was transmitted to our Congress by the 
 President of the United States in his Message of March 28, 
 1898. 
 
 While the people of the United States were intensely in- 
 flamed by the outrage, and desired war at once, believing, 
 with the greater part of the world, that the disaster was at- 
 tributable to an outside source and not to internal accident, 
 they nevertheless followed the counsels of their leaders and pa- 
 tiently awaited the result of the cool investigation ordered by 
 them ; and when, after over two months of waiting, war was 
 finally declared, the nation was content to accept the judg- 
 ment of the President, which based the war on broad human- 
 itarian principles for the liberation of an oppressed people, 
 and cited the Maine disaster as merely an incident, one among 
 many, that finally led to the inevitable struggle between the 
 United States and Spain. 
 
 To go back a little, the sympathies of the people of the 
 United States, always in favor of the Cubans as against 
 Spain, had become pronounced to such an extent in the de- 
 bates in our Congress and in the articles of the press, that 
 between the public of the United States and that of Spain 
 a great animosity and a strong desire for immediate hostil- 
 ities developed, which required tactful exertions on the part 
 of the diplomatic corps of both countries to keep in re- 
 pression. Among other acts of conciliation adopted by our 
 government was the discontinuance, with regard to Cuba, 
 of the practice in vogue among all civilized nations from 
 times of long ago — that of sending men-of-war on amicable 
 visits to the ports of foreign nations. Realizing the possibil- 
 ity that the appearance of one of our war vessels in a Cuban 
 
THE DESTRUCTION OF THE MAINE. 93 
 
 port during the period of strained relations between the 
 United States and Spain might be regarded by the ignorant 
 class of the latter country as a menace, and might conse- 
 quently occasion a pretext for an outbreak of the unruly mob, 
 our government refrained from despatching our ships of war to 
 Cuban waters for any purpose whatever ; but a time arrived 
 when it was believed to be advisable to act otherwise in this 
 respect. 
 
 In January, 1898, the relations between the Spaniards under 
 arms and the Spaniards not enrolled as combatants, many on 
 both sides being classed, on the one hand, as adherents of the 
 aggressive General Weyler, and, on the other, as those of the 
 more pacific General Blanco, together with the further confu- 
 sion caused by the acts of the Cubans themselves represented 
 by diverse parties and interests, led to rioting in the City of 
 Havana, which, never becoming serious, nevertheless threat- 
 ened the safety and property of all people within its limits. 
 For the protection of American citizens and their interests it 
 became obligatory on our government to display our flag in 
 the troubled region. Our State Department acted through 
 correspondence with the State Department of Spain in this 
 direction with a careful regard for the peculiarities of the sit- 
 uation. The result of the diplomatic correspondence between 
 the two governments was that the best interests of both 
 countries would be observed by sending a man-of-war of 
 the United States to Havana on a visit of a thoroughly ami- 
 cable nature. The Spanish, in turn, intimated their intention 
 of returning the courtesy by sending one of their battleships 
 on a similiar visit to New York. The ship chosen by the 
 United States for this interchange of visits was the battle- 
 ship Maine. The Spaniards, on their part, selected the ar- 
 mored cruiser Vizcaya. 
 
 The Maine, built at the New York Navy Yard, was a second- 
 class battleship, which went into commission September 17, 
 1895 ; she was a powerful vessel, as shown by the following de- 
 tails of structure, armament, and personnel : — Extreme length, 
 324 feet ; beam, 57 feet ; draught, 22 feet i inch ; displacement, 
 6,650 tons; horse power, 9,290; speed, 17.45 knots; she was 
 subdivided into 214 water-tight compartments. Her armor 
 
94 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 protection was a heavy armored belt of i8o feet on each side, 
 joined by heavy steel transverse bulkheads forward and aft, and 
 roofed by a strong protective deck. Forward and abaft the 
 armored portion of the ship, cellulose protection was relied 
 u[)on. Two turrets, in barbette, of heavy steel, one forward 
 and on J a'*^, arranged in the echelon system, carried, each, two 
 lo-inch breech-loading rifled guns. Si.x 6-inch breech-loading 
 rifles, seven 6-pounder and eight i-pounder rapid firing rifles 
 completed her gun battery. A powerful ram and four torpedo 
 tubes were an additional instalment to her powers, aggressive 
 and defensive. She was completely fitted with all the modern 
 appliances for pumping, lighting, interior and exterior signal- 
 ling, internal communication, ventilating, and all other re- 
 quirements necessary to the efficiency of a battleship. Her 
 crew numbered 354 all told, 26 of whom were ofificers. The 
 ofificers of the Maine at the time of the disaster were : 
 Captain Charles D. Sigsbee ; Executive Ofificer, Lieuten- 
 ant-Commander Richard Wainwright ; Navigator, Lieuten- 
 :int George F. W. Holman ; Lieutenants, John Hood, Carl W. 
 Jungen, George P. Blow, John J. Blandin, and Friend W. Jen- 
 kins ; Naval Cadets, Jonas H. Holden, Wat T. Cluverius, Jr., 
 Amon Bronson, Jr., and David F. Boyd, Jr. ; Surgeon, Lu- 
 cien G. Heneberger ; Paymaster, Charles M. Ray ; Chief 
 Engineer, Charles P. Howell; Passed Assistant Engineer, 
 Frederic C. Bowers ; Assistant Engineers, John R. Morris 
 and Darwin R. Merritt ; Naval Cadets (engineer division), Pope 
 Washington and Arthur Crenshaw ; Chaplain, John P. Chid- 
 U'ick ; First Lieutenant of Marines, Albertus W. Catlin ; 
 Boatswain, Francis E. Larkin ; Gunner, Joseph Hill; Car- 
 penter, George Helms ; Pay-Clerk, Brent McCarthy. 
 
 The Maine, from the date of her commissioning, proved 
 herself an exceptionally efificient ship, in calm and in storm, 
 and met with but few of the mishaps incident to such compli- 
 cated structures as are battleships. She did active and al- 
 most continuous cruising along the eastern coast of the 
 United States from between the extreme limits of Bar Har- 
 bor, Maine, in the north, to New Orleans, Louisiana, in the 
 south ; at first, under the command of Captain A. S. Crown- 
 inshield, later Chief of the Bureau of Navigation ; afterwards 
 
THE DESTRUCTION OF THE MAINE. 95 
 
 under the command of Captain Sigsbee. She participated in 
 all the drills of the North Atlantic Squadron ; acted success- 
 fully, under Captain Sigsbee, as the senior officer's ship of the 
 squadron detailed by the Navy Department for the repression 
 of filibustering operations in the Cuban War with Spain ; 
 and visited many of our cities on occasions of public moment. 
 
 On Monday night, January 24, 1898, the Mciiiie, then with 
 the North Atlantic Squadron in the roads of Dry Tortugas, 
 Florida, received orders to proceed to Havana. She imme- 
 diately got under way and arrived at her destination the fol- 
 lowing morning, where she was boarded by the Spanish 
 government pilot and was by him conducted to the mooring 
 buoy where she subsequently met her fate. Captain Sigs- 
 bee's orders from our government were simply to make a 
 friendly visit, all the details of his action in carrying out these 
 orders being left to his discretion. This officer acted with 
 marked tact and judgment under trying circumstances. The 
 customary gun salutes were exchanged, and the usual inter- 
 change of official visits was strictly carried out ; but beyond 
 this, the visit of the Maine as a friendly tentative proved a 
 failure. Captain Sigsbee emphasized the fact that he ap- 
 peared on a friendly mission and gave all opportunities con- 
 sistent with dignity for the establishment of social relations. 
 While the representatives of all factions were punctiliously 
 polite, the Spaniards of the higher classes in general were 
 cold and non-responsive. The autonomists were apparently 
 suspicious. The Spaniards of the lower classes frequently 
 manifested a disposition to show their dislike openly, and 
 none but the Cubans gave a hearty welcome. 
 
 No open hostility was shown by any one, but it was deemed 
 prudent to take all measures possible for the guard and safety 
 of the ship consistent with her presence in the port of a 
 friendly nation. Extra sentries were kept posted and vigi- 
 lant lookout was maintained night and day, but nothing of 
 an unusual or threatening nature was observed at any time. 
 
 At 9: 40 P. M., on the 15th of February, 1898, nearly all 
 the officers and crew not on duty having retired for the night, 
 a heavy explosion, unmistakably that of a submarine mine, 
 took place under the forward part of the ship in the neigh- 
 
96 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 borhood of the forward magazines. This explosion was fol- 
 lowed by another one, almost simultaneous, evidently that of 
 one or more of the magazines ignited by the submarine mine. 
 The forward part of the ship was at once reduced to a mass 
 of wreckage, the after part remaining comparatively un- 
 harmed. The ship sank at once to the bottom in six fath- 
 oms of water, the poop deck being nearly awash, until later, 
 when the vessel sank deep in the mud. 
 
 The scene was one impossible to depict ; eye witnesses only, 
 of the terrible calamity, could realize the horror of the situ- 
 ation. The placid waters of the harbor were suddenly lashed 
 into foam in the neighborhood of the doomed ship ; a heavy 
 column of flame and smoke, dotted with innumerable fragments 
 of the once mighty vessel, shot upward into the calm obscurity 
 of the night ; the waters around were sprinkled with the forms 
 of men — some, through almost a miraculous escape, unin- 
 jured ; others wounded; others dead, but apparently intact in 
 person ; others torn into fragments. In the bosom of the ship, 
 as afterwards ascertained by the divers, hundreds of men lay 
 drowned in their hammocks in such a tangle that even at- 
 tempt at escape had evidently been impossible ; others, to 
 whom a brief interval of time, limited by minutes, had been 
 given for an effort to reach the upper decks, were caught by 
 the rushing waters and floating debris sweeping aft, in com- 
 partments and in places remote from the hatches which they 
 were striving to reach as the only exit from the death trap be- 
 low. Among the latter were two ofificers, Lieutenant Friend 
 W. Jenkins and Assistant Engineer Darwin R. Merritt. 
 
 The loss of men all told, counting those who were imme- 
 diately killed and those who subsequently died of their wounds, 
 was 266, and the saved were 88. 
 
 The survivors exerted their utmost efforts in the rescue of 
 the wounded, and in the hopeless attempt to save the ship. 
 Captain Sigsbee directed the operations with a cool bravery 
 paralleled by few episodes in the world's history, ably seconded 
 by his executive officer, Lieutenant-Commander Wainwright — 
 later the hero of the Glouccsto' 3.\. the naval battle off Santiago, 
 and earnestly aided by all the others. Fire was raging in the 
 upheaved part of the wreck forward ; ammunition stored in 
 
THE DESTRUCTION OF THE MAINE. 97 
 
 emergency magazines in different parts of the superstructure 
 of the ship was exploding at frequent intervals. Only two 
 boats were left available for the work of rescue. Under Cap- 
 tain Sigsbee's direction, some officers were sent to the neigh- 
 borhood of the fire to suppress it if possible ; other officers 
 and men were detailed to the boats with orders to rescue the 
 men in the water. All proceedings were initiated and executed 
 with the coolness attending an ordinary daily drill, manifest- 
 ing a state of discipline of which the Navy and the nation may 
 be forever proud. 
 
 It was believed by many on board, if not by all, that the ex- 
 plosion was the beginning of an attack by the Spaniards. In 
 pursuance of this belief, orders were given to procure arms, 
 which, however, were not obtainable, the ship having sunk so 
 quickly that all armories and racks for arms were at once sub- 
 merged. The survivors found themselves a defenseless group 
 gathered together on the poop, the only remaining dry and 
 intact part of the ship at the time — some clad in the uniform 
 of the day ; others partly robed ; still others only in their night 
 clothing. To whomever the dastardly deed was attributable, 
 it soon became evident that a continuance of the attack was 
 not contemplated, but that all in the vicinity Avere lending 
 their aid to the rescue of the few who were left. 
 
 The noise of the explosion had aroused not only the harbor, 
 but the entire city, and even the outlying suburbs. In the im- 
 mediate neighborhood of the Maine was the Spanish cruiser 
 Alfonso XII. and the Ward Line steamer City of U^asliing- 
 ton. The greatest activity was displayed by these vessels in 
 sending boats to the scene of the disaster, and notable credit 
 is due to the officers and crew of the City of Washington for 
 bravery evinced on their part. Certain small row-boats plying 
 a passenger trade in the harbor also contributed to the work 
 of rescue. In a short time all of the men afloat were picked 
 up out of the water and taken — some to the Alfonso XII., 
 others to the City of Washington, and others to the hospitals 
 on shore, receiving everywhere proper attention from the sur- 
 geons. Captain Sigsbee, remaining on board the wreck, dis- 
 patched officers in all possible directions to make a muster of 
 the saved, and not until this had been done, and it had long 
 
98 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 since become evident that no more could be accomplished for 
 his ship and that no further advantage was to be gained by 
 exposing his own life and the lives of those whom he retained 
 on board as assistants, did he finally give the order to aban- 
 don the wreck. He himself was the last to leave, stepping 
 from the now all but submerged poop deck into his gig with 
 the deliberate calm dignity befitting a captain who, with his 
 ship sunk under him, was nevertheless not vanquished in 
 spirit. 
 
 Captain Sigsbee, with his ofificers, went on board the Ward 
 Line steamer City of WasJiington for the night. The follow- 
 ing day, all of the wounded who were able to travel, and all of 
 the officers and men whom it was not necessary to retain in 
 Havana in the interests of the Maine, were sent by steamer to 
 Key West, Florida. Captain Sigsbee, with a small staff of 
 officers retained to assist him, occupied quarters at hotels in 
 the city. The badly wounded were transferred from the Al- 
 fonso XII. and the City of WasJiington to hospitals on shore. 
 
 Work was at once begun in various lines : that of recovering 
 the bodies of the dead ; of making preliminary investigations 
 as to the cause of the disaster ; and of recovering from the 
 wreck such articles of the equipment of the ship as were still 
 above the water line or accessible to divers. Tliis property 
 was put on board the U. S. Despatch Steamer Fern and the 
 U. S. Light House Tender Mangrove, which arrived in port 
 from Key West the day following the explosion in answer to 
 a request by cable from Captain Sigsbee. The Spanish offi- 
 cials expressed profound sympathy for the occurrence, and 
 disclaimed any govermental knowledge of its cause. On the 
 afternoon of February 17, impressive funeral services at the 
 municipal palace were held over nineteen bodies, the first re- 
 covered, which, after the services in the palace, were taken to 
 the Colon Cemetery escorted by one of the most imposing 
 processions, civic, naval, and military, that had been witnessed 
 in Havana for a long period of years. Every effort was made 
 by the Spaniards to express sympathy on a magnificent scale. 
 
 On the 2lst of February, a Court of Inquiry, ordered by 
 Rear-Admiral Montgomery Sicard, U. S. Navy, Commander- 
 in-Chief of the United States force on the North Atlantic Sta- 
 
THE DESTRUCTION OF THE MAINE. 99 
 
 tion, convened on board the U. S. Light House Tender Alaii- 
 grove in the harbor of Havana. The Court was composed of 
 Captain William T. Sampson, President ; Captain French E. 
 Ciiadwick and Lieutenant-Conimander William P. Potter, 
 Members; and Lieutenant-Commander Adolph Marix, Judge 
 Advocate. The Court made a most patient, thorough and 
 searching investigation into all matters pertaining to the des- 
 truction of the Maine, examining the wreck in detail, above 
 and below the water line, with the assistance of expert Naval 
 Constructors and divers, and examining all witnesses whose 
 testimony promised to throw light, in the faintest degree, on 
 the subject. Eighteen days of this investigation were held 
 on board the U. S. Light House Tender Mangrove in the 
 Harbor of Havana, and five days on board the U. S. Battle- 
 ship Iowa off Key West, Florida. 
 
 The primary object of a naval court of inquiry, in the case 
 of damage to naval property, is to determine whether or not 
 blame for this damage should attach to any officer in whose 
 charge this property may be. The finding of the Court in 
 the case of the Maine is of historic interest. The official 
 report reads as follows : 
 
 "After full and mature consideration of all the testimony 
 before it, the Court finds as follows: 
 
 " I. That the United States Battleship J/(7/;/r arrived in the 
 harbor of Havana, Cuba, on the 25th day of January, l89<S, 
 and was taken to buoy No. 4, in from 5{, to 6 fathoms of 
 water, by the regular Government pilot. 
 
 " The United States consul-general at Havana had notified 
 the authorities at that place, the previous evening, of the 
 intended arrival of the Maine. 
 
 " 2. The state of discipline on board the Jl/ai/ie was excel- 
 lent, and all orders and regulations in regard to the care and 
 safety of the ship were strictly carried out. 
 
 "All ammunition was stowed in accordance with prescribed 
 instructions, and proper care was taken whenever ammunition 
 was handled. 
 
 " Nothing was stowed in any one of the magazines or shell 
 rooms which was not permitted to be stowed there. 
 
loo THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 " The magazines and shell rooms were always locked after 
 having been opened, and after the destruction of the Maine 
 the keys were found in their proper place in the captain's 
 cabin, everything having been reported secure that evening 
 at 8 p. m. 
 
 " The temperatures of the magazines and shell rooms were 
 taken daily and reported. The only magazine which had 
 an undue amount of heat was the after lo-inch magazine, 
 and that did not explode at the time the Maine was des- 
 troyed. 
 
 " The torpedo war heads were all stowed in the after part of 
 the ship, under the ward room, and neither caused nor par- 
 ticipated in the destruction of the Maine. 
 
 " The dry gun-cotton primers and cietonators were stowed 
 in the cabin aft, and remote from the scene of the explosion. 
 
 '* Waste was carefully looked after on board the Maine to 
 obviate danger. Special orders in regard to this had been 
 given by the commanding of^ccr. 
 
 " Varnishes, driers, alcohol and other combustibles of this 
 nature were stowed on or above the main deck and could not 
 have had anything to do with the destruction of the Maine. 
 
 " The medical stores were stowed aft, under the ward room, 
 and remote from the scene of the explosion. 
 
 " No dangerous stores of any kind were stowed below in 
 any of the other storerooms. 
 
 " The coal bunkers were inspected daily. Of those bunkers 
 adjacent to the forward magazines and shell rooms, four were 
 empty, namely: B3, B4, B5, B6. A15 had been in use that 
 day, and A16 was full of New River coal. This coal had 
 been carefully inspected before receiving it on board. The 
 bunker in which it was stowed was accessible on three sides 
 at all times, and on the fourth side at this time, on account of 
 bunkers B4 and B6 being empty. This bunker, A16, had 
 been inspected that day by the engineer of^ceron duty. 
 
 " The fire alarms in the bunkers were in working order, and 
 there had never been a case of spontaneous combustion of 
 coal on board the Maine. 
 
 " The two after boilers of the ship were in use at the time of 
 the disaster, but for auxiliary purposes only, with a compara- 
 
THE DESTRUCTION OF THE MAINE. loi 
 
 tively low pressure of steam, and being tended by a reliable 
 watch. 
 
 "These boilers could not have caused the explosion of the 
 ship. The four forward boilers have since been found by the 
 divers, and are in a fair condition. 
 
 " On the night of the destruction of the Maine, everything 
 had been reported secure for the night at 8 p. m. by reliable 
 persons, through the proper authorities, to the commanding 
 officer. At the time the JMainc was destroyed the ship was 
 quiet, and, therefore, least liable to accident caused by 
 movements from those on board. 
 
 EXPLOSIONS. 
 " 3. The destruction of the Maine occurred at 9:40 p. m. 
 on the 15th day of February, 1898, in the harbor of Havana, 
 Cuba, she being at the time moored to the same buoy to 
 which she had been taken upon her arrival. There were two 
 explosions of a distinctly different character, with a very 
 short but distinct interval between them, and the for- 
 ward part of the ship was lifted to a marked degree at the 
 time of the first explosion. The first explosion was more in 
 the nature of a report like that of a gun, while the second ex- 
 plosion was more open, prolonged, and of greater volume. 
 This second explosion was, in the opinion of the court, caused 
 by the partial explosion of two or more of the forward maga- 
 zines of the ATainc. 
 
 CONDITION OF THE WRECK. 
 
 " 4. The evidence bearing upon this, being principally ob- 
 tained from divers, did not enable the Court to form a 
 definite conclusion as to the condition of the wreck, although 
 it was established that the after part of the ship was practi- 
 cally intact, and sank in that condition a very few minutes 
 after the destruction of the forward part. 
 
 " The following facts in regard to the forward part of the 
 ship are, however, established by the testimony : 
 
 *' A portion of the port side of the protective deck, which 
 extends from about frame 30 to about frame 41, was blown 
 up, aft, and over to port. The main deck, from about frame 
 30 to about frame 41, was blown up, aft, and slightly over to 
 
I02 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR, 
 
 starboard, folding the forward part of the middle superstruc- 
 ture over and on top of the after part. 
 
 " This was, in the opinion of the Court, caused by the 
 partial explosion of two or more of the forward magazines 
 of the Maine. 
 
 " 5. At frame 17, the outer shell of the ship, from a point 
 I li- feet from the middle line of the ship, and 6 feet above the 
 keel when in its normal position, has been forced up so as to 
 be now about 4 feet above the surface of the water, therefore 
 about 34 feet above where it should be had the ship sunk un- 
 injured. 
 
 " The outside bottom plating is bent into a reversed V shape 
 (/^), the after wing of which, about 15 feet broad and 32 feet 
 in length (from frame 17 to frame 25), is doubled back upon 
 itself against the continuation of the same plating, extending 
 forward. 
 
 " At frame 18 the vertical keel is broken in two, and the flat 
 keel bent into an angle similar to the angle formed by the 
 outside bottom plating. This break is about 6 feet above the 
 surface of the water, and about 30 feet above its normal 
 position. 
 
 " In the opinion of the Court this effect could have been pro- 
 duced only by the explosion of a mine situated under the 
 bottom of the ship at about frame 18 and somewhat on the 
 port side of the ship. 
 
 " 6. The Court finds that the loss of the Maine on the occa- 
 sion named was not in any respect due to fault or negligence 
 on the part of any of the ofificers or members of the crew of 
 said vessel. 
 
 " 7. In the opinion of the Court the Maine was destroyed 
 by the explosion of a submarine mine, which caused the 
 partial explosion of two or more of the forward magazines. 
 
 " 8. The Court has been unable to obtain evidence fixing 
 the responsibility for the destruction of the Maine upon any 
 person or persons." 
 
 ■^)A/\^ 
 
 CUJ24JZ' UAAj^^. 
 
CHAPTER IV. 
 THE NAVAL BATTLE OF MANILA BAY. 
 
 BV 
 
 Lieut. C. G. CALKINS, U. S. N. 
 
 NOT long ago the Philippine Archipelago was nothing 
 but a geographical expression to most of us. Now it 
 threatens to become an interminable problem in our 
 political future and appeals to the interest of millions of eager 
 Americans. It may be worth while to discuss the historic 
 event which brought about this transformation. Even per- 
 sonal impressions and incidental corrections may, perhaps, be 
 set forth without suspicion of vanity or pedantry. For in- 
 stance, it is worth noting that the Philippine Islands were dis- 
 covered by Commodore Dewey before May i, 1898. The 
 work done by the Navy in the campaigns of 1898 was based 
 quite as much on mental preparation as on that splendid, 
 though incomplete, material equipment which has been one of 
 the most picturesque features of our national progress since 
 1885. Given the constant factors of loyalty and discipline, 
 the problems of war are solved by taking thought before 
 putting on the panoply of battle. 
 
 When the Philippine Islands had to be studied, it appeared 
 that sources of information were neither numerous nor inter- 
 esting. Beside a few rare old books of rambling gossip about 
 monastic affairs, there are two or three modern works blending 
 scientific fragments with travelers' talcs. Vague consular 
 documents relating chiefly to commerce have also been 
 printed. But the true basis of the campaign was contained in 
 the portfolio of charts of the China Sea and Eastern Archi- 
 pelago. The modern arts of navigation and pilotage reduce 
 themselves to the interpretation of charts, and the tactics of 
 naval warfare as well as strategy in general are only special 
 
I04 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 applications of the same method. These graphic representa- 
 tions are supplemented by volumes of Sailing Directions, 
 which attempt verbal expression for hydrographic and topo- 
 graphic detail. Special interest attached to the Est ado Gen- 
 eral dc la Armada, or Navy List of Spain, which enumerates 
 the armament of ships and the accomplishments and decora- 
 tions of officers with elaborate candor. We knew the force of 
 the Spanish squadron in every detail, and were informed in re- 
 gard to the names and ages of all officers on duty in the Phil- 
 ippines. But no minute comparisons were attempted. Our 
 confidence was founded on national and personal qualities 
 and convictions. 
 
 After buying every chart of the Philippines in Hong Kong 
 and examining the approaches to Manila, it became plain 
 that no strong defensive combination was ready to oppose 
 our advance on that capital. The situation might have justi- 
 fied the removal of the Spanish squadron to some place of 
 greater tactical advantage, but there were political and other 
 considerations to oppose such action. It did not appear that 
 forts commanding the entrance to Manila Bay had been con- 
 structed during the three centuries of Spanish domination, 
 and it was felt that no improvised batteries or torpedo-lines 
 could serve as barriers for both channels. Once inside the 
 bay, our fleet would find convenient anchorage anywhere 
 within a circle twenty miles in diameter. Security would be 
 attained as soon as the Spanish fleet was disabled and the bat- 
 teries silenced or isolated from support. 
 
 While it was known that Spain had a more numerous squad- 
 ron in the Archipelago than we had on the Asiatic station, 
 there was more reason to dread their dispersion than their con- 
 centration at Manila. ■ Light draught and local experience 
 should have given them many advantages in a dodging cam- 
 paign. If concentrated, their ships would have more men 
 afloat and nearly as many modern rifled guns as we carried, 
 but they had no ship equal to the Olyinpia in all round effec- 
 tiveness, to the Baltimore in weight of metal, or to the 
 Raleigh in rapid fire. Moreover, they had " lame ducks " well 
 known at the Hong Kong dock-j^ards. Therefore we counted 
 on finding them at anchor and disposed for fighting under the 
 
THE NAVAL BATTLE OF MANILA BAY. 105 
 
 protection of shore-batteries, under conditions implying dis- 
 couragement and anticipation of defeat. 
 
 Our own preparations began with the choice of an objec- 
 tive. Ten days after the destruction of the Maine, while 
 most of us were still holding that tragedy an accident, the 
 Commander-in-Chief was informed that his squadron must be 
 ready to attack the Philippines if war were declared. Concen- 
 tration was immediately directed. The Olympia and Petrel 
 were already at Hong Kong; the Boston and Concord \\wxx\i^i\ 
 thither from Korea; the Raleigh, and later the revenue cutter 
 Hugh McCulloch, came north from the Indian Ocean via Sing- 
 apo^-e. Last of all, and not a day too soon, came the Balti- 
 more from Honolulu. There was a scanty margin of time for 
 cleaning her bottom and filling her coal bunkers after the Brit- 
 ish authorities had issued their proclamation of neutrality. 
 Two small steamers, the Nan-Shan and the Zafiro, were pur- 
 chased and prepared for service as colliers or tenders. There 
 was time for the discussion of this gathering and an exchange 
 of reassuring editorials between colonial and metropolitan jour- 
 nals. Manila was cheered from Madrid by statements deny- 
 ing that our concentration had any serious meaning, and 
 depreciating our equipment for attack. But this report, reach- 
 ing the Philippines during the last week of April, came too 
 late to restore public confidence. 
 
 After coaling, the ships were all painted a dull greenish 
 g,ay,—" wet moon color," as the Spanish Admiral named it 
 when prescribing a tardy imitation. The tint selected was 
 found to blend naturally with the waters of Manila Bay. An- 
 other important detail was the distribution of ammunition. 
 All the stock on hand, including a supply brought out by the 
 Baltimore, was divided according to the batteries of the differ- 
 ent ships. Some attempt was also made to get rid of superflu- 
 ous wood-work to reduce the danger from sparks and splinters 
 in action. So much had to be left in place that the precau- 
 tion appeared suggestive rather than final. Fortunately the 
 enemy's shells did not complete the demonstration of this 
 well-founded opinion. 
 
 Changes \n personnel \^2id also to be considered. The Com- 
 manding Of=ficer of the Boston had served his time on the sta- 
 
io6 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 tion and his relief was at hand. But Captain Wildes wanted 
 to stick to his ship to test the discipline which he had spent 
 thirty months in establishing. Therefore Captain Lamberton 
 joined the Olyuipia as Chief-of-Staff. Lieutenant Elliot and 
 other officers had also voluntarily prolonged their term of ser- 
 vice. There were cases where there seemed no room for 
 choice. Both the Captain and Executive Officer of the Olyin- 
 pia had been stricken by climatic disease before war was de- 
 clared. Captain Gridley had not been ill until after the ship 
 reached Hong Kong in February, and he insisted on retaining 
 his command. He performed all his responsible duties with 
 unfailing skill and with characteristic coolness and courtesy 
 until the battle was over. A month later he died on his way 
 home, a willing sacrifice to his country and his profession. 
 Lieutenant-Commander Paine had suffered longer in his effort 
 to complete a three-years' cruise without surrendering to the 
 climate. The doctors were kind and inflexible, and he was 
 sent home in April. He had been an eager and active officer 
 for thirty-three years, two-thirds of which had been passed in 
 the grade of lieutenant, and there was much regret that he 
 should be forced to miss this opportunity of employing his 
 recognized talents in working a battery in action. 
 
 Lieutenant Rees came from the old Moiiocacy, which 
 was laid up at Shanghai, and was assigned to duty as Execu- 
 tive of the Olyiiipia. He was followed by several officers 
 and most of the crew of that antique side-whecler, and every 
 ship had her full complement. Altogether our force was 
 about 1,750 men. A few Chinamen were missing at the last 
 moment ; a painter with twenty years of naval service, some 
 stewards, and several mess-attendants deserted in Hong Kong. 
 The Chinese who remained showed no fear in action and 
 could bear comparison with any other race for cool indus- 
 try and cheerful curiosity. 
 
 The Baltimore having made good use of the days of 
 grace following the proclamation of neutrality, the flagship 
 led the last group of ships out of the hospitable harbor of Hong 
 Kong on April 25. As we passed the vessels of the British 
 fleet, their bulwarks were thronged with eager soldiers and 
 sailors. The men-of-war might not cheer, but the convales- 
 
THE NAVAL BATTLE OF ^MANILA BAY. 107 
 
 cent soldiers of the hospital-hulk were able to express Brit- 
 ish feeling by a hearty round of applause. We were going to 
 war, and they felt both sympathy and envy. Our own men 
 were cheerful and confident ; ready to trust their guns, their 
 ships, their Commander-in-Chief and themselves. 
 
 There could be little doubt as to our objective. " Proceed 
 to the Philippine Islands. Commence operations particularly 
 against the Spanish fleet. You must capture or destroy ves- 
 sels. Use utmost endeavor." This was the President's mes- 
 sage, a model of wholesome elasticity and inspiring brevity. 
 Had it been written a month later all exhortation might have 
 been omitted. It soon came to be an axiom that Admiral 
 Dewey would be strenuous and thorough in all his undertak- 
 ings. Some New York papers had ventured to interpret the 
 gathering of ships at Hong Kong to mean that they were to 
 come to the Atlantic. The odd notion of a local war between 
 two nations with world-wide interests still survived. Our 
 commerce in the Pacific demanded protection. Spain's col- 
 onies invited attack. Beside the military weakness which ex- 
 posed their capital and their naval stations, there were ele- 
 ments of moral weakness and strategic confusion in the con- 
 dition of the Philippines. Much had to be conceded to the 
 claims of prestige and sentiment. We had reason to hope 
 for the concentration of the Spanish Squadron at Manila, to 
 hold that capital and to suppress a renewal of the Tagalo in- 
 surrection of 1896. Dispersion would have bafified our pur- 
 pose, and dodging might have prolonged the life of Monto- 
 jo's fleet. Its prompt destruction involved, as we now see, 
 not only the moral conquest of the Archipelago, but also the 
 confusion of Spain's counsels and the diversion of her most 
 powerful squadron from operations in the Atlantic. 
 
 Two restless days and nights were spent in Mirs Bay, com- 
 pleting material preparations and awaiting the last rem- 
 nants of ofificial instruction and casual information. Our 
 visit to this region drew from the Manila press a sarcastic ap- 
 peal to know how long we would " hide our flag on the inhos- 
 pitable coasts of China." Did we intend to continue " wast- 
 ing coal and hoarding ammunition " until the war was over? 
 This was printed April 27, the very day we sailed from Mirs 
 
io8 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 Bay and shaped our course southeast for the shores of Luzon. 
 The situation might have seemed to justify some address 
 to our ship's companies, some appeal to their loyalty as Amer- 
 icans, to their energy as fighting seamen. Fortunately the 
 enemy saved us the trouble. Every public authority in Ma- 
 nila, Governor-General, Alcaldo and Archbishop, had burst in- 
 to eloquence upon the declaration of war. The staple of 
 these addresses was ever the same. Americans were abused 
 for oppressing " Indians," hating religion and lacking courage. 
 General Augustin's bitter words were published in every ship : 
 "A squadron manned by foreigners possessing neither instruc- 
 tion nor discipline is preparing to come to this Archipelago 
 with the ruffianly intention of robbing us of all that means 
 life, honor and liberty." Whatever the effect may have been 
 in Manila this address roused an excellent fighting spirit 
 among our men. On the Olympia at least, nothing more 
 was needed except a quiet lesson from Captain Gridley to the 
 thirty men who were to point the guns. At dusk on Satur- 
 day evening he reminded them that we were at war with 
 Spain and that it was the duty of every man to do his best, 
 to waste no ammunition, but to take deadly aim and keep it 
 up until the enemy was beaten. Nothing more was needed 
 to prepare them for their Sunday morning's work. 
 
 The squadron formed in double column for a passage of 
 630 miles, maintaining a speed of about eight knots an hour. 
 This low speed was adopted to give training to watch officers 
 and engineers and also to show consideration for the smaller 
 and slower vessels of our fleet. The force was made up of 
 cruisers only; there were no ironclads and no torpedo boats. 
 But it could hardly be called a homogeneous squadron. The 
 Olympia had tried to combine many forms of power, and 
 European criticism has said that she is " over-engined and 
 overgunned " ; while every gun was welcome, she had no 
 chance to use her speed in this campaign. Her armor is 
 confined to her turrets, where it was obstructive as well as 
 protective in action. The heavy battery of the Baltimore 
 gave moral as well as material effect to her bulky outlines, 
 but she was not well-found in rapid-fire guns. The Boston is 
 an early example of a good type, but she has her steering- 
 
THE NAVAL BATTLE OF MANILA BAY. 109 
 
 engine entirely exposed. Tlie Kaicigh has been said by a high 
 authority to have "nothing good about her but her guns," 
 but nothing else but her guns had anything to do with the 
 coming battle. No battery could be better served or better 
 fitted for the destruction of Spanish cruisers than the five- 
 inch rapid-fire guns of the Raieigh. The Concord and Petrel 
 have ever been reckoned as handy vessels for cruising and 
 for inshore work generally. They showed themselves fit to 
 form in line of battle, and developed every unit of power in 
 their batteries. No battleship was needed to make this 
 squadron effective and, for the work in sight, invincible. 
 But these qualities could only be demonstrated by fighting. 
 
 The sea was smooth, and the passage from China to Luzon 
 was uneventful. On the third night out, in the dark hours of 
 the morning, we made the land near Cape Bolinao. A dark 
 mass and a rank tropical odor revealed the great island. 
 Daylight showed leagues of mangrove swamp backed by 
 ridges of rock, covered with scrubby timber, with lofty peaks 
 farther inland. Rather barren for the tropics it seemed, but 
 the coast is bold with landmarks for safe navigation. The 
 Boston and Concord were sent ahead to reconnoiter Subic Bay, 
 and later the j5'^?///;;/6'rr was detached to support them. The 
 wake of this advance squadron was strewn with cabinet-work 
 and lumber. Clearing ship for action is a destructive yet in- 
 conclusive process which appeals to some boyish or primitive 
 instinct of sailor-men, and the task was prosecuted with er- 
 ratic vigor. 
 
 In the afternoon the southwestern cape of Luzon was 
 rounded, and the advance section of our fleet was discovered 
 lying peacefully off the entrance of Subic Bay, The narrow 
 channel was unfortified and the navy-yard was open to attack. 
 But our game was not there, and the scouting cruisers gath- 
 ered like a pack of hounds at fault. There was time before 
 dark for a final council, and the captains were called on board 
 the Olyvipia. About sunset Captain Gridley was directed to 
 lead the squadron through the Boca Grande, the wide 
 southern channel of entrance to Manila Bay. The other 
 ships were to follow the Olyuipia, guided by a narrow ray 
 from her stern lantern, each ship turning in the visible wake 
 
no THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 which trailed after the file-leader. All lights except these 
 stern lanterns had been mask-ed or extinguished during the 
 night. A track was laid off on the chart and approved by 
 the Commander-in-Chief, and this track was closely followed 
 from dusk to dawn, from Subic entrance to the mouth of the 
 Pasig River in front of Manila. Four changes of course were 
 required, and the points where turns must be made were 
 picked up by cross-bearings of islands and headlands checked 
 by the courses steered and the readings of the patent log. 
 No local knowledge was needed to arrange these details, and 
 no degree of darkness could have disturbed our navigation. 
 The moon made efforts to break through the clouds, but on 
 the whole the night was dark, in spite of the dancing pillars 
 of cloud pulsing with tropical lightning among which we 
 cruised. There were light showers which dampened hun- 
 dreds of suits of white duck, but nobody noticed such trifles. 
 
 As night fell, we began to realize that we were preparing to 
 force an entrance into a guarded bay with hostile batteries 
 and ships lying in wait for us. No welcome flashed from the 
 dark summits of Corregidor and Pulo Caballo. Spain had 
 extinguished every light intended to aid mariners in approach- 
 ing her Archipelago. Having reason to suspect that the 
 batteries on Corregidor were placed to command both chan- 
 nels, we had chosen the wider one and had shaped courses to 
 pass that stronghold at a distance of three miles and a half, — 
 not out of range, but too far off to be checked in a resolute 
 advance. Before ten o'clock all hands went to quarters, and 
 the guns were ready for service at any moment during tlie 
 next twelve hours. Small islands showed clearly on the 
 horizon, though black shadows lay under the land. La 
 Monja, or the Haystack, was left to port, and El Fraile showed 
 a jagged lump nearly ahead. While we could see these marks 
 we needed no pilot. Yet the Spaniards abused the whole 
 British race because of a suspicion that we were helped by 
 the master of a British steamer trading to Manila. The 
 legend of a foreign pilot belongs with the story of British 
 gunners recruited in Hong Kong. We had Americans at the 
 wheel and Americans behind the guns. Yet questions were 
 asked in the British Parliament and fictions were invented in 
 
THE NAVAL BATTLE OF MANILA BAY. m 
 
 Spain. "With every aggravating circumstance, darkness, 
 treachery and desperation, the crime of Cavit6 was consum- 
 mated " ; thus the story was told in the journals of Madrid. 
 
 Yet there was nothing to show that the situation was 
 strained or desperate. There were no dramatic moments on 
 the bridge of the Olyuipia. The Commodore and Captain 
 Gridley took counsel and kept watch quietly. Formal 
 reports were hardly necessary and sonorous orders were never 
 given. As we entered the channel, a clear light winked and 
 flashed a long message from the north shore. Later, a rocket 
 soared from the summit of Corregidor. There were dull 
 flashes from other points, but no roar of guns followed them. 
 Our course led past El Fraile at a distance of 1,500 yards. 
 There was deep water close to the rock, and it was a good 
 landmark. Just beyond opened the broad expanse of Manila 
 Bay, where we might cruise or anchor, blockade or fight, at 
 will. 
 
 Changing course from East to N. E. by N. swung the 
 stern ray from the Olyuipia s guiding light toward the rock, 
 and a moment later there was a red flash, a whistling shriek 
 overhead, and a loud report. Then came other dull flashes 
 from the South. Before one had time to remember that 
 Secretary of the Navy who used to be fond of saying, " No 
 naval ofificer now living will ever hear the sound of a hostile 
 gun," the Raleigh, Boston and Concord made sharp answer, 
 and shells were seen bursting in fiery spray against the south- 
 ern cliff's. The McCulloch also let her six-pounders speak out 
 in testimony of vigilance. The Oljnipia was too far ahead to 
 assist, and there was no thought of confusing the line by any 
 turning movement. The plan was to get through the pass 
 and to leave the batteries to rave over their lost opportunity. 
 Our unchecked advance carried us out into open wateV and sig- 
 nal lanterns were soon flashing assurance that the fleet was un- 
 touched by shell or torpedo. 
 
 All the defenses of both channels were made worthless by 
 our safe passage. Returning at leisure to dismantle the bat- 
 teries and dismiss their garrisons, it was found that four bat- 
 teries guarded the northern channel and three were placed to 
 command the Boca Grande through which we entered. 
 
112 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 There were nineteen guns in all and they were all rifled, 
 though most of them were muzzle-loaders. The best 
 battery, containing three breech-loading rifles of modern type, 
 was placed on El Fraile, where it had an excellent chance to 
 disable one or more ships. Had the existence of this battery 
 been known we might have circled around it to shatter the 
 rock and dismount the guns by concentrated fire. Restinga 
 Point also fired, but it was too far off to count. Pulo Caballo 
 did not open, " because of the speed at which the enemy fled," 
 says a simple apologist in the Diario dc Manila, who adds that 
 one of the Fraile guns was crippled by recoil at the first fire. 
 
 There had been much speculation about mine-fields, which 
 had no effect upon the tactical methods pursued. Mines 
 were simply ignored ; there was no dragging or dodging to 
 eliminate this danger. The channel is too wide and too deep 
 for effective defense by torpedoes. Yet we knew that ma- 
 terials were accumulated, that telegrams were sent appealing 
 for gun-cotton, for pebble-powder, for blasting-powder, for 
 insulating tapes and guns. Finally the Colonel of Marine 
 Artillery commanding, telegraphed from Corregidor on April 
 27 declaring the " batteries ready and lines of torpedoes in 
 place. " He added a request for gunboats to patrol the 
 channels, closing with a characteristic proverb : " Pcdido 
 gucda pedidoy " Things urgent remain urgent." This sums 
 up the whole military system of Spain. Yet we were assured 
 by the highest authority, by the Governor-General as well as by 
 the Commandant of the Naval Arsenal, that the Boca Grande 
 was " full of torpedoes." This statement came too late to be 
 of any service, as it was delivered on May 2. It was not 
 thought necessary to have the channel explored, and the 
 warning remains unverified to this day. 
 
 The moon set shortly after the firing ceased, and we crept 
 onward through the darkness at slow speed. Since the 
 enemy's squadron had not fought in the entrance channel with 
 the support of the shore batteries, there was no reason to ex- 
 pect them to attack in open water. They must have scattered 
 to hide in remote harbors, or sought shelter under the guns of 
 Manila or Cavite. The transports were called up to form an 
 outer column abreast the column of attack. The course was 
 
THE NAVAL BATTLE OF MANILA BAY. 113 
 
 shaped for Manila, and speed was reduced so that the anchor- 
 age would be approached at early daylight. The white glow 
 \n the northeast broke into bright points of electric light, mark- 
 ing the avenues of Manila. Many snatched an hour or so of 
 sleep during this silent mid-watch. The Commander-in-Chief 
 watched the slow progress of the ship and tried to induce Cap- 
 tain Gridley to rest and recruit his shattered strength. Coffee 
 was ordered to be ready at four o'clock and every one wel- 
 comed that refreshment. The coffee from the cabin was ac- 
 companied by sticky gingerbread ; that from the ward-room 
 brought a burden of thick bread and butter. Hardtack would 
 have been more to the purpose, and sandwiches not unaccept- 
 able. We heard afterward that some ships' companies had to 
 fight on empty stomachs. Breakfast at the usual hour was no 
 wanton luxury after all. 
 
 Daylight came out behind Manila and revealed long ranges 
 of white houses and gray fortifications with domes and towers 
 breaking the dim outlines. Eager eyes were turned to the an- 
 chorage off the breakwater. The binoculars showed a cluster 
 of black hulls and lofty spars ; sixteen sailing-ships were 
 counted. There were no men-of-war, no steamers of any sort, 
 and another scrap of misinformation was cast away. Our 
 transports and despatch-boat were warned off and the battle 
 flags were broken at every masthead. The Olyuipia s main- 
 mast bore a broad pennant of blue with the single star of a 
 commodore. It was almost five o'clock and the dawn was 
 spreading. All this we saw from the forward bridge of the 
 Olympia and all that is told hereafter is the report of one 
 pair of eyes from that post of observation. That it was a good 
 look-out station has been proved by two excellent narratives, 
 the official report of Admiral Dewey and the account written 
 by Mr. J. L. Stickney for the New York Herald. Each ship 
 had one or two posts of equal advantage, but there were none 
 such outside the six fighting cruisers. This is proved by nu- 
 merous extraneous publications, American and Spanish. There 
 was not a single foreign vessel in port,— not even a German 
 cruiser. 
 
 The Olympia carries her standard compass on a grating 
 supported by brass rods some twelve feet above the con- 
 
114 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 ning-tovver overhanging the forward turret. This crow's-nest 
 seemed to the Commodore a convenient station for handling 
 his squadron in action, and there he spent several hours on that 
 eventful Sunday morning. There was barely room for the 
 compass and the navigator on this perch, but it escaped the 
 jar and the smoke which annoyed those standing on the bridge. 
 Captain Gridley was directed to stay in the conning-tower, 
 where he had a clear outlook and a set of voice tubes for pass- 
 ing orders. Ensign Butler stood outside the tower acting as 
 aid to the Captain. The ship was steered from a wooden pi- 
 lot-house, on the roof of which Captain Lamberton took his 
 stand. The Executive Officer, Lieutenant Rees, stood on the 
 bridge to direct the working of the guns. There were half-a- 
 dozen petty officers and marine orderlies on the bridge, and a 
 quartermaster who took a twelve-hour's trick at the wheel. 
 The signals were worked from the after bridge by Lieutenant 
 Brumby and Ensign Scott of the stafT. Every officer had his 
 " understudy " indicated by order of rank or special detail. 
 Ensign Kavanagh assisted the navigator with that change in 
 view. The marine-guard was stationed on the upper deck to 
 pass orders or to use their rifles when required. 
 
 It was after five when we sighted the enemy. Then we saw 
 a line of gray and white vessels stretching to the eastward from 
 the bay sheltered by Sangley Point. To the right lay a sweep 
 of green grass and yellow sand ; the white buildings of the Ar- 
 senal were behind. Topmasts were housed and flame-colored 
 flags were afloat. As the Olympia turned to face them, a 
 white cloud with a heart of fire rose from Sangley Point and a 
 shell soared toward our line. The plunge of the projectile 
 was followed by the roar of the gun. There has been a two-gun 
 battery on that point since the year i6oo, but this was the crack 
 of a modern rifle. One shell was seen dropped beyond us de- 
 scribing a trajectory of more than six miles. They were ready 
 for us then, and meant to fight. But a moment later two 
 harmless fountains sprang up miles ahead of our column and it 
 was plain that the defense was flurried. Another proof of 
 wildness came from the batteries along the water-front of Ma- 
 nila. The two small breech-loaders on the south mole and the 
 four big ones along the promenade rashly opened fire as our 
 
•fl Q 
 
THE NAVAL BATTLE OF MANILA BAY. 115 
 
 line extended. A few broadsides in return would have laid 
 waste the helpless mass of buildings in the background. But 
 the heaviest battery was the only one noticed. The Boston 
 and Concord sent some warning shells close to the guns, 
 but their wanton fire was kept up for many hours. 
 
 The column swept past the city " in perfect and majestic 
 order," wrote an unwilling admirer in the city ; " rather con- 
 fused," said the Spanish Admiral, who saw the line slantwise 
 and made out eight ships instead of six. We did not count 
 his force until later, but his flagship, the Rciiia Cristina, was 
 readily made out, as well as the white Castilla, which was 
 moored and protected by lighters filled with sand. While the 
 head of our column was still three miles away, the two 
 largest ships went off like bunches of fire-crackers and the 
 waters ahead of the Olynipia were troubled by plunging 
 showers of shells. The other cruisers joined the fray, and for 
 half an hour their fire was brisk though ineffective. We were 
 patient for twenty odd minutes, but when the distance was 
 estimated as 5,400 yards, the historic order, " You may fire 
 when you are ready, Gridley," was uttered, and the roar and 
 jar of an eight-inch gun pointed on the starboard bow an- 
 nounced that we had begun to fight. The firing was deliber- 
 erate at first, but when we turned to the southwest and had 
 our port broadside opposed to the enemy all the guns opened, 
 and a mighty shower of projectiles was poured upon the 
 Spanish line. 
 
 Yet the enemy's fire was not smothered, even when all our 
 line lay parallel to his and every ship was engaged. Shells 
 soared and whistled overhead. Others fell short and plunged 
 and sank, or else leaped wildly up to dive again. Ricochet 
 effects were worthless and incalculable. Perhaps each vessel 
 could have counted a hundred shells that struck within her 
 own length, yet did no harm. When a shell burst at the sur- 
 face, the splash and smoke of the explosion would be followed 
 by spiteful whistlings and sullen plunges as the lazy fragments 
 made their scattering flight. Decks were scored, wire rigging 
 stranded and signal-halyards cut by sharp-edged bits of steel. 
 But no shell burst among our guns' crews, or scattered splin- 
 ters among the firemen and others who toiled below. The 
 
ii6 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 Olyiiipia had a dozen boats on cradles or davits, but not one 
 of them was injured by the Spanish fire. Other ships had 
 their boats blown to pieces by the blast of their guns, but 
 none were touched by the enemy. The Baltunore was pene- 
 trated by an armor-piercing shell from Sangley Point, but the 
 projectile did not explode and it failed to strike anybody in 
 its wandering course. A six-pounder shell burst in the ward- 
 room of the Boston^ doing uncompensated injury to an 
 oflficer's wardrobe. 
 
 The course was set co pass the Spanish line at a mean dis- 
 tance of 3.000 yards, and a steady fire was maintained from 
 our port broadside. But a new disturbing factor now ap- 
 peared. A launch about forty feet long steamed out from 
 behind the batteries and stood across our track. She then 
 turned her head inshore, and seemed to He in wait for the 
 Olyvipia. She bore the Spanish ensign and her movements 
 indicated a desperate resolve to use torpedoes. Of course, 
 rapid fire wa«5 opened to sink her. Even the main battery 
 threatened h^r, while six-pounders dropped shells close to 
 her side. The marines also used their rifles to put her out of 
 action. The boat was soon crippled and ran ashore, followed 
 by a rain of projectiles. No man ever lived through a fiercer 
 storm of fire, yet we are assured that this crew escaped with 
 their lives. Must all the truth be told ? The English owner 
 ot the boat declares that she was manned by his Filipino ser- 
 vants, bound for Manila on domestic errands. The incident 
 leaves one puzzled, but inspires respect for the possible en- 
 dnvance of torpedo boats. 
 
 Within a mile of Sangley Point the Olynipia made a quick 
 turn and swept back to the eastward, followed by her flock, 
 with the starboard batteries playing. We could see that the 
 Castilla s hull was scarred and blackened by our shells. The 
 Spanish fire seemed .slacker than at first, and some ships were 
 shifting uneasily in the rear rank. With some exasperation 
 we noted a large percentage of misses from our well-aimed 
 guns. It was hard to be sure of the fall of any particular 
 shot, but many splashed ineffectually. Yet our batteries kept 
 hammering away, straining and jarring the ship in the shock 
 of their recoil. Sometimes the shock seemed to come from 
 
THE NAVAL BATTLE OF MANILA BAY. 117 
 
 the outside, but no casualty was reported. Nor did any of 
 our consorts drop out of line or slacken fire. Yet the Spanish 
 ensigns still flew and their broadsides still thundered when we 
 had completed our third run past their line and had been en- 
 gaged for an hour and a half. 
 
 There was some natural impatience for visible results. As 
 we headed to the eastward for the fourth run, preparations 
 were made to close, in order to try the effect of stationary 
 practice. The Olynipia was headed southeast to cross the 
 five-fathom curve. At this instant the Rcina Cristiiia was 
 seen to move to a gap in the line and to turn her bows to 
 seaward. The two flagships drew together as if for a duel, 
 but the Olyuipia\NdLS covering more ground than her opponent, 
 who was exposed to the concentrated fire of several broad- 
 sides. The slow advance continued until the Cristina was 
 within 1,200 yards and we could see our shells strike home. 
 Dark clouds of smoke poured up from the bow and stern and a 
 plume of white steam made another signal of distress. A 
 shell had pierced the superheater, the ship was on fire in two 
 places, the steering-engine was shot away and most of the 
 guns were disabled. So the ship turned inshore and sought 
 refuge in shoal water close to the Arsenal. The object of her 
 charge need not be considered. As usual, the Spaniards 
 were reduced to counsels of desperation. Perhaps some 
 dream of attack by ramming or using torpedoes inspired the 
 effort. T\\Q Don Juan de Austria \\z.^ made a similar move- 
 ment earlier in the fight, but her rush was still more brief and 
 ineffective. This battle had to be fought out with guns, 
 though the enemy found that a hard saying. 
 
 Again we steamed to the westward, while Admiral Montojo 
 was shifting his flag to the Isla de Cuba. In passing the 
 Cast ilia, it was noted that she, too, was on fire. Turning 
 within 1,500 yards of the batteries on the point, the fleet 
 stood out toward the middle of the bay. The fine rifled guns 
 on shore were as ineffective at 1,200 yards as they were at 
 12,000. They followed us with steady fire as we steamed to 
 the northward, and the heavy guns outside the walls of 
 Manila resumed their task of bombardment. Their shells of 
 9.5 inches calibre might have been powerfully destructive 
 
Ti8 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 had their descending flight landed them on our decks, but 
 they all missed, even when our two groups made a motionless 
 cluster of nine vessels within range of their cross-fire. The 
 Spanish Captain-General telegraphed to Madrid that we 
 *' withdrew behind the merchant shipping to transfer wounded." 
 The rest of the world insists in prose and verse that we 
 stopped fighting to get breakfast. There may have been 
 other considerations, but we had done a morning's work, — a 
 bigger one than we knew — and breakfast was welcome. 
 There were sardines, corned beef and hard-tack on a corner 
 of the wardroom table, still encumbered by the surgeons' 
 ghastly gear, which was all unstained, however. Indeed, the 
 answer to the signal, " Report casualties," had been comfort- 
 able. Half-a-dozen men slightly wounded by the shock of 
 that erratic shell which traversed the Baltimore s upper deck 
 covered everything. A capable observer watching the fight 
 from one of our colliers was able to give the net result of our 
 work as soon as we stopped firing, but he estimated the 
 American loss as not less than 400. Let us be thankful that 
 it was not so, though we may not know why our men's lives 
 were spared. 
 
 The crews had glorious opportunities for cheering each 
 other. The big Baltimore and the little Petrel drew special 
 attention as the two extremes of our fleet, but not one ship 
 was slighted, nor was there a word of captious comparison 
 mixed with the generous burst of applause. All had fought gal- 
 lantly and loyally, and all had escaped unharmed. Natural 
 selection had done its work on the niceties of naval uniform 
 while we were cleared for action. Golf caps and pith helmets 
 were seen in high places; officers and men came on the bridge 
 in obsolescent pajamas or inadequate undershirts; the turret 
 crews were frankly primeval in their attire. But good spirits 
 and prompt obedience were the natural order of the day. 
 There had been no need to promote them by signalling com- 
 monplace maxims. There was neither shirking nor flinching 
 among the 1,700 men under the Commodore's pennant on the 
 first of May. 
 
 The smoking hour and the consultation of captains after 
 breakfast were enlivened and inspired by frequent explosions 
 
THE NAVAL BATTLE OF MANILA BAY. 119 
 
 of ammunition in the burning ships off Cavite. The inevi- 
 table decision was that the work should be finished. The 
 records show that this movement began at 10:45 A. M., but it 
 might have been six hours or a week later if one had to trust 
 individual impressions. The Baltimore was designated to 
 lead the line, and the intervals were closed, as Sangley Point 
 was approached from the westward. One gun from the point 
 was still in action when the Baltiuiore stopped her engines 
 and turned her heavy broadside on the earthworks. Her six- 
 inch and eight-inch shells were soon bursting and throwing up 
 showers of sand close to the guns. The other ships ranged 
 past in succession, and the Olynipia poured in a galling fire 
 from her six-pounders at a distance of 1,800 yards. In passing 
 the Baltimore each ship had to stop firing and take to cheer- 
 ing, which seemed to have a decisive effect, as the batteries 
 were silenced and deserted by their demoralized garrisons. 
 One ship attempted to keep up the battle. The Don An- 
 tonio de Ulloa fired two or three shots, but she was soon silenced 
 and sunk by shells from the Boston and Raleigh, which 
 were turning the point to approach the Arsenal. She was the 
 only ship sent to the bottom by our projectiles. Others were 
 burned, blown up, or driven ashore by our fire. The Spanish 
 flag still waved from the lofty shears at the Cavite Arsenal, 
 but a few well-aimed shells from the Raleigh shattered build- 
 ings and scattered troops about the navy-yard. The red and 
 yellow flag came down ; a white sheet was shown from the 
 Commandant's quarters, and Cavite was surrendered. 
 
 ll\\Q Petrel \\?id stood in ahead of the other ships assisting 
 in the bombardment, and she was now sent in to finish the 
 task of destroying the Spanish vessels, which had taken refuge 
 behind the Arsenal and scattered themselves in shoal water 
 close to the wharves, which were thronged by troops under 
 arms and by the beaten crews who had escaped from the 
 squadron. Lieutenant Hughes lowered the Petrefs soundest 
 whaleboat and dashed in past these forces, supported by Lieu- 
 tenant Fiske in another whaleboat. For the first time that 
 day Americans and Spaniards came face to face. But the Spa- 
 nish officers seemed to realize the responsibilities of surrender, 
 and the work of destruction ^\■as not opposed. Cruisers sunk 
 
I20 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 within pistol range of the quays were boarded and set on 
 fire by our boats' crews, and a flotilla of tugs and launches 
 was gathered and brought out by the Petrel. The armed 
 transport Manila was found to be uninjured and was also 
 made a prize for the fleet. Meanwhile the Concord, supported 
 by the Olynipia, had stood in toward Las Pinas on a similar 
 errand. The steamer Isla de Mindanao, which had held a 
 place in the Spanish line during the action, had drifted ashore 
 there, and her crew were driven off and the ship set on fire by 
 the Concord's shells. This vessel was armed, and there is 
 evidence that she fired during the action. She had brouglit 
 war material on her last voyage from Spain, and she had been 
 towing disabled cruisers just before the action. Her owners 
 had intended to dispatch her to Spain on the next Saturdajs 
 May 7. They showed a lamentable lack of faith in American 
 activity, and insurance companies refuse to pay for losses due 
 to imprudent delay and belligerent behavior. 
 
 This second action lasted about two hours, or nearly as long 
 as the first. It was performed before a larger audience, as the 
 British steamer Esmeralda had just entered the harbor with a 
 journalist or two on board. In spite of various destructive 
 and dramatic incidents, the vital inspiration of battle was 
 lacking. The enemy failed to stand to his guns. Only half-a- 
 dozen shells were fired by the Spaniards, while a thousand or 
 so were discharged from their ships in the early morning. But 
 we had to make sure that all resistance was over. Our victory 
 at Cavite also silenced the batteries at Manila forever. The 
 Captain-General was warned that further firing would compel 
 the fleet to bombard the walled city. In acceding to this 
 warning he admitted total defeat. 
 
 The wanton and ineffectual employment of batteries adja- 
 cent to a defenseless city furnishes an instance of the desper- 
 ate futility of Spanish traditions. The legend runs that the 
 Governor-General had forbidden the batteries to fire, but that 
 the Colonel of Artillery felt himself bound by technical rules 
 affecting his military honor. So he persisted until defeat was 
 demonstrated. He was told that the next day would see him 
 under close arrest. He did not linger until the day of grace 
 was done, but shot himself in the Plaza before the palace of 
 
J 
 
 ^* 
 
 
 
THE NAVAL BATTLE OF MANILA BAY. 121 
 
 the Archbishop the same eveninj:^. That sinister fact is cer- 
 tain, and it is also true that his wife died and his son became 
 insane. So his daughter is left alone in the world to reflect on 
 the cruelty of war as aggravated by arbitrary and fatalistic 
 notions of honor. 
 
 Early in the afternoon our line was anchored in front of 
 Manila, and our battle flags waved until sunset. The garrison 
 might have heard the cheers of our seamen and the notes of 
 the " Star Spangled Banner " when our band saluted the col- 
 ors. Our Sunday's work included the destruction of eleven 
 vessels, eight of them classed as cruisers in the Spanish regis- 
 ter. Seven of them were anchored in line of battle and 
 cleared for action when we approached Cavite. There was no 
 question of a surprise. Our departure from Hong Kong and 
 Mirs Bay and our presence off Bolinao, Subic and Corregidor 
 had been duly reported by telegraph. The guns had been 
 manned at daylight and the regular rounds of cheers, for the 
 King, for the Queen, and for Spain, had roused the 2,000 men 
 of the Spanish fleet. 
 
 The victorious squadron had fought in the following order : 
 Olympia, Baltimore, Raleigh, Coiieord, Petrel and Boston. 
 The McCulloch, N^aii-Shaii and Zafiro made up our convoy 
 or reserve. The names of the Spanish ships may also be 
 noted : Reina Crist ina, Castilla, Don Anto)iio de Ulloa, Isla 
 de Mindanao, Velasco, Argos, Marques Del Dnero, General 
 Lezo, Isla de Cuba, Isla de luzon, Don Juan dc Austria. The 
 three cruisers last named are to be raised and refitted for ser- 
 vice, under a contract signed in October. 
 
 The total number of effective guns in the batteries, placed 
 to command the channels of entrance and the approaches to 
 Cavit6 and Manila, attains the formidable figure of sixty-one. 
 Smooth-bores and field-pieces are not counted. Of these guns 
 twenty-five were breech-loading rifles, nine rifled mortars and 
 the rest muzzle-loading rifles; The average calibre was over 
 seven inches. When the fleet was destroyed and the Sangley 
 Point battery silenced, all the rest were put out of action. 
 The Manila batteries were silenced by intimidation and the 
 Corregidor defenses condemned to isolation. 
 
 The American fleet was free to work its will upon the capi- 
 
122 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 tal of the Philippines, but certain instincts or principles 
 seemed to forbid bombardment. Spanish sentiment failed to 
 understand our restraint. The papers still raved of defend- 
 ing the city, and our position was declared to be critical for lack 
 of a naval base, of coal, and of other supplies. It was said that 
 our shells did little harm in Cavite, and, therefore, that 
 Manila could stand a bombardment. But neither the town 
 nor the Arsenal had been our target during the action off 
 Cavite. On the other hand, a Madrid journal declared that all 
 the buildings had been laid in ruins before the place was sur- 
 rendered. 
 
 After the Governor-General's rant about " ruffianly inten- 
 tions," backed by the Archbishop's invective against the 
 " base passions engendered by heresy," which inspired our 
 campaign, it may have been difficult to allow for the moral re- 
 straints and humane tendencies which modified the situation. 
 Certainly Spanish history reveals no such forbearance. The 
 bombardment of Valparaiso, a commercial city undefended 
 by a single gun, is counted as one of the glories of the Span- 
 ish Navy. In 1866 the squadron of Mendez Niinez fired 2,600 
 shells into that city, making the bonded warehouses their 
 principal target, but incidentally hitting several churches and 
 hospitals. Property to the value of $15,000,000.00 was 
 destroyed. Half of this belonged to foreigners, yet the Span- 
 ish Commodore refused to receive the protest of the Consuls 
 against the proposed bombardment. He wenton to Callao and 
 attempted a similar attack, the history of which is given in 
 the medal awarded to the Peruvians who took part in the 
 defense : " With fifty guns you beat off three hundred." 
 This motto might have braced the defenders of Manila, but 
 they preferred to quote some empty phrase of Mendez-Niiflez 
 about " honor without ships rather than ships without honor." 
 That sentiment failed to inspire a single torpedo attack dur- 
 ing the summer of 1898, though there were scores of idle 
 naval officers, many of them qualified as torpcdistas, in 
 Manila, with handy steam launches and torpedoes at their 
 disposition. Their best excuse is the desire not to expose 
 the city to retaliation. The " new school " of naval strategy, 
 which takes commerce-destroying and the bombardment of 
 
THE NAVAL BATTLE OF MANILA BAY. 123 
 
 commercial towns to be principal objects of maritime attack, 
 has its prophets in Spain as well as in France. Let us hope 
 that war may teach them humanity. 
 
 It was necessary, however, to deprive Manila of some of 
 the resources of civilization. A strict commercial blockade 
 was announced and enforced. The cable was also cut as soon 
 as it was found that we were not to be allowed to use it. The 
 English managers had no choice under the terms of their con- 
 tract and the constraints of Spanish authority. The interrup- 
 tion of this line of communication was far more hurtful to 
 Spain than to us, since our dispatches could be forwarded via 
 Hong Kong with only two or three days delay. Steamers were 
 allowed to give passage to all neutrals who desired to with- 
 draw from Manila, and even Spaniards, a Bishop, for instance, 
 were granted the same favor when their stay in Manila would 
 involve special hardship. Mails were also allowed to go in 
 and out A\ithout interference. Foreign cruisers and trading 
 steamers rendered this service at frequent intervals. 
 
 This sketch of visible results may be supplemented by some 
 notes on the methods employed. Personal opinions and im- 
 pressions only will be offered, and it is recognized that chron- 
 icle and argument are alike defective. The tactical scheme 
 was simple ; a column of vessels was to be led past the enemy 
 until his defeat was accomplished by broadside fire. It took 
 five turns to do the work. The length of our line with 400- 
 yard intervals was about 2,500 yards, and this was also the 
 mean distance from the Spanish center. The enemy had 
 formed his ships with the western flank inside Sangley Point 
 and the eastern flank near shoal water north of Bakor. Ad- 
 vancing in column, we moved freely in open water, slipping 
 past our own smoke, and disconcerting the enemy's aim b)' 
 varying distances. The Commander-in-Chief led the line and 
 was enabled to guide his supporters by example as well as by 
 signal. The extended order of our ships allowed effective 
 concentration from all broadsides on the huddled Spanish 
 formation. Finally, no turning movements were necessary 
 within the space covered by the guns of the enemy's ships. 
 
 Our track was determined at first by the depth of water as 
 shown on the chart. It was thought best to keep outside the 
 
124 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 " five-fathom curve." The Olyinpia drew twenty-four feet, or 
 four fathoms, and the rest could follow in her wake without 
 taking soundings or angles for position. Certain sinister 
 notes on the navigation of Cavite Bay imposed caution ; " from 
 Spanish surveys," " point extending to eastward," " filling up 
 since Horsburgh's time," were warnings that turned out to be 
 unnecessary. The chart was correct, except that the water 
 had deepened to the eastward. The Captain-General cabled 
 to Madrid that our fleet had suffered greatly and had been 
 " forced to make various changes and evolutions " by the fire 
 of batteries ashore and afloat. The evolutions had all been 
 planned, and we cruised and fought between the points B'and 
 C of the diagram prepared in Hong Kong. 
 
 The enemy chose to open fire at extreme ranges, but we 
 fired only one shot from a distance greater than 5,000 yards. 
 Many of us had been taught that 2,000 yards was the maxi- 
 mum ran^je for naval guns in action, and that that could be 
 attained well enough by cast-iron smooth-bores. Fortunately, 
 we had emerged from that era of darkness, and we saw a 
 squadron destroyed at 2,500 yards. Had all the guns of the 
 water batteries of Manila been mounted on Sangley Point, 
 and had the Spanish line drawn back into shallow water, we 
 might have had to diminish our distances to the danger point 
 and to make turns under concentrated fire. Being left at 
 liberty, however, a distance was chosen which enabled us to 
 punish the enemy for his hopeless marksmanship without loss 
 or injury to our ships. 
 
 The enemy failed to inflict damage, not on account of any 
 deficiency in the range or penetration of the shells fired from 
 his thirty modern breech-loading rifles of 12 centimeters and 
 upward, or from his numerous rapid-fire six-pounders. Nor 
 is there evidence that his ammunition was defective. Not 
 even the ravages of our fire can be alleged as a complete ex- 
 cuse. The guns were pointed wildly, that is all. 
 
 Rapid fire from our guns doubtless had much to do with 
 the unsteadiness of gunners. The Olynipia and Raleigh had 
 fine batteries of five-inch rapid-fire guns. Each shell from 
 these guns was fit for any work that was done that day. 
 Superheaters can be pierced, steering-engines crippled, and 
 
THE NAVAL BATTLE OF MANILA BAY. 125 
 
 guns' crews swept away by five-inch shells as well as by those 
 of heavier calibre. No armor had to be pierced, and no ship 
 was structurally disabled by any single shell. Nor were guns 
 dismounted in shore batteries, nor parapets thrown down by 
 any projectiles. The work was done by the shattering and 
 incendiary effects of shells exploded inboard. The preference 
 for "heavy guns in protected positions" was not justified 
 here. The four eight-inch guns in the Olympias turrets were 
 able to fire only thirty-five shots in all, which was the average 
 for each gun in the five-inch battery, which had also a greater 
 percentage of hits among its 350 fires. Yet each turret was 
 handled by a vigilant and experienced officer, and was fired 
 on both broadsides without impediment. 
 
 Rapid-fire projectiles of smaller calibres, down to .three- 
 pounders, are also deadly in effect. They rarely fail to ex- 
 plode, and they are capable of igniting wood. Of course, the 
 Spanish protest against the use of " incendiary projectiles 
 forbidden by all laws divine and human " was mere ignorant 
 raving. Had high explosives been used with delayed-action 
 fuses, — the ammunition of the future, — the protest might 
 have been still more shrill. Let us hope that before another 
 contest comes we may be provided with genuine smokeless 
 powder. Of old-fashioned ammunition we had a plenty. Our 
 eight-inch guns might have been fought for a week, but the 
 five-inch supply was low enough to cause some concern, about 
 forty per cent, having been used in two hours. The Naval 
 Bureau of Ordnance promptly replaced all deficiencies, and 
 other Bureaus did likewise. It is worth noting that neither 
 gun-mounts nor ammunition delayed the Olympias fire, 
 though annoying accidents have frequently interfered with 
 target practice. The improvement was doubtless due to the 
 training of the crews and to the adjustments made by division 
 officers during a three years' cruise. 
 
 Range-finding offered the usual difficulties. The Baltimore 
 had an electric range-finder which hardly survived the first 
 broadside. The method of picking up ranges by a rapid-fire 
 gun was not convenient in the Olynipia, where most of the 
 battery is mounted on co.vered decks. The approximate posi- 
 tion of the Spanish line was marked on the chart and the dis- 
 
126 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 tance measured from successive positions determined by cross- 
 bearings. Some annoyance resulted from the attempt to 
 communicate with the guns by "passing the word." The eye 
 is the organ to be trusted during the crash and roar of naval 
 action, and a series of dials should give direct and visible mes- 
 sages from the bridge or conning-tower to each division of the 
 battery. Telephones fail and voice-tubes are uncertain. 
 
 It remains to consider the concrete effect of our fire. Ad- 
 miral Montojo reckoned seventy hits in the hull and super- 
 structure of the O'istina, with fifty odd killed and one hundred 
 wounded. Her Captain, Don Luis Cadarso, was among the 
 slain. On the last Sunday before the fight he had addressed 
 his crew after mass, and his fiery harangue made them break 
 forth {promunpicron) into cheers for every Spanish emblem of 
 authority. The two funnels were also riddled by rapid-fire 
 projectiles ; the steam-steerer was disabled ; steam was escap- 
 ing from the superheater; the ship was on fire forward and 
 aft ; the ammunition had begun to explode when she retired 
 from action. No other ship drew so much of our fire, and it 
 is probable that less than ten per cent, of the shots aimed at 
 her were effective. The estimate for the glorious running 
 fight off Santiago was as low as three per cent. The Castilla 
 also suffered heavily. The total number of killed and 
 wounded is given as 381 in Spanish reports. The battery at 
 Sangley Point lost six men killed and four wounded be- 
 fore the crews were driven from the guns, which were not 
 dismounted by our fire, though one had been crippled by its 
 own discharge. The effect of heavy shells against earth-works 
 seems to be less, and the value of rapid-fire greater, than had 
 been allowed. It has been a maxim among engineers that 
 one gun ashore was worth five or ten afioat under like pro- 
 tection. This experiment does not establish any such co-effi- 
 cient. Flagships draw fire, and it is probable that half as 
 many shells were fired at the Olympia as at the Cristina, yet 
 the score of hits is at least one hundred to nothing. 
 
 Apologists find reasons enough for this difference. Our 
 ships were called iron-clads, invulnerable to Spanish shot. 
 Cold steel was invoked " to disturb the deadly calm in which 
 instruments of precision were regulating engines of destruc- 
 
THE NAVAL BATTLE OF MANILA BAY. 127 
 
 tion." Now none of our ships was handled from armored 
 conning-towers. Wooden bridges and pilot-houses served 
 our turn. Our broadside batteries were unshielded by armor. 
 None of the existing protection was tested during the action. 
 Scarcity of gunners and incapacity of engineers are also 
 cdleged. If it were to be discussed from our point of view, 
 the scheme of defense would seem lacking in energy, foresight, 
 and persistence. Individual courage was there, but organized 
 resolution was not in evidence. The Spanish Admiral ex- 
 plained his decision not to fight in deep water by his unw ill- 
 ingness to lose men as well as ships. This amazing reason 
 seems to have been allowed to circulate to the discouragement 
 of the fleet. 
 
 The deep water which had to be abandoned was in the har- 
 bor of Subic. Had the artillery scattered about Manila been 
 mounted at the entrance to Subic, our work would have been 
 done in a slow and costly fashion. But in spite of a dozen 
 annual reports from the commission which has been investi- 
 gating Subic since 1885, nothing seems to have been known 
 of its defensive conditions. It was abandoned two days be- 
 fore our coming, and the fleet was brought back to defend 
 Cavite. The delay in mounting guns and mooring torpedoes 
 caused the Admiral " much disgust." 
 
 The only advocate of Subic was Captain del Rio, who was 
 left behind to burn his coal-depot. He had sketched an im- 
 aginary naval attack in 1891, and his pamphlet must have 
 been familiar to every naval officer of high rank at Manila. 
 Assuming an attack on Manila by a squadron somewhat su- 
 perior to the defensive force, he points out that the hostile 
 Admiral will reconnoitre Subic. Finding it empty, he will 
 gladly stand in to seek the Spanish squadron. Encountering 
 it motionless off Cavite, he will destroy it and the Arsenal. 
 Then he will bombard Manila. This prediction erred only in 
 assuming a ruthless Spanish temper in the victorious Admiral. 
 The notion of strategic naval defense by a squadron not con- 
 fined to the harbor of a commercial capital is not universally 
 accepted. Yet, if the United States ever undertakes the de- 
 fense of Manila, it will be necessary to make Subic a naval 
 port de sortie and to equip and fortify it accordingly. 
 
128 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 When the last gun was silenced on this memorable May 
 day, a high authority announced the meaning of the day's 
 work as follows : "Spain has lost her fleet and she has lost 
 these islands also ; without ships she cannot hold them, and 
 this fleet cannot be replaced." Desperate efforts have been 
 made by military and diplomatic methods to reverse this ver- 
 dict. But history does not allow the hands of the clock to be 
 put back, and the fact remains that the Philippine Archipel- 
 ago was virtually and strategically relieved from the domina. 
 tion of Spain by the squadron commanded by Admiral Dewey 
 on the first of May. 
 
 (2j^.(i^'C/o\,f 
 

CHAPTER V. 
 
 STATEMENT OF THE SINKING OF THE 
 MERRIMAC."^ 
 
 BY 
 
 FRANCIS KELLY, U. S. S. New York, Flagship. 
 
 IT had always been my inclination to enlist in the American 
 Navy as fireman. I saw my opportunity on the 2 1st of 
 April, 1898, when the war broke out between the 
 United States and Spain. On that date, I went on board the 
 U. S. R. S. Franklin at the Navy Yard, Norfolk, Va., and 
 through a special request, enlisted for one year. I passed all 
 the required examinations, having had ten years of experience 
 in the merchant service, in engine and fire rooms, as well as 
 on deck. The next day after enlisting, I was detailed to go 
 on board the Mcrriinac, which was then loaded with coal for 
 the use of Rear-Admiral Sampson's fleet, then blockading the 
 island of Cuba. Arriving at Key West on the 7th of May, 
 we anchored outside all the fleet which was there at that time. 
 I passed the remark to my shipmates that it looked as if they 
 were going to leave us there for a target, we lying so far out 
 to sea, and on the 17th, when we received orders to paint her 
 all black, over her war color, I believed it still more. But 
 all such thoughts soon vanished, for on the night of the 19th, 
 we got orders to get ready for sea and to proceed to 
 Cienfuegos to meet Schley's fleet, which was there at that 
 time watching the harbor, in which Cervera and his ships were 
 thought to be. 
 
 On the 24th, we got a signal from the Brooklyn to go along- 
 
 * Mr. Kelly was the only man below the deck of the Merrimac after she came well within 
 range of the Spanish guns. He gives a most interesting statement of one of the bravest 
 deeds of history. 
 
 The Publishers. 
 
I30 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 side the U. S. S. Massachusetts and give her all the coal she 
 wanted. As we had over 5,000 tons aboard, several small 
 ships of the fleet came alongside and took on coal. 
 
 On May 28, we were compelled to leave early, proceed to 
 Santiago, and begin coaling the remainder of the ships as 
 soon as possible, because the Commander-in-Chief wanted to 
 have the Mcrrimac dismantled so that she could be sunk in the 
 harbor of Santiago de Cuba, to bottle up the Spanish fleet, 
 which, by that time, was known to be there and not at Cien- 
 fuegos. 
 
 It was the first day of June when we were ordered to dis- 
 mantle her. At that time she had on board about 2,500 tons 
 of coal. Then the crew got orders from Lieutenant Gilmore 
 to take all their clothes and transfer them to the Massachu- 
 setts. After this, the crew of the MassacJiusetts began to dis- 
 mount the Merriniacs guns and her other gear. At the 
 same time, a working party from the flag-ship Nczv York 
 was detailed for the cable to be run right aft, so that when 
 we should enter the harbor of Santiago, we might be held by 
 an anchor aft as well as fore. 
 
 On that same day, the first of June, at four o'clock in the 
 afternoon, Admiral Sampson on the bridge of the Neiv York 
 signaled to the fleet, asking for volunteers to go in and de- 
 signedly sink the J/rrr/;«rt<; in the entrance to Santiago harbor. 
 
 At the same hour, Mr. Crank, chief engineer of the IMcrri- 
 mac, came down into the engine room along with Lieutenant 
 Hobson, for the purpose of showing him all the connections 
 of the keelson valves on board, which might be of use in as- 
 sisting to sink her. He also showed him the bunker doors 
 which we had opened. When those seven mines, which were 
 hanging over the port side under water, should be connected 
 and exploded, that side of the ship would be blown in, the 
 water would rush through those bunker doors, and fill up fire- 
 room, engine-room, and holds numbers one, two and three. 
 Hold number three had been filled with coal for our own use. 
 It was all gone. We had cut two holes in the wooden bulk- 
 head twenty feet in diameter, which would allow the water to 
 travel from hold number three to holds numbers two and one. 
 So, you see, we were prepared to make a good job o^ it. 
 
SINKING OF THE MERRIMAC. 131 
 
 Now I, Francis Kelly, was present with Mr. Crank and 
 Lieutenant Hobson when all these things were being discussed. 
 After the plan of action had been decided upon, Lieutenant 
 Hobson went up on deck. 
 
 As Mr, Crank still stopped in the engine-room, I asked him 
 if he was going into the harbor with her. He answered that 
 he was going, as far as he knew. By this time it was six 
 o'clock at night. Then I asked Mr. Crank if I could get to 
 go in along with him, as I had heard that our machinist, 
 George Phillips, was going in with him. 
 
 He asked me if I was willing to go. I answered that I 
 certainly was, and that was the reason I had asked him. 
 Then he wanted to know if I realized the job I was about to 
 undertake. I told him I did. Then he took me up from the 
 engine-room to the bridge, where were Commander Miller of 
 the Mej-rijiiac and Lieutenant Hobson. Mr. Crank said to 
 Commander Miller, — " Here is Kelly, the water tender, who 
 wants to go in along with us to help sink the Alcrriuiacy 
 Lieutenant Hobson asked from what ship I came. Mr. Crank 
 told him that I was one of the Mcrrimac' s own crew. Then 
 Lieutenant Hobson said he didn't want any of her own crew ; 
 that the men he wanted were volunteers. Mr. Crank said, " I 
 am going in with her myself, so I would like to have Kelly 
 and Phillips along with me, as they thoroughly understand 
 the work they have got to do. I do not think I could get 
 better men for the same job, as they understand the run of 
 the ship." Then Lieutenant Hobson called me by name. 
 " Kelly, go and get Phillips, as I want to see you together." 
 
 You see, the flag-ship Neiv York was supposed to chase the 
 Merrhnac into the harbor, firing blank shots. This was to 
 blindfold the Spaniards, and make them believe that it was a 
 Spanish ship that the Nciv York was chasing. Such a ship 
 was expected about this time by the Spaniards with provisions 
 for their fleet. In reality, the Nezv York had captured this 
 merchantman several days before. 
 
 When we both came back to Lieutenant Hobson, he gave 
 us the following instructions. The signal, two bells, was to 
 mean that I was to knock the bonnets of the keelson valves 
 and cut the pipes. When this had been done below, I was to 
 
132 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 come on deck, go to the bridge and report to Lieutenant 
 Hobson that I had performed my duty. I was then to lie 
 down on the bridge. Then Lieutenant Hobson was to signal 
 one bell to Phillips, the machinist, to stop the engines. As 
 soon as this was done, I was to leave the bridge, dive overboard 
 and get into a small boat that had been towed alongside the 
 Merrimac. In this boat we were supposed to make good 
 our escape if possible. After I got into the boat, I was to 
 cut away the lines fore and aft which held her to the Merri- 
 mac. By that time Phillips would be up on deck from the 
 engine-room to report to Lieutenant Hobson. I was sup- 
 posed to have pulled the boat about twenty yards from the 
 side of the Merrimac and to be ready to pick up the remainder 
 of the crew. At this time Lieutenant Hobson would give 
 the word of command to let go the two cables as he was put- 
 ting her across the entrance of the harbor, and, by that same 
 command, the rest of the crew were to dive overboard and 
 swim for the small boat which I was keeping ready for them. 
 The crew would not mind the swimming part of it as we were 
 all supposed to be good swimmers. Lieutenant Hobson was 
 to be the last man to leave the Merrimac. He was to stand 
 on the bridge and touch the button which connected the 
 mines hanging on her port side and so explode them. We 
 were also told that if the sinall boat in which the crew was to 
 escape was blown up by the Spanish, we would have to swim 
 over three miles. Now those three miles of water were alive 
 with sharks, and before we could strike the beach it would be 
 necessary for us to pass among all those man-eaters. The 
 clothing we had for that trip was very light, consisting of a 
 pair of pants cut off above the knees, a life belt, a revolver 
 and belt and thirty-six rounds of ammunition well covered 
 with tallow to prevent the water getting to them, and three 
 pairs of stockings. We had to have as many as that on our 
 feet, to keep them from being cut should we have the good 
 luck to get to the beach. These were Lieutenant Hobson's in- 
 structions, knowing that the flag-ship Nciv York would have 
 a steam launch cruising around the entrance of the harbor 
 looking for us. 
 
 On the first of June, at eight o'clock in the evening, Admi- 
 
SINKING OF THE MERRIMAC. 133 
 
 ral Sampson came on board the Merrimac to see how Lieu- 
 tenant Hobson was getting along with the clearing of the 
 ship. He saw that the work was going on pretty well. He 
 also inspected the decks from forward to aft, the mines which 
 the electrician had about finished, and the cable chains, to be 
 sure that they were placed in the right position on deck, that 
 there might be no fouling in their running out. Seeing that 
 everything was all right, he left the Mcj'riniac at 9:30 P. M. 
 I expect that he said that he would be back before we 
 should start to go in, but something happened to his steam 
 launch about one o'clock on the morning of the 2d, when he 
 was returning to the Merrimac for the last time. When he 
 did come on board, he went to the bridge and asked Lieu- 
 tenant Hobson if everything was ready. The answer was, 
 " Yes." Then the Admiral said, " You are rather late this 
 morning." 
 
 Lieutenant Hobson replied, " We can make it, sir." " What 
 time is it?" Lieutenant Hobson took his watch out and 
 went to the starboard side of the bridge, where there was a 
 lamp covered over to keep it from showing light about decks. 
 Then he replied to Admiral Sampson that it was twenty 
 minutes past three. Commander Miller of the Merrimac 
 had been standing on the bridge with them all this time. 
 
 Turning to the Commander, the Admiral said, " I think we 
 will be going." 
 
 Commander Miller said, "Am I not going with the ship?" 
 
 But Admiral Sampson replied, " No, no, we are too old for 
 this cruise. It is one of the most daring that ever was made, 
 and it requires young heroes like Lieutenant Hobson and his 
 crew. We will bid them ' good-night ' and ' God speed.' " 
 Uttering these words to Commander Miller, he shook hands 
 with Lieutenant Hobson and his crew and then went over 
 the gangway. 
 
 Phillips and I were ordered below, and the telegraph was 
 rung half speed ahead by Lieutenant Hobson on the bridge. 
 Ten minutes after we started, daylight came on. Then Ad- 
 miral Sampson sent up signals for us to return. He also sent 
 the torpedo-boat Porter after us and made us come back, 
 Down below we did not know that we were to turn back. 
 
134 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 I was working hard in the fire-room. Mr. Crank, the engi- 
 neer, was also helping me by raking the fires so as to get up 
 as much steam as possible. Mr. Crank made the remark 
 that we were like three rats in a trap, as everything had been 
 closed down on us so that no noise could be heard from the 
 engines. Five minutes later Lieutenant Hobson sent down 
 the chief gunner's mate to tell Mr. Crank that we were to 
 turn back by the orders of Admiral Sampson. The time was 
 four A. M. and the day was just breaking. We steamed to 
 the starboard side of the flag-ship, which lay one mile from 
 us. Mr, Crank gave me orders to draw the fires, which had 
 been made extraordinarily heavy for the purpose of getting 
 high pressure to drive her hard across the channel. We got 
 the fires down to prevent her making any noise that would 
 arouse the suspicions of the Spaniards. This was the second 
 of June. 
 
 That day we lay on the decks wishing that the flag-ship 
 would send us something to eat, as we commenced to feel 
 hungry. We had been up the day before and all that night, 
 and you may believe that there was not much cooked aboard 
 for those two days, because the excitement in regard to the 
 sinking of the ship was working the boys up to a high pitch. 
 
 About ten o'clock in the morning, the Marblchcad steamed 
 alongside of us, and Mr. Crank requested them to send over a 
 machinist and fireman to relieve Phillips and Kelly, so that 
 they might be in working order for the morning of the third. 
 By this time, the Nezv York had a whale boat alongside and 
 took us aboard to get something to eat. That afternoon at 
 four, we lay down and rested till half-past eleven that night. 
 
 At about half-past two, the pilot discovered a light and made 
 the remark, " You are not going to take me any further in, as 
 the Spanish will see the light of the compass through the win- 
 dow of the pilot house." Turning to Lieutenant Hobson he 
 asked him to get something to cover the window, as that would 
 protect the man at the wheel. Lieutenant Hobson, seeing 
 that the pilot was getting scared, said it would be much better 
 to let the steam launch come alongside and get the pilot off the 
 Merrimac^ as the Spaniards knew him well, for he was a 
 Cuban. 
 
SINKING OF THE MERRIMAC. 135 
 
 During this time Lieutenant Hobson had run another sig- 
 nal down to the engine-room. It was a rope. One end was 
 to be made fast to machinist Phillips' arm, so tliat in case the 
 telegraph was blown away by the enemy, one pull of the rope 
 by Lieutenant Hobson would stop the engines and tell me to 
 cut the pipes and let go the keelson bonnets, for the purpose 
 of sinking her. 
 
 We started away, for the second time, into the harbor, 
 about three o'clock on the morning of the third. Just as we 
 were entering, a torpedo boat fired a six-pounder and des- 
 troyed all our steering gear. Lieutenant Hobson ga\'e the 
 signal to stop the engines. At the same moment he also 
 told the man at the wheel to put his helm hard aport. He 
 replied, " Hard aport, sir, but helm will not answer." 
 
 During this time I was cutting away the pipes. Before this, 
 I had heard the shooting, and one shot had come through the 
 plates into the fire-room. I had gone into the engine-room 
 and asked Phillips if he heard the shooting. He said, yes, 
 and that it was the Nczv York, for, you remember, the Nciv 
 York was to pretend to chase us. Then I said that it was a 
 very funny blank shot to come through the plates, for the 
 ball went right past me. 
 
 Then Phillips went on deck to set off his mine, leaving me 
 below to cut the pipes yet remaining. This was a very hard 
 thing to do, because all this time there was heavy firing and 
 the shots were coming into the engine-room and the force of 
 the water knocked me down below the platform. I had a 
 hard time to get out again, there being no light in the engine- 
 room. When I did get out, I had a curious feeling on me. 
 Hearing so much firing, I did not know what minute one of 
 those shots might penetrate the boilers, and there was twenty- 
 five pounds more of steam on than she was tested for. Dur- 
 ing all this time I had not seen any water in the starboard 
 boilers. As the steam was still rising, I thought of starting 
 the auxiliary pump, but then it seemed as if I might as well 
 take my chances and put water into the boilers. I expected 
 to be killed as soon as I went on deck anyhow, hearing such 
 terrible shooting, and might as well get blown up by the 
 boilers down below. So I opened the feed check on the star- 
 
136 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 board boiler and started the fire pump and, leaving it working, 
 proceeded on deck. 
 
 I had not seen Phillips since he went up to set off his mine 
 and thought I might find him lying down somewhere near the 
 place where we were all to meet. This place was on the star- 
 board side of the spar deck. But you could not see or hear 
 anything for the rapid firing. So I crawled along the deck 
 on my hands and knees, thinking that every moment would 
 be my last, until I got alongside the mine which I was to set 
 off. This was mine number seven. Near it was a life belt 
 and a revolver which I was to put on. Then I got hold of 
 the wire which I was to connect and found the insulation on. 
 As I had lost my knife, I had to tear it off with my teeth, so 
 that it could be set off. No sooner had I set the mine off 
 than a shell from the western battery struck the main mast 
 and exploded. A piece of it struck me over the left eye and 
 on the mouth. Both my legs also were struck, and I was 
 knocked flat on the deck. My wounds were slight. As there 
 was no decrease in the firing, I thought that it was all up with 
 me now. Finally I got on my feet and made toward the en- 
 gine-room, looking for Phillips, but I could not see him. I 
 did see that the pressure of the steam was gaining, and opened 
 up the connection doors of the boilers to reduce the steam. 
 I did not know at what moment they would explode, for the 
 water was rushing all about. Then I went up on deck again 
 to go to the place where we were to assemble. The boat in 
 which we were to make our escape had been blown away by 
 the enemy. This made the men get together in another part 
 of the ship, I did not know this, as I saw the block in its 
 place as if the boat had been unhooked. As it was twenty 
 minutes since Phillips and I had seen each other. Lieutenant 
 Hobson thought that I must have been killed down below. 
 
 The Spaniards were all the time firing away, as I wandered 
 about the decks alone. Then the thought struck me to 
 make for the bridge. As I was on the starboard side close to 
 the machinist's mess room, I heard a voice, but where, I could 
 not tell. Then I overheard some one say, "That is Kelly." 
 I went through a mass of smoke calling out, " Hallo, where 
 are you ? '' The answer came, " Come alongside of the bunker 
 hatch." Just at that moment a shell from Morro battery ex- 
 
SINKING OF THE MERRIMAC. i37 
 
 ploded all around me, but none of it touched me, I got 
 alongside the rest of the men and they told me to lie down 
 with them. Some one asked me if I had been wounded, as 
 they had seen the shell burst all around me, I said, yes, that 
 over by the mine I got pelted in the eye and mouth and legs. 
 One of the men said to me, " You were lucky, as Lieutenant 
 Hobson and I were on the point of shooting you. We 
 thought you must be a Spaniard who had gotten on board, 
 for we were sure you had been killed down below when you 
 didn't turn up sooner." Lieutenant Hobson asked me if I 
 had gone down into the engine-room to see if Phillips had 
 been there, as I could not find him or any one on deck. He 
 also asked me how things were down below. I answered him 
 that the water was blowing freely. At this time they were 
 firing away strong at us from the western battery, and one 
 shot had struck the smokestack and whistle, tearing them 
 away. As the steam was escaping, I was satisfied that the 
 boilers would not explode, knowing that there was an inde- 
 pendent valve from each boiler connected with this pipe. 
 That was the only thing which was in my mind while lying 
 on deck. 
 
 Then the enemy began to explode the submarine mines, and 
 one of them struck on her starboard side, giving her a list to 
 port. Lieut. Hobson said, " They are helping us to sink her, 
 lads." This was about a hundred yards from the entrance to the 
 harbor. The next mine that struck her was the final blow which 
 lifted her bodily eight feet out of the water. Then the water 
 rushed with terrific force and washed us along the deck forward 
 and then aft again, washing some of the men overboard. It 
 washed me into a bunker, I thought it was all up with me, 
 but kicked until the ship settled to the bottom and then shot 
 up like a rocket. I was very nearly used up from the amount 
 of water I drank, but the life belt assisted me in my struggle. 
 When I looked about to see where I was, I noticed a lot of 
 wreckage floating around. Striking out, I got hold of a 
 scuttle bucket. I heard the Spaniards cheering. They still 
 kept firing at everything they saw. During the time that I 
 was hanging on to the bucket, I was wondering if all my com- 
 rades were drowned, I could see none of them. But soon I 
 heard some one calling to me, " Come over this way," The 
 
138 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH VVAiL. 
 
 voice came from outside tlie catamaran, so I dived off the 
 scuttle bucket and came up alongside Lieut. Hobson. He 
 asked me if I was all right. I said, " Yes, but I feel a little 
 shaky." 
 
 By this time they had stopped firing at the Mcrriviac. I 
 should think that the time from their starting firing till they 
 finished was about thirty-five minutes. We still remained 
 hanging on to the float for an hour and a half. We saw the 
 Spanish soldiers running about the beach with signal lamps. 
 As daylight came on, the Spaniards saw us from the lighting 
 tops of the Reina Mercedes. Then Lieut. Hobson discovered 
 the steam launch of the Cristobal Colon coming toward us. 
 He said, " Lads, they see us." They came within fifteen yards 
 of us and challenged all of us in Spanish. Lieut. Hobson an- 
 swered them in Spanish. Then the officers of the launch gave 
 orders to the Spanish marines to get ready. One of our men, 
 Dan Montague, called out, " They are going to fire on us," 
 At that moment Lieut. Hobson said, " I give myself up as a 
 prisoner of war, also the men with me, under the flag of truce." 
 That was for them to notify the flag-ship that we were safe. 
 So then the Spanish officers told us to give up our arms, and 
 Lieut. Hobson told us to swim for the launch. At that mo- 
 ment we cast loose our belts and revolvers and let them over- 
 board, sooner than allow the Spaniards to get them. Then 
 we went on board the steam launch one by one. They 
 stripped us of our life belts, dumping them overboard and 
 leaving us with only the trunk of our overalls. I can assure 
 you that we were pretty well exhausted by being so long in 
 the water. The steam launch took us to the Reina Mercedes. 
 As soon as we went aboard, all the Spanish crew ran from for- 
 ward to aft to see the American prisoners. Surely we were 
 pretty wild-looking men, with nothing on but plenty of grease 
 and a half pair of pants. This was about half-past six o'clock 
 the morning of the third. Lieut. Hobson was taken to the 
 cabin and we got supplied with the articles asked for. 
 
 During this time our launch had been cruising around look- 
 ing for us. When the Spaniards spied her from the fort, they 
 began firing at her. Then the New York sent three shells at 
 the Reina Mercedes and these landed very close to where we 
 were standing washing ourselves. At once the Spaniards 
 
SINKING OF THE MERRIMAC. 139 
 
 sounded " Quarters " and flew to their guns, thinking that 
 there was going to be a battle. Some of us commenced to 
 laugh at them, which made them mad, but we did not care, 
 for we thought that there was something worse in store for 
 us. 
 
 About nine o'clock that same morning, Admiral Cervera 
 gave orders that we should be removed from the ship to the 
 cells in Morro Castle, The launch put us ashore, and we had 
 about a mile and a half to walk on a bad road and in our bare 
 feet. When we reached the Castle the Commander ordered 
 Lieut. Hobson to be taken to a cell by himself, then turned 
 and shook hands with us all, at the same time pointing out 
 our cells to us. These were not inviting. The smell was 
 like that of a pig-sty, but we were pretty tired, so we lay 
 down and commenced to think how we all had escaped with 
 our lives. I passed the remark that our time had not yet 
 come. Shortly after this, they opened the cell door and 
 brought some rice and olive oil and horse beans and black 
 bread and wine. The fare was not very good but there was 
 no use in kicking. 
 
 At three o'clock that same day, they opened the cell door 
 and told us all to come out. Some of us thought we were 
 going to be shot, but they took to Lieut. Hobson 's cell, uniform 
 cloth which had been sent from the flag-ship. There had 
 also been sent tobacco, and money in case of hunger. Lieut. 
 Hobson told the English consul to buy us each a hammock 
 and a blanket. With these, we returned to our cell. Then we 
 started to smoke, hearty and glad to know that they knew 
 that we were safe. 
 
 On the second day, the bombarding began. Some stray 
 shots came close to the cell where we were. The sentry, who 
 was guarding us, ran away. The sergeant of the guard got 
 hold of him and kicked him back to his post. He went down 
 on his knees and began to pray while the mortar and bricks 
 were flying thickly around him and in through the window 
 and door of the cell. 
 
 On the morning of the sixth of June, they came to the cell 
 and wakened us, telling us to get dressed, as we were to be 
 removed from Morro Castle to the prison in the town, about 
 six miles away. When we were all ready, they formed a 
 
I40 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 guard of thirty soldiers. There was also a sergeant and one 
 officer. We were made to go in single file with fifteen of the 
 guard in front and fifteen behind. They marched us over 
 hills and railroad tracks for the purpose of fooling us in regard 
 to the roads. When we had marched about three miles they 
 handed us over to another guard, a body of sixteen men, a 
 sergeant and an officer, who took us the rest of the way. 
 Along the road the women were crying, thinking that we were 
 going to be shot. When we got to the city, Lieut. Hobson 
 was put by himself and the seven of us into one cell, with cots 
 in it. We were taken out in the day time. Every morning 
 they used to let two of us out at a time to wash, with a guard 
 of sixteen men forming a square around us while we washed. 
 
 During all this time they did not believe that we belonged 
 to the navy, but thought that we had been engaged outside 
 the navy for the purpose of sinking the Merrimac. They 
 thought that navy men would not do such a deed. Every day 
 for about eight days, some of the Spaniards would come to 
 our cell, making motions with their hands as if firing a gun, and 
 saying that in about two hours we should be shot. This con- 
 tinued until the English consul put a stop to it. We also made 
 a report to the English consul in regard to the complement of 
 bread with which we were served. Some days we would get 
 two ounces, other days three, with rice and beans and olive 
 oil all mixed up together. Besides this, there was a sardine 
 and a half for each man and two bottles of wine. That was 
 our living during our stay. But the English consul brought 
 us eighty-five biscuits, which cost twenty cents apiece, some 
 sugar and some coffee. He told us he could not do any more, 
 as there was nothing else in the place. 
 
 Then I took the fever and so did Dan Montague. We had 
 it badly. A Spanish doctor visited us every morning. He 
 always complained of the very bad smell in the cell. There 
 was but one opening about eighteen inches square. That 
 was all the ventilation we had. Exercise we had none. At 
 last the English consul requested the general to remove us to 
 a place where we could get more fresh air, saying that we should 
 all be down with the fever. So they removed us to another 
 block, which looked like a prison and a hospital and barracks. 
 There we had plenty of fresh air and a new doctor to attend 
 
SINKING OF THE MERRIMAC. 141 
 
 us who could speak good English. We began to recover our 
 strength under the treatment he gave us. But they never 
 let us out of this place to wash. They sent water in to us. 
 They would not allow us to walk about the cell and told us 
 to sit on our cots. 
 
 On the morning of the 25th of July, about seven o'clock, 
 the doctor came in and told us that he had been ordered to 
 notify us that we were to be exchanged that day. He said 
 that we might as well be ready about two o'clock. But no 
 one came until three o'clock the next day. Then it was the 
 doctor who made his appearance and wondered why we were 
 not gone. At eight o'clock that night the aide-de-camp of 
 the general came and asked if we had any complaints to make 
 against any of the officers for anything that had happened 
 while we had been in prison. We said no, but alas, we had plenty 
 of them to make ! At seven the next morning, the doctor 
 and the aide-de-camp both came and notified us from the gen- 
 eral that we were to be exchanged at ten o'clock that day. 
 Then the doctor shook hands with us all, saying that war was 
 a bad thing and that they were going to have a battle at five 
 o'clock that evening, and added, " Perhaps you will be fight- 
 ing against us." Again he told us to be ready at ten o'clock. 
 We said that we would not accept the exchange unless Hob- 
 son was to be released with us. Then an officer came with 
 handkerchiefs and blindfolded us, leading us to the place of 
 exchange. We sat there about half an hour, until our officer 
 brought the ten Spanish prisoners to exchange for the eight 
 Americans. But the Spaniards would accept only man for 
 man. We were then taken to the American lines and were 
 received with loud cheering. We had another hearty cheering 
 and reception when we got on board the Nciv York^t Siboney. 
 
 This is the true statement of the sinking of the JMerriniac 
 and of our imprisonment in Morro Castle and in Santiago. 
 
CHAPTER VI. 
 THE STORY OF THE TEXAS. 
 
 HER PART IN THE NAVAL BATTLE OF SANTIAGO. 
 
 CYRUS S. RADFORD, Lieut. U. S. Marines. 
 R. K. CRANK, Ass't Engineer, U. S. N. 
 
 BEFORE proceeding to describe the naval battle of Santi- 
 ago, the precautions taken by Admiral Sampson to 
 make the blockade of Santiago effective and to pre- 
 vent the escape, by day or by night, of any of the enemy's 
 vessels, should be noted. 
 
 On June 2nd, the day after his arrival off Santiago, Admiral 
 Sampson issued an " Order of Battle." By this order, the 
 American naval force was divided into the First and Second 
 Squadrons. The First Squadron, under Admiral Sampson, 
 comprised the Nezv York, loiva, Oregon, Nciv Orleans, May- 
 flozver and Porter. The Second Squadron, under Commodore 
 Schley, comprised the Brooklyn, Massachusetts, Texas, Mar- 
 blchead and Vixen. These ships were stationed on a semi- 
 circle around the Morro, a fort at the entrance of the harbor 
 on the east, each ship lying six miles from the entrance, the 
 ships on the extreme east and west keeping two miles 
 from shore. At night the vessels were to close in nearer. 
 The accompanying sketch shows the arrangement of the ships 
 under this first order. The First Squadron was on the east, 
 the Second Squadron on the west, of the entrance. The Ad- 
 miral also said : " If the enemy tries to escape, the ships must 
 close in and engage as soon as possible, and endeavor to sink 
 his vessels or force them to run ashore in the channel." 
 
 On June 7th, when the dark nights came on, the Admiral 
 adopted the following plan for night blockade ; three armed 
 picket-launches were stationed at dark at a distance of one 
 
144 
 
 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 mile from the Morro, one launch to the east, one to the west 
 and one south of the entrance. Outside of the launches, at a 
 distance of two miles from the Morro and disposed in a simi- 
 lar manner, were stationed, naming from west to east, the 
 Vixen, the Sinvance and the Do/phiii, the eastern and western 
 vessels being about three-fourths of a mile from shore. The 
 larger remaining vessels, in their regular blockading order, lay 
 four miles from the entrance. 
 
 On June 8th, the loiva, Oregon and MassaeJnisetts took turns 
 of two hours each, in keeping a search-light on the entrance 
 
 ///. — Picket launches. 
 
 b. — Guard ship. 
 
 s. — Search-light ship. 
 
 Disposition of vessels for night blockade according to Admiral's 
 last order. 
 
 of the harbor. This proving to be a success, these ships were 
 ordered to go in, each in turn for two hours, to a distance of 
 two miles and keep the beam of a search-light directly up the 
 narrow harbor entrance, taking care not to expose the picket 
 launches. On June I2th, the blockading distance was re- 
 duced to three miles in the daytime and to two miles at night. 
 After the landing of the Army, when the position of the 
 
THE STORY OF THE TEXAS. 
 
 145 
 
 enemy became critical, one battle-ship always lay in the 
 shadow near the ship that was using the search-light, with the 
 men at the guns, ready for immediate action. 
 
 The morning of Sunday, July 3rd, 1898, was slightly 
 cloudy and sultry. The ships of the American blockading 
 squadron lay in their usual positions around the harbor-mouth 
 of Santiago, anticipating nothing beyond the usual, quiet, un- 
 eventful day of routine duties. The ships lay, as they had 
 done for weeks in compliance with the order of Admiral 
 Sampson, in a large semi-circle, with the Morro for its center. 
 The little Vixen lay farthest to the west and closest in shore ; 
 
 .vixC<* 
 
 %MArrKJwe( 
 
 ^MAAeuHCAO 
 
 %NC«' ORIEAN} 
 
 
 
 
 Blockading positions of ships according to Admiral's order of 
 June 2nd. These were relatively the positions in wliich the ships 
 lay on July 3rd, except that the distance from the Morro was three 
 miles instead of six. 
 
 then came the Brooklyn, — she was out of position, outside 
 the semi-circle and about 7,000 yards distance from the 
 Morro; almost due east of the Brooklyn, and 5,100 yards 
 S. S. W. from the Morro, lay the Texas ; she was heading 
 nearly east, with her port broadside to the shore. To the 
 east of the Texas and in the order named came the lozva, Oregon 
 and Indiana. These ships lay in their positions on the semi- 
 
146 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 circle ; they were about two thousand yards apart and each 
 ship headed towards the Morro, as had been ordered by the 
 Admiral. Close inshore to the eastward lay the converted 
 yacht Gloucester ; she was about 4,300 yards from the Morro. 
 The flag-ship Neiv York had left her blockading station about 
 nine o'clock to go to Siboney, where the Admiral was to have 
 a consultation with General Shafter ; the Massaehusetts had 
 gone earlier in the morning to Guantanamo to coal. Pur- 
 suant to orders, the remaining ships had closed in to fill up 
 the gaps in the blockading line. The torpedo-boat Eriesson 
 and the converted yacht Hornet lay about six miles to the 
 eastward of the Morro. 
 
 The usual Sunday-morning muster and inspection had been 
 omitted to give the men a chance to rest ; and as the chaplain 
 was ill, there had been no prayers on the quarter deck, as was 
 customary. Most of the men were lying around the decks. 
 Shortly before 9:30 A. M., moving columns of smoke were 
 seen back of the hills to the west of the harbor-mouth. There 
 was but little breeze and the smoke went straight up. It had 
 become an instinctive habit and almost second nature to 
 watch the Morro and the harbor; and nothing that was visible 
 in the direction of the entrance escaped notice. It was 
 thought from the columns of smoke, that some of the ships 
 inside were changing their position ; it was l^ped, no doubt, 
 by many, that the Spanish ships were coming out. Very soon 
 after the smoke was first observed, the black bow of a big 
 ship was seen poking out of the channel to the east of Smith 
 Cay. 
 
 Almost simultaneously, signal guns w^ere fired from the 
 lozva and Oregon ; and the signal, 250, "The enemy's vessels 
 are escaping," was hoisted on all our ships. On the Texas, 
 some one shouted down through the ward-room hatch, " They're 
 coming out ! " and a moment later the general alarm sounded. 
 It is hard to describe one's emotions at this time. There was 
 a feeling of intense but suppressed excitement and of mo- 
 mentary doubt that the Spaniards were really coming out ; 
 and there was a desire on the part of nearly every one to 
 verify, by the testimony of his own eyes, the stupendous fact 
 that the jong.awailed enemy was at last coming out to meet 
 
v/^t<^. ^^ 
 
 V ^.^. A- 
 
THE STORY OF THE TEXAS. 147 
 
 us ; but with all, I think, there was a feeling of elation over the 
 fact that the enemy was coming. One felt as if the time of 
 his life — or at least, of his naval life, — had come. 
 
 In a moment, all was activity aboard. The ships were al- 
 ready cleared for action and ammunition was kept in readiness 
 near the guns. We were practically ready for battle at any 
 time. The men instinctively went to their stations. They 
 had almost lived at the guns for five weeks. As the engines 
 were moved frequently to keep the ship in position, the fires 
 were kept in good condition, heavy and covered over, a third 
 of them being cleaned every watch, as is usual at sea. The 
 steam pressure was always kept up to the highest working- 
 pressure. The officer-of-the-deck shouted down the speaking 
 tube : " For God's sake give us all the steam you can ! 
 They're coming out ! " Then came the slamming down of 
 battle-hatches, shutting out the last ray of natural light from 
 the compartments below the protective deck ; the shutting of 
 water-tight doors ; the calls of the men in the handling-rooms 
 and at the ammunition hoists ; the hurrying of feet as the 
 men went to their stations ; the clanging of the general alarm ; 
 — all apparent confusion, yet all perfect system and order. 
 The ships were sighted and the general alarm was sounded at 
 9:35 ; just three minutes afterwards, we began firing with our 
 port guns. The Spaniards said that they had expected to 
 surprise us at prayers ; what a cruel disappointment ! 
 
 The leading ship of the enemy came out rapidly, firing with 
 her big gun as she cleared Socapa Point, probably at the 
 Brooklyn or the Texas ; the shell fell short. The forts opened 
 fire simultaneously. 
 
 The leading vessel of the enemy was soon followed by 
 three others; they came out rapidly, running apparently at 
 about nine knots. We now know that the order in which the 
 enemy came out was as follows: 1st, the Maria Teresa, fly- 
 ing the flag of Admiral Cervera ; 2nd, the Viscaya ; 3rd, the 
 Cristobal Colon; 4th, the Almirante Oquendo. As soon as 
 the Maria Teresa cleared the mouth of the harbor, she turned 
 sharply to the west and ran full speed close inshore, the other 
 vessels following in her wake at intervals of about 500 or 600 
 yards. 
 
148 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 The ships of our squadron that were lying to the eastward 
 of the Texas, as well as the Brooklyn, were headed towards 
 the Morro, so that they had only to go ahead at full speed, 
 as they did, to close in on the enemy. The Texas was 
 headed towards the east, and as soon as the enemy was 
 sighted, she went ahead full speed with both engines and with 
 the helm hard-a-starboard so as to swing around to the west ; 
 as she swung, the port guns were fired as rapidly as passible, 
 the turret gun being fired. 
 
 The other vessels of our force, with the exception of the 
 Vixen, headed full speed for the enemy, firing with their main 
 and secondary batteries as they closed in. The Vixen was 
 lying close inshore, about 5,300 yards west of the Morro, 
 and right in the path of the enemy's ships. Had she re- 
 mained there she would have been caught between the shore 
 and the enemy's ships, or between the enemy's line of 
 battle and our ships, and exposed to the fire of both ; so 
 she very properly and promptly hustled seawards, going be- 
 yond the Brooklyn's first position, and ran parallel to our 
 ships and outside of them during the engagement. The 
 Gloucester, lying a little to the eastward of the Morro and 
 about a mile and a half off shore, headed at full-speed for 
 the enemy, firing as she approached ; she began firing at 
 about 3,500 yards and soon reduced her distance to less than 
 3,000 yards, when she slowed down to wait lor the two Span- 
 ish torpedo destroyers in case they should come out. 
 
 As soon as they cleared the entrance, the enemy's ships 
 opened a very rapid, fierce fire on our ships. At first their 
 range seemed to be fairly good ; but later, as the action 
 became closer, all their shells seemed to go too high. The 
 fire from our ships was also very rapid. As we knew very 
 closely the distance at which our ships had been lying from 
 the Morro at the beginning of the fight, and hence knew very 
 closely the range at which to fire, our fire at first must have 
 been very accurate, — as indeed, was subsequently proved to 
 be the case. A very light breeze was blowing from the shore, 
 and the smoke hung in heavy clouds over our ships and was 
 blown back into the faces of the men at the guns, seriously 
 interfering with our fire. This same smoke however, forming 
 
THE STORY OF THE TEXAS. 149 
 
 as it did, a grayish-white background for the lead-color of 
 our ships, must have made it very difficult for the enemy to 
 see us well. The black hulls of their ships stood out plainly 
 through the smoke of their guns. 
 
 When the four large vessels of the enemy were well clear 
 of the harbor-mouth and the rear one had gotten about 1,500 
 yards to the westward of the Morro, the destroyers /Y///^// and 
 Furor made their appearance and turned to the west to follow 
 in the wake of the other vessels. This was shortly before ten 
 o'clock. The Gloucester, in anticipation of the coming out of 
 the destroyers, had slowed down to wait for them, keeping up 
 a deliberate fire on the enemy's cruisers in the meanwhile. 
 As soon as the destroyers appeared the Gloucester opened a 
 rapid fire on them and closed in on them at full speed. 
 
 At ten o'clock, then, all of the enemy's vessels were well 
 out of and away from the harbor-mouth and steaming at full 
 speed to the west. The leading vessel was half a mile south 
 east of the entrance to Cabanas Bay,— a small bay about two 
 miles to the westward of the Morro. The interval between 
 the enemy's ships was about 500 or 600 yards. The Pluton 
 and Furor were close inshore and about half a mile west 
 of the entrance of Santiago. Our ships that were at first 
 lying to the east of the Morro had closed in rapidly. The 
 Gloucester had arrived at a point just about south of the 
 Morro. The Indiana, steaming almost due west, had come 
 up to a point about 2,500 yards southeast of the Morro. The 
 Oregon, heading at first northwest, had swung around to the 
 westward and had come up rapidly until she was nearly 
 abreast of the Texas. The loiva, at first headed almost due 
 north, had also swung around to the westward, and was on 
 the starboard beam of the Oregon. The Texas had swung 
 around in a big circle to port, with starboard helm, until she 
 was now heading west, with the loiva and Oregon on her star- 
 board quarter. The Brooklyn, heading northeast and running 
 directly for the enemy, would have crossed the bows of the 
 Texas, had she (the Brooklyn^ continued on her course ; but, 
 putting her helm hard-a-port, the Brooklyn swung around to 
 the eastward almost directly in the course that the Texas was 
 taking. Continuing to swing with a port helm, the Brooklyn 
 
15© THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 made almost a complete circle, finally standing off to the west 
 on a course 'parallel to that of the enemy's vessels. As the 
 Brooklyn swung, she ran directly across the bows of the Texas ; 
 the Texas was forced to slow and stop until the Brooklyn had 
 passed out of the way. About this time, while the Texas 
 was slowed or stopped, the Oregon passed her on the star- 
 board side, running between the Iowa and the Texas and 
 blanketing the fire of the Texas. This was a little after ten 
 o'clock. This manoeuvre on the part of the Oregon was ex- 
 tremely dangerous in the smoke and confusion of the battle. 
 It is said that one of her 6-inch-gun captains had the lock 
 string of his gun in his hand, waiting for a favorable oppor- 
 tunity to fire into the Texas at point-blank range. With the 
 Oregon on the starboard bow and the loiva on the starboard 
 quarter, the Texas was at the focus of the enemy's fire, — in a 
 very fair position to receive the shells of the enemy directed 
 at these other two vessels. It was at this time that the shells 
 from the enemy were flying most thickly and rapidly over 
 the decks of the Texas. It is probable that the 6-inch shell 
 that struck and burst just outside the smoke-pipe, in the air- 
 trunk to the forced-draft blowers, came aboard at this time. 
 
 The Nezv York had gotten under way from Siboney at the 
 beginning of the fight. At first she could make only eight 
 knots, having only a fraction of her boiler power in use, but she 
 gradually increased her speed and was coming up slowly astern. 
 The torpedo-boat Ericsson had also gotten under way at the 
 beginning of the fight and ran up in time to overhaul easily 
 all the ships; she stopped to assist the loiva in picking up 
 the men of the Vizcaya after that ship had been beached. The 
 action began at a range, forthe7>;ir(^i-, of about 4,500 yards. At 
 9:45, the range given out on the Texas was 3,200 yards. Shortly 
 afterwards, a range of 2,600 yards was given out. This was 
 the last range given. 
 
 The perpendicular distance between the enemy's column 
 and our own column was about 2,200 yards; this was because 
 we were firing at the enemy forward of the beam. 
 
 The Oregon passed the Texas, and running ahead, engaged 
 the two leading vessels of the enemy with the Brooklyn. The 
 Texas and Iowa devoted themselves to the last two vessels of 
 
THE STORY OF THE TEXAS. 151 
 
 the enemy. The destroyers received the concentrated fire of 
 the secondary batteries of the Texas, Oregon, loiva, Lidiana 
 and Gloucester. The fire directed on these two, the Pbitoii and 
 Furor, was something terrible ; the water around them fairly 
 foamed from the rain of rapid-fire shells that struck near them. 
 A big shell — whether from one of the 12-inch guns of the lozva 
 that was fired at one of the boats or from the after 6-inch gun 
 of the Texas, that was also fired at one of the boats, no one 
 knows — struck one of the destroyers, cutting her nearly in 
 two. The other boat was cut to pieces by shell. The Glouces- 
 ter followed the destroyers closely, though she was exposed 
 to the fire of the larger vessels of the enemy that were in the 
 rear. 
 
 About 10:15, the two leading vessels of the enemy were about 
 one and a half miles west of the mouth of Cabanas Bay. Un- 
 til ten o'clock the order of the enemy's vessels was as follows: 
 1st, Maria Teresa; 2nd, Vizcaya ; 3rd, Colon; 4th, Oquendo. 
 Between 10 and 10:15, this order was changed. The l^izcaya, 
 keeping her course, had taken the lead. The Colon, passing 
 inshore of the Teresa, followed on the starboard quarter of the 
 Vizcaya, and at some time, the Oquendo passed the Teresa. 
 Our ships were enveloped in smoke and were very hotly en- 
 gaged with the enemy about this stage of the fight ; so it is 
 very difficult, if not impossible, to say with certainty just 
 what happened. At 10:15, the position of our ships was this : 
 The Brooklyn was the farthest offshore, abreast of the leading 
 vessel of the enemy ; the Oregon followed closer inshore and 
 about on the starboard quarter of the Brooklyn ; the Oregon was 
 500 yards or more closer to the enemy than the Brooklyn, i. e., 
 about 3,000 yards from them ; the Texas was just astern of 
 the Oregon and about 1,000 yards behind the Oregon and 
 about abreast of the third of the enemy's vessels ; the lozva 
 was on the starboard quarter of the Texas diud about 400 yards 
 astern of her; the India)ia perhaps a mile and a quarter 
 astern of the lozua ; the Gloucester dhowi half a mile southeast 
 of Cabanas Bay, engaging the destroyers, which were just off 
 the mouth of the bay. These hours given are approximately 
 accurate. 
 
 The destroyers were the first of the enemy's vessels to be 
 
152 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 knocked out. The explosion on the Furor occasioned by a 
 big shell, most probably from the lozva, which was the first 
 visible sign of disaster in the enemy's squadron, took place 
 about 10:17 ; and the Fjiror sank in deep water a little to the 
 west of Cabanas (about one mile). A great cloud of steam 
 and smoke ascended from the Furor as she exploded. Siie 
 stopped and sheered in toward the beach, firing her guns to 
 the last. When the smoke cleared away, only the Pluton was 
 to be seen. The Phiton slowed after the Furor exploded. 
 Soon after, there was an explosion on the Pluton and she 
 steered wildly, being apparently unmanageable; she did, how- 
 ever, get close inshore and was beached in the surf on the 
 rocks. The destroyers went down about 10:22. 
 
 The action was probably hottest from ten o'clock until the 
 Teresa and Oquendo were beached. The enemy's vessels 
 kept up a continuous and very rapid fire. Numbers of their 
 shells, both large and small, passed over the Texas. Their 
 fire was not so rapid as ours, however. Roughly, the Brooklyn 
 and the Oregon were engaged with the Viscaya and the Colo)i 
 after 10:15 ; and the Texas and lozva with the Oquendo and 
 Maria Teresa. At ten minutes past ten, the Maria Teresa 
 the third of the enemy's vessels in column, was seen to be 
 sheering in towards the beach ; she seemed to be on fire for- 
 ward before she headed in. But this smoke was probably 
 due to an explosion, as it seemed to clear away soon, after 
 which she at once headed for the beach. To those on the 
 American ships astern, it looked as if she were coming back to 
 aid the Oquendo, which was now the last ship in the column, 
 and, because of this position, had been receiving the concen- 
 trated fire of the Texas and lozva and probably also of the 
 Indiana. The Oquendo went on a short distance past the 
 Teresa and then herself headed in towards the beach. These 
 two ships beached in a small cove called Nima-Nima, about six 
 miles west of Morro : they went ashore about 500 to 800 yards 
 apart and almost simultaneously. This was at 10:35. The 
 Teresa hoisted a white flag. The Oquendo simply struck her 
 colors. 
 
 The Cristobal had gained steadily on the Vizcaya, and about 
 the time that the first two ships were beached, she passed in- 
 
THE STORY OF THE TEXAS. 153 
 
 shore and ahead of the ]^i::caya. They were a mile and a half 
 beyond Nima-Nima at 10:35. The Brooklyn was well on the 
 port quarter of the leading ship of the enemy and well off- 
 shore (about sixty-five hundred yards). The Oregon followed 
 on the starboard quarter of the Brooklyn, about half a mile 
 closer inshore. The Texas followed in the wake of the Ore- 
 gon and about a mile astern of her ; the loiva was close on the 
 starboard quarter of the Texas; the Indiana was about a mile 
 astern of the Texas. The running fight continued. The two 
 fleeing Spaniards replied rather weakly to the fire of our ships, 
 which was concentrated on the Vtaeaya. The Texas was fir- 
 ing at a range of 6,400 yards. This rather dispirited fight con- 
 tinued for about seven miles. The ]^i::caya must have suf- 
 fered severely from the fire of these four ships, the Brooklyn, 
 Oregon, Texas and lozoa. At 10:55, the Vi.zeaya sheered in 
 towards the beach, on fire forward and aft, and in a very short 
 time she hauled down her colors (11:05). She was enveloped 
 in clouds of thick smoke that came from her decks and sides ; 
 through the smoke patches of flame could be seen. Her 
 men were to be seen lowering boats, and many jumped over- 
 board. The Texas was abeam of the [7^<:7riv? about 11:30. 
 About this time, there was a terrific explosion on the Viacaya 
 and our men burst into cheers. The Vi:^eaya went ashore at 
 Acerradero, about fifteen miles west of the Morro. The Iowa 
 dropped out of the chase here, and remained to pick up the 
 ofificers and men of the Viaeaya ; she was out of the fight 
 from this time, as was also the Indiana. The Ne70 York was 
 gaining slowly and coming up astern, increasing her speed all 
 the time. 
 
 The Colon had increased her lead and was now doing her 
 best to escape. She was closely followed by the Brooklyn and 
 Oregon. The Texas followed about four miles astern of the 
 Oregon. The speed was about sixteen knots and at times it 
 must have run nearly two knots higher. The Brooklyn shaped 
 her course so as gradually to force the Colon to run ashore 
 The Brooklyn was about a mile farther offshore than the Ore- 
 gon, which held a parallel course. The Texas was headed for 
 the Colon. The Brooklyn was firing from her 8-inch guns. 
 The greater number of the shells fell short, a few going over 
 
154 
 
 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 the Colon. The chase continued from 11:30 until 1:20, the 
 Brooklyn gradually edging the Colon in towards the beach and 
 the Oregon hauling up astern. As there was a point of land 
 (Cape Cruz) in plain sight, and as the Brooklyn was heading di- 
 rectly for it, it soon became evident that the Colon must turn 
 out seaward or run ashore on this point, if the Brooklyn did 
 not intercept her before the point was reached. After the 
 Vizcaya was beached and we had ceased firing on her, there 
 was no further firing until about 12:45. We had been gaining 
 on her all the time, even the Texas being in the push. About 
 12:45, the Oregon fired two heavy shells at the Colon, \\\\\q\\ 
 fell short. The Oregon s next shot fell very close. The Brook- 
 lyn tried a few shots, which fell far short on account of the 
 great distance from the Colon. It is probable that the com- 
 manding ofificer of the Colon had decided that the game was 
 up and was simply looking for a good place to beach his ship. 
 His case was hopeless. The shells from the Oregon were 
 splashing close around his ship, the Neiv York was coming up 
 rapidly astern and the Brooklyn could have headed him off 
 had he turned to seaward. So the Colon was seen to slacken 
 her speed about one o'clock, and at 1:20 she ran on the beach 
 and surrendered. The Texas hoisted the signal : " The 
 enemy's vessel has surrendered," and Captain Philip called all 
 liands aft for silent prayer. The Colon surrendered to Com- 
 modore Schley, who signalled 'to \.\s.q Neiv York: "We have 
 gained a great victory ; details will be communicated later." 
 
 
 u 
 
 y^^-^^.^V.^^.vT. A., 
 
CHAPTER VII. 
 THE NAVAL BATTLE OF SANTIAGO. 
 
 BY 
 
 Capt. ROBLEY D. EVANS, U. S. N. 
 
 ON May 19, 1898, the Spanish Admiral, Pascual Cervera y 
 Topete, had entered the harbor of Santiago, on the 
 south side of the Island of Cuba, with the fast 
 armored cruisers Infanta Maria Teresa, Vizcaya, Alinirantc 
 Oquendo and Cristobal Colon, together with the sea-going 
 torpedo boats Furor and Phiton. 
 
 On Sunday morning, July 3, 1898, the American fleet, com- 
 manded by Rear-Admiral W. T. Sampson, was blockading the 
 harbor of Santiago. The entrance to the harbor was de- 
 fended by numerous batteries, none of sufficient strength to 
 endanger the blockading fleet, but together strong enough to 
 protect the lines of electric and observation mines with which 
 the narrow channel was known to be planted. 
 
 The disposition of the blockading fleet was as follows: 
 becrinning at the eastern end of the line was the auxiliary 
 gunboat Gloucester, off Aguadores, close into the land and 
 about three miles from the Morro fort ; next to the Gloueester 
 the flag-ship Nexv York; then the battleship Indiana ; then 
 the battleship Oregon ; next to her the battleship Iowa ; next 
 to her the second-class battleship Texas; next to her the 
 armored cruiser Brooklyn, flying the broad pennant of Com- 
 modore Schley ; and on the western end of the line, the 
 auxiliary gunboat Vixen, close into the land. 
 
 The fleet was arranged in an irregular half circle with the 
 western part of the curve flattened out, owing to the lay of 
 the land in that direction, and all distant about three miles 
 from the Morro— the fort at the eastern entrance to the har- 
 bor. This was the usual position of the American fleet from 
 daylight until dark. 
 
156 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 The orders from the flag officer commanding, Admiral Samp- 
 son, were as follows: " The vessels will blockade Santiago de 
 Cuba closely, keeping about six miles from the Morro in the 
 daytime and closing in at night, the lighter vessels well 
 inshore. The first squadron will blockade on the east side 
 of the port and the second squadron on the west side. If 
 the enemy tries to escape, the ships must close in and en- 
 gage as soon as possible and endeavor to sink his vessels or 
 force them to run ashore in the channel." 
 
 The distance from the Morro was afterwards decreased to 
 three miles in the daytime and less at night. 
 
 Sunday, July 3, was one of those beautiful clear days some- 
 times seen in the tropics, without a cloud in the sky and 
 when objects can be distinguished at a long distance. The 
 flag-ship Nezv York had started to Siboney, at about 9 A. M., 
 flying the signal : " Disregard the movements of the Com- 
 mander-in-Chief " — Admiral Sampson had been invited to a 
 conference and was on his way to meet General Shafter. 
 
 At about 9:35 the Spanish fleet was discovered coming out. 
 The lozva, from her position, could see farther into the harbor 
 than any other ship and was therefore the first to discover 
 them. Before the leading vessel, the Maria Teresa, bearing 
 the flag of Admiral Cervera, had made the turn into the chan- 
 nel in front of the Punta Gorda battery, the lozua flew the 
 signal : " Enemy's ships coming out ; " at the same time she 
 fired a shotted gun to call attention to the signal. This was 
 the first gun of the engagement. 
 
 The above signal was immediately repeated, and almost at 
 the same moment, by the Oregon, a few seconds later by the 
 Texas and then by the Brooklyn. 
 
 Lieut. Schuetze, navigator of the hnva, and Lieut. F. K. 
 Hill were on the bridge when the latter discovered the Maria 
 Teresa as her bow showed around the end of Cayo Smith. 
 Lieut. Hill immediately jumped to a six-pounder on the 
 bridge, gave the gun extreme elevation and as the signal was 
 run up, fired in the direction of the enemy's ships. The sig- 
 nal had been bent on the night before and was, therefore, all 
 ready. 
 
 At this moment the ships of the American fleet were in the 
 
THE NAVAL BATTLE OF SANTLVGO. 157 
 
 following positions : — The Nciv York about four miles to the 
 eastward of her usual position, turning with helm hard aport — 
 the Admiral's flag in plain sight from the Iowa ; the Glouces- 
 ter close inshore off Aguadores ; the Indiana in or near the 
 position usually occupied by the Nczv York, heading for the 
 Morro and going at full speed ; the Oregon heading for the 
 entrance at full speed ; the lozua heading a little to the west- 
 ward of the entrance, going at full speed ; the Texas heading 
 about East across the course of the lozua ; the Brooklyn head- 
 ing about North by West and the Vixoi heading South and 
 coming out fast from under the land. 
 
 Almost immediately upon the discovery of the Maria Teresa, 
 the Oregon and loiua opened fire on her at a range of 6,000 
 yards. The Texas and Brooklyn also opened with their port 
 batteries. As the Maria Teresa, followed by the l^izeaya. 
 Colon and Oqiiendo, in the order named, cleared the point and 
 stood to the westward, the Indiana, which was approaching 
 the Morro from the eastward, was exposed to their fire and 
 became hotly engaged. 
 
 When the last Spanish vessel, the Oqnendo, cleared the 
 point, the action was general on both sides and the fire 
 very heavy. The shore batteries had all opened on the Amer- 
 ican fleet as soon as the first shots were fired at the Maria 
 Teresa and, as they received no answer from the Americans, 
 they continued to fire at will, but it could not be observed 
 that any damage resulted from their efforts. 
 
 The Spanish squadron was now standing to the westward 
 in column, the distance between the ships being about 600 
 yards and the speed gradually increasing to about thirteen 
 knots. 
 
 Three American battleships were closing in on them at full 
 speed, keeping them on their starboard bows and using all guns 
 that would bear in that direction. The Spanish were using 
 their broadsides and firing with great rapidity but with little 
 accuracy. 
 
 The armored cruiser Brooklyn, at this stage of the battle, 
 put her helm to port and turned to the south, away from the 
 enemy's fleet, and thereby materially increased her distance 
 from them. In performing the manceuvre she caused the 
 
158 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 Texas to slow down and stop to avoid collision. Before the 
 latter could recover her speed she had fallen somewhat astern 
 of the battleships. As the Brooklyn completed her turn and 
 headed off to the westward she became hotly engaged with 
 the Viscaya, as was also the Texas, the latter having regained 
 her position by an increase of speed. 
 
 The pace proved too hot for the Maria Teresa and the 
 Oqueiido, and at about ten o'clock both ships were seen to be 
 in distress. Soon smoke began to show from their after 
 hatches and through the shot holes in their sides and they 
 turned and stood for the beach, first the Maria Teresa and 
 then the Oqucndo. At 10:25 the former, and a few minutes 
 later, the latter took the beach. Both were in flames fore 
 and aft. 
 
 The Colon had in the meantime tried to carry out her part 
 of Admiral Cervera's well-considered plan of escape. When 
 all the ships were fully engaged and the smoke was the thick- 
 est, she ran inside the Spanish ships ahead of her and, at a 
 speed of seventeen knots, made her dash for liberty. The 
 Oregon immediately passed under the stern of the loiva, across 
 the bows of the Texas and stood after the Colon, in so doing 
 closely engaging the Vizcaya. At this time the battleships 
 loiva and Indiana swung to the westward and the American 
 fleet was in column at irregular distances. The cruiser Brook- 
 lyn, well off to the left, led the column and was broad off the 
 port quarter of the Colon, about six miles away from her ; the 
 Oregon came next, well inside the Brooklyn but astern of her 
 and a little on the port quarter of the Colon ; next came the 
 Texas on the port quarter of the Oregon and astern of her ; 
 next after the Texas came the loiva, inside ship of all, head- 
 ing for the Vizcaya, and last the Indiana, almost directly in 
 the wake of the lozva. 
 
 At 9:50, two thousand yards astern of the Spanish ships 
 came the torpedo boats Pinion and Furor. The Indiana flew 
 the signal : " Enemy's torpedo boats escaping," and opened 
 on them with her secondary and rapid-fire batteries as they 
 passed the Morro and hauled to the westward. The Iowa 
 and Texas also opened a furious fire on them and a few mo- 
 ments later the Gloucester attacked them with great spirit. 
 
THE NAVAL BATTLE OF SANTLVGO. 159 
 
 At 10:30, the Furor blew up and sank in deep water, and the 
 Pluton headed for the beach, where she ran on the rocks and 
 was submerged except a small portion of her bows. The 
 American fleet, having destroyed or disabled the two torpedo 
 boats and two of the Spanish cruisers, stood on in column, as 
 before described, in chase of the two remaining ships. 
 
 At II o'clock the Vir:caya \.v\x\\&A for the beach, in flames, 
 and was run ashore at Accerraderos, fifteen miles to the west- 
 ward of the Morro, where she continued to burn until practi- 
 cally destroyed. At this time the battle of Santiago may be 
 said to have ended. 
 
 The Indiana was sent back to guard the Santiago entrance 
 and prevent the escape of the Spanish vessels known to be 
 still in the harbor. The loiva, assisted by the Hist and 
 Ericsson, rescued the crew of the Viscaya ; the Harvard per- 
 formed the same service for the Maria Teresa and Oqucndo, 
 assisted by the boats of the Indiana and Gloucester. 
 
 Shortly after the surrender of the l''i.zcaja, the flag-ship A^^-tc; 
 York passed to the westward in chase after the Colon. The 
 Brooklyn, Oregon, Texas and Vixen continued also in chase 
 and at about i P. M. the Oregon opened fire with her forward 
 thirteen- inch guns. The Brooklyn fired with her eight-inch 
 guns at about the same time. The Oregon's first shot, at 
 nine thousand yards, fell short, but the second at nine thou- 
 sand eight hundred went over the Colon, and her captain, 
 deeming further resistance to be useless, struck his colors at 
 1:15 P. M. and ran his ship on the beach at Rio Tarquino, 
 about fifty miles to the westward of the Morro. After she 
 had been surrendered her sea valves were treacherously 
 opened and the vessel sank and rolled over on her side. 
 No shot struck the Colon after she made her run past the 
 other Spanish ships and her commander stated that she sur- 
 rendered only because he found the Oregon could reach him 
 and he feared the effect of her thirtecn-inch shells. 
 
 When the flag-ship Neiv York passed near the wreck of the 
 Vizcaya, it was evident at a glance that the hnva could be of 
 no service in chasing the Colon. At the same time it was 
 clear to all that the fast battleship Oregon, and the faster ar- 
 mored cruisers, Nezu York and Brooklyn, were surely and 
 
i6o THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 steadily overhauling her and that it would be only a short 
 time before they would come up with her and compel her 
 surrender. This was accomplished, as before stated, at 
 1:15 P. M. 
 
 The effect on the American ships of the fire of their Span- 
 ish opponents was very much less than might have been ex- 
 pected. The loiva was more damaged than any other vessel, 
 having been struck in the starboard bow by two six-and-a- 
 half-inch shells, one of which exploded on the berth-deck, do- 
 ing great damage. She was also cut up somewhat about the 
 upper works by small projectiles and her sides and turrets 
 marked by a great number of Mauser bullets fired from the 
 Oqucndo. One shell struck at or near the water line on the 
 starboard bow and penetrated the cellulose belt. The cellu- 
 lose was washed out of the coffer-dam before it had time to 
 swell and stop the shot hole and the water astern for several 
 miles was covered with it. 
 
 The BrookIy)i lost the only man killed in the action. She 
 was much cut up or marked by small projectiles, but was not 
 struck by anything larger than a six-inch shell. The fact 
 that she was struck much oftener than any other ship was no 
 doubt owing to the much larger target she presented to the 
 enemy due to her high foreboard and great length. 
 
 The Texas came next in point of damage received. She 
 was twice struck, once by a six-inch shell which exploded 
 after passing through the hammock berthing, doing much 
 harm ; the other shell, size not known, exploded near the 
 bridge and did considerable damage to the pilot-house. 
 
 The Oregon was struck by one six-inch shell and two frag- 
 ments of shell but was not seriously injured. 
 
 The Indiana was marked by two small fragments of shell 
 but no damage was done her. 
 
 The other American ships were not struck. In no case was 
 the machinery injured and not a single gun was put out of 
 action by the fire of the Spaniards. 
 
 The accuracy of fire on the American side was vastly supe- 
 rior to that of the Spaniards and its effects were terrific. , The 
 ]\Iaria Teresa s water mains were cut before she reached the 
 Morro and when she was headed to the westward she had 
 
> to 
 
 O PI 
 
THE NAVAL BATTLE OF SANTL\GO. i6i 
 
 forty dead men on her decks. In fact, all the Spanish ships 
 were simply smothered by the fire of the Americans. The 
 full effect of this fire could not be observed except in the case 
 of the Colon, as all the others were burned and partially sub- 
 merged, but the parts above water show how effective and 
 terrific it must have been. The forward turret of the Oquendo 
 is a fair sample of it. An eight-inch shell struck the edge of 
 the hood of this turret, flanged it back and exploded, killing 
 every man and officer in the turret and disabling every piece 
 of machinery in it. 
 
 Every ship except the Colon showed in all parts, above the 
 protective decks, the awful havoc caused by the explosion of 
 modern projectiles. Their exposed sides were simply riddled 
 and in many cases the shells passed completely through from 
 side to side. To the accuracy of the American fire may 
 be fairly attributed the inaccuracy of the Spanish return 
 fire. 
 
 The loss of life in the action was most disproportionate, the 
 Americans having lost but one man, while the Spanish loss 
 in killed was given by Admiral Cervera, in his telegram to 
 General Blanco, as over six hundred. This has since been 
 reduced to about four hundred. The number of wounded 
 will never be known, as a great many of them were burned 
 with their ships. 
 
 The American hospital ship, Solace, however, cared for 
 and took north 117 wounded Spanish officers and men. Of 
 the several plans of escape open to Admiral Cervera, he un- 
 doubtedly adopted the one most likely to succeed. He 
 might have headed to the eastward after passing the Morro 
 instead of to the westward, but if he had done so he would 
 have had to pass the battleships Oregon and Indiana at close 
 range, immediately after encounter the New York, one of the 
 most efficient armored cruisers in the world. If he had 
 succeeded in escaping from Admiral Sampson's fleet, he 
 would still have had to deal with the vessels under Commo- 
 dore Watson at Guantanamo, among them the battleship 
 Massachusetts. 
 
 He might have opened out his ships after clearing the en- 
 trance and made for the open sea, each vessel steering a 
 
i62 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 different course. Had he done so, each of his ships would 
 have had to pass between two American ships, and the result 
 to him would have been the almost instant destruction of his 
 fleet. 
 
 If Admiral Cervera had intended to fight with the object 
 of doing all the damage possible to the American fleet, he 
 should have come out with his ships in column, closed to half 
 distance, with the torpedo boats close under the stern of the 
 last, or next to the last vessel, and in this formation charged 
 the American line. In the thick of the smoke there would 
 have been a chance for ram and torpedo, and it is more than 
 probable that the Americans would have lost seriously in 
 ships and lives. The result would, however, have been the 
 same in the end— the Spanish fleet would have been des- 
 troyed and sunk in deep water, and the loss of life appalling. 
 
 But Admiral Cervera had no such intentions. He came out 
 to escape and not to fight more than was necessary in order to 
 accomplish his object. He was compelled by imperative 
 orders to leave the harbor and under all the circumstances he 
 adopted the course most promising of success. His plans 
 were admirably made, and the attempt to carry them out, 
 one of the most gallant recorded in history. 
 
 It was a fatal mistake to send the fleet out in the face of 
 such a force, and the result must have been foreseen by Ad- 
 miral Cervera and the able officers associated with him, but 
 once outside, by standing to the westward, he confined the 
 fire of the American fleet to one side of his ships and thus re- 
 duced the chance of hits to the minimum. 
 
 The handling of the torpedo boats was a mistake. They 
 should have been kept close to the leading ships and on their 
 starboad or inshore sides, ready at the proper moment to use 
 their torpedoes or make a dash for liberty. 
 
 The only other course open to the Spanish Admiral was to 
 attempt to escape by night, and this was rendered absolutely 
 impossible by the persistent use of search lights by the Amer- 
 ican fleet, and by the further fact that three battleships were 
 always close in to the entrance of the harbor. Any attempt to 
 come out during this time — from dark until daylight — would 
 have resulted in the sinking of the leading ship and the ground- 
 ing and destruction of all the others. 
 
THE NAVAL BATTLE OF SANTL4G0. 
 
 163 
 
 It may be fairly assumed that if Admiral Cervera— one of 
 the ablest men of his profession— had been left to his own 
 devices, the Spanish fleet under his command would not have 
 attempted to escape from Santiago harbor on the 3d of July 
 Following is a list of the vessels engaged in the battle of San- 
 tiago with their batteries. 
 
 AMERICAN SHIPS. 
 
 NAME. 
 Nciv York 
 
 Brooklyn 
 
 Texas 
 
 Iowa 
 
 Indiana 
 
 Oregon 
 
 Gloucester 
 
 BROADSIDE. 
 
 5 8 inch rifles. 
 
 6 4 " >^ 
 
 4 6 pounders. 
 
 2 1 
 
 r 6 5 inch rifles. 
 
 I 6 8 " 
 
 '{ 5 6 pounders. 
 
 2 1 
 
 . Colt Automatic. 
 
 I 12 inch rifle. 
 
 4 6 " 
 
 6 6 pounders. 
 
 2 Hotchkiss revolving guns. 
 
 4 12 inch rifles. 
 
 4 8 " 
 
 3 4 " 
 
 10 6 pounders. 
 
 I 1 
 
 i 2 Colt Automatics. 
 
 13 inch rifles. 
 
 2 6 •' <' 
 
 10 6 pounders. 
 
 -I 
 
 4 1 
 
 -Colt Automatic. 
 -13 inch rifles. 
 
 10- 
 
 2- 
 I- 
 
 -6 pounders. 
 
 -I " 
 
 -Colt Automatic. 
 
 2 6 pounders. 
 
 3 — 3 
 
 I Colt Automatic. 
 
164 
 
 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 Vixen 
 
 NAME. 
 
 Infanta , 
 Maria Teresa • 
 
 2 6 pounders. 
 
 3 1 
 
 SPANISH SHIPS. 
 
 BROADSIDE. 
 
 — 1 1 inch rifles. 
 
 —5-5 " " 
 — 6 pounders. 
 
 — I 
 
 — Nordenfeldt machine guns. 
 
 — Maxim " " 
 
 Vizcaya 
 
 A Imirante 
 Oquendo 
 
 Cristobal 
 Colon 
 
 Pluton 
 
 Furor 
 
 II inch rifles. 
 
 5 5-5 " 
 
 4 6 pounders. 
 
 5 1 
 
 4 Nordenfeldt machine guns. 
 
 2 Maxim " " 
 
 2 II inch rifles. 
 
 5 5-5 " 
 
 4 6 pounders. 
 
 5 1 
 
 4 Nordenfeldt machine guns. 
 
 2 Maxim 
 
 -9.8 inch rifles. 
 -6 " " 
 
 -47 " " 
 
 -6 pounders. 
 
 -I 
 
 -Maxim machine guns. 
 
 2 — 12 pd'r rapid-fire Maxim Nordenfeldt guns. 
 
 I Maxim Automatic. 
 
 2 — 12 pd'r. rapid-fire Maxim Nordenfeldt guns. 
 
 I Maxim Automatic. 
 
 *These guns were not on board — they were replaced by guns supposed to be six-inch 
 rifles. 
 
 /^^ 
 
^(jtAxJ^^ [A- ^. ^CLV^-cy-^^^^ 
 
CHAPTER VIII. 
 THE VOYAGE OF THE OREGON. 
 
 BY 
 
 Lieut. W. H. ALLEN, U. S. N. 
 
 THE U. S. S. Oregon, when designed and built, was 
 classed as a coast-line battleship. It was not intended 
 that she should make long trips at sea, but her duty 
 was to defend the coast against any vessels that might be 
 sent to devastate it. The ship is nominally of 10,288 tons dis- 
 placement, but, when equipped for a long cruise, displaces 
 nearly 12,000 tons. She was designed for 15 knots, but 
 on her official trial developed a speed of 16.7 knots, under 
 forced draft, using both her main and auxiliary boilers. Her 
 crew consists ordinarily of thirty officers and 438 men, and 
 her armament is the heaviest carried by any vessel of the 
 same displacement. Foreign experts doubted the ability of 
 this class of ships to keep at sea in rough weather. 
 
 The only extended trip of the Oregon previous to March, 
 1898, had been from San Francisco to Acapulco, Mexico, a 
 distance of about eighteen hundred miles. This voyage was 
 made at various speeds to determine the coal consumption. 
 At that time this was considered a long distance for a battle- 
 ship to make without a stop. Subsequently, on a trip from 
 San Francisco to Puget Sound, during a violent wind, she 
 demonstrated her ability to weather any gale if properly 
 handled. 
 
 In order to make the ship more steady at sea, bilge keels 
 were built on her bottom. This was done in the dry dock at 
 Bremerton, Washington. 
 
 As the Oregon was being hauled out of the dry dock at 
 Bremerton on the morning of February 16, 1898, news of the 
 blowing up of the Maine in the harbor of Havana was re- 
 
i66 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 ceived. On that day commenced the preparations for her 
 memorable voyage to the eastern coast. Previous to going 
 into 'dock, all ammunition and coal had been removed in order 
 to lighten her, the ammunition having been left at the Mare 
 Island Navy Yard near San Francisco. 
 
 Orders were received to proceed as soon as possible to San 
 Francisco and prepare for a long cruise. Owing to the Klon- 
 dike excitement in the northwest section of the country, vexa- 
 tious delays occurred in procuring the necessary coal for the 
 trip to San Francisco, nearly all available vessels being di- 
 verted to the Klondike trade. It was not until the 6th of 
 March that the Oregon sailed for San Francisco, where she 
 arrived on the 9th. 
 
 Ammunition, coal and stores were hurried on board, the 
 bunkers and store rooms of the ship being crowded to their 
 utmost capacity. The work was carried on night and day, the 
 crew working with an enthusiasm seldom seen on a man-of- 
 war. At this time the final destination of the Oregon was not 
 known to any one on board, but it was surmised that she 
 would proceed as far as Callao, Peru, and there await further 
 instructions. Just as the ship was ready for sea, Captain A. 
 H. McCormick, who was in command, was obliged to leave 
 on account of ill health, and was relieved by Captain Charles 
 E. Clark, who assumed command the morning before the ship 
 sailed, and who remained on the ship until after the battle of 
 Santiago. During the period of preparation the excitement 
 on board was intense, and no one doubted what would be the 
 findings of the Court of Inquiry on the Maine disaster, though 
 the final result was in doubt. It is certain, however, that the 
 crew of the Oregon hoped for war, whatever may have been 
 the wishes of the officers. 
 
 Final orders were received from the Navy Department on 
 March 18, and early on the morning of the 19th, the Oregon 
 sailed from San Francisco, and after passing through the 
 Golden Gate and across the bar, was headed by the most di- 
 rect route for Callao, Peru. 
 
 During the trip from San Francisco to Callao fine weather 
 was experienced. Ten knots an hour was decided upon as 
 the most economical speed for this distance, and the engine*, 
 
THE VOYAGE OF THE ORECiON. 167 
 
 Wefe run at a constant rate of seventy-five revolutions per 
 minute. As she was just out of dock and her bottom clean, 
 this gave her a speed of nearly eleven knots per hour during 
 the entire trip. Owing to the construction of the ship, when 
 she had been a few days at sea, all parts below the upper deck 
 became so heated that it was impossible for the men to sleep 
 in their quarters, and this continued all the way around, even 
 in the cool climate of the Straits of Magellan. It may be 
 mentioned that the temperature in the armored portion of the 
 ship over the boilers and engines ranged from 1 10° to 11 5°, while 
 the temperature in the ammunition passages was at times as 
 high as 140°, and these parts of the ship were not cooled by 
 the blowers, which supplied hot air. The temperature of the 
 fire and engine rooms was even greater than this, and it is 
 worthy of note that during the entire trip around, only one 
 man of the engineer's force of the ship succumbed to the 
 heat, while on previous occasions on short trips such occur- 
 rences were common. This was probably due to the enthusi- 
 asm of the crew. Every man seemed determined to do every- 
 thing in his power to push the ship along. 
 
 From the time of leaving San Francisco, clearing ship for 
 action and battery drill were the order of the day, and prepa- 
 rations were made for all possible contingencies. These drills 
 were carried on daily with few exceptions until the arrival of 
 the Oreo-on at Key West. The crew and officers thus became 
 thoroughly familiar with their duties in battle. Little time 
 could iDe spared for actual target practice, and ammunition 
 was precious, but frequent sub-calibre practice was had, to 
 perfect the gun pointers. 
 
 The equator was crossed on March 31, and that day was 
 given up to the reception of King Neptune, who came on 
 board with his suite and initiated all those who had not be- 
 fore come into his royal domain. All land lubbers were 
 treated to a shave and a bath, and were given certificates 
 showing that they were now free to pass Neptune's kingdom, 
 and bespeak for them good treatment. 
 
 The Oregon s band, composed of sailors, was an unfailing 
 source of amusement during the voyage, and there was danc- 
 ing on the superstructure deck nearly every evening. A 
 
i68 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 whist party of officers met nightly in the cabin, pajamas being 
 the customary uniform. 
 
 During this portion of the trip the anxiety for news was 
 great, and on our arrival at Callao, April 4, there was a feel- 
 ing of disappointment that the report of the Court of Inquiry 
 had not been made public. The meagre news that could be 
 gathered from the papers published at Callao and Lima was 
 contradictory and unsatisfactory. Two days after our arrival, 
 however, the findings of the Court were published. It was 
 here that Captain Clark was notified by the Department of 
 the presence on the east coast, of the Spanish torpedo boat 
 Tcnierario. The picture and description of this vessel, in con- 
 nection with her slow speed, failed to create any alarm among 
 the officers and crew, who even hoped that they might meet 
 and sink her. The captain decided, however, that if she was 
 met in the Straits of Magellan she would be there for no 
 other reason than to attack the Oregon^ and that he would 
 sink her, war or no war. 
 
 The gunboat Marietta had been at Callao, and sailed for 
 Valparaiso the day before the arrival of the Oregon. Her 
 captain, by order of the Department, had purchased coal for 
 the Oregoji, and it was ready for the ship on her arrival. 
 Coaling was commenced immediately, and carried on night 
 and day until all bunkers were full and about two hundred 
 tons of coal in sacks were piled on deck. This large amount 
 was taken because of the uncertainty of finding any at Punta 
 Arenas. 
 
 The sentiment of the Peruvians seemed to be strongly in 
 favor of the United States, but it was reported that a plot 
 existed among the Spanish residents of Callao and Lima to 
 sink or blow up the Oregon. In consequence of this rumor 
 the number of sentries was doubled, and they were furnished 
 with ball cartridges. The steam launch patrolled around the 
 ship from dusk until daylight, and no boats were allowed to 
 approach the ship without proper authority. This patrol was 
 continued in all South American ports visited by the Oregon. 
 
 Coaling being finished, the Oregon left Callao just before 
 dark April 7, and headed for the western entrance to the 
 Straits of Magellan. Fair weather was encountered until the 
 
THE VOYAGE OF THE OREGON. 169 
 
 afternoon of April 16, when the ship was off Cape Pilar, at the 
 western entrance to the straits. Fortunately it was clear 
 enough for her to run in before the gale, \\hich proved to be 
 a very severe one, even for this region, noted for its furious 
 gales. At dusk we anchored outside Port Tamar in fort}' 
 fathoms of water, having two anchors down. The gale blew 
 furiously during the night, which was an anxious one, but the 
 good ship rode it out without difificulty, and early next morn- 
 ing was under way for the run through the straits to Punta 
 Arenas. This proved to be one of the remarkable runs of the 
 voyage. The distance to Punta Arenas is 165 miles, and the 
 captain decided to reach that point in the evening, if possible. 
 The ship was, therefore, run under assisted draft, that is, the 
 fire-room blowers were used to increase the natural draft of 
 the smoke pipes. The distance to Punta Arenas was covered 
 in eleven hours, or at a rate of fifteen knots an hour. The 
 strain on the engineers and firemen was great, but all bore it 
 without a murmur. During this run crews were stationed at 
 the secondary battery, in case the Toiicrario should be found 
 in the straits, where there are many coves in which a vessel 
 might lie in wait. On approaching Punta Arenas the lights 
 of several vessels were visible through the dusk, and as a pre- 
 caution the crew was called to quarters and the guns loaded. 
 The anchorage was reached at 6:30 P. M., April 17, No 
 Spanish vessels were found in the port, and there was no later 
 news than that we had heard at Callao. Arrangements were 
 immediately made for taking in coal from the coal hulk, and 
 the work commenced early the next morning. 
 
 The Marietta arrived about midnight, having been storm- 
 bound in Tuesday Bay, a harbor near the western entrance to 
 the straits. Seeing the Oi'cgoii pass, her captain immediately 
 got up anchor and followed to Punta Arenas. 
 
 While the coaling was going on the usual courtesies were 
 exchanged with the Chilian naval and military authorities. 
 The sentiment here, as at Callao, seemed to favor the United 
 States, but, nevertheless the launches patrolled around the 
 ship at night, as in that port. On the evening of the 20th an 
 English mail steamer arrived from Valparaiso, but she brought 
 no later news than the 17th. Coaling was distressingly slow, 
 
1 70 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 owing to the poor facilities, and working night and day, only 
 about 500 tons had been taken on board by the evening of 
 the 20th. For this coal the government was obliged to pay 
 the sum of twenty-two dollars per ton. 
 
 At 7 A. M., April 21, the day war was declared, the Oregon, 
 accompanied by the Marietta, took her departure from Punta 
 Arenas and steamed towards the eastern entrance to the 
 straits. The Marietta preceded, on account of her lesser 
 speed, and also to act as a scout. During the day two Amer- 
 ican steamers bound to the westward to engage in the Klon- 
 dike trade, were met, and one of them, much against her 
 captain's will, was compelled to stop while a boat was sent to 
 obtain the latest news. The other was interrogated by sig- 
 nals, but neither had as late news as we already possessed. 
 
 The two ships passed out of the straits after dark and both 
 were for the first time in the Atlantic, and headed once more 
 to the northward. During the remainder of the voyage, no 
 lights were shown except two lights on the Llarictta, to serve 
 as a guide for the Oregon, and these were carefully screened 
 so as to show only astern. The Marietta was pushed to her 
 utmost capacity, while the Oregon was obliged to go slower 
 than her usual speed. The Marietta rolled and pitched in a 
 fearful manner in the Atlantic swell, and life must have been 
 very uncomfortable for her ship's company. From the Oregon 
 she appeared at times fairly to stand on end, but she pluckily 
 kept on. On the Oregon all lookouts were doubled, and the 
 crews slept at their guns or on the tops of the turrets. No 
 precaution against surprise was neglected, though it was not 
 thought that any formidable Spanish vessel would be found 
 in this locality. Drills were carried on with renewed energy, 
 for the captain realized that when the tropics were reached it 
 would be necessary partially to suspend drills in order to keep 
 the crew in good physical condition. 
 
 On the morning of April 30 the Oregon left the Marietta 
 and pushed ahead at fourteen-knot speed, and at 3 P. M. 
 dropped her anchor in the harbor of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 
 the Marietta arriving about 9 P. M. The first boat alongside 
 the ship was eagerly questioned for news, and it was then 
 learned that war had been declared on the 2 1st. This news 
 
THE VOYAGE OF THE OREGON. 171 
 
 was received with wild cheering by the ship's company, and 
 all on board were anxious to be away to the scene of action. 
 
 The Oregon had anchored at the usual man-of-war an- 
 chorage, but soon after her arrival, various rumors were heard 
 as to the movements of the Tevierario, one being that she was 
 at Isla Grande, a port a few miles to the southward of Rio 
 de Janeiro. In consequence of this, the 07-cgo)i moved farther 
 up the harbor and Captain Clark gave notice to the Brazilian 
 authorities that if the Tcmerario entered the harbor and an- 
 chored within half a mile of the Oregon or Marietta, she 
 would be fired upon and sunk. The Marietta was anchored 
 nearer the entrance with orders to signal the approach of the 
 Spaniard. The Brazilian Admiral stationed a torpedo de- 
 stroyer near the entrance to intercept the Tevierario should 
 she attempt to enter the harbor. At this time, however, the 
 redoubtable Teincrario was in the vicinity of Montevideo and 
 Buenos Ayres, in a state of dilapidation, and finally went up 
 the La Plata River as far from the scene of action as possible, 
 there to remain until the war was over. 
 
 Although a state of war existed, no objection was raised to 
 the stay of our ships in port, repairs being necessary to the 
 engines, and no difficulty was experienced in obtaining all the 
 coal needed ; in fact, it was understood that our government, 
 through its agents, held an option on all the coal in the harbor, 
 and the Brazilian government had not declared coal contra- 
 band of war. 
 
 While here, information was received of the departure of 
 Cervera's fleet from the Cape de Verdes in the somewhat po- 
 etical cablegram, " Four armored cruisers, heavy and fast, 
 three torpedo boats, sea-going class, left St. Vincent on the 
 29th ; avoid them if possible." The news of Admiral Dewey's 
 victory at Manila and of the bombardment of Matanzas was 
 received, and created the wildest enthusiasm among the crew, 
 and was celebrated in proper style, the band playing patriotic 
 airs and several of the crew making speeches. 
 
 The departure of the two ships was somewhat delayed by the 
 non-readiness of \.\\q Nict}ieroy,\\\\\Q\\ had been purchased from 
 the Brazilian government. This vessel had been bought by 
 Brazil during the recent revolution and fitted as a dynamite 
 
172 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 cruiser, but had never seen active service in that capacity. 
 The guns had been removed, and she was to all intents and 
 purposes a merchant vessel. Her machinery and boilers being 
 in bad condition, extensive repairs were necessary before she 
 could sail, and the Brazilian government stipulated that she 
 should not leave until twenty-four hours after the departure 
 of the Oregon and Marietta. The Nictlieroy is known in our 
 service as the Buffalo. 
 
 None of the of^cers or crew were allowed to go ashore ex- 
 cept on duty, on account of the prevalence of yellow fever in 
 the city. 
 
 The orders received by Captain Clark left everything to his 
 discretion after leaving Rio de Janeiro, being in general terms 
 to avoid the Spanish fleet and to proceed to some West In- 
 dian or United States port and report to the Department. 
 
 On the morning of May 5, the Oregon and Marietta steamed 
 out of the harbor of Rio de Janeiro, and after passing outside 
 the marine league, the Marietta was ordered to cruise off 
 Cape Frio, while the Oregon steamed slowly up and down 
 off the harbor entrance, awaiting the NictJicroy, which did 
 not come out until the evening of the 6th. The three vessels 
 then started to the northward, but it soon became evident 
 thatthe Nictlieroy could not make more than six or seven 
 knots. The captain then decided to push ahead, leaving the 
 Marietta to convoy the Nictheroy, with orders to proceed to 
 Bahia and report to the Department. The Oregon soon lost 
 sight of the two vessels, and headed for Bahia, where the captain 
 wished to notify the Department of his action. During this 
 trip the upper works of the ships were painted war color, in 
 place of the former spotless white. The hull was painted 
 during the stay at Bahia. This port was reached at 8 P. M., 
 May 8, and, after reporting to the Department, the captain re- 
 ceived orders to proceed north, and at the same time the 
 Department expressed its confidence in the ability of the 
 Oregon to defeat the whole Spanish fleet. The ship left 
 Bahia at 10 P. M., May 9, and resumed her voyage north. 
 
 After leaving Bahia, the plan of action in case the Spanish 
 fleet was encountered, was developed. In general terms, as 
 the Spanish fleet was supposed to have a speed of nineteen 
 
THE VOYAGE OF THE OREGON. i73 
 
 knots, the Oregon was to run away at full speed. If the 
 Spaniards pursued, they were likely to become separated at 
 high speed, and the Oregon could engage them singly, or two 
 at a time, if necessary, with a good chance of success. Even 
 if the Oregon was defeated, the Spaniards would pay dearly 
 for their victory. Subsequent events showed that the Oregon 
 could probably have gotten the better of the whole squadron. 
 The orders to the officer of the deck were substantially as 
 follows : In case a suspicious vessel was sighted, immediately 
 to sound the general alarm, go to quarters and run away from 
 the stranger at full speed. 
 
 The first test of this plan occurred on the morning of May 
 II. The officer of the deck at early daylight sighted the 
 masts of a vessel and immediately sounded the electric gongs. 
 The crew rushed to quarters, the men and officers below in 
 decided undress, all divisions were ready in eight minutes, 
 and the ship was soon running at full speed, under forced 
 draft, away from the stranger. Full daylight showed the 
 suspected vessel to be an inoffensive merchantman, but the 
 incident proved how quickly the crew of the Oregon zov\\6. pre- 
 pare for action in an emergency. Another period of excite- 
 ment occurred on the night of May 12, shortly before 
 midnight, when the masthead lights of two steamers were seen 
 on one side of the ship and, shortly after, the light of another 
 steamer on the other side. We were then near Cape St. 
 Roque, and as this was the locality where it was thought the 
 Spanish fleet might be encountered, many believed that the 
 Oregon actually passed through it unobserved, for it will be 
 remembered that all lights were carefully screened, and she 
 carried no running lights. At this time, however, the Spanish 
 fleet was near Martinique. After the battle of Santiago, a 
 wounded Spanish sailor who was taken to the Oregon irom the 
 Cristobal Colon, stated that on May 12, the Colon had picked 
 up off Cape St. Roque, a flour barrel marked " U. S. S. 
 Oregon!' This, of course, was only a sailor's "yarn." No more 
 exciting incidents occurred during this portion of the trip, 
 and the Oregon pushed on rapidly to her next stopping place^ 
 Bridgetown, on the island of Barbadoes, where she arrived at 
 3:30 A. M., May 18. 
 
174 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR, 
 
 It had not been the intention of Captain Clark to enter the 
 harbor during the night, but as a number of suspicious lights 
 were seen in the vicinity of the island, he decided to go in 
 and anchor. After daylight the health officer visited the 
 ship, and she was placed in strict quarantine, having come 
 from an infected port. 
 
 Barbadoes being an English colony the British declaration 
 of neutrality was strictly enforced. The captain was not al- 
 lowed to report the arrival of the ship or receive any tel- 
 egraphic communication. The arrival, however, was reported 
 by our consul. The ship was allowed to take coal and stores 
 enough to reach the nearest home port, but the Colonial gov- 
 ernment was liberal in the allowance of coal. Only two hun- 
 dred tons were needed, however, and this was taken in before 
 night. Here it was learned that the Spanish fleet was, or had 
 been at Martinique, though it was actually at this time at 
 Curacoa. Two Spanish torpedo boats and a transport had 
 been seen to pass the harbor a day or two before, so the Ore- 
 gon was evidently in the vicinity of some Spanish vessels. 
 Little news of the progress of the war could be gleaned from 
 the local papers. The sympathy of the Barbadians was 
 clearly with us, and we were constantly advised to go in and 
 whip the Spaniards. The ship attracted great attention and 
 during our stay was surrounded by boatloads of spectators. 
 At 9:30 P. M. the Oregon was again under way, and stood out 
 of the harbor to the westward, with her steaming lights burn- 
 ing. After proceeding to the westward a few miles, all lights 
 were extinguished and the ship headed to the eastward to 
 make a detour around the Windward Islands. The strictest 
 kind of lookout was kept, and it was not until Martinique 
 had been passed that a feeling of relief was felt, for then it 
 was reasonably certain that the Oregon was out of reach of 
 the Spanish fleet. From this time until arrival at Jupiter In- 
 let, Florida, nothing of special importance occurred, though 
 the ceaseless vigilance which had marked the whole trip was 
 never for a moment relaxed. 
 
 The Oregon arrived at Jupiter Inlet at 8 P. M., May 24. 
 Captain Clark reported his arrival, and received the congrat- 
 ulations of the Department. He was ordered, if the Oregon 
 
THE VOYAGE OF THE OREGON. 175 
 
 needed repairs, to proceed to Hampton Roads, otherwise to 
 Key West. As the ship, owing to the constant care and 
 earnest work of all on board, was practically in as good con- 
 dition as when she left San Francisco, Key West was her 
 next stopping place, where she arrived on the morning of 
 May 26. 
 
 The total distance traveled by the Oregon during this re- 
 cord-breaking trip was 13,792 miles, at an average speed of 
 1 1.2 knots per hour. During the entire journey, the engines 
 were never once slowed or stopped for repairs. The voyage 
 occupied sixty-eight days, of which fifty-eight days or parts of 
 days were spent at sea. Such repairs as were necessary were 
 made by the ship's force. No body of men could have 
 worked more earnestly under adverse circumstances than did 
 the Oregon's crew. Comfort was out of the question during 
 the trip, but not a murmur was heard. Such patriotism 
 speaks for itself. Later on, the crew showed its capacity for 
 fighting as well as for work. 
 
 Arriving at Key West, the work of coaling the ship at once 
 began, and was carried on night and day until i A. M. on the 
 23th of May, when the Oregon was once more under way, to 
 join Commodore Watson's blockading squadron on the north 
 coast of Cuba. She reached it on a beautiful Sunday morn- 
 ing. The ship and crew were dirty, forming a strong contrast 
 to the other ships, w^ith their crews in Sunday dress of spotless 
 white. But her reception was none the less hearty, and 
 amounted to an ovation. Each ship in turn cheered the Ore- 
 gon's crew, and their bands played welcoming airs, the most 
 popular apparently being, "There's a new coon in town," and, 
 " There'll be a hot time in the old town to-night." 
 
 The Oregon's stay with Commodore Watson's fleet was 
 brief, for the next morning Admiral Sampson arrived from 
 Key West on the Neio York, and, in company with her and 
 the Majjloiver, the ship proceeded around the east end of 
 Cuba, and on June i joined the blockading squadron off 
 Santiago de Cuba. 
 
 Naval of^cers at Key West had been skeptical as to the 
 ability of the Oregon to make the speed claimed for her, after 
 her long trip and no repairs. But during the cruise with the 
 
176 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 New York she had maintained a speed of thirteen knots with- 
 out difficulty, and on the day of her arrival off Santiago 
 occurred an amusing incident, which at the same time settled 
 the question of the Oregon s speed. 
 
 Soon after joining the squadron, the Admiral steamed 
 away on the New York, without leaving orders for the Oregon. 
 Captain Clark asked Commodore Schley by signal what 
 station would be assigned to the Oregon. The Commodore 
 replied, " Proceed six miles to the southward and report 
 names of strange vessels," meaning that this was to be our 
 station. It happened that just at this time smoke was seen to 
 the south, and in a moment the Oregon was off in pursuit, 
 and the boilers put under forced draft. All was excitement 
 on board, for herewas the first prize. Gradually the Oregon 
 increased her speed to sixteen knots, and was closing up on 
 the stranger, which, in the distance, appeared to be a large 
 steamer. The lookout even saw the cargo being thrown 
 overboard, and the steamer was evidently doing its best to 
 escape. A nearer view showed the chase to be a large tug, 
 and when finally a blank charge brought it around, the 
 United States flag was shown, and it proved to be a news- 
 paper boat, with a number of correspondents on board, 
 bound for Port Antonio, Jamaica, with despatches. The 
 chase occupied about four hours, as the tug was making four- 
 teen knots an hour. Those correspondents would have fared 
 sadly that day had they fallen into the hands of the fire- 
 men of the Oregon. Seeing the mistake of the Oregon, the 
 Commodore ordered the Marblehead to overtake and order 
 her back, but the Marblehead could only meet her on the 
 return from the fruitless trip, although making fifteen knots. 
 The Oregon received a hearty cheer from the Marblehead, for 
 here was a battleship with cruiser speed. She participated in 
 all the bombardments of the forts at Santiago, occupied a 
 regular station on the blockading line, and nightly, in turn 
 with the loiaa and Massaehusetts, moved in close to the en- 
 trance of the harbor and turned her searchlights into it to 
 prevent the escape of the Spanish fleet. 
 
 The event for which her crew had impatiently waited took 
 place on Sunday, July 3. The writer was officer of the deck at 
 

 • ■X, 
 > 
 
THE VOYAGE OF THE OREGON. 177 
 
 the time. The ship had been tidied up for the usual Sunday- 
 inspection by the captain, and officers and crew were in Sun- 
 day dress. The first call for quarters had sounded at 9:25, 
 and all hands were awaiting the 9:30 call. At 9:28 the chief 
 quartermaster rushed up to the bridge with the cry, " They're 
 coming out." At that instant nothing was visible in the 
 harbor entrance, but a moment later a Spanish ship, the Afa- 
 ria Teresa, flying a large new Spanish ensign, showed her 
 black hull and masts, rounding a point inside the entrance. 
 Although he had many times rehearsed what he would do in 
 case the Spaniards came out, the officer of the deck was mo- 
 mentarily dazed, but recovering quickly, he caused the alarm 
 gongs to be sounded from the pilot house. For a moment or 
 two every one thought the gongs had sounded accidentally, as 
 was often the case, but the order, " To your quarters," con- 
 vinced the crew that this was no false alarm. A rousing cheer 
 went up from the men as they rushed to their stations, strip- 
 ping off their clothes as they ran. The Oregon was heading 
 towards the entrance at the time. She immediately went 
 ahead full speed towards the enemy, and in a few minutes was 
 under forced draft. The Oregon had at all times kept fires 
 spread in all her main boilers, and was thus ready for the 
 emergency, attaining her maximum speed before the other 
 ships of the squadron, and quickly passed all except the 
 Brooklyn. 
 
 It is claimed on the Oregon that the first gun of the action 
 was fired from one of her six-pounders, and that she first made 
 the signal, "The enemy is escaping," but these statements 
 have been disputed, as have the stories of many other inci- 
 dents of the battle. In such exciting moments, one's atten- 
 tion is naturally concentrated on his own ship. 
 
 The story of the battle has been often and graphically told, 
 but in the first newspaper accounts the Oregon was omitted 
 and the ATassachusetts ^wi in her place. It is now a matter of 
 record how the Oregon, with her marvelous speed, soon passed 
 the other ships of the squadron and closed up on \.\\& Brooklyn, 
 her guns all the time firing on the enemy ; how she overtook 
 three of the Spanish ships one by one, passing them as they 
 turned to the beach in flames, and still rushing ahead, with the 
 
178 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 Brooklyn outside her, was finally able, with her thirteen-inch 
 guns, to force the Cristobal Colon to run on the beach and 
 surrender. The chase lasted nearly four hours. During the 
 engagement the Oregon fired nearly 1,800 shots from her guns, 
 and by singular good fortune was struck only once, and then 
 by a small fragment of a shell which merely marred the paint 
 on one of her turrets. 
 
 She well earned her Spanish and American nicknames, 
 " The Yankee Devil," and " The Bull Dog of the Navy." 
 
 The Oregon at present, after a few minor repairs, made nec- 
 essary by the wear incident to war service, is on her way to 
 her native waters, the Pacific, but without the rush and ex- 
 citement which marked her voyage to the eastern coast. 
 
 ^Luxh, lA'^/.^ccu^tpr-^ 
 
CHAPTER IX. 
 THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 
 
 BY 
 
 Maj.-Gen. WM. R. SHAFTER, U. S. V., Commanding General. 
 
 IN April, 1898, it was decided by the War Department to 
 assemble troops on the Atlantic seaboard, with a view to 
 their mobilization for use in Cuba. At that time I was in 
 command of the Department of California and was stationed 
 at San Francisco. Orders came to proceed to New Orleans ; 
 upon arrival there I was directed to come to Washington, 
 at once, for consultation with the President and was informed 
 that the command of the first expedition that would be sent 
 to Cuba was to be given to me. It was understood that this 
 expedition would be what is termed a " reconnoissance in 
 force," for the purpose of communicating with General Gomez, 
 supplying him with arms and ammunition and ascertaining the 
 number of his men and their position. It was to be organized 
 at Tampa, Florida. I proceeded to Tampa and practically com- 
 menced the work of organizing troops for the expedition, and 
 incidentally the 5th and 7th Army Corps. On May 30 a tele- 
 gram was received from the Headquarters of the Army in which 
 it was stated : "Admiral Schley reports that two cruisers and 
 two torpedo boats have been seen in the Harbor of Santiago, 
 Go with your force to capture garrison at Santiago and assist 
 in capturing harbor and fleet." 
 
 Transports had already been assembled in Tampa Bay. 
 • Orders were immediately given for loading aboard these trans- 
 ports the necessary subsistence and quartermaster's supplies, 
 and for the embarkation of the authorized number of troops and 
 their material. The facilities at Tampa and Port Tampa, for 
 embarking the troops and the large amount of supplies 
 required, were inadequate, and with the utmost effort it was 
 
i8o THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 not possible to accomplish this work as quickly as I hoped 
 and desired. 
 
 On the evening of June 7, orders were received to sail without 
 delay, but with not less than 10,000 men. After some of the 
 transports had started out and had reached the lower bay, 
 telegraphic instructions were received from the Secretary of 
 War directing that the sailing of the expedition be delayed 
 until further orders. This delay was occasioned because the 
 Navy reported that a Spanish war vessel had been sighted in 
 the Nicholas Channel. The ships in the lower bay were 
 immediately recalled. On the next day, in compliance with 
 instructions from the Adjutant-General of the Army, the 
 necessary steps were taken to increase the command to the 
 full capacity of the transports and the expedition sailed on 
 June 14, with 815 of^cers and 16,072 enlisted men. 
 
 The passage to Santiago was generally smooth and unevent- 
 ful. The health of the command remained remarkably good, 
 notwithstanding the fact that the conveniences on many of the 
 transports, in the nature of sleeping and closet accommoda- 
 tions, space for exercise, etc., were not all that could have been 
 desired. 
 
 While passing along the north coast of Cuba, one of the 
 two barges we had in tow broke away during the night and 
 was not recovered. The loss proved to be very serious, for it 
 delayed and embarrassed the disembarkation of the army. 
 On the morning of June 20 we arrived off Guantanamo Bay 
 and about noon reached the vicinity of Santiago, where 
 Admiral Sampson came on board the headquarters transport. 
 It was arranged between us to visit in the afternoon the Cuban 
 General Garcia, at Aserraderos, about eighteen miles to the west 
 of the Morro. During the interview, General Garcia offered 
 the services of his troops, comprising about 4,000 men in the 
 vicinity of Aserraderos, and about 500 under General Castillo 
 at the little town of Cujababo, a few miles east of Daiquiri. 
 I accepted his offer, telling him however that although no 
 military control could be exercised over him except such as 
 he would concede, yet as long as he served under me I 
 would furnish his command rations and ammunition. 
 
 From the time the orders were received every effort possi- 
 
THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. iSi 
 
 ble was made to become familiar with the surroundings of 
 Santiago, both as to the terrain and the climatic conditions 
 with which we should have to contend. The description 
 given in the " Journal of the Siege of Havana " of the experi- 
 ence of the English Army during their siege of Havana in 
 1762 was re-read. Valuable information was also obtained 
 from two natives of Cuba, who were on the Segurani;a with 
 me, one of them a civil engineer who had assisted in making 
 surveys in the vicinity of Santiago. From General Garcia 
 also additional information was received which was of great 
 value in planning the attack on Santiago. At this interview 
 with General Garcia, all the possible points of attack were for 
 the last time carefully considered and, for the information 
 and guidance of Admiral Sampson and General Garcia, the 
 following plan of campaign was then and there outlined. 
 
 With the assistance of the small boats of the Navy, the 
 disembarkation was to commence on the morning of the 
 twenty-second at Daiquiri. On the twenty-first, 500 insur- 
 gent troops were to be transferred from Aserraderos to Cuja- 
 babo, increasing the force already there to 1,000 men. This 
 force under General Castillo was to attack the Spanish force 
 at Daiquiri in the rear at the time of disembarkation. (This 
 movement was successfully made.) To mislead the enemy as 
 to the real point of our intended landing, I requested General 
 Garcia to send a small force, about 500 men, under General 
 Rabi, to attack the little town of Cabanas, situated on the 
 coast a few miles to the west of the entrance to Santiago 
 harbor, and where it was reported that the enemy had several 
 hundred men intrenched and from which a trail leads around 
 the west side of the bay to Santiago. Admiral Sampson was 
 requested to send several of his war ships, with a number of 
 the transports, opposite this town, Aserraderos, for the pur- 
 pose of making a show of disembarking there. In addition 
 the Admiral was asked to cause a bombardment to be made 
 at Cabanas, upon the forts around the Morro, and also at the 
 towns of Aguadores, Siboney and Daiquiri. The troops un- 
 der General Garcia, remaining at Aserraderos, were to be 
 transferred to Daiquiri or Siboney on the twenty-fourth. This 
 was successfully accomplished at Siboney. 
 
i82 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 The approach to Santiago and the attack upon it was to be 
 made from the east over a narrow road, in some places not 
 better than a trail, running from Daiquiri through Siboney and 
 Sevilla towards Santiago. This seemed the only feasible plan. 
 Subsequent information and results confirmed that judgment. 
 
 On the morning of the twenty-second the army commenced 
 to disembark at Daiquiri. The following general order indi- 
 cates the manner in which the troops left the transports and 
 the amount of supplies carried immediately with them : — 
 
 Headquarters Fifth Army Corps, 
 On Board S. S. Seguranca, at Sea, June 20, 1898. 
 General Orders, No. 18. 
 
 Extract. 
 
 1. Under instructions to be communicated to the proper 
 commanders, troops will disembark in the following order : 
 
 First. — The 2nd division, 5th corps (Lawton's). The Gat- 
 ling gun detachment will accompany this division. 
 
 Second. — General Bates's brigade. This brigade will form as 
 a reserve to the 2nd division, 5th corps. 
 
 Third. — The dismounted cavalry division (Wheeler's). 
 
 FonrtJi. — The ist division, 5th corps (Kent's). 
 
 Fifth. — The squadron of the 2nd Cavalry (Rafferty's). 
 
 Sixth. — If the enemy, in force, vigorously resist the land- 
 ing, the Light Artillery, or part of it, will be disembarked by 
 the Battalion Commander and brought to the assistance of 
 the troops engaged. If no serious opposition be offered, this 
 artillery will be unloaded after the mounted squadron. 
 
 2. All troops will carry on the person the blanket roll 
 (with shelter tent and poncho), three days' field rations (with 
 coffee ground), canteens filled and lOO rounds of ammunition 
 per man. Additional ammunition, already issued to the troops, 
 tentage, baggage and company cooking utensils will be left 
 under the charge of the Regimental Quartermaster, with one 
 non-commissioned ofificerand two privates from each company. 
 
 3. All persons not immediately on duty with, and consti- 
 tuting a part of, the organizations mentioned in the foregoing 
 paragraphs will remain aboard ship, until the landing be ac- 
 complished and until notified that they can land. 
 
THE SANTIACxO CAMPAIGN. 1S3 
 
 4. The Chief Quartermaster of the expedition will control 
 all small boats and will distribute them to the best advantage 
 to disembark the troops in the order indicated in paragraph i. 
 
 5. The Ordnance Officer, Second Lieutenant Brook, 4th 
 Infantry, will put on shore, at once, 100 rounds of ammuni- 
 tion per man and will have it ready for distribution on the 
 firing line. 
 
 6. The Commanding General wishes to impress officers 
 and men with the crushing effect a well-directed fire will have 
 upon the Spanish troops. All officers concerned will rigidly 
 enforce fire discipline and will caution their men to fire only 
 when they can see the enemy. 
 
 By Command of Major-General Shafter. 
 
 E. J. McClerNAND, Assistant Adjutant-General. 
 
 The small boats belonging to the Navy and to the trans- 
 ports, together with a number of steam-launches furnished by 
 the Navy, were brought alongside and loaded with troops as 
 prescribed in the order just quoted. When General Law- 
 ton's division was fairly aboard the small boats, the latter were 
 towed in long lines by the steam-launches to the shore. The 
 sea wa.j somewhat rough but, by the exercise of caution and 
 good judgment the beach was reached and the troops disem- 
 barked satisfactorily. As a precaution against a possible 
 attack upon the part of any Spaniards who might have been 
 hidden in the adjacent blockhouses and woods, the Navy 
 opened a furious cannonade upon these places, while the 
 troops were moving towards the shore. It was learned after- 
 wards that the Spanish garrison had retired, in the direction 
 of Siboney, soon after daylight. By night about 6,000 troops 
 were on shore. General Lawton was ordered to push forward 
 a strong force in order to seize and hold Siboney. 
 
 On the twenty-third the disembarkation was continued and 
 about 6,000 more men landed. Early on this date General 
 Lawton's advance reached Siboney, the Spanish garrison of 
 about 600 men retiring as he came up and ofTering no opposi- 
 tion except a few scattering shots at long range. Some of 
 the Cuban troops pursued the retreating Spaniards and skir- 
 
i84 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 mished with them. During the afternoon of this date the dis- 
 embarkation of Kent's division was commenced at Siboney, 
 which enabled us to estabhsh a base eight miles nearer Santi- 
 ago. The unloading of troops and supplies was continued at 
 both Daiquiri and Siboney. The disembarkation was con- 
 tinued throughout the night of the twenty-third, and by the 
 evening of the twenty-fourth it was practically completed. 
 
 The orders for June 24 contemplated General Lawton's 
 division taking a strong defensive position a short distance 
 from Siboney, on the road to Santiago ; Kent's division was 
 to be held near Siboney, where he disembarked ; Bates's brig- 
 ade was to take position in support of Lawton, while Wheel- 
 er's division was to be somewhat to the rear on the road from 
 Siboney to Daiquiri. It was intended to maintain this situa- 
 tion until the troops and transportation were disembarked, 
 and a reasonable quantity of necessary supplies landed. Gen- 
 eral Young's brigade, however, passed beyond Lawton on the 
 night of the twenty-third, thus taking the advance, and on 
 the morning of the latter date became engaged with a Span- 
 ish force intrenched in a strong position at La Guasima, a 
 point on the Santiago road, about three miles from Siboney. 
 General Young's force consisted of one squadron of the 1st 
 Cavalry, one of the lOth Cavalry and two of the ist U. S. 
 Volunteer Cavalry ; in all 964 officers and men. The enemy 
 made an obstinate resistance, but were driven from the field 
 with considerable loss. Our own loss was one officer and fif- 
 teen men killed; six officers and forty-six men wounded. The 
 engagement had an inspiriting effect upon our men and, doubt- 
 less, correspondingly depressed the enemy, as it was now 
 plainly demonstrated to them that they had a foe to meet 
 who would advance upon them under their heavy fire delivered 
 from intrenchments. General Wheeler, Division Commander, 
 was present during the engagement and reports that our 
 troops, officers and men, fought with the greatest gallantry. 
 This engagement gave us a well-watered country farther to 
 the front, on which to encamp. 
 
 The unloading of transportation and subsistence stores, so 
 that we might have several days' rations on shore, was con- 
 tinued durincf the remainder of the month. This work was 
 
THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 185 
 
 ably superintended by Lieutenant-Colonel Charles F. Hum- 
 phrey, Deputy Quartermaster General U. S. A., and Colonel 
 John F. Weston, Assistant Commissary General of Subsist- 
 ence, Chief Commissary. Nothwithstanding their utmost 
 efforts, it was with great difficulty that supplies were landed 
 in excess of those required daily to feed the men and animals, 
 and the loss of the scow, mentioned as having broken away 
 during the voyage, as well as the loss at sea of lighters sent 
 by the Quartermaster Department was greatly felt. The lack 
 of wharves, scows, steam-lighters and steam-launches can be 
 appreciated only by those who were on the ground directing 
 the disembarkation and landing of supplies. It was not until 
 nearly two weeks after the army landed that it was possible 
 to place on shore three days' supplies in excess of those re- 
 quired for the daily consumption. 
 
 On June 30, I personally reconnoitered the country about 
 Santiago and completed the plan of attack. From a high hill, 
 from which the city was in plain view, the San Juan Hill 
 could be seen and the country about El Caney. The roads 
 were very poor, indeed little better than bridle paths, until 
 the San Juan River and El Caney were reached. The posi- 
 tion of El Caney, to the northeast of Santiago, was of great 
 importance to the enemy as holding the Guantanamo road, as 
 well as furnishing shelter for a strong outpost that might be 
 used to assail the right flank and rear of any force operating 
 against San Juan Hill. In view of this, I decided to begin 
 the attack next day at El Caney with one division, while 
 sending two divisions on the direct road to Santiago, passing 
 by El Pozo House, and, as a diversion, to direct a small force 
 against Aguadores from Siboney, along the railroad by the 
 sea, with a view of attracting the attention of the Spaniards 
 in the latter direction, and of preventing them from attack- 
 ing our left flank or going to the support of Santiago garrison. 
 
 During the afternoon of June 30, the division commanders 
 were assembled, and the general plan of battle was explained 
 to them.' Lawton's division, assisted by Capron's light bat- 
 tery, was ordered to move out during the afternoon towards 
 El Caney, to begin the attack there early the next morning. 
 After carrying El Caney, Lawton was to move by the Caney 
 
i86 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 road towards Santiago and take position on the right of the 
 line. Wheeler's division of dismounted cavalry, and Kent's 
 division of infantry, were directed on the Santiago road, the 
 head of the column resting near El Pozo. Toward these 
 heights Grimes's battery moved on the afternoon of the 30th, 
 with orders to take position thereon early the next morning 
 and, at the proper time, to prepare the way for the advance 
 of Wheeler and Kent on San Juan Hill. The attack at this 
 point was to be delayed until Lawton's guns were heard at 
 El Caney and his infantry fire showed that he had become 
 well engaged. 
 
 The history of the disasters of previous expeditions in that 
 climate determined me to bring on the battle at the earliest 
 possible moment. The preparations were far from what I 
 desired them to be, but if we were to succeed the blow must 
 be struck promptly. We were in a sickly climate ; our sup- 
 plies had to be brought forward by a narrow wagon road 
 which the rains might at any time render impassable ; fears 
 were entertained that a storm might drive the vessels con- 
 taining our stores to sea, thus separating us from our supplies ; 
 and lastly, it was reported that General Pando, with 8,000 
 reinforcements for the enemy, was en route from Manzanillo 
 and might be expected in a few days. 
 
 Early on the morning of July i, Lawton was in position 
 around El Caney, Chaffee's brigade on the right across the 
 Guantanamo road, Miles's brigade in the center and Ludlow's 
 on the left. The duty of cutting off the enemy's retreat, 
 along the Santiago road, was assigned to the latter brigade. 
 The artillery opened on the town at 6:15 A. M. The battle 
 here soon became general and was hotly contested. The 
 enemy's position was naturally strong and was rendered more 
 so by blockhouses, a stone fort, intrenchments cut in solid 
 rock and the loopholing of a solidly built stone church. The 
 opposition offered by the enemy was greater than had been 
 anticipated and prevented Lawton from joining the right 
 of the main line, during the day, as had been intended. 
 After the battle had continued for some time, Bates's brigade 
 of two regiments reached my headquarters from Siboney. I 
 directed him to move near El Caney, to give assistance if 
 
THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 187 
 
 necessary. He did so and was put in position between Miles 
 and Chaffee. The battle continued with varying intensity 
 during most of the day and until the place was carried by 
 assault about 4:30 P. M. As the Spaniards endeavored to 
 retreat along the Santiago road, Ludlow's position enabled 
 him to do very effective work and practically to cut off all 
 retreat in that direction. 
 
 After the battle of El Caney was well opened, and the 
 sound of the small-arms fire caused me to believe that Lawtou 
 was driving the enemy before him, I directed Grimes's battery 
 to open fire from the heights of El Pozo on the San Juan 
 blockhouse, which was visible in the enemy's intrenchmcnts 
 that extended along the crest of San Juan Hill. This fire 
 was effective and the enemy could be seen running away from 
 the vicinity of the blockhouse. The artillery fire from El 
 Pozo was soon returned by the enemy's artillery. They evi- 
 dently had the range of this hill and their first shells killed 
 and wounded several of our men. As the Spaniards used 
 smokeless powder it was very difficult to locate the positions 
 of their pieces while, on the contrary, the smoke caused by 
 our black powder plainly indicated the position of our batterw 
 
 At this time the cavalry division under General Sumner, 
 which was lying concealed in the general vicinity of the El 
 Pozo House, was ordered forward with direction to cross 
 the San Juan River and deploy to the right on the Santiago 
 side, while Kent's division was to follow closely in its rear 
 and deploy to the left. These troops moved forward in com- 
 pliance with orders, but the road was so narrow as to render 
 it impracticable to retain the column of fours formation at all 
 points, while the undergrowth on either side was so dense as 
 to preclude the possibility of deploying skirmishers. It 
 naturally resulted that the progress made was slow, and the 
 long-range rifles of the enemy's infantry killed and wounded 
 a number of our men while marching along this road and 
 before there was any opportunity to return the fire. 
 
 At this time Generals Kent and Sumner were ordered to 
 push forward with all possible haste and place their troops in 
 position to engage the enemy. General Kent, with this end 
 in view, forced the head of his column alongside of the cavali\ 
 
i88 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 column as far as the narrow trail permitted and thus hurried his 
 arrival at the San Juan and the formation beyond that stream. 
 A few hundred yards before reaching the San Juan, the road 
 forks, — a fact that was discovered by Lieutenant-Colonel 
 Derby of my staff, who had approached well to the front in a 
 war balloon. This information he furnished to the troops, 
 with the result that Sumner moved on the right hand road, 
 while Kent was enabled to utilize the road to the left. 
 
 General Wheeler, the permanent commander of the cavalry 
 division, who had been ill, came forward during the mornino- 
 and later returned to duty, rendering most gallant and 
 efficient service during the remainder of the day. 
 
 After crossing this stream, the cavalry moved to the right 
 with a view of connecting with Lawton's left when he should 
 come up, and with their left resting near the Santiago road. 
 In the meanwhile Kent's division, with the exception of two 
 regiments of Hawkins's brigade, being thus uncovered, moved 
 rapidly to the front from the forks in the road previously 
 mentioned, utilizing both trails, but more especially the one 
 to the left, and having crossed the creek formed for attack in 
 front of San Juan Hill. During the formation, the Third 
 Brigade suffered severely. While personally superintending 
 this movement, its gallant commander. Colonel Wikoff, was 
 killed. The command of the brigade then devolved upon 
 Lieutenant-Colonel Worth, 13th Infantry, who was soon 
 severely wounded, and next upon Lieutenant-Colonel Liscum, 
 24th Infantry, who, five minutes later, also fell under the 
 terrible fire of the enemy. The command of the brigade 
 then devolved upon Lieutenant-Colonel Ewers, 9th Infantry. 
 
 While the formation just described was taking place. Gen- 
 eral Kent took measures to hurry forward his rear brigade. 
 The loth and 2nd Infantry were ordered to follow WikoiY's 
 brigade, while the 21st was sent on the right hand road to 
 support the 1st Brigade under General Hawkins, who had 
 crossed the stream and formed on the right of the division. 
 The 2nd and loth Infantry, Colonel E. P. Pearson command- 
 ing, moved forward in good order on the left of the division, 
 passed over a green knoll and drove the enemy back towards 
 his trenches. 
 
THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 189 
 
 After completing their formation, and advancing a short 
 distance, both divisions found in their front a wide bottom, 
 intersected by several lines of barbed wire fence, beyond 
 which there was a high hill, along whose crest the enemy was 
 strongly intrenched. Nothing daunted, these gallant men 
 pushed on and drove the enemy from his chosen position, 
 both divisions losing heavily. In the action on this part of 
 the field, most efificient service was rendered by Lieutenant 
 John H. Parker, 13th Infantry, and the Gatling gun detach- 
 ment under his command. 
 
 Words fail to do justice to the gallant conduct of regi- 
 mental commanders and their heroic men in this fierce 
 encounter, for, while the generals indicated the formations 
 and the points of attack, it was, after all, the intrepid 
 bravery of the subordinate oflficers and men that planted our 
 colors on the crest of San Juan Hill and drove the enemy 
 from his trenches and blockhouses, thus gaining a position 
 which sealed the fate of Santiago. 
 
 The fighting continued, at intervals, until nightfall, but our 
 men held resolutely to the positions gained at the cost of so 
 much blood and toil. During the night Lieutenant-Colonel 
 Derby collected and sent forward the necessary tools, and 
 later in the night trenches of very considerable strength were 
 constructed. During the afternoon Major Dillenbeck, by my 
 order, brought forward the two remaining batteries of his 
 battalion and put them in position at El Pozo, to the left of 
 Grimes. Later in the afternoon all three batteries were 
 moved forward to positions near the firing line, but the 
 nature of the country and the intensity of the enemy's small- 
 arms fire was such that no substantial results were gained by 
 our artillery in the new positions. The batteries were 
 intrenched during the night. The diversion at Aguadores 
 was successful, in that the Spaniards who were there were 
 held so that they could not withdraw to reinforce those in 
 Santiago. 
 
 After the brilliant and important victory gained at El 
 Caney, Lawton started his tired troops, who had been fight- 
 ing all day and marching much of the night before, to con- 
 nect with the right of the cavalry division. Night came on 
 
igo THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 before this movement could be accomplished. In the dark- 
 ness, the enemy's pickets were encountered, and the Division 
 Commander, being uncertain of the ground and as to what 
 might be in his front, halted his command and reported the 
 situation to me. This information was received about 12:30 
 A. M. General Lawton was directed to march by the road 
 passing my headquarters and the El Pozo House, as the only 
 certain way of gaining his new position. 
 
 My headquarters were practically on a line from El Caney 
 to Aguadores, at the junction of the Santiago and El Caney 
 roads and from a mile to a mile and a half to the rear of the 
 center of the line. Lawton's division returned along the 
 Caney road to the Santiago road, thence along the Santiago 
 road to the San Juan river and took position on the right of 
 the cavalry division early the next morning, the morning of 
 the second. Chaffee's brigade arrived first about half past 
 seven.'and the other brigades before noon. 
 
 On the night of July i, the 34th Michigan and 9th Massa- 
 chusetts, which had just arrived at Siboney from the United 
 States, were brought forward. The 34th Michigan was 
 placed in the rear of Kent, and the 9th Massachusetts was 
 assigned to Bates, who placed it on his left. 
 
 Soon after daylight on July 2 the Spaniards opened fire, 
 but with the intrenchments made during the night by our 
 troops, the approach of Lawton's division and the presence of 
 Bates's brigade, which had taken position during the night 
 on Kent's left, little apprehension was felt as to our ability to 
 repel the Spaniards and to hold our position. 
 
 It is proper to state here that General Bates and his bri- 
 gade performed most arduous and efificient service, having 
 marched much of the night of June 30 and a good part of 
 the next day, during which they also participated in the 
 battle of El Caney. After this they proceeded, by way of 
 El Pozo, to the left of the line at San Juan, reaching the new 
 position about midnight. 
 
 All day on the second the battle raged with more or less 
 fury, but such of our troops as were in position at daylight 
 held their ground, and Lawton also gained a strong and com- 
 manding position on the right. About 10 P. M. the enemy 
 
THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 191 
 
 made an assault on one of our pickets and for a short time 
 firing was general throughout the line, but no advantage was 
 gained on either side. 
 
 On the morning of the third of July the battle was renewed, 
 but the enemy seemed to have expended his energy in the 
 assault of the previous night, and the firing along the lines 
 was desultory until stopped by the sending of the following 
 letter within the Spanish lines : 
 
 Headquarters United States Forces, 
 
 Near San Juan River, July 3, 1898, 8:30 a. m. 
 
 To THE Commanding General of the 
 Spanish Forces, Santiago de Cuba. 
 
 Sir : I shall be obliged, unless you surrender, to shell Santiago 
 de Cuba. Please inform the citizens of foreign countries, and 
 all women and children, that they should leave the city before 
 10 o'clock to-morrow morning. 
 
 Very respectfully, 
 
 Your obedient servant, 
 William R. Shafter, 
 
 Major- General, 
 U. S. V. 
 
 To this letter the following reply was received : 
 
 Santiago de Cuba, July 3, 1898. 
 
 His Excellency, 
 The General Commanding Forces 
 
 of the U. S., Near San Juan River. 
 
 Sir: I have the honor to reply to your communication of 
 to-day, written at 8 130 A. M. and received at i P. M., demand- 
 ing the surrender of this city, or in the contrary case announc- 
 ing to me that you will bombard this city and that I advise 
 the foreigners, women and children, that they must leave the 
 city before 10 o'clock to-morrow morning. 
 
 It is my duty to say to you that this city will not surrender 
 and that I will inform the foreign consuls and inhabitants of 
 the contents of your message. 
 
 Very respectfully, 
 
 Jos6 ToRAL, 
 Commander in Chief, \th Corps. 
 
192 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 The first message went under a flag of truce at 12 : 30 P. M. 
 I was of the opinion that the Spaniards would surrender if 
 given a reasonable time and thought this result would be 
 hastened if the men of their army could be made to under- 
 stand how they would be treated as prisoners of war. Acting 
 upon this presumption, it seemed best to offer to return all 
 the wounded Spanish officers at El Caney who were able to 
 bear transportation, and who were willing to give their paroles 
 not to serve against the forces of the United States until 
 regularly exchanged. This offer was made and accepted. 
 These officers, as well as several of the wounded Spanish pri- 
 vates, twenty-seven in all, were sent to their lines under the 
 escort of some of our mounted cavalry. Our troops were 
 received with honors, and there is every reason to believe that 
 the return of the Spanish prisoners and what they told of the 
 treatment they had received from us produced a favorable 
 impression on their comrades. The cessation of firing about 
 noon on the third practically terminated the battle of Santiago. 
 
 After deducting the detachments retained at Siboney and 
 Daiquiri to render those depots secure from attack ; organiza- 
 tions held to protect our flanks ; others acting as escorts and 
 guards to light batteries ; the members of the Hospital Corps ; 
 guards left in charge of blanket rolls, which the intense heat 
 caused the men to cast aside before entering battle ; orderlies, 
 etc., it is doubtful if we had more than 12,000 men on the 
 firing line on July i, when the battle was fiercest and when 
 the important and strong positions and San Juan Hill were 
 captured. A few Cubans assisted in the attack on El Caney 
 and fought valiantly, but their numbers were too small to 
 change materially the strength as indicated above. 
 
 The enemy confronted us with numbers about equal to our 
 own, they fought obstinately in strong and intrenched posi- 
 tions, and the results obtained clearly indicate the intrepid 
 gallantry of the company officers and men and the benefits 
 derived from the careful training and instructions given our 
 troops during recent years, in rifle practice and other battle 
 exercises. 
 
 Our losses in all these battles embracing the actions at San 
 Juan Hill, El Caney and Aguadores July i and 3 and the 
 
THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. i93 
 
 actions around Santiago July lo and 12 were: killed, 22 offi- 
 cers and 222 enlisted men ; wounded, 93 officers and 1,288 
 enlisted men. 
 
 On the night of July 2 the Spanish garrison of Santiago was 
 reinforced by about 3,000 troops under General Escario. 
 General Garcia, with between four and five thousand Cubans, 
 had been intrusted with the duty of watching for these 
 reinforcements and intercepting them, but for some reason he 
 failed to do so, and General Escario passed into the city along 
 my extreme right near the bay. Up to this time I had been 
 unable to complete the investment of the town with my own 
 men, but to prevent any more reinforcements coming in, or 
 the enemy escaping, I extended the lines as rapidly as possible 
 to the extreme right and completed the investment of the 
 place, leaving General Garcia's forces in the rear of our right 
 flank, to scout the country for any approaching Spanish rein- 
 forcements, a duty which his forces were very competent to 
 perform. 
 
 In the battle of Santiago, the Spanish Navy endeavored to 
 shell our troops on the extreme right, but the latter were con- 
 cealed by the inequalities of the ground, and the shells did 
 little if any harm. Their naval forces also assisted in the 
 trenches, having 1,000 on shore, and I am informed that tkcy 
 sustained considerable loss, — among others Admiral Cervcra's 
 chief of staff was killed. Being convinced that the city woukl 
 fall, Admiral Cervera determined to put to sea, informing the 
 French Consul that it was better to die fighting than to sink 
 his ships. The news of the great naval victory which followed 
 was enthusiastically received by the army. 
 
 Information of our naval victory was transmitted under a 
 flag of truce to the Spanish Commander at Santiago on July 
 4, and the suggestion was again made that he surrender to 
 save needless effusion of blood. On the same date I informed 
 Admiral Sampson that, if he would force his way into thc 
 harbor, the city would surrender without any further loss of 
 time Commodore Watson replied that Admiral Schley was 
 temporarily absent, but that in his (Watson's) opinion the 
 Navy should not enter the harbor. 
 
 In the meanwhile- letters passing between General Toral 
 
194 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR.. 
 
 and myself caused the cessation of hostilities to continue. 
 Each army, however, continued to strengthen its intrench- 
 ments. Being still of the opinion that the Spaniards would 
 surrender without much more fighting, on July 6, I called Gen- 
 eral Toral's attention to the changed conditions and at his 
 request gave him time to consult his home government. This 
 he did, asking that the British Consul with the employes of 
 the Cable Company be permitted to return from EI Caney to 
 the city. His request was granted. 
 
 The strength of the enemy's position was such that I did 
 not wish to make an assault if it could be avoided. An 
 examination of the enemy's works, made after the surrender, 
 fully justified the wisdom of the course adopted. The 
 intrenchments could have been carried only with very great 
 loss of life, probably with not less than three thousand killed 
 and wounded. 
 
 On July 8, General Toral offered to march out of the city 
 with arms and baggage, provided that he would not be mo- 
 lested before reaching Holguin, and to surrender to the Amer- 
 ican forces the territory then occupied by him. I replied that, 
 while his proposition should be submitted to my home gov- 
 ernment, I did not think that it would be accepted. 
 
 Meanwhile arrangements were made with Admiral Sampson 
 that when the Army again engaged the enemy, the Navy 
 would assist by shelling the city from ships stationed off 
 Aguadores, dropping a shell every few minutes. 
 
 On July lo, the ist Illinois and the ist District of Columbia 
 regiments arrived and were placed on the line to the right of 
 the cavalry division. This enabled me to push Lawton's line 
 farther to the right and practically to command the Cobra 
 road. 
 
 On the afternoon of the date last mentioned, the truce 
 was broken at 4 r. M. I determined to open with four bat- 
 teries of artillery and went forward in person to the trenches, 
 to give the necessary orders, but the enemy anticipated us 
 by opening fire with his artillery, a few minutes after the hour 
 stated. His batteries were apparently silenced before night, 
 while ours continued playing upon his trenches until dark. 
 During this firing, the Navy fired from Aguadores, most of 
 
THE SAxNTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 195 
 
 the shells falHng in the city. There was also some small- 
 arms firing. 
 
 On the morning of July li, the bombardment by the 
 Navy and our field guns was renewed and continued until 
 nearly noon, and on the same day a report was sent to the 
 Adjutant-General of the Army that the right of Ludlow's 
 brigade of Lawton's division rested on the bay. Thus our 
 hold upon the enemy was complete. At 2 p. M. on this date, 
 the eleventh, the surrender of the city was again demanded. 
 The firing ceased and was not again renewed. 
 
 By this date, the sickness in my army was increasing very 
 rapidly, as a result of exposure in the trenches to the intense 
 heat of the sun, the heavy rains and the dews which, in Cuba, 
 are almost equal to rains. The weakness of the troops was 
 becoming so apparent that I was anxious to bring the siege 
 to an end, but in common with most of the officers of the 
 army I did not think an assault would be justifiable, especially 
 as the enemy seemed to be acting in good faith in his pre- 
 liminary propositions to surrender. 
 
 On July II, I wrote General Toral as follows: 
 
 "With the largely increased forces which have come to me, 
 and the fact that I have your line of retreat securely in my 
 hands, the time seems fitting that I should again demand of 
 your Excellency the surrender of Santiago and of your 
 Excellency's army. I am authorized to state that should 
 your Excellency so desire, the Government of the United 
 States will transport the entire command of your Excellency 
 to Spain." 
 
 General Toral replied that he had communicated my prop- 
 osition to his General-in-Chief, General Blanco. 
 
 July 12, I informed the Spanish Commander that Major- 
 General Miles, Commander-in-Chief of the American Army, 
 had just arrived in camp and requested him to grant us a 
 personal interview on the following day. He replied that he 
 would be pleased to meet us. The interview took place on 
 the thirteenth, and I informed General Toral that only his 
 surrender could be considered and that as he was without 
 hope of escape he had no right to continue the fight. 
 
 On the fourteenth another interview took place, during 
 
196 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 which General Toral agreed to surrender, upon the basis of 
 his Army, the 4th Army Corps, being returned to Spain, the 
 capitulation embracing all of eastern Cuba, east of a line pass- 
 ing from Asseraderos on the south to Sagua de Tanamo on 
 the north, via Palma Soriano. It was agreed that commis- 
 sioners should meet during the afternoon to arrange definitely 
 the terms of surrender, and I appointed Major-Generals 
 Wheeler and Lawton and Lieutenant Miley to represent the 
 United States. 
 
 The Spanish Commissioners raised many points and were 
 especially desirous of retaining their arms. The discussion 
 lasted until late at night and was renewed at 9:30 next morn- 
 ing. The terms of surrender finally agreed upon included 
 about 12,000 Spanish troops in the city and as many more in 
 the surrendered district. There were included also a small 
 gun-boat and about 200 seamen, together with five merchant- 
 ships in the harbor. One of these vessels, the Mexico, 
 had been used as a war vessel and had four guns mounted 
 on it. 
 
 It was arranged that the formal surrender should take place 
 between the lines on the morning of July 17, each army being 
 represented by lOO armed men. At the time appointed, I ap- 
 peared at the place agreed upon accompanied by my staff, 
 my general officers and their stafT, and lOO troopers of the 
 2nd Cavalry under Captain Lloyd M. Brett. General Toral 
 also arrived with a number of his oflficers and 100 Infantry. 
 We met midway between the representatives of our two 
 armies, and the Spanish Commander formally consummated 
 the surrender of the city of Santiago and the 24,000 troops 
 in the city and the surrendered district. 
 
 After this ceremony, I entered the city with staff and es- 
 cort, and at twelve o'clock, noon, with appropriate cere- 
 monies, the American flag was hoisted over the governor's 
 palace by Captain McKittrick and Lieutenant Miley of my 
 staff and Lieutenant Wheeler of General Wheeler's staff. 
 
 On August 4, I received orders to begin embarkation for 
 transfer to Montauk Point, Long Island, New York. The 
 movement continued without interruption until August 25, 
 when I sailed for Montauk with the last troops of my com- 
 
THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 197 
 
 mand, turning over the district of Santiago to Major-General 
 Lawton. 
 
 Something may be said of the natural obstacles which had 
 to be encountered and which no foresight could have over- 
 come or obviated. The rocky and precipitous coast afforded 
 no sheltered landing places, the roads were mere bridle paths, 
 the effect of the tropical sun and rains upon unacclimated 
 troops was deadly, and a dread of strange and unknown 
 diseases had its moral effect upon the army. 
 
 At Daiquiri, the landing of the troops and stores was made 
 at a small wooden wharf, which the Spaniards tried unsuccess- 
 fully to burn, and the animals were pushed into the water and 
 guided to a sandy beach about 200 yards in extent. At 
 Siboney, the landing was made on the beach and at a small 
 wharf erected by the engineers, I had neither the time nor 
 the men to spare to construct permanent wharves. At times 
 the roads were impassable for wagons. The San Juan and 
 Aguadores rivers would often suddenly rise so much as to 
 prevent the passage of wagons, and then the eight pack trains 
 with the command had to be depended upon for the victual- 
 ling of the troops, as well as the 20,000 refugees, who could 
 not, in the interest of humanity, be left to starve while we 
 had rations. Often for days nothing could be moved except 
 on pack trains. After the great physical strain and exposure 
 of July I and 2, the malarial and other fevers began rapidly to 
 advance throughout the command, and on July 4 the yellow 
 fever appeared at Siboney. 
 
 The supply of Quartermaster and Commissary stores dur- 
 ing the campaign was ample and, notwithstanding the difficul- 
 ties in landing and transporting the ration, the troops on the 
 firing line were at all times supplied with its coarser compo- 
 nents, namely, bread, meat, sugar and coffee. 
 
 The sick and wounded received every attention that it wa^ 
 possible to give them. The medical ofificers, without excep- 
 tion, worked night and day to alleviate the suffering, which was 
 no greater than invariably accompanies a campaign. Of the 
 wounded, only fourteen died as the result of their wounds. 
 Each soldier and officer carried into action what was termed 
 a " First aid package," — a small supply of bandages and anti- 
 
198 
 
 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 septic dressing. In many cases, the wounds were so well 
 dressed on the battle-field by use of these packages that it 
 was not found necessary to remove the dressing until after 
 the wounded men returned to the United States. 
 
 In closing, it is proper to say a word in regard to the disci- 
 pline of the command. It is a remarkable fact that not an 
 officer or enlisted man was brought to trial by court-martial 
 during this campaign. The discipline of the entire command 
 was superb. 
 
 ""^^^^^^^ 
 
I\ 
 
CHAPTER X. 
 MILES'S CAMPAIGN IN PUERTO RICO. 
 
 BY 
 
 Capt. henry H. WHITNEY, U. S. A,, Assistant Adjutant-General. 
 
 " During a campaign, whatever is not profoundly considered in all its 
 detail is without result. Every enterprise should be conducted according 
 to a system ; chance alone can never bring success." — Napoleon. 
 
 PUERTO RICO was a strong base of supplies for the 
 Spaniards in Cuba, and as it was known that the rainy 
 season did not begin until late in August, it seems to 
 have been the plan of the Major-General Commanding to 
 strike the first real blow there, making it a secondary base of 
 operations against Cuba later in the fall. But the presence 
 of Cervera's fleet changed the plan, when the Navy asked for 
 the Army's assistance at Santiago. When this bugaboo of the 
 seas had been so brilliantly disposed of, and General Miles 
 had taken reinforcements to Shafter's army and with them 
 the prestige of a " Master of Victory," he hurried to Guan- 
 tanamo to assemble his Puerto Rican expedition. 
 
 Every contingency that might arise had been foreseen, and 
 on the 15th of July, requisition by cable was made for a train 
 of 800 pack mules complete, 400 freight travois with saddle^^, 
 an abundant supply of medical stores, hospital supplies, 
 ambulances and tentage, dock construction corps with labor- 
 ers, steain tugs and lighters, and $100,000 for hire of native 
 transportation and purchase of horses. All infantiy was to 
 be supplied with smokeless powder arms, and there was to be 
 sent a full allowance of transportation for all commands. 
 
 Several days were spent waiting for the necessary naval 
 convoy; finally, on the 2ist of July, the fleet set sail, com- 
 posed of the following vessels: transports Lampasas, Nueces, 
 
200 . THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 City of Macon, ComancJic, Unionist, Specialist, Rita and Still- 
 zuatc?-, together with the cruiser Columbia and converted 
 cruiser Yale, with a grand total of 3,554 fighting men. The con- 
 voying squadron was composed of the U. S. Battleship Massa- 
 cJmsetts, the U. S. converted yacht Gloucester, and the U. S. 
 converted yacht Dixie. The cruiser Columbia, and auxiliary 
 cruiser Yale, having troops aboard, are not properly consid- 
 ered part of the convoy. 
 
 When the invasion of Puerto Rico was definitely decided 
 upon, a temporary landing on Vieques, or Crab Island, about 
 13 miles east of the main island, was considered. This could 
 be effected without opposition, hospitals established, the 
 troops from Cuba recuperated and a landing made, when the 
 proper time came, at any desired point on the main island. 
 But after the fever had broken out, it was not deemed safe to 
 take any of the Cuban troops. Besides, Santiago had fallen 
 and it was important to seize Puerto Rico and make secure 
 some of the substantial fruits of victory, before the enemy7 
 seeing the hopelessness of the struggle, sued for peace. So, 
 on the representation of naval ofificers who had cruised along 
 the eastern coast, Point Fajado, on the northeast coast, was 
 selected, and on the i6th of July General Miles cabled that re- 
 inforcements on transports coming from the United States be 
 directed to proceed to that point. 
 
 When, on leaving the Windward Passage, the bows of the 
 ships turned eastward on their hazardous mission, the General 
 Commanding had with him very little more means for disem- 
 barking on a strange and hostile shore than did Columbus 
 when he sailed westward on adjoining seas some four centu- 
 ries before. The fleet moved slowly, expecting to be over- 
 taken by or fall in with transports bringing reinforcements 
 and appliances for landing quickly. Finally the northern end 
 of Mona Passage was reached, but no looked-for ships ap- 
 peared. The problem now became a serious one for the Gen- 
 eral Commanding, who had but 3,554 unskilled troops with 
 which to land in the face of between eight and nine thousand 
 Spanish regulars and more than that many armed volunteers, 
 the majority of whom could concentrate at any point on the 
 coast in from four to five days. The waters about Point 
 
MILES'S CAMPAIGN IN PUERTO RICO. 201 
 
 Fajado, the selected landing place, might be used as a rendez- 
 vous for the naval vessels in fair weather, but is nothing of a 
 harbor at which to land troops and munitions of war without 
 the means at hand for disembarking, and with no prospect of 
 securing any on arrival. As the landing place had been well 
 advertised in our own press, the Spanish commander evi- 
 dently knew of our intention and would bring artillery from 
 the Capital, some 35 to 40 miles away, over passable roads, 
 and entrench on the hills commanding the beach. This, it 
 was learned afterwards, had in a measure, been done, when a 
 naval vessel touching at this point brought away some Puer- 
 to Rican refugees. So common prudence as well as one of the 
 first principles of strategy demanded that the landing be 
 made elsewhere in an unexpected quarter. 
 
 An officer on the staff of the Major-General Commanding 
 had made, in May, a hasty reconnaissance of the southern 
 portion of the island and had gathered important information 
 about the harbors on that coast and noted the number and lo- 
 cation of the native lighters, means for defence, etc. It was 
 known that on the south coast Guanica was the best harbor 
 of which there was a chart, and it was reported to be unmined 
 and undefended. It opened into the most disaffected district 
 of the island. Four miles from its head, at Yauco, is the ter- 
 minus of a railroad, fifteen miles long, leading to Ponce. The 
 town of Ponce could be taken easily, being practically unde- 
 fended because the troops had been withdrawn to oppose our 
 projected advance from the east. Ponce once occupied, we 
 would have the largest town on the island, the end of a cable, 
 and the terminus of the fine military read leading to the Capi- 
 tal. 
 
 The General's mind was soon made up, and he signalled to 
 the Admiral of the fleet, (Captain Higginson) his desire to 
 change the objective. As fast as the signal flag could spell 
 out the words, came back the message of the naval commander, 
 with hearty co-operation, " All right, Guanica it is," and the 
 ships were""prom^rhr lieaded south by southwest into the 
 Mona Passage, a vessel being dispatched to Cape San Juan to 
 redirect any transports that should arrive there. 
 
 With all lights out and absolute quiet aboard, the fleet 
 
202 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 crept through the passage, close to the shore, and arrived off 
 Guanica harbor on the morning of July 25. The Gloucester 
 (Commander Wainwright) was sent forward to reconnoiter. 
 She made her way slowly at first, zigzagging her course back 
 and forth across the mouth of the harbor, feeling for possible 
 mines or torpedoes, more mindful, apparently, of the safety 
 of the transports to follow than of her own. When sure that 
 the way was unobstructed, she struck straight in, followed 
 closely by the transports. Spanish troops, to the number of 
 about 250 were occupying the village but retreated when a 
 few shells from the Gloucester were thrown about them. The 
 marines, two companies of the provisional engineer battalion 
 and several companies of infantry were put ashore in ship's 
 boats, a skirmish line was formed and shortly afterwards out- 
 posts established. Brigadier-General Gilmore, who was the 
 first general officer to land, superintended the disembarka- 
 tion. Upon opening fire the inhabitants, terror stricken, fled 
 from the town to the hills. During the day word was sent to 
 them to return to their homes, which, before night, they did 
 and were very demonstrative in their expressions of joy at the 
 arrival of the Americans. It was the policy of the General 
 Commanding to make the best impression upon the natives on 
 the initial landing, knowing how rapidly the news of arrival 
 would travel over the island and the effect his every act would 
 have upon future operations in the interior. The Spaniards 
 / had'caused reports to be circulated freely among the ignorant, 
 mainly through the priesthood, that the American soldiers were 
 I giant ravishers who, though impotent against Spanish arms, 
 would despoil their homes and destroy their property. At the 
 date of invasion, therefore, a large proportion of the illiterate 
 native element were in doubt whether to support the ills 
 they already had or to fly to others that might be worse. The 
 best protection to life and property was what they wanted 
 and what they would fight for. General Miles showed by his 
 treatment of the inhabitants that the complete success of the 
 expedition depended as much on the conciliation of them as 
 upon the force of his arms. 
 
 Our arrival was a complete surprise, as was afterwards 
 learned, the enemy having no intimation of our proximity. 
 
MILES'S CAMPAIGN IN PUERTO RICO. 203 
 
 On the morning of July 26 General Garretson, with parts of 
 the 6th Mass. and the 6th 111. regiments of his brigade, under- 
 took a reconnaissance, in force, to about three miles beyond 
 Guanica along the road towards Yauco. He found the 
 Spanish troops in position on a hill along a solid angle 
 formed by the intersection of the north and east slopes. The 
 enemy opened fire on the advance guard of his force from a 
 position on a hill to the west. The suddenness and volume 
 of the fire caused a momentary confusion among our troops, 
 but they were quickly steadied, and in a spirited engagement 
 drove the Spaniards from their position into the valley be- 
 yond. The force of the enemy engaged consisted of batta- 
 lion 25 ("Patria") of the Spanish regulars and some volun- 
 teers — in all about 600 to 700 men. The casualties on the 
 American side were two officers and two enlisted men slightly 
 wounded. The casualties of the enemy were reported to be 
 one lieutenant and one cornet killed, eighteen seriously and 
 thirty-two slightly wounded. On the following day, July 
 27, a further reconnaissance established the fact that the 
 enemy had retreated beyond Yauco, which a part of General 
 Henry's command promptly occupied. 
 
 Several staunch lighters were found in the harbor and 
 these, towed by two navy steam launches, were of great assis- 
 tance in disembarking the light batteries, ammunition and 
 supplies. The Chief Engineer, Lt.-Col. Black, built a pon- 
 toon bridge 260 feet long, employing the battalion of provi- 
 sional engineers under Maj. Sackett. On this bridge most 
 of the animals and stores were unloaded and it has been con- 
 tinued in use almost daily up to the present time. 
 
 As Ponce was our real objective, Guanica being what might 
 be called an accidental one, on account of its harbor, the Dixie, 
 followed by Capt. Higginson with the rest of the naval con- 
 voy, moved into the port of Ponce on the evening of July 
 27, and its commander, through one of his of^cers. Ensign 
 Curtin, took possession of the Playa without opposition. 
 Seventy lighters and several schooners that were in the har- 
 bor were seized by the navy and declared prizes of war. On 
 suspension of hostilities the lighters were turned over to the 
 army for proper disposition, when it was found that they 
 were the property of private citizens. 
 
204 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 On the morning of July 28, General Miles, accompanied 
 by his staff, landed, formally took possession and raised the 
 National colors and the headquarters flag over the custom 
 house. Maj.-Gen. Jas. H. Wilson, who had arrived at Gua- 
 nica with his command on the tvv^enty-seventh, was sent for- 
 ward to occupy the city of Ponce two miles inland from, the 
 port. The Spanish troops, numbering about 500, retreated 
 on our approach, leaving arms and ammunition in store-houses 
 and barracks. Before retiring they endeavored to destroy 
 the railroad property at the station, planting mines along the 
 route to Yauco, setting fire to the rolling stock, breaking 
 down the telegraph lines and destroying the cable instru- 
 ments. The railroad, under the energetic supervision of Brig. 
 Gen. Roy Stone, was soon put in running order and the tele- 
 graph lines were promptly repaired by the Signal Corps under 
 the immediate supervision of Lt.-Col. Sam Reber. New cable 
 instruments were procured by Colonel James Allen at St. 
 Thomas, Danish West Indies. On the day of landing the 
 Major-General Commanding published, in Spanish and Eng- 
 lish, a proclamation to the inhabitants of Puerto Rico, for 
 which they were anxiously looking. This manifesto had a 
 very salutary effect upon the people. The dignity of its lan- 
 guage and the wisdom of its assurances as to the future policy 
 of the government will give it the highest rank among state 
 papers. 
 
 General Wilson proceeded energetically to get his com- 
 mand into shape for a forward movement and to organize 
 the civil administration of the city and district. Owing to 
 the lack of launches, which had been foreseen before leaving 
 the U. S. but which had not been remedied, the work of land- 
 ing troops and supplies was seriously hampered and the difficul- 
 ties would have been almost insurmountable had it not been 
 for the assistance rendered by the navy in towing lighters back 
 and forth from the shore to the transports. As it was, the 
 preparations for an advance into the interior were delayed at 
 least a week longer than would have been otherwise necessary. 
 This movement was further delayed by the grounding of two 
 loaded transports, the MassacJntsctts and Manitoba. 
 
 General Schwan having joined at Ponce with his command, 
 
MILES'S CAMPAIGN IN PUERTO RICO. 205 
 
 July 31, and General Brooke with his on August i, gave a 
 total strength of about fourteen thousand men. The General 
 Commanding was now ready to make his contemplated 
 forward movements. The friendly attitude of most of the in- 
 habitants, the abundant supply of provisions in some sections 
 of the country, the apparent healthfulness of the climate and 
 the ability to hire native transportation convinced him that 
 columns starting from Ponce as a base of operations, moving 
 first on diverging lines and then converging finally toward a 
 principal objective, would meet with success. The columns 
 were to capture or drive the enemy out of the small towns, 
 receive and disarm such volunteers as desired to surrender, 
 and so conduct their march that the inhabitants might be 
 made to understand that our chief object was to overthrow 
 the armed authority of Spain ; that it was not a war of de- 
 vastation, but one bringing protection and security to all 
 within the control of our military and naval forces. The 
 campaign was to be conducted along four lines of operations 
 separated into two groups, Brooke's and Wilson's commands 
 forming one, and Henry's and Schwan's the other — the 
 former converging towards Aibonito and the latter towards 
 Arecibo. 
 
 On the second and third of August the forces under Major- 
 General Brooke landed at Arroyo, about forty miles east of 
 Ponce. They consisted of General Peter Hains's brigade, 
 made up of the following elements: 
 
 3rd 111. Vol. Infantry (Colonel Bennitt); 
 
 4th Ohio Vol. Infantry (Colonel Coit) ; 
 
 4th Penn. Vol. Infantry (Colonel Cass); 
 
 27th Indiana Light Battery ; 
 
 5th Missouri Light Battery " A" ; 
 
 Penn. Light Battery " B," (with three dynamite guns); 
 
 Philadelphia City Troop ; 
 
 Troop " H," 6th U. S. Cavalry ; 
 
 Co. " H," 8th U. S. Infantry ; 
 
 Detachment Hospital Corps ; 
 
 Detachment Signal Corps. 
 
 Total 4,790- 
 
2o6 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 The task selected for this force was the movement on 
 Aibonito with the view of co-operating with General Wilson 
 in the defeat and capture of the Spanish, particularly those in 
 the vicinity of Cayey, it being especially important that the 
 column should reach this point in time to intercept the enemy 
 should he abandon his position at Aibonito and retreat along 
 the military road to San Juan. 
 
 On the morning of August 5, at eight A. M., General 
 Hains, with the 4th Ohio Vol. Infantry in advance and the 
 3rd 111. Vol. Infantry in reserve, moved on the town of Guay- 
 ama, occupied by about 300 of the enemy, who offered but 
 slight resistance and were driven out of the town and pursued 
 beyond it with a loss on our side of four enlisted men 
 wounded. One of the enemy was killed and two wounded, 
 so far as known. A few shots fired from the Sims-Dudley 
 dynamite guns are reported to have had a very demoralizing 
 effect upon the enemy. By the night of the fifth, the 3rd 111. 
 and the 4th Ohio Vol. Infantry occupied a strong position on 
 the outskirts of the town. No active movement again oc- 
 curred until the eighth of August, when a reconnaissance along 
 the Cayey main road, " for the purpose of developing the 
 enemy's position and to clear the way for the engineers to 
 map the country correctly," was attempted by two com- 
 panies of the 4th Ohio Vol. Infantry. They were met with a 
 sharp fire from the enemy on the hills. Some members of 
 Co. " C," 4th Ohio Vol. Infantry, fell back to the town, 
 bringing reports of a repulse. In consequence of this, the re- 
 maining companies of the regiment were sent forward to the 
 support of the reconnoitering party, when the enemy retired 
 to stronger positions and the regiment returned to the camp 
 with five men wounded and two overcome by heat. No 
 further aggressive movement was made until August 13, 
 General Brooke being seriously delayed by the grounding of 
 two transports on which were his artillery, cavalry and most 
 of his rations. For this day a general attack upon the Span- 
 ish position was planned. The enemy, variously estimated at 
 from six hundred to fifteen hundred infantry, had been 
 busily engaged, during the eight days he was left unmo- 
 lested, in entrenching himself along the crests and in the 
 
MILES'S CAMPAIGN IN PUERTO RICO. 207 
 
 passes of the hills north of Guayama, where Nature had pro- 
 vided a stronghold that lent itself most admirably to the 
 genius of the Spanish engineer. The trenches were cleverly 
 hidden among banana trees and palms, and disposed along 
 not less than five miles of the divides of the Sierra de Jajome, 
 the Corro de las Palmas and the Atlas de Guamani, in the 
 form of an arc convex towards the front, with advanced 
 works on the sharp spurs jutting out from the main divide. 
 The Spanish center occupied the Guamani Pass, 2,100 feet 
 above the sea level, through which the military road to Cayey 
 leads. Their right rested on a spur of the Sierra de Jajome 
 range, 2,400 feet high. The left, on the Atlas de Guamani, 
 was 400 feet higher. The trenches and barricades covered 
 about four miles of the main road south of the pass and 
 every important trail along which the position might be 
 flanked. Brooke's general plan of action was an artillery as- 
 sault upon the Spanish center, which was to begin when Gen- 
 eral Hains, with the 4th Ohio, had excuted a flank movement 
 against the enemy's right on the crest of the Sierra de 
 Jajome. At the moment when the order suspending hostili- 
 ties was received the artillery was unmasked before the Span- 
 ish trenches, at a bend in the road about three miles above 
 Guayama, and was about to open fire. The flanking column 
 had proceeded about eight and a half miles on the old Cayey 
 trail, which passes through the village of Carmen, four miles 
 south of the Jajome range. The greater part of this march, 
 although over a rough mountain trail, was accomplished in a 
 remarkably short time, considering the heat, yet without a 
 single straggler. In the light of what is now known of the 
 strength of the Spanish position it would seem that our 
 troops had a very warm day's work before them. General 
 Brooke was " satisfied, however, that but for the receipt of 
 telegram from Headquarters of the Army the entire Spanish 
 force would have been captured." 
 
 As rapidly as General Wilson's command was disembarked 
 at Ponce it was pushed forward along the military road lead- 
 ing to San Juan, the troops finally comprising the force being 
 as follows : 
 
2o8 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 General Oswald Ernst, commanding Brigade, 
 2nd Wis. Vol. Infantry (Colonel Born), 
 3rd Wis. Vol. Infantry (Colonel Moore), 
 i6th Penn. Vol. Infantry (Colonel Hulings), 
 Battalion of Light Artillery (Major Lancaster), 
 
 consisting of — 
 Light Battery " F," 3rd Artillery (Potts), 
 Light Battery " B," 3rd Artillery (Anderson), 
 4th Artillery, Detachment with two dynamite guns 
 
 and one Gatling gun (Buckey), also 
 Troop " C," N. Y. Vol. Cavalry (Clayton), 
 5th Co. U. S. Vol. Signal Corps, 
 Hospital Detachment. 
 
 Total 3,417. 
 
 On the evening of the seventh of August Wilson's out- 
 posts occupied a line across a narrow valley about seven and 
 a half miles beyond the village of J nana Diaz, controlling 
 the valley of the Descalabrado River. Energetic recon- 
 naissance and reports of spies and deserters disclosed the fact 
 that the enemy had gathered a force of about 2,000 regulars 
 and volunteers at Aibonito, thirty-five miles from Ponce, a 
 village situated in a pocket near the summit of the main 
 divide, in a position of great natural strength overlooking and 
 commanding at every turn the winding military road leading 
 to it. Coamo, an advanced position held by not less than 
 250 of the enemy, was in the way of a movement against 
 Aibonito and, as it could not be taken by direct attack with- 
 out great loss, Wilson decided to turn it by the enemy's 
 right. On the evening of the eighth, he sent the i6th Penn. 
 Vol. Infantry by exceedingly difficult mountain cross trails 
 over the divide into the valley of the Coamo River, so as to 
 reach the main road from a half-mile to a mile in the rear of 
 the town. Meanwhile, at 6 A. M. on the morning of the 
 ninth, General Ernst, with the main body of his brigade, 
 moved forward and began the direct attack against the town, 
 four guns of Captain Anderson's battery having shelled and 
 destroyed the block-house commanding the forks of the road 
 about a mile and a half southwest of Coamo. The entire 
 
MILES'S CAMPAIGN IN PUERTO RICO. 209 
 
 movement was executed substantially as planned. The i6tli 
 Penn., under the guidance of a staff officer who had discov- 
 ered the mountain route, reached the road beyond the town 
 and engaged the enemy, who began retreating at the opening 
 of the direct attack. The affair lasted about an hour and was 
 terminated by the surrender of the Spanish forces. The 
 brunt of the action fell upon the i6th Penn., which lost seven 
 men wounded. The Spanish lost two officers and fourteen 
 men killed and wounded, while seven officers and 163 men 
 surrendered. The enemy was taken completely aback by the 
 brilliant turning movement of the Pennsylvania men, most of 
 whom, brought up among the mountains of their own state, 
 took as naturally to hill climbing as did Lord Robert's regi- 
 ment of Goorkhas in India during his advance upon Cabul. 
 Those of the enemy who were not cut off were pursued by 
 the cavalry about five and a half miles beyond Coamo, where 
 the advance was stopped by fire from the enemy's batter- 
 ies on the summit of Asomante Hill and El Peilon, situated 
 two and a half miles northwest of the town of Aibonito. On 
 the slopes below the batteries were the infantry intrenchments, 
 which completely swept, with a plunging fire, the main road 
 for several miles. The position was practically impregnable 
 against a direct assault and Wilson decided after a careful re- 
 connaissance of all approaches, to turn it by a movement 
 around the right as at Coamo, moving the main body of the 
 brigade to Barranquitas, and thence to Aibonito, via Plondu- 
 ras, or to Cayey, via Comerio and Cidra, leaving a battalion 
 as a containing force in front of the position. To divert the 
 enemy's attention from the movement, which was ordered for 
 the thirteenth, and to develope his fire, an artillery reconnais- 
 sance was made by Light Battery " F," 3rd Artillery (Potts), 
 which on the twelfth advanced from camp at Coamo and 
 opened fire, at one P. M., with five guns, from a position on 
 the reverse side of a low ridge to the left of the main road, 
 at a range of 2,250 yards from the batteries on Asomante and 
 1,200 feet below them. More than a passing word is due this 
 action of the artillery. Before the guns were in place the 
 action was begun by the Spanish batteries on El Penon. 
 The preliminary shell firing developed the range almost imme- 
 
2IO THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR 
 
 cliately as corresponding to the calculated range of 2,250 yards, 
 and in less than twenty minutes the enemy's battery was si- 
 lenced and the fire was directed on the rifle pits, whose occu- 
 pants scampered out at the first direct shot. 
 
 Too much credit cannot be given for the skill displayed by 
 this battery. It was manned mostly by men who had never 
 before been under fire, yet it came into position exposed to 
 the projectiles of small arms and field pieces, and in an in- 
 credibly short time had ranged the objectives to a nicety. 
 The position was most difficult, with an enemy elevated 1,200 
 feet in a range of 2,250 yards, and could never even have been 
 reached had not the sloping hillside afforded the necessary 
 additional elevation ; yet the greater difficulty under which 
 the Spaniards labored, compelling the use of plunging fire, — 
 where the slightest deviation in depression made their shots 
 go wild of the mark, — is all that rendered our position tena- 
 ble, for the ranges had been carefully determined beforehand 
 by the enemy. The ammunition in the meantime ha'd been 
 exhausted, and, as the primary object of the reconnaissance 
 had been attained, the guns were withdrawn. It is believed, 
 however, that if advantage could have been taken of the first 
 supremacy of fire by throwing forward a regiment of infantry 
 on the hog-back, which approaches the position from the 
 south, its capture would have been a certainty, for the ac- 
 curate fire of the battery would have held the enemy in check 
 till our forces got within rifle range, when their left flank 
 would have been at our mercy. The casualties on our side 
 were two enlisted men killed, and two officers and three men 
 wounded. The order to suspend hostilities, received on the 
 thirteenth, stopped the projected movement by the flank. 
 The distinguishing feature of General Wilson's operations was 
 his thorough reconnaissance of the ground before making any 
 advance, so that there was no hesitancy or miscalculation 
 when once a movement was begun. 
 
 With Wilson advancing in force on Aibonito, and Brooke 
 at Guayama moving evidently against the same objective by 
 way of Cayey, it must have looked to the enemy as if General 
 Miles was determined to push his entire command along the 
 main military highway through the Spanish center to San 
 
MILES'S CAMPAIGN IN PUERTO RICO. 211 
 
 Juan. Indeed, this seemed about the only land operation 
 against the Capital, with Ponce as a base, that was practicable. 
 But to do what the enemy least suspects you of doing is a 
 cardinal principle of warfare, whether it be between prize 
 fighters in the ring or between armies in the fieldo So Gen- 
 eral Miles decided that the opportunity was ripe for the 
 planned diversion around the western end of the island, in or- 
 der that the ground might be swept clean as his army moved 
 towards the ultimate objective, San Juan. General Schwan 
 was therefore directed, on August 6, to proceed from Ponce 
 with six companies of the nth U. S. Infantry to Yauco, mov- 
 ing by rail if desirable. Troop A, 5th U. S. Cavalry, and two 
 batteries of light artillery were to move by wagon road. At 
 Yauco the remainder of the nth Infantry and two companies 
 of the 19th U. S. Infantry were to be added and when the 
 expedition was organized it was to proceed to Sabana Grande, 
 San German, Mayaguez, and from thence to Lares and 
 Arecibo, driving out or capturing all the Spanish troops in 
 the western portion of the island. It was to be a sort of 
 " flying column " of picked troops moving with the greatest 
 freedom and dispatch. The column as finally organized con- 
 sisted of the following : 
 
 nth U. S. Infantry (Colonel DeRussey), 
 Troop " A," 5th U. S. Cavalry (MacComb), 
 Battery " C," 3rd U. S. Artillery (Califf), 
 Battery " D," 5th U. S. Artillery (Thorp), 
 Detachment Signal Corps, 
 Detachment Hospital Corps. 
 
 Total, 1,464. 
 
 A party of well-mounted natives, numbering at various 
 times from eleven to twenty men, under their chief, Lugo 
 Vifia, a man of fine character, accompanied the expedition as 
 scouts and rendered valuable service. But one day was occu- 
 pied in organization, the command moving out on the morn- 
 ing of the ninth. General Schwan supplementing its regular or 
 government transportation, which was quite inadequate, with 
 hired or impressed native transportation. 
 
212 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 This expedition was unique in several respects. The force 
 comprising it was taken entirely from the regular establish- 
 ment and was made up of the three fighting arms — cavalry, 
 infantry and artillery. The cavalry fought mounted, the only 
 instance during the war where this arm had an opportunity to 
 acfin its natural sphere. The strict tactical order of march, as 
 laid down in the text books, was followed successfully and 
 satisfactorily, — an answer to the objection that practice 
 marches, so faithfully made by the regulars in peace-time, 
 were not simulating war conditions. The disposition on the 
 march was as follows : the troop of cavalry acted as a screen 
 and marched about two miles in front of the " point " of the 
 advance guard. Two companies of infantry, one platoon of 
 artillery and two Gatling guns constituted the advance guard. 
 A pioneer detachment, consisting of one non-commissioned 
 officer and eight men, with the requisite tools carried in a 
 cart, and under the direction of the engineer officer of the 
 brigade, were attached to the advance guard. The main body 
 consisted of nine companies of infantry, one battery and two 
 platoons of artillery and two Catlings. The train followed 
 the main body in the following order : hospital train, ammu- 
 nition train and supply and baggage wagons. The rear guard 
 was composed of one company of infantry, a detachment 
 from it being required to guard the exposed flank of the 
 train. This order was preserved until the afternoon of the 
 tenth, when the cavalry ran into the enemy's scouts near Hor- 
 migueros. Here the entire garrison of Mayaguez, numbering 
 some 1,300, of which about 900 were regulars, had selected a 
 position of great strength on the hills commanding our line of 
 march, in order to oppose the advance on the town. In the 
 engagement that ensued the enemy was completely routed ; 
 the advance guard, admirably led by Captain Hoyt, pushing 
 forward followed by the main body, on the principal road ; 
 the cavalry, under the skilful guidance of Captain MacComb, di- 
 verging to the right to attack the Spanish flank. One en- 
 listed man killed and one officer and fifteen men wounded 
 comprised the loss on our side, while that of the enemy 
 amounted to fifteen in killed alone. The command bivouacked 
 on the spot and at an early hour the next morning resumed 
 
MILES'S CAMPAIGN IN PUERTO RICO. 213 
 
 the march. General Schwan entered Mayaguez at the head 
 of his troops at 9:30 A. M., with band playing and colors flying, 
 the populace giving him a most enthusiastic reception. Six 
 companies of the first Ky. Vol. Infantry on the transports 
 Morgan and Hudson convoyed by the U. S. S. Montgomery, 
 had been sent from Ponce as reinforcements to Schwan in 
 time, it was expected, to reach Mayaguez so as to be of 
 assistance in taking this important seaport. The Montgomery, 
 entering the harbor on August ii all cleared for action, was 
 surprised to find that Schwan had already arrived and was in 
 possession, with his flag flying from the hill overlooking the 
 bay. His column of regulars did not tarry long at Mayaguez. 
 Leaving the Kentucky infantry to hold the town and to pa- 
 trol the surrounding country, which was swarming with bush- 
 whackers, he promptly resumed the pursuit of the fleeing Span- 
 ish force. On August 13 his advance, under Lieutenant- 
 Colonel Burke, overtook this force while crossing the Rio Pri- 
 eto, near Las Marias, in their retreat toward Lares, inflicting 
 upon them a heavy loss in killed, wounded and drowned. 
 The part of the Spanish force which reached Lares on the 
 evening of the thirteenth evacuated it the next day in an- 
 ticipation of pursuit. The task set for this column had been 
 nearly completed, when early on August 14, notice to sus- 
 pend hostilities was received. The engagement on the Prieto 
 has the distinction of being the last affair of the war on land, as 
 it occurred later than the battle of Manila by several hours. 
 Eleven towns, including the important seaport town of Maya- 
 guez, and the country adjacent to them, had been cleared of 
 the enemy. One hundred and sixty-three regulars, including 
 a Colonel, a Lieutenant-Colonel and three other officers, had 
 been made prisoners of war and a large number of captured 
 or surrendered volunteers had been paroled. Under condi- 
 tions of intense tropical heat and bad roads, the command 
 had made a remarkable march. They had covered a distance, 
 including outposts, etc., of ninety-two miles from August 7 to 
 August 13. Fully one-fourth of the command were sick, 
 they had no extra clothing and their shoes were worn out, yet 
 >vhen the telegram to General Schwan from headquarters, 
 " Commanding General sends congratulations and thanks. 
 
214 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 He relies implicitly upon your skill, good judgment and gen- 
 eralship," was published to the men, new life was infused into 
 them and fresh hardships were eagerly sought. 
 
 General Henry, with a part of his original command, led 
 the fourth and last column, made up of the following troops: 
 
 General Garretson, commanding Brigade composed 
 
 of the 
 6th Mass. Vol. Infantry (Colonel Rice), 
 6th 111. Vol. Infantry (Colonel Foster), 
 Troop " B," 2nd U. S. Cavalry (Hoppin), 
 Part of Troop '' A," N. Y. Vol. Cavalry (Coudert), 
 Four Cos. 19th U. S. Infantry, 
 Detachment Signal Corps, 
 Detachment Hospital Corps. 
 
 Total force about— 3,060. 
 
 He was directed to proceed north through Adjuntas and 
 Utuado to Arecibo, connect with Schwan and cut off the re- 
 treat of any of the enemy who might attempt to reach San 
 Juan in that direction. Previous to General Henry's move- 
 ment General Stone had been sent forward with material to 
 repair and build the road between Adjuntas and Utuado. 
 He employed native labor for the purpose, assisted by a com- 
 pany of the Provisional Engineer Battalion. The rough 
 mountain trail could be widened only sufficiently to permit 
 the passage of troops and supplies with great difificulty, yet 
 Henry had succeeded, without opposition from the enemy, in 
 getting a force through to within a few miles of Arecibo, when 
 the order to suspend military operations was received. 
 When the Commandante of Arecibo learned that troops and 
 wheeled vehicles had come over the Utuado trail he evinced 
 the greatest surprise. The route was deemed impossible ex- 
 cept for solitary animals, and was left totally unguarded. A 
 few determined men posted at the single pass could have held 
 it against a division. 
 
 A glance in review shows that the announcement that a 
 peace protocol was signed found aggressive activity along 
 the line of operations, which extended almost straight from 
 
MILES'S CAMPAIGN IN PUERTO RICO. 215 
 
 Aguadilla on the northwest coast, southeast to Arroyo on the 
 south coast. Schwan was close on the heels of the Spanish reg- 
 ulars he had routed at Hormigueros and again on the Rio 
 Prieto, and what few might have escaped would surely have 
 run into the arms of Henry's command approaching Arecibo. 
 Brooke's guns were primed ready to fire on the heights above 
 Guayama, and Wilson was about to execute a most difficult 
 and hazardous turning movement around Asomante. The 
 military student was on the point of gaining valuable mate- 
 rial for his education. There would have been some blood 
 spilled, the interest of the country in the Puerto Rican cam- 
 paign would have been aroused in consequence, military repu- 
 tations would have been made, and some, perhaps, lost. Oi 
 the favorable result to the American arms there can be no 
 question. Even if Wilson and Brooke had found it expedient 
 to " mark time," as it were, in front of their allotted tasks, 
 Henry and Schwan would surely have joined at Arecibo, thv^ 
 Spaniards stationed here having retreated to San Juan. 
 With the former seaport on the north coast as a new base, 
 they were to move along the shore by the railroad and two 
 parallel wagon roads, which have frequent connecting cross 
 roads, and, with the left flank always in close supporting dis- 
 tance of the sea, would, in two days at least, have been in 
 the rear of San Juan, and at the northern terminus of the 
 main military highway, along which a force would have been 
 despatched to take the positions at Aibonito and Cayey in 
 the rear, if they had not already fallen. 
 
 Such, briefly outlined, was the campaign suspended August 
 13 by the peace protocol and auspiciously closed on October 
 18, when the U. S. flag was raised in San Juan, farther east 
 by a thousand miles than ever before. Sovereignty changed 
 hands on that day and there is no question of divided interest 
 in the title. 
 
 The campaign in Puerto Rico was clean cut and strate- 
 gically brilliant, and none the less great because on account of 
 it a thousand homes are not in mourning and twice that num- 
 ber of pensioners are not compelled to stand at the doors 
 of the Treasury and demand alms of the Government. It 
 demonstrated too that the Commanding General of the Army 
 
2i6 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 is as great a strategist, at the council board with a map and a 
 pair of dividers, as he is a great personal leader of men in 
 battle. 
 
 But it is not the business of the historian to draw conclu- 
 sions or to point morals, particularly when he happens to be 
 an army officer. Sufficient facts are presented in the pre- 
 ceding pages, it is hoped, to enable the reader to make intel- 
 ligent deductions. Suffice it to say, that the prompt suc- 
 cess of the army in Puerto Rico was an important factor in 
 precipitating Spanish overtures for peace, so anxiously de- 
 sired by both the nations in arms, while the strategic and 
 purely material advantages accruing from the campaign make 
 it the most profitable and satisfactory one of the war, 
 
 "At the last accounting, the war has only cost us directly 
 about $165,000,000, and as a compensation for the outlay we 
 have appropriated Puerto Rico, which can hardly be valued 
 at much less than double that sum."* 
 
 Note : — Troops and Stores on Transports for Puerto 
 
 RicAN Expedition, leaving Guantanamo 
 
 July 21, 1898. 
 
 Steamer Yale (Captain Wise). 
 
 General Miles and Staff, General Garretson and Staff, 
 12 Cos. 6th Mass. Vol. Infantry, I Co. 6th 111. Vol. 
 Infantry, with camp and garrison equipage, — -a total of 
 1,410 men ; 52,000 field rations (lacking 18,000 pounds 
 bacon, 200 pounds sugar), 25,000 rations tomatoes, and 
 4,000 travel rations. 
 
 Steamer Columbia (Captain Sands). 
 
 3 Cos. 6th 111. Vol. Infantry, — a total of 300 men, 
 with camp and garrison equipage, and 1,300 travel ra- 
 tions. 
 
 Lampasas (Captain Barstow). 
 
 Provisional Engineer Battalion, 10 officers, 139 enlisted 
 men, with 45 days rations, engineer's supplies, pontoon 
 train, 22 wagons, 136 horses and mules, forage, ammuni- 
 tion, packs and harness for pack-train and Headquarters 
 mess supplies; and Red Cross surgeons and nurses. 
 
 *Hon. Hannis Taylor in tlie December numter of the North American Review. 
 
MILES'S CAMPAIGN IN PUERTO RICO. 217 
 
 Nueces (Captain Risk). 
 
 12 officers, and 199 enlisted men of Siege Battery *' B/' 
 5th U. S. Artillery, and 24 teamsters, 7 hospital corps 
 men, 163 horses and mules, 22 wagons, 6-7 in. mortars 
 and 10-6 in. mortars, 10 field cars, with ammunition and 
 appliances ; also 50 kegs of powder, for General Shafter. 
 
 City of Macon (Captain Savage). 
 
 275 unassigned regular recruits and 100,000 rations. 
 
 Comanche (Captain Pennington). 
 
 General Henry and staff, LightBatteries " C "and " F," 
 3d Artillery, " B," 4th Artillery and " D," 5th Artillery, 
 — a total of 492 men, with 6-3.2 in. guns to each battery; 
 also 483,000 rounds 30 calibre ammunition, 50 steel 
 shields and 100,000 rations. 
 
 Unionist (Capt Scanes). 
 
 Horses for light batteries, 2-5 in. siege guns, 216 
 smokeless, and 216 black powder charges for same, 
 863,000 rounds 30 calibre, 85,000 rounds revolver ammu- 
 nition, 7 escort wagons, and 7 sets of harness, 1,000 rations 
 of forage, much of it in a damaged condition, and 22,000 
 gallons of water, with capacity to condense 1,000 gallons 
 daily. 
 
 Stillzvater (Captain Stevenson). 
 
 6 officers and 60 enlisted men of Signal Corps, 53 horses 
 and mules ; 8 wagons ; 2 lance trucks ; i balloon ; tele- 
 graph and signal stores, etc. 
 
 Rita (Captain Porter). 
 
 6 companies 6th 111. Vol. Infantry,— a total of 672 
 men, with camp and garrison equipage and 2,700 travel 
 rations. 
 
 Specialist (Captain Evans). 
 
 Horses for light batteries, and forage for 200 horses 
 for five days ; 4 caissons and limbers for 3.2 in. guns and 
 ammunition for same ; Battery " G," 5th U. S. Artillery ; 
 2-3.2 in. guns and limbers; 2 caissons and limbers for 
 same ; 5 limbers and 2 caissons belonging to Batteries 
 "C" and "F," 3d Artillery, guns of Battery " B," 4th 
 Artillery, and " D," 5th Artillery; 6-5.2 in. guns and 
 limbers; 2-3.2 in. gun carriages and limbers; 8 caissons 
 
2l8 
 
 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 and limbers for 3.2 in. guns, with harness belonging to 
 Light Batteries " E" and " K," ist Artillery, and "A" 
 and " F," 2nd Artillery, and Battery " F," 5th Artillery, 
 in Santiago, Cuba ; 23 boxes of clothing, consigned to 
 General Shafter's troops, which Quartermaster at Dai- 
 quiri, Cuba, could not receive ; 3,500 rounds of ammuni- 
 tion, for 3.2 in. field guns, of which about 700 rounds 
 were intended for Light Batteries in Santiago, Cuba, and 
 2,800 rounds for Batteries going to Puerto Rico, and 16 
 wagons to haul extra field-gun ammunition. 
 
 NAVAL CONVOY. 
 
 U. S. Battleship Massaclmsetts, 
 U. S. converted yacht Gloucester, 
 U. S. converted yacht Dixie. 
 
" 
 
 77' ^- / 1^1—^ 
 
 
CHAPTER XI. 
 THE BLOCKADE OF CUBA. 
 
 liV 
 
 Capt. H. C. TAYLOR, U. S. N. 
 
 THERE are different kinds of blockades, varying with 
 the objects to be attained. In a general way they 
 may be said to be naval and commercial. The former 
 has a military object in view, the holding within a port of an 
 enemy's fleet, preventing its exit and thereby destroying for 
 the time its power for harm, its warlike offensive quality, 
 compelling it to that inactivity which in itself is a form 
 of strategic paralysis. Such was the blockade of Cervera's 
 fleet in Santiago by our squadron. This form of blockade is 
 of a directly warlike character,— force is matched against 
 force,— a battle is always probable, usually imminent. If the 
 enemy within attempts to escape, he knows he must fight, must 
 lose heavily in ships and men ; if the force outside means to 
 make sure of its object and keep the enemy in, it must for 
 its part keep close to shore and chance heavy losses from the 
 enemy's sorties, from land batteries and submarine mines. 
 The situation assumes an actual fighting character, one 
 actively hostile. 
 
 A commercial blockade, on the other hand, although an act 
 of war and frequently of great weight in determining the 
 final issue, is not directly warlike in its nature. It does not 
 necessarily nor usually involve the sinking of ships or the 
 killing of men. Attempts to evade it when discovered, are 
 met by threats, such as firing a shot across the bows or the 
 milder menace of a blank charge. Should the blockade run- 
 ner think his chances of escape good, he disregards the gun 
 which orders him thus to heave to and he may escape ; but 
 should there appear the slightest sign of fighting or loss of life, 
 
220 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 the delinquent surrenders at once and without bloodshed. 
 When in the possession of the capturing force, the prize 
 passes to judicial trial to decide whether it is justly captured. 
 Whatever that decision may be, the people of the prize are 
 not regarded as prisoners of war and are released as soon as 
 convenient, without any pledge or guarantee required from 
 them that they will not repeat the offence. In fact there 
 are several instances in our own War of the Rebellion of per- 
 sons returning more than once, only to be recaptured in new 
 attempts to run the blockade. Commercial blockade has the 
 general features of a game to be played, of great hazards and 
 high stakes, but not the quality of war and killing, nor the 
 sanguinary tinge which marks the incidents of an active cam- 
 paign carried on by a military or naval force properly opposed. 
 The blockade of Cuba as generally understood was the 
 effort to close its ports, prevent trade and prohibit the entry 
 of all articles which could assist the enemy in prosecuting the 
 war. The subject had received attention before the war came. 
 It had been decided that a blockade of the western half of 
 Cuba would practically isolate the Spanish force in the is- 
 land. The axial railway running east and west has branches 
 to the north and south coast, but the continuity of this road 
 is broken after it passes to the eastward of a line joining Cien- 
 fuegos on the south coast and Sagua la Grande on the north. 
 A blockade therefore extending from Cienfuegos around the 
 west end to Sagua la Grande would include all points from 
 which goods, if landed, could be shipped conveniently or in 
 any way successfully to Havana and to the army in its vi- 
 cinity. There was no doubt in naval minds generally that 
 this blockade could be made effective, as blockades go, as 
 thorough in fact as any we know of in history ; but there had 
 been at times differences of opinion as to how efTective the most 
 perfect blockade could be. Some there were who held that 
 the Spanish army, depending as it did from day to day upon 
 the arrival of provision ships, would actually begin to starve 
 within a few days, in a week would be at the last gasp and in 
 a fortnight would surrender unconditionally and even gladly. 
 Thus would be avoided the loss, misery and bloodshed of a 
 protracted campaign by sea and land. The statement that a 
 
THE BLOCKADE OF CUBA. 221 
 
 passive blockade, however thorough, could produce such results 
 was contrary to the nature of things. It was the effort so 
 often made before to find a short cut to success, a royal road to 
 learning. 
 
 It should be said that the great majority of practical men 
 among naval officers recognized the impossibility of such re- 
 sults flowing from a simple blockade. Students of the art of 
 war learn early in their studies that there are no easy roads 
 by which to travel toward the goal of victory, — it is in war 
 as in other trades and pursuits, the object to be obtained will 
 require vigorous work and persistent effort in proportion to 
 its value. The blockade of Cuba was but one of several 
 factors which combined could compel the surrender of the 
 Spanish. Vigorous offensive movements must accompany a 
 blockade. The closing of our southern ports in the War of 
 the Rebellion was very satisfactory after experience had 
 taught us the proper methods. Perhaps none in history has 
 been more successful, and it is well-known that the suffering 
 of the Southern Confederacy was much increased by its ina- 
 bility to procure the munitions of war as well as the necessi- 
 ties of life in sufficient quantities; yet the starving out of the 
 South by this means took four years to achieve. It was 
 forced by necessity to pro luce many of the articles needed, 
 but this was not altogether the reason for the tenacity of its 
 resistance. That was in great part due to the fact that a 
 large majority of the blockade runners did succeed in passing 
 through the lines, both in and out. Not more than a third of 
 the attempts were unsuccessful. Not more than that propor- 
 tion were captured or otherwise prevented from landing their 
 cargoes in the Confederacy and departing outward bound 
 with cotton which was largely used to pay the cost of goods 
 imported. There was no reason to expect a higher percent- 
 age of captures by our blockading line at Cuba than in our 
 Civil War, certainly not in the opening months of such a war 
 before experience in the methods of blockading was gained. 
 The conditions of our blockade of Cuba were distinctly favor- 
 able to those attempting to evade it. South of Cuba lies 
 Jamaica with good ports and with but a short distance inter- 
 vening between it and Manzanillo, where a network of reefs, 
 
222 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 permeated by deep but dangerous channels badly surveyed or 
 in some cases quite unknown, offer every opportunity to such 
 a traffic. Farther to the west but still within easy distance 
 of Jamaica is another similar labyrinth of islands and reefs in 
 the neighborhood of the Isle of Pines, whose channels, known 
 only to the local pilots, afforded access for light-draught 
 vessels to Batabano and other landing places inside the Isle 
 of Pines. All blockade runners of whatever country could 
 take their goods on board at Jamaica and start thence to any. 
 one of the south Cuba ports. Jamaica is an English posses- 
 sion and that government was neutral, even friendly in its 
 disposition towards us, but there is no international law or 
 general custom which would regard the use of this island for 
 that purpose as an act of enmity, a blockade being, as has 
 been said before, of a commercial rather than a warlike nature. 
 Similar conditions prevailed to the north of Cuba. The 
 Bahamas, an English group of islands whose reefs and islets 
 extend southward over the Great Bahama banks to within 
 sight of Cuban shores, offered every chance of concealment to 
 those attempting to violate the blockade. Nassau in the 
 center of this group was used for years as the starting point 
 of blockade runners during the War of the Rebellion, and the 
 Bahama bank, to the south of that port, makes the passage to 
 Cuba even more feasible than to the United States for those 
 vessels whose errands require secrecy. The closer the exam- 
 ination of existing conditions was carried the more certain it 
 became that, whatever an ideal and theoretical blockade might 
 accomplish, a practical blockade, such as a fleet could main- 
 tain ought not to be counted upon for more than a small 
 part in deciding the campaign against Spain in the West 
 Indies. 
 
 It was felt of course that the blockade must be as stringent 
 as it was possible to make it and, to insure this, it was decided 
 to concentrate the force at the government's disposal upon 
 the western half of the island and to close all ports from Sagua 
 la Grande on the north around the western end of Cuba to 
 Cienfuegos on the south and thus to stop or at least check 
 the influx of goods destined for the Spanish forces. 
 
 On the twenty-second day of April, 1898, the President of the 
 
THE BLOCKADE OF CUBA. 223 
 
 United States issued the proclamation of the blockade of 
 Cuba in the following terms : 
 
 PROCLAMATION. 
 
 Blockade of Cuban ports by the President of the United 
 States. A proclamation. Whereas, by a jomt resolution 
 passed by the Congress and approved April 20, 1898, 
 and communicated to the government of Spain, it was de- 
 manded that that said government at once relinquish its au- 
 thority and government in the Island of Cuba, and withdraw 
 its land and \iaval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters, and 
 the President of the United States was directed and empow- 
 ered to use the entire land and naval forces of the United 
 States and to call into the actual service of the United States 
 the militia of the several states, to such extent as might be 
 necessary to carry said resolution into effect, and. 
 
 Whereas, in carrying into effect slid resolution, the Presi- 
 dent of the United States deems it necessary to set on foot 
 and maintain a blockade of the north coast of Cuba, including 
 ports on said coast between Cardenas and Bahia Honda and 
 the port of Cienfuegos on the south coast of Cuba aforesaid, 
 in pursuance of the'laws of the United States and the laws of 
 nations applicable to such cases. An efficient force will be 
 posted so as to prevent the entrance and exit of vessels from 
 the ports aforesaid. Any neutral vessels approaching any of 
 said ports or attempting to leave the same without notice or 
 knowledge of the establishment of such blockade will be 
 duly warned by the Commander of the blockading forces, who 
 will endorse on her register the facts and the date of such 
 warning, where such endorsement was made, and if the same 
 vessel shall again attempt to enter any blockaded port, she 
 will be captured and sent to the nearest convenient port for 
 such proceedings against her and her cargo, as prizes, as may 
 be deemed advisable. Neutral vessels lying at any of said 
 ports at the time of the establishment of said blockade will be 
 allowed 30 days to issue therefrom. 
 
 In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand, and 
 caused the seal of the United States to be affixed. 
 
 (Seal) 
 Done at the City of Washington, this twenty-second day of 
 April, A. D. 1898, and of the Independence of the United 
 States, the One Hundred and Twenty-second. 
 
 William McKinley. 
 
 By the President, 
 
 John Sherman, Secretary of State, 
 
224 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 It will be observed in this proclamation that, on the north 
 coast of Cuba, Bahia Honda is the most western point named 
 and that a gap of several hundred miles intervenes between it 
 and Cienfuegos, on the south coast of the island. At Bahia 
 Honda begins aline of reefs skirting the shore and rendering 
 it unapproachable as far as Cape San Antonio. After passing 
 San Antonio, for some distance on the southern shore the 
 coast has no harbors of commercial importance. Add to this 
 the fact that communication with the capital from these 
 western points of the island was difificult, that the insurgents 
 were strong in that section while the military grasp of Spain was 
 relatively feeble, and it will be understood that ships employed 
 in blockading that portion of Cuba would be in a measure 
 wasted. The Isle of Pines was however, a prominent feature 
 of the south coast between Cape San Antonio and Cienfuegos, 
 and abreast of it was Batabano on the mainland of Cuba, a 
 place of some importance, being but thirty miles from Ha- 
 vana and connected with it by a direct railroad. Only vessels 
 of very light draft could reach it, however, and it was to be 
 supposed that the government thought the limited number 
 of ships then available could be better employed elsewhere. 
 
 It will be noticed further that the proclamation omits the 
 port of Sagua la Grande, lying on the north shore to the 
 eastward of Cardenas. This point was of considerable value 
 to the Spaniards and its omission was thought at the time to 
 be due to reasons of state, unknown to the writer. 
 
 War having been declared on the twenty-first of April, the 
 first movement toward Cuba was made by Admiral Sampson's 
 fleet leaving Key West the morning of the twenty-second 
 and arriving off Havana at sundown of the same day. Pa- 
 trolling, during the night, before that port in fleet formation, 
 the vessels took station the next day at points specified by 
 the Admiral and began the regular work assigned to them. 
 Shortly after leaving Key West the Spanish steamer Bitena 
 Ventura was captured, and in the first few days of the block- 
 ade several vessels were intercepted and either captured and 
 sent in as prizes or warned of the blockade and ordered to 
 keep off. The latter were valuable vessels which, being 
 within the limit of time set by the President in his proclama- 
 
H 3= 
 
 
^jiH 
 
THE BLOCKADE OF CUBA. 225 
 
 tion and belonging to neutral nations, could not be regarded 
 as guilty, unless after one warning a second attempt should 
 be made. The margin of time thus given does not, however, 
 exempt vessels belonging to the enemy, and of these one 
 of the most notable captures was the Panama which appeared 
 from the northward steering for Havana and was pluckily 
 brought to by the little Mangrove, which was assisted later in 
 securing the prize by the Indiana. 
 
 From Havana as a center Admiral Sampson extended the 
 blockade to neighboring harbors east and west, as rapidly as 
 his force was increased by the Navy Department. Matanzas 
 was almost immediately guarded by monitors and small 
 vessels and these extended the line, as their numbers made it 
 practicable, to cover the entrance to the reefs and islands, 
 inside of which lies Cardenas. Beyond this to the eastward 
 there was no marked extension for some time, and later, when 
 the force at hand would have permitted the next port to the 
 eastward, Sagua la Grande, to be closed, the order so to 
 blockade it was withheld by the government for reasons 
 which as before mentioned were not known to the writer or to 
 the fleet generally. 
 
 Extending in the same way to the westward the line of 
 vessels soon included Maricl, twenty miles west of Havana. 
 The intention was to make a close blockade of the three 
 ports: Havana in the center, Matanzas to the east and Mariel 
 to the west, for the reason that the two latter ports were near 
 enough to Havana to be constantly in touch with it and 
 directly in the sphere of military influence which concentrated 
 at the capital. West of Mariel the next harbor of import- 
 ance, fifteen miles distant from it, was Cabanas while ten 
 miles farther west was the sheltered bay of Bahia Honda. 
 Cabanas and Bahia Honda were deemed of secondary im- 
 portance because of their distance from Havana and the 
 lack of railroad connection. They were, however, observed 
 by our vessels though not closely blockaded in the earlier 
 days of the war. 
 
 These two bays of Cabanas and Bahia Honda would have 
 offered some advantages as a shelter and refuge for our tor- 
 pedo boats and other light craft as well as an anchorage for 
 
226 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 colliers if we could have taken possession of them. It has 
 always been found in blockade service, or in any duty which 
 demands that a fleet of war vessels maintain itself in a given 
 locality for long periods of time, that a temporary advanced 
 base near the scene of operations is very necessary to the 
 efiflciency of the fleet. 
 
 Such a base is not likely to be found in most blockades ex- 
 cept upon the enemy's coast or upon islands lying con- 
 veniently near it. The reefs and islets of the Bahama bank 
 are near enough to portions of the northern coast of Cuba, 
 but being English possessions they were neutral territory 
 during this war and could not, therefore, be occupied for such 
 purposes. Opposite Havana and about ninety miles distant 
 is Key West and Tortugas. Both of these harbors could be 
 utilized as bases and Key West became a center of bustle and 
 activity throughout the war. Hither vessels resorted to take 
 coal, provisions and ammunition, and to receive such minor 
 repairs as the resources of its naval station could make. It was 
 felt, however, that a distance of ninety miles across a rough 
 channel was too great for the convenience of the numerous 
 small vessels which were in use and there was serious thought 
 of seizing one of the less frequented harbors of the north 
 coast of Cuba and holding it as an advanced base. In the 
 early stages of the war the blockading fleet did not have at its 
 disposal a land force capable of holding a position on shore. 
 Later on, a body of marines was sent to Admiral Sampson 
 but, soon after they became available, the interest of the cam- 
 paign shifted to Santiago de Cuba, six hundred miles to the 
 eastward, and the marines were urgently needed to hold a 
 base at Guantanamo. The blockade about Havana, there- 
 fore, was obliged to rely upon Key West and no position 
 upon the enemy's shore was held by us in that vicinity. The 
 points that were under consideration for advanced bases in 
 the early days of the war were, as before said, Cabanas and 
 Bahia Honda to the westward of Havana and one of the 
 islands off Cardenas to the eastward. More convenient than 
 these, being closer to Havana, would have been Mariel to the 
 west and Matanzas to the east but as before mentioned these 
 points were in one case strongly fortified and held by the 
 
THE BLOCKADE OF CUBA. 227 
 
 Spanish, and in the other so closely uader observation of the 
 enemy's troops that their occupation would have been diffi- 
 cult if not impossible. 
 
 A lesson may be drawn from the above in reference to hav- 
 ing at hand, when war threatens, a considerable force of 
 marines fully equipped for land operations and ready to be 
 placed aboard transports, these latter being also kept fully 
 equipped for this duty. The preparation of this body of 
 marines and the vessels that are to carry them should keep 
 pace with that of the principal fleet or squadron, when opera- 
 tions against or near to an enemy's coast are anticipated, and 
 they should sail in company with the fleet for the scene of 
 operations, unless some important naval battle with a hostile 
 squadron is impending. 
 
 The blockade of the southern coast of Cuba began later, as 
 was to be expected, and was more irregular in its operations. 
 The President's proclamation mentioned at first only Cien- 
 fuegos on the south coast, and operations at that point were 
 interrupted for a time by the expectation that Cervera might 
 bring his squadron there. Thus our strength off that port 
 varied at different times from a heavy squadron of iron clads 
 to a small gun-boat or auxiliary vessel. West of Cienfuegos 
 and occupying a large part of the coast front between that 
 port and Cape San Antonio, lies the Isle of Pines, with a 
 great expanse of reefs, shoals and channels between it and the 
 Cuban shore. Inside of this island the coast of Cuba 
 makes a great bend inward, forming a large recess in the land. 
 In the middle of this bend in the Cuban shore lies Batabano, 
 separated from Havana by the width of the island which 
 being here at its narrowest is less than thirty miles. A rail- 
 road crosses the island between Batabano and Havana. The 
 position is an ideal one for running the blockade and it was 
 early seen that our possession of the Isle of Pines was essen- 
 tial to a successful blockade of Batabano and of that part 
 of the coast extending for fifty miles on each side of it. 
 
 It is probable, had a large force of marines been ready early 
 in the war, that the Isle of Pines would have been at once 
 occupied, but even without that advantage some blockade 
 runners were captured by our ships in that vicinity. It was, 
 
228 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 however, only in the latter days of the war and after Cervera's 
 squadron had been destroyed that our numbers sufficed to de- 
 tach a portion of our force to occupy the Isle of Pines, and 
 before this occupation was effected the campaign was brought 
 to an end by the Peace Protocol. We repeat that we cannot 
 too strongly emphasize the necessity for marines to be at the 
 disposal of an Admiral from the day a naval war begins. 
 Any regularly organized body of troops would be similarly 
 useful, but the preparation of an army for war does not 
 usually include the instant mobilization of a small force to be 
 landed at once upon an enemy's territory. The minds of 
 army chiefs are naturally and properly directed to the prepa- 
 ration for the line of battle of a due proportion of infantry, ar- 
 tillery and cavalry, and to the provision of the stores and 
 munitions of war for a large army. This great task is not 
 compatible with sudden mobilization of a smaller body for a 
 special purpose. For this sort of work the marines were 
 doubtless invented in the early days of history. 
 
 There came a time very early in the days of the blockade 
 of Cuba when the battleships and other heavy vessels were 
 suddenly called away from blockade duty. The news that 
 Cervcra had sailed from the Cape de Verde Islands for the 
 West Indies and the uncertainty as to his exact destination 
 made it necessary for the ships of the line of battle to seek 
 him out and if possible destroy his squadron. It was among 
 the probabilities that he would proceed to Puerto Rico where 
 the Spanish government had, at the port of San Juan de 
 Puerto Rico, a comfortable harbor and dockyard facilities, 
 defended by some strength of guns and fortifications on shore. 
 On May 4, therefore, Admiral Sampson with his flag-ship 
 the Nciv York, the lozva, the Indiana, Terror and AinpJii- 
 trite, together with the Detroit, Montgomery and smaller ves- 
 sels, left the blockade and proceeded a thousand miles to the 
 eastward to search for Cervera's squadron at Puerto Rico. 
 The absence of these vessels from the blockading line did not 
 seriously affect its efficiency, as they were for the most part 
 constructed more with a view to fleet engagements than for 
 chasing blockade runners, and there were no Spanish armed 
 ships then in Cuban ports to make the presence of our battle- 
 
THE BLOCKADE OF CUBA. 229 
 
 ships and monitors necessary to sustain our line of blockading 
 ships in case of an attack from the enemy. We may except 
 from this statement the Detroit and Montgomery, which cruis- 
 ers accompanied the fleet to Puerto Rico but were regarded 
 also as very valuable blockaders. 
 
 Not finding Cervera's squadron at San Juan and believing 
 therefore that he contemplated some other destination, Ad- 
 miral Sampson moved promptly back to the westward, learn- 
 ing on the way that the Spanish fleet had touched at Curagoa, 
 an island in the southern part of the Caribbean Sea near the 
 main land of South America. Our squadron regained the 
 vicinity of Havana and Key West on the nineteenth of May, 
 having been absent fifteen days from the blockade. The Fly- 
 ing Squadron, which had been ordered to the front from 
 Hampton Roads, arrived off Key West about the same time 
 and, as Cienfuegos was thought to be a probable destination 
 for Cervera's force, the Flying Squadron sailed at once from 
 Key West for that port. This squadron was composed of 
 the Brooklyn, Admiral Schley's flag-ship, the Jllassire/insetts, 
 Texas and smaller vessels, reinforced in a few days by the lozcur. 
 The blockade of Havana was now for the moment strength- 
 ened by the vessels that had returned from Puerto Rico, with 
 the exception of the Iowa, but a few days later the news 
 reached the fleet there of the arrival of Cervera's force at San- 
 tiago. The knowledge that the Flying Squadron was off 
 Cienfuegos and that therefore the Spanish ships might, after 
 hastily coaling at Santiago, leave that port and come west- 
 ward along the northern coast of Cuba caused the Com- 
 mander-in-Chief, Admiral Sampson, again to withdraw from 
 the Havana blockade a number of vessels and move to the 
 eastward to guard the mouth of the old l^ahama channel and 
 intercept Cervera at that point, thus forcing him to battle be- 
 fore he could decide between passing to the northward, to 
 raid our coasts, and continuing along the Cuban shore in an 
 attempt to raise the blockade of Havana and enter that port. 
 At this stage of the war the blockading force was much 
 strengthened by vessels of the cruiser and gunboat type which 
 our government had hurried to the front to assist in the 
 blockade. Moreover, the position chosen by the Admiral for 
 
230 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 patrolling the Bahama Channel with the heavy ships was one 
 which enabled them to guard at the same time and quite 
 effectively a considerable stretch of coast east of Havana and 
 Matanzas ; so that, although the blockading line on the north 
 coast was at times thinly held, it was at no time so sparsely 
 occupied as to cause a question concerning its effectiveness. 
 
 On the southern coast Cienfuegos, after it was known that 
 Cervera was at Santiago, was blockaded and a gradual exten- 
 sion of the line was made a little to the east, while to the 
 west our efforts reached as far as the Isle of Pines. It was in 
 this vicinity that the attempts of the valuable prize Santo 
 Domingo to run in her valuable cargo were finally frustrated 
 and the vessel destroyed. 
 
 The squadron patrolling the western mouth of the old 
 Bahama Channel continued that work until the Commander- 
 in-Chief had assured himself that the Sj^anish ships were 
 still at Santiago and that the Flying Squadron had arrived 
 from Cienfuegos in that vicinity. He then, with his fllag-ship 
 and the Oregon, which had lately arrived at Key West and 
 joined the patrol, proceeded eastward to take command at 
 Santiago, leaving the patrol to be continued under the com- 
 mand of Commodore Watson. The latter's force was still 
 further diminished by the Indiana being sent to Key West, 
 where she organized the force of vessels which was to convoy 
 General Shafter's army to Santiago. 
 
 At this period, that is about the first of June, the blockade 
 had been extended and strengthened and the general condi- 
 tion was as follows: Havana and Matanzas thoroughly 
 guarded ; Cardenas and Mariel sufficiently so ; Cabanas and 
 Bahia Honda also blockaded, but it was not expected that 
 any large or valuable cargoes would enter those harbors owing 
 to the difTpiculty of landing their goods and of transporting 
 them to the Spanish centers of military force ; Cienfuegos 
 blockaded and the great bay of the Isle of Pines beginning to 
 come under the influence of our watchfulness ; Sagua la 
 Grande on the north side still open. So much for the western 
 half of the island. To the eastward on the north coast the 
 harbors of Nuevitas, connected by rail with Puerto Principe, 
 but not with Havana ; Nipe bay, a deep and commodious har- 
 
THE BLOCKADE OF CUBA. 231 
 
 bor but not having easy connections with the centers in the 
 interior; and some other harbors of less importance not 
 permanently guarded. Passing thence around Cape Maysi, 
 the extreme eastern point of Cuba, we come, on the southern 
 side, to the harbor of Guantanamo, a place of some import- 
 ance commercially and, in a military and naval view, very 
 necessary as a base to a fleet operating at Santiago and its vi- 
 cinity. Its value being recognized, it was occupied by a division 
 of the squadron under Commander McCalla. On June 10 a 
 strong post on shore was occupied by our marines and cdter some 
 brisk fighting permanently secured. Remarks have already 
 been made about bases for naval operations on a hostile coast 
 and their usefulness was fully demonstrated in the case of 
 Guantanamo. Doubtless even without this base the blockade 
 of Cervera's fleet at Santiago would have been maintained for 
 as long a time as the circumstances demanded, but the work 
 was made much simpler and easier by the possession of this 
 valuable harbor. Our battleships could and did, to some ex- 
 tent, coal directly ofi the port of Santiago in the open sea 
 from the steam colliers that were sent to the squadron, but it 
 was most difficult and resulted in more or less damage to the 
 vessels that thus lay close together in the swells which even 
 in the quietest weather are felt in the open sea. The repairs 
 of modern ships demand some quiet harbor near by in order 
 to preserve their ef^ciency and as soon as Guantanamo was se- 
 curely in our hands the government hurried to that point 
 the repair-ship J^n/ca/i, a complete outfit of tools and ma- 
 chines, and a body of skilled mechanics and officers who ren- 
 dered valuable assistance to the battleships which came for 
 that purpose to Guantanamo. The value of this port to our 
 blockade of Cuba can hardly be overestimated and this experi- 
 ence should not be forgotten by us in future operations. It 
 was recognized fully in the War of the Rebellion, though not 
 until experience had taught us that the blockade of the North 
 Carolina coast could not be successfully maintained if based 
 upon New York or even upon Hatnpton Roads, and it was 
 not until Beaufort, North Carolina, was in our hands at a dis- 
 tance of only a few hours steaming from the Wilmington 
 blockade that the needs of the blockade were completely filled 
 
232 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 and its efficiency thoroughly established. Off Charleston, the 
 blockading line had Port Royal conveniently at hand after its 
 capture by Admiral Dupont and this harbor served also as a base 
 for the blockade of Savannah river. In the Gulf of Mexico, 
 Pensacola and Ship's Island served as bases for the block- 
 ade of Mobile and the Mississippi River. The general princi- 
 ple that a base is necessary to efficient blockading is not new 
 but is of special application in our present stage of naval 
 evolution, which requires coal as a fuel, in large quantities, 
 and convenient methods for taking it on board. During the 
 sail period, that is the few centuries intervening between the 
 warfare of rowing galleys and triremes and our present con- 
 dition of steam propulsion, vessels being driven by wind alone 
 were independent so far as their powers of propulsion were 
 concerned, although in the matter of provisions and repairs 
 they still felt a base to be a great convenience. English 
 fleets blockading off Cadiz had Gibraltar close to them. 
 Those blockading Brest had their own ports across the 
 English channel, while those fleets which watched Toulon, 
 not always successfully, had Sardinia and Corsica conveniently 
 at hand. 
 
 Passing to the westward from Santiago toward Cienfuegos, 
 we come to no ports or harbors until we reach Manzanillo 
 which is in the upper part of a deep gulf in the southern side 
 of the island. At the period of which we speak, this port and 
 the other towns in the same gulf were for the first time be- 
 ginning to be watched by occasional vessels and this soon de- 
 veloped into a regular blockade, culminating in the attack upon 
 Manzanillo of a division of small ships under Commander 
 Todd and the complete destruction of all the enemy's armed 
 vessels in the port. From Manzanillo westward along the 
 southern shore there extended to Trinidad, which is to the 
 eastward of Cienfuegos, a line of reefs and keys separated by 
 a considerable interval from the coast, the area thus included 
 being occupied by keys and devious channels making naviga- 
 tion for a stranger impossible. Had the war continued long, 
 this stretch of coast would probably have been the resort of 
 blockade runners from Jamaica but it would not in any case 
 have had great effect upon the final result of the war, for the 
 
THE BLOCKADE OF CUBA. 233 
 
 goods once landed could not have been transported in any- 
 large quantities or in any reasonable time to points of Span- 
 ish influence in the island. 
 
 No blockade, as has been said, is perfect and there were 
 one or two occasions in which vessels were successful in break- 
 ing through our lines off the Cuban ports. But these excep- 
 tions were rare. Vessels above the size of fishing craft, as a 
 rule, failed completely to get in or out of blockaded ports. 
 There was very little effort made by vessels in Cuban harbors 
 to come out, while on the contrary considerable effort was made 
 by Spanish and other vessels to carry valuable cargoes to the 
 island. In this respect the reports of our smaller armed ves- 
 sels on the blockade form a mass of evidence of great interest. 
 The running ashore of the fine stQ^nrxQV Sa)ito Domingo, with 
 her rich cargo by the Eagle near the Isle of Pines on the 
 southern coast of Cuba, and her subsequent burning by Lieu- 
 tenant Southerland, commanding the Eagle, is an example of 
 these incidents and there are many similar cases. The rigid 
 character of the blockade can be best understood by a succes- 
 sion of reports made by certain vessels blockading different 
 ports of Cuba. These taken together show that the same 
 blockade runner tried successively several ports and at each 
 one was chased off until at the last one she was run ashore 
 and destroyed. The incident is sufficiently typical to justify 
 brief extracts from the reports of the vessels concerned. We 
 will premise by stating that Cienfuegos, where the blockade 
 runner first made her attempt, is near the central part of the 
 southern coast of Cuba. Her second attempt was at or near 
 the Isle of Pines at a distance of about one hundred and fifty 
 miles. The third scene of her efforts was at Mariel on the 
 north coast and it was here that she was caught and de- 
 stroyed. 
 
 U. S. S. Yankton, 
 Off Cienfuegos, July 3, 1898. 
 
 Sir: — I have the honor to report that on July 2, about 3:30 
 P. M., I sighted a smoke bearing south-southwest and 
 gave chase. At 4 P. M. the steamer, which up to this 
 time had been heading for Cienfuegos, turned at first to the 
 
234 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 eastward and then to the southward and westward, and 
 steamed away from us. I was able plainly to see that she had 
 four masts and two smokestacks between the second and 
 third masts. The two forward masts seemed to have heavy 
 cross-trees. I chased her for two hours, but she evidently was 
 making about 15 knots, while we were making only 12. As 
 there was no possibility of our overhauling her I turned back 
 and reported the occurrence to the commanding officer of the 
 Detroit. 
 
 The vessel answers to the description, furnished me by 
 Commander Dayton, of the Spanish auxiliary cruiser Alfonso 
 XII, but, I am at a loss to understand why, if this were the 
 case, she did not show fight, unless she mistook us for a -heav- 
 ily armed gunboat. 
 
 Very respectfully, 
 
 J. D. Adams, 
 Lieut. -Commander, U. S. iV., Commanding. 
 The Commander-in-Chief of U. S. Naval Force, 
 North Atlantic Station. 
 
 U. S. S, Eagle, 
 Off Isle of Pines, Cuba, July 3, 1898. 
 
 Sir: — At 5:05 this morning, when about 10 miles west of 
 Cape Pepe, Isle of Pines, bound to Rosario Channel, a large 
 four-masted steamer with two smokepipes was sighted to the 
 southward, standing to the northward and westward. 
 
 The Eagle gave chase immediately, and a few minutes later 
 the steamer altered her course to the southward almost at 
 right angles and commenced to run away. She continued on 
 this southerly course for over ten miles, when, it becoming 
 apparent that she was slowly dropping the Eagle, she com- 
 menced to edge away to the westward, and at the end of the 
 chase was heading about west by north, a good course for 
 San Antonio. 
 
 The Eagle c\\-di%e.di her for a distance of 59 miles. There was 
 nothing shown to indicate her nationality. 
 
 I have the honor to be, very respectfully, 
 W. H. H. SOUTHERLAND, 
 
 Lieut., U. S. N., Comjnanding. 
 The Commander-in-Chief of United States Naval Force, 
 North Atlantic Station. 
 
THE BLOCKADE OF CUBA. 235 
 
 U. S. S. Prairie, 
 
 Off Havana, Cuba, July 5, 1898. 
 
 Sir: — I have the honor to report that at half-past 10 on the 
 morning of July 5, 1898, I being the senior officer present of 
 the Havana blockading force, the Commanding Officer of the 
 U. S. S. Hazvk came on board and reported to me that on the 
 preceding night a large four-masted steamer was observed by 
 him attempting to run the blockade and enter Havana ; that 
 as soon as she caught sight of the Hazuk she turned and 
 steamed down the coast to the westward pursued by the 
 Hawk. Upon reaching the entrance to the harbor of Mariel 
 she attempted to enter the harbor and in so doing ran high and 
 dry on the beach on the west side of the entrance. The com- 
 manding officer of the Haivk reported the circumstances to 
 the commanding officer of the U. S. S. Castine, the nearest 
 blockading vessel, and was ordered to report to me by him. 
 The commanding officer of the Gw//;/r immediately proceeded 
 to the spot and shelled the vessel, setting her on fire. Upon 
 receiving the report from the commanding officer of the 
 Hawk I proceeded with this vessel to the place and found the 
 steamer burning fiercely and opened fire upon her with my 
 port battery to complete her destruction. 
 
 Very respectfully, 
 
 C. J. Train, 
 Commander, U. S. N. , Commanding, 
 and Senior Officer Present. 
 The Secretary of the Navy. 
 
 The efficiency of the blockade is plainly shown by the 
 above reports. It is quite within bounds to say that nothing 
 of consequence reached the enemy through ports that were 
 being guarded. It should be observed, however, that the war 
 ended so quickly that no systematic running of the blockade 
 had begun. There had been no time to organize a system. 
 There is no reason to doubt that the conditions existing in 
 Cuba were not different, or at least not more favorable to block- 
 aders, than were the conditions of our own coast in the War 
 of the Rebellion. It is needless to dwell upon what might 
 have happened in case the blockade had been existing a year 
 or even six months, and the urgent needs of the inhabitants 
 of the island had begun to be measured in money value suffi- 
 
236 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 cient to tempt adventurous men and capitalists to fit out 
 ships and take the risks of their ventures. Practically we 
 may say that the enemy got nothing through the blockaded 
 ports and comparatively little from Sagua la Grande which 
 was still open. Yet how disappointing were the results of this 
 three months exclusion from outside assistance to those who 
 thought ten days' stoppage of provisions for the Spanish army 
 would cause its surrender ! In truth that large force, which 
 was said to live from day to day upon provisions brought in 
 from abroad and which it was thought could not last a fort- 
 night without such supplies, did continue to live and thrive 
 without them except such small amounts as came in through 
 Sagua la Grande. 
 
 It was a never-ceasing wonder that no attacks of the nature 
 of sorties were made by the Spanish vessels upon our blockad- 
 ing lines. The description of such a sortie is given in a 
 German account as having occurred on May 14 at Havana. 
 ^It is stated that two Spanish gunboats came out and attacked 
 the blockade line and that an action ensued, but our own 
 records do not confirm this. These vessels may have come 
 out and in the darkness some shots may have been fired at 
 them, but anything in the nature of a determined attack on 
 the part of vessels of the Spanish navy is entirely without 
 foundation. It was customary for some small armed vessel of 
 the Spanish force to come to the mouth of the harbor when- 
 ever our ships appeared and the WTiter has seen at Sagua la 
 Grande quite a display of energy in that way when his ship 
 lay for a few hours off that port to reconnoiter, but it 
 amounted to nothing more than this in almost all instances. 
 
 When we consider the numerous small armed craft in the 
 possession of the Spaniards in Cuba, the intricate and dan- 
 gerous reefs and shoals which made entrance into many of 
 their ports hazardous or impossible to strangers ; when we re- 
 flect on the experience the Spanish officers and their pilots had 
 had through several generations, and their intimate acquaint- 
 ance with these tortuous channels ; and when finally we re- 
 cognize the approved bravery of Spanish gentlemen, we stand 
 bewildered before the entire failure of these men to harass us 
 seriously and cause us heavy loss in our attempts to blockade 
 
THE BLOCKADE OF CUBA. 237 
 
 their coasts. Knowing them as gallant men we discern in 
 their conduct a strange and fatal apathy. To inquire whence 
 this came, — -what causes may be found for it in the history of 
 Spain, — arc questions we need not here pursue. It is a diffi- 
 cult problem and he who attempts to solve it by instancing the 
 corruption of government, the form of religious worship, or 
 any other special and definite circumstance, must be care- 
 ful that he does not confuse cause and effect ; for he may dis- 
 cover at the end of his reasonings that all the defects he enu- 
 merates have themselves a common cause in some inherent 
 national malady, whose nature and origin are unknown to him. 
 
 
CHAPTER XII. 
 THE ANNEXATION OF HAWAII. 
 
 BY 
 
 Hon. SHELBY M. CULLOM, Chairman of Senate Committee on Hawaiian Annexation. 
 
 TRADITION indicates that during the twelfth and 
 thirteenth centuries there was more or less intercourse 
 between the various groups of the islands of Polynesia. 
 Voyages were made between the Hawaiian Islands and the 
 Samoan and Society groups. About that time the Harvey 
 Islands and New Zealand were colonized. The fact that the 
 Hawaiians, New Zealanders, the inhabitants of the Easter 
 Islands and others in the south and east, have a distinct 
 physical resemblance, as well as similar moral peculiarities, 
 would tend to bear out the tradition that the Polynesian 
 races sprang from the East Indian countries, and probably 
 trace a relationship back to the Hindoostanees of the third 
 and fourth centuries. It is claimed that many of the modern 
 Polynesians speak dialects of the same language, have similar 
 traditions and general rites. In many instances they have 
 the same color as the residents of Java. They have also the 
 straight black hair of many of the Malaysian people. 
 
 There being no written history which extends far into the 
 early centuries of the Christian era regarding these various 
 peoples, of course very many of these assumptions are based 
 only upon collateral facts and, to a certain extent, upon 
 known conditions. Alexander, who is perhaps the leading 
 modern historian of the Hawaiian people, says : "The ques- 
 tion of the origin of the Hawaiian race cannot yet be said to 
 have been fully solved." The general fact remains, however, 
 that the affinities of the people are with the islands to the 
 south and southwest. 
 
 Again, it has been proven that the Polynesian language is 
 
240 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 but one member of a wide-spread family of languages, spoken 
 over the islands from Micronesia, the Philippines and the 
 Malayan Archipelago, even to Madagascar. 
 
 Marquesan traditions state that the progenitors of the race, 
 or of the chiefs, were Wakea and Papa, his wife, but they 
 give so early a date that nothing whatever authentic can be 
 ascertained in regard to it. There are no traditions of any 
 voyages to and from other countries for at least thirty genera- 
 tions (about one thousand years) after Wakea's reputed time, 
 but there are still to be seen many of the early great works, 
 such as the lava-stone temples called " Heiaus," and the 
 great fish-ponds along the coasts of several of the Hawaiian 
 Islands. These works, which are plainly visible at this date, 
 show that the labor of possibly thousands of men had been so 
 employed by the island chiefs, in the building of these royal 
 premises ; and they, possibly better than anything else, mark 
 approximately the time of certain classes of rulers. It is 
 quite likely, however, that the two progenitors above men- 
 tioned, Wakea and Papa, were simply words expressive of 
 certain ideas, as the first is the God of Light, in the Marquesan 
 Islands, while Papa is intended as a personification of the 
 Great Mother. This idea is also expressed in the Hawaiian 
 phrase, "The Mother of Islands." 
 
 Everything relating to the Hawaiian Government during 
 the latter half of the last century and for many years in this 
 century must refer in some important particulars to the 
 dynasty of Kamehameha, or his successors whose reigns 
 covered the period of some of the great changes and reforms 
 which have taken place. A very brief sketch of the rise of 
 the Kamehameha administration may be of interest. 
 
 In November, 1736, Kekaulike, who was the chief of the 
 Island of Maui, died and was succeeded by his son, Kameha- 
 meha Nui, Niii being translated "Great." He died in 1765 
 and was succeeded by his brother Kahekili. During his 
 reign, on the eighteenth of January, 1778, Captain Cook, the 
 great English navigator, while sailing due north from the 
 Society Islands, discovered the Islands of Oahu and Kauai. 
 The next day he landed at Waimea, Kauai, where he held 
 friendly intercourse with the natives, and afterwards laid in 
 
THE ANNEXATION OF HAWAII. 241 
 
 supplies at Niihau. He finally sailed for Alaska on the second 
 of February. The Hawaiians looked upon him as an incarna- 
 tion of the god Lono and upon his crew as supernatural be- 
 ings. Returning from the Arctic the following winter, he 
 anchored in Kealakekua Bay, on the Island of Hawaii, Janu- 
 ary 17, 1779. Here he received almost divine honors and 
 was loaded with munificent presents of the best that the 
 islands could produce. By the rash and arbitrary conduct 
 either of himself or his men, however, he involved himself in 
 an afTray with the natives, in which he was killed on February 
 14, 1779. The spot where he fell is now marked by an appro- 
 priate monument, erected in 1825 by Lord Byron, an Eng- 
 lish Captain. 
 
 The struggles between Kahekili and other island chiefs 
 were kept up from 1765 to 1794. Sometimes the warriors of 
 one island defeated the others, and the supremacy over Hawaii, 
 Oahu, Kauai and Maui passed backwards and forwards re- 
 peatedly. Armies went from island to island in fleets of 
 double canoes, and sanguinary conflicts were carried on. 
 There are instances, well authenticated by tradition and by 
 the reports of visiting travelers, where the armies of one side 
 were driven bodily over perpendicular precipices and hundreds 
 were killed. During the chiefship of Kahekili, war continued 
 between Maui and Hawaii, with occasional expeditions to 
 Oahu. Kamehameha I., now became his rival for the control 
 of Maui. He was defeated once or twice by Kahekili, who 
 captured Oahu ; but, after a time, he succeeded in overcoming 
 all the various island chiefs, efTected a consolidated govern- 
 ment over all the islands, except Kauai and Niihau, and be- 
 came the king. He finally obtained the cession of Kauai, 
 from the chief of that island, in 1809, and thereafter was the 
 ruler and king of the entire group, until his death in 18 19. 
 
 Kamehameha I., was the original Hawaiian governmental 
 reformer. The government at the time of his accession was a 
 sort of semi-barbarous establishment, with chieftains over the 
 principal islands. He re-organized the general system and 
 broke up that which existed at the time, appointing governors 
 in place of the chieftains. These governors, subject to his 
 personal supervision, appointed tax collectors, heads of dis- 
 
242 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 tricts, and other subordinate officers. They also dispensed 
 justice, after a manner. The four great chiefs who had aided 
 him in all his wars were the twin-brothers, Kameeiamoku and 
 Kamanawa, and a half-brother. These, with Keeaumoku 
 and Keaweheulu, were his recognized advisors and, together 
 with Kalauimoki, they may be regarded as his cabinet. 
 
 Prior to his death in 1819, Kamehameha I., had appointed his 
 favorite queen, Kaahumanuu, as the premier or regent, called 
 a " Kuhinanui," to exercise equal authority with his son Kame- 
 hameha II., who was known as " Liholiho." She possessed 
 the power of veto over the young king's acts. Liholiho visited 
 England in 1823 and died there in 1825, whereupon Kauikea- 
 ouli, his brother, known as Kamehameha III., began to reign 
 in 1833, at nineteen years of age. The premiership of Kaa- 
 humanuu was continued on account of the youth of the 
 young monarch, and the former council of chiefs or governors 
 was converted into The House of Nobles. 
 
 Up to that time the common people were not considered to 
 have any political rights whatever, but during the reign of 
 Kamehameha III. both he and his chiefs became convinced 
 of the necessity of remodeling their system. They sent to 
 the United States for a legal advisor and a person to instruct 
 them in the science of government. In 1838, they chose Mr. 
 Richards as advisor and interpreter ; and he, having been re- 
 leased from his connection with the American Mission, en- 
 tered upon his duties in 1839, ^Y delivering a series of lectures 
 on the science of government to the king and his chiefs, at 
 Lahaina. A code of laws was drawn up and a declaration of 
 rights was prepared by a graduate of the Seminary at that 
 place, directed by the king. The king and the chiefs spent 
 several days in discussing it. At a second meeting, which in- 
 cluded all the important chiefs of the islands, it was read a 
 third time and unanimously approved. It was then signed 
 by the king and published June 7, 1839, i" ^ pamphlet of 
 twenty-four pages. The next year, 1840, a constitution was 
 drawn up in a similar manner and approved in the general 
 council of the chiefs. 
 
 The islands were visited occasionally by Russian and Ameri- 
 can ships and some French and English vessels. Probabh- 
 
THE ANNEXATION OF HAWAII. 243 
 
 the most important visitors, who, at any time before or since, 
 have visited Hawaii, were those who arrived on March 20, 
 1820, in the American brig, TJiaddeus, from Boston. These 
 were the first missionaries to the islands, the first party con- 
 sisting of the Rev. Asa Thurston and the Rev. Hiram Bingham, 
 ordained missionaries, with their wives and five other Ameri- 
 cans and four Hawaiians who had received some education at 
 a school in the States. These missionaries at once com- 
 menced their labors, and on August 25, 1821, the first Christ- 
 ian meeting house was erected in Honolulu. Following this, 
 many native congregations were organized and a number of 
 churches built. The missionaries were persistent and indus- 
 trious. 
 
 Up to this time, the Hawaiians had had no written language 
 or printed books. The missionaries prepared an alphabet, 
 created and introduced a written language and, in 1822, six 
 months after the first church building was erected, the first 
 printed sheet in the Hawaiian tongue was struck off at the 
 American Mission in Honolulu. The missionaries and many 
 of the leading citizens devoted much time to the introduction 
 of this new language. Teachers were immediately sent out 
 among the natives, who were eager for knowledge and ad- 
 vanced rapidly in the study of the new tongue. It was 
 adopted by the Seminary which had been established at La- 
 haina. Schools for its introduction were opened in many 
 places throughout the islands. It may not be amiss to say 
 that the general features of the new tongue are these : — there 
 are but twelve letters in the alphabet ; five of the letters arc 
 vowels which have, generally, the European pronunciation ; 
 all words end with a vowel. During the twelve or fifteen years 
 following its introduction it became quite well understood 
 not only by the younger, but even by the older classes of the 
 people, and it still remains the native language. 
 
 From immemorial time, a system of tabus, or forbidden 
 things, had grown up in Hawaiian life ; the penalties for vio- 
 lation of these, in many cases, were extremely severe. A few 
 years after the introduction of Christianity by the mission- 
 aries, many of the chiefs and important of^cials of the islands 
 became earnest Christians and at quite an early date the sys- 
 
244 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 tern of tabus was destroyed. Many of the old superstitions 
 which had come down from a distant past were shown to be fool- 
 ish and members of the royal family took part in the efforts to 
 break up some of the more ridiculous notions. At a later day 
 the worship of idols was abandoned. In the city of Honoluki 
 and in Hilo, to-day, some of the largest churches are native- 
 churches of different denominations. 
 
 During the closing years of the reign of Kamehameha I., 
 the principal business, or method of obtaining money or prop- 
 erty, was the sale of sandal-wood ; ships loaded with sandal- 
 wood were frequently dispatched to China, and cargoes were 
 bartered for various articles of trade. In 1829, an adventurer, 
 on the pretense that he had discovered an island of sandal- 
 wood in the South Pacific, obtained one or two vessels from 
 credulous Hawaiians and started away for the south. One of 
 the vessels had about 300 men and the other 179 men. The 
 inhabitants went wild over this expedition. One of the ves- 
 sels was never heard of again ; the other one, on its return, 
 nearly a year later, had only twenty remaining of its origi- 
 nal crew. 
 
 In 1 83 1, under the care of the Rev. Lorrin Andrews, the 
 Lahaina Luna Seminary was founded. A printing press and 
 book-bindery were attached to the school and many books 
 were printed. In the year 1832, Kaahumanuu, the premier or 
 " Kuhinanui," who had become noted for her advanced ideas 
 of government, religion and humanity, died. After her death, 
 Kamehameha III. became king. 
 
 In 1833, the Rev. John Diell arrived in Honolulu, bringing 
 with him from New London, Connecticut, the frame-work of a 
 chapel, which was erected in Honolulu under the name of the 
 Bethel Church. About this time schools began to be opened 
 for the native children, and school-houses were erected for 
 English-speaking children. In 1837, a girls' boarding-school 
 was opened in Wailuku. 
 
 The sandal-wood trade, which at one time amounted to 
 $400,000 a year, fell off in 1835 to $30,000. Efforts were 
 made to start silk plantations and cotton began to be manu- 
 factured in 1835 and 1837. I" ^836, the first English news- 
 paper, the Sandwich Island Gazette, was published in Hono- 
 lulu. 
 
THE ANNEXATION OF HAWAII. 245 
 
 There were, however, still existing among the inhabitants 
 of the islands, very crude notions of government. They 
 could not understand a government distinct from the person 
 of the king. They had always been led to believe that the 
 king or monarch was the controller and practically the 
 owner of all the property, particularly the real estate of the 
 islands, and that the king could dispossess any person at will. 
 At a later date the idea of independent ownership of land be- 
 gan to be understood better. 
 
 In 1838 and 1839, there was a great religious revival, which 
 extended to nearly all the islands and affected nearly all the 
 people. In the two years, over fifteen thousand people were 
 admitted to the Protestant churches and during the same 
 time over seven thousand were admitted to one of the 
 churches in Hilo. 
 
 In the latter year, 1839, ^ Captain La Place of a f^rench 60- 
 gun brig, arrived at Honolulu. As the French Ministry had 
 adopted a vigorous colonial policy, the Hawaiian Islands, as 
 well as the Marquesas and Tahiti, felt its effects. Captain 
 La Place issued a manifesto, practically compelling the islands 
 to submit to any indignity which he might see fit to atteinpt. 
 He announced that on the twelfth of July he intended to 
 commence hostilities. On the fourteenth, with one hundred 
 men with fixed bayonets and a band of music, he proceeded 
 to a building belonging to the king and presented certain de- 
 mands, which the king was required to sign by breakfast 
 next morning. He refused to grant time for consideration or 
 consultation and the convention was signed. But Captain 
 La Place soon sailed away ; and after his departure the de- 
 mands which he had imposed upon them obtained little atten- 
 tion. 
 
 In the period of 1839 to 1842, as there had been much con- 
 fusion growing out of religious persecution, a declaration of 
 rights, which has been termed the Magna Charta of Hawaiian 
 freedom, was signed by the king and promulgated. The fol- 
 lowing year a constitution was drawn up and proclaimed, creat- 
 ing a legislative body of representatives. Old laws were 
 revised and new ones added. School laws were enacted in 
 1841 and, in 1842, all government property was set apart and 
 
246 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 a Treasury Board created. A regular system of keeping ac- 
 counts, paying government officers and collecting taxes, was 
 adopted. 
 
 On May 30, 1 840, a great eruption of the volcano of Kilauea 
 began and continued for three weeks. A few small hamlets 
 were overwhelmed by the lava stream on its way to the coast, 
 but no lives were lost. 
 
 A school for the education of young chiefs was founded in 
 May, 1840, and fifteen men of high rank were educated 
 through the medium of the English language for about ten 
 years. The school now known as the Oahu College, one of 
 the finest institutions to be found anywhere, was founded at 
 Punahou in 1842. The buildings and grounds of this college 
 are now, fifty-eight years after its founding, among the finest 
 and best in the islands. 
 
 In 1842, the government of the islands having had frequent 
 difficulties with the French government, certain attempts were 
 made by other countries to take advantage of the simplicity 
 of some of the Hawaiian officers and diplomats but through 
 intervention and recognition by the United States, these dif- 
 ficulties were readily settled. 
 
 In 1843, under the coaching of certain private interests, the 
 government was induced to yield certain points to Lord Pau- 
 let, representative of the British government, but the king 
 and premier protested bitterly against the proceedings of the 
 British Ambassador and appealed to the sense of justice and 
 magnanimity of the Queen of England for redress. The king 
 was intimidated into signing a guarantee deed for the benefit 
 of speculators but finally, declined to yield to any further in- 
 timidation. The speculators had brought in lists of damages 
 against the government in a short time aggregating about 
 $80,000. An attempt was made to collect these claims by 
 additional force and intimidation. Certain lands were claimed 
 by a Mr. Charlton. Lord Paulet seized the land which had 
 been claimed by Charlton, cleared it of its occupants and de- 
 molished a number of the houses. The British government 
 at London, as soon as the true state of affairs was presented 
 to the Premier, disavowed the acts of Lord Paulet and of 
 those who had been attempting the intimidation uf the 
 
THE ANNEXATION OF HAWAII. 247 
 
 Hawaiians, and declined to accept the provisional cession of 
 the Hawaiian Islands, which had been forced from King 
 Kamehameha III. under duress. 
 
 On the thirty-first day of July, 1843, a ceremony memora- 
 ble in Hawaiian history was celebrated by a salute of twenly- 
 one guns in honor of the restoration of the flag from unau- 
 thorized British encroachments. The king addressed the 
 people, a great crowd of whom had assembled at the native 
 church in Honolulu, and said to them, " The life of the land 
 has been restored through righteousness;" using the words 
 which have since been adopted as a national motto :— " Ua 
 mau ke ea o ka aina i ka pono." The British Admiral, Thomas, 
 who was present, gave his assistance in establishing order and 
 morality. His act of justice was fully approved by the 
 British government. The ground whereon this ceremony 
 took place is named " Thomas Square," in honor of the 
 Admiral. 
 
 In 1845, the Legislature created a Board of Commissioners 
 to settle land titles. Before these commissioners, all persons 
 were required to file their claims to land within two years, in- 
 to be forever barred. This board continued in office until 
 March 31, 1855, having performed a great work, the results of 
 which are comprised in many large books deposited in the 
 records of the Land Office. After investigation, it was finally 
 determined that three classes of persons had vested rights in 
 land, namely, — first, the king ; second, the chiefs; third, the 
 common people. It was decided that the king should allow to 
 the chiefs one-third, to the common people one-third and 
 keep one-third for himself. In 1848 a division was effected. 
 The king voluntarily divided the lands which had been sur- 
 rendered to him, reserving only one-half of his share for him- 
 self as his own private estate and setting apart the other half 
 for the use of the government. This was deemed an illus- 
 trious example of public spirit, and within the next two years 
 nearly all the chiefs gave v\p one-third of their lands to the 
 government in order to obtain an absolute title to the re- 
 mainder. The common people were given fee-simple titles for 
 their house-lots and the lands which they actually cultivated. 
 These were finally confirmed, anioiintinj, in dl, to 11,309 
 
248 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 claims. Aliens were not allowed to hold lands in fee-simple, 
 until July, 1850. Thus a foundation was laid for individual 
 property in land. The poor people became for the first time 
 owners of their homes, the ancient feudal system having now 
 been swept away. 
 
 Alexander says that the preliminary declaration of rights, 
 published in 1839, was the first step towards establishing the 
 right of individual property in land. It also guaranteed re- 
 ligious liberty and was followed by the edict of toleration, 
 issued by the king in 1839. 
 
 Under this constitution, land could be conveyed without 
 the consent of the king. Land forfeited for the non-payment 
 of taxes reverted to him. He had the direction of the govern- 
 ment property and was given the prerogative to make treaties 
 and receive ambassadors. He was commander-in-chief of the 
 army, with power to make war in any time of emergency, 
 when the chiefs or nobles could not be assembled. He was 
 also the chief judge of the Supreme Court. 
 
 The office of the premier was continued, being the same in 
 nature as that created by Kamehameha I. for Kaahumanuu, 
 but all business done by the premier was under the authority 
 of the king. 
 
 The four governorships instituted by Kamehameha I. were 
 perpetuated with nearly the same powers. 
 
 A Legislature was created, composed of a House of Nobles 
 consisting of fifteen hereditary nobles, together with the king 
 and premier, and certain representatives to be chosen by the 
 people. The Legislature was to meet annually. The number 
 of representatives was fixed by law at seven. The two 
 houses could sit separately or together, at their discretion. 
 
 A Supreme Court was established, consisting of the king, 
 premier and four judges to be appointed by the Legislature. 
 Under the provisions of this constitution, the Legislature 
 was formally opened in May, 1845, with appropriate ceremo- 
 nies which have been retained since. An attorney general 
 appointed at that time, Mr. Ricord, made an able report in 
 regard to the Constitution and the powers and duties of the 
 king. By order of the Legislature, he prepared two volumes 
 of statute laws, organizing five executive departments, and. 
 
THE ANNEXATION OF HAWAII. 249 
 
 until now, there has been little change in this executive ma- 
 chinery set in operation over fifty years ago. 
 
 In 1850, the number of representatives in the legislative 
 council was increased from seven to twenty-four, and the 
 cabinet ministers were given seats and votes in the House of 
 Nobles. An act was passed regulating elections. The office 
 of the premier, or, in Hawaiian language, the lailiina niii, was 
 retained as a kind of vice-king, in deference to the wishes of 
 the chiefs. This officer was to be the king's special counselor 
 and the king and premier each had a negative upon the other's 
 acts. 
 
 A privy council was created. 
 
 The members of the House of Nobles were appointed by 
 the king for life, but their number could not exceed thirty. 
 The House of Nobles was empowered to sit as a court to try 
 impeachments brought by the House of Representatives 
 against public officers. 
 
 Representatives were to be elected only by universal 
 suffrage. There was no property qualification for voters or 
 representatives. 
 
 All revenue bills were to originate in the lower house. 
 
 For a number of years, the constitution worked reasonably 
 well. Occasionally amendments were offered and, in 1856, 
 the sessions of the Legislature were made biennial instead of 
 annual. 
 
 Kamehameha HI. died December 15, 1854, and was suc- 
 ceeded by Alexander Liholiho, who became King Kameha- 
 meha IV. His brother, who afterwards became Kamehameha 
 v., was known as Prince Lot. He was very strongly opposed 
 to the American tendency of the constitution of 1852 and, ac- 
 cordingly, on the thirtieth of November, 1863, after the 
 death of his brother, he was proclaimed king, under the title 
 of Kamehameha V., without taking the oath to support the 
 constitution. He did not convene the regular Legislature in 
 1864, but called a constitutional convention, to be held on the 
 thirteenth of June. 
 
 He, together with several of his special friends, made a tour 
 through several of the islands to induce the people to support 
 the chano-es which he desired to make in the constitution. 
 
250 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 The convention met on the seventh of July, 1864, and after 
 considerable debate and controversy, the action of the con- 
 vention not being satisfactory to him, on the thirteenth of 
 August, 1864, he prorogued the convention and declared the 
 existing constitution to be abrogated. 
 
 On the twentieth of August, 1864, he promulgated a new 
 constitution, on his own authority, which was submitted to 
 without resistance and which continued in force for twenty- 
 three years. This constitution made fewer changes than was 
 expected. The clause guaranteeing elections by ballot was 
 stricken out, the office of kiihina mii was abolished, and other 
 provisions made for a regency in case of minority of the royal 
 heirs or in the absence of the king. 
 
 Some other changes were made in the number of representa- 
 tives and nobles. Voters were required to own a certain 
 amount of real property and, if born since 1840, to know how 
 to read and write. 
 
 During the existence of the constitution of 1864, govern-- 
 ment offices were freely bestowed upon members of the Legis- 
 lature. Consequently, the legislative bodies were soon 
 under the direct influence of the crown. 
 
 There was a great deal of discontent in the public mind 
 with the arbitrary reign of Kamehameha V. Upon his death 
 in 1872, W. C. Lunalilo was elected king by the Legislature. 
 He took the oath to support the constitution. He lived only 
 about a year, his death occurring in February, 1874; where- 
 upon, David Kalakaua was chosen king by the Legislature and 
 took the oath to support the constitution. 
 
 The disposition manifested during the two past reigns, 
 that of Kamehameha V. and Lunalilo, to override the people 
 and to take away constitutional prerogatives was intensified 
 during the reign of Kalakaua. The evil tendency of the 
 wrongful assumptions of kingly power produced its legitimate 
 effect and caused a revolution in 1887. By this Kalakaua 
 was compelled to sign and proclaim a new constitution on the 
 seventh of July. This new constitution contained a great 
 many changes, nearly all of them tending strongly in favor of 
 the rights of the people at large. It was, in a limited sense, 
 comparable to the Magna Charta granted by King John, at 
 Runnymede, many hundred years ago. 
 
THE ANNEXATION OF HAWAII. 251 
 
 After the death of Kalakaua, the sovereign, Queen Lili- 
 uokalani, insisted upon or claimed the right to demand the 
 resignations of the former cabinet and to appoint a new one. 
 It was said that she was about to present a new constitution 
 and insist upon its acceptance by the people. The people, 
 generally, were wide-awake and were not willing to submit to 
 any constitution about to be proposed by the queen, without 
 having something to say about its terms. Another revolution 
 therefore took place, which resulted in the organization of a 
 provisional government, the dethronement of the queen and 
 the final adoption of a republican form of government. 
 
 The Legislature of 1892 closed its sessions January 14, 1893, 
 " and passed into history, flagrant with intrigue against the 
 public interest." The act of the queen and the announce- 
 ment of her intended revocation of the constitution, to fol- 
 low the removal of her constitutional advisers and the ap- 
 pointment of a new cabinet, produced the utmost consterna- 
 tion in Honolulu. A revolution immediately followed and a 
 Provisional Government was at once established. Special 
 commissioners were at once sent to Washington, leaving for 
 San Francisco by steamer on January 19, to arrange terms 
 of union with the United States. A draft of a treaty was 
 proposed by President Harrison and sent to the Senate for 
 action. 
 
 On the twenty-fourth of January, 1893, after an investiga- 
 tion had been made, which looked to the punishment for trea- 
 son of a number of people who had been tried and found 
 guilty, the following document was forwarded to the new re- 
 publican government : — 
 
 "I, Liliuokalani Dominis, do solemnly swear in the presence 
 of Almighty God that I will support tiie constitution, laws 
 and government of the Republic of Hawaii, and will not, 
 either directly or indirectly, encourage or assist in the restora- 
 tion or establishment of a monarchical form of government in 
 the Hawaiian Islands. 
 
 (Signed) LlLIUOKALANI. 
 
 Subscribed and sworn to this twenty-fourth day of January, 
 1893, before me, 
 
 W. L. Stanley, Notary Public. 
 
252 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 On the same day, a lengthy paper, signed by the late queen, 
 announced her irrevocable abdication, renunciation and release 
 of all claims or pretensions whatsoever to the late throne of 
 Hawaii. 
 
 Meantime, while awaiting further developments, the situa- 
 tion at Honolulu becoming serious. United States Minister 
 Stevens, acting at the request of the Provisional Government, 
 proclaimed a Protectorate over the country February i, 1893. 
 He hoisted the American flag over the government building, 
 while a battalion of U. S. troops from the U. S. Cruiser 
 Boston, then in the harbor, took possession of the premises 
 and remained on guard. 
 
 President Cleveland assumed the administration of the 
 government of the United States on the fourth of March and 
 immediately withdrew the treaty from the Senate. He fol- 
 lowed this by sending Colonel J. H. Blount, as a Special 
 Commissioner, to visit the islands, examine and report. 
 Colonel Blount reached Honolulu on March 27, took of- 
 ficial control, terminated the Protectorate on April i, 
 lowered the American flag, and the troops from the Boston 
 returned to their ship. 
 
 This unexpected action on the part of the American Gov- 
 ernment caused the greatest consternation all over the 
 United States and appeared almost like a death-blow to the 
 Provisional Government. But the men who, like the signers 
 of the American Declaration of Independence, had put their 
 hands to the work did not turn back. They maintained the 
 organization and kept control of affairs. 
 
 They were successful in the collisions which occurred be- 
 tween their forces and those of the expiring monarchy. 
 They conducted their new government with firmness, decency 
 and constant watchfulness. The situation culminated early 
 in the following year by the calling of a Constitutional Con- 
 vention. The adoption of the constitution ordained by that 
 body resulted in the establishment of the Republic of 
 Hawaii. 
 
 The government of the Republic, which has been in full 
 operation since the fourth of July, 1894, and which will con- 
 tinue in operation until final action by the Congress of the 
 
THE ANNEXATION OF HAWAII. 253 
 
 United States, has been a strong, vigorous, effective govern- 
 ment. It has maintained good order and demonstrated its 
 stability. Under its administration, the welfare of the com- 
 mon people has been closely looked after and the conditions 
 of society generally are remarkably good. 
 
 Among the incidents or occurrences of more or less impor- 
 tance, which have taken place during the last half century 
 upon the islands, that of the development and growth of lep- 
 rosy is one of very great significance. This unwelcome dis- 
 ease was first observed in 1853, and its spread was quite 
 rapid, persistent and apparently uncontrollable, for ten or 
 twelve years. The alarm created by its presence was wide- 
 spread and serious. Public interest was awakened, not only 
 among the people of the islands but in the United States 
 and other countries, and special efforts for taking control of 
 the persons effected were directed by law. It seemed to at- 
 tack persons of Hawaiian or part Hawaiian parentage in a far 
 greater proportion than those of other races and nationalities. 
 After a careful investigation by the best medical authorities 
 of the world, acting by their advice, the Legislature in 1865 
 passed a law to isolate all lepers from association with other 
 persons. In that same year Dr. Hutchinson, acting for the 
 Government, selected a peninsula on the north side of the is- 
 land of Molokai, covering about five thousand or six thousand 
 acres and shut off from the main portion of the island on the 
 south by a range of inaccessible mountains over two thousand 
 feet in perpendicular height. Upon the cast, north and west 
 sides of the peninsula dash the high waves of a raging ocean, 
 whose rushing waters break upon coral rocks. Upon this 
 peninsula the first colony of lepers, 140 in number, was estab- 
 lished in 1866. The government has provided liberally and 
 kindly for the unfortunates; it furnishes them with clothing, 
 food and medical attendance, paying all expenses and making 
 their support a part of the fixed charge upon the general pub- 
 lic. The law operates effectively throughout the groups and, 
 whenever any person is credibly charged with having become 
 leprous, he or she is held in a detention hospital until the cer- 
 tainty of the infection has been determined. Then he is 
 conveyed to the settlement to remain there permanently. 
 
25 I THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 About 1,150 persons so gathered are now at this place. The 
 disease does not appear to be increasing or diminishing at 
 present but remains somewhat stationary. The usual period 
 of life of those confined here is from three to ten years after 
 admission. They do not seem especially unhappy, considering 
 their almost certain future. Very few whites or Chinese or 
 Japanese contract the disease, probably not one per cent in 
 all. There was grim philosophy in the remark of one of the 
 physicians in charge, who told us that the chief amusement 
 of the people was attendance upon funerals. Two brass 
 bands exist among the lepers and there is a rivalry between 
 them as to which shall give the most acceptable music at the 
 burials, which occur every day or two. There are two or 
 three churches. Catholic and Protestant. The hospital duties 
 are performed at Kalaupapa, the women's settlement, by five 
 devoted Sisters of Charity from Syracuse, N. Y., who have 
 given their lives to the work. At Kalawao, on the eastern 
 end of the peninsula, the hospitals and cottages of the male 
 lepers are located and several Catholic brothers look care- 
 fully after them, under the direction of Brother Joseph 
 Button, who came from Wisconsin and dedicated himself to 
 this work for life. Sad as the situation appears to be, the 
 dread conditions are greatly mitigated by the kindly care 
 given by the government in their support and comfortable 
 maintenance. 
 
 There is one feature of the Hawaiian policy which deserves 
 more attention in this country, and that is the educational 
 system. Schools are carefully maintained and a sufficient 
 classification is kept. School attendance is compulsory by 
 general law. Good educators have been imported from the 
 States, but the chief value of the school establishment is 
 found in its English tendency. The native Hawaiian lan- 
 guage has been abandoned in schools and the English tongue 
 is made the arbitrary medium of all their studies. This has 
 a far-reaching effect which can readily be understood by those 
 interested in the progress of American institutions in the new 
 territorial accessions. 
 
 The Hawaiian Islands are delightful oases in the broad 
 Pacific. They lie a little over two thousand miles to the 
 
THE ANNEXATION OF HAWAII. 255 
 
 southwest of California, which is, in fact, the nearest of the 
 enhghtened countries bordering upon the Pacific. As facilities 
 for steam transportation across the Pacific exist at present, it 
 is about a six-days voyage from San Francisco to Honolulu. 
 
 There are eight of the larger islands which compose the 
 group, of which seven are inhabited. The area of the group 
 is about 6,740 square miles. The largest of these islands, Ha- 
 waii, has 4,2 10 square miles. The next in size, Maui, has 760 
 square miles. But the most important of the group is Oahu, 
 which has a population of 40,000 and an area of 600 square 
 miles. The most fertile of the islands, Kauai, has a little less 
 than 600 square miles of surface and is called the " Garden 
 Island," because it is abundantly watered and adapted to the 
 growth of several important agricultural products. 
 
 For many years, Honolulu, the chief city, situated upon the 
 island of Oahu, has been an important port of call for the 
 great number of ships, including whalers, freighting ships, 
 fishing vessels, war vessels and others, which have traversed 
 the Pacific. It bids fair now, since it is to come under the 
 beneficent control of the United States, to become the prin- 
 cipal commercial point in that broad ocean 6,000 miles across. 
 
 The group takes its name from the largest of the islands, Ha- 
 waii. The soil upon them all is volcanic in character, except 
 for a very small extent along the coast where it is of a coral- 
 line formation. During the past ages, there have doubtless 
 been innumerable flows of lava from the different volcanoes, 
 most of which are now extinct. There are remaining at 
 present on the Island of Hawaii two living volcanoes, both of 
 which are occasionally active. They are both upon one 
 mountain, Mauna Loa. The greater one in size, Mokuaweo- 
 weo, is situated at the top of this great mountain at a height 
 of nearly 14,000 feet above the level of the sea. The other 
 one, Kilauea, upon the north side of the same mountain is 
 about twenty miles from Mokuaweoweo at a point 4,000 feet 
 above the level of the sea. Kilauea, which has within the 
 last score of years been frequently in eruption, has often been 
 described by travelers and others and, because of the existence 
 of the so-called " Lake of P'ire " in its crater, has become some- 
 what celebrated. On the adjacent island of Maui is the 
 
256 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 crater of Haleakala, the largest extinct crater in the world, 
 being nearly twenty miles in extent and half a mile in depth. 
 
 The soil of all the islands is composed of lava. Much of 
 this has become disintegrated or decomposed by lapse of time 
 and now upon the application of water becomes wonderfully 
 fertile and productive. Lying only a few degrees from the 
 equator, in nearly the same latitude as Cuba, the products of 
 the soil are all tropical in character, except at high altitudes 
 upon the slopes of the higher mountains where the tempera- 
 ture ranges, according to elevation, from summer heat to 
 freezing. The rainfall varies greatly according to location, 
 elevation and prevalent winds. For the larger part of the 
 year, the northeast trade winds are nearly constant and the 
 precipitation of moisture from the clouds upon the windward 
 or northeast side of the islands is many times greater than 
 upon the leeward side. For instance, upon the windward 
 side of Hawaii, at Hilo and Olaa, two places fifteen miles 
 apart, the annual rainfall varies from 150 to 200 inches, while 
 at Kailua, on the leeward or southwestern side of Hawaii, it is 
 about sixty inches and at Waimea, on the north and west, only 
 forty inches. At Paia, on the island of Maui, where there is 
 a profitable sugar plantation irrigated by artesian water, there 
 is an annual rainfall of only thirty inches. 
 
 At Honolulu the temperature is delightful and constitutes 
 a chief attraction to the American visitor. It averages for 
 the year about seventy-two or seventy-three degrees Fahren- 
 heit, while the highest is about eighty-eight and the lowest 
 about fifty-eight. The cooling influence of the northeast 
 trade winds has the effect of modifying the temperature of 
 the entirs group, so that there is no really hot weather and 
 no cold weather except on the tops of the high mountains. 
 The temperature at sea level is such as to be well adapted for 
 the growth of sugar cane, rice and tropical products generally. 
 
 Churches are numerous and church privileges are in most 
 places easily available. 
 
 The government for many years, even under the king has 
 been an excellent one and the abuses, which crept into the 
 administration of the Hawaiian monarchs, resulted in most 
 cases from the improper influences of white courtiers. 
 
THE ANNEXATION OF HAWAII. 257 
 
 The revolution which resulted in the estabh"shment of a Re- 
 pubh'c was the natural outcome of the attempt to break down 
 the high civilization which existed, by pressing degrading 
 measures and acts upon weak rulers. The people would not 
 submit and the result is before us. The Republic, which suc- 
 ceeded the Monarchy in 1S93, has since commended itself to 
 Ilawaiians and to the world. It became a strong and excel- 
 lent government, advanced in its ideas and efficient in execu- 
 tion of wise laws. It was respected and deserved respect. 
 But any small insular establishment in a remote part of the 
 Pacific, growing rapidly rich and prosperous, would have been 
 simply a standing invitation to predatory powers to capture 
 and possess. 
 
 The people of Hawaii with their institutions are decidedly 
 valuable acquisitions to the United States as a government. 
 Their annexation is not so directly valuable to the individual 
 American as to the country. Of course that means much to 
 individual Americans ultimately, by their participation in the 
 property of the United States. But the failure of the 
 United States to avail itself of the opportunity which offered 
 itself in July last, would have been clearly censurable if not 
 criminal. As it now is, the sugar fields and rice fields, the 
 coffee plantations and the cattle ranches of Hawaii will all 
 prove of advantage to our interests. These products, which 
 now have an annual export value of about sixteen millions 
 and promise much more, will go far to render us independent 
 of other nations in certain trade matters. 
 
 But in addition to all else which may be said about the 
 value of this most excellent country, one of its chief jewels 
 is Pearl Harbor. Its name is well chosen, for it will certainly 
 become in a few years not merely Pearl Harbor, but the 
 Pearl of the Pacific. It is a wonderful natural addition to 
 our facilities for the building, repairing, protection and devel- 
 opment of the shipping and commercial interests of the 
 United States in the Pacific. It is the only harbor of mag- 
 nitude available in a vast water field seven or eight thousand 
 miles in extent. Considering the delightful climate, it is 
 bound to become a veritable sailor's home, — a home for com- 
 merce, — and although it be two thousand miles from our 
 
258 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 nearest seaport, it is still hundreds of miles nearer to our 
 coast than to any other. 
 
 ANNEXATION TO THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 For many years there has been a strong sentimental relation- 
 ship in social, religious and commercial interests between the 
 government and people of the Hawaiian Islands and those of 
 the United States. The dynasty of the Kamehameha family 
 in Hawaii began not far from the time that the United States 
 became an independent republic. The visits of the English 
 mariner, Captain Cook, to Hawaii and his discoveries and 
 death took place there during our own Revolutionary period. 
 From that time down to the last decade, the vicissitudes of 
 political and governmental affairs have very frequently in- 
 volved Hawaii in difificulties with other nations. On several 
 occasions the kindly offices of the ships of the United States 
 have been tendered by our government in aid of the Hawaiians, 
 whose rights were invaded by the navies of other nations. 
 Great Britain and France, each with armed force, invaded the 
 islands in 1839 ^"^ ^843. 
 
 Annexation to the United States was solicited by Hawaii 
 in 1853 ^^^^ ^ treaty to that end was signed by the negotia- 
 tors, but the sudden death of the king prevented its adoption. 
 Daniel Webster when Secretary of State in March, 1853, 
 writing to Commissioner Brown, instructed him as follows:— 
 
 ** It is obvious, from circumstances connected with 
 their position, that the United States require that no 
 other power should colonize or possess the Sandwich 
 Islands, or exercise over their government an influence 
 which would lead to partial or exclusive favors in mat- 
 ters of navigation or trade." 
 
 The people of the United States and of Hawaii have looked 
 to annexation as manifest destiny, and the failure of the treaty 
 sent to the Senate by President Harrison on its peremptory 
 withdrawal by his successor was a staggering blow to the 
 hopes of both Americans and Hawaiians. The real sense of 
 our people was voiced by the Senate Committee on Foreign 
 Relations in their report of March 16, 1898, as follows:— 
 
THE ANNEXATION OF HAWAII. 259 
 
 ''The full ownership of the Hawaiian Islands is indis- 
 pensable to the commerce of the United States, in re- 
 spect of its development and safety, and equally indis- 
 pensable as to the defense of our Pacific coasts." 
 
 The preceding remarks indicate the conservative sentiment 
 of the Congress of the United States in relation to the neces- 
 sity of annexation. This sentiment was greatly emphasized 
 by the events of the recent war with Spain and heightened by 
 the naval victories at Manila and elsewhere, so that Congress 
 on the seventh of July, 1898, adopted a joint resolution to 
 provide for annexing the Hawaiian Islands to the United 
 States. This resolution declares that the cession of those 
 islands by the government of the Republic of Hawaii is ac- 
 cepted, ratified and confirmed and that they are thereby de- 
 clared to be annexed as a part of the territory of the United 
 States. 
 
 In pursuance of the further provisions of this resolution, a 
 Commission, consisting of the following five persons, was ap- 
 pointed by the President to recommend to Congress such 
 legislation concerning the Hawaiian Islands as they should 
 deem necessary and proper: — 
 
 Senator Shelby M. Cullom, of Illinois, Chairman. 
 Senator John T. Morgan, of Alabama. 
 Representative Robert R. Hitt, of Illinois. 
 President Sanford B. Dole, of Hawaii. 
 Judge Walter F. Frear, of Hawaii. 
 
 These Commissioners met at Honolulu on the eighteenth 
 day of August, 1898, and held their sessions in the govern- 
 ment building, formerly the palace of King Kalakaua, and of 
 the late Queen, Liliuokalani. Daily sessions were held for 
 several weeks and all matters pertaining to the future govern- 
 ment of the islands were fully and freely considered. The 
 principal question which confronted the Commission was the 
 form of the government to be recommended for adoption. 
 The Commission discussed the question whether there should 
 be established a colonial government for the islands, a govern- 
 ment by a commission, as in the District of Columbia, or a 
 
26o THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 territorial form of government much after the fashion of the 
 territorial governments heretofore established for the Dakotas, 
 Idaho and other territories which have since become states. 
 The Commission considered with care all the questions in- 
 volved and unanimously determined that the colonial system 
 should not be recommended ; neither did they favor the sug- 
 gestion of government by a commission, but believed that 
 every consideration of duty demanded a territorial form of 
 government in harmony with past precedents, taking into 
 account the history of the islands, the relation they have sus- 
 tained to the United States, their fitness for self-government 
 and the perfection of their government already established, 
 patterned largely after our own. 
 
 Besides all these reasons in favor of a territorial form of 
 government, the Commission regarded the joint resolution of 
 Congress annexing the islands as in a sense equivalent to a 
 declaration that the islands should not be regarded as a colony, 
 the language of the act or joint resolution being: — "that the 
 Hawaiian Islands and their dependencies be, and they are 
 hereby, annexed as a part of the territory of the United 
 States," etc., etc. 
 
 These islands are as completely a part of the United States 
 as it has been possible for the United States Government to 
 make them by legislative action and while the United States 
 may have the arbitrary power to govern the people of the 
 islands in some other manner, yet the Commission deemed it 
 to be its duty to make the recommendation for a territorial 
 form of government. The proposed government is intended 
 to be as nearly like that of the present Republic of 
 Hawaii as the conditions of the new sovereignty will admit. 
 The bill provides for appointment by the President of the 
 United States of a Governor and Secretary of the territory, 
 leaves the local courts to remain as already established, pro- 
 vides for the appointment by the President of the United 
 States of a United States District Judge for life for the Dis- 
 trict of Hawaii and attaches the district to the Ninth Judi- 
 cial Circuit of the United States. This, in the judgment of 
 the Commission, was important, because of the multitude of 
 weighty questions constantly arising out of our commerci.il 
 
THE ANNEXATION OF HAWAII. 261 
 
 relations with the Pacific States and the large amount of for- 
 eign shipping already calling at Hawaiian ports. For these 
 and for many other reasons, it was deemed necessary to sepa- 
 rate the jurisdictions, thus leaving all cases arising under 
 local laws to the territorial courts, and all cases arising under 
 United States laws to be disposed of by a United States Dis- 
 trict Court. Of course the creation of a United States District 
 Court carries with it the necessity of a United States District At- 
 torney and Marshal to prosecute and execute the orders of the 
 Court. The ordinary territorial judiciary will be appointed 
 by the Governor and confirmed by the Senate, and their com- 
 pensation provided by the territory. The territorial machin- 
 ery provided in the bill reported by the Commission is in- 
 tended to cause as little change or shock as possible to the 
 accustomed methods already in vogue and well understood by 
 the people. Otherwise, the system proposed is nearly identi- 
 cal with that already in operation in other territorial 
 governments of the United States. 
 
 The limitations upon the right of suffrage are rather con- 
 servative. Both a property and an educational qualification 
 are required for the position of senator and also for voters for 
 senators, and an educational qualification is required for the 
 position of representative and also for voters for representa- 
 tives. It is thought, however, as both qualifications were in 
 force under the monarchy and retained under the republic, 
 that there will be but little objection to those limitations. 
 
 The giving of vitality to the recommendations of the Com- 
 mission remains for Congress to direct and, as the Fifty-fifth 
 Congress has adjourned without final action, it is believed 
 that the early sessions of the Fifty-sixth Congress will speed- 
 ily dispose of the Hawaiian question by actual annexation 
 and the establishment of the proposed territorial government. 
 This desired result will happily bring under the beneficent 
 control of this government a people who are worthy of the 
 kindest care and consideration from the United States. 
 
CHAPTER XIII. 
 THE MANILA CAMPAIGN. 
 
 BV 
 
 Maj-Gen. WESLEY MERRITT, U. S. A 
 
 COMMODORE DEWEY'S matchless Naval victory 
 over the Spanish fleet in the Bay of Manila, May i, 
 1898, raised a difficult and unlooked-for problem in the 
 prosecution of the war with Spain. In order to follow up the 
 advantage gained, and to secure full control of the capital of 
 the islands, it was necessary to send heavy reinforcements of 
 troops at the very earliest possible date. It was estimated 
 that a force of at least 20,000 men would be required for the 
 capture of the city itself and its subsequent occupation. The 
 task of organizing, arming and equipping so large a body of 
 troops under pressure of such urgent necessit\' was simph- 
 enormous. San Francisco was selected as the rendezvous for 
 the troops; and the first regiment of volunteers, the Second 
 Oregon, arrived at this point May 13, 1898. 
 
 On May 16, Major-General Wesley Merritt, United States 
 Army, was placed in command of the Department of the Pa- 
 cific, which department included all the military forces which 
 participated in the Philippine operations. 
 
 The first expedition to the Philippines, under command of 
 Brigadier-General Thomas M. Anderson, United States Vol- 
 unteers, consisting of the First California Infantry, the Sec- 
 ond Oregon Infantry, part of the Fourteenth United States 
 Infantry, and a detachment of California Artillery — 115 ofifi 
 cers and 2,386 enlisted men — sailed May 25, arriving off Ma- 
 nila June 30. 
 
 The second expedition, under the command of Brigadier- 
 General F. V. Greene, United States \^olunteers, sailed June 
 15, and consisted of the First Colorado, First Nebraska, 
 
264 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 Tenth Pennsylvania Infantry, four companies each of the 
 Eighteenth and Twenty-third United States Infantry, two 
 batteries Utah Artillery and a detachment of United States 
 Engineers — a total of 158 ofificers and 3,428 enlisted men — 
 reaching their destination July 17. 
 
 The third fleet of transports, in command of Brigadier-Gen- 
 eral Arthur MacArthur, United States Volunteers, put to sea 
 June 27, carrying four companies of the Eighteenth and 
 four companies of the Twenty-third United States Infantry, 
 one company of United States Engineers, the First Idaho, 
 First Wyoming, Thirteenth Minnesota, First North Dakota 
 and detachments of the Hospital and Signal Corps. This 
 fleet did not drop anchor in Manila Bay until July 31, six 
 days after the arrival of the transport Neivport, which sailed 
 from San Francisco June 29, with General Merritt and his staff, 
 four batteries of the Third United States Artillery and the 
 Astor Battery (New York Volunteers). There was an aggre- 
 gate in the three expeditions of 470 officers and 10,464 enlisted 
 men, including those on the Neivport, who participated in the 
 operations before Manila. The fourth and subsequent ex- 
 peditions did not arrive until after the fall of the city. The 
 military situation in Manila Bay when General Merritt as- 
 sumed command of the troops was as follows: 
 
 Rear-Admiral Dewey's fleet of warships was anchored ofT 
 Cavite, outside the line of military transports and supply 
 vessels. He was in full control of the bay, and his vessels 
 passed and repassed within range of the water batteries at 
 Manila, without drawing the fire of the enemy. General 
 Anderson commanded the military forces prior to General 
 Merritt's arrival, with headquarters in Cavity, that town being 
 occupied by the Second Oregon, detachments of California 
 heavy artillery and two regiments of regular infantry. Gen- 
 eral Greene's brigade, comprising the troops of the second ex- 
 pedition, with the addition of the Third United States 
 Artillery was encamped not far from Manila, along the line of 
 the bay shore, and near the village of Paranaque, about five 
 miles by water and twenty-five miles by the road from Cavite. 
 
 The left or north flank of Greene's brigade camp extended 
 to a point on the Calle Real, the only road out of Manila 
 
THE MANILA CAMPAIGN. 265 
 
 toward Cavite, one and a quarter miles from the oute tine of 
 tlie Spanish trenches of Manila. The Spanish line sTretched 
 eastward from old Fort San Antonio (the powder magazine), 
 just south of the Malate suburb, in more or less detached 
 works, through swamps and rice fields, completely encircling 
 the city and covering all avenues of approach. 
 
 Between the American and Spanish lines on the Calle Real, 
 along the front of General Greene's brigade, the Filipino in- 
 surgents under General Aguinaldo had established an earth- 
 work within 800 yards of the magazine fort. In addition, 
 the insurgents occupied a position to the right of Greene's 
 line, on the road leading from the village of Pasay, and they 
 also commanded the approach by the beach. In fact, they 
 held positions of investment at various points opposite the 
 Spanish line throughout their entire extent. They had been 
 waging a desultory warfare against the Spaniards for several 
 months, their forces now numbering about 12,000 men. They 
 were well supplied with small arms and ammunition, besides 
 several antiquated field pieces. The presence of a quasi- 
 hostile force of native troops between the American and the 
 Spanish positions was, of course, very objectionable. The 
 situation was difficult to deal with, owing to the peculiar re- 
 lations which existed between the American and the insur- 
 gent leaders as a result of the active operations undertaken 
 by the latter, more or less encouraged by the naval authorities, 
 prior to the arrival of the army reinforcements. General 
 Emilio Aguinaldo, the principal leader of the insurgents, 
 shortly after the battle of Manila Bay, had come to Cavite 
 from Hong Kong and begun active work in raising troops,, 
 and had succeeded to some extent in pressing the Spaniards 
 back toward Manila. At least 4,000 officers and men had 
 been made prisoners by Aguinaldo's forces ; and they held full 
 possession of the territory adjacent to Manila, including the 
 Province of Cavite, which Admiral Dewey had allowed them 
 to occupy. Aguinaldo then proclaimed himself president of 
 the Philippine Republic, and, at the time of the arrival of the 
 third expedition, he had established executive and legislative 
 departments, and was ostensibly in complete control of an in- 
 dependent government. On July 4, in a letter addressed to 
 
266 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 General Aguinaldo, General Anderson, in behalf of the United 
 States, expressed entire sympathy for the native people of 
 the Philippine Islands and the most friendly sentiments 
 toward them. A desire was also expressed both to have the 
 most amicable relations with the insurgent commander, and 
 to have his people co-operate with the Americans in military 
 operations against the Spaniards. Considerable correspond- 
 ence, mainly with regard to the dif^culty of collecting sup- 
 plies for the American forces, passed between Generals 
 Anderson and Aguinaldo. It was found necessary to solicit 
 the latter's aid in obtaining horses, buffaloes, carts, etc., for 
 purposes of transportation, for which the native population 
 was disposed to charge exorbitant prices. Further communi- 
 cations passed between them on the subject of securing maps 
 and other data concerning the topography of the country 
 about Manila. Aguinaldo, although profuse in promises of 
 assistance in every possible direction, actually rendered very 
 little aid. This correspondence was abruptly terminated by a 
 letter from the Filipino General dated July 24, in which he 
 asserted that he had come from Hong Kong in order to pre- 
 vent his own countrymen from making common cause with 
 the Spaniards against the Americans and protested against 
 the landing of American troops in places conquered and occu- 
 pied by the insurgents, without previous notice, in writing, 
 to his "Government." 
 
 General Merritt sought no communication with the insur- 
 gent leader, not wishing to recognize his authority until 
 Manila should be under American control, when he would be 
 in a position to issue a proclamation and enforce his authorit\' 
 in the event of Aguinaldo's pretentions conflicting with his 
 designs. Aguinaldo did not offer his services as a subordinate 
 leader and the preparations for attack were conducted inde- 
 pendently, no attempt being made to secure the co-operation of 
 the insurgents. The wisdom of this course was subsequentl}- 
 fully established by the fact that when the American troops 
 carried the Spanish intrenchments, extending from the sea to 
 the Pasay road on the extreme Spanish right, they were 
 under no obligations, by prearranged plans of mutual attack, 
 to turn to the right and clear the front still held against the 
 
THE MANILA CAMPAIGN. 267 
 
 insurgents, but were able to move forward at once and occupy 
 the city and suburbs. 
 
 The position of the insurgent troops between General 
 Greene's brigade and the Spanish line made a forward move- 
 ment difificult. It was arranged, however, between the brio-. 
 ade commander and the insurgent chief that the latter's forces 
 should move farther inland, thus giving the Americans unob- 
 structed control of the roads in their immediate front. Gen- 
 eral Greene then threw forward a heavy outpost line on the 
 Calle Real, occupied the insurgent trenches and, about 100 
 yards in advance of them, constructed another line of trenches 
 about 270 yards in length in which a portion of the guns of the 
 Utah battery was placed. The Spanish line of intrenchments 
 stretched from the beach at Fort San Antonio, across the 
 American front, eastward in a curved line, for a distance of 
 about 1,200 yards, enveloping their right flank and terminat- 
 ing in a fortified blockhouse on the Pasay road known as 
 Blockhouse 14. The entire length of the line was held by a 
 strong force of infantry, while several light pieces of artillery 
 were mounted at the stone fort on the beach and near the 
 blockhouse on the Pasay road. It was supported in its rear by 
 strong reserves at Malate and in the walled city. 
 
 The activity of the Americans in pushing forward and con- 
 structing trenches aroused the Spaniards, who made a sharp 
 attack with infantry and artillery on the night of July 31. 
 The trenches were then occupied by two battalions of the 
 Tenth Pennsylvania Infantry, a foot battery of the Third 
 Artillery and four guns of batteries A and B, Utah Artillery, 
 which sustained the attack until reinforcements came up 
 from the rear. When the firing commenced, battery K of the 
 Third Artillery proceeded at once to the trenches, followed by 
 a battalion of the First California Infantry. The second and 
 third battalions of the latter regiment and the First California 
 Infantry moved forward and awaited orders just out of range 
 of the Spanish fire. For about an hour and a half both sides 
 kept up a heavy artillery and infantry fire. In the Tenth 
 Pennsylvania Regiment, which was posted to the right of the 
 intrenchments, six men were killed and twenty-nine wounded. 
 Of the other regiments engaged, four men were killed, includ- 
 
268 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 ing Captain Richter of the First California, and four wounded. 
 It is estimated that the American forces fired nearly 60,000 
 rounds of infantry ammunition and 160 rounds of artillery, 
 while the Spaniards used nearly double that amount. The 
 intense darkness of the night and the blinding rain may 
 account for the small number of casualties, as compared with 
 the amount of ammunition expended. 
 
 After this attack the construction of trenches was vigor- 
 ously pushed, although constantly interrupted by the enemy's 
 fire. Owing to the almost incessant rains, which kept the 
 trenches half filled with water, this work was attended by 
 great suffering among the men, who were obliged to remain 
 at their work twenty-four hours before being relieved. 
 
 During the week following, the Spaniards repeated these 
 night attacks, inflicting losses aggregating five killed and ten 
 wounded. The brigade commander expressed the opinion 
 that these nightly attacks could be stopped if the fleet would 
 co-operate and reduce the Spanish fort. Both Admiral 
 Dewey and General Merritt, however, believed that a bombard- 
 ment by the fleet would precipitate a general action, which 
 they were anxious to avoid at that time on account of unpre- 
 paredness ; but it was agreed that the Raleigh and three other 
 vessels should be held in readiness to render assistance if 
 necessary. A blue light was to be burned on shore as the 
 signal for the ships to open fire, but this signal was not to be 
 given except in the face of imminent danger of being driven 
 from the trenches. This contingency did not arise and the 
 signal consequently was not used, although the enemy con- 
 tinued to harass the troops until the notice was given of pos- 
 sible bombardment after forty-eight hours or sooner, if the 
 Spanish firing continued. From this time, August 7, until 
 the final assault, not a shot was fired on either side. Great 
 difficulty was experienced during this period in preventing 
 the insurgents from provoking further outbursts from the 
 Spaniards, and it was necessary to use stringent measures, 
 even force, to keep them from breaking the tacit armistice. 
 
 The strain of the night fighting and the heavy details for 
 outpost duty rendered it imperative to reinforce Greene's 
 troops with General MacArthur's brigade, which had arrived 
 
THE MANILA CAMPAIGN. 269 
 
 on the 31st of July. The landing from the transports was 
 accomplished under great difficulties. The vessels being at 
 anchor off Cavite, five miles from the point where it was de- 
 sired to land the men, it was necessary to employ native 
 lighters, called "cascos," or small steamboats, to move the 
 men to the landing place and then disembark them either 
 through the surf in small boats or by running the lighters 
 head-on to the beach. Severe squalls and heavy rains con- 
 tinuing day after day, the landing was accomplished only as a 
 result of hard work and great hardship. 
 
 The same difficulties were met in landing supplies and equi- 
 page, so that the greater portion of the troops were provided 
 with shelter tents only and suffered many discomforts on ac- 
 count of inadequate protection from the fierce heat of the sun 
 and the terrific rain-storms characteristic of the tropics at this 
 season. 
 
 On August I, the forces of Generals Mac Arthur and 
 Greene were organized into a division of two brigades, the 
 first and second, respectively, and designated as the Second 
 Division, Eighth Army Corps, with General Thomas M. Ander- 
 son in command. There were now about 8,500 men in po- 
 sition for the attack. Admiral Dewey's fleet had been 
 strengthened by the arrival of the monitor Monterey and the 
 time had come for final action. Under date of August 7, the 
 naval and military commanders sent a joint letter to the Gover- 
 nor-General of the Philippines, notifying him that operations of 
 the land and naval forces of the United States against the de- 
 fenses of Manila might begin at any time after the expiration of 
 forty-eight hours from the time of its receipt and suggesting 
 the removal of all non-combatants from the city. The follow- 
 ing is a translation of the reply received from the Governor- 
 General : 
 
 Manila, August 7, 1898. 
 
 The Governor-General and Captain-General of the 
 Philippines to the Major-General of the Army 
 AND the Rear Admiral of the Navy, commanding, 
 respectively, the military and naval forces of 
 the United States. 
 
 Gentlemen: — I have the honor to inform your excellen- 
 
270 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 cies that at half-past twelve to-day I received the notice with 
 which you favor me, that after forty-eight hours have elapsed 
 you may begin operations against this fortified city or at an 
 earlier hour if the forces under your command are attacked by 
 mine. 
 
 As your notice is sent for the purpose of providing for the 
 safety of non-combatants, I give thanks to your excellencies 
 for the humane sentiments you have shown and state that, find- 
 ing myself surrounded by insurrectionary forces, I am without 
 places of refuge for the increased numbers of wounded, sick, 
 women and children who are now lodged within the walls. 
 
 Very respectfully, and kissing the hands of your excellencies, 
 
 FORMIRE JaUDENES, 
 Governor-General and Captain-General of the Philippines. 
 
 On August 9 the American commanders united in a for- 
 mal demand for the surrender of the city : 
 
 Headquarters U. S. Land and Naval Forces, 
 
 Manila Bay, Philippine Islands, August 9, 1898. 
 The Governor-General and Captain-General of the 
 Philippines. 
 Sir: — ^The inevitable suffering in store for the wounded, 
 sick, women and children, in the event that it becomes our 
 duty to reduce the defenses of the walled town in which they 
 are gathered, will, we feel assured, appeal successfully to the 
 sympathies of a general capable of making the determined 
 and prolonged resistance which your excellency has exhibited 
 after the loss of your naval forces and without hope of succor. 
 We therefore submit, without prejudice to the high senti- 
 ments of honor and duty which your excellency entertains, 
 that surrounded on every side as you are by a constantly in- 
 creasing force, with a powerful fleet in your front and deprived 
 of all prospect of reinforcement and assistance, a most useless 
 sacrifice of life would result in the event of an attack, and 
 therefore every consideration of humanity makes it imperative 
 that you should not subject your city to the horrors of a bom- 
 bardment. Accordingly, we demand the surrender of the city 
 of Manila and the Spanish forces under your command. 
 
 Very respectfully, 
 
 W. Merritt, 
 
 Major-General, United States Army, 
 
 Commanding Land Forces of the United States. 
 
 George Dewey, 
 
 Rear-Adniiral, United States Navy, Commanding 
 
 United States Naval Forces on Asiatic Station. 
 
THE MANILA CAMPAIGN. 271 
 
 The Governor-General's reply of the same date stated that 
 the council of defense had considered the matter and declared 
 that the demand for surrender could not be granted, but he 
 offered to consult his government if sufficient time were al- 
 lowed him for the communication by way of Hong Kono-. 
 This request was declined for the reason that further delay, 
 with little prospect of results favorable to the Americans, 
 would subject the troops in the trenches, unnecessarily, to 
 great exposure and the unhealthy conditions of a bivouac 
 during the rainy season. 
 
 The main batteries in defense of Manila being so situated 
 that an attempt to reduce them by bombardment from the 
 sea would almost certainly have been attended with loss of 
 life among non-combatants in the city and great damage to 
 neutral property, Admiral Dewey and General Merritt de- 
 cided that an effort should be made to carry the extreme right 
 of the Spanish line of intrenchments, which, with its flank on 
 the seashore, was open to the fire of the Navy. As the army 
 was without siege guns, the reduction of Fort San Antonio, 
 where the Spanish line began, was to be accomplished by 
 the guns from the ships, to prepare the way for the assault. 
 
 All the troops were in position at an early hour on the 
 morning of the thirteenth, with General Anderson in com- 
 mand, he having moved his headquarters from Cavit6 to the 
 brigade camps in anticipation of the attack. General Greene's 
 brigade was stationed to the American left, along the beach, 
 and inland across the Calle Real, the First Colorado, Eigh- 
 teenth United States Infantry and Third United States 
 vVrtillery being in the trenches, while the remainder of his 
 force, consisting of the First California, First Nebraska and 
 Tenth Pennsylvania, constituted the reserve. The brigade 
 under General MacArthur was located to the right, about half 
 a mile inland on the Pasay road, opposing Blockhouse 14 and 
 the left of the Spanish trenches. 
 
 The insurgent forces were unable to restrain their impa- 
 tience and for several hours before the operations commenced 
 maintained a general fusillade along their lines, provoking a 
 considerable fire of small arms and cannon from the Span- 
 iards. 
 
272 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 The division and brigade commanders were to be guided 
 by the following instructions, issued the previous day : 
 
 Headquarters Department of the Pacific and Eighth 
 Army Corps. Manila Bay, P. I., August 12, 1898. 
 
 Memorandum for General Officers in camp regarding 
 
 THE possible ACTION OF SATURDAY, AUGUST 1 3. 
 
 The navy, under Rear-Admiral Dewey, is to sail at 9 o'clock 
 in the morning, August 13, moving up to the different 
 positions assigned to the warships, and open fire about 10 
 o'clock. The troops are to hold themselves in readiness, as 
 already agreed upon, to advance on the enemy in front, 
 occupying the intrenchments after they are so shaken as to 
 make the advance practicable without a serious disadvantage 
 to our troops. In case the navy is delayed in dismounting 
 the enemy's guns and leveling the works, no advance is to 
 be made by the army unless ordered from these Headquar- 
 ters. In the event of a white flag being displayed by the 
 enemy on the angle of the walled city, or prominently any- 
 where else in sight, coupled with a cessation of firing on our 
 part, it will mean surrender, as the Admiral proposes, after 
 having fired a satisfactory number of shots, to move up towards 
 the walled city and display the international signal, " SUR- 
 RENDER." If a white flag is displayed, this will be an 
 answer to his demand ; the troops will advance, in good order 
 and quietly. 
 
 The Headquarters will be on board the Zafiro, which has 
 been placed at the disposal of the Commanding General 
 by the Admiral. Six companies of the Second Oregon Reg- 
 iment, now quartered at Cavite, will accompany these Head- 
 quarters, to be used in occupying and keeping order in the 
 walled city in the event of necessity. If the white flag is 
 displayed, the Admiral will send his Flag Lieutenant ashore, 
 accompanied by a Staff Officer from these Headquarters, who 
 will bring word as to the proposition made by the enemy. 
 The troops in the meantime will advance and, entering the 
 enemy's works by our left flank, move in such positions as 
 may be assigned them by orders from these Headquarters. 
 This is not intended to interdict the entrance, if possible, by 
 the First Brigade or part of the troops over the enemy's 
 works on the right. It is intended that these results shall be 
 accomplished without the loss of life ; and while the firing 
 continues from the enemy with their heavy guns, or if there 
 is an important fire from their intrenched lines, the troops 
 
THE MANILA CAMPAIGN. 273 
 
 will not attempt to' advance unless ordered from these 
 Headquarters. 
 
 In the event of unfavorable weather for the service of the 
 guns on board ship, the action will be delayed until further 
 orders. 
 
 Memorandum of the positions to be occupied by the troops 
 after entering the enemy's defenses will be carried by the 
 Chief of Staff, General Babcock, and will be complied with 
 as far as is practicable. 
 
 Wesley Merritt, 
 
 Major- General. 
 
 At 9 A. M., the fleet, accompanied by the Zajiro, steamed 
 toward Manila, from Cavitc, taking a position opposite the 
 magazine fort, with the Zajiro abreast of the camp as near 
 shore as her draft would permit. The fleet of foreign war- 
 ships which had hitherto been at anchor off the walled city 
 steamed out of the line of fire. The Olyinpia at 9:40 sent two 
 challenge shots from her 8-inch guns in the direction of the 
 Malate fort, quickly followed by a 6-inch shell from the Pet- 
 rel. One of these shots struck the water, ricocheted, and ex- 
 ploded at the base of the fort. As the fire was not returned 
 and the expected white flag failed to appear, after a brief 
 pause, the flag-ship, with the Petrel and the Raleigh, opened a 
 hot and accurate fire of heavy and rapid-fire projectiles which 
 was continued for half an hour against the sea flank of the 
 Spanish intrenchments and the magazine fort. 
 
 When it was believed that Greene's brigade could move, 
 the fleet was signalled to cease firing and a column from the 
 First Colorado Regiment left the trenches and deployed rapidly 
 forward between the Calle Real and the beach ; another line 
 from the same regiment advanced swiftly up the beach in 
 open order. The skirmishers were compelled to halt and lie 
 down, however, on account of the continued firing from the 
 fleet, where evidently the signals to stop firing had not 
 been observed. When the cannonading from the fleet finally 
 ceased, the second and third battalions of the First Colorado 
 moved up from the trenches and all pushed forward rapidly, 
 the column to the right keeping up a steady fire on the ene- 
 my's works to cover the advance of the line on the beach. 
 The latter line forded the creek, waded along the beach and en- 
 
274 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 tered the fort, which was found deserted, where the American 
 flag was hoisted ; meanwhile the second and third battalions ad- 
 vanced toward the trenches flanking the fort, passed over them, 
 finding them vacated, and joined the first battalion beyond on 
 the Calle Real. The fort being taken without resistance, the 
 Eighteenth Regular Infantry moved forward and was met by 
 a sharp fire from the woods near Cingalon and Paco, and one 
 battalion deployed to the right of the road in formation for 
 attack. The enemy was using smokeless powder and it was 
 therefore impossible accurately to locate his position, but his 
 fire was replied to by volleys and the advance was kept up by 
 a series of determined rushes until the abandoned Spanish 
 trenches were reached. Simultaneously with the advance of the 
 Eighteenth Infantry, the Third United States Artillery moved 
 up from their position on the extreme right and occupied the 
 trenches in their front. The reserve then came up and was 
 ordered to follow toward Manila by the beach. 
 
 Meantime the First California had joined the First Colorado 
 beyond the fort on the Calle Real and the two regiments were 
 advancing through Malate. They were checked by a heavy fire 
 from a second line of defense along the road from Malate to Cin- 
 galon, which was replied to and subdued after an engagement 
 lasting about fifteen minutes. The advance then continued 
 toward Manila, the First California and the Eighteenth Infan- 
 try moving along the Calle Real, while the Colorado Regiment 
 took the right flank and the First Nebraska took the beach. 
 In this formation the brigade proceeded through Malate and 
 Ermita, in the face of a straggling fire from the direction of 
 Paco, reaching the Luneta just south of the walled city at about 
 I P. M. A white flag was flying at the southwest corner of 
 the city wall. Here word was received by the brigade com- 
 mander that negotiations for surrender were in progress. A 
 force of nearly i,ooo Spanish troops who had retreated from 
 Santa Ana through Paco, probably driven in by the insur- 
 gents, and who doubtless had conducted the fire on the right 
 flank of the Americans, were met at the Paco road. They 
 surrendered to Greene and were ordered inside the city. The 
 walls of the town were lined with armsd Spaniards, who, in re- 
 turning the fire from a party of insurgents, killed one man and 
 
THE MANILA CAMPAIGN. 275 
 
 wounded two others in the California regiment. A consider- 
 able force of the insurgents had penetrated to the walls from 
 the direction of Paco, expecting to enter the city and raise 
 their flag. To prevent this a battalion of the Third Artillery 
 was sent down the Paco road to hold them in check. 
 
 In accordance with the instructions given the brigade com- 
 manders by General Merritt, Greene's troops then moved to 
 the east around the walled city, crossed the Pasig river and 
 occupied positions on the north side for the protection of 
 lives and property there. 
 
 During the advance of Greene's troops from the fort, two 
 little captured gunboats, the Barcelo and Gr//^^, moved along 
 abreast of them close in shore, and rendered valuable assis- 
 tance to the advancing column by a vicious fire from their 
 rapid-fire guns. The commanders of these small craft showed 
 admirable courage in taking them within easy range of the 
 enemy's heavy ordnance. 
 
 Meantime some sharp fighting had occurred in General Mac- 
 Arthur's advance on the right along the Pasay road. Soon 
 after the naval attack commenced, the Astor Battery sucess- 
 fully engaged in a spirited duel with an opposing battery, 
 and Battery B of the Utah Artillery opened fire on Block- 
 house 14. There was no response to the fire of the latter 
 battery but the opposition to the Astor Battery was quite 
 stubborn and was subdued only after a hot contest. About 
 eleven o'clock, when it was known that the attack of the 
 Second Brigade on the Malate fort had been successful, a 
 general advance was begun. Blockhouse 14 had been aban- 
 doned by the Spaniards and the United States flag was hoisted 
 over it. Here a battalion of the Twenty-third Regular Infan- 
 try was left to intercept any possible advance of the insur- 
 gents toward Manila. The Minnesota and North Dakota 
 regiments, with parts of the Fourteenth and the Twenty- 
 third Infantry and the Astor Battery, moved along the Pasay 
 road. At a point just south of Cingalon a blockhouse was 
 found burning and a scattering fire from the enemy was en- 
 countered. As the forward movement was pressed, the inten- 
 sity of this fire increased until it developed into strong oppo- 
 sition at Blockhouse 20 in the village mentioned, which was 
 
275 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 occupied by a strong detachment of infantry. Here the ad- 
 vance party of the American line, consisting of volunteers 
 from the Astor Battery and the Minnesota regiment, was 
 obliged to retire after reaching a point within eighty yards of 
 the blockhouse. A rough work was hastily improvised and 
 held with great gallantry by a firing line of about fifteen men 
 until the main body of the troops came up. The Americans 
 directed their fire from behind the village church, stone walls 
 and intrenchments hastily constructed in the street. The 
 opposition, though obstinate, succumbed to the steady fire of 
 the Americans and the advance was resumed toward Malate. 
 The engagement lasted for an hour and a half and resulted in 
 the loss of four killed and thirty-six wounded. This action 
 was probably the most hotly contested of the day, but it was 
 the last stand against MacArthur's advance and the city was 
 entered through the Paco district without further incident. 
 
 The swampy condition of the ground and the heavy under- 
 growth which concealed the enemy rendered the movements 
 of MacArthur's troops extremely difficult and hazardous. 
 The station of MacArthur's troops after the surrender in- 
 cluded the Ennita and Malate districts and extended north to 
 the Pasig River. 
 
 The losses of the day in the First Brigade amounted to 
 four killed and thirty-eight wounded ; in the Second Brigade, 
 two killed and five wounded. The previous losses in the 
 trenches were fourteen killed and sixty wounded, making a 
 total of one hundred and twenty-three casualties in the taking 
 of Manila. 
 
 While the operations on shore were in progress, the Zafiro 
 had remained with the fleet. At the appearance of the white 
 flag on the city walls, representatives of General Merritt and 
 Admiral Dewey were sent ashore in the launch of the Belgian 
 Consul, which that official courteously placed at their dispo- 
 sal, to communicate with the Captain-General. Upon the re- 
 turn of these officers the international signal, " The enemy 
 has surrendered," was displayed from the masthead of the 
 Olynipia. General Merritt with his personal stafT then re- 
 turned with the Belgian Consul to the walled city, entering 
 through the Pasig River, which was so filled with sunken hulks 
 
THE MANILA CAMPAIGN. 277 
 
 as to render the ingress very tortuous and difficult. Landing 
 at the northwest corner of the city, the party, headed by the 
 Belgian Consul, moved along the Paseo de Santa Lucia, passed 
 through the walls and entered the Cathedral, where the act- 
 ing Governor-General and his adviser were in consultation. 
 After the general terms of surrender were agreed upon, Gen- 
 eral Merritt proceeded to the city palace of the Governor- 
 General, which was soon filled with the Spanish officials who 
 had come to make formal transfer of their offices. The terms 
 of surrender, which were signed by General Merritt and the 
 Captain-General, were subsequently incorporated in the formal 
 terms of capitulation as arranged by the officers representing 
 the two forces. Apart of the Second Oregon Regiment, which 
 had proceeded by sea from Cavite, disembarked and entered 
 the walled town as a provost guard ; at 5:45 P. M. the Spanish 
 colors were hauled down, the flag of General Merritt was run 
 up on the palace and the American flag was displayed and 
 saluted by the guns of the fleet. 
 
 The city was filled with Spanish troops driven in from the 
 intrenchmcnts and regiment after regiment lined the streets 
 in readiness to deliver up their arms. The colonel of the 
 Oregon regiment was designated to receive the arms and de- 
 posit them in a place of security. The Governor-General's 
 palace was temporarily used as a repository for the captured 
 arms and accoutrements. 
 
 The trophies of the battle of Manila amounted to $900,000 
 in public funds, 13,000 prisoners of war and 22,000 stands of 
 arms. 
 
 After the battle the insurgent forces gathered outside the 
 American lines endeavoring to gain admission to t'.-.c town, 
 but strong guards were posted and General AguinalJo was 
 given to understand that no insurgents would be allowed to 
 enter with arms. A few of the houses in the suburbs, whose 
 occupants had taken refuge in the town, were looted by the 
 insurgents in spite of the vigilance of the Americans. Con- 
 siderable fear was evinced among the Spanish forces inside 
 the city that a massacre would be attempted by the insur- 
 gents, and they were very anxious to unite with the Ameri- 
 cans against them. 
 
278 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 The headquarters of the General Commanding were estab- 
 lished in the city ofifice of the Governor-General immediately 
 after the surrender and steps were at once taken to inaugurate 
 a government of military occupancy. General MacArthur 
 was appointed provost marshal-general and civil governor of 
 the town. General Greene was made director of financial af- 
 fairs and placed at the head of the customs and internal- 
 revenue department. Lieut. -Col. Whittier was appointed col- 
 lector of customs and Major Whipple of the Pay Department, 
 a bonded officer, was made custodian of the public funds to 
 control and disburse all Spanish moneys from whatever source 
 derived. 
 
 A proclamation was issued to the people of the Philippines, 
 under date of August 14, 1898, and published in all the news- 
 papers of the city, in English, Spanish and native dialect, con- 
 cisely reciting the conditions then existing in the island as 
 the result of the operations of the American Army and Navy ; 
 setting forth the form of government to be adopted, the 
 methods of its administration, military and civil, the privileges 
 to be afforded to neutral nations in Philippine ports under 
 United States authority, the protection to be accorded to 
 places devoted to religious worship, the arts and sciences, edu- 
 cation, etc., and finally assuring the people that they would not 
 be molested or disturbed in their persons and property so long 
 as they preserved the peace and performed their duties towards 
 the representatives of the United States, except so far as 
 might be found necessary for the good of the service of the 
 United States and the benefit of the people of the Philippines. 
 
 It was not until August 16 that a cablegram was received 
 announcing the signing of the peace protocol and the proc- 
 lamation of the President directing a cessation of hostilities. 
 This was at once communicated to the Spanish authorities 
 and resulted in a formal protest from the Governor-General 
 regarding the transfer of public funds then taking place, on 
 the ground that the protocol was dated prior to the sur- 
 render. The delivery was insisted upon, however, and was fi- 
 nally made under protest. 
 
 The operations around Manila were not marked by any con- 
 spicuous feature in the way of hard fighting, with heavy loss. 
 
THE MANILA CAMPAIGN. 
 
 279 
 
 or any particularly brilliant military manoeuvres ; but for a 
 body of men, a large proportion of whom were newly organ- 
 ized and hastily equipped and very few of whom had ever 
 participated in an engagement, to enter under fire a town cov- 
 ering a wide area, to deploy rapidly and guard all principal 
 points in the extensive suburbs, to keep out the insurgent 
 forces pressing for admission, to disarm quietly an opposing 
 army more than equalling their own in numbers and finally, to 
 prevent all rapine, pillage and disorder, and gain complete 
 possession of a city of 300,000 inhabitants, who were stirred 
 up by the knowledge that their own people were fighting in 
 the outside trenches, was an accomplishment of which onl\' 
 the law-abiding, temperate, resolute American soldier, abl)- 
 and skilfully handled by his regimental and brigade com- 
 manders, was capable. 
 
 y^C^ry ^^^j??^ 
 
CHAPTER XIV. 
 THE WORK OF THE PRESIDENT. 
 
 BY 
 
 Hon. perry S. HEATH, First Assistant Postmaster General. 
 
 ^ X- "\ T 7E want no wars of conquest. We must avoid the 
 \/\/ temptation of territorial aggression. War 
 ' ' should never be entered upon until every agency 
 of peace has failed." 
 
 These were the ringing words of William McKinley, when 
 he took the oath of office as President of the United States, 
 on the 4th of March, 1897, with the shadow of an impending 
 conflict with Spain resting darkly over him. From the views 
 thus expressed he never deviated during all the trying period 
 that afterwards intervened. When every agency of peace 
 had failed, and war became inevitable, he accepted all of its 
 grave responsibilities, just as, after the protocol of peace had 
 been signed, he declared that where the flag had once been 
 raised it should not be hauled down with his consent, and 
 that, as far as in him lay, he would carry out to their logical 
 and legitimate conclusions the results achieved by the war. 
 
 More fully than any one else Mr. McKinley appreciated, 
 when he entered upon the duties of Chief Executive, the 
 dread responsibilities which a declaration of war would im- 
 pose. He knew that though war migiit be demanded or pro- 
 claimed by the people of any nation — Imperial, Monarchical 
 or Republican — the responsibilities for its conduct and for its 
 results must fall upon the Executive. He comprehended the 
 peculiar difficulties which surrounded our relations with Spain, 
 the greatest of these being that which had the least popular 
 consideration — the possibility that a declaration of war with 
 Spain would bring about the hostile intervention of other 
 European Powers, intimately connected with that country by 
 
282 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 ties of common interest and family relationship. Traditions 
 and international understandings, the Monroe Doctrine, the 
 inviolability of which has so recently been asserted by this 
 country), and questions of politics and religion all aided to 
 complicate the situation. While it is true that each of the 
 great political parties in the campaign which preceded the 
 election of President McKinley had condemned in strong 
 terms the existing condition of affairs in Cuba, and declared a 
 readiness to exhaust every effort to secure to the people of 
 that island the blessings of freedom and good government, no 
 pledge was given by either party which could, even by infer- 
 ence, be held to bind the Government of the United States to 
 take up arms to accomplish the end which was rhetorically 
 advocated. 
 
 When Mr. McKinley left his home in Canton, Ohio, to as- 
 sume the duties of the Presidency, he had in mind a plan, 
 which he had carefully thought out, for the emancipation of 
 Cuba and the establishment of an independent form of govern- 
 ment in that island. His purpose was to bring about this re- 
 sult by a series of swift and positive diplomatic movements, 
 which included an appeal to motives of humanity and justice, 
 and an array of the more powerful, if less disinterested, mo- 
 tives of self interest. There can be little doubt that one of 
 his leading ideas for the pacification of Cuba was the sur- 
 render of Spanish sovereignty to be brought about by diplo- 
 matic negotiation or by friendly purchase, the United States 
 to be either the direct purchaser or the guarantor in behalf of 
 an independent Cuban Republic. He immediately proceeded 
 to put in operation all the agencies of diplomacy to secure an 
 amelioration of the condition of the people of Cuba. Con- 
 temporaneously with these efforts he called Congress in extra 
 session, to enact laws which should place the industrial, com- 
 mercial and agricultural interests of our own country upon a 
 more satisfactory basis. He asked Congress, before transact- 
 ing any other business, first to provide sufficient revenue to 
 administer the Government faithfully, without the contraction 
 of further debt or the continued disturbance of our finances. 
 In the light of events that followed, it may well be claimed 
 that Divine Providence shaped the ends to which the Presi- 
 
THE WORK OF THE PRESIDENT. 283 
 
 dent directed the nation. Without the revival of prosperity, 
 which ahnost immediately followed the legislation recom- 
 mended, — the enactment of which consumed time and tended 
 to create a feeling of unrest on the part of those who desired 
 speedy action in Cuba, — there could not have been the na- 
 tional cohesion which enabled us to secure the results after- 
 wards achieved. 
 
 During this extra session, called only to consider economic 
 questions, events in Cuba so progressed as to excite the public 
 mind almost beyond the limits of repression. General W'ey- 
 ler's policy of concentration, inaugurated February 16, 1896, 
 removed from the provinces controlled by the Spanish army 
 the rural population, including women, children and helpless 
 old people. The massing of these in the neighborhood of the 
 cities, and the leaving of them there to die of starvation, had 
 reached a culmination of horror which shocked the civilized 
 world. The President issued an appeal to the people of the 
 United States to relieve the necessities of these innocent 
 sufferers; Congress made an appropriation for the purpose; 
 and the noble organization of the Red Cross, and, later on, 
 many newspaper and private agencies of benevolence were 
 drawn to their assistance. 
 
 Agitation for the recognition of Cuban Independence, or 
 for forcible intervention by the United States, was rampant 
 all over the country, sustained by the pulpit, the press and 
 the lecture forum. Resolutions by the hundred were adopted 
 at public gatherings and forwarded to the President, almost 
 as urgent in tone as those addressed to President Lincoln 
 prior to the Proclamation of Emancipation. So many Ameri- 
 cans, impelled by righteous indignation at the stories of 
 Cuban wrongs, had entered the service of the Cuban army of 
 freedom that there was scarcely a Congressional District 
 which did not number one or more of these recruits, whose 
 relatives were importunate in beseeching their Representa- 
 tives in Congress to take speedy measures to put an end to 
 the struggle. 
 
 Expeditions, unauthorized by international law, but quite 
 generally sanctioned by public sentiment, fitted out in our 
 ports to carry arms, ammunition and men to aid the cause < f 
 
284 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 Cuba Libre, became so alarmingly frequent and formidable 
 that the President ordered a special patrol by revenue cutters 
 and naval vessels of our coast adjacent to Cuba, and directed 
 the appointment of special officers of the Department of Jus- 
 tice to prosecute the offenders against our neutrality laws. 
 Among those intercepted and prosecuted as the result of 
 these measures was General Calixto Garcia, the Cuban patriot, 
 whose death in December, 1898, while on a mission of peace 
 and conciliation to the City of Washington, \ms generally de- 
 plored. 
 
 To the different delegations from Congress who waited upon 
 him to urge immediate action, President McKinley, with the 
 frankness which has always characterized his dealings with 
 the legislative branch of the Government, explained his plans 
 and his aspirations for a peaceful settlement, and asked them 
 to give him further time. Congress trusted the President, and 
 respected his wishes by adjourning the extra session without 
 taking decisive action on the Cuban question. 
 
 Diplomatic elTorts to effect an adjustment were continued 
 with increased vigor. The President, it is understood, went 
 just as far in his demands as he could within the constitutional 
 limits of his power, stopping short only of such action as 
 might be construed into a practical declaration of war. Spain 
 replied, in her customary manner, by promises and prevarica- 
 tion. The pressure of public sentiment increased in volume. 
 Local militia organizations, covertly or openly abetted by 
 governors of States, and many individual citizens of military 
 training, undertook the organization of volunteer forces to 
 proceed to Cuba to aid in the liberation of its people. Politi- 
 cal parties and geographical lines were ignored. The men 
 who carried on the agitation were those who had fought on 
 each side of the most desperate civil war of modern history. 
 
 To withstand this pressure until the time was ripe ; to con- 
 tinue to enforce our neutrality laws in the face of a hostile 
 public sentiment ; and scrupulously to observe all our in- 
 ternational obligations towards Spain, imposed upon the 
 President duties which called for the exercise of the highest 
 executive ability and tact. 
 
 When the 356 members of the House of Representatives 
 
THE WORK OF THE PRESIDENT. 285 
 
 and the ninety Senators, fresh from intercourse with their 
 people, met in regular session of Congress on the 6th of De- 
 cember, 1897, it was as the commingling of many streams 
 forming one mighty flood of public sentiment in favor of the 
 immediate evacuation of Cuba by Spain, or an open declara- 
 tion of war by the United States as the alternative. The 
 President addressed to Congress a thoughtful, firm, but tem- 
 perate message. Summarizing the historical facts, he reminded 
 Congress that our relations towards Spain and Cuba had been 
 almost a continuous question since the first enfranchisement 
 of the colonial possessions of Spain in the Western Hemi- 
 sphere in 1823, and that the possibility that some other Euro- 
 pean Power might take advantage of the weakness of Spain's 
 hold upon Cuba to establish a foothold on that island to the 
 detriment of the United States, had called forth repeated dec- 
 larations that this country would permit no disturbance of 
 Cuba's connection with Spain, unless in the direction of inde- 
 pendence, or the acquisition of the island by the United States 
 through purchase. 
 
 While maintaining in his communications to Congress the 
 reticence which must accompany uncompleted negotiations, 
 and withholding any statement of precise propositions, so as 
 to avoid embarrassment to the Government of Spain, he 
 stated that our new Minister to that country (General Stewart 
 L. Woodford) had been instructed to inquire seriously 
 whether the time was not ripe for Spain, of her own volition, 
 moved by her own interests, to make proposals of settlement 
 honorable to herself and just to her Cuban colony ; and also 
 instructed to intimate, in plainest terms, that the United 
 States, as a neighboring country, with large interests, both 
 commercial and humane, in Cuba, could not be required to 
 wait much longer for the restoration of peace and order in 
 that island. The President still counselled a last appeal to 
 peaceful negotiation. Forcible annexation of Cuba by the 
 United States, he said, would be an act of criminal aggression. 
 Recognition of the belligerency or of the independence of 
 the Cuban Republic he also put aside, for the reason that the 
 essential qualifications of sovereignty required by interna- 
 tional law had not, in his judgment, been yet attained. De- 
 
286 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 nouncing General Weyler's concentration order as an act, not 
 of civilized warfare, but of extermination, he gave full faith 
 to the declarations of the new Spanish Government of Premier 
 Sagasta, which had succeeded that of Premier Canovas, under 
 whom this cruel policy originated, that it would be reversed^ 
 and that a broad and liberal scheme of Home Rule or 
 Autonomy would be granted to Cuba. These propositions 
 he thought were in the line of abetter understanding between 
 this Government and that of Spain. He felt that it was 
 honestly due to Spain that she should be given a reasonable 
 chance to realize her expectations and to prove the asserted 
 efficacy of the new order of things to which she stood irrevo- 
 cably committed. 
 
 At the same time he added these pregnant words : 
 
 " Sure of the right, keeping free from all offence ourselves, 
 actuated only by upright and patriotic considerations, moved 
 neither by passion nor selfishness, the Government will con- 
 tinue its watchful care over the rights and property of Amer- 
 ican citizens, and will abate none of its efforts to bring about 
 by peaceful agencies a peace which shall be honorable and 
 enduring. If it shall hereafter appear to be a duty imposed 
 by our obligations to ourselves, to civilization and humanity, 
 to intervene with force, it shall be without fault on our part 
 and only because the necessity for such action shall be so 
 clear as to command the support and approval of the civilized 
 world." 
 
 This declaration was afterward abundantly fulfilled. On 
 the night of the 15th of February, eleven weeks after the 
 assembling of Congress, the United States battleship JMainc, 
 while on a friendly visit to the harbor of Havana, and lying 
 at a mooring especially assigned to her by the Captain of the 
 port, was destroyed by a submarine mine, and in this catas- 
 trophe two of her ofificers and 264 of her crew perished. 
 
 The horror and suspicion which this occurrence created in 
 the minds of the President and his advisers were increased by 
 the fact that Consul-General Fitzhugh Lee at Havana had 
 cabled, suggesting delay in sending the Maine to that city, on 
 the ground that the Spanish authorities professed to think her 
 presence had some ulterior purpose, and would obstruct 
 
THE WORK OF THE PRESIDENT. -<^7 
 
 autonomy and most probably produce a demonstration. This 
 telegram was received after the Maine had sailed for Havana. 
 
 Those who saw President McKinlc}- the night this fateful 
 news was received say that the anguish depicted on his face 
 was as great as that which Abraham Lincoln exhibited when 
 he visited the battlefield of Gettysburg. He knew then that 
 all his efforts to avert a war, of which no one could foretell 
 the duration or extent, had been una\-ailing. 
 
 This was the crucial moment in the President's life ; a 
 turning point in the life of the Republic. Then the sturdy 
 characteristics of firmness and readiness of mind derived from 
 his ancestry were displayed. Mr. McKinlcy, as is well known, 
 is of Scotch-Irish descent. The crest of "James McKinlay 
 the Trooper," head of the Scotch clan of McKinlay, from 
 whom the McKinle\'s of Pennsylvania and Ohio descended, 
 was an olive branch clasped in a mailed hand. The motto 
 accompanying this emblem implied Moderation and Patience. 
 Its literal reading was, " Not too much." In transition from 
 Scotland to the North of Ireland the "a" of the name was 
 changed to "e," and under the Scotch-Irish name of " Mc- 
 Kinley," the ancestors of the present President of the United 
 States came to America, where, in York County, Pennsyl- 
 vania, his great grandfather, David McKinley, a gallant pri- 
 vate soldier of the War of the Revolution, was born. 
 
 These old heraldic bearings derived new significance in the 
 present crisis. The "olive branch" had been extended for 
 eleven months; the "mailed hand" was now to come into 
 play. Not for the first time was William McKinley, the 
 soldier, called upon to take heroic assumption of responsi- 
 bility, but never before in so vast a theater and with the 
 world for a spectator. William McKinley was a gallant 
 soldier in the war of 1861-5. He entered that war as a private 
 and emerged as a Major. He participated in many battles, 
 and won promotion for distinguished services. He knew 
 what war meant, and had shown his capacity in positions of 
 great difificulty and responsibility. 
 
 An incident recorded of him in that struggle illustrates the 
 self-reliance of the man, and the qualities which were now to 
 be brought into operation on a far grander scale. The story, 
 as told by one of his biographers, is this; — 
 
288 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 " At the battle of Opequan, McKinley (who, Hke his ances- 
 tor of Revolutionary fame, had entered the war as a private, 
 but who was now a Captain and Aide on General Crook's 
 staff) was sent with an order to General Isaac H. Duval to 
 move his command quickly to a position on the right of the 
 Sixth Corps ; but Duval, not knowing the topography of the 
 country, asked the young aide, ' By what route shall I move 
 my command?' Captain McKinley was without definite 
 orders or knowledge of the country, but having a general idea 
 of the direction of the water courses and location of the 
 troops, replied, 'I would move up this creek.' Duval then 
 said, ' I shall not move without definite orders.' McKinley 
 knew that any delay was hazardous, and so, acting on his own 
 view of the position of the armies, at once replied: 'This is 
 a case of great emergency. General, and so I order you, by 
 command of General Crook, to move your command on the 
 road up this ravine to a position on the right of the army ! ' 
 The movement proved exactly right, and Duval's command 
 was soon in position to do effective work. It drove the 
 enemy in confusion from their works and contributed to the 
 victory of the day. Still it is not hard to conjecture what 
 would have been the young aide's fate, if the order had been a 
 mistake." 
 
 The admirable equipoise of Mr. McKinley's character, and 
 his readiness to meet emergencies whenever they occurred, 
 and however unexpectedly they confronted him, have been 
 manifested on many occasions since the termination of this 
 great epoch in American history. Three years before he was 
 called to enter upon the duties of Chief Executive of the Na- 
 tion, when he was filling a similar but less exalted position, 
 that of Chief Executive of the great State of Ohio, disturb- 
 ances of a most threatening character broke out among the 
 coal miners. Governor McKinley assumed personal direction 
 of the State troops sent to suppress rioting, and by his firm- 
 ness and moderation averted what threatened to be a san- 
 guinary and widespread disturbance. 
 
 His twelve years' service in Congress, his experience in 
 other walks of life, in all of which he acquitted himself in the 
 most trying circumstances with credit and distinction, marked 
 
THE WORK OF THE PRESIDENT. 289 
 
 him as the man destined for the hour when the storm of for- 
 eign war broke over the United States. 
 
 On the day after the news of the destruction of the battle- 
 ship Maine, the President was visited b)^ nearly every member 
 of Congress, urg'insf immediate warlike action. He counselled 
 prudence and delay; he asked them all to suspend judgment 
 before determining the responsibility for the tragic occurrence. 
 In point of fact, he sustained the wise cable message sent by 
 Captain Sigsbee of the Mai)ie in announcing the disaster. 
 
 President McKinley knew — none better — tliat the country 
 was not prepared for war. We had an army of but 27,500 
 men, while Spain had sent 135,000 troops to Cuba alone. The 
 Spanish Navy, on paper at least, was equal, if not superior, to 
 that of the United States. Very little had been done since 
 the war of 1 861-5 in the way of fortifying our sea coast or 
 providing siege guns or fixed ammunition. It is related that 
 at this juncture a distinguished army officer reported to the 
 President, "If we should go to war with Spain to-morrow, we 
 have not enough small ammunition for a continuous battle of 
 two hours." 
 
 Nevertheless a caucus of the Mouse of Representatives, 
 confined to no one political party, decided almost unanimously 
 on an immediate declaration of war; and a sufficient number 
 of members of Congress were present at this conference to in- 
 dicate that the strength of the war party in both Houses was 
 sufficient to override even a Presidential veto. 
 
 The President had asked Congress, at the beginning of the 
 session, to await the result of Spain's new policy of granting 
 autonomy to Cuba, and of reversing General VVeyler's order 
 of concentration. The hopes of peace which these proposi- 
 tions held out failed him at this critical juncture. Our Con- 
 suls in Cuba reported the continuance of such sickening 
 scenes of starvation, cruelty and death in the camps of the re- 
 concentrados that the Correspondence, though called for by 
 Congress, was for the time prudently withheld by the Pres- 
 ident from publication, lest in the excited state of the public 
 mind it might prove a spark in the powder magazine, already 
 dangerously near explosion. These Consuls also reported 
 that autonomy was an absolute failure ; that coercion and 
 
290 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 bribery had been tried in vain to induce Cubans of character 
 to give countenance to the movement. Sr. Manuel Rafael 
 Angulo, sent to Washington as a Delegate from the so-called 
 Colonial or Autonomist Government of Cuba, about this time 
 cabled Governor-General Blanco at Havana, through the 
 Spanish Minister in Washington, that it was necessary, in 
 order to offset what he termed " the perfidious machinations 
 of Lee and his copartners," to have a cable message sent him 
 giving the names of representative native-born Cubans of 
 standing who adhered to the Autonomist Government. 
 When the reply was received on April 15th, 1898, he wrote 
 despairingly to Sr. Jose Maria Galvez, President of the Coun- 
 cil of the so-called Colonial Government at Havana, that the 
 names which had been forwarded to him were all " Peninsu- 
 lares " (that is, Spaniards), not Cubans ; that he had seen the 
 President of the "Chamber of Congress" by appointment, 
 and had also had an interview with the Honorable John Ad- 
 dison Porter, Secretary to the President, at the White House, 
 who had made it apparent that if the Autonomist solution 
 was to be well received in the United States it must be shown 
 to be, not a Spanish proposition, but a Cuban ; also that it 
 must be shown that affairs had changed in Cuba, not in ap- 
 pearance only, but substantially. 
 
 Autonomy was thus admitted to be a subterfuge, even by 
 its originators, and the promised reforms a failure. 
 
 Amid all these discouragements the President remained un- 
 dismayed ; his courage never failed him ; he abated none of 
 his high purposes; and Congress showed its unlimited con- 
 fidence in him by an act which excited the wonder and 
 admiration of Europe. On the mere suggestion of the Ex- 
 ecutive, by a unanimous vote of both Houses, on the 9th of 
 March, 1898, an appropriation of fifty million dollars was made 
 " for the national defence and for each and every purpose 
 connected therewith, to be expended at the direction of the 
 President." It is a matter of history that Congress subse- 
 quently supplemented this grant by authorization to nego- 
 tiate a three per cent loan to the extent, if necessary, of 
 $400,000,000, only half of which was called out, and which 
 was subscribed by the people in sums ranging from twenty 
 
THE WORK OF THE PRESIDENT. 291 
 
 dollars upwards, no one subscription accepted exceeding five 
 thousand dollars. 
 
 Immediate steps were taken by the President so to utilize 
 the fund created by the special appropriation of $50,000,000 
 as to place the country on a war footing. Agents were sent 
 abroad to purchase all available warships before the outbreak 
 of hostilities brought the neutrality laws into force. On the 
 suggestion of the President, the four swift ocean steamers of 
 the International Navigation Company were chartered and 
 fitted out as cruisers and scouts, and other vessels were bought 
 for colliers and transports. At home every arsenal and navy 
 yard, and all private firms engaged in the manufacture of 
 munitions of war, were put to work at their full capacity, by 
 night as well as by day. 
 
 On the nth of April, the President addressed a message to 
 Congress, setting forth in detail the final efforts he had made, 
 through diplomatic channels, by means of Minister Woodford 
 at Madrid, to bring about an amelioration of the condition of 
 the people of Cuba, and the reply of the Spanish Government, 
 which remitted the question of the settlement of terms of 
 peace with the Cuban insurgents to the so-called Insular 
 Congress of the pretended Autonomist Government of Cuba. 
 "With this last overture," he said, "in the direction of imme- 
 diate peace, and its disappointing reception by Spain, the 
 Executive is brought to the end of his effort." 
 
 The President referred to the destruction of the Maine as a 
 tragic horror, increasing the elements of danger and disorder, 
 and asked that Congress authorize and empower the President 
 to take measures to secure a full and final termination of 
 hostilities between the Government of Spain and the people 
 of Cuba, and to secure in the island the establishment of a 
 stable government, capable of maintaining order and observing 
 its international obligations, insuring peace and tranquility 
 and the security of its citizens as well as our own, and to use 
 the military and naval forces of the United States as may be 
 necessary for these purposes. 
 
 On the same day he sent to Congress the delayed Consular 
 correspondence relating to the atrocities perpetrated on the 
 reconcentrados of Cuba. 
 
292 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 On the 19th of April, after nine days' debate and conference, 
 Congress passed a joint resolution calling upon Spain to with- 
 draw its land and naval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters, 
 and directing the President to use the entire land and naval 
 forces of the United States, and to call into the actual service 
 of the United States the militia of the several States, to such 
 extent as might be necessary to carry this resolution into 
 effect. This was in effect a formal declaration of war. 
 
 On the morning of the 21st of April, before he could present 
 this ultimatum to the Spanish Government, Minister Woodford 
 received his passports, and immediately afterwards Minister 
 Polo y Barnabe withdrew from Washington. On the 22nd of 
 April the blockade of the north coast of Cuba was proclaimed 
 by President McKinley, and on the 25th of April Congress 
 passed an act declaring the existence of a state of war 
 between the United States and Spain. 
 
 It is not the purpose of this chapter to follow in detail the 
 events of that brief and glorious struggle, but only to indicate 
 some of the prominent incidents of the President's personal 
 participation therein. Every movement, great or small, 
 received the benefit of his personal consideration, and of the 
 experience he had gained in the War of 1861-65, the animosi- 
 ties arising from which his efforts have done so much to 
 obliterate. It was indeed fortunate for the Government and 
 the people of the United States that a man occupied the 
 Executive chair who was by birth and training so well 
 equipped to perform the duties devolving upon him as was 
 William McKinley. In the prime of life, 55 years of age, his 
 mental and physical vigor sustained by a life of conspicuous 
 rectitude and his administrative powers enforced by years of 
 trying experience, he entered the arena with every qualifica- 
 tion to command the esteem of his countrymen and to insure 
 also the respect of the governments of other Nations. In the 
 selection of the general oflficers to command the volunteer 
 forces he ignored sectional lines, calling to his aid distinguished 
 army officers who had worn the gray to co-operate with those 
 who had worn the blue, thus presenting to the world the 
 imposing spectacle of a United Nation of seventy millions of 
 people — a 
 
THE WORK OF THE PRESn)ENT. 293 
 
 "Tower of strength, 
 
 " Which stood four-square to all the winds that blew." 
 
 When 200,(X)0 volunteers responded promptly to the Presi- 
 dent's call, he said : " I feel that the American people have 
 committed these boys to my hands;" and he watched over 
 the minutest details of their equipment, encampment, suste- 
 nance, hospital accommodation and transportation, not con- 
 tenting himself with the reports of his capable Chiefs of 
 Department, but going directly to the Bureau ofificials who 
 had the actual work in charge. The President spent hours 
 every day following the movements of the campaign with pin 
 points on the maps in the war room of the White House, 
 studying out every possible condition and contingency. He 
 knew neither rest nor recreation from the hour when hostili- 
 ties commenced until the protocol of peace was signed. Like 
 Lincoln, he never slept when there was duty to perform. 
 
 The cabinet met frequently, sometimes twice a day. It 
 was by the President's personal direction that Secretary Long 
 issued the famous order to Admiral Dewey to proceed to the 
 Bay of Manila, capture or destroy the Spanish fleet, and take 
 possession of the harbor and the city. It is said that when 
 the President announced to the Cabinet his determination to 
 strike this decisive blow at the power of Spain in the East, 
 the audacity and gravity of the proposition produced a silence 
 which could be felt, and which was not broken for several 
 minutes. The President carried his point, and the result is 
 known of all men. 
 
 When the land attack on Santiago was determined upon, 
 the President asked how many siege guns were ready to be 
 taken to Santiago, and the reply was that fifteen or twenty 
 were at command. The President contended that not less 
 than eighty were necessary, and it was not his fault that 
 eighty were not sent. Thus he looked after the details of 
 preparations for battle. 
 
 Direct telegraphic communication was established between 
 Playa del Este, the Cuban cable terminus on the Santiago 
 coast, and the Executive Offices at the White House in Wash- 
 ington, and was maintained during and after the battles of 
 
294 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 San Juan and El Caney. General Shafter's camp was near 
 Sevilla, within easy communicating distance of Playa del Este. 
 The interchange of cable messages was rapid, and on the part 
 of our Commanding General indicated a desire to retreat or to 
 ask for a parley with the Spanish Commander. 
 
 On the 3rd of July, General Shafter cabled that he had the 
 city of Santiago well invested on the north and east, but, as 
 he added significantly, — "with a very thin line." He said 
 that as he approached the city he found the defences so strong 
 that it would be impossible to carry it by storm with his 
 present forces, adding : " I am now seriously considering with- 
 drawing about five miles and taking up a new position on the 
 high ground between the San Juan River and Siboney, with 
 our left at Santiago, so as to get our supplies to a large extent 
 by means of the railroad, which we can use, having engines 
 and cars at Siboney. Our losses up to date will aggregate a 
 thousand." Then he spoke of his own health and that of his 
 generals, and of his efforts to get Admiral Sampson to force 
 the entrance of the harbor. Of himself he said : " I have been 
 unable to be out during the heat of the day for four days, but 
 am retaining the command. General Wheeler is seriously ill, 
 and will probably have to go to the rear to-day. General 
 Young also very ill, confined to his bed ; General Hawkins 
 slightly wounded in foot during sortie enemy made last night." 
 
 Other dispatches followed, and one in particular was spoken 
 of in the press dispatches some days after its receipt, as fol- 
 lows: 
 
 "There was some talk in the Cabinet to-day about the tele- 
 gram General Shafter sent on Sunday morning, to the effect 
 that he would have to have reinforcements before he could 
 proceed. Just what was said is not known. It is learned 
 that the telegram contained suggestions which were stricken 
 out. It is claimed that if these statements had been made 
 public the country would have been greatly worried on Sun- 
 day." 
 
 The public did not then know, nor till some time afterwards, 
 how firm was the grasp which the President kept on the 
 progress of events. On the 15th of July, 1898, he directed 
 this dispatch to be sent : 
 
THE WORK OF THE PRESIDENT. 295 
 
 "Washington, July 15, 1898, 9:20 p. m. 
 " MajoR-General Shafter, Playa del Este : 
 
 " The President and Secretary of War are becoming 
 impatient with parley. Any arrangement that allows the 
 enemy to take their arms had as well be abandoned once for 
 all, as it will not be approved. The way to surrender is to 
 surrender, and this should be fully impressed on General 
 Toral." 
 
 Once more the result justified the President's judgment, 
 Santiago was surrendered, and with it a force nearly double 
 that of the investing army. 
 
 In every movement of the war, as well as in the peace ne- 
 gotiations that followed, the President's firm hand was felt, 
 and the country has surely just cause to be proud of the hu- 
 mane and Christian policy by which he sought to avoid a war; 
 the prudent and patriotic foresight with which, when war be- 
 came inevitable, he postponed its outbreak until the country 
 was ready for it ; and the marvelous skill, courage and judg- 
 ment with which he so directed affairs, aided by the invincible 
 valor of our sailors and soldiers, as to bring about an early, 
 honorable and glorious peace. 
 
 C^^^^J.,^,^,^ 
 
r^^^:y:''^U>t^'2^'u^tjcj^, 
 
CHAPTER XV. 
 WAR LEGISLATION OF THE SENATE. 
 
 F'.V 
 
 Hon. J. W. DANIEL, Member of Commitiee on Foreign Relations. 
 
 THE causes of the war between the United States and 
 Spain are to be found in the geography, in the past 
 history, in the racial and institutional differences be- 
 tween the two peoples and in the cherished principles of 
 American polity which are essential to our interest, peace and 
 safety. Were I to enumerate them, I should say that they 
 lie in the proximity of Cuba to the United States; in our 
 Monroe Doctrine ; in the incapacity, corruption and cruelty of 
 Spanish rule ; in the weakness and irritating incidents of our 
 diplomacy with Spain ; in our extensive commerce with Cuba, 
 and the large investments of American capital there ; and 
 finally, in the destruction of the battleship Maine in Havana 
 harbor on the night of February 15, 1898. The war with 
 Spain has been called a war of humanity ; and, to a certain 
 extent, it was, as is demonstrated by the generous contribu- 
 tions of our Government and people to relieve the suffering 
 Cubans. But it was no less a war of national interest, dignity 
 and honor. 
 
 The Senate of the United States has played an important 
 part in shaping the policy of our Government with reference 
 to the war and the questions which produced it, but this 
 policy cannot be appreciated without fully understanding the 
 causes of the war and the incidents that led up to it. In 
 some respects the Senate has more intimate relations with our 
 foreign affairs than has the House of Representatives. It 
 shares with the President the power of appointing officers, 
 including the ambassadors, ministers and consuls who repre- 
 sent us in foreign lands. It shares, also, with him the power 
 
298 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 of making treaties. By reason of its smaller membership and 
 its greater freedom of debate, the sense of the body can be 
 more readily collected, expressed and fashioned into measures. 
 The Committee on Foreign Relations is the organ of the 
 Senate in the consideration and presentation of questions 
 relating to our foreign affairs. When the Cuban revolution 
 broke out, this Committee was composed as follows : 
 
 John Sherman, Chairman ; William P. Frye, Cushman K. 
 Davis, J. Donald Cameron, Shelby M. Cullom, Henry Cabot 
 Lodge, Republicans; John T. Morgan, George Gray, David 
 Turpie, John W. Daniel, Roger Q. Mills, Democrats. 
 
 The Committee was kept busy from the incipiency of the 
 revolution to its close in considering the numerous and vexa- 
 tious questions to which it gave rise. Contemporaneously 
 other foreign affairs of great magnitude arose, which likewise 
 required serious consideration, especially the Venezuela Bound- 
 ary question, the Armenian massacres, Hawaiian annexation 
 and the General Arbitration Treaty. From time to time the 
 Committee took the evidence of witnesses as to the conditions 
 in Cuba, and many communications and resolutions were laid 
 before it. Numerous reports were made to the Senate, some 
 of which were able and exhaustive discussions of international 
 law questions, such as the Monroe Doctrine, arbitration, neu- 
 trality, belligerency, the rights of American citizens and the 
 construction and interpretation of treaties and statutes. 
 
 The Senate took the initiative in dealing with the great 
 issues arising concerning Cuba, and it is believed that the 
 measures which it favored were in consonance with the spirit 
 of our institutions, with our necessary political relations to 
 the island of Cuba and with that sense of justice toward a 
 people struggling for liberty which best befitted the first re- 
 public of the Western world. 
 
 It also initiated some less consequential though eminently 
 worthy measures, such as that proposed by Mr. Gallinger au- 
 thorizing the expenditure of $50,000 for the relief of suffering 
 Americans in Cuba, and that proposed by Mr. Proctor author- 
 izing the officers of our army in Cuba exercising separate 
 commands to furnish subsistence, medical and Quartermasters' 
 supplies to destitute inhabitants. It concurred without a dis- 
 
WAR LEGISLATION OF THE SENATE. 299 
 
 senting voice in the action of the House, which was equally 
 unanimous, in placing fifty millions of dollars in the hands of 
 the President to be used for war purposes ; — an act of question- 
 able policy from the point of view of constitutional criticism, 
 but bespeaking clearly the confidence of Congress in the Presi- 
 dent and'the unbounded patriotism with which all men were 
 ready to sustain him. 
 
 The narrow space of this article forbids that I follow the 
 course of debate in the Senate or even refer to the many able 
 and eloquent speeches which were made during the successive 
 Congresses that dealt with the Cuban struggle. They were as 
 a rule of a high order and up to the highest standard of delib- 
 erative assemblies ; but it is of the action of the body that 
 I am to treat, and this prevents the reference that I should be 
 often prompted to make to the excellent suggestions and elo- 
 quent addresses of particular Senators. 
 
 The late Cuban revolution broke out in February, 1895, on 
 the eve of the adjournment of the Fifty-third Congress. Since 
 that period there have been two sessions of the Fifty-fourth 
 Congress, under Cleveland's administration, and three of the 
 Fifty-fifth, under the administration of McKinley. 
 
 When the first session of the P"ifty-fourth Congress con- 
 vened, on December 2, 1895, President Cleveland said in his 
 message : — 
 
 " Cuba is again gravely disturbed, and an insurrection, in 
 some respects more active than the last preceding revolt which 
 continued from 1868 to 1878, now exists in a large portion of 
 the eastern interior of the island, menacing some populations 
 on the coast." 
 
 But he exhorted Congress against sentimental sympathy 
 with the Cubans and declared that — 
 
 " Neither the warmth of our people's sympathy with the 
 Cuban insurgents, nor our loss and material damage conse- 
 quent upon the futile endeavors thus far made to restore 
 peace and order, nor any shock our humane sensibilities may 
 have received from the cruelties which appeared to specially 
 characterize this sanguinary and fiercely conducted war have 
 in the least shaken the determination of the Government to 
 fulfil every international obligation." 
 
300 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 At this time the revolution, which had been organized under 
 the leadership of Jose Marti and Maximo Gomez, was ten 
 months old. Numerous skirmishes had taken place between 
 the Cubans and Spaniards. Marti had been killed and Gomez 
 wounded. Martinez Campos, the most distinguished general 
 of Spain, had succeeded Callejas as Captain-General, only to 
 get his laurels dishevelled. The Cuban Convention had 
 adopted a constitution. Betancourt had been chosen Presi- 
 dent, Maso Vice-President, and Maximo Gomez, a hero of the 
 Ten Years War and a native of San Domingo, had been made 
 General-in-Chief, with Antonio Maceo as his Lieutenant. A 
 provisional government had been organized with its capital at 
 Cubitas. Laws had been enacted for the collection of taxes 
 and the establishment of post-ofifices. Fifty thousand Cuban 
 volunteers were in arms, and Gomez and Maceo were riding 
 over the island perplexing and baffling the armies of Spain 
 marshalled for their subjugation. Maceo a little later appeared 
 in sight of Havana. 
 
 This was the seventh insurrection that had agitated Cuba 
 during the present century and it was soon evident that it 
 was the most serious. Should the belligerency of the Cubans 
 be recognized ? This was the first question presented. Bel- 
 ligerency is a state of war. To recognize it is to accord to 
 those on both sides engaged in it the rights of war. Many 
 resolutions were soon offered in the Senate favoring the rec- 
 ognition of belligerency, Senators Allen and Call being the 
 first to advocate their passage. 
 
 The strongest argument against such action on the part of 
 the United States is to be found in the message of President 
 Grant delivered to Congress during the Ten Years War, in 
 which he opposed any sort of recognition of the Cubans, on 
 the ground (i) that it would authorize the right of search on 
 the high seas of vessels of both parties and would subject 
 those carrying arms and munitions of war, which might now be 
 transported freely in vessels of the United States, to detention 
 and possible seizure ; (2) would give rise to countless vex- 
 atious questions ; (3) would release the parent government 
 from responsibility for acts done by the insurgents ; (4) would 
 invest Spain with the right to exercise the supervision recog- 
 
WAR LEGISLATION OF THE SENATE. Joi 
 
 nized by our treaty of 1795 over our commerce on the high 
 seas ; and the further fact that it would require the enforce- 
 ment of a large and onerous code of neutrality on our Govern- 
 ment. But to this it might be answered, (i) that as belligerency 
 is a fact, it was but just that the fact should be recognized, with 
 its attendant consequences ; (2) that it is no ofTence to a for- 
 eign nation to recognize a state of war within its borders, 
 Abraham Lincoln having been himself the first by the impli- 
 cation of his proclamation blockading southern ports, to rec- 
 ognize the Southern Confederacy, which he afterwards over- 
 threw ; (3) that it is in the interest of humanity, as said by our 
 Supreme Court, that the rights of war should be accorded 
 whenever war prevails ; (4) that while the right of search of 
 our vessels on the high seas by Spain might occasionally be 
 annoying, it was not an incovenience of a very grave nature ; 
 (5) that a different policy pursued in the Ten Years War had 
 brought no good result ; (6) that while recognizing belligerency 
 would release the parent government from responsibility for 
 acts done by the insurgents, such responsibility on the part 
 of a bankrupt nation like Spain was not a matter of momen- 
 tous consequence, for in releasing her we would transfer the 
 responsibility to the insurgents who, representing the inhabi- 
 tants of Cuba, were just as likely to make good their respon- 
 sibility as the Spaniards. Further, that a mercantile 
 consideration of that kind should not stand in the way of 
 national honor and humanity. Eventually, by the treaty 
 which we have just ratified with Spain, we have taken upon 
 ourselves the burden of her debts to American citizens for 
 property injured, and twenty millions of claims, or more, have 
 already appeared and been filed at our State Department. 
 So that the upshot of this objection is that we have been vic- 
 timized by our own refusal to recognize the belligerency of 
 the insurgents in the pursuit of that straightforward policy 
 which our code of national ethics dictated. Above all there 
 lay a still weightier consideration We were not dealing with 
 a far distant land like Armenia, where the cruelties of the 
 Turk provoked resolutions of protest on the part of the Senate. 
 We were dealing with a practical question involving a neigh- 
 boring people. The lovely and fruitful island of Cuba, des- 
 
302 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 cribed by Columbus as " the most beautiful island that eyes 
 ever beheld, filled with excellent ports and profound rivers," 
 is a part of the American Continent and only one hundred 
 miles from our shores. It is about the size of the State of 
 Virginia and is capable of supporting many millions of inhab- 
 itants. As it is the nearest of the West Indian group to our 
 coast, so it is the largest and most populous and the rich- 
 est in wealth of mine, field, forest and orchard. With spa- 
 cious harbors, long mountain ranges, well-nigh impenetrable 
 fastnesses and jungles, it is easily defended, and its topo- 
 graphical, like its geographical, position makes it a strategic 
 point of primary importance to American contemplation. 
 It is naturally a military and naval outpost of the United 
 States. It is the key of the Gulf of Mexico and the 
 Caribbean Sea. It stands sentinel to the approaches of the 
 cities and harbors of our southern coast. It commands the 
 eastern outlet to the projected canal which must ere long 
 connect the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, whether by the 
 Nicaraguan or Panama route. Havana, its metropolis, was 
 the rendezvous of the Spanish armaments launched against 
 the South American republics in the early part of this 
 centur}'. It is the most important of all the lands which 
 come within the purview of our Monroe Doctrine. By that 
 doctrine we have separated Cuba from the sphere of Euro- 
 pean influence and intervention. No European nation, in the 
 face of that doctrine, would now think of recognizing Cuban 
 revolutionists as belligerents, and still less would any Euro- 
 pean monarchy incline to recognize the independence of a 
 Cuban Republic. 
 
 On the contrary, we are bound to the island and its people 
 by the strongest ties. In 1809 Jefferson declared the desira- 
 bility of Cuba in our Union and answered the objection, that 
 if we received it no limit would be drawn to our future acqui- 
 sitions, by the reply that " it could be defended without a 
 navy, and that this develops the principle which ought to 
 limit our future." In recent times the spread of the British 
 Empire over the earth, the tendency of smaller states to con- 
 solidate in great confederacies and the concurrent tendency 
 of greatei- states to appropriate the possessions of weaker ones 
 
WAR LEGISLATION OF THE SENATE. ^o^ 
 
 have all conspired to quicken American interests in the islaiul 
 and to make plain the path of destiny and duty. But for the 
 Monroe Doctrine, that island, which once fell into the hands 
 of England in 1762, would long since have fallen into English 
 hands again or those of some grasping European nation. 
 
 The debate on the Cuban question had scarcely begun in 
 the Senate when, on the seventeenth of December, 1895, was 
 announced a message from President Cleveland on the 
 Venezuelan Boundary controversy, in which he informed 
 Congress of the declination of Great Britain to arbitrate that 
 question with Venezuela and invoked the Monroe Doctrine, 
 as applicable to constrain " the United States to resist by 
 every means in its power, as a wilful aggression upon its 
 rights and interests, the appropriation by Great Britain of any 
 lands or the exercise of governmental jurisdiction over any 
 territory which after investigation we have determined of 
 right belongs to Venezuela." 
 
 The Monroe Doctrine, as formulated by President Monroe 
 in 1823, in warning the allied powers of Europe against joining 
 Spain to subjugate the South American republics, is the 
 simple declaration that we 
 
 " should consider any attempt (of the monarchies of 
 Europe) to extend their system to any portion of our 
 hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety." 
 
 President Cleveland declared this doctrine 
 
 " essential to the integrity of our free institutions and 
 the tranquil maintenance of our distinctive form of gov- 
 ernment ; it was intended to apply to every stage of our 
 national life, and can not become obsolete while our Re- 
 public endures." 
 
 He combated the British idea that it was not founded on 
 the general consent of nations, by declaring that it 
 
 " finds its recognition in those principles of international 
 law which are based upon the theory that every nation 
 shall have its rights protected and its just claims en- 
 forced." 
 
 The vigor of this message, challenging Great Britain to 
 war over a boundary line in Venezuela, is in striking contrast 
 
304 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 to the President's warning against " sentimental sympathy " 
 with the Cubans and his deferential regard for Spanish sov- 
 ereignty. It was against the extension of the monarchical 
 system on this continent that Monroe had uttered his doctrine, 
 and the principles which led to the Venezuelan message 
 would have seemed to call for the President's full sympathy 
 in the Cuban struggle and for his readiness to recognize those 
 engaged in it. Beyond this, the Monroe Doctrine has its 
 corollary which touches keenly our national honor. It warned 
 Europe against interference in the affairs of the American 
 Continent ; and in doing so, as the Hon. Thomas F. Bayard, 
 Secretary of State during Mr. Cleveland's first administration, 
 said — 
 
 "The United States has proclaimed itself the protector 
 of this Western world, in which she is by far the superior 
 power, from interference by European governments." 
 
 The same idea, logically extended, was expressed by 
 Senator Lindsay, of Kentucky, during the debate, when he 
 said — 
 
 " We have made ourselves the keeper of this brother 
 and, if we shrink from the duties which we have vol- 
 untarily assumed, the blood of that brother will cry out 
 from the ground against us." 
 
 Denying to Cuba the right to be rescued from the Spanish 
 wolf by any European alliance such as we had with France 
 during our own Revolution, placarding her coasts with notices 
 to all the world, " Hands off," we could not play the dog in 
 the manger and ourselves withhold at least a moral and sym- 
 pathetic support to her suffering people. Against such un- 
 speakable wrongs as that little island suffered under Spanish 
 rule our intervention was clearly warranted. 
 
 This corollary of the Monroe Doctrine is part of it to all 
 minds which follow the logic of this manly and just declara- 
 tion. It is a doctrine necessary to our defense and to our 
 dignity and honor as a nation. There was nothing original in 
 Monroe's message, but this does not detract from its author's 
 glory, which lies in the responsibility he bravely assumed 
 against embattled Europe and in the good judgment he 
 
WAR LEGISLATION OF THE SENATE. 305 
 
 exercised in the deliverance of the message. President Madi- 
 son, in 181 1, had uttered like sentiments with respect to 
 Spain in the Floridas, and their germs will be found in the 
 nature of our institutions and in our geographical situation. 
 It was simply the embodiment of an idea in every thought- 
 ful mind, just as the Declaration of Independence was the 
 embodiment, by Jefferson, of the matured conviction of his' 
 generation and his country. Moreover, the fact that all our 
 great statesmen, including our Presidents from John Ouincy 
 Adams to Grover Cleveland, have reaffirmed this doctrine, 
 and that the people have thoroughly responded to every 
 utterance is an assurance of its rectitude and of its fixity as a 
 part of the American law, as much as any clause of our writ- 
 ten Constitution. 
 
 The Senate has the honor of being the first political branch 
 of the government of the United States to indicate its realiz- 
 ing sense of these American principles during our recent 
 troubles. They found expression on January 28, 1896, when 
 Mr. Morgan, from the Committee on Foreign Relations, 
 reported Mr. Call's resolution, with two resolutions as a substi- 
 tute, the first declaring that the war in Cuba should be con- 
 ducted on civilized principles, and the second that the Presi- 
 dent be requested to interpose his friendly offices by the 
 recognition of belligerent rights to the Cubans. Mr. Cameron, 
 from the same Committee, reported a minority resolution of 
 the Committee, to the effect that the President be requested 
 to interpose his friendly offices with Spain for the recognition 
 of the independence of Cuba. 
 
 On February 5, 1896, Mr. Morgan, under instruction from 
 the same Committee, reported the following concurrent 
 resolution as a substitute for those previously presented : — 
 
 "Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representa- 
 tives concurring therein). That, in the opinion of Con- 
 gress, a condition of public war exists between the 
 Government of Spain and the Government proclaimed 
 and for some time maintained by force of arms by the 
 people of Cuba; and that the United States of America 
 should maintain a strict neutrality between the contend- 
 ing powers, according to each all the rights of bellige- 
 rents in the ports and territory of the United States." 
 
3o6 
 
 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 On the twenty-eighth day of February, 1896, it was adopted 
 by the following vote : — 
 
 (See Record, Part 3, 54th Cong., ist Session, p. 2257,) 
 
 
 
 YEAS— 64. 
 
 
 Allen 
 
 Cullom 
 
 Jones (Ark.) 
 
 Proctor 
 
 Allison 
 
 Daniel 
 
 Kyle 
 
 Quay 
 
 Bacon 
 
 Davis 
 
 Lindsay 
 
 Roach 
 
 Baker 
 
 Dubois 
 
 Lodge 
 
 Sherman 
 
 Bate 
 
 Elkins 
 
 McBride 
 
 Shoup 
 
 Berry 
 
 Faulkner 
 
 McMillan 
 
 Smith 
 
 Brown 
 
 Frye 
 
 Mantle 
 
 Squire 
 
 Burrows 
 
 Gallinger 
 
 Martin 
 
 Stewart 
 
 Butler 
 
 Gear 
 
 Mills 
 
 Teller 
 
 Call 
 
 Gibson 
 
 Mitchell (Ore.) 
 
 Thurston 
 
 Cameron 
 
 Gorman 
 
 Morgan 
 
 Turpie 
 
 Cannon 
 
 Gray 
 
 Nelson 
 
 Vest 
 
 Carter 
 
 Hawley 
 
 Pasco 
 
 Walthall 
 
 Chandler 
 
 Hill 
 
 Peffer 
 
 Warren 
 
 Clark 
 
 Irby 
 
 Perkins 
 
 White 
 
 Cockrell 
 
 Jones (Nev.) 
 
 Pritchard 
 NAYS— 6. 
 
 Wilson 
 
 Caffery 
 
 
 George 
 
 Morrill 
 
 Chilton 
 
 
 Hale 
 
 Wetmore 
 
 
 NOT VOTING— 18. 
 
 
 Aldrich 
 
 Gordon 
 
 Palmer 
 
 Till man 
 
 Blackburn 
 
 Harris 
 
 Pettigrew 
 
 Vilas 
 
 Blanchard 
 
 Hoar 
 
 Piatt 
 
 Voorhees 
 
 Brice 
 
 Mitchell (Wis.) Pugh 
 
 Wolcott 
 
 
 Murphy 
 
 Sewell 
 
 
 This resolution by the Senate was a signal triumph for 
 those who contended that — 
 
 (i) The war in Cuba had assumed the proportions that 
 merited recognition ; 
 
 (2) The policy of recognition of belligerency was hu- 
 mane and just ; and that 
 
 (3) Congress might fitly express its opinion upon the 
 subject. 
 
 But it was a concurrent resolution only — that is, a mere 
 expression of opinion, without efficacy of a legislative char- 
 acter. It was received in the House with applause, but that 
 body subsequently passed a resolution of its own, by way of 
 amendment to that of the Senate, though differing little in 
 import. Subsequently it receded from its amendment, and 
 on April 6, 1896, concurred in the resolution of the Senate 
 by a vote of 247 yeas to only 27 nays. 
 
WAR LEGISLATION OF THE SENATE. 3°? 
 
 President Cleveland ignored these resolutions of Congress. 
 Affairs in Cuba grew worse and worse. In February, 1896, 
 Captain-General Don Valeriano Weyler took command. A 
 more brutal monster never encumbered the earth. With fire 
 and sword he ravaged the land, and a reign of terror ensued 
 such as even Cuba had never known before, for he " Out- 
 heroded Herod " in deeds of violence and blood. The 
 inhabitants were driven into the towns in indiscriminate bands 
 of old men, women and children, and herded together in 
 pestilential camps without food, medicine or shelter. There 
 they perished by thousands and tens of thousands, amidst 
 scenes of anguish and horror that no language can adequately 
 describe. 
 
 When Congress met December 7, 1896, President Cleveland 
 informed them that the insurrection in Cuba continued with 
 all its perplexities ; that it was not possible to perceive any 
 progress toward the pacification of the island, but that the 
 situation had not in the least improved ; that, though Spain 
 held Havana and the seaports and all the considerable towns, 
 the insurgents still roamed at will over at least two-thirds of 
 the island ; that the industrial value of the island was fast 
 diminishing; that both parties were engaged in the wholesale 
 annihilation of property, and that the rural population had 
 been required to concentrate in the towns. He declared that 
 the spectacle of the utter ruin of an adjacent country, by 
 nature one of the most fertile and charming on the globe and 
 hardly separated from our own territory, should engage our 
 serious attention. He pointed out further that our citizens 
 had from thirty to fifty millions invested in railroad, mining 
 and other enterprises in the island, and that we were deeply 
 interested in a commerce which amounted in 1893 to one 
 hundred and three millions, in 1894 to ninety-six millions. 
 While still enjoining our non-interference, he further declared 
 that when the inability of Spain to deal successfully with the 
 insurrection had become manifest, and 
 
 " It is demonstrated that her sovereignty is extinct in 
 Cuba for all purposes of its rightful existence ; and when 
 a hopeless struggle for its reinstatement has degenerated 
 into a strife which means nothing more than the useless 
 
3o8 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 sacrifice of human life and the utter destruction of the 
 very subject-matter of the conflict, a situation will be 
 presented in which our obligations to the sovereignty of 
 Spain will be superseded by higher obligations which 
 we can hardly hesitate to recognize and discharge." 
 
 It was now evident that something more than sentimental 
 sympathy was involved in our relations to Cuba. It was also 
 evident that the President recognized the principle which the 
 Senate asserted, that our obligations to the sovereignty of 
 Spain might be superseded by higher ones. In no event did 
 our obligation to Spain require that we should not recognize 
 the patent fact that there was war in Cuba ; and the President's 
 vague, indefinite postponement of any specific recommenda- 
 tion was taken as an indication that his patience would be long 
 exercised before he got beyond the expression of generalities. 
 
 Both political parties, in their platforms of 1896, had 
 expressed the sympathy so profoundly felt by the American 
 people in the Cuban struggle, and the people generally^ con- 
 curred in the declaration of the Republican platform that 
 Spain had lost control of Cuba and was unable either to pro- 
 tect property or lives of resident Americans, or to comply 
 with its treaty obligations. 
 
 Numerous resolutions were offered during this short session 
 of Congress but nothing of moment was done, and soon the 
 Cleveland administration passed away, leaving all the ques- 
 tions which had arisen during the war as a heritage to its 
 successor. 
 
 On the fourth of March, 1897, President McKinley was 
 inaugurated, and in anticipation thereof President Cleveland 
 had convened the Senate in special session. The inaugural 
 address made no allusion to the war in Cuba. 
 
 On the sixth of March, 1897, President McKinley called 
 Congress in extra session. Accordingly, on the fifteenth of 
 March the first session of the Fifty-fifth Congress convened. 
 The message of the President was confined to recommenda- 
 tions touching a tariff revenue bill and was silent on the 
 question of the war in Cuba. But soon the Calendar 
 thickened, as in previous sessions, with resolutions on this 
 subject. Mr. Allen introduced a resolution recognizing the 
 
WAR LEGISLATION OF THE SENATE. 
 
 509 
 
 political independence of Cuba, and Mr. Morgan offered a 
 joint resolution, which read as follows : — 
 
 " Resolved, by the Senate and House of Representa- 
 tives of the United States of America in Congress 
 assembled, That a condition of public war exists between 
 the Government of Spain and the Government pro- 
 claimed and for some time maintained by force of arms 
 by the people of Cuba ; and that the United States of 
 America shall maintain a strict neutrality between the 
 contending powers, according to each all the rights of belli- 
 gerents in the ports and territory of the United States." 
 
 This resolution was passed on May 20, 1897, by a vote of 
 41 yeas to 14 nays, the vote being as follows : — 
 
 
 
 YEAS— 41. 
 
 
 Bacon 
 
 Cullom 
 
 Lindsay 
 
 Rawlins 
 
 Baker 
 
 Davis 
 
 McBride 
 
 Shoup 
 
 Bate 
 
 Deboe 
 
 Mantle 
 
 Stewart 
 
 Berry 
 
 Fo raker 
 
 Mason 
 
 Thurston 
 
 Butler 
 
 Gallinger 
 
 Mills 
 
 Tillman 
 
 Carter 
 
 Gorman 
 
 Morgan 
 
 Turner 
 
 Chandler 
 
 Hansbrough 
 
 Nelson 
 
 Turpie 
 
 Chilton 
 
 Harris (Kan. 
 
 ) Pasco 
 
 Walthall 
 
 Clark 
 
 Heitfeld 
 
 Pettigrew 
 
 
 Clay 
 
 Jones (Ark.) 
 
 Pettus 
 
 
 Cockrell 
 
 Kenney 
 
 Pritchard 
 NAYS— 14. 
 
 
 Allison 
 
 Gear 
 
 Hoar 
 
 White 
 
 Burrows 
 
 Hale 
 
 Spooner 
 
 Wilson 
 
 Caffery 
 
 Hanna 
 
 Wellington 
 
 
 Fairbanks 
 
 Hawley 
 
 Wetmore 
 
 
 
 NOT VOTING— 33. 
 
 
 Aldrich 
 
 Gray 
 
 Morrill 
 
 Sewell 
 
 Allen 
 
 Harris (Tenn.) Murphy 
 
 Smith 
 
 Cannon 
 
 Jones (Nev. ) 
 
 Penrose 
 
 Teller 
 
 Daniel 
 
 Kyle 
 
 Perkins 
 
 Vest 
 
 Earle 
 
 Lodge 
 
 Piatt (Conn.) 
 
 Warren 
 
 El kins 
 
 McEnery 
 
 Piatt (N. Y.) 
 
 Wolcott 
 
 Faulkner 
 
 McMillan 
 
 Proctor 
 
 
 Frye 
 
 Martin 
 
 Quay 
 
 
 George 
 
 Mitchell 
 
 Roach 
 
 
 Thus a second step was taken by the Senate toward the 
 recognition of Cuban belligerency. It affirmed, by implica- 
 tion, the right of Congress to make direct recognition of a 
 condition of war in a foreign country. It was contended in 
 debate that this was the exclusive province of the Executive. 
 
3IO THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 But war is a fact, and the right of the political powers of the 
 Government to recognize that fact has been afifirmed by the 
 Supreme Court of the United States in a number of cases, 
 and was abundantly demonstrated by Henry Clay when chair- 
 man of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate, and 
 must exist in the nature of things. Whoever is invested with 
 discretion to deal with facts, either in making or administer- 
 ing laws, must of necessity have the power of discriminating 
 between them and recognizing them as they are. Those who 
 so contended were vindicated in their opinions by this deci- 
 sive vote in the Senate. The joint resolution went to the 
 House and there disappeared, as no Committee on Foreign 
 Affairs had been appointed and as the House had declined to 
 equip itself with the machinery of general legislation. 
 
 The President, during the session, transmitted a list of 
 claims of citizens of the United States against Spain and also 
 a list of citizens arrested since February 24, 1895, with corres- 
 pondence relative to their imprisonment. 
 
 The subject of the war was debated from time to time on one 
 or another of the resolutions offered, but no important action 
 was taken. 
 
 When the second session of Congress met on December 6, 
 1897, ^t was greeted by a message from President McKinley 
 which fully considered the Cuban situation, and he justly 
 regarded it as the most important problem pertaining to our 
 foreign relations. He had entered his firm protest against 
 the policy of extermination which had been inaugurated by 
 Spain, had at last demanded the instant release, or speedy trial, 
 of American citizens under arrest and had applied the funds 
 appropriated by Congress to the relief of Americans suffering 
 in Cuba. 
 
 The assassination of Canovas and the succession of Sagasta 
 to the leadership in Spain had been contemporaneous with 
 the departure of our Minister, General Woodford, to the 
 Court of Spain, and the new Spanish Government had indi- 
 cated a change in policy which had somewhat ameliorated 
 the conditions. Weyler had been superseded by Blanco as 
 Captain-General,[and a less vigorous regime had been estab- 
 lished. But the war still raged with no sign of abatement ; 
 
WAR LEGISLATION OF THE SENATE, 311 
 
 and our Consul-General Lee, whose firm and intelligent course 
 had inspired great confidence in his opinion, testified in con- 
 currence with the general view that the Cubans could not 
 take the towns, nor the Spaniards subjugate the country, and 
 that both sides were conducting a warfare of waste and ruin, 
 and of indefinite duration. 
 
 Under these circumstances the President declared that of 
 the untried measures there remained only recognition of the 
 insurgents as belligerents ; the recognition of the independence 
 of Cuba ; neutral intervention to end the war, by propos- 
 ing a rational compromise between the contestants, and 
 intervention in favor of one or the other party. He added : 
 
 " I speak not of forcible annexation ; for that, under our 
 code of morality, can not be thought of." 
 
 He opposed any sort of recognition of the Cubans, on the 
 grounds stated by General Grant during the Ten Years War, 
 which we have already quoted, but withheld any specific 
 recommendation of his own, declaring that : 
 
 " the near future would demonstrate whether or not a 
 righteous peace is likely to be attained." 
 
 The message was followed by numerous resolutions touch- 
 ing the subject, such as had been offered in previous sessions ; 
 and while the devastating struggle continued in the island, 
 the debate rolled on in the Senate from day to day and from 
 week to week, and a patient people still listened to the cries 
 of woe and looked upon the scenes of horror which had so 
 long tortured the very soul of the nation. 
 
 Suddenly, on February 16, 1898, the news was flashed over 
 the land that on the night before, the U. S. battleship Maine 
 had been blown up in Havana harbor and 266 of her crew had 
 suddenly passed to a fiery, or watery death. The note of the 
 Alpine hunter's horn, it is said, agitating the air, sometimes 
 disturbs the balance of the accumulated avalanche and sends 
 it hurling down the mountain side. This incident settled the 
 fate of Cuba and culminated in the termination of Spanish 
 rule in America. 
 
 A board of naval officers, of which Admiral Sampson was 
 chairman, investigated it and reported that the explosion 
 
312 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 must have occurred from an extraneous cause. Consul-Gen- 
 eral Lee, who was near by at the time and quickly on the 
 scene of action, testified to the same effect. Some believed 
 that it was the direct work of the Spanish authorities ; others, 
 that it was done by some Spanish sympathizer without 
 governmental agency ; still others made the far-fetched sug- 
 gestion that the insurgents had committed the crime to induce 
 American intervention. An interesting incident of this ses- 
 sion was the visit of Senators Proctor, Money, Gallinger and 
 Thurston to Cuba. They related their observations to the 
 Senate, and their harrowing accounts of the acute conditions 
 there existing stimulated the general feeling that the time for 
 action on our part was near at hand. A little later the Com- 
 mittee on Foreign Relations, consisting of Senators Davis, 
 (who had succeeded Mr. Sherman as chairman upon his 
 becoming Secretary of State), Frye, Cullom, Lodge, Clarke, 
 Foraker, Morgan, Gray, Turpie, Daniel and Mills, concluded 
 that— 
 
 " The destruction of the Maine was compassed by the 
 official act of the Spanish authorities (and the ascertain- 
 ment of the particular person is not material), or was 
 made possible by a negligence on their part so willing 
 and gross as to be equivalent in culpability to positive 
 criminal action." 
 
 They expressed their belief that recognition of the bellige- 
 rency of the Cubans, if it had been given seasonably when 
 it was suggested by concurrent resolutions to that effect passed 
 by Congress, would have — 
 
 " caused a speedy termination of the war without involving 
 the United States in the contest," 
 
 but that now it would fall short of meeting the situation. 
 They might have repeated the remark with reference to the 
 failure of the House of Representatives to concur in the joint 
 resolution of the Senate recognizing Cuban belligerency. 
 
 At this time Spain was engaged in the last hopeless effort 
 to bring about an armistice with renewed promises of auton- 
 omy, and our Minister at Madrid, General Woodford, was 
 still parleying with the Spanish Ministry upon some vague prop- 
 
WAR LEGISLATION OF THE SENATE. 313 
 
 osition, which it was thought might placate the indignation 
 of the American people by assurance from Spain of a stable 
 government based on the participation of the Cubans therein. 
 
 But the day of diplomacy had passed, and the press of the 
 country clamorously called for, while the people impatiently 
 expected some decisive word from the President. Indisposed 
 to war and having done all he thought he could to prevent it, 
 the President spoke that word on April 11, 1898, in a message 
 to Congress, in which he reviewed the Cuban revolution and 
 recommended the forcible intervention of the United States 
 as a neutral to stop the war, according to the dictates of 
 humanity and following many historic precedents where 
 neighboring states had intervened to check the hopeless sacri- 
 fice of life by internecine conflict beyond their borders, justi- 
 fying themselves on national grounds. 
 
 He added these words : — 
 
 " It involves, however, hostile constraint upon both 
 the parties to the contest, as well to enforce a truce 
 as to guide the eventual settlement." 
 
 Two days afterwards, April 13, 1898, the committee on 
 Foreign Relations through their chairman submitted an able 
 report in favor of intervention and recommended the adop- 
 tion of the following resolutions : — 
 
 Joint Resolution For the recognition of the independence of the people of 
 Cuba, demanding that the Government of Spain relinquish its authority and 
 government in the island of Cuba, and to withdraw its land and naval forces 
 from Cuba and Cuban waters, and directing the President of the United 
 States to use the land and naval forces of the United States to carry these 
 resolutions in effect. 
 
 Whereas, the abhorrent conditions which have existed for 
 more than three years in the island of Cuba, so near our own 
 borders, have shocked the moral sense of the people of the 
 United States, have been a disgrace to Christian civilization, 
 culminating, as they have, in the destruction of a United States 
 battleship, with 266 of its officers and crew, while on a friendly 
 visit in the harbor of Havana, and cannot longer be endured, 
 as has been set forth by the President of the United States in 
 his message to Congress of April eleventh, eighteen hundred 
 and ninety-eight, upon which the action of Congress was 
 invited : Therefore, 
 
314 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 Resolved by the Senate and Hoiise of Representatives of the 
 United States of America in Congress assembled. 
 
 First. That the people of the island of Cuba are, and of 
 right ought to be, free and independent, 
 
 Seeond. That it is the duty of the United States to 
 demand, and the Government of the United States does here- 
 by demand, that the Government of Spain at once relinquish 
 its authority and government in the island of Cuba and with- 
 draw its land and naval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters. 
 
 TJiird. That the President of the United States be, and he 
 hereby is, directed and empowered to use the entire land and 
 naval forces of the United States, and to call into the actual 
 service of the United States the militia of the several states, 
 to such extent as may be necessary to carry these resolutions 
 into effect. 
 
 A minority, consisting of Messrs. Turpie, Mills, Daniel and 
 Foraker, concurred in the report, but favored — 
 
 " The immediate recognition of the Republic of Cuba 
 as organized in that island as a free, independent and 
 sovereign power among the nations of the world." 
 
 The resolution as originally offered by Mr. Foraker had 
 contained such a provision, and on the motion of Mr. Turpie 
 the words were inserted in the first clause " and that the 
 Government of the United States hereby recognizes the 
 Republic of Cuba as the true and lawful government of the 
 island." The debate on this question was deeply interesting. 
 
 The suggestion of the President, of neutral intervention — 
 of hostile constraint on both parties without any recognition 
 of rights to the insurgents — was specially opposed as out of 
 keeping with the respect which this Republic should show 
 to a neighboring people following its example. Abra- 
 ham Lincoln in the House of Representatives on February 12, 
 1848, declared that "any people, anywhere, being inclined 
 and having the power, have the right to rise up and shake off 
 the existing government and form a new one that suits them 
 better." This is a most valuable and sacred right and a right 
 which we hope and believe is to liberate the world. It was 
 by the exercise of this right that the United States became a 
 free nation. It was this right that the Cubans were exercis- 
 ing against the most odious and cruel despotism that has 
 
WAR LEGISLATION OF THE SENATE. 
 
 315 
 
 ever oppressed any land on the American continent. It was 
 but just that we, who were the first to proclaim the right, should 
 be the first to accord it to our neighbors. Besides, the con- 
 sideration weighed with some that the recognition of the 
 Cuban Government would give us a competent authority 
 and ingratiate our country into its confidence and good will. 
 It is the destiny of the island ultimately to be annexed to the 
 United States, and a liberal policy would best pave the way 
 to that consummation. 
 
 Eager and impatient crowds filled the Senate galleries and 
 awaited the result of the debate, while the press of the coun- 
 try, in morning issues and extra editions, warned the Senate 
 that the Spanish fleet of Cervera was heading under full steam 
 to attack American ports, and that while the Senate debated 
 " Rome might perish." Every Senator except the lamented 
 Walthall, who was then sick and soon afterwards departed this 
 life, was present. 
 
 By a decisive vote the Senate supported the view that the 
 
 Republican Government of Cuba should be recognized, and 
 
 the amendment to that effect was carried, the vote being as 
 
 follows : 
 
 YEAS— 51. 
 
 Allen 
 
 Gallinger 
 
 Mason 
 
 Roach 
 
 Bacon 
 
 Harris 
 
 Mills 
 
 Smith 
 
 Baker 
 
 Heitfeld 
 
 Mitchell 
 
 Stewart 
 
 Bate 
 
 Jones (Ark.) 
 
 Money 
 
 Teller 
 
 Kerry 
 
 Jones (Nev. ) 
 
 Murphy 
 
 Thurston 
 
 Butler 
 
 Kenney 
 
 Nelson 
 
 Tillman 
 
 Cannon 
 
 Kyle 
 
 Pasco 
 
 Turley 
 
 Chandler 
 
 Lindsay 
 
 Penrose 
 
 Turner 
 
 Chilton 
 
 McEnery 
 
 Perkins 
 
 Turpie 
 
 Clay 
 
 McLaurin 
 
 Pettigrew 
 
 Vest 
 
 Cockrall 
 
 Mai lory 
 
 Pettus 
 
 White 
 
 Daniel 
 
 Mantle 
 
 Quay 
 
 Wilson 
 
 Foraker 
 
 Martin 
 
 Rawlins 
 NAYS-37. 
 
 
 Aldrich 
 
 F"airbanks 
 
 Hoar 
 
 Sewell 
 
 Allison 
 
 Faulkner 
 
 Lodge 
 
 Shoup 
 
 Burrows 
 
 Frye 
 
 McBride 
 
 Spooner 
 
 Caffery 
 
 Gear 
 
 McMillan 
 
 Warren 
 
 Carter 
 
 Gorman 
 
 Morgan 
 
 Wellington 
 
 Clark 
 
 Gray 
 
 Morrill 
 
 Wetmore 
 
 Cullom 
 
 Hale 
 
 Piatt (Conn.) 
 
 Wolcott 
 
 Davis 
 
 Hanna 
 
 Piatt (N. Y.) 
 
 
 Deboe 
 
 Hansbrough 
 
 Pritchard 
 
 
 Elkins 
 
 Hawley 
 
 Proctor 
 
 ABSENT— I. 
 Walthall 
 
 
3i6 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 Upon motion of Mr. Davis, an additional amendment was 
 adopted, without dissent, declaring : — 
 
 Fourth. That the United States hereby disclaims any 
 disposition or intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdic- 
 tion, or control over said island except for the pacification 
 thereof, and asserts its determination, when that is ac- 
 complished, to leave the government and control of the 
 island to its people. 
 
 Then by a vote of 67 to 21 the resolutions thus amended 
 were adopted. 
 
 The House of Representatives struck out the clause of the 
 resolutions recognizing the Republican Government in Cuba. 
 A conference committee was appointed and, at a late hour of 
 the night, the Senate concurred in the action of the House, 
 by a vote of 42 to 35 and the resolutions without recognition 
 of the Cuban Republic were adopted. This meant war. 
 
 Spain speedily declared war against the United States, and 
 on April 25, 1898, a resolution, which originated in the House 
 and speedily passed the Senate, was approved by the Presi- 
 dent, declaring war with Spain to have existed since April 21, 
 and authorized the President to — 
 
 " use the entire land and naval forces of the United 
 States and to call into active service the militia of the 
 several States to such extent as might be necessary." 
 
 Six days later Admiral Dewey's fleet, which had sailed di- 
 rectly, under orders, for the Philippine Islands, destroyed the 
 Spanish fleet in Manila Bay, and the beginning of the end 
 was at hand. 
 
 On July 3, 1898, history repeated itself, and the Spanish 
 fleet of Cervera, endeavoring to escape from Santiago Bay, 
 was sunk by the American fleet under Commodore Schley, 
 Admiral Sampson, its nominal commander, being temporarily 
 absent in consultation with the commander of our land forces. 
 
 On July 17, after the brilliant assaults of the American 
 army had shown the futility of further resistance, the Spanish 
 army at Santiago surrendered. On the first of January, 1899, 
 
WAR LEGISLATION OF THE SENATE. 317 
 
 the American army took formal possession, under Gen. J. R. 
 Brooke, of the island of Cuba, and the career of Spain on the 
 American Continent was closed. 
 
 On the twelfth of August the protocol of a treaty was 
 signed at Washington by W. R. Day, our Secretary of State, 
 and Jules Cambon, the Ambassador of France, representing 
 the Spanish Government, by which it was agreed, with a view 
 to the establishment of peace between the two countries, that 
 Spain should relinquish all claims to sovereignty over, and 
 title to, Cuba; should cede the island of Porto Rico to the 
 United States, and such island in the Ladrones as might be 
 selected by the United States ; that the United States should 
 occupy the city, bay and harbor of Manila pending the con- 
 clusion of a treaty of peace that should determine the control, 
 disposition and government of the Philippines. It was also 
 agreed that Cuba and Porto Rico should be immediately evac- 
 uated by Spain and that Commissioners, appointed by the 
 two Governments, should make arrangements accordingly ; 
 that each government should appoint not more than five Com- 
 missioners to treat of peace, their meeting to take place at 
 Paris not later than October i. 
 
 At the time when this protocol was signed, our naval forces 
 under Commodore Dewey and our land forces under Gen. 
 Merritt were besieging Manila, and Gen. Aguinaldo, with the 
 Philippine forces, was assisting us. 
 
 The President appointed Hon. W. R. Day, who resigned 
 the Secretaryship of State to accept the commission ; Hon. 
 Cushman K. Davis, Chairman of the Senate Committee 
 on Foreign Relations ; Hon. W. P. Frye and Hon. George 
 Gray, members of that Committee, and Whitelaw Reid, Esq., 
 of New York, as Commissioners on behalf of the United 
 States. On October i they met at Paris the Commissioners 
 appointed by the Queen of Spain. 
 
 The work of the Commission was long and laborious, but it 
 was concluded by a treaty, signed at Paris, December 15, 1898, 
 which was communicated to the Senate on January 4, 1899, 
 by the President. The treaty fulfilled the provisions of the 
 protocol with respect to Cuba and Porto Rico and the island 
 in the Ladrones which was to be ceded to the United States. 
 
3i8 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 By the third article Spain ceded the whole Philippine archi- 
 pelago to the United States, and the United States agreed to 
 pay to Spain $20,000,000 within three months after the ex- 
 change of the ratifications of the treaty. 
 
 It was also provided that the United States should for ten 
 years admit Spanish ships and merchandise to the ports of 
 the Philippines on the same terms as ships and merchandise 
 of the United States ; that we would send back to Spain, at 
 our own cost, the Spanish soldiers taken as prisoners of war 
 on the capture of Manila by the American forces, and that 
 the arms of the soldiers in question should be restored to 
 them. Stands of colors, uncaptured war vessels, small arms, 
 guns of all calibres, ammunition and materials of all kinds be- 
 longing to the land and naval forces in the Philippines and 
 Guam should remain the property of Spain. Mutual release 
 and return of prisoners of war was provided for, and the 
 United States undertook to obtain the release of all Spanish 
 prisoners in the hands of the insurgents in Cuba and the 
 Philippines. 
 
 There was mutual relinquishment of all claims, national 
 and individual, for indemnity of any kind that arose out of the 
 war. But this, like the return of prisoners of war, oper- 
 ated as a heavy burden upon the United States and a trivial 
 burden on Spain, for many thousands of Spanish prisoners 
 were in our hands, entailing considerable cost for their trans- 
 portation home, and the claims of our citizens against Spain 
 and her insurgent subjects during the Four Years' War are 
 variously estimated at from $5,000,000 to $20,000,000. 
 
 The debate on the treaty occurred in secret session and is 
 not reported. But in open session resolutions were offered by 
 Senators Vest, Bacon, Allen and others defining the princi- 
 ples of our government with reference to the annexation 
 of territory. It was shown by numerous decisions of the 
 Supreme Court that annexation carried with it the principles 
 of our Constitution as to the rights of the inhabitants to the 
 equal protection of the laws and as to the uniformity of tariff 
 and revenue laws as applicable to them. 
 
 Under the constitution, a vote of two-thirds of the Senators 
 present is requisite to ratify a treaty, and for some weeks it 
 
WAR LEGISLATION OF THE SENATE. 3^9 
 
 seemed as if such a vote could not be obtained. The main 
 objection to the treaty was directed against the cession of the 
 PhiHppine archipelago to the United States. The islands are 
 7,000 miles from the United States, and they are tenanted 
 by a heterogeneous population incapable of assimilation with 
 our own people. The climate is such that our white race cannot 
 establish their homes in the country and colonize it. The 
 islands must, in the nature of things, become a mere depend- 
 ency, where the many must be ruled by a few of alien blood. 
 
 As a real-estate investment, the experience of the modern 
 colonizing nations indicates that it will not be a success. 
 But, beyond these and other considerations of public policy, 
 we had made the Filipinos our allies in dispossessing Spain of 
 the islands, and it seemed to many inconsistent with the 
 honor of this nation that, when our mutual efforts had been 
 successful, we should ourselves take the tainted title of Spain 
 and step into her shoes to force a government upon the in- 
 habitants against their will. 
 
 These considerations alone moved many Senators to oppose 
 the treaty. There were others scarcely less cogent. De- 
 fended by the ocean east and west, the United States is 
 to-day impregnable. With the Philippine Lslands to defend, 
 we have a weak spot which will be immediately assailed in 
 the event of war between this and any other great nation, 
 and which will require vast expenditures of men and money 
 to protect. 
 
 Our institutions are free. The Malay race has never 
 founded a free state, nor do they seem to be capable of doing 
 so. By the treaty we incorporate the twelve to twenty thou- 
 sand islands into our territory and make eight millions of 
 these strange people American citizens. It is true that we 
 do not invest them with political rights, but they are our 
 citizens nevertheless, and we become permanently responsible 
 for them and their government and bring them under a free 
 constitution which has no place for subject peoples. It was 
 admitted by the opponents of the treaty that we could not 
 leave the islands in the hands of Spain, nor incontinently 
 withdraw and let them be appropriated by any other nation. 
 But it was contended that temporary military occupation, 
 
320 
 
 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 after the fashion of our occupation of Cuba, with friendly 
 offices to the inhabitants to enable them to form a stable 
 government, was the better policy to pursue ; and that from 
 that point of view we could satisfy all equitable demands 
 upon us and shape our future course consistently with our 
 interests and without the assumption of the permanent obli- 
 gations that the acceptance of sovereignty entailed. 
 
 On Saturday night, February 4, 1899, the forces of Agui- 
 naldo most improvidently attacked the American Army at 
 Manila, but were mowed down like grass and repulsed. The 
 Monday following the Senate voted on the treaty. Up to 
 that morning the necessary two-thirds vote in favor of it had 
 not been assured and its defeat seemed probable. When the 
 roll was called the issue seemed still doubtful, but when the 
 vote was announced it stood as follows : — 
 
 VOTE ON THE TREATY. 
 
 FOR RATIFICATION. 
 
 Aldrich 
 
 Faulkner 
 
 McBride 
 
 Ross 
 
 Allen 
 
 Foraker 
 
 McEnery 
 
 Sewell 
 
 Allison 
 
 Frye 
 
 McLaurin 
 
 Shoup 
 
 Baker 
 
 Gallinger 
 
 McMillan 
 
 Simon 
 
 Burrows 
 
 Gear 
 
 Mantle 
 
 Spooner 
 
 Butler 
 
 Gray 
 
 Mason 
 
 Stewart 
 
 Carter 
 
 Hanna 
 
 Morgan 
 
 Sullivan 
 
 Chandler 
 
 Hansbrough 
 
 Nelson 
 
 Teller 
 
 Clark 
 
 Harris 
 
 Penrose 
 
 Thurston 
 
 Clay 
 
 Hawley 
 
 Perkins 
 
 Warren 
 
 Cullom 
 
 Jones (Nevada) 
 
 Pettus 
 
 Wellington 
 
 Davis 
 
 Kenney 
 
 Piatt (Conn.) 
 
 Wolcott 
 
 Deboe 
 
 Kyle 
 
 Piatt (New York) 
 
 
 Elkins 
 
 Lindsay 
 
 Pritchard 
 
 
 Fairbanks 
 
 Lodge 
 
 Quay 
 
 Total 57. 
 
 
 AGAINST 
 
 RATIFICATION. 
 
 
 Bacon 
 
 Gorman 
 
 Mills 
 
 Roach 
 
 Bate 
 
 Hale 
 
 Mitchell 
 
 Smith 
 
 Berry 
 
 Heitfeld 
 
 Money 
 
 Tillman 
 
 Caffery 
 
 Hoar 
 
 Murphy 
 
 Turley 
 
 Chilton 
 
 Jones (Arkansas 
 
 ) Pasco 
 
 Turner 
 
 Cockrell 
 
 Mallory 
 
 Pettigrew 
 
 Vest 
 
 Daniel 
 
 Martin 
 
 Rawlins 
 
 
 Total 27. 
 
 ABSENT AND PAIRED. 
 
 Messrs. Cannon and Wilson, for, with Mr. White, against, and Messrs. Proctor 
 and Wetmore, for, with Mr. Turpie, against. 
 
WAR LEGISLATION OF THE SENATE. 321 
 
 Thereupon, and thereby, all the Philippine Islands became 
 a part of American territory and all their people American 
 citizens, except indeed that citizens of Spain may within a 
 year preserve their allegiance to that kingdom by formal dec- 
 laration before a court of record of that intent. 
 
 The Spanish Cortes by a small majority refused its ap- 
 proval of the treaty. But this was not essential. The Queen 
 Regent's signature was affixed to it March 17, 1899, ^'""-^ ^^ 
 soon as formal exchanges of the ratification are made the war 
 with Spain will be a thing of the past. 
 
 Pending the consideration of the treaty Mr. McEnery 
 offered the following resolution : — 
 
 Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives, ete. 
 That by the ratification of the treaty of peace with Spain it is 
 not intended to incorporate the inhabitants of said islands 
 into citizenship of the United States, nor is it intended to 
 permanently annex said islands as an integral part of the 
 territory of the United States. But it is the intention of the 
 United States to establish on said islands, a government suit- 
 able to the wants and conditions of the inhabitants of said 
 islands, to prepare them for local self-government, and in due 
 time to make such disposition of said islands as will best pro- 
 mote the interests of the citizens of the United States and 
 the inhabitants of said islands. 
 
 Upon this he vainly endeavored to get a vote before the 
 treaty was ratified. Failing in this it was considered after- 
 wards, and Mr. Bacon offered the following amendment 
 which was lost by a tie vote, the Vice-President voting against 
 it. 
 
 Resolved, further, IhsX the United States hereby disclaim 
 any disposition or intention to exercise permanent sovereignty, 
 jurisdiction, or control over said islands, and assert their 
 determination, when a stable and independent government 
 shall have been erected therein, entitled in the judgment of 
 the Government of the United States to recognition as such, 
 to transfer to said government, upon terms which shall be 
 reasonable and just, all rights secured under the cession by 
 Spain, and to thereupon leave the Government and control of 
 the islands to their people. 
 
322 
 
 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR, 
 
 The vote stood as follows :- 
 
 
 
 YEAS— 29. 
 
 
 Bacon 
 
 Gorman 
 
 Lindsay 
 
 Quay 
 
 Bate 
 
 Gray 
 
 McLaurin 
 
 Rawlins 
 
 Berry 
 
 Hale 
 
 Martin 
 
 Smith 
 
 Caffery 
 
 Harris 
 
 Money 
 
 Tillman 
 
 Chilton 
 
 Heitfeld 
 
 Murphy 
 
 Turner 
 
 Clay 
 
 Hoar 
 
 Perkins 
 
 
 Cockrell 
 
 Jones (Arkansas) Pettigrew 
 
 
 Faulkner 
 
 Jones (Nevada) Pettus 
 
 
 
 
 NAYS— 29. 
 
 
 Allison 
 
 Hanna 
 
 Morgan 
 
 Simon 
 
 Burrows 
 
 Hawley 
 
 Nelson 
 
 Stewart 
 
 Carter 
 
 Kyle 
 
 Penrose 
 
 Teller 
 
 Chandler 
 
 Lodge 
 
 Piatt (Conn.) 
 
 Warren 
 
 Deboe 
 
 McBride 
 
 Piatt (New York) 
 
 Wolcott 
 
 Fairbanks 
 
 McEnery 
 
 Pritchard 
 
 
 Frye 
 
 McMillan 
 
 Ross 
 
 
 Gear 
 
 Mantle 
 
 Shoup 
 
 
 
 NOT VOTING— 32. 
 
 
 Aldrich 
 
 Davis 
 
 Mills 
 
 Thurston 
 
 Allen 
 
 Elkins 
 
 Mitchell 
 
 Turley 
 
 Baker 
 
 Foraker 
 
 Pasco 
 
 Turpie 
 
 Butler 
 
 Gallinger 
 
 Proctor 
 
 Vest 
 
 Cannon 
 
 Hansbrough 
 
 Roach 
 
 Wellington 
 
 Clark 
 
 Kenney 
 
 Sewell 
 
 Wetmore 
 
 Cullom 
 
 Mallory 
 
 Spooner 
 
 White 
 
 Daniel 
 
 Mason 
 
 Sullivan 
 
 Wilson 
 
 TheM 
 
 cEnery resolution was then adopte 
 
 :d by the f( 
 
 ing vote : 
 
 " 
 
 YEAS— 26. 
 
 
 Allison 
 
 Gear 
 
 McEnery 
 
 Pettus 
 
 Burrows 
 
 Gray 
 
 McLaurin 
 
 Piatt (N. Y.) 
 
 Chandler 
 
 Hale 
 
 McMillan 
 
 Quay 
 
 Deboe 
 
 Hanna 
 
 Mantle 
 
 Sullivan 
 
 Fairbanks 
 
 Harris 
 
 Mason 
 
 Teller 
 
 Faulkner 
 
 Kyle 
 
 Nelson 
 
 
 Frye 
 
 Lodge 
 
 Perkins 
 
 NAYS— 22. 
 
 
 Bacon 
 
 Hawley 
 
 Morgan 
 
 Simon 
 
 Bate 
 
 Hoar 
 
 Murphy 
 
 Smith 
 
 Caffery 
 
 Lindsay 
 
 Pettigrew 
 
 Stewart 
 
 Carter 
 
 McBride 
 
 Piatt (Conn.) 
 
 Warren 
 
 Clay 
 
 Martin 
 
 Rawlins 
 
 
 Cockrell 
 
 Money 
 
 Ross 
 
 
 
 NOT VOTING— 42. 
 
 
 Aldrich 
 
 Elkins 
 
 Mitchell 
 
 Turley 
 
 Allen 
 
 Foraker 
 
 Pasco 
 
 Turner 
 
 Baker 
 
 Gallinger 
 
 Penrose 
 
 Turpie 
 
 Berry 
 
 Gorman 
 
 Pritchard 
 
 Vest 
 
 Butler 
 
 Hansbrough 
 
 Proctor 
 
 Wellington 
 
 Cannon 
 
 Heitfeld 
 
 Roach 
 
 Wetmore 
 
 Chilton 
 
 Jones (Ark.) 
 
 Sewell 
 
 White 
 
 Clark 
 
 Jones (Nev. ) 
 
 Shoup 
 
 Wilson 
 
 Cullom 
 
 Kenney 
 
 Spooner 
 
 Wolcott 
 
 Daniel 
 
 Mallory 
 
 Thurston 
 
 
 Davis 
 
 Mills 
 
 Tillman 
 
 
WAR LEGISLATION OF THE SENATE. 323 
 
 This ex post facto resolution was not considered by the 
 House of Representatives, and interest in the subject had now 
 waned as it was not believed that any explanatory resolution 
 of Congress could affect the significance of a treaty negotiated 
 by the President and the Senate, and which must remain the 
 supreme law of the land until changed by competent author- 
 ity. The terms of the resolution were contradictory to the 
 terms of the treaty, and being ineffective as an amendment or 
 alteration thereof would merely indicate the vacillations of 
 opinion, without in any respect changing the situation. An- 
 nexation " for better or for worse " had taken place with all 
 its necessary consequences and no obscuration of the fact 
 could in any wise affect it. Future Congresses will receive 
 the subject as an appropriate matter for legislation, and they 
 alone can deal with it. 
 
 In closing hostilities with Spain, we succeed to problems 
 in our new possessions which only time, patience and wisdom 
 can rightly solve. The exploits of our soldiers and sailors, the 
 patriotism with which all classes and sections have sustained 
 the Government, with our tremendous exhibition of national 
 power and spirit, have made a deep impression upon the civil- 
 ized world and exalted the pride of American citizenship. 
 The relations of friendship between ourselves and the mother 
 country have been cemented, and the whole English-speak- 
 ing people has been brought into the communion of a race 
 patriotism that is full of hope and inspiration. The last ves- 
 tige of sectional legislation that grew out of our civil dissen- 
 sions was erased from our statute books and to-day there is 
 no citizen disfranchised. The President has had the satisfac- 
 tion of commissioning ex-Confederate and ex-Union soldiers 
 in our volunteer Army to fight side by side; and, as the whole 
 people have supported him, so he in turn with an equal grace 
 and magnanimity has delighted to confer trust and honor 
 without regard to the past strife of sections or present political 
 difference. A people so nobly disposed and so thoroughly 
 united may surely regard their future with confidence and 
 self-reliance, and go forth to grapple with whatever difficulty 
 confronts them, '' rejoicing as a strong man to run a race." 
 
 But we should not leave the war without reflecting upon 
 
324 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 the lesson of local self-government which it teaches. Least 
 of all the colonizing nations has Spain been able to learn it, 
 and without it she has wasted her courage and her substance 
 in vain. The discoverer and mistress of the Western world, 
 the conqueror and founder of a great European empire and 
 the possessor of many islands of the sea has no longer an acre 
 of ground on the continent which she discovered, and is 
 shrivelling up within her own borders while she feeds upon 
 bitter memories. Without conception of human rights or 
 democratic institutions, and with no regard for them when 
 forced to realize their existence, the Empire of Spain has 
 perished under the inflexible rule as to the survival of the 
 fittest — has perished because it showed itself unfit to endure. 
 
 Froude in his book on the West Indies relates that after 
 the Revolutionary War, the King and the cabinet of Great 
 Britain, fancying that other colonies would follow the example 
 of secession set by the United States and declare their inde- 
 pendence, despairingly granted them local rights and autono- 
 mous charters. To their surprise these measures appeased 
 the spirit of discontent and her colonies were drawn in closer 
 and more fraternal relations to the mother country. 
 
 The British Ambassador at the Court of France recently 
 proclaimed the beneficial influence of our independence upon 
 Great Britain as well as upon ourselves. America taught 
 the mother country a lesson. She had the wisdom and the 
 magnanimity to learn it and apply it ; and the consolidation 
 and expansion of her empire may be largely attributed to it. 
 Spain could never learn that lesson. Her mind seemed to be 
 closed and her heart hardened against it and, as she recalls 
 the dust of Columbus back to the land to which he gave a 
 continent and the dream of universal dominion, she receives 
 the last instruction from this Republic, which all nations 
 should attend, that a government which does not rest upon 
 the recognition of the rights of man and the community must 
 surely fall. 
 
 ^^ 
 
 .-^i^r^?J^:^-^.^i-^a-c^ 
 
CHAPTER XVI. 
 PROVIDING THE "SINEWS OF WAR." 
 
 BY 
 
 Ho^f. NELSON DINGLEY, Chairman Committee on Ways and Means. 
 
 IT has been justly remarked by an intelligent financial writer 
 that " the same energy and adaptation of means to ends 
 which marked the exploits of the army on the land and 
 the navy on the sea, also marked the financial administration 
 of the war with Spain." 
 
 Up to the time of the destruction of the U. S. Battleship 
 Maine in the harbor of Havana, on the 15th of February, 
 1898, the administration and the country believed that the war 
 with Spain would be averted through peaceable pressure 
 brought to bear on the Spanish ministry : and consequently 
 no preparations for an armed conflict were entered upon. 
 While the hope of a peaceful solution continued to be enter- 
 tained, pending the inquiry into the blowing up of the 
 Maine, yet the administration in the meantime quietly 
 took measures to contract for needed ammunition and supplies 
 — of which there were almost none on hand, — relying on the 
 assurances of leading members of Congress that appropria- 
 tions would be forthcoming when required. 
 
 The excitement so increased in this country, in consequence 
 of rumors that the naval board of inquiry would probably 
 find that the Maine was destroyed by external agencies, 
 that, on the 7th of March, the President summoned to the 
 White House the chairmen of the Finance Committee and 
 Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, and the chairmen 
 of the Committee on Ways and Means and Committee on Ap- 
 propriations of the House, with several other leading 
 members of both houses, to confer with him on the critical 
 condition of affairs. 
 
326 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 The conference resulted in a decision to appropriate imme- 
 diately fifty millions of dollars " for national defence." Chair- 
 man Cannon of the Committee on Appropriations, on the 
 same day, introduced in the House a joint resolution to this 
 effect, which practically unanimously passed the House on 
 March 8, and also the Senate on the next day. The object 
 in making this appropriation, which it was proposed to draw 
 from the cash balance in the Treasury, was to put the country 
 measurably in a position to enter into an armed conflict, in 
 case one could not be avoided. For this preparation, time 
 was indispensable. 
 
 With great dif^culty the armed conflict was averted for six 
 weeks, and during this time every effort was put forth partially 
 to prepare the country for war, so far as coast defences and 
 military and naval supplies were concerned. Before these 
 preparations could be adequately made, the report of the 
 Naval Board of Inquiry on the destruction of the Maine, the 
 detailed statements of visiting Senators and Representatives 
 as to the fearful condition of the reconcentrados in Cuba, and 
 the apparent indifference of Spain to the situation, so stirred 
 public sentiment in this country that Congress on April 19 
 passed a joint resolution, approved by the President on the 
 succeeding day, directing armed intervention, if necessary, to 
 end the unbearable situation in the Island of Cuba, and secure 
 the independence of the people of that country. 
 
 The President on the same day, April 20, presented this 
 ultimatum to Spain, and the Spanish Minister accepted it as 
 a declaration of war, and immediately demanded and was 
 given his passports, notwithstanding the President had allowed 
 Spain till April 23 to reply. April 25 the two houses of 
 Congress passed a joint resolution formally declaring war 
 against Spain. 
 
 For ten days previous to this culmination, the majority 
 members of the House Ways and Means Committee, after 
 conference with the President and Secretary of the Treasury, 
 had been giving their attention to the preparation of a bill 
 " to provide ways and means to meet war expenditures." 
 This bill was introduced in the House by Chairman Dingley 
 on the 23d of April — the day of the expiration of the ultima- 
 
PROVIDING THE SINEWS OF WAR. 327 
 
 turn to Spain — and referred to the Ways and Means Commit- 
 tee. The Committee on Ways and Means, after considering 
 the bill April 25 and 26, ordered it reported ; and on the 
 latter day Chairman Dingley reported it to the House. 
 
 The bill was based on the estimates of the officials of the 
 war and navy departments, that the war would cost about 
 $50,000,000 per month. It was thought desirable not only 
 as a measure of precaution, but also as a potent factor in 
 creating the impression in Spain and Europe that this country 
 had the ability and disposition to push the war with the 
 utmost energy, to provide the means for carrying it on for at 
 least one year, in case it should continue that length of time; 
 and to impose such additional internal taxes, making use in 
 part of the stamp taxes levied from 1864 to 1872, as would 
 strengthen the credit of the government by providing means 
 for paying the interest and gradually extinguishing the prin- 
 cipal of necessary loans. 
 
 The bill, as reported, provided for additional internal taxes, 
 estimated to yield about $90,000,000 per annum, of which 
 $33,000,000, it was estimated, would come from doubling the 
 tax of $1 per barrel on fermented liquors, $15,000,000 from 
 doubling the 6 cents per pound tax on tobacco and increasing 
 the tax on cigars and cigarettes, $5,000,000 from the imposition 
 of a special tax on dealers in tobacco and cigars, $2,000,000 
 from an increase in the tax on tonnage in the foreign trade, 
 and $38,000,000 from a documentary and proprietary stamp 
 tax, based substantially on the stamp-tax acts enacted near 
 the close of the War of the Rebellion. 
 
 To provide whatever additional means might be required 
 to prosecute the war, the Secretary of the Treasury was 
 authorized to borrow on the credit of the United States, from 
 time to time, whatever amount should be required, not to 
 exceed five hundred millions, and to issue therefor ten-twenty, 
 three per cent bonds, to be offered at par as a popular 
 loan. 
 
 An important section was added, not as a war measure but 
 as a permanent provision to guard against any temporary 
 deficiency of revenue in the future, authorizing the Secretary 
 of the Treasury to issue one-year three per cent certificates of 
 
328 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 indebtedness, not exceeding one hundred millions to be out- 
 standing at any one time — the object being to provide means 
 to meet any temporary insufficiency of revenue to pay current 
 expenditures, and thus avoid either bankruptcy or the neces- 
 sity of using for this purpose the greenback redemption fund, 
 or (what is the same thing) the demand notes which have 
 been presented and redeemed, a necessity which from 1893 to 
 1896 created the " endless chain " that came so near resulting 
 in serious disaster. 
 
 The bill was taken up for consideration in the House April 
 27, and, by agreement, was debated in the committee of the 
 whole for three days, and on the last day was opened to 
 amendment. 
 
 The opposition to the bill was directed almost entirely 
 against the section authorizing the Secretary of the Treasury 
 to borrow whatever amounts might be required, outside of 
 the revenue for war taxes, to meet the expenditures of the 
 war. The opponents contended that instead of borrowing 
 and issuing interest-bearing obligations therefor, more revenue 
 should be raised by an income tax, and that the so-called 
 " seigniorage " of the silver bullion of the Treasury, estimated 
 to amount to $42,000,000, should be utilized by using that 
 amount of silver certificates against it ; and $150,000,000 addi- 
 tional U. S. demand notes or greenbacks should be issued, 
 through which means, it was contended, the people could be 
 relieved of the burden of interest-bearing obligations. 
 
 To these contentions the friends of the bill replied, that, 
 inasmuch as the Supreme Court of the United States had 
 decided that a Federal income tax is unconstitutional, unless 
 imposed on the basis of population — a condition which made 
 such a tax impracticable — the income-tax plan was a proposi- 
 tion to remand the government for means to carry on the war 
 to the proceeds of a law suit already decided against us ; that 
 the silver " seigniorage " idea ignored the fact that there can 
 be no seigniorage or profit in coinage until coinage actually 
 takes place ; and that the proposition to issue additional 
 demand notes or greenbacks, without providing the means 
 for their payment, rests on the " fiat " idea of money, and has 
 been shown by experience to be not only mischievous and 
 
PROVIDING THE SINEWS OF WAR. 
 
 329 
 
 daneerous, but in the end the costliest finance to which our 
 people was ever subjected. 
 
 The income-tax amendment was defeated by a vote of 171 
 to 134; the silver " seigniorage " amendment was ruled out 
 on a point of order; and the additional greenback amend- 
 ment was lost by a vote of 147 to 106. 
 
 All amendments offered, except such as were presented by 
 the Committee on Ways and Means, were rejected, and April 
 29 the bill passed the House by a vote of 181 to 131, " pre- 
 sent " I, not voting and paired 42 ; as follows : 
 
 YEAS— iSi. 
 
 Acheson, 
 
 Adams, 
 
 Aldrich, 
 
 Alexander, 
 
 Arnold, 
 
 Babcock, 
 
 Baker, Md., 
 
 Barham, 
 
 Barney, 
 
 Barrows, 
 
 Bartholdt, 
 
 Beach, 
 
 Belden, 
 
 Belford, 
 
 Belknap, 
 
 Bennett, 
 
 Bingham, 
 
 Bishop, 
 
 Booze, 
 
 Boutell, 111., 
 
 Boutelle, Me., 
 
 Brewster, 
 
 Broderick, 
 
 Broniwell, 
 
 Brown, 
 
 Brownlow, 
 
 Ihumm, 
 
 Bull, 
 
 lUirleigh, 
 
 lUirton, 
 
 r.utler, 
 
 Cannon, 
 
 Cajiron, 
 
 Cliickering, 
 
 Clark, Iowa., 
 
 Connell, 
 ""Cooper, Wis., 
 
 Corliss, 
 
 Cousins, 
 
 Crump, 
 
 Crumpacker, 
 
 Cummiitgs, 
 
 Curtis, Iowa, 
 -Curtis, Kans., 
 
 Dalzell, 
 
 Danford, 
 
 Davidson, Wis., 
 
 Davison, Ky., 
 
 Dayton, 
 
 Dingley, 
 
 Dolliver, 
 
 Dorr, 
 
 Dovener, 
 
 Driggs, 
 
 Eddy, 
 
 Ellis, 
 
 Evans, 
 
 Faris, 
 
 Fenton, 
 
 Fischer, 
 
 Fitzgerald, 
 
 Fletcher, 
 
 Foote, 
 
 Foss, 
 
 Fowler, N. J., 
 
 Gardner, 
 
 Gibson, 
 
 Gillet, N. Y., 
 
 Graff, 
 
 Griffin, 
 
 Grosvenor, 
 
 Grout, 
 
 Grow, 
 
 Hager, 
 
 Hamilton, 
 
 Harmer, 
 
 Hawley, 
 
 Heatwole, 
 
 Hemenway, 
 
 Henderson, 
 
 Henry, Conn., 
 
 Henry, Ind., 
 
 Hepburn, 
 
 Hicks, 
 
 Hilborn, 
 
 Hill, 
 
 Hitt, 
 
 Hooker, 
 
 Hopkins, 
 
 Howe, 
 
 Howell, 
 
 Hull, 
 
 Jenkins, 
 Johnson, Ind., 
 Johnson, N. Dak., 
 
 Joy, 
 
 Kerr, 
 
 Ketcham, 
 
 Kirkpatrick, 
 
 Knox, 
 
 Kulp, 
 
 Lacey, 
 
 Landis, 
 
 Lawrence, 
 
 Littauer, 
 
 Loud, 
 
 Loudenslager, 
 
 Levering, 
 
 Low, 
 
 Lybrand, 
 
 McAlcer, 
 
 McCall, 
 
 McCleary, 
 
 McChllait, 
 
 McDonald, 
 
 McEwan, 
 
 Mclntire, 
 
 Mahon, 
 
 Marsh, 
 
 Mercer, 
 
 Mesick, 
 
 Miller, 
 
 Mills, 
 
 Minor, 
 
 Mitchell, 
 
 Moody, 
 
 Morris, 
 
 Mudd, 
 
 Northway, 
 
 Olmsted, 
 
 Otjen, 
 
 Overstreet, 
 
 Parker, N. J., 
 
 Payne, 
 
 Pearce, Mo., 
 
 Pitney, 
 
 Powers, 
 
 Pugh, 
 
 Ray, 
 
 Reeves, 
 
 Robbins, 
 
 Royse, 
 
 Russell, 
 
 Sauerhering, 
 
 Shannon, 
 
 Shattuc, 
 
 Sherman, 
 
 Showalter, 
 
 Smith, 111., 
 
 Smith, S. W., 
 
 Smith, Wm. Alden, 
 
 Southard, 
 
 Southwick, 
 
 Spalding, 
 
 Sperry, 
 
 Sprague, 
 
 Steele, 
 
 Stevens, Minn., 
 
 Stewart, N. J., 
 
 Stewart, Wis , 
 
 Stone, C. W., 
 
 Stone, W. A., 
 
 Strode, Nebr., 
 
 Sturtevant, 
 
 Sulloway, 
 
 Tawney, 
 
 Tayler, Ohio, 
 
 Tongue, 
 
 Updegraff, 
 
 Van Voorhis, 
 
 Wadsworth, 
 
 Walker, Mass., 
 
 Walker, Va., 
 
 Wanger, 
 
 Ward, 
 
 Weaver, 
 
 Wheeler, Ala., 
 
 White, 111., 
 
 Williams, Pa., 
 
 Wise, 
 
 Young. 
 
33° 
 
 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 Adamsbn, 
 
 Bailey, 
 
 Baker, III., 
 
 Ball, 
 
 Bankhead, 
 
 Barlow, 
 
 Bartletty 
 
 Bell, 
 
 Henner, 
 
 Benton, 
 
 Berry, 
 
 Bland, 
 
 Bodine, 
 
 Bodkin, 
 
 Bradley, 
 
 Brantley, 
 
 Bretmer, Ohio, 
 
 Brewer, 
 
 Broussard, 
 
 Briicker, 
 
 Brimdidge, 
 
 Btirke, 
 
 Carniack, 
 
 Castle, 
 
 Clardy, 
 
 Clark, Mo., 
 
 Clayton, 
 
 Cochran, Mo., 
 
 Cooncy, 
 
 Cooper, Tex., 
 
 Cozvherd, 
 
 Cox, 
 
 Davey, 
 
 Allen, 
 
 Barber, 
 
 Barrett, 
 
 Brosius, 
 
 Campbell, 
 
 Catchiii^s, 
 
 Clarke,' N. H., 
 
 Cochrane, N. Y., 
 
 Codding, 
 
 Colson, 
 
 Connolly, 
 
 Davis, 
 
 De Armond, 
 
 De Graifeureid, 
 
 De Vries, 
 
 Dinsmorey 
 
 Dockery, 
 
 Elliott, 
 
 Fitzpatrick, 
 
 Fleming, 
 
 Fowler, N. C^ 
 Fox, 
 
 Gaines, 
 
 Greene, 
 
 Griffith, 
 
 Griggs, 
 
 GUNN, 
 
 Handy, 
 
 Hartman, 
 
 Hay, 
 
 Henry, Miss., 
 
 Henry, Tex., 
 
 Howard, Ala,, 
 
 Hoivard, Ga., 
 
 Hunter, 
 
 Jones, Va., 
 
 Jones, Wash., 
 
 Kelly, 
 
 Kitlg, 
 
 Kit chin, 
 
 Kleberg, 
 
 Knowles, 
 
 Lamb, 
 
 Lanham, 
 
 NAYS— 131. 
 
 Latimer, 
 
 Lentz, 
 
 Lester, 
 
 Lezuis, Ga., 
 
 Lewis, Wash., 
 
 Linney, 
 
 Little, 
 
 Livingston, 
 
 Lloyd, 
 
 Lozie, 
 
 McCORMiCK, 
 
 McCidloch, 
 
 McDo7vell, 
 
 McMillin, 
 
 McRae, 
 
 Maddox, 
 
 Mac^iiire, 
 
 Martin, 
 
 Maxwell, 
 
 Meyer, La., 
 
 Miers, Ind., 
 
 Moon, 
 
 Norton, Ohio., 
 
 Norton, S. C, 
 
 Ogden, 
 
 Osborne, 
 
 Otcy, 
 
 Peters, 
 
 Pierce, Tenn., 
 
 Rhea, 
 
 Richardson, 
 
 R IDG ELY, 
 
 Rixey, 
 
 ANSWERED "PRESENT"— I. 
 Baird. 
 NOT VOTING— 42. 
 
 Cranford, 
 Davenport, 
 Ertnentront, 
 Gillett, Mass., 
 Hinrichsen, 
 Hurley, 
 Jetf, 
 Lorimer, 
 Mahany, 
 Mann, 
 Marshall, 
 
 Mcekison, 
 
 New LANDS, 
 
 Odell, 
 
 Packer, Pa., 
 
 Pearson, 
 
 Perkins, 
 
 Prince, 
 
 Shelden, 
 
 Snover, 
 
 Strait, 
 
 Robb, 
 
 Robertson, La., 
 Robinson, Ind., 
 Sayers, 
 Settle, 
 Shafroth, 
 Shuford, 
 Simpson, 
 Sims, 
 Skinner, 
 Slayden, 
 Smith, Ky., 
 Sparkman, 
 Stallings, 
 Stark, 
 
 Stephens, Tex.y 
 Stokes, 
 
 Strowd, N. C, 
 Sullivan, 
 Sttlzer, 
 
 Sutherland, 
 —S'Manson, 
 
 Talbert, 
 
 Taylor, Ala,, 
 
 Thorp, 
 
 Underwood, 
 
 Vandiver, 
 
 Vehslage, 
 
 Vincent, 
 
 Wheeler, Ky., 
 
 Wilson, 
 Zenor. 
 
 Tate, 
 
 Terrv, 
 Todd, 
 Warner, 
 Weymouth, 
 White, N. C, 
 Wilber, 
 
 Williams, Miss.y 
 Yost. 
 
 Republicans in Roman ; Democrats in Italics ; Populists and Silver men in 
 Small Caps. 
 
 The bill went to the Senate April 30, and was referred to 
 the Senate Committee on Finance. A majority of this com- 
 mittee, composed of six Democrats and one Populist, re- 
 ported back the bill, May 12, with the bond and certificate 
 provisions stricken out, and amendments for the issue of one 
 hundred and fifty millions of new greenbacks, and the im- 
 
PROVIDING THE SINEWS OF WAR. 331 
 
 mediate coinage of forty-two millions of so-called seignior- 
 age from the silver bullion in the Treasury and the issue of 
 silver certificates thereon ; while the five Republicans of 
 the committee, composing a minority, reported in favor of the 
 retention of the House provisions for the issue of certificates 
 of indebtedness and bonds, reducing the amount of the latter 
 to three hundred millions. 
 
 Both the majority and minority of the Finance Committee 
 concurred in reporting amendments to the House bill giving a 
 rebate of 7i per cent, on sales of beer stamps, striking out the 
 special tax on dealers in tobacco and the tax on tonnage, 
 slightly reducing the proposed House rate on cigars and cigar- 
 ettes, levying a special annual tax on bankers, brokers, pro- 
 prietors of circuses etc., theatres, billiard and pool rooms ; and 
 imposing a tax on inheritances and legacies in estates exceed- 
 ing ten thousand dollars, and on refineries of oil and sugar 
 producing more than two hundred and fifty thousand dollars 
 annually ; and also providing for a stamp tax on bills of lading, 
 and on sleeping and parlor car tickets ; with other amend- 
 ments of an immaterial character. 
 
 The new internal taxes proposed by the amendments re- 
 ported by the Senate Finance Committee, were estimated by 
 them to produce fifty millions additional to those provided by 
 the House bill, nine millions of which it was estimated would 
 be derived from the legacy and succession tax, five millions 
 from the special taxes on brokers etc., and thirty millions from 
 the additional stamp taxes, raising the stamp taxes, as the 
 Committee estimated, to sixty-eight millions, and as the two 
 House taxes proposed to be dropped (the tax on dealers in 
 tobacco and the tax on tonnage) aggregated seven millions, the 
 net increase over the House bill was estimated at forty-three 
 millions. 
 
 The bill was taken up in the Senate May 16 for discussion 
 and amendment. The House bond and certificate of indebt- 
 edness provisions, offered by the minority of the Senate 
 Finance Committee, were restored by a vote of 45 to 31 ; the 
 greenback amendment, reported by the majority of the 
 Finance Committee, was defeated by a vote of 45 to 31 ; the 
 seigniorage amendment, somewhat modified, was adopted by 
 
3i2 
 
 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 a vote of 48 to 31 ; and all the other amendments reported by 
 the Committee were adopted by the Senate. 
 
 An amendment offered by Mr. Tillman, of South Carolina, 
 imposing a duty of ten cents per pound on tea — the only 
 tariff provision in the bill — was adopted by a vote of 48 to 32. 
 
 On June 4 the bill, as amended, passed the Senate by a 
 vote of 48 to 28, and 13 not voting and paired, as follows: 
 
 Aldrich, 
 
 Allison, 
 
 Baker, 
 
 Burrows, 
 
 Caffc-ry, 
 
 Carter, 
 
 Chandler, 
 
 Clark, 
 
 Davis, 
 
 Deboe, 
 
 Elkins, 
 
 Fairbanks, 
 
 Allen, 
 
 Bacon, 
 
 Bate, 
 
 Berry, 
 
 Butler, 
 
 Cannon, 
 
 Chilton, 
 
 Cullom. 
 Faulkner, 
 Gray, 
 Koincy, 
 
 
 YEAS— 48. 
 
 
 Foraker, 
 
 Lodge, 
 
 Piatt, N. Y., 
 
 Frye, 
 
 McBride, 
 
 Pritchard, 
 
 Gallinger, 
 
 McEnery, 
 
 Sevvell, 
 
 Gear, 
 
 McMillan, 
 
 Shoup, 
 
 Gonnan, 
 
 Mantle, 
 
 Spooner, 
 
 Hale, 
 
 Mason, 
 
 Thurston, 
 
 Hanna, 
 
 Mitchell, 
 
 Turpie, 
 
 Hansbrough, 
 
 Morrill, 
 
 Warren, 
 
 Hawley, 
 
 Murphy, 
 
 Wellington, 
 
 Hoar, 
 
 Nelson, 
 
 Wetmore, 
 
 Kyle, 
 
 Perkins, 
 
 Wilson, 
 
 Lindsay, 
 
 Piatt, Conn., 
 NAYS— 28. 
 
 Wolcott. 
 
 Clay, 
 
 McLaiirin, 
 
 Rawlins, 
 
 Cockrell, 
 
 Mallory, 
 
 Roach, 
 
 Datiiel, 
 
 Martin, 
 
 Stewart, 
 
 Harris, 
 
 Money, 
 
 Sullivan, 
 
 Heitfeld, 
 
 Pasco, 
 
 Tilltnan, 
 
 Jones, Ark., 
 
 Pettigrew, 
 
 Ttirley, 
 
 Jones, Nev., 
 
 Pettns, 
 
 White. 
 
 NOT VOTING— 13. 
 
 
 Mills, 
 
 Quay, 
 
 Vest. 
 
 Morgan, 
 
 Smith, 
 
 
 Penrose, 
 
 Teller, 
 
 
 Proctor, 
 
 Turner, 
 
 
 Republicans in Roman ; Democrats in Italics; and Populists and Silver men in 
 Small Caps. 
 
 The bill as amended by the Senate was promptly non- 
 concurred in by the House, and sent to a conference by the 
 vote of the two Houses on June 6. 
 
 The conferees were Senators Allison, Aldrich and Jones of 
 Arkansas, on the part of the Senate ; and Representatives 
 Dingley, Payne and Bailey, on the part of the House. 
 
 The conferees met on the same day in the Senate Finance 
 Committee room, and daily thereafter till June 9, on which 
 day the Republican majority of the Senate and House confer- 
 ees reached a final agreement. 
 
 The conference report was presented in the House by 
 
PROVIDING THE SINEWS OF WAR. 
 
 333 
 
 Chairman Dingley at 5 o'clock P. M, of the same day, and 
 after a debate of three hours (a recess to 8 o'clock having 
 been taken after the reading of the report) was agreed to by 
 the House at i r.30 o'clock P. M., by a vote of 154 to 107 — the 
 division running on the same lines as those shown in the 
 passage of the original bill. 
 
 The Senate took up the conference report the next day 
 (June 10), and agreed to it at 5 P. M. by a vote of 43 to 22, 
 and 24 not voting and paired, as follows : 
 
 YEAS-43. 
 
 Aklricli, 
 
 "Fairbanks, 
 
 Lindsay, 
 
 Perkins, 
 
 Allison, 
 
 Foraker, 
 
 McBride, 
 
 Piatt, Conn., 
 
 Baker, 
 
 Frye, 
 
 McEnery, 
 
 Pritchard, 
 
 Burrows, 
 
 Gallinger, 
 
 Mantle, 
 
 Quay, 
 
 Caffery, 
 
 Gear, 
 
 Mason, 
 
 Shoup, 
 
 Carter, 
 
 Gorman, 
 
 Mitchell, 
 
 Tnrpie, 
 
 Chandler, 
 
 Hanna, 
 
 Morgan, 
 
 Warren, 
 
 Clark, 
 
 Hansbrough, 
 
 Morrill, 
 
 Wellington, 
 
 Cullom, 
 
 Hawley, 
 
 Alurphy, 
 
 Wilson, 
 
 Deboe, 
 
 Hoar, 
 
 Nelson, 
 
 Wolcott. 
 
 Elkins, 
 
 Kyle, 
 
 Penrose, 
 
 NAYS— 22. 
 
 
 Bacon, 
 
 Cockrell, 
 
 Martin, 
 
 Rawlins, 
 
 Bate, 
 
 Daniel, 
 
 Mills, 
 
 Reach, 
 
 Butler, 
 
 Heitfeld, 
 
 Money, 
 
 Sullivan, 
 
 Cannon, 
 
 Jones, Ark., 
 
 Pasco, 
 
 Teller. 
 
 C hilt oily 
 
 Jones, Nev., 
 
 Pettigrew, 
 
 
 Clay, 
 
 McLaurin, 
 
 Pettus, 
 
 
 
 NOT VOTING— 24. 
 
 
 Allen, 
 
 Ha7-ris, 
 
 Proctor, 
 
 Tillman, 
 
 Berry, 
 
 Ketiney, 
 
 Sevvell, 
 
 Pnrley, 
 
 Davis, 
 
 Lodge, 
 
 Smith, 
 
 Tttrner, 
 
 Faulkner, 
 
 McMillan, 
 
 Spooner, 
 
 Vest, 
 
 Gray, 
 
 Mallory, 
 
 Stewart, 
 
 Wetmore, 
 
 Hale, 
 
 Piatt, N. Y., 
 
 Thurston, 
 
 White. 
 
 Republicans in Roman ; Democrats in Italics ; and Populists and Silver men in 
 Small Caps. 
 
 The act to " provide ways and means to meet war expendi- 
 tures," as finally agreed to by both houses, and approved by 
 the President on June 13, provided for the increase of the 
 internal tax on fermented liquors to two dollars per barrel, 
 with a discount of ']\ per cent on stamps purchased — making 
 the tax practically $1.85 per barrel ; for the increase of the 
 internal tax on tobacco to 12 cents per lb., with an increase 
 to $3.60 per thousand on cigars and cigarettes weighing more 
 than three pounds per thousand, to one dollar per thousand 
 
334 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 on cigars weighing less, and to $1.50 per thousand on cigar- 
 ettes weighing not more than three pounds per thousand; for 
 special annual taxes, after July i, on bankers, brokers, pawn- 
 brokers, proprietors of theatres, museums and concert halls in 
 cities of over twenty-five thousand population, proprietors or 
 agents of circuses and other public exhibitions for money, 
 and proprietors of bowling alleys and billiard tables, and on 
 certain manufacturers of and wholesale dealers in tobacco — 
 retail dealers in tobacco and cigars being exempted ; for stamp 
 taxes after July i on certain specified certificates, documents 
 and other instruments, including checks, bills of lading issued 
 by railroads, express companies and other common carriers, 
 telegraph and long-distance telephone messages, sleeping and 
 parlor car tickets, insurance policies, medicinal proprietary 
 articles and preparations, chewing gum and bottled wine ; for 
 excise taxes on refiners of sugar or petroleum on the gross 
 amount of their business in excess of $250,000; for an excise 
 tax on legacies and distributive shares of personal property, 
 where such property shall exceed the value of ten thousand 
 dollars ; and for an excise tax on manufacturers of mixed flour 
 for the purpose of securing the marking of the same. 
 
 The only tariff provision in the bill was one imposing a 
 duty of ten cents per pound on tea imported after the passage 
 of the act, which was estimated to yield ten millions annually. 
 The Senate amendment for the coinage of the so-called 
 "seigniorage" of silver bullion in the Treasury was dropped, 
 and a provision simply reciting the coinage clause of the 
 unrepealed provisions of the silver purchase act of 1890, as 
 it is being executed, substituted for it. 
 
 The uncertain elements in the estimates of the revenue that 
 would be secured by the internal-revenue provisions of the 
 War-Revenue Act, lay in the receipts from the stamp taxes, 
 which were variously estimated, and from the tax on inheri- 
 tances and legacies, which were estimated b}'- the Senate 
 Finance Committee at nine millions per annum. The lowest 
 estimate of the aggregate war revenue was nine millions per 
 month, or $108,000,000 per annum, and the highest twelve 
 and one-half millions, or $150,000,000 per annum, with ten 
 millions per annum additional from the customs duty on tea. 
 
PROVIDING THE SINEWS OF WAR. 335 
 
 The receipts from the internal-revenue provisions of the 
 War-Revenue Act (additional to the revenue derived from the 
 internal taxes levied by previous laws), based on the receipts 
 for the first three months, are estimated by the Commissioner 
 of Internal Revenue for the fiscal year which will end June 
 30, 1899, as follows : 
 
 From Tobacco etc. ..... $16,000,000 
 
 From Fermented Liquors etc. . . . 33,000,000 
 
 From Stamp Taxes, Schedules A & B . . 40,000,000 
 From Special Annual Taxes on Bankers etc. 7,000,000 
 From Legacies and Successions . . . 3,600,000 
 From Gross Receipts of Refineries. . . 400,000 
 
 $100,000,000 
 
 Note. The receipts from legacies the first three months were only $375,337, but after 
 sufficient time has elapsed to close up estates of persons deceased since July ist, 1898, it is 
 believed the tax on gross receipts will be more than the estimate. 
 
 The full text of the two sections of the War-Revenue Act, 
 authorizing the issue of bonds and of certificates of indebted- 
 ness, is as follows : 
 
 Sec. 32. That the Secretary of the Treasury is authorized 
 to borrow from time to time, at a rate of interest not exceed- 
 ing three per centum per annum, such sum or sums as, in his 
 judgment, may be necessary to meet public expenditures, and 
 to issue therefor certificates of indebtedness in such form as 
 he may prescribe and in denominations of fifty dollars or 
 some multiple of that sum ; and each certificate so issued 
 shall be payable, with the interest accrued thereon, at such 
 time, not exceeding one year from the date of its issue, as the 
 Secretary of the Treasury may prescribe : Provided, That the 
 amount of such certificates outstanding shall at no time 
 exceed one hundred millions of dollars ; and the provisions of 
 existing law respecting counterfeiting and other fraudulent 
 practices are hereby extended to the bonds and certificates of 
 indebtedness authorized by this act. 
 
 Sec. 33. That the Secretary of the Treasury is hereby 
 authorized to borrow, on the credit of the United States, from 
 time to time, as the proceeds may be required to defray 
 expenditures authorized on account of the existing war (such 
 proceeds when received to be used only for the purpose of 
 meeting such war expenditures), the sum of four hundred 
 
336 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 million dollars, or so much thereof as may be necessary, and 
 to prepare and issue therefor, coupon or registered bonds of 
 the United States in such form as he may prescribe, and in 
 denominations of twenty dollars or some multiple of that 
 sum, redeemable in coin at the pleasure of the United States 
 after ten years from the date of their issue, and payable 
 twenty years from such date, and bearing interest payable 
 quarterly in coin at the rate of three per centum per annum ; 
 and the bonds herein authorized shall be exempt from ail 
 taxes or duties of the United States, as well as from taxation 
 in any form by or under State, municipal or local authority : 
 Provided, That the bonds authorized by this section shall be 
 first offered at par as a popular loan under such regulations, 
 prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury, as will give 
 opportunity to the citizens of the United States to participate 
 in the subscriptions to such loan, and in allotting said bonds 
 the several subscriptions of individuals shall be first accepted, 
 and the subscriptions for the lowest amounts shall be first 
 allotted : Provided furtJier, That any portion of any issue of 
 said bonds not subscribed for as above provided may be dis- 
 posed of by the Secretary of the Treasury at not less than 
 par, under such regulations as he may prescribe, but no com- 
 missions shall be allowed or paid thereon ; and a sum not 
 exceeding one-tenth of one per centum of the amount of the 
 bonds and certificates herein authorized is hereby appropriated 
 out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, 
 to pay the expense of preparing, advertising and issuing the 
 same. 
 
 In view of the fact that Congress had either appropriated, 
 or proposed to appropriate, $361,000,000 to provide for the 
 expenditures of the war up to January i, 1899, in response to 
 the estimates of the war and navy officials ; and in view of 
 the further fact that the war revenue up to that time would 
 not be likely to exceed fifty-five millions, and the available cash 
 balance in the Treasury (exclusive of the one hundred millions 
 greenback redemption fund and the fifty million working 
 balance required for the operations of the Treasury), would 
 not exceed seventy millions more — leaving a balance of at 
 least two hundred and thirty millions of the appropriations 
 
PROVIDING THE SINEWS OF WAR. 337 
 
 to be provided for, Secretary of the Treasury Gage thought 
 it wise, immediately after the approval of the War-Revenue 
 Act, to take measures to invite popular subscriptions for 
 two hundred millions of the three per cent bonds authorized 
 to be issued and sold. 
 
 There were many financiers who pointed to the fact that 
 the four per cent loan of 1925 was then selling in the market 
 at a premium which netted three and a quarter per cent 
 interest to the investor, and to the further fact that the 
 war-revenue law practically withdrew the proposed loan 
 from the competition of large investors, by providing that 
 " in allotting said bonds the several subscriptions of indi- 
 viduals shall be first accepted, and the subscriptions for the 
 lowest amounts shall be first allotted," and doubtfully shook 
 their heads at the possibility of placing a loan of two 
 hundred millions bearing only three per cent interest, with- 
 out the payment of a single dollar in commissions, and with 
 the expenditure of less than one-tenth of one per cent for 
 clerical help, stationery, engraving and printing and distrib- 
 uting. 
 
 The success of the loan went far beyond the expectations 
 of the most sanguine believers in the patriotism and ability of 
 our people, and contributed powerful)}^ to impress on Spain 
 and on Europe a profound conviction of the unity of our 
 people in support of the war, and of the unlimited extent of 
 our resources. 
 
 Notwithstanding subscriptions were limited to thirty days, 
 yet when the loan closed on the afternoon of July 14, tenders 
 had been made by about 320,000 persons for $1,394,000,000, 
 or nearly seven times the amount offered. 
 
 The popular character of the tenders is shown by the fact 
 that there were 230,000 subscriptions for $500 or less — a large 
 number for $20, $40 and $50 — amounting in the aggregate to 
 $101,000,000, or more than half the entire loan; while the 
 other $99,000,000 was taken by about 70,000 subscribers, no 
 one of whom received over $4,500. Not a single syndicate or 
 corporation or individual subscribing for over $4,500, was able 
 to obtain a dollar of the loan. 
 
 It is probable that the remarkable success of this popular 
 
338 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 loan was as potent a factor in bringing the war to an early 
 and successful close as a victory on the land or the sea. 
 
 The war was much shorter than was anticipated, and for 
 the first time in our history less costly than was estimated by 
 the War and Navy Departments and appropriated for by 
 Congress. The estimates and appropriations up to January 
 I, 1899, were $361,000,000, to meet which $325,000,000 were 
 provided ; while the actual expenditures up to that time were 
 only $200,000,000, or $220,000,000 including the amount 
 which it is proposed to pay Spain for improvements in the 
 Philippines, leaving a balance in the Treasury of about $roo,- 
 000,000 (in addition to the greenback redemption fund and a 
 working balance of $50,000,000) to meet the extraordinary 
 expenditures in excess of the war revenue necessitated for 
 some time by the new responsibilities imposed upon us by 
 the successful results of the war. 
 
from a photograph bv Purdj of Uo3ton, Copyright 1397 
 
CHAPTER XVII. 
 THE NAVY DEPARTMENT IN THE WAR. 
 
 BY 
 
 Hon. JOHN D. LONG, Secretary of the Navy, 
 
 OUR new navy, which has come out of the war witn Spain 
 with so much credit and renown, dates from the ad- 
 ministration of President Arthur, when Mr. Chandler 
 was Secretaiy of the Navy. The first ships were the Chicago, 
 Atlanta, Boston, and Dolphin. John Roach builded, not 
 better than he knew, but apparently better than anybody else 
 knew. He and Secretary Chandler not only laid the founda- 
 tion of our present magnificent navy, but gave an impulse to 
 iron naval ship building in this country which has resulted in 
 the creation of American ship yards capable of turning out as 
 good work as any in the world. An infelicitous attempt was 
 made to discredit the little DolpJiin as " structurally weak," but 
 she has circumnavigated the globe and has come out of the 
 recent war equal to every demand and sound as a nut. 
 
 Secretary Whitney, with continuing ability and foresight, 
 enlarged the work which was begun under Mr. Chandler, and 
 was followed in the same lines by Secretaries Tracy and Her- 
 bert, each adding to the number of our war ships and develop- 
 ing in every way our naval power. 
 
 When I entered upon my duties in March, 1897, the Navy, 
 though not large compared with the navies of one or two foreign 
 powers, was well equipped and well prepared. A high pro- 
 fessional spirit animated its officers ; the Bureaus and leading 
 naval stations were officered by chiefs alive to their responsi- 
 bilities, zealous and progressive. It is fair to say that after 
 the last above named date no new life or force was infused 
 into the administration of the Navy. These were already 
 there. The fleets went on, as during the year before, in the 
 
340 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 gunnery and target practice and manoeuvres at sea. They 
 were supplied at home and abroad with ammunition, coal, 
 medical and other supplies, so that they were ready for any 
 emergency, and the credit of their substantial preparedness 
 when war came belongs to no one man nor to any one year. 
 
 And yet it was the preparation of a small Navy, almost 
 pathetically small as compared, for instance, with that of Great 
 Britain. It had seen no war service ; its battleships, gunboats 
 and torpedo boats were untried. To appreciate the situation 
 we must forget the glory and confidence felt in it everywhere 
 to-day and remember that a year ago it had very little popular 
 hold. At the first muttering of the storm with Spain, it was 
 an open question whether her naval power was not equal to 
 our own. She had ships of the finest and most recent naval 
 construction ; she had gallant and educated officers and brave 
 seamen ; she had ready access to every resource which the 
 skill of Europe could supply in the way of naval construction, 
 armament and ammunition. It was with a consciousness of 
 these facts on our part that, when the possibility of war 
 became apparent, the work of providing for its exigencies, 
 which had been begun and carried on so well already under 
 the ordinary conditions of past years, was continued strenu- 
 ously and earnestly by the same agencies to meet the 
 extraordinary demands which war would bring. 
 
 As early as January, 1898, the increasing tension of our 
 relations with Spain put the Navy Department on its guard. 
 The fleet in Atlantic waters had been largely engaged during 
 the previous years in enforcing the neutrality laws, and great 
 vigilance had been exercised in preventing the fitting out and 
 departure of filibustering expeditions from our coast. Recog- 
 nizing the importance of retaining experienced enlisted men 
 in the service, the Commander-in-Chief of the European 
 station was directed, on the nth day of January, 1898, not to 
 discharge men whose enlistments were about to expire. This 
 was probably the first important order given in contemplation 
 of war. On January 17, the Commander-in-Chief of the South 
 Atlantic station was informed of the critical condition of our 
 relations with Spain and directed to proceed with the Cincin- 
 nati and Castiiie from Montevideo to Para, Brazil. On the 
 
THE NAVY DEPARTMENT IN THE WAR. 341 
 
 same day, the Helena, then on her way to the Asiatic station, 
 was ordered to await instructions at Lisbon ; and the Wil- 
 mington, on her way to the South Atlantic station, was 
 ordered to await instructions in the West Indies. On January 
 26, the Commander-in-Chief of the European station was 
 ordered to assemble his squadron at Lisbon, and on the next 
 day the Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic station was ordered 
 to retain the men whose enlistments were about to expire. 
 
 For several years prior to the incoming of the present 
 Administration, it had been the policy of our Government to 
 refrain from sending naval vessels to Cuban waters. This 
 policy was now reversed, and in the Fall of 1897, the North 
 Atlantic squadron, following the formerly established custom, 
 and so without just cause of offense to Spain, was ordered 
 south for the purpose of winter evolutions and practice. The 
 next step was for our naval vessels to resume friendly visits 
 to Cuban ports ; and after conference between our Secretary 
 of State and the Spanish Minister, in which the subject was 
 "discussed and accepted," the authorities at Madrid and 
 Havana were informed that the U. S. S. Maine would be 
 forthwith instructed to call at the port of Havana. 
 
 The order dispatching the Maine was sent January 24, the 
 ship being at that time off Dry Tortugas, Florida. The 
 telegram directing this movement was as follows : 
 
 Washington, January 24, 1898. 
 SiCARfi, Key West : 
 
 Order the Maine to Havana, Cuba, and make friendly call, 
 pay his respects to the authorities, particular attention must 
 be paid to usual exchange of civilities. Torpedo boat must 
 not accompany Maine. The squadron must not return to 
 Key West on this account. 
 
 The Maine was received in Havana with every mark of 
 official courtesy. Reports from her commanding officer, 
 however, and other sources, indicated from the first that this 
 visit was received with disfavor. 
 
 A little after one o'clock, on the night of February 15, my 
 daughter came into my apartment at the Hotel Portland, 
 woke me from a sound sleep, and gave me a dispatch which 
 she had just received from a Western Union messenger boy 
 
342 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 in the hallway, with the information that it was of great 
 importance. It was the famous dispatch from Captain 
 Sigsbee announcing the destruction of the Maine, and was as 
 follows : 
 
 Havana, February 15, 1898. 
 Secretary of the Navy, 
 
 Washington, D. C. : 
 Maine blown up in Havana Harbor at 9:40 to-night, and 
 destroyed. Many wounded and doubtless more killed or 
 drowned. Wounded and others on board Spanish man-of-war 
 and Ward Line steamer. Send light-house tenders from Key 
 West for crew and the few pieces of equipment above. No 
 one has clothing other than that upon him. Public opinion 
 should be suspended until further report. All officials 
 believed to be saved. Jenkins and Merritt not yet accounted 
 for. Many Spanish officers, including representatives of Gen- 
 eral Blanco, now with me to express sympathy. 
 
 Sigsbee. 
 
 It was almost impossible to believe that it could be true, or 
 that it was not a wild and vivid dream. As my eyes went 
 over and over the letters, I seemed to see between the lines 
 the harbor at Havana, lying under the shadow of night, 
 suddenly rift with a column of fire and startled with the 
 thunder of the explosion of the noble battleship. Commander 
 Dickins was at that time, in the absence of Captain Crownin- 
 shield, acting Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, and I sent 
 the dispatch to him with a short note written in lead pencil as 
 follows: 
 
 Dear Dickins : 
 
 I have just received this terrible telegram. Please have 
 request attended to at once by telegram in ordinary language, 
 not using cipher. 
 
 Commander Dickins reported a little later at my hotel. I 
 was sitting in a small room adjoining the hotel office with 
 two or three newspaper correspondents, who had already 
 heard the news and had come to me for confirmation of it. 
 Dickins was ordered to send to the naval station at Key West 
 instructions to dispatch a vessel to Havana with medical 
 assistance. He then went to the White House to inform the 
 
THE NAVY DEPARTMENT IN THE WAR. 343 
 
 President of the catastrophe. The following telegram was 
 sent to Captain Sigsbee: 
 
 SiGSBEE, Havana : 
 
 The President directs me to express for himself and the 
 people of the United States his profound sympathy with the 
 ofificers and crew of the Maine, and desires that no expense 
 be spared m providing for the survivors and caring for the 
 ^^^d- Long. 
 
 The telegram of Captain Sigsbee did much to hold public 
 opinion in check and to assist the Department in securing in 
 the public mind as dispassionate a view as possible of the dis- 
 aster, and a suspension of judgment until the facts could be 
 investigated. 
 
 A Board of Inquiry was appointed on February 19 to 
 investigate and report to the Department the cause of the 
 explosion. It consisted of Captain W. T. Sampson, Captain 
 F. E. Chadwick, Lieutenant-Commander Wm. P. Potter as 
 members, and Lieutenant-Commander Adolph Marix as 
 recorder. They proceeded to Havana and began their inves- 
 tigations on the 2 1st day of February. A most thorough 
 and exhaustive examination of the wreck was made, and the 
 Board reported on the 2ist day of March that the Maine had 
 been destroyed by the explosion of a submarine mine, but 
 that the responsibility could not be fixed upon any person or 
 persons. The most cursory examination, even by a non- 
 technical eye, of the drawings which accompany the report is 
 convincing that the cause of the disaster must have been 
 from the outside. The impression has prevailed that the 
 Department was cognizant of the nature of the findings of 
 the Court long before they were received in Washington. 
 This, however, was not the case. At one time the advisability 
 of having the report telegraphed in cipher was considered, 
 but the proceedings were so protracted and the preparations 
 for any emergency had reached such a stage that this step 
 was not deemed necessary. 
 
 On February 25, the Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic 
 station. Commodore Dewey, was ordered to assemble the 
 squadron under his command at Hong Kong and to retain 
 the Olympia, which was under orders to proceed to San Fran- 
 
344 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 CISCO. Instructions were given, outlining his conduct and 
 duty in the event of hostilities. The Baltiuiore, then at 
 Honolulu, was directed to join the Asiatic squadron and a 
 large supply of ammunition was sent to Honolulu by the 
 Mohican and transferred to that vessel. 
 
 The Department, as early as March 3, issued instructions 
 to the Office of Naval Intelligence to make special inquiries 
 of our naval attaches in Europe as to what men-of-war and 
 torpedo boats could be purchased abroad. They were 
 directed to submit estimates of cost and to report upon the 
 condition of purchasable ships. It was considered important 
 to secure any war vessels which might be in the market, not 
 only to strengthen our own navy, but to prevent them from 
 coming into the possession of Spain, and it was necessary 
 that any purchases made abroad should be concluded before 
 the outbreak of hostilities, which, under the neutrality laws, 
 would then make their purchase impracticable. 
 
 With a view to these and other proper expenditures. Con- 
 gress passed, on March 9, the Emergency Bill, appropriating 
 $50,000,000 for National defence. A Board was at once 
 appointed for the purpose of examining such vessels of our 
 own merchant marine as were deemed suitable for naval 
 purposes. With the ample means thus provided, the pur- 
 chase of vessels, ammunition, guns and all classes of naval 
 war material went rapidly on. The inquiries set on foot in 
 Europe showed the impossibility of obtaining war ships in 
 any number in foreign markets. On the day of the passage 
 of the Emergency Appropriation, the Naval Attache at Lon- 
 don was authorized to negotiate for the purchase of two 
 cruisers then building in England for the Brazilian Govern- 
 ment, the Aniazonas and the Alniirante Abreii. This purchase 
 was successfully concluded and the United States flag was 
 hoisted March 18 on board the Aniazonas, renamed the Nczv 
 Orleans, which soon afterwards became an efficient part of 
 our naval war fleet. The Alniirante Abreu, since then 
 named the Albany, was far from completion, but one vessel 
 could not be bought without the purchase of both. An 
 officer was sent to Europe with instructions to negotiate for 
 other vessels, but made no purchases. The Naval Attache at 
 
THE NAVY DErARTMENT IN THE WAR. 345 
 
 Berlin purchased at Elbing, Germany, a torpedo boat which 
 was renamed the Soiiicrs. Unfavorable weather and other 
 causes prevented her prompt departure for the United States, 
 and when war was declared she was in an English port, where 
 she remained. The cruiser Diogenes was purchased from the 
 Thames Iron Works on April 2, 1898, and there placed in 
 commission as the Topeka. The Nictlicroy, afterwards re- 
 named the Buffalo, was purchased at Rio Janeiro and the 
 Manly, a very small torpedo boat, was purchased in Europe. 
 
 The statement of the armed vessels actually bought affords 
 but a meager idea of the number of vessels the purchase of 
 which was under consideration from time to time, and for 
 some of which extensive negotiations were carried on. Of 
 those really desirable, few could be obtained, and great care 
 was necessary to avoid burdening our navy list with a number 
 of obsolete craft, for many of which exorbitant prices were 
 asked. A number of colliers were purchased abroad, as it was 
 not practicable to obtain enough suitable vessels for this pur- 
 pose in the United States, and they proved of great value 
 during the war. 
 
 A naval war board was established early in March, and 
 continued in session at the Department throughout the war. 
 Its services were of great value, although there was at first an 
 inclination in the public mind to carp at such a board and to 
 make it the easy target of criticism ; but no institution was 
 ever more thoroughly vindicated. The time of the Secretary 
 of the Navy, like that of every other Cabinet officer, is so 
 much taken up with interviews and routine work, that it was 
 a great relief to me to refer questions relating to naval move- 
 ments to this board, which, in the quiet of its room, aided by 
 maps and charts, and constant telegraphic communication, 
 was able to give professional and undivided consideration to 
 every problem that arose. Its duty was to consider and out- 
 line the strategical policy of the Department. Under it were 
 prepared, for the consideration and signature of the Secretary, 
 orders bearing upon this policy, and to it were referred all in- 
 formation received of the movements of the Spanish naval 
 forces and everything bearing upon the operations of the war. 
 Its permanent members were Rear-Admiral Montgomery 
 
346 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 Sicard, U. S. N., Captain A. T. Mahan, U. S. N. (retired), and 
 Captain A. S. Crovvninshield, U. S. N. : — Admiral Sicard, a 
 man of long and copious naval experience, and of the most 
 painstaking deliberation ; Captain Mahan, the famous naval 
 author, quick, earnest and competent ; and Captain Crownin- 
 shield, through whom all orders to ships in commission are is- 
 sued and who is in direct touch with the personnel of the navy 
 as Chief of the Bureau of Navigation. 
 
 In the meantime, the Columbia ^.wA Minneapolis, in reserve, 
 had been ordered to prepare for service. The Brooklyn had 
 been ordered to proceed from La Guayra to Hampton Roads, 
 in contemplation of the Flying Squadron. The Commanders- 
 in-Chief of stations had been ordered to husband ammunition 
 and to keep their vessels filled with the best coal obtainable. 
 
 The Helena and Bancroft had been ordered to the United 
 States, and the Commander-in-Chief of the European station 
 had been ordered to attach the New Orleans to his command 
 and proceed home. The Oregon had been ordered from 
 Bremerton, Washington, to San Francisco, with a view to 
 bringing her around to augment the Atlantic fleet, and the 
 Cincinnati, Castine and Wibnington had been ordered to pro- 
 ceed from Para, Brazil, to Port Antonio, Jamaica. 
 
 The report of the Maine Court of Inquiry was received at 
 the Department on March 24. Lieutenant-Commander 
 Marix brought it into my office about ten o'clock in the 
 morning, and after reading the findings of the Court I went 
 with him to the White House, where they were read by him 
 to the President, and I recall that both the President and 
 myself were much struck with their brevity. This report was 
 forwarded to Congress on March 28 with a special message. 
 
 Congress having passed an act authorizing the appointment 
 of officers in the navy and marine corps in such numbers as 
 might be required, to serve for the period of the emergency 
 created by warAvith Spain, the Department appointed boards 
 to conduct the examination of applicants. As a result 856 
 officers were commissioned for temporary service. 
 
 On March 3, the navy yards at Brooklyn, Boston and 
 League Island were instructed to enlist seamen, firemen and 
 petty officers for general service, and the enlisted force was 
 
THE NAVY DEPARTMENT IN THE WAR. 
 
 347 
 
 steadily increased as vessels became available for service, 
 until, on August 15, the date on which it reached its maximum, 
 there were 24,123 enlisted men in the service. 
 
 The purchase of auxiliary ships, under the efficient direction 
 first of Assistant-Secretary Roosevelt and then of his successor, 
 Mr. Allen, went on as rapidly as possible. As fast as pur- 
 chased, they were sent to the navy yards and to certain private 
 establishments for such changes as were necessary for their use 
 by the navy. The old monitors, which had been laid up in 
 reserve, were placed in commission and were provided with 
 crews from the naval militia of the states and stationed at 
 important ports along the coast. A system of coast defense 
 and coast signal service was devised and was ready to be put 
 in operation upon the outbreak of hostilities. 
 
 The total ships added to the navy numbered 128. The 
 maximum fighting force separated into classes was as follows : 
 
 Battle ships (first class) 
 Battle ship (second class) 
 Armored cruisers 
 Coast-defense monitors 
 Armored ram 
 Protected cruisers 
 Unprotected cruisers . 
 Gunboats 
 Dynamite cruiser. 
 Torpedo boats 
 Vessels of old Navy, includ 
 Auxiliary navy : 
 
 Auxiliary cruisers . 
 Converted yachts . 
 Revenue cutters . 
 Light-house tenders 
 Converted tugs 
 Converted colliers. 
 Miscellaneous 
 
 ncr monitors 
 
 4 
 I 
 
 2 
 
 6 
 
 I 
 
 12 
 
 3 
 18 
 
 I 
 1 1 
 
 14 
 
 II 
 
 28 
 
 15 
 
 4 
 
 27 
 
 19 
 
 19 
 
 On April 20, Congress passed the resolution directing the 
 President to intervene in Cuba. In order to understand the 
 situation of the navy on this date, let us recall that the North 
 Atlantic Squadron, under command of Captain W. T. Samp- 
 son, U. S. N,, was in the vicinity of Key West. The Oregon 
 had reached Atlantic waters on her way to join the North 
 
348 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 Atlantic Squadron ; the North Patrol Squadron, for the pro- 
 tection of the Atlantic coast between the capes of the Dela- 
 ware and Bar Harbor, had been organized under command of 
 Commodore J. A, Howell, U. S. N. ; the Flying Squadron, 
 under command of Commodore W. S. Schley, U. S. N., had 
 been assembled at Hampton Roads; the Asiatic Squadron, 
 under command of Commodore George Dewey, was at Hong 
 Kong, China; and the Pacific Squadron, under Admiral Miller, 
 was at different points on the Pacific coast. 
 
 Commodore Dewey, having carried out his orders to retain 
 the men whose enlistments were about to expire, to proceed 
 to Hong Kong, China, with the squadron under his command 
 and keep his fleet full of the best coal obtainable, to retain 
 the Olynipia, to purchase two supply vessels, and to arm and 
 man them, and having been reinforced by the Baltimore, and 
 received full instructions outlining his duties, was ready for 
 the outbreak of hostilities. The following dispatch was sent 
 to him : 
 
 Washington, April 24, 1898. 
 
 Dewey, Hong Kong'. 
 
 War has commenced between the United States and 
 Spain. Proceed at once to the Philippine Islands. Commence 
 operations at once, particularly against the Spanish fleet. 
 You must capture vessels or destroy. Use utmost endeavors. 
 
 Long. 
 
 Upon the request of the Governor of Hong Kong, Commo- 
 dore Dewey left that place on April 25 and proceeded to 
 Mirs Bay, China, where the arrival of the United States 
 Consul from Manila was awaited. The squadron sailed on 
 April 27 and arrived at Manila on the morning of May i. 
 The brilliant action of the squadron in passing the mines and 
 forts at the entrance of the harbor, and in engaging and 
 destroying the Spanish fleet under Admiral Montojo, is with- 
 out parallel in naval history. It is described in other chapters 
 of this book. 
 
 News of this great victory was first received through the 
 public press, via Madrid. The official dispatch, sent by the 
 
THE NAVY DEPARTMENT IN THE WAR. 349 
 
 McCulloch to Hong Kong and transmitted from that place, 
 was not received at the Department until May 7, It was 
 dated Manila, May i, and being of some length was received 
 in piece-meal. The fact of its arrival at once became known, 
 and many correspondents and others had gathered in the 
 big reception room of the Department eagerly awaiting its 
 translation. 
 
 The news was received with the greatest enthusiasm. It 
 announced the complete destruction of the Spanish fleet, 
 without injury to our squadron and without the loss of a single 
 man. Another dispatch, received from Commodore Dewey 
 on the same day, dated Cavite, May 4, announced that he 
 had taken possession of the naval station at Cavite and 
 destroyed its fortifications, that he controlled the bay com- 
 pletely and that he could take the city at any time. The 
 gratification of the Department at the receipt of this news it 
 is difflcult to state. Aside from the moral effect of the vic- 
 tory, coming almost immediately upon the outbreak of 
 hostilities, and the inspiriting influence it had on the personnel 
 of the entire naval service, it relieved the Pacific coast from 
 all danger of attack and all shipping in the Pacific ocean from 
 fear of capture. An immense saving to the country was 
 effected by the decrease in marine insurance rates which 
 followed in consequence. 
 
 The force under Commodore Dewey consisted of the Olym- 
 pia, flagship, Baltimore, Raleigh, Petrel, Coneord, Boston, the 
 revenue cutter MeCnlloeJi and the supply ship Zafiro and 
 collier NansJiau. The Spanish squadron was composed of the 
 Reiiia Cristiua, flagship, the Castilla, Don Juan de Austria, 
 Don Antonio de Ulloa, Is la dc Cuba, Is la de Iu::on, Marques 
 del Duero, General Iczo, Argos, Velaseo and transport Isla de 
 Mindanao. All the ships of the Spanish squadron were sunk 
 or burned, and the casualties on the Spanish side amounted 
 to about 400 killed and wounded. 
 
 This victory made Commodore Dewey deservedly famous, 
 and gave him rank with the most distinguished naval heroes 
 of all time. Nor was his merit most in the brilliant victory 
 which he achieved in the battle fought with the utmost gal- 
 lantry and skill, waged without an error, and crowned with 
 
.^5° THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 overwhelming success. It was still more in the nerve with 
 which he moved from Mirs Bay to Manila harbor ; the genius 
 of his conception of attack ; the high commanding confidence 
 of a leader who has weighed every risk, prepared himself for 
 every emergency, and has that unfaltering determination to 
 win and that utter freedom from the thought or possibility of 
 swerving from his purpose, which are more than half the 
 battle. It was a man of resolution and power, who, at that 
 vast distance from home, with his little fleet shut off by the 
 neutrality laws from every port, bearing the fate of his coun- 
 try in his hand, was equal to the emergency and met it as 
 serenely and masterfully as if it were an incident of an ordi- 
 nary voyage. 
 
 On May 7 the following message was cabled to him : " The 
 President, in the name of the American people, thanks you 
 and your officers and men for your splendid achievement and 
 overwhelming victory " ; and on the loth he was informed 
 that the thanks of Congress had been tendered him and the 
 officers and men under his command, and that he had been 
 promoted to the grade of Rear Admiral. Admiral Dewey 
 established a blockade of the harbor of Manila, and the 
 Department at once took steps to reinforce this squadron. 
 The Charleston, which had been previously sent to Honolulu, 
 sailed for Manila on June 4 with the chartered steamer City 
 of Pekin, and the transports Australia and City of Sydney, 
 carrying the first detachment of troops. 
 
 The CJiarleston had orders to stop at the Island of Guam, 
 in the Ladrones, and to demand the surrender of that place 
 with all officials and persons in the military service of Spain. 
 She arrived at the Port of San Luis d'Apra on June 20, and 
 on the next day received the surrender of the Island. After 
 taking on board the Governor and Captain of the Port and all 
 officers and men in the Spanish service, she sailed for Manila, 
 where she arrived on June 30. Further to reinforce the 
 Asiatic squadron, the Monterey sailed for Manila, with the 
 collier Brutus, on June 11, and the Monadnock on June 25, 
 accompanied by the collier Nero. 
 
 On June 18, information was received of the sailing of the 
 Spanish home fleet, under Admiral Camara, for the Philip- 
 
THE NAVY DEPARTMENT IN THE WAR. 351 
 
 pines. Admiral Dewey was kept informed from day to day 
 of the progress of this squadron, and as soon as information 
 was received that it had passed into the Suez Canal, the 
 Eastern squadron was formed under command of Commodore 
 Watson, and a statement given to the press that this fleet 
 would sail at once for the coast of Spain. This action induced 
 Admiral Camara's squadron to return to Spain. The rein- 
 forcements, however, which the Department had dispatched 
 to Admiral Dewey, so strengthened the force under his com- 
 mand that no anxiety was felt on his account. During the 
 continuance of hostilities, the conduct of affairs in the Philip- 
 pines, under Admiral Dewey, merited the warmest commenda- 
 tion of the Department. 
 
 On May 26, he was advised that it was desirable not to 
 have any political alliances with the insurgents or any faction 
 in the islands which might incur liability to maintain their 
 cause, and on June 14 he was directed to report fully any 
 conferences, relations or co-operations which he had had with 
 Aguinaldo. Admiral Dewey's reply showed that he had 
 acted with great discretion, and that while his relations with 
 the insurgent leader were cordial, and he had exercised a 
 strong influence towards having the insurgents conduct their 
 war in a humane and civilized manner, he had refrained from 
 any recognition of the insurgent cause or any action which 
 committed this country to support it. Upon the arrival of 
 General Merritt, the joint operations of the Army and Navy 
 were begun, which resulted in the surrender of Manila on 
 August 13. 
 
 In the conduct of the war in the Atlantic, three objects 
 were in view, the most important of which was the blockade 
 of Cuba. It was believed that, the establishment of a close 
 and efficient blockade, which would prevent supplies and 
 munitions of war from entering the island, might induce the 
 Spanish to capitulate before the conclusion of the rainy 
 season. 
 
 The next important object was the destruction of the 
 Spanish fleet. In order to introduce supplies and munitions 
 of war into Cuba, it was necessary for the Spanish to raise 
 
352 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 the blockade, and this could only be accomplished by defeat- 
 ing our fleet, or by evading it and reaching a port in Cuba. 
 
 The third consideration was the protection of the Atlantic 
 sea coast of the United States. 
 
 With these purposes in view, the Department in March 
 directed the monitors to join the squadron under Admiral 
 Sicard, and detached the Massachusetts and Texas from his 
 command and ordered them to proceed to Hampton Roads, 
 where the Flying Squadron was organized. The Brooklyn, 
 Mi)iiieapolis and Cohiuibia were also attached to this squadron. 
 It was stationed at this central point in order that it might 
 go to any port on the Atlantic coast which should be menaced 
 by a Spanish fleet, or be able promptly to reinforce the fleet 
 in Cuban waters should the Spanish endeavor to raise the 
 blockade. 
 
 Captain W. T. Sampson, U. S. N., was assigned to the 
 command of the North Atlantic fleet on March 26 to succeed 
 Rear-Admiral Sicard, U. S. N., whom, on account of his 
 health, it was found necessary to relieve from this onerous 
 and exacting duty. Upon the detachment of Admiral Sicard, 
 Captain Sampson was the senior officer present. He was 
 thoroughly familiar with the personnel and materiel of the 
 fleet and with all the arrangements which had been made 
 immediately before the war, and the Department had every 
 confidence in his judgment and professional ability. Upon 
 the outbreak of hostilities on April 21, he was assigned to the 
 command of the United States naval force on the North 
 Atlantic station with the rank of Rear Admiral. 
 
 It proved to be a wise selection in every respect. It is fair 
 to say greater mere naval responsibilities rested on Admiral 
 Sampson than on any other officer during the war. They 
 were discharged with great ability and without error. The 
 number of ships and men subject to his command was larger 
 than those of any other officer. His duties were of a com- 
 plicated and very onerous character ; they began with the 
 beeinninp; of the war and lasted until its close. Aside from 
 the routine of correspondence and the details of so extensive 
 and exacting a command, there were three great objects to be 
 accomplished by him. First, the maintenance of the blockade 
 
THE NAVY DEPARTMENT IN THE WAR. 353 
 
 of the island of Cuba; second, the pursuit and destruction of 
 the Spanisli Atlantic fleet ; third, the work of convoying, 
 landing, and co-operating with, the Army in the movement 
 upon SantiaL;o and afterwards upon Porto Rico. How thor- 
 oughly all this was done is now matter of historj'. 
 
 The command of the Flying Squadron upon its formation 
 was given to Commodore W. S. Schle}-, U. S. N., who was 
 informed that, in case of the juncture of the Flying Squadron 
 and the fleet under Admiral Sampson, he would be placed 
 under command of Admiral Sampson. 
 
 At 6:30 A. M., on April 22, Admiral Sampson sailed from 
 Key West with the squadron under his command, and in 
 execution of the President's orders of April 21, at once estab- 
 lished a blockade of the northern coast of Cuba from Bahia 
 Honda to Cardenas. 
 
 The instructions to Admiral Sampson were that he should 
 make every efl^ort to capture or destroy the Spanish war 
 vessels in West Indian waters, including the small gun-boats 
 which were stationed along the coast of Cuba. He was 
 expressly directed not to expose the squadron under his 
 command to the fire of the batteries at Havana, Santiago or 
 other strongly fortified ports of Cuba, or Porto Rico, as it 
 was deemed of prime importance that our vessels should not 
 be risked to capture or injury before the Spanish squadron 
 had been met and defeated. 
 
 At the beginning of the war it was the opinion of Admiral 
 Sampson, urged strenuously by him and concurred in by 
 Captains Evans, Taylor and Chadwick, that a strong attack 
 upon the batteries at Havana would compel the capitulation 
 of that place, but in view of the undesirability of sending 
 troops to Cuba, especially until the more formidable vessels 
 of the Spanish navy had been destroyed or captured, this 
 course was deemed to involve risks which in the exercise of a 
 wise discretion were judged inadvisable. It was clear to the 
 Department that our battleships should be exposed to no risk 
 of destruction until they could meet those of the enem\'. 
 
 Information having been received that a Spanish gun-boat 
 had been seen off the New England coast, the Cohimhia and 
 Minneapolis were ordered from Hampton Roads to make a 
 
354 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 cruise in the waters between Newport, R. L, and Eastport, 
 Me., calling at different ports for the purpose of reassuring 
 the inhabitants of the cities and towns in that section. 
 
 The fleet under command of Admiral Sampson had become 
 so large with the additions of the auxiliary ships that it was 
 necessary to provide for a division of the many duties with 
 which he was charged, and two Commodores were sent to 
 serve under his orders, the senior, Commodore Remey, to 
 command the naval base at Key West, and the junior. 
 Commodore Watson, to be given a command afloat. 
 
 Upon the withdrawal of our attaches from Spain, it became 
 very difificult to secure information regarding the prospective 
 movements of the Spanish fleet, and a secret service was 
 organized in order to keep the Department informed of the 
 resources, condition and plans of the Spanish naval forces. 
 An officer was sent to Europe, who followed and reported 
 the movements of the naval force under Admiral Camara, 
 and another officer proceeded to Cadiz, reporting the strength 
 of the Spanish vessels there, and later, to the West Indies for 
 the same purpose. Information was also received from a 
 variety of other sources. 
 
 It was exceedingly important to secure early advices as to 
 the departure and destination of the Spanish squadron under 
 Admiral Cervera. On April 28, the Department was informed 
 that it was probable that part of the Spanish flotilla would 
 leave the Cape de Verde Islands that night. The agent of 
 the Department was authorized to charter a steamer to follow 
 the Spanish squadron and report the direction taken. On 
 April 29 this agent reported that four cruisers and three 
 destroyers had sailed, and on the next day this vessel returned 
 to port and cabled that the Spanish flotilla when last seen 
 was continuing west at full speed. 
 
 Steps were at once taken to ascertain, at the earliest possi- 
 ble moment, the presence of these vessels on this side of the 
 Atlantic, and the Harvard and St. Louis were sent to sea 
 under sealed orders, with instructions to cruise to the eastward 
 of the Windward Islands on certain lines specifically laid 
 down. 
 
 Explicit instructions were given as to the length of time to 
 
THE NAVY DEPARTMENT IN THE WAR. 355 
 
 remain on this duty, and the method of communicating with 
 the Department in the event of sighting the Spanish fleet. 
 The ships were required to make at least three hundred and 
 thirty-six miles a day on the trip from New York to the 
 cruising grounds. 
 
 Admiral Sampson was promptly informed of the sailing of 
 Cervera's squadron and of its strength, and given an outline 
 of action in the event of certain contingencies, such as the 
 appearance of this fleet on the Atlantic coast of the United 
 States, or their entry into San Juan or other ports in West 
 Indian waters. 
 
 On April 30, instructions were sent to cut the cable on the 
 south coast of Cuba. On the next day the Yale was sent to 
 sea with instructions similar to those given the St. Louis and 
 Haj-vard, to proceed to the Island of Porto Rico and cruise 
 around that island. 
 
 On May 4, Admiral Sampson sailed east from off Havana 
 for the purpose of observation, and, continuing in that direc- 
 tion, arrived at San Juan, Porto Rico, on the 12th. His 
 purpose in going to San Juan was to make a reconnoissance 
 to ascertain if the Spanish fleet was in that port. Finding 
 that the Spanish squadron was not there, he bombarded the 
 fortifications and turned westward again in order to cover 
 Havana and prevent any attempt to raise the blockade. 
 Telegrams were received from the Harvard and St. Louis on 
 the nth, stating that they had been unable to get any news 
 of the whereabouts of the Spanish squadron. On the 12th 
 the Harvard cabled from St. Pierre, Martinique, that the 
 Spanish torpedo-boat destroyer, Furor, had arrived that day 
 at Fort de France, Martinique, and later departed, and that a 
 fleet of five large vessels had been seen off the coast, probably 
 the Spanish. 
 
 This was the first information the Department had of the 
 whereabouts of Admiral Cervera's squadron. Early the next 
 morning, May 13, Commodore Schley, at Fortress Monroe, 
 Va., was instructed to get ready for sea immediately, and later 
 in the day directed to proceed at once to Charleston, S. C. 
 The Miiuicapolis was ordered to proceed with all dispatch to 
 cruise between Monte Cristi, Haiti, and Caicos Bank, Baha- 
 
356 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 mas, and the ^7. Paul was ordered to cruise between Morant 
 Point, Jamaica, and the west end of Haiti. Admiral Sampson 
 and the Naval Station at Key West were informed of the 
 sighting of the Spanish squadron and of the orders to the St. 
 Paul and Minneapolis, and the importance of keeping in touch 
 with the movements of the Spanish was emphasized. 
 
 On May 14, the Spanish squadron was reported at the 
 Island of Curacoa. The Naval Station at Key West was 
 promptly given this information and instructed to keep a 
 close lookout in Yucatan Channel, as the enemy might round 
 Cape San Antonio or enter the Gulf of Mexico. The orders 
 to the St. Paul o{ the 13th were revoked, and that ship was 
 directed to proceed at utmost speed to Key West. Admiral 
 Sampson was instructed to return with all possible dispatch 
 to Key West. The information regarding the enemy's squad- 
 ron and the orders to Admiral Sampson were received by him 
 on the 15th, by the torpedo-boat Porter, the squadron being 
 then off Puerto Plata, Haiti. 
 
 Admiral Sampson, upon receipt of these dispatches, sent 
 the Yale to cruise between Jamaica and Cuba; the Harvard 
 was instructed to cruise in Mona passage and on the north 
 side of Porto Rico Island ; and the St. Lonis was ordered to 
 cut the cable at Santiago and at Guantanamo, Cuba, then at 
 Ponce, Porto Rico, and then to proceed to St. Thomas about 
 May 19 to await orders. He advised the Department of the 
 disposition made of these vessels and that the squadron was 
 proceeding at best speed to Key West. 
 
 Information was received which induced the Department to 
 believe that Admiral Cervera's squadron would proceed from 
 Curacoa to the Gulf of Venezuela to coal. The Harvard was 
 informed of this at St. Pierre, Martinique, on the 15th, and 
 directed to endeavor to get and keep in touch with the Span- 
 ish fleet. A telegram was sent to Cape Haitien, to be sent 
 thence to the Minneapolis, to the same effect, and the St. Paul 
 at Key West was instructed to proceed to Cape Haitien and 
 communicate. After sending these dispatches, the afore- 
 mentioned telegram from Admiral Sampson was received re- 
 garding the disposition of the auxiliary cruisers, and the De- 
 partment instructed the Harvard at Martinique to obey the 
 
THE NAVY DEPARTMENT IN THE WAR. 3j/ 
 
 orders of Admiral Sampson rather than the Department's 
 order of the 15th. 
 
 The Naval Station at Key West was instructed to be ready 
 to coal the North Atlantic Squadron and the Flying Squadron 
 upon arrival, and Admiral Sampson was directed to reinforce 
 the Flying Squadron by an armored vessel and such torpedo 
 boats, if any, as he thought fit, and send this squadron to 
 Cienfuegos. . He was given the choice of remaining on the 
 blockade of Havana, or of proceeding with the squadron 
 under orders for Cienfuegos. 
 
 The Flying Squadron arrived at Key West on the morning 
 of May 18, and Admiral Sampson arrived on theAVzc ]^orl^ on 
 the same afternoon. At this point he received the instruc- 
 tions of the Department above mentioned and gave Commo- 
 dore Schley the choice of remaining with the blockading 
 squadron off Havana, or proceeding with the Flying Squadron 
 to the south coast of Cuba. From a strategical point of view 
 it seemed probable that the Spanish squadron would endeavor 
 to make the port of Cienfuegos or Santiago. Commodore 
 Schley preferred to remain in command of the squadron des- 
 tined for Cienfuegos, and after coaling sailed at 9 A. M., on 
 the 19th, for that port, with the Brooklyn, Texas, Massachu- 
 setts and Seorpioii. Later on the same day, information was 
 received to the effect that the Spanish squadron had arrived 
 at Santiago. The Minneapolis, at St. Thomas, and the St. 
 Paul, at Cape Haitien, were given this information, and or- 
 dered to proceed off Santiago. Information and instructions 
 to the same effect were sent the next day to the Harvard off 
 the north coast of Porto Rico, the St. Louis at Mole St. Nich- 
 olas, Haiti, and the Yale at Cape Haitien. Admiral Sampson 
 was informed at Key West of this report and advised to send 
 word to Commodore Schley to proceed at once off Santiago 
 de Cuba with his whole command. Admiral Sampson re- 
 ported that he deemed it best to let the Flying Squadron re- 
 main at Cienfuegos until a report could be had from the 
 auxiliary vessels at Santiago or more definite information re- 
 ceived as to the presence of the Spanish squadron there. On 
 May 20, the lozoa, Castiiie and Mcrrimac sailed by his order 
 to Key West to reinforce the squadron under Schley. 
 
358 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 On May 21, Admiral Sampson left Key West for the block- 
 ade of Havana, having, at 3 A, M. of that day, sent the Marble- 
 head with the order to Commodore Schley to proceed to San- 
 tiago. On May 23, a dispatch was received from the St. Louis 
 from St. Thomas, stating that the Spanish fleet was not at 
 Santiago de Cuba at 7 P. M., of May 18, and that it was not 
 off that port at 8 A. M,, May 19. The log of the Colon, which 
 has since come into possession of the Department, shows that 
 the Spanish fleet anchored in the harbor of Santiago at 8:20 
 A. M., May 19, from which it is evident that the St. Louis must 
 have missed the Spanish fleet by a very few minutes. 
 
 No information having been received from Commodore 
 Schley, and it being of vital importance to verify the report of 
 the arrival of the Spanish squadron at Santiago, and, if there, 
 prevent it from again getting out of the reach of the Depart- 
 ment on the high seas, the cable office at Mole St. Nicholas 
 was directed, on the 25th, to deliver to the first American 
 vessel arriving in port, the following message : " Where is the 
 Flying Squadron ? Await further orders at Mole." Later in 
 the day, a dispatch was received from Commodore Schley 
 dated May 22, sent by the LLarvard from Mole St. Nicholas, 
 reporting his arrival off Cienfuegos on May 21, and stating 
 that he was not informed as to whether the Spanish fleet was 
 in that port or not. 
 
 The LLarvard reported that she had left Santiago on May 
 24 ; that on the same day the Minneapolis had left that port 
 for Cienfuegos to report to Schley; that the Spanish fleet 
 had not been seen and no information had been obtained re- 
 specting its recent movements. The LLarvard was promptly 
 directed to " Proceed at once and inform Schley and also the 
 senior officer present off Santiago as follows: 'AH Depart- 
 ment's information indicates Spanish division is still at Santi- 
 ago. The Department looks to you to ascertain facts and 
 that the enemy, if therein, does not leave without a decisive 
 action.' " This dispatch was delivered to Commodore Schley 
 on the morning of May 27, the squadron being at that time 
 between 20 and 25 miles to the southward of Santiago. 
 
 On May 26, a telegram, received from Commodore Schley, 
 dated May 24, off Cienfuegos, stated that coaling off Cienfuegos 
 
THE NAVY DEPARTMENT IN THE WAR. 359 
 
 was very uncertain: that he had ascertained the Spanish fleet 
 was not at that place and that he would move eastward on the 
 next day, the 25th, and communicate from Nicholas Mole, 
 Haiti ; but that he could not blockade if Spanish squadron 
 was at Santiago, on account of want of coal. 
 
 The orders which had been sent to Commodore Schley by 
 \h& Marblehead on t\\^ morning of May 21, directing him to 
 proceed to the port of Santiago, were not received until the 
 morning of the 24th, whereas the duplicate orders sent later 
 on the same day by the Hai.'k were received by Commodore 
 Schley early in the morning of May 23, which shows the 
 wisdom of sending two vessels with these very important 
 
 orders. 
 
 The Department having this information, expected the 
 squadron under Commodore Schley to reach Santiago some 
 time during the 24th. 
 
 In the meantime, the fleet under Admiral Sampson had 
 been guarding the Nicholas Channel in such a manner as to 
 prevent the approach of the Spanish squadron from the east 
 
 to Havana. 
 
 On May 26 he wired the Department that not having heard 
 from Commodore Schley and '< as the Spanish squadron may 
 have evaded at Santiago and attempted to reach Havana by 
 Cape San Antonio, I have moved westward to provide agamst 
 this contingency. Will attempt to cover Havana from both 
 
 directions." 
 
 Later on the same day he cabled the Department, which 
 dispatch was received on the morning of the 27th, that he 
 had received information from Schley under date of May 23, 
 as follows : " Am not satisfied the Spanish squadron is not in 
 Cicnfuegos, Cuba," and also added that " He states he will 
 remain off Cienfuegos keeping squadron ready for emergency. 
 He reports Adula entered into Cienfuegos May 23 ; learned 
 probably from her, as she left, if the Spanish squadron was in 
 port. I think that he has gone probably to Santiago de 
 Cuba. To assure this, I send Wasp to Cienfuegos to-night. 
 If he has not left, this will enable him to reach Santiago de 
 Cuba before I could do so." 
 
360 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 Commodore Schley, upon the receipt, on May 2'j^ of the 
 Department's telegram by the Harvard irova Mole St. Nicho- 
 las, sent a reply by the same vessel which was transmitted 
 from Kingston on May 28, acknowledging receipt of the 
 Department's telegram, and stating that he could not remain 
 off Santiago on account of the coal supply ; that he much 
 regretted his inability to obey the orders of the Department ; 
 that he was forced to proceed for coal to Key West by way 
 of the Yucatan channel, and that he had been unable to 
 ascertain anything positive respecting the enemy. 
 
 It is difficult to state the anxiety which this dispatch caused 
 the Department. It was the most anxious day in the naval 
 history of the war and was the only instance in which the 
 Department had to whistle to keep its courage up, It was 
 received on the afternoon of the day on which the President 
 and his Cabinet reviewed the Army Corps at Camp Alger. 
 The feeling that the Spanish fleet might leave the harbor of 
 Santiago was a heavy weight upon the President's mind. To 
 deal with it was not difficult when its whereabouts were 
 known, but to feel that it might leave the Cuban coast, that 
 its movements might be lost track of, and that it might 
 appear at any time on the coast of the United States, was 
 depressing beyond measure. The despatch was not given out. 
 
 The most energetic measures were at once taken to 
 endeavor to hold our footing at Santiago, and Admiral Samp- 
 son, who had received information that Commodore Schley 
 could not maintain the blockade at that place, sent the Nezu 
 Orleans and Sterling on the 27th with orders to him " to 
 remain on the blockade of Santiago at all hazards, assuming 
 that the Spanish vessels are in that port," and gave instruc- 
 tions for the sinking of the collier Sterling to obstruct the 
 channel of the harbor in case he should leave Santiago. 
 
 Admiral Sampson was promptly advised of the receipt of 
 Schley's telegram that he had gone to Key West with his 
 squadron for coal, and was asked " how soon after the arrival 
 of Schley at Key West could you reach Santiago de Cuba 
 with the Neiv York, Oregon, the Indiana and some lighter 
 vessels and how long could you blockade there?" To this 
 Admiral Sampson replied that he could reach Santiago in 
 
THE NAVY DEPARTMENT IN THE WAR. 361 
 
 three days, could blockade indefinitely, and would like to 
 start at once with the Nezv York and Oregon, arriving in two 
 days, and added : 
 
 "Do not quite understand as to the necessity of awaiting 
 arrival of Schley, but I would propose meeting and turning 
 back the principal part of the force under his command if he 
 has left." 
 
 Admiral Sampson was at once instructed to proceed to 
 Santiago. Further orders were sent to Commodore Schley, 
 to Port Antonio and to Kingston : 
 
 " It is your duty to ascertain immediately if the Spanish 
 fleet is in Santiago and report. Would be discreditable to 
 the Navy if that fact were not ascertained immediately. All 
 military and naval movements depend upon that point." 
 
 Later on the same day, the 29th, a more reassuring dispatch 
 was received from Commodore Schley, sent from Port Anto- 
 nio, stating that he would endeavor " to coal in open sea and 
 retain position off Santiago until coal supply of larger vessels 
 is reduced to the lowest safe limit." The squadron under 
 his command had proceeded west, on its way to Key West, to 
 a point about forty miles in a direction to the southward and 
 westward of Santiago, and, on the afternoon of May 28, 
 returned in the direction of Santiago and arrived at a point 
 about ten miles to the southward of that port shortly after 
 dark. On the morning of the 29th, the Cristobal Colon was 
 seen in the entrance of the harbor. 
 
 Admiral Sampson was at once instructed to proceed with 
 all possible dispatch to Santiago, with the Netv York, Oregon 
 and such other vessels as he might desire, and instructions 
 were sent to Schley, at Kingston, to " hold on at all hazards. 
 Nezv York, Oregon and New Orleans are on the way." 
 
 Admiral Sampson left Key West at 1 1 V. M. on May 29 
 with the Nexv York, Oregon, Mayfloiver and Porter, and ar- 
 rived at Santiago on the first of June at 6 A. M., and immedi- 
 ately established a most thorough and effective blockade of 
 that port. 
 
 On June 4 the Department was advised of the sinking of 
 the Merrimac in the channel of Santiago in the early morning 
 
362 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 of June 3, by Asst. Naval Constructor Hobson and a crew of 
 seven men. This dispatch further reported that the crew of 
 the Merriniac were prisoners of war. The story of this thrill- 
 ing achievement is elsewhere told. 
 
 In order to enable the fleet to remain indefinitely on the 
 blockade of Santiago, it became of great importance to secure 
 a harbor of refuge where the ships could take shelter in case 
 of storm, and where repairs could be made and the coal sup- 
 ply replenished. With this object in view, the MarblcJiead 
 and Yankee took possession of the bay of Guantanamo, which 
 is situated a short distance to the eastward of Santiago, on 
 June 7. On June 10, the first battalion of marines was landed 
 here for the purpose of holding this port, and, although for 
 the next three days they were almost continuously under the 
 fire of the Spanish, they succeeded in driving off the enemy and 
 in maintaining their position. This action reflected great 
 credit on the Marine Corps. 
 
 As soon as it was ascertained definitely that the Spanish 
 fleet was at Santiago, it was determined to send a force of U. 
 S. troops to that point, and the Department arranged a suita- 
 ble convoy for the transports which had been assembled by the 
 War Department at Tampa. The expedition rendezvoused 
 off Rebecca Shoals, Florida, at 8 P. M. on June 15, and was 
 successfully convoyed to Santiago, where the troops were 
 landed by aid of the Navy, and the joint operations of the 
 Army and Navy then began. 
 
 On June 21, the Department divided the North Atlantic 
 fleet into squadrons, and assigned Commodore Watson to 
 command of the first squadron, detached Commodore Schley 
 from command of the Flying Squadron and assigned him to 
 command of the second squadron, and directed Commodore 
 Remey to exercise command over all vessels within signaling 
 distance of the Naval Station at Key West. 
 
 Information having been received that the Spanish home 
 squadron, under Admiral Camara, had passed Cape Bon Tunis 
 going to the east on June 22, Commodore Watson was di- 
 rected to hold himself in readiness to sail, with the lozva, Ore- 
 gon, N'ezvark, Yoseuiite, Yankee and Dixie, for St. Michaels, 
 Azores. The Northern Patrol Squadron, under command of 
 
THE NAVY DEPARTMENT IN THE WAR. 3^3 
 
 Commodore Howell, was ordered to Key West to strengthen 
 the blockade, and Admiral Sampson was instructed to give 
 Commodore Howell command of the first squadron of the 
 North Atlantic fleet upon the relief of Commodore Watson. 
 
 On June 28, a blockade was proclaimed of the entire south- 
 ern coast of Cuba from Cape Cruz to Cape Francis and of the 
 port of San Juan, Porto Rico. 
 
 It is not a part of this article to treat of the detailed opera- 
 tions of the fleet under Admiral Sampson, and it is sufficient 
 to say that the blockade was maintained so effectively, both 
 by day and night, that the exit of the Spanish squadron was 
 not possible without a decisive engagement. 
 
 From the first day of June the most thorough arrange- 
 ments had been made for bottling up the Spanish fleet in 
 Santiago. The ships were stationed in a semi-circle about six 
 miles from the entrance of the harbor during the day, and 
 much closer in at night, and the ships were instructed to keep 
 searchlights directed on the entrance of the harbor from dark 
 to dawn. A standing order was issued that, in case the enemy 
 endeavored to escape, the ships must close in and engage as 
 soon as possible. 
 
 As is well known, Admiral Cervera's squadron, upon the in- 
 vestment of the City of Santiago by the Army and Navy, 
 attempted to leave the harbor, on the morning of July 3, and 
 was completely destroyed in an action which in its brilliancy 
 and decisiveness stands side by side with the battle of Manila. 
 
 Although the Commander-in-Chief was some miles away at 
 the beginning of the action, his plans were followed by Com- 
 modore Schley and the captains of our ships, which closed in 
 with great gallantry, spirit and effectiveness, and the result 
 showed in a striking manner how important an element in 
 naval warfare are the officers in command and the men behind 
 the guns. In this battle both won and deserved immortal 
 fame. It is difficult to account for the inefficiency of the 
 Spaniards, who are brave men, and for their overwhelming de- 
 feat, except upon the ground of the greater accuracy of our 
 own fire, the splendid spirit and dash of our attack, and the 
 fact that the enemy, instead of making a stand-up fight, had 
 only in mind to escape. 
 
364 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 News of this victory was not had until late on the evening 
 of the 3d. Early on the morning of that day, information 
 was received that a retreat of the Army before Santiago was 
 contemplated, and that the fleet under Admiral Cervera had 
 succeeded in making an exit from the harbor and escaping. 
 
 The official dispatch from Admiral Sampson was not re- 
 ceived until about mid-day on the 4th. It announced the en- 
 tire destruction of the Spanish squadron, consisting of the 
 Cristobal Colon, Vizcaya, Oqiicndo, Maria Teresa and two 
 torpedo-boat destroyers, the Plnton and Furor. In this ac- 
 tion, only one man was killed on our side and our ships suf- 
 fered no injury of any account. 
 
 After the surrender of Santiago on July 17, the Army ex- 
 pedition, under General Miles, was convoyed to the southern 
 coast of Porto Rico by the Massachusetts, Columbia, Yale, 
 Dixie and Gloucester. 
 
 The city of Ponce, Porto Rico, surrendered, on July 26, to a 
 small squadron composed of the Dixie, Annapolis, Gloucester 
 and Wasp, and on August i, the Gloucester and Wasp took 
 possession of Arroyo. 
 
 Throughout the entire period of the war the blockade of the 
 coast of Cuba was prosecuted with great vigor, and much ser- 
 vice of an extremely arduous and wearying character was 
 rendered by the vessels on this duty. The incidents of the 
 blockade are described elsewhere. 
 
 The history of the Navy during the war is one of continued 
 efificiency and success. It is in many respects unprecedented. 
 Two of the greatest naval victories of all time were won, 
 practically without loss of life, injury to person, or damage to 
 naval property. Not a gun was lost or a flag captured by the 
 enemy. The health of our men and of^cers during the whole 
 time was as good as if it had been a period of peace instead of 
 war. While .the Navy was well prepared at the beginning, it 
 must be remembered that, owing to the large increase in the 
 number of enlisted men and volunteer ofificers, and of 
 auxiliary ships with their armament and equipment, a vast 
 amount of work was necessary, but it was done without delay 
 or friction, and there was no emergency for which the Navy 
 
THE NAVY DEPARTMEN r IN THE WAR. 365 
 
 was not ready. Yachts were converted into gunboats and 
 fought as efficiently as if they had been encased in armor. 
 Great transport ships were converted into cruisers. Naval 
 vessels convoyed the army, and it was our seamen who landed 
 the troops at Santiago. Supplies of provisions and clothing- 
 were furnished in the most satisfactory manner. Three great 
 suppl}' ships, capable of carrying meats, vegetables and other 
 provisions sufificient to maintain fleets for months, were afloat. 
 The repair-ship Vulcan, equipped in the most thorough man- 
 ner with every appliance for repairing our ships and engines 
 at sea, was in constant attendance upon our fleet, and was a 
 navy yard in itself. Distilling vessels and a hospital ship were 
 marked features. Medical arrangements were perfect ; and 
 the whole condition of the Navy reflects the highest credit, 
 not only upon officers and men afloat, but upon the succes- 
 sive Assistant-Secretaries and the Commandants of naval sta- 
 tions and especially upon the Chiefs of Bureaus at Washing- 
 ton, who were charged with the duty of equipping, provisioning 
 and supplying the ships of the fleets. 
 
 More gallant officers and men never served on board ship. 
 The professional spirit which animated them cannot be too 
 highly praised. It was not confined to any one branch of the 
 service — it animated the of^cer on deck, the engineer in the 
 bowels of the ship, the marine at his post, whether afloat or 
 ashore — zeal and pride in his corps was the characteristic of 
 each man. There was not only the joy of the contest, the love 
 of adventure, the element of pluck and courage, but a fine sense 
 of lo5'al service, of patriotic devotion and of the determination 
 to win. In the glare of the glory of Manila, Santiago and the 
 sinking of the Merrhnac, there is danger of overlooking the re- 
 peated instances of conspicuous and heroic individual gallan- 
 try which were occurring almost every day and of which the 
 official reports are full. It is only as we read the complete ac- 
 counts of the war that each individual receives the due recogni- 
 tion of his services, and each act of gallantry its meed of praise. 
 It is also to be said that on both sides there was a great deal of 
 chivalrous feeling and that no personal animosity towards the 
 foe was exhibited. When the battle was over, nothing could 
 exceed the tenderness and care with which our ofificers and 
 
366 
 
 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 seamen risked their lives to rescue and protect the foemen 
 whom they had vanquished. War is a horror of hardship and 
 bloodshed, but if anything can relieve its dark shadows, it is 
 the spirit with which the war with Spain was undertaken and 
 with which also it was fought to a swift and victorious end. 
 
 Dec. 24, 1898. 
 
CHAPTER XVIII. 
 WORK OF THE TREASURY DEPARTMENT. 
 
 BV 
 
 Hon. LYMAN J. GAGE, Secretary of the Treasury. 
 
 I 
 
 IT is well said that final judgment cannot be passed upon 
 events still recent. This applies to the financial history 
 of a war as well as to the operations of fleets and armies. 
 Not until years after the civil war closed was there fully com- 
 prehended the depth of that struggle as measured by the prob- 
 lems met and solved in raising money. Now that time has 
 set its seal on the efforts of those who achieved or failed in 
 that fearful conflict, the financial trials of a generation ago are 
 better understood. We know well to-day the effects of meas- 
 ures then adopted and their influence on subsequent affairs, 
 while we see in a clearer light what was actually accomplished 
 at the time by the Government for the Union in the resort to 
 many expedients for procuring funds ; and we realize more 
 fully how the Confederacy suffered, in depreciated paper cur- 
 rency, a repetition of the direful and well-nigh hopeless days 
 which marked the financial story of the Revolution. 
 
 As the events of the Spanish-American War are yet of yes- 
 terday, no more will be attempted now than to tell as simple 
 a story as possible of the war operations of the Treasury De- 
 partment. 
 
 All ages have recognized that money is the essential in con- 
 ducting war. Centuries ago Cicero declared : " Money is the 
 sinews of war" — a trite phrase, which has not lost force by 
 repetition in all the years since it was uttered. In fact, as 
 time has gone on, it has gained in strength until it is regarded 
 now as an axiom. Money is indispensable, and the power of 
 the war chest has perhaps never been better demonstrated 
 than during the late conflict from which we have emerged 
 
368 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR, 
 
 There is a vast difference in time and in methods since 
 Alexander led his legions over the hills of Greece to conquer 
 the world. To-day this modern republic of ours stands fore- 
 most for a different world conquest, a struggle in which is in- 
 volved the advancement of humanity and civilization. In 
 the olden days, when warriors fought with spear and shield 
 and battle axe, their methods of subsistence were as primitive 
 as were their weapons of warfare. They lived in large part 
 upon the country, as we term it, by foraging and plunder. 
 To-day no army is well organized without a commissary de- 
 partment, equipped to the point of perfection, for it has come 
 to be realized that soldiers fight best when they are well fed. 
 I may be pardoned in this connection for relating a story told 
 by Rear-Admiral Schley. Recently, when he served as a 
 member of the Porto Rican Evacuation Commission, a Spanish 
 member of that body said to him : " How do j^ou account for 
 the easy manner in which your countrymen have so over- 
 whelmingly defeated mine ? " To which the Admiral replied : 
 " General, you must get down to a fundamental principle ; 
 you cannot expect men to fight who are not fed, nor soldiers 
 to win victories who are not paid." 
 
 Vast changes have taken place even in recent times in the 
 methods of conducting maritime warfare. The tendency in 
 this respect has long been toward an increase of expenditures. 
 The cost of a single battleship runs into the millions, while 
 to refill once all the vessels of our navy with ammunition 
 costs more than six millions of dollars. The necessity for 
 such an outlay of treasure during the war for independence 
 would have broken the spirit of even the indomitable Wash- 
 ington, and no nation of this time not rich in material re- 
 sources could expect to prosecute war successfully. 
 
 Naturally enough, the chief function of our Treasury De- 
 partment during the recent conflict was to keep the war chest 
 supplied. The main purpose of this chapter will be to tell a 
 simple stor}' of how this was done. Incidentally, however, 
 the writer maybe permitted to recount with pride some of the 
 achievements of other branches of the Treasury service in the 
 war with Spain. 
 
 Not many realize how vast an organization is the Treasury 
 
WORK OF THE 'IRBASURV DEPARTMENT. 369 
 
 Department. In the last annual report of the Secretary there 
 were no less than twenty-seven chapters, devoted to as many 
 different branches. These by no means include all the 
 Treasury services, for there are yet several important subdi- 
 visions which are not made the subject of an annual report. 
 
 Ever since the very beginning of Cuban troubles the United 
 States Treasury Department has had more or less of a share 
 in them as represented by the efforts of this Government to 
 enforce the neutrality laws as they relate to vessels. The 
 first expedition in January of 1895, intended to carry arms 
 and ammunition to the little band of insurgents who were 
 even at that time making ready for the revolution which was 
 proclaimed shortly afterwards on Washington's birthday, was 
 apprehended at Fernandina, Florida, by officers of the Treas- 
 ury Department. The arms and boxes of ammunition on 
 board the Lagonda, their first vessel, were cast overboard into 
 the bay to escape capture by the Treasury's collector of 
 customs. From that time until the actual breaking out of 
 hostilities between the United States and Spain, the Treas- 
 ury Department was vigilant and active in maintaining 
 neutrality. Expedition after expedition was circumvented 
 or captured, and much annoyance and expense resulted from 
 these efforts. A long coast line furnished ample opportunity 
 for the successful embarkation of men, guns and ammunition 
 for Cuba. The Florida Peninsula was also a base which was 
 frequently used for illicit expeditions, and therefore the 
 coasts of the Peninsula and Gulf were patrolled by revenue 
 cutters of the Treasury Department, and collectors of customs 
 were under strict orders to take the most effective steps at 
 their command to prevent violation of the law. The revenue 
 cutters engaged were the Boutzvell, Colfax, Forward, Hamilton, 
 McLane, Morrill, Wijidom and Winona. As the revolution 
 in Cuba progressed, the burden of maintaining neutrality as 
 between nation and nation increased. The continued com- 
 plaints of the Spanish Government against the landing of 
 expeditions in Cuba were met by every effort the Department 
 could bring to its command; yet, notwithstanding a well- 
 ordered patrol, both by the cutters and vessels of the navy, 
 and despite the vigilance of customs of^cers, arms and ammu- 
 
37° THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 nition are alleged to have reached the insurgents from the 
 United States, although in no such quantities as frequently 
 reported. This part of the Treasury work prior to the war 
 was committed to the care of the Bureau of Navigation, and 
 much of its time, ordinarily given to the consideration of 
 questions relating to American merchant vessels and the pro- 
 tection of American seamen, was devoted to the extraordi- 
 nary work which grew out of the struggle of the Cuban insur- 
 gents to throw off the yoke of Spain. 
 
 Later on, when war between the United States and Spain 
 had been declared, this sa-me Bureau of Navigation performed 
 an important part in regulating the exports of coal from this 
 country. One of the earliest precautionary measures of Con- 
 gress was a joint resolution, approved April 22, which au- 
 thorized the President to regulate the export of coal or other 
 material used in war from any seaport of the United States. 
 The execution of this resolution was delegated to the Secre- 
 tary of the Treasury, and under his direction the Bureau of 
 Navigation from time to time framed regulations and instruc- 
 tions. It was recognized by the Treasury Department that 
 the commanders of Spanish fleets would have a problem of 
 no mean proportions to solvG :°in obtaining adequate supplies 
 of fuel and provisions with iiome ports 3,000 miles away. 
 Our naval plans were drav/n -mth the intent to increase the 
 enemy's difficulties in this respect^ and it was therefore de- 
 signed that we should cake Poito Rico. It was also realized 
 that the loss of that island to them as a base of supplies would 
 intensify their necessities and increase the probability of their 
 obtaining fuel from accessible neutral points, the latter being 
 stocked with coal from the United States. So far as known, 
 however, in view of the efforts of the Department, no coal or 
 other material used in war reached the Spanish forces from 
 the United States. The regulations and instructions at the 
 same time were so framed as to permit coal exporters to take 
 full advantage of the opportunity afforded by the strike in the 
 Welsh collieries, and an actual increase of about 7 per cent in 
 our coal exports for May and June over the exports for the 
 same months in 1897 was recorded. 
 
 In the interests of American commerce — both present and 
 
WORK OF THE TREASURY DEPARTMENT. 371 
 
 future — efforts were made by the Treasury Department to 
 confine the list of contraband articles within the narrowest 
 practicable limit. The following list actually promulgated 
 will probably be accepted by maritime nations for some years 
 to come : 
 
 Absolutely contraband. — Ordnance; machine guns and their 
 appliances, and the parts thereof ; armor plate, and whatever 
 pertains to the offensive and defensive armament of naval 
 vessels ; arms and instruments of iron, steel, brass or copper, 
 or of any other material, such arms and instruments being 
 specially adapted for use in war by land or sea ; torpedoes 
 and their appurtenances; cases for mines, of whatever ma- 
 terial ; engineering and transport materials, such as gun car- 
 riages, caissons, cartridge boxes, campaigning forges, canteens, 
 pontoons; ordnance stores; portable range finders; signal 
 flags destined for naval use; ammunition and explosives of 
 all kinds ; machinery for the manufacture of arms and muni- 
 tions of war ; saltpeter ; military accouterments and equip- 
 ments of all sorts ; horses. 
 
 Conditionally contraband. — Coal, when destined for a naval 
 station, a port of call, or a ship or ships of the enemy ; mate- 
 rials for the construction of railwaj's or telegraphs, and 
 money, when such materials or money are destined for the 
 enemy's forces ; provisions, when destined for an enemy's 
 ship or ships, or for a place that is beseiged. 
 
 The revenue-cutter service took an active and creditable 
 part in the war with Spain. It is provided by law that the 
 revenue cutters shall, whenever the President so directs, co- 
 operate with the Navy. It is not in derogation of the rights 
 of any other department to claim that what they did contrib- 
 uted as well to the glory of the Treasury Department, of 
 which they form, in times of peace, an integral part. Under 
 the law referred to, there were with the Navy thirteen rev- 
 enue cutters, carrying sixty-one guns, ninety-eight officers 
 and five hundred and sixty-two enlisted men. Of these, 
 eight cutters (forty-three guns), fifty-eight officers and three 
 hundred and thirty-nine men, were in Admiral Sampson's 
 fleet and on the Havana blockade ; one cutter (six guns), ten 
 officers and ninety-five men, were in Admiral Dewey's fleet 
 at Manila, and four cutters (twelve guns), thirty officers and 
 
2>12 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 one hundred and twenty-eight men, co-operated with the 
 Navy on the Pacific coast. 
 
 In addition to services rendered by vessels with the naval 
 forces, there were seven others, carr^'ing ten guns, thirty-three 
 officers and one hundred and sixty-three men, with the army, 
 engaged in patrolling and guarding mine fields in various 
 harbors from Boston to New Orleans. 
 
 At the battle of Manila, the McCiilloch, Captain D. B. 
 Hodgsdoii, efficiently performed the duties assigned by Admi- 
 ral Dewey. During that engagement the McCitllocJt was sta- 
 tioned near the line of moving ships, in order that she might 
 instantly assist in withdrawing any that might be disabled. 
 While so stationed, the cutter was frequently subjected to 
 the fire of the battery on Sangley Point. This happened 
 whenever the line was out of range of the guns in that bat- 
 tery. As the guns of the battery could not be depressed 
 so as to fire upon the fighting ships, they were trained upon 
 the McCiillocJi, which, however, fortunately escaped injury. 
 It was this vessel that carried to Hong Kong the dispatches 
 announcing to the government and to the world the victory. 
 Until November, 1898, the McCidlocJi remained with the fleet 
 in Manila, serving in the capacity of a dispatch vessel, and 
 frequently on special duty. The cutter was assigned b}- the 
 Admiral to light the mouth of the Pasig River the night after 
 the battle of Manila, and guard the fleet from possible attacks 
 of torpedo boats. It was frequently employed in patrol duty 
 in Manila Bay, stopping and searching ships seeking entry. 
 Early in September the McCullocJi was sent by the Admiral 
 to Batangas, where it captured the insurgent steamer Abbey, 
 which was reported to have sailed from Macao with 3,000 
 stands of arms for Aguinaldo's troops. Admiral Dewey hav- 
 ing received some additions to his fleet of fighting vessels, she 
 was returned to the Treasury Department and ordered to San 
 Francisco, her permanent station. Here the vessel will be en- 
 gaged, as all revenue cutters are, in preventing violations of 
 the revenue laws, and in those benevolent efforts which have 
 characterized the winter cruising of our service, in the saving 
 of lives and in patrolling the coast in stormy weather, guard- 
 ing the safety of ships and passengers. 
 
WORK OF THE TREASURY DEPARTMENT. 373 
 
 At the battle of Cardenas, May 12, the revenue-cutter Hud- 
 son, Lieutenant Frank H. Newcomb commanding, sustained 
 the fight against the gun boats and shore batteries of the 
 enemy, side by side with the navy torpedo-boat Winsloiv, 
 and when Ensign Bagley and half the crew of the last-named 
 vessel had been killed, and her commander wounded, rescued 
 from certain destruction the vessel and survivors of the 
 crew. On that same day the Windom, Captain Maguire com- 
 manding, engaged a shore battery at Cienfuegos and des- 
 troyed the rendezvous of the Spanish troops there. The 
 Manning, Captain F. M. Hunger commanding, was in many 
 engagements with the shore batteries of the enemy. Rear- 
 Admiral Howell and Commodore Remey have officially com- 
 mended the service for its valuable assistance. 
 
 Another important branch of the Treasury service contrib- 
 uted its most ef^cient vessels to the navy. It will be well 
 remembered that the light-house tender Mangrove gained dis- 
 tinction by capturing alone the Spanish auxiliary cruiser 
 Panama. This was the richest prize of the war. The 
 Panama, with a large cargo of provisions for Havana, had 
 sailed from New York prior to the declaration of war, and 
 there was much anxiety in the blockading fleet that she 
 mightjescape into Havana with provisions enough to supply 
 that city for some time. The Mayflozvcr, the Maple, the 
 Mangrove and the Armeria were transferred to the navy, and 
 they all rendered conspicuous service during the war. 
 
 At the time that probability of war with Spain became 
 pronounced, the Light-house Establishment numbered among 
 its officers several who are distinguished for their achieve- 
 ments during the war. Commodore (now Admiral) Schley 
 was chairman of the Light-house Board, while Captain 
 Roblcy D. Evans, of the battleship hnva. Commander Theo- 
 dore F. Jewell, of the Minneapolis, Commander William M. 
 Folger, of the Neiu Orleans, and Commander George F. F. 
 Wilde, of the ram Katahdin, occupied important trusts in the 
 service. 
 
 As soon as it became apparent that open hostilities were 
 likely between the United States and Spain as the result of the 
 latter's troubles with her colonies in the West Indies, the 
 
374 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 Light-house Service began preparations for the new condi- 
 tions that would be imposed by war with a foreign maritime 
 power. A comprehensive plan was devised by which the ser- 
 vice in^all its parts could be made an efficient aid to the naval 
 and military branches. Provisions were made for the prompt 
 removal and replacement of buoys and daymarks, and for 
 changing their conditions and characteristics. The extinc- 
 tion and re-lighting of light-houses, beacons and lighted 
 buoys, and making changes in the characteristics of lights on 
 short notice, was regarded as specially important, particularly 
 in the case of lights marking important channels and ap- 
 proaches to harbors. Every effort was made to equip this 
 branch of the public service so that it might still render its 
 customary aid to navigation and at the same time furnish no 
 advantage to the enemy. 
 
 A small allotment from the appropriation of $50,000,000 for 
 the national defence, amounting to $75,000, and subsequently 
 another of $38,500, was made to enable the Light-house 
 Board to carry out the plans for rendering aid to the naval 
 and military establishments, while at the same time maintain- 
 ing its own regular service. Telephone and telegraph lines 
 were built between light-houses, submarine cables laid, and 
 light keepers were provided with signal flags to enable them 
 to communicate with vessels. Many of the light-houses were 
 utilized as stations in the line of coast signal stations which 
 was established all along the Atlantic and Gulf coasts. The 
 tenders of the service not transferred to the navy rendered 
 valuable assistance in several important harbors in planting 
 and protecting the submarine-mine defenses, and, upon re- 
 ceipt of notice from the War Department of the establish- 
 ment of mines, the lights marking the approaches to harbors 
 were extinguished in whole or in part, and changes in the 
 buoys were made at important seacoast ports. Friend 1)- 
 mariners were notified of changes; but during all the war no 
 seacoast light was extinguished, and no light not extinguished 
 was otherwise modified. The extinction of harbor lights was 
 not a direct measure of defense, but was necessary to prevent 
 injury to the mines liable to be caused by merchant vessels 
 passing during the night. 
 
WORK OF THE TREASURY DEPARTMENT. 375 
 
 At some points on our coast natural conditions are so in- 
 surmountable that light-houses cannot be built. At each of 
 these places light-ships are anchored. These were prepared 
 at any time to seek safety upon the appearance of the enemy. 
 The Light-house Board reports that, while a naval attack on 
 the coast did not occur, and the system of coast communi- 
 cation did not have the actual test which such an attack 
 would have given it, most valuable experience was gained. 
 
 Among the questions to which the war has given rise is 
 that in regard to neutralizing the light-house service in time 
 of war. In view of the intimate relations between this ser- 
 vice and coast defense, it is said by the Board to be impracti- 
 cable to neutralize the whole service, but it is highly desirable 
 that certain light stations and all light vessels and tenders 
 employed only in their regular duties as such should be neu- 
 tralized. This suggestion corresponds in some respects to that 
 which has recently been revived by the New York Chamber of 
 Commerce in reference to extending the same immunity to 
 private property on the sea as that which is granted to pri- 
 vate property on land. The subject has already been con- 
 sidered by the President, and in his last message to Congress 
 he recommended that the Executive be authorized to corre- 
 spond with the Governments of the principal maritime powers 
 with a view to incorporating into the permanent law of civil- 
 ized nations the principle of the exemption of all private 
 property at sea, not contraband of war, from capture or de- 
 struction by belligerent powers. Such questions as these are 
 significant of the tendency of modern civilization to confine 
 warfare within as narrow limits as possible, and are greatly to 
 be commended. 
 
 The United States Signal Service is of comparatively recent 
 origin. According to the report of its Superintendent, it was 
 organized in conformity with the recommendations of a board 
 convened by the Navy Department, October i8, 1897, "for 
 the purpose of considering the establishment of coast signal 
 stations for naval defence." The establishment of such a ser- 
 vice was a new problem which confronted the Government. 
 That it was so easily and satisfactorily solved is due in large 
 part to the fact that the Government already had in existence 
 
376 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 aline of life-saving and light-house stations along the Atlan- 
 tic and Gulf coasts. " The crews of the Life-saving Service," 
 says the Superintendent of the United States Signal Service, 
 "for ten months in the year (August to May) constantly 
 patrol the beaches from Maine to Texas, and no vessel can 
 approach within sight of the coast and escape their attention, 
 while the light-house keepers and observers of the Weather 
 Bureau have exceptional facilities for noting the approach of 
 ships." That these stations were availed of to the fullest ex- 
 tent may be realized from the fact that of the 233 stations 
 which formed those of the Coast Signal Service, 139 were 
 furnished by the Life-saving Service and 49 by the Light- 
 house Establishment. 
 
 Under the provisions of a special act of Congress, the 139 
 stations of the Life-saving Service performing coast signal 
 duty were kept open and manned during the months of June 
 and July, the inactive season, when the crews would otherwise 
 have been laid off. The value of this branch of the service 
 in time of war may be better understood by the fact that 
 keepers and crews are well drilled in the signals of the inter- 
 national code, and their thorough discipline is such that they 
 may at a moment be relied upon to perform effective service 
 in aid of either the military or naval branch. 
 
 The unexampled rapidity with which our armies and fleets 
 overwhelmed the enemy happily rendered it impossible for 
 Spanish ships to threaten the coast. There was, therefore, 
 no opportunity for measuring the importance of the signal 
 stations, but the naval ofificer in charge of the system reports 
 that the service would have effectively answered every pur- 
 pose of its establishment had occasion called. As a matter of 
 fact, it did render valuable service by advising the Navy De- 
 partment of the movement of Government vessels. The most 
 notable was the report of the arrival of the battleship Oregon 
 on the coast of Florida, after its long cruise from the Pacific. 
 
 The United States Marine Hospital Service is another 
 branch of the Treasury Department which had its measure of 
 added duties to perform in consequence of the war with 
 Spain. It rendered aid to the army and the navy in the care 
 of sick or injured soldiers and sailors, many of whom were 
 
WORK OF THE TREASURY DEPARTMENT. 377 
 
 treated at the various hospitals of the service. By arrange- 
 ment with the War Department, officers of the Marine 
 Hospital Service were detailed for duty on vessels used by 
 the army as transports. While so stationed, it was their 
 duty to assist in keeping the ships in good sanitary condition 
 and free from infection. This was a matter of no easy accom- 
 plishment in view of the fact that during the summer season 
 these transports were in constant movement between infected 
 ports and ports of this country. It being a great — if not the 
 greatest — duty of the Marine Hospital Service to prevent the 
 introduction of epidemic diseases into the United States, that 
 service was called upon to establish regulations for the land- 
 ing of troops at Montauk Point. These regulations, care- 
 fully complied with by the officers of the army, effectually 
 prevented the spread of any disease from among our fever- 
 stricken soldiers who came direct from the battlefields of 
 Santiago to their own country. 
 
 Yet another Treasury Service performed meritorious work 
 in connection with the war. Before the outbreak of hostili- 
 ties, but with this possible contingency in view, the Coast 
 Survey steamers Bachc and Blake were engaged on hydro- 
 graphic work on the southern coast. The former made a re- 
 survey of Tortugas Harbor and approaches, this being a 
 suitable gathering place for war-ships. The work was in- 
 tended to bring out also the possibilities of that harbor as a 
 coaling station for deep-draft vessels. After the destruction 
 of the Maine the BacJie was employed in the transportation of 
 divers and wrecking material to Havana and in carrying 
 back the dead and wounded. She was placed at the disposal 
 of the Commander of the North Atlantic Squadron the morn- 
 ing following the disaster. The Blake, in April and May, 
 made a re-survey off Key West to develop a harbor for war- 
 ships at our southernmost port. 
 
 During the war the issue of charts to the general public 
 was discontinued, the entire supply being practically confined 
 to the Army and Navy. The work of printing charts was car- 
 ried on night and day. In part, the war-room at the White 
 House was equipped by the Coast and Geodetic Survey. 
 Four large wall maps were prepared for the use of the Presi- 
 
378 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 dent. These were hung in the war room and were suitably 
 provided with small pin flags, thus enabling the Executive to 
 follow the movements of the land and sea forces. Many de- 
 tailed maps of various localities were also furnished, and 
 special information was collected as needed by the President. 
 
 While the faithful work performed in each of the above- 
 named services was of great value, yet the most important 
 function of the Department was to provide funds for the car- 
 rying on of those successful naval and military operations 
 which added so much to the glory of our arms. 
 
 In devising plans for the financial administration of a war, 
 it is the duty of those who have in charge so important a 
 trust to have regard to two things: (i) the procuring of 
 funds promptly, and in amounts sufficient to meet instantly 
 all demands of the military and naval departments; (2) in so 
 procuring funds to have great care that the public credit be 
 not impaired. As a corollary to the latter consideration 
 there should be strict attention paid to the industrial condi- 
 tion of the country itself, for it may be readily perceived that 
 anything which operates injuriously upon the business of the 
 country must also impair the nation's credit. It was the 
 hope and aim of those who had to do with the financial ad- 
 ministration of the war that these things should be ac- 
 complished. 
 
 War expenditures began practically with the blowing up of 
 the Maine. It is true, some preparations had been made in 
 view of the possibility of a conflict with Spain, but so far as 
 these are concerned they were not reflected in the withdrawal 
 of moneys from the Treasury. When, however, that sad 
 event occurred, possibility became probability, and the regular 
 appropriations, made annually with a view to the main- 
 tenance of the military and naval establishments on a peace 
 basis, were rapidly exhausted. The cash balance stood, at 
 the close of February, 1898, at $227,224,000. This by no 
 means represented the amount which would have been avail- 
 able for war purposes. It is our fixed policy to maintain, at 
 all events, the integrity of a fund in the Treasury, amounting 
 to $100,000,000, in gold, known commonly as the " gold 
 reserve." Upon this base of safety depends the stability of 
 
WORK OF THE TREASURY DEPARTMENT. 379 
 
 more than $900,000,000 in other forms of money, and to under- 
 mine this foundation, ah'eady too narrow, if measured by 
 the standard which prudent business men employ, would be 
 to threaten our whole financial structure. Having regard, 
 therefore, to the maintenance of the public credit, this fund 
 should not be impaired unless the nation's necessity should 
 be greater than the danger which would follow from a resort 
 to it. Of the remaining $127,000,000, some $33,000,000 were 
 held in trust for the redemption of notes of national banks, 
 either in process of liquidation or which were voluntarily en- 
 laced in retiring circulation : $14,000,000 must be held for 
 the redemption of Pacific Railroad bonds, due January i, 
 1899 ; $13,000,000 of fractional silver and minor coins must be 
 practically deducted, because a large part were worn and un- 
 current, and from that fund the country's needs for small 
 change must be satisfied. These deductions left but $67,000,- 
 000, and it was not to be forgotten that, while every energy 
 should be employed for war preparations, civil establishments 
 must not be the subject of any neglect. Thus some $30,000,- 
 000 or $40,000,000 were required to be kept on hand as cash 
 to be used for the ordinary functions of the Government. 
 " That amount," says a writer on war finances, " corresponds 
 to the cash on hand which a merchant keeps in the till to 
 make change, or to meet small bills." So this available cash 
 balance of $227,000,000 at the close of February, 1898, shrank, 
 when measured by the Government's ordinary needs, to 
 barely $25,000,000 or $30,000,000. 
 
 We had so long been a peace-loving nation, and it has been 
 so contrary to our traditional policy to maintain large armies, 
 and, until recently, to maintain a fleet worthy of the name, 
 that our commendable tendencies in the one direction, and 
 our reprehensible neglect, perhaps, in the other, rather 
 invited the hasty and ill-considered action of the enemy in 
 suggesting early in March the recall of Consul-General Lee. 
 This act, hostile in its nature, and following so soon after our 
 country had been plunged into the depths of sorrow by what 
 many believed to be the wanton destruction of a ship and its 
 crew, resulted in more pronounced activity looking to the 
 national defense. The President without delay conferred with 
 
3So THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 the leaders in both Houses of Congress. The result of this 
 conference was that the House, on March 8, and the Senate the 
 following day, without discussion and by a practically unani- 
 mous vote, passed a bill appropriating $50,000,000 for the 
 national defense. There has been a question whether or not 
 a still larger appropriation would not have had the moral 
 effect of aiding diplomatic negotiations, but the appropriation 
 was not made for that purpose, for the Government energeti- 
 cally began the work of preparation which was contemplated 
 by the act. The sum made available was to be expended 
 under the direction of the President. In disposing of it to 
 the best advantage, the Executive allotted to the several 
 Departments amounts in accordance with the requirements of 
 their respective services, as follows : Navy Department, 
 $29,723,274.22; War Department, $18,944,627.68; State 
 Department, $393,860.89 ; Treasury Department, $170,000.00; 
 total, $49,231,762.79. 
 
 Activity in preparation for the coming conflict was now the 
 order of the day. Others will tell how speedily the army and 
 navy were placed on a war footing by means of the money 
 thus made available by Congress. The United States Secret 
 Service, a bureau of the Treasury Department, devoted its 
 energies to the breaking up of the spy system which had been 
 established by Spanish officials at Montreal. How successful 
 this work proved to be is elsewhere told by the Chief of the 
 Service. 
 
 Until the last moment the President and other conservative 
 officials earnestly hoped that war might be escaped through 
 the medium of diplomacy. That was not to be, however, and 
 Congress, April 23, passed the declaration of war and made 
 it effective from the 2ist of that month. For the first time in 
 a half century the United States were at war with a foreign 
 nation. The storm had broken and it came swiftly. No 
 years of apprehension, no careful, patient effort to husband 
 resources as is done by nations expecting war; but the coun- 
 try was brought suddenly face to face with conditions which 
 imperatively required the immediate raising of large sums of 
 money. The enemy, while impoverished, and in a measure 
 exhausted by long continued troubles with its colonies, had. 
 
WORK OF THE TREASURY DEPARTMENT. 381 
 
 nevertheless, almost at our door an army fully equipped, 
 variously estimated in the strength of men to be six or eight 
 times that of our own. On the sea Spain was believed to be 
 nearly, if not quite, equal in the number of ships and guns, 
 and in the fighting strength of the men who manned them. The 
 enemy was instantly ready ; so must we be. With the first 
 call for volunteers — a call which met with noble response — 
 came the necessity for immediately providing adequate reve- 
 nues to meet new and extraordinary situations. Allotments 
 from the appropriation of $50,000,000 for the national defense 
 could be depended on only in part for equipping, transport- 
 ing and maintaining the thousands who rushed to the aid of 
 their country. Congress was therefore soon called upon to 
 supply deficiencies, both for the naval and military services, 
 and it was also called upon to provide means for speedily fill- 
 ing the war chest. In view of what has already been said, and 
 of the following list of appropriations made on account of the 
 war, this duty was imperative : 
 
 For the national defense, Act March 9, 1898, $50,117,000.00 
 Army and navy deficiencies, Act May 4, " 34.625,725.71 
 
 Naval Appropriation Act, May 4, 1898, amount 
 of increase over preceding naval appropria- 
 tion act, 23,095,549.49 
 Fortification Appropriation Act, May 7, 1898, 
 amount of increase over act as passed by 
 House, 5,232,582.00 
 Naval Auxiliary Act, May 26, 1898, 3,000,000.00 
 Additional clerical force, War Department, 
 
 Auditors' offices, etc.. Act May 31, 1898, 227,976.45 
 
 Life-saving Service, Act June 7, 1898, 70,000.00 
 
 Army and navy deficiencies. Act June 8, 1898, 18,015,000.00 
 Appropriations in act to provide ways and means 
 
 to meet war expenditures, June 13, 1898, 600,000.00 
 
 Army, navy and other war expenses for six 
 months, beginning July i, 1898, in general 
 deficiency act, 226,604,261.46 
 
 Expenses of bringing home remains of soldiers, 200,000.00 
 
 Total, $361,788,095.11 
 
 Committees in Congress conferred with the heads of vari- 
 ous Departments as to their necessities, and on May 3 the 
 
382 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 Secretary of the Treasury appeared before the Senate Com- 
 mittee on Finance and was questioned as to the necessity for 
 mcreased revenues and appropriations. The result of these 
 and other conferences was the War Revenue Act of June 13, 
 1898. Pending the discussion of its provisions in the House 
 and Senate, the available cash balance in the Treasury, which 
 on April 23 had been reduced to $220,364,000, or rather, as 
 previously explained, to $20,000,000 or $25,000,000 could be 
 relied upon to furnish the ready means for carrying on the 
 operations of the war. 
 
 It ordinarily happens that any scheme by which new taxes 
 are to be provided must fail of being thoroughly efficient in 
 time of war by reason of the fact that much time is consumed 
 in placing it in operation. The main point, aside from avoid- 
 ing unjust and oppressive taxation, in framing the war reve- 
 nue legislation of 1898, was to place the Treasury in a position 
 where it would be at once in receipt of additional funds. It 
 was beyond the power of any one to tell how long the war 
 would continue. Experience, drawn from other perilous times 
 counseled in favor of two courses for raising money — one by 
 borrowing, the other by levying additional taxes. It was ob- 
 vious that the whole of any great sum could not be raised by 
 taxation within the time it would be required for use, nor 
 could any great sum be raised within a short period without 
 oppressing the people and seriously affecting the financial, 
 commercial and industrial interests of the country. On the 
 whole, it seemed best (and it is believed both the present and 
 future will bear witness to the fact that it was best) to borrow 
 at once a sum sufficient to maintain active and aggressive oper- 
 ations, and at the same time, by the imposition of additional 
 taxes, to give assurance to intending subscribers to the con- 
 templated issue of bonds that the war loan would have behind 
 it a substantial increase in the revenues. 
 
 With the beginning of the new calendar year, the tariff act, 
 which had become operative July 24, 1897, had begun to ful- 
 fil the promises of its supporters that it would provide suffi- 
 cient revenues for the ordinary needs of the government. 
 Close observers of its subsequent operation were convinced 
 that when full recovery had come from the abnormally heavy 
 
WORK OF THE TREASURY DEPARTMENT. jSj 
 
 importations of the spring of 1897 the act would produce all 
 the revenue that was required. It therefore was not deemed 
 prudent to modify any of its provisions. In explanation of 
 the bill to provide ways and means to meet war expenditures 
 Mr. Dingley said : 
 
 " They (the Committee on Ways and Means) naturally have 
 had recourse to the legislation of the period of the Civil War, 
 when so large an amount had to be raised, and they have 
 found, after a careful consideration of the question of taxation, 
 that on the whole it is better at the present time, and we 
 trust that that may be all that may be necessary, that about 
 $100,000,000 additional revenue should be raised, and that 
 entirely through internal revenue legislation. Hence, the 
 war revenue bill which has been reported provides for internal 
 revenue taxes exclusively. These taxes have been selected, 
 first, because we have the machinery for the collection of 
 them now, and they can be collected with but slight additions 
 to the force and with but slight increase of expense. We 
 have selected them also because they were a source of revenue 
 successfully seized upon during the Civil War, and because 
 they are taxes either upon articles of voluntary consumption 
 or upon objects where the tax will be met by those who are 
 ordinarily able to pay them ; and we have refrained from put- 
 ting a tax in a direction where it would be purely upon con- 
 sumption, unless the consumption were an article of volun- 
 tary consumption, so that the consumer might regulate his 
 own tax, following what is the accepted rule of taxation in all 
 countries, with a view of imposing the least burden and dis- 
 turbing the business of the country as little as possible." 
 
 The bill was introduced in the House April 25, 1898, and it 
 passed that body April 29 by a vote of 181 to 131. It was 
 the subject of much consideration by the Senate Finance 
 Committee, and with amendments was reported to the Senate 
 May 12. It passed that body June 4 by a vote of 48 to 28. 
 The report of the Conference Committee was agreed to in the 
 House June 9, and in the Senate June 10. Three days later 
 it received the approval of the President, and by the terms of 
 the act went into effect the next day, except where in some 
 cases July i was specified. 
 
 Prior to the passage of the act, the more important internal 
 revenue taxes were grouped under three heads. Those under 
 the head of spirits yielded, for the fiscal year 1898, $92,500,- 
 
384 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 000 ; those under the head of tobacco, $36,000,000, and those 
 subject to tax under the head of fermented h'quors, $39,500,- 
 000. By the war revenue act, the taxes on fermented Hquors 
 and tobaccos were doubled, while there was no addition made 
 to those on spirits. Some comment has been made as to why 
 this third group was not also subjected to additional taxes. 
 The main reason lies in the fact that, with spirits already 
 taxed $1.10 per proof gallon, it was believed the revenue- 
 producing capacity of that group had been fully utilized, if 
 not exceeded. There is a maximum revenue point in all taxes 
 upon articles which are the subject of voluntary use. It is 
 doubtful if a tax of $2.20 a gallon on spirits would have added 
 greatly to Treasury receipts. In addition, the legitimate 
 trade in spirits by reason of over-production was already de- 
 pressed, and additional taxes in this direction would have 
 proved neither profitable to the government nor anything but 
 ruinous to the private interests involved. 
 
 A tax of ten cents a pound on tea imported into the 
 United States was provided, and it was estimated that the 
 revenue to be derived from this source would amount to not 
 less than $10,000,000 a year. It had been seriously contem- 
 plated, when the Dingley act was under consideration, to sub- 
 ject tea to the same tax levied by the war revenue act. The 
 main argument, aside from the revenue-producing qualities of 
 such a tax, was that its imposition would result in an improve- 
 ment in the quality of tea imported. Low grade and adul- 
 terated teas could not afford to pay the specific rate of ten 
 cents a pound, and the result would be that teas of higher 
 grades would form the bulk of importations. Such had been 
 the working of a similar tax imposed by Great Britain. By 
 the act of March 2, 1897, however, Congress had taken steps 
 to prevent the importation of spurious and adulterated teas, 
 and under its provisions the Treasury Department had 
 organized a Tea Board for the purpose of selecting standards 
 with which all subsequent importations were to be compared. 
 The new tax on tea, therefore, served a double purpose — that 
 of providing considerable additional revenue, and at the same 
 time of contributing to the efforts to secure better teas for 
 consumption in the United States. 
 
WORK OF THE TREASURY DEPARTMENT. 385 
 
 A tax known to the old internal revenue schedules, in 
 vogue during the Civil War and for some years thereafter, 
 was revived — taxes on patent and proprietary medicines and 
 toilet articles, on chewing gum, and on wine. Certain new 
 taxes on business were also provided. These were levied on 
 bankers, brokers, museums, concert halls, circuses and other 
 public exhibitions, bowling alleys and billiard and pool rooms. 
 Taxes were also levied on refiners of petroleum and sugar, 
 and on pipe line companies. Stamp taxes were also revived 
 and applied to various business transactions, as represented 
 by bonds, debentures, certificates of stock and of indebted- 
 ness, bills of exchange, bank checks and drafts, and, in fact, 
 a variety of instruments, including telegraph dispatches, ex- 
 press receipts, passenger tickets, etc. 
 
 Opportunity was also taken to incorporate in the act provi- 
 sions subjecting mixed flour to certain taxes and restrictions. 
 This was not done, of course, in aid of the public revenues, 
 but to regulate an industry which had become as objection- 
 able as that of the production of oleomargarine, which, under 
 a previous internal revenue law, had been subjected to simi- 
 lar restraints. The operation of the law for the first six 
 months of its existence indicated that it would produce 
 about $100,000,000 a year. 
 
 That part of the law which relates to loans authorized the 
 Secretary of the Treasury to issue certificates of indebted- 
 ness, payable not exceeding one year from the date of issue, 
 to the amount of $100,000,000. This provision was designed 
 to enable the Secretary to provide the public treasury with 
 funds in case it should be necessary to do so in a quicker 
 manner than could be done by availing himself of the provi- 
 sions relating to the issue of bonds. It did not become neces- 
 sary to resort to the issue of such certificates. 
 
 Section 33 of the act authorized the Secretary of the 
 Treasury to borrow on the credit of the United States 
 $400,000,000, or so much thereof as might be necessary to 
 defray expenses authorized on account of the war, and to 
 issue bonds therefor in denominations of $20 or some mul- 
 tiple of that sum, redeemable in coin at the pleasure of the 
 United States after ten years from the date of their issue 
 
386 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 payable twenty years from such date, and bearing interest pay- 
 able quarterly in coin at the rate of 3 per centum per annum. 
 The section also contained a provision that " The bonds 
 authorized by this section shall be first offered at par as a 
 popular loan, under such regulations prescribed by the 
 Secretary of the Treasury as will give opportunity to the citi- 
 zens of the United States to participate in subscriptions to 
 such loan, and in allotting said bonds the several subscrip-. 
 tions of individuals shall be first accepted, and the subscrip. 
 tions for the lowest amounts shall be first allotted." The 
 law also provided that an appropriation not exceeding one- 
 tenth of one per centum of the amount of the bonds and 
 certificates authorized be appropriated to pay the expense of 
 preparing, advertising and issuing the same. 
 
 It was decided, under this authority, to ask the people of 
 the United States to subscribe to a loan of $200,000,000. 
 It was believed that that sum, together with the additional 
 taxes to be derived from the revenue provisions of the act, 
 would be sufficient to meet the expenditures which would be 
 incurred before Congress would again meet in December. 
 Most of the large war appropriations had been made available 
 only until the 31st of that month. 
 
 The war loan of 1898 was one of the great successes of the 
 war. It exhibited the power of the public credit, and 
 increased our financial prestige both at home and abroad. 
 No sooner had it become apparent that Congress would give 
 the Secretary of the Treasury the authority above described 
 than the Department began to arrange for the floating of the 
 loan. After the report of the Conference Committee had 
 been agreed to in both Houses, the Executive approval being 
 certain, all the energies of the Department were directed 
 toward asking the people of the United States, the moment 
 the President should put his signature to the act, to subscribe 
 for bonds to the amount of $200,000,000. Late in the after- 
 noon of Saturday, June II, the Public Printer was placed in 
 possession of copy for circulars, pamphlets, blanks and 
 forms relating to the call. When the Department opened 
 for business on the Monday morning following, the immense 
 work of printing had been done, and 4,000,000 impressions 
 
WORK OF THE TREASURY DEPARTMENT. 3^7 
 
 of the various papers referred to were ready for delivery. 
 A mailing division had already been organized in the Depart- 
 ment, engaged in preparing envelopes, so that on the very 
 day the act received the Executive approval the Secretary of 
 the Treasury sent broadcast through the land the call for 
 subscriptions to the loan. Every effort possible was made 
 to make the loan what it was intended by Congress it should 
 be — a popular one. All the banks in the country, both State 
 and national, were invited to co-operate with the Secretary ; 
 the great express companies tendered their services free of 
 cost ; all the money-order post-offices were charged with the 
 receipt of subscriptions, and every newspaper in the country 
 was asked to lend its aid in disseminating information con- 
 cerning the loan. With few exceptions this was freely done, 
 and as a result of all these agencies combined it is probable 
 that few citizens of the United" States were not aware that 
 the Government had asked the people to subscribe to its 
 bonds. 
 
 The books of the loan were open for a period of thirty-two 
 days, closing July 14. The clerical work during this time 
 and subsequently was something unprecedented in the history 
 of national loans. It was not possible at the time to utilize 
 any considerable number of clerks from the regular force, 
 owing to the fact that the war had greatly increased the ordi- 
 nary business of the Department in all its branches. It 
 became necessary, therefore, to organize immediately a tempo- 
 rary force. This work was intrusted to Assistant Secretary 
 Vanderlip. The number of persons employed on this force 
 varied, according to requirements, from 350 in the latter half 
 of June to 600 at the close of August. Nor was it possible 
 to do the work in the Treasury building. For the loan of 
 1898 the " new city post-office building," not yet completed, 
 was used. The ground floor of this structure was hastily 
 prepared, and all during the summer months the several hun- 
 dred clerks of the temporary force were there engaged in re- 
 ceiving, recording and scheduling subscriptions to the loan. 
 Here, also, the first deliveries of bonds were made, a branch 
 of the office of the Register of the Treasury having been 
 organized for that purpose. Experienced clerks from the De- 
 
388 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 partment were placed in charge of the respective divisions, 
 and, notwithstanding the unprecedented character of the 
 undertaking, and its immensity, the work was satisfactorily 
 performed. Some idea of its extent may be had from the 
 fact that, during the thirty-two days the books were open, 
 more than 320,000 subscriptions were received. Of these, 
 291,850 subscribers were successful. Great as was the total 
 of subscriptions, it was evident that man)^ having large sums 
 to invest were deterred from subscribing because of the belief 
 that the loan would be absorbed by those who had invested 
 small sums. The most sanguine supporters of the popular- 
 loan idea had estimated that not more than thirty or forty 
 million dollars would be covered by subscriptions in amounts 
 of $500 and less. As a matter of fact, subscriptions of this 
 class absorbed more than half the loan, those who had sub- 
 scribed for $500 or less being allotted bonds to the amount, in 
 round numbers, of $101,000,000. The remaining $99,000,000 
 was taken by 59,626 people, whose subscriptions ranged from 
 $520 to $4,500 each. The line between the successful and 
 the unsuccessful subscriber was drawn at the latter figure, 
 each of those who subscribed for amounts of $4,500 receiving 
 only 1,300 of the bonds. One thing in particular operated to 
 encourage people of small means to invest in the loan. It 
 was confidently believed that such subscriptions would by no 
 means take the greater part of the bonds, and as an encourage- 
 ment to the humble investor the Secretary of the Treasury 
 had announced in his call for subscriptions that all of $500 
 and less would receive immediate allotments. This feature, 
 while successful beyond expectation, had also its evil results. 
 The discrimination in favor of people of small means was the 
 invitation to many to submit fictitious subscriptions, or sub- 
 scriptions signed by persons who were to have no interest in 
 the bonds. Every obstacle the Department could interpose 
 was placed in the way of such subscriptions. Many millions 
 of dollars in suspected subscriptions were suspended ; where 
 the cases were plain they were returned outright, or the 
 persons through whom they were submitted were given an 
 opportunity to explain their interest. Thousands of such 
 subscriptions, involving millions of dollars, were rejected as 
 
WORK OF THE TREASURY DEPARTMENT. 3S9 
 
 the result of the Department's searchhig investigations, and 
 the energetic efforts of the Department no doubt deterred 
 others from submitting so-called " dummy " bids. 
 
 The loan was a success from the very moment the 
 books were opened. It had been doubted by some of the 
 ablest financiers of the country whether the Government 
 could float a loan in time of war at so low a rate of interest as 
 3 per cent. There was apparently just reason for this mis- 
 giving. The old 4's and 5's were quoted at such rates in the 
 market as to bring to the holders approximately 3^ per cent, 
 a slightly larger rate than the Government proposed to attach 
 to bonds issued while the country was at war. To those who 
 were fearful of failure the Secretary of the Treasury pointed out 
 that the bonds of the new loan would find a market among 
 the national banks, because, under present conditions, they 
 were more valuable as a basis for circulation than either the 
 bonds of 1904 or 1925. It was shown that a national bank 
 doing business on a capital of $100,000 would, with the old 
 bonds as a basis for circulation, make a profit of only $65.10, 
 while with the new 3's a bank doing business with the same capi- 
 tal would make a profit of $1,437.50 in a year. It was repre- 
 sented also that the business welfare of the country required 
 that the loan, above everything else, should be a success. It 
 was as important in this respect as a victory in the field or on 
 the sea, in fact more so, for, if the war loan of 1898 had failed, 
 the disaster would have been greater than would have been the 
 defeat of General Shafter's army at Santiago or the Ameri- 
 can fleet blockading that port. The result was shown in the 
 patriotism manifested by groups of leading financiers in the 
 country, some of whom submitted offers to the Government 
 guaranteeing to take the whole or any part of the loan which 
 ihc people should leave unsubscribed. In fact, one syndicate 
 offered to take $100,000,000 of the loan at a slight premium. 
 Not many days had passed after the books were open, there- 
 fore, when it became certain that the loan would be subscribed 
 for many times over. Very nearly fourteen hundred million 
 dollars was the'amount subscribed for in all, or seven times the 
 total of bonds offered. The results set forth in a strong light 
 
390 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 our vast resources in wealth, just as the patriotic rush to arms 
 exhibited our strength in men. 
 
 On the day the loan closed Santiago fell, thus presaging 
 the end of the war. Short as was the struggle, it had not 
 been without much loss of precious lives and great cost in 
 money. It will be for others to recount the deeds of those 
 who fell ; it remains for me to tell the less thrilling story of 
 the cost to the public treasury. By December 31, when most 
 of the war appropriations expired by limitation, war expendi- 
 tures had reached a total of $195,000,000. The tendency of 
 such expenditures, during the last three months of the year, 
 showed slight decreases ; but they were still such as to indi- 
 cate that the cost, as given above, will be much enlarged. 
 
 By the end of the calendar year, also, the Government had 
 received into the Treasury almost the entire $200,000,000 on 
 account of the war loan. In receiving and disbursing large 
 sums drawn from and returned to the markets, it was the 
 intention to prevent, if possible, any derangement of com- 
 merce or the industries of the country. This, it is believed, 
 was successfully accomplished. Large expenditures, in part, 
 offset the equally large receipts ; but these could not be made 
 to coincide to such an extent as to maintain equilibrium. 
 The Secretary of the Treasury, therefore, provided that in 
 paying for the bonds of the loan subscribers might do so in 
 instalments, which would have the effect of obviating the sud- 
 den withdrawals of money from centers where it might other- 
 wise be productively employed. Deposits in national banks 
 were also largely increased by equitable distribution through- 
 out the country. These accounts, on the day the books of 
 the loan were opened, stood at $27,948,000 and had been 
 increased to $95,900,000 at the end of the year. 
 
 During all the course of the war it was the constant effort of 
 the Department to do nothing which would interrupt the 
 returning tide of prosperity. Never was there, at any time 
 during the struggle, any appreciable stringency in the money 
 market ; in fact, for the whole of the year 1898, no alarming up- 
 ward tendency of rates was noticeable, except immediately suc- 
 ceeding the destruction of the Maine and during the period of 
 uncertainty which preceded the declaration of war. Even the 
 
WORK OF THE TRP:ASURY DEPARTMENT. 
 
 :i9i 
 
 certainty of war itself, with all its disturbing Influences, fur- 
 nished only a basis for improving conditions ; thus, while the 
 nation emerged from the conflict victorious upon sea and 
 land, its credit also had been preserved, nay strengthened, and 
 the business of the country had expanded rather than dimin- 
 ished. It will not often fall to the lot of any nation to be so 
 singularly fortunate in any of these respects. 
 
CHAPTER XIX. 
 U. S. MILITARY GOVERNMENT OF SANTIAGO. 
 
 RV 
 
 Ma;.-Gen. LEONARD WOOD, U. S. V. 
 
 THE American control of affairs in the Province of San- 
 tiago began with the surrender of the Spanish Army, 
 July 17, 1898. 
 
 The problem which presented itself was a very complex 
 one and included everything, from the feeding and care of the 
 Spanish prisoners of war to the thorough and complete rees- 
 tablishment of the Civil Government. 
 
 In the city was that portion of the population which had 
 not f!ed to Caney and the Spanish prisoners of war, these latter 
 amounting to between 11,000 and 12,000 men. Round about 
 it was encamped the American Army of approximately 20,000 
 men and the Cuban forces under General Garcia of about 
 4,000. Four miles away was the village of Caney with some 
 17,000 or 18,000 refugees. It was the beginning of the most 
 unhealthy season of the year. Already the American Army 
 were feeling seriously the frightfully depressing influence of 
 the climate, and fevers of all types were prevalent, especially 
 malarial fever in all its various forms and some few cases of 
 yellow fever. 
 
 Scattered along the road between Santiago and Siboney 
 were various hospitals and detention hospitals with cases of a 
 suspicious character. Within the city, affairs were in a very 
 disorderly and demoralized state and the sanitary condition 
 was as bad as it could have been. 
 
 The American Commander, General Shafter, immediately 
 devoted himself to getting the American Army into the best 
 possible camps, as near good water as practicable and in reach 
 of the supplies of which we had a great abundance, but of 
 
394 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 which we had been unable to avail ourselves on account of 
 the bad roads. The condition of the roads was due principally 
 to the excessive amount of rain which had converted them 
 into perfect quagmires, through which wagon-trains struggled 
 painfully and slowly, carrying only a small portion of the 
 average load. At the same time he was also selecting a 
 suitable camp for the Spanish prisoners of war and making 
 the necessary arrangements to feed them and take as good 
 care of them as possible. The General's headquarters at this 
 time were in Santiago in the old palace of the Civil Governor, 
 where I had also established my headquarters on being as- 
 signed to the command of the city. 
 
 My duties were to maintain order in the city and do all 
 that I could toward improving its sanitary condition and to 
 look after the welfare and well-being of its inhabitants. It is 
 very difficult for Americans who have clean towns to appre- 
 ciate the condition in which we found the city of Santiago. 
 It is an old, tumble-down place, interesting and picturesque 
 in many ways, but at this time it was frightfully dirty and full 
 of filth, dead people, dead animals and all kinds of refuse. 
 The people were generally sick and terror-stricken from the 
 siege and the frightful effects of starvation and disease. It 
 was difTficult to work with such material, and at first very 
 arbitrary measures had to be employed to get men to do the 
 necessary sanitary work. This was accomplished however by 
 rounding up, under military guard each morning, a certain 
 number of men and putting them to work for the day. At 
 night they were lined up and paid a dollar apiece. The same 
 methods were employed to obtain wagons to haul away the 
 refuse. None of our Army wagons were available as they 
 were all required to haul rations out to our camps and to the 
 Spanish prisoners of war, so we had to depend on such wagons 
 as we could find in the city. Their owners were either afraid 
 or unwilling to work, and the only way we could get them 
 was to order the chief of police to assemble all sorts of 
 wagon transportation at a certain point each morning. The 
 collection of wagons was then sent out in detachments under 
 military guard to do the work of the day whatever it happened 
 to be. The city was at once divided into districts and a 
 
U. S. MILITARY GOVERNMENT OF SANTIAGO. 395 
 
 thorough house-to-house inspection made as rapidly as pos- 
 sible, the most unsanitary sections and houses being especially 
 reported upon and made the subject of immediate action. 
 At the same time, while this was being done, it was necessary 
 to maintain a very rigid system of police to prevent looting 
 and robbery, as the city was practically without any local 
 government and full of people thoroughly demoralized. The 
 sick had also to be looked after as well as we could. There 
 were no less than 15,000 reported among the population, who 
 had to be taken care of and fed. Food and medicine had to 
 be furnished to all charitable institutions, also to the sick of 
 the Spanish Army of whom we had over 2,000. The people 
 were returning from Caney where they had been exposed to 
 great hardships and undergone great suffering. They nearly 
 all came back either actually sick or just beginning to break 
 down. The hospitals were overcrowded with people and were 
 found to be almost entirely without food and entirely without 
 medicines and surgical supplies. The same conditions pre- 
 vailed in the orphan asylum and the asylum for old people. 
 There was absolutely no money in the city treasury and, out- 
 side of rice, some flour and coffee, there w^as no food in the 
 city. In fact there was a condition of the utmost demorali- 
 zation and destitution. This, combined with the well-known 
 unhealthiness of the city and its reputation for being one of 
 the hotbeds of yellow fever in the island, made the situation 
 extremely grave. All about the city in every direction, ex- 
 tensive earthworks had been thrown up and land torn up 
 for other purposes, all of which tended to increase tremen- 
 dously the already prevalent malaria and to produce the worst 
 types of this disease. From all the surrendered province the 
 smaller towns were sending in appeals for food and assistance. 
 The harbor was full of transports loaded with food and sup- 
 plies which we were getting on shore and distributing as 
 rapidly as possible. Nearly all the lighters had been de- 
 stroyed and the docking facilities were very limited, hence 
 this work was necessarily interfered with a good deal and 
 rendered slower than would otherwise have been the case, but 
 those having it in charge did the best they possibly could 
 under the circumstances and deserve credit for the result 
 
396 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 which they obtained. In criticizing their work it must be 
 remembered that they struggled with great difficulties, not 
 the least among these being the fact that it was impossible to 
 get suitable workmen. The population was demoralized and 
 sickly, and the men employed were able to do only a portion 
 of the work which robust men could have done. However, 
 at the end of a week we had the sanitary renovation of the 
 worst portions of the city well under way and had removed 
 all the dead people from the houses and the dead animals from 
 the streets, burying the one and burning the other. The 
 death rate, as a direct result of the hardships of El Caney 
 and the upturning of the earth, was rapidly increasing, and it 
 now reached the rather alarming proportion of nearly 200 per 
 day. Many of the cases were suspicious and it was extremely 
 difficult to get undertakers and others to dispose properly 
 of the dead. So great was this difficulty that it was finally 
 resolved to burn them, as a means of getting them out of the 
 way and as a preventive of further infection. This was ac- 
 complished in a rather crude but effective manner with a 
 grating of railroad iron, piling the bodies upon it, mixed with 
 grass, sticks, etc., and saturating the whole with kerosene. 
 This measure seemed to meet with the entire approval of the 
 people and undoubtedly resulted beneficially. 
 
 The municipal police were reorganized and given all possi- 
 ble support, and the condition of the public order in the city 
 soon became excellent. The Spanish prisoners of war gave us 
 absolutely no trouble and were as law-abiding a set of men as 
 I have ever seen. Physicians had been appointed to the 
 different hospitals and rations regularly issued to the sick. 
 One Court of the First Instance was in operation and also the 
 municipal courts of the city. The Spanish prison which w^as 
 found full of political prisoners, was thoroughly inspected and 
 all those held for political reasons were promptly released. 
 Large working parties were set to work on the water-system, 
 repairing the injuries done during the siege and making every 
 effort to get it into efficient working condition. Large tem- 
 porary crematories were established outside the city where all 
 infectious materials were taken and destroyed. 
 
 A yellow fever hospital was established on an island in the 
 
U. S. MILITARY GOVERNMENT OF SANTIAGO. 397 
 
 harbor and relief stations for the distribution of rations and 
 medicines put into operation throughout the city. At each 
 of these reHef stations food was issued from 7 A. M. till dark. 
 No effort was made to issue rations in exact amounts, but 
 every one strove to give the people, who applied, that which 
 they most needed. This work was very successful, thanks to 
 the liberal issue of supplies sent to the Army and also to the 
 large amount of Cuban rations on hand and the very liberal 
 assistance of the Red Cross. The results of this systematic 
 work were soon apparent, both in the appearance of the city 
 and in the health and condition of the people. The place had 
 become comparatively clean and the death rate sensibly 
 decreased. A spirit of confidence soon began to appear 
 among the people. Public order became excellent and rob- 
 beries and disorders of rare occurrence. The Cuban people 
 deserve great credit for the orderly manner in which they con- 
 ducted themselves and the self-restraint which they displayed 
 in these very trying days of reorganization. 
 
 In August the Spanish prisoners of war were removed and 
 the American Army of invasion also, the latter being replaced 
 by Volunteer troops. These were established as rapidly as 
 possible in suitable camps about the city and at the various 
 towns throughout the conquered territory, and every effort 
 was made to put them in as good sanitary condition as pos- 
 sible. 
 
 General Lawton had succeeded General Shafter as Com- 
 manding General of the Department. General Garcia had 
 visited the city and had been received with every considera- 
 tion and honor which we could show him, and he seemed to 
 appreciate fully the attentions which he had received. 
 
 The Cuban Army in the province was rapidly disintegrating 
 and the people going back to their homes. There were some 
 disorders in the interior, robberies, etc., but considering the 
 situation and conditions these were remarkably few. 
 
 The school system of Santiago was reestablished, a local 
 Board of Education having been appointed and some twenty 
 schools started in the city under native teachers. People 
 showed a keen appreciation of the advantages offered them 
 and the number of schools had to be rapidly increased. At 
 
398 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 the present time there are, including the kindergarten, some 
 sixty schools. The hospitals had in the meantime been thor- 
 oughly renovated and supplied, as far as it was possible for us 
 to do so, with the necessary medicines and apparatus. The 
 municipal courts were put on a better footing and sanitary 
 work in Santiago and other cities was being pushed as rapidly 
 as possible. The health of the Volunteers who replaced the 
 Regulars was far from good and, although given every atten- 
 tion in their food, shelter, etc., we found that the amount of 
 sickness among them was very great ; in fact it was very evi- 
 dent that the sickness was due, not altogether as we had at first 
 supposed to the exposure and service incidental to the cam- 
 paign, but really principally to the effects of the climate. Those 
 of us living under the best conditions obtainable were almost 
 as much subject to the fever as others. In short I do not 
 believe that the large amount of sickness in the Army of inva- 
 sion was due to anything else than the effects of the climate 
 and exposure during the campaign. Troops can be kept in 
 Cuba in fairly healthy condition, provided they are given good 
 shelter and kept at a fair elevation above the sea. It is very 
 important that they should be in buildings under heavy roofs, 
 well protected from the sun. Good health cannot be main- 
 tained in tents. I believe that if we use the caution which 
 the British have observed in Jamaica and elsewhere, we can 
 obtain the same results and maintain an army in a state of 
 efficiency and good health. Mounted troops will however 
 be able to do much better duty in this island than foot troops, 
 for the vegetation is so dense that a march is extremely hot 
 work, and in the rainy season the men are always wet from 
 the brush, mud, etc., under foot. 
 
 In October General Lawton went home on sick leave hav- 
 ing had a long siege of fever and I was left in command of 
 the Department. The situation as it then stood was : — the 
 city of Santiago had been pretty well cleaned up and in fairly 
 good running order; a fair condition of confidence and good 
 order existed throughout the surrendered territory ; the 
 people were beginning to return from Jamaica and other out- 
 side places, whither they had gone to escape the war. During 
 October a general renovation of all public buildings and a 
 
U. S. MILITARY GOVERNMENT OF SANTIAGO. 399 
 
 sytematic repair of the streets of the city and roads about it 
 was commenced, about one thousand men being employed. 
 Schools were increased both in Santiago, Guantanamo, Man- 
 zanillo and other large towns of the province. The evacua- 
 tion of the province by Spanish troops was completed and 
 the towns up to this time held by them were put through the 
 same process of renovation which had taken place in Santiago. 
 At this time the most wretched of all portions of the province 
 was the District of Holguin where the people were found in a 
 condition of the greatest destitution and suffering, and the 
 whole district thoroughly infested with smallpox. Active 
 measures were taken to stamp this out, the people of the dis- 
 trict being vaccinated and some of the small infected thatched 
 villages destroyed. Clothing and medicine in large supplies 
 were obtained both by purchase and from the various chari- 
 table contributions ; a large corps of medical men were put to 
 work ; military quarantine was established and every energy 
 devoted to bringing the district into a state of normal health 
 and establishing wholesome sanitary conditions. This work 
 was under the immediate charge of Colonel Duncan N. Hood, 
 2d. Immunes, who had as his chief medical officer. Captain 
 Robert S. Woodson, U. S. A., with an able corps of Cuban 
 assistants, chief of whom was Colonel Felipe Veranes of the 
 Cuban Army. All these gentlemen deserve the greatest 
 credit, as their work was of the highest degree of efficiency 
 and thoroughness and as the service rendered to the people 
 of the afflicted district was invaluable. They established 
 large isolation hospitals and in the comparatively short time 
 of six weeks had the disease thoroughly under control and at 
 the present time it has been practically stamped out. 
 
 The light-houses throughout the Department were reestab- 
 lished in October. Extensive plans for reopening of roads 
 which had been abandoned for many years were completed ; 
 indigent rations were sent to the interior towns within our 
 reach and every effort made to get the people away from the 
 larger towns and scattered upon their plantations throughout 
 the Department. The end of December found the condition 
 of the province as regards public health excellent with the 
 exception of the remains of the epidemic in Holguin. The 
 
400 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR, 
 
 rural police of 250 men had been established, divided into 
 four companies and stationed in the large towns in different 
 parts of the province. These men are thoroughly acquainted 
 with the country and also with the disorderly element. They 
 have rendered efficient service up to date and they will, I 
 believe, be able to maintain order throughout the interior. 
 Municipal government in all the larger towns has been re- 
 established and these different towns made self-supporting as 
 far as possible. The courts, including the Supreme Court, 
 have been put in thorough working order ; freedom given the 
 press, and the people granted a Bill of Rights which gives 
 them the privilege of free assemblage, a guarantee of prompt 
 trial and right to give bail for all offenses not capital. Good 
 public spirit is rapidly developing and the people are all inter- 
 ested in the welfare of the province and the improvement of 
 the public service. Especially is this true of the interest in 
 the schools, which is very keen, and in the establishment of a 
 thorough judicial system. They are all anxious to have a 
 modification of the existing methods of procedure and also to 
 have a public school system on the same basis as the public 
 school system of the United States. There is a strong spirit 
 abroad for provincial and municipal autonomy, which spirit, 
 while it recognizes the necessity of a Central Government, 
 wishes it to be as limited in its jurisdiction as possible and as 
 inexpensive as consistent with efficiency. 
 
 The revenues of the province are ample for the maintenance 
 of the present form of government and for the support of the 
 necessary police, etc., as well as the maintenance of several 
 thousand men engaged in public works, such as road building 
 and harbor improvements. Several hundred miles of road 
 have been built. Plans for water-works and harbor improve- 
 ments in the larger towns have been completed, and in Santi- 
 ago the Barber Asphalt Company are laying five miles of 
 pavement, at the same time putting in modern sewers and a 
 modern water-system, as the work is completed. Dredging 
 plans for the harbor have been finished and work is about to 
 begin. In addition to paying the expenses of the Civil Gov- 
 ernment, $220,000 was saved from the customs revenue of the 
 province between July 17 and Dec. 31, 1898. This will be 
 
U. S. MILITARY GOVERNMENT OE SANTIAGO. 401 
 
 devoted to payment for the pavement and partial payment 
 for the dredging. The improvements are much needed and 
 the people are anxious to assist in every way in these public 
 works. 
 
 The present condition of the province is one which promises 
 well for the future and if the details of the Civil Government 
 are not pressed upon them too rapidly and if they are left to 
 assimilate and absorb what has already been given them, 
 before attempting more advanced problems, good results may 
 be expected. The people as a class are kind and impulsive in 
 disposition and are sincerely anxious to learn and to improve. 
 One thing must be remembered and that is that a solid foun- 
 dation must be built before the superstructure is put on. 
 There is needed : — reform in the courts and methods of pro- 
 cedure ; honest municipal administration with thorough root- 
 ing up of old and corrupt methods accompanied by much 
 needed sanitary reforms, etc. ; construction of proper hospitals 
 and schools ; also a thorough reformation of the present edu- 
 cational methods with the construction of suitable buildings ; 
 honest work for honest pay, and an entire avoidance of the 
 former ruinous system of multitudinous office-holders in the 
 ruined public buildings of towns with empty treasuries, 
 ghastly hospitals and impossible streets. 
 
CHAPTER XX. 
 
 THE WORK OF THE CUBAN DELEGATION. 
 
 BY 
 
 Gkn. T. ESTRADA PALMA. Delegate Plenipotentiary of the Republic of Cuba. 
 
 AFTER the peace of Zanjon, in 1878, the Cuban leaders 
 for the most part left Cuba and scattered through 
 Spanish America and the United States. A great 
 many individuals and families later followed their example 
 and it may be broadly stated that nearly all the Cubans out- 
 side of Cuba, after the termination of the ten years war, were 
 in sympathy with the idea of Cuban independence. Jose 
 Marti conceived the idea of organizing the Cuban immigration 
 into a revolutionary party and succeeded in establishing clubs 
 throughout Central and South America, Mexico, Santo Do- 
 mingo, Jamaica, Haiti and in many cities of the United 
 States, particularly in the cigar-manufacturing centers. These 
 clubs were united to form what was called the Cuban Revolu- 
 tionary Party. They elected a president, who was called a 
 Delegate, and a treasurer, the Delegate naming the secretary 
 of the party. 
 
 The following are the by-laws of the Cuban Revolutionary 
 Party : 
 
 Article ist. The Cuban Revolutionary Party is estab- 
 lished with the object of accomplishing, by the united efforts 
 of all men of good will, the absolute independence of the 
 island of Cuba, and with the object of aiding a similar move- 
 ment for Porto Rico. 
 
 Article 2nd. The Cuban Revolutionary Party does not 
 intend to precipitate war in Cuba inconsiderately, nor to be- 
 gin a movement crudely and inharmoniously, at th-e expense 
 of the country, but to bring about an organization approved 
 by all the various elements and in accord with them all, which 
 
404 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 will undertake a war, brief in duration, whole-hearted and 
 single-aimed, for the purpose of establishing peace, opportu- 
 nities of work and consequent happiness, for all the inhab- 
 itants of the island. 
 
 Article 3rd. The Cuban Revolutionary Party will bring 
 together all the revolutionary elements now existing and, 
 without degrading compromises with any man or body of men, 
 will unite in the common movement all the elements, so that 
 war may be conducted in a thoroughly republican spirit and 
 method, with the sole aim of establishing a nation able to 
 guarantee the happiness of its own children and to fulfil in 
 the history of the Continent the difficult duties that its geo- 
 graphical situation entails. 
 
 Article 4th. The Cuban Revolutionary Party does not 
 propose to perpetuate in the Cuban Republic, under new 
 guises and with new words, the spirit of tyrannical authority 
 and the bureaucratic composition of the colony but to found 
 and to insure, in the untrammeled and free exercise of the 
 legitimate rights of man, a new nation, sincere in its democ- 
 racy and able by honesty, stability and hard work to cope 
 with the dangers that nearly always attend a novel condition 
 of society existing among a people suddenly brought out of 
 bondage into freedom. 
 
 Article 5th. The Cuban Revolutionary Party does not 
 propose to give over Cuba to the oppression of a dominant 
 victorious party that will look on the island as its prey by 
 right of conquest. It seeks only to insure by all legitimate 
 means, which the freedom and protection of foreign countries 
 offer it, the war which will be for the dignity and welfare of 
 all the Cubans ; and to deliver to all the inhabitants a liberated 
 country. 
 
 Article 6th. The Cuban Revolutionary Party is estab- 
 lished to found one free and united country in which the ele- 
 ments of organization will, from the first, work together to 
 overcome the dangers threatening them at home and abroad, 
 to substitute reform and good order for the economic disorder 
 in which the financial system of the island is now and to pre- 
 pare it for its immediate development. 
 
 Article 7th. The Cuban Revolutionary Party will en- 
 deavor not to utter an indiscreet word, or do any indiscreet 
 action which might attract the ill-will of other peoples or 
 countries with whom it is the duty of Cuba, not only from 
 motives of prudence but of affection, to maintain friendly re- 
 lations. 
 
THE WORK OF THE CUBAN DELEGATION 405 
 
 Article 8th The Cuban Revolutionary Party has for its 
 purposes : 
 
 1st, To unite in a continuous and common effort for Cuba's 
 liberty all the Cubans residing in foreign lands 
 
 2nd. To encourage sincere and cordial relations among 
 the political and historical factors and agents in and out of 
 the island which can contribute to the swift success of the 
 war, and to aid and strengtiien all the institutions that after 
 the war shall be established and founded in consequence of it. 
 
 3rd. To disseminate in Cuba the knowledge of the spirit, 
 aims and methods of the revolution and to bring all the in- 
 habitants of the island to one mind with a spirit favorable to 
 victory, in order that war may speedily be conducted with- 
 out unnecessary risk to Cuban lives 
 
 4th To collect funds for the realization of that pro- 
 gramme and to open every possible source for the war, and 
 
 5th To establish discreetly, with countries friendly to 
 US; relations which will tend to accelerate with the least pos- 
 sible blood and sacrifice the successful issue of the war and 
 the foundation of the new republic which is indispensable to 
 American equilibrium. 
 
 The members of the clubs contributed funds which were re- 
 mitted to the treasurer who expended the moneys on the 
 order of the Delegate 
 
 Jose Marti was elected the first Delegate and undertook the 
 work of opening and maintaining correspondence and com- 
 munications with those in various parts of Cuba who were 
 likely to respond to a call to arms in favor of the independ- 
 ence of their country. The preliminary work of organiza- 
 tion lasted several years. At the end of that time Marti 
 had conferred with all the principal veteran leaders of the ten 
 years war, who had agreed that General Maximo Gomez, then 
 residing in Santo Domingo, should be the Commander-in-chief 
 of the coming revolution. 
 
 As the Spaniards did not allow the inhabitants of Cuba to 
 own rifles without permits, plans had to be made for the 
 shipment of arms as well as munitions to the island. Ac- 
 cordingly a large supply of war material was purchased and 
 when all plans had been perfected and the various agents in 
 Cuba had notified Marti that the people were ready to rise, 
 three vessels, the Baracoa, the Auiadis and the Lagonda, were 
 chartered to take the various generals and their followers, to- 
 
4o6 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 gether with the arms, to Cuba. The landings were to be sim- 
 ultaneous and in several parts of the island. General Gomez 
 was to take one vessel, General Maceo another, and Generals 
 Roloff and Sanchez the third. Unfortunately the Lagonda 
 was seized in Fernandina, Fla., by the United States authori- 
 ties, as were also the arms and munitions. As the plan had 
 failed Marti notified all those concerned that for the time 
 being the uprising had to be postponed. This seizure 
 occurred about the middle of January, 1895. Efforts made 
 for the restitution of the war material were successful. The 
 people of Matanzas notified Marti that to delay the uprising 
 was extremely dangerous as they were likely to be imprisoned 
 and their secret deposits of arms and munitions discovered 
 by the Spanish authorities. As a result Marti sailed for San- 
 to Domingo to join Gomez having previously designated 
 the 24th of February as the day on which the uprising in 
 Cuba should take place. On his leaving the United States, 
 the afTairs of the Cuban Revolutionary Party were left in 
 charge of Benjamin J. Guerra, the treasurer, and Gonzalo de 
 Quesada, the secretary. After the death of Marti in May, 
 1895, an election was held by the clubs constituting the Cuban 
 Revolutionary Party and the writer was elected Delegate. 
 
 During the ten years war, the interests of the Cuban revolu- 
 tion abroad were attended to by a body of men who were known 
 as the Cuban Junta. This name was revived by the news- 
 papers and by those familiar with certain affairs and was ap- 
 plied to designate the Cuban Delegation, which has been 
 commonly known as the Cuban Junta. 
 
 On the establishment of a civil government by the Cuban 
 Revolutionists in the fall of 1895, I was elected by the Con- 
 stituent Assembly as Delegate Plenipotentiary abroad, be- 
 ing vested with the fullest powers of representation as to all 
 matters pertaining to Cuban interests, including diplomatic 
 relations. The Delegate was empowered to appoint all em- 
 ployes or representatives and to remove them at his pleasure, 
 to receive, collect and invest all funds, to raise money by 
 issuing securities or otherwise, to purchase and ship war 
 material, to represent the Cuban Government at Washington 
 and to appoint representatives with diplomatic functions to 
 other countries. 
 
THE WORK OF THE CUBAN DELEGATION. 407 
 
 The funds for the expedition to Cuba were all furnished 
 by the Delegation; there was no private enterprise. After 
 Marti and Gomez from Santo Domingo and the Maceos and 
 their followers from Costa Rica had been landed in Cuba in 
 April, the first large expedition to land was that led by Roloff 
 and Sanchez in the summer of 1895. 
 
 It will be remembered that after General Martinez Campos's 
 defeat by Maceo at Peralejo, the former withdrew to Bayamo 
 and sent to Santa Clara and Puerto Principe for reinforce- 
 ments. It was then that Roloff and Sanchez were landed on 
 the south coast of Santa Clara and the organization of that 
 province was perfected before Martinez Campos could extri- 
 cate himself from Bayamo. The next expeditions sent by 
 the Delegation landed in the province of Santiago, the one 
 under Francisco Sanchez Echevarria, the other under Carlos 
 Manuel de Cespedes. In January, 1896, General Calixto 
 Garcia sailed from the city of New York with a large 
 supply of arms and ammunition, on the steamer Hawkins, 
 which unfortunately foundered at sea, a number of the men 
 and crew being drowned. The steamer Bermuda was then 
 procured and Garcia was about to leave the harbor of New 
 York when, on the 24th of February, he was arrested with over 
 one hundred companions, the vessel and cargo being both 
 seized. General Garcia was admitted to bail and, as soon as 
 the Bermuda was released and the cargo partly restored, 
 sailed for Cuba, landing in Santiago where he fought until the 
 end of the war. 
 
 Towards the end of December, 1895, when the invasion of 
 the western provinces by Gomez and Maceo was attracting 
 so much attention, the Delegate prepared and presented a 
 petition to the Government of the United States, asking that 
 belligerent rights be granted to the Cubans. The Delegate, 
 accompanied by Mr. Gonzalo de Quesada and Mr. Horatio S. 
 Rubens, counsel of the Delegation, went to Washington and 
 Cuba's case was presented to Secretary Olney and to the 
 members of Congress. Much opposition was encountered by 
 reason of the fact that the Cubans had adopted the policy of 
 destroying the cane-fields in order to cut off the resources of 
 Spain, some plantations being owned by citizens of the 
 
4o8 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 United States. This opposition was soon overcome, and 
 towards the end of January, 1 896 a resolution was presented to 
 the Senate by the Committee on Foreign Relations favoring 
 the recognition of the belligerency of the Cubans. The mani- 
 fold duties of the Delegate necessitated his frequent visits to 
 New York, where the office of the Cuban Delegation had 
 been established, and in consequence he appointed Mr. Gon- 
 zalo de Quesada as Charg6 d'affaires at Washington so that 
 the interests of Cuba might constantly be represented at the 
 capital. 
 
 From the very first all possible efforts were made to secure 
 the sympathy and suppor.t of the American press, as being the 
 best medium possible for spreading propaganda in favor of 
 the insurrection, throughout the United States. At all times 
 access was given to the representatives of newspapers who 
 were ever ready to state the Cuban case as it was explained 
 to them. Notwithstanding all charges to the contrary, not a 
 dollar was spent by the Cuban Delegation for the support of 
 the American press, which did so much to rouse that popular 
 opinion which ultimately compelled the effective intervention 
 of the United States in Cuba. 
 
 The amount of good done to the cause of Cuba by the 
 newspapers cannot be overrated ; although it is true that 
 many false and exaggerated reports were published, the Dele- 
 gation at no time stood sponsor for them. From the very 
 first the rule was adopted to publish nothing but what the 
 Delegation was convinced was true and which might be proven, 
 if necessary. The circulation of pamphlets, while effective to 
 a certain extent, was found to be almost useless with public 
 men, who receive so many pamphlets in their mail that they 
 tossed them directly from the desk to the waste basket. Ac- 
 cordingly, every member of the House of Representatives and 
 of the Senate was visited in person and the cause of Cuba 
 was pleaded. The result was that, backed by the progress of 
 the Cuban invasion of the western provinces and later on by 
 the wonderful campaign of Maceo in Pinar del Rio, the ques- 
 tion of the recognition of belligerent rights of the Cuban in- 
 surgents became the most prominent one before Congress. 
 Information of all kinds was asked for by the friends of Cuba 
 
THE WORK OF THE CUBAN DELEGATION. 409 
 
 who favored recognition, as material for the preparation of their 
 speeches, and no adequate idea can be formed of the amount 
 of labor necessary to supply this demand alone. The debates 
 had to be attended daily in order to supply data for the 
 correction of misstatement of facts and for the contraversion 
 of the arguments used by the friends of Spain. As a result, 
 nearly the whole night had to be spent in drawing up memo- 
 randa for use on the following day. It will be remembered 
 that the debate on the first resolution favoring the recogni- 
 tion of belligerency, which was adopted by an overwhelming 
 majority in both Houses, lasted several months. While this 
 work was being carried forward the newspapers were not neg- 
 lected and at the same time a heavy correspondence from 
 all the United States and foreign countries had to be at- 
 tended to, funds raised, arms and ammunition bought, vessels 
 procured and expeditions sent to strengthen the equipment 
 of the Cuban forces, there being throughout the war thou- 
 sands of men who had taken the field, but who were entirely 
 unarmed. At the same time communications had to be main- 
 tained between the Delegation and the Civil Government in 
 Cuba as well as with the Commander-in-chief and the Com- 
 manders of the various provinces. Questions of policy were 
 thus determined on and the most urgent needs of the various 
 Army Corps were ascertained. The means of communication 
 were extremely precarious and the utmost care had to be 
 taken in the selection of the persons who were entrusted 
 with the correspondence. Employes of regular steamship 
 lines, either native Cubans or well-known sympathizers, 
 would carry the correspondence at great personal risk and 
 deliver it to the secret agents or committees in the Cuban 
 ports who then undertook to dispatch the letters to their des- 
 tination, and to return the answers through the same channels. 
 When communication became more systematic in the island, 
 the Delegation ordered an issue of postage stamps of various 
 denominations and sent them to the proper authorities in 
 Cuba. 
 
 During the progress ot the invasion, because of the rapid- 
 ity of the movements of the Cuban troops and the uncer- 
 tainty of finding them in a prescribed district at a certain 
 
4IO THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 time, it was impossible to land war supplies for their use. 
 Even after Maceo had returned to the province of Pinar del 
 Rio, many months had to pass before an expedition could 
 safely be sent to him, because of the extreme vigilance and 
 number of Spanish cruisers guarding the coast of Pinar del 
 Rio and the large number of Spanish troops who were patrol- 
 ling the coast. 
 
 A deposit of arms and ammunition had been made at Key 
 West, which were intended to be sent to Cuba when oppor- 
 tunity offered, and some of these were placed on the sailing 
 vessel Competitor with Colonel Munson and about forty men. 
 After landing most of the men and a portion of the cargo on 
 the coast of Pinar del Rio, a Spanish gunboat captured the ves- 
 sel and its remaining cargo, together with a number of the 
 crew. There being some American citizens among the pris- 
 oners, the United States intervened in their behalf, prevented 
 their execution after they had been condemned to death and 
 ultimately succeeded in obtaining their release. The few 
 thousands of cartridges which were landed by the Competitor 
 were safely delivered to Maceo, who made good use of them 
 by administering a signal defeat to the Spaniards in the 
 battle of Cacaraiicara. Subsequently the Delegation suc- 
 ceeded in landing several important expeditions in Pinar del 
 Rio, one of which carried a dynamite cannon, which had been 
 previously tested. This was successfully used by Maceo, for 
 the first time in actual warfare. This expedition was in 
 charge of General Rius Rivera who afterward succeeded 
 Maceo in command of the Province of Pinar del Rio and who 
 was subsequently captured by the Spaniards. The Delega- 
 tion used its judgment in sending supplies to the island, 
 selecting such provinces for immediate relief as appeared to 
 be in most urgent need. Although the forces throughout the 
 island were all necessitous, nevertheless care had to be taken 
 to land resources in the places where they were least exposed 
 to capture by the Spaniards and where, for the time being, 
 there were important operations. 
 
 The problem of sending supplies became more and more 
 difificult as time went on. It was harder to leave the shores 
 of the United States with a cargo than it was to land it in 
 
THE WORK OF THE CUBAN DELEGATION. 411 
 
 Cuba. President Cleveland issued two proclamations several 
 months apart, calling upon all citizens and residents of the 
 United States to respect the neutrality laws. The utmost 
 rigor was exercised by the Federal authorities, who, in their 
 anxiety to avoid the possibility of all claims by Spain against 
 the United States for violation of neutrality, proceeded 
 rather too far in restraining the sailing of expeditions. The 
 best proof of unjust discrimination against the Cubans, in this 
 particular, is that the Government failed in every prosecution 
 to obtain a forfeiture either of the vessel or its cargo. There 
 were a great many of these prosecutions which put the Dele- 
 gation to great expense and caused it to lose valuable time in 
 the landing of much needed supplies in Cuba. An extensive 
 system of espionage was established along the Atlantic coast 
 by the Spaniards, who virtually were put in control of all the 
 machinery of the Treasury Department and even of the Navy 
 to prevent the sailing of supplies. 
 
 All that was needed was a fair amount of suspicion aroused 
 in some Spanish agent and complaint founded thereon, to ob- 
 tain an order for a revenue cutter or naval vessel to proceed to 
 the point from which the expedition was supposed to be about 
 to sail and to have the local United States District Attorney and 
 Marshal prepared to seize, arrest and prosecute. It was de- 
 cided over and over again that the shipment of arms and mu- 
 nitions to the Cuban insurgents was not a violation of the 
 laws of neutrality, but nevertheless the seizures and prosecu- 
 tions continued. 
 
 Aside from the extraordinary official vigilance and strin- 
 gency, the continued risk of discovery made it necessary to 
 change the point of shipment in each succeeding expedition, 
 or at least to vary the plan of sailing. There was, too, con- 
 stant danger that the crews of the vessels woukl give informa- 
 tion to the authorities. This indeed happened at least on 
 their return from the landing in Cuba in almost every instance 
 where a large vessel demanding a numerous crew was used. 
 No matter how well these men were paid, the Spaniards 
 almost invariably succeeded in bribing some of them to 
 testify. At one time there was a prosecution of those who 
 were on board or managed the expedition, every time a ves- 
 
412 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 sel returned to the United States. Of the large number of 
 prosecutions of individuals for the violation of the neutrality 
 laws, only three were successful. The men convicted were 
 Captain Wiborg, Captain John D. Hart and Dr. Joseph J. Luis, 
 in the order named. With the captains there was compara- 
 tively little trouble. One indeed turned informer and suc- 
 ceeded in convicting Dr. Luis and another meditated the sur- 
 render of an expedition to the Spaniards. This was 
 discovered, however, before he could do any harm. The 
 Spanish agents offered liberal rewards to the captains who 
 were known to be in the service of the Delegation to give in- 
 formation concerning plans or to betray the landing point in 
 Cuba, but without success. There was never a more honest 
 and loyal set of men than these. The one who took the 
 largest number of expeditions to Cuba is Captain John 
 O'Brien, popularly known as " Dynamite " Johnny O'Brien. 
 Among the others who served faithfully and well are Captains 
 Morton and Edward Murphy who have since died, Captains 
 Lewis, Dickman, Wiborg, Riley and Samuel Hughes, the last 
 of whom was particularly brave and dashing. He even took 
 his wife with him on two occasions. 
 
 It was found to be extremely dangerous to notify the 
 Cubans in the field that an expedition would be landed at 
 a given point, at a certain time, because any movement of 
 the Cuban troops towards the coast would become known to 
 the Spaniards, who, immediately suspecting the true reason, 
 would dispatch a large body of troops to the neighborhood 
 and send several gun-boats to control that part of the coast. 
 
 It was for this reason, as well as the practical difficulties of 
 making the landing in any other manner than by surf-boats, 
 that it was found necessary to send men with the arms, 
 whose duty it was to load the small boats, row them ashore, 
 land the supplies and then either transport them inland or 
 bury them while they went into the interior to notify the 
 Cuban troops of the landing place. Considering the great 
 dif^culties attending the proper organization, dispatch and 
 landing of these expeditions, it is really remarkable that 
 there were so few losses. 
 
 In the course of the revolution, the Delegation lost three 
 
THE WORK OF THE CUBAN DELEGATION. 413 
 
 steamers, which foundered at sea, all under nearly the same 
 conditions. It is a curious fact that each of these vessels was 
 lost in the month of January, the Hazvkins in 1896, the Com- 
 modore in 1897 and the Tillie in 1898. In each case, the 
 pumps, which had been properly tested before starting, were 
 found to be clogged when the critical moment came and 
 other circumstances tend to show that there was foul play. 
 In each instance, the Spanish officials in the United States 
 were aware that the vessel was about to sail, but made no at- 
 tempt to prevent it. The Hawkins and Coininodore with the 
 James H. Woodall were the property of the Delegation, while 
 the Tillie was merely chartered. The Delegation made it a 
 rule to charter rather than to buy a vessel, because of the 
 fact that after the first expedition the vessel would be the sub- 
 ject of a continuous and strict surveillance, and the hiring of a 
 crew for such a vessel would be fraught with grave danger of 
 having a spy or a traitor appear on board. 
 
 The vessels used at various times in this service were the 
 Bermuda, the Three Friends, the Laurada, the Dauntless, the 
 Horsa, the James H. Woodall, the Leon, the Monarch, the Som- 
 iners Smith, the George IV. Childs and the Commodore, which 
 made two successful trips before she foundered. 
 
 These expeditions were in charge of the chief of expedi- 
 tions. General Emilio Nunez, and Dr. Joaquin D. Castillo, 
 who alternated in taking them to the Cuban shores. Colonel 
 Federico Perez Carbo also landed a number of them, once be- 
 ing attacked ^by two Spanish gun-boats, which he succeeded 
 in outrunning. 
 
 Hardly was one expedition landed before another had to be 
 undertaken and in all thirty-six expeditions were landed suc- 
 cessfully. It was thus that the Cubans were supplied with 
 arms and ammunition. It meant the running of a blockade 
 byjthe United States vessels to leave the American shores 
 and the running ^of the Spanish blockade in Cuba, followed 
 by almost certain seizure of the vessel on her return, and the 
 prosecution of the Captain and the representative of the 
 Delegation who happened to be on board. 
 
 The most strenuous efforts were made by the Spanish 
 agents and diplomatic representatives to have the Delegation 
 
414 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 prosecuted and convicted, but they failed to obtain the neces- 
 sary evidence to convict under the law. 
 
 Possibly no better recommendation for the value of the 
 work done by the Delegation can be given than the state- 
 ments of the Spanish Ministers at Washington, Senors Dupuy 
 de Lome and Polo, who told Secretary of State Day that if 
 the United States Government had closed up the Delegation 
 there would have been an end to the war in Cuba. This 
 statement was also repeatedly made by the Secretaries of 
 Foreign Relations of the Spanish Cabinet at Madrid, as may 
 be seen in the Spanish Red Book, transmitting to the Cortes 
 the diplomatic correspondence between Spain and the United 
 States. 
 
 The work of carrying supplies to the men in the field was 
 continued even after the declaration of war between Spain 
 and the United States, and many of the men who had served 
 the Delegation were used by the American government to 
 great advantage in their various capacities. The Delegation 
 had always a number of skilful Cuban pilots, representing 
 various parts of the island, and these were of great value in 
 selecting the best localities for disembarkation. Of course, as 
 time went on, the men engaged in these expeditions became 
 experts, so that landings were ultimately made in about half 
 the time which was at first consumed. As the difficulties 
 placed in the way of departing from the United States in- 
 creased, it was found best to charter both a sailing vessel 
 which could carry a large cargo and a steamer which, after 
 making a landing, would return for a second and sometimes 
 even a third cargo, to the place where the schooner was 
 lying in wait. 
 
 The largest expedition was that landed by the Laurada in 
 the port of Banes, where she remained twenty-six hours un- 
 loading in sight of a Spanish fort. Naturally, these expedi- 
 tions cost much money and the question was frequently asked, 
 where did the Cubans get it. 
 
 The organization of the Cuban Revolutionary Party was 
 kept intact until December, 1898 and the various clubs con- 
 tributed with the utmost regularity. When an extraordinary 
 effort was to be made, they were advised of the fact and 
 
THE WORK OF THE CUBAN DELEGATION. 415 
 
 always responded most loyally. Besides this source of income, 
 there were private contributions from individual sources, one 
 Cuban lady in particular contributing more than one hundred 
 and twenty thousand dollars. 
 
 On the death of General Antonio Maceo, the Cubans all 
 over the world contributed to an extraordinary collection, to 
 prove that, despite the great blow the revolution had received, 
 it was a fight for principle and not because of the prestige of 
 any one leader. The Cuban colony of Paris alone contributed 
 more than one hundred thousand dollars on this occasion. 
 Besides these sources of income, there were the taxes collected 
 by the Cubans in the island, which in the year 1895 to 1896 
 aggregated over four hundred thousand dollars. In addition, 
 some bonds were sold for cash, or given in part payment for 
 the charter of vessels, postage stamps were sold and later 
 silver souvenir coins. 
 
 There was comparatively very little money contributed to 
 the cause by the American public, but the sympathy of the 
 people was perhaps in the end just as practicable and even 
 more effective in winning independence for Cuba. 
 
 While the collection of funds was a matter necessitating a 
 great deal of detail work and much care, the disbursements 
 were equally onerous. 
 
 Not one dollar was paid out of the treasury, except on a 
 written order of the Delegate, to which a receipt was 
 attached. The order specified the amount and purpose of the 
 expenditure and the receipt had to be signed before the money 
 was paid over. A receipt was also given for each item as it 
 was contributed to the treasury. 
 
 Besides the expenditures for the war material and expedi- 
 tions, there were large amounts spent monthly to maintain 
 abroad the families of some of the principal ofificers of the 
 revolution. While the amounts thus paid were very mode- 
 rate in each instance, being in fact just sufificient to enable the 
 recipients to live in the most modest way possible, the sum 
 total was a considerable sum. Railroad transportation for 
 the men who accompanied the expeditions and their main- 
 tenance while in this country, together with the necessary 
 office expenses of the Delegation, swelled the amount to very 
 
4i6 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 respectable proportions. The amount expended in telegrams 
 and cablegrams alone was very considerable. 
 
 It may readily be imagined that the problem of keeping a 
 fair balance in the treasury for an emergency was constantly 
 occupying the mind of the Delegation. To attend to anyone 
 of the numerous branches of work charged on the Delegation 
 demanded a great amount of detail work, and to attend to all 
 the branches simultaneously, for none could be neglected, was 
 a Herculean task. In forming a proper estimate of the ser- 
 vices rendered by the Delegation, this fact should be con- 
 stantly borne in mind. 
 
 While, therefore, funds were being raised to equip the 
 army, the campaign in Washington was being carried on most 
 vigorously to obtain the recognition of belligerent rights. 
 
 The passage of the concurrent resolution by Congress, in 
 April, 1896, favoring the recognition of the Cubans, was fol- 
 lowed by a period of expectancy, which however did not sig- 
 nify that no work was being done. The friends of Cuba in 
 Congress were kept constantly informed of the progress which 
 was being made by the revolution, and reassured that under 
 no circumstances would Cuba accept anything short of her 
 absolute independence. An effort was made to re-cast the 
 resolutions, and adopt them in the form of a joint resolution 
 which would compel some action, either favorable or other- 
 wise, by President Cleveland, but Secretary of State Olney 
 warned Congress in advance that the President maintained 
 the right of recognition to lie solely with the Executive and 
 that he would accordingly reject the resolution. For this 
 reason the matter was not pressed any further at the time. 
 
 As the time for the election of a President to succeed Mr. 
 Cleveland approached, efforts were successfully made to have 
 both the great political parties adopt a plank in their platform 
 favorable to Cuba. 
 
 On December 21, 1896, the Senate Committee on Foreign 
 Relations unanimously reported in favor of a resolution which 
 had been previously offered by Senator Cameron, wherein it 
 was resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
 the United States of America in Congress assembled, 
 
 "That the independence of the Republic of Cuba be, and 
 
THE WORK OF THE CUBAN DELEGyVTION. -P? 
 
 the same is hereby acknowledged by the United States of 
 America. 
 
 " Be it further resolved, That the United States will use its 
 friendly offices, with the government of Spain, to bring to a 
 close the war between Spain and the Republic of Cuba." 
 
 Again Secretary Olney announced that Congress had no 
 power of recognition, this time doing so publicly. No action 
 was taken on this resolution as President McKinley had been 
 elected and all eyes were turned on him. 
 
 The policy of extermination had been inaugurated by Wey- 
 ler and the consequent horrible conditions were depicted by 
 the Delegation from reliable reports. This was found an ad- 
 ditional, strong argument for some action by the United States 
 in respect to Cuban affairs. 
 
 The truth of these statements was established when Presi- 
 dent McKinley, on May 17, 1897, asked Congress for a $50,000 
 appropriation for the indigent American citizens of Cuba. 
 
 On May 20, the Senate adopted the resolution introduced 
 by Senator Morgan, recognizing the belligerent rights of the 
 Cubans. 
 
 Despite all efforts, these resolutions could not be brought 
 before the House of Representatives for a vote, because of 
 its peculiar rules, although there was an overwhelming major- 
 ity of Congressmen ready to vote for its adoption. 
 
 The work on propaganda was continued despite all obsta- 
 cles, and public opinion became stronger and stronger in fa- 
 vor of putting an end to a condition of affairs which was a 
 disgrace to civilization. The message of President McKinley 
 in December, 1897, though conservative, admitted a state of 
 horrors and suggested the possibility of action in the near 
 future. 
 
 Even so far back as Mr. Cleveland's administration, efforts 
 were being made by the American Government to have Spain 
 grant liberal reforms or autonomy. As soon as this became 
 known, the Delegation protested most vigorously that no 
 half measures would be acceptable to the Cubans, and demon- 
 strated to the Cuban sympathizers in Congress the futility 
 of such a plan. 
 
 Nevertheless, negotiations apparently continued and, as 
 
4i8 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 the position of the United States became stronger on behalf 
 of Cubaj Spain began to make promises of autonomy and 
 even to frame a scheme of reforms, which was formulated 
 just about as Congress was assembled in December, 1897. 
 The Delegation took up the proposed legislation and dis- 
 cussed it seriatim and proved beyond the shadow of a doubt, 
 to any fair-minded man, that the whole plan was a trap and 
 a mockery, framed only for the purpose of preventing action 
 on the part of the United States, while the policy of exter- 
 mination could be carried on. Even while showing the utter 
 inadequacy of the proposed scheme of autonomy, the Dele- 
 gation never ceased to declare that even an ideal plan, guar- 
 anteed by the American government, would not be accepted 
 by the Cubans, who had declared their unalterable deter- 
 mination to fight on to independence or death. From this 
 time on, the popular interest was so intense, that the daily 
 mail of the Delegation increased to an enormous extent and, 
 as every letter was invariably answered, its force had to be 
 increased. Although general instructions were given as to 
 the manner in which communications should be answered, 
 there were hundreds of special inquiries which demanded 
 more careful consideration and diplomatic replies. 
 
 As a natural result of the popular interest or perhaps as the 
 original cause of it, the newspapers devoted themselves with 
 renewed ardor to the cause of Cuba and a constant stream of 
 reporters seeking news and interviews were received at the 
 offices of the Delegation, even late into the night. 
 
 Hundreds of visitors appeared at the Delegation daily, to 
 give gratuitous advice or to seek information or to give 
 personal expression to their sympathy, while the number of 
 men who applied to be sent to Cuba to fight the Spaniards 
 was legion. These latter were informed that the Cubans 
 needed arms, not men, and that the Delegation would not vio- 
 late the neutrality laws of the United States by enlisting men. 
 
 Another great drain on the time of the Delegation was the 
 horde of adventurers offering their services for some desperate 
 deed, such as the assassination of Weyler, the blowing up of 
 the palace in Havana, or of the Arsenal, or of some Spanish 
 man-of-war. Untold inventors insisted on explaining their 
 
THE WORK OF THE CUBAN DELEGATION. 419 
 
 apparatus or their plans, so that everything from a sub-marine 
 boat to an airship had to be discussed. 
 
 Under the auspices of the Delegation, various meetings 
 were held by the Cubans at which autonomy was rejected, and 
 a manifesto was signed by all the prominent leaders to the 
 same effect. When arguments in favor of the autonomic 
 plan were published in the papers by Spanish statesmen, the 
 Delegation forthwith refuted them, but despite all its efforts 
 the American administration apparently believed that Spain 
 was acting in good faith and that the Cubans were unreason- 
 able. 
 
 The hypocrisy and bad faith of Spain was made manifest by 
 the letter which Minister Dupuy de Lome wrote to Seiior 
 Canalejas. This was taken from the desk of Canalejas at 
 Havana and brought to the United States by the man who 
 took it, to serve his countrymen, and delivered to the Delega- 
 tion. It was decided to give the letter the broadest publicity, 
 inasmuch as it showed just how Spain was deceiving the 
 United States. The letter was given to the press and the 
 very morning of its publication it was delivered to the Presi- 
 dent. The Delegation was prepared to prove its genuineness 
 in case that should be attacked, but de Lome rendered that 
 unnecessary by admitting the authorship. 
 
 The letter was given to the President, to be disposed of as 
 he saw fit, and when Canalejas claimed it as his property, it 
 was given up to him. 
 
 It has been repeatedly asserted that the de Lome letter 
 was stolen by agents of the Delegation in this country or ab- 
 stracted from the mails but this is absolutely untrue. 
 
 Whatever may have been the effect of the assertions con- 
 tained in this letter in official circles, the effect on the Ameri- 
 can public was profound. The insults to President McKinley 
 contained in the letter made the people indignant, while the 
 chicanery of Spain was made most manifest. 
 
 Within a few days after the publication of this letter, the 
 battleship Maine was blown up in Havana harbor. 
 
 There now followed a period in which delicacy prevented 
 the Delegation from obtruding Cuba's woes, while the whole 
 American people were mourning the dead of the Maine, 
 
420 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 The lull was short-lived, however, for enormous pressure 
 was now brought to bear on the Delegation to persuade the 
 Cubans to accept an armistice. High officials at Washington, 
 representatives of European bankers, and even the church of 
 Rome joined in trying to persuade Spain to grant an armis- 
 tice and the Cubans to adopt it. The Delegation firmly re- 
 fused to consider the proposition, stating that the Cubans 
 would continue to fight while acceptable terms might be dis- 
 cussed, but that under no consideration would an armistice be 
 accepted, particularly when the wet season was shortly coming 
 on and thus Spain would be spared the expense and danger 
 attending a summer campaign. It also pointed out that the 
 Cuban army could only subsist on the resources of the country, 
 which would be no longer possible if an armistice were ac- 
 cepted. In such a case, the Cubans would have had to die of 
 starvation, to disband, or to be driven by their necessities into 
 breaking the agreement for ail armistice and again to live on 
 the country. Documents expounding the Cuban view were 
 frequently filed by the Delegation with the Secretary of State. 
 
 When fairly satisfied that the Cuban autonomy plan had 
 failed in practice, a scheme was suggested whereby Spain was 
 to retain suzerainty, Cuba occupying the same relation to 
 Spain that Egypt does to England. This too was rejected, 
 with the explanation that the Cubans would never be satisfied 
 until the Spanish flag was forever removed froin Cuban soil. 
 
 Then came the final message of President McKinley and 
 renewed agitation in Congress. 
 
 Up to the very last moment, the Delegation insisted that 
 some declaration be made recognizing the independence of 
 Cuba and at last succeeded in having the resolution passed 
 with the fourth paragraph containing the Teller amendment, 
 which declared that the United States would exercise no con- 
 trol or sovereignty in Cuba, except for the purposes of paci- 
 fication. The declaration that the people of Cuba are and of 
 right ought to be free and independent was much fought 
 against, but finally was incorporated in the resolution. 
 
 After the declaration of war between Spain and the United 
 States, the Delegation organized several expeditions of hun- 
 dreds of Cubans, which conveyed to Cuba arms and munitions 
 
THE WORK OF THE CUBAN DELEGATION. 4-'i 
 
 sent by the American government, placed its pilots and 
 managers of expeditions at the disposal of the United States, 
 and indicated the places where much needed rations could be 
 landed to save their starving countrymen. 
 
 When the peace protocol was signed, the Delegation, at the 
 request of the American authorities, sent the news to the 
 Cubans in the field, at the same time advising them as to the 
 terms of the protocol, which was on the lines of the resolution 
 of intervention. 
 
 After the proclamation of the protocol, the Delegation still 
 continued to place the questions, which would certainly arise, 
 before the American authorities and to suggest the measures 
 which in justice to the Cubans should be taken. 
 
 The pending prosecutions were at the request of the Dele- 
 gation dismissed, and money, which was deposited as bail, was 
 restored and used by the Delegation in furnishing food to the 
 needy and aiding the families of Cuban officers and others to 
 return to Cuba. 
 
 Fully confident that the pledges in favor of Cuba would be 
 religiously carried out by the United States, the Delegation 
 was arranging to close its offices, when in November the Assem- 
 bly of Representatives authorized the Delegate and Charge 
 d'affaires Quesada to remain at their posts in representation 
 of the Cubans. 
 
 The Cuban Revolutionary Party was, however, dissolved by 
 proclamation of the Delegate. 
 
 At present writing, the work of the Delegation is about 
 ended and in a few days the offices will be closed. 
 
 The Delegation is content to be judged by the results of its 
 labors. 
 
CHAPTER XXI. 
 THE SECRET SERVICE IN THE WAR. 
 
 BY 
 
 JOHN E. WILKIE, Chief Secret Service Division, Treasury Department. 
 
 THERE was nothing spectacular about the work of the 
 Secret Service men during the Spanish-American war, 
 for there were wholly lacking the military features 
 which the public so generally associated with that branch of 
 the Government's service. In the War of the Rebellion Col. 
 Baker's men were operating in the enemy's country sur- 
 rounded by all the perils that menace a spy in hostile terri- 
 tory. There were hairbreadth escapes and thrilling experiences 
 of the most sensational character. Penetrating the enemy's 
 lines, securing information of his strength, position and prob- 
 able movements— these were the tasks set for the daring fel- 
 lows who composed the Secret Service force in the War De- 
 partment in the early sixties. Not so in the last war. The 
 late secret service campaign, if it may so be termed, was one 
 wholly of defense and protection. It was believed that every 
 large center of population was infested by foreigners of anar- 
 chistic tendencies who might seize the opportunity for the 
 execution of plots against the officers of the Government or 
 against the welfare of the community at large. It was also 
 believed that Spain would attempt to secure official informa- 
 tion of our plans and movements, and it was to checkmate 
 the moves of these two dangerous classes that the Treasury 
 Department Secret Service devoted its energies. 
 
 When Col. Baker's force was disbanded at the close of the 
 Rebellion, the counterfeiting of government obligations had 
 grown to such appalling dimensions that the Service was re- 
 organized as a branch of the Treasury Department for the sup- 
 pression of this and other crimes against the Government, but 
 
424 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 for the last thirty years the Secret Service Division as we know 
 it to-day has existed for the purpose of suppressing counter- 
 feiting, and its operations are limited to that field by the 
 phraseology of the appropriation bill to which it owes its ex- 
 istence. Under the terms of this bill the operatives of the 
 division could not be reimbursed for any services rendered in 
 any other direction, and therefore, on the i6th of April I pre- 
 pared the following letter to the Honorable Lyman J. Gage, 
 Secretary of the Treasury : 
 
 Treasury Department, Secret Service Division, 
 Washington, D. C, April i6, 1898. 
 The Honorable, 
 
 The Secretary of the Treasury. 
 Sir : 
 
 Owing to recent international complications, the Secret 
 Service Division has been called upon to supply men for spe- 
 cial detail outside of the duties prescribed by the appropria- 
 tion from which they are paid. In order that this additional 
 expense may be properly and promptly met, and that this 
 Division may be in a position to respond instantly to any 
 such demand upon its force, I respectfully request that the 
 sum of five thousand dollars be allotted to this Division from 
 the fifty-million-dollar defense fund, said five thousand dollars 
 to be employed in defraying the expense of such special in- 
 vestigations as we may from time to time be called upon to 
 make. 
 
 Respectfully yours, 
 
 John E. Wilkie, Chief. 
 
 The application was at once approved by the Secretary, 
 who instructed Assistant Secretary Vanderlip to go with me 
 to the White House and secure the President's approval. A 
 very brief statement was sufficient to satisfy President Mc- 
 Kinley that the apportionment was justified, and the Division 
 was supplied with the necessary funds for commencing active 
 operations. 
 
 During the last two weeks of April and the early part of 
 May, I perfected, as far as possible, the organization of an 
 auxiliary secret service force. It was my aim to leave the 
 regular force of the Division free to pursue its legitimate la- 
 
THE SECRET SERVICE IN THE WAR. 4-'5 
 
 bor of looking up counterfeiters. It was a time of great pub- 
 lic excitement, when the clever criminals who follow this 
 particular branch of law-breaking would find it easier to carry 
 on their operations, and I did not feel that it would be wise 
 to interfere with the routine of the Department. For the 
 auxiliary force, the requirements were comparatively simple. 
 Experience as a detective was desirable, but a knowledge of 
 Spanish was even more important. The secret service office 
 in the Treasury Department was inundated with applications 
 for positions. I think I could have put into the field a brig- 
 ade of detectives, but out of all those who applied, hardly two 
 percent were selected. The applications came from all parts 
 of tiie United States, from Canada, from Mexico and from 
 Cuba. The force as finally organized was made up wholly of 
 Americans, the majority of whom had, at one time or an- 
 other, resided either in South America, Spain or Cuba. 
 They were men of unusual intelligence and education, and in 
 volunteering for secret service work were actuated wholly by 
 motives of the highest loyalty and patriotism. 
 
 April 21, the Spanish Minister, Sefior Polo y Bernabe, and 
 his suite left Washington. Their programme, as announced, 
 included a direct run to neutral territory and a short stay in To- 
 ronto, which was their first objective point. It was added 
 that they would sail within a few days for the other side. 
 
 As it was the desire of this Government that no harm 
 should come to the ex-Minister, while it was extremely un- 
 likely that anything would happen to mar his journey to 
 Canada, it was deemed wise to provide him unostentatiously 
 with an escort, and two members of the Secret Service Divi- 
 sion therefore accompanied the ministerial party as far as Ni- 
 agara. While these two agents were introduced to Seiior 
 Polo, and were known to the other members of his party, I 
 sent, by another route, two capable men, who arrived in To- 
 ronto about the time that the departing Minister reached 
 there, and through whom I was kept informed of their move- 
 ments. 
 
 That there was, beyond any question, a deliberate determi- 
 nation on the part of Spanish representatives to secure inside 
 information as to the intentions of those directing the military 
 
426 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 and naval operations of the United States forces, became a 
 matter of absolute certainty before the war was two weeks 
 old. The Downing case, so-called, demonstrated that some 
 members of the Spanish ex-Minister's party in Canada were 
 devoting themselves to this particular kind of work ; and it may 
 not be amiss to go somewhat into detail in considering one of 
 the earlier sensations of the war. 
 
 Among the members of Sefior Polo's suite, who was making 
 his headquarters at Toronto, was Sefior Ramon Carranza, 
 who had been naval attache of the legation here. To the 
 agents in Toronto, it seemed that this officer received the 
 greater number of suspicious visitors, and his callers therefore 
 came in for a close surveillance. On the morning of May 6th, 
 Lieutenant Carranza received in his private apartment a black- 
 eyed, dark-faced young man of sturdy build, and for an hour 
 and a half they were engaged in earnest conversation. The 
 greater part of their talk is recorded in the Secret Service Di- 
 vision at Washington. It resulted in the absolute engage- 
 ment of the stranger as a secret informant. It appeared that 
 he was an Englishman by birth, that he had been naturalized, 
 that he had served as a petty officer on the Brooklyn in the 
 United States Navy ; that he had lost his place, and that he 
 was willing to give the Spanish agent the benefit of the know- 
 ledge he had acquired while in the navy, and to obtain for 
 him at Washington and at the governmental navy yards, cer- 
 tain other information which would be of benefit to the enemy. 
 He received explicit instructions from Lieutenant Carranza as 
 to the forwarding of any information he might obtain. The 
 cipher code that he was to use was explained to him, and an 
 address in Montreal was given to him where all the informa- 
 tion was to be forwarded. At the conclusion of his talk with 
 the Lieutenant, he left the room and proceeded to an obscure 
 hotel in Toronto, where he had been staying, accompanied by 
 an agent of the Service. He was to leave Toronto that after- 
 noon. A Secret Service man saw him aboard the train, and 
 saw his ticket by way of Buffalo and the Lehigh Valley and 
 Baltimore & Ohio Roads to Washington. All of this informa- 
 tion, including a careful description of the suspect, was wired 
 to me by one of my men, and it was a simple matter, when his 
 
THE SECRET SERVICE IN THE WAR. 427 
 
 train arrived the following morning, to identify the first paid 
 agent of Spain who came to the Capital. All unconscious of 
 the fact that every movement was being watched, the man 
 made his way to a lodging-house in E Street, where he left a 
 black hand-bag that he was carrying, and started out for a 
 walk which included a visit to the Navy Department. Two 
 hours after he arrived he returned to his boarding-house, from 
 which he emerged an hour later and made his way to the 
 general post office. While he stopped at the window to pur- 
 chase a stamp, one of the men who had been shadowing him 
 slipped in through the office of the Postmaster, and was at the 
 letterdrop when the suspect, after affixing a stamp, dropped 
 a letter through the slot. It was sealed with red wax, and was 
 addressed : 
 
 Frederick W. Dickon, Esq. , 
 
 Dorchester St., 1248, Montreal, Canada. 
 
 It was brought to my office and opened. It read as 
 follows : 
 
 Washington, Saturday, May 7, '98. 
 A cipher message has been sent off from Navy Department 
 to San Francisco, directing the cruiser Charleston to proceed 
 to Manila with five hundred men and machinery for repairs 
 for Dewey. A long cipher has been received from Dewey at 
 the Department at 3:30 P.M. They are translating it now. 
 Cannot find it out yet. I heard important news respecting 
 movements of colliers and cruiser Neivark at Norfolk Navy 
 Yards ; also about the new Holland boat, as to what they in- 
 tend to do with her and her destination. I shall go to Nor- 
 folk to find important news. My address will be Norfolk 
 House, Norfolk, Virginia, but shall not go until Tuesday, 
 
 Respectfully yours, 
 G. D., in haste. 
 
 A copy of this letter, with the report of the agent who had 
 overheard the conversation between Lieutenant Carranza 
 and the spy in Toronto, was presented to the Adjutant Gen- 
 eral of the War Department, and he advised an immediate 
 
428 THE AMERICAN-SrANISH WAR. 
 
 arrest. Assistant Secretary Meiklejohn directed Captain 
 Sage of the 8th Artillery, stationed at Washington Barracks, 
 to report to me at the Treasury Department, with two men. 
 At eleven o'clock that night, accompanied by Chief Clerk 
 Moran of the Secret Service Division, and Eugene Crist, then 
 an emergency employe of the Division, and afterward an offi- 
 cer in the District troops in the Cuban campaign, I secured 
 admission to the house where the suspect was rooming, 
 arrested him, turned him over to Captain Sage, and searched 
 his apartment. His name was then learned for the first 
 time. It was George Downing. The landlady of the estab- 
 lishment stated that he had been there a week before and 
 that he had left, telling her that he was going to Virginia. 
 His cipher code, several envelopes directed to the same ad- 
 dress in Montreal as that borne by the letter we had seized, 
 some other papers, and something less than $200 in money, 
 were taken to headquarters. The fact that he made abso- 
 lutely no resistance when arrested, as well as his demeanor at 
 the time, was an absolute indication of guilt ; and, two days 
 later, overwhelmed by the weight of his guilty knowledge and 
 shame at the betrayal of the Government to which he had 
 sworn allegiance, he hanged himself to the bars of his cell. 
 
 The tremendous activity of all the various branches of the 
 War and Navy Departments, in preliminary precautionary 
 measures, attracted a vast amount of attention; and the 
 knowledge that there were in this country a very large number 
 of Spanish sympathizers, resulted in a natural uneasiness as to 
 the possible interference, by the use of high explosives, with 
 ship-building operations, ammunition manufacturing and so 
 on. Among the earliest work of the Division there were 
 many cases of suspected spies at the various navy yards, and 
 in and about manufacturing establishments having govern- 
 ment contracts. A number of powder-mill explosions, occur- 
 ring in various parts of the country just about the time that 
 hostilities were begun, were very generally charged up to 
 emissaries of the enemy, but it was not satisfactorily estab- 
 lished in a single instance that the disaster was due to out- 
 side causes. Every manufactory in the country, where ex- 
 plosives and ammunition were being made to fill " rush " orders 
 
THE SECRET SERVICE IN THE WAR. 429 
 
 from the government, was testing its capacity. Most of 
 them were running night and day, extra hands were at work 
 and the possibihties of accident were multiplied almost a 
 hundred fold. I feel perfectly safe in saying that not a 
 single government factory was attacked or damaged by spies. 
 A patriotic public, jealous of the interest and safety of its 
 country, supplied the Secret Service Division with a good 
 deal of material for investigation. After the Downing epi- 
 sode, the letters relating to the presence or acts of suspicious 
 strangers increased greatly in number. Most of these un- 
 doubtedly were founded on trifling suspicion, but consider- 
 ably more than a thousand cases were considered of sufficient 
 importance to warrant an investigation by agents of the 
 Service. In the majority of instances it was discovered that 
 the suspected persons had been injudicious in their conversa- 
 tion, or had been too outspoken in their friendship for Spain, 
 and it was found necessary to interfere only where the individ- 
 uals had expressed a determination to do something if the op- 
 portunity presented itself. Such persons were watched for a 
 while, and then, if necessary, warned that the Government was 
 aware of their sentiments and intentions, and that any attempt 
 on their part to make a move against the interests of the 
 United States would be followed by arrest. In the majority 
 of cases this was sufficient to cause a subsidence of any enthu- 
 siasm there might have been, or any determination to act as a 
 spy. Of the thousand or more suspects who were reported 
 to the Secret Service Division, more than six hundred men 
 and women were underdose surveillance for longer or shorter 
 periods. There were professors, diplomats, doctors, mer- 
 chants, cigar-makers, marines, electrical experts, government 
 employes of foreign birth and uncertain antecedents, capital- 
 ists, milliners, dress-makers, society women and servants. 
 
 On the i6th of May, the President having affixed his signa- 
 ture to an application I made for a further allotment of fifty 
 thousand dollars for the emergency force of the Division, I was 
 able to cover more satisfactorily and completely the points 
 of army mobilization, and all of the cities where it seemed 
 advisable to locate the agents of the Service. Montreal, 
 Toronto, New York, Philadelphia, Washington, Newport 
 
43° THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 News, Savannah, Jacksonville, Tampa, Key West, Mobile, 
 New Orleans, Galveston and San Francisco were the principal 
 points of activity. Through the Gulf States there.was a large 
 foreign element of Spanish extraction, that was heartily in 
 sympathy with Spain ; and in Mobile and New Orleans, es- 
 pecially, there were combinations of tobacco smugglers and 
 foreign cut-throats, whose operations it was extremely desir- 
 able to watch. In consorting with the members of these 
 gangs, agents of the Secret Service ran greater risks than fell 
 to the lot of the average man in the Service. The only plot- 
 ting, however, that promised to amount to anything, had its 
 origin in the active brain of Lieutenant Carranza ; and every 
 agent employed by him to operate in the interests of the 
 enemy, who came into the United States for that purpose, 
 was detected and arrested. 
 
 One of these plans, of an exceedingly interesting character, 
 developed in the latter part of May. The Spanish agent, 
 with the co-operation of some Canadian private detectives, 
 elaborated a scheme to secure information for the benefit of 
 the Spanish commanding officers in Cuba and Manila. For 
 their purpose they needed men of military experience, and, 
 by offers of liberal pay and promises of future reward com- 
 mensurate with the success of the undertaking, they 
 secured the services of several ex-members of the Canadian 
 militia. The Canadian assistants of the Spanish agents 
 picked up these men, and, after satisfying themselves of their 
 willingness to embark in the scheme, they showed them to 
 Lieut. Carranza, who approved the selection. Li brief the 
 plan was this: — The men were to proceed to Tampa and San 
 Francisco and enlist in the American troops bound for Span- 
 ish territory, were to make themselves acquainted with e\'ery 
 possible feature that could be of any benefit to the Spanish 
 officers ; were to proceed with the troops to the objective 
 points, and, at the first favorable opportunity, were to leave 
 the American lines and surrender themselves to the Spanish 
 outposts. Each of the men was to be provided with a ring, 
 upon the inner circumference of which were engraved the 
 words, " Confienza Augustina." As soon as the Spanish lines 
 had been reached, the spy was to send this ring by a courier 
 
THE SFXRET SERVICE IN THE WAR. 431 
 
 to the commanding general, who had been instructed that the 
 wearer of the ring would be the bearer of some information. 
 He was then, upon being escorted to the Spanish headquar- 
 ters, to give the of^cer the benefit of the knowledge that he 
 had acquired of the American forces and plans. 
 
 Of three men picked out for this service, one was to go to 
 San Francisco, and two to Tampa. The one selected for the 
 San Francisco-Manila expedition, after having been provided 
 with his railway transportation and advance funds, concluded 
 that the assignment was one not wholly creditable to an Eng- 
 lishman, and confided to his former colonel the details of the 
 proposition that had been made to him. His action in giving 
 up the project was applauded, but it led to an assault upon 
 him by employes of the agents who had secured his services, 
 and he was compelled to leave the Dominion to escape more 
 severe punishment. The two men who went to Tampa in the 
 furtherance of the Spanish scheme were ill-fated. One of 
 them enlisted and was arrested because of his suspicious ac- 
 tions ; the other tried to enlist and, failing, set himself about 
 securing information to be forwarded to Montreal. This 
 i-nan — Frank Arthur Mellor — who was masquerading under 
 the name of Miller, was a guest at the Almeria Hotel at 
 Tampa. On Tuesday, May 24, the following telegram 
 addressed to him was received : 
 
 Cannot telegraph money to-day. Move from where you are 
 and telegraph from some other town. Write fully re stocks 
 at once. Will wire money and instructions on receipt. 
 
 SiDDALL. B 
 
 Mellor was taken in charge by an agent of the service, and 
 questioned as to the identity of his Montreal correspondent. 
 He claimed that his communications with Montreal were 
 wholly innocent in their nature, but he failed to explain satis- 
 factorily what he meant by the information " re stocks," 
 which seemed to us altogether too suggestive of information 
 about movements of troops. With such facts as had been ob- 
 tained at Tampa in my possession, I started an investigation 
 at Montreal, and soon established that Siddall was a character 
 who was being used as a " blind" by agents in the pay of Car- 
 
432 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 ranza ; and a further investigation made it quite clear that 
 Mellor was one of the men engaged in pursuance of the plan 
 originated by Lieut. Carranza. This was more than confirmed 
 later, when the young Englishman whose conscience had 
 troubled him as soon as he realized what his engagement with 
 the Spanish agents meant, was brought back from England 
 and prevailed upon to tell the entire story of his connection 
 with the Spanish agents. If anything were needed to com- 
 plete the evidence against Mellor, it was supplied in an unex- 
 pected way, by Lieut. Carranza himself. Two days after the 
 arrest of Mellor at Tampa, Lieut. Carranza, then living at 42 
 Tupper Street, Montreal, wrote a long letter to a relative 
 occupying a high position in the Spanish Navy, in which he 
 made a number of statements concerning his duties at Mon- 
 treal, and lamented the fact that their best spies had fallen in- 
 to the hands of the Americans. He referred specifically to 
 the arrest of Mellor at Tampa, without naming him, but as 
 Mellor's was the only arrest, on the day mentioned, at Tampa, 
 the inference was irresistible. 
 
 The Carranza letter furnished one of the sensations of the war, 
 for it supplied to the United States Government the one thing 
 which was most needed to rid this Continent of the men who 
 were most actively engaged in maintaining the Spanish spy 
 system, A very careful and close watch had been kept upon 
 Carranza and his associates, with the hope that it might be pos- 
 sible to make out a case strong enough to induce the British Gov- 
 ernment to expel them from British territory. This watch upon 
 Carranza included occasional visits to his house by Secret Ser- 
 vice agents, — of course without his knowledge. One of these 
 visits was made on the morning of Friday, the 27th of May. 
 The agent was accompanied by two American friends, a gen- 
 tleman and a lady, and their call was for the ostensible pur- 
 pose of examining the house with a view to renting it fur- 
 nished when the two months* lease held by the Spanish gen- 
 tleman should have expired. Lieut. Carranza and Captain 
 du Bosc were at breakfast at the time of the call. The visi- 
 tors were shown through the establishment, and in the bed- 
 room of Lieut. Carranza the agent saw an official-looking 
 letter, sealed and stamped, ready for mailing, l}'ing upon the 
 
THE SECRET SERVICE IN THE WAR. 433 
 
 dresser. Cenjecturing that any document addressed to Ma- 
 drid, emanating from either of the Spanish officers, would 
 probably be of value to the United , States Government, he 
 slipped the letter into his pocket, and ^later in the day started 
 it for Washington in the hands of an American railroad engi- 
 neer, who carried it with him to the end of his run into Ver- 
 mont, and then entrusted it to the United States mail service. 
 It reached Washington Saturday night, and Sunday I had it 
 translated. It was as follows : 
 
 Montreal, 26th of May, 1898. Tupper Street, 42. 
 To His Excellency Sr. Don Jose Gomez Ymav. 
 Mv Dear Don Jose: 
 
 It was my belief that they would have appointed you to 
 command the Cadiz fleet, and it was my intention to have sent 
 you a telegram asking that you would take me with you to meet 
 you in the Antilles, or wherever you might say. The case 
 has not turned out thus, however, and it seems as though God 
 were not on our side, because the election of Seiior Camara, 
 I fear, will be fatal, although he may have a good chief of 
 staff. No one could possibly suit him, because he is very 
 capricious, and besides is not a hard worker ; on the contrary, 
 he is lazy and would pay no attention to the advice of any 
 one. You will not take this for flattery, but to-day no one 
 but you and Don Pasquale Cervera should have command of 
 our fleet, and that is the belief of the younger element of the 
 personnel. Now there is no remedy, and may God shed his 
 light upon him and keep him in his hands. I wrote to the 
 Minister, and with the confidence due to my special duties I 
 said to him, on sending a clipping from a newspaper containing 
 a telegram from Cadiz, speaking of our fleet and of its Admiral, 
 that it was not Seftor Camara but you who should command it ; 
 and that we, the lower personnel, who have traveled about a 
 little, know you very well. It may be that this action may 
 have made a bad impression upon him, but I don't care, be- 
 cause if I can do so, I shall leave the service when this war is fin- 
 ished. I have been left here to receive and send telegrams 
 and to look after the spy service which I have established, or, 
 I had better say, am establishing here, because, until a very 
 little while ago, I was not permitted to do as I pleased. We 
 have had bad luck because they have captured our two best 
 spies, one in Washington, who hanged himself — or else they 
 did it for him — and the other day before yesterday in Tampa. 
 The Americans are showing the most extraordinary vigilance. 
 
434 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 I do not wish to remain here without taking an active part in 
 the war, and I desire duty in which I can take the initiative and 
 do something. I shall be extremely gratified to have a ship in 
 order to run the blockade, or a torpedo boat. However, if there 
 is no other remedy, I would go perfectly willingly on board a 
 large ship. I am very sorry that the war finds me so low in 
 rank, for it offers opportunities for any one who wishes to 
 work and to risk himself. I cannot believe that Don Pas- 
 quale could be in Santiago as reported by the American press. 
 He entered it on the i8th, and if he had gone immediately to 
 Havana he would have met only two monitors in front of it. 
 I make it out that he entered that place only to coal, and for the 
 moral effect it would produce in Spain. Suppose he went out 
 Friday, the 2oth, if he had gone to the North and through the 
 Providence Channel, he would have passed into Havana right 
 under the noses of the Americans, who had only small cruis- 
 ers ; for Schley was at sea on the night of Thursday, Samp- 
 son on that of Friday, and on that of Sunday, the 22d, he took 
 the lower channel for the East, and on Wednesday turned 
 back towards Havana. Schley's' squadron has been reinforced 
 by the Iowa, and Sampson's by the Oregon. I believe that in 
 war one has to tempt fortune. If it had not been because 
 Sampson was afraid that Don Pasquale might go to Havana 
 and that Schley would not be there, or our confidence is well 
 grounded that he found himself very short of ammunition 
 after the bombardment through the stealing in the Ordnance 
 Department, the fact remains that it was logical for him to 
 remain near Santiago and Cienfuegos, and, if he could not 
 prevent the entrance of our squadron, to shut it up, and thus 
 close its campaign, as those people over there already believe 
 it closed. But I cannot believe such a stupid thing possible. 
 I suppose that he went to the South or Porto Rico and that 
 he had ordered a cruiser or two there to cover the Terror 
 and that he will appear at San Juan the 27th or 28th. '^ He 
 will coal there and will rest a day or two and will then return 
 to delay and annoy them and delay the invasion. The Viz- 
 caya and the Oquendo at least need to go into dry-dock. I 
 telegraphed to Don Pasquale on the morning of the 20th when 
 I knew he was in Santiago, saying that the squadrons were at 
 Key West. He did not answer me. That afternoon there 
 came another telegram from Madrid saying he had left Santiago. 
 I continued sending messages to General Blanco in respect 
 to all the movements, and now, so far as I know, Don Pasquale 
 has arrived at Porto Rico, where I shall try to correspond 
 with him. If he should have set out for Martinique or 
 Havana, having twenty-four hours advantage, he would have 
 arrived before now. I am very much afraid lest they attack 
 Porto Rico by sea and land and put off the attack on Havana. 
 
THE SECRET SERVICE IN THE WAR. 435 
 
 They are not going to do more than try to take the latter, 
 and they think then, if they destroy our fleet, of taking the 
 war into Spain with Havana already in their power. They 
 have no confidence in their army but they have in their 
 navy, and they are afraid of our army and yellow fever, 
 because if the men should begin to die in Cuba there would 
 be a tremendous row, as they are not like our people. 
 Anyway, we shall see when there is news of the fleet. I 
 expect it to-morrow. With them cleaning their hulls at the 
 Keys, we should be able to clean something in three days at 
 Porto Rico. Each day that passes is worse for us on account 
 of the almost total lack of preparation. If the Cadiz squad- 
 ron is to come to bombard Boston, Portland and Long Island, 
 they can do it now, but after a few months it will be too late. 
 I think, if we are to have any success in this matter, it will 
 be through treating for peace by yielding Cuba and having 
 them recognize the debt. If we do not do this soon, it 
 will be too late and we shall lose Cuba and Porto Rico and 
 all that this war has cost us, and in addition we shall be 
 charged with the Cuban debt for which our Treasury is 
 responsible. There is no doubt here that we cannot continue 
 this war, in which we have nothing to gain, and may lose our 
 three colonies and be ruined for fifty years. In the matter 
 of money there is no patriotism here. Proof is given by the 
 bank, which ought to have bought gold, although at a pre- 
 mium of one-hundred per cent, and issued notes against it in 
 the same or a slightly greater quantity. With one hundred 
 and fifty millions it has made thirteen hundred millions. 
 This is the moment of the year at which, instead of returning 
 twenty-three or twenty-four per cent, it returns only twelve 
 or fifteen. As regards its buying gold, exchange has gone 
 down, and if in buying four hundred millions it issues five 
 hundred millions, paying six hundred or seven hundred, inas- 
 much as the state subscribes at the rate of five per cent, 
 this would represent to the bank an interest of about three 
 per cent, and its dividend would have gone down very little. 
 The bank is the nation, and with the nation it has grown rich 
 by ofi^ering paper money, w^iich it did not have in its treasury, 
 and by getting interest on that which it really never had 
 given out. But, whatever the bank does, nobody dares object 
 except those who have no money in their pants if they 
 should call for it. 
 
 I have written to the Minister, but I did not give him so 
 much news of the fleets as to you, because I had other 
 things to speak of. If you should see him you might give 
 him "some news. We shall see when they relieve me and 
 send some one here to work and not amuse himself. I can 
 imagine your anxiety for Francisco and the rest, an anxiety 
 
436 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 that we share. Their terrible ships do not go as fast as ours 
 by perhaps two and a half miles. As for the monitors, they 
 do not count for much ; they can be used only to bombard 
 in a smooth sea, and besides cannot go fast, and carry very 
 little coal. They have delayed Sampson the whole voyage. 
 
 My regards to Raphael and his daughters, and you know 
 how much your kinsman and subordinate loves you. 
 
 Ramon Carranza. 
 
 I should be glad to have you write me your opinions. 
 You know how much I appreciate them. If the squadron 
 is in Cuba, they are going to destroy its wretched fortification 
 and sink a couple of steamers in the mouth. They have al- 
 ready telegraphed to Key West for them to see if they have 
 got them there, and the inventor, Holland, offers his subma- 
 rine boat to destroy the mines. 
 
 It will be seen at once that the statements in the early part 
 of the letter, gave to this Government exactly what it had 
 been waiting for; and the information was so convincing in 
 its nature, that, upon receiving a photographic copy of the 
 original, the British Government ordered both Lieutenant 
 Carranza and Captain Du Bosc, to leave the country. The 
 fact that the letter was in the hands of the Secret Service Di- 
 vision at Washington, was not made public until about a week 
 later. In the meantime, the agent who had secured the letter 
 was ordered away from Montreal, to make it absolutely certain 
 that his identity should not be discovered, and the Spanish 
 officers were at their wits' end to account for the disappear- 
 ance of their compromising letter. An unfortunate private 
 detective in Montreal was suspected of being responsible for 
 its disappearance, but it was impossible to sustain the charge 
 in court, and the case was dismissed. When the letter was 
 given to the public, a vigorous denial of its accuracy was 
 made by its author, but his denial could not stand against 
 the evidence of the document itself. With his removal from 
 the field of activity, the Spanish spy system received its 
 death-blow. 
 
^^.^^^^^-'^^^^ 
 
 PL, 
 
 a 
 o I 
 
 ^ « a s < 
 
CHAPTER XXII. 
 
 WOMAN'S WORK IN THE WAR. 
 
 BV 
 
 MRS. AMOS G. DRAPER, Treasurer D. A. R. Hospital Corps. 
 
 IF, as a noted orator said, *' In raising your monuments to 
 the heroes of war, one should honor not only the hero- 
 ism and patriotism of the dead soldier, but that of the 
 mother who gave him birth and of the faithful, self-sacrificing 
 nurse, who in many cases lost her life in theefifortto save his," 
 surely no history of the American-Spanish war can be com- 
 plete without some mention of the part in it sustained by 
 women. In all pieceding wars mothers have given their best- 
 beloved to their country, and hundreds of women in other 
 times of need have pressed eagerly forward to do all they 
 could to relieve the suffering. But in this war women have 
 not only, as in previous ones, responded to the call of duty, 
 but also for the first time in the history of our country their 
 freely-offered services have been formally accepted, and an 
 organization of women has been recognized, not as an auxil- 
 iary, but as temporarily a part of the Medical Departments 
 of the Army and Navy and subject to their orders. During 
 this war the trained woman nurse has obtained for herself a 
 position unique in history, and the relief work undertaken by 
 women in every section of the United States has been so 
 helpful as to lead the Surgeon-General of the Navy to say in 
 his official report : " In this war, woman has done her per- 
 fect work." 
 
 As it was evident to all thinking persons early in the year 
 '98 that war would soon be declared, various chapters of 
 Daughters of the American Revolution and other patriotic 
 organizations passed resolutions, which were forwarded to the 
 
438 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 President and other officials, offering their services in case war 
 should be declared. No definite plan of help was proposed 
 by any of them beyond collecting supplies which might be 
 used in case of need. Acting therefore upon a suggestion 
 from the War Department, the Board of Management of the 
 National Society D. A. R,, (Mrs. Daniel Manning, President 
 General) after passing several resolutions indicating a desire 
 to be of use, on April 27, '98, offered its services to the Sur- 
 geons General of the Army and Navy, as an examining board 
 for female nurses. 
 
 It was known that the Surgeon-General of the Army had 
 received a number of applications from women for positions 
 as nurses but that a lack of sufficient clerical force to examine 
 properly into the qualifications of the different applicants had 
 rendered it impossible for him to take any steps toward engag- 
 ing women as contract nurses up to that time. It was thought 
 that women nurses might also be needed in the Naval 
 Hospitals. The Surgeon-General of the Army, as we see from 
 his annual report, 
 
 " foreseeing the necessity for a large force of trained 
 nurses at the general hospitals, applied to Congress (April 28, 
 1898), for authority to employ by contract as many nurses 
 as might be required during the war, at the rate of $30 per 
 month and a ration, the pay to be furnished from the appro- 
 priation of the Medical and Hospital Department. This was 
 very promptly granted." 
 
 On the same day the offer of the Daughters of the American 
 Revolution was accepted, as is seen by the following letters. 
 
 "The Bureau of Medicine and Surgery of the Navy Depart- 
 ment heartily approves of the proposition of your Committee to 
 form a corps of able, trained nurses from whose number compe- 
 tent nurses may be promptly detailed for such service as 
 may be required in caring for the sick and wounded during 
 the present war. 
 
 The standard of competency of these nurses will be left 
 entirely to the discretion of your Committee. The Bureau 
 places the same reliance on your judgment as it does on your 
 patriotism, and it rests assured that a manifestation of the same 
 loyalty and the same zeal in good works will be shown in the 
 labors of your Committee as was shown by your ancestors. 
 
WOMAN'S WORK IN THE WAR. 439 
 
 whose never-failing support and devotion sustained the cour- 
 age of their husbands and brothers in the struggle of the 
 Nation for independence. 
 
 Very respectfully, 
 
 (Signed) W. K. Van Reypen, 
 
 Surgeon General, U. S. Navy." 
 
 " I have received a large number of applications from trained 
 nurses and other patriotic ladies who are willing to serve as 
 nurses, but have been obliged to answer all of these offers to 
 the effect that no trained nurses are needed at present, and I 
 am uncertain as to what our requirements may be in the 
 future. It is not my intention to send any female nurses with 
 troops to Cuba, and in case we have a number of good hospi- 
 tals established I expect to depend principally upon our trained 
 men of the Hospital Corps for service as nurses in the wards. 
 I should, however, be glad to avail myself of the services of a 
 certain number of female nurses for the care of special cases 
 and for the preparation and distribution of special diet in the 
 hospitals. I appreciate very highly the offer of the National 
 Board of Management of the Daughters of the American 
 Revolution and am quite willing to turn this whole matter 
 over to your Committee, giving you the applications now on 
 file and those which may hereafter be received, and allowing you 
 to select proper persons for the service required in case I have 
 occasion to call for the assistance of trained female nurses. 
 
 In this case I would expect you to answer all letters of 
 inquiry and to keep a list of eligibles from which to make 
 your selections in case of a call from me. This list need not 
 be a long one, and it is desirable that those selected should be 
 from different parts of the country. Residents of Washing- 
 ton should not have a preference in this selection over those 
 of other cities. As a rule, I think it would be better to have 
 women of not less than thirty and not more than fifty years 
 of age. They should, of course, be able to present proper 
 testimonials as to training, capacity and character. No 
 special legislation will be necessary in order to make appoint- 
 ments if the services of female nurses are required. The com- 
 pensation will be $30 a month, with board, and lodging 
 accommodations in the hospital where this is practicable. 
 
 I shall be glad to confer with your Committee at any time, 
 and remain, 
 
 Very respectfully yours, 
 
 (Signed) Geo. M. Sternberg, 
 
 Surgeon General, U. S. Army" 
 
440 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 The Board adopted the plan, as endorsed by the Surgeons- 
 General of the Army and Navy, appointing the following ofB- 
 cers : — Dr. Anita Newcomb McGee, Director, Miss Mary 
 Desha, Mrs. Francis S. Nash, Assistant Directors and Mrs. 
 Amos G. Draper, Treasurer. The Surgeons-General were 
 then promptly notified that the D. A. R. Hospital Corps was 
 formed and ready for work. 
 
 May 3, the Surgeon-General of the Army referred to the 
 Corps six hundred applications and letters from women and 
 organizations of women, offering services ; May i6, the Sur- 
 geon-General of the Navy referred one hundred and forty-two 
 of similar character, and thereafter all applications from women 
 for hospital positions in the Army and Navy, whether sent to 
 the President, Secretary of War, Members of Congress or the 
 Surgeon-General, were referred to the Corps for examination, 
 action and filing. 
 
 While all applicants were no doubt actuated by a spirit of 
 patriotism and desire to serve their country, their qualifications 
 ranged from having served one season successfully in light 
 opera to twenty years of successful experience as trained nurse, 
 superintendent, etc. The standard set by the Surgeon-Gen- 
 eral of the Army was adhered to; a set of questions prepared 
 by the Hospital Corps and approved by the Surgeons-General 
 was sent to each applicant, whose letter indicated any evidence 
 of hospital training. Those designated for service were re- 
 quired, except in a few emergency cases, to be not only grad- 
 uates from a regular training school but to be endorsed by 
 their superintendents. 
 
 On May 7, a request was received from the Surgeon-Gen- 
 eral of the Army for the names of three (afterwards increased 
 to four) surgical nurses for duty at the Military Hospital at 
 Key West, Fla., and on May 13, they signed contracts and left 
 for Key West. On the same day the names of six female 
 nurses for the Hospital Ship, Relief, were called for by the 
 Surgeon-General of the Army. From that time on, orders 
 were being received, and were filled, sometimes at the rate of 
 150 a day, from the list which on April 28 we were told " need 
 not be a long one." On September 7, the D. A. R. Hospital 
 Corps was relieved from further duty by the Surgeon-General 
 
WOMAN'S WORK IN THE WAR. 441 
 
 of the Army, having selected over nine hundred nurses from 
 ahuost every State east of the Rocky Mountains, for service 
 in twenty-two different Army hospitals, and six for service at 
 the Naval hospital at Norfolk, Va. Between five and six 
 hundred of these were selected between August 15 and Septem- 
 ber 7. 
 
 The Chief Surgeons at Jacksonville and Montauk appointed 
 directly many persons. These in addition to the nurses who 
 failed to sign contracts and those who were qualified by the 
 D. A. R. Hospital Corps but were not ordered to duty un- 
 til after September 7, increased the number to twelve hundred, 
 more than a full regiment ! These figures do not include the 
 faithful band of volunteer nurses or those employed in the 
 service of the Red Cross Auxiliary and other patriotic organ- 
 izations, of whom mention will be made later. 
 
 Thirteen of the contract nurses, Isabella R. Bradford, Sis- 
 ter Anastasia Burke, Sister M. Elizabeth Flanagan, Margaret 
 J. Greenfield, Sister Mary Larkin, Katherine Stansberry, Sis- 
 ter Mary Agnes Sweeney, Irene S. Toland, M. D., Ellen May 
 Tower, Margaret N. Tricoche, Minerva Turnbull, Clara H. 
 Ward and Sister Caroline Wolfe, died in service. Many more, 
 like the soldiers they nursed, were so enfeebled by disease, as 
 to be practically dependent upon others for support for weeks 
 and months. "Greater love hath no man than this, that a 
 man lay down his life for his friends." 
 
 While Miss Dix was appointed Superintendent of nurses in 
 1 861 by the Secretary of War, and served in that position 
 until the close of the Civil War, trained nursing as a profes- 
 sion was then unknown, and this is the first time that trained 
 nurses have been recognized as a part of the Medical Depart- 
 ment of the Government. That the idea of women nurses in 
 the regular military hospitals was not acceptable to many of 
 the Commanding Surgeons at first, was of course to be 
 expected. But the fact remains that in every instance where 
 their services were allowed, (often in the face of much opposi- 
 tion) within a short time the Surgeon Commanding asked for 
 more, considering their presence a necessity. The following 
 extracts are cited as examples of many that could be given if 
 space permitted. The first is from Major Dewitt, Surgeon 
 
442 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 Commanding the Hospital at Fortress Monroe, where only 
 thirty-four of the seventeen hundred patients died. 
 
 " I am satisfied that whatever success we may have had in 
 the treatment of our sick and wounded, has been in a great 
 measure due to the skill and devotion of the female nurses." 
 
 Major Mearns, Surgeon Commanding the John Blair Gibbs 
 General Hospital, says : 
 
 " In patriotism, courage and patient endurance of hard- 
 ships, the female contract nurses. . . . have risen above the 
 standard of enlisted men, and I am compelled to compare 
 them in these respects with the soldiers of the regular army 
 of the U. S." 
 
 Like all other "persons employed in hospitals," the con- 
 tract nurse is required to "wear habitually during the war, on 
 the left sleeve of the coat, midway between the shoulder and 
 elbow, a brassard or arm badge, consisting of a red cross on a 
 white ground," in accordance with the treaty of Geneva. 
 This, and the fact that in many instances her maintenance 
 was paid entirely or in part by the Red Cross Auxiliary No. 
 3, has given rise to the erroneous impression among many 
 persons, that she was a volunteer nurse, working in the ser- 
 vice of the " American National Red Cross." The Hospital 
 Ship, Relief, owned by the Government, whose women nurses 
 were designated by the D. A. R. Hospital Corps and 
 engaged by the Surgeon-General, was supposed by many per- 
 sons to belong to the " civil society " above mentioned 
 because, according to the treaty, it carried the Geneva cross 
 flag at the fore whenever the National flag was flown. 
 
 Various organizations, religious and otherwise, applied for 
 permission to serve in the military hospitals. These were 
 declined, but the service of many members of the organiza- 
 tions, applying as individuals were gladly accepted. This is 
 notably the case of the Sisters of Charity, Sisters of Mercy, 
 Sisters of the Holy Cross, Sisters of St. Joseph and Sisters of 
 the American Congregation, all of the latter order being 
 daughters of Indian Chiefs — Cheyennes and Sioux. Two 
 
WOMAN'S WORK IN THE WAR. 443 
 
 hundred and forty-three of these served, 218 of them being 
 designated by the D. A. R. Hospital Corps. 
 
 This is the first time that Roman CathoHc Sisters have 
 signed contracts as individuals. They did it cheerfully in 
 this instance, realizing the principle at stake and being 
 desirous of aiding and not hindering the Government in its 
 efforts to secure the highest grade of nursing for its men. Of 
 the value of their services Colonel Hoff writes from Chicka- 
 mauga : — 
 
 " No words can express my sense of obligation to the kind 
 Sisters for their admirable work with, and tender care of our 
 sick. . . . Please return to the Sisters my sense of obligation 
 to them, and the hope that I may feel at liberty to call upon 
 them under like circumstances in the future." 
 
 Dr. Almy says in a letter from Montauk : — 
 
 " In fact, it is due to their untiring work that every one says 
 that the ' Annex ' is the model hospital here. I would wish 
 to state that I consider them a great and indispensable help 
 in the military hospitals." 
 
 Other equally appreciative letters could be given. 
 
 Miss Ella Lorraine Dorsey, a " high private in the D. A. R. 
 Hospital Corps," was given the privilege and duty of examin- 
 ing and filing all papers in relation to the Sisters, and to her 
 kindness I am indebted for the data concerning them. 
 
 The following extracts from the annual report of the Sur- 
 geon-General : — 
 
 "A number of patriotic societies offered to provide the hos- 
 pitals with nurses, but the Committee referred to, answered 
 its purpose so well that I did not feel the need of additional 
 assistance and was relieved from what would otherwise have 
 been a serious responsibility ; " 
 
 and from a letter received from Major Carter, Surgeon Com- 
 manding Lciter Hospital : — 
 
 " I cannot refrain from expressing my admiration for the 
 care and discretion exercised by the D. A. R. Hospital 
 Corps in the selection of nurses ; and I beg leave to express 
 my highest appreciation of the invaluable aid they afforded 
 the management of Leiter Hospital ; " 
 
444 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 and scores of other letters give an idea of the value set upon 
 the services rendered by the D. A. R. Hospital Corps. The 
 best proof, however, of the thoroughness of the work of 
 selection lies in the fact that not one of the nurses designated 
 by the D. A. R. Hospital Corps was discharged for " mis- 
 conduct or neglect of duty." 
 
 One shudders to think what might have been the result if 
 nurses had been chosen by political influence alone, nor can 
 one refrain from admiring the wisdom and forethought of the 
 Surgeon-General of the Army for his persistent refusal, in the 
 face of much adverse criticism, to appoint women nurses in 
 the beginning, until their credentials could be properly 
 (examined, and for his continued adherence to the high 
 standard of excellence first maintained. 
 
 That it would have been impossible for any woman or corps 
 of women, living in one locality to have obtained such results, 
 is self-evident. The Daughters of the American Revolution 
 were peculiarly fitted for this work. Not only were its 
 members alive to all patriotic deeds ; they were thoroughly 
 organized and embraced all classes of society, all political 
 parties and all shades of religious belief. Two of the officers 
 of the Hospital Corps were daughters of Union men, and two 
 of Southern veterans. April 30, a circular letter had been 
 sent by the Board to its 582 chapters in every state in the 
 Union, calling upon them for assistance. This was promptly 
 responded to. Committees, usually consisting of physicians' 
 wives, were formed to which were referred the credentials of 
 applicants from that section. One wealthy woman in Boston 
 came to town twice a week and opened her house to receive 
 the applications of nurses and visited personally the physi- 
 cians, patients and hospitals to whom references were made, 
 before giving her endorsement. Women of wealth and 
 influence in Buffalo, Chicago, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Detroit, 
 Philadelphia, Rochester and St. Louis were equally efficient, 
 many of them remaining at home through the entire summer 
 to fulfil the duties of their office. Their work was ably 
 supplemented by the Associated Alumnae of Trained 
 Nurses and other organizations of similar character, as well as 
 by the superintendents of training schools who rendered 
 
WOMAN'S WORK IN THE WAR. 445 
 
 invaluable assistance. These and many others worked 
 zealously for the good of the cause, without hope of reward, 
 satisfied with the consciousness of duty well performed. 
 
 When the hospital at Fortress Monroe was opened a new 
 dif^culty arose. In a tent hospital, there were and neces- 
 sarily could be no accommodations for women nurses. Realiz- 
 ing the necessity, however, Mrs. Walworth, Director-General 
 of the Woman's National War Relief Association, telegraphed 
 to the Hospital Corps ; — " If the Surgeon-General will send 
 eight nurses designated by you to Fortress Monroe, we will 
 pay their board." Within two hours the nurses had been 
 appointed by the Surgeon-General and were on their way. 
 
 This Society deserves more than a passing mention. Not 
 only did it pay the board of the nurses above mentioned; it 
 supplied thousands of dollars worth of delicacies to the hos- 
 pital at Fortress Monroe, engaged cooks in order that the 
 food might be served in the most palatable manner, and 
 furnished medicines and supplies to many of the transports 
 setting out for Porto Rico. Many a poor soldier has reason 
 to bless the day that his surgeon, young and inex- 
 perienced, who let his medicine case be taken on board ship 
 with other baggage and thus found it inaccessible, met Mrs. 
 Walworth and was given a fresh supply of needed articles. 
 When the poor fever-stricken remnant of our gallant army 
 was landed at Montauk, Miss Helen Gould, whose generous 
 gift of $100,000 had been gratefully accepted by the Govern- 
 ment some time before, was chosen to represent the Associa- 
 tion and, from that time until the last tent was pitched, she 
 and other ofificers of the Association might be seen, minister- 
 ing to the sick and affording help in so many ways that the 
 thanks of Congress were tendered her for her manifold ser- 
 vices. 
 
 Miss Reubena Walworth volunteered as a nurse at the 
 beginning of the war and was employed by the Association. 
 She labored most zealously at Fortress Monroe and at Montauk 
 and finally lost her life in the Detention Hospital, beloved 
 by all with whom she came in contact. 
 
 Early in July one great deficiency was seen in the method 
 of supplying women nurses to the military hospitals as they 
 
446 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 were needed. Since Congress had provided no special fund 
 for their transportation, considerable delay had always occurred 
 before they could reach their destinations, and as these hospi- 
 tals were rapidly filling up with patients, in consequence of the 
 outbreak of typhoid and malarial fevers in the different camps, 
 the effect of such delay became daily more dangerous. The 
 Red Cross Society for the Maintenance of Trained Nurses, 
 Auxiliary to the American National Red Cross Relief Com- 
 mittee, Auxiliary No. 3, through its Acting President, Mrs. 
 Winthrop Cowdin, who was always keenly alive to the needs 
 of the soldier and the nurse and on the alert to supply them 
 if possible, offered to make good this lack. Five hundred dol- 
 lars was placed in the hands of the Treasurer of the D. A. R. 
 Hospital Corps as Acting Treasurer, which was afterwards in- 
 creased to $5,500, to meet transportation expenses of nurses, 
 ordered directly from Washington. The transportation ex- 
 penses of over 400 others was paid from New York to their posts 
 of destination. Owing to this generous contribution, nurses 
 were ordered by telegraph by the D. A. R. Hospital Corps to 
 proceed at once to their posts of duty, being assured that their 
 transportation would be refunded them, without waiting for the 
 ofificial papers necessary under the old system. In this way they 
 were ready for service several days, sometimes a week earlier, 
 and there is no doubt that much suffering and some lives were 
 saved thereby. This Society also provided maintenance for 
 43 nurses at Fortress Monroe, 150 at the Sternberg Hospital, 
 Chickamauga, furnished supplies in great abundance to the 
 nurses and men at many of the hospitals, most especially 
 those of Sternberg and Montauk, supported over 200 nurses 
 sent by permission to different hospitals in this country and 
 in Cuba, and richly earned for itself the encomium of Major 
 Rafferty of Fort Hamilton : 
 
 "Were I to choose the most worthy and successful body of 
 workers from among all the generous people who have been 
 rendering such beautiful aid to our sick and wounded, I should 
 unhesitatingly point to your Auxiliary for the Maintenance of 
 Trained Nurses. " 
 
 This Society also lost by death one of its efficient workers. 
 
WOMAN'S WORK IN THE WAR. 447 
 
 Miss Phinney, who after serving faithfully at the Leiter Hos- 
 pital succumbed to the physical and mental strain. 
 
 Nor did the D. A. R. Hospital Corps content itself with be- 
 ing merely an examining board for nurses. From the first 
 week in May when we undertook to supply 500 hospital shirts, 
 till the last of September, when we reported $60, 000 in money 
 and supplies received and forwarded, it formed one of the 
 channels into which poured the great stream of relief work un- 
 dertaken by women throughout the entire country. From 
 the 236 chapters and societies contributing, it sent supplies to 
 every general hospital in the United States, Cuba, Porto Rico 
 and Manila and to many of the field and division hospitals, 
 started a diet kitchen at Fort McPherson, Ga., gave employ- 
 ment to many women, whose relatives were in the war, and 
 furnished patterns of garments needed in hospitals to hundreds 
 of applicants. 
 
 In Connecticut the relief work was thoroughly organized 
 under its energetic State Regent. One had but to telegraph 
 to New Haven, and whether the request was for collapsible 
 rubber bath-tubs, straw matting beds or food delicacies, it 
 was granted instantly. 
 
 In many of the towns in New York and Pennsylvania, notices 
 were read from the different churches calling upon the peo- 
 ple to unite, and War Emergency Relief Boards were formed, 
 frequently with a Daughter of the American Revolution at 
 the head. One in Cleveland, Ohio, having 188 auxiliaries in 
 the city and surrounding towns, contributed over $9,000 in 
 money and sent 365 boxes of clothing and supplies. In 
 Rochester, N. Y., the work begun under the auspices of the Iron- 
 dequoit Chapter, D. A. R., soon outgrew its quarters, and a 
 large organization called the Rochester War Relief Committee 
 was formed which embraced 118 organizations in Rochester 
 and in the towns of western New York. These contributed 
 thousands of dollars in money and supplies to different camps 
 and hospitals wherever the call seemed most urgent. Mite 
 boxes were placed in different hotels and public places in De- 
 troit, and the result, mostly in pennies, was wisely expended 
 in fruits and other delicacies for the sick. 
 
 The Daughters of the Confederacy in Virginia and in Texas 
 
448 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 contributed most generously to the cause. Contributions both 
 in money and supplies were sent by them through the D. A. 
 R. Hospital Corps to several hospitals, chiefly to Pablo Beach, 
 1 8 miles from Jacksonville, where a large convalescent hospi- 
 tal was established for convalescents and others who had 
 become debilitated through climatic influences. Mrs. Fitzhugh 
 Lee worked unceasingly for the good of the soldiers stationed 
 there and herself supervised many of the details of relief work. 
 
 Other societies, notably the King's Daughters, Woman's 
 Relief Corps, Council of Jewish Women, Rathbone and Py- 
 thian Sisters, Ladies of the G. A. R., Temperance Unions and 
 many Church Societies, both Catholic and Protestant, lent 
 willing aid to our efforts to serve our country. 
 
 Our support came from all classes ; from the richest to the 
 poorest, from those in perfect health to the woman who, 
 although confined to her bed, cut out io8 flannel bands and 
 later wrote, " I have so enjoyed the pattern you sent me," 
 from the old lady of 83 who faithfully served her country 
 during the Civil War to the boy of ten, who culled from 
 newspapers and magazines the choicest and brightest clippings 
 and sent them in envelopes to the different hospitals. 
 
 The ofifice in Washington was open from 8 A. M. to ii 
 and 12 P. M. When, one by one, the many efficient volunteer 
 helpers were obliged to leave town, and one of the officers 
 even was unable to render further assistance, the others 
 uncomplainingly lengthened their own hours and no call, 
 whether for nurses or supplies, at whatever hour of the day or 
 night it might be received, was unheeded. In reviewing the 
 work one can only echo the words of a most faithful worker: 
 " We are learning a great lesson here and that is in finding 
 out the best in hundreds of people we never could have met 
 but for such a crisis. I believe more than ever in humanity." 
 
 It is an historical fact that the decision of the Government 
 to send the Hospital Ships, Scaudia and Arizona, to Manila 
 was hastened, if not actually inspired, by the efforts of a 
 woman who at her own expense came to Washington from 
 Portland, Oregon. Almost on her knees she begged the mili- 
 tary authorities to send relief to the men, many of whom 
 had been school boys under her tuition. Like the importunate 
 
w 
 
 WOMAN'S WORK IN THE WAR. 449 
 
 ..idow in Bible times, she would not be denied. Letters were 
 sent by the D. A. R. Hospital Corps to the State Regents of 
 all States west of the Rocky Mountains, informing them of 
 the good deeds of their Eastern Sisters and inciting them to 
 effort in the same direction. This met with the same gener- 
 ous response that had been accorded all other appeals to the 
 patriotism of women, and our boys at Manila had reason to 
 echo the prayer made by members of a Kentucky Regiment 
 who stood with uncovered heads, as supplies were being 
 brought in, and said, " God bless the Daughters of the Ameri- 
 can Revolution." 
 
 As the D. A. R. Hospital Corps was organized for service 
 in the Army and Navy, the money and supplies passing 
 through its hands were spent under the direction of the 
 Surgeons General. In this way duplication of charitable 
 gifts was avoided and every garment sent and every dollar 
 expended was appreciated to the fullest extent. If the sup- 
 plies reached their destination and were of service in alleviat- 
 ing suffering, what does it matter that in many cases they, as 
 well as the nurses furnished by the D. A. R. Hospital Corps, 
 were credited to the American National Red Cross, which m 
 the minds of many persons stands for all that is good and 
 true? That they did relieve suffering and were sent where 
 they were most needed has been abundantly proven. Ex^ 
 tracts from a few letters chosen at random, from many in the 
 possession of the Daughters of the American Revolution are 
 given. 
 
 "It is not possible within reasonable limits, to set forth all 
 the varieties of help afforded by the D A R. But whcther 
 it was nurses, supplies, wines, waters, clothing or cooks that 
 were needed, the D. A. R. were ev^r ready to meet he 
 demands. Thanks and gratitude are particularly due to the 
 Cincinnati Committee and its able Chairman. No request ot 
 any sort was made to them in vain. And their promptness 
 and business-like methods were deserving of the highest com- 
 mendation." 
 
 "There was not a single article that was not needful. . . . 
 The thermometers, medicine glasses, swabs, slippers, handker- 
 chiefs, sponges, soaps, bay rum. fans, etc., etc., in a word each 
 and every article will meet its proper recognition in discharge 
 
450 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 of our labor and will contribute largely to the comforts and 
 also pleasure of the sick, all of whom with us, seem to be 
 very refined and of respectable appearance, some mere boys, 
 and all looking to the nurses now as their own friends and 
 relations." 
 
 " The grape juice, soups and other delicacies came just as 
 they were most needed, and the poor convalescents enjoyed 
 all so much. We divided the good things among the nurses 
 and rejoiced in them as much as the sick, for there is nothing 
 harder than to have the care of sick, and not have wherewith 
 to nourish them as their condition requires." 
 
 In the beginning the D. A. R. Hospital Corps had taken 
 upon themselves the privilege of supplying each nurse with a 
 dozen aprons, which were furnished by the different Chapters, 
 according to their ability, at the rate of from one to seventy-five 
 dozen. As the demand for nurses increased, the stock became 
 exhausted and with fear and trembling the question was put 
 to the Chairmen of different Committees by Miss Desha, 
 Assistant Director, who had been placed in charge of this 
 matter: "Shall we supply these later nurses with aprons?" 
 As quick as the wires could carry the message, came the first 
 response, " Let us keep our word. Rochester ready in one 
 week with twenty dozen." This was followed with similar 
 messages from Chicago and Elmira, but the climax was 
 reached when Louisville responded that 200 dozen were await- 
 ing our orders, thus completing our quota. 
 
 The D. A. R. Hospital Corps was only one outlet for the 
 activity of the " Daughters." A War Committee, with Mrs. 
 Daniel Manning, Chairman, and Mrs. Russell A. Alger, Vice- 
 Chairman, was formed. They sent food and clothing to many 
 different hospitals and purchased a launch for the Hospital 
 Ship, Missouri, of which Major Arthur writes ; 
 
 "The launch proved of the very greatest utility in bringing 
 our sick on board. We put all the recumbent patients in the 
 launches on litters, and towed those able to sit up in the 
 ship's gig, behind. In this way we transferred one hundred 
 and six patients from the shore to the ship in an hour and 
 three quarters." 
 
 Many members gave as individuals, like the woman in Phil- 
 
WOMAN'S WORK IN THE WAR. 451 
 
 adelphia who, when the news of the battle of El Caney was 
 received, telegraphed the President, " How can $600 best be 
 expended for soldiers at Santiago?" The reply, " Soups, 
 Franco-American," was hardly received before they were 
 bought and ready for shipment on the first transport. 
 
 Others took upon themselves the care of the families of the 
 soldiers and sailors, both regulars and volunteers. Rents 
 were paid ; food and clothing given to the destitute ; and as 
 far as possible, employment obtained for the women who, 
 especially in the case of the Regulars, were often left stranded 
 with no means of obtaining a livelihood and no money to 
 enable them to go where work could be found. 
 
 The official report of the work of the D. A. R. places the 
 amount contributed at $350,000, and every Daughter will re- 
 member with pride the additional fact that Miss Clara Barton, 
 the President of the American National Red Cross, is a 
 charter member and Honorary Vice President General ot 
 the D. A. R., that Mrs. Walworth, Director-General of the 
 Woman's National War Relief Association, is one of its found- 
 ers, and that Miss Helen Gould is also a " Daughter." 
 
 The Massachusetts Volunteer Aid Association called upon 
 all the women of that State to help fit out the Hospital Ship. 
 Bay State, which, although designed primarily for the use of the 
 Massachusetts soldiers was given to the Government to be used 
 as the needs demanded. This ship, like the Solace, Relief and 
 Missouri, is said to have been loaded to the water's edge 
 with medical supplies, delicacies and clothing suitable for the 
 comfort of the sick and wounded. 
 
 The Legion of Loyal Women, as an auxiliary to the Ameri- 
 can National Red Cross, contributed large supplies of food 
 and clothing to the various camps, and individual members 
 established diet kitchens at several hospitals and rendered 
 other valuable assistance. 
 
 The W. C. T. U. opened lunch rooms and " Rest rooms" 
 near all the camps, making them as inviting as possible that 
 the tired soldier might be induced to while away his leisure 
 hours there, and avoid the pitfall of the neighboring saloons 
 No history of the part taken by w^oman in this war can be 
 complete without mention of the American National Red 
 
452 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 Cross, which with the various other societies bearing the name 
 " Red Cross," some of them auxiliary to, and all animated by 
 the same noble purpose, contributed more than half the sup- 
 plies furnished to the various camps during the war. For 
 while it is true that most of the incorporators and many of 
 the officers are men, all women are proud of the fact that the 
 President, Miss Clara Barton, is a woman. To the State of 
 Texas, with her party of doctors and nurses on board, was given 
 the honor of being the first ship to sail into Santiago after the 
 surrender. Her nurses were the first women to minister to the 
 sick and wounded in Cuba and hundreds of men and women 
 " rise up to call her blessed." 
 
 The Red Cross of California, the Red Cross of Oregon and 
 the Red Cross of Seattle have taken a very prominent part in 
 the relief work of the war. Men and women nurses have been 
 sent to Manila by them, a hospital established, and thousands 
 of dollars worth of supplies of all sorts forwarded to the Phil- 
 ippines. 
 
 While women as well as men realize that " In union there 
 is strength," and most of the relief work was carried on by 
 organizations, there are several notable exceptions. Five 
 women, Clara Barton, Anna Bouligny, Margaret Chanler, 
 Helen Miller Gould, and Annie Wheeler, received the thanks 
 of Congress for their deeds of generosity and mercy, and hun- 
 dreds of others gave in equal measure, according to their 
 ability. 
 
 As the war drew to a close and the men were allowed to 
 return to their homes, patriotic women all over the country 
 united to make their journey as comfortable as possible. 
 Home-made bread, cakes, lemonade, etc., were taken to the 
 different stations and served to the wan, gaunt specimens of 
 humanity, many of whom said that it was the first nourish- 
 ing food they had eaten for months. Nurses and doctors 
 were employed to go into the cars and examine the patients ; 
 permission was obtained to remove those who were unable to 
 travel further and to place them in hospitals ; and assistance 
 was rendered to the convalescent. At one station in Pennsyl- 
 vania a man was found lying in the broiling sun, with face as 
 yellow as a lemon. The passers-by were afraid to go near him 
 
WOMAN'S WORK IN THE WAR, 453 
 
 as it was reported he had yellow fever. A woman physician, 
 a Daughter of the American Revolution, went up to him, and 
 finding after examination that he was suffering simply from a 
 severe case of malaria, had him conveyed to a hospital, took 
 care of him herself until other nurses could be obtained and 
 had the satisfaction of seeing him discharged, quite convales- 
 cent, within a few days. 
 
 I wish I might truthfully say that the supplies poured out 
 in such abundant measure, " twice trodden and running over," 
 always reached those for whom they were intended, or that 
 all suffering was, as it ought to have been, relieved by them. 
 That such was not always the case thousands, alas, can testify. 
 This is in very few instances the fault of the senders, but like 
 many other things, can be accounted for by the general un- 
 preparedness of our country for war. In a few hours, spent at 
 one of the hospitals, I saw seriously ill patients obliged to lie 
 on the floor of a tent, although an ample supply of cots were 
 only two miles away and had been for days, but for lack of 
 transportation facilities they could not be obtained. On my 
 return to the station I saw gallons of milk standing in the hot 
 sun where it had been all day, because no wagon could be 
 found to take it to tlie typhoid patients, who were suffering 
 for lack of it. All who were interested in the work know that 
 in every hospital there were times when there would be a lack 
 of necessities, and times when necessities, comforts and luxu- 
 ries even were received in such abundance that they could not 
 be utilized. 
 
 Such things will inevitably occur, until the Surgeon-General 
 of the Army has as full power accorded him as is given to the 
 Surgeon-General of the Navy, and until all relief work in time 
 of war or national disaster is organized under one or more 
 national societies, in harmony with the Government and under 
 its control, and whose chiefs shall be either elected by the people 
 or appointed by the Government or both. Then and not till 
 then will the greatest possible good be given the greatest 
 number of people at the least expenditure of money and 
 strength. 
 
 Different commanders have vied with each other in disclaim- 
 ing the honor for their victories, giving it to the " men behind 
 
454 '1*HE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 the guns." Shall no word of praise be given to the woman, who, 
 by her skill in restoring the sick to health and by her furnish- 
 ing the needed supplies when the men were exhausted, ren- 
 dered them capable of winning victories? It was a glorious 
 thing to stand firm, and make the famous charge at San Juan. 
 Was it not also glorious for a woman, reared in the Northern 
 climate, to offer her services as nurse for soldiers stricken with 
 the dread yellow fever, and then when on her arrival at the 
 hospital she found that, while there was no lack of trained 
 nurses like herself, no one could be engaged to properly pre- 
 pare the food, to go herself into the kitchen, and for five weeks 
 prepare with her own hands the broths and soups necessary 
 for several hundred sick and convalescents? It required true 
 courage and patriotism to lie in the trenches day after day, 
 uncomplainingly, although wet to the skin, as so many of our 
 brave men did. Was no courage or patriotism shown by 
 the pleasure-loving, young girl, who cheerfully relinquished a 
 trip to the sea-shore and performed routine clerical work day 
 after day, in order that the money thus saved might be expend- 
 ed in delicacies for the wounded, ■ — or by the woman, who, 
 employed in the service of the Government during the day, 
 worked until midnight all through the hottest summer ever 
 known in Washington, in order that " haply some life might 
 thereby be saved," or by the woman in Cleveland, who packed 
 box after box through the long summer days, until at last she 
 fainted at her self-imposed task, and was carried away to suffer 
 for weeks from the effects of her labors,— or by the poor laundry 
 women who worked over hours, without pay, that the shirts 
 sent to the soldiers might be soft and clean as only freshly- 
 laundered linen can be, — or by the colored cook, who for two 
 days, steadily, in a hot kitchen, strained and prepared the 
 grape-juice, which was so refreshing to the fever-stricken 
 patients, — or by hundreds of women, whose deeds come to 
 the mind of every reader of these pages, wherever in this 
 great country he may be ? 
 
 Not long ago the earthly remains of the brave men who 
 died in Cuba and Porto Rico were brought home, to be 
 interred in that beautiful and historic spot, Arlington, 
 where the heroes of many a war are resting. The President 
 
WOMAN'S WORK IN THE WAR. 455 
 
 and other high officials of the Government were present to do 
 them honor ; flags were put at half-mast ; Government ofifices 
 were closed ; the whole nation mourned. In honoring them, 
 however, we should not fail to respect the memory of the 
 young physician, Dr. Irene Toland, who, as soon as she was 
 told that yellow-fever had broken out among the soldiers and 
 that her services were needed, left an extensive practice in St. 
 Louis and was sent to Cuba. After restoring many to health 
 by her efficient nursing, her strength was exhausted and she 
 died at Santiago, having as truly given her life in the service 
 of her country as any soldier who fell on the field of battle. 
 Nor should we forget Sister Mary Larkin and Ellen May 
 Tower who lost their lives in Porto Rico that their patients 
 might live. 
 
 When the Government erects at Arlington its well- 
 deserved tribute to the men, whose names are on the roll of 
 honor of their country, close beside it should stand a slender 
 marble shaft, inscribed " Sacred to the memory of the women 
 who gave their lives in response to their country's call." 
 

CHAPTER XXIII. 
 
 CHRISTIAN ACTIVITY IN OUR WAR WITH SPAIN, 
 ARMY AND NAVY CHRISTIAN COMMISSION. 
 
 PERSONAL GLIMPSES OF ITS WORK. 
 
 BY 
 
 Maj.-Gen. O. O. HOWARD. 
 
 ON the 3rd of September, 1861, I lost my first brigade 
 command. It was caused by my promotion, passing 
 as I did from a senior colonelcy to the rank of a 
 Brigadier General of Volunteers. While waiting under Mc- 
 Clellan for an assignment to a new brigade, I was living with 
 my Adjutant General and some friends in what was called the 
 chain-bidldiug. It was in Washington, near the New York 
 Avenue Presbyterian church, where General Scott had once 
 roomed. 
 
 Having at the time but little official business on hand, I 
 spent many hours with the members of the Young Men's 
 Christian Association, of which institution I was a member. 
 The Washington branch, which I was helping, had immedi- 
 ately undertaken an active Christian work in the regiments, as 
 soon as they came to be stationed in and around the District 
 of Columbia. These efforts were similar to those before the 
 Spanish War, lately undertaken and carried forward by our 
 young men, particularly in the local branches near State en- 
 campments. 
 
 About the same time that we in Washington set up our 
 Christian standard and were unfurling it in that part of the 
 United States Army, a central committee in Philadelphia 
 showed itself with a larger outlook. This committee sprang 
 from the Young Men's Christian Association of the United 
 States. 
 
458 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 George H. Stuart, an eminent Christian merchant of Phila- 
 delphia, became, upon invitation of the committee, the 
 conspicuous President of the new organization, soon chris- 
 tened : " The Army Christian Commission." 
 
 I have regarded the Washington enterprise of 1861 as a 
 stepping-stone to the Commission — to that grand body of 
 men and women (for women's organizations were soon multi- 
 tudinous and auxiliary) who raised millions of dollars and 
 carried by their delegates essential comforts, proper literature 
 and breezes of home-life to our camps and hospitals during 
 the four dreadful years of the Civil War. 
 
 The general national association long ago became interna- 
 tional, and through institutions of learning, academies, 
 colleges and universities, has taken its Christian enterprises 
 in behalf of young men into every part of every country on 
 the globe where such institutions exist. 
 
 When the war with Spain became imminent and State 
 camps for soldiers were located and occupied by the National 
 Guard, at once local associations became active. They 
 planted large-sized tents that are more like old-fashioned 
 pavilions than army tents. Let us take for an example one 
 such pavilion. You find it equipped with a platform at one 
 end, which carries a desk for the secretary and a cabinet organ, 
 with song books of different kinds and sizes heaped around 
 it, with tables long and short usually covering the entire 
 space of the pavilion, excepting the platform and the room 
 occupied by benches and chairs convenient to the tables, and 
 a few stands devoted to harmless games. On the tables are 
 found an abundance of weekly journals, monthlies and dailies, 
 with here and there piles of small books and booklets. But 
 the main thing noticeable is the fine arrangement for writing: 
 ink-wells, headed paper and patriotic envelopes by the million. 
 As soon as one of the pavilions had been erected, there were 
 put up outside of it, under canvas or rough boards in shanty 
 form, a small storehouse and kitchen where the secretary- 
 manager and his three or four assistants ate and slept and 
 kept on hand reserve supplies. Either here or at the end of 
 the pavilion could always be found a large tank of ice water 
 that somehow, like the widow's barrel and cruse, never became 
 
CHRISTIAN ACTIVITY IN OUR WAR WITH SPAIN. 459 
 
 empty. Such was the early equipment intended for about 
 four or five regiments for each pavilion. 
 
 To go back for a moment to the impelling force, near the 
 first of May our grand international committee living in New 
 York and vicinity did several things. They first called a 
 public Association meeting of members, in the Collegiate 
 Church (The Dutch Reformed) of the city, which was largely 
 attended, the members coming together from all quarters and 
 from different denominations. They established a Branch, 
 the name of which, as finally settled upon, was " The Army 
 and Navy Christian Commission." They then fixed head- 
 quarters at No. 3 West 29th Street, at the same place where 
 for a long time have gathered the secretaries and helpers of 
 the international committee, a place before and after this 
 event full of benevolent activity and Christian interest. Two 
 young men were selected and placed in charge as business 
 managers, Mr. W. E. Lougee and Mr. Wm. B. Millar. The 
 first controlled the large correspondence and the raising from 
 the people of the necessary funds ; the other appointed and 
 regulated the field agents for each encampment and the 
 superintendents of the pavilions. Very soon, of course, a 
 treasurer was essential. Frederick B. Schenck, Esq., was 
 wisely chosen, for he had the confidence of the business 
 community. 
 
 Such was the arrangement already existing, but naturally 
 not yet perfected, when in the same month of May, Major D. 
 W. Whittle and I met at the Murray Hill Hotel late one 
 evening. Our visits to the Commission made the next morn- 
 ing, to the CJiristiaii Herald, to the Secretaries of the Bible 
 Society, to the American Tract Society and to Mr. Sankey's 
 commercial establishment, from which came many thousands 
 of hymns and song books, proved to be remarkably fruitful. 
 Bibles, parts of Bibles, Testaments, books and booklets, song 
 books and religious weeklies were generously given, boxed 
 and sent forward to our order without charge. General 
 Samuel Thomas kindly secured us transportation for ourselves 
 to Chickamauga, Atlanta, Mobile, Tampa and return. 
 
 My first sight of a furnished pavilion, such as I have 
 described, was at Camp Coppinger in the thin forest of pines 
 
46o THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 about four miles northeast of Mobile. Just outside the pavil- 
 ion was the small platform temporarily removed from its 
 place inside. The cabinet organ and all the seats had also 
 been carried out and arranged in front of it. The soldiers 
 were already gathered. Just after dark the benches were 
 filled, but more men were standing on the right and left, more 
 still in the rear— probably 2,000 altogether. Mr. Harte, from 
 the Mobile Association, with selected singers to help him, 
 was conducting some preliminary exercises. He was a large, 
 well-built, healthful-looking young man of most acceptable 
 presence and speech. It was indeed a weird scene that 
 greeted us— all lighted up in smoke and flame by torches of 
 the pitch-pine held in the hands of many soldiers. These 
 were mainly regulars with a sprinkling of volunteers from the 
 Texas regiment and from the Alabama camp just joined. 
 Ofificers of every rank were gathered near the platform. As 
 we approached— Major Whittle, Lieutenant John Howard 
 and myself— we heard Mr. Harte making promises of our 
 coming, so that we knew that we were waited for. It was a 
 rousing welcome that was given us when we stepped upon 
 the platform, for, be assured, the soldiers do not hesitate in 
 any voluntary meeting, religious or otherwise, to cheer 
 heartily when they choose. 
 
 It was a great delight to me to hear the hymns, especially 
 those of a patriotic kind, that filled with their music the piny 
 woods that night. Strong, manly voices followed up the 
 inimitable solos with such choruses as could not be rendered 
 elsewhere. 
 
 Major Whittle, an evangelist of long experience, who in the 
 Civil War was my beloved staff of^cer and companion, accus- 
 tomed to soldier audiences, never appeared to better advan- 
 tage than when speaking on that occasion. He was, without 
 doubt, specially inspired. His face shone brightly as the 
 flambeaux waved near him, and his voice rang out eloquently 
 as he demonstrated with extraordinary clearness what the 
 Scriptures meant by repentance and belief in Christ. His 
 illustrations, usually drawn from his early army associations, 
 were fresh, pointed and convincing. 
 
 My first address at that Camp Coppinger followed that of 
 
CHRISTIAN ACTIVITY IN OUR WAR WITH SPAIN. 461 
 
 Major Whittle, and the subject was, " He died for me." I 
 also illustrated my theme by several selections from my own 
 army experience, taking cases where an officer or soldier had 
 been killed or desperately wounded when connected with my 
 staff or myself in campaign and battle ; that is to say, where in 
 some sense the life surrendered appeared to be given for me. 
 
 Perhaps the most marked instance among my illustrations 
 was that of my hostler and orderly, McDonald. At the battle 
 called Kolb's Farm, in Georgia, with my staff and orderlies I 
 was watching some important operations not far from our 
 front line, when McDonald was hit by a rifle ball that passed 
 through his instep, giving him a very painful wound. He 
 rode up near me and told me that lie was wounded, while 
 showing me his foot. He said that he should die. I told 
 him, no; I knew the wound was painful, but did not believe 
 it fatal. I said that if he would go back to the field hospital 
 I would join him after the battle was over and do what I 
 could for his comfort. He then rode away, but before 
 departing he looked up into my face while a tear was glisten- 
 ing in his eye and said, " How glad I am that I was wounded 
 and not you." I felt then, and the impression has remained 
 with me, that McDonald gave his life for my life. When I 
 went back to the field hospital I found that he had already 
 been carried away to Lookout Mountain, where he was placed 
 in hospital. He died there and was buried among the vast 
 multitude marked " Unknown." 
 
 The soldiers at Mobile — the most of them — afterwards went 
 to Tampa and thence to Cuba and fought in the battles about 
 Santiago. Many of them were killed or wounded or died in 
 hospitals. Some of them, convalescing, were sent home. I 
 met some in the hospitals at Key West and I came up with 
 others on the Scgurajica to New York. On board were many 
 that had come from Santiago de Cuba. I saw one man in 
 the social hall on the long side seat ; the nurse and one or 
 two of his comrades were near him. He lay there stretched 
 out, pale as death, hardly breathing. The nurse said that he 
 could not live many minutes longer. A young doctor came 
 to him and I accompanied the doctor. I put my hand on his 
 head and spoke to him gently, and he opened his eyes and 
 
462 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 told me his name and his regiment and the letter of his com- 
 pany. His name was Corcoran of the 3d Regular Infantry. 
 He was from Baltimore, the only son of Michael Corcoran of 
 that city. When I turned away the doctor said, " General, 
 you have done him more good than medicine," for the young 
 man showed evidence of increasing life. As I was on the 
 point of leaving the social hall, I came toward Corcoran. 
 Just then the young man opened his eyes and looked at me 
 for a moment and said: "Aren't you General Howard?" 
 " Yes," I replied. 
 
 " I thought so. You spoke to us at Mobile and told us the 
 story of Private McDonald." I sat down close to him and 
 said gently : 
 
 "Are you trusting in McDonald's Savior?" 
 
 He answered me with decision and with more strength of 
 voice than I had believed he could command : " Yes, I am ! " 
 
 Day by day, as we moved along on the large steamer, I 
 visited Corcoran in the forward part of the ship and found 
 him slowly gaining strength. Once he said to me: " General, 
 I am praying all the time." 
 
 Like McDonald, after he became a Christian, he appeared 
 to become more and more attached to me, and was greatly 
 delighted at a small present which I gave him, of something 
 that had been with me for some years. He would not allow 
 his mess-mate to take it out of his sight. I learned from his 
 comrades that he had been a splendid soldier, in fact an ath- 
 lete, and they said that it was surprising how quickly the 
 fever had brought him to death's door. 
 
 This incident gives some idea of how we may, when we 
 least think of it, make a lodgment in the mind and heart of 
 an immortal soul, and how by the Divine help such a soul 
 may enter into salvation. 
 
 I omitted to say that the Evangelical Division of the Army 
 and Navy Commission was intrusted to D. L. Moody, the 
 evangelist. He early made up his mind that something more 
 than giving literature, however good, and games, however 
 innocent, and letter-paper, however abundant, was necessary 
 to satisfy Christian people and please the Master. He heard 
 at the outset that there were almost no chaplains at Tampa 
 
CHRISTIAN ACTIVITY IN OUR WAR WITH STAIN. 463 
 
 and many vacancies among them elsewhere. He therefore 
 sent to Tampa many of his best speakers. They went also 
 to Camp Alger and the camps at Chickamauga, Jacksonville, 
 Mobile, Miami and elsewhere. 
 
 It was a little later that Major Whittle and I met a bevy of 
 the workers at Chickamauga. Our organization was more 
 complete at that great camp than anywhere else. We sat 
 down in a place we called headquarters, not far from General 
 John R. Brooke, commanding the Corps present. Our group 
 was at his left rear, near the Signal Corps, and not far from 
 Leiters' Station. These Christian headquarters had tents, 
 shanties for storehouses, and a board kitchen extensive enough 
 to accommodate at least twenty boarders, with a good Chris- 
 tian worker as a sort of commandant of kitchen, " to run that 
 part of the machine." It was very delightful and very profit- 
 able to sit by Whittle's tent at a place where prayer was wont 
 to be made, and where the Christian helpers came in from all 
 parts of the encampment for prayer, conference and supplies. 
 From that center they went out all over the vast forest to 
 the twenty-eight pavilions, arranged as I have described and 
 ready for their meetings. The pavilion we usually found 
 filled with soldiers sitting at the tables, reading the literature, 
 or playing some harmless games or writing letters to the 
 home-circle or to other friends. 
 
 The singers were a great feature of our efforts ; each one of 
 them, like Maxwell or Burke, was a leader and a teacher. 
 He could sing a solo and in a few minutes teach a regiment 
 or brigade to sound the chorus. Maxwell at times seemed to 
 play upon a body of men 3,000 strong as he would upon an 
 organ or a piano. The choruses in the open air were always 
 strong, grand, impressive. It seemed to me wonderful that 
 there were so many good singers. The singers did more. 
 They visited the hospitals every day, and, where they could, 
 they sang hymns to the convalescent, and with others they 
 went from house to house, or from canvas to canvas, to give 
 cheer and condolence, or receive for transmission tender mes- 
 sages which the sick men believed they themselves would 
 never be able again to give. 
 
 The Red Cross had a noble work, and in fact it did not dif- 
 
464 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 fer materially from ours, because of Christian hearts like those 
 of Dr. Gill and Miss Clara Barton, who distributed the re- 
 lief. Medicines, soups and delicate fruit are themselves pow- 
 erful instrumentalities to lift up human souls when they are 
 carried in the right way to those who are in need ; but these 
 things ought we to have done and not leave the other things 
 undone. 
 
 The Army and Navy Commission and the Red Cross Soci- 
 ety combined, gave precious food and helpful, healing medi- 
 cine to souls as well as to bodies. 
 
 The evidences of good feeling between the volunteers from 
 different sections were not wanting in any of the large camps 
 that we visited. In the city of Mobile our reception was cor- 
 dial. The stars and stripes decorated all the streets through 
 which we passed and floated from vertical and horizontal 
 staffs over the hotels and other public buildings. This was 
 far different from the Mobile of a few years ago. 
 
 On our second visit to his regiment I had the honor of for- 
 mally presenting Mr. Harte, who had become my fast friend, 
 and whom the Second Alabama had just elected as chaplain. 
 The camp was about as far from town as Camp Coppinger, 
 but in a different direction. As Mr. Harte and I were leaving 
 Mobile to visit this encampment. Major Whittle with some 
 singers and a Christian delegation went again to Camp Cop- 
 pinger. 
 
 The regimental commander. Colonel Clark, in his welcome 
 made us feel at home. He took us to his large mess-tent, 
 introduced us to his officers and invited us hospitably to 
 break bread with him and them at his table. All the commis- 
 sion who were off duty accompanied us to the pavilion. The 
 contents of this large tent and the surroundings were like 
 those at other places. The cabinet-organ stood by my side and 
 helped to relieve my diffidence while speaking for the first 
 time to a southern regiment, for I could put my arm upon the 
 top piece and lean hard. The soldiers and the flaming, smok- 
 ing torches were before me spread out like a fan. The most 
 of the men sat down or reclined upon the ground ; while the 
 singing and reading proceeded I was looking into those young 
 faces. How like boys the six or seven hundred seemed ! 
 
CHRISTIAN ACTIVITY IN OUR WAR WITH SPAIN. 465 
 
 Could lads from seventeen to twenty-five have been no older 
 in the sixties ? How bright, hopeful and interested they were ! 
 A Yankee General was to address them. That night I told 
 the story of my conversion forty-one years before this visit, 
 and of my union for a time with a southern church at Tampa, 
 —and I tried to show something of the Savior's love, which 
 was as easily manifest to each of them as to me. The soldier 
 could not be excluded, for of one commander of a hundred 
 men our Master had said : " I have not seen so great faith, no, 
 not in Israel." 
 
 Some young man, after I had ended my speech, shouted : 
 " Three cheers for General Howard ! " They were given with 
 a will. I then asked them byway of response to cheer the old 
 flag. Instantly it was done with apparent unanimity and 
 with marked power and effect. After the last song and a 
 benediction by the chaplain, the soldiers gathered around me, 
 some to take my hand, while others showed their sympathy 
 and good will by touching my arm and shoulder. I said to 
 myself : " The old hostility is all gone ! " 
 
 In the hospitals everywhere there were remarkable exhibi- 
 tions of mutual helpfulness and fellowship between the sick 
 men who had come together from various sections, particu- 
 larly as soon as the patients were sufficiently convalescent to 
 pay and return visits, going from bed to bed. 
 
 The fraternal feeling between General Fitz-Hugh Lee and 
 myself, also between General Joseph Wheeler, Major Whittle 
 and myself, was pronounced. It seemed hardly possible that 
 in so many bloody battles we had actually fought against 
 each other. Indeed, the truth is, that we never did have any 
 personal animosity, and it rejoiced all the comrades of both 
 sides in the old strife, who were able to participate in this war 
 with Spain, to find themselves together, fighting [now for the 
 
 same flag. 
 
 When I intimated to General Wheeler that I might have to 
 go upon his staff, he welcomed the thought with lively accla- 
 mation. 
 
 Though Tampa enjoyed great advantages from our Chris- 
 tian Commission, we did not plant so many pavilions for the 
 soldiers' convenience as at Chickamauga. The Moody Taber- 
 
466 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 nacle left at Tampa after Mr. Moody's evangelical visit the 
 previous winter, had been removed to " The Tampa Heights," 
 the highest ground of the encampment, and there set up. An 
 immense platform for singers, benches for hundreds of soldiers 
 and a screen from the hot sun constituted the Tabernacle — 
 that was the famous structure. Here spoke Dr. Dixon of 
 Brooklyn, Major Whittle, Rev. Mr. Anderson of Tampa and 
 others. Here sang Burke, Sankey and other choice singers in 
 Israel. These talked as they sang, and sang as they talked. 
 How the soldiers enjoyed those gatherings and profited by 
 them cannot be told. It was these men who were to pene- 
 trate the jungles of Cuba, tread upon the stinging cactus, 
 break down all barriers, natural and artificial, and charge in 
 front of prepared intrenchmcnts without faltering, — rushing 
 up to the crests of ElCaney and San Juan. Hundreds of them 
 were not only brave and true soldiers of their country, but 
 were soldiers of the Cross who purposed in their hearts to do 
 and suffer the will of God. 
 
 The Army and Navy Commission established a central 
 station and depot in the town of Tampa. Mr. Mahan of 
 North Carolina was the Agent or Secretary in charge. The 
 clergy of Tampa, some Christian citizens and nearly all the 
 regimental chaplains gathered daily around our commission, 
 and we worked together. The public places at and near the 
 city and the Picnic Island, or some shady place near tobacco 
 factories, were used for meetings day and night. Besides 
 these, speakers and singers went two by two from regiment to 
 regiment — in fact, to any place where they were permitted and 
 welcome. They labored faithfully to hold those who were 
 already Christians in line and tried to extend their number. 
 In this there was abundant success. 
 
 We, all who were in fellowship at Tampa and thereabouts, 
 rejoiced that our labor was not in vain. Of its power and 
 usefulness as a means of prevention to waywardness and dissi- 
 pation. General Shafter spoke in decided terms, General 
 Henry publicly praised the services and many other general 
 of^cers were glad to recognize and supplement them as oppor- 
 tunity offered. I am sure that thousands of friends at home 
 were made glad that, by those means, prodigals were re- 
 
CHRISTIAN ACTIVITY IN OUR WAR WII li STAIN. 467 
 
 deemed, and doubtful souls brought into the fruitful valley of 
 decision, while the sick and the ailing, tenderly cared for, were 
 not neglected. 
 
 Key West is an odd city, built on a coral fl.it. The attrition 
 of ages has been so small that the soil is not deep enough any- 
 where for much plant or vegetable life. Its population is 
 now about 20,ooo. The proximity of the place to Cuba has 
 naturally caused the persecuted of that island to flock thither 
 and their home work has followed them. The manufacture of 
 cigars became the principal industry and large tobacco factor- 
 ies have thriven. The gathering of sponges, of shells of all 
 sorts, the abundant fisheries and the ordinary shops for trade, 
 together with the necessary restaurants and hotels, suggest 
 some of the occupations of the inhabitants. But the war with 
 Spain shut off everything except what war retains and what war 
 brings. Key West at once became an important war port. 
 Commodore Remey, always on his flag-ship, the Lancaster, 
 commanded the entire harbor and what pertained to it in the 
 city. The old army barracks, brushed up for temporary occu- 
 pancy, were again after years filled with soldiers. The large 
 Catholic convent was generously offered by the Sisters of 
 Charity and accepted as an Army and Navy hospital. Other 
 buildings in strenuous need for the sick and wounded were 
 hired and long tents put up in yards in their neighborhood. 
 All were furnished completely for hospital use. Naval vessels 
 came and went ; army transport ships and Red Cross steam- 
 ers found here a refuge from wandering Spaniards and fierce 
 storms at sea. Storehouses were filled with naval and trans- 
 port replenishments, while docks and slips were occupied by 
 vessels large and small to be loaded or unloaded. The popu- 
 lation at Key West is mixed, consisting of many Cubans, 
 some stay-at-home Spaniards who pass with Americans for 
 Cubans, often to disgrace them, hosts of negroes and a small 
 number of bona-fide Americans, or rather Anglo-Saxons, 
 thrown into the interstices, naturally includingthe more recent 
 importations from the Bahamas. There are churches well 
 attended, and schools fairly good for all. But the most no- 
 ticeable places of business which I have not yet mentioned are 
 the liquor saloons. On the first available spot when you 
 
468 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 land from the main wharf you see the " First Chance," and 
 not far on cityward is the " Second Chance," and the corners 
 of the street give plenty of others, more or less respectable. 
 The more disreputable are of course only dives and brothels 
 where all sorts of traps are set to catch soldiers when off duty 
 and sailors " on liberty." What a fine place is Key West for 
 unscrupulous men, such as gamblers, thieves, rumsellers and 
 their helpers ! Our Secretary and Commission manager, young 
 Mr. Steele, arrived from New Orleans. He found a few 
 Christian assistants. A good man and his wife took him to 
 their home about a stone's throw from the " First Chance " 
 and told him that he might eat and sleep at their house. 
 Steele looked over the Key West territory thus occupied and 
 at first felt discouraged at the miserable condition of things, 
 though he was a tall, strong, healthful, able man of God. An 
 idea struck him, perhaps launched by the Spirit. It was to 
 rent that vacant tobacco factory whose gable end was toward 
 the large wharf. It would hold on its second floor four or 
 five hundred people. He made a good bargain, as the factory 
 was not in use. He soon fitted it up like our field pavilions 
 — not forgetting the cold-water tank. An aged Christian 
 negro, James by name, generally stood by the broad door- 
 way or near the stairs to welcome the comers, and his wife, 
 Martha, kept the tables and their contents clear of dust. The 
 showy outside sign and the waving flag caught my eye. 
 
 " Oh, General Howard ! " cried Steele, when I came to the 
 head of his stair-way and uttered my name, " I have been 
 asking the Lord to send you here, but I didn't know you were 
 anywhere near!" In that large room I had my first soldier 
 and sailor audience sitting together. Mr. W. C. Howland, 
 my delightful young secretary and assistant, aided in the 
 music, while Mr. Steele and I conducted the ordinary social 
 religious meeting. This tobacco warehouse became a step- 
 ping stone to like efforts on the Lancaster, invited by Captain 
 Perry, its commander, and Commodore Remey. There I had 
 my first experience with seamen by themselves. Probably my 
 army language and war stories were as quaint to them as were 
 their special sea talk and odd ocean tales to me. From this 
 opening, Mr. Howland and I passed on to the large steamer 
 
CHRISTIAN ACTIVITY IN OUR WAR WITH SPAIN. 469 
 
 Saratoga, a naval-supply ship that carried us in five days on 
 to Guantanamo. There the Vixoi pleasantly bore us up the 
 coast, past the famous battle grounds of both Army and Navy, 
 as far as Santiago de Cuba, 
 
 Only one large tent (pavilion) succeeded in getting to the 
 first front to be there where the need of Christian supply and 
 aid was greatest, but Miss Clara Barton, whom I next met on 
 the transport Comal at Santiago, was early on hand. Admiral 
 Sampson had seen to it that the relief transport Texas, with 
 Miss Barton on board, should be put into the ever-to-be-re- 
 membered harbor ahead of all the fleet. The battle being 
 over, kind Christian supply took the lead. When I held the 
 lady's hand I said in substance : " Miss Barton, some journals 
 
 say that I have turned funds away from you " "You 
 
 could not," she exclaimed, " because our work is one ! " Yes, 
 it was one, and the Lord's method. Good tidings, bread and 
 medicine for the needy were for our own young men and for 
 the starving Cubans, — the well-filled pavilion conducted by 
 the Army and Navy Christian Commission and the large relief 
 ship at the quay pouring out her treasures for the poor and 
 suffering under the guidance of the Red Cross Association, 
 these were the combined manifestations of the Master's great 
 love for men. 
 
 » "-"^ « 
 
 
CHAPTER XXIV. 
 THE TREATY OF PEACE. 
 
 BY 
 
 Hon. JOHN BASSETT MOORE, Counsel and Secretary of the Peace Commission. 
 
 THE rapid progress of the American arms, as narrated in 
 the preceding pages of this volume, induced the gov- 
 ernment of Spain on the twenty-second of July, 1898, to 
 make formal overtures for peace. This was done by a note, 
 couched in the form of a message from the government of Her 
 Majesty the Queen Regent of Spain to the President of the 
 United States, and signed by the Duke of Almodovar del Rio, 
 as Minister of State. It intimated that Spain was prepared to 
 relinquish her sovereignty over Cuba, and expressed a wish to 
 learn from the President the basis on which a " political status" 
 mi-ght be established there and an end be put to a conflict 
 " which would continue without reason should both govern- 
 ments agree upon the means of pacifying the island," 
 
 The note of the Duke of Almodovar was presented to the 
 government of the United States by M. Cambon, the French 
 Ambassador at Washington, who, in the interruption of dip- 
 lomatic relations between the United States and Spain, in 
 consequence of the state of war, acted, with permission 
 of his government and the approval of that of the United 
 States, in a friendly capacity, as the representative of Spanish 
 interests. The reply of the President was made on the thir- 
 tieth of July, in a note which was addressed by Judge Day, 
 then Secretary of State, to the Duke of Almodovar, and 
 which was handed to M. Cambon for communication to the 
 Spanish government. 
 
 The suggestion of Spain that the war might be brought to 
 a close on the basis of an agreement as to the future status of 
 Cuba was not accepted. On the contrary it was declared 
 
472 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 that the " local question " as to the peace and good govern- 
 ment of Cuba, out of which the war had grown, had by the 
 course of events been " transformed and enlarged into a gen- 
 eral conflict of arms between two great peoples." In the 
 prosecution of this, conflict the President had been compelled 
 to avail himself unsparingly of the lives and fortunes of his 
 countrymen, and untold burdens and sacrifices, far transcend- 
 ing any material estimation, had been imposed upon them. 
 Nevertheless, the President was, said the note, inclined to 
 offer abrave adversary generous terms of peace. The Presi- 
 dent's terms were then defined as follows: 
 
 " The United States will require : 
 
 " First. The relinquishment by Spain of all claim of 
 sovereignty over a title to Cuba and her immediate evacua- 
 tion of the island. 
 
 " Second. The President, desirous of exhibiting signal gen- 
 erosity, will not now put forward any demand for pecuniary in- 
 demnity. Nevertheless, he cannot be insensible to the losses 
 and expenses of the United States incident to the war or to 
 the claims of our citizens for injuries to their persons and 
 property during the late insurrection in Cuba. He must, 
 therefore, require the cession to the United States and the 
 immediate evacuation by Spain of the island of Porto Rico 
 and other islands now under the sovereignty of Spain in the 
 West Indies, and also the cession of an island in the Ladrones 
 to be selected by the United States. 
 
 " Third. On similar grounds the United States is entitled 
 to occupy and will hold the city, bay and harbor of Manila, 
 pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace which shall de- 
 termine the control, disposition and government of the Phil- 
 ippines. 
 
 " If the terms hereby offered are accepted in their entirety, 
 commissioners will be named by the United States to meet 
 similarly authorized commissioners on the part of Spain for 
 the purpose of settling the details of the treaty of peace and 
 signing and delivering it under the terms above indicated." 
 
 The reply of the Spanish government bears as date the sev- 
 
THE TREATY OF PEACE. 473 
 
 enth of August, 1898. In regard to Cuba, Porto Rico and 
 other Spanish islands in the West Indies, and the island in 
 the Ladrones, it in substance accepted, without qualification or 
 reserve, the President's terms. In respect of the Philippines, 
 it was less specific. Though it declared in conclusion that 
 the government of Her Majesty the Queen Regent " accepts 
 the proffered terms, subject to the approval of the Cortes of the 
 Kingdom, as required by their constitutional duties," some of 
 the expressions used in relation to the Philippines were not 
 free from ambiguity. This circumstance induced the President 
 to pronounce the note unsatisfactory and to propose, as the 
 most direct and certain way of avoiding misunderstanding, to 
 embody in a protocol the precise terms on which negotiations 
 should be undertaken. This course was adopted, and on the 
 twelfth of August the protocol was signed at Washington by 
 Judge Day, Secretary of State, duly empowered by the Pres- 
 ident for the purpose, and by M. Cambon, French ambassa- 
 dor, acting under a special full power from the Queen Regent 
 of Spain. 
 
 This protocol embodied, without qualification or reserve, 
 the precise terms offered by the President to Spain on the thir- 
 tieth of July. It consisted of six articles. By the first, Spain 
 agreed to " relinquish all claim of sovereignty over and title 
 to Cuba." By the second, she engaged to cede Porto Rico and 
 other Spanish islands in the West Indies, and an island in the 
 Ladrones, to be selected by the United States. The third was 
 in these words: "The United States will occupy and hold 
 the city, bay and harbor of Manila, pending the conclusion of 
 a treaty of peace which shall determine the control, disposi- 
 tion and government of the Philippines." The fourth pro- 
 vided for the appointment of two commissioners, to meet 
 respectively at Havana, in Cuba, and San Juan, in Porto Rico, 
 for the purpose of arranging and carrying out the details of 
 the immediate evacuation by Spain of Cuba, Porto Rico and 
 other Spanish islands in the West Indies. By the fifth, it 
 was stipulated that the United States and Spain should each 
 appoint not more than five commissioners to treat of peace, 
 and that the commissioners so appointed should meet in 
 Paris not later than October i, 1898, and proceed to the ne- 
 
474 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 gotiation and conclusion of a treaty of peace. By the sixth 
 and last article it was agreed that, upon the conclusion of the 
 protocol, hostilities between the two countries should be sus- 
 pended, and that notice to that effect should be given as 
 soon as possible by each government to the commanders of its 
 military and naval forces. 
 
 The way having thus been cleared for the negotiation of 
 a peace, the two governments proceeded, in conformity with 
 the stipulations of the protocol, to the appointment of their 
 respective commissioners for that purpose. On the part of the 
 United States, the President appointed the Hon. William R. 
 Day, who subsequently acted as president of the American 
 commission ; the Hon. Cushman K. Davis, chairman of the 
 Committee on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate ; 
 the Hon. William P. Frye and the Hon. George Gray, both 
 members of the same committee ; and the Hon. Whitelaw 
 Reid, formerly Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipo- 
 tentiary of the United States to France. 
 
 On the part of Spain, the Queen Regent appointed as com- 
 missioners Sefior Don Eugenio Montero Rios, President of 
 the Senate of Spain ; Senor Don Buenaventura Abarzuza, a 
 senator of the Kingdom and formerly ambassador of the 
 Spanish Republic to France; Sefior Don Jose de Garnica, an 
 associate of the Supreme Court of Justice of Spain and a dep- 
 uty of the Cortes ; Sefior Don Wenceslao Ramirez de Villa- 
 Urrutia, Minister Plenipotentiary of Spain to Belgium ; and 
 General Rafael Cerero, ranking General of Engineers of the 
 first army corps. 
 
 The secretaries of the American and Spanish commissions 
 were, respectively, the writer of the present chapter, who had 
 lately held the office of Assistant Secretary of State of the 
 United States and who acted as secretary and counsel, and 
 Sefior Don Emilio de Ojeda, Envoy Extraordinary and Minis- 
 ter Plenipotentiary of Spain at Tangiers. 
 
 On the arrival of the American commission in Paris towards 
 the end of September, notice of its presence was given to the 
 French government by Gen. Horace Porter, United States 
 ambassador, and arrangements were made for its immediate 
 presentation to M. Delcasse, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
 
THE TREATY OF PEACE. 475 
 
 and to President Faure. This done, the next question was 
 how to bring the American and Spanish commissions together. 
 All difficulty on this score was forestalled by M. Delcasse, who, 
 with the hospitality and tact characteristic of his government 
 and people, invited the members of the two commissions to 
 meet each other at a breakfast at the Foreign Office. At this 
 breakfast there were also present, besides the American and 
 Spanish ambassadors, M. Brisson, then Prime Minister of 
 France, and other officials of the French government. All 
 the arrangements were faultless, and I believe it was the unan- 
 imous opinion of those for whose benefit the function was 
 given, as it certainly was of the American commission, that 
 an affair of the kind could not have been conducted with 
 greater skill and propriety. 
 
 For the meetings of the joint commission, the French gov- 
 ernment set apart two large rooms in the Foreign Office, 
 which have been the scene of many notable gatherings, among 
 which may be mentioned the Congress of Paris of 1856. 
 Here, on the first of October, 1898, the American and Spanish 
 commissioners met in their first official conference. There 
 were present all the commissioners and the American secretary, 
 and also Mr. Fergusson, who accompanied the American com- 
 missioners as interpreter and who, as the proceedings were 
 conducted in English and in Spanish, acted as the medium of 
 oral communication to the end of the conferences. The 
 functions of secretary on the Spanish side were performed by 
 Senor Villa-Urrutia till the third session, when Senor Ojeda 
 appeared and entered upon the discharge of his duties. The 
 proceedings were conducted with as little formality as pos- 
 sible. No^one was chosen to preside over the deliberations of 
 the joint commission. The representatives of the two govern- 
 ments ranged themselves on either side of a long table, in the 
 order in which they were named in their full powers, so that no 
 question could arise as to form and precedence. The oral dis- 
 cussions, however, represented but a small part of the labors 
 of the commissions. Projects and counter-projects were sub- 
 mitted in writing and under the rule, adopted by the joint 
 commission, that written arguments might be filed in support 
 of rejected propositions as well as written answers to such 
 
476 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 arguments, most of the questions that arose in the negotia- 
 tions were fully argued in writing. These arguments appear 
 as annexes to the protocols or official minutes of the confer- 
 ences. 
 
 On the proposal of the American commissioners, it was 
 agreed that the questions before the joint commission should 
 be taken up in the order in which they appeared in the protocol 
 of the twelfth of August. The American commissioners there- 
 fore submitted, at the second session, a paper containing a 
 draft of two articles, to be inserted in the treaty of peace, for 
 the purpose of giving effect to Spain's engagement to relin- 
 quish all claim of sovereignty over and title to Cuba, and to 
 cede Porto Rico and other Spanish islands in the West Indies, 
 and an island in the Ladrones, the island of Guam being speci- 
 fied as the one which the United States had selected in that 
 group. These matters were, in the view taken of them by 
 the American commissioners, determined by the protocol of 
 the twelfth of August. Hence, where the protocol said 
 " Spain will relinquish," or " Spain will cede," the draft 
 articles said " Spain hereby relinquishes," and "Spain hereby 
 cedes ; "and to these simple stipulations, which were expressed 
 in the very words of the protocol, were merely added certain 
 incidental stipulations as to the transfer of public property 
 and archives. 
 
 At the third session, the Spanish com.missioners presented 
 a counter-proposition. The substance of this proposition was 
 that Spain should not only relinquish her sovereignty over 
 Cuba but also transfer it to the United States, which should 
 " at the proper time " transfer it to the Cuban people, and 
 that the relinquishment and transfer thus made should embrace 
 not only " all the prerogatives, powers and rights " of the 
 Spanish crown, but also "all charges and obligations of every 
 kind" in existence at the time of the ratification of the treaty 
 of peace, which the crown of Spain, or her authorities in Cuba, 
 had lawfully contracted, such charges and obligations to be 
 considered as " an integral part " of the sovereignty relinquished 
 and transferred. The cession of Porto Rico and other ceded 
 territory was to be made, subject to similar burdens as to 
 charges and obligations. 
 
THE TREATY OF PEACE. 477 
 
 It is obvious that these proposals of the Spanish commis- 
 sioners presented the serious question of the assumption by 
 the United States and in turn by Cuba of what is commonly 
 known as the Cuban debt. This debt, for the payment of 
 which the revenues of Cuba were pledged, was contracted by 
 the Spanish government and its authorities for the most part 
 during the insurrections in Cuba after 1868. In that year the 
 so-called debt of Cuba amounted to only $18,000,000. In 1880, 
 two years after the close of the ten years war, it amounted to 
 upwards of $170,000,000. Between February, 1895, when the 
 last insurrection broke out, and January i, 1898, new bonds 
 were issued to the amount of 858,550,000 pesetas, or $171,000- 
 000. There were also other debts, uncertain in amount, 
 which were understood to be considered in Spain as properly 
 chargeable to Cuba. To Spain the question of the disposi- 
 tion of these financial burdens was evidently more important, 
 from the pecuniary point of view, than that of the relinquish- 
 ment of territory, the attempt to retain which had given rise 
 to them. The Spanish commissioners therefore bent all 
 their efforts to the establishment of the position that the 
 debts in question must follow the sovereignty of the island 
 and must be assumed by whatever nation possessed that 
 sovereignty. The American commissioners, on the other 
 hand, maintained that from no point of view could the debts 
 in question be considered as local debts of Cuba or as obliga- 
 tions chargeable to the island ; that they were created by the 
 government of Spain, for its own purposes and through its own 
 agents ; and that the precedents which had been cited of the 
 assumption or apportionment of debts, where a state was ab- 
 sorbed or divided, were inapplicable to the so-called Cuban 
 debt, the burden of which, imposed upon the people of Cuba 
 without their consent and by force of arms, was one of the 
 principal wrongs for the termination of which the struggles 
 for Cuban independence were undertaken. The American 
 commissioners moreover contended that Spain, by her uncon- 
 ditional agreement to relinquish her sovereignty over Cuba, 
 had waived the question of the debt. On these grounds the 
 American commissioners repeatedly declined to assume the 
 so-called Cuban debt, either for the United States or for 
 
478 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 Cuba. The discussion continued, however, in various forms, 
 upon successive propositions and counter-propositions, till 
 the eighth conference, on the twenty-fourth of October, when 
 the president of the American commission, replying to a 
 remark of the president of the Spanish commission, brought it 
 to a head by pointedly inquiring whether the Spanish com- 
 missioners " would refuse to consider any articles as to Cuba 
 and Porto Rico which contained no provision for the assump- 
 tion of indebtedness by the United States, or Cuba, or both." 
 The Spanish commissioners asked for time in which to 
 reply, and an adjournment was taken till the twenty-sixth of 
 October. On that day the Spanish commissioners presented 
 their answer in writing. In substance, they declared that 
 they would not refuse to consider any articles which did not 
 contain a provision for the assumption of indebtedness, since 
 the " final approval " of such articles must be contingent on 
 an agreement upon a complete treaty of peace ; and they 
 " invited " the American commissioners " to enter upon the 
 discussion of the other points to be embodied in the treaty, 
 at the outset to take up the discussion of the Philippine 
 Archipelago, and to propose to the Spanish commissioners 
 what they understand should be agreed upon in said treaty 
 with respect to this subject." 
 
 The joint commission was thus brought face to face with 
 the question of the Philippines. To this question the Amer- 
 ican commissioners had given much consideration since their 
 arrival in Paris. They had heard General Merritt, who, be- 
 sides presenting his own views orally, brought with him from 
 Manila, for the information of the American commission- 
 ers, communications from General F, V. Greene and other 
 officers in relation to the condition of things in the Archipel- 
 ago. They had examined Mr. John Foreman, who, from 1880 
 to 1898, a period of eighteen years, had spent altogether 
 eleven years in the Philippines and whose book on the islands 
 is a standard authority. They had also taken the testimony 
 of other persons, competent to speak on the subject, besides 
 obtaining a mass of information, some in print and some in 
 manuscript, on the various aspects of the situation. All these 
 things they communicated either textually or in substance. 
 
THE TREATY OF PEACE. 
 
 479 
 
 according to the circumstances, to their government, with 
 which they were, as is always the case in these days of tele- 
 graphs and fast steamers, in constant correspondence through 
 the whole course of the negotiations. 
 
 The proposal of the American commissioners on the sub- 
 ject of the Philippines was presented at the eleventh confer- 
 ence, which was held on the thirty-first of October. It pro- 
 vided for the cession of the whole group, but stated that the 
 American commissioners were prepared to insert in the treaty 
 a stipulation for the assumption by the United States of any 
 existing indebtedness of Spain incurred for public works and 
 improvements of a pacific character in the islands. On receiv- 
 ing this proposal, the Spanish commissioners asked for an 
 adjournment in order that they might examine it "and either 
 accept it or present a counter-proposal." The kernel of this 
 reply, as it turned out, lay in the latter alternative. At the 
 next conference, which was held on the fourth of November, 
 the Si)anish commissioners submitted a counter-proposal in 
 the form of an argumentative memorandum, in which — 
 after contending that the protocol of the twelfth of August 
 did not justify a demand for the cession of the whole group 
 and that the capture of Manila by the American forces, after 
 the signature of that instrument, though in fact before news 
 of its signature was received in the islands, was, in view of the 
 agreement for a suspension of hostilities, unlawful, — they 
 declared that the treaty of peace ought to provide for the 
 immediate delivery of Manila to the Spanish government, the 
 immediate release of the Spanish garrison, the return to the 
 Spanish government of all funds and public property taken 
 by the Atnerican army since the occupation of the place as 
 well as of all taxes collected prior to its restoration, and for 
 an indemnity to Spain for the damage occasioned by the de- 
 tention of her troops as prisoners, to which was to be ascribed 
 the spread of the Tagals insurrection in Luzon and its exten- 
 sion to the Visayasand the ill-treatment of Spanish prisoners, 
 civil and military, by the natives. They concluded by invit- 
 ing the American commissioners to present a proposition 
 concerning " the control, disposition and government " of the 
 Philippines which should conform to "the stipulations of 
 Article III " of the protocol. 
 
48o THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 To this argumentative counter-proposal, the American com- 
 missioners submitted at the fourteenth conference, on the six- 
 teenth of November, an extended reply. Obviously, the 
 principal point at issue between the two commissions was the 
 proposal for the cession of the group. The American com- 
 missioners did not controvert the general principle that acts 
 of war, committed after a general suspension of hostilities, do 
 not afford a basis for a claim of title by conquest, even 
 though such acts be committed prior to the receipt of notice 
 of the suspension ; but they pointed out that by the third 
 article of the protocol the United States was to " occupy and 
 hold the city, bay and harbor of Manila pending the conclu- 
 sion of a treaty of peace," and that the occupation thus ex- 
 pressly provided for imported a military occupation, with all 
 the rights and powers of government legally incident to 
 such occupation. The great subject of controversy, however, 
 was the effect to be given to the words " control, disposition 
 and government." Did the stipulation that the treaty of 
 peace should " determine the control, disposition and govern- 
 ment of the Philippines " warrant a demand for the cession 
 of territory ? Did they authorize a demand for the transfer 
 of sovereignty over the group or any part of it? 
 
 We have seen that the words in question were first used in 
 the note of the thirtieth of July, in which the terms on which 
 the United States would enter upon negotiations for peace 
 were conveyed to the Spanish government, and that the 
 reply of the Spanish government on this point, as given in its 
 note of the seventh of August, was unsatisfactory. The exact 
 words of that note, w^hich was presented in English, were as 
 follows : 
 
 "The terms [of the President of the United States] relating 
 to the Philippines seem, to our understanding, to be quite in- 
 definite. On the one hand, the ground on which the United 
 States believe themselves entitled to occupy the bay, the 
 harbor and the city of Manila, pending the conclusion of a 
 treaty of peace, cannot be that of conquest, since, in spite of 
 the blockade maintained on sea by the American fleet, in 
 spite of the siege established on land by a native supported 
 and provided for by the American Admiral, Manila still 
 
THE TREATY OF PEACE. 481 
 
 holds its own and the Spanish standard still waves over the 
 city. On the other hand, the whole archipelago of the 
 Philippines is in the power and under the sovereignty of Spain. 
 Therefore the government of Spain thinks that the tempo- 
 rary occupation of Manila should constitute a guarantee. 
 It is stated that the treaty of peace shall determine the con- 
 trol, disposition and government of the Philippines ; but as the 
 intentions of the Federal government by regression remain 
 veiled, therefore the Spanish government must declare that, 
 while accepting the third condition, they do not a priori re- 
 nounce the sovereignty of Spain over the archipelago, leav- 
 ing it to the negotiators to agree as to such reforms as the 
 condition of these possessions and the level of culture of their 
 natives may render desirable. 
 
 " The government of Her Majesty accepts the third condi- 
 tion with the above-mentioned declarations. 
 
 " Such are the statements and observations which the Span- 
 ish government has the honor to submit in reply to your 
 Excellency's communication. They accept the proffered 
 terms [i. e., the various terms offered in the note of the thir- 
 tieth of July], subject to the approval of the Cortes of the 
 kingdom, as required by their constitutional duties." 
 
 It may fairly be argued that the statement that the Spanish 
 government did not " <^ priori " renounce "the sovereignty of 
 Spain over the archipelago" clearly implied that the renun- 
 ciation of that sovereignty might become the subject of 
 negotiation, and that the reply did in reality constitute an ac- 
 ceptance of the offer of the United States in the fullest sense, 
 the meaning of that offer being that the question of the Phil- 
 ippines should be left in its entirety for future determination 
 in the treaty of peace. Nevertheless, the President, as has 
 been seen, declined to treat as an acceptance of his offer a re- 
 ply which was capable of more than one construction. This 
 decision was made known to M. Cambon, the French ambas- 
 sador, in oral conference, and was afterwards formally con- 
 veyed to him in a note of the tenth of August, with which 
 there was enclosed a draft of the protocol in the exact words 
 in which it was signed two days later. The attempt to reach 
 an agreement by correspondence was abandoned and the 
 
482 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 terms on which negotiations were to be undertaken were 
 embodied in a single document. 
 
 But, apart from any reservations in the note of the seventh 
 of August, the Spanish commissioners contended that the 
 words " control, disposition and government " did not com- 
 prehend the subject of sovereignty. In this contention they 
 placed much stress upon the French text of the protocol. The 
 protocol was signed both in English and in French. In fact, the 
 French text was a translation of the English, but both texts 
 purported to mean the same thing. In the French text the 
 words "control, disposition and government" appeared as 
 " le controle, la disposition et la gouvcrneinciity In reality, the 
 French word controle possesses a signification less extensive 
 than the English " control." It denotes " supervision " or 
 *' inspection " rather than the full power and authority con- 
 veyed in the word " control." But the words disposition and 
 gouvernenient have the same extensive meaning in French that 
 "disposition" and "government" have in English. The 
 American commissioners therefore answered that the Spanish 
 contention would involve, practically, the elimination of the 
 three words of the English text altogether and of two of the 
 three words of the French text. The position of the Ameri- 
 can commissioners was that it was the object of the clause in 
 question to leave the whole subject of the Philippines open 
 for future negotiation and settlement. Nothing was to be 
 considered as prejudged against either party. The effect of 
 using the word " sovereignty " would have been to restrict 
 the negotiations to the question of supreme power and con- 
 trol. The words " control, disposition and government" were 
 broad enough to cover any form of adjustment on which the 
 parties might ultimately agree, including that of the transfer 
 of sovereignty. 
 
 At the fifteenth conference, on the twenty-first of Novem- 
 ber, the American commissioners, in order to bring the dis- 
 cussions to a close, presented a final proposition, on the 
 acceptance or rejection of which tiie continuance of the nego- 
 tiations was to depend. This proposition embraced the ces- 
 sion of the entire archipelago of the Philippines and the 
 p.iyment by the United States of the sum of $20,000,000, and 
 
THE TREATY OF PEACE. 483 
 
 in connection with this offer the American commissioners 
 stated that, " it being the policy of the United States to 
 maintain in the Philippines an open door to the world's com- 
 merce," they were prepared to insert in the treaty a stipula- 
 tion to the effect that, for a term of years, Spanish ships and 
 merchandise should be admitted into the ports of the islands 
 on the same terms as American ships and merchandise. The 
 proposition also embraced a mutual relinquishment of claims 
 that had arisen since the beginning of the insurrection in 
 Cuba in 1895. In conclusion, the American commissioners 
 expressed the hope that they might receive from the Spanish 
 commissioners, on or before the twenty-eighth of November, 
 a definite and final acceptance of these proposals and also of 
 the demands as to Cuba, Porto Rico and other Spanish 
 islands in the West Indies, and Guam, in the form in which 
 those demands had been provisionally agreed to. In this 
 event, it would, declared the American commissioners, "be 
 possible for the joint commission to continue its sessions and 
 to proceed to the consideration and adjustment of other mat- 
 ters, including those which, as subsidiary and incidental to the 
 principal provisions, should form a part of the treaty of peace." 
 In particular, the American commissioners expressed a desire 
 to treat of religious freedom in the Caroline Islands, as agreed 
 to in 1886; of the release of political prisoners in connection 
 with the insurrections in Cuba and the Philippines ; of the ac- 
 quisition of the island in the Carolines variously known as 
 Kusaie, Ualan, or Strong Island ; for a naval and telegraph 
 station ; of cable landing rights at other places in Spanish 
 jurisdiction ; and of the revival of certain treaties previously 
 in force between the United States and Spain. 
 
 During the week following the submission of this " final 
 proposition," the Spanish commissioners made by letter va- 
 rious alternative proposals, as possible substitutes for the 
 American demands. These proposals were, however, de- 
 clined; and on the twenty-eighth of November the Spanish 
 commissioners presented in conference a formal written ac- 
 ceptance of the ultimatum. 
 
 The treaty of peace was signed on the tenth of December. 
 Its text will be found at the end of this volume. It covers 
 
484 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 the subjects embraced in the final proposition of the Ameri- 
 can commissioners and such as may be considered "sub- 
 sidiary and incidental " thereto. In regard to none of the 
 additional points on which the American commissioners ex- 
 pressed a desire to treat, except that of the release of politi- 
 cal prisoners, was any stipulation inserted. Proposals on all 
 the other points were presented, but they were rejected by 
 the Spanish commissioners, in some cases with the statement 
 that they might form the subject of future negotiation 
 between the two governments. In truth, after more than two 
 months of constant negotiation and strenuous discussion, the 
 joint commission, having reached a conclusion on essential 
 questions, could go no further. The situation of the Spanish 
 commissioners was from the beginning a difficult one and the 
 time had come to bring the conference to a close. Moreover, 
 the American commissioners had rejected various proposals 
 of the Spanish commissioners, including one for an investiga- 
 tion and arbitration of the case of the Maine by an interna- 
 tional commission. 
 
 It is proper as well as gratifying to state that, while the con- 
 sciousness of a serious conflict of views and of interests was 
 ever present, the intercourse of the two commissions was char- 
 acterized by the uniform observance of the dictates of cour- 
 tesy and propriety. Any reports that may have got abroad 
 to the contrary were founded on misapprehension. The com- 
 missioners on both sides were too much impressed with the 
 importance of the work committed to them to allow its perfor- 
 mance to be retarded or put in jeopardy by displays of per- 
 sonal feeling, even if they Had been disposed to indulge in them. 
 The American commissioners, in the last paper submitted 
 by them, availed themselves of the opportunity to express 
 " their sense of the thoroughness, learning and devoted 
 ability, no less than the uniform courtesy," with which the 
 Spanish commissioners had conducted the negotiations then 
 about to terminate. The president of the Spanish commission, 
 responding to this expression, declared that " he had much 
 pleasure in acknowledging the courtesy and consideration 
 which had been shown by the American commissioners in their 
 personal intercourse during the continuance of the negotia- 
 
THE TREATY OF PEACE. 
 
 485 
 
 tions, which, however painful to the Spanish commissioners, 
 would leave with them the personal remembrance of the at- 
 tentions which had been bestowed upon them by the worthy 
 members of the American commission." 
 
 The conferences closed with words of personal respect and 
 good-will. In the same spirit we may cherish the hope that, 
 with the re-establishment of the state of peace and the re- 
 moval of the causes of discord that produced its interruption, 
 the relations between the two countries will again assume the 
 friendly aspect which distinguished them in former times. 
 
J Vo^-^l^^t^ 
 
 LckjCCdz 
 
CHAPTER XXV. 
 WHAT ENGLAND FEELS. 
 
 BY 
 
 Hon. JUSTIN McCARTHY, M. P. 
 
 THE close of the War between the United States and 
 Spain took the general public of England even more 
 by surprise than the opening of the war had done. 
 The blowing up of the Maine made almost every one here feel 
 well assured that an appeal to arms must follow. Even 
 among those who had little means of forming an opinion as 
 to whether the explosion was the result of mere accident or 
 not, it seemed to be accepted as a kind of omen that some- 
 thing serious would come next. For a long time, for a whole 
 generation, in fact, the English public had a vague general 
 knowledge that there were constant troubles between the 
 United States and Spain, owing to the fact that Cuba was in 
 a state of perpetual insurrection, and that Cuba lay almost 
 within gunshot of the shores of one of the American States. 
 But most people here had grown accustomed to the vague 
 general knowledge that such a condition of things could not 
 last for ever, and were content with the assumption that it 
 would probably last for their time, and, therefore, turned 
 their attention away to other subjects. Of course, I am now 
 speaking of what I may call the outer public, of the man in 
 the streets, as that public has been described by one English 
 writer; of the bald man on the top of an omnibus, as he has 
 been described by another English writer. The bald man on 
 the top of the omnibus knew that there was trouble in Amer- 
 ica because of the condition of Cuba ; but the trouble had 
 been going on so long without coming to a crisis that he had 
 ceased to look out for a crisis as a possibility of immediate 
 concern. But when the blowing up of the Maine was made 
 
488 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 known to the world, the English public suddenly became 
 prepared for an immediate crisis. Then a quick revulsion of 
 feeling set in, and the general public began to think that the 
 preparations were moving slowly, and that the war, somehow, 
 was hanging fire. At last, the actual business of battle began, 
 and then the impression of our friend on the top of the 
 omnibus distinctly was that the war was destined to last for 
 a considerable time ; and, at the moment when he had made 
 up his mind to this opinion, there came the news that the Span- 
 ish fleets were destroyed, that Spain had lost Cuba and the 
 Philippines, and that the war was all over. 
 
 How were the sympathies of the people of England in 
 general affected by the war and by its conclusion ? I think 
 it is not too much to say that the sympathies of the 
 vast majority of the people in Great Britain and Ireland 
 were thoroughly with the American cause and with the 
 American triumph. Now, I do not desire to make this 
 statement without some serious reservations. Among a cer- 
 tain minority of Englishmen, there was still a sort of old- 
 fashioned, traditional attachment to Spain, which misled the 
 judgment of many. Those who were thus misled regarded 
 Spain as a grand, old, historic state, the existence of which 
 was an important element in the dignity of Europe; a state 
 which had at one time divided the empire of the world with 
 England herself ; a state which had waged big war with 
 England, and been honorably defeated ; a state which, later 
 still, had been rescued from a foreign conqueror by the arms 
 of England. Now, we must make allowance for feelings or 
 prejudices of this kind. They are not ignoble in themselves ; 
 and even when they are unreasonable they have a sort of 
 claim on our sympathy. Then, again, there comes in the 
 question of religion. A certain proportion of the English 
 aristocracy is made up of Catholics, and of Catholics who, 
 for the most part, are inclined to old-world Tory views where 
 political questions are concerned. Therefore, to a certain 
 number of Englishmen, the struggle between America and 
 Spain became a subject for the sentiment of religion to work 
 upon, or the traditional feeling of reverence for the old order 
 of things, and an idea that the new order was asserting itself 
 
WHAT ENGLAND FEELS. 489 
 
 as an unwelcome intruder. I am far from saying that the 
 Catholic population of England were generally in sympathy 
 with Spain ; for I know that any such saying could be 
 founded only on a strange misapprehension ; but what I do 
 wish to convey is that a considerable number of the Catholic 
 aristocracy gave their good wishes to Spain simply on the 
 ground that Spain was a Catholic country and that America 
 was not. 
 
 In Ireland, also, there was a certain difference of opinion — 
 I am now speaking of national Ireland, not the Ireland of 
 Dublin Castle and the vice-regal lodge. Ireland had been 
 attached to Spain by old ties of affection ; Spain, from what- 
 ever motive, had endeavored at more than one period of 
 her history to give help to the Irish national cause. Thomas 
 Moore, the Irish national poet, had coupled, in one of his 
 songs, the shamrock of Erin and olive of Spain. Irish exiles 
 had risen to great distinction in the military and civil ser- 
 vice of Spain. I can myself remember the days when 
 Marshal O'Donnell, Duke of Tetuan, an Irishman by descent, 
 was Prime Minister of Spain ; and it used to be commonly 
 said at the time, that O'Donnell refused to learn English be- 
 cause he could not consent to converse in the tongue of his 
 country's conquerors. Naturally, therefore, there was a feel- 
 ing among a small minority of Irishmen that Spain was enti- 
 tled to their special sympathy ; but I can say with confidence 
 that the minority was very small indeed. The vast majority 
 of Nationalist Irishmen everywhere gave their cordial good 
 wishes to America, the country which had been the shelter 
 and the home of so many millions of their race. I believe 
 the whole of the Irish Nationalists in the House of Commons, 
 save for two exceptions, openly and formally proclaimed their 
 sympathy with the United States ; and if I were to mention 
 the names of the two exceptions, the names would probably 
 convey no manner of idea to the ordinary American reader. I 
 am entitled, therefore, to say that the vast majority of people 
 in these Islands admitted the justice of the American cause, 
 acknowledged that America had forborne to the utmost limits 
 of forbearance, and sincerely rejoiced in America's swift 
 success. 
 
49° THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 I have very little doubt that, when the diplomatic history 
 of the crisis comes to be given to the world, it will be made 
 plain that the diplomatic influence of England had its impor- 
 tant effect in warning certain European states against the dan- 
 gers of any policy that might seem like intervention. I have 
 not been a great admirer of Lord Salisbury's foreign policy in 
 general, and do not often feel drawn into much sympathy 
 with the conduct of a Tory Government ; but I am well con- 
 vinced that in this instance Lord Salisbury and the Tory Gov- 
 ernment did play a fair, a friendly and a manly part towards 
 the United States. It might have been thought, and undoubt- 
 edly it was thought by some, that by her victory over Spain 
 and her obtaining possession, under whatever qualifications, 
 of Cuba and the Philippine Islands, America was taking a new 
 and perilous departure in her political life, and might become 
 hereafter a new and portentous element of unsettlement in the 
 politics of the civilized world. Such a feeling as this did un- 
 doubtedly find expression here and there ; but it had no real 
 effect on the general feelings of the public. Those who were 
 fairly well acquainted with the history of the whole question 
 had long known that if Spain were to persevere in her methods 
 of governing Cuba, it would at last become impossible for the 
 United States to look with a cold neutrality at the scenes 
 that were going on within easy reach of her own shores. A 
 whole generation had passed away since one of our most pop- 
 ular writers, Anthony Trollope, who, besides being one of our 
 foremost novelists, was a keen and sound observer of political 
 events, gave warning to all his public that the policy of Spain 
 in Cuba would one day force the United States to intervene. 
 Many other English writers, newspaper correspondents among 
 the rest, who had studied the subject from personal obser- 
 vation, had told the same story to their English readers. 
 
 Most of us, therefore, who take any continuous interest in 
 foreign affairs, had long been filled with the knowledge that 
 the time must come when the antiquated policy of Spain 
 would have to give way to the growing influence of enlighten- 
 ment and civilization. This was, in fact, the feeling of all, or 
 nearly all, of those who belonged to what I may call the polit- 
 ically-instructed classes in these islands. When I speak of 
 
WHAT ENGLAND FEELS. 49^ 
 
 the politically-instructed classes, I mean to speak of those who 
 were prepared to form their opinions upon practical informa- 
 tion, and were not absolutely governed by some sentiment or 
 prejudice which took no account of actual conditions and re- 
 fused to learn anything from the teaching of events. Those 
 politically-instructed classes had long recognized the fact that 
 in the Spanish administration of Cuba and in the republican 
 system of the United States, mediaeval barbarism and modern 
 civilization were brought into a direct antagonism. Those 
 who saw this could not but trust and believe that the antag- 
 onism must end in the victory of civilization. All reasonable 
 men had to admit that America could not long endure the 
 existence of such a system as that which was practised in 
 Cuba, without feeling its disturbing effects upon her own con- 
 dition as a state. Let us put aside, if we will, for the moment, 
 any consideration of the claims which mere humanity must 
 have had upon a Government based like that of the United 
 States on the principle of human equality before the law. 
 Let us take the coldest, the most narrow and practical, the 
 most prosaic view of America's duty and assume that there 
 was no occasion for her to trouble herself about the sufferings 
 of Cuba, so long as those sufferings brought to her no manner of 
 domestic inconvenience. Let us assume that it ought to be 
 nothing to America, even though Cuba were deluged with blood, 
 so long as no American blood w^ere spilt to swell the deluge. 
 
 The plain fact was that the unceasing struggle in Cuba did 
 lead to the shedding of much generous American blood. The 
 sympathies of Americans were naturally drawn to the condi- 
 tion of that suffering Cuban population, whose efforts at inde- 
 pendence were encountered day after day, and year after year 
 by just such repressive measures as the Duke of Alva had 
 employed centuries before to crush the population of the 
 Netherlands. Many American sympathizers were constantly 
 taking part in expeditions and efforts of all kinds to set Cuba 
 free from the merciless domination of its Spanish rulers. 
 New York itself became the headquarters of many an organi- 
 zation formed by American citizens with the avowed object 
 of assisting the insurgents of Cuba. It would have been per- 
 fectly impossible for any application of what are called the neu- 
 
492 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 trality laws to prevent Americans from taking personal part 
 in organizations so humane and so noble in their purpose. 
 I remember well having heard the late Earl Russell, Lord 
 John Russell as he then was, boast in the House of Commons 
 of the open manner in which he and his friends had endeav- 
 ored to assist the Greeks against the Turks, although they 
 were perfectly well aware that they were violating the neutral- 
 ity laws and were pledging their own country, so far as they 
 could do it, to the support of the Greek patriots against the 
 brutal tyranny of the Ottoman Government. The result, of 
 course, was that England did interfere in the end, and that 
 the naval battle of Navarino, the untoward event, as it was 
 diplomatically called, put an end once and for ever to the 
 dominion of Turkey over that country which is now the 
 Kingdom of Greece. Now, let us suppose for a moment that 
 Greece, instead of lying at the Eastern end of the Mediterra- 
 nean, had been an island lying almost within sight of one of 
 the English shores ; is it not perfectly certain that Lord John 
 Russell and his friends would have secured the intervention 
 of their country at a much earlier date in favor of the rescue 
 of the Greeks from their Ottoman oppressors? Only the 
 other day the voice of the best and most enlightened men 
 and women in Great Britain was crying shame upon the slow- 
 ness and apathy of the Great Powers in allowing the rule of 
 the Turk to endure so long in the island of Crete. How 
 would it have been if Crete had been an island lying within 
 easy reach of the population of Dover or Brighton ? All 
 American statesmen had for more than a whole generation a 
 sense of the terrible burthen which was put upon them by the 
 action of the Spanish Government in Cuba, Remonstrance 
 after remonstrance was tried in vain. The American Govern- 
 ment, at one time, made the proposition that the whole sub- 
 ject should be referred to a conference of the civilized powers, 
 Spain herself to be included in the consultation, and, of course, 
 the proposal was angrily and contemptuously rejected by 
 Spain. The wonder to most of us was, not that America 
 should have intervened at last, but that she had not inter- 
 vened long beforCo 
 
 Any one who had studied the question with intelligent obser- 
 
WHAT ENGLAND FEELS. 493 
 
 vation, even though the Atlantic lay between him and the scene 
 of the struggle, must have known that the hand of the Ameri- 
 can Government would sooner or later have been forced by the 
 American people, if by no other impulse, and that Cuba would 
 have to be cleared of the Spanish domination. This was the 
 conviction which events were slowly bringing home to the minds 
 of all classes of Englishmen who took any interest in what was 
 happening beyond the range of their own national concerns. 
 In England, no doubt, it was the fashion of many people 
 for a long time to regard America as a land given up altogether 
 to the culture of cotton, to the building of railways, the work- 
 ing of mines and the worship of the almighty dollar. Only 
 of later years have we begun to trouble ourselves in any seri- 
 ous way with the purposes of American statesmanship, only 
 of late years has it become the habit of educated Englishmen 
 to visit the United States as their fathers and grandfathers 
 used to visit France and Germany. Even to this day we are 
 somewhat slow to understand the workings of American polit- 
 ical life. I have met with many an intelligent PLnglishman who 
 firmly believed that Tammany Hall was one of the State insti- 
 tutions of the Republic, with which the President and Con- 
 gress had a direct connection. 
 
 All the same, however, there has been in this country of 
 late a wonderful awakening of public attention to the actual 
 condition of things in the American Republic ; and every year 
 and every week brings the people of the two countries into 
 closer and more friendly communication. Thus it came to 
 pass that when the knowledge was first brought home to the 
 minds of Englishmen that war must break out between Spain 
 and America, if Spain would not relinquish her hold on Cuba, 
 there were ready instructors amongst Englishmen to teach 
 the English public that the quarrel was none of America's 
 seeking, and that even if America cared nothing as a State 
 for the pleadings of mere humanity, she would have to consid- 
 er whether her own interest as a State did not compel her to 
 the work of intervention. We heard very little talk indeed on 
 this side of the Atlantic about the greed of the young Repub- 
 lic for the acquisition of new territory. No reasonable person 
 really supposed that the American people had any desire to 
 
494 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 become the owners of Cuba, or felt any imperious longing 
 to put down the pride of Spain. On the whole, I may 
 confess that as a looker-on I am rather surprised that so 
 little was said on this subject. Some of the few — the very 
 few — champions whom Spain found in the English press did 
 indeed ring the changes on the supposed inconsistency of the 
 American Republic when it took upon itself to invade an 
 island which could not by any possibility be claimed as a part 
 of the Union. In one or two instances we were gravely as- 
 sured that to invade Cuba was to fly in the face of the Mon- 
 roe Doctrine ; for there are still, it would appear, some people 
 left among us who believe that the Monroe Doctrine pledged 
 American statesmanship never to take account of anything 
 that might happen outside the territorial limits of the Ameri- 
 can Union. But on the whole it must be owned that the 
 voice of the English journals and the English people expressed 
 a thorough understanding of the dififiiculties which had long 
 beset the American Republic in regard to the condition of 
 Cuba, and a friendly and cordial wish for the success of the 
 American cause. Even the controversy that arose on the 
 other side of the Atlantic with regard to the ultimate settle- 
 ment of the Philippine Islands did not waken much of an echo 
 on this side. The general feeling among politicians, among 
 Members of the House of Commons, for example, seemed to 
 be that America might safely be trusted to act for the best 
 interest of humanity in her ultimate disposal of the new terri- 
 tory which had come within her influence ; and that the busi- 
 ness of English statesmanship was to discourage in the best 
 way it could any attempts at foreign intervention with the 
 work which America had found it necessary to undertake. 
 
 For the first time within my personal recollection there ex- 
 isted to all appearances a thoroughly friendly understanding 
 between the parent country and the " mighty daughter," as 
 Swinburne calls the American Republic. That friendly un- 
 derstanding had been growing up for some years on this side 
 of the Atlantic. For a long time after the American Civil 
 War there was a feeling of bitterness among certain classes in 
 this country towards the United States. That feeling came 
 out of the impression that England had been humiliated in 
 
WHAT ENGLAND FEELS. 495 
 
 the controversy about the Alabama claims, and had been 
 compelled to pay damages and to make a public apology. I 
 need hardly say that such a feeling as this did not spread 
 through the English people as a whole ; it belonged only to 
 what is called Society, and to certain orders of men in official 
 and political life. The men who had confidently predicted the 
 break-up of the American Republic, the bursting of the Repub- 
 lican bubble, while the war was going on, were naturally the 
 men to be angry because their predictions had proved utter 
 failures, and were naturally more angry still when England 
 had to pay the penalty for their prejudices and their mistakes. 
 The class of men whose dominant influence had caused Eng- 
 land to make mistakes at a time of momentous crisis were the 
 very men who denounced Mr. Gladstone because of the honor- 
 able determination of himself and his official colleagues to make 
 manful reparation for the wrong that had been done. Through- 
 out the whole controversy about the Alabama, as through- 
 out the whole Civil War, the great majority of the English 
 people entertained none but friendly sentiments towards the 
 cause of the Union. The English working-classes as a whole 
 were heart and soul with that cause. The working-men in the 
 towns of Lancashire and Yorkshire, who suffered most in 
 their daily lives from the outbreak and the prolongation of 
 the Civil War in America, were the most cordial and united 
 in their hopes that the war might go on until its great objects 
 should have been attained. But then it is hardly necessary to 
 say that the true opinions of the majority of the people do 
 not always find a ready way to the intelligence of a distant 
 State, while that State is convulsed by civil war. The people 
 of America, north and south, were left for the most part to 
 form their estimate of English public opinion from the utter- 
 ances of Society and of certain political organizations, and of 
 the newspapers which represented Society and these political 
 organizations. Only two daily journals in London, out of 
 seven or eight, advocated the cause of the Union. Therefore, 
 I have no doubt that an impression prevailed widely in 
 America that the English people generally were hostile to the 
 unity of the American Republic. Naturally such an impres- 
 sion gave rise to many utterances of remonstrance, anger and 
 
496 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 complaint from disappointed Americans who believed that 
 England ought to have been on the side of the Union, and 
 were assured by too many English newspapers that England 
 only desired to see the Republic broken up. 
 
 Let me refer to one single and striking illustration of the feel- 
 ing which then prevailed among some leading public men in 
 America. Take, for instance, the example of Mr. Charles Sum- 
 ner. As everybody knows, Sumner had been, during all the 
 previous part of his public career, a most cordial friend to Eng- 
 land. When the Civil War broke out, Sumner, no doubt, fully 
 expected that the whole heart and sympathy of the English 
 people would go with the cause of the Union. He believed 
 himself to be mistaken ; assuming too hastily that the utter- 
 ances of certain London newspapers and certain Members of 
 Parliament were the voice of England, he felt bitterly disap- 
 pointed; and he denounced England with all the force of his pow- 
 erful eloquence. The effect was positively distressing to many 
 Englishmen who had long known Mr. Sumner and always re- 
 spected him, and who found themselves unable, at the mo- 
 ment, to make any satisfactory explanation of the hostile 
 attitude which he had taken up. Now, it was but natural that 
 many men on this side of the ocean should regard the language 
 of Charles Sumner as expressing the general sentiments of the 
 American people, and should get it into their minds that 
 America had become the bitter enemy of England. It is easy 
 to understand how, at such a time and under such conditions, 
 the most utter misinterpretation of international feeling may 
 grow up ; and it is certain that for some time — indeed for a 
 long time — after the close of the Civil War there was a want 
 of cordial understanding between some classes on both sides 
 of the ocean. Of course, as years went on, the feeling of bit- 
 terness on either side began to grow less and less ; but be- 
 tween the fading of enmity and the growing up of friendship 
 there is often a vast blank interval. 
 
 At the time of the Venezuela controversy there was a flash 
 of angry feeling on both sides which ill-natured persons on 
 both sides were willing, no doubt, to fan into a flame. It was 
 soon, however, made apparent that neither on this side of the 
 ocean nor on the other was there the slightest inclination 
 
WHAT ENGLAND FEELS. 497 
 
 among reasonable men, that is, among the great bulk of 
 either population, to bring about an international quarrel. I 
 think a good many sober-minded Englishmen were deeply im- 
 pressed by the fact that notwithstanding all our prophets of 
 evil had been telling us, there was evidently no intention on 
 the part of the United States to put on an attitude of hostility 
 towards England. There were questions of what I may fairly 
 call minor importance still awaiting settlement between the 
 two countries, and it was made clear that the American 
 people in general were just as anxious as the English people 
 that these questions should be settled in a reasonable and a 
 friendly spirit, a spirit of " give and take." While this condi- 
 tion of feeling prevailed in England, there came on the quar- 
 rel between America and Spain. Englishmen of the more in- 
 telligent order saw that, so far from America's desiring to 
 force a quarrel on this country, she had a quarrel forced upon 
 her in which all the sympathies of civilization and of humanity 
 ought to be engaged on her side. The moment was thoroughly 
 propitious for a good understanding between the two peoples. 
 Englishmen could not but see that America was taking the 
 course which the best of Englishmen would have called on 
 England to take under the like conditions. A wave of public 
 feeling rose up in this country which was wholly in sympathy 
 with the action of America in regard to the Cuban troubles. 
 It was easily seen that America had not been in training for 
 anything that might be called a great struggle, that she had 
 not been expecting any crisis of the kind to arise so suddenly, 
 and most people here were prepared to find the process of 
 national armament go on but slowly, and, as I have already 
 said, to see a prolonged struggle with Spain. But there were 
 two facts which particularly impressed the great bulk of the 
 English people. One was the fact that the American Presi- 
 dent and his Government showed no inclination to rush into 
 a war; but, on the contrary, allowed every opportunity for a 
 satisfactory settlement on the basis of peace — a settlement 
 which Spain could have obtained almost up to the last mo- 
 ment, if only her councils had been guided by common pru- 
 dence, to say nothing of the spirit of Christianity and human- 
 ity. The other fact which deeply impressed Englishmen was 
 
498 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 the readiness with which the American people threw them- 
 selves into the struggle, and proved themselves equal to any 
 sacrifice on behalf of the national cause, and of mercy to an 
 enslaved and a tortured population. As the war went on — short 
 though its time of duration — it was easy for critics on either side 
 of the ocean to find fault with the military and naval arrange- 
 ments made by America. On this side of the water there was 
 but little inclination to enter into any such criticism. Some 
 of us could still remember the breakdown, at one time almost 
 complete, of the English military arrangements in the Crimea ; 
 and very few indeed felt any surprise that America, in her first 
 foreign war, should give some evidences of imperfect adminis- 
 tration. I may, perhaps, also remark that much interest was 
 created among intelligent readers here by the frankness and 
 the boldness with which some of the American war correspon- 
 dents criticized the arrangements made by their own naval and 
 military authorities, and by those who were in charge of the 
 commissariat. Of course, the English readers to whom I refer 
 had no means of knowing whether these strictures were de- 
 served or undeserved ; but they regarded it as a healthy sign 
 of America's public spirit that men might fearlessly find fault 
 with the preparations which had been made for carrying on 
 the war. I have myself heard some Americans say that the 
 criticisms were unjust ; I have heard from other sources, also 
 American, that they were well deserved. That, however, was 
 not the question which directly concerned the English public. 
 Many Englishmen could well remember the splendid ser- 
 vice which was rendered by William Howard Russell, the 
 war correspondent of The Times during the Crimean cam- 
 paign, when he denounced and exposed the shortcomings of 
 our naval and military authorities in their arrangements for 
 the arming, and even the feeding and the clothing of the 
 British troops. There were many at the time who com- 
 plained bitterly of the course taken by Russell, and who 
 called it unpatriotic to invite the attention of the enemy and 
 the world to the shortcomings of the War Office administra- 
 tion. The general voice of public opinion, however, com- 
 mended Russell for his courage, and declared that a war cor- 
 respondent could not better serve his country than by ex- 
 
WHAT ENGLAND FEELS. 499 
 
 posing the defective system which was leaving an army to 
 perish. Now, I have no means of knowing whether the 
 American war correspondents who found fault with the ar- 
 rangement of the war with Spain were right or wrong in 
 their censures ; but I know that public opinion in England 
 fully recognized the necessity for free and open criticism, and 
 felt sure that no sound administration could suffer from it in 
 the end. Public opinion in England, too, was much im- 
 pressed by the fact that so many young Americans possessed 
 of large private fortune and free to lead lives of mere luxury, 
 had flung themselves heart and soul into the strucro-le, 
 and shared as volunteers the worst dangers and the most 
 painful privations of the campaign. The end came almost 
 before we knew that the reality of the struggle had well 
 begun ; and men learned in England that Spain was without 
 a navy and that the struggle was all over. 
 
 The public here read with delight and enthusiasm the 
 accounts from both sides, of the generosity with which the 
 vanquished had been dealt with by the victors, of the welcome 
 which had been given to defeated Spanish admirals on the 
 decks of American war-vessels, of the cheers w^ith wdiich 
 American soldiers and sailors had greeted their former 
 enemies when the strife was done. The worst characteristic 
 of war in its distant days was the hardness of heart, the 
 ferocity of temper which it engendered among the victors, 
 and which, even when the battle was over and the cause ad- 
 judged, sought new expression in the further punishment 
 and humiliation of the vanquished. No trace of this anti- 
 quated feeling was to be found on the victorious side in this 
 Cuban campaign ; victors and vanquished recognized the 
 heroic qualities in each other, and the chief desire of the 
 conqueror seemed to be to soften as much as possible the 
 pangs of defeat to the conquered. Americans fully under- 
 stood that the responsibility of the war did not rest upon the 
 shoulders of the Spanish ofificers and men who had to do 
 their part in the fighting, and who had done it with so gallant 
 a spirit. Not even the rulers of Spain were alone responsible 
 for that war. The Queen-Regent of Spain, it was well un- 
 derstood, had done all that lay in her power to maintain 
 
500 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 peace ; but all that lay in her power was not much, for the 
 temper of the Spanish people was not then such as to allow 
 of the just and wise concessions which alone could have 
 rendered it possible for America to hold her hand. 
 
 Yet the Spanish Government and the Spanish people were 
 not altogether responsible for the policy which led to the 
 war. Government and people alike were visited with an in- 
 heritance of wrong, with a curse which had come down from 
 ages of mediaeval intolerance and cruelty. The temper 
 which animated the long and futile attempt to stamp out the 
 rebellion of the Netherland provinces had bequeathed its pas- 
 sion to other generations ; and it seemed to many a Spaniard 
 a part of the traditional duty of every Spanish patriot to 
 maintain, by whatever means, and at whatever cost, the fatal 
 gifts with which past conquest had endowed the nation. 
 Spain is above all things an old-fashioned country ; she clings 
 to old ideas and old traditions; and her recent governments 
 have done all they possibly could to keep her from any 
 knowledge of the spread of civilization in the world of newer 
 thoughts and better education outside. Then, again, as all 
 intelligent Americans knew, Spain was divided by dynastic 
 factions ; and nothing was more certain than the fact that if 
 the party in power were to make concessions to justice, hu- 
 manity and prudence, the party out of power would take ad- 
 vantage of the opportunity to advertise itself as the patriot 
 band which alone could hold for Spain the possessions she 
 had won in her domineering days. All this was thoroughly 
 understood by enlightened Americans ; and even during the 
 very war itself there was a certain feeling of commiseration 
 in the American heart for the brave Spaniards who had to fight 
 in such a cause. Therefore, the whole world could see, and 
 the people of England readily saw, that there was no bitter- 
 ness of feeling in the mind of the American conquerors, and 
 that the close of the strife allowed victors and vanquished to 
 shake hands and be friends again. Even among those who 
 in this country had looked on at the struggle with eyes that 
 were friendly to Spain, there were many who thought that 
 Spain after all had come easily out of it and that her defeats 
 on sea and land, and the losses of territory which those de- 
 
WHAT ENGLAND FEELS. 501 
 
 feats had entailed upon her, might only be the means of giv- 
 ing her a new starting point from which to set out on a 
 brighter and a happier career. 
 
 One of Spain's great troubles during many recent gen- 
 erations has been her ownership of those colonial possessions 
 which she did not know how to govern, and had too much 
 inherited pride to give up. No one can doubt the quickness, 
 the intelligence and the general capacity of the Spanish peo- 
 ple, and there is nothing particularly sanguine in the hope 
 that, relieved from the burden and the curse of those ill-fated 
 colonial possessions, she may yet come to hold a high place 
 among the States of Europe. Spain, like Italy, will begin to 
 do well when she gives up the vain idea of figuring as one of 
 tile great European Powers. Even the biggest and strongest 
 of those continental Powers which we call great, cannot be 
 maintained in the place of their ambition without the most 
 terrible sacrifices of national prosperity and national comfort, 
 and without the constant danger of some convulsion which 
 may bring the whole artificial system into chaos. For Spain 
 to attempt to imitate such a course of policy is an effort as 
 needless as it is hopeless. It cannot be done, and there is 
 nothing worth having to be got by it, even if it could be 
 done. Therefore, even among the friends of Spain in this 
 country, there were many indeed who drew some comfort and 
 some hope for Spain out of the very wreck and welter which 
 came of her attempt to maintain her ill-omened dominion 
 over Cuba. 
 
 When the battle was over, and America was the victor, as 
 everybody knew from the beginning that she must be, most 
 of the friends of Spain drew a deep breath and felt a sense of 
 relief that the question was settled, and that Spain was re- 
 lieved of a burden far too heavy for her strength to carry. 
 If there was any feeling of ill-will towards America among 
 any of the English sympathizers of Spain, it certainly found 
 no expression in the press or from the platform. I cannot 
 remember having heard or read an unkindly or uncharitable 
 word in this country about the policy and the conduct of the 
 United States, when once the war was over and the swords 
 on either side were sheathed. 
 
502 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 Indeed there seemed to come over the great mass of the 
 people in England a sudden feeling of positive enthusiasm for 
 the United States. " Now at last we are brought together," 
 appeared to be the general sentiment of England. An idea 
 was spreading that this country owed something like reparation 
 to their kinsfolk in America. I do not wonder at the idea. 
 Something like a reparation was undoubtedly due. Great 
 Britain, as a State, had often acted an unfriendly part towards 
 the American Republic. Great Britain, as a State, had proved 
 herself not a friend to the Republic at more than one crisis, 
 when even the mere expression of friendship would have been 
 an encouragement, and something like a positive help. I 
 should say now that when I speak of Great Britain as a State 
 I do not by any means intend to put the blame for her action 
 on the majority of the English people. I have already shown 
 how, during the whole of the great Civil War, the majority of 
 the English people were cordial and thorough in their sym- 
 pathy with the cause of the Union. But it often happens in 
 human affairs that the state policy of a nation does not repre- 
 sent the feeling of the majority of the people. The course 
 taken, for instance, by the English Government under Lord 
 Palmerston at the time of the dispute about the Trent affair 
 was one of bluster and of positive hostility which certainly 
 was not a fair representation of the national feeling. We have 
 learned long since on the clearest evidence that it did not rep- 
 resent the feeling of Queen Victoria or of her husband, the late 
 Prince Consort, We know that it did not represent the feeling 
 of the English Liberals who recognized the leadership of Rich- 
 ard Cobden and John Bright. We know that it did not repre- 
 sent the feelings of the educated and enlightened men who fol- 
 lowed the intellectual guidance of John Stuart Mill. We 
 know that it did not represent the feelings of the English 
 working-classes. Still, it was a course which presented itself 
 plainly to the world as the action of the English Government, 
 and, therefore, as the action of the State. Therefore, I can 
 quite understand the revulsion of feeling which took place in 
 the minds of many Englishmen, when they saw the American 
 Government stand up for the cause of humanity and civilization 
 and carry on a war against Spain for the sake of rescuing the 
 victims of tyranny in Cuba. 
 
WHAT ENGLAND FEELS. 503 
 
 England did, in fact, owe some reparation to America ; and 
 the opportunity for discharging the debt in some sort of in- 
 telHgible way was welcomed by the great majority of English- 
 men. The feeling swelled into positive enthusiasm. Nothing 
 less would content some of our public men than the expres- 
 sion of a hope that England and America might in the future 
 be not merely friends but actual pledged allies. One English 
 public man, as we all know, indulged in the utterance of a 
 hope that the Union Jack and the Stars and Stripes might be- 
 fore long be seen floating side by side somewhere or other — 
 it did not appear to matter where — over a foreign battle-field. 
 Many of the more composed observers on both sides of the 
 Atlantic thought that this, perhaps, was going a little too fast 
 and too far. I remember talking on the subject with a distin- 
 guished American, then on a visit to England, who had served 
 his country well on the battle-field and in the field of literature. 
 The opinions which he gave me were exactly in accordance 
 with my own, and are in accordance, I think, with those of most 
 people in Great Britain and in America. He is and always has 
 been the friend of England and of Englishmen; but he could not 
 see his way to any actual alliance between England and the 
 American Republic. He pointed out that England's vast va- 
 riety of enterprises outside the limits of the British Empire 
 could hardly obtain a practical working guarantee from the 
 people of the American Republic. I know that some distin- 
 guished countrymen of my own, both in Ireland and in the 
 States, spoke loudly against the suggested alliance, on the 
 ground that by strengthening England it might enable her 
 for an indefinite time to resist the national claims of the Irish 
 people. My own impression was quite the other way. I 
 should have thought that an alliance, if such were possible, be- 
 tween England and a Republic, the essential condition of 
 whose existence is the recognition of the principle of home 
 rule, would make the claim of Ireland, already thoroughly rec- 
 ognized by the whole Liberal Party of Great Britain, abso- 
 lutely irresistible. But, at the same time, I was entirely in 
 agreement with the opinion of my American friend, that an 
 actual alliance between England and America consigned to a 
 formal treaty is hardly to be accomplished under the existing 
 conditions. 
 
504 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR, 
 
 That, however, is not a question into which there is any oc- 
 casion for me to enter just now ; I am only concerned to 
 note as an observer the fact that the general feeling of the 
 English people was one of such enthusiasm towards the 
 American Republic that a popular orator could hardly go too 
 far in the expression of his desire for a union of heart and pur- 
 pose between England and America. It is quite time that 
 such a feeling as this should prevail. The English and the 
 Americans are, after all, for the most part, of the same kith 
 and kin. " Blood is thicker than water " was the exclamation 
 of the American naval commander when he came to the res- 
 cue of the English ships on which fire was suddenly opened 
 from the forts in the Chinese river. My mind went back to a 
 story told of an English naval commander at a more distant 
 date — during the war between England and America which 
 broke out in 1812. The English naval commander was talk- 
 ing over the defeats inflicted on English vessels during that 
 struggle, and he brought his reflections to a conclusion with a 
 cheery and good-natured remark that after all we don't so 
 much mind being beaten by American ships and American 
 sailors, it would be a different thing if the defeat came from 
 Frenchmen or Russians, but the Americans are only ourselves 
 over again. Now, the feeling expressed by these two sailors, 
 the American and the Englishman, was just the kind of feeling 
 which prevails at the present moment among the vast majority 
 of the English people. There is a common desire that the 
 English-speaking races, wherever they may be settled through- 
 out the world, by Atlantic or Pacific shores, should recognize 
 their common kinship, and accept as far as possible a common 
 purpose in the work of civilization. 
 
 The English people, I hope, have got quite enough of al- 
 liances with the great Powers of the European continent. 
 England was allied forty years ago with the French Second 
 Empire, for the purpose of maintaining the Ottoman dominion 
 in the southeast of Europe ; and what came of the alliance ? 
 Is there an educated Englishman living to-day who has a word 
 to say in defence of the policy which led to the Crimean war? 
 Is there an Englishman who does not know that the result of 
 the war was not to weaken but to strengthen Russia? What 
 
WHAT ENGLAND FEELS. 5°5 
 
 did the alliance do for England, even as regarded our relations 
 with France? Do the French people love England now? 
 Do we not read every day in the French press the sort of 
 language which makes one believe that Fashoda is taking 
 the place of Waterloo in the embittered memories of the 
 French people? Do we not hear every day some talk of a 
 French alliance with Russia or even with Germany, with the 
 object of enabling France sometime or other to make England 
 pay for her triumph in the valley ot the Nile? The plain 
 truth is that in the present temper of Europe, with the new 
 fashion and the new passion for the acquisition of territory 
 here and there and anywhere, in Asia and in Africa, it is im- 
 possible for England to form cordial friendship with any of 
 the great continental Powers. Reasonable Englishmen are, 
 therefore, beginning to feel that the time has come when Eng- 
 land ought to look for lasting friendships elsewhere, and, that 
 the one true and lasting friendship in her power to make, 
 would be with her kith and kin, whose national banner bears 
 the Stars and Stripes. No one can feel more convinced than 
 I am that such a friendship would make for the best interests 
 of freedom and of civilization all over the world. I believe 
 that in the minds and the hearts of the best Englishmen of all 
 parties such is the feeling, the hope, and indeed the conviction. 
 There seems every reason to believe that an opportunity has 
 now arisen for a thoroughly good understanding between the 
 United States and England, such as never arose before since 
 the severance of the colonies from the parent country. In- 
 deed, at different periods of the interval between that time 
 and the present, it has seemed as if England and America 
 were drifting farther and farther away from each other in 
 sympathy and in understanding. I am again anxious to 
 point out, however, that this drifting apart was not so much 
 the work of the populations as the work of the governing 
 systems. The opportunity that seems to me now to have 
 arisen is an opportunity for a greater harmony between the two 
 States, using the word in its political sense, as well as between 
 the two peoples. We used to hear a good deal, at one time, 
 about " the manifest destiny " of the American Republic. 
 The phrase with the peculiar significance once attached to it 
 
5o6 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 has almost passed out of the memory of the present genera- 
 tion. The manifest destiny of America now is to lead the way 
 in the culture of all the arts and the teachings which tend to 
 the development of humanity and the growth of civilization. 
 That destiny it is in America's own hands to accomplish for 
 herself. She starts to the work with advantages denied to 
 any of the older States. She is free from that debilitating 
 load of pauperism which defective conditions and bad systems 
 have brought upon the great States of Europe. She is not 
 vexed with a thirst for territorial aggrandizement, having, to 
 use the familiar colloquial phrase, " enough and to spare " of 
 her own. 
 
 Some alarm was undoubtedly expressed in this country, 
 and by Englishmen who are sincere friends of the American 
 Republic and have proved themselves so at the most trying 
 time, that the territorial conquests which the Republic has 
 lately had to make might bring with them a desire to gain 
 still further possessions, and, as a means to such an end, to 
 accept the modern policy of certain European States which 
 stretch out grasping hands in this, that and the other direc- 
 tion. I may say that I have not felt any fear of this kind my- 
 self, and that I do not think it is generally felt by the people of 
 Great Britain and Ireland. Most of us have noted with satis- 
 faction the strong protest which many Americans have made 
 against any indulgence in such a temptation, and have settled 
 down to the conviction that such will be the general senti- 
 ment of the American people. Only a very small minority, 
 indeed, in Great Britain and Ireland could have .so misinter- 
 preted the motives and the purposes of the American people 
 as to believe, even for a moment, that the war with Spain was 
 undertaken out of any pitiful desire for the annexation of 
 Cuba and the Philippines. If any such desire had prevailed 
 in America, nothing could have been more easy than to find 
 an excuse and an opportunity long ago for putting it into 
 action. The condition of Cuba has been a trouble to Amer- 
 ica for far more than a generation ; and there was a time, un- 
 doubtedly, when a policy of conquest might have found an 
 enthusiastic support among the populations of some of the 
 American States. Nothing could have been more easy, at one 
 
WHAT ENGLAND FEELS 5°? 
 
 time or another, than to pick a quarrel with Spain, and force 
 her into a war. There were seasons during which Spain, rent 
 by actual civil strife, would have been in a far worse position 
 for the maintenance of her colonial possessions than she was 
 at the time when the war broke out at lasto It is now well 
 understood in England that America held back from a war 
 policy as long as she fairly could, and gave Spain every op- 
 portunity of putting herself right before the world, by adopt- 
 ing a better system of government in Cuba. There is, there- 
 fore, no fear whatever that a cordial understanding between 
 England and the United States could be checked by any serious 
 misgivings on the part of Englishmen about the policy of 
 America in the future. My own strong belief is that a cor- 
 dial understanding between England and America would help 
 the better intellects and the healthier purposes of England to 
 set her free from the old-world traditions which regard 
 national greatness as a question of territorial mileage. The 
 English-speaking races, actuated by that cordial sympathy and 
 common understanding, of which 1 have spoken, would open 
 the way for civilization to spread itself everywhere, and would 
 form a guarantee of peace such as the world has never yet 
 seen. 
 
 We hear constant talk of what terrible evils may yet be 
 brought upon the world by the ambition of Russia, by the 
 ambition of Germany or of France — there is even a man of 
 great military authority in England who has warned the 
 world more than once against the imminent danger which 
 may yet be threatened by the overweening ambition of China. 
 Now, against all these menaces to the world, even including 
 the possible passion of China to make a descent upon Europe 
 — a danger which need hardly yet be taken into serious ac- 
 count — I know of no barrier so strong and worthy of reliance 
 as a general good understanding between the two great Eng- 
 lish-speaking peoples. Even the Chinese Alexander the 
 Great or Tamerlane, whenever he rises on the world's horizon, 
 whose soul is swelled by the fierce desire to make conquest of 
 Europe, might perhaps take into his calculations that in such 
 an attempt he would have to reckon with America as well as 
 with England. Certainly the ruler of Russia or of Germany, 
 
5o8 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 whose ambition urged him into fields of reckless enterprise, 
 would be apt to think the matter over very carefully when it 
 was made clear to him that the English-speaking races all over 
 the world would be likely to make common cause against any 
 reckless disturber of the world's peace. 
 
 It is impossible to measure the influence which might be 
 brought to bear, for the cause of humanity and good order, 
 by such a general understanding among the English-speaking 
 races. So far as I can observe or understand, the general 
 feeling of the best men in England is thoroughly in favor of 
 such an international union. I should have to come to the 
 same conclusion, even if, like some of my own countrymen, I 
 were opposed to such a union on the ground that the grasping 
 policy of England might only be strengthened and encouraged 
 by a partnership with the powerful Republic of the west. I 
 have already explained that I have no such feeling, and that 
 I believe, on the contrary, the policy of the American Repub- 
 lic would have a most wholesome influence on the policy of 
 England. But, even if I shared the views of some of my 
 countrymen, I should none the less be compelled to declare, 
 as an observer, that there is just now all over England a feel- 
 ing of the most cordial friendship towards America, a recog- 
 nition of the purpose which has inspired her recent policy, 
 and a thorough faith in the position which she is destined to 
 hold as a leader of modern civilization. Such a feeling on the 
 one side, understood and appreciated as it is sure to be on 
 the other, opens the way for a genuine international alliance 
 which needs no formal treaties, signed and interchanged, to 
 ensure its value and its lasting power. 
 
CHAPTER XXVI. 
 THE WORK OF THE ARMY AS A WHOLE. 
 
 BY 
 
 Maj.-Gen. nelson a. miles, Commanding U. S. Army. 
 
 OUR war with Spain had many exceptional features. 
 Some preceded, some occurred during the progress, 
 and some appeared after the close of hostilities. In 1 
 the first place, there was a formal declaration of war before the i 
 opening of hostilities. This is not only far from being the rule 
 in the experience of warring nations, but is a rare occurrence. 
 For many months the nation had been expecting war. Fifty 
 millions of dollars had been appropriated for the national 
 defense, and for each and every purpose connected therewith, 
 to be expended at the discretion of the President. Presuma- 
 bly that immense sum was used in the purchase of ships, arms, 
 and the munitions of war for the Army and Navy, that new 
 levies might be promptly armed and equipped. That the 
 war was inevitable was apparent to every thoughtful reader of 
 history. The statesmen of the nation had recognized the 
 question of the duty of the Government of the United States 
 towards Spain and the Cuban struggle for liberty, as being 
 by far the most important problem Avith which we were then 
 called upon to deal. If that did not mean something more 
 than a mere probability of war, what did it mean ? For several 
 years previous to the declaration of war, we had energetically 
 employed our powers, if not in the interest of Spain and 
 against the interest of the Cuban patriots, at least to maintain 
 our friendly relationship with the kingdom of Spain. Nearly 
 a year in advance of the declaration of war, the unanimous 
 voice of the people of the nation, expressed in the nominat- 
 ing conventions of the great political parties, was a direct 
 command for a cessation of this policy, and its reversal. This 
 
5IO THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 voice was heard, expressly recognized, and with apparent 
 cordiality accepted by the candidates. The voice of the 
 people was heard by Congress, and Congress responded. So 
 clearly was the approach of war discerned that, weeks before 
 the declaration of war, the continental powers unitedly, 
 through their ambassadors and envoys, addressed to the 
 Executive an expression of hope that humanity and modera- 
 tion might mark the course of this Government and people ; 
 as if this Government and people had not led all the nations 
 of all the world in humanitarian principles. This notice was 
 not only an exceptional, but an unprecedented feature. Not 
 only that, but it now forms a precedent pregnant with possi- 
 bilities of future perplexities and dangers for this country. 
 
 War having been declared, it was an exceptional feature 
 that our antagonist had already more than she could handle 
 with patriots of Puerto Rica, Cuba and the Philippine Islands 
 alone. For three years she had been steadily losing ground. 
 Cuba was lost to Spain. The circumstances of Cortes were 
 immeasurably less favorable than ours when he burned his 
 ships behind him. With a few hundred followers he joined 
 the weaker side, and with it won an empire, vastly greater in 
 extent and numbers than our acquisitions from Spain ; not 
 only so, but with a loss of fewer of his men, all-told, than we 
 had killed at Santiago. 
 
 Another exceptional feature was the practical unanimity of 
 our people as evidenced in the voting of $50,000,000, in the 
 declarations in their political conventions, and the response 
 to the call for volunteers. Such unanimity had never before 
 been known in all our history. In 1861 the cause of disunion 
 had many sympathizers in every section of the country ; in 
 1846 more than one half the population was averse to the 
 war; in 1812 the prospect was that whole states would have 
 to be coerced ; in 1776 the Tories were a large, vigorous and 
 dangerous minority. 
 
 Another exceptional circumstance in our experience of war 
 was the immense number of trained soldiers for service. It is 
 true our regular military establishment was small, but nearly 
 a million of the best-trained soldiers in the world stood ready 
 as minute men to answer the call of their country in an emer- 
 
THE WORK OF THE ARMY AS A WHOLE. 511 
 
 ■gency. The few individuals among them, whose services 
 were for some reason accepted, abundantly proved their ex- 
 perience and aptitude in camp, on the march and in action. 
 
 Some further exceptional features will present themselves 
 in due course, as we now proceed with a sketch of the history 
 of the war from the commencement of actual hostilities. 
 
 In conducting the preparations for war, it was reasonable 
 that the highest executive should expect and fully consider, 
 in dealing with military questions, the best thought, based on 
 long experience and mature study, of the highest military and 
 naval officials. In case their superiors in authority should 
 decide against any advice or plan submitted and in favor of 
 some other, then it became their duty to support the one 
 adopted with unhesitating zeal. Such being the case, we 
 believed that the calling for so large a number of volunteers 
 before they could be properly equipped and especially the 
 manner in which they were brought into service, was injudi- 
 cious. We felt as Wellington must have felt in the campaign 
 in Spain. Plagued as he was by the Spanish habit of getting 
 together recruits first, and thinking of how to feed and equip 
 them afterwards, he wrote : 
 
 " It will answer no purpose to bring to the theatre of war 
 on the Donro or the Ebro crowds of starving soldiers. We 
 shall increase our difficulties without reaping any advantage 
 from the trouble taken in forming them. An army well 
 equipped, disciplined, officered and instructed is far more 
 effective than a larger one without these essential conditions." 
 
 The President, on the 25th of April, announced to the 
 world that Congress had declared war, and immediately 
 directed the Secretary of the Navy to telegraph orders to the 
 Commander of the Asiatic Squadron, then lying in the Port 
 of Hong Kong, pointing out in diplomatic terms that, as 
 there could be no harbor of rest within his reach, there re- 
 mained for him only to commence operations ; and nothing 
 could be more superb than the promptitude with which the 
 summons was obeyed, and a new name emblazoned high over 
 all on the roll of naval heroism. The proclamation of neu- 
 trality by different governments having debarred our Asiatic 
 Squadron from harbor privileges, this was recognized as the 
 
512 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 only course open, for inaction would mean the speedy exhaus- 
 tion of the supplies of the fleet, 12,000 miles from any home 
 port and from the means of replenishing. As is usual in 
 momentous affairs of the history of the world, and as the event 
 proved, the man for the occasion was present. There was 
 not a moment's hesitation or vacillation as to the course he 
 would pursue. He at once ordered the ships of his squadron 
 to Mirs Bay, and gave it a formation that it maintained 
 throughout the voyage and to the end of the epoch-making 
 battle. There was no uncertainty or doubt manifested by 
 him, as there was when Nelson set out from Naples, the latter 
 having obtained provisions and water through the interposi- 
 tion of his friend. Lady Hamilton, just prior to the battle of 
 the Nile. On the 26th of April, Dewey set out for Manila, 
 leading his fleet in the following order : the flagship Olympia, 
 bearing the broad pennant of the Commanding Commodore; 
 then the Baltimore, the Raleigh, the Petrel, the Concord, and 
 the Boston. The revenue cutter McCullocJi, with the trans- 
 ports Nanshan and Zafiro, formed a separate column to the 
 starboard. The Commander of the squadron had never been 
 at Manila, nor had a single one of his officers ; yet he had 
 made a study of the charts he had taken care to procure, of 
 Philippine waters, made his plans thereon, and proceeded to 
 put them into execution. He well knew that the enemy was 
 informed by telegraph of his movements, and would have 
 nearly a week in which to complete their preparations to 
 receive him. In this he was at one disadvantage that Nelson 
 never had to take into account. " In early morn, at dawn of 
 May," as some poetical genius has expressed it, he found 
 himself with his squadron intact and in order of battle, and 
 with the order established at Mirs Bay unchanged, calmly re- 
 posing on the waters of the harbor of Manila. The change 
 from darkness to light and from light to darkness, comes with 
 extreme rapidity in the tropics, and as the great disk of the 
 equatorial sun swept up from below the horizon, the squadron 
 of the enemy was presented suddenly but distinctly to the view, 
 formed in battle array. Its formation was very similar to that 
 which Nelson encountered in Aboukir Bay, when he exclaimed 
 that before the morrow his fate would be a peerage or West- 
 
THE WORK OF THE ARMY AS A WHOLE. 513 
 
 minster Abbey. We hear no such exclamation on the part 
 of Dewey. It was about 5:30 that the attack began in both 
 cases ; Nelson in the evening, Dewey in the morning. All 
 night long Nelson's battle raged, replete with dramatic per- 
 sonal incidents, and, as at Trafalgar, ship to ship, and hand to 
 hand encounters. We hear of nothing personally demonstra- 
 tive on the part of Dewey. Nelson himself describes the 
 French position as " a strong line of battle for preventing the 
 entrance to the Bay, flanked by enormous gun-boats, four 
 frigates, and a battery of guns and mortars." The French 
 ships were placed "at a distance from each other of about 160 
 yards, with the van ship close to a shoal in the Northwest, 
 and the whole of the line just outside a four-fathom sand 
 bank; so that an enemy, it was considered, could not turn 
 either flank." The Spaniards had disposed their forces so as 
 to cover the entrance to Cavite, the western flank of the fleet 
 resting on Sangley Point, and the eastern flank resting on the 
 shoal near the land on the other side of the Bay, both flanks 
 being apparently so close to shoal water as to prevent Dewey 
 from passing at either place, or " doubling" on them. Here 
 the parallelism ended. No signal was flying to the breeze 
 over Dewey like that of Nelson at Trafalgar that America 
 "expects every man to do his duty." He simply ported his 
 helm at once and headed for the Spemiards, followed by his 
 ships. As was afterwards learned, the Spanish line consisted of 
 the Reina Christina (flagship), Cast U la, Isle dc Lnr.on, Isle dc 
 Cuba, Don Juan de Austria, Don Antonio do Ulloa, and the 
 Marques Del Duero. Five times he slowly passed along the 
 Spanish line of battle, back and forth, steadily closing in 
 towards them, and working his 120 guns mounted on 19.500 
 tons of ship displacement against the enemy's 90 guns and 
 12,000 tons of ship displacement, after which he quietly went 
 to breakfast. It was the next morning after the battle when 
 Nelson finished his work, and estimated his loss and gams ; it 
 was immediately after breakfast when Dewey deliberately 
 proceeded to finish the business and take an account of stock. 
 Never in the history of the world was the superiority of mtel- 
 lect over mere brute force more gloriously illustrated. Every 
 portion of the contest in Manila Bay seems to have been 
 
514 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 carefully, though quickly, calculated and provided for in 
 advance. The enemy had the greater number of ships and 
 men, but the mechanical power employed was with the 
 Americans ; and contrary to all previous experience, there 
 was no attempt at ramming or boarding and no attempt at 
 the display of independent individual bravery. Such display 
 was exclusively on the losing side. 
 
 It requires no great stretch of poetic license to perceive the 
 descendants of the Gallic and Iberian Romans reminded by 
 the sudden appearance of the descendants of the rude rovers 
 of Angle-land, of the descents that were made by the vikings 
 upon the maritime towns of the Bay of Biscay fifteen centur- 
 ies ago. Their consternation was most natural in any event; 
 but to those whose education and intelligence could carry their 
 reflections back through the intervening annals, the event 
 must have been especially portentous. May not the Filipino 
 wonder if the landing of Dewey and Merritt at Manila shall 
 prove as disastrous to the natives as was that of Hengist and 
 Horsa on the Island of Thanet fourteen and one half centu- 
 ries ago ? 
 
 At the conclusion of the contest it was found that no one in 
 our fleet had been killed, and only eight men had been in- 
 jured, — none of these seriously. Not a single ship had re- 
 ceived any injury that reduced her efficiency in the slightest, 
 with the exception of one gun on the Baltimore struck by the 
 same shell that caused all the wounds that were experienced 
 by our men at the battle. We have already noticed the dis- 
 proportion in favor of the Americans between the tonnage dis- 
 placement and the number of guns; but this disproportion 
 and that of the hits between the two fleets was comparatively 
 small. That the American fleet was the stronger in battery 
 power is no reproach to us, but the reverse ; for it shows that 
 the American Commander acted in accordance with the first 
 principles of warfare. It was Napoleon who said that God 
 was on the side of the heaviest battalions. Nelson always re- 
 cognized that fact. When attacking superior numbers, both 
 of men and ships, he so attacked, laying ship to ship on the 
 flank, as to throw out of action a considerable portion of the 
 enemy's fleet, leaving him actually superior at the point of 
 battle. 
 
THE WORK OF THE ARMY AS A WHOLE. 515 
 
 Commodore Dewey, having gotten his superior tonnage and 
 superior metal into the action, proceeded to use them effec- 
 tively. But few of the enemy's guns could reach him at all, 
 and such as could have reached him failed to do so because 
 of poor gunnery, probably resulting from excitement and con- 
 sternation at the terrible destructiveness of the American fire. 
 This permitted the display of extraordinary individual heroism 
 on the Spanish fleet, and prevented any opportunities for the 
 same on that of their antagonists. The result was that there 
 were none but heroes on the American fleet, because every 
 man stood at his post and fought with deliberation, without 
 excitement ; and the Commander himself, while showing the 
 highest quality of courage and bravery, could make no greater 
 display personally than his lowest subordinate. Of course 
 the coolness of the Commander in such an action is imparted 
 to all his subordinates, and the confidence of the Commander 
 in his men and of the men in their Commander must have been 
 owing in no small degree to previous acquaintance and pre- 
 vious drill and preparation. All this preparation and superior- 
 ity in the adaptation of means to ends, scientific construction 
 of guns and appurtenances, accurate proportioning of powder 
 ingredients, elaborate and ingenious mechanisms for handling 
 guns and ammunition ; — all such expedients being calculated 
 and perfectly in control in advance, while it insured victory, 
 detracts nothing from, but rather enhances the glory of the 
 men, and especially of the leader, who achieved success. 
 
 The success of Dewey was as substantial as it was spectac- 
 ular, a concurrence of circumstances extremely rare in the 
 affairs of the world. Never before in the annals of time did a 
 name spring more suddenly from quiet professional life into 
 world-wide fame. In the last minute of the month of April 
 that name was practically unknown beyond the purview of 
 the departmental roster. Before the end of the first of May, 
 with the speed of that appliance which girdles the earth in 
 forty minutes, or less, that name, emblazoned on every sky, 
 obscured the lustre of many of the maritime achievements of 
 the past. 
 
 When war was declared, we had a regular army of 25,000 
 men, located in small detachments at the various military sta- 
 
5i6 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 tions scattered all over our vast country. We had made a 
 very little advance on the conditions that existed at the time 
 of the Venezuelan embroglio, at which time we had but three 
 high-power guns mounted and in position for service along 
 the vast extent of coast line of the United States. Our navy 
 had recently been increased by the addition of purchased 
 cruisers and battleships, but they were only about half manned, 
 and all were more or less deficient in ammunition. 
 
 Our fortifications were inadequate for the defence of the 
 great commercial cities and important harbors, and such de- 
 fences as we had were only partly equipped in guns, ammuni- 
 tion and men. Foreign nations regarded us as a people de- 
 voted to industrial and commercial pursuits and unworthy of 
 serious consideration as a military or naval power, although 
 they well understood that our reserve power and wealth were 
 elements of strength which could be utilized if we were given 
 time for preparation. 
 
 The Navy of Spain, as well as her Army, having been en- 
 gaged in active war for years, was naturally supposed to be 
 prepared for immediate action, and therefore capable of the 
 greater effectiveness at the commencement of the contest ; 
 and our authorities, as the event proved, were unduly cautious 
 in ordering aggressive movements. This was very natural 
 under the circumstances ; but had they fully comprehended 
 the enemy's weakness, notwithstanding the appearances, as 
 well as the excellent state of discipline of the forces manning 
 our Navy, the obvious movement, whether for aggressive or 
 defensive operations, was an immediate seizure of Puerto Rico. 
 This is no new discovery. That it was a necessity of the sit- 
 uation could not well be overlooked. Indeed, as early as 
 February 3 preceding the declaration of War, a retired ofifi- 
 cer, Admiral Ammen, writing from the Naval Hospital in 
 Washington to Senator Morgan of Alabama in regard to the 
 ostensible efforts of the Spanish authorities to organize an 
 autonomous government for Cuba, said : 
 
 " I hope this Cuban autonomy will not be permitted to be 
 smothered, and if attempted and ignored, that Congress will 
 be disposed to acknowledge the independence of the Island of 
 Cuba, which will in my belief enable them to attain it. If Spain 
 
THE WORK OF THE ARMY AS A WHOLE. 517 
 
 chooses to make war, we should at once take Puerto Rico, 
 which will leave her without a point except the Island of Cuba. 
 Then I would say we should knock all of their defences down 
 except those of Havana, for the comfort and in aid of the in- 
 surgents, but not land a man on the island, as we should do 
 on Puerto Rico, which we should occupy with a considerable 
 force. As for Havana, we might try our hand as between her 
 guns and our's afloat. As for the Spanish Navy, I have the 
 idea that it is in a very bad condition, and it would be a ques- 
 tion of relative forces whether we should engage it." 
 
 The sanitary objections to a campaign in Cuba during the 
 summer season were well understood. The details of the ex- 
 pedition under the charge of Admiral Bacock of the British 
 Navy, with Lord Albemarle in command of the military forces, 
 in the year 1762, were accessible, and not only accessible but 
 thoroughly canvassed. The invading force numbered about 
 15,000 men, almost exactly the number of our first expedi- 
 tionary force to Santiago. The total loss of the British in 1762 
 and that of our army in the present year, including sickness, 
 was represented by very nearly the same figures. 
 
 As the portent of war grew darker and rose higher in our 
 political sky, it became my duty to urge with increasing zeal 
 and earnestness the importance of early and thorough prepara- 
 tion. It was not in my power to do more than give warning, to 
 point out the dangers and suggest the remedies. This much 
 I did, or tried to do, with a persistency and earnestness limited 
 only by the strict requirements of official courtesy. Tentage, 
 transportation and camp equipage were insufificient for any im- 
 portant military operations. Congress passed a joint resolution 
 which was approved April 20, demanding that the Government 
 of Spain relinquish its authority on the Island of Cuba. Prior to 
 that action Congress had appropriated $50,000,000 for the na- 
 tional defence. During the period intervening, in anticipation 
 of actual hostilities, efforts were made by the military author- 
 ities to secure material for military operations on a scale com- 
 mensurate with the exigencies of the situation and on a scale 
 far more expansive than had been adopted for a great many 
 years. The importance of that act of Congress can be readily 
 appreciated, as the time thus given was most opportune for se- 
 
5i8 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 curing such munitions of war as were absolutely necessary to 
 the proper equipment of an army and for securing the mate- 
 rials which had not previously been in demand in our country, 
 but which are indispensable to the highest success in modern 
 warfare. I had earnestly recommended the purchase of smoke- 
 less powder, rapid-fire and machine guns, modern rifles and 
 such like requisites. A number of bills had been introduced 
 in Congress looking to a re-organization and an increase of the 
 Regular Army, but the wide divergencies of opinion on the 
 subject might have prevented any action whatever but for the 
 growing strain upon the relations between our government and 
 that of Spain. These strained relations served to emphasize 
 the need for action on the subject, and resulted in an act, 
 which was approved by the President on the 26th of April, au- 
 thorizing an increase in the enlisted strength of the Army to 
 62,597 men, which number was subsequently increased by a 
 supplementary act authorizing the enlistment of 10,000 men 
 possessing immunity from diseases incident to tropical climates. 
 Previous to the passage of this act, as early as the 9th of April, 
 I had recommended the equipment of 50,000 volunteers, and 
 shortly thereafter that an additional auxiliary force of 40,000 
 men be provided as a reserve and for the protection of the 
 coasts. This would have given us an effective force of 162,597 
 men, which when supplemented by the auxiliary force of 
 50,000 natives of Cuba, I believed would be sufficient. I 
 deemed it, however, of the first importance that this force 
 should be well equipped and placed in the highest degree of 
 efficiency for active service. 
 
 As early as the middle of April steps were taken for the 
 mobilization of the regular troops, various regiments of infan- 
 try being ordered to Mobile, New Orleans and Tampa, the 
 understanding then being that these orders were preparatory 
 to an immediate movement to Cuba upon a declaration of 
 war, which then seemed imminent. On further consideration, 
 the authorities modified this order, and part of the regular 
 infantry, with artillery and cavalry, was diverted to Chatta- 
 nooga and placed in camp at Chickamauga Park. On May 
 10, the regular artillery and cavalry were ordered from 
 Chickamauga to Tampa, preparatory to a movement on Cuba. 
 
THE WORK OF THE ARMY AS A WHOLE. 519 
 
 Subsequently 70,000 men were ordered to move on Cuba, and 
 commissary stores for 90 days for the men and 30 days for 
 the animals were ordered to be concentrated at Tampa, but 
 the want of proper equipment and ammunition rendered such 
 movement impracticable, and it never reached the stage of 
 an actual attempt at departure from our shores. 
 
 The President's proclamation declaring a state of war ap- 
 peared on the 25th of April, and the next day it became my 
 duty to advise giving prompt attention to the equipment, 
 organization and discipline of the troops for field service, 
 and that, after being assembled, organized and sworn into the 
 service of the United States, they would require uniforms, 
 tentage, complete camp equipage, arms and ammunition and 
 a full supply of stationery, including blank books for reports 
 of the Quartermaster's, Commissary, Medical and Ordnance 
 Departments ; that they would also require complete equip- 
 ment of supplies and munitions of war, hospital appliances 
 and transportation, including ambulances and stretchers ; that 
 the officers and non-commissioned officers would have to 
 be appointed and properly instructed in their duties and re- 
 sponsibilities, and that they should have some instruction in 
 tactical exercises and other duties of the highest importance 
 to the efficiency and health of troops in the field ; that the im- 
 portance of this preliminary work was urgent, as also that it 
 should be completed in advance of the troops leaving their 
 States ; and it was furthermore strongly represented that 
 this might be done while the general and staff officers were 
 being selected, appointed and properly instructed, and the 
 large camps were being secured, and stores collected therefor. 
 It was a matter of very great concern to me that unequipped, 
 ununiformed men by the thousands should not be collected 
 in great camps away from their States where it would be 
 difficult for them to be properly supplied with food, camp 
 equipage, blankets, tentage, medical supplies and transpor- 
 tation facilities ; for the absence of these appliances could 
 not but cause debilitating results upon the health and strength 
 of the men who were thus gathered together. 
 
 While the railways of the United States were engaged in 
 transporting troops, munitions of war and supplies to Tampa 
 
520 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 and other points of departure on the Gulf and the South At- 
 lantic, the military authorities at Washington took steps to 
 obtain accurate and detailed information within the limits of 
 the prospective seat of war. Two young, energetic and in- 
 telligent officers of the Bureau of Military Information were 
 assigned, the one to Cuba, the other to Puerto Rico, to attempt 
 the daring and difficult duty of ascertaining and reporting 
 conditions as they might be found to exist in the territories 
 respectively assigned to them. Both, in the results of their 
 efforts, gave abundant proof of the wisdom of their selection. 
 
 The emissary to Cuba, Lieutenant Rowan, having left the 
 United States on April 9, landed April 24 at Portillo, about 
 70 miles west of Santiago de Cuba. He penetrated the 
 interior, found and conferred with General Garcia, one of the 
 most successful and brilliant leaders of the Cuban Army, and 
 without undue delay hastened to lay before his superiors in 
 Washington the valuable data that he had acquired. With 
 General Garcia's concurrence, he brought back with him two 
 officers of that chieftain's staff, Brigadier-General Enrique 
 Collazo and Lieutenant-Colonel Carlos Hernandez. The 
 course of his return journey lay up to Manati on the North 
 Coast; thence by an open boat to Nassau, New Providence, 
 whence they arrived in the United States May 13. 
 
 It was nearly a month after Lieutenant Rowan's departure 
 that Lieutenant Whitney sailed, May 5, from Key West for 
 Puerto Rico, which, after a ten days' voyage, he entered and 
 proceeded to explore under disguise, giving his attention 
 more particularly to the southern sections of the island. He 
 departed thence on his return June i, and reported the re- 
 sults of his mission in Washington on the 9th of that month. 
 Like the report of Lieutenant Rowan, that of Lieutenant 
 Whitney was eminently satisfactory at Army Headquarters. 
 He had gone on the most hazardous duty an officer can be 
 called upon to perform. He was in constant and imminent 
 danger of discovery, the penalty for which would have been 
 an ignominious death from which there could have been no 
 appeal. 
 
 Several relief expeditions carrying arms and supplies for 
 the Cubans were organized and dispatched. The first of these 
 
THE WORK OF THE ARMY AS A WHOLE. 521 
 
 was equipped at Key West under the direction of Colonel 
 Hall, since promoted to Brigadier General. This expedition 
 landed under charge of Captain O'Connell of the United 
 States Army, his assistant, Lieutenant Crofton, also of the 
 army, being the first of^cer to land on Cuban soil during the 
 Spanish-American War. 
 
 One of the most important of these expeditions was under 
 the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Dorst of the volunteer 
 army, which sailed from Key West by way of Nassau and 
 landed at the harbor of Banes on the north coast of Cuba, 
 where he delivered to the Cubans, who held and continued 
 to hold that port, 7,500 rifles, a million cartridges, 5,000 uni- 
 forms and other munitions of war and supplies of which the 
 ten thousand veteran Cubans under General Garcia stood 
 sadly in need. Colonel Dorst returned early in June, reported 
 the entire success of his expedition, and received the hearty 
 congratulations of his commanding officers, whose trust he 
 had so thoroughly vindicated. 
 
 Meanwhile the forces gathering at Tampa, originally des- 
 tined for an invasion of Cuba on a much larger scale, were 
 being organized to a strength of five thousand with a view to 
 a lodgment at Tunas on the south side of Cuba, where it was 
 expected to open communication with the General in Chief 
 of the Cuban forces. General Gomez, and support and co-op- 
 erate with him in the healthful mountain region where he was 
 understood to be operating. This expedition was designed to 
 be under the command of Major-General Shafter, the senior 
 officer then at Tampa, and was intended to be strong enough 
 to effect a landing and maintain its position, while furnishing 
 all the supplies needed by the force of General Gomez. The 
 movement of Admiral Cervera's fleet from the Cape de Verde 
 Islands rendered necessary the adoption of new plans, and 
 this expedition, like the first one designed, was suspended, and 
 in effect never advanced to the point of setting sail. 
 
 The reports of conditions at Tampa became such that at this 
 time I determined to take the field in person with headquarters 
 temporarily at Tampa. I issued an order to the Army designed 
 to increase and promote the csprtt dc corps on the part of offi- 
 cers and men, to bring the military forces to the highest state 
 
522 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 of efficiency, and to call forth the best energies of all the 
 elements composing the Army, of whatever character or sta- 
 tion, in order that they might the more speedily accomplish the 
 objects in view through an increased zeal for the cause and an 
 enlarged earnestness of effort. Attention was called to the 
 high development which had been reached throughout the 
 civilized world by the experience of the past century, and the 
 faithful observance of laws and regulations which govern mili- 
 tary bodies in all civilized countries, and I urged that all offi- 
 cers, of whatever grade, should as far as lay in their power 
 guard and preserve the health and welfare of all under their 
 charge, that the officers should labor diligently and zealously to 
 perfect themselves and their subordinates in military drill, in- 
 struction and discipline ; and above all, that they should con- 
 stantly endeavor, by precept and example, to maintain the high- 
 est soldierly standard, to foster and stimulate that high soldierly 
 spirit and patriotic devotion to duty which must characterize 
 an effective army. Reciting the fact that the order was issued 
 upon the day sacred to the memory of the herioc dead, the 
 30th of May, I hoped that the injunctions, from all the cir- 
 cumstances, would be strongly impressed, and result benefi- 
 cially, most especially throughout the volunteer regiments that 
 were so rapidly forming, and lessen the dangers that are always 
 present with large bodies of men gathered on short notice for 
 a great national purpose. 
 
 Definite information having been received that Cervera's 
 fleet had been inclosed in the harbor of Santiago de Cuba by 
 our Navy, orders were given to General Shafter, May 30, to 
 embark his troops and proceed to that harbor for the purpose 
 of assisting our naval forces in capturing that fleet; and on 
 the same evening I left Washington. 
 
 Reaching Tampa on the ist of June, I found that place 
 crowded with an indiscriminate accumulation of supplies and 
 war material. The confusion, owing partly to the want of 
 terminal railway facilities and partly to the want of system 
 in loading and billing material, appeared for a time to be 
 utterly inextricable. The sidings from the port of Tampa 
 for perhaps fifty miles into the interior were blocked with cars, 
 and the resulting difficulties of the situation prevented proper 
 
THE WORK OF THE ARMY AS A WHOLE. 523 
 
 embarkation of the troops earlier than June 8, on which 
 date the flotilla was in the act of moving to sea. This move- 
 ment, however, was suspended by orders from Washington, 
 and the expedition did not sail until the 14th. My request 
 for permission to accompany the expedition had not been 
 granted, and on the day following its departure I received 
 and immediately complied with, the following : 
 
 Washington, D. C, June 15, 1898. 
 Major-General Miles, 
 Tampa, Fla., 
 Important business requires your presence here ; re- 
 port at once. Answer. 
 
 R. A. Alger, 
 Secretary of War. 
 
 In a chapter like this, it is impossible to enter into the de- 
 tails of this expedition ; nor is it necessary, since it is all very 
 fully described by others in the foregoing chapters, and I will 
 content myself with merely repeating the belief which I enter- 
 tained from the first and stated ofiflcially to the Department, 
 that we could secure the surrender of the Spanish army in the 
 Island of Cuba without any great loss of life. I know of no 
 reason at present to revise that opinion. There is, however, a 
 duty which I owe to the Cuban patriots before leaving this 
 part of my subject, and that is to make clear the fact of the 
 co-operation received from their governmental and military 
 authorities. While at Tampa, on the 9th, and again on 
 the 1 2th of June, I received cheering news by cable from 
 the Cuban patriots in response to my communications to 
 General Garcia on the 2d. These were in the form of 
 suggestions and requests, but they were heartily accepted 
 as commands. Nothing could have been more convincing 
 of the hearty good will of the Cubans toward the American 
 people and American government at that time than the 
 alacrity with which this response was made and the instruc- 
 tions followed out. So anxious was General Garcia to assure 
 us of the readiness of the patriot armies and people to co-op- 
 erate that his response was hurried forward through different 
 channels, in order that in case one should miscarry, another 
 
524 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 might reach its destination. In that response he was careful 
 to add that he would take measures at once to carry out my 
 recommendations, regarding them as orders, and that he would 
 immediately proceed to concentrate forces at the points indi- 
 cated ; that he would march without delay ; that already he 
 had put forces in motion to intercept aid going from Holguin 
 and other points to Santiago ; that, repeating every assurance 
 of good will, he desired to second our plans. 
 
 It was on the sixth of June that Colonel Hernandez, on 
 board the steamer Gloucester, had arrived in the harbor of 
 Banes. Proceeding ashore at once, he delivered my commu- 
 nication to General Garcia, who had recently come into pos- 
 session of that port. It conveyed to General Garcia the first 
 information regarding the proposed expedition to Santiago, 
 and he immediately gave orders for the concentration sug- 
 gested in the vicinity of Santiago de Cuba. The difficulties in 
 his way were very great, but were overcome, one after another, 
 until on the 19th, at 7:30 A. M., he reached Aserradero and 
 placed himself in communication with Admiral Sampson. 
 Invited by the latter on board his flagship, the two proceeded 
 to concert a plan of attack preparatory to the expected arrival 
 of General Shafter's expedition. It should not be forgotten 
 that in his attitude toward the military authorities of our 
 government General Garcia was not acting simply on his own 
 authority, but in obedience to orders that he had previously 
 received from the Council of the Cuban Government, to obey 
 ■ and respect the orders and instructions of the commanders of 
 the American Army whenever they should commence opera- 
 tions in the territory under his command. General Shafter, 
 on arrival of his expedition off Santiago Bay, with Admiral 
 Sampson, visited General Garcia at his headquarters at Aser- 
 radero to confer with him in regard to the attack by land. 
 The result of this conference was that it was determined to 
 make the landing of the American forces east instead of west 
 of the Bay of Santiago, and Cuban troops were placed on 
 board American transports to reinforce the brigade of General 
 Ramon, already in position to protect the landing of the 
 American forces. These reinforcements landed at Sigua and 
 advanced at once on Daiquiri, the united commands being 
 
THE WORK OF THE ARMY AS A WHOLE. 525 
 
 under General Castillo. The Spanish troops at Daiquiri has- 
 tily abandoned their position at that place, which was at once 
 occupied by the Cubans ; and when the American Navy bom- 
 barded the hills in the vicinity of that town, preparatory to 
 the landing of the forces of General Shafter, the result of 
 such bombardment was the spilling of Cuban blood only. 
 From that time until the close of the campaign the Cubans 
 were always in the vanguard, whether at Firmezaand Siboney, 
 or Las Guasimas and El Caney. 
 
 On the 1st of July, under orders from General Shafter, 
 General Garcia, with his 4,000 Cubans, began at 5:30 in the 
 morning, his march toward Marianajo, and at 7 o'clock occu- 
 pied the positions allotted to him at that point. Marianajo 
 lies between El Caney and San Juan Hill, and it was part of 
 the duty assigned him to protect both El Caney and San 
 Juan Hill should the enemy come out from Santiago to rein- 
 force either place during the battle. This duty was effectively 
 performed. All the Cubans were under the enemy's fire, 
 and their loss amounted to about one hundred. After the 
 conclusion of this day's action, under orders from General 
 Shafter, General Garcia, at the head of his forces, made a 
 night march to the extreme right flank. At dawn of the 2d 
 he was north of the city in a strong position, with his van- 
 guard in close proximity to the city, and during the 2d drove 
 the enemy from the villages of Cuabitas and Boniato and cap- 
 tured several fortified positions, closing in on San Vicente. 
 During this day the Cubans suffered ten casualties, the skir- 
 mishing continuing all day. From this time General Garcia 
 continued to advance and extend his right until his men 
 scouted, picketed and occupied the ground between the coast 
 and the Bay of Santiago, and at the same time strong com- 
 mands were covering the roads leading from Holguin and 
 other Spanish garrisons to Santiago. 
 
 Upon the surrender of the city of Santiago, General Garcia, 
 commanding the Cuban forces, was debarred from any co- 
 operation in the enjoyment of the honors or fruits of the 
 victory. 
 
 On the 26th of June I received a formal order to organize 
 an expedition for operation against the enemy in Cuba and 
 
526 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 Puerto Rico, with which I proceeded at once to comply. The 
 hmits of the space of this chapter will not permit me to go 
 into the details of these preparations ; nor of various subsid- 
 iary military enterprises which I had advised, such as the cap- 
 ture of the Isle of Pines and the harbor of Nipe ; nor of the 
 provisions I recommended against the spread of the yellow 
 fever which had broken out in the southern portion of our 
 own country. A clear understanding of the course of events 
 cannot be obtained, however, with the omission of either of 
 the following self-explanatory dispatches: 
 
 PlAYA del ESTE, July 3, 1 898. 
 
 The Secretary of War, WasJiington : 
 
 We have the town well invested on the north and east, 
 but with a very thin line. Upon approaching it we find it of 
 such a character and the defences so strong it will be impossi- 
 ble to carry it by storm with my present force, and I am se- 
 riously considering withdrawing about 5 miles and taking up a 
 new position on the high ground between the San Juan River 
 and Siboney, with our left at Sardinero, so as to get our supplies 
 to a large extent by means of the railroad, which we can use, 
 having engines and cars at Siboney. Our losses up to date 
 will aggregate a thousand, but list has not yet been made ; 
 but little sickness outside of exhaustion from intense heat and 
 exertion of the battle of the day before yesterday and the al- 
 most constant fire which is kept up on the trenches. Wagon 
 road to the rear is kept up with some dif^culty on account of 
 rains, but I will be able to use it for the present. General 
 Wheeler is seriously ill, and will probably have to go to the 
 rear to-day. General Young also very ill, confined to his bed. 
 General Hawkins slightly wounded in foot. During sortie 
 enemy made last night, which was handsomely repulsed, the 
 behavior of the regular troops was magnificent. I am urging 
 Admiral Sampson to attempt to force the entrance of the 
 harbor, and will have a consultation with him this morning. 
 He is coming to the front to see me. I have been unable to 
 be out during the heat of the day for four days, but am re- 
 taining the command. General Garcia reported he holds the 
 railroad from Santiago to San Luis, and has burned a bridge 
 and removed some rails ; also that General Pando has arrived 
 at Palma, and that the French consul with about four hun- 
 dred French citizens came into his lines yesterday from San- 
 tiago. Have directed him to treat them with every courtesy 
 possible. 
 
 11:44 A. M. ^WKYHYA^, Major-General. 
 
THE WORK OF THE ARMY AS A WHOLE. 527 
 
 Headquarters of the Army, 
 Washington, D. C, July 3, 1898. 
 General Shafter, Playa del Estc, Cuba : 
 
 Accept my hearty congratulations on the record made of 
 magnificent fortitude, gallantry and sacrifice displayed in the 
 desperate fighting of the troops before Santiago. I realize 
 the hardships, difficulties and sufferings, and am proud that 
 amid those terrible scenes the troops illustrated such fearless 
 and patriotic devotion to the welfare of our common country 
 and flag. Whatever the results to follow their unsurpassed 
 deeds of valor, the past is already a gratifying chapter of his- 
 tory. I expect to be with you within one week with strong 
 reinforcements. 
 
 Miles, Llajor-Goicral Coinviandi)ig. 
 
 Headquarters Fifth Army Corps, 
 Near Santiago, Playa, July 4, 1898. 
 Maj.-Gen. Nelson A. Miles : 
 
 Covnnajidnig the Army of the United States, WasJiiugton : 
 I thank you in the name of the gallant men I have the 
 honor to command for splendid tribute of praise which you 
 have accorded them. They bore themselves as American 
 soldiers always have. Your telegram will be published at 
 the head of the regiments in the morning. I feel that I am 
 master of the situation and can hold the enemy for any length 
 of time. I am delighted to know that you are coming that 
 you may see for yourself the obstacles which this army had to 
 overcome. My only regret is the great number of gallant 
 souls who have given their lives for our country's cause. 
 
 Shafter. 
 
 I left Washington for Charleston, S. C, on the evening of 
 July 7, and, on board the steamer Yale, loaded with 1,500 
 troops, and accompanied by the steamer Columbia, also con- 
 veying troops, I arrived off Santiago harbor on the morning 
 of July II, and, the bombardment being in progress, notified 
 Admiral Sampson, commanding the fleet, of my purpose to land 
 the troops I had brought with me within a little harbor called 
 Cabafias, two and one-half miles from the entrance of Santiago 
 harbor, preparatory to a prompt advance against the Spanish 
 position. The Admiral at once came on board the Yale, and 
 I explained to him more fully the purpose of my presence and 
 my plan of operations, and received his very cordial acquies- 
 
528 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 cence in the plan and assurance of his readiness to co-operate. 
 I then went on shore and opened communication with Gen- 
 eral Shafter, between whom and Washington the following 
 dispatches had been exchanged : 
 
 SiBONEY, VIA Haiti. 
 Received Washington, July lo, 1898 — 5:55 p. m. 
 Adjutant-General, U. S. Army, Washington : 
 
 Headquarters Fifth Army Corps, 10. — I have just received 
 letter from General Toral declining unconditional surrender. 
 Bombardment by the Army and Navy will begin at as near 
 4 P. M. to-day as possible. 
 
 Shafter, Major General. 
 
 War Department, July 10, 1898. 
 General Shafter, Playa del Este, Santiago, Cuba : 
 
 Should the Spaniards surrender unconditionally and wish to 
 return to Spain, they will be sent back direct at the expense 
 of the United States Government. 
 
 R. A. Alger, Secretary of War. 
 
 At 12:45 P- ^'1 J"^y ^^' General Shafter signaled to Admiral 
 Sampson : 
 
 Please continue firing with heavy guns until 11 o'clock, and 
 then cease firing until further orders. 
 
 At 4:45 P. M., the Brooklyn reported to the flagship : 
 General Shafter states that fire from ships very accurate, 
 shells falling in city; lines have been advanced. Flag of truce 
 went forward to demand unconditional surrender. Will com- 
 municate with you fully directly to Aguadores as to time of 
 firing and result of truce. 
 
 On July 12, as stated by the Secretary of the Navy in his 
 annual report, the Admiral received a dispatch from General 
 Shafter stating : 
 
 My lines are now complete to the bay north of Santiago. 
 Your shots can be observed from here perfectly, at least those 
 that fall in the town. Flames followed several shots fired to- 
 day. 
 
 On that morning I rode from Siboney to the headquarters 
 of General Shafter. After consulting with him, he sent a 
 communication to General Toral, saying that the Command- 
 
THE WORK OF THE ARMY AS A WHOLE. 529 
 
 ing General of the American Army had arrived in his camp 
 with reinforcements, and that we desired to meet him between 
 the lines at any time agreeable to him. He replied that he 
 would see us at 12 o'clock next day. The interview was held, 
 after which I rode along the trenches from right to left, ex- 
 amining the entire position, during the progress of which I 
 received the following in reply to a telegram I had sent the 
 night before : 
 
 Washington, D. C, July 13, 1898 (Received 2:45 p. m.). 
 Major-General Miles : 
 
 You may accept surrender by granting parole to officers 
 and men, the officers retaining their side arms. The officers 
 and men after parole to return to Spain, the United States 
 assisting. If not accepted, then assault, unless in your judg- 
 ment an assault would fail. Consult with Sampson and pur- 
 sue such course as to the assault as you jointly agree upon. 
 Matter should be settled promptly. 
 
 R. A. Alger, Secretary of War. 
 
 Just before the time appointed for a second meeting with 
 the Spanish Commander between the lines, a letter was re- 
 ceived of which the following was the translation : 
 
 Santiago de Cuba, July 14, 1898. 
 
 Honored Sir: 
 
 His excellency the general in chief of the army of the 
 Island of Cuba telegraphs from Havana yesterday at 7 P. M. 
 the following: " Believing the business of such importance as 
 the capitulation of that place should be known and decided 
 upon by the Government of His Majesty, I give you notice 
 that I have sent the conditions of your telegram, asking an 
 immediate answer and enabling you also to bhow this to the 
 General of the American army to see if he will agree to await 
 the answer of the Government, which can not be as soon as 
 the time which he has decided, as communication by way of 
 Bermuda is more slow than by Key West. In the mean- 
 while your honor and the General of the American army may 
 agree upon capitulation on the basis of repatriation [returning 
 to Spain]." I have the honor to transmit this to you, in case 
 you may [consider] the foregoing satisfactor}^, that we may 
 designate persons in representation of himself, who, with those 
 in my name, agree to clauses of the capitulation upon the basis 
 
530 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 of the return to Spain, accepted already in the beginning by 
 the general in chief of this army. 
 
 Awaiting a reply, I am, very respectfully, your servant, 
 
 Jose Toral, etc. 
 General in Chief of the American Forces. 
 
 My reply was made verbally at the interview which imme- 
 diately followed, and which resulted in a definite surrender not 
 only of the Spanish garrison at Santiago, but of all the troops 
 in the eastern end of Cuba. This was largly due to the ac- 
 tion of General Garcia and his troops. It is set forth in the fol- 
 lowing self-explanatory telegram : 
 
 Headquarters Cavalry Divison, United States Army. 
 
 Before Santiago, Cuba, July 14, 1898 — 12:55 p. m. 
 The Secretary of War, Washington, D. C. : 
 
 General Toral formally surrendered the troops of his army 
 corps and division of Santiago on the terms and understand- 
 ing that his troops would be returned to Spain. General 
 Shafter will appoint commissioners to draw up the conditions 
 of arrangement for carrying out the terms of surrender. This 
 is very gratifying, and General Shafter and the officers and 
 men of this command are entitled to great credit for their te- 
 nacity and fortitude in overcoming almost insuperable obstacles 
 which they have encountered. A portion of the army has 
 been infected with yellow fever, and efforts will be made to 
 separate those who are infected and those free from it, 
 and to keep those who are still on board ship separated 
 from those on shore. Arrangements will be immediately 
 made for carrying out the further instructions of the President 
 and yourself. 
 
 Miles, Major-General, Coinmanding the Army. 
 
 Directing General Shafter to appoint the Commissioners 
 provided for in the terms of the surrender, in a letter of instruc- 
 tions, and in other written communications instructing him to 
 take immediate measures for the protection of the health of 
 the troops, I returned to Siboney to push forward prepara- 
 tions for an immediate descent upon Puerto Rico. While 
 these preparations were in progress, I visited and inspected 
 Daiquiri and other stations, and on the 17th of June concen- 
 trated transports at Guantanamo Bay, in order to take on wa- 
 ter, coal, etc., having immediately after the agreement to 
 
THE WORK OF THE ARMY AS A WHOLE. 531 
 
 surrender asked Admiral Sampson to supply me with naval 
 convoy. 
 
 By 3 o'clock of that day, July 21, the ships of the flotilla 
 were heaving anchors, and presently thereafter were majesti- 
 cally plowing the waters of the deep in the direction of Puerto 
 Rico. So important did I consider the necessity of moving 
 the troops away from the yellow fever and malarial camps, 
 that I had given orders for them to move to the sea shore or 
 the mountains, and just before departure, a final telegram was 
 sent to the Secretary of War: 
 
 Headquarters of the Army, 
 On Board U. S. S. Yale, 
 
 GUANTANAMO BAY, July 21, 1 898. 
 
 Secretary of War, Washington, D. C. : 
 
 ******* 
 
 There is not a single regiment of regulars or volunteers 
 with General Shafter's command that is not infected with 
 yellow fever, from one case in the Eighth Ohio to thirty-six 
 in the Thirty-third Michigan. 
 
 After consulting with best medical authorities, it is my 
 opinion that the best mode of ridding the troops of the fever 
 will be as I have directed, namely, the troops to go up as high 
 into the mountains as possible, selecting fresh camps every 
 day. If this does not check the spread of the disease, the 
 only way of saving a large portion of the command will be to 
 put them on transports and ship them to the New England 
 coast to some point to be designated by the Surgeon-General. 
 
 Miles, Major-General Commanding. 
 
 We were moving with an effective force of 3,314 men 
 against an enemy over 17,000 strong. The convoy under 
 Captain Higginson consisted of the battleship Massachusetts 
 and two smaller vessels. The Yale and Columbia, though 
 armed ships, were loaded with troops and therefore available 
 only as transports. The long and anxiously looked for tugs, 
 launches and lighters, that had been ordered from Santiago, 
 Washington and Tampa, were expected at any moment to 
 heave in sight, and the hope of meeting them was not given 
 up until the entire Windward Passage had been traversed. 
 Then, beyond the possibility of further cable communication 
 
532 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 with the government, I signaled to the commander of the con- 
 voy to halt long enough to send hira by a boat lowered for 
 the purpose the following : 
 
 On Board U. S. S. Yale, 
 En Route to Puerto Rico, July 22, 1898. 
 
 Sir: Our objective point has been Pt. Fajardo or Cape San 
 Juan, but so much time has occurred since the movement was 
 decided in that direction and such publicity has been given 
 the enterprise, that the enemy has undoubtedly become ap- 
 prised of our purpose. While it is advisable to make a dem- 
 onstration near the harbor of San Juan near Pt. Fajardo or 
 Pt. Figueroa, I am not decided as to the advisability of land- 
 ing at either of these places, as we may find them well occupied 
 by strong Spanish forces. If we draw them to that vicinity, 
 we might find it judicious to quickly move to Puerto Guanica, 
 where there is deep water near the shore — 4I fathoms — and 
 good facilities for landing. We can move from Cape San Juan 
 to that point in twelve hours (one night), and it would be impos- 
 sible for the Spanish to concentrate their forces there before 
 we will be reinforced. I am also informed that there are a 
 large number of strong lighters in the harbors at Ponce and 
 Guanica, as well as several sailing vessels, which would be 
 useful. As it is always advisable not to do what your enemy 
 expects you to do, I think it advisable, after going around the 
 northeast corner of Puerto Rico, to go immediately to Guanica 
 and land this force and move on Ponce, which is the largest 
 city in Puerto Rico. After or before this is accomplished, we 
 will receive large reinforcements, which will enable us to move 
 in any direction or occupy any portion of the island of Puerto 
 Rico. 
 
 Your strong vessels can cover our landing, and capture any 
 vessels in the harbor of Ponce, Guanica, or the ports on the 
 southern coast ; one light vessel can remain at Cape San 
 Juan to notify transports that will arrive where we have 
 landed and another could scout off the northwest corner of 
 Puerto Rico to intercept others and direct them where to find 
 us. 
 
 Very respectfully, 
 
 Nelson A. Miles, 
 Major-General, Conwianding United States Army^ 
 
 Capt. Francis J. Higginson, 
 
 Counna}idi)ig United States Naval Convoy. 
 
 Two days later, in pursuance of understanding with Captain 
 
THE WORK OF THE ARMY AS A WHOLE. 533 
 
 Higginson, arrived at by means of signaling, another halt was 
 made, while Captain Whitney of my staff visited Captain 
 Higginson, with his maps and reports, under instructions to 
 give him all the information it was possible to give as to the 
 result of his late secret explorations on the island of Puerto 
 Rico. 
 
 The design of this chapter will not admit of any detailed 
 reference to an impressive burial at sea, and other incidents 
 of the voyage, nor to the subsequent campaign, the history 
 thereof being already given by another participant and in an- 
 other chapter. Enough that the voyage ended off Guanica, 
 at daylight, July 25, the harbor being entered without seri- 
 ous opposition, and the landing speedily effected, the resist- 
 ance overcome after a short skirmish, and the flag of the 
 United States at once hoisted over Puerto Rican soil. The 
 day following, the town of Yauco was occupied after a spirited 
 engagement by troops under General Garretson, giving us 
 possession of the railroad and highway to the city of Ponce. 
 
 The day following the spirited engagements at Guanica 
 and Yauco, the villagers who had fled during the affairs came 
 back. Among the number who crowded about our horses, as 
 we sat watching the movements of the troops and the return of 
 the excited villagers, was a tall, slender, black-eyed Ethiopian, 
 whom I observed coming close up to my horse. Looking me 
 full in the face with the most intense earnestness, he secured 
 my attention. I spoke to him kindly and asked him what he 
 wanted. He said in good English : " Is this General Miles ? " 
 and he repeated the question after being answered in the 
 affirmative. I reassured him of the fact ; when he took a 
 letter which had been sewed inside of his shirt, written on 
 fine French notepaper, in the Spanish language, and handed 
 it to me, the translation of which is as follows : 
 
 To the Chief of Operations of the Invading Army of the 
 
 American Union. 
 Citizen : 
 
 Not knowing exactly how I ought to guide myself in 
 entering into a direct communication with your camp, I 
 direct this to the Chief of Operations to express to you my 
 duty in these historical moments and that trust in the power 
 
534 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 of a strong conscience and in the valor of arms as they per- 
 tain to the great issues of liberty and of patriotism in this 
 island. An absolute military censorship shuts out from the 
 city the means of obtaining the news, and I wish that you 
 and your companions may know the true feeling of our 
 municipality. Here we wait with impatience American oc- 
 cupation that comes to break the chain that has been forged 
 constantly during four centuries of infamous spoliation, of 
 torpid despotism and shameful moral slavery. When the 
 rudders of the American ships entered the waters of the coast 
 of Guanica to bear to this country political revolution, great 
 confidence was born again, again was awakened the ideal of 
 sleeping patriotism in our consciences and the lullaby of per- 
 fidious promises which have never been fulfilled. An entire 
 city, with the exception of those who live under the shadow 
 of pretense and official immunity, is prepared to solemnize 
 the glorious triumph of civilization and offers its blood as a 
 holocaust to such a grand proposition. Let this message bear 
 to you notice that our municipal conscience does not sleep and 
 wait. Here you can count on the great masses who are pre- 
 pared to second your gigantic strength. All the districts of 
 this jurisdiction are prepared for combat. The districts of 
 the city are also prepared. Men of intrepid heart surround 
 me ready for the struggle. The only thing that prevents the 
 manifestation of unity is an absolute need of the elements of 
 war. On the other hand, we have already driven from the 
 town our eternal enemies to the rights of Puerto Ricans. I 
 do not wish to impose upon my ideas of patriotism the grave 
 responsibility of directing my men upon the enemy without 
 capacity to maintain the struggle. In this moment of activity 
 may this communication serve to dispose you to embrace an 
 opportunity to utilize the services that I offer. Before clos- 
 ing, I wish to warn you that at the entrance to this city, on 
 the roads of Adjuntas and Canas, the Spanish government is 
 actively engaged in constructing several trenches to fool- 
 ishly obstruct the march of the army of liberty, and they are 
 concealing themselves in the small neighboring hills and 
 difficult passes in the canyons in order to carry out this resist- 
 ance. With many wishes for your health and much appre- 
 ciation of the great triumph of America, 
 
 I am, your humble servant, 
 
 Felix Mato Bernier. 
 July 26, 1898. (ponce, p. r.) 
 
 The above illustrates the sentiment of the intelligent por- 
 tion of the people of Puerto Rico, as well as the courage that 
 
THE WORK OF THE ARMY AS A WHOLE. 535 
 
 would prompt a man to write a letter of that kind and send 
 it through the Spanish lines, thereby running the risk of death, 
 if not torture, in case of discovery. In fact, the atrocities 
 that were perpetrated upon men holding such sentiments 
 within our own time would better become the people of the 
 dark ages than of the 19th century under a so-called civilized 
 government. There are men who exhibit hands the joints of 
 which have been crushed by the blows of a hammer, or feet 
 the soles of which have been shaved off and they afterwards 
 compelled to walk on the gravel road between Ponce and San 
 Juan. They can show other scars and mutilations by which 
 they have been tortured, when their only offence was love of 
 liberty and hope of freedom. People possessing such senti- 
 ments as are indicated in the above letter, and the courage to 
 write them under such circumstances, are richly deserving of 
 their liberty. To such a people it was my pleasure to issue 
 the following proclamation : 
 
 Headquarters of the Army of the United States, 
 
 Ponce, Puerto Rico, July 28, 1898. 
 To the Inhabitants of Puerto Rico : 
 
 In the prosecution of the^war against the Kingdom of Spain 
 by the people of the United States in the cause of Liberty, 
 Justice and Humanity, its military forces have come to occupy 
 the Island of Puerto Rico. They come bearing the banner of 
 Freedom, inspired by a noble purpose to seek the enemies of 
 our country and yours, and to destroy or capture all who are 
 in armed resistance. They bring you the fostering arm 
 of a nation of free people, whose greatest power is in its Jus- 
 tice and Humanity to all those living within its fold. Hence 
 the first effect of this occupation will be the immediate release 
 from your former political relations, and it is hoped a cheer- 
 ful acceptance of the government of the United States. 
 
 The chief object of the American military forces will be to 
 overthrow the armed authority of Spain and to give to the 
 people of your beautiful island the largest measure of liberty 
 consistent with this military occupation. We have not come 
 to make war upon the people of a country that for centuries 
 has been oppressed, but, on the contrary, to bring protection, 
 not only to yourselves but to your property, to promote your 
 prosperity and bestow upon you the immunities and blessings 
 of the liberal institutions of our o-ovcrnment. It is not our 
 
536 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 purpose to interfere with any existing laws and customs that 
 are wholesome and beneficial to your people so long as they 
 conform to the rules of military administration of order and 
 justice. 
 
 This is not a war of devastation, but one to give to all 
 within the control of its military and naval forces the advan- 
 tages and blessings of enlightened civilization. 
 
 Nelson A. Miles, 
 Major-General, Commanding United States Army. 
 
 This was seed sown on good ground, and a bountiful and 
 speedy harvest of patriotic sentiment was the result. The 
 sentiment spread like magic over the island. It caused a 
 large number of volunteers immediately to desert the cause 
 and'colors of Spain. They returned to their homes, surrendered 
 their arms and equipments, and took the oath of allegiance to 
 the United States; and this had a discouraging and demoral- 
 izing effect upon the regular troops of the Spanish govern- 
 ment, which greatly aided us in the conquest of the island. 
 
 On the 27th of July reinforcements arrived under Major- 
 General Wilson, and that night the expedition started from the 
 Bay of Guanica, timed to reach that of Ponce at daylight. The 
 combined movement resulted as planned, to the letter, and the 
 American flag waved over the public buildings of the port 
 and the city founded by Ponce de Leon. Still further reinforce- 
 ments arrived under Brigadier-General Schwan on the last 
 day of July. The movements of the different columns and 
 short engagements have been described by another, and the 
 results were most gratifying. On the 13th of August I re- 
 ceived notification from the War Department that the Presi- 
 dent had signed preliminaries of peace, and instructed a 
 cessation of hostilities. With the utmost dispatch of wire 
 and horsemanship, I called a halt on the four columns press- 
 ing the island with the prospect that within a few days the 
 entire island would have been in our possession, including the 
 capital city of San Juan. Four of these columns had been 
 in actual contact with the enemy, and two were in the 
 very act of opening battle, when the messages of instruction 
 arrived on foaming horses, putting an end to further blood- 
 shed. The balance of our main force had already passed 
 
THE WORK OF THE ARMY AS A WHOLE. 537 
 
 around the mountains or over the mountain trails to the north 
 side of the island in spite of every and all opposition of the 
 Spaniards, and our forces were then in such a position as to 
 make that of the Spanish forces, outside of the garrison at San 
 Juan, utterly untenable. The Spaniards had been defeated, 
 or captured, in six different engagements, and driven from 
 every position they had taken up to that time. The number 
 of troops then in Puerto Rico on our side did not exceed 
 14,365, only 6,342 of whom had actually engaged the enemy ; 
 and I had advised the Secretary of War that no more of the 
 large force which had been designed by the Department for 
 this expedition need be sent. 
 
 When the protocol was signed at 4:23 P. M., the bombard- 
 ment of Manzanillo had been in progress for an hour, and it 
 continued until the next morning, when the news of the cessa- 
 tion of hostilities arrived and put an end to the bombardment. 
 Captain Goodrich commanded the attacking squadron, which 
 consisted of \.\\q Ne^vark, Hist, Sinvancc, Osceola 2iX\di Alvarado. 
 On that same morning hostilities were renewed at Manila, 
 where the war had so gloriously opened on the 1st of May. 
 The attack upon that city by Dewey and Merritt began as 
 previously planned, as it was impossible to get news of the 
 signing of preliminaries of peace much within a week. A 
 division of the naval squadron shelled the forts on the 
 south side of the city, while the trenches were occupied by 
 the land forces under command of General Merritt. The 
 squadron had no casualties; no vessels were injured, and the 
 losses among our troops were only five men killed. General 
 Merritt's men followed the retreating Spaniards into the 
 walled city, where their commander agreed upon terms of 
 capitulation. It will thus be seen that on the morning of 
 August 13 actual fighting was in progress between the 
 Spanish and American armed forces in Puerto Rico and in the 
 Philippines — an extreme distance of 175 degrees of longitude, 
 about 12,500 miles. At the same time preparations were in 
 an advanced stage of progress for a demonstration upon the 
 Spanish coasts and the islands of Spain, in the Mediterra- 
 nean as well as in the Atlantic, and a state of hostilities would 
 undoubtedly have been in operation there within a very few 
 
53S THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 weeks at the furthest had not the preliminary terms of peace 
 been agreed upon. 
 
 It is plain now to all, as it was to a few at the beginning, 
 that grand strategy required the seizure of Puerto Rico immedi- 
 ately upon the commencement of hostilities. That island, 
 having enjoyed a long period of peace, was then totally un- 
 prepared to resist any considerable attacking force, either na- 
 val or military. That island in our possession, reinforce- 
 ments of Cuba, naval or military, would have been out of the 
 question ; that is to say, any attempt to reinforce or re-provi- 
 sion the Spanish forces in Cuba would have resulted in failure. 
 
 What are the lessons that have been taught by our recent 
 war with one of the ancient powers? The history of the 
 downfall of Spain should be a warning to the enlightened na- 
 tions of the earth that they cannot successfully rule a people 
 by tyranny and cruelty ; that past achievements, military and 
 naval glory and renown, count as naught in a crisis where in- 
 telligence, skill, enterprise and thorough knowledge of modern 
 appliances of war determine the fate of a nation. The theory 
 that we can remain indifferent to the progress that is being 
 made every day in the art of war, that we can rely upon the 
 enthusiasm of the hour, the uprising of the patriotic yeo- 
 manry, and that our people will rush to arms and in a short 
 time achieve victories, is a dangerous illusion. When our 
 forefathers were accustomed to keep their hunting rifles on the 
 antlers, ready to kill wild beasts or encounter a savage foe 
 skilled in the land-crafts and the essential knowledge of the 
 woodman and the hunter, they constituted an irregular force 
 that was irresistible and unconquerable in the sparsely popu- 
 lated timber country of one hundred years ago. So in our 
 great war, when the national capital was in danger, it is our 
 pride and glory to point to the fact that tens of thousands of 
 men suddenly left their farms and counting-houses, their work- 
 shops and colleges, and rushed to the defence of the national 
 capital. Yet in the Ball's Bluffs, the Bull Runs and the Shi- 
 lohs, it was the result of one irregular, sparsely equipped, un- 
 drilled and undisciplined force against another in the same 
 condition, and with the same amount of spirit, enterprise 
 
THE WORK OF THE ARMY AS A WHOLE. 539 
 
 and American courage. The success gained by a mass of such 
 physical forces against another of the same character is no 
 proof that such a force could stand against a well-discipHned, 
 well-drilled military body, armed with the destructive appli- 
 ances of modern warfare. 
 
 The two great wars that preceded our recent one de- 
 monstrated this fact, that the pride and glory of the greatest 
 military nation of modern times, shouting "On to Berlin!" 
 soon met its Sedan, and witnessed the triumphant occupation 
 of the city of Paris by the more skilled and better equipped 
 German forces. The vast hordes of brave Chinese were no 
 match for the skillful Japanese, though they outnumbered the 
 latter twelve to one. While we, in the last war, raised the great 
 force of 278,000 men, it is perfectly well known to all military 
 men that some of the appliances were obsolete and insufificient, 
 either for effective service or to protect the lives and health 
 of the heroic men who had volunteered in their country's ser- 
 vice. From the days of Valley Forge to the present, the 
 suffering and death of large numbers of men can be traced 
 directly to the want of thorough and proper system, of effi- 
 cient organization, of rigid responsibility and accountability 
 on the part of all officials, added to the fact that the conduct 
 of military affairs has not been in the hands of military men 
 whose experience and record for efficiency and integrity has 
 been demonstrated by years of service. If thousands of men 
 are mustered into service when there is not sufficient clothing, 
 camp equipage and garrison equipage, tentage, transportation 
 and proper supplies of quartermaster's, commissary, and 
 medical stores to furnish them the requirements and necessi- 
 ties of life, they cannot be considered an efficient army or 
 army corps. They are simply so many men employed and 
 kept or bound to service by the sanctity of their oath of en- 
 listment. Inferior, insufficient and conspicuous white canvas, 
 inferior clothing material, inferior and unsuitable food, inferior 
 artillery, short-range, single-breechloading rifles, black powder, 
 are things obsolete, and should be classed with the spear, the 
 bow and arrow, the pike, the flint-lock, the smooth-bore, and 
 other implements of the past. This is the age of progress in 
 the art of war, as well as in all the other arts and sciences. It 
 
540 THE AMERICAN-SPANISH WAR. 
 
 is the day of the long range, low trajectory, wonderfully 
 penetrating, smokeless powder rifle. It is the age of the 
 rapid-fire machine gun, capable of throwing from 400 to 700 
 projectiles per minute ; the enormous 100-ton gun, capable 
 of throwing a projectile weighing one ton 14 miles ; the day 
 of dynamite guns, throwing from 10 to 500 pounds of high 
 explosives ; the day of the range finder and plotting-board ; 
 of well-directed and well-controlled military balloons; of the 
 electric telegraph and telephone ; steam power — all utilized in 
 modern appliances, the most destructive in warfare. 
 
 The achievements of our Army in 100 days, notwithstand- 
 ing all its defects and embarrassments, have added a chapter 
 of glory to the military history of the United States. Her 
 sons have exhibited the grandest patriotism, heroism, fortitude 
 and sacrifice. The campaign was offensive from start to 
 finish. There was scarcely a check. There was not a single 
 reverse or disaster or retreat. Not an inch of ground was lost, \ 
 not a soldier captured. It Avas one series of successes, not- \ 
 withstanding the trials and difificulties and obstacles to be 
 surmounted. Nearly twelve millions of people have been / 
 liberated from the cruel despotism of a monarchical govern- 1 
 ment and admitted to the sunlight of freedom, where justice 
 and independence and liberty are assured. The territory \ 
 acquired is of enormous area, although portions of it may yet 
 be given to the native occupants. Yet the island of Puerto 
 Rico alone, which will remain as part of the territory of the 
 United States, is valued at more millions than the entire cost 
 of the war with Spain, and we may well greet our noble sailors 
 and soldiers with the cheerful welcome, " Hail and well done." 
 
 / 
 
\ tUXiAxl^^ 
 
ADDENDUM. 
 
 CONDITION OF CUBA UNDER SPANISH MISRULE. 
 
 SPEECH OF 
 
 Hon. REDFIELD PROCTOR 
 
 IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES MARCH I7, 1898. 
 
 Mr. President, more importance seems to be attached by 
 others to my recent visit to Cuba than 1 have given it, and it has 
 been suggested that I make a public statement of what I saw and 
 how the situation impressed me. This I do on account of the 
 public interest in all that concerns Cuba, and to correct some 
 inaccuracies that have, not unnaturally, appeared in reported 
 interviews with me. 
 
 My trip was entirely unofficial and of my own motion, not 
 suggested by any one. The only mention I made of it to the 
 President was to say to him that I contemplated such a trip and 
 to ask him if there was any objection to it ; to which he replied 
 that he could see none. No one but myself, therefore, is responsi- 
 ble for anything in this statement. Judge Day gave me a brief 
 note of introduction to General Lee, and I had letters of intro- 
 duction from business friends at the North to bankers and other 
 business men at Habana, and they in turn gave me letters to their 
 correspondents in other cities. These letters to business men 
 were very useful, as one of the principal purposes of my visit was 
 to ascertain the views of practical men of affairs upon the situa- 
 tion. 
 
 Of General Lee I need say little. His valuable services to 
 his country in his trying position are too well known to all his 
 countrymen to require mention. Besides his ability, high charac- 
 ter and courage, he possesses the important requisites of unfail- 
 ing tact and courtesy, and, withal, his military education and 
 training and his soldierly qualities are invaluable adjuncts in the 
 equipment of our representative in a country so completely under 
 military rules as is Cuba. General Lee kindly invited us to sit at 
 
542 ADDENDUM. 
 
 his table at the hotel during our stay in Habana, and this oppor- 
 tunity for frequent informal talks with him was of great help to 
 me. 
 
 In addition to the information he voluntarily gave me, it fur- 
 nished a convenient opportunity to ask him the many questions 
 that suggested themselves in explanation of things seen and heard 
 on our trips through the country. I also met and spent con- 
 siderable time with Consul Brice at Matanzas, and with Cap- 
 tain Barker, a stanch ex-Confederate soldier, the consul at Sagua 
 la Grande. None of our representatives whom I met in Cuba are 
 of my political faith, but there is a broader faith, not bounded by 
 party lines. They are all three true Americans, and have done 
 excellent service. 
 
 THE MAINE, 
 
 It has been stated that I said there was no doubt the Maine 
 was blown up from the outside. This is a mistake. I may have 
 said that such was the general impression among Americans in 
 Habana. In fact, I have no opinion about it myself, and care- 
 fully avoided forming one. I gave no attention to these outside 
 surmises. I met the members of the court on their boat, but 
 would as soon approach our Supreme Court in regard to a pend- 
 ing cause as that board. They are as competent and trustworthy 
 within the lines of their duty as any court in the land, and their 
 report, when made, will carry conviction to all the people that 
 the exact truth has been stated just as far as it is possible to 
 ascertain it. Until then surmise and conjecture are idle and 
 unprofitable. Let us calmly wait for the report. 
 
 SECTIONS VISITED. 
 
 There are six provinces in Cuba, each, with the exception of 
 Matanzas, extending the whole width of the island, and having 
 about an equal sea front on the north and south borders. Matan- 
 zas touches the Caribbean Sea only at its southwest corner, 
 being separated from it elsewhere by a narrow penmsula of Santa 
 Clara Province. The provinces are named, beginning at the west, 
 Pinar del Rio, Habana, Matanzas, Santa Clara, Puerto Principe, 
 and Santiago de Cuba. My observations were confined to the 
 four western provinces, which constitute about one-half of the 
 island. The two eastern ones are practically in the hands of the 
 insurgents, except the few fortified towns. These two large 
 provinces are spoken of to-day as " Cuba Libre," 
 
ADDENDUM. 543 
 
 Habana, the great city and capital of the island, is, in the eyes 
 of the Spaniards and many Cubans, all Cuba, as much as Paris is 
 France. But having visited it in more peaceful times and seen 
 its sights, the tomb of Columbus, the forts — Cabana and Morro 
 Castle, etc. — I did not care to repeat this, preferring trips in the 
 country. Everything seems to go on much as usual in Habana. 
 Quiet prevails, and except for the frequent squads of soldiers 
 marching to guard and police duty and their abounding presence 
 in all public places, one sees few signs of war. 
 
 Outside Habana all is changed. It is not peace nor is it war. 
 It is desolation and distress, misery and starvation. Every town 
 and village is surrounded by a " trocha " (trench), a sort of rifle 
 pit, but constructed on a plan new to me, the dirt being thrown 
 up on the inside and a barbed-wire fence on the outer side of the 
 trench. These trochas have at every corner and at frequent in- 
 tervals along the sides what are there called forts, but which are 
 really small blockhouses, many of them more like large sentry 
 boxes, loopholed for musketry, and with a guard of from two to 
 ten soldiers in each. 
 
 The purpose of these trochas is to keep the reconcentrados in 
 as well as to keep the insurgents out. From all the surrounding 
 country the people have been driven in to these fortified towns 
 and held there to subsist as they can. They are virtually prison 
 yards, and not unlike one in general appearance, except that the 
 walls are not so high and strong ; but they suffice, where every 
 point is in range of a soldier's rifle, to keep in the poor reconcen- 
 trado women and children. 
 
 Every railroad station is within one of these trochas and has 
 an armed guard. Every train has an armored freight car, loop- 
 holed for musketry and filled with soldiers, and with, as I ob- 
 served usually, and was informed is always the case, a pilot 
 engine a mile or so in advance. There are frequent blockhouses 
 inclosed by a trocha and with a guard along the railroad track. 
 With this exception there is no human life or habitation between 
 these fortified towns and villages, and throughout the whole of 
 the four western provinces, except to a very limited extent among 
 the hills where the Spaniards have not been able to go and drive 
 the people to the towns and burn their dwellings. I saw no 
 house or hut in the 400 miles of railroad rides from Pinar del Rio 
 Province in the west across the full width of Habana and Matan- 
 zas provinces, and to Sagua La Grande on the north shore, and to 
 
544 ADDENDUM. 
 
 Cienfuegos on the south shore of Santa Clara, except within the 
 Spanish trochas. 
 
 There are no domestic animals or crops on the rich fields and 
 pastures except such as are under guard in the immediate vicinity 
 of the towns. In other words, the Spaniards hold in these four 
 western provinces just what their army sits on. Every man, 
 woman and child, and every domestic animal, wherever their 
 columns have reached, is under guard and within their so-called 
 fortifications. To describe one place is to describe all. To 
 repeat, it is neither peace nor war. It is concentration and des- 
 olation. This is the " pacified " condition of the four western 
 provinces. 
 
 West of Habana is mainly the rich tobacco country ; east, so 
 far as I went, a sugar region. Nearly all the sugar mills are de- 
 stroyed between Habana and Sagua. Two or three were stand- 
 ing in the vicinity of Sagua, and in part running, surrounded, as 
 are the villages, by trochas and " forts " or palisades of the royal 
 palm, and fully guarded. Toward and near Cienfuegos there 
 were more mills running, but all with the same protection. It is 
 said that the owners of these mills near Cienfuegos have been 
 able to obtain special favors of the Spanish Government in the 
 way of a large force of soldiers, but that they also, as well as all 
 the railroads, pay taxes to the Cubans for immunity. I had no 
 means of verifying this. It is the common talk among those who 
 have better means of knowledge. 
 
 THE RECONCENTRADOS — THE COUNTRY PEOPLE. 
 
 All the country people in the four western provinces, about 
 400,000 in number, remaining outside the fortified towns when 
 Weyler's order was made were driven into these towns, and these 
 are the reconcentrados. They were the peasantry, many of them 
 farmers, some landowners, others renting lands and owning more 
 or less stock, others working on estates and cultivating small 
 patches ; and even a small patch in that fruitful clime will support 
 a family. 
 
 It is but fair to say that the normal condition of these people 
 was very different from what prevails in this country. Their 
 standard of comfort and prosperity was not high measured by 
 ours. But according to their standards and requirements their 
 conditions of life were satisfactory. 
 
 They lived mostly in cabins made of palms or in wooden 
 
ADDENDUM. 545 
 
 houses. Some of them had houses of stone, the blackened walls 
 of which are all that remain to show the country was ever in- 
 habited. 
 
 The first clause of Weyler's order reads as follows : 
 
 I ORDER AND COMMAND 
 
 " First. All the inhabitants of the country or outside of the line 
 of fortifications of the towns shall, within the period of eight days, 
 concentrate themselves in the towns occupied by the troops 
 Any individual who, after the expiration of this period, is found 
 in the uninhabited parts will be considered a rebel and tried as 
 such." 
 
 The other three sections forbid the transportation of provi- 
 sions from one town to another without permission of the military 
 authority, direct the owners of cattle to bring them into the 
 towns, prescribe that the eight days shall be counted from the 
 publication of the proclamation in the head town of the municipal 
 district, and state that if news is furnished of the enemy which 
 can be made use of, it will serve as a " recommendation." 
 
 Many, doubtless, did not learn of this order. Others failed to 
 grasp its terrible meaning. Its execution was left largely to the 
 guerrillas to drive in all that had not obeyed, and I was informed 
 that in many cases the torch was applied to their homes with no 
 notice, and the inmates fled with such clothing as they might have 
 on, their stock and other belongings being appropriated by the 
 guerrillas. When they reached the towns, they were allowed to 
 build huts of palm leaves in the suburbs and vacant places within 
 the trochas, and left to live, if they could. 
 
 Their huts are about lo by 15 feet in size, and for want of 
 space are usually crowded together very closely. They have no 
 floor but the ground, no furniture, and, after a year's wear, but 
 little clothing except such stray substitutes as they can extem- 
 porize ; and with large families, or more than one, in this little 
 space, the commonest sanitary provisions are impossible. Condi- 
 tions are unmentionable in this respect. Torn from their homes, 
 with foul earth, foul air, foul water, and foul food or none, what 
 wonder that one-half have died and that one-quarter of the living 
 are so diseased that they cannot be saved ? A form of dropsy 
 is a common disorder resulting from these conditions. Little 
 children are still walking about with arms and chests terribly 
 emaciated, eyes swollen, and abdomen bloated to three times the 
 natural size. The physicians say these cases are hopeless. 
 
546 ADDENDUM. 
 
 Deaths in the streets have not been uncommon, I was told 
 by one of our consuls that they have been found dead about the 
 markets in the morning, where they had crawled, hoping to get 
 some stray bits of food from the early hucksters, and that there 
 had been cases where they had dropped dead inside the market 
 surrounded by food. Before Weyler's order, these people were 
 independent and self-supporting. They are not beggars 'even 
 now. There are plenty of professional beggars in every town 
 among the regular residents, but these country people, the recon- 
 centrados, have not learned the art. Rarely is a hand held out to 
 you for alms when going among their huts, but the sight of them 
 makes an appeal stronger than words. 
 
 THE HOSPITALS. 
 
 Of these I need not speak. Others have described their con- 
 dition far better than I can. It is not within the narrow limits of 
 my vocabulary to portray it. I went to Cuba with a strong con- 
 viction that the picture had been overdrawn ; that a few cases of 
 starvation and suffering had inspired and stimulated the press 
 correspondents, and that they had given free play to a strong, 
 natural and highly cultivated imagination. 
 
 Before starting I received through the mail a leaflet published 
 by the Christian Herald, with cuts of some of the sick and starv- 
 ing reconcentrados, and took it with me, thinking these must be 
 rare specimens, got up to make the worst possible showing. I 
 saw plenty as bad and worse ; many that should not be photo- 
 graphed and shown. 
 
 I could not believe that out of a population of 1,600,000, two 
 hundred thousand had died v/ithin these Spanish forts, practically 
 prison walls, within a few months past from actual starvation and 
 diseases caused by insufficient and improper food. My inquiries 
 were entirely outside of sensational sources. They were made of 
 our medical officers, of our consuls, of city alcaldes (mayors), of 
 relief committees, of leading merchants and bankers, physicians 
 and lawyers. Several of my informants were Spanish born, but 
 every time the answer was that the case had not been overstated. 
 What I saw I cannot tell so that others can see it. It must be 
 seen with one's own eyes to be realized. 
 
 The Los Pasos Hospital, in Habana, has been recently de- 
 scribed by one of my colleagues, Senator Gallinger, and I can- 
 not say that his picture was overdrawn, for even his fertile pen 
 
ADDENDUM. 547 
 
 could not do that. But he visited it after Dr. Lesser, one of Miss 
 Barton's very able and efficient assistants, had renovated it and 
 put in cots. I saw it wlien 400 women and children were lying on 
 the floors in an indescribable state of emaciation and disease, 
 many with the scantiest covering of rags — and such rags ! — sick 
 children, naked as they came into the world ; and the conditions 
 in the other cities are even worse. 
 
 MISS BARTON AND HER WORK. 
 
 Miss Barton needs no indorsement from me. I had known 
 and esteemed her for many years, but had not half appreciated 
 her capability and devotion to her work. I specially looked into 
 her business methods, fearing that here would be the greatest dan- 
 ger of mistake, that there might be want of system and waste and 
 extravagance, but found she could teach me on these points. I 
 visited the warehouse where the supplies are received and dis- 
 tributed ; saw the methods of checking ; visited the hospitals 
 established or organized and supplied by her ; saw the food dis- 
 tributions in several cities and towns, and everything seems to me 
 to be conducted in the best manner possible. The ample, fine 
 warehouse in Habana, owned by a Cuban firm, is given, with a 
 gang of laborers free of charge to unload and reship supplies. 
 
 The Children's Hospital in Habana, a very large, fine private 
 residence, is hired at a cost of less than $100 per month, not a 
 fifth of what it would command in this city. It is under the ad- 
 mirable management of Mrs. Dr. Lesser, of New York, a German 
 lady and trained nurse. I saw the rapid improvement of the first 
 children taken there. All Miss Barton's assistants seem excel- 
 lently fitted for their duties. In short, I saw nothing to criticize, 
 but everything to commend. The American people may be 
 assured that their bounty will reach the sufferers with the least 
 possible cost and in the best manner in every respect. If our 
 people could see a small fraction of the need, they would pour 
 more "freely from their liberal stores" than ever before for any 
 cause. 
 
 When will the need for this help end ? Not until peace 
 comes and the reconcentrados can go back to the country, rebuild 
 their homes, reclaim their tillage plots, which quickly run up to 
 brush in that wonderful soil and clime, and until they can be free 
 from danger of molestation in so doing. Until then the American 
 people must in the main care for them. It is true that the 
 alcaldes, other local authorities, and the relief committees are now 
 
548 ADDENDUM. 
 
 trying to do something, and desire, 1 believe, to do the best they 
 can. But the problem is beyond their means and capacity, and 
 the work is one to which they are not accustomed. 
 
 General Blanco's order of November 13 last somewhat modi- 
 fies the Weyler order, but is of little or no practical benefit. Its 
 application is limited to farms " properly defended " and the owners 
 are obliged to build " centers of defense." Its execution is com- 
 pletely in the discretion of the local military authorities, and they 
 know the terrible military efficiency of Weyler's order in strip- 
 ping the country of all possible shelter, food or source of 
 information for an insurgent, and will be slow to surrender this 
 advantage. In fact, though the order was issued four months 
 ago, I saw no beneficent results from it worth mentioning. 
 
 I do not impugn General Blanco's motives, and believe him 
 to be an amiable gentleman, and that he would be glad to relieve 
 the condition of the reconcentrados if he could do so without loss 
 of any military advantage ; but he knows that all Cubans are in- 
 surgents at heart, and none now under military control will be al- 
 lowed to go out from under it. 
 
 I wish I might speak of the country — of its surpassing rich- 
 ness. I have never seen one to compare with it. On this point. I 
 agree with Columbus, that this is the " most rich and beautiful 
 that ever human eye beheld," and believe every one between his 
 time and mine must be of the same opinion. It is indeed a land — 
 
 "Where every prospect pleases 
 And only man is vile." 
 
 THE SPANIARD. 
 
 I had little time to study the race question, and have read 
 nothing on it, so can only give hasty impressions. It is said that 
 there are nearly 200,000 Spaniards in Cuba out of a total popula- 
 tion of 1,600,000. They live principally in the towns and cities. 
 The small shopkeepers in the towns and their clerks are mostly 
 Spaniards. Much of the larger business, too, and of the property 
 in the cities, and in a less degree in the country, is in their hands. 
 They have an eye to thrift, and as everything possible in the way 
 of trade and legalized monopolies, in which the country abounds, 
 is given to them by the Government, many of them acquire prop- 
 erty. I did not learn that the Spanish residents of the island had 
 contributed largely in blood or treasure to suppress the insur- 
 rection. 
 
ADDENDUM. 549 
 
 THE CUBAN. 
 
 There are, or were before the war, about 1,000,000 Cubans on 
 the island, 200,000 Spaniards (which means those born in Spain), 
 and less than half a million of negroes and mixed bloods. The 
 Cuban whites are of pure Spanish blood and, like the Spaniards, 
 dark in complexion, but oftener light or blond, so far as 1 noticed. 
 The percentage of colored to white has been steadily diminishing 
 for more than fifty years, and is not now over 25 per cent of the 
 total. In fact, the number of colored people has been actually 
 diminishing for nearly that time. The Cuban farmer and laborer 
 is by nature peaceable, kindly, gay, hospitable, light-hearted and 
 improvident. 
 
 There is a proverb among the Cubans that " Spanish bulls can 
 not be bred in Cuba " — that is, the Cubans, though they are of 
 Spanish blood, are less excitable and of a quieter temperament. 
 Many Cubans whom I met spoke in strong terms against the bull 
 fights ; that it was a brutal institution, introduced and mainly 
 patronized by the Spaniards. One thing that was new to me was 
 to learn the superiority of the well-to-do Cuban over the Spaniard 
 in the matter of education. Among those in good circumstances 
 there can be no doubt that the Cuban is far superior in this re- 
 spect. And the reason of it is easy to see. They have been 
 educated in England, France, or this country, while the Spaniard 
 has such education as his own country furnishes. 
 
 THE NEGRO. 
 
 The colored people seem to me by nature quite the equal 
 mentally and physically of the race in this country. Certainly 
 physically they are by far the larger and stronger race on the 
 island. There is little or no race prejudice, and this has doubt- 
 less been greatly to their advantage. Eighty-five years ago there 
 were one-half as many free negroes as slaves, and this proportion 
 slowly increased until emancipation. 
 
 THE MILITARY SITUATION. 
 
 It is said that there are about 60,000 Spanish soldiers now in 
 Cuba fit for duty out of the more than 200,000 that have been 
 sent there. The rest have died, have been sent home sick, or are 
 in hospitals, and some have been killed, notwithstanding the 
 official reports. They are conscripts, many of them very young, 
 and generally small men. One hundred and thirty pounds is a 
 fair estimate of their average weight. They are quiet and obe- 
 
55° ADDENDUM. 
 
 dient, and if well drilled and led, I believe would fight fairly well, 
 but not at all equal to- our men. Much more would depend on 
 the leadership than with us. The officer must lead well and be 
 one in whom they have confidence, and this applies to both sides 
 alike. As I saw no drills or regular formation, I inquired about 
 them of many persons, and was informed that they had never 
 seen a drill. I saw perhaps 10,000 Spanish troops, but not a piece 
 of artillery or a tent. They live in barracks in the towns, and are 
 seldom out for more than the day, returning to town at night. 
 
 They have little or no equipment for supply trains or for a 
 field campaign such as we have. Their cavalry horses are scrubby 
 little native ponies, weighing not over 800 pounds, tough and 
 hardy, but for the most part in wretched condition, reminding one 
 of the mount of Don Quixote. Some of the officers, however, 
 have good horses, mostly American, I think. On both sides cav- 
 alry is considered the favorite and the dangerous fighting arm. 
 The tactics of the Spanish, as described to me by eye-witnesses 
 and participants in some of their battles, is for the infantry, when 
 threatened by insurgent cavalry, to form a hollow square and fire 
 away ad libittcm^ and without ceasing until time to march back to 
 town. 
 
 It does not seem to have entered the minds of either side that 
 a good infantry force can take care of itself and repulse anywhere 
 an equal or greater number of cavalry, and there are everywhere 
 positions where cavalry would be at a disadvantage. 
 
 Having called on Governor and Captain-General Blanco and 
 received his courteous call in return, I could not with propriety 
 seek communication with insurgents. I had plenty of offers of 
 safe conduct to Gomez's camp, and was told that if I would write 
 him, an answer would be returned safely within ten days at most. 
 
 I saw several who had visited the insurgent camps, and was 
 sought out by an insurgent field officer, who gave me the best in- 
 formation received as to the insurgent force. His statements 
 were moderate, and I was credibly informed that he was entirely 
 reliable. He claimed that the Cubans had about 30,000 men now 
 in the field, some in every province, but mostly in the two eastern 
 provinces and eastern Santa Clara, and this statement was cor- 
 roborated from other good sources. They have a force all the 
 time in Habana Province itself, organized in four small brigades 
 and operating in small bands. Ruiz was taken, tried and shot 
 within about a mile and a half of the railroad and about fifteen 
 
ADDENDUM. S5i 
 
 miles out of Habana, on the road to Matanzas, a road more trav- 
 eled than any other, and which I went over four times. 
 
 Arranguren was killed about three miles the other side of the 
 road and about the same distance, fifteen or twenty miles, from 
 Habana, The Cubans are well armed, but very poorly supplied 
 with ammunition. They are not allowed to carry many car- 
 tridges ; sometimes not more than one or two. The infantry, es- 
 pecially, are poorly clad. Two small squads of prisoners which I 
 saw, however, one of half-a-dozen in the streets of Habana, and 
 one of three on the cars, wore better clothes than the average 
 Spanish soldier. 
 
 Each of these prisoners, though surrounded by guards, was 
 bound by the arm and wrists by cords, and they were all tied 
 together by a cord running along the line, a specimen of the 
 amenities of their warfare. About one-third of the Cuban army 
 are colored, mostly in the infantry, as the cavalry furnished their 
 own horses. 
 
 This field officer, an American from a Southern State, spoke 
 in the highest terms of the conduct of these colored soldiers ; that 
 they were as good fighters and had more endurance than the 
 whites ; could keep up with the cavalry on a long march and 
 come in fresh at night. 
 
 THE POLITICAL SITUATION. 
 
 The dividing lines between parties are the straightest and 
 clearest cut that have ever come to my knowledge. The division 
 in our war was by no means so clearly defined. It is Cuban 
 against Spaniard. It is practically the entire Cuban population on 
 one side and the Spanish army and Spanish citizens on the other. 
 
 I do not count the autonomists in this division, as they are so 
 far too inconsiderable in numbers to be worth counting. General 
 Blanco filled the civil offices with men who had been autonomists 
 and were still classed as such. But the march of events had sat- 
 isfied most of them that the chance for autonomy came too late. 
 
 It falls as talk of compromise would have fallen the last year 
 or two of our war. If it succeeds, it can only be by armed force, 
 by the triumph of the Spanish army, and the success of Spanish 
 arms would be easier by Weyler's policy and method, for in that 
 the Spanish army and people believe. 
 
 There is no doubt that General Blanco is acting in entire good 
 faith ; that he desires to give the Cubans a fair measure of auton- 
 omy, as Campos did at the close of the ten-year war. He has, of 
 
552 ADDENDUM. 
 
 course, a few personal followers, but the army and the Spanish 
 citizens do not want genuine autonomy, for that means govern- 
 ment by the Cuban people. And it is not strange that the Cubans 
 say it comes too late, 
 
 I have never had any communication, direct or indirect, with 
 the Cuban Junta in this country or any of its members, nor did I 
 have with any of the juntas which exist in every city and large 
 town of Cuba. None of the calls I made were upon parties of 
 whose sympathies I had the least knowledge, except that I knew 
 some of them were classed as autonomists. 
 
 Most of my informants were business men, who had taken no 
 sides and rarely expressed themselves. I had no means of guess- 
 ing in advance what their answers would be, and was in most 
 cases greatly surprised at their frankness. 
 
 I inquired in regard to autonomy of men of wealth and men as 
 prominent in business as any in the cities of Habana, Matanzas, 
 and Sagua, bankers, merchants, lawyers and autonomist officials, 
 some of them Spanish born but Cuban bred, one prominent Eng- 
 lishman, several of them known as autonomists, and several of 
 them telling me they were still believers in autonomy if practi- 
 cable, but without exception they replied that it was " too late " 
 for that. 
 
 Some favored a United States protectorate, some annexation, 
 some free Cuba ; not one has been counted favoring the insurrec- 
 tion at first. They were business men and wanted peace, but said 
 it was too late for peace under Spanish sovereignty. They char- 
 acterized Weyler's order in far stronger terms than I can, I could 
 not but conclude that you do not have to scratch an autonomist 
 very deep to find a Cuban. There is soon to be an election, but 
 every polling place must be inside a fortified town. Such elections 
 ought to be safe for the "ins." 
 
 I have endeavored to state in not intemperate mood what I saw 
 and heard, and to make no argument thereon, but leave every one 
 to draw his own conclusions. To me the strongest appeal is not 
 the barbarity practiced by Weyler nor the loss of the Maine, if 
 our worst fears should prove true, terrible as are both of these 
 incidents, but the spectacle of a million and a half of people, the 
 entire native population of Cuba, struggling for freedom and de- 
 liverence from the worst misgovernment of which I ever had 
 knowledge. But whether our action ought to be influenced by any 
 one or all these things, and, if so, liow far, is another question. 
 
ADDENDUM. 553 
 
 I am not in favor of annexation ; not because I would appre- 
 hend any particular trouble from it, but because it is not wise 
 policy to take in any people of foreign tongue and training, and 
 without any strong guiding American element. The fear that if 
 free the people of Cuba would be revolutionary is not so well 
 founded as has been supposed, and the conditions for good self- 
 government are far more favorable. The large number of edu- 
 cated and patriotic men, the great sacrifices they have endured, 
 the peaceable temperament of the people, whites and blacks, the 
 wonderful prosperity that would surely come with peace and 
 good home rule, the large influx of American and English immi- 
 gration and money, would all be strong factors for stable institu- 
 tions. 
 
 But it is not my purpose at this time, nor do I consider it my 
 province, to suggest any plan. I merely speak of the symptoms 
 as I saw them, but do not undertake to prescribe. Such remedial 
 steps as may be required may safely be left to an American Pres- 
 ident and the American people. 
 
APPENDIX. 
 
 Message of the President of the United States to Congress 
 
 ON THE 
 
 Relations of the United States to Spain 
 BY reason of 
 Warfare in the Island of Cuba. 
 
 To the Congress of the United States : 
 
 Obedient to that precept of the Constitution which commands 
 the President to give from time to time to the Congress informa- 
 tion of the state of the Union and to recommend to their consider- 
 ation such measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient, it 
 becomes my duty now to address your body with regard to the 
 grave crisis that has arisen in the relations of the United States 
 to Spain by reason of the warfare that for more than three years 
 has raged in the neighboring island of Cuba. 
 
 I do so because of the intimate connection of the Cuban ques- 
 tion with the state of our own Union and the grave relation the 
 course which it is now incumbent upon the nation to adopt must 
 needs bear to the traditional policy of our Government if it is to 
 accord with the precepts laid down by the founders of the Repub- 
 lic and religiously observed by succeeding Administrations to the 
 present day. 
 
 The present revolution is but the successor of other similar 
 insurrections which have occurred in Cuba against the dominion 
 of Spain, extending over a period of nearly half a century, each of 
 which, during its progress, has subjected the United States to 
 great effort and expense in enforcing its neutrality laws, caused 
 enormous losses to American trade and commerce, caused irrita- 
 tion, annoyance, and disturbance among our citizens, and, by the 
 exercise of cruel, barbarous, and uncivilized practices of warfare, 
 shocked the sensibilities and offended the humane sympathies of 
 our people. 
 
 Since the present revolution began, in February, 1895, this 
 country has seen the fertile domain at our threshold ravaged by 
 fire and sword in the course of a struggle unequaled in the history 
 of the island and rarely paralleled as to the numbers of the com- 
 
556 APPENDIX. 
 
 batants and the bitterness of the contest by any revolution of 
 modern times where a dependent people striving to be free have 
 been opposed by the power of the sovereign state. 
 
 Our people have beheld a once prosperous community reduced 
 to comparative want, its lucrative commerce virtually paralyzed, 
 its exceptional productiveness diminished, its fields laid waste, its 
 mills in ruins and its people perishing by tens of thousands from 
 hunger and destitution. We have found ourselves constrained, in 
 the observance of that strict neutrality which our laws enjoin, 
 and which the law of nations commands, to police our own waters 
 and watch our own seaports in prevention of any unlawful act in 
 aid of the Cubans. 
 
 Our trade has suffered ; the capital invested by our citizens in 
 Cuba has been largely lost, and the temper and forbearance of our 
 people have been so sorely tried as to beget a perilous unrest 
 among our own citizens which has inevitably found its expression 
 from time to time in the National Legislature, so that issues 
 wholly external to our own body politic engross attention and 
 stand in the way of that close devotion to domestic advancement 
 that becomes a self-contained commonwealth whose primal maxim 
 has been the avoidance of all foreign entanglements. All this 
 must needs awaken, and has, indeed, aroused the utmost concern 
 on the part of this Government, as well during my predecessor's 
 term as in my own. 
 
 In April, 1896, the evils from which our country suffered through 
 the Cuban war became so onerous that my predecessor made an 
 effort to bring about a peace through the mediation of this 
 Government in any way that might tend to an honorable adjust- 
 ment of the contest between Spain and her revolted colony, on 
 the basis of some effective scheme of self-government for Cuba 
 under the flag and sovereignty of Spain. It failed through the 
 refusal of the Spanish Government then in power to consider any 
 form of mediation or, indeed, any plan of settlement which did 
 not begin with the actual submission of the insurgents to the 
 mother country, and then only on such terms as Spain herself 
 might see fit to grant. The war continued unabated. The resist- 
 ance of the insurgents was in no wise diminished. 
 
 The efforts of Spain were increased, both by the dispatch of 
 fresh levies to Cuba and by the addition to the horrors of the 
 strife of a new and inhuman phase happily unprecedented in the 
 modern history of civilized Christian peoples. The policy of 
 
APPENDIX. 557 
 
 devastation and concentration, inaugurated by the Captain-Gen- 
 eral's bando of October 21, 1896, in the Province of Pinar del 
 Rio was thence extended to embrace all of the island to which 
 the power of the Spanish arms was able to reach by occupation or 
 by military operations. The peasantry, including all dwelling in 
 the open agricultural interior, were driven into the garrison 
 towns or isolated places held by the troops. 
 
 The raising and movement of provisions of all kinds were in- 
 terdicted. The fields were laid waste, dwellings unroofed and 
 fired, mills destroyed, and, in short, everything that could deso- 
 late the land and render it unfit for human habitation or support 
 was commanded by one or the other of the contending parties and 
 executed by all the powers at their disposal. 
 
 By the time the present administration took office a year ago, 
 reconcentration — so called — had been made effective over the 
 better part of the four central and western provinces, Santa 
 Clara, Matanzas, Havana and Pinar del Rio. 
 
 The agricultural population to the estimated number of 300,000 
 or more was herded within the towns and their immediate vicin- 
 age, deprived of the means of support, rendered destitute of 
 shelter, left poorly clad and exposed to the most unsanitary con- 
 ditions. As the scarcity of food increased with the devastation 
 of the depopulated areas of production, destitution and want 
 became misery and starvation. Month by month the death rate 
 increased in an alarming ratio. By March, 1897, according to 
 conservative estimates from official Spanish sources, the mortal- 
 ity among the reconcentrados, from starvation and the diseases 
 thereto incident, exceeded 50 per centum of their total number. 
 
 No practical relief was accorded to the destitute. The over- 
 burdened towns, already suffering from the general dearth, could 
 give no aid. So-called "zones of cultivation " established within 
 the immediate areas of effective military control about the cities 
 and fortified camps proved illusory as a remedy for the suffering. 
 The unfortunates, being for the most part women and children, 
 with aged and helpless men, enfeebled by disease and hunger, 
 could not have tilled the soil without tools, seed or shelter for 
 their own support or for the supply of the cities. Reconcentra- 
 tion, adopted avowedly as a war measure in order to cut off the 
 resources of the insurgents, worked its predestined result. As 
 I said in my message of last December, it was not civilized war- 
 fare ; it was extermination. The only peace it could beget was 
 that of the wilderness and the grave. 
 
5S8 APPENDIX. 
 
 Meanwhile the military situation in the island had undergone a 
 noticeable change. The extraordinary activity that characterized 
 the second year of the war, when the insurgents invaded even the 
 hitherto unharmed fields of Pinar del Rio and carried havoc and 
 destruction up to the walls of the city of Havana itself, had re- 
 lapsed into a dogged struggle in the central and eastern provinces. 
 The Spanish arms regained a measure of control in Pinar del Rio 
 and parts of Havana, but, under the existing conditions of the 
 rural country, without immediate improvement of their produc- 
 tive situation. Even thus partially restricted, the revolutionists 
 held their own, and their conquest and submission, put forward 
 by Spain as the essential and sole basis of peace, seemed as far 
 distant as at the outset. 
 
 In this state of affairs my Administration found itself con- 
 fronted with the grave problem of its duty. My message of last 
 December reviewed the situation and narrated the steps taken 
 with a view to relieving its acuteness and opening the way to 
 some form of honorable settlement. The assassination of the 
 prime minister, Canovas, led to a change of government in Spain. 
 The former administration, pledged to subjugation without con- 
 cession, gave place to that of a more liberal party, committed 
 long in advance to a policy of reform involving the wider princi- 
 ple of home rule for Cuba and Puerto Rico. 
 
 The overtures of this Government, made through its new envoy. 
 General Woodford, and looking to an immediate and effective 
 amelioration of the condition of the island, although not accepted 
 to the extent of admitted mediation in any shape, were met by 
 assurances that home rule, in an advanced phase, would be forth- 
 with offered to Cuba, without waiting for the war to end, and that 
 more humane methods should thenceforth prevail in the conduct 
 of hostilities. Coincidentally with these declarations, the new 
 Government of Spain continued and completed the policy already 
 begun by its predecessor, of testifying friendly regard for this 
 nation by releasing American citizens held under one charge or 
 another connected with the insurrection, so that, by the end of 
 November, not a single person entitled in any way to our national 
 protection, remained in a Spanish prison. 
 
 While these negotiations were in progress the increasing desti- 
 tution of the unfortunate reconcentrados and the alarming mortal- 
 ity among them claimed earnest attention. The success which 
 had attended the limited measure of relief extended to the 
 
APPENDIX. 559 
 
 suffering American citizens among them by the judicious expendi- 
 ture through the consular agencies of the money appropriated 
 expressly for their succor by the joint resolution approved May 
 24, 1897, prompted the humane extension of a similar scheme of 
 aid to the great body of sufferers. A suggestion to this end was 
 acquiesced in by the Spanish authorities. On the 24th of Decem- 
 ber last, I caused to be issued an appeal to the American people, 
 inviting contributions in money or in kind for the succor of the 
 starving sufferers in Cuba, following this on the 8th of January 
 by a similar public announcement of the formation of a central 
 Cuban relief committee, with headquarters in New York City, 
 composed of three members representing the American National 
 Red Cross and the religious and business elements of the com- 
 munity. 
 
 The efforts of that committee have been untiring and have 
 accomplished much. Arrangements for free transportation to 
 Cuba have greatly aided the charitable work. The president of 
 the American Red Cross and representatives of other contributory 
 organizations have generously visited Cuba and co-operated with 
 the Consul-General and the local authorities to make effective dis- 
 tribution of the relief collected through the efforts of the central 
 committee. Nearly $200,000 in money and supplies has already 
 reached the sufferers and more is forthcoming. The supplies are 
 admitted duty free, and transportation to the interior has been 
 arranged, so that the relief, at first necessarily confined to 
 Havana and the larger cities, is now extended through most, if 
 not all of the towns where suffering exists. 
 
 Thousands of lives have already been saved. The necessity for 
 a change in the condition of the reconcentrados is recognized by 
 the Spanish Government. Within a few days past the orders of 
 General Weyler have been revoked ; the reconcentrados, it is 
 said, are to be permitted to return to their homes, and aided to 
 resume the self-supporting pursuits of peace. Public works have 
 been ordered to give them employment, and a sum of $600,000 
 has been appropriated for their relief. 
 
 The war in Cuba is of such a nature that short of subjugation 
 or extermination a final military victory for either side seems im- 
 practicable. The alternative lies in the physical exhaustion of 
 the one or the other party, or perhaps of both — a condition which 
 in effect ended the ten years war by the truce of Zanjon. The 
 prospect of such a protraction and conclusion of the present strife 
 
56o APPENDIX. 
 
 is a contingency hardly to be contemplated with equanimity by 
 the civilized world, and least of all by the United States, affected 
 and injured as we are, deeply and intimately, by its very existence. 
 
 Realizing this, it appeared to be my duty, in a spirit of true 
 friendliness, no less to Spain than to the Cubans who have so 
 much to lose by the prolongation of the struggle, to seek to bring 
 about an immediate termination of the war. To this end I sub- 
 mitted, on the 27th ultimo, as a result of much representation 
 and correspondence, through the United States minister at Mad- 
 rid, propositions to the Spanish Government looking to an armis- 
 tice until October i for the negotiation of peace with the good 
 offices of the President. 
 
 In addition, I asked the immediate revocation of the order of 
 reconcentration, so as to permit the people to return to their 
 farms and the needy to be relieved with provisions and supplies 
 from the United States, co-operating with the Spanish authorities, 
 so as to afford full relief. 
 
 The reply of the Spanish cabinet was received on the night of 
 the 31st ultimo. It offered, as the means to bring about peace in 
 Cuba, to confide the preparation thereof to the Insular Parliament, 
 inasmuch as the concurrence of that body would be necessary to 
 reach a final result, it being, however, understood that the powers 
 reserved by the constitution to the Central Government are not 
 lessened or diminished. As the Cuban Parliament does not meet 
 until the 4th of May next, the Spanish Government would not ob- 
 ject, for its part, to accept at once a suspension of hostilities if 
 asked for by the insurgents from the general-in-chief, to whom it 
 would pertain, in such case, to determine the duration and con- 
 ditions of the armistice. 
 
 The propositions submitted by General Woodford and the reply 
 of the Spanish Government were both in the form of brief memo- 
 randa, the texts of which are before me, and are substantially in 
 the language above given. The function of the Cuban Parliament 
 in the matter of " preparing " peace and the manner of its doing 
 so are not expressed in the Spanish memorandum ; but from Gen- 
 eral Woodford's explanatory reports of preliminary discussions 
 preceding the final conference it is understood that the Spanish 
 Government stands ready to give the Insular Congress full powers 
 to settle the terms of peace with the insurgents — whether by 
 direct negotiation or indirectly by means of legislation does not 
 appear. 
 
APPENDIX, 561 
 
 With this last overture in the direction of immediat© peace, and 
 its disappointing reception by Spain, the Executive is brought to 
 the end of his effort. 
 
 In my annual message of December last I said : 
 
 Of the untried measures there remain only : Recognition of the 
 insurgents as belligerents ; recognition of the independence of 
 Cuba ; neutral intervention to end the war by imposing a rational 
 compromise between the contestants, and intervention in favor of 
 one or the other party. I speak not of forcible annexation, for 
 that can not be thought of. That, by our code of morality, would 
 be criminal aggression. 
 
 Thereupon I reviewed these alternatives, in the light of Pres- 
 ident Grant's measured words, uttered in 1875, when after seven 
 years of sanguinary, destructive and cruel hostilities in Cuba he 
 reached the conclusion that the recognition of the independence 
 of Cuba was impracticable and indefensible ; and that the rec- 
 ognition of belligerence was not warranted by the facts according 
 to the tests of public law. I commented especially upon the lat- 
 ter aspect of the question, pointing out the inconveniences and 
 positive dangers of a recognition of belligerence which, while add- 
 ing to the already onerous burdens of neutrality within our own 
 jurisdiction, could not in any way extend our influence or effective 
 offices in the territory of hostilities. 
 
 Nothing has since occurred to change my view in this regard ; 
 and I recognize as fully now as then that the issuance of a proc- 
 lamation of neutrality, by which process the so-called recognition 
 of belligerents is published, could, of itself and unattended by 
 other action, accomplish nothing toward the one end for which 
 we labor — the instant pacification of Cuba and the cessation of 
 the misery that afflicts the island. 
 
 Turning to the question of recognizing at this time the inde- 
 pendence of the present insurgent government in Cuba, we find 
 safe precedents in our history from an early day. They are well 
 summed up in President Jackson's message to Congress, De- 
 cember 21, 1836, on the subject of the recognition of the inde- 
 pendence of Texas. He said : 
 
 In all the contests that have arisen out of the revolutions of 
 France, out of the disputes relating to the Crowns of Portugal and 
 Spain, out of the separation of the American possessions of both 
 from the European Governments, and out of the numerous and 
 constantly occurring struggles for dominion in Spanish America, 
 
562 APPENDIX. 
 
 so wisely consistent with our just principles has been the action 
 of our Government, that we have, under the most critical circum- 
 stances, avoided all censure, and encountered no other evil than 
 that produced by a transient estrangement of good will in those 
 against whom we have been by force of evidence compelled to 
 decide. 
 
 It has thus made known to the world that the uniform policy 
 and practice of the United States is to avoid all interference in 
 disputes which merely relate to the internal government of other 
 nations, and eventually to recognize the authority of the prevail- 
 ing party without reference to our particular interests and views 
 or to the merits of the original controversy. 
 
 * * * But on this, as on every other trying occasion, safety 
 is to be found in a rigid adherence to principle. 
 
 In the contest between Spain and the revolted colonies we 
 stood aloof, and waited not only until the ability of the new States 
 to protect themselves was fully established, but until the danger 
 of their being again subjugated had entirely passed away. Then, 
 and not until then, were they recognized. 
 
 Such was our course in regard to Mexico herself. * * * jj- 
 is true that with regard to Texas the civil authority of Mexico has 
 been expelled, its invading army defeated, the chief of the Re- 
 public himself captured, and all present power to control the 
 newly organized government of Texas annihilated within its con- 
 fines ; but, on the other hand, there is, in appearance at least, an 
 immense disparity of physical force on the side of Texas. The 
 Mexican Republic, under another Executive, is rallying its forces 
 under a new leader and menacing a fresh invasion to recover its 
 lost dominion. 
 
 Upon the issue of this threatened invasion the independence of 
 Texas may be considered as suspended ; and were there nothing 
 peculiar in the relative situation of the United States and Texas, 
 our acknowledgment of its independence at such a crisis could 
 scarcely be regarded as consistent with that prudent reserve with 
 which we have hitherto held ourselves bound to treat all similar 
 questions. 
 
 Thereupon Andrew Jackson proceeded to consider the risk that 
 there might be imputed to the United States motives of selfish in- 
 terest in view of the former claim on our part to the territory of 
 Texas, and of the avowed purpose of the Texans in seeking rec- 
 ognition of independence as an incident to the incorporation of 
 Texas in the Union, concluding thus : 
 
 Prudence, therefore, seems to dictate that we should still stand 
 aloof and maintain our present attitude, if not until Mexico itself, 
 or one of the great foreign powers shall recognize the independ- 
 ence of the new government, at least until the lapse of time or the 
 course of events shall have proved beyond cavil or dispute the 
 
APPENDIX. 563 
 
 ability of the people of that country to maintain their separate 
 sovereignty and to uphold the government constituted by them. 
 Neither of the contending parties can justly complain of this 
 course. By pursuing it we are but carrying out the long-estab- 
 lished policy of our Government, a policy which has secured to us 
 respect and influence abroad ancl inspired confidence at home. 
 
 These are the words of the resolute and patriotic Jackson. 
 They are evidence that the United States, in addition to the test 
 imposed by public law as the condition of the recognition of in- 
 dependence by a neutral state (to wit, that the revolted state 
 shall " constitute in fact a body politic, having a government in 
 substance as well as in name, possessed of the elements of stabil- 
 ity," and forming de facto, " if left to itself, a state among the na- 
 tions, reasonably capable of discharging the duties of a state,") 
 has imposed for its own governance in dealing with cases like 
 these the further condition that recognition of independent state- 
 hood is not due to a revolted dependency until the danger of its 
 being again subjugated by the parent state has entirely passed 
 away. 
 
 This extreme test was, in fact, applied in the case of Texas. 
 The Congress to whom President Jackson referred the question 
 as one *' probably leading to war," and therefore a proper subject 
 for "a previous understanding with that body by whom war can 
 alone be declared and by whom all the provisions for sustaining 
 its perils must be furnished," left the matter of the recognition of 
 Texas to the discretion of the Executive, providing merely for the 
 sending of a diplomatic agent when the President shall be satisfied 
 that the Republic of Texas had become " an independent State." 
 It was so recognized by President Van Buren, who commissioned 
 a charge d'affaires March 7, 1837, after Mexico had abandoned an 
 attempt to reconquer the Texan territory, and when there was at 
 the time no Iw/ia fide contest going on between the insurgent Prov- 
 ince and its former Sovereign. 
 
 I said in my message of December last, " It is to be seriously 
 considered whether the Cuban insurrection possesses beyond dis- 
 pute the attributes of statehood which alone can demand' the rec- 
 ognition of belligerency in its favor." The same requirement 
 must certainly be no less seriously considered when the graver is- 
 sue of recognizing independence is in question, for no less positive 
 test can be applied to the greater act than to the lesser ; while, 
 on the other hand, the influences and consequences of the struggle 
 
564 APPENDIX. 
 
 upon the internal policy of the recognizing State, which form im- 
 portant factors when the recognition of belligerency is concerned, 
 are secondary, if not rightly eliminable, factors when the real 
 question is whether the community claiming recognition is or is 
 not independent beyond peradventure. 
 
 Nor from the standpoint of expediency do I think it would be 
 wise or prudent for this Government to recognize at the present 
 time the independence of the so-called Cuban Republic. Such 
 recognition is not necessary in order to enable the United States 
 to intervene and pacify the island. To commit this country now 
 to the recognition of any particular government in Cuba might 
 subject us to embarrassing conditions of international obligation 
 toward the organization so recognized. In case of intervention 
 our conduct would be subject to the approval or disapproval of 
 such government. We would be required to submit to its direc- 
 tion and to assume to it the mere relation of a friendly ally. 
 
 When it shall appear hereafter that there is within the island a 
 government capable of performing the duties and discharging the 
 functions of a separate nation, and having, as a matter of fact, the 
 proper forms and attributes of nationality, such government can 
 be promptly and readily recognized and the relations and interests 
 of the United States with such nation adjusted. 
 
 There remain the alternative forms of intervention to end the 
 war, either as an impartial neutral by imposing a rational com- 
 promise between the contestants, or as the active ally of the one 
 party or the other. 
 
 As to the first, it is not to be forgotten that during the last few 
 months the relation of the United States has virtually been one of 
 friendly intervention in many ways, each not of itself conclusive, 
 but all tending to the exertion of a potential influence toward an 
 ultimate pacific result, just and honorable to all interests con- 
 cerned. The spirit of all our acts hitherto has been an earnest, 
 unselfish desire for peace and prosperity in Cuba, untarnished by 
 differences between us and Spain, and unstained by the blood of 
 American citizens. 
 
 The forcible intervention of the United States as a neutral to 
 stop the war, according to the large dictates of humanity and fol- 
 lowing many historical precedents where neighboring States have 
 interfered to check the hopeless sacrifices of life by internecine 
 conflicts beyond their borders, is justifiable on rational grounds. 
 It involves, however, hostile constraint upon both the parties to 
 
APPENDIX. 565 
 
 the contest as well to enforce a truce as to guide the eventual 
 settlement. 
 
 The grounds for such intervention may be briefly summarized 
 as follows : 
 
 First. In the cause of humanity and to put an end to the 
 barbarities, bloodshed, starvation and horrible miseries now exist- 
 ing there, and which the parties to the conflict are either unable 
 or unwilling to stop or mitigate. It is no answer to say this is all 
 in another country, belonging to another nation, and is therefore 
 none of our business. It is specially our duty, for it is right at 
 our door. 
 
 Second. We owe it to our citizens in Cuba to afford them that 
 protection and indemnity for life and property which no govern- 
 ment there can or will afford, and to that end to terminate the 
 conditions that deprive them of legal protection. 
 
 Third. The right to intervene may be justified by the very 
 serious injury to the commerce, trade and business of our people, 
 and by the wanton destruction of property and devastation of the 
 island. 
 
 Fourth, and which is of the utmost importance. The present 
 condition of affairs in Cuba is a constant menace to our peace, 
 and entails upon this Government an enormous expense. With 
 such a conflict waged for years in an island so near us and with 
 which our people have such trade and business relations — when 
 the lives and liberty of our citizens are in constant danger and 
 their property destroyed and themselves ruined — where our trad- 
 ing vessels are liable to seizure and are seized at our very door 
 by war-ships of a foreign nation, the expeditions of filibustering 
 that we are powerless to prevent altogether, and the irritating 
 questions and entanglements thus arising — all these and others 
 that I need not mention, with the resulting strained relations, are 
 a constant menace to our peace, and compel us to keep on a 
 semi-war footing with a nation with which we are at peace. 
 
 These elements of danger and disorder already pointed out 
 have been strikingly illustrated by a tragic event which has 
 deeply and justly moved the American people. I have already 
 transmitted to Congress the report of the naval court of inquiry 
 on the destruction of the battleship Maine in the harbor of 
 Havana during the night of the 15th of February. The destruc- 
 tion of that noble vessel has filled the national heart with inex- 
 pressible horror. Two hundred and fifty-eight brave sailors and 
 
566 APPENDIX. 
 
 marines and two officers of our Navy, reposing in the fancied 
 security of a friendly harbor, have been hurled to death, grief and 
 want brought to their homes and sorrow to the nation. 
 
 The naval court of inquiry, which, it is needless to say, com- 
 mands the unqualified confidence of the Government, was unani- 
 mous in its conclusion that the destruction of the Maitie was 
 caused by an exterior explosion, that of a submarine mine. It 
 did not assume to place the responsibility. That remains to be 
 fixed. 
 
 In any event the destruction of the Maine, by whatever exterior 
 cause, is a patent and impressive proof of a state of things in 
 Cuba that is intolerable. That condition is thus shown to be 
 such that the Spanish Government cannot assure safety and 
 security to a vessel of the American Navy in the harbor of 
 Havana on a mission of peace, and rightfully there. 
 
 Further referring in this connection to recent diplomatic cor- 
 respondence, a dispatch from our Minister to Spain, of the 26th 
 ultimo, contained the statement that the Spanish minister for 
 foreign affairs assured him positively that Spain will do all that 
 the highest honor and justice require in the matter of the Maine. 
 The reply above referred to of the 31st ultimo also contained an 
 expression of the readiness of Spain to submit to an arbitration 
 all the differences which can arise in this matter, which is subse- 
 quently explained by the note of the Spanish minister at Washing- 
 ton of the loth instant, as follows : 
 
 As to the question of fact which springs from the diversity of 
 views between the reports of the American and Spanish boards, 
 Spain proposes that the facts be ascertained by an impartial 
 investigation by experts, whose decision Spain accepts in advance. 
 
 To this I have made no reply. 
 
 President Grant, in 1875, after discussing the phases of the 
 contest as it then appeared, and its hopeless and apparent indefi- 
 nite prolongation, said : 
 
 In such event, I am of opinion that other nations will be com- 
 pelled to assume the responsibility which devolves upon them, 
 and to seriously consider the only remaining measures possible — 
 mediation and intervention. Owing, perhaps, to the large ex- 
 panse of water separating the island from the peninsula, * * * 
 the contending parties appear to have within themselves no 
 depository of common confidence, to suggest wisdom when pas- 
 
APPENDIX. 567 
 
 sion and excitement have their sway, and to assume the part of 
 peacemaker. 
 
 In this view in the earlier days of the contest the good offices 
 of the United States as a mediator were tendered in good faith, 
 without any selfish purpose, in the interest of humanity and in 
 sincere friendship for both parties, but were at the time declined 
 by Spain, with the declaration, nevertheless, that at a future 
 time they would be indispensable. No intimation has been re- 
 ceived that in the opinion of Spain that time has been reached. 
 And yet the strife continues with all its dread horrors and all its 
 injuries to the interests of the United States and of other nations. 
 
 Each party seems quite capable of working great injury and 
 damage to the other, as well as to all the relations and interests 
 dependent on the existence of peace in the island ; but they seem 
 incapable of reaching any adjustment, and both have thus far 
 failed of achieving any success whereby one party shall possess 
 and control the island to the exclusion of the other. Under 
 these circumstances, the agency of others, either by mediation or 
 by intervention, seems to be the only alternative which must 
 sooner or later be invoked for the termination of the strife. 
 
 In the last annual message of my immediate predecessor during 
 the pending struggle, it was said : 
 
 When the inability of Spain to deal successfully with the insur- 
 rection has become manifest, and it is demonstrated that her 
 sovereignty is extinct in Cuba for all purposes of its rightful ex- 
 istence, and when a hopeless struggle for its re-establishment has 
 degenerated into a strife which means nothing more than the use- 
 less sacrifice of human life and the utter destruction of the very 
 subject-matter of the conflict, a situation will be presented in 
 which our obligations to the sovereignty of Spain will be super- 
 seded by higher obligations, which we can hardly hesitate to 
 recognize and discharge. 
 
 In my annual message to Congress, December last, speaking to 
 this question, I said : 
 
 The near future will demonstrate whether the indispensable 
 condition of a righteous peace, just alike to the Cubans and to 
 Spain, as well as equitable to all our interests so intimately 
 involved in the welfare of Cuba, is likely to be attained. If not, 
 the exigency of further and other action by the United States 
 will remain to be taken. When that time comes that action will 
 be determined in the line of indisputable right and duty. It will 
 be faced, without misgiving or hesitancy, in the light of the obli- 
 gation this Government owes to itself, to the people who have 
 confided to it the protection of their interests and honor, and to 
 humanity. 
 
 Sure of the right, keeping free from all offense ourselves, actu- 
 
568 APPENDIX. 
 
 ated only by upright and patriotic considerations, moved neither 
 by passion nor selfishness, the Government will continue its 
 watchful care over the rights and property of American citizens 
 and will abate none of its efforts to bring about by peaceful 
 agencies a peace which shall be honorable and enduring. If it 
 shall hereafter appear to be a duty imposed by our obligations to 
 ourselves, to civilization and humanity to intervene with force, it 
 shall be without fault on our part and only because the necessity 
 for such action will be so clear as to command the support and 
 approval of the civilized world. 
 
 The long trial has proved that the object for which Spain has 
 waged the war cannot be attained. The fire of insurrection may 
 flame or may smolder with varying seasons, but it has not been 
 and it is plain that it cannot be extinguished by present methods. 
 The only hope of relief and repose from a condition which can no 
 longer be endured is the enforced pacification of Cuba. In the 
 name of humanity, in the name of civilization, in behalf of en- 
 dangered American interests which give us the right and the duty 
 to speak and to act, the war in Cuba must stop. 
 
 In view of these facts and of these considerations, I ask the Con- 
 gress to authorize and empower the President to take measures 
 to secure a full and final termination of hostilities between the 
 Government of Spain and the people of Cuba, and to secure in 
 the island the establishment of a stable government, capable of 
 maintaining order and observing its international obligations, 
 insuring peace and tranquillity and the security of its citizens as 
 well as our own, and to use the military and naval forces of the 
 United States as may be necessary for these purposes. 
 
 And in the interest of humanity and to aid in preserving the 
 lives of the starving people of the island I recommend that the 
 distribution of food and supplies be continued, and that an appro- 
 priation be made out of the public Treasury to supplement the 
 charity of our citizens. 
 
 The issue is now with the Congress. It is a solemn responsi- 
 bility. I have exhausted every effort to relieve the intolerable 
 condition of affairs which is at our doors. Prepared to execute 
 every obligation imposed upon mc by the Constitution and the 
 law, I await your action. 
 
 Yesterday, and since the preparation of the foregoing message, 
 official information was received by me that the latest decree of 
 the Queen Regent of Spain directs General Blanco, in order to 
 prepare and facilitate peace, to proclaim a suspension of hostilities. 
 
APPENDIX. 569 
 
 the duration and details of which have not yet been communi- 
 cated to me. 
 
 This fact, with every other pertinent consideration, will, I am 
 sure, have your just and careful attention in the solemn delibera- 
 tions upon which you are about to enter. If this measure attains 
 a successful result, then our aspirations as a Christian, peace-lov- 
 ing people will be realized. If it fails, it will be only another 
 justification for our contemplated action. 
 
 William McKinley. 
 Executive Mansion, April 11, 1898. 
 
570 APPENDIX. 
 
 RESOLUTION OF CONGRESS. 
 
 Joint Resolution For the recognition of tlie independence of the people of 
 Cuba, demanding that the Government of Spain relinquish its authority and 
 government in the Island of Cuba, and to withdraw its land and naval 
 forces from Cuba and Cuban waters, and directing the President of the 
 United States to use the land and naval forces of the United States to carry 
 these resolutions into effect. 
 
 Whereas, the abhorrent conditions which have existed for more 
 than three years in the Island of Cuba, so near our own borders, 
 have shocked the moral sense of the people of the United States, 
 have been a disgrace to Christian civilization, culminating, as 
 they have, in the destruction of a United States battleship, with 
 two hundred and sixty-six of its officers and crew, while on a 
 friendly visit in the harbor of Havana, and can not longer be en- 
 dured, as has been set forth by the President of the United States 
 in his message to Congress of April eleventh, eighteen hundred 
 and ninety-eight, upon which the action of Congress was invited : 
 Therefore, 
 
 Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United 
 States of America in Congress assembled, 
 
 First. That the people of the Island of Cuba are, and of right 
 ought to be, free and independent. 
 
 Second. That it is the duty of the United States to demand, 
 and the Government of the United States does hereby demand, 
 that the Government of Spain at once relinquish its authority and 
 government in the Island of Cuba and withdraw its land and 
 naval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters. 
 
 Third. That the President of the United States be, and he 
 hereby is, directed and empowered to use the entire land and 
 naval forces of the United States, and to call into the actual ser- 
 vice of the United States the militia of the several States, to such 
 extent as may be necessary to carry these resolutions into effect. 
 
 Fourth. That the United States hereby disclaims any dis- 
 position or intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or con- 
 trol over said Island except for the pacification thereof, and 
 asserts its determination, when that is accomplished, to leave the 
 government and control of the Island to its people. 
 
 Approved, April 20, 1898. 
 
APPENDIX. 571 
 
 DECLARATION OF WAR. 
 
 An Act Declaring that war exists between the United States of America 
 and the Kingdom of Spain. 
 
 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives' of the 
 United States of Atnerica in Congress assembled, 
 
 First. That war be, and the same is hereby, declared to exist, 
 and that war has existed since the twenty-first day of April, anno 
 Domini eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, including said day, 
 between the United States of America and the Kingdom of 
 Spain. 
 
 Second. That the President of the United States be, and he 
 hereby is, directed and empowered to use the entire land and 
 naval forces of the United States, and to call into the actual ser- 
 vice of the United States the militia of the several States, to such 
 extent as may be necessary to carry this Act into effect. 
 
 Approved, April 25, 1898. 
 
57 2 APPENDIX. 
 
 BLOCKADE. 
 
 BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. 
 
 A PROCLAMATION. 
 
 Whereas, by a joint resolution passed by the Congress and ap- 
 proved April 20, 1898, and communicated to the Government of 
 Spain, it was demanded that said Government at once relinquish 
 its authority and Government in the Island of Cuba, and withdraw 
 its land and naval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters ; and the 
 President of the United States was directed and empowered to 
 use the entire land and naval forces of the United States, and to 
 call into the actual service of the United States the militia of the 
 several States to such extent as might be necessary to carry said 
 resolution into effect ; and 
 
 Whereas, in carrying into effect said resolution, the President of 
 the United States deems it necessary to set on foot and maintain 
 a blockade of the north coast of Cuba, including all ports on said 
 coast between Cardenas and Bahia Honda and the port of Cien- 
 fuegos on the south coast of Cuba : 
 
 Now, therefore, I, William McKinley, President of the United 
 States, in order to enforce the said resolution, do hereby declare 
 and proclaim that the United States of America have instituted, 
 and will maintain a blockade of the north coast of Cuba, including 
 ports on said coast between Cardenas and Bahia Honda and the 
 port of Cienfuegos on the south coast of Cuba, aforesaid, in pur- 
 suance of the laws of the United States and the law of nations 
 applicable to such cases. An efficient force will be posted so as 
 to prevent the entrance and exit of vessels from the ports afore- 
 said. Any neutral vessel approaching any of said ports, or at- 
 tempting to leave the same, without notice or knowledge of the 
 establishment of such blockade, will be duly warned by the Com- 
 mander of the blockading forces, who will endorse on her register 
 
APPENDIX. 573 
 
 the fact, and the date, of such warnhig, where such endorsement 
 was made ; and if the same vessel shall again attempt to enter 
 any blockaded port, she will be captured and sent to the nearest 
 convenient port for such proceedings against her and her cargo 
 as prize, as may be deemed advisable. 
 
 Neutral vessels lying in any of said ports at the time of the es- 
 tablishment of such blockade will be allowed thirty days to issue 
 therefrom. 
 
 In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and caused 
 the seal of the United States to be affixed. 
 
 Done at the City of Washington, this 22d day of April, a. u. 
 1898, and of the Independence of the United States, 
 
 [seal] the one hundred and twenty-second. 
 
 William McKinlev. 
 
 By the President : 
 
 John Sherman, Secretary of State. 
 
574 APPENDIX. 
 
 FIRST CALL FOR VOLUNTEERS. 
 
 BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 A PROCLAMATION. 
 
 Whereas, a joint resolution of Congress was approved on the 
 twentieth day of April, 1898, entitled " Joint Resolution For the 
 recognition of the independence of the people of Cuba, demanding 
 that the Government of Spain relinquish its authority and govern- 
 ment in the Island of Cuba, and to withdraw its land and naval 
 forces from Cuba and Cuban waters, and directing the President 
 of the United States to use the land and naval forces of the 
 United States to carry these resolutions into effect," and 
 
 Whereas, by an act of Congress entitled " An Act to provide 
 for temporarily Increasing the Military Establishment of the 
 United States in time of war and for other purposes," approved 
 April 22, 1898 ; the President is authorized, in order to raise a 
 volunteer army, to issue his proclamation calling for volunteers to 
 serve in the Army of the United States : 
 
 Now, therefore, I, William McKinley, President of the United 
 States, by virtue of the power vested in me by the Constitution 
 and the laws, and deeming sufficient occasion to exist, have 
 thought fit to call forth and hereby do call forth, volunteers to 
 the aggregate number of 125,000, in order to carry into effect the 
 purpose of the said Resolution ; the same to be apportioned, as 
 far as practicable, among the several States and Territories and 
 the District of Columbia, according to population, and to serve 
 for two years, unless sooner discharged. The details for this 
 object will be immediately communicated to the proper authorities 
 through the War Department. 
 
 In witness whereof I have hereunto set my hand and caused the 
 seal of the United States to be affixed. 
 
 Done at the City of Washington, this twenty-third day of April, 
 A. D, 1898, and of the Independence of the United 
 
 [seal] States the one. hundred and twenty-second. 
 
 William McKinley. 
 By the President : 
 
 John Sherman, Secretary of State. 
 
APPENDIX. 575 
 
 PRIVATEERING, ETC. 
 
 BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. 
 
 A PROCLAMATION. 
 
 Whereas, by an Act of Congress approved April 25, 1898, it is 
 declared that war exists and that war has existed since the 21st 
 day of April, a. d. 1898, including said day, between the United 
 States of America and the Kingdom of Spain ; and 
 
 Whereas, it being desirable that such war should be conducted 
 upon principles in harmony with the present views of nations and 
 sanctioned by their recent practice, it has already been announced 
 that the policy of this Government will be not to resort to priva- 
 teering, but to adhere to the rules of the Declaration of Paris ; 
 
 Now, therefore, I, William McKinley, President of the United 
 States of America, by virtue of the power vested in me by the 
 Constitution and the laws, do hereby declare and proclaim : 
 
 1. The neutral flag covers enemy's goods, with the exception 
 of contraband of war. 
 
 2. Neutral goods, not contraband of war, are not liable to con- 
 fiscation under the enemy's flag. 
 
 3. Blockades in order to be binding must be effective. 
 
 4. Spanish merchant vessels, in any ports or places within the 
 United States, shall be allowed till May 21, 1898, inclusive, for 
 loading their cargoes and departing from such ports or places ; 
 and such Spanish merchant vessels, if met at sea by any United 
 States ship, shall be permitted to continue their voyage, if, on 
 examination of their papers, it shall appear that their cargoes 
 were taken on board before the expiration of the above term ; 
 Provided, that nothing herein contained shall apply to Spanish 
 vessels having on board any officer in the military or naval ser- 
 vice of the enemy, or any coal (except such as may be necessary 
 for their voyage), or any other article prohibited or contraband 
 of war, or any despatch of or to the Spanish Government. 
 
576 APPENDIX. 
 
 5. Any Spanish merchant vessel which, prior to April 21, 1898, 
 shall have sailed from any foreign port bound for any port or 
 place in the United States, shall be permitted to enter such port 
 or place, and to discharge her cargo, and afterward forthwith 
 to depart without molestation ; and any such vessel, if met at sea 
 by any United States ship, shall be permitted to continue her 
 voyage to any port not blockaded. 
 
 6. The right of search is to be exercised with strict regard for 
 the rights of neutrals, and the voyages of mail steamers are not 
 to be interfered with except on the clearest grounds of suspicion 
 of a violation of law in respect of contraband or blockade. 
 
 In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and caused 
 the seal of the United States to be affixed. 
 
 Done at the City of Washington, on the twenty-sixth day of 
 April, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hun- 
 [seal] dred and ninety-eight, and of the Independence of the 
 United States the one hundred and twenty-second. 
 
 William McKinley. 
 By the President : 
 
 Alvey A. Adee, Acting Secretary of State. 
 
APPENDIX, 577 
 
 SECOND CALL FOR VOLUNTEERS. 
 
 BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 A PROCLAMATION. 
 
 Whereas, an Act of Congress was approved on the twenty-fifth 
 day of April, 1898, entitled "An Act Declaring that war exists 
 between the United States of America and the Kingdom of Spain," 
 
 and 
 
 Whereas, by an Act of Congress entitled " An Act to provide 
 for temporarily increasing the Military Establishment of the 
 United States in time of war and for other purposes," approved 
 April 22, 1898 ; the President is authorized, in order to raise a 
 volunteer army, to issue his proclamation calling for volunteers 
 to serve in the Army of the United States : 
 
 Now, therefore, I, William McKinley, President of the United 
 States,'by virtue of the power vested in me by the Constitution 
 and the laws, and deeming sufficient occasion to exist, have 
 thought fit to call forth and hereby do call forth, volunteers to 
 the aggregate number of 75,000 in addition to the volunteers 
 called forth by my proclamation of the twenty-third of April, in 
 the present year ; the same to be apportioned, as far as practi- 
 cable, among the several States and Territories and the District of 
 Columbia, according to population, and to serve for two years, 
 unless sooner discharged. The proportion of each arm and the 
 details of enlistment and organization will be made known through 
 the War Department. 
 
 In witness whereof I have hereunto set my hand and caused the 
 seal of the United States to be affixed. 
 
 Done at the City of Washington, this twenty-fifth day of INIay, 
 in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred 
 
 [seal] and ninety-eight, and of the Independence of the 
 United States the one hundred and twenty-second. 
 
 William McKinlev. 
 
 By the President : 
 
 William R. Day, Secretary of State. 
 
578 APPENDIX. 
 
 EXTENDING BLOCKADE. 
 
 BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. 
 
 A PROCLAMATION. 
 
 Whereas, for the reasons set forth hi my Proclamation of 
 April 2 2, 1898, a blockade of the ports on the northern coast of 
 Cuba, from Cardenas to Bahia Honda, inclusive, and of the port 
 of Cienfuegos, on the south coast of Cuba, was declared to have 
 been instituted ; and 
 
 Whereas, it has become desirable to extend the blockade to 
 other Spanish ports : 
 
 Now, therefore, I, William McKinley, President of the United 
 States, do hereby declare and proclaim that, in addition to the 
 blockade of the ports specified in my Proclamation of April 22, 
 1898, the United States of America has instituted and will main- 
 tain an effective blockade of all the ports on the south coast of 
 Cuba, from Cape Frances to Cape Cruz, inclusive, and also of the 
 port of San Juan, in the island of Porto Rico. 
 
 Neutral vessels lying in any of the ports to which the blockade 
 is by the present Proclamation extended, will be allowed thirty 
 days to issue therefrom, with cargo. 
 
 In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and caused 
 the seal of the United States to be affixed. 
 
 Done at the City of Washington, this twenty-seventh day of 
 June, A. D. 1898, and of the Independence of the 
 
 [seal] United States the one hundred and twenty-second. 
 
 William McKinlev. 
 
 By the President : 
 
 J. B. Moore, Acthtg Secretary of State. 
 
APPENDIX. 
 
 579 
 
 RESOLUTION OF CONGRESS. 
 
 Joint Resolution To provide for annexing the Hawaiian Islands to the 
 United States. 
 
 Whereas, the Government of the Republic of Hawaii having, in 
 due form, signified its consent, in the manner provided by its 
 constitution, to cede absolutely and without reserve to the 
 United States of America all rights of sovereignty of whatsoever 
 kind in and over the Hawaiian Islands and their dependencies, 
 and also to cede and transfer to the United States the absolute 
 fee and ownership of all public, Government, or Crown lands, 
 public buildings or edifices, ports, harbors, military equipment, 
 and all other public property of every kind and description be- 
 longing to the Government of the Hawaiian Islands, together 
 with every right and appurtenance thereunto appertaining : 
 Therefore, 
 
 Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United 
 States of America i?t Congress assembled. That said cession is ac- 
 cepted, ratified, and confirmed, and that the said Hawaiian Islands 
 and their dependencies be, and they are hereby, annexed as apart 
 of the territory of the United States and are subject to the 
 sovereign dominion thereof, and that all and singular the prop- 
 erty and rights hereinbefore mentioned are vested in the United 
 States of America. 
 
 The existing laws of the United States relative to public lands 
 shall not apply to such lands in the Hawaiian Islands ; but the 
 Congress of the United States shall enact special laws for their 
 management and disposition : 
 
 Provided, That all revenue from or proceeds of the same, except 
 as regards such part thereof as may be used or occupied for the 
 civil, military, or naval purposes of the United States, or may be 
 assigned for the use of the local government, shall be used solely 
 for the benefit of the inhabitants of the Hawaiian Islands for 
 educational and other public purposes. 
 
58o APPENDIX. 
 
 Until Congress shall provide for the government of such islands 
 all the civil, judicial, and military powers exercised by the officers 
 of the existing government in said islands shall be vested in such 
 person or persons and shall be exercised in such manner as the 
 President of the United States shall direct ; and the President 
 shall have power to remove said officers and fill the vacancies so 
 occasioned. 
 
 The existing treaties of the Hawaiian Islands with foreign 
 nations shall forthwith cease and determine, being replaced by 
 such treaties as may exist, or as may be hereafter concluded, 
 between the United States and such foreign nations. The muni- 
 cipal legislation of the Hawaiian Islands, not enacted for the ful- 
 fillment of the treaties so extinguished, and not inconsistent with 
 this joint resolution nor contrary to the Constitution of the 
 United States nor to any existing treaty of the United States, 
 shall remain in force until the Congress of the United States 
 shall otherwise determine. 
 
 Until legislation shall be enacted extending the United States 
 customs laws and regulations to the Hawaiian Islands the existing 
 customs relations of the Hawaiian Islands with the United States 
 and other countries shall remain unchanged. 
 
 The public debt of the Republic of Hawaii, lawfully existing at 
 the date of the passage of this joint resolution, including the 
 amounts due to depositors in the Hawaiian Postal Saving Bank, 
 is hereby assumed by the Government of the United States ; but 
 the liability of the United States in this regard shall in no case 
 exceed four million dollars. So long, however, as the existing 
 Government and the present commercial relations of the Hawai- 
 ian Islands are continued as hereinbefore provided said Govern- 
 ment shall continue to pay the interest on said debt. 
 
 There shall be no further immigration of Chinese into the 
 Hawaiian Islands, except upon such conditions as are now or may 
 hereafter be allowed by the laws of the United States ; and no 
 Chinese, by reason of anything herein contained, shall be allowed 
 to enter the United States from the Hawaiian Islands. 
 
 The President shall appoint five commissioners, at least two of 
 whom shall be residents of the Hawaiian Islands, who shall, as 
 soon as reasonably practicable, recommend to Congress such 
 legislation concerning the Hawaiian Islands as they shall deem 
 necessary or proper. 
 
 Sec. 2. That the commissioners hereinbefore provided for shall 
 
APPENDIX. 581 
 
 be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and con- 
 sent of the Senate. 
 
 Sec. 3. That the sum of one hundred thousand doUars, or so 
 much thereof as may be necessary, is hereby appropriated, out of 
 any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropiated, and to be 
 immediately available, to be expended at the discretion of the 
 President of the United States of America, for the purpose of 
 carrying this joint resolution into effect. 
 
 Approved, July 7, 1898. 
 
582 APPENDIX. 
 
 [translation.] 
 
 DON ALFONSO XIII 
 
 BY THE GRACE OF GOD AND THE CONSTITUTION, KING OF SPAIN, 
 AND IN HIS NAME DURING HIS MINORITY, 
 
 DONA MARIA CRISTINA, 
 
 QUEEN REGENT OF THE KINGDOM. 
 
 Whereas it has become necessary to negotiate and sign at 
 Washington a protocol in which the preliminaries of peace be- 
 tween Spain and the United States of America shall be settled, 
 and as it is necessary for me to empower for that purpose a 
 person possessing the requisite qualifications ; Therefore, I have 
 decided to select, after procuring the consent of His Excellency 
 the President of the French Republic, you, Don Julio Carabon, 
 ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of the French 
 Republic in the United States of America, as I do, by these pres- 
 ents, select and appoint you to proceed, invested with the char- 
 acter of my plenipotentiary to negotiate and sign with the pleni- 
 potentiary whom His Excellency the President of the United 
 States of America may designate for that purpose the aforesaid 
 protocol. And I declare, from the present moment, all that you 
 may agree upon, negotiate, and sign in the execution of this com- 
 mission acceptable and valid, and I will observe it and execute it, 
 and will cause it to be observed and executed as if it had been done 
 by myself, for which I give you my whole full powers in the most 
 ample form required by law. In witness whereof I have caused 
 these presents to be^issued, signed by my hand, duly sealed and 
 countersigned by the undersigned, my minister of state. Given 
 in the palace at Madrid, August ii, 1898. 
 [l. s.] Maria Cristina. 
 
 Juan Manuel Sanchez y Gutierrez de Castro, 
 
 Minister of State. 
 
APPENDIX. 583 
 
 PROTOCOL OF AGREEMENT 
 
 BETWEEN 
 
 THE UNITED STATES AND SPAIN. 
 
 William R. Day, Secretary of State of the United States, and 
 His Exxellency Jules Cambon, Ambassador Extraordinary and 
 Plenipotentiary of the Republic of France at Washington, respec- 
 tively possessing for this purpose full authority from the Govern- 
 ment of the United States and the Government of Spain, have 
 concluded and signed the following articles, embodying the terms 
 on which the two Governments have agreed in respect to the 
 matters hereinafter set forth, having in view the establishment of 
 peace between the two countries, that is to say : 
 
 ARTICLE I. 
 
 Spain will relinquish all claim of sovereignty over and title to 
 Cuba. 
 
 ARTICLE II. 
 
 Spain will cede to the United States the island of Porto Rico 
 and other islands now under Spanish sovereignty in the West 
 Indies, and also an island in the Ladrones to be selected by the 
 United States. 
 
 ARTICLE III. 
 
 The United States will occupy and hold the city, bay and har- 
 bor of Manila, pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace which 
 shall determine the control, disposition and government of the 
 Philippines. 
 
 ARTICLE IV. 
 
 Spain will immediately evacuate Cuba, Porto Rico and other 
 islands now under Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies ; and to 
 this end each Government will, within ten days after the signing 
 
5S4 APPENDIX. 
 
 of this protocol, appoint Commissioners, and tlie Commissioners 
 so appointed shall, within thirty days after the signing of this 
 protocol, meet at Havana for the purpose of arranging and carrying 
 out the details of the aforesaid evacuation of Cuba and the adja- 
 cent Spanish islands ; and each Government will, within ten days 
 after the signing of this protocol, also appoint other Commission- 
 ers, who shall, within thirty days after the signing of this proto- 
 col, meet at San Juan, in Porto Rico, for the purpose of arranging 
 and carrying out the details of the aforesaid evacuation of Porto 
 Rico and other islands now under Spanish sovereignty in the 
 West Indies, 
 
 ARTICLE v. 
 
 The United States and Spain will each appoint not more than 
 five Commissioners to treat of peace, and the Commissioners so 
 appointed shall meet at Paris not later than October i, 1898, and 
 proceed to the negotiation and conclusion of a treaty of peace, 
 which treaty shall be subject to ratification according to the 
 respective constitutional forms of the two countries. 
 
 ARTICLE VI. 
 
 Upon the conclusion and signing of this protocol, hostilities 
 between the two countries shall be suspended, and notice to that 
 effect shall be given as soon as possible by each Government to 
 the commanders of its military and naval forces. 
 
 Done at Washington in duplicate, in English and in French, by 
 the Undersigned, who have hereunto set their hands and seals, 
 the i2th day of August, 1898. 
 
 [seal] William R, Day, 
 [seal] Jules Cambon. 
 
APPENDIX. 585 
 
 SUSPENSION OF HOSTILITIES. 
 
 BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
 
 A PROCLAMATION. 
 
 Whereas, by a protocol concluded and signed August 12, 1898, 
 by William R. Day, Secretary of State of the United States, and 
 His Excellency Jules Cambon, Ambassador Extraordinary and 
 Plenipotentiary of the Republic of Prance at Washington, respec- 
 tively representing for this purpose the Government of the United 
 States and the Oovernnient of Spain, the United States and Spain 
 have formally agreed upon the terms on which negotiations for 
 the establishment of peace between the two countries shall be 
 undertaken ; and 
 
 Whereas, it is in said protocol agreed that upon its conclusion 
 and signature hostilities between the two countries shall be sus- 
 pended, and that notice to that effect shall be given as soon as 
 possible by each Government to the commanders of its military 
 and naval forces : 
 
 Now, therefore, I, William McKinley, President of the United 
 States, do, in accordance with the stipulations of the protocol, 
 declare and proclaim on the part of the United States a suspen- 
 sion of hostilities, and do hereby command that orders be immedi- 
 ately given through the proper channels to the commanders of 
 the military and naval forces of the United States to abstain from 
 all acts inconsistent with this proclamation. 
 
 In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and caused 
 the seal of the United States to be affixed. 
 
 Done at the City of Washington, this 12th day of August, in 
 the year of our Lord one thousand eighty hundred and 
 
 [seal] ninety-eight, and of the Independence of the United 
 States the one hundred and twenty-third. 
 
 William McKinley. 
 
 By the President : 
 
 William R. Day, Secretary of State. 
 
586 APPENDIX. 
 
 THANKSGIVING. 
 
 BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 A PROCLAMATION. 
 
 The approaching November brings to mind the custom of our 
 ancestors, hallowed by time and rooted in our most sacred tradi- 
 tions, of giving thanks to Almighty God for all the blessings He 
 has vouchsafed to us during the year. 
 
 Few years in our history have afforded such cause for thanks- 
 giving as this. We have been blessed by abundant harvests, our 
 trade and commerce have wonderfully increased, our public credit 
 has been improved and strengthened, all sections of our common 
 country have been brought together and knitted into closer bonds 
 of national purpose and unity. 
 
 The skies have been for a time darkened by the cloud of war ; 
 but as we were compelled to take up the sword in the cause of 
 humanity we are permitted to rejoice that the conflict has been of 
 brief duration and the losses we have had to mourn, though griev- 
 ous and important, have been so few, considering the great results 
 accomplished, as to inspire us with gratitude and praise to the 
 Lord of Hosts. We may laud and magnify His Holy Name that 
 the cessation of hostilities came so soon as to spare both sides the 
 countless sorrows and disasters that attend protracted war. 
 
 I do therefore invite all my fellow-citizens, as well those who 
 may beat sea or sojourning in foreign lands as those at home, to set 
 apart and observe Thursday, the twenty-fourth day of November, 
 as a day of national thanksgiving, to come together in their several 
 places of worship, for a service of praise and thanks to Almighty 
 God for all the blessings of the year; for the mildness of the sea- 
 sons and the fruitfulness of the soil, for the continued prosperity 
 of the people, for the devotion and valor of our countrymen, for 
 the glory of our victory and the hope of a righteous peace, and to 
 pray that the Divine guidance which has brought us heretofore to 
 safety and honor may be graciously continued in the years to come, 
 
APPENDIX. 587 
 
 In witness whereof I have hereunto set my hand and caused the 
 seal of the United States to be affixed. 
 
 Done at the City of Washington, this twenty-eighth day of Octo- 
 ber, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hun- 
 [seal] dred and ninety-eight, and of the Independence of the 
 United States the one hundred and twenty-third. 
 
 William McKinley. 
 By the President : 
 
 John Hay, Secretary of State. 
 
588 APPENDIX. 
 
 RESERVATION FOR NAVAL PURPOSES— HAWAII. 
 
 BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 A PROCLAMATION. 
 
 Whereas, by joint resolution " to provide for annexing the 
 Hawaiian Islands to the United States," approved July 7, 1898, the 
 cession by the government of the Republic of Hawaii to the 
 United States of America, of all rights of sovereignty of whatso- 
 ever kind in and over the Hawaiian Islands and their depend- 
 encies, and the transfer to the United States of the absolute fee 
 and ownership of all public. Government or Crown lands, public 
 buildings, or edifices, ports, harbors, military equipment, and all 
 other public property of every kind and description belonging to 
 the government of the Hawaiian Islands, was duly accepted, rati- 
 fied and confirmed, and the said Hawaiian Islands and their depend- 
 encies annexed as a part of the territory of the United States and 
 made subject to the sovereign dominion thereof, and all and singu- 
 lar the property and rights hereinbefore mentioned vested in the 
 United States of America ; and 
 
 Whereas, it was further provided in said resolution that the 
 existing laws of the United States relative to public lands shall 
 not apply to such lands in the Hawaiian Islands, but the Congress 
 of the United States shall enact special laws for their manage- 
 ment and disposition ; and 
 
 Whereas, it is deemed necessary in the public interests that 
 certain lots and plats of land in the City of Honolulu be immedi- 
 ately reserved for naval purposes : 
 
 Now, therefore, I, William McKinley, President of the United 
 States, by virtue of the authority in me vested, do hereby declare, 
 proclaim and make known that the following-described lots or 
 plats of land be and the same are hereby reserved for naval pur- 
 
APPENDIX. 589 
 
 poses until such time as the Congress of the United States shall 
 otherwise direct, to wit : 
 
 ist. The water front lying between the Bishop Estate and 
 the line of Richard Street including the site of prospective 
 wharves, slips, and their approaches, 
 
 2nd. The blocks of land embracing lots No. 86 to 91, 100 
 to 131, including Mililani Street to the intersection of Hale- 
 kauwali Street ; and the Government water lots lying between 
 the Bishop Estate and Punchbowl and Allen Streets. 
 
 In witness whereof I have hereunto set my hand, and caused 
 the seal of the United States to be affixed. 
 
 Done at the City of Washington, this second day of November, 
 in the year one thousand eight hundred and ninety- 
 [seal] eight, and of the Independence of the United States 
 the one hundred and twenty-third. 
 
 William McKinlev. 
 By the President: 
 
 John Hay, Secretary of State. 
 
59° APPENDIX. 
 
 MESSAGE 
 
 FROM THE 
 
 PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 
 
 TRANSMITTING A TREATY OF PEACE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES 
 AND SPAIN, SIGNED AT THE CITY OF PARIS ON DECEMBER lO, 1898. 
 
 To the Senate of the United States : 
 
 I transmit herewith, with a view to its ratification, a treaty of 
 peace between the United States and Spain, signed at the city of 
 Paris on December lo, 1898 ; together with the protocols and 
 papers indicated in the list accompanying the report of the Secre- 
 tary of State. 
 
 William McKinley. 
 
 Executive Mk-iisio-n, Washington, January 4, 1899. 
 
 To the President : 
 
 The undersigned, Secretary of State, has the honor to lay before 
 the President, with a view to its submission to the Senate if 
 deemed proper, a treaty of peace concluded at Paris on Decem- 
 ber 10, 1898, between the United States and Spain. 
 
 Accompanying the treaty are the protocols of the conferences of 
 the Peace Commission at Paris, together with copies of statements 
 made before the United States Commissioners, and other papers 
 indicated in the inclosed list. 
 
 Respectfully submitted. 
 
 John Hay. 
 
 Department of State, Washington, /afiuary 3, 1899. 
 
APPENDIX. 591 
 
 TREATY OF PEACE 
 
 BETWEEN 
 
 THE UNITED STATES AND SPAIN. 
 
 The United States of America and Her Majesty the Queen 
 Regent of Spain, in the name of her august son Don Alfonso 
 XIII., desiring to end the state of war now existing between the 
 two countries, have for that purpose appointed as plenipoten- 
 tiaries : 
 
 The President of the United States, 
 
 William R. Day, Cushman K. Davis, William P. Frye, George 
 Gray and Whitelaw Reid, citizens of the United States ; 
 
 And Her Majesty the Queen Regent of Spain, 
 
 Don Eugenio Montero Rios, president of the senate, Don Buena- 
 ventura de Abarzuza, senator of the Kingdom and ex-minister of 
 the Crown ; Don Jose de Garnica, deputy to the Cortes and asso- 
 ciate justice of the supreme court ; Don Wenceslao Ramirez de 
 Villa-Urrutia, envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary 
 at Brussels, and Don Rafael Cerero, general of division ; 
 
 Who, having assembled in Paris, and having exchanged their 
 full powers, which were found to be in due and proper form, have, 
 after discussion of the matters before them, agreed upon the fol- 
 lowing articles : 
 
 ARTICLE I. 
 
 Spain relinquishes all claim of sovereignty over and title to 
 Cuba. 
 
 And as the island is, upon its evacuation by Spain, to be occu- 
 pied by the United States, the United States will, so long as such 
 occupation shall last, assume and discharge the obligations that 
 may under international law result from the fact of its occupation, 
 for the protection of life and property. 
 
 ARTICLE II. 
 
 Spain cedes to the United States the island of Porto Rico and 
 other islands now under Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies, 
 and the island of Guam in the Marianas or Ladrones. 
 
592 APPENDIX. 
 
 ARTICLE III, 
 
 Spain cedes to the United States the archipelago known as the 
 Philippine Islands, and comprehending the islands lying within 
 the following line : 
 
 A line running from west to east along or near the twentieth 
 parallel of north latitude, and through the middle of the naviga- 
 ble channel of Bachi, from the one hundred and eighteenth 
 (iiSth) to the one hundred and twenty-seventh (127th) degree 
 meridian of longitude east of Greenwich, thence along the one hun- 
 dred and twenty-seventh (127th) degree meridian of longitude east 
 of Greenwich to the parallel of four degrees and forty-five min- 
 utes (4° 45') north latitude, thence along the parallel of four 
 degrees and forty-five minutes (4° 45') north latitude to its inter- 
 section with the meridian of longitude one hundred and nineteen 
 degrees and thirty-five minutes (119° 35') east of Greenwich, 
 thence along the meridian of longitude one hundred and nineteen 
 degrees and thirty-five minutes (119° 35') east of Greenwich to 
 the parallel of latitude seven degrees and forty minutes (7° 40') 
 north, thence along the parallel of latitude of seven degrees and 
 forty minutes (7° 40') north to its intersection with the one hun- 
 dred and sixteenth (ii6th) degree meridian of longitude east of 
 Greenwich, thence by a direct line to the intersection of the tenth 
 (loth) degree parallel of north latitude with the one hundred and 
 eighteenth (ii8th) degree meridian of longitude east of Greenwich, 
 and thence along the one hundred and eighteenth (ii8th) degree 
 meridian of longitude east of Greenwich to the point of beginning. 
 
 The United States will pay to Spain the sum of twenty million 
 dollars ($20,000,000) within three months after the exchange of 
 the ratifications of the present treaty. 
 
 ARTICLE IV. 
 
 The United States will, for the term of ten years from the date 
 of the exchange of the ratifications of the present treaty, admit 
 Spanish ships and merchandise to the ports of the Philippine 
 Islands on the same terms as ships and merchandise of the 
 United States. 
 
 ARTICLE V. 
 
 The United States will, upon the signature of the present 
 treaty, send back to Spain, at its own cost, the Spanish soldiers 
 
APPENDIX. 593 
 
 taken as prisoners of war on the capture of Manila by the 
 American forces. The arms of the soldiers in question shall be 
 restored to them. 
 
 Spain will, upon the exchange of the ratifications of the pres- 
 ent treaty, proceed to evacuate the Philippines, as well as the 
 island of Guam, on terms similar to those agreed upon by the 
 Commissioners appointed to arrange for the evacuation of Porto 
 Rico and other islands in the West Indies, under the Protocol 
 of August 12, 1898, which is to continue in force till its provisions 
 are completely executed. 
 
 The time within which the evacuation of the Philippine Islands 
 and Guam shall be completed shall be fixed by the|two Governments. 
 Stands of colors, uncaptured war vessels, small arms, guns of all 
 calibres, with their carriages and accessories, powder, ammunition, 
 livestock, and materials and supplies of all kinds, belonging to the 
 land and naval forces of Spain in the Philippines and Guam, 
 remain the property of Spain. Pieces of heavy ordnance, exclu- 
 sive of field artillery, in the fortifications and coast defences, shall 
 remain in their emplacements for the term of six months to be 
 reckoned from the exchange of ratifications of the treaty ; and 
 the United States may, in the meantime, purchase such material 
 from Spain, if a satisfactory agreement between the two Govern- 
 ments on the subject shall be reached. 
 
 ARTICLE VI. 
 
 Spain will, upon the signature of the present treaty, release all 
 prisoners of war, and all persons detained or imprisoned for politi- 
 cal offences, in connection with the insurrections in Cuba and the 
 Philippines and the war with the United States. 
 
 Reciprocally, the United States will release all persons made 
 prisoners of war by the American forces, and will undertake to 
 obtain the release of all Spanish prisoners in the hands of the 
 insurgents in Cuba and the Philippines. 
 
 The Government of the United States will at its own cost return 
 to Spain and the Government of Spain will at its own cost return 
 to the United States, Cuba, Porto Rico and the Philippines, ac- 
 cording to the situation of their respective homes, prisoners 
 released or caused to be released by them, respectively, under this 
 article. 
 
594 APPENDIX. 
 
 ARTICLE VII. 
 
 The United States and Spain mutually relinquish all claims for 
 indemnity, national and individual, of every kind, of either Gov- 
 ernment, or of its citizens or subjects, against the other Govern- 
 ment, that may have arisen since the beginning of the late 
 insurrection in Cuba and prior to. the exchange of ratifications of 
 the present treaty, including all claims for indemnity for the cost 
 of the war. 
 
 The United States will adjudicate and settle the claims of its 
 citizens against Spain relinquished in this article. 
 
 ARTICLE VIII. 
 
 In conformity with the provisions of Articles I, II, and III of 
 this treaty, Spain relinquishes in Cuba, and cedes in Porto Rico 
 and other islands in the West Indies, in the island of Guam, and 
 in the Philippine Archipelago, all the buildings, wharves, bar- 
 racks, forts, structures, public highways and other immovable 
 property which, in conformity with law, belong to the public 
 domain, and as such belong to the Crown of Spain. 
 
 And it is hereby declared that the relinquishment or cession, 
 as the case may be, to which the preceding paragraph refers, 
 cannot in any respect impair the property or rights which by law 
 belong to the peaceful possession of property of all kinds, of 
 provinces, municipalities, public or private establishments, eccle- 
 siastical or civic bodies, or any other associations having legal 
 capacity to acquire and possess property in the aforesaid terri- 
 tories renounced or ceded, or of private individuals, of whatsoever 
 nationality such individuals may be. 
 
 The aforesaid relinquishment or cession, as the case may be, 
 includes all documents exclusively referring to the sovereignty 
 relinquished or ceded that may exist in the archives of the Penin- 
 sula. Where any document in such archives only in part relates 
 to said sovereignty, a copy of such part will be furnished when- 
 ever it shall be requested. Like rules shall be reciprocally 
 observed in favor of Spain in respect of documents in the archives 
 of the islands above referred to. 
 
 In the aforesaid relinquishment or cession, as the case may be, 
 are also included such rights as the Crown of Spain and its 
 authorities possess in respect of the official archives and records, 
 executive as well as judicial, in the islands above referred to, 
 
APPENDIX. 595 
 
 which relate to said islands or the rights and property of their 
 inhabitants. Such archives and records shall be carefully pre- 
 served, and private persons shall without distinction have the 
 right to require, in accordance with law, authenticated copies of 
 the contracts, wills and other instruments forming part of nota- 
 rial protocols or files, or which may be contained in the executive 
 or judicial archives, be the latter in Spain or in the islands afore- 
 said. 
 
 ARTICLE IX. 
 
 Spanish subjects, natives of the Peninsula, residing in the ter- 
 ritory over which Spain by the present treaty relinquishes or cedes 
 her sovereignty, may remain in such territory or may remove 
 therefrom, retaining in either event all their rights of property, 
 including the right to sell or dispose of such property or of its 
 proceeds ; and they shall also have the right to carry on their 
 industry, commerce and professions, being subject in respect 
 thereof to such laws as are applicable to other foreigners. In case 
 they remain in the territory they may preserve their allegiance to 
 the Crown of Spain by making, before a court of record, within 
 a year from the date of the exchange of ratifications of this treaty, 
 a declaration of their decision to preserve such allegiance ; in 
 default of which declaration they shall be held to have renounced 
 it and to have adopted the nationality of the territory in which 
 they may reside. 
 
 The civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of 
 the territories hereby ceded to the United States shall be deter- 
 mined by the Congress. 
 
 ARTICLE X. 
 
 The inhabitants of the territories over which Spain relinquishes 
 or cedes her sovereignty shall be secured in the free exercise of 
 their religion. 
 
 ARTICLE XI. 
 
 The Spaniards residing in the territories over which Spain by 
 this treaty cedes or relinquishes her sovereignty shall be subject 
 in matters civil as well as criminal to the jurisdiction of the courts 
 of the country wherein they reside, pursuant to the ordinary laws 
 governing the same ; and they shall have the right to appear 
 
596 APPENDIX. 
 
 before such courts, and to pursue the same course as citizens of 
 the country to which the courts belong. 
 
 ARTICLE XII. 
 
 Judicial proceedings pending at the time of the exchange of 
 ratifications of this treaty in the territories over which Spain re- 
 linquishes or cedes her sovereignty shall be determined according 
 to the following rules: 
 
 1. Judgments rendered either in civil suits between private 
 individuals, or in criminal matters, before the date mentioned, 
 and with respect to which there is no recourse or right of review 
 under the Spanish law, shall be deemed to be final, and shall be 
 executed in due form by competent authority in the territory 
 within which such judgments should be carried out. 
 
 2. Civil suits between private individuals which may on the 
 date mentioned be undetermined shall be prosecuted to judgment 
 before the court in which they may then be pending or in the 
 court that may be substituted therefor. 
 
 3. Criminal actions pending on the date mentioned before the 
 Supreme Court of Spain against citizens of the territory which by 
 this treaty ceases to be Spanish shall continue under its jurisdic- 
 tion until final judgment ; but, such judgment having been ren- 
 dered, the execution thereof shall be committed to the competent 
 authority of the place in which the case arose. 
 
 ARTICLE XIII. 
 
 The rights of property secured by copyrights and patents 
 acquired by Spaniards in the Island of Cuba and in Porto Rico, 
 the Philippines and other ceded territories, at the time of the 
 exchange of the ratifications of this treaty, shall continue to be 
 respected. Spanish scientific, literary and artistic works, not sub- 
 versive of public order in the territories in question, shall continue 
 to be admitted free of duty into such territories, for the period of 
 ten years, to be reckoned from the date of the exchange of the 
 ratifications of this treaty. 
 
 ARTICLE XIV. 
 
 Spain will have the power to establish consular officers in the 
 ports and places of the territories, the sovereignty over which 
 has been either relinquished or ceded by the present treaty. 
 
APPENDIX. 597 
 
 ARTICLE XV. 
 
 The Government of each country will, for the term of ten years, 
 accord to the merchant vessels of the other country the same 
 treatment in respect of all port charges, including entrance and 
 clearance dues, light dues, and tonnage duties, as it accords to its 
 own merchant vessels, not engaged in the coastwise trade. 
 
 This article may at any time be terminated on six months' 
 notice given by either Government to the other. 
 
 ARTICLE XVI. 
 
 It is understood that any obligations assumed in this treaty by 
 the United States with respect to Cuba are limited to the time of 
 its occupancy thereof; but it will upon the termination of such 
 occupancy, advise any Government established in the island to 
 assume the same obligations. 
 
 ARTICLE XVII. 
 
 The present treaty shall be ratified by the President of the 
 United States, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate 
 thereof, and by Her Majesty the Queen Regent of Spain ; and 
 the ratification shall be exchanged at Washington within six 
 months from the date hereof, or earlier if possible. 
 
 In faith whereof, we, the respective Plenipotentiaries, have 
 signed this treaty and have hereunto affixed our seals. 
 
 Done in duplicate at Paris, the tenth day of December, in the 
 year of Our Lord one thousand eight hundred and ninety-eight, 
 
 [seal] William R. Day. 
 [seal] Cushman K. Davis, 
 [seal] William P. Frye. 
 I [seal] Geo. Gray. 
 
 [seal] Whitelaw Reid, 
 [seal] Eugenic Montero Rios. 
 [seal] B. de Abarzuza. 
 
 [seal] J. DE GaRNICA. 
 
 [seal] W. R. de Villa Urrutia. 
 [seal] Rafael Cerero, 
 
CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE. 
 
 189 
 
 S. 
 
 Jan. 
 
 23- 
 
 " 
 
 24. 
 
 " 
 
 25. 
 
 " 
 
 26. 
 
 " 
 
 29. 
 
 Feb. 
 
 8. 
 
 « 
 
 9- 
 
 " 
 
 14. 
 
 Mar, 
 
 15- 
 
 17- 
 
 19. 
 
 20. 
 
 21. 
 
 U. S. Fleet assembled at Key West. ; 
 
 The battleship Maine ordered to Havana. 
 The battleship Maine arrived at Havana. 
 Spain ordered the battleship Vizcaya to visit America. 
 Spain ordered a squadron to sail for Havana. 
 Translation of a letter written by the Spanish minister at 
 Washington, speaking disparagingly of President McKin- 
 ley, published by the Cuban Junta in New York. 
 The Spanish Minister at Washington recalled. 
 Spain appointed Sehor Louis Polo de Bernabe to succeed 
 
 Sefior Dupuy de Lome as Minister at Washington. 
 At 9 : 40 P. M., while moored to the buoy assigned her by the 
 Government pilot in the harbor of Havana, the battleship 
 Maine was destroyed by an explosion. 
 A Court of Inquiry on the Maine disaster appointed. 
 The Spanish Government disavowed the reflections on Presi- 
 dent McKinley by its late Minister at Washington, Sefior 
 Dupuy de Lome. 
 The Spanish cruiser Vizcaya reached New York, 
 The remains of 135 of the crew of the Maine were given a 
 public funeral in Havana, and buried in a local cemetery 
 at the expense of the Spanish authorities. 
 The United States Government declined a request by Spanish 
 
 officials for a joint examination of the Maine wreck. 
 Spanish officers made an examination of the Maine wreck. 
 The Maine's Court of Inquiry held its first session. 
 The Senate directed its Naval Committee to investigate the 
 
 Maine disaster ; voted $200,000 for the investigation. 
 The Vizcaya left New York for Havana. 
 
 Premier Sagasta declared that no Spanish Government would 
 arbitrate the Cuban trouble. 
 , United States Senator Proctor arranged an investigating trip 
 from Havana to the Cuban provinces. 
 The Navy Department decided to send two war ships to Cuba 
 with supplies for the reconcentrados, 
 
6oo CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE. 
 
 Mar. 4. Spain began assembling a naval fleet at Cadiz for Cuba. 
 
 " 6. Spain asked the recall of Consul-General Lee from Havana, 
 
 and the substitution of merchant for war-vessels for the 
 transport of relief supplies. 
 Both requests were refused. 
 " 7. Spain withdrew her request for the recall of Consul-General Lee. 
 
 " 8. In Congress, the House passed the $50,000,000 National De- 
 
 fense Bill unanimously. 
 " 9. Senator Proctor completed his tour of the Cuban provinces. 
 
 In Congress, the Senate adopted the $50,000,000 National De- 
 fense Bill unanimously. 
 " II. In Congress, the House Naval Committee provided for three 
 
 new battleships to cost $5,000,000 each. 
 " 13. A special Board was appointed to examine all vessels the U. S. 
 
 Government might wish to buy or lease. 
 " 16. Spain remonstrated to the United States against the presence 
 of the White Squadron at Key West. 
 Speech of Senator Proctor in United States Senate on the con- 
 dition of Cuba. 
 " 17. The Navy Department divided Admiral Sicard's fleet and 
 ordered a formidable squadron to Hampton Roads. 
 19. The United States battleship Cr^^tf« left San Francisco for the 
 Atlantic Station. 
 In Congress, the House adopted a bill to admit war supplies free. 
 " 21. The Court of Inquiry on the Maine disaster completed its inves- 
 tigation and reported its inability to fix the responsibility. 
 " 23. The Navy Department increased the fleet at Key West. 
 " 25. The light-house tender Mangrove was ordered to Havana to 
 convey to Key West all American officials excepting Con- 
 sul-General Lee. 
 A flying squadron was organized at Hampton Roads. 
 " 26. President McKinley announced his intention to ask Congress 
 i to appropriate $500,000 for the relief of Cuban reconcen- 
 
 trados. 
 " 29. American ultimatum on Cuban situation presented to Spain. 
 April i. Spain replied to American ultimatum in unsatisfactory terms. 
 Spanish torpedo flotilla arrived at Cape Verde Islands. 
 " 5. Consul-General Lee directed to return home. 
 
 7. Representatives of the Powers at Washington presented a joint 
 expression of a hope for peace, to the President. 
 " 8. Premier Sagasta announced a termination of negotiations. 
 
 " II. President McKinley sent message on Cuba to Congress, 
 
CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE. 6or 
 
 April 12. In Congress, the Foreign Committees of the two Houses prac- 
 tically agreed to authorize the President to intervene in 
 Cuba, and favored a recognition of independence. 
 " 13. Spanish Cabinet deiared the United States policy incompatible 
 with Spanish sovereignty and voted a large war credit. 
 14. The Spanish Minister at Washington arranged to turn the 
 Legation over to the French Ambassador. 
 " 15. The Navy Department chartered the steamships S/. Paul, St. 
 Louis, City of Paris and City of New York. 
 The British Government notified its officials at Jamaica that 
 coal would be contraband of war. 
 16. In Congress, the Senate adopted the intervention resolution. 
 
 19. A conference committee's report on the Senate resolution for 
 
 intervention, with the recognition clause stricken out, was 
 adopted by each House of Congress. 
 
 20. President McKinley signed the intervention resolution and sent 
 
 an ultimatum to Spain. 
 Spanish Minister at Washington demanded his passports. 
 
 21. The Spanish Government sent the United States Minister at 
 
 Madrid his passports before he delivered the ultimatum. 
 Sampson's fleet at Key West ordered to blockade Havana. 
 
 22. President McKinley proclaimed a blockade of Havana and 
 
 other Cuban ports, and the United States cruiser Nashville 
 captured the first prize of war off Key West. 
 The United States squadron at Hong Kong, under Commodore 
 Geo. Dewey, sailed for Manila, Philippine Islands. 
 
 23. President McKinley issued a call for 125,000 volunteers. 
 
 In Congress, the Army Reorganization Bill was adopted and a 
 War Revenue Bill introduced, both in the House. 
 " 25. President McKinley recommended to Congress the recognition 
 of a state of war with Spain, and a resolution declaring 
 that war had existed since April 21, was adopted in both 
 Houses. 
 
 John Sherman, Secretary of State, resigned and Wm. R. Day. 
 Assistant Secretary, was appointed his successor. 
 27. The United States warships. New York, Puritan and Cincin- 
 nati shelled the batteries of Matanzas, Cuba. 
 29. Portugal issued a neutrality proclamation, thus forcing the 
 Spanish squadron, under Admiral Cervera, to leave the Cape 
 Verde Islands. 
 
 The Senate adopted conference report on Naval Appropriation 
 Bill. 
 
 The House passed the War Revenue Bill. 
 
6o2 CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE. 
 
 May I. Commodore Dewey's squadron of six warships destroyed 
 
 Spanisli fleet of eleven vessels, w^ithout the loss of a ship 
 
 or a man. 
 " 2. In Congress, both Houses voted a war emergency appropriation 
 
 of $34,625,725. 
 " 4. Admiral Sampson's fleet sailed from Key West. 
 
 " 7. President McKinley appointed Commodore Dewey, Acting 
 
 Rear-Admiral. 
 " 9. Congress adopted resolutions of thanks to Admiral Dewey. 
 
 " II. Three United States vessels engaged the batteries at Cardenas, 
 
 Cuba, and Ensign Bagley was killed. 
 General Merritt appointed Military Governor of the Philippines. 
 " 12. Admiral Sampson bombarded the fortifications of San Juan. 
 " 14. The cable at Cienfuegos, Cuba, was cut by Americans. 
 " 15. The Atlantic Coast Patrol Squadron went on duty. 
 
 All members of the Spanish Cabinet resigned. 
 " 17. In Congress, the House Committee on Foreign Affairs reported 
 
 favorably on the annexation of Hawaii. 
 " 18. Sehor Sagasta formed a new Cabinet. 
 " 19. Admiral Cervera's fleet reached Santiago. 
 " 23, The first United States troops for the Philippines embarked. 
 " 24. It was reported that the combined squadrons of Admiral 
 
 Sampson and Commodore Schley had securely trapped 
 
 Admiral Cervera's fleet in Santiago Harbor. 
 " 25. Three more transports left San Francisco for Manila. 
 United States Government decided to seize Porto Rico. 
 The battleship Oregon reached Jupiter Inlet, Fla. 
 " 27. Amendments were offered to the War Revenue Bill in the 
 
 Senate, providing for the annexation of Hawaii. 
 " 28. General Shafter was ordered to move the army at Tampa. 
 " 31. Fortifications at the entrance of Santiago Harbor bombarded. 
 June 2. In Congress, the House passed an Urgent Deficiency Bill. 
 " 3. Assistant Naval Constructor Hobson sank the collier Merriinac 
 
 across the entrance of Santiago Harbor. 
 " 4. The Senate adopted the War Revenue Bill. 
 
 Captain Charles V. Gridley, U. S. N., commander of Admiral 
 
 Dewey's flagship, died in Kobe, Japan, aged 53 years. 
 " 7. Fortifications at Caimanera bombarded by United States ships. 
 
 " 9. Admiral Sampson seized Guantanamo Bay. 
 
 " 10. A force of 600 United States Marines was landed at Caimanera. 
 In Congress, the Senate adopted the conference report on the 
 
 War Revenue Bill. 
 
CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE. 603 
 
 June 12. The United States Marines holding Caimanera were engaged 
 for thirteen hours by Spanish regulars and guerrillas. 
 " 13. President McKinley signed the War Revenue Bill. 
 " 14. The Fourth Army Corps, under Major-General John J. Cop- 
 
 pinger, was selected to occupy Porto Rico. 
 " 15. Captain-General Blanco received authority to treat for the 
 exchange of Naval Constructor Hobson and his comrades. 
 The House adopted the resolution for the annexation of Hawaii. 
 " 22. General Shafter's army began landing at Baiquiri. 
 
 24. Americans marching towards Santiago attacked by Spaniards. 
 
 Rough Riders had a severe engagement at La Ouasina. 
 27. It was decided to send a squadron under Commodore John C. 
 Watson to attack Spanish coast cities. 
 
 " 29. Flying squadron merged into Admiral Sampson's fleet off 
 Santiago. 
 
 " 30. Admiral Camara was requested by the Egyptian Government 
 to withdraw from Port Said as soon as possible. 
 The first expedition to Manila arrived at Cavite. 
 July i. El Caney and San Juan Hill captured by United States troops. 
 The War Revenue Bill went into effect. 
 " 2. The army and navy resumed the attack on Santiago. 
 
 " 3. On orders from Spain, Cervera attempted to escape from 
 
 Santiago Harbor. Fleet totally destroyed by Americans. 
 General Shafter demanded the surrender of Santiago before 
 July 5. 
 " 5. Admiral Camara's squadron entered Suez Canal. 
 
 The threatened bombardment of Santiago was delayed. 
 " 6. Naval Constructor Hobson and his comrades were exchanged. 
 
 The Senate adopted the Hawaiian Annexation Resolutions. 
 " 7. President McKinley signed the resolutions for the annexation 
 
 of Hawaii. 
 Cruiser rJiiladclphia ordered to Honolulu. 
 
 " 8. Admiral Camara ordered to return to Spain immediately. 1 
 
 General Shafter informed General Toral that the attack on 
 Santiago would be renewed if the city was not sur- 
 rendered by noon, July 9. 
 Congress adjourned till December 5. 
 " 9. General Toral offered to surrender Santiago on condition that 
 his army be allowed to retreat, but General Shafter refused. 
 " 10. General Toral declined to surrender and was notified that bom- 
 bardment by the army and navy would be opened at four 
 P. ]M. A further delay however occurred. 
 " II. General Miles landed in Cuba with additional reinforcements. 
 All members of the Spanish Ministry resigned. 
 
6o4 CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE. 
 
 July 12. General Toral was given until noon of the 14th to surrender. 
 " 14. Genera! Toral agreed to surrender. 
 
 Popular subscriptions to the war-loan exceeded $1,300,000,000. 
 " 17. General Toral formally surrendered to General Shafter. 
 " 18. President McKinley proclaimed temporary government for 
 Santiago. 
 Advance force of the United States expedition to Porto Rico 
 sailed. 
 
 " 20. General Leonard Wood appointed Military Governor of 
 Santiago. 
 
 25. General Miles landed the Porto Rico expedition at Guanica. 
 " 26. General Merritt, the United States Governor of the Philippines, 
 
 arrived at Manila with the second military expedition. 
 " 28. Orders were issued to General Shafter to send his army to the 
 United States as soon as possible, because of the fever. 
 City and port of Ponce surrendered to General Miles. 
 " 30. President McKinley and Ambassador Cambon reached an 
 agreement on a basis for peace. President demanded sur- 
 render of sovereignty over Cuba and Porto Rico ; cession 
 of one of the Ladrone Islands, and possession of Manila, 
 pending disposition of the Philippines by a joint com- 
 mission. 
 Aug. I. Camp Alger was ordered abandoned. 
 
 2. President McKinley made public the terms of "peace. 
 
 3. Spain accepted the United States terms of peace. 
 Troops at Camp Alger transferred to Manassas. 
 
 5. Guayama, Porto Rico, captured by United States troops. 
 
 6. The Infanta Maria Teresa, Admiral Cervera's flagship, raised. 
 9. Spaniards made a night attack on United States troops at 
 
 Malate. 
 
 10. Peace protocol was agreed upon by Judge Day, Secretary of 
 State, and Ambassador Cambon of France, in behalf of 
 Spain. 
 
 A new tariff for Cuba was promulgated by the War Depart- 
 ment. 
 
 11. The Spanish Cabinet approved the peace protocol. 
 
 12. Peace protocol signed in Washington. President immediately 
 proclaimed an armistice, ordered cessation of hostilities 
 and raised the blockade of Cuba, Porto Rico and Manila. 
 
 13. Ignorant of the arrnistice, the United States troops captured 
 Manila. 
 
 17. The War Department promulgated a tariff for the Philippines. 
 
CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE. 605 
 
 Aug. 18. The United States troops occupied all former Spanish posi- 
 tions at Manila. 
 
 " 20. New York gave a grand reception to Admiral Sampson's fleet. 
 First mail to Spain since war opened, sent from New York. 
 
 " 23. Surgeon-General Sternberg recommended that all sick troops 
 in Cuba and Porto Rico be sent north immediately. 
 The Navy Department opened bids for the construction of 
 twenty-eight torpedo boats and destroyers. 
 
 " 24. Severe fighting between Spaniards and insurgents in the 
 Visaya Islands was reported. 
 
 " 25. Red Cross steamer Comal sailed from Tampa with 1,000,000 
 rations for the destitute in Havana. 
 
 " 26. The United States Peace Commission was completed as fol- 
 lows : — Wm. R. Day (President), Cushman K. Davis, 
 Wm. P. Frye, Edvv. D. White and Whitelaw Reid. 
 Sept. 3. President McKinley inspected Camp Wikoff at Montauk Point. 
 
 " 5. The Spanish Cortes re-assembled. 
 
 " 9. Associate Justice White declined appointment to the Peace 
 
 Commission and .Senator George Gray was selected. 
 The United States and Spanish Military Commissions for Porto 
 Rico held their first joint session in San Juan. 
 
 " 12. The United States and Spanish Military Commissions for 
 Cuba held their first joint session in Havana. 
 
 " 13. The Spanish Cortes ratified the peace protocol. 
 
 " 16. Spain appointed the following Peace Commission : — Montero 
 Rios (President), W. R. de Villa Urrutia, Buenaventura 
 de Abarzuza, General R. Cerero and Jose de Garnica. 
 Judge Day resigned the office of Secretary of State. 
 
 " 18. Admiral Montojo suspended by Spanish Council of War. 
 
 " 19. .Spain recalls her troops remaining in the West Indies. 
 
 " 24. President McKinley demanded that Spaniards begin evacuation 
 of Cuba by October 15, and complete it by December 31. 
 Oct. I. The Peace Commissioners held their first joint session. 
 
 " 3. Admiral Dewey was instructed to send two warships to China. 
 
 " 6. Rear-Admiral Howell was succeeded in the command of the 
 
 North Atlantic Squadron by Commodore Philip. 
 
 " 7. President McKinley decided that Porto Rico must be evacuated 
 
 October 18, and Cuba by December i. 
 
 " 8. The Navy Department reported that during the war only 
 
 seventeen sailors were killed and sixty-seven wounded. 
 Two sessions of the Peace Commissioners were held separately. 
 Spain insisted on the assumption of the Cuban debt by the 
 United States. 
 
6o6 
 
 CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE. 
 
 Oct. II. 
 
 i6. 
 
 i8. 
 24. 
 
 25- 
 
 26. 
 
 27. 
 
 Nov. 
 
 Dec. 
 
 31- 
 I. 
 
 3- 
 
 5- 
 
 12. 
 
 13- 
 
 16. 
 
 18. 
 
 20. 
 21. 
 
 23- 
 24. 
 26. 
 28. 
 I. 
 
 A Naval Board of Inquiry decided that the battle of Santiago 
 was fought on plans originating with Rear-Admiral 
 Sampson. 
 
 Captain-General Macias of Porto Rico sailed for Spain, 
 
 Spanish evacuation of Porto Rico was officially completed. 
 
 The limit for evacuation of Cuba extended to January i, 1899. 
 
 Nine warships took part in the Peace Jubilee at Philadelphia. 
 
 Admiral Dewey released the Spanish sailors captured at Manila. 
 
 The Spanish Peace Commissioners accepted declaration of 
 United States Commissioners on question of Cuban debt. 
 
 Philadelphia celebrates Peace Jubilee with military parade. 
 
 United States Commissioners demanded whole of Philippines. 
 
 The Infanta Maria Teresa foundered off the Bahamas. 
 
 A United States Naval Reservation at Honolulu was established. 
 
 Secretary of State Hay made public the protocol of peace. 
 
 The Washington Cabinet instructed the United States Peace 
 Commissioners that the right to consider the disposition of 
 the Philippines would not be debated further. 
 
 In reply to a request for further time, the United States Gov- 
 ernment notified Spain that Cuba must be evacuated by 
 Jan. I. 
 
 At the joint meeting of the Peace Commission the Spaniards 
 asked that the Philippine clause be submitted to arbitra- 
 tion. 
 
 The Navy Department abandoned the Infanta Maria Teresa. 
 
 Contracts were signed for the raising and refitting of three 
 Spanish warships, sunk in the battle of Manila, for 
 $500,000. 
 
 Commercial bodies in Spain urged a speedy conclusion of peace. 
 
 The United States Peace Commissioners delivered an ultimatum 
 rejecting the proposal for arbitration, offering $20,000,000 
 for the Philippines, and insisting on resignation of all 
 claims arising since the beginning of the Cuban insurrection. 
 
 The Hawaiian Commission held its first meeting in Washington. 
 
 British officials at Manila celebrate American Thanksgiving. 
 
 Marshal Blanco resigned the office of Captain-General of Cuba. 
 
 Spanish Peace Commissioners accepted United States ultimatum. 
 
 Filipino Independents declared that they would fight for inde- 
 pendence before they would accept the bartering of the 
 islands. 
 
 The Spanish Supreme Court at Santiago de Cuba was reorgan- 
 ized and installed as a United States judicial authority. 
 
CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE. 607 
 
 Dec. 3. John McCullagh, ex-Superintendent of Police of New York, 
 
 was commissioned to reorganize the police force of Havana. 
 
 " 6. The chief differences in the Peace Commission adjusted ; treaty 
 
 to be signed in a few days. 
 " 7. Hawaiian Commissioners' report sent to Congress. 
 
 " 9. Assistant Secretary Vanderlip reported that the customs col- 
 
 lections in Porto Rico aggregated more than $100,000 since 
 American occupation. 
 " 10. Treaty of Peace signed by the Peace Commissioners in Paris. 
 " II. Major-General Lee left Savannah on the transport Pamxi/ia for 
 Havana. 
 Red Cross steamer Comal sailed for Havana with 1,250,000 
 
 rations for starving Cubans. 
 General Calixto Garcia, Cuban patriot, died in Washington. 
 General John R. Brooke appointed Military Governor of Cuba. 
 " 12. General Wm. Ludlow appointed Military Governor of the city 
 
 of Havana. 
 " 13. Brooklyn^ Tiuvi'.y, C(r?j>"//«<? and AViW;//;" ordered to Havana. 
 •' 17. Battleships Oregon and IoT.ua arrived at \'alparaiso. Chili, on 
 
 their way to the Pacific. 
 1899. 
 Jan. I. Formal transfer by Spain to the United States of the sover- 
 eignty of Cuba. 
 " 16. President appointed commission of five to study commercial and 
 social problems of the Philippines. 
 Feb. 6. Treaty of Peace ratified by the United States Senate. Yeas, 57 ; 
 nays, 27. 
 " 15. Anniversary of destruction of battleship Maine. Appropriate 
 
 exercises held at Havana. 
 " 20. Bill appropriating $20,000,000 for payment to Spain under the 
 provisions of the treaty of peace, passed by the House of 
 Representatives. 
 " 24. Triumphal entry into Havana of General Gomez and 500 of his 
 troops. 
 Mar. I. Bill making Rear- Admiral Dewey an Admiral passed by the 
 Senate. 
 " 6. United States Commission to the Philippines arrived at Manila, 
 
 " 17. Treaty of Peace signed by the Queen Regent of Spain. 
 Apr. II. Exchange of treaties of peace at Washington between Secretary 
 of State Hay and M. Cambon, French Ambassador who 
 acted for Spain. 
 
I 
 
 I 
 
 i