E 
 
 wntiw i iiMfm i w w iMiiiuwiiw wwi 
 
 Battle of Atlanta 
 
 Jind Other Campaigmj 
 .Addresses, Etc. 
 
 MA.!OR-GP.Nf:HAl r^mNVitlE M. lnn)C 
 
 :| 
 
Class, Fif'(c.i4^ 
 
 prksi:nted by 
 
COMPLIMENTS 
 
 OF 
 
 GENERAL GRENVILLE M. DODGE 
 

 MAJOR-GENERAL GRENVILLE M. DODGE 
 
 Comniauder 
 
 Department of the Missouri 
 
 ISGo. 
 
THE 
 BATTLE OF ATLANTA 
 
 AND 
 
 OTHER CAMPAIGNS, 
 ADDRESSES, Etc. 
 
 Major-General Grenville M. Dodge 
 
 COUNCIL BLUFFS, IOWA 
 THE MONARCH PRINTINC; COMPANY 
 
 1910 
 
^^' 
 
 -y 
 
 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 Page. 
 
 The Southwestern Campaign 9 
 
 Letter of General Dodge to his Father 35 
 
 The Battle of Atlanta 3 9 
 
 Letter to General Raum 5 3 
 
 The Indian Campaigns of 1864-65 63 
 
 The Indian Campaigns of 1865-66 79 
 
 Campaign up the Tennessee River Valley Ill 
 
 The Army of the Tennessee 129 
 
 The Campaign in the West 137 
 
 A Talk to Old Comrades 145 
 
 General Grant 151 
 
 Use of Block-Houses During the Civil War 159 
 
 An Incident of the War 165 
 
 Gen. G. M. Dodge on the Water Cure 173 
 
 Misplaced Sympathy 177 
 
 LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS 
 
 Major-General Grenville M. Dodge Frontispiece 
 
 Major-General Samuel R. Curtis 7 
 
 Sylvanus Dodge 34 
 
 Sixteenth Army Corps in the Battle of Atlai^ta 38 
 
 Monument on the Battlefield of Atlanta 52 
 
 Old Fort Kearney 62 
 
 James Bridger, Guide 78 
 
 Pumpkin Buttes 94 
 
 Brigadier-General G. M. Dodge and Staff 110 
 
 Commanders of the Army of the Tennessee 128 
 
 Major-General G. M. Dodge and Staff 136 
 
 Fort Cottonvi^ood 140 
 
 Where General McPherson Fell 144 
 
 Major-General George E. Meade 150 
 
 Pontoon Bridge Across the Tennessee River 158 
 
 To the Memory of Samuel Davis 164 
 
 Company L, Fifty-First Iowa Infantry 172 
 
 Scotts Bluffs 176 
 
MAJOR-GEXEKAL SAMUEL R. CURTIS 
 
 Commander of the Army of the Southwest, in the Spring of 1861. 
 
THE SOUTHWESTERN CAMPAIGN 
 
 The Southwest became prominent before the nation vavly in 
 tl;e war from the doubt existing as to the position of Missouri, 
 will eh was saved hy the energy and determination of Franlv P. 
 Bhiir and Colonel Nathaniel Lyon; the latter first capturing Camp 
 Jackson, on :\Iav loth, 1861. He then, piclving up what force he 
 could Avithout waiting for them to be disciplined or drilled, marched 
 rapidly against the Missouri State troops under Price, who were 
 driven to tlic soutliwest through Springfield, where, being joined 
 by the troops from Arkansas, under Colonel McCollough, they stood 
 and fought the battle of Wilson's Creek. This would have been a 
 great victory for the Fnion forces if Lyon had not divided his 
 forces at the request of General Siegel and trusted the latter to 
 carry out his plan of attack in the I'car while Lyon attacked in 
 the front. This General Siegd failed to do. leaving the field when 
 the l)attle was half over, and allowing Lyon to fight it out alone. 
 Even then, if Lyon bad not been killed at tlie head of his Army 
 while fighting the whole force of the enemy, it would have turned 
 out to be a great victory for the Union forces, and would have held 
 that country. The death of Lyon caused a return of his troojis to 
 Eolla and Sedalia. and opened \\]^ again the wlioU' of Missouri to 
 the Missouri State troops under General Price. 
 
 One of the notable facts of this l)attle of Wilson's Creek was 
 that it was ftmght by young officers who ranked only as Ca|)tains 
 and Lieutenants, all of whom afterwards liecame distinguished 
 officers in the war' — Schofield, Sturgis, Totten, DuBois, and Sweeny 
 — and from the fact that in the first great battle of the Southwest 
 one of the two commanders of Armies falling at the head of their 
 forces in battle was killed liere — General L\on. The other was 
 General j\IcPherson, who fell at Atlanta. 
 
 Lyon pursued tlie tactics of Grant by attacking the enemy 
 wherever to be found, and not taking into consideration the dis- 
 parity of forces. The excitement caused by Lyon's camjiaigns in- 
 —9 — 
 
10 The Southwestern Campaign". 
 
 duced the Govcvnnient to create the Western Department, and 
 assign to it on July 2.")tli. isiil. General John C. Fremont as its 
 commander. 
 
 In August, ISC)!, I huKh'd in St. Louis with my Kegiment, 
 the Fourth Iowa Infantry, and soon after was sent to Eolla, Mo., 
 which was then the most important outpost, being the nearest to 
 the enemy's Army. Soon after 1 reached there General Fremont 
 commenced formulating his plans for the campaign in the South, 
 and l)oing the commander of that outpost I was in daily communi- 
 cation with him. There was a constant stream of reports coming 
 from the enemy's lines that seemed to give great importance to their 
 strength and their position, and I was continually ordered to send 
 out scouts and troops to test the information. I invariably found 
 it wrong and my telegrams will show my o])inion of those reports. 
 
 Soon after arriving at Eolla I was placed in comnuind of the 
 post, and had cpiite a force under me, and was ordered to prepare 
 to winter there. 
 
 The battle of Wilson's Creek was fought on August 10th, and 
 soon thereafter General Price formed his plan of campaign to move 
 north into north Missouri and endeavor to hold it by the recruits 
 that he could obtain there. With from five to ten thousand men 
 of the Missouri State Guards, General Price moved, and as he 
 marched north in September his Army increased heavily in num- 
 bers and enthusiasm. Tlie Federal forces were scattered all over 
 Missouri — some eighty thousand in all. At least half of these could 
 have been concentrated to operate against any force of the enemy, 
 but they were all protecting towns, cities and railways and endeav- 
 oring to make Missouri loyal, while Price concentrated and moved 
 where he pleased, until, on September 21, ISGl, he captured Lex- 
 ington, with some 3,000 or more prisoners. The movement of Price 
 on Lexing-ton and the defeat and capture of our forces there, forced 
 Fremont to concentrate, and he moved with four Divisions, making 
 an Army of 38,000, on Springfield, which he reached October 27th. 
 Price was then far south of that place. Had our forces been con- 
 centrated to meet Price's Army we had enough to defeat him ; but 
 the moment Fremont commenced concentrating his four Divisions 
 to act against him, Priie moved hack as fast as he had advanced, 
 and did not stoj) until lie was soutli of Springfield and near supports 
 in i\rkansas. 
 
The Southwestekx C'ampaiox. 11 
 
 General ^McCullongh, in his letters from Springfield, Mo., 
 August 24th, says that there were. only 3,000 troops in Springfield 
 and all the Arkansas troops had left the service. Price's total force 
 was about 12,000 men, and on November 7th he reached and joined 
 McCullough and suggested to General A. S. Johnston a campaign 
 against St. Louis, offering to raise in Missouri and Arkansas a 
 force of 25.000 men in such a camijaign, and stated he should 
 wait for Fremont at Pineville. Ark., l:)e]ieving in tliat rugged coun- 
 try he could defeat him. 
 
 While at IJnlla I was ordered to send a force to take Salem, 
 
 to the south of me, and I entrusted the command of the force to 
 
 Colonel Greusel, of the Thirteentli Illinois Infantry. I issued to 
 
 him the following instructions : 
 
 If the men who are away from home are in the rebel Army, or if their 
 families cannot give a good account of them or their whereabouts, take their 
 property or that portion of it worth taking ; also their slaves. Be sure that 
 they are aiding the enemy, then take all they have got. 
 
 \Y\^en I wrote these instructions I had not considered for a 
 moment what a row the order to take the slaves would cause. I 
 sini])ly treated them as other ])roperty. It was written innocently, 
 but made a sensation I never dreamed of, and I have often since 
 been quoted as one of the first to liberate and utilize the negro. 
 
 On the return of Lyon's Army to RoUa I was ordered by Gen- 
 eral Fremont to report at his headquai'ters in St. Louis. On my 
 arrival in St. Louis I reported myself to his Adjutant, who was 
 in the basement of the old home of Thomas A. Benton, on Choutau 
 Avenue. l)ut was unable to obtain an interview with the General. 
 I showed my dispatch to his Adjutant-General, and waited there 
 two days. I met any numl)er of staff officers, and was handed about 
 from one to another, never reaching or hearing from General Fre- 
 mont. After remaining in St. Louis two days I considered it was 
 my duty to return to my command, and left a note to the Adjutant 
 stating that I had waited tlieiv two days for an interview with 
 General Fremont, and had left for my command, and that if 
 wanted would return to St. Louis again. 
 
 Evidently no communication was made to Fremont of my 
 presence in tlie city or of my note, for soon after 1 arrived at Rolla 
 I received a sharp note from liim asking why I had not reported 
 as ordered. I answered l)y wire that I had reported, had been unable 
 to see him, and would report immediately again in St. Louis. I 
 was determined to see him this time, and I, therefore, went directly 
 
12 The Southavestern Coipaiox. 
 
 to Coloiu'l Benton's house, and, taking a sealed envelope in my 
 liand. marched right up tlie front steps, passed all the guards as 
 tliougli J belonged there, and went into his room and reported 
 myself jjresent. I tliere learned from liini as much of his plans 
 as he thought best to give me in regard to Ids movements, and 
 obtained from him the information that Price's Army was not 
 far from Rolla, and instructions to be on the alert. I supposed 
 that my command at Bolla was to accompany his march to Spring- 
 field, and on my return to Rolla made every ])reparation to do so, 
 but never received the order. Everything in the department was 
 absolutely chaos. It was impossible to obtain [)rovisions, accouter- 
 ments, equipment, or anything else upon a proper requisition. 
 Everything seemed to require an order from one of General Fre- 
 mont's staff, and my own lieginient suffered a long time before I 
 could get for it tlie necessarv arms, clothing, equipment, etc. 
 
 AVhile I was at Eolla the dispatch sent l)y the Government to 
 General Gurtis, to be forwarded to Fremont at Springfield, reliev- 
 ing him of the command, was brought by a staff' officer to me with 
 the request that I should see that the staff' officer had an escort 
 and went through promptly to Springfield. General Curtis, who 
 was from my own state, wrote me a private note stating the im- 
 portance of pushing this staff officer through. President Lincoln 
 sent the order to General Curtis with this peculiar note : 
 „ . ,. ,, 7 c< D /-( *• Washington, October 24, 18G1. 
 
 My Dear Sir: — Herewith is a ildcuinent, half letter, half order, which, 
 wishing you to see but not to mal^e public, I send unsealed. Please read it 
 and then inclose it to the officer who may be in command of the Department 
 of the West at the time it reaches you. I cannot know now whether Fre- 
 mont or Hunter will then be in command. Yours truly. 
 
 A. Lincoln. 
 
 In a few days I received a letter from General Hunter, who 
 had relieved General Fremont, instructing me tliat thereafter 
 everything in the department must be carried on in accordance 
 with the orders of the War Department and the Army Regulations, 
 and I immediately saw a change for the better. I was soldier 
 enough, although I had not had much experience then, to know that 
 the methods being pursued under Fremont could bring nothing 
 but disaster to the service. Every order was signed by somebody 
 acting as a General, a Colonel, or something else, while in fact 
 many of them had no rank whatever, and in looking over my own 
 orders I do not know wliv T did not sign mvself as an Actino; Gen- 
 
The Southwestern" Campaign. 13 
 
 ♦ 
 eral, as those who suceceded me did. Even after General Halleek 
 took command I noticed in the orders of General Hunter that he 
 assigned persons to the command of a Brigade as Acting Brigadier- 
 Generals instead of their rank as Colonel Commanding, etc. 
 
 I remained at Eolla nntil the return of the troops under 
 General Hunter; and finally those commanded by Siegel, Asboth 
 and Osterliaus were encamped at Eolla outside of the post and 
 were reporting directly to the commanding officer of the depart- 
 ment, while 1 as i)0st commander reported directly to the same 
 authority. 
 
 General Hunter as soon as he look connuand Avired the War 
 Department that there was no force of the enemy in his neighlwr- 
 liood, although orders had been given 1iy Fremont a day or two 
 before to march out and fight Price's Army. Hunter, therefore, 
 in accordance witli his ordcn-s from Wasliingtoii. al^andoned the 
 pursuit, although with tlie force lie liad lie could have driven 
 Price and McCullough south of the Arkansas Kiver, and probably 
 have avoided the later campaign that ended in the Battle of Pea 
 Eidge. Hunter moved his forces back to Eolla and Sedalia and 
 sent 18,000 of his men to join General Grant in the campaigns up 
 the Tennessee River. 
 
 This force at Eolla was mostly Germans, and the change of 
 commanders from Fremont to Hunter, and later to Halleek, was 
 unsatisfactory to them, though one of the officers. General Oster- 
 haus. took no part in the feeling and sentiment that seemed to 
 exist that for success it was necessary to liave Fremont or Siegel 
 in connnand, and my understanding was that the force at Eolla 
 during the winter of 18G1-G2 Avas the nucleus of the force that was 
 again to march to the Southwest under the orders of General Hal- 
 leek and to be commanded by General Siegel. General Halleek, 
 ■when he assumed command of the department, in his letters to 
 the War Department and his orders to the troops showed plainly 
 his disgust at the condition of matters in that department. He 
 wrote to the War Department: 
 
 One week's experience here is suflicient to prove that everything is in 
 complete chaos. The most astounding orders and contracts for supplies of 
 all kinds have been made, and large amounts purported to have been re- 
 ceived, but there is nothing to show that they have ever been properly issued 
 and they cannot now be found. 
 
 Of the condition of the troops he found in his department, he 
 
 wrote : 
 
14: The Southwestern Campaign. 
 
 Some of these corps are not only organized in a way entirely contrary 
 to law, but are by no means reliable, being mostly foreigners, and officered in 
 many cases by foreign adventurers, or perhaps refugees from justice ; and, 
 having been tampered with by political partizans for political purposes, they 
 constitute a very dangerous element to society as well as to the Army itself, 
 Wherever they go they convert all Union men into bitter enemies. The men, 
 if properly ofiicered, would make good soldiers, hut witli tlieir present officers 
 they are little better than an armed mob. 
 
 They were not i>ai(l, had not heen mustered into our service, 
 and the commissions emanated from General Fremont, not from 
 the State or Government. 
 
 General Halleck's plans evidently were to make a campaign 
 against Price as soon as he could organize the forces concentrated 
 at Rolla. Price's headquarters were at Springfield, and his north- 
 erly line Avas along the Osage Valley. His force was estimated 
 anywhere from 10,000 to 30,000. As outposts General Halleck had 
 Rolla, Jefferson City, and Sedalia. There was located at Eolla 
 five or six thousand troops; at Sedalia and along that line al)out 
 ten or twelve thousand, under General Pope, including Jeff C. 
 Davis's Division ; but these troops Halleck intended to send down 
 the Mississippi and up the Tennessee. 
 
 General Pope in his letters to General Halleck urged that 
 he be allowed to move on Price and destroy his Army, which he 
 said he could do with his force. Rumors of Price's force and their 
 movements were a constant terror and excitement throughout Mis- 
 souri. The whole of northern Missouri Avas aroused by Price's 
 l)roximity, and all the counties had recruiting officers from his 
 Army enrolling and sending it recruits. The numbers of these re- 
 cruiting officers and their small squads of recruits were magnified 
 into thousands, and Price, wdien he sent a thousand men to Lexing- 
 ton for the purpose of holding that place and recruiting, brought 
 orders from Halleck for a movement of all the troops to cut him off. 
 The prompt movement of Halleck kept him from remaining there 
 very long, but he Avas enabled to take about three thousand recruits 
 from there Avithout molestation from us. 
 
 Price's campaign as planned for the Avinter Avas to have Gen- 
 eral McCnllongh's Arkansas force, Avhicli Avas lying at Cross Tim- 
 bers, near Elkhorn Tavern, and Van Ruren in Arkansas, join liim. 
 Price complained bitterly of his inability to ol)tain any aid from 
 McCullough, stating that if he could obtain it he could march into 
 northern Missouri and hold the State, and recruit there an Army 
 of Missourians; Avhich, from my experience in the State, I have 
 
The Southwestern Campaign. 15 
 
 no cl(3iibt Jie would have done if he could have moved there and 
 held his position. 
 
 General Halleck's plan evidently was to move a body from 
 Rolla directly on Springfield, with the intention of striking and 
 defeating Price before Price could receive reinforcements, but Hal- 
 leck had a great disinclination to move until he had organized the 
 forces in the State of Missouri into Brigades and Divisions, had 
 them properly mustered and officered, and had his stafE departments 
 so arranged that they could be depended npon to take care of any 
 moving column. This disinclination of Halleck to move carried 
 us on to the first of January. 
 
 In December General Siegel was given command of the troops 
 at Rolla, and Captain Phil Sheridan was sent there as Quarter- 
 master for that Army. His ability and foresight in organizing 
 the transportation of an Army, feeding it, and fitting it for a 
 campaign, was shown every day. 
 
 On December 26th General Halleck assigned General S. E. 
 Curtis to the command of the District of Southwest Missouri. This 
 included the forces under Siegel at Eolla, and caused very severe 
 comments from them. From the letters of Halleck, written at the 
 time and afterwards, this placing of Siegel under Curtis was caused 
 by the letters and opinions — in fact, the denunciations — of Siegel 
 made by Captains Schofield, Totten, and Sturgis, when with Lyon 
 in the Wilson's Creek campaign. Evidently Halleck lost all faith 
 in Siegel as commander of the Southwestern Army, and therefore 
 assigned Brigadier-General Samuel E. Curtis, Avho had been sta- 
 tioned at St. Louis, to the command. But General Siegel was still 
 left in command of two Divisions of the troops near Eolla, which 
 was a great mistake. 
 
 As soon as General Curtis assumed command General Halleck 
 commenced urging him to move to the south on Springfield, agree- 
 ing to send to him Colonel Jeff C. Davis's Division to join him be- 
 fore reaching Springfield, which Division w'as about 5,000 strong, 
 and was with Pope on the Lamine Eiver line. Curtis hesitated, and 
 did not feel secure with the forces he had, although Halleck did 
 not believe Price w^ould stand for a fight, or that Curtis would 
 need Jeff C. Davis's Division. 
 
 The Army of the Southwest, about seven thousand strong, was 
 organized at Eolla, and moved from there January 14th, towards 
 Springfield, halting at Lebanon. From Lebanon it moved on to 
 
IG The Southwestern Campaign. 
 
 Marshfield, where Colonel Jetf C. Davis, witli his Division, joined 
 it. Great preparations were made there for the attack upon Price, 
 and we moved out of Marshfield prepared for battle, General Siegel 
 commanding the First and Second Divisions, one under General 
 Osterhaus and the other under General Asboth. General Jeff C. 
 Davis, from General Pope's Army, commanded the Third Division, 
 and Colonel Eugene A. Carr the Fourth Division, a Brigade of 
 which I commanded. 
 
 When within about three miles of Sj^ringfield we received 
 orders to attack tliat town the next morning, and moved at mid- 
 night. All the reports we received were that Price was in S})ring- 
 field ready for battle. I had the extreme left, and pid out my 
 skirmishers soon after midnight, supposing, of course, that I was 
 in front of the enemy, although I had seen nothing of them. In 
 the darkness I lost track of the company of the Fourth Iowa, 
 who were the skirmishers of my Brigade, and was greatly wor- 
 ried at the fact, but at dajdight I met them on the road mounted 
 upon horses and dressed in all kinds of 'costumes. The officer in 
 command, who was an enterprising one, had started his skirmish- 
 line, and, not meeting an}^ enemy, had jiushed right into Spring- 
 field, which he found evacuated except for a rear guard and a num- 
 ber of horses. They mounted the horses and rode back to us. All 
 this time our extreme right, imder Siegel, was using its artillery 
 upon the town, not knoAving that the enemy had gone. 
 
 General Curtis, in his order of battle, instructed Ca]itain 
 Sheridan to line u[) his transportation in the rear of the line of 
 battle, so that it could be used as a defensive obstruction for the 
 troops to fall back to, provided they met any check or were driven 
 back. Captain Sheridan looked on this order as a very singular 
 one, and says that he could, in his imagination, if anytliing hap- 
 pened our army, see his transportation flying over that rough coun- 
 try, knowing that his mule-drivers would l)e the first to run. most 
 likely from a false rejiort, not even waiting for an attack. While 
 this order at the time caused no comment, it now, after our long ex- 
 ])erience, looks very ridiculous, though not more so than many oth- 
 ers we received at the beginning of the war. 
 
 It was not long before we were all on the mai'ch through 
 and bej'ond Springfield, Price and his Army being in full retreat, 
 with a force, so far as we could learn, of al)out ten thousand 
 men. We followed him as rapidly as possible, he leaving a strong 
 
The SouTHWESTEK^T C'amfaigx. 17 
 
 rear guard under Colonel Little to sto}) us at every stream. Gen- 
 eral Siegel had urged upon General Gurtis a detour l)y his two 
 Divisions to head off Price or stop him. so that he could attack him 
 in front while we attacked his rear. Gurtis had acceded to this. I 
 had the advance following up Price, and endeavored to hold him, 
 while Siegel moved l)y anothei- road, expecting to catch him in 
 flank or get ahead of him. 
 
 I remend^er that ahout noon of each day at some good de- 
 fensive i)oint. generally across a creek with a wide, open valley, 
 Price would oi)en out with his artillery and ca\alrv and act as 
 though he intended to give hattle. Our cavalry would fall back to 
 give way to our infantry, and we woidd go into line, put out our 
 skirmishers, and lose half a day, and as night came on Price would 
 get out without our accomplishing anything. I remember dis- 
 tinctly that my Pegiment would go into line, strip themselves, and 
 throw down the t-hickens, potatoes, apples, and otlier eatables they 
 had foraged and taken during the day, and as they would go for- 
 ward the trooj)s in our I'ear would come up and gobl)le what they 
 had dropped. Al>out tlie third time the Eegiinent went into line 
 I noticed the hoys luul left nothing but their knapsacks, and were 
 holding on to their chickens and provisions. One of the bo3's saw 
 me looking at them, and thinking I was going to order them to 
 drop what they had in their hands or on their backs, he appealed 
 to me, saying, "Golonel, we have fed that damned Thirty-sixth Illi- 
 nois Infantry every day and left ourselves without any supper. 
 They put u]) this game that is going on to get our chickens. There 
 ain't any Price on that side of the river, and they can't fool us any 
 longer if they do you." 
 
 At Cane Greek. Flat Greek, Sugar Greek, etc., we had pretty 
 sharp skirmishes. I soon discovered the plan of Price. It was 
 to leave a strong rear-guard and make a great show while his trains 
 and the rest of his Army were ])ushing to the South as fast as pos- 
 sible ; so as soon as I saw him sto]) I went at him head-on with the 
 cavalry and infantry, not e\en Avaiting to deploy more than a 
 Pegiment. Pi'ice's men would line the road and get one or two 
 volk" s at us and then slip off into the woods before we could deploy 
 or return their fire. They did not get hurt much, but we did; but 
 at the same time it l)roke uj) his game of holding us back, and we 
 kept close on to his rear. For two or three days we were looking 
 for Siegel to aet in ahead and check Pi'ice, when to our astonish- 
 
18 The Southwestern Campaign. 
 
 nient a report came from our rear that lie had turned his column 
 in on our road some eiglit miles behind \is, and there was a gen- 
 eral howl from the force that had been ])ounding away at Price's 
 rear. 
 
 Finally Ave pushed Price back to Fayetteville, Ark., where we 
 landed during the month of February, and where we were halted 
 by General Halleck's orders, who stated that he would relieve our 
 front of the enemy by his movements with the rest of his forces 
 through Southeast Missouri, down the Mississippi, and up the Ten- 
 nessee. 
 
 While Price Avas laying at Springfield, in December, he com- 
 municated with the Confederate Government, and changed all his 
 Missouri State force as far as practicable into Confederate troops. 
 He also complained to the Government, and to General Polk, who 
 commanded at Columbus, Ky., of the impossibility of obtaining the 
 co-operation of the Confederate forces west of the Mississippi River. 
 From the representations of Polk and Price, the Confederate Gov- 
 ernment organized all the country Avest of the Mississippi River into 
 a department known as the Trans-Mississippi District, and placed it 
 under the command of General Earl Van Dorn, Avho assumed com- 
 mand early in February, 1862. As soon as he assumed command 
 General Van Dorn prepared to make an aggressive campaign, using 
 all his forces in i\.rkansas and those under Price, estimating that 
 they Avould reach 30,000 troops. His plan Avas to move his forces 
 directly from Arkansas northward, west of Iron Mountain, by way 
 of Salem, while Price moved from Springfield directly east and 
 joined his column by way of Salem and Rolla, thence the combined 
 column to move directly on St. Louis, Van Dorn calculating that 
 he could strike and capture St. Louis before Halleck could concen- 
 trate his troops or obtain any knoAvledge of his movements that 
 would enable him to defeat him before reaching St. Louis. Van 
 Dorn expected to make this move in February, and his plans and 
 the energy with which he executed them and concentrated his troops 
 shows him to have been an officer of ability and great energy. 
 General Halleck's prompt movement of General Curtis's army 
 from Rolla southwest in January, thus driving Price out of Spring- 
 field, compelled Van Dorn to change his plans, and instead of mov- 
 ing toAvards St. Louis he moved his troops by Van Buren and the 
 Boston Mountains, making a junction with Price's force in the 
 Boston Mountains beloAV Fayetteville, and Avhile General Curtis's 
 
The Southavestern C'ampaigx. 19 
 
 Army was la^ying at C'ross Hollows, evidently in full security, 
 thinking his campaign was over and expecting Price and Van Dorn 
 to be drawn away from his front by the movement down the Mis- 
 sissippi. General Curtis was obliged to scatter his forces in that 
 destitute country over a wide expanse so as to obtain food and 
 forage. Van Dorn, without our having any knowledge of the fact, 
 marched over the Boston Mountains, and it was March 3d before 
 General Curtis was aware that Van Dbrn was almost in his front 
 and on his flank. The I"nion refugees flying before Van Dorn's 
 movement gave us the first reliable notice of the new combina- 
 tion and the new movement. General Curtis immediately sent out 
 orders, and, by miarching all night, during heavy snows and se- 
 vere cold weather, was able to concentrate most of his force on 
 Sugar Creek, near Bentonville. General Siegel and his force did 
 not move promptly, as ordered by Curtis, and was almost cut off 
 before reaching Bentonville. Ho had to cut his way through a 
 portion of Van Dorn's Cavalry, which he was al)le to do without 
 much loss, and our line was formed on the north side of Sugar 
 Creek, facing to the south, — a strong j^osition, — expecting to ' 
 receive Van Dorn's attack on the main telegraph road from Fayette- 
 ville to Springfield. We were on a plateau with a broad open val- 
 ley in our front. In the rear of us was what was known- as the 
 Cross Timbers, a deep gorge. To the west of us Avas much open 
 ground, over which was a road parallel to the main road, passing 
 down what was known as Little Cross Timbers, and entering the 
 Springfield and Fayetteville road about midway betAveen Elkhorn 
 TaA'ern and Cassville, some four miles in our rear. 
 
 While I Avas in command at Rolla I had organized by details 
 from the Twenty-fourth and Twenty-fifth Missouri Eegiments a 
 Corps of scouts AA^ho lived in Xorthern Arkansas and Southern Mis- 
 souri and Avere thoroughly acquainted Avith that country. During 
 the day of the 6th of March, while Siegel Avas joining us and Ave 
 were preparing for the battle, some of these scouts came to me 
 and told me that Van Dorn proposed to move to our rear by this 
 Little Cross Timber road. About 4 o'clock in the afternoon I 
 went to General Curtis and re])orted these facts to him, and also 
 told him of this road and of the feasibility of blockading it, sup- 
 posing, of course, he Avould send some of the troops on his ex- 
 treme right to do it; but he turned to me and said: "You take a 
 portion of your command and go there and l)lockade the road." 
 
20 The South west eux C'ampaigx. 
 
 It was after dark before I could reaeli the Little Cross Tim- 
 bers, as I had to inarch infantry to tlie place, which was quite a dis- 
 tance away from where wc were. J took six companies of the 
 Fourth Iowa Infantry and one company of the Third Illinois Cav- 
 alry and marched to carry out this order. In the dark two of my 
 companies crossed the road and got lost, while with the other five 
 I got into Cross Timbers Hollows and spent about three hours 
 felling trees all through the gorge, and only left when my cavalry 
 reported the movement of Yan Dorn's Army coming down the 
 road. I returned to my eamj) supi)Osing my two companies had 
 been cut off, but u|)on discovering that the enemy were coming 
 down the road they managed to get back across it and reached the 
 camp. 
 
 I reported immediately to General Curtis's headquarters, and 
 informed him that Van Dorn's Army was moving down that road 
 to his rear. He did not believe it, and thought that I had mis- 
 taken some of his cavalry for Yan Horn's Army. There were no 
 pickets out on our right flank, and I so reported to General Curtis, 
 but evidently my report made no impression u})on him, and I 
 returned to cam]). 
 
 Early on the morning of the 7 th of March I received a 
 request from General Curtis to report at a schoolhouse that was 
 on the main Fayetteville road a half mile north of Sugar Creek, 
 where I met all the commanders of Divisions, and, I think, some 
 of the Brigade commanders, and where a council of war was being 
 held as to the policy that was to be pursued. I was so confident 
 that Yan Horn was in our rear that when I went to this council I 
 took my Brigade and halted it on the road near whore the council 
 was to be held. Generals Siegel, Asboth, and a majority of the 
 officers present, advised that we should fall l)ack to Cassville to- 
 wards Springfield, and not give battle there, Init Colonel Jeff C 
 Davis and myself protested, and I stated that 1 l)elieved a portion 
 of Van Dorn's force was then in our rear. The rear of Curtis's 
 Army was in a great deal of confusion ; its trains were stretched out 
 on the F'ayetteville road and the ground that we were upon was 
 wooded and not very defensible for a battle, unless they attacked 
 us on the Sugar Creek front. 
 
 While we were in this council, about 8 :30 a. m., scattered fir- 
 ing commenced in our rear near the Elkhorn Tavern, and General 
 Curtis in(|uired what it was, and asked what troops those were that 
 
The Southwestern Campaign. 21 
 
 were out iqion the road, i answered that they were mine, and he 
 ordered Colonel Carr to immediately send me to the Elkhorn Tav- 
 ern and ascertain Avhat the firing- meant. 
 
 Colonel Can' evidently was of the same opinion as myself, 
 and aeeom])anied me as T moved as rapidly as possible to the Elk- 
 horn Tavt'rn. v,here we went without being deployed right into bat- 
 tle ; in fact, right into the enemy's skirmishers. The fact is, the 
 first notice I had that tb.e battle was on was when a shell fell 
 among my drummers and lifers, who were at the head of my Regi- 
 ment, and killed and demoralized tliem, so that we heard no more 
 of drumming and fifing that day. 1 immediately deployed a 
 company of the Fourth Iowa, which had been thoroughly drilled 
 as skirmishers, and pushed forward toward the White Eiver road, 
 seeing some teams of the enemy passing that way with forage, and 
 I pushed down the slopes of the Cross Timber Hollows nearly a 
 mile before I developed the enemy in force. 
 
 The firing of the artillery and the sharp skirmish firing of my 
 movement satisfied Colonel Carr that the enemy was in force in 
 my front, and he immediately sent liack" word for his other Brigade, 
 Commanded by Colonel Yandever, (^f the Xinth Iowa Infantry, to 
 come to the rear, now our front. They had hardly reached the Elk- 
 horn Tavern and deployed into line before Price's whole Army 
 moved in on us in line of liattle and disabled two of our batteries. 
 The fighting on this front, with only Carr's two Brigades in line, 
 the strength of lioth not exceeding thive thousand men, was kept up 
 continuously all day. until dark, Avith varying success. 
 
 As soon as I saw, near the middle of the day, the formation of 
 the enemy. I knew that 1 could not hold the extended line we were 
 covering, and 1 commenced drawing in mv right and closing on 
 Yandever until 1 backed down through an open field that had been 
 cleared, and where the logs had been hauled to the lower edge of 
 the slope to make a fence. Behind these logs I placed my 
 Brigade and fought all the afternoon, with the enemy sometimes 
 around both flanks and sometimes in my rear. 
 
 Colonel A^andever held his line at the Elkhorn Tavern in the 
 edge of thick timber on the main Fayetteville road until late in the 
 afternoon, fighting desperately, when the enemy, taking advantage 
 of the timbei' as a blind, l)y largely superior numbers, drove him 
 back across an open field to a line of Avoods in his rear and in 
 mv rear, wbieb he successfullv held. T Avas not aAvare of his move- 
 
The Southwestern Campaign. 
 
 ment until the tire in that direction slaclvened. and I sent out my 
 adjutant, Lieutenant James A. Williamson (afterwards a Brevet 
 Major-General), who returned and reported that the enemy were 
 in possession of that field; in fact, he ran right into them and re- 
 ceived their fire, but got back to me safely. It was then nearly dark. 
 The fire on my front had slackened, and. my Brigade was almost 
 entirely out of ammunition. I immediately ordered them to form 
 in column -and led them right out from the right, moving in the 
 direction where Vandever's Brigade had formed in its new position. 
 As I moved out I passed right in sight of a column of the Confed- 
 erate forces, who evidently had come out of the hollow and were 
 forming to again attack Vandever. They probably thought I was 
 a portion of their force, for they made no demonstration towards 
 me, and I passed right by them. As I passed out into the open I 
 could see that General Asboth, who had been brought there by 
 General Curtis, was forming to attack at the Elkhorn Tavern 
 again ; and I met General Curtis, who seemed astonished to find 
 me with my force intact. He asked me where I was going. I 
 told him that I ^\'as out of ammunition, and that I was bringing out 
 my force to form it on the new line. Paving the command a high 
 compliment, he immediately ordered me to fix bayonets and to 
 charge on the enemy at the same time that Asboth with his rein- 
 forcement moved down the Fayetteville road towards the Elkhorn 
 Tavern. I immediately did this, and passed right back over the 
 field where I had been fighting, but found no enemy. They had 
 evidently left my front at the same time I retired, and I returned 
 and went into line on tlie right of Vandever's Brigade, probably 
 500 feet in the roar of tlie original line, and there we laid all night 
 under arms. 
 
 Van Corn's plan of attack was to tlirow the Arkansas forces 
 under McCullough and ]\IcIntosh on Curtis's right, facing the Lit- 
 tle Cross Hollow road, while at the same time General Price with 
 his force moved around us l)y the Little Cross Timber road to our 
 rear and attacked from the Cross Timbers. 
 
 When passing through Little Cross Tindjor Hollow Price struck 
 the timber l)loekade, and, as he shows in his report, was held 
 there for a long time l)el'()re lie could clear out (he roads and get 
 his forces and artillery througli. This delaved his attack in the 
 rear until nearly 10 o'clock in the morning. Tlie two forces of 
 ^IcCullouoh and Price were setiarated l)v a liiuh I'idge bv the name 
 
The Southwestern Campaign'. 33 
 
 of Pea Eidge, over wliic-li it was impracticable for them to con- 
 nect, and, therefore, the two attacks were separate and not in con- 
 cert. 
 
 General McCullongh. in attacking from the west, struck Gen- 
 eral Jetf C. Davis's Division. Davis had a Division of troops that 
 had been thoroughly drilled. He was a very competent officer and 
 handled them with great skill, and the attack of McCullough and 
 I^lclntosh, though 'desperate, was without avail, both rebel com- 
 manders being killed in the attack, which took all the fight out of 
 the Arkansas troops and made their attacks towards evening of 
 very little effect. Davis pursued them so energetically that after 
 the death of their commanders they straggled off towards Ar- 
 kansas and no more fighting occurred on that flank. 
 
 General Siegel's two Divisions had remained facing Sugar 
 Creek. General Curtis had endeavored to bring them forward, but 
 without avail. A Brigade of General Osterhaus's Division aided 
 General Davis during the latter part of the day, but the Brigade from 
 Asboth's Division did not get into line to help Carr until nearly 
 dark, although General Curtis went in person for them. Colonel 
 Carr's troops had been marching two nights before the battle, and 
 on the night of the 7th he asked General Curtis to relieve them, so 
 they could get some sleep. General Curtis promised they should 
 be relieved by one of General Siegel's Divisions, but they held the 
 line all that night right where they were formed, and when we 
 looked for our relief the next morning we learned that General 
 Siegel and his troops were nearly a mile in our rear, taking their 
 breakfast. 
 
 The general plan of General Curtis's attack on the morning of 
 the 8th was for a combined movement on Price's Army by both 
 of General Siegel's Divisions, and General Davis, who had been 
 brought over to our front, holding Carr's Division in reserve. We 
 waited a long time for General Siegel to get into position; and in 
 fact before he got into position Colonel Carr had been brought out 
 from the reserve and placed on the right of Davis. The enemy 
 opened out upon us, and my Brigade holding the right I commenced 
 swinging my line in over the ground I had fought over the day be- 
 fore, and discovered that the enemy were withdrawing from us ; were 
 not standing and giving battle ; and the fighting on the morning of 
 the 8th was merely a fight of Price's rear-guard to enable him to 
 withdraw h\ the Huntsvillo road, ho having received orders that 
 
The Southavestern Ca]\li'ai(;n. 
 
 morning from \';iii Doin lo do so. ^'an Doin iioiit'ying Price that 
 this was necessai\. as ihc Arkansas troops, altci' the death of McCnl- 
 loii;zh and ^[elnlosli, had most of them retreated to the south, 
 leaving Price's Ai'iiiy ihe oidy force intact in our rear, so that he 
 now liad the diflicuH prohlem of getting away from us. 
 
 The fighting hisied hut a short time, mostly with artillery, 
 and occasioned very little loss tVir that day. We soon discovered 
 the rebels fleeing over the hills and down the White River Road, 
 and being nearest to that road I immediately started my Brigade 
 after them. T had not proceeded far when I received an order 
 from General Curtis t(^ return and hold the battle-held. I was a 
 good deal astonished at this, as I could see the enemy demoralized 
 in my front, with their baggage-trains and their artillery, and I 
 had no doubt, (as 1 knew the country. ]ia\ing had a detachment sta- 
 tioned at Blackl)urn's Mills, at the crossing of White River, supply- 
 ing our Army with forage and grain before the l)attle,) that I could 
 capture this jjortion of the army before it could make a crossing of 
 White River. 
 
 When T arrived on the liattle-field General Gurtis told me thai 
 General Siegel and his I)i\isions had gone to the rear towards 
 Cassville ; in fact, 1 myself heard him give one ot the Brigades that 
 was passing an order to halt there, which tliey did not obey, but 
 kept on. General Siegel wrote back advising Curtis to form 
 his new line in the rear of Gross Timbers, as Viin Dorn might 
 return to the hght, Init Curtis instructed Colonel (*arr"s Division 
 to remain on the held and hold it. which it did. General Curtis 
 afterwards made very severe comi)laints to General Halleck of the 
 actions of General Siegel, and in answer General Halleck wrote 
 as follows : 
 
 I was by no means surprised at General Siej>el's conduct before the 
 battle of Pea Ridge. It was plainly in keeping with what he did at Ca>-- 
 thage and Wilson's Creek. After your expedition started I received docu- 
 mentary proof from Captains Sturgis, Schofield, and Totten, and a number 
 of other officers, in regard to his conduct on those occasions, which destroyed 
 all confidence in him. It was for that reason that I telegraphed to you so 
 often not to let Siegel separate from you. I anticipated that he would try 
 to play you a trick by being absent at the critical moment. I wished to 
 forewarn you of the snare, but I could not then give you my reasons. I am 
 glad you prevented his project and saved your army. I cannot describe to 
 you how much luieasiness I felt for you. Yon saved your army and won a 
 glorious victory by refusing to take his advice. 
 
 Ca])tain Kinsnuin, of Com])any B. Fourtli Iowa, who was hold- 
 ir.g Pea Ridge, and witnessed tlie I»attle from that point, and could 
 
The Southwestern Campaign. 
 
 look down upon CarrV Division, (loseril)0(! tlio l)attlo in the rear as 
 follows : 
 
 At 8 :30 o'clock Colonel Dodge opened the ball, and the battle was soon 
 raging all along the line with a fierceness and obstinacy which omened a 
 terrific struggle. The weather was splendid, and the smoke instead of hang- 
 ing murkily among the trees, rose rapidly and rolled away over the hills iu 
 dense sulphurous masses. The thunder of the artillery was terrific, and the 
 shot and shell hissed and screamed through the air like flying devils, while 
 the infantry of both armies, with their rifles, shot-guns, and muskets, kept 
 a pi'it'i'ci liunicanc of death howling through the woods. The rebels fought 
 well, bill Liciii'ially lii-cd too high, and their batteries, although getting our 
 raiigv nciui-atcly, missed the elevation much of the time. Their poor shoot- 
 ing was our salvation. Had they done as well as our men, with the tre- 
 mendous odds against us, they must have annihilated us. The enemy were 
 clear around our right flank, enveloping us, and it looked as though they 
 would capture Dodge's Brigade, when Colonel Dodge took a battalion of 
 Colonel Carr's regiment, the Third Illinois cavalry, and charged the forces 
 that were turning our right flank like a whirlwind. Everything gave way 
 before them. Every man in that battalion seemed to ride for his life, and 
 they swept way around our front, routing and demoralizing that flank of 
 the enemy, and effectually freeing our rear and flank. Price told some of 
 our boys of the Fourth Iowa who were captured on the day of the fight and 
 have since escaped, that we fought more like devils than human beings. The 
 rebel colonels (several of them) inquired of our boys who those black-coated 
 fellows were, and who led them. They said there must have been at least 
 3.000 of them. When the boys told them there were less than 000 oi them, 
 the Colonels said they needn't tell them any such stuff as that; that they 
 knew it was a damned lie. But they sent their compliments to Colonel 
 Dodge for the bravery of himself and his command, and well they might, for 
 opposed to Colonel Dodge's Brigade of 1,050 men, and two guns of the First 
 Iowa Battery, were six regiments of Confederate troops, a large force of 
 Confederate Missouri State troops, and eighteen guns, and many of the.se 
 Confederate troops were the men who did the hard fighting at the Wilson 
 Creek battle. All day. from 8 :30 in the morning till 5 :30 at night. Dodge's 
 Brigade held its ground, dealing death into the rebel ranks, and, when dark 
 came, with ammunition expended, the Fourth Iowa walked away from the 
 field in good order, with the sullen savage tread of men who might be driven 
 by main strength, but could not be conquered. Although this was one of 
 the first battles of the war, the Northern men showed I heir d-sperate fighting 
 qualities ; and on the second day the South met and faced great slaughter. 
 
 Fayel, the correspondent of the Missouri Democrat, gives this 
 account of the part Colonel Eugene A. Carr's Fourth Iowa Divi- 
 sion took in the hattle at Elk Horn Tavern : 
 
 Having given an account of the battle fought b,y Brigadier-General 
 Jeff C. Davis's Division, which occurred the same day, on our left, I will 
 now attempt to give some details of the Elk Horn Battle — the latter having 
 commenced early in the morning. First in order comes a descriittion of the 
 locality, near Elk Horn Tavern. 
 
 The house is on the Fayetteville and Springfield road, about four 
 miles north of Sugar Creek, between which two points our camp was 
 pitched, on the elevated ridge constituting the northern bank of the creek. 
 Leading north from the tavern, the road drops into the head of the long 
 gorge running towards Keetsville seven miles, known as the "Cross Timbers." 
 
 Into the strong fastness north of the Tavern the enemy had obtained 
 a lodgment from 10,000 to l.'.OOO strong in the rear of onr wing, on the 
 morning of the Ttli. His strength consisted in part of tlu' following rebel 
 
26 The Soutiiwesteux Campaign. 
 
 Divisions, as was subsequently ascertained : Frost's, Slack's, Parson's, 
 and Rains's; and 'the batteries of Ghebor, Clark (six pieces), E. McDonald 
 (three pieces), and Wade (four pieces). There was present also one Regi- 
 ment of Indians, the whole commanded by General Van Dorn in person. 
 and General Price, who directs the Missouri forces. 
 
 Early in the morning, while General Curtis was in consultation with 
 his officers regarding a change of front, consequent on the approach of the 
 enemy on the west of us, news came that the enemy were in close vicinity 
 to the Elk Horn Tavern. The General then immediately ordered Colonel 
 Carr to proceed to effect a dislodgment of the enemy. The formidable num- 
 bers present at the time not being known. Colonel Carr directed Colonel 
 Dodge, with the First Brigade of the Fourth Division, to take a position 
 near the Elkhoru Tavern, Colonel Carr accompanying the expedition him 
 self. The point indicated was about a mile and a half distant from our 
 camp, the ground being level and gradually ascending, with open fields on 
 either side of the road, interspersed with an occasional belt of timber. 
 
 Colonel Dodge having discovered the enemy in the timber to the right, 
 opened the First Iowa Battery on them, causing considerable execution : 
 two rebels on horseback were seen to fall, and the rest fled. The enemy 
 having fled to the hollow. Colonel Dodge deployed his line, covering as much 
 ground as possible, the Thirty-fifth Illinois being on his left. He sent for- 
 ward a company of skirmishers from the Fourth Iowa, who soon became 
 sharply engaged with the enemy and the latter opened on us a perfect tor- 
 nado of round shot, shell, and grape. The Thirty-fifth Illinois became en- 
 gaged, fighting with determined bravery, and about this time Colonel Smith 
 was wounded in the head 'uy a shell, which took ofl: a part of his scalp. He 
 also received a bullet in his shoulder, and his horse was shot under him. all 
 about the same time. Just before he was wounded, several ammunition- 
 chests exploded, one after the other, wounding Captain Jones and Lieuten- 
 ant Gamble, who were standing near Colonel Carr, the latter making a 
 fortunate escape. The explosion of a caisson was terrific. 
 
 There was a short lull in the storm of leaden hail, during which time 
 the enemy advanced up the hollow through the brush, along the main road, 
 when Colonel Vandever, who had arrived, ordered forward the infantry. A 
 desperate conflict with small arms ensued. Back rolled the tide of battle, 
 the enemy being driven to the foot of the hill, when he reopened the batter- 
 ies. Our men fought like heroes ; many fell covered with wounds. The 
 latter, when brought to the rear by their comrades, encouraged those who 
 were still breasting the fierce cannonade, by hurrahing for the Union. 
 
 Colonel Vandever, in leading forward his brigade, had his horse hit 
 twice, and Colonel Phelps, in the van of his own Regiment, had three 
 horses shot under him. Major Geiger, of the same Regiment, and Captain 
 Hayden. of the Dubuque Battery, had two horses shot under them. Major 
 Coyle, of the Ninth Iowa, was wounded in the leg. 
 
 Colonel Dodge having discovered that the enemy were preparing for a 
 general attack, changed his front to the right, covering his men with a log 
 fence, thus compelling the enemy to cross an open field to reach him. Our 
 line was formed and we opened fire with one section of a battery, the 
 other pieces having left the field for want of ammunition. The enemy ad- 
 vanced on our right, left, and center, under cover of a destructive fire, 
 poured in on our works under twelve pieces of artillery. The fighting now 
 lasted over two hours, during which time we held our position ; only one 
 Brigade contending against at least six thousand rebel infantry and a 
 heavy bombardment from their artillery, the latter playing upon us at short 
 range. Our men fought like heroes without wincing under the galling fire 
 belching forth from behind trees and rocks, and much of the time from a 
 concealed foe. At one time we were reinforced by three rifled pieces from 
 a German battery, which fired four rounds, and then was com]ielled to 
 withdraw from the field, being flanked by a Regiment of the eneni^-. 
 
The Southwestern Campaign. 37 
 
 Colonel Dodge, in order to discover the position of the enemy on his 
 right, directed his firing to cease, when a thousand rebel plush caps and 
 black broad brims popped up into view from the bushes, and, forming, they 
 advanced with great confidence to within one hundred feet of our line. Our 
 men were then ordered to pour in a fire on the dastardly enemy, taking good 
 aim. They were thrown into confusion by our murderous volley and fled. 
 
 Their places were filled by a fresh Regiment, and Colonel Dodge, find- 
 ing that the enemy were outflanking him on the right and that his force 
 was too weak to permit an extension of his line, sent for and soon re- 
 ceived a reinforcement of five companies of the Eighth Indiana, which were 
 I)Osted on the right. The firing now became terrific. The enemy annoyed 
 us severely by placing a battery on our left, which completely enfiladed our 
 line. The Fourth Iowa now getting short of ammunition, and the Thirty- 
 fifth Illinois having been forced to give way on the left, it was at this criti- 
 cal time that Lieutenant-Colonel Challenor was ordered to rally his men, 
 who were hurled on the enemy, driving his left back a short distance. Hav- 
 ing advanced too far, the Lieutenant-Colonel was surrounded and captured 
 with forty of his men. Our ammunition, as before stated, having given 
 out. we fell back to the open field, maintaining our line of battle in 
 splendid order. The enemy rushed forward with their batteries and entire 
 force. The Fourth Iowa halted, turned on them, and checked for a time 
 their advai!((' until the last round of ammunition was exhausted. General 
 Curtis ((miing up about this stage of the action, was received with a round 
 of cheers from our boys. The General learning that the ammunition had 
 given out. ordered the Fourth Iowa to fix bayonets and charge on the 
 enemy. The men did so briskly, across the field, but found no enemy. 
 
 On Colonel Vandever's front the enemy now commenced swarming up 
 the road and along the gorge, and out of the brush in front of us. Our 
 troops fought them bravely, the officers exposing their persons in leading in 
 front of their men ; but we were overwhelmed at this time by superior 
 numbers. We retreated across the field, but rallied again along the fence 
 behind our original position. Upon retiring as above mentioned, reinforce- 
 ments were seen coming up under General Asboth. In a gallant attempt to 
 resist the advancing column of the enemy, General Asboth received a severe 
 wound in the arm. After the terrible conflict of the day our gallant troops 
 bivouacked in front of the enemy, awaiting the reopening of the conflict in 
 the morning. 
 
 Colonel Vandever fought Little's Division. Colonel Dodge's Brigade 
 contended in the morning directly with Rain's and Clark's Divisions, both 
 immediately under the direction of Sterling Price. The latter had his po- 
 sition for some time behind young Clarke's battery. 
 
 The enemy fired wagon-nuts, pieces of chain, marble, gravel, and all 
 sorts of projectiles. The overcoat worn by Colonel Dodge was perfectly 
 riddled by the jagged holes made by these unusual missiles. 
 
 Colonel Dodge, the day after the battle, received a letter from a widow 
 lady in Illinois, stating that she had three sons in the field fighting for the 
 Union ; that her youngest son, who was in feeble health, was in his Brigade, 
 and she asked it as a special favor to her in her loneliness to have him dis- 
 charged. The young man whose mother had such solicitude in his behalf 
 was named Preston Green, and was killed in the action of the Tth, near 
 Elkhorn, while bravely performing his duty. 
 
 During the battle. Colonel Dodge's horse was shot under him. An 
 enlisted man, detailed as clerk in the Adjutant's office, was acting as order- 
 ly for Colonel Dodge. When his horse fell, he ordered the orderly to dis- 
 mount and give him his horse. The orderly said, "You will be killed if you 
 get on another horse ; this is the third you have lost." But the orderly dis- 
 mounted and stood where the Colonel had stood when he asked for the 
 horse, and at that moment was instantly killed by a shot from the enemy. 
 After the liattle. tlio Adjutant, Lieutenant Williamson, found in the order- 
 
S8 The Southwestekx Campaign'. 
 
 l.v's desk a note in which lie sniil he was suro he would be killed in the bat- 
 tle, and in whicli. also, lie left directions as to the dis].osal of his effects and 
 whom to write lo. 
 
 Ill (jOiK'ral Price's comiiiaiul tliefo was a IJog-inu'iit or more 
 of Indians c-ommanded by Colonel Albert B. Pike. Tbev crawled 
 np througb the thick timber and attacked iiiv extreme left. I saw 
 them and tnnied one of the guns of my battery on them, and they 
 left. \Yq saw n(^ mor(> of them, btit they scal])ed and mutilated 
 some of otir dead, (ieiieral Curtis entered a C()Ui])laint to General 
 l*rice. who answered that they wei'e not of his command, and that 
 they had scalped some of his dead, and he said he did not approve 
 of their being upon the field. They evidently scal])ed many of the 
 dead, no matter what side they belonged to. 
 
 The battle of Pea Ridge being one of the first of the war and 
 one of unquestioned victory, had a great deal of attention called to 
 it. and for months — in fact for years, and, I think even now — was 
 c^)nsidered to have been won by (leneral Siegel. The ]U'oper credit 
 was not given to General Curtis, while the history and records of 
 the !)attle show that he was entitled to all of the credit, and fought 
 the battle in ()]>itosition to SiegeFs views. A statement of the 
 losses shows what commands fought the battle. The total force 
 engaged on our side, according to General Curtis's report, was 
 10,500 men, formed in four Divisions, Siegel's two Divisions being 
 the largest, the Third and Fourth Divisions having less than 2,000 
 men each. The losses were : 
 
 First Division,* commanded by Osterhans 144 
 
 Second Division,* commanded l).v Asboth 119 
 
 Third Division, commanded by Colonel Jeff C. Davis 329 
 
 Fourth Division, commanded by Colonel Carr 701 
 
 *Divisions were commanded by General Siegel. 
 
 Van Dorn's and Price's reports of the battle show how great 
 their defeat was, and why it was, and while for some time General 
 Curtis called anxiously on Halleck for more reinforcements, de- 
 manding that the column which was marching South in Kansas 
 be sent to him. A'au Dorn and Price, from the time they left the 
 field, never stopped until they lauded at Memphis, Tenn., their 
 first movement being towards Pocahontas, with a view of attacking 
 Pope in the rear, who was at N"eM^ Madrid. Finding Xew Madrid 
 ca])tured. they turned their forces to Desarc, and were then trans- 
 ported liy l)oats to ]\remphis. This relieved Missouri of any C*on- 
 federate force in or near its border, and General Halleck imme- 
 
The Southwestern Campaign. 29 
 
 diately gave General Curtis orders to move on the flank of Van 
 Dorn and keep up witli him, l)ut through that swampy, hilly coun- 
 try it was impossihle for him to meet Van Dorn, and Curtis with 
 his Army finally landed at Helena, Ark., and most of it joined 
 the Vicksburg siege. 
 
 Captain Phil Sheridan was the Quartermaster and Commis- 
 sary of General Curtis's Army. He kept us in flour, meat, and 
 meal, and sometimes had my whole regiment detailed in running 
 and protecting mills, driving cattle, etc. He had great difficulty 
 in obtaining details, as at that early day a good many commanders, 
 and especially General Siegel and his officers, did not think it the 
 duty of a soldier to be detailed on anything l)ut a soldier's duty; 
 so Sheridan naturally came to me, as lie was my Quartermaster 
 while I commanded the i)0st at Rolla, and when with the marching 
 column he camped and tented with me. Sheridan and Curtis 
 had considerable dillicidty. and Curtis relieved him and ordered him 
 to report to General Halleck, at St. Louis. We who knew Sheri- 
 dan's ability, and the necessities of our Army, did all we could to 
 hold liim with us. He left us just before the Battle of Pea Ridge, 
 and our Ai'uiy saw a great difference after he was gone. He used 
 to sav to me. '■Dodge, if 1 could get into the line I believe I could 
 do sometliing;" and his aml)ition was to get as high a rank as I then 
 had and as large a command— a Colonel commanding a Brigade. 
 In his memoirs he ])ays the Fourth Iowa a great compliment, and 
 says tlicv will have a warm place in his heart during his life. 
 
 Duri ug the Battle of Pea Ridge Sheridan was at Springfield, 
 Mo., preparing to turn over his property to the officer who was to 
 relieve him. and he there showed his soldierly ([ualities. The dis- 
 patches from Curtis's army had to l)e I'elayed at Springfield. The 
 first dispatches after the Ijattle were sent all in ])raise of General 
 Siegel, and by i)ortions of his command, claiming he had won the 
 battle. Sheridan, knowing this to be untrue, withheld the Siegel 
 dispatches until the telegrams from General Ciu-fis to General 
 Halleck were received, and sent them forward first, notwithstand- 
 ing the fact that he felt he had l)een unjustly treated by General 
 Curtis. 
 
 This Armv had no water or rail communication. It was 300 
 miles from its nearest supply-depot, and therefore it had to live off 
 of a country that was sparsely settled by poor people; but Sheri- 
 dan showed that doiuinant coiul)ination of enter|)rise and energy. 
 
30 The Southwestern Campaign. 
 
 by running every mill and using every means of supply within 
 fifty miles of lis. that he developed so fully later in the war. He 
 kept us and our stock fairly well supplied ; as I remember, there 
 weri' no complaints. When General Curtis concluded to relieve him, 
 I went with others and endeavored to induce him to change his 
 mind. I had had experience and knew what it was to have an Army 
 well fed a long ways from its base, and I felt that if we lost Sheridan 
 we would suffer, which later proved to be the case; but General 
 Curtis did not listen to us. In fact, he was angry at our appeal, 
 and his Adjutant, General McKinney, came to see us afterwards and 
 urged us not to press the matter; if we did, he said, we might go to 
 the rear with Sheridan. 
 
 At the Battle of Pea Eidge and during the campaign we were 
 very destitute of all hospital appliances for the care of the wound- 
 ed, and the ability and ingenuity of our medical staff in supplying 
 our wants was inestimable. The day after the battle, when we had 
 all our own wounded and so many of the enemy's with us, Mrs. Gov- 
 ernor Phelps, the wife of Governor Phelps, of ^Missouri, who com- 
 manded the Twenty-fifth Missouri Infantry, arrived on the field 
 with a general supply of sanitary goods, a part of which had been 
 sent to my Eegiment from Philadelphia by the father and mother 
 of Captain Ford, who was then a Lieutenant in Company B, Fourth 
 Iowa Infantry. These were a great relief, as fully one-third of my 
 command were killed and wounded, and were suffering for want of 
 this class of goods. Mrs. Phelps spent her time day and night on 
 the field aiding the surgeons and succoring the wounded. 
 
 General Curtis endeavored to send all the wounded to the rear 
 who could stand the trip. I was hauled 250 miles over a rough 
 road in an ambulance, and if any of you have had the same experi- 
 ence you can judge what I suffered. Captain Burton, of my Eegi- 
 ment, who was severely wounded in the arm. sat on the front seat 
 of that ambulance the whole distance, and never murmured, al- 
 though he came near losing his arm from the exposure. It was 
 during this ambulance trip, while lying on my back, that I re- 
 ceived a telegraphic dispatch from General Halleck notifying me 
 of my promotion for services in this battle. It was thought, and 
 M'as also stated in the pa])ers, that I could not live, and I told Gen- 
 eral Halleck afterwards that they expected to have the credit of 
 lunkiug a Briaadier-General and at the same time to have a vacancy, 
 
The Southwesterx Campaign. 31 
 
 too. but that on tlie vacancy I fooled them, for tlie promotion in- 
 sured my getting well. 
 
 This campaign demonstrated early in the war what could be 
 accomplished by a small Army 300 miles away from any rail or 
 water communication, in a rugged, mountainous, sparsely settled 
 country, marching in winter, and virtually subsisting upon the 
 country. Nothing escaped that Army that was eatable. 
 
 The Battle of Pea Eidge was fought by the two Divisions 
 commanded by (*arr and Davis, not exceeding G,000 men, and it is 
 a lesson in war that is very seldom appreciated: that no one can 
 tell what the result of a battle may l)e, and that even where forces 
 are very wide a])art in numbers it is not always the larger force 
 that wins. In this battle A^an Dorn had put twice as many men 
 into the fight as Curtis did, and still was defeated. His dividing 
 his force and attacking our Army at two different points was fatal 
 to his success, as General Curtis had the inside line and could 
 move from one jiart of his command to another within an hour, 
 wliile for Van Dorn to move from one portion of his Army to the 
 other would have taken at least half a day, and therefore he was 
 whipped in detail. If he had thrown his whole force upon Cur- 
 tis's right flank at the point where McCuUough fought and was 
 overwhelmed by Davis's Division, there would have been great 
 danger of our Army being defeated, or at least forced to the rear. 
 
 There was no strategy nor tactics in this battle ; it was simply 
 men standing up and giving and taking, and the one that stood the 
 longest won the battle. The only strategy or tactics was the 
 movement of Van Dorn attacking on the right flank and in the rear, 
 and these moves were fatal to his success. Curtis's Army fought 
 each man for himself. Every commander fought his own part of 
 the battle to the best of his ability, and I think the feeling of all 
 was that unless they won they would have to go to Eichmond, as 
 the enemv was in the rear, which fact made us desperate in meeting 
 and defeating the continued attacks of the enemy. I sent for 
 reinforcements once when the enemy was clear around my right 
 flank and in my rear, and they sent me a part of the Eighth In- 
 diana, two companies of the Third Illinois Cavalry, and a section of 
 a batterv. The battery fought ten minutes under a heavy fire. 
 The four companies of the Eighth Indiana lined up alongside the 
 Fourth Iowa, and stayed there fighting bravely until the end. The 
 Third Illinois hold mv right flank. The officer who brought this 
 
32 The Southwestern Campaign. 
 
 force to mo was Lieutenant Shields, of my own Regiment, avIio was 
 acting as aid on Colonel Carr's staff. As he rode up to me to re- 
 port the Eighth Indiana lie halted alongside of me, and at the same 
 instant lioth of our horses fell dead without a struggle — something 
 very unusual. 1 was quiclv. and junn)ed clear of mv horse, but 
 Shields's horse fell upon him. 1 walked away, not thinking of 
 Shields; but he called back to me and said, "Colonel, you are not 
 going to leave me this way are you?" and I returned and helped 
 him from under his horse. An examination of the two horses 
 made the next day, showed that tlu'y must haw been killed l)y the 
 same bullet, which passed through theii- necks at the sanu' [ihu-e. 
 killing them instantly. 
 
 A log house was used by us early in the morning as a temporary 
 hospital. When my skirmishers fell back this log house was left in 
 the lines of the enemy, and Hospital Steward Baker, of the Fourth 
 Iowa, was left in charge of the wounded there. When General 
 Price came u]) he asked him who those black-coated devils were, 
 and when Baker told him there were only six hundred he did not 
 believe him. He said no six hundred men could stand such at- 
 tacks, and paid the Brigade a very high comiiliment for their fight- 
 ing, and told Baker to give them his com[)liments. 
 
 I never returned to this Army. l)ut many of the troops who 
 fou2,-ht so gallantly fought afterwards in Corps and Armies that I 
 was connected with. ^ly own Eeginient went into Ijattle with o4:H 
 rank and file present. Company B was on detailed service holding 
 Pea Ridge, and had no casualties in line of battle. My Regiment 
 was greatly reduced from sickness and men on furlough, but the 
 bravery and steadiness with which those with me fought was a sur- 
 prise and a great satisfaction to me. One-third of them fell, and 
 not a straggler left the field. I had drilled the Regiment to most all 
 kinds of conditions — in the open, in the woods — and many com- 
 plained, and thought I was too severe, as many Regiments at the 
 posts where they were stationed only had the usual exercises; but 
 after this, their first battle, they saw what drilling, maneuvers, and 
 discipline meant, and they had nothing but praise for the severe 
 drilling I had given them. They never fell under my command 
 again, but on every held that they fouglit they won the praise of 
 their commanders, and General Grant ordered that they should 
 place on their banners, '"First at Chickasaw Bayou." 
 
The SouTHWESTEiiX Campaign. 33 
 
 I have never thought that General Curtis lias reeeived the 
 credit he was entitled to for this campaign and battle. With 12,000 
 men he tpversed Missouri into Arkansas, living off the country, 
 and showing good judgment in concentrating ta meet Van Dorn 
 and refusing to retreat when urged to do so at the conference at the 
 log schoolhouse on the morning of the 7th. The night of the 7th 
 I know some officers thought we ought to try to cut ourselves out to 
 the East, Price being in our rear; but Curtis said he would fight 
 where we were. He then had no knowledge of the condition of 
 the enemy. On the morning of the 8th he brought General Siegel's 
 two Divisions into the fight and concentrated on Price, whose 
 fighting was simply to cover his retreat. General Curtis failed to 
 reap the full benefit of the battle because Siegel went to Cassville, 
 leaving only Davis's and Carr's Divisions on the field. We who 
 took part in this campaign appreciate the difficulties and obstacles 
 Curtis had to overcome, and how bravely and efficiently he com- 
 manded, and we honor him for it. So did General Halleck; but 
 the Government, for some reason, failed to give him another com- 
 mand in the field, though they retained him in command of de- 
 partments to the end of the war. 
 
SYLVANUS DODGE 
 Fatlu'i- of Major-Genenil G. M. Dodge. 
 
Letter of General Grenville M. Dodge to his 
 Father on the Battle of Pea Ridge 
 
 St. Louis, Mo., April 2, 1862. 
 DEAR FATHER : — I know there is no one wlio would like 
 to have a word from me more than you. I write but little— am very 
 weak from my wounds ; do not sit up much ; but I hope ere long to 
 be all right again. Nothing now Init the battle will interest you. 
 It was a terrible three days to me ; how I got through God only 
 knows. I got off a sick bed to go to the fight, and I never got a 
 wink of sleep for three days and three nights. The engagement 
 was so long and with us so hot that it did not appear possible for 
 us to hold our ground. We lacked sadly in numbers and artillery, 
 but with good judgment and good grit we made it win. My officers 
 were very brave. Little Captain Taylor would stand and clap his 
 hands as the balls grew thick. Captain Burton was as cool as a 
 cucumber," and liked to have bled to death ; then tlie men, as they 
 crawled back wounded, would cheer me ; cheer for the Union ; and 
 always say, "Don't give up Colonel, hang to em :" and many who 
 were too badly wounded to leave the field stuck to their places, 
 sitting on the ground, loading and firing. I have heard of brave 
 acts, but such determined pluck I never before dreamed of. My 
 flag-bearer, after having been wounded so he could not hold up the 
 colors, would not leave them. I had to peremptorily order him 
 off. One time when the enemy charged through my lines the boys 
 drove them back in confusion. Price fought bravely ; his men de- 
 served a better fate, but although two to one they could not gain 
 much. Their artillery was served splendidly— they had great ad- 
 vantage over us in this.. ]\Iine run out of ammunition long before 
 night and left me to the mercy of their grape and canister. Had I 
 have had my full battery at night I could have whipped them 
 badly. After the Fourth Iowa's ammunition gave out or before 
 this all the other Regiments and Brigades had given way, leaving 
 me without support, and when I found my ammunition gone I 
 
36 Letter to Sylvanus Dodge. 
 
 never felt such a chilling- in my life. It is terrible right in the 
 midst of a hot contest to have your cartridges give out. We had 
 fired forty-two rounds, and had but a few left. I saved them 
 and ceased firing, falling back to my supports. The enemy 
 charged me in full force. I halted and they came within fifty feet. 
 We opened on them such a terrible fire they fled. General Curtis 
 rode into the field then and asked me to charge. This would have 
 blanched anybody but an Iowa soldier. No ammunition and to 
 charge! We fixed bayonets, and as I gave the order the boys 
 cheered and cheered, swinging their hats in every direction. 
 CHiABGE ! and such a yell as they crossed that field with, you 
 never heard — it was unearthly and scared the rebels so bad they 
 never stopped to fire at us or to let us reach them. As we marched 
 back, now dark, nearly one-half the entire Army had got on the 
 ground and the black-coats (Fourth Iowa) had got their fame up. 
 The charge without ammunition took them all, and as we passed 
 down the line the whole Army cheered us. General Curtis com- 
 plimented us on the field, and what was left of the Fourth Iowa 
 held their heads high that night, though a gloomy one for those 
 who knew our situation. The next morning it fell to my lot to 
 open the battle with my artillery again, and for one hour we poured 
 it into them hot and heavy. We opened with thirty-two guns; 
 they answered with as many, and such a roar you never heard. 
 The enemy could not stand it and fled. Our whole army deployed 
 in sight that morning and it was a grand sight with the artillery 
 playing in open view. I had read of such things, but they were 
 beyond my conception. This closed the battle and we breathed free. 
 I escaped most miraculously. A shell burst right in front of me, 
 and, tearing away my saddle holsters and taking off a large piece of 
 my pants, never even scratched me. My clothes were riddled and 
 I got a hit in the side that is serious, but did not think of it at the 
 time. Yours, etc., G. M. 
 
-^ ^ n 
 
 r i oj 
 
THE BATTLE OF ATLANTA 
 
 Fought July 22, 1864 
 
 A Paper Read Before New York Commandery 
 M. 0. L. L. 
 
 By Major-General Grenville M. Dodge 
 
 Companions : 
 
 On the ITtli day of July, 1864, General John B. Hood relieved 
 General Joseph E. Johnston in command of the Confederate Army 
 in front of Atlanta, and on the 20th Hood opened an attack upon 
 Sherman's right, commanded by General Thomas. The attack was 
 a failure, and resulted in a great defeat to Hood's Army and the 
 disarrangement of all his plans. 
 
 On the evening of the 21st of July, General Sherman's Army 
 had closed up to within two miles of Atlanta, and on that day 
 Force's Brigade of Leggett's Division of Blair's Seventeenth Army 
 Corps carried a prominent hill, known as Bald or Leggett's Hill, 
 that gave us a clear view of Atlanta, and placed that city within 
 range of our guns. It was a strategic point, and unless the swing 
 of our left was stopped it would dangerously interfere with Hood's 
 communications towards the south. Hood fully appreciated this, 
 and determined upon his celebrated attack in the rear of General 
 Sherman's Army. 
 
 On the 22d of July, the Army of the Tennessee was occupying 
 the rebel intrenchments, its right resting very near the Howard 
 House, north of the Augusta Railroad, thence to Leggett's Hill, 
 which had been carried by Force's assault on the evening of the 21st. 
 From this hill Giles A. Smith's Division of the Seventeenth Army 
 Corps stretched out southward on a road tliat occupied this ridge, 
 with a weak flank in air. To strengthen this flank, by order of 
 General McPherson I sent on the evening of the 21st one Brigade 
 of Fuller's Division, tlio other being left at Decatur to protect our 
 
 —39— 
 
J:0 The Battle of Atlanta. 
 
 parked trains. Fuller eaiii]icd his Bri.uado about half a mile in the 
 rear of the extreme left and at ri,uht angles to Blair's lines and com- 
 manding the open ground and valley of the forks of Sugar Creek, 
 a position that pro\ed very strong in the battle. Fuller did not go 
 into line: siuiply bnnuacked ready to respond to any call. 
 
 On the morning of the 32d of July, General McPherson called 
 at my headquarters and gave me verbal orders in relation to the 
 movement of the Second (Sweeney's) Division of my command, 
 the Sixteenth Corps, which had been crowded out of the line by 
 the contraction of our lines as w(> neared Atlanta, and told me 
 that I was to take position on the left of the line that Blair had 
 been instructed to occupy and intrench that morning, and cautioned 
 ine about protecting my flank very strongly. McPherson evidently 
 thought that there would be trouble on that flank, for he rode out 
 to examine it himself. 
 
 I moved Sweeney in the rear of our Army, on the road leading 
 from the Augusta Eailway dovm the east branch of Sugar Creek 
 to near where it forks; then, turning west, the road crosses the 
 west branch of Sugar Creek just back of where Fuller was camped, 
 and passed up through a strip of woods and through Blair's lines 
 near where his left was refused. Up this road Sweeney marched 
 until he reached Ftiller, when he halted, -waiting until the line I 
 had selected on Blair's proposed new left could be intrenched, so 
 that at mid-day, July 22d, the position of the Army of the Ten- 
 nossee was as follows: One Division of the Fifteenth across and 
 north of the Augusta Railway facing Atlanta : the balance of the 
 Fifteenth and all of the Seventeenth Corps l)ehind intrenchments 
 running south of the railway along a gentle ridge with a gentle slope 
 and clear valley facing Atlanta in front, and another clear valley 
 in the rear. The Sixteenth Corps was resting on the road described, 
 entirely in the rear of the Seventeenth and Fifteenth Corps, and 
 facing from Atlanta. To the left and left-rear the country was 
 heavily wooded. The enemy, therefore, was enalded, under cover 
 of the forest, to a|)proach close to the rear of our lines. 
 
 On the night of July 21st Hood had transferred Hardee's 
 Corps and two Divisions of "Wlieeler's Ca\alry to our rear, going 
 around our left flank, Wheeler attacking Sprague's Brigade of the 
 Sixteenth Army Corps at Decatur, where our trains were parked. 
 At daylight, Stewart's and Cheatliam's Corps ami the Georgia 
 Militia were withdrawn closer to .\tlania. and placed in a ])osition 
 
The Battle of Atlanta. 41 
 
 to attack simultaneously with Hardee, the plan thus involving the 
 destroying of the Army of the Teninessee by attacking it in rear 
 and front and the capturing of all its trains corraled at Decatur. 
 Hardee's was the largest Corps in Hood's Army, and according to 
 Hood there were thus to move upon the Army of the Tennessee 
 about 40,000 troops. 
 
 Hood's order of attack was for Hardee to form entirely in the 
 rear of the Army of the Tennessee, but Hardee claims that he met 
 Hood on the night of the 21st; that he was so late in moving his 
 Corps that they changed the plan of attack so that his left was to 
 strike the Seventeenth Corps. He was to sAving b.is right until he 
 enveloped and attacked the rear of the Seventeenth and Fifteenth 
 Corps. 
 
 Hood stood in one of the batteries of Atlanta, where he could 
 see Blair's left and the front line of the Fifteenth and Seventeenth 
 Corps. He says he was astonished to see the attack come on Blair's 
 left instead of his rear, and charges his defeat to that fact; but 
 Hardee, when he swung his right and came out in the open, found 
 the Sixteenth Corps in line in the roar of our Army, and he was 
 as much surprised to find us there as our Army was at the sudden 
 attack in our rear. The driving back by the Sixteenth Corps of 
 Hardee's Corps made the latter drift to the left and against Blair, 
 — ^not only to Blair's left, but into his rear, — so that what Hood 
 declares was the cause of his failure was not Hardee's fault, as his 
 attacks on the Sixteenth Corps were evidently determined and fierce 
 enough to relieve him from all blame in that matter. 
 
 Historians and others who have written of the Battle of Atlanta 
 have been misled by being governed in their data by the first dis- 
 patches of General Sherman, who was evidently misinformed, as 
 he afterwards corrected his dispatches. He stated in the first dis- 
 patch that the attack was at 11 a. m., and on Blair's Corps, and 
 also that General McPherson was killed about 11 a. m. The fact 
 is, Blair was not attacked until half an hour after the attack upon 
 the Sixteenth Corps, and McPherson fell at about 2 p. m. General 
 Sherman was at the Howard House, which was miles away from the 
 scene of Hardee's attack in the rear, and evidently did not at first 
 comprehend the terrific fighting that was in progress, and the serious 
 results that would have been effected had the attack succeeded. 
 
 The battle began within fifteen or twenty minutes of 12 o'clock 
 (noon) and lasted until midnight, and covered the ground from 
 
42 The 'Battle of Atlanta. 
 
 the Howard House along the entire front of the Fifteenth (Lo- 
 gan's) Corps, the ' Seventeenth (Blair's) on the front of the Six- 
 teenth (which was formed in tlie rear of the Army), and on to 
 Decatur, where Sprague's Brigade of the Sixteenth Army Corps 
 met and defeated AVlieeler's Cavahy — a distance of about seven 
 miles. 
 
 The Army of the Tennessee had jjresent on that day at Atlanta 
 and Decatur about 26,000 men ; tlioro were 10,000 in the Fifteenth 
 Army Corps, 9,000 in the Sixteenth Corps, and 7,000 in the Sev- 
 enteenth. About 21.000 of these were in line of battle. Three 
 Brigades of the Sixteenth Corps were absent, the Sixteenth Corps 
 having 5,000 men in a single line which received the attack of the 
 four Divisions of Hardee's Corps, Hardee's left, Cleburn's Divi- 
 sion lapping the extreme left of Blair and joining Cheatham's 
 Corps which attacked Blair from the Atlanta front ; and, according 
 to Hood, they were joined by the Georgia j\Iilitia under General 
 Smith. Extending down the line in front of the Armies of the Ohio 
 and the Cumberland, Stewart's Corps occupied the works and held 
 the lines in front of the Army of the Cumberland. The Sixteenth 
 Army Corps fought in the open ground; the Fifteenth and Seven- 
 teenth behind intrenchments. 
 
 Where I stood just at the rear of the Sixteenth Army Corps, 
 I could see the entire line of that corps, and could look up and see 
 the enemy's entire front as they emerged from the woods, and I 
 quickly saw that both of my flanks were overlapped l)y the enemy. 
 Knowing General McPherson was some two miles away, I sent a 
 staff officer to General Giles xV. Smith, requesting him to refuse his 
 left and protect the gap between the Seventeenth Corps and my 
 right, which he sent word he would do. Later, as the l^attle prog- 
 ressed, and I saw no movement on the part of General Smith, I 
 sent another officer to inform him that the enemy were passing my 
 right flank, which was nearly opposite his center, and requested 
 him to refuse his left immediately, or he would be cut off. This 
 officer (Lieutenant D. Sheffly, who belonged to the Signal Corps, 
 and acted as my aide only for the time being) found, on reaching 
 Smith, that he was just becoming engaged ; that he had received 
 orders to hold his line, with a promise that other troo]is would be 
 thrown into the gap. 
 
 My second messenger. Lieutenant Shrl'tly. returning over the 
 road uiion wliich ^fePlierson was a few niiuulcs later shot dead. 
 
The Battle of Atlanta. 43 
 
 met the General on the road with a veiT IVw attendant;^, and tnrned 
 to warn him of his dangerous ])!isilion, assuring him that the enemy 
 lield the woods and were advancing. The General paying no heed 
 to the warning and moving on, my aide turned and followed him. 
 They had proceeded but a short distance into the woods when a 
 sharp command, "Halt," was heard from the skirmish-line of the 
 rebels. Without heeding the command, General McPherson and his 
 party wheeled their horses, and at that moment a heavy volley was 
 poured in, killing MtPherson and so frightening the horses that 
 they became unmanageable and plunged into the underbrush in dif- 
 ferent directions. My aide became separated from the General and 
 the rest of the praty, and was knocked from his horse by coming in 
 contact with a tree, and lay for some time in an unconscious con- 
 dition on the ground. As soon as he was sufficiently recovered he 
 returned on foot to me, having lost his horse and equipments. Of 
 General McPherson he saw nothing after his fall. His watch, 
 crushed by contact with the tree, was stopped at two minutes past 
 2 o'clock, which fixed the time of General McPherson's death. 
 
 General McPherson could not have left his point of observa- 
 tion more than a few minutes when I detected the enemy's advance 
 in the woods some distance to my right, and between that flank and 
 General Blair's rear. Puller quickly changed front with a portion 
 of his brigade to confront them, and pushing promptly to the attack 
 captured their skirmish-line and drove back their main force. U23on 
 the persons of some of these prisoners we found McPherson's papers, 
 field-glass, etc., which conveyed to me the first knowledge I had of 
 his death; or, rather, as I then supposed, of his capture by the 
 enemy ; and seeing that the papers were important I sent them by 
 my Chief of Staff with all haste to General Sherman. 
 
 General McPherson, it seems, had just witnessed the decisive 
 grapple of the Sixteenth Corps Avith the charging columns of the 
 enemy, and, as probably conveying his own reflections at that 
 moment, I quote the language of General Strong, the only staff 
 officer present with him at that critical time: 
 
 The General and myself, accompanied only by our orderlies, rode 
 on and took positions on the right of Dodge's line, and witnessed the des- 
 perate assaults of Hood's army. 
 
 The Divisions of (ienerals Fuller and Sweeney were formed in a sin- 
 gle line of battle in the open fields, without cover of any kind (Fuller's 
 Division on the right,) and were warmly engaged. The enemy, massed in 
 columns three or four lines deep, moved out of the dense timber several hun- 
 dred yards from General Dodge's position, and after gaining fairly the open 
 fields, halted and opened a rapid fire upon the Sixteenth Corps. They, how- 
 
44 TriK Battle of Atlanta. 
 
 ever, seemed surprised to (iiul our iul'autry iu line of battle, prepared for 
 attack, and after facing for a few niiuulcs the destructive fire from the 
 Divisions of Generals Fuller and Sweeney, fell back in disorder to the 
 cover of the woods. Here, however, their lines were quickly reformed, and 
 they again advanced, evidently determined to carry the position. 
 
 The scene at this time was grand and impressive. It seemed to us 
 that every mounted officer of the attacking column was riding at the front 
 of, or on the right or left of, the first line of battle. The regimental colors 
 waved and fluttered in advance of the lines, and not a shot was fired by the 
 rebel infantry, although the movement was covered by a heavy and well-di- 
 rected fire from artillery, which was posted in the woods and on higher 
 ground, and which enabled the guns to bear upon our troops with solid shot 
 and shell, firing over the attacking column. 
 
 It seemed impossible, however, for the enemy to face the sweeping, 
 deadly fire from Fuller's and Sweeney's Divisions, and the guns of the Four- 
 teenth Ohio and Welker's Batteries of the Sixteenth Corps fairly mowed 
 great swaths in the advancing columns. They showed great steadiness, and 
 closed up the gaps and presei-ved their alignments; but the iron and leaden 
 hail which was poured upon them was too much for flesh and blood to stand, 
 and, before reaching the center of the open field, the columns were broken up 
 and thrown into great confusion. Taking advantage of this. General Dodge, 
 with portions of General Fuller's and General Sweeney's Divisions, with 
 bayonets fixed, charged the enemy and drove tliem back to the woods, taking 
 many prisoners. 
 
 General McPheison's admiration for the steadiness and determined 
 bravery of the Sixteenth Corps was unbounded. Gereral Dodge held the 
 key to the position. 
 
 Had the Sixteenth Corps given way the rebel army would have been 
 in the rear of the Seventeenth and Fifteenth Corps, and would have swept 
 like an avalanche over our supply trains, and the position of the Army of 
 the Tennessee would have been very critical, although, without doubt, the 
 result of the battle would have been in our favor, because the Armies of the 
 Cumberland and the Oliio were close at hand, and the enemy would have been 
 checked and routed further on. 
 
 General Blair, in his official report of the hattle, says: 
 I witnessed the first furious assault upon the Sixteenth Army Corps, 
 and its prompt and gallant repulse. It was a fortunate circumstance for 
 that whole army that the Sixteenth Army Corps occupied the position I 
 have attempted to describe, at the moment of the attack ; and although it 
 does not become me to comment upon the brave conduct of the officers and 
 men of that Corps, still I can not refrain from expressing my admiration for 
 the manner in which the Sixteenth Corps met and repulsed the repeated 
 and persistent attacks of the enemy. 
 
 The Sixteenth Corps lias a record in that hattle which we 
 seldom see in the annals of war. It mot the shock of hattle aud 
 fired the last shot late that night, as the enemy stubbornly yielded 
 its grasp on Bald Hill. Tt fonght on four parts of the field, and 
 everywhere with ci\ua\ success. It lost no gun that it took into 
 the engagement, and its losses were almost entirely in killed and 
 wounded^ — the missing having been cajitured at Decatur through 
 getting mired in a swamp. 
 
 At no time during the Atlanta campaign was tlu'iv present in 
 the Sixteenth Corps more tlian two small Divisions of tliree Bri- 
 
The Battle of Atlanta. -io 
 
 gades each, and at this time these two Divisions were widely scat- 
 tered: on the Atlanta field only ten Eegiments and two Batteries 
 were present, three entire Brigades being absent from the Corjjs. 
 It was called upon to meet the assault of at least three Divisions 
 or nine Brigades, or at the least forty-nine Eegiments, all full to 
 the utmost that a desperate emergency could swell them, impelled 
 by the motive of the preconcerted surprise, and orders from their 
 commander at all hazards to sweep over any and all obstructions; 
 while, on the other hand, the force attacked and surprised was 
 fighting without orders, guided only by the exigency of the moment. 
 Their captures represented forty-nine different Eegiments of the 
 enemy. How many more Eegiments were included in those nine 
 Brigades I have never been able to learn. The fact that this small 
 force, technically, if not actually, in march, in a perfectly open 
 field, with this enormously superior force leaping upon them from 
 the c-over of dense woods, was able to hold its ground and drive its 
 assailants, pell-mell, back to the cover of the woods again, proves 
 that when a great battle is in progress, or a great emergency occurs, 
 no officer can tell what the result may be when he throws in his 
 forces, be they 5,000 or 20,000 men; and it seems to me to be 
 impossible to draw the line that gives the right to a subordinate 
 officer to use Ms own judgment in engaging an enemy when a great 
 battle is within his hearing. 
 
 Supix)se the Sixteenth Corps, with less than 5,000 men, seeing 
 at least three times their number in their front, should have re- 
 treated, instead of standing and fighting as it did: What would 
 have been the result? I say that in all my experience in life, until 
 the two forces struck and the Sixteenth Coros stood firm, I never 
 passed more anxious moments. 
 
 Sprague's Brigade, of the same corps, was engaged at the same 
 time within hearing, l^ut on a different field, — at Decatur, — fight- 
 ing and stubbornly holding that place, knowing that if he failed the 
 trains massed there and en route from Eoswell would be captured. 
 His fight was a gallant and sometimes seemingly almost hopeless 
 one — giving ground inch by inch, until, finally, he obtained a posi- 
 tion that he could not be driven from, and one that protected the 
 entire trains of the Army. 
 
 As Hardee's attack fell upon the Sixteenth Army Corps, his 
 left Division (Cleburn's) lapped over and beyond Blair s left, and 
 swung around his left front: they poured down through the gap 
 
46 The Battle of Atlanta. 
 
 between the left of the Seventeenth and the right of the Sixteenth 
 Corps, taking Blair in front, flank, and rear. Cheatham's Corps 
 moved out of Atlanta and attacked in Blair's front. General Giles 
 A. Smith commanded Blair's left Division, his right connecting 
 with Leggett at Bald Hill, where Leggett's Division held the line 
 until they connected with the Fifteenth Corps, and along this front 
 the battle raged with great fury. 
 
 As Cleburn advanced along the open space between the Six- 
 teenth and Seventeenth Corps they cut of! from Blair's left and 
 captured a portion of two Eegiments of his command, and forced 
 the Seventeenth Corps to form new linesj utilizing the old intrench- 
 ments thrown up liy the enemy, fighting first on one side and then 
 on the other, as the attack would come from Hardee in the rear 
 or Cheatham in the front, imtil about 3 :30 p. m., when, evidently 
 after a lull, an extraordinary effort was made by the rebels to wipe 
 out Giles A. Smith's Division and capture Leggett's Hill, the 
 enemy approaching under cover of the woods until they were within 
 fifty yards of Smith's temporary position, when they pressed for- 
 ward until the fight became a hand-to-hand confiict across the 
 trenches occupied by Smith, the troops using bayonet freely and 
 the officers their swords. This attack failed ; it was no doubt timed 
 to occur at the same time that Cheatham's Corps attacked from the 
 Atlanta front, Avhich Leggett met. The brunt of Cheatham's attack 
 was against Leggett's Hill, the key to the position of that portion 
 of the Army of the Tennessee. General Giles A. Smith's Division 
 had to give up the works they occupied and fall into line at right 
 angles with Leggett's Division, Leggett's Hill being the apex of 
 the formation; and around this position for three-quarters of an 
 hour more desperate fighting was done that I can describe. Up to 
 midnight the enemy occupied one side of the works while we 
 occupied the other, neither side giving way until Hood saw that 
 the whole attack was a failure, when those who were on the outside 
 of the works finally surrendered to us. Their attack at this angle 
 was a determined and resolute one, advancing up to our breast- 
 works on the crest of the hill, planting their flag side by side with 
 ours, and fighting hand to hand until it grew so dark that nothing 
 could be seen but the flash of guns from the opposite sides of the 
 works. The ground covered by these attacks was literally strewn 
 T\-ith the dead of both sides. The loss of Blair's Corps was 1,801 
 killed, wounded, and missing. Blair's left struck in the rear flank. 
 
The Battle of Atlanta. 47 
 
 and the front gave way slowly, graduall\', lighting for every inch 
 of ground, until their left was opposite the right fiank of the Six- 
 teenth Corps; then they halted, and held the enemy, refusing to 
 give another inch. 
 
 It would be difficult in all the annals of war to find a parallel 
 to the fighting of the Seventeenth Corps; first from one side of 
 its works and then from the other, one incident of which was that 
 of Colonel Belknap, of the Union side, who, reaching over the 
 works, seized the Colonel of the Fortv-fifth Alabama, and, drawing 
 him over the breastworks, made him a prisoner of war. 
 
 About 4 p. m. Cheatham's Corps was ordered by Hood to again 
 attack; they directed their assault this time to the front of the 
 Fifteenth Corps, using the Decatur wagon-road and railway as a 
 guide, and came forward in solid masses, meeting no success until 
 they slipped through to the rear of the Fifteenth Corps by a deep 
 cut used by the railway passing through our intrenchments. 
 
 As soon as they reached our rear, Lightburn's Division of the 
 Fifteenth Corps became partially panic-stricken, and fell back, 
 giving up the intrenchments for the whole front of this Division, 
 the enemy capturing the celebrated Degress Battery of 20-pounders 
 and two guns in advance of our lines. The officers of Lightburn's 
 Division rallied it in the line of intrenchments, just in the rear 
 of the position they had in the morning. 
 
 General Logan was then in command of the Army of the Ten- 
 nessee. He rode over to my position, and I sent Mercer's Brigade 
 of tlie Second Division, under tlie guidance of Major Edward 
 Jonas, my Aide-de-camp, to the aid of the Fifteenth Corps. Of the 
 performance of that Brigade on that occasion. T quote the words 
 of that staff officer. Major Jonas : 
 
 I conducted Mercer's Brigade to the point where needed : arrived at 
 the railroad, he at once deployed and charged, all men of the Fifteenth Corps 
 at hand joining with him. Mercer's Brigade recaptured the works and the 
 guns. Old Colonel Mercer was slightly wounded, and his celebrated horse, 
 "Billy," killed. By your direction I said to General Morgan L. Smith (tem- 
 porarily in command of the Fifteenth Corps) : "General Dodge requests 
 that you return this Brigade at the earliest practicable moment, as there 
 is every indication of i-enewed assault on our own line," and. after saying 
 that your request would be respected. General Smith added : "Tell Gen- 
 eral Dodge that his Brigade (Mercer's) has done magnificently, and that it 
 shall have full credit in my report." 
 
 Afterwards one of Mercer's officers — Captain Boyd, I think — 
 in trving his skill as an artillerist, cracked one of the recaptured 
 gmis. At the same moment of Mercer's attack in front. General 
 
48 The Battle of Atlanta. 
 
 Wood's Division of tlie Fifteenth Arniv Corps, nnder the eye of 
 General Shi'rnian. attacked the Confederates ocenpying- onr in- 
 trenehnients in flank, and Williamson's Brigade joined Mercer's in 
 recapturing our line and the batteries — the Fonrth Towa Infantry 
 taking a conspicnons part. 
 
 I'oloncl fiercer and many of his men whom he so gallantly 
 led had served their time before this battle occurred, and were 
 awaiting transportation home. Eloqnent words have l)een ^n'itten 
 and spoken all over the land in behalf of the honor and the bravery 
 of the soldier; but where is the word spoken or written that can 
 say more for the soldier than the action of these men on that field ? 
 They were out of service : they had written that they were coming 
 home, and their e\es and hearts were toward the Xorth. ]Many an 
 anxious eye was looking for the boy who ^(^luntarily laid do\\n his 
 life that day, and many a devoted father, mother or sister has had 
 untold trouble to obtain recognition in the War Department because 
 the soldier's time had expired. He was mustered out ; waiting to 
 go home; and Avas not knovsTi on the records; but on that day he 
 fought on three different parts of the field, without a thought except 
 for his cause and his country. 
 
 The continuous attacks of Cheatham made no other impression 
 on the line. Our men were behind the intrenchments and the 
 slaughter of the enemy was something fearful. General J. C. Brown, 
 wdio commanded the Confederate Division that broke through our 
 line, told me that after breaking through it was impossible to force 
 his men forward : the fire on their flanks and front was so terrific 
 that when driven out of the works one-half of his command was 
 killed, wounded, or missing. The Confederate records sustain this, 
 and it is a wonder that they could force their line so often up to 
 within too to 300 feet of us, where our fire would drive them back 
 in s|)ite of the efforts of- their officers, a great many of whom fell 
 in these attacks. 
 
 I could see the terrific fighting at Leggett's Hill, but of that 
 along the line of the Fifteenth Corps I can only speak from the 
 records and as told me by General Jolin C. Brown, of the Confed- 
 erate Army. The stubbornness and coolness "with which they con- 
 tested every inch of the ground won his admiration, and the manner 
 and method with which the line was retaken must have been seen 
 to be appreciated. 
 
The Battle of Atlanta. -±9 
 
 ^A^len darkness fell upon us the enemy had retired, except 
 around the angle in the Seventeenth Corps, known as Leggett's or 
 Bald Hill. Here there was a continuous fire, desultory and at close 
 quarters, the enemy in places occupying ground close up to our 
 intrenchments. To relieve these men of the Seventeenth Army 
 Corps holding tliis angle, who were worn out, at the request of 
 Greneral Blair I sent two Eegiments of Mercer's Brigade. They 
 crawled in on their hands and knees, and swept the enemy from 
 that front. 
 
 The whole of Hood's Army, t'xcept Stewart's Corps, was thrown 
 into our rear, upon the flank and the Ircmt of the Army of the 
 Tennessee, and after fighting from mid-day until dark were re- 
 pulsed and driven back. That Army held or commanded the entire 
 battle-field, demonstrating the fact that the Army of the Tennessee 
 alone was able and competent to meet and defeat Hood's entire 
 Arm}'. The battle fell almost entirely upon the Sixteenth and 
 Seventeenth Corps and two Divisions of the Fifteenth Corps, three 
 Brigades of the Sixteenth being absent. The attack of the enemy 
 was made along this line some seven times, and they were seven 
 times repulsed. 
 
 We captured eighteen stands of colors, 5,000 stands of arms, 
 and 2,017 prisoners. We lost in killed and wounded 3,521 men and 
 ten pieces of artillery, and over 1,800 men. mostly from Blair's 
 Corps, were taken prisoners. The enemy's dead reported as buried 
 in front of the different Corps was over 2,000, and the enemy's total 
 loss in killed, wounded and prisoners was 8,000. 
 
 Tlie criticism has often been made of this battle that with two 
 Armies idle that day, one the Army of the Ohio (two-thirds as 
 large as the Army of the Tennessee) and the other the Army of the 
 Cumberland (the largest of all Sherman's Armies), why we did 
 not enter Atlanta. General Shernutn urged Thomas to make the 
 attack; Thomas's answer was tliat the enemy were in full force 
 behind his intrenchments. The fact was that Stewart's Corps was 
 guarding that front, but General Schofield urged Sherman to allow 
 him to throw his x\rmy upon Cheatham's flank, in an endeavor to 
 roll up the Confederate line and so interpose between Atlanta and 
 Cheatham's Corps, which was so persistently attacking the Fif- 
 teenth and Seventeenth Corps from the Atlanta front. Shennan, 
 whose anxiety had been very great, seeing how successfully we were 
 meetins: the attack, his face relaxing into a ])leasant smile, said to 
 
50 The Battle of Atlanta. 
 
 Schofield. '•Tjet the Army of the Tennessee fight it out this time." 
 This flank attack of Schofield on Cheatham would have no doubt 
 cleared our front facing the Atlanta intrenchments, but Stewart 
 was ready -snth his three Divisions and the Militia to hold them. 
 
 General Sherman, in speaking of this battle, alwa^'s regretted 
 that he did not allow Schofield to attack as he suggested, and also 
 force the fighting on Thomas's front; but no doubt the loss of 
 McPherson really took his attention from everything except the 
 Army of the Tennessee. 
 
 At about 10 o'clock on the night of the '2'M, the three Corps 
 commanders of the Army of the Tennessee (one of them in com- 
 mand of the Army) met in the rear of the Fifteenth Corps, on the 
 line of the Decatur road, under an oak tree, and there discussed 
 the results of the day. Blair's men were at the time in the trenches ; 
 in some places the enemy held one side and they the other. The 
 men of the Fifteenth Corps were still in their own line, but tired 
 and hungry, and those of the Sixteenth were, after their hard day's 
 fight, busy throwing up intrenchments on the field they had held 
 and wool. It was thought that the Army of the Cumberland and 
 the Army of the Ohio, which had not been engaged that day, should 
 send a force to relieve Blair, and Dodge, being the junior Corps 
 commander, was dispatched by General Logan, at the requests of 
 Generals Logan and Blair, to see General Sherman. My impres- 
 sion is that I met liim in a tent : I have heard it said that he had 
 his headquarters in a house. T\lien I met him he seemed rather 
 surprised to see me, but greeted me cordially, and spoke of the loss 
 of McPherson. I stated to him my errand. He turned upon me 
 and said, "Dodge, you whipped them today, didn't you?" I said, 
 "Yes, sir." Then he said: "Can't you do it again tomorrow?" and 
 I said, "Yes. sir" : bade him good-night, and went back to my com- 
 mand, determined never to go upon another such errand. As he 
 explained it afterward, he wanted it said that the little Army of 
 the Tennessee had fought the great battle that day. needing no 
 help, no aid, and that it could be said that all alone it had whipped 
 the whole of Hood's Army. Therefore, he let us hold our position 
 and our line, Imowing that Hood would not dare attack us after 
 the "thrashing" he had already received. When we consider that 
 in this, the greatest battle of the campaign, the little Army of the 
 Tennessee met the entire rebel Army, secretly thrust to its rear, on 
 its flank, and upon its advance center, with its idolized commander 
 
The Battle of Atlaxta. 51 
 
 killed ill the first shock of battle, and at nightfall found the enemy's 
 dead and wounded on its front, we see that no disaster — no tem- 
 porary rebuff — could discourage this Army. Every man was at his 
 post; every man doing a hero's duty. They jiroved they might be 
 wiped out but never made to run. They Avere invincible. 
 
 Companioais, regarding so great a battle, against such odds, 
 with such loss, the question has often been asked me— and I know- 
 it has come to the mind of all of us — why it was that this battle 
 was never put forth ahead of many others inferior to it, but better 
 known to the world and causing much greater comment? 
 
 Tlie answer conies to all of us. It is apparent to us today, as 
 it was that night. We had lost our best friend, — that superb soldier, 
 our commander, General McPherson ; his death counted so much 
 more to us than victory that we spoke of our battle, our great suc- 
 cess, with our loss uppermost in our minds. 
 
LETTER TO GENERAL RAUM 
 
 Correcting Some Statements 
 
 IN 
 
 General Green B. Raum's 
 
 Description of The Battle of Atlanta 
 
 Published 
 
 In The National Tribune, Washington, D. C. 
 September 25, 1902 
 
 .1/// Dear General: 
 
 Keferring to my conversation with you in Washington, I will 
 endeavor to aid you m getting at the actual facts connected with 
 the Battle of Atlanta, as it has never yet been properly written up. 
 
 I delivered an address on September 25th, 1889, to the Army 
 of the Tennessee on that battle, copy of which I am sending to 
 you, and from which I think you can get a good deal of information. 
 
 I first want to call your attention to the fact tliat tlie battle 
 commenced about iifteen minutes after 13 o'clock, and that the 
 Sixteenth Army Corps fought a long time before the Seventeenth 
 Corps was attacked. You can verify this statement by reading 
 General Strong's account of the battle, Avhieh is given in our Army 
 of the Tennessee records, volume 11 to 13, page 212. 
 
 It was Just 12 o'clock exactly when I reached Fuller's head- 
 quarters. Having gone to the front to select my position. Fuller 
 asked me to stop and take luncheon, and I got down from my horse 
 and went into his tent. I had sat down at the table when I heard 
 skirmish firing in the rear. Fuller said it was a lot of the boys out 
 there killing hogs. Tlie stillness had been oppressive as we went 
 clear to the left and front of Blair's line to select my new position. 
 We inquired from the pickets and found that nobody had seen 
 anything of the enemy. It made an impression on us all ; so the 
 moment I heard this firing T jumped up. as if by instinct, and told 
 
">i: The Battle of Atlanta. 
 
 Fuller to get into line, and sent a staflE officer towards Sweeney ; but 
 
 before be bardly got out of tbe tent Sweeney was in line and fi.ght- 
 
 ing. so you can see bow sudden tbe attack was. 
 
 In volume 11 to 13 of tbe Army of tbe Tennessee records, 
 
 page 243, Strong, in bis address on tbe Battle of Atlanta, has this 
 
 to say fixing the time of the commencement of tbe Iiattle. speaking 
 
 of tbe time when an officer was sent witb an order to me from 
 
 :\IePherson : 
 
 The officer had hai-dly ilis^appeared from sight, when a shot was 
 heard to the left aud rear of us. theu another, followed quickly by a rattling 
 volley of small arms, and at almost the same instant a shell came crashing 
 through the tree-tops near us. followed by a rapid and i 'cessa-.t firing from 
 Dodge's Corps. At the first shots every officer sprang to his feet and called 
 for his horse. The time. I should think, was ten or fifteei minutes past 
 12 o'clock. 
 
 Then after speaking of tbe fighting of this Division, comes 
 
 this, on page "243 : 
 
 After the tiro attempts to break the Sixteenth Corps had failed. Gen- 
 eral McPherson sent me to General Blair to ascertain the condition of 
 affairs along his line, and instructed me to say to General Giles A. Smith 
 to hold his position : that he would order up troops to occupy the gap be- 
 tween the Seveuteeiith and Sixteenth Corps: and also saying as I left him 
 that he would remain with his orderly where he theu was ( a commanding 
 position on Dodge's right I until I returned. I rode rapidly through the 
 woods towards the Seventeenth Corps aud found General Blair with Gen- 
 eral Giles A. Smith near the extreme left of the Fourth Division ( Hall's 
 Brigade > . 
 
 This conclusively shows that Blair was not attacked until after 
 two attacks had been made upon me, although Hall's report gives 
 the attack upon Blair as at 12 o'clock, that time being before the 
 Sixteenth Corps was attacked. Fuller gives the time of attack 
 upon him as 12 :30. By reading all of page 243 you will get a 
 full and clear idea of time and everything. The time was also 
 taken by my staff and record made of it, and that agrees with 
 Strong. This only shows how far apart officers can get as to time 
 in a great battle, and on many things, unless correct data is made 
 of record on the spot. 
 
 On p>age 484, of volume 14 to IG of Society of tbe Army of 
 
 tlie Tennessee records, General Leggett says : 
 
 Both divisions of the Sixteenth Anny Corps immediately became hotly 
 
 engaged Just at this time I espied General McPherson upon the 
 
 high ground in the immediate rear of General Fuller's command, and sent 
 Captain John B. Raymond of my staff to inquire of General McPherson the 
 expediency of having General Giles A. Smith and myself change our line 
 so as to face south, and at the same time I sent Captain OJeorge W. Porter 
 to ascertain whether or not the left of General Smith and the right of Gen- 
 eral Fuller were sufficiently near together lo antagonize any force seeking 
 
Letter to General Eaum. 
 
 entrance theie The enemy in front of the Sixteenth Corps rallied 
 
 in the woods (this is after the first attack) and renewed their attack with 
 increased vigor and bitterness. .... The conflict continued for some time, 
 with no appearance on either side of any disposition to yield the ground, 
 when the enemy gave way, and fell back in confusion, followed by the 
 
 Sixteenth Corps The second assault (upon the Sixteenth Corps) 
 
 was simultaneous with the attack upon General Giles A. Smith's Division, 
 which was the left of the Seventeenth Corps. 
 
 You will note from my address that the momeat I was at- 
 tacked I sent an aide, and afterwards a signal officer named Sheffly 
 (I think), who was detailed with me that day, or happened to be 
 with me. These officers had gone to General Giles A. Smith, who 
 commanded Blair's left, Fourth Division, Seventeenth Corps, to 
 get him to refuse his left and join my right. I think the first officer 
 I sent was Captain Jonas of my staff, wdio returned immediately 
 to me, and General Giles A. Smith sent me word that he would 
 refuse. That was a long time before Cleburn's Division got between 
 us; Ijut, as ray paper and your article show, McPherson had sent 
 word to Giles A. Smith without knowing the condition in his front, 
 to hold his position, stating that he would send reinforcements to 
 fill the gap between Fuller and himself. Of course, had McPherson 
 been there earlier and seen what I saw, he would have had Smith's 
 left join my right immediately, which would have put Cleburn in 
 front of us instead of between us. That is one of the things that 
 occur in Imttle that the person on the ground knows better than 
 the one distant. It was on the third attack on my line that the 
 enemy struck Blair, as Strong did not go to Blair until after the 
 repulse of the second attack. Cleburn's force got right m behind 
 Blair's left and picked up that portion of his line that was refused, 
 and swept back his force so that Blair's left, even before Waglin 
 of the Fifteenth Corps got there, was pretty nearly an extension of 
 but a quarter of a mile away from Fuller's right, and after I got 
 through fighting I had to withdraw my entire right quite a dis- 
 tance to connect with Waglin and Blair, as Cleburn's force had 
 pressed clear beyond me and before he was halted was way in the 
 rear of my right. 
 
 After the second attack, Cleburn, as he pressed through the 
 gap between Fuller and Smith, forced Fuller to change front and 
 use part of his force to protect his flank, and the Sixty-fourth 
 Illinois in this movement captured the skirmish-line that killed 
 McPherson, taking from them his field-glass, orders, and other 
 papers that they had taken from McPherson's body ; and later in the 
 
56 The Battle of Atlanta. 
 
 day I sent these to General Sherman. See report Sixty-fourtli Illi- 
 nois, vohune 38, part 3, War Records, page 494. Fnller's maps, 
 page 480, volume -38, part 3, War Records, show where Fuller 
 fought, and where \yo liad to intrench. 
 
 Where I stood in niy line I could see the entire Confederate 
 force, and all of my own, something that very seldom occurs, and, 
 of course, the scene, as Blair states, was a magnificent one. I saw 
 Fuller do a most gallant act. I sent an aide to him with instruc- 
 tions to charge, but before he got there Walker's division broke the 
 center of Fuller's Brigade, his own regiment, the Twenty-seventh 
 Ohio, falling back. I saw Fuller get down ofp his horse, grab the 
 colors of the Twenty-seventh, rush to the front with them in his 
 hands, and call upon his regiment to come to the colors; and they 
 rallied and saved his front. It was but a moment later that I saw 
 Walker, who commanded the division that was attacking Fuller, fall 
 from his horse, and the division broke and went into the woods. 
 The action of Fuller was very gallant, and has been painted, and I 
 have a copy of the painting in my room. 
 
 Blair in his re])ort has this to say of the fighting, which 
 
 shows that he watched us a long time before lie was attacked : and 
 
 if you will read his re})ort carefully, you will see that it l)ears out 
 
 my statements in full : 
 
 I started to go back to my command and witnessed the fearful assault 
 made on the Sixteenth Army Corps, and its prompt and gallant repulse by 
 that command. It was a most fortunate circumstance for the whole army 
 that the Sixteenth Army Corps occupied the position I have attempted to 
 describe at the moment of attack, and although it does not belong to me 
 to report upon the bearing and conduct of the officers and men of that 
 Corps, still I cannot withhold my expression of admiration for the manner 
 in which this command met and repulsed the repeated and persistent at- 
 tacks of the enemy. The attack upon our flank was made by the whole of 
 Hardee's Corps. 
 
 I speak in my address of Mercer's Brigade fighting on three 
 ])arts of the field. Mercer, after helping to retake the Decatur- road 
 line, camped right in the rear of the Fifteenth Corps, and did not 
 come back to me. When Logan, Blair and myself met that even- 
 ing, Blair asked Logan for some help to go up to relieve troops at 
 Bald Hill. Logan, seeing Mercer's Brigade there, ordered me to 
 send it up. They went up there and crawled in and relieved the 
 men on Bald Hill. This was very late in the night, and even then 
 fresh men coming in drove out or captured what men there were 
 still lying on the enemy's side of the intrenchments. Mercer never 
 made a report of this liattle. You will see l)y my paper that he 
 
Letter to General Eaum. 57 
 
 was virtually out of the service, awaiting transportation home ; but 
 he went in with his regiment the same as though they were still in 
 the service. He was a German, and I do not suppose he knew the 
 importance of reporting; and as it was only a short time later that 
 I had to leave that army, I therefore did not follow it up, and I 
 find no report of Mercer or of the Ninth Illinois ; but I think the 
 regimental reports of the Eighty-first Ohio give all these facts. See 
 War Kecords, volume 38, part 3, page 463, and report Second Bri- 
 gade. Second Division Sixteenth Army Corps, volume 38, part 3, 
 page 450. 
 
 In my address I did not go much into detail, but i have all the 
 data of this battle compiled, and intend some day to put it in 
 shape; but I give you enough so you can, after examining the re- 
 ports of Blair and the others, make your article historically correct. 
 Most of it is correct and well-stated, but I know you want to get 
 the dates and movements at the left on such an occasion so full that 
 they will stand criticism, as the Battle of Atlanta was the great bat- 
 tle of that campaign. 
 
 Your article and many others that I have seen assumes that 
 it was a part of Hardee's Corps that struck Blair's front — that is, 
 his fro. ! that was towards Atlanta; but that is not so. Cleburn's 
 Division was the left Division of Hardee's Corps. There were three 
 other Divisions. Maney's (Cheatham's old Division), Bate's, and 
 Walker's. Walker was the next to Cleburn and attacked Fuller. 
 Bate and Maney struck Sweeney. Cleburn's Division was in front 
 of Blair after Cleburn had driven back his left and he had refused 
 it from Leggett's Hill towards my right. What saved Blair was 
 that Cheatham, who commanded Hood's old Corps, whose orders 
 were to attack Blair's front at the same time Hardee struck his 
 rear, in accordance with the plans of both Hood and Hardee, did 
 not attack because Hardee struck me, which was a surprise to them 
 as well as to me, and when Cheatham got ready to attack Blair's 
 front, hitting Leggett's Division, and on down the Fifteenth Corps, 
 two Divisions, Bate's and Walker's, had been whipped, and were 
 virtually out of the fight, because after the third attack upon me, 
 and my breaking up of one of their columns so badly, they did not 
 come again in any force. They went back to the road on the 
 ridge, just south of and parallel to my line. I forget the name of 
 the road, but it was the one that led off to Decatur, and there they 
 intrenched, and when I pnslied forward my skirmishers I found 
 
58 The Battle of Atlanta. 
 
 them in force. Between 3 and 4 o'clock ]\[aney"s Divit^ion left my 
 front and went around to help Cleburn. 
 
 There have also been many statements that in the first attack 
 two Divisions of Hardee's Corps struck the Sixteenth Corps and 
 two the Seventeenth. Blair's. This is not correct. Three Divisions 
 struck my Corps, and out' r)ivisi(^n, Cloburn's. struck Blair's Corps, 
 and caught his left and rear: l)ut after tlie third attack on my front 
 M'aney's Division was sent around to join Cleburn. and joined in 
 the fiercest attack of the day. about 4 [). m.. upon Leggett's and 
 Smith's Divisions after their line had been refused and formed al- 
 most at right angles at Leggett's Hill, and reaching out towards 
 me. with Waglin's Brigade on their left. From all accounts this 
 attack was a fearful one, Maney's men reaching and holding the 
 outside of the intrenchments that were occupied by Blair's men. 
 This line faced almost due south, and both forces fought there off 
 and on until about T p. m., some of the enemy remaining in the 
 outside intrenchments until Mercers Brigade of the Sixteenth 
 Corps went in at near midnight to support that line. 
 
 Again, many records have it that Blair was forced back early 
 in the battle. This is a mistake, as his Fourth Division, command- 
 ed by General Giles A. Smith, which was on the extreme left, held 
 most of his original intrenched line until between 3 and 4 o'clock, 
 when the attack of Cheatham from the Atlanta side forced them to 
 take a new position to keep them from being crushed by Cleburn in 
 the rear and Cheatham's attack from the Atlanta front. 
 
 There is another thing that does not seem to be fully under- 
 stood, and that is that when Blair got his left refused so a? to face 
 Maney and Cleburn in his front they were unable to gain any head- 
 way on him in their attacks. In fact, they suffered great loss, and 
 they only damaged Blair when they got in behind his left. Blair 
 had three Eegiments there refused at right angles to his front, 
 and it was a portion of two of these Eegiments that Cleburn picked 
 up. Blair lost nearly all his prisoners from Giles A. Smith's Divi- 
 sion, when Cleburn swept down through the gap and got right in 
 behind them before they knew anybody was on them. In fact, 
 Blair's men had to turn around and fight towards their rear, and, 
 as I have stated, Cleburn got past Fuller's right and commenced 
 shooting into his flank. Just after "Walker was killed there was a 
 lull, and F\iller turned two regiments right into Cleburn's main 
 line. and. as Captain Allen of the Signal Corps, says, and my rec- 
 
Letter to General Kaum. 59 
 
 oi'ds show, captured that skiniiisli-liiio tli;it killed McIMicixtii. and 
 brmio-lit it in. 
 
 To show MePlierson's feeling about lilairV leL't Hank. 1 sent 
 Fuller's command to that tlank the night before on -a request from 
 Mcpherson, who felt anxious about Blair's position, that flank being 
 in the air; hut Elair camped Fuller near where he opened the bat- 
 tle in tlu^ rear of the Seventeenth Corps instead of connecting his 
 left with it. Thev camped about a quarter of a mile to his rear and 
 a little back from his extreme left. Blair, no doubt, thought that 
 would protect him, as well as put them in line, but he took one 
 of my batteries (]\[una\'s) and put it in his front line. Xow this 
 l)attery w-as on the way from Blair to report to me, coming down 
 just as McPherson was going up the road, and tlie same skiliiiish- 
 line that killed jMcPherson killed the horses of that battery and 
 captured a ])ortion ot the men, and McPherson really almost fell 
 ujion the limber of one of the guns. This was Murray's United 
 States Battery of four pieces. I do not know as I have seen this 
 mentioned in any of the reports, unless it is in min.e; but these 
 arc the facts of the matter. That is the way a battery of my Corps 
 was reported lost or ca|)tured by the enemy. It Avas passing from 
 Blair to m,yself, and not captured in line of battle or fighting, as a 
 great many have stated and supposed to be the case. 
 
 In your article you speak of Logan taking a part of the Six- 
 teenth Corps and leading it, as though it was right on my front, 
 and then speak of him as leading a portion of the Fifteenth Corps 
 that had been broken through on the Decatur road back into posi- 
 tion. The facts are that it was about 4 o'clock in the afternoon 
 when Logan came to me and asked me to send any force I had 
 free to help retake tlie line that General John C. Brown's Division 
 had broken through the Fifteenth Corps. I sent Mercer's Brigade 
 of the Second Division, and with it sent (*aptain Jonas of my staff. 
 (See his statement copied in my address.) Logan followed with 
 the comnuind, and it double-quicked the whole distance without 
 stop{)ing. As soon as it got there it found Lightburn's Division 
 drifted back, but holding their line behind the trees, and the enemy 
 in possession of DeGresse's Battery; and as Mercers Brigade went 
 in on the front, Williamson's Brigade of Wood's Division, which 
 Sherman had directed to make a flank charge, was moving, and 
 they both reached the works together. The men of Piercer's Bri- 
 o-ade got bold of DeGresse's guns (see report of Eighty-first Uli- 
 
60 The Battle of Atlanta. 
 
 uois) and tiirnod them on the enemv. There has always been a eon- 
 test between these two Brigades as to which got there first. Init that 
 does not matter, for tlie}- got in together and retook the line. Gen- 
 eral J. C. Brown, who commanded the Confederate Division, was 
 with me afterwards for many years on the Texas and Pacific Rail- 
 way, and has given me a full account of his attack, and the fury 
 with which he was forced out by this movement from the flank by 
 Wood and the direct assault by Mercer. ^Mercer in going in had 
 his horse killed under him. 
 
 Fighting along the Fifteenth Corps came late, and was all 
 pretty much after the fighting on my front was over, because when 
 General Logan came to me for aid I was intrenching the new line 
 made by the refusal of Blair's left, and took Mercer's Brigade right 
 out of my front to go witli him. The fact is I did not happen to 
 have a single man in reserve. Every man I had on the field Avas in 
 line from the commencement of the fighting. Sweeney's Division 
 stood right uj) in the road it was marching on, and the tAvo bat- 
 teries AA'ere in the center of his division; the position Avas a very 
 strong one. If I had had plenty of time to select a position I could 
 not have found a stronger one. It Avas the first time I ever saAv 
 such execution done by artillery. They used canister against those 
 columns Avith terrible effect. 
 
 To show you how small a thing will sometimes change the 
 prospects in a battle, one of Hardee's Divisions coming toAA-ards me 
 got entangled in something — at that time I could not tell what, but 
 on going to the ground afterwards I found that it was a mill-pond — 
 that exposed the flank of Maney's Division that was next to Walk- 
 er's. Seeing this, I rode down to Mercer and told him to take his 
 Brigade and charge right into it. Avhich he did. It Avas quite a 
 time before I could tell Avhat the result Avas. but I soon saAv ]n-is- 
 oners coming back and Imew then that Mercer had them. He had 
 that Division at a great disadAantage, and captured a great many 
 prisoners out of it and several battle-flags. See report Second 
 Brigade, Second Division Sixteenth Army Cordis, volume 38, part 3, 
 page 450. Armv Records. That charge, no doubt, saved my line, 
 because I had a very thin line, and Avith the most of Hardee's 
 Corps coming at me in double column, as it Avas, I have no doubt 
 that if it had reached me it Avould have given me trouble: but they 
 ncA-er srot to me on anv of their attacks. We were fortunate enough 
 
Letter to General Raum. 61 
 
 to break them before they couhl reach the line, though on Fuller's 
 front they were right up to it when Walker fell. 
 
 There was a great dis})ute between Hood and Hardee about 
 this movement to the rear. Hood claiming that Hardee should have 
 reached there early in the morning, while Hardee claimed he did 
 not receive the order in time to get there before he did — a very for- 
 tunate fact for us, for if he had reached the rear of the Seventeenth 
 and Fifteenth Corps, and Cheatham and Stewart had attacked in 
 the front, it would have been rough times for the old Army of 
 the Tennessee; but no doubt they would have come out of it with 
 honor in some way. 
 
 I think there is no doubt about the time McPherson was killed 
 — it was just about two hours after the battle had opened. Of 
 course there are all kinds of time given, but the fact of the stopping 
 of the watch of the signal officer, Sheffly, when he fell against the 
 tree at two minutes past two, is almost conclusive evidence. See 
 his statement, volume 11-13, page 242, records Society Army of 
 the Tennessee. You can judge of that yourself, because even before 
 McPherson got up to my right, where he stood, as Strong says, 
 watching me, I had been fighting some time, for he had to ride 
 from near Sherman's headquarters up there, a distance of two to 
 three miles. If you will read carefully the address I am sending 
 you, and the report Blair made — also the address of Strong — I 
 think you will come to the same conclusions I give you. An article 
 on the death of General McPherson, by W. W. Allen, of San Diego, 
 California, Signal Officer of the Army of the Tennessee, appeared 
 in an issue of the National Tribune some time this year, but of 
 what date I do not know. It goes to prove the time and the hour 
 McPherson was killed, and the capture of the skirmish-line that 
 killed him. Of course a great many of the official reports are mis- 
 leading as to time, and it is only by these circumstances that we can 
 judge definitely. I notice it was 12 :20 o'clock, according to Allen, 
 when they first heard the rattle of musketry and artillery. 
 
 When vou have read Allen's article please return it to me. I 
 will be very glad to give you any further information you may need 
 if it is possible for me to do so. 
 
 Truly and cordially yours, 
 General Green B. Raum. Grenville M. Dodge. 
 
 Chicago, III. 
 
THE INDIAN CAMPAIGNS 
 1864 AND 1865 
 
 Written in 1874 
 
 By Major-General Grenville M. Dodge 
 
 AND Read to the 
 
 Colorado Commandery of the Loyal Legion 
 OF THE United States, at Denver 
 
 April 21, 1907. 
 
 In December, 1864, I was assigned to the command of the 
 Department of the Missouri. In January, 1865, I received a dis- 
 patch from General Grant asi^ing if a campaign on the plains could 
 be made in the winter. I answered, "Yes, if the proper preparation 
 was made to clothe and bivouac the troops." A few days after I 
 received a dispatch from General Grant ordering me to Fort Leaven- 
 worth. In the meantime the Department of Kansas was merged 
 into the Department of the Missouri, placing under my command 
 Missouri, the Indian Territory, Kansas, Colorado, Utah, Wyoming, 
 and all the country south of the Yellowstone Eiver, and embracing 
 all the overland mail-routes and telegraph-lines to the Pacific. 
 
 On reaching Port Leavenworth I found that General Curtis, 
 the former commander of that department, had reported against 
 any campaign during the winter; that the Indians had possession 
 of the entire country crossed by the stage-lines, having destroyed 
 the telegraph-lines; and that the people living in Colorado, Utah, 
 California, Western Nebraska and Western Kansas were without 
 mails, and in a state of panic ; that the troops distributed along the 
 routes of travel were inside their stockades, the Indians having in 
 nearly every fight defeated them. This success had brought into 
 hostility with the United States nearly every tribe of Indians from 
 Texas on the soutli to the Yellowstone on the north. It was a for- 
 midable combination, and the friendly Indians were daily leaving 
 the reservations to join tlieir hostile brethren. Two thousand In- 
 
64 The Indian Campaign. 
 
 dians had destroyed over one hundred miles of telegraph, and were 
 in possession of tlie country between the Arkansas and the Xorth 
 Platte Rivers. 
 
 The opinion at Fort Leavenworth before I arrived was that 
 it was impossible to make a successful campaign against these 
 Indians during the winter and successfully open these lines of com- 
 munication. There were two Regiments of Cavalry in Kansas, 
 mostly idle. There was no communication with any of the posts 
 except by messenger. A dispatch from Colorado showed a panic 
 there, and the people demanded that troops of the Department be 
 stationed there to protect the citizens, instead of their organizing 
 and fighting the Indians, and that martial law had been declared. 
 
 I saw, after spending a day at Fort Leavenworth, that it was 
 necessary to change the depressed feeling and temper existing 
 among the troops and the citizens throughout the department. I 
 sent for Bela M. Hughes, agent of the overland stages, and Edward 
 Craighten, general manager and superintendent of the overland 
 telegraph, and consulted fully with them. I selected from my old 
 guides some of the most trusted men, and some of the trusted 
 Indians that I had known, and sent by them to each district com- 
 mander who could be reached, these two short dispatches : 
 
 1. What measures are you taking to keep open the route and protect 
 it? What Indians are engaged in the struggle? Where are their villages? 
 Do their families travel with them? Have you spies in their camps? What 
 action have you taken to repair telegraph-lines? Give me all particulars. 
 
 2. Place every mounted man in your command on the South Platte 
 Route. Repair telegraphs ; attack any body of Indians you meet, large or 
 small. Stay with them and pound them until they move north of the Platte 
 or south of the Arkansas. I am coming with two Regiments of cavalry to 
 the Platte line and will open and protect it, and whip all the Indians in 
 the way. 
 
 I also found that the plains were covered with Indian traders 
 who had permits, under the guise of which they were stealing from 
 the Indians, both friendly and hostile, and were selling them arms 
 and ammunition. I immediately revoked all these permits, and 
 ordered the arrest of all traders who had in their possession Indian 
 or Government stock. I also immediately wired to Major Frank 
 North, who was the interpreter of the Pawnee Indians, and also 
 to the Chief of the Omaha Indians, both of whom had been with 
 me on the plains, and instructed them to select their most trusted 
 men and send them on the plains to ascertain for me the purpose 
 of the hostile Indians, and whether thev would head towards the 
 
The Indian Campaign. G5 
 
 settlements, or if their movements indicated thev would attack 
 only the lines of comnmnication and the trains crossing the plains. 
 At the same time we stopped all trains on the plains and ordered 
 them to the nearest military post, instructing the officers to arm 
 and organize them in companies, and place a United States officer 
 over them, and have them move with the army trains. 
 
 Having perfected the i)reliniinary organization for moving 
 upon the stage- and telegraph-lines, we saw it was necessary to 
 concentrate on one line. At this time the stage- and telegraph-lines 
 on the north ran from Fort Leavenworth to Fort Kearney, and 
 from Omaha to Fort Kearney, where they were consolidated, run- 
 ning up the Platte Valley to the month of the Lodge Pole, the stage- 
 station at that point heing known as Jnlesbnrg. The lines here 
 separated again, the main telegraph-line running to old Fort Lara- 
 mie, thence u|) the .Sweetwater through South Pass and thence to 
 Ltah. The stage-line ran up the South Platte to Denver, then by 
 the Cache La Poudre to Laramie Plains, over them to Fort Halleck 
 and Bridger. and on to I'tah. I concluded to concentrate all our 
 eflforts to open the line I'loiu Fort Leavenworth and Omaha to 
 Kearney, thente to Denver and on to Ftali. known as the South 
 Platte Eoute. 
 
 The overland route from Fort Leavenworth and Omaha cross- 
 ing the continent had a stage-station about every twelve miles. 
 The troops along the lines were posted at the forts and stockades 
 about every hundred miles, with a few soldiers distributed at each 
 stage-station. Then scattered alon;r the road were ranches, and 
 relay- and feeding-stations for the regular commercial and supply- 
 trains that were continually on the road. The great mining-camps, 
 and all the inhal)itants of C^olorado, T'tah, Wyoming, and Idaho, 
 were dependent upon tliese trains for their supidie-. Tn winter 
 these trains were generally mule-trains of twenty wagous each, and 
 during the summer were generally ox-trains of fifty to a Inmdred 
 wagons each. They were in the halnt iif straggling along through 
 the country, taking care of themselves. Tlieir stock had to l:)e herd- 
 ed at night, and it was a great temptation to the Indians to steal, 
 and a great deal of this had been done, but no actual fighting or 
 attacking of trains or troojjs occurri'd until the winter of L'^iU-Go. 
 The stopping of these trains, nuiil. and supi)lies. and the destruction 
 of the telegraph wires, caused great consternation in that country 
 
6G The Indian Campaign. 
 
 and on the Pacific Coast, and tlic demands npon the Governnient to 
 open and maintain tliese lines Avere persistent. 
 
 At Fort Leavenwortli there apjieared to have been no systematic 
 effort to reopen these lines. It seemed tliat the troops were taking 
 care of the posts and resisting attacks. They did not seem to appre- 
 ciate the Indian character; that the only way to strengthen and 
 protect the lines of comnumication was to go for the Indians. 
 Wliat troops had l)een sent against the Indians were small and weak 
 parties, and had evidently gone out with the intention of locating 
 the Indians and avoiding them. 
 
 Along the s(ndh emigrant line from Kansas City, following 
 the Arkansas Eiver to Xew ]\Iexico, was ihe line of supplies for all 
 of >;ew Mexico and Southern Colorado. The Indians here were in 
 possession. The travel and traffic along it were not to be compared 
 with that along the ncn'thern lines. Then again the citizens of 
 Kansas and Nebraska had settled along these routes as far west as 
 tlie l()(tth Meridian, obtaining their living from this great traffic, 
 and tl'.e Indians in their raids had picked them np, a family at a 
 time, until they had a great many prisoners, mostly women and 
 children. tb;e men himig generally massacred when captun-d. 
 
 I found the Eleventh Kansas Cavalry at Fort Eiley, and the 
 Sixteenth Kansas Cavalry at Fort Leavenworth, and immediately 
 placed them en route for Fort Kearney, All the posts were, unfor- 
 tunately, short of subsistence, forage, and ammunition. The three- 
 months' Eegiments enlisted in Colorado for the Indian service had 
 been discharged, tln'ir tiuu' having expired, and there had been no 
 troops sent to take their places, ^ly only resource was to utilize the 
 Colorado Militia until I e(ndd send troops GOO miles to take their 
 places. 
 
 I innned lately started for Fort Kearney, taking with me a 
 few soldiers in the stage and one of my staff. It was the opinion 
 of all the officers at Fort Leavenworth that it would be impossible 
 for me to make the trip, but I knew it required personal presence 
 among the troojis to bring about quick results. The troops that I 
 had ordered to march from Fort Eiley refused to march in the 
 winter. I answered to place under arrest all officers of the com- 
 panies and Eegiments that refused to obey the order, and have them 
 report to Fort Leavenworth, intending to re]dace them with vet- 
 eran officers of tlie de]>artnu'nt whom 1 knew Avould move, no matter 
 what the hai-dship. The next morning I received a report from 
 
Thb Indian Campaign. 67 
 
 Fort EilcY that the troops would move. IMic lU--iiiicnt that marched 
 from Fort Eilcy to Fort Kearney lost thirteen men from freezing, 
 as the weather was very severe, and while they were i)roperly clothed, 
 they .lid not know liow to protect themselves ri'omtlie weather. 
 
 On my arrival at Fort Kearney 1 immediately notified Mr. 
 Huo-hes. agent of the stage-lines, that 1 was prepared to protect 
 his "stages, and called upon him to replace his stock immediately, 
 ready to start out his stages. I also notified Mr. Craighten. super- 
 intendent of the telegraph-lines, to replace his operators, for.l wonld 
 have his lines o'pen in a few days. Both of these orders were made 
 known to the public. T also notified the "press" at Omaha and Fort 
 Leavenworth that all trains which were tied up on the plains would 
 be moved to their destinations during that month. We found it 
 necessary to inspire energy and conhdence m these three great 
 interests, as not one of them even thought we would succeed, and. hi 
 fact, the "i^ress" comments on mw orders showed that they had no 
 faith in them. I found on the line of the Platte the Seventh Iowa 
 Cavalry, and at Fort Laramie and on the Sweetwater the Eleventh 
 Ohio Cavalrv. 
 
 When we arrived in sight of Fort Kearney the troops were 
 prepared to tight us. thinking it was a band of Indians. We dis- 
 covered that the troops were depressed from the success of the 
 Indians and the murder and mutilation of their comrades, and 
 that they hardlv stuck their heads out of the stockade. Having had 
 experience with Indians. I called the troops together and instructed 
 them how to handle and to fight Indians, telling them that an ag- 
 gressive war would be made against the Indians, and no uuitter how 
 large the Indian bands were, or how small the troop, that hereafter 
 thev must stand and fight: that if thev did the Indians would run. 
 If thev did not. the Indians would catch and seal], them, and even 
 if thev had to rc'treat. they must do so with their faces to the enemy. 
 The Indians, after the Chivington tight on Big Sandy, had 
 concentrated u].on the South Platte and on the Sweetwater. The 
 reports showed that thev held i)ossession from Julesburg to Valley 
 Junction and to Mud Springs, and held the telegraph-line west 
 of Fort Laramie. They had with them -iSm head of captured 
 stock and had cai.ture.l all the stage-stations and numy trains, 
 devastated th.e ranches, butehered jnany nuai. women, and children, 
 and destroved 100 miles of telegraph. 
 
68 The Indian Campaign. 
 
 To show iiioi-c plainly than I ran (h'scribe the condition of 
 the eountrv. 1 «:ive the reports of the three commanding officers 
 along the St)uth Platte Route, in answer to the dispatclies which 
 I sent by messenger to all commanders the day I arrived at Fort 
 Leavenworth. These answers met me at Fort Kearm-y. 
 
 (reneral Robert ^Mitchell, who commanded the territory from 
 Omaha to Lodge Pole, replied as follows : 
 
 The telegraph from Lodge Pole Creek, twenty-five miles west to .Tules- 
 burg. ou Laramie Route, is destroyed for fifteen miles. Poles cut down and 
 destroyed on the Denver line beyond .Jnlesburg for the first fifty miles. The 
 telegraph is destroyed about ten miles north. We are compelled to haul 
 poles from 130 to 140 miles. Every means in my power is used to have the 
 lines fixed. All the available troops I have at my disposal are in the vicinity 
 of .Jnlesburg. except some small garrisons at posts required to be kept up 
 ou the Denver route. My district only extends to Jnlesburg. I have sent 
 some troops, however, up that route fifty miles since the outbreaks and find 
 everything destroyed. We have no communication with Denver, and have 
 not had since the last outbreak. Neither can I communicate with Fort 
 Laramie in consequence of the lines being down. I have been traversing the 
 country constantly on and adjacent to the mail- and telegraph-lines during 
 the past four months, sending guards on the stages, and, when deemed neces- 
 sary, mounted guards and patrols on all dangerous portions of the road 
 through my district. 
 
 This plan succeeded until an overpowering force attacked Jnlesburg 
 and drove the troops inside of their works and burned the stage- and tele- 
 graph-station, destroying a large amount of stores for both companies. The 
 overland stage cannot run through until they can provide for supplies for 
 stock from Jnlesburg to the Junction, where overland stage leaves Denver 
 route, everything belonging to the stage company, citizens and government 
 being entirely destroyed. The Indian villages are unknown to us. From the 
 best information I have I believe them to be on the Powder River. I know 
 certainly there is a large village there. There have been no squaws in the 
 country, to my knowledge, since last fall. The tribes engaged are the Chey- 
 ennes, Arapahoes, Kiowas, Brule, Ogallala Sioux, a portion of the Black- 
 feet, and a large portion of what is known as the Missouri River Sioux, 
 the same Indians General Sully made the campaign against last summer. 
 From 3.000 to ."i.OOO additioT^al troops will be needed to punish the Indians. 
 One column will never be able to overtake them, unless they are willing to 
 give battle. I think three columns of men. 1,000 strong each, with ample 
 garrison on the overland-mail and telegraph lines, well mounted and sup- 
 plied, can clear out tlie country of all hostile Indians, if done before grass 
 comes. After that time, in my judgment, it will take twice that number 
 of men. 
 
 In addition to the troubles west, I would not be surprised any day 
 to hear of an outbreak in the northern part of my district. I am informed 
 by Indian scouts that there is a large encampment of Indians on the Run- 
 ning Water that are ready to engage in the war against the whites. Among 
 them are some of the Yanktonais Sioux. 
 
 Colonel E. E. Livingston reported as follows: 
 In reply to your inquiries I would respectfully state that in the early 
 part of January last, indications of large parties of Indians moving west- 
 ward on Republican were reported by the scouts sent to gain information 
 of their movements. Ou January 7th they had crossed South Fork of Platte 
 River, twenty-three miles west of this post, camped with their families, form- 
 ing a camp of 400 lodges, containing eight warriors each, many lodges being 
 
The Indian Campai(!N. '>•' 
 
 thirty robes in size. They commenced the work of destruc-tioii alonj;- the 
 road" west as far as Junction Station, 100 miles from liere. Their forces in 
 this fight were not less than 2,000. well armed with breech-loading carbines 
 and rifles. A desperate attempt on their part to burn the overland-stage 
 station near this post was made at this time, but was frustrated by the 
 gallantry of Captain N. J. O'Brien, Company F, Seventh Iowa Cavalry. 
 Every ranch and stage-station from Junction Station to this post is burned, 
 and the charred remains of every inmate who failed to e>:cape tells ot the 
 brutality they were subjected to. I telegraphed Hon. Sam H. Ell)ert. acting 
 Governor of Colorado, early in January of the state of things. The troops 
 of Colorado have been withdrawn from Valley, fifty miles west of here, 1 
 surmise to concentrate around Denver. The telegraph-lmes to Salt l.ake 
 and the' Denver branch lines are destroyed for a distance of nearly ten miles 
 on the northern route, and in diffeivnt points throughoul KMt miles along 
 the Denver route. 
 
 I have but 3(iO troops, but so* long as human endurance holds out we 
 will work night and day to get the communication perfect with the west. 
 
 The Indians engaged in this war are the Cheyennes. Ogallalas, and 
 Brule Sioux They have gone northward towards Horse Creek and Fort 
 Laramie. Their trail leads in that direction, but they are slow in marching, 
 feeling audacious and indifferent to any effort from the small body ot troops 
 in this district. I saw their signals today, probably those ot small war 
 parties on the North Platte. You will hear of continued murders and rob- 
 beries 'as long as the road is so poorly protected by troops. No spies can be 
 used now, owing to numerous small war parties being met everywhere in 
 this country. 1 predict that if more troops are not sent into this district 
 immediately, this road will be stripped of every ranch and white ma" »» i* 
 Should these Indians swing around by Niobrara River and take the Omaha 
 road below Kearney, where settlements are numerous, infinite mischief will 
 result to the settlers. What we need are troops, supplies for them and a 
 vigorous campaign against these hostile Indians. They must be put on the 
 defensive instead of us. No difficulty can arise m finding them. Over _.MUU 
 cattle accompany them. 
 
 Headquarters, Distb ct Colorado. 
 
 Denver, Colorado Territory, Feb. 2, 1805. 
 The Indians are bold in the extreme. They have burned every ranch 
 between Jnleslnirg and Valley Station, and nearly all the property at latter 
 nlace- driven off all stoqk, both public and private. These Indians are led 
 by white men. and have complete control of all the country outside my dis- 
 trict, so that I am hemmed in. 
 
 The weather has been very severe lieiv f..r nearly three weeks; the 
 thermometer 30 degrees below zero, with quite a fall ot snow ..n the grouiul_. 
 I have tried every means in my power to raise volunteers tor three months 
 State service, but as yet have not succeeded, owing to the factional spirit 
 existing in the community. 
 
 The Legislature took the matter in hand at my suggestion, appropriat- 
 ing so much money. Territorial bonds, to give the men a bounty and pur- 
 chase horses to mount them on, as I have none : but the members cannot 
 agree on the spoil likely in their estimation to accrue from such a proceed- 
 ing, so the bill has not yet passed. I addressed the Speaker ot the House 
 yesterday, informing him that unless something was done within forty-eight 
 hours I would be compelled, much against my will, to proclaim martial law 
 and stop all business, forcing every man to enter the ranks and open the 
 line of communication. I have now a city organization of about 100 men 
 organized into companies, so that in case of an attack here I would have 
 something tangible to lay hold of and make a fight. I have had a great deal 
 of trouble in this matter, as there is no concert ot action. ev(>r\ man sus- 
 pecting his fellow of some chicanery. 
 
70 The Ixdian Campaig^^ 
 
 Fort Lyon is iK'in;^ rapidly fdrtified. so that "200 men can defend it 
 ai;ainst 2,000 Indians. Militia companies are being organized all over the 
 settled parts of the country (under penalty of being pressed into service) 
 to defend the frontier settlements southward, and could I but get a Regi- 
 ment here now I could keep things in a running trim until the arrival of 
 a sufficient force to make a campaign. The Indians are now determined to 
 make it a war of extermination, and nothing short of 5,000 men can make 
 it extermination for them. 
 
 Major Wynkoop informed me from Fort Lyon that many warriors 
 were on the headwaters of the Smokj- Hill and intended attacking all the 
 settlements as well as Denver. Provisions, owing to the transportation-line 
 being cut off, are at an exorbitant price, as well as labor and forage. 
 
 Cannot troops be sent out here immediately, or authority to raise 
 companies, which could be easily done, for one year? 
 
 The Santa Fe line has threatened to stop running on account of the 
 Indians. Should such be the case, them all is cut off. 
 Respectfully, your obedient servant. 
 
 Thomas Moonlight, 
 Colonel Elcccnth Kansas (Javajry. CominandiiKj. 
 
 Colonel Chivington. from Fort Eankin, reported : 
 
 Lieutenant-Colonel Collins, with 200 men of the Eleventh Ohio, and 
 Company D, Seventh Iowa Cavalry, fought Indians from the 4tli to the 
 9th inst., at Mnd Springs. The Indians at one time charged our forces in 
 the face of artillery and were nearly successful. Two thousand warriors 
 were engaged in the fight. It is supposed forty Indians were killed. Beaure's 
 and Craighten's herds were driven off. The Indians crossed at Bush Creek, 
 going north. The telegraph poles were gone and wires so inextricably tan- 
 gled as to be useless. Seven hundred lodges crossed Pole Creek, six miles 
 below Pole Creek crossing. 
 
 These Indians were not driven off and the telegraph-lines re- 
 taken without severe fighting and loss of many soldiers. Within two 
 weeks the troops drove these Indians nortli. wliere a detachment of 
 troops from Fort Laramie attacked iIumu and drove them across 
 the Platte. Finally the Indians saw that a _ different warfare was 
 being made against them, and they fled to their villages on the 
 Powder Eiver and in the Black Hills country. 
 
 There was such energy and such spirit displayed by the troops, 
 that after two weeks' work they had the telegra])h-lines replaced 
 between Omaha and Denver, a distance of GOO miles, and this with- 
 out any additional force to aid them. Tlie progress made in putting 
 un the wires is shown by this report: 
 
 'Sly troop is at Moore's ranch ; passed there at 2 o'clock. We ran 
 twelve miles of wire and set eight miles of poles, had two severe fights, and 
 marched fifty-five miles in fifty-two hours. Operators furnished valuable 
 service. E. B. Mx-rphy. 
 
 Captain Scrrnth loira Caralri/. 
 
 The thermometers all this tinu' were from o to 10 degrees 
 below zero. On February 13th telegraiihic communication was 
 
The Indian Campaign. 71 
 
 resumed through to Califoi'uia, aud Mr. Craighton uotilied the 
 Government of the fact. 
 
 An inquiry made of Craighten by General Grant, as to where 
 I was located (Craighten being a jjersonal friend of mine who was 
 most skei^tical at the start of my accomplishing anything with the 
 material I had, was overjo^'ed at our success), was answered, "No- 
 body knows Avhere he is, but everybody knows where he has been." 
 
 From the 5th to the 13th of February every mounted man on 
 that line was in the saddle, either assisting the operators or chasing 
 real or imaginary Indians. The moment a scout came in, instruc- 
 tions were given to the officers to send them out and not allow 
 any mounted troops in the stockade until the lines were opened 
 and the Indians driven at least 100 miles away from the line of 
 telegraph, and the only dashes the Indians made after we got fairly 
 at them was to cut off a part of an unguarded train, and at un- 
 guarded ranches, and at those stage-stations where only a few 
 soldiers were located : Init in every attack the soldiers stood their 
 ground and fought, and when dri\en they only backed far enough 
 to get a secure place. The troops knew better than to go back to the 
 fortified posts, as they had instructions to keep to the hills, but in 
 nearly every case they were successful, and the daring that some of 
 the troops showed in these fights was remarkable. 
 
 Great atrocities were committed by the Indians, scalping the 
 men ali^-e and abusing the women. This caused the troops to stand 
 and fight, preferring to die rather than to fall into their hands. 
 Wherever a fight Avas successfully nuido, no matter whether com- 
 missioned or non-commissioned officers commanded. I tclegraplied 
 him in person thanking him, and to the commanding otlieer of his 
 Regiment, requesting that he be given the first promotion, and wrote 
 to the Governor of his State. 
 
 As soon as this stage-line was opened we concentrated aboht 
 500 mounted men, intending to catch the Indians before they left 
 the Xorth Platte; but the Indians fled as soon as they heard of this, 
 and did not stop until they reached Powder River, too far north for 
 us to folloAv until arrangements were made for supi)lies for troops 
 and stock, as everything had to be teamed from Fort LeaveuAvorth. 
 
 The storms during March Avere very severe. Snow lay Iavo feet 
 on the level and Avas crusted so hard that for Aveeks it Avas almost 
 impossible to force animals through it. As soon as Ave heai'd from 
 my scouts of the departure of the Indians and found they liad no 
 
72 The Indian Campaign. 
 
 intention of niolestino- the citizens of Nebraska, and had placed 
 themselves on Powder Eiver too far north to return until the return 
 of the grass in May, I distributed the troops along the stage- and 
 telegraph-lines to Salt Lake, and returned to open the South Route 
 to New Mexico. 
 
 My experience on the North Route, witli the reports from the 
 troops and from my Indians, soon satisfied me that every Indian 
 tribe of any importance from the British Possessions in the north 
 to the Red River in the south, were preparing to engage in open 
 hostilities. These tribes often pretended to be friendly, deceiving 
 the Government and the Indian agent, a crafty trick that was 
 impossible to make the Government understand. For instance, they 
 would go to the Indian agent for provisions, and would make him 
 believe that they were for peace, and would promise to bring to 
 the agency their tril)L'. Probably by the time the report of the Indian 
 agent reached the Government, this same tribe would he off on the 
 warpath and have ca])tured a train or murdered some settlers, and 
 the troops in return had attacked and destroyed them, and we were 
 called to account for it, as it was claimed by the agents we were 
 attacking peaceable Indians. This went so far that it prevented 
 me from opening the southern emigrant trail several weeks. Finally 
 I took the matter in my own hands, regardless of the action or 
 report of the agents. 
 
 While these parleys were going on the Indians suddenly ap- 
 peared all along the southern emigrant trail in the Arkansas River 
 Valley, attacking trains, posts, and escorts. I threw my troops 
 against the bands of Southern Arapahoes, Cheyennes, Comanehes, 
 and Kiowas that were in the vicinity of the trail. The troops had 
 caught on to the severe fighting on the Platte, had heard of the 
 new methods of warfare and victories, and they in all cases stood 
 their ground and defeated the Indians, although they suffered 
 severely in some instances. This was a reception that the Indians 
 did not expect and they fled to the Wichita Mountains, suing for 
 peace, which I knew was simply to ju'event us attacking them there, 
 but accomplished its purpose with the Government and finally 
 brought about the treaties that Avere not worth the paper they Avere 
 Avritten on, and later on forced the campaigns that Sheridan after- 
 wards made, Avhile if we had been alloAved to have followed them 
 up and punish them as we did the northern tribes, we would have 
 conquered a peace that would have been a lasting one. 
 
The Indian Campaign. 
 
 The Indians of the phiins are the best skirmishers in the world. 
 In rajiidity of movements, in perfect liorsemanship. sudden wliirl- 
 ing, protecting the Ijody by clinging to tlie side of the horse, and 
 rapid movements in open and difticnlt ground, no trained cavalry 
 in the worhl can equal them. On foot their ability to hide behind 
 any obstruction, in ravine, along creeks, and under creek and river 
 banks, and in fighting in the open plains or level ground, the 
 faculty to disappear is beyond one's belief except he has experienced 
 it. In skulking and sharpshooting they are adepts, but troops prop- 
 erly instructed are a match for them on foot, and never fail to 
 drive and route them, if they will stand and fight and never re- 
 treat except slowly with their faces to them. I have seen 
 several times, when caught in a tight place, bands of Indians 
 held Ijy a few men by holding to ridges and slowly retreating, always 
 using our rifles at everv opportunit}^ when an Indian was in range, 
 never wasting a shot on them unless there was a prol^ability of 
 hitting them. The Indians have a mortal fear of such tactics. 
 
 In a fight the Indians will select the positions and pick out 
 quickly any vantage ground, and sometimes as high as 200 will 
 concentrate at such a point where we could not concentrate twenty 
 men without exposing them, and from this vantage ground they 
 will pour a deadly fire on the troops, and we cannot see an Indian — 
 only puffs of smoke. By such tactics as this they harass and defeat 
 our troops. Many a fight occurred between Indians and soldiers 
 both watching the smoke to show each other's position. You can 
 ivatch this kind of a fight and never see a person unless some one 
 is hit and exposes himself, wdien it is nearly always a sure death. 
 The Indian character is such that he will not stand continual fol- 
 lowing, pounding, and attacking. Their life and methods are not 
 accustomed to it, and the Indians can be driven by very inferior 
 forces by continually watching, attacking, and following. Xone 
 of our campaigns have l^een successful that have not been prepared 
 to follow the Indians day and night, attacking them at every oppor- 
 tunity until they are worn out, disbanded, or forced to surrender, 
 which is the sure result of such a campaign. 
 
 The Indians during the months they had been hostile, and 
 especially in their attacks on the stage-stations and ranches, had 
 captured a large number of men, women, and children. These 
 prisoners had made known to the troops, by dropping notes along 
 the trail and through the reports of friendly Indians, their terrible 
 
The Ixdiax Campaigx. 
 
 condition and the usage that was being made of them. Their ap- 
 peals to ns to rescue them were pitifuh 
 
 I knew the prisoners would be sent far north to the villages, 
 and their winter quarters out of our reach ; that these villages were 
 unprotected because every brave and dog-soldier had his warpaint 
 on and was joining the hostile forces attacking along our lines, 
 which were increasing ever}- day. I also knew it would be impossible 
 for any of our troops to reach them or to rescue them by following 
 them, and as soon as I arrived at Fort Kearney I asked authority 
 of the Government to enlist and muster into service two companies 
 of Pawnee Indians, to be under the command of their old inter- 
 preter. Major Xorth, who I knew to be a brave, level-headed leader. 
 This authority was immediately given me, and Major Xorth was 
 given confidential instructions to proceed to the Sioux counti}^, 
 apparently on scout duty, but to watch his opportunity and rescue 
 these prisoners, while their braves were down fighting us. He 
 started, but storms of snow came down so heavy that his ponies 
 could get nothing to eat. and during the latter part of February 
 and all of March these storms were continuous, the snow falling 
 to the depth of two feet over the entire plains. Major Xorth was 
 compelled to seek shelter in the river bottoms, and browsed his 
 stock on Cottonwood limbs to save them. In the campaign of the 
 summer and winter of 18G5 and 18t56 Major Xorth, with his two 
 enlisted companies, to which I added two more, made some won- 
 derful marches, scouts, battles, and captures, and during that 
 campaign we recaptured and had surrendered to us many of these 
 women and children prisoners. 
 
 After the war Major Xorth became manager of the Indians 
 in Buffalo Bill's Wild West Show, and died in that service. He was 
 a noted man on the plains. My acquaintance with him commenced 
 in 1856, and together we had seen and- endured many hardships. 
 It was seldom one met his equal in any of the different phases of 
 plains life. Although he had led an eventful career, still I never 
 heard him refer to what he had done or accomplished, or the part 
 he had taken in battles, and probably no man was ever more wor- 
 shiped than he was by the two tril)es of Pawnee Indians : and his 
 death was virtually their destruction, for during his life among 
 them he held them under good discipline and kept them away from 
 vice, diseases, and war. 
 
The Indian Campaign. 75 
 
 A 2;reat iiiaiiv amusing reports eaiiic to me from my scouts and 
 the captured Indians. When on the j.lains in the 50's I was known 
 among the Indians by the name, in their hingnage, that signified 
 "Long Eye." '^Shar]) Eye," and "Hawl^ Eye." 'This came from 
 the fact that when I first went among them it was as an engineer 
 making surveys through tlieir country. ^Yith my engineering in- 
 struments I could set a head-flag two or three miles away, even 
 further than an Indian could see, and it is their custom to give a 
 practical name to everything. Of course I was not many days on 
 the plains until it reached the Indians that "Long Eye'^ was there, 
 and in everv fight tliat occurred they had me present. They said 
 I could shoot as far as 1 could see. The scouts said the Indian 
 chiefs laid their defeats to that fact. Then again they were very 
 superstitious about my power in other matters. When the overland 
 telegraph was built they were taught to respect it and not destroy it. 
 They were made to believe that it was a Great Medicine. This was 
 done after the line was opened to Fort Laramie by stationing several 
 of their most intelligent chiefs at Fort Laramie and others at Fort 
 Kearney, the two posts being 300 miles apart, and then having 
 them talk to each other over the wire and note the time sent and 
 received. Then we had them mount their fleetest horses and ride 
 as fast as they could until they met at Old Jule's ranch, at the 
 mouth of the Lodge Pole, thte being about half wav lietween Kear- 
 ney and Laramie. Of course this was astonisliing and mysterious to 
 the Indians. Thereafter you could often see Indians with their heads 
 against the telegraph poles, listening to the peculiar sound the 
 ^dnd makes as it runs along the wires and through the insulators. 
 It is a soughing, singing sound. They thought and said it was 
 "Big Medicine" talking. I never could convince them that I could 
 not go to the telegraph poles the same as they did and tell them 
 what was said, or send a message for them to some chief far away, 
 as they had often seen me use my traveling-instrument and cut into 
 the line, sending and receiving messages. Then again, most of the 
 noted scouts of the plains wlio had married into the different tril)es 
 had been guides for me, and many of these men were half-breeds, 
 and were with these hostile Indians. Some of them took part with 
 tliem. l)ut more of them had tried to pacify and bring theui to 
 teruis, and they gave me information about those who were not 
 engaged in the depredations. 
 
The Ij^diax Campaign. 
 
 I was supposed to be, by the Indians of the pkiins, a person 
 of great power and great moment. These half-breeds worked upon 
 their superstitions, endeavoring to convince them it was useless to 
 fight "Long Eye.'' Xo doubt my appearing on tlie |)lains the time 
 I did, and the fact that from the time I appeared until the time 
 I left, the troops had nothing Init success, carried great weight with 
 them, and seemed to confinn what the old voyageurs and guides 
 told them, and had much influence in causing their abandonment 
 of the Platte country and returning to their villages. 
 
 My own experience on the plains led me to be just as watch- 
 ful and just as vigilant when I knew the Indians were not near 
 me as I was when they were in sight. In all my travels I never 
 allowed them to cam]i near or occupy my camps even in the time of 
 peace, when they were friendly, and I never allowed myself to 
 Ivnowingly do them an injustice, making it a point never to 
 lie to them in any of my councils and treaties, or never 
 allow, if I knew it, the interpreter to deceive them. That 
 brought me respect in all my dealings with them, and I treated 
 them with I'espect, courtesy, and consideration, and demanded the 
 same from them. This, no doubt, was one of the princi]:)al reasons 
 that in fifteen years, more or less, of intercourse with them, trav- 
 eling through their country both during the times they were hostile 
 and at peace, that I escaped numy of the misfortunes that befell 
 others. 
 
 Although this short campaign was not remarkable for great 
 battles or large loss by killed and wounded, still it required great 
 fortitude from the troops, and often great personal courage, and 
 its success was of great moment to the Government and to the 
 people of the plains and the Pacific Coast, for over these three 
 great overland routes were carried the nutils, telegrams, and traffic 
 during the entire war of the rebellion, which did much to hold 
 these peojde loyal to our Government. A long stoppage was a 
 destruction to business, and would In'ing starvation and untold 
 misery: and when, with only thirteen days and nights of untiring 
 energy on the part of the troops in a winter of unheard-of severity, 
 California, T^^tah and Colorado were put in communication with 
 the rest of the Avorld, there was great rejoicing. In seventeen days 
 the stages were started and overland travel was again safe, after 
 being interrupted for two months, and by ]\rarch 1st the commercial 
 
The Indian Campaign. 77 
 
 trains were all en route to their destinations and I had returned to 
 my duties at the headquarters of the Department, in St. Louis. 
 
 It was with no little satisfaetion that I answered a personal 
 letter General Grant had written me. wlien he assigned me to this 
 duty, and which I found awaiting me on my return to Fort Leaven- 
 worth. Ill his letter he outlined what it was necessary to do and 
 why he had asked me to take the field, lie judged rightly of the 
 condition of affairs and the necessity of immediate action. I wrote 
 him how promptly the troops resimndcd to my call. Thvy had 
 opened the overland routes; they liad made tliem secure and were 
 then guarding them, and they would be kept open. But after grass 
 came, unless these hostile Indians were thoroughly chastised, they 
 would certainly and successfully attack them and prevent safe 
 travel overland, and from my letter the order soon came for me to 
 prepare for the extensive campaign of the next summer and winter 
 that followed these Indians to the Yellowstone on the north and the 
 Cimarron on the south, and conquered a peace with every hostile 
 tribe. 
 
JAMES BKIlXiEU 
 
 Chief (juide to Iiulijin Campaign. ISG.j-G. 
 
- THE INDIAN CAMPAIGNS 
 1865 AND 1866 
 
 During the Indian campaigns of the winter and spring of 
 186J;-65, against the Indians that were holding all the overland 
 roads, stations, telegraph and emigrant routes over the plains, my 
 command reopened them in a short campaigTi of sixty days in which 
 many fights occurred in which the troops were uniformly successful. 
 The telegraph-lines were rebuilt, the stages re-established, the mails 
 trans])orted regularly, and protection given. Although we were able 
 to drive the Indians off of all of these routes and open them suc- 
 cessfully and hold them open, my experience convinced me that 
 as soon as grass started on the plains these Indians would again 
 come down on the routes, and that the only possible way of set- 
 tling the Indian question was to make a well-planned and continu- 
 ous campaign against them on the Arkansas, the Smoky Hill, the 
 Eepul)lican, and the North and South Platte A'alley routes, and to 
 keep them off the traveled roads. To do this we would be obliged 
 to get our troops into their country as soon as possible and go for 
 their villages. 
 
 In my report to the Government, in April. 1865, I set forth 
 the necessity for this and outlined the plans. I'pon the receipt of 
 that report I received authority from General Grant and General 
 Pope to go forward and carry out the plans that I had suggested. 
 This plan contemplated placing upon the plains about 5,000 men 
 to protect the stations and telegraph-lines, furnish escort to emi- 
 grants and Government trains of supplies that were necessary to 
 su]iply the wants of that vast country with provisions and outfit 
 five movable columns of soldiers, a total of 6,000 or 7,000 men. 
 Contracts were immediately made for the supplies for this number 
 of men ; for horses for the cavalry, and for the sujiplying of the 
 posts on the plains with a surplus at eacJi. so that if the campaign 
 extended into the winter it would not have to stop for want of provi- 
 sions. The campaign in -the sjiring had to be made on sup]ilies 
 moved there in the middle of winter, at ureat cost and sufPerimr. 
 
80 The Indiax Campaign. 
 
 The Quartermaster ami Commissary at Fort Leavenworth made 
 contraets for supplies to be delivered in June, and General Grant 
 sent to Fort Leavenworth something like 10,000 troops, very few 
 of Avliom got into the campaigns from the fact that the troops 
 would no sooner reach Fort Leavenworth than they would protest, 
 claiming that the Civil War was ended and saying they had not 
 enlisted to fight Indians. The Governors of their States, Congress- 
 men, and other influential men. Avonld bring such pressure to 
 bear that the War Department would order them mustered out. 
 While the Government was at great expense in moving these troops 
 to the plains, some even reaching as far as Julesburg, we never 
 got any- service from them ; they were a great detriment, and caused 
 much delay in our plans, so that the overland routes had to be 
 protected by about one-half of the troops that it was at first thought 
 necessary to accomplish the work. Three Eegiments of infantr}^, 
 eleven Eegiments of cavalry, and three Batteries of artillery, that 
 reported to me under the order of General Grant, were mustered out 
 on the march between Fort Leavenworth and Juleslnirg. 
 
 There was enlisted for the Lidian campaign, five Eegiments 
 of United States volunteers, recruited from the rebel prisoners, 
 who, desiring to be at liberty, were willing to enlist under the 
 United States flag to fight Indians, and these five Eegiments had 
 to be depended upon mostly for taking care of all the country west 
 of the Lakes, — the overland routes on the plains, to man th.e posts 
 on the upper Missouri and Mississippi Elvers, and for escorts for 
 surveying parties, etc. So when I was ready to move all five col- 
 umns I had less than T.OOO officers and men in my department. 
 The Indians commenced their depredations on all tlie routes in 
 April, especially on the Arkansas route, where wc liad to contend 
 with the South Cheyennes, Comanches, Apaches. Kiowas. and Arap- 
 ahoe tribes. This district was under the command of Brigadier-Gen- 
 eral Ford, a very efficient officer, and it was planned that he should 
 make a campaign in ^lay and June into the Indian country, cross- 
 ing the Arkansas and moving south for their villages, which we 
 knew were situated in the Wichita Mountains. General Ford had 
 a compact veteran command, and fought one or two battles before 
 crossing the Arkansas. Just about the time he was ready to cross 
 the Arkansas the Gijvernment sent west a peace commission com- 
 posed of Senator Doolittle, General Alex McD. McCook. and others. 
 Tlie Indian as:ent for tliese tribes was Colonel J. H. Leavenworth. 
 
The Indian Campaign. 81 
 
 They no sooner reached the Indian country than they protested 
 against the movement of any troops into the territory south of 
 the Arkansas Eiver. In fact, General McCook issued an order, 
 using General Pope's name as authority, stopping General Ford's 
 movement. He had no authority to do this, but General Ford 
 obeyed, as the information came to him that these chiefs were 
 assembling at the mouth of the Little Arkansas to make peace. 
 After parleying with the Indians, the commission accomplished 
 nothing, and' the Indians all the time were committing their depre- 
 dations on the emigrant ^-rains that were passing up the Arkansas 
 Valley to New Mexico and Colorado. All the protests and appeals 
 of General Pope, General Ford and myself to the Government in 
 relation to this matter seemed to have no effect. These Indians 
 had murdered the settlers, wiped out their ranches, and stolen their 
 prdperty and their stock, and our scouts who went among them 
 saw their eai)tures in plenty. As soon as we would start out to 
 punish them, even those that had crossed north of the Arkansas 
 Eiver, protests were sent to Washington and came back to us, so 
 that we virtually accomplished nothing. The condition of matters 
 became so complicated that on June 6, 1865, I stated my views of 
 the question to Major-General John Pope, commanding the Mil- 
 itary Division of the Missouri, as follows : 
 
 Headquarters Department of the Missouri. 
 
 Fort Leavenworth, June 6, 1865. 
 Major-General John Pope, Commanding Military Division of the Missouri: 
 General : You have been notified of the action of Major-General 
 McCook, under the orders of the Congressional Committee, in stopping the 
 expedition of General Ford south of the xVrkansas, that they might confer, 
 and, if possible, make peace with the Arapahoes, Cheyennes, Comanches, 
 Kiowas, etc. Colonel Leavenworth stalled south a week ago to bring the 
 chiefs up to the mouth of Cow Creek, and while we are endeavoring to make 
 terms with them, their warriors are strung along the route from Zarah to 
 Lyon, dashing in on any train that they find off its guard. They are in 
 parties of from fifteen to fifty, and hide in the valleys and ravines. These 
 Indians now have their villages at Fort Cobb, and have driven out all 
 friendly Indians and traders, declaring that they mean war and nothing 
 else. They are composed of one band of Arapahoes, led by Little Rover ; 
 one small band of Cheyennes, three bands of Apaches, a large body of 
 Comanches, also the Southern Comanches, and all the Kiowas, and they 
 have no respect for our authority or power, and I have no faith in any 
 peace made by them until they are made to feel our strength. I do not 
 believe it will be a month before we hear of large trains being captured or 
 attacked by them in force. They notified Jesus, the Mexican trader sent 
 in by General Carleton, to leave, and it is said they murdered Major Mor- 
 rison, a trader permitted to go in by General Carleton. It appeared to me 
 bad policy to give permits to any of the traders to go among them to trade. 
 Not one of them will act as guide to take a force toward them. 
 
82 TiiK Indian Campaign. 
 
 Coloiiol liOiivomvorth sntisfiod tho conmiitlee. and I think (Joneral 
 MoCdok also, that llu> I'onianchrs and othors had not romniittod any dopre- 
 dalions. Thorc is not an ollicoi- or trador who has been on the phiins but 
 knows thi>y iiavc b.vii in all or nearly all tho oiitra.aes committed. I desire 
 very mueh to liaxc i)i'aii' willi the Indians, hut I do think we shouUI punish 
 tl\em for what they have done, and that they should feel our power and 
 have respect for us. My plan to reach them is to start in three columns for 
 Fort Cobb : viz.. First, by Ma.ior Merrill's route ; second, by Captain 
 Mooner's route: third, from the mouth of Mulberry Creek, on the Arkansas. 
 Make the parties about 4(M» or 500 strong, and march direct for their vil- 
 lages. This will draw every warrior after us and leave the Santa Fe route 
 free. When we get tlown there if the Indians are so anxious for peace, they 
 will have an opportunity to show it. and we can make an agreement with 
 them that will stop hostilities until the properly authorized authorities 
 conclude a lasting i)eace. 1 have attempted to get those expeditions off 
 twice. 'Phi> tirst time they were stopjied by General Halleck, on Colonel 
 lAVtvenworth's representations. lli> started to make peace; the Indians 
 stole all his stock, and very nearly got his scalp, lie came back for fight 
 and wished to whip them, but lias now changed again, and it is possible 
 he may get the chiefs together, but 1 very nuuh doubt it: and, even if he 
 does, they will only represent a portion of each tribe. I have concluded, by 
 representations of the Congressional Committee made to General Ford, to 
 wait and see the effects of Colonel Leavenworth's mission. I will have my 
 troops at the designated points. If he should fail I will go forward and 
 make the campaign as originally ordered. I desire to add that there is not 
 a leading ollicer on the plains who has had any experience with Indians 
 who has faith in peai'e nuule with any of these Indians unless they are 
 punished for tho murders. robl>eries and outrages they have committed for 
 over a year; and uidoss we have a settled policy, either fight and allow 
 the counnanding ollicer of the depart nu'iit to dictate terms of peace to them, 
 or else it be deeided that we are not to tight, but make some kind of peace 
 at all hazards, we will siiuandor the summer without result. Indians will 
 rob auil murder, and some Indian agents will defend them, and when fall 
 comes I will be held responsible for not having protected the route or pun- 
 ished them for what they may have done. It must be evident to the Gov- 
 ernment that I cannot be making war on the Indians while other parties 
 are at the same time making peace, as has been the case so far. Whatever 
 may be the desire of the (lOvernment. I will lend all my energies to carry 
 it out and make over.v oHit'cr and nnin under me do the same. I cannot 
 approve the manner in which the Indians have been treated, and have no 
 faith in them, nor will I allow such treatment as shown at the Big Sandy 
 fight. If peace is concluded I trust that their reservations may be made 
 at safe distitluvs from overland routes so far as possible, and that they be 
 made to keep away from them. 
 
 I am. very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 G. M. DoDOE, 
 
 ilajor-Gcncral. 
 
 The (unonuuonl, at'tor roeoiving Genoral Pope's ami luv own 
 views, sent out Inspeetov-General J. IT. Saekett, of the Regular 
 Anuy. to investigate the eonditions in that country and to report 
 to the Government the aetual faets. In the meantime the peace 
 commission that liad heen endeavoring to negotiate with these 
 Indians had gone on to Denver, still ]n"otesting against any move- 
 ment against the Indians, helieving that peace could be brought 
 about. General Saekett. u]ion ivaehing the Indian country, sent 
 
The Indian Campaign. 
 
 the following dispatch, on June 14, 1805, to the commanding oflicer 
 at Fort Tjiirnod, Kas. : 
 
 For the last few days tlio Indians along the ronfi; have been voi'y 
 active and hostile; many men have been murdered, hundreds of animals 
 have been stolon, Fort IJodge has lost every animal. The force can now 
 do nothing with the Indians. A large and effective cavalry force under a 
 good commander must be sent here without delay, or the large number of 
 trains now on the plains will be destroyed or captured. 
 
 T'poii tlir receipt of this dispatch 1 immediately gave orders 
 to tlic cniiiiiiniKling officer to go out and concenti'ate our forces 
 noi'lli of the Ai-kansMS, and to pi-ntcd the trains, hiit not io go 
 soutl) of ilic I'ivcr. This they accomplished \cry effectively, and 
 drove all tlie Indians south of the Arkansas, killing and capturing 
 a good many. On -June 14th, General Po]!0 wi'otc a long letter 
 to (Jcncral ('. 8. Gi'ant, enclosing my letter to him, reiterating 
 what I had said, and insisting for \cvy strong I'easons that tlie 
 Indians should he left entindy to the military;' Ihat there should 
 1)0 no peace commission sent until the military had met these 
 Indians and hrought lliem to terms, either hy fighting or negotia- 
 tions; and afterwards for the commission to go there and make 
 such arrangements as they saw propei-. In the mustering out of 
 troops General Ford was relieved of the conunand and ]\Iajor- 
 General John B. Sanhoi-n, a very efficieni ollieei-, was sent to take 
 his place. It was now agreed that after the I'aihnx; of the peace 
 commission to accom|)lisli anything with these Indians that I 
 should lu'ds'e the campaigns south of the Ai'kansas, and General 
 Said)Oi-ii concentrated his troojjs and moved to the Arkansas. Be- 
 fore I reached there \ received a communication from Colonel 
 I^eavenworth stating that all the chiefs of the Indians were then 
 on Cow Creek, anxious to meet Inm. At the same lime, a dispatch 
 came from Washington to (Jeneral I'ope, stopping Sanhorn's move- 
 ment. General JV)pe imuKMliately ari'anged to liaM; an interview 
 with these Indians, and General Sanhorii weid there wilh instruc- 
 tions to make an agreement with them that they shoidd keep off 
 of the overland trails, and to arrange a time for a commission to 
 meet them, later in the year. On August 5th Sanborn agreed with 
 the chiefs of the Kiowas, Apaches, Comanches, and Arapahoes, on 
 the part of the Government, to suspend all actions of hostility to- 
 wards any of the tribes above mentioned and to remain at peace 
 until the ffiui'th day of October, 1805, when they were to meet the 
 (Jovei'iimeiit commissionei-s at Bluffs Ci'eek al)Out fortv miles south 
 
84 The Indian Campaign. 
 
 of the Little Arkansas. Tliis agreement did not take in the South 
 Chevennes, who had been more mischievous than any of the tribes, 
 but this tribe kept south of the Arkansas, retaining all the stock 
 they captured, and none of them were punished for the murders 
 they committed. It was a business matter on their part to remain 
 at peace only until the troops moved out of that country and to 
 prevent Sanborn with his organized forces from going south to 
 their villages and j)unishing them. The effect of this agreement 
 was that the Indians continued their depredations through the fol- 
 lowing years, — not so mueli by killing l)ut by stealing, — until finally 
 they became so hostile that in the campaign against them by Gen- 
 eral Sheridan, in 18G8, an agreement was made with them forcing 
 all the tribes to move into the Indian 'J'erritory. If General Ford 
 or General Sanborn had been allowed to go forward and punish 
 these Indians as they deserved, tbey would have been al)le to make 
 not only a peace, but could have forced tliem to go on the reserva- 
 tion in the Indian territories, and thus have saved the murders 
 and crimes that they committed, for so many years afterwards ; 
 however, this agreement of Sanborn's allowed the emigration to go 
 forward over the Arkansas, properly organized and guarded, and 
 it was not molested during the rest of that year. 
 
 To show the conditions on the overland routes u]3 the two forks 
 of the Platte Eiver at the time, I sent this dispatch : 
 
 Headquarters Department of the Missouri. 
 
 St. Louis, Mo., June 17, 1865. 
 Major-General John Pope. Commuiulinri Milifari) Dirision of the Missouri. 
 St. Louis: 
 General: There is no doubt hut that all, or nearly all. the tribes of 
 Indians east of the Rocky Mountains from the British Possessions on the 
 north to the Red River on the south are engaged in open hostilities against 
 the Government. It is possible that in a few of the tribes tliere are some 
 chiefs and warriors who desire to be friendly, but each day reduces the 
 number of these, and they even are used by the hostile tribes to deceive us 
 as to their intentions and keep us quiet. The Crows and Snakes appear 
 to be friendly, but everything indicates that they too are ready to join in 
 the hostilities, and the latter (the Snakes) are accused of being concerned 
 in the depredations west of the mountains. In my opinion there is but one 
 way to effectually terminate these Indian troubles : viz., to push our cav- 
 alry into the heart of their country from all directions, to punish them 
 whenever and wherever we find them, and force them to respect our power 
 and to sue for peace. Then let the military authorities make informal 
 treaties with them for a cessation of hostilities. This we can accomplish 
 successfully, for the Indians will treat with soldiers, as they fear them and 
 have confidence in their word. Any treaty made now by civilians, Indian 
 agents, or others, will, in my opinion, amount to nothing, as the Indians 
 in all the tribes openly express dissatisfaction with them and contempt for 
 them. The friendly Indians say that whenever the hostile bands are made 
 
The Indian Campaign. 
 
 aware of our ability and determination to whip them, they will readily and 
 in good faith treat with our officers and comply with any demands we may 
 make. If we can keep citizen agents and traders from among them we can, 
 I am confident, settle the matter this season, and when settled I am clearly 
 of the opinion that these Indians should be dealt with entirely by com- 
 petent commissioned officers of the Army, whom they will respect and who 
 will not only have the power to make them comply with the terms of the 
 agreements made, but will also have the power and authority to compel 
 troops, citizens and others to respect implicitly and to comply strictly with 
 the obligations assumed on our part. The cavalry now moving into the 
 Indian country will, I doubt not. if allowed to proceed and carry out the 
 instructions given them, accomplish the object designed by bringing about 
 an effectual peace and permanent settlement of our Indian difficulties. 
 I am. General, very respectfully, your oljedient servant, 
 
 (i. M. Dodge, 
 
 Major-General. 
 
 The cciinpaign to the north was phmned with a view of going 
 after all the northern Indians then at war — the Arapahoes, Xorth 
 Chevennes, and the ditferent hands of the Sioux. Their depreda- 
 tions had extended east to the Missouri Tiiver, and General Pope 
 sent General Sully with a force up that river to take care of the 
 hostile Sioux that had gathered and had been fighting the troops 
 at Forts E ice, Berthoud, and other points. Before reaching these 
 posts his column was turned and sent to Devil's Lake after the 
 Santee Sioux, who had been committing depredations in Minne- 
 sota, but after reaching the lake he failed to find any Indians, they 
 having fled to the British Possessions. He returned to the Mis- 
 souri Eiver and endeavored to make terms with the tribes concen- 
 trated on it, but only partially succeeded. We knew that there were 
 from two to three thousand of the Sioux, Cheyennes and Arapa- 
 hoes concentrated at or near Bear Butte, near the north end of the 
 Black Hills, and it was the intention of General Sully ^vith his 
 force to go after this band. Init, being turned to the east. I organ- 
 ized a force about 1,000 strong under Colonel Xelson Cole, Avho 
 went up the Missouri River in boats to Omaha and whose orders 
 were to move from Omaha to Columbus up the Loup Fork to its 
 head and thence across the Niobrara to the ^^Hiite Earth River 
 and then to Bear Butte. Failing to find the Indians there, he was 
 to push on to Powder and Tongue Rivers, where he was to join 
 Brigadier-General P. E. Connor, who was in command of this 
 district. Lieutenant-Colonel Samuel Walker's colunm of about 
 500 men of the Sixteenth Kansas Cavalry was to go north from 
 Fort Laramie along the west base of the Black Hills and join 
 Colonel Cole, and later join General Connor on the Tongue River ; 
 while General Connor, with a small command of about 500 men, 
 
86 The Indian Campaign. 
 
 was moving north along the Phitte to the head of Salt Creek clown 
 the Salt to Powder River, where he was to establish a fort and 
 supply station; from thence he was to move along the east base 
 of the Big Horn Mountains until he struck the hostile Indians in 
 that vicinity. These columns should have moved in May or June, 
 but it was July and August before they got started, on accoimt of 
 the failure of the contractors to deliver the supplies to them on 
 the plains at the different supply-depots; but when they started 
 they moved with alacrity, and would, no doubt, have accomplished 
 the purpose of tlie campaign had it not been for the fact that they 
 were stopped by an order from Washington to return to Fort Lara- 
 mie by October 15th. 
 
 During May, June, and July the Indians were very aggressive 
 all along the South Platte and Xorth Platte routes. Every Gov- 
 ernment train had to go guarded ; every emigrant train had to be 
 organized into trains of 50 or 100 wagons, with the teamsters 
 armed and placed under an officer, and even then a great many of 
 their people were killed and a great deal of stock run off. The com- 
 manding officer at Fort Laramie, during June, had concentrated 
 at his post about 2,000 of what was considered friendly Indians. 
 Most of these Indians had been captured during the spring cam- 
 paign. They had brought in with them most of the prisoners that 
 had been captured on their raids upon the stage-lines and the 
 ranches. General Connor, desiring to get these Indians removed 
 as far as possible from the hostile Indians, under my order moved 
 them south toward the Eepublican Eiver. in charge of two com- 
 panies of the Seventh Iowa Cavalry, commanded by Captain Fonts. 
 These Indians did not take kindly to this movement, and the escort 
 sent with them was not as large as it ought to have been, ^^lien 
 they were sixty miles south of Fort Laramie they were communicat- 
 ed with by a band of hostile Indians who followed down the opposite 
 side of the Platte River, and early in the morning they attacked 
 their escort, killing Captain Fonts and four soldiers, and wounding 
 seven others. In the fight there were a great many Indians killed 
 and wounded, but these Indians were allowed to go south with 
 their arms, to convince them that we put confidence in them and 
 did not treat them as prisoners. With the aid of the other Indians 
 on the north side of the Platte, they forced the escort to intrench 
 itself, by doing which the train and the women and others who had 
 been rescued from the Sioux Indians were saved, as word was 
 
The Indian Campaign. 87 
 
 gotten to Fort Laramio and relief was sent. The Indians after 
 this light crossed tlie North Tlatte Jliver and moved norlh toward 
 the Bkck Hills. 
 
 Colonel Moonlight, in command of Fort Laramie, as soon as 
 he heard of this revolt, went to relieve the inti'onched party. The 
 Indians, however, had crossed the Platte River. He followed 
 them. Wlien wiihin ten or fifteen miles of the band, through care- 
 lessness in taking care of his horses, the Indians turned upon him, 
 stampeded his stock, and, in fact, drove oif 200 or 300 head of it, 
 leaving his command on foot. The attack of the hostiles fright- 
 ened the horses so that they could not be controlled, and they ran 
 towards the Indians. Moonlight and his command had to march 
 back to Laramie, a long distance, without food or transportation, 
 as they had started out with only one or two days' rations. Colonel 
 Moonlight was immediately relieved of his command, but the dam- 
 age had been done, which gave the hostile Indians great encourage- 
 ment. General Connor sent this dispatch : 
 
 JULESBURG, Tune 15, 180.">. 
 
 ,, . ^-, J 7-v J (Received 9:50 p. m.) 
 
 Major-General Dodge: ^ *^ 
 
 I ordered the Indians who surrendered at Laramie to be sent to Kear- 
 ney. Colonel Moonliglit sent them without first dismounting them, under 
 charge of two companies of Seventh Iowa Cavalry. They revolted sixty 
 miles this side of Laramie, killing Captain Fonts, who was in command, 
 and four soldiers, and wounding seven ; also killed four of their own chiefs 
 who refused to join them ; fifteen Indians were killed ; the Indians fled 
 north with their ponies, women, and children, leaving all their camp 
 equipage. Troops are in pursuit. Mail-stages have stopped west of Camp 
 Collins. Everything appears to work unfavorably owing to failure of corn 
 contractors and incompetency of some of my subordinates. I will overcome 
 all obstacles, however, in a sliort time. Have you sent me cavalry yet? 
 J. D. Doty. Governor of Utah. w;is Imriod at Camp Douglas Cemi'tery this 
 morning. Died of heart disease. P. E. Connor, 
 
 Brigadier-Gen crtil. 
 
 During July, a band of the Arapahoes raided the South Platte 
 River stage-line between Fort Collins and Fort Halleck, drove oflE 
 most of the stock from the stations, and committed other depreda- 
 tions. Colonel Porter, who was in command of that district, con- 
 centrated his force and went after the Indians, and in a v(m-\ few 
 days restored the stage stations and gave the Indians sound whip- 
 pings, whicli kept that line cleai' nearly all summer. The Indians 
 that had done tliis work had gone into Fort Collins claiming to 
 be friendly and wisliing to make a treaty, and after being fed there 
 for some tim(\ left one night and committed the depredations be- 
 fore troops could stop them. From liere tliey moved immediately 
 
88 The Indian Campaign. 
 
 north to join the liostile Indians north of the North Platte. I 
 had received notice from Washingion tliat the Interior Department 
 had information that these Indians were peaceable and would not 
 join in the campaigns; but, being on the ground, I knew better, 
 because we were capturing them in nearly all of the attacks that 
 they made. With them was a portion of one of the bands of the 
 Sioux. 
 
 On July 2T, ten iniles west of the North Platte Bridge station, 
 a Mormon train coming east Avas attacked by the Indians and Lieu- 
 tenant Casper W. Collins, of the Eleventh Ohio, and twenty-five 
 men of the Eleventh Kansas, went out to relieve it, when about 
 one thousand Indians attacked him. While he saved the train he 
 lost his own life, and twenty-tive of his men were scalped and their 
 bodies horribly mutilated; but while the Indians had heavy losses 
 in the fight, they were able to divide up and scatter before any of 
 the troops sent to attack them could reach them. I named the 
 ]jost at Platte Bridge Fort Casper, and it is now known as the town 
 of Casper, on the North-Western railroad. 
 
 On August 16th a large band of Sioux Indians attacked a mil- 
 itary station on the South Platte route. They were overtaken by 
 the Pawnee Indian Battalion of our forces, who gave them a good 
 whipping. They killed a large number and took their stock and 
 scattered them. This was a band of Sioux Indians that had been 
 lying on the North Platte and made this dash to the South Platte 
 stage-line, thinking we had withdrawn tlie troops from it to the 
 northern expedition. Very few of them ever got back to their 
 tribes. 
 
 The battalion of Pawnees with General Conner had made a 
 great capture of a band of Cheyennes who had been down on the 
 Fort Halleck route. The latter had there captured a part of a 
 company of a Michigan Eegiment wlio were escorting a few wagons, 
 the captives having been tied to the wagons and burned. By some 
 means, General Conner got word of this, and knew the trail they 
 would take to get back to the main eomnumd, and on this trail 
 he placed Major North and his battalion of Pawnees. Major 
 North, in describing to me wdiat followed, said that when the In- 
 dians came back and discovered that they were surrounded, one, an 
 old man, moved up towards him and placed his hand up to his 
 mouth, telling him to come on ; that they were ready to die : that 
 they were full of white men up to that, — meaning up to his mouth. 
 
The Indian Campaign. 89 
 
 The Pawnees killed every one of this band and scalped them. On 
 one of them was fonnd a diary of one of the Michigan soldiers who 
 had been killed, and one of the Cheyennes had used the book to 
 give an account of their travels, their camps and fights, and what 
 they had done on this raid. From this diary our guides could tell 
 just exactly where the party had been, where they had camped, 
 where they had captured the Michigan soldiers, and their route on 
 their return. A half-breed had written in the book a defiance of 
 the troops, telling ^yhat the Indians demanded. Among other 
 things they demanded that before they would make peace we should 
 give up all their prisoners; that we should abandon the country 
 north of the Platte Eiver, etc. 
 
 As soon as General Connor reached Powder River he estab- 
 lished his post and named it Fort Connor. (It was afterward 
 named Fort Eeno by me.) Connor immediately pushed on to the 
 Crazy Woman Mountain fork of Powder River and then to the 
 east base of the Big Horn Mountains, following that to the Tongue 
 River and down the Tongue until James Bridger, the chief scout 
 and guide of the ex])edition, claimed to have seen the smoke 
 a long distance away, of an Indian cam]). No one else could 
 see it, but, as a precaution, Connor sent out the Pawnee 
 scouts, and on August 27th they discovered about 2,000 Indians 
 camped on the Tongue River, near the mouth of Wolf Creek. It 
 is a singular fact that in this vicinity General Crook fought his 
 great battle on the Rosebud, the Custer massacre occurred, and it 
 was not very far away that the Phil Kearney disaster occurred, 
 when Lieutenant Fetterman and his whole command was slaugh- 
 tered. General Connor immediately corralled the trains and took 
 his available forces. al)Out 250 men, and marched all night and 
 struck this band at daylight, giving them a complete surprise. 
 They were Arapahoes under Black Bear and Old David, with sev- 
 eral other noted chiefs. The band was just breaking up their 
 cam]), but the Indian soldiers rallied and fought desperately. Cap- 
 tain H. E. Palmer, A. A. G., with General Connor, gives this de- 
 scription of the attack : 
 
 The word was passed back for the men to close up and follow the 
 General and not to fire a shot until he fired in advance. General Conner 
 then took the lead, riding his horse up the steep bank of the ravine and 
 dashing out across the mesa as if there were no Indians just to his left. 
 Every man followed as close as possible. At the first sight of the General 
 the Indian ponies grazing on the table-land in front of us sent up a tre- 
 mendous whinnying, and galloped down toward the Indian village. More 
 
90 The Indian CAiiPAiGN. 
 
 than 1,000 doss began to bark, and more than 700 Indians made the air 
 ring with their fearful yelling. It appeared that the Indians were in the 
 act of breaking camp. The most of their tepees were down and packed for 
 the march. The ponies, more than .3,000, had been gathered in and most 
 of the squaws and children were mounted, spme of them having taken the 
 line of march up the stream to the new camp. The General watched the 
 movements of his men until he saw the last man emerge from the ravine, 
 when he wheeled on the left into line. The whole line then fired a volley 
 into the village without stopping their horses, and the bugles sounded a 
 charge. Not a man but realized that the charge into the village without 
 a moment's hesitation was our only salvation. We already saw that we 
 were greatly outnumbered, and that only desperate fighting would save our 
 scalps. We were in the village in the midst of a hand-to-hand fight with 
 the warriors and squaws, for many of the squaws did as brave fighting 
 as their savage lords. Unfortunately for the squaws and children, our men 
 had no time to direct their aim. and bullets from both sides and murderous 
 arrows filled the air. Women and children fell among the killed and 
 wounded. The scene was indescribable. Each man seemed an army by 
 himself. Near the sweathouse I emptied my revolver into the carcasses of 
 three warriors. One of our men, a member of the Eleventh Ohio Cavalry, 
 a fine-looking soldier with as handsome a face as I ever saw on a man, 
 grabbed me by the shoulder and turned me about that I might assist him in 
 drawing an arrow from his mouth. Having no surgeon of a higher grade 
 than a hospital steward, it was decided that in order to get the arrow out 
 of his mouth the tongue would have to be cut out, which was done. The 
 Indians made a brave stand trying to save their families, and succeeded in 
 getting away with a large majority of their women and children, leaving 
 behind nearly all of their plunder. 
 
 . We now went up a stream called Wolf Creek. General Connor in close 
 pursuit. Soon after we left the village General Connor advised me to in- 
 struct Captain North to take his battalion of Indians and get all the stock 
 he could possibly gather. General Connor pursued the savages fully ten 
 miles from camp, when he found himself accompanied by only fourteen men. 
 Our horses were so worn out that it was impossible for the men to keep up. 
 The Indians noticed his movements and turned upon him and his soldiers. 
 They fell back as fast as possible. Captain North and myself had succeed- 
 ed in coralling about a thousand ponies. Scores of buffalo-robes, blankets, 
 and furs were heaiied up on lodge-poles, and on these we placed our dead, 
 and burned their bodies to keep the Indians from mutilating them. Our 
 attack on the village began at 9 ill. m. We remained until 2 :30 and had 
 destroyed a great deal of Indian property. At 2 :oO we took up the line of 
 march for the corralled train. Captain North with his eighty Indians 
 undertook to drive the captured stock. They were soon a great ways 
 ahead, while the rest of the force was engaged in beating back the Indians. 
 The Indians pressed on every side. They seemed to have plenty of am- 
 munition, but they did most of their fighting with arrows. Before dark we 
 were reduced to forty men. and had only a little ammunition. The Indians 
 showed no signs of stopping the fight, but kept on charging on us. dashing 
 away at the stock, and keeping us constantly on the move until fifteen 
 minutes of twelve, when the last shot was fired by our pursuers. The in- 
 cidents of this fight would make very interesting reading. Every man was 
 a general. Not a man in the company but realized that his life was in 
 the balance. We must either whip the Indians and whip them badly or be 
 whipped ourselves. We could see that the Indians greatly outnumbered 
 us. but we were better armed than they. As for fighting qualities the 
 savages proved themselves as brave as any of our men. We had accom- 
 plished a great deal : 250 Indian lodges and their contents had been burned, 
 with the entire winter's supplies : the son of Black Bear was killed : sixty- 
 three Indians were killed, 1.100 ponies were captured, and a lot of women 
 and children were taken prisoners. 
 
The Indian Campaign. 91 
 
 General Connors report of this battle was burned in Utah, and 
 consequently was never forwarded to me or to the Government, so 
 we do not know what the loss on his part was ; but it was severe. 
 
 General Connor now moved down the Tongue Eiver to make 
 a connection with Colonel Walker and Colonel Cole, at the appoint- 
 ed rendezvous. His scouts discovered that Colonel Cole in moving 
 north had endeavored to reach the mouth of Powder Eiver and had 
 failed, and after six da3^s' fighting had marched south, expecting 
 to go to Fort Laramie, not knowing that there were supplies at 
 Fort Connor. 
 
 Colonel Cole, who with his column had started from Omaha, 
 had made reasonable progress, following out the routes laid down, 
 and did not discover any Indians until he reached the Little Mis- 
 souri Eiver, on a. branch of the Piney that he was coming down. 
 Lieutenant-Colonel Walker, of the center column, visited his camp 
 and was two davs behind him. He should have immediately Joined 
 him, to carry out his instructions. Cole was headed to^vard the 
 Tongue Eiver, near tlie Wolf Mountains. When he got into the 
 brakes of the Pow^ler Eiver, he discovered many signs of Indians. 
 This is a very rough country, and he had great difficulty in getting 
 his long trains through it ; however, he dropped into the valley about 
 fifty miles above the mouth of Powder Eiver and sent a detachment 
 with his best guide fifty miles across to Tongue Eiver and Panther 
 Mountains and discovered nothing of Connor. In Cole's instruc- 
 tions he was told that there would be a supply-depot at Panther or 
 Wolf Mountains, but General Connor had changed this and made 
 the supply-depot at what was known as Camp Connor, on Powder 
 Eiver, and he did not notify either Cole or Walker of this change, 
 which he should have done, as had he done so it would liave avoid- 
 ed all the trouble that these two columns encountered. Cole's de- 
 tachment of cavalry discovered no signs of Connor on Tongue Eiver 
 and so followed down the river, while they should have gone up; 
 and failing to find any sign of any depot at Panther Mountains, re- 
 ported back to Cole. Cole's rations were now exhausted, or nearly 
 so, as he had not been as careful of them as he should have been, 
 expecting as he did to find a depot where he could get plenty at 
 the end of his sixty days' march. It shows that he was not up to 
 the woodcraft of the country. In examining Powder Eiver to- 
 wards its mouth lie found it destitute of grass and full of can- 
 yons. He, therefoi'e, msidc ud liis mind to move soiitli up tlir Pow- 
 
92 The Indian Campaign. 
 
 der Eiver valley, with a view to either meeting Connor or making 
 for Fort Laramie. The Indians, seeing this retreat, became very 
 bold. There were at least 2,000 of them, Cheyennes and Sioux, 
 and without making an attack they simply harassed him, some- 
 times forcing a fight ; but very few were hurt. Colonel Cole should 
 have parked his train, placed it in a defensive position under a 
 good guard, and then mobilized the rest of his force, and, with what 
 rations he had, gone after the Indians, giving them battle and 
 forcing the fight with them. He had plenty of men. 
 
 Cole had not advanced very far towards Fort Connor when, 
 on September fith. Colonel Walker and his command joined him. 
 Then he had plenty of men to meet all the Indians in the country, 
 if his force was properly handled. When this fighting commenced 
 he was not over thirty miles from where Connor fought his battle, 
 and Captain Palmer states that they heard a cannon. l)ut could 
 not tell which direction the noise came from. Connor, hearing 
 nothing from Cole, sent out Major North with a couple of Indian 
 scouts and with Bridger as guide. They got over into the Powder 
 River country and discovered Cole's trail. During Cole's retreat 
 up ^he Powder there came a fearful snow-storm. The animals hav- 
 ing marched so far without grain, were already very much exhaust- 
 ed, and the storm lasting three days, they became so weak that they 
 were not fit to use, and they Avere therefore shot, just as they 
 stood at the picket-line, to prevent them from falling into the 
 Indians' hands. This destruction of the animals and the burning 
 of all their equipment was about the first thing that Major North 
 struck, and of course he experienced a great anxiety, fearing that 
 Cole had met with great disaster, and immediately reported to Gen- 
 eral Connor, who at once sent Sergeant C. L. Thomas with two 
 Pawnees with dispatches to Colonel Cole to march on up Powder 
 River to Fort Connor, where he would find supplies. Cole's troops 
 seem to have started out not fully prepared for such a trip, especial- 
 ly in the line of shoes and leggings, although they were carefully 
 instructed by me to be sure to take a surplus, as I knew the coun- 
 try. Cole's excuse is that while he made ample requisition, the Quar- 
 termaster never shipped them, and so when he reached Omaha he 
 had to buy such as he could find. Colonel Cole's troops seem to have 
 kept up their organization and their fighting qualities, for whenever 
 they met the Indians they always whipped them ; but they were on 
 the retreat, which gave everv advantage to the Indians. When 
 
Till': Indian Campaign. 93 
 
 Cole's troops reached Fort Connor they were in a deplorable con- 
 (Jition — ragged, barefooted, and almost without rations and am- 
 munition. 
 
 The Indians surrounding Fort Connor at this time had 
 become so numerous that the commanding officer thought it pru- 
 dent to intrench the post, which shows good judgment; but Colonel 
 Cole complains in his report that the troops Avere made to help 
 do this intrenching. Speaking of this he says : 
 
 While camped here (Fort Connor) an occurrence took place, strange 
 but most true, which as an integral part of the closing history of the com- 
 mand must have full relation. Some thirty-six hours after reaching this 
 post, a fatigued detail of 400 men was ordered from the Second Missouri 
 Light Artillery to work on the earthworks being thrown up around the 
 place. If the spirit that prompted the detail expected to force its principles 
 through insubordination or rebellion, it was disappointed. What a sight was 
 here! Four hundred ragged, bare-footed men, emaciated with fatigue, who 
 had met and worsted the enemy on three several occasions, marched up in 
 the face of a garrison of 2.000 or more. 
 
 I don't know where he got the 2,000 troops, as all the troops 
 when he reached Fort Connor were two companies of Michigan cav- 
 alry, (leneral Connor tlien not having reached that post; and when 
 he did. all told there were not -2.000 troops there. Cole's loss was 
 
 very light, nine killed.— while he claims to have killed from 200 
 
 to 500 of the Indians. 
 
 It was verv evident to me that there was no very severe fight- 
 ing here ; it was simply a skirmish on a retreat. 
 
 Lieutenant-Colonel Walker's column, which started from Fort 
 Laramie on August 2d, moved up the west base of the Black Halls, 
 and struck Cole's column on August 20th on what was known as 
 Piney CJreek. After striking Cole's trail he followed it a short 
 distance, and then left it and struck Powder River, much farther 
 south than Cole ha.l. and on reaching the river he fell right into 
 the same l)an.l of In.lians that were gathered along the Powder 
 River to harass Cole. He, to(^ was short of provisions, although 
 he was equipped to travel verv rapidly, having all his sui-plies on 
 pack-mules. As so(ui as he got in touch with Cole he joined him 
 and followed him to Fort Connor. General Connor's idea was to 
 make up a rapid-moving column of about 1,000 men, using the 
 pack-mules of Walker, and then combine his and Cole's troops to 
 move .ui a line farther to the west and follow these Indians to the 
 Britisli Possessions if necessary. He had the ammunition, equii> 
 ment and evervthing at Fort Connor to fit out these columns with. 
 
The Indian Campaign. 95 
 
 As near as they could estimate there were ahout G,(J(JU Indians all 
 told. 
 
 The wagon-road train that started from Sioux City under 
 Colonel Sawyer's engineering party, with two companies of the 
 Fifth United States Volunteer Infantry under the command of 
 Captain George N. Williford, that were to open a wagon-road from 
 Sioux City up the Niobrara River by a short route to the north end 
 of the Black Hills, intended to cross to Powder River and then 
 to the south end of the Bio' Horn Mountains, making a direct emi- 
 grant route into Montana. As soon as I heard of the instructions 
 given this expedition I got word to Colonel Sawyer that it was 
 impossible for him to travel on that route; that he must keep to 
 the south end of the Black Hills and follow up the North Platte 
 until he struck what was known as the Bozeman trail, that was laid 
 out in 1864 by some emigrants going into Montana. This was the 
 trail that Connor had taken on his route to Tongue River. It was 
 feasible all the way from the Platte to Montana. Colonel Sawyer 
 paid no attention to this information, but kept on his original 
 route until he got into the brakes of the Powder River, not very 
 far from where Cole struck them. When within twenty miles of 
 the River, he ascertained by his own guide that it was impossible 
 to advance any farther in that direction; consequently, he had to 
 retrace his steps. On the second day they were attacked by a large 
 band of Indians; evidently the Cheyennes and Sioux that after- 
 wards attacked Colonels Cole and Walker. These Indians kept them 
 corralled nearly four days and nights, fighting through the day and 
 withdrawing at night, only to begin their hostilities at dawn ; but 
 finding that their efforts only resulted in many being killed, they 
 abandoned the siege and left, going south, striking Cole's trail on 
 August 22d, which they followed, and on the 23d Colonel Sawyer 
 marched into Fort Connor. While Captain Williford does not say 
 that he took charge of this train, that is a fact. Ho took charge of 
 it and kc])t it until he got to Fort Connor. He was a s])lendid 
 officer and it was through his good judgment and his ability as a 
 soldier that he saved the wliole outiit. The Bent Boys, who were 
 at the head of the Cheyennes, would communicate with Sawyer and 
 get him to send out persons for the purpose of trading with them, 
 and whoever was sent inside their lines was held prisoner, the idea, 
 being to wear Sawyer's force out by this means. But they struck 
 the wrong man in Captain Williford. who. comprehending the sit- 
 
OG The Ixdiax Campaign. 
 
 uation, attacked the Indians. I knew Williford in the Civil War, 
 and he was a verv efficient officer. At Fort Connor I relieved Willi- 
 ford, his men being mostly barefooted, and put Colonel Kidd of 
 the Michigan Cavalry, in command, with a suitable esc-ort. and in- 
 structed him to follow the Coimor trail imtil they struck Tongue 
 River, and then to swing towards the Yellowstone and strike the 
 trail up that river to Bozeman. This train, when they got nearly 
 opposite to where General Connor fought, was again attacked by 
 the Indians: but Colonel Eadd managed to get news to Greneral 
 Connor and he sent two or three companies of his command to the 
 rescue. They Ajere absent while he fought his banle on Tongue 
 Eiver. They drove off the Indians, and relieved the train, which 
 reached Montana in safety. 
 
 Early in September I reached Fort Connor — before General 
 Cole and Colonel Walker had concentrated there — and gave instruc- 
 tions under the direction of the authorities at Washington, forward- 
 ed to me by General Pope, to withdraw all the troops to Fort Lara- 
 mie, and stop all their operations against the Indians, and endeavor 
 to bring them in for a consultation, and. if possible, to make an 
 agreement as to the cessation of all hostilities. This was a fatal 
 mistake. When I received this dispatch from General Pope, on 
 Atigust 31st. I sent the following message to him : 
 
 Headqiabteks U. S. Fobces. 
 Fort Laramie. Dakota Territory. August 31. 1S65. 
 Maior-Gcncral John Pope. St. Louh. Mo.: 
 
 I consider rhe Indian matrers here of so much importance, and know- 
 ing no one c-an judge of them so well as when he is on the ground, that I 
 desire to make a proposition to the Government. If the Government will 
 allow me to keep General Connor in the field with not to exceed 2.ChX» men 
 of his present force, leaving the forc-es you have designated to garrison 
 posts on the plains. I will settle these Indian difficulties before spring sat- 
 isfactorily to the Government, and bring alxjut a peace that will be lasting. 
 I may do it in a month or two : or it may l>e longer. The additional ex- 
 pense to the Government will be the pay of that number of troops for the 
 time detained. All the stores, forage, etc.. to support them are here and 
 CM route. As soon as we settle with them we can send these troops in and 
 take 2.000 more from our posts in addition and muster them out. General 
 Connor left Powder River with sixty days" supplies, and I am satisfied if 
 we will allow him he will settle the matter before he returns. Should he 
 come back by our orders without s?ttling the matter, the entire Indian 
 tribes will be down on our lines, and we will have our hands full, and more 
 too. The forces for Utah I will soon have on the road, and when Connor 
 gets back he can go right there. G. M. Dodge. 
 
 llajor-Gcneral. 
 
 General Connor, after getting news of the position of Cole's 
 and Walker's forces, moved back with his forces to Fort Connor, 
 
The Indian Campaign. 97 
 
 with a view of taking cominaiid of Cole's and Walker's forces and 
 organizing- them into two eolninns — one a light column Avith pack- 
 nuiles, and tlie other with the trains, — and then to follow and at- 
 tack the Indians that had been fighting Cole and Walker. When 
 he arrived at Fort Connor he found my dispatches, which, of course, 
 changed his whole policy. He knew then where all the Indians 
 were located. They had all been forced away from the traveled 
 lines to protect their villages, and it was only a question of time — 
 weeks or months — before we would have conquered a peace that 
 the Indians would have recognized. 
 
 The dispatches which I sent from Fort Laramie brought an an- 
 swer from General G-rant to the effect that the authorities at Wash- 
 ington were determined to stop all campaigns against the Indians. 
 They had been nuide to l)elieve l)y the Interior Department that 
 all they had to do was to withdraw the troops and the Indians 
 would come in and make i)eace. On my return from 'Fort Connor, 
 when I reached the Xorth Platte I sent this dis])atch : 
 
 Major-Gnural Join, Pope, St. Louis: Hokseshoe, September 15. ISCo. 
 
 Arrived liere today on my return from Powder River. That post is 
 well lomied. riuht in heart of ludinn cduntry, and is an important post, 
 The Indians' trails all cross at or near it, and it will have good effect here- 
 after in holding- in check Indians. Have not heard from General Connor 
 since August 24. We cannot reach him now. They have doi?e a good deal 
 of work on Powder River ; got up stockade and commenced Quartermaster 
 buildings ; well under way. Great lack of Quartermaster's stores up there, 
 the Powder River stores not having reached Laramie yet. From Laramie 
 to Powder River, then to Virginia City, is an excellent wagon-road : good 
 grass, water, and wood all the way, and the most direct road that can 
 be got. The travel over it in another season will be immense ; it saves 
 at least 450 miles in distance. After the Indians attacked Colonel Sawyer's 
 wagon-road party and failed in their attempt, they held a parley. Colonel 
 Bent's sons, George and Charles Bent, appeared on part of Indians, and 
 Coliinel Sawy(M- gave them a wagon-load of goods to let him go undisturbed, 
 Captain Willifcird, commanding escort, not agreeing to it. The Indians 
 ac(P]ited proposition and agreed to it, but after receiving the goods they 
 attacked party ; killed three men. Bent said that there was one condition 
 on which the Cheyennes would treat ; viz., the hanging by Government of 
 Colonel Chivington. He also said that the Indians considered that they 
 were strong enough to fight the (iovernment ; preferred to do it; that they 
 knew the Government would withdraw troops in fall ; then they would 
 have it all their own way again. Expressed great fear about Connor, and 
 said they were concentrating everything to meet him, which is true. Since 
 he left no Indians have troubled the mail- or telegraph-lines, but are all 
 moving north, stragglers and all. At Fort Connor they kill a few of them 
 as they pass every few days. There is one band of Arapahoes in Medicine 
 Bow Mountains, who are committing depredations around Denver, on Cache 
 La Poudre and Big Thompson Creeks. They belong to the band that was 
 at Cow Creek treaty. I shall be in Laramie tomorrow ; see General Whea- 
 ton ; thence to Denver. Bent also said that some of tribes had agreed to 
 make peace on jNIissouri River, but they were doing this to keep us from 
 
The Indian Campaign. 
 
 sending a force that way. These Bent boys were educated in St. Louis. One 
 has been with Price in the rebel Army ; was captured. His father got 
 him released and took him to his ranch on the Arkansas River, when he 
 joined the Cheyennes, of which he is a half-breed. He was dressed in -one 
 of our staff officer's uniforms. G. M. Dodge, 
 
 Major-Oeneral. 
 
 On General Connor's arrival at Fort Connor he wired me the 
 results of the campaign and protested strenuously against the order 
 stopping it, saying he Avas then "in condition and position to close 
 it, conquer the Indians, and force a lasting peace. On receipt of 
 his report I sent this dispatch : 
 
 Central City, Colo., September 27, 1865. 
 Major-General John Pope, St. Louis, Mo.: 
 
 On August 28th, General Connor surprised Medicine Man's band of 
 Indians on Tongue River ; killed fifty ; captured village, all winter provi- 
 sions, and 600 horses — all the stock they had. On the 1st of September 
 the right column, under Colonel Cole, had a fight with the Sioux, Chey- 
 ennes, and Arapahoes, on Powder River, and whipped them. On the even- 
 ing of the 3d of September attacked them again, driving them down Powder 
 River ten miles. Next morning at daylight attacked again, fight lasting 
 until 10 a. m., when Indians were defeated with loss of 200 killed. They 
 fled in every direction, losing large number of horses, camp equipage, provi- 
 sions, etc. On 8th instant. Colonel Walker, commanding center column, 
 who was in advance of Colonel Cole met Indians in large force. Colonel 
 Cole came up and after a short Imt spiiited engagement they totally routed 
 Indians, driving them in every directiun with great loss, several of prin- 
 cipal chiefs being killed in this fight. On the night of the 9th of September 
 a severe snow-storm raged, n which 400 of Colonel Cole's horses perished. 
 I was in that storm on Powder River. It was very severe, and I lost several 
 animals. Our total loss in all the engagements not more than fifty killed and 
 wounded, including one officer. Colonel Cole or Colonel Walker had not 
 communicated with General Connor and were on Powder River, but by this 
 time they have communicated, as they had ascertained where General Con- 
 nor's column was. G. M. Dodge, 
 
 Major-Oeneral. 
 
 General Connor, in compliance with his orders, moved south 
 from Fort Connor to distribute at the different posts where they had 
 been assigned, the forces not ordered to be mustered out. As soon 
 as he started south to Fort Laramie the Indians followed him and 
 swarmed immediately on the overland routes, both the North and 
 South Platte, reaching even as far as the Arkansas, and committed 
 great depredations. The troops along those lines had been mus- 
 tered out, and the regular-army force that was to take their places 
 had not arrived. It was a harvest for the Indians. In my absence 
 General Pope had assigned to the different districts regular-army 
 officers for permanent command. They were to take the places of 
 the volunteers. Under my instructions I immediately sent word 
 to the Indians to come to Fort Laramie for the purpose of a consul- 
 
The Indian Campaign. . 99 
 
 tation. To accomplish this I sent out the best-posted guides (using 
 chiefs, sub-chiefs, half-breeds of friendly Indians) that I knew on 
 the plains, to each of the hostile tribes asking them to come into 
 Fort Laramie. I instructed the messengers to tell them that if any 
 of their people had gone to the Missouri Eiver for peaceable pur- 
 poses to let them go, but to liring in all that were left, providing 
 they felt disposed to settle without delay. I sent them word that 
 if they did not come in and settle they would find that our summer 
 campaign was only a taste of what they would get this winter, for 
 we would give them no rest. I posted the district commanders thor- 
 oughly, telling them what we wanted was to settle w^ith the Indians 
 before they discovered the smallness of our forces on the plains. I 
 told them they might sa}'', also, that all of the Indians soutli of the 
 Arkansas had made peace, and gave instructions that they be told 
 about the battle with the Arapahoes and Cheyennes on Powder 
 and Tongue Elvers. I sent the district commanders word to show 
 Big Ribs, one of my messengers, the forces at their posts, and to 
 impress upon him our power. The effect of this appeal to the dif- 
 ferent tribes was that early in the spring of 1866 we got together 
 at Fort Laramie the principal chiefs and the head men of the North 
 Cheyennes, Arapahoes, and the different tril)es of the Sioux, Avhen 
 a council was held. 
 
 I had instructed General Frank Wheaton, who commanded 
 at Fort Laramie, that we would agree to almost anything to bring 
 a permanent peace except to allow the Indians to come down to 
 the North Platte and occupy the country through which the new 
 military road was laid out to Bozeman, Mont. Our troops, in passing 
 up the east base of the Black Hills, had discovered gold. There 
 were Colorado and California Eegiments in tlie commands, and 
 I knew, and so did General Connor, that many were preparing, 
 as soon as a treaty was made, to go back into that country and 
 prospect it, and I gave that reason to the Indians for holding them 
 north of the Belle Fourche Fork of the Cheyenne River; but that 
 country was their best hunting-ground. They were perfectly willing 
 to give up all the country south of the Platte River, and not to 
 interfere with the building of the I'nion Pacific road or with any 
 of the overland routes up the North or South Platte; but they 
 would not consent to give up the Black Hills north of the North 
 Platte. Finally we made an agreement with them that they should 
 occupy the country north of the North Platte River until such time 
 
100 The Ixdiax Ca^ipaigx. 
 
 as the Government should see proper to send a commission out to 
 negotiate a permanent peace with them. I gave instructions to 
 tell them that if the white men went into their territory and we 
 did not keep them out, the}- were at liberty to do so. I knew that 
 would deter any white man going in there, and as long as they kept 
 the peace, we would. Bed Cloud, who had then come to the head 
 of the Ogalalla band of the Sioux Indians, took a prominent part 
 in this conference, and was backed by such chiefs as Spotted Tail, 
 Man-Afraid-of-His-Horses, Big Bibs, and the Bent boys on behalf 
 of the Cheyennes. He declared that they would never give up their 
 country north of the Platte. "'You may take my country,'' said 
 Bed Cloud, "lint I will mark every mile of that Bozeman trail 
 from the Xorth Platte to Yellowstone with the bodies of your 
 soldiers ;*" and this he pretty nearly accomplished. This agreement, 
 made at Fort Laramie, accomplished nothing. During the years 
 1866, 1S6T and 1868 the Indians swarmed across the lines agreed 
 upon and occupied the coimtry, especially along the Union Pacific, 
 which was then being constructed through that country. The Grov- 
 ernment had to send in additional troops, and all the military posts 
 over the country had to be re-occupied the same as they had been 
 before. The Grovernment endeavored to again reach these Indians 
 through a peace commission in 1868. General W. T. Sherman was 
 at the head of it, and it was composed of General Harney and 
 others. They visited me at Fort Sanders, "Wyo., before they went 
 to make a treaty with the Indians, and wished to know my reasons 
 for the position I took in the consultation of 1866. I then told 
 General Sherman that my soldiers had found gold in all the streams 
 heading in the Black Hills north of the North Platte, and that 
 as soon as he allowed those Indians to come to the Xorth Platte 
 under a treaty of peace, he would not be across the Missouri Eiver 
 on his return before that country would be covered by prospectors 
 from California and Colorado. General Sherman answered that 
 their instructions were to make such a peace and they were sent 
 there to do it, and, sure enough, they did ; and as soon as the treaty 
 was made the miners poured into the country. One of the first 
 mines that was discovered was the Homestake or Homestead. Sit- 
 ting Bull, who had taken part in this treaty and whose country 
 was the Black Hills, sent in protest after protest, demanding that 
 the Government live up to the terms of the treaty and drive 
 the miners out. but no attention was paid to them. The miners and 
 
The Indian Campaign. • 101 
 
 settlers poured into tlie Black Hills countrv and drove the Indians 
 out, and Sitting Bull said in a conference he had with some of the 
 Army officers in the 70's that if the Government did not jirotect 
 their territory as provided in the treaty, they would themselves; 
 and they started to do it. The massacres of that year came from 
 his band, the troubles finally ending with the sacrifice of the Custer 
 Eegiment in 187G. While this was a horrible event, the Indians, 
 under the treaty, were fully justified in it. During this same time 
 Eed Cloud occupied the Bozeman trail. He killed emigrants, be- 
 sides murdering Captain Fetterman and his company at Fort Phil 
 Kearney; and other troops located at the posts that Ave established 
 along there in 186G. such as Forts Reno, McKinney, Phil Kearney, 
 and C. F. Smith. It was not until after the Custer massacre that 
 these Indians were In'ought to time and put on reservations; since 
 then jDcace has prevailed. 
 
 The Government had the same difficulty on the Arkansas 
 River route that we had on the Platte routes in the summer of 
 1866, 1867, and 1868. The Indians that had made the agreement 
 with Colonel Leavenworth were all committing depredations until 
 finally the Government sent General Sheridan there with instruc- 
 tions to punish them. They tried to |)lay the same game with 
 Sheridan that they had played with us, )jut he would have none 
 of it. Tliere was no one in Washington wlio would force liim to 
 listen to the appeals of the peace commission. His troops, under 
 Colonels Custer, Evans, and others, fought three battles south of 
 the Arkansas, noticeably wiping out some liands, and making them 
 give up their prisoners, stop their murders, and go on reservations 
 in the Indians' territory. From that time on tliey have been peace- 
 able. 
 
 We were much better prepared, in the fall of 1865, both on 
 the i^rkansas and on the Yellowstone, to conquer these Indians. 
 We had got up to their villages and had plenty of troops, plenty 
 of provisions, and plenty of clothing, and could carry on the cam- 
 paign through the winter, if necessary; and so, if we had allowed 
 General Ford or General Sanborn to have gone forward with the 
 columns and punish those southern Indians, they would have made 
 a permanent ]3eace. But the fact is the Indians did not give up 
 until they were thoroughly thrashed and made to recognize the 
 power and autlioi'itv of the Government. 
 
102 The Ixdiax Caaipaigx. 
 
 The policy of the United States in dealing ^rith the Indian 
 problem is beyond the comprehension of any sensible man. They 
 were treated the same as foreign nations: and while they made 
 treaties they never carried out their part of them, breaking them 
 whenever the trend of civilization westward interfered with them 
 in any way. The Government attempted to deal with and govern 
 the Indians with civil agents and at the same time tried to enforce 
 peac-e through the military authorities. This caused friction: and 
 deception and cheating in the supplying of them through their eon- 
 tractors and civil agents brought imtold complaints. If the Gov- 
 ernment had treated the Indians as a ward that they were boimd 
 to protect, as the English did. they would have had very Uttlje 
 trouble in handling them. The military force would have held all 
 c<mf erences with them : fed them when they needed it ; located 
 them in an early day on unoccupied good hunting-groimds : and 
 finally, as civilization moved into their territories and as their 
 tribes wasted away, woidd have given them reservations where the 
 Government from the money they received from the lands the 
 Indians claimed, c-ould have kept and fed them without any great 
 burden or cost. In all the davs of Indian warfare and treaties, 
 there never was such a farct?. or failure to c-omprehend the frontier 
 situarion. as in the years 1S65 and 1S66. and the failure of the 
 Government to take advantage of the comprehensive plans instituted 
 by the military authorities, as well as of the great expenditures 
 made, and to punish the Indians as they deserved, brought, in after 
 years, greater expenditures and more disturbances than ever. 
 
 Early in the campaign, after General Pope had made known 
 his views to the Government, he rtequested me to write fully mine 
 to the Secretary of the Interior, who had charge of Indian affairs, 
 and who was from my state, and I sent him this letter : 
 
 BLeadquaktees Depabtmext of the Missouri. 
 
 St. Lons. Mo.. June 22. 1S65. 
 HoH. James Haiian^ Secretary of Ihe Interior. WashiiiiitoH, D. C: 
 
 Mr Ife\B SiK : Copies of Senator Doolittle's and Commissioner Dole's 
 letters to tou of dates Mar 31 and June 12 hare been furnished me. My 
 acquaintance with you leads me to believe that you are endeavoring to get 
 at the real facts of our Indian difficulties and the best methods for putting 
 an end to them. So far as Senator Doolittle's letter refers to *"some general 
 getting up of an Indian war on his own hook" and for his own purposes. 
 1 shall indulge no reply. You know me. and if it was intended in any way 
 to apply to me I leave you to judge of how much credence should be at- 
 tached to it. My sinc-ere desire is to terminate these Indian troubles, and 
 I have no hesitation in saying that if I am allowed to c-arry out the policy 
 
The Indian Campaign. 
 
 103 
 
 now being pursued towar.l then, 1 will have peaee ^vith then. |;;:»';;;;;';;;;;|;;:;: 
 
 mmmmm 
 
 with the ordei. of S. au or > committee, of which Senator 
 
 had just got my tunes '>'"' i^/^^,^"",.,^^. ^^.^^ after an interview with 
 Doolittle is a memher. '-''l;"^^ J^J^^. ^^;";^'^^^^^^ movements to stop. 
 
 ^i^SFEHS^f «'».^?.' - ..-e. p »i 
 
 iiiiplSliii 
 
 MMmmmm 
 
 and indicated their purposes ^^"e,/,'??,'";'^!^.^ stealing etc. I under- 
 
 while the whites are backmg fh^"^ J-.^,^^\;'; Doolittle Ind Commissioner 
 
 Indians on the Y^rpath nnist be o^-^^y^'j'f ^ I ^^^ convinced that the 
 no outrages oi^ ^arbanties mu t be comm^^^ ^^ ^^^^,^ ^^^^. ^^j^^^,_^ 
 
 only way to ff «'t"«" , jf ^ ^"^^^ ^"l^^l ^^ we find them, show them our 
 
 JS^m" rule ^anle^^in^^^ull^n to Know that we are ready to make 
 
lOrt The Indian Campaign. 
 
 peace with them — not, however, by paying them for murdering our people 
 and plundering our trains and posts, but by informing them that if they will 
 refrain from further hostilities they shall not be molested ; that neither 
 agents nor citizens shall be allowed to go amo ig them to swindle them; 
 that we will protect them in their rights ; that we will eiforce compliance 
 with our part of the treaty, and will require them to do the same on their 
 part. Let them ask for peace. We should keep citizens out of their 
 country. The class of men sent among them as agents so there for no good 
 purpose. They take positions for the sole purpose of making money out 
 of the Indians by swindling them, and so long as they ca.i do this they 
 shield them in their crimes. 
 
 Colonel Leavenworth, who stands up so boldly for the southern In- 
 dians, was dismissed from the United States service. He "blows hot and 
 cold" with singular grace. To my officers he talks war to the knife; to 
 Senator Doolittle and others he talks peace. Irdeed, he is all things to all 
 men. When officers of the army deal with these Indians, if they mistreat 
 them, we have a certain remedy for their cases. They can be dismissed 
 and disgraced, while Indian age^.its can only be displaced by others perhaps 
 no better. Now I am confident we can settle these Indian difficulties in 
 the manrer I have indicated. The Indians say to me that they will treat 
 with an officer of the army (a brave), in all of whom they seem to have 
 confidence, while they despise and suspect civilian agents and citizens, by 
 whom they say they have been deceived and swindled so much that they 
 put no trust in their words. I have given orders to the commanders of each 
 of my columns tliat when they have met and whipped these Indians, or 
 even before, if they have an opportunity, to arrange, if possible, an in- 
 formal ti<'aly with them for a cessation of hostilities, and whatever they 
 agree to do. to livi' to strictly. alloM'ing no one, either citizen or soldier, to 
 break it. I sliall myself uo (.iit on lli,' plains in n few weeks and try to get 
 an i.iterview willi tli.' rhiel's and if jiossililc cffecl an amicable settlement of 
 affairs ; but I am utterly opposed to making any treaty that pays them for 
 the outrages they have committed, or that hires them to keep the peace. 
 Such treaties last just as long as they think them for their benefit, and 
 no longer. As soon as the sugar, coffee, powder, lead, etc.. that we give 
 them, is gone, they make war to get us to give them more. AVe must first 
 punish them until we make them fear us and respect our power, and then 
 we must ourselves live strictly up to the treaties made. No one desires 
 more than I do to effect a permanent peace with these Indians, and such is 
 the desire of every officer under me, all of whom agree in the method sug- 
 gested for bringing it about. 
 
 Very many of these officers on the plains have been there for years, 
 and are well acquainted with these Indians and their character, and my own 
 opinions in this matter are founded not alore from my experience and ob- 
 servations since I have commanded here, but also with intercourse with 
 them on the plains during a number of years prior to the war, in which 
 time I met and had dealings with nearly every tribe east of the Rocky 
 Mountains. Until hostilities cease I trust that you will keep all agents, 
 citizens and traders away from them. When peace is made with them, if 
 civilian agents and citizens are sent among them, send those who you know 
 to be of undoubted integrity. I know you desire to do so. and from the 
 appointments you have already made I believe you will be successful. My 
 plan, however, would be to keep these Indians under the care of officers of 
 the army, stationed in their country ; that what is given them be given by 
 these officers, and that all citizens, agents and traders should, while among 
 them, be subject to their (the officers') supervision a'Hl police regulations. 
 In this way I have no doubt these Indians can be kept in. their own coun- 
 try, their outrages stopped, and our overland routes kept safe. Now. not 
 a train or coach of any kind can cross the plains in safety without being 
 guarded, and I have over .3.000 miles of route to protect and guard. The 
 
The Indian Campaign. 105 
 
 statement that the Sand Creek affair was th<> lirst Indian asgression is a 
 mistake. For montlis prior to that affair the Indians liad been attacking 
 onr trains, posts, and ranches ; had robbed the emigrants and murdered any 
 partj^ they considered too weak to defend themselves. 
 
 The theory that we cannot punish these Indians effectually, and that 
 we must make or accept any kind of a peace in order to hold our overland 
 routes, is not sustained by the facts, is singularly erroneous, and I cannot 
 agree to it by any means. I have now seven different columns of troops 
 penetrating their country in all directiors, while at the same time I am 
 holding the overland routes. This display of force alone will alarm and 
 terrify them; will show tlicni that we are in earnest, have the power, and 
 intend at all hazards to make tlicni behave themselves. After we have 
 taui;lit them this they will sue for peace: then if the government sees fit 
 to indemnify them for any wrongs inflicted upon them, they will not charge 
 it to our fears or inability to cope with them. The cost of carrying on this 
 war with them is, to be sure, cons:deral)le ; but the question arises. Had we 
 not better bear this cost now while the preparations are made and the 
 force on hand ready to be thrown in such strength into their country as 
 to make quick, effective, and final work of it, than to suffer a continuance 
 of their outrages for a long time and finally have to do the work at greater 
 expense of blood and treasure? I have written you this frankly and truly, 
 knowing that you want to get at the facts and do that which is for the 
 best, and I am convinced that when you fully understand these matters you 
 will agree with me. I shall be glad at any and all times to furnish you any 
 information in my i)osscssion that vdu may desire, and I assure you I shall 
 bend all my energies to the acfniii|ilislniirnl of the great object in view and 
 so much desired — a lasting and jusi ix-acc with these Indians. 
 
 I have the honor to l)e. very respectfully, your obiMlimt servant. 
 
 (!. .M. noiKiE, 
 Major-Gciicidl ('niinniinding. 
 
 Since writinu' tliis report of the Indian campaign of 1865 
 and 1866, I have seen Secretary of the Xavy Gideon Wells's diary 
 of the reconstrnction ])eriod. from whicli tlie following extracts 
 are taken : Tuesday, August 8, 1865. 
 
 Stanton submitted a number of not material questions, yet 
 of some little interest. Before the meeting closed the subject of army 
 movements on the plains came up, and Stanton said there were three col- 
 umns of twenty-two thousand troops raovivg into the Indian country, with 
 a view to an Indian campaign. Inquiry as to the origin and authority of 
 such a movement elicited nothing from I lie War Secretary. He said he 
 knew nothing on the subject. He had been told there was such a move- 
 ment, and Meigs had informed him it was true. Grant had been written to 
 for information, but Grant was away and he knew not when he should have 
 a reply. The expenses of this movement could not, he said, he less than 
 $50,000,000. But he knew nothing about it. 
 
 Friday, August 11, 1865. 
 
 The question of the Indian war on the plains was again brought for- 
 ward. No one, it appears, has any knowledge on the question. The Secre- 
 tary of War is in absolute ignorance. Says he has telegraphed to General 
 Grant, and General Grant says he has not ordered it. McCulloch wanted to 
 know the probable expense — the numbers engaged, etc. Stanton thought 
 McCulloch had better state how many should be engaged — said General 
 Pope had command. Harlan said he considered Pope an improper man — 
 was extravagant and wasteful. Thought twenty-two hundred instead of 
 twenty-two thousand men was a better and sufficient number. 
 
 This whole thing is a discredit to the War Department. 
 
106 The Indian Campaign. 
 
 Tuesday, August 15, 1865. 
 
 Stanton sa.vs there is to be a large reduction of the force which is 
 moving against the Indians. That by the 1st of October the force will be 
 about 6,000. That large supplies have gone on, but they can be divided or 
 deflected to New Mexico and other points, so that they will not be lost. 
 
 Friday, August 18, 1865. 
 
 Senator Doolittle and Mr. Ford, who have been on a mission to the 
 plains, visiting New Mexico, Colorado, etc., had an interview with the 
 President and Cabinet of an hour and a half. Their statement in relation 
 to the Indians and Indian affairs exhibits the folly and wickedness of the 
 expedition which has been gotten up by somebody without authority or the 
 knowledge of the Government. 
 
 Their strong protestations against an Indian war, and their statement 
 of the means which they had taken to prevent it, came in very opportunely. 
 Stanton said General Grant had already written to restrict operations ; he 
 had also sent to General Meigs. I have no doubt a check has been put on a 
 very extraordinary and unaccountable proceeding, but I doubt if an active 
 stop is yet put to war expenses. 
 
 It is no wonder tliat with sucli ignorance in the Cabinet as 
 to the condition of the country, that the administration at Wash- 
 ington was so incompetent in tlie Civil War. Xo person can read 
 Secretary Wells's diary of the daily doings at Washington of the 
 Cabinet during President Lincoln's administration and see hoAV 
 little appreciation and support he got from his Cabinet. Dissen- 
 sions among themselves and hardly ever agreeing on any important 
 question, brings to view the great responsibility of the President and 
 the fact that in all the important matters he was dependent upon 
 his own judgment. The Cabinet knew nothing of the Indian depre- 
 dations that for three months held all the lines of travel, mail, and 
 telegraph crossing the plains to California, with every State and 
 Territory Avest of the Missouri River appealing for protection, 
 until President Lincoln wrote to General Grant to try and have 
 something done to protect that country. General Grant instructed 
 me to make the campaign in the winter of 1864-65, which was so 
 successful that in forty days all the overland routes were opened, 
 and the stage, telegrajih, and mails replaced, as shown in my re- 
 ports, though at the beginning of the campaign every tribe of 
 Indians from the British Possessions to the Indian Territory was 
 at war, with captures and murders of settlers along all the overland 
 routes, in all the frontier States, every-day occurrences ; with women 
 and children captured and outrages committed that cannot be men- 
 tioned. And yet this Cabinet had no knowledge of the conditions, 
 and concluded from the report of the Doolittle Peace Commission 
 that the Indian expedition was a complete failure, notwithstanding 
 that this commission failed to make peace Avith a single tribe of 
 
The Indian Campaign. 107 
 
 Indians and failed to stop the depredations of any band of 
 Indians; and, upon its report, declaring that the Indian expedi- 
 tions were a folly and wickedness gotten up by some one without 
 the authority or knowledge of the Government. 
 
 There never were 22.000 troops on the plains, nor one-half of 
 that nunil)or. The War Department may have sent that number 
 out, but, as I have shown, they were all mustered out before they 
 reached their work; and the cost of the campaign with a year's 
 supplies at the posts for all the troops on the plains or engaged 
 in the campaign was not more than $10,000,000, a very small 
 amount compared with the Trouble and cost of fighting these 
 Indians for ten years thereafter. Secretary Harlan says that 2,200 
 troops were sufficient. When I took command, in January, 1865, 
 there were not to exceed 5,000 troops guarding trains, stages, and 
 telegraph-lines, and protecting all the routes of travel across the 
 plains, and they had utterly failed. All travel had been stopped 
 and no expeditions against the Indians had been made. The 
 Indians had held the overland routes for three months in spite of 
 these troops. It shows how little knowledge Secretary Harlan had 
 of the condition of Indian affairs in his department. From the 
 statements of Secretary Wells it is evident where the order came 
 from to stop all operations on the plains and withdraw all troops 
 by October 15th. When Secretary Stanton states that by October 
 1st the troops on the plains would be reduced to 6,000, it shows 
 how little knowledge he had of affairs in his department, for at 
 that time there were not 6,000 troops on the plains or in my com- 
 mand. 
 
 It is well that no one knew the condition of affairs; that no 
 one was aware of the ignorance of the group of statesmen at Wash- 
 ington who were supposed to be responsible for our nation and its 
 preservation. They did not seem to know where to ascertain the 
 facts. It would seem that Secretary Stanton purposely wished to 
 place a reflection on General Grant, for he must have known that 
 he was responsible for the Army and for all of its movements. It 
 seems that General Grant was away at the time the dispatches of 
 General Pope and myself were sent showing the necessity of con- 
 tinuing the campaign and punishing these savages. When he re- 
 turned he tried to stop this Cabinet panic, but his dispatches in 
 answer to those from Pope and myself show that he could not da 
 it, and the fatal mistake was made of stopping the campaign just 
 
lOS The Ixmax Campaign. 
 
 > it was aeixuniplishing and successfully ending a years work. 
 It s<vuis to have all eonie abv^ut thi>>«gh the misrepresentation of 
 the Doolittle Peace Commission and the lack of proper information 
 u the [VI rt of the Cabinet. 
 
 In the years 18i»3. ISiU and 1865 the Indians deliberately 
 
 made \n\r. Wlieving that the Civil War had so crippled ns that 
 
 we could not eti^ectively contend with them: but jjust as we had 
 
 -vent nuUions of dollar?, sent thousands of troops into their coun- 
 
 :ry. and ct>nunenced fighting and capturing them, we were forced 
 
 o lay down our arms almost in sight of the line of battle and b^ 
 
 iior peaex\ and the Indians believed they had defeated us and that 
 
 we cvHild not ecmqiier them, and for from three to ten years after- 
 
 \v-j»tvl we had to spend great sums, make winter campaigns, and 
 
 suffer gtvai losses of life and pivT>perty. beJbte we obtained the last- 
 
 cice^ which was in sigttt in 1S05 and 1S66 if we had been 
 
 • to carry out our cam|>aigns and plans to a legitimate end. 
 
 "fte clcsv- of ^ly campaigns on the plains the Legisla- 
 
 State of Iowa |iassed and sent me these commendatiiTns 
 
 L my services: 
 
 IkVsv^fiYt^. By rise $*aat* and Ho«ss)^ «>f R^paresentatiines of iW Stace 
 c: l..«x- 1" <: :>n cttauks oJf ti* p««M»^ «f tkis $tac& are do? and ai« hMwfey 
 exrvv.ltxl :- Ms„. >i*M*?ia]l CnearaBi? M. D«>>^. iKw kfe albte and ^S«iat 
 aici-.LS^'vV.^cc o: la^ttan alEatr? «o tiof plaiiB& in prMeetimar tb? Great Orer- 
 ittd R<i!w«««5.. Attd v>«r w*aw« KnoliM^ ftwB sW depreidbnoss and ineaiaoas 
 . c Iv06<il« IndSatts, as afc«> 6» Kb? dfescio^ni^ted SMvkies ^ a ««MaiBander in 
 ^^ 6«4d. ai^ lBt$ aH^ ad«ttn«$inrat»i» •i>f iBm^ I>^i>aiit»<«it of tke MK^ooii. 
 
 Thiring this campaagning on the pkins I had as my escort 
 
 :tty A, FoaiMer^nth Pamsylvania Cavalry. They bekmged to 
 T*^-^ K^^jTwx^its that was sent from the East to take part in 
 
 aigtts. antd dtd not ask to be miastered oot until 
 
 ^iw. I was greatly indebted to this company for 
 
 ■ :2 they gave- to sne and the intidligiattee- tl&ey sibowed 
 
 — ■- ■> trip. They had seroed faitMnlbr im. the Civil 
 
 'Var. and tfear v«$t««an experience tfeese^ was a great baoseit in 
 
 -V V- -V -- X:isd to do on the plaiiD^^ often in taking ntessas^es 
 
 _ jdtiiHr diaties wiaepf eaily two ««■ tiuree of ttean 
 
 -— - -'—--, It has always beien a great pleasoie to 
 
 a, ever sina? tiiey ovganixed d&esr soci- 
 
 ;:y. :, a:c^":. : itiSv bat, nii&ttfnnatetr, I hav? bi&ai s© 
 
 :sr away tlsat 1 _ ■ ; and to tibe swrrivii^ measiWi? I with 
 
 cwait (pfesssire €x-::-:, :.> ::itanks Ifcsr tfe»r »»! swriifes to b&. 
 
CAMPAIGN UP THE TENNESSEE 
 RIVER VALLEY 
 
 General Dodge 
 In The Rear of General Bragg's Army 
 
 AND 
 
 Colonel Streight's Raid 
 Spring of 1883 
 
 When General Grant planned the second campaign against 
 Vicksburg he notified me, then in command of the District of 
 Corinth, with about eight thousand infantry and two thousand 
 cavalry, that he intended to take my command with him; but a 
 few days before starting he sent one of his staff officers to me stating 
 that he had concluded to leave me with my command and some 
 additional troops to hold that flank while he moved on Vicksburg. 
 This dispatch was a great disappointment to myself and my com- 
 mand. M^ien the officer returned to General Grant he no doubt told 
 him of our disappointment, as General Grant wrote me a letter 
 stating that my command was of much more importance than a 
 command directly under him, and said he had fears that General 
 Bragg, who was then facing General Rosecrans in Middle Ten- 
 nessee, might detach a portion of his force, cross the Tennessee 
 River, and endeavor to make a lodgment on the Mississippi River at 
 some point and break up his communications with the North, 
 with a view of forcing him to abandon the campaign. He said he 
 had left me to take care of that flank, as he knew I would stay 
 there. I read between the lines and learned what was expected 
 of me. 
 
 General Grant, in discussing this order of his afterwards, said 
 that he had learned from my services under him that I was pecu- 
 liarly fitted for such a command, where I had to rely on my own 
 judgment, and that I acted promptly without waiting for orders, 
 and that it came, he thought, from my experience before the war, 
 
112 Campaign up tpie Tennessee. 
 
 when I was always in charge of engineering parties in the field 
 and often in a hostile Indian country where I had to act promptly 
 in any emergency. There was, at that time, quite a large force in 
 my front and between me and General Bragg, commanded by 
 General Earl Van Dorn, General N. B. Forrest, and General P. D. 
 Roddey. This force was collecting supplies and storing them along 
 the Memphis and Charleston Railroad from Bear River to Decatur, 
 Ala. The Tennessee Valley in this territory was twenty miles wide, 
 and full of all kinds of supplies. I wrote to General Grant about 
 this storage of supplies for General Bragg's Army, and suggested 
 that I move up the Tennessee Valley with my force to destroy 
 these stores and whatever there was in the valley that Bragg's Army 
 could utilize ; but General Grant made no response then to my sug- 
 gestion.. In February I discovered a movement of the force in my 
 front towards General Rosecrans's Army and notified him in the 
 following dispatch : 
 
 ,, . ^, , „ Corinth, Miss., February 10, 1863. 
 
 Major-Qeneral Rosecrans: ' '' ■ 
 
 One of my scouts left Van Dorn Sunday night. He then had two 
 regiments and one battery across the Tombigbee, at Cotton-Gin Port ; was 
 crossing slowly, and all his forces had not got to him. His men and officers 
 said he was going to Bragg. His stock is not in good condition. He 
 appears to be going the Pikevill and Russellville road. Streams are high, 
 and roads bad. We captured mail from Bragg's Army yesterday. All the 
 officers' and privates' letters express a belief that Bragg is fixing to fall 
 back ; some say to Huntsville, some to Bridgeport. You can judge how re- 
 liable such suspicions are. I have endeavored to get a gunboat up to Flor- 
 ence, and if one could go there it could destroy all the forces, and check Van 
 Dorn materially. I will co-operate with it in any way to benefit the service. 
 
 G. M. Dodge, 
 
 B rif/adier-Gciicral. 
 
 On February IGth General Van Dorn's command commenced 
 
 crossing the Tennessee to join General Bragg's Army. I sent my 
 
 cavalry to attack him. I wired General Rosecrans that we had 
 
 attacked Van Dorn's rear guard and took some fifty prisoners from 
 
 him. He had with him General Roddey, commander of some 
 
 fifteen hundred men, of which we captured about two hundred. 
 
 These prisoners said they were ordered to join General Bragg's 
 
 Army. General Rosecrans, in answer to my dispatch, sent me this 
 
 message : 
 
 MURFREESBOROUGII, February 16, 1863. 
 
 Brigadier-General Dodge, Corinth, Miss.: 
 
 Hurlbut's request and my own coincide. Hope you will be able to 
 cut off some of Van Dorn's command. Will give you all our news in your 
 direction. Accept my thanks for your promptness and energy. 
 
 W. S. Rosecrans, 
 
 Major-General. 
 
Campaign up the Tennessee. 113 
 
 Soon after this General Rosecrans conceived the idea of send- 
 ing Colonel A. D. Streight with two thousand mounted cavalry 
 and infantry from Nashville by boat to Eastport, Miss., to go from 
 there east to Georgia, destroying the railroads and -supplies Bragg's 
 army was depending on, and then move south and west, finally land- 
 ing in Corinth, Miss. General Eosecrans proposed that I should 
 send two brigades to luka in support of this movement, which 
 General Grant acceded to. and said in making this movement for 
 me to go on and carry out the plan I had suggested in destroying 
 the Memphis and Charleston Railroad and the supplies gathered 
 along it. I sent this dispatch, giving my plan of the movement: 
 
 Hdqrs. Dist. of Corinth. Deprt. of the Tennessee. 
 , ^ . , , ^ , Corinth, April 4, 1863. 
 
 Henry Binmore, Assistant Adjutaiit-Lreneral: 
 
 Captain.- — In accordance with Major-Gen era 1 Horlbiit's dispatch, I 
 submit the phm of operations east of here. General Rosecrans proposes to 
 land a force at Floicnrc. attack and take that place, while, with a heavy body 
 of cavalry, he penetrates Alabama north of Tennessee River, and gets into 
 .Johnson's rear. At the same time I am to strike and take Tuscumbia, and, 
 if practicable, push my cavalry to Decatur, destroy the saltpeter works, 
 and the Tuscumbia and Decatur Railroad, which they have just finished, 
 and take all the horses and mules in that country, to prevent them from 
 raising any large crops. To do this, I propose to move simultaneously 
 with General Rosecrans, throw all my cavalry suddenly across Bear Creek, 
 capture the ferries, and hold them vuitil my infantry and artillery arrive, 
 and then immediately force my cavalry as far toward Tuscumbia as pos- 
 sible and secure the crossings of Little Bear, on which creek the enemy 
 will concentrate. To accomplish this I shall move light, taking nothing but 
 ammunition and provisions, and march twenty miles per day, with infantry 
 and artillery. I shall take such a force as to render certain the success 
 of the expedition, and propose to take command in person. The movement 
 is to be made next week, or as soon as General Rosecrans notifies me he 
 is ready. I trust this will meet the view of the General commanding. 
 
 I ain. very respectfully, your obedient servant. 
 
 G. M. Dodge, 
 Brigadier-General Commanding. 
 
 To ascertain what enemy I would have to meet, I sent my chief 
 of staff, Captain George E. Spencer, a very competent otficer who 
 was a genius in getting inside of the enemy's lines, with a communi- 
 cation to General P. D. Roddey, who had returned to Tuscumbia, 
 and was in command of the rebel forces south of the Tennessee 
 River. I told Captain Spencer that the communication was an 
 important one and he must not deliver it to any one except General 
 Roddey; that he must impress upon the officer on the enemy's 
 picket-line that he must take him to General Roddey and in that 
 way he would be able to determine very closely what forces I would 
 have to meet. Captain Spencer went prepared to do this. He met 
 
11-i Campaign up the Tennessee. 
 
 ■the ]iicket officer; they became very chummy, and the officer took 
 Captain Spencer right through all of the enemy's forces between 
 Bear Eiver and Tuscumbia, and he delivered the message to General 
 Eoddey, who was in great anger at his officer; but they made the 
 best of it. After the war, Captain Spencer and General Eoddey 
 were great friends and I believe partners in some business. The 
 result of Captain Spencer's trip I set forth in the following dis- 
 patch to General Oglesby : 
 
 ,T • ^ , ^ , , J . Corinth. April 17, 1863. 
 
 Major-Qcneral Oglesoy. Jackson: 
 
 My A. A. G., Captaiu George E. Spencer, has just returned from 
 Tuscumbia ; succeeded in getting through all the enemy's camps and obtain- 
 ing valuable information. The forces are posted as follows : Colonel 
 Dibrell, 900 men, at Tuscumbia Landing; Colonel Josiah Patterson, 1,000, 
 at Florence ; Colonel M. W. Hannon, 1,800, at Tuscumbia ; Colonel Rod- 
 dey's old regiment, 800. at Tuscumbia Landing ; Baxter Smith, 350, ten 
 miles this side; Colonel Hampton, 300 at same place; W. R. Julian, 300, 
 at Grey's, six miles this side; and Smith, 100, at Big Bear. The above all 
 cavalry. Between Courtland and Tuscumbia, one brigade of infantry, under 
 Colonel Wood, as follows: Colonel A. H. Helvenston, 300; Colonel 
 J. B. Bibb, 500; Colonel W. B. Wood, Sixteenth Alabama, 400. The last 
 brigade, and one brigade of cavalry, under General Roddey, arrived at 
 Tuscumbia last week. This more than doubles their force. They have also 
 five pieces of artillery at Florence and six pieces at Tuscumbia. 
 
 G. M. Dodge, 
 
 Brigadier-General. 
 
 Upon notification of General Kosecrans of the movement of 
 Colonel Streight, I moved out to carry out the combined plan, 
 engaging the enemy at Little Bear and Tuscumbia, and defeated 
 them as my report shows. Colonel Streight was greatly delayed 
 in starting from Nashville, and was only partially mounted, his 
 intention being to complete the mount of his force as he traveled 
 through the enemy's country — a fatal mistake. His delay in reach- 
 ing me and my movement caused Bragg to send General Forrest 
 to join General Roddey; and so by the time General Streight 
 reached Eastport, April 31st, the force before me had been doubled 
 and the best cavalry officer in the rebel force had arrived to take 
 command in my front. 
 
 Colonel Streight lost part of his horses and mules while unload- 
 ing at Eastport, and, although I made an effort to mount him, 
 stripping my own transportation and scouring the country in my 
 vicinity, still he left us after I captured Tuscumbia the second 
 time, on May 26th, with two hundred of his men dismounted and 
 one-half of the rest on mules, illy prepared for such a trip. I told 
 Colonel Streight that I would hold the enemy in my front as long 
 
Campaign up the Tennessee. 115 
 
 as 230ssible, but the moment Colonel Forrest got word of his move- 
 ment he would go after him and follow liini to death. His only 
 salvation was to get three or four days' start by long marches 
 before Forrest learned of his movement. Colonel Streight was an 
 officer peculiarly fitted for such a raid. He was active, clear- 
 headed, determined, and of excellent judgment, and his many 
 fights with Forrest showed him full of resources; but his two- 
 days' halt at Moulton, the heavy rains, and the condition of his 
 stock, were fatal to him. 
 
 On the morning of May 2Tth I felt carefully of the enemy 
 and found them in my front, and commenced immediately to force 
 them back, trying to make them believe, if they discovered Colonel 
 Streight, that it was only a side movement into the loyal part of 
 Alabama, where we had many friends and where we enlisted a 
 Eegiment of loyal iVlabamians, which was afterwards known as the 
 First Alabama Cavalry, commanded by Colonel George E. Spencer, 
 whose Regiment became noted for its valuable service throughout 
 the war. General Sherman selected it as his headquarters escort 
 in his march to the sea. 
 
 Generals Forrest and Roddey, on May 28th, made a determined 
 stand to halt my advance on Town Creek. The high water delayed 
 my crossing, but on the morning of the 29th, after my force had 
 crossed and driven the enemy from the heights beyond, I discovered 
 that I had only General Roddey and his force in my front and I 
 forced my cavalry out towards Decatur until the enemy disappeared 
 from the front. The evening of the 28th I notified Colonel Streight 
 that Forrest was still with me, and I was greatly alarmed to find 
 that Colonel Streight w^as still directly south of me, wdien I hoped 
 he would be well on the road. When General Bragg found that I 
 was continuing my advance up the Tennessee, destroying his stores, 
 he despatched General Van Dorn with his cavalry command to cross 
 the Tennessee at Florence and get in my rear, but as soon as the 
 enemy disappeared in my front, I turned immediately and marched 
 rapidly back to Bear River, so that, if General Van Dorn succeeded 
 in crossing the Tennessee River, I would have him in my front. 
 My troops destroyed all the supplies in the whole Valley of the 
 Tennessee, burnt the railroad stations, and destroyed the railroad 
 so that it was never rebuilt until after the w^ar. There followed 
 me back to Corinth almost the entire negTo population of that 
 vallev. Thev came in everv conceivable conveyance from their 
 
116 Campaign ip the Tennessee. 
 
 masters* private carriage to a wheelbarrow, and they had hitched 
 to the couveyanees sometimes a cow and horse and sometimes a 
 fine team of horses, or a cow and an ox. Hundreds were on foot, 
 with their household goods packed on a mule, a horse, or a cow. 
 They made a picturesque column, much longer than my command. 
 At night their camps spread over a large territory, the camp-fires 
 surrounded by the most motley and poorly-dressed crowd I ever 
 saw, and it was a problem to me what I could do with them or what 
 would become of them if the enemy's forces should happen to get 
 into my rear. However, we all arrived safely at Corinth, where I 
 established the great contraband camp and guarded it by two com- 
 panies of Xegro soldiers that I uniformed, armed, and equipped 
 without any authority, and which came near giving me trouble. 
 !Mauy of the Xegro men afterwards joined the First Alabama Col- 
 ored Infantry and other Xegro Eegimeuts that I raised and mus- 
 tered into the service. 
 
 In my advance up the Talley of the Tennessee, after I ha3 
 passed Beaver Creek the enemy got into my rear, committing 
 depredations and picking up stragglers, and all kinds of reports 
 went back to Corinth of our fighting, capture, and other calamities 
 too numerous to mention. These reports were all repeated to Gen- 
 eral Grant, who said, after being surfeited with them. '"Well, if 
 Dodge has accomplished what he started out to do, Ave can afford to 
 lose him." General Grant said afterwards in discussing this move- 
 ment that he knew they could not capture or destroy the kind of 
 troops I had with me without my being heard from; that they 
 might defeat me. but they could not capture me ; and the boys used 
 to use this saying in rounding up what value I was to the service. 
 As my own report and that of Colonel Streight gives more and 
 better detail of the movements of both, and the results, I submit 
 them here : 
 
 I moved from Coriuth with the Second Division. Sixteenth Army 
 Corps. Wednesday, April 15. Camped at Bnrusville. The next day moved 
 to Cook's, two and a half miles west of Great Bear Creek, and made my 
 preparations to cross, the rebels holding the opposite side. 
 
 Friday morning, April 17, I made a feint at Jackson and Bailings 
 Fords, and, under the cover of my artillery, threw the most of my force 
 across at Steminine's Ford. 
 
 The cavalry, under Colonel Comyn, and mounted infantry, under 
 Lieutenant-Colonel Phillips, made the crossing and pushed forward. My 
 instructions were for them to go forward three and a half miles, and await 
 my coming. Colonel CornjTi, meeting the enemy abotit a mile out, com- 
 menced fighting them, they falling back rapidly. Hearing of Colonel 
 Roddey commanding a force of the enemy on my left flank, I sent orders 
 
Campaign up the Tennessee. 117 
 
 forward for the commiuul to halt; but before the messenger got to him 
 Colonel Koddey had got between the cavalry and infantry. The Third 
 Brigade was in advance, commanded by Colonel Bane, who, ascertaining 
 this fact, pushed forward and fell upon their rear, but not until Colonel 
 Roddey had taken two pieces of artillery, twenty-two- men, and one com- 
 pany of mounted infantry, who were guarding it, which, through neglect, 
 had been allowed to fall three miles in the rear of the advance. 
 
 Colonel Cornyn, hearing firing in the rear, immediately fell back, 
 and with the First Alabama Cavalry charged the rebels and retook the 
 artillery and caissons, with the exception of one gun. which the enemy 
 succeeded in getting off with. 
 
 The charge of the Alabamians with muskets only, and those not 
 loaded, is creditable, especially as they are all new recruits and ])oorly 
 drilled. In this charge, Captain Cameron, the commanding officer of the 
 Alabama Cavalry, a deserving and much-lamented officer, was killed. 
 
 Colonel Bane, on his arrival, disposed of his troops admirably. 
 Colonel Cornyn advanced with his cavalry as a feint, and the rebels 
 advanced to meet him. He fell back to the rear of the infantry, which 
 was posted under cover and out of sight on both flanks of the cavalry. 
 On the appearance of the enemy, the infantry opened a heavy and destruc- 
 tive fire, which caused the rebels to fall back in confusion, utterly routed. 
 This day's work brought us thirteen miles in advance of the main force. 
 
 Colonel Streight not arriving, I fell back with the advance to Great 
 Bear Creek, where the rest of the command was posted, to await his coming. 
 
 Sunday afternoon, Colonel Streight commenced landing his force at 
 Eastport, but came poorly prepared for his contemplated movement. He 
 had two thousand infantry and about one thousand mules. At least four 
 hundred of them were unserviceable, and in unloading them, through the 
 carelessness of one of his officers, two hundred strayed away. He was 
 under the impression that he would find plenty of stock in the valley to 
 mount the rest and replace those broken down. During Monday and Tuesday 
 we scoured the country, and found all we could. 
 
 Tuesday night Colonel Fuller's Brigade, from Corinth, joined me. 
 
 Wednesday murning I advanced with all the force, and came up with 
 the enemy at Rock Cut, five miles west of Tuscumbia ; planted my batteries, 
 and drove them out of it, taking the line of Little Bear Creek that night. 
 The enemy's position was a very strong one, and there was but one way 
 to flank it. The enemy fell back as soon as I brought the infantry to bear 
 upon them. 
 
 Thursday we moved, crossing at three places, throwing my cavalry 
 by the Frankfort and Tuscumbia road, into the enemy's rear ; but during 
 the night, anticipating this movement, the enemy fell back. We reached 
 Tuscumbia about noon, and after slight skirmishing took possession of the 
 city. I immediately dispatched Lieutenant-Colonel Phillips, with two 
 squadrons of mounted infantry, two squadrons of the Fifteenth Illinois 
 Cavalry, and a section of Welker's battery, to take Florence. They 
 refused to surrender, when Colonel Phillips immediately opened on the 
 town. A few shell brought them to terms, and we occupied the place. At 
 the same time I ordered Colonel Cornyn forward toward Courtland, to feel 
 the enemy. He came up with their rear some two miles beyond Leighton. 
 The command consisted on our part of the Tenth Missouri and Seventh 
 Kansas Cavalry, about eight hundred in all, and drove the enemy eight 
 miles. The rebel force was thirty-five hundred, besides one battery. The 
 fighting of the cavalry against such odds is beyond all praise. 
 
 The next morning the cavalry fell back to Tuscumbia, to await the 
 advance of the main column. 
 
 Finding it impossible to obtain stock to mount Colonel Streight's 
 command. I took horses and mules from my teams and mounted infantry, 
 and furnished him some six hundred head, mounting all but two hundred 
 
118 Campaign up the Tennessee. 
 
 of his men. I also turned over all my hard hrcad. sonu' ten thousand 
 rations, and he left me at midnight on the 2(>th instant, with the intention 
 of going through Russellville, Moulton. and Blountsville. to Gadsden, then 
 divide, one force to strike Rome and the other Etowah Bridge. 
 
 I moved forward Monday morning, and drove the enemy across Town 
 Creek that night, and ascertained that they were in force, under Forrest, 
 on the opposite bank. That night I communicated with Colonel Streight, 
 at Mount Hope, and ascertained that he was all right. 
 
 Tuesday morning the creek rose ten feet, and the current was so 
 swift that neither horse nor man could cross. I immediately made dis- 
 position to cross at three points, to cover the railroad bridge and throw 
 across foot-bridges. 
 
 The resistance of the enemy was very strong, and their sharp- 
 shooters very annoying. The artillery duel was very tine, parts of Welker's, 
 Tannrath's, Richardson's, and Robinson's batteries taking part in it. The 
 practice on both sides was excellent. The Parrott guns drove the enemy 
 away from their pieces, disabling and keeping them away for two hours, but 
 the fact of my being unable to cross infantry prevented our securing them. 
 
 About noon I crossed the railroad bridge with the Eighty-first Ohio 
 and Ninth Illinois Infantry, and soon after crossed the rest of my force, 
 except the artillery, on foot-bridges, and drove the enemy within three 
 miles of Courtland. when they, hearing of the force at Moulton. fled to 
 Decatur. I followed up, and then returned to camp at Town Creek that 
 night, being unable to cross any of my artillery. 
 
 Colonel Streight reached Moulton Tuesday night, and commenced 
 crossing the mountains Wednesday, having got nearly two days' start of 
 them. They supposed he was making for Decatur, and only discovered 
 Wednesday that he was crossing the mountains toward Georgia. 
 
 Having accomplished fully the object of the expedition, and driving 
 the enemy, which was 5,500 strong, to Decatur, and having been on half 
 rations for a week, I fell back to Tuscumbia, in order to communicate 
 with transports, to obtain rations and ammunition. On arriving there I 
 received information that the gunboats had gone down the river, taking 
 the transports with them, a part of Van Dorn's force having made their 
 appearance on the north side of the Tennessee River and shelled South 
 Florence that day at 4 p. m. They also planted a battery at Savannah 
 and Duck River ; but my precaution in destroying all means of crossing 
 the river on my advance, prevented him getting in my rear, and the gun- 
 boats, to save the transports, left the day before, having a short engage- 
 ment at Savannah and Duck River. Van Dorn's force then moved toward 
 Decatur. That was the last we heard of them. 
 
 On my return I burned all provisions, produce, and forage, all mills 
 and tan-yards, and destroyed everything that would in any way aid the 
 enemy. I took stock of all kinds that I could find, and rendered the valley 
 so destitute that it cannot be occupied by the Confederates, except pro- 
 visions and forage are transported to them. I also destroyed telegraph 
 and railroad between Tuscumbia and Decatur, and all the ferries between 
 Savannah and Courtland. 
 
 I have no doubt but that Colonel Streight would have succeeded had 
 he been properly equipped and joined me at the time agreed upon. The 
 great delay in an enemy's country necessary to fit him out gave them time 
 to throw a large force in our front. Although Colonel Streight had two 
 days' start, they can harass him, and perhaps check his movements long 
 enough for them to secure all their important bridges. If he could have 
 started from Bear Creek the day I arrived there, then my movements would 
 have been so quick and strong that the enemy could not have got their 
 forces together. 
 
 The animals furnished him were very poor at the start. Four hundred 
 of them were used up before leaving me. and those furnished him by me 
 
Campaign up the Tennessee. 119 
 
 were aljout all the serviceable stock he had, though I hear he sot two 
 huudretl good mules the day he left me, in Moulton Valley. 
 
 On my return, I sent Colonel Gornyn, with the Tenth Missouri, Sev- 
 enth Kansas, Fifteenth Illinois Cavalry, and Ninth Illinois Mounted 
 Infantry, to attack the force congregated at Tupelo and Okolona. He 
 came up with the enemy on Wednesday, and immediately attacked them, 
 fhey being some three thousand strong, under Major-General S. J. Gholson 
 and Brigadier-General Ruggles. Brigadier-General Chalmers, with thirty- 
 five hundred men, was at Pontotoc, but failed to come to Gholson's aid, 
 though ordered to. 
 
 Colonel Cornyn fought so determinedly and so fast that he soon 
 routed the force in his front, driving them in all directions, killing and 
 wounding a large number and taking one hundred prisoners, including some 
 seven officers; also a large number of arms and one hundred and fifty horses, 
 saddles, etc. 
 
 The enemy fled toward Okolona and Pontotoc, and Colonel Cornyn 
 returned to Corinth. 
 
 The expedition so far can be summed up as having accomplished the 
 object for which it started, the infantry having marched two hundred and 
 fifty miles and the cavalry some four hundred, and fought six successful 
 engagements, driving the enemy, three thousand strong, from Bear Creek 
 to Decatur, taking the towns of Tuscumbia and Florence, with a loss not 
 to exceed one hundred, including three officers. Destroyed a million and a 
 half bushels of corn, besides large quantities of oats, rye, and fodder, and 
 five hundred thousand pounds of bacon. Captured one hundred and fifty 
 prisoners, one thousand head of horses and mules, and an equal number of 
 cattle, hogs, and sheep ; also one hundred bales of cotton, besides keeping 
 the whole command in meat for three weeks. Destroyed the railroad from 
 Tuscumbia to Decatur ; also some sixty flat-boats and ferries in the Ten- 
 nessee River, thereby preventing Van Dorn, in his move, from crossing to 
 my rear ; also destroyed five tan-yards and six flouring-mills. 
 
 It has rendered desolate one of the best granaries of the South, pre- 
 venting them from raising another crop this year, and taking away from 
 them some fifteen hundred negroes. 
 
 We found large quantities of shelled corn, all ready for shipment, 
 also bacon, and gave it to the flames. 
 
 I am, respectfully, your obedient servant. G. M. Dodge, 
 
 Brigadier-General U. 8. A. 
 
 The following is Colonel A. D. Streight's report : 
 
 General Dodge informed me that there was no doubt but Forrest had 
 crossed the Tennessee River, and was in the vicinity of Town Creek ; 
 hence, he agreed to advance as far as Courtland, on the Decatur road, and, 
 if possible, drive the enemy in that direction, but if they (the enemy) 
 turned toward Moulton, our cavalry, under General. Dodge, was to be sent 
 in pursuit. 
 
 With this understanding, I marched from Tuscumbia at 11 p. m. on 
 the night of the 26th instant in the direction of Moulton, via Russellville. 
 It was raining very hard, and the mud and darkness of the night made our 
 progress very slow. One hundred and fifty of my men had neither horses 
 nor mules, and fully as many more had such as were unable to carry more 
 than the saddles ; hence fully three hundred of the men were on foot. 
 
 It was expected when I left General Dodge that the greater part of 
 my command would be able to reach Moulton, some forty miles distant, 
 by the next night, but, owing to the heavy rains and consequent bad condi- 
 tion of the roads, it was impossible ; consequently I dispatched a messen- 
 ger to General Dodge, stating that I would halt at Mount Hope and wait 
 for the portion of my command who were on foot to come up. 
 
120 Campaign up the Tennessee. 
 
 We continued to scour the coimtry for horses and mules, but so many 
 of those drawn at Nashville were continually failin;:. that, although we 
 were successful in collecting a large number, still, many of the men were 
 without anything to ride. 
 
 On the night of the 27th. at Mount Hope. I received word from 
 General Dodge, stating that he had driven the enemy, and that I should 
 push on. My command had not all come up yet. nor did they until about 
 10 a. m. the next day, when we proceeded to Moulton. where we arrived 
 about dark. Up to this time we had been skirmishing occasionally with 
 small squads of the enemy, but I could hear of no force of consequence 
 in the country. All of the command but about fifty men were now mounted. 
 
 We started from Moulton. in the direction of Blountsville. via Day's 
 Gap. about midnight on April 28. The two previous days it had been 
 raining most of the time, and the roads were terrible, though on the evening 
 of the 2Sth it bid fair for dry weather, which gave us strong hopes of 
 better times. 
 
 We marched the next day (the 29th) to Day's Gap. about thirty- 
 five miles, and bivouacked for the night. Every man now was mounted, 
 and although many of the animals were very poor, nevertheless we had 
 strong hopes that we could easily supply all future demands. We destroyed 
 during the day a large number of wagons belonging to the enemy, laden 
 with provisions, arms, tents, etc.. which had been sent to the mountains 
 to avoid us. but. luckily, they fell into our hands. We were now in the 
 midst of devoted Union people. Many of Captain Smith's men (Ala- 
 bamians) were recruited near this place, and many were the happy greetings 
 between them and their friends and relations. I could learn nothing of the 
 enemy in the country, with the exception of small squads of scouting-parties, 
 who were hunting conscripts. We moved out the next morning before day- 
 light. I will here remark that my men had been worked very hard in 
 scouring so much of the country, and. unaccustomed as they were to riding, 
 made it still worse : consequently, they were illy prepared for the trying 
 ordeal through which they were to pass. I had not proceeded more than 
 two miles, at the head of the column, before I was informed that the rear 
 guard had been attacked, and just at that moment I heard the boom 
 of artillery in the rear of the column. I had previously learned that the gap 
 through which we were passing was easily flanked by gaps through the 
 mountains, both above and below ; consequently, I sent orders to the rear to 
 hold the enemy in check until we could prepare for action. The head of 
 the column was at the time on the top of the mountain. The column was 
 moving through the gap : consequently the enemy was easily held in check. 
 
 I soon learned that the enemy had moved through the gaps on my 
 right and left, and were endeavoring to form a juuction in my advance ; 
 consequently I moved ahead rapidly until we passed the intersecting roads 
 on either flank with the one we occupied. The country was open sand 
 ridges, very thinly wooded, and afforded fine defensive positions. As soon 
 as we passed the point above designated (about three miles from the top 
 of the mountains), we dismounted and formed a line of battle on a ridge 
 circling to the rear. Our right rested on a precipitous ravine and the left 
 was protected by a marshy run that was easily held against the enemy. 
 The mules were sent into a ravine to the rear of our right, where they 
 were protected from the enemy's bullets. I also deployed a line of skirmish- 
 ers, resting on our right and left flanks encircling our rear, in order to 
 prevent a surprise from any detached force of the enemy that might 
 approach us from that direction and to prevent any straggling of either 
 stray animals or cowardly men. 
 
 In the meantime I had instructed Captain Smith, who had command 
 of our rear guard (now changed to our front), to hold his position until 
 the enemy pressed him closely, when he should retreat rapidly, and. if pos- 
 sible, draw them onto our lines, which were concealed by the men lying 
 
Campaign up the Tennessee. 121 
 
 down immediately hack of the top of the ridge. The lines were left suffi- 
 ciently open to permit Captain Smith's command to pass through near the 
 center. I had two twelve-pounder mountain howitzers, which were stationed 
 near the road (the center). They were also concealed. "We had hardly 
 completed our arrangements when the enemy charged Captain Smith in 
 large force, following him closely, and no sooner had he passed our lines than 
 our whole line rose up and delivered a volley at short range. We continued 
 to pour a rapid fire into their ranks, which soon caused them to give way 
 in confusion ; but their re-inforcements soon came up, when they dismounted, 
 formed, and made a determined and vigorous attack. Our skirmishers were 
 soon driven in, and about the same time the enemy opened upon us with a 
 battery of artillery. 
 
 The enemy soon attempted to carry our lines, but were handsomely 
 repulsed. During their advance they had run their artillery to within three 
 hundred yards of our lines, and as soon as they began to waver I prepared 
 for a charge. I ordered Colonel Hathaway, Seventy-third Indiana, and 
 Lieutenant-Colonel Sheets, Fifty-first Indiana, on the left, to make a charge, 
 in order to draw the attention of the battery, and immediately threw the 
 Third Ohio, Colonel Lawson, and the Eightieth Illinois, Lieutenant-Colonel 
 Rodgers, forward rapidly, hoping to capture the battery. The enemy, after 
 a short but stubborn resistance, fled in confusion, leaving two pieces of 
 artillery, two caissons, anu about forty prisoners, representing seven 
 different regiments, a larger number of wounded, and about thirty dead on 
 the field. Among the former was Captain William II. Forrest, a brother 
 of General Forrest. Our loss was about thirty killed and wounded, among 
 the latter Lieutenant-Colonel Sheets, Fifty-first Indiana (mortally), a brave 
 and gallant officer and one that we were illy prepared to lose, and Lieuten- 
 ant Favey, Eightieth Illinois (on my staff), severely. 
 
 It was now about 31 o'clock, fighting having continued since about 6 
 o'clock in the morning. I had learned, in the meantime, that the enemy 
 were in heavy force, fully three times our number, with twelve pieces of 
 artillery, under General Forrest in person ; consequently I was fearful 
 that they were making an effort to get around us and attack in the rear 
 of our position ; hence I decided to resume the march. Everything was 
 soon in readiness, and we moved out, leaving a strong guard (dismounted) 
 in the rear, to check any immediate advance the enemy might make previous 
 to the column getting in motion. We were not too soon in our movements, 
 for the column had hardly passed a cross-road some six miles from our first 
 battle-ground when the enemy were discovered advancing on our left. 
 Sharp skirmishing commenced at Crooked Creek, which is about ten miles 
 south of Day's Gap, anu finally the enemy pressed our rear so hard that I 
 was compelled to prepare for battle. I selected a strong position about a 
 mile south of the crossing of the creek, on a ridge called Hog Mountain. 
 The whole force soon became engaged (about one hour before dark). The 
 enemy strove first to carry our right ; then charged the left ; but with the 
 help of the two pieces of artillery captured in the morning and the two 
 mountain howitzers, all of which were handled with good effect by Major 
 Vananda, of the Third Ohio, we were able to repulse them. 
 
 Fighting continued until about 10 p. m. when the enemy were driven 
 from our front, leaving a large number of killed and wounded on the field. 
 I determined at once to resume our march, and as soon as possible we moved 
 out. The ammunition which we had captured with the two guns was 
 exhausted, and being very short of horses, I ordered the guns spiked and the 
 carriages destroyed. I had ordered the Seventy-third Indiana (Colonel 
 Hathaway) to act as rear guard, and I remained in the rear in person, 
 for the purpose of being at hand in case the enemy should attempt to press 
 us as we were moving out. We had but fairly got under way when I 
 received information of the enemy's advance. 
 
 The moon shone very brightly, and the country was an open wood- 
 
122 Campaign up the Tennessee. 
 
 land, with an occasional spot of thick undergrowth. In one of these thickets 
 I placed the Seventy-third Indiana, lying down, and not more than twenty 
 paces from the road, which was in plain view. The enemy approached. 
 The head of his column passed without discovering our position. At this 
 moment the whole regiment opened a most destructive fire, causing a com- 
 plete stampede of the enemy. I will here remark that the country from 
 Day's Gap to Bloimtsville (about forty miles) is mostly uninhabited; 
 consequently there is nothing in the country for man or beast. I had hopes 
 that by pushing ahead we could reach a place where we could feed before 
 the enemy would come up with us, and, by holding him back where there 
 was no feed, compel him to lay over a day at least to recuperate. I had 
 learned that they had been on a forced march from Town Creek, Ala., a 
 day and two nights previous to their attacking us. We were not again 
 disturbed until we had marched several miles, when they attacked our 
 rear guard vigorously. I again succeeded in ambuscading them, which 
 caused them to give up the pursuit for the night. We continued our march, 
 and reached Blountsville about 10 o'clock in the morning. Many of our 
 mules had given out, leaving their riders on foot, but there was very little 
 straggling behind the rear guard. 
 
 At Blountsville we found sufficient corn to feed our tired and hungry 
 animals. Ammunition and rations were hastily distributed to the men, 
 and the remaining ammunition was put on pack-mules and the wagons 
 burned, as it was now understood that it would be impossible to take them 
 over the roads before us. After resting about two hours, we resumed our 
 march in the direction of Gadsden. 
 
 The column had not got fairly under motion before our pickets were 
 driven in, and a sharp skirmish ensued between Forrest's advance and our 
 rear guard, under Captain Smith, in the town of Blountsville. The 
 enemy followed closely for several miles, continually skirmishing with the 
 rear guard, but were badly handled by small parties of our men stopping 
 in the thick bushes by the side of the road and firing at them at short 
 range, and when we reached the East Branch of the Black Warrior River 
 the ford was very deep and the enemy pressed so closely that I was com- 
 pelled to halt and offer him battle before we could cross. After some 
 maneuvering, I advanced a heavy line of skirmishers, who drove the enemy 
 out of sight of my main line, when I ordered the troops, except the 
 skirmishers, to cross the river as rapidly as possible. After all had crossed 
 except the skirmishers, they were rapidly withdrawn, under cover of our 
 artillery, and a heavy line of skirmishers thrown out on the opposite bank 
 for that purpose. It was about 5 p. m. when the last of the command 
 crossed the East Branch of the Black Warrior. We proceeded in the 
 direction of Gadsden vs^ithout further interruption, with the exception of 
 small parties who were continually harassing the rear of the column, until 
 about 9 o'clock the next morning, May 2, when the rear guard was fiercely 
 attacked at the crossing of Black Creek, near Gadsden. After a sharp 
 fight the enemy was repulsed. 
 
 I had learned in the meantime, through my scouts, that a large 
 column of the enemy was moving on our left, parallel with our route, 
 evidently with the intention of getting in our front, which made it necessary 
 for us to march all night, though the command was in no condition to do 
 so, and, to add still more to my embarrassment, a portion of our ammuni- 
 tion had become damaged in crossing Will's Creek, which, at the time, was 
 very deep fording. I only halted at Gadsden sufficiently long to destroy a 
 quantity of arms and commissary stores found there, and proceeded on. 
 Many of our animals and men were entirely worn out and unable to keep 
 up with the column ; consequently they fell behind the rear guard and were 
 captured. 
 
 It now became evident to me that our only hope was in crossing the 
 river at Rome and destroying the bridge, which would delay Forrest a day 
 
Campaign up the Tennesski':. 123 
 
 or two and give us time to collect horses and mules, and allow the command 
 a little time to sleep, without which it was impossible to proceed. 
 
 The enemy followed closely, and kept up a continuous skirmish with 
 the rear of the column until about 4 p. m., at which time we reached Blount's 
 plantation, about fifteen miles from Gadsden, where we could procure forage 
 for our animals. Here I decided to halt, as it was impossible to continue 
 the march through the night without feeding and resting, although to do 
 so was to bring on a general engagement. Accordingly, the command was 
 dismounted, and a detail made to feed the horses and mules, while the 
 balance of the command formed in line of battle on a ridge southwest of the 
 plantation. 
 
 Meanwhile the rear guard, in holding the enemy in check, had become 
 severely engaged and was driven in. The enemy at once attacked our main 
 line, and tried hard to carry the center, but were gallantly met and repulsed 
 by the Fifty-first and Seventy-third Indiana, assisted by Major Vananda, 
 with two mountain howitzers. They then made a determined effort to turn 
 our right, but were met by the gallant Eightieth Illinois, assisted by two 
 companies of the Third Ohio. 
 
 The enemy, with the exception of a few skirmishers, then fell back 
 to a ridge some half a mile distant, and commenced massing his force, as if 
 preparing for a more determined attack. It was becoming dark, and I 
 decided to withdraw unobserved, if possible, and conceal my command in 
 a thicket some half a mile to our rear, there to lie in ambush and await 
 his advance. In the meantime I had ordered Captain Milton Russell (Fifty- 
 first Indiana) to take two hundred of the best-mounted men, selected from 
 the whole command, and proceed to Rome, and hold the bridge until the 
 main command could come up. 
 
 The engagement at Blount's plantation revealed the fact that nearly 
 all of our remaining ammunition was worthless, on account of having been 
 wet. Much of that carried by the men had become useless by the paper 
 wearing out and the powder sifting away. It was in this engagement that 
 the gallant Colonel Hathaway (Seventy-third Indiana) fell, mortally 
 wounded, and in a few moments expired. Our country has seldom been 
 called upon to mourn the loss of so brave and valuable an ofiicer. His 
 loss to me was irreparable. His men had almost worshiped him, and when 
 he fell it cast a deep gloom of despondency over his regiment which was 
 hard to overcome. 
 
 We remained in ambush but a short time when the enemy, who by 
 some means had learned of our whereabouts, commenced a flank movement, 
 which we discovered in time to check. I then decided to withdraw as 
 silently as possible, and push on in the direction of Rome, but as a large 
 number of the men were dismounted, their animals having given out, and 
 the remainder of the stock was so jaded, tender-footed, and worn down, 
 our progress was necessarily slow ; yet, as everything depended on our reach- 
 ing Rome before the enemy could throw a sufiicient force there to prevent 
 our crossing the bridge, every possible effort was made to urge the command 
 forward. We proceeded without interruption until we reached the vicinity 
 of Centre, when one of my scouts informed me that a force of the enemy 
 was posted in ambush but a short distance in our front. I immediately 
 threw forward a line of skirmishers, with orders to proceed until they ' 
 were fired upon, when they should open a brisk fire on the enemy, and hold 
 their position until the command had time to pass. 
 
 The plan worked admirably, for, while my skirmishers were amusing 
 the enemy, the main column made a detour to the right, and struck the 
 main road some three miles to the rear of the enemy. As soon as our main 
 force had passed, the skirmishers withdrew and fell in the rear of the 
 column. I was then hopeful that we could reach Rome before the enemy 
 could overtake us. My principal guide had thus far proved reliable, and 
 I had made particular inquiries of him as to the character of the road 
 
124 Campaign up the Tennessee. 
 
 and the eoinitry the evening before, and he assured me that there were no 
 difficult streams to cross and that tlie road was good ; hence we approached 
 the Chattanooga River at the ferrj- without any information as to the 
 real condition of things. Captain Russell had managed to ferry the last of 
 his command across about one hour previous to my arrival, but the enemy 
 had seized and run off the boat before we reached there. 
 
 I then ascertained that there was a bridge some seven or eight miles 
 up the river, near Gaylesville, and procured new guides and pushed on as 
 rapidly as possible in order to reach the bridge before the enemy should 
 take possession of it. We had to pass over an old coal-chopping for several 
 miles, where the timber had been cut and hauled off for charcoal, leaving 
 innumerable wagon-roads running in every direction, and the command was 
 so worn out and exhausted that many were asleep, and in spite of every 
 exertion I could make, with the aid of such of my officers as were able 
 for duty, the command became separated and scattered into several squads, 
 traveling in different directions, and it was not until near daylight that the 
 last of the commard had crossed the river. The bridge was burned, and we 
 proceeded on and passed Cedar Bluff just after daylight. It now became 
 evident that the horses and mules could not reach Rome without halting to 
 rest and feed. Large numbers of the mules were continually giving out. 
 In fact, I do not think that at that time we had a score of the mules drawn 
 at Nashville left, and nearly all of those taken in the country were bare- 
 footed, and many of them had such sore backs and tender feet that it was 
 impossible to ride them ; but, in order to get as near as possible to the 
 force I had sent ahead, we struggled on until about 9 a. m. when we halted 
 and fed our animals. The men, being unaccustomed to riding, had become 
 so exhausted from fatigue and loss of sleep that it was almost impossible 
 to keep them awake long enough to feed. We had halted but a short time, 
 when I was informed that a heavy force of the enemy was moving on our 
 left, on a route parallel wuth the one we were marching on, and was then 
 nearer Rome than we were. About the same time I received this informa- 
 tion our pickets were driven in. The command was immediately ordered 
 into line, and every effort made to rally the men for action, but nature was 
 exhausted, and a large portion of my best troops actually went to sleep 
 while lying in line of battle under a severe skirmish-fire. xVfter some 
 maneuvering. Forrest sent in a fiag of truce, demanding the surrender of 
 my forces. Most of my regimental commanders had already expressed the 
 opinion that, unless we could reach Rome and cross the river before the 
 enemy came up with us again, we should be compelled to surrender. Con- 
 sequently, I called a council of war. I had learned, however, in the mean- 
 time that Captain Russell had been unable to take the bridge at Rome. Our 
 condition was fully canvassed. As I have remarked before, our ammunition 
 was worthless, our horses and mules in a desperate condition, the men were 
 overcome with fatigue and loss of sleep, and we were confronted by fully 
 three times our number, in the heart of the enemy's country, and, although 
 personally opposed to surrender, and so expressed myself at the time, yet 
 I yielded to the unanimous voice of my regimental commanders, and at once 
 entered into negotiations with Forrest to obtain the best possible terms 
 I could for my command, and at about noon. May 3, we surrendered as 
 prisoner's of war. 
 
 We were taken to Richmond, Va. The men were soon sent through 
 the lines and exchanged. My officers and myself were confined in Libby 
 Prison, where we remained until the night of February 9 last, when four of 
 my officers and myself, together with several other prisoners, succeeded in 
 making our escape, and reached Washington in safety abouth March 1. 
 The balance of my officers, or nearly all of them, are still confined as pris- 
 oners or have died of disease the result of long confinement, insufficient 
 food, and cruel treatment at the hands of the enemy. 
 
 I am unable to report the exact numlier of casualties in the command, 
 
Campaign up the Tennessee. 125 
 
 but from the best information I have been able to obtain there were fifteen 
 officers and about one hundred and thirty enlisted men killed and wounded. 
 It was a matter of astonishment to all that so much fighting should occur 
 with so few casualties on our side ; but we acted purely on the defensive, 
 and took advantage of the nature of the country as Ijest we could. From 
 actual personal observation where we had driven the enemy from the field, 
 and from what my surgeons, left with our wounded, learned in relation 
 to the loss of the enemy, I am convinced that we killed more of his men than 
 we lost in both killed and wounded. 
 
 Previous to the surrender, we had captured and paroled about two 
 hundred prisonei-s, and had lost about the same number in consequence of the 
 animals giving out, and the men, unable to keep up, broke down from 
 exhaustion, and were necessarily picked up by the enemy ; but in no case 
 was the enemy able to capture a single man in any skirmish or battle within 
 my knowledge. 
 
 I deem it proper to mention the barbarous treatment my wounded 
 received at the hands of the enemy. Owing to the nature of the service 
 we were performing, we were compelled to leave our wounded behind. I 
 provided for them as best I could by leaving them blankets and such rations 
 as we had, and two of my surgeons remained behind to attend them ; but 
 no sooner did the enemy get possession of our hospitals than they robbed 
 both officers and men of their blankets, coats, hats, boots, shoes, rations, 
 and money. The medical stores and instruments were taken from the sur- 
 geons, and my wounded left in a semi-naked and starving condition, in some 
 instances many miles from any inhabitants, to perish. 
 
 Many thanks to the Union ladies of that country, for they saved 
 many a brave soldier from a horrible death. 
 
 In reviewing the history of this ill-fated expedition, I am convinced 
 that had we been furnished at Nashville with 800 good horses, instead of 
 poor, young mules, we would have been successful, in spite of all other 
 drawbacks ; or if General Dodge had succeeded in detaining Forrest one 
 day longer, we would have been successful even with our poor outfit. 
 
 A. D. Stbeight, 
 Colonel Fifty-first Indiana Veteran Volunteer Infantry. 
 
 On m}' return, I dispatched Colonel Cornyn with his Brigade 
 to the attack of the force of the enemy that I had located near 
 Tupelo, Miss. He tells the story of his hattle better than I can, in 
 his official report, which follows : 
 
 We arrived at Tupelo on Tuesday, May 5, and here we fought the 
 best-contested fight of the whole expedition. Just before entering the town 
 of Tupelo, and to the east of the railroad, it is necessary to cross a dense 
 and almost impassable swamp, on the western edge of which runs Old Town 
 Creek. We had almost reached the western edge, and were approaching, 
 as well as the nature of the swamp would permit, the bridge over this 
 creek, when the enemy, entirely unseen by us, opened upon us with mus- 
 ketry. I immediately threw out to my right and left several squadrons of 
 the Tenth Missouri, who succeeded in dislodging the enemy, and securing 
 an easy passage of the bridge for the balance of the command. Still keeping 
 my skirmishers out to my right and left, and an advance guard in front. I 
 moved down a lane to the left and south of the town and massed my 
 command in an open field, about six hundred yards from the southern border 
 of Tupelo. Here word was brought me from one of my skirmishing squad- 
 rons that the enemy were drawn up in line on their front, to the number of 
 six hundred. I ordered two squadrons of the Seventh Kansas, that were 
 armed with Colt's revolving rifles, to dismount and attack them on foot, 
 supporting them with two scpiadrons of the Tenth Missouri (mounted), 
 
126 Campaigx up the Texxessee. 
 
 under Lieutenant-Colonel Bowen. with orders to charge with the saber as 
 soon as the enemy's line should break. This order, I am proud to say, was 
 well obeyed and gallantly executed by both the mounted and dismounted 
 soldiers, for the enemy retired, and for a few minutes all was silent along 
 the lines. In about half an hour from the first attack, sharp firing was 
 heard on my front, and the enemy was advancing toward us wnth yells. 
 I immediately moved my whole force to the rear and west of the village, 
 and, placing my mountain howitzers upon the brow of a hill, I sent forward 
 all the cavalry except one squadron of the Fifteenth Illinois, which I 
 ordered to dismount and support the battery. Lieutenant-Colonel Phillips, 
 commanding the Ninth Illinois Mounted Infantry, having been detailed for 
 that purpose early in the morning, acted as the rear guard and guard for the 
 train, and, knowing that the rear was in such good hands, I felt no 
 anxiety on that account : and this important trust was well sustained. As 
 soon as my front had become fully engaged with the enemy, who fought 
 with considerable' determination. I ordered the battery to shell the woods 
 from which the enemy was emerging. This fire was effective, and from 
 that moment the battle became general. At one time two regiments of 
 mounted infantry, commanded by the rebel General Ruggles, forced their 
 way between my fighting column and my reserve, but were suddenly induced 
 to retire much more rapidly than they came. My left at one time fell 
 back toward the battery, which then poured charge after charge of canister 
 into the rebel ranks, with considerable effect, forcing them to retreat, 
 rapidly followed by the cavalry. The enemy had scarcely begun to waver 
 when his whole force fled in dismay, throwing away their arms, coats, and 
 hats. We took from the enemy eighty-one prisoners, including three com- 
 missioned officers. On the field, the scene of the battle, immense quantities 
 of arms, coats, and blankets were found and destroyed b.v us. I had no 
 means of ascertaining the enemy's loss in killed and wounded, but from the 
 evidence of the battle-field it must have been heavy. 
 
 Florence M. Corxyj^. 
 Colonel Tenth Missouri Caralrii. Commanding Cavalry Brigade. 
 
 Colonel Cornyn was a very efficient cavalry officer and always 
 accomplished whatever he was sent to do. He was an aggressive 
 fighter, always attacking, no matter what the force before him, 
 and had won a deserved standing as a Brigade commander. When 
 he was killed, by his Lieutenant-Colonel, Bowen, during the latter's 
 trial before a court-martial on charges preferred by Colonel Cormn, 
 there was a bitter personal dispute and enmity between them 
 which came to this sad ending. 
 
THE ARMY OF THE TENNESSEE 
 
 Address to the Army of the Tennessee 
 
 Delivered at the National Encampment, G. A. R. 
 Washington, D. C, October, 1902 
 
 By Major-General Grenville M. Dodge 
 
 Coiiiradcs of ilie- Army of the Tennessee: 
 
 On the 28th of August, 18G1, General U. S. Grant was as- 
 signed to duty in command of the District of Southeast Missouri, 
 with headquarters at Cairo, 111., and here commenced the organiza- 
 tion and growth of the Army of the Tennessee. It remained under 
 his personal command, or as a uwit of his great Army, from the 
 beginning until the end of the war. except for two short intervals, 
 one after the great Battle of Donelson, and the other after the great- 
 er Battle of Shiloh, both of which he won, and gave the first great 
 light and hope to our country; and it is hard noAv, after reading 
 all the records, to understand the reasons for his being relieved. It 
 appears to have been done through a misunderstanding, and with no 
 intention of doing injustice to General Grant. 
 
 Following General Grant as commander came General Sher- 
 man, a member of the Army almost as long as General Grant. Gen- 
 eral Sherman was in direct command, or the Army served under 
 him as a unit of his greater Army, from the time he assumed com- 
 mand until the end of the war. 
 
 After General Sherman came General McPherson, that ideal 
 soldier, who commanded the Army until he fell in the great Battle 
 of Atlanta, on the 22d of July. Upon his death, General Logan 
 took command of the Army, as the senior officer present, and at the 
 end of the battle of July 22d he could say that he had met and de- 
 feated Hood's whole Army in the greatest battle of that campaign. 
 
 Following General Logan came General 0. 0. Howard, the 
 only General taken from another Army to command it in all the 
 history of the Army of the Tennessee, or even any of its Corps. 
 
130 The Army of the Tennessee. 
 
 The next day after assuming command General Howard led the 
 Anny into the great battle of the 28th of July, Avhich the Confed- 
 erates said was not a battle, but a simple killing and slaughtering 
 of their forces. He remained in command until the end of the Re- 
 bellion, and at the end of the war generously gave way to General 
 Logan, so that one of its original members might command it at 
 the great review here in Washington — an act that could come only 
 from such a just and thoughtful soldier as Howard. 
 
 I speak of our Army's commanders first, as an Army takes its 
 habits and character from its head ; and probably no other Army in 
 the world was so fortunate as to have always at its head great sol- 
 diers and great commanders, recognized as such the world over — 
 two of them the peers of any commander that ever stood up in a 
 great conflict. 
 
 The Army of the Tennessee covered more ground in its cam- 
 paigns than all the other Armies combined, and all its campaigns 
 were marked by some great struggle, battle, or movement that chal- 
 lenged the admiration of the world. First came Fort Donelson, 
 next Vicksburg, and following that Chattanooga, where it fought on 
 both flanks in that great battle, one Division taking the point of 
 Lookout Mountain above the clouds. Then came the Atlanta cam- 
 paign; following that the strategical march to the sea ; and, finally, 
 that bold movement from Savannah to Goldsboro, which is consid- 
 ered by the best critics as one of the boldest and best-planned cam- 
 paigns of history — one in which every chance was taken, and every 
 opportunity given the enemy to concentrate upon an inferior force. 
 
 The record of this Army is probably the most satisfactory of 
 any that ever existed, as it was harmonious in all its parts and had 
 no jealousies, each of its units to the best of its ability helping the 
 others. Again, it was modest; it struck blow after blow, and let 
 the world sing its praises. All its campaigns were great successes, 
 and it never lost a battle. All its Army, Corps, Division, and Bri- 
 gade commanders were exceptionally able men, and were seldom 
 relieved except to assume more important commands. Its experi- 
 ences were more varied than any other Army, for in its campaigns, 
 battles, and marches, reaching from the Missouri Eiver to the At- 
 lantic, at Washington, over a territory two thousand miles long and 
 five hundred miles wide, it opened the Mississippi, it forced its way 
 to the sea, it M-as reviewed by the Government of the nation here 
 in this citv. and it disbanded and the men went to their homes 
 
The Army of the Tennessee. 131 
 
 \\athout causing an unpleasant comment or a painful thought in 
 all this broad land. 
 
 The Society of the Arm\- of the Tennessee is. endeavoring to 
 perpetuate its history and memories by erecting here in this capital 
 of our great nation monuments to the memory of its dead com- 
 manders which will place before the world not only their deeds, but 
 the great events in which our Army took so important a part. 
 First came General McPherson, as he was the first to fall, in the 
 great Battle of Atlanta. He fell just after watching the attack 
 in the rear on the Sixteenth Army Corps, which held the key to the 
 situation. He was a dear friend of mine; and the last words he 
 spoke were in praise of the fighting of that Corps. General Sher- 
 man, in reporting his death, spoke of him as follows : 
 
 General McPherson fell in battle, booted and spurred, as the gallant 
 and heroic gentleman should wish. Not his the loss, but the country's, and 
 the army will mourn his death and cherish his memory as that of one 
 who, though comparatively young, had risen by his merit and ability to 
 the command of one of the best armies which the nation bad called into 
 existence to vindicate her honor and integrity. History tells of but few 
 who so blended the grace and the gentleness of the friend with the dignity, 
 courage, faith and manliness of the soldier. His public enemies, even the 
 men who directed the fatal shot, never spoke or wrote of him without ex- 
 pressions of marked respect. Those whom he commanded loved him even 
 to idolatry, and I, his associate and commander, fail in words adequate to 
 express my opinion of his great worth. 
 
 General McPherson was so dear to our old Army that the 
 great victory at the Battle of Atlanta was never spoken of by our 
 Army except to express our great grief at the loss of our com- 
 mander. His faith in what he could accomplish Avith our Army was 
 unbounded. He spoke of us on July 4, 1863, as follows : 
 
 With tireless energy, with sleepless vigilance, by night and by day, 
 with battery and with rifle-pits, with trench and mine, you made your sure 
 approaches, until, overcome by fatigue and driven to despair in the attempt 
 to oppose your irresistible progress, the whole garrison of over 30,000 men, 
 with all their arms and munitions of war, have, on this, the anniversary of 
 our National Independence, surrendered to the invincible troops of the 
 Army of the Tennessee. The achievements of this hour will give a new 
 meaning to this memorable day, and Vicksburg will bi-ighten the glow of the 
 patriot's heart which kindles at the mention of Bunker Hill and Yorktown. 
 This is indeed an auspicious day for yon. The God of Battle is with you. 
 The dawn of a conquered peace is breaking upon you. The plaudits of an 
 admiring world will hail you wherever you go, and it will be an ennobling 
 heritage, surpassing all riches, to have been of the Army of the Tennessee 
 on the Fourth of July, 1863. 
 
 Next we erected the statue, facing Pennsylvania Avenue, of 
 General John A. Rawlins, who, above all, represented the organiza- 
 tion and spirit of our great Army, and who shared its fortunes 
 
132 The Army of the Tennessee. 
 
 from beginning to end as Chief of Staif of its first and greatest 
 commander. In 18T3, npou the death of General Eawlins. General 
 John A. Logan spoke of him thus : 
 
 But there is one whose tongue is now still iu death whose name I 
 cannot forbear to mention ; one who. though gone from our midst, is with 
 us in memory: for who can forget John A. Rawlins? Faithful in every 
 duty, true in every trust, though dead he is not forgotten : though gone 
 forever, yet he will ever live in affectionate remembrance in the hearts of 
 all who knew him. His name is woven in indelible colors iu the history 
 of our country, and is liuked with a fame that is undying. 
 
 General Eawlius. in giving a liistorv of the Army of the Ten- 
 nessee, paid this tribute to it : 
 
 In no army did the soldier enjoy greater liberty, consistent with mili- 
 tary discipline, than in the Army of the Tennessee, and in none were his 
 rights and his life more carefully guarded. 
 
 The subordination of the Army of the Tennessee to the policies and 
 acts of the Government affecting the institution of slavery in the prosecution 
 of the war. is worthy of the highest commendation. It had no policy of its 
 own to propose, but went forth, as expressed by the legislative branch of 
 the Government, to do battle iu no spirit of oppression, or for any purpose 
 of conquest or subjugation, or purpose of overthrowing or interfering with 
 the rights or established institutions of the States in rebellion ; but to defend 
 and maintain the supremacy of the constitution, and to preserve the Union 
 with all the dignity, equality and rights of the several States unimpaired. 
 
 The Army of the Tennessee did great deeds in all the departments of 
 the States' service, and individually and collectively illustrated in a peculiar 
 manner the qualities of noble American character which gained success in 
 the field, preserved its fruits by subsequent statesmanship, and by exalted 
 virtue crowned victory with the attributes of peace and justice. 
 
 In April, 1900. we unveiled the beautiful and life-like monu- 
 ment to General John A. Logan, that brilliant, magnetic soldier, 
 our comrade from Cairo to Louisville. Of him, at the unveiling, 
 President McKinley spoke as follo-ws : 
 
 Logan's career was unique. His distinction does not rest upon his 
 military achievements alone. His services in the Legislature of his own 
 State, in the National House of Representatives, aud in the Senate of the 
 United States, would have given him an equally conspicuous place in the 
 annals of the country. He was great in the forum and in the field. 
 
 He came out of the war with the highest military honors of the volun- 
 teer soldier. Brilliant in battle and strong in military council, his was also 
 the true American spirit, for when the war was ended he was quick and 
 eager to return to the peaceful pursuits of civil life. 
 
 General Logan's love and devotion to us only ended with his 
 life, and at one of our reunions he characterized our work thus : 
 
 The Army of the Tennessee was not limited in its scope ; the theater 
 of its operations and the extent of its marches, comprehending within their 
 bounds an area greater than Greece aud Macedonia in their palmiest days, 
 and greater than most of the leading kingdoms of Europe at the present day, 
 reached from the Missouri River on the north nearly to the Gulf of Mexico 
 on the south, and from the Red River of Louisiana to the Atlantic Ocean. 
 
The Army of the Texnessek. 133 
 
 The friendship and loyalty of Sliennan to Grant was the first 
 great cause of tlie success of both, and for the harmony that exist- 
 ed in the Array of the Tennessee. Sherman fell under the com- 
 mand of Grant at Paducah, in the spring of 1862, holding a small 
 command. He was the ideal soldier, as he dropped from a Depart- 
 ment and Army commander to that of a post, and later a Division, 
 without a murmur. Sherman's first words to Grant, on February 
 15, 1862, were these : 
 
 I should like to hear from you, aud will do everything in my power 
 to hurry forward to you reinforcements and supplies, and if I could be of 
 service 'myself would gladly come without making any question of rank with 
 you or General Smith, whose commissions are of the same date. 
 
 On the same date he wrote again : 
 
 Command me in any way. I feel anxious about you, as I know the 
 great facilities they [the enemy] have of concentration, by means of the 
 river and railroads, but have faith in you. 
 
 The monument to our old commander, General Sherman, is 
 nearly complete. It is upon these grounds we expect to unveil 
 it next October, and, as President of the Society of the Army of 
 the Tennessee, and as President of the Commission which has in 
 charge the erection of the monument, I give you a cordial invita- 
 tion to be present. You will receive due notice, and proper arrange- 
 ments will be made for the occasion, and you will meet here your 
 comrades of the Armies of the Cumberland, the Potomac, and the . 
 Ohio, who have already signified their intention of being present to 
 honor the memory of our old commander. 
 
 And now, my comrades, it is with the greatest satisfaction that 
 I sav to you that after seven years' continued effort, this year we 
 obtained an appropriation from Congress of $250,000 to be used 
 in the erection of a monument upon these grounds to General U. S. 
 Grant, (and the model for it will soon be selected,) to this modest, 
 charitable, and just soldier and statesman. The whole world has 
 o;iven its tribute. From those whom we fought and defeated have 
 come the most gallant words of praise and touching sympathy. 
 President Lincoln, above all others, recognized his power and ability 
 Avhen he handed him his commission and gave him command of all 
 the Armies, and assured him that he should not in any way inter- 
 fere with him.— armed him with all the powers of the President, 
 with carte blanche to use them as he saw fit. Grant made his an- 
 swer at Appomattox, bringing peace to our nation and gratitude to 
 tlie conquered. General Grant was a man of few words, and when 
 
134 The Army of the Tennessee. 
 
 called upon to speak of the Arm}' of the Tennessee^, paid it this 
 
 tribute : 
 
 As au Army, the Army of the Tennessee never sustained a siniile de- 
 feat during four years of war. Every fortification which it assailed sur- 
 rendered. Every force arrayed against it was either defeated, captured, or 
 destroyed. No officer was ever assigned to the command of that Army who 
 had afterwards to be relieved from it. or to be reduced to another command. 
 Such a history is not accident. 
 
 And now, my comrades, one of our number who has left us by 
 an assassin's hand, wdiose heart, words and acts were ever for us, 
 who from a Major in our Army became the best-loved President 
 of our nation, Comrade William McKinley, at one of our gather- 
 ings paid this tribute to you : 
 
 It is recorded that in eighteen months' service the Army of the Ten- 
 nessee captured 80,000 men, witli flags and arms, including 600 guns — a 
 greater force than was engaged on either side in the terrible battle of Chick- 
 amauga. From the fields of triumph in the Mississippi Valley it turned its 
 footsteps towards the eastern seaboard, brought relief to the forces at Chat- 
 tanooga and Nashville, pursued that peerless campaign from Atlanta to the 
 seaboard under the leadership of the glorious Sherman, and planted the 
 banners of final victory on the parapets of Fort McAllister. • 
 
 It is said that the old Army of the Tennessee never lost a battle and 
 never surrendered a flag. Its Corps badges — '"forty rounds" of the Fifteenth 
 Corps ; the fleeting arrow of the Seventeenth Corps ; the disc, from which 
 four bullets have been cut, of the Sixteenth Corps — are all significant of 
 the awful business of cruel war, all of them suggestive of the missiles of 
 death. 
 
 It gave the Federal Army Grant, Sherman, and Sheridan ; McPherson, 
 Howard, Blair, Logan, Hazen. John E. Smith, C. F. Smith. Halleck, Raw- 
 lins. Prentiss. Wallace. Porter, Force, Leggett, Noyes, Hickenlooper, C. 
 C. Walcutt, and your distinguished President, who flamed out the very 
 incarnation of soldierly valor before the eyes of the American people ; all 
 have a secure place in history and a secure one in the hearts of their coun- 
 trymen. 
 
 On this anniversary, as my closing words to you, two verses of 
 
 General John Tilson's tribute are most api)ropriate : 
 
 Ho I comrades of the brave old band, we gather here once more, 
 With smiling eye and clasping hand, to fight our battles o'er. 
 To quaff from out the brimming cup of old-time memory. 
 And bright relight the pathway of our old Tennessee. 
 As myriad sparks of war's romance our meetings warm inspire ; 
 The heady fight, the anxious march, the jolly bivouac fire ; 
 The days of doubt, of hope, of care, of danger, and of glee : 
 Oh, what a world of racy thought illumines Tennessee ! 
 
 Our roster thins ; as years pass on we drop off one by one ; 
 Ere long, too soon, to yearly call, there will be answer — none ; 
 Then as along the record page these mourning columns creep. 
 The whisper comes to closer still our living friendships keep. 
 Another thought we forward cast to that not distant day, 
 When left of all our gallant band will be one veteran gray, 
 And here's to him who meets alone — wherever he may be. 
 The last, the lone survivor of the grand old Tennessee. 
 
2<^ 
 
THE CAMPAIGN IN THE WEST 
 
 Address to the Army of the South-West 
 
 AT National Encampment, G. A. R. 
 
 Washington, D. C. 
 
 October, 1902 
 
 My connection with the United States forces west of the Mis- 
 sissippi River commenced at the beginning of the war, when I took 
 my Regiment, the Fonrth Iowa, to St. Louis, and fell under the 
 command of Fremont. I took part in the campaigns of that 
 Department until after the Battle of Pea Ridge, when I left the 
 command and went to the Army of the Tennessee. After the At- 
 lanta campaign, in Xovember, 1864, I returned to Missouri as 
 commander of that Department and Army. 
 
 Of the transactions of the troops south of Missouri I have 
 very little knowledge; but I know that the troops which served 
 west of the Mississippi never had credit for the amount of work, 
 liardships and exposures they endured. Owing to the fact of there 
 having been fought there but two great battles, Wilson's Creek and 
 Pea Ridge, and two minor ones, what they did was swallowed up 
 in the great events that occurred east of tlie Mississippi. Even 
 Pope's campaign openin-r up a portion of the ]\Iississi|)j)i is hardly 
 ever spoken of. 
 
 The Battle of Wilson's Creek, the first signal contest west of 
 the Mississippi, was fought l^efore my command reached St. Louis. 
 The history of that battle, and the credit that is due to the com- 
 mander of that Army, General Lyon, and his men, are well known. 
 There participated in the battle many officers who were afterwards 
 greatly distinguished ; among them Schofield, Sturgis, Hunter, and 
 others. It was the first battle that called attention to the West, 
 and to the troops west of the Mississippi. That battle was lost be- 
 cause a portion of the command did not comprehend and fulfill 
 General Lyon's orders. Tliis mistake would have been overcome if 
 
 — 137— 
 
138 The Campaigx in the West. 
 
 it had not been for the loss in the battle of its commander, Gen- 
 eral Lyon. But the fighting of the troops and the boldness of the 
 movement immediately attracted the attention of the country, and 
 held it until after the battle of Pea Eidge. 
 
 The Army of the Southwest, which General Curtis command- 
 ed, and which traveled three hundred miles from its base without 
 water or rail communication, and lived off a barren country, and 
 which fought that decisive Battle of Pea Eidge and cleared the 
 country until nearly the end of the war of any organized force of 
 the enemy, had more marching and endured more suffering than 
 the great Armies I was connected with east of the Mississippi, and 
 its three days' fighting at Pea Eidge compared favorably with any 
 of our battles, when the numbers engaged are considered. 
 
 Then again, at the end of the war, the sufferings of the troops 
 that I took onto the plains in the Indian campaigns in the win- 
 ters of 186-1-5, 1865-6, were far beyond any of the sufEerings of any 
 of our Armies during the Civil War. Their exposures through the 
 cold weather, and the brutalities and butcheries of the Indians, 
 which it was impossible for them to avenge or retaliate, were be- 
 yond description. 
 
 Our early campaign in Missouri was without previous experi- 
 ence. It was simply one soldier standing up against another in 
 battle, and we had to learn all the tricks of camp life, and from ex- 
 perience how to take care of our soldiers. 
 
 There were a great many funny incidents in the Pea Eidge 
 campaign. The Southwestern Army ^^•as organized at Eolla, Mis- 
 souri, of which post I was in command. My quartermaster was 
 Captain Philip H. Sheridan, and my commissary. Captain M. P. 
 Small. No one who knew or saw Sheridan then thought of the 
 great position he was to occupy in our Army, but when he took 
 hold of that Army and stripped it and fed it, three hundred miles 
 away from rail or water communication, we all knew that his was a 
 master-mind. When he came to me at Eolla, the first order he 
 gave was to take away about three-quarters of our transportation. 
 I think we had about two wagons to the company, and ho brought 
 us down to about four to a regiment. You can all appreciate the 
 rebellion I had on my hands when I undertook to enforce his order. 
 I know he stood by and watched to see what I was going to do. 
 Every Eegimont and Command entered a protest, and said some 
 very unkind tilings of him. denomicing him as a regular officer who 
 
The Campaign ix the West. 139 
 
 had no mere}' upon a volunteer; but I had then had experience 
 enough to appreciate our necessities, and started in by stripping my 
 own Eegiment, and then enforcing the orders upon the others. We 
 were not long on that march before they appreciated the foresight 
 of Sheridan. He had great energy and great resources. He had 
 to run all the mills along our line of march; he had to forage in 
 every direction, and the punishment that he gave to some of the 
 people to make them tell where their horses, forage and sweet pota- 
 toes were hidden would astonish those of our people who have been 
 so horrified at tlie mild persuasions used for similar purposes in 
 the Philippines. 
 
 To show you liow little we knew of war on our first march, in 
 January, 1862, from Eolla to Springfield, Missouri, all the reports 
 we had obtained were that Price and his Army were in Springfield. 
 The troops of our Army were divided into two commands, those 
 under Siegel, composed of two Divisions, commanded by Osterhaus 
 and Asboth, mostly Germans, and two Divisions of Americans com- 
 manded by Colonel Jeff C. Davis and Colonel E. A. Carr. I com- 
 manded a Brigade on the extreme left in Carr's Division, and, in 
 accordance with instructions, put out a company in front of me 
 as skirmishers. It was dark, and impossible for us to see much, 
 and the first thing I knew I had lost my skirmishers, and was in 
 great distress until about daylight in the morning, when, while 
 Siegel's guns and our own were booming away at Springfield, my 
 company came back mounted on Confederate horses and mules — old 
 hacks that the enemy had left behind them — and brought us news 
 that there was no enemy in Springfield, and had not been for two or 
 three days. 
 
 As we marched along towards Pea Ridge through the country. 
 Price's Army faced us with a rear guard only, his main body keep- 
 ing a long distance ahead of us. At every stream they would halt 
 our advance, and move out a couple of pieces of their artillery, and 
 ])ut out a strong skirmish-line, which would force our Army into 
 line, thinking we were going to have a battle. My Brigade led the 
 advance most of the time on that march, and as soon as they 
 would line up the officers would have the boys strip. They would 
 throw down their chickens, sweet potatoes, and everything they had 
 gathered, and by the time they had gone forward, and the enemy 
 had run. the Thirty-sixth Illinois, or some other Regiment, would 
 come up and gobble what they had left. About the third time we 
 
^ a 
 
 1^ •- bo 
 
 
 1^^ 
 
 3 5 
 
 
TiiK Ca:\ipaigx ix the West. 141 
 
 lined up I discovered that every boy was hanging on to his chickens, 
 sweet potatoes, and provender, and when I gave orders to the Col- 
 onels to have them throw them aside, the boys made answer: "jSTo 
 you don't, Colonel ! Youtan't fool ns any more; we have fed those 
 Thirty-sixth Illinois fellows as long as we propose to." 
 
 At Pea Eidge we were surrounded by Van Dorn, who placed 
 Price's two Divisions in our rear, and he himself on our right flank 
 with McCullough and Mcintosh's Divisions. The great Pea Piidge 
 divided his Army, so it was impossible for one part to support the 
 other. His Army was twice as large as that of Curtis, and the 
 fact that it was divided enabled Curtis to whip his Army in detail, 
 so that Van Dorn's Army was virtually whipped before Curtis got 
 his entire force into the field, Siegel only coming into battle after 
 Van Dorn's Arkansas force had left for the South, Jeff C. Davis's 
 Division having killed its two Division commanders, and Van Dorn 
 had given Price orders to get out the best way he could, which 
 forced him to retreat to the east towards WTiite River. 
 
 After the Pea Ridge campaign the Battle of Prairie Grove was 
 fought, under ihe command of General F. C. Herring, who was 
 Lieutenant-Colonel of the Ninth Iowa Infantry in the Battle of 
 Pea Ridge. As it was not in my command I have no knowledge of 
 the detail of it ; but from the reports it evidently was a sharp fight. 
 
 In the spring of 1865 Jeff C. Thompson and his command sur- 
 rendered to me on the Arkansas line. His command consisted of 
 six thousand men, but he found he could not gather them, and 
 claimed that not half of his command was present. AVhen I asked 
 him how it was possible to get them all together, he suggested that 
 I should send them rations. I therefore loaded two steamers from 
 St. Louis, and sent them around by the White River, and Thomp- 
 son issued his celebrated order bringing the men all in, and there 
 was gathered about twice the number he had present when he sur- 
 rendered to my forces. When asked for his transportation he said 
 that he would show it, to me, and out of the rivers and bayous he 
 run down about one hundred canoes and flats, as the transportation 
 he had to move his army with. It was at this time that he made 
 that celebrated speech. When his soldiers came in without bring- 
 ing their guns, as he had instructed them to do, bringing along old 
 shot-gims and muskets that were of no use, he said if they were not 
 satisfied with the generosity of this Government they should emi- 
 grate to Mexico, and he denounced more than half of them as being 
 
142 The Campaign ix the West. 
 
 soldiers whom he had never seen, stating that they had st<i3'ed in 
 the hrusli and along the river-banks in Arkansas nutil the moss 
 had grown npon their heads and backs. From this speech of his 
 came the celebrated saying of "■'moss-baclv?.'" 
 
 A part of my Corps fought under that gallant General. A. J. 
 Smith, in the Banks campaign up the Eed Eiver, and there is no 
 doubt but that his generalship and the fighting of the two Divi- 
 sions of the Sixteentli Corps saved that Army from a great defeat. 
 The commander of one of his Divisions, General T. E. G. Eansom, 
 was a school*mate of mine, and. afterwards came to me in the Atlan- 
 ta campaign and commanded a Division under me in the Sixteenth 
 Corps. 
 
 "Wlien I look at the history of all of the operations west of the 
 Mississippi Eiver. and see their results, it is a great gratification 
 to me to know tliat all the campaigns, except possibly the one of 
 Banks, were victories for our side. 
 
 ^^^len I returned, to the command of the Department of the 
 Missouri, in Xovember, 186-i, I found all the Indian tribes on the 
 plains at war, occupying all the lines of communication through to 
 the Pacific, and there was a great demand from the people upon 
 the Government that those lines should be opened. General Grant 
 sent a dispatch, asking if a campaign upon the plains could be made 
 in the winter. Having spent eight or ten years of my life upon the 
 plains before the war. I answered that it could, if the troops Avere 
 properly fed and clothed. His answer to that was to place all the 
 plains and Indian tribes within my command, instructing me to 
 make an immediate campaign against them, and I had. therefore, 
 to move the troops that Avere at Leavenworth, Fort Eiley. and other 
 points, onto the plains in mid-winter, and I think it was the Eleventh 
 Kansas that had thirteen men frozen to death on the march 
 to Fort Kearney. Those troops on that winter march up and down 
 those stage- and telegraph-lines, in forty days opened them up. re- 
 paired the telegraph, and had the stages running. Then came the 
 longer campaign of the next simimer and next fall, where Gen- 
 eral Cole's command suffered so much, and also where General Con- 
 ner fought the Battle of Tongue Eiver. I remember of the Indians 
 capturing a company of Michigan troops that were guarding a 
 train that was going to Fort Halleck. loaded vrith. rations and bacon. 
 They tied some of the soldiers to the wheels of the wagons, piled the 
 bacon around the wagons, and burned them up. A band of this 
 
The Campaign ix the West. 143 
 
 party of Indians was captured by a battalion of Pawnees, who were 
 far north of them and got on their trail and surrounded the band 
 that had committed these atrocities. The chief of them, an old 
 man. came fontard and S|X)ke to Major North, who commanded 
 the Pawnees, and holding his hand up to his mouth he said that he 
 was full of white men up to here, and was ready to die. The In- 
 dians virtually cleaned out the white people along the stage-lines 
 they captured. I took from them a great many of their prisoners 
 in the fall of 1865, when they came into Laramie to make peace, and 
 the stories of the suffering of the women were such that it would be 
 impossible to relate them. 
 
 In connection with this campaign on the plains, it is a singular 
 fact that nearly three thousand Confederates took part. When 
 I took command at St. Louis I found the prisons full of Confederate 
 prisoners. The war was then virtually at its end, and they were 
 very anxious to be relieved from prison life, and as we needed forces 
 on the plains, I obtained authority from the War Department to 
 organize what was known as the L'nited States Volunteers, and 
 filled the regiments with these Confederate soldiers, placing (jver 
 them as officers, men and officers selected from our own command, 
 and thus organized a ver\- effective force, which did excellent service 
 on the plains, three-quarters of which remained in that cotmtry 
 after the war was over. 
 
pqsc 
 
 
A TALK TO OLD COMRADES 
 
 Address to Sixteenth Army Corps 
 
 Delivered at the National Encampment, G. A. R. 
 Washington, D. C, October, 1902 
 
 By Major-General Grenville M. Dodge 
 
 Comrades of the Sixteenth Army Corps: 
 
 The Sixteenth Army Corps was organized Deeeml:)er 18th, 
 186?, and formed into two wings. General A. J. Smith command- 
 ed the right wing, and General G. M. Dodge the left wing of the 
 Corps. The left wing was organized with tlie Corps, the right 
 wing a year or more afterwards. The Corps, as a body, was never 
 together, though it probably took part in more widely separated 
 fields than any other Corps in the Army of the Tennessee. The 
 right wing, under General Smith, was in the Vicksburg campaign, 
 and after tliat it went to the Department of the Gulf, and was with 
 General Banks in his movement up Red River, and saved that Army 
 from defeat; of this there is no doubt. After that, it was sent 
 after Forrest, and it was the only command that I know of that 
 cauglit and whipped him. Tlie left wing overtook General Forrest 
 at Town Creek, in 1803, in its march to Decatur in the rear of 
 Bragg's Army, but he did not stay long enough for us to get a good 
 fight out of him. 
 
 From the campaign after Forrest, General Smith's command 
 was sent to the Department of the Missouri to drive out Price. 
 Tliere I found them, in December, 1864, when I took command of 
 that Department, in a deplorable condition, — without clothing, 
 shoes, or camp equipage. Under an order from General Grant, I 
 sent tlieni to Xashville, with all the force in my department, some 
 twenty thousand men all told, to help General Thomas, and I sent 
 them everything they needed to clothe and equip them. You all 
 remember how you were frozen in on the Mississippi, and had to 
 take tlio ears. One of the pleasantest recollections of my life is 
 
 —145— 
 
146 A Talk to Old Comrades. 
 
 that I received a letter from General Smith, thanking me for appre- 
 ciating their condition, and having in Nashville when they arrived, 
 everything they needed. He said that it was the first time they 
 had been treated decently, and they were thankful they had fallen 
 into the hands of some one who appreciated them. 
 
 At the Battle of Xashville it was General Smith, with the 
 right wing of the Sixteenth Corps, and the troops of the Depart- 
 ment of the Missouri, that turned the left flank of Hood's Army, 
 and was practically in his rear when stopped ; and I have heard 
 many officers who were there say that if he had been let alone he 
 would have captured or destroyed that Aving of the Army. Thus 
 ended the eventful career of the right wing, and its fortunes were 
 cast with the Army of the Cumberland in its chase after Hood. 
 
 Tbe left wing was organized from the troops I commanded in 
 the District of Corinth, and had in it the old Second Division of 
 the Army of the' Tennessee that Grant organized at Cairo, that 
 fought at Belmont, Henry and Donelson, Shiloh, and the two 
 Corinths. It had on its banners, "First at Donelson." I took 
 command right after the Battle of Corinth, where it had been cen- 
 sured by Eosecrans and praised by Grant for the part it took in 
 the Battle of Corinth. General Grant held us at Corinth as a pro- 
 tection to his communications while the campaign against Vicks- 
 Inu'g was going on. In a letter to me he said he had left us there 
 to protect that flank, for he knew that if Bragg endeavored to break 
 that line Ave Avould stay; so you see he still had faith in his old 
 Division. From Corinth we marched Avith Sherman in his cele- 
 brated trip from Memphis to Chattanooga. We wintered on the 
 line, and rebuilt the Nashville and Decatur Eoad, and in his 
 Memoirs General Grant, after describing the condition of the Army, 
 and the necessity for rebuilding the railway from Nashville to De- 
 catur, speaks thus of the Avork of the Sixteenth Army Corps : 
 
 General Dodge had no tools to work with except those of the pioneer — 
 axes, picks, and spades. With these he was enabled to intrench his men, 
 and protect them against surprise from small parties of the enemy, and, 
 as he had no base of supplies until the road could be completed back to 
 Nashville, the first matter to consider, after protecting his men. was the 
 getting in of food and forage from the surrounding country. He had his 
 men and teams bring in all the grain they could find, or all they needed, 
 and all the cattle for beef, and such other food as could be found. Millers 
 were detailed from the ranks to run the mills along the line of the army. 
 Where they were not near enough to the troops for protection they were 
 taken down and mox^ed up to the line of the road. Blacksmith shops, with 
 all the iron and steel found in them, were used up in like manner. Black- 
 
A Talk to Old Comrades. 147 
 
 smiths were detailed and set to work making the tools necessary in railroad 
 and bridge building. Axemen were at work getting out timber for bridges, 
 and cutting fuel for locomotives and cars. Thus every branch of railroad 
 building, making tools to work with, and supplying the workmen with food, 
 was all going on at once, and without the aid of a mechanic or workman 
 except what the command itself furnished. General Dodge had the work 
 assigned to him finished within forty days after receiving his orders. The 
 number of bridges to rebuild was 182, many of them over deep and wide 
 chasms. The length of road repaired was 102 miles. 
 
 I only quote a small part of what General Grant says in this 
 connection, to show you that while the Sixteenth Corps had its 
 share of figlitina-. and praise for it, still it was a Corps that Grant 
 called upon in an emergency, and when he wanted great deeds done ; 
 and proves not only what they could turn their hands to when 
 necessary, but is also a sample of what our great army was made of. 
 
 In the spring of 1864 we became a part of the great Army in 
 the Atlanta campaign. When we arrived at Chattanooga, on the 
 5th of May, I called at General Sherman's headquarters. General 
 McPherson, our Army Commander, was there. Sherman said to 
 him: "You had better send Dodge to take Ship's Gap." "^Vlly, 
 General," replied McPherson, "that is thirty miles away, and 
 Dodge's troops are not yet unloaded, and he has no transportation 
 with him." Sherman said : "Let him try it. and have the trans- 
 portation follow." We struck out, and that night at midnight 
 Sprague's Brigade of the Fourth Division of the Sixteenth Corps 
 had gained the Gap. The enemy appeared the next morning. 
 This opened the way through Snake Creek Gap, planting us in 
 the rear of Johnston's Army, and forcing him to abandon his 
 impregnable position at Dalton. 
 
 Our battles in the Atlanta campaign were those of the Army 
 of the Tennessee. The left wing received continual commendation 
 until the great battle of the 22d, when it happened to l)e in the 
 rear of our Army, and received and defeated the celebrated move- 
 ment of Hood to our rear. Sprague's Brigade fought all day at 
 Decatur, and saved our trains. In the battle 'of the 22d of July 
 we had only five thousand men in line, but met and repulsed three 
 Divisions of Hardee's Corps, and McPherson, wdio stood on our 
 riglit and witnessed the fight, watching the charge of Fuller and 
 ^Mersey, and the breaking of two of the enemy's columns, spoke of us 
 in the highest terms, and five minutes later was dead. Our Army, 
 who knew and loved him, never could reconcile ourselves to his 
 o-reat loss. 
 
148 A Talk to Old Comrades. 
 
 The Battle of Atlanta was one of the few battles of the war 
 where the attack on the Sixteenth Army Corps caught it on the 
 march in the rear of the Army, without intrenchments or protec- 
 tion of any kind, both sides fighting in the open. 
 
 In his address describing the battle of the 22d of July, Gen- 
 eral Strong, of General McPherson's staff, says : 
 
 General McPherson and myself, accompanied only by our orderlies, 
 rode out and took position on the right of Dodge's line, and witnessed the 
 desperate assaults of Hood's army. General McPherson's admiration for 
 the steadiness and bravery of the Sixteenth Corps was unbounded. Had the 
 Sixteenth Corps given way the rebel army would have been in the rear 
 of the Seventeenth and Fifteenth Corps, and would have swept like an 
 avalanche over our supply-trains, and the position of the Army of the Ten- 
 nessee would have been vei-y critical. 
 
 General Frank P. Blair pays this tribute to the fighting of the 
 Sixteenth Army Corps, in his official report of the Battle of At- 
 lanta : 
 
 I started to go back to my command, and witnessed the fearful assault 
 made on the Sixteenth Army Corps, and its prompt and gallant repulse by 
 that command. It was a most fortunate circumstance for the whole army 
 that the Sixteenth Army Corps occupied the position I have attempted to 
 describe at the moment of attack ; and, although it does not belong to me to 
 report upon the bearing and conduct of the officers and men of that Corps, 
 still I camiot withhold my expression of admiration for the manner in which 
 this command met and repulsed the repeated and persistent attacks of the 
 enemy. The attack upon our flank and rear was made by the whole of 
 Hardee's corps. 
 
 Under General Howard, a part of the left wing took part in 
 the battle of the 28th of July. On August 19th I was given a Con- 
 federate leave, when that heau-ideal of a soldier, my old schoolmate 
 and comrade, General T. E. G. Eansom, took command of the 
 Corps. The right wing knew him. for he was with you in the Red 
 Eiver campaign. He died on a stretcher in command of the 
 Corps in the chase after Hood. The old Second Division had its 
 innings with General Corse, at Altoona, where the fighting has 
 been immortalized in verse and song. My fortunes took me away 
 to the command of the Army and Department of the Missouri, and 
 the two Divisions of the left wing were merged one into the 
 Fifteenth and the other into the Seventeenth Corps, and, so far as 
 the campaigns were concerned, the Corps fought in two units, 
 the right and left wings, and each was a Corps command. 
 
 The grave of that remarkable soldier. General A. J. Smith, 
 whose distinguished services were so often recognized by Generals 
 Grant and Sherman, has not a stone to designate it. The Society 
 
A Talk to Old Comrades. 149 
 
 of the Annv of the Tennessee is aiding in raising the funds to com- 
 memorate liis memory and deeds by erecting a monument in his 
 home in St. Louis. 
 
 The Sixteenth Army Corps had great opportunities in the 
 campaigns it took part in, and never failed to make the most of 
 them. They went cheerfully to any work assigned to them. They 
 have left in the war records a history that they may well be proud 
 of, and every work they have undertaken has received the strong 
 commendation of their superior officers. 
 
MAJOR-GENERAL GEORGE E. MEAD 
 
 Commander 
 
 Army of the Potomac 
 
 1864 
 
GENERAL GRANT 
 
 Remarks at Army of Potomac Reunion 
 Niagara Falls, N. Y. 
 
 ^Vlien you consider that it is now thirty-three years after the 
 war, that the Government lias published every report, letter and 
 order that was of any moment, you will agree with me that it is 
 difficult to interest an Army audience in talking about another 
 Army, and I shall not detain 3-ou long on that subject. There are, 
 however, some incidents of General Grant's first visit to your 
 Army, his return to ours, and the planning of the grand campaign 
 that was to end the war, that may interest you. 
 
 In December, 1863, after the Battle of Chattanooga, the Army 
 of the Tennessee camped along the railway from Columbia, Tenn., 
 to Decatur and Huntsville, iVla. xifter the Battle of Chattanooga 
 General Grant returned to Nashville and called there to meet 
 him several Corps Commanders of the Army of the Ten- 
 nessee, and General Sheridan of the Army of the Cumberland. 
 If I remember rightly, there were present Generals Grant, Sherman, 
 Sheridan, Granoer, Logan, Eawlins, and myself. All of us of 
 the Army of the Tennessee were a hard-looking crowd. Xone of 
 us had seen Nashville or any base of supplies since we had marched 
 from the Mississippi River to Chattanooga, and we had been hard 
 at work building railways and foraging. We arrived in Nashville 
 late in the afternoon, and General Sherman took us to General 
 Grant's headquarters. General Grant suggested that we should call 
 upon the Military Governor of Tennessee, Andrew Johnson, and pay 
 our respects to him. We, of course, followed General Grant, and 
 were introduced to Governor Johnson. I remember that our uni- 
 forms were greatly worn, one or two of us wearing blouses with 
 Army overcoats, and he looked at us with a very quizzical eye, until 
 General Grant said to excuse us that he had not given us time since 
 we reached the city to change our suits; but Grant knew we'had no 
 
 — 151— 
 
152 Eeunion of Army of Potomac. 
 
 others. Governor Johnson was then a very radical man, and was 
 very emphatic in informing us that while he was Military G-overnor 
 of Tennessee no rebel would receive much consideration from him, 
 and brought his fist down on a piano in the room with such force 
 that the sound from it startled us all, and we left there with the idea 
 that rebels in Tennessee had better get out ; but we soon found that 
 his words were much stronger than his acts, for I hardly ever got 
 my hands on rebel stock or supplies that I did not find Johnson try- 
 ing to pull them off. 
 
 After our visit, General Sherman suggested tbat we should all 
 go to the theater that evening, and under his lead we went to the 
 principal opera house to hear the play of Hamlet. We were all 
 strangers in Nashville; even General Grant was not well known. 
 We paid our way in and found the theater crowded with soldiers 
 going to and returning from veteran furloughs. General Sherman, 
 who you all know was a great lover of the theater, sat alongside of 
 me and soon commenced criticising the play, earnestly protesting 
 that it was being murdered. I had to check him several times and 
 tell him unless he kept quiet the soldiers in the audience would rec- 
 ognize him and there would be a scene. We had entered late, and 
 there soon came on the scene where Hamlet soliloquizes over the 
 skull of Yorick. The audience was perfectly still, endeavoring to 
 comprehend the actor's words, when a soldier far back in the aud- 
 ience rose up and in a clear voice called out, as the actor held up the 
 skull, "Say, pard, what is it, Yank or Eeb?" The house appre- 
 ciated the point and was instantly in an u})roar, and General Grant 
 said we had better leave, so we went quietly out, no one discovering 
 Grant's or Sherman's presence. Sherman immediately suggested 
 that we should find an oyster-house and get something to eat, and 
 General Eawlins was put forward as guide and spokesman. He 
 led us to a very inviting place. We went in and found there was 
 but one large table in the place. There was one man sitting at it, 
 and Eawlins, in his modest wa}^ without informing the man who 
 his ])arty was, asked him if he would change to a smaller table and 
 let us have that one. The man said the table was good enough for 
 him and kept on eating, and Eawlins backed out into the street 
 again. Sherman said if we depended on Eawlins we would get 
 nothing to eat, and said he would see what could be done. He 
 hailed a man who pointed out another saloon kept by a woman, 
 and to this Sherman took us, and she served us what We then con- 
 
Keuniox of Army of Potomac. 153 
 
 sidered a very nice oyster stew. As we sat around the taljle, we 
 talked more than we ate, and by the time we had half finished our 
 supper the woman came in and asked for the pay and said we must 
 leave, as under the military rules her house must close at 12 mid- 
 night and it was then a few minutes after that hour; so out we got 
 and took our way to Grant's headquarters, where we bunked down 
 the best we could during the night. Some of the staff heard of 
 our evening's adventure and gave the news to the press, and the 
 next morning before breakfast all the parties were present to apolo- 
 gize to Grant that tlic)- did not recognize him, as we were out of 
 our own Jurisdiction and in that of the Army of the Cumberland; 
 Init Grant in his modest way satisfied them that he had no com- 
 plaint. However, there poured in on him for all of us complimen- 
 tary tickets and invitations to almost everything in N'ashville. 
 
 After breakfast we all assembled in a large room at head- 
 quarters to hear what General Grant had to say to us. He took up 
 with us the plan for a winter campaign. He pro])Osed himself to 
 take about 30,000 of the troops concentrated at Chattanooga and 
 transport them by the Ohio and Mississippi Eivers to New Orleans, 
 and there take with him the troops of General Canby and go thence 
 to Mobile and attack that place. General Sherman was to go to 
 Memphis, gather up all the forces along the Mississippi River, in- 
 cluding the troops at Vicksburg and Natchez, together with the 
 Seventeenth Corps, and march from Vicksburg to Meridian and 
 thence join Grantat Mobile. I was to take the Sixteenth Corps, which 
 was then located on the line of the Nashville and Decatur road, 
 together with about 10,000 cavalry that General William Sooy 
 Smith had concentrated near Nashville, and sweep down through 
 Alabama, Northern Mississippi, and Western Tennessee, attacking 
 any forces of the enemy that might be met, and destroying all the 
 railroads and provisions that had been stored in that country, this 
 with a view of making it difficult for any of the confederate armies 
 to again occupy the territory, so as to enable Sherman and Grant, 
 when the spring and summer campaign came on, to utilize all the 
 Union troops that had been occupying that country. After the 
 plans were all made and all the arrangements agreed upon. Gen- 
 eral Grant reported them to Washington, but President Lincoln 
 objected because he was afraid, if we took so many troops from 
 Chattanooga, that Longstreet, who was occupying Eastern Tennes- 
 see with his Armv, would return to Chattanooo;a or ^Fiddle Tennes- 
 
154 Reunion of Army of Potomac. 
 
 see and undo all wo had accomplislied in the Battle of Chattanoofia. 
 G-rant had no fear of this, but he made up his mind to go imme- 
 diately to East Tennessee and take the forees there under General 
 Foster, attack and defeat Long-street, and then eome back and 
 carry out his plans. He found after reaching Knoxville that Gen- 
 eral Poster's forces could not be used, so he abandoned the cam- 
 paign, only sending Sherman to Vicksburg, who marched out to 
 Meridian and returned, while the 10,000 cavalry under General 
 William Sooy Snuth, who was to join Sherman overland but 
 failed, was badly defeated by Forrest and had to retreat. 
 
 In March, 186-4, General Grant was called to Washington to 
 be given his commission as Lieutenant-General of the Army and 
 command of all the forces. On his return to Nashville, on March 
 17th, we were again called to meet him. General Grant told us of 
 his visit to Washington, his reception by the President, and all 
 the courtesies that had been paid him. He told us that he accepted 
 the commission of Lieutenant-General and Commander of all the 
 Armies on condition that his plans should not be interfered with 
 at Washington and that he should have the command of. the staff 
 departments of the armies. Those departments had always consid- 
 ered themselves independent of the Commander in the field; in 
 fact, in the beginning of the war the officers of Commissary Quar- 
 ter-Master and Ordnance Departments declined to obey the orders of 
 the commanders they were serving under, except upon the order 
 of their chief in Washington. General Grant settled this. A Com- 
 missary of Subsistence declined to carry out one of his orders, and 
 General Grant said to him that while he could not force him to 
 obey the order, he could relieve him and put in his place one of 
 the line officers who would obey all orders. This officer reported 
 this to Washington and it changed their orders so that they were 
 ordered to obey the orders of the officer in the field and to report 
 their orders to their chiefs in Washington. General Grant said 
 that President Lincoln said in reply to his request for the command 
 of the staff departments that he could not give him that legally ; but, 
 he said, "There is no one but myself that can interfere with your 
 orders; and you can rest assured that I will not do it." We were 
 all anxious to hear of his visit to the Army of the Potomac, and 
 his opinion of it, and Sherman soon got him to talking about it. 
 He said it was the finest Army he had ever seen ; far superior to any 
 of ours in equipment, supplies, and transportation. He said, how^- 
 
IiEUXiox OF Army of Poto.alac. 155 
 
 ever, that the officers he talked with considered he would have a 
 much more difficult problem on his hands than he had had in the 
 West, and he said to Sherman that some officer who both of them 
 knew, but whose name I have forgotten, told him, "^'You have not 
 faced Bobby Lee yet;"' and as he said it, I could see that twinkle 
 in Grant's eye that we often saw there when he meant mischief. 
 Grant, after discussing the Army of the Potomac and having noth- 
 ing but praise for it, informed us that he should make his head- 
 quarters with that Army and leave Sherman to command the 
 Armies of the West, also informing us that he proposed to take sev- 
 eral of us East with him. Sherman protested strongly against this, 
 and it was finally compromised by his taking Sheridan and leaving 
 the rest of us with Sherman. During the two or three days we 
 were with Grant he outlined in a general way his plan of campaign 
 that every Army should move as early as possible in the spring, all 
 on the same day against the enemy, so that Lee and Johnston 
 could not detach any of their commands to reinforce the others. 
 He said, ''I will try to keep Lee from sending any force to John- 
 ston, but," he said to Sherman, "if he does, I will send you two men 
 where he sends one." He also informed us of the necessity of clos- 
 ing the war with this campaign. 
 
 Our visit with Grant ended, he took Sherman as far as Cincin- 
 nati with him, to talk over and complete their plans, while we re- 
 turned to our commands to fit them out for the campaign. Gen- 
 eral Sherman has since pointed out to me in the Burnett House, at 
 Cincinnati, the room they occupied the night before they parted, 
 and where over their maps the final orders were given him and final 
 arrangements made that inaugurated the two great campaigns of 
 Richmond and Petersburg in the East, and Atlanta in the West. 
 After the Atlanta campaign I paid General Grant a visit at City 
 Point. I reached his headquarters in October, and spent two 
 weeks with him, and saw the Armies of the James and the Potomac. 
 Evenings we would sit around his camp-fire, and in his genial, 
 comprehensive way, he told us of his campaign and the great battles 
 you had fought, and brought out fully to me what a great Army 
 you were. I asked him what he claimed for the Battle of the Wil- 
 derness. There had been great discussion, as you know, about it, 
 and Grant, with the same twinkle of the eye that T had seen at 
 Xashville, said, "I only claim that after that battle, (and I took 
 tlie initiative on tlie inarcli towards Eiehnioud.) that tlie Armv of 
 
156 Keuxiox of Army of Potomac. 
 
 the Potomac was no longer afraid of Bobby Lee." He had not 
 forgotten his talk with us at Nashville. 
 
 Now you ha\e had Grant's opinion of your great Army, and as 
 my toast is the Army of the Tennessee, I Avill close by giving you 
 General Grant's description of that Amiy when called upon to 
 respond to the same toast at one of our reunions. He said, "As an 
 Army, the Army of the Tennessee never sustained a single defeat 
 during four years of war. Every fortification which it assailed sur- 
 rendered. Every force arrayed against it was either defeated, 
 captured, or destroyed. No officer was ever assigned to the com- 
 mand of that army who had afterwards to be relieved from it or to 
 be reduced to another command. Such a historv is not accident." 
 
USE OF BLOCK-HOUSES DURING 
 THE CIVIL WAR 
 
 To the Editor of the Army and Navy Journal: 
 
 I was greatly interested in the communication of Captain 
 Joubert Eeitz, published in your journal March 21, 1903, giving a 
 description of the block-house system inaugurated by General 
 Ivitchener in the Transvaal War. It was a continuous line of 
 block-houses connected by barbed wire, to prevent the Boers crossing 
 the railway lines, and virtually corralling their forces in certain 
 districts until want of food forced them to surrender. Captain 
 Eeitz asserts that the block-house system did more to end the war 
 than the whole British Army. 
 
 In the Civil War our block-house system was just as effective, 
 but in another direction. We used it for the purpose of protecting 
 our lines of communication, not as a trocha, or a line connected 
 with wire fencing and other obstructions, as used by the British and 
 by the Spaniards in the Cuban War. The British built theirs of 
 bags filled with earth. The Spaniards erected neat structures 
 of two stories, built of concrete, with wooden roofs and openings for 
 two lines of fire, one above the other. These were erected not more 
 than half a mile apart. In the Civil War our block-houses were 
 usually erected of logs, one and two stories high. The face of the 
 upper story had an angle of forty-five degrees to the face of the first 
 story, thus concentrating a direct fire upon an enemy approaching 
 from any point of the compass. The first block-houses in the West 
 that I know of were built by my command in July and August, 
 1862, when it rebuilt the Mobile & Ohio Railroad from Columbus 
 to Humbolt. There were many important bridges on this line, and 
 we built block-houses at the most important ones, and stockades at 
 the others. 
 
 In the fall of 18G2, when Forrest and Jackson made the noted 
 raids into West Tennessee, the forces at all these structures that 
 my command had erected held their positions, and defeated the 
 
 —159— 
 
IGO Block Housks in the Civil War. 
 
 enemy when attacked, while at the bridges between Jackson, Tennes- 
 see, and Grand Junction, where they had only earth defenses, the 
 forces were driven away or captured and the bridges destro\ ed. The 
 result of this was that General Grant issued an order commending 
 the action of the detachments that were successful, stating that 
 wherever they stood success followed, and the enemy suifered a loss 
 in killed and wounded greater tlian tlie garrisons of the block- 
 houses and stockades. This result also caused General Grant to 
 issue an order to build block-houses and stockades on the line of the 
 Memjahis & Charleston Eailway at all important bridges from Mem- 
 phis to Corinth, and they protected this line of communication until 
 it was abandoned. 
 
 The block-houses held about a company, but sometimes stock- 
 ades or earth intrenchments were added to hold two companies, 
 and our orders were imperative to all forces occupying them never 
 to leave them or surrender, no matter how large the attacking force. 
 My first order stated that a company in a block-house or stockade 
 was equal to a Eegiment attacking, and I do not remember the 
 enemy, in their numerous raids, ever capturing one that was de- 
 fended, up to the time I left Corinth in the summer of 1863. After 
 the Battle of Chattanooga, when our Armies were lying along the 
 line of the railway from Nashville to Decatur and Nashville to 
 Stevenson, I rebuilt the Nashville & Decatur Eailway, on which 
 there were at least thirty important bridges, at each of which we 
 built strong block-houses and stockades, and the enemy never cap- 
 tured one of them, though in two instances they were attacked 
 with a brigade, and often with two Eegiments and batteries. We 
 protected against artillery fire by throwing up earthworks to the 
 height of the first line of fire, taking the chance of any damage be- 
 ing done above that. Our orders here were Avhen Forest, Eoddy, 
 and HIannan attacked this line to hold the posts under any and all 
 circumstances, stating that if they stayed in the lilock-houses and 
 stockades nothing could defeat them, and so it proved. Where 
 these forces struck a Eegiment, and captured it in earth-works, 
 they went twelve miles north to the Sulphur Trestle, a bridge one 
 hundred and twenty-five feet high, defended by two companies in a 
 block-house and stockade, and were sig-nally defeated. The Army 
 of the Cumberland protected the line from Nashville to Stevenson, 
 and on to Chattanooga, with block-houses at all bridges and impor- 
 tant points, and when on the 5th of May, 1864, General Sherman 
 
Block Houses in the Civil \Xa\i. 161 
 
 started on the Atlanta campaign, General Hooker reports on April 
 23, 1864, that he detailed 1,460 men to occupy block-houses from 
 N"ashville to Chattanooga, and this force held that line of road 
 throughout the campaign, though many attempts were made to de- 
 stroy it. During the Atlanta campaign as Ave advanced the rail- 
 way was rebuilt, and all bridges and stations had block-houses or 
 stockades to protect theuL 
 
 General Green B. Kaum's Brigade was located at some of the 
 most important structures. General Wheeler, with all of John- 
 ston's Cavalry force and several batteries, endeavored to destroy 
 this, our only line of communication for transporting supplies. 
 General Eaum's story is so to the point tliat I quote it almost 
 entire. He says : 
 
 My experiences with block-houses extended from May to November. 
 18G4, on the Memphis <& Charleston railroad, and the Chattanooga «& Atlanta 
 railroad. Block-houses were built along these railroads exclusively for the 
 protection of bridges. They were built of heavy square timbers, sometimes 
 with two or three thicknesses of timber, and were of various sizes. I had a 
 two-story block-house built at Mud Creek, east of Scottsboro, Ala. : it would 
 easily hold 100 men. These houses were carefully pierced with loop-holes, 
 so that the garrison could cover every approach. My garrisons were usually 
 too large for the block-houses. In these cases I threw up an earth-work, 
 and protected it with abatis. The Confederate forces soon learned to re- 
 spect a block-house. I found it to be an absolute defense against musketry. 
 
 During the Atlanta campaign our bloi-k-houses were constantly at- 
 tacked by raiding parties ; small and great trains would be thrown from the 
 track and burned, and small sections of the track destroyed. About July ."». 
 18<j4. an enterprising Confederate cavalryman with about 300 men made a 
 rapid march up Dirt Town Valley, crossed the Chattanooga range by a 
 bridle-path, threw a train of fifteen loaded cars off the track, burned them, 
 and destroyed a small section of the track, but he did not attempt to destroy 
 the bridge near by at Tilton — it was defended by a block-house with a 
 rapacity for seventy men. 
 
 When fieneral Wheeler made his great raid north in August, 1864, he 
 struck the railroad at various places. He destroyed two miles of track im- 
 mediately south of Tilton. Ca.. Imt did not come within range of the block- 
 house, and did not attemjjt to destioy the bridge defended by the block- 
 house. During this raid (leneral Wheeler, without hesitation, attacked and 
 carried a part of the works at Dalton. During the Atlanta campaign there 
 was not a liridge destro.ved by the Coifederates between Nashville and At- 
 lanta which was protected by a block-house. 
 
 After the fall of Atlanta, General Hood moved with his entire army 
 against the Chattanooga and Atlanta railroad, destroying thirty-seven miles 
 of track. On October 12 he struck the railroad at Ke.saca and Tilton. Til- 
 ton was garrisoned by the Seventeenth Iowa. Lieutf^nant-Colonel Archer 
 commanding. He had about o.")() men — no artillery. An Army Cori)s was in 
 his front. Colonel Archer held the enemy off seven hours, fighting from his 
 rifle-pits and block-house. At last the Confederate commander i)laced sev- 
 eral batteries in position, and opened uiion the devoted garrison. In a short 
 time the block-house was rendered untevable, and Colonel Archer was forced 
 to surrender. This was the first and only success against our block-house 
 system. On December 4. 1864, Bates's division of Cheatham's Corps at- 
 tacked the block-house at the railroad crossing of Overall's Creek, five miles 
 
162. Block Houses in the Civil War. 
 
 north of Murfreesboroiigh, Tenu. The enemy used artillei-y to reduce the 
 block-house, and although seventy-four shots were fired at it. uo material in- 
 jury was done; the garrison held out until relieved by General Milroy from 
 Murfreesboi'ough. 
 
 After the Atlanta eampaign, in the Department of the Mis- 
 souri, every important bridge and town where detachments of 
 troops were stationed was protected by block-houses and stockades, 
 and during the Indian campaigns of 1864-5-6 our lines of com- 
 munication, stage and telegraph, were all held successfully by small 
 detachments of troops in block-houses and stockades, and were never 
 captured unless overwhelming forces of the Indians attacked them, 
 and only then when the defensive works were inferior or not prop- 
 erly constructed; and, even in cases where detachments left their 
 stations, if they had remained they would have successfully held 
 them. After I took command on the plains and issued positive or- 
 ders for detachments to stay by their posts and never leave them, 
 not a single detachment that I remember of was captured in its 
 l)l(K'k-]iouse or stockade. With the small force we had it would 
 have been impossible to maintain our mail, telegraph and overland 
 routes successfully, if it had not been for our system of block -liouses 
 and stockades, dotted for thousands of miles over each of the over- 
 land I'oiites. It is evidt'nt from our experience in the West that our 
 block-house and stockade system of defending our lines of commu- 
 nication was a great success, not only as against raids of cavalry, but 
 from attacks of infantry and artillery, and saved to us a very large 
 force for the field. I left on the line of the railway from ISFashville 
 to Athens during the Atlanta campaign only two Eegiments of 
 negroes, taking with me my entire Corps, and without the block- 
 liouses to defend the lines from Nashville to Stevenson and Steven- 
 son to Atlanta, it would have taken a thousand men without 
 hldck-hoiise protection for every hnudj'ed required with it. 
 
 GrRENVILLE M. DODGE. 
 
1 
 
 TO THE MEMORY OF SAMUEL DAVIS 
 
 .Moiuimeiit t'lvc-ted in Nashville. Teuu., to Samuel Davis, Confederate Spy 
 executed hy order of (Teiioial Dodee. at Pulaski. Tenn.. in 1864. 
 
AN INCIDENT OF THE WAR 
 
 Execution of the Confederate Spy, Samuel Davis 
 AT Pulaski, Tenn., November, 1863 
 
 Xkw VoK'K. . I line l.Mll. 1S!»:. 
 
 To the Editor of Tlir Confnlrralr V, 'I emit : 
 
 In fiilfllhueiit of niy proinisc to ^iw you iii\ ivtollcctioiis of 
 Sam Davis, (wjio was hung as a s|)y in Xoxcinbei'. ISii;;, at Pulas- 
 ki. Tciui..) I desire to say tliat in wi'itiug of matters wliifli oc- 
 cunvd tliirty-fonr years ago one is apt to make mistakes as to 
 minor details; l)ut tlie principal facts were such that they im- 
 pressed themselves upon my mind so that I can speak of them witli 
 some certaint}'. 
 
 When General (Irant ordered General Sherman (whose head 
 of column -was near East port, on the Temiessee Kiver) to drop 
 everything and l)ring his army to Ghattanooga, my Corps (the Six- 
 teenth) was then located at Goi'intli. ^Fiss., and I hrouglit up the 
 rear. 
 
 General Grant's anxiety to attack Bragg's command before 
 Longstreet could return from East Tennessee brought on the bat- 
 tle before I could reach Chattanooga. General Grant, therefore, 
 instructed General Sherman to halt m\ command in Middle Ten- 
 nessee and to instruct me to rebuild the railway from Nashville to 
 Decatur. The fulfilling of the above order is fully set forth by 
 General Grant in his Memoirs. 
 
 ^yiien I reach(>d the line of the Xashville and Decatur railroad. 
 I distributed my tr()o])s from Columbia south towards Athens, Ala- 
 bama. I had about lo.OOO men and 8,000 animals, and was with- 
 out provisions, with no railroad or water communication to any 
 base of supply, and was obliged to draw subsistence for my com- 
 mand from the adjacent country until' 1 could rebuild the railroad 
 and receive my supplies from Xahsvilk'. 
 
 My command was a ])ai't of the Army of the Tennessee, occu- 
 
 — 165— 
 
166 An Incident uj- the Wak. 
 
 laying temporarilv a portion of the territory of tlie Department 
 of the Cuniberland, but not reporting or subject to the commandei- 
 of that department. 
 
 Upon an examination of tlic countiy, 1 Un\\u\ tliat tliere Avas 
 an abundance of everythiii^- uccdt'd to supply my command, except 
 where Slierman's forces liad swept across it along Elk Eiver. He 
 wrote me, "I do not think that my forces have left a chicken for 
 you." I also found that T was in a country where the sentiment 
 of the people was almost unanimously against us. T had very lit- 
 tle faith in converting them by the taking of the oath of allegiance ; 
 I therefore issued an order stating that I required the products of 
 the country to supply my command, and that to all who had these 
 products, regardless of their sentiments, who would bring them 
 to the stations where my troops were located, I would pay a fair 
 price for them; b\it that, if I had to send and bring the supplies 
 myself, I should take them without making ])ayment, giving them 
 only receipts ; and also issued instructions that every train going 
 for supplies should be accompanied by an officer and receipt given 
 for what ho took. This had a good effect, the citizens generally 
 bringing in tlicir supplies to my command and receiving the proper 
 voucher: hut it also gave an opportunity i'ov straggling bands to rob 
 and charge up their depredations to my command. This caused 
 many complaints to be filed with the military governor of Tennes- 
 see and the Department Commander of the Army of the Ciimbcr- 
 land. 
 
 Upon investigation I found most of those depredations were 
 committed by irresponsil)lc ])arties of l)oth sides, and I also dis- 
 covered that there was a well-organized and disciplined Corps of 
 scouts and spies within my lines, one force operating to the east of 
 the line, under Captain Coleman, and another force operating to 
 the west, having its headquarters in the vicinity of Florence, Ala- 
 bama. I issued orders to my own spies to locate these parties, send- 
 ing out scouting parties to wipe them out or drive them across the 
 Tennessee River. 
 
 My cavalry had had considerable experience in this work in 
 and around Corinth, and they were very successful and brought in 
 many prisoners, most of whom could only be treated as prisoners of 
 war. 
 
 The Seventh Kansas Cavalry was very efficient in this service, 
 and they captured Samuel Davis, Joshua Brown, Smith, and Gen- 
 
An Incident op the War. 1(j7 
 
 oral Bragg's Chief of Scouts and Secret Service Colonel S. Shaw, 
 all about the same time W'c flid not know of the importance of 
 the capture of Shaw, or that he was the Captain Coleman com- 
 manding Bragg's secret-sei'vice force. Nothing was found on any 
 of the prisoners of importance, except upon Davis, who evidently 
 had been selected to carry the information they had all obtained 
 through to General Bragg. Upon Davis were found letters from 
 Captain Coleman, the commander of the scouts to the east of us, 
 and many others. I was very anxious to capture Coleman and 
 break up his command, as my own scouts and spies within the Con- 
 federate lines were continually reporting to us the news sent south 
 from and the movements of Coleman within my lines. 
 
 Davis was brought immediately to me, as his captors knew his 
 importance. They believed he was an officer and also knew lie was 
 a member of Coleman's command. 
 
 When brought to my office T met him pleasantly. I knew what 
 had been found upon him and I desired to locate Coleman and his 
 command and ascertain, il' possible, wlio was furnishing the in- 
 formation, which I saw was accurate and valual)le, to Ccncral 
 Bragg. 
 
 Davis met me modestly. He was a fine, soldicidy-lookmg 
 young man, dressed in a faded Federal soldier's coat, one of our 
 army soft hats, and top boots. He had a frank, open face, which 
 was inclined to brightness. \ tried to impress upon him the dan- 
 ger he was in, and that I knew lie was only a messenger, and held 
 out to him the hope of lenient treatment if he would answer truth- 
 fully, as far as he could, my questions. 
 
 He listened attentively and respootfully to mc. Imt. as 1 recol- 
 lect, made no definite answei-, and I had him returned to the 
 prison. My recollection is that Captain Ai'mstrong, my Provost 
 Marshal, placed in the prison with him and the other prisoners one 
 of our own spies, who claimed to them to l)e one of tlie Confederate 
 scouting parties operating witliin my lines, and 1 think the man 
 More, whom the other jjrisoncrs si)eak of as having been captured 
 with them and escaping, was this man. However, lliey all kept 
 Iheiv own counsel and we ohiained no information <jf value from 
 them. 
 
 The reason of this ivticence was the fact that they all knew 
 Colonel Shaw was one of our captives, an.l thai if his imporlance 
 
168 An Incident of the W\ar. 
 
 was made known to iis he would certainly be hung; and they did 
 not think that Davis would be executed. 
 
 Upon Davis was found a large mail of value. Much of it was 
 letters from the friends and relatives of soldiers in the Confed- 
 erate Army. There were many small presents — one or two, I re- 
 member, to General Bragg — and much accurate information of my 
 forces, of our defenses, our intentions, substance of my orders, criti- 
 cisms as to my treatment of the citizens, and a general approval of 
 my payment for supplies, while a few denounced severely some of 
 the parties who had hauled in supplies under the orders. Captain 
 Coleman mentioned this in one of his letters. 
 
 There were also intimations of the endeavor that would be 
 made to interrupt my work, and plans for the capture of single 
 soldiers and small parties of the command out after forage. 
 
 I had Davis brought before me again, after my Provost Mar- 
 shal had reported his inability to obtain anything of value from 
 him. 1 then informed him that lie would he tried as a spy; that 
 the evidence against him would surely convict him; and made a 
 direct appeal to him to give me the information T knew he had. He 
 very quietly, Init firmly, refused to do it. I therefore let him be 
 tried and suffer the consequences. Considerable interest was taken 
 in young Davis l)y tlie Provost Marshal and Chaidain Young, and 
 considerable pressui'e was brougiit to hear upon tliem by some of 
 the citizens of Pulaski ; and I am under the impression that some 
 of them saw Davis and endeavored to induce him to save himself, 
 but they failed. Mrs. John A. Jackson, I remember, made a per- 
 sonal appeal in his behalf directly to me. Davis was convicted 
 upon trial and sentenced. Then one of my noted scouts, known as 
 "Chickasaw," believed that he eouhl |)re\ail upon Davis to give 
 tlie information we asked. 
 
 He took him in hand and never gave it up until the last mo- 
 ment, going to the scaffold witli a promise of pardon a few moments 
 before his execution. 
 
 Davis died to save his own chief, Colonel Shaw, wlio was in 
 prison with him and was captured the same day. 
 
 The parties who were ])i'isoners with Davis have informed me 
 that it was Shaw wlio liad selected Davis as the messenger to Gen- 
 eral Bragg, and liad given to liini ])art of his mail and papers. 
 
 T did not know tliis certainly until a long time after the war. 
 I first learned of it hv rumor and what some of mv own scouts have 
 
Ax Incident of tjii-: Wau. 1(59 
 
 told iiic since the Will', ami it has since l)ei-ii conlii'ined conlidentially 
 to iiie liy one of the |)i-isoners who wa> ca|itnivd ahoul tlie same time 
 that l)a\is was and who was impi-isoiied with him ii|i to the time 
 he was con\icte(| and sentenced, and knew Colonel Shaw, as well as 
 all the facts in the case. 
 
 Idle statement made to me is. that Colonel S. Shaw was the 
 child' or an im|H)i-tant oriicer in General Brao-o-'g Secret-Service 
 Coi'ps: that Shaw had riiniished the iin|iortant documents to Davis; 
 and that I heir captors did not know Shaw and his impoi-tance. 
 
 Colonel Shaw I sent with the otlier prisoners Xortli. as ])ri.son- 
 ci-s of war. 1 also learned that Shaw was lireatly alarmed when he 
 was iiHormed 1 was tr^dng to indnce Davis to give me the infor- 
 mation he had. 
 
 'Idiis is where Davis showed himself a trne soldier. He had 
 heen entrusted with an important commission hv an important 
 ofhcer. who was imprisoned wilh him. and died rather than hetrav 
 him. He knew to a certainty, it he inrornied me ot tiie facts, that 
 Shaw would he executed, for he was a far more important person to 
 us than was l)a\is. 
 
 Dnring the wai' 1 had many spies captured; some executed 
 who were captured within the Conft'derate lines and who were 
 e(pially lira\(' in meeting their fate. 
 
 By an extraordinarx ell'ort I saved the life of one who was 
 captureil hy Forrt'st. I'h rough my etforts this man escaped, though 
 Cleneral Forrest sized him up coi'rectly. He was one of the most 
 im])ortant men we vwv had within the Confederate lines. 
 
 Forrest was determined to hang him, hut :\rajo!'-General Folk 
 helieved him imiot'cnt and desired to sa^■e him. 
 
 (ireat intei'cst was taken in Da\is at the tijue, because it was 
 known by all of the command that T desired to save him. 
 
 Your publication bears many evidences of this fact. It is 
 not, therefore, necessary for me to state that I regretted to see sen- 
 tence executed ; but it was one of the fates of war. Avhich is cruelty 
 itself, and there is no rcHning it. 
 
 I find this letter bearing upon the cas(' ; it may be of interest. 
 It is my Hrst report to ^lajor !>. M. Sawyer, Assistant Adjutant- 
 (leiiei'al, Army of the Tennessee, iiolifving him of the capture of 
 Davis, h is dated. I'lilaski, Tenn.. No\eniher -ioth. i,S63, and is as 
 follows: 
 
170 An Incident of the War. 
 
 I herewith inclose a copv of (lisi)atrht's taken from (Hu- of Bragg's 
 spies. He had a hea\y mail, papers, etc.. ami shows ('apt a in Coleman is 
 pretty Avell posted. 
 
 We have broken up several bands of mnunri-d robbers and Confederate 
 cavalry in the last week, capturing some five commissioned officers and one 
 hundred enlisted men. who have l)een forwarded. 
 
 I also forward a few of the most important letters found in the mail. 
 The tooth-brushes and blank-books I was greatly in need of and therefore 
 ai>pro]iriat('(l them. I am. 
 
 \'ery respect fully, your obedient servant, 
 
 G. :m. Dodge. 
 
 i'riiinilirr <T<iivniJ. 
 
 The severe penalty oi' death, where a spv is eajitured. is not 
 because there is anything dishonorable in tlie fact of the person be- 
 ing a sp3'. as only men' of peculiar gifts for such seryice. men of 
 courage and cool judgment and undoubted ])atriotism. are selected. 
 The fact that the information they ol)tain is found \yitliin their 
 enemy's lines, and the probability of great danger to an Army, is 
 \vhat causes tlie ])enalty to l)e so very severe. A soldiec caught in 
 the uniform, or a part of the uniform, of liis enemy, witliin his 
 enemy's lines, establishes the fact that he is a spy and is tliere in 
 violation of the Articles of War and for no good pur[»ose. This 
 alone will prohibit his being treated as a prisimer of war. when 
 caught, as Davis was, in our uniform, witli vahiable doeuutcuts upon 
 him, and seals his fate. 
 
 I appreciate fully that the jjeople of 'I'ennessee ami Davis's 
 comrades understand his soldierly qualities and propose to hoiuu- his 
 memory. I take pleasure in aiding in raising the monument to 
 his memory, although the services he performed were for the pur- 
 pose of injuring ni}^ command, but given in faithfully performing 
 the duties he was assigned to. I am 
 
 Truly and respectfully. 
 
 (tT?enville M. Dodge. 
 
 Major-Gene.ral. 
 
X. — 
 
 ^ hi 
 
GEN. G. M. DODGE ON THE 
 ** WATER CURE" 
 
 [The following is ;i reprint of an article tlial appeared originally in 
 the New York Kveninu I'ost.— (i. M. D.] 
 
 The Xew Vofk Kvcninu- Post lias tlius h.'on "c-allcMl down"" hy 
 CTeiieral Groiivillc M. Dod^c, who is \\vU known tln-ouohout Iowa 
 and the Xation as one of the k'ading Corps Coinmanders of the- 
 Union Army diirinii- tlic Civil War: 
 
 To the Editor of //,, l-:rruiin, Post: 
 
 As one who lias had some experience in the necessities, nsa.aes. and 
 cruelties of war, which always prevail during a campaiun in an enemy's 
 country, I am surprised at the position of your journal, and its 
 hitterness asainst the alleged action of Major (ilenu. Lieutenant Conger, 
 and Assistant Surgeon Lyon. 
 
 The testimony of Sergeant Kiley. ujion whicli you hnsc your attack 
 on these officers, goes to prove that they gave the water cure to a Filipino 
 who had been made presidente in one of the provinces by our Government 
 who had taken the oath of allegiance to our country, and then used his 
 i>fficial i)osition to cover his acts as captain of an insurgent company which 
 was acting in arms against our Army and within our lines. Therefore, he was 
 a traitor and a spy. and his every act was a violation of the laws of war. and 
 branded him an outlaw and guerilla. If these are the facts, under the usases 
 of war these officers were justified in what they diil ; in fa<t. if tln-y had 
 shot the traitor they would never have been called to ac<iiunl. and in all 
 probability this is what would have happened to him in the Civil War. 
 
 An officer has great latitude under such circumstances, and it is nut 
 safe or fair to condemn one for almost any act that detects a traitor and 
 sjjy in arms against the (iovernmeut which he has sworn to protect, and 
 which has put him in a position of trust. You ignore entirely this side of 
 the question, and only treat Major (ilenn"s a<ts as cruelties to peaceable 
 Filipino citizens. I can remember when the journals of this country upheld 
 and applauded an officer who. in the Civil War. ordered a man shot if he 
 attempted to haul down the American flag, and cannot understand tln' pres- 
 ent hysterics of some journals over the terrible violation of the laws of war 
 in punishing a traitor, caught in the act. with the water cure only. The 
 treatment may have been severe, but it is not perniaiuuitly harmful. 
 
 1 am astonished that these fearfully wronglit-ni» journals have no 
 word of commeudation for our soldiers in the Philip|iines. who have suffered 
 untold cruelties, assassiiiat iois. burning by slow tires, burial alive, mutila- 
 tions, and atrocities : who have submitted to every indignity without 
 resentment or complaint : and I have been greatly gratified over their excel- 
 lent behavior under such trying circumstances. In their comments these 
 journals are \ery carelitl not to sa.\- why these |iunis]iments are gi\en to 
 such traitors, ktiowiiig well if they did our peni)le would look upon the acts 
 as one of the iiecessilies of war. and would wonder at the leniency of Major 
 (ileiHi and his conunaud. ( ;i;i;.N vt i.t.i-: M. l»oin,i:. 
 
 Xrir YorL-. April IT. 
 
174: GrENEKAL DODGE ON THE WaTER CuRE. 
 
 There can be no doubt that ''war is hell," no matter whether 
 it be on the Pliilippine Islands or any other place in the world. 
 There has been much howling over the administration of "the water 
 cure" in the Philippines, but every man who has had one 3^ear's 
 experience in real war will admit that that "cure" is not so severe 
 as killing- or wounding captured enemies who have knowledge of 
 hidden arms or other Army supplies. Every one of the "water- 
 cured" Filipinos was given the opportunity to escape that punish- 
 ment, but ref\ise(l tn tell what he knew and was therefore rightly 
 punished until ho was willing to tell the truth. General Dodge's 
 letter proves that the punishment was justified, and his opinion will 
 be sustained by every person who has knowledge of "the necessities, 
 usages, and cruelties of war," which "always prevail during a cam- 
 paign in an enemy's country.'" Tlio truth is that the armies of the 
 United States have been too lenient in the Philippines. That is 
 the reason why the war has been so long continued, and the only 
 reason why the final peace will be still further delayed. War is 
 never a picnic, but should at all times be made terrible in order 
 that peace and safety may be speedily gained. "The water cure" 
 is inclined to be slightly irritating to the throats of the traitors in 
 the Philijipines, it is true, but it is not so bad or so cruel as maim- 
 ing them for life, or killing them. The yellow journals may con- 
 tinue to howl, but tlie loyal American peojile will sustain the sol- 
 diers of the Nation in every effort to comjiel peace that comes within 
 the rules of war. 
 
MISPLACED SYMPATHY 
 
 Address to the 
 
 New York Commandery. Military Order of Loyal 
 
 Legion, on Cruelties in the Philippines 
 
 1 .Irsiiv to enter my protest and eall the attention of tlir roiii- 
 ,, anions to llie position of a portion of the puhlie pivss. and M.nie 
 people, towards our Arinv in the Philippines, and what thev assert 
 are eruelties perpetrated there. 
 
 There is a eertaiii portion ..!' the pre- and also of the people, 
 who are and alwavs haw heen ahsolutelv opposed to the operation.- 
 of onr annv in the jMiilippmes. Thev wen- xrvv anxions t<. push ns 
 into a war whic-h we were all <MM'"^<''1 ^"- '»'" "'■^'■'' •-^■^^'"■- "^ ''^-'■'' 
 thev r.'fused to aeeept the results, and have , ersistent ly opposed 
 evervthinu- done tliat was not in exael aeeor.hmee with their vi.'ws. 
 in ordei' to work upon the svmpathies of the people, some of the 
 papers are pnhlishin- pictures showin,ij our soldier> in the verv aet 
 of committing uivat outra-es: the pictures were manufaetnred in 
 their own olTu-es. as were also most oi' the outra-es e.unplained of. 
 Yon liave not, however, seen in these papers anv pictures port raving 
 the cruelties perpeti'ated upon our xddiers. which have heen worse 
 than anv acts ever cmmitted hv the savages in our wars with them: 
 they are. in fact. t<H. revolting to ivlale. 1 have ha.l niucli to do 
 with Indian warfare, hut have nevr seen anv criudtie^ to !.<■ com- 
 pared with those intlic-ted upon our s,ddiers hv the Filipino-, and 
 these occurrences were not rare, hut geiu'ral.— happening all the 
 time. Verv little has heen said on this sul.ject. lor it wa- ma the 
 policv of the (iovernnient to have the stories of tlu'se atrocitio 
 ,,,inted, or hrought hidore the peoole: hut now that our arniv is 
 hein- so hitterlv attacked, it is lime that the soldiers- side (d' the 
 ,p,estion should' he pres-^iited. and w are learning of the soldiers 
 who have heen assassinated, their f.vi hiirned. huried alive killed 
 hv slow-hnrninu- lires, their howels cut open and wound around 
 
1T8 Misplaced Sympathy. 
 
 trees. The Fili|)iii()s iiidulged in every torture and indignity tliat 
 was possible, and, as a general thing, our soldiers did not retaliate. 
 How they managed to refrain from taking vengeance is beyond my 
 comprehension, but their action is greatly to their credit and honor. 
 Tlie questions I Mdsh to bring before you, however, are, Wliat 
 are the rights of an officer in such matters? What are his duties 
 and jjrivileges in war in an enemy's country that is under martial 
 law? Take, for instance, General Smith's position when he was 
 sent to Samar, with instructions to wipe out the insurrection there. 
 He is said to have issued instructions to kill everybody found in 
 arms that Avas over ten years of age, and to burn tlio country, if it 
 was necessary to wipe out the insurrection, and the result is that in 
 ninety days or less he did wipe out the insurrection, and without 
 any great loss on our side or on the |)art of the enemy. Now they 
 are denouncing him for a threat, — not an act. The temptation to 
 retaliate must have been very great, for the treatment the Ninth 
 Infantry received from those savages was nothing short of murder, 
 followed by the most horrible mutilation, by a people who pretended 
 to be their friends and at peace. In the ninety days he was operat- 
 ing there General Smith brought the island to peace, everybody in 
 it had surrendered, and it is quiet. If he had made war under the 
 methods advocated, allowing no one to be hurt, in all probability 
 the subjugation of the island would have required a year's time, 
 and there would have been ten times the suffering and loss of life 
 than actually occurred. He simply followed the plan of war that 
 was pursued by Grant, Sherman, and other commanders in the Civil 
 War: that is, made it just as effective and short as possible. You 
 know Sherman's position was that after a certain length of time 
 when an enemy had been whipped, it was their (hity to cease making 
 war, and if they did not do so, he considered that any uu-ans were 
 justifiable in order to bring it to an end. He stated this ncit clear- 
 ly in his St. Louis speecli. He stated tlie case as follows : 
 
 I claim that when we took Vicksbur;:, by all the rules of civilized 
 warfare the Confederates should have surrendered, and allowed us to restore 
 peace in the land. I claim also that when we took Atlanta they were bound 
 by every rule of civilized warfare to surrender their cause, which was then 
 hopeless, and it was clear as daylight that they were bound to surrender 
 and return to civil life ; but they continued the war, and then we had a 
 right under the rules of civilized warfare to commence a system that would 
 make them feel the power of the Government, and make them succumb. 
 I had to go through (ieorgia to let them see what war meant. 1 had a right 
 to destroy, which I did, and I mad(^ them feel the (•onse(iuences of war so 
 fully rliey will never again imile an in\a(liug Army. 
 
^IlSPLACKD SyM I'Alin . 179 
 
 You all know of the troubles tliat occurred in the border states 
 during the Civil War. and of the cruelties to the families oC Cuion 
 men who entered our Army. It was father against son, brother 
 against brother, and, as General Sherman said, '*It was cruelt\', 
 and there was no refining it." We know what severe orders wei-e 
 given for treatment of enemies, within our lines, when their acts 
 Avcre in violation of tlu^ laws of wai'. in one case torpedoes were 
 |ilacrd under a road o\cr which our troops were marching, and 
 several soldiers were killed. Sherman hajipened to come along just 
 iit that time, and said to the Colonel of the First Alabama Cavalry, 
 which was his escort. "Burn the country within fifteen miles sur- 
 rounding this spot.'" You all know what that meant: it was a 
 license imder which other things besides burning was done. An 
 eye-witness describes Sherman's march to the sea and through 
 the Carolinas as a "cloud of smoke by day and a pillar of fire by 
 night." Who ever made the suggestion that Sherman's uniform 
 sh®uld lie stripped off for this, or that he should be shot, as some 
 of our representatives in Congress and our press now demand 
 should be done in the Philii)pines for making war in earnest? 
 
 Take another case, where Captain AmU'rson captured a train 
 of convalescent unarmed Union soldiers in Xorth Missouri, and 
 l)laced them in line and shot every one of them. Shortly after- 
 wards Colonel Johnson, of the Missouri State ]\[ilitia. who was fol- 
 lowing Anderson, came up. Andei'son attacked this militia com- 
 nutnd of Kio men and killed l-t:!. only seventeen getting away. 
 Only one man was taken alive, and he saved himself by giving a 
 Masonic sign. The war records are full of cases of individual acts, 
 itnd I select one of which I had personal knowledge. It is found 
 in volume 38, of the War Records. The orders in Missouri at that 
 iime Avere that any person who harbored a guerilla, and did not re- 
 port the fact to the nearest commanding Union officer, should re- 
 ceive the same treatment as the guei'illa. A man by the name of 
 McEeyjiolds violated these orders, and liaiix.red (,)uantrell. the 
 guerilla, and the oflieei- who detected it. after stating all the facts 
 and evideiu^e. I'eported to me as follows: 
 
 < >ii consiili.itioii Willi the squadron i((iiiiuiin(lers, Captain Hambliii 
 .tiid Licurciiant (Jr.iin. it was decided to execute ^rcReynolds. which was 
 •<-;UTied "in under my ord.Ms. " U. M. Box. 
 
 riijitaiii ('(niiiiiiiiii II. Scrcnth Canilrii. Missouri Sttitr Militia. 
 
 In reporting this case to the Adjutant General in Washington 
 ] did not approve it, as my investigation showed that the statements 
 
180 ;\IisPLACi-:o (Sympathy. 
 
 of McReynolds's acts were li'iic. I did iidt ccnsui-t' the ofrucr.-. hut 
 issued an ordei- tliat ofticci's should h)ll()\v more tdosely the orders of 
 the Departnienl. and cikKhI that oi'der as follows: "Hereafter men 
 caught in ai'ins will lia\c no mercy shown tliem."" General John 
 McNeill, of )tlissoui'i. took twelve eiti/i'ns out an<l sliot them, it be- 
 ing claimed tlu'y were eoimeeted with guerillas that sliot a T^nion 
 man. In some histories it is known as the Palmyra massaci'e. It 
 is claimed that the Union man turned up alive. If the ivpoiis 
 of the numbers of rohhers. guerillas and outlaw^ who wei'e >hot on 
 sight in Kentucky. Missouri. Tennessee, and elsewhere, li\ Imth 
 sides in ISIi-t and ISO.'), could he gathered up they would lurnish 
 retaliations and cruelties enough for these wal(>r-cui'e joui'iinls foi- 
 years. 
 
 Consider this matter in a hroacK'r sense. Take the order of 
 General Grant to General Sliei'idan to make the Shenandoah A'alley 
 a l)ari'en waste: it was ahsolutely destroyed so the enemy could not 
 again occupy it. I can see no difference between an order to make 
 the Shenandoali A'alley a l)arren waste and Smith's order to mak-e 
 Samar a "howling wilderness." Take the order I recei\ed to go 
 to the ivar of I5ragg"s Army and destroy the Valley of tlie Tennes- 
 see, anti all the supplies gatliered there for the use of Ins Army, 
 which valley was hurned fi'om Bear Eiver to Decatur. Thoe were 
 orders from })rincipal officers in oui- Army, and I only (piote them 
 to show the contrast between tliat time and the present. Senators 
 in the halls of (Vmgi'ess tind it necessary in tliese days to take iij) the 
 Cjuestion. Senator IJawlins. of T'tah, nuide an attack upon our 
 officers, and especially upon General Ghatfee, wliic-li was nothing 
 short of disgraceful, and should not be allowed to go without \'igor- 
 ous condemnation. He I'epresents a state and people under whose 
 orders Ijieutenant (iunnison and his pai'ty were massaci'e(| h\' Mor- 
 mons disguised as Indians. Some one should get up in the Senate 
 and call him to account for these things, and ask him, in considera- 
 tion of these facts, wliv he is so deepiv outraged by the orders of 
 (n'nei-al Chairee, a gallant soldier and giaitleman, a liunuine num. 
 and one who, in my <ipinion, has done nothing in the Philippines 
 but what was perfectly justilied. an<l will in time be considered 
 to have been huuuine. 
 
 The two Senatoi's fnun Coloi'ado ha\-e taken it upon them- 
 selves to denounce ill hitter terms what they call unheard-of acts 
 and crueltit's of our Ai'!u\. I would point them to a case in their 
 
Misplaced Sympathy. 181 
 
 own state, -wliicli was more severe than any act in the IMiili|i|»ines 
 ha> hivn. A i-euimcnt of ('(.h)raao eavalr\ un(h'i- Colonel J. .M. 
 ( 'hixin-toii. a niiiiistei' hy profession, attacked and destroyed a hand 
 o|' Indians eiieani|ie(l on the l>ii:- Sandy. lU'ai' ('ani|) l.yon. wlio 
 ehiimcd to he mu\vv the pi'otet-tion of the olTieers at Fort Lyon. 
 This was a massacre of men. women and children ol' a fi'iendly liand 
 of Indians, and was one of tlie main causes of hi-in_i;in;: into arms 
 ;i,u-ainsr tlu' I'nited States every trihe of Indians south (d' the 
 Yellowstone. Wdien an investigation of this atfair was ordered 
 tlie State of Colorado almost imanimouslx protested against it. 
 upholding the act. and (piott'd that old saying. "There is no good 
 Indian except a dead one." Thiid< of oui- wars willi the Indians 
 in which \\liole hands were wiped out. e\'en the women and (duldren 
 t)eing desti'oyed : lhiid< of the wars in which we employed Indians 
 jrlgainst Indians: they m)t onlv killed hut scalped. I do not know 
 of a single treaty ever made with the Indians that the I'nited States 
 has Jiot viohited. and when an liulian had the hardihood to ohject 
 the CTOvernment slarted in to wipe him out. This has heen the 
 treatment of the Indians trom the Atlantic to the I'acilic. until at 
 the jH'esent time ihei'e is not a wild Indian living in the entire 
 country; yet 1 cannot renieml)er that this press has ever heen 
 nroused ; it was too nvdv honu'. 
 
 Take the case of ^lajor (ilenn, who is ahout to \)v conrtmar- 
 tialed fen- giving the watt-r cure to the pi'csidente in one of the 
 Provinces of Luzon, as the testimony goes to show. This jiresidente 
 had heen ai)pointed to office h\ our (Jovernment. had taken the 
 oath n\' allegiance, and was there to repi'esent us. While he was 
 occupying this position, it was discovered that he was the captain 
 of an insurgent company. gi\ing acti\-e assistaiu-e to the enemy, 
 and he was. thei'efore. a traitor and a spy. and under the laws of 
 war (h'served to he shot ; hut instead tlie\ pi'oposed to coui'tmartial 
 tilenn foi' simply gi\ing him the water cure: and this, in ni\- opin- 
 ion, is a gi'eal wrong. 
 
 Order 100. whu'h is often .pioted. was issued in the Civil War 
 to govern officei's. It was prepared hy Profess(u- Lieher. and was 
 consi(l(Mvd and adopted. I hcliew. I»v a hoard of ollicers : anyhow, 
 it wa- \-ei'y caivfull\- drawn. I am told it has heen considered and 
 used li\- nearly all the nations. It gi\-es an ollicer great latitude, 
 and wliei'e an ollicei' meets a sa\age enemy, or one that is vi(datini:' 
 the laws of wai'. those laws ai'c suspended and it \iriuallv is left 
 
1.S2 Misplaced Sympathy. 
 
 to his own judgniont as to how far he should go in intlieting pun- 
 ishment, and under this order tliere is no doubt both Smith and 
 Glenn were i3rotected in their actions. It may seem harsh, but you 
 are all aware how mam' harsh orders were given in the Civil War 
 for the purpose of forcing the cncniy to obey our orders, and liow 
 often those orders and threats accomplished the purpose without 
 any other act. When the colored troops were first organized, on sev- 
 eral occasions Confederate officers sent in demands for them to sur- 
 render, coupled M'ith the threat that if they refused the ])lace would 
 be taken and no quarter granted. I know of one instance where 
 an officer believed this threat and surrendered a TJegiment of col- 
 ored infantry for tlie ])Ui-])ose of liaviug tlieni protected. Then 
 there is the case of Fort Pillow; whetlier or not F(n-est gave the or- 
 der it is claimed he gave, I do not know ; l)ut the fact that no quarter 
 was shown there has been amply verified. 
 
 Within the past week there has been appointed a committee 
 of distingnishcd citizens, most of whom are well-known opi)onents 
 of our Government in its policies and acts during the Spanish War. 
 They propose to hunt up and lay before Congress all cases of cruelty 
 on the part of our Army, with the avowed pur|)ose of sustaining 
 the national honor. I must say this is the first time I ever heard 
 of national honor being sustained by such methods. Have you, or 
 any one else, ever heard a single word of protest from these people 
 or any one connected with them against the revolting cruelties 
 of the enemy in the Philippines? They evidently have no desire 
 to learn about these things, but want some excuse for attacking our 
 Army, hoping thereby to l)ring dishonor upon our country before 
 the world. The national honor nevei- has, never can, and never 
 will be protected by such methods. Tt is upheld and maintained 
 today, as it always has l)ecn, by the patriotism of our people as 
 represented by our Army in the Civil War, in Cuba, the Philippines, 
 and China. 
 
 These attacks upon the Army are for a double purpose, and 
 you should not forget it. Every time they make this great hub- 
 bub about cruelties they are hitting back at those that were in 
 the Civil War. There is an element in this country that already 
 has no use for the soldier of the Civil War. They are continually 
 crying about the pension he is getting; that he is favored in the 
 Government service; etc., etc. They do not dare attack him openly, 
 as vet. hul do it eovertlv. Tliei'e is no officer listening to me who 
 
Misplaced Sympathy. 183 
 
 did not .Sfc enieltios in the Civil War. .Many of you have had t<> 
 order them, but }on kno\\- you were never broughl to account for 
 tlioin wlien tlicy wvw acts of necessity. We were always careful 
 that no cruelties were comniilled by enlisted men, but whatever 
 was done was by tlie order of au officer. It was the practice of tlie 
 War Department never to interfere in tlu'se matters, leaving them 
 to the officer who was in charge of the forces in the field. Xone of 
 these things occurred without his knowledge; lie was on the spot 
 and knew the necessity for them, and if he did not take action it 
 was considered that none was necessary, and they were seldom 
 called to account for it afterwards ; but in the Philippines they 
 are bringing officers to account simply because of the outcry of 
 people who care notliing for the merits of the case, except to nuike 
 capital against our country^s policy in maintaining itself in tlie 
 Philippines. In view of all the facts, I must doubt the sincerity 
 of those who are seeking to bring discredit upon our little Army, 
 the marvellous efficiency of which has won the admiration of the 
 world. iTinder the regulations, it is impossible for the Army to 
 defend itself and make answer to these attacks, except through their 
 own officers, and their reports do not reach the public, for the ])ress 
 seems to use only that which reflects upon the Army, and omits 
 tliat which is in its favor. It is the duty of every companion here. 
 as well as of every good citizen, to entei- his }n'otest against these 
 unjust attacks. The right side is l)eginning to get a hearing, and 
 when the facts and causes for the action of tlie Army are gener- 
 ally known, it will be found that our Army is as humane and well- 
 behaved a body of troops as ever went into a f(ueign country, and we 
 must all assist in seeing tliat it r(H-eives justice. 
 
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 LIBRARY OF CONGRF«J« 
 
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