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REPORT OF THE MINORITY 
 
 COMMITTEE OJV MILITARY AFFAIRS, 
 
 THE PETITION OF 
 
 THE LEGAL REPRESENTATIVES OF ANTONIO PACHECO, 
 
 COMPENSATION FOR A SLAVE. 
 

MINOEITY REPORT. 
 
 FEBRUiSRY 9, 1848. 
 
 Mr. Dickey submitted the following, as the views of the minority 
 of the Committee on Military Affairs, upon the petition of the 
 legal representatives of Antonio Pacheco: 
 
 Upon the petition of Antonio Pacheco'' s heirs a minority of the 
 Committee on Military Affairs ask leave to report: 
 
 That the facts in this case are distinctly set forth in the report of 
 the majority, viz: "That Pacheco was the owner of a negro slave 
 named Lewis, who was hired by an officer of the army, duly au- 
 thorized, from his owner, as an interpreter and guide to the defeat- 
 ed command of Major Dade; that he was one of the few survivors 
 of the disastrous defeat of that command, and remained either vol- 
 untarily or as a captive amongst the hostile Indians until the spring 
 of 1837, when he accompanied Jumper, a Seminole chief, to one of 
 our military posts in Florida; that he was then claimed by his 
 owner, and the military commander, in whose control he was, re- 
 fused to deliver him to his owner, and ordered that he be sent with 
 the Indians to the west; because he deemed his transportation proper 
 inasmuch as he was considered capable of exercising an injurious 
 influence over the Indians; and thus, in pursuance of this order, he 
 was transported to the west, and his owner thereby deprived of his 
 value." 
 
 The undersigned being unable to coincide with the majority of 
 said committee, have been induced, from the importance of the 
 questions involved, to place before the House some of the reasons 
 which have led them to a satisfactory conclusion that the petition- 
 ers are not entitled to relief. Before entering upon the principal 
 question involved in the consideration of this claim, the undersigned 
 would remark, that in no aspect of the case can they regard it as 
 valid. Admitting, for the sake of the argument, that the slave was 
 property in every sense of that term, it appears very clearly to the 
 minds of the undersigned, that compensation cannot be granted 
 according to well known and established usages which have con- 
 trolled this government from its earliest history. 
 
 The military officers of government are its special agents, limited 
 irv their sphere of action, but authorized to bind the government so 
 
4 Rep. No. 187. 
 
 far as their legitimate powers extend, and no farther. Thus a milita- 
 ry officer may undoubtedly bind his government, so far as may be ne- 
 cessary to provide the men under his command with the ordinary ra- 
 tions to sustain them, if not provided by the other agents of govern- 
 ment; but if they be furnished by the government, and the officer pur- 
 chases, upon the public credit, wines, or chocolate, or other luxu- 
 ries, such contract places the government under no moral or legal 
 obligation to pay for them. The rule in regard to military officers 
 is nearly the same as that in civil life. While the agent acts strict- 
 ly within the limits of his autboruty he binds his principal, but 
 when he transcends his authority his acts become his own, for 
 which he alone is liable. These principles have been so often de- 
 cided that it would seem useless to quote precedents. 
 
 And now, admitting this man Lewis to have been the property of 
 the petitioner, had the officer who sent him west of the Mississippi 
 legal authority to bind his government by such act? Had the same 
 officer taken the horse or the ox of the petitioner and sent him west 
 of the Mississippi, in the same manner, would the government have 
 been bound to pay for him] Certainly not. The offirpr, if neces- 
 sary to transport his baggage or provisions, would have possess- 
 ed authority to hire, or even to purchase, or to impress into the 
 service horses or oxen for that purpose. But he had no authority 
 to hire, purchase, or impress a horse or ox to send out of the coun- 
 try. Such act would have rendered the officer liable, but not the 
 government. 
 
 Taking the negro, had he been property, for the purpose of 
 sending him west of the Mississippi would not have constituted a 
 " taking for the public use.''"' He cannot be regarded as used by 
 the public while he is pursuing his own happiness in the western 
 country. Not being taken for public use, the taking was the act 
 of the officer, for which the gQvernment is not responsible under 
 the practice which has been followed since our existence as a 
 nation. 
 
 But questions of the most grave importance seem legitimately 
 involved in this case. The character of slavery and the constitu- 
 tional relation which the federal government and the people of the 
 free States hold to that institution, must necessarily be determined 
 before we can arrive at a satisfactory conclusion upon the case 
 presented. 
 
 1st. As to the character of slavery. In the earlier ages, many 
 nations of the earth regarded war as the only honorable employ- 
 ment of man. When prisoners were captured, it was supposed that 
 the victor had the legitimate right to deprive them of life, or to 
 save the life of the prisoner and hold him as a slave. Thus, slavery 
 is regarded by most writers as one of the resulting consequences of 
 war. The prisoners captured were held by physical force, and 
 whenever they made their escape they became free. To eflfect 
 their escape, they might use any means within their power, pro- 
 vided they did not injure innocent persons. 
 
 The practice of taking prisoners of war continues to this day. 
 
Rep. No. 187. S 
 
 but the holding of prisoners as slaves has long since ceased among 
 civilized nations, although it has but recently been abandoned by 
 the semi-barbarians of Algiers and Tunis. 
 
 The practice of seizing upon the unoffending people of Africa, 
 . and bringing them to the American continent and holding them as 
 slaves, followed the abrogation of that of holding prisoners of war 
 in perpetual servltudej and, although the importation of slaves to 
 these Slates has been interdicted by law since the year 1808, it is 
 still openly continued by one of the governments on the American 
 continent, and clandestinely practised by citizens of other govern- 
 ments. 
 
 The inhabitants of Africa are seized in violation of the dictates 
 of humanity and of the natural rights of man. They are torn 
 from their native land by physical force, and, while on board the 
 slave-ships, are held in subjection by chains and fetters. It is 
 perfectly clear that they had at all times the most indisputable 
 right to release themselves from bondage by any means which God 
 and nature had placed within their power. That right descended 
 to their offspring, and still continues. Th'ey owe no alleo-iance 
 whatever to our government; it has never extended to th^m its 
 protection, and can demand from them, by no principle of reason 
 or justice, any support. Thus it is said, with great force, that 
 slavery is a state of war between the slave and those* who oppress 
 them. All his feelings are opposed to the laws and the govern- 
 ment which holds him in subjection. Thus, the slave "Lewis," 
 whose master now claims at the hands of Congress a compensation 
 for his body, was held in servitude by the local laws of Florida, 
 which authorized his master to chastise him into obedience to his 
 own w-ill. To his master, nor to the government of Florida, nor 
 to that of the United States, was he under any moral obligations 
 of friendship or obedience. He had the most clear and indispu- 
 table moral right to relieve himself from servitude at the earliest 
 practicable moment. When he joined the enemy, after Dade's de- 
 feat, his master, the government, and the laws of Florida lost their 
 control over him. He then became free. From that time, he acted 
 in concert with our enemies, and was one of them. Had he been 
 slain in battle, no one would have supposed the United States 
 liable to the master. When he submitted to our arms, together 
 with his Indian allies, he did so as an enemy, and thereby became 
 a "prisoner of war," in the same manner and entitled to the same 
 rights and privileges to which his fellow prisoners were entitled. 
 The officer in command was fully authorized to extend to him the 
 same terms of capitulation which he extended to others. Those 
 terrns had been prescribed and made known both to him and to the 
 Indians. Those propositions were, that they should emigrate west 
 of the Mississippi, In these terms there was no exceptions. See 
 Doc. 225, 3d session 25th Congress. 
 
 Under these stipulations, and the pledged faith of the govern- 
 ment, he submitted as a prisoner of war to an officer of the United 
 States. It is said that the petitioner then claimed him. What 
 claim had he to this prisoner? The answer is, that he had no more 
 
6 Rep. No. 187. 
 
 claim to the negro than the negro would have had to the master, 
 had he been taken prisoner by the enemy. Having been /ree, 
 there was no law of Florida, or of the federal government, by 
 which he could have been re-enslaved. There is no practice or 
 usage of civilized nations at this day which could justify the re- 
 enslaving of this man Lewis. It would have reflected dishonor 
 upon the government to have violated its faith by enslaving those 
 prisoners who had come in under a promise of being transported 
 west of the Mississippi. The officer to whom he surrendered was 
 not authorized by any law to decide upon the fact of his being a 
 slave. There was no mark by which he could ascertain whether 
 the prisoner had been a slave or not. The question of his right to 
 liberty could not be legally passed upon or decided by a military 
 officer in the service of the United States. That would have been 
 a judicial question, could it have been raised, which no mere mili- 
 tary officer of this government was authorized to determine. 
 
 If the petitioner had any legal right to the custody of the man 
 Lewis, [which is by no means admitted,] it was his duty to have 
 enforced it by judicial process, by which the negro could have been 
 brought before competent authority, and the legal claim of the 
 petitioner could have been determined. But the undersigned deny 
 that the petitioner could stand by and see the negro carried beyond 
 the Mississippi, and then turn round, and as a consequence of his 
 own neglect, call on the government to pay him for such servant. 
 Again, the negro was neither killed nor maimed, but was dis- 
 charged out of custody of the officer, and the petitioner may now 
 enforce his claim to him if he has any. There is the slave; if the 
 petitioner has had any legal right to him since he was taken, that 
 right remains unimpaired, and the petitioner is at full liberty to 
 enforce it judicially; but while he thus sleeps upon his rights, the 
 undersigned are unable to discover any good cause why the govern- 
 ment should award him a compensation for said slave. These 
 objections present themselves to the undersigned as insuperable at 
 the very tlireshold of the case. 
 
 Beside these difficulties, however, there are other considerations 
 which address themselves with great solemnity to the judgment of 
 the committee. 
 
 The legislative branch of this government are now called upon 
 to recognize slaves as 'property under the constitution of the United 
 States, and the undersigned have therefore examined this part of 
 the case with some care. 
 
 It is undoubtedly true that during the earlier ages, slaves were 
 regarded by many nations as a species of property. Indeed, we 
 find that as late as 3749, Lord Chancellor Hardwick decided that 
 trover lay for a West India slave, before the courts of Great Brit- 
 ain. But such was the progress of public opinion, that in 1772 
 Lord Mansfield, with the unanimous concurrence of all the judges 
 of the king's bench, decided, in the celebrated case of Somerset, 
 (see 20 State Trials,) that a slave brought upon British soil became 
 ipso facto free. In his closing remarks, he said " The state of 
 slavery is of such a nature that it is incapable of being introduced 
 
Rep. No. 187. ^ 7 
 
 011 any reasons moral or political^ hut only hy positive law. It is 
 so odious that nothing can he suffered to support it hut positive 
 law.^^ From the time of Lord Hardwick's decision to that of Lord 
 Mansfield, no act of Parliament had changedthe English law in 
 any respect whatever, and the revolution in the judicial branch of 
 government resulted entirely from the force of public sentiment. 
 Yet slaves were at that time held in all the colonies which subse- 
 quently formed the States of this Union at the time of adopting the 
 constitution. But the patriots of that day were inspired with the 
 great and important truths relating to the rights of man. The con- 
 vention which put forth our declaration of independence on the 4th 
 July, 1776, proclaimed those great principles which challenged the 
 admiration of the world. They declared it to be a " self-evident 
 truth," that men were born free and equal, with certain inalienable 
 rights, among which were life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; 
 that to protect tho^e rights governments are formed among men 
 deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed." No 
 form of language could more forcibly deny that man can be made 
 property, than this declaration of the sages of American freedom. 
 
 In 1787 the convention met to frame our federal constitution; 
 and it is important to understand the light in which they viewed 
 this question. 
 
 Mr, Madison in his papers informs us that on 
 
 "Wednesday, August 22d, the convention proceeded to consider 
 the report of the Committee of Detail, in relation to duties on ex- 
 ports, a capitation tax and a navigation act. The fourth section 
 reported was as follows: 
 
 " ' No tax or duty shall be laid by the legislature on articles ex- 
 ported from any State, nor on tie migration nor importation of 
 such persons as the several States shall think proper to admit; nor 
 shall such migration nor importation be prohibited.' 
 
 " Mr. Gerry thought we laad nothing to d© with the conduct of 
 the States as to slavery, hut we ought to he careful not to give any 
 sanction. 
 
 "Mr. Sherman, was opposed to any tax on slaves imported, as 
 making the matter worse, hecause it implied they loere property. 
 
 " The whole subject was again committed to a committee of 
 eleven, which, August 24th, reported as follows, concerning the 
 4th section: 
 
 " ' Strike out so much of the 4th section as was referred to the 
 committee, and insert, 'the migration or importation of such per- 
 sons as the several States now existing shall think proper to admit, 
 shall not be prohibited by the legislature prior- to the year 1800, 
 nut a tax may be imposed on such migration or importation, at a 
 rate not exceeding the average of the duties laid on imports.^ 
 
 " The next day the report was taken up. and amended by substi- 
 tuting 1808 for 1800, and the .first part was then adopted. 
 
 " Mr. Gorham thought Mr. Sherman should consider the duty 
 not as implying that slaves are property, but as a discouragement 
 to the importation of them. 
 
8 . Rep. No. 187. 
 
 The discussion, it will be observed, turned upon the peculiar 
 phraseology of the second part of the report, which, in classifying 
 slaves with merchandise, seemed to imply that they were property. 
 No one expressed a "desire that such an idea should be embodied in 
 the constitution; on the contrary, there was a manifest desire on 
 the part of the members of the convention to explain the phrase- 
 ology as to exclude the construction given to it by Mr. Sherman. j 
 Mr. Madison, it seems, agreed with that gentleman. He thus re- \ 
 ports himself: 
 
 " Mr. Madison thought it wrong to admit in the constitution the 
 idea that there could he property in man. 
 
 "Col. Mason — (in answer to Mr. Gouverneur Morris) — the pro- 
 Tision as it now stands was necessary for the case of convicts, <in 
 order to prevent the introduction of them. 
 
 "Still, the convention was not satisfied, and it was finally agreed, 
 nem. con., to have the clause read 
 
 "'But a tax or duty may be imposed on such importation, not 
 exceeding ten dollarsybr each person.'' 
 
 "And then the second part, as amended, was agreed to." 
 
 And thus it stands to this day. 
 
 This is one of the most important facts on record. It demon- 
 states, beyond all doubt, the settled purpose of the federal conven- 
 tion carefully to exclude from the constitution they were framing 
 the idea that there could be property in man; and that the term 
 ^'^ persons^'' was used when slaves were referred to, with the inten- 
 tion that, so far as the constitution was concerned, they were 
 always to be regarde;'? as persons, and not as piroperty. Mr. Sher- 
 man was opposed to the clause, "as acknowledging men to be 
 PROPERTY." Mr. Madison was also opposed to it, because he 
 " thought it WRONG TO ADMIT IN THE CONSTITUTION 
 THE IDEA THAT THERE COULD BE PROPERTY IN 
 MAN." 
 
 And the clause was so amended to exclude in express terms the 
 idea that there could be property in man. 
 
 These views appear to have fully accorded with the public senti- 
 ment of that period. In every instance in which reference to glaves 
 is made in the constitution, they are termed persons. Thus, in 
 fixing the ratio of representation, it provides that "the number 
 shall be ascertained by adding to the whole number of free per- 
 sons, including those bound to service for a term of years, and 
 excluding Indians not taxed, three-fifths of all other persons.'" It 
 is clear that the framers not only regarded slaves as persons, but 
 they were spoken of as other persons — thus placing them upon the 
 same general basis as freemen. In the 9th section of the first ar- 
 ticle, the constitution provides that "the migration or importation 
 of such persons as any of the States shall think proper to admit, 
 shall not be prohibited until the year 1808," &c. Here, again, the 
 language is carefully used to distinguish slaves from property. 
 Again, in the second section of the third article, the constitution 
 provides : " No person held to service or labor in one State under 
 
Rep. No. 187. 9 
 
 the laws thereof, and escaping into another, shall, by any law or 
 regulation thereof, be discharged from such service or labor." 
 Thus, in every instance in which the constitution refers to slaves, 
 they are designated as persons^ contradistinguishing them from 
 property. We are not only informed that the framers of the con- 
 stitution regarded it as wrong to admit in the constitution "that 
 there could be property in man," but they carefuHy employed such 
 language, in framing that instrument, as to exclude such an idea. 
 The undersigned regard this subject as separated from all uncer- 
 tainty or doubt; so that any man who carefully examines it must 
 be convinced that to regard slaves as property, under our federal 
 constitution, would be to pervert the language of the constitution, 
 and to defeat the recotded intention of those who framed it. 
 
 The undersigned are 'further confirmed in this conclusion by the 
 decision of this point by the highest judicial authority known to 
 the constitution. In the case of Groves vs. Slaughter and others, 
 (15 Peters's Reports, 449,) this question came distinctly before the 
 Supreme Court of the United States. The constitution of Missis- 
 sippi had prohibited the introduction of slaves into that State after 
 a certain day. Slaves were taken there and sold on a credit after 
 the time allowed by the constitution of that State. Suit was com- 
 menced on the note given, in consideration of the slaves. The 
 defence was, that the contract was illegal and void under the 
 constitution of that State, which prohibited the sale therein of 
 slaves from without the State. The reply to this was, that slaves 
 were property^ and therefore the State of Mississippi had no power 
 to prohibit their introduction into the State, as the power to regu- 
 late commerce between the States belonged only to Congress. In 
 deciding the law. Judge McLean said : " By the laws of certain 
 States, slaves are treated as property; and the constitution of Mis- 
 sissippi prohibits their being brought into that State by citizens of 
 other States for sale or as merchajidise. Merchandise is a compre- 
 hensive term, and may include every article of traffic, whether 
 foreign or domestic, which is properly embraced by a commercial 
 regulation. But if slaves are considered in some of the States as 
 merchandise, that cannot divest them of the leading and controlling 
 quality of persons, by which they are designated in the constitu- 
 tion. The character of the property is given them by the local 
 law. This law is respected, and all rights under it are protected 
 by the federal authorities; but the constitution acts upon slaves as 
 persons, and not as property." 
 
 If slaves be property , it follows that Congress may regulate the 
 interstate slave trade. They may prohibit the transportation of 
 slaves from one State to another; or they may authorize the estab- 
 lishment of slave markets in each State of the Union, under such 
 regulations as may be deemed reasonable. If slaves, under our 
 constitution, be regarded as property, then, indeed, no individual 
 State has power to prohibit slavery within its jurisdiction. The 
 constitution of several States declare tnat there shall be neither 
 slavery nor involuntary servitude within such State. But if slaves 
 be regarded as property under our federal compact, then no 
 
10 Rep. No. 187. 
 
 State of the Union has power to consecrate its soil to freedom. 
 No State can, under the federal constitution, exclude horses or 
 property of any kind from being brought into it and sold. If, 
 therefore, slaves be property, they may be transported to New 
 York or Ntw England, and held there, and sold like other prop- 
 erty. But those who regard slaves as property, will hardly con- 
 tend for such a right. 
 
 The undersigned are conscious that doubts on this subject have 
 long existed in the minds of some statesmen and jurists who have 
 been born and educated in States where slaves are held to be 
 property by the force of the local laws. Being accustomed to 
 regard them as property, they draw no distinction between the 
 laws of the slave States and those of the federal government. 
 Persons thus educated in the slave States, coming into the office 
 of President, or into either of the executive departments, or into 
 either house of Congress, are likely to bring with them the views 
 imbibed in such States. Thus we find that in some instances the 
 President of the United States and other officers of the government 
 have at times, without examination, regarded slaves as property, 
 and, in some instances, have paid the public funds for such slaves, 
 not only without authority of law, but in opposition to the spirit and 
 the letter of the federal compact. The same officers, after having 
 their attention called particularly to the subject, have seen their 
 error, changed their practice, and refused to regard slaves as prop- 
 erty. So, alro, in some of our treaties, slaves are referred to in 
 connexion with other property. Thus our treaty with Great Brit- 
 ain, of 1814, speaks of " negroes or other property;" so too in 
 some of our treaties with the Indians, the same language is used. 
 But in all these cases the undersigned have reasons to believe the 
 framers of these treaties neither examined the subject, nor is it 
 probable that they even thought of any distinction between the 
 relation which the federal government holds to slavery, and that 
 maintained by the government of the slave States. And iX is 
 proper to remark, that, in making treaties Avith foreign nations, 
 the government is controlled solely by the law of nations. Un- 
 der these circumstances, the undersigned feel that the language 
 employed in those treaties can form no precedent for the discharge 
 of our legislative duties when this precise question is presented 
 for our decision. 
 
 It is also the case that in some instances the courts in free 
 states have carelessly applied to slaves, the term "property." But 
 the committee have searched in vain for a case in which slaves are 
 decided to be property binder the federal constitution. It is be- 
 lieved that no court, either of the free or the slave States, or of 
 the United States, have made decisions to that extent, while it has 
 already been shown that the Supreme Court of the United States, 
 have decided that they are not property. Nor are they regarded 
 merely as property in any of the slave States. In every State of 
 the Union they are punishable for crimes under the State laws, 
 such is not the case with any species of property. Murder may 
 be committed upon slaves in any State, iind the murderer hanged 
 
Rep. No. 187. II 
 
 therefor. But no such punishment applies to the killing of any 
 other species of property. Slaves in such States are, however, for 
 certain purposes under their laws, regarded as a '■'■peculiar kind of 
 property. ^^ But the laws of those State* are /oca^, and have no 
 bearing upon the relation which the federal government holds to 
 the institution. Slavery is the creature of municipal law, and can 
 extend no farther than such municipal enactment has force. _ It is, 
 therefore, strictly confined to the jurisdiction creating it. So 
 strictly is this rule of law observed by courts of justice, that if a 
 slave escape from his master on to free soil, but, for a moment, he 
 becomes free forever. Thus, in the case of Forbes vs Cochran, 
 et al, (vide 2, Barnwell & Cresswell, 448.) Bayley, justice, re- 
 marked, " slavery is a local law, and, therefore, if a man wish to 
 preserve his slaves, let him attach them to him by affection, or 
 make fast the bars of their prison, or rivet^well" their chains, for 
 the instant they get beyond the limits where slavery is recognized 
 by the local laws, they have broken their chains, they have es- 
 caped from their prison, they are free." The same principles were 
 decided in the case of Somerset, (see 20 vol. State trials,) and are 
 recognized by the courts of the United States, and by those of 
 nearly all of the several states of this Union. See 2 Marshall, 
 Rep. 467; 1st Leigh, Rep. 172; Gilmer's, Rep. 143; 2 Mum- 
 ford, 393 ; 5th Read, Rep. 126 ; Walker's Mississippi Reps. 36. 
 In the latter case, the court say, '' slavery is condemned by reason 
 and the laws of nature. It exists and can exist only through mu- 
 nicipal regulations.''"' Property may be taken by the owner from 
 one State to another, or from one nation to another, but, if a man 
 voluntarily take his slave, or send him to a free State, the moment 
 he enters such State, he becomes a freeman. From that moment 
 the masters' power over him ceases, and he can no more be enslaved. 
 
 But the undersigned feel that it is the duty of statesmen to 
 meet out justice with an even hand to all the people of our govern- 
 ment. In order to do this, long existing usages and v/ell es- 
 tablished precedents must be followed. Instability ii le.oislation 
 creates distrust, and destroys confidence in the legi;^' at.ve b?dy. 
 The undersigned, have, therefore, looked into the forv.^:- r.rhv-";i'je 
 of Congress on this subject, and they find but one principle has 
 ever been acknowledged by Congress, in regard to the question 
 under consideration. The legislative branch of government has 
 never regarded slaves as property, nor has any claim for the pay- 
 ment of slaves, either lost or killed in the public service, been paid 
 by law of Congress, except, perhaps, in one or two instances. 
 The only law which the undersigned have ^ound is the case of 
 Depeyster, which passed the House of Repr sentatives, without 
 discussion or examination, at the 1st session, -Sth Congress, (see 
 laws of that session.) , 
 
 It is within the personal knowledge of at least one of the under- 
 signed, that the bill in that case was regarded by seme of the older 
 members of the house as unsustained by principle, au'! opposed to the 
 entire practice of the government, since we have been a nation. But 
 it passed while such members were absent from the house, or at least 
 
12 Rep. No 187 
 
 without their attention being called to it, and one of those days in 
 which no discussion is permitted. As it passed without discussion 
 or examination, it can, with no propriety, be said to form a pre- 
 cedent for other cases ; particularly, when the House of Repre- 
 sentatives has frequently passed upon this question upon full ex- 
 amination, and have as uniformly refused to pay for the loss of 
 persons held as slaves. The case of Francis Larche is one fa- 
 miliar to most of those who have serve\l long in Congress. The 
 petitioner in that case owned a slave, horse, and cart, all of which 
 were in his service near New Orleans, in 1814. The day of the 
 battle near that city, the slave, horse, and cart, were impressed 
 into the public service, by order of the commanding officer. 
 During the battle, the negro and horse were killed, and the cart 
 destroyed by the cannon shot of the enemy. The owner subse- 
 quently applied to Congress for compensation. The case was re- 
 ferred to the committee on claims, who reported in favor of paying 
 for the horse and cart, but against paying for the slave. See 
 House Reports, 1 sess. 21 Congress, vol. 3, No. 401. This is, per- 
 haps, the strongest possible case. The owner had not hired the 
 slave to government, but the slave had been impressed against the 
 will of the owner. If any case could be attended with circum- 
 stances which demanded pay from the government for the loss of 
 a slave, this was surely such a case; yet the committee, composed 
 of men from the southern States, as well as from the northern 
 States, appear to have come to the unanimous conclusion, that the 
 allowance of this claim would be an overturning of the established 
 usages of the government. They say, in their leport, that they 
 had caused examination to be made at the Treasury Department, 
 to see if slaves who had been killed in public service during the 
 revolutionary war had been paid for. And they learned that no 
 such instance could be found. They also cite a number of cases 
 where claims were made for slaves killed, and those who died in 
 the public service during the war of 1812, all of which were rejected. 
 On the 9th April, 1816, Congress passed an act entitled "an act 
 to authorize the payment for property lost or captured, or destroy- 
 ed by the enemy while in the military service of the United States." 
 A motion was made to amend the bill so as to include slaves lost 
 or killed in the public service; but the amendment was rejected. 
 Another attempt was made to amend a similar bill on the 24th 
 January, 1825, but the amendment was again rejected. These ex- 
 press decisions of the House, and the number of reports against 
 claims for payment of slaves lost in the public service, would seem 
 to have permanently established the principles which should govern 
 us in the present case. But several cases of this description have, 
 within the last five or six years, been reported upon favorably, and 
 efforts have been made to change the established usage of the gov- 
 ernment in cases of this description. At the 2d session of the 27th 
 Congress the Committee on Territories reported a bill for the relief 
 of the people of West Florida, by which provisions were made for 
 the payment of slaves taken from their owners by the array under 
 General Jackson, in 1814. This bill was opposed on the ground 
 
Rep. No. 187. 13 
 
 that slaves were persons^ and not property, and when the final vote 
 was taken by yeas and nays, the claim was rejected. But enumer- 
 ation of particular cases can add no strength to the position assum- 
 ed by the undersigned. From the first session of the first Congress 
 down to the present day, no case can be found in which the legisla- 
 tive branch of government has, upon examination or discussion of 
 this subject, admitted slaves to be property. Many claims of this 
 character have been rejected. The action of the House has at all 
 times been opposed to allowing claims of this description ; having, 
 for more than half a century, regarded slaves as persons and not as 
 property. The undersigned can now see no good reason for re- 
 versing the principles on which Congress has so long acted, and 
 overturn the plainly expressed intention of those who framed our 
 federal compact. 
 
 But the undersigned are deeply impressed with the important 
 principles involved in this case, which yet remain to be examined. 
 The time seems rapidly approaching when the relation which the 
 federal government holds to the institution of slavery, under the 
 constitution, must be examined and determined. The undersigned 
 are conscious that they cannot do justice to their own views of this 
 case without defining, with some degree of precision, the constitu- 
 tional powers of the federal government in respect to slavery. 
 They find that, prior to the adoption of the federal constitution, 
 each of the several States entering into the compact had full, per- 
 fect, and absolute control over the institution of slavery within its 
 own boundary, and could continue or abolish it at the pleasure of 
 its people. By adopting the constitution none of those powers 
 were delegated to the federal government, but each of the several 
 States retained to itself the same powers in relation to slavery 
 which it had previously possessed. A portion of the States, in 
 pursuance of their most obvious constitutional rights, have abolished 
 that institution. Other States, by virtue of the same right, still 
 continue to sustain it. Nor has Congress the constitutional power 
 to interfere with the exercise of those rights. The several States, 
 having retained to themselves all powers not delegated to the 
 federal government, each may now sustain slavery, or it may en- 
 tirely separate itself from all participation in the support of that 
 institution. The rights of the several States on this subject are 
 equal and perfectly reciprocal. The federal government, in the 
 opinion of the undersigned, possesses no power to involve the slave 
 States in the abolition of their " peculiar institution." Nor has it 
 the right to involve the free States in its support. It is strictly a 
 State institution, over which Congress has no control, except to 
 legislate for the recapture of fugitive slaves, as provided for in the 
 last clause, 2d section of the 4th article of the constitution. With 
 this one exception, the undersigned entertain the opinion that Con- 
 gress possesses no jurisdiction over that subject, and is totally des- 
 titute of all power to legislate, either to uphold or destroy it. The 
 federal government belongs equally to all the States, and when it 
 puts forth its powers it must act for all the people of all the States. 
 It follows, as a corollary, that it cannot act where slavery is con- 
 
14 Rep. No. 187. 
 
 cerned. If it acts against slavery, it must encroach upon the rights 
 of the slave States; if it act for the support of that institution, it 
 will equally encroach upon the rights of the free States; for they 
 hold their right to be free from what they regard the guilt of 
 slavery to be as supreme as that of the people of the south to be 
 free from its abolition. The framers of the constitution, as we 
 learn from the discussions at the time of its adoption, intended to 
 leave the institution of slavery entirely with the States. It is in 
 vain that we look to that instrument for any powers conferred on 
 Concrress over slavery. These opinions are believed to be fully 
 born^e out by the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United 
 States.— See Groves vs. Slaughter, 15 Peters' Rep. p. 449; also 
 case of Priggs vs. the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 16 Peters' 
 Reports. 
 
 This doctrine, so prominent in the discussions at the time of 
 adopting the constitution, and which it is believed has not only 
 been confirmed by judicial decisions of the courts of the United 
 States, but by those of the different States, has been frequently re- 
 cognised by the House of Representatives. By an almost unani- 
 mous vote in December, 1838, it was resolved that this government 
 is a government of limited powers; that^ by the constitution of the 
 United States, it has no power whatever over the institution of 
 slavery in the several States of this Union.^'' It would be useless 
 to quote other resolutions or acts of this House to prove a propo- 
 sition so well known and understood by all intelligent men. So 
 far has this doctrine been carried that, for many years, it was re- 
 garded as a useless occupation of time, even to receive petitions 
 asking us to act in any way touching the institution of slavery, 
 even in the District of Columbia, where it exists' by act of Congress, 
 and such petitions, by a standing rule of the House, were laid on 
 the table without being read or referred. 
 
 It seemed to have been the unanimous opinion of statesmen, that 
 Congress possessed no powers whatever in relation to slavery. A dis- 
 tinguished Senator in speaking before that body on this subject, in 
 1839, said, "according to the compromises of the constitution no 
 power whatever was granted to the federal government in respect 
 to domestic slavery, but that which relates to taxation, representa- 
 tion, and the power to restore fugitive slaves; all other power," said 
 he " in regard to the institution of slavery, was retained exclusively 
 by' the States." This was spoken in the presence of that learned 
 body, and no member, it is believed, either denied or doubted the 
 doctrine advanced. 
 
 The undersigned entertain the same sentiments. They feel that 
 to legislate for the payment of slaves by this government, or to 
 appropriate the funds of the nation, drawn in part from the free- 
 men of the north, for such a purpose, would be to involve the 
 people of the free States in the support of an institution which 
 they have discarded, which they regard as wrong, to which they 
 are, morally and religiously opposed, and from the evils and bur- 
 dens of which they are most obviously exempted by the constitu- 
 tional compact. 
 
Rep. No. 187. 15 
 
 The undersigned are not unconscious that the last clause of the 
 second section of the fourth article of the constitution has been 
 referred to, to show that the constitution has involved the free 
 States in the support of slavery. This, however, if true, must be 
 limited to the terms to which that clause extends. It has no other 
 reference to slavery than regards fugitive slaves, and cannot prop- 
 erly be construed as extending further. But we find, by the his- 
 tory of its adoption, that the framers were careful not to involve 
 the people of the free States in the arrest or return of fugitive 
 slaves. The covenant on the part of the free States is, that they 
 will pass no law or regulations, nor do any acts, to relieve such fu- 
 gitive from the service of his master. When that clause of the 
 constitution was before the convention, a member from South Ca- 
 rolina moved to amend it so as to make it the duty of the people of 
 the free States to arrest and imprison fugitive slaves, in the same 
 manner as they were bound to arrest and imprison fugitives from 
 justice. But Mr. Wilson, of Pennsylvania, objected that such 
 provision would involve the people of the free States in the ex- 
 pense of arresting and imprisoning slaves, and the amendment was 
 rejected. 
 
 This is conclusive to show that no acts were to be done by the 
 people of the free States in favor of fugitive slaves. Indeed, this 
 very stipulation is to abstain from action. So clearly is that inten- 
 tion expressed on the face of the constitution, that the Supreme 
 Court of the United States, in the case of Prigg vs. Commonwealth 
 of Pennsylvania, declared the States incompetent to legislate on 
 the subject, and that the last member of the section, which says 
 "they shall be delivered up on claim of the party to whom such 
 service or labor may be due," imposes upon the people of the free 
 States no other obligation than peaceably and quietly to permit the 
 holder of the slave to enter such State and pursue and take his 
 slave without molestation or hindrance. To the extent, then, of 
 abstaining from all participation in aiding the slave to escape from 
 service, the people of the free States are bound to uphold that insti- 
 tution, and no farther. The master cannot demand of them aid or 
 assistance m retaking his slave. If the slave resist his master, there 
 is no obligation upon the people of such free State to assist the 
 master in overpowering the slave. So far from this, some of the 
 State legislatures have, by statute law, rendered it penal for any 
 citizen of such State (not being an officer of the United States) to 
 render any assistance to the master in such case. Of the perfect 
 constitutional power of the States to pass such laws, the under- 
 signed entertain no doubts. And they are led to the- conclusion 
 that this provision of the constitution gives no power, either ex- 
 press or by implication, to Congress to legislate either for the ben- 
 efit or the abolition of slavery, except for the arrest of such fugi- 
 tives; and, on that point, the powers of Congress extend no farther 
 than to attach penalties to any act of interference on the part of 
 those who defend, protect, or secrete the fugitive from arrest. The 
 undersigned, after the most careful examination of this case, and 
 
16 Rep. No. 187. 
 
 of the important principles involved in its consideration, have been 
 led to the conclusion — 
 
 Firstly. — That, admitting the man Lewis to have been the prop- 
 erty of the petitioner, in the ordinary acceptation of that terra, the 
 circumstances of this case come within no established rule of com- 
 pensation known in the practice of this government. 
 
 Secondly .—Thdii Lewis was a prisoner of war, and could not 
 properly have be.en surrendered by the military officer in command 
 to any person claiming him as a slave. 
 
 Thirdly. — That slaves, under the provisions of the federal con- 
 stitution, are not regarded as property, and ought not to be paid 
 for by the government as such. 
 
 Fourthly. — That for Congress to allow compensation for the man 
 Lewis, would be to reverse the entire system of legislation on the 
 subject which controlled this body since the adoption of the con- 
 stitution, and would bespeak an instability of purpose which must 
 necessarily impair the confidence now reposed in us by our consti- 
 tuents. 
 
 Fifthly. — That, by the constitution of the United States, the fed- 
 eral government are not authorized to legislate upon the subject of 
 slavery, or in any manner to involve the people of the free States 
 in the payment for slaves. 
 
 The undersigned, therefore, recommend to the consideration of 
 the House the following resolution: 
 
 Resolved, That the petitioner is not entitled to relief. 
 
 JOHN DICKEY. 
 JAMES WILSON. 
 DAVID FISHER. 
 DUDLEY MARVIN. 
 

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