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LEE'S INVASION 
 OF NORTHWEST VIRGINIA 
 
LEE'S INVASION 
 
 OF NORTHWEST VIRGINIA 
 
 IN 1861 
 
 BY 
 
 GRANVILLE DAVISSON HALL 
 
 Falstaff — I will not lend thee a penny. 
 Pistol— Why, then the world's mine oyster 
 which I with sword will open. 
 
 MERRY WIVES OF WINDSOR. 
 
 Sir Andrew — Plague on't! an' I thought he 
 had been valiant and so cunning in fence, 
 I'd have seen him damned ere I'd have 
 challenged him. 
 
 TWELFTH NIGHT. 
 
 19 11 
 

 Copyright, 1911 
 
 ^ by 
 Granville Davisson Hall 
 
 
 § 
 
 Press of 
 
 The Mayer & Miller Company 
 
 525 S. Dearborn Street 
 
 Chicago 
 
 ©CI.A297096 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Reconnoissant 9 
 
 Virginia in Revolt a Hundred Years Ago. ... 17 
 
 Civil Preliminaries in 1861 26 
 
 The Military Initiative 31 
 
 Organizing Rebellion in the Northwest 32 
 
 Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Bridges Burned. . 43 
 
 Porterfield 's Retreat to Philippi 48 
 
 Surprise and Capture of Philippi 52 
 
 Lee Sends Garnett to Meet the Union Ad- 
 vance 63 
 
 McClellan's Advance on Rich Mountain. ... 70 
 Battle of Rich Mountain — Official Reports 77 
 Rosecrans' Statement Before Committee of 
 
 Congress 90 
 
 Retreat and Death of Gen. Garnett 101 
 
 Pegram's Retreat and Surrender 110 
 
 Resume 122 
 
 Lee's Final Failure to Get Through the 
 
 Mountains 129 
 
 McClellan's Abandonment of the Kanawha 
 
 Valley 141 
 
 The Campaign Reviewed by Col. Porterfield. . 151 
 The Story of a West Virginia Scout 157 
 
RECONNOISSANT. 
 
 Fifty years after the event, there are signs of a re- 
 nascent literature dealing with the southern rebellion, 
 which apologists for that attempt at national homicide 
 prefer to describe as the "War between the States." 
 In this semi-centennial year, the American citizen may 
 well suspend his mad pursuit after the almighty dol- 
 lar and take a few minutes off to recall the events 
 and portents which a half century ago darkened the 
 western hemisphere. This slender volume is a modest 
 attempt to trace the salient features of a single epi- 
 sode in the great tragic story; the opening chapter 
 in a volume whose "finis" no man could then fore- 
 cast. 
 
 The sole attempt to justify the rebellion in its 
 initial stage was the protest against "coercion." This 
 was simply a demand by the conspirators, who had 
 seized the machinery of all the Southern state gov- 
 ernments, that the lawful authority of the nation 
 should not interfere with their plans or pleasure in 
 the trifling matter of upsetting the United States 
 government. Yet when the next stage had been 
 reached, coercion was the first weapon drawn in Vir- 
 ginia against every citizen who resisted the usurpa- 
 tion which had seized the Commonwealth. It was 
 first employed in the State capital to compel a sover- 
 eign convention to pass an ordinance of secession 
 against the expressed will of two-thirds of the voters 
 of Virginia. 
 
 Lee's invasion of Northwest Virginia was an at- 
 tempt to apply the same argument to the loyal people 
 
 9 
 
]0 Lee's Invasion op Northwest Virginia 
 
 west of the Allegheny mountains, whose representa- 
 tives had been "coerced" in the Convention; to sil- 
 ence them by military terrorism, as their fellow-loy- 
 alists had been silenced in the East. It was the first 
 blow in a war forced between neighbors and brethren 
 who had no quarrel of their own. 
 
 The men used for this purpose were drawn chiefly 
 from the Shenandoah Valley ; and there is nothing in 
 evidence to show that they had much heart in the 
 work. In the earlier Virginia, The Valley had stood 
 shoulder to shoulder with the West in a fight against 
 the discrimination and injustice of the Tidewater, 
 demanding larger citizenship and equal taxation. 
 For these they had unitedly fought a battle which 
 went back to the beginning of the century; had com- 
 bined in popular conventions at Winchester and 
 Staunton, the last of which, held in 1825, had sat as 
 a deliberative body and formulated demands so force- 
 ful that they led to the assembling of the State Con- 
 vention of 1829-30; and this proving barren of re- 
 sults, had renewed the struggle later in the Conven- 
 tion of 1850-51. In the crisis of 1861, the men of 
 the Valley were little behind their western brothers 
 in devotion to the Union; but under pressure of a 
 deep-laid and adroit conspiracy and later military 
 terrorism, they were forced, "like dumb-driven cat- 
 tle," into a rebellion which the great majority of 
 them abhorred. 
 
 Virginia was not the only one of the seceding States 
 in which a majority of the people were friendly to 
 the government. If there could have been throughout 
 the South in the autumn of 1860 a plebiscite on the 
 issue of secession even as free as the vote in Virginia 
 
Reconnoissant 1 1 
 
 in February, 1861, on that issue in the guise of 
 "Reference," it would have shown a very large ele- 
 ment in those States who did not want secession. But 
 in the States farther south, even more than in Vir- 
 ginia, public opinion was controlled by a violent min- 
 ority, and the timid well-intentioned citizens shrank 
 from an avowal of opinion or sentiment sure to sub- 
 ject them to denunciation. So that an unconstrained 
 vote in the Coast States expressive of the real senti- 
 ments of the people there was then — and had been 
 for many years — impossible. 
 
 It was part of the original Confederate plan to 
 overrun and hold all Virginia to the Ohio river. The 
 execution of this was entrusted to Gen. Lee. The 
 failure of the scheme was signal. The struggle lasted 
 only a few months, but it was sufficient. For while, 
 after this first campaign, there were raids to obtain 
 supplies and guerrilla warfare in some counties, there 
 was never serious danger of the subjugation of West- 
 ern Virginia by the Confederacy. 
 
 Gen. Lee did not win any laurels in the Northwest. 
 The forces he threw across the mountains were driven 
 back. When, after the defeat and death of Gen. 
 Garnett, he took personal command and made an at- 
 tack on Reynolds at Cheat Mountain, he failed ; failed 
 again at Elkwater ; failed the third time when he tried 
 to launch Floyd through the mountain passes of the 
 Gauley and upper Kanawha. Lee's renown was won 
 in defensive war, fighting on the inner and shorter 
 lines, on familiar ground. His genius was Fabian, 
 not Napoleonic. He gained no fame in purely ag- 
 gressive war. To his complete failure in Western 
 Virginia was added his discomfiture when, after two 
 
12 Lee's Invasion op Northwest Virginia 
 
 years experience, he undertook to carry the war into 
 Pennsylvania. 
 
 Following the failure of the Rebellion, the South 
 needed a hero. Jefferson Davis did not quite fill the 
 bill. In Virginia, at least, Gen. Lee has taken the 
 place, though it must be added that Stonewall Jack- 
 son is a strong claimant in the popular mind. 
 
 The real ground for the exalted esteem in which 
 Lee is held in Virginia is probably not so much his 
 military achievements as his lovable personality and 
 the modest demeanor which colored his later life. 
 He was a man not only of fine social culture but of 
 brains and scholarship. When, as an army officer, 
 after careful deliberation, he deserted his standard 
 and put himself in the front of the organized war 
 for its overthrow, he clearly understood what he was 
 risking. He was putting to the touch not only life 
 and fortune, but his future place in world history. 
 If he should win, he would be an illustrious patriot. 
 If he failed, he knew he would be entitled to the 
 reward all history accords to traitors. He had Bene- 
 dict Arnold before him as an example. When the 
 end came, Lee had the sagacity to understand that 
 under the unprecedented magnanimity of the govern- 
 ment, there was nothing for him but silence, submis- 
 sion and a humility becoming one who had been the 
 instrument of irremediable injury to the people he 
 loved. 
 
 To men who attempt great crimes and fail, the world 
 is more charitable than they deserve. We may all, 
 however, do justice to the personal virtues of Gen- 
 eral Lee without condoning the irreparable wrong 
 done by him in turning his sword against the govern- 
 
Reconnoissant 13 
 
 raent which had bred and fed and trusted him ; which 
 had never, in the weight of a feather, wronged him 
 or his people ; which, indeed, had been their faith- 
 ful and obedient servant from its foundation down 
 to the hour when they assailed it. 
 
 "0, Liberty," quoth Madam Roland, standing at 
 the foot of the guillotine, ' ' what crimes are committed 
 in thy name ! ' ' So, in the name of patriotism men 
 have lent themselves to great wrongs. But in time 
 the inexorable truth vindicates itself, and the real 
 crimes of history are pilloried in the impartial ver- 
 dicts of mankind. The American Rebellion, judged 
 by the motives which inspired it and by the lack of 
 justifying reasons, will take its place in the catalogue 
 of indefensible crimes. Even out of these, it does ap- 
 pear, good is educed, and 
 
 "Ever the right comes uppermost, 
 And ever is justice done." 
 
 The invasion of Northwest Virginia was a mistake 
 — a part of that tremendous mistake which began with 
 the firing on Sumter. In moral relations, there are 
 many proofs of error; in military dialectics, there 
 needs be only one — failure. No less able an adviser 
 than George W. Summers warned the Richmond 
 junta against it. Governor Letcher lent himself to it, 
 yet had his doubts. Colonel Porterfield, in a letter 
 printed between these covers, admits the error. It 
 is not unlikely some of the eminent Western Virginia 
 statesmen then exiled in Richmond exercised an un- 
 due influence in pressing the enterprise, more for 
 personal than for military reasons. 
 
14: Lee's Invasion of Northwest Virginia 
 
 The facts recited in this narration are derived 
 chiefly from the official publication known as the 
 ' ' Rebellion Record. ' ' The endeavor has been to bring 
 them into chronological and related order, so as to 
 make a consecutive story. From this remark is ex- 
 cluded (of course) General Rosecrans' statements 
 before the joint committee of Congress on the Con- 
 duct of the War, the "Story of a Scout," also the 
 preliminary chapter on the mutinous conditions in 
 Virginia at the close of the Eighteenth Century, when 
 Thomas Jefferson and Aaron Burr were organizing 
 for the overthrow of the Federal Party — or of the 
 Federal Government. This is an incident in Virginia 
 annals little known to the present generation. The 
 reader may find it an interesting parallel to the 
 preparations in Virginia, with similar purpose, in 
 1860 and 1861. 
 
 No connected story of this campaign has ever be- 
 fore been printed. The present essay does not claim 
 to be exhaustive of even the brief time and limited 
 territory covered by it. A compilation of this kind 
 of necessity omits much which lends interest to his- 
 torical narration. This lack is in some measure 
 compensated by the authenticity of what is given, 
 comprising the controlling events which enter into the 
 historical movement. 
 
 An acceptable addition to the official record is 
 some pertinent comment on the campaign and its 
 crowning event — the battle of Rich Mountain — 
 written by Col. George A. Porterfield, of Charles 
 Town, West Virginia. This appears in his letters ap- 
 pended to the narrative. These shed the light of ap- 
 posite criticism just where it seems to be due. 
 
Reconnoissant 15 
 
 The military operations in Northwest Virginia 
 quickly following the investment of Gen. Lee with 
 command, developed the first serious collision between 
 Northern and Southern armies in the field. Com- 
 pared with later movements, this campaign is a minor 
 event. Yet it was not without consequences, imme- 
 diate and remote. It gave the first shock to the the- 
 ory then prevalent in the South that Northern men 
 would not stand up on the martial field before the 
 superior gentlemen of that section. It proved that 
 courage, endurance and military skill were not the ex- 
 clusive possession of those bred upon a servile soil. 
 It furnished a commander for the army upon whom 
 depended the defense of the national capital. Out of 
 this grew weighty consequences, military and political. 
 It resulted also in the exemption of Northwest Vir- 
 ginia from further military attack and the security 
 throughout the war of Ohio, eastern Kentucky and 
 western Pennsylvania. Not least important, it made 
 easy the restoration of civil government in Virginia, 
 followed by the creation of a separate State west of 
 the Alleghenies — an event far-reaching and momen- 
 tous in the sequel — which, in the words of Abraham 
 Lincoln, "turned that much slave soil into free and 
 consummated an irrevocable encroachment upon the 
 cause of the Rebellion." 
 
 Olencoe, Illinois, March, 1911. 
 
VIRGINIA IN REVOLT MORE THAN A HUN- 
 DRED YEARS AGO. 
 
 More than sixty years prior to the Rebellion in 
 1861, Virginia was on the verge of open revolt against 
 the United States. She had ratified the constitution; 
 but there had been a dissentient element — consider- 
 able and influential — which, under the stimulation of 
 Mr. Jefferson's scarcely disguised hostility to the 
 Federal leaders, had steadily through the years waxed 
 in bitterness. 
 
 This country has long been accustomed to regard 
 South Carolina as the most disaffected of the States; 
 yet inexorable facts entitle Virginia to dispute this 
 unenviable eminence. Her action in sending a statue 
 of Gen. Lee to the National Hall of Fame does her no 
 credit. That hall is supposed to be the valhalla where 
 the fame of the great and good citizens of the Republic 
 is to ripen through the ages and furnish inspiring ex- 
 amples to the youth of rising generations. For Vir- 
 ginia to place there the figure of one whose sole claim 
 to distinction is that he betrayed the government 
 which had educated and cherished him, and tried to 
 tear down the fabric of civil liberty Virginia's own 
 illustrious citizens had builded in an earlier age — 
 men whose names and work are revered all over the 
 civilized world — is an offense against the patriotism 
 of the country and a slur upon such names as AVash- 
 ington, Madison, George Mason and John Marshall. 
 It indicates that Virginia has learned little from her 
 costly and bloody experience. 
 
 17 
 
18 Lee's Invasion op Northwest Virginia 
 
 When President Washington neared the close of 
 his second term, he acquainted Mr. Jefferson with his 
 determination not to be a candidate for a third. 
 Mr. Jefferson, believing this opened the presidential 
 field to him, became still more industrious than he 
 had been in sowing the seed of dissension; more 
 censorious and demonstrative in his hostility towards 
 the Federal leaders; to whom he imputed a design to 
 subvert the republic and establish a monarchy. Despite 
 this covert but widely spread detraction, it failed to 
 give him the coveted place when Washington's suc- 
 cessor was chosen in 1796. John Adams was elected 
 President, and the Virginia statesman had to be con- 
 tent with second place. For a time, there was an ap- 
 parent truce. It was only apparent. A still-hunt 
 went on ; and the opposition party, calling itself ' ' Re- 
 publican, " waxed in strength and in rancor under 
 the special culture of Mr. Jefferson in Virginia and 
 Aaron Burr in New York. 
 
 The attitude of the French Revolutionary govern- 
 ment greatly embarrassed Mr. Adams ' administration, 
 as it had embarrassed that of Washington. French 
 emissaries in the United States commited lawless acts 
 which threatened international complications. Their 
 conduct became so insolent and offensive as to force 
 the enactment of what were called the alien and sedi- 
 tion laws. This legislation was used by the anti-ad- 
 ministration party to add fuel to the "Republican" 
 flame. On the authority of the secret despatches of 
 the French minister, Fauchet, it is stated that the 
 French government had information upon which it 
 imputed to the Jeffersonian party the design of caus- 
 ing a general explosion of revolt to subvert the 
 United States government. 
 
Virginia in Revolt 19 
 
 Mr. Jefferson had been sent to France as pleni- 
 potentiary at a time when the French revolution was 
 in embryo. He witnessed the assembling of the States- 
 General. He was consulted, on the one hand, by the 
 ministers of Louis XVI and, on the other, by popular 
 leaders like Bailey and Mirabeau. He came home 
 in 1789 to take the post of Secretary of State in 
 Washington's cabinet, deeply imbued with the ideas 
 of the revolutionary leaders; and this sympathy per- 
 vaded and colored his political conduct thencefor- 
 ward. 
 
 For more than a hundred years the country has 
 accepted Jefferson as the "father" of the party which 
 came into power in 1800 as "Republican," and which 
 afterwards, calling itself "Democratic," held con- 
 trol of the government, with scarcely a break, down to 
 1861. But John Minor Botts, of Virginia — who was 
 no mean figure in Southern politics prior to the Re- 
 bellion — held that this paternal relation belonged to 
 Aaron Burr.* It is in evidence that in 1800 the Repub- 
 lican party was very evenly divided touching this claim 
 of paternity. In the election for president that year, 
 Burr and Jefferson each received the same number of 
 electoral votes. It was only through the magnanimity 
 of Hamilton that Jefferson won the prize — under cir- 
 cumstances which will be mentioned later. In that 
 contest, the Republican party — and the Democratic 
 ever after — were dominated by the fundamental idea 
 of diluting the powers of the central government and, 
 at its expense, strengthening the sovereignty and 
 importance of the individual states. This theory of 
 
 ♦It is a curious fact that Botts' father was one of the 
 counsel who defended Burr when on trial for treason. 
 
20 Lee's Invasion of Northwest Virginia 
 
 government is generally credited to Jefferson. It was, 
 in fact, the theory of the group of politicians with 
 whom he co-operated — mostly in the South — and be- 
 longed rather to that era in our national history than 
 to any one leader. 
 
 Mr. Jefferson was sent to France in the spring 
 of 1785, as successor to Dr. Franklin, and was absent 
 from the country through the entire formative period 
 out of which emerged the new form of a national 
 government. He did not yield a cordial support to 
 the Constitution framed in his absence. It created 
 a federal nation, and that was not what he wanted. 
 He was willing to have a nation for protection against 
 foreign aggression, but not for domestic government. 
 A mere league of states for home purposes was his 
 ideal — as if it were possible to have this and pre- 
 sent the front of a nation to the rest of the world. 
 
 Under the skillful and tireless misconstruction of 
 Mr. Jefferson and his accomplished coadjutor, Mr. 
 Burr, the energetic measures of Mr. Adams' ad- 
 ministration were colored and construed to such pur- 
 pose that as early as 1798 Virginia had become a hot- 
 bed of "Republican" reaction. Even Mr. Madison, 
 who had been one of the most pronounced — as he 
 was one of the ablest — of the nationalists in the con- 
 vention which framed the Constitution, yielded to the 
 reactionary furor and wrote the "Resolutions of '98," 
 passed by the Virginia Assembly December 21st of 
 that year, while Mr. Jefferson wrote the cognate 
 declarations put forth next year by the legislature of 
 Kentucky. It was in these Kentucky resolutions the 
 remedy of "nullification" was first suggested. This 
 was brought forward thirty odd years later by Cal- 
 
Virginia in Revolt 21 
 
 houn and put down with a strong hand by President 
 Jackson. Both the Virginia and Kentucky declara- 
 tions embodied the creed of a government without the 
 backbone of national authority; with the individual 
 states sovereign and independent of obligation to each 
 other — a theory tried out in the prior Confederation 
 and found a calamitous failure. In the U. S. House 
 of Representatives, a member denounced the alien and 
 sedition acts, declaring the people ought to resist 
 their execution, and he "hoped in God they would." 
 
 In Virginia the fury of revolt appears to have 
 completely dominated the Assembly. In December, 
 1796, they passed an act "authorizing the executive 
 to procure arms for the defense of the Common- 
 wealth." This is just what Letcher did prior to the 
 spring of 1861. By resolution passed in November, 
 1796, the executive was directed to proceed to execute 
 this act. In January, 1798, the Assembly passed an 
 act to establish arsenals in the counties of Prince Ed- 
 ward and Orange or Culpepper, and to have "build- 
 ings erected for the preservation of arms and fortifi- 
 cations thrown up for the defense of the arsenals." 
 Each arsenal was to be capable of holding ten thou- 
 sand complete stand of arms ; and to insure a supply of 
 arms, the executive was empowered to establish a 
 manufactory in the vicinity of Richmond and required 
 to procure six hundred pistols, holsters, swords, scab- 
 bards and belts for the equipment of cavalry. The 
 executive was also authorized to issue arms and am- 
 munition to the regiments within the limits for which 
 the arsenals were erected. 
 
 By acts of Assembly passed in 1796, 1798 and in 
 January, 1799, taxes were imposed on all classes of 
 
22 Lee's Invasion of Northwest Virginia 
 
 taxable property, including slaves over twelve years 
 of age, for the purposes contemplated by the warlike 
 legislation described. When we reflect how, through 
 the whole history of Virginia, the ancient regime re- 
 sisted taxation of this sacred form of property, we 
 may realize the intensity of the war fever which would 
 warrant the legislature in a measure of this kind ! 
 
 In January, 1800 — the presidential year — an act 
 was passed directing the executive "to distribute 
 without delay among the several regiments of militia, 
 according to their strength, two-thirds of all the 
 arms and accoutrements belonging to the State or 
 which might be procured under appropriations 
 made." 
 
 Thus, at the opening of the year in which the 
 election for President was to be held, the Common- 
 wealth was equipped for war! For what? Against 
 whom? 
 
 Relating to the dangerous conditions shown by the 
 foregoing details, Gen. W. R. Davie, of North Caro- 
 lina, in June, 1799, wrote Justice Iredell (one of the 
 judges of the United States Supreme Court, appointed 
 by Washington), and commenting on the exasperated 
 party feeling in the country, remarked that Virginia 
 was the only State of which he despaired. He said 
 he had conversed with some gentlemen who had been 
 traveling in other states and had recently been at the 
 Petersburg (Virginia) races, who had "returned with 
 the firm conviction that the leaders in Virginia were 
 determined to overthrow the General Government; 
 that if no other measure would effect this, they would 
 risk it upon the chance of war. ' ' He added : " I under- 
 
Virginia in Revolt 23 
 
 stand that some of them talk of 'seceding from the 
 Union,' while others boldly assert the policy and 
 practicability of severing the Union, alleging that 
 Pennsylvania would join them; that Maryland would 
 be compelled to change her politics with her situation ; 
 that the submission and assistance of North Carolina 
 was counted on as a matter of course, and that the two 
 southern states (South Carolina and Georgia) would 
 follow." 
 
 Judge Iredell, in a letter to his wife, January 24 ; 
 1799, said : 
 
 "The General Assembly of Virginia are pursuing steps which 
 directly lead to civil war ; but there is a respectable minority 
 struggling in defense of the Government, and the Government 
 itself is fully prepared for anything they can do and resolved, 
 if necessary, to oppose force with force." 
 
 In the election of 1800, the Republican party, under 
 the lead of Jefferson and Burr, won the presidency. 
 Had the result been adverse to them — had Mr. Adams 
 and the Federal party triumphed — who is prepared to 
 affirm that Virginia would not then have headed a 
 revolt against the continuance of that party in control 
 of the Government, as she did sixty-one years later 
 against the change of control arising from the election 
 of Lincoln? 
 
 The Constitution provided that the candidate re- 
 ceiving the highest electoral vote should be President. 
 Mr. Jefferson and Mr. Burr each received the same 
 number of votes — seventy-three. There being no 
 choice, the election was thrown into the House of 
 Representatives. It depended on Federal votes which 
 of these men should be President. A choice was not 
 
24 Lee's Invasion of Northwest Virginia 
 
 reached without difficulty. Mr. Jefferson was sounded 
 to know what assurances he was willing to give touch- 
 ing certain vital issues. He declined to give any 
 pledges. He was elected by Federal votes, on an ap- 
 peal made by Hamilton in a spirit of patriotism and 
 personal magnanimity which elicited high praise from 
 John Randolph, who succeeded Jefferson as Washing- 
 ton's secretary of state. Mr. Randolph in after life 
 often declared that Jefferson owed his election to 
 Hamilton, and that to Mr. Hamilton's action in this 
 crisis the country owed the safety of the republic. Mr. 
 Randolph knew thoroughly the inside of Jeffersonian 
 and Virginia politics at that time; and such a state- 
 ment from him has a deep significance. 
 
 In explanation of his course, Mr. Hamilton de- 
 clared if there was a man in the world he "ought to 
 hate, ' ' it was Jefferson. To those who know with what 
 rancorous misrepresentations Jefferson pursued Ham- 
 ilton for years, even when associated with him in 
 Washington's cabinet, this declaration will seem fully 
 justified. Mr. Hamilton said that, on the other hand, 
 he had never had any personal complaint to make 
 against Burr. But he regarded Burr as a bold, dar- 
 ing man of unprincipled ambition, who had no aim 
 but his own aggrandisement and who was restrained 
 by no moral scruples. It was vain to hope he could 
 be won over to Federalist views. He would combine 
 the rogues of all parties and overrule the good men 
 of all parties. On the other hand, Jefferson had pre- 
 tensions to character. He was fanatic in his democ- 
 racy and at the same time crafty, persevering and in- 
 sincere, but a far less dangerous man than Burr. 
 If Jefferson were elected, the whole responsibility 
 
Virginia in Revolt 25 
 
 would rest upon the Republican party; if Burr, the 
 responsibility would be upon the Federalists, for the 
 people had intended to vote for him for Vice-Presi- 
 dent only, in which place he would be harmless. 
 
 Hamilton's course in giving the presidency to Jef- 
 ferson, for such reasons as stated by him, easily con- 
 nects with his later death by the hand of Burr on the 
 heights of Weehawken. 
 
 The political revolution thus outlined, accomplished 
 one hundred and ten years ago under threat of re- 
 bel] ion and the overthrow of the Government, was 
 fundamental and far-reaching. It set the example 
 which, being followed, gave to the world the American 
 Civil war of 1861-65. The party which thus came 
 into power in 1801 held the control thus gained 
 through a practically unbroken succession for sixty 
 years. At last the time and the conditions came for 
 another change of control. The party which had held 
 the reins so long made war rather than surrender 
 them in obedience to the verdict of the people ren- 
 dered in strict conformity to the Constitution and laws. 
 Had John Adams been chosen President in 1800, 
 there is reason to believe Virginia would have ten- 
 dered then the issue of secession, or some other form 
 of disruption, with the dread alternative of civil 
 war. 
 
THE CIVIL PRELIMINARIES IN 1861. 
 
 The rebellious conspiracy in Virginia was so ripe 
 for co-operation with the Cotton States by the open- 
 ing of the year 1861, and so entirely in control of 
 the executive and legislative State machinery, that 
 the General Assembly was called by Gov. Letcher to 
 meet in extraordinary session January 7th. Despite 
 the false pretenses put forward in his message 
 as reasons for this astonishing proceeding, the sole 
 object was to commit Virginia to the Southern revolu- 
 tion, already in full tide and only waiting for Vir- 
 ginia to embark; and from the day the legislature 
 met, events moved toward that end with a swiftness 
 and precision which showed how completely the pro- 
 gramme for Virginia had been prepared. 
 
 Disregarding precedents requiring consent of the 
 voters before a convention could be called, the As- 
 sembly on the 14th of January ordered an election for 
 delegates to a convention to meet February 13th. The 
 second day after the Legislature met, they voted a 
 declaration that they were "unalterably opposed" to 
 any attempt by the Government to "coerce into re- 
 union or submission" any State attempting to with- 
 draw from the Union. A week later they adopted 
 another declaration that if the differences between 
 the North and the South failed of adjustment, "then, 
 in the opinion of the General Assembly, every consid- 
 eration of honor and interest" demanded Virginia 
 should ally herself with the "slaveholding States of 
 the South." 
 
 26 
 
The Civil Preliminaries 27 
 
 Thus did the legislative body undertake to stake 
 out for the sovereign body about to be assembled a 
 road which led straight to Mongomery. The Legis- 
 lature of Virginia had no constitutional authority to 
 call a convention, nor to deal itself with national ques- 
 tions. This rested only in the voters of the State. 
 The most the Assembly had the right to do was to 
 submit to the voters whether they would authorize 
 a convention. The vote on "reference" shows that 
 if the question of calling a convention had been sub- 
 mitted, none would have been called. The legislature 
 did submit to the people when electing delegates the 
 question whether their action should go back to them 
 for approval ; and the answer to that question was, by 
 a vote of two to one, that no action affecting the State's 
 relations to the Federal Government should have any 
 effect until approved by subsequent vote of the people 
 of Virginia. 
 
 The vote on "reference" was, in the whole State, 
 except eight small and remote counties, 100,356 for 
 reference to 45,161 against. This shows that less than 
 one-third of the voters of Virginia wanted secession. 
 Yet in sixty days these proportions were reversed ! 
 
 As the next logical step in the programme, the 
 Convention was organized and controlled by the seces- 
 sion minority. John Janney, of Loudoun, who called 
 himself a "Union man," was made President. In his 
 address — blowing hot and cold — he apostrophised the 
 American flag floating over the old capitol in which 
 the Convention sat, and prayed it might "remain 
 forever:" "provided," thus and so. "Provided al- 
 ways" Virginia had equal rights with other States 
 
28 Lee's Invasion of Northwest Virginia 
 
 like New York, Ohio and Pennsylvania — as if she had 
 not always had these, and more! 
 
 One of the things John Janney did to keep the 
 flag flying over the Virginia capitol was, to appoint 
 a committee on Federal relations, twenty-one in num- 
 ber, of whom only two proved faithful to the Union 
 — and one of these not without reproach. 
 
 Another: When the Convention had appointed as 
 commander-in-chief of the Virginia forces, Robert E. 
 Lee — who within a month had received as a special 
 mark of confidence at the hands of President Lincoln, 
 a commission as a colonel of cavalry in the U. S. 
 Army — President Janney had Lee brought into the 
 Convention hall and, with spectacular ceremonial and 
 effusive feeling, congratulated him on his traitorous 
 desertion of the American flag, which he had taken an 
 oath to defend, to accept command of the Virginia 
 (Confederate) armies raised and to be raised in rebel- 
 lion against it. 
 
 The history of this Convention need not be further 
 recited here. Step by step, with military trim and 
 energy, they marched straight to an ordinance of se- 
 cession, which was passed in secret session, in terrorem, 
 with injunction of secrecy till leave should be given to 
 disclose. The secret league, eight days later reduced 
 the once proud Commonwealth to the condition of 
 vassalage under the Cotton-State Insurrection, with 
 Jefferson Davis as absolute dictator and his minions 
 riding rough-shod over her people. 
 
 Other measures taken by the Convention in be- 
 trayal of the people of Virginia, long before the date 
 when those people had the right to decide by their 
 votes whether there should be any secession or league 
 
The Civil Preliminaries 29 
 
 with the Southern Confederacy, are summarized by 
 historian Virgil A. Lewis, in his volume, "How West 
 Virginia Was Made," as follows: 
 
 Election of members of the Congress of the United States 
 forbidden. 
 
 Alliance, offensive and defensive, made with the so-called 
 Confederate States. 
 
 Constitution of the Confederate States adopted. Members 
 elected to the Confederate Congress. 
 
 Officers who had sworn to support the Constitution of the 
 United States released from their oaths. 
 
 All the people of Virginia absolved from their allegiance 
 to the United States. 
 
 Capture of Harper's Ferry I*. S. Arsenal, etc., Navy Yard 
 and other U. S. property at Gosport; seizure of custom houses 
 at Norfolk and Richmond. 
 
 Virginia formally admitted as a member of the Confeder- 
 ate States. 
 
 Even before the consummation of the secret league 
 with Stephens, Virginia, east of the mountains and 
 in many counties west of them, was under a despotism. 
 When the farce of voting (May 23rd) whether they 
 would ratify or reject the secession ordinance was 
 staged, the people of Virginia were already muzzled 
 and manacled. In Richmond, where John Minor 
 Botts had received 1,800 votes as a candidate for the 
 Convention against Randolph, only two votes were 
 cast against the ordinance. So everywhere else with- 
 in the Confederate lines. Only in a limited number of 
 free counties in Northwest Virginia, did men dare 
 exercise their electoral rights as citizens. The pun- 
 ishment of these recalcitrants, was the work under- 
 taken by General Lee. 
 
30 Lee's Invasion of Northwest Virginia 
 
 There is philosophic truth behind the old Greek 
 axiom, that "Whom the gods would destroy they first 
 make mad." Men filled with a blind fury cannot 
 realize how close behind them marches retribution. 
 Of a crisis in the French ^Revolution, Carlyle re- 
 marks : 
 
 "This, then, is the abomination of desolation; come sud- 
 denly, though long foreshadowed as inevitable. For to the 
 blind all things are sudden." 
 
 AVhen imbecile Louis XVI summoned the States- 
 General as the last expedient to save the Bourbon 
 regime, which for hundreds of years had ridden 
 France like "an old man of the sea," how was he to 
 foreknow that he was but opening the door to a lion 
 which was waiting to devour him and his line? Driven 
 by the imperious demands of the hour, he walked 
 blindly into the jaws of the Revolution. 
 
 No more could the conspirators at the Virginia 
 capital foresee that the Convention, summoned at 
 their behest, without authority, as part of their plan 
 to destroy what they could no longer control and to 
 draw a line of perpetual warfare across this continent, 
 was to be the "beginning of the end" of the mediaeval 
 oligarchy who had for more than two hundred years 
 imposed a system of caste and savagery upon this 
 country and ruled its political counsels for their 
 own evil ends. 
 
THE MILITARY INITIATIVE. 
 
 LEE IN THE SADDLE. 
 
 April 19th, the rank of Major-General of the mili- 
 tary and naval forces of Virginia was created, and 
 three days later Robert E. Lee, a colonel of cavalry 
 in the United States Army, was nominated to the 
 rank and confirmed by the Convention, with special 
 honors and congratulations at the hands of Presi- 
 dent Janney. 
 
 Two days before, A. G. Richardson, Adjutant-Gen- 
 eral of Virginia, sent orders to Brig.-Gen. James 
 H. Carson, Sixteenth Brigade, Winchester, direct- 
 ing him to issue "instant orders" to the brigade 
 to be in readiness for service at a moment's warning 
 to support a movement of State troops against the 
 United States Arsenal at Harper's Ferry. Next day, 
 similar orders were sent to Gen. Thomas Hay- 
 mond, Fairmont, to give orders to the Third Division 
 to be ready for service at a moment's notice, and 
 that he "take measures effectually to prevent the 
 passage of Federal or any other troops from the 
 West eastward on the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad." 
 The brigadiers in Raymond's division were: Burton 
 Fairfax, Preston county; J. H. Carson, Frederick 
 county; James Boggs, Pendleton county; C. B. Con- 
 rad, Gilmer county; Bushrod W. Price, Marshall 
 county ; and John J. Jackson, Wood county. 
 
 The day the Secession ordinance was passed, the 
 Convention appropriated $100,000, with instructions 
 to Letcher "to repel invasion." 
 
 31 
 
ORGANIZING REBELLION IN THE 
 NORTHWEST. 
 
 CONCENTRATIONS WEST OF THE MOUNTAINS. 
 
 The day following the consummation of the secret 
 league of usurpation between the Convention and 
 Alexander H. Stephens, the Confederate Secretary 
 of War at Montgomery wired John Letcher, rebel 
 Governor, to know at what points and in what num- 
 bers the military forces of Virginia were to be ren- 
 dezvoused, adding: "For action here, an early answer 
 is expected." May 1st, Letcher wired Secretary Wal- 
 ker in reply : 
 
 "Arrangements have been made to call out, if necessary, 
 50,000 volunteers from Virginia, to be rendezvoused at Nor- 
 folk, Richmond, Fredericksburg, Alexandria, Harper's Ferry, 
 Grafton, Kanawha, Parkersburg and Moundsville." 
 
 In this reply is clearly disclosed the expectation 
 that the Confederacy would take speedy possession 
 of all Western Virginia to the Ohio river. 
 
 May 3rd, Governor Letcher issued a proclamation, 
 calling on the State volunteer companies, where there 
 were any, or when organized, to rendezvous "for the 
 service of Virginia." Anticipating this proclama- 
 tion, General Lee had already issued orders to carry 
 out its objects. These orders did not obtain general 
 publicity in Northwestern Virginia. They were cir- 
 culated through secret channels among those only 
 who were known to be in co-operation or sympathy 
 with the Kebellion. So dominant was the Union sen- 
 timent, that the only open rendezvous established in 
 
 32 
 
Organizing Rebellion in the Northwest 33 
 
 the Northwest at that time was at Fetterman, on the 
 Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, two miles north of Graf- 
 ton. Here Capt. William P. Thompson (son of 
 Circuit Judge George W. Thompson, of Wheeling) 
 put his Marion guards into camp. The Postmaster at 
 Fetterman, it was said, was friendly to the cause and 
 the Confederate correspondence during the occupa- 
 tion at Grafton was carried on through the Fetter- 
 man office, the Grafton office not being deemed trust- 
 worthy. Two or three days before the advance of 
 the Union forces under Kelley and Morris, this ren- 
 dezvous was moved up to Grafton, the arrival of 
 about a thousand troops from the south sufficing to 
 keep the Union people of Grafton quiet. 
 
 APPOINTMENT OF RECRUITING OFFICERS. 
 
 April 29th, Maj. Alonzo Loring, of Wheeling, was 
 directed by Gen. Lee to "Muster into the service 
 of the State such volunteer companies as offer them- 
 selves in compliance with the call of the Governor, 
 take command of them and direct the military opera- 
 tions for the protection of the terminus of the Balti- 
 more & Ohio Railroad and also of the road." Maj. 
 Loring was further instructed to put himself in com- 
 munication with Maj. Francis M. Boykin, Jr., who 
 had been directed to give protection to the railroad in 
 the vicinity of Grafton "with a view to co-operate, if 
 necessary," and to report the number of companies 
 he might muster into the service, the condition of 
 their arms, equipments, etc. 
 
 April 30th, Gen. Lee directed Maj. Francis M. 
 Boykin, Jr., "commanding Virginia volunteers, Wes- 
 ton, Virginia, ' ' to muster into the service of the State 
 
34 Lee's Invasion of Northwest Virginia 
 
 such companies as might offer their services "for the 
 protection of the northwestern portion of the State." 
 
 He was instructed to assume the command, to take 
 post at or near Grafton (unless some other point 
 should offer greater facilities for the command of 
 the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad and the Parkersburg 
 Branch) ; to "endeavor to obtain the co-operation of 
 the officers of the road" and afford them every assist- 
 ance in his power; also to endeavor to give quiet and 
 security to the inhabitants of the country; to place 
 himself in communication with Maj. Loring at Wheel- 
 ing and co-operate with him if necessary; to report 
 the number of companies he might muster, with sug- 
 gestions as to the best means for the accomplishment 
 of the object in view. He was advised that 200 "old 
 flint-lock" muskets would be forwarded to him by 
 Gen. T. J. Jackson, then in command at Harper's 
 Ferry. 
 
 May 3rd, Gov. Letcher issued a proclamation au- 
 thorizing the commanding general of the military 
 forces of Virginia to cause to be mustered into the 
 service of the State from time to time, as the public 
 exigencies might require, such additional number of 
 volunteers as he might deem necessary. 
 
 May 4th, Maj. Loring was notified by Gen. Lee 
 that his authority to call out volunteers was limited 
 to Tyler, Wetzel, Marshall, Ohio, Brooke and Han- 
 cock counties. 
 
 GEN. LEE'S AVANT COUREUR. 
 
 May 4th, Gen. Lee directed Col. George A. Porter- 
 field of Jefferson county, to repair to Grafton and se- 
 lect a position for troops to be called into the serv- 
 
Organizing Rebellion in the Northwest 35 
 
 ice, with a view to hold both branches of the Balti- 
 more & Ohio Railroad to the Ohio river. He was di- 
 rected to co-operate with Maj. Loring of "Wheeling, 
 and to place a force on the Parkersburg branch, and 
 was advised that Maj. Boykin would act under his 
 orders. 
 
 Col. Porterfield was authorized to extend the call 
 for volunteers to Wood, Wirt, Roane, Calhoun, Gil- 
 mer, Ritchie, Pleasants and Doddridge counties — to 
 rendezvous at Parkersburg; to Lewis, Harrison, 
 Monongalia, Taylor, Barbour, Upshur, Tucker, 
 Marion, Randolph and Preston counties — to rendez- 
 vous at Grafton. 
 
 The muskets to be sent by Jackson from Harper's 
 Ferry were to be distributed under Porterfield 's 
 orders. He was instructed that it was not intended 
 to interfere with the peaceful use of the railroad, and 
 he was to co-operate with its officers and agents and 
 "aid them in the management of the road" as much 
 as possible. 
 
 In a dispatch from Gen. Jackson to Gen. Lee, 
 dated Harper's Ferry, May 7th, Jackson said: "An 
 unarmed company in Harrison county has offered its 
 services and I design arming it at Grafton." This, 
 it is presumed, is the company which marched into 
 Clarksburg from Romine's, May 20th, under com- 
 mand of Uriel M. Turner. 
 
 THE ENEMY'S COUNTRY. 
 
 May 10th, Maj. Boykin reported from Grafton to 
 Gen. Lee: 
 
 "The feeling in nearly all our counties is very bitter, and 
 nothing is left undone by the adherents of the old Union to 
 
36 Lees Invasion of Northwest Virginia 
 
 discourage those who are disposed to enlist in the service of 
 the State. I find that organizations exist in most of the 
 counties pledged to support what they term 'the Union.' " 
 
 Maj. Boy kin deemed it impracticable to hold Graf- 
 ton with the very small force which could be gotten 
 together soon, and saw "no alternative but to send 
 troops from the east for the present. This section'' 
 he said "is verging on a state of actual revolution, 
 and many men who were true and loyal to the State, 
 are afraid to leave their families among men who 
 recognize as a leader John S. Carlile, who openly 
 proclaims that the laws of the State should not be 
 recognized." 
 
 Maj. Boykin thought they should have at least one 
 battery and that 500 men would be sufficient to quell 
 any disturbance which might arise "if a smaller force 
 were sent." 
 
 He thought troops should be assembled at Par- 
 kersburg immediately and recommended that Judge 
 William L. Jackson, formerly second auditor and 
 afterwards lieutenant-governor of Virginia, be put 
 in command at that place.* 
 
 In reply to this, Gen. Lee wrote Maj. Boykin, May 
 11th, that he must "persevere and call out companies 
 from well-affected counties and march them to Graf- 
 ton." He advised that 400 rifles and some ainmuni- 
 
 *Francis H. Peirpoint, in a speech from the balcony of 
 the McClure Hotel, Wheeling, May 11, 1861, said: "An officer 
 had come to Grafton to make a rendezvous for Letcher's 
 troops 'if it was not offensive to the people.' But the 
 b'hoys live at Grafton — 100 of them, as good as ever trod 
 the soil. They told this officer: 'Now, my friend, we are a 
 hospitable people and we will be generous with you. We 
 will give you until the next train starts to leave. But as 
 sure as there is a God in heaven, if you come back this 
 way, you will not get through.' He left by the first train." 
 
 The writer learns from good authority this reference 
 was to Maj. Boykin. 
 
Organizing Rebellion in the Northwest 37 
 
 tion had been ordered from Staunton to Maj. Goff, 
 Virginia volunteers, Beverly,* who had been directed 
 to communicate with Porterfield and take his direc- 
 tions as to the disposition of the arms and ammuni- 
 tion. Gen. Lee did not "think it prudent to order 
 companies from other parts of the State to Grafton, 
 as it might irritate instead of conciliating the popu- 
 lation in that region." 
 
 May 13th, Gen. Lee wrote Maj. Boykin again, to 
 inform him that 600 additional rifles had been sent 
 to Maj. Goff, at Beverly, to be subject to Col. Porter- 
 field's orders. He stated that Maj. Goff had been 
 ordered to muster troops in Randolph and adjacent 
 counties, and it was hoped to obtain there a sufficient 
 number for the needs of Grafton, as he deemed it 
 "inadvisable to send troops from the East for the 
 present." 
 
 COL. PORTERFIELD AT GRAFTON. 
 
 Col. Porterfield arrived at Grafton May 14th, and 
 immediately reported to Gen. Robert S. Garnett, 
 Adjutant General, Richmond, that the officers who 
 had been directed to report to him were not present, 
 nor was there any volunteer or other force there. 
 He would proceed at once to ascertain the where- 
 abouts of Maj. Goff's command. On account of the 
 sparseness of the population, it would be difficult to 
 get the various companies to act in concert. "After 
 my return," he said, "I would desire as soon as pos- 
 sible to be reinforced by a detachment of not less than 
 250 men and a few pieces of artillery, if they can be 
 spared from the command at Harper's Ferry." 
 
 ♦David Goff, brother of Nathan and Waldo P. Goff, of 
 Clarksburg. 
 
38 Lee's Invasion of Northwest Virginia 
 
 May 16th, Col. Porterfield wrote again to Adjt. 
 Gen. Garnett : 
 
 PORTERFIELD TO GARNETT. 
 
 "In my last report I stated that I would first get pos- 
 session of the arms sent to Maj. Goff, and then try to collect 
 a force to occupy this place. I accordingly sent a messenger 
 to Maj. Goff, at Beverly, about 50 miles distant, and proceeded 
 to ascertain what force I could get, its condition and the senti- 
 ment of the people of the counties of Taylor, Barbour and 
 Harrison. I also sent orders to the captains of companies, 
 supposed to be armed, in the neighboring counties to bring 
 their companies immediately to a designated point and there 
 await my orders. 
 
 ''The messenger returned from Beverly with the reply that 
 nothing had been heard of the rifles, nor had Maj. Goff been 
 informed that they were to be sent to him. This is a serious 
 disappointment. Several companies in this vicinity are or- 
 ganizing and expecting to be furnished at once with arms and 
 ammunition. I found a company organized at Pruntytown 
 which will be ready to receive arms in a day or two. There 
 is another at Philippi awaiting arms, and another in Clarks- 
 burg which will soon be ready. I have seen the officers of 
 these companies. There are other companies forming in the 
 surrounding counties, but all without arms and un-uniformed. 
 This force when received will not for some months be more 
 effective than undisciplined militia. There are but two com- 
 panies in this vicinity known to be armed. One of these — 
 Capt. Boggess', at Weston — has old flint-lock muskets, in bad 
 order, and no ammunition. The other — Capt. Thompson, at 
 Fairmont — has a better gun and some ammunition. These 
 companies are now marching towards this point: are ordered 
 to do so, at least. This is the only force on which I have 
 to depend; and it is very weak compared with the strength 
 of those in this section who, I am assured, are ready to op- 
 pose me. 
 
 "I have found great diversity of opinion and much bitter- 
 ness of feeling among the people of this region. They are 
 apparently upon the verge of civil war. A few bad men have 
 done much mischief by stirring up rebellion among the people 
 
Organizing Rebellion in the Northwest 39 
 
 and representing to them the weakness of the State and its 
 inability or indisposition to protect them, the power of the 
 government at Washington and their willingness to give any 
 required aid to resist the State authorities. I am too credibly 
 informed to entertain any doubt that they have been and will 
 be supplied with the means of resistance. They and their 
 accomplices have also threatened the property and persons of 
 law-abiding citizens with fire and sword. Their efforts to 
 intimidate have had their effect both to dishearten the one and 
 encourage the other. Many good citizens have been dispirited, 
 while the traitors have seized guns and ammunition of the 
 State to be used against its authority. Arms in the hands 
 of disbanded volunteer companies have been retained for the 
 same avowed purpose. 
 
 "The force in this section will need the best rifles. Those 
 at Harper's Ferry which were injured by the fire, if fitted up, 
 will do very well, as there will not be the same use for the 
 bayonet in these hills as elsewhere; and the movements should 
 be light infantry and rifle; although the bayonet, of course, 
 would be desirable." 
 
 May 19th, Gen. Lee wrote Col. Porterfield that 1,000 
 muskets and rifles for use of the troops under his com- 
 mand had been sent to Maj. Goff and Lieut. Cheno- 
 weth, of Beverly ; that several hundred arms had also 
 been sent, for the use of Porterfield 's command, to 
 Gen. Jackson, at Harper's Ferry; and that several 
 companies had been directed to go with arms from 
 Staunton to Beverly, "to gather strength as they pass 
 along." 
 
 SENATOR MASON ON INTERNATIONAL RIGHTS. 
 
 Ex-Senator James M. Mason, who had been di- 
 rected to go to Maryland on a secret mission, wrote 
 Gen. Lee from Winchester May 15th regarding the 
 occupancy of Maryland Heights by Gen. Jackson; 
 about which it appears Gov. Letcher had some scruples 
 
40 Lee's Invasion of Northwest Virginia 
 
 as being an invasion of the sovereign State of 
 Maryland. Mr. Mason said the occupancy of Mary- 
 land Heights was necessary to the command of the 
 town of Harper's Ferry, and that a small body en- 
 trenched there could hold the position against a su- 
 perior force. In reference to the right of Virginia to 
 occupy the Heights, he said : 
 
 "I want to speak only of our right to fortify and hold those 
 Heights, whether Maryland protest or no, putting aside the 
 law of necessity and its sanctions. If Maryland were suo jure 
 and a friendly contiguous power, the occupation of her terri- 
 tory, hostile and menacing to Virginia, gives the clear right 
 in public law to Virginia to occupy her territory too, so far 
 as necessary for self-protection; a right not to be questioned 
 under existing circumstances by Maryland or any other power. 
 
 "But Maryland is not suo jure; she comprises one of the 
 United States, a power now foreign to Virginia and in open 
 hostility to us. Occupying her territory, therefore, is only 
 occupying the territory of the enemy ; nor is it invasion in the 
 proper sense of that term, because the occupation is defensive 
 and precautionary only, and not for aggression, and will cease 
 as soon as the enemy withdraw from Maryland." 
 
 MAKES A MILITARY SUGGESTION. 
 
 Regarding the position of the Baltimore & Ohio 
 Railroad, Mr. Mason said it was "important that a 
 sufficient military force of our State should be ex- 
 hibited and retained along that road at important 
 points west of Harper's Ferry, at least as far as the 
 western slope of the Allegheny mountains; and, as 
 two such points," he said, "I would indicate Pied- 
 mont and Grafton. The numerous tunnels through 
 the mountains, the numerous bridges across rivers and 
 streams, and especially the expensive and complicated 
 viaduct along Cheat river, in the Allegheny raoun- 
 
Organizing Rebellion in the Northwest 41 
 
 tains, furnish abundant places for such irremediable 
 damage, provided we are in advance of the invad- 
 ers. ' ' 
 
 LEE admits his first failure. 
 
 May 21st, Gen. Lee wrote Mr. Mason: 
 
 "Measures have been taken more than three weeks ago for 
 securing control of both branches of the Baltimore & Ohio 
 Railroad and for throwing a force into the disaffected region 
 of the State; to carry out which Maj. Loring has been sent to 
 Wheeling to protect the terminus of the main road and Col. 
 Porter field to Grafton with instructions to concentrate there 
 three regiments, at Parkersburg one regiment, at Moundsville 
 one regiment. These measures having in part failed, several 
 companies have been sent from Staunton to Beverly, with in- 
 structions to gather strength as they pass through the country, 
 for Col. Porterfield's command. By this means it is hoped 
 that a considerable force has been concentrated at Grafton by 
 this time and loyalty in some degree engendered in the dis- 
 affected region of which you speak." 
 
 MILITARY CENSORSHIP BY A WHEELING EDITOR. 
 
 In a letter written by Capt. Daniel Shriver of the 
 (Wheeling) Shriver Grays, dated Harper's Ferry 
 May 19th, addressed to Gen. T. J. Jackson, in com- 
 mand there, Shriver says there were at that date be- 
 tween 300 and 400 Federal troops stationed on Wheel- 
 ing Island, who had been regularly sworn into the 
 United States service by Major Oakes and furnished 
 with arms at request of citizens of Hancock, Brooke, 
 Ohio and Marshall counties, "for the express purpose 
 of resisting the authority of the State of Virginia. 
 At this time," says Captain Shriver, "A. W. Camp- 
 bell, of the city of Wheeling, by published authority 
 from Gov. Dennison, of Ohio, will not permit citi- 
 
42 Lee's Invasion op Northwest Virginia 
 
 zens of Wheeling to ship provisions in any quantity 
 over the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad." 
 
 RECRUITING AT FETTERMAN. 
 
 In report made by Col. J. M. Heck, of the 25th 
 Virginia (Confederate) regiment, sometime after the 
 battle of Rich Mountain, he states that May 24th he 
 reported for duty to Col. Porterfield, who, he says, 
 then held Fetterman with about 100 men. He adds 
 that on the 25th of May Porterfield received six or 
 seven recruits under Col. Turk ; that May 26th Porter- 
 field, with this small force, took possession of Grafton ; 
 and at midnight of the 26th Heck says he departed 
 for Richmond, under instructions from Porterfield, 
 to report the condition of the command at Grafton 
 and the need of reinforcement. 
 
 HOW LEE WOULD DEAL WITH " TRAITORS. ' ' 
 
 Gen. Lee wrote Col. Porterfield May 24th acknowl- 
 edging his letter of the 18th and expressing regret 
 that he had "not been successful in organizing the 
 companies of volunteers that you (he) expected. In 
 answer to your inquiry as to the treatment of 
 traitors," pursues the General, "I cannot believe 
 that any citizen of the State will betray its interests, 
 and hope all will unite in supporting the policy she 
 may adopt." 
 
 MORE MUSKETS AND AMMUNITION. 
 
 May 27th Gen. Lee advises Col. Porterfield that he 
 had ordered 1,000 muskets, with sufficient supply of 
 powder and lead, to Beverly, escorted by Col. Heck 
 and Maj. Cowen; and that Col. Heck had been in- 
 structed to call out all the volunteers he could along 
 the route. 
 
B. & 0. RAILROAD BRIDGES BURNED. 
 
 GEN. SCOTT CAUTIONS MCCLELLAN. 
 
 May 21, 1861, Gen. Scott communicated (by letter) 
 with Gen. McClellan, at Cincinnati, in command of 
 the Department of the Ohio, evidently regarding the 
 threatening aspect of matters in Northwest Virginia, 
 though the paper does not appear among the official 
 records, and May 24th he wired McClellan as follows : 
 
 "We have certain intelligence that at least two companies 
 of Virginia troops have reached Grafton, evidently with the 
 purpose of overaweing the friends of the Union in Western 
 Virginia. Can you counteract the influence of that detach- 
 ment? Act promptly, and Alaj. Oakes, at Wheeling, may give 
 you valuable assistance." 
 
 Answering this, McClellan wired Adjt. Gen. Town- 
 send, May 26th: 
 
 "My time has been so much occupied I have been unable 
 to reply to the General's letter. 
 
 "I was engaged in maturing plans to carry out the Gen- 
 eral's telegraph instructions when I learned by telegram that 
 two bridges on the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad near Farming- 
 ton station had been burned Saturday night. I received this 
 information late yesterday afternoon at Camp Dennison. Col. 
 Kelley, of the First Virginia Volunteers, with his own regi- 
 ment and four companies of the Second, are ordered by tele- 
 graph to move without delay from Wheeling towards Fair- 
 mont, guarding the bridges as they proceed. Col. Irvine, of 
 the Sixteenth Ohio, was ordered to support the movement. Col. 
 Steedman, of the Fourteenth Ohio, supported by the Eighteenth 
 and two light guns, was ordered to occupy Parkersburg and 
 the lines of the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad towards Grafton. 
 
 "Col. Kelley left Wheeling about 7 a. m. today. Col. Irvine 
 crossed at Benwood about 10 o'clock. Col. Steedman moved 
 to Parkersburg about 10 o'clock. 
 
 43 
 
44 Lee's Invasion op Northwest Virginia 
 
 "By telegraph this morning I directed the necessary sup- 
 plies to re-establish telegraph communication and to repair 
 bridges, etc., to be forwarded at once from Wheeling. 
 
 "Gen. Morris holds himself ready to move from Indianapolis 
 on receipt of telegraphic orders, with from two to five regi- 
 ments, should it become necessary. The regiments at Camp 
 Dennison are in the midst of the process of reorganization for 
 three-year service. By tomorrow one fine regiment will be 
 ready to move and others will soon be prepared. I hope, how- 
 ever, that the forces already out toward Grafton will suffice 
 for the end in view. 
 
 "I telegraphed Maj. Oakes, making him acting aide-de- 
 camp temporarily, that he might be able to interfere authori- 
 tatively should it prove necessary. 
 
 "P. S. — Nothing is yet known by the public of this move- 
 ment. I have thus far succeeded in keeping it secret and 
 hope to do so until Grafton is occupied or the troops have 
 considerably advanced. Have this instant heard from Col. 
 Kelley at Mannington, Va., as follows: 
 
 " 'Agreeably to your orders, I left my camp this morning 
 at 5 o'clock with my regiment and Capt. Hayes' company of 
 the Second regiment. Just arrived here without accident or 
 casualty. Found the road in good order. Bridges all safe 
 and guarded by the railroad company and loyal citizens. Will 
 move forward to the burned bridges. This town will be occu- 
 pied by Col. Irvine, who follows. We will repair bridges as 
 soon as possible. I hear that Parkersburg is occupied.' " 
 
 May 26th, Gen. McClellan wired Col. B. F. Kelley, 
 First Regiment Virginia Volunteers, Wheeling: 
 
 "If you have reliable information that bridges of the Balti- 
 more & Ohio Railroad have been burned you will at once pro- 
 cure transportation on that railroad and move your whole 
 command, including the separate companies of Virginia volun- 
 teers not attached to your regiment, as near to Fairmont as 
 can be done without endangering the safety of your command. 
 Leave a sufficient guard to protect the bridges and other struc- 
 tures most liable to destruction. Col. Irvine, of the Sixteenth 
 
B. & 0. Railroad Bridges Burned 45 
 
 Ohio, is ordered to cross the river and support you. Telegraph 
 me constantly as to the state of affairs and how much support 
 you need. Conduct the preliminaries of your movement with 
 as much secrecy as possible and see that the telegraph con- 
 veys no intimation of it in any direction. Consult Maj. 
 Oakes freely. The move must be made with the greatest 
 promptness to secure the bridges. Take at least one week's 
 rations. Accoutrements will follow you tomorrow. I count 
 on your prudence and courage. Preserve the strictest disci- 
 pline. See that the rights and property of the people are 
 respected, and repress all attempts at negro insurrection." 
 
 Under same date, Gen. McClellan wrote Col. Kel- 
 ley: 
 
 "I have telegraphed you this evening, instructing you to 
 make a forward movement on Fairmont. The principal reason 
 for this order was the burning of the bridges, which caused 
 me to anticipate by some two or three days the more carefully 
 prepared measures I had contemplated with the intention of not 
 only securing the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad but also of driving 
 all the armed Secessionists out of Western Virginia. 
 
 "In your present movement you will be careful to run no 
 unnecessary risk; for it is absolutely necessary that we should 
 not meet with even a partial check at the outset. The chief 
 object of your advance is to prevent any further destruction 
 of the railroad. You will not move on Grafton without re- 
 storing the bridges in your rear, unless you receive positive 
 information that Col. Steedman's command has actually 
 reached Grafton or a neighboring point where you can without 
 doubt unite with him. Col. Steedman occupies Parkersburg 
 tomorrow morning with two regiments and will then proceed 
 to take possession of the line of the B. & 0. R. R. as far 
 towards Grafton as he can with safety. Col. Irvine will be 
 under your orders." 
 
 Under same date, Gen. McClellan instructed Col. 
 Irvine to cross the river at Benwood and support Col. 
 Kellev's movement: 
 
46 Lee's Invasion of Northwest Virginia 
 
 "Leave a detachment to guard the bridge over the Ohio 
 and secure Wheeling. Advance the rest of your command at 
 least as far as Fish creek ( ? ) . Render all assistance in pre- 
 serving the bridges. I do not expect you to be driven back. 
 Support will soon reach you if necessary. Preserve the strict- 
 est discipline. Take one week's rations. See that the rights 
 and property of the people are respected, and repress all at- 
 tempts at negro insurrection." 
 
 Under same date, Gen. McClellan instructed Col. 
 J. B. Steedman, commanding Fourteenth Regiment, 
 Marietta, Ohio, to cross the river and occupy Parkers- 
 burg, and that the Eighteenth Ohio at Athens would 
 support him. He was ordered to move by rail towards 
 Grafton as far as prudent, leaving sufficient guards 
 at Parkersburg and the bridges as he advanced. He 
 gave the same instructions to protect rights of per- 
 son and property, concluding with the instruction to 
 "repress all attempts at negro insurrection." 
 
 Under same date, Gen. McClellan wired Brig. Gen. 
 Thomas A. Morris, Indianapolis: 
 
 "You will probably be ordered tomorrow to move with, say, 
 two regiments to Wheeling or Parkersburg. Circumstances 
 may change this, but be ready. Keep this secret; and when 
 you do move give out Pittsburg or some other point as your 
 destination." 
 
 Under same date, Gen. McClellan issued a proclama- 
 tion to the people of Western Virginia, wherein he 
 assured them, among other things, that he would 
 "with an iron hand, crush any attempt at insurrec- 
 tion on the part of the slaves." 
 
 Under same date, he issued an address to his troops, 
 ordering them to "cross the frontier and enter upon 
 the soil of Virginia." It would seem from the reitera- 
 
B. & 0. Railroad Bridges Burned 47 
 
 tion of this injunction about negro insurrection that 
 the General was laboring under some grave misappre- 
 hension as to the state of facts in the territory he 
 was invading. There was not an acre of the earth's 
 surface anywhere at that date in less danger of servile 
 insurrection than Western Virginia. The insurrec- 
 tion of white people was the only one that need have 
 cost Gen. McClellan a moment's anxiety. 
 
 May 30th, Gen. McClellan reported to Adjt. Gen. 
 Townsend that Col. Kelley had occupied Grafton at 
 2:30 P. M. that day, "without the loss of a single 
 life, ' ' the Secessionists having abandoned the place be- 
 fore his arrival. "The Colonel," he said, "will pursue 
 them on the Beverly road and endeavor to capture at 
 least some of the arms that they sent away before 
 they retreated." Col. Kelley 's movement had been re- 
 tarded by the necessity of rebuilding the burned 
 bridges. On arriving at the place where the bridges 
 had been burned, he had at once sent an advance 
 guard to secure the important bridge across the Mon- 
 ongahela one mile east of Fairmont. He commended 
 Col. Kelley highly and suggested he be made a brig- 
 adier of volunteers. 
 
 The General added to this report : 
 
 "I am now organizing a movement on the valley of the 
 Great Kanawha; will go there in person and endeavor to cap- 
 ture the occupants of the Secession camp at Buffalo, and then 
 occupy the Gauley bridge." 
 
PORTERFIELD'S RETREAT TO PHILIPPI. 
 
 HIS OWN REPORT OF HIS REASONS. 
 
 May 29th, from Philippi, Col. Porterfield reported 
 to Adjt. Gen. Garnett that on the 27th, at Grafton, 
 he had received reliable information of a contemplated 
 movement from the West by which a large body of 
 men were to be precipitated upon him in a few hours ' 
 time. "I was assured," he said, "that about 1,500 
 Federal troops had collected at Marietta, some at 
 Bellaire, 1,000 to 1,500 on the island opposite Wheel- 
 ing ; ' ' and, in this state of things, he adds : 
 
 "I ordered some of the bridges of the Baltimore & Ohio 
 Railroad northwest of Fairmont to be destroyed; which order 
 was carried into effect by the destruction of two between 
 Farmington and Mannington, about 35 miles northwest of 
 Grafton. 
 
 "I also sent out an expedition to destroy a bridge of the 
 Northwestern Virginia Railroad 50 or . 60 miles west from 
 Grafton. The object of this expedition has, I am informed, 
 been accomplished, although my party has not returned. I 
 caused a small bridge on the same road about 15 miles west 
 of Grafton to be destroyed, but I learn it has been repaired by 
 the company so trains can pass over it. 
 
 "On the evening of the 27th I received information of the 
 arrival by the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad of a body of troops 
 variously estimated at from 1,000 to 3,000 at the burned 
 bridges near Mannington. It was supposed these men would 
 be followed by others as soon as the house-cars which con- 
 tained them could be returned to the Ohio river. In this 
 state of things I inquired of Gen. Johnson by telegraph (the 
 Grafton end of which only was under the control of our 
 friends, so far as I know) if he could reinforce me. For reply, 
 
 48 
 
PORTERFIELD 's KETREAT TO PHILIPPI 49 
 
 I was informed that no men could be sent from his command 
 at Harper's Ferry. 
 
 "On the 28th, learning from most reliable persons that the 
 invading force had reached Fairmont, 20 miles northwest of 
 Grafton, and thinking that the latter point, from its topography 
 and the character of its population (a good part of which 
 would have united with our enemies upon their appearance), 
 was not an eligible one for us, and considering our very inade- 
 quate supply of provisions and ammunition — particularly caps 
 — and that our number of infantry was small (not more than 
 550) and the want of any sort of training or military discipline 
 among our men; and being informed that other bodies of men 
 besides those first spoken of had passed the burned bridges by 
 means of temporary repairs of them and approached Fair- 
 mont, I concluded to remove the State arms and stores to 
 Philippi, about 15 miles in our rear; there establish a depot 
 in a friendly country; to concentrate such volunteers as were 
 on the way or could be easily and speedily attracted to that 
 point, and there to organize and strengthen my command. I 
 met on the way an unarmed company of volunteers from 
 Upshur ; and at Philippi I was joined by a well-armed com- 
 pany of horse from Rockbridge. I have been compelled to 
 send home, for want of arms to supply them with, a company 
 of horse from Pocahontas, and to dismiss to their homes for a 
 short time a like company raised in Barbour. 
 
 "As soon as I can organize my command, which I hope to 
 do soon, I will return to some more eligible point in the 
 neighborhood of Grafton which will enable me to command 
 both railroads; and in the meantime I hope to be able more 
 effectually to cut off the railroad communications east and 
 west of that place." 
 
 In the foregoing, Col. Porterfield speaks of the 
 force with which he retired to Philippi as not more 
 than 550 infantry. It was authentically reported in 
 the "Wheeling papers at the time that on the 23rd of 
 May about 1,000 horse and infantry from the South 
 arrived at Webster on their way to Grafton. From 
 
50 Lee's Invasion of Northwest Virginia 
 
 Staunton, May 5, 1861, Harman wrote Gov. Letcher 
 that by direction of Gen. Lee he would that day start 
 arms, etc., intended for the Northwest, under escort 
 of Capt. F. F. Sterret's company of cavalry; that he 
 had also ordered Capt. Felix H. Hull, then at Staun- 
 ton, to proceed at once to Highland to gather 200 men, 
 including his company, to accompany Capt. Ster- 
 rett 's command ; that Capt. Moorman, of Pendleton, 
 was also to join with 200 men; that Capts. Stover 
 and McNeil, of Pocahontas, each with 150 men, if pos- 
 sible, were to repair to Huttonsville — all to unite their 
 commands under Capt. Sterrett and proceed to Bev- 
 erly. "My aim," said Harman, "is that the expedi- 
 tion shall reach its destination (Grafton, if thought 
 proper) at least by the day of election:" which was 
 May 23rd, the day these troops arrived at Webster. 
 A letter from Gen. Lee to Col. Porterfield, dated May 
 24th, reads : " By this time the companies from Staun- 
 ton must have reached you, and also one from Harper's 
 Ferry; and I hope the true men of your region have 
 been encouraged to go into the service of the State." 
 Gen. Johnson, commanding at Harper's Ferry, sent 
 to the Adjutant General at Richmond July 1st an 
 anonymous letter written from Martinsburg, stating 
 that, according to the best information to be obtained 
 there, Col. Porterfield left Grafton the previous Mon- 
 day "with his command of about 1,500 men, and went 
 to Philippi, where he probably awaited reinforce- 
 ments from the Valley." The writer reported the 
 arrival of United States troops at Mannington, said 
 nothing definite was known about the troops ad- 
 vancing from Parkersburg, but that some of the rail- 
 road bridges on that line also it was believed had been 
 
PORTERFIELD 's RETREAT TO PHILIPPI 51 
 
 destroyed. There had been no military force of 
 either side at Grafton the previous Wednesday at 4 :00 
 p. ni., but some of the Union men of the neighborhood 
 were gathering together with such arms as they could 
 get at home. The writer added that the bridges be- 
 tween Martinsburg and Cumberland should be burned 
 (especially the bridge over the Potomac proper). 
 "Small bridges," he said, "are but a small hindrance 
 in point of time to an army; and recollect, the rail- 
 road is to be the means of precipitating the immense 
 body of men from Ohio and west of Ohio who are to 
 occupy our Virginia. Only important bridges will 
 present obstacles, as to time, of any material value. 
 West of Martinsburg there are important bridges, but 
 I fear they are in the hands of Union men and a lit- 
 tle force would be required." 
 
 Whatever Col. Porterfield 's force may have been, 
 it would seem the "true men" of that locality, in- 
 voked by Gen. Lee, did not contribute much to it. 
 The only report of any accessions from such sources 
 relates to the "six or seven raw recruits" which 
 Col. Heck reported as joining Col. Turk at Fetter- 
 man. 
 
THE SURPRISE AND CAPTURE OF PHILIPPI. 
 
 The Junction of Kelley and Morris at Grafton — The 
 Strategic Advance and Rout. 
 
 mcclellan's REPORT TO GEN. SCOTT. 
 
 Gen. McClellan, from Cincinnati, June 1st, wired 
 Adjt. Gen. Townsend: 
 
 "Learning that the rebels who abandoned Grafton were 
 this morning at Philippi, I have ordered an advance on that 
 point in two columns from Grafton and Clarksburg, with in- 
 structions to drive them beyond Beverly and hold the latter 
 place. 
 
 "I propose also to advance on Elizabeth and Weston in 
 order to encourage the Union sentiment and to induce the 
 Kanawha people to take a more decided course. I think they 
 are not yet fully up to the mark and need careful nursing. 
 
 "By driving the rebels beyond Beverly, I think we shall free 
 almost the whole of Western Virginia from their influence. 
 
 "I have already informed you that I have placed the opera- 
 tions in Western Virginia under Brig. Gen. Thomas A. Morris, 
 of the Indiana volunteers, a graduate of West Point, and a 
 cool, deliberate man." 
 
 Same date, McClellan to Townsend: 
 
 "Road from Parkersburg to Grafton open. Move on Phil- 
 ippi and Beverly tonight to drive the rebels entirely over 
 the mountains. 
 
 "Kanawha movement suspended for the present in conse- 
 quence of conference with Union men. I explain by mail." 
 
 GEN. MORRIS' REPORT TO MCCLELLAN. 
 
 Col. Kelley 's command, arriving at Grafton May 
 30th, was joined in the evening of June 1st by the 
 forces under Gen. Morris via Parkersburg Branch, 
 
 52 
 
The Surprise and Capture of Philippi 53 
 
 being six companies of his own regiment and 
 nine of the Ninth Indiana. Under the latter date, 
 Gen. McClellan had wired Adjt, Gen. Townsend that 
 an advance on Philippi would be made that night; 
 but upon conference between Morris and Kelley, it 
 was agreed to defer it until the following night. The 
 story of the advance, the surprise of Porterfield 's 
 camp, the rout of his forces and the wounding of 
 Col. Kelley are told in Gen. Morris' report, supple- 
 mented by a letter written recently by Capt. Thomas 
 H; Norton, of Wheeling (since dead). 
 
 To mislead the numerous spies, Gen. Morris gave 
 an order to Col. Kelley, June 2nd, to take six com- 
 panies of his own regiment, nine of Milroy's and six 
 of Irvine's Sixteenth Ohio and proceed on the Balti- 
 more & Ohio Railroad to a point about six miles east 
 from Grafton, and thence march by the shortest and 
 most practicable route to Philippi, regulating march 
 and bivouac so as to be sure of coming before Phil- 
 ippi as near four o'clock in the morning as possible. 
 "But should you this evening" (the order read) "re- 
 ceive certain information that the Rebels have re- 
 treated eastward from Philippi, you will follow them 
 with all the speed the strength of your troops will 
 allow. In such case, as early as possible, inform Col. 
 Dumont, on the other bank of the river, and direct 
 his co-operation in the pursuit, to continue, in your 
 discretion, till they are beyond Beverly." 
 
 This column moved eastward by railroad train on 
 the 2nd at 9 :00 a. m., and was generally understood 
 to be an advance on Harper's Ferry. After leaving 
 the cars as directed, the distance to Philippi was 
 about twenty-five miles on a road but little traveled. 
 
54 Lee's Invasion of Northwest Virginia 
 
 The instructions required a rapid march during the 
 day and early part of the night, to a point from 
 which, after a sufficient rest, Philippi could be cer- 
 tainly reached by four o'clock next morning. 
 
 Capt. Thomas H. Norton, of Wheeling, a lieuten- 
 ant in Col. Kelley's command, narrates in the Wheel- 
 ing Intelligencer of August 10, 1906, following inci- 
 dents in this connection : 
 
 "About midnight a terrific rainstorm interrupted the march 
 and the command was halted for a few hours, and I remember 
 seeking shelter under a wagon from the downpour until I was 
 called upon to take charge of a prisoner in the person of a 
 backwoods farmer who lived in the vicinity, and to whom 
 Capt. Fordyce represented that we were a detachment of Con- 
 federate troops sent from Harper's Ferry to reinforce Porter- 
 field. Acting under this supposition the man consented to 
 guide our column to the point it was desired to reach, but we 
 soon undeceived him as to the identity of our troops, and 
 under a threat of instant death compelled him to accompany 
 us and show us the way. Either from accident or design, the 
 command was guided in a direction that brought us a mile or 
 more on the flank of Porterfield's encampment at Philippi, 
 and when the head of the column reached the apex of the hill 
 that gave us a view of the town and the camp of the enemy, 
 we were startled by an artillery fire from the heights on the 
 opposite side of the river, which we first supposed was a Con- 
 federate battery opening fire on us ; but a few moments dis- 
 closed it to be attached to the brigade of Ohio and Indiana 
 troops that were co-operating in the movement from the direc- 
 tion of Webster. This fact cheered our men and the companies 
 though wearied with the long march double quicked down 
 the road, and were the first to enter the main street of the 
 town, along which the enemy were retreating in hot haste. 
 
 "I remember that I had the pleasure of assisting to eat the 
 very excellent breakfast prepared for Col. Porterfield, which 
 
The Surprise and Capture of Philippi 55 
 
 we found steaming hot in his quarters at Philippi after the 
 so-called battle was over, and in rummaging about the adju- 
 tant's office in the same building we captured a lot of official 
 documents. Among them was a letter from Governor Letcher, 
 of Virginia, recommending the Colonel to run down to Wheel- 
 ing some day, and capture the arms recently sent there by the 
 Secretary of War, and if attacked by Ohio or Pennsylvania 
 troops to retreat along the line of the B. & 0. R. R., burning 
 the bridges to prevent pursuit. I sent the original or a copy 
 of this letter to the Intelligencer and it w r as published to- 
 gether w T ith a description of the affair at Philippi." 
 
 Col. Dumont, commanding the Seventh Indiana 
 regiment, was directed to proceed at 8 :30 p. m. on the 
 2nd, to Webster, three miles west of Grafton, where 
 he was joined by Col. Steedman, with five companies 
 and two fieldpieces; also by Col. Crittenden, with six 
 companies of his regiment. From Webster this column 
 was to march on Philippi, distant about seventeen 
 miles, arriving there at four o'clock precisely next 
 morning. This column was to divert the attention of 
 the enemy until the attack was made by Col. Kelley. 
 When joined by Kelley, the whole force was to be 
 under his command. This force leaving Grafton after 
 dark, had reasonable assurance of reaching the enemy 
 in advance of any information from their friends, as 
 the event proved. Gen. Morris' report states that: 
 
 "The march through the storm and darkness was very 
 severe. The last five miles made by Dumont's column was 
 covered in seventy-five minutes. Many of the men fainted 
 and were left on the road. Others threw away their haversacks 
 and provisions to keep up." 
 
 The arrival of the two columns was but fifteen min- 
 utes apart. A reconnaissance in advance of Dumont's 
 column was made by Col. F. W. Lander, who had the 
 
56 Lee's Invasion of Northwest Virginia 
 
 immediate direction of the artillery. After the bridge 
 over the Tygart's Valley was taken, "he pressed for- 
 ward and joined Col. Kelley, rode into the enemy's 
 ranks and captured the person reported to have shot 
 Col. Kelley. He had great difficulty in restraining 
 the Virginia volunteers from summarily despatching 
 the man, who is a noted secessionist and a quarter- 
 master of the Rebel forces. ' ' * 
 
 Gen. Morris' report says there was much difficulty 
 in getting an accurate statement of the Rebel loss; 
 
 *In answer to an inquiry by the writer touching the 
 identity of this person, Col. Porterfield wrote under date of 
 March 6, 1905: "Capt. Jordan was the quartermaster. I 
 had heard the report that he had shot Col. Kelley, but never 
 put confidence in it. I thought he had said so for notoriety. 
 I do not think any one knew who wounded Col. Kelley." 
 
 Capt. Norton, in the letter already quoted from, makes 
 the following statement regarding the shooting of Col. 
 Kelley: 
 
 "Col. Kelley was undoubtedly shot — and at the time was 
 supposed mortally wounded — by a Confederate quartermaster 
 named Simms. We had not proceeded half way through the 
 village before my attention was called by some of the 
 men to the fact that Col. Kelley had been shot and fallen 
 from his horse. Turning about I saw a number of soldiers 
 surrounding a burly man on the side of the road who held 
 in his hand an old-fashioned horse-pistol. They were say- 
 ing, 'This is the man who shot our Colonel!' and were 
 about to put him to death with their bayonets; but just at 
 that moment a mounted officer rushed into the crowd of ex- 
 cited soldiers and rescued the imperiled Confederate. Our 
 men cried out: 'Who are you?' and he replied: 'Col. Lander, 
 your commander. This man is a prisoner of war, and to 
 kill him is murder. Go after the enemy.' 
 
 "Our men then seemed pacified, but took charge of the 
 prisoner. Some of the men then assisted Col. Kelley into a 
 house opposite to where he was shot, and he was laid on a 
 mattress on the floor; where, after the fray was over, it was 
 ascertained that his wound was not necessarily mortal, and 
 in a few days, Dr. Frissell, of Wheeling — who was then 
 regarded as the most accomplished surgeon in our State — 
 was sent for, and he soon pronounced the Colonel out of 
 danger. In a few weeks Col. Kelley was well enough to 
 be removed to Wheeling, and I was detailed with a platoon 
 of soldiers to escort him to the city, and finally carried him 
 in a carriage to the home of his father-in-law, Mr. William 
 S. Goshorn, who lived out the Pike in Pleasant Valley, where 
 in a month or two he fully recovered. 
 
 "Simms was removed to Grafton and held there as a 
 prisoner for some time in a room at the hotel; and several 
 times, when off duty, I engaged him in conversation, but 
 never could induce him to admit that he fired the shot that 
 wounded Col. Kelley." 
 
The Surprise and Capture of Philippi 57 
 
 that their killed were estimated at from fifteen to 
 forty, and were supposed to have been carried off by 
 friends during the confusion incident to the pursuit. 
 
 June 3rd, Gen. McClellan wired Townsend, trans- 
 mitting following telegram from Gen. Morris, in com- 
 mand at Grafton: 
 
 "We surprised the rebels, about 2,000 strong, at Philippi 
 this morning. Captured a large amount of arms, horses, 
 ammunition, provisions and camp equipage. The attack was 
 made after a march during the entire night in a drenching 
 rain. The surprise was complete. Fifteen rebels killed. The 
 gallant Col. Kelley, of the First Virginia volunteers, is, I fear, 
 mortally wounded. No other important casualties on our 
 side." 
 
 Gen. McClellan reported to Townsend June 10th, 
 regarding the rout of the enemy at Philippi, that 
 he had learned they had received very considerable 
 accessions to their numbers. "To prevent further 
 outrages upon the railroads," he said, "I directed an 
 immediate movement to dislodge and disperse them. 
 This was executed under the orders of Gen. Morris, 
 Col. Kelley of the First Virginia volunteers having 
 the immediate command of the attacking columns." 
 
 Gen. McClellan compliments Col. Kelley highly and 
 recommends his appointment as a brigadier. He also 
 commends Col. Dumont and Col. Lander of the In- 
 diana troops. 
 
 confederate accounts. 
 
 Maj. M. G. Harman, Col. J. M. Heck and Maj. 
 R. E. Cowen despatched from Staunton to Richmond, 
 June 6th: 
 
58 Lee's Invasion of Northwest Virginia 
 
 "Messrs. Spalding and Cook have just reached here, leaving 
 Philippi Monday morning. The Federal troops surprised Col. 
 Porterfield's command, opening fire upon the town with artil- 
 lery, and drove us out, with a reported loss of about six 
 killed and a considerable quantity of arms, baggage and 
 provisions. Much heavier loss to the enemy in men. Mc- 
 Clellan led the Federal forces. Our forces retreated to Beverly. 
 
 "An expedition under Col. Heck leaves here Friday for 
 the Northwest. We urge you will send by express train 
 2,000 men with arms and ammunition, to drive the vandals 
 out, or else give up our border. These gentlemen were in the 
 engagement; say Col. Porterfield had but little ammunition of 
 any kind. Send an officer of experience to command our 
 forces, with a battery and 5,000 arms if possible." 
 
 Same date Maj. Harman wrote Gen. Lee, as fol- 
 lows, enclosing a letter he had written to Col. Porter- 
 field at Beverly: 
 
 "From all the information I have received, I am pained to 
 have to express my conviction that Col. Porterfield is entirely 
 unequal to the position which he occupies. The affair at 
 Philippi was a disgraceful surprise, occurring about day- 
 light, there being no picket guard, or guard of any kind, on 
 duty. The only wonder is that our men were not cut to pieces. 
 They were all asleep, and were only aroused by the firing of 
 the enemy." 
 
 In Harman 's letter to Porterfield, referred to in 
 the foregoing, he states that he had received a tele- 
 gram from Gen. Lee, saying: "Send a messenger to 
 Col. Porterfield to be valiant and maintain his 
 ground until relief reaches him." 
 
 Col. Porterfield, from Huttonsville, June 9th, wrote 
 Adjt. Gen. Garnett, regarding the state of his com- 
 mand: 
 
 "I have not been able to get even proper returns made out 
 to send to your headquarters, and my own reputation has 
 
The Surprise and Capture of Philippi 59 
 
 been injured by the character of my command. In fact, if it 
 had been intended to sacrifice me I could not have expected less 
 support than I have had." 
 
 He adds: 
 
 ''I have been reliably informed that two companies of ne- 
 groes, armed and uniformed, have been seen at Fairmont. The 
 country to the northwest is in a state of revolution, all law- 
 abiding citizens being driven off by the traitors, assisted by 
 northern troops. The private property of Secessionists, but 
 otherwise inoffensive citizens, and their cattle, young, unbroken 
 colts, and the clothing of women and children, have been 
 seized and taken off from citizens of Philippi." 
 
 In a letter to Adjt. Gen. Garnett, June 11th, Col. 
 Porterfield says Col. William L. Jackson had reported 
 to him for duty. 
 
 "He has been very active and will become a most useful 
 officer. Col. Willey, who has also been very zealous and use- 
 ful, was left sick in Philippi. I have assurance that he shall 
 be well treated." 
 
 Col. Willey 's usefulness consisted in his services in 
 burning the bridges between Mannington and Farm- 
 ington. 
 
 PHILIPPI COURT OF INQUIRY. 
 
 A court of inquiry into the responsibility for the 
 disaster at Philippi was constituted at request of 
 Col. Porterfield. Their report was submitted July 
 4th. The summary of the testimony shows condi- 
 tions existing prior to the attack of Kelley and Du- 
 mont, June 3rd: 
 
 "The Court reported that the force at Philippi had con- 
 sisted of 600 effective infantry and 175 cavalry, Virginia 
 troops, sufficiently well armed but badly and insufficiently sup- 
 
60 Lee's Invasion of Northwest Virginia 
 
 plied with accoutrements and ammunition. They were taken 
 by surprise between daybreak and sunrise on the morning of 
 June 3rd, no alarm or intimation of their approach having 
 been given by the pickets until the enemy was within four or 
 five hundred yards and had opened artillery fire. 
 
 "The investigations of the commission had developed that 
 a main and picket guard as strong as was consistent with 
 the effective infantry force present, was regularly detailed 
 and posted at distances sufficiently far out to accomplish the 
 object in view, provided they knew and did their duty, which 
 latter is strongly to be suspected from the fact that although 
 in advance they failed to give any intimation of the enemy's 
 approach, a conclusion which is strengthened by the official 
 report of the mounted officers out with the scouting parties 
 on the night of June 2nd that they had neither seen an infan- 
 try picket nor been challenged by its sentinels going from or 
 returning to the town that night. 
 
 "It appears that immediately upon the arrival of the com- 
 mand at Philippi, the officer in command, Col. Porterfield, 
 took measures to place his force, which was raw and new in 
 service, under a course of instruction, and to select those, in 
 his opinion, best fitted to instruct the sentinels and guards in 
 their duties. The testimony shows that while there was a 
 certain degree of confusion in some quarters, a portion of the 
 command moved from the town in good order, and that the 
 whole force, nearly, after passing some distance from the town, 
 was reformed and proceeded in order. 
 
 "It is shown in the evidence that an expectation of attack 
 or movement upon Philippi shortly to be made was enter- 
 tained generally among the officers and others of the command 
 and that intelligence (how well founded is not known) was 
 brought from time to time of the strength and supposed intent 
 of the enemy; that this had so far produced its effect as to 
 induce the officer in command to call a meeting of his officers; 
 that the result of their consultations and deliberations was an 
 almost if not unanimous decision in favor of immediate re- 
 treat; that when Col. Porterfield returned to the room (from 
 which he had been absent a short time) their opinion was 
 conveyed to him, to which he seemed loth to accede, yet de- 
 
The Surprise and Capture of Philippi 61 
 
 termined to make a further examination of the munitions on 
 hand and to prepare the baggage and train for removal at a 
 moment's notice. No orders to march at any particular time 
 were given, so far as can be gathered from the testimony, 
 although it appears that an understanding or impression was 
 had or entertained by some that the movement would not 
 take place until morning, while some believed it contingent on 
 the weather. 
 
 "The record will disclose the fact of a difference of con- 
 struction (as to the hour of the return) of the orders given 
 to the officer in command of the cavalry company from which 
 the scouting party or parties was taken for duty on the night 
 of the 2nd June. 
 
 "The testimony of several witnesses bears evidence of the 
 cool, deliberate and self-possessed conduct of Col. Porterfield 
 on the morning of June 3rd." 
 
 In reviewing the proceedings of the court, Gen. Lee 
 remarks that : 
 
 "The position at Philippi was seriously threatened by a 
 superior force of the enemy, distant only four hours' march; 
 that Col. Porterfield was aware of the danger of his position 
 and prudently prepared to vacate it. His desire to prevent 
 the occupation of the town by the enemy was worthy of all 
 praise, and had he promptly sent back his baggage and inef- 
 fective men and arranged his plan of defense and taken proper 
 measures to secure information of the advance of the enemy, 
 he might safely have retained his position and either given 
 battle or retired, as circumstances might dictate. It does not 
 appear from the record of the court that any plan of defense 
 was formed; but it does appear that the troops retired with- 
 out his orders, and that the instructions to the advance guard 
 were either misconceived or not executed. To these circum- 
 stances must be attributed the disaster that followed, and 
 they call for heavy censure of all concerned. 
 
 "The commanding General remarks with pleasure upon the 
 coolness, self-possession, courage and energy displayed by Col. 
 Porterfield at the moment of attack: but he cannot exonerate 
 
62 Lee's Invasion of Northwest Virginia 
 
 him from blame in not taking proper precautionary measures 
 beforehand. Yet, in consideration of all the circumstances, 
 he does not think it necessary to do more than express the 
 opinion of the court in the hope that the sad effect produced 
 by the want of forethought and vigilance as exhibited in this 
 case will be a lesson to be remembered by the army through- 
 out the war." 
 
LEE SENDS GARNETT TO MEET THE 
 UNION ADVANCE. 
 
 DISPOSITIONS AND PLANS OF THE NEW COMMANDER. 
 
 June 13th, Gen. Lee advised Col. Porterfield that 
 Gen. Robert S. Garnett, Adjt. Gen. of the P. A. N. 
 Va., had been sent to take command in the North- 
 west. June 16th, Gen. Garnett reported to his suc- 
 cessor, Adjt. Gen. Cooper, that his command had oc- 
 cupied the mountain pass at Laurel Hill, twelve miles 
 north of Beverly, and the pass in the Rich Mountain 
 on the turnpike leading from Beverly to Buckhannon, 
 at a point about seven miles west of Beverly. 
 
 June 18th, Gen. Garnett wrote to Cooper, complain- 
 ing of the condition of his command and insufficiency 
 of supplies. 
 
 He wrote on the 20th that the enemy was reported 
 6,000 strong at Philippi and 4,000 in Grafton, with 
 six pieces of artillery at Philippi. His own opinion 
 was there were not more than 7,000 men at both 
 places. 
 
 He explained his reasons for seizing the two passes 
 named. He had heard the enemy were moving from 
 Philippi to Buckhannon and made a forced march 
 by night to take possession of these passes before 
 they could be occupied by the enemy, both being 
 necessary to check an advance on Beverly from either 
 direction. He presumed it was the object of the 
 enemy to seize the two passes and thus shut his forces 
 in the valley of Beverly, Huttonsville, etc. But he 
 now doubted if anything could be done with the 
 Laurel Hill pass. It was not so formidable as he 
 
 63 
 
64 Lee's Invasion of Northwest Virginia 
 
 had been led to suppose, and would present no diffi- 
 culty to good light infantry. 
 
 From Laurel Hill, June 25th, Gen. Garnett re- 
 ported to Adjt. Gen. Cooper, more in detail, the con- 
 dition and surroundings of his command and the 
 strategic advantages and disadvantages of his situ- 
 ation. He said that he had reached Huttonsville on 
 the 14th and found twenty-three companies of 
 infantry, mostly mustered in, but "in miserable 
 condition as to arms, clothing, equipments, instruc- 
 tion and discipline." Twenty of these were organ- 
 ized into two regiments, one under Lieut. Col. W. L. 
 Jackson, and the other under Lieut. Col. J. M. Heck. 
 These two regiments were at once marched to Rich 
 Mountain pass and to Laurel Hill. Though the force 
 was "wholly incapable" of rendering anything like 
 efficient service, he deemed it so important to possess 
 the two turnpike passes over Rich Mountain and 
 Laurel Hill before they should be seized by the enemy, 
 that he left Huttonsville on the evening of the 
 15th with the two regiments he had organized there 
 and Capt. Rice's battery, and by marching them 
 the greater part of the night, reached the two passes 
 early in the afternoon of the following day. "I re- 
 gard these two passes," says Gen. Garnett, "as the 
 gates to the Northwestern country, and had they been 
 occupied by the enemy, my command would have been 
 effectually paralyzed or shut in the Cheat River val- 
 ley. It was a great mistake on the part of the enemy 
 not to have remained here after driving Col. Porter- 
 field's command over it." 
 
 Gen. Garnett said he had blocked all the country 
 roads leading from the northwestern country which 
 
Lee Sends Garnett 65 
 
 "cross this range of mountains between the foot of 
 Cheat Mountain and St. George;" he was now en- 
 deavoring to collect grain and cattle from the direc- 
 tion of Philippi and Buckhannon, and expected to 
 make a depot at the foot of Cheat Mountain six miles 
 south of Huttonsville. He regarded his force suffi- 
 cient to hold these passes, but not sufficient to hold 
 the railroad. He remarks that the road from St. 
 George to Cheat River bridge, near Rowlesburg, by 
 which he could approach the railroad, is blocked. He 
 thinks his best chance of getting to the railroad would 
 be by the Morgantown road from Evansville. From 
 that point, he could equally menace Grafton, twelve 
 miles distant, and Cheat bridge, fourteen miles dis- 
 tant; at each of which points the Union army had a 
 force. They would be obliged to keep their forces at 
 these points, which would enable him to get at the 
 road at Independence, five miles from Evansville, de- 
 stroy it there and then fall upon the force at Cheat 
 River bridge (by marching along the railroad), be- 
 fore it could be reinforced from Grafton. The objec- 
 tion to this plan was that the enemy at Philippi 
 could throw himself on Garnett 's rear. If he had 
 sufficient force to hold Laurel Hill securely, his re- 
 maining force could regain it from Cheat bridge via 
 St. George, with a little work on that road, the 
 roads from Philippi (four in number) being blocked 
 by Garnett. His "moving force" — say 3,000 — would 
 not be sufficient, he feared, for this operation. 
 
 Two companies of infantry were being organized 
 at Beverly under Col. Porterfield, who had been as- 
 signed temporarily to the command of that place. 
 
66 Lee's Invasion of Northwest Virginia 
 
 "The mass of the country people," said Gen. 
 Garnett, ' ' is against us. ' ' 
 
 Gen. Lee, in his acknowledgment of this report, 
 says: 
 
 "The rupture of the railroad at Cheat River would be worth 
 to us an army." 
 
 July 1st, Gen. Garnett wrote again, asking for ad- 
 ditional force: 
 
 "With the railroad running across my entire front, I have 
 become satisfied I cannot operate my present position with 
 any reasonable expectation of substantial success with the 
 present force under my command. My hopes for increase of 
 my force in this region have been sadly disappointed. Only 
 eight men have joined me here and fifteen at Col. Heck's 
 camp. These people are thoroughly imbued with an ignorant 
 and bigoted Union sentiment. 
 
 "Unless I am misinformed as to the state of feeling among 
 the people and the condition of things in the Kanawha valley, 
 it is my opinion that Gen. Wise's command could be of more 
 service to the cause by operating in the direction of Parkers- 
 burg and the Northwestern Railroad. It would produce a 
 very effective diversion in favor of the operations from this 
 point." 
 
 In a letter dated July 6th, Gen. Garnett refers to 
 this again : 
 
 "Some subsequent information has confirmed me in my 
 convictions as to the propriety of such a movement. I learned 
 a day or two since from sources in my front that 2,800 men 
 who had been put upon light-draft steamers in Pittsburg to 
 operate in the Kanawha valley were diverted from that pur- 
 pose and landed at Parkersburg; from which place they 
 came to Clarksburg, and thence to Buckhannon; where, with 
 
Lee Sends Garnett 67 
 
 others from Philippi to the number of 3,000 to 4,000, they 
 have taken up their position with supporting - forces at Weston 
 and Clarksburg, numbers unknown." 
 
 Gen. Garnett did not favor a direct move on Par- 
 kersburg, because that, instead of taking the troops 
 away from his front, would simply bring in more 
 troops from beyond the Ohio ; but if "Wise were to 
 retrace his steps from Charleston to Summersville in 
 Nicholas county, and go thence to Bulltown in_ Brax- 
 ton county — "both of which counties are loyal to our 
 cause — he would be within a day's march of Wes- 
 ton and threaten both it and Buckhannon; and the 
 enemy would have to draw from his force in my front 
 to meet him. The valley of the Kanawha is com- 
 paratively loyal to our cause, and the force under 
 Floyd would be abundant to meet any force which 
 it is probable the enemy will send into that region 
 for the present." 
 
 Garnett suggested that the enemy could at all 
 times maintain superiority of numbers in his vicini- 
 ty, and it was a question for the government to de- 
 cide "whether the mere paralyzation of a superior 
 force of the enemy, with the hope of seizing the rail- 
 road if an opportunity should offer, is a sufficient 
 object to warrant the maintenance of our forces in 
 this region. I have," he adds, "by no means relin- 
 quished or abated my hope of being able on some 
 favorable occasion to get at the road. But this is a 
 contingency. ' ' 
 
 DIVERSION BY WISE. 
 
 To Gen. Garnett 's suggestion of a diversion which 
 might be made by Gen. Wise, Gen. Lee replied July 
 
68 Lee's Invasion of Northwest Virginia 
 
 11th, and same date wrote to Wise in regard to it. 
 To the latter, he said: 
 
 "Gen. Garnett thinks one of the most effective means of 
 keeping the Kanawha valley free is to give Gen. McClellan full 
 occupation where he now is. He thinks if your column should 
 move from Charleston direct upon Parkersburg it would merely 
 have the effect of bringing further reinforcements from Ohio; 
 but if it were to march from Sunimersville, in Nicholas county, 
 to Bulltown, in Braxton, both of which are loyal to our cause, 
 it would be within a few days' march of Weston and would 
 threaten both it and Buckhannon, and that the enemy would 
 thus be divided and might be struck at in detail. Communica- 
 tion with Gen. Garnett can be had by way of Huttonsville. He 
 estimates the enemy's force at 6,000 men; at Grafton a few 
 hundred; at Clarksburg about 3,000; at Weston 2,000, and at 
 Cheat River bridge from 2,000 to 3,000— making a total of 
 about 17,000 men." 
 
 In reply to this suggestion, Gen. Wise wrote Gen. 
 Lee from Charleston, July 17th : 
 
 "Gen. Garnett was mistaken in his anticipations about the 
 enemy not invading the Kanawha valley and in his apprehen- 
 sion of my moving from Charleston direct upon Parkersburg. 
 We are now on both sides of the Kanawha as high as the 
 mouth of Coal River, front to front to the foe. * * * At Coal, 
 I have posted 900 efficient men ; at Two-Mile and Elk, say, 800 
 efficient, and at Gauley Bridge, Summersville and the Old Mill, 
 on the Birch river, in all 1,000, with instructions to scout 
 towards Suttonville, where the enemy are already in posses- 
 sion. I have anticipated Gen. Garnett, you see, in this move- 
 ment. I cannot reinforce him, but he may me, by the road 
 leading from Huttonsville up Tygart's valley road to Rack- 
 stone, up that fork to where it crosses the range of Rich 
 Mountain; thence between Grassy Creek and Back Fork of Elk 
 to where it crosses Elk; thence southwest to the head of 
 Laurel creek; thence to the head of Big Birch river and down 
 the same to the Old Mill near there at the gorge of Birch 
 mountain, in my outpost from Summersville. If Gen. Floyd 
 
Lee Sends Garnett 69 
 
 can reinforce Coal river and Gen. Garnett can, in considerable 
 number, reinforce Birch and Elk, T will make a diversion that 
 shall distract and defeat the enemy." 
 
 CHEAT RIVER VIADUCT. 
 
 June 22nd, Jefferson Davis wrote to Gen. John- 
 son, commanding at Harper's Ferry, suggesting that 
 "if the bridge at Cheat River and the Grand (King- 
 wood) tunnel could be destroyed so as to prevent 
 the use of the railroad for the duration of the war, 
 the effect upon public opinion in West Virginia would 
 doubtless be of immediate and great advantage to 
 our cause." 
 
 From Grafton, June 23rd, Gen. McClellan reported 
 to Adjt. Gen. Townsend that he had information 
 which made it probable there were from 1,500 to 3,000 
 Rebels at Romney, entrenched with a few guns. He 
 thought their object was to cover the approach to 
 Winchester, and to serve as a base for guerrilla par- 
 ties operating towards Piedmont. 
 
THE UNION ADVANCE ON RICH MOUNTAIN. 
 
 GEN. MCCLELLAN'S PLANS. 
 
 From Parkersburg, June 22nd, Gen. McClellan 
 wired Adjt. Gen. Townsend that he was on the point 
 of moving forward to Clarksburg, to advance thence 
 "either on the rear of the enemy at Beverly or to go 
 on to Piedmont." 
 
 From Grafton, June 23rd, McClellan wired Town- 
 send: 
 
 "I did not find my orders intelligently carried out for the 
 advance on Cheat River, and will go there myself tomorrow 
 to see it properly attended to. It is very important to secure 
 that line. 
 
 "There is certainly a strong force of some kind near Hut- 
 tonsville, with a strong advanced party entrenched near Laurel 
 Mountain, between Philippi and Beverly." 
 
 As soon as he could get his command well in hand, 
 the General proposed moving with his available force 
 from Clarksburg to Buckhannon, "then on Beverly, 
 to turn entirely the detachment at Laurel Moun- 
 tain," the troops at Philippi to be advanced in time 
 to follow up the retreat of the Rebels in their front. 
 "After occupying Beverly," he said, "I shall move 
 on Huttonsville and endeavor to drive them into the 
 mountains, whither I do not propose to follow them 
 unless under such circumstances as to make success 
 certain. 
 
 "As soon as practicable, I intend to clear out the Valley of 
 the Kanawha." 
 
 70 
 
The Union Advance on Rich Mountain 71 
 
 mcclellan proclaims. 
 
 June 23rd, a proclamation was issued by Gen. 
 McClellan from Grafton, "To the Inhabitants of 
 Western Virginia," warning them against engaging 
 in guerrilla warfare; and another, "To the Soldiers 
 of the Army of the West," concluding with these 
 words: "Soldiers, I have heard that there was dan- 
 ger here. I have come to place myself at your head 
 and share it with you. I fear now but one thing — 
 that you will not find foemen worthy of your steel." 
 
 REBUKES GEN. MORRIS. 
 
 Somewhat in line with this vainglorious pronounce- 
 ment was a rebuke given by McClellan to Gen. Mor- 
 ris in a letter to him a fortnight later. While at 
 Buckhannon, Gen. McClellan received a letter by 
 messenger from Gen. Morris, then in command at 
 Philippi with a force of three to four thousand con- 
 fronting Garnett at Laurel Hill, written to acquaint 
 his superior with the situation there. Gen. Morris' 
 letter does not appear with Gen. McClellan 's reply, 
 but the reply, dated July 3rd, indicates that Morris 
 had expressed apprehension of attack by Gen. Gar- 
 nett and fear that the defense of Philippi was not 
 sufficiently assured with the force at his command. 
 Gen. McClellan 's reply expresses surprise that Mor- 
 ris should feel any apprehension and rebukes him 
 rather harshly for timidity, adding, however, that he 
 had ordered the Sixth Ohio, Col. Latham's company, 
 and such of Keys' cavalry as were fit for service, to 
 reinforce him. 
 
 "Do not ask for any further reinforcements," said 
 McClellan. "If you do, I shall take it as a request 
 
72 Lee's Invasion of Northwest Virginia 
 
 to be relieved from your command and return to In- 
 diana. I have spoken plainly. I speak officially. 
 * * * I must have generals under me who are will- 
 ing to take as much risk as I am. I propose taking 
 the really difficult and dangerous part of this work on 
 my own hands. ' ' We shall see how McClellan did this 
 at Rich Mountain. 
 
 July 6th, from Buckhannon, A. A. Gen. Williams 
 sent a letter to Gen. Morris, directing him to move 
 next morning to a position within two miles of Gar- 
 nett's army, which is particularly described as being 
 "near Eliot's farm, in preference on the south side 
 of Barker's Mill Run, on the heights in the rear of 
 William Yeager's house." He said it was "prefer- 
 able to avoid the defile north of the Eliot house by 
 crossing the river somewhere near the nineteenth 
 milepost from Beverly and recrossing at the ford 
 where the Middle Fork road crosses, just at the posi- 
 tion to be occupied." Morris was directed to occupy 
 Belington by a strong advanced guard, also to cover 
 the paths leading from the rebel camp to his left. 
 It was added that he was to do all in his power to 
 hold Garnett in check in the present position and to 
 induce the enemy to believe Morris was to make the 
 main attack, "the object being to cut them off at 
 Beverly. ' ' 
 
 The reference in this letter to ' ' the nineteenth mile- 
 post from Beverly," just at the position Morris was 
 directed to take, "within "two miles of the enemy," 
 indicates that the distance from Beverly to Garnett 's 
 position was seventeen miles, contrary to the opinion 
 expressed in Col. Porterfield's letter that it did not 
 exceed twelve. 
 
The Union Advance on Rich Mountain 73 
 mcclellan's resources and plans. 
 
 July 5th, Gen. McClellan wrote Adjt. Gen. Town- 
 send from Bnckhannon : 
 
 "You will observe that this is the most strategical position 
 in this region. From it I can cover our base of operations and 
 supplies and move readily by good roads in any desired direc- 
 tion. 
 
 "Have directed the positions on Cheat River, Grafton, Web- 
 ster, Clarksburg and Parkersburg to be entrenched. The 
 bridges and tunnels of the two branches of the road are now 
 well guarded. The Cheat River, covering the left of our base, 
 is guarded by eleven companies; Grafton, by a regiment; 
 Clarksburg, by some eight companies, besides Virginia re- 
 cruits; Parkersburg six companies, two regiments of Indiana 
 troops to arrive there today and to be disposable as a reserve 
 
 when needed. companies occupy Wirt C. H. Four 
 
 companies at Ravenswood repulsed 0. J. Wise night before 
 last. 
 
 "In consequence of the threatening aspect of affairs in the 
 Great Kanawha valley, I have ordered four regiments there. 
 
 "Our troops composing the active army are at Philippi, 
 amusing the enemy, who is strongly entrenched with artillery 
 on Laurel Mountain, between that place and Beverly. I have 
 with me here six entire regiments of infantry, six detached 
 companies, two batteries, two companies of cavalry. Two 
 more regiments and some five or six detached companies of 
 infantry will reach here by tomorrow night. 
 
 "The Seventh Ohio occupied Weston three days since, and 
 four companies of the Seventeenth reached Glenville from 
 Parkersburg yesterday. I ordered strong detachments of these 
 companies to move last night on Bulltown, to break up a large 
 force of armed rebels congregating there. 
 
 "I expect to find the enemy in strong position on Rich 
 Mountain just this side of Beverly. I shall, if possible, turn 
 the position to the south and then occupy the Beverly road 
 in his rear. * * * From all I learn the enemy is still un- 
 certain where the main attack is to be made, and is committing 
 
74 Lee's Invasion of Northwest Virginia 
 
 the error of dividing his army in the face of superior forces. 
 If he abandons the position of Laurel Mountain, the troops at 
 Philippi will press him closely. I shall know tonight with 
 certainty what he has in the pass at Huttonsville." 
 
 Next day McClellan despatched Townsend: 
 
 "By the 8th or 9th, at latest, I expect to occupy Beverly, 
 fighting a battle in the meanwhile. I propose to drive the 
 enemy over the mountains towards Staunton, and expect your 
 further orders by telegraph whether to move on Staunton or 
 towards Wytheville." 
 
 Same date McClellan to Townsend: 
 
 "I expect to attack the enemy on the 8th or 9th. He is 
 entrenched on Rich Mountain. Have ordered Morris to move 
 in the morning his command (sixty-two companies and one 
 battery) to within one and a half miles of Laurel Mountain, 
 where the enemy is strongly entrenched." 
 
 To the first telegram, Townsend replied: 
 
 "When you speak of extending your operations to Staun- 
 ton, and even to Wytheville, the General fears your line will 
 be too long without intermediate supports. He wishes you to 
 weigh well these points before deciding." 
 
 July 10th, from Middle Fork bridge, McClellan 
 wired Townsend: 
 
 "In sight of the enemy, who is strongly entrenched. I 
 think I can turn his position. My other column from Phil- 
 ippi is within a mile of the entrenchments on Laurel Hill ; 
 advanced guards within two hundred yards of the enemy on 
 each line. Shall make no further extended movement with- 
 out laying the whole case before the General and obtaining 
 his orders in advance." 
 
THE ACTION AT RICH MOUNTAIN. 
 
 FEDERAL REPORTS. 
 
 When the last foregoing despatch was written, Gen. 
 McClellan, with the main body of his army, was at 
 Roaring creek, a tributary of the Middle Fork river, 
 where he confronted the force under Col. Pegram, 
 entrenched near the west base of Rich Mountain, on 
 the Beverly and Buckhannon turnpike. 
 
 What followed is related in several reports, as 
 follows : 
 
 The official reports of Gen. McClellan to the War Depart- 
 ment at Washington; 
 
 •Report of Gen. Rosecrans, second in command, to Gen. 
 McClellan ; 
 
 Testimony of Gen. Rosecrans before the Committee on the 
 Conduct of the War, at Washington, in 1865. 
 
 MCCLELLAN 'S REPORTS OF PROGRESS. 
 
 Following wires were sent by Gen. McClellan to 
 Townsend, prior to writing his official report: 
 
 From the top of Rich Mountain, 9 :00 a. m., July 
 12th : 
 
 "We are in possession of all the enemy's works up to a 
 point in sight of Beverly. * * * Rosecrans' column left 
 camp yesterday morning and marched some eight miles through 
 the mountains, reaching the turnpike some two or three miles 
 in the rear of the enemy, driving out a defensive force and 
 taking a couple of guns. I had position ready for twelve 
 guns near main camp, and as guns were moving up ascertained 
 that the enemy had retreated. Am now pushing on to Beverly 
 and part of Rosecrans' troops are within three miles of it." 
 
 75 
 
76 Lee's Invasion of Northwest Virgini, 
 
 From Beverly, July 12th, 8 :00 p. m. : 
 
 "I turned the enemy's very strong entrenchments on Rich 
 Mountain yesterday with Gen. Rosecrans' brigade and one 
 company of cavalry. Had a spirited action with a large party 
 of the enemy, who had two guns on the summit of the moun- 
 tain. Captured both guns and killed a large number of the 
 enemy. This morning as we were in the act of moving twelve 
 guns into position to command the enemy's entrenchments by 
 a road cut last evening, it was ascertained that he had left 
 in the utmost confusion. I advanced on Beverly and occupied 
 it with the least possible delay, thus cutting off Garnett's re- 
 treat on Huttonsville and forcing him to take the Leadsville 
 and Saint George road. Captured official papers show Gar- 
 nett's forces to have been ten thousand men. Have ordered 
 Gen. Morris to press him closely, and have given instructions 
 by telegraph which will throw 5,000 to 6,000 men and four 
 guns in his front, so that there is good reason to hope we may 
 yet capture him. 
 
 "I shall move on Huttonsville tomorrow morning and en- 
 deavor to seize Cheat Mountain pass before the enemy can 
 occupy it in strength. With that pass seized, the position 
 on Cheat River strongly occupied, and Gauley Bridge held, 
 as it is probably by this time by Gen. Cox, I think we shall 
 have placed the occupation of Western Virginia on a safe 
 basis." 
 
 From Beverly, July 13th : 
 
 "Garnett abandoned his camp early this morning. He 
 came within a few miles of Beverly, but our rapid march 
 turned him back in great confusion and he is now retreating 
 on the road to Saint George. I have ordered Gen. Morris to 
 follow him closely and have telegraphed for two Pennsylvania 
 regiments at Cumberland to join Gen. Hill at Rowlesburg. 
 The General is concentrating all his troops at Rowlesburg to 
 cut off Garnett's retreat near West Union, or, if possible, 
 Saint George." 
 
RICH MOUNTAIN. 
 
 mcclellan's report to GEN. SCOTT. 
 
 Headquarters Army of Occupation, Western Virginia, 
 
 Gamp near Euttonsville, July 14, 1861. 
 
 Colonel: I have the honor to submit, for the informa- 
 tion of the commanding general, the following report of the 
 operations of the forces under my command from the time 
 of my leaving Grafton : 
 
 Previous to my departure from Grafton I became satis- 
 fied that a large body of the rebel army (supposed to consist 
 of six or seven thousand men, under Brigadier General Rob- 
 ert S. Garnett, formerly of the United States army) occupied 
 an intrenched position at Laurel Hill, about thirteen miles 
 south of Philippi, on the turnpike leading to Beverly, with 
 the apparent intention of making a determined stand at that 
 point. Whereupon I at once resolved to push on with all 
 the available force at my disposal, and endeavor, by making 
 a rapid detour through Buckhannon, to reach Beverly and 
 strike their rear, cutting off their supply communication 
 from Staunton. 
 
 As soon as I had concentrated my forces at Buckhannon, 
 I moved forward, and at the same time ordered General 
 Morris to advance from Philippi and take a commanding 
 position about a mile and a half distant, and directly op- 
 posite the enemy's works, thereby enabling him to divert 
 their attention from me, also to watch their movements and 
 be in position to act promptly after I had reached their rear 
 at Beverly. 
 
 General Morris promptly responded to my order and se- 
 cured the proper position with but slight resistance, and I 
 pushed forward with my column as rapidly as my means of 
 transportation would permit. 
 
 On the evening of the 9th instant I arrived at Roaring 
 creek, near the base of Rich Mountain, where I found the 
 
 77 
 
78 Lee's Invasion of Northwest Virginia 
 
 enemy, in considerable force, had destroyed a bridge, and 
 were strongly intrenched at a point where the road enters a 
 defile leading up the mountain, about tAvo miles distant from 
 my camp. On the morning of the 10th I ordered a recon- 
 naissance in force, consisting of the 9th and 4th Ohio volun- 
 teers and Loomis's battery, under the supervision of Lieu- 
 tenant Poe, topographical engineers. This was pushed within 
 two hundred yards of the enemy's guns, and resulted in the 
 loss of one man killed and one wounded, but the dense thickets 
 with which their works were surrounded prevented the attain- 
 ment of much positive or satisfactory information. It served, 
 however, to confirm my previous supposition that the in- 
 trenchments were held by a large force, with several guns in 
 position to command the first approaches, and that a direct 
 assault would result in a heavy and unnecessary loss of life. 
 These considerations at once determined me to make an effort 
 to turn their flank and commence the attack from the rear. 
 Accordingly, I ordered General Rosecrans to move at 4 o'clock 
 in the morning with the 19th Ohio, the 8th, 10th, and 13th 
 Indiana regiments, and Burdsall's dragoons, to cut his way 
 through the almost impenetrable thickets of brush to the lofty 
 summit of Rich Mountain, at Hart's farm, about five miles 
 distant, and to move thence at once down the turnpike road 
 and attack the intrenchments in rear, and, during the progress 
 of his march, to communicate with me every hour. The re- 
 mainder of the force under my command to be held in readi-' 
 iic^s to assault in front as soon as Rosecrans' musketry 
 should indicate that he was immediately in their rear. The 
 order to General Rosecrans to attack the rear of the enemy's 
 lower intrenchments was not carried out, but his brigade re- 
 mained at Hart's farm during the remainder of the day and 
 night, and I received no communication from him after about 
 11 o'clock a. m., when he was still distant about a mile and 
 a half from Hart's farm. 
 
 About the time I expected the general to reach the rear 
 of their intrenchments I moved up all my available force 
 to the front and remained, in person, just in rear of the ad- 
 vance pickets, ready to assault when the indicated moment 
 should arrive. In the meantime I sent Lieutenant Poe to 
 
Rich Mountain 79 
 
 find such a position for our artillery as -would enable us to 
 command the works. Late in the afternoon I received his 
 report that he had found such a place. I immediately detailed 
 a party to cut a road to it for our guns, but it was too late 
 to get them into position before dark, and, as I had received 
 no intelligence whatever of General Rosecrans' movements, 
 I finally determined to return to camp, leaving merely suf- 
 ficient force to cover the working party. Orders were then 
 given to move up ten guns with the entire available infantry 
 at daybreak the following morning. As the troops were much 
 fatigued, some delay occurred in moving from camp, and 
 just as the guns were starting intelligence was received that 
 the enemy had evacuated their works and fled over the moun- 
 tains, leaving all their guns, means of transportation, am- 
 munition, tents, and baggage behind. Then, for the first time 
 since 11 o'clock the previous day, I received a communication 
 from General Rosecrans giving me the first intimation that 
 he had taken the enemy's position at Hart's farm, from which 
 it appeared that he, with great difficulty, and almost super- 
 human efforts on the part of his men, had forced his way up 
 the precipitous side of the mountain, and at about 1 p. m. 
 reached the summit, where he encountered a portion of the 
 enemy's forces, with two guns in position behind earth and 
 log works, affording protection to their men. 
 
 The attack was commenced by the enemy with heroic 
 spirit and determination. They opened upon the advance of 
 our column with volleys of musketry and rapid discharges of 
 canister, killing several of our men and at first throwing 
 them into some confusion. They, however, soon rallied and 
 returned a brisk and accurate fire, which told with terrible 
 effect in the enemy's ranks, killing and wounding nearly 
 every man at their guns. The troops then advanced, continu- 
 ing their well-directed fire until they drove the enemy from 
 their position and caused them to take flight down the turn- 
 pike towards their intrenchments at the base of the moun- 
 tain. 
 
 The troops then encamped on the battle-field at about 2 
 o'clock p. m., and remained there until the following morn- 
 ing, when I made a rapid march and occupied Beverly. I 
 
80 Lee's Invasion of Northwest Virginia 
 
 here learned that General Garnett, as soon as he discovered 
 we were approaching his rear and had cut off his retreat in 
 this direction, abandoned his intrenchnients at Laurel Hill, 
 leaving his tents and other property, and had made a hasty 
 retreat in the night over a rough country road leading towards 
 St. George. General Morris had been repeatedly instructed by 
 me to keep a close watch upon Garnett's movements, and to 
 be ready the moment he retreated to follow him up vigor- 
 ously with all his available force and crush him if possible; 
 but, much to my surprise, when he discovered that Garnett 
 had escaped, he only sent a portion of his force about eight 
 miles, and then halted it for several hours to communicate 
 with me and bring up re-enforcements. 
 
 This detention gave Garnett the opportunity to get far 
 in advance, and had it not been for the rapid and well- 
 directed march of the advance conducted by Captain Benham, 
 it is believed that the rebel general would have escaped un- 
 harmed. Captain Benham is entitled to great praise for his 
 prompt and energetic movement upon Garnett's rear, the re- 
 sult of which will be seen from his report enclosed. This 
 shows that General Garnett and about twenty others of the 
 enemy were killed, and fifty prisoners, two stands of colors, 
 and one rifled cannon taken, besides the baggage train and 
 a large amount of other property I take very great pleas- 
 ure in recommending Captain Benham to the special notice 
 of the general-in-chief. 
 
 Immediately after learning that Garnett had retreated, I 
 ordered Brigadier General Hill (commanding at Grafton) to 
 assemble all his disposable force and endeavor, by a rapid 
 march upon Saint George or West Union, to cut off the re- 
 treat of the rebels ; but I have not yet heard the result of 
 his movement. My last advices this evening report General 
 Hill's advance within four miles of the retreating rebels. 
 
 I have not time now to notice individual acts of merit and 
 bravery displayed in the recent conflicts, but shall take an 
 early opportunity of presenting them to you in detail. I 
 cannot, however, let the present occasion pass without making 
 mention of the services of Brigadier General Rosecrans in 
 conducting his command up the very precipitous sides of the 
 
Rich Mountain 81 
 
 mountains and overcoming the formidable obstacles which 
 impeded his progress; also, for the very handsome manner 
 in which he planned and directed his attack upon the rebels 
 at Hart's farm, carrying them after a stout and determined 
 resistance. I also consider it due to my volunteer aide-de- 
 camp, Colonel F. W. Lander, to speak of his services in 
 this connection. He (by the request of General Rosecrans) 
 accompanied his column, and by his experience assisted ma- 
 terially in conducting the troops over a most difficult coun- 
 try, and displayed extraordinary activity and courage in the 
 battle. He escaped unhurt, having the horse under him dis- 
 abled by a canister shot. 
 
 I pursued the retreating rebels yesterday as far as Cheat 
 River, and became satisfied that they would not stop short of 
 Staunton. I therefore returned to this camp, which commands 
 the communication between eastern and western Virginia over 
 the Staunton and Parkersburg turnpike. 
 
 General Garnett's command, when last heard from, were 
 retreating in great confusion near the north branch of the 
 Potomac on the road leading from West Union to Williams- 
 port. 
 
 I trust I will not be regarded as merely conforming to a 
 formula when I express the great obligations due to my per- 
 sonal and general staff, who by their good judgment, un- 
 tiring energy and cool conduct, have enabled me to overcome 
 the inevitable difficulties of an imperfect and hasty organiza- 
 tion, and to accomplish whatever good results have been 
 achieved. As far as I have myself observed and learned from 
 their officers, the conduct of the volunteers who participated 
 in the actions at Rich Mountain and at Carrick's Ford was 
 unexceptionable. They invariably displayed an ardent desire 
 to meet the enemy, and great gallantry in action, and, in my 
 judgment, all they require to make good and reliable soldiers 
 is a little more drill and discipline. 
 
 The results of the action at Rich Mountain, as nearly as 
 can be ascertained, were as follows: Our loss in killed, 12; 
 wounded, 59 ; no prisoners. The loss of the enemy in killed, 
 135; wounded and prisoners (not yet reported,) as near as 
 can be determined, between 800 and 900. Two brass 6-pounder 
 
82 Lee's Invasion of Northwest Virginia 
 
 cannon, a large number of muskets, two stands of colors, and 
 other property, were taken. Two 6-pounder brass cannon 
 were captured at the lower intrenchments, with a large 
 wagon train, with horses and a large number of tents. But 
 the really important results of these operations are the com- 
 plete rout and annihilation of the rebel forces, the capture of 
 one and the death of the other of their leaders, that this por- 
 tion of Western Virginia is entirely freed from their presence 
 and that there is now not one single organized band of the 
 rebels on this side of the mountain north of the Kanawha 
 valley. 
 
 After my arrival at Beverly I received a note from Colonel 
 Pegram, containing a proposition to surrender his command 
 as prisoners of war. This note, with my reply, are enclosed. 
 His command, consisting of 33 commissioned officers and 560 
 men, are now prisoners. 
 
 I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 GEORGE B. McCLELLAN, Major General U. S. Army. 
 
 Colonel E. D. Townsend, A. A. G., 
 
ROSECRANS' REPORT TO McCLELLAN. 
 
 Headquarters of the Army, Washington, D. C. 
 Headquarters 1st Brigade U. S. Volunteer Militia. 
 Beverly, Virginia, July 19, 1861. 
 
 Major: In obedience to the order of the major general 
 commanding, I have the honor to submit the following report 
 of the operations of the 1st brigade, consisting of the 8th and 
 10th Indiana volunteer militia, the 13th Indiana U. S. vol- 
 unteer infantry, and 19th Ohio U. S. volunteer militia, which 
 resulted in dislodging the rebel forces from their intrenched 
 position at camp Garnett on Rich Mountain. 
 
 After the armed reconnaissance was over, by direction of 
 the major general I ordered the 8th Indiana to bivouac in 
 advance of the camp at Roaring creek, and the 10th and 13th 
 into camp. 
 
 About 10 p. m. I came to the headquarters with a plan 
 for turning the enemy's position. The general, having con- 
 sidered it and heard the information on which it was based, 
 was pleased to direct me to carry it out, and for that pur- 
 pose ordered Colonel Sullivan, of the 13th Indiana, and 
 BurdsalPs cavalry, temporarily attached to the brigade, and 
 that the movement should begin at daylight on the next morn- 
 ing. 
 
 The troops were ordered to parade in silence under arms, 
 without knapsacks, with one day's rations in their haversacks 
 and their canteens filled with water. By inadvertence the as- 
 sembly was sounded in the 19th Ohio regiment and lights put 
 in several tents, when I discovered it ; but they were promptly 
 extinguished. 
 
 The pickets relieved, the regimental camps and guards with 
 the sick, and a few men of each eompany remaining, orders 
 were given that the reveille should be beaten at the usual hour, 
 and the column formed and moved forward in the following 
 order and strength: 
 
 83 
 
84 Lee's Invasion of Northwest Virginia 
 
 First. 8th Indiana, under Benton 242 strong 
 
 Second. 10th Indiana, under Manson 425 " 
 
 Third. 13th Indiana, under Sullivan.. 650 
 
 Fourth. 19th Ohio, under Beatty 525 
 
 Total infantry 1,842 
 
 Fifth. Burdsall's cavalry 75 
 
 Aggregate 1,917 
 
 Colonel Lander, accompanied by the guide, led the way 
 through a pathless forest over rocks and ravines, keeping far 
 down on the southeastern declivities of the mountain spurs 
 and using no axe, to avoid discovery by the enemy, who 
 we supposed would be on the alert by reason of the appear- 
 ance of unusual stir in our camp and the lateness of the 
 hour. A rain set in about 6 a. m. and lasted until about 
 11 o'clock a. m., with intermissions, during which the col- 
 umn pushed cautiously and steadily forward, and arrived at 
 last and halted in rear of the crest on the top of Rich Moun- 
 tain, hungry and weary with an eight-hours' march over a 
 most unkindly road. They lay down to rest, while Colonel 
 Lander and the general examined the country. It was found 
 that the guide was too much scared to be with us longer, 
 and we had another valley to cross, another hill to climb, 
 another descent beyond that to make, before we could reach 
 the Beverly road at the top of the mountain. On this road 
 we started at 2 o'clock and reached the top of the mountain 
 after the loss of an hour's time, by mistake in the direction 
 of the head of the column, in rectifying which the 10th In- 
 diana took the advance. 
 
 Shortly after passing over the crest of the hill, the head 
 of the column, ordered to be covered by a company deployed 
 as skirmishers, was fired on by the enemy's pickets, killing 
 Sergt. James A. Taggart and dangerously wounding Capt. 
 Christopher Miller, of the 10th. The column then advanced 
 through dense brushwood, emerging into rather more open 
 brushwood and trees, when the rebels opened a fire of both 
 musketry and 6-pounders, firing some case shot and a few 
 shells. 
 
Rosecrans' Report to McClellan 85 
 
 The 10th advanced and took position at A, Plan No. 1, 
 with one company deployed as skirmishers covering its front. 
 The 8th advanced and halted in column of fours at B. The 
 13th advanced to C, in an old road, where it was ordered to 
 occupy the heights, with three companies at d d d, and skir- 
 mish down the hill, keeping strong reserves on the top; three 
 companies were ordered back to E, to cover the debouch up 
 the valley on the left; the companies of the remainder were 
 to fill the space in the line marked | | | , the remain- 
 ing two companies standing in column at . The 19th Ohio 
 came down the road and halted in column at H.* 
 
 Owing to misunderstanding orders, Colonel Sullivan oc- 
 cupied the hill with his whole regiment, and it took forty 
 minutes to correct the error and get in the proper position as 
 indicated. The command forward was then given, and an- 
 other company from the right of the 10th deployed as skir- 
 mishers, leaving an interval through which the 8th could pass 
 in column and charge the rebel battery on the left of their 
 position at Z as soon as our fire had told properly. At the 
 same time Colonel Sullivan was to take his four companies 
 and charge around the road on the left. After an advance 
 of fifty yards and some heavy firing from our line, the en- 
 emy showed signs of yielding, and 1 gave orders to the 8th 
 and sent them to the colonel of the 13th, to charge in column. 
 The 8th made a mistake and got into line at B, where, in 
 consideration of their abundant supplies of ammunition, I 
 left them. 
 
 The 13th went into column at D, Plan 2. Seven companies 
 of the 19th Ohio deployed into line at H and delivered two 
 splendid volleys, when the enemy broke. Meanwhile I rode 
 round to the 13th and drove them in to charge up across the 
 road, as shown at L. The 10th charged by fours at J. The 
 8th came down and charged upon the rebel front at K. 
 
 The battle was over, the enemy dispersed, one piece of can- 
 non taken at A, another at B, and their dead and wounded 
 scattered over the hill-side. 
 
 *Gen. Rosecrans' battle plans were not found by the compilers 
 with his report. 
 
86 Lee's Invasion of Northwest Virginia 
 
 Learning from a captive that the 44th Virginia and some 
 Georgia troops and cavalry were below, and finding it too 
 late to continue the operations against the rebels' position 
 that evening with troops as much exhausted as were ours, 
 and threatened, too, by succors, the troops were bivouacked in 
 the position shown on Plan No. 2 — Lieutenant Colonel Hol- 
 lingsworth going down on the ridge with six companies to 
 the position mentioned, within half a mile of the rebel pickets. 
 
 The two brass 6-pounders captured were put in order, and, 
 under command of Captain Conckle, 19th Ohio, placed — one 
 looking down the Beverly road at C, the other at d, looking 
 towards camp Garnett. 
 
 During that rainy night our men bivouacked cheerfully, 
 and turned out with great promptitude whenever the rebels 
 by their movements alarmed our pickets. About 3 o'clock in 
 the morning of the 12th our pickets brought in a prisoner from 
 the rebel camp, from whom I learned their forces were dis- 
 organized and probably dispersing. This determined the disposi- 
 tions for the attack on the camp. I ordered Colonel Beatty, 
 with all the 19th, to proceed along the ridge and take their 
 position on the south side of the road, and directed BurdsalPs 
 cavalry, accompanied by one company of the 10th Indiana, 
 to reconnoitre down the road. Colonel Sullivan, with the 
 13th, was to follow the movement promptly, and by his skir- 
 mishers to clean the hill-side north of the road. 
 
 These orders were obeyed, and, finding the position aban- 
 doned, Burdsall's cavalry and company C, 10th Indiana regi- 
 ment, entered the camp about 6 o'clock a. m., where they 
 found and took prisoners ten (10) officers, five (5) non-com- 
 missioned officers, fifty-four (54) privates, the descriptive list 
 of which is hereto attached, and marked A. Colonel Beatty 
 entered the upper camp about the same time and occupied it, 
 taking charge of the property, among which were two brass 
 6-pounders, and some eighty tents, four caissons, and one 
 hundred (100) rounds of ammunition. Colonel Sullivan, of 
 the 13th Indiana, came in and occupied the camp on the north 
 side of the road, and took charge of the horses, wagons, tents, 
 tools, and implements of the rebels there. 
 
Rosecrans' Report to McClellan 87 
 
 The 8th and 10th Indiana were left in possession on the 
 battle-field, and were charged with the duty of burying the 
 dead. They remained until next morning, the 13th, when the 
 whole force moved forward to their present encampment at 
 Beverly. 
 
 Having given the details, I close my report by the follow- 
 ing 
 
 SUMMARY OF THE MOVEMENT. 
 
 With strong detachments from the 19th Ohio, the 8th, 10th 
 and 13th Indiana, and BurdsalPs cavalry, amounting to 1,912 
 rank and file, I set out at 5 a. m. of the 11th, and by a cir- 
 cuitous route through a trackless mountain forest reached 
 the Beverly road at the top of Rich Mountain, where I found 
 the enemy advised of my approach, and in force with two 
 6-pounders, field-pieces, and infantry, from various circum- 
 stances judged to have been from 800 to 1,200 strong, though 
 probably not all of them in action. We formed at about 3 
 o'clock, under cover of our skirmishers, guarding well against 
 a flank attack from the direction of the rebels' position, and 
 after a brisk fire, which threw the rebels into confusion, car- 
 ried their position by a charge, driving them from behind 
 some log breastworks, and pursued them into the thickets on 
 the mountain. We captured twenty-one (21) prisoners, two 
 brass 6-pounders, fifty stand of arms, and some corn and 
 provisions. Our loss was twelve (12) killed, and forty-nine 
 ( 49 ) wounded. 
 
 The rebels had some twenty (20) wounded on the field. 
 The number of the killed we could not ascertain, but sub- 
 sequently the number of burials reported to this date is one 
 hundred and thirty-five (135), many found scattered over the 
 mountain. Our troops were informed that there were one or 
 two regiments of rebels towards Beverly, and finding the hour 
 late, bivouacked on their arms, amid a cold, drenching rain, 
 to await daylight, when they moved forward on the enemy's 
 intrenched position, which was found abandoned by all ex- 
 cept sixty-three (63) men, who were taken prisoners. 
 
 We took possession of two brass 6-pounders, four caissons, 
 and one hundred rounds of ammunition, two kegs and one 
 
88 Lee's Invasion of Northwest Virginia 
 
 barrel of powder, 19,000 buck and ball cartridges, two stands 
 of colors, and a large lot of equipments and clothing, consist- 
 ing of 204 tents, 427 pairs pants, 124 axes, 9S picks, 134 
 spades and shovels; all their train, consisting of 29 wagons, 
 75 horses, 4 mules, and 60 pairs harness. 
 
 The enemy finding their position turned, abandoned in- 
 trenchments which taken by the front would have cost us a 
 thousand lives, and dispersed through the mountains, some 
 attempting to escape by the way of Laurel Hill, and others 
 aiming for Huttonsville. Among the former were the com- 
 mand of Colonel Pegram, which, unable to join the rebels at 
 Laurel Hill, surrendered to the major general on the 13th. 
 Our loss in the engagement, killed and wounded, is shown in 
 the statement hereto appended, marked B. The list of prison- 
 ers taken is shown in the paper hereto appended, marked D. 
 The invoice of property captured and turned over to the post 
 quartermaster is hereto annexed, marked E. 
 
 In closing this report, I deem it proper to observe that, 
 considering the inexperience of both officers and men, the 
 fact that one-fourth were on picket guard the previous evening, 
 and had a most fatiguing march through the rain, and with 
 only inadequate supplies of food, their conduct was admirable. 
 
 Among those w T ho are entitled to special mention are Colo- 
 nel Lander, who, with the guide, led the way into the very 
 midst of the action; Colonel Manson, of the 10th Indiana, 
 who was everywhere along his line, inspiring the men by his 
 voice and presence, and w T ho bravely led the charge of his 
 regiment. 
 
 Colonel Benton was ready to obey orders, and moved among 
 his men with alacrity. 
 
 Colonel Sullivan charged with his command as the rebels 
 were dispersing, and captured several of the prisoners. Major 
 Wilson, of the 8th, was conspicuous for coolness and prompt- 
 itude of action. Lieutenant Colonel Colgrove, of the 8th, 
 deserves especial mention for his coolness while forming his 
 lines of the regiment under fire. Major Foster, of the 13th, 
 showed coolness and self-possession in forming a portion of his 
 men under the fire of the cannon. 
 
Rosecrans' Report to McClellan 89 
 
 My thanks are due to Captain Kingsbury, my assistant adju- 
 tant general, and to Captain A. Irwin Harrison, for their 
 valuable and efficient aid in carrying orders under fire. 
 
 The 10th Indiana was under fire for an hour and a half. 
 
 The 19th Ohio distinguished itself for the cool and hand- 
 some manner in which they held their post against a flank 
 attack, and for the manner in which they came into line and 
 delivered their fire near the close of the action. 
 
 I consider Colonel Beatty to have managed his men well, 
 and to have been ably seconded by Colonel Hollingsworth and 
 Major Buckley. 
 
 For the individuals who distinguished themselves under the 
 eyes of their regimental commanders, I respectfully refer to 
 the report of the colonels of regiments herewith submitted. 
 
 Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 W. S. ROSECRANS, 
 Brigadier General United States Army. 
 
 Major S. Williams, A. A. G., 
 
 United States Army, Headquarters Army of West Virginia. 
 
GEN. ROSECRANS' ACCOUNT OF THE BAT- 
 TLE GIVEN BEFORE A COMMIT- 
 TEE OF CONGRESS. 
 
 Gen. Rosecrans' official report to Gen. McClellan 
 was written in Beverly a week after the battle. He 
 was called before the Committee of Congress on the 
 Conduct of the War, to whom he made a sworn de- 
 tailed statement of his campaigns, April 22, 1865. 
 In that statement is embraced the substance of his 
 official report to Gen. McClellan, and some additional 
 facts and explanations elicited by the inquiries of the 
 Committee. The discerning reader by scanning Gen. 
 McClellan 's report and this statement of Gen. Rose- 
 crans will be able to judge whether the commanding 
 officer was fair to his subordinate and whether he 
 himself acted the part of a brave soldier in that en- 
 gagement. 
 
 Answering questions of the Chairman, Gen. Rose- 
 crans, after detailing the circumstances of his in- 
 duction into the service, said: 
 
 Of the campaign in Western Virginia in 1861, I have to 
 state that as soon as Garnett entered West Virginia he moved, 
 with his main column, to Lanrel Hill, on the Beverly and 
 Wehster road, seventeen miles north of Beverly;* while Gen. 
 Pegram, with a considerable column — seizing the pass over 
 Rich Mountain, on the Beverly and Ripley turnpike — covered 
 Garnett's communications with his base at Staunton. 
 
 General McClellan, having ordered Gen. Morris with all 
 his available force to confront Garnett, moved from Camp 
 
 *Col. Porterfleld thinks this distance does not exceed 
 twelve miles. 
 
 90 
 
Gen. Rosecrans' Account of the Battle 91 
 
 Dennison to Parkersburg the 22d of June. 1861 , where he 
 assembled three small brigades and two batteries. I was 
 ordered to accompany him, and at Parkersburg placed in com- 
 mand of a provisional brigade, consisting of the 8th and 10th 
 Indiana, and the 17th and 19th Ohio volunteer infantry, three 
 months' service. Moving McCook's and Schleick's brigades to 
 Grafton, he left me in command at Parkersburg, whence, un- 
 der his orders, I moved to Clarksburg on the 28th, and im- 
 mediately advanced to Duncan's farm, 15 miles distant on the 
 road to Buckhannon, where I encamped and reported for 
 orders. 
 
 General McClellan having determined that General Morris 
 should watch the motions of Garnett, while he, with the re- 
 mainder of his available force, should move by the way of 
 Buckhannon and Rich Mountain to Beverly, permitted me to 
 occupy Buckhannon, which I did by a night march; and on 
 my arrival found, contrary to our information and belief, 
 that the citizens were mainly loyal, and that the place had 
 never been in the hands of the enemy for more than a few 
 hours. 
 
 As soon as General McClellan's troops had concentrated at 
 this point and his supplies came up, he moved, reaching Roar- 
 ing creek, at the foot of the western slope of Rich Mountain, 
 about 3 o'clock p. m. of the second day, where the command 
 went into camp in a drenching rain. Reconnoitring the enemy, 
 he was found posted in a strong natural position on the turn- 
 pike near the foot of the mountain — his right covered by an 
 almost impenetrable laurel thicket — his left resting high up 
 on the spur of the mountains, and his front defended by a 
 log breast-work, in front of which was an abatis of fallen 
 timber. As the second in rank, the command of the camp de- 
 volved on me, and my first duty was to know the locality. 
 I soon learned that a young man named Hart, whose father 
 kept a tavern in the gap at the top of Rich Mountain, was 
 loyal, and had been seen in our camp; and that, having 
 herded cattle, he knew the mountains thoroughly, which fact 
 I reported to Lieut. Poe, chief engineer at General McClellan's 
 headquarters, suggesting that search should be made for this 
 young man and his information obtained. 
 
92 Lee's Invasion of Northwest Virginia 
 
 On the 9th of July, Gen. McClellan, having completed his 
 preparations, ordered a reconnaissance in force, which was 
 made by McCook's brigade, supported by my own, and resulted 
 in disclosing the great strength of the enemy's position with- 
 out ascertaining his numbers. On returning from this re- 
 connoissance, Gen. McClellan directed me to occupy the front 
 with my brigade, which was to lead in the attack he intended 
 to make the next morning. Having made the necessary dis- 
 positions, on returning to my tent an officer of my command 
 informed me that he had found young Hart. Being brought 
 to my tent, the young man informed me that the enemy's 
 camp was two and three-quarter miles west of his father's 
 house at the top of the mountain, where they had their hospi- 
 tal and commissary stores; that it was possible to reach the 
 top of the mountain by a circuitous route through the forest 
 around the enemy's left to a point within a mile and a half of 
 the gap, whence there was a practicable sled and cart road 
 to his father's house. He stated he had no doubt he could 
 conduct a body of troops to this point, even in the night, 
 but that they could not take with them any artillery. I 
 immediately repaired to the tent of Gen. McClellan with 
 this information, showed him a sketch, and explained it. I 
 then asked him if he desired to see young Hart, and at his 
 request brought the young man to his tent, where the gen- 
 eral questioned him very carefully. I then sent Hart to 
 my tent to await orders, and said to the general : "Now, general, 
 if you will allow me to take my brigade I will take this 
 guide and, by a night's march, surprise the enemy at the 
 gap, get possession of it, and thus hold his only line of 
 retreat. You can then take him on the front. If he gives 
 way we shall have him; if he fights I will leave a portion of 
 the force at the gap and with the remainder fall upon his 
 rear." Col. Marcy, chief of staff, at once fell in with my 
 suggestion, and the general, after an hour's deliberation, as- 
 sented, stating that as one of my regiments (the 17th Ohio) 
 was absent, he would give me the 13th Indiana, Col. Jeremiah 
 Sullivan; and then inquired about what time I thought I 
 could reach the point, which was a matter of importance to 
 know, so as to time his attack. I said I supposed I might 
 
Gen. Rosecrans' Account of the Battle 93 
 
 be able to reach it by 10 o'clock on the morning of the 11th, 
 and that I thought he could safely begin his attack on that 
 supposition. But it was finally decided that, as unforeseen 
 obstacles might arise to retard the time of my reaching the 
 gap, I should take Burdsall's cavalry and send a message 
 back every ten minutes, reporting progress, while he was to 
 hold his troops in readiness to commence the attack the mo- 
 ment he heard the noise of my firing. I then gave him the fol- 
 lowing as my proposed arrangement : "The troops to be formed 
 in front of his quarters at 3 o'clock in the morning, and to 
 enter the forest at the front line of our pickets at daylight 
 with one day's rations." To this arrangement he assented, 
 and an invitation to Col. Lander to accompany me completed 
 the programme. 
 
 The troops entered the forest in the morning in a terrible 
 rain-storm. As it was now daylight, and the enemy might 
 discover our movements, on consultation with the guide and 
 Col. Lander, who accompanied him, it was deemed best to in- 
 cline much further to the right than had been at first intended, 
 which lengthened the route. At 11 a. m., weary and wet, the 
 column halted on the brink of a deep valley, the opposite side 
 of which was the last ascent, except a small one, before reach- 
 ing the road that would bring us to an open wood with 
 a gentle descent three-quarters of a mile to the object of our 
 march. From this point I despatched to Gen. McClellan stat- 
 ing this fact, and that, owing to the excessive roughness of 
 the road, almost impassable for horses, and to the fatigue of 
 the animals, I should not send another despatch until I had 
 something of importance to communicate. Down through 
 this gorge, and toiling slowly up the opposite ascent, the head 
 of the column arrived at, within a short distance of the top 
 of the mountain, a cleared field, after eleven hours' marching, 
 at about 1 p. m., where, halting, the men were directed to rest 
 and lunch, while, with the guide and Col. Lander, I recon- 
 noitred our position. 
 
 To the east, apparently near our feet, though seven miles 
 distant, lay Beverly. Cavalry horses were hitched in the 
 streets; the end of a tented encampment appeared on the 
 right, partly hidden by the mountain; wagons were passing, 
 
94 Lee's Invasion of Northwest Virginia 
 
 all indicating the presence of a considerable force in Beverly. 
 Beyond the depression in the open ground in front of us was 
 a low wooded crest which we had to ascend, and thence it was 
 but a short mile to Hart's tavern. At two o'clock the 
 column, closed in mass, was moved noiselessly and swiftly 
 across the open ground into the edge of the forest, and 
 thence, after some difficulty in finding the way, wound up 
 the hill to the top of the crest, which it reached about half 
 past two o'clock, in a terrific shower, and was fired upon by 
 the enemy's advance guard. The 10th Indiana rapidly ad- 
 vanced, inclining to the right, along the crest of a steep de- 
 clivity overlooking the Beverly road, halted and formed in 
 line of battle just out of range of the enemy's musketry. 
 The 8th Indiana, under my orders, halted in column, while the 
 13th Indiana, following the 10th, formed on its left and oc- 
 cupied a spur of the mountain covered by a thicket over- 
 looking the field in front of the enemy's position. The 19th 
 Ohio halting faced towards the enemy's encampment in the 
 direction of which lay a broad well-trodden way. 
 
 The enemy, posted behind log breastworks nearly parallel 
 to the road, opened upon us with artillery from a point on 
 each of his flanks, while the sharpshooters occupied the line 
 of fence in front of his position. Owing to a mistake in 
 its movements the 13th Indiana took forty minutes to get into 
 the proper position and to occupy the thicket in front of 
 our left; so that it was forty minutes after three o'clock 
 before our line of battle was ready to advance. All this time 
 the enemy was firing on us with his artillery, which, however, 
 did us but little damage, most of the shots going over the 
 heads of the troops, while we could do nothing but annoy 
 them by our skirmishers. When the line was ready to move, 
 I brought down the 8th Indiana, and directed it, taking ad- 
 vantage of the cover on the right of our line, to make its 
 way to and capture the artillery on the enemy's left. By 
 mistake Col. Benton took the direction of the centre. He 
 was then directed to take advantage of a roll in the ground 
 and charge another gun of the enemy's towards our left. Mis- 
 understanding this, he passed through an interval between th£ 
 wings of the 10th, and began deploying in front of his left. 
 
Gen. Rosecrans' Account of the Battle 95 
 
 I directed him to remain in that position, and the colonel 
 of the 10th to form his left wing in column on the left 
 platoon, and be ready to charge the enemy's line in due time. 
 The whole line advanced. Col. Sullivan had been ordered to 
 take a portion of the 13th, which had remained in column 
 for want of space, and moving around on the left of the field, 
 to charge the enemy's battery on the right. Comprehending 
 the rawness of our troops, and desirous of putting an end to 
 the artillery fire as soon as possible, I placed myself at the 
 head of this charging column of the 13th Indiana, and urged 
 it forward at a double-quick. Col. Sam Beatty, of the 19th 
 Ohio, conforming the movement of his command to that of 
 our advancing line, took advantage of the first opening to form 
 half of his regiment in line of battle, and delivered a terrific 
 volley opportunely — just as the charging column of the 13th 
 had got within about a hundred yards of the enemy's breast- 
 works. At this the enemy began to waver. A second volley 
 from the 19th threw him into confusion, whereon our whole 
 line, charging with a terrific shout, leaped the enemy's breast- 
 works and pursued his fugitive army into the woods. The 
 battle was over. The enemy's dead and wounded covered the 
 ground. Two pieces, the only artillery he had, fell into our 
 hands. Flushed with success, our troops scattered very much 
 through the woods, and it became a matter of critical im- 
 portance to reassemble them without delay. This was substan- 
 tially accomplished by a little after six o'clock. While the 
 troops were reassembling, a quartermaster of the 44th Virginia 
 was captured down the road towards Beverly, who reported 
 that his regiment had reached a point within three-quarters 
 of a mile of the battle, but did not dare to come up. This, 
 and what had been seen from the top of the mountain, made 
 it evident that our position was an isolated point between the 
 rebel intrenched camp on the west and another force of un- 
 known strength in the vicinity of Beverly. Xo firing was 
 heard in the direction of the intrenched camp. No at- 
 tack had therefore been made by Gen. McClellan. There was no 
 assurance of succor from that quarter; nothing to prevent the 
 enemy taking his measures to overwhelm us without the pos- 
 sibility of prevention from our main body. What was to be 
 
96 Lee's Invasion of Northwest Virginia 
 
 done ? We could not go to Beverly, for we were already sep- 
 arated from our command by the enemy, whose strength had 
 
 been stated to me by and McC. as probably from 5,000 
 
 to 8,000 men. It was too late to undertake an advance on 
 the enemy's camp, distant nearly three miles of a road skirted 
 by almost impenetrable thickets of underbrush. In this 
 emergency Capt. Conklin was detailed to take charge of the 
 captured pieces of artillery, and the troops were placed in 
 position to prevent a surprise and to defend themselves from 
 attack coming either from the enemy's camp or from Beverly. 
 By the time these dispositions were made it was dark. Mean- 
 while a messenger had been sought among our cavalry, and 
 none could be found who would undertake to carry word to 
 Gen. McClellan. The night was dark, cold and rainy. The 
 wounded of both sides filled all the outhouses, and were 
 huddled together in a tavern; in fact, every building was used 
 to keep them from the inclemency of the weather. The troops 
 turned out six times during the night, on account of the 
 picket firing on the front, expecting an attack of the enemy. 
 At three o'clock in the morning a prisoner was brought in, 
 from whose answers I inferred that the enemy were attempting 
 to evacuate, and accordingly made disposition to move on them 
 at daylight, which was done. On reaching the enemy's camp 
 our advance discovered a white flag, and soon it was sur- 
 rendered with all that remained of Pegram's force, about a 
 hundred and seventy men, with all their artillery, transporta- 
 tion, camp and garrison equipage and quartermaster's stores. 
 Pegram, with the remainder of his force, had escaped during 
 the night to the north of us with the intention of reaching 
 Gen. Garnett; but the news of the capture of the gap, which 
 had been carried to Beverly by the 44th Virginia, was de- 
 spatched that night to Garnett, whose position, was, as I have 
 before stated, seventeen miles north of Beverly. Gen. Morris 
 was in his front to prevent his advance, and he could re- 
 treat only by Beverly on the turnpike, or take an inferior 
 road in a northeast direction through a rough country down 
 Cheat River and strike the northwest Virginia turnpike, which 
 leads from Clarksburg to Winchester, near the Maryland line. 
 He chose the latter, apprehensive that he would be intercepted 
 
Gen. Rosecrans' Account of the Battle 97 
 
 by our force coming over Rich Mountain. On the next morn- 
 ing, at seven o'clock, Gen. Morris began to pursue him. This 
 movement cut off the retreat of Pegram, who sent in a flag 
 of truce and surrendered to Gen. McClellan, who, on the 
 morning of the 12th, as soon as he had learned of the capture of 
 the rebel camp, marched through it to Beverly, and thence fol- 
 lowed the 44th Virginia, and whatever other rebels had re- 
 treated by the turnpike, towards Staunton, continuing the pur- 
 suit to the top of Cheat Mountain. 
 
 The committee will remember that Gen. Morris overtook 
 the rear guard at Carrick's ford, where, during a sharp 
 skirmish, Garnett fell, and his troops, continuing their retreat, 
 finally escaped to Winchester. Thus, by the capture of the 
 gap at Rich Mountain, the keystone was knocked from the 
 rebel arch of defence, and they were driven from Western 
 Virginia. 
 
 I forbear to take notice of the various reports and state- 
 ments concerning this battle which have been privately and 
 publicly circulated. The committee will find the facts here 
 stated substantially in my official report, which is that of 
 the four regimental commanders who accompanied me in that 
 expedition — Col. Jerry Sullivan, 13th Indiana, now brigadier; 
 Col. Samuel Beatty, 19th Ohio, now brigadier; Col. Benton, 8th 
 Indiana, now brigadier; and Col. (afterwards brigadier gen- 
 eral) Manson, and is hereby made a part of my testimony. 
 
 As no explanation was ever, to my knowledge, given for 
 the failure of our main force to attack the enemy on the 11th, 
 it is proper to say that while we were seizing the gap, not 
 only was the firing of the enemy's artillery heard, but the 
 musketry and cheers of our own men in the final charge on 
 the enemy's line were heard by the men in the camp, a mile 
 and a half in rear of our main force. 
 
 It should also be added, that so strong was the impression 
 that our column had met with disaster in the conflict at the 
 gap, that Gen. McClellan sent his chief of staff from the 
 front back to the camp to arm all the teamsters, lest the 
 enemy, after having destroyed my brigade, should fall upon 
 and cut the main body to pieces. 
 
 As it is probably known to some members of the commit- 
 
98 Lee's Invasion of Northwest Virginia 
 
 tee that sundry reports of this battle, at variance in many 
 material points with its true history as here given, were iu 
 circulation in Washington during the latter end of 1861 and 
 the early part of 1862, I have been careful to enter into de- 
 tails, giving all the facts of importance in relation to the 
 actions of the general commanding, his staff officers, and 
 those who served with me in the affair. 
 
 By Mr. Gooch: 
 
 Question. Do you know any reason why Gen. McClel- 
 lan did not make an attack, with the force immediately under 
 him, in his front, as was contemplated when you left him? 
 
 Answer. I know of no reason why he did not, and of no 
 reason why he should not have done so. 
 
 Question. If he had made that attack, as was contemplated 
 between you and him, in your opinion what would have been 
 the result? 
 
 Answer. The enemy, having no attack made on his front, 
 had despatched to the gap one half of his artillery and a 
 considerable force in addition to that usually stationed there. 
 The probabilities are that had the attack in front been 
 made, we should have beaten the enemy and destroyed or cap- 
 tured nearly his entire force that day, instead of allowing 
 them to run away through the woods, individually or in 
 squads, during the night subsequent to the capture of the 
 gap, as they did. At all events Gen. McClellan was bound, as 
 a military man, to have made the attack in his front, for 
 the purpose of preventing the enemy from falling on me with 
 too heavy a force. 
 
 Question. Do you know whether Gen. McClellan has 
 ever assigned any reason why he did not make the attack, as 
 contemplated between you and him? 
 
 Answer. The only reason I have ever seen assigned is 
 contained in his official report, published as a campaign docu- 
 ment, and prefaced by the remark that he had not, until re- 
 cently, had in his possession the necessary papers to enable 
 him to write a report of the campaign of Western Virginia 
 In that report he says: 
 
 "About half past two the firing which we had heard in the 
 direction of the gap, and which apparently receded, ceased. 
 
Gen. Rosecrans' Account of the Battle 99 
 
 Shortly afterwards an officer appeared in the rebel camp and 
 made a speech. We could not hear the words, but from 
 the cheers which followed many supposed it had fared badly 
 with our detachment. Immediately ordered roads to be cut 
 and guns got into position, intending to open the next morn- 
 ing, in order to relieve Rosecrans." 
 
 I am quoting from memory and may not give the words 
 exactly, but I give the substance. Gen. McClellan adds that 
 he was delayed by accidents the next morning in opening, un- 
 til the arrival of a messenger announcing the capture of the 
 rebel camp. This is all I have ever seen or heard from him 
 in reference to the matter. 
 
 Question. If he had supposed that the enemy was getting 
 the better of you, why should he have delayed until the next 
 morning before commencing the attack? 
 
 Answer. Such a mode of relieving me was the surest way 
 to enable the enemy to destroy me. The only sure relief he 
 could have given would have been to attack the enemy the in- 
 stant he heard the first firing. 
 
 Question. I understand you to say you expected to reach 
 the top of the mountain by 10 o'clock in the morning. In 
 reality you did not arrive there until half past two o'clock. 
 Why was that? 
 
 Answer. In reply to Gen. McClellan's question about what 
 time I thought I could reach the top of the mountain I stated 
 that I thought 10 o'clock would be the latest. That was on 
 the supposition that I should start as soon as possible after 
 our conversation. But, as I have already stated, it was, on 
 the suggestion of Gen. McClellan, determined that the head of 
 the column should not quit the main road and enter the forest 
 at our front picket line until daylight. A further cause of 
 delay, which has been stated, was this: that, owing to the 
 fact that we were undertaking this march mainly in the day- 
 time, Gen. Lander thought, on consultation with the guide, 
 and I decided, that it would be wiser to take a more circuitous 
 route, passing farther from the enemy. This lengthened 
 our march, making it over ten hours. 
 
 Question. How far distant from you were Gen. McClellan 
 and the main body of our army at the time you were en- 
 gaged with the enemy? 
 
100 Lee's Invasion op Northwest Virginia 
 
 Answer. In a straight line it was probably two miles; 
 by road it was two and three-quarter miles to the rebel lines, 
 and our troops were formed in line of battle in front of the 
 rebel lines just out of range of their fire. 
 
 Question. Then he must have known from the sound of 
 your guns, if in no other way, when you commenced your at- 
 tack upon the enemy and the continuance of the fight? 
 
 Answer. Certainly. 
 
 Question. How many men had Gen. McClellan under his 
 command, including the force which accompanied you? 
 
 Answer. I do not know exactly, but believe at least 
 between 6,000 and 7,000 effective men. 
 
 Question. How many men did you take with you when 
 you made your movement to the top of the mountain? 
 
 Answer. Either 1,743 or 1,843; I forget which. My offi- 
 cial report shows the number, and is made a part of my testi- 
 mony. 
 
THE RETREAT AND DEATH OF GEN. GAR- 
 NETT. 
 
 HIS WITHDRAWAL FROM LAUREL HILL. 
 
 The Confederate position on top of Rich Mountain 
 was not lost till late in the afternoon of the 11th. 
 The entrenched camp at the west base of Rich Moun- 
 tain was not abandoned by Pegram until after mid- 
 night succeeding. But Gen. Garnett, more than a 
 dozen miles distant as the crow flies, knew that a bat- 
 tle had been fought; and anticipating, or learning, 
 the result, left his position on the west side of Laurel 
 Hill at dusk that evening and crossed to the east side 
 of the mountain. 
 
 Here he halted, waiting perhaps for definite news 
 and in distressing uncertainty after he received it 
 whether or not to attempt a retreat through Beverly. 
 Col. Porterfield, in the appended correspondence, says 
 he was with Garnett 's command at this time, and 
 that Garnett could easily have removed all doubt 
 about the line of retreat to the south if he had but 
 used his cavalry scouts to ascertain. 
 
 It is not to be assumed that Gen. Morris' videttes 
 were not alert; but if they were, Garnett 's with- 
 drawal across the mountain must have been managed 
 very skillfully, for Morris did not know till next 
 morning what had happened. Then Capt Benham, 
 apparently one of the most intrepid of his subordi- 
 nates, took the lead in the pursuit. But Garnett had 
 the whole night's lead, and the weather conditions 
 
 101 
 
102 Lee's Invasion of Northwest Virginia 
 
 were such as made desperate work for both pursuers 
 and pursued. A mountain storm set in, and roads 
 and streams alike soon became almost impassable. 
 
 At Carrick's Ford of Cheat River, the rear of the 
 retreating army was overtaken; and in the sharp en- 
 gagement which followed, Gen. Garnett, while per- 
 sonally directing the placing of skirmishers, received 
 a fatal bullet. 
 
 Gen. Morris' troops, from excessive fatigue and 
 lack of food were compelled to forego farther pursuit. 
 The Confederates passed through to Winchester road ; 
 and although Gen. Hill, commanding at Grafton, had 
 imperative orders to intercept them, he was unable 
 to organize a force with the celerity necessary to ef- 
 fect this. Gen. Hill wrote a lengthy report explain- 
 ing the difficulties and disabilities which the sudden 
 order imposed on him. 
 
 Following reports of Gen. Morris and Capt. Ben- 
 ham, of the Union army, and of Col. Taliaferro and 
 others of the Confederate, give the most interesting 
 available facts. 
 
 morris' pursuit of garnett. 
 
 July 13th, 6:00 A. M., Gen. Morris wired Adjt. 
 Gen. Williams that after resting two hours, his ad- 
 vanced column — Steedman, Dumont and Milroy — 
 moved at 3:00 in pursuit of Garnett. He had left 
 Belington the day before with four wagons of hard 
 bread and pork — all the wagons available, the rest 
 having been sent to Philippi for supplies. As pre- 
 viously reported, he had but seven wagons to the 
 regiment. His men had necessarily to be restricted in 
 rations, and must be so as they advanced. He en- 
 
The Retreat and Death of Gen. Garnett 103 
 
 closed a telegram from Capt. Benham, one and a 
 half miles east of New Interest at 6 :10 A. M. 
 
 July 14th, Gen. Morris wrote Williams from Car- 
 rick's Ford. Steedman's 14th Ohio, in advance, 
 with two sections of Barnett's artillery, next Du- 
 mont's Seventh and then Milroy's Ninth Indiana, 
 started from Leadsville at 4:00 o'clock in the morn- 
 ing under immediate command of Capt. Benham. 
 About 6 :00 o 'clock a drizzling rain set in, which by 
 9 :00 o 'clock had become quite heavy. 
 
 The enemy left the main turnpike and turned 
 towards Cheat River, crossing two branches of Laurel 
 Mountain over a narrow and difficult road. Owing to 
 the heavy rains, the roads were very difficult for both 
 men and provision wagons. By 11:00 o'clock the 
 rain had become a drenching storm and so continued 
 for several hours, making the mountain roads nearly 
 impassable. At 2:00 o'clock, the whole command was 
 up to Carrick's Ford, after a march of 18 to 20 miles. 
 
 MORRIS TO MCCLELLAN. 
 
 July 16th, from Brigade headquarters, Elliott's 
 Farm, near Belington, Gen. Morris reported again 
 to Adjt. Gen. Williams: 
 
 "On the morning of the 14th, I reported to you the opera- 
 tions up to the routing of the Confederate forces at Carrick's 
 ford, about 2:00 P. M. of the 13th. I have to add that while 
 our troops were halting for rest, our scouts followed close 
 upon the route of the enemy four to six miles farther, and 
 on the morning of the 14th we learned they were fully fifteen 
 miles in advance. About noon of the same day*, we started 
 for Saint George, in pursuance of orders, which place we 
 reached at night. Without provisions other than the beeves 
 sent by Gen. McClellan, and in the exhausted state of our 
 command, it was impossible to pursue farther. At Saint 
 
104 Lee's Invasion of Northwest Virginia 
 
 George we heard that Gen. Hill had met the flying enemy and 
 captured or dispersed the remnant. Our scouts discovered four 
 miles west of our route 12 wagons mostly loaded with now 
 clothing and had taken possession of them. On the morn- 
 ing of the 15th, we left Saint George and after a march 
 of 23 miles reached this place at 9:00 A. M. 
 
 THE BATTLE AT CARRICK's FORD. 
 
 In Capt. Benham's report of his pursuit of Gen. 
 Garnett's army, dated "Camp 8 miles south of St. 
 George, July 13, 1861." he says that as they ap- 
 proached the Ford they came upon the rebels' train, 
 the last half of which was just crossing the river. 
 The enemy had taken a strong position with his in- 
 fantry and artillery upon a precipitous bank, 50 to 
 80 feet high, on the opposite side of the river, while 
 the ground on the other side where the Union troops 
 were was low land, nearly level with the river. He 
 says: 
 
 "Steedman's regiment, in the advance, opened fire most 
 gallantly upon them; which was immediately returned by their 
 strong force of infantry and by their cannon. Upon which 
 Barnett's artillery was ordered up and opened on them with 
 excellent effect. 
 
 "As soon as I perceived a position by which their left could 
 be turned, six companies of Col. Dumont's regiment were 
 ordered to cross the river about 300 yards above them to pass 
 up the hill obliquely from our right to their left and take 
 them in the rear. 
 
 "By some mistake — possibly in the transmission of the 
 order — this command crossed at about double this distance 
 and turned out, first, to their right; which delayed the effect 
 of this movement. After some fifteen minutes, however, this 
 error was rectified, and the hill being reported as impracticable, 
 this command — now increased to the whole regiment — was or- 
 dered down to the ford, under close cover of this hill on their 
 side, and there to take them directly in front at the road. 
 
The Retreat and Death op Gen. Garnett 105 
 
 "The firing of Steedman's regiment and of Milroy's now 
 well ill action, with repeated and rapid discharges of the ar- 
 tillery during this movement, decided the action at once. As 
 Dumont reached the road, having passed along and under their 
 whole front, the firing ceased and the enemy fled in great 
 confusion, Dumont's regiment pursuing them about one mile 
 farther and having a brisk skirmishing with their rear for the 
 first half of that distance, during which Gen. Garnett was 
 killed. 
 
 "The enemy would still have been followed up more closely, 
 and probably to the capture of a large portion of their scat- 
 tered army, but that this was absolutely impossible with our 
 fatigued and exhausted troops ; who had already marched some 
 eighteen miles or more in an almost incessant violent rain, 
 and the greater part of them without food since the evening 
 — and a portion from noon of yesterday — so warm had been 
 their pursuit on their hasty retreat from Laurel Mountain, 
 twenty-six miles distant." 
 
 SUMMARY OF RESULTS. 
 
 Capt. Benham thus sums up the results of the pur- 
 suit : 
 
 "The capture of about forty loaded wagons and teams, 
 being nearly all their baggage train and including a large 
 portion of new clothing, camp equipage and other stores; 
 their headquarters papers and military chest; two stand of 
 colors and one piece of fine rifled artillery; while the com- 
 manding general, Robert S. Garnett, is killed; 15 to 20 of the 
 enemy killed and nearly 50 prisoners. Our own loss, 2 killed 
 and 6 or 7 wounded." 
 
CONFEDERATE ACCOUNTS OF THE DEFEAT. 
 
 THE KILLING OF GEN. GARNETT. 
 
 Col. B. B. Taliaferro, 23rd Virginia Infantry, un- 
 der date of Monterey, August 10th, reported to Gen. 
 H. R. Jackson, commanding at that point : 
 
 "On the evening of the 12th, Gen. Garnett bivouacked at 
 Kaler's ford, on Cheat River, the rear of his command being 
 about two miles back on Pleasant run. On the morning of the 
 13th the command was put in motion. Before the wagon train 
 had crossed the first ford, half a mile above Kaler's, the 
 cavalry scouts reported the enemy close upon our rear with a 
 very large force of infantry well supported by cavalry and 
 artillery. First regiment ordered to take position across the 
 meadow and hold the enemy in check until train had passed 
 the river, and then retreat behind 23rd Virginia. 
 
 "In a few minutes, the enemy's skirmishers were seen 
 running along the opposite bank, which was low and skirted 
 by a few trees. A hearty cheer having been given for Presi- 
 dent Davis, we opened upon the enemy, who replied with heavy 
 fire from their infantry and artillery. After continuing the 
 fight until nearly every cartridge had been expended and 
 until the artillery had been withdrawn by Gen. Garnett's or- 
 ders, and as no part of the command was within sight of sup- 
 porting distance, I ordered the regiment to retire. It would 
 have been impossible to hold the position, and already nearly 
 thirty of my men had been killed or wounded. 
 
 "After marching half a mile, I was directed by Col. Starke 
 to move on to the next ford, where I would overtake Gen. 
 Garnett. On the farther side of this ford, I met Gen. Garnett, 
 who directed me to halt my regiment 150 yards distant 
 mound the turn of the road and to detail for him ten good 
 riflemen, remarking that 'This is a good place, behind this 
 driftwood, to post skirmishers.' A few minutes later Col. 
 Starke rode by and said Gen. Garnett directed me to march 
 
 106 
 
Confederate Accounts of the Defeat 107 
 
 as rapidly as I could and overtake the main body. In a few 
 minutes, Lieut. De Priest reported to me that Gen. Garnett 
 had been killed. He fell just as he gave the order to the 
 skirmishers to retire, and one of them was killed by his side.* 
 "About daylight we reached Red House, in Maryland, on 
 the Northwestern Turnpike, near West Union. At this last 
 place a large force under Gen. Hill was concentrated; but it 
 did not attack us, and we moved the same day as far as Green- 
 land, in Hardy county, and after seven days arduous march, 
 reached this place." 
 
 REPORT OF COL. RAMSAY. 
 
 Col. J. N. Ramsay, commanding at Petersburg, 
 wrote Col. Jackson, July 16th, that his command was 
 there, marching to Harrisonburg: "Not many killed, 
 but hundreds missing. We have suffered awfully. 
 We were near starvation. What is left of this army 
 will not be fit for service in a month." 
 
 UNION SENTIMENT IN THE VALLEY. 
 
 In a despatch from Maj. M. G. Harman, command- 
 ing at Staunton, dated July 15th, he says, speaking 
 of the retreat of Garnett 's army to Monterey : 
 
 "I would urge upon you the great importance of keeping 
 the enemy from ever touching this country; for Union men in 
 great numbers would be found here in this county and other 
 counties in the Valley if the Federal troops were here to 
 protect them. It is necessary, to keep our people loyal, to 
 keep the enemy from having an opportunity to tamper with 
 many of them." 
 
 Harman wrote Gen. Lee, July 15th : 
 mcclellan's flunk. 
 
 "The enemy displayed no courage, after defeating us on 
 top of Rich Mountain, or the forces at Camp Garnett would 
 have been cut to pieces." 
 
 *See letter of Col. Porterfield in appended correspondence. 
 
108 Lee's Invasion of Northwest Virginia 
 
 This refers to the failure of McClellan to attack 
 the entrenchments at the west base of Rich Mountain 
 when he heard the guns of Rosecrans' attack on De 
 Lagnel upon the top of the mountain. 
 
 CONFEDERATE COMMENT. 
 
 In a letter from Jefferson Davis to Gen. Johnson, at 
 Harper's Ferry, July 10th, Mr. Davis said: "Gar- 
 nett is lamentably weak, but reinforcements now on 
 the way will, I hope, prevent a junction of McClellan 
 and Patterson." 
 
 A letter of Brig. H. R. Jackson, written from Mon- 
 terey July 16th, regarding Garnett's retreat, said: 
 
 "There can be no doubt that during the earlier days of 
 last week the enemy engaged the attention of Gen. Garnett 
 at Laurel Hill by repeated feints and skirmishes, and on 
 the afternoon of the 11th turning the left flank of our posi- 
 tion at Camp Garnett in large force. He succeeded, after 
 a protracted (and on our side a desperate) struggle, in seiz- 
 ing the summit of the mountain which had been held by a 
 small body of our troops. Camp Garnett was thereupon 
 abandoned." 
 
 July 18th, Richmond received report of "the dis- 
 astrous retreat of Garnett's command to Monterey." 
 
 A letter from Richmond, July 20th, notified Brig. 
 Gen. W. "W. Loring that he was assigned to the com- 
 mand of the Northwestern army, and was ordered "to 
 keep the enemy on the other side of the Allegheny 
 ridge. ' ' 
 
 Brig. Gen. H. R. Jackson, commanding the North- 
 western army, ad interim, wrote the Adjutant Gen- 
 eral's office, July 22nd: 
 
Confederate Accounts of the Defeat 109 
 
 "From an intelligent officer — Capt. Hall — one of the re- 
 cently released prisoners, I learn that while in the enemy's 
 camp he had intimate intercourse with Gen. Rosecrans, who 
 told him that by means of telegraphic railroad facilities 
 Gen. McClellan could at any time concentrate troops even to 
 the number of 50,000 in Northwestern Virginia. Rosecrans 
 also said they were on the lookout for Wise." 
 
PEGRAM'S RETREAT AND SURRENDER. 
 
 ABANDONMENT OF FORT GARNETT. 
 
 That portion of Col. Pegram's command who were 
 defeated by Rosecrans at Hart's, on top of Rich 
 Mountain, retreated eastwardly and reached Beverly. 
 The main body who, with Col. Pegram at their head, 
 vacated Camp Garnett, at the west base of the moun- 
 tain, in the night, proceeded northeastwardly through 
 the mountains with the expectation of joining Gar- 
 nett 's army. But Garnett had begun his retreat too 
 soon for them to reach him; and Gen. Morris, pur- 
 suing sharply, cut off the only road by which Pegram 
 could have followed Garnett. Thus he found him- 
 self, after McClellan 's arrival at Beverly, between 
 two Federal armies, with no convenient way for es- 
 cape. There was one trail across the Cheat range, 
 known as ' ' The Old Seneca Path, ' ' by which he might 
 have got out of reach if his men had been in condi- 
 tion ; but they were so reduced by hunger and fatigue 
 that the alternative of flight into a mountain region 
 where it would have been impossible to subsist, drove 
 Pegram to surrender to McClellan; and he accord- 
 ingly, about midnight of the 12th, from "Mr. Kittle 's 
 house, near Tygart's Valley river, six miles from 
 Beverly," addressed a communication to "The Com- 
 manding Officer of the Northern Forces, Beverly," 
 offering, in view of the reduced and almost famishing 
 condition of his force, to surrender. 
 
 Gen. McClellan sent his reply by Adjt. Gen. Wil- 
 liams, with escort, who arrived at Pegram's head- 
 
 110 
 
Pegram 's Retreat and Surrender 111 
 
 quarters a little after sun-up next morning, addressed 
 to "John Pegram, Esq., styling himself Lieut. Col. 
 P. A. C. S.," accepting the surrender. 
 
 Col. Pegram asked only that they "receive at your 
 hands such treatment as Northern prisoners have in- 
 variably received from the South." Gen McClellan, 
 in his acceptance of the surrender, said he would re- 
 ceive the "officers and men" as "prisoners of war" 
 and "treat them with the kindness due to prisoners 
 of war. But, ' ' he said, "it is not in my power to re- 
 lieve you or them from any disabilities incurred by 
 taking arms against the United States." In a sub- 
 sequent exchange of prisoners, Col. Pegram was re- 
 fused parole, because he had been an officer in the 
 United States army. 
 
 Col. Pegram, at Beverly, July 14th, wrote a report 
 to the Adjutant General at Richmond, touching the 
 disaster which had overtaken his command, "not 
 knowing," he remarks in the opening, "where a com- 
 munication will find Gen. Garnett. " Col. Pegram 
 describes the engagement on the top of Rich Moun- 
 tain with some particularity: 
 
 THE BATTLE AT HART 's. 
 
 "The battlefield was immediately around the house of one 
 Hart, situated at the highest point of the turnpike over the 
 mountains and two miles in the rear of my main line of 
 trenches at the foot of the western slope of the mountain. 
 The intricacies of the surrounding country semed scarcely 
 to demand the placing of any force at Hart's; yet I had that 
 morning placed Capt. De Lagnel, of the Confederate artillery, 
 with five companies of infantry, numbering in all about 
 
112 Lee's Invasion of Northwest Virginia 
 
 310 men, with instructions to defend it to the last extremity 
 against whatever force might be brought to the attack by the 
 enemy, but also to give me timely notice of his need of re- 
 inforcements. These orders had not been given two hours 
 before Gen. Rosecrans, who had been conducted up a distant 
 ridge on my left and then along the top of the mountain by 
 a man, attacked the small handful of troops under Capt. De 
 Lagnel with 3,000 men. 
 
 "When from my camp I heard the firing becoming very 
 rapid, without waiting to hear from Capt. De Lagnel, I or- 
 dered up reinforcements and hurried on myself to the scene 
 of action. When I arrived, the piece of artillery was entirely 
 unmanned, Capt. De Lagnel having been severely wounded ; 
 after which his men had left their piece. The limber and 
 caisson were no longer visible, the horses having run away 
 with them down the mountain; in doing which they met and 
 upset the second piece of artillery which had been ordered 
 up to their assistance. 
 
 "Seeing the infantry desert the slight breastworks thrown 
 up that morning by Capt. De Lagnel, I used all personal 
 exertions to make them stand to their work, until even I saw 
 that the place was hopelessly lost. 
 
 "On my way back to camp, I found the reinforcing force 
 under the command of Capt. Anderson of the artillery in the 
 greatest confusion, they having fired upon their retreating 
 comrades. I hurried on to camp and ordered the remaining 
 companies of my own regiment in camp to join them. This 
 left my right front and right flank entirely unmanned. 
 
 "I then went back up the mountain where I found the 
 whole force drawn up in line in ambuscade near the road under 
 command of Maj. Nat Tyler, of the 20th.. I called their at- 
 tention and said a few encouraging words to the men, ask- 
 ing them if they would follow their officers to the attack; 
 to which they responded by a cheer. I was here interrupted 
 by Capt. Anderson, who said to me: 'Col. Pegram, these men 
 are completely demoralized and will need you to lead them.' 
 I took my place at the head of the column, which I marched 
 in single file through the laurel thickets, and through almost 
 impassable brushwood, up a ridge to the top of the moun- 
 
Pegram's Retreat and Surrender 113 
 
 tain. This placed me about one-fourth of a mile on the right 
 flank of the enemy; which was exactly the point I had been 
 making for. 
 
 "I had just gotten all the men up together and was about 
 to make my dispositions for the attack when Maj. Tyler came 
 up and reported that during the march up the ridge one of the 
 men in his fright had turned around and shot the first sergeant 
 of one of the rear companies, which had caused nearly the 
 whole company to run to the rear. He then said that the 
 men were so intensely demoralized that he considered it mad- 
 ness to attempt to do anything with them by leading them on 
 to the attack. A mere glance at the frightened countenances 
 around me convinced me that this distressing news was but 
 too true, and it was confirmed by the opinion of three or 
 four of the company commanders around me. They all agreed 
 with me that there was nothing left to do but to send the 
 command under Maj. Tyler to effect a junction with either 
 Gen. Garnett, at Laurel Hill, or Col. W. C. Scott, who was sup- 
 posed to be with his regiment near Beverly. 
 
 "It was now six and a half o'clock P. M., when I retraced 
 my steps with much difficulty back to camp, losing myself fre- 
 quently on the way and arriving there at eleven and a quarter 
 o'clock. I immediately assembled a council of war of the 
 field officers and company commanders remaining, when it was 
 unanimously agreed that after spiking the two remaining 
 pieces of artillery, we should attempt to join Gen. Garnett by 
 marching through the mountains to our right. This act was 
 imperative, not only from our reduced numbers, now being 
 about 600, and our being placed between two large attacking 
 armies, but also because at least three-fourths of my command 
 had no rations left ; the other fourth not having flour enough 
 left for one meal. 
 
 "Having left directions for Sergt. Walke and given direc- 
 tions to show a white flag at daylight, I then called companies 
 G and H, of the 20th regiment, with which and seven com- 
 panies of Col. Heck's regiment, I started at one o'clock A. M., 
 and without a guide, to make our way if possible over the 
 mountains where there was not the sign of a path, towards 
 Gen. Garnett's camp." 
 
114 Lee's Invasion of Northwest Virginia 
 
 They arrived at Tygart's Valley river at seven 
 o'clock the next evening, having made twelve miles 
 in eighteen hours. Here Col. Pegram was informed 
 there was a small Confederate camp at Leadsville, 
 three miles distant. He hired a horse and rode for- 
 ward, but when in sight of Leadsville church he 
 stopped at a farmhouse, where he was informed that 
 Garnett's army had retreated eastward, pursued by 
 3,000 of the enemy. Col. Pegram went back to his 
 command, which he found in confusion. Another 
 council of war was held later in the evening. It was 
 found there was but one road over which escape was 
 possible. This would lead them within three miles 
 of Beverly (then occupied by the enemy), over Cheat 
 Mountain and other mountain ranges, into Pendleton 
 county; and it was known that along this road it 
 would be found impossible to obtain subsistence. 
 
 One of the captains had escaped by this route after 
 the retreat from Philippi, and thought they could 
 do it again; but as it was then 11:00 P. M., and if 
 this road were to be taken it would have to be done 
 at once without allowing the half-famished men to 
 get anything to eat, all the officers except the captain 
 referred to and one other, voted that it was impossi- 
 ble to do anything but surrender; and these two 
 agreed that the chances of escape if they took the 
 road to Pendleton were "very slim." Accordingly, 
 Col. Pegram wrote and despatched his note to Gen. 
 McClellan, as previously set forth. 
 
 REPORT OF COL. HECK. 
 
 Col. Jonathan M. Heck, under whom before the 
 breaking out of hostilities the militia at Morgantown 
 
Pegram 's Retreat and Surrender 115 
 
 had refused to muster because he was a secessionist, 
 who had entered the Confederate service under Por- 
 terfield, had been sent by Garnett to take charge of 
 Camp Garnett at the west base of Rich Mountain 
 and was second in command at the time of the en- 
 gagement, wrote a report to "Col. R. R. Howison," 
 Richmond, some time after the surrender, but without 
 date. 
 
 In his account of preliminary operations at Rich 
 Mountain, Col. Heck says Pegram very much under- 
 rated the enemy's strength in front and wrote to 
 Gen. Garnett for permission to surprise and attack 
 him. He thinks this report of Pegram kept Garnett 
 from ordering him to fall back, as he had no doubt 
 Garnett would have done, at the same time falling 
 back from his own position to Cheat Mountain, had 
 he learned, or even supposed, the force in front of 
 Pegram half as strong as it was. Heck makes this 
 statement as "due to the memory of Gen. Garnett, 
 who fell a victim to a combination of circumstances 
 over which he had no control. ' ' The reader will note 
 in Col. Porterfield's correspondence, appended to this, 
 that he discredits Col. Heck's theory as to Garnett 's 
 ignorance of the magnitude of Gen. McClellan's 
 army.* 
 
 Following statements are from Col. Heck's report: 
 
 REPORT OF COL. HECK. 
 
 "On the morning of the 11th a cavalry sergeant of the 
 enemy who had been detailed to assist in keeping up com- 
 
 ♦Pegram says in his report: "If I had known the num- 
 ber of the enemy and their means of getting to my rear — 
 which all my so-called reliable woodsmen informed me was 
 impossible — I would have retreated the night before, cutting 
 down trees on both sides of the mountain, thus giving time 
 to Gen. Garnett to retreat by way of Beverly to Huttons- 
 ville." 
 
116 Lee's Invasion of Northwest Virginia 
 
 munication between Rosecrans, who had started away early 
 that morning with six regiments of infantry to turn our left 
 flank, and Gen. McClellan, who with the main body of the 
 enemy and eighteen pieces of artillery was to take us in 
 front as soon as Rosecrans made the attack in the rear, 
 missed his way, rode up to our line and was wounded and 
 captured. Col. Pegram learned from him that the enemy had 
 moved a force to our rear, but could not learn by which 
 flank. Pegram had already, in anticipation of a rear attack, 
 sent two or three companies to the top of the mountain. 
 He now sent two more companies and a piece of artillery to 
 reinforce the picket on the mountain, which made in all a 
 force of about 300 men, under command of Capt. De Lagnel. 
 
 "Col. Scott, who was marching with a regiment to rein- 
 force Gen. Garnett, was requested by Pegram to hold a road 
 one mile west of Beverly. This was done because Pegram 
 thought Rosecrans would try to turn his right flank by a 
 circuitous route coming in at that road. But the enemy made 
 the attack about 11 o'clock on the mountain from the left 
 flank. After Capt. De Lagnel was wounded, Capt. Curry, of 
 the Rockbridge Guards, took command and conducted the 
 retreat. The enemy having charged and taken the piece of 
 artillery, were bayoneting our wounded soldiers, who had been 
 shot down at their posts. Pegram at once determined to take 
 half the command and charge and retake the position; and 
 immediately organized and marched from our camp, leaving 
 me in command with instructions to hold that position at all 
 hazards. In the meantime the enemy was busy making 
 preparations for an attack in front, cutting roads and placing 
 a large number of pieces of artillery in position. 
 
 "About 11 o'clock at night, having heard nothing further 
 from Col. Pegram, his adjutant and other officers insisted on 
 a council of war. I called a few officers together and repeated 
 to them my orders from Col. Pegram instructing me to hold 
 the position till I heard from him, which might not be before 
 morning, as he had not then determined whether he would 
 attack Gen. Rosecrans that night or in the morning. We 
 were about returning to our several posts, as we were expect- 
 ing an attack every moment, when Col. Pegram returned and 
 
Pegram 's Retreat and Surrender 117 
 
 informed us that he had determined not to make the at- 
 tack at Hart's house and had sent the men he had selected for 
 that purpose away under command of Maj. Nat Tyler; and 
 he ordered me to call in all the companies and pickets and 
 retreat immediately in the direction of Gen. Garnett's camp 
 at Laurel Hill. 
 
 "Soon after sun-up on the 12th we were in sight of Beverly, 
 and could see the river valley for many miles both right and 
 left. Had we gone directly down this valley, we could have 
 escaped, as the enemy did not enter Beverly until one P. M. 
 of that day. I suppose we would have gone down into the 
 valley at this point if Col. Pegram had not mistaken some of 
 our (Lilley's) men for the enemy's advance. As it was, we 
 were kept in the mountains, marching slowly in the direction 
 of Garnett's camp at Laurel Hill." 
 
 Col. Heck says the surrender of Pegram was op- 
 posed by himself and Capt. J. B. Moorman, of the 
 Franklin guards. They were in favor of crossing 
 Cheat Mountain by the road near Beverly, which 
 would have led into Pendleton county. "Capt. Moor- 
 man," Heck says, "had marched his company by the 
 same route after the defeat at Philippi and thought 
 it could be done again." 
 
 REPORT OF MAJ. NAT. TYLER. 
 
 Maj. Nat. Tyler, in a report made by him, says that 
 the fight began about 11 o'clock and lasted three 
 hours, when the enemy succeeded in getting to the 
 road between the rebel position and Beverly. He 
 says Col. Pegram ordered him before the firing ceased 
 to reinforce Capt. De Lagnel with the 20th regiment. 
 
 "And as we were marching up the mountain, he determined 
 to take command of a storming party and attempt the re- 
 capture of Hart's house. Before arriving in position he ascer- 
 
118 Lee's Invasion of Northwest Virginia 
 
 tained the impossibility of successfully storming the enemy's 
 position, and ordered me to continue the retreat with the 
 20th regiment while he returned and brought the remainder of 
 the command. We reached Beverly at daybreak." 
 
 REPORT OF ENGINEER JED HOTCHKISS. 
 
 Engineer Jed Hotchkiss, who had assisted Col. 
 Heck in laying out Camp Garnett, made a report to 
 him some time after the battle. He mentions that 
 about 50 men had reached Beverly at 11 o'clock A. M. 
 of the 12th ' ' and found the people helping themselves 
 to abandoned commissary stores, expecting the enemy 
 every moment." At the conclusion of his report 
 Hotchkiss refers to some friction which had occurred 
 between Heck and Pegram as to the command at 
 Camp Garnett: 
 
 "Pegram being ordered by Gen. Garnett, as he himself said, 
 to report himself and command to you, he arrogantly demanded 
 the command of the post because of his superiority of rank, 
 before asking you for it or you had refused to give it to him; 
 that you expressed a willingness to give it up to him if you 
 could be assured that such was the desire of Gen. Garnett ; and 
 afterwards by his arbitrary and selfish direction of affairs, 
 and in the opinion of many concerned and engaged, brought 
 about the disasters that attended the battle of Rich Moun- 
 tain. To my personal knowledge, you sent one that came to 
 you with information in reference to the designs or operations 
 of the enemy in turning our left flank to communicate the 
 same to Lieut. Col. Pegram the day before the battle." 
 
 Hotchkiss says the Confederate countersign the 
 night following the battle was "Indian;'' that the 
 Union countersign that night was the same, and that 
 this enabled the escaping Confederates to pass the 
 Union pickets at one point when challenged by them. 
 
Pegram 's Retreat and Surrender 119 
 
 DEATH OF CONVENTIONIST HUGHES. 
 
 John N. Hughes, a member of the Virginia Con- 
 vention, was killed in mistake by Confederate troops 
 while attempting to carry a despatch on horseback 
 from Col. W. C. Scott, of the 44th Virginia to Col. 
 Pegram. In a letter from Maj. Harman, at Staunton, 
 to Gen. Lee, Harman says that Mr. Hughes "was 
 sent by Col. Scott to Col. Pegram and was killed by 
 our men." During the progress of the fight on top 
 of Rich Mountain, Col. Scott's regiment was posted at 
 a road junction one mile west of Beverly with in- 
 structions to remain there in expectation that Pe- 
 gram 's position was going to be flanked on his right 
 and that the flanking force would approach Beverly 
 by this road intersection. Col. Scott had a letter from 
 Pegram requesting this, and had been instructed by 
 Garnett to comply. In his report Col. Scott sa}'s: 
 
 "The letter was read to most of my officers and to Mr. 
 John N. Hughes, who resides in Beverly, with whom I had be- 
 come acquainted in the late convention, and who had expressed 
 a determination to join my regiment. He said he was perfectly 
 acquainted with the road on which Col. Pegram desired me to 
 take position." 
 
 Col. Scott was in momentary expectation of some 
 word from Pegram relieving him from this station 
 and directing him to reinforce Pegram. 
 
 "But getting no such message, or any information from 
 the fight, and hecoming impatient, I determined to send a 
 messenger myself. I therefore ordered Mr. J. N. Hughes, who 
 volunteered for the purpose, to go to Col. Pegram and know 
 from him whether or not he wished my services at any other 
 point than the one I then occupied, and if so to send me a 
 
120 Lee's Invasion of Northwest Virginia 
 
 guide. If not, 1 ordered Hughes to bring me information of 
 whatever was going on. He dashed up the mountain at a 
 rapid gallop." 
 
 "After waiting a long while for return of Hughes," 
 Col. Scott says Lieut. Cochrane, of the Churchville 
 cavalry, came down the turnpike off the mountain, 
 "with a few of his men," and addressing himself to 
 the Colonel, explained the situation on the mountain 
 and accompanied him, at the head of his regiment, 
 back up the mountain. Lieut. Cochrane, March 6, 
 1862, wrote a letter to Col. Scott, in response to re- 
 quest to "state what occurred while 1 was with you 
 on the 11 th day of July last in relation to the Rich 
 Mountain fight. ' ' In this letter Lieut. Cochrane says : 
 
 "On the way up the mountain, I informed you of the 
 death of Hughes, and you requested me not to mention it to 
 the men, as it might dampen their spirit." 
 
 The report current afterwards was that Hughes on 
 the mountain had met a Confederate force and sup- 
 posing them to be Union troops had ridden forward 
 and hurrahed "for Lincoln," and that they had im- 
 mediately riddled him with bullets. Lieut. Coch- 
 rane 's remark was suggestive of the idea that it was 
 his detachment which Hughes had met with this un- 
 fortunate result. In hope of clearing up a doubt as 
 to the precise circumstances, the writer, Dec. 26, 
 1903, addressed an inquiry to Col. Porterfield, resid- 
 ing at Charlestown, Jefferson county, to ask for his 
 recollection of the matter. His reply to the inquiry 
 is contained in his letter of Jan. 4, 1904, appended. 
 Later, through the courtesy of the postmaster at 
 Beverly, the writer was enabled to obtain the follow- 
 
Pegram's Retreat and Si hrender 121 
 
 ing statement from Col. S. N. Bosworth, 31st Vir- 
 ginia Inf. C. S. A., who was present at the Rich 
 Mountain fight and has always lived at Beverly: 
 
 "Mr. John N. Hughes was killed on the top of Rich 
 Mountain by the Confederate troops that fought there. He 
 thought them to be the enemy and turned his horse to return 
 to Scott's regiment, when they fired on him. He was buried 
 in a trench with twenty-one other Confederate soldiers, and 
 was after the war removed to Mount Iser, Beverly, and there 
 reinterred. His body was known by his shawl, in which 
 eighteen bullet-holes were found." 
 
 A later note from Col. Bosworth said : 
 
 "I think the statement that Mr. Hughes was killed by a 
 small detachment of Confederate troops that was supporting 
 Lieut. De Lagnel's piece of artillery is correct. I was near 
 there but not on the ground at the time, and I have no doubt 
 that is the true version of it. Mr. Hughes was somewhat in- 
 toxicated at the time — at least it was so reported." 
 
RESUME. 
 
 The reader who has followed this narration can 
 hardly have failed to note two things regarding the 
 Confederate invasion — one, the inadequacy of mili- 
 tary plan ; the other, the imbecility of execntion. Gen. 
 Lee begins the movement on Northwest Virginia in 
 fashion more academic than military. He proceeds 
 on the assumption that the people there will submit 
 without a struggle, as they did in East Virginia, to 
 the Confederate assumption of control by virtue of 
 the secret league of usurpation and violence entered 
 into by the Convention with the emissary of the 
 Southern Confederacy. 
 
 Officers to organize military forces and take pos- 
 session of the country are appointed in districts where 
 they dared not allow it known they held such com- 
 missions. The designation of Alonzo Loring to take 
 charge of the western terminus of the Baltimore & 
 Ohio Railroad, to hold and control it for the Con- 
 federacy, with authority to call out and organize 
 volunteers in the Panhandle counties, to any one 
 familiar with the circumstances and the state of local 
 public opinion at that time, was a proceeding little 
 less than fantastic. It was on a parity with Gov. 
 Letcher's telegraph order to raise the Confederate 
 flag on the Wheeling custom house. 
 
 Maj. Boykin, who was first sent to Grafton to take 
 charge there of the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad and 
 the interests of the Confederacy, in co-operation with 
 Maj. Loring, was politely requested by a delegation 
 
 122 
 
Resume 123 
 
 of citizens to avail himself of the next train for his 
 departure. When Col. Porterfield went to Grafton 
 later, he found neither officers nor men to take his 
 orders or support him. Both he and Boykin des- 
 patched Gen. Lee that the whole region was cold and 
 inhospitable to Confederate pretensions. 
 
 It is apparent Gen. Lee was ill-informed as to the 
 state of public sentiment in Northwest Virginia, — as 
 ignorant, possibly, as Gen. McClellan was touching 
 danger of negro insurrection. In consequence, valu- 
 able time was lost in organizing Gen. Lee's army of 
 occupation. He evidently supposed the Secession 
 element in the Northwest was so preponderant it 
 would rise, in response to his call, and take posses- 
 sion of the country. This was a serious mistake. 
 
 Further pursuing this erroneous lead, Gen. Lee 
 planned to hold Grafton, the junction point of the 
 Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, with a few companies of 
 raw volunteers. He expected these to be collected in 
 the adjacent country, and this failing, arranged to 
 have them gathered up along the route from Staun- 
 ton to Tygart's Valley. The Federal authorities 
 could not have permitted this possession of the rail- 
 road junction if it had taken a hundred thousand men 
 to prevent it. Col. Porterfield, with the raw recruits 
 who had been sent him, was compelled to abandon 
 the post precipitately on the first demonstration of 
 the Federal advance. Following this, he is surprised 
 and driven out of Philippi, as result of conditions 
 for which he was little responsible. 
 
 Next, Lee's Adjutant General, — protege of Jeffer- 
 son Davis, with whom he had served in the Mexican 
 war — is sent out with a force of several thousand 
 
124 Lee's Invasion of Northwest Virginia 
 
 men, for a purpose nowhere well denned. There is no 
 evidence of any purpose or expectation that Gen. 
 Garnett would move north of the railroad line. His 
 confidential despatches show no plan for any such ad- 
 vance ; nor even a definite purpose to capture Grafton ; 
 nor to do any other specific thing except to disable 
 the railroad. He takes possession of the passes in 
 the westerly mountain range, places a small force at 
 the west base of Rich Mountain, and posts his main 
 army at the Laurel Hill where the Tygart's Valley 
 river cuts through it, a dozen miles or more north 
 from Beverly. Then, a little later, he tells Gen. Lee 
 he finds the place not defensible against good light 
 infantry. 
 
 Here he is confronted by Morris, with a force in- 
 ferior in numbers to his own; and assumes more the 
 attitude of an army of observation than one of ag- 
 gression. After a little, Gen. Garnett seems to real- 
 ize that he does not know just what he is there for. 
 He discusses his situation in despatches to Gen. Lee 
 and explains its disabilities. He finds the means of 
 defense available to the Union commander so far ex- 
 ceeds his own means of attack that an opportunity to 
 assail Grafton, or the railroad at any other point, is 
 too remote a contingency to be of value ; and he sug- 
 gests whether the game of holding an army idle for 
 the mere chance of such a contingency is worth the 
 cost. 
 
 McClellan's advance was not ill-planned or exe- 
 cuted, though it might be thought the rout of Porter- 
 field at Philippi should have been better followed 
 up. There was no real obstacle to Morris going to 
 the southern end of Tygart's valley and sealing up 
 
Resume 125 
 
 the Cheat Mountain pass. Col. Kelley's instructions 
 contemplated pursuit as far as Beverly, and he was 
 to have command of the whole force after the junction 
 at Philippi; but Kelley's wound — at the moment 
 supposed to be mortal — interfered with this pro- 
 gramme; and with the limited knowledge of the 
 country or resources of the enemy coming forward, 
 the commanders were but prudent in the halt at 
 Philippi. That Porterfield's men expected McClel- 
 lan to take the entire valley is apparent. Some of 
 them went across the mountains from Beverly into 
 Pendleton, in full persuasion the Federals would over- 
 take them if they attempted to reach Cheat Mountain 
 pass. They knew the valley was bare of Confederate 
 troops, and none nearer than Staunton, but the Fed- 
 eral officers did not know this. 
 
 Regarding the decisive action at Rich Mountain, 
 the credit for the Union victory there belongs to 
 Rosecrans and the men who with him, through eleven 
 hours of storm, climbed up the precipitous and thicket 
 beset mountains to the rear of the rebel breastworks 
 at Hart's. True, McClellan contemplated a flank 
 movement before his arrival in front of Pegram's en- 
 trenchments. Any commander with a map before 
 him must have done that. But when confronted by 
 Pegram's entrenchments at the foot of Rich Moun- 
 tain, it appears he contemplated a direct attack in 
 front. The real problem there was like the one con- 
 fronted by Wolfe at Quebec: how to find the way 
 around to the enemy's rear. 
 
 Rosecrans, second in command, after viewing the 
 formidable defenses of Pegram, was fortunate in find- 
 ing a son of the man who kept the little tavern on 
 
126 Lee's Invasion of Northwest Virginia 
 
 the mountain top, and in learning the young man was 
 loyal to the Government. He took young Hart to 
 McClellan's tent on the night of the 10th and ex- 
 plained to the General his plan to head a force under 
 Hart 's guidance for a flanking march around through 
 the wooded mountains to the south, to come in on the 
 mountain-top east of Hart's. McClellan, with the 
 abundant caution of his nature, hesitated, though his 
 chief of staff assented to the plan at once. With the 
 indecision which characterized McClellan's future 
 military career, he seemed to shrink from the ordeal 
 of action. He took an hour to think it over; and, 
 finally consenting, delayed the start next morning. 
 
 Rosecrans told the joint committee of Congress it 
 was agreed that night between McClellan and him- 
 self that the moment McClellan heard the guns of 
 Rosecrans' attack on top of the mountain, he was 
 to open on Pegram 's entrenchments in his front at 
 the foot of the mountain. Such an understanding 
 was a matter of course; necessary to Rosecrans' se- 
 curity and to the success of the whole movement. Pe- 
 gram if left undisturbed, would send part of his force 
 to help resist Rosecrans' attack at Hart's. In fact, 
 — McClellan not attacking, — this is just what hap- 
 pened. Pegram, finding he was not to be attacked, 
 did send a detachment to the aid of De Lagnel. But 
 it was too late, as the day was already lost. 
 
 The firing at Hart 's was plainly heard in the camps 
 of both McClellan and Pegram. McClellan not only 
 failed to attack but actually withdrew to a safer dis- 
 tance, leaving Rosecrans to his fate — so far as that 
 depended on help from the main army and the com- 
 manding General. Rosecrans did not need their help. 
 
Resume 127 
 
 He not only routed the enemy on the mountain top, 
 but, after a night of anxiety, marched down the 
 mountain at daylight and took possession of Pegram's 
 abandoned camp, in McClellan's front, and sent a 
 messenger to acquaint his superior that the road to 
 Beverly was now open. 
 
 The fall of Rich Mountain brought Garnett quickly 
 to face the crisis he must have looked forward to. 
 Pegram's defenses were at least five miles nearer 
 Beverly than Garnett 's main army. The danger of 
 having his communications cut at Beverly must have 
 been constantly before Garnett. Yet he was con- 
 strained by the presence of Morris in his front to re- 
 main at Laurel Hill and guard against attack. How 
 to do this and still be prepared to get away via Bev- 
 erly in the event of adversity at Rich Mountain, was 
 the problem. No retreat east or north could be any- 
 thing but disaster. East by the "Old Seneca Path" 
 there were formidable mountain ranges practically 
 uninhabited, where an army must perish from lack 
 of food. To the Northeast were long stretches of 
 mountain roads, of which he knew nothing, to be 
 traversed in furious storms, and raging streams to 
 cross, before he could reach the Winchester road, and 
 probability of interception once that road was 
 reached. 
 
 Thus Garnett had lain, with a threatening foe in 
 front, another on his flank, at the mercy of events he 
 could not control nor foresee. When the moment for 
 action came and Rosecrans knocked the peg from 
 under the defenses at Rich Mountain, Garnett 's cam- 
 paign — or Lee's, if it was his — went to pieces like a 
 house of cards ! 
 
128 Lee's Invasion of Northwest Virginia 
 
 Garnett might still have escaped by way of Beverly, 
 if he had known, or dared. The news of the Rich 
 Mountain disaster reached him promptly, and he 
 started to move at dusk that night. He could have 
 had till noon next day to cover twelve miles of good 
 road between him and Beverly. But either he be- 
 came panic-stricken or was not well-informed of the 
 state of affairs at Beverly. His nerve seems to have 
 failed him at the one supreme moment of his life 
 when he needed it. 
 
 After he got his army over to the east side of the 
 mountain, he might have turned south to safety. He 
 turned north, and was lost; he himself — it was whis- 
 pered among the officers — courting death and putting 
 himself in the way of it as the only escape from the 
 overwhelming humiliation he had not the hardihood 
 to face. 
 
LEE'S FINAL FAILURE TO GET THROUGH 
 THE MOUNTAINS. 
 
 THE STORY TOLD BY GEN. ROSECRANS. 
 
 Twelve days after the engagement at Rich Moun- 
 tain, Gen. McClellan was directed to turn over the 
 command of the Department of the Ohio to Gen. Rose- 
 crans and repair at once to Washington. Referring 
 to this in his testimony before the Committee on the 
 Conduct of the War, April 22, 1865, Rosecrans says 
 McClellan left him a memorandum of what he had 
 proposed to enable the troops, acting on the defens- 
 ive, to hold Western Virginia against further attack. 
 The main points of defense were, to fortify and hold 
 Gauley Pass from the Kanawha valley towards Lew- 
 isburg; Cheat Mountain pass, on the Beverly and 
 Staunton road; and Red House pass, on the North- 
 western Virginia turnpike, leading from Clarksburg 
 to Winchester. 
 
 Gen. Rosecrans' account of the remainder of the 
 season's operations, subsequent to the departure of 
 McClellan, is a terse and graphic statement; and the 
 story of that part of the campaign cannot be better 
 told than in the General's own words. 
 
 There were then, he told the Committee, ten regi- 
 ments of three-year troops in West Virginia east of 
 the Kanawha valley. They were newly raised and 
 without drill or experience. There was one battalion 
 of cavalry and two batteries of artillery, one of them 
 mountain howitzers, manned by regulars. The 
 
 129 
 
130 Lee's Invasion of Northwest Virginia 
 
 strength of these regiments would average about 
 eight hundred men. In the Kanawha valley there 
 were about 2,700 men under Gen. Cox. In all there 
 were probably 11,000 men scattered all over West 
 Virginia. 
 
 Gen. Rosecrans says: 
 
 "I immediately addressed myself to the task of meeting 
 the anticipated coming invasion of the rebels. Gen. Cox 
 was instructed to proceed to the north of Gauley and fortify 
 that pass. To Brig. Gen. J. J. Reynolds was confided the 
 defense of the Cheat Mountain pass, which included that of 
 the road leading from Huttonsville to Lewisburg, which was 
 closed by a line of field-works at a place called Elkwater, 
 a few miles south of Huttonsville. Col. Lorin Andrews, with 
 three and a half regiments, was posted on the Northwestern 
 Virginia turnpike, near the point where it crossed the north 
 branch of the Potomac, where, under the direction of Capt. 
 Merrill, of the engineers, he threw up some field-work. 
 
 "Soon the news oozed through every pore of society that, 
 acting on the defensive in front of Washington, the rebels 
 intended to make an offensive campaign to recover pos- 
 session of Western Virginia; that to Gen. Lee was to be con- 
 fided the accomplishment of this work. Dismay and alarm 
 pervaded the State, even reached Washington, and came to 
 me in friendly warning from more than one of the departments 
 of the government. Nor was it long before these rumors re- 
 ceived confirmation. Gen. Lee, appearing in Gen. Reynold's 
 front with a flag of truce, proposed the exchange of some of 
 our men captured at Bull Run for the prisoners of war cap- 
 tured by us at Rich Mountain and Beverly and paroled by 
 order of Gen. Scott.* 
 
 ♦Answering later a question asked by the Chairman, Gen. 
 Rosecrans said he did not make the exchange of prisoners 
 proposed by Gen. Lee. He declined because he saw Lee 
 wanted to exchange prisoners captured at Bull Run for 
 mountaineers captured at Rich Mountain and Beverly, who 
 knew the country and would immediately add valuable men 
 to his strength, while the Bull Run prisoners would add 
 nothing to the strength of the Union forces, and, in fact, 
 could not serve with Rosecrans' command. He told Lee 
 unless he could remedy this inequality there could be no 
 exchange; and there was none. 
 
Lee's Final Failure 131 
 
 "A heavy force appeared menacing us in front at Cheat 
 Mountain, while another column, coming from Warm Springs 
 by way of Huntsville, appeared in front of Elkwater. 
 
 "Meanwhile, Gen. Cox from Kanawha valley, informed 
 me that while Gen. Wise was advancing on his position at the 
 mouth of Gauley by the Lewisburg and Kanawha turnpike 
 with a force variously estimated at from five to eight thousand 
 men, he had information that Gen. Floyd with another column 
 was advancing from Lewisburg with the intention of crossing 
 Gauley above him, and attacking either our depots at Weston 
 and Clarksburg or making his rear on the Kanawha river in 
 the vicinity of Charleston. 
 
 "I at once despatched Gen. Cox instructions to remove 
 his sick and all public property not absolutely necessary 
 from the valley, and if compelled to leave to retire fight- 
 ing towards the Northwestern Virginia railroad with a view 
 to concentration in case of necessity, with Gen. Reynolds 
 and other troops farther east. The post at New Creek sta- 
 tion was turned over to Col. Biddle, of Gen. Burk's command, 
 and that on the northwest road stripped of all save a nominal 
 force to reinforce Gen. Reynolds. 
 
 "The governor of Ohio, at this time apprehending disaster 
 to us, sent us the 28th, 47th and 30th, raw regiments of three- 
 years troops. I also assembled all the troops that could be 
 spared, seven regiments and a half, three of Avhich had just 
 received their arms, and marched from Clarksburg, by way 
 of Weston, Bulltown and Sutton, to meet Gen. Floyd, who, 
 having crossed Gauley, had attacked and overwhelmed Col. 
 Tyler, of the 7th Ohio, at Cross Lanes, a distance from Clarks- 
 burg of 117 miles and about 20 miles above Gen. Cox's position 
 at the mouth of the Gauley. 
 
 "Our column crossing Big Birch mountain on the 10th 
 September, 1861, encamped at its foot, ten miles above Somer- 
 ville, on the ground from which we had driven Floyd's out- 
 posts. Here the citizens reported that Floyd, with from 15,000 
 to 20,000 men, was encamped below Somerville, near Cross 
 Lanes, on the north side of the Gauley. We could not stop 
 to count numbers. Our only alternatives were to fight and 
 whip or pass him and unite with Gea. Cox. Accordingly at 
 
132 Lee's Invasion op Northwest Virginia 
 
 3 o'clock the next morning our column began to move, and 
 by 1 o'clock p. m., after a march of fifteen miles, halted two 
 miles from the enemy's intrenched position, having thus far 
 had only a little skirmishing. While resting cavalry, of which 
 we had but two companies, our staff began to reconnoitre. Fir- 
 ing between the enemy's advanced guard and the head 
 of our column soon followed, and by half past two o'clock 
 Col. Lytle was in the camp of the rebel Col. Reynolds, who 
 had retreated into the thick forest, the entrance of which, 
 marked with numerous paths leading to the rear, satisfied me 
 that the citizens' reports of the enemy being intrenched were 
 probably correct. I therefore directed the leading brigade 
 (Benham's), consisting of three of my best regiments, to ad- 
 vance cautiously, but firmly, and to feel the enemy's position. 
 Unfortunately, its commander, excited and impressed with the 
 idea that the enemy was retreating, though emphatically cau- 
 tioned to beware of masked batteries, advanced through the 
 forest without deploying skirmishers, until the head of the 
 column emerged in front of an intrenched line, and a battery 
 of seven or eight pieces behind a parapet, where it received a 
 terrific artillery and musketry fire, which brought it to a 
 stand. This sudden and fierce fire caused the commander to 
 send for reinforcement and artillery. Despatching orders for 
 the other four regiments to follow and halt at the edge of 
 the woods, I proceeded to the front and reconnoitred the 
 enemy's position. Meanwhile Col. Robert McCook, whose 
 brigade followed next, sent a portion of the 9th Ohio to our 
 right, where it also drew the enemy's artillery, accompanied 
 by heavy volleys of musketry. His line was found to extend 
 across a bend in the Gauley river, its flanks resting upon 
 almost inaccessible precipices five or six hundred feet above the 
 Gauley. I now prepared for the assault, and to that end 
 sent Col. W. S. Smith, with the 13th Ohio, supported by the 
 28th Ohio, under Col. Mohr, to our left, where he reported he 
 could find cover from the enemy's musketry until within about 
 fifty yards of his flank, whence he thought he could ascend 
 to the height on which their breastworks were built, and, by 
 a sudden rush, take them. It was sunset before the fierce fir- 
 ing at that point indicated that Smith's column was at work. 
 
Lee's Final. Failure 133 
 
 Meanwhile Col. McCook had formed the 9th and the 47th Ohio 
 as a storming column, to be supported by the 10th Ohio, to 
 attack the battery on the enemy's centre. The troops were 
 much jaded, and to inspire them with spirit I told them I 
 would lead them myself. At this time the firing on our left 
 receded, showing our attack there had not succeeded. It was 
 also dusk, and an officer brought the report that our column, 
 under Col. Smith, had found it impracticable in the darkness 
 and depth of the ravine to accomplish its work. It therefore 
 became necessary to defer the attack until morning. Taking 
 good care to leave the impression that we were immediately 
 in their front, and ready for the attack, the troops were 
 quietly and carefully withdrawn to a good position, just out 
 of reach of the enemy's fire, where, exhausted with the march- 
 ing and fighting of the day, they lay down on their arms. At 
 five o'clock next morning Col. Ewing, from the advance, 
 brought in a contraband, who stated that during the night the 
 enemy had withdrawn across the Gauley, destroying the foot- 
 bridge and sent the ferry-boats over the falls, leaving only a 
 small portion of his troops on the north side. Orders were 
 immediately given to advance, and Col. Ewing took possession 
 of the camp and the few prisoners he could find skulking 
 through the woods unable to make their escape. Orders 
 were immediately given to drive the enemy from the opposite 
 side of the river, and hold the ferry, which, under Gen. 
 Benham, was to be put in condition for crossing our troops 
 as rapidly as possible. The Gauley, for a distance of nearly 
 twenty miles, rushes through a chasm cut in the rocks from 
 five to eight hundred feet deep, with precipitous sides, the 
 current, excepting at a very few places, being too swift to 
 cross, even with a skiff. Carnifex ferry, at the mouth of 
 Meadow river, a southern tributary of the Gauley, is a level 
 reach about two hundred and fifty yards long and one hun- 
 dred and twenty-five yards wide, above and below which the 
 water dashes over the rocks white with foam. The descent 
 from the north side is by a winding road about a mile and a 
 half in length from the line of the enemy's intrenchment. 
 It was extremely difficult to obtain materials, and it took 
 twelve days to replace the ferry-boats the enemy had destroyed. 
 
134 Lee's Invasion of Northwest Virginia 
 
 Meanwhile Gen. Cox, from the mouth of the Gauley, despatched 
 that after Wise had skirmished heavily with his advanced 
 guard, he retired towards Lewisburg, and that he, Gen. Cox, 
 should cross the Gauley in pursuit. I replied that he should 
 advance carefully, until we could get the means to cross 
 and join him. He obeyed the instructions, and so soon as a 
 single small ferry-boat was ready, Gen. McCook, with two and 
 a half regiments, by working night and day for forty-eight 
 hours, crossed and joined him at the head of the Sunday 
 road. It was also our misfortune to have been compelled to 
 move so light that our ammunition and provisions were both 
 nearly exhausted, and the trains to replenish them, which 
 had been directed to follow us, were so delayed by the ter- 
 rible rains which set in the night after the battle that they did 
 not reach us for nine days thereafter. And the country was 
 unable to supply us, which would have so long delayed us, 
 even had we not been hindered by want of means of crossing 
 the Gauley. The enemy having retreated towards Lewis- 
 burg, Gen. Cox followed him, taking possession of one or two 
 lines of intrenchments on his way, and reaching the top of 
 Mount Sewell, where I joined him on the 28th, leaving orders 
 for the remainder of my troops to follow as rapidly as pos- 
 sible. It was pending this movement, when Gen. Lee, learn- 
 ing that I was marching to attack Floyd, attempted to force 
 Reynolds from his position at Cheat Mountain, but was badly 
 beaten. From that time he seemed to be in observation, await- 
 ing the result of the operations under Floyd and Wise. Gen. 
 Reynolds, with rare intelligence and sagacity, kept him per- 
 petually harassed, until finally the battle of Carnifex ended 
 the enemy's operations in the Kanawaha valley. 
 
 "Gen. Lee next determined to concentrate all his force on 
 the Lewisburg road to oppose the advance of our victorious 
 troops. When, therefore, we reached the top of Mount Sewell, 
 we found him strongly posted in front of us, intrenched with 
 an army of about 14,000 men; we had in our advance on his 
 front 5,300 men and four and a half regiments coming up 
 from the rear. One of the most terrible storms ever known 
 in Western Virginia set in. Eighteen horses perished in one 
 night at headquarters. The Gauley rose fifty feet. Forage, 
 
Lee's Final Failure 135 
 
 clothing and commissary stores at its mouth, down the 
 Kanawha, in spite of our utmost exertions, were damaged or 
 swept away by the flood. The roads became almost impas- 
 sable. The country between the mouth of the Gauley and 
 Mount Sewell, a distance of thirty-eight miles, never abund- 
 antly supplied, was now almost destitute of forage. It was 
 evident that as, all told, we could not number to exceed 8,500 
 effectives, we had no reasonable chance of driving Lee, with 
 near twice that number, from an intrenched position, nor 
 could we have compelled Lee to retire. Would it have been 
 advisable to advance any farther at that season of the year, 
 when it was impossible to have subsisted either animals or 
 men, and when, moreover, we had nothing to accomplish by 
 an advance of a small column far into the interior, beyond 
 support and in proximity to the enemy's great rail communica- 
 tions? Having spent two or three days in examining the 
 country with a view to future operations, the troops were 
 withdrawn to the vicinity of the Gauley, where prompt meas- 
 ures were taken to supply them with clothing, an imperative 
 necessity, from the fact that the continual marching during 
 the past four months, and their remoteness from depots of 
 supplies had rendered it impracticable heretofore, and the 
 troops were so naked that in one regiment I counted one 
 hundred and thirty-five men without pantaloons on parade. 
 This position was held because it covered all the country in 
 its rear, and still threatened and compelled the enemy to 
 watch us. While thus occupied I learned from various sources 
 that Gen. Lee had determined to drive us from our position 
 by sending a column through Raleigh Court House to strike 
 the Kanawha below us, and cut off our supplies, while he 
 should take advantage to attack us on our front, and des- 
 perately damage us in the retreat to which he expected to 
 force us. Knowing the country better than Gen. Lee, I felt 
 certain his column west of the river would be obliged to 
 take the route by Fayette Court House over Cotton mountain, 
 and strike the river opposite the mouth of the Gauley, where 
 our rear guard was posted, and took measures accordingly. 
 Nor was I disappointed. On the 27th October the head of 
 Floyd's column, passing through Fayetteville, seized the road 
 
136 Lee's Invasion of Northwest Virginia 
 
 opposite Miller's Ferry, where lay McCook's brigade, and the 
 next day opened with artillery from the top of Cotton moun- 
 tain, a distant and comparatively harmless fire on our posi- 
 tion and depots at the mouth of the Gauley. Between our 
 forces and Floyd's ran New river, through a narrow chasm 
 from seven hundred to a thousand feet deep, cut in the rocks. 
 The water whirls and foams through this channel, with but 
 two short level reaches in twenty- five miles. One of these, at 
 Miller's ferry, the enemy watched. About four miles above 
 was a small pool, known as Townsend's ferry, to which there 
 was a descent by a foot-path and a small ascent leading from 
 the opposite side to the plateau, southeast of Fayetteville. 
 Having satisfied myself of the possibility of using this as a 
 place of crossing by which to surprise the enemy, I ordered 
 the means therefor to be prepared, which consisted in sawing 
 down the trees to avoid noise, and lowering by ropes over the 
 cliffs materials for two ferries, one formed of wagon boxes 
 laid side by side across two parallel poles, to which they were 
 bound by two others lying on the tops of the boxes and se- 
 cured to the lower ones by rope lashings. Over this was 
 stretched canvas paulin. The other was what is known in the 
 west as a bull-boat, covered with paulin. These were to be 
 passed to and fro by a rope stretched across the river, which 
 here was not too wide to admit of it. The work was pushed 
 with the utmost secrecy and despatch, under the direction of 
 Maj. (now major general) Crawford, and during a continued 
 rain of seventy hours. The plan of operations was as fol- 
 lows: The bridge which lay next above Gen. Cox's, at the 
 mouth of Gauley, passing down secretly to a point six miles 
 below, being reinforced by troops brought up from Charles- 
 ton and other points on the river below, was secretly to cross 
 the Kanawha at the mouth of Loup creek, and lie concealed 
 until our preparations as above described were made for the 
 crossing. When that was done, Gen. Cox was to commence 
 skirmishing with the enemy, whose artillery had been driven 
 from the front of Cotton hill. 
 
 The commander of the Loup creek force was to send a 
 column of 1,000 men across the mountains to Cassidy's mill, 
 four miles west of the enemy's position, and about the same dis- 
 
Lee's Final Failure 137 
 
 tance from Fayetteville, which lay seven and a half miles 
 in his rear, and while this detachment was on its way was 
 to march with the remainder of his forces up the river, and, in 
 conjunction with Gen. Cox's troops, drive the enemy from Cot- 
 ton hill, and prepare to attack him in his encampment on 
 Laurel creek at its southern base. As soon as his detach- 
 ment should have reached the mill this attack was to begin. 
 While thus drawing the enemy's attention, Gen. Schenck was 
 to move simultaneously to cross New river with 2,700 men at 
 Townsend's ferry and seize the enemy's line of retreat near 
 Fayetteville, announcing the success of this operation to the 
 command in the enemy's front. Thus Floyd's force would 
 be hemmed in beyond the possibility of escape. To be in readi- 
 ness for any movement of Gen. Lee co-operating with Floyd 
 by attacking us on the Lewisburg road, thorough watch was 
 to be kept on that road towards Mount Sewell, and McCook's 
 brigade with our artillery was to hold it, or a point near 
 Hawk's Nest, which offered such difficulties to the advance of 
 an enemy as would have enabled him to hold Gen. Lee for at 
 least twenty-four hours. Our troops on the west side, hav- 
 ing taken Floyd, were, in that case, to march to Bowyer's 
 ferry, cross New river seven miles south of Fayetteville, and 
 place themselves, G,000 strong, on the Lewisburg road in the 
 rear of Lee's position, which would have put him wholly in 
 our power. The execution of this plan proceded until the 
 ferry-boats were ready; but the exceedingly violent rains had 
 raised New river so that the small level at Townsend's ferry 
 disappeared, and the river there, as elsewhere, was but a tor- 
 rent, over which it was impossible even to ferry a skiff. When 
 this became certain Gen. Schenck's command was ordered to 
 move with all possible despatch to the mouth of Gauley, and 
 cross the Kanawha at the falls, where means were in readi- 
 ness. 
 
 On the morning of November 11, Gen. Cox's troops attacked 
 and drove the enemy's advance guard from Cotton hill, where 
 the head of the Loup creek column arrived before noon, and 
 pushed on over the mountain, attacked the enemy's rear guard 
 at Laurel creek, his main body having retired from his en- 
 campment there to Dickinson's farm, three miles further south. 
 
138 Lee's Invasion of Northwest Virginia 
 
 At 12 o'clock on the same day the detachment, 1,300 instead 
 of 1,000 strong, arrived at Cassidy's mill, on the flank and 
 rear of the enemy, and there waited for orders while watching 
 for the advance of Lee on the east side of the mill, and the 
 movement of our column over the river, as well as that of Gen. 
 Schenck, who, by marching all night, reached the mouth of 
 Gauley on the morning of the 12th, and began crossing. Our 
 column on the enemy's front, on the side of the mountain, lay 
 on their arms from four o'clock in the afternoon of the 11th 
 until the next morning, though its commander had ample and 
 explicit orders. Hearing nothing from that front until late 
 in the morning of the 12th, at 10 o'clock I despatched Capt. 
 W. F. Rainolds, topographical engineers, aide-de-camp, to as- 
 certain what was the matter. At about 2 p. m. he found the 
 command about half a mile south of the foot of the moun- 
 tain, lying on their arms, and after inquiry as to what was the 
 matter, rode to the front beyond our advanced skirmishers 
 to some hastily-built breastworks, thrown up by the enemy at 
 Dickinson's farm, opposite Miller's ferry, the day before, and 
 found them deserted. Returning, he informed our commander, 
 who expressed surprise, and immediately set about ordering 
 a move. But the column only reached the enemy's deserted 
 camp at about 11 o'clock that night, when it halted. Mean- 
 while the detachment at Cassidy's mill, instead of moving 
 across to Fayetteville, only three or four miles distant, was 
 ordered to march four miles down the stream to join the rear 
 of this column, seven miles and a half north of Fayetteville, 
 which it did. The enemy had retreated about midnight of the 
 11th, an advanced guard hearing the movement, which was not 
 more than three miles from the main body, and reporting 
 the same to the column headquarters as early as 2 a. m. of 
 the 12th. This put Floyd about twenty-four hours ahead. Our 
 troops halted here, and the commander, Gen. Benham, sent me 
 the following despatch, viz. : 
 
 "One mile from Dickinson's — 11% p. m. 
 "Gen. Rosecrans: I push forward with the chance of catch- 
 ing Floyd's train. Do not let me be interfered with, though 
 he has a long start. Two great blunders, made by my two best 
 
Lee's Final Failure 139 
 
 officers, have put me twenty-four hours behind Floyd. I should 
 have been only twelve hours had it not been for this. I in- 
 tend to take his train. It is safe for all to come on, as I am 
 pushing to Raleigh. 
 
 "Respectfully, etc." 
 
 On the forenoon of the 14th our advance came up with 
 the enemy's rear guard, with which it had a smart skirmish. 
 Meanwhile, Gen. Schenck with, his command, had followed 
 as rapidly as possible, and, being senior in rank, was ordered 
 to assume the command until my arrival on that side of the 
 river. Gen. Schenck sent his adjutant general, Maj. Piatt, 
 to the front to ascertain the condition of affairs, and sent all 
 the subsistence he could get forward on unharnessed train 
 animals to supply our hungry men, who were out of rations, 
 and to give such orders as might be deemed prudent in the 
 premises. The major met a messenger from Gen. Benham with 
 despatches to Gen. Schenck, informing him that he had In- 
 formation which led him to believe Lee, with a considerable 
 force, was at Bowyer's, urging Gen. Schenck to come and meet 
 him, and proposing that their united forces should proceed 
 at once in that direction. But, proceeding to the front, the 
 major ascertained that our troops were exhausted, out of 
 rations, and in the then condition of the roads could neither 
 be supplied nor had they much prospect of catching the enemy 
 or his trains, which, of course, were sent in advance of his re- 
 treating forces. Moreover, a terrible snow and rain storm 
 came on; the roads became desperate, and it was perfectly 
 manifest that further pursuit would be much more likely 
 to damage us than the enemy. Under these circumstances Gen. 
 Schenck gave orders to discontinue pursuit and return to 
 Fayetteville, where supplies could reach him, and whence, 
 subsequently, I ordered all troops, except Gen. Schenck's, 
 to return to their old positions. Thus Floyd escaped; but his 
 column had retreated in a most demoralized condition, leaving 
 some ammunition and camp equipage behind. 
 
 Gen. Lee did not carry out the plan of attack he had origin- 
 ally proposed on the Lewisburg road, the condition of the roads 
 between us and Mount Sewell having interposed almost insup- 
 erable obstacles; and, morever, Gen. Lee himself having been 
 
140 Lee's Invasion of Northwest Virginia 
 
 called about that time east under orders for Charleston, 
 most of Lee's troops retiring from the position in front of 
 Mount Sewell to an intrenched camp at Meadow Bluff; while 
 Floyd's troops went to Dublin Station, on the Southwest 
 Virginia and Tennessee railroad. Thus ended the enemy's 
 campaign against us in Western Virginia — in defeat and fail- 
 ure — and the people, during the winter, established an ef- 
 fective civil government, which has ever since continued. 
 
 As the civil administration of a department commander 
 is an important element of duty, in closing the statement of 
 my campaign in Western Virginia it will be proper to say 
 that the people of Western Virginia gave testimony to their 
 satisfaction with my administration by a unanimous vote of 
 thanks from both houses of the legislature, which was passed 
 during the session of 1861-'62. 
 
McCLELLAN'S ABANDONMENT OF THE 
 KANAWHA VALLEY. 
 
 Is Easily Persuaded by a Kanawha Delegation. — Explana- 
 tions by the General and by Judge Summers. 
 
 MCCLELLAN EXPLAINS TO GEN. SCOTT. 
 
 The following is Gen. MeClellan's explanation, 
 written to Adjt. Gen. Townsend from Cincinnati, 
 June 1, 1861 : 
 
 "I had intimated in preceding despatches an intention of 
 moving on the valley of the Great Kanawha, and in fact ma- 
 tured my plans for carrying that intention into effect in 
 such manner as to render all resistance hopeless, with the 
 design of effecting the occupation, as I did that of the Graf- 
 ton line, without firing a shot. 
 
 "My view of our course is that we should not cross the 
 frontier without being fully assured that our assistance is 
 demanded b t y the Union men and that our movements should 
 be in such force as to preclude the possibility of resistance. 
 
 "I had a long interview this morning with Judge L. 
 Ruffner and Col. B. F. Smith, both of Kanawha valley. * 
 They came accredited by Hon. V. Horton, of Pomeroy, and 
 other reliable men, and are represented as expressing the 
 sentiment of the Union men of that region. 
 
 "My conference with them was full and frank. I told 
 them that I did not believe it to be the will of the general 
 government to force assistance on the Union men where there 
 was good ground to believe that they were able and willing 
 to take care of themselves; that should I learn that any 
 force from eastern Virginia had entered their valley, I could 
 
 *CoL Benjamin H. Smith, U. S. District Attorney, and 
 Lewis Ruffner, salt manufacturer, both resident at Charles- 
 ton. 
 
 141 
 
142 Lee's Invasion op Northwest Virginia 
 
 promptly drive them out; that they might count upon our 
 aid whenever demanded; that it is necessary for them to make 
 up their minds to take a decided stand. 
 
 "They stated that the Union feeling (shown to be decidedly 
 preponderant by the late elections) is rapidly increasing; as- 
 sert their ability to keep the secessionists under, say that they 
 will not allow themselves to be forced into the Southern Con- 
 federacy, and deprecate sending any troops there for the 
 present. I have therefore thought it prudent to submit the 
 matter to Gen. Scott, the more especially as I think no ill 
 effects can follow from some delay; for I have information 
 which satisfies me that there are no East Virginians nor Con- 
 federate troops in that region, and that they cannot move 
 them there at present. 
 
 "These Kanawha gentleman approve of the Grafton move- 
 ment; and I have determined, until I receive further in- 
 structions from Gen. Scott, to modify my original plan so as 
 to accomplish the same result in a manner that will not be 
 obnoxious." 
 
 It seems pertinent to remark that Gen. McClellan's 
 "view" that the Union armies should not "cross the 
 frontier" except on request of the Union men south 
 of it, nor without an irresistible force at command, is 
 rather startling from the military point of view. Un- 
 der this rule of action, the United States armies could 
 not have entered a single insurrectionary state. Gen. 
 McClellan's proneness to mix his political views with 
 his military duties, so fatal to his reputation as a 
 commander and so injurious to the country, it thus 
 appears, developed at a very early stage of his career. 
 
 Hon. George W. Summers, Col. Benjamin H. Smith 
 and Lewis Ruffner had gone to Gallipolis to persuade 
 the Union commander there not to cross the river. 
 He told them he had no orders to cross, but he was 
 liable to have such orders; so Messrs. Smith and 
 Ruffner went on to Cincinnati to urge Gen. McClellan 
 
McClellan's Abandonment of Kanawha 143 
 
 to keep out of the Kanawha valley. Mr. Summers — 
 the ablest, most important, most influential of the 
 three — did not accompany them. 
 
 Mr. Summers had been a member of the Virginia 
 convention. His course at Richmond, and his printed 
 declarations after his return home, indicated that he 
 was in sympathy with (or under the influence of) the 
 Confederate cabal. 
 
 Col. Smith was U. S. District Attorney. He was 
 regarded as loyal. So was Mr. Ruffner, who was an 
 old man, of great ability; a salt manufacturer; a 
 brother of Dr. Henry Ruffner, distinguished for his 
 anti-slavery attitude, who died at Charleston before 
 the year was out. Lewis Ruffner afterwards took 
 part in the loyal reorganization at Wheeling. Mr. 
 Summers did not. 
 
 THE EARLY ATTITUDE OP KANAWHA. 
 
 The Union men in Kanawha were not sufficiently 
 pronounced in their loyalty to the United States to 
 be represented in the convention which gathered at 
 Wheeling, May 13th, 1861, to organize resistance to 
 the transfer of Virginia to the Southern Confederacy. 
 Mr. Summers had promised Union members of the 
 convention at Richmond that he would co-operate in 
 their movement to resist the Confederate usurpation; 
 but the promise was not kept. Mr. Ruffner went to 
 Wheeling as a member of the General Assembly, and 
 became, ex-officio, a member of the June convention, 
 which reorganized the government of Virginia. Mr. 
 Smith late in the session of the convention which met 
 at Wheeling in November, 1861, to frame a constitu- 
 tion for the new State of West Virginia, obtained a 
 
144 Lee's Invasion of Northwest Virginia 
 
 seat in that body as a delegate from Logan county, 
 though a resident of Kanawha, upon petition of a 
 few refugees who were under protection of an Ohio 
 regiment. His subsequent part in the proceedings 
 of that convention indicated that his object in getting 
 into it was to promote certain special interests: one 
 being protection of wild-land owners who had been 
 delinquent in payment of taxes on their lands more 
 than twenty years; another, to aid in engrafting on 
 the West Virginia constitution the same old " internal 
 improvement" policy which had proved the ruin of 
 Virginia; third, to resist measures looking to the 
 gradual or other removal of slavery in the new State. 
 He and Brown of Kanawha were the champions of 
 the slave interest in the recalled sitting of the con- 
 vention in February, 1863. 
 
 Assuming that these gentlemen were simply timid 
 and were sincere in their later avowal of loyalty to 
 the United States government, they made a mistake in 
 persuading Gen. McClellan to withhold troops from 
 the Kanawha valley; and he, it is apparent, needed 
 very little persuasion. The reasons he gives Adjt. 
 Gen. Townsend for abandoning the plan for occupa- 
 tion are not convincing. He says he had satisfied 
 himself there were no "East Virginia" troops in the 
 Valley; and, again, that there were no "Confederate" 
 troops. If Gen. McClellan was well informed, he 
 knew there were several hundred Confederate troops 
 there at the time he wrote his letter to Townsend. All 
 the troops organized anywhere in Virginia under the 
 proclamation of Letcher and the call of Gen. Lee 
 were "Confederate." To justify driving them out 
 or capturing them, it was not necessary that they 
 
McClellan's Abandonment of Kanawha 145 
 
 should have come from Eastern Virginia. Gen. Mc- 
 Clellan is little less than childish, also, in the remark 
 that if he found the rebels had got into the Valley, 
 he would promptly drive them out. This was a case 
 where prevention was more economical than cure — 
 as the event abundantly proved. 
 
 JUDGE SUMMERS MAKES AN EXPLANATION. 
 
 In a public address at Wheeling, in the old court- 
 house, the evening of August 3, 1863, Mr. Summers 
 undertook to defend this application to Gen. McClel- 
 lan to keep troops out of the Kanawha valley. From 
 the shorthand notes of that address, the following is 
 now transcribed: 
 
 "I was sent, with certain other gentlemen, who have been 
 honored with the public confidence from that day to this — 
 one of whom is now a delegate from the county of Kanawha, 
 one of whom is U. S. Disrict Attorney of West Virginia — 
 to Gallipolis, where we communed with as sound a man as 
 the land produces — I mean the representative of the Pomeroy 
 district in the Congress of the United States, Hon. V. B. 
 Horton. There was then a regiment at Gallipolis, the colonel 
 of which assured us he had no orders to cross the river. 
 
 "The line of remark presented on that occasion was briefly 
 this: The Kanawha country was not on any line of transit; 
 troops sent to Eastern Virginia would pass by the railroads 
 from Parkersburg and Wheeling. Through the Valley, you 
 encounter a series of hills rendering the roads inadequate 
 for the passage of troops or any large amount of supplies. 
 That there was no necessity — as yet, at all events — for hostile 
 demonstrations there ; that there were some two or three 
 companies, at the outside, of State troops organized at the 
 time of the John Brown raid; that the counties immediately 
 on the river had no purpose whatever, so far as we could 
 understand to attempt to annoy the towns on the Ohio, and — 
 least of all — to cross the stream. 
 
146 Lee's Invasion of Northwest Virginia 
 
 "That view was concurred in by the commandant of the 
 regiment and by all our friends at Gallipolis at the time, 
 so far as I know; and two gentlemen went on to Cincinnati 
 and had a conference, as I was informed, with Gen. McClellan 
 himself, who coincided in the view that no troops need be 
 sent there unless troops from the Confederate states were 
 sent out to the Kanawha country. That was all we desired. 
 We had no expectation of troops from the east. We supposed 
 they would have enough to do beyond the mountains. We 
 had no conception at that time of Wise and his troops com- 
 ing there. Indeed, he brought no troops. He brought a lot of 
 officers — no privates, I believe; they were all officers. 
 
 "After our return to Kanawha, to our chagrin and sur- 
 prise, we understood messengers had been sent — alarmed as 
 they were at the appearance of this regiment at Gallipolis — 
 to the East for aid in the form of troops and munitions of 
 war. 
 
 "From that hour, I washed my hands of the whole matter. 
 All I had done was upon the concession that both parties 
 were to act on this line of policy, and if one acted other- 
 wise, of course, it relieved the other. When these troops 
 v/ere in possession of the valley, no opportunities occurred — 
 at least on my part — of communicating with Ohio, with the 
 commanding general, or anybody else, in relation to the change 
 which had occurred." 
 
 IMBECILITY OF MCCLELLAN. 
 
 Gen. McClellan, in yielding to the persuasion of 
 these gentlemen, seems conscious he had taken leave 
 of his better (military) judgment. His weak com- 
 plaisance in the matter resulted in the occupation and 
 despoilment of the Valley by Wise and his lieutenants, 
 and in costly military operations to recover the coun- 
 try thus abandoned to the enemy. Judge Summers, 
 a lawyer, might be excused for thinking the war then 
 opening was to be just a bit of children's game; but 
 
McClellan 's Abandonment of Kanawha 147 
 
 Gen. McClellan, an educated soldier, ought to have 
 known better. 
 
 Gen. Lee had prompt advice of Gen. McClellan 's 
 agreement not to occupy the Kanawha valley, for it 
 is a matter of official record that six days after Mc- 
 Clellan had so informed Gen. Scott, Wise had orders 
 to proceed thither at once. 
 
 In connection with Judge Summers' explanation, it 
 may be remarked that the official records afford some 
 insight into the conditions existing in that region 
 at that juncture. We note that, 
 
 May 3rd, Col. Tompkins, Charleston, was ordered to 
 take command of troops called out in the Kanawha 
 valley under proclamation of Gov. Letcher. 
 
 May 27th, Col. Tompkins, "commanding Virginia 
 volunteers," despatches from Falls of Kanawha to 
 Adjt. Gen. Garnett: 
 
 "I have this moment express from Lieut. Col. McCausland, 
 at Buffalo, dated yesterday, stating that the U. S. Govern- 
 ment had sent two hundred troops to Gallipolis and will have 
 six hundred more there today. Send down all the troops you 
 have." 
 
 Same date, Col. Tompkins wrote Adjt. Gen. Gar- 
 nett explaining the situation: 
 
 "Great excitement prevails in this region. The divided 
 sentiment of the people adds to the confusion, and except 
 the few loyal companies now mustered into the service of the 
 State, there are few people who sympathize with the secession 
 policy." 
 
 May 29th. Col. Tompkins, " commanding Confed- 
 erate forces in the Kanawha valley," — from which it 
 would seem there really were some Confederate 
 
148 Lee's Invasion of Northwest Virginia 
 
 troops there — wired Garnett at Staunton that troops 
 were gathering along the Ohio border, "several hun- 
 dred at Gallipolis." 
 
 May 30th, Col. Tompkins wrote Gov. Letcher that 
 he had then 340 men under his command, and when 
 the companies then in process of formation in that 
 valley should have been completed, he would have 
 about a thousand. At this time, Col. Jenkins, ex-Con- 
 gressman, was raising a regiment of cavalry; which 
 evidently is not counted in Col. Tompkins' reckon- 
 ing. 
 
 Same date, Col. Tompkins issues an appeal : 
 
 "Men of Kanawha! Men of Virginia! To arms! Repel 
 the aggressors! Preserve your honor and your rights! Rally 
 in every neighborhood, with or without arms; organize and 
 unite and report to those nearest to you in military posi- 
 tion." 
 
 It was in this posture of affairs that Gen. McClel- 
 lan, two days later, notified Gen. Scott he had aban- 
 doned his purpose to occupy the Kanawha valley. 
 
 If it be true, as Mr. Summers asserts, that Wise 
 took none but officers with him into the Kanawha, it 
 must also be true he found on his arrival in the val- 
 ley a very energetic and efficient organization ready 
 to his hand. For nowhere in the whole theater of the 
 war do we find more drastic measures than those im- 
 mediately put in operation there by Wise. From his 
 letter to Gen. Lee, dated July 17th, it appears Wise 
 had then three thousand men under his command, 
 none of whom, so far as appears, had been sent from 
 the East. The absence of Union troops in the valley 
 left the Union people there helpless in the presence of 
 
McClellan 's Abandonment of Kanawha 149 
 
 even a small force of organized Confederates and 
 made Wise as completely master there as if he had 
 taken a large army with him. 
 
 Judge Summers did well to "wash" his hands of 
 this calamitous business. But water will not always 
 cleanse. Lady Macbeth declared the attempt to wash 
 out the stain of Duncan's blood would "the whole 
 multitudinous seas incarnadine." No more could 
 Pilate free his hands from the innocent blood of Jesus, 
 though he wash till Doomsday. In any case it avails 
 no more to wash hands after the mischief is done 
 than to lock the stable after the steed has been stolen. 
 
 Gen. McClellan never took the trouble to "wash" 
 his hands of this Kanawha blunder. He never tried 
 to justify or explain what he had done beyond the 
 (quoted) letter to Adjt. Gen. Townsend. If he felt 
 any compunction for his abandonment of the South- 
 west to the ravage of Wise, he never gave a sign. But 
 after a time, he seems to have perceived something 
 had gone wrong in that part of his military preserve. 
 June 12th he wired Townsend : 
 
 "I have started all the preparations for an expedition to 
 gain possession of the Kanawha valley; which will probably 
 be the end of the secession cause in that region." 
 
 They were only "preparations" and he had only 
 "started" them; so we need not be surprised to find 
 it was not until July 2nd (when at Buckhannon) 
 that McClellan issued an order to Gen. Cox to move 
 an army into the Kanawha valley. Following are the 
 details of the order : 
 
 "Assume command of the First and Second Kentucky 
 regiments; call on Gov. Dennison for a company of cavalry 
 
150 Lee's Invasion of Northwest Virginia 
 
 and six guns; expedite the equipment of this force and move 
 at once to Gallipolis; cross the river and occupy Point Pleas- 
 ant; move two regiments to the mouth of Ten Mile creek, 
 where the road from Letart Falls intersects the Kanawha 
 river; place a regiment in reserve at Point Pleasant; en- 
 trench two guns at Letart's and four at your advanced posi- 
 tion on the Kanawha. Remain on the defensive, and endeavor 
 to keep the rebels near Charleston until I can cut off their re- 
 treat by movements from Beverly." 
 
 This order illustrates the unreadiness of McClellan, 
 so painfully characteristic of his conduct in his larger 
 command; where it is asserted he took as his con- 
 fidential adviser a General who by his open disobedi- 
 ence of orders on the field more than once entitled 
 himself to be shot by a drumhead court martial. Mc- 
 Clellan had eminent talent for preparation. On the 
 Potomac he developed an equally eminent talent for 
 masterly inactivity. 
 
 Gen. McClellan was called to the command of the 
 army of the Potomac because the newspapers ac- 
 claimed him as the "Young Napoleon of the West." 
 This acclaim was based solely on his own grandilo- 
 quent reports; and when, a fortnight after Rich 
 Mountain, the National capital was in a panic over 
 the rout of the Union army at Bull Run, the "Young 
 Napoleon" was called thither to take charge of the 
 army of defense and restore the confidence of the 
 country. 
 
 The facts narrated in the foregoing pages show 
 that Rosecrans, not McClellan, was the hero of Rich 
 Mountain, which battle was decisive of the campaign 
 in West Virginia in 1861 : which defeated and dis- 
 credited Lee, and cleared the field for the restoration 
 of civil government in Virginia. 
 
CRISP COMMENT BY COLONEL PORTER- 
 FIELD. 
 
 Rosecrans the Hero of Rich Mountain — Garnett's Mistake. 
 
 DEATH OF CONVENTIONIST HUGHES. 
 
 Charles Town, W. Va., January 4, 1904. 
 G. D. Hall, Esqr. 
 
 My Dear Sir: Your letter of the 26th ult., inquiring the 
 particulars of the killing of John N. Hughes, on the Rich 
 Mountain, July 11th, 1861, has been received. I regret that I 
 cannot give you as full and satisfactory a statement as to 
 how that unfortunate affair occurred as I would wish. 
 
 On the evening of July 11, 1861, when the battle of Rich 
 Mountain was being fought, Col. W. C. Scott, with his regi- 
 ment, was stationed on the road coming from a northerly 
 direction into Buckhannon turnpike, a mile or so west of 
 Beverly. Whilst there he sent Mr. Hughes as a messenger 
 to Col. Pegram, whose camp was at the western base of the 
 mountain. Col. Scott at that time heard the sound of the 
 battle, but thought it came from Pegram's camp and not from 
 the top of the mountain where there was a small force under 
 Capt. De Lagnel. Whilst the battle was going on, some 
 mounted men were seen in the road east of the Confeder- 
 ate position, who were mistaken for the enemy and fired upon. 
 From the best of my recollection, Hughes was killed by that 
 fire; but I am not certain that he was. Later, Capt. De 
 Lagnel sent a squad of cavalry down to Scott's position. Mr. 
 Hughes may have met that cavalry and been killed by them, 
 but I do not think it at all probable that he was. I will try 
 to get positive information on this point, and if I succeed will 
 send it to you. 
 
 Gen. Rosecrans was undoubtedly entitled to the credit of 
 the success at Rich Mountain. He planned and carried out the 
 movements by which it was accomplished. Rich Mountain was 
 
 151 
 
152 Lee's Invasion of Northwest Virginia 
 
 the key to Garnett's position; and when Rich Mountain 
 was taken, Laurel Hill fell with it, and Garnett's whole army 
 was then defeated. 
 
 McClellan should have made a feint of attack on Pegram's 
 camp, to prevent Pegram from sending reinforcements to De 
 Lagnel, on the top of the mountain — just as Gen. Morris 
 feigned an attack on Garnett and held him at Laurel Hill. 
 
 The whole campaign was admirably planned and executed 
 by the Union side; but just the reverse by the Confederate. 
 McClellan being in command, of course, got all the credit 
 for it. How far he acted by the advice of Rosecrans, I do not 
 know. 
 
 As has been stated, Gen. Garnett was detained at Laurel 
 Hill, all the time expecting an attack would be made on him 
 there. The movements of Gen. Morris in his front were all a 
 feint intended to hold him in his position until Rich Mountain 
 was taken. When Garnett found that Rich Mountain was lost, 
 and that he was defeated, he seemed to have lost his head. He 
 then had ample time to retreat through Beverly, and save 
 what was left of his army and his train. There was no 
 excuse for his not knowing that the road was open to him. 
 He had sufficient cavalry to have ascertained that fact to a 
 certainty. The reports said to have been brought to him 
 that trees had been felled across the road, and that McClel- 
 lan's troops were in Beverly, were all false. The real state 
 of affairs in his then front could have been ascertained by a 
 reliable cavalry company in a single hour. But he did not 
 use the means he had of getting the truth. He acted upon the 
 belief that he could not retreat by the main road through 
 Beverly, and turned off to the east upon a by-road of which he 
 knew little or nothing, with the result that was to have been 
 expected. 
 
 A full and correct account of this campaign would be very 
 interesting and instructive. Some years ago Gen. E. A. 
 Carman, formerly of the U. S. A., then living in Washing- 
 ton city, wrote what he entitled "The W'est Virginia Campaign 
 of 1861," but I have not seen notice of its publication. He 
 showed me his manuscript; but from my recollection I think 
 it was rather defective. 
 
Comment by Colonel Porterfield 153 
 
 It would require more time and labor than I could spare 
 from my present duties to attempt to write a history of it. 
 Yours very truly, 
 
 GEORGE A. PORTERFIELD. 
 
 Charles Town, W. Va., Feb. 5th, 1904. 
 
 G. D. Hall, Esq., 
 
 Dear Sir: Since the receipt of your letter of the 19th 
 ult., I have gotten a copy of the second volume of the Records 
 of the War, and I am now inclined to agree with you that 
 John N. Hughes was killed by a party of cavalry under 
 Lieut. James Cochrane. I wrote to his son, who is a druggist 
 at Bristol, Tenn., to know if he had heard his father speak 
 of this unfortunate occurrence, or if his father had left any 
 papers in which it had been referred to. He replied in the 
 negative. Perhaps some of the older residents of Beverly may 
 remember how it occurred. 
 
 The firing of some of Capt. Anderson's men upon some of 
 their comrades was on the western side of the mountain. 
 
 It was impossible for Hughes to have passed the top of the 
 mountain after the battle commenced. It was near three 
 o'clock before the battle was fully begun. I heard the fir- 
 ing, and it lasted about three hours. Rosecrans reports that 
 he reached the top of the mountain about a mile and a half 
 south of the road, about one o'clock; and he was delayed by 
 the pickets and other obstacles about two hours before he 
 reached De Lagnel's position. 
 
 There was constant communication between Garnett and 
 Pegram's camps until the top of Rich Mountain was taken. 
 After that it was impossible. 
 
 The distance from Beverly to Laurel Hill does not exceed 
 twelve miles. I passed over the road often, and did not 
 think the distance so great as that. Almost all of Garnett's 
 force was on the western slope of Laurel Hill. It was pro- 
 tected by breastworks of logs and stone. 
 
 Garnett began his retreat at dusk on the evening of the 
 11th of July. He moved down the turnpike to where the road 
 to St. George enters it. There he halted his command for 
 
154 Lee's Invasion of Northwest Virginia 
 
 awhile — about half an hour — and then turned down the St. 
 George road. He marched all that night. 
 
 It was not known to Gen. Morris that Garnett had retreated 
 until the morning of the 12th. 
 
 I do not place much confidence in Heck's statement. That 
 paper was written some time after he left the service, and was 
 made up, no doubt, from memory and from what had been 
 told him. On page 257 he states: "The enemy * * * 
 were bayoneting our wounded soldiers who had been shot at 
 their posts." This is not true. He says "the day after we 
 
 left Buckhannon, June , the enemy under Rosecrans, five 
 
 thousand strong, occupied the place and was largely rein- 
 forced." This, of course, was reported to Pegram and Garnett. 
 I therefore do not believe that Pegram asked Garnett for 
 permission to go out and attack McClellan at Roaring creek. 
 
 Garnett could have retreated to the top of Cheat Moun- 
 tain any night, but he would never have consented to doing so 
 without a contest. He had just come from Richmond, where 
 he had heard such a howl of abuse of me, for the accident to 
 my small and destitute command, that he could not have 
 faced his eastern friends if he had done so. I understood that 
 he had joined in this himself. If he did, his "Arab chickens 
 came home to roost." It was said by Capt. (afterwards Gen- 
 eral) Benham, U. S. A., who had served with Garnett on 
 Gen. Taylor's staff in the battle of Buena Vista and was with 
 the pursuing column and the first to recognize Garnett's body 
 after he was killed, that he believed Garnett had wilfully 
 placed himself where he would be shot, to avoid the mortifica- 
 tion of his disastrous defeat. 
 
 Gen. Garnett was no doubt a brave man, and a good officer 
 in a subordinate position; but his campaign in Western Vir- 
 ginia shows that he was deficient as a general in the field with 
 a separate command. He was undoubtedly stunned by his de- 
 feat, and did not know which way to move. He should often 
 whilst at Laurel Hill have asked himself the question: "What 
 shall I do if Pegram should be defeated?" and have been 
 prepared to act accordingly. He failed in this respect. He 
 was unfortunate in having had to divide his command. It 
 should have been united ; but I know of no place west of 
 Cheat Mountain where this could have been safely done. 
 
Comment by Colonel Porterfield 155 
 
 Garnett was a great favorite of Jefferson Davis ; had served 
 with him in the Mexican war. In his "Rise and Fall of the 
 Confederate Government," Mr. Davis compares him to Ney, 
 the last of the rear-guard in Napoleon's retreat from Moscow. 
 
 I observe by reference to McClellan's report (page 205) 
 that he does not give Rosecrans the credit, to which he is 
 justly entitled, of first proposing to turn Pegram's left flank — 
 which resulted in the defeat of Garnett's army — but intimates 
 that it was his own original proposition ; and there appears a 
 disposition to slur Rosecrans throughout this report. There 
 was a lack of magnanimity in this, to say the least of it. 
 
 Rosecrans found a man named Hart, of whom he inquired 
 if it was possible to take a force to the top of the moun- 
 tain south of the road. When informed that it was, he took 
 the man to McClellan, and the result of the interview was that 
 McClellan ordered Rosecrans on that expedition. Before that, 
 it was said, McClellan intended to attack Pegram's front — 
 which would have been attended with great loss of life. 
 
 I also notice that (on page 213) Rosecrans complains of an 
 offensive letter which McClellan had written him. Gen. Rose- 
 crans was an upright man, and proved himself to be one of the 
 ablest generals of the war. Every word of his reports can be 
 relied upon as true. 
 
 The Richmond authorities made a great mistake when they 
 sent troops into Northwestern Virginia. The Hon. George W. 
 Summers advised Gov. Letcher not to do so, and he was right. 
 That part of the state was separated from the rest by the great 
 Allegheny and Cheat ranges of mountains. The people gen- 
 erally were for the Union. Any required number of troops 
 could be (and were) sent to their aid from Ohio, Indiana and 
 Pennsylvania. The authorities appear not to have taken all 
 this into consideration. The first aim of Garnett was to reach 
 and destroy the B. and 0. railroad. The destruction of that 
 road west of the mountain would have amounted to nothing. 
 It was torn up in the valley, during the war, from Harper's 
 Ferry to the North mountain, the ties piled up and burned, 
 the rails heated and bent; and yet the road was fully repaired 
 in as little time as it took to tear it up. 
 
 It is now near forty years since the war ended; the harsh 
 feeling engendered by it is passing away ; and all right-thinking 
 
156 Lee's Invasion of Northwest Virginia 
 
 persons must acknowledge that it is better to have a united 
 than a divided country. 
 
 I am always ready to give you any information that I can. 
 Yours truly, 
 
 GEORGE A. PORTERFIELD. 
 
 P. S. — I was with Garnett's command when he began his 
 retreat, at dusk on the evening of July 11th, also when he 
 turned down the St. George road, about two hours later. 
 
 McClellan is in error when he states that "Our rapid march 
 turned Garnett back and cut off his retreat." (See pages 203 
 and 204.) At the date of his report, 9 a. m., July 12th, when 
 he says: "I am now pushing on to Beverly," Garnett could 
 have been on the Cheat Mountain, if he had followed the turn- 
 pike through Beverly. Garnett no doubt thought McClellan 
 would move towards Beverly at once — which was improbable; 
 but even could he have done so, Garnett had the means of 
 holding him in check until his train passed through. 
 
 McClellan needed no messenger from Rosecrans when he 
 heard the sound of his guns on the top of the mountain. 
 
 If they were "in sight of Beverly," they saw it from the 
 top of the mountain. McClellan does not say when they en- 
 tered that town. It was not before noon, 12th. 
 
THE STORY OF A SCOUT.* 
 
 Who Tried to Do a Little Business on His Own Account. 
 
 Who Spent Near Two Years in Rebel Prisons, and 
 
 Who Gave His Life for the Union Cause. 
 
 A few miles east of Clarksburg, in staid old Har- 
 rison county, named for one of the early governors 
 of Virginia who was one of the signers of the Decla- 
 ration of Independence, lived and died Leonard 
 Kreitzer. He had been a soldier of the Revolutionary 
 war, in a New Jersey regiment, an alien by birth, but 
 an American patriot by choice. After the Revolution, 
 he settled near where the hamlet of Bridgeport after- 
 wards grew, on the borders of Simpson's creek. He 
 was a model farmer, a good citizen, of strong indi- 
 viduality and high moral attributes which he im- 
 parted to a grandson, adopted by him, who bore his 
 Christian name and whom he reared to the simple 
 and healthful life of his farm. 
 
 Leonard Clark, who had come of this lineage on 
 his mother's side and Huguenot blood on his father's, 
 was at the beginning of the Rebellion a young man of 
 family in his early prime; of medium stature, pow- 
 erfully built, close-knit and muscular; face dark, 
 handsome, leonine and resolute. He was not obtru- 
 sive in manner, nor given to needless speech. He had 
 the instincts and breeding of a gentleman. His in- 
 telligence was of a high order ; his courage undoubted. 
 
 A few years before the period with which we deal, 
 he had a frightful and desperate encounter with a 
 maniac. It was "in the haying." He had crossed 
 into the meadow for a chat with a neighbor, Elder. 
 
 •This story, save slight correction and some omissions and addi- 
 tions, was contributed to the Pittsburgh Dispatch a dozen years ago. 
 
 157 
 
158 Lee's Invasion of Northwest Virginia 
 
 They were sitting in the shade when the neighborhood 
 school teacher, Rodney Atchison, who had dismissed 
 for the day, came across the meadow on his way home. 
 He approached and picked up Elder's scythe, lying 
 near, and turning away cut a few strokes and then 
 came back as if to lay it down. Instead of this, he 
 sprang at Elder and with a stroke of the keen blade 
 severed his head from the body. Turning instantly, 
 he aimed a blow at Clark with the same deadly intent. 
 Clark was quick and "ducked." The blade flashed 
 over his head and only clipped a lock of hair. Clark 
 seized the madman, and after a desperate struggle 
 broke away from him, snatched a stake from a near- 
 by fence and knocked the scythe from Atchison's 
 hands, and with another blow felled him and held him 
 till help arrived. 
 
 This was the man who in the early spring of 1861, 
 then domiciled at Claysville, Taylor county, found 
 himself too indignant over the presence of rebel troops 
 at Grafton, and later at Philippi, to wait for the 
 arrival of the United States volunteers expected from 
 beyond the Ohio. As the only thing he could do, 
 after Porterfield's withdrawal to Philippi, he deter- 
 mined to get some information as to the number and 
 position of the Secession forces at that place. He 
 was familiar with the mountain region south of the 
 Baltimore & Ohio railroad; had driven cattle and in 
 other ways traversed the roads and by-ways in Bar- 
 bour and the counties south of it; and in the crisis 
 now impending, strongly felt not only the call of his 
 country, but the ' ' call of the wild ' ' itself inviting him 
 to adventure as a scout. He accordingly, close on the 
 heels of the retreating Confederates, set out on the 
 
The Story op a Scout 159 
 
 dangerous service he proposed to himself, afoot and 
 alone, without confiding his purpose even to his fam- 
 ily. 
 
 The story of this adventure of Clark's was told 
 the writer at Grafton by a brother-in-law of his not 
 long after it occurred. 
 
 In the neighborhood of Porterfield's camp, Clark 
 was discovered by the rebel pickets, who were mounted 
 and gave chase. The hue and cry brought others, 
 who joined in the pursuit. He took to the woods, and 
 thus for a time baffled his pursuers. But they were 
 persistent; and whenever he would emerge into open 
 ground, he would find himself headed off by horse- 
 men, while dismounted men chased him through the 
 brush. 
 
 Thus the chase went on hour after hour through 
 the day, Clark by desperate exertions keeping out of 
 the clutches of his pursuers, who might have shot 
 him, but seemed intent on taking him alive. The 
 country was rugged, and the toil of climbing the steep 
 hillsides was but partly compensated by the run down 
 the other side. Faint with hunger, worn down with 
 running, climbing, dodging, hiding, hat lost and cloth- 
 ing torn, a man of ordinary physique and courage 
 must have given up; but Clark kept up the flight, 
 steadily heading north and drawing his enemies far- 
 ther from their camp. At times he would be appar- 
 ently cut off in all directions. Finally, he was so ex- 
 hausted, he could go no farther, and crawled into a 
 hollow log in a brush-heap which offered its friendly 
 shelter. He lay there a long time listening to the 
 shouts of his disconcerted pursuers. They could not 
 believe he had escaped ; for they had a cordon drawn 
 
160 Lee's Invasion of Northwest Virginia 
 
 all round the piece of woods in which he had been 
 last seen. And so they lingered in the vicinity and 
 beat the covers in all directions. At times some came 
 very near and Clark listened to their conversation. 
 One man actually came and stood on the log which 
 concealed him. At this moment he gave himself up 
 for lost. But the man went away without making 
 any discovery, and the friendly darkness coming on, 
 they withdrew. Clark lay still far into the night, 
 and hearing his persecutors no more, at last ventured 
 to crawl out, and once more set out in the direction of 
 the north star, which had guided many a fugitive 
 before in that region towards havens of freedom, 
 desperately tired, sore, cramped and hungry, but res- 
 olute and refreshed by his few hours' respite. He 
 had not gone far before a sharp "Halt!" was fol- 
 lowed by the whistle of a bullet. Clark did not waste 
 a moment "on the order of his going." He plunged 
 into the obscurity of the woods and was followed; 
 but his incentive to escape was greater than the incen- 
 tive to pursue, and his pursuers dropped off one by 
 one till he heard them no more. He kept straight on 
 through the night as well as his condition allowed, 
 and when daylight smiled on him, he was in a friendly 
 country. 
 
 Next day he reached his home and appeared among 
 his astonished family more dead than alive. What 
 clothes remained were in tatters; hat and shoes gone, 
 feet bare and bleeding : the physical man in a pitiable 
 state, but the ardor of the patriot in no wise dimin- 
 ished. 
 
 When Gen. Morris, at the head of Union soldiers 
 from Indiana, arrived at Grafton, Leonard Clark 
 
The Story of a Scout 161 
 
 was the first to offer himself for the hazardous serv- 
 ice of a scout. From that time on until captured, 
 he never rested nor shrank from his dangerous duty. 
 His services, by reason not only of his personal su- 
 periority of mind and body, but of his familiarity 
 with the whole mountain region which became the 
 theater of war, were invaluable to the Union com- 
 manders. His career as a scout was abruptly ended 
 by his capture. In company with Dr. William B. 
 Fletcher, of Gen. Morris' staff, he had penetrated 
 some distance within the Rebel lines in Pocahontas 
 county. Suddenly, they were confronted by the 
 enemy's pickets, who with loaded guns demanded 
 their surrender. Clark, by a quick dash, got under 
 cover and could have escaped. Fletcher was caught 
 and his captors, recognizing Clark and eager to get 
 him, called to him that unless he came back they 
 would shoot Fletcher. Clark realized what sur- 
 render meant for him, but satisfied they would exe- 
 cute their threat if he refused, he went back and 
 gave himself up. 
 
 Clark was lodged in the jail at Fincastle, Virginia. 
 He lay there for weary weeks, uncertain what fate 
 awaited him, but had good reason to apprehend the 
 worst, as it had been freely given out that he would be 
 hanged as a spy. Weeks lengthened into months, 
 and still the threat was not made good. Some 
 friendly influence had interposed and saved his life. 
 It was said William P. Cooper, who had been editor 
 of the Clarksburg Register, and some other influential 
 Secessionists from Clarksburg, who had been the 
 prisoner's friends at home, had managed to placate 
 the bloody purpose first entertained. 
 
162 Lee's Invasion of Northwest Virginia 
 
 After nearly nine terrible months in the Fineas- 
 tle jail, Clark was removed to Richmond and lodged 
 in the Belle Isle prison, where for a year he endured 
 the privations and hardships of Confederate prison 
 life. Here he was freed from the shadow of the gal- 
 lows; and whereas solitude had been added to the 
 other horrors of his situation at Fincastle, here he 
 had at least the comfort afforded by company in his 
 misery. 
 
 He was exchanged in the latter part of March, 
 1863, and at once returned to Western Virginia, ar- 
 riving home a few days after the Jones raid had 
 made the circuit of the upper Monongahela valley. 
 It was the fortune of the writer to accompany him 
 from Wheeling to Clarksburg. He had been in pris- 
 ons nearly two years and for many months had liter- 
 ally sat under the shadow of death. He looked like 
 a man who had come out of the grave — his long 
 black hair and beard contrasting with the pallor of 
 a face bleached by protracted seclusion from the 
 sunlight. He would not talk of what he had gone 
 through, and one could not but respect his silence. 
 But his spirit was unbroken, and he looked forward 
 bravely and hopefully to the work before him. He 
 was eager to get back into the service. Gen. Palm- 
 er, of Tennessee, who had been a prison mate and 
 released by the same exchange, offered him a regi- 
 ment if he would go to Tennessee and join his com- 
 mand. It was a tempting offer, but Clark's heart was 
 set on service in West Virginia. Some friends pressed 
 Gov. Peirpoint to give him a colonel's commission. 
 The application failed. Many such commissions went 
 to less capable and less deserving men. 
 
The Story of a Scout 163 
 
 Another hardship was added to Clark's overflowing 
 cup. In his eagerness to get into the Union service 
 when he went on Gen. Morris's staff as a scout, he 
 had taken no thought as to pay. The military au- 
 thorities were likewise remiss in not having him prop- 
 erly enlisted. So that when exchanged, he could get 
 no pay for his lost two years, pressing as were the 
 needs of his family. 
 
 A statement of the case was furnished by the writ- 
 er, after Clark's death — as he now recalls the time 
 — to Hon. Chester D. Hubbard at Washington, then 
 Congressman from the Wheeling district, and by him 
 placed in the hands of a committee to bring in a bill 
 for the relief of those entitled to it. Whether any- 
 thing was ever done, the writer is now unable to say. 
 
 But nothing could keep Leonard Clark from serv- 
 ing the Union cause. His brother-in-law, Capt. Tim. 
 Roane, commanded a company in a regiment of 
 mounted infantry. Clark attached himself to the 
 company and set to work drilling the men. He was 
 a magnificent horseman. The cavalry arm was his 
 natural place. He had the intrepid qualities, if op- 
 portunity had offered, to make a great cavalry leader. 
 Thus passed the time in which he shared the for- 
 tunes of Capt. Roane's company, holding commission 
 as a lieutenant. 
 
 Leonard Clark was killed at Moorefield, Virginia 
 (now West Virginia), in August, 1864, in a charge 
 against the enemy. Though the writer saw him 
 buried, it was more than twenty years later before he 
 knew the precise circumstances attending his death. 
 These were received from an officer of the regiment 
 who was in the field at the time. 
 
164 Lee's Invasion op Northwest Virginia 
 
 After his exchange, Dr. Fletcher, who was in Belle 
 Isle prison when Clark was sent there, visited Clark's 
 family and showed them the greatest consideration 
 and kindness. The writer of this had long desired to 
 get into communication with Dr. Fletcher, who was 
 in charge of the Indiana Hospital for the Insane, to 
 learn some particulars of his association with Clark 
 as a scout on Gen. Morris's staff. Some six years 
 ago, a letter of Dr. Fletcher's, with a portrait of 
 him, was printed in the Chicago Tribune, relating to 
 the effects of cigarette smoking. The writer of this 
 immediately wrote the Doctor to ask if he was the 
 Dr. Fletcher who had scouted with "Len" Clark 
 in the "West Virginia campaign in 1861, and been cap- 
 tured with him. A prompt answer came back that 
 he was that identical person and had a good picture 
 of Clark. It was the intention to write him very 
 soon to ask all the particulars it was possible to ob- 
 tain in regard to his service with Clark and the cir- 
 cumstances of their capture; but before the letter 
 could be written, a report came from Indianapolis 
 announcing Dr. Fletcher's sudden death. This closed 
 the last avenue through which it had been hoped in- 
 teresting details of the invaluable services rendered 
 the Union cause by Leonard Clark as a scout in the 
 campaign of 1861, might be obtained. West Virginia 
 sent many brave men to the defense of the Union. 
 Perhaps no one of them dared more, toiled more dis- 
 interestedly, suffered more, deserved more, and re- 
 ceived less reward or recognition, than the subject of 
 this sketch. 
 
 Glencoe, Illinois, March, 1911. 
 
Lee's Invasion of 
 Northwest Virginia 
 
 in 1861 
 
 By the author of 
 
 "The Rending of Virginia" 
 
 "Daughter of the Elm" 
 
 "Old Gold" 
 
 etc. 
 
 Printed by a Chicago House 
 Published at Glencoe, Illinois 
 
 By mail or express, carriage paid, $ 1 .25 
 
 Send orders to 
 A. C. HALL, GLENCOE. ILLINOIS 
 
The Rending 
 
 Of Virginia A History 
 
 By 
 Granville Davisson Hall 
 
 THIS IS A WORK OF ABIDING VALUE. It 
 records a chapter of American history from original 
 sources. The author, as reporter in the Conventions 
 which, at Wheeling, restored and reorganized the Virginia 
 government in 1861, preserved the sole record of the 
 debates which explain this remarkable proceeding. The 
 work embodies a complete history of the Convention at 
 Richmond which passed an ordinance of secession, and by 
 coup d'etat, not equalled in violence or infamy since 
 Louis Napoleon overthrew the French Republic, delivered 
 the Old Dominion in chains to the Southern Confederacy. 
 It embraces also a chronicle of that Convention written 
 especially for its pages, at the age of 87, by one of the ablest 
 members of the body, who died recently at the age of 97. 
 C. The restoration and rehabilitation of Virginia as a State 
 in the Union, and the subsequent creation of an indepen- 
 dent State west of the Mountains, are events of the highest 
 historical importance. They involve some of the most 
 interesting questions that have arisen in American annals. 
 These were ably discussed in the recent suit in the U. S. 
 Supreme Court for adjustment of the ante-war debt of 
 Virginia. In that suit the "Rending" was consulted as an 
 authority and privately commended by counsel on both 
 sides as "accurate and valuable." 
 
 C This Virginia episode will in time be regarded as, next 
 to Emancipation, the most compensatory fruit of the 
 Rebellion. No student is well equipped who has not 
 given it attention. 
 
 Send orders to 
 
 Price of the book, $2.00. A. C. HALL 
 
 Glencoe, Illinois. 
 
' 
 
 *B 
 
 239. 
 

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