619 15 py 1 When you have read this, please pass it on to a friend. oJLLETIN NO. 32 JULY, W7 THE AMERICAN RIGHTS LEAGUE For Upholding the Duty of the Republic in International Relations 2 WEST 45TH STREET, NEW YORK ® THE UNITED STATES AND PAN-GERMANISM BY ANDRE CHERADAME The present situation in Europe is due to two factors: first, the almost complete fulfillment by the Germans of a plan which they had long been preparing with the utmost care; second, the repeated mistakes of the Allies in their carrying on of the war — mistakes which alone have permitted the Germans to consum- mate their plan almost without opposition. The Pan-Germanist programme of 191 1 called for the establish- ment of Prussian hegemony over a territory of nearly 4,015,000 square kilometres — in other words, besides actual conquest in the East and West, it meant the indirect yet effective seizure of Austria- Hungary, the Balkan States, and Turkey. At the beginning of 191 7 — before the capture of Bagdad by the English and the strategic retreat of the German troops in the West — the programme had been realized to the extent of 3,600,000 square kilometres — that is, in nine-tenths of its entirety. The basic explanation of this achievement lies partly in the fact that, if the Germans are outlaws they are very intelligent outlaws, perfectly trained for the task of seizing the booty on which they have set their hearts ; partly in the fact that the leaders of the Allies, intelligent and animated by the best intentions though they are, have been quite unenlightened as to the multiple realities of the European tangle, a thoroughgoing knowledge of which is absolutely necessary for the conduct of the terrible war in progress. II The capital mistakes made by the Allies are as follows: They believed that a friendly agreement with Bulgaria was possible, although that country was treaty-bound to Berlin and Constan- tinople long before the war. They cherished illusions concerning King Constantine, who, above all else, was brother-in-law of the Kaiser. They organized the Dardanelles expedition, which should "olograph Jitn never have been attempted. Even if this operation had been judged technically feasible, its futility would have been apparent if the Allies had realized — and it was their arch-error not to realize -that the strategic key to the whole European war was the Danube. The mere occupation by the Allies of the territory stretching from Montenegro through Serbia to Roumania, would have resolved all the essential problems of the conflict. Cut off from the Central Empires, Bulgaria and Turkey, whose arsenals were depleted by the Balkan disturbances of 1912-1913, would have found it im- possible to make a strong stand against the Allies. Turkey, who had been imprudent enough to defy them, would have been obliged to open the Straits within a very short time, for sheer lack of muni- tions to defend them. This opening of the Straits would have been effected by a strong pressure by the Allies on the south of Hungary. Moreover, by the same action the Central Empires would have been barred from reinforcements and supplies from the Orient. Germany, finding herself cut off on land in the South as she was blockaded by sea in the North, would have been obliged to come to terms. Unhappily, the general staffs of the Allies in the West were not prepared to grasp the politico-scientific character of the war, especially the cardinal importance of the economic factor. This ignorance remained unenlightened until Roumania was crushed in 191 6. As a result, for twenty-seven months the Balkans were looked on by the leaders in the West as being of only secondary military importance. The direct result of the mistakes of the Allies, coupled with the methodical procedure of Berlin, has been the realization of nine-tenths of Pan-Germany. This Pan-Germany is composed of two elements. First, the great occupied territories taken by Germany from Belgium, France, Russia, Serbia, and Roumania. Second, the practical seizure effected by her at the expense of her own allies: Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey; for, as a matter of fact, the Quadruple Alliance is nothing but a great illusion carefully fostered by the Kaiser for the purpose of concealing the true situation from the neutrals — particularly the United States. If one wishes to see things as they are, one must realize that Austria-Hungary, Bul- garia, and Turkey are not the Allies — that is, the equals — of Ger- many. These three states are practically the vassals of Berlin, in whose sight they scarcely count for more than Saxony or Bavaria. The principal proof of this state of affairs lies in the fact that the Kaiser yields an uncontested supremacy from Hamburg to the British front at Bagdad. Since the beginning of hostilities there has been a formidable extension of Prussian militarism. At first, it held in its grasp only the sixty-eight million people of the German Empire. By April, 191 5, it had extended and organized its influence among the thirty millions of Austro-Hungarians, who until that time had taken orders from their own independent military chiefs. After October- November, 191 5, — the date of Serbia's downfall, — the Prussian system reached out to Bulgaria and Turkey. By taking account of these extensions and adding together the populations of the territories occupied by Germany, together with those of her in- fatuated allies, one finds that to-day — April, 191 7 — Prussian militarism no longer controls sixty-eight million souls, as in the beginning of the war, but about one hundred and seventy-six million European and Ottoman subjects. This is the brutal, overwhelming fact which Americans must face if they wish to learn the sole solution of the war which will assure to them, as well as to the rest of the world, a durable peace. The following figures will show how the three groups of the population of Pan-Germany are divided at the beginning of 1 91 7: The Masters Germans The Vassals Magyars Bulgars Turks The Slaves French Belgians Alsatians, Lorrainers Danes Poles, Lithuanians Ruthenians Czechs Jugo-Slavs Roumanians Italians Armenians Levantines Ottoman Greeks Arabs Total (about) 10,000,000"] 5,000,000 6,000,000 3,000,000 7,500,000 1,500,000 200,000 22,000,000 5,500,000 8,500,000 11,000,000 8,000,000 800,000 2,000,000 2,000,000 2,000,000 8,000,000 73,000,000 21,000,000 82,000,000 176,000,000 To sum up, seventy-three million Germans rule over twenty- one million vassals and eighty-two million slaves, — Latin, Slavic, Semitic, belonging to thirteen different nationalities, — who are bearing the most cruel and unjustifiable yoke that the world has ever known. It is undeniable, moreover, that each extension ot Prussian militarism over a new territory has enabled Germany to prolong the struggle by obtaining new supplies of food, new reinforcements to press into her service and territory to exploit, new civil popula- tions, whose labor is made use of even in works of a military nature. As a result, the technical problem now confronting the Allies in Europe is, through the mistakes of their former leaders, infinitely more complicated than at the outbreak of hostilities. To-day Berlin, by means of Prussian terrorism methodically and pitilessly employed, disposes of the military and economic resources of one hundred and seventy-six million people, occupying a strategic position in the centre of Europe which is all to her profit. It is this very state of things, founded on the slavery of eighty-two millions of human beings, which is intolerable. Ill Many times, and rightly, the Allies have declared that it was not their object to exterminate the German people and bring about their political extinction. On the other hand, it is just and essen- tial to proclaim that Pan-Germany must be destroyed. On this depends the liberty, not only of Europe, but of the whole world. This is the point of view which, in the crisis of to-day, should prevail with Americans, for the following reasons: Suppose that Pan- Germany were able to maintain itself in its present position. It cannot be denied that its territory contains considerable latent military and economic resources, as well as strategic positions of world significance, like the Dardanelles. If these resources were freely exploited and developed to their highest pitch by the relent- less organizing spirit of Berlin, Prussianized Pan-Germany, divid- ing Europe in two, would dominate the Continent, uncontestably and indefinitely, by means of her crushing strength. France, Russia, England, Italy, ceasing to exist as great powers, could only submit to Germany's will. And Berlin, mistress of Europe, would soon realize, not merely the Hamburg-Bagdad and Antwerp- Bagdad railways, but the Brest-Bagdad line as well; for Brest has long been coveted secretly by the Pan-Germanists, who would make of it the great military and commercial transatlantic port of Prussianized Europe. Moreover, if Germany achieved the ruin of the Allies, it is entirely probable that the General Staff of William II would launch a formidable expedition against the United States without delay, in order to allow her no time to organize herself against the Prus- sian tyranny hypothetically dominating Europe. Even if Berlin felt it necessary to defer this step, Americans would none the less be forced to prepare for the inevitable struggle and to serve an apprenticeship to militarism which would be odious to them. If Americans, then see things as they really are, and perceive the dangers to which they are pledging their future, they will be con- vinced that they, quite as much as Europeans, have a vital interest in the annihilation of Pan-Germanism. In a word, it is clear that any peril accruing to the United States from Europe can arise only from so formidable a power as Pan-Germany, and not from a Germany kept within her legitimate frontiers, and forced to behave herself, by the balance of other powers. We must also realize that the moral considerations at stake are a matter of the liveliest interest to the United States. Can republican America allow the feudal spirit which kindled the torch of this war to triumph over the world? Granting for a moment that Germany were victorious, Russia, after a frightful reign of anarchy, would be forced to submit once more to the yoke of auto- cracy. As for the peoples of Western Europe, reduced to worse than slavery, they could only renounce their dearest ideals — the ideals for which they have shed their blood for centuries. The present war, then, is manifestly a struggle & outrance be- tween democracy and feudalism. To Americans as well as to Europeans falls the task, not only of preserving their corporeal independence, but of saving our common civilization. This can be accomplished only by the destruction of Pan-Germanism. Berlin, failing so far to crush the Allies completely, is bending every effort to maintaining Pan-Germany in its present position, so that, after peace is declared, it may crystallize and swiftly de- velop its full power. IV Let us face the cruel truth and say: the Allies may yet be completely vanquished if certain developments come about, or if new strategic mistakes are added to those portentous ones which nearly lost them the fight, in spite of the righteousness of their cause and their immense, if badly employed, latent resources. If we wish, then, really to understand the crisis of to-day and the mighty peril which still menaces the world's liberty, we must not shrink from meeting the realities of the military situation. We must be ready to face the most serious developments which can be conceived. Such an attitude implies, not pessimism, but that readiness for the worst which lies at the root of military wisdom. Let us now accept the following facts. The troops of France are beginning to be exhausted. The iniquitous administration of the Czar has seriously compromised the provisioning of the Russian army with food and munitions. In that vast country, it is possible that idealistic extremists may guide the revolution toward pacifism or anarchy. The swarming agents of Germany are working there without respite. If their efforts succeed, the strength of Russia will swiftly dissolve. This would practically insure a German victory, for, with the Russian armies demoralized, all the forces of Pan-Germany could be flung against the Franco-British front. Moreover, if, from the moral standpoint, the Berlin government is universally to be despised, the same cannot be said about her general technical military ability, whose elements are as follows: Berlin is incontestably mistress of Pan-Germany — that is, she has absolute disposal of vast resources in men and in the manifold products of a great territory with a population of one hundred and seventy-six millions. The Kaiser's Great General Staff, whose intellectual resourcefulness cannot be questioned, is quick to make the most of every lesson taught by the war. The annual levies of men from the various territories of Pan-Germany certainly out- number the losses sustained each year by her troops. It is, there- fore, in my opinion, a grave error to assume, as the Allies have done, that the Germans can be beaten by mere attrition of their forces. By organizing under one uniform system the soldiery furnished by the many different countries of Pan-Germany, Prus- sian militarism has unquestionably given its troops a cohesion and a unity which was unknown to the vassal-allies of Germany before the war. This state of affairs has undoubtedly added to the military effectiveness of the vast armies which take their orders from Berlin. The German military authorities most advantageously employed the respites given them by the strategic errors of the Allies. Never have the broad lines of trenches, the far-flung battle frontiers, been more powerfully guarded than now. Never have the Germans had more abundant stores of munitions. Never has the network of railways covering the length and breadth of Pan-Germany been so complete. Never has the Great General Staff, making full use of its central position, been better able to concentrate on any front with lightning speed. For these reasons, it is my opinion that we may safely say that never before has the Berlin govern- ment, from a military point of view, been so strong. The various statistics which justify such a conclusion are, I think, to be relied on. Even supposing them to be exaggerated, it is much better to run the risk of overestimating the enemy's strength than to underestimate it. Many of the Allies' mistakes sprang from neglect of this axiom. If the programme for 191 7, which we have good reason to attri- bute to the Germans, were substantially carried out (and, after all, this is not impossible), in six to eight months the United States would find themselves face to face with a Germany controlling the resources not only of the present-day Pan-Germany, but of all Europe. And, Americans, do not think your turn would be long in coming. Do not take it for granted that the German people, worn out by the endless horrors of war, would cry to their masters, "Peace at any price!" The German people, as I know them, filled with enthusiasm by a victory that would be without parallel in the history of the world, maddened by incalculable plunder, would follow the lead of their Emperor more blindly than ever. The pride and ambition of the Kaiser and his General Staff are so pro- digious that, unless all signs fail, they would give the United States no chance to organize against a Prussianized Europe. In eight or ten months, after new advances had been made to Japan, who would be isolated by the defeat of her Allies in Europe, and with the aid of the German-Mexicans and German-Americans whose mis- sion, as every one knows, is to paralyze by every possible means the military organization of the United States, it would be possible to look for ruthless action against America by the Pan-Germanized forces of Europe. The prediction of such extraordinary eventualities will no doubt seem fantastic and unprobable to many of my American readers. I beg them, nevertheless, to consider them seriously. As a matter of fact, if we consider what has been achieved by the Germans since August, 19 14, the events which I have forecast are much less amazing than those indicated by me in 1 901, when, in my book & Europe et la Question d'Autriche au Seuil du XXe Steele, I unmasked the Pan-German plot, which was then looked on as a mere phantasmagoria — although as a matter of fact it was so real that it now stands almost completely fulfilled. You Americans, then, should learn your lesson from the past. Your own best interest lays on you the obligation to face facts which may at present seem improbable, and to prepare yourselves without losing a day for meeting the gravest perils. As the situ- ation now stands, a delay in making a decision may involve disastrous results. For instance, the three weeks of parleying indulged in by the Allies before deciding to send troops to Serbia were of the utmost significance. Those three lost weeks simply prevented the Allies from achieving victory, and resulted in an unthinkable prolongation of the war. The surest, the most economical way for Americans to avoid excessive risks is to prepare at once for the severest kind of struggle on the hypothesis that the Allies may sustain grave reverses. Everything favors concerted action by the United States and the Allies. Their material and moral interests are identical, and, in doing away with autocracy, Russia removed the well-justified distrust felt in the United States for the land of the Czars. As we have seen, a German victory over Russia, involving the fall of Salonika and, later, the breaking of the Western front, would be unquestionably the most dangerous eventuality imaginable for the future security of the United States. American interest, therefore, demands not only that support should be given France and Great Britain, but that the United States should hasten to help the Russians, who will probably be called on first to meet the onslaught. By way of conclusion, let me again urge my point that the line of action morally and materially most profitable to the United States is that which, by achieving the total destruction of Pan- Germany and Prussian militarism, will terminate the horrible carnage once for all. The real problem for America is clearly to discern Pan-Germany lurking beneath the Quadruple Alliance of the Central Powers, and to decide to strike this Pan-Germany quick and hard. This is the one and only way to foil the odious Prussian militarism which threatens the liberty of the world. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 020 914 031 7 LIBRARY OF W"«J 020 914 031 7