,^ m/k' ''< v^-"^. ^0^ "TT-^ :% ..^^ ^.n. ^^. '^o * • • * * * <*. •■/ ./■'^^, ,* '^ v^. o ,0 4 o^ . ^ .v-^. -'^^^. \^ 0' ,0 .V^. "'^v^k^^^xv ^, :• .^S-""--.. 'Mm'' ,^J:T^ ^ <- 'o..- ,G^ (/ya ^^-^^ "^. bV"^ o. r'v. ,G^ \3 -^..5' A ^^ \ V ^ n\ >?>1 /V» ^ "C^-, BRIEF VIE^W" OF CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS, SHOWING THAT THE UNION CONSISTED OF INDEPENDENT STATES UNITED. 1864, .4 Oonstitiitioual Powers. In England, which is a constitutional government, one of the limitations of the central power, that of the monarch who commands the military forces, is the custom of making the Mutiny Act an annual one. Continuing in force hut one year, Parliament, which therefore cannot be prorogued beyond that period, or either House thereof, by refusing to re-enact it, can paralyze the military organization which pervades that mighty empire, and in one instant plunge it into anarchy. And were the occasion to arise, in which either element of that government were to clearly perceive its existence aimed at by the others, cam it be supposed that it would hesitate to use a power conservative of its being? If it believed the existing form of government an appro- priate one, would it have the right to refrain from so proper a use of its reserved power ? Would it not by refraining in fact lend its aid to destroy it ? The military power of the kingdom is therefore only delegated to the crown, and for a year at a time. In the event supposed, the soldiery would side with the orders of the State to which they might hap- pen to feel themselves allied, just as in this country, were the Federal Goverment to go out of existence, the different portions of the army would fall back to the States which furnished .them. It is the consciousness of this that restrains the desires and moderates the views of each Estate, or State, as AVebster defines it, in England ; and insures a compro- mise on every question concerning which opinions are found to be opposite and conflicting. It is because of this that England is truly the government of a limited mon- archy. What would seem at first sight more natural than that the bead of a government and commander of its armies, should have over them the absolute power of command ? That in military organization the principle of obedience to its head should be fundamental ? Where, however, this is so, there is always despotism ; while in England and the old United States, where, also, independent, but not necessarily conflict- ing, powers co-existed, freedom and liberty resulted. Of En- gland then it may be said, that certain powers are not delega- ted to the crown, but are reserved to the nobles or the people. Had the Puritans, or Impuritans, as they have been called, happily for us never left their native shores, and had they increased there as rapidly as they have here, it might have been they would have organized themselves into a society for the abolition of the hereditary order of the peerage ; the power that stands between the crown and the people, re- straining both; and. which, perhaps, less perfectly serves the purpose than, ultimately, it shall be found our sov- ereign States will with us. And it might have been we would never have heard of the attempted abolition of the hereditary order of negro slavery in America. If, by their sophistries, these social disturbers could have gained the people to return them in sufficient numbers to the House of Commons, to have a majority therein, and in turn have dcluded^^ the crown with an idea that the progress of humanity would be greater, were it to join them in assuming entire control of aftairs, that is in usurping* the whole Government, and that honest industry was an obsolete and exploded mode of acquiring wealth — it was a pitiful way at best, for one could only lay by some- thing for a rainy day; wlu'i-eas, by the printing press, Alad- din's wonderful Uiniji was thrown in Ihe shade in the mat- ter of princely fortunes, and palaces, and harems ; if this eould have been brought about, and a crusade for the aboli- tion of the hereditary order inaugurated, of course the peers, to save the constitution of government, as well as with a view to self-preservation, would have rejected the Mutiny Bill. With their Beechers and Sumners, and Wades and Sewards, and Lincoln and his Leaguers, how old England would have rung, and how all her decent people would have sickened, with their howling cry of military necessity and national life. How some sophistic Binney would have urged her judges to rule, that as subordination was of the very essence of military organization, the power to enforce it was therefore to be educed from its institution; that, in short, in the absence of law his desire was to be adopted as law. Or to speak more accurately, in the absence of a law passed by the Three Estates, but not in the absence of all law, for in such a case, each Estate would have the legal and moral right to use its own law, its entire, its absolute power. And such would be its duty, for only by the three orders, each maintaining itself, could the constitution of government be preserved. But would her judges have proved faithless, and have aided him to tumble an old es- tablished government in ruins, and erect a new one thereon. 1^0 ! They would have remembered the just fate of many a victim of the block-and-axe ; and it may be that the pil- lory and the whipping-post would have tied the tongues and palsied the hands of the would-be demagogues and in- cendiaries, without v/hose wild ravings the usually calm and cautious judgment of a learned lawyer could hardly have been disturbed. The use of reserved power, while attended with disorder, would have saved England from a dreadful revolution and the loss of some of her elements of greatness. And it would be in such a case, if ever, that the doctrine of military necessity could be properly invoked ; for it would be solely with a view to support and continue the existence of the legal establishments of a kingdom ; in — 6— ♦^boii., to use the simplest language, to preserve the consti- tution, and truly to save the national life. The use of its reserved power by an establishment of a nation would seem to be entirely conservative. The con- stant declaration of an intention, in certain contingencies, to use it, would be entirely proper, and solely for the pur- pose of conservation. Indeed, such constant declaration ought to convince a reasonable mind that such was the only object. As to the assumption of power which has not been delegated, no doubt ought to exist. It is usurped, not for the purpose of conservation, but for the purpose of destruction and revolution. The intention is, by destroy- ing other power, to attain undisputed domination. Power is a subtle matter — beneficent in the hands of those who with chastened desires possess the art of government, but dangerous and, it may be, fatal, when wielded by the presumptuous ignoramus, the pretentious quack, or the artful and unscrupulous adventurer. The deadhest poison is used by the skillful physician to preserve life and restore health ; by the charlatan in such manner as to sacrifice both ; or by the evil-minded with the intention to destroy. And 80 with the knife. In the hand of the surgeon, the diseased part is removed and the blessing of health follows its use; or held by the innocent, it may deter or repel an assailant; while the hand of an assassin may direct it with fatal effect. Its use, or the intention of him who uses it, in no wise alters the nature of the knife or of the poison. JS'either is the nature of power in the least degree changed by the use thereof, nor by the intention of those who use it; although the effects of its use may differ as widely as salvation and destruction. Power is subtle because it is the domination of mind over matter. When the mind supposes itself to be fully instruct- ed, its belief is entire, and tlie action as well as direction of the will wonhl a])})ear to be a mere consequence, to be uliiiost in\oInntarv. The mind mav bocoinc fnrtlier in- structed, it may at last attain the fullness of knowledge of the subject, but its belief, however, is not less nor more entire ; it is still nothing but belief; but it is changed, like that of him informed he had been pursuing a wrong road, and the direction of the will is also necessarily changed. But he may have been pursuing the right road, and if he believe one who deceives him, he then travels with equal confidence away from the place he desires to reach. The collected mind of a people is controlled or impelled by the same causes which affect that of the individual. Power such as we speak of, that of the collected will, is where legal establishments or institutions exist; and where the principles thereof are firmly fixed in the minds of the people, who therefore yield obedience to the heads of the respective organizations, and maintain them. This is organized power, and its efhciency and permanence are in exact proportion to the correctness of the principles on which it is based. Among nations, and also in the institu- tions which compose them, as is the direction of their will, 80 is the direction of their arms ; to hope otherwise would be as idle as to expect the grass to bend against the wind. Consequently in a constitutional government, the declara- tion of an intention to destroy an institution which the minds of the people, or of a sufficient portion of them, have maintained, and yet consent to maintain, is in reality a de- claration of civil war. Now a constitutional government en- dures just so long as the minds of the people who live under it, consent to uphold the independent organizations which compose it ; and without which there cannot be constitu- tional government. A constitution implies the existence of two or more social elements, and its preservation and con- tinuance depend upon their vitality ; the vitality depends upon the healthfulness of the organization ; and in the organization of each element there must necessarily be not only a right of resistance, but also a power of resistance. This moderates the aims of each, and good government — 8— instead of aiuircby or despotism is the result; for the same social force possesses a very different character when sub- ject to other forces, when of equal power with them, and when itself absolute. When the consent thereto ceases, a change immediately commences, and the fall or destruction ofthe establishment is consummated slowly or suddenly in proportion to the unity or intensity of the public will. Con- sent to an institution may cease,or apparently cease,but it may be revived and become as full or fuller than before, in which event, if the organization yet remain undestroyed, the estab- lishment would be revived, and become correspondingly strong. This occurred in England, where, after the Great Rebellion, the nobility, which as an order had not made itself obnoxious, and whose organization had not been de- stroyed, was fully restored ; while in France, where it was destroyed, it has been found impossible, although the con- sent revived, to re-establish it. In this country constitu- tional government existed because independent States exist- ed, and the principle thereof'was implanted in the minds of the people, who therefore upheld them ; and just in propor- tion as that principle of the mind became debased, the foun- dation ofthe independence ofthe States was sapped, and a new and unconstitutional principle, that of absolutism ot the Executive of the Federal Government, consequently assumed sway over them. By expressing in words on parchment their argreement to create a new organization, for certain specified purposes, to which limited powers were delesrated, the States by no means agreed to surrender their independent existence ; on the contrary, their Avords and terms are clear and express as to their own perpetuity, to say nothing as to the actual fact of their continued existence. And they provided, too, that at their will the^ can alter their agreement, that is, alter the government which they made. They certainly never agreed that their agreement could alter itself This, pre- posterous as it bounds, a\ ould hrtve been the case, if, as is held by some, the Executive cau, hy being himself the sole interpreter, disregard the limitation upon him, and wield such power as he claims to have the right to decide he pos- sesses. Of course he would decide that he held sufficient to enable him to effect any object that he conceived to be proper, which would be supreme and absolute power. If every one connected with the Federal Government were united with the Executive in such view, it would not alter the position, for every one of the States could hold an op- posite view; and in such a case it would scarcely be con- tended that the Federal Government could rightfully defy their will. If this be not so, what was meant by the pro- vision that in making alterations, the States should proceed according to certain forms ? Why provide for alterations at all, and by a cumbrous and tedious mode, if the Execu- tive himself can in an instant effect the change ; forifhe can do so, he can also disregard the alteration. If the minds of the people consent to this, if they consent that the States shall no longer remain independent, but be mere phantoms of departed powers, then the Federal Executive is absolute, and wields all power, and the constitution of government is gone, for there will I'emain only a people and their master, whose will is their only law. The constitution consists in the union and agreement of independent powers, and endures only so long as those in- dependent powers endure. By being reduced to writing, the declarations of the supreme law of the States, not of the Government of the United States, but a law governing that government, are not made more binding, but they are more readily understood, and become more widely and dis- tinctly known. The words used are not the constitution — they indicate the intentions of the States which form it, they express the terms of agreement that have been settled by the States, but they are no more the constitution than a certificate is a marriage, and there has been many a valid marriage without a word of writing, to which the unwrit- 9 —10— ten canstitution of the Three Estates of England may be compared ; and much writing, often, where there was no real marriage, as in the middle ages, when ceremonies were performed in the names of children who could not yet speak; and who, from early death, never attained the power im- plied in the terms of the pretended compact. This fallacy of taking the word for the thing, the shadow for the sub- stance, has deluded the people of many modern nations into the belief, that, b}^ engrossing on parchment pretentious words, and provisions and conditions, they were making constitutions. Being based upon nothing, that is, there being no pre-existing independent powers, first to agree upon, and afterward, for which continued existence is es- sential, to support and enforce, the conditions and provis- ions, these visionary productions of the dreamer last just 80 long as their provisions and conditions are not required to restrain the use of power. The moment this occurs by any one invoking them to protefi, it m list. To the extent 6( that habit is a second nature, also seem un natural, A law entirely appropriate to a very different era of national life, is, without investigation, altogether incomprehensible to us. How little, in this country, can we appreciate the value of the dual principle in government. We are aware that it appears in the spiritual and temporal Emperors in the con- stitution of Japan ; in the Monarchy and Premiership of England; in the Sultan and Grand Vizier of Turkey, and that in the early French Monarchy, it existed in the Crown and Mayor of the Palace. It is a principle very much de- rided, aud seems truly whimsical to those who scout at the idea of a monarch without power or authority, as it is the fashion to assert, when speaking of the English Crown. As to this law of Aragon, its existence simply, without any other evidence, and just as infallibly as in comparative anatomy the nature and character of an organic structure can be determined from a single bone, would prove that national government to have resulted from an agreement be- tween the barons, a union of their powers ; that the head thereof, the crown, was limited ; and that it was well un- derstood that it, like other crowns, would be apt to trans- cend its delegated powers. It further proves that the contracting parties relied upon, what it was perfectly natural for military organizations to rely upon, their own power for self protection ; and that were the use of force by theerown, attempted tobe pushed to the extent of extinguish- ing the existence of a bcxrony, like the project, with us, of subjugating a State, and reducing it to the condition of a territory, it would result in good faith as well as self interest enlisting all the other barons in its support. In the absence of such an organic law, if the crown could have commanded force to a sufficient exteitt, it could have been used for the confiscation of all property and the entire subjugation autl enslavement of the people. Everything would be at the mercy of a conqueror who recognized no limit to his j)()wer, except his desire. So far then from being whimsi- —38— cal, this wise law was t'ounded on reason and justice, by men of forecast; aud was of a nature to be most beneficial in moderating the aims and views of existing forces, thus preserving the principle of constitutional government. It was in truth a law of civilized warfare ; and a protection to all, to the strong as well as the weak, for the dominant party of to day, might on the morrow, be found struggling for life. How clearly then it seems to be a law dictated by enlightened self-interest, and more important, perhaps, to . the party apparently successful, than to that which is for the moment, considered unsuccessful. For, suppose, in a fed- eration, the numerically stronger parties in a contest for domination, were to announce that they intended to recog- nize no limit to their use of power, as conquerers. So un- blushing a proclamation would but nerve the less numerous people to an effort of the homeric age; and such an effort always rises to a pitch of valour and endurance that is ever crowned with success. This might place at tbe mercy of the scorned, the vanquished boasters, stripped of power, with none to deny that their fate was but the fate they de- signed for others. In the feudal system the barons were each independent, because each established aud maintained himself by his own organized power. They confederated together and gener- ally elected one of themselves as monarch, delegating to him certain powers, but reserving to themselves all others. Thus arose the limited monarchies of Europe, not one of which, however, has continued limited after the loss of inde- pendence on the part of the separate powers which created it. The loss of their independence involved also the abolition of their entire legal system, which, as no limitation of the central power then remained, resulted in the crown neces- sarily becoming absolute, and devising or adopting a legal system of a different and altogether opposite nature. Th^e feudal federations were often exceedingly defective, and at beet, it has been only some happy accident that has pre- —39— served sufficient of the federative principle to secure along continuance of free government. A good example of the system is afforded in the history of the constitutional king- dom of Aragon, where the twelve great nobles, who created the monarchy, installed the incumbent of the throne with the celebrated condition, — " We who are as much as you^ and are worth more than you, we chose you for our lord, on condition that you will respect our laws ; if not, not." The distinguishing excellence' of the " General Privilege," reluctantly conceded by Peter the Great to the Cortes at Saragossa, in 1283, consists, like that of Magna Charta, in the wise and equitable protection which it afiorded to all classes of the community. [Prescott's Ferd. k Isab. i. c] When this crown became united with that of Castile, and had made the conquest of Granada, and then of America, by the re-establishment of the Hermandad, which undoubt- edly, as to its illegal and incendiary features, has here been reproduced ifl Loyal Leagues, its power overbalanced that of the nobles, and consequently became despotic over, not them alone, but over the people also, and free government ceased in Spain ; not to be restored as Prescott, perhaps vainly, supposes. For the maxima and elevated thoughts, now. existing, which he miscalls " the dormant seeds of liberty, waiting only the good time to germinate ;" [Ibid, iii, 447] are not seeds, but the fruit itself. Or considering the free institutions of Aragon as a once entire and classic structure, they are merely beautiful fragments ; precious relics indeed, but such as may always be found among the • fallen ruins of some ancient temple of liberty. Free government survives in England, because her con- quests have not been incorporated with the kingdom, and her insular position has not necessitated large armies in the island itself; andbecause of the limitation of the power of the 9r6wn by the Mutiny Act. Perhaps these causes combined are in reality less potent than the territorial power of the great nobility, which is preserved in its nature and orgaui- zation, and conse(]^ueutly in its character, by the law of pri- moa^eniture. This makes them in fact independent princes, though their strictly feudal cliaracter has ceased. It may be made as an incidental obsers^ation, that were the peerage destroyed, not only would the social and political character of England soon be changed, but by the division of property, and the destruction of the forests and parks, with a view to cultivation, the cliiT>ate too, perhaps, would undergo an al- teration, as in other countries, and most probably from the same causes, and much of the land might become sterile, and the population decrease and her material prosperity ba lost. De Tocqueville says, " Aided by Roman law and by its interpreters, the kings of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries succeeded in founding absolute monarchy on the rums of the free institutions of middle ages. The English alone refused to adopt it, and they alone have preserved their independence." [Memoir and Remains, i, 428,] When free institutions have been ruined, it is impossible to con- ceive any other government than absolutism succeeding them, and as government of this nature has long prevailed over the whole of Asia, it would not appear that Roman law, except so far as its principle is despotic, had any rela- tion thereto. In Europe, Roman law was resorted to, be- cause it was widely known through the surviving literature of the fallen empire. Had there been no Roman Empire, it is not easy to see that absolutism would consequently have been of less certain, though undoubtedly it might have been of less easy, establishment. In speaking of Eng- land he ap2:)ears to reverse the order of cause and ett'ect, for. the real obstacle was the continued existence of free insti- tutions, with which absolutism is utterly incompatible; and it would therefore be more accurate to say, that it was be- cause the English refused to abandon their own laws, thus preventing the crown becoming their despotic master, that they thereby avoided the necessity of a resort to despotic or Jxoiuan law. —41— Mr. Johu Stuart Mill considers that as in France, "a larsro part of the people have been engaged in military service, many of whom have held at least the rank of non-commis- sioned ollicers, there are in every popular insurrection, sev- eral persons competent to take the lead, and improvise some tolerable plan of action." (On Liberty, 2d ed. 201.) It does not appear to have occurred to him that his "toler- able plan" could only result in substituting a few new offi- cers in the places of a few old ones, without at all aiiecting the vitality of the dominating military organization, and that consequently the principle of the government would not be in the least degree disturbed. He continues ; " What the French are in military affairs, the Americans are in every kind of civil business. * * * * ^^^j .^ people capable of this is certain to be free ; it will never let itself be enslaved by any man or body of men because these are able to seize and pull the reins of the central adminis- tration." (Ibid. 201-2.) Fortunately for the author's rep- utation, his book was printed in 1859. Liberty is not the fruit of the happy conceits aud telling paragraphs of ear- nest writers. Their thoughts are often drawn, unconsciously, from what has formerly existed, without adverting to, or comprehending, the deeply hidden principle involved ; their delusory promises of what the future is to bring forth, are apt to be based only on their visionary hopes, aud not upon a correct understanding of the law of cause and effect. Ceaseless in their action and re-action, but ever varjnag in the degree of intensity, opinions modify or destroy institutions ; and institutions, modify or destroy opinions. Each have their turn. It is not exactly in either of these forms of de- struction, that liberty exists — there is, necessarily, too much of despotism for that. In their infancy institutions domi- nate absolutely, else they cannot reach maturity. Iv. their decay, adverse opinions assume despotic sway, and thus se- cure their fall. Rather then would liberty seem to be a living reality through the era of the maturity of institutions; 6 —42— and happy the nation in which that career of glory is long pi'Otracted. The birth of hberty may thus occur. The princi" pie of federation necessarily involves consent ; consequently it is based upon the equality of rights among the confeder- ates ; and as each is independent, he or, if a state, it na- turally upholds any one whose views and opinions coincide with his or its own. Hence arises difference of opinion in the nation, and each opinion receives sufficient support to make it respectable. Although altogether adverse to the hopeful but fallacious view of Mr. Mill, this is real liberty, securely planted on an enduring foundation, with the pro- mise of a fair development ; and it would appear to be not only a direct result of the principle of federation, but to be impossible without it ; for unless there exist the organiza- tion of an independent state or baron, on which to rely for support, each individual, in each assertion of his right, must, for himself, which of course is a simple impossibility, organize a combination for the purpose. Liberty, however, cannot outlast its foundation. Hence it is, that in a land where the vitality of its institutions or establishments has become exhausted ; where the confederate powers, be they states, or be they barons, have lost their independence and ceased their existence ; where nothing remains but a cen- tral government and a people, that government is absolute, and the tendency in the people is to become uniform in char- acter and manners ; and then there is, or soon will be, no- thing left, and nothing even to hope for, but a sort of Asiatic despotism. The principle of consent among the independent powers, and its consequence, a compromise of difference, does not seem to have been entirely appreciated by De Tocqueville, who, in his admirable vi^ork on this country, says '' The first ditiiculty which presents itself arises from the complex nature of the Constitution of the United States, which con- sists ol" two distinct social structures, connected, and, as it were, en»M>sed one within the other: two governments com- —43— pletely separate and almost independent." (Democracy in Am. Cambridge ed. 1862, i. 173) "Evidently this is no longer a Federal Govern meat, but an incomplete National Q-overnmeiit, which i:^ neither exactly uational, nor exactly federal." (Ibid. i. 201.) And again he says, "The most prominent evil of all federal systems is the complicated nature of the means they employ. Two sovereignties are necessarily in presence of each other." (Ibid, i. 210) The principle of the system is accurately described ; but the difficulties and evils he complains of, and would remove, are exactly what are required to restrain those who tempo- rarily wield power, no matter wliat their intelligence or their purpose, for the consequences of violent changes are never foreseen b}'' their enthusiastic authors ; nor can they be avoided by their helpless victims. And while they serve this important end, they aftbrd at the same time what no one more than Mr. Alills, pp, 114, 116, recog- nizes as an absolute necessity for liberty and freedom, varied fields for rival developments. So far then from removing such difficulties and evils, the wise statesman would thorough- ly and rigidly maintain them, with the view to lead irresist- ably the minds of all, to perceive no other mode of settling any question except by compromise, D.)e3 not a contest for domination between two such independent powers, with separate orbits, quite resemble a quarrel of the priest and physician over a patient, for whom nature would yet do much if man would be content to do less. These necessary ministers to our welfare greatly depend for their success upon their sway over the ' mind; but who would tol- erate for one instant a contest between the tailor and the shoemaker, as to the absolute supremacy of either in the matter of the whole apparel ? "Were it the latter who aspired to domination, would not any one unconsciously plagiarise, by exclaiming " Cobbler stick to thy last? " Mr. De Tocqueville says, " In England, the constitution may change continually ; or rather it does not in reality —44— exist." (Dem. i. 126) And that the, (his twelfth edition, Paris, 1848, contains it also) " immutability of the consti- tution of France is a necessary consequence of the laws." (Ibid, ii, 429) In view of the events of the five years im- mediately following the revolutionary efforts of 1848, may it not be said that, even if the Constitution of England do continually change, and do not in reality exist, that never- theless the infatuated people there believe it does exist, and with a ftiir promise of continuance ; while that of France. immuiahU though it be, restrains neither President nor Emperor. This writer's error appears to be fundamental, but it must be remembered that he " writes under the im- pression of a kind of religious terror produced in his mind by the view of that irresistable revolution which has advanced for centuries in spite of every obstacle, and w^hich is still advancing in the midst of the ruins it has caused." (Ibid, i. 6.) It is possible to understand that the curse of God, imposing slavery with all its heathen horrors, for countless centuries upon the unhappy people of mysterious Africa, could strike religious terror in the mind. It is too much to say that a calm survey of the gradual fall of European feu- dal institutions, protracted as it was, through some hundreds of years, could do so. It could not have been to this, but, probably, it was to the tales of terror, heard amid the scenes of nameless crimes, enacted in their wild anarchy of a few short years, by a maddened people, that the otherwise justly balanced mind and gentle spirit of the accomplished French- man succumbed. He says " The form of government which is usually termed mixed has always appeared to me a mere chimera. Accurately speaking, there is no such thing as a mixed government, in the sense usually given to that word, because, in all communities, some one principle of action may be discovered which preponderates over the others. * * * * I am therefore of opinion, that social power superior to all others must always be placed somewhere.'' (Ibid, i. r,n.) —45— l8 it not now clear that, if social power superior to all others, in the sense Mr. De Tocqueville gives, be placed somewhere, it will soon be everywhere ; that it will inevit- ably destroy the others ? That when by the aid of the de- moeratia^ it has succeeded in destroying the aristocratic, principle, it will instantly turn upon its blind and faithful ally, and appear in its true colour, a despotism; which, though it may be long protracted in its duration, is, as all history shows, the closing stage of a national life that must at last end? A nation, composed as it is of families and different interests, with their varied pursuits, may well be likened to a collection or confederation of trees, in each of which and in all ot which, there is one power, the principle of life. But that power is divided by immutable laws, and may cor- rectly be termed a mixed power, or government, for the action thereof is as well on the roots which grow downward, and are not seen, as on the limbs which grow upward, and whose increase is so slow that the nicest eye can scarce discern it. And the foliage and the fruit, too, though they be but the product of a year, result from the same power, or from one involved therewith ; for the yield of fruit of its peculiar flavour, and of leaves after their own form, would seem to be the result of attendant laws or principles, co-existent with the principle of life. Philosophers who would construct their ideal governments, should have also the power to create the beings who are to live under them. Perhaps they have; for the subjects of such despotism become in time so abject, that it is scarcely possible to realize that we and they were made by the same creator. The maturity of national life is so full in its product of rich fruit, its varied enterprizes and its useful novelties, that it appears to excite in reformers the desire to direct all power exclusively to their production. But their views and doc- trines tend to a stationary despotism, like that of China, and the insipid uniformity, which is the result, would seem to be as unnatural and unlawful as if, had one of those disturb- —46— ers the power to do no, lie were, by destroyiug their pecu- liar laws of developeraent, to have all trees yield but oue fruit, of one size, oue colour, aud one flavour. Why this iuviucible determiuatiou to reduce ever)'thiug to one single elenieut? We breathe the atmosphere, but no one is mad enough to attempt the use of the deadly gases into which it may be resolved. Is the planetary system to fall in ruins, because within it, one orb revolves around another, aud all around their centre, and the tendency of their motions be centripital and centrifugal? Though we may not compre- hend it, do we not believe in the Trinity? As the works of God are more perfect than those of man, it should be our aim to change by development only, not to destroy, the institutions and their principles, that may happen to exist in the land it is our lot to live in. It sometimes hap- pens that the tree of little promise yields rich fruit, and with time assumes a fairer form ; but if either its roots or its limbs be destroyed it can bear none at all, and there is no other to speedily replace it. So far then from, cousidering the co-existence of separate and balanced powers in a nation as an imperfection, a chimera, it is their presence in proper proportion, and their free and healthy action, no one domin- ating and destroying, but each serving its appointed pur- pose, that presents the truest and fairest picture of perfec- tion. An instance of how the purest and most devoted theoreti- cal opponent of absolutism may, when entrusted with power, himself become tyrannical, is to be found in the public career of Mr. De Tocqueville. In 1839 he prepared the report of the Committee of the Chamber of Deputies on the abolition of slavery in the French colonies ; and in send- ing a copy of it to John Stuart Mill, he wrote, "I have not tried to be eloquent. I have even carefully avoided irritat- ing the colonists, which has not prevented their newspaper^ from lavishing much abuse on me. But yon know what colonists are ; they are all alike, to whatever nation they —47— may belong. Tliey become mving madmen as soon as one speaks of justice to their negroes." [Memoirs, ii. 50.] Had it occurred to this most accomplished writer that his subject was not eloquence itself, it can scarcely be doubted that all his great powers would have been used to make it such. That his natural disposition led him to avoid irritatino- the colonists, only proves that he believed himself to be right, not that they were wrong; that he was conscious of -being able to direct against them an amount of force which they w^ere powerless to resist; and was aware his influence was greatin proportion to the elevation and sincerity of his mistak- en views, and his temperance in their enunciation. He ouo-ht to have known, to entitle him to speak so confidently, but he could not know, what colonists are; for he was not one himself. Stigmatizing newspaper opposition as lavish per- sonal abuse, was denying to others all right to opinion, and claiming for himself infallibility. Colonists differ from the subjects of the parent government in being unheeded in argument and unheard in council, for they cannot join anv one of the parties into which the nation is divided, and which, to strengthen itself, will uphold the interests of its adherents. They perceive that the intention of the home government, in its often visionary scheme of change, to be enforced against the consent of the colonists, portends to them, certainly revolution, and, if resisted, perhaps, civil war; but that as regard the home government or nation, the intention and its consummation, while an affair of com- paratively insignificant proportions, must of course be thought conducive to its interests and advantageous to its policy. The possibility of a resistance amounting to war is altogether incomprehensible to it. It is not only on the subject of negroes that contemned colonists, in the esti- mation of a nation that believes itself all powerful, lose their reason With the exception of Brazil and Canada, the colo- nists of the whole of America, when they revolted, became raving madmen in the eyes of Spaniards and Englishmen i —48— yet the subject of "justice to their negroes," did not, in the remotest degree, euter into that mighty contest which made a continent the master of its destiny. When Virginia so long protested against sending Africans there, no doubt the English considered her people as disordered in their intel- lect. Mr. De Tocqueville selects the Southern States of the Union and England and no other country, as the scenes of great and approaching revolution. " Slavery, he says, now confined to a single tract of the civilized earth, attacked by Christianity as unjust, and by political economy as prejudi- cial, and now contrasted with the democratic liberty and the intelligence of our age, cannot survive." [Dem. in Am. i. 490.) While history shows most clearly that institutions change with time, and often even fall by violence, it by no means appears that it is owing to external causes acting upon them, when confined to a single tract of the earth. It is usually the effect of internal causes ; but it may be that these, as in tiie Southern States, aad in the island empires of feudal Japan and semi-feudal England, can act with equal or even greater potency in an opposite direction ; and in a time of war such counteraction is so overwhelming, that a year will almost undo the work of a century of peace- Discarding prejudice, it is impossible to perceive any difi^er- ence in principle, and there is none, in one man being au hereditary noble, and another an hereditary slave. If it be right that one man should be elevated, can it be wrong that another should be depressed? That Christianity attacks slavery as unjust, is claimed only by those who reject the sole authority for Christianity, for no political abolitionist does or can accept the entire bible. Slavery is simply an inside form of government, and an excellent one it has proved for the negro race. Like all others it may be im- proved in its character without disturbing its nature. Abolitionists only repeat, without at all adding to, what Montesquieu has said on the subject. His views are those —49— of oue who, a wituess of an institution in its expiring con- dition, in liis own country, applied them, not altogether philosophically, to the somewhat difl'ereut and newly estab- lished serfdom of another race ou another continent. With- out adverting to its sanction by Divine Law, he attacks it as '* opposite to the law of nature." (Spirit of Laws, 2nd ed. i. 339.) The exact meaning of this view is that were the author of it to create a world, it would be one with an alteration or improvement in that respect. Like all others of his day, he was of course ignorant of the fact that slavery always existed in Africa ; and that, consequently, it is natural ; unless, indeed, we are to hold that to be unnatural which is proved to be the invariable natural tendency in certain races of man. It might as well be said that the Avonderfully organized slavery to which the red ant subjects the black ant, (Swainsou's volume in Lardner's Cabinet Cyclopedia, London, 1840, pp. 594 to 348.) " is opposite to the law of nature." Some writers on political economy, ignoring the equally important science of history, have, in their ill-judged aversion to stable institutions, proclaimed that slavery was prejudicial, and to prove their asser- tion, they themselves alleged it was a cause of weak- ness ; but the severest test the world's history affords has more than exposed the fallacy. Its contrast with such democratic liberty as is permitted, and such intelligence of our age as is exhibited, by abolitionists, while it makes civilized man blush at their ignorance and falsehoods, and sicken at their crimes, it, at the same time, forces him to turn to Asia to seek their parallel. A member of the French A.ssembly and one of the victims of the coup d' etat, as an exile, De Tocqueville sends to the London Times, 11th Dec. 1851, a graphic account of that event. "In pursuance of Article 68 of the Constitution * * * * Any measure by which the President of the Republic dissolves the is"ational Assembly, prorogues it, or places ob- stacles in the exercise of its powers, is a crime of high trea- —50— pon * ♦ * * By this act merely the President is deprived of all authority." The soldiers having arrested the members of the Assembly, it was w^ile they were confined, Dec. 2d, 1851, that " the National Assembly, decrees Louis JSTapoleon Bonaparte is deprived of all authority as President of the Kepublic." (Memoirs and Remains, ii. 182.) "If the judg- ment of the people of England can approve these military saturnalia, and if the facts I have related do not rouse its censures, I shall mourn for you and ourselves, and for the Bacred cause of legal liberty throughout the world; for the public opinion of England is the grand jury of mankind in the cause of freedom, and if its verdict were to acquit the oppressor the oppressed would have no other recourse but in God." [Ibid, ii. 190, 1.] It is too much to expect that one nation should preserv^e the freedom of others. Indeed, it rarely happens that it can even preserve it; own. The public opinion, as it is called, of England, or rather the sentiment of the few who write, for opinion is apt to find its expression in action or inaction, and not in words, appears to have had no appreciable influence on the course of affairs in France. It is not easy to perceive how it could have had, except by bringing on war, and had such been the result, the effect would necessarily have been exactly the reverse of what was designed ; for nothing could so effectually con- solidate power in France as would war with England. But no sight can be more mournful than this of the honest hearted and honourable minded man, whose every pulse beat for liberty and whose every breath chanted its praise, now amazed at the failure of the scheme he and others had devised for its security, and utterly cast down at seeing it expire, perhaps forever, in his own loved land. It was in the agony of such a mind that he wrote to his friend, Nas- sau W. Senior, 24th Feb. 1854, " While you preserve your aristocracy, you will preserve your freedom. If that goes, you arc in danger of fallins- into the worst of tyrannies — that of a despot appointed and controlled, if coutrolled at —51-- all, by a mob." [Ibid, ii. 260 ] He was, however, fixed in his admiration ofthe organization of all national power un- der one head, the result of his incredulity as to mixed govern- ment, and of his desire as a reformer for the removal of ali barriers which might obstruct the accomplishment of favour- ite schemes ; and not less fixed in his belief that the conclu- sive arguments of a few nervous writers could prove a limit to such national power, in the face too of repeated lessons that the utmost of their ability is,by uncertain insurrection- ary movement, to sometimes transfer the direction of it to the hands of another, who, whatever his disposition, soon learns that power so organized can only be used despotic- ally; that is, in amauner strictly in accordance with the nature of its organization. So thoroughly was this the trained habit of his mind, that we find him in the following year writing to Mr. Senior, 5th Feb. 1855; " Dangerous as it is to speak of a foreign country, I venture to say that England is mistaken if she thinks that she can continue separated from , the rest of the world, and preserve all herpeculiarinstitutions uninfluenced by those which prevail over the whole of the continent. In the period in which we live, and still more, in the period which is approaching, no European nation can long remain absolutely dissimilar to all the others. I believe that a law existing over the whole continent, must in time influence the laws of Great Britain, notwithstanding the sea, and notwithstanding the habits and institutions, which, still more thsjn the sea, have separated you from us, up to the present time." [Ibid, ii. 293.] Sentimental writers, calling themselves economists, phi- lanthrophists, and teachers of a religion with the latest im- provements, have for many years been engaged in a crusade, generally profitable to themselves, againt such institutions as proved obstacles in their intellectual raids. The key-note they sounded was, that, while iheir government would be cheaper than that of kings and lords, and even than that ofthe old government ofthe United States, which especially they —52— derided, sneering at it as dominated by the slave power, and stigmatizing its glorious flag as "hates' polluted rag, shielding a pirate's deck ;'' it would at the same time, they said, enure to the profit of the people in a greatly increased production everywhere. In the summer of this year, 1864, they believed that everything was in their grasp. Richmond and Atlanta were the gates to the paradise they sought. Following John Bright, who recently proposed the division of the lauded property of England, and whose proposition received the countenance of Richard Oobden, Andrew Johnson, in accepting the nomination for the Vi-ce Presi- dency, bids for votes b}' proposing to divide the large es- tates of the South among the poor of the North. The followers of Mahomet, wielding however the sword instead of the pen, were not more lustful in their greed of empire than these' sentimentalists, whose scheme, fortunately, can- not now be pushed much further, not that inexhaustable patience offers the least hindrance, but that, in their own language, it will not pay. Cotton famines and the surfeit of debt and depreciating paper money, and the reassertion of rights, almost destroyed by the schemers and vulgar jesters and buffoons who have been aping statesmen, must soon determine the limit of credulity. This was a conse- quence which De Tocqueville did not foresee, and England therefore may not encounter the fate he so confidently pre- dicted ; for if it be found that the strong arms and resolute wills of Southern men shall prove their sufficient defence, it can scarcely be, that the crusade against English institu- tions can soon or easily find a John Brown to commence* or an Abraham Lincoln to conduct it. The thirteen English Colonies in America declared them- selves, and ultimately were recognized as, free and indepen- dent States. Each by its own military power, and, by the Continental Army, all for each, had maintained its claim to sovreiguty; and they agreed together for certain purposes, upon a federative union, with the provision that it whould be perpetual; a stipulation found in the League —53— of the New England colonies, 1643, and in most treaties of peace which have been made between nations. Soon after, ward they amended their agreements of union, and in their new articles called the Federal Constitution, they wisely omit- .ted a word found to be unmeaning, for they engaged, to use the very word of Washington, in an "experiment." In a writ- ten compact, in order that no misunderstanding should arise, they clearly dejfined the sole ends they had in view, and the sole means they were willing to permit should be used to attain those ends. So far were they from entertaining any idea of surrendering the States as organized indepen- dent powers, that it may be truly said the prominent object of the Union was the more effectually to preserve them in that condition. That they attempted to do this, and wisely attempted it, is proved by the marvelous success of the cen- tral government they formed, — a success that continued uninterrupted until that principle was abandoned. Its career is conclusive that the federal organization was a healthy one, which cannot be the case in any nation, unless its constitution be in harmony with its social adjustments. That their plan was for them a correct one, cannot be ques- tioned, for it would sound like a truism to say that a federal form of government is necessary for a federation. To un- dertake to conduct a federal, on the same principle as a consolidated, government, is a violation of its nature, and only tears it to pieces. It would not be more contradictory and convulsive, were the impossible absurdity attempted, to annually elect an hereditary monarch. Except in one re- spect the Federal Government is identical in principle, though not in character, with the feudal monarchies of Europe. The same social forces enter into its organization' the people being the democratic ; the states, the aristo- cratic ; and the central government, the monarchial force. "While the citizen, as one of the people, is a democrat, he is, at the same time, if he have any respect for law and princi. pie, something more ; for as each individual takes his part —54-- in all branches of the government, it is essential that he should have a threefold nature. It is his duty to maintain his personal rights, in the preservation of whichall arealike interested, — as a member of a State, he partakes of the nature of what might be termed its baronial independence, which, undoubtedly, he has no right to consent shall be irnpaired, — and certainly it would be wrong in him to uphold the cen- tral government, in the usurpation of power from political bodies to which he does not belong ; but with which, as a member of a State, he is in a compact well defined in its provisions against such assumption. It is objected that this is a complicated system of government, but it is quite im- possible to perceive that any greater intellectual eSbrt is necessary to understand it, than is required of most of us in the ordinary affairs of life ; scarcely more than to prevent us confounding the oflices of the priest, the lawyer and the physician. While the democratic principle enters largely and vitally, and most properly so, into the organization of American institutions, the government, when properly con- ducted, is in reality that of a limited democracy ; and as such, it differs as widely from the vile despotism of pure or simple democracy, as that of the limited monarchy of England, from the absolute one of Russia. IlTothing has so perplexed impartial observers of our civil troubles, as the fact, that while the party of the administration, by the gen- eral possession of a slight smattering of knowledge, claims itself to be a somewhat superior class, yet its conduct throughout, has been marked by a disregard of honour and of legal rights, and a countenance of constant rioting and insubordination. Often changing its name, and at this moment calling itself the republican party, its characteristics are identically those of the parties which have dominated in other destructive eras ; — anarchy of thought prevailing among the members, who are turbulent and uncontrolla- ble, and in fact,entirely ignorant of the principles of govern- ment. The most highly cultivated and considerate persons, —55— whose just and liberal views are due to sober study and reflection, together with the great mass of honest-minded unpretending people, uiiperv^erted by the greed of gain, often illiterate, but by an instinctive unsophistic process of reasoning arriving at correct results, are those who best un- derstand and conform to our governmental system. And how brave, and patient, and enduring they have proved themselves. Called into being, by the unhappy civil troubles^ for the war had nearly destroyed old part:es,though not their principles, history does not afford the example of a party standing so boldly in opposition to the u&e of usurped power by the administration of government. Un- like the English, who for ten years without a murmur suc- cumbed to Cromwell, or the voiceless French cowering be- fore Kobespiere, in the face of a thoroughly organized reign of terror, and of the most reckless tyranny used for its persecution, it has steadily increased in strength ; and as the advance of time more clearly exposed the revo. lutionary aims of a dominant minority, it has only assumed a bolder tone and firmer opinion. Yet no turbulence, no disregard of law, has been exhibited. With these character- istics of a true aristocracy, this party,composed of men re- solved to maintain their equally valuable' democratic prin- ciples, has calmly stood in dignified and sublime repose, un- moved amid the tempest of a war upon its rights. Such a party cannot be lightly stirred to action ; it may never be; possibly it may expire under the despotism, for absolute power cannot permit the existence of parties. But should it move, it would be fortunate were it to do so as with one mind and a common purpose, depriving, like the burst of volcanic fire, whatever it touched of its organic character, and using it to feed the purifying flame. It is a mixed government, this of the United States, and one that worked most satisfactorily until its balance was disturbed, by a dominant party at the I^orth rejecting the aristocratic principle, that of independence of the States, —50— when at once were let loose the Bame frantic passions which raged in the French Revolution. Tlie exception alluded to in the preceding paragraph, is the radical difierence arising from the fact that after the institution of monarchy, the inevitable consequence results that the subjects of the baron gradually lose their character as such, and become, by degrees, subjects of the crown; while in a federation, so long as its members exist, each citizen must of necessity continue to remain associated with a State. Like the barons, the States are original, primitive, and self-existing powers; and confederating together they created the lim- ited federal government which, as it grew in strength and became thoroughly established, assumed supremacy over its creators ; a tendency incidental it would seem to federa- tions, and perhaps only to be checked by another confeder- ation somewhat resembling in its nature, that of the barons of England at Runnymede. A further resemblance may be traced. After a feudal federation has been etiected, in the creation of a baron, the monarch, as an agent, uses the power that has been delegated to him ; and the new baron, if an hereditary peer, can, equally with the others, aid in continuing the limitation of that delegated power which created, not only him, but all others, except those who at the birth of the nation, like the thirteen original States with us, established themselves by the use of the force of their organized power. In this sense, by being made equal with them, he becomes one of the primitive powers. He par- takes of their nature. Here it becomes necessary to cor- rect an error into which Mr. Francis Lieber has fallen. He says " The king made the Norman-English nobility. The nobility did not make the king " (On Civil Liberty and Self-Government, i. 64.) The Norman nobility undoubtedly existed long before the Conquest. By the transfer to England the nature of thefr organized power was not altered; they merely acquired new titles; as well might it be said that an old society moved into a new building, —57— becomes a new society ; and it could, therefore, just as confidently, and more correctly, be stated that, the ISTor- man-English nobility made the king. The king did not make the nobility. And so in the admission of a new State. The act in reality is that of the States, inasmuch as it is the result of their power, but it is performed by their agent, the Federal Government, to whom they expressly delegated the power to 'perform it. This view would re- move the perplexity of those who consider the Union to be the parent of the State. It merely appears to be so, because authorized to use a portion of the inherent power of the States to effect precisely that object. A new State is the peer of the other States, and can join them in continuing to limit the delegated central power. An unconstitutional attempt to introduce a new State, as in the instance of "Western Virginia, cannot be settled by the senatorial re- presentatives of the States, consenting to receive among them Senators from it ; for the States, who are the ultimate judges of the acts of their agent, exist elsewhere than in the Federal Senate. This instance of Western Virginia may be likened to the case of the patent issued in 1856, to Sir James Parke, creating him. Baron Weusleydale for life. The peers loudly protested against the intrusion of a life- peer to sit among them, for were all new creations to be such, in time, as hereditary peerages expired, the constitu- tion would be vitally changed, or, perhaps, lost, and there- fore, after a fall consideration of the subject, he was rejected. " The crown was forced to submit to the decision of the Lords ; and Lord Wensleydale soon afterwards took his seat, under a new patent, as an hereditary peer of the realm." [May's Constitutional Hist, of England, i. 249.] It was proposed to insert in the Articles of Constitution an authority for Congress "to call forth the force of the Union against any member of the Union failing to fulfill its duty under the articles thereof." (Elliott's Debates, v. 128.) Mr. Madieon said, " A union of States containing such an in- 8 .r.c. gredient seemed to provide for its own destruction." (Ibid, 140.) Mr. Hamilton considered the idea as so preposterous that he could say little more than that, "It is impossible." (Ibid, 200.) The proposition was unanimously rejected. (Ibid, 140.) While the denial of the power of coercion would seem to be so clear that it does not admit of argu- ment, for it is simply a question of fact, the prevalence of the unconstitutional idea, to which Washington referred, made it essential, that any remaining trace of doubt should be removed. The struggle, one that unhappily yet eon- tinuea, first occurred on the question of the adoption of the Constitution, and as though Providence designed to aid the blindness of man in this favoured land, a compromise was effected b}- the adoption of the ten amendments. Though not more binding than the body of the instrument, they are infinitely more emphatic, inasmuch as thejr were in- tended to set at rest the points in dispute, upon which questions had already arisen agitating the country. And it is remarkable that in the three great convulsions which have marked its history, the administration of the Federal Government has not only assumed the power of coercion, which was unanimously refused by the States, but has in- vaded the powers or rights reserved to the States or the people, by one or more of these ten amendments ; and which "Washington said were reserved even without them. Xo one would would venture to deny this in the matter of the Alien and Sedition Laws ; nor would any one who en- tirely understood the subject, hold a different view as to the Force Bill in the time of the Nullification of South Carolina. With regard to existing affairs, the President now in office, in a message, has boldly taken the position, that he violated the Constitution and disregarded his oath, to such an extent as he thought proper. Prior to these acts of resistance by Bonle of the States, against the usurpation of power by a ^arty which happened to administer the central government, there was a resistance, begun by Massachusetts, in which —59— all became combined, against the usurpations of the gov- ernment of England. This continual and successful resist- ance has not been at the cost of liberty ; on the contrary, it has been the means of preserving it. And it should be impressed on every mind, that the four periods of resistance have exactly marked the duration of successive generations of man, as though the memory of freedom did not survive, and each for itself had to struggle for the prize : for the jirst occurred about the year 1770, the others about the years 1800, 1830, and I860. From these facts of resistance alone, and altogether independently of the evidence and conclusions previously given, it is seen that tlie State or Colony, in its revolt, possessed power which it could use, and that it used it successfully ; and that after it had en- tered into the Federal Union, there has not been wanting the full evidence that its power had not ceased to exist. The fact of the power would not seem to be an open ques- tion. Wa are now further to inquire whether the power has a legal and recognized existence, that is, whether when a State acts altogether independently, the power it wields is its own or is wrested from some other goveroment. It might very well be claimed that the power used by the English subjects in the revolt of the Colonies, legitimately belonged to the Crown, which, however, by its attempted usurpations, forfeited its right thereto, whereupon it became legally vested in the bodies politic formed by the successful rebels. But it has never been held that one State acting against central government, uses the power of another State. The pretence is that iu acceding to the Federal Union, it parted with all power ; and that when it so acts, it usurps power from it. That is, it is pretended that the Federal Govern- ment is an unlimited sovereignty. But this idle and pre- tentious claim vanishes when we look at the agreements of the States in their Articles of Constitution. The word peo- ple is both singular and plural. In the Constitution it is —60— used in the plural number. The preamble of Mr. Pinckuey's plan, of the 29th of May, 1787, as did also that reported by Mr. Rutledge, on behalf of the committee, Aug. 6tli, com- menced, " We the people of ^ew Hampshire, Massachu- setts, etc. etc.,'" each State being named. This preamble was adopted unanimously, but obviously on the suggestion that some of the States might not accede to the Union, the State of Rhode Island not even being present in the Con- vention, all their names were struck out, and the word '• United" inserted by Mr. Morris, who, as Madison says, gave the Jinish to the style and arrangement of the reported draft and subsequent resolutions. (Elliott's Debates, v. 129, 376, 882, audi. 507.) The enacting clause places it beyond even cavil that its Articles were the agreements of States. — '• The ratification of the Conventions of nine States shall be sufficient for the establishment of this Constitution between the States so ratifying the same ;" not over the States, nor the people of the States. We may perceive that only a limited .and clearly defined power was delegated, for the agreement between the States is that " the powers not delega- ted to the United States, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or the people." And the preservation of the powers which the States reserved to themselves and their people, ia secured and guarded by many recognitions, among others, " the right of the peo- ple to be secure in their persons, houses and papers," that of "freedom of speech and of the press;" and that *' a well regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free Slate, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed." There is also the recognition of the separate and distinct organizations of " the militia of the several States." The State then possesses "power;" the Constitution uses that word ; and as its machinery of legislation is perfect, it necessarily can use that power. By the same mode as they act on any other subject, its people, who can only be guided and impelled by their minds, whicli — 6i— cannot be coerced, if they conceive it to be a measure necessary for the preservation of tlioir recognized, not granted, nor guaranteed, personal rights, can by their con- vention and their votes, repeal their ordinance of accession to the Federal Union ; and by their arms prepare to main- tain their act. In considering such an act, which we can- not deny to be an exercise of power, the real question for us, as it is a violation of a joint compact, is whether it is a rightful or wrongful exercise of power, for neither the in- tention of those who bring about the action, nor the result of the action, in the least possible degree affects the nature of the power they use ; not more than the nature of the knife or the poison is changed by the difference of inten- tion in its use. Among sovereigns there is no superior. One does ndt direct the affairs of another ; the moment this occurs, the re- sult is one sovereign power, not two, for one becomes sub- jugated to the other. Each therefore is equal, each is in- dependent. Its acts are to be taken as the result of its judgment with a view to promote its interest. Does it err, it suffers. A sovereign claims that the use of its power, ' is the result of its considerate will, and is for its benefit, and that no other can consistently interfere. It therefore holds that its power is its right, and the two words become almost synonymous. Arrived at this point, only a single step is required to reach, in a degraded monarchy, the doc- trine of the Divine right of Kings, or in simple democracy, always fitful when unlimited, the equally false dogma. Vox Populi,Vox Dei. But in governments which have true con- stitutions, the words in question are employed with more precision than is the case when used by warlike tribes in their conquests, founding nations, or by old or expiring, or apparently expiring nationalities, on which ceaserism threat- ens to settle, or has already fastened itself. Thus, that English Parliament, which heard the great Earl of Chat- ham defy the throne when he said, " My Lords ! I re- —02— joice that America has resisted," heard hirn also say, ^'Foioer without right is the most detestahle object that can be offered to the human imagination; it is not only perni- cious to those whom it subjects, but works its own de- struction." In the Federal Constitution, except in one instance, Art. X, of Amendments, which reserves the illim- itable residue, the word p9?(;<:;r would seem to be used to ex- press that limited amount thereof, which the States have delegated to the separate departments of the Federal Govern- ment which they created ; and the word right, to express that which belongs absolutely to each person of the State. It is in the collected people of the State, the body politic, that the supreme and absolute sovereignty is recognized as inherent. In this sense it is scarcely possible in our system, also, when speaking of a State, which, if separated from the Union, becomes an unlimited sovereignty, to sepa- rate power from right, otherwise than to view it as an effect resulting from a cause ; for if the people are su- preme in tht'ir rights, they necessarily are also supreme in their power. The States delegated none of their people's rights, they merely delegated a part of that power which is the result of those rights. Certainl}- their agents cannot rightfully transcend the amount of power entrusted to them, and invade those rights, for that would result in the as- sumption of supreme power by the agents, who would thereby become the sovereign power ; and the loss of all rights by the people, who would consequently sink to the conditioa of subjects. To speak with exactness, the word right means legal moral power. It is so used in the Articles of Constitution, for instance, in the recognition of the right to keep arras. This is a right, not conferred or granted thereby, but recognized as pre-existing and inherent. It was, as has been stated, acquired by success in arms against England, and, as is also the case with regard to the other rights, appears to be recognized as personal, ujt pertaining to the State, but to each individual thereof. A State there- —63— fore, formed as it is of a voluntary associatioM of iudivid- uals, though undoubtedly it could assume the power to do so, could not rightfully deprive any one individual of these rights, even if it were unanimous except as to that person. Were it wrongfully to do so, as one man could not success- fully maintain his rights against a multitude resolved to be disloyal to their agreement, and to rebel against the principle of their government, of course there would be nothing left for him but enslavement, or else, expatriation or secession, which would remain his right, for the State would not be a voluntary association unless he could withdraw from it. By Section XXV, of the Declaration of Rights of the State of Pennsylvania, the expressed and unquestionable right to do this is recognized. As each State is a voluntary association of individuals, so the Union is a voluntary association of States, the ob- jects in view being " to establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general weltare, and secure the blessings of liberty to our- selves and our posterity." And more completely to secure these distinctly stated objects, the States agreed that alterations of the articles could be made by three fourths of them agreeing thereto. This preserves the principle of con- sent, but it involves another principle, that no alteration be made touching the independence of a State, or the right of any person. Now the States which might agree to an alter- ation, could do so were the majority in each to be but one vote, and they might all be the lesser States ; whereas the vote in the States opposing the alteration could be unani- mous, and these might all be the greater States. Thus, a3 by the census of 1860, the eight greater States contain a pop- ulation of 16,197,127, while the twenty-six lesser States contain 14,950,698. Now to one half of this latter number add one for each of the twenty-six States, and we have 7,475,375, very considerably less than one-fourth of the population, who could legally make an alteration against — 04 — the will of 23,673,476, the entire population of the eight greater States and one half (lacking one for each) of that of the twenty-six lesser States. This is oti tlie basis of an election for members of the Convention bv a g-eneral ticket throughout a State. If each district iu a State should elect a member, the minority could be very much further re- duced. This conclusively proves that the people of all the States do not form one body politic, for in sach a society the rule of the majority prevails. Were an alteration so made, to be of a nature similar to some of the acts of the present Executive, to the efiect, for example, that the people should not have the right to keep arms, could folly itself supp ose that so great a violation of the principles on which the fed- eral compact was founded would be permitted ? So fur as form and words were concerned, it would clearly be the 'law, no lawyer and no judge could gainsay that. Hso pam- phleteer? would be required to furnish, as in other cases of violation of the Constitution, an interminable amount of chop-logic, unanswerable because unintelligible, to prove what every one could see. They would be dumb, for the letter of the law would speak for itself. Yet would not the people be silent. Tiiey would show that a povcer existed in the laud beyond the letter of the law. The spirit of liberty would manifest itself, and renew the spirit of the law. Let us suppose another case. No State can, without its own consent, be deprived of its equal representation in the Senate. Were, however, the 31, 036, 609 people of thirty- three of the States to unanimously resolve that as the State of Delaware had but 112.216, it should therefore have but one Senator, and alter the agreement to that effect, it would be submitted to; because sufhcient power did not exist to pre- vent it. It may however be well supposed that this eas}-, quiet and successful usurpation of power in a case apparent- ly trivial, would be fraught with more danger and result in a greater levolntioii, than would the other (iase ; for once excited, the lust of power is insatiable ; and unrestrained, —65— it would sweep on until it leveled every barrier in the dust. Whereas, in the case previously supposed, power would merely be used for the maintenance of the barriers of re- sistance, and with success, its use would most probably terminate. From the view that has been presented, it is to be supposed that in the withdrawal of a State from the Union, the end sought is conservation of that State, certainly not the de- etruction of another, much less of itself ; nor is the govern- ment of the Federal Union among the remaining States necessarily less perfect, except in the degree resulting from the degradation of the principle of union, owing to the in- creased power of domination in a party animated by the fell spirit of unconstitutional aims, ji^or does a State with- draw because of its objection to the pre-existing and yet existing terms of Union. But it is because of a declaration by a majority of the States that they will no longer consider themselves bound by those agreements, and that the minor- ity must submit to have imposed upon them, — not new terms of agreement, for consent is necessary to agreement, but terms to which the}- will not agree. It is because the principle of consent, the sole foundation of the whole system of free and federal government, is about to be abandoned, and no longer recognized; and as a consequence, that another principle, ybrce, a principle upon which each State itself is based, but one altogether repugnant to the federal system, is to reign undisputed through the future. Owing to the frequency of elections, the interests and social conditions existing in a State, and the opinions which pre- vail, are at all times faithfallj' and exactly represented in its internal government. The people of a State can there- fore by no possibility desire revolution, other than that which is always going on with them. It is impossible, for at their will they make such change as they desire. Their abandoning the manifold advantages which are so well known to result from union, would therefore seem to make 9 ^66- it conclusive, so far as the people of the withdrawing State were concerned, that their act was solely with a view to prevent a revolution, which was going on in other States, from reaching them. It cannot be supposed that a single State, or any number of them, being a minority, but acting singly, as they necessarily must at iirst, would attempt to dominate the majority. But it can be supposed that a ma- jority of the States acting, as a political party, through the machinery of the Federal Government, might attempt to dominate the minority; and the intention in their attempt would be, and could only be, to effect a revolution against the will of, and in, the minority States. In the event then of the withdrawal of a State, wisdom and knowledge would lead our minds to the belief, that sober reflection may with time brino; a conviction, that the extreme act was a ris^htful exercise of its power; or it may prove otherwise; for it is time alone which dispels the clouds of ignorance as well as of passion, and finds, on one side or the other, a modified opinion, and in both, a kindly temper favourable to a compromise. It may then be considered as settled, that a State in with- drawing from the Union uses its power. This cannot be controverted. The fact is so, and the law is so. The fact that it has done so may be disagreeable to us — it is more sadly so than can be comprehended b}' those who do not understand the nature of the government, — and we may have no kuow^ledge of the law ; yet must we be careful lest we transo'ress ; for is^norance of the law excuseth no man. But a State's rightful or wrongful use of that power is another and an open question, and one upon which each man has a right to form his own deliberate opinion ; he has, how- ever, no moral right to the indulgence of incendiary utter- ances, whose only meaning is the destruction of established power. If the act be recognized, and the State considered as a foreign government, then the Federal Government may rightfully hold it to account for violating the compact —07— into whicli it had entered, because the States delegated to the Federal Government the power to make war upon for- eign governments. But war cannot be rightfully and con- stitutionally made upon a State by the Federal Govern^ ment, so long as it claims that State as belonging thereto, because the States, as has been shown, expressly, and the vote was unanimous, withheld the power to use force against a State belonging to the Union. Force was author- ized to be used only against persons. If used against States it is wrongful, it is usurped power, and violates the compact with States yet belonging to the federation, and the rights of persons in them, and would, if successful result- in the destruction of the States, and the loss of rights on the part of the citizens. It therefore increases the numbers of those opposed to abandoning the constitutional principles of the government, and must, if persisted in, ultimately result in the withdrawal of yet other States. It would be attempted, but vainly attempted, to prevent this, by the suppression of all power in those States wdiose votes exhibited a change of opinion,-vainly, because State orgaaization,"once suppressed, there would arise in its place an armed part}' organization, for which the people and the States haveprovided by their Bills of Rights, and to maintai n which the physical ability exists. And that armed party would ba of the majority, for the conclu- sive reason, that so long as a party continued in a minority its suflVage would not be violated, and it could not, as a mat- ter of course, be brought to arm. But were the Adminia- tration of the Federal Government to succeed in retaining the consent of the people of the States now supporting it, to the use of power, which it is admitted by all, is extra- constitutional, the whole nature, form, and character, and eventually the name, of the "iSTorthern Government must become changed; one consolidated State replacing the union of many. The Southern States, on the other hand, if successful in maintaining their independence, will con- tinue to have a government of States united, scarcely differ- —68— ing from the admirable government we would have thrown to the winds. This would be inevitable, for no truth can be plainer than that the wrongful assumption of power, is more injurious to those from whom it is wrested by the arts of deception, or who ignorantly surrender it, inasmuch as it is apt to be permanent; than to those against whom it is used, for on them its effect, however severe, is only tran- sient. The plan of Federal Government has often been resorted to. Its action is satisfactory so long as its principle is adhered to ; but its principle is so delicate — that vital prin- ciple, the principle of compromise — that attempted viola- tion of the agreements of union is apt to be frequent. The BcBotian federation was composed of twelve or thirteen au- tonomous towns under the headship of Thebes. Platfea, one of the federation, was ill-used and discontented. It craved the protection of Sparta against Thebes, and surren- dered the town and territory without reserve. The Spartan King, having no motive to undertake a trust which promised nothing but trouble, advised them to solicit the protection of A-thens. They did so, and received it; for Thebes now invaded the Platfean territory. Battle was about to be joined when the Corinthians interposed with their media- tion, which was accepted by both parties. *' They decided altogether in favour of Platj^ea, pronouncing that the The- bans had no right to employ force against any seceding member of the Bcootian federation." (Herodotus, vi. 108, Qrote's Greece, iv. 221.) While the doctrine of this exam- ple of two thousand years was recognized by the wise men who sat in the Federal Convention, it and their endorsement of it, have unfortunately been lost upon us. We may grieve, but we should not be surprised at this disregard of human wisdom, for there was, also forourguidance, another example of two thousand years ago, and its acceptance by the same venerable men as a just rule ordained by Divine Wisdom, which also we have hardened our minds into re- —69— jecting. In providing for the rendition of fugitives from service, there was to guide them and us, the Epistle of iSt. Paul returning Ouesimus. No one who has written on the subject, has been more unqualified in his assent to the principle of secession, than John Quincy Adams. He speaks of it as a right vested in the people of every State. " Thus stands the RIGHT," he snjB, and by printing the word in capitals, instead of italics, he more than emphasises it. Mr, Adams says " It is not immaterial to remark that the signers of the Declaration, though qualifying themselves as the Representatives of the United States of America in general Congress assembled, yet issue the Declaration in the name and by the authority of the good people of the colonies, and that they declare, not each of the separate colonies, but the united colonies tree and independent States." (Oration by J. Q. Adams, 50th Anniversary N. Y. His. Soc, 183i^, p. 15.) "Therewasno congeniality of prin\3iple between the Declaration of Inde- pendence and the Articles of Confederation." (Ibid, 17.) " The right of a single State or of several States in combi- nation together to secede from the Union, has been directly asserted, frequently controverted, etc., * * * * but is now terminating in a more devoted adherence and willing subserviency to the authority of the Union. * * * * With these qualifications, we may admit the same right as vested in the people of every State in the Union, with refer- ence to the general government, which was exercised by the people of the United Colonies, with reference to the supreme head of the British Empire, of which they formed a part — and under these limitations, have the people of each State in the Union a right to secede from the Confederated Union itself. Thus stands the RIGHT." (Ibid, 67, 68, 69.) It is not too much to say that there is not the slightest trace of an idea that the people of all the Colonies or States, ever formed themselves into one body politic. Every atom of evidence is directly to the contrai'y. What was proposed —To- by New Hampshire (see ante p. 14) would have effected that result; but her proposal was not even made a subject of discussion. Up to July 1776, the Colonies were making constitutions, which, in view of the continued sovereignty of the CrowQ, they styled temporiiry. Virginia, however, formed for herself a constitution without any such provis- ion ; but in order to make the act a logical one, she had, on the 29th of June, 1776, declared the government "as formerly exercised by the Crown of Great Britain, totally dissolved." (Elliot's Debates, i. 66.) The Declaration of Independence was proposed, iu Congress, by the Delegates from Virginia, under inst ructions from that State to pro- pose, not only that measure, but also " a Confederation to bind the Colonies more closely together." (Ibid, i, 56.) As it was five years before this proposed Confederation was at last agreed to by ever}" State, one after another, it is utterly incomprehensible that they could by their Declaration, as Judge Story holds, have ceased to be States ; [Ibid, i. 66.1 and this without any one suspecting it. That in the assertion of independence they assumed to be States, and afterwards continued in the same condition, cannot be controverted, because, on all questions, in both the Conti- nental Congress and in that of the Confederation, all votes were by States; as it now is in the event of a failure of the Electoral College to electa President. On the first of July, 1776, on the motion to adopt the Declaration, the two mem- bers from Delaware were divided; the following day, how- ever, the scale was turned by the appearance of a third member. [Ibid, 59, 60.] The action of this State, through its embassy, was un([uestionably that of a political unit. And such was also the case with that of each of the States. A vague idea of the exact nature of the result that followed from the position assumed by the Colonies, has no doubt arisen from the use, and it was a proper use, iu the Decla- ration of Independence, of the word unaniraous. It merely conveys the idea of a fact, and it means nothing beyond that, unless, indeed, in conuectiou with the absence of the names of the Colonies, the hope was entertained that Canada would in time be included in the revolt. Had this occurred, the absence of her name, if those of the others had appear- ed, would probably have proved an obstacle in future nego- tiations. Had Gen. Montgomery captured Quebec, under the term United Co?07?/65, undoubtedly the Province of Canada would have been claimed. In the revolutionary period there were two principal questions, and only two; and in these unanimity was essential. The first was resistance against the tyranny of England; and out of this grew the second, which was the dissolution of the dependence on its Crown. Had any colony determined on non-resistance, or on a continuance of British sovereignty, certainly the others could not have undertaken to etfect for it, what it would, in that event, have been opposed to ; which was actually the case with the Province of Canada. On the minor ques- tions, those which regarded the measures by which the two principal ones could most eltectually be established, una- nimity w^as not required. As to the assertion that " there was no congeniality of principle between the Declaration of Independence and the Articles of Confederation," nothing more need be said than that, as they were both proposed by the same men, in the same instructions, to the same men, and both were adopted by the same States, it is fair to presume and claim, that the people of that day believed it a question of not the slightest importance whether they were, or were not congenial; and if such was their belief, it need require no violent effort to be also ours. Without commenting on his use of the word suhserviency, which has no place in the vocabulary of freemen, it may be remarked, that Mr. Adams' admission of the principle of secession as a right vested in the people of a State, seems too broad and sweeping in its character. Their vested power is exclusive, but in view of the compact of the States, whili they have a right of judgment as to the propriety of its exercise, it is not an exclusive riglit. He probably had in his mind the ordinary case, wherein the only organized power is that of the otie national government, without a true constitution, and consequently unprovided with a mode of changing rulers, where undoubtedly, as it is the only possible means, the clear and unqualified right, if the word be used as the synoniyra of power, of revolution exists. But federations differ Irom simple national governments. He had not, perhaps, considered that in our system, the people of a State live under two governments ; tVieir own, always appointed by themselves, and directed by their will; and the federal, appointed, as to its administration, perhaps, exclusively by other States, and directed, perhaps, by the will of hostile majorities living exclusively in those other States. And that therefore, so fiir as the seceding State is concerned, the rupture of the federal relation need not necessarily be, except as to one of its governments, of a revolutionary, and much less of an anarchial, character. It has previously been shown that the withdrawal of a State would be because of the revolutionary tendency of other States ; a tendency boding all the ills of social war, not at first amongst themselves, but directed against the State, that, with a view to check that tendency extending to it- self, would engage in a measure which, however essential for the preservation of its existence, would certainly be at the hazard of a conflict of arms ; l)ut by which, however, it would escape the greater horrors of anarci)y and dire social war. Generally among men a successful revolution is pronounced to be right; for an existing sovereignty could scarcely admit that its title to power was to be trnced to a wrong. But there is a higher view by which to judge of human affairs than by this vulgar mode of measurement. By considering the corrrectness of the principles involved, and the elevated aims of the unfortunate, we may often juHtly hold that those who fail have been in the right ; and, ™73— on the other hand, that those who succeed, however remark- able their energy or respectable their ability, may never- theless have been grievously in the wrong. It is thus we judge the people of other lands. Mr. Adams has passed away, leaving his well considered opinion that if separation should come, it ought to be in peace. He would have held that American to be a reckless man, who, claiming that we alone have adopted the maxim, that " government derives its just powers from the consent of the governed;" and that we alone can, by the ballot, ascertain consent ; yet vaunts before the world his delight at usurped power crush- ing consent ; and at force and corruption violating and pol- luting the ballot by which alone it is possible to ascertain it. It has been attempted to show that the constitutional power of the Federal Government is, as it was intended it should be, strict!}^ limited, like that of the Crown of Eng- land ; and by the same made — the only possible, one — the withholding- from it the supreme and absolute power of command over the arms and armed men of the country ; that this is the direct result of the principle of federation, appearing wherever that principle can be traced ; and that wli-en the best men of the land lose the disposition to be their own defenders that principle disappears. And it may not be doubted that so long as this constitutional limitation of power is recognized ; so long as it is held to be the supreme law that a State possesses power that it can use at will ; so long as it is believed that one State has no right to inter- fere in the affairs of another, just so long will our free in- stitutions endure. . But when sophists delude them, men's enervated minds become, as it were, saturated with the un- wholesome fogs of the muddy and stagnant swamps of lifeless twaddle, instead of filled with bounding vigour in- spired by healthful draughts of the knowledge of principles, sought at their clear and lucid fountain heads. And they call it progress as they are lured on through dark and tangled wastes by some short-lived jack o' the lantern, bred of the pestilential vapours which surround them. And that a —74— master may think, and act, and be responsible for them, and save them, as they vainly hope, from the sloughs from which they have lost the ability to escape, they agree that power shall no longer remain divided, and listlessly consent to drop the arms from hands once nerved by the spirit of liberty. Thus they yield themselves, their bodies and their minds, to the keeping of a despot, for whatever may be his intention or his character, the possessor of undivided power must, by the law of its nature, draw the rivets from every association within its sphere, like the loadstone island, which, as the ship of Sinbad the Sailor approached, drew from it the spikes which held its planks together, tumbling them an useless wreck upon its shore. Liberty and progress co-exist with, and are fostered by, the division of power, while anarchy, which ever attends a war of principles, and these are potent and conflicting in this i^orthern land, must, perhaps for ver}^ many years, reign the undisputed monarch through the fearful, yet, ultimately, unsuccessful struggle for its consolidation. The only escape from this dreaded fate is through a return to the true principle of the federal system ; for the real and actual division of power in this country, is the very soul and spirit of all its institutions ; it pervades all the founda- tions, and it appears in all the superstructures. Each State is based upon it, for by the sword it wrested it from England, and it was intended that its organizaiion, as well as that of the Federal Government, should wield it. Contiguity does not affect it, for adjoining States may, as they choose to will, use opposing ]iower, while widely separated ones may will to use it in a similar direction. Every citizen is bound by this division of power, for it is the law and the Consti- tution. He that is opposed to it is the really disloyal, if that ^^•ord applies in our system, for, as a member of a body politic, he has plighted his faith to support it. Yet while ho is bound by it, and it is his duty to submit to it, he has the riii'ht, if he think proitor to do so, to pro])Ose and urge iN ;il;(M:itioii : but he liiis tho right to do so, only in the ■ I 0~ mode the Law and Constitution point out. Does he, when entrusted with admiuistr-iition, venture to assume and use power which has not been delegated to the i'ederal Govern- ment, or he who urges him so entrusted, to assume and use such power, he becomes lawless ; his object is revolution ; he strikes at the Constitution ; he would destroy it. He it is that aims at the national life. He is the architect of ruin ; and his crime is more heinous than that of the regi- cide, for he seeks to destroy a constellation of sovereigns. An accurate, and it is thought to be a moderate estimate of the debt of the Federal Grovernment, liquidated and unliquidated, is, that it already amounts, and without any indication of a termination to its increase, to full four thou- sand millions of dollars. While in principal equal to, the interest on it will be double, that of Great Britain. The valuation of British property is, however, three times that of the Northern States, so that the burden on Americans, and soon it will begin to be felt, is actually six times that on Englishmen. There is no ordinary peril in this. The organized institutions of the country may, possibly,even yet be restored, and with them a constitutional government somewhat resembling that of England in its nature and its success ; but it will be found to be an impossibility to con- tinue more than a few years longer the present enforced unity of government, whose tall must necessarily involve along with its own, that of the most overstrained tinaneial system that has yet been presented to the world. Montes- quieu ascribes the facility with which the Mahometans made their conquests, to the overtaxation of the Empire: it having reached such a point that " Anastasius invented a tax for breathing." (The Spirit of Laws, i, 310.) Their conquests could not have been eiiected at all, much less with such facility, had the people of the Empire been their own soldiers. But their day for that was over; had they, however, been so, they themselves would have prevented, or if not. they would have cured, the disorder of over tax- ation. The melancTiolv truth seems to be, that the old age of national life brings witli it, an administration of government controlled bj^ or in the hands of, the extrava- gant moneyed class, who, with adverse interests, always distrust the people; a standing army of foreign mercena- aries, an establishment so unstable, that, when it has ex- hausted the country which requires for its defence arms more valiant than its own, it either possesses itself of that country, or else quickly disappears, like water in sand ; a disuse of arms among the people who, by that time. Piave abandoned the simple mode of life of their hardy and self- reliant forefathers; and a taxation so onerous as to amount to positive spoliation. When plunged in such condition, a nation has passed its era of making conquests. This shirt of Nessus has been slipped upon the American people by men whose rapturous applause, at their own succes-, drowned the soft and gentle footfalls of the avenging gods, who, in their ap- proaches, as heathen story tells, are ever shod with wool. Yet there were not wanting those who gave utterance to their alarm; but they were unheeded, and often silenced by the cry that they were disloyal, and not patriotic ; the low voice of innocence was stifled by loud-mouthed crime. Pa- ti'iotism ! And what is it ? As to its possession, the same re- ply may be given that the venerable and Reverend Dr. Alex- ander made to the conceited student of divinity, who enquired of him "Whether he had Ruy religion?" "ISTone to speak of, young man! " And so with patriotism or loyalty. The man who speaks of it is not to be trusted, for he is without it as Burely as the man who vaunts his honour is without that quality; or as the woman who could condescend to dicuss the question of her virtue, must not only possess it not, but must also, be without a comprehension of what it is. Men may differ widely, they may be in grievous error, and yet possess patriotism. He who, by mad fanaticism, ruins his country, is not, necessarily, without it. It is a quality pOHsesscd by every one who boasts not of it, who trades not in it; and truly did Dr. Johnson say of those who do, that "Patriotism is the last rofnuo of a scoundrel." W 5 78 •■«( c '\V, \**' "°^'-^'-/ ^^/.^'^«*^ "-^'•:^%o' ^^-^. •**_ ..J.-* ^""V. *^, " o ^0 r.: o^c,^' ^^ 'O'- n^ .^^ ...^/,:^s;'.\ c:^' z--^^- ^.^V •>- .V' » y* S- .-to.. ,'■/ .<&■ c " " " » -^^ > ^^ a"*" ^^"^ ' ""-.^ ^^ /V V .K ii^^ INniANA >-' [• .