^^' 9^ - • . ^ • aS* "^^ * o « o ' ,^^ 4 o i ^y *i:^'. *> '^w^^ Va^<^ ^^-n^. '"^^^ :^-. ■ifsr' \ '™^^^- i «-• No- «2, i i TREATY OF PEACE BETWEEN THE ONITED STATES AND SPAIN. MESSAGE FROM TH2E RESIDENT OF THE UMTED STATES, TRANSMITTmO A TREATY OF PEACE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND SPAIN, SIGNED AT THE CITY OF PARIS, ON DECEMBER 10, 1898. January 4, 1899.-Read ; treaty read the first time and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations, and, together with the Message and accompanying papers, ordered to be printed m confidence for the use of the Senate^ January 11, 1899.-Injunction of secrecy removed. January 13, f899.— Ordered printed. k WASHIN^GTON: GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE. 1899. 55Tn CONGEESS, ) SENATE. ( Doc. Ko. G2, 3d Session. 5 ' Pait 1. A TREATY OF PEACE BETWEEN TDE CNITED STATES AND SPAIN, /^l^^. 3z/ MESSAGE FROM THE PPiESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES;.^ TRANSMITTING > A TREATY OF PEACE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND SPAIN, SIGNED AT THE CITY OF PARIS, t/ ON DECEMBER 10, 1898. January 4, 1809. — Read ; treaty read the first time and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations, and, together with the Message and areompanying papers, ordered to be printed in confidence for the use of the Senate, January 11, 1899. — Injunction of secrecy removed, January 13, 1899.— Ordered printed. WASHINGTON: GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE. 1899. ^'TV ^y 39946 '7 y J li<^y 55Tn Congress, ) SENATE. ( Doo. No. 62, 3d Session. ( ( Part 1. r^ TREATY OF PEACE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND '% SPAIN. ^ MESSAGE FROM THB PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, TRANSMITTING A TREATY OF PEACE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND SPAIN, SIGNED AT THE CITY OF PARIS ON DECEMBER 10, 1898. January 4, 1899. — Read; treaty read the first time and referred to the Committee on P^oreign Relations, and, together with the message and accompanying papers, ordered to be printed in confidence for the use of the Senate. Januaky 11, 1899. — Injunction of secrecy removed. January 13, 1899.— Ordered printed. To the Senate of the United States: I transmit herewith, with a view to its ratification, a treaty of peace between the United States and Si)ain, signed at the city of Paris on December 10, 1898; together with the protocols and papers indicated in the list accompanying the report of the Secretary of State. William MoKinley. Executive Mansion, Washington, January 4, 1899. To the President: The undersigned, Secretary of State, has the honor to lay before the President, with a view to its submission to the Senate if deemed proper, a treaty of peace concluded at Paris on December 10, 1898, between the United States and Spain. Accompanying the treaty are the protocols of the conferences of the Peace Commission at Paris, together with copies of statements made before the United States Commissioners, and other papers indicated in the inclosed list. Eespectfully submitted. John Hay. Department of State, Washington, January 3, 1899, 3 1 Tlio United States of America and Her Majesty the Queen 2 Regent of Spain, in the name of her august son Don Alfonso 3 XIII, desiring to end the state of war now existing between the 4 two countries, have for that purpose appointed as plenipotentiaries : 5 The President of the United States, 6 William E. Day, Cushman K. Davis, William P. Frye, George 7 Gray, and Whitelaw Keid, citizens of the United States; 8 And Her Majesty the Queen Regent of Spain, 9 Don Eugenio Montero RIos, president of the senate, DonBuen- 10 aventura de Abarzuza, senator of the Kingdom and ex-minister of 11 the Crown; Don Jose de Garnica, deputy to the Cortes and asso- 12 ciate justice of the supreme court; Don Wenceslao Ramirez de 13 Villa-Urrutia, envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary 14 at Brussels, and Don Rafael Cerero, general of division; 15 Who, having assembled in Paris, and having exchanged their 16 full powers, which were found to be in due and proper form, have, 17 after discussion of the matters before them, agreed upon the fol- 18 lowing articles: 19 Article I. 20 Spain relinquishes all claim of sovereignty over and title 21 to Cuba. 22 And as the island is, upon its evacuation by Spain, to be 23 occupied by the United States, the United States will, so long 24 as such occupation shall last, assume and discharge the obli- 25 gations that may under international law result from the fact 26 of its occupation, for the protection of life and property. g TREATY OF PEACE. 27 Article IL 28 Spain cedes to the United States the island of Porto Eico 29 and other islands now nnder Spanish sovereignty in the West 30 Indies, and the island of Guam in the Marianas or Ladrones. 31 Article in. 32 Spain cedes to the United States the archipelago known as 33 the Philippine Islands, and comprehending the islands lying 34 within the following line: 35 A line running from west to east along or near the twentieth 36 parallel of north latitude, and through the middle of the naviga- 37 ble channel of Bachi, from the one hundred and eighteenth (118th) 38 to the one hundred and twenty seventh (127th) degree meridian 39 of longitude east of Greenwich, thence along the one hundred 40 and twenty seventh (127th) degree meridian of longitude east of 41 Greenwich to the parallel of four degrees and forty five minutes 42 (4° 45') north latitude, thence along the parallel of four degrees 43 and forty five minutes (4° 45') north latitude to its intersection 44 with the meridian of longitude one hundred and nineteen degrees 45 and thirty five minutes (119<^ 35') east of Greenwich, thence 46 along the meridian of longitude one hundred and nineteen degrees 47 and thirty five minutes (119° 35') east of Greenwich to the par- 48 allel of latitude seven degrees and forty minutes (7° 40') north, 49 thence along the parallel of latitude of seven degrees and forty 50 minutes (7° 40') north to its intersection with the one hundred 51 and sixteenth (116th) degree meridian of longitude east of Green- 52 wich, thence by a direct line to the intersection of the tenth 53 (10th) degree parallel of north latitude with the one hundred 54 and eighteenth (118th) degree meridian of longitude east of Green- 55 wich, and thence along the one hundred and eighteenth (118th) 56 degree meridian of longitude east of Greenwich to the point of 67 beginning. 68 The United States wiU pay to Spain the sum of twenty million 59 dollars ($20,000,000) within three months after the exchange of 60 the ratifications of the present treaty. TREATY OF PEACE. 7 Gi AETICLE IV. G3 The United States will, for the term of ten years from the date 63 of the exchange of the ratifications of the present treaty, admit 64 Spanish ships and merchandise to the ports of the Philippine 65 Islands on the same terms as ships and merchandise of the QG United States. 67 Article V. 68 The United States will, upon the signature of the present 69 treaty, send back to Spain, at its own cost, the Spanish soldiers 70 taken as prisoners of war on the >3ai)ture oi Manila by the VI American forces. The arms of the soldiers in question shall be 72 restored to them. 73 Spain will, upon the exchange of the ratifications of the pres- 74 ent treaty, x^roceed to evacuate the Philippines, as well as the 75 island of Guam, on terms similar to those agreed upon by the 76 Commissioners appointed to arrange for the evacuation of Porto 77 Rico and other islands in the West Indies, under the Protocol of 78 August 12, 1898, which is to continue in force till its provisions 79 are completely executed. 80 The time within which the evacuation of the Philippine Islands 81 and Guam shall be completed shall be fixed by the two Govern- 82 inents. Stands of colors, uncaptured war vessels, small arms, 83 guns of all calibres, with their carriages and accessories, powder, 84 ammunition, livestock, and materials and supplies of all kinds, 85 belonging to the land and nayal forces of Spain in the Philippines 86 and Guam, remain the property of Spain. Pieces of heavy ord- 87 nance, exclusive of field artillery, in the fortifications and coast 88 defences, shall remain in their emplacements for the term of six 89 mouths, to be reckoned from the exchange of ratifications of the 90 treaty J and the United States may, in the meantime, purchase 91 such material from Spain, if a satisfactory agreement between 92 the two Governments on the subject shall be reached. 8 treaty of peace. 93 Abticle YL 94 Spain will, npon the signature of the present treaty, release all 95 prisoners of war, and all persons detained or imprisoned for politi- 96 cal ofifences, in connection with the insurrections in Cuba and the 97 Philippines and the war with the United States. 98 Reciprocally, the United States wHl release all persons made 99 prisoners of war by the American forces, and will undertake to 100 obtain the release of all Spanish prisoners in the hands of the 101 insurgents in Cuba and the Philippines. 1 02 The Government of the United States will at its own cost return 103 to Spain and the Government of Spain will at its own cost return 104 to the United States, Cuba, Porto-Rico, and the Philippines, 105 according to the situation of their respective homes, prisoners 106 released or caused to be released by them, respectively, under 107 this article. 108 akticle vn. 109 The United States and Spain mutually relinquish all claims for 110 indemnity, national and individual, of every kind, of either Gov- 111 ernmeut, or of its citizens or subjects, against the other Govern- 112 ment, that may have arisen since the beginning of the late insur- 113 rection in Cuba and prior to the exchange of ratifications of the 1 14 present treaty, including all claims for indemnity for the cost of 115 the war. 116 The United States will adjudicate and settle the claims of its 117 citii:ens against Spain relinquished in this article. 118 Abticle Vin. 119 In conformity with the provisions of Articles T, II, and III of 120 this treaty, Spain relinquishes in Cuba, and cedes in Porto Rico 121 and other islands in the West Indies, in the island of Guam, and 122 in the Philippine Archipelago, all the buildings, wharves, bar- 123 racks, forts, structures, pubhc highways and other immovable 124 property which, in conformity with law, belong to the public 125 domain, and as such belong to the Crown of Spain. TREATY OF PEACE. 9 126 And it is hereby declared that the relinquishment or cession, 127 as the case may be, to which the i)recediDg paragraph refers, 128 cannot in any respect impair the property or rights which by 129 law belong to the peaceful possession of property of all kinds, 130 of provinces, municipalities, public or private establishments, 131 ecclesiastical or civic bodies, or any other associations having 132 legal capacity to acquire and possess property in the aforesaid 133 territories renounced or ceded, or of private individuals, of what- 134 soever nationality such individuals may be. 135 The aforesaid relinquishment or cession, as the case may be, 136 includes all documents exclusively referring to the sovereignty 137 relinquished or ceded that may exist in the archives of the Penin- 138 sula. Where any document in such archives only in part relates 139 to said sovereignty, a copy of such part will be furnished when- 140 ever it shall be requested. Like rules shall be reciprocally 141 observed in favor of Spain in respect of documents in the 142 archives of the islands above referred to. 143 In the aforesaid relinquishment or cession, as the case may be, 144 are also included such rights as the Crown of Spain and its 145 authorities possess in respect of the official archives and records, 146 executive as well as judicial, in the islands above referred to, 147 which relate to said islands or the rights and property of their 148 inhabitants. Such archives and records shall be carefully pre- 149 served, and private persons shall without distinction have the 150 right to require, in accordance with law, authenticated copies of 151 the contracts, wills and other instruments forming part of nota- 152 rial protocols or files, or which may be contained in the executive 153 or judicial archives, be the latter in Spain or in the islands afore- 154 said. 155 Aeticle IX. 156 Spanish subjects, natives of the Peninsula, residing in the ter- 157 ritory over which Spain by the present treaty relinquishes or cedes 158 her sovereignty, may remain in such territory or may remove 159 therefrom, retaining in either event aU their rights of property, 10 TREATY OF PEACE. IGO including the right to seU or dispose of such property or of its 161 proceeds; and they shall also have the right to carry on their 162 industry, commerce and professions, being subject in respect 183 thereof to such laws as are applicable to other foreigners. In case 16-4 they remain in the territory they may preserve their allegiance 165 to the Crown of Spain by making, before a court of record, within 166 a year from the date of the exchange of ratifications of this treaty, 167 a declaration of their decision to preserve such allegiance; in 168 default of which declaration they shall be held to have renounced 169 it and to have adopted the nationality of the territory in which 170 they may reside. 171 The civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of 172 the territories hereby ceded to the United States shall be deter- ] 73 mined by the Congress. 174 Article X. 175 The inhabitants of the territories over which Spain relinquishes 176 or cedes her sovereignty shall be secured in the free exercise of 177 their religion. 178 Article XI. 179 The Spaniards residing in the territories over which Spain by 180 this treaty cedes or relinquishes her sovereignty shall be subject 181 in matters civil as well as criminal to the jurisdiction of the courts 182 of the country wherein they reside, pursuant to the ordinary laws 183 governing the same; and they shall have the right to appear 184 before such courts, and to pursue the same course as citizens of 185 the country to which the courts belong. 186 Article xn. 187 Judicial proceedings pending at the time of the exchange of 188 ratifications of this treaty in the territories over which Spain 189 relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty shall be determined accord- 190 ing to the following rules : 191 1. Judgments rendered either in civil suits between private 192 individuals, or in criminal matters, before the date mentioned. TEEATY OF PEACE. 11 193 and with respect to which there is no recourse or right of 194 review under the Spanish law, shall be deemed to be final, 195 and shall be executed in due form by competent authority in 196 the territory within which such judgments should be carried 197 out. 198 2. Civil suits between private individuals which may on the 199 date mentioned be undetermined shall be prosecuted to judgment 200 before the court in which they may then be pending or in the 201 court that may be substituted therefor. 202 3. Criminal actions pending on the date mentioned before the 203 Supreme Court of Spain against citizens of the territory which 204 by this treaty ceases to be Spanish shall continue under its juris- 205 diction until final judgment; but, such judgment having been 200 rendered, the execution thereof shall be committed to the 207 competent authority of the place in which the case arose. 208 Article XIII. 209 The rights of property secured by copyrights and patents 210 acquired by Spaniards in the Island of Cuba and in Porto Rico, 211 the Philippines and other ceded territories, at the time of the 212 exchange of the ratifications of this treaty, shall continue to 213 be respected. Spanish scientific, literary and artistic works, not 214 subversive of public order in the territories in question, shall 215 continue to be admitted free of duty into such territories, for 216 the period of ten years, to be reckoned from the date of the 217 exchange of the ratifications of this treaty. 218 Article XIV. 219 Spain will have the power to establish consular officers in the 220 ports and places of the territories, the sovereignty over wbich 221 has been either relinquished or ceded by the present treaty. 222 Article XV. 223 The Government of each country will, for the term of ten 224 years, accord to the merchant vessels of the other country the 225 same treatment in respect of all port charges, including entrance 12 TREATY OF PEACE. 226 and clearance dues, light dues, and tonnage duties, as it accords 227 to its own merchant vessels, not engaged in the coastwise trade. 228 This article may at any time be terminated on six months' 229 notice given by either Government to the other. 230 Article XVI. 231 It is understood that any obligations assumed in this treaty 232 by the United States with respect to Cuba are limited to the 233 time of its occupancy thereof; but it will upon the termination 234 of such occupancy, advise any Government established in the 235 island to assume the same obligations. 236 Article XVII. 237 The present treaty shall be ratified by the President of the 238 Uuited States, by and with the advice and consent of the Sen- 239 ate thereof, and by Her Majesty the Queen Eegent of Spain; 240 and the ratifications shall be exchanged at Washington within 241 six months from the date hereof, or earlier if possible. 242 In faith whereof, we, the respective Plenipotentiaries, have 243 signed this treaty and have hereunto afiixed our seals. 244 Done in duplicate at Paris, the tenth day of December, in 245 the year of Oar Lord one thousand eight hundred and uinety- 246 eight. [seal] William E. Day [seal] Oushman K. Davis [seal] William P. Frye [seal] Geo. Gray [seal] Whitblaw Reid. [seal] Eugenio Montero Rfos [seal] B. de Abarzuza [seal] J. DE GARNICA [seal] W R de Villa Urrutia [seal] Rafael Cerero 55th Congress, ) SENATE. (Doc.No.G2, 3d Session. ] I Part 2. A TREATY OF PEACE BETWEEN THE DNITED STATES AND SPAIN. MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, TRANSMITTING A TREATY OF PEACE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND SPAIN, SIGNED AT THE CITY OF PARIS, ON DECEMBER 10, 1898. ACCOMPANYING PAPEES. January 4, 1899. — Read ; treaty read the first time and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations, and, together with the Message and accompanying papers, ordered to be printed in confidence for the nse of the Senate. January 11, 1899. — Injunction of secrecy removed. January 13, 1899. — Ordered printed. WASHmGTON": GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE. 1899. LIST OF PAPEES. 1. Treaty of Peace of December 10, 1898. 2. Protocols of the conferences at Paris (1 to 22). 3. Peace protocol of August 12, 1898, and correspondence. 4. Correspondence between the Department of State and the Embassy af France, at Washington, as representing the interests of Spain. 5. Consular reports on Philippine affairs. 6. Statement of Maj . Gen. Wesley Merritt, U. S. A., October 4, 1898, before the United States Peace Commission at Paris, and accompanying papers. 7. Memoranda concerning the situation in the Philippines, by Maj. Gen. F. V. Greene, U. S. v., and accompanying papers. 8. Statement of Mr. John Foreman, October 8, 1898, before the United States Peace Commission at Paris. 9. Statement of Commander R. B. Bradford, U. S. N., October 14, 1898, before the United States Peace Commission at Paris. 10. Statement of Gen. Charles A. Whittier, U. S. V., before the United States Peace Commission at Paris. 11. Preliminary report of Dr. George F. Becker, of the United States Geological Survey, on the geological and mineral resources of the Philippines. 12. Data concerning the Philippine Islands : Their history, people, geography, geol- ogy, resources, and strategic importance. 13. A sketch of the economic condition of the Philippines, by Max L. Tornow. 14. Protectorates, Colonies, and nonsovereign States. 15. The Federated Malay States : A sketch of their growth and political arganiza- tion, by Francis B. Forbes. 1 TREATY OF PEACE OF DECEMBER 10, 1898. The United States of Amer- ica AND Her Majesty the Queen Regent of Spain, in the Name of Her August Son Don Alfonso XIII, desiring to eud the state of war now existing between the two countries, have for that purpose appointed as P]enij)otentiaries : The President of the United States, William E. Day, Cushman K. Davis, William P. Frye, George Gray, and Whitelaw Eeid, citizens of the United States ; And Her Majesty the Queen Eegent of Spain, Don Eugenio Montero Eios, President of the Senate, Don Buenaventura de Abarzuza, Senator of the Kingdom and ex- Minister of the Crown, Don Jos]^ DE Garnioa, Deputy to the Cortes and Associate Justice of the Su- preme Court; Don Wenceslao Eamirez de Villa-Urrutia, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary at Brussels, and Don Eafael Cerero, General of Division; Who, having assembled in Paris, and having exchanged their full powers, which were found to be in due and proper form, have, after discussion of the matters before them, agreed upon the following articles : Article I. Spain relinquishes all claim of sovereignty over and title to Cuba. And as the island is, upon its evacuation by Spain, to be occu- LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS DB AME- RICA Y S. M. LA Eeina Eegente DE ESPANA, en NoMBRE DE SU AuGusTo Hijo Don Alfonso XIII, deseando poner termino al estado de guerra hoy existente entre ambas Xaciones, han nom- brado con este objeto por sus Plen- ipotenciaros, a saber: El Presidente de los Esta- Dos Unidos de America i. William E. Day, Cushman K. Davis, William P. Frye, George Gray, y Whitelaw Eeid, ciudadanos de los Estados Unidos; Y su Majestad la Eeina Ee- gente DE ESPANA, i. Don Eugenio Montero Eios, Presidente del Senado. Don Buenaventura de Abarzuza Senador del Eeino, Ministro que ha sido de la Corona, Don Jose DE Garnica, Diputado 4 Cortes, Magistrado del Tribunal supremo, Don Wenceslao EamiSez de Villa-Urrutia, Enviado Extra- ordinario y Ministro plenipoten- ciairo en Bruselas; y Don Eafael Cerero, General de division, Los cuales reunidos en Paris, despues de haberse comunicado sus plenos poderes que fueron ha- llados en buena y debida forma, y previa la discussion de las materias pendientes, han convenido en los siguientes articulos : Aeticulo I. Espana renuncia todo derecbo de soberania y propiedad sobre Cuba. En atencion 4 que dicha isla, cuando sua evacuada por Espana, 3 TREATY OF PEACE. pied by the United States, the United States will, so long as such occupation shall last, assume and discharge the obligations that may under international lawresultfrom the fact of its occui)ation, for the protection of life and uroperty. Article II. Spain cedes to the United States the island of Porto Kico and other islands now under Spanish sov- ereignty in the West Indies, and the island of Guam in the Marianas or Ladrones. Article III. Spain cedes to the United States the archipelago known as the Phil- ippine Islands, and comprehending the islands lying within the follow- ing line: A line running from west to east along or near the twentieth paral- lel of north latitude, and through the middle of the navigable chan- nel of Bachi, from the one hundred and eighteenth (118th) to the one hundred and twenty seventh (127th) degree meridian of longi- tude east of Greenwich, thence along the one hundred and twenty seventh (127th) degree meridian of longitude east of Greenwich to the parallel of four degrees and forty five minutes (4° 45') north latitude, thence along the parallel of four degrees and forty five minutes (4° 45') north latitude to its intersection with the meridian of longitude one hundred and nine- teen degrees and thirty five min- utes (119° 35') east of Greenwich, thence along the meridian of longi- tude one hundred and nineteen degrees and thirty five minutes (110° 35') east of Greenwich to the parallel of latitude seven degrees and forty minutes (7° 40') north, thence along the parallel of lati- tude seven degrees and forty min- utes (7° 40') north to its intersection with the one hundred and six- va 4 ser ocupada por los Estados Unidos, los Estados Unidos mien- tras dure su ocupacion, tomardn sobre si y cumpliran las obliga- ciones que por el hecho de ocuparia, les impone el Derecho Internacion- al, para la proteccion de vidas y haciendas. Articulo II. Espaiia cede d los Estados Uni- dos la Isla de Puerto Rico y las dem4s que estan ahora bajo su so- berania en las Indias Occidentales, y la Isla de Guam en el Arcliipie- iago de las Marianas 6 Ladrones. Articulo III. Espana cede 4 los Estados Uni- dos el archipielago conocido por Islas Filipinas, que comprende las islas situadas dentro de las lineas siguientes: ^ Una linea que corre de Oeste a Bste, cerca del 20° paralelo de la- titud Norte, a traves de la mi tad del canal navegable de Baclii, desde el 118° al 127° grados de longitud Este de Greenwich; de aqui a lo largo del ciento veintisiete (127) grado meridiano de longitud Este de Greenwich al paralelo cua- tro grados cuarenta y cinco minu- tos (4° 45') de latitud Norte; de aqui siguiendo el paralelo de cua- tro grados cuarenta y cinco minutos de latitud Norte (4° 45') hasta su interseccion con el meridiano de longitud ciento diez y nueve grados y treiuta y cinco minutos (119° 35') Este de Greenwich; de aqui si- guiendo el meridiano de longitud ciento diez y nueve grados y treiuta y cinco minutos (119° 35') Este de Greenwich, al paralelo de latitud siete grados cuarenta minutos (7^ 40') Norte; de aqui siguiendo el paralelo de latitud siete grados cuarenta minutos (7° 40') Norte, a su interseccion con el ciento diez y seis (116°) grado me- ridiano de longitud Este de Green- wich, de aqui por una linea recta, 4 la interseccion del decimo grade TREATY OF PEACE. teentli (116th) degree meridian of loiigitudeeastof Greenwich, thence by a direct line to the intersection of the tenth (10th) degree parallel of north latitude with the one hun- dred and eighteenth (118th) degree m eridian of longitude east of Green- wich, and thence along the one hundred and eighteenth (118th) degree meridian of longitude east of Greenwich to the point of beginning. The United States will pay to Spain the sum of twenty million dollars ($20,000,000), within three months after the exchange of the ratilications of the present treaty. Article IV. The United States will, for the term of ten years from the date of the exchange of the ratifications of the present treaty, admit Span- ish ships and merchandise to the ports of the Philippine Islands on the same terms as ships and mer- chandise of the United States. Article V. The United States will, upon the signature of the present treaty, send back to Spain, at its own cost the Spanish soldiers taken as pris- oners of war on the capture of Manila by the American forces. The arms of the soldiers in question shall be restored to them. Spain will, upon the exchange of the ratifications of the present treaty, proceed to evacuate the Philippines, as well as the island of Guam, on terms similar to those agreed upon by the Commissioners appointed to arrange for the evacu- ation of Porto Kico and other is- lands in the West Indies, under the Protocol of August 12, 1898, which is to continue in force till its provisions are completely executed. The time within which the evacu- ation of the Philippine Islands and Guam shall be completed shall be fi-x.ed by the two Governments. paralelo de latitud Norte, con el ciento diez y ocho (118°) grado me- ridiano de longitud Este de Green- wich, y de aqui siguiendo el ciento diez y ocho grado (118°) meridiano de longitud Este de Greenwich, al punto en que comienza esta de- marcacion. Los Estados Unidos pagardn 5, Espaua la suma de veiute milliones de dollars ($20,000,000) dentro de los tres meses despues del canje de ratificaciones del presente tratado. Articulo IY. Los Estados Unidos durante el termino de diez aiios a contar desde el canje de la ratiticacion del pre- sente tratado, admitiran en los puer- tos de las Islas Filipinas los buques y las mercancias esi)aFioles, bajo las mismascondicionesque los buques y las mercancias de los Estados Unidos. Articulo V, Los Estados Unidos, al ser fir- mado el presente tratado, traspor- taran a Espana, a su costa, los soldados espaiioies que hicieron prisioneros de guerra las fuerzas Americanas al ser capturada Ma- nila. Las armas de estos soldados les seran devueltas. Espana, al canjearselas ratifica- ciones del presente tratado, proce- dera a evacuar las Islas Filipinas, asi conio la de Guam, en condi- ciones semejantes 4 los acordadas por las Comisiones nombradas x)ara concertar la evacuacion de Puerto Eico y otras Islas en las Antillas Occidentales, segun el Protocolo de 12 de Agosto de 1898, que con- tinuara en vigor hasta que scan completamente cumpUdas sus disposiciones. El termino dentro del cual ser4 completada la evacuacion de las Islas Filipinas y la de Guam, ser4 fljado por ambos Gobiernos. Seran 6 TREATY OF PEACE. Stands of colors, nncaptured war vessels, small arms, guns of all calibres, with tlieir carriages and accessories, powder, ammunition, livestock, and materials and sup- plies of all kinds, belonging to the land and naval forces of Spain in the Philippines and Guam, remain the property of Spain. Pieces of heavy ordnance, exclusive of field, artillery, in the fortifications and. coast defences, shall remain in their emplacements for the term of six months, to be reckoned from the exchange of ratifications of the treaty; and the United States may, in the mean time, purchase such material from Spain, if a sat- isfactory agreement between the two Governments on the subject shall be reached. Article VI. Spain will, upon the signature of the present treaty, release all prisoners of war, and all persons detained or imprisoned for politi- cal offences, in connection with the insurrections in Cuba and the Philippines and the war with the United States. Eeciprocally, the United States will release all persons made pris- oners of war by the American forces, and will undertake to ob- tain the release of all Spanish prisoners in the hands of the in- surgents in Cuba and the Philip- pines. The Government of the United States will at its own cost return to Spain and the Government of Spain will at its own cost return to the United States, Cuba, Porto- Kico, and the Philippines, accord- ing to the situation of their re- spective homes, prisoners released or caused to be released by them, respectively, under this article. Article YII. propiedad de Espafia banderas y estandartes, buques de guerra no , apresados, armas portdtiles, caiio- nes de todos calibres con sus moii- tajes y accesorios, polvoras, muni- clones, ganado, material y efectos de toda clase pertenecientes a los ejercitos de mar y tierra de Espaiia en las Filipinas y Guam. Las pie- zas de grueso calibre, que no scan artilleria de campaua, colocadas en las fortificaciones y en las costas, quedar^n en sus emplazamentos por el plazo de seis meses 4 partir del canje de ratiflcaciones del pre- sente tratado, y los Estados Unidos podr4n, durante ese tiempo, com- Ijrar 4 Espafia dicho material, si am- bos Gobiernos llegan 4 un acuerdo satisfactorio sobre el particular. ARTfCULO VI. Espafia al ser firmado el j)resente tratado, pondra en liberl ad a todos los prisioneros de guerra y a todos los detenidos 6 presos por delitos politicos 4 consecuencia de las in- surrecciones en Cuba y en Filipinas y de la guerra con los Estados Unidos. Reciprocamen te, los Estados Uni- dos pondran en libertad a todos los prisioneros de guerra hechos por las fuerzas Americanas, y gestioua- ran la libertad de todos los prisi- oneros espanoles en poder de los insurrectos de Cuba y Filipinas. El Gobierno de los Estados Uni- dos trasportara, por su cuenta 4 Espafia, y el Gobierno de Espafia trasportard por su cuenta 4 los Estados Unidos, Cuba, Puerto Rico y Filipinas, con arreglo 4 la situa- cion de sus respectivos hogares, los prisioneros que pongaii 6 que hagan poner en libertad respectivamente, en virtud de este Articulo. Articulo VII. The United States and Spain Espafia y los Estados Unidos de mutually relinquish all claims for America renuncian mutuamente, indemnity, national and Individ- por el presente tratado, 4 toda rec- TREATY OF PEACE. ual, of every kind, of either Gov- enimeut, or of its citizens or sub- jects, against the other Govern- ment, that may have arisen since the beginning of the late insurrec- tion in Cuba and prior to the ex- change of ratifications of the pres- ent treaty, including all claims for indemnity for the cost of the war. The United States will adjudi- cate and settle the claims of its citizens against Spain relinquished in this article. Article VIII. In conformity with the provisions of Articles I, II, and III of this treaty, Spain relinquishes in Cuba, and cedes in Porto Eico and other islands in the West Indies, in the island of Guam, and in the Philip- pine Archipelago, all the buildings, wharves, barracks, forts, struc- tures, public highways and other immovable property which, in con- formity with law, belong to the public domain, and as such belong to the Crown of Spain. And it is hereby declared that the relinquishment or cession, as the case may be, to which the pre- ceding paragraph refers, cannot in any respect impair the property or rights which by law belong to the peaceful possession of property of all kinds, of provinces, municipal- ities, public or private establish- ments, ecclesiastical or civic bod- ies, or any other associations hav- ing legal capacity to acquire and possess property in the aforesaid territories renounced or ceded, or of private individuals, of whatso- ever nationality such individuals may be. The aforesaid relinquishment or cession, as the case may be, includes all documents exclusively referring to the sovereignty relinquished or ceded that may exist in the ar- chives of the Peninsula. Where any document in such archives only lamaci6n de indemnizacion na- clonal 6 privada de cualquier genero de un Gobierno contra el otro, 6 de sus siibditos 6 ciudada- nos contra el otro Gobierno, que pueda haber surgido desde el co- mienzo de la ultima insurreccion en Cuba y sea anterior al canje de ratificaciones del presente tratado, asi como 4 toda indemnizacion en concepto de gastos ocasiouados por la guerra. Los Estados Unidos juzgaran y resolveran las reclamaciones de sus ciudadanos contra EspaCa, ^ que renuncia en este articulo. Articulo VIII. En cumplimiento de lo convenido en los Articulos I, II y III de este tratado, Espaila renuncia en Cuba y cede en Puerto Rico y en las otras islas de las Indias Occiden tales, en la Isla de Guam y en el Archipiel- ago de las Filipiuas, todos los edi- ficios, muelles, cuarteles, fortalezas, establecimientos, vias publicas y dem^is bienes inmuebles que con arreglo 4 derecho son del dominio piiblico, y como tal corresponden a la Corona de Espaiia. Queda por lo tanto declarado que esta renuncia 6 cesion, segiin el caso, 4 que se reiiere el p^rrafo an- terior, en nada puede mermar la propiedad, 6 los derechos que cor- respondan, con arreglo A las leyes, al poseedor pacifico, de los bienes de todas clases de las provincias, municipios, establecimientos publi- cos 6 privados, corporaciones civiles 6 eclesiasticas, 6 de cualesquiera otras colectividades que tienen per- sonalidad juridica para adquirir y poseer bienes en los men cion ados territories renunciado 6 cedidos, y los de los individuos particulares, cualquiera que sea su nacionalidad. Dicha renuncia 6 cesion, segun el caso, incluye todos los documentos que se refleran exclusivamente 4 dicha soberania renunciada 6 ce- dida, que existan en los Archives de la Peninsula. Cuando estos documentos exist- 8 TREATY OF PEACE. in part relates to sam sovereignty, a copy of such part will be furnished whenever it shall be requested. Like rules shall be reciprocally observed in favor of Spain in re- spect of documents in the archives of the islands above referred to. In the aforesaid relinquishment or cession, as the case may be, are also included such rights as the Crown of Spain and its authorities possess in respect of the official archives and records, executive as well as Judicial, in the islands above referred to, which relate to said islands or the rights and property of their inhabitants. Such archives and records shall be carefully pre- served, and private persons shall without distinction have the right to require, in accordance with law, authenticated copies of the con- tracts, wills and other instruments forming part of notarial protocols or tiles, or which may be contained in the executive or judicial ar- chives, be the latter in Spain or in the islands aforesaid. Article IX. Spanish subjects, natives of the Peninsula, residing in the territory over which Spain by the present treaty relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty, may remain in such territory or may remove therefrom, retaining in either event all their rights of property, including the right to sell or dispose of such prop- erty or of its proceeds; and they shall also have the right to carry on their industry, commerce and pro- fessions, being subject in respect thereof to such laws as are appli- cable to other foreigners. In case they remain in the territory they may preserve their allegiance to the Grown of Spain by making, before a court of record, within a year from the (late of the exchange of ratifl- catious of this treaty, a declaration entes en dichos Archivos, solo en parte correspondan 4 dicha sober- ania, se facilitardn copias de dicha parte, siempreque scan solicitadas. Eeglas andlogas habran reciproca- mente de observarse en favor de EspaSa, respecto de los documen- tos existentes en los Archivos de las Islas antes mencionades. En las antecitadas renuncia 6 cesion, segiin el caso, se hallan comprendidos aquellos derechos de la Corona de Espana y de sus Au- toridades sobre los Archivos y Eegistros oficiales, asi administra- tivos como judiciales de dichas islas, que se refieran 4 ellas y 4 los derechos y propiedades de sus hab- itantes. Dichos Archivos y Ke- gistros deberan ser cuidadosa- mente conservados y los particu- laressinexcepci6n,tendranderecho a sacar, con arreglo a las Leyes, las copias autorizadas de los con- tratos, testamentos y demds docu- men tos que form en parte de los l^rotocolos notariales 6 que se cus- todien en los Archivos administra- tivos 6 judiciales, bien estos se hallen en Espana, 6 bien en las Islas de que se hace mencion anteriormente. Articulo IX. Lossiibditosesparioles,naturales de la Peninsula, residentes en el ter- ritorio cuya soberania Espana re- nuncia 6 cede por el i)resente tra- tado, podran permanecer en dicho territorio 6 marcharse de el, conser- vando en uno ii otro caso todos sua derechos de propiedad, con inclu- sion del derecho de vender 6 dis- poner de tal propiedad 6 de sus productos; y ademas tendran el derecho de ejercer su industria, comercio 6 prafesion, sujetandose a este respecto a las leyes que scan aplicables d los demas extrangeros. En el caso de que permanezcan en el territorio, podran couservar su nacion alidad espaiiola haciendo ante una oflcina de registro, den- tro de un aiio despues del cambio de ratificaciones de este tratado, TREATY OF PEACE. of their decision to preserve such allegiance ; in default of which dec- laration they shall be held to have renounced it and to have adopted the nationality of the territory in which they may reside. The civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the territories hereby ceded to the trnited States shall be determined by the Congress. Article X. The inhabitants of the territories over which Spain reliuquishes or cedes her sovereignty shall be se- cured in the free exercise of their religion. Article XI. The Spaniards residing in the territories over which Spain by this treaty cedes or reliuquishes her sovereignty shall be subject in matters civil as well as criminal to the jurisdiction of the courts of the country wherein they reside, pursuant to the ordinary laws gov- erning the same; and they shall have the right to appear before such courts, and to pursue the same course as citizens of the country to which the courts belong. Article XII. Judicial proceedings pending at the time of the exchange of ratifi- cations of this treaty in the terri- tories over which Spain relin- quishes or cedes her sovereignty shall be determined according to the following rules: ]. Judgments rendered either in civil suits between private individ- uals, or in criminal matters, before the date mentioned, and with re- spect to which there is no recourse or right of review under the Span- ish law, shall be deemed to be final, and shall be executed in due form by competent authority in the ter- ritory within which such judgments should be carried out. una declaracion de su proposito de conservar dicha nacionalidad; d falta de esta declaracion, se con- sider arii que han renunciado dicha nacionalidad y adoptado la del ter- ritorio en el cual pueden residir. Los derechos civiles y la condi- cion politica de los habitantes naturales de los territorios aqui cedidos a lo Estados Unidos se determinaran por el Congreso. Arti'culo X. Los habitantes de los territorios cuya Soberania Espaiia renuncia 6 cede, tendr4n asegurado el libra ejercicio de su religion. Articulo XI. Los espanoles residentes en los territorios cuya soberania cede 6 renuncia Espana por este tratado, estardn sometidos en lo civil y en lo criminal a les tribuuales del pais en que residan con arreglo 4 las leyes communes que regulen su competencia, pudiendo comparecer ante aquellos, en la misma forma y ampleando los mismos pro cedimi- entos que deban observar los ciu- dadanos del pais a que pertenezca el tribunal. Articulo XII. Los procedimientos judiciales pendientes al canjearse las ratifi- caciones de este tratado, en los territorios sobre los cuales Espana renuncia 6 cede su soberania, se determinaran con arreglo a las reglassiguientes : 1. Las sentencias dictadas en causas civiles entre particulares 6 en materia criminal, antes de la fecha mencionada, y contra las cua- les no hay a apelacion 6 casacion con arreglo a las leyes espaiiolas, seconsiderarancomofirmes,yseran ejecutadas en debida forma por la Autoridad corapetente en el terri- torio dentro del cual dichas senten- cias deban cumplirse. 10 TREATY OF PEACE. 2. Civil suits between private in- dividuals which may on the date mentioned be undetermined shall be prosecuted to Judgment before the court in which they may then be pending- or in the court that may be substituted therefor. 3. Criminal actions pending on the date mentioned before the Su- preme Court of Spain against citi- zens of the territory which by this treaty ceases to be Spanish shall continue under its jurisdiction un- til final judgment; but, such judg- ment having been rendered, the execution thereof shall be commit- ted to the competent authority of the place in which the case arose. Article XIII. The rights of property secured by copyrights and patents acquired by Si)aniards in the Island of Cuba, and in Torto Eico, the Philippines and other ceded territories, at the time of the exchange of the ratifi- cations of this treaty, shall con- tinue to be respected. Spanish sci- entific, literary and artistic works, not subversive of public order in the territories in question, shall continue to be admitted free of duty into such territories, for the period of ten years, to be reckoned from the date of the exchange of the ratifications of this treaty. Article XIV. Spain shall have the power to establish consular officers in the ports and places of the territories, the sovereignty over which has been either relinquished or ceded by the present treaty Article XV. The Government of each country will, lor the term of ten years, ac- cord to the merchant vessels of the other country the same treatment in respect of all port charges, in- cluding entrance and clearance 2. Los pleitos civiles entre par- ticulares que en la fecha mencio- nada no hayan sido juzgados, con- tin uar^n su tramitacion ante el tribunal en que se halle el proceso, 6 ante aquel que lo sustituya. 3. Las acciones en materia crimi- nal pendientes en la fecha mencio- nada ante el Tribunal Supremo de Espaiia contra ciudadanos del terri- torio que segun este tratado deja de ser espaiiol, continuardn bajo su ju- risdiccion hasta que recaiga la sen- tencia definitiva; pero una vez dic- tada esa sentencia, su ejecucion ser^ encomendada a la Autoridad competente del lugar en que la accion se suscito. ARTfCULO XIII. Oontinuar^n respettlndose los de- rechos de propriedad literaria, ar- tistica e industrial, adquiridos por espauoles en las Islas de Cuba y en las de Puerto Kico, Filipinas y de- mas territorios cedidos, al hacerse el canje de las ratificaciones de este tratado. Las obras espanolas cien- tificas, literarias y artisticas, que no sean peligrosas, para el orden pub- lico en dichos territorios, continu- aran entrando en los mismos, con franquicia de todo derecho de adua- na por un plazo de diez aiios a con- tar desde el canje de ratificaciones de este tratado. ARTfCULO XIV Espafia podr4 establecer Agen- tes Consulares en los puertos y plazas de los territorios cuya re- nuncia y cesion es objeto de este tratado. Articulo XV. El Gobierno de cada pais conce- der4, por el termino de diez aiios, 4 los buques mercantes del otro el mismo trato en cuanto 4 todos los derechos de puerto, iucluyendo los de entrada y salida, de faro y TREATY OP PEACE. 11 dues, light dues, and tonuage duties, as it accords to its own merchant vessels, not engaged in the coastwise trade. This article may at any time be terminated on six months' notice given by either Government to the other. Article XVI. It is understood that any obli- gations assumed in this treaty by the United States with respect to Cuba are limited to the time of its occupancy thereof; but it will upon the termination of such occu- pancy, advise any Government established in the island to assume the same obligations. Article XVII The present treaty shall be rati- fied by the President of the United States, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate thereof, and by Her Majesty the Queen Regent of Spain; and the ratifications shall be exchanged at Washington within six months from the date hereof, or earlier if possible. In faith whereof, we, the respec- tive Plenipotentiaries, have signed this treaty and have hereunto afQxed our seals. Done in duplicate at Paris, the tenth day of December, in the year of Our Lord one thousand eight hundred and ninety-eight. [SEAL [seal' [seal' [seal [SEAL William R. Day CusHMAN K. Davis William P Frye Geo. Gray WniTELAW Reid. tonelaje, que concede 4 sus propios buques mercantes no empleados en el comercia de cabotaje. Este articnlo puede ser denun- ciado en cualquier tiempo dando noticia previa de ello cualquiera de los dos Gobiernos al otro con seis meses de anticipacion. Articulo XVI Queda entendido que cualquiera obligacion aceptada en este tratado por los Estados Unidos con respecto a Cuba, est4 limitada al tiempo que dure su ocupacion en esta isla, pero al terminar dicha ocupacion, aconsejarfin al Gobierno que se es- tablezca en la isla que acepte las mismas obligaciones. Articulo XVII El pasente tratado sera ratificado por el Presidente de los Estados Unidos, de acuerdo y con la apro- bacion del Senado, Su Majestad la Reina Regeute de EspaSa; y por y las ratiflcaciones se canjearAn en Washington dentro del plazo de seis meses desde esta fecha, 6 antes si posible fuese. En fe de lo cual, los respectivos Plenipotenciarios firman y sellan este tratado. Hecho por duplicado en Paris 6, diez de Diciembre del aiio rail ocho- cieutos noventa y ocho. Eugenic Montero Rios [seal] B. DE Abarzuza [seal] J. DE GARNICA [seal] W R'de Villa Urrutia [seal] Rafael Oerero [seal] PROTOCOLS OF THE CONFERENCES AT PARIS. Protocol ISTo 1 Conference of October 1, 1898. Present: On the part of the United States, Messrs: Day, Davis, Frye, Gray, Reid. On the part of Spain Messrs: Montero-Rios, Abarzuza, Garnica, Villa-Urrutia Cerero. There was present, as Secretary of the United States Commission, Mr. Moore, and as Interpreter of the same Commission, Mr. Fergus- son. Mr. Ojeda, Secretary of the Spanish Commission, not having arrived in Paris, his duties were, on motion of Mr. Montero Rios, the American Commissioners as- senting, discharged by Mr. Villa- Urrutia. The commissions and full power of the American Commissioners were exhibited to the Spanish Com- missioners and copies given to them. The commission of the American Secretary was also exhibited, and a copy furnished to the Spanish Commissioners. The commissions, which were also full powers, of the Spanish Commissioners were exhibited, and copies given to the American Com- missioners. It was resolved that the proto- cols of the Conferences should be kept in English and in Spanish by 12 Protocolo No. 1. Conferencia del 1° de Octuhre 1898. Presentes por parte de los Esta- dos Unidos de America, los Se- nores Day, Davis, Frye, Gray, Reid. Por parte de Espaiia los Senores Montero Rios, Abarzuza, Garnica, Villa-Urrutia, Cerero. Asistian en calidad de Secretario de la Comision de los Estados Uni- dos, encargado de la redaccion in- glesa del protocolo, Mr Moore, y como Interprete de dicha Comis- ion Mr Fergusson. No habiendo aim llegado a Paris el Secretario de la Comision Espa- nola, Seuor Ojeda, se presto a hacer sus veces, por mediacion del Sr. Montero Rios y con el asentimi- ento de los Comisarios Americanos, el Sehor Villa-Urrutia. Los nombramientos y plenipo- tencias de los Comisarios Ameri- canos fueron presentados 4 los Comisarios espanoles 4 quienes se entregaroncopias de los misuios. Tambien fue presentado el nom- bramiento del Secretario de la Comision Americana y hecha eu- trega de una copia de ^1. Asimismo fueron presentados por los Comisarios Espaiioles sus pleni- potencias de que se dieron copias a la Comision Americana. Se convino en que las Actas de la conferencia se redactasen en espa- nol 6 ingles por los respectivos TREATY OF PEACE. 13 the respective Secretaries, and that in the event of a disagreement between them it should be settled by the Commissioners, to whom the protocols should always be submitted for approval. It was also resolved that the protocols should contain the prop- ositions presented by the Com- missioners and the action thereon, suppressing any record of the de- bates, in order that the discussions should be as full, frank, and friendly as was desired by all the Commissioners. The Spanish Commissioners moved that the Commissioners on either side should have the right to file memoranda on points deemed by them to be of sufficient importance to warrant such action. On this motion no decision was reached. Upon the suggestion of Mr Montero Rios that an order of business be established by the Commission, Mr. Gray moved that a committee be appointed, to consist of a Commissioner on each side, to agree upon, frame and submit to the conference rules of procedure for the guidance thereof. The motion being agreed to, Mr. Gray and Mr. Villa-Urrutia were designated as the Committee, and requested to report to the Confer- ence at the next session, which it was resolved should be held on October 3, at 2 o'clock, p. m. The President of the Spanish Commission stated that he was charged by his Government to lay before the American Commission- ers a proposition, in limine and of a pressing nature, which he pre- sented in writing and of which a copy and translation are hereto annexed. Mr Day requested that it be read, which was done, the In- terpreter translating it into Eng- lish. Upon the conclusion of the reading, Mr Day said that the Secretarios, y que cuando no hubiese entre ellos acuerdo, re- sol viese la couferencia, 4 cuya aprobacion habian de ser siempre sometidas. Se acordo tambi^m que endichas actas constasen las proposiciones que presentaran los Comisarios y los acuerdos que recayeran sobre las mismas, suprimiendo en cambio cuanto se refiriese 4 su discusion para permitir que esta fuera tan amplia, tau franca y tan amistosa comos unos y otros Comisarios deseaban. Los Comisarios Espaiioles pro- pusieron que los Comisarios de una u otra de las partes tuvieran el derecho de presentar Memoranda sobre aquellos puntos que por su importanciaentendieran que asi lo requerian. No se decidio nada sobre este punto. Indicada por el Senor Montero Rios la conveniencia de fijar el ordeu de los trabajos de la Comi- sion, propuso Mr Gray el nom- bramiento de dos delegados en represeutaciou de cada una de las partes para que, puestos de acuerdo, redacten y sometan 4 la Couferencia las reglas de procedi- miento a que ^sta deba ajustarse. Aprobada la proposicion, fueron designados el Sr Villa-Urrutia y Mr Gray para la redaccion del reglamento que habia de presen- tarse a la aprobacion de la con- ferencia en su proxima sesion, acordandose que esta tuviera lugar el 3 de Octubre 4 las dos de la tarde. El Presidente de la Comision Espaiiola manifesto que tenia en- cargo de su Gobierno de presentar 4 los Comisarios Americanos como cuestion previa y de caracter ur- gente una mocion que presento por escrito y cuya copia es anexa al Protocolo. Mr Day pidio que se diera de ella lectura, y asi lo hizo, traduci^ndola al ingMs el Int6r- prete. Terminada la lectura declar6 Mr Day que los Comisarios Ameri- ;[4 TREATY OF PEACE. American Commissioners would canos estudiarian dicha moci6n examine the proposition and reply y darian su respuesta en la sesion to it at the next session. proxima. ^ William R. Day B Monteeo Rios CusHMAN K. Davis B de Abarzuza Wm. p. Frye J DE Garnica Geo. Gray W R de Villa Urrutia Whitelaw Reid. Rafael Cerero J. B. Moore. Annex to Protocol Xo. 1. Los Comisarios espaiioles para convenir con los SeSores Comisarios Americanos uu Tratado de paz entre Espaiia y los Estados-Unidos de America tienen el honor de hacer presente 4 los Senores Comisarios Americanos lo siguiente: Habiendose convenido en el articnlo 6° del Protocolo firmado en Wash- ino-ton el 12 de Agosto iiltimo por el Seiior Miuistro de Estado del Gobi- erno federal y el Seiior Embajador de Francia en concepto de Plenipo- tenciario de Espaiia en que "al concluirse y firmarse aquel documeuto deberian ser suspendidas las hostilidades entre los dos paises" ; y siendo de este convenio inmediata y necesaria consecuencia que el Statu quo existent^ en aquel momento en Filipinas no habia de poder alterarse en perjuicio de ninguua de las dos Altas partes contratantes mieutras hubiera de durar tal suspension de hostilidades, los Comisarios espaiioles eutienden que habiendo de ser el sobredicho Protocolo y su estricta observancia la base necesaria del Tratado de paz que estan llamados a convenir con los Seiiores Comisarios Americanos, estan en el caso de proponer y demandar a dichos Senores Comisarios que juntamente con los infrascritos se sirvan declarar que dicho Statu quo debe ser inmedia- tamente restablecido por la parte contratante que lo haya alterado 6 que haya consentido 6 no impedido su alteracion en perjuicio de la otra. Y entendiendo los Comisarios espaiioles que tal Statu quo fue alter- ado y continna cada diacon mayor gravedad alteraudoseen perjuicio de Espana por los rebeldes tagalos que formaron durante la campaua y continuan formando una fuerza auxiliar de las tropas regulares Ameri- canas, demandan 4 los Seiiores Comisarios Americanos que juntamente con los infrascritos se sirvan declarar que las autoridades y jefes de las fuerzas Americanas en las Islas Filipinas deben proceder inmediata- mente 4 restablecer en su estricta y absoluta integridad aquel Statu quo en los territorios que ocupen y se abstengan de impedir por ningun medio directo ni indirecto que las autoridades y fuerzas espanolas lo restablezcan en los territorios que no ocupan las de los Estados TJnidos. Los Comisarios espaiioles se reservan volver 4 insistir sobre este asunto asi como sobre los derechos que a Espaiia pudieran corresponder por efecto de la indicada alteracion que ha sufrido y puede continuar sufriendo en Filipinas el Statu quo del 12 de Agosto ultimo hasta su restablecimiento. Est4 conforme Emilio de Ojeda TREATY OF fEACE. 15 [Translation.] Annex to Protocol No. 1. The Spanish Commissioners to arrange with the American Commis- sioners a treaty of peace between Spain and the United States of America, have the honor to lay before the American Commissioners the following: It having been agreed by Article VI of the Protocol signed in Wash- ington on Angust 12 last by the Secretary of State of the Federal Gov- ernment and the Ambassador of France acting as Plenipotentiary of Spain that "upon the conclusion and signing of this Protocol, hostili- ties between the two countries shall be suspended"; and it being a direct and necessary consequence of this arrangement that the statu quo at the time existing in the Philippines could not be altered to the prejudice of the two High Contracting Parties during the continuance of such suspension of hostilities, the Spanish Commissioners, under- standing that the Protocol aforesaid and its observance must be the necessary basis of the treaty of peace they are called upon to arrange with the American Commissioners, feel bound to propose and demand of the said Commissioners that jointly with the undersigned they be pleased to declare that the said statu quo must be immediately restored by the contracting party that may have altered the same, or that may have consented to or failed to prevent its alteration to the prejudice of the other. And the Spanish Commissioners, understanding that such statu quo was altered and continues being altered with daily increasing gravity to the prejudice of Spain by the Tagalo rebels, who formed during the campaign and still form an auxiliary force to the regular American troops, demand of the American Commissioners that jointly with the undersigned they be pleased to declare that the authorities and officers of the American forces in the Philippine Islands must at once proceed fully and absolutely to restore the said statu quo in the territories they may occupy, and must abstain from preventing, by any means, direct or indirect, the restoration thereof by the Spanish authorities and forces in the territory not occupied by those of the United States. The Spanish Commissioners reserve the right to insist again upon this matter as well as upon the rights that may attach to Spain through the effect of the said alteration which the statu quo of August 12 last has suf- fered or may continue to suffer in the Philippines until its restoration. True copy : Emilio de Ojeda. Commissions and Full Powers Referred to in the Fore- going- Protocol. commissions of american plenipotentiaries. William McKinley, President of the United States of America, to all who shall see these Presents, Greeting : Know Ye ! That, reposing special trust and confidence in the Integ- rity and Ability of William R. Day, of Ohio, I do appoint him a Com- missioner Plenipotentiary of the United States, under the Protocol signed at Washington of the twelfth day of Angust, 1898, to negotiate and conclude a Treaty of peace between the United States and Spain, 16 TREATY OF PEACE, and do authorize and empower him to execute and fulfill the duties ot this commission, with all the powers, privileges, and emolanients there- unto of right appertaining, during the pleasure of the President ot the United States. In testimony whereof, I have caused these letters to be made patent, and the seal of the United States to be hereunto affixed. Given under my hand at the city of Washington the ISth day of September in the year of Our Lord one thousand eight hundred and ninety eight, and the 123rd year of tlie Independence of the United States of America. Signed: William McKinley. By the President : Signed: J. B. MoORE, Acting Secretary of State. The commissions of the other American Plenipotentiaries were in the same form, their names being as follows: CusHMAN K. Davis, of Minnesota, William P. Fryb, of Maine, George Gray, of Delaware, and Whitelaw Keid, of New York. FULL POWER OF AMERICAN PLENIPOTENTIARIES. William McKinley, President of the United States of America, to all who shall see these Presents, Greeting: Know Ye! That, reposing special trust and confidence in the Integ- rity and Ability of the Honorable William R. Day, of Ohio, lately Secre- tary of State of the United States, the Honorable Cushman K. Davis, of Minnesota, a Senator of the United States, The Honorable William P. Frye, of Maine, a Senator of the United States, the Honorable George Gray, of Delaware, a Senator of the United States, and the Honorable Whitelaw Keid, of New York, lately Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States to France, I do appoint them jointly and severally to be Commissioners on the part of tlie United States under the Protocol signed at Washington on the twelfth day of August, 1898, to negotiate and conclude a Treaty of peace between the United States and Spain, hereby empowering them jointly and severally to meet the Commission- ers api)ointedor to be appointed under said Protocol on behalf of Spain, and with them to negotiate and sign a Treaty of peace between the United States and Spain, subject to the ratification of their Govern- ment; and the said commission to hold and exercise during the pleasure of the President of the United States for the time being. In testimony whereof, I have caused these letters to be made patent and the seal of the United States to be hereunto affixed. Given under my hand at the city of Washington this 13th day of September in the year of Our Lord one thousand eight hundred and ninety-eight, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and twenty-third. Signed: William McKinley. By the President : Signed: J. B. Moorb. Acting Secretary of State, TREATY OF PEACE. 17 COMMISSIONS AND FULL POWERS OF SPANISH PLENIPOTENTIABFES. Don Alfonso XIII, por la gracia de Dios y la Coastitucion Key de EspaSa y en su nombre y durafiite su meiior edad DoNA Maria Cris- TiNA, Keina Kegente del Keiuo, Por cuauto ba llegado el caso de celebrar entre Espana y los Estados Unidos de America un tratado de paz ; siendo necesario que al electo autoiice Yo debidamente a personas que merezcan Mi Eeai confianza y concurriendo en Vos Don Eugenio Montero Eios, Caballero de la Insigne Orden del Toison de Oro, condecorado con el Collar de la Real y distinguida orden de Carlos III, Presidente del Senado, ex-ministro de la Corona, ex-presidente del Tribunal Supremo de Justicia, Acade- micode ladeCiencias Morales y Politicas, las circunstanciasque a este fin pueden apetercerse; por tanto, He venido en elegiros y nombraros, como por la presente Os elijo y uombro para que, en cumplimiento de lo esti- pulado en el Articulo quinto del Protocolo firmado en Washington el dia doce del mes de Agosto ultimo yrevestidodel car^cterde Mi Pleni- potenciario, conferencieis y convengais lo mas acertado y oportuno, en union de los demas Plenipotenciarios que, con esta misma fecba, nom- bro y con los que designe al propio objeto el Presidente de los Estados Unidos. Y todo lo que asi conferencieis, convengais, trateis, concluyais y firmeis lo doy desde aliora jjor grato y rato, lo observar^ y cumplire, lo bare observar y ciimplir como si por Mi misma lo hubiere confer- enciado, convenido tratado, concluido y firmado, para la cual Os doy Mi pleno poder en la mas amplia forma que de derecho se requiera. Y en fe de ello, He hechoa expedir la presente firmada de Mi mano, debida- mente sellada y refrendada del infrascrito Mi Ministro de Estado. Dado en el Palacio de Madrid a veintidos de Septiembre de mil oclio- cieutos noventa y ocho. Firmado: Maria Cristina= El Ministro de Estado= rirmado=JuAJ!^ Manuel Sanchez Y Gutierrez de Castro = [Translation.] Don Alfonso XIII, by tbe grace of God and the constitution King of Spain, and in bis name and during bis minority, DONA Maria Cristina, Queen Kegent of tbe Kingdom : Wbereas the occasion bas arisen for the concluding between Spain and the United States of America of a Treaty of peace, and it being necessary that to such end I should duly confer authority' upon per- sons who shall merit my royal confidence, and you, Don Eugenio Montero Rios, Knight of the^ Worthy Order of tbe Golden Fleece, decorated with tbe Collar of tbe Royal and distinguished Order of Charles III, President of the Senate, ex-Minister of the Crown, ex- President of the Supreme Tribunal of Jus' ice, Academician of the Moral and Political Sciences, embody tbe characteristics which meet tbe requirements of the case, I have therefore chosen and appointed, and by these piesents do choose and appoint you to the end that, pur- suant to tbe stipulations of Article V of tbe Protocol signed in Wash- ington of the twelfth day of the month of August last, and invested with tbe character of my Pleuij)oteutiary, you may in unison with the T P 2 1^ TEEATY OF PEACE. Other Plenipotentiaries I have appointed under this date and those who may be designated by the President of the United States for the same purpose, confer and agree upon what may be best and most advis- able And everything you may so confer and agree upon, negotiate, conciude and sign, I now confirm and ratify, I will observe and execute, will cause to be observed and executed, the same as it I myself had conferred and agreed upon, negotiated, concluded and signed it, for all of which I confer upon you ample authority to the iullest extent required by law. In witness whereof I have caused these presents to issue signed by my hand, duly sealed and attested by the undersigned, my Minister of State. ^ „ ^ Given in the Palace of Madrid on the twenty-second day of Septem- ber of eighteen hundred and ninety-eight. Signed: Maria Cristina. Signed : Juan Manuel SInchez y Gutierrez de Castro, Miuister of State. The commissions and full powers of the other Spanish Plenipoten- tiaries were in the same form, their names and titles being as follows: Don Buenaventura Abarzuza, Senator of the Kingdom and some- time Ambassador and Minister of the Crown ; Don Jose de Garnica y Diaz, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of Justice, Deputy of the Cortes, Member of the General Codification Commission, ex- Vice-President of the Congress of Deputies; Don Wenceslao Ramirez de Villa-Urrutia, Knight Grand Cross of the Royal Order of Isabel the Catholic, Knight Commander of the Royal and Distinguished Order of Charles III, decorated with the White Cross of the second class of Naval Merit, Grand Cross of the Dutch Lion of the Netherlands, Oak Crown of Luxemburg, the Maji- dieh of Turkey, Knight Commander of the Legion of Honor of France, of the Concepcion de Villaviciosa of Portugal, decorated with the Cross of the second class of the Bust of Bolivar, Knight of St-Maurice and St-Lazarus of Italy, of the Crown of Prussia, of the Crown of Christ of Portugal, Licentiate in civil and canonical law, and through competitive examination, in administrative law Academician Professor of the Royal Academy of Jurisprudence and Legislation, my Minister Plenipotentiary to His Majesty the King of the Belgians; Don Rafael Cerero y Saenz, General of Division, Ranking General of Engineers of the first Army Corps, Knight of the Grand Cross of the Orders of San Hermenegildo and of Military Merit, white insignia, decorated with the Cross of the third class of the Order of Military Merit, red insignia. COMMISSION OF AMERICAN SECRETARY. William McKinley, President of the United States of America, to all who shall see these presents, greeting: Know ye ! That, reposing special trust and confidence in the Integrity and Ability of John Bassett Moore, of New York, I do appoint him Sec- retary and Counsel to the Commissioners of the United States appointed under the Protocol signed at Washington on the twelfth day of August, 181)8, to negotiate and conclude a Treaty of peace between the United States and Spain, and do authorize and empower him to execute and fulfill the duties of this Commission, with all the powers, privileges, and TREATY OF PEACE. 19 emoluments thereunto of right appertaining, during the pleasure of the President of the United Slates. In testimony whereof, I have caused these letters to be made patent, and the seal of the United States to be hereunto affixed. Given under my hand at the city of Washington, the 13th day of September in the year of Our Lord one thousand eight hundred and ninety-eight, and the lliord year of the Independence of the United States of America. Signed: William McKiimley. By the President: Signed: Wn.LiAM K. Day, /Secretary of State. Protocol No 2. Protocolo No. 2. Conference of October 3, 1898. Conferencia del 3 de Octubre de 1898. Present: On the part of the United States : Messrs : Day, Davis, Frye, Gray, Eeid, Moore, Fergus- son. On the part of Spain: Messrs: Montero Rios Abarzuza Garnica Villa-Urrutia Cerero The protocol of the preceding session was read and approved. Messrs. Gray and Villa-Urrutia, as a committee on procedure, re- ported that they had, after confer- ring together, decided that it was not advisable at present to recom- mend the adoption of any rules in addition to those already deter- mined upon or still under discus- sion. The question of annexing to the protocol memoranda on points of importance was then discussed. The Spanish Commissioners pro- posed that the Commissioners on either side should have the privi- lege of filing memoranda on points which they should deem to be of sufficient importance to justify such action, the memoranda so filed to be annexed to the protocols. The American Commissioners proposed that the right should be reserved to the Commissioners on either side to present memoranda on points which they might deem of sufficient importance to justify Presentes Por parte de los Es- tados Unidos de America, los Seiiores Day, Davis, Frye, Gray, Eeid, Moore, Fergusson. Por parte deEspana. los Seiiores Montero Eios, Abarzuza Garnica Villa-Urrutia Cerero. El protocolo de la sesion anterior fue leido y aprobado. Los Sehores Gray y Villa-Urru- tia como poneutes para fonnular las reglas de procedimiento, niani- festaron que despues de haber con- ferenciado, habiau decidido que no creian por ahora necesario reco meudar que se adoptasen otras reg- las adicionales a las acordadas anteriormente y que aun se halla- ban sujetas 4 debate. Se discuti6 la cuestion de unir como anexos al protocolo los Mem- orandums relativos 4 asuntos de importancia. Los Comisionados Espauolespro- pusieron que los de ambas Partes tuvieran facultad de presentar Memorandums sobre los puntos que creyeran de bastante impor- tancia para justificar tal determi- naciou y que los Memorandums formasen parte del protocolo como anexos al mismo. Los Comisionados Americanos propusieron que sedeberiareservar 4 los Comisionados de ambas partes este derecho de presentar Memo- randums sobre puntos que se juz- gasen de bastante importancia para 20 TREATY OF PEACE. them in so doin^, the question of annexiuii' such memoiauda to the protoeof to be determined in each case by the Joint Commission. No agreement having been reached, it was decided to refer the matter to the Secretaries for their consideration and adjust- ment, subject to the further action of the Commission. The American Commissioners then read their reply to the com- munication presented by the Span- ish Comruissioners at the first con- ference in relation to the preserva- tion of the status qno in the Philip- pines. A copy of the reply is hereto annexed. The Spanish Commissioners re- served the right to put in an an- swer to the reply at the next ses- sion. The Spanish Commissioners then asked for the opinion of the Ameri- can Commissioners on the order of business. The American Commissioners stated that they were ready with propositions as to matters deter- mined by the Protocol. The Spanish Commissioners said they were ready to receive them. The propositions, as hereto an- nexed, were then read, aud a copy of them handed to the Spanish Commissioners. After the reading was completed, the Spanish Commissioners stated that they desired to examine the paper, and, if necessary, present amendments, and moved that an adjournment be taken until Friday. After discussion, it was agreed to adjourn to two o'clock, p. m., on Friday, October 7. William R. Day CusHMAN K. Davis Wm. p. Frye Geo. Gray Whitelaw Reid. J. B. MOOEE. hacerlo asi-, pero que la cuestion de unir tales Memorandums al pro- tocolo se resolveria en cad a caso X)or la Comision en pleno. No habiendose llegado 4 un acuerdo, se decidio encomendar el asunto al estudio y resolucion de los Secretarios, salvo la aproba- cion posterior de la Comision. Los Comisionados Americanos leyeron luego su contestacion A la comunicacion presentada por los Comisionados Espanoles en la pri- mera conferencia relativa a la con- servacion del statu quo en las Islas Filipinas. Una copia de la con- testacion se acompaua anexa ^ esta acta. Los Comisionades espanoles se reservan el derecho de contestar en la primera sesion. Los Comisionados Espaiioles pro- ponen luego a los Comisionados Americanos que expongan su opin- ion acerca del ordeu que se seguira en los tiabajos de la conferencia. Los Comisionados Americanos inauifiestan que tieneu preparadas proposiciones sobre asuntos deter- miuados por el Protocolo. Los Comisionados Espanoles dicen que est^n preparados para recibirlas. Las proposiciones que se in- cluyen anexas son leidas dandose copias de ellas ^ los Comisionados Espanoles. Despues de terminada la lectura los Comisionados Espanoles mani- fiestan que desean examinar el documento, y si lo creen necesario presentar enmiendas, y proponen que se aplace la sesion hasta el Viernes. Despues de haberse discutido esto, se convino en levantar la sesion hasta las dos de la tarde del Viernes 7 de Octubre. E. MONTERO Rios B DE ABARZUZA J. DE GARNICA W R DE Villa Urrutta Rafael Cerero treaty of peace. 21 Annex 1 to Protocol ^o. 2. The American Commissioners, having duly considered the communi- cation made to them in writing by the tipauish Commissioners at their conference on the 1st instant, make the following answer: The American Commissioners concur in the opinion, which that com- munication is • understood to convey, that the Protocol of August 12, 1898, embodies the conditions on which negotiations for peace have been undertaken. But in the proposal and demand of the Spanish Commissioners that the American Commissioners join them in a declaration that the status quo existing at the time of the signature of the Protocol " must be immediately restored by the contracting party that may have altered the same, or that may have consented to or failed to prevent its altera- tion to the prejudice of the other", as well as in the demand of the Spanish Commissioners that the American Commissioners join them in the declaration that the American authorities in the Philippines shall proceed to restore or else refrain from interfering with the effort of Spain to restore the status quo understood by the Spanish Commis- sioners to have been disturbed by the Tagalo rebels, who are described as an auxiliary to the American forces, the American Commissioners can see nothing but a proposal and demand to divert the conference from the object for which it has met to the consideration of a subject which properly belongs to the two Governments, and not to the Com- missioners here assembled. The American Commissioners do not intend to intimate that the proposal was made with this design, but they think it evident that this would be the necessary result of its discussion. The topics embraced in the communication of the Spanish Commis- sioners were set forth in much detail in notes of the French Embassy in Washington to the Department of State of the United States of August 29 and September 3 and 11. To these notes the Department of State replied on September 5 and 16. An examination of these diplo- matic papers will show that they embraced contested matters of fact as well as contested matters of law. In respect of some of the questions of fact, is is probable that neither Government at present possesses full and accurate information; while, in respect of other questions of fact, the reports in the possession of the Spanish Government were so entirely at variance with authentic information in the possession of the United States as to compel the conclusion that at least some of these reports were not of an official character. In respect of questions of law, the views of the two Governments were also at variance. The American Commissioners, therefore, with a view to prevent the diversion and failure of the present negotiations, as well as on the ground of a want of power, deem themselves obliged to reply that the questions involved in the present proposals and demands of the Span- ish Commissioners having heretofore been presented to the Govern- ment of the United States and answered in notes of the Department of State, any further demands as to military operations in the Philippines must be addressed by the Government of Spain to the Government of the United States at'^Washington, and consequently that they cannot join in the proposed declarations. True copy: J. B. Mooee. 22 treaty of peace. Annex 2 to Protocol No. 2. In entering upon negotiations for a treaty of peace, the natural pro- cedure is to follow the order ot the topics in the Protocol of August 12, 1898, by which the United States and Spain agreed upon the terms on whicii they would enter upon the present negotiations. By Article I of the Protocol, Spain agrees to " relinquish all claim of sovereignty over and title to Cuba". With a view to the immediate execution of this engagement, steps have already been taken for the evacuation of the island, as provided by the Protocol. Only one thing remains to complete the legal formalities of the trans- action, and that is to embody in a treaty of peace an appropriate stipula- tion by which Spain relinquishes, according to the engagements of the Protocol, all claim of sovereignty and title. The American Commissioners therefore propose, as a part of the treaty of peace, the following article: "The Government of Spain hereby relinquishes all claim of sover- eignty over and title to Cuba. " In this relinquishment of sovereignty and title is included all claim to the public domain, lots and squares, vacant lands, public buildings, fortifications and the armaments thereof, and barracks and other structures which are not private individual property. The archives, state papers, public records, and all papers and documents relative to the domain and sovereignty of the island and necessary or convenient for the government thereof, including all judicial and legal documents and other public records necessary or convenient for securing to individ- uals the titles to property or other rights, are embraced in the foregoing relinquishment; but an authenticated copy of any of them that may be required will be given at any time to such officer of the Spanish Grov- ernment [as] may apply for it. The Government of Spain will likewise furnish an authenticated copy of any paper, record or document in the Spanish archives, home or colonial, or in the possession of the Spanish tribunals, home or colonial, relative to the domain and sovereignty of the island and necessary or convenient for the government thereof, or necessary or convenient for securing to individuals the titles to prop- erty or other rights." By Article II of the Protocol, Spain agrees to "cede to the United States the Island of Porto Rico and other islands now under Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies, and also an island in the Ladrones, to be selected by the United States". The Government of the United States having selected in the Ladrones the Island of Guam, the American Commissioners propose as the next article of the treaty of peace the following stipulation : "The Government of Spain hereby cedes to the United States the Island of Porto Eico and other islands now under Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies, and also the Island of Guam, in the Ladrones. "In this cession is included all right and claim to the public domain, lots and squares, vacant lands, public buildings, fortifications and the armaments thereof, and barracks and other structures which are not private individual property. The archives, state papers, public records, aiid all papers and documents relative to the domain and sovereignty of the islands and necessary or convenient for the government thereof, including all judicial and legal documents and other public records necessary or convenient for securing to individuals the titles to prop- erty or other rights, are embraced in the foregoing cession j but an TREATY OF PEACE. 23 anther.ticated copy of any of tbem that may be required will be given at any time to such officer of the Spanish Government as may apply for it. The Government of Spain will likewise furnish an authenti- cated copy of any paper, record or document in the Spanish archives, home or colonial, or in the possession of the Spanish tribunals, home or colonial, relative to the domain and sovereignty of the islands and necessary or convenient for the government thereof, or necessary or convenient for securing to individuals the titles to proi^erty or other rights." True copy: J. B. MOOEE. Protocol No. 3. Peotocolo No. 3. Conference of October 7, 189S. Conferencia del 7 de Octubre de 1898. Present On the part of the United States. Messrs. Day Davis Frye Gray Eeid Moore Fergusson. On the part of Spain Messrs. Montero Eios, Abarzuza Garnica, Villa- Urrutia, Cerero. Mr. Ojeda, having exhibited his commission and furnished a copy of it, assumed the duties of Secre- tary of the Spanish Commission. The protocol of the preceding session was read and approved. On the question of procedure referred to them at the last con- ference the Secretaries made the following report J < 'Where a proposition is presented and rejected, the side presenting it shall have the right to file a brief memorandum giving its rea- sons in support of such proposi- tion, and the other side shall have the right to file a brief reply, the written discussidn to be confined to such memorandum and reply, which are to be annexed to the protocol." This report was adopted by unan- imous consent. The Spanish Commissioners then presented, in i)ursuance of the res- ervation made by them at the last conference, a reply to the Ameri- can answer on the subject of the statm quo in the Philippines, at Presentes. Por parte de los Estados TJnidos de America los Senores Day, Davis, Frye, Gray, Reid, Moore, Fergusson. Por parte de EspaSa los Senores Montero Eios Abarzuza Garnica, Villa-Urrutia, Cerero. El Sr. Ojeda despues de haber presentado su nombramiento y dado cop] a de el, actuo en calidad de Secretario de la Comision Espa- iiola. Se leyo y aprobo el acta de la sesion anterior. Eespecto del procedimiento que habia de adoptarse y que en la ultima sesion se dejo 4 cargo de los Secretarios, estos informaron haber llegado al acuerdo siguiente : "Siempre que una proposicion sea presentada y rechazada, la parte que la haya presentado ten- dra el derecho de aiiadir un breve Memorandum en que se expresen las razones en que aquella se funda, y la otra parte tendra el derecho de contestar en forma breve, limi- tandose dicha discusion por escrito al citado Memorandum y contes- tacion queiran anexos al acta." El acuerdo an teriorfue un^nime- mente aprobado. Los Comisarios Espanoles pre- sentan en virtud de lareserva que hicieron en la ultima conferencia una contestacion 4 la comunica- cion de los Comisarios Americano-s relativa al tStatu quo en Filipinas, 24 TREATY OF PEACE. the same time stating that the reply was presented for the pur- pose of reserving the right to bring up the subject hereafter. The reply was received and filed ; copy and translation are hereto annexed. The Spanish Commissioners then presented, as an amendment to the American proposals, a set of articles, in Spanish, copy and translation of which are hereto annexed, in relation to Cuba and Porto Kico. The American Commissioners, in order to afford opportunity for the translation and consideration of the articles, moved that the con- ference be adjourned till Tuesday, October 11, at two o'clock, p. m. The conference was adjourned accordingly. William R. Day CusHMAN K. Davis Wm. P Frye Geo. Gray Whitelaw^ Reid. John B. Moore. mauifestando al mismo tiempo que el objeto de dicha contestacion era el de reservar el derecho de pro- mover este asunto ulteriormente. Dicho document© fu6 debida- mente recibido y su copia y tra- duccion figuran como anexos al acta presente. Los Comisarios Espanoles pre- sentan 4 continuacion, como enmi- enda d las proposiciones de los Americanos, el articulado que va adjunto, relative 4 Cuba y Puerto Eico. Los Comisarios Americanos, 4 fin de disponer del tiempo necesa- rio para la traduccion y considera- cion de dicho articulado, propusie- ron que la conferencia fuese apala- zada hasta el Martes 11 de Octu bre. Se aprobo este acuerdo y se aplazo la proxima sesion hasta el dia 11 de Octubre 4 las 2 P. M. E ^ONTERO Rigs B DE Abarzuza J DE GARNICA W R DE Villa XJrrutia Rafael Cerero Emilio de Ojeda Annex 1 to Protocol ISTo. 3. COMISION PARA LA NEGOCIACION DE LA PAZ CON LOS ESTADOS XJNIDOS. PROPOSICION. No. 2 (a). Los Comisarios espanoles se han enterado, con la detencion que requiere la importancia del asunto, de la contestacion escrita en que los Comisarios americanos se niegan a aceptar la proposicion que los espa- noles habiamos preseutado en la sesion celebrada ppr los unos y los otros en 1° del corriente, para que se declarase por la conferencia, en pleno, que debia restablecerse el statu quo en Filipinas existente en 12 de Agosto ultimo, en que se concluyo y firmo en Washington el proto- colo, cuyo articulo 6° contiene el acuerdo de suspender las hostilidades entre los dos paises. Vista esta contestacion, los Comisarios espafioles entienden que es de su deber hacer presente 4 los SeCores Comisarios americanos, que si el statu quo existente en Filipinas en 12 de Agosto ultimo, lejos de resta- blecerse continua perturbandose cada vez mas, en perjuicio de Espana, el Gobierno de S M. C. y en su nombre sus Plenipotenciarios en esta conferencia, se reservan proveer, 4 lo que entiendan que exige el TREATY OF PEACE. 25 derecho de Espafia, una vez que no conciben como ha de poder cele- brarse el tratado de paz que estan encargados de convenir con los Sen ores Comisarios americanos sobre la indeclinable base del Protocolo de Washington de 12 de Agosto ultimo, si esta base se est4 alterando coustantemente en una de sus partes y cada dia en mayor perjuicio de Espaiia. Paris, 7 de Octubre de 1898. Est^ contorme Emilio d Ojeda [Translation.] Annex 1 to Protocol ISTo. 3. PROPOSITION. 1^0. 2 (a). With the careful consideration the subject demands, the Spanish Commissioners have informed themselves of the written reply in which the American Commissioners decline to accept the proposition which the Spaniards presented at the session held by both Commissions on the Ist instant, to the effect that the joint body declare that the statu quo existing in the Philippines on the 12th of August last, date of the concluding and signing in Washington of the Protocol, Article VI of which contains the agreement to suspend hostilities between the two countries, shonld be restored. In view of this reply, the Spanish Commissioners understand that it is their duty to make known to the American Commissioners that if the statu quo existing in the Philippines on August 12 last, far from being restored, continues to be disturbed to the prejudice of Spain, the Government of Her Catholic Majesty, and in her name its plenipoten- tiaries in this conference, reserve the right to act as they may deem the rights of Spain shall require, since they cannot conceive how the treaty of peace they are charged with arranging with the American Com- missioners upon the immutable basis of the Protocol of Washington of August 12 last, can be concluded if this basis is being constantly altered in one of its parts, and continually to the greater prejudice of Spain. True copy : Emilio de Ojeda. Annex 2 to Protocol No. 3. comision para la negociacion de la paz con los estados UNIDOS. ARTICULO l". Su Majestad la Eeina Gatolica en nombre y representaci6n de Espana y constitucionalmente autorizada por las Cortes del Keiuo, renuncia A su soberania sobre la Isla de Cuba, transfiriendola a los Estados Unidos de America que la aceptan para que puedan a su vez transferirla oportunamente al pueblo cubano con las condiciones estab- lecidas en este tratado, ofreciendo los Estados Unidos que desde su ratificaci6n seran siempre y fielmente cumplidas. 26 TREATr OF PEACE. ARTICULO 2°. La remmcia y transfereucia que hace Su Majestad Catolica y que aceptan los Estados Unidos de America, compreude: 1". Todas las ])rerrogativas, atribucioues y dereclios que, como parte integrante de dicha Soberania, corresponden 4 Su Majestad Catolica sobi^ la Isla de Cuba y sus habitantes: 2°. Todas las cargas y obligaciones de todas clases, pendientes al ratificarse este Tratado de paz, que la Corona de Espafia y sus Autx)ri- dados en la Isla de Cuba, bubiesen contraido legalmente en el ejercicio de la soberania que renuncian y transflerer, y que, en tal concepto, Ibrmau parte integrante de la misma Akticulo 3". En cumplimiento de lo conveuido en los dos articulos anteriores Su Majestad Catolica, en la representacion con que celebra este Tratado, renuncia y transfiere a los Estados Unidos, que los aceptan, en el con- cei)to sobredicho, todos los edificios, muelles, cuarteles, fortalezas, estab- lecimientos, vias piiblicas y demas bienes inmuebles que, con arreglo a derecho, son de dominio publico, y que como de tal dominio publico, corresponden a la Corona de Espana en la Isla de Cuba. Quedan por lo tauto exceptuados de esta renuncia ytransferenciatodos los bienes inmnebles radicantes en la Isla de Cuba que correspondan en el orden civil al Estado, en concepto de su propriedad patrimonial, asi como todos los derecbos y bienes de cualquiera clase que sean, que, liasta la ratificacion del presente Tratado, bayan venido pacificameute poseyeudo, en concepto de dueiios, las Provincias, Municipios, Estab- lecimientos piiblicos 6 privados, Corporaciones eclesiasticas 6 civiles y cualesquiera otras colectividades que tengan legalmente personalidad juridica para adquirir y poseer bienes de la Isla de Cuba, y los particu- lares, cualquiera que sea su nacionalidad. Su Majestad Catolica renuncia tambien, y transfiere 4 los Estados Unidos, a quien se le entregaran por el Gobierno Espanol, todos los documentos y titulos que se refieran exclusivamente a la soberania transferida y aceptada, que existan en los Arcbivos de la Peninsula. Habiendo de facilitarle copias cuando los Estados Unidos las reclamasen, de la parte correspondiente a dicha Soberania que con tengan los demas documentos y titulos tambien relativos a otros asuntos agenos a la Isla de Cuba, que existan en los mencionados Arcbivos. Una regla analoga habra reciprocaraente de observarse, a favor de Espafia, respecto 4 los documentos y titulos agenos en todo 6 en parte 4 la Isla de Cuba que se ballen actualmente en sus Arcbivos y que interesen al Gobierno Espanol. Todos los Arcbivos y Eegistros oficiales, asi administrativos como judiciales, que estan 4 disposicion del Gobierno de EsiDaiia y de sus autoridades en la Isla de Cuba, y que se refieran a la misma isla 6 4 sus habitantes y 4 sus derecbos y bienes, que dar4n 4 disposicion de los Estados Unidos con los mismos derecbos y obligaciones con que hoy lo estan 4 disposicion del Gobierno Espanol y de dicbas sus Autoridades. Los par ticul ares, asi espanoles como cubanos, tendran derecho 4 sacar, con arreglo 4 las leyes, las copias autorizadas de los contratos, testa- mentos y denies documentos que forman parte de los ])rotocolos notari- ales 6 que se custodien en los Archives administrativos y judiciales, bien estos se halleu en Espana 6 eu la Isla de Cuba. TREATY OF PEACE. 27 ARTICULO 4". Para fijar las cartas y obligaciones de todas clases, qne la Corona de Espaiia cede y tianstiere como parte de su soberauia sobre la Isla de Cuba a los Estados Unidos, y que estos aceptan, se atenderd d las dos reglas sigulentes: Primera. Las cargas y obligaciones que hayan de transferirse, ban de baber sido establecidas en forma constitucional y en uso de sus legitimas atribuciones, por la Corona de Espaiia, como soberana de \a> Isla de Cuba, 6 por sus Autoridades legitimas usando de las suyas respectivas, antes de la ratificacion de este Tratado, Seguuda. Su creacion 6 constitucion ha de haber sido para el servicio de la Isla de Cuba 6 con cargo ti su Tesoro especial Articulo 5". En virtud de lo dispuesto en el Articulo anterior quedan compren- didos en la sobredicba transferencia, las deudas cualquiera que sea su clase, cargas de justicia, sueldos 6 asignaciones de funcionarios asi civiles como eclesiasticos, que bayan de continuar prestando sus servicios en la Isla de Cuba, y pensiones de jubilacion y retiro y de viudedad ii horfandad con tal que en todas ellas concurran las dos cir- cunstancias prescritas en el Articulo anterior. Articulo 6®. Su Majestad Catolica, en nombre y re])resentaci6n de Espaiia, y con- stitucion almente autorizada por las Cortes del Keiuo, cede a los Estados Unidos de America y estos aceptan para si mismos, la Soberania sobre la Isla de Puerto Kico y las demas que corresponden en la actuabdad a la Corona de Espaiia en las Indias Occidentales. Articulo 7". Esta cesion de la soberania sobre el territorio y habitantes de Puerto Eico y las demas islas mencionadas, se entiende que consiste en la cesion de los derecbos y obligaciones, bienes y documentos relativos 4 la Soberania de dichas islas, iguales A los que respecto 4 la renuncia y transferencia de la soberania de la Isla de Cuba, se definen en los Articulos 2" basta el 5" inclusive de este Tratado. Esta couforme Emilio de Ojeda [Translation.] Annex 2 to Protocol No. 3. Article I. Her Majesty the Catholic Queen, in the name and representation of Spain, and thereunto constitutionally authorized by the Cortes of lAie Kingdom, relinquishes her sovereignty over the Island of Cuba, trans- ferring it to the United States of America, which accept it, in order that they may in their turn transfer it at the proper time to the Cuban 28 TREATY OF PEACE. people, upon the conditions established in this treaty, the TJnited States promising hereby that as soon as they are ratified they wiU always be faithfully complied with. Article II. The relinquishment and transfer made by Her Catholic Majesty, and accepted by the United States of America, embrace: 1st. All the prerogatives, powers and rights, which, as an integral part of the sovereignty, belong to Her Catholic Majesty both over the Island of Cuba and over its inhabitants; 2nd. All charges and obligations of every kind in existence at the time of the ratification of this treaty of peace, which the Crown of Spain and her authorities in the Island of Cuba may have contracted lawfully in the exercise of the sovereignty hereby relinquished and transferred, and which as such constitute an integral part thereof. Article III. In compliance with the provisions of the two preceding articles. Her Catholic Majesty, acting in the same representative character with which she has entered into this treaty, relinquishes and transfers to the United States, which accept them, upon the conditions above stated, all the buildings, wharves, barracks, fortresses, establishments, public ways of communication, and all other immovable property which according to law attaches to the public domain, and which so attaching belongs to the Crown of Spain in the Island of Cuba. All immovable property situated in the Island of Cuba which under the civil law belongs to the state as patrimonial property, and all rights and property of whatsoever kind, which up to the ratification of the present treaty have been peacefully enjoyed and held in ownership by provinces, municipalities, public and private establishments, ecclesi- astical and civil corporations, or any other collective bodies lawfully incorporated and having legal authority to acquire and hold property in the Island of Cuba, and by private individuals, whatsoever their nationality, are therefore excluded from the above relinquishment and transter. Her Catholic Majesty further relinquishes and transfers to the United States all right to the documents and papers exclusively relating to the sovereignty hereby relinquished and accepted, to be found in the archives of the Peninsula, said documents and papers to be delivered to the United States by the Spanish Government. Copies of such por- tions of othpir documents and papers relating to other subjects foreign to the Island of Cuba, but relating to the sovereignty aforesaid which may exist in the said archives, shall be given to the United States whenever desired. A similar rule shall be reciprocally observed in favor of Spain regarding documents and papers foreign, in whole or in part, to the Island of Cuba, which may be in the archives of the latter and of interest to the Spanish Government. All archives and ofticial records, executive and judicial, which are at the disposal of the Government of Spain and its authorities in tlie Island of Cuba, and which refer to the said island or its inhabitants, and to their rights and property, shall be at the disposal of the United States with the same rights and obligations as now attach to them while at the disposal of the Spanish Government and its said authori- ties. Private persons, Spaniards and Cubans alike, shall be entitled to make according to law authenticated copies of contracts, wills, and TREATY OF PEACE. 29 other instruments forming part of the notarial registers and flies or in the custody of the executive and the judicial archives, be the same either in Spain or in the Island of Cuba. Article IY. In order to establish the charges and obligations of all kinds which the Crown of Spain cedes and transfers as a part of its sovereignty over the Island of Cuba to the United States, and which the latter accept, the two rules following will be observed : First: The charges and obligations to be transferred must have been levied and imposed in constitutional form and in the exercise of its legitimate powers by the Crown of Spain, as the sovereign of the Island of Cuba, or by its lawful authorities in the exercise of their respective powers prior to the ratification of this treaty. Second: The creation or establishment of such charges or obliga- tions must have been for the service of the Island of Cuba, or charge- able to its own individual treasury. Article Y. Pursuant to the provisions of the foregoing article, there shall be embraced in the said transfer all debts, of whatsoever kind, lawful charges, the salaries or allowances of all employes, civil and ecclesias- tical, who shall continue to render services in the Island of Cuba, and all pensions in the civil and military services and of widows and orphans; provided that they conform to the requirements prescribed in the foregoing article. Article YI. Her Catholic Majesty, in the name and representation of Spain, and thereunto constitutionally empowered by the Cortes of the Kingdom, cedes to the United States of America, and the latter accept for them- selves, the sovereignty over the Island of Porto Rico and the other islands now belonging to the Crown of Spain in the West Indies. Article YII. This cession of the sovereignty over the territory and inhabitants of Porto Eico and the other islands mentioned, is understood to embrace the cession of the rights and obligations, property and documents relating to the sovereignty of the said islands, similar in all things to those which, with respect to the relinquishment and transfer of the sovereignty of the Island of Cuba, are defined in Articles II to Y, inclusive, of the treaty. True copy : Emilio de O jeda. JDOMMISSION OF THE SPANISH SECRETARY. ExcMO. Senor. S. M. el Rey (q. D. g.) yen su nombre la Reina Regente del Reino, se ha servido expedir el Real Decreto siguiente : "Tomando en consideraciou las especiales circumstancias que con- curren en Don Emilio de Ojeda, Mi Enviado Extraordiuario y Ministro 30 TREATY OF PEACE. Plenipotenciario cerca de S. M. SberiflBana; En nombrede Mi Angusto Hijo el Key Don Alfonso Trece y como Reina Regente del Reino; Vengo en disponerque, coiiseivando su cargo, pase 4 desempeSar las funciones de Secretario General de la Comision espanola encargada de negociar en Paris el tratado de paz entre Espana y los Estos Unidos de America. "Dado en Palacio a veintiseis de Septiembre de mil ochocientos noveuta y ocho. Maeia Ceistina. "El Presidente del Consejo de Ministros — "Peaxedes Mateo Sagasta." Lo que traslado 6, V. E, para su conocimiento ***. Dios gue. a V. E. m. a. Madrid, 26 Septiembre de 1898. SAGASTA. Sefior Don Emilio de Ojeda. [Translation.] Most Excellent Sir: H. M. the King (whom God preserve) and in his name the Queen Regent of the Kingdom has been pleased to issue the Royal Decree following: "Bearing in mind the special qualifications of Don Emilio de Ojeda, My Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary near His Sher- iffian Majesty, in the name of my August Son, the King Don Alfonso XIII, and as Queen Regent of the Kingdom, I will that, still retaining his office, he discharge the functions of Secretary General of the Spanish Commission entrusted with negotiating in Paris the Treaty of Peace between Spain and the United States of America. "Done at the Palace on the twenty-sixth of September, eighteen hun- dred and ninety-eight. "Maria Cristina. "Praxedes Mateo Sagasta, ^^ President of the Council of Minister s.^^ Which I transmit to Y. E, for your information ***. God preserve Y. E. many years. Madrid, September 26, 1898. Seiior Don Emilio de Ojeda. Sagasta. Protocol No. 4. Protocolo No. 4. Conference of October 11, 1898. Conferencia del 11 de Octubre de 1898 Present On the part of the Presentes Por parte de los Es- United States. Messrs Day Davis tados Unidos de -America los Frye Gray Reid Moore Fergus- Seiiores Day, Davis, Frye, Gray, ®^"- Reid, Moore ,Fergusson. On the part of Spain. Messrs. Por parte de Espana. los Seiiores Montero Rios Abarzuza. Garuica, Montero Rios, Abarzuza, Garnica, Villa-Urrutia Cerero Ojreda. Villa- Urn? tia, Cerero, Ojeda. TREATY OF PEACE. 31 The protocol of the preceding session was read and approved. The American Commissioners presented a paper, co])y of which is hereto annexed, in which they rejected the articles submitted by the Spanish Commissioners at the last session as an amendment to the proposals of the American Commissioners on the subject of the relinquishment by Spain of sovereignty over Cuba and the cession of Porto Eico and other islands in the West Indies, and the island of Guam in the Ladrones. The paper having been read in English and in Spanish, and the Spanish articles having been re- jected, the President of the Span- ish Commission on behalf of the Spanish Commissioners, presented under the rules a memorandum, setting forth their reasons in sup- port of their propositions. The American Commissioners inquired whether the Spanish Com- missioners considered their jirop- ositions as finally rejected. The Spanish Commissioners re- plied that the rejection was set Ibrth in the very terms of the American reply, and that the oc- casion had therefore arisen for the l^reseutation of their memorandum ; but that, before filing the latter, they were ready and even preferred to discuss the subject of it orally, since this might result in an agree- ment and render the filing of the memorandum unnecessary. The American Commissioners said that the memorandum could be read, but that they reserved the right under the rules to make a written reply, and that any oral discussion into which they might enter was not to be considered as a waiver of that right. The memorandum, copy and translation of which are hereto an- nexed, was then read. The reading having been com- pleted, the American Commission- ers stated that their understand- ing of the situation was this — that, Fu6 leida y aprobada el acta de la sesion anterior. Los Comisarios Americanos pre- sentan una contestacion rechazan- do el articulado deTratado que les entregarou los Comisarios Espaiio- les en la sesion anterior como en- miendaal proyectodel Tratado que preseiitaron los Americanos en lo relativo d la renuncia de Espafia 4 la Soberauia de Espaiia sobreCuba y a la cesion de Puerto Rico y otras islas en las Antillas asi como de la isla de Guam en el Archipielago de las Ladrones. Se lee dicha contestacion en ingles y en espanol. Kechazado el articulado espanol el Presideute de la Comision es- paiiola en nombre de dicha Comis- ion y en virtud del reglamento, presenta un Memorandum en que se con sign an las razones en que fundaron su proposicion La Comision americanapregunta si consideran los espaiioles defini- tivameute rechazada su proposi- cion. La Comisi6n espafiola dice que el rechazo esta consignado en los pro- pios terminos de la contestacion americana, y que por tanto era Ue- gado el momeuto de presentar el Memorandum ; pero que esto no ob- stante esta dispuesta a discutir oral- mente el asunto antes de que se tome acta del Memorandum y hasta preferiria este curso, puesto que de llegarse a un acuerdo en la discu- sion podri'a prescindirse de la pre- sentacion del Memorandum. Se admite la lectura del docu- mento, si bien los Comisarios amer- icanos se reservan el derecho, sea 6 no leido 6 discutido oralmeute, de contestar por escrito en la misma forma. L^ese en ingles el Memorandum que va adjunto al acta presente. Los Comisarios Americanos mani- fiestan que en su sentir, habiendo sido rechazado el articulado pre- sentado por los Comisarios Espa- 32 TREATY OF PEACE. the articles presented by the Span- ish Commissioners having been re- jected, and the Spanish Commis- sioners having thereupon tiled a memorandum under the rules, the American Commissioners were en- titled to make a written reply, and that the question now recurred on the articles proposed by the Amer- ican Commissioners. The Spanish Commissioners de- clared that in their opinion the propositions on both sides had been rejected, and that both proposi- tions were before the Commission on an equal footing for oral dis- cussion. The American Commissioners stated that they were ready to hear the Spanish Commissioners. The Spanish Commissioners sug- gested that, as the American Com- missioners wished to reply to the Spanish memorandum, it would be advisable to postpone the oral dis- cussion till the reply was before the Commission. To this the American Commis- sioners assented. The President of the Spanish Commission then stated that from the rapid reading of the paper pre- sented by the American Commis- sioners at the opening of the ses- sion, they had derived the impres- sion that those Commissioners were laboring under a misappre- hension as to the stipulation in the Spanish articles touching Spain's relinquishment of sover- eignty over Cuba. In proposing that the sovereignty should be re- linquished to the United States in order that the latter might transfer it to the Cuban people, Spain had merely conformed to the letter and spirit of the joint resolution of the American Congress; but it was not her intention to impose upon the United States an obligation to make such transfer, as was shown by tlie fact that it was said in the articles that the United States "may" transfer the sovereignty, not that they were bound to do it. noles, y habiendo estos presentado el Memorandum al respecto, segun previene el reglamento, los Corai- sarios Americanos estJin facultados para contestar por escrito y que por tanto la discusion debia versar ahora sobre los articulos propue- stos por los Americanos. Los Comisarios Espaiioles decla- raron que en su opinion habiendo sido rechazados ambos estaban en igual caso y debian discutirse 4 la vez ambos proyectos. Los Comisarios Americanos en vista de esto se manifestarou dis- puestos a oir los argumentos que tenian que aducir los Espauoles; pero estos teniendo en cuenta que los Americanos debian presentar una contestacon escrita propusie- ron aplazar la discusion oralhasta que les fuera conocido el contenido de la respuesta Americana. Se convino en ello. El Presidente de la Comision Espaiiola manifesto que por la rapida lectura del documento Americano comentando el articu- lado presentado por la Comision Es- panola, habia el comprendido que los Comisarios Americanos habian sido inducidos en error al creer que en dicho articulado se exigia que los Estados Unidos al aceptar la renuncia en su favor de la Sobe- rania de Espana sobre Cuba, hubie- ran de transmitirla al pueblo cubano. El Presidente anadio que al mencionar en dicho articulado que dicha renuncia la hacia Espaha " a fin de que los Estados Unidos puedan transferirla al pueblo cu- bano,''^ Espafia se adaptaba al espiritu y a la letra de la joint- resolution del Congreso Americano, pero en el proyecto espanol no se imponia esta obligacion 4 los Esta- dos Unidos puesto que se decia que 2)odian hacer la transferencia de la Soberanfa mas no que hubieran de tener la obligacion de hacerla. TREATY OF PEACE. 33 The American Commissioners re- Los Comisarios americanos con- plied that the language employed testaron que en efecto liabia side in the article would, under the su impresion que la renuncia por American law, impress the relin- parte de Espafia estaba hecha en quishment with a trust. terminos que seguu las leyes Ameri- cauas imijlicaban una obligacion fiduciaria. . The Spanish Commissioners said La Comision Espaiiola contest© that if the phraseology would, que si tal era el seutido que seguu under American law couvey that las leyes Americanas podiau atri- meauing, they would change it in buirle, se modiflcaria el texto en el the sense in which they had just seutido que acababa de sugerir. suggested. The conference was adjourned to . Se*aplaz6 la conferencia hasta Friday, October 14, at two o'clock el Viernes 14 de Octubre 4 las dos p. m. P. M. William E. Day E. Montero Rios CusHMAN K. Davis B. de Abarzuza WM. P FRYE J. DE GrARNICA Geo. Gray W R de VillaIJrrutia Whitelaw Reid. Rafael Cerero John B. Moore. Emilio de Ojeda Annex 1 to Protocol Ko. 4. The American Commissioners, when they presented in the conference of the 3rd instant a draft of articles for the relinquishment by Spain of sovereignty over and title to Cuba and for the cession of Porto Rico and other islands in the West Indies, and the Island of Guam in the Ladrones, stated that the disposition of these subjects was deter- mined by the Protocol of August 12, 1898. The two articles of the Protocol relating to these subjects are brief, and, as it seems to the American Commissioners, easy of comprehen- sion and readily to be carried into effect. They are : "Article I. Spain will relinquish all claim of sovereignty over and title to Cuba. "Article II. Spain will cede to the United States the island of Porto Rico and other islands now under Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies, and also an island in the Ladrones to be selected by the United States." The American Commissioners were careful, in the articles proposed by them, to express the relinquishment or cession, as the case might be, in the very words of the Protocol, merely adding thereto the usual suijsidiary and incidental clauses touching public property and archives, with a view to making the treaty effectual, and preserving evidence of public and private property rights. The American Commissioners regret to find in the articles presented by the Spanish Commissioners on the 7th instant a departure from the terms of the Protocol in the following particulars: To the unconditional engagement of the Protocol to relinquish all claim of sovereignty over and title to Cuba, they have proposed conditions: 1. That Spain shall transfer her sovereignty over the island to the T P 3 34 TREATY OF PEACE. United States, and that the United States "■ shall in their turn transfer it at the proper time to the Cuban people." 2. That this transfer shall be made upon the conditions to be estab- lished in the treaty between the United States and Spain. . 3. That the United States shall engage itself to Spain for the per- formance of these conditions. In place of the unconditional relinquishment agreed to in the Pro- tocol, it is proposed that the relinquishment now offered shall embrace all charges of every kind which Spain and her authorities in Cuba have lawfully contracted heretofore, and may hereafter contract, prior to the ratification of the treaty of peace; and these "charges and obliga- tions," past, present, and future, which it is proposed to "transfer" to the United States, are declared to include debts, civil and ecclesiastical salaries, and civil and military i^en^ions, ostensibly in arrears, as well as yet to accrue. To the American Commissioners this appears to be not a proposition to "relinquish all claim of sovereignty over and title to Cuba", T3ut in substance a proposition to " transfer " to the United States and in turn to Cuba a mass of Spanish charges and obligations.* It is difficult to perceive by what logic an indebtedness contracted for any purpose can be deemed part of the sovereignty of Spain over the Island of Cuba. In the article proposed it is attempted to yoke with the transfer of sovereignty an obligation to assume an indebted- ness arising out of the relations of Spain to Cuba. The unconditional relinquishment of sovereignty by Spain stipulated for in the Protocol is to be changed into an engagement by the United States to accept the • sovereignty burdened with a large mass of outstanding indebtedness. It is proper to say that if during the negotiations resulting in the con- clusion of the Protocol Spain had proposed to add to it stipulations in regard to Cuba such as those now put forward, the proposal, unless abandoned, would have terminated the negotiations. Tlie American Commissioners, therefore, speaking for their Govern- ment, must decline to accept the burden which it is now proposed shall be gratuitously assumed. The American Commissioners further observe that in article 3 of the draft there is a negative clause, by which property not belonging to the Crown of Spain is excepted from the proposed relinquishment and transfer of sovereignty. In one respect this exception appears to be unnecessary, and in another illogical. So far as it affects the question of legal title it is unnecessary, since such title, if not held by Spain, would not pass to the United States by Spain's transfer of sovereignty. On the other hand, so far as it affects the question of sovereignty, it is illogical, since the sovereignty, which includes the right of eminent domain, would, if excepted from the relinquishment, remain with Spain. We would thus have the singular spectacle of Spain relinquishing her sovereignty over property belonging to the Crown, but retaining it over all other property. Thus again we should witness the utter defeat of the explicit engage- ment m the Protocol that Spain would "relinquish all claim of sover- eignty over and title to Cuba." In the articles presented by the American Commissioners there were stipulations in relation to archives and oflacial records, which stipula- tions were intended to secure, and, as the American Commissioners believe, would effectually secure, the object of preserving and of furnish- • See Protocol No. 5. TREATY OF PEACE. 35 ing to those in interest evidence of title to property in the islands in question. In the articles submitted by the Spanish Commissioners, it is provided that documents and papers relating to sovereignty to be found in the archives of the Peninsula shall be furnished to the United States; also "copies of such portions of other documents and papers relating to other subjects foreign to the Island of Cuba and the sovereignty afore- said as may exist in the said archives." It is difficult for the Americans to understand this latter clause ; per- haps its exact meaning is not conveyed in the English translation of the Spanish text. It is to be further observed that in the provisions of the Spanish articles relating to the furnishing of record evidence of titles to lands in Cuba and Porto Rico, it is stipulated that the archives and records shall be at the disposal of the United States "with the same rights and obligations as now attach to them while at the disposal of the Spanish Government and its said (insular) authorities." This restric- tion, the object of which is not perceived, would seem to limit the con- trol over archives and official records, after Spain's relinquishment of sovereignty, to the same power, both in kind and in extent, as was for- merly possessed by the Spanish Government. This appears to be inconsistent with the right of control which every sovereign power should possess over its archives and official records. All the conditions and qualiflcations above referred to are by general reference incorporated in the articles rehiting to the cession of Porto Eico and other islands in the West Indies, and render these articles equally inadmissible. True Copy : J. B. Moore. Annex 2 to Protocol No. 4 coinsion para la negociacion de la paz con los estados UNIDOS. Memorandum, en que se exponen sucintamente las razones 6 fundamentos delproyecto de articulos para el Tratado de Paz, relativos a la renuncia, por parte de Espana, de su Soherania en Cuba y Puerto Rico, que pre- sentan a la Gonferencia los Plenipotenciarios JEspanoles. Los Plenipotenciarios Espanoles aceptan el pensamiento generador del proyecto de articulo presentado por los Seiiores Comisarios Ameri- canos sobre la renuucia de Espana a su soberania en Cuba y la cesion de su soberania en Puerto Rico; pero les es imposible prestar el mismo asentimiento k lo dem^s que en dicho proyecto se contiene, ya porque entienden que parte de ello esta fuera del alcance que cabe dar 4 la renuncia y cesion sobredichas, ya porque tambien estas renuncia y cesion, tal como aparecen en aquel proyecto, no contienen bajo otros aspectos cuanto es indispensable que compreudan. I. LA RENUNCIA QUE HACE S. M. C. DE SU SOBERANfA EN LA ISLA PE CUBA ES INDIS- PENSABLE QUE SEA ACEPTADA POR EL PRESIDENTE DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS DE AMERICA. El Gobierno de la Union amerioana nunca exigio al Gobiernoespaiiol que abandonase la Soberania en Cuba, sino que la renunciase para que 36 TREATY OF PEACE. la Isla fuese independiente. Asi consta en la correspondencia diplo- m^tica que conserva el Gobierno de S. M. C. sobre las negociacioDes eutre Ambas Altas Partes contratautes anteriores a la declaraciou de guerra; Asi tambieu las Camaras Aiuericanas lo declararou en la resolucioa coiijunta de 19 de Abril ultimo, aprobada despu6s por el Senor Presideute de los Estados Unidos. El articulo primero de la citada resoluciou, dice: "que el pueblo de Cuba es y debe ser libre e iudepeudieute." Asi tambien el Seiior Secretario de Estado en Washington ordeno en 20 del citado mes a su Miuistro en Madrid, que lo comunicase al Gobi- erno espaiioi, empleando las mismas palabras del texto de aquella reso- luciou para que "Espaiia renunciase inmediatamente su Autoridad y Gobieruo en la Isla de Cuba." Y asi finalmente se consigno en el Articulo 1° del Protocolo firmado en Washington en doce de Agosto pasado, cuyo Articulo 1**, segun el texto olicial, firmado en idioma trances, a la vez que el firmado en idioma ingles por los representantes de Ambas Altas Partes contratantes, dice asi: " Article I. L'Espagne renoncera a toute pretention a sa souverai- nete et a tout droit sur Cuba," que literalmeute traducido al espaiioi equivale a lo siguiente: " La Espana renunciard a toda pretension 4 su soberania y 4 todo derecho sobre Cuba." Seria ofender la grande ilustracion de los Senores Comisarios Ameri- canos tratar de demostrarles la esencial diferencia que, segun la doctrina elemental del derecho publico interuacional, y la practica de las naciones, existe entre el abandono y la renuncia de la Soberania. El territorio abandonado tiene derecho para adquirirlo el primer ocu- pante; el territorio renunciado pasa necesariamente a aqu(^l 4 cuyo favor tiene que hacerse la renuncia. Y los Estados Unidos exigierou la de Espana para el pueblo cubano 4 fin de que se coustituyese independiente. Aunque es verdad que los Estados Unidos de America, en el caso presente, exigieron esto de Espana, exigieron tambien que tal renuncia habia de hacerse por su mediacion. Los Estados Unidos habian de recibir la Isla de Cuba y conservarla en su poder teniendo su gobierno hasta su pacificacion, " abrigando el proposito de dejar (no se puede dejar lo que no se tiene) el domiuio y gobierno de la Isla al pueblo de esta, una vez realizada dicha pacificacion." Asi solemnemente se consigno en el articulo 4° de la resoluciou conjuuta de las Camaras Americanas y en el despacho del Seiior Ministro de Estado Americano a su Ministro en Madrid. Y si hasta la pacificacion de la Isla no ban de dejar su dominio y gobierno los Estados Unidos, es de toda evidencia que entretanto son ellos los que lo han de conservar. Y efectivamente los Estados Unidos conservaron y conservan en su poder -k Santiago de Cuba y los demas territorias de la Isla en que do- minan sus armas, sin haberlos entregado al pueblo cubano, por no tener todavia Gobierno que lo reprosente. Y en el Protocolo de Washington ya citado (articulo 4"), se acordo que la evacuacion de la Isla por las tropas espanolas y sus detalles se convendrian por una Comision mixta foniiada por Comisarios del Gobieruo Espaiioi y Comisarios del Gobierno de Washington, pero no por Comisario del pueblo cubano. El Gobieruo federal es pues, el que, necesariamente, tiene que aceptar la renuncia que hace el de Espana a la soberania en la Isla, para con- servar esta Isla en su poder y gobernarla hasta que este pacificada, en cuyo caso, y no antes, segun sus propias resoluciones, es cuando se pro- ponen dejar la soberania de aquel territorio a disposicion del Gobieruo que se constituya eu Cuba. , TREATY OF PEACE. 37 II. LA CESI6n Y la RKNUXCIA DE la SOBERANI'a CO:\IPRKNnEX LAS DE LOS DERKCHOS Y DE LAS OBLIGACIONES QUE LA CONSTITUYEN. El coiicepto de la Soberaiifa de uu Estado nimca se ha confundldo en e\ mniido antigiio ni muclio menos en el muiido moderno y cristiano, con el concepto del dominio civil y privado y menos aiin con el del dominio del senor sobie el esclavo. El Soberano, es verdad qne tiene pverrogativas y derecbos sobre el teriitorio y sns babitantes; pero estas prenogativas y derecbos le correspondeh no para sn satisfacci(5n y goce, siuo para el buen gobienio y bienestar de los pneblos que estan a sn soberania sometidos, Por esta razon, los derecbos del Sobevano se convierten en obligaciones para con sns subditos. El Soberano tiene obligacion de cnidar de sn bnen regimen y de sn progreso y prosperidad. El Soberano no es dneno de los impuestos y rentas que percibe de sus subditos, para emplearlos y cousumirlos en su propio y personal beneticio, sino i)ara iuvertirlos en le satislaccion de las necesidades pnblicas y en el bien- estar de aquellos. El cumplimiento de estas obligaciones es el funda- raento de la legitimidad de sus facultades para celebrar con terceras persouas todas las convencioues y contraer todas las obligaciones que scan necesarias para procurarse los recursos precisos al buen regimen y gobierno de sus subditos j atender el mejor servicio publico de los mismos. Estas obligaciones subsisten desde que se contraen hasta que se cum- pi en. Y es de toda evideucia que si durante todo el tiempo intermedio entre la constitucion y el cumplimiento de una obligacion de soberanfa, el Soberano la pierde por renuncia li otro titulo legitimo, la obligacion pendiente pasa como ])arte integrante de la soberania misma a aquel que en ella le sucede. Seria contrario 4 la nocion mas elemental de la justicia, e incompatible con el dictado de la conciencia universal de las gentes, qne un Soberano perdiera sus derecbos sobre el territorio y sus subditos y hnbiera de continuar esto no obstante, sometido al cumpli- miento de las obligaciones que habia creado, exclusivamente, para su regimen y gobierno. Estas maximas aparecen observadas por todas las naciones cultas que no ban querido atropellar los principios eternos de la justicia, incluso aquellas en que estas cesiones se bicieron por la fuerza de las armas y como premio de la victoria en los Tratados sobre cesiones ter- ritoriales. Earo es el Tratado en que no ba pasado con el territorio cedido al nuevo Soberano una parte proporcional de las obligaciones generales del Estado cedente, que en la mayoria de los casos tenian la forma de deuda pCiblica. Pero aun es mas claro el caso a que se refiere la convencion que ba de elaborar esta conferencia. Aqui no se trata de transferir, con la Sobe- rania de Cuba y Puerto Eico una parte proporcional de las obligacio- nes y cargas generales de la Metropoli, sino tan solo las obligaciones y cargas que son peculiares a las Islas que se ceden y transtieren. Cuando no se trata de obligaciones de conjunto y comnnes a todos los territor- ios sometidos al Soberano que las contrae, sino de obligaciones especiales al territorio mismo cedido y contrafdas por sus legitimas Autoridades, ni una sola vez, aun en aquellos Tratados en que el vencedor se ba mos- trado mas despiadado con el vencido, ban dejado de pasar con el terri- torio cedido sus propias y peculiares cargas y obligaciones. Asi, puede considerarse como clausula casi obligada, la de que la cesion del terri- torio lleva consig'o la de las obligaciones y deudas departamentales, 38 TREATY OF PEACE. comunales y en general hablando, peculiares al territorio de la cesion. El Gran Conquistador de este siglo no se atrevio jamas <4 violar esta regla de eterna justicia, en todos los Tratados que celebro con aquellos Soberanos, cuyos territorios, en todo 6 en parte, convertia en premio de sus victorias. Pues bien, es de hacer constar, que la soberania de Espaua jamas dejo de administrar separadamente de la Metropoli sus colonias en America, desde su descubrimiento. La America Espaiiola estuvo siempre gobernada desde la Capital de la Mouarquia por un Cousejo especial llamado de ludias que en nada interveuia en el regimen y go- bierno de la Peninsula, el cual corria a cargo del Consejo llamado de Castilla. Dividido el territorio descubierto por Colon y por otros ilustres explo- radores Espaiioles (que tan inmenso, aunque no siempre agradecido servicio ban prestado a la civilizaciou) en Virreinatos y Capitanias Geuerales, cada uno de estos pequeiios Estados recaudaba sus propios ingresos y cubria sus proprios gastos, 6 contraia para cubrirlos las obli- gaciones que las necesidades cfe su propio gobierno demandaban ; y cuando alguuo de estos territorios se hallaba en deficit permanente, como sucedia d la Isla de Cuba, la colonia bermana mas i)r6xima acudia ^ su socorro. El Yirreinato de Mejico desde 1766 hasta 1806 auxilio a la Isla de Cuba anualmente con fuertes cantidades para sus atenciones de gobierno y para el desarrollo de su natural riqueza entonces inex- plotada, ^ cuyos gastos no podia, 4 la sazon, atender con sus recursos propios. I^ada menos que 108 millones de pesos entraron en Cuba pro- cedentes de Mejico bajo tal concepto, durante aquel periodo; conoci- 6ndose estos auxilios en la administracion colonial Esi)anola con el nombre de "situado de Mejico." En el siglo actual llevo Espaiia basta sus tiltimas cousecuencias este sistema de administracion separado e indepeudiente de sus colonias. El Miuisterio de Ultramar era el departamento donde se concentraba esta administracion. Cada colonia tuvo anualmente su proprio pre- supuesto y sus deficits; cuando sus propios ingresos no eran bastantes para cubrir sus proprios gastos fueron atendidos por operaciones espe- ciales de deuda consolidada, hipotecaria 6 flotante para y por cuenta de la colonia en cuyo beneficio estas operaciones se bicieron. Y la separacion entre la administracion de la Peninsula y la colonial fue, durante mucbo tiempo tan completa, que el personal de funcion- arios ptiblicos jiara los servicios administrativos y judiciales de las colonias, era peculiar 4 las mismas, basta el panto deque estos fuuciou- arios no tenian aptitud legal para ser incluidos en los cuerpos gerarqui- cos similares de Espaiia, ni desempenar en ella an41ogas fuuciones. Este regimen es bajo el que vino Espaiia administrando 4 Cuba basta el momento presente. Sabemos bien que faera de Espaiia se incurre en gravisimos errores, por efecto de no ser conocido el regimen colonial Espaiiol, pero es tiempo ya, y sobre todo es necesario, en la occasion presente, que estos errores se desvanezcan, contrastandolos con la verdad de los becbos y con los preceptos de las leyes espanolas. Cuba y Puerto Eico nunca ban vivido dentro del presupuesto general de la Nacion espanola ni Bu este figuraron jamas sus ingresos, ni se incluyeron sus gastos. Todas las obligaciones que esten pendientes y hayau sido legalmente creadas para el servicio de Cuba y Puerto Rico y a cargo de sus especiales Tesoros, siempre distintos y separados del Tesoro de la Peninsula, son obligaciones cubanas 6 puertorriquenas, es decir, obligaciones locales, que afectau unica y exclusivamente al territorio de las Islas y 4 sus habitantes. TREATY OF PEACE. 39 Lo dicho basta aqui sobre la imturaleza de las obligaciones colo- niales y sobre los obligados a su cuiupliniiento, jamas lo ban devscono- cido, (dicho sea en su honor), los pueblos Hlspano-americanos. Aquellos conquistaron por su propio esluerzo su independencia y la mayor parte de ellos antes que Espana la hubiera reconocido, habian, por leyes anteriores y solemnes de sus Camaras, declarado propias y como las mas privilegiadas de todas las deudas, las que la Corona de Espana habia contraido durante su soberauia, para el servicio de aquellos ter- ritories, y se hallaban registradas en sus respectivos libros de Tesoreria. Son muy contadas las republicas hispano-americanas que aguardaron ^ haeer tan honrada declaracion, (i que la Metropoli reconociera su independencia, porque, como decian, la Kepublica Argentina en el Tra- tado que celebro con Espana en 21 de Septiembre de 1863, y la del Uruguay, en el que celebro en 19 de Julio de 1870, ''asicomo ellas adquirian los derechos y privilegios correspondientes 4 la Corona de Espana, contraian tambien todos sus deberes y obligaciones." Notese que las Eepublicas hispano americanas, sin excepcion, recono- cieron e hicieron suyas estas deudas de cualquier clase que fueran, detallandolas en el Tratado de paz con Bolivia de 21 de Julio de 1847, en que se dice que, "comprendian todos los creditos por pensiones, sueldos, suministros, anticipos, fletes, emprestitos forzosos, depositos, contratos y cualquiera otra deuda, ya de guerra, ya anterior 4 esta, que pesaren sobre aquellas Tesorerias, siempre que procediesen de ordenes directas del Gobierno Espaiiol 6 de sus autoridades constituidas en aquellos territorios." Espano no reconocio la independencia de ningim Estado americano que antes hubiera sido colouia suya, siuo con esta condicion, que aquellos Estados expontaneamente declararon en sus respectivos tra- tados, que era de perfecta justicia. Su derecho y su dignidad no le permiten recouocer sin esta condicion, que ahora mas que antes, si cabe, continua siendo de justicia, la inde- pendencia de los pueblos cubano y puertoriqueno que estos no ban podido conquistar por su propio y exclusivo esfuerzo. Espana esta dispuesta a ceder la soberania de Puerto- Rico y demds Islas de las Indias Occidentales, y 4 renunciar 4 la Soberania de la Isla de Cuba, todo a favor de los Estados Unidos, que babr^n de aceptarla; poniendo 4 su disposicion esta Soberania en el estado en que actual- mente la posee, y por lo tanto con los derechos y las cargas que actual- mente la constituyen. A esto se obligo en los articulos 1 " y 2 " del Protocolo firmado en Washington en 12 de Agosto ultimo y esto es lo que quiere cumplir con la mas exquisita lealtad en este Tratado. Est4 conforme Emilio de Ojbda [Translation.] Annex 2 to PRr»TOCOL No. 4. Memorandum succinetly setting forth the grounds or reasons of the pro- posed articles for the treaty of peace relating to the relinquishment by Spain of her sovereignty over Cuba and Porto Bico, presented to the conference by the Spanish Plenipotentiaries. The Spanish Plenipotentiaries accept the main idea of the proposed article, as drafted by the American Commissioners, relating to the relinquishment by Spain of her sovereignty over Cuba and tibe cession of 40 TREATY OF PEACE. her sovereignty over Porto Eico; but they arc unable to concur in the remaining portions of said draft; because, on tne one hand, they under- stand that part thereof goes beyond the proper scope of said relinquish- ment and cession; and because, on the other, the said relinquishment and cession as expressed in the said draft do not embody, in other ways, all that it is indispensable they should. I, IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT THK PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES SHOULD ACCEPT THE RELINQUISHMENT MADE BY HER CATHOLIC MAJESTY OF HER SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE ISLAND OF CUBA. The Government of the American Union never demanded that the Spanish Government abandon (abandonar) the sovereignty over Cuba, but that it relinquish (renunciar) the same, so that the island should become independent. It so appears from the diplomatic correspond- ence in the possession of the Government of Her Catholic; Majesty relating to the negotiation between the two contracting parties prior to the declaration of war. It was also thus declared by the American Congress in the Joint Eesolution of April 19 last, subsequently approved by the President of the United States. The first clause of that resolu- tion reads "that the people of Cuba are and of right ought to be free and independent." So also, on the 20th of the same month, did the Secretary of State in Washington instruct the American Minister in Madrid to say to the Spanish Government, using the identical language of the Joint Reso- lution, that "Spain should at once relinquish its authority and govern- ment in the Island of Cuba." And so, finally, was it set forth in Article I of the Protocol signed in Washington on the 12th of August last, the official text of which as signed in French and English by the representatives of the two High Contracting Parties reads as follows: "Article P'. L'Bspagne renoncera ^ toute pretention, a sa souve- rainete ot a tout droit surCuba," which literally translated into Spanish is as follows: "Espana renunciar^ 4 toda pretension 4 su soberania y A todo derecho sobre Cuba." To undertake to explain the essential difference which according to the elementary principles of public international law and the usage of nations exists between the abandonment (abaudono) and the relinquish- ment (renuncia) of sovereignty, would be to offend the intelligence of the learned American Commissioners. Abandoned territories can of right be acquired by the first occupant, while relinqiiished territories necessarily pass unto him to whom relin- quishment is made. And the United States demanded that Spain relinquish in order that the Cuban people might become independent. Although it is true that the United States of America demanded this of Spain in the present case, they also demanded that such relin- quishment must be made through them. The United States were to receive the Island of Cuba and retain the possession thereof, governing it until its pacification was secured, asserting its "determination to leave [no one can leave what he does not hold] the government and control of the island to its people, as soon as the said pacification is accomplished." So was it solemnly set forth in section 4 of the Joint Resolution of the American Congress and in the despatch of the Sec- retary of State to the American Minister at Madrid. And if the United States are not to leave the government and control of the island until TREATY OF PEACE. 41 tlie pacification thereof is accomplished, it is self-evident that in the mean time the United States are called ui)od to administer the one and retain the other. And in fact the United States held and continue to hold Santiago de Cuba and the other territories of the island where their arms are sui)reme without having delivered them over to the Cuban people, as the latter have not as yet any Government to represent them. And in the said Protocol of Washington (Article IV) it was agreed that the evacuation of the island by the Spanish troops and the details thereof should be arranged and carried out by a mixed commission consisting of Commis- sioners appointed by the Washington Government and by the Spanish Government, but not of Commissioners appointed by the Cubans. The Federal Government is therefore the one which must of necessity accept the relinquishment made by Spain of her sovereignty over the island, so as to retain the latter under its control and government until it is pacified, in which event, and not before, according to its own decla- rations, it will leave the sovereignty over that territory at the disposal .of the Government that may be constituted in Cuba. II. THE CESSION AND RELINQUISnMENT OF SOVEREIGNTY EMBRACES THE CESSION AND RELINQUISHMENT OF THE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS CONSTITUTING IT. The idea of the sovereignty of a state was never confounded in the ancient world, and much less in the modern and Christian world, with the idea of individual or private ownership. Much less still with the authority of the master over the slave. The sovereign, it is true, has prerogatives and rights over the terri- tory and its inhabitants; but these prerogatives and rights attach to him not for his own satisfaction and enjoyment but for the good gov- ernment and the welfare of the people subject to his rule. For this reason the rights of the sovereign become obligations with respect to his subjects. The sovereign is bound to see that they have good gov- ernment and to their progress and prosperity. The sovereign is not the owner of the tax proceeds or of the revenues he receives from his subjects, to be used for his own personal benefit, but to meet with them all public necessities and attend to the public welfare. The fulfilment of these obligations is the foundation of the legitimacy of his authority to enter into conventions and agreements of all kinds with third par- ties, to contract all the obligations necessary to raise means for the good administration of tlie government of his subjects, and to attend to the public service in the best possible manner. These obligations exist from the moment they are contracted until they are fulfilled. And it is perfectly self-evident that if during the period intervening between the assumption by a sovereign of an obli- gation and the fulfilment of the same, he shall cease to be bound thereby through relinquishment or any other lawful conveyance, the outstand- ing obligation passes as an integral part of the sovereignty itself to him who succeeds him. It would be contrary to the most elementary notions of justice and inconsistent with the dictates of the universal conscience of mankind for a sovereign to lose all his rights over a territory and the inhabitants thereof, and despite this to continue bound by the obliga- tions he had contracted exclusively for their regime and government. These maxims seem to be observed by all cultured nations that are unwilling to trample upon the eternal principles of justice, including those in which such cessions were made by force of arms and as a reward 42 TREATY OP PEACE. for victories throngli treaties relating to territorial cessions. Rare is the treaty in which, together with the territory ceded to the new sov- ereign, there is not conveyed a proportional part of the general obliga- tions of the ceding state, which in the majority of cases have been in the form of a public debt. But the case to which the convention to be framed by this conference refers is clearer still. It is not the purpose here to transfer, together with the sovereignty over Cuba and Porto Rico, a proportional part of the obligations and general charges of the mother country, but only the obligations and charges attaching individually to the islands ceded and transferred. When not treating of general obligations common to all the territories subject to the sovereign contracting the same, but of the special obligations of the particular territories ceded which were contracted by its legitimate authorities, in no single case, not even in those treaties in which the victor has shown himself most merciless towards the vanquished, have the individual and separate charges and obligations of a ceded territory failed to pass therewith. Thus it may be considered as an absolutely essential condition that the cession of territory carries with it the cession of the departmental, communal, and, generally speaking, individual obligations and debts of the ceded terri- tory. The Great Conqueror of this century never dared to violate this rule of eternal justice in any of the treaties he concluded with those sovereigns whose territories he appropriated in whole or in part, as a reward for his victories. Very well; it must be recorded that the sovereignty of Spain never ceased to administer its colonies in America, from the time of the dis- covery, separate from the mother country. Spanish America was always governed from the capital of the monarchy by a special council called "Council of the Indies", which in no wise interfered in the regime and government of the Peninsula, which was under a council designated as the "Council of Castile". The territory discovered by Columbus and other illustrious Spanish explorers who have rendered such great though not always appreciated services to civilization being divided into vice-royalties and captaincies- general, each of these small states collected its own revenues and met its own expenses, or contracted obligations to meet the necessities of its own separate government; and when one of these territories found itself with a permanent deficit, as was the case in the Island of Cuba, the nearest sister-colony came to its rescue. The Vice-royalty of Mex- ico from 1766 to 1806 annually assisted the Island of Cuba with heavy sums for its governmental needs and the development of its natural resources, at the time unexploited, which expenses it could not, at sucl time, meet from its own revenues. Kot less than 108 millions of pesos came into Cuba from Mexico during that period, this assistance being known in the Spanish colonial administration under the name of " Situ- ado de 3Iexico." During the present century Spain carried to the last extreme this system of the separate and independent administration of its colonies. The Ministry of the Colonies was the department where this adminis- tration was centered. Each colony had annually its own budget and deficits. When its own revenues were not sufficient to cover its own expenses, these were met by special operations in the way of consoli- dated, mortgage or floating debts, and were chargeable to the colony tor whose benefit such operations were conducted. And the separation of the administration of the Peninsula and the colonies was for a long time so complete, that the body of public TREATY OF PEACE. 43 employees in the executive and judicial services of the colonies was separate and independent, to the extent that these employees had not the legal capacity to be included in the similar hierarchical bodies of Spain, or to discharge therein like functions. This regime is the one under which Spain has been administering Cuba up to the present time. We are well aware that outside of Spain grave errors are fallen into, owing to the Spanish colonial system being unknown; but it is high time and above all at this juncture is it necessary that these errors be dissipated by comparing them with the actual facts and the jDrovisions of Spanish laws. Cuba and Porto Eico have never been included in the general budget of the Spanish nation, nor have their revenues ever figured therein, which is also true of their expenditures. All outstand- ing obligations that have been legally contracted for the service of Cuba and Porto Eico, and which are chargeable to their individual treasuries, always distinct and separate from the treasury of the Penin- sula, are Cuban or Porto Eican obligations, that is, local obligations, solely and exclusively affecting the territory of the islands and their inhabitants. What has been said up to this point regarding the nature of the colonial obligations and those bound thereby, has never been disre- garded (to their honor be it said) by the Spanish- American peoples. They achieved their independence through their own efforts, and the majority of them, before Spain had recognized it, had by prior and sol- emn act of their legislatures, declared as their own and as having pref- erence those debts which the Crown of Spain had contracted during the continuance of its sovereignty for the service of such territories, and which debts were recorded in their respective treasury books. Very few of the Spanish-American Eepublics delayed so honorable a declaration until the mother country had recognized their independence, as was said by the Argentine Eepublic in the treaty concluded with Spain on September 21, 1863, and by Uruguay, in that concluded on July 19, 1870 : "Just as they acquired the rights and privileges belonging to the Crown of Spain, they also assume all its duties and obligations." ISTote that the Spanish-American republics without exception recog- nized and assumed as their own these debts of every Tci?id whatsoever, specifying tliem in the treaty of peace with Bolivia of July 21, 1847, wherein it is stated that they "include all debts for pensions, salaries, supplies, advances, transportation, forced loans, deposits, contracts, and any other debt incurred during war times or prior thereto, chargeable to said treasuries ; provided they were contracted by direct orders of the Si»anish Government or its constituted authorities in said territories." Spain did not recognize the independence of any American state which had previously been her colony save upon this condition, which those states spontaneously incorporated in their respective treaties, as of right they should. Her right and her dignity will not permit her to recognize — without this condition, which now more than ever if possible is still just and proper — the independence of the Cuban and Porto Eican peoples, which they have not been able to achieve by their own unaided efforts. Spain is disposed to cede the sovereignty over Porto Eico and other islands of the West Indies, and to relinquish the sovereignty over the Island of Cuba, all in favor of the United States, which shall accept the same; she placing this sovereignty at their disposal in the condition in which she now holds it, and therefore, with the rights and charges at present constituting it. She bound herself to this by Articles I and II 44 TREATY OF PEACE. of the Protocol signed at Washington on August 12 last, and this is what she desires to carry out with the strictest faith in the present treaty. True copy: Emilio de Ojeda. Peotocol No 5. Conference of October 14, 1898. Present: On the part of the United States : Messrs. Day, Davis, Frye, Gray, Eeid, Moore, Fergusson. On the part of Spain: Messrs: Montero Rios Abarzuza Garnica Villa-Urrutia, Cerero, Ojeda. The protocol of the i)receding session was read and approved. The American Commissioners presented a rei)ly to the memoran- dum submitted by the Spanish Commissioners at the last session on the relinquishment of sover- eignty over Cuba and the transfer of debts. The paper was read, and a copy of it is hereto annexed. The Spanish Commissioners, re- ferring to the paper in which the American Commissioners rejected at the conference of the 11th in- stant the articles presented by the Spanish Commissioners at the con- ference of the 7th, on the subject of Cuba and Porto-Kico, called at- tention to the following sentence: "To the American Commission- ers this appears to be not a propo- sition to 'relinquish all claim of sovereignty over and title to Cuba,' but in substance a proposition to 'transfer' to the United States and in turn to Cuba a mass of Spanish charges and obligations." The Spanish Commissioners de- sired a modification of this sen- tence on the ground that it might be thought to imply that they were not acting in good faith. The American Commissioners stated that in their opinion the sentence did not convey such an Protocolo No. 5. Conferencia del 14 de Octithre de .1898. Presentes. Por parte de los Es- tados Unidos de America los Se- iioresDay, Davis, rrye,Gray, Reid, Moore, Fergusson. Por parte de Espana los Senor- es Montero Rios Abarzuza, Garn- ica, Villa-Urrutia, Cerero, Ojeda. El protocolo de la sesion ante- rior fue leido y apro])ado. Los Oomisionados Americanos presentaron uno, contestacion al Memorandum que los Oomisiona- dos Espaiioles sometieron en la iiltima sesion acerca de la renuncia de la soberania sobre Cuba y la transferencia de sus deudas. El documento fue leido incluyendose una copia anexa 4 esta acta. Los Comisiouados Espanoles, re- firiendose al escrito en el cual los Comisionados Americanos rechaza- ron en la Conferencia del dia 11 del corriente los articulos presentados por los Comisionados Espanoles en la conferencia del 7, acerca de Cuba y Puerto Rico, llamaron la atencion sobre la siguiente frase: "Creen los Comisionados Ameri- canos que esto no parece ser una proposicion para renunciar a toda pretension de soberania y 4 todo derecho sobre Cuba, sino m^s bien una proposicion para transferir a los Estados Unidos y estos a su vez a Cuba, una masa de cargas y obli- gaciones espaiiolas." Los Comisionados espanoles pi- dieron la raodificacion de esta frase fundandoseenquepudieraimplicar que ellos no procediau de buena fe. Los Comisionados Americanos manifestaron que en su opinion la frase no tenia tal interi)retaci6n, TREATY OF PEACE. 45 imputntioi), bnt, out of deference to the ;:i.]);ii!i.sl] Comujissioiieis, they altered it so as to read as follows : "To the American Commission- ers this appears to be not a propo- sition to 'relinquish all claim of sovereignty over and title to Cuba,' but in effect a proposition to ' trans- fer' to the United States and in turn to Cuba a mass of charges and obligations which, in the opinion of the American Commis- sioners, properly belong to Spain." This matter having been dis- posed of, the Spanish Commission- ers stated that, before proceeding with the discussion of the ques- tions under consideration, they de- sired it to be understood that, if certain articles should be agreed to, but in the end no treaty should be signed, the articles so agreed to should not in such case be taken as expressing either Government's estimation of its just rights in re- spect of the subjects to which the articles related. The American Commissioners concurred in this view. The Joint Commission then pro- ceded to the oral discussion of the points discussed in the Spanish memorandum of October 11 and the American reply of to-day. After the discussion of the first point, — the question whether the sovereignty over Cuba should be relinquished to the United States — was exhausted, without any agree- ment having been reached upon it, the American Commissioners iDro- posed to take up the second point, — the question whether charges and obligations constituted a part of the sovereignty and as such passed with it. The Spanish Commissioners sug- gested that if no agreement could be reached on the first point, it seemed te be needless to discuss the second. The American Commissioners, concurring in this view, proposed that, owing to the lateness of the pero que por deferencia ^ los Comi- sionados Espanoles,la modificaban en los terminos siguientes : "Creen los Comisionados Amer- icanos que esto no paiece ser una proposicion para renunciar 4 toda pretension de soberania y 4 todo derecho sobre la Isla de Cuba, sino que en realidad es una proposicion para transferir 4 los Bstados Unidos y estos a Cuba una masa de cargas y obligaciones que en opinion de los Comisionados Americanos per- tenecen realmeute 4 Espaua." Eesnelto esto asunto, los Comi- sionados Espanoles manifestaron que antes de proceder a la dis- cusion de las cuestiones sometidas 4 estndio, deseaban que se estab- leciera, que si algunos articulos fuesen aprobados, pero que al final no se llegase d firmar un Tratado, tales articulos aprobados no de- berian en ningun caso ser conside- rados como expresando la opinion de cualquiera de los Gobiernos sobre sus justos derechos respecto 4 los asuntos a los cuales dichos articulos se referian. Los Comisarios Americanos acep- taron esta proposicion. Luego la Comision procedio a la discusion oral de los puntos que se tratan en el Memorandum Espanol del 11 de octubrey a la contestacion Americana presentada hoy. Y habiendose discutido, sin que se llegase a un acuerdo el primer punto, relativo 4 si la soberania sobre Cuba deberia renunciarse a favor de los Estados Unidos, los Comisarios Americanos propusie- ron continuar con el segundo 6 sea la cuestion de si las cargas y obliga- ciones constituian una parte de la soberania y como tales debian transmitirse con esta. Los Comisionados Espafioles in- dicaron que si no se podia llegar 4 un acuerdo en el primer punto, no parecia oportuno continuar la dis- cusion del segundo. Los Comisionados Americanos opinaron de la misma manera y propusieron que dado lo avanzado 46 TREATY OF PEACE. liour, tlie conference be adjourned de la iiora, se aplazara la confer- to continue the discussion of the encia para contiuuar la discusiou first point at the next session, which del primer punto en la proxima should be held on Monday, the 17th sesion, que se celebrara el Lunes 17 of October, at two o'clock, p. m. de Octubre a las dos de la tarde. The Spanish Commissioners Los Oomisionados Espanoles ap- agreeing, the conference was ad- robaron esta mocion y en su con- journed accordingly. secuencia se suspendio la confer- encio. William R. Day E. Montero Eios CusHMAN K. Davis B. de Abarzuza Wm. P Feye J. DE Garnica Geo. Gray W R de Villa Urrutia Whitelaw Reid. Rafael Cerero John B. Moore. Emilio de Ojeda Annex to Protocol Ko. 5. The American Commissioners hereby present their reply to the mem- orandum which the Spanish Commissioners, under the rules of the Commission, submitted on the 11th instant, for the purpose of giving their reasons in support of the articles which the American Commis- sioners had rejected, in relation to Cuba and Porto Rico. I. The Spanish memorandum, referring to the demands of the United States before the war, to the joint resolution of Congress, and to the language of Article I of the Protocol of August 12, 1898, maintains that it is "imperative" that the United States "should accept the relinquishment made by Hei Catholic Majesty of her sovereignty over the Island of Cuba". This contention is based upon the fact that in the various documents referred to the United States required Spain to "relinquish "her sovereignty, but did not demand that she "abandon" it. A distinction is thus made between a relinquishment and an abandon- ment; and it is argued that while '■'■ abandoned territories''^ become dere- lict, so that they may be acquired by the first occupant, '•^relinquished territories''^ necessarily pass to him to whom relinquishment is made. The American Commissioners are unable to admit that such a dis- tinction between the words in question exists either in law or in com- mon use. The word "relinquish ', as defined m the English dictionaries, means "to give up the possession or occupancy of; withdraw from; leave; abandon; quit." Again: "to renounce a claim to; resign; as, to relin- quish a debt." On the other hand, we find in that great monument of Spanish learn- ing, the law dictionary of Escriche {Diccionario de Legislacion y Jurispru- dencia), under the word renunciar, which the Spanish memorandum declares to be the equivalent of the French word renoncer (used in Spain's version of the Protocol) and of the English word "relinquish", the following definition- "The voluntary giving up of a right exercised or expected to be exercised, or of a thing held or possessed or expected to be held or possessed." TREATY OF PEACE. ' 47 Commenting upon tins definition, Escriclie says: "The relinquishment diifers from the cession in that the latter requires for its comi)letion the concurrence of the wills of the grantor and the grantee and a just cause for the transfer, while the former is perfect with only the will of the reliuquisher. The effect of the relin- quishment is confined to the abdication or dropj^ing of the right or thing relinquished. The effect of the cession is the conveyance of the right to the grantee," The distinction thus drawn, not between relinquisliment and abandon- ment, which are treated both in English and in Spanish as practically the same, but between relinquishment and cession^ is written ui)on the face of the Protocol, which, while obligating Spain (Article I) to "relin- quish all claim of sovereignty over and title to Cuba," in the next article requires her to "cede to the United States the Island of Porto Eico and other islands now under Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies, and also an island in the Ladrones, to be selected by the United States". If it were true, as maintained in the Spanish memorandum, that the act of relinquishment includes, and requires for its completion, the process of legal transfer from one hand to another, and thus constitutes in form and in eff"ect a cession, it is obvious that the contracting par- ties, in framing the Protocol, employed, in stipulations which were deliberately separated and sharply contrasted, different words to express the same meaning. The American Commissioners understand the Spanish memorandum to maintain that their Government, prior to the war, demanded of Spain, in effect if not in words, the relinquishment of her sovereignty over Cuba to the United States. The Spanish memorandum doubtless refers to the demand a copy of which was communicated by the Secretary of State of the United States to the Spanish Minister at Washington on the 20th of April last. The precise words of this demand are "that the Government of Spain at once relinquish its authority and Govern- ment in the island of Cuba and Cuban waters"; and the demand is accompanied by the declaration that the United States, in taking the step, "disclaims any disposition or intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over said island except for the pacification thereof, and asserts its determination, when that is accomplished, to leave the government and control of the island to its people under such free and independent Government as they may establish". To this demand the United States required by a certain time "a full and satisfactory response * * *, whereby the ends of peace in Cuba shall be assured ". From the demand thus fully set forth, the Spanish memorandum extracts the assertion by the United States of its determination "to leave the government and control of the island to its people," and, omitting both what precedes and what follows, construes that asser- tion as a demand "that such relinquishment must be made through them" (the United States). The demand as a whole, however, carefully and clearly excludes this construction. Not only is the assertion pre- ceded, in the same sentence, by an express disclaimer on the part of the United States of any disposition or intention to take the sovereignty of the island, but the assertion itself includes an express declaration of a determination to allow the island to remain, after pacification, " under such free and independent Government" as may be established by its people. To this construction of the demand we may ai)ply a simple test. If 48 ' TREATY OF PEACE. Spain had answered that she would relinquish her sovereignty over the Island of Cuba, and had at the same time declared that it was not her intention to relinquish it to the United States, would anyone have imagined that she had failed to make "a full and satisfactory response" to the demand? 11. The second part of the Spanish memorandum is devoted to an argu- ment to maintain the proposition that "the cession and relinquishment of sovereignty embraces the cession and relinquishment of the rights and obligations constituting it." The American commissioners are not disposed to comment upon the indefiniteness of this proposition, or upon the fallacies involved in treating the obligations wliich a sovereign may incur in the exercise of his sovereignty as a part of the sovereignty itself. National sovereignty [soherania naciofial), as defined by high Spanish authority [Noinsimo Biccionario enciclopedico de la lengua castellana, por D. Delhu Donadin y Bnignau, based on the Dictionary of the Spanish Academy), is "the right which a nation has of organizing the public powers in such a way as it may deem advisable." This right, though it includes the power to contract obligations, is in no sense composed of them. The thing done in the exercise of sovereignty is not a part of the sover- eignty itself; the power to create is not the thing created. Nor is it possible to shut our eyes to the fact that in the Spanish memorandum the term obligations is used indiscriminately in respect of two different things, namely, tlie duties which a sovereign as such owes to his sub- jects, and the debts which he may specially contract in the exercise of his sovereign power for his own purposes. With these preliminary observations, the American Commissioners proceed to the consideration of the specific matter before them. The American Commissioners note the declaration in the Spanish memorandum that there is no i)urpose now to transfer with the sover- eignty of Cuba and Porto Eico a proportional part of the national debt of Spain, but "only the obligations and charges attaching individually to the islands," which obligations and charges it likens to the local debts which pass with ceded territory. It appears, however, by the expla- nation given in the memorandum of the origin of these charges and obligations, and of the manner in which they were contracted, that they include the whole of what is commonly called the Cuban debt. The American Commissioners, therefore, while reaffirming their position as to the exclusion by the Protocol of any proposal for the assumption of such charges and obligations, will examine the subject in some of its aspects. It is true that the financial department of the Island of Cuba, com- monly called the "Cuban Treasury," was not a branch of the Spanish Treasury, but it is equally true that it was accountable to the Spanish Secretary for the Colonies, the Ministro de Ultramar, and that it was managed by a body of officials appointed by the Crown, at whose head was a high functionary, called Inteiidente General de Hacienda. In each year a budget was made up by the Spanish Colonial Secretury on data furnished by the lutendente General, and this budget was submitted to and acted upon by the Cortes. If in any year the revenues collected in Cuba were insufficient to meet the burdens imposed upon them, the deficit was charged to the island, and formed a new item of the Cuban debt. It thus appears that the finances of the island were exclusively TKEATY OF PEACE. 49 controlled by the Spanish Government, and that the debt was in no sense created by Cuba as a province or department of Spain, or by the people of the island. In reality it is notorious that the denial to Cuba of any financial autonomy and of any power to protect herself against the imposition by Spanish othcials of enormous burdens for purposes foreign and adverse to her interests, has been the most prolific source of discontent in the island. The debt creating power, such as com- monly belongs to communes or municipal corporations, never was dele- gated to Cuba. Such a thing as a Cuban obligation, created by the island in the exercise of powers either inherent or delegated, is unknown to the markets of the world. Having briefly sketched the system of financial administration with respect to Cuba, we may consider the origin of the debt. Prior to 18G1 no so-called Cuban debt existed. The revenues of the island were as a rule far more than sufficient to pay the exj)enses of its government, and produced in each year a sur- plus. This surplus was not expended for the benefit of the island, but was sent to Madrid. The surpluses thus disposed of amounted, from 1856 to 1861 inclusive, to upwards of $20,000,000. In 1804, in order to meet the national expenses of the attempt to " reincorporate" San Domingo into the Spanish dominions, and of the "expedition to Mexico", the Spanish authorities issued bonds to the amount of $3,000,000. Subsecjuently new loans were made, so that the so-called Cuban debt had swollen by 1868 to $18,000,000. In that year the ten years war for Cuban independence broke out, a war produced by causes so generally conceded to be just as to need no exposition on this occasion. All the expenses of this war were imposed upon Cuba, so that in 1880, according to a statement made at Madrid in that year by a Spanish Secretary for the Colonies, the so called Cuban debt amounted to upwards of $170,000,000. Subsequently the Spanish Government undertook to consolidate these debts, and to tliis end created in 1880 the so called Billetes hipotecarios de la Isla de Cuba, to the amount of 620,000,000 pesetas, or $124,000,000. The Spanish Government undertook to pay these bonds and the interest thereon out of the revenues of Cuba, but the national character of the debt was shown by the fact that, upon the face of the bonds, " the Spanish nation" {la Nacion espafiola) guaranteed their payment. The annual charge for interest and sinking fund on account of this debt amounted to the sum of 39,191,000 pesetas, or $7,838,200, which was disbursed through a Spanish financial institution, called the Banco Hispano- Colonial, which is said to have collected daily from the custom house at Havana, through an agency there established, the sum of $33,339. In 1890 a new issue of bonds was authorized by the Spanish Govern- ment, to the amount, as it is understood, of 875,000,000 pesetas, or $175,000,000, with the same guarantee as before, apparently with a view to refund the prior debt, as well as to cover any new debts contracted between 1886 and 1890. It seems, however, that only a small number of these bonds had been disposed of when in February, 1895, the last insurrection and movement for independence broke out. The Govern- ment of Spain then proceeded to issue these new bonds for the purpose of raising funds with which to suppress the uprising, so that those out- standing on January 1, 1898, amounted, according to published reports, to 858,550,000 pesetas, or $171,710,000. In addition to these a further loan, known as the " Cuban War Emergency Loan", was, as the Ameri- T P 1 50 TREATY OF PEACE. can Commissioners are ad^dsed, floated to the amount of 800,000,000 pesetas, or $160,000,000, represented by what are called "live per cent peseta bonds ". Although it does not appear that any mention is made in these bonds of the revenues of Cuba, it is understood that they are regarded in Spain as properly constituting a part of the "Cuban Debt", together with various unliquidated debts, large in amount, incurred by the Span- ish authorities in opposing by arms the independence of Cuba. From no point of view can the debts above described be considered as local debts of Cuba or as debts incurred for the benefit of Cuba. In no sense are they obligations properly chargeable to that island. They are debts created by the Government of Spain, for its own purposes and through its own agents, in whose creation Cuba had no voice. From the moral point of view, the proposal to impose them upon Cuba is equally untenable. If, as is sometimes asserted, the struggles for Cuban independence have been carried on and supported by a minor- ity of the people of the island, to imi^ose upon the inhabitants as a whole the cost of suppressing the insurrections would be to punish the many for the deeds of the few. If, on the other hand, those struggles have, as the American Commissioners maintain, represented the hopes and aspirations of the body of the Cuban people, to crush the inhabit- ants by a burden created by Spnin in the eflbrt to oppose their inde- pendence, would be even more unjust. The American Commissioners deem it unnecessary, after what has been stated, to enter into an examination of the general references, made in the Spanish memorandum, to cases in which debts contracted by a state have, upon its absorption, been assumed by the absorbing state, or to cases in which, upon the partition of territory, debts con- tracted by the whole have been by special arrangement apportioned. They are conceived to be inapplicable, legally and morally, to the so- called "Cuban Debt", the burden of which, imposed upon the people of Cuba without their consent and by force of arms, was one of the prin- cipal wrongs for the termination of which the struggles for Cuban independence were undertaken. The American Commissioners have deemed it due to the Spanish Commissioners and to themselves to make these observations ujion the general subject of Cuban "charges and obligations", apart from the special circumstances under which the i)resent negotiations were begun. But, as they have heretofore stated, they consider the subject to be dis- posed of beyond all question by tlie Protocol. The suggestion that their government should assume, eitlier for itself or for Cuba or Porto Eico, the burden of the "charges and obligations" now in question was not put forward during the negotiations that resulted in the con- clusion of that convention, nor, if it had been so put forward, would it have been for a moment entertained by the United States. From unselfish motives, of which it is unnecessary to make a renewed declaration, the Government of the United States, at great sacrifice of life and treasure, has prosecuted the conflict which followed its demand for the relinquishment by Spain of sovereignty over Cuba. One of the results of that conflict is the unconditional agreement, embodied in the first article of the Protocol, that Spain " will relin- quish all claim of sovereignty over and title to Cuba". Upon the sim- ple fulfilment of that stipulation the American Commissioners are obliged to insist. True copy: John B. Moore, TREATY OF PEACE. 51 Protocol No. 6. Conference of October 17^ 1898, Present On the part of the United States Messrs. Day Davis Frye Gray Eeid Moore Fcrgusson. Oil the part of Spain Messrs. Montero Eios Abarzu/a Garnica Cerero. Messrs. Villa- TJrrutia and Ojeda were absent because of illness. The protocol of the preceding session was read and approved. The President of the Spanish Couimission stated that, without making any formal protest, he de- sired to bring to the attention of the American Commissioners the fact that he had received from his Government a telegram referring to reports to the eli'ect that two Ameri- can men-of-war were about to leave American ports with reenforce- ments of troops for the garrison at Manila, and that Spanish prison- ers in the possession of the Tag- alos are ill-treated. He would not read the telegram, but as such re- ports tended to excite the public mind and embarrass the efforts to establish peace and concord be- tween the two nations, he hoped that the American Commissioners would bring the matter to the knowledge of their Government. The President of the American Commission replied that the Amer- ican Commissioners possessed neither information nor instruc- tions such as would enable them to deal with the subject, which properly belonged to the two Gov- ernments, but that, prompted by motives similar to those avowed by the President of the Spanish Com- mission, they would communicate to their Government the fact that the reports in question had been brought to their attention The discussion of the business before the Joint Commission hav- Protocolo IST" 6. Gonferencia del 17 de Octuhre de 1898. Presentes Por parte de los Es- tados Unidos de America, los Se- n ores Day, Davis, Frye, Gray, Keid, Moore, Fergusson. Por parte de Espana. los Seijores Montero Eios, Abarzuza, Garnica, Cerero. Los Comisarios espaiioles in- forman 4 los Americanos que los Se- uores Villa-Urrutia y Ojeda no pueden asistir a la conferencia por hallarse eufermos. Se leyo y fu6 aprobada el acta anterior. El Senor Presidente de la Co- mision Espanola, sin hacer una reclamacion concreta, llama la atencion de los Seiiores Comisarios Americanos acercadeun telegrama que ha recibido del Gobierno Es- paiiol relativo al envio a Manila de dos buques de guerra Americanos y refuerzos de tropas a la guarni- ciou de Manila, asi como 4 los malos tratamientos de que sou victimas los esi^aiioles prisioneros de los tagalos, y sin leer dicho tele- grama, ruega k los Sen ores Comi- sionados Americanos lo pongan en conocimiento del Gobierno de Washington 4 fin de evitar que esos hechos fomenten la eferves- cencia del espiritu publico y enar- deciendo las pasior ella que los Comisarios espafioles aceptaban los articulos presentados jjor la Comision amer- icana relativos 4 Cuba, Puerto Rico y Guam. Los Comisarios EspaQoles con- testaron que los aceptaban en el sentido expresado en su documen- to, y subordinada su aceptacion 4 la aprobacion de los dem4s articu- los (jue hay^tde contener el Tratado de paz. A propuesta de los Comisarios Americanos, se aplazo la proxima conferencia para el 27 de Octubre 4 las 2 P. M., 4 fin de que los Comi- sarios Americanos pudieran estu- diar con todo detenimiento la con- testacion dada por los Comisarios Espafioles. E. Montero Rios B. DE ABARZUZA J. DE GARNICA W R DE Villa Ureutia Rafael Cerero Emilio de Ojeda treaty of peace. 63 Annex to Protocol Ko. 9. comision paea la negociacion db la paz con los estados unidos. [Memoraudum presentado en la aosion de 21 de Outubre 1898.] Los Comisarios espaiioles se ban enterado con verdadera pena del Memorandum presentado por los Senores Comisarios americanos en la conferencia liltima celebrada en 17 del corriente. En este documento dicbos Senores, fuudtindose en afirmaciones y apreciaciones con cuya esactitud la Comision espanola no puede manifestarse conforme, {i pesar de la recta iutencion con que, no duda, que fuerou expuestas, concluyen aquellos por mauifestar que sustituyeii el i^royecto de los dos articulos sobre Cuba y las demiis islas, que babian presentado en la conferencia de 3 del corriente, con otios dos, reducidos a la copia literal de los dos primeros articulos del Protocolo de Wasbiugton, alegaiido para esto que entienden que el Tratado de paz, en cuauto se refiere a la soberania de las Aiitillas y de la Isla de Guam en las Marianas, no debe contener mas ni menos que la reproduccion literal de aquellos dos articulos. Mas como estos ya forman i)arte de un Couvenio obligatorio cual lo es el Protocolo de Wasbington, j^arece iniltil bacer de ellos una mera reproduccion en el tratado que ba de elaborarse en la conferencia. Los contratos, asi en el orden privado como en el internacional, son per- fectos, y producen todos sus efectos para las partes que los bayan otor- gado, sin necesidad de niuguua confirmacion posterior que en nada puede aumentar su eficacia. Parece, por esto, reduudante esta reproduccion, si 4 ella se ba de limitar el Tratado de paz sobre las Antillas, como quieren los Senores Comisarios americanos. Si esta consideracion es de pura razon y aun de mero buen sentido, la propuesta de los Comisarios americanos no se comprende sino en el supuesto de que estos entienden que el Tratado, aparte de cualquier disposicion de caracter secundario que en 61 pueda inciuirse, no debe versar mds que sobre el Arcbipielago Fibpino. Si tal es el pensamiento de la Comision Americana, la EspaSola no puede prestarle su asentimiento porque entiende que su ejecucion seria una iufraccion del Protocolo. Despu^s de las tres condiciones que el Seiior Secretario de Estado de Wasbington, contestando en 31 de Julio ultimo al Mensaje del Gobierno de Su Majestad Catolica, de 22 del mismo mes, propuso ^ Espafia para terminar la guerra, dijo: "Si las condiciones ofrecidas aqui son acep- tadas en su integridad, los Estados Uuidos nombrariin Comisarios que se encontraran con los igualmente autorizados por Espaiia, con objeto de arreglar los detaUes del Tratado de paz y de firmarlo en las condi- ciones arriba expresadas." Estos detaUes no aparecen circunscritos al arcbipielago. El propio Seiior Presidente de la Eeptiblica Americana, en la confe- rencia que celebro el 10 de Agosto con el Senor Embajador de Francia, representante de Espai5a para el caso, distinguio perfectamente el Pro- tocolo del tratado de paz, diciendo que aqu61 debia ser un mero documento preliniinar que no tendria por objeto ni por efecto m4s que consagrar sin dilacion alguna el acuerdo de los dos Gobiernos sobre los principios mismos de la paz, y que, por lo tanto, no seria necesario reservar en el, ni los derecbos de las Cortes, ni los del Senado federal, llamados iinicamente a ratificar el Tratado definitivo. El Senor Presidente, es verdad, bablo del asunto de las Filipinas para decir que quedaba reservado a la Conferencia de Paris, pero nunca dijo, 64 TREATY OF PEACE. ni indico siquiera, que este asunto habria de ser el unico que se trataria eu esta Coufereucia. Y finalmente, en el Articulo 5« del Protocolo, redactado de couformidad con todos estos precedeates, se dice que los Comisarios uombrados por ambas Altas Partes habiau de proceder eu Paris a uegociar y coucluir un Tratado de paz sin limitar ni concretar su objeto y empleaudo, por la iuversa, una frase cuyo evidente seutido es que eu el Tratado de paz que se elaborase por la Coiuisiou habian de resol verse todas las cues- tiones, a la sazon pendieutes, entre los dos Estados, que no estuviesen resueltas ya en el acuerdo preliminar del Protocolo. Cierto es que los Seuores Comisarios Americanos fundau precisamente su ultimo proyecto en la consideracion de que todo lo relativo a las Autillas espaiiolas ya fue resuelto eu el Protocolo. Mas 4 esta consi- deracion es precisameute a la que desde la primera conferencia no ban podido ni pueden prestar su aseiitimieuto los Comisarios espaSoles. Los Americanos en su Memorandum de II de este mes manifestaron que los Comisarios espafioles, ponian en su proyecto condiciones a la renuncia de la soberania en Cuba. Gravisimo error. En aquel pro- yecto no se desconoce el caracter puro e incondicional de tal renuncia, lo unico que alii se hace es consiguar eu lo que esta remmcia consiste. Y esto es esencialmente diverso de lo que los Seuores Comisarios Americanos entieuden. Y que, efectivamente, los articulos del proyecto de los espanoles tiene por uuico objeto fijar el seutido de la reuuucia, pero no someterla a condicioues, est^ demostrado por el objeto mismo de las discusioues orales y escritas que vienen mediaudo entre los uuos y los otros. Los SeQores Comisarios Americauos eiitiendeu que el linico seutido que ijuede darse 4 la renuncia de soberauia couvenida en el Protocolo, es el propio del abandono de esta soberania; para deducir de aqui, que Espaiia debe abandonar la Isla de Cuba como cualquier potencia puede abandonar un territorio desierto del Africa que antes bubiera poseido. Por mas que la Comision espaQola distingue el seutido juridico de la palabra abandono del que es propio de la reniincia, no sostendria esta discusiou tecnica, impropia de una Coufereucia diplomatica, siud fuera porque la Comision Americana sostieue su opiuion como el principal fuudamento que da (i su aspiraciou de que, por tal supuesto abaudouo, quede cortado todo vinculo de derecho y niuguuo nuevo surja de aquel acto, entre Bspana y los Estados XJnidos, al apoderurse de la Isla, bien en su propio nombre y para ellos mismos, bien en nombre y para el pueblo cubauo. Pero esta aspiraciou, sin ejemplo eu los fastos diplomdticos del muudo, no pueden admitirla los Comisarios espanoles, daudo por reproducido cuanto expusieron en el primer capitulo del Memorandum que preseu- tarou en contra del proyecto de articuladode la Comisiou Americana, y auaden las breves consideraciones siguieutes, que les sugieren los dos Memorandum ultimameute preseutados por la misma. Deja la espaiiola 4 uu lado la cita que, en apoyo de su opinion, la Comisiou Americana liace del Diccionario de Escriche, que es una obra muy respetable ciertamente, pero cuyo unico objeto es la exposiciou de la jurisprudeucia pr^ictica del Derecho privado, exposiciou muy popular, es verdad, eu Espaua, porque sirve de mentor a los jovenes abogados en el primer periodo de su vida profesional, pero que es completamente agena a la cieucia del Dereclio internacional y publico. Cases de abandono, en el seutido que se pretende, no registra la his- toria moderna de los pueblos mas que los de territories desiertos, 6 alo sumo, poblados por las tribus barbaras del Africa. Abandono de un TEEATY OF PEACE. 65 verdadevo Estado, ya formado, de existencia secular, con una organiza- cion social y politica completa y poblado de habitantes que gozan y tieneu derecho 4 gozar de todos los beneficios de la civilizacion moderna, no ba habido liasta abora, ni creen los Comisarios espanoles que lo habra en el mundo. Los territorios abandonados son legitimamente ocupados per el Estado que quiera establecer en ellos su soberania. Mas esta ocupa- cion, meraraeiite de lieclio, no impoiie al ocupante otros deberes mils que los que en las regiones de Africa cumplen las potencias de Europa con las barbaras tribus que los pueblan 6 los recorren. j Cree la Comision Americana que los Estados Unidos en concepto de ocupantes de la Isla de Cuba, puesto que este es el unico en que segun el supuesto que defieiulen, liabran de posesionarse de ella, no ban de tener para con los babitautes de la graude Antilla mas deberes que los que se cumplen con aquellos degradados seres humauos? Tenemos la completa seguridad de que no es tal el pensaraiento de los SeSores Comisarios Americanos, pero 4 esta consecuencia fatalmente couduce A la Comision americana, su empeno en negar toda diferencia de derecbo entre los efectos del abandouo y los efectos de la renimcia. A esta no obsta la protesta de los Seiiores Comisarios Americanos en su ultimo Memorandum, afirmando que los Estados Unidos dispensardn 4 los babitantes de Cuba y 4 sus propiedades toda la proteccion que necesiten, como vienen baci^ndolo en la pequena porcion de territorio que en la isla ya ocupan por la fuerza de las armas. ^ Creen los Estados Unidos que 4 Espaua con relacion 4 la Isla de Cuba y 4 sus babitantes, no debeu reconoccrsele por aquellos m4s derecbos al dejar su soberania, que los que Estados Unidos 6 cualquiera otra Potencia se apresurarian 4 reconocer 4 la m4s desgraciada de las tribus africanas de cuyo territorio se apoderaran? Pero, aparte de que ellos mismos no dan 4estaobliga- ci6n que dicen que tienen, m4s fuudamento que el hecbo de ser posee- dores de la Isla, lo cual confirma lo que acabamos de iudicar, tambien es cierto que dichos Seiiores Comisarios no se prestan 4 que esta, ni otra obligacion alguua de los Estados Unidos, se consigue en el tratado que, segun exigen, ba de limitarse 4 la reproduccion de los dos primeros articulos del Protocolo. Por lo tanto esaobligaci6n que en el Memoran- dum dicen que contraen no ser4 exigible por no constar en el Tratado, y sin ^nimo de ofensa para los Estados Unidos, la logica no permite que se niegue en absoluto, la posibilidad de que pase, en m4s 6 en menos, con ella, lo que con las obligaciones que expont4neamente contrageron los Estados Unidos en las negociaciones que prepararon el Protocolo y que, esto no obstante, los Senores Comisarios americanos se niegan 4 que consten en el Tratado. Las C4maras de los Estados Unidos en su resolucion conjunta, y el Seiior PrCvSidente de la Union en su ultimatum 4 F^8i)aria, pudo exigir 4 esta JSJ^aciou, aunque iniitil es decir que Espana no bubiera accedido 4 tan enorme exigencia, el abandono absoluto de su soberania en Cuba en el sentido en que abora lo exigen sus Comisarios, como pudo tambien exigirle su cesion franca y libre de toda carga 4 los Estados Unidos. Mas lo cierto es que no lo exigio, porque se limito 4 reclamarle la renun- cia de su soberania para que el pueblo cuhauo fuer a libre e indepeiidiente, 6 lo que es lo mismo, la renuncia, de su soberania en favor del pueblo cubano, para que fuera libre 6 independiente, si bien, al mismo tiempo, no consintio y antes bien exigio, que esta renuncia fuera, desde luego, hecba 4 favor de los Estados Unidos, para aqu^l pueblo 4 quien los Estados Unidos babian de prestar ayuda y direccion, porque no de" otro modo era posible que la Isla de Cuba dejara de pasar directa 6 T P 5 GG TREATY OF PEACE. inmediatnTnente del poder de EspaSa al del pueblo ciibano, para haber de permauecer en poder de los Estados Unidos hasta la ])aeificaci6n de la isla. Esto nos parece que los Sefiores Comisarios Americanos no l^ueden menos de reconocerlo como rigurosameute exacto. T si tales fueron los termiuos en que los Estados Unidos encerraron su exigencia a que al fin accedio Espaiia sin que aquellos los hubiesen previamente modificado, es claro como la luz del Sol, que el convenio de que es formula el articulo 1° del Protocolo, (pues otro no se celebro eutie las dos Altas Partes) tiene necesariamente que entenderse en el sentido de los terminos en que fue propuesto por una de ellas, y aceptado por la otra, y que no es licito aliora 4 cualquiera de ellas alterar estos termi- nos con el fin de couvertir aquella renuncia, exigida para un objeto determiiiado, y A tenor de un procedimiento establecido, en un abandono absolute sin el objeto y procedimiento couvenidos, como el que pretende la Comision Americana que se haga. No es pues el caso del abandono que la Comision Americana exige, sino el de la renuncia couvenida que la Espanola sostiene, el que ha de consiguarse en el tiatado. Es un caso analogo a tantos otros por que ban pasado las potencias coloniales cuando perdieron su soberauia en todas 6 parte de sus colonias. Jamas una potencia colonial abandono, en el sentido que ahora se quiere imponer, una colonia para que se convirtiese en un nuevo Estado independiente y libre. Cuando esto sucedio, la Metropoli cedio 6 renuncio su soberania, si antes la colonia niisma no la Labia conquistado por la fuerza de las armas, pero jam^s la abandono en el sentido sobredicho. Si los Seiiores Comisarios ameri- canos no estan conformes con esta categorica afirmacion, les rogamos que nos citen un caso que la contradiga. Los Comisarios espauoles ruegan tambien 4 los Seiiores Comisarios americanos que fijen su atencion, tan ilustrada y serena, en la contra- diccion palpitante que resalta entre su teoria y los heclios que los Estados Unidos vieneu llevando 4 cabo. Segun la Comision Americana la unica situacion legal posible sobre la Isla de Cuba, entre Espafla de una parte y los Estados Unidos por si, 6 en nombre del pueblo cubano, de la otra, es la siguiente: Espafla debe abandonar la Isla de Cuba. Los Estados Unidos despues del abandono ban de posesionarse de la Isla para el pueblo cubano. Y por consiguiente el transito de la Gran Antilla de una 4 otra situa- cion, ha de hacerse sin establecerse vinculo alguno de derecho entre Espana y su antigua colonia y por ella los Estados Unidos. Pues bien, las fuerzas de los Estados Unidos rindieron a Santiago de Cuba, y firmaron con las Autoridades militares espafiolas una capitulacion. En esta no exigieron que las fuerzas de la Metropoli abandonaran 4 Santia- go de Cuba, sino que se lo entregaran 4 las Autoridades americanas, formandose inventario, que firmaron ambas partes, en el cual consta cuanto la una entrego y la otra recibio. La Comision americana que estd en la Habana, por haber sido nombrada en cumplimiento de lo prescrito en el Articulo 4° del Protocolo exige 4 la Comision espanola que le entregue todo lo que A Espaiia correspondia en uso de su sobe- rania, asi en \o civil como en lo ?«i/if«r,yesto, en virtuddeinstrucciones expiesas de su Gobierno, y por demas esta el decir que esta entrega tambien ha de ser en forma de inventario. Ante estos hechos ^es posible negar que Espana, al renunciar 4 su soberania en Cuba, exigen los Estados Unidos que se la entregue 4 ellos mismos? Pues aun haymiis que esto: la Comision Americana, 4 pesar de la teoria que sostiene, ha aconiodado sus priraeros actos a la que sostiene la espanola. En el parrafo 2" del articulo 1° que aquella present© en 3 TREATY OF PEACE. 67 de octabre, llama cesion (no abaudono) 4 la rentincia de la soberania de Espafia en Cuba. Y esto no se puede explicar por una simple incorrec- cion de lenguaje, porque en el Articulo 2" flja cuales ban de ser los efec- tos de la cesion de la soberania de Puerto liico, y emplea para fijar estos efectos, las mismas, exactamente las mismas frases, que acababa de emplear en el Articulo 1° para lijar los de la rentincia de la soberania en Cuba. Prueba acabada de que, segun la Comision Americana, 4 pesar de sus opiniones sostenidas al calor de la controversia con la espafiola, al redactar su primer proyecto entendia que los efectos de la reniincia de la soberania eran los mismos, exactamente los mismos, que los de su cesion. Y si quisiera decirse que aunque sean iguales los efectos, la reniincia, que la Comision Americana llama abandouo, se distingue de la cesion en que aquella no se bace con relacion a nadie que haya de adquirir el territorio abandon ado, y por el contrario, la cesion se hace a favor de quien haya de adquirir el territorio cedido, tampoco los Comisarios Americanos niarcaron esta diferencia en su proyecto, porque, hablando en ambos articulos de los Arcbivos y demas papeles que babian de ser objecto de la renimcia 6 cesion, dicen por igual en los dos, empleaudo las mismas frases, que toda copia legalizada de aquellos documentos que pudiera ser requerida por un funcionario del Gobierno espaiiol, se le expedira en todo tiempo, y esto es ininteligible sino en el sentido de que ha de liaber quien pueda expedir tal copia. Y no sera posible esta expedicion sino por quien tenga en su poder el documento que ha de copiar. Y no puede tenerlo en su poder quien no lo haya recibido. Por consiguiente los Comisarios Americanos al establecer en el Articulo 1" las reglas concernientes a la entrega de los Archivos de la Isla de Cuba, partian del supuesto de que esa entrega habia de ser hecha a alguien. Y eso, y nada m«4s que eso, es lo que consignaron en el arti- culo 2°, respecto .4 la entrega de los Archivos de la Isla de Puerto Rico. La Comision amerieana acude para sostener su inaceptable opinion sobre el abandono por Espafia de la Isla de Cuba, 4 la diferencia que cousta en el Protocol© mismo. Dicen que Espana se presto solamente d ceder 4 Puerto Rico a los Estados Unidos, entretanto que respecto a la Isla de Cuba se obligo a renunciarla. De esto deducen que los efectos de la obligaciou de Espaiia, respecto 4 una Antilla, son mas amplios que respecto 4 la otra. Ya hemos probado con el texto pro- pio del proyecto de articulado de dichos Seiiores que ni aun esta di- ferencia en los efectos con relacion a Espafia entreveian ellos,al redactar su proyecto, que existia. La diferencia, no obstante, se comprende bien bajo otro aspecto. Los Estados Unidos exigieron a Espana y despues le declararon la guerra para que Cuba fuera libre e independiente. Y claro esque habiendovencido ya nopodian exigirleque se lacediese, dejando 4 un lado la libertad e independencia de la Isla, porque esto daria motive al mundo para creer que tal libertad e independencia no habia sido la verdadera causa del conflicto. ^o le hicieron la misma exigencia respecto 4 Puerto Rico, y si reclamaron despues la soberania de la pequena Antilla, y de las dem^s que rodean 4 la Grande (y que haran en lo porvenir imposible su independencia, sin la voluntad y gracioso consentimiento de los Estados Unidos, que siempre la tendr.4n 4 su merced, por su dominio sobre las que la rodean como un circulo de hierro,) fue en concepto de indemnizacion de los gastos de la guerra, y de los perjuicios que decian que los ciudadanos americanos habian sufrido durante la insurreccion colonial. Esta es la natural esplicacion de que en el Protocolo aparezca la soberania de una isla como renun- ciada y la de las otras como cedida. 68 TREATY OF PEACE. Los Comisariof? espanoles entienden por todo lo diclio, que es para ellos iin deber ineludible, el oontiimar sosteuieiido que la remmcia de la soberania en Cuba, 4 que se obligo Espaua en el articulo del Protocolo, debe entenderse no abandono de la soberania en el sentido que dan 4 la frase los Sefiores Comisarios ainericanos, sino en el de reniincia pro- piamente dicba, tal como se ha empleado en el ejemplar escrito en trances, que tirmo tambien el Gobierno americano, y que por lo tanto, no puede meiios de aceptar como testo oficial. Por consiguieute, Espana tiene la obligacion de renunciar a la total soberania sobre la Gran Antilla, para que a esta obligacion corres])onda otra por parte delos Estados Unidos, y es la de recibir la Isla en nombre y para el pueblo cubano, por el cual, aparte de los altos fines bumanitarios que, segun aflruian, inspiro su condncta, por mas que 4 ello no pueda asentir Espana, se constituyerou libremeute y por su propia expontaneidad mandatarios con todas las obligaciones que se impone el '■'• negoUornm. gestor^^ (aunque segun per- sisteu en afirmar no lo sean <'m rem suam^^) segun denomina el derecho a aquel que se enoarga de reclamar y gestionar los intereses de oti o, por mas que este no le liaya couferido expresa y oQcialmente su mandato. Green, por esto, los Gomisarios espanoles que el contraproyecto del Articulo primero que presfentaron,esta redactado en el extricto sentido que tiene el articulo I'' del Protocolo, excei)to en uu importaute punto de que pasan los Comisarios espanoles A ocuparse. Los Estados Unidos de ATnorica exigieron 4 Espaiia, segun se ha dicho, la reniincia de la soberania en Cuba, en los terminos que en este Memorandum quedan expresados. La Comision Americana en su pemiltimo Memorandum dice, que si Espaiia hubiese accedido al ser requerida con el ultimatum, -A abandonar la Isla de Cuba, sin entregarla 4 los Estados Unidos, todo el mundo hubiera creido que Espaiia accedia 4 cuanto se podia exigirle. Lo hubiera quiza creido todo el mundo, menos los Estados Unidos, porque no parece a la Comision espailola que tenga necesidad de demostrar, que haya nadie, ni en Europa ni en America, que crea que los Estados Unidos se hubieran dado por satisfechos con que Espana se retirase de la Isla de Cuba, habiendo ellos de abstenerse de toda intervencion en la Grande Antilla, para que el pueblo que la habita eontiiiuase guerre- ando entre si y hacieudo de si mismo y de sus destinos, en virtud de su natural derecho, el uso 6 el abusoque, supuesto que era independiente, podia hacer sin 6 contra la voluntad de los Estados Unidos. De estos terminos es indeclinable 6 inmediata consecuencia, que los Estados Unidos tienen que recibir la Isla de Cuba, no para couservarla para siempre, ni siquieraindefiuidamentecomo pi^opia, sino para ejercer su soberania, mientras la Isla no este paciticada y para entregarla al pueblo que la habita tan pronto la paciticaciou se haya realizado. Esto, pues, debe constar en el Articulo primero del Tratado relative 4 tal reniincia, si ha de acomodarse al contrato convenido entre las dos Altas Partes. Asi lo comprendieron los Comisarios espaiioles. Mas inspirdndose en sus vivos deseos de transaccion y de paz, se prestaban a que los Estados Unidos quedasen en libertad de transmitir al pueblo cubano la sobe- rania de la Isla, cuando ellos, y solo ellos, considerasen que habiallegado la oportunidad de hacerlo. Propouiendolo asi los Comisarios espaiioles, renunciaban en obsequio de los Estados Unidos el importantisimo derecho que tiene Espaiia para exigiiles, cuando la paciiicacion de la Isla se realice, que no reten- gan dicha soberania y la entroguen 4 aquel pueblo. La Comision americana persiste en alirmar que tal es el proposito de TREATY OF PEACE. 69 los Estados Unidos, pero uo quiere que conste en el tratado el notorio derecho de Espaua para exigir su cnnipliinieuto 4 su debido tiempo. Mas una vez que los Senores Oomisarios Americanos se oponen termi- nantemente a la aceptacion del Articulo propuesto por entenderque no se aconioda al primero del Protocolo, los esi^anoles lo sustituyen con otro que no solamente se acomodara de un modo estricto al recto seiitido de aquel Articulo primero, sino que aparecera redactado con sus propias palabras pero tambi^n con las frases literalmente copiadas de los despacbos que precedieron 4 su redaccion y fijaron su sentido. He aqui la iiueva redaccion que proponen en sustitucion de la anterior : "Su Majestad Catolica la Eeiua Regeute de Espaiia, en nombre de su Augusto hijo Don Alfonso XIII. Key de Esi)aiia, constitucionalmente . autorizada por las Cortes del Eeiuo, renuncia a su soberania y a todo derecho sobre Cuba. "Los Estados Unidos de AmMca, aceptando esta renuncia, reciben de Espana la Isla de Cuba para prestarle ayuda y direccion y tenerla en su dominio y gobierno hasta que, uua vez realizada su pacificacion, dejen dicbo dominio y gobierno al j)ueblo cubano." FUNDAMENTO DE ESTE ARTICULO. El p^rrafo 1° es la transcripcion del Articulo 1" del Protocolo, con las variaciones de caucilleria. El sentido y las frases del parrafo 2° estan tomadas del ultimatum dirigido por el Gobierno de Wasbington a Espana y comuuicado eu 20 de abril ultimo por aquel Senor Secretario de Estado al Ministro de Espaiia en aquella capital. Figuran asi mismo en el el pensamiento y Lis frases del Gobierno Americano cousiguados en la coutestacion del Senor Secretario de Estado en Washington en 31 de julio ultimo al Mensaje del Gobierno espailol proponiendo laterminacion dela guerra. He aqui dichas frases: " el Gobierno de los Estados Unidos no ha com- parddo las aprensiones de Espaiia sobre este punto (el de la falta de actual aptitud del pueblo cubano para su independencia) pero piensa que en las condicioues de perturbaciou y abatimieuto en que esta la Isla, esta necesita ayuda y direccion que el Gobierno americano se lialla dispuesto a otorgarleJ^ No hay, pues, en el Articulo nuevamente redactado otro pensamiento ni otras frases que las consiguadas en el ultimatum de los Estados Unidos a Espana, en el despacho citado de su Secretario de Estado y en el Protocolo redactado accediendo al ultimatun y de acuerdo con la intencion de los Estados Unidos consiguada en el despacho sobre- dicho. Esto no obstante, ruegan los Comisarios Espaiioles de un modo especial a los Senores Comisarios Americanos, que tengan presente que si la legitima exigeucia por parte de Espaiia para que en el Tratado se coiisigne su derecho para reclamar, a su debido tiempo, a los Estados Unidos de Ann rica el cumplimiento del compromiso que expontanea- mente contrageron de dejar la Isla de Cuba libre 6 independiente, asi que este paciticada, no fuese de su agrado, aquellos estan dispuestos a renunciar 4 tal exigencia, dejando 4 la exclusiva apreciacion de los Estados Unidos el resolver cuando hayan de cumplir tal compromiso, si esta renuncia de la Comision espafiola hubiera de servir para la con- clusion del Tratado pendiente de paz. Los Senores Comisarios Americanos recliazau tambi6n los demd,s articulos del proyecto presentado por los espaiioles. 70 TREATY OF PEACE. No admiten que cle la soberania formen parte las cargas y obligaciones del Soberano que procedau exclusivamente del servicio publico de la Coloiiia. Y siu eutrar la Comisi6n espafiola en la discusion purameute tecnica de si forman parte de la soberania estas obligaciones, 6 son tan solo efecto del ejercicio de la soberania misma, porque el resultado de esta discusion seria comx)letamente ineficaz para el punto sobre que no convienen unos y otros Comisionados, pasan los esi)anoles a rectificar brevemente los heclios y los conceptos que se hallan escritos en el Memorandum americauo de 14 del corriente. Para demostrar aquellos que las obligaciones coloniales de Espafia en Cuba no deben quedar a cargo de esta Isla, expoueu que tales obligaciones fueron contraidas por la Corona con intervencion de sus funcionarios en la Colonia pero sin que esta liubiese intervenido ni prestado su consentimiento para contraerlas. En efecto ; el regimeu colonial eutonces vigente en Espana no daba 4 sus colonias la facultad de tener Camaras electivas que ejerciesen con el soberano el poder supremo. En los iiltimos veiute aiios ya no sucedia asi. Las Antillas tenian su representacion en ambas Cj'imaras, la cual, i^or cierto, intervino en todos los actos legislativos sobre obligaciones coloniales, sin que nuuca hubiese protestado contra su legitiniidad y fuerza obligatoria. Mas, aparte de esto, no se puede negar que mientras aquel regimen subsistio conservando todos los caracteres de la legalidad 4 la sazon establecida, los actos que la sober- ania colonial ejerciera dentro de las atribucioues que las leyes le con- feriau, fueron perfectamente legitimos y produjeron lo que no podian menos deproducir: todassus justas consecuencias. Esta es una maxi- ma fundamental en el dereclio publico, sin la cual seria imposible el credito de un Estado, porque la validez de todos sus actos estaria siem- pre a merced de culquiera causa revolucionaria triunfante. Puede dis- cutirse el acierto de los actos del Soberano, pero no cabe discutir su legitiniidad y car<4cter obligatorio cuando ban sido ejecutados en virtud de atribucioues y con las solemnidades reconocidas y establecidas por la ley. Este principio fue reconocido por el Primer Consul, cuando otorgo con Baviera su Tratado de 24 de Agosto de 1801. En su Articulo 5° se acordo aplicar lo dispuesto eu el Tratado de paz de Lunoville referente 4 las deudas hipotecarias de los paises de la orilla izquierda del Ebin. En estos territories liabia Dietas que intervenian el poder del Soberano y por esto en dicbo Tratado de Luneville se habia exigido que tales deudas hubiesen sido por ellas consentidas. Mas en el Ducado de Deux-Ponts y en la parte del Palatinado del Rbin que adquiria la Francia por el Tratado con Baviera, no Labia aquella institucion de Gobieruo, y por esto convino el Primer Consul, en el Tratado de 1801 que las deudas de estos paises pasarian con ellos, con tal que biibiesen sido registradas en sa origen por sus Autoridades administrativas superiores. Segim la tesis contraria 4 esta doctrina si llegara a desaparecer el regimen autocratico de la Rusia actual, el pueblo ruso podria dejar de cumplir todas las obligaciones que sus Emperadores, mientras aquel regiuien subsista, hayan contraido y contraigan para el regimen y gobierno de su Imperio. Los mismos Estados Unidos, que, de seguro continuaron observando desde su emancipacion muchos de los preceptos legislativos acordados antes sin su intervencion, por el poder de su Metropoli, teudrian que devolver 4 la Rusia el Alaska que les vendio el Emperador en 1807 sin haber intervenido en la venta los habitantes de la regiim vendida ; como teudrian que devolver a Espaiia la Florida, por ideutica razon, etc. TREATY OF PEACE. 71 Si para que sea legitima una deuda es necesario que al crearla inter- venga por si mismo el pueblo que la ha de pagar, cuaudo las leyes uo le dan tal iiiterveucion, cou inucha mas razon habia de ser necesaria la interveucion de uu pueblo cuaudo su Soberano veudiese el territorio que aquel habita. La propia actual cesion de la soberania de las Antillas estaria viciada de nulidad ya que los pueblos cubano y puertoriqueno uo fueron cou- sultados ui prestaron basta abora su expreso y formal aseutimiento al Protocolo de Washingtou. He abi las cousecuencias de la teoi ia que bajo el calor de la discusion se balla expuesta en el Memorandum de los Sefiores Comisarios Americanos. Precisameute el punto que limita mils la libertad de contratacion de los Soberaiios, en la celebracion de los tratados, es el relativo d las deu- das de sus Estados. Sobre la integridad de su territorio y aun sobre su propio bouor pueden libre y validameute coutratar porque contratau sobre lo que es suyo. Pero carecen de esta libertad cuaudo sus actos repercuteu inmediatamente en los legitimos derecbos privados de aquellos particulares que, al amparo de las leyes los babiau legitima- mente adquirido, sin que'despues bayan tenido iutervencion alguna en los conflictos que en los tratados se resuelven, ni teugan por lo tanto que indebidamente sufrir sus consecueucias en perjuicio de sus privados y legitimos intereses. Los acreedores de un Estado, cuaudo cou el contratau tieuen siempre muy en cuenta las condiciones de solveneia del Estado 4 quien prestan su fortuua. Por esto, cuaudo estas condiciones de solveneia decrecen por efecto de cesiones territoriales, las Altas Partes entre quieues median estas, asi las que bacen la cesion como las que adquieren lo cedido, pro- curan siempre respetar en su integridad aquellos derecbos por medio del reparto de las obligaciones, entre el territorio conservado por el Sobe- raiio cedente y el territorio adquirido por el Soberano cesionario. Esto es lo que ba venido baciendose en los Tratados de cesion territorial. Mas cuaudo los acreedores ban adquirido por el ])ropio titulo de su contrato un derecbo directo sobre ciertos y determiuados bienes 6 ciertas y determinadas reutas para reintegrarse con ellos del capital prestado y de sus legitimos intereses, el Soberano no puede desi)Ui'S, sin contar previamente con su aseutimiento, ceder ni disponer libremente, como si fuerau de su exclusivo y pleno dominio de aquellos bienes y rentas. Si uu Soberano se prestara A cometev un atropello semejante de derecbos que uo son suyos, no por eso aquellos 4 quienes tales derecbos correspondan tendran el deber de resignarse y quedaran privados de reclamar en nombre de los principios sagrados que amparan la pro- piedad privada, el respeto a lo suyo, contra quien quiera que sea en cuyo poder se balle aquello que legitimamente les perteuece. Y bueno es, con este motivo, bacer foruialmente constar, que aun en la bipotesis de que no fuese aceptable el principio que sostiene la Comision espanola y que combate la Americana, {"i saber que la deuda colonial no debe quedar a cargo de la Metropoli, esto nunca podria sig- nificar que Espaila bubiese de contraer abora respecto a los teuedores de esa deuda mas obligaciones que las (pie contrajo al crearla. Y por 10 tanto; respecto a aquella parte de la deuda en que no contrajo mas que una obligacion subsidiaria de pago, por baberse consignado en su emision una bipoteca expresa sobre ciertas y determinadas rentas y productos, Espana teudra el derecbo de uoconsiderarse nunca obligada por tal contrato, con arreglo a derecbo, d pagar tal deuda, sino cuaudo despues de baberse destinado 4 su pago en primer termino las rentas y productos bipotecados resultaran estos insulicientes, pues basta entouces 72 TEEATY OF PEACl • no ser^ exigible, segun las reglas elementales del derecho, la obligaci6n Bubsidiaria que contrajo. Sin detenerse la Comision espaBola hoy sobie las noticias muchas inexactas, que sobre la deudacubaua se leen en el Memorandum ameri- cano, se limitara a atirmar que la Isla de Cuba no cubrio, por regla general, desde su descubrimiento, sus propios gastos. Mientras Espaiia conserve las colouias americanas, viuo la Isla soste- niendosecon los auxilios pecuniarios desus bermanas, y senaladamente de los del Virreiuato de Mejico. En este siglo, durante muy poeos anos luvo sobrantes, merced al desarrollo de su natural riqueza obtenida al fin con aquellos recursns, y estos sobrantes es cierto que entrarou en el Tesoro de la Peninsula. Mas apesar de ellos es lo cierto que en la cueuta general del Estado espaiiol, de 1896 a 97 aparece el Tesoro de la Penin- sula con anticipos a Cuba en los anos auteriores de la epoca moderna, por valor de 429,602,013.08 pesetas, asi como aparecen tambien adelan- tados a Puerto Kico 3,220,488.67 pesetas y k Santo Domingo 1,397,161.69 pesetas. La prosperidad de Cuba fu6 de corta duracion, durante la mayor parte del tiempo transcurrido desde los tiempos de Colon, ya por la escasez de sus liabitantes, ya i)or la servidumbre de la raza negra que formaba la mayoria, y ya, en fin, porque los espanoles prefirieran colonizar otras partes de America, no pudo la Isla desarollar sus riquezas naturales, y, sin embargo, hubo que veuir gastando coustantemente en ella las graudes sumas que exigia el planteamiento de las reformas y la creacion de los establecimientos que son condicion eseucial de la vida moderna. La Comision espauola no puede menos de protestar contra la afirma- ciou que en el Memorandum auiericano se hace, de que la iusurreccion de los diez anos fue producto de causasji^.s/as. Y lamenta que sin una necesidad que lo reclamara de un modo indeclinable tal atirmacion se Jiaya consignado, como la Comision americana, seguramente y con razon lameutaria que la espanola consiguase aqui sin necesidad que lo exigiera, la justicia de las rebeliones de los aborigenes del inmenso territorio americano que los Estados Unidos tuvieron que sofbcar tantas veces con mauo ferrea y que asimismo consiguase el derecho a cuyo amparo los Estados del Sur habian querido romper por las armas el lazo federal. Es inutil, por lo que luego se dird, que la Comision espaiiola se ocupe concretamente de los capitulos de la deuda cubana a que se refiere el Memorandum americano. Comprenden los errores que bayan podido cometerse en este documento, porque es muy natural que los Senores Comisarios americanos no conozcan con toda la precision que se requiere para juzgarlos con acierto, los actos de la Admiuistracion espaiiola, ni en la Peninsula, ni en sus colonias. Y esto aparece adem^s confirmado por los heclios. Sobre la razon que se cree que hay contra parte de la deuda cubana en la pretendida justicia de la rebelion de una minoria de aquel pueblo reclamando su indepeudenda, soloharemos la observaciou siguiente: Lt4 minoria insurrecta, es verdad, se levanto en armas en deinanda de la independeucia de la isla. Los Estados Unidos equivocadamente creyeron que su causa era justa y se la impusieron con las armas 4 Espana. Mas ahora resulta que Espaiia tenia razon, porque los propios Estados Unidos reconocen que aquel pueblo no tiene aim las coudiciones necesarias para gozar desde hiego de su plena libertad y soberania, y por esto estiin resueltos 4 no otorgarsela y a retener en ella su dominio, hasta que el pueblo cubano pueda gozar de esa libertad prematuramente reclamada. TREATY OF PEACE. 73 La Comision Espafiola esta ademas en el caso de llainar la atencion sobre las obligaciones de Puerto ]\ico. El ineniorandmn a que contesta, se refiere uuicaineute a las de Cuba; ^es que se cree que a pesar de que la soberania de la pequena Antilla no es renuueiada, sino cedida por Espaua a los Estados Uuidos, debe tambien pasar libre de toda carga a su poder? jEs que se asieuta el principio de que las cesiones de territorio, cualquiera que sea la causa que las produzca, aunque esta i'uera la couquista, y mucho mds siendo esta causa puramente conven- cional, no llevan ipso facto en si mismas las cargas que afecten al terri- torio cedido? En la discusion oral, los Sres Comisarios Americanos indicaron que el gobierno Espanol babia declarado que sobre la pequena Antilla no existia deuda alguna. Los Comisarios Espanoles hau registrado cuidadosamente todas las uegociaciones escritas que mediaron entre las dos Altas partes, desde el ultimatum del Sr. Presidente de la Union de 20 Abril de este afio, basta la firma del protocolo en Washington, en 12 de Agosto del mismo. En ninguna de ellas hallaron indicaciones ni vestigios de tal declaracion. Y dicho sea de paso, entre otras obli- gaciones, pesa desde hace mucbisimos aiios sobre la pequena Antilla, una parte que aunque exigua, no es menos sagrada, de la carga perpetua y verdaderamente de justicia, con que EspaQa mas que en su nombre en el de America, bavenido demoustrando su gratitud al inmortal Colon que la descubrio y a sus legitimos descendientes, y que la logica llevaria 4 los Estados TJnidos a repudiar para que continuara pagandola Espaua, si bubieran de prevalecer las conclusiones de la Comision, de aquellos. Mas es el caso que la discusion sobre la deuda llamada de Cuba no parece tener oportunidad en estos momentos. Los SeQores Comisarios Americanos al ocuparse de los capitulos princi- pales de tal deuda, creyeron sin duda que la Comision espafiola proponia en su proyecto que desde luego fuesen aquellos admitidos como deuda colonial, para pasar con la soberania a Cuba, 6 a los Estados Unidos. Y este es el capital error sobre que descansa su memorandum. Los Comi- sarios Espanoles no proponen sino que se consigne en el Tratado un prin- cipio basta abora siempre reconcido, a saber, que con una colonia pasa la deuda que le es peculiar y afecta a su territorio. Contra este principio, nada se dice en el Memorandum Americano. ISTi espera la Comision Espafiola que se diga 4 lo menos por los Estados Uuidos, cuyo territorio fue por ellos adquirido, no solo con su sangre, sino tambien con el dinero de sus cajas. Hoy no faltan publicistas que afirmen que por los trece primeros Estados satisficieron a su Metropoli quince millones de libras esterlinas. Y son becbos oliciales que por la Louisiana, por la Florida, por los Estados Indios, por Texas, por California y por el Alaska se pagaron a Francia, Espafia, India, liusia y Mexico fuertes sumas. Esta vez seria la primera en que los Estados Unidos, contra sus propias tra- diciones, adquirieran gratuitamente territorios que anexionar pronto 6 tarde 4 la Union. El caso de la adquisicion de Texas, tan identico en su origen, en sus procedimientos y en su terminb al actual de la Isla de Cuba, prueba de un modo barto elocuente cuan distinta es la politica que entonces siguio el gobierno de Washington con Mexico, de la que abora quiere seguir con el Gabinete de Madrid. Entonces sus armas empleadas tambien en apoyo de los insurrectos de Texas, se extendieron por la Eepiiblica mexicana, llegaudo 4 apoderarse de la propia capital, lo que no ba suce- dido abora; entonces exigieron de Mexico la independencia de Texas, como abora de Espafia la de Cuba, y ademas la cesion del Nuevo Mexico y de California, como abora exigieron la de Puerto Eico y demas Antil- las Espanolas, Pero entonces pagaron a Mexico sin exigirle indemni- 74 TREATY OF PEACE. zacion de guerra, cl valor de los tenitorios que se anexioiiaban, y tomaron ademas A su cargo la indemnizacion de los Ciiuliidniios Ameiicanos per aqiiella Eepublica i)erjudi(adas. Hoy haii exigido a E-spafia por una iudemnizacion aualo^a y por gastos de guena, la cesiou de las islas sobredichas, y quieieu adeuias que las cargas de estas islas y de sa liermana la grande Autilla quedeu 4 cargo de la Metropoli, que las iutrodujopor su niauo en el niundo civilizado. Lo que ])ropouen los Comisarios EspaHoles es iiuicamente el recono- ciiniento de este priucipio, porque su ejecuciou entieuden que debe quedar despues a cargo de una Comision de personas rectas e impar- ciales. Si esta, reconocieudo la cueuta que Espaiia preseute de las obligaciones que euticude que dcben ser A cargo de Cuba y de Puerto Rico, declarau que debeu ser a cargo de la Metropoli, Espaiia se con- foruiara. Pero si declaran que todas 6 alguuas deben ser a cargo dela Colouia, uo bay razon para roperty of all kinds whatsoever which up to the date of the ratification of this treaty have been either peacefully exercised, or possessed or held by the provinces, municipalities, public or private institutions, civil or ecclesiastical corporations, or any other collective entities having legal capacity to acquire and hold property in the Island of Cuba, and by private individuals of whatsoever national- ity, shall not be included in the relinquishment and transfer above made. "Her Catholic Majesty also relinquishes and transfers to the United States all the documents and title papers exclusively relating to the sovereignty transferred and accepted and to all rights thereof, which may be found in the archives of the Peninsula. Copies shall also be given to the United States whenever they may ask for them, of the passages concerning the said sovereignty and rights, which may occur in other documents not relating to the Island of Cuba, but to other sub- jects foreign to it, which may exist in the said archives. And the same shall be observed reciprocally in favor of Spain regarding docu- ments and papers, having nothing to do, either in whole or in part, •with the Island of Cuba, now to be found in the Cuban archives, which may be of interest to the Spanish Government. 92 TREATY OF PEACE. "All the official archives and registries, whether belongiug to the Judicial or to the executive departmeuts of the Government, now at the disposal of the Spanish Government and its authorities in the Island of Cuba, and relating to the said island or its inhabitants, and to their rights and property, shall be left without restriction of any kind at the disposal of the United States, in order that the latter may keep them with tlie same powers which were heretofore vested in the Spanish Gov- ernment and autliorities. "Private individuals, whether Spaniards or Cubans, shall have the right to ask for and obtain, in the manner provided by law, authenticated copies of all contracts, last wills and testaments, and other documents to be found in the notarial archives, which are deemed to form part of the judicial or executive archives eitlier in Spain or in Cuba." Article VI of the Spanish draft did not set forth the reason of the cession made by Spain in favor of the United States of the Island of Porto Rico, the other Spanish Antilles, and of the Island of Guam in the Marianas. That reason nevertheless was exfdained in the despatch of the Secretary of State of the United States in his answer to themes- sage transmitted to him by tbe Spanish Government. Said despatch states that the President of the Kepublic did not demand the payment of any war indemnity, owing to his desire to give testimony of signal generosity, and then it says : "Nevertheless he cannot be insensible to the losses and expenses of the United States incident to the war or to the claims of our citizens for injuries to their persons and property during the late insurrection in Cuba. He must, therefore, require the cession to the United States and the immediate evacuation by Spain of the Island of Porto Rico and other islands now under the sovereignty of Spain in the West Indies, and also the cession of an island in the Ladroues, to be selected by the United States." The island designated by them was the Island of Guam. The Spanish Commissioners have now decided to change the text of the article as formerly framed by them and offer as a substitute another article which will leave on record the reason of the cession. It is ijuite certain that the American Commission will agree with the Spanish Commission in the advisability of preventing the United States from being shown in the treaty as acquiring gratuitously the said islands. Here is the new text of the article : "Article IV. "In compensation for the loss and expenses incurred by the United States on account of the war and for the claims of their citizens for damages done to their persons or property during the last insurrection in Cuba, Her Catholic Majesty, in the name and in representation of Spain, and constitutionally authorized to do so by the Cortes of the Kingdom, cedes to the United States of America, and the latter accept for themselves the Island of Porto Rico and all other islands in the West Indies which are now under the sovereignty of Spain, and also the Island of Guam in the Marianas or Ladrones Archipelago, which was chosen by the United States by virtue of Article II of the Protocol signed at Washington on August 12 ultimo." In regard to Article VII in the draft of the Spanish Commission, the lattei understands that it is its duty, for the reasons stated in this memorandum, to leave it as it is, with no other change than that which TREATY OF PEACE. 93 is required indispensably to put it in harmony with the new articles now introduced. In consequence thereof, it will read as follows: Article V, "This cession of sovereignty over the territory and inhabitants of Porto Eico and the other islands mentioned is understood to consist in the transfer of the rights and obligations, property and documents relating to the sovereignty over said islands, in the same way as was provided in the i)recediiig articles in reference to the relinquishment and transfer of the sovereignty over the Island of Cuba." It results, in recapitulation, that the only question up to now in existence between the two Commissions and awaiting their decision is a question of money, which as far as one of the High Contracting Parties is concerned is relatively of secondary importance. That question is the one which relates to the colonial debt. The Spanish Commissioners understand that a question of such a nature as this cannot fail to be solved satisfactorily between two ])aities, one of which is the greatest nation of the new world, immensely rich and prosperous, blessed with inexhaustible resources, whether due to nature or to the prodigious activity of its inhabitants, which on the other hand acquires by this treaty territories of great imi)ortance, and thereby fulfils an aspiration of its policy in America, while the other paity is a great and noble nation of the old world, a cordial friend of her late antagonist in days for her more prosperous, but now impover- ished through the misfortunes heaped uj^on her during the century which is about to terminate; whose treasury is overburdened by obli- gations, and for whom the present treaty will mean the solemn confirma- tion of the loss of the last remnants of her American empire, although through her discovery of the new world she was instrumental in the very existence of the Great American Republic, and to the enrichment of the modern nations, perhaps at the expense of her own welfare and to the detriment of the full development of the great elements of Avealth accumulated in her own bosom but neglected through her desire preferentially to attend to her colonies, creatures who like all others in the order of nature enlist the utmost solicitude on the part of their mother, who feeds and supports them at the sacrifice of her own welfare. True copy : Emilio de Ojeda Protocol No. 10. Protocolo No. 10. Conference of October 27^ 1898. Confercncia del 27 de Octubre de 1898. Present — On the part of the Presentes Por parte de los Es- TJnited States: Messrs. Day, tados Unidos de America, los Davis Frye, Gray, Reid, Moore, Senores Day, Davis, Frye, Gray, Fergusson. Reid, Moore, Fergusson. On the part of Spain: Messrs. Por parte deEspaiia los Senores Montero-Rios, Abarzuza, Garnica, Montero Rios Abarzuza Garnica Villa- Urrutia, Cerero, Ojeda. Villa Urrutia Cerero Ojeda. The i)rotocol of the preceding Fue leida y aprobada el acta de session was read and approved. la sesi6u anterior. 94 TREATY OF PEACE. The American Commissioners presented their written reply, copy of which is hereto annexed, to the niemoiaudum filed by the Spanish Commissioners at the last session ill support of the articles which they presented on the 21st instant, and which were afterwards rejected by the American Commissioners. The American Commissioners, referring to the acceptance by the Spanish Commissioners, in the terms expressed in the protocol of the last session, of the articles pre- sented by the American Commis- sioners, said that they were uncer- tain whether the acceptance was intended to apply to the articles first or to those last presented by them, and suggested that, if it was immaterial to the Spanish Commis- sioners, the American Commission- ers preferred that the acceptance should be taken to refer to the arti- cles first presented by them, as those articles contained provisions as to public archives and records. The President of the Spanish Commission replied that, as his acceptance of the articles was con- ditional upon the approval of the treaty of peace, he had no objec- tion to accepting these or any other articles, and especially as the first article of the Ajnerican project was the same, saving differences in diplomatic form, as the first para- graph of the first Spanish article; but that he did not mean that he renounced the second paragraph of that article, and that with re- spect to this part and to the other articles presented by Spain, he reserved, as provided in the pro- tocol of the 5th session, all the rights therein contained if there was no ultimate agreement npon the whole. The President of the American Commission replied that the American Commissioners were con- tent to take tlie acceptance of the Spanish Commissioners, as ex- pressed in their paper and entered Los Comisarios americanos hacen entrega de su contestacion exrita que es anexa al acta presente, al Memorandum presentado por los espanoles en apoyo de los articulos presentados por ellos en la sesion del 21 del coriente, que fueron re- chazados por los Comisarios ameri- canos. Los Comisarios Americanos refi- riendose a la aceptacion por los Comisarios Espaiioles, en los t6rmi- nos expresados en el acta de la iil- tiraa sesion, de los articulos pre- sentados por los Comisarios Ameri- canos, manifestaron hallarse incier- tos sobre si dicha aceptacion se referia a los articulos primeramente presentados pos ellos 6 4 los lilti- mos, y sugirieron que si a los Co- misarios espaiioles les era indifer- ente, los Comisarios Americanos preferirian que la aceptacion re- cayese sobre los articulos primera- mente presentados por ellos, por contener estos disposiciones rela- tivas a los Archives publicos y ex- pedientes. El Presideute de la Comision espaiiola contesta que siendo su aceptacion de dichos articulos con- dicional de la aprobacion del tra- tado de paz, no tiene inconveuiente en aceptar estos u otros articulos, tanto mas cuanto que el articulo 1° del proyecto americano, es igual salvo las diferencias de cancilleria, al primer parrafo del articulo espa- iiol; pero que esto no significa que renuncie a la segunda parte de di- cho articulo 1" presentado por Es- paua, y que en cuanto 4 esta parte del articulo y 4 los demas presenta- dos por Espaiia, se reserva todos los derechos que contienen, como se con vino en el acta de la 5"^ sesion, si no hubiese acuerdo ulterior so- brela totalidad. El Presidente de la Comision Americana contesto que las Comi- sarios Americanos se aveniau 4 que la aceptacion de los Comisarios Espanoles, tal cual la expresaba el exrito cousignado en el acta de la TREATY OF PEACB. ^5 in the protocol of the last confer- ence, as applying to the articles last submitted, which were ex- pressed iu the words of the Proto- col of August 12, 1898. The President of the Spanish Commission repeated that the form or wording of those or of the other articles was a matter of in- difference to him; and he asked wliether the American Commis- sioners woukl object to inserting in the article in which the cession of Porto Rico and the other islands in the West Indies and the island of Guam was made, or in any of the other articles of the treaty, a statement that the cession was made as indemnity for the expenses of the war and the injuries suffered during it by American citizens. The President of the Anieri- can Commission replied that the articles should stand as when they were accepted, and be considered as disposed of for the present, add- ing further that the American Commissioners did not mean to be understood that it should not ap- pear in some proper form in the treaty that the cession of Porto Rico and the other islands above referred to was on account of in- demnity for the losses and injuries of American citizens and the cost of the war. This view had been expressed in the note addressed to the Spanish Grovernment contain- ing the demand of the President of the United States, and the American Commissioners recog- nized the force and meaning of that demand. The President of the Spanish Commission said that it was not his intention now to discuss this point, but to state his desire that the ques- tion and the answer to it should be entered in the protocol. The President of the Spanish Commission then inquired whether the American Commissioners were ready to answer the written pro- posal presented by the Spanish ultima conferencia, se refiriese & los articulos ultimainente presentados, expresados en las palabras del Protocolo de 12 de Agosto de 1898. El Presidente de la Comision Espaiiolarepite quele esindiferente la forma y redaccion de unos ti otros articulos, y pregunta 4 la Comision Americana si esta tendria inconveniente en que en el articulo en que se trata de la cesion de Puerto Rico, otras islas de las Antillas y la de Guam, 6 en otro cualquiera de los articulos del trata do, se exprese que esta cesion es en concepto de indemnizacion por los gastos de la guerra y los perjuicios sufridos durante ella por los Ciudadanos Americanos. El Presidente de la Comision Americana contesto que los articu- los debian permanecer como esta- ban cuando fueron aceptados, de- biendo por ahora considerarse como terminados, y aiiadio que los Comisarios americanos no querian signiflcar que se eutendiese que no habria de figurar en forma adecu- ada en el Tratado, que la cesion de Puerto Rico y las demds islas an- teriormente raencionadas, era 4 cuenta de indemnizacion por p6r- didas y agravios delos Ciudadanos Americanos y gastos de la guerra, Este punto de visto habia sido ex- presado en la nota dirigida al Go- bierno Espanol en que se consigna- ban las demandas del Presidente de los Estados Unidos y los Co- misarios de los Estados Unidos re- conocian la fuerza y el significado de esta deraanda. El Presidente de la Comisi6n Espanola dice que no era su inten- cion el debatir ahora este punto, sino el de hacer con star su desco de que figuren en el protocolo su pregunta y la coutestacion dada. El Presidente de la Comision Espanola pide entonces 4 la Comi- sion Americana que con teste 4 la proposicion escrita hecha en la se- sion anterior por los Comisarios 96 TREATY OF PEACE. CommissioTiers at the last session, in which they accepted condition- ally the two articles of the Ameri- can draft. The President of the American Commission said that he under- stood tliat in the said proposal the American Commissioners were in- vited to present tlieir propositions in regard to the Philippine Islands, and said that as this matter was of capital importance, and as the American Commissioners were not yet ready to submit a proposal in regard to it, he would propose an adjournment in order that they might have an opportunity to do so, and would suggest that in the mean time the Secretaries should endeavor to agree on the terms of the article relating to public prop- erty, archives and records in Cuba, Porto Kico and other islands in the West Indies, and Guam, for sub- mission to the Joint Commission. This suggestion was adopted, as well as the proposal for an adjourn- ment; and it was agreed, on mo- tion of the American Commission- ers, that the Joint Commission should meet again on Monday the 3 1 st of October, at two o'clock, -p.m., when the American Commissioners should present a projiosal on the subject of the Philippines; and that if by that time tlie American Commissioners were not prepared to do so the meeting should be postponed to a later day. William E. Day CusHMAN K. Davis Wm. P Feye Geo. Gray Whitelaw Eeid. John B. Moore. Espanoles, al acepta.r condicional- mente losdos articulos del proyecto Americano. El Presidente de la Comision Americana manifiestaque entiende que en dicha proposicion se les invita a presentar sus proposi- ciones relativas a Filipinas, y dice que siendo este punto de lm])or- tancia tan capital, y no hallandose la Comision Americana en disposi- cion de formular aquellas todavia, propone un aplazamiento para ha- cerlo y sugiere que entre tanto los Secretaries Generales de ambas Comisiones se pongan de acuerdo para redactar un articulo relative a la propiedad piiblica, & los Ar- chivos, expedientes y documentos notariales en Cuba, Puerto Eico, otras islas de las Antillas y Guam, que ser4 sometido a la Comision en pleno. Se aprueba esta suggestion asi como el aplazamiento pedido por la Comision Americana, y se con- viene que los Comisarios se reuni- ran el lunes 31 de Octubre 4 las 2 P. M. en que la Comision America- na presentara sus proposiciones sobre Filipinas, sin perjuicio de que si para entonces no hubiese aun po(lido elaborar sus proposi- ciones, la Comision Americana, se acuerde un nuevo aplazamiento. E MONTERO Ei'os B. DE ABARZUZA J. DE GARNICA. W E DE Villa Urrutia Eafael Cerero Emilio de Ojeda Annex to Protocol ISTo. 10. To the memorandum submitted by the Spanish Commissioners in support of the articles presenteain in the sense of being left derelict. It is perfectly manifest that the contracting parties in deliberately employing different stipulations with respect to Cuba and Porto Pico neither expressed nor intended to express the same idea. This differ- ence is so clearly and fully explained in the memorandum of the Ameri- can Commissioners of the 14th of October that it seems to be idle to enlarge upon it. The American Commissioners have never based their position as to Spain's relinquishment of all claim of sovereignty over Cuba upon the English text of the Protocol as distinguished from the Erench text, as the Spanish memorandum suggests. On the contrary, in their memo- randum of the 14th of October, the American Commissioners distinctly declared that the words used with reference to Cuba in the Erench text were precisely the same in meaning as those used in the English text. In their memorandum of the 14th of October, the American Commis- sioners api)lied to their position as to Si)ain's relinquishment of all claim of sovereignty over Cuba a simple test. If Spain, they said, had, in re])ly to the demands of the United States, declared that she relin- quished her sovereignty over Cuba, but did not relinquish it to the United States, no one could have imagined that the demand of the United States would not have been satisfied. The Spanish memorandum intimates that everybody would have thought so except the United States, and declares that there is no one either in Europe or in America who believes that the United States would have been content with Spain's withdrawing from the island and would have abt^tained from all intervention therein, leaving the inhabitants to continue to fight among 100 TREATY OF PEACE. themselves. It is obvious, however, that Spain's relinquishment of sovereignty over Cuba and the subsequent intervention of the United States for the purpose of establishing order there are different matters. Whatever the United States might in certain contingencies have done with respect to Cuba, Spain would have satisfied the demands of that Government by withdrawing from the island. The question of subse- quent intervention in its affairs would then have lain between the United States and the people of the island themselves. The United States certainly could not have complained if Spain, while relinquish- ing her sovereignty, had refused to aid in or be a party to this inter- vention. In the Spanish memorandum an effort is made to answer that part of the argument submitted by the American Commissioners on the 14th instant in which it is maintained that the so-called Cuban debt is not in any sense a debt of Cuba, but that it is in reality a part of the national debt of Spain. The American Commissioners were able to show that the debt was contracted by Spain for national purposes, which in some cases were alien and in others actually adverse to the interests of Cuba; that in reality the greater part of it was contracted for the purpose of supporting a Spanish army in Cuba; and that, while the interest on it has been collected by a Spanish bank from the reve- nues of Cuba, the bonds bear upon their face, even where those reve- nues are pledged for their payment, the guarantee of the Spanish nation. As a national debt of Spain, the American Commissioners have never questioned its validity. The American Commissioners, therefore, are not required to main- tain, in order that they may be consistent, the position that the power of a nation to contract debts or the obligation of a nation to pay its debts depends upon the more or less popular form of its government. They would not question the validity of the national debt of Russia, because, as the Spanish memorandum states, an autocratic system pre- vails in that country. Much less do the American Commissioners main- tain that a nation cannot cede or relinquish sovereignty over a part of its territory witliout the consent of the inhabitants thereof, or that it impairs the national obligation of its debt by such cession or relin- quishment. Into these questions they do not think it necessary to enter. As to the rights, expectations, or calculations of creditors, to which the Spanish memorandum adverts, the American Commissioners have only to say that as regards the so-called Cuban debt, as explained in their memorandum of the 14th instant, the creditors, from the begin- ning, took the chances of the investment. The very pledge of the national credit, while it demonstrates on the one hand the national character of the debt, on the other hand proclaims the notorious risk that attended the debt in its origin, and has attended it ever since. The Spanish memorandum observes that in the last twenty years the Antilles have been represented in tlie Spanish Cortes and declares that their representatives have participated in all legislative acts bear- ing upon colonial obligations without ever protesting against their la w- fnlness or binding force. The information in the possession of the American Commissioners leads to a different conclusion. The American Commissioners have in their hands the Diario de las Sesiones de Cortes, for Thursday, the 29th of July, 1886, when the Cuban budget for 188(5-1887 was introduced and discussed. By this record it appears that on the day named Senor Fernandez de Castro, a Senator from Cuba, referring to the budgets of 1880, 1882, 1883, 1884, TREATY OF PEACE. lOl and 1886, declared that he had objected to all of them, and that no Cuban debt ought to be created, siiice the obligations embraced in it were national and not local. He entered into a brief examination of the items which constituted the debt, and created something of a sen- sation by pointing out that quinine had been consumed in Cuba, during the war of 1808-1878, at the rate of $5,000 a week. Another Cuban Senator, Seuor Morelos, supported the views of Sehor Fernandez de Castro. Senator Carbonell, representing the University of Havana, in a speech of great power, continued the argument, saying: "Have the people involved in this matter ever been consulted? The country has not been heard, and now for the first time has become acquainted with the fact that it has to pay such debts." The Cuban and Porto Rican Senators, Senores Portuondo, Ortiz, Labia, Montoro, Fernandez de Castro, Figueras, and Vizcarrondo, went fur- ther, and introduced a bill to provide for the payment by Spain of the so-called Cuban debt in proportion to the productive capacity of the various provinces. The protests of the colonial Senators were not heeded, but their jus- tice was recognized by no less a Spanish statesman than Senor Sagasta, the present Premier of Spain, then in the opposition, who said: "Our treasury is not now sufiHciently provided with funds to aid Cuba in the way and to the extent that we would like to do; but I say the Peninsula must give all that it can, and we must do without hesi- tation all that we can." Was not this a clear acknowledgment of the national character of the debt°^ Perhaps not so clear as that made in the decree of autonomy for Cuba and Porto Rico, signed by the Queen Regent of Spaiu ou the 25th of November, 1897, and countersigned by Senor Sagasta, as President of the Council of Ministers. In Article II of the "Transient Articles" of the decree, we find the following declaration: "Article II. The manner of meeting the expenditures occasioned by the debt which now burdens the Cuban and Spanish treasury, and that which shall have been contracted until the termination of the war, shall form the subject of a law wherein shall be determined the part payable by each of the treasuries and the special means of paying the interest thereon, and of the amortization thereof, and, if necessary, of paying the principal. "Until the Cortes of the Kingdom shall decide this point, there shall be no change in the conditions on which the aforesaid debts have been contracted, or in the payment of the interest and amortization, or in the* guarantee of said debts, or in the manner in which the payments are now made. "When the apportionment shall have been made by the Cortes it shall be for each one of the treasuries to make payment of the part assigned to it. " Engagements contracted with creditors under the pledge of the good faith of the Spanish nation shall in all cases be scrupulously respected." In these declarations we find a clear assertion not only of the power of the Government of Spain to deal with the so-called Cuban debt as a national debt, but also a clear admission that the pledge of the reve- nues of Cuba was wholly within the control of that government, and could be modified or withdrawn by it at will without affecting the obligation of the debt. As to what is stated in the Spanish memorandum touching the aid 102 TREATY OP PEACE, given to Cuba in the last century or tlie early part of the present cen- tury by the Vice Koyalty of Mexico, the American Coniniissioners might offer certain pertinent historical observations; but they deem it neces- sary now to say only that Mexico is not making any claim before this Joint Commission, either directly or indirectly. As to the statement that Cuba has produced during a very few years in the present century a surplus which was turned over to the treasury of the Peninsula, the American Commissioners will cite the justly celebrated Diccionario Geogrdfico-Estadistko-Histdrico de la Ida de Cnba, by Senor Don Jacobo de la Pezuela, by which (see article on Senor Don Claudio Martinez de Pinillos) it appears that after 1825 uot only were all the expenses of the island paid oat of its revenues, but surpluses were sent, annually and regularly, to the mother country. These surpluses from 1850 to 1860 amounted to .$34,410,830. And it is to be observed that in addition to the regular annual surpluses turned over after 1825, extraordinary subsidies were from time to time granted to the Home Government. It was for services rendered in matters such as these that iSefior Pinillos received the title of Countof Villanueva. As to the recent "advances" to Cuba, referred to iu the Spanish memorandum, it is to be regretted that details were not given. But, by the very term "advances", it is evident that the Spanish memoran- dum does not refer to gifts, but to expenditures for the reimbursement of which Cuba was expected ultimately to provide; and the American Commissioners do not doubt that these expenditures were made for the carrying on of the war, or the jiayment of war expenses, in Cuba. When the American Commissioners, in their memorandum of the 14th instant, referred to the Cuban insurrection of 1808 as the product ot just grievances, it was not their intention to offend the sensibilities of the Spanish Commissicmers, but to state a fact which they supposed to be generally admitted. They might, if they saw fit to do so, cite the authority of many eminent Siianish statesmen in support of their remark. Tliey will content themselves with mentioning only one. On February 11, 1809, Marshal Serrano, President of the Provisional Gov- ernment at Madrid, in his speech at the opening of the Constituent Cortes, referred to the revolution in Spain and the insurrection in Cuba in the following terms: "The lievolutiou is not responsible for this ris- ing, which is due to the errors of i>ast Governments; and we hope that it will be speedily put down and that tranquillity, based upon liberal reforms, will then be durable." (Annual Kegister, 1809, page 255.) The American Commissioners have read without offense the reference in the Spanish memorandum to the Indian rebellions which it has been necessary for the United States to suppress, for they are unable to see any parallel between the uprisings of those barbarous and often savage tribes, which have disappeared before the umrch of civilization because they were unable to submit to it, and the insurrections against Spanish rule in Cuba, insurrections in which many of the noblest men of Spanish blood in the island have participated. Nor are the American Commissioners offended by the reference of the Spanish memorandum to the attempt of the Southern States to secede. The Spanish Commissioners evidently misconceive the nature and the object of that movement. The war of secession was fought and concluded upon a question of constitutional j^rinciple, asserted by one party to the conflict and denied by the other. It was a conflict in no respect to be likened to the uprisings against Spanish rule in Cuba. The American Commissioners are unaware of the ground on which TREATY OP PEACE. 103 it is asserted in the Spanish memorandum that the United States has been compelled to admit that the Cuban people are as yet unfit lor the enjoyment of full liberty and sovereigrnty. It is true that an intimation of such unfitness was made in the note of the Spanish Government ou the 2lind of July last. The Government of the United States, in its reply of the 30tli of July, declared that it did not share the apprehen- sions of Spain in this regard, but that it reiooni/cd that in the present distracted and prostrate condition of the island, brought about by the wars that had waged there, aid and guidance would be necessary. The reference in the Spanish memorandum to the obligations of Porto Eico is not understood by the American Commissioners, who had been led to believe that there was no Porto Kican debt. On June 30, 18 lO, Seiior Castellano, Colonial ]\linister of Spain, in submitting to the Cortes the budget of Porto Eico for 1890-97, the last one, as it is uudeivstood, ever framed, said: "The duty to report to the National representation the financial con- dition of Porto Eico is exceedingly gratifying. It shows the ever grow- ing prosperity of the Lesser Antille, which, through the multiplicity of its production and the activity of its industry, has succeeded in securing markets for its surpluses in the whole world. " It being ivithout ami public debt {sin denda pi'tblica), all its neces- sities being covered, its' treasury being full to repletion, its public serv- ices being fulfilled with regularity, with economy in the expenses, and with a constant development of the revenues of the state, the spectacle afforded by Porto Eico is worthy of attention." The Gaccta de Madrid of July 1, 189(), wliich published this budget, published also a Law, approved June 1*9, 1896, providing for the dispo- sition to be made of the surplus of $l,7aO,909 in the treasury of Porto Eico at the expiration of the fiscal year 1895-90. No Porto Eican Loan was ever contracted or floated belbre 1896. No Porto Eican bonds are quoted in the markets of Europe or America. It is possible that the Governor General of Porto Eico may have borrowed money from a bank or from private persons in order to meet in advance expenses authorized by the budget, and that he may have given promissory notes for the amount borrowed, but these notes, paid on maturity, do not constitute a Porto Eican debt, in the sense claimed by the Spanish Commission: Nor is it to be supposed, in view of the flourishing condition of the colonial finances, as explained by the Si)anish Minister of the Colonies, that any note of the kind referred to remains unpaid. The American Commissioners are not acquainted with the works of the publicists who maintain that the thirteen original United States paid to Great Britain 15,009,000 pounds sterling, presumably for the extinguishment of colonial debts. The American Commissioners, how- ever, feel no interest in the matter, since the statement is entirely erroneous. The preliminary and definitive treaties of peace between the United States and Great Britain of 1782 and 1783 were published soon after their conclusion, and have since been republished in many forms. They are the only treaties made between the two countries as to American independence, and they contain no stipulation of the kind referred to. Nor do the American Commissioners perceive the relevancy of the citation in the Spanish memorandum of the sums paid by the United States to France, Spain, Eussia, and various Indian nations for terri- 104 TREATY OF PEACE. tory acquired from them. In none of these cases does .t apy/ear that tbe" United States assumed any debts. The money paid by the United States was paid for the territory. As to the case of Texas, the American Commissioners have only t« observe that Texas was an independent state which yiehled up its independence to the United States and became a part of the American Eepublic. In view of this extinction of the national sovereignty, the United States discharged the Texan debt. Indeed, the whole reference made in the Spanish memorandum to the case of Texas is quite inac- curate. The United States did not demand of Mexico the independ- ence of Texas. That independence was established by the inhabitants of Texas themselves, and had long- been acknowledged, both by the United States and by other powers, before the voluntary annexation of Texas to the United States. The payments of money made by the United States to Mexico for terri- tory obtained by the former from the latter at the close of the Mexican war are referred to in the Spanish memorandum, but these payments established no principle. They were made by the United States as a part of the general settlement with Mexico, and it will hardly be argued that if the treaty of peace had contained no stipulation in the subject, anything would have been due from the United States. The Spanish memorandum, however, refers to these transactions as if they constituted precedents for the proposal put forward by the Si)anish Commissioners for the arbitration by the United States and Spain of the question whether the whole or any part of the alleged Cuban and Porto Rican debts should be assumed or guaranteed by the United States. The American Commissioners are compelled to take a difierent view of the subject. They have no doubt that if during the negotiations with Mexico a proposal had been put forward by either party for the arbitration of the question whether Mexico should cede the territories demanded by the United States, or whether if they were ceded the United States should pay for them, and if so how much, such proposal would have been rejected by the other party as entirely inap- plicable to the transaction. So it is in the present case. The Commissioners of the United States and of Spain have met for the purpose of concluding a treaty which is to terminate a war. The matters involved in this transaction are mat- ters for mutual adjustment and definitive settlement. They are matters to be determined by the parties themselves, and not by any third party. Arbitration comes before war, to avert its evils; not after war to escape its results. As was shown by the American Commissioners in their memorandum of the 14th of October, the burdens imposed by Spain upon Cuba in the form of the so-called Cuban debt have been the fruitful source of Cuban insurrections. In the opinion of the American Commissioners the time has come for the lifting of this burden, and not for the sub- mission to a third party of the question whether it shall be lifted at all. Having answered so much of the Spanish memorandum as relates to the vital articles of the Spanish proposals and expounds the Spanish views regarding them, the American Commissioners do not think it necessary to discuss the remaining articles, which may be, for the pur- pose of this discussion, regarded as merely subsidiary, and as to which they make all necessary reservations. Near the close of their memorandum, the Spanish Commissioners say : '•It appears by this recapitulation that the only question now pend- ing between the two Commissions and awaiting their decision is a TREATY OF PEACE. 105 question of money, Avliich. so far as one of the nigh Contracting]^ Parties is concerned, is relatively of secondary importance. That question is the one which relates to the colonial debt." In this conclusion the American Commissioners concur. The American Commissioners have maintained that the proposal by the Spanish Commissioners that the United States shall assume the so-called Cuban debt is in reality a proi)osal to affix a condition to the unconditional promise made by Spain in the Protocol of Aufjust 12, 1898, to "relinquish all claim of sovereignty over and title to Cuba"; and they have further maintained that the abstention of Spain from l^roposing such a condition at that time precludes her from proposing it now. The American Commissioners have declared, and now repeat, that if such a proposal had been made during the negotiations that resulted in the conclusion of the Protocol it would have terminated them, unless it had been withdrawn. In conflrmation of the position that the Spanish Commission is now precluded from proposing the assumption by the United States of the so-called Cuban debt, the American Commissioners, besides invoking the unconditional stipulation of the Protocol, are able to point to the fact that the Spanish Government, in the correspondence that resulted in the conclusion of that instrument, took the precantion, in replying to the demand of the United States for the relinquishment by Spain of all claim of sovereignty over Cuba, and her immediate evacuation of the island, to refer to the duty which in her opinion rested upon the United States under the circumstances to provide for the protection of life and property in the island until it should have reached the stage of self-government. In his note of August 7, 1898, the Duke of Almo- dovar, replying to the demand of the United States, said: "The necessity of withdrawing from the territory of Cuba being imperative, the nation assuming Spain's place must, as long as this territory shall not have fully reached the condition required to take rank among other sovereign powers, provide for rules which will insure order and i)rotect against all risks the Spanish residents, as well as the Cuban natives still loyal to the mother country." If to this reservation, which the American Commissioners have declared their readiness to recognize in the treaty, the Spanish Govern- ment had desired to add another on the subject of the Cuban debt, the opportunity then existed and should liave been seized. Indeed, the insertion of a few words in th-e reservation actually made would have rendered it applicable to the so-called Cuban debt as well as to the pro- tection of life and property. A labored argument is made in the memorandum submitted by the Spanish Commissioners to prove that the Government of the United States in declining to take upon itself the so-called Cuban debt is act- ing in violation of all principles of international law and assumes an attitude hitherto unknown in the history of civilized nations. Cases supposed to be apposite are cited, showing the assumption of national debts where one sovereignty is absorbed by another, or a division of national indebtedness where a nation is depiived of an integral part of its domain, either by cession, or the attainment of independence by a colony theretofore charged with raising a part of the national revenue. Elsewhere we have pointed out the differences manifestly existing between the cases cited and the one in hand. The United States may well rest its case upon this point ui)on the plain terms of the Protocol, which, as the memorandum submitted by the Spanish Commissioners well says, contains the agreement between the parties — "for no other 106 TREATY OF PEACE. was formulated botween the two parties", and which is executed when kSpaiu reliiiiiuishes all claim of sovereiguty over and title to Cuba. If the question were still open the United States might well challenge the fullest inquirj^ into the equity of this demand. It is urged in the Spanish Commissioners' memorandum that the United States, erroneously believing in the justice of the cause of Cuban inde- pendence, made it its own, and took up arms in its behalf. "TheUnittMl States", so declares the Spanish memorandum, "made a demand on Spain, and afterwards declared war on her, that Cuba might become free and independent." The causes of the demand of the United States for the termination of Spanish sovereignty in Cuba are amply shown in the history of the events which preceded it. For many years the United States patiently endured a condition of affairs iu Cuba which gravely affected the interests of the nation. As early as 1875 President Grant called attention to all its dread horrors and the consequent injuries to the interests of the United States and other nations, and also to the fact that the agency of others, either by mediation or by intervention, seemed to be the only alternative which must sooner or later be invoked for the termination of the strife. During that administration, notwith- standing that it was clearly intimated to Spain that the United States could no longer endure the situation — which had become intolerable — , no unfriendly action was taken, and for ten years it suffered all the inconvenience and deprivation, destruction of trade and injury to its citizens incident to the struggle, which was ended by the Peace of Zanjon, only to break out again and to be waged with every feature of horror and desolation and profitless strife which had characterized the former struggle. President Cleveland, in his Annual Message of 1896, was constrained to say to the Congress of the United States : " When the inability of Spain to deal successfully with the insurrection has become manifest, and it is demonstrated that her sovereignty is extinct in Cuba for all pur- poses of its rightful existence, and when a hoj^eless struggle for its re establishment has degenerated into a strife which means nothing more than the useless sacrifice of human life and the utter destruction of the very subject-matter of the conflict, a situation will be j^resented in which our obligations to the sovereignty of Spain will be superseded by higher obligations, which we can hardly hesitate to recognize and discharge". Throughout President Cleveland's administration this situation was patiently endured, at great loss and expense to the United States, which then and at all times was diligent in maintaining the highest obligations of neutrality, through the vigilance of its navy and its executive and judicial de])artments. The present Chief Executive of the United States, in his first Annual Message, in 1897, again called attention to the disastrous eflects upon our interests of the warfare still being waged in Cuba. The patient waiting of the people of the United States for the termination of these conditions culminated in the Message of April 2, 1898, of the President to Congress, in which he said: "The long trial has proved that the object for which Spain has waged the war cannot be attained. The fire of insurrection may flame or may smoulder with varying seasons, but it has not been and it is plain that it cannot be extinguished by present methods. The only hope of relief and repose from a condition which can no longer be endured is the enforced pacification of Cuba. In the name of humanity, in the name of civilization, in behalf of endangered American interests which give us the right and the duty to speak and to act, the war in Cuba must stop." Acting upon this Message the Congress of the United States, in the Eesolutiou approved by the Presi- TREATY OF PEACE. 107 dent A]>ril 20, 1898, which has been so often referred to in the memo- randiim submitted by the Spanish Commissioners, based its demand that the Government of Spain relinquish its authority atul i;overnment in tiie Ishmd of Cuba, and withdraw its lorces from Cuba ai.d Cuban waters, upon conditions in Cuba (so near the United States) which were decUired to be such that they could no longer be endured. It is not necessary to recite the record of the events which followed that deuiand, well known to the members of this Commission, and which are now a part of the history of the world. It is true that tlie enforced relincpiishment of Si)anish sovereignty will result in the free- dom and independence of the Island of Cuba and. not in the aggran- dizement of the United States. This resume of events which led to the United States taking up arms is not made to wound tlie suscepti- bilities of the Spanish nation, or its distinguished representatives upon this Commission, but, in view of the truth of history and the statements made in the memorandum submitted by the Spanish Commissioners, less could not be said by the representatives of the United States. Not having taken up arms for its own advancement, having refrained from acquiring sovereignty over Cuba, the United States now seeks to attain a peace c(msistent with its ends and purposes in waging war. In asking, as a victorious nation, for some measure of reparation, it has not emulated the examples of other imtions and demanded reparation in money for the many millions spent and the sufferings, privations and losses endured by its people. Its relations to Cuba have been tliose of a people suffering without reward or the hoi)e thereof. The American Commissioners therefore feel that they are fully justi- fied both in law and in morals in refusing to take upon themselves in addition to the burdens already incurred the obligation of discharging the so called colonial debts of Spain — debts, as heretofore shown, chielly incurred in opixtsing the object for the attainment of which the resolu- tion of intervention was adopted by the Congress and sanctioned by the President of the United States. If it could be admitted, as is argued in the memorandum submitted by the Spanish Commissioners, that the United States in tliis relation stands as the agent of the Cuban people, the duty to resist the assumption of these heavy obligations would be equally imperative. The decrees of the Spanish Government itself show that these debts were incurred in the fiuitless endeavors of that Gov- ernment to suppress the aspirations of the Cuban people for greater liberty and freer government. True copy; John B. Moore. Protocol I^o. 11. Protocolo Xo. 11, Conference of October 31, 1898. Gonferencia del 31 Octubre de 1898. Present On the part of the Presentes. Por parte de los Es- United States. Messrs Day tados Uuidos de America, los Davis Frye Gray Reid Moore SeHores Day. Davis. Frye. Gray. Fergusson Reid. Moore. Fergusson. On the part of Spain Messrs. Pori^artedeEspafia. losSenores Montero-Rios Abarzuza, Garnica, Montero Rios. Abarzuza. Garnica. Villa- Urrutia, Cerero, Ojeda. Villa- Urrutia. Cerero. Ojeda. The protocol of the preceding Fue leida y aprobada el acta de session was read and approved. la sesidn anterior. 108 TREATY OF PEACE. The American Coininissioners stated that, in accordance with the understanding- expressed in the protocol which had just been read, they were prepared to present their proposal on the subject of the Phil- ippines, The proposal was read in English and translated into Span- ish, and delivered to tlie Spanish Commissioners. It was as follows : "The American Commissioners, having been invited by the Spanish Commissioners at the last confer- ence to present a proposition in regard to the Philippine Islands, beg to submit the following article on that subject: "'Spain hereby cedes to the United States the archipelago known as the Philippine Islands, and lying within the following line : A line running along the parallel of latitnde Hio 30' North from the 118th to the 127th degree meridian of longitude East of Greenwich, thence along the 127th degree me- ridian of longitude East of Green- wich to the parallel of 4"^ 45' North latitude, thence along the parallel of 4° 45' North latitude to its inter- section with the meridian of longi- tude 119° 35' East of Greenwich, thence along the meridian of longi- tude 119° 35' East of Greenwich to the parallel of latitude 7° 40' North, thence along the parallel of latitude of 7^ 40' North to its in- tersection wiih the 116th degree meridian of longitude East of Greenwich, thence by a direct line to the intersection of the 10th de- gree parallel of North latitude with the 118th degree meridian of longi- tude East of Greenwich, and thence along the 118th degree meridian of longitude East of Greenwich to the parallel of latitude 21° 30' North.' "A proper reference to the ces- sion thus proposed may be inserted in the article of the treaty relat- ing to public property, archives and records in territory which Spain cedes or over which she relinquishes her sovereignty. El Presidente de la Coniision Americana, maniflesta que, con- forme al acuerdo que con sign a el acta que acaba de leerse, los Com- isarios Americanos estan dispues- tosa presentar su proposicion rela- tiva 4 Filipinas. La proposicion es leida en ingles, dispues en espa- nol, y entregada d los Comisarios Espanoles. Su contenido es el si- guiente: "Los Comisarios Americanos, ha- biendo sido invitados por los Com- isarios Espaiioles en la ultima con- fereucia a presentar una proposi- cion respecto de las Islas Filipinas, se permiten someter sobre esta cuestion el articulo siguiente. " Espaiia por este articulo cede 4 los Estados Unidos el archipiel- ago conocido por IvSlas Filipinas, situado dentro de las lineas sig- uientes: una linea que corre 4 lo largo del paralelo 21° 30' de latitud iSorte desde el grado 118 hasta el grado 127 del meridiano de longi- tud Este de Greenwich; y de aqul a lo largo del grado 127 meridiano de longitud Este de Greenwich hasta el paralelo 4° 45' de latitud Norte; y de aqui a lo largo del paralelo 4° 45' latitud Norte hasta su interseccion con el meridiano ( e longitud 119° 35' Este de Green- wich; de aqul 4 lo largo del me- ridiano de longitud 119° 35' Este de Greenwich, al paralelo de lati- tud 70 40' Norte; de aqui a lo largo del paralelo de latitud 7° 40' Norte, hasta su interseccion con el grado IIG del meridiano de longi- tud Este de Greenwich; de aqui por una linea directa 4 la intersec- cion del decimo grado paralelo de latitud Norte con el 118 grado me- ridiano de longitud Este de Green- wich, y de aqui a lo largo del grado 118 meridiano de longitud Este de Greenwich al paralelo de latitud 21° 30' Norte. "Una irencion oportuna de la cesion asi propuesta, puede ser in- sertada en el articulo del Tratado relative 4 la propiedad publica, Archives y actas uotariales en los territories que Espana cede 6 d cuya soberauia renuncia. TREATY OP' PEACE. 109 "The American Commissioners beg further to state that they are prepared to insert in the treaty a stipnhition for the assumption by the United States of any existing indebtedness of Spain incurred for public worlvs and improvements of a pacific character in the Pliilippines." The Spanish Commissioners asked for an adjournment in order that they might examine the pro- posal, and either accept it or pre- sent a counterproposal, and sug- gested that the Commission shcmld meet again on Friday, tlie 4th of November, at two o'clock, p. m., without prejudice to asking for a postponement, if it should be nec- essary. This suggestion was accepted, and the conference was accordingly adjourned. William E. Day CusHMAN K. Davis Wm. P Frye Geo. Gray Whitelaw Eeid, John B. Moore. " Los Comisarios Americanos se permiten ademas manifestar (jue est.ln dispuestos a insertar en el Tratado una estipulaciou por la que asumiran los Estados Unidos cualquiera deuda de Espana con- traida para obras publicas 6 mejoras de cariicter pacihco en Fiiipinas." Los Comisarios Espanoles piden un aplazamiento para estudiar dicha proposicion y sugieren que ambas Comisiones se reunan de nuevo el viernes proximo a las 2 P. M., sin perjnicio de pedirun nuevo l)lazo si fuese necesario. Aceptada esta indicacion, se levanto la sesion. E. MONTERO Rios B. DE ABARZUZA J. DE GAENICA W R DE Villa TJrrutia Rafael Cerero Emilio DE Ojeda Protocol Ko. 12. Conference of November 4, 1898. Present — On the part of the United States: Messrs. Day, Davis, Frye, Gray, Reid, Moore, Fergusson. On the part of Spain: Messrs. Montero Rios, Abarzuza, Garnica, Villa-Urrutia, Cerero, Ojeda. The protocol of the preceding session was read and ajiproved. The President of the Spanish Commission stated that, having carefully examined the i)roposal of the American Commissioners in re- lation to the Philippines, he pre- sented a counter- proposal on that subject, which counter-proposal he delivered to the Secretary of the Spanish Commission, who handed it to the Secretary of the American Commissiou. Protocolo No 12. Conferencia del 4 de Noviembre de 1898. Presentes Por parte de los Es- tados Unidos de America, los Senores Day. Davis. Frye. Gray. Reid. Moore Fergusson Por parte de Espana los Senores Montero Rios. Abarzuza. Garnica. Villa-Urrutia. Cerero. Ojeda. Fue leida y aprobada el acta de la sesion anterior. El Presidente dela Comision Es- panola manifiesta que despues de haber examinado atentamente la proposicion delos Comisarios Ame- ricanos, relativa a Fiiipinas, pre- senta una contraproposicion sobre el mismo asunto, que entrega al Secretario dela Comision Espanola, quien -k su vez la pone en manos del Secretario de la Comision Ame- ricana. 110 TREATY OF PEACE. The American Commissioners de- siring to have the counterproposal translated to tbein immediately, it was read in English by their Inter- jireter; and it is annexed to the protocol. The President of the American Commission then stated that as they understood from the reading of the paper that their proposal was rejected, they had under the rules aright to lile a memorandum in writing in support thereof, and that, under the circumstances, and in order that the paper presented by the Spanish Commissioners might be carefully translated and considered, the American Commis- sioners desired an adjournment till Tuesday, the 8th of November, at two o'clock, p. m. The Spanish Commissioners agreed to the adjournment, but stated that, as their paper, besides rejecting the American proposal, also put forward a counter i>ro- posal, they understood that they would have the right to submit a memorandum in writing in support of such counter proposal, if the American Commissioners should reject it. The Commissioners concurring in opinion upon these matters, the conference was adjourned to the day previously fixed. William E. Day CusHMAN K. Davis Wm. P Frye Geo. Gray Whitelaw Eeid. John B. Moore. Los Comisarios Americanos de seando que fuese inmediatamente traducida dicha con trap roposicion, llie leida en ingles por su inter- prete y auadida en calidad de an- exo al presente Protocolo. El Presidente de la Comision Americana manifiesta que entiende que de la lectura del anterior doc- umento se desjjrende ser rechazada la proposiciondela Comision Amer- icana, y que segiin el reglamento tiene esta el derecho de presentar un Memorandum escrito en apoyo de aquella; que en vista de ello y a fin de que pudiera ser traducido cuidadosamente y examinado el documento presentado, los Comisa- rios Americanos deseaban aplazar la conferencia hasta el martes 8 de i^oviembre a las 2. P. m. Los Comisarios Espanoles asien- ten al aplazamiento, ])ero aiiadem que el documento por ellos presen- tado ademas de rechazar la propo- sicion Americana contiene una con tra-proi)osici6n y que por tan to en- tienden que asimismo tendrian el derecho de presentar un Memoran- dum por escrito en apoyo de su contra-proposicion si esta fuese re- chazada por los comisarios Ameri- cajios. Sie.tdo esto acordado x>or los Comisarios, se aplaza la conferen- cia hasta el dia y hora auterior- mente citados. E. MOISTERO Rios B. DE AbARZUZA J. DE GARNICA W R DE Villa Urrutia Rafael Cerero Emilio de Ojeda Annex to Protocol No. 12. comision para la NEGOCIACION de la PAZ CON LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS. PROPOSICION. La Comision Espanola ha leido con viva sorpresa la proposicion que la Americana ha presentado en lasesion del 31 del ultimo nies deOctubre. El tiuico articulo que en ella se contiene, esta reducido a que Espana TREATY OF PEACE. Ill ceda 4 los Estados Unidos el arcljipielago conocido por Fslas Fdipinns, situado en el penmetro alli geograticameiite detenninado. Contiene adeniiis dicha i)i()posici6n, aunque no pava queformen parte del articulo, dos pariafos de U)S cuales el segmido es de una iniportancia tal (pie exige que la Coniisii'-.n espanola baya de ocuparse en este escrito especialmente de sii contonido. Los Coniisarios espanoles acaban de decir que les ha causado viva sorpresa esta proposicion, y es de su deber exponer las razones que tal sentiniiento explican. Desde la primera conferencia basta la iiltiina, los Senores Oomisanos Americanos sostuvieron constantemente, y alegaron couio principal fundaraento de los proyectos sobre Cuba y Puerto Rico, (lue en estas conferencias, aiubas Comisiones teniau que ateuerse (i las bases estable- cidas en los preliminares de paz, que liabian sido convenidos y tirmados el 12 de Agosto ultimo. Lo mismo decian y continuan diciendo los Coniisarios Espanoles. La unica diferencia entre los unos y los otros consistio en que los Americauos sostenian que aquel docuniento babia de ser entendido extrictanieute en su sentido literal, sin querer tomar en consideracion para tijar este sentido uiugun otro dato, antecedente ni documento. Y coino en el Protocol© no se babia escrito la frase "Deuda de Cuba 6 de Puerto Rico", entendiau que por esta razon Espafia debfa transmitir 6 ceder su soberaiiia sobre aquellas islas,que- dandose con sus obligaciones, Los Coniisarios Espanoles, por la inversa, entendiau que el sentido literal del Protocolo debia fijarse teniendo ])resentes no solo las reglas generales del Derecbo iuternacional sobre interpretacion de los tratados, siuo tambien las uegociaciones en que anibas partes lo babian preparado y en que de antemano lo babfan oticialniente interi)retado. Pues bien, la proposicion pretendiendo la cesion por Espana de las Islas Filipinas 4 los Estados Unidos, no solainente no cabe dentro de los articulos del Protocolo, sino que esta en notoria contradiecion con el, y es, en opinion de la Comision esiianola, su flagrante intVaccion. Contiene aquel convenio seis articulos y de ellos solamente el tercero se refiere al Arcbipi^lago Filipino. Dice asi literalmente traducido del texto oticial frances: "Los Estados Unidos ocuparan y tendran la ciudad, la babia y el puerto de Manila, esperaudo la conclusion de un tratado de paz que debera determinar la inspeccion (controle), la disposici(5n y el gobierno de las Filipinas." Esto es lo imico que bay en el Protocolo sobre el arcbipi^lago. Aunque la Comision espanola adoptase para la interpretacion de este articulo, el estrecbo criterio del sentido literal que la americana so- stiene (por extrano que sea este sostenimiento), que debe aplicarse, no se podria decir otra cosa sino que en aquella disposicion se acordo la ocupacion nieramente temporal 6 provisional de Manila y su ])uerto y babia por los Estados Unidos basta que se biciese el tratado de paz en que se babia de determinar 6 couvenir sobre la inspeccion, la disposicion y el gobierno de Fili])inas. iQiie tiene esto que ver con un cambio 6 cesion de soberania? La primera parte del articulo es completamente clara. Xo ofrece la menor duda de que alli lo iinico que se convino sobre Manila, su babia y puerto, fue su ocupacion, no definitiva, sino provisional, por los Estados Unidos, ocupacion que no babia de durar mas que basta la celebracion del Tratado de paz. No necesita el sentido literal del texto comprobacion alguna. Mas si la necesitara, pueden los Senores Comi- sarios Americanos registrar el numero 19 del Libro araarillo, que acaba 112 TREATY OF PEACE. de publicar el Gobierno de la Republica Francesa. Dicho numero con- tiene la Circular que A los ties dias de tirmado el Protocolo, dirigio el Senor Ministro de negocios extraiigeros de Francia (i sus Einbajndores en Europa, ddndoles cuenta de la niision 4 que el Gobierno de la Repiiblica se liabia prestado que deserapenara su Embajador en Wash- ington para ofiecer la paz al Gobierno de los Estados Unidos en nom- bre del de Su Majestad Catolica. Y en esta Circular dice el Senor Ministro que su Embajador en aquella capital habia firraado en nombre de Espana, y 4 su ruego, un Protocolo que contenia las exigencias de los Estados Unidos para la paz. Enuniera el Senor Ministro tales exigencias y respecto 4 Filii)inas cousigna, como la iinica que contenia aquel documento, la ocupacionPBO VISIONAL deManilapor lasfuerzas americanas. Los Senores Comisarios Americanos no desconocer4n la iucontrasta- ble fuerza moral del testimonio del Sefior Ministro de la Republica Francesa, amiga i)or igual de los dos Estados beligerantes, y cuyo Senor Ministro no podia saber el couteuido del Protocolo, sino per el autori- zadisimo conducto de su Embajador, que lo liabia discutido, convenido y firmado en nombre de Espana con el Gobierno Americano. El carActer merameute provisional de tal ocupacion subsistio aim despues de firmado el Protocolo, cuando, contra lo convenido en su articulo 6°, el General Merritt se apodero de la plaza por la fuerza. En el tiltimo parrafo del numero 5 de las reglas convenidas para la capitulacion y que lueron firmadas en 14 de Agosto en nombre del Ejercito Americano i)or el Brigadier General de voluutarios Mr. E. V. Green, por el Capitau de la Marina Americana Mr. Lamberton, por el Teniente Coronel e Inspector General Mr. Whittier y por el Teniente Coronel y Juez Abogado Mr. Crowder, se lee lo siguiente: "La devo- lucion de las armas depositadas por las fuerzas Espanolas, tendra lugar cuando se evacue la plaza ]>or las mismas 6 por el Ejercito Americano. ^^ Entendian, pues, los que esto firmaban que las fuerzas Americanas no ocupaban definitivamente la plaza jiorque suponian que podia llegar el caso de que hubieran de evacuarla. Y si suponian esto, claro es que entendian que era meramente provisional la ocupacion. Es verdad: las fraces "inspeccion, disposicion y gobierno delas Fili- pinas" no tiene un seutido claro. El Gobierno Espaiiol y su Represen- tante en Washington ya lo hicieron notar reclamado su explicacion al Gobierno Americano (que no la dio), antes de firmarse el Protocolo. Pero cualquiera que sea la que ahora intente dar, no puede llegarse, en ningiin caso, 4 pretender que tales frases encierren el pensamiento de la cesion de la soberania de Espana en el archipielago. Esta cesion alii convenida, 6 sea la adquisicion 4 perpetuidad del archipielago por los Estados Unidos, estaria en contradiccion con la occupacion exclu- sivamente temporal de Manila, tambien alii acordada, ya que esta expresamente consign ada en el mismo parrafo. No podrian nunca tampoco admitirse con arreglo 4 las maximas de interpretacion de los Tratados porque tal supuesta cesion seria un bene- ficio a favor de quienes se negaron a aclarar sin alegar para ello razon alguna valedera, cuando oportunamente se les pidio, el concepto que ya entonces aparecia ambiguo e indetermiuado de tales frases; y porque aun sin tal razon, habria lugar a aplicar 4 los Senores Comisarios Ameri- canos, con el fandamento que ellos no tuvieron para aplicarla a los espa- noles (segun estos entienden), la razon que consignaron en su ultimo Memorandum, y segun la cual, "la absteucion de Espana de proponer en el Protocolo la condiciou del transi);iS() de. la Deuda, la incapacitaba para propuncrla ahora." Los Estados Unidos se abstavieron de pro- TREATY OF PEACE. 113 poner 4 Espana en el Protocolo, franca y abiertamente, corao franca y abiertamente debe coiisiguaise todo en los Tiatados (lue siempre se otorgan para ser entendidos y cuniplidos de bucna f('', la cesion de sa Soberania en el arcliipi.'lauo. No lo liicieron, y pur eso estiin incapaci- tados de pioponerla abora. Cuanto precede reahnente sobra ])or(iue existe la i)rneba iirefutable para los Senores Coniisarios Aniericancjsde que al tirniarse el Piotocolo de Washington el dionisimo Senor I'residento de la Union no .solo no abrigaba el pensaniiento de que Espana liubiese de ceder el Arclii- pielago Filipino a los Estados Unidos, sino que abrigaba el i)ensaniiento contrario, 6 sea el de que Espana habrd deconservar alii su Soberania. En la couferencia que el Embajador de Fraucia Senor Canil)on tuvo en 4 de agosto ultimo cou Mr. Mac-lvinley a presencia de su Secretario de Estado, liaciendole observaciones sobre la cesion de la Isla de Puerto Rico en compensacion de los gustos de la gnerra, el Senor Presidente le contesto niostrandose inflexible en este punto, y le repitio que la cuestion de Filijjinas era la iiuica que no estaha ya (lejinitivamciiie resuelta en su peiisamiento. Cou tal luotivo el Senor Canibon le ])idi6 explicaciones sobre el sentido de las sobredichas frases de la clausula S'' relativa al Arcliipielago Filipino, porque aparecia redactada en terminos que podian prestarse a los teniores de Espaila respecto a su soberania en aqnellas islas. El Senor Presidente le contesto las sigui- entes textnales palabras: "No quiero dejar subsistir ningiin eqnivoeo sobre este particular. Los negociadoros de los dos j^ai.^es seran los que resuelvau cuales sean las ventajas i)ernianentes" (fijcse la atencion en la frase: no "dereclios") "que ])edirenuis en el arcliipielago, y en fin los que decidan la inteivencion, (conlrolc). disposicion y gcjbierno de Fili- pinas" y agrego "ElGobierno de Madrid puede tener la seguridad de que, hasta ahora, no hay nada resvclto, a priori cv mi jiensaviioito contra Espana, asi como considero que no bay nada decidido contra los Estados Uuidos.'' ^Cabe en lo posible que nadie dnde de que el 12 de Agosto el Senor Presidente de los Estados Unidos al tirmar su Secretario de Estado el Protocolo, no tenia el pensaniiento de exigir a Espana la cesiou de su Soberania en el arcbijiiilago para los Estados Unidos? Pero bay mas: no solo uo tenia ese proposito, sino que sus frases demuestrau que tenia el de que Es])ana babfa de conservar aquella Soberania. Segiin el los Comisionadosen Paris baUlan de acordar las ventajas permantnfes que los Estados Unidos pedirian en el arcbipielago. Pues si Esimna no bubicra de conservar su soberania, ^quc ventajas para el porvenir era posible que pidierau los Comisionados de los Estados Unidos a Es])aiia y que esta babia de poder concederles? Si los Estados Unidos se babian de quedar con la soberania, ^como se explica que sus Comisionados en Paiis bubierau de pedir 4 Espana ventajas en un arcbipielago que el mismo tiemijo babian de reclanuir y recibir como suyo? Mas aiin bay otra prueba, tan irrefutable como la anterior de que el Gobieriio de Wasbingtou no solameute entonces estaba ageno a todo pensaniiento y proposito sobre la soberania del Arcliipielago Filipino, sino que consintio que estabubieradecoutinuaren E.s[)ario, excluyendo en su proi)io pensamieuto toda mudanza sobre este punto al redactar primero y al tirmar desjiues la clausula 3^* del Protocolo. Contestando al Gobierno de Espana, porsu despaclio de7 de Agosto, al Honorable Senor Secretario de Estado eu Washington, que le babia liecho saber en el suyo del ol de .lulio las condieiones, tales como aparecen redactadas e iucluidas en el Protocolo, bajo las cuales el T P 8 114 TREATY OF PEACE. Gobierno Americano estaba dispuesto a poner termino (i la guerra, le decia el Ministro espanol sobre la base 3'' lo que sigue: "La base reiereute a las Islas Filipinas parece a nuestra inteligencia demasiado indeterminada. En primer t«^rmiuo el titulo invocado por los Estados Uuido.s para la ocupacion de la bahia, puerto y ciudad de Manila^ esperando la conclusion de un Tratado de paz, no puede ser el de conquista, porque la ciudad de Manila se defiende aun: 4 pesar del bloqueo por mar y el asedio por tierra, aquel por la flota Americana, y este por las fuerzas que acaudilla un indigena alentado y pertrecbado por el Almirante, la bandera espanola no ba sido arriada. En segundo lugar el Archipielago Filipino se balla iutacto en poder y bajo la soberania de Espana. Entiende pues el Gobierno Espanol que la ocupa- cion temporal de Manila habra de constituir una garantia. Dicese que en el Tratado de paz se determinar4 la intervencion, la disposicion y el gobierno de Filipinas, y como la intencion del Gobierno federal queda per demas velada en esta clausula interesa a este Gobierno consignar que aceptando la base tercera no renuncia a priori a la Soberania total del Archipielago Filipino^ dejando d los negociadores el cuidado de estipular acerca de las reformas aconsejables por la sitnacion de aquellas posesiones y el nivel de cultura de siis naturales. El Gobierno de Su Majestad acepta la base 3"" acompanada por la declaracion supradichaJ'^ Bien claro aparece que el Gobierno Espailol no acepto la unica base que en el Protocolo bay sobre Filipinas, sino en cuanto en ella se qui- siera decir que Manila no habia de ser mas que temporalmente ooupada, como garantia, y que la intervencion, la disposicion y el gobierno de que en la base se hablaba, tendrian por unico objeto el regimen y gobi- erno interior de aquellas islas, pero no su soberania total que Espana expresamente se reservaba y babia de conservar. Contra esta interpretacion dada de antemano por el Gobierno de Su Majestad Catolica d la base tercera del Protocolo, y en cuyo unico sentido la aceptaba, nada dijo, nada indico el Gobierno de Washington antes de tirmarlo. Por la inversa el Seiior Secretario de Estado al remitir al Senor Embajador de Francia la minuta del Protocolo que Labia de firmarse le decia en una carta, que la nota del Gobierno Espa- ijol (que era la en que se hallaban las f rases anteriormente transcritas, ) contenia en su espiritu la aceptacion por Espaila de las condiciones propuestas por lOfe Estados Unidos. Por consiguiente la condicion tercera habia sido redactada por el Gobierno Americano en el mismo sentido en que la entendia el Gobierno Espanol, porque no podia decir, en otro caso, el Senor Secretario de Estado, con vista de la Nota en que constaba el unico sentido aceptable para el Gobierno Espanol, que este la aceptaba. Asi pues; los Estados Unidos podran reclamar hoy tal soberania, mas para esta reclamacion no pueden fundarse en el Protocolo. Y 2, que otro titulo que no sea este pueden alegar contra la voluntad de Esparia? En el protocolo se fijaron las bases que los Estados Unidos exigian 4 Espana para la paz, 6 lo que es lo mismo tod as las condiciones que los Estados Unidos imponian a Espaiia para que pudiera aquella restable- cerse eutre los dos paises. A la vez se acordo alii, la inmediata suspen- sion de las hostilidades, suspension que por parte de Espana fue religiosamente observada hasta el preseiite; Por lo tanto los Estados Unidos no pueden ni tienen derecho para exigir hoy 4 EspaSa mas condiciones onerosas, que las contenidas en el Protocolo, por cansas anteriores a su feclia, una vez que entonces no impr sieron mas que las quo alii estan escritas, dandose con su aceptacion por satisfechosj ni TREATY OF PEACE. 115 por causas posteriores ya que desde entonces Bspana no ejecnto acto alguno de ajiiesion ui dio motivo a nuevas exigeucias ni reclamacioues de los E8tados Unidos. Si por niotivos que no estAn en la esfera de la competencia de la . Coniision Espafiola, el Gobieriio Americano desea ahora adquirir la sobe- rania del arcliipielago filipino, no es ciertamente el medio adecuado para el logro de su proposito una reclamacion hecha al amparo de los preliminares de paz convenidos en el Protocolo firmado en Washing- ton en 12 de Agosto por ambas Altas Partes. Los Comisarios Espanoles indicaron al principio de este escrito que el 2° parrafo que desput^s del proyectado articulo con tenia la proposi- cion Americana era de tal importancia que les imponia la necesidad de ocuparse especialmente de su contenido. Dichos Sres Comisarios manifestan en el que estdn dispuestos <4 insertar en el tratado una estipulacion por la que asumirdn los Estados Unidos cualquiera deuda de Espana contraida para obras publicas 6 mejoras de cardcter pacifico en Filipinas. El Arcliipielago estii efectivamente gravado con una deuda de 200 millones de pesetas, garantizada con la bipoteca de los productos y rendimientos de la Aduana de Manila; y pesan adem^s sobre la Corona obligaciones, cargas de justicia y otras pensiones de menor importancia, del servicio exclusivo de aquella Colonia. For lo que hace a la deuda hipotecaria, ya ban consignado los Comi- sarios Espanoles con ocasion de la deuda de la misma clase que pesa hipotecariamente sobre la renta de las Aduanas y sobre todos los impuestos, directos 6 iudi rectos de la Isla de Cuba, que no pueden siquiera admitir discusion acercadel valor yeficacia de tales hipotecas. Constituidas legalmente por un Soberano legitimo y legitimamente adquiridas por los particulares de diversas nacionalidades que se inte- resaron en equellas operaciones de credito, Espana no es dueua de los dereclios de estas terceras personas que estan al amparo de las leyes que protegen la propiedad privada, para que eu un Tratado con los Estados Unidos ni con otra Potencia alguna, pueda consentir en nada que signifique 6 implique una lesion de dereclios que no son suyos. Se lo vedan los deberes m4s elementales de la probidad publica y privada. Espana no reclama el reconocimiento de esas deudas bipotecarias para su propio beneficio, puesto que su tesoro no se ha obligado ^ pagar tales deudas sino subsidiariamente, esto es, solamente en el caso en que no fueran suticientes las rentas e impuestos hipotecados. Si hace tal recla- macion es solamente en cumplimiento de un deber moral que pesa sobre todo dendor honrado y adeniAs en beneficio de los tenedores de su deuda propia, los cuales no podrian menos de ver un peligro para sus intereses en el hecho de que Espaiia, sin estar 4 ello obligada, recargase las obligaciones de su tesoro con otras cuantiosas a que hubiera de atender juntamente que 4 las suyas propias y corriendo el peligro de que sus recursos no bastasen para atender a todas. La deuda y obli- gaciones de las Colonias que 4 ella directamente interesan son las que no gozan del privilegio de una hipoteca, porque respecto a ellas esta princi- palmente obligada al pago, y entiende que no es justo que cuando las ha contraido por y para sus colonias, haya de continuar despues de perderlas, gravada con tales cargas, que son, despues de todo, una pequeiia parte del iumenso capital que en aquellas se invirtio y que ha cubierto con sus propios recursos. Quede dicho, por lo tanto, y esperan los Comisarios Espanoles que no habran de tener necesidad de repetirlo, que Espana no puede ni debe, 116 TREATY OP PEACE. porque el respeto d l) ageno se lo veda, convenir en este tratado, m en ninguno, sobie nada que implique la lesion 6 la supresiou 6 siquiera descouociiniento de derecbos piivados y agenos contra la voluutad de sus legitiiuos y particulares duenos. Mas aiin por lo que toca a la dueda colonial no privilegiada, su dig- nidad y el respeto (jue se debe 4 si misma, le vedan igualuiente adniitir las bases que resaltan en el parrafo de la proposicion de que se esta ocupaudo y que consiste en el exauien de la inversion que Espana liaya jiodido dar a los productos obtenidos por la creacion de dicbas duedas. Esto equivaldria & someter al criterio de una potencia extrafia los actos de su gobierno interior. Acertados 6 no, (acertados entiende que ban sido todos,) fueron perfectamente legitimos y estan al amparo de su Soberauia. Y aiin en la inadmisible hipotesis de que tal acierto no bubiera babido en ellos, no saben los Comisarios Espanoles que baya iiadic que pueda bacer depender la legitimidad de una deuda legalmente contraida, de la inversion buena 6 mala, que, despues de constituida, baya dado el deudor 4 sus productos. No ban de poner termino los Comisarios Espanoles 4 este escrito sin llaiiiar la ateiicion de los bonorables Comisarios Americanos sobre un pun to que no pnede menos de ser resuelto en el tratado, en compli- mieiito de lo convenido en la base ii^ del protocolo: dice estaasi: " Una vez terminado y firmado este protocolo, deberan suspenderse las bosti- lidades en los dos i)aises, y 4 este efecto se deberan dar ordenes por cada uno de los dos Gobiernos 4 los Jefes de sus luerzas de mar y tierra, tan pronto como sea posible." Ya antes de la firma del Protocolo, el Sr Presidente de la Union, despues de enterar al Sr Embajador de Francia el dia 30 de Julio nltiino, de las coudiciones que los Estados Unidos imponian a Espana para restablecer con ella la paz, le manifesto que consentia en conceder la suspension de bostilidades en seguida que cl tSeilor Ministro de Entado Enpafiol hiciera saber al Embajador de Francia^ su representante en Wash- i)H/ton, que acepfaba las negociaciones sobre las bases indicadas por el Gobierno federal; y que autorizaba a dicho Embajador para jirmar en su nombre el acta preliminar que ponia termino a las hostilidades. El Gobierno espanol manifesto su conformidad con tales bases, y autorizo al Embajador de Francia para aceptarlas y firmarlas en su nombre, por su despacbo de 7 de Agosto, que fue immediatamente comunicado al Gobierno de AVasbington. Apesar de esto, las bostili- dades no se suspeudieron entonces. Mas al fin se acordo su suspension pocos dias despues, 6 sea el dia 12, por el mencionado art 6° del protocolo. Esto no obstante el dia 13, el General Merritt, Jefe de las fuerzas Americanas en Manila, y el Admirante de la flota en aquella babi'a, exi- gieron la reudicion de la plaza, y por no prestarse a ella sus autoridades, r()m])ieron el fuego dicbas fuerzas contra el polvorin de San Antonio Abad, y contra las trincberas que defendfan la ciudad del lado de tierra, causando innecesariamente uu numero considerable de bajas 4 las fuerzas espafiolas, que bubieran entregado pacificamentela ciudad 4 los Americanos, en cumplimiento de la base 3' del Protocolo, para que la conservasen en garantia basta la celebracion del tratado de paz. El General Merritt entro i)or la fucrza en Manila, bizo prisionera de guerra su guarnicion compuesta de 8 a 9,000 hombres, se apodero de los fondos ])ublicos y de la recaudacion de los impuestos, incluso los de Aduanas, nombro intcdente general y Administrador de la bacienda TREATY OF PEACE. 117 pnblica y recolector de dichos impnestos d los oficiales de sii ejorcito que tuvo por couveniente, destituyendo por esto j'l los fniicioiiarios espaPioles ; relevo al Commaiulanto Espauol de la gnardia civil cncargada del ordou pfiblico; cotistitnyo tribunales militares; abrio el piierto de Manila y todos los demas de Filipinas que se liallaban en i)o.sesi6n de sns fiierzas de mar y tierra, al comercio de sii nacion y al de los Deutrales, previo el pago de los derechos que rigiesen al tien)po de su introduccioii y que sus fimcionarios percibieron, Todo esto cousta en el acta preliminar de capitulacion del 13 de Agosto, en la capitulacion niisma del 14, en el bando del General Merritt de igual fecba, eu sus ordenes de 22 y 2;» del ])ropio mes, y en las demas dictadas jjor las Autoridades y funcionarios Americanos eu JNIanila. El Gobierno esjianol reclamo al de Washington, contra todo lo alii ocurrido, por conducto de la Embajada Irancesa, eu 29 de Agosto, .'> y 11 de Septiembre ultimo, iusistiendo despues hasta el presente, eu las mismas reclauiaciones, y seualadamente eu la iumcdiata libertad de la guaruicion prisionera eu Manila y eu la devoluciou de sus annas, questo que por uua parte no podia euviar refuerzos desde la Peninsula al Arcliipielago, cuyo euvio tampoco veiau con liueuos ojos los Estados Unidos, y ]ior la otra, necesitaba aquellas fuerzas para liberal 4 mil- lares de es[)arioles prisioueros de los insurrectos tagalos, y victimas de sus malos tratamientos, y para corabatir y domiuar aquella insurrecciou de sufe propiossiibditos. Las reclauuicioues del Gobierno Espanol fuerou Lasta aliora iniitiles. Estos heclios coiitinuau cada dia toraaudo peor aspecto. El 21 de Septiembre el Cai)itan W. P. Moftbt, nombrado por el Prevoste Goberuador Americano, encargado de las prisiones de la plaza de Bilibid, con facultad de disponar la entrada y libertad de toda clase de i)resos, se la dio a dos llauiados Silvestre Lacoy y Marcos Alarcou, que estaban proresados por el delito de robo eu cuadrilla, 4 otros dos que lo estaban por desercion, a 6 que lo estaban por desa- cato, 4 otro que lo estaba por asalto y robo y 4 otros tres que lo estabau Ijor liomicidio. Como se ve, todos estos ijresos Estaban en la carcel por delitos couiunes. Este liecho inaudito fue comunicado al Gobierno de S. M. C. por la Comandaucia General del Apostadero de Manila. Aliora bieu, se bace ])reciso examinar todos estos hecbos desde el punto de vista de su legalidad y cou relacion a lo que en la clausula 0'*^ del protocolo se liabia couveuido, y coustituia una formal obligaciou para ambos Gobieruos. ^ Desde cuando debio coraenzar 4 producir sus efectos la suspension le las liostilidades acordada en dicba clausula 6-'^? La contcstaciou no es dudosa. El texto es claro yexplicito: las bostilidades babian de suspeuderse desde la conclusion y finna del protocolo. Esto ocurrio eu la tarde del 12 de Agosto. Por lo tanto, desde dicba tarde los actos de guerra que cualquiera de los beligerantes ejecutara, Labian de teuersecomono bechos para el efectode res tablecer el " statu quo ante" el momento de la tirma del protocols. Es ocioso y hasta seria ofensivo para la alut41ustraci6n de la Co- mision Americana exponer aqui la doctriba, no solo adaiitida desde los tiempos de Grotius siu contradiccion eu el Derecbo y en las ])r;icti('as interuacionales, y a que prestau su asentiiuiento y su apoyo todos los ilustres tratadistas Anglo- Americanos que de la materia se ban ocupado, sino que adem4s est/i elevada en los Estados Unidos 4 la categoria de Derecho establecido, en el arto 140 de sus instrucciones para los Ejercitos en Cauipafla, que dice asi: "El armisticio liga 4 los beliger-. 118 TREATY OP PEACE. antes a partir del dia convenido entre ellos para su ejecucion, pero los oliciales dc los dos ejercitos no son responsables de esta ejecucion, ra^s que desde el dia en que el armisticio les ha sidooficialmeiite notiflcado." El dia de la ejecucion fljado en el Articulo 6" del Protocolo fue el en que se coucluyese y flrmase : asi textualniente se dice alii: "A la con- clusion y lirma de este Protocolo las hostilidades entre los dos paises debcran ser suspendidas." El General Merritt y el Almirante de la escuadra no seraa personal- mente responsables de la sangre que iunecesariainente derraraaron el dia 13, si eutonces no tenian noticia oticial del Protocolo que se liabia tirmado el dia auterior en Wasliiugton, pero esto no obsta para que, como dice uno de los m4s ilustres tratadistas del derecho Internacional, el honor militar exije absteuerse escrupulosamente de aprovecharse de toda ventaja que podria sacarse de la ignorancia de las tropas que no hubieran sido todavia informadas del armisticio. En casos como este la Potencia beligerante cuyas fuerzas, por ignorancia, ejecutaron un acto de guerra, no puede aprovecharse de sus ventajas y debe reponer las cosas al " statuo" quo ante" indemnizaudo al beligerante perjudicado de los daiios y perjuicios que por aquel acto de guerra se le hubieran in- ferido, y restituyeiido, como dice el ilustre publicista auglo americano Dudley Field, todas las presas hechas en contravenciou del armisticio. Esto es tan elemental y vulgar en los Estados Unidos, que en sus colegios sirve de texto la obra titulada "Elementos de Derecho inter- nacional y Leyes de Guerra" escrita por el Mayor General Halleck y en cuya edicion de Filadelfia— pfigiua 283 se lee lo siguiente: "La tregua liga 4 las partes contratantes desde el momento de su con- clmion ^ menos que no se estipule especialmente otra cosa, pero no liga 4 los individuos de una nacion hasta el punto de hacerles person almente responsables de su ruptura mientras no tengan noticia actual y posi- tiva de ella. "Por consiguiente, si los individuos sin conocimiento de la suspen- sion de hostilidades, matan un enemigo 6 destruyen su propiedad, no cometen por tales actos un crimen ni estdn obligados a indemnizacion peeuniaria, pero si se liacen prisioneros 6 presas, el soberano estd en la ohligacion de poner a aquellos inmediatamente en libertad y de restituir las presas.''^ El Gobierno americano no ha puesto, liasta ahora, en libertad 4 la guarnicion j)risionera de Manila, ni ha reducido su ocupaciou belica de la plaza 4 los limites de un simple derecho de guarnicion en ella, que es, segun el articulo 3'^ del Protocolo, lo unico a que tenia derecho como garantia hasta el Tratado de Paz. Los Comisionados espanoles, por lo tanto, en cumplimiento de lo expresamente convenido en el Protocolo, entienden que en el Tratado de Paz debe consignarse: 1°. La entrega inmediata de la plaza al Gobierno Espafiol. 2°. La libertad inmediata de la guarnicion de la misma. 3°. La devolucion al Gobierno Espaiiol de todos los fondos y propie- dades piiblicas de que se apodero el Ejercito Americano despues de entrar en la plaza y de los impuestos de todas clases que ha venido percibiendo y que perciba hasta su devolucion; y, 4". El compromiso por parte de los Estados Unidos de indemnizar 4 Espana de los gravisimos perjuicios que le ha ocasionado con la reteu- cion de aquellas tropas prisioneras, porque a esto fue debido queimpu- uemente se propagase la insurrecion tagala en la Isla de Luzon y su invasion en las Islas Visayas, y porque tambien a esto mismo ha sido debida la continuaci6n de los malos tratamientos de los millares de TREATY OF PEACE. 119 prisioneros espanoles civiles y militares, 4 que impimemente contiiiuan sometiendoles las fiierzas iusurrectas tagalas. En virtud de caanto precede la Comision Espanola tiene el honor de hacer a la Comision Americana la siguiente proposicion: Primero. Que no puede acepter la proposicion que ha presentado pidiendo la cesion de la soberania del Archipielago Filipino a losEsta- dos Unidos por entender que es contraria a los preliminaresdepazcon- venidos en el Protocolo de Washington; y Segundo. Que en su consecuencia la invita a que, de acuerdo con lo convenido en los mencionados articnlos 3° y 6° del Protocolo, se sirva presentar una proposicion sobre la iutervencion, disposicion y gobieruo del Archipielago Filipino, y sobre el compromiso que, segiin lo que se acaba de decir, debeu contraer los Estados Unidos por eiecto del hecho de guerra ejecutado por sus tropas despues de tinnado el Protocolo, apoderandose 4 viva fuerza de la ciudad de Manila y ejecutando los actos que estan fuera de los unicos derechos que los Estados Quidos podian ejercer en aquella ciudad y su bahia y puerto, con arreglo 4 lo convenido en la meuciouada base 3-' del Protocolo. Esta conforme Emilio de Ojeda [Translation.] Annex to Protocol Xo. 12. proposition. The Spanish Commission has read with great surprise the proposition presented by the American Commission at the meeting held on the 31st of October, ultimo. The only article which said proposition contains is reduced to pro- viding for the cession by Spain to the United States of the archipelago known as the Philippine Islands, situated within the perimeter geo- graphically determined in its text. But in addition thereto the proposition contains two paragraphs, not intended to form a part of the article, the second of which is of such importance as to demand from the Spanish Commission to deal with it specially in this paper. The Spanish Commissioners have stated that the American proposi- tion excited in them great surprise, and it is their duty to set forth the reasons which explain that feeling. From the first to the last conference, the American Commissioners have been alleging constantly — and that allegation was the principal ground upon which their drafts relating to Cuba and Porto Rico were based— that in their conferences the two Commissions have to abide by the bases established in the preliminaries of peace agreed upon and signed on the llith of August ultimo. The same was said and con- tinues to be said by the Spanish Commissioners. One ditierence, how- ever, has existed in this respect between the two Commissions, and this has been that the American Commissioners understand that the Protocol should be construed according to its letter, strictly, and with- out taking into consideration any data, antecedent or document. For this reason, as the words " Debt of Cuba, or of Porto Rico" were not written on the Protocol, they have deemed that Spain should transmit or cede her sovereignty over the islands, but should retain the latter's 120 TREATY OF PEACE. obligations. The Spanish Commissioners understand, on the contrary, that for determining- the literal meaning of the Protocol it is necessary not only to bear in mind the general rules of international law as to the interpretation of treaties, but also the negotiations carried on between the two parties which culminated in this agreement, ajid in which the interpretation of the latter had been given beforehand and officially. Therefore the proposition relating to the cession by Spain to the United States of the Philip]>ine Islands, besides not being included in or covered by the articles of the Protocol, appears to be in open con- tradiction of its terms. In the opinion of the Spanish Commission it is a flagrant violation of the agreement. The Protocol contains six articles, and only one, the third, refers to the Philippine Aichii)elago. Literally translated (into Spanish) from the official French text, it reads as follows: — "The United States shall occupy and hold the city, the bay and the harbor of Manila pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace which shall determine the inspection {controle), the disposition, and the gov- ernment of the Philippine Islands." This is all that the Protocol says about the archipelago. Even acceptiixg as a proper standard for the interpretation of this article the narrow one of the literal meaning, as claimed (no matter how strange it may appear) by the American Commission, the Spanish Com- mission would have only to reply that the text of the Protocol refers to nothing else than the temporary or provisional occupation by the United States of Manila, its harbor, and its bay, until the treaty of peace, determining or agreeing upon the inspection, disposition and govern- ment of the Philippine Islands, should be concluded. What has this to do with any change or cession of sovereignty? The first part of the article is perfectly clear. Not even the slight- est doubt can exist as to the fact that the only agreement as to Manila, its bay and its harbor, referred to the occupation thereof, not final but ])rovisional, by the United States; said occupation to last only until the conclusion of the treaty of peace. No proof is necessary' to cor- roborate this literal construction of the text. But should it be required, the American Commission would find it in document number 19 in the Yellow P>ook just published by the Government of the French Repub- lic. Said document contains the circular addressed by the French Minister of Foreign Aftairs to the French Ambassadors in Europe, three days after the signing of the Protocol, acquainting them with the mission which the Government of the Republic had allowed to be entrusted to the French Ambassador at Washington, to offer peace to the Government of the United States in behalf of the Government of Her Catholic Majesty. This circular states that the French Ambassa- dor at Washington had signed, m the name of Spain and at her request, a Protocol setting forth the demands of the United States, and after enumerating those demands, and in referring to the Philip- pine Islands, the French Minister of Foreigu Affairs says that the only one contained in that document was the provisional occupation of Manila hy the American forces. The American Commission will not disregard the unquestionable moral weight of the testimony of the Minister of Foreign Affiiirs of the French Republic, equally friendly to the two belligerent states, who could know nothing about the Protocol except througii the most authori- tative channel of the French Ambassador who had discussed it with TREATY OF PEACE. 121 the American Governmeut, and agreed to it and signed it, in the name of Spain. The mere provisional character of that occupation remained even after the Protocol was signed, when General Merritt, contrary to wliat had been agreed upon in Article VI of the same, forcibly took posses- sion of Manila. In the last paragraph of number 5 in the rules for capitulation agreed upon and signed on Augiist 15, on the part of the United States by Brigadier General of Volunteers E. V. Greene, by Cai)tain Lamberton of the United States Navy, by Lieutenant-Colonel and Inspector-General Whittier, and by Lieutenant-Colonel Judge- Advocate Crowder, the followitig was said: — "The return of the arms surrendered by the Spanish forces shall take place when they evacuate the city or when the American army evacuates.'''' Therefore it was understood by those who signed this agreement that the American forces did not permanently occupy the jdace, as they anticipated the case that they would have to evacuate it. And if they anticipated this, it is clear that they understood their occupation of the place to be merely ])rovisional. True it is that the words "inspection, disposition and government of the Philippine Islands" have not a clear meaning. The Spanish Gov- ernment and its representative at Washington had noticed this fact and asked for the proper explanation thereof (which was not given) by the American Governmeut, before the Protocol was signed. Butwiiat- ever construction may now be placed upon these words, the fact is that in no case can their meaning be so stretched as to involve in any way the idea of cession of the sovereignty of Spain over the archipelago. Such a cession or acquisition in perpetuum of the archipelago by the United States, had it been agreed upon in the Protocol, would have been in contradiction with the mere temporary occupation of Manila, which at the same time was agreed upon in the same clause of that instrument. Nor could the said construction ever be admitted as valid, under the rules of interpretation of treaties, because the said admission would result in benetiting a party who refused to explain, when asked at the proper time to do so, the meaning of the words which even then were considered ambiguous and indeterminate. Even if this were not the case, the rule which the Spanish Commission understand to have been applied to them without reason, set forth by the Americim Commis- sioners in their last "memorandum", namely, that "the abstention of Spain from proposing in the Protocol the condition of the transfer of the debt precluded her from proposing it now", would be applicable to the case. The United States abstained from proposing to Spain in the Protocol, frankly and openly, as frankly and openly as all things must be set forth in all treaties, Avhich must never be concluded unless to be understood and complied with in good faith, the cession of her sover- eignty over the archipelago. They did not do it, and they became thereby precluded from proposing it now. All the foregoing statements must really be considered in excess of necessity, as it is a fact, perfectly well known to the American Com- missioners, that when the Protocol was signed at Washington the most worthy President of the Union not only had no idea that Spain would have to cede the Philippine Archipelago to the United States, but entertained, on the contrary, an opposite idea, namely, that Spain would retain her sovereignty over it. 122 TREATY OF PEACE. In tbe conference held on August 4 last, between Mr. Cambon, Ambassador from France, and President McKinley, in the presence of th« United States Secretary of State, Mr. Cambon made some remarks as to the cession of Porto Kico in compensation for the expenses of the war, and the President, showing himself inflexible upon that point, repented his assertion that the Philippine question was the only one notfinaUy settled in his mind. It was then that Mr. Cambon asked for an explanation about the meaning of the above cited phrases in Article III of the Protocol, relating to the Philippine Archipelngo, as the lan- guage of said article might lend itself to inspire fear in Spain in regard to her sovereignty over these islands. President McKinley answered him, verbatim, as follows: " I do not want any ambiguity to be allowed to remain on this point. The negotiators of both countries are the ones who shall resolve ni)on the permanent advantages (notice that he said "advantages" and not "rights") which we shall ask in the archii)elago, and decide upon the intervention {controle), disposition and government of the Philippine Islands." He farther said: "The Madrid Government can rest assured that up to now nothing is decided a priori .^ in my own mind, against Spain, nor do I consider anything decided by it against the United States." Is it therefoie doubtful that on the 12th of August, when the Secre- tary of State of the United States signed the Protocol, the President of the United States had no idea of demanding from Spain the cession to the United States of her sovereignty over the archipelago'^ But there is something more. The President of the United States, far from entertaining that purpose, clearly showed by his language that he desired that Sjiain should preserve her sovereignty. He said that the Commissioners at Paris would have to come to an agreement as to the permanent advantages to be demanded by the United States in the Philippine Archipelago. If Spain was to be deprived of her sovereignty, what future advantages could possibly be asked from Spain by the IFnited States Commissioners, or granted them by Spain? How would it be possible for the American Commissioners at Paris to ask Spain for advantages in an archipelago which they at the same time had to demand and receive as their own j^roperty? There is still another proof, as irrefutable as the above, that the Washington Government, far from having at that time any idea or intention to acquire sovereignty over the Philippine Archipelago, con- sented that said sovereignty continue to be vested in Spain, by remov- ing from its own mind all idea of change in this respect, either when framing or signing Article III of the Protocol. When the Spanish Government, by its despatch of the 7th of August, answered the note of the Honorable Secretary of State of the United States of the 31st of July, wherein he informed Spain of the conditions, such as set forth in the Protocol, upon which the American Govern- ment was disi)osed to put an end to the war, the Spanish Secretary of State used in regard to basis 3 the following language: " The basis relating to the Philijipine Islands seems, according to our understanding, to be too indeterminate. In the first place, the title invoked by the United States for the occupation of the bay, harbor and city of Manila, pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace, cannot be conquest, as the city of Manila is still delending itself. In spite of the blockade by sea and the siege by land, the former by the American fleet, the latter by forces commanded by a native encouraged and assisted by the American Admiral, the Spanish flag has not been lowered. In the TREATY OF PEACE. 123 goconfl place, the Philippine ATf'liipolMp;o is wholly in the power niid under f he sovereignty of tjpaiu. The iSpanish Govei innent understands, therefore, that the temporary occupation of Manila must constitute a guarantee. The treaty of peace, it is said, shall determine the inter- vention, dis])ositiou and government of the Philipi)ine Islands, and as the intention of the Federal Government is too much veiled in this clause, it is important for this Government to state that tcliile acceptin// the 3d basis, it does not relinquish a priori the entire sovereignty over the Philippine Archipelago, and leaves to the negotiators the care to stipulate in regard to such reforms as it may he advisable to introdiice there, — in view of the situation of those possessions and the degree of cultivation of their inhabitants. The Government of Her Majesty accepts the 3d clause as supplemented by the aforesaid declaration^ It appears very plainly that the Spanish Government did not accept the only item of the Protocol which relates to the Philippine Islands, except in so far as it meant that the occupation of Manila should he only temporary and in the nature of a guarantee, and that the inter- vention, disposition and government spoken of in the item should refer to the interior regime and administration of the government of the said islands, and not to the entire sovereignty, which Spain expressly reserved and was entitled to retain. Against this construction placed beforehand by the Government of Her Catholic Majesty upon the 3d basis of the Protocol, — a construc- tion upon which exclusively it was accepted, — the Washington Govern- ment said or suggested nothing, before signing the instrument. On the contrary, the Secretary of State of the United States, when sending to the French Ambassador the draft of the Protocol which was to be signed, said to him in a letter that the note of the Spanish Government (the one in which the above quoted phrases appear) contained in its spirit the acceptance by Si)ain of the conditions proposed by the United States. Therefore, the third condition had been framed by the Ameri- can Government in the same sense in which it had been understood by the Spanish Government. Otherwise it would have been impossible for the Secretary of State of the United States to say, upon examina- tion of the note in which the Spanish Government explained the only meaning of the article which would be accej)table to it, that the Span- ish Government did accept it. The result is that while the United States may now come and claim the said sovereignty, the claim can never be founded upoti the Protocol. And what other title, diflerent from that agreement, can they allege, against the will of Spain, to be vested in them? The bases upon which the United States agreed to make peace with Spain, or, in other words, the conditions which the United States imposed upon Spain for the reestablishment of peace between the two countries, were set forth in the Protocol. An immediate suspension of hostilities was also agreed upon in that instrument; and Spain up to the present time has scrupulously kept the agreement. Therefore the United States can have no right to demand now from Spain any oner- ous conditions not contained in the Protocol, either because of events prior to its date, — since when the Protocol was signed the United States did not make more demands than are written therein, and were satisfied with their acceptance by Spain, — or because of subsequent events, since Spain, after the instrument was signed, did not commit any aggression or give the United States any occasion to make further complaints or demand's. If for reasons which are beyond the sphere of jurisdiction of the 124 TREATY OF PEACE Spanish Commission, the American Goveinmont wislies now to acquire sovereignty over the Philippine Archipelago, the proper way to accom- plish that purpose is certaiuly not a claim based upon the preliminaries of peace agreed upon between the two High Contracting Parties and set forth in the Protocol signed at Washington on the 12th of August. The Spanish Commissioners stated at the beginning of this paper that the second paragraph which the American proposition contained after the proposed article was of such importance that it imposed on them the necessity of dwelling especially upon its import. The Commissioners assert therein that they are disposed to insert in the treaty a stipulation whereby the United States will assume any debt of Spain contracted for public works or improvements of a pacific character in the Philippines. The archipelago is in fact burdened with a debt of 200 millions of peseias, secured by mortgage on the proceeds and revenues of the Manila custom house; and there further rest upon the Crown obliga- tions, just charges and other pensions of lesser importance, exclusively connected with the service of that colony. With respect to the mortgage debt, the Spanish Commissioners have already stated with relation to the debt of a like nature which by way of mortgage burdens the revenues of the custom houses and all the taxes, direct and indirect, of the Island of Cuba, that they cannot even admit any discussion relative to the validity and efficacy of such mortgages. Legally created by a legitimate sovereign, and legally acquired by the individuals of various nationalities who interested themselves in those provincial operations, Sj^ain is not the proprietor of the rights of these third parties, who are under the aegis of the laws protecting pri- vate property, so as to consent in a treaty with the United States or any other power in any way to anything which means or implies an impairment of rights which are not hers. The most elemental duties of public and private probity forbid this. Spain does not demand the recognition of these secured debts for her own benefit, since her treasury has not bound itself to pay the same, save subsidiarily, that is, only in the event that the revenues and taxes mortgaged are insufficient to meet them. If she makes the demand it is only in obedience to a moral duty resting upon every honest debtor, and, further, in behalf of the holders of her own debt, who could not but see a danger to their interests in the fact that Spain, without being bound thereto, should overburden her treasury with other heavy obliga- tions for which it would be liable jointly with her own, and running the risk of her resources being insufficient to meet tliem all. The debt and obligations of the colonies which directly interest her are those not enjoying the privilege of security, because with respect to these she is primarily bound, and she understands that it is not just that when she has contracted them for her colonies she should continue, after losing them, burdened with such charges, which are, after all, a small part of the immense capital invested in those colonies which was furnished from her own resources. Let it be understood therefore, and the Spanish Commissioners hope there will be no necessity to repeat it, that Spain cannot and ought not, since respect for the rights of others forbids it, to agree in this treaty or in any to anything implying the impairment or suppression or even disregard of the private rights of others against the will of their legiti- mate and special proprietors. Still more with respect to the unprivileged (unsecured) colonial debt, TREATY OF PEACE. 125 their dignity and the respect due to their own selves likewise forbid them accepting the bases which stand out in the paragraph of the prop- osition under consideration, which consists of the looking into the investment Spain may have made of the proceeds resulting from the creating- of such debts. This would be equivalent to submitting to the judgment of a foreign power the acts of her internal government. Judi- cious or not (and the Commissioners understand they have all been judicious) they were perfectly legitimate acts and they are protected by her sovereignty. And even in the inadmissible hypothesis that such judiciousness were wanting in them, the Spanish Commissioners do not know that there is anyone who can cause the legitimacy of a legally contracted debt to depend upon the investment, good or bad, which alter its crea- tion, the debtor may have made of its proceeds. The Spanish Commissioners cannot close this paper without calling the attention of the honorable A merican Commisioners to a point which cannot but be resolved in the treaty, in obedience to the stipulations of the 6th basis of the Protocol, which is as follows: "Upon the conclu- sion and signing of tljis Protocol, hostilities between the two countries shall be suspended, and notice to that effect shall be given as soon as possible by each Government to the commanders of its military and naval forces." Even before the signing of the Protocol the President of the Union, after apprising the Ambassador of France on the 30th of July last of the conditions the United States imposed on Spain for restoring peace therewith, said to him that he consented to granting the suspension of hostilities as soon as the ^^S2mnish Minister of State should make Icnoicn to the Ambassador of France, his representative in Washington, that he accepted the negotiations upon the bases suggested by the Federal Govern- ment; and authorized the said Ambassador to sign in his name the prelim- inary minute which put an end to the hostilities^^ The Spanish Government made known its agreement to such bases, and authorized the Ambassador ot France to accept and sign them in its name through its despatch of August 7, which was immediately com- municated to the Government at Washington. Notwithstanding this, the hostilities were not then suspended. But finally the suspension thereof was agreed to a few days later, that is on the 12th, in the said 6th article of the Protocol. In spite of this, on the 13th, General Merritt, commander of the Ameri- can forces in Manila, and the Admiral of the fleet in that bay, demanded the surrender of the place, and as its authorities did not agree thereto, the said forces opened fire on the San Antonio Abad powder-magazine and on the trenches which defended the city on the land side, unneces- sarily causing a considerable number of losses to the Spanish forces, who would have peacefully delivered the city over to the Americans in obedience to the third basis of the Protocol that they might hold it as a guaranty pending the conclusion of the treaty of peace. General Merritt entered Manila by force, he made prisoners of war of its garrison made up of eight or nine thousand men, he took possession of the public funds and the collection of taxes, including customs receipts, he named as Intendant General and Administrator of the Public Treasury, and Tax Collector, the officers of his army he saw tit, thereby displacing the Spanish officials. He relieved the Spanish Com- mander of the civil guard charged with the maintenance of public order; he constituted military courts; he opened the port of Manila and all th ^ other ports of the Philippines in the possession of his land 126 TREATY OF PEACE. and naval forces to the commerce of his nation and of neutral nations, conditioned on the payment of the dues in force at the time of his arrival, which were collected by his officials. All of this is recorded in the preliminary minute of the capitulation of August 13, in the capitu- lation of the 14th itself, in the proclamation of General Merritt of like date, in his orders of the 22nd and 23rd of the same month and in the others dictated by the American authorities and officials in Manila. The Spanish Government remonstrated to that of Washington through the French Embassy against everything that occurred there on August 29 and the 3rd and 11th of September last, repeating such remon- strances since and down to the present time, signally insisting upon the immediate release of the garrison held prisoners in Manila and upon the return of their arms, since, on the one hand, it could not send rein- forcements from the Peninsula to the archipelago, nor would the United States look favorably upon such an action, and, on the other hand, it needed those forces to liberate the thousands of Spanish prisoners of the Tagalo insurgents, victims of their ill-treatment, and to combat and dominate that insurrection of its own subjects. The remonstrances of the Spanish Government have been up to the present fruitless. These acts are daily assuming a worse phase. On September 21 Captain W. P. Moff'att, appointed by the American Provost Marshal in charge of the Bilibid prisons with authority to regulate the entrance and release of all kinds of prisoners, released two named Silvestre Lacoy and Marcos Alarcon, charged with the offense of highway robbery; two otliers charged with desertion; six charged with contempt of authority; another charged with assault and robbery, and three others charged with homicide. As is seen, all these prisoners were in jail for common crimes. This unheard of act was communicated to the (iov- ernment of Her Catholic Majesty by the Commandant General's Office of the station of Manila. Very well ; it becomes necessary to examine all these acts from the standpoint of their legality and with relation to what was agreed on in Article VI of the Protocol, which constituted a formal obligation for both Governments. When was the suspension of hostilities agreed on in said Article VI to go into effect? The answer is not doubtful. The text is clear and explicit: the hostilities were to be suspended upon the conclusion and signing of the Protocol. This occurred on the afternoon of August 12. Therefore from that afternoon the warlike acts which either of the bel- ligerents should commit were to be held as not done in order to restore the statu quo ante at the moment of signing the Protocol. It is idle, and may even be an insult to the great learning of the American Commission, to expound here the doctrine, not only admitted without contradiction since the time of Grotius in international law and usage, and to which all the learned Anglo-American treatise-writers have given their assent and support, but which is furthermore raised in the United States to the category of established law in article 140 of the Instructions to Armies in the Field, which reads as follows: "The armistice binds the belligerents from the day agreed upon between them for its going into effect; but the officers of the two armies are not responsible for this except from the day upon which they are officially notified of the armistice". The day when it was to go into effect determined in Article VI of the Protocol was that on which it should be concluded and signed. There it says verbatim: "Upon the conclusion and signing of this Protocol, hostilities between the two countries shall be suspended," TREATY OF PEACE. 127 General Merritt and the Admiral of the squadron may not be y)erson- ally responsible for the blood they unnecessarily shed ou the 13th if they had no official notice then of the Protocol which had been signed on the previous day in Washington; but this does not conflict, as one of the most learned writers on international law says, with military honor, demanding that they scrupulously abstain from profiting by any advantage that may be gained through the ignorance of troops who may not yet have been informed of the armistice. In cases like this the bel- ligerent power whose forces through ignorance commit a warlike act, cannot profit by its advantages, and should restore things to the statu quo ante, indemnifying the belligerent injured for the damages and injuries he may have suffered through said warlike act, and restoring, as is said by the learned Anglo-American publicist Dudley Field, all prizes taken in violation of the armistice. This is so elementary and common in the United States that in their colleges the work entitled "Elements of International Law and Laws of war", written by Major General Halleck, serves as a text-book, and in the Phihidelphia edition thereof, page 283, appears the following: "The truce binds the contracting parties /ro?H the moment of its con- clusion unless otherwise specially stipulated; but it does not bind the individuals of a nation to the extent of making them personally respon- sible for its rupture until they have actual and positive notice thereof. "Consequently, if individuals without knowledge of the suspension of hostilities, kill an enemy or destroy his property, they do not by such acts commit a crime, nor are they bound to pecuniary indemnity, but if prisoners or prizes are taken the sovereign is bound to immediately release the former and restore the prizes.''^ The American Government has not released, up to this time, the imprisoned garrison of Manila, nor has it reduced its military occupa- tion to the limits of a simple right to garrison it, which is, according to Article III of the Protocol, the only thing it had a right to do as a guaranty until the signing of the treaty of peace. The Spanish Commissioners, therefore, in obedience to what was expressly agreed to in the Protocol, understand that the treaty of peace ought to embody: 1st The immediate delivery of the place to the Spanish Government. 2nd The immediate release of the garrison of the same. 3rd The return to the Spanish Government of all the funds and pub- lic property taken by the American army since its occupation of the place, and of the taxes of every kind collected or to be collected up to the time of returning the same. 4th The obligation on the part of the United States to indemnify Spain for the serious damage occasioned her by the detention as pris- oners of the said troops, to which detention is due the spreading with impunity of the Tagalo insurrection in the island of Luzon and its inva- sion of the Visayas islands, and because, moreover, to this same cause has been due the ill-treatment of thousands of Spanish prisoners, civil and military; treatment to which the Tagalo insurgents have con- tinued to subject them with impunity. In virtue of what has been said the Spanish Commission has the honor to make to the American Commission the following proposition: First.— That it cannot accept the propositions it has presented ask- ing for the cession of the sovereignty of the Philippine Archipelago to the United States, as it understands that this is contrary to the prelim- inaries of peace agreed upon in the Protocol of Washington. Second. — In consequence of this it invites the American Commission 128 TREATY OF PEACE. to present, in accordance with the stipulations of Articles III and VI of the Protocol, a proposition concerning the control, disposition and government of the Philippine Arcjhipelago and concerning tlie obliga- tion \vhi(;h, as has just been said, it is the duty of the United States to contract because of the acts of war committed by its troops after the signing of the Protocol in forcibly seizing the city of Manila and per- forming acts beyond the sco|)e of the only rights the United States could exercise in that city, its bay and harbor, pursuant to the stipula- tions of the said Article II of the Protocol. True copy; E^riLio DE Ojeda Protocol No. 13. Conference of XovemberO, 1S9S. On the 8th instant, the day to which the conference was ad- journed, the American Com njission- ers requested a postponement of the meeting from two to four o'clock, in order that an opportunity might be given for the completion of the copying of their answer to the counter-proposition presented by the Spanish Commissioners at the last session. The Si)anish Com- missioners being unable to be pres- ent at the latter hour, the session was, on their suggestion, post- poned till the 9th of November, at two o'clock, p. m., at which hour there were Pieseut On the part of the United States: Messrs. Day, iJaxis, Frye, Gray, Keid, Moore, Fergusson. On the part of Spain: Messrs. Montero R;os, Abarzuza, Garuica, Villa-Urrutia, Cerero, Ojeda. Tlieprotocol of the precedingses- sion wivs read and approved. The American i ommissioners presented an Answer to the Coun- ter Proposition submitted by the Spanish Commissioners on the -Ith instant in relation to the Philip- pines. A (;opy of the Answer is hereto annexed. The Spanish Commissioners !!rtated that they would examine the answer, but that its length and the necessity of haiing it carefully translated made it impossible for Protocolo No. 13. Gonferencia del 9 de Noviembre de 1898. El 8 del corriente, dia seiialado para la reunion de las Comisiones, solicitarou los Comisarios america- nos que en vez de celebrarse a las dos tuviese lugar a las cuatro de aquella tarde, a tin de completar la copia de su respuesta 4 la coutra- proposiciou presentada por los Comisarios Espaiioles en la ultima sesion. No pudiendo concurir a dicha hora los Comisarios Espa- noles, !se aplazo a propuesta suya hasta hoy ".) de Noviembre a las U. P. M. en cuya hora se hallan. Presentes Por parte de los Es- tados Unidos de America, los Senores Day. Davis. Frye. Gray. Peid. Moore. Fergusson. Por parte de Espana. los Senores Montei'o Kios. Abarzuza. Garnica. Villa Urrutia. Cerero. Ojeda. Fu6 leida y aprobada el acta de la sesion anterior. Los Comisarios americanos pre- sentan una contestacion -k la cou- traproposicion presentada en la sesion del 4 del corriente por los Comisarios Espanoles relativa a las Islas Filipinas y se une dicho doc- uniento a esta acta. Los Comisarios Espanoles mani- festaron que examinarian dicha contestacion y que en vista de su extension y de la necesidad de tra- ducirla con esmoro, que hacia im- TEEATY OF PEACE. 129 them at the moment definitely to state what time woukl be needed for a reply; and they proposed either to advise the American Com- missioners later in the day when the Commission might meet again, or at once to designate a day with- out prejudice to asking for a post- ponement, should it be necessary and should the nature of the docu- ment require it. The American Commissioners preferring the latter course, the conference was adjourned till Sat- urday the 12th of JSTovember at two o'clock, p. m., with the understand- ing that the Spanish Commission- ers might if necessary ask for a postponement. William R. Day CusHMAN K. Davis Wm P Frye Geo. Gray Whitelaw Reid. John B. Mooee. posible el saber d punto fijo el tiempo que se necesitaria para con- testarla, proponian,ya seadar civiso 41a Comisicin Americana aquella noche misma, del dia en que podia reunirse la Comision, ya sea fijar en aquel momento un dia sin per- juicio de pedir un aplazamiento si fuese necesario y resultase de la naturaleza del documento. Los Comisarios Americanos ha- biendo dado la preferencia 4 la se- gunda de estas proposiciones, se aplazo la conferencia hasta el s4- bado 12 del corriente a las dos P. M. en la inteligencia de que los Comi- sarios Espafioles tendriau la facul- tad de pedir un aplazamiento si lo considerasen necesario. E. MONTERO Rfos B DE ABARZUZA J. DE GARNICA W R DE Villa TJrrutia Rafael Cerero Emilo de Ojeda Annex to Protocol l^o. 13. ANSWER OF THE AMERICAN COMMISSIONERS TO THE PROPOSITION OF THE SPANISH COMMISSIONERS OF NOVEMBER 3, 1898. The American Commissioners, replying to the Spanish proposition of the 4th instant, will proceed at once to the examination of the grounds on which the Spanish Commissioners endeavor to justify their expression of surprise at the American proposals of the 31st of October on the subject of the Philippines. The Spanish argument sets out with the erroneous assumption that the United States bases its demands in respect of the Philippines upon the terms of the Protocol in the same sense as it bases its demands in regard to Cuba and Porto Rico upon the terms of the same instrument; and, proceeding upon this assumption, it finds in the position of the United States on the two subjects an inconsistency. The United States, it declares, adhered, in respect of Cuba and Porto Rico, to the <' letter" of the Protocol, while in the case of the Philippines, it has presented a demand "not included in or covered by the articles" of that agreement. The American Commissioners are not disturbed by this charge of inconsistency, since they deem it obviously groundless. They based their demands in regard to Cuba and Porto Rico upon the precise terms of the Protocol, because it was in those very terms that the IFnited States had made its demands and Spain had conceded them, by ijromising to "relinquish all claim of sovereignty over and title to T P 9 130 TREATY OF PEACE. Cuba" and to "cede" to the United States Porto Eico and certain other islands. The United States, in insisting upon the words of the Protocol on these subjects, merely asked that the precise concessions of Spain be made good. _ . , o. . ^ * *i In the case of the Philippines, the United States, except as to the bay city, and harbor of Manila, confined itself to demanding that the subject should be left in the widest and fullest sense for future nego- tiations. While it did not, with the exception referred to, demand specific concessions, it reserved and secured the right to demand them. Its position, therefore, is, not that its present demands in respect of the Phihppines were specifically set out in tlie Protocol, but that they are justified by and included in the right which it therein expressly reserved and secured to make demands in the future. Putting aside, however, the erroneous assumption of which notice has just been taken, it appears that the Spanish Commissioners ditfer with the Americ;in Commissioners as to the scope and meaning of the third article of the Protocol signed by the representatives of the two Governments at Washington on the 12th of August, 1898. This article is as follows : "Article 3.— The United States will occupy and hold the city, bay and harbor of Manila, pending the conclusiou of a treaty of i)eace, which shall determine the control, disposition and government of the Philippines." The Spanish Commissioners contend that in the negotiation and settlement of a treaty under this article nothing can be demanded by the United States which impairs the sovereignty of Spain over the islands, and that a fair construction of the terms of the article can require only such changes in the government of the islands, reforms in administration and kindred changes, as do not affect ultimate Spanish sovereignty. It is the contention on the part of the United States that this article leaves to the determination of the treaty of peace the entire subject of the future government and sovereignty of the Philippines necessarily- embraced in the terras used in the Protocol. The Spanish Commissioners support their contention upon two grounds: First, that the meaning of the words is not such as to include the sovereignty of Spain in the Philippines. Second, that the history of the negotiations, and the reservations made by Spain in the course thereof, preclude the United States from making its claim. It is a principle of law no less applicable to international differences than to private controversies that where the result of negotiations has been embodied in a written compact, the terms of such agreement shall settle the rights of the parties. The reasons upon which this doctrine rests are too well known to need recapitulation here. While the United States might well rest its case upon a construction of the terms used, it has no disposition to avoid the fullest examination and the most searching scrutiny of the negotiations which preceded the making of the Protocol, as they but serve to make clear the purpose of the parties to leave to the treaty now in process of negotiation the fullest oppor- tunity to dispose of the government and sovereignty of the Philippine Islands in such a manner as might be recorded in the treaty. The two Governments being at war, negotiations with a view of obtaining a treaty of peace were opened by the Government of Spain through the Minister of State addressing to the President of the United States, in the name of the Government of Her Majesty the Queen Eegent, a note dated the 22nd of July, 1898, which it is not necessary TREATY OF PEACE. 131 to set out in full here. It is sufficient to say that therein the President of the United States is asked to name the terms ujioii which i)eace may be had between the two countries. This note was presented to the President of tlie United States on the 2()tli day of July, LSlKi, by Mr. Canibon, Ambassador of the French Republic at Washinoton, author- ized to make tlie api>licatioi!, and represeut the Spanish (government in the subsequent negotiations which led up to the execution of the Protocol. At tliat meetinj;- the President received the note of July 22 from the Sj^anish Government and advised Mr. Cambon tliat aftei' con- sultation with his Cabinet lie would prepare an answer whicli could be transmitted to- the Spanish Government. On July 30, foUowing, the terms of peace having been carefully considered and aj^reed upon by the President and his Cabinet, the President received j\Ir. Cambon at the Executive Mansion in Washington, at which meeting were also present JMr. Thi'-baut, Secretary of tlie Freiudi Embassy in Washiiigton, and the then Secretary of State of the United States. The answer of tlie President to the communication of the Spanish Government, dated J uly 30, 1898, was then read to Mr. Cambon. This note was in the exact form in which it was afterwards signed and delivered to Mr. Cambon to be sent to the Si)anish Government, with a single exception. After some discussion of the terms of the note as to Cuba, and Porto Pico and other West Indian islands, Mr. Cambon said he did not know what the Spanish Government would desire as to the Philipi)ines, and no matter what the note might say as to the Commission, the Spanish Government would regard the purjiose of the United States as being fixed to acquire not only Cuba and Porto Pico, but the Philippines as well. The President said that as to the Philippines the note expressed the purposes of this Government, and their final disposition would depend upon the treaty to be negotiated by the Commissioners and ratified by the interested Covernments. After further discussion, in which the President reiterated that the treaty must determine the fate of the Phili[)pines, and the note of the President on that subject reading then as now with the single exception that the word " {)Ossession " was then in Article lEI, so that it read ''con- trol, possession and government of the Philii)pines", where it now reads "control, disposition and government of the Philippines" Mr. Cambon said that tlie word "possession" translated into Spanish in suc'i a way as to be regarded as of a severe and threatening nature, and suggested a change in that word. He suggested the word "condition". The President ioi)Osed by the United States." The best answer to this obvious misconstruction of the terms of the note of the Secretary of State is in the text of the note itself, which is as follows : Department of State, Washington, August 10, 189S. Excellency, Altliougb it is yonr xinderstancling -that the note of the Duke of Ahnodovar, which you left with the President on yesterday afternoon, is intended to convey an acceptance by the Spanish Government of t\w terms set forth in my note of the 30th ultimo as the basis on which the President would appoint Commis- sioners to negotiate and conclude with Commissioners on the ]>art of Spain a treaty of peace, I understand that we concur in the opinion that the Duke's note, doubtless owing to the various transiormafions which it has undergone in the course of its circuitous transmission by telegra]>h and in cipher, is not, in the form in which it has reached the hands of the President, entirely exiilicit. Under these circumstances, it is tliought that the most direct and certain way of avoiding misunderstanding is to embody in a Protocol to be signed by us as the representatives, respectively, of the United States and Spain, the terms on which tlie negotiations for peace are to be undertaken. I therefore enclose herewith a draft of sucli a Protocid in which you will find that I have embodied the precise terms tendered to Spain in my note of the 30th ultimo, together with appropriate stipulations for the appointii,ent of Commissioners to arrange the details of the immediate evacuation of Cuba, Porto Rico, and other islands under Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies, as well as for the appointment of Commissioners to treat of jieace. Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurance of my highest consideration. (Signed:) William R. Day. Hia Excellency M. Jules Cambon, etc. 136 TREATY OF PEACE. this note, so far from saying- tLat the Secretary of State of the ;ed States understands that the note of tlie Spanish Government In United of August 7 accepts the American terms, it is distinctly said "although it is your (Mr. Cambon's) understanding that the note of the Duke of Almodovar is intended to convey the acceptance by the Spanish Gov- ernment of the terms set forth in my note of the 30th ultimo, * * * I understand that we concur in the opinion that the Duke's note, doubt- less owing to the various transformations which it has undergone in the course of its circuitous transmission by telegraph and in cipher, is not, in the form in which it reached the hands of the President, entirely explicit." Here it is distinctly stated that the Secretary of State and Mr. Cam- bon concur that the note is not entirely explicit. Was it then to be expected after all this careful negotiation that a note which the Ameri- can representatives contended did not accept the terms of the United States, and which both negotiators agreed was not explicit, was to be received as a satisfactory answer to the American demand*? Not so. " Under these circumstances it is thought that the most direct and certain way of avoiding misunderstanding is to embody in a Protocol, to be signed by us as the representatives, respectively, of the United States and Spain, the terms on which the negotiations for peace are to be undertaken." This is a most emphatic and definite declaration that the note of August 7 was not satisfactory, and that it was the purpose of the United States to leave nothing open to misunderstanding, but to embody, in a ccmtract so plain that dispute would be forever foreclosed, the exact terms upon which negotiations lor peace would be under- taken. The note goes on to say "I therefore enclose herewith a draft of such a Protocol, in which you will find that I have embodied the precise terms tendered to Spain in my note of the oOth ultimo, together with appropriate stipulations for the appointment of Commissioners, etc." What does this note mean? Does it admit the construction that the proposal was intended to embody the acceptance of August 7, reserving Spanish sovereignty? It is definitely settled, as a perusal of the document will show, that the Protocol embodied, not the uncer- tain and equivocal terms of the note of August 7, but the precise terms stated in the note of the American Government of July 30. This note to Mr. Cambon enclosed the Protocol just as it was written and just as it was signed by the parties. It would seem, if ever an attemj)t was fairly made to have a clear understanding, if ever all precautions were taken which could leave no room for misunderstanding, such was the course pursued in the present case. It is thus seen how utterly groundless is the declaration in the Span- ish "proposition" that, in order to determine tbe meaning of the Pro- tocol, it is necessary to "bear in mind * * * the negotiations carried on between the two parties w hich culminated in this agreement, and in which the interpretation of the latter had been given beforehand and officially"! In the correspondence thus invoked by the Spanish Com- missioners as an interpretation of the Protocol, the two Governments did not contemplate the execution of such an instrument; and if the response of the Si^anish Government to the American demands had taken the form of a simple acceptance, no Protocol would have been made. The first suggestion of such an instrument was that made in the interview in which the Spanish response was declared to be unsat- isfactory. It was because the Spanish response was unacceptable that the United States demanded a Protocol. And it is upon this rejected TREATY OF PEACE. 137 response that the Spanish araninent for the limitation of the clear scope and meaning of the Protocol is built. If further proof of tlie soundness of the position of the United States were needed, it would lie found in a most convincing form in the tele- gram sent by Mr. Cambon to tlie French Minister of Foreign Affairs. See the French "Yellow Book" referred to in the Snanish memorandum, telegram number 9, Mr. Cambon to the French Minister of Foreign Affairs. No. 9. — M. Jules Camhon, Amhassador of the French L'epuhlic at Washington, to M. Delcasse, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Washington, August 10, 189S. The Federal Government has decided to state precisely {prcciner), in a Protocol, the bases upon which the peace negotiations nmst, in its ju« President says that, tliough not then making any demand for pecuniary indemnity, nevertheless he cannot be insensible to the losses and expenses of the United States incident to the war, or to the claims of our citizens for injuries to their loersons and property during the late insurrection in Cuba. He must, therefore, require the cession to the United States, and the immediate evacuation by Spain, of the Island of Porto Pico, etc. On similar grounds, to wit, among others the right of the United States to have indemnity for its losses, the United States will hold the city, bay and harbor of Manila pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace, which shall determine the control, disi)osition and government of the Philip])ines. How could tlie United States receive indemnity in whole or in part from the control, disposition and government of the Philippines, if Spanish sovereignty was not to be touched? It is difficult to conceive what terms could have been used which would more clearly have evidenced the purpose of the parties to aflord the fullest latitude in dealing with the Philippine question. The treaty was to determine not TREATY OF PEACE. 139 alone the control, disposition and government, but at the same time had full power to determine all that is implied in control, disposition and government. Certainly the word "control" was not used here in the sense of "register" or "inspection", but in its broader sense of "authority or command; authority over; power over; the regulation or rule of." What word could be broader than "disposition," which has practically the same meaning in both the French and English languages? "Tlie disposal of; distribution of; alienation of; definite settlement of; ulti- mate destination.^^ We have in these two words, then, authority over, dominion of, final and ultimate destination of the subject nuitter. What is "government" but the right of administration, or exercising sover- eignty, the direction, the political management of a state? Either of these terms im]>lies ])ower of interfering with sovereignty. Taken together, they give the fullest scope in dealing with all power, govern- mental, territorial aud administrative. It is not argued in the Spanish "proposition" that these words should have a narrow meaning so far as disposition and government are con- cerned, but transcribed into the French language it is sought to give a narrower meaning to the word "control." It must be construed in the connection in which it is found in the Protocol, in its broader sense of l)Ower or dominion. NoxcitKr a sociis is a legal maxim which applies to the discussion or determination of the meaning of phrases. "Control" associated with dis])osition aud government of territory might have a very different signiticance when used in another relation in its less familiar meaning of "inspection or register." The word "disi>osition" used in another association might have an entirely ditierent meaning, and a meaning which, in connection with government aud control, would deprive it of all sense. The American Government, then, feels itself amply supported iu its right to demand the cession of the Philippines with or without conces- sions, relying upon either the exact terms of the Protocol or those terms interpreted in the light of the negotiations, oral and written, which led to its execution. The Commissioners of the United States notice with regret that an attem])t has been made in the memorandum of the Spanish Commis- sioners to invoke the high authority of the F'reuch JMinister for Foreign Affairs iu the interi)retation of the Protocol, so as to exclude therefrom all mention of the right of the treaty to deal witli the control, disposi- tion and government of the Phili[)i)ines. In the French "Yellow Book" cited by the Spanish Commissioners, it is api)arent that as early as the 10th of August the French Ciovernment was in possession of the exact terms of the Protocol, transmitted in the note of that date of its Ambas- sador, Mr. Cambon. Would anybody believe that in summing up this note the Minister would intentionally omit one of the most essential X)arts of the Protocol ? The note number 19 referred to is no part of the negotiations; its purpose was merely to advise the Ambassadors of the French Republic at London, St. Petersburg, Berlin, Vienna, etc., of the result of the action of the representative of France in briuiiing about a suspension of hostilities, and the ])relimiuary agreement as to peace, between two nations toward which the French (iovernment was actuated by feelings of humanity and mutual friendship. In this note it is said that the points upon which both parties have rea(;hed an agreement were set forth in a Protocol. In stating the contents of that instruments- 140 TREATY OP PEACE. doubtless through inadvertence, it is not stated that the treaty shall determine the control, disposition and government of the Philippines. The attention of the Minister being called to this matter by the American Ambassador in Paris, he very promptly corrected any mis- apprehension which might exist as to his despatch. Tliis appears in the following letter from the American Ambassador, which has just been received by the American Commissioners: Ambassadb des Etats-Unis, 18, Avenue Kl^ber, Paris, November 5, 189S. Dear Sir: I beg to inform you that I saw the French Minister of Foreign Affairs in regard to that portion of the reply of the .Spanish Peace Commissioners in which they refer to a letter sent by him to the French Ambassadors dated August 15, 1898, which appears in the French "Yellow Book", ami attempt to construe the language used therein as an interpretation of the French Minister of the meaning of the Pro- tocol, and speak of the unquestionable moral weight of the testimony therein given l»y him regarding that instrument. He assured me emphatically and unreservedly that the letter referred to was intended to be simply a brief resume of the general features of the preliminary peace negotiations carried on between the two belliger- ents, and that he did not attempt to quote the precise language of the Protocol. He disclaimed any intention of given any views of his own regarding it, having no authority for so doing, and declared that the brief mention contained in his letter could m no wise be construed as an interpretation by him of the terms or meaning of that instrument. He promised that he would at once send to the French Ambas- sadors the full text of the Protocol in order that they might be informed of its con- ditions in extenso and that there might be no ground for misapprehension as to its terms. The Minister repeated what he had said several times before, and which I know to be true, that he and his Government had all along observed a strict and impartial neutrality between the two powers which were negotiating, being equally friendly to both, and that he intended to continue the observance of such neutrality. Very truly yours, (Signed): Horace Porter. Hon. William E. Day, President of the American Peace Commission, Paris. It is stated that the occupation of Manila was to be only temj^orary. This is undoubtedly true. The Protocol, so far as it relates to the Philip- pines, is itself provisional. It expressly provides for the doing of certain things pending the conclusion of a treaty which is in this particular to supersede it. Had it provided for the permanent occupation of Manila by the United States, it would have withdrawn the Philipj)iiies to that extent from the sphere of future negotiation. While the terms of surrender cited in the Spanish memorandum, negotiated after the execution of the Protocol and having nothing to do with the negotiations for peace, show the character of this occu[)a- tion, it is to be noticed that the very paragraph cited from the terms of that document shows that it was equally contemplated that condi- tions might arise which would require the evacuation by the Spanish forces of the city. In it it is said "the return of the arms surrendered by the Spanish forces shall take place when they evacuate the city or when the American army evacuates it." The commanders of the American and Spanish forces did not undertake to determine the right of either party permanently to hold Manila, but contemplated conditions which inight require its evacuation by the forces of either country. But it is as idle to cite the stipulations of the capitulation for the purpose of determining the meaning of the Protocol as it would be to cite the stipulations of the Protocol for the purpose of determining the meaning of the capitulation. It is notorious that, owing to the inter- ruption of telegrai)hic communication, Manila was captured and the capitulation arranged and concluded by the commander of the American forces in the Philippines without communication with his Government, TREATY OF PEACE. 141 wbicli was at the moment as uninformed of what was taldnj? place at Manila as was its commander of what was taking? place at Washington. It is snperHuous, therefore, to argue, even if it were material to do so, that the stipulations of the capitulation cannot be invoked in explana- tion or limitation of the stipulations of the Protocol. For the same reason it is perhaps unnecessary to comment upon the statement that " General Merritt, contrary to what had been agreed upon in Article VI of the same (Protocol), forcibly took possession of Manila". The Ameri- can Commissioners are loth to assume that the Si>anish "proposition" employs these words for the purpose of intimating that General Merritt could at the time of the capture of Manila have had knowledge of the Protocol. It is a fact doubtless well known to the Spanish Govern- ment that on the 16th of August last, four days after the signature of the Protocol, and four days before the receipt at Washington of the news of the capture and capitulation of Manila, the Department of State addressed to the French Ambassador a note soliciting the con- sent of the Spanish Government to the restoration of cable communi- cation bi'tween Manila and Hong Kong, in order that continuous telegraphic connection with the Philippines might be reestablished. It is observed that the Spanish Commissioners in their "proposition" say that the words of the Protocol in relation to the Philippines "have not a clear meaning", but that no matter what construction maybe placed upon them, "in no case can their meaning be so stretched as to involve in anv way the idea of cession of the sovereignty of Spain over the archipelago", since "such a cession or acquisition in perpetiatm of the archipelago by the United States, had it been agreed upon in the Protocol, would have been in contradiction with the mere temporary occupation of Manila, which at the same time was agreed upon in the same clause of that instrument". This statement, as well as the para- graph that immediately follows it, merely reiterates the erroneous assumption, to which we have already adverted, that the ultimate demands of the United States in respect of the Philippines were embodied in the Protocol, while, as a matter of fact, the instrument shows upon its face that it was agreed that the formulation of those demands should be postponed till the negotiations for a treaty of peace should be undertaken. . How, then, stands the demand of the Government of the United States for the cession of the Philippine Islands with the concessions which it is willing to make, as set forth in its proposition of the 3Ist ultimo? This demand might be limited to the single ground of indem- nity, but this limitation the American Commissioners do not herein concede. The United States does not now put forward any claim for pecuniary indemnity to cover the enormous cost of the war. It does not take the sovereignty of Cuba; as has been shown in former memo- randa submitted by the American Commissioners, it assumes only bur- dens there. It does demand, and Sj^aiu has agreed to cede, the Island of Porto Rico and the small Island of Guam in the Ladrones. What is Spain asked to give up in the Philippines? A country constantly in rebellion against its sovereignty, so that if the United States were to withdraw therefrom to-day, Spain would immediately have to resort to arms to overcome a rebellious and discontented people. This situation could not be more vividly portrayed than to use the words of the Spanish memwandum in which, after speaking of Spain's neglect of her own welfare to the detriment of her full development, this condition is attributed to "her desire to preferentially attend to her colonies, creatures who, like all others in the order of nature, euUst 142 TREATY OF PEACE. the utmost solicitude on the part of their innther, who feeds and sup- liorts them at the sacrifice of her welfare". The American Commissioners note, with some surprise, that the Spanish Commissioners, so soon after having j)rovisionally accepted the American articles as to Cuba and Porto llico, now return to the question of the so called Cuban debt. They regret to find a jxx^^ition which, under certain reserves, ]jad been distinctly waived, immediately resumed, and now expressed in language rarely employed in diplomacy, unless to convey a deliberate ultimatum. The t5]);iiiish Conimissioners assume that this debt, for the most part incurred by ISi)ain (not Cuba) in the effort first to subjugate the Cuban insurgents, and subsequently to overcome the United States, hus the binding effect of a mortgage upon the very land wrested trom Spain through the defeat of this effort. They then say that they cannot even admit any discussion as to the validity and efficacy of such mortgages. In language equally unusual, they continue: '■^Let it he understood, therefore, and the Spanish Com- missioners hope there will he no necessity to repeat it, that Spain cannot and ought not to agree in this treaty," etc. 5^^ow, since Spain, as lately as in the next to the last paper filed here by her Commissioners did, under reserve, agree in this treaty to waive objections to our aitii-les containing no reference to the so-called Cuban debt, the American Com- missioners feel themselves justified in ini^uiring distinctly whether this sudden change of position is final! Do the Spanish Commissioners Avish it to be understood now, without any necessity for repetition, that they will accept no treaty which does not provide for an assumption of this so-called Cuban debt, or for some part of it, by the United States, for itself or for Cuba? The American Commissioners observe also the declaration that the dignity and self respect of Spain forbid an in(iuiry into the use Spain may have made of the proceeds of these loans. Kow — to consider only a single aspect of the issue thus raised — it is not denied that the pro- ceeds of a part of these loans were employed directly in making war upon the United States. Is it to be understood that the United States, after succeeding in the war, is forbidden to take notice even of this fact? That would be to recptire the successful nation to pay the war expenses of the defeated nation. Is it an acceptance, without inquiry, of this part of the so-called Cuban debt, that the Spanish Commis- sioners declare is demanded by the dignity and self-respect of Spain — which they wish therefore to have now understood, and which they hope there will be no necessity to repeat? The American Commissioners do not here examine the statements that these debts were legally created, that they may have been legally acquired by individuals of various nationalities, or that Spain is not the proprietor of these rights of third parties. They do question the statement that Spain does not deuumd the recognition of these so- called "secured debts" for her own benefit. They are bonds of the Spanish nation, guaranteed by the faith of the Spanish nation, with another guarantee (which might more pro[)erly have been called a "subsidiary" one), pledging S])anish sovereignty and control over cer- tain Spanish colonial revenues. Spain has failed to maintain her sovereignty and control over these revenues, and is bound to the third parties with whom she dealt for that failure to make good her title to the security she pledged. The tliird parties knew what it was pledged for— the continuous effort to put down a people struggling for freedom from the Si)anish rule. They took the obvious chances of their investment on so precarious a security, but they must have relied TREATY OF PEACE. 143 on tlio broad jiuarantco of the Sj^aiiish nation. It is not tor ns to deny that "the most elementary duties of public and ])rivate ijrob- ity" justify that reliance, but we do deny, emphatically, that tliey require the freed people, or anyone acting for them, to pay the cost of all the efforts for their subjugation. To admit that such costs could be attached ineradicably to the soil they lived on, is to i)ut it in the ])o\ver of any unjust ruler to condenm a colony to perpetual subjuga- tion and mis'goverumont by simply loading it with so-called '• mortgages" for loans effected without their consent by their oppressors, till it can neither bear them itself nor tind anyone else to assume them. That would be a conclusion alike repugnant to common sense and menacing to liberty and civilization. After reviewing in their " proposition" the provisions of the Protocol, the Spanish Commissioners proceed to inquire whether there is any other "title", not founded on that agreement, upon which the demand for the cession of the group can be supported. Under this head they discuss the cai)ture of ]Manila by the American forces, and, after con- cluding that the capitulation was invalid, they declare that the treaty of i)eace should provide for the immediate delivery of the place to the Spanish Government, the immediate release of the Spanish garrison, and the performance of various acts which imply that the military occupation and government of the city by the United States has been illegal. These startling pretentions require at the hands of the American Com- missioners a comi)rehensive examination. On the ii2nd of July, 1808, the Government of Spain, inipelled by and admitting the adverse results of the war, made representations to the President of the United States by written communication of its ]\Iin- ister of Foreign Affairs, transmitted through the Ambassador of France at Washington, to the expressed end that "the calamities already so great" and "evils still greater" to the two countries might "be termi- nated otherwise than by force of arms". The response of the President, through Mr. Day, Secretary of State, to this communication was made July 30, 1898, and was in part as follows: The President therefore reapondini: to your Excellency's request will state the terms of peace Tvhich will be accepted liy him at the present time, subject to the approval of the Senate of the United States hereafter. Your Excellency in discussing the subject of Cuba intimates that Spain has desired to spare tlie island the dangers of preniMtnre independence. The Government of the United States has not shared the apprehensions of Spain in this regard, but it recog- nizes the fact that in the distracted and prostrate condition of the island,, aid and guidance -will be necessary, and these it is prepared to give. The United States will require: First. The relinquishment by Spain of all claim of sovereignty over or title to Cuba and her immediate evacuation of the island. Second. The President, desirous of exhibiting signal generosity, will not now put forward anv demand for pecuniary indemnity. Nevertheless, he cannot be insensible to the losses and expenses of "the United States incident to the war or to the claims of our citizens for injuries to their persons and property during the late insurrection in Cuba. He must, therefore, require the cession to the United States and the immediate evacuation by Spain of the Island of Porto Rico and other islands now under the sovereignty of Spain in the West Indies, and also the cession of an island in the Ladrones, to be selected by the United States. Third. On similar grounds, the United States is entitled to occupy and will hold the citv, bav, and harbor of Manila pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace which shall determine the control, disposition and government of the Philippines. If the terms hereby offered are accepted in their entirety. Commissioners will be named by the United States to meet similarly authorized Commissioners on the part of Spain' for the purpose of settling the details of the tresrty of peace and signing and delivering it under the terms above indicated. 144 TREATY OF PEACE. The nej^otiations thus entered into were followed by the Protocol of agreement between the United States and Spain signed at Washington August 12, 1898, by which it was provided; Articlk I. Spain will relinquish all claim of sovereignty over and title to Cuba. Article II. Spain will cede to the United States the Island of Porto Rico and other islands now under Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies, and also an island in the Ladroues to be selected by the United States. Article III. The United States vi'ill occupy and hold the city, bay and harbor of Manila, pend- ing the conclusion of a treaty of peace which shall determine the control, disposi- tion and government of the Philippines. Article lY of that instrument obligated Spain to the immediate evacuation of Cuba, Porto Kico and the other islands under Spanish, sovereignty in the West Indies, and provided for the appointment by each government, within ten days of the above date, of Commissioners who should meet at Havana in Cuba and at San Juan in Porto Rico within thirty days after such date for the purpose of arranging and carrying out the details of such evacuation. By Article V of the Protocol, th'e Contracting Parties agreed to appoint each not more than live Commissioners to treat of peace, who should meet at Paris not later than October 1, 1898, and proceed to the negotiation and conclusion of a treaty of peace. Article VI of tlie Pro- tocol is as follows: Upon the conclusion and signing of this Protocol, hostilities betvp^een the two coun- tries shall be suspended, and notice to that effect shall be given as soon as possible by each Government to the commanders of its military and naval forces. Before the notice provided for in Article VI could possibly be given, and on the 13th day of August, 1898, the next day after its signa- ture, the American land and naval forces at Manila attacked that city and, upon the 14th of August, 1898, compelled its surrender under the terms of a military capitulation, which comprehended not only the sur- render and occupation of the city, but also the surrender of its garri- son, being from 9,000 to 11,000 troops in number, and comprising substantially the entire Spanish military force in the Philippine Islands, The United States thereupon, having previously for a long time been in possession of the bay and harbor of Manila, took military possession of that city, and has ever since been in military occupation thereof, administering its government concerns in the manner usual in such cases. In so doing, the United States took possession of the public property of Si»aiu situate in Manila, including certain moneys due to that Government which had been collected as revenues; proceeded to administer, collect and expend the taxes and customs of that port, and also to take charge of and administer the police government of the city; and generally continued to exercise over the city, harbor and bay the rights and powers of a belligerent in rightful military occupancy. It is now contended by Spain, who also, as a part of that contention, rejects the articles tendered by the United States for the cession to that Government of the Philippine Archipv^Iago, that such occupation and acts were in violation of the Protocol, and that, for that reason, she is entitled: 1. To the immediate delivery of the place (Manila) to the Spanish Governiuentj TREATY OF PEACE. 145 2. Tlie iinmedinte release of the garrison of the same; 3. Tlie return to the yi)aiiish Government of all the funds and public property taken by the American army since its occupation of the place, and all the taxes of every kind collected or to be collected up to the time of returning the same ; 4. The recognition of the obligation on the part of the United States to indemnify Spain for alleged serious damage occasioned by the deten- tion as prisoners of her troops, to which detention it is alleged is due the spread with impunity of the Tagalo insurrection in Luzon and its invasion of the Vizayan islands, and, moreover, because to the same has been due the alleged ill-treatment of thousands of Spanish prison- ers, military and civil. In the dilatory assertion of these extraordinary claims the Spanish Commissioners have at times repudiated and at other times have appealed to and claimed rights under the stipulations of a convention entered into between Spain and the United States, by and under which the rights, duties, liabilities and status of the contracting parties were explicitly settled. That convention is the Protocol of August 12, 1898. It is contended by the American Commissioners that an establish- ment of the status quo provided for by that Protocol, and comprehended within its intent and meaning upon a fair construction of its terms, is the only demand that Spain can, upon her own theory, make in the premises, even if it is hypothetically conceded, for the mere purposes of this branch of the discussion, that the legal propositions which she advances are at all applicable to the alleged breach of the armistice. For the United States insists and has always insisted (except hypo- thetically as stated above and merely for purposes of this argument) that the military operations by which Manila was captured were justi- fiable and lawful. The status quo is the right of the United States to occupy and hohl the city, harbor and bay of Manila pending the con- clusion of a treaty of peace which shall determine the control, disposi- tion and government of the Philippines. That condition exists. The United States does so hold such territory. It has been so conceded and insisted by Spain in correspondence which will be particularly considered in another i)ortion of this paper. That occupancy is refer- able to, and is justitied by, the Protocol, and cannot be defeated by the abeged illegality of hostilities. To so invalidate it, it will be nec- essary for Spain to denounce and repudiate the Protocol in all its parts, including, of course, the authority under which this Commission is proceeding and the stii)ulation for an armistice, and thus produce a renewal of active war, as we shall elsewhere more fully demonstrate. It is maintained by the American Commissioners that all and singular the acts done after the surrender of MaTiila and cora])lained of by Spain were and are rightful acts under the Protocol itself; that they would have been rightful if no naval or military oi)erations whatever had been conducted against that city after the signature thereof, and that their rightfulness is not impaired by such hostile operations. The Protocol presents two features : One, general in its character, per- taining to negotiations for peace; the other, subordinate and special in its provisions, pertaining to the capitulation of the city of Manila and its bay and harbor, but which is also an inseparable part and parcel of the stipulations and processes by which a treaty of peace is to be effected. The second of these features presents a case of the military capitu- lation of a certain defined territory, to be occupied and held by the United States '' pending the conclusion of a treaty of jieace which shall T P 10 146 TREATY OF PEACE. determine the control, disposition and government of the Philippines". This stipulation is sometimes ignored and sometimes relied upon by the Spanish Commissioners to meet the various exigencies of their argument. The Spanish Commissioners are entirely correct in treating this par- ticular stipulation of the Protocol (as they do in one branch of their argument) as a military convention providing lor a capitulation, and in citing (as they do) the laws of war applicable to military occupancy of a conquered or surrendered portion of the territory of one of the bel- ligerents. If, therefore, as the American Commissioners contend, the acts complained of, and for which Spain now demands reparation, were rightful acts under the Protocol, and could rightfully have been done by that Government if no hostilities whatever had been conducted against Manila after its signature, the entire contention of Spain for reparation on account of those acts fails. The Protocol, as respects the occupation by the United States of the city of Manila and its bay and harbor, was, as we have observed, a military convention for the capitu- lation of certain territory therein specifically defined. When executed by the United States taking possession it presented a case of military occupatio)! of that certain defined territory, and vested in that Govern- ment all the rights which the laws of war give to a military occupancy. This capitulation was general in its character and terms. It compre- hended the defined territory and all that it contained, including the forts, the munitions of war, the barracks. It included every thing and every person left in the city by Spain. It included the garrison for that reason. Under the special circumstances of the case the sur- render of the garrison was necessarily contemplated by the Protocol. The city was closely besieged on the land side by the insurgents. It was in extremity for provisions and the insurgents contiolled the water sup])ly. The Spanish forces had been unable to raise the siege, and therefore could not escaj)e from the city on the land side. The city was blockaded by the American fleet; the fleet of Spain had been destroyed and there was no escape for her troops by water. The con- ditions were such that even if an escape could have been effected by land or sea, the forces of Spain would have had no base whatever for any military operations. So clearly was this the situation that the Spanish Commander-in-Chief fled from the city shortly before it was attacked, took refuge on a neutral man-of-war, and was conveyed by it to Hong Kong. Had it been intended that the garrison should be per- mitted to depart from the capitulated city, the usual provision would have been made that it should march out with its arms and with the honors of war. Containing no such provision, the exaction that the Spanish troops should surrender to the occupying power was as justi- fiable and legal under the Protocol as was the taking possession by that i^ower of the forts, barracks and munitions of war. Consequently, no rightful claim whatever against the United States can be made that afterwards it refused to permit the capitulated army to resume its arms and proceed beyond the limits of the capitulated territory as an organized military force for the purpose of suppressing the Tagalo insurrection, or for any military purpose whatsoever. That this has always been the position of the United States upon this ques- tion plainly appears from the diplomatic correspondence between the two Governments, and particularly in the letter of the Secretary of State to Mr. Cambon dated September 16, 1898. The argument which would sustain the right of Spain to the release of her army would, with equal cogency, sujjport a claim on her part to have delivered up to TREATY OF PEACE. 147 her for the same purpose a ship of war that might have been included in the capitulation, and all the munitions of war which came into the possession of the United iStates under and by virtue of its stipulated right of occupancy. In all cases where, pending wai-, a certain defined part of the territory of one of the belligerents is by the terms of a military convention, agreed to be put in the military occupation and possession of the other belligerent, the sovereignty of the occupying l)aity (the United States in the present instance) disi>laces or suspends the soveieignty of the other belligerent and becomes for the purposes of the military occupation a substitute for it. It is not necessary to multiply citations of the many authorities which sustain this proposition. General Ualleck's work on International Law has been invoked by the Spanish Commissioners and the citations in this paper will be limited to that work, observing that they are made from the chapter which treats of the rights of military occupation dur- ing war as contradistinguished from the rights of a complete conquest. •'Capitulations are agreements entered into by a commanding officer for the surrender of his army, or by the governor of a town, or a for- tress, or particular district of country, to surrender it into the hands of the enemy." (Halleck, Vol. 11, p. 319.) "It follows, then, that the rights of military occupation extend over , the enemy's territory only so far as the inhabitants are vanquished or reduced to submission to the rule of the conqueror. Thus, if a fort, town, city, harbor, island, province, or particular section of country belonging to one belligerent, is forced to submit to the arms of the other, such place or territory instantly becomes a conquest, and is sub- ject to the laws which the conqueror may impose on it; although he has not yet acquired the 2>l€num dominium et utile, he has the temporary right of possession and government." (Halleck, Vol. II, p. 434.) To consider more specifically the claims advanced by the Spanish Commissioners: The first is, that Spain "is entitled to the immediate delivery of the place (Manila) to the Spanish Government." To do this would contravene the provisions of the Protocol by which it is agreed that "the United States will occupy awd hold the city, bay and harbor of Manila pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace," which treaty the two Commissions have been negotiating ever since October 1, 1898. They are negotiating under the Protocol. That instrument is an entirety. Keither party, having entered into it and continued the negotiations for which it provides to a date more than two months after the acts were done of which Spain now comi)iains, can now allege such acts as grounds for the rejection of the obligations of that instrument. If any right of repudiation ever existed, it should have been asserted in due time as against the entire instrument and all of its i)rovisious. This has never been attempted. On the contrary, the contracting parties have proceeded to negotiate, agree, and perform under the requirements of that instrument. By so doing, Spain has waived the alleged breaches of the Protocol which she now advances. The second demand is for the immediate release of the garrison of Manila. We show in another place that this garrison was, under the facts and circumstances, necessarily included in the capitulation pro- vided for by the Protocol. The third demand is for the return to the Spanish Government of all funds and public property taken by the American army since its 148 TREATY OF PEACE, occupation of the place (Manila) and all taxes of every kind, collected or to be collected. We have maintained in another portion of this paper that the occu- pation of Manila is justly referable to the Protocol; that that instru- ment is a military capitulation ; that the effect of the occupancy by the United States was to suspend the sovereignty of Spain in the territory so occupied, and to substitute for the purposes of military occu])ation the sovereignty of the United States. It follows upon principle and authority from these considerations that the United States luid the right to take the public pro|)erty, and to collect the taxes demanded, and has the right to retain the siiine. ''I'olitical laws, as a general rule, are suspended durin.gthe military occupation of a conquered territory. The political connection between tlie people of such territory and the state to which they belong is not entirely severed, but is interrupted or suspended so long as the occu- ])ntion continues. Their lands and immovable propeity are, therefore, not subject to the taxes, rents, etc., usually paid to the former sover- eign. These, as we have said elsewhere, belong of right to the con- queror, and he may demand and rereive their payment to himself. They are a part of the spoils of war, and the people of the captured ])rovince or town can no more pay them to the former government than they can contribute funds or military muintions to assist that govern- ment to prosecute the war. To do so would be a breach of the implied conditions under which the jseopleof a conquered territory are allowed to enjoy their private pro])erty, and to pursue their ordinary occupa- tions, and would render the oViender lial)le to punisliment. They are subject to the laws of the conqueror, and not to the orders of the dis- ])laced government. Of lands and immovable property belonging to the conquered state, the conqueror has, by the rights of war, acquired the use so long as he holds theai. The fruits, rents and profits are therefore his, and he may lawfully claim and receive them. Any con- tracts or agreements, however, which he may make with individuals farming out such ])ro])erty, will continue only so long as he retains con- trol of them, and will cease on their restoration to, or recovery by, their former owner." (H;illeck, Vol. II, p. 437.) "During the war of 1812 the city and harbor of Castine, a port of the United States, was taken and occujtied by the British Ibices: their commander proceeded to levy and collect customs duties. The ques- tion of his right to do so and the suspension of the sovereignty of the United States was afterwards adjudicated by the Supreme Court. "'By the conquest and military occupation of Castine,' says the Su])ien)e Court, 'the enemy acquired that firm ])oss(Ssion which enabled him to exercise the fullest rights of sovereignty over that place. The sovereignty of the United States over the territory was, of course, suspended, and the laws of the United States could no longer be rightfully enforced there, or be obligatory upon the inhabit- ants who remained and submitted to the conquerors. By the sur- render, the inhabitants passed under a temporary allegiance to the British Government, and were bound by such laws, and such only, as it chose to recognize and impose. Fiom the nature of the case, no other laws could be obligatory upt)n them; for where there is no pro- tection or allegiance or sovereignty there can be no claim to obedience. Castine was, therefore, during this i)eriod, so far as respected our revenue laws, to be deemed a foreign port, and goods imported into it by the inhabitants were subject to such duties only as the British Gov- TREATY OF PEACE. 149 ernment chose to require. Such goods were in no correct sense imported into the United States.'" (Halleck, Vol. IF, p. 44(5-447.) " Tlie moneys derived from tliese sources may be used for the snpport of the government of tlie conquered territory, or for the expenses of the war." (Halleck, Vol. II, p. 447.) "Those who are permitted to hold commercial intercourse with such territory, whether they be subjects of the conqueror, or of foreign iStates, must conform to the regulations, and pay the duties established by the conquering power; and, in case of conquest by the United States, the President, in the absence of legislative enactments, exercises this power." (Halleck, Vol. II, p. 446.) " We will next consider the effect of a military occupation of a State upon debts owing to its government. Does such conquest of the state cany with it the incorporeal rights of the State, such as debts, etc.? In other words, do these rights so attach themselves to the territory that the military possession of the latter carries with it the right to possess tlu^ former? There are two distinct cases here to be considered : First, where the imperium of the conqueror is established over the whole State {victoria imiversaUs) ; and, second, where it is established over only a parf, as the capital, a province, or a colony {victoria part ic- ularis). As has already been stated, all rights of military occupation arise from actuat possession, and not from constructive conquests; they are de facto, and not dejure rights. Hence, by conquest of a part of a country, the government of that country, or the State^is not in the pos- session of the conqueror, and he, therefore, cannot claim the incorporeal rights which attach to the whole country as a ^State. But, by the mili- tary ])ossessiou of a part, he will acquire the same claim to the incor- poreal rights which attach to that part, as he would, by the military occupation of the whole, acquire to those which attach to the whole. We must also distinguish with respect to the situations of the debts, or rather the locality of the debtors from whom they are owing, whether in the conquered country, in that of the conqueror, or in that of a neutral. If situated in tlie conquered territory, or in that of the con- queror, there is no doubt but that the conqueror may, by the rights of military occupation, enforce the collection of debts actually due to tlie displaced government, for the de facto government has, in this respect, all the p(jwcrs of that which preceded it." (Halleck, Vol. II, p. 401.) In other particulars Spain has not only waived any right to insist that the hostilities at Manila were in violation of the Protocol, but has acted upon the assumption that they were not such acts of violation. On August 15, 1898, the French Ambassador, acting for Spain, in a letter of that date, addressed to the Secretary of State, inquired as follows: "May the postal service by Spanish steamers be reestablished between Spain and Cuba, Porto Rico, Philii>pines?" "Will Spanish merchants be permitted to send supplies in Spanish bottoms to Cuba, Porto liico, Philippines?" To these inquiries the Department of State answered by letter dated August 17, 1898, that: "1. This Government will interpose no obstacle to the reestabhsh- ment of the postal service by Spanish steamers between Spain on the one side and Cuba, Porto Eico and the Philippines on the other. "2. The United States will not object to the importation of supplies in Spanish bottoms to Cuba and the Philippines, but it has been decided to reserve the importation of supplies from the United States to Porto Rico to American vessels." 150 TREATY OP PEACE. Though it is probable that both of these coiumimications were written before uotice of the capture of Manila had been received, yet it is believed that Spain has, down to the present time, availed herself of the privileges thus solicited and granted. On August 29, 1898, the French Ambassador, acting for Spain, by- letter of that date, addressed to the Secretary of State, suggested that " the Spanish trooj)S, ichom the capitulation of the city of Manila has reduced to inaction, might be placed at once at the disposal of Spain, who would use them for the defense of the islands against the insur- gents. " The Minister of State at Madrid thinks that, if the United States Government sees any objection to this arrangement, it will, at least, Jiave no reason to oppose the despatch of troops directly from the l*eninsula to the Pliilii)piues." To this letter the Department of State made answer under date of jSeptember 5, 1898, and observed, among things: '■'■ h\ your informal note of the -:9th ultimo it is stated that the Span- ish Government suggests that, for the purpose of checking insurgent hostilities, the Spanish troops now held as prisoners of war by the American forces may be placed at the disposal of Spain, to be used against the insurgents; or, if this be objected to, that the Spanish Government may be allowed to send troops from the Peninsula to the Philipinnes. It can scarcely be expected that this Government would even consider the question of adopting the lirst alternative, in view of the lact that for some time before the surrender of Manila the Spanish forces in tnat city were besieged by the insurgents by land while the port was blockaded by the forces of the United States by sea." It seems impossible to conceive that the correspondence from which the above quota,tions have been made could have taken place except upon the basis of the opinion then entertained both by the United States and Spam, that the possession by the former power of the City of Manila, and the surrender to it of the Spanish forces were either lawful ab initio, or had become lawful by acquiescence and waiver by Spain, and that nothing had been done or required by the United States that was not warranted by the terms of the Protocol respecting the occupation by tiiat (Tovernment of the city, harbor and bay of Manila. And, on the lith day of September, 1898, the Ambassador of France, acting for Spain, in a letter of that date to the Secretary of State, dis- tinctly stated that ''the Spanish Government is of opinion that the occupation by the American forces of the city, bay and harbor of Manila must be considered in virtue of the Protocol of August 12, and not in virtue of what was agreed to in the capitulation of the 14th of the same month, which is absolutely null by reason of its having been concluded after the belligerents had signed an agreement declaring the hostilities to be suspended." Considering together these requests and concessions, and particu- larly the explicit admission above quoted, it seems a feat of forensic and dialectic hardihood to assert now that the military occupation by the United States of the City of Manila is void under the Protocol, and that, for that reason, the city ought to be delivered up to Spain, its gar- rison liberated, its forts, barracks, and munitions returned, the moneys collected paid back to Spain, and the United States to be mulcted in damages for the military operations of the insurgents. And, considering from altogether another point of view the claim that, since Manila was actually captured a few hours after the Protocol was signed on the other side of the globe instead of a few hours before, TREATY OF PEACE. 151 it should be returned, the thought might occur to a just and impartial mind to remember why it was not captured earlier. The world knows that the attack was only delayed to protect the city and its Spanish inhabitants from the dreaded vengeance of the insurgents. It would be extraordinary if this act of humanity should now be claimed by the beneficiary as the sole reason for depriving the benefactor of his victory. It might further occur to a just and impartial mind that the General and the Admiral commanding, to whom that humane delay was due, were entitled to a more generous recognition of perfectly well known facts than is implied in the statements of the Spanish Commissioners that "in spite of this (the signature of the Protocol) General Ivlerritt and the Admiral of the fleet demanded the surrender of the place, etc. * * * opened fire, * * * unnecessarily causing a considerable num- ber of losses to the Spanish forces;" and again that "General Merritt and the Admiral of the squadron may not be personally responsible for the blood they unnecessarily shed on the 13th, if they had no official notice then of the Protocol which had been signed on the previous day in Washington". The American Commissioners have too high an esti- mate of the chivalric honor of the Spanish people to accept that as the final record Spain would wish to make of this incident. The American Commissioners for the various reasons hereinbefore stated are constrained to reject the several demands embodied in the "proposition" to which the present paper is an answer. True copy : John B. Mooee. Protocol No. 14. Conference of November 16, 1898. The conference having been postponed at the request of the Spanish Commissioners, in order that they might have an oppor- tunity to prepare a reply to the paper presented by the American Commissioners at the last session, it was decided to meet on the 16th of November, at two o'clock, p. m., at which hour there were Present: On the part of the United States : Messrs : Day, Davis, Frye, Gray, Eeid, Moore, Fergus- son. On the part of Spain c Messrs: Montero Kios, Abarzuza, Garnica, Villa-Urrutia, Cerero, Ojeda. The protocol of the preceding session was read and approved. The Spanish Commissioners pre- sented their answer, copy and Protocolo No. 14. Confer encia del 16 de Noviembre de 1898. Los Comisarios espaiioles en vir- tud de lo acordado en la sesion anterior respecto del aplazamiento de la proxima conferencia para una fecha posterior 4 la fijada, solicita- ron une prorroga para presentar su contestacion al Memorandum que en la ultima sesion presentaron los Comisarios Americanos y ha- biendose fijado de comun acuerdo el dia 16 k las 2 P. M. para la re- union de ambas Comisiones, se hallan en dicho dia y hora Presentes Por parte de los Es- tados Unidos de America los Senores Day, Davis, Frye, Gray, Eeid, Moore, Fergusson. Por parte deEspaua. los Senores Montero Eios, Abarzuza, Garnica, Villa-Urrutia, Cerero, Ojeda. Fue leida y aprobada el acta de la sesion anterior. Los Comisarios Espanoles pre- sentan la contestacion al Memoran- 162 TREATY OP PEACE. translation of wliicli are annexed to this protocol, to tlie j^nierican Memorandum relating- to tliePliil- ippine Islands, and in so doing tlie President of tbe Spanish Conimis- sion stated that the document, besides being an answer to the American Memorandum, was also a Memorandum in support of the last proposition presented by the Spanish Commissioners; and he called attention to the concluding part, wherein a motion or projjosi- tion was made with reference to the contingency that the American Commissioners should think that they must insist upon their former proposal on the Philippines. The American Commissioners asked that the final part of the Memorandum, to which the Presi- dent of the Spanish Commission referred, be read, and it was orally translated into English by their Interpreter. The American Commissioners moved that, in order that the whole paper might be carefully translated and attentively examined, the con- ference be adjourned till Saturday, November 19, at two o'clock, p. m., without prejudice to asking for a postponement if necessary. The Spanish Commissioners ex- pressed their assent to this motion, and it was therefore decided that the next conference should be held on Saturday, the 19th instant, at two o'clock, p. m. William E. Day CusHMAN K. Davis Wm P Frye Geo. Gray Whitelaw Eeid. John B. Mooee. dum Americano, que es anexa al acta presente, relativo (i las Islas Filipinas, y al hacerlo, el Presi- dente de la Comisicn Espanola, manifiesta que dicho documento (i la vez que contesta al Americano, es asimismo un Memorandum en apoyo de la ultima proposicion presentada por los Comisarios Espauoles, y llama la atencion sobre su ultima parte en que se hace una mocion 6 i)roposici6n para el caso en que los Comisarios Americanos crean deber insistir en su anterior proposicion sobre Filipinas. Los Comisarios Americanos piden que sea leida la ultima parte del Memorandum a que se retiere el Presidentede laComision Esi)afio- la, y esta es vertida verbalmente al ingles i)or su interprete. Los Comisarios A mericanosmani- fiestan que considerando que es necesario traducir con esuiero y en- terarse atentanieiite de dicho docu- mento, proi)oiien el aplazaniiento de la sesion hasta el S^ibado a las 2 de la tarde, sm perjuicio de i)edir una pronogasi lo estinuisen neces- sario. Los Comisarios es])anoles mani- fiestan su asentimiento, y queda por tanto fijada la ])r6xima confer- encia i)ara el s^bado 19 4 las 2 P. M. E. MONTERO Rios B. de Abarzuza J. DE GARNICA W R DE Vtlla-Urrutia Rafael Cerero Emilio de Ojeda Annex to Protocol No. 14. COMISION PARA LA NEGOCIACION DE LA PAZ CON LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS. [Presentado en la sesion del dia 16 de Novlembre 1898. (14' conferencia.)] Eliiltimo escrito presentado por laComision Americana tiene un doble objeto. Por una parte es el Memorandum que presento en apoyo de su proposicion de 31 de Octubre ultimo, pidiendo la cesion de las Islas TREATY OP PEACE. 153 Filipinas 6. los Estados Unidos. Y por la otra es la exposici6n de las razones que tieue la Comision Americana para no adinitir la proposiciou espauola de 4 de este mes, en que la invitaba (i que presentase una cuyo objeto fuera el cumplimieuto de lo convenido en los Articulos 3 y G del Protocolo de Washington. For lo que hace al primer objeto sobre que versa el Memorandum Americano, la Comisiou Espanola se dedicara primeramente en este 4 replicar 4 su conteiiido. Y por lo que hace a la segunda parte, aquella insistird en la forma de Memorandum reglamentario en la exposiciou de las razones que abonan su proi)osici6n rechazada. REPLICA AL MEMORANDUM AMERICANO. Eazones de mt^todo y el deseo de reducir las proporciones de este escrito, iiiclinan a los Coniisarios Espafioles 4 ocuparse primeiamente del punto relativo a his deudas hipotecarias de las colonias de Espana, que, anque de capital importancia, no hubierau vuelto 4 controvertir en esta parte de la discusion del tratado, si no apareciera nuevamente proinovido por la Comision Americana en el ultimo parrafo de su propo- siciou, pidiendo la cesiou del Archipielago Filipino. L'econoce la Comision Esijanola la diticulrad que siente para contestar 4 esta parte del Memorandum Americano, debida esta dillculrad a los graves en ores de hecho de que aijuella esta sembrada, y tambitn a las extrafias doctrinas juridicas que alii campeau. Ante todo necesita la Comision Espanola hacer constar que en su documento no entiende haber empleado lenguage, ni siquiera fiases impropias de una discusion diplonnitica. Celosa de las consideraciones a (jue tiene derecho, empieza por guardar religiosamente las que cor- responden 4 los demAs, y, en sus documentos evita con el mayor cuidado toda trase que pueda ser personalmente desagradable 4 (juien vaya dirigida, y con mucha mas razon, las que pudieran reputarse otensivas 4 quienes cstAn, y tienen derecho 4 estar, al amparo de las personas con quienes los Comis.arios Espanoles tengan que discutir. Los Comisarios Americanos dicen que notaron con sorpresa que los Espanoles, despu^s de haber aceptado provisionalmente los articulos que aquellos habian propuesto sobre Cuba y Puerto Kico, vuelven ahora 4 suscitar la cuestion de la deuda cubana, planteando de nuevo un tenia que bajo ciertas reservas hahia sido terminantemcnte ahandonado. Y no satisfechos con tan rotundas atirmaciones auadieron que la Comision Espanola en su contestacion escrita presentada en la sesion de 26 de Octubre, habia retirado sus observaciones anteriores 4 los articulos de la Comision Americana. Por lo que hace 4 esta supuesta retirada, invitamos 4 nuestros dignos colegas de America 4 que, buscando con todo detenimiento las frascs de nuestra contestacion escrita, en que aquella conste, se sirvan citai las, pues entre tanto y siempre nosotros hemos de afirmar de un modo rotundo, que en nuestro documento no existen tales frases, resultando de ^1 por lo contrario que nada teniamos que retirar, puesto que sos- teniamos nuestras atirmaciones, aunque subordinando su sostenimiento en lo futuro 4 las conveniencias de Espana. En efecto, como prueba de lo que acabamos de decir y como suticiente contestacion a las frases de la Comision Americana, basta transcribir aqui las en que consta aquella supuesta aceptacion provisional y aquei terminante abandono del tenia sobre la mencionada deuda. "Los Comisarios Espanoles contestan 4 la sobredicha pregunta (que es la que por escrito les habia hecho la Comision Americana en la reunion del dia 24 Octubre) y dicen que, afirm- ando sus conviccion de que con arreglo 4 derecho, las obligaciones 154 TREATY OF PEACE. coloniales de Cuba y Puerto Eico deben pasar con estas islas y su sober- ania, no rehusan toniar en consider acion cualquier otro articulo relativo a Cuba y Puerto Bico que no contetiga la clausula de asumir las cargas por los JEstados Unidos 6 por Cuba 6 por ambos''^ (estas eran las propias palabras de la pregunta a que coutestaban), "subordinaiido la detinitiva aprobacion de tal articulo 4 la de los demas que hayan de formar la totalidad del Tiatado, etc." Y eutre las razoues que por escrito con- signaron para dar esta contestacion, esta la que alii se expresa con las siguientes frases " Considerando que no liabiendo de elaborarse este Tratado, como nunca se lia elaborado ni puede elaborarse ninguuo, con el imieo criterio de la rigurosa justicia que cada una de las partes pueda entender que le asista, sino tamblen con el de la conveniencia de cada una de ellas y aun de ambas para moditicar a su tenor las exigencias del criterio meraniente juridico, y que por consiguiente sobre la cuestion relativa a la deuda de Cuba los Coniisarios Espanoles que entienden que el rigor del derecho la resuelve 4 su favor, tienen el deber y estan disquestos 4 cumi)lirlo, de moderar este rigor i)or las conveniencias que para Espaiia puedan surgir de otras estipulaciones del Tratado, que sin ser perjudiciales a los Estados Unidos, puedan ser favorables a Espafia". Parece bien claro que el supuesto abaudono de que ahora se liabla en el Memorandum Americano y la supuesta aceptacion de los articulos relativos 4 Cuba y Puerto Pico, estaba limitada al caso en que la Co- mision espaiiola entendiera que en los demas que se fueran discutiendo y aprobando, bubiese para Espana ventajas que, a su juicio, la compen- saran de un wSacrificio mayor 6 menor de su derecbo sobre las deudas, puesto que, si tales ventajas no se ol'redan, no tendria la Comision Es- pafiola razon para bacer ninguno; y por lo tanto, claro es que jiodria insistir en el recouocimiento de su derecho. Pues bien, ^ qu6 ventajas desde entonces se ban ofrecido 4 Espaiia, hasta este momento, en el curso de las couferencias'? Desde aquella fecha los trabajos del Tratado no adelantaron mas que un paso, y este ha consistido en pedir a Espana, sin alegar razon alguna en pro de tal peticion cuando se hizo, que ceda 4 los Estados Unidos el Arcbiiiielago de Filipinas. s Entiende la Comision Americana que esta cesiou es una ventajja para Espana"? Sus Comisionados no se sorpren- derian al oir una contestacion en sentido afirmativo, que ya hacen pre- ver ciertas frases consignadas en el Memorandum 4 que contestan. No uecesitan decir que no participan de esa opinion. Hubiera, pues, estado la Comision EspaSola en su derecho, volviendo 4 insistir no de un modo incidental, sino directo y principal, en sus reclamaciones sobre la transmision de las deudas y obligaciones colo- niales. No lo han hecho, ni se proponen hacerlo ahora, mas esto no ha obstado ni obsta 4 que no deje pasar en silencio supuestos y afirma- ciones, siquiera para que no llegue un dia en que se diga que habian sido por ella consentidas porque no las habia controvertido, neg4ndolas 8xi)resamente su asentimiento. Afirma la Comision Americana que Espaiia contrajo (no dice que haya invertido la deuda anteriormente contraida) la mayor parte de la deuda hipotecaria de cuba '■'-en su esfuerzo primero para subyugar a los insur- rectos cubanos, y luego para oponerse a los Estados Unidos, y discurri- endo sobre el mismo tema, aiiade, que "no se ha negado que parte del iraporte de estos emprestitos se invirtio directameute en bacer la guerra 4 los Estados Unidos." Para hacer tales afirmaciones es indispensable suponer que se ignoran las feclias de la creacion de tales deudas. La unabn^ emitida por Real Decreto de 10 de Mayo de 1886, es decir, ocho alios iespu^s de establecida la paz en Cuba, y nueve antes de que, por TREATY OF PEACE. 155 las sugestioTies y medios que ya son del domiuio publico, hubiera vuelto 51 perturbai'se. La seguuda emision se hizo por Eeal Decreto de 27 de Setiembre de 1890, es decir, doce aflos despu^s que reinaba una paz completa en Cuba y se ballaba esta isla en el apogeo de su prospe- ridad, y ciuco afios antes que liubiese comenzado su desolacion por la nueva rebelion que alii, mas 6 menos espontaneamente suigio. Y en los dos Decretos se dice adeinas cuales ei an las causas que provocaban estas emisioues, y Jos gastos en cuya satisfaccion se Labia de invertir su imi)orte, figuiando entre los priucipales el pago de los deficit de los presupuestos anteriores y posterioies de la isla, los cuales bien sabido es que eian debidos a la gran rebaja que en sus impuestos habia becbo la Metropoli. ^ Queira decirse que esta, por un don sobrenatural de adivinacion, sabia en 1886 y 1890 que en 1895 Labia de reproducirse la insurreccion de Cuba, y en 1898 los Estados Unidos le habian de dispensar su pro- teccion armada? Pues, solamente en tal Lipotesis podria admitirse la exactitud de las frases que se leeu en el Memorandum Americano. Y por lo que Lace a los gastos que a Espana ocasiono la guerra de los Estados Unidos, sin duda su Comision ignora que en 20 de Abril de este alio, en que comenzaron las Lostilidades, el Tesoro Espafiol aun estaba realizando las operacioues que, en forma de obbgaciones con la garantia especial de lasAduanas de la Peninsula, Labia acordado Lacer en 189(5 y 1897 por mil millones de pesetas, y otra por doscientos veinte y tres millones de pesetas, acordada en 2 de Abril de 1898 con la garantia especial de las reutas del tobaco y timbre del Estado y la del inqjuesto de cousumos de Es])aria, y que, en fin, para la atenciou especial de la guerra con los Estados Unidos, se Labia acordado adem^s emitir por Real Decreto de 31 de Mayo de este ano, deuda perpetua interior al 4 per cent por valor de mil millones de pesetas de las cuales fueron inmediatamente negociadas 800,785,000. Despues de estos datos, es de suponer que la Comision Americana no Labra de insistir en la afirma- cion tan sin fundamento aventurada en su Memorandum, por compren- der que los gastos de la guerra con los Estados Unidos nadatienen que ver con la deuda Lipotecaria colonial de Cuba. Una vez mas la Comision Americana es])one en su iiltimo Memoran- dum la extrana teoria de que las culonias Espauolas no tienen obliga- cion de pagar la deuda contraida por la Metropoli para sofocar la rebelion de pocos 6 mucLos de sus Labitantes. Pero esta vez llegau Lasta el pun to de poner tan singular teoria al amparo del sentido coniiin, afirmando que la contraria es una amenaza para la libertad y la civilizacion. AL! si los colonos y los ciudadanos de la Gran Repiiblica hubiesen alegado para justificar una rebeldia, 6 en lo futuro alegasen en caso igual de que aquel i)oderoso Estado no est4 ciertamente exento, una teoria semejante, ^ la Lubiera admitido y la admitira el Gobierno Ameri- cano? Lo que no el sentido comun, sino el sentido moral reprueba, es que se iutente poner toda rebelion contra los poderes legitimos al amparo de la libertad y de la civilizacion. ^ Era 6 no Espana soberana legitima de Cuba cuando surgiola primera insurreccion y durante toda la seguuda? i Se La atrevido nadie a negar ni a poner en duda siquiera, la soberania de Espana sobre aquella isla en el tiempo 4 que nos esta- mos refiriendo? ^ No fueron los mismos Estados Unidos y su Gobierno los que un dia y otro dia le reclamaron que la sofocase, sin excluir el medio de las armas, restableciendo lo mas pronto posible la paz en su colonia? Pues accediendo Espaiia a estas instancias j quidn, inclusolos Estados Unidos, puede negar la legitimidad de los gastos que Lizo al Batisfacerlas ? 156 TREATY OF PEACE. Teoria semejante J[ue, por los respetos que la Comision espaSola viene guardando v tiene el deber de guardar, no califica coino seguramente la calificarian "todos los poderes constituidos de la tierra, uo puede soste- uerse 4 la faz de los hombres, sino partieiulo del supuesto de que el poder metropolitano era ilegitimo y su soberauia una arbitrariedad del des- potismo. ^Y coucreta y cefiidameute se calilica asi ^ la Corona de Espana por su dominacion en Cuba liasta la celebracion del Protocolo de VVasbiiigtou? ^ Puede, sobre todo, calirtcarla asi el Estado que, sin cesar, ha solicitado la accion de esa soberania para dominar a los que coiitia ella se habian levantado en la isla con las annas en la mano? Pasaremos 4 otro asunto, ya que este es muy delicado para tratarlo con calma y serenidad en una discusion diplomatica en que se intenta con trover tirlo. En el Memorandum ;1 que estamos contestando, se asienta la singular afirmacion de que la bipoteca constituida eii las dos sobredicbas emi- siones, puede llaniarse mas i)ropiamente una garantia subsidiaria y que quien est^ principalmente obligada al pago es la nacion espanola. Sin duda laComisi(3n Americana, al bacer tal afirmacion, no tenia a la vista el articulo 2° del Keal Decreto de 10 de Marzo de 1880, acordando la einision de 1,240.000 billetes bi])Oteearios de la Isla de Cuba, ni el par- rafo tambien seguiido del articulo igualmente segundo del Keal Decreto de 27 de Setiembre de 1>00, acordando la emision de 1,750,000 billetes hipotecarios tambien de la misnia isla. Los dos diceu literalmente lo mismo, y bastard por lo tanto que trauscribamos uno de ellos. Dice asi: "Los nuevos billetes tendran la garantia especial de las rentas de Aduanas, sello y timbre de la Isla de Cuba, la de las contribucioHes directas e indirectas que alii existan 6 puedan establecerse en lo suce- sivo, y la general de la jSTacion Espaiiola. Estaran exentos de todo Impuesto ordiuario y extraordinario, etc." Tampoco ha debido ver la Comision Americana ninguno de los titulos emitidos de estas deudas, que se hallan i)or tod as partes esparcidos incluso en Cuba y en las manos de terceros y i)articulares duenos; si los bubiera visto, habria leido en ellos lo siguiente: '•^ Gar ant in especial do, las rentas de Aduaiias, sello y timbre de la Isla de Cuba, la de las con- tribuciones directas e indirectas que alii existan 6 puedan establecerse en lo sucesivo y la (jeneral de la Nacion Espanola." " El Banco hispano- colonial percibira por medio de sus delegados en la Isla de Cube 6 recibir4 en Barcelona por conducto del Banco Espafiol de la Habana, el producto de las Aduanas de la misma, reteniendose anticipada y dia- riamente lo necesario, segun la tabla al dorso, para aplicarlo en cada trimestre al pago de Intereses y amortizacion." Si despues de esto la Comision Americana continua eutendiendo que esta deuda no se emitio como hipotecariay que la bipoteca no consistio en las rentas de las Aduanas de Cuba y sus demas impuestos; y que estas rentas no fueron las que se sefialaron principalmente y en primer lugar, y por lo tanto antes que el Tesoro de la Peninsula para el pago de los intereses y amortizacion de esta deuda, nada mds tenemos quo decir. No sabemos deniostrar la evidencia. Por lo que hace a los tenedores de estos titulos y a la severidad que entendemos es injustiflcada, con que aquellos son tratados en el INIemo- randum Americano, no es Espaiia la que tiene el deber de defenderlos. Cuando 4 su notioia llegue el juicio que sobre ellos se emite, esdesupo- ner que por si niismos se defenderan, porque desjjues de todo, no nece- sitan hacer grandes esluerzos para demostrar la justicia de su causa. Por lo que a Esi)afia toca, y con esto su Comision precede dcontestar categoricamente 4 las preguntas que se formulan en el Memorandum TREATY OF PEACE. 157 Americano, le basta defender la legitimidad de sus actos y el perfecto derecho con que creo aquella deuda y establecio su bipoteca; y por con- signiente, el estricto que tiene para no pagar los intereses y amortiza- ciou dela raisnia, sino cuando se le i)ruebe la insuficiencia de las rentas bipotecadas con que aqnellos deben ser primeramente satisfecbos. Si los que tales rentas tengan en su poder, quieren 6 no cumplir la obligacion sobre ellas constituida, es cosa que quedara bajo su respon- sabilidad puesto que Espaiia no tiene medios de bacerles cumplir esta obligacion, ni por otra parte tiene «lla para con los acreedores mas deberes que los que bonradamente ba venido basta abora cumpliendo. Pero Espaba, vuelve a decirlo su Comision (y es lo unico que textual- mente ba dicbo en su documento anterior aunque en otro sentido apa- rezca en el Memorandum Americano) no puede prestarse en esteTrntado con los Estados Unidos, ni en otro alguuo con cualquier Potencia 4 bacer ni declarar en su propio nombre, nada que manitieste 6 siquiera implique que ella misma pone en duda y mucbo menos desconoce, ni aim voluntariamente iiierma por lo que -A ella toca, los derecbos bipotecarios de los tenedores de aquellas deudas. No tiene medios efica(;es para que los que bayau de ser tenedores de las bipotecas, respeten tales derecbos. Por esto no los emplea si los tuviese, ya que no por estricta justicia a lo meuos por un deber moral, los emplearia, ajustiindose asi 4 los sen- timientos de la probidad piiblica y privada. Creen, pues, los Comisarios Espanoles baber contestado bien categori- camente a las preguntas que sobre este particular se les dirigen eu el Memorandum Americano, y despues de esto pasan a ocuparse del princi- pal punto tratado en aquel Memorandum y que se refiere a la soberania del Arcbijuelago filipino. Segun el Memorandum Americano se funda la cesion del Arcbipielago que se pide a Espana, no en que tal cesion se baya convenido en el articulo 3" del Protocolo, como se con vino en el 2° la de la Isla de Puerto Kico, sino en que. segun aquella Comision, entre los asuntos relativos a las Islas Filipinas que en el articulo sobredicbo se dejaron a la libre resolucion de la Conferencia de Paris, esta el que tiene por objecto la cesion por Espafia de la soberania en aquellas islas 4 los Estados Unidos de America. La Comision espanola sostiene que lejos de baberse encomendado tan grave asnnto a la Conferencia de Paris, asunto que siu duda seria mas importante que todos los que esta Uamada a discutir. el articulo 3" del Protocolo descansa sobre el supuesto de que la soberania del Arcbi- pielago habia de continuar siendo de Espana. La Comision Americana busca el fundamento de su tesis en la iuter- pretacion de las frases de la citada clausula 3", y ademas en las nego- ciaciones que la prepararon y terminarou con su acei)taci6n. Examinaremos con fria serenidad los razonamientos de esta tcsis. Dice la Comision Americana que es un principio de derecbo que '■'■ cuando el resultado de negociaciones se ba comprendidoen un escrito cerrado, los terminos de este acuerdo deben definir los derecbos de las partes." La Comision Espanola admite esta regla de la interpretacion de los Tratados, si tiene couio fundamento iiulispensable, el de que los terminos del acuerdo sean claros y precisos y de indudable y fijo sentido, porque, en tal caso, debe entenderse que las diferencias que durante las nego- ciaciones bubiera babido, entre los Estados contratantes, quedaron resueltas por el acuerdo claro, i)reciso, y de tijo sentido en que convini- eron. Mas ^es este el caso sobre que discuten al presente ambas Comisiones? Antes de contestar 4 esta jtregunta, entiende la Comision l-^spafiola, 158 TREATY OF PEACE. que es bueno transcribir, una vez m^s, el texto del Articulo 3° del Pro- tocolo, literal y fielmente traducido del ori^nal frauces. Dice asi : " Los Estados Unidos ocuparaii la Ciudad, puerto y baliia de Manila en espera de la conclusion de un Tratado de paz que debera deterniinar la inter- vencion (controle) la disposicion y el Gobierno de las Filipinas". Nosabe laComisionEspafiolasi la Americana ignora que, al recibirse por el Gobierno de Madrid el despaclio del Sefior Secretario de Estado de Washington, en feclia 3° de Julio, comunicandole lastres condicioiies con cuya aceptacion por Espana, estaban los Estados Unidos dispnestos a liacer la paz, y la tercera de las cuales era la que, sin la menor altera- ciou se transcribio despues en el Protocolo, formando su clausula 3% dirigio un despaclio telegrafico al Seiior Embajador de Francia en Wash- ington Mr. Cambon el l^de Agosto en el que, sobre este punto le decia literalmente lo siguiente : " El tercer punto en que se deterinina la forma de disponer de las Islas Filipinas, parece lalto de precision 4 este Gobi- erno. Ha suplido (este Gobierno se entiende) las deftciencias que en el se advierten, suponiendo que no hay cnestion respecto de la soberania pernianente de Espana en aquel Arcliipielago y que la ocupacion tem- poral de Manila, su puerto y su bahia, por el Gobierno federal, sola- mente ha de durar el espacio necesario i)ara un acuerdo entre ambos paises, sobre reformas administrativas." Tenemos a disposicion de la Comision Americana este despacho por si quisiera leerlo y estudiarlo por si misma. Mr. Cambon, recibido que hubo este docuraento, tuvo con el Seiior Presidente de la Eepublica Americana una conferencia, el dia 3, y que, respecto al particular de que la Comision Es])anola se ocupa en este momeuto, aparcce referida en el despacho de dicho Senor Embajador de 4 de Agosto, en los t -rminos siguientes: "Aproveche esta declara- ci on para rogar al Presidente que tii\iera la bondad de precisar sus intenciones en lo que posible se rehere a Fili|iiiias. En este ])nnto, le dije, esta la contestacion del Gobierno Federal redactada en terminos que i)ueden prestarse 4 todas las pretensiones de parte de los Estados LJnidos, y por consiguiente, a todos los temores de Espana, respecto de su soberania" El Presidente le coutesto como luego se dir4. Mas el Gobierno Espaflol, 4 jiesar de las palabras de slquel Alto Magistrado insistio, en su despacho de 7 de Agosto, en las dudas que le ofrecia el sentido de la clausula 3^. Imitil insistencia. El Gobierno Americano, ni entouces, ni antes, ni despues, se presto a manifestar concretamente su pensamiento envnelto en las frases de controle, disposiciiui y go- bierno de Filipinas, de que se habia de ocupar la Conferencia de Paris. Ahora es cuando por primera vez entra en esta explicacion. En el Memorandum 4 que esta contestando la Comision Esiianola, es donde la consigna la Americana. Dice: " Ciertamente la palabra control (en ingles) no fue aqui aplicada en el sentido de register (investigacion 6 inspecci6n)sino en su sentido m^sampliodeautoridad 6 mando * * * l que palabra podia ser mas amplia que disposicion, que practicamente tieiie la misma signiflcacion en frances y en ingles? * * * tenemos portantoen estas dos palabras "la autoridad sobre", "dominiode", linal y definitiva explicacion de la materia en cuestion." ^ Que es gobierno sino el derecho de admin istracion 6 de ejercer soberania, la direccion, el manejo politico de un Estado? Ciialquiera de estos terminos im|)lica la facultad 6 poder de intervenir con soberania. Juntos tienen el mas amplio alcance, para tratar de todos los poderes, gubernameutal, territorial 6 administrativo." La explicacion, si no parece oportuna por lo tardia, tampoco parece satisfactoria, Desde luego se ocurre que si con el proposito de que tal TREATY OF PEACE. 159 cosa significasen aqiiellas palabras, se empeiio el Gobierno Americano en sostenerlas, aunque sin explicarlas, ti pesar de las diversas veces en que asi se le pidio ^„porqiie razon no tuvo entonces la franque^fa que ostenta ahora su Coniision "i ^ porque en vez de decir que la conferencia de Paris Labia de deterniinar la intervencion, la disposicion y gobierno de las Islas Filipiiias, no dijo que dicha conferencia liabia de resolver sobre su soberania, acordando 6 no, su cesion 4 los Estados Unidos, coino abora la reclaman sus Comisionados fund^ndose en que en aquellas liases esta tambicn conteuida esta cesion? ^iSTo bubiera sido esto mas breve, mas explicito y de mayor franqueza? Pero ^es admisible la interpretacion que abora fiiera de sazon pre- tenden dar aquellos 4 las sobredicbas f rases? Dicen que la j^alabra control (controle en frances) no puede tomarse en el sentido de register (invest igacion 6 inspeccion) sinoeueldeautoridadomando. Y ^porcjue ? l*orqu6 este es el sentido mas amplio que tal palabra tiene en inqles. Mas presciuden de tijar su atencion en que el Protocolo fue recbictado tainbien en frances, cnyo ejemplar tirmo como oficial el Senor Secret ario de Estado de Wasbington. Y que dicba palabra, en frances, no sign i Qca semejante cosa sino investigacionoinspeccion, quetanibien signiticaeu ingles y ;c6ino ])ue(len dejar de recouocer los Cumisarios Americanos que cuando uu Tratado se ha redactado oficialmente en dos 6 mds idiojiias (\, sus palabras no se puede dar otro sentido que el que sea comiin a todos ellos? Sostienen asimismo que la palabra disposicion significa enajencion. No lo negamos por mas que cuando se emplea en este sentido, es para aplicarla a las relaciones juridicas de la vida civil y privada, pues en fianc's la significacion mas comiin y frecuente de tal palabra es la de "distribncion segiin un orden cierto y determinado." Afirman que la palabra gobierno significa el dereclio de administrar 6 de ejercer soberania, y aunque tal sentido puede admitirse, tampoco puede recbazarse el de la "manera de gobernar" 6 la "forma que tal gobierno ba de tener." Mas sea uno ii otro el sentido en que aquellas tres palabras fueron erapleadas en la clausula 3% si no bubiera en las negociaciones datos suficientes para fljar eiitre tan diversos sentidos aquel en que se emplearon, es imposible que se desconozca como se acaba de demon strar, que por lo meuos no tietien en si mismas y por si solas tales palabras un sentido claro preciso y que no ijueda ofrecer niotivo a aiubigiledades y dudas. Asi lo demostraron y;i entonces los becbos. El Gobierno Espaiiol y su representante en Wasbington, precisamente porcjue no tenfan esa claridad, reclamaron aunque inutilmente explica- ciones, y ^^quien se empefio con verdadera tenacidad en sostener tan oscuras (rases? No se negarii que ba sido el Gobierno de Washington. Pues sirvanse leer los Senores Comisionados lo que sobre la interi)reta- cion de frases semejantes, dice el inmortal Vattel,una de las mas grandes autoridades en cuanto se refiere a las relaciones internacionales de los pueblos, en su Dcrecho de Gentes, tomo 3", pagina 197. "La duda debe resolverse contra aquel que ba dado la ley en el Tratado, porque es ^1, en alguna manera quien la ba dictado, y falta suya es si no se ba expre>^ado mas claramente; y entendiendo 6 restrigiendo la significa- cion de los terminos en el sentido que le es menos favorable, no se le hace ningun agravio 6 no se le bace mas que aquel a que ba querido exponerse. Mas con una interpretacion contraria se correria el riesgo de convertir terminos vagos 6 ambiguos en lazos para el mas debil con- tratante que ba sido obligado a recibir lo que el mas fuerte ba dictado." 160 TREATY OF PEACE. Acaba de indicar la Comision Espanola que en las negociaciones hay datos sndcientes para fijar el verdadero sentido de aquellas tres bien Diemorables palabras Lo mismo por six parte afirma la Comision Americana. Veamos cual de los dos contradictorios sentidos entieuden ambas Comisiones que es el que debe preferirse. Eu el Memorandum Americano se asieuta como base de todo el razo- namiento, segun ya se ba dicho, que en la clausula 3' del Protocolo, se dejo a la libre resolucion de la Conferencia de Paris que habia de elabo- rar el Tratado de Paz el punto relativo a la soberauia del Arcbipielago Filipino. Pues bien, i ha tenido la Comision Americana en cuenta cuaudo bacia tan graves afirmaciones, que el Senor Secretario de Estado de Washington, en su despacho de 30 de Julio, en que comunico al Gobierno Espanol las tres c()ndiciones, que el de los Estados Unidos le imponiapara la paz y en que la tereera, como queda dicho, estada redactada con las mismas palabras con que se lee en el Protocol©, establecia tambien el nombramiento de los Comisarios que habian de redactar el Tratado de paz y tijaba y circunscribia sus facultades para este objeto? En dicho despacho se lee el parrafo siguiente: "si las condiciones ofrecidas aqui >son aceptadas en su iutegridad, los Estados Unidos nombraran Comisarios que se encoutraran con los igualmeute antorizados por Espana con el objeto de arreglar los detalles del Tratado de Paz y de hrmarlo en las condiciones arriba indicadas." j Entiende la Comision Americana que es un detalle en este Tratado de Paz la inesperada cession que reclaman a Espana de un inmenso territorio que tiene mas de 300,0(H) kilometros cuadrados de superticie y que cuenta con mas de 9,0U0,(JU0 de babitantes? ^Entiende que es un detalle l-d, adquisicion de un Arcbipielago que para nadie es un secreto que esta llamado & ser i^roximamente un factor importante para la paz del niundo? Pero acndamos 4 los precedentes, como hace la Comision Americana, en busca de ese sentido tan ambiguo. Eetiere aquella el principio de las negociaciones. Estamos conformes con su relate hasta que llega a la narracion de la primera Conferencia de Mr Cambon con el Senor Presidente de los Estados Unidos: se retiere en el .Memorandum que, en tal conferencia el Presidente dijo resi)ecto a Filipinas que la nota, (la citada del oO de Julio) expresaba los propo- sitos de su Gobierno y la disi)osici6n final de aquellas depeuderia del Tratado que debia negociarse i)()r los Comisionados. que despues de una iiosterior discusion en (jue el Presidente leitero que el Tratado habi'a de ii'^t? was the only one which was not as yet finally settled in his mind.' After narrating his insistence with respect to the phrases which are already embodied in this memorandum, Mr, Cambon continues: "Mr, McKinley answered me: 'I do not want any misunderstanding to remain on this subject; the negotiators of the two countries shall be the ones to be called upon to decide what are to be [note this] the permanent advan- tages we shall ask for in the aichii)elago, and, finally, those to decide the intervention {controle), disposition and government of the Philip- pine Islands. And', he added, 'the Government of Madrid can rest assured that up to the present nothing against Spain has been settled a priori in my own mind, a? I myself consider that nothing is decided against the United States', " (Verbatim,) Compare one narration wifh the other. That of the American memo- randum confined itself to the statement that the President had said that the disposition of the Philip])ine Islands should depend upon the treaty, and that he could not make any change in the words. But it omits the second and most important part of Mr. Cambon's conversa 184 TREATY OF PEACE. tion as narrated by him, although it contains information capable of removing all doabt iu regard to this question. It is to be noticed, in the first place, that while the word sovereignty used in connection with the 1 hilippine Islands is carefully avoided, both in this answer and in the former one and in the notes of the American Government, the same pains are taken by the Spanish Government and by its representative in Washington to use the very same words and unceasingly repeat that the Spanish sovereignty was not under discussion. Let this remark be united to the others already made in regard to the persistent and clear although implied refusal to explain the meaning of the words above mentioned. But in spite of all this, the President said, and the American Com- mission does not categorically deny it in its memorandum, that the Paris conference should be the only one called upon to decide as to the permanent advantages to be asked by the United States in the Philip- pine Archipelago, and as to the control, disposition and government of the islands. The memorandum says that the President did not confine himself to speaking of permanent advantages. It is true that the Spanish Com- mission has not said, nor does it say now, that he confined himself to that point, for he added what has just been referred to. But what has this to do with ignoring the meaning of the words of the President? If his mind, already fully made up at that time, was to ask of the con- ference not merely one but several permanent advantages to be enjoyed by the United States in the archipelago, it is self evident that he did not think of asking for the sovereignty. Could the latter ever be con- sidered as a permanent advantage of the United States in those islands? And even though so singular a hypothesis were upheld, how could the plural number used by the President of the United States be properly explained? To this observation already made in the preceding paper of the Spanish Commission no answer has been given in the American memorandum, and the reason is that none can be given which can harmonize with the purposes it is there attempted to uphold. We cannot occupy ourselves with the indications made in the memo- randum about the different languages spoken by both interlocutors in the aforesaid conferences. Such a circumstance cannot impart any probability to the supposition that the President did not express, not an incidental idea, but the important and capital statements which Mr. Cambon asserts he heard. If Mr. Cambon did not understand what the President said, although, as stated in the Memorandum, he had at his side his own Secretary who understands and speaks the English language, nevertheless he cannot be supposed to have attributed to him, without deliberately violating truth, such positive language as that recorded in his despatch. Let us pass now to the note of the Spanish Government of August?. The American Commission concurs with the Spanish that in said note the Government of Madrid, upon stating that it accepted Article III, reserved a priori its sovereignty over the Philippine Archipelago; there- fore we deem it unnecessary again to transcribe its contents verbatim. The only difference existing between the two Commissions lies in that while the Spanish Commission asserts, and reiterates this assertion, that in the note of its Government, on referring to the sovereignty therein reserved for Spain, the adjective "entire" or "whole" was employed, the American Commission says that there is no such adjec- tive in the English translation of the note which Mr. Cambon delivered to the Government of Washington. We have the copy, not the trans- TREATY OF PEACE. 185 lation, as it is called in the American memorauduni, of the original note of the Spanish Government, Avhich we place at the disposal of the American Commission. Therein appears the adjective. If when the translation thereof into English was made in Washington it was omit- ted, it is a matter with which the American Commission is acquainted, as it has seen such translation ; but the Spanish Commission, who never hail knowledge of it, cannot but be ignorant of it. Tbe diflerence is of no importance whatever, since, leaving the said adjective out of the question, the truth is, and the American Commission acknowledges it, that the Spanish Government reserved therein a priori its sovereignty- over the Philippines, and that it only accepted Article III with this reservation. And if the Spanish Government did not change its mind afterwards— and this in fact is not asserted, nor would such an asser- tion be possible, in the American memorandum— the result must always be that the Protocol and its 3rd Article do not in good law bind the Spanish Government save with the express reservation it made on accei)ting it, and which it did not subsequently withdraw. But in the American memorandum, doubtless recognizing the incon- trovertible force of the consequence which grew out of the Protocol having been signed without the Government of Washington, once apprised of such reservation, making any objection thereto, it is stated that the President of the Union as well as his Secretary of State, on hearing the said note read, remarked that it was vague and indefinite, purporting to accept the terms of that of the United States, while it required some modification, and, as regards tlie Phihppines, while in one paragraph it stated the acceptance of the article, in another it seemed to retain the full right of sovereignty. The argument is skill- ful, but unfortunately its accuracy is not as apparent as its skillfulness. It is true that tlie said gentlemen showed their dissatisfaction upon the note being read to them. What is apparently inaccurate, judging from what Mr. Cambon then said, is that the cause of the dissatisfaction was what was said, not vagitely and indefinitely^ hut clearly and explicitly, in the note as to the reservation which Spain made of her sovereignty over the archipelago. The very American memorandum transcribed the paragraph in interest of the note, and therein this reservation appears, not vague and uncertain, but express, clear and explicit. The cause for his dissatisfaction at the time given by the President was a very different one, which Mr. Cambon refers to in the following paragraph from his despatch of August 10. Here it is: "Duke: Again has it been at the White House, in the presence of Mr. McKinley, and at his express request, that I have communicated to the Secretary of State the telegram (the note aforesaid) of August 7, in which Your Excellency declares that the Government of Spain accepts the conditions imposed by the United States. This reading visibly displeased the President of the Republic and the Secretary of State. Alter a long silence Mr. McKinley said to me: 'J had aslced of Sjyain the cession, and consequently the immediate evacuation [we have been unable to ascertain when this immediate evacuation was requested] of th e Is Ian ds of Cuba an d Porto Rico. Instea d of the categorica I accept- ance I expected, the Spatiish Government addresses me a note in tchich it involves tlie necessity of obtaining the approval of the Cortes. I eannot lend myself to going into these considerations of an internal nature? I observed that' the Government of Her Majesty in complying with its constitutional duties did no more than follow the President upon whom like obligations are imposed, and that in his reply of July 30 he had expressly reserved the ratification by the Federal Senate." (This is the fact; and so it appears fiom said despatch of July 30.) 186 TREATY OF PEACE. Neither the President nor bis Secretary of State advanced any reason for their displeasure other than the foregoing, and, according to Mr. Cambon, these gentlemen said nothing during the conversation resj)ect- ing the said reservation made by Spain of her sovereignty over the archipelago, nor regarding anything else whatever save the reservation of the Spanish Government as to the approval of the Cortes. Thus the President ended by answering Mr. Cambon, who questioned him as to the pledges of sincerity Spain might give, as follows: "There might be a means of putting an end to all misunderstanding; we might draw up a projet which shall reproduce the conditions proposed to Spain in the same terms in which I have already framed them, [up to this time this was in effect all that had been agreed upon] and ivhich shall estah- lish the terms ivithin tvhich there shall be named on the one hand the Pleni- potentiaries charged icith negotiating the treaty of peace in Paris, and on the other the special Gon\missioners entrusted with the determining of the details for the evacuation of Cuba and Porto Rico.'''' (The incorporation of this was overlooked in the note of July 30, and this alone would have been sufficient to explain the change in the framing of the condi- tions of peace.) See, then, if there is not an immense difference between what is stated in the American memorandum and what Mr. Cambon said to the Span- ish Government in his note of August 10, or, immediately after having been present at so important a conference, and when, consequently, what occurred thereat was fresh in his mind. Doing justice to the abso- lute truthfulness of the American Commissioners, their account of that conference, three months after it was held, cannot be preferred by the Spanish Commissioners to that of Hon. Mr. Cambon, who gave his immediately after the happening of the event, which he so minutely recounted in his despatch. It is denied in the American memorandum that the Secretary of State of Washington stated in his note of August 10 to Mr. Cambon, as the Spanish Commission had asserted, that the note of the Government of Madrid (that of August 7) contained in its spirit an acceptance by Spain of the conditions imposed by the United States, and in this connection the said note is inserted literally. The Spanish Commission corrects its former assertion, accommoda- ting it to the above. But it is due to it to say that on making the asser- tion it referred to the note of Mr. Cambon of August 11, which begins with the paragraph following: Duke: Upon transmitting to me the draft of the Protocol, the text of which I have ^yirecl Your Excellency, the Secretary of State addressed me a note which may be epitomized as follows: Although the note delivered yesterday at the White House conveys in its spirit an acceptance by Spain of the' conditions proposed by the United States, in its form it does not so specify with sufficient explicitness, owing doubtless to its having to be translated and put in cipher several times. These words, which may well be explained without detracting from the unquestioned veracity of the Hon. Mr. Cambon, led, as they could not but do, the Spanish Commissioners into error. They nobly comply with the duty of so admitting. But after all the difference is unimportant. The Secretary of State (and this certainly does appear from his own letter) raised no objection to the Spanish note of August 7, other than that it was not entirely explicit, undoubtedly due to the various transformations which it had undergone. But the fact is that the Secretary of State could not pos- sibly have directed his objection to tlie paiagraph of said note, perfectly well translated into English (save the adjective "entire"), which is TREATY OF PEACE. 187 copied in the American memorandum, and which it is said was read to the President of the American Union and his Secretary of State, wherein the Spanish Government clearlj^, explicitly and conclusively reserves a priori its sovereignty over the Philippines. All the remain- ing contents of the note may be little explicit, if it is wished so to assert, but that reservation was not, surely. Therefore the note to which we refer does not contradict the statement we are supporting, that the said reservation, of which the Government of Washington was opportunely apprised and which appears so clearly in the English translation in its possession, was not by it contradicted, nor did it serve as a reason for employing the new form of Protocol as a means of solemnizing the agreement npon the bases of peace. This reason clearly stands out in the documents already examined which said nego- tiations embody. In view of the foregoing, it seems to us that whatever may have been the. real intentions of the Government of Washington, its acts and its written and spoken words do not suffice to overcome the assertion we make that Spain accepted the 3rd article of the Protocol in the sense communicated to that Government, and not contradicted by it, that its sovereignty over the Philippines was preserved* (reserved) a priori, since their control, disposition and government, which were to be deter- mined by the Paris conference, referred only to their internal regime. And this, of itself, would be sufficient to maintain without fear of suc- cessful contradiction that this conference cannot consider, nor has it the power to consider, the cession asked by the United States, even though in the hypothesis to our mind impossible that the proof, drawn Irom the very words of the President of the Union, which we have attempted to furnish and we think we have furnished that in his own mind at that time the said sovereignty was beyond all subsequent discussion, should be destroyed. What is the Spanish Commission to say with respect to the words it reads in the American memorandum which seem to seek in a war indemnity a ground for their present request; as though this were not excluded from discussion, and it had not been acknowledged by the very American Commission that it had been agreed to cover this indemnity for the expenses of the war, and not only these but also the claims of Ameiican citizens, the majority of which, if not all, natives of Cuba, although apparently later naturalized in the United States, who had suffered injuries in the last insurrection, by the cession of Porto Rico, the other West Indies, and the Island of Guam in the Mariana? Or, is this indemnity to be an open account in which it shall be proper to ask all that remains to Spain, including the Peninsula itself? Certainly the limiting of the indemnity to the Island of Guam in the East is another indication which proves that the United States did not think at the time of the Philippine Islands. If they did, is it conceiv- able that they would then claim, at the outset, a small and insignificant island and fail to claim the immense Philippine Empire which was so near to it? Be it acknowledged, then, that the demand or request for the Philip- pine Archipelago which is made for the United States in the form and *Tlie Spanish text here is "o priori quedaba d salvo la soberani'a",— iu English "the sovereignty was a priori or from the beginning left iu safety, or preserved, or conserved."' ' In'the foregoing page the Spanish text instead of "cxuedaba 6. salvo" reads reserva. [Note of translator.] 188 TEEATY OF PEACE. under tbe conditions set forth in tlie American proposition, lacks foundations. While this cession is claimed in such form and under such conditions, the Spanish Commission cannot but decline it. MEMOliANDUM IN SUPPORT OF THE LAST SPANISH PROPOSAL. It will be remembered that, in that proposal, the Spanish Commis- sioners asked that the American Commissioners should i)resent another adjusting tlie same to the stipulations of Articles III and VI of the Protocol, that is, expounding the form of intervention, disposition and government which should be established by Spain in the Philippines, the return of the city, bay and harbor of Manila, the release of its garri- son, now held as jirisoners, the refunding of the public moneys, revenues and imposts which might have been collected up to the time when the city might be delivered, and the undertaking or say the acknowledg- ment on the part of the United States of the obligation to indemnify Spain for the detention of the troo])S that garrisoned the city when it surrendered on the 14th of August last. The American Commission has rejected that proposal because in its judgment the aforesaid Articles III and VI of the Protocol do not demand that it be presented. With respect to the first part which refers to the intervention, dispo- sition and government of the archipelago, all attempt to demonstrate here that Article III is not in accordance with the American proposal which, instead of addressing itself to the internal regime of these islands, asks their cession to the United States, would be a mere repe- tition of the statements set forth by the Spanish Commission in the preceding part of this paper. It is believed that its arguments show with the clearness of noon-day that the cession of those islands which is in every respect foreign to the provisions in the Washington agreement is one thing, and that the internal regime of the said islands, which under the aforesaid Article III may and must be a matter for the treaty of peace, is another. The Spanish Commissioners would then be remiss in their own con- victions if they did not persist in requesting the American Commission to present a proposal concerning said regime in which the 3rd Article of the said agrement will remain unbroken, not only in its meaning but also in its intent. In the first paragraph of the proposal with especial reference to the capture of Manila the immediate return to Spain of the city, its bay and harbor is demanded. By way of rectifying here one of the misapprehensions of fact that abound in the American memorandum, we have to put it on record tliat the Spanish proposal did not demand that immediate return, nor the immediate execution of anything set forth in the following paragraphs of the proposition, which contain nothing to be instantly done. The immediate delivery was, as it could not otherwise be, to be effected upon the conclusion of the treaty of peace. So conclusive is the proof that the Spanish Commissioners were bound to suppose that they should never be called upon to make this rectification. The first paragraph of the aforesaid proposal reads as follows: "The Spanish Commissioners therefore in accordance with the express stipulations of the Protocol understand that the treaty of peace must provide for, first the delivery, etc." If this was to be agreed upon in the treaty of peace, how can it be supposed that the Spanish Commission should ask that the delivery be effected before it was agreed on? TREATY OF PEACE. 189 We shall now clear tills memorandum of difiSculties by making two rectifications of a personal character before taking uj) the discussion of the point bearing on the surrender and capitulation of Manila and their consequences. There is not in the Spanish memorandum to which the last American memorandum is a reply, a single sentence that assails or wounds the respectability of General Merritt and Admiral Dewey. The American memorandum would intimate that the idea is suggested with more or less ability in the Spanish memorandum tliat the military commanders of the Union conquered the city of Manila by the force of arms on the 13th of August when they already knew that the suspension of hostilities had been agreed on. This is an error. The Spanish Commission did not use, is not in the habit of using, cun- ning of any kind to conceal its sentiments. If it had believed that these generals had broken the armistice after receiving notice of its conclusion, it would have said so openly. By so doing it would not have been lacking in the regard which these commanders deserve, in the same way as it occurred to no one in 1871 that it was a lacking of the regard due to the German General de Manteuff'el to charge him with the offence which he committed when, after a partial armistice between the French and German forces had been signed, he availed himself of the mistake made by General Clinchant upon the extension of the said armistice, and surrendered the army corps under his com- mand and compelled it to take refuge in Switzerland. We have said nothing, we have nothing to say against the personal behavior of these two commanders. On the contrary we can state a fact that redounds to the credit of the hue sentiments of the Admiral. On the 1st of May, he sent to the Governor General of Manila from the Olympia, perhaps under the intoxicating influence of victory, a communication which read as follows: "If all the vessels, torpedo-boats and warships under the Spanish flag do not surrender immediately, Manila will be destroyed.'' We i)resume that this communication will have no place in the chap- ter of history in which are recorded the services rendered to the cause of humanity of which there is so much ostentation in these days. But we take pleasure in acknowledging that the author of this draconian order, refrained, in the spontaneousness of his kind feelings, from carry- ing it out, although he might have had the power to attempt it. This cannot prevent us from not carrying the favorable opinion to which the honorable commanders are personally entitled to the point of considering ourselves obliged to them for their deliberately i)ostpon- ing the surrender of the city until the I3th of August for the purpose of "protecting the city and the Spanish residents against the awful vengeance of the insurgents". This purpose does not seem compre- hensible; in the early days of May the insurgents were not yet besieg- ing from the land side the city, which was only blockaded from the bay by the American fleet. They began afterwards and not with the same numbers of forces from the outset, since these were increased little by little, until they made up the masses of insurgents who were in front of the trenches of defence on the day of the surrender. So that if the American commanders had not taken possession of the city until then for the reason above mentioned, they should much less have done so thereafter. But besides this, it is demonstrated by the fact that such a danger did not e-xist, for it could at all times have been avoided by the American forces which upon the surrender of Manila should have landed in and garrisoned the city, in the same way as it was avoided after the 14th of August, in spite of the fact that as above stated the 190 TREATY OF PEACE. itisurgents in irms who prevailed outside of the city were in larger numbers. It may thus be seen how it is no sin of in,0()0. The Spanish Government undertook to pay these bonds and the interest thereon out of the revenues of Cuba, but the national character of tiie debt was shown by the fact that, upon the face of the bonds, "the Spanish Nation" {la Nacion UspafioJa) guaranteed their payment. The annual charge for interest and sinking fund on account of this debt amounted to the sura of 39,191,000 pesetas, or $7,8o8,!i00, which wa^s disbursed through a Spanish financial institution, called the Banco Hispano- Colonial, which is said to have collected daily from the custom house at Havana, through an agency there established, the sum of $33,339 ". The Americau Commissioners then referred in the same paper to the authorization by the Spanish Government in 1890 of a new issue of bonds, apparently with a view to refund the prior debt as well as to cover any new debts contracted between 188(3 and 1890, and stated that, after the renewal of the struggle for independence in February, 1895, this issue was diverted from its original purpose to that of rais- ing funds for the suppression of the insurrection. The American Commissioners are at a loss to perceive how, in recit- ing these transactions, in which past and not future obligations were dealt with, they could have been understood to intimate that Spain, through what is described in the Spanisli memorandum as a "super- natural gift of divination," foresaw the insurrection of 1895 and the ultimate intervention of the United States. The American Commis- siouers will not indulge in the ready retort which this fanciful eQort at sarcasm invites. Whether the consequences of imposing upon Cuba burdens not to be borne, were or were not foreseen by Spain, is a ques- tion upon which it would be idle now to speculate. As to the special "Cuban War Emergency Loan," composed of "five per cent peseta bonds," which were referred to as part of what was con- sidered in Spain as properly constituting the Cuban debt, the Americau Commissioners expressly declared that it did not appear that in these bonds the revenues of Cuba were mentioned. The American Commissioners, in reviewing in their paper of the 14th of October the history of the so-called Cuban debt, necessarily invited the fnllest examination of their statements. They have yet to learn that those statements contained any error. They freely admit, however, that they had never seen it asserted, till they read the assertion in the Spanish memorandum, that the deficien- cies in the Cuban appropriation bills or budgets which the debts are said to represent were "due to the great reductions of taxes made in Cuba by the mother country." If, as they are now assured, this is a fact "well known," they are compelled to admifc that they were, and that they still remain, ignorant of it. Indeed, the American Commis- sioners were not aware that Cuban appropriation bills or budgets 200 TREATY OP PEACE. existed prior to 1880, in May of wliich year the first measure of the kind was submitted to the Spanish Cortes. During the discussion of that budget, a distinguished Senator, not a Cuban, who had been Min- ister of State in the S])anish Cabinet, SeEior Don Servando Ruiz Gomez, presented to the Senate an official statement of the Colonial Depart- ment, showing that the alleged debts of Cuba amounted to $120,834,- 410,25 in gold and $45,300,070 in paper, or, in round numbers, $140,000,000 in gold. It is true that after 1880, and especially after 1880, deficiencies appeared in the budgets, but a correct conception of their cause may be derived from the budget of 1880-1887, when the prior debts were consolidated. The amount of the burdens imposed upon Cuba by that budget, eight years, as the Spanish memorandum observes, "after the reestablisliment of peace," was $25,959,734.79, which was distributed as follows: General obligations $10,853,836.79 Departmeut of .Justice 863, 022. 22 Department of War 6, 730, 977. 17 Department of the Treasury 903, 326. 29 Departmeut of the Navy 1,434,211.40 Dt-partment of the Interior 3, 935, 6.58. 92 Department of Fomeuto. 1, 238, 702. 00 .$25, 959, 734. 79 Of the sum total of this burden, it is seen that the three items of General Obligations, War, and Navy, constitute nearly three-fourths. And what were the " General Obligations"? The principal item — nine-tenths of the whole— was that of $9,017,423.02, for interest, sink- ing fund, and incidental expenses, on the so-called Cuban debt. The rest went chiefly for pensions to Spanish officials. The budget for 1890-1S97 amounted to $28,583,132.23. These figures, which speak for themselves, seem to render peculiarly infelicitous the novel suggestion that the deficiencies in the Cuban budgets have been due to tlie reduction of taxes. As to that part of the Spanish memorandum in which the so-called Cuban bonds are treated as "mortgage bonds," and the rights of the holders as "mortgage rights," it is necessary to say only that the legal dilference between the pledge of revenues yet to be derived from taxa- tion and a mortgage of property cannot be confused by culling the two things by the same name. In this, as in another instance, the American Commissioners are able to refer to previous statements which, although the Spanish memorandum betrays no recollection of them, for obvious reasons remain unchallenged. The American Com- missionervS have shown, in their argument of the 27th of October, that the Spanish Government itself has not considered its pledge of the revenues of Cuba as in any proper legal sense a mortgage, but as a matter entirely within its control. In proof of this fact the American Commissioners quoted in that argument certain provisions of the decree of autonomy for Cuba and Porto llico, signed by the Queen liegent of Sixain on the 25th of November 1897, and countersigned by Senor Sagasta, as President of the Council of Ministers. By that decree it was declared that the manner of meeting the expenditures occasioned by the debt which burdened "the Cuban and Spanish treasury" should "form the subject of a law" wherein should be "determined the part payable by each of the treasuries, and the sjiecial means of paying the interest thereon, and of the amortization thereof, and, if necessary, ot paying the principal:" that, when the "apportionment" should have TREATY OF PEACE. 201 been "made by the Cortes," eacli of the treasuries should "mate pay- ment of the part assigned to it," and, finally, that ^^engagements con- tracted icith creditors under the pledge of the good faith of the Spanish nation shall in all cases he scrupnlously respected." In these dechirations the American Commissioners find, as^they stated in the argument above referred to, "a clear assertion not only of the power of the Government of Spain to deal with the so called Cuban debt as a national debt, but also a clear admission that the pledge of the revenues of Cuba was wholly within the control of that Government, and could be modified or witlidrawn by it at will without affecting the obligation of the debt," and, so long as the stipulated pay- ments upon the debt were made, without violating the engagements ot Spain with her creditors. No more in the opinion of the Spanish Government, therefore, than in point of law, can it be maintained that that Government's promise to devote to the payment of a certain pait of the national debt reve- nues yet to be raised by taxation in Cuba, constituted in any legal sense a mortgage. The so-called pledge of those revenues constituted, in fact and in law, a pledge of the good faith and ability of Spain to pay to a certain class of her creditors a certain part of her future reve- nues. They obtained no other .security, beyond the guarantee of the "Spanish ISTatiou," which was in reality the only thing that gave sub- stance or value to the pledge, or to which they could resort for its performance. One more remark, and the American Commissioners have done with the renewed discussion into which they regret to have been obliged to enter on the subject of the so-called Cuban debt. The Spanish Com- missioners are correct in saying that the Government of the United States repeatedly urged Spain to reestablish peace in Cuba, and did not exclude the use of arms for that purpose; but the impression con- veyed by this partial statement of facts is altogether erroneous, as is also the implied representation that Spain's course in the matter may be considered as a compliance with the demands of the United States. The Government of the United States did indeed repeatedly demand that order be reestablished in Cuba; but through long years of patient waiting it also tried and exhausted all the efforts of diplomacy to induce Spain to end the war by granting to the island either independence or a substantial measure of self-government. As early as the spring of 18G9, not long after the deepening gloom of the ten years' war began to settle upon the island, the United States offered its mediation and its credit for the reestablishment of peace between Spain and her colony. Spain then as afterwards preferred war to the relinquishment of her rule, and the United States did not assume to discuss the legiti- macy of the expenses incurred in the pursuit of that policy. But the question of Spain's right to incur those expenses, and that of her right or her power to fasten them as a perpetual burden upon the revenues of Cuba, after those revenues have ])assed beyond her control, are questions between which the American Commissioners feel neither diffi- culty nor hesitation in declaring and maintaining a fundamental difl'er- ence both in law and in morals. The American Commissioners, before passing to the principal subject before the conference, will briefly notice that i>artof the Spanish mem- orandum which treats of the occupation of JNlanila by the American forces. With the elaborate references to the apparent imi)lication in a pre- vious paper that General Merritt and Admiral Dewey might have 202 TREATY OF PEACE. knowingly violated tlie armistice in their capture of Manila a few lionrs after its signature, and with the new remarks aboiit Admiral Dewey's draconian order, the spoutaneousness of his kind feelings, and other and similar phrases, we do not occupy ourselves; nor with the objec- tions to our use of the word "fled" in describing the escape of the Spanish General before the surrender. We are entirely content on these points with the record. For the same reason we pass witliout comment the remark concerning the claim for indemnity "on similar grounds" in the Philippines that "on first sight this argument is not wanting in force; but the American Commissioners know perfectly well that this is only apparent, and that what did occur proves absolutely the contrary." We interpret this apparent charge of intentional deceit in the light of the valued assurance given in another part of the same paper by the Spanish Commissioners when they, themselves, admit that "no language or even a phrase improper to a dijdomatic discussion has been used by them" and "they avoid with the greatest care the use of any phrase which might be personally unpleasant." With regard to what is stated in the Spanish memorandum as to the occupation of territory as a guaranty in time of peace, and the limita- tions that are usually affixed to such occupation, the American Com- missioners have only to advert to the fact that, as has often been observed by the Spanish Government in its communications, the state of war between the United States and Spain is not yet ended. In its original demands, just as in the Protocol of August 12, the United States declared that it would "occupy and hold the city, bay and har- bor of Manila, pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace." These words imported a military occupation, with all its usual incidents, political and administrative, during the continuance of the state of war. The distinction between the occupation of territory as a guaranty in time of peace, and the military occupation of the enemy's territory in time of war, is well illustrated in the case of France and Germany in 1871, which the Spanish memorandum, unfortunately for its purpose, cites in support of its contention as to the nature of the American occupation of Manila under the Protocol. By a convention concluded on January 28, 1871, France and Germany agreed to a general armis- tice, which took effect immediately in Paris and three days later in the departments. Under this convention the belligerent armies were to preserve their respective positions, which were separated by a definite line of demarcation, and, simply in recognition of the nature of the occupation, each of the armies reserved the right " to maintain its authority in the territory that it occupies, and to employ such means as may be considered necessary for the purpose by its commanders." By a subsequent convention of February 15, 1871, the fortified town of Belfort, which was besieged by the Germans, but had not been taken when the armistice was made, was brought within the German lines of occupation. On February 20, 1871, the belligerent powers concluded a preliminary treaty of peace. By this treaty, which, unlike the conven- tion for an armistice, required the formal ratification of the two govern- ments, the sovereignty of France over Alsace-Lorraine was renounced, and provision made for the payment to Germany besides of a war indemnity. By an additional convention signed on tlie same day it was agreed that the German troops should "refrain for the future from raising contributions in money in the occupied territories," but, on the other hand, it was declared that the German authorities should "con- tinue to collect the state taxes" therein. . And it was provided by the preliminary treaty that not until the conclusion and ratification of the TREATY OF PEACE. 203 definitive treaty of peace should "the administration of the depart- ments" remaining "in German occupation" be "restored to the French authorities ", "The United States will occupy and hold," so reads the Protocol, "the city, bay and harbor of Manila, pendin<2^ the conclusion of a treaty of peace". These brief words obviously and necessarily imported the military occupation, in time of war, though not of active hostilities, of a designated territory, with the usual incidents of such occupation, and not an occupation as a guarantee in time of peace. JFrom the incidents of one kind of occupation nothing is to be inferred as to the incidents of the other, for the simple reason that the two things are different in their nature. The occupation by a belligerent army of a hostile territory is conceded to involve the exercise of a paramount power of control which would be utterly inconsistent with the rights of the titular sovereign over his territory and its inhabitants in time of peace. The American Commissioners have examined with special care that part of the Spanish memorandum which deals with the " control, dis- position and government of the Philippines", and to the consideration of that subject they will now address themselves. The American Commissioners are obliged at the outset to oall atten- tion to the fact that the present argument of the Spanish Commissioners contains the same defects as the previous one, in being directed against a position which the American Commissioners not only have never assumed, but which tliey expressly repudiate. The American Com- missioners now repeat that their proposal for the cession of the Philip- pines is neither based nor alleged to be based upon a specific concession of Spanish sovereignty in the Protocol, but upon the right secured to the United States by that instrument to make in the negotiations for peace such demands on the subject as it should then deem ap])ropriate under the circumstances. The only obligation therefore now resting upon the American Commissioners is to show not that their proposals in regard to the Philippines are founded on the Protocol, in the same sense as their demands in the case of Cuba, Porto Kico, and Guam, but that those proposals are embraced within the right thereby expressly secured to the United States to make demands in the future. In the light of this plain and simple proposition, which is sustained not only by the Protocol itself, but by every document referred to or quoted in the present discussion, how idle and unavailing is the char- acterization of the present demands of the United states as "tardy", as well as the insinuation that that Government in ])ostponing, with the express concurrence of Spain, the formulation of its demands, was guilty of a want of "frankness"! The American Commissioners are gratified to find in the passages quoted in the Spanish memorandum from Mr. Cambon's reports of his conferences with the President, the amplest confirmation of their posi- tion. Those reports, as quoted by the Spanish Commissioners, show that the Spanish Government, far from asking, in any proper sense of the word, "explanations" of the phrase "control, disposition and gov- ernment", fully understood its meaning, and sought but failed to obtain a limitation of it. Indeed, there is not to be found from first to last a suggestion that if the words "control, disposition and government" were allowed to stand they did not embrace the amplest right to deal with Spanish sovereignty in the islands. In this relation it is the duty of the American Commissioners to notice the fact that the Spanish memorandum, in comparing the reports of 204 TREATY OF PEACE. Mr. Cambon with tliose quoted by the American Commissioners, inti- mates that the former are entitled to preference because they were con- temporaneous. But the record quoted by the American Commissioners was also contemporaneous, and was made by the Secretary of State under the supervision of the President himself. With this observation, the American Commissioners will pursue their argument. In his report of the conversation of the 30th of July, Mr. Cambon is quoted as stating that "the President of the Kepublic was firm in not changing the terms of Article III", bat that, as the result of an appeal to his generosity, he consented to substitute the word "disposition" for "j)ossession." The American Commissioners have already stated that the President refused to change the word "possession" except for a word of equally extensive meaning, and that the reason for which Mr. Cambon was understood to desire the change was that the word "possession" would, when translated into Spanish, seem to be of a severe and threatening nature. The meaning of Mr. Cambon, as defined in his report to the Spanish Government, was that the word "disposition" did not "pre- judge" the result of the negotiations, and that it had not so "compre- hensive" a meaning as the word "possession." The American Commissioners are unable to concur in Mr. Cambon's estimate of the relative comprehensiveness of these two English words; but they are obliged to point ont, as a matter more material to the present discussion, that he does not, as the Spanish Commissioners affirm, allege that he "accepted the change because he understood that all question about the sovereignty of Spain over the Philippine Islands was thereby eliminated". On the contrary, his only claim is that the word "disposition" did not "prejudge" the "result" of the "negotia- tion". His understanding therefore appears to have been precisely the opposite of that ascribed to him in the S])anish memorandum. That this is the case is confirmed beyond all peradventure by the unsuccessful efforts subsequently made by Mr. Cambon, under instruc- tions of the Government at Madrid, to obtain a limitation of the Ameri- can demand, as it then and has ever since stood, that the treaty of peace should determine "the control, disposition and government of the Philippines". The telegram of the Spanish Government to Mr. Cambon, in relation to this demand, has now for the first time been disclosed to representa- tives of the Government of the United States. What other instruc- tions Mr. Cambon may then have had in his possession, it is not material to conjecture. But, according to his own report, as quoted in the Spanish memorandum, he requested the President, in the interview of the 3rd of August, "to have the kindness to state as precisely as pos- sible his intentions in regard to the Philippine Islands. On this point," continues Mr. Cambon, " I told him ' the answer of the Federal Government is couched in terms that may lend themselves to all claims on the part of the United States, and consequently to ail api)reheusions of Spain in regard to her sovereignty.' " Here is a clear declaration of Mr. Cambon that the phrase "control, disposition and government", admitted of "all claims" on the part of the United States", and that it created apprehensions on the part of Spain in regard to her "sovereignty"; and he asked, not for an "explanation" of the phrase, but for a statement by the President, as "precisely as possible", of his "intentions". In other words, Mr. Cambon, acting under the instructions of the Spanish Government, endeavored to obtain at that time a statement of the demands which TREATY OF PEACE. 205 the United States would make iu regard to the sovereignty of Spain, and thereby at least an implied limitation of the rights in that regard. The reply of the President, as reported by Mr. Cambon, shows that he was firm in his determination both to retain the precise words of the demand and the full liberty of action which they secured. On this sub- ject the President, as reported by Mr. Cambon, declared that ho did not want "any misunderstanding to remain": nothing was decided as against either Government; the negotiators of the treaty of peace must determine the matter. This is from first to last the sum and substance of Mr. Cambon's reports, as quoted iu the Spanish memorandum. The recurrence iu that memorandum to Mr. Cambon's apparently casual use of the words "permanent advantages", as an evidence that sovereignty was not in question, when he himself declares that the words "control, disposition aud government" lent themselves to "all claims" and therefore raised apprehension as to Spain's "sovereignty", discloses the infirmity of the contention in which the argument is employed. Indeed, the words "permanent advantages" are not in the context of Mr. Cambon invested with the importance which the Spanish memoraudam now ascribes to them. As the American Commissioners pointed out on a previous occasion, it is not pretended that Mr. Cainbon attempted to report the original words of the President, who spoke in English; and, immedi- ately after attributing to the President words which he translates by the terms "permanent advantages", Mr. Cambon narrates the Presi- dent's undoubted declaration that the "control, disposition and gov- ernment" of the Philippines must be determined iu the treaty of peace, in advance of which the case was not to be considered as decided against either Government. In his report of the interview of the 9th of August, Mr. Cambon, as quoted in the Spanish memorandum, states that, when the note of the Spanish Government of the 7th of that month, in rei)ly to the Amer- ican demands, was read, the President aud the Secretary of State were visibly displeased, and that, after a long silence, the President objected to that part of the reply which related to the evacuation of Cuba and Porto Rico. The Spanish memorandum declares that neither the Presi- dent nor the Secretary of State advanced any other reason than this for their displeasure, and that, "according to Mr. Cambon, these gentle- men said nothing during the conversation respecting the said reservation made by Spain of her sovereignty over the archipelago". As no direct assertion to this effect by Mr. Cambon is quoted, the American Com- missioners are obliged to assume that he made none, and that the state- ment in the Spanish memorandum is a mere inference from an omission to report what was said on the subject of the Philippines. This omission may be accounted for by the fact that Mr. Cambon, although he had previously declared that the American demand admitted of " all claims ' on the part of the United States, expressed and maintained the opin- ion that the Spanish reply fully accepted it, and therefore left nothmg in that regard to be conceded, while in respect of the demand for the evacuation of Cuba aud Porto Rico, which was to be immediate, the reservation by Spain of the approval of the Cortes, which was not then in session, presented an obstacle to an agreement. This objection he deemed it necessary to report, since it required, in his own opinion, a modification of Spain's reply to the American demands. But whatever may have been the cause of the omission, it is a fact that no small part of the "visible displeasure" of the President and the Secretary of State arose from the apparent design, upon which comment was duly 206 TREATY OF PEACE. made, in some way to limit the scope of the demand in reg^ard to the Philippines — a design then as ever afterwards frustrated. In the opinion of the American Commissioners the note in question was far from "explicit''; nor can it be maintained that the President, while hearing that note with " visible displeasure" and adhering with "real stubbornness "to the phrase "control, disposition and government", because it "prejudged" nothing, at the same time accepted the words of limitation. But what does Mr. Cambon say as to the introduction of the subject of the Protocol, which had not previously been suggested ? After further conversation the President, as reported by Mr. Gambon, said: "There might be a means of putting an end to all misunderstanding; we might draw up a projet, which shall reproduce the conditions proposed to Spain in the same terms in which I have already framed them, and tvhich shall establish the terms within which there shall be named on the one hand the Plenipotentiaries charged with negotiating the treaty of peace in Paris, and on the other hand the special Commissioners entrusted with the determination of the details of the evacuation of Cuba and Porto Kico." The American Commissioners are unable to perceive the "immense difference" between this version of the President's words and that given in their own paper. The President suggests a meaus for putting an end, not to any particular misunderstanding, but to "all misunder- standing." And how does he propose to do this? By drawing up a Protocol, which "shall reproduce the conditions proposed to Spain," not with qualifications, reservations or explanations, but "in the same terms in which I have already framed them." There was not, nor could there be, anj^ misapprehension as to the meaning and effect of these words, nor was any betrayed in the telegram, heretofore quoted by the American Commissioners, in which Mr. Cambon advised the Spanish Government that the Government of the United States had "decided to state precisely {preciser), in a Protocol, the bases upon which peace negotiations must, in its judgment, be entered upon." With this telegram Mr. Cambon communicated the text of the Pro- tocol; and if his telegraphic summary of the note of the Secretary of State of the 10th of August was, as the Spanish Commissioners admit, inaccurate, it is equally true that his previous telegram conveyed with no uncertainty the purpose of the United States in requiring the adop- tion of a Protocol. If the fact were less clear than it is, that the refusal of the President to accept the Spanish reply of the 7th of August as in any respect a satisfactory answer to the demands of the United States, gave rise to the Protocol, the American CommisvSioners would deem it proper to examine in detail the references to that note in the Spanish memoran- dum. But they will, under the circumstances, merely advert to the statement that Spain in the paragraph relating to the Philippines explicitly "reserved" her sovereignty over the archipelago, the impli- cation being that she expressly withdrew it from the sphere of negotia- tion. The language of the note is, however, that " the Spanish Gov- ernment must declare that, while accepting the third condition, they do not a ])riori renounce the sovereignty of Spain over the archipelago." This language, instead of withdrawing the sovereignty from discussion, implies that it may, as the result of the negotiations, be necessary to renounce it. The American contention, however, does not require fur- tlier analysis of the note of August 7 than has been given in this and the preceding memoranda of the American Commissioners. It was TKEATY OF PEACE. 207 rejected by the President, and the final agreement of tlie parties reduced to tlio clear and unequivocal terms of the Protocol. The Spanish Commissioners endeavor to argue that there could have been no intention to iuclude in the powers of this Joint Commission the (question of the sovereignty of the Philippines, because the Secretary of State of the United States, in his note of the 30th of July last, after stating the demands of his Government, added: "If the terms hereby ofi'ered are accepted in their entirety. Commissioners will be named by the United States to meet similarly authorized Commissioners on the part of Spain for the purpose of settling the details of the treaty of peace and signing and delivering it under the terms above indicated." Is the " unexpressed demand " of the United States, inquire the Spanish Commissioners, for the cession of an immense territory, understood by the American Commissioners to be a detail of the treaty of peace? The American Commissioners have no difficulty in replying that they do so understand it, but not in the sense which the question implies. It is evident that the Spanish memorandum seeks to construe the lan- guage of the Secretary of State as if he had used in connection with the word " details " the word "unimportant," and actually proposed to refer to the Commissioners the settlement of only " unimportant details." It should seem unnecessary to say, however, that in speaking of "details" he merely referred to the particulars of the treaty as consid- ered separately and in relation to the whole. It can hardly be sup- posed that if the two Governments had intended that the negotiations of the treaty of peace should be occupied with details of little impor- tance, they would each have sent five commissioners to a neutral capital for the purpose of arranging them. But it is argued by the Spanish Commissioners that the words "con- trol, disposition and government", even taken by themselves, do not comprehend the subject of sovereignty, but merely that of governmental "reforms". To the American Commissioners such an interpretation is incomprehensible. If nothing but "reforms" had been intended, it could never have occurred to either party to employ for that purpose three words none of which expressed its meaning, while each of them contained a broader one. On the other hand, the use of the word "sovereignty" in conjunction with the words actually employed was unnecessary, while, if used alone, it would have defeated the very object of postponing the whole subject of the Philippines for future determination. "Control, disposition and government" included every- thing. "Sovereignty" would have excluded everything but itself, and have left to future determination merely the question of its own exist- ence, supreme and unconditional. In the event of the United States desiring to take only a i)art of the archipelago, such a limitation of the scope of the negotiations would have been injurious to both parties. The Spanish Commissioners, however, have sought to restrict the meaning of the words "cont'ol, disposition and government," by an appeal to the French text, into which the original English was trans- lated; and as the French word '■'■ cotitr6le''\ by which "control" was translated, bears a sigiiiticance less extensive than the latter, they seem to contend that all the other words, both in the English and in the French text, should be reduced to harmony with it. To the American Commissioners, this argument appears to involve the elimination of the entire English text and of the greater part of the French. It first strikes out, as at least superfluous, the English words "disposition and government," and the French words '-'■ disposition et gouvernemenV\ and then limits the meaning of the English "control" 208 TREATY OF PEACE. to that of tlio French ^^controIe'\ It thus virtually reduces the stipu lation to the single Freuch word last meutioued. By no princii)le oi construction can this process be defended. The American Commissioners are therefore, for the reasons which they have stated, com])elled to maintain that by the plain and compre- hensive terms of the Protocol, as construed in their normal sense and in the light of all the circumstances of its adoption, the future of the Philippines was left, in the fullest measure, to the determination of this Joint Commission. This conclusion renders it necessary to answer the proposals of the Spanish Commissioners for the resignation by this Commission of its peacemaking functions under the Protocol of the 12th of August, and the transfer to other persons of the duty of determining the question now particularly before it. The Spanish Commissioners propose that the Joint Commission, shall, instead of disposing of the question of the Philippines, adopt one of the following courses: I. Eemit that question to the two Governments, for adjustment, if possible, by direct negotiation; or II. Advise those governments to submit it to an arbitration, in which the true sense of Articles III aud VI shall be determined. To the first of these proposals it is sutlicient to reply that bofh Gov- ernments have by the solemn engagement of the Protocol committed to their direct representatives here assembled the duty of concluding a definitive treaty of peace which shall determine the destiny of the archipelago. That these representatives shall, after weeks of patient investigation and interchange of views in oral discussion and written argument, surrender their task unaccomplished to other representatives of the same Governments, is a suggestion which cannot be seriously enteitained. Indeed, the memorandum of the Spanish Commissioners frankly admits that in the event of a new disagreement the situation would be the same as that which now confronts the Paris conference. It is equally futile now to invite arbitration as to the meaning of terms plainly expressed in the Protocol. " To avoid misunderstand- ing," as the United States declared in its note of the 10th of August, the precise agreement of the two Governments was put into a concise and simple form. Shall it be said that this Joint Commission is incap- able of interpreting the very compact under which it has assembled? The principle of international arbitration can have no application to such a case. To avoid war no government, it is believed, will do or suffer more than the one which the American Commissioners have the honor to represent in this conference. Unfortunately no way for arbi- tration was opened before the actual conflict began. Arbitration, as we have had occasion heretofore to observe, precedes war, to avoid its horrors; it does not come after the trial by battle to enable either party to escape its consequences. The American Commissioners, feeling that this body must accept the responsibility of reaching conclusions, must decline to ask the assist- ance of an arbitrator. It is true that the very constitution of a joint commission like the present presupposes a possible irreconcilable differ- ence of opinion of representatives of one nation opposed to others of equal number and authority. In such an event, nothing remains but for one of the contesting parties to yield its opinions in order that a peaceful solution may be reached. In the present case the American Commissioners have determined to make concessions to the extent embodied in the proposals which will conclude this memorandum. TREATY OF PEACE. 209 The United States is accused by tLe Spanish Commissioj^^ers of harsh and severe measures in dealing with a discomfited enemy. In the light of events which led to and characterized the war, no less than of historical precedents which might be cited, this charge is found to be entirely groundless. For half a century the attempts of the Cubans to overthrow the sovereignty of Spain over the island, within a hundred miles of the shores of the United States, have produced serious disturbances in that country, grave and constant interference with its commerce, and frequent danger of the rupture of friendly relations with Spain. How could the conditions existing in the island be otherwise than of vital concern to us? The Cubans were our neighbors, with whom our rela- tions were necessarily intimate and extensive; and they had been engaged in a struggle for independence with stronger reasons than existed in our own case when we rebelled against the mother country. The revolution of 18t)o, like the prior attempts at independence, entailed upon us heavy burdens. It made it necessary to i)atrol our coasts, to tax both civil and military resources in order to detect and prevent expeditions from our shores in the interests of the insurgents, and to repress the natural sympathy of our citizens, while we remained passive witnesses of misery, bloodshed and starvation in a land of plenty almost within sight of our borders. At length came the destruction of the battleship Maine in the harbor of Havana, with the loss of 266 of her crew. While we may not attribitte this catastro[)he to the direct act of a Spanish official, it betrayed, in the opinion of the United States, such neglect or inability on the part of Si)ain to secure the safety of the ship of a friendly nation in the principal harbor of the island as to induce Congress to recite it as an outgrowth of conditions which required our intervention. War ensued; and in less than four months nearly all the ports of Cuba were blockaded, Santiago was taken, the Spanish fleets in the West Indies and the Philippines destroyed, Porto Eico was about to surrender, Manila was on the point of capitulating, and all the colonies of Spain lay practically at the mercy of the United States. This recital is made, not in an unbecoming spirit of triumph, but because it exhibits the conditions that existed, and the advantages that the United States enjoyed, when, i^referring peace to war, it agreed to the Protocol. The Spanish Commissioners in their memorandum have in diplomatic words expressed their surprise at our want of magnanimity to a defeated country. How does the case appear iu the light of what has been stated? We might have demanded from Spain indemnity in money for the cost of the war, which, even if no unforeseen contingencies occur, will have amounted to $240,000,000, at the close of the present calen- dar year, to say nothing of further expenses which will be required under the laws of the United States existing at the outbreak of the war. We might have required compensation for our injuries and losses, national as well as individual, prior to the outbreak of the war. Yet we have asked for no money. From the relinquishment of Spanish sovereignty in Cuba we derive no compensation. Porto Eico, Guam and the Philippines will bring burdens as well as benefits, and, regarded simply as indemnity, will be grossly inadequate to compensate the United States for the mere pecuniary cost of the war; and yet, in spite of all this, for the sake of peace, we propose to make to Spain liberal concessions. Can we be justly charged with abuse of our opportunities, T P li 210 TREATY OF PEACE. or with taking undue advantage of the misfortunes of an adversary? The American Commissioners can perceive no ground for such a charge. On the contrary, they think that the Spanish Commissioners should accept our terms at once, and restore jieace between the two countries. Even if the United States were disposed to permit Spanish sover- eignty to remain over the Philippines, and to leave to Spain the resto- ration of peace and order in the islands, could it now in honor do so? The Spanish Commissioners have, themselves, in an earlier stage of these negotiations, spoken of the Filipinos as our allies. This is not a relation which the Government of the United States intended to estab- lish ; but it must at least be admitted that the insurgent chiefs returned and resumed their activity with the consent of our military and naval commanders, who permitted them to arm with weapons which we had captured from the Spaniards, and assured them of fair treatment and justice. Should we be justified in now surrendering these people to the Government of Spain, even under a promise of amnesty, which we know they would not accept? If, on tiie other hand, the United States should be content to retain Luzon alone, could anything but trouble be expected from the division of the group 1 Would not contrasts in government, in modes of admin- istration, and in the burdens of taxation, in different islands lying so closely together, but largely inhabited by kindred peoples, produce discontent among the inhabitants'? If the natives of the islands that remained under Spanish rule should, as doubtless would be the case, continue in insurrection, would not the natives of the American islands endeavor to help them, by fitting out hostile expeditions and furnishing arms and supplies? Would not complaints then be made by one Gov- ernment against the other, leading to crimination and recrimination and probably in the end to another international war? The situation that has arisen in the Philippines was neither foreseen nor desired by the United States, but, since it exists, that Government does not shirk the responsibilities growing out of it; and the American Commissioners now make to the Spanish Commissioners, in the light of those responsibilities, a final proposition. The proposal presented by the American Commissioners in behalf of their Government for the cession of the Philippines to the United States having been rejected by the Spanish Commissioners, and the counter- proposal of the latter for the withdrawal of the Anu^rican forces from the islands and the payment of an indemnity by the United States to Spain having been rejected by the American Commissioners, the Ameri- can Commissioners, deeming it essential that the present negotiations, which have already been greatly protracted, should be brought to an early and definite conclusion, beg now to i)resent a new proposition embodying the concessions which, for the sake of immediate peace, their Government is under the circumstances willing to tender. The Government of the United States is unable to n.iodify the pro- posal heretofore made for the cession of the entire archipelago of the Philipi)ines, but the American Commissioners are authorized to offer to Spain, in case the cession should be agreed to, the sum of twenty million dollars ($20,000,000) to be paid in accordance with the terms to be fixed in the treaty of peace. And it being the policy of the United States to maintain in the Philippines an open door to the world's commerce, the American Com- missioners are prepared to insert in the treaty now in contemplation a stipulation to the eflect that, for a term of years, Spanish ships and TREATY OF PEACE. 211 inercliaiidise shall be admitted into the ports of the Philippine Islands on the same terms as American shij^s and merchandise. The American Commissioners are also authorized and prepared to insert in the treaty, in connection with tbe cessions of territory by Spain to the United States, a provision for the mutual relinquisiiment of all claims for indemnity, national and individual, of every kind, of the United States against Spain and of Spain against the United States that may have arisen since the beginning of the late insurrec- tion in Cuba and prior to the conclusion of a treaty of peace. The American Commissioners may be permitted to express the hope that they may receive from the S[)anish Commissioners, on or before Monday the L'Sth of the present month, a definite and final acceptance of the i)roposals heroin made as to the Philippine Islands, and also oi the demands as to Cuba, Porto Rico and other Spanish islands in the West Indies, and Guam, in the form in which those demands have been provisionally agreed to. In this event it will be possible for the Joint Commission to continue its sessions and to proceed to the consideration and adjustment of other matters, including those which, as subsidiary and incidental to the principal provisions, should form a part of the treaty of peace. In particular the American Commissioners desire to treat of religious freedom in the Caroline islands, as agreed to in 1880; of the release ot prisoners now held by Spain for political offenses in connection with the insurrections in Cuba and the Philii^pines; the acquisition of tbe island variously known as Kusaie, Ualan, or Strong Island in the Caro- lines, for a naval and telegraph station, and of cable-landing rights at other places in Spanish jurisdiction ; and the revival of certain tireaties heretofore in force between the United States and Spain. True copy : John B. Moore. Protocol No. 16. Protocolo No. 16. Conference of Novemhcr 28, 1808. Gonferencia del 28 de N'oviemhre de 1898. The conference which was to Aplazada la Gonferencia que de- have been held on the 23rd instant bio celebrarse el dia 23 del corri- having been adjouined in couse- ente a cousecuencia de la corre- queuce of the correspondence ex- spondancia cambiada eutre los changed between the Presidents Presidentes de ambas Comisiones, of the two Commissions, which is que va anexa al Acta presente, en appended to the present protocol, forma de dos cartas del Presidente in the shape of two letters of the de la Comision Espanola y de las President of the Spanish Comniis- dos contestaeiones a aquellas del sion and the answers thereto of the Presidente de la Comision Ameri- President of tbe American Com- cana, se reunieron ambas Comis- mission, the Joint Commission met iones hoy (i las 2 de la tarde, bal- to day at two o'clock, p. m., when landose there were Present: — On the part of the Presentes Por parte de los United States: Messrs: Day, Estados Unidos de America, los Davis, Frye, Gray, Keid, Moore, Sen ores Day, Davis, Fiye, Gray, Fergusson. Keid, Moore, Fergusson. 212 TREATY OF PEACE. On the part of Spain : Messrs Moiitero Kios, Abarzuza, Garuica, Villa- Urrutia, Cerero, Ojeda. The protocol of the preceding conference was read and approved. The President of the Spanish Commission, in accordance with the agreement previously reached, presented to the American Commis- sioners a document containing the final answer of the Spanish Gov- ernment to the proposition as to the Philii)pii:ie Islands which the American Commissioners pre- sented as final at the last session. The language of the answer is as follows: "The Spanish Commissioners hastened to lay before their Gov- ernment the proposition which, as final, was presented to them at the last session by the American Com- missioners, and they are now spe- cially authorized to give within the time designated and under the conditions expressed the reply which was requested of them by the American memorandum. "Examined solely in the light of the legal principles which have guided the action of the Spanish Commissioners during the course of these negotiations, the latter consider the American proposition in every way inadmissible for the reason repeatedly set forth in pre- vious documents forming a part of the Protocol. "Neither can they consider the said propositions as a satisfactory form of agreement and compromise between two opposing principles, since the terms which by way of concession are oliered to Spain do not bear a proper proportion with the sovereignty which it is endeav- ored to compel us to relinquish in the Philippine Archipelago. Had they borne such proportion, Spain would have at once, for the sake of peace, made the sacrifice of ac- cepting them. The American Commission knows that the Span- ish Commission endeavored, al- Por parte deEspana. los Senores Montero Rios, Abarzuza, Garnica, Villa- drrutia, Cerero, OJeda. Fue leida y aprobada el acta de la sesiou anterior. El Presidente de la Comision Espanola de conformidad con lo acordado anteriormente presenta a los Comisarios Americanos un documento que contiene la contes- tacion deflnitiva del Gobierno Espaiiol a la proposicion sobre Fili- pinas, que con caracter de final presentaron en la ultima sesion los Comisarios Americanos. Los terminos de dicha contesta- cion son los siguientes: " Los Comisarios Espafioles se apresuraron a poner en conocimi- ento de su Gobierno la proposicion, que con caracter de definitiva les fue presentada en la sesion ultima por los Senores Comisarios Ameri- canos, y se hallan hoy explicita- meute autorizados a dar la respues- ta que dentro del plazo senalado y con las condiciones expresadas en el Memorandum Americano se les pedia. " Examinada unicamente d la lay de los priucipios juridicos que ha veuido inspirando la conducta de los Comisarios Esijaholes durante el curso de estas negociaciones, encuentran estos de todo punto inadmisible la proposicion Ameri- cana, por las razonesrepetidamente expuestas en anteriores docu- nientos que forman parte de Pro- tocolo. " Tampoco pueden considerar dicha proposicion como satisfacto- ria formula de aveneucia y trans- accion entre opuetos priucipios, pues las condiciones que a titulo de concesion se ofrecen 4 Espaiia, no guaidan ninguna proporcion con la soberania 4 que se nos quiere obligar 4 renunciar en el Archipielago filipino. Si la hu- bieran guardado, hubiese liecho Espaiia, desdeluego, elsacrificiode aceptarlas en aras del deseo de la paz. Consta 4 la Comision Ameri- cana que la Espaiiola intento, aun- que sin exito, entrar en esta via, TREATY OF PEACE. 213 though fruitlessly, to follow this course, goiug so far as to propose arbitration for the settlement of the principal questions. "Spain then having on her part exhausted all diplomatic recourses in the defence of what she consid- ers her rights and even for an equit- able compromise, the Spanish Com- missioners are now asked to accept the American proposition in its en- tirety and without further discus- sion, or to reject it, in which latter case, as the American Commission understands, the peace negotia- tions will end and the Protocol of Washington will, consequently, be broken. The Government of Her Majesty, moved by lofty reasons of patriotism and humanity, will not assume the responsibility of again bringing upon Spain all the horrors of war. In order to avoid them it resigns itself to the painful strait of submitting to the law of the vic- tor, however harsh it may be, and as Spain lacks material means to defend the rights she believes are hers, having recorded them, she accepts the only terms the United States oifers her for the concluding of the treaty of peace." This answer was delivered to the American Commissioners and translated by their Interpreter into English. The President of the Spanish Commission expressed the opinion that, the proposition of the Ameri- can Commission having been ac- cepted, it was in order for the Secretaries of the two Commis.sions to confer and agree uiwn the form in which the articles relating to Cuba, Porto Rico, and the Philip- pine islands should be drawn up, which articles they should after- wardssubmit to the Joint Commis- sion for approval or modification. The American Commissioners assented to this proposal, and sug- gested that the correspondence exchanged between the lastand the present session be appended either to this j)rotocol or to the next. llegando hasta proponer el arbi- trage para la rosolucion de las cuestioues principales. "Agotados pues, por parte de Espaha todos los recursos diplo- miiticos para la defensa del que considera su derecho, y aun para unaequitativatransacci6n,seexige hoy 4 los Comisarios Espanoles que acepten en conjunto y sin mas dis- cusiones la proposicion Americana 6 que la rechacen, en cuyo caso quedarian terminadas, segun en- tiende la Comision Americana, las negociaciones para la paz y roto por consiguiente el Protocolo de Washington. El Gobieruo de S. M. movido por altas razones de pa- triotismo y de humanidad, no ha de incurrir en la responsabilidad de desatar de nnevo sobre Espafia todos los horrores de la guerra. Paraevitarlosseresignaaldoloroso trance de some terse a la ley del ven- cedor, por dura que esta sea, y corao careceEspaiiademedios materiales para defender el derecho que cree le asiste, una vez ya consignado, acepta las linicas condicioues que los Estados Unidos leofreceu para la conclusion del Tratado de paz." Es entregada dicha contestacion 4 los Comisarios Americanos y ver- tida al ingl6s por su interprete. El Presidente de la Comision Espauola manifiesta que aceptada la proposicion de la Comision Americana procederia en su sentir que los Secretarios de ambas Comisiones se pusieran de acuerdo para la redaccion de los articulos referentes a Cuba, Puerto Rico y Fihpinas, que someteT-ian luego a la Comision en pleno para que esta los aprobase 6 modificase. Asiente 4 ello la Comision Ameri- cana y su Presidente propone cjue la corresi)ondencia cambiada entre los dos Presidentes en el intervale entre la ultima y la presente sesion, sean anexas a esta acta 6 4 la proxima. 214 TREATY OF PEACE. Tlie President of the Spanish Commission coDCurring in this sug- gestion, it was agreed that the two letters which he had addressed to the President of the American Cora- niissiou and the answers thereto given by the latter be appended to tlie present protocol. The President of the American Commission expressed the hope that a mutually satisfactory agree- ment might be reached as to all matters other than those disposed of by the acceptance of the Ameri- can proposition, and, in order to hasten the conclusion of the treaty, he proposed that the American Commission should draw up arti- cles and present them at the next conference to be orally discussed, thus avoiding the presentation of memoranda which would delay the negotiations. The President of the Spanish Commission answered that the form in which the American Com- missioners should desire to pro- ceed was left entirely to their choice and that he had nothing to suggest in this respect; and he also expressed the opinion that the presentation of memoranda would be unnecessary, except in some special case which might occur. He proposed tiiat the meeting should be adjourned until the Sec- retaries should have drawn up the draft of articles previously men- tioned by him. The President of the American Commission concurred in this pro- posal, and, being desirous also to present the articles referring to the subsidiary points of the treaty at the next session, he moved that that session should be held on Wednesday the 30th instant, at two o'clock, p. m. The President of the Sjianish Commission concurred in this pro- posal, and requested the American Commission to hasten as much as practicable their proceedings, so as to terminate at the earliest pos- sible moment the labors of the Ck)iimiissioii. El Presidente del a Comision Es- pailola es de la misma opinion y se acuerda que las dos cartas que ha dirigido al Presidente de la Comision Americana y las dos con- testaciones de este, seau anexas al acta presente. El Presidente de la Comision Americana manitiesta su esperanza de que pueda llegarse ahora a un acuerdo satisfactorio respecto de los demas puntos subsidiarios de su pro])Osici6n, aparte de los que han sido ya aceptados, y dice que con objeto de apresurar la conclu- sion del tratado, se propone redac- tar los demiis articulos y presen- tarlos en la proxima conferencia para ser discutidos oralmente, evi- tdndose asi la presentacion de Me- moranda que retrasaria las nego- ciaciones. El Presidente de la Comision Espanola contesta que la forma en que deseen proceder los Comisa- rios Americanos queda completa- mente 4 su eleccion, y que nada tiene por tanto que sugerir al re- specto, siendoasimismode opinion que huelga la presentacion de IVIemoranda al respecto, salvo algiiu caso especial que pudiera ocurrir y propone que se levante la sesi6n y se aplace la nueva reunion hasta que los Secretarios puedan redac- tar el proyecto de articulado. El Presidente de la Comision Americana hace asiinismo esta re- serva, y deseando presentar el ar- ticulado referente a los puntos subsidiarios del tratado en la proxima sesion, propone que esta tenga lugar el Miercoles 30 del presente ii las 2. El Presidente de la Comision Espaiiola conviene en que asi sea y ruega (i los Comisarios Ameri- canos que apresureu en lo posible sus procedimientos 4 fin de que termiuen cuanto antes las tareas de la Comisidu. TREATY OF PEACE. 215 The session was accordingly En consecuencia queda aplazada adjounied till Wednesday tlie 3Utli la proxiina sesion para el Micicoles instant, at two o'clock, p. m. 30 del corriente -X las 2 P. M. William K. ])ay E. Montero Rios CusHMAN K. Davis B. de Abarzuza Wm P Frye J. de Garnica Geo. Gray W R' de Villa Ureutia WniTELAW Eeid. Eafael Cerero John B. Moore. Emilio de Ojeda Annex 1 to Protocol No. 16. comision tara la negociacton de la paz con los estados UNIDOS. Sr. D. William R. Day. MuY Sexor mio, a fin de que pueda esta Comision y en su caso el Gobierno de S. M. 0. deliberar con pleno y exacto conocimiento de su sentido sobre la proposicion con que termina el Meraoiaudum presentado en la sesion de ayer por la Comision que dignamente presidis, y que acaba de traducirse al espanol, me es necesario rogaros que, con la urgencia que os sea posible, os sirvais, si os parece conveniente, aclarar el concepto de los puntos siguieutes de dicba proposicion, cuya inteli- gencia es para mi obscura y vaga: Primero. La proposicion que baceis ^descansa sobre la base de que lascolonias espanolas ban de pasar libres de toda carga, quedando por consiguiente todas, absolutaniente todas, las obligaciones y dendas coloniales pendientes, de cualquier clase que ell as scan y cualqniera que baya sido su oiigen y objeto, a cargo exclnsivamente de Espana? Segundo. El ofreciViiieuto que los Estados Unidos hacen a Espafiade establecer igualdad de condiciones durante cierto numero de anos en los puertos del Arcbipielago entrc los buques y mercancias de ambas naciones, ofricimiento que se bace preceder de la alirmacion de que la politica de los Estados Unidos es mantener en las Filipinas la puerta abierta el comerico del mundo, ;^debe entenderse en el sentido de que los buques y mercancias de las demas naciones ban de gozar 6 poder gozar de la misma situacion que por cierto tiempo se conceda 4 los de Espaua, mientras los Estados Unidos no cambien dicba politica? Tercero. Habiendo consignado el Sr. Secretario de Estado, en la nota de 30 de Julio ultimo, que la cesion por Espana de la Isla de Puerto Rico y de otras islas actualmente bajo su soberania en las Indias Occidentales, asi como de una en las Ladrones, era en compen- »aci6n de las p6rdidas y gastos becbos por los Estados Unidos, durante la guerra, y de los dafios que sus ciudadanos babian sufrido durante la ultima insurreccion de Cuba, ^cuales son las reclamaciones 4 que se refiere la porposicion, al exigirse en ella que en el tratado se ba de insertar una disposicion sobre ell abandono mutno de todas las reclama- ciones individuales y nacionales surgidas desde el principio de la liltima insurreccion en Cuba basta la conclusion del tratado de paz? Cuarto. Al decirse que en el tratado se ha de convenir sobre la liber- tad de los detenidos por Espaiia por delitos politicos relacionados con las insurrecciones de Cuba y Filipinas, ji,se quiere dar 4 entender que 4 la vez no se ha de convenir sobre la libertad de los prisoneros espa- 216 TREATY OF PEACE. Boles que estan en poder de las fiierzas americanas y de sus anxiliares los insurrectos de Cuba y Filipinas? Quiiito. Tambien se ha de coiiveuir en el tratado sobre la adquisicion por los Estados Uuidos del dereclio de amarre de cables en otros sitios bajo la jurisdiccion de Espaua. ^En que region estan dicbos sitios? Esta frase, 2,comi)rei)de solamente los territorios de Espaiia en el Ori- ente 6 tambien en la Peninsula? Sexto, Se dice asimismo que se renovar^u ciertos tratados que hasta ahora estuvieron en vigor entre los Estados Unidos y Espaiia, j, Curies sou estos tratados ? Y finalmente, S6ptimo. Dicen los Comisarios aniericanos que si los espaiioles aceptan final y concretameute su proposicion y las anteriores sobre Cuba, Puerto Eico y demas islas, sent posible 4 la Comision en pleno coutinuar sus sesiones y proceder al estudio y arreglo de otros puntos, 2,significan estas frases que si la Comision espaQola no acepta final y concretameute dichas proposiciones, sin modificacion sustancial, la Comision en pleuo no continuara sus sesiones? Os ruego y euearezco la resolucion de estas dudas, si lo teneis 4 bien, sobre la inteligeucia de vuestra proposicion, lo mils pronto que os sea posible, para que la Comision espanola pueda dar en sesion de la Comi- sion en pleno la contestacion que considere procedente. Aceptad, Senor, os lo ruego, el testimonio de midistinguidaconside- racion. E. MONTERO Kios Paris, 22 de Noviemhre de 1898. [TraDshition.] Annex 1 to Protocol No. 1G. commission for the negotiation of peace with the united STATES. Mr. William E. Day My dear Sir, In order that this Commission and, if necessary, the Government of H. C. M., may study with a full and exact knowledge the proposition wliich closes the memorandum presented at yesterday's session by the Commission you worthily head, the translation into Spanish of which has just been completed, it becomes necessary to beg you that with all possible haste you will be pleased to make clear the meaning of the following points of said proposition, which to me is obscure and vague: First. Is the proposition you make based on the Spanish colonies being transferred free of all burdens, all, absolutely all outstanding obligations and debts, of whatsoever kind and whatever may have been their origin and purpose, remaining thereby chargeable exclusively to Spain? Second. Is the ofl'er made by the United States to Spain to establish for a certain number of years similar conditions in the ports of the archipelago for vessels and merchandise of both nations, an offer which is preceded by the assertion that the policy of the United States is to maintain an open door to the world's commerce, to be taken in the sense that the vessels and goods of other nations are to enjoy or can enjoy TREATY OF PEACE. 217 the same privile<2:e (situacion) which for a certain time is panted those of Spain, while the United States do not chan,<^e such policy"? Third. The Secretary of State havin": stated in his note of July 30 last that the cession by Spain of the Island of Porto Rico and the other islands now under Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies, as well as one of the Ladrones, was to be as compensation for the losses and expenses of the United States during the war, and of the damages snflered by their citizens during the last insurrection in Cuba, what claims does the proposition refer to on requiring that there shall be inserted in the treaty a provision for the mutual relinquishment of all claims, indi- vidual and national, that have arisen from the beginning of the last insurrection in Cuba to the conclusion of the treaty of peace? Fourth. Upon stating that the treaty must contain an agreement as to the release of those held by Spain for political olienses connected with the insurrections of Cuba and the Philippines, is it desired that it be taken as meaning that at the same time there is to be no agreement as to the release of the Spanish prisoners held in the possession of the American forces and their auxiliaries, the insurgents of Cuba and the Philippines'? Fifth. In the treaty there is also to be an agreement as to the acquire- ment by the United States of cable landing inivileges in other places under the jurisdi<;tion of Spain. Where are such places? Does this sentence only include territories of Spain in the Orient, or in the Peninsula also? Sixth. It is also said that certain treaties which were in force between the United States and Spain up to this time will be revived. What are these treaties'? And, finally, seventh. The American Commissioners say that if the Spanish Commissioners accept their proposition finally and definitely and the previous proposals as to Cuba, Porto Eico and other islands, it will be possible for the Joint Commission to continue its sessions and proceed to the examination and arrangement of other points. Do these words mean that if the Spainsh Commission does not finally and defi- nitely accept said propositions without substantial modifications, the Joint Commission will not continue its sessions? I beg and earnestly request you to settle these doubts, should you be so disposed, as to the meaning of your proposition as soon as may be possible, in order that the Spanish Commission may, in a session of the Joint Commission, furnish the reply it may deem proper. Accept, Sir, I pray you, the expression of my distinguished consid- eration. Signed: E. Monteko Rios. Paris, November 22, 1898. Annex 2 to Protocol ISTo. 1G. United States and Spanish Peace Commission, United States Commissioners. Paris. November 22, 1898. Senor Don E. Montero Rios. My dear Sir. Having received and read your letter of today, touching the final proposition presented by the American Commission- ers at yesterday's conference, I hasten to answer your enquiries seri' atim^ first stating your question, and then giving my reply. 218 TREATY OP PEACE. "First. Is the propo.iition you make based on the Spanish colonies being transferred free of all burdens, all, absolutely all outstanding obligations and debts, of whatsoever kind and whatever may have been their origin and purpose, remaining thereby chargeable exclusively to Spain 1 " In reply to this question, it is proper to call attention to the fact that the American Commissioners, in their paperof yesterday, exi)ressed the hope that tbey might receive within a certain time "a definite and final acceptance" of their proposal as to the Philippines, and also "of the demands as to Cuba, Porto Kico and other Spanish Islands in the West Indies, and Guam, in the form in which those demands have been provisionally agreed to." The form in which they have thus been agreed to is found in the pro- I)osal presented by the American Commissioners on the 17th of Octo- ber and annexed to the protocol of the Gth conference, and is as follows : "Article 1. Spain hereby relinquishes all claim of sovereignty over and title to Cuba. "Ar'I'ICLE "2. Spain hereby cedes to the United States the Island of Porto Ilico and other islands now under Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies, and also the Island of Guam in the Ladrones." These articles contain no provision for the assumption of debt by the United States. In this relation, I desire to recall the statements in which the Ameri- can Commissioners have in our conferences repeatedly declared that they would not accept any articles that required the United States to assume the so-called colonial debts of Spain. To these statements I have nothing to add. But, in respect of the Philippines, the American Commissioners, while including the cession of the archipelago in the article in which Spain "cedes to the United States the Island of Porto Itico and other islands now under Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies, and also the Island of Guam in the Ladrones," or in an article expressed in similar words, will agree that their Government shall pay to Spain the sum of twenty million dollars ($liO,0{)0,OUU). "Second. Is the offer made by the United States to Spain to estab- lish for a certain number of years similar conditions in the ports of the archipelago for vessels and merchandise of both nations, an offer which is preceded by the assertion that the i)olicy of the United States is to maintain an open door to the world's commerce, to be taken in the sense that the vessels and goods of other nations are to enjoy or can enjoy the same privilege {situacion) which for a certain time is granted those of Spain, while the United States do not change such policy?" The declaration that the policy of the United States in the Philip- l)ines will be that of an open door to the world's commerce necessarily implies that the offer to j^lace Spanish vessels and merchandise on the same footing as American is not intended to be exclusive. But, the ofler to give Spain that privilege for a term of years, is intended to secure it to her for a certain period by special treaty stipulation, what- ever might be at any time the general policy of the United States. "Third. The Secretary of State having stated in his note of July 30 last that the cession by Spain of the Island of Porto Kico and the other islands now under Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies, as well as one of the Ladrones, was to be as comi)ensation for the losses and expenses of the (Jiuted States during the war, and of the damages suffered by their citizens during the last insurrection in Cuba, what claims does the proposition refer to on requiring that there shall be TREATY OF PEACE. 219 inserted in the treaty a provision for the mutual relinquishment of all claims, individual and national, tliat have arisen from the beginning of the last insurrection in Cuba to the conchision of the treaty of ])eace?'' While the idea doubtless was conveyed in the note of the Secretary of State of the United States of the 3Uth of July last that the cession of " Porto Kico and other islands now under the sovereignty of Spain in the West Indies, and also the cession of an isUmd in the Ladrones, to be selected by the United States," was required on grounds of indem- nity, and that "on similar grounds the United States is entitled to occupy and will hold the city, bay, and harbor of Manila, pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace which shall determine the control, dis- position and government of the Philippines," no definition has as yet been given of the extent or precise effect of the cessions in that regard. The American Commissioners therefore propose, in connection with the cessions of territory, "the mutual relinciuishment of all claims for indemnity, national and individual, of every kind, of the United States against Spain and of Spain against the United States, that may have arisen since the beginning of the late insurrection in Cuba and prior to he conclusion of a treaty of peace." And I may add that this offer is made by the American Commissioners in full view of the fact that the citizens of the United States, having claims that come within the foregoing relinquishment, will, on the strength thereof, apply to their own Government for indemnity. As to the fourth, fifth and sixth questions contained in your letter, permit me to point out that they do not relate to matters concerning which the American Commissioners stated that the acceptance of our proposals within the time mentioned would be a condition of continuing the conferences. The American Commissioners confined that condition to their proposals touching Cuba, Porto Eico and other Spanish islands in the West Indies, Guam, and the Philippines. In respect of the other matters referred to, they expressed their readiness to "treat", in case the Spanish Commissioners should remove the obstacle to so doing, by a definite and final acceptance of the proposals abovementioned, the refusal of which would render the continuance of the conferences impracticable. In what I have just said, you will find an answer to your seventh question. It does not appear to be necessary to specify at this moment the par- ticulars of the subjects referred to in your fourth, fifth and sixth ques- tions, since, if our proposals in regard to Cuba, Porto Kico and other Spanish islands in the West Indies, Guam, and the Philippines, are not accepted, the negotiations will end. I deem it proper, however, even at the risk of seeming to anticipate, to say, so far as concerns the subject of your fourth question, that the American Commissioners would expect to treat for the release of prisoners on the basis of abso- lute equality. All Spanish prisoners in the possession of the American forces would necessarily be released as the result of a treaty of peace; and the American Commissioners would be willing to stipulate that their Government would undertake to obtain the release of all Spanish prisoners in the hands of the insurgents in Cuba an.d the Phihppines. With an exj^ression of regret that the process of translating your letter has somewhat delayed my reply, I beg you to accept, my dear sir, the expression of my distinguished consideration. Signed: William E. Day. 220 TREATY OP PEACE. Annex 3 to Protocol No. 16. C0MISi6n para la NEG0GIACi6n DE la PAZ CON LOS ESTADOS UNIDOb. Hon. M. William E. Day, Presiderite de la Gomision americana para la pnz con Espafia. MUY SENOR Ml'O DE MI DISTINGUIDA considekackjN. A fin de adelantar cuanto sea posible los tiabajos que por ambos Gobiernos 4 una y otra Oomisiou ban sido encomendados, y que ya requieren una proxima terminaciou, ruego a Yd., en nombre de esta Ooraision que se sirva propouer a la de su digna presidencia si esta dispuesta 4 acceptar por via de trausaccion sobre la soberania del Arcbipielago Filipino cualquiera de las tres proi)osiciones siguieutes: A. — " Eenuncia de Espaiia a su soberania en Cuba y cesion de Puerto Kico y deiuas Antillas, Isla de Guam en las Ladrones y Arcbipielago Filipino, incluso Mindanao y Jolo, 4 los Estados Uuidos, habiendo de satisfaeer estos 4 Espaiia la cantidad de cien millones de dollars ($100,000,000) en compensacion de su soberania en el arcbipielago y de las obras de utilidad piiblica ejecutadas durante su dominacion en todas las islas de Oriente y Occidente cuya soberania reuuncia y cede." B. — "Cesion 4 los Estados Unidosde la IslaCusayeen las Carolinas, del derecho de amarre de un cable en cualquiera de ellas 6 de las Marianas, niientras sean del domiuio de Espaua, y del Arcbipielago Filipino propiauieute dicbo, 6 sea euipezando por el Norte, de las Islas Bataues, Babuyanes, Luzon, Visayas y todas las demas que siguen al Sur liastael mar de Jolo, reservandose EspaSa al Sur de este mar las Islas de Mindanao y Jolo, que nunca ban formado parte del Arcbi- pielago Filipino pro])iamente dicbo. " Los Estados Unidos en compensacion de las islas sobredichas, del derecho de amarre del cable y de las obras publicas ejecutadas por Espaiia en aquellas islas durante su dominacion, abonaran 4 Espaiia la cantidad de cincuenta millones de dollars ($50,000,000)." C. — " Espana renuncia a su soberania en Cuba y cede gratuitamente 4 los Estados Unidos el Arcbipielago Filipino propiamente dicbo, ade- m4s de Puerto Rico y dem4s Antillas y la Isla de Guam que cede en compensacion delos gastos de guerra e indemnizaciones deciudadanos americanos por daiios sufridos desde el principio de la ultima iusurrec- cion cubana: "Los Estados Unidos y Espana soineter4n 4 un tribunal arbitral cu41es son las deudas y obligaciones de caracter colonial, que deban pasar con las islas cuya soberania Espaiia renuncia y cede." Buego 4 Vd. que esa Comision se sirva deliberar sobre cada una de estas proposiciones por si considera acceptable cualquiera de ellas, comunic4ndomelo si lo tiene 4 bien antes del lunes ])r6ximo 28 del cor- riente 6 teniendo formado ya su juicio para dicbo dia (que es el lijado en la utima proposicion de esa Comision), en que podran reunirse ambas en pleno 4 la bora acostumbrada de las dos de la tarde. y en cuya sesion esta Comision espanola dar4 su deflnitiva contestacion, de que, segim la de la americana, habr4 de depender la coutiuuaciou 6 terminaciou de estas conferencias. Queda de Vd. con la mayor consideracioa atento servidor q. 1. b. 1. ni. E. MoNTERO Bios Paris, 23 de Ifoviembre de 1898. TREATY OP PEACE. 221 [Translation.] Annex 3 to Protocol No. 16. commission for the negotiation of peace with the united STATES. Hon. William E. Day, President of the American Commission for Peace with Spain. My dear and esteemed Sir, In order to push to the utmost the work which has been entrusted by the two Governments to one and the other Commission and which now requires a prompt termination, I beg you, in the name of this Commission, to be pleased to propose to that worthily headed by you whether it is willing to accept, by way of compromise in re the sovereignty of the Philippine Archipelago, any of the three propositions ibllowing: A. "Eelinquishment by Spain of her sovereignty over Cuba and cession of Porto Eico and other Antilles, Island of Guam in the Ladrones and the Phili])pine Archipelago, including Mindanao and Siilu, to the United States, the latter paying to Si)ain the sum of one hundred million (-$100,000,000) dollars as compensation for her sover- eignty in the Archipelago and the works of public utility she has exe- cuted during her rule in all the islands of the East and West the sovereignty over which she relinquishes and cedes." B. " Cession to the United t>tates of the Island of Cusaye in the Carolines, of the right to land a cable on any of these or of the Marianas, while they remain under Spanish rule, and {ccsion) of the Philippine Archi])elago proper, that is, beginning on the North, the Islands of Batanes, Babuyanes, Luzon, Visayas, and all the others following to the south as far as the Sulu Sea, Spain reserving to the south ot this sea the Islands of Mindanao and Sulu which have never formed a part of the Philippine Archipelago proper. "The United States, as compensation for said islands, for the right to land cables and for the public works executed by Spain in said islands during her rule, will pay to Spain the sum of fifty million ($50,000,000) dollars." C. " Spain relinquishes her sovereignty over Cuba and gratuitously cedes to the United States the Philippine Archipelago proper, besides Porto Eico, the other West Indies and the Island of Guam, which she cedes as compensation for the expenses of the war and as indemnity to American citizens for injuries suffered since the beginning of the last Cuban insurrection. " The United States and Spain will submit to an arbitral tribunal what are the debts and obligations of a colonial character which should pass with the islands the sovereignty over which Spain relinquishes and cedes." I beg you that said Commission be pleased to deliberate over each of these propositions so that, should it consider anyone of them acceptable, it may be communicated to me, should you be so disposed, before Mon- day next, the 28th instant, or your mind being already made up, on that day (which is the one set in the last proposition of the said Commission) when the two Commissions may meet jointly at the usual hour of two, p. m., at which session this, the Spanish Commission, will give its final reply, upon which, according to the answer of the American, must dex^end the continuation or termination of these conferences. I remain, with the greatest consideration, your obedient servant. Signed: E. Montero Eios. Paris, Ifovember 23 j 1898. 222 TREATY OF PEACE. Annex 4 to Protocol No. 16. United States and Spanish Peace Commission. United States Commissioners. Paris. November 26, 1898. My dear Sir, Your letter dated the 23rd instant, in which you propose, by way of compromise, the adoption of one of three alternative propositions, in place of the proposition submitted by the American Commissioners at our last conference, was not received by me till the evening of the 24th. I at once had it carefully translated, and, in compliance with your request, laid it before my associates. We maturely considered it, and, although our last proposition, which was submitted under instructions, was expressly declared to be final, we decided, in view of the importance of the subject, to communicate your proposals to our Government. Its answer has just been received; and, as we anticipated, it instructs us to adhere to the final proposition which we have already submitted. It is proper to say that my associates and myself, during the long course of the negotiations, have, in accordance with the wishes of our Government, given the most deliberate attention to everything in the way of argument or of suggestion that has been brought to our notice, in the hope that some basis of mutual agreement might be found. But, unfortunately, our discussions seemed to divide us, rather than to bring us together, and no progress was made towards a common accord. Under these circumstances the American Commissioners, acting upon explicit instructions, offered at once, for the sake of peace, all the concessions which their Government was able to make concerning the particular matters embraced in the proposition the acceptance of which was made a condition of further negotiations. As I stated in my letter of the 23rd instant, if that proposition should be accepted, the matters referred to in the concluding paragraph of the paper submitted by the American Commissioners at the last ses- sion, would become the subject of negotiations, and, in regard to them, I should hope for a mutually satisfactory arrangement. The American Commissioners expect to be i)resent at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Monday next for the purpose of receiving the answer to their final i^roposition. I remain, with the highest consideration, your obedient servant, Signed: William E. Day. Seiior Don E. Montero Eios, etc., etc., etc. Protocol Ko. 17. Protocolo Ko. 17. ^ - _,,-., -, o/^ -,r.^r, CoTiferenda Hcl 30 dd Novienihre clo Conference of ISovemher 30, ISOS. '' ^SDS Present: On the part of the Presentes Por parte de los Esta- United States : Messrs : Day, Davis, dos Unidos de America, los SePio- Frye, Gray, Eeid, Moore, Fergus- res Day, Davis, Frye, Gray, Eeid, son. Moore, Fergusson. On the part of Spain: Messrs: Por parte de Espafia los Seiio- Montero Eios, Abarzuza, Garnica, res Montero Eios, Abarzuza, Gar- Yilla- Urrutia, Cerero, Ojeda. nica. Villa- Urrutia, Cerero, Ojeda. TREATY OF PEACE. 223 The protocol of the preceding session was read and approved. The President of the American Commission presented a draft of articles with reference to tlie con- clusion of a definitive treaty, in the first part of wliich draft were in- cluded the articles agreed upon by the two Secretaries for submission to the Joint Commission, in rela- tion to, the matters comprised in the proposition accepted by the Spanish Commissioners at the last session. The Joint Commission then pro- ceeded to the consideration of the draft, article by article, and, after discussing some of the articles, de- cided to adjourn the session, and to continue the discussion at the next conference, which was fixed for Thursday, the 1st of December, at three o'clock, p. ni. William R. Day CusHMAN K. Davis Wm P Frye Geo. Gray Whitelaw Eeid. John B. Moore. Fue leida y aprobada el acta de la sesion anterior. El Presidente do la Comision Americana presentaun proyecto de articulos para la conclusion de un tratado de paz definitivo, en cuya parte primera estan incluidos los que fueron acordados entre los Sec- retarios de ambas Comisiones para ser sometidos a la Comision en pleno, relativos A las materias cora- prendidas en la proposicion acep- tada por los Comisarios Espaholes en la ultima sesion. La Comisi hich was to be submitted by the Spaniards to their Government, and as the other part also was dejieudent upon instructions from tliat Gov- ernment, he deemed it useless to examine and discuss the latter part. And, on the other hand, he stated that the Secretary General of the Spanish Commission had delivered to the Secretary General of the American Commission a draft of other articles which must necessarily form part of the treaty Fu^ leida y aprobada el acta de la sesion anterior. El Presidente de la Comision Americana recuerda que en la iilti- ma sesion presento un proyecto de articulos para un tratado definitive y pregunta .4 los Comisarios Espa- uoles si lo han examiuado y estan dispuestos a dar una coutestacion El Presidente de la Comision Espanola maniflesta que ha con- sul tado a su Gobierno y no puede contestar hasta haber recibido sus instrucciones ; pero de todos modos no estA dispuesta la Comision Espanola 4 tratar de los puntos ac- cessorios que desea la Americana sin que antes se haya concluido con todo lo relativo 4 lo que con- stituyeesencialmente el Tratado de paz. El Presidente de la Comision Americana pregunta aide la Espa- nola si puede decirle cuando reci- bir4 dichas instrucciones, y el Presidentedela Comision Espanola contesta que i)robablemente las recibira de hoy 4 manana. Proponen los Comisarios Ameri- canos que se proceda a la lectura y discusion de los articulos por ellos i^ropuestos que no fueron ex- aminados en la sesion anterior y el Presidente de la Comision Es- panola haceobservarque dividien- dose dichos articulos en dos par- tes: una compuesta de los oclio primeros arti<;ulos yaexaminaday aprobada en la iiltima sesion salvo cuatro puntos tres de los cnales quedaron los Americanos en estu- diar y el 4° quedaron los EsiJanoles en consultar 4 su Gobierno, y la otra pendiente tambien de instruc- ciones de su Gobierno, cree inutil examiuar y discutir esta ultima. En cambio hace presente que el Secretario General de la Comision Espanola ha entregado al de la Americana el proyecto de los dem^s articulos que debcn formar parte necesariansente del Tratado de paz y sobre los cuales hasta el presente momento la Comision Americana nada ha coutestado y ademas que TREATY OF PEACE. 225 of peace aud with respect to wliich the American Commissioners had not as yet given an answer; aud further that the American Com- mission was to have consulted its Government and to give an answer to-day on the three points above mentioned as forming a part ot some of the eight articles already approved, which answer was nec- essary in order that the agreement previously reached upon these ar- ticles might be enlarged ; and that, therefore, with a view to preserve in the discussion the natural order, he considered it requisite that the articles that were indispensable to such treaty should be completed by the answer of the American Commissioners before passing on to the discussion of points of minor interest which did not affect the concluding of peace, though this did not imply that the Spanish Commissioners did not entertain the desire to take them up at the proper time. The American Commissioners insisted that these subsidiary Ijoints be taken up, or all discus- sion be postponed until the Span- ish Commissioners shall have received instructions to treat upon all the points which have been submitted to them. The President of the Spanish Commission held to his opinion, insisting that even after the in- structions of his Government with respect to the subsidiary points were received, the Spanish Com- mission would not discuss them until after the termination of the discussion of the articles which it had presented, and which related to the treaty of peace i)roper. The American Commission having in- quired as to what were the three points to which the President of the Spanish Commission had above referred, which the American Com- missioners were to examine, he re- plied that they were as follows: The extending to Cuba and Porto Eico of the commercial treatment granted to Spain in the Philip- T p 15 la Comision Americana quedo en consultar 4 sa (^obierno y en dar hoy contestaci('>n sobre dichos tres indicados i^untos relativos ^ al- gunos de los ocho articulos apro- bados que faltabuu para ami)liar sobre dichos puntos el acuerdo ya tomado sobre aquellos y que por tanto, con objeto de guardar en la discusion el orden natural, con- sidera necesario que se completen estos articulos indispensabies de dicho Tratado con la contestacion de los Comisarios Americanos, antes de pasar 4 discutir puntos demenor interes que no afecton ^ la conclu- sion de la paz, lo cual no quiere decir que los Comiwsarios Espanoles no tengan el deseo de tratar oijor- tunamente de ellos. Insisten los Comisarios Ameri- canos en que deben ser examina- dos estos puntos subsidiarios 6 renunciarse 4to(la discusion hasta que los Comisarios Espaiioles ha- yau recibido instrucciones para tratar sobre todos los puntos que les hay an sido sometidos. Mantiene el Presideute de la Comision Espahola su opinion iu- sistiendos en que aun despues de recibidas las instTucciones de su Gobierno sobre tales puntos acces- orios la Comision Espafiola no en- trara 4 discutirlos siuo despues que se hay a tcrminado la discusion de los articulos que tiene present- ado y que son relativos al Tratado de paz propriamento dicho, y hab- iendole preguntado la Comision Americana cualeseran los tres pun- tos 4 que se referia el Presideute de la Comision Espanola y que de- bian ser examinados por la Com- ision Americana, contesta que son tres, a saber: ampliacion A Cuba y Puerto Rico del trato comercial concedido ^ Espaiia en Eilipinas; repatriacion por cuenta de ambas 226 TREATY OF PEACE. pines; the repatriation at the ex- pense of both nations of the pris- oners taken, and the return to Spain of the war material in Caba and Porto Eico with respect to which the evacuation commissions had not come to a decision, since such material in the Philippines, he understood, belonjs^ed to Spain. He added that the Spanish Com- mission had promised to consult its Government regarding the main- tenance of public order in the Phil- ippines, and that if the American Commissioners were ready to enter upon the discussion to which they were invited, he would, without having received instructions, un- dertake to give a categorical an- swer upon this point, which answer he was confident his Government would ratify. The discussion continued, the American Commission insisting on its proposal to discuss the whole of its draft, or to postpone all discus- sion until the Spanish Commission should have instructions upon all points. The Spanish Commission, holding to its opinion that it was duly authorized to treat ui)on everything essential to the treaty of peace, and therefore ready to sign its articles at once, but deter- mined not first to treat of those points which are not essential to the treaty, asked that its readiness to discussinthenatural order what- ever related directly to the treaty of peace, be spread upon the minutes. The arguments on both sides having been repeated, the Presi- dent of the American Commission stated that he as well as his col- leagues hoped that the relations of the two countries might not be limited to the strict terms of a treaty of peace, but rather that an agreement might be reached for mutual concessions which would be beneficial to both Gov- ernments and promote the cordial- ity in their relations. The Presi- dent of the Spanish Commission stated til at this was also the desire naciones de los prisioneros hechos, y devolucion a Espaua del material de guerra en Cuba y Puerto Rico de que ya no hubieran dispuesto las Comisiones deevacuacion, por- que en cuanto al existente en Fili- pinas entieude el Presidente que pertenecia 4 Espaiia. Aiiade que por su parte la Comision Espaiiola se comprometio 4 consultar acerca del mantenimiento del orden pub- lico en Filipinas y que si los Comisa- rios Americanos estan dispuestos 4 aceptar la discusion 4 que les in- vita, el se compromete sin haber recibido instrucciones 4 dar sobre este punto una resj^uesta catego- rica que su Gobierno confia en que ratificara. Continue la discusi6n mantenien- do la Comision Americana su pro- posito de discutir el conjunto de su proyecto 6 de aplazar toda dis- cusion hasta que la Bspauola tenga instrucciones sobre todos sus extre- mes, y sosteniendo la Espaiiola su criterio de que est4n debidamente autorizados atratar de cuanto cons- tituye el Tratado de paz esencial- mente dicho, y dispuestos por tan to 6. firmar sus cMusulas al punto; pero resueltos 4 no tratar antes aquellos puutos que no son esen- ciales adichotratado,desean conste en el acta su disposicion 4 seguir discutiendo por suorden natural cuanto 4 dicho Tratado de paz di- rectamente se refiere. Repitense los argumentos por una y otra parte y habiendo mani- festado el Presidente de la Comi- sion Americana que tauto 61 como sus colegas esperaban que no se limitarian las relaciones de ambos paises 4 las condiciones estrictas de un Tratado de paz, sino que podria llegarse 4 un acuerdo sobre mutuas concesiones beneficiosas para ambos Gobiernos y que fo- mentarian la cordialidad en sus relaciones, el Presidente de la Co- misi6n Espanola manifesto que tales eran tambi^n los deseos de TREATY OF PEACE. 227 of the Spanish Commission era, but that to his mind it would be easier to reach an understanding upon the less important points if the decisions arrived at on the necessary articles of the treaty of peace were satisfactory. The American Commissioners proposed to adjourn the session in order that the instructions awaited by the Spanish Commissioners might arrive, and to examine the articles j)resented by the latter. The Spanish Commissioners agreed to this, and the session was adjourned till Saturday, the 3rd instant, at two p. m. William R. Day CusHMAN K. Davis Wm P Frye Geo. Gray Whitelaw Eeid. John B. Moore. los Comisarios Bspafioles pero que en su sentir cuanto miis satisfac- torias fuesen las soluciones dadas 4 los articulos indispensables del Tratado de paz m4s se facilitaria lainteligencia^quepodriallegarse respecto de los dem^s puntos menos importantes. Los Comisarios Americanos pro- pusieron aplazar la sesion a fin de dar lugar 4 que llegasen las ins- trucciones que aguardaban los Comisarios Espanoles y 4 estudiar los articulos por estos presentados. Acordado asi por la Comision Espafiola se aplazo la sesion para el sdbado 3 del corriente 4 las 2, p.m. E. Montero Rios B. DE ABARZUZA J. DE GARNICA W R DE Villa TJrrutia Rafael Cerero Emilio de Ojeda Protocol No. 19 Protocolo No. 19. Conference of December 5, 1898. Confer encia del 5 Diciemhre del898. At the request of the American Commissioners the session which was to have been held on Satur- day the 3rd instant was postponed until today at three p. m., when there were Present On the part of the United States: Messrs: Day, Davis, Frye, Gray, Eeid, Moore, Fergusson. On the part of Spain : Messrs : Montero Rios, Abarzuza, Garnica, Villa- Urrutia, Cerero, Ojeda, The protocol of the preceding session was read and approved. The President of the American Commission asked the President of the Spanish Commission whether he had received instructions from his Government touching the points on which the American Commissioners desired to treat. The President of the Spanish Commission replied that he had in A peticion de los Comisarios Americanos la sesion que debio celebrarse el Sabado 3 del corriente fu6 aplazada para hoy (i las 3, hal- Idndose en dichos dia y hora Presentes Por parte de los Estados Unidos de America: los Senores Day Davis Frye Gray Reid Moore, Fergusson. Por parte de Espaua : los Senores Montero Rios, Abarzuza, Garnica, Villa- Urrutia, Cerero, Ojeda. Fue lefda y aprobada el acta de la sesion anterior. Pregunta el Presidente de la Comision Americana al Presidente de la Comision Espafiola si ha reci- bido instrucciones de su Gobierno relativas a los puntos que la Comi- sion americana deseaba tratar, y el Presidente de la Comision Espafiola contesta que en efecto las ha reci- bido pero que reitera su proposito 228 TREATY OF PEACE. fact received them ; but he reiter- ated his purpose not to take up those points until the matters in- herent in and essential to the treaty of peace proper should be discussed and finally approved. It was agreed that the Commis- sions should communicate to each other the answers of their respec- tive Governments to the questions previously submitted to them. The President of the American Commission stated, in the first place, that his Government was not willing to grant and embody in the treaty of peace the exten- sion to Porto Eico and Cuba of the commercial treatment offered to Spain in the Philippines for ten years; but that, recognizing the advisability of concluding a com- mercial agreement between the countries, the subject might be treated of in a general commercial convention. With respect to the return and transportation at the expense of each nation of the prisoners taken by it, it was agreed, as an addi- tion to Article VIII, that Spain and the United States should transport them at their expense to the nearest port of their respec- tive countries, but that the trans- portation of prisoners of war taken in the Philippines should not in- clude native soldiers but only Peninsular Spaniards in the army. The Secretaries-General of the two Commissions were charged with the framing of this addition to Article VIII. With regard to the return of the war material in Cuba and Porto Pico not disposed of by the evac- uation commissions, the American Commissioners declared that they were not authorized to treat. With respect to the war material in the Philippines, the American Commissioners stated tb at it should be governed by the same condi- tions as were agreed to by the evacuation commissions in the West Indies. de no tratar dichos puntos hasta que se hayan discutido y aprobado definitivamente los asuntos que son iuherentes y esenciales al Tratado de paz propiamente dicho. Se convino en comenzar por comunicarse ambas Comisiones las contestaciones respectivas de sus Gobiernos 4 los puntos que les fueron sometidos anteriormeute y manifiesta el Presidente de la Comision Americana en primer lugar, que su Gobierno no esta dispuesto d conceder y consignar en este Tratado de paz la extension A Puerto Eico y 4 Cuba del trato comercial ofrecido 4 Espana du- rante diez aiios en Filipinas ; pero que reconociendo la coveniencia de que se pacte un acuerdo comer- cial entre ambos paises, podria tra- tarse este asunto en un tratado de comercio. Eespecto de la devoluci6n y tras- porte por cuenta de una y otra Naci6n de los prisioneros hechos por cada una de ellas, se acuerda como adicion al Articulo VIII, que Espaiia y los Estados Unidos los trasportaran 4 su costa al puerto m^s cercano de sus paises respectivos, pero que el trasporte de los prisioneros de guerra hechos en Filipinas, no se extender^ 4 los soldados indigenas sino a los indi- viduos peninsulares de aquel ejer- cito. Los Secretarios Generales de ambas Comisiones quedan encarga- dos de la redaccion de esta adicion al Articulo VIII. En lo relativo d la devolucion del material de guerra en Cuba y Puer- to Eico de que no hayan dispuesto las Comisiones de evacuacion, la Comision Americana se declarain- comi)etente para tratar. Eespecto del material de guerra existente en Filipinas, los Comisa- rios Americanos manifestaron que debia ajustarse A, lasmismas condi- ciones acordadas por las Comisio- nes de evacuacion en las Antillas. TREATY OF PEACE. 229 The President of tlie Spanish Commission and his colleagues maintained that the cession of the archipelago did not carry and could not carry with it anything except what was of a fixed nature; they explained the character of the siege artillery and heavy ordnance which the Americans claimed for themselves, and after some dis- cussion to the end of determining precisely what each Commission understood as portable and fixed material, it was agreed that stands of colors, uncaptured war vessels, small arms, guns of all calibres, with their carriages and accesso- ries, powder, ammunition, live stock, and materials and supplies of all kinds belonging to the land and naval forces shall remain the property of Spain; that pieces of heavy ordnance, exclusive of field artillery, in the fortifications, shall remain in their empjacements for the term of six months to be reck- oned from the ratification of the treaty; and that the United States might, in the mean time, purchase such material from Spain, if a sat- isfactory agreement between the two Governments on the subject should be reached. It was agreed that the Secreta- ries-General of the two Commis- sions should be entrusted with the framing of such an article. The President of the Spanish Commission, having agreed at the last session to consult his Govern- ment regarding the proposal of the American Commissioners that the United States should maintain I)ublic order over the whole Philip- pine Archipelago, pending the ex- change of ratifications of the treaty of peace, stated that the answer of his Government was that the authorities of each of the two nations should be charged with the maintenance of order in the places where they might be established, those authorities agreeing among themselves to this end whenever they might deem it necessary. El Presidente de la Comision Espanola y sus colegas manifesta- ron que la ce8i6n de dicho Archi- pi61ago no llevaba ni podia llevar consigo sino lo que es de caracter inmueble, explicaron las coudi- ciones de la artillerfa de plaza y de sitio que reclamaban para si los Americanos, y desi)U('s de al- guna discusion al efecto de deter- minar con precision lo que una y otra Comision entendian j)or mate- rial portatil y material fijo, sc cm- vieue en que seran propiedad de Espaua banderas y estandartes, buques de guerra no apresados, armas port^tiles, can ones de todos calibres con sus montajes y acce- sorios, polvoras, municioues, ga- nado, material y efectos de toda clase pertenecientes a los ejercitos de mar y tierra; que las jnezas de grueso calibre, que no scan artil- leria de campana, colocadas en las fortificaciones y en las costas, que- daran en sus emplazamientos por el plazo de seis meses 4 partir del canje de ratificaciones del tratado; y que los Estados Unidos podrdn, durante este tiempo, comprar a Espana dicho material si ambos Gobiernos llegan 4 uu acuerdo satisfactorio sobre el particular. Se acuerda que los Secretarios Generales de ambas Comisiones queden encargados de redactar dicho articulo. El Presidente de la Comisi6n Espanola habiendo quedado en la sesion anterior en consultar 4 su Gobierno, respecto la proposicion de los Comisarios Americanos por la cual los Estados Unidos man- tendrian el orden en todo el Archi- pielago fili])ino, mieutras se ratifl- caba el Tratado de paz, manifiesta que la contestacion de su Gobierno es que las Autoridades decada una de ambas naciones cuiden de cou- servar el orden en las regiones en que se hallen establecidas y po- niendose con este objeto de acuer- do Unas y otras cuando lo estimen necesario. 230 TREATY OF PEACE. In view of this reply the Ameri- can Commissioners did not insist that their proposal should be incor- porated in the treaty. The readingin English and Span- ish of the articles of the treaty from the first to the eighth inclu- sive was then proceeded with, and they were approved by both Com- missions, which declared them to be final save as to mere modifica- tions of form, upon which the Sec- retaries-General might endeavor to agree. The President of the American Commission, desiring that the dis- cussion of the matters presented by that Commission should next be taken up,thePresidentof the Span- ish Commission maintained the opinion which he had expressed at the last session, and at the begin- ningof this, to the effect that theex- anniuition of those matters should not be entered upon until the Com- missions had discussed what was essential to the treaty of peace, and that therefore the articles pro- loosed by the Spanish Commission as additional to the first eight, should be taken up. It was agreed that in view of the lateness of the hour the session should be adjourned until tomor- row, Tuesday, the 6th instant, at two, p. m. William E. Day CusHMAN K, Davis Wm P Frye Geo, Gray Whitelaw Eeid. John B. Moore. En vista de esta contestaci6n, los Comisarios Americanos no in- sistieron en que formase su propo- siciou parte del Tratado. Se i)rocede en seguida ^ la lec- tura en espaiiol y en ingles de los articiilos del tratado desde el pri- mero al ocho inclusive y son apro- bados por ambas Comisiones que los declaran defiaitivos salvas cu- alquieramodificaciondemera forma sobre las cuales tratarian de po- nerse de acuerdo los Secretarios Geiierales. Deseando entonces el Presidents de la Comision Americana que se pasase a la discusion de los puntos presentados por su Comision, y mantenieudo el Presideute de la Comision Espauola el criterio que habia sostenido en la sesion ante- rior y al priucipio de esta, de que no podia pasarse al examen de dichos puntos sin haber antes di- scutido cuanto era esencial al tra- tado de paz y tomando por tan to en consideracion los articulos adi- cionales 4 los ocho primeros, pro- puestos por la Comision Espaiiola, acordose que en vista de lo avan- zado de la bora se aplazasela sesi6n hasta mail ana martes 6 del corri- ente a las dos, p. m. EUGENIO MONTERO ElOS B. DE Abarzuza J. DE GARNICA W E DE Villa Urrutia Eafael Cerero Emilio De Ojeda Annex to Protocol ISTo. 19. THE EIGHT ARTICLES AS DISCUSSED IN THE CONFERENCE. PREAMBLE. The United States of America and Her Majesty the Queen Ee- gent of Spain, in the name of her August Sou Don Alfonso XIII, PREAMBULO. S. M. la Eeina Eegente de Es- pafia, en nombre de Su Augusto Hijo Don Alfonso XIII. y los Es- tados Uuidos de America, dese- TREATY OF PEACE. 231 desiring to end the state of war now existing between tlie two countries, have for that purpose appointed as Plenipotentiaries: The President of the United States, William R. Day, lately Secretary of State; Cushman K. Davis, a Senator of the United States; William P. Frye, a Senator of the United States; George Gray, a Senator of the United States j and Whitelaw Reid, lately Minis- ter Plenipotentiary of the United States to France; And Her Majesty the Queen Regent of Spain, (here insert names and titles). Who, having assembled in Paris, and having exchanged their full powers, which were found to be in due and proper form, have, after discussion of the matters before them, agreed upon the following articles : Article I. Spain hereby relinquishes all claim of sovereignty over and title to Cuba. And as the island is, upon its evacuation by Spain, to be occu- pied by the United States, the United States will, so long as such occupation shall last, assume and discharge the obligations that may under international law at- tach to its character as occupant, for the protection of life and prop- erty. Article II. Spain hereby cedes to the United States the Island of Porto Rico and other islands now under Span- ish sovereignty in the West Indies, and the Island of Guam in the Ladrones or Marianas. ando poner t^rmino al estado de guerra hoy existente entre ambas Naciones, han nombrado con este objeto por sus Plenipotenciarios, a saber : S. M. la Reina Regente de Es- paQa d (aqui se insertau los uom- bres) y el Presidente de los Estados Unidos de America 4 (aqui se in- sertau los nombres). Los cuales reunidos en Paris, despues de habersecomunicado sus plenipotencias respectivas, habien- dolas hallado en buena y debida forma, previa la discusion de las materias pendieutes, han conve- nido en los articuios siguientes : Arti'culo 1". Espana por el presente renuncia todo derecho de Soberania y pro- piedad sobre la Isla de Cuba. En atencion a que dicha Isla esta 4 punto de ser evacuada por Espana y ocupada por los Estados Unidos, los Estados Unidos mientras dure su ocupacion, tomardn sobre si y cumj)liran las obligaciones que el derecho internacioual impone 4 un caracter de ocui^antes, para la pro- teccion de vidas y haciendas. Arti'culo 2°. Espana par el presente Tratado cede a los Estados Unidos la Isla de Puerto Rico y las demas que estan ahora bajo su soberania en las ludias Occidentales, y la Isla de Guam en el Archipi^lago de las Marianas 6 Ladrones. Article III. Spain hereby cedes to the United States the archipelago known as Articulo 3°. Cede tarabien Espaiia a los Esta- dos Unidos el Archipielago cono- 232 TREATY OF PEACE. the Philippine Islands, and com- prehending the islands lying within the following line: A line running from west to east along or near the twentieth par- allel of north latitude, and through themiddle of the navigablechannel of Bachi, from the one hundred and eighteenth (118th) to the one hun- dred and twenty- seventh (127th) degree meridian of longitude east of Greenwich, thence along the one hundred and twenty-seventh (127th) degree meridian of longi- tude east of Greenwich to the par- allel of four degrees and forty five minutes (4° 45') north latitude, thence along the parallel of four degrees and forty-five minutes (4° 45') north latitude to its inter- section with the meridian of longi- tude one hundred and nineteen degrees and thirty-five minutes (1 i 9°35') east of Greenwich, thence along the meridian of longitude one hundred and nineteen degrees and thirty-five minutes (119° 35') east of Greenwich to the parallel of lati- tude seven degrees and forty min- utes (7° 40') north, thence along the parallel of latitude of seven degrees and forty minutes (7° 40') north to its intersection with the one hundred and sixteenth (lU)th) degree meridian of longitude east of Greenwich, thence by a direct line to the intersection of the tenth (10th) degree parallel of north lat- itude with the one hundred and eighteenth (118th) degree meridian of longitude east of Greenwich, and thence along the one hundred and eighteenth ( I18th) degree meridian of longitude east of Greenwich to the point of beginning. The United States will pay to Spain the sum of twenty million dollars ($20,000,000) within three months after the exchange of the ratifications of the present treaty. Article IV. The United States will, upon the signature of the present treaty, send, back to Spain, at its own cost, cido por Islas Filipinas, situado dentro de las lineas siguieutes : Una linea que corre de Oeste d Este, cerca del 20° paralelo de lati- tud Norte, a traves de la mitad del canal navegable de Bachi, desde el 118° al 127° grados de longitud Este de Greenwich; de aqui a lo largo del ciento veintisiete (127) grado meridiano de longitud Este de Greenwich al paralelo cuatro grados cuarenta y cinco minutos (4° 45') de latitud Norte; de aqui sguendo el paralelo de cuatro gra- dos cuarenta y cinco minutos de latitud Norte (4° 45') hasta su in- terseccion con el meridiano de longitud ciento diez y uueve grados y treinta y cinco minutos (119° 35') Este de Greenwich; de aqui siguiendo el meridiano de longitud ciento diez ynueve grados y trienta y cinco minutos (119° 35') Este de Greenwich al ijaralelo de latitude siete grado cuarenta minutos (7° 40') Norte, de aqui siguiendo el paralelo de latitud siete grados cuarenta minutos (7° 40') Norte 4 su interseccion con el ciento diez y seis (116°) grado meridiano de longitud Este de Greenwich, de aqui por una linea recta a la inter- seccion del decimo grado paralelo de latitud Norte, con el ciento diez y ocho (118°) grado meridiano de longitud Este de Greenwich, y de aqui siguiendo el ciento diez y ocho grado (118°) meridiano de longitud Este de Greenwich al puntoeu que comienza esta demarcacion. Los Estados Unidos pagar^n 4 Espaiia la suma de veinte millones de dollars ($20,000,000) dentro de tres meses despues del canje de ratificaciones del presente tratado. Abticulo 4". Los Estados Unidos al ser fir- mado el presente tratado trasporta- r4naEspana 4su costa los soldados TREATY OF PEACE. 2S5 the Spanish soldiers taken as pris- oners of war on the capture of Ma- nila by the American forces. The arms of the soldiers in question shall be restored to them. Spain will, upon the exchange of the ratitications of the present treaty jjroceed to evacuate the Philippines, as well as the Island of Guam, on terms similar to those agreed upon by the Commissioners appointed to arrange for the evac- uation of Porto Rico and other islands in the West Indies, under the Protocol of August 12 1898, which is to continue iu force till its provisions are completely executed. The time within which the evacua- tion of the Philippines and of the Island of Guam shall be completed shall be fixed by the two Govern- ments. Article V. In conformity wi th the provi sion s of Articles I, II and III of this treaty, Spain relinquishes in Cuba, and cedes in Porto Rico and other Islands in the West Indies, in the Island of Guam, and in the Philip- pi ue Archipelago, all the buildings, wharves, barracks, forts, struc- tures, public highways and other immovable property which in con- formity with law belong to the pub- lic domain, and as such belong to the Crown of Spain. And it is hereby declared that the relinquishment or cession, as the case may be, to which the pre- ceding paragraph refers, cannot in any respect impair the property or rights which by law belong to the peaceful i>ossession of property of all kinds, of provinces, municipal- ities, public or private establish- ments, ecclesiastical or civic bodies, or any other associations having legal capacity to acquire and pos- sess property in the aforesaid ter- ritories renounced or ceded, or of private individuals, of whatsoever nationality such individuals may be. espafioles que hicieron ju'isioneros de guerra las fnerzas Americanas al ser capturada Manila. Las armas de estos soldados les serdn devueltas. EspaQa al ratificarseel presente tratado, procedera a evacuar las IslasFilipinas,asicomo lade Guam, en condiciones semejantes a. las acordadas por las comisiones nom- bradas pai a concer tar la e vacuacion de Puerto Rico y otras Islas en las Indias Occidentales, segun el Pro- tocolo de 12 de Agosto de 1898, que continuar4 en vigor hasta que sean completamente cumplidas sus dis- posiciones. El termino dentro del cual sera completadalaevacuacion de las Islas Filipinas y de la de Guam, sera fijada por ambos Go- biernos. Articulo 5°. En cumplimiento delo convenido en los articulos 1°, 2" y 3" de este tratado, Espaha renuncia en Cuba y cede en Puerto Rico y en las otras Islas de las Indias Occidentales y en la Isla de Guam, en las Islas Filipinas, todos los ediflcios, muel- les, cuarteles, fortalezas, estableci- mientos, vias piiblicas y demas bienes inmuebles, que con arreglo 4 derecho son del dominio publico y como tal corresponden 4 la Corona de E span a. Queda por lo tanto declarado que esta renuncia 6 cesiou, segun el caso, d que se refiere el parrafo an- terior, en nada puede mermar la propiedad 6 los derechos que cor- respondan con arreglo a las leyes al poseedor pacifico, de los bienes de todas clases de las provincias, municipios, establecimientos pub- licos 6 i)rivados, corporaciones civi- les 6eciesiAsticas,6 de cualesiiuiera otras colectividades que tienen per- sonalidad juridica para adquirir y Ijoseer bienes en los mencionados territorios renunciados 6 cedidos, y los de los individuos parti culares cualquieraque sea su nacionalidad. 234 TREATY OF PEACE. The aforesaid relinquishment or cession, as the case may be, in- cludes all documents exclusively referring to the sovereignty relin- quished or ceded that may exist in the archives of the Peninsula. Where any document in such archives only in part relates to such sovereignty, a copy of such part will be furuished whenever it shall be requested. Like rules shall be reciprocally observed in favor of Spain in respect of docu- ments in the archives of the islands above referred to. In the aforesaid relinquishment or cession, as the case may be, are also included such rights as the Crown of Spain and its authorities possess in lespect of the official ar- chives and records, executive as well as judicial, in the islands above referred to, which relate to said islands or the rights and property of theirinhabitants. Such archives and records shall be carefully pre- served, and private persons shall without distinction have the right to require, in accordance with law, authenticated copies of the con- tracts, wills and other instruments forming part of notarial protocols or files, or which may be contained in the executive or judicial archives, be the latter in Spain or in the isl- ands aforesaid. Dicha renuncia 6 cesion, segun el caso, incluye todos los docu- mentos que se refleran exclusiva- mente a dicha Soberauia renun- ciada 6 cedida que existan en los Archivosde la Peninsula. Cuando estos documentos existentes en dichos Archives, solo en parte cor- respondan a dicha Soberania, se facilitardn copias de dicha parte, siempre que seau solicitadas. Eeglas analogas habr4n reciproca- mente de observarse en favor de Espana respecto de los documentos existentes en los Archives de las Islas antes mencionadas. En las antescitadas renuncia 6 cesion, segun el caso, se hallan com- prendidos aquellos derechos de la Corona de Espaiia y de sus Autori- dades sobre los Archives y Eegis- tros Oliciales, asi administrativos come judiciales de dichas Islas que se refleran (i ellas 6 4 los derechos y propiedades de sus habitantes. Dichos archives, registres, etc., deber^n ser cuidadesamente cen- servados y los particulares sin excepcion, teudr^u derecho (i sacar con arreglo (i las Leyes, las copias autorizadas de los centratos, testa- mentos y demas documentos que formen parte de los protecelos notariales 6 que se custodien en los archives administrativos 6 judiciales, bien estos se hallen en Espaiia, 6 bien en las Islas de que se hace meucion anteriormente. Article VI. Artioulo 6°. The United States and Spain, in consideration of the provisions of this treaty, hereby mutually relin- quish all claims for- indemnity, na- tional and individual, of every kind, (including all claims for in- demnity for the cost of the war,) of either Government, or of its cit- izens or subjects, against the other Government, that may have arisen since the beginning of the late in- surrection in Cuba and prior to the ratification of the present treaty. Espaiia y los Estados Unides de America en atencion a lo estable- cido per este tratade, renuncian mutuamente per el presente a toda reclamacion de indemnizacien na- cioual 6 privada de cualquier genero (incluyende toda reclama- cion per indemnizacienes per el coste de la guerra), de un Gobi- erno centra el etre, 6 de sus sub- ditos 6 ciudadanos centra el etre Gobierno, que puedau haber sur- gido desde el comienzo de la ulti- ma insurreccion en Cuba y anter- ior 4 la ratificaci6n del presente tratado. TREATY OF PEACE. 235 Article VII. The United States will, for the term of ten years from the date of the exchange of the ratifications of the present treaty, admit Span- ish ships and merchandise to the ports of the Philippine Islands on the same terms as ships and mer- chandise of the United States. Article VIII. Spain will, upon the signature of the present treaty, release all per- sons held by her as prisoners, mili- tary or political, in connection with the insurrections in Cuba and the Philippines, and the war with the United States. Eeciprocally, the United States will release all persons make pris- oners of war by the American forces, and will undertake to ob- tain the release of all Spanish pris- oners in the hands of the insur- gents in Cuba and the Philippines. Artictjlo 70. Los Estados Unidos durante el t^rmino de diez auos 4 coutar desde el canje de la ratificacion del pre- sente tratado, admitirdn en los puertos de las Islas Filipinas los buques y las mercaucias espanoles, bajo las mismas coudiciones que los bnques y las mercancias de los Estados Unidos. Articulo S". Espana al ser firmado el pre- sente tratado, pondrd en libertad a todos los detenidos en calidad de prisioneros de guerra 6 por delitos politicos, a cousecuencia de las in- surrecciones en Cuba, y en Filipi- nas, y de la guerra con los Estados Unidos. Eeciprocamentelos Esta- dos Unidos pondr^n en libertad 4 todos los prisioneros de guerra he- chos por las fuerzas Americanas y gestionar^n la libertad de todos los prisioneros espanoles en poder de los insurrectos de Cuba y de Fili- pinas. Protocol No. 20. Conference of December 6, 1S98. Present — On the part of the United States Messrs. Day, Davis, Frye, Gray, Eeid, Moore, Fegusson. On the part of Spain: Messrs: Montero Kios, Abarzuza, Garnica, Villa- Urrutia, Cerero, Ojeda. The protocol of the preceding session was read and approved. The President of the American Commission, referring to the dis- cussion that had taken place at the two preceding sessions on the sub- ject of procedure, stated that he recognized the force of the position of the President of the Spanish Commission that the articles re- lating to the necessary part of the treaty should first be taken up; Protocolo No. 20. Conferencia del 6 de Biciembre de 1898. Presentes. Por parte de los Es- tados Unidos de America: los Seiiores Day, Davis, Frye, Gray, Eeid, Moore, Fergusson. Por parte de Espaiia: los Seno- res Montero Eios, Abarzuza, Gar- nica, Villa-Urrutia, Cerero, Ojeda. El acta de la sesion anterior fu6 leida y aprobada. El Presidente de la Comision Americana, refirieudose A la discu- sion habida en las dos anteriores sesioues respecto al orden de tra- bajos, declaro reconocer la razon que tenia el Presidente de la Comi- sion Espaiiola para discutir en pri- mer termino los articulos relativos A la parte necesaria del tratado j pero que, en opinion de los Comi- 236 TREATY OF PEACE. but that, in the opinion of the American Commissioners, nothing was more strictly pertinent to a treaty of peace than a clause for the revival of treaties, which the war had suspended or terminated, such, for example, as the extradi- tion treaty between the two coun- tries; and he therefore proposed that the Joint Commission should take up, first, the article proposed by the American Commissioners for the revival of former treaties, then the articles ])roposed by the Spanish Commissioners, and then the rest of the articles proposed by the American Commissioners. The President of the Spanish Commission replied that he felt compelled to insist upon the con- tention of that Commission on the subject of procedure, and that he begged to differ as to the order in which the article for the revival of treaties should be discussed ; while such an article might be relevant to a treaty of peace, yet it was usually the last article of all, and should therefore be the last con- sidered. The President of the American Commission observed that, while the American Commissioners felt that their view was reasonable and proper, they desired to proceed with the business of the Joint Com- mission; and he inquired whether, if the articles proposed by the Spanish Commission were taken up and considered, all the articles proposed by the American Com- mission would then in like manner be taken up and considered. The President of the Spanish Commission answered in the affirm- ative, adding that he had not pro- posed to take up the articles of the Spanish Commission because they were its articles, but because they were specially appropriate to a treaty of peace. The President of the American Commission then took up the sub- ject of nationality, in regard to sarios Americanos, nada habia mds estrictamente pertinente 4 un tra- tado de paz que la renovacion de los tratados suspendidos 6 termi- nados por la guerra, tales como, por ejemplo, el tratado de extradi- cion entre los dos paises; por lo cual proponia que la Comision en pleno se ocupara en primer termiuo del articulo projiuesto i)or los Comi- sarios Americanos para renovar los anteriores tratados, siguiendo con los articulos propuestos por los Comisarios Espafioles y acabando con los dem4s articulos propuestos por los Comisarios Americanos. EI Presidente de la Comision EsijaSola replied que debia insistir en el punto de vista adoptado por esta Comision respecto al procedi- miento, sintiendo no estar de acuerdo respecto al orden en que se habia de discutir el articulo relative a la renovacion de los tra- tados, i)ues si bien es verdad que este articulo suele insertarse en los tratados de paz, ordinaria- mente es el ultimo de todos, y debe por lo tanto ser el ultimo de los que se estudian. El Presidente de la Comisi6n Americana replied que, aunque los Comisarios Americanos entendian que su punto de vista era razon- able y adecuado, deseaben sin embargo adelantar los trabajos de la Comision mixta, ypregun to que si los articulos i^ropuestos por la Comision Espaiiola eran discu tides y examiuados, serian a su vez todos los articulos proi)uestos por la Comision Americana de igual manera discutidos y examinados El Presidente de la Comision Es- panola contesto afiimativamente, afiadiendo que no habia propuesto discutir los articulos dela Comision Espafiola porque fuesen los suyos propios, sino po)qae eran especial- mente propios de un Tratado de paz. El Presidente de la Comision Americana empezo ocup^ndose de nacion alidad, respecto a la cual la TREATY OF PEACE. 237 which the American Commission originally presented the following article : "Article VI. Spanish subjects residing in the territory over which Spain by the present treaty relin- quishes or cedes her sovereignty may remain in such territory, or may remove therefrom, retaining, in either event, all their rights of property; and, in case they remain, they may preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain, by making, before a court of record, within a year from the date of the signature of this treaty, a declaration of their decision to reserve such allegiance, in default of which declaration they shall be held to have renounced it and to have adopted the national- ity of the territory in which they may reside. Except as provided in tins treaty, the civil rights and political status of the inhabitants of the territories hereby ceded to the United States shall be deter- mined by the Congress." To this article the Spanish Com- missioners proposed on the 30th of November the amendments con- tained in the two following articles : " NATIONALITY. " Article — . Spanish subjects now or hereafter residing or domi- ciled in the territory the sover- eignty over which Spain relin- quishes or cedes by the present treaty may live in or withdraw from said territory, acquiring and retaining in either case every kind ofproperty, or, alienatingand freely disposing thereof or of its value or proceeds; practice, with the free- dom they now enjoy, industry, com- merce, and other mechanical or lib- eral professions, and enjoy their personal status, without being sub- ject to any exception prejudicial to the rights secured to them by this treaty. If they reinain in the ter- ritory they shall be allowed to pre- serve their nationality by making before the proper officer a declara- Comision Americana presento en un principio el articulo que sigue : "Articulo VI. Los subditos espanoles que residan en el terri- torio cuya Soberania Espana ha renunciado 6 cedido por el presente tratado, podran permanecer en dicho territorio, 6 podran salir de 61, conservando en ambos casos todos sus derechos de propiedad, y en el caso de que permauecieran en 6\, podr4n conservar su nacion- alidad espaiiola haciendo ante una Oflcina de registro, dentro del aiio de la fecha de la lirma de este tratado, una declaracion de su proposito de conservar dicha na- cionalidad; 4 falta de esta decla- racion, se considerara que han renunciado su nacionalidad y aceptado la del territorio en que residen. A excepcion de lo dis- puesto por este tratado, los dere- chos civiles y la capacidad poli- tica de los habitantes de los territories aqui cedidos ^ los Estados Unidos, ser4n definidos por el Congreso." En 30 de Noviembre, los Comi- sarios Espafioles propusieron que este Articulo se enmendara por medio de los dos articulos sigui- entes : ' ' NACIONALIDAD. "Articulo — . Los subditos es- paiioles residen tes 6 domiciliados al presente 6 en lo futuro en el terri- torio cuya soberania Espaila re- nun cia 6 cede por el presente tra- tado, podran vivir en dicho terri- torio 6 retirarse de 61, adquiriendo y conservando en nno ii otro caso, toda clase de propiedad 6 realizan- dola y disponiendo libremente de ella 6 de su valor 6 producto, ejer- cer con la libertad que actualmente tienen, la industria, el comercio y demfis j)rofesiones mecdnicas 6 liberales y gozar de su estatuto personal; sin que puedan ser some- tides .4 ningtin regimen de excep- cion en perjuicio de los derechos que en este tratado se les recono- cen. Si permanecen en el territo- rio, podrdn conservar su nacionali- 238 TREATY OF PEACE. tioii of such intention, within the term of one year, to be reckoned from the date of the exchange of ratifications of this treaty or the taking up of their residence therein. " Failure to comply with this re- quirement shall be considered as a renunciation of their nationality, and the adoption of that of the ter- ritory in which they may reside. Save in the cases covered by this treaty, the civil rights and political condition of the Spaniards living in ceded territories shall be gov- erned by the laws applicable to all other foreigners in the territory of their residence. "Article — . All the other in- habitants of the territories ceded shall have the right to choose the Spanish nationality within the period of one year to be reckoned from the date of the exchange of the ratifications of this treaty, the choice to be made in the manner provided for in the preceding arti- cle. Notice thereof shall be given immediately to the Spanish Gov- ernment, or to its consular officers, and without which requisite the nationality thus chosen shall not be at any time recognized." The American Commissioners proposed, at this meeting, as a snb- stitute for the foregoing articles, the following article: "Aeticle VI. Spanish sub- jects, natives of the Peninsula, re- siding in the territory over which Spain by the present treaty relin- quishes or cedes her sovereignty may remain in such territory or may remove therefrom, retaining in either event all their rights of prop- erty, including the right to sell or dispose of such property or of its proceeds ; and they shall also have the right to carry on their indus- try, commerce and professions, being subject in respect thereof to such laws as are applicable to dad haciendo ante una oficina publica de registro una declaracion de su prop6sito de conservar dicha nacionalidad, dentro del t4rmino de un alio, que se coutard, desde la fecha del canje de ratiticacionesde este tratado, 6 desde que aquellos fijen alli su residencia. " Si faltasen 4 este requisito, se les considerar4como si la hubiesen renuuciado y adoptado la nacion- alidad del territorio en que residan. Bxcepto en cuanto previene este tratado, los derechos civiles y con- dicion politica de los espanoles habitantes en los territorios cedi- dos, se regiriin por las leyes comuues 4 todos los demiis extraugeros en el territorio de su residencia." " Articulo — . Los dem4s habi- tantes de los territorios cedidos podran optar por la nacionalidad espafiola en el termino de un ailo, h contar desde el cambio de ratifl- caciones de este tratado, habiendo de hacer esta opcion en la forma prescrita en el articulo anterior y ponerla inmediatamente aderaas en conocimiento del Gobierno Es- paiiol 6 de sus agentes cousular^s, sin cuyo requisito no les sera re- conocida en ningiin tiempo la na- cionalidad de su opcion." Los Comisarios Americanos pro- ponen en esta sesion, que los ante- riores articulos scan sustituidos por el siguiente: "Artioulo VL Los siibditos espailoles naturales de la Penin- sula, que residan en el territorio cuya soberania Espaha renuncia 6 cede por el presente tratado, po- dran permanecer en dicho territo- rio 6 march arse de el, conservaudo en uno ti otro caso todos sus dere- chos de propiedad, con inclusion del derecho de vender 6 disponer de tal propiedad ode susproductos ; y ademas tendr4n el derecho de ajercer su industria, commercio 6 profesion, sujettindose 4 este re- specto 4 las leyes que sean apjjli- TREATY OF PEACE. 239 other foreigners. In case they re- main in the territory they may pre- serve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain by making, before a court of record, within a year from the date of the exchange of ratifica- tions of this treaty a declaration of their decision to preserve sucli alle- giance; in default of which decla- ration they shall be held to have renounced it and to have adopted the nationality of the territory in which they may reside. "The civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the territories hereby ceded to the United States shall be determined by the Congress." The President of the Spanish Commission objected to this article, as it was read, on various grounds ; and, after some discussion, the President of the American Com- mission stated that with respect to the article in question, as well as the other articles which the Ameri- can Commissioners might adopt, they would require, as a necessary condition of their adoption, the in- sertion in each article that was to run for a length of time of a clause limiting the obligation of the United States thereunder, in re- spect of Cuba, to the time of its occupation of the island, or else the insertion in the treaty of a gen- eral clause to this eflect, as follows : "Itis understood thatany obliga- tion assumed by the United States with respect to Cuba is limited to the time of its occupancy thereof." No conclusion having been reached on the articles in question; it was agreed that the rest of the articles should be read and then handed to the Spanish Commis- sioners in order that they might consider them and give their answer to the counter - proposals of the United States at the next confer- ence, and that all the articles should be inserted in the protocol of today's conference. cables A los demils extrangeros. En el caso de que permanezcan en en el territorio, podr4n conservar su nacionalidad Espaiiola haciendo ante una oflcina de registro, dentro de un alio despues del cambio de ratificaciones de esta tratado, una declaracion de su proposito de con- servar dicha nacionalidad; ^ falta de esta declaracion, se considerarA que han renunciado dicha naciona- lidad y adoptado la del territorio en el cual pueden residir. "Los derechos civiles y la con- dicion politica de los naturales que habitan los territorios aqui cedidos 4 los Estados Unidos se determi- naran por el Congreso." El Presidente de la Comision Espanola present© variasobjeciones al texto de este articulo, y despues de alguna discusion, el JPresidente de la Comision Americana declaro que con respecto al articulo en cuestion, como 4 los demas que los Comisarios Americanos puedan aceptar, pediran que, como con- dicion necesaria de su adopcion, se iuserte en todos los articulos que deban estar en vigor durante cierto tiempo, una clausula limi- tando la obligacion que de ellos se derive para los Estados Unidos, con respecto 4 Cuba, al tiempo de su ocupacion de la Isla, 6 en otro caso que se inscriba en el tratado una clausula general que diga: " Se entiende que cualquier obli- gacion asumida por los Estados Unidos con respecto 4 Cuba, se limita al tiempo que ocupen d esta." No habien dose adoptado acuerdo alguno sobre este articulo, se con- vino en que se leyeran los dem^s y se entregaran a los Comisarios Espaiioles, para que pudieran ex- aminarlos y coutestar 4 las contra- proposiciones de los Estados Uni- dos en la sesi(3n pr6xima, decidit^n- dose ademds que, todos los articu)os se insertaran en el protocolo de la conferencia de hoy. 240 TREATY OF PEACE. Pursuant to this agreement, the following articles oft'ered by the Spanish Commission were read : "GRANTS AND CONTRACTS FOR PUBLIC WORKS AND SERVICES. "Article — . "All grants and contracts for public works and services in the islands of Cuba, Porto Rico, the Philippines and other ceded terri- tory shall be maintained in force until their expiration, in accord- ance with the terms thereof, the new Government assuming all the rights and obligations thereby at- taching up to the present time to the Spanish Government. "public contracts. "Article — . " Contracts formally entered into by the Spanish Government or its authorities for the public service of the islands of Cuba, and Porto Rico, the Philippines and others ceded by this treaty, and which contracts are still unperformed, shall continue in force until their expiration pursuant to the terms thereof. Such contracts >as also cover the service peculiar to Spain or any of her other colonies, the new Government of the above mentioned islands shall not be called upon to carry out, save only in so far as the terras of said con- tracts relate to the particular serv- ice or treasury of such islands. The new Government will there- fore, as regards the said contracts, be h olden to all the riglits and obligations therein attaching to the Spanish Government. "List of Pending Contracts for Public Works and Services. "Mail and Transportation con- tract with the Corapauia Transat- lantica. E n cumplimiento de este acuer do, fueron leldos los siguientes articu- los que habian sido propuestos por la Comision Espaiiola: "CONCESIONES DE OBRAS Y SERVICIOS PUBLICOS. "Articulo — . Continuaran observ4ndose igu- alraente todas las concesiones de obras y servicios publicos en las islas de Cuba, Puerto Rico, Fili- pinas y denies territorios cedidos, hasta su cancelacion, con arreglo a las chiusulas con que hubiesen sido otorgadas, subrogandose el nuevo Gobierno en los derechos y en las obligaciones que por dichos contratos correspondieron hasta ahora al Gobierno Espanol." "CONCESIONES DE OBRAS Y SERVICIOS PUBLICOS "Articulo— Los contratos regularmente cel- ebrados por el Gobierno Espanol 6 j)or sus Autoridades para el servi- cio publico de las Islas de Cuba, Filipinas, Puerto Rico y demas que se ceden por este tratado, y cuyos contratos eston pendientes de cum- plimiento, coutinuardn observau- dose hasta su terminacion, con ar- reglo d, sus clausulas. "En aquellos en que tambi^n estuviese interesado el servicio pe- culiar de Espaiia 6 de cualquiera de sus demas colonias, el nuevo Gobierno de las islas sobredichas, no concurrira a su cumplimiento, sino en la parte que, con arreglo al contrato misrao, corresponda a su servicio y Tesoro especial. " Quedara por lo tanto el nuevo Gobierno subrogado en lugar del Bspaiiol, en todos los derechos y ob- ligaciones que de los mencionados contratos pudierau resultar en favor 6 en contra de aquel. "Lista de contratos pendientes por obras y servicios publicos. "Contrato para correos y tras- portes con la Compafiia Trasatlan- tica." TREATY OF PEACE. 241 ' Contract with English Com- pany ('Cuba Submarine') for theca- ble on the south of Cuba. "Cable contract, Manila to Hong Kong, with another English Com- pany ('The Eastern'). "Railroad concesssien from Ma- nila to Dagupan. "All other concessions for rail- roads now in operation or under construction in Cuba or Porto Rico. "The above are all the contracts at present recalled, although it can- not be stated that there are not others relative to public works and services. None of recent date. "December 1,1898." The President of the American Commission stated that the Ameri- can Commissioners were con- strained to reject these articles. The United States did not propose to repudiate any contract found upon investigation to be binding under International Law; but no such clauses as now proposed had been inserted in treaties heretofore made by the United States with Spain, France, Mexico and Russia, for the acquisition of territory ; and it might be assumed that the United States would deal justly and equita- bly in respect of contracts tliat were binding under the principles of In- ternational Law. The following article, proposed by the Spanish Commission, was then read : " Contrata de la Oompafiia Ingle- sa (Cuba Submarine) para el cable en el Sur de Cuba. "Contrato del cable de Manila 4 Hong Kong con otra Compania Inglesa (The Eastern). " Concesion del ferrocaril de Ma- nila (i Dagupdn. "Todas las dem^s concesion es de ferro-carriles en explotacion 6 en construccion en Cuba y Puerto Rico. "Estos son los contratos que ahora se recuerdan, auuque no puede decirse si hay otros relatives 4 obras y servicios publicos, ningu- no de ellos de fecha reciente. " 1° de DKiembre de 1898." El Presidente de la Comision Americana declare que los Comisa- rios Americanos se veiau obligados a rechazar estos Articulos. Los Estados LTnidos no se proponen re- pudiar ningun contrato que, al ser examinado, se encueutreque obliga segun la ley internacional; pero clausulas parecidas a la que ahora se propone no se han insertado en tratados anterionnente celebrados porlos Estados Unidos con Espana, Francia, Mexico y Rusia por ad- quisicion de territories ; y podia admitirse que los Estados Unidos obrar^m con justicia y erjuidad en los contratos que los obliguen con areglo a los principios del derecho internacional. Se leyo el siguiente articulo, pro- l)uesto por la Comision Espaiiola: "religion. "religi6n. "Article — , "Articulo — . The Roman Catholic Apostolic Religion, its institutions and minis- ters, shall continue to enjoy in all the territories which are the sub- ject of this treaty the lioerty and the rights in the undisturbed pos- session of which they are at present. "The members of this Church, whatever their nationality, shall T P 16 La Religion Catolica Apostolica Romana y sus instituciones y min- istros continuaran gozando en todos los territories que son objeto de este tratado, de la libertad y prerogativas en cuya pesesion pacifica se hallan. " Los fieles de esta Inglesia, cual- quiera que sea su nacionalidad, 242 TREATY OF PEACE. continne to enjoy the same liberty they now enjoy with respect to the profession of their religion and the exercise of their form of worship." The President of the American Commission stated that the United States could make no distinction as to religion, and proposed the following article : "RELIGION. continuardn ^sfmismo gozando de la libertad que hoy tieuan para la profesion de su religion y el ejerci- cio de su culto." El Presidente de la Comision Americana declara quelos Estados Unidos no puedeu hacer distincion entre las religiones, y propone el artlculo siguiente: "RELIGION. ARTICLE — . "The inhabitants of the terri- tory over which Spain relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty shall be secured in the free exercise of their religion." The following article, proposed by the Spanish Commissiouj was read: "The 'Maine.' ^^Draft of additional articles to the Treaty of Peace icith the United States. "'MAINE.' "Article — . "At the request of the Spanish Government, the two High Con- tracting Parties agree to appoint an International Commission to be entrusted with investigating the causes of and responsibility for the 'Maine' catastrophe which occurred in the harbor of Havana on February 15, 181)8. This Inter- national Commission shall be com- posed of seven ex^ierts to be ap- pointed as follows: "Three by the Spanish Govern- ment — one to be a Spanish subject, another a British subject, and a third a French subject. "Three by the United States Government — one to be a citizen of the United States, another a Brit- ish subject, and a third a French subject. ARTICULO "Los habitantes del territorio, cuya Soberania Espafia renuncia 6 cede, tendran asegurado el libre ejercicio de su religion." Se ley 6 el siguiente articulo pro- l>uesto por la Comision Espaiiola : "El Maine. '^Proyecto de artioulos adicionales al Tratado de paz con los Estados Unidos. "MAINE "Artioulo — . A petici6n del Gobierno Espa- uol, las dos Altas Partes Contra- tan tes convieuen en nombrar una Comision internacional encargada de depurar las causas y responsa- bilidadesdelacatastrofedelSlaine, ocurrida en el puerto de la Habana el 15 de Febrero de 1898. Esta Comision internacional, se compou- dra de siete tecnicos nombrados de la manera siguiente: " Tres por el Gobierno Espanol, cuyos nombramientoshan derecaer Ijrecisamente uno en un subdito espanol, otro en un subdito brita- nico y el tercero en un subdito frances. " Tres por el Gobierno Norte Americano cuyos nombramientos habran de recaer, uno en un ciu- dadano de los Estados Unidos,otro en un subdito britanico y el tercero en un subdito frances. TEEATY OF PEACE. 243 " The Commission to be presided over, with a deciding vote, by a German expert, chosen by mutual agreement by the Spanish and American Governments. "Should no agreement be reached hereon, the Spanish Gov- ernment shall designate one per- son and the United States Gov- ernment another, both persons to be experts and of German nation- ality, the choice for President to be decided by lot and the drawing to take place at the Department of State at Washington. " The expenses of this Commis- sion are to be borne in equal moie- ties by the two Governments, the Commission to meet in Havana at the earliest possible moment after the consent of the Governments of Germany, France and Great Brit- ain is secured. "In the event of the Spanish Government being found responsi- ble, it shall pay to the United States its share of the expenses of the Commission. Further, a Span- ish warship must go to New York and salute the flag of the United States. " If, on the contrary, the Commis- sion shall decide that Spain is not responsible, attributing the catas- trophe to an accident inside the vessel or other fortuitous cause, the Government of the United States shall pay to Spain its share of the expenses of the Commission. "Moreover, the President of the United States shall report the ar- bitral award to the Congress of the United States, setting forth in the official message the righteous course of the Spanish nation." This article was rejected by the American Commissioners, who stated that they considered the case as closed. The President of the Spanish Commission stated that he was unable to consider it as closed, since the President of the United States had referred to it in his " Presidird la Comision con veto decisivo un tecnico Alem4n,elegido de comun acuerdo por los Gobier- nos Espauol y Americano. Caso de no llegarse 4 un acuerdo, el Go- bierno Espanol designara un indi- viduo y el Norte Americano otro, debiendo ser tecnieos y de nacion- alidad Alemana, y en el Ministero de Negocios Extrangeros de Washington sedicidir4 por suerte el que haya de ser Presidente. "Los dos Gobiernos sufragardn por mitad los gastos de esta Co- mision que deberA reunirse en la Habana 4 la brevedad posible, pre- vio el aseutimientode los Gobiernos de Alemauia, Francia y Gran Bre- tana. "Caso de aparecer responsable el Gobierno Espauol, tendrd que abonar la parte de gastos corre- spoudientes por esta Comision 4 los Estados Unidos. Ademas, un barco de guerra espaiiol tendrd que ir 4 Nueva York a saludar el pa- bellon de los Estados Unidos. "Si, por el contrario, decidiera la Comision la irresponsabilidad de Espana, atribuyendo la catitstrofe 4 un accidente en el interior del buque, 6 caso fortuito, el Gobierno de los Estados Unidos tendr4 que abonar la parte de gastos corre- spondieute por esta Comision d Espaiia. "Ademiis, el Presidente de los Estados Unidos deberd dar cuenta de la sentencia arbitral 4 las CA- maras Norte- Americanas, haciendo constar en el Meusage Olicial la lealtad de proceder de la Naciou Espaiiola." Este articulo fue rechazado por los Comisarios Americanos, quienes declararon que consideraban ter- minado el asunto. El Presidente de la Comisi6n Espanola declare que no podia con- siderarlo como terminado, desde que el Presidente de los Estados Unidos se habia referido 4 61 en su 244 TREATY OP PEACE. message to Congress on Monday last. The President of the American Commission stated that the Amer- ican Commissiooers had not re- ceived a copy of the message and therefore had not read it. The President of the Spanish Commission replied that he had in his possession an extract from it, which he could produce. The President of the American Commission answered that the American Commissioners did not care to continue the discussion of the subject on the present occasion. The following article x>roposed by the Spanish Commissioners was read : Mensage al Congreso el Lunes iiltimo. El presidente de la Oomision Americana declaio que los Comi- sarios Americanos no habian reci- bido copia del Mensage, y por lo tanto no lo habian leido. El Presidente de la Comision Espaiiola contesto que tenia en su poder uu extracto del mismo, que podia presentar. El Presidente de la Comision Americana replico que los Comisa- rios Americanos no estabau dis- puestos a continuar la discusion de este asunto en la ocasion presente. Se leyo el siguiente articulo, pro- pnesto por los Comisarios Espa- noles : "pension to the duke of veragua. "carga de justicia del duque de VERAGUA. "Article — . "The United States will con- tinue paying to the descendants of the Great Discoverer of America, Christopher Columbus, the portion still payable of the pension they have been collecting since the time of their illustrious predecessor, as a proof of the gratiiude of modern civilization which Si)ain has been paying. "This pension, since the Royal Order of Kovember 11, 1829, has been reduced to the two sums fol- lowing: $3,400 (hard dollars) annually, chargeable to the treasury of Poi-to Rico and $4,000 (like dollars) to the treasury of Manila. "The United States and the said descendants by mutual agree- ment may fix the principal repre- sented by these pensions and liq- uidate the latter by delivering over the principal thus agreed on, if deemed mutually advisable." The American Commissioners stated that they rejected this article. Tlie following article, proposed by the Spanish Commissioners, was read; "Articulo — . Los Estados Unidos continu- aran sarisfaciendo 4 los descen- dientes del Gran descubridor de America, Cristobal Colon, la parte de pension todavia subsistente que han venido cobrando, desde los tiempos de su ilustre progenitor, come una prueba de gratitud de la civilizacion moderna, que venia satisfaciendo Espaua. "Esta pension viene reducida desde Real Orden de 11 de ]S^ovi- embre de 1829, a las dos cantidades siguientes : "$3,400 (pesos fuertes anuales, cousignada sobre el Tesoro de Puerto Rico y 4,000 (idem) sobre el Tesoro de Manila. "Los Estados Unidos y dichos descendientes de comim acuerdo podrau capitalizar estas pensiones y extinguirlas por la entrega del capital que iijen, si asi respectiva- mente lotuvieran por conveniente." Los Comisarios Americanos de- elaran que rechazan este articulo. Se leyo el siguiente articulo, pro- puesto por los Comisarios Espa- iioles : TREATY OF PEACE. 245 "deposits and bonds. "Article — . "Moneys received by Govern- ment offices and establishments in the aforesaid territories from Spanish citizens in the way of de- jjosits, consignments, loans and security of all kinds shall be re- turned to the lawful owners, whenever proper, either because of the expiration of the time for which they were made, or because of the fulfilment of the principal obligations by them guaranteed. This restitution shall be made by the Head of the Office where the sums of money were deposited, consigned, loaned, or given as se- curity; and in default thereof by whoever is responsible for such sums under the law." The American Commissioners stated that they rejected this arti- cle. The following article, proposed by the Spanish Commissioners, was then read : "consuls. "Article — . " Spain shall have the power to establish Consular officers in the ports and places of the territories, the sovereignty over which has been either relinquished or ceded by the jiresent treaty." This article the American Com- missioners accepted. The following article, proposed by the Spanish Commissioners,was then read : "jurisdiction of courts. "Article — . The Spaniards residing in the said territories shall be subject in matters civil as well as criminal to the jurisdiction of the Courts of the country wherein they reside, pursuant to the ordinary laws gov- "dep6sitos y fianzas. "Articulo — . Seran devueltos los depositos, consignacioues, prdstamos y fian- zas detodas clases eonstituidas por ciudadanos espafioles'en los estab- lecimientos y oficinas del Estado, existentes en los territorios so- bredichos, 4 sus legitimos dueQos cuando fuere proc-edente su devo- lucion por haber vencido los plazos por que se hubiesen hecho 6 por haberse ya cumi)lido las obligacio- nes priucipales 4 que sirvieron de garantia. Bsta devolucion se hara por el Jefe de la Oficina en que se hubieren entregado las cantidades depositadas, consiguadas, presta- das 6 dadas en fianza, 6 en su de- fecto por quien de dicha devolu- cion deba responder con arreglo 4 las leyes." Los Comisarios Americanos de- clarau que rechazan este articulo. Se leyo el siguiente articulo, pro- puesto por los Comisarios Espano- les: "agentes consulares. "Articulo — . Espana podra establecer Agen- tes consulares en los puertos y plazas de los territorios cuyaren- uncia y cesiou es objeto de este tratado." Los Comisarios Americanos acep- tan este articulo. Se leyo el siguiente articulo, pro- puesto por los Comisarios Espauo- les: "jurisdicci6n civil y criminal. "Articulo — . Los esi^anoles residentes en los mencionados territorios estaran sometidos en lo civil y en lo crim- inal a los Tribunales del pais en que residan con arreglo 4 las leyes comunes que regulen sucompeten- 246 TREATY OF PEACE. erning tlie same; and they shall have the right to appear before said Courts," aud to pursue the same course as citizens of the country to which the Courts be- long." This article the American Com- missioners accepted. The following article, proposed by the Spanish Commissioners, was read : cia, pudiendo comparecer ante los mismos en la misma forma y em- pleando los mismos procedimientos que deban observar los ciudada- nos del pais d que pertenezca el Tribunal." Los Comisarios Americanos acep- tan este articulo. Se leyo el siguiente articulo, pro- puesto por los Comisarios Espaiio- les: "JUIUSDICTION OF C0UKT3. '^Article — . Civil and criminal actions and suits against the Government that may be j)euding at the time of the exchange of the ratifications of this treaty, to which the citizens of the countries the sovereignty over which has been relinquished or ceded are a party and who pur- suant to such treaty cease to be Spaniards shall be tried and deter- mined subject to the following rules: "First. Judgments rendered either in civil or criminal matters, before the date aforesaid, and with respect to which there is no re- course, under the Spanish l«,w, shall be deemed to be final, and shall be executed in due form by competent authority in the terri- tory within which such judgments should be carried out. "Second. Personal actions and cases against the Government which may be pending before the Courts of the Peninsula or the islands adjacent tliereto, wherein a citizen of the said territories who by this treaty ceases to be a Span- iard is the plaintiff, shall, if the de- fendant is a Spaniard, continue to be tried in due form before the said Courts to the rendition of the final judgment. Personal actions where- in the defendant is an inhabitant of the said territories which by this treaty cease to be Spanish, shall be tried by the competent Court of the domicile of the de- "COMPETENCIA DE TUIBUNALE8. "Articulo — . Los pleitos civiles y adminis- trativos y las causas criminales pendientes al hacerse el canje de ratificaciones de este tratado, en que sean parte los ciudadanos resi- deiites en los territorios renunciado y cedidos que con arreglo 4 aquel dejeii de ser espaiioles concluiran de sustanciarse a tenor de las re- glas siguientes: ^'■Primera : Las sentencias dic- tadas antes de la fecha mencioiiada asi en lo civil como en lo criminal, y contra las cuales no haya recursos que iuterponer con arreglo a la ley espafiola, tendran el caracter de ejecutorias y deberan ser cumpli- das por los tramites legales por la autoridad competente en el terri- torio en que proceda su cumj)li- miento. '■^Segunda. Los pleitos civiles por accion personal, ylos adminis- trativos pendientes ante los Tri- bunales de la Peninsula e Islas adyacentes, en que fuese deman- dante un ciudadano de dichos ter- ritorios, que por este tratado deje de ser espanol, continuarau sus- tanciandose por los Tribunales ante quienes penden, hasta que recaiga sentencia ejecutoria, si fuese espanol el demandado. Los tambien por accion personal en que sea demandado un habitante de los sobredichos territorios que ])or este tratado pierda la naciona^ lidad espafiola, pasaran al conoci TREATY OF PEACE. 247 fendant. Actions in rem or mixed actions, when the immovable prop- erty in litigation is situate in the Peninsula or adjacent islands, shall be pursued to final judgment and until the same is executed before the Courts having cognizance thereof. "Third. Criminal actions pend- ing on said date before the Su- preme Court of Spain against citi- zens of the territorj^ relinquished and ceded, which ceases to be Span- ish by this treaty, shall continue under its jurisdiction until final judgment; but this having been once rendered, the cases shall pass for execution to the jurisdiction of the competent Court at the place where the same should be carried out." The American Commissioners proposed, in place of the foregoing article, the following : "jurisdiction of courts. "Article — . Judicial proceedings pending at at the time of the exchange of rati- fications of this treaty in the territo- ries over which Sj^ain relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty shall be determined according to the fol- lowing rules: "1. Judgments rendered either in civil suits between private indi- viduals, or in criminal matters, be- fore the date mentioned, and with respect to which there is no re- course or right of review under the Spanish law, shall be deemed to be final, and shall be executed in due form by competent authority in the territory within which such judgments should be carried out. "3. Civil suits between private individuals which may on the date mentioned be undetermined shall be prosecuted to judgment before the Court in which they may then be pending, or in the Court that mav be substituted therefor. miento del Juez 6 Tribunal del domicilio del demandado que fuese competente. Aquellos en que se ejercite una accion real 6 mixta si el inmueble que fuese su objeto radicase en la Peninsula e Islas adyacentes, contiuuaran hastaque en ellos recaiga ejecutoria y esta sea cumplida ante los Tribunales que de ella estuvieran couociendo. '■'■Tercera. Las causas criminales pendientes en la sobredicha fecha ante el Tribunal Supremo de Es- pana, contra los ciudadanos de los territorios renunciado y cedidos, que dejen de scr espaholes por este tratado, contiuuaran sometidas 4 su jurisdiccion hasta que recaiga sentencia; pero una vez que esta fuese dictada,pasaran para su cum- plimiento (\ la jurisdiccion del Juez que sea competente en el lugar en que aquella deba ser cumplida." Los Comisarios Americanos pro- ponen que el anterior articulo se substituya por el siguiente: "jurisdicci6n de los tribunales. "Articulo — . Los procedimientos judiciales pendientes al canjearse las ratifi- caciones de este tratado, en los territorios sobre los cuales Espana renuncia 6 cede su soberania, se deter minaran con arreglo a las reglas siguientes : "1. Las sentencias dictadas en causas civiles entre particulares, 6 en una materia criminal, antes de la fecha mencionada, y contra las cuales no haya apelacion 6 derecho de revision, con arreglo ^ las leyes espanolas, se considerariin como firmes, y seran ejecutadas en de- bida forma por la Autoridad com- petente en el territorio dentro del cual dichas sentencias deban cum- plirse. "2. Los pleitos civiles entre par- ticulares q ue en le fecha menciou ada no hayan sido juzgados, contiuu- aran su tramitacion ante el Tribunal en que se halle el proceso, 6 ante aquel que lo sustituya. 248 TREATY OF PEACE. "3, Criminal actions pending on the date mentioned before the Su- preme Court of Spain against citi- zens of the territory which by this treaty ceases to be Spanish shall continue under its jurisdiction until final judgment; but, such judgment ha\ing been rendered, the execu- tion thereof shall be committed to the competent authority of the place in which the case arose." The following aiticle, proposed by the Spanish Commissioners, was read : "COYPRIGHTS AND PATENTS. "Article — . The rights of property secured by copyrights and patents acquired by Spaniards in the islands of Cuba, and Porto-Rico, the Philip- pines, and all otber territories ceded, at the time of the exchange of the ratifications of this treaty, shall continue to be respected. Spanish scientific, literary and ar- tistic works, not subversive of pub- licorderin the said territories, shall continuetobe admitted free of duty in the said territories, for twenty- fiv^e (25) years, to be reckoned from the date of the exchange of the ratifications of this treaty, and the proprietary rights of their authors shall be protected for a like period." The American Commissioners proposed, as a substitute, the fol- lowing article: "3. Las acciones en materia cri- minal pendientes en la fecha men- cionada ante el Tribunal Suj^remo de Espaua contra ciudadanos del territorio que segun este tratado deja de ser espanol, continuaran bajo su jurisdiccion hasta que re' caiga la sentencia definitiva; pero una vez dictada esa sentencia, su ejecucion sera encomendada 4 la Autoridad competente del lugar en que la accion se suscito." Se leyo el siguiente articulo, pro- puesto por los Comisarios Espa- noles: "PROPIEDAD I.ITEUAUIA ± INDUSTRIAI . "Articulo — Continuaran respetdndose los derechos de propiedad literaria, artistica 6 industrial adquiriridos por EspaHoles en las Islas de Cuba, Puerto Rico, Filiiiinas y demas territories cedidos, al hacerse el canje de ratificacionet^ de este tratado. Las obras espauolas cientificas, literarias y artisticas, que no scan peligrosas para el orden publico en dichos territorios, continuaran entrando en los mis- nios con franquicia de todo derecho de Aduana durante veinte y cinco (25) afios, 4 contar desdo el canje de ratificaciones de este tratado, y durante el mismo t^rmino ser4 protegida la propiedad de sus autores." Los Comisarios Americanos pro- pusieron que se sustituyese este articulo por el siguiente: "copyright and PATENTS. "Article — . The rights of property secured by copyrights and patents acquired by Spaniards in the island of Cuba, and in Porto Rico, the Phil- ippines, and other ceded territo- ries, at the time of the exchange of the ratifications of this treaty, shall continue to be respected. Spanish scientific, literary and ar- "PKOPRIEDAD LITERARIA E INDUSTRIAL. "Artjculo . Los derechos de propiedad lite- raria e industrial reconocidos 4 los Espanoles por medio de registros y patentes en las Islas de Cuba, Puerto Rico, Filipinas y otros terri- torios cedidos, al canjearse las rati- ficaciones de este tratado, contin- uaran siendorespetados. Lasobras espauolas cientificas, literarias y TREATY OF PEACE. 249 tistic works, not subversive of pub- lic order in the territories in ques- tion sliall continue to be admitted free of duty into such territories, for the period of ten years, to be reckoned from the date of the ex- change of the ratifications of this treaty." The reading of the articles pro- posed by the Spanish Commis- sioners having been completed, the President of the American Commission stated that it was his understanding that the articles proposed by the American Com- missioners would be accepted or rejected by the Spanish Commis- sioners at the next meeting. The President of the Spanish Commission replied that the Span- ish Commissioners would pursue the same course with respect to the American articles as the Amer- ican-Commissioners had pursued with reference to the Spanish arti- cles. On motion of the American Com- missioners the conference was ad- journed till to- morrow, Wednesday , the 7th of December, without prej- udice to the right of the Spanish Commissioners to request a post- ponement. William E. Day CusHMAN K. Davis Wm P Frye Geo. Gray Whitelaw Eeid. John B. Moobe. artisticas, que no sean subversivas contra el orden publico en los terri- torios referidos, continuarjin siendo admitidas libres de derechos en los mismos, durante diez anos a coutar desde el canje de las ratificaciones de este tratado." Habiendose terminado la lectura de los artfculos propuestos por los Comisarios Espanoles, el Presi- dente de la Comision Americana declaro que entendia que los arti- culos propuestos por los Comisarios Americanos serian aceptados d rechazados por los Comisarios Espaiioles en la sesion proxima. El Presidente de la Comision Espanola contest© que los Comi- sarios Espanoles seguir^m respecto 4 los articulos Americanos el mismo procedimiento que los Comisarios Americanos habian seguido con referenda 4 los articulos espanoles. A propuesta de los Comisarios Americanos, se levauto la sesion, acordando reunirse manana, Mier- coles 7 de Diciembre, sin perjuicio del derecho de los Comisarios Es- panoles para pedir un aplazami- ento. Eugenio Montero Rios B. de Abarzuza J. DE GARNICA W R DE Villa Urrutia Eafael Cerero Emilio de Ojeda Protocol No. 21 Pbotocolo No. 21. Conference of December 8, 1898. Conferencia del 8 de diciembre de 1898. The session which was to have been held on yesterday having been postponed at the request of the Spanish Commissioners, the Joint Commission met today at two o'clock, p. m., there being Aplazada, d propuesta de los Comisarios Espanoles, la sesion que debi6 haber tenido lugar el dia de ayer, se reunieron el dfa de hoy a las dos de la tarde, hallaudose 250 TREATY OF PEACE. Present on the part of the United States : Messrs : Day, Davis, Frye, Gray, Eeid, Moore, Fergusson. On the part of Spain: Messrs: Montero Ei'os, Abarzuza, Garuica, Villa-Urrutia, Cerero. Mr. Ojeda was unable to be pres- ent, owing to ilhiess, and Mr. Villa- Urrutia performed his duties as Secretary. The protocol of the preceding session was read and approved. The Spanish Commissioners pro- posed that the American Commis- sioners modify the clause i)reseuted by them and mentioned in the pro- tocol of the last session relating to the limiting of the obligations of the United States in Cuba to the time of its occupation thereof. The American Commissioners took this proposition under con- sideration and submitted to tlie Conference a new wording of the clause which was approved and which is as follows: "It is understood that any obli- gations assumed in this treaty by the United States with respect to Cuba are limited to the time of their occupancy thereof; but they will, upon the termination of such occupancy, advise any Goveru- ment established in the island to assume the same obligations." The Spanish Commissioners ob- served that although the American Commissioners had rejected at the last session the article presented by the Spanish Commissioners re- lating to the "Maine," they consid- ered it their duty to insist upon this question being submitted to arbitration. The American Commissioners answered, referring to tlie observa- tions made by them on this subject at the last session. The Spanish Commissioners re- plied that since this new i)roposal for arbitration was also rejected, they would ask the American Com- missioners to be pleased to propose some m-'thod of clearing up the matter of the "Maine," and the re- Presentes por parte de los Esta- dos Unidos de America, los Seiio- res Day, Davis, Frye, Gray. Eeid, Moore Fergusson. Por parte de Espana los Sefio- res Montero Eios, Abarzuza, Gar- nica, Villa-Urrutia Cerero Por hallarse enfermo no pudo asistir el Sr Ojeda, e hizo sus veces como Secretario el Sr Villa-Urru- tia. Fue leida y aprobada el acta de la sesion anterior. Los Comisarios Espanoles pro- pon en que los de los Estados Un idos modifiquen la clausula por ellos presentada y que se menciona en el acta de la sesion ultima, relativa a la limitacion de las obligaciones de los Estados Unidos en Cuba al tiempo que dure su ocupacion. Los Comisarios Americanos to- man en consideracion esta proposi- cion y someten a la conferencia una redaccion de dicha clausula que es aceptado y dice asi : "Queda entendido que qal- quier obligacion aceptada en este Tratadopor los Estados Unidos con respecto a Cuba esta limitada al tiempo que dure su ocupacion en esta Isla, i^ero al terminar dicha ocupacion, aconsejaran al Gobierno que se establezca en la Isla, que acepte las mismas obligaciones." Los Comisarios Espafioles mani- festan que annque la Comision Americana habia rechazado en la sesion iiltima el articulo presentado por la Comision Espanola sobre el "Maine", consideraban sin embar- go su deber insistir en que esta cuestion se sometiese a un arbi- trage. Los Comisarios Americanos con- testaron que se referian a las mani- festaciones que hicieron en la sesion anterior. Los Comisarios Espailoles re- plican que jiuesto que esta nueva proposicion de arbitrage era tam- bien rechazada, se sirvieran los Senores Comisarios Americanos l^roponer cualquier medio de ex- clarecer este asunto del "Maine" TREATY OF PEACE. 251 sponsibility growing out of it, so tliat the unjust prejudice against Spain shown in the United States by reason of an incomplete inves- tigation might disappear, and the resentment of Spain, because the uprightness of her authorities or subjects, and the capacity of her administration to guarantee the safety in her ports of vessels of a nation with which she was at peace, had been placed in doubt, might also be blotted out. The American Commissioners replied that they had no method to propose. The President of the Spanish Commission, pursuant to the rules, presented a memorandum, which is hereto annexed, in support of the propositions rejected by the American Commissioners at the last session. The American Interpreter pro- ceeded to translate the Memoran- dum and to read it in English. The President of the American Commission reserved the right to reply in writing to the memoran- dum at the next session. After explanations interchanged by the Presidents of the two Com- missions, such articles presented by the Spanish Commissioners as were acceiDted or modified by the Amer- ican Commissioners were ap- proved. The reading of the articles pre- sented by the American Commis- sion was then entered upon. The articles were read, one by one, in the order in which they stood. The first was as follows: y las respousabilidades consi- guientes, demanera que pudiesen desaparecer las injustas preven- ciones que se habian manifestado en los Estados Unidos contra Es- pafia por causa de una informacion incompleta, y se borrase tambien el resentimiento de Espana por haberse puesto en duda la lealtad de sus Autoridades 6 de sus na- cionales y la capacidad de su ad- ministracion para garantizar por su parte la seguridad en sus puer- tos a los barcos de una Nacion con quien estaba en paz. Los Comisarios Americanos con- testaron que no tenian ningun me- dio que proponer. El Presidente de la Comision Espanola, con arreglo al reglamen- to, presento un Memorandum, que va anejxo al Acta, en apoyo de las proposiciones rechazadas por la Comision Americana en la sesiou ultima. El Interprete Americano proce- dlo a la lectura en ingles de dicho Memorandum. El Presidente de la Comision Americana se reserva el derecho de contestar por escrito d dicho Mem- orandum en la sesion proxima. Despuos de las explicaciones que mediaron entre los Presidentes de Ambas Comisiones quedo entendi- do que se aprobaban los articulos presentados por la Comision Esi^a- Bola, tales como habian sido acep- tados 6 modificados por la Comi- sion Americana. Procediose entonces ^ la lectura de los articulos presentados por la Comision Americana. Los articulos fueron leidos uno por uno, en el orden en que fueron presentados. El 1" fue el siguiente: "Article "Spain hereby cedes to the United States the island variously known as Kusaie, Ualan, or iStrong Island, in the Carolines; and also concedes to the United States the right to land telegraph cables in "Articulo. "Espana cede por el presente 4 los Estados Unidos la Isla diversa- mente llamada Kusaie, Ualan o Strong Island en las Carolinas; y ademas concede a los Estados Uni- dos el derecho de amarrar cables 252 TREATY OF PEACE. the Canary Islands, or on any ter- ritory owned by Spain on the coast of Africa, or in the Peninsula. "In consideration of what is set forth in this article, the United States will pay to Spain the sum of one million dollars, ($1,000,000) within three months from the exchange of the ratifications of the present treaty." The President of the Spanish Commission declared that even in the event of an agreement being reached upon this article, it would have to figure elsewhere than in the treaty, as it was foreign there- to ; but that he was compelled to reject it, because the Spanish Gov- ernment at this time neither enter- tained the idea of disposing of one of the Caroline Islands, nor could it do so for want of Constitutional authority, previous authorization of the Cortes being necessary in the premises. Neither could what related to cable landings be accept- ed, because if stipulated in a treaty it might imply an easement on the national territory which the Spanish Government was not em- powered to create, and because any American Company might request through the executive channel as other alien companies have done, such a concession, which was for- eign to an international treaty. The following article was then read: telegr^ficos en las Islas Canarias 6 en cualquier territorio espaiiol de la costa de Africa 6 en la Penin- sula, "En consideraci6n de losestable- cido en este articulo, los Estados Unidos pagar^n a EspaQa la suma de un millon de dollars ($1,000,000) dentro de los tres meses del canje de ratificaciones del presente tratado." El Presideiite de la Comision Espanola declare que aun en caso de que Imbiera habido acuerdo sobre este articulo tendria que figurar aparte del tratado, por ser ageno al mismo; iiero que se veia obligado 4 rechazarlo, por que si entraba en el 4nimo del Gobierno Espahol, en estemomento, el auage- nar una de las Islas Carolinas, ni podia tampoco hacerlo por carecer de facultades constitucionales, ne- cesitando para ello estar previa- mente autorisado por las CJortes. Tampoco podia aceptarse lo rela- tivo al amarre de cables, por quo estipulado en un tratado podria significar una servidumbre sobre territorio iiacional, que el Gobierno Espanol no estaba autorizado d constituir, y porque cualquiera CompaSia Americana podria solid- tar por la via admiuistrativa y como lo hanhechootras Compahias Extrangeras, una coucesion agena a un tratado iuternacioiial. Se ley luego el articulo siguiente : "Article "In conformity with the under- standing established by an ex- change of notes in the year 1886, Spain agrees that American mis- sions and missionaries shall be allowed to resume and hereafter freely to carry on their work in the Caroline Islands that remain under Spanish sovereignty. The President of the Spanish Commission observed that it was not known that any claim was pending in the premises, and that as the Constitution of the State "AllTfCULO "De conformidad con el acuerdo establecido por un canje de notas, en el aiio 188G, Espafia conviene en que las misiones Americanas y los Misioneros podrdn reanudar y des- pu6s Uevar libremente k efecto sus trabajos en las Islas Carolinas que quedan bajo la Soberania de Es- paSa." El Presidente de la Comision Espaiiola manifiesta que no consta este jjendiente ninguna reclama- cion sobre el particular, y que como la constituci6n del Estado TREATY OF PEACE. 253 laid down the rights of private individuals in religious matters, there was nothing in this regard to insert in the treaty. The following article was then read; "Article "The United States and Spain will reciprocally accord to the ships of each other, in their respective ports, most favored nation treat- ment, in respect of all port charges, including entrance and clearance dues, light dues and tonnage duties. "It is further agreed that the two Governments will enter into negotiations with a view to the conclusion of a commercial con- vention.-" In place of the first paragraph, the American Commissioners now propose the following : " Spain will in her ports accord to vessels of the United States the same treatment in respect of all port charges, including entrance and clearance dues, light dues, and tonnage duties, as is accorded to Spanish vessels in the ports of the United States." The President of the Spanish Commission objected to the second paragraph of tlie article as unneces- sary; and suggested that tbe first paragraph be amended so that it should be reciprocal in its provi- sions and be limited as to its duration. After discussion, the following article was drawn up : " The Government of each coun- try will, for the term of ten years, accord to the merchant vessels of the otlier country the same treat- ment in respect of all port charges, including entrance dues, light dues and tonnage duties, as it accords to its own merchant vessels not engaged in the coastwise trade. This article may at any time be terminated on six mouths' notice given by either Government to the other." marca los derechos de los particu- lares en materias religiosas, nada hay que insertar d este respecto en el tratado. Se ley6 luego el articulo siguiente : Aetioulo. "Los Estados Unidos y Espana concederan reciprocamente a los buques de cada uno de ellos, en sus respectivos puertos, el trato de la nacion m^s favorecida respecto 4 todos los derechos de puerto, inclu- yendo los de entrada y salida, faros y touelage. "Se conviene ademas en que los dos Gobiernos empecaran las nego- ciaciones para concluir un couvenio comercial." En lugar del primer p^rrafo pro- ponen ahora los Comisarios Ameri- canos el siguiente : " Espaiia concedera en sus puer- tos, 4 los buques de los Estados Unidos, el mismo trato con respecto 4 todos los derechos de puerto, in- cluyendo derechos de entrada y salida, de faro y tonelage, que se concede a los buques espafioles en los puertos de los Estados Unidos." El Presidente de la Comision Espaiiola manifesto que el segundo parrafo del articulo era innecesario, y pidio que se moditicase el primer parrafo de manera que fuese recip- roca la estipulaiiion y limitado el tiempo de su duracion. Despues de discutido se aprobo el articulo en la forma siguiente: "El Gobierno de cada pais con- cedera por el termiuo de diez anos, 4 los buques mercantes del otro el mismo trato en cuanto (i todos los derechos de puerto, incluyendo los de entrado y salida, de faro y tone- lage, que concede a sus propios buques mercantes no empleados en el comercio de cabotage. Este arti- culo puede ser denunciado en cual- quier tiempo dando noticia previa de ello cualquiera de los dos Gobi- ernos al otro con seis meses de an- ticipacion." 254 TREATY OF PEACE. The following article was then Seleyoluegoelarticulosiguiente; read: "Article "The following treaty stipula- tions heretofore entered into by the United States and Spain shall be held to continue in force: "Treaty of October 27, 1795, so far as it is confirmed by Article XII of the Treaty of February 22, 1819; "Treaty of February 22, 1819, so far as its provisions have not been executed or become obsolete; "Convention of February 17, 1834, for the settlement of claims ; "Agreement of February 11-12, 1871, for the settlement of claims, Article VII; "Convention of January 5, 1877, and the supplementary convention of August 7, 1882, for the extradi- tion of criminals; "Protocol of January 7, 1877, concerning Judicial procedure; "Convention of June 19, 1882, concerning trade marks; and the agreement between the two coun- tries in relation to international copyright. The President of the Spanish Commission stated that the Span- ish Commissioners were unable to accept this article. Some of the treaties to which it referred Avere obsolete or related to conditions which no longer existed, and it would involve a more extended examination than the Joint Com- mission was in a position to give. But this did not imply that the two Governments might not take up the subject themselves. The American Commissioners inquired whether the objection of the President of the Spanish Com- mission applied to the extradition treaties. Articulo. " Los siguientes tratados, antes celebrados entre los Estados Uni- dos y Bspaha, continuaran en vigor : "Tratado de 27 Octubre de 1795, en su parte contirmada por el arti- culo XII del Tratado de 22 de Fe- brero de 1819. " Tratado de 22 de Febrero de 1819, en sus disposiciones que no han sido ejecutadas 6 que no han caido en desuso. " Convenio de 17 de Febrero de 1834 para el arreglo de reclama- ciones. "Acuerdo de 11-12 de Febrero de 1871, para el arreglo de reclama- ciones (Articulo Yll) "Convenio de 5 de Enero de 1877, y convenio supletorio de 7 de Agosto de 1882, para la extradi- cion de criminales. "Protocolo de 7 de Enero de 1877, sobre procedimientos judi- ciales. "Convenio de 19 de Junio de 1882, respectos §> las m areas de fiibrica: y el acuerdo entre los dos paises, con relaci()n a la proj^iedad literaria internacional," Manifesto el Presidente de la Comision Espaiiola que no podia aceptar dicho articulo, por que al- gunosde los Tratados a que el mismo se referia estaban y^ en desuso 6 se referian a condiciones que ya no existian, por lo cual er£ preciso hacer un estudio de cada uno de ellos mas detenido que el que podia hacer esta Comision. Pero que esto no significaba que ambos Gobier- nos no pudierau entenderse direc- tamente sobre este asunto. Los Comisarios Americanos pre- guntaron si las observaciones del Presidente de la Comision Esi^aiio- la se aplicabau d los tratados de extradiciou. TREATY OF PEACE. 255 The President of the Spanish Commission replied that it did, as those treaties needed revision. The American Commissioners urged the revival of the extradi- tion treaties, the convention con- cerning trade-marks, and the agreement in relation to interna- tional copyright; and proposed that, in view of the immediate im- portance of the subjects to which they related, they should, if the Spanish Commissioners were not prepared to revive them fully, be revided temporarily as a modus Vivendi, for a period of a year or even for six months, so as to enable the two Governments to consider the question of their renewal. The President of the Spanish Commission adhered to the views which he had expressed, and the article was rejected. The following article was then read: "Article "The present treaty shall be rati- fied by the President of the United States, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate thereof, and by Her Majesty the Queen Regent of Spain; and the ratifications shall be exchanged at Washington within six months from the date hereof, or earlier if possible, "In faith whereof, we, the re- spective Plenipotentiaries, have signed this treaty, and have here- unto affixed our seals. "Done in duplicate at Paris, the day of in the year of Our Lord, one thousand eight hundred and ninety eight." This article was accepted. The conference was then ad- journed, with the understanding that the Joint Commission should reassemble for the purpose of sign- ing the treaty, whenever it should be ready for signature; and that, El Presidente de la Comision Bs- pafiola respondio que si, por que estos tratados necesitaban ser co- rregidos. Los Comisarios Americanos pi- dieron larenovacion de los tratados de extradicion, m areas de f^brica y propiedad literaria y propusieron que en vista de la importancia in- mediata de los asuntos a que se referian fuesen renovado tempo- ralmente como un modus viveridi, por un plazo de un ano 6 de seis meses, si los Comisarios Espaiioles veiau inconveniente en su renova- cion absoluta, 4 fin de permitir 4 ambos Gobiernos el estudiar la cuestion de su renovacion. El Presidente de la Comision Espaiiola mantuvo su anterior opi- nion, y el articulo fue rechazado. Se leyo luego el articulo sigui- eute: "ARTfCULO "El presente Tratado serd rati- ficado per Su Majestad la Reina Regente de Espana y por el Presi- dente de los Estados Unidos, de acuerdo y con la aprobacion del Sen ado; y las rati ficacionessecan- gearan en Washington dentro del plazo de seis meses desdeestafecha, 6 antes si posible faese. " En fe de lo cual, los respectivos Pleuipotenciarios firman y sellan este Tratado. Hecho por duplicado en Paris A die/ de Diciembre del ano mil ochocientos noventa y ocho. Se aprobo este ai'ticulo. Se levanto la sesion en la inteli- gencia de que la Comision en pleno se reuniria con objeto de firiiiar el tratado, cuando estuviese en dis- posicion de ser firmado, y que entre tauto ambas Comisiones podrian comuuiearsa cualquier Memoran- 256 TEEATY OF PEACE. in the mean time, each Commission ^um que con arreglo al reglamento might communicate to the other deseasen presentar. any memoranda which it should Eugenio Montero Rfos desire to file under the rules. B. de Abarzuza William II. Day J. de Garnica OusHMAN K. Davis W. E. de Villa-Urrutia Wm P Frye Eafael Oerero Geo. Gray Emilio de Ojeda Whitelaw Reid. John B. Moore. Annex to Protocol No. 21. Memorandum. La Comiaion Espafiola propuso 4 la Americana el proyecto de varios Articulos, para el tratado de paz, que esta rechaza. Se niega a reconocer 4 los habitantes de los paises cedidos y renun- ciados por Espana, el derecho de optar por la ciudadania que hasta ahora gozaron. Y sin embargo, este derecho de opcion, que es uno de los mas sagrados de la personalidad humana, ha sido constantemeute respectado desde que se emancipo el hombre de la servidumbre de la tierra, lindiendose 4 este sagrado derecho tributo en los Tratados que sobre cesion territorial se celabraron en el mundo moderno. Se niegau .4, estipular el respecto quemereceu los contratos celebrados por un Soberano legitimo para obras y servicios publicos, contratos que afectan sustancialmente 4 la propiedad privada de particulares y que fueron respetados en el Tratado de Campo Formio de 1797, en el de Paris de 1814, en el de Zurich de 1859, en el de Paris de 1860, en los de Vieua de 1864 y 1866, y que respeto tambien Alemania al terminar su guerra con la Prancia por el tratado de Frankfort de 1871. La Comision Americana alega como unica razon para no estipular este respecto el que los Estados Unidos, en sus tratados, nunca lo han re- conocido. Como si los Estados Unidos fueran la unica Potencia posee- doradel criterio de justicia que debe inspirar las convenciones y los actos de las Naciones. Se niegau 4 que scan devueltos 4 sus legitimes y particulares duenos, por quienes, scan funcionarios espanoles 6 americanos, esten obligados segun justicia a esta devolucion, las cantidades que hubiesen entregado en las Cajas ptiblicas en los territorios que dejan de pertenecer 4 Espafia en concepto de consignaciones depositos 6 fianzas de contratos u obli- gacioiies, despues que estos hayan sido cumplidos y la fianza, por lo tan to, deba ser cancelada. Y sin embargo 4 esta devolucion se rindio homeuage por Belgica, los Paises Bajos, Austria, Francia, Cerdena Diuamarca, Prusia, Italia y Alemania en los Tratados que entre si celebraron en 1839, 1859, 1804, 1866 y 1871. Se niegau a reconocer el car^cter permanente de las obligaciones que por este Tratado contraen los Estados CJnidos respecto 4 cosas y per- sonas en Cuba, limitando su duraciou al tiempo de la ocupacion militar de la Grande Antilla por las tropas americanas, sin teuer presente que las obligaciones correlativas que Espana contrae exige la Comision Americana que scan permaneutes y que por cousiguieiite queda de esa manera violada la justicia al violarse el principio de reciprocidad que TREATY OF PEACE. 257 informa siempre los dereclios y las obligaciones de las partes contra- tantes. La Comision Americana se presta en la sesion de hoy (D^'« 87) ^ aconsejar los BE, UU. la observaiicia de este Tratado al Gobieruo independiente de Cuba quando llegue ^ constituirse. La 0. E. vista esta manifestacion, atempera cuauto acaba de decir sobre este panto hasta que quede en harraonia con las manifestaciones en esta sesion de la Comision Americana. Nada tiene que decir la Comision Espanola sobre la negativa de la Americana 4 tomar a cargo de los Estados Unidos la pension de gratitud que Espana viene pagando a los descendientes del inmortal descubridor de America. Espana se reserva este asunto para resolverlo como entienda mas couforme a la justicia sin olvidar la causa de la civilisacion moderna de la misma America. Espafla hapodido sacrificar y sacrifica sus intereses todos coloniales en el altar de lapaz yparaevitar larenovacion deuna guerra quees evidente que no puede sostener con una nacion incomparablemente mas poderosa yde may ores recursos. Ha sostenido sus derechos en estas Confereucias con toda la energia que correspondia 4 la rectitud de su conciencia. Cuando 4 su Comision le fue impuesta como ultimatum la proposicion conqueconcluye el Memorandum Americano presentado en la sesion de 21 de Noviembre ultimo, sin abandonarsu dereclio ysolo porvia de trans- accion, inspirandose en su amor 4 la i)az, hizo proposiciones en que sus intereses eran sacrificados ; los Estados Unidos las recbazaron todas. Sobre las dos importantes cuestiones de derecho dependientes de la interpret acion que se diera al Protocolo de Washington, propuso d la Comision Americana el arbitrage. Fue tambien rechazado. Al ultimatum que acaba.de citarse de 21 de Noviembre sucede el que en la ultima sesion va envuelto en los Articulos que propone la Comision Americana. La Espaiiola que cumpliendo las iustrucciones de su Gobierno se sometio al 1°, se sometera tambien a este. Se conforma, pues, con que los Estados Unidos iucluyau en el Tratado los Articulos a que este Memorandum se refiere. Pero la Comision Americana rechaza tambien otro que es para Espana, si cabe, de mayor importancia que los demas Articulos que la Espaiiola habia propuesto; porque a diferencia de estos, aquel afecta d su propia dignidad. La catastrofe del "Maine," di ocasion en los Estados Unidos 4 que una parte muy caracterizada y sefialada de su prensa, cubriese de ultrages el honor inmaculable del pueblo espanol. Parecia que el tiempo iba haciendo su obra de templauza de las pasiones y de olvido de los agravios, cuando la Comision Americana, en su citado Memorandum de 21 de Noviembre ultimo, renovo tan lamen- table incidente acusaudo de descuido 6 incapacidad 4 Espana para garantir en sus puertos la seguridad de los buques de una Nacion amiga. El derecho mas sagrado que a Espana no podia dejar de reconocersele por que se le recouoce al mas desgraciado de los seres humanos en la tierra, era el de defenderse de una imputacion, que en tan tristes con- diciones la dejaba ante las demas Naciones. Por esto present© su Comision el 1° de este mes los Articulos proponiendo el nombramiento de una tecnica internacional, nombrada con todas las garantias imagi- nables paraasegurar su imparcialidad, 4 tin de que procediese i inves- tigar las causas de la catastrofe y si en ell a cabia, siquiera fuera per negligencia, alguna responsabilidad 4 Espana. Cuando esta i)roposici6n estaba sometida 4 la Comision Americana, el Senor Presidente de los Estados Unidos en su Mensage de 5 del mismo mes dirigido a las Ctimaras American as volvio 4 ocuparse de un asunto que T P- — 17 258 TREATY OF PEACE. no podia menos de remover las pasiones de los dos pueblos entre quienes susComisiona dos estaban elaborando el restablecimieuto de la paz. Califlco la catastrofe de so.spechosa, afirmo que su causa habia sido externa y aiiadio que solameute por falta de una prueba positiva la Comisiou Americana, que habia informado sobre ella, habia dejado de Gonsignar d quien correspondm la responsabilidad de dicha accion. I Como era posible imaginar que al siguieute dia de pronunciadas estas frases en Washington la Comisiou Americana en Paris habia de negar 4 Espana aquel sagrado derecho de defensa cuyo resj)eto redamaba? No puede, pues, la Comision EspaSola revsignarse a tal negativa y con- signa solemnemente su protesta contra ella, haciendo coustar que en lo futuro no sera licito jamas a los que se opouen 4 que se depuren las causas de aquella horrible catastrofe, imputar abierta 6 embozadamente respousabilidades de ningun g^nero por ella a la noble Nacion Espanola y a sus Autoridades. [Translation.] Annex to Protocol l^o. 21. Memorandnm. The Spanish Commission proposed to the American Commission the draft of several articles for the treaty of peace, which the latter has rejected. The American Commission refuses to acknowledge the right of the inhabitants of the countries ceded or relinquished by Spain to choose the citizenship with which up to the i)resent they have been clothed. And nevertheless this right of choosing, which is one of the most sacred rights of human beings, has been constantly respected since the day ill which man was emancipated from serfdom. This sacred right has been respected in treaties of territorial cession concluded in mod- ern times. It refuses also to stipulate anything in relation to the respect due the contracts entered into by a legitimate sovereign for public works and services, — contracts which materially affect the rights of property of private individuals, which were respected in the treaties of Campo Formio of 1797, of Paris of 18U, of Zurich of 1859, of Paris of 1800, of Vienna of 1804 and 18(56, and which Germany respected also when ending the war with France by the treaty of Frankfort of 1871. The American Commission alleged as its only reason for this refusal that the United States in its treaties has never recognized these contracts as though the United States were the only power controlling the standard of justice which must govern the conventions and the acts of nations. It refuses to provide for the restitution to their lawful and private owners by whoever, be he a Spanish or an American official, is bound rightfully to do it, of the sums of money they may have paid into the public treasuries of the territory which ceases to belong to Spain, in the way of consignments, deposits, or security for contracts or obliga- tions, after they have been executed or performed, and which security should be returned. And nevertheless homage was paid to such return by Belgium, Netherlands, Austria, France, Sardinia, Denmark, Prussia, Italy and Germany in the treaties concluded between them in 1839, 1859, 1864, 1866 and 1871. TREATY OP PEACE. 259 The American Commission refuses to recognize the permanent char- acter of the obligations contracted by the United States in this treaty with respect to persons and things in Cuba, limiting the duration thereof to the time of the military occupation of the Greater Antille by the American troops, without bearing in mind that the American Commis- sion demands that the corresponding obligations contracted by Spain shall be permanent, and that justice is thus violated in attacking the principle of reciprocity which always governs the rights and obligations of contracting parties. In today's session (December 8), the American Commission consents to the United States advising the independent government of Cuba whenever it shall be constituted, to observe this treaty. In view of this statement, the Spanish Commission moderates what it has just said upon this point in so far as it is necessary to make it harmonize with the statements of the American Commission made in this vsessiou. The Spanish Commission has nothing to say to the refusal of the American Commission to assume for the United States the pension of gratitude which Spain has been paying to the descendants of the immortal discoverer of America. Spain reserves this matter to settle it as she understands shall best befit justice, without forgetting the cause of modern civilization and America itself. Spain has been able to sacrifice, and does sacrifice, all her colonial interests upon the altar of peace, and in order to prevent the renewal of a war which it is evident siie cannot sustain with a nation incomj)ar- ably more powerful and with greater resources. She has upheld her rights in these conferences with all the energy the rectitude of her conscience demanded. When there was imposed upon her Commission as an ultimatum the proposition which closes the American memorandum presented at the session of November 21 last, without waving its rights, and solely by way of compromise, inspired by its love for i)eace, it made propositions wherein her interests were sacrificed. The United States rejected them all. Upon the two important questions of law, depending upon the inter- pretation to be given the Protocol of Washington, it proposed arbitra- tion to the American Commission. This proposition was also rejected. The ultimatum of ISfovember 21, which has just been cit«d, is suc- ceeded by that which at the last session is involved in the articles the American Commission proposes. The Spanish Commission which, com- plying with the instructions of its Government, submitted to the first, will also bow to this. It assents, then, to the United States including in the treaty the articles to which this memorandum refers. But the American Commission also rejects another article which is to Spain, if possible, of greater importance than the other articles the Spanish Commission had proposed ; because, difleriug from these, the former affects her own dignity. The Maine disaster gave occasion for a very respectable and prominent part of the press in the United States to cover with insults the unstainable honor of the Spanish people. It seems that time was doing its work of tempering passions and casting into oblivion the wrongs, when the American Commission, in its said memorandum of November 21, again brought up so lamentable an inci- dent, accusing Spain of negligence and incapacity to guarantee security to vessels of a friendly nation in her ports. The most sacred right, which could not fail to be recognized as attaching to Spain, as it is vouchsafed to the most wretched of human beings, was that of defend- ing herself from an imputation which left her in so sorry a plight before 260 TEEATY OF PEACE. the other nations. For this reason her Commission, on the first of this month, presented tlie articles proposing the appointment of an Inter- national Expert Commission, to be named with all imaginable guaran- tees to assure its impartiality, in order that it might proceed to inves- tigate the cause of the disaster, and whether any responsibility were attachable to Spain, even were it through negligence. When this proi^osition was under submission to the American Com- Hiission, the President of the United States, in his message to the American Congress of the 5th of the said month, again took up a sub- ject which could not but rekindle the passions of the two peoples whose Commissioners were working over the restoration of peace. He char- acterized the disaster as suspicious; he aftirmed that its cause was external; and added that only /or want of positive proof the American Board of Inquiry which had reported thereon had failed to fix the responsibility for the act on any one. How could it be imagined that on the day following that upon which these words were pronounced in Washington, the American Commis- sioners in Paris could refuse to Spain that sacred right of defense, the respecting of which she demanded? The Spanish Commission, therefore, cannot yield to such a refusal, and solemnly records its protest against it, setting forth that in the future it shall never be lawful for those who oppose the investigating of the cause of that horrible disaster, to impute, openly or covertly, responsibility of any kind therefor to the noble Spanish nation, or its authorities. True copy : Emilio de Ojeda. Protocol N"o. 22. Conference of Decemher 10, 1898. Protocolo Fo. 22. Confer cncia del 10 de Dicie7nbre de 1898. Present: on the part of the United States: Messrs: Day, Davis, Frye, Gray, Reid, Moore, Fergusson. On the part of Spain: Messrs: Montero Kios, Abarzuza, Garnica, Villa- Urrutia, Cerero, Ojeda. The protocol of the preceding session was read and approved. The American Commissioners presented a written reply to the memorandum of the Spanish Com- missioners read at the last session. The reply is hereto annexed (An- nex No. 1.). The Treaty of Peace (Annex No. 2.) was read and approved and was signed by Plenipotentiaries of the two High Contracting Parties. The President of the Spanish Commission expressed his thanks Presentes: Por parte delosEsta- dos Unidos de America: los Seno- res : Day, Davis, Frye, Gray, Reid, Moore, Fergusson. Por parte de Espana: los Seiio- res : Montero Rios, Abarzuza, Gar- nica, Villa Urrutia, Cerero, Ojeda. Fue leida y aprobada el acta de la sesiou anterior. Los Comisarios Americanos pre- sentaron su contestacion escrita al Memorandum de los Comisarios Espaiioles leido en la sesion ultima, que va anexo al j)rotocolo (anexo No. 1). Se leyo y aprobo el Tratado de Paz (Anexo No. 2) y se procedio a su flrma por los Plenipotenciarios de las dos Altas Partes Contratantes. El Senor Presidente de la Co- mision Esi)aiiola manifiesta su agra- TREATY OF PEACE. 261 to the American Commissioners for the kind phrases with which their last inemorandnm coiichided. He had much i)leasure in acknowl- edging also the courtesy and con- sideration which had been shown by them in their personal inter- course during the continuance of the negotiations, which, however painful to the Spanish Commis- sioners, would leave with them the personal remembrance of the at- tentions which had been bestowed upon them by the worthy members of the American Commission. The President of the American Commission replied that the words to which the President of the Span- uish Commission referred were but the spontaneous expression of the true feelings of the American Com- missioners toward the Spanish Commissioners, for whom they en- tertained sentiments of the highest esteem and regard. The protocol of this session was read and approved, and the Joint Commission ended its labors. William E. Day CusHMAN K. Davis W-" P Frye Geo. Gray Whitelaw Reid John B. Moore. decimiento A< los Oomisarios Ameri- canos por las at^ntas frases con que terminaron su ultimo Memo- randum y secom])la(*e en reconocer asimismo la cortesfa y la prudencia que en sus relaciones personales han demostrado durante el curso de una negociacion que aunque dolorosa para los Comisarios Espa- iloles dejava en ellos el recuerdo personal de las atenciones que han merecido ^los dignos miembros de la Comision Americana. El Presidente de la Comisidn Americana contesto que las pala- bras 4 que aludio el Presidente de la Comision Espaiiola eran la expontanea expresion de los ver- daderos sentimientos de los Comi- sarios Americanos hacia los Comi- sarios Espanoles, por quienes te- nian la mayor estimacion y aprecio. Se leyo y aprob6 el Protocolo de esta sesion, acabando sus trabajos la Comision en pleno. EUGENIO MONTERO RfOS B. De Abarzuza J. De Garnica W E De Villa Urrutia Eafael Cerero Emilio De Ojeda Annex 1 to Protocol Xo. 22. memorandum of the AMERICAN COMMISSIONERS IN REPLY TO THAT OF THE SPANISH COMMISSIONERS SUBMITTED AT THE MEETING OF DECEMBER 8, 1898. In the memorandum submitted at the last meeting by the Spanish Commissioners, the statement is broadly made, "The American Com- mission refuses to acknowledge the right of the inhabitants of the countries ceded or relinquished by Spain to choose the citizenship with which up to the present time they have been clothed." The American Commissioners do not so understand the arti(?le upon the subject of citizenship submitted by them as a substitute for the article proposed by the Spanish Commissioners. An analysis of this article will show that Spanish subjects, natives of Spain, are allowed a year's time in which, by the simple process of stating in a court of record their intention so to do, they may preserve their allegiance to Spain. Such persons have the fullest right to dispose of their property and 262 TREATY OF PEACE. remove from the territory, or remaining to continue to be Spanish subjects or elect the nationality of the new territory. As to natives, their status and civil rights are lett to Congress, which will enact laws to govern the ceded territory. This is no more than the assertion of the right of the governing power to control these important relations to the new government. The Congress of a coun- try which never has enacted laws to oppress or abridge the rights of residents within its domain, and whose laws permit the largest liberty consistent with the preservation of order and the protection of prop- erty may safely be trusted not to depart from its well settled practice in dealing with the inhabitants of these islands. It is true that the Spanish Commissioners proposed an article upon the subject of nationality supplementing the one offered by them as to nationality of Spanish subjects, which provides that all inhabitants of the ceded territory other than Spanish subjects shall have the right to choose the Spanish nationality within one year after the exchange of ratifications of the treaty. This would permit all the uncivilized tribes which have not come under the jurisdiction of Spain, as well as foreign residents of the islands, to elect to create for themselves a nationality other than the one in control of the territory, while enjoying the benefits and protection of the laws of the local sovereignty. This would create an anamolous condition of affairs leading to complications and discord important to avoid. The American Commission felt constrained to reject the articles tendered by the Spanish Commissioners in respect to contracts entered into for public works and services. It took this step because the nature, extent and binding obligation of these contracts are unknown to the American Commissioners, and they again disclaim any purpose of their Government to disregard the obligations of international law in respect to such contracts as investigation may show to be valid and binding upon the United States as successor in sovereignty in the ceded territory. The American Commissioners also rejected the article proposed by ttie Spanish Commissioners upon the subject of " Deposits and Bonds." In the form tendered, the American Commissioners understand this article to obligate the United States to return moneys " received by Government Offices and Establishments from Spanish citizens" for the purposes specified, although the same never came into the posses- sion of the authorities of the United States in said territories. Nothing can be further from the intention of that Government than to keep from the lawful owners such sums as come under its control which should be restored after the fulfilment of contracts or obligations intended to be secured thereby. Certainly the United States has no intention to indulge in such confiscation of property which becomes subject to its control, and may safely rely in such matters upon the confidence war- ranted by its consistent record. Respecting the observation in the memorandum of the Si^anish Com- mission upon the last message of the President of the United States, wherein he refers to the disaster to the battleship Maine, the American Commissioners feel obliged to decline to enter upon any discussion of the same, in obedience to well established precedents and practice in the history of their country. The American Commissioners cannot close this final memorandum without expressing their sense of the thoroughness, learning, and devoted ability, no less than the uniform courtesy with which the Spanish Commissioners have conducted the negotiations about to terminate. True copy: John B. Mooeb. TREATY OF PEACE. 263 Annex 2 to Protocol IS'o. 22. The United States op Amer- ica AND Her Ma.testy the Queen Regent of Spain, in THE Name of Her August Son Don Alfonso XIII, desiring to end tlie state of war now existing between tlie two countries, have for tliat purpose appointed as Plenipotentiaries : The President of the United States, William R. Day, Cushman K. Davis, William P. Frye, George Gray, and Whitelaw Reid, citizens of the United States ; And Her Majesty the Queen Regent of Spain, Don Eugenio Montero Rios, President of the Senate, Don Buenaventura db Abarzuza, Senator of the Kingdom and ex- Minister of the Crown, Don Jose DE Garnica, Deputy to the Cortes and Associate Justice of the Su- preme Court; Don Wenceslao Ramirez db Villa-Urrutia, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary at Brussels, and Don Rafael Cbrero, General of Division; Who, having assembled in Paris, and having exchanged their full powers, which were found to be in due and proper form, have, afttr discussion of the matters before them, agreed upon the following- articles : Article I. Spain relinquishes all claim of sovereignty over and title to Cuba. And as the island is, upon its evacuation by Spain, to be occu- Los EsTADos Unidos de Ame- rica Y S. M. LA Keina Regents DE ESPANA, EN NOMBRE DE SU AuGUSTO Hijo Don Alfonso XIII, deseando poner termino al estado de guerra hoy existente entre ambas Xaciones, han nom- brado con este objeto por sus Ple- nipotenciaros a saber : El Presidente de los Esta- Dos Unidos de America A : William R. Day, Cushman K. Davis, William P. Frye, George Gray, y Whitelaw Reid, ciudadanos de los Estados Unidos; Y SU Ma JEST AD LA Reina Re- GENTE DE EsPA5A, A Don Eugenio Montero Rios, Presidente del Senado. Don Buenaventura de Abarzuza Senador del Reino, Ministro que ha sido de la Corona, Don Jose DE Garnica, Diputado a Cortes, Magistrado del Tribunal supremo. Don Wenceslao Ramirez db Yilla-Urrutia, Enviado Extra- ordinario y Ministro plenipotenr ciairo en Bruselas, y Don Rafael Cerero, General de division; Los cuales reunidos en Paris, despues de haberse connmicado sus plenos poderes que fuerou ha- llados en bueua y debida forma, y previa la discussion de las materias pendieutes, ha convenido en los siguientes articulos : Articulo I. Espafia renuncia todo derecho de suberania y propiedad sobre Cuba. En ateucion ^ que dicha isla, cuando sua evacuada por Espafia, 264 TREATY OP PEACE. pied by the TJnited States, tlie United States will, so long as such occupatiou shall last, assume and discharge the obligations that may under international law result from the fact of its occupation, for the protection of life and property. Article II. Spain cedes to the United States the island of Porto Kico and other islands now under Spanish sov- ereignty in the West Indies, and the island of Guam in the Marianas or Ladrones. Article III. Spain cedes to the United States ^ne archipelago known as the Phil- ippine Islands, and comprehending the islands lying within the follow- ing line: A line running from west to east along or near the twentieth paral- lel of north latitude, and through the middle of the navigable chan- nel of Bachi, from the one hundred and eighteenth (118th) to the one hundred and twenty -seventh (127th) degree meridian of longi- tude east of Greenwich, thence along the one hundred and twenty- seventh (127th) degree meridian of longitude east of Greenwich to the parallel of four degrees and forty-live minutes (4° 45') north latitude, thence along the parallel of four degrees and forty-five minutes (4° 45') north latitude to its intersection with the meridian of longitude one hundred and nine- teen degrees and thirty-five min- utes (119° 35') east of Greenwich, thence along the meridian of longi- tude one hundred and nineteen degrees and thirty-five minutes (119° 35') east of Greenwich to the parallel of latitude seven degrees and forty minutes (7° 40') north, thence along the parallel- of lati- tude seven degrees and forty min- utes(7o40')northtoits intersection with the one hundred and six- teenth (116th) degree meridian of va a ser ocupada por los Estados Unidos, los Estados Unidos mien- tras dure su ocupaciou, tomaran sobre si y cumpliran las obliga- ciones que por el hecho de ocuparla, les impoue el Derecho Internacion- al, para la ijroteccion de vidas y haciendas. Articulo II. Espaiia cede a los Estados Uni- dos la Isla de Puerto Kico y las demas que estan ahora bajo su so- beraniaenlas Indias Occidentales, y la Isla de Guam en el Archipie- lago de las Marianas o Ladrones. Articulo III. Espaiia cede a los Estados Uni- dos el archiepi^lago conocido por Islas Filipinas, que comprende las islas situadas dentro de las lineas siguientes : Una linea que corre de Oeste a Este, cerca del 20° paralelo de la- titud Norte, a traves de la mitad del canal navegable de Bachi, desde el 118° al 127° grados de longitud Este de Greenwich; de aqui a lo largo del ciento veintisiete (127) grado meridiano de longitud Este de Greenwich al paralelo cua- tro grados cuarenta y cinco minu- tos (4° 45') de latitud :N'orte; de aqui siguiendo el paralelo de cua- tro grados cuarenta y cinco minutos de latitud Norte (4° 45') hasta su interseccion con el meridiano de longitud ciento diez y nueve grados y treinta y cinco minutos (119° 35') Este de Greenwich; de aqui si- guiendo el meridiano de longitud ciento diez y nueve grados y treinta y cinco minutos (119° 35') Este de Greenwich, al paralelo de latitud siete grados cuarenta minutos (7° 40') Norte; de aqui siguiendo el paralelo de latitud siete grados cuaranta minutos (7° 40') Norte, A su interseccion con el ciento diez y seis (116°) grado me- ridiano de longitud Este de Green- wich, de aqui jjor una linea recta, d la interseccion del decimo grado paralelo de latitud Norte, con el TREATY OF PEACE. 265 longitude east of Greenwich, tbence by a direct line to the intersection of the tenth (10th) degree parallel of north latitude with the one hun- dred and eighteenth (118th) degree meridian of Ion gitude east of Green- I wich, and thence along the one hundred and eighteenth (118th) degree meridian of longitude east of Greenwich to the point of beginning. The United States will pay to Spain the sum of twenty million dollars ($20,000,000) within three months after the exchange of the ratifications of the present treaty. Article IV. The Fnited States will, for the term of ten years from the date of the exchange of the ratifications of the present treaty, admit Span- ish ships and merchandise to the ports of the Philippine Islands on the same terms as ships and mer- chandise of the United States. Article V. The United States will, upon the signature of the present treaty, send back to Spain, at its own cost, the Spanish soldiers taken as pris- oners of war on the capture of Manila by the American forces. The armsof the soldiers in question shall be restored to them. Spain will, upon the exchange of the ratifications of the present treaty, proceed to evacuate the Philippines, as well as the island of Guam, on terms similar to those agreed upon by the Commissioners appointed to arrange for the evacu- ation of Porto Kico and other is- lands in the West Indies, under the Protocol of August 12, 1898, which is to continue in force till its provisions are completely executed. The time within which the evacu- ation of the Philippine Islands and Guam shall be completed sliall be fixed by the two Governments. ciento diez y ocho (118°) grado me- ridiano de longitud Este de Green- wich, y de aqui sigiiiendo el ciento diez y ocho grado (118°) merid'ano de longitud Este de Greenwich, al punto en que comieuza esta de- marcacion. Los Estados Unidos pagar^n ^ Espafia la suma de veinte milliones de dollars ($20,000,000) dentro de tres meses despu^s del canje de ratificaciones del presents tratado. Articulo IV. Ijos Estados Unidos durante el t^rmiuo de diez anos a contar desde el canje de la ratiticacion del pre- sente tratado admitiran en los puer- tos de las Islas Filipinas los buques y las mercancias espaiioles, bajo las mismas condiciones que los buques y las mercancias de los Estados Unidos. Articulo V. Los Estados Unidos, al ser fir- mado el presente tratado, traspor- tariin 4 Espafia, 4 su costa, los soldados espaiioles que hicieron prisioneros de guerra las fuerzas Americanas al ser capturada Ma- nila. Las armas de estos soldados les seran devueltas. Espaiia, al canjearse las ratifica- ciones del presente tratado, proce- dera 4 evacuar las Islas Filipinas, asi como la de Guam, en condi- ciones semej antes a las acordadas por las Comisiones nombradas ])ara concertar la evacuacion de Puerto Eico y otras Islas en las Antillas Occidentales, segim el Protocolo de 12 de Agosto de 1898, que con- tinuara en vigor hasta que scan completamente cumplidas sus disjwsiciones. El termino dentro del cual ser4 corapletada la evacuacion de las Islas Filipinas y la de Guam, sera, tijadoporaaibosGobiernos. Seran 266 TREATY OF PEACE. Stands of colors, uncaptujed war vessels, small arms, guns of all calibres, with their carriages and accessories, powder, ammunition, livestock, and materials and sup- plies of all kinds, belonging to the land and naval forces of Spain in the Philippines and Guam, remain the property of Spain. Pieces of heavy ordnance, exclusive of field artillery, in the fortifications and coast defences, shall remain in their emplacements for the term of six months, to be reckoned from the exchange of ratifications of the treaty; and the United States may, in the mean time, purchase such material from Spain, if a sat- isfactory agreement between the two Governmeiits on the subject shall be reached. Article YI. Spain will, upon the signature of the present treaty, release all prisoners of war, and all jjersons detained or imprisoned for jioliti- cal oiiences, in connection with the insurrectioijs in Cuba and the Philippines and the war with the United States. Reciprocally the United States will release all persons made pris- oners of war by the American forces, and will undertake to ob- tain the release of all Spanish prisoners in the hands of the in- surgents in Cuba and the Philip- pines. The Government of the United States will at its own cost return to Spain and the Government of Spain will at its own cost return to the United States, Cuba, Porto- Eico, and the Phili])pines, accord- ing to the situation of their re- spective homes, prisoners released or caused to be released by them, respectively, under this article. Article VII. The United States and Spain mutually relinquish all claims for indemnity, national and individ- ual, of every kind, of either Gov- propiedad de Espana banderas y estandartes, buques de guerra no apresados, armas portatiles, cano- nes de todos calibres con sus mon- tajes y accesorios, polvoras, muni- ciones, gauado, material y efectos de toda clase j)ertenecientes 4 los ejercitos de mar y tierra de Espana en las Filipas y Guam. Las piezas de grueso calibre, que no sean ar- tilleria de campaiia, colocadas en las fortificaciones y en las costas, quedaran en sus emplazamentos por el plazo de seis meses a partir del canje de ratificaciones del presente tratado, y los Estados Unidos podrdn, durante ese tiempo, com- prar 4 Espana dicho material, si ambos Gobiernos llegan a un acuerdo satisfactorio sobre el par- ticular. ARTfCULO VI. Espafia,alserfirmadoel presente tratado, pondra en libertad a todos los prisioneros de guerra y a todos los detenidos 6 presos por delitos politicos 4 consecuencia de las in- surre9cionesen Cuba y en Filipinas y de la guerra con los Estados Unidos. Eeciprocamente, los Estados Uni- dos pondran en libertad 4 todos los prisioneros de guerra hechos por las fuerzas Americanas, y gestiona- ran la libertad de todos los prisi- oneros espafloles en poder de los insurrectos de Cuba y Filipinas. El Gobierno de los Estados Uni- dos trasportara, por su cuenta 4 Espana, y el Gobierno de Espana trasportara por su cuenta a los Estados Unidos, Cuba, Puerto Rico y Filipinas, con arreglo 4 la situa- cion de sus respectivos hogares, los prisioneros que pongan 6 que hagan j)oner en libertad respectivamente, en virtud de este Articulo. Articulo VII. Espaiia y los Estados Unidos de America renuncian mutuauiente, por el presente tratado, a toda re- clam acion de indemnizacion na- TREATY OF PEACE. 267 eminent, or of its citizens or sub- jects, against the other Govern- ment, that may have arisen since the beginning of the late insurrec- tion in Cuba and prior to the ex- change of ratifications of the pres- ent treaty, including all claims for indemnity for the cost of the war. The United States will adjudi- cate and settle the claims of its citizens against Spain relinquished in this article. Article VIII. In conformity with the provisions of Articles I, II, and III of this treaty, Spain relinquishes in Cuba, and cedes in Porto Eico and other islands in the West Indies, in the island of Guam, and in the Philip- pine Archipelago, all the buildings, wharves, barracks, forts, struc- tures, public highways and other immovable property which, in con- formity with law, belong to the public domain, and as such belong to the Crown of Spain. And it is hereby declared that the relinquishment or cession, as the case may be, to which the pre- ceding paragraph refers, cannot in any respect impair the property or rights which by law belong to the peaceful possession of property of all kinds, of provinces, municipal- ities, public or private establish- ments, ecclesiastical or civic bod- ies, or any other associations hav- ing legal capacity to acquire and possess property in the aforesaid territories renounced or ceded, or of private individuals, of whatso- ever nationality such individuals may be. The aforesaid relinquishment or cession . as the case may be, includes all documents exclusively referring to the sovereignty relinquished or ceded that may exist in the ar- chives of the Peninsula. Where any document in such archives only in part relates to said sovereignty, a copy of such part will be furnished clonal 6 privada de cualquier genero de un Gobierno contra el otro, 6 de sus subditos 6 ciudada- nos contra el otro Gobierno, que pueda haber surgido desde el co- mienzo de la viltima insurreccion en Cuba y sea anterior al canje de ratiticaciones del i^rcseiite tratado, asi como a toda iuderanizacion en concepto degastos ocasionados por la guerra. Los Estados Unidos juzgar^n y resolveran las reclamaciones de sus ciudadanos contra Espaua, a que renuucia en este Articulo. Articulo YIII. En cumplimiento de lo convenido en los Articulos I, II y III de este tratado, Bspana renuucia en Cuba y cede en Puerto Rico y en las otras Islas delas Indias Occidentales, en la Isla de Guam y en el Archipie- lago de las Filipinas, todos los edi- ficios, muelles, cuarteles, fortalezas, establecimientos, vias publicas y dem4s bienes inmuebles que con arreglo d derecho son del dominio publico y como tal corresponden a la Corona de Espaha. Queda por lo tan to declarado que esta renuucia 6 cesi6n, segun el caso, 6, que se refiere el parrafo an- terior, en nada puede mermar la propiedad, 6 los deiechos que co- rrespondan, con arreglo a las leyes, al poseedor pacifico, de los bienes de todas clases de las provincias, municipios, establecimientos piibli- cos 6 privados, corporaciones civiles 6 eclesiasticas, 6 de cualesquiera otras colectividades que tienen per- sonalidad juridiea paca adquirir y poseer bienes en los mencionados territorios renunciado 6 cedidos, y los de los individuos i)articnlares, cualquiera que sea su uacionalidad. Dicha renuucia 6 cesion, segiin el caso, incluye todos los documentos que se refleran exclusivameiite A dicha Soberania renunciada 6 ce- dida, que existan en los Archives de la Peninsula. Cuando estos documentos exis- tentes en dichos Archives, solo en parte correspondan a dicha Sobe- 268 TREATY OF PEACE. whenever it shall be requested. Like rules shall be reciprocally observed in favor of Spain in re- spect of documents in the archives of the islands above referred to. In the aforesaid relinquishment or cession, as the case may be, are also included such rights as the crown of Spain and its authorities possess in respect of the official archives and records, executive as well as judicial, in the islands above referred to, which relate to said islands or the rights and property of their inhabitants. Such archives and records shall be carefully pre- served, and private persons shall witliout distinction have the right to require, in accordance with law, authenticated copies of the con- tracts, wills and other instruments forming part of notarial protocols or files, or wliich may be contained in the executive or judicial ar- chives, be the latter in Spain or in the islands aforesaid. Article IX. Spanish subjects, natives of the Peninsula, residing in the territory over which Spain by the present treaty relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty, may remain in such territory or may remove therefrom, retaining in either event all their rights of property, including the right to sell or dispose of such prop- erty or of its proceeds; and they shall also have the right to carry on their industry, commerce and pro- fessions, being subject in respect thereof to such laws as are appli- cable to other foreigners. In case they remain in the territory they may preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain by making, before a court of record, within a year from the date of the exchange of ratifi- cations of this treaty, a declaration of their decision to preserve such allegiance; in default of which dec- rania, se facilitaran copias de dicha parte, siempre que sean solicitadas. Eeglas analogos habran reciproca- mente de observarse en favor de Espaiia, respecto de los documen- tos existentes en los Archivos de las Islas antes mencionades. En las antecitadas renuncia 6 cesion, segiin el caso, se hallan comprendidos aquellos derechos de la Corona de Espafia y de sus Au- toridades sobre los Archivos y Kegistros oficiales, asi administra- tivos como judiciales de dichas islas, que se refieran a ellas y a los derechos y propiedades de sus ha bitantes. Dichos Archivos y Re- gistros deber^n ser cuidadosa- mente conservados, y los particu- laressinexcepcion, tendran derecho a sacar, con arreglo 4 las Leyes, las copias autorizadas de los con- tratos, testamentos y demas docu- mentos que formen parte de los protocolos notariales 6 que se cus- todien en los Archivos administra- tivos 6 judiciales, bien estos se hallen en Espana, 6 bien en las Islas de que se hace meucion anteriormente. Articulo IX. Los siibditos espanoles, naturales de la Peninsula, residentes en el te- rritorio cuya soberania Espana renuncia 6 cede por el presente tra- tado, podran permanecer en dicho territorio 6 marcharse de el, conser- vando en uno u otro caso todos sus derechos de propiedad, con inclu- sion del derecho de vender 6 dis- poner de tal propiedad 6 de sus productos; y ademds tendran el derecho de ejercer su industria, comercio 6 profesion, sujetandose 4 este respecto 4 las leyes que sean aplicables a los dem^s extrangeros. En el caso de que permanezcan en el territorio, podran conservar su nacionalidad espanola haciendo ante una Oficina de registro, den- tro de un auo despues del cambio de ratiticaciones de este tratado, una declaracion de su proposito de conservar dicha nacionalidadj TREATY OF PEACE. 269 laration they s?liall be held to have renouuced it and to have adopted the nationality of the territory in which they may reside. The civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the territories hereby ceded to the United States shall be determined by the Congress. Article X. The inhabitants of the territories over which Spain relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty shall be se- cured in the free exercise of their religion. Article XI. The Spaniards residing in the territories over which Spain by this treaty cedes or relinquishes her sovereignty shall be subject in matters civil as well as criminal to the jurisdiction of the courts of the country wherein they reside, pursuant to the ordinary laws gov- erning the same; and they shall have the right to appear before such courts, and to pursue the same course as citizens of the country to which the courts belong. Article XII. Judicial proceedings pending at the time of the exchange of ratifi- cations of this treaty in the terri- tories over which Spain relin- quishes or cedes her sovereignty shall be determined according to the following rules: 1. Judgments rendered either in civil suits between private individ- uals, or in criminal matters, before the date mentioned, and with re- spect to which there is no recourse or right of review under the Span- ish law, shall be deemed to be final, and shall be executed in due form by competent authority in the ter- ritory within which such judgments should be carried out. 2. Civil suits between private in- dividuals which may on the date a falta de eata declaracion, se con- siderara (jue han renunciado dicha nacioualidad y adoptado la del te- rritorio en el cual pueden residir. Los derechos civiles y la condi- cion politica de los habitantes naturales de los territorios aqui cedidos 4 los Estados Unidos se determinaran por el Congreso. Articulo X. Los habitantes de los territorios cuya soberania E span a renuncia 6 cede, tendran asegurado el libre ejercicio de su religion. Articulo XI. Los espaiioles residentes en los territorios cuya soberania cede 6 renuncia Espaua por este tratado, estaran sometidos en lo civil y en lo criminal 4 les tribunales del pais en que residan con arreglo a las leyes communes que regulen su competencia, pudiendo comparecer ante aquellos, en la misma forma y ampleando los mismos procedi- mientos que deban observar los ciudadanos del pais a que perte- nezca el tribunal. Articulo XII. Los procedimientos judiciales pendientes al caujearse las ratifi- caciones de este tratado, en los territorios sobre los cuales Espana renuncia 6 cede su Soberania, se determinaran con arreglo a las reglas siguientes: 1. Las sentencias dictadas en causas civiles entre particulares 6 en materia criminal antes de la fecha meucionada, y contra las cua- les no haya apelacion 6 casation con arreglo 4 las leyes espanolas, seconsideraran como firmes, y seran ejecutadas en debida forma por la Autoridad competente en el terri- torio dentro del cual dichas senten- cias deban cumplirse. 2. Los pleitos civiles entre par- ticulares que en la fecha mencio- 270 TREATY OP PEACE. mentioned be undetermined shall be prosecuted to judgment before the court in which they may then be pending or in the court that may be substituted therefor. 3. Criminal actions pending on the date mentioned before the Su- preme Court of Spain against citi- zens of the territory which by this treaty ceases to be Spanish shall continue under its jurisdiction un- til final judgment; but, such judg- ment having been rendered, the execution thereof shall be commit- ted to the competent authority of the place in which the case arose. Aeticle XIII. The rights of property secured by copyrights and patents acquired by Spaniards in the Island of Cuba, and in Porto Eico, the Philippines and other ceded territories, at the time of the exchange of the. ratifi- cations of this treaty, shall con- tinue to be respected. Spanish sci- entific, literary and artistic works, not subversive of public order in the territories in question, shall continue to be adraitteresented by consular agents, such protection will be exer- cised by the French agent. Fouith. Questions the adjustment of which may necessitate representations to the Department of State will be dealt with either by the minister of Austria-Hungary or by me [the French Ambassador], accordingly as the Austrian or the French consul shall have had the initiative therein. Fifth. In all other cases I shall charge myself [the French Ambassador] alone with the steps to be taken with respect to the Government of the United States. " In reply, I beg to inform you that the Government of the United States admits your friendly action in assuming charge of the pro- tection of Spanish subjects and interests in the United States, and that the scheme which you and the Austro-Hungarian minister have devised for the practical division of the charge you have simultane- ously assumed is provisionally accepted so long as experience shall show its convenience in practice. It is, of course, understood, in con- formity with the international usage which obtains in circumstances like the present, that the arrangement contemplates only the friendly offices of yourself or of your esteemed colleague, as well as of the con- sular representatives of your respective nations, should occasion there- for arise, with regard to Spanish subjects and tlieir interests actually within the jurisdiction of the United States, and embraces no repre- sentative office by either of you on behalf of the Government of Spain, between which and the Government of the United States a condition of war unha^jpily exists. I shall communicate to the competent authorities copies of the notes thus addressed to me by yourself and the Austro-Hungarian minister, to the end that they may give all due heed to such representations as the agents of either country may feel called upon to make in behalf of Spanish subjects and interests in fulfilment of the friendly office of pro- tection thus assumed and admitted. In order, however, that no con- fusion may exist as to the distribution of protective functions among the respective consulates, I beg that you will favor me with a list of the French consular officers who have been designated to act in the manner stated in your note. Be pleased to accept, etc. John Sherman. Mr. Cambon to Mr. Day. [Translation.] Embassy of the French Republic, Washington, April 26, 1898. (Received April 26, 8 p. m.) Mr. Secretary of State: In your acknowledgment, dated April 25, of a note which I had the honor to address to you on the 22d of the same month, in regard to the steps which I had taken, in concert with the minister of Austria-Hungary, for the purpose of insuring the protection of Spanish subjects and interests in the United States, TREATY OF PEACE. 287 w^hich onr Governments have simultaneously assumed, you were good enough to express to me the desire to receive the list of French consuls and consular agents designated to exercise such protection, under the conditions indicated in my above-mentioned note. In order to comply with your request, I hasten to transmit to you, as an inclosnre, the list of these agents, and I avail myself of this occasion to thank yoa for the instructions intended to facilitate their mission which you propose to issue to the competent authorities. Pray accept, etc., Jules Cambon. [Inclosure in the French ambassador's note of April 26, 1898. J List of French cotisular posts charged with the protection of Spanish interests. Consulates. — New Orleans, San Francisco. Vice- consulates. — Philadelphia, Galveston. Consular agencies. — Cincinnati, Detroit, Kansas City, Lonisville, St. Lonis, St. Paul, Brownsville, Dallas, El Paso, San Antonio, Baltimore, Boston, Charleston, S. C, Norfolk, Portland, Me., Apalachicola, Baton Rouge, Birmingham, Mobile, Peuaacola, Savannah, Los Angeles, Portland, Oreg., San Jose. Mr. TJiiebaut to Mr. Adee. [Translation.] Embassy of France in the United States, Washingtoti, April 27, 1898. Dear Mr. Adee : Referring to our conversation of day before yester- day, I have the honor to transmit to you herewith for your information copy of a telegram which the Ambassador has received from the agent of the steamer Buena Ventura, recently captured by the Federal squadron in the Gulf of Mexico : Liverpool, April 24, 1898. Not being able to communicate with our Buena Ventura, notwithstanding all efforts made, we beg you to be pleased to indicate to us in what way we can do so. Families anxious. Larranaga. The Ambassador would be especially obliged to you if you could ena- ble him to answer this telegram. News of the crew of this vessel might doubtless be obtained either from the Department of the Navy or the Treasury. Be pleased to accept, etc., Thiebaut. Mr. Adee to Mr. Thicbaut. Departiment OF State, April 28, 1898. My Dear Me. TheSbaut: Iu further acknowledgment of your per- sonal note of yesterday, requesting permission, on behalf of the fam- ilies and friends of the officers and crew of the steamer Buena Ventura, recently captured by the Federal squadron, to communicate with the 288 TREATY OF PEACE. said officers and crew, I beg to inform you that I am now in receipt of a reply to my letter to the Attorney-General on the subject. Mr. Grijigs states that the jjersous seizetl on the various vessels recently captured as prizes of war are now being harbored and i)rotected at Key West Barracks, and that they are therefore at present in the custody and control of the War Department, but that he has directed the United States attorney for the southern district of Florida to cooperate with the otticers of the War Department in permitting all proper communi- cations from the respective families or friends to reach the otiicers and crew of the vessel in question. In order to save any possible delay, I have, however, written the Secretary of War, requesting that the privilege you ask for the families and friends of the crew be granted, although 1 have little tioubt that the instructions of the Attorney-General above referred to will have accomplished already the desired result. 1 will again communicate with you on receiving any further informa- tion in the matter. I am, etc., Alvey A. Adee. Mr. Thh'haut to Mr. Adee. Washington, April 2S, 1S9S. ]\[y^ Deati Mr. Adee: I hasten to acknowledge receipt of your per- sonal note of to-day in which you inform me that the persons seized on the Spanish vessels recently captured by the Federal tleet are now in the custody and control of the War Department, at Key West Bar- racks, but that upon instructions of the Attorney-General, the United States attorney for the southern district of Florida will cooperate with military authorities in permitting all proper communicaiions from fami- lies or friends to reach the otiicers and crew of the steamer Buena Ventura. I have at once transmitted this information to the agent of the vessel in question at Liverpool. I am directed by the ambassador to convey to you his thanks for your so courteous action iu the matter, and I beg you to believe me, my dear Mr. Adee, Most sincerely, yours, Thiebaut. Memorandum from French Embassy. CouM the Department of State inform the French ambassador whether^ the Spanish schooner Sojia is among the number of vessels captured by the Federal Heet? Washington, April 29, 1S98. Mr. Moore to Mr. Camhon, ^o. 15.] Department of State, April 29, 1898. Excellency: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note of the I'Oth instant, transmitting a list of the French officers who have been intrusted with the protection of Spanish subjects and inter- TREATY OF PEACE. 289 ests in the Uuitefl States, and to inclose herewith for your information and use six printed copies of the coriespondence which has passed between your Embassy, the Austro IJungarian legation, and this Dei^artrnejit on the subject. Accejit, etc., J. IJ. MOOEE, Acting Secretary. [Inclosure.] CORITESPOXnKNCr: COXCKRKIJJG the protection of SPANISH SURJECTS AXD INTER- ESTS IN' THE UXriKD STATES BY THE DIPLOMATIC AND CONSCI-AK OIFICERS OF FliAXCE ANU AL'STHIA-HUNGAUY. The French ambassador to the Secretary of State. [Translation.] Embassy of the Fkench Eepcbuc ik the United States, Wafshinyton. April 22, 1808. Mr. Sf.crktaky of State: I have the honor to infortn you that before leaving Wafthiuj^ou, and in fulfillrnent of the instructions of his Government, M». Polo y Beruab<- confided to me and at the same time to the minister of Aiiiitria-Hungary the x^rotection of Soanish subjects and interests in the L'uit'rd States. With a view to simplifv in practice the accomplishment of the mission which our respective Governments have accepted, the minister of Austria- Hungary and I have made in common accord the following arrangements: First. The archives of the Spanish legation in Washington will remain stored in the legation of Austria-Hungary. Second. The care of the consular archives and the protection of Spanish interests will be fontided to the consulat«rs-general of Austria-Hungary in New York and Chi- caj£o and the consulates of France in Ni;w Orleans, San Francisco, and Philadelphia. Third. In those localities where only one of the two countries has a representa- tive, he will assume the protection of'Spanish interests; in those places wh»^re the two countries are only represented by consular agents, such protection will be exer- cised bv the P'rench agent. Fourth. Questions the adjustment of which may necessitate representations to the Department of State will lie dealt with either by the mini8t«r of Austiia-Hun -ary or by me, accordingly as the Austrian or French consul shall have had the initiative therein. . . i Fifth. In all other cases I shall charge myself alone with the steps to be taken with respect to the Government of the United States. I to-dav send instructions in this sense tEBORNE, Medical Director, U. S. N. Accept, etc., William E. Day. Mr. Day to 3Ir. Camhon. No. 66.] Department of State, July 28, 1898. Excellency: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note of the 25th instant, relative to the case of the Spanish sailing ves- sel Amapala, said to be held as a prize at Tampa, and to inform you in reply that the matter in question is receiving the attention of this Government. Accept, etc., Wm. R. Day. Mr. Camhon to Mr. Day. Embassy of the French Eepublio, Washingtoii, July 28, 1898. Mr. Secretary of State : The consul of France at San Juan de Porto Eico telegraphs me that at the joint request of the consuls the captain general lias recognized, in writing, the neutrality of a point selected outside of the city where the foreigners have taken refuge. Our consul adds that as soon the Federal vanguard shall make its appearance he intends to notify the general commanding the American army of this humane arrangement. I have the honor to bring this fact to your knowledge in order that you may be able to send General Miles such instructions as you may think proper. Be pleased to accept, etc., Jules Cambon. Mr. Moore to Mr. Camhon. No. 68.] Department of State, July 30, 1898. Excellency: As I had the honor to inform you by my note of the 28th instant, I communicated on that day to the Attorney- General a copy of yours of July 25, in relation to the Spanish sailing vessel Ama;pala, TREATY OF PEACE. 305 I am now advised by the Acting Attorney-General that the United States attorney for the southern district of Florida has been instructed to forward to his Department the prize master's report, togetJier with the tacts and circumstances attending the capture and detention of tlie vessel, and to furnish his opinion as to the propriety of pursuing the course indicated by you. Accept, etc., J. B. Moore. Mr. Bay to Mr. Camhon. No. 60.] Department of State, August 2, 1S9S. Excellency: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note of the 28th ultimo by which you advise me that the consul of France at San Juan, Porto Rico, has telegraphed you that at the joint request of the consuls, the Captain-General has recognized in writing the neutrality of a place outside the city where foreigners have taken refuge, and that as soon as the United States forces make their appear- ance a notification of this humane arrangement will be given to the general in command. This fact you state you bring to my knowledge in order that such instructions may be sent to General Mdes as may be thought proper. I have accordingly communicated a copy of your note to the Secre- tary of War. Accept, etc., William E. Day. Mr. Day to Mr. Cambon. No. 74.] Department of State, August 4, 1898. Excellency: With further reference to your note of the 25th ultimo, in relation to the Spanish brig Amapala^ I have the honor to inform you that I am just in receipt of a letter from my colleague, the Attor- ney-General, inclosing a copy of a report of the United States district attorney at Jacksonville, Fla,, on the case in question. By the report of the district attorney it appears that the statement made to your excellency by the parties in interest that the Amapala was compelled by bad weather to seek shelter at Tampa, is wholly incorrect. The evidence taken in preparatorio discloses the fact that the brig was captured off Havana while Hying the colors of the Kepub- lic of Honduras and attempting to run the blockade. The brig has accordingly been condemned and ordered to be sold. It appears that there is no desire on the part of the authorities of the United States to detain the passengers who were on board of the brig at the time of the capture. It is thought, however, that this Govern- i^ie'it is not under any obligation to provide them with the means of transpoitation, especially as the devices resorted to by the brig for the purpose of escaping lawful capture must have been known to those on board. ^ Accept, etc., Wllliam E. Day. TP 20 306 TREATY OF PEACE. Mr. Day to Mr. Cambon. No. 81.] Department of State, Angnst 6, 1898. Excellency: Referring to your note of tlie 28tb ultimo advising me that at the request of the consuls the captain-general of Porto Eico had recognized, in writing, the neutrality of a point outside the city of San Juan for the refuge of foreigners, I have the honor to inform you that the Secretary of War has telegraphed General Miles so far as practica- ble to recognize this arrangement. Accept, etc., William E. Day. [On August 12, 1898, there was signed by the Secretary of State on behalf of the United States and by the Ambassador of France at Wash- ington on behalf of Spain a Protocol of Agreement preliminary to the final establishment of peace between the United States and Spain.] Memorandum left at the Department of State. Ambassade de France, August 15, 1898. May the postal service by Spanish steamers be reestablished between Sjjain and Cuba, Porto Eico, Philippines'? Will Spanish merchants be permitted to send sui)plies in Spanish bottoms to Cuba, Porto Eico, Philippines'? Will Spanish tank steamer Cadagna, chartered by French merchants and now lying in Havre, be permitted to proceed to Philadelphia to take mineral oil for industrial purposes'? The French Embassy has been unofficially requested by the Spanish Government to learn the names, rank, number of American commis- sioners for the evacuation of Cuba and Porto Eico, for the jieace negotia- tion at Paris, as it is the desire of the Spanish Government to appoint commissioners of same rank, etc. In which delay should a claimant appeal from a decision of United States prize court to the United States Sux^reme Court II Mr. Moore to Mr. Cambon. Department of State, August 16, 1898. Dear Mr. Cambon: In response to one of the inquiries left at the Department yesterday in behalf of the embassy by Mr. Thiebaut, I have the pleasure to inform you, by direction of the President, that the American commissioners for the evacuation of Cuba and Porto Eico are as follows : For Cuba: Major-General Wade, Admiral SamjDson, Major-General Butler. For Porto Bico : Major-General Brooke, Admiral Schley, Brigadier- General Gordon. Believe me, etc., J. B. Moore, TREATY OF PEACE. 307 Mr. Moore to Mr. Cambon. No. 96.] Department of State, Aur/ust 16, 1898. Excellency: This Goveruinent is advised that the Eastern Tele- graph Company will at once proceed to restore cable communication between Hongkong and Manila if the United iStates and Spain will consent to that measure. This Government desires such communication to be reopened and, as we have restored Spain to full telegraphic communication with Cuba, it is not supposed that she will object to the reestablishment of cable communication between Hougkcmg and Manila. The Department will be greatly obliged to your excellency if you will be so good as to communicate with the Spanish Government on the subject. Accept, etc., J. B. Moore, Acting Secretary. Mr. Camion to Mr. Bay. [Translation.] French Embassy, Washington, August 17, 1898. Mr. Secretary of State: The Spanish Government, not wishing to make use any longer of the good offices which the Government of the Kepublic has rendered it in its diplomatic communications with the Federal Government, wishes to send to Washington one of its consuls in Canada, who would be authorized to attend to all the questions of detail, the settlement of which the cessation of hostilities will, of course, permit or necessitate. By order of my Government, I have the honor to notify you of this wish of the cabinet of Madrid, and I would be much obliged to you if you would inform me whether the Federal Government is disposed to permit such consul to be sent to Washington in the capacity of an unofiicial agent. Accept, etc., Jules Cambon. Mr. Moore to 3Ir. Ganibon. '!So. 98.] Department of State, August 17, 1898. Excellency: In a memorandum left at the Department on the loth instant, in behalf of your Embassy, I note the following inquiries: 1. May the postal service by Spanish steamers be reestablished between Spain and Cuba, Porto Bico, and the Philippines? 2. Will Spanish merchants be permitted to send supplies in Spanish bottoms to Cuba, Porto Bico, and the Philippines? 3. Will the Spanish tank steamer Cadagna, chartered by French merchants and now lying in Havre, be permitted to proceed to Phila- delphia to take mineral oil for industrial i)urposes? It is understood that these inquiries are made with reference to the fact that, although a suspension of hostilities between the United States and Spain has been proclaimed, the state of war between the 308 TREATY OF PEACE. two countries still continues, and that intercourse between them not having been formally restored must, so far as it is allowed, be the sub- ject of special understanding. With this observation, I proceed to answer your inquiries in the order iu which they have been stated. 1. This Government will interpose no obstacle to the reestablishment of the postal service by Spanish steamers between Spain on the one side and Cuba, Porto Kico, and the Philippines on the other. 2. The United States will not object to the importation of supplies in Spanish bottoms to Cuba and the Philippines, but it has been decdded to reserve the importation of supplies from the United States to Porto Eico to American vessels. 3. The Spanisli tank steamer Cadagna, chartered by French mer- chants and now lying at Havre, will be permitted to proceed to Phila- delphia and to take mineral oil for industrial purposes, provided such oil is not to be transported to Porto Eico. The concessions contained in these answers are made upon the under- standing that American vessels will not for the time being be excluded from Spanish ports, as well as upon the understanding that, if hostili- ties should at any time be renewed, American vessels that might hap- pen to be in Spanish ports would be allowed thirty days in which to load and depart with noucontrabaud cargo, and that any American vessel which, prior to the renewal of hostilities, should have sailed for any Spanish port or place would be permitted to enter such port or place and discharge her cargo, and afterwards forthwith to depart without molestation, and, if met at sea by any Spanish ship, to continue her voyage to any port or place not blockaded. These rules were observed by the United States at the outbreak of the war and would again be observed by this Government in the event of a renewal of hostilities. Accept, etc. J. B. Moore, Acting Secretary, Mr. Moore to Mr. Camhon. No. 99.] Department of State, August 19, 1898. Excellency: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note of the 17th instant, in which you state that the Spanish Govern- ment, not wishing to make use any longer of the good offices which the Government of France has rendered it in its diplomatic communications with the United States, wishes to send to Washington one of its consuls from Canada, who would be authorized to attend to all the questions of detail, the settlement of which the cessation of hostilities will naturally permit or necessitate. You therefore inquire, by order of your Govern- ment, whether the Government of the United States is disposed to permit such a consul to be sent to Washington in the capacity of an unofficial agent. The general terms in which the Spanish Government has caused its suggestion to be conveyed leave the Department in some doubt as to the precise object with which it is made or as to the precise capacity in which the proposed unofficial agent is to act; but the statement that the Spanish Government does not wish any longer to make use of the good offices which your Government has rendered it in its diplomatic communications with the United States indicates that such agent, who, TREATY OF PEACE. 309 althongh a consul accredited to another Government, would have no official standing with reference to this Government, would be expected to discharge in some sense diplomatic functions. To such a measure there are, it is conceived, two objections. In the first place, although hostilities have been suspended, the state of war between the United States and Spain still continues. In the second place, the Department is not informed as to the ques- tions of detail to which the suggestion of the Spanish Government refers. Arrangements have already been made for the treatment of the particular matters with reference to which the suspension of hos- tilities was proclaimed. Tlie immediate evacuation of Cuba, Porto Kico, and other Spanish islands in the West Indies is to be carried out by- commissioners specially appointed for that purpose, and the question of peace is to be treated of by specially appointed commissioners who are to meet in Paris. Under these circumstances, it seems to this Government to be desir- able that diplomatic communications between the United States and Spain, in relation to any questions other than those above mentioned, should for the present continue to be conducted through the very accept- able channel through which they have heretofore been made since the beginning of the war. Accept, etc., J. B. Moore, Acting Secretary. Mr. Moore to Mr. Camhon. [Personal.] Department of State, August 19, 1898. My Dear Mr. Ambassador: Eeferring to your oral request, I have now the pleasure to transmit herewith, for the files of your embassy, a typewritten copy in English of the peace protocol signed August 12, 181)8, of the President's order directing the Secretary of State to sign that instrument, and of the President's proclamation. I am, etc., J. B. Moore. Mr. Camhon to Mr. Day, [Translation.] Embassy of the French Eepublic, WasMngton, August 20, 1898. Mr. Secretary of State: In response to the wish which I had the honor to express to you verbally, you did me the favor, on the IDth of this month, to transmit to me, for the archives of my embassy, a copy of the protocol signed on the 12th of August, of the powers con- ferred upon the Secretary of State to sign this instrument, and of the proclamation suspending hostilities issued by the President of the United States on the same day. I have the honor to thank you for the transmission of these docu- ments, and I avail myself of this occiision to renew to you, Mr. Secre- tary of State, the assui'ances of my very high consideration. Jules Cambon. 310 TREATY OF PEACE. Mr. Camhon to Mr. Day. [Translation.] Embassy of the FRENcn Eepublic, Washington, August 30, 1898. Mr. Secretary of State : In a communication under date of the 19th of this month you made known to me the objections which would be entertained by the Federal Government to the sending to Washing- ton of a Spanish consul under the conditions indicated in my note of the 17th of August. You add that the settlement of the principal ques- tions to which the suspension of hostilities gives rise having been intrusted to special commissions designated to meet, respectively, in Cuba, Porto Rico, and at Paris, it seems to you desirable that diplo- matic communications relative to other questions shonld continue for the present to be exchanged between the Cabinets of Washington and Madrid by the same intermediary through which they have passed since the commencement of the war. I have the honor to inform you that I have communicated this infor- mation to the Spanish Grovernment, and 1 avail myself of this occasion to renew to you, Mr. Secretary of State, the assurances of my very high consideration. Jules Caivibon. Mr. Camhon to Mr. Bay. fTrnmlation.] Embassy of the French Republic, Washington, August 20, 1898, Mr. Secretary of State : 1 have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication, under date of the 17th of this month, in which you inform me, in response to the inquiries contained in my note of the 15th, that- First. The Federal Government will oppose no obstacle to the reestablishment of the royal mail postal service between Spain, Cuba, Porto Rico, and the Philippines. Second. That it will permit Spanish merchants to transport, under the Spanish flag, provisions destined for Cuba and the Philippines, but that the importation into Porto Rico of provisions from the United States will be reserved to American vessels. Third. That the Spanish reservoir ship Gadagna, freighted by French merchants, may proceed to Philadelphia and there receive on board a cargo of distilled petroleum for industrial purposes, on the condition that this cargo is not taken to Porto Rico. You add that, the suspension of hostilities allowing a state of war to subsist between the two countries, the above concessions are granted with the following reservations: First. During the present period access to Spanish ports shall not be denied to American vessels. Second. Should hostilities be resumed, American vessels shall enjoy the immunities accorded to Spanish vessels by articles 4 and 5 of the President's proclamation of April 26 last. I have hastened to communicate the foregoing information to the Spanish Government. Be pleased to accept, etc., Jules Oambon. TREATY OF PEACE. 311 Mr. Camhon to Mr. Bay. [Translation.] Embassy of the French Republic, Washington, August 22, 1898. The telej^rara by which the French Ambassador communicated to the Spanish Goveiument the objections stated by the Secretary of State of the United States, in his letter of August 19, with regard to the pro- posed dispatch to Washington of a Spanish consul, crossed a dispatch from the Madrid cabinet, proposing, for the execution of that unofficial mission, :\I. Torroja, ex- consul of Spain at Philadelphia, who speaks English very well, and who is said to have left a very good impression in the United States. The French ambassador would be thankful to the Secretary of State if he would inform him as speedily as possible whether there appears to be any prospect that this new proposition of the Madrid cabinet will be favorably entertained by the Federal Government. M. J. Cambou avails himself, etc. Mr. Camhon to Mr. Bay. [Translation.] French Embassy, Washington, August 22, 1898. At the request of the Spanish Government, the French Ambassador has the honor to inform the Secretary of State of the United States that the royal commissioners who have been designated to arrange the details of the evacuation of the Spanish Antilles are: For Cuba: The General of Division Gonzales Parrado, Eear-Admiral Pastor y Landero, and Marquis de Montoro. For Porto Rico: General of Division Ortega y Diaz, I^aval Captain of the First Class Vallarino y Carasco, and Auditor of Division (military judge) Sanchez del Aguila y Leon. Mr. J. Cambon takes advantage of this opportunity, etc. Mr. Bay to Mr. Camhon. Department of State, Bo. 102.] Washington, August 23, 1898. Excellency: Referring to your inquiry of the loth instant, I have the honor to inform vou that by the statutes of the United States an appeal may be taken to the Supreme Court from all final decrees ot any district court in prize cases where the matter in dispute, exclusive oi costs, exceeds the sum or value of $2,000; and that an appeal is allowed in such cases, without reference to the value of the matter in dispute, on a certificate of the district judge that the adjudication involves a question of general importance. The law requires that the Supreme Court shall receive, hear, and determine such appeals, and shall always be open for the entrv thereof. Power is vested in the Supreme Court also, if, in its judgment, the purposes of justice require it, to allow any amendment either in form or substance of any appeal in prize causes. 312 TREATY OF PEACE. It is provided that appeals in such causes shall be made within thirty days after the rendering of the decree appealed from, unless the court previously extends the time for cause shown in the particular case. The Supreme Court is empowered if, in its judgment, the purposes of justice require it, to allow an appeal in any prize case if it appears that any notice of appeal or of intention to appeal was filed with the clerk of the district court within thirty days after the rendition of the final decree therein. This answer to your inquiry is based in substance upon sections 695, 1006, and 1009 of the Eevised Statutes of the United States. Accept, etc., William E. Day. . Mr. Day to Mr. Camhon. Department of State, Washington, August 24, 1898. The Secretary of State of the United States has had the honor to receive the communication of the French ambassador of the 22d instant, in which it is stated that the Spanish Government, in pursuance of its previous proposal to send a consul to Washington to conduct in an unofficial capacity diplomatic correspondence with this Government, has designated for that function Mr. Torroja, ex-consul of Spain at Philadelphia, who speaks English, and who is said to have left a good impression in the United States. In view of the fact that the telegraphic dispatch of the Spanish Gov- ernment, conveying this designation, is understood to have crossed the telegram of the Frencli embassy conveying our objections, as stated in our note of the 19th instant, to the original proposal, it does not appear to be necessary for the Department now to do more than refer to that note as having answered by anticipation the present communication. Mr. William R. Day avails himself of this oi)portunity to renew to M. Cambou the assurances of his highest consideration. Mr. Bay to Mr. Camhon. Department of State, Washington, August 24, 1898. The Secretary of State of the United States has the honor to inform the Embassy of the Kepublic of France that it is expected that the commissioners appointed on the part of the United States for the pur- pose of arranging and executing the details of the evacuation of Cuba by Spain will soon depart for Havana in a public shij). It is deemed proper to give notice of this intention in order that the mines in the harbor of Havana may now be removed, if, indeed, this has not already been done. The Secretary of State will be greatly obliged if the Embassy will cause the substance of this communication to be conveyed by telegraph to the Spanish Government, and advise him of that Government's reply, in order that preparations may immediately be made for the departure of the United States commissioners. TREATY OF PEACE. 313 Mr. Camhon to Mr. Day. [Translation.] Embassy op the French Republic, Washington, August 24, 1898. In order to comply witli the wish expressed by the Secretary of State of the Uuited States iu his note of August 24, the Embassy of France this day informed the Spanish Government, by cable, that the United States commissioners charged with the arrangements to be made for the evacuation of Cuba were sliortly to proceed to Havana, and asked that orders be issued for the removal of mines from that harbor, iu the event of this not having already been done. The Embassy of France will have the honor of communicating to the Department of State the reply of the Spanish Government as soon as it receives it. Mr. Bay to Mr. Camhon. Department of State, August 26, 1898. The Secretary oi State of the United States has the honor to inform the French Embassy that an inquiry has been made by a firm of ship brokers in the city of New York as to whether an American schooner would be received at Las Palmas, Canary Islands, if cleared for that port. In view of the position taken by this Government in reply to certain inquiries of the Government of Spain as to the reception of Spanish ships in the ports of this country, it is supposed that the S(;hoouer in question would be received at Las Palmas if cleared from the United States during the suspension of hostilities. The shippers, however, are unwilling to clear the schooner without a positive assur- ance to that effect, and as tbe Uei)artment has not as yet received from the Spanish Government a response to its note to the French embassy of the 17th instant, the Secretary of State ventures to express the hope that the French embassy will cause an inquiry to be made of the Span- ish Government as to whether the schooner in question will be received at Las Palmas if she should clear for that port pending the suspension of hostilities. Mr. Day to j\h'. Camhon. Department of State, Washington, August 26, 1898. The Secretary of State has the honor to acknowledge the receipt of the note of the'^ambassador of France of the li2d instant, advising hira of the composition of the commissinn designated on tlie part of Spain to arrange the d. tails of the evacuation of the Spanish Antilles, and to say in reply that translatioiis thereof have been communicated to the Secretaries of War and the Navy. Mr. William R. Day has the honor to renew to Mr. Jules Cambon the assurances ot his highest consideration. 314 TREATY OF PEACE. Mr. Camhon to Mr. Bay, [Translation.] , French Embassy, Washington, Aitgvst 29, 1898. Referring to a coiiimunicatioii from tlie boiiorable Secretary of State of the United States, dated August 24, coucerniug the approaching departure of the American commissioners charged with settling the details of the evacuation of Cuba, the French embassy has the honor to state that the Spanish Government has given orders to the Havana authorities for the removal of any mines which may still be in that harbor. In this connection the Madrid cabinet has expressed a wish to know in what kind of vessel the American commission will take i^assage. It would prefer that it should not be a Federal war vessel, the presence of which, in Havana harbor might, by calling up the recollection of the Maine, give rise to demonstrations which it vvould not be easy to pre- vent, and which both parties would evidently be interested in avoiding. Mr. Camhon to Mr. Bay, [Translation.] French Embassy, Washington, August 29, 1898. The French embassy has just received a telegram from Havana in which Captain General Blanco expresses the wish to know whether the Federal Government would see any objection to officers of the Spanish army returning singly to Spain by way of the United States. The French embassy would be much obliged to the Department of State if it would enable it to reply to this question by telegram. Mr. Camhon to Mr. Bay, [Translation.] French Embassy, Washington, August 29, 1898. According to news received at Madrid from the Philippines, the insurrection is spreading more and more in the archipelago. By the help of five vessels at their disposal, the insurgents are said to be threatening various points where the Spanish forts are not able to oppose a successful resistance, and the peaceable population is thus exposed, without defense, to the barbarous treatment of the rebel bands. The Koyal Government, whose duty it is to provide for the protection of the life and property of the Spanish subjects in the Philippines, has expressed the wish that the Federal Government be informed of the fears which this situation causes it, and which might be advantageously remedied in the following manner: The Si)anish troops whom the capitulation of the city of Manila ha« reduced to inaction might be placed at once at the disi)osal of Spam, who would use Ihem for the defense of the islands against the insur gents. The minister of state at Madrid thinks that if the United States Government sees any objections to this arrangement, it will, at least, have no reason to oppose the dispatch of troops directly from the peninsula to the Philijjpiues. TREATY OF PEACE. 315 Mr. Camhon to Mr. Day, [Translation.] Embassy of the French Republic, Washington, August 2'.>, 1898. The Frencli Embassy has beeu requested to inform the Federal Gov- ernmeut that the families of tlie officers of tlie garrison of the archi- pelago of the Ladroues are in a state of entire destitution. The Spanish Government is contideut that as soon as the attention of the Department of State has been called to this painful sitnation the United States will act in accordance with the feelings of humanity and the responsibility which it has assumed in sending those officers to Manila, and will take the necessary steps to have their families sent to Cavite. Mr. Moore to Mr. Camhon. No. 103.] Department of State, Washington, August 30, 1898. Excellency: Referring to previous correspondence concerning Mr. Jimenez Zapatero, I have the honor to advise you that he has been released from confinement as a prisoner of war at Fortress Monroe, but that he still remains at the post because of lack of funds. Accept, etc., J. B. Moore, Acting Secretary. Department of State, September 1, 1898. The Department of State, replying to the inquiry of the French em- bassy of the 29th ultimo, has the honor to say that this Government does not, under the present circumstances, object to officers of the Span- ish army returning singly to Spain by way of the United States. Mr. Thiabaut to Mr. Moore. [Personal.] French Embassy, Washington, September 3, 1898. Dear Mr. Moore: In reference with the informal note of this Embassy, dated August 29, and with our conversation of this morning, I have the honor to call your attention to the following statements: From advices received at JMadrid, negotiations are said to be carried on by the Federal authorities for the purpose of chartering at Hong- kong ships for the transportation to Spain of the Spanish troops surrendered at Manila. These troops or part thereof are needed by Spain to protect the Philippine Ishmds in her possession against the insurgents. A ship with some TOO insurgents on board is said to have left Manila with a view of attacking some of the islands in Spain's possession. 316 TREATY OF PEACE. Similar expoditions are said to be preparing in Luzon and starting therefrom with the same purpose; these vessels are flying a tiag which has not been recognized by the maritime powers, and are therefore liable of being denounced as pirates. These expeditions can hardly be carried on without the knowledge of the commander of the American forces in the bay of Manila; as Spain is scrupulously observing the disi)Ositions of the protocol, it is believed by the Spanish Government that the Government of the United States will, on the other hand, cause the hostilities, from what- ever quarter, to be suspended in the Philippines pending the peace negotiations. Yours, most sincerely, Thiebaut. Mr. Moore to Mr. Thiebaut, [Personal.] French Embassy, Washtngton, September 5, 1898. Dear Mr. 'I'hiebaut: Since the receipt of your informal note of the 29th ultimo and your personal letter of the 3d instant consideration has been given to the matters therein referred to, and pertinent advices have been received from our military and naval commanders in the Philippines. As the result of our investigations it appears that some of the reports which you have brought to our attention in behalf of the Government at Madrid have no solid foundation, while others relate to matters that occurred before the signing of the protocol of August 12. The rumor that the authorities of this Government are carrying on negotiations for the purpose of chartering at Hongkong ships for the transportation to Spain of the Spanish troops that surrender at Manila appears to be wholly groundless. No such negotiations have to our knowledge been undertaken. None have been authorized. In our conversation of the 3d instant you disclaimed any intention on the part of the Spanish Government to impute to the commanders of the American forces at Manila connivance with any recent hostile proceedings of the insurgents. I am now able to say that they have no knowledge of the incidents referred to as having lately taken place at Manila. As to the rumor that a ship with 700 insurgents on board has lately left Manila with a view to attack some of the islands in the Philippines, we are advised that no insurgent vessel having trooi)8 on board has recently left either Manila or Manila Bay. It is stated, however, that about August 10, before the protocol was signed, two vessels with from one to two hundred troops left Manila Bay, destination unknown. The report that similar expeditions are preparing in Luzon with a hostile purpose against other islands appears also to be inexact. Our advices are to the effect that the insurgents have three or four small vessels, only two of which have guns, and that the largest of these vessels will not carry more than 250 men. In your informal note of the 29th ultimo it is stated that the Spanish Government suggests that, for the purpose of checking insurgent hos- tilities, the Spanish troops now held as prisoners of war by the Ameri- can forces may be placed at the disposal of Spain, to be used against the insurgents J or, if this be objected to, that the Spanish Government TREATY OF PEACK. 317 may be allowed fco seud troops from the peninsula to the Philippines. It cau scarcely be expected that tliis Government would eveu consider the question of adopting the first alternative, in vicAv of the fact that for sometime before the suirender of IManila the Spanish forces in that city were besieged by the insurgents by land while tlie port was block- aded by the forces of the United States by sea. As to the second, alternative, it will be a matter for regret if it should be adopted on the strength of rumors, some of which have beeu shown to be groundless, while others yet are unconfirmed. The Government of the United States will, through its military and naval commanders in the Philipi)ines, exert its intluence for the purpose of restraining insurgent hostilities pending the suspension of hostilities between the United States and Spain. Jt would be unfortunate if any act should be done by either Govern- ment which might, in certain aspects, be inconsistent with the suspen- sion of hostilities between the two nations, and which might necessi- tate the adoption of corresponding measures of precaution by the other Government. Very sincerely, yours, J. B. Moore. Mr. Gamhon to Mr. Moore [Trauslation.] Embassy of the French Republic, Washington., September 6, 1898. The Ambassador of France has the honor to inform the Secretary of State of the United States that the Spanish Government has accepted, by way of reciprocity, the proposition for a modus vivendi, as regards navigation, which formed the subject of the communication of the Department of State of the 17th ultimo. In consequence of this acceptance, and in order to reply to the inquiry made by the Department of State in its note of August 26, the Eoyal Government has given to the competent autliorities in the Canary Islands the necessary orders to the end that the American schooner which the ship brokers in Kew York propose to send to Las Palmas may be at perfect liberty to enter that port. Mr. Cambon avails himself of this occasion to renew to the Hon. J. B. Moore the assurances of his highest consideration. Mr. Moore to Mr. Camion. Department of State, Washington, September 6, 1898. By a note of the 20th ultimo, the French embassy communicated to the Department of State a report received from the Spanish Govern- ment to the effect that the families of the officers of the garrison of the archipelago of the Ladrones were in a state of destitution; and the embassy was so good as to say that the Spanish Government was con- fident that as soon as the attention of the Department was called to the painful situation, the United States would act in accordance with 318 TREATY OF PEACE. the feelings of humanity and the responsibility it had assumed in send- ing those otticers to JMauila, and would take the necessary steps to have their families sent to Cavite. Immediately upon the receipt of the note of the embassy, the Depart- meuL, desirous of heeding every dictate of humanity, caused inquiries to be made as to the situation of the families in question. A reply to those inquiries has just been received, in the form of a telegram from Admiral Dewey, dated at Manila on the 5th instant. Admiral Dewey states that the families of the Spanish oflicers are still at Guam, and that, according to the testimony of all the United States naval officers who have visited the island, the reports of their destitution are wholly groundless. The Spanish governor informed Captain Glass that all the families were provided for before leaving. When the Monterey and Monadnoclc were there they found no signs of destitution and heard no complaints. Spanish olticers now held as prisoners at Manila received letters from Guam by both vessels, and in these letters no mention was made of any destitution. It further appears that Spanish officers at Guam are still collecting taxes, and are able to relieve any want. Mr. J. B. Moore takes this occasion to renew to his excellency, Mr, Jules Cambju, the assurances of his highest consideration. CONSULAPv EEPORTS ON PHILIPPINE AFFAIRS. AFFAIRS IN THE PHILIPPINES. Mr. Williarns to Mr. Gridler. N"o. 8.] Consulate of the United States, Manila^ Philippine Islands, February 31, 1898, Sir: I liave tlie lionor to inform you that diirinj? tlie year 1897 the record of arrivals and departures of vessels of all flags from Manila, Iloilo, and Cebu, the open ports of the Philippiue Islauds, is as follows: Arrivals. Total. Departures. Flag. steam- ships. Ships. Barks. Steam- ships. Ships. Barks. Total. United States 1 150 28 47 10 19 2 15 20 1 8 22 2 21 192 31 47 10 21 2 3 1 1 1 149 28 47 10 18 2 13 23 8 18 1 22 190 29 47 Tnmn 10 1 1 1 19 2 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Tot'il 332 322 Certain defects as to tonnage, etc., exist in the records supplied me. These I hope to have remedied for the current year, so that my 1898 report may be nearer complete. I have the honor, etc., Oscar F. Williams, United States Consul. Mr. Williams to Mr. Cridler. ;N'o. 9.] Consulate of the United States, Manila, Philippine Islands, February 22, 1898. Sir: Without specific instructions it seems my duty at this critical period to inform the Washington Government somewhat as to political conditions here. But as I have been here less than a month vigilance has not overcome all difficulties, and the rigid censorship of the press in general and the suppression of such publications as uttered the truth have made news gathering onerous. I have before me a lengthy dispatch giving dates of many warlike and political matters, with rumors, observations, and conclusions, but deem it wise to write more briefly to-day, to bide events and wait specific instructions from you. Peace was proclaimed, and since my coming festivities therefor were held ; but there is no peace, and has been none for about two years. Conditions here and in Cuba are practically alike. War exists, battles are of almost daily occurrence, ambulances bring in many wounded, 319 320 TKEATY OF PEACE. and hospitals are full. Prisoners are brought here and shot without trial, and Manila is under martial law. The Crown forces have not been able to dislodge a rebel army within 10 miles of Manila, and last Saturday, February 19, a battle was there fought and 5 dead left on the held. Much of such information is found in my longer dispatch, referred to, and which is at your con)mand. The Governor-General, who is amiable and popular, having resigned, wishes credit for pacification, and certain rebel leaders were given a cash bribe of $1,050,000 to consent to public deportation to China. This bribe and deportation only multiplied claimants and fanned the tires of discontent. Insurgents demand fewer exactions from church and state, a half of public offices, and fewer church holidays, which seriously retard business. A republic is organized here, as in Cuba. Insurgents are being armed and drilled; are rapidly increasing in numbers and efficiency, and all agree that a general uprising will come as soon as the governor- general embarks for Spain, wliich is fixed for March. While some combatant regiments have recently been returned to Spain, it was for appearance only, and all authorities now agree that unless the Crown largely reinforces its army here it will lose possession. Command me for any desired information. Your obedient servant, Oscar F. Williams, Consul. Mr. Williams to Mr. Cridler, No. 2, special.] Consulate of the United States, Manila, Philippine Islands, March 19, 1898. Sir: Matters are in a serious state here. I have daily communica- tion by cable and letter with Commodore Dewey, but we pass letters by British and other shipmasters and by i)rivate parties, because cables and letters are tampered with. Insurrection is rampant; many killed, wounded, and made prisoners on both sides. A battle ship, the Bon Juan de Austria, sent this week to the northern part of Luzon to cooperate with a land force of 2,000 dispatched to succor local forces, overwhelmed by rebels. Last night special squads of mounted police were scattered at danger points to save Manila. I caution Americans against bearing arms in violation of local law, although threats have been made by Spaniards that all Americans would soon have their throats cut. Certain ones are so frightened as to frequently come to my consulate and hotel, and spies watch all my movements. Yesterday I examined stock of an American who had been threat- ened and abstracted his ledger. To-day his inventory and accounts were placed in my safe. To-day two others came to me to send their effects to some American ship lying in the bay, and I have so planned. I have no instructions from you as to these delicate complications, but so far have gotten on well. I fly our flag all the time, give double hours to the consulate, and have notified Americans that tliey can find me all the time at the consulate, or at my hotel, or on the path between. We have many liolidays, but I keep open consulate every day, including Sundays, so Americans may find me. TREATY OF PEACE. 321 Eebellion never more tlireatening to Spain. Eebels getting arms, money, and friends, and they outnumber the Spaniards, resident and soldiery, probably a hundred to one. Keport says that Holy Week the insurgents plan to burn and cap- ture Manila. But, if so, you will learn it by wire before you receive this dispatch. My March quarterly reports may be delayed or captured. If no trouble thwarts my work, all reports from here will be sent by first mail after March 31, but my consular agents at Cebu and Iloilo are both absent, and hence I may not receive their reports for transmission as early as I send my own. All news comes direct from Washington. I hear nothing as to rela- tions between United States and Spain, and, depending upon unofficial reports, I must act as if peace reigned. I can only assure you of vig- ilance and loyalty, await your instructions, and reniaiu. Your most obedient servant, UsoAR F. Williams, Consul, Mir. Williams to Mr. Cridler. Special.] Consulate of the United States, Manila., Philippine Islands, March 27., 1898. Sir: Because of having given daily information to Commodore Dewey as to disturbances here I have assumed tliat he informed the Washington Government, and I have written little on war matters. Cuban conditions exist here ])ossibly in aggravated form. Spanish soldiers are killed and wounded daily, des})ite claimed i^acitication, and the hospitals are kept full. The majority of casualties are reported from the ranks of the native insurgents, and the cruelties and horrors of war are daily repeated. Cavite is the naval port of Luzon, situated about S miles across the bay from Manila, and about twenty miles distant by way of bay shore and public highway, and last Thursday, March 24, a Crown regiment of natives, the Seventy-fourth, stationed there was ordered to advance against native insurgents near by. The regiment refused to obey orders, and 8 corporals were called out and shot to death in presence of the regiment, which was again ordered to advance and threat made that a refusal would be death to all. All did refuse and were sent to barracks to await sentence. On the morning of the following Friday, March 25, the entire regiment, with arms and equipment, marched out of the barracks and deserted in a body to the insurgents, saying they were willing to tight the foreign enemies of Spain, but would not fight their friends. Since beginning this dispatch I learn of the desertion to the insur- gents of another entire regiment. These are said to be the severest set-backs received by Spain during the two years' insurrection here. On Friday morning, March 25, a church holiday, a meeting of natives was being held near my consulate in Manila, the natives being- unarmed. The building was surrounded by police and military, the meeting broken up, twelve natives wantonly shot to death, several wounded, and sixty-two taken prisoners. Saturday morning, March 2G, the sixty-two prisoners were marched in a body to the cemetery and shot to death, although it Avas shown that several were ciiance passers-by oremi^loyees in shix)s adjoining, not being in attendance at the meeting. T p 21 322 TREATY OF PEACE. It was cold comfort to the widows and orphans of innocent men ta have Spanish oflicers present them the mangled corpses of husbands and fathers. Such horrors, but usually on a smaller scale, but at times attended by greater disregard for modern rules of war, occur almost daily, and the piteous cry goes up, "Will it ever stop?" The Crown forces are now building a cordon of small forts on city's outskirts for defense against provincial natives, who are expected to soon attack Manila. In fact, two detectives and one messenger have come to me this evening with information that attack was to be made to-night, and everybody is anxious, as 8,000 native insurgent soldiers are encamped only live miles away. The insurgents seem to lack arms and organization, but, so far as I can learn, outnumber the Spanish forces and inhabitants twenty to one. Arms are being obtained and organization slowly effected, and all classes fear the near future. It is said that the only reason why Manila has not been taken and burned is because a vast majority ot its population is in perfect accord with the insurgents. Because of anxiety among Americans and my wish to keep in reach of all demands, I keep tlie consulate open double hours and on all holi- days and Sundays, with biggest flag flying, so any needing a refuge may find it. Barbarities are reported as daily practiced, such as placing prisoners and suspects in black-hole dungeons in the walls of old Manila, so placed that with rise of tide prisoners are drowned; several hundred reported to have so perished. Cruelties too horrid for an ofllcial report are detailed to me every day, and it seems that the cry of outraged humanity would soon com- pel Spain to abolish Middle Age methods of warfare. Christian nations are such only in name when such atrocities as daily blacken the calendar are known to be perpetrated here and no eftbrt made to protect the weak. There is to-day no Christian nation — policy and mock diplomacy govern all; the vilest cruelties of war are added to the mangling of old men, women, and children to make full the measure of iniquity. The American Indians would not permit one of their tribes to prac- tice such barbarities. Why should so-called Christian nations decline to call a halt upon Spanish outrages'? All information as to defenses of Manila has been sent to Commodore George Dewey at Hongkong. For fear of confiscation this dispatch and other mail go by messen- ger to Hongkong, to be there mailed. Cable is cut in three places. I keep copies of dispatches, etc., but at present, for reasons, they are not copied on the register at consulate, I remain, etc., Oscar F. Williams, United States Consul, Manila. Mr. Williams to Mr. Bay. United States Consulate, Manila, Philippine Islands, March 31, 1898. Honored Sir: My returns and accounts for March quarter to both your Department and the Treasury having been j)erfected and mailed, I turn with reluctance, but from a sense of duty, to somewhat intorm TREATY OF PEACE. 323 you, as Secretary for Foreign Affairs, of the insurrection wliic.i for about two years has devastated these marvelously fair islands, "covered them with blood, often of the innocent, and has bereft thousands of homes of the husbands and sons who were the sole breadwinners." Last week Thursday, March 24, at Cavite, near here, the Seventy- fourth Spanish Regiment, recruited among the natives of the southern islands of this group, refused to obey orders and attack the native insurrectionists. Eight corporals were called out and shot to death in presence of the regiment. Again orders to advance were given and disobeyed, when death to all was threatened. The regiment expressed a willingness to fight the foreign enemies of Spain, but said they would all be shot rather than fight their friends. All were sent to barracks to be punished later, but the next morning all took arms and deserted to the insurgents. On Friday, March 25, a church and legal holiday, unarmed natives were holding a meeting near my consulate. The building was sur- rounded by police and the suspicious military, the meeting broken up, twelve natives shot to death, several wounded, and sixty-two prisoners taken, certain of whom were mere passers-by, not having attended the meeting. The next morning these sixty- two prisoners, without form of trial, were marched in a body to the cemetery and all shot to death. Hardly a day passes without such scenes of middle- age treachery and baribarity. A recent uprising at Cape Bolinao, on the northwest coast of this island (Luzon), about 300 miles from Manila, was crushed by united action of two regiments of infantry aided by the battle ship Don Juan de Austria. A British shipmaster there at the time reports about forty killed and forty wounded. After surrender, the Spaniards put dead and wounded together in a house and by burning it cremated all. In the old walls of "Walled Manila," built about 300 years ago, are said to be several "black hole " dungeon prisons, in which incarceration is almost sure death. Two of these, both of which I have seen, with apertures at summit of wall, have floors below low tide, so two or three feet of slime, mud, and water floor the dungeons. In these hundreds of so- called insurgents have lately been placed, and all drowned by the rising tide. No judge, no jury — simply hate, suspicion, treachery. Of this several reports have been made to me, one that above two hundred victims were counted in one of these prisons. ]^o reliance can be placed upon the public press. Censorship is rigid, and the oldest daily there. El Diario de Manila, and another, have been suspended by public order because truth was told. Months ago pacification was claimed by the Governor-General. It was false. A truce had been bought with $1,050,000, during which the Governor-General hoped to embark for Si)ain, but all was a hollow farce. The Madrid Government seems now to understand all, and the Governor-General has been ordered to remain, and his appointed suc- cessor sent to one of the provinces. Now 5,000 armed rebels, which for days have been encamped near Manila and have been reenforced from the mountains, plan to attack the city to-night. All is excitement and life uncertain. News came this afternoon of the wounding of a governor of one of the southern provinces and the defeat of the Crown forces under his command. The only church permitted here is the Roman Catholic, and its inter- ference with the Government, its intolerance, immorality, and despotism are perhaps the greatest bar to ijrogress in these islands. 324 TREATY OF PEACE. From cousensus of opinion received from men of several nationalties, ft'om oldest foreign residents, from natives, Chinese, and a few Spaniards, I believe that of the Philippine people, estimated at fifteen millions, not five per cent are loyal to Spain. But oflicials and priests, the leeches of the people, are in authority, have money, influence, and cunning, so that the natives and half-breeds (Chinese and European) are more or less controlled. During the period when war between the United States and Spain was expected, which seems happily now to be disappearing, I daily heard the assurance that the natives, half-breeds, Chinese merchants, and such Spaniards as were in business were all ready to welcome our fleet, fight with it to hoist over these islands the United States flag, and swear allegiance to it; and once done, all interests here would thrive, be settled and happy. I have daily felt it a duty to inform you, but for nearly the entire period of my incumbency every odd hour of day and many of evenings have been given to inspection of forts, arsenals, and battle ships in order to fully inform Commodore Dewey at Hongkong. And because his means of communication with Washington were better than my own, I have trusted all to him. Another fact, I have not had money to cable Commodore Dewey as asked, but needed to borrow for it. Fortunately I have been well every hour, so that by double hours at the consulate, and by keeping it open, with flag flying on holidays and Sundays, the Americans have felt sure of a refuge if trouble came, and threats were freely made that all Americans would have their throats cut. I have not dared to fully trust the post-ofiQce or telegraph com- pany, as letters and cables have been freely tampered with, and hence have, until to-day, sent much mail by private messengers to Hongkong, and have received mail the same way. To-day's mail being returns and accounts, etc., and having no chance to send to Hongkong, all was mailed here. This will be sent by mes- senger to China. Now bubonic plague exists at Hongkong, and quarantine here delays ships, and Cover nor- General has ordered that ships take no passengers from these islands. By discoveries here and by a plan devised, I have saved the United States Treasury in two mouths nearly double the amount of my salary, aud each year hereafter it will be saved $200 from one item alone. My hotel room has been searched, and, I believe, my consulate also, and friends have daily called to advise me to seek safety in hiding or in flight; but I have not shared their fears sufficiently to leave a post at which you had expectations that I would remain and perform every loyal duty to your Department and to our Government. All officials have treated me well except one underling, whose head I threatened to smash, and with a return of cordiality between nations I shall make all official calls anew, as I have but just received my exe- quatur from Madrid. My work for the commodore now lighter, I shall prepare reports on Philippine tariff", import wants, products, and institutions for the de- partments at Washington. I do not copy this on the records of the consulate, because it may be there read any night by spies, and if so, my usefulness as well as my personal comfort would be impaired. I dare not even intrust my cipher cables and code to the old office safe, but carry all in my pockets. TREATY OF PEACE. 325 I rc'fjret to burden j'oii with a report so unfavorable, and hope ere long to be able to write of better conditions; but being your anti])odes, the news is old before it passes between us. For economy's sake I have not used the cable to United States, but have, as said, intrusted Commodore Dewey to inform you. Believing that before you receive this you will have succeeded the- venerable Mr. Sherman as premier, I beg you to accept congratula- tions, a moiety of which go to our country and its good President and a moiety to you, with the hope that your career as a national servanv may be as long, as honored, and as beneficial as has been that of you/ illustrious predecessor. I am, etc., Oscar F. Williams, United States Consul, Manila, Philippine Ixlandd, Mr. Williams to Mr. Day. Special.] U. S. S. Baltimore, Consulate of the United States, Bay of Manila, Philippine Islands, May 4, 189S. SiE : I have the honor to briefly report to you concerning the battle of Manila Bay, fought on May 1, 1898. Heeding your mandate, and by repeated request of Commodoia George Dewey, of the United States Asiatic Squadron, I left ]Manil,i on Saturday, April 23, and on Wednesday, April 27, at about 1 o'clo".k; p. m., boarded the flagship Olympia in Mirs Bay, near Hongkong After meeting the commodore and his captains and commanders i a council, the commodore at once ordered his fleet to start at 2 p. m. for Manila Bay. On Saturday, April 33, Subig Bay was reconnoitered because of reported hiding of Spanish fleet in its inner harbor, but no fleet being there found, the commodore proceeded at once to the south channel entrance to Manila Bay, and while by many reports mines, torpedoes, and land defenses obstructed entrance, yet the flagship led the van, and between 10 p. m., April 30, and 2 a. m.. May 1, our fleet of six war ships, one dispatch boat, and two coal-laden transports passed all channel dangers unharmed, despite shots from forts, and at 2 a. m. were all safe on the broad expanse of Manila Bay. After my departure, April 23, and by drawing fire to save Manila if possible, all Spanish war ships went to their strongly fortified naval station at Cavite, where the inner harbor gave refuge and where poten- tial support could be had from several forts and well-equipped batteries which extended several miles right and left from Port Cavite. At about 5.30 a. m., Sunday, May 1, the Spanish guns opened fire at both the Manila breakwater battery and at Cavite from fleet and forts. With magnificent coolness and order, but with greatest promptness, our fleet, in battle array, headed by the flagship, answered the Spanish attack, and for about two and a half hours a most terrific fire ensued. The method of our operations could not have shown greater system, our guns greater effectiveness, or our officers and crews greater bravery. And while Spanish resistance was stubborn and the bravery of Spanish forces such as to challenge admiration, yet they were outclassed, weighed in the balance of war against the methods, training, aim, and bravery shown on our decks, and after less than three hours' perilous and intense 326 TREATY OF PEACE. combat one of Spcaiii's war ships was siiikiiij?, two others burning, and all others with land defenses had severely suffered when our squadron, with no harm done its ships, retired for breakfast. At about 10 o'clock a. m. Commodore Dewey renewed the battle and with effects most fatal with each evolution. ]S"o better evidence of Spanish bravery need be sought than that, after the castigation of our first engagement, her ships and forts should again answer our tire. But Spanish efforts were futile. Ship after ship and battery alter battery went to destruction before the onslaught of Ameri- can energy and training, and an hour and a half of our second engage- ment wrought the annihilation of the Spanish fleet and forts with several hundred Spaniards killed and wounded and millions in value of their Government property destroyed. While amazing, almost unbelievable as it seems, not a ship or gun of our fleet had been disabled, and, except on the Baltimore, not a man had been hurt. One of the crew of the Baltimore had had a leg fractured by slipping and another hurt in the ankle in a similar manner, while four received slight flesh wounds from splinters thrown by a 6-inch projectile which pierced the starboard side of the cruiser. But in the battle of Manila Bay the United States squadron of six war ships totally destroyed the Spanish fleet of eight war ships, many forts and batteries, and accomiflished this work without the loss of a man. History has only contrasts. There is no couplet to form a compari- son. The only finish fight between the modern war ships of civilized nations has proven the prowess of American naval men and methods, and the glory is a legacy for tiie whole people. Our crews were all hoarse from cheering, and while we suffer for cough drops and throat doctors we liave no use for liniment or surgeons. To every ship, oflicer, and crew all praise be given. As Victoria was answered years ago, " Your Majesty, there is no second," so may I report to your Department as to our war ships conquering the Spanish fleet in the battle of Manila Bay: There is no first; there is no second. The cool bravery and efficiency of the commodore was echoed by every captain and commander and down through the lines by every officer and man, and naval history of the dawning century will be rich if it furnishes to the world so glorious a display ot intelligent command and successful service as must be placed to the credit of the United States Asiatic Squadron under date of May 1, 181(8. It was my lot to stand on the bridge of the Baltimore by the side of Captain Deyer during tlie first engagement, and to be called to the flagship Olympia by the commodore, at whose side, on the bridge, I stood during the second engagement. And when the clouds roll by, and I have again a settled habitation, it will be my honor and pleasure to transmit a report showing service somewhat in detail, and for which commaiiders promise data. Meanwhile our commodore will ofiicially inform you of events which will rival in American history the exifloits of Paul Jones. I have, etc., Oscar F. Williams, United States Consul. Manila, Fhili^piue Islands, TREATY OF PEACE. B2t Mr. Williams to Mr. Bay. Special.] Cruiser Baltimore, Consulate of the United States, Manila Bay, Opposite Cavite, Manila, PMlippine Islands, May 12, 1898. Sir : To aid you, if possible, permit me to give assurance of the friend- liness of the Philippine natives to our country and to me as its representative. During the period of my residence in Manila, every week was a his- tory of barbarities by Spaniards, and of efforts, often futile, of the natives to obtain rights and protect their homes. Scores of times 1 have heard hopes expressed that either United States or Great Britain would acquire these islands. In all this foreign residents, other than Spanish, concurred; and all such classes are most friendly to me. In the struggle between Spain and the insurgents, the deaths have been many and greater among the natives. First, because the Spaniards have been much better armed. Second, because the Spaniards killed many noucombatants, old men, women, and children, while the natives refrained from such barbarities. From consensus of opinions of many reliable people, I estimate Spanish forces here about as follows: First. Naval force, in ships annihilated in the notable battle of Manila Bay, in which ten Spanish war ships were burned and sunk — two auxiliary gunboats, ditto — and about thirty steamers, schooners, tugs, etc., captured. Second. About 4,000 Spanish infantry, nearly a half of whom are in hospitals. Third. About 6,000 native troops under Spanish officers, but if such officers were deported their soldiers would eagerly follow our flag. An insurgent leader, jMajor Gonzales, reported to me last week on the Olympia, that they had 37,000 troops under arms, good and bad, surrounding Manila, endeavoring to cooperate with us. In the main they are very poorly armed, but have about 6,600 rifles taken from the Spaniards. They have captured the entire railroad line and the Kiver Pasig, thus cutting off supply lines, while we by cutting off supply by bay and sea can soon starve Manila into surrender. These natives are eager to be organized and led by United States officers, and the members of their cabinet visited me and gave assur- ance that all would swear allegiance to and cheerfully follow our flag. They are brave, submissive, and cheaply provided for. To show their friendliness for me as our nation's only representative in this part of the world, • I last week went on shore at Cavite with British consul, in his launch, to show the destruction wrought by our fleet. As soon as natives found me out, they crowded around me, hats off, shouting "Viva los Americanos," thronged about me by hundreds to shake either hand, even several at a time, men, women, and children striving to get even a finger to shake. So 1 moved half a mile, shak- ing continuously with both hands. The British consul, a smiling spectator, said he never before saw such an evidence of friendship. Two thousand escorted me to the launch amid hurrahs of good feeling for our nation, hence I must conclude: First. Our squadron can force surrender in a day. Spaniards are all cooped up in Manila. 328 TREATY OF PEACE. Secor.d. Spanish officers of native regiments away, these fi,O0O, together with sek^ctious from the 37,000 insurgents, can give us ample land force, and can be well armed with rifles of Spanish soldiers and from barracks and arsenals. Third. Few United States troops will be needed for conquest and fewer still for occupancy. Expulsion of Spaniards, naval, civil, raili- tary, and clerics, will remove all discord and danger, and civil govern- ment, crude in the beginning but better than the present, will be easy and be well received, while native priests, of which there are many, can fully and with perfect acceptability meet all religious requirements so far as present established religion is concerned. All natives, all foreigners other than Spanish, and certain Spaniards in mercantile and retired life will aid us to every extent. The people crave a change of flag. Hence I believe ample assurances are at hand that civil government by us will be easy of organization and gratefully received by the people. My communications to your Department are, these war days, sujjra consular, but on other lines I endeavor to serve our fleet and thus serve our nation. All rejoice over the merited promotion of our commodore to the rank of rear-atlmiral, but every man of the fleet proved a hero, and it seems as if the siiield of Providence warded off the enemy's shot, leaving our men unharmed, our shi}>s and guns intact, and gave us the most impor- tant and unique victory of history. The student of the next century will read with i)ride that the right arm of Spain was broken at the battle of "Manila Bay," and from this must come the acquisition of these islands, many times more extensive, njore populous, and more valuable than Cuba, or else their capture will force S[)ain to conditions of peace on basis of honor, so much sought by our nation. I have, etc., Oscak F. Williams, United /States Consul. Mr, Williams to Mr. Bay. Special.] U. S. S. Baltimoue, Consulate of the Unitkd States, Manila Bay, off Cavitb, Manila, Philippine Islands, May 34, 1898. Sib,: I have the honor to report successful efforts on the part of the insurgents of these islands iu preparation for more successful war against Spain. Officers have visited me during the darkness of night to inform the fleet and me of their operations, and to report increase of strength. At a conference with General Aguinaldo, the head of the movement, I was told that they had now above 4,500 Mauser rifles taken from the Spaniards, and had also abundant ammunition. Until the present they have been fatally crippled in these respects. Last week Major Gonzales cairtured two buffalo cart loads of rifle ammunition from the Spaniards. To day I executed a power of attor- nej^ whereby General Aguinaldo releases to his attorneys iu fact $400,000, now in bank in Hongkong, so that money therefrom can pay for 3,000 stand of arms bought there and expected here to-morrow. TKEATY OF PEACE. 329 The same sources informed me that about 37,000 insurgents stand ready to aid United States forces, and General Ajjuiualdo's headquar- ters were this a. m. at 7 o'clock surrounded by 500 to 1,000 men eager to enlist. I was there at that hour and saw the men. My relatii)ns with all are cordial, and I manage to keep them so pro bono publico. When General Merritt arrives he will find large auxiliary land forcea adapted to his service and used to this climate. I am, sir, Oscar F. Williams, United States Consul. Mr. WiUiams to jllr. Day. Special.] U. S. S. Baltimore, Consulate of the United States, Manila, Fhilippine Islands, June 16, 1898. Sir : I have the honor to report that since our squadron destroyed the Spanish fleet o;i May 1, the insurgent forces have been most active and almost uniformly successful in tlieir many encounters with the crown forces of Spain. General Emilio Aguinaldo, the insurgent chief, who was deported late in 1897, returned recently to Cavite and resumed direction of insurgent forces. He is not permitted by his people to personally lead in battle, but from headquarters govtn'ns all military movements. He told me to day that, since his retnru, his forces had captured nearly 5,000 prisoners, nearly 1,000 of whom were Spaniards, and all of whom had rides when taken. General Aguinaldo has now about 10,500 rifles and 8 fleldpieces, with 8,000 more rifles, 2 Maxim guns and a dynamite gun bought in China and now in transit. The insurgents have defeated the Spaniards at all points except at fort near Matate, and hold not oidy North Luzon to the suburbs of Manila, but Batanyes Province also and the bay coast entire, save the city of Manila. While the Spaniards cruelly and barbarously slaughter Filipinos taken in arms, and often noncombatants, women, and children, the insurgent victors, following American example, spare life, protect the helpless, and nurse, feed, and care for S})aniar{ls taken prisoners and for Spanish wounded as kindly as they care for the wounded fallen from their own ranks. For future advantage I am maintaining cordial relations with General Aguinaldo, having stii)nlated submissiveness to our forces when treat- ing for their return here. Last Sunday, 12th, they held a council to form provisional government. I was urged to attend, but thought best to decline. A form of government was adopted, but General Agui- naldo told me to-day that his friends all hoped that the Pliilippines would be held as a colony of United States of America. It has been my efibrt to maintain harmony with insurgents in order to exercise greater influence hereafter when we reorganize governyient. Manila is hemmed in; foreigners other than Spaniards have, by kind- ness of Eear- Admiral Dewey, been allowed to leave the beleaguered city and are cared for on mes chant ships in the bay. The Baltimore leaves early to-morrow to meet the troop ships north- east of Luzon, and incidentally to reconnoiter Dagupan Bay. the north- ern terminus of the Manila railroad, for Spanish cruisers and merchant ships. 330 TREATY OF PEACE. We are impatient, nnide doubly so by the miraculous battle of May 1, which after iuspectiou of waters and wrecks proved to be more signal than detailed in my dispatch on that subject. The Spanish fleet, comprised of the following vessels, was annihilated, so far as Spain is concerned, viz : Cruiser (flagship) Reina Christina, cruiser Don Antonio de Ulloa, cruiser Don Juan de Austria, cruiser Isle de Cuba, cruiser Isle de Luzon, gunboat General Lezo, gunboat Marques del Duero, gunboat Velasco, gunboat Argos, and armed trans- port Isle de Mindanao. The above destroyed and sunk; the armed transport Manila was captured and soon appears as a United States cruiser, and the cruiser Callao has since been ca^itured and augments our fleet. The superb cruisers Isle de Cuba and Isle de Luzon were almost uninjured when sunk, by scuttling, to defeat capture. These are rich prizes which, later on, I hope to see flying our flag. We have had neither death nor serious sickness since we came. Manila is at the mercy of our fleet, and I believe its cai)ture may be effected, so far as the fleet's part is concerned, without the loss of a man or the disabling of a vessel. Rear- Admiral Dewey only awaits troops to insure order and good government once we are in possession. We fear the city may fall too soon. For this reason Admiral Dewey asked me to remain here, where he could command such service as I may be able to render in event of his taking the city. I expect that on July 4 we will celebrate in Manila under the folds of "Old Glory," and write in living letters a page of history that this magnificent insular em^iire has become a part and parcel of the United States of America. I have the honor, etc., Oscar F. Williams, United States Consul. Mr. Ci'idler to Mr. Williams. N"o, 18.] Washington, August 4, 1898. Sir : I have to acknowledge the receipt of your special dispatch of the 16th of June last, copy of which has been sent to the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy. Your course, while maintaining amicable relations with the insurgents, in abstaining from anj^ partici- pation in the adoption of their so-called provisional government, is approved. Respectfully, yours, Thos. W. Cridlbr, Third Assistant Secretary, Mr. Williams to 3fr. Day. Special.] U. S. S. Baltimore, Manila Bat, Manila, Philippine Islands, July 2, 1898. Sir: I have the honor to report the arrival here on June 30 of 2,500 United States trooi^s under command of General Anderson, the flotilla being convoyed by the Charleston. To General Anderson and all I am rendering every possible assist- ance, and have been asked by him to treat with General Aguinaldo as to American interests. TREATY OF PEACE. 331 We await second flotilla, and also Monfere;/, hut !nay take Manila to- morrow. The health of men, naval and military, is excellent; all eager for great results. Cavite and navy-yard have been put in excellent sani- tary condition and soldiers are most comfortably quartered. Weather is superb for the latitude — mercury hovering about 80° to 85° in the shade during day, with cooler nights. Frequent rains make air pure and climate healthful. En route the Charleston made conquest of the Ladrone group of the Philippine Islands by taking Guam and bringing away its government officials and Spanish residents as prisoners of war. If long occupation or possession on the part of our Government be considered, I believe early and strenuous efforts should be made to bring here from the United States men and women of many oi^cupa- tions— mechanics, teachers, ministers, shipbuilders, merchants, elec- tricians, plumbers, druggists, doctors, dentists, carriage and harness makers, stenographers, typewriters, photographers, tailors, blacksmiths, and agents for exporting— and to introduce American products, natural and artificial, of many classes. To all such I pledge every aid, and now is the time to start. Good government will be easier the greater the influx of Americans. My dispatches have referred to our present percentage of export trade. If now our exports come here as interstate duty free, we have practical control of Philippine trade, which now amounts to many mil- lions, and because of ingrafting of American energy and methods upon the fabulous natural and productive wealth of these islands can and probably will be multiplied by twenty during the coming twenty years. All this increment should come to our nation, not go to any other. Those who come early will reap great rewards and serve patriotic pur- pose at the same time, while their prompt and successful work will fur- nish outlet for the glut of United States products. Each American concern in each of the hundred ports and populous towns of the Phil- ippines will be a commercial center and school for tractable natives conducive to good government on United States lines. Spanish or native language not essential. With Spaniards expelled, it should apply that our language be adopted at once in court, public office, school, and in newly organized churches, and let natives learn English. I hope for an influx this year of 10,000 ambitious Americans, and all can live well, become enriched, and patriotically assist your represent- atives in the establishment and maintenance of republican government on these rich islands so extensive in area as to form an insular empire. I hope in your own good way my idea may be effectively placed before the American people. I have the honor, etc., O. F. Williams, Consul. Mr. Williams to Mr. Day, [Special.] Consulate of the United States, Manila, Philippine Islands, U. S. S. Baltimore, Manila Bay, August 4, 1898. Sm: It has been my study to keep on pleasant terms with General Aguinaldo for ultimate objects. By so doing I have avoided certain troubles and aided our forces. Admiral Dewey says I have planted the seeds of cordial cooi^eration. 332 TREATY OF PEACE. My argument with General Aguinaldo has been that the conditions of government by U. S, A. in the Philippine Islands would be vastly better for him and his people in honor, advancement, and profits than could exist under any plan fixed by himself and Filipinos. 1 have traversed the entire ground of government with him in council, and he has called his officials from fifteen provinces to meet me for their dis- cussion, all stated as friendly but unofficial on my part. Our relations are coidial, while certain antagonisms have arisen between the general and certain other Americans. I hope to briug about harmony and cooperation for mutual good. I have the honor to be, sir, your most obedient servant, Oscar F, Williams, United States Consul, 31anila, Fhilvp2^ine Islands, Mr. Williams to Mr. Bay, [Special.] Consulate of the United States, Manila, Philippine Islands, U. S. 8. Baltimore, Manila Bay, August 5, 1898. Sir : Because of my isolation and of your many duties I have left to representatives of our Navy and Army much of the duty of corre- spondence. Presumably when Manila falls and the Philippine Islands become by conquest a part of our national domain, my duties as consul will end. In view of such probabilities I seek your appointive favor, and with pride recall to your mind the report of the then Commodore Dewey, made to Secretary Long and by him transmitted to you — this under date of April IS — says of me : "His assistance has been invaluable." This report was made before I ever saw the admiral, and made without my knowledge, and I know that my services to our Navy, Army, citizens, and nation have since been much greater than before. Your commendations of my service have been most gratifying to me, and because of narrow resources I hope to have honorable and profitable station here or elsewhere in the United States public service. Could I be appointed general commissioner of customs of the Philippine Islands, light-house inspector, or general commissioner of agriculture, I should be honored and pleased. I'or many years I have made special study of tariffs and economic questions; have translated the Philippine tariff, and so have a measure of fitness. The n I was reared a farmer, and my business interests having always been along such lines, I have kept fully abreast with agricultural matters. Am a gniduate of Cornell University, and for above twenty years was a teacher, lecturer, and author, and might well serve as su])erintendent of public instruction, I need your recognition, and hope by cable or otherwise to have relief from present anxieties. I have the honor to be, sir, your most obedient servant, Oscar F. Williams, United States Consul, Manila, Phili^^ine Islands. TREATY OF PEACE. 333 Mr. Williams to Mr. Day. [Telegram.] Manila, September 5, 1898, (Eeceived 10.20 a. m.) To-day delegation from 4,000 Viscayau soldiers, also representing southern business interests, came to me pledging loyalty to annexation. Several insurgent leaders likewise. Spain can not control; if we evac- uate, anarchy rules. Williams. Mr. Wildman to Mr. Bay. ■jsfo. 19.1 Hongkong, Wovemher 3, 1897. Sir: Since my arrival in Hongkong I have been called upon several times by Mr. F. Agon cilia, foreign agent and high commissioner, etc., of the new republic of the Philippines. Mr. Agoncilla holds a commission, signed by the president, members of cabinet, and general in chief of the republic of Philippines, empow- ering him absolutely with power to conclude treaties with foreign governments. Mr. Agoncilla offers on behalf of his government alliance offensive and defensive with the United States when the United States declares war on Spain, which, in Mr. Agoucilla's judgment, will be very soon. In the meantime he wishes the United States to send to some port in the Philippines 20,000 stand of arms and 200,000 rounds of ammunition for the use of his government, to be paid for on the recognition of his government by the United States. He pledges as security two provinces and the custom-house at Manila. He is not particular about the price— is willing the United States should make 25 per cent or 30 per cent profit. He is a very earnest and attentive diplomat and a great admirer of the United States. On his last visit he surprised me with the information that he had written his government that he had hopes of inducing the United States to supply the much-needed guns, etc. In case Sefior Agoncilla's dispatch should fall into the hands of an unfriendly power and find its way into the newspapers, I have thought it wise to apprise the State Department of the nature of the high com- missioner's proposals. Seiior Agoncilla informs me by late mail that he will proceed at once to Washington to conclude the proposed treaty, if I advise. I shall not advise said step until so instructed by the State Depart- ment. I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant, EOUNSEVILLE WiLDMAN, GonSU . Mr. Gridler to Mr. Wildman. JH-Q. 23.] Washington, December 15, 1897. Sir : I have to acknowledge the receipt of your dispatch No. 19 of November 3, 1807, in which you announce the arrival at your post of Mr. F. Agoncilla, whom you describe as foreign agent and high com- 334 TREATY OF PEACE. missioner of the new republic of the Philippines, and who holds full power to negotiate and conclude treaties with foreign powers. Mr. Agoncilla offers an alliance "offensive and defensive with the United States when the United States declares war on Spain, which, in Mr. Agoncilla's judgment, will be very soon," and suggests that 20,000 stand of arms and 200,000 rounds of ammunition be supplied to his government by that of the United States. You may briefly advise Mr. Agoncilla, in case he should call upon you, that the Government of the United States does not negotiate such treaties and that it is not possible to forward the desired arms and ammunition. You should not encourage any advances on the part of Mr. Agoncilla, and should courteously decline to communicate with the Department further regarding his alleged mission. Kesx)ectfuily, yours, Thos. W. Cridler, Third Asaistant iSecretary. Mr. Wildman to Mr. Day. No. 42.] Consulate of the United States, Hongkong, May 6, 1898. Sir: Supplementary to my cable of this date, I have the honor to inclose, by request, statement of Don Dorotes Cortes, Don Maximo Cortes, and Dona Eustaquia, wife of Don Maximo; also like statement of Arcadio Kosario, Gracio Gonzaga, and Don Jose Maria Basa, all very wealthy landholders, bankers, and advocates of Manila. They desire to tender their allegiance and the allegiance of their powerful families in Manila to the United States. They have instructed all their connections to render every aid to our forces m Manila. The letters to the President, inclosed, explain themselves. I have the honor to be, etc., itOUNSEVlLLE WiLDMAN, Consul. Mr. Cridler to Mr. Wildman. No. 42.J June 16, 1898. Sir : The Department has received your dispatch No. 42, of the 6th ultimo, reporting that a number of influential families of Manila desire to tender their allegiance to the United States. In reply I have to inform you that a copy has been sent to the War Department, with the suggestion that the information be conveyed to General Merritt. Eespectfully, yours, Thos. W. -Cridler, Third Assistant Secretary. Mr. Wildman to Jilr. Bay. No. 43.] Consulate of the United States, EojigJtong, May 14, 1898. Sir: I have the honor to inclose, by request, the statements of Severino Eotea. Claudio Lopez, A. H. Marti, and Eugenia Ploua, all wealthy and i>rominent landholders of the Philippine Islands. TREATY OF PEACE. 335 They desire to submit their allegiance and the allegiance of their families in the Philippine Islands to the United States. The letters to the President inclosed explain themselves. I have the honor to be, etc., EOUNSEVILLB WiLDMAN, Consul. To the President of the United States of North America: Severino Kotea and Lopez, proprietor and farmer, native of Negros Oriental (Visayas), Philii)pine Islands, with great consideration exposes: Having known the history and Constitution of the noblest liberal and rightful nation of the United States, he willingly adheres to the Gov- ernment in annexing his country, and it will be for him a great honor to be joined it as soon as an additional star to the victorious flag of the United States of America and considered him as one of its citizens. Hongkong, May 11, 1898. (Signed) Severing Kotea. To the President of the United States of America: Claudio Lopez, merchant and proprietor and vice-consul of Portugal at Iloilo, native of the Philippine Islands, emigrant to this colony of Hongkong for political causes, exposes with great consideration: Having known the history and Constitution of the noblest liberal and rightful nation of the United States of xVmerica, he, for the present, adheres to the Government in annexing his country, and considers that it will be for him a great honor to join his country as an additional star to the always victorious flag of the United States of America and to count him as one of its citizens. Hongkong, 9th May, 1898. (Signed) Claudio Lopez. To the President of the United States of America: We, the subscribers, natives of the Philippine Islands, emigrants to this colony, for political causes, with great consideration expose: Having known the history and the Constitution of the noble, liberal, and rightful nation of the United States of America, for the present, they adhere to the Government, considering that it will be for them a great honor to join their country as an additional star to the always victorious flag of the United States of America and considered them as its citizens. (Signed) A. H. Maeti. To the President of the United States of North America: Eugenia Plona and Padillo, proprietor and farmer, native of Negros Occidental (Visayas), Philippine Islands, and emigrant to this colony for political causes, with great consideration, exposes: Having known the history and Constitution of the noblest liberal and rightful nation of United States, he willingly adheres to the Gov- ernment in annexing his country, and it will be for him a great honor to be joined it as an additional star to the always victorious flag of the United States of North America, and considered him as one of its citizens. Hongkong, May 10, 1898. (Signed) Eugenia Plona. 336 TREATY OF PEA< 'E. Mr. Wildman to Mr. Day. [Telegram received in cipher.] Hongkong, 3Iay 19, 1898. (Keceived 19th — 4.55 a. m.) Day, Washington : This answers Long's cable to Dewey. From best information obtain- able Dewey can not reply under week. Twenty-one thousand Spanish troops, of which 4,000 native, 2,000 volunteers. All but 1,000 at Manila. Tbey have ten moiintain guns; no large field artillery; i>roven last rebellion not practicable. Plenty good ponies, 12 hands high, No food Philippines but rice. Large sni)j)ly of rifles should be taken for insur- gent allies. Wildman. Mr. Wilfhnan to Mr. Moore. No. 63.] Consulate op tue United States, Hongkong, July 16, 1898. Sir: I am taking the liberty of calling your attention to the continu- ous repetition of telegraphic information reaching this port that it is the policy of the United States Government to allow the Philippine Islands to return to Spain on the conclusion of the war. Without placing any reliance in these statements, I desire to use them as a text upon which to respectfully submit the result of my experience with the leaders of the present Philippine insurgents, and to suggest the utter impossibility of Spain, even with the aid of the United States, ever regaining a foothold on these islands. I have lived among the Malays of the Straits Settlements and have been an honored guest of the different sultanates. I have watched their system of government and have admired their intelligence, and I rank them high among the semicivilized nations of the earth. The natives of the Philippine Islands belong to the Malay race, and while there are very few pure Malays among their leaders, I think their stock has rather been improved than debased by admixture. I consider the forty or fifty Philippine leaders, with whose fortunes I have been very closely connected, both the superiors of the Malays and the Cubans. Aguinaldo, Agoucilla, and Sandico are all men who would all be lead- ers in their separate departments in any country, while among the wealthy Manila men, who live in Hongkong and who are spending their money liberally for the overthrow of the Spaniards and the annex- ation to the United States, men like the Cortes family and the Basa family, would hold their own among bankers and lawyers anywhere. I believe I know the sentiments of the political leaders and of the moneyed men among the insurgents, and, in spite of all statements to the contrary, I know that they are fighting for annexation to the United States first, and for independence secondly, if the United States decides to decline the sovereignty of the islands. In fact I have had the most prominent leaders call on me and say tliey would not raise one finger unless I could assure them that the United States intended to give them United States citizenship if they wished it. In my opinion, Spain with the aid of the entire world can never reestablish herself, outside of a few of the large cities. An attempt at reconquest would reduce the islands to a state of anarchy, and reduce them to a level of Acheen. TREATY OF PEACE. 337 There lias been a systematic attempt to blaclcen the name of Agui- naldo and his cabinet, on account of the questionable terms of tlieir surrender to Spanish forces a year ago this month. It has been said that they sold their country for geld, but this has been conclusively disproved, not only by their own statements but by the speech of the late Governor-General Kivera in the Spanish Senate June 11, 1898. He said that Aguinaldo undertook to submit if the Spanish Govern- ment would give a certain sum to the widows and ori)hans of the insurgents. He then admits that only a tenth part of this sum was over given to Aguinaldo, and tliat the other promises made he did not find it expedient to keep. 1 was in Hongkong September, 1897, when Aguinaldo and his leaders arrived under contract with the Spanish Government. They waited until the 1st of November for the paynient of the promised money and the fultilluient of the promised reforms. Only $100,000, Mexican, was ever placed to their credit in the banks, and on the 3d of November Mr. F. Agoncilla, late minister of foreign affairs in Aguinaldo's cabinet, called upon me and made a proposal which I transmitted to the State Department in my dispatch No. 19, dated November 3, 1897. In reply the State Department instructed me "to courteously decline to com- municate with the DejKirtment further regarding the alleged mission." I obeyed these instructions to the letter until the breaking out of the war when, alter consultation with Admiral Dewey, I received a dele- gation from the insurgent junta, and they bound themselves to obey all laws of civili/ed warfare and to place the'mselves absolutely under the orders of Admiral Dewey if they were permitted to return to Manila. At this time their president, Aguinaldo, was in Singapore negotiating through Consul General Pratt with Admiral Dewey for his return. On April 27, in company with Consul O. F. Williams, we received another delegation, composed of Sefior Sandigo, Jose Maria Basa, Tomas Mascardo, Lorenzo L. Zialcita, Andres E. de Garchitorena, Manuel Malvar, Mariano Llanza, Salvatore Estrella. We agreed on behalf of Dewey to allow two of their number to accompany the fleet to Manila, consequently on the same day I took in the tug Fame Alizandrino and Garchitorena, accompanied by Mr. Sandico, to the Olymina in Mir's Bay. On May 2 Aguinaldo arrived in Hongkong and immediately called on me. It was May 16 before I could obtain permission from Admiral Dewey to allow Aguinaldo to go by the United States ship McCidlock, and I put him aboard in the night so as to save any compli- cations with the local Government. Immediately on the arrival of Aguinaldo atCavite he issued a proclamation, which I had outlined for him before he left, forbidding })il!age, and making it a criminal offense to maltreat neutrals. He, of course, organized a government of which he was dictator, an absolutely necessary step if he hoi)ed to maintain control over the natives, and from that date until the present time he has been uninterruptedly successful in the field and dignified and just as the head of his government. According to his own statements to me by letter, he has been approached by both the Spaniards and the Germans, and has had temi)ting otfers made him by tlie Catholic Church. He has been watched very closely by Admiral Dewey, Con- sul Williams, and his own junta here in Hongkong, and nothing of moment has occurred which would lead any one to believe that he was not carryiiig out to the letter the promises made to me in this consulate. The insurgents are fighting for freedom from the Spanish rule, and rely upon the well known sense of justice that controls all the actions of our Government as to their future. T P 22 338 TREATY OF PEACE. In conclusiou, I wisb to put myself on record as stating that the insurgent government of the Philipiiine Islands can not be dealt with as though they were North American Indians, williug to be removed from one reservation to another at the whim of their masters. If the Uuited States decides not to retain the Philippine Islands, its 10,000,000 people will demand independence, and the attempt of any foreign nation to obtain territory or coaling stations will be resisted with the same spirit with which they fought the Spaniards. 1 have the honor, etc., EOUNSEVELLE WlLDMAN, Consul- General. Mr. Moore to Mr. Wildman. [Telrgrani sent.] Department of State, Washington^ August 6, 1898. Wildman, Consul, Honglcong: If you wrote A.giiinaldo, as reported by Hongkong correspondent Daily Mail your action is disapproved, and you are forbidden to make pledges or discuss policy. Moore. [TelPgram received in ciplier.] Hongkong, August 8, 1898. (Eeceived 9.10 a. m.) Moore, Washington: Never made pledges or discussed policy of America with Aguinaldo further than to try and hold him to promises made before Dewey took him (to) Oavite, believing it my duty, it being understood that my influence is good. If report contrary, I disavow it. Wildman. Mr. Wildman to 2Ir. Moore. No. GG.J Consulate of the United States, Honglcong, August 9, 1898. Sir: On August 7 I received the following cablegram: Washington, August 7, 1898. Wildman, Consul, Honglcong : If yon wrote Aguinaldo as reported by Hongkong correspondent Daily Mail, your action is disapproved, and you are forbidden to make pledges or discuss policy. Moore. To which I replied on August 8, 1898 : Moore, Waslimqton: Never made pledges or discussed policy of America Tvith Agniualdo further than to try and hold him to promises made before Dewey took him (to) Cavite, believing it my duty, it being understood that my influence is good. If report contrary', I disavow. Wildman. I feel it only justice to myself to make some explanation regarding the numerous newspaper rei)orts that go from this city, and to the many opinions that are put into my mouth regarding the conduct of TREATY OF PEACE. 339 the war by my friends of the press. I have never so far taken occasion to deny any of them, knowing that the Department wouhl realize tliat, through tlie accidents of war and the geographical situation of Hong- kong, I have been placed in a position, through no de.sire of ray own, which has made me a mark for the representatives of all the big news- papers of the world. In my dispatch, Xo. 63, of July 18, 1898, 1 tried to briefly outline the position Consul Williams and myself have taken toward the insur- gents. We believed that they were a necessary evil, and that if Agui- naldo was placed in command, and was acceptable to the insurgents as their leader, that Admiral Dewey or General Merritt would have some one whom they could hold responsible for any excesses. The other alternative was to allow the entire islands to be overrun by small bands bent only on revenge and looting. We considered that Agui- naldo had more qualifications for leadership than any of his rivals. We made him no pledges and extracted from him but two, viz, to obey unquestioningly the commander of the United States forces in the Phil- ippine Islands, and to conduct his warfare on civilized lines. He was in and out of the consulate for nearly a month, and I believe I have taken his measure and that I acquired some influence with him. I have striven to retain his influence and have used it in conjunction with and with the full knowledge of both Admiral Dewey and Consul Williams. Aguinaldo has written me by every opportunity, and I believe that he has been frank with me regarding both his actions and his motives. I do not doubt but that he would like to be President of the Philipiune Republic, and there may be a small coterie of his native advisers 'who entertain a like ambition, but I am perfectly certain that the great majority of his followers, and all the wealthy educated Filipinos have but the one desire — to become citizens of the United States of America. As for the miss of uneducated natives they would be content under any rule save that of the friars. My correspondence with Aguinaldo has been strictly of a personal nature, and I have missed no opportunity to remind him of his antebellum promises. His letters are childish, ^nd he is far more interested in the kind of cane he will carry or the breast- plate he will wear than in the figure he will make in history. The demands that he and his junta here have made upon my time is excess- ive and most tiresome. He is a man of petty moods, and I have repeat- edly had letters from Consul Williams requesting me to write to Aguinaldo a friendly letter congratulating him on his success, and reminding him of his obligations. I do not care to quote Admiral Dewey, as his letters are all of a strictly personal nature, but I feel perfectly free to refer you to him as to my attitude and actions. I do not say this because I feel that I need to make any defense, but because I believe that the Daily Mail to which you refer in the above telegram has misconstrued my attitude, and placed me in a false position. I find on investigation that the letter you refer to as ])ublished in the London Mail was a personal one, written by me on July 25 at the request of Consul Williams, and on lines with which we liave been working with Aguinaldo from the first. Aguinaldo had for some weeks been getting what Admiral Dewey called a "'big head," and writing me" sulky, childish letters. In consequence I wrote him in part as follows : "If you stand shoulder to shoulder with our forces, and do not allow any small dif- ferences of opinioi. and fancied slights to keep you firm the one set purpose of freeing your island from the cruelties under which you elaim it has be^n groaning for so many hundred years, your name in history will be a glorious one. There are 340 TREATY OF PEACE. greater prizes in the world than being the mere chief of a revolution. Do not forget that the United States undertook this war for the-sole purpose of relieving the Cubans from the cruelties under which they were suft'erint;', and not for the love of conquest or the hope of gain. AVhatever the hual disposition of the conqurred territory may be you can trust to the United States that justice and honor will control all their dealings with you. The first thing is to throw off the Spanish yoke. Do not let anything interfere with this." If the newspapers cau make anything out of this personal letter that looks like a pledge or an assumption on my part of powers that are not vested in me, I must decline to accept their interpretation, and inso- much as Aguinaldo himself does not so construe it, I trust the Depart- ment will not consider that I have exceeded the bounds of discretion or embarrassed the Department in any way. I have the honor, etc., KOUNSEVELLE WtLDMAN, Consul- General. Mr. Wildnian to Mr. Moore. [Telegram received.] Hongkong, August 15, 1898. (Received 3.20 a. m.) Moore, Washington: Spanish consul received dispatch Sunday ordering surrender Manila. Shall I offer to deliver jjersonally and save more delay? Believe can be of service to Dewey shouk? Aguinaldo make trouble, WiLDMAN. The above telegram from Wild man was answered by the Secretary thus : " Spanish consul should deliver dispatch in his own way. Take no action respecting Aguinaldo without specific directions from this Department." June 22, 1898. For the ^Secretary: Here are two dispatches from Mr. Pratt, consul-general at Singapore, respectively numbered 214 and 217. Ko. 214 incloses a copy of Mr. Pratt's confidential No. 212, to which you have already replied. It also incloses a copy of his No. 213, narrating his parting interview with General Aguinaldo. Mr. Pratt states that in this interview he enjoined upon General Aguinaldo the necessity, under Commodore Dewey's direction, of assuming absolute control over his forces in the Philippines, since no excesses on their part would be tolerated by the United States, the President having declared that the present hostili- ties with Spain were to be carried on in strict conformity with the prin- ciples of civilized warfare. Mr. Pratt states that to this injunction General Aguinaldo gave his full assent, assuring him that he intended, and was able, when in the field, to hold his followers, the insurgents, in check and lead them on ''as our commander should direct." Gen- eral Aguinaldo, as Mr. Pratt reports, "further stated that he hoped the United States would assume protection of the Philippines for at least long enough to allow the inhabitants to establish a government of their own, in the organization of which he would desire American TREATY OF PEACE. 341 advice and assistance," "These questions," says Mr. Pratt, "I told him I had no authority to discuss." Tliis confirnis Mr. Pratt's state- ment, in liis recent telegram, that lie couhned his action to bringing General Aguinaldo and Commodore Dewey together. In his Ko. 217, of the 5th of May, he incloses an article from the Singa- pore Free Press containing an account of his conferences with General Aguinaldo. The statements in this article Mr. Pratt pronounces to be substantially correct, and it seems to be the source of the article which was published in the New York Herald the other day from Vancouver. These dispatches of Mr. Pratt seem to be covered by the instruction already sent him, which stated that it was i)roper for him to obtain the unconditional personal assistance of General Aguinaldo, but not to make any political pledges. J. B. M. Mr. Pratt to Mr. Bay. No. 214.] Consulate-General of the United States, 8inga2)ore, May 1, 1898. Sir: I have the honor to submit the inclosed copies of my reports, Nos. 212 and 213, of the 28th and 30th ultimo, respectively, regarding my action in arranging for the cooperation with the American forces of General Emilio Aguinaldo, leader of the insurrectionary movement in the Philippines, and departure of the latter to join Commodore Dewey. I have the honor to be, etc., E. Spencer Pratt, United /States Consul- General. Mr. Pratt to Mr. Day. [Confidoiitiiil.] Ko. 212.] Consulate-General of the United States, Singapore, April 28, 1898. Sir: I have the honor to report that I sent you on the 27th instant, and confirmed in my dispatch No. 211 of that date, a telegram, which deciphered read as follows : Secretary of State, Washington: General Aguinaldo gone my instance Ilongkong arrange with Dewey cooperation insurgents Manila. Pratt. The facts are these: On the evening of Saturday the 23d instant, I was confidentially informed of the arrival here, incognito, of the supreme leader of the Philij)pine insurgents. General Emilio Aguinaldo, by Mr. H. W. Bray, an English gentleman of high standing, who, after fifteen years' residence as a merchant and planter in the Philippines, had been compelled by the disturbed condition of things resulting from Spanish misrule to aliaudonhis property and leave there, and from whom 1 had previously obtained much valuable information for Commodore Dewey regarding fortifications, coal deposits, etc., at different points in the islands. Being aware of the great prestige of General Aguinaldo with the insurgents, and that no one, either at home or abroad, could exert over them the same influence and control that he could, I determined at once 342 TREATY OF PEACE. to see him, and, at my request, a secret interview was aceordinj^ly arranged for the following- morning, Sunday, the 24tb, in which, besides General Aguinaldo, were only present the General's trusted advisers and Mr. Bray, who acted as interpreter. At this interview, after learning from General Aguinaldo the state of aud object sought to be obtained by the present insurrectionary move- ment, which, though absent from the Philippines, he was still directing, I took it upon myself, whilst exj)laining that I had no authority to speak for the Government, to point out the danger of continuing inde- pendent action at this stage; and, having convinced him of the expe- diency of cooperating with our lleet, then at Hongkong, and obtained the assurance of his willingness to proceed thither and confer with Commodore Dewey to that end, should the latter so desire, I tele- graphed the Commodore the same day as follows, through our consul- general at Hongkong: Aguiualdo, insurgent leader, here. Will come Hongkong arrange with Commo- dore lor general cooperation insurgents Manila if desired. Telegraph. Pratt. The Commodore's reply reading thus: Tell Aguinaldo come soon as possible. Dewey. I received it late that night, and at once communicated to (ieneral Aguinaldo, who, with his aid-de-camp and private secretary, all under assumed names, I succeeded in getting off by the British steamer Malacca, which left here on Tuesday the 20th. Just previous to his departure, I had a second and last interview with General Aguinaldo, the particulars of which I shall give you by next mail. The general impressed me as a man of intelligence, ability, and cour- age, and worthy the confidence that had been placed in him. I think that in arranging for his direct cooperation with the com- mander of our forces, I have prevented possible conflict of action and facilitated the work of occupying and administering the Phihppines. If this course of mine meets with the Government's approval, as I trust it may, I shall be fully satisfied; to Mr. Bray, however, I con- sider there is due some special recognition for most valuable services rendered. How that recognition can best be made I leave to you to decide. I have, etc., E. Spencer Pratt, United /States Consul- General. Mr. Pratt to 3Ir. Day. isTo. 213.] Consulate-General of the United States, Shifiapore, April 30, 1898. Sir: Preferring to my dispatch No. 212, of the 28th instant, 1 have the honor to report that in the second and last interview I had with Gen. Emilio Aguinaldo on the eve of his departure for Hongkong, I enjoined upon him the necessity, under Commodore Dewey's direction, of exerting absolute control over his forces in the Philippines, as no excesses on their part would be tolerated by the American Govern- ment, the President having declared that the present hostilities with Spain were to be carried on in strict accord with modern principles of civilized warfare. TREATY OF PEACE. 343 To this General Agiiinaldo fully assented, assurinpj me that he intended and was perfectly able, once on the field, to hold his followers, the insurgents, in check and lead them as our commander should direct. The general further stated that he hoped the United States would assume protection of the Philippines for at least long enough to allow the inhabitants to establish a government of their own, in the organi- zation of which he would desire American advice and assistance. These questions I told him 1 had no authority to discuss. I have, etc., E. Spencer, Pratt, United States Consnl- General, Mr. Pratt to Mr. Bay. No. 217.] Consulate-Gkneral of the United States, Sinr/apdre, Mai/ 5, 1898. Sir: 1 regret to have to report that the circumstances attending the departure from here of General Emilio Aguinaldo to join Commodore Dewey, which I had endeavored so hard to prevent being disclosed, were, in substance, made public in yesterday's edition of the Singa- pore Free Press, from the inclosed copy of which you will note, by reference to my reports Nos. 212 and 213 of the 28th and 3Cth ultimo, respectively, that though the facts aie, in the main, correctly given, the dates are not quite accurate and a certain amount of conjecture has been indulged in as regards my action in the matter and that of the commodore. Almost immediately after the occurrence the editor of the above journal told me that he had been informed, but declined to say by whom. I endeavored to get him to promise to keep the whole affair quiet, but, though he would not agree to this, he gave me his word not to mention it until after sufficient time should have elapsed to admit of General Aguinaldo's reaching Hongkong, which he must already have done. Hence no harm can come of the disclosure, and, though it is annoy- ing, I suppose I should rather congratulate myself that the secret pos- sessed by such a number was kept so long. I have, etc., E. Spencer Pratt, United States Consul General. [Inclnanro.— The Singapore Free Press, Wednesday, May 4, 1S98.] THE WATt— IMPOltTANT POLITICAL ARRANGEMLNT — AGUINALDO IX SINGAPORE — AN INCOGNITO VISIT — HE JOINS ADMIRAL DEWEY — PLAN CARRIED OUT BY AMERICAN CONSUL-GENERAL. Just before the actual outbreak of bostilitics between Spain and tbe United States Singapore has been tbe scene of a secret political arrangement by which Gen. Emilio Aguinaldo y Fami, tbe supreme head of the revolutionary movement in the Philip- pines, has entered into direct relations with Admiral Dewey, commauder of the American squadron in China waters, while that oiiicer was still at Hongkong. In order to understand and appreciate this interesting historical incident properly, it will be necessary to allude to the causes leading to the second appearance of the rebellion in the Philippines, which was almost coincident with, though not instigated by, the strained relations between Spain and the United States. In December last General Primo de Rivera, who above all other Spanish generals has an intimate knowledge of the countiy and its inhabitants, found the position 344 TREATY OF PEACE. untenable for both parties. Neither of these had the remotest chance of terminal lug the rebellion decisively, the rebels secure in their mountain fastnesses, the Spaninrds holding the chief towns and villages on the const. Primo de Rivera theruibro sent two well-known Philippine natives, occupying high positions in Mauila, to propose terms of peace to General Aguinaldo in Biac-na Bato. A coun- cil of the revolutionary government was held, in which it was agreed to lay down arms on condition of certain reforms being introduced. The principal of these were : 1. The ex])ul8ion, or at least secularization, of the leliijions orders, and the inhi- bition of these orders from all official vetoes in civil administration. 2. A general amnesty for all rebels, and guarantees for their personal security and from the vengeance of the friars and parish priests after returning to their homes. 3. Radical reforms to curtail the glaring abuses in public administration. 4. Freedom of the press to denounce official corruption and blackmailing. 5. Representation in the Spanish Parliament. 6. Abolition of the iniquitous system of secret deportation of political suspects, etc. Primo de Rivera agreed to these reforms in sum and substance, but made it a con- dition that the principal rebel leaders must leave the country during His Majesty's pleasure. As these had lost all their property or had had it confiscated and plun- dered, the Government agreed to provide them with funds to live in a becoming manner on foreign soil. The rebels laid down their arms and peace was apparently secured, but no sooner had they done so and returned to their houses than the intrausigeant religious orders commenced at once to again persecute them and trump up imaginary charges to pro- cure their rearrest. The Spanish Governmejit, on its side, imagining itself secure, desisted from carrying out the promised reforms, thinking another trick like that played on the Cubans after the peace of Zanjon, arranged by Martinez Campos, might succeed. The Phili])pinos, however, with this business before them, refused to be nlade dupes of, and have taken up arms again, not alone in the immediate districts round Manila but throughout the Archijielago, which merely awaits the signal from General Aguinaldo to rise en masse, no doubt carrying with them the native troops hitherto loyal, and for which loyal service they have received no thanks but only ingratitude. Gen. Emilio Aguinaldo, accompanied by his aide-de-camp. Col. Marcelo H. del Pilar, and his private secretary, Mr. J. Leyba, arrived incognito in Singapore from Saigon on April L'l, 1898. In Saigon, where Aguinaldo had remained for one week, he had interviews with one or two old Philipjiino friends now resident there. The special purpose of Aguinaldo's visit to Singapore was to consult other friends here, particularly Mr. Howard W. Bray, an old and intimate English friend, for fif- teen years resident in the Philippines, about the state of affairs in the islands gen- erally—particularly as to the possibility of war between the United States and Spain, and whether, in such an event, the United States would eventnall y recognize the inde- penilence of the Philippines, provided he lent his cooperation to the Americans in the conquest of the country. The situation of the moment was this, that the condi- tions of the honorable peace concluded ou December 14, 1897, between President Aguinaldo, on behalf of the Philii-pine rebels, and H. E. Governor-General Primo de Rivera, on behalf of Spain, had not been carried out, although their immediate execution had been vouched for in that agreement. These reforms would have provided protection to the people against the organized oppression and rapacity of the religious fraternities, would have secured improved civil and criminal procedure in courts, and have guaranteed, in many ways, improve- ments in the iiscal and social conditions of the people. The repudiation by the Span- ish Government of these conditions, made by General Primo di Rivera, now left the rebeUeaders, who had for the most part gone to Hongkong, free to act. And it was in pursuance of that freedom of action that Aguinaldo again sought counsel of his friends in Saigon and Singapore, with a view to the immediate resumption of opera- tions in the Philippines. Meantime Mr. Bray, whose assistance to this journal on matters connected with the Philippines has been very considerable, as our readers will have seen, was intro- duced by the editor of the Singapore Free Press to Mr. Spencer Pratt, consul-general of the United States, who was anxious, in view of contingencies, to learn as much as possible about the real condition of the Philippines. It was a few days after this that Aguinaldo arrived incognito in Singapore, when he at once met his friends, including Mr. Bray. Affairs now becoming more warlike, Mr. Bray, after conversation with Mr. Spencer Pratt, eventually arranged an interview between that gentleman and General Aguinaldo, which took place late on the evening of Sunday, the 24th April, at " The Mansion," River Valley road. There were present on that occasion Gen. Emilio Aguinaldo y Fami, Mr. E. Spencer Pratt, consul-general United States of America; Mr. Howard W. Bray; Aguinaldo's private secretary, Mr. J. Leyba; Col. M. H. del Pilar, and Dr. Marcelino Santos. TREATY OF PEACE. 345 Dnriug this coufercnce, at which Mr. Bray acted as interpreter, General Agniualdo explaiuccl to the Amorioan cousul-geueral, Mr. Pratt, the incidents and objects of th« late rebellion, and described the present disturbed state of the country. General Aguinaldo then proceeded to detail the nature of the cooperation he could give, in which lie, in the event of the American forces from the squadron landing and taking possession of Manila, would guarantee to maintain order and discipline amongst the native troops and inhabitants in the same humane way in which he had hitherto conducted the war, and prevent them from committing outrages on defenseless Spaniards beyond the inevitable in fair and honorable warfare. He further declared his ability to establish a proper and responsible government on liberal principles, and would be willing to accept the same terms for the country as the United States intend giving to Cuba. The consul-general of the United States, coinciding with the general views expressed daring the discussion, placed himself at once in telegraphic communica- tion with Admiral Dewey at Hongkong, between whom and Mr. Pratt a frequent interchange of telegrams consequently took place. As a result another private interview was arranged at the American consular residence at the Raffles Hotel between General Agniualdo, Mr. Spencer Pratt, Mr. Howard Bray, and Mr. Leyba, private secretary to General Aguiiuildo. As a sequel to this interview, and in response to the urgent request of Admiral Dewey, General Agniualdo left Singapore for Hongkong by the first available steamer, the Peninsular and Orienta/1 Malacca, on Tuesday, the 26th April, at noon, accompanied by his aide-de-camp, Captain del Pilar, and Mr. Leyba, his private secretary. . i , The only interview or conversation with any strangers that General Agumaldo had during his stay in Singapore other than the above interviews was during a visit paid by General Aguinaldo to Mr. W. G. St. Clair, editor of the Singapore Free Press, at the office of' this journal. On that occasion General Aguinaldo was accompanied by Mr. Bray and ?.Ir. Leyba. Throughout the whole'stay of General Aguinaldo in Singapore the editor was kept fully informed d;iilv of the progress of aftairs. Naturally, however, all statement of what occurred has been withheld by us until what has been deemed the fitting moment has arrived. . The substance of the whole incident in its relations to the recent course of afifairs in the Philipi)ine8 has been very fully telegraphed by the editor both to New York and LondoH. The influence of the incident on the future of the Philippines may prove to be of a far-reaching historical character. AGUINAI-DO'S POLICY. General Aguinaldo's policy embraces the independence of the Philippines, whose internal affairs would be controlled under P^uropean and American advisers. Amer- ican protection would be desirable temporarily, on the same lines as that which might be instituted hereafter in Cuba. The ports of the Philippines would be free to the trade of the world, safeguards being enacted against an influx of Chinese aliens who would compete with the industrial population of the country. There would be a complete reform of the present corrupt judicature of the country under experienced European law officers. Entire freedom of the press would be estab- lished, as well as the right of public meeting. There would be general religious toleration, and steps would be taken for the abolition and expulsion of the tyran- nical religious fraternities who have laid such strong hands on every branch of civil administration. Full provision would be given for the exploitation of the natural resources and wealth of the country by roads and railways, and by the removal of hindrances to enterprise and investment of capital. Spanish officials would be removed to a place of safety until opportunity offered to return them to Spain. The preservation of public safety and order, and the checking of reprisals against Span- iards would, naturally, have to be a first care of the government in the new state of things. 3Ir. Pratt to Mr. Bay. :N^o. 223.1 Consulate-General of the United States, Singapore, May 30, 1S98. Sir: I liave tlie liouor to submit for your consideration a proclama- tion in Spauisli, issnecl prior to the departure of our fleet for Manila by the insiiro-ent leaders in Hong-kong-, calling upon the Filipinos not to obey the appeal of the Spaniards to oppose the Americans, but to rally in support of these, as they came as their friends and liberators. TREATY OF PEACE. Three copies of tlie English translation of the above I also inclose for handing to the press, should that, in your opinion, seem advisable. I have the honor to be, E. Spencer Pratt, United States Consul General. [Incloaure.] AMERICA'S ALLIES— THE MANIFESTO OF HIE FILIPINOS. The following is a trauslation from tlie Spanish of a proclamation of the rehel leaders in Hongkong, sent over to the Philipj)iuc8 in advance of the American squadron : Compatriots : Divine Providence is about to place independence vrithin our reach, and in a way the most free and independent nation could hardly wish for. The Americans, not from mercenary motives, but for the sake of humanity and the lamentations of so many persecuted people, have considered it opportune to extend their protecting mantle to our beloved country, now that they have been obliged to sever relations with Spain, owing to the tyranny this nation is exercising in Cuba, causing enormous injury to the Americans, who have such large commercial and other interests tliere. At the present moment an American squadron is preparing to sail for the Philip- pines. V\"e, your brothers, are very much afraid that you may be induced to fire on the Americans. No, brothers, never make this mistake. Rather blow your own brains out than lire a shot or treat as enemies those who are your liberators. Your natural enemies, yonr executioners, the authors of your misery and unhappi- ness, are the Sjianiards who govern you. Against these you must raise your weapons and odium ; understand well, against the Spaniards and never against the Americans. Take no notice of the decree of the Governor-General calling you to arms, although it may cost you your lives. Rather die than be ungrateful to our American liberators. The Governor-General calls you to arms. What for? To defend your Spanish tyrants? To defend those that have despised you, and even in public speeches asked for your extermination — those that have treated you little better than savages ? No ! No! A thousand times no! Give a glance at history and you will see that all Spain's wars in Oceania have sacrificed Philippine blood. We have been put to fight in Cochin-China to assist the French in an affair that in no way concerned the Philippines. We were compelled to spill our blood by Simon de Anda against the English, who in any case would have made better rulers than the Spaniards. Every year our children are taken away to be sacrificed in Mindanao and Sulu, on the pretense of making us believe these people are our enemies, when in reality they are our brothers, like us fighting for their independence. After having sacrificed our blood against the English, against the Anna^nites, against the people of ilindanao, etc., what recompense or thanks have we received from the Spanish Government? Obscurity, poverty, the butchery of those dear to us. Enough, brothers, of this Spanish tutelage. Take note, the Americans will attack by sea and prevent any reenforcements coming from Spain; therefore we insurgents must attack by land. Probably you will have more than sufdcient arms, because the Americans have arms and will find means to assist us. There, where you see the American flag flying, assemble in numbers; they are our redeemers. Our unworthy names are as nothing, but one and all of us invoke the name of the greatest patriot our country has seen, in the sure and.^ certain hope that his spirit will je with us in these moments and guide us to victory — our immortal Jo86 Rizal. Mr. Pratt to .Ifr. Day. No. 225.] Consulate-General of the United States, Singapore, June 2, 1898. Sir: I have the honor to submit inclosed a telegram from Hongkong of the 25th ultimo, on tlie situation in the Philippines, published in Singapore yesterday afternoon, the 1st instant. TREATY OF PEACE. 347 Considering the entbusiastic manner General Aguinaldo has been received by tiie natives and the conlidenee witli wliich lie already appears to have insi)ired Admiral Dewey, it will be admitted, I think, that I did not overrate bis importance and that I have materially assisted the cause of the United States in the Philippines in securing his cooperation. Why this cooperation should not have been secured to us during the months General Aguinaldo remained awaiting events in Hongkong, and that he was allowed to leave there without having been approached in the interest of our Government, I can not understand. ISTo close observer of what had transpired in the Philippines during the past four years could have failed to recognize that General Agui- naldo enjoyed above all others the confidence of the Filippino insur- gents and the respect alike of Spaniards and foreigners in the islands, all of whom vouched for his high sense of justice and honor. I have the honor to be, etc., E. Spencer Pratt, United States Consul- General. [Inclosure in dispatcli No. 125.] [The Singapore Free Press, Wednesday, June 1, 1898. Hongkong Telegraph, 25th.] THK WAR — THE SITUATION IN THE PHILIPPINES. The Japanese crui.ser Akitsushima arrived here yesterday from Manila, and the fol- lowing is the latest news: General Agninaldo arrived hy the McCtiUoch on the 19th instant, and was received ■with great enthusiasm by the natives. Admiral Dewey was very much pleased with him, and has turned over to him two modern field pieces and 300 rifles, with plenty of ammuuition. General Aguinaldo is now organizing an attack on the Spanish land forces, and a decisive battle may be expected soon. The Manila papers are publishing sensational articles hourly, among which is that the U. S. S. Baltimore is so used up in the late engagement that the American admiral decided to scuttle her. The archbishop has assured the people that four Spanish battle ships are on their way out, and that God lias informed him that in the next engagement the armies of the most Christian Spain will be victorious. Mr. Pratt to Mr. Day. No. 228.] Consulate-General of the United States, ^iiigaj/orc, June n, 1S9S. Sir: I have the honor to submit an article from the London Spec- tator, which was reproduced in the Singapore Free Press of yesterday, and a reply thereto, published to-day in the same paper, which last, 1 think, is deserving of special consideration as being the expression of opinion of Mr. H. W. Bray, one of the best authorities on the Philip- pines and the Filipinos. I have the honor to be, etc., E. Spencer Pratt, United States Consul-G( neral. 348 TREATY OF PEACE. [Ino.losurel.— Singapore Free Press, Jaue 7, 1898.) THE FATE OF THE PHILIPPINES. We take it to be certain, in s])ite of interruptions in the telei^raphic service, that Manila has surrendered ; that the Tagal population will hold the larger Philippine Islands, subject to guidance from leaders recognized by the Americans; and tliat the latter will never, whatever the ultimate issue of the war, hand the colony back to Spain. They are more governed by Tuoral considerations than their enemies choose to think, and a conviction that Spaniards are incurably cruel, are, in lact, born inquisitors, has sunk deeply into their minds. To an American the Spaniard, it should be remembered, is not the man of tbe Peninsular war, but the mun who con- quered the Americas and so misgoverned them that his own j^eople rose Jipon him in unquenchable fury. The Americans will have, therefore, at the close of the war, to decide how their newly acquired property shall be disposed of, and ahead j- fierce jealousies and far-reaching ambitioi.s have been awal^eued throughout Europe. America, it is said, will not keep the islands; and il' they are to be sold, either for money or for territory, to whom are they to go? Their possession might disturb "the balance of power" in the far East. England, it is said, must not have them, because she has already too much ; Germany, ijecause her designs upon China would thereby be facilitated ; Russia, because she would be too near Australia ; and France, because she may choose in the next war to act as Russia's obedient ally. Japan, as a pagan power, is out of the question when two and a half millions of Christians have to be disposed of; and it is very doubtful whether Holland would undertake the laborious task of reducing the Philippines to order. She succeeds in .Java alter a fashion, and might make a heavy bid for a second tropical estate, but the attempt to form a colonial army seems beyond her strength. She has been trying through a ■whole generation to conquer Acheen, and the fierce little Malay State holds her successfully at bay. These arguments and many like them will be urged on the Americans by the chancelleries of Europe, which are already twittering with excite- ment and putting out little I'eelers, and looking at Manila like children at a cake which they want badly but think it decorous not to ask for or see. We think the Americans will keep the Philij)pines; we hope they will, most heart- ily, and we can show that they have the means of doing so with little trouble to themselves. We think they will keep them because we tliink that the Americans ■will emerge from this war with new ideas and larger ambitions. They will have defeated a second-class European State, and will feel acutely thr.t as matters stand they would have been defeated bj' a first-class one. They ( ould not have fought France, to say nothing of Great Britain, without suffering great defeats at sea and enormous losses by land. That is not a position which suits the American temper, and Washington will therefore set itself to construct a first-class iron fleet. They can do that at home with twice the rapidity of the Japanese, because Ihey have a hundred times the Japanese command of money, and they can man the fleet when constructed by sweeping all the shiftless boys of the Union, as they are doing already, into great naval schools, one for each State. Tliat fleet once built, the desire for a position in the world equal to their position nmong nations, for islands as coaling stations, for posts of vantage if Europe threatens them, will induce, or, indeed, com- pel them to give up their idea of nonintervention, which already, as we see, has given way the moment their deeper emotions are stirred. Already, before the war has well begun, they are threatening Cuba, Porto Rico, Hawaii, and the Philippines, and as soon as it is over and the fleet built they will open the Nicaragua Canal, claiming right of free passage through it for their battle ships, and change their Monroe doctrine into a direct and effective protectorate of the two Americas. They will, we believe, from the first hesitate to give up the Philippines, partly because the islands provide admiral stations for their fleet, but chiefly because they are determined that China, which is their biggest natural foreign market, shall not be closed to their trade. They must be ready to strike, if need be, on the Chinese coast, and to strike hard; and seeing that, they will not give up islands which ofl'er them impregnable defenses for their dockyards, their coal vaults, and their arsenals. To retain them is, of course, to give up their traditional policy of noninterference in the politics of the world ; but we confess we have not much faith in self-denying politics of that kind. To shake down an ancient European throne is surely inter- ference w ith Europe of a definite kind, and they are doing that already. The people of the United States have not realized their new positiim yet, but when they do, we shall hear, we feel confident, much less of nonintervention. We think America will keep the Philippines and we heartily hope it. She will govern them well enough, much better than any power exceiit ourselves, and we have more of the world's surface than we can well manage. It is true that the posi- tion in the Pacific would be magnificent; that we can create a civil service by a mere advertisement in the Gazette, the educated middle class thirsting for more TREATY OF PEA 1;E. 349 careers," and that we could "arrison the islands with Sikhs and Afridis, to the delight of both, without riskinj^ a single bouB of "Tommy Atkins," but we can not undertake to govern the whole dark world. The envy we excite is already too great, and tlie strain upou the mental power of those who govern is already excessive, so excessive that we fear there is already a faltering at the center of affairs, produced not by timidity, but by a just sense that for EngbTud to do anything anywhere is to stir the water which envelops the world and drive a wave upon some coast it is not intended to attack. It would be a relief if another English-speaking power would take up a jtortion of our task, and in taking it perform the duty of repaying something to the world which yields her such advantages. The "weary Titan*" in fact, needs an ally wliile traversing "the too vast orb of his fi^te," and the only ally whose aspirations', ideas, and language are like his own is the great American people. The Frenchman is too tickle, the Eussian too full of guile, and the German too harsh in his treatment of all who do not think tliat to be drilled is the tirst, if not the only duty of man. We hope the Americans will keep the Philippines, and that they can keep them we have no doubt whatever. Euroi)e, to put the truth in its most brutal form, can not attack them without our permission, and the constitutional difiiculty is all rubbish, as Congress can make laws for territories, or declare the islands to be held, like Bosnia, as lands "in temporary military occupation" of the United States. The Americans are not governing Manila to-day through the universal suffrage of the Tagals, and need not therefore govern it to-morrow, while as to the means of hold- ing the islands they have a resource of which no one has spoken hitherto, but to which, as an instrument of power, there is hardly a limit. No one doubts that the States can produce and train any amount of officers, and they have, like ourselves, the means of enlisting a large and etfective Sepoy army. They have already 4,000 or 5,000 negro troops who have distinguished themselves in the Indian wars, and who are now about to be dispatched to Cuba because they are "immune" from yellow fever. Nothing stops the Americans from raising the negro force to 20,000 men — tbere are now 9,000,000 of colored people under the Stars and Stripes — and with them holding the Philippines, Hawaii, and Porto Eico, pay- ing them out of local revenues. With such a garrison those islands would be as safe as drawing-rooms and as full of business as Broadway or the Strand. There is really no obstacle, for the prejudice of color, as tierce as it is in the States, would not operate against a C(donial army, more especially if that army were a good one. And it wonld be a good one. The bravery of the trained negro is never questioned, he is accustomed not only to obey, but to respect white othcers, and the tropical regions in which he would be stationed exactly suit not only his constitution, bnb his notion of that which constitutes happiness in life. Insteadof remaining a source of weakness to the Union, he can be turned by wise and lenient management into an instrument of empire. We do not, be it observed, give way for one moment to the theory that white men can not retain their energy in the tropics— nearly the whole of Brazil is within their limit; but if white Americans dislike service in lauds so warm they have mil- lions of dark Americans who do not, and w ho are as proud of the greatness of the Republic, and, if decently treated, as faithful to its flag, as any of their lighter brethren. The Americans are waking up to a per(e])tion of the value of this instru- ment of force, and when once they have fully realized it we shall hear little of their difficulty in garrisoning distant possessions iuliabited bj- dark tribes, 'i'he Tagals will not feel insulted because the garrison which keeps their villages safe is only white at the top. [Inclosure 2 — Singapore Free Press, June 8, 1898.] TUE FATE OF THE PHILIPPINKS. The author of the Spectator article quoted in your yesterday's issue under the above heading has ])Ut forward one sensible proposition. His theories on other points may be all right, but I am afraid he has reckoned without his host. America has not yet conquered the Philippines — not by a long way — but will occupy them with the assistance and good will of the Filipinos. The possession of Manila no more means the possession of the Pbi!i]ipines than the possession of New York means the possession of America, and without this good will and assistance of the inhabitants I must beg leave to state that neither the United States nor any other nation could ever hope to take the Philippines, excejjt with an army of 200,000 men or more, if even then, no matter what theorists maj' say to the contrary. The solu- tions which the European pa[ier8 have been kind enough to put forward re the dis- posal of the Philippines may be dismissed with the words of General Augustin'a 350 TREATY OF PEACE. proclamation: "Vain designs, ridiculons boasts!" When the time comes I am inclined to think the inhabitants themselves are going to have the biggest say in this question, especially after the events of May 30 to June I last. Spain, with :in army of 35,000 men fully armed, has been able to do nothing against an army of imperfectly organized Filipinos, who have never disposed to more than 600 rifles. Yet nobody can taunt the Spanish soldier witli want of valor, whilst his patient endurance of hardships and privations, indifferent food, and entire absence of personal comforts give him the advantage over other European soldiers, who require an efhcient commissariat and transport department. In a country like the Philippines a soldier to be ell'ective must be able to skip from crag to crag like a goat, without hindrance or paraphernalia, to be evenly matched with the inhabitants. The Tagals will feel very much insulted if they try to garrison their villages by troops of the type proposed by the writer of the article under review. It would be a daugerous experiment. I would not advise the Americans or any one else to try. Such crass ignorance on the state of the Philippines and its inhabitants exists on every side, that it is almost useless to try and explain to outsiders that the I'hilip- pines are as different from British India, Ceylon, Burma, the West Indies, etc., as light is from darkness. The people are the most enlightened and vigorous branch of the Malay race, and have been Christians for centuries, in fact longer than the principles of the Keformatiou were established in Great Britain, and are the nearest akin to Europeans of any alien race, and it is simply ridiculous to imagine that eight to ten millions of such people can be bought and sold as an article of com- merce without first obtaining their consent. Let all those who are greedy for a slice of the archipelago ponder well over this before burning their fingers. To put them on a level with Sikhs and Afridis is simple nonsense. The much over- estimated Sikh would find his match pretty soon with the sturdy Philippine native, and those who think differently had better read what no less an authority than General Gordon says of his Philippine troops in the Taiping rebellion. No decent or respectable Filipino will tolerate any social relations with the pagan Chinese. The only possible solution of the Philippine question is an independent govern- ment. Tinder American protection, and this is the policy I recommended General Aguinaldo and his compatriots to accei^t, and which will, no doubt, be carried out. Time will show. H. W. Bkay. Singapore, Sth June, 1898. Mr. Pratt to Mr. Day. No. 229.] Consulate-Geneeal of the United States, Singapore, June 9, 1898. SiK : I have the honor to report that this afternoon, on the occasion of the receipt of the news of General Agninaklo's recent successes near Manila, I was waited upon by the Philippine residents in Singapore aud presented an address which, though written in Spanish, was delivered in French, and which I accordingly replied to in that language. The reports of the proceedings seut me by the editors of the Singapore Free Press aud Straits Times, both of whom were present, I submit herewith, with duplicates for the press should you consider their publi- cation desirable. The original address in Spanish was not left with me, but I am prom- ised it as soon as properly written out, and will then forward it. My reply, however, I can not forward, as it was not written, but extem- poraneous, and has been correctly rendered from the French into English ill the within reports, from which you will note that I avoided touching upon the question of our future policy re the Philippines. I have the honor, etc., E, Spencer Pratt, United States Consul- General. TREATY OF PEACE. 351 [Inolosnres.— The Straits Timee, June 9.] MR, SPENCER PRATT SERENADED— MEETING OF FILIPINCI REFUGEES AT THE UNITED STATES CONSULATE— THE V PRESENT AN ADDRESS TO MR. SPENCER PRATT AND DRINK TO AMERICA, ENGLAND, AND ADMIRAL DEWEY. The United States consulate at Singapore was yesterday afternoon in an unusual state of bustle. That bustle extended itself to Ratiles Hotel, of which the consulate forms an ontlyinj: part. From a period shortly prior to 5 o'clock, afternoon, the natives of the'Philippines resident in Singapore began to assemble at the consulate. Tlieir object was i)artly to present an address to Hon. Spencer Pratt, United States consul-general, and partly to serenade him, for which purpose some twenty- five or thirty of the Filipinos came equipped with musical instruments. Gradu- ally the crowd gathered in the vicinity of the United States consulate, and, after a little quiet preliminary music, Dr. Santos, as representing the Philippine community in Singapore, proceeded to read the following address, which was originally drafted in Spanish and then translated into French. The address was read iu French, and the following is an English translation : THE ADDRESS. '^To the Hon. Edward Spencer Pratt, consul-general of the United States of North America, Singapore : "Sir: The Philippine colony resident in this port, composed of representatives of all social classes, have come to present their respects to you as the legitimate repre- sentative of the great and powerful American Republic, in order to express our eternal gratitude for the moral and material protection extended by Admiral Dewey to our trusted leader Gen. Emilio Aguinaldo, who has been driven to take up arms in the name of 8,000,000 Filipinos, in defens'e of those very principles of justice and liberty of which your country is the foremost champion. Our countrymen at home, and those of us residing here, refugees from Spanish misrule and tyranny in our beloved native land, hope that the United States, your nation, persevering in its humane policy will eflicaciously second the programme arranged between you, sir, and General Aguinaldo in this port of Singapore, and secure to us our independ- ence under the protection of the Uuited States. Our warmest thanks are especially- due to you, sir, personally, for having been the first to cultivate relations with GenerarAguinaido, and arrange for the cooperation with Admiral Dewey, thus sup- porting our aspirations which time and subsequent actions have developed and caused to meet with the ap]dause and approbation of your nation. Finally, Ave request you to convey to your illustrious President and the American people, and to Admiral Dewey, our' sentiments of sincere gratitude and our most fervent wishes for their prosperity. "Singapore, June 8, 1S98." Dr. Santos, having presented the above address to Mr. Spencer Pratt, proceeded, speaking in French, to state his belief that the Filipinos would prove and were now proving themselves fit for self government. While it would be very desirable that such a government should be under American protection, yet it would be found that the brave Filipinos, who were now driving the Spanish troops before them, were quite fit also to fill offices of civil administration. Referring to certain news which had been telegraphed from Europe, Dr. Santos deprecated the transfer of the Philippines from Spain to any power. He was quite confident that the sympathy of the American people vrould l;e with a nation who were struggling to be free. THE united STATES CONSUL-GENERAL REPLIES. After listening to the address the United States consul-general, also speaking in French, said: "Gentlemen, the honor you have conferred upon me is so unexpected that I can not find appropriate words with which to thank you and with which to reply to the eloquent address you have just read to me. Rest assured, though, that I fully under- stand and sincerely appreciate the motives that have prompted your present action and that your words, which have sunk deep in my heart, shall be faithfully repeated to the President, to Adiuiral Dewey, and to the American people— from whom I am sure that they will meet with lull and generous response. A little over a month ago th« world resounded with the praises of Admiral Dewey and his fellow-officers and men for a glorious victory wou by the American Asiatic Squadron in the Bay of Manila. Now we have news of the brilliant achievements of your own distin- guished leader, Gen. Emilio Aguinaldo, cooperating on laud with the Americans at 352 TREATY OF PEACE. sea. Yon have just reason to be proud of what has been and is being accomplishea by General Agniualdo and your fellow-countrymen under his command. When, six weeks ago, I learned that General Aguinaldo had arrived incognito in Singapore, I immediately sought him out. An hour's interview convinced me that he was the man for the occasion ; and, having communicated with Admiral Dewey, I accordingly arraugeil for him to join the latter, which he did, at Cavite. The rest you know. "I am thankful to have been the means, though merely the accidental means, of bringing about the arrangement between General Aguinaldo and Admiral Dewey, which has resulted so happily. I can only hope that the eventful outcome will be all tlsat can be desired for the happiness and welfare of the Filipinos. My parting words to General Aguinaldo were, 'General, when you have proved yourself great, prove yourself magnanimous,' and from the treatment accorded to the recent Spanish pris- oners it would appear that he had done so." [Applause.] At the conclusion of Mr. Pratt's speech refreshments were served, and as the Fili- pinos, being Christians, drink alcohol, there was no difficulty in arranging as to refreshments. " Long life and prosperity " were drunk to Mr. Consul-General Spencer Pratt, Then the American Eepublic was cheered. Then Commodore Dewey was cheered for liis gallant victory. Then England was cheered for sheltering the Fili- pino refugees. PRESENTlJfG A FLAG. Then Dr. Santos, as the spokesman of the Filipino refugees, again addressed the audience with many complimentary remarks on the gallantry of Admiral Dewey and the skill and foresight of United States Consul-General Pratt, and with glow- ing forecasts of the prosperity that awaited the PJiilippine Islands under the new rtgime. Ho expressed a desire to have an American tiag as a reminiscence of tlie day's proceedings. Mr. Spencer Pratt, again speaking in French, i-eplied, saying: "This flag was borne in battle, and is the emblem of that very liberty that you are seeking to attain. Its red stripes represent the blood that was shed for the cause; the white represents the purity of the motive; the blue field stands for the azure of the sky; the stars are the free and independent States of the Union. Take the flag and keep it as a souvenir of this occasion." At the conclusion of IVIr. Pratt's speech, he handed auAmericau flag to Dr. Santos, ■who received it reverently, and waved it exultantly amidst the cheers of the assem- bled Filipinos. The flag would, said Dr. Santos, be preserved so that future gen- erations might look at it with pride. [Singapore Free Press, June 9, 1898.] MR. SPENCElt illATT AND THE FILIPINOS OF SINGAPORE— AN ADDRESS OP CONGRATULATION. A little after 5 p. m. last evening a numerous deputation, consisting of all the Filipinos resident in Singapore, waited upon the American consul-geueral, Mr. Spencer Pratt, at his residence, and presented him with an address congratulatory of the American successes in the present war, and expressive of the thanks of the Filipino community here for the aid now being given by the United States to the aspirations of the Filipino people for national freedom. There were also present Mr. W. G. St. Clair, editor of the Singapore Free Press; Mr. A. Reid, editor of the Straits Times, and Mr. Howard W. Bray, whose active sympathies with the Fili- pino nation are so well known as to entitle him to be styled " Aguinaldo's English- man." Mr. Spencer Pratt and Mr. Pray both wore thebadge of tlie Liga Filipina, presented to them by General Aguinaldo during his iucojinito vi.sit to Singapore. After Mr. Bray had performed the ceremony of introducing the deputation to Consul-General Spencer Pratt, Dr. Santos, the chief Filipino refugee here, who has been educated at Barcelona and Paris, delivered the address of which the follow- ing is a translation: "To the Hon. Edward Spencer Pratt, " Consul-General of the United States of North America, Singapore. "Sir: The Filipino colony resident in this 73ort, composed of representatives of all social classes, have come to present their respects to you as the legitimate repre- sentative of the great and powerful American Republic, in order to express our eternal gratitude for the moral and material protection extended by Admiral Dewey to our trusted leader Gen. Emilio Aguinaldo, who has been driven to take up arms in the name of 8,000,000 Fillipinos in defense of those very principles of justice and liberty, of which your country is the foremost champion. Our countrymen at home, and those of us residing here, refugees from Spanish misrule and tyranny in our beloved native land, hope that the Usiited States, your nation, persevering in its humane policy, will efficaciously second the programme TREATY OF PEACE. 353 arranged between you, sir, and General Aguinaldo in this port of Singapore, and secure to us our independence under the protection of the United States. Our warmest thanks are especially due to you, sir, personally, for having feeen the first to cultivate relations with General Aguinaldo and arrange for his cooperation with Admiral Dewey, thus supporting our aspirations which time and subsequent actions have developed and caused to meet with the applause and approbation of your nation. " Finally we request you to convey to your illustrious President and the American people, and to Admiral Dewey, our sentiments of sincere gratitude and our most fervent wishes for their prosperity. " Singapore, June S, 1898." The address, which was written in Spanish, and read in French by Doctor Santos, the spokesman, was replied to in French by Mr. Spencer Pratt, to the following effect : "Gentlemen, the honor you have conferred upon me is so unexpected that I can not find appropriate words with which to thank you, with which to reply to the eloquent address you have just read to me. Rest assured, however, that I fully understand and sincerely appreciate the motives that have prompted your present action, and that your words, which have sunk deep in my heart, shall be faithfuDy repeated to the President, to Admiral Dewey, and to the American people, from whom, I am sure, they will meet with full and generous response. A little over a month ago the world resounded with the praise of Admiral Dewey and his fellow officers and men for a glorious victory won by the American Asiatic Squadron in the bay of Manila. To-day we have the news of the brilliant achievements of your own distinguished leader, Gen. Emilio Aguinaldo, cooperating on land with the Ameri- cans at sea. You have just reason to be proud of what has been and is being accom- plished by General Aguinaldo and your fellow-countrymen under his command. When, six weeks ago, I learned that General Aguinaldo had arrived incognito in Singapore, I immediately sought him out. An hour's interview convinced me that he was the man for the occasion, and having communicated with Admiral Dewey, I accordingly arranged for him to join the latter, which he did at Cavite. The rest you know. "I am thankful to have been the means, though merely the accidental means, of bringing about the arrangement between General Aguinaldo and Admiral Dewey, which has resulted so happily. I can only hope that the eventual outcome will be all that can be desired for the happiness and welfare of the Filipinos. My part- ing words to General Aguinaldo were, 'General, when you have proved yourself great, prove yourself magnanimous,' and from the generous treatment that we under- stand he has accorded to the Spanish prisoners taken in the recent fight he has done so." [Applause.] Dr. Santos then addressing his fellow-countrymen (Paysanos), called for suc- cessive vivas for the Presideut of the United States, for Admiral Dewey, and for Consul-General Pratt; for England, the "nation hospitali^re," and for the editors of the Singapore Free Press and Straits Times. Consul-General Pratt called for " vivas" for General Aguinaldo and the Filipino people. Mr. Spencer Pratt subsequently presented an American flag to Dr. Santos, for the Filipino deputation. This flag, he said, was borne in battle, and is the emblem of that very liberty that you are seeking to attain. Its red stripes represent the blood that was shed for the cause, the white the purity of the motive, the blue field the azure of the sky, the stars the free and independent States of the Union. Take it and keep it as a souvenir of this occasion. On receiving the flag from the consul's hands Dr. Santos called for three cheers for the American nation, waving the flag on high, and stating that the Filipinos would always cherish this emblem, which would be preserved for future generations to look upon with pride. A band of Filipino musicians was in attendance and played a selection of music, including some very pretty melodies of their native land. This interesting ceremony terminated about 6 p. m. Mr. Bay to Mr. Fratt. [Telegram.] Department of State, June 16, 1S98. Two hnndred twelve received and answered. Avoid uuautliorized negotiations with. Philippine insurgents. IP 23 ^^^' 354 TREATY OF PEACE. Mr. Bay to Mr. Pratt. No. 78.] Department of State, Washington^ June 16, 1898. Sir: I have to acknowledge receipt of your confidential dispatch No. 212, of the 28th of April last, in which you report your proceediugs in bringing together the insurgent general Emilio Aguinaldo and Admiral Dewey, before the latter's departure for Manila. It appears that your meeting with General Aguinaldo was brought about through the good offices of Mr. H. W. Bray, a l>ritish subject, who had been compelled by the disturbed condition of things in the Philippines to abandon his property and business tliere, and that, after an interview with General Aguinaldo, you telegraphed to Admiral Dewey that the insurgent leader would come to Hongkong to arrange for a general cooperation of the insurgents, if this should be desired. The admiral telegraphed in reply: "Tell Aguinaldo come as soon as possible." As a consequence General Aguiualdo, with his aid-de-camp and private secretary, left Singapore for Hongkong on the 26th of April for the purpose of joining Admiral Dewey. You promise the Department a fuller account of your interview with General Aguinaldo by the next mail, and say that in arranging for his "direct cooperation" with the commander of the United States forces you have prevented a possible conflict of action and facilitated the work of occupying and administer- ing the Philippines. The Department observes that you informed General Aguinaldo that you had no authority to speak for the United States; and, in the absence of the fuller report which you promise, it is assumed that you did not attempt to commit this Government to any alliance with the Philippine insurgents. To obtain the unconditional personal assistance of General Aguinaldo in the expedition to Manila was proper, if in so doing he was not induced to form hopes which it might not be practi- cable to gratify. This Government has known the Philippine insurgents only as discontented and rebellious subjects of Spain, and is not acquainted with their purposes. While their contest with that power has been a matter of public notoriety, they have neither asked nor received from this Government any recognition. The United States, in entering upon the occupation of the islands, as the result of its military operations in that quarter, will do so in the exercise of the rights which the state of war confers, and will expect from the inhabitants, without regard to their former attitude toward the Spanish Government, that obedience which will be lawfully due from them. If, in the course of your conferences with General Aguinaldo, you acted upon the assumption that this Government would cooperate with him for the furtherance of any plan of his own^ or that, in accepting his cooperation, it would consider itself pledged to recognize any political claims which he may put forward, your action was unauthorized and can not be approved. Eespectfully yours, William K. Day. TREATY OF PEATB. . 355 Mr. Pratt to Mr. Moore. No. 235.] Consulate-General of the United States, Singapore^ June 20, 1898. Sir : I have the honor to report that I have received the Depart- lueut's cipher telegram readiug thus: Washington, June 17. Pratt, Consul-General, Shujapore : Two hundred and twelve received and answered. void anaathorized negotia- tions with Philippine insurgents. Day. and that I have sent the Department the following cipher telegram in reply : Singapore, June 19. Secretary of State, Washington: No intention negotiate. Left that Dewey who desired Aguinaldo come. Pratt. which means that I neither have nor had any intention to negotiate with the Philippine insurgents, and, in the case of General Aguinaldo, was especially careful to leave such negotiations to Commodore Dewey. My action in the matter was indeed limited to obtaining the assurance of General Aguinaldo's willingness to cooperate with our forces, com- municating this to Commodore Dewey, and, upon the latter's express- ing the desire that he should come on as soon as possible, arranging for the general to do so. I shall anxiously await the instruction your telegram refers to for the Department's opinion of my above course, but can scarcely believe, in view of the motives which prompted it and the excellent results which have ensued, tluit it can be aito;^ether disapproved. 1 have, elc, E. Spencer Pratt. Mr. Pratt to 3lr. Moore. No. 230.] Consulate-General of the United States, Singapore, Jtme 21, 1898. Sir : In continuation of my dispatch No. 235, of the 20th instant, I beg to state that if, in regard to General Aguinaldo, I arranged directly with Commodore Dewey without obtaining the Department's ])ievious authorization it was because of the little time there was in which to act and the practical impossibility of explaining by cable to the Depart- ment the value of the general's cooi)eration, of which I felt the com- modore would already be in a position to judge from what he must have learned of the situation while at Hongkong. 1 beg further to state that it was not only on account of the material aid I was conlident he could lend us that 1 regarded the cooperation of General Aguinaldo as so desirable, but also because, as the recog- nized leader of the insurgents, he was, I considered, the one best able to direct and influence them, and therefore the one most important for our commander to have under immediate control, both as concerned the present and future policy of our Government in the Philippines, whatever that policy might be. 356 TREATY OF PEACE. Had it not been arranged for General Aguinaldo thus to cooperate with us it is more than probable that he would have returned to the islands of his own accord and undertaken independent operations, which might, I fear, have caused us serious embarrassment. I am not having, nor do I propose to have, any further dealings here with the Philii)i)ine insurgents. I have the honor, etc., E. Spencer Pratt, United States Consul- General. Mr. Cridler to 7i/V. Pratt. No. 82.] Department of State, Washington, June 25, 1898. Sir : I have to acknowledge the receipt of your dispatches, JSTos. 214 (May 1) and 217 (May 5,1898), in regard to arrangements made with Aguinaldo for cooperation with our is^avy. In reply I have to inform you that the Department is pleased to learn that you did not make any political pledges to Aguinaldo. KespectfuUy, yours, Thos. W. Cridler, Third Assistant Secretary. Mr. Cridler to Mr. Pratt. No. 84.] Department of State, Washington, July 9, 1898. Sir: I have to acknowledge the receipt of your dispatch No. 222 bis of May 18 last, in regard to the expenses incurred in relieving the Amer- ican refugee from the Philippines. You will please ascertain and report the amount necessarily expended in this matter by the British vice-consul at Cebu. The $30 expended by you in sending Mr. Dorr to Hongkong is cov- ered by the Department's telegram to relieve immediate necessities, liesx^ectrully, yours, Thos. W. Cridler, Third Assistant Secretary, Mr. Day to Mr. Pratt. No. 87.] Department of State, Washington, July 20, 1898. Sir: Your No. 229 of the 9th ultimo, inclosing printed copies of a report from the Straits Times of the same day, entitled "Mr. Spencer Pratt's Serenade," with a view to its communication to the press, has been received and considered. By Department's telegram of the 17th of June you were instructed to avoid auauthorized negotiations with the Philippine insurgents. TREATY OP PEACE. 3?)7 The reasons for this instruction were conveyed to yon in my No. 78 of the 16th of June, by which the President's views on the subject of your relations with General Aguinaldo were fully expressed. The extract now communicated by you from the Straits Times of the 9th of June has occasioned a feeling of disquietude and a doubt as to whether some of your acts may not have borne a significance and pro- duced an impression which this Government would be compelled to regret. The address presented to you by the twenty-five or thirty Filipinos who gathered about the consulate discloses an understanding on their part that the object of Admiral Dewey was to support the cause of General Aguinaldo, and that the ultimate object of our action is to secure the independence of the Philippines " under the protection of the United States." Your address does not repel this implication, and it moreover repre- sents that General Aguinaldo was " sought out by you," whereas it had been the understanding of the Department that you received him only upon the request of a British subject named Bray, who formerly lived in the Philippines. Your farther reference to General Aguinaldo as " the man for the occasion," and to your "bringing about" the "arrange- ment" between "General Aguinaldo and Admiral Dewey which has resulted so happily," also represents the matter in a light which causes apprehension lest your action may have laid the ground of future mis- understandings and complications. For these reasons the Department has not caused the article to be given to the press, lest it might seem thereby to lend a sanction to views the expression of which it had not authorized. Eespectfully, yours, William B. Day. [Confidential.] Mr. Pratt to Mr. Moore. ITo. 240.] Consulate-General of the United States, Singapore, July 2, 1898. Sir : I have the honor to report that I have learned from reliable private sources that the Sultan of Sulu, who, on his return home from Mecca, stopped over in Singapore, where he still remains, has nego- tiated or is in the way of negotiating for the transfer of the protectorate of his territory in the Philippines from Spain to British North Borneo, to which, as will be seen by the map, it is adjacent. This would seem to have special significance at the present juncture, and I have considered that you might deem it of sufiicient importance to demand investigation. After the Sulu war of 1876, it will be remembered, Spain's suzerainty, hitherto disputed, was formally admitted by the Sultan and recognized by both England and Germany in the protocol signed by the powers on the 11th of March, 1877. I have the honor, etc., E. Spencer Pratt, United States Consul- General, 358 TREATY OP PEACE. Mr. Pratt to Mr. Day. [Confidential.] No. 250.] Consulate-General of the United States, Singapore, July 28, 1898. Sir : I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your instruction No. 78, of the 16th ultimo, in reply to my dispatch No. 112, of the 28th of April last, reporting- my proceedings in bringing together the insur- gent leader, Gen. Emilio Aguinaldo, and Admiral Dewey before the latter's departure for Manila. I have carefully considered your observations upon my action in this matter and beg to repeat what I have stated in my later dispatches on the same subject, that I declined even to discuss with General Aguinaldo the question of the future policy of the United States with regard to the Philippines, that I held out no hopes to him of any kind, committed the Government in no way whatever, and, in the course of our confi- dences, never acted upon the assumption that the Government would cooperate with him — General Aguinaldo — for the furtherance of any plan of his own, nor that, in accepting his said cooperation, it would consider itself pledged to recognize any political claims which he might put forward. I have the honor, etc., E. Spencer Pratt, United States Consul- General. Mr. Criiller to Mr. Pratt. No. 90.] Department of State, Washington, August 2, 1898. Sir: I have to acknowledge the receipt of your No. 235 and No. 236 of June 20 and 21, 1898, concerning the Philippine insurgents and your action regarding them. In this connection reference is made to the Department's instruc- tions No. 78 of June 16 and No. 87 of July 20, 1898, as well as to the concluding paragraph of your No. 236, wherein you say that you are not having nor do you propose to have any further dealings with the Philippine insurgents. Eespectfully, yours, Thos. W. Cridler, Third Assistant Secretary, Mr. Johnson to Mr. Moore. No. 26.] Consulate of the United States, Amoy, China, July 8, 1898. Sir: I have the honor to submit a few facts and comments on con- ditions prevailing here which are suggested by the supposition that our Government contemjilates taking charge of the Philippines, either tem- porarily or permanently. If the information I ofler is already in your possession, then this dispatch can be of no service. There is a large Chinese population in the Philippines, who constitute the most intelligent class of common laborers, as well as many wealthy merchants. It is estimated that over 90 jjer cent of these are from Amoy and speak the Amoy dialect. There is a regular line of steamers between Amoy and Manila, and the traific both in passengers and freight is an important industry. The Spanish Government maintains a consulate at Amoy for the sole purpose of looking after this trade with the Philippines, and it is TREATY OF PEACE. 359 given out here, I am informed, that the consulate will be closed and the affairs turned over to a merchant as soon as the islands pass from Spanish control. The largest British firms here inform me that Amoy is the most important Chinese port, so far as the Philippines are concerned, and that should we retain them the business in this consulate will increase many fold. It would under such conditions be inimical to our interests for any other nation to secure any exclusive rights in this province, especially in the vicinity of Amoy. It is reported in the press that Japan is now endeavoring to secure the exclusive right to develop the mines of this province. These include large coal fields near Amoy, as well as exten- sive deposits of lead, iron, and precious minerals. These coal fields are not yet worked. The Japanese recently secured a concession on the island of Amoy, which is to be developed in the interest of her Formosa trade. She has within a year let the contracts for buildings to the extent of 70,000 yen, and many moves which have attracted my atten- tion confirm the rumor that slie has in view a monopoly of the coal and iron and lead of the surrounding mountains. Amoy has probably the finest harbor in southern China, which is also taken into consideration. The leading British merchant here, Mr. Francis Cass, who during the past twenty years has frequently acted as American vice-consul, and whose knowledge is extensive and judgment good, thinks these are facts which should be considered in the event America retains the Philip- pines. Amoy's trade with the United States leads that of all other China ports, and is cbiefly in the hands of the British. The entire community is jubilant over the prospect of the Manila trade passing under our control. So enthusiastic are they that every possible demonstration of good will has been resorted to. On July 4 every American flag which they could secure was hoisted over their commercial houses dur- ing the entire day, and every firm called at the consulate to express congratulations. The German firms were scarcely less cordial in their congratulations. They have sufl'ered in their extensive trade with the Philippines because of certain annoying regulations, and realize that if put upon a similar fair basis to that now prevailing with the United States great good will result. Not knowing whether these facts are known in the Department or not, I refrain from further details until I know your pleasure. I have the honor, etc., A. BURL1NGA]VIE JOHNSON, United States Consul. • Singapore, June 30, 1896. To His Excellency the President of the United States of America. Your Excellency: Confirming my letter of 20th instant, I have now the honor to inclose a cover just received from General Againaldo, the Philippine insurgent leader, with instructions to forward it by first mail to Your Excellency. In the letter which General Aguinaldo writes me he states that ho incloses a telegram which he desires me to transmit to Your Excellency, but both this and other documents I regret to say have been extracted from the cover during transit. The envelope arrived here with the side torn away and a note written on the same by your consul-general in Hongkong, through whom it was 360 TREATY OF PEACE. forwarded, tbat it had been received in bad condition from H. M. S. Linnet. I have taken steps to find the missing document, which will be for- warded to Your Excellency if the search proves successful. 1 have the honor, etc., Howard W. Bray. [Translation.] Cavite, June 10, 1898. To the President of the Repuhlic of the Great North American Nation. Dear and Honored Sir: I come to greet you with the most tender effusion of my soul, and to express to you my deep and sincere grati- tude, in the name of the unfortunate Philippine people, for the efllcient and disinterested protection which you have decided to give it, to shake off the yoke of the cruel and corrupt Spanish domination, as you are doing to the equally unfortunate Cuba, which Spain wishes to see anni- hilated rather than free and independent, giving her, to quiet her and to cicatrize the deep wounds made in her heart by the iniquities com- mitted upon her children, a false autonomy, of which one bold blow of the Governor-General may deprive her immediately, as she has no colonial army to serve as a counterpoise to the almost sovereign powers of that supreme authority. At the same time, as I am always frank and open, I must express to you the great sorrow which all of us Filipinos felt on reading in the Times, a newspaper of the greatest circulation and reputation in the whole world, in its issue of the 5th of last month, the astounding state- ment that you, sir, will retain these islands until the end of the war, and, if Spain fails to pay the indemnity, will sell them to a European power, preferably Great Britain; but we found a palliative to our sor- row in the improbability and suddenness of that statement, as common sense refuses to believe that so sensible a public man as you would venture to make an assertion so contrary to common sense, before events are entirely consummated, as you well know that if God favors the triumph of your arms to-day, to-morrow He may defeat them and give the victory to Spain, and because such an assertion is not consistent with the protection of which you make a boast toward this unfortunate people, which has been groaning for more than three centuries in the clutches of a nation which has for its shield (emblem) the lion, one of the ferocious animals, although she displays it as a symbol of nobility, which she certainly does not possess, besides the fact that it is opposed to your noble and generous sentiments to wish to sell these islands to a European power such as England, thereby making us pass under the domination of that nation, which, although it has a truly liberal gov, ernment, partakes none the less of the nature of a tyranny as it is monarchical. Oh, sir, you are greatly injured by this statement, which ought to be regarded merely as a diplomatic trick invented by the friends of Spain to induce us to help her by using this vile slander which has been hurled against you to arouse our hostility to that powerful nation over whose destinies you happily preside. The Philippine people, however, have not given credit to that awk- wardly invented fable, and have seen in your nation, ever since your fleet destroyed in a moment the Spanish fleet which was here, in spite of its being assisted by the guns of their two forts, the angel who is the harbinger of their liberty; and they rose like a single wave when, TREATY OF PEACE. 861 as soon as I trod these shores, I addressed them to gain them over; and they captured, within the period of ten days, nearly the whole garrison of this Province of Cavite, in whose port I have my govern- ment — by the consent of the admiral of your triumphant fleet — as well as the garrison of the adjoining Province of Bataan, together with the governors and officials of both provinces; and my valiant hosts are now besieging Manila, the capital, on the south and east, while my forces in the Province of Bulacan, which adjoins this province on the north, and the chief town of which is likewise being besieged by them, nearly surround Manila on the north. Such is the astonishing triumph which this suffering people has gained in a few days over the conquering race whose traditional valor, of which it is continually bragging, has been humbled on these battle- fields and has been succeeded by a great terror; and a people of such warlike qualities, which is, moreover, thoroughly civilized, as nearly two thirds of them can read and write, and as they have in their midst many men of high attainments in the sciences and arts, should not be sold as if it were a lamb to be sacrificed and exploited for the greed of another nation. I close by protesting once and a thousand times, in the name of this people, which knows how to fight for its honor by means of its impro- vised warriors and artillery men, against the statement published by the Times, mainly for the purpose of casting a blot in history upon its glorious name; a people which trusts blindly in you not to abandon it to the tyranny of Spain, but to leave it free and independent, even if you make peace with Spain, and I offer fervent prayers for the ever- increasing prosperity of your powerful nation, to which and to you I shall show unbounded gratitude, and shall repay with interest that great obligation. Tour humble servant, Emilio Aguinaldo. Consulate-General of the United States, Eonglong, August 4, 1898. Sir : By request I have the honor to confirm the following telegram sent you on the 2d instant: Cortes family, represeuting wealthy educated families Manila, implore you through Consul-General Wildman, in name humanity and Christianity, not to desert them, and aid to obtain annexation Philippines to America. Please see the President. I may add in explanation of this telegram that there is a large colony of wealthy Filipinos who have been driven out of Manila, and the bulk of whose fortunes have been confiscated, resident here. They are people of education as well as wealth, and they are intensely loyal to the United States. The Cortes family are particularly so, and they have contributed money liberally to aid Aguinaldo on the understand- ing that he was fighting for annexation of the Philippines to the United States. Naturally I sympathize with them in their desire to become a part of the United States, and have advised them that you would give their cablegram your kindly consideration. I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant, EOUNSEVELLE WiLDMAN, Consul-General, Hon. Marcus Hanna, United States Senate, Washington, STATEMENT OF MA J. GEN. WESLEY MERRITT, U. S. A., OCTOBER 4, 1898, BEFORE THE UNITED STATES PEACE COMMISSION AT PARIS, AND ACCOMPANYING PAPERS. Commissioners of the United States, Paris, October Jf, 1898. Gen. Wesley Merritt appeared before the Commission. The first matter offered was a communication from Gen. F. V. Greene, U. S. V., which was read by the secretary. Mr. Day. What have you to say. General, as to the qualifications, knowledge, and ability of General Greene to speak on this subject? General Merritt. This communication was written without a knowledge on his part that it would be laid before the Commission, so he probably expresses himself a little more strongly than he would if he knew he was talking to you gentlemen having this matter ir charge. I consider his views exceedingly good, and they are sup ported by the views of the others who have reported on the different subjects mentioned there, and I can say that generally they are all men of ability and men whose views would have a great deal of weight with me. Mr. Frye. What experience has General Greene had? General Merritt. In what direction? Mr. Frye. In any direction as an investigator? He was in Russia a while? General Merritt. Yes, sir; and wrote the best and most authentic — the best received — book on the Russian-Turkish war published yet. He is a man who reads a great deal, quite a student, a very bright man. Mr. Davis. Is he a Regular Army officer? General Merritt. Yes, sir; graduated from the Academy, I think in 1867, and has since that time been instructor of engineering at the Academy and was when I knew him — while I commanded at the Academy, about five years. Mr. Reid. What opportunities has he had for observation in the Philippines? General Merritt. He went at the same time I did and left at the same time. He was out on the lines all the time, and took a great deal of interest in investigating with the citizens and soldiers. He knew some of the ranking officers, although he did not know Agui- naldo nor have anything to do with him. It was part dt my policy that we should keep ourselves aloof from Aguinaldo as much as pos- sible, because we knew trouble would occur from his wanting to go to Manila at the time of its surrender. Mr. Frye. He is a gentleman on whose judgment you would have a great deal of reliance? General Merritt. Yes, sii*. 362 TREATY OF PEACE. 363 The Chairman. When did General Greene get to the Philippine Islands? General Merritt. He got there about the middle of July. The Chairman, And left about what time? General Merritt. The latter part of August. The Chairman, Your army occupied Cavite and vicinity? General Merritt. When General Greene got there he was put at once Ijeyond Aguinaldo's headquarters at Bacu, on the beach and opposite Manila, where he established his lines. When I got there I found the insurgents were holding the lines in front of him, and I directed him, peaceably if he could and if not by force, to get his lines in front, so there would be no mixture of troops. It was rather an anomalous condition, and the general in command there agreed to take part of the lines The Chairman. The insurgent general? General Merritt. Yes, sir. General Greene saw a great deal of them in moving around his lines and prospecting in other directions to learn the character of the country. The Chairman. Was he in the interior of the country? General jNIerritt. No, sir. The Chairman. How long in Manila? General Merritt. About two weeks; from the 13th of August to the 29th of August. The Chairman. What do you regard as the principal means of information as to the character and needs of the people? General Merritt. His means of information ? The Chairman. Yes, sir. General Merritt. Merely the contact that would naturally occur from an active man moving around and seeing more or less of them and hearing them talk. The Chairman. Principally with the insurgents? General Merritt. As well as the British and other foreign residents and some few Spaniards. The Chairman. After you occupied ]\Ianila? General Merritt. Yes, sir. Before that, of course, it was mainly the insurgents and such English as came out to visit us. After the reading of General Greene's statement General Merritt made the following statement : General Merritt. I would add to my remarks in regard to General Greene's report that immediately upon the occupation of Manila I appointed General Greene chief of the bureaus of collection. He occupied a position in Manila which was analogous to the position of the Secretary of the Treasury in the United States, and in that way he got a good deal of information, which came to him from different sources. In that connection it might be remarked that Augustine, the Gov- ernor-General up to the 5th of August, borrowed from the Philippine Bank in Manila $2,000,000, and they have nothing to show for it nor no place to be repaid from. We had to bolster up the bank in order to keep it from going to pieces. There would have been a run on it at once; but the other banks, the Hongkong and English banks— all managed by Englishmen — stepped in and said they would guaranty the payment of bills by this Filipino bank up to a certain amount, I think $200,000, and we transacted business with them through the custom-house the same as the other banks. Of course when they arrive at that limit we will have to have additional security or the 364 TREATY OF PEACE. bank will have to be closed. For a while we protected it by closing it and putting a guard over it. The statement of Major (and Dr. ) Bournes was read by the sec- retary. Mr. Frye. Please make a statement about him, General. General Merritt. He was at Atlanta, Ga., when the expedition started. I had an interview — he came to me at Governors Island — and I was so well satisfied that he knew more than anyone else who had applied to go as interpreter that I got the War Department to appoint him a surgeon in the service, and I sent him ahead with Gen- eral Greene. He was a man who had been there three or more years — I was under the impression that he had been there longer than the date he gives in his report — is a man of great intelligence, knows the different languages of the islanders, talks with them fluently, knows Spanish and English of course ; and his views, while modestly put, are entitled to a great deal of credit. The Chairman. Are we to understand that he had a three years' residence in the islands — the Philippine Islands? General Merritt. Yes, sir; he had been there as a naturalist or something of that kind. The Chairman. Had been on the other islands from Luzon? General Merritt, Yes, sir; Iloilo and Mindanao, and some others perhaps. Major Bournes is a very intelligent and very honest man. I place more weight to his views than any other man I know of, because he has had a better opportunity to judge, and he states his views mildly. Mr. Reid, He has had longer experience than others? General Merritt. Yes, sir. The statement of Maj. J. L. Bell, major of engineers, was then read by the secretary. General Merritt. Major Bell was an officer on my staff, and went out there before I did, conducted the secret service, and was very active. He moved around in the insurgent lines, and, to a certain extent, in the Spanish lines, though I forbade his being disguised or anything of that kind. All the risk he took was as an officer of the army. He knows the army and navy officers from Aguinaldo down, and had frequent conferences with him and his officers. His report relates more particularly to the situation as regards the Filipino army. Major Bell got his information before I arrived there and at the time I was there. I think he exaggerates the number of troops and arms they have for the service. The largest estimate outside of his has been 15,000 guns — small arms. I doubt very much whether the insurgents have that many. The Spaniards, who are supposed to have lost quite a number of arms because of the desertion of the natives whom they armed, have more arms than troops there. They surrendered 22,000 stands of arms of the latest patterns and millions of cartridges. Mr. Reid. Mausers? General Merritt. Yes, sir; and others. Mr, Frye. To us? General Merritt. Yes, sir; and they claimed to surrender 14,000 soldiers, but up to the time I left we could not count more than eight or ten thousand, and that is probably about the number. Mr. Gray. Spanish soldiers? General Merritt. Yes, sir; except two regiments, who were natives. TREATY OF PEACE. 365 They wanted to dismiss the natives and send them off, bnt T ohjocted to that and said they had armed them and must treat the natives as the Spaniards. The Chairman. Where are those soldiers? General Merritt. In the city's different convents. We made them vacate the barracks and used them for our own troops. They are in the public squares, churches, convents, etc. The Chairman. In and about Manila? General Merritt. Yes, sir; and in the suburbs. Mr. Gray. Under guard? General Merritt. No, sir. Mr. Gray. Under parole? General Merritt. No, sir; they would not take parole. I believe there is something in the Spanish military regulations that makes it capital punishment for the Spanish soldiers to take parole. Mr. Davis. Under any circumstances? General Merritt. Yes, sir; so they told me. They consider it a breach of honor, and they are liable to trial by court-martial, and the officers subject to capital punishment if they did it. I, however, made them promise for themselves and their men, and sign a roll, that they would not take up arms during this war against us; but that was scarcely necessary, for there was not a possibility of their doing so. They surrendered all their arms except the side arms of the officers. Mr. Reid. Are they well behaved? General Merritt. Yes, sir; the officers were a little bumptious at first. They would march around the streets with their side arms, and it created some little friction, and I had a letter written to General Arderius, and said that it would look better if they discarded theii* arms and did not parade the streets so much, and that had the desired effect, and there has been no trouble since. I did not exact it in the note, but I would have done so if necessary. The next statement was that of Admiral Dewey, dated August 29, 1898, which was read by the Secretary. During the reading : Mr. Frye. Is there anything more recent from Admiral Dewey than that? General Merritt. Not to my knowledge. This is a copy of a dis- patch sent by him in reply to a question propounded from Washington. Mr. Gray. Is not 3,000,000 an overestimate of the population of the Island of Luzon? General Merritt. I think not; they generally put it larger. The Chairman. It was first stated by Admiral Dewey at 825,000. Do you know how he got that estimate? General Merritt. I do not. After the reading of Admiral Dewey's statement : The Chairman. I would like to ask about Admiral Dewey's views. He selects the Island of Luzon as the one to be obtained. Do you understand that that is Admiral Dewey's view? General Merritt. I understand the question was asked from Wash- ington, "If we took but one island, which is the best to seize upon?" The Chairman. Do you know, aside from that question, what Admiral Dewey's view is as to taking one island, or all the islands? General Merritt. I do not. I am inclined to believe, however, that he is in favor of taking the entire archipelago; but I would not so state it. The Chairman. You never heard him say so? 366 TREATY OF PEACE. General Merritt. We have talked the matter over many times, but I would not state that he expressed himself in this way, as I might talk to this commission. Mr. Reid. This statement was made in reply to a question asking which island would be best to retain if only one was kept? General Merritt. Yes, sir; and he naturally selects the largest and most populous. I did not have a chance to talk with him after read- ing this dispatch, or I would have asked him to express himself in that regard. He told me that reply was to a question from Wash- ington asking. If we retained only one island, which is the better one to retain? The Chairman. That was the question in June? General Merritt. I think he said his telegram in June referred to the capacity of the natives to gov^ern themselves as compared with the Cubans. The next statement was that of Lieut. Col. Charles L. Jewett, judge-advocate, U. S. V. Before it was read General Merritt said : I think you will not find much in what Colonel Jewett says. He was a gentleman highly recommended to me from Indiana as judge- advocate, and I appointed him, although he did not know enough about the business to give him charge of the whole business; and I gave him something to occupy him. He was very anxious to come here, and wanted me to ask Washington to send him, but he does not know very much, and his views are not worth much. He intimates he knows a good deal, but does not give it in his statement. The statement was then read by the secretary. The next statement was that of Mr. Andre, Belgian consul at Manila. Before it was read : General Merritt. That is rather important. The man is an intel- ligent man. He expresses himself very poorly in English, and I have tried to have Ills report corrected to an extent, but I think a good deal of reliance can be placed upon it. He is very earnest in hoping that the Spanish will be excluded and the Filipinos not allowed to govern themselves, but some government established there which will protect the merchants and business men. It might be remarked that he is largely interested in business matters, and has been there, I think, for about fourteen j^ears; is quite a wealthy man, and gives his views from that standpoint. The statement was then read by the secretary, Mr. Frye. How old a man is he? General Merritt. He is quite a young man. He tells me he has been there fourteen years. He states his case entirely from the point of view of a rich merchant. He does not sign himself as the Belgian consul, because he said he could not do so, but he gives his statement as his personal opinion. He seems to think the United States is engaged in a crusade for the benefit of the oppressed of all lands. Mr. Gray. Where is this Belgian consul resident? General Merritt. In Manila. The next paper consisted of correspondence between General Ander- son and General Aguinaldo. Before it was read : General Merritt. I do not know that the Commission will be inter- ested in that. It is correspondence between General Anderson and Aguinaldo, and relates largely to Aguinaldo's growing views. The TREATY OF PEACE. 367 whole correspondence was deprecated by Admiral Dewey before I got there, and I suppressed the whole thing after I arrived, because it was not the wish of the Government to make any promises to the insurgents or act in any way with them. The correspondence was read by the secretary. Mr. Frye. In obtaining supplies in what money did you pay? General Merritt. The money of the country. Mr. Frye. Mexican silver? General Merritt. Yes, sir. With reference to the last letter read, that letter and one other letter received from Aguinaldo, which has been mislaid and which I can not reproduce, I made no reply to, except to tell him he must withdraw his forces outside those limits. The commission he refers to was brought to me by General Ander- son. He asked me if I would talk to them, and I said I would. It was a few days after the surrender, and I received them at my head- quarters in Manila, and they agreed the insurgents should withdraw outside any lines I might designate. I detailed two officers, General Greene and General MacArthur, to designate a line in red pencil, and gave it to them on a map, and told them I should insist on the with- drawal of his troops. It took in part of the lines Aguinaldo's troops had occupied previous to our getting there, but it was necessary to enforce a proper status between the insurgents and our own forces and to keep them out of Manila. Before that time, rather early after my arrival there at Manila, I had telegraphed to the War Department of the possible trouble that might arise with the insurgents, and asked for instructions as to whether I should consider them as enemies and treat them accordingly in such case. To that request I had no reply, and the consequence was I had to mix diplomacy with force in order to avoid a tilt with them. I knew, if bloodshed was once had, that would be the end of an amicable status there, and to that end I was careful only to enforce that which was proper and which I conceived must be executed in order to have my troops fully occupy the ground we had taken. In his letters to General Anderson he speaks of concessions they made there in the occupation of lines. They did. I told General Greene — gave him the instructions — to try to get these positions by an amicable arrangement if possible, but, if necessarj^, to report the faot to me, and I should use force to secure them. At the time I went there I found we had no lines, no base upon which to approach Manila. The insurgents had their pickets to the front of ours, and our main guard was in the rear of their main guard, and I gave General Greene orders to change that status, which he did, and purely by arrangement with that general of whom Major Bell speaks as being a very sensible fel- low and a good fellow. It appears, Avhen the request was made of him, he corresponded with Aguinaldo, and the latter agreed to it. Mr. Reid. Do you think any danger of conflict is now reasonably remote? General Merritt. I think there is no danger of conflict as long as these people think the United States is going to take possession there. If they imagine, or hear from any source, that the Spaniards are to be reinstated there, I think they will be very violent. Mr. Davis. What do you mean by "there"? General Merritt. I mean at Manila; in the military lines; in the positions they held. The Chairman. Suppose the United States should acquire even the 368 TREATY OF PEACE. island of Luzon and set up there its own governnskent, do you think Aguinaldo and his followers would submit to it? General Merritt. On the island of Luzon alone? The Chairman. Yes; taking that now under consideration only. General Merritt. Only with the understanding that eventually it should be restored to the Filipinos, in the event of the United States vacating. Mr. Davis. Suppose the United States, by virtue of a treaty with Spain, should take Luzon, all the Philippines, or a part, by virtue of a treaty, paying no attention to the insurgents, how would that be taken by Aguinaldo? General Merritt. I think Aguinaldo and his immediate following would resist it, but whether he could resist to any extent I do not know, because his forces are divided. I believe that as matters go on Aguinaldo will lose more or less of his power there. This oppo- sition he speaks of in the last letter read on the part of his chiefs arises principally from this fellow Pelo (?), who is an insurgent and a freebooter and a very bad man, and he is only favorable to Aguinaldo as long as Aguinaldo heads a war party against all comers. Mr. Davis. He is in for booty? General Merritt. Yes, sir. The Chairman. If the United States should say that we shall take this country and govern it our own way, do you think they would submit to it? General Merritt. Yes, sir. The Chairman. Even Aguinaldo? General Merritt. Aguinaldo without his party would not amount to anything. Mr. Frye. Suppose, by treaty, we take Luzon alone and establish our Government there, raise our flag there, give to the people the freedom from taxation and other burdens, from slavery, etc., that we give to our own people, how long, in your opinion, would it be before there would be insurrections in all these other islands we have returned to Spain or that Spatn retains? General Merritt. 'These other islands, as Dr. Bournes and this Andre point out, are scarcely in revolt against Spain now. Whether, resulting from example in Luzon, they would be incited to insur- rection is a question. Aguinaldo is the head and front of the insurrection so far as it extends. Mr. Frye. Suppose we had the possession as I suggest, with a good government as I suggest, the knowledge of which would be in time conveyed to these other islands, that these people in Luzon were so much better off than they were, do you think the natives of Luzon would abstain from sending filibustering expeditions and inciting rebellion in these other islands? General Merritt. I think, as Major Bell has pointed out, there are a good many of these insurrectionists who like the business because they have nothing to lose and something to gain in the way of booty. Mr. Frye. Do you not think, if we retain Luzon, and the other islands remain under the sovereignty of Spain, we should be in con- tinual danger of a conflict with Spain? General Merritt. I think so, unquestionably. Mr. Davis. I did not understand the General to answer clearly the first question, which was that if we should set up a government in Luzon which, by its fairness, would invite comparison with that of Spain, what would those other islands do about it? TREATY OF PEACE. 369 General Merritt. I do not know enough about those other islands to give an opinion. Mr. Gray. Are they intelligent enough to appreciate the difference? General Merritt. I doubt if they are, because they are not much on the seacoast, and they do not know much about it. As Senator Frye suggests, filibustering expeditions might be raised at Luzon. Mr. Gray. Suppose, by final treaty with Spain, we should abandon Luzon and all the Philippines, exacting such terms and conditions and guaranties as we should think necessary, and abandon them entirely, reserving only a coaling station, perhaps; what do you think they would do about it? General Merritt. I think in the island of Luzon they would fight to the bitter end. I have talked with a number of them, intelligent men, who said their lives were nothing to them as compared with the freedom of the country, getting rid of Spanish government. Mr. Davis. Do you think Spain would be able to reduce them? General Merritt. No, sir. Mr. Gray. Do you think, in the event of such an abandonment, it would be possible for them to set up a self-government? General Merritt. It would take time to do it. They would have to be educated up to it. They want a protectorate, but they do not exactly understand what that means. Their idea is that they should collect the revenues and keep them in their treasury, and that we should be at the expense of maintaining an army and a navy there for their protection, which is the kind of a protectorate they would like very much. Mr. Frye. I suppose their idea of government is practically derived from the Spaniards? General Merritt. Yes, sir. The Chairman. What they desire is a government for their benefit, maintained and paid for by us? General Merritt. Yes, sir. Mr. Davis. Do you understand that condition of slavery prevails which is described in that letter read? General Merritt. Yes, sir; entirely as described by Mr. Andre. Mr. Gray. If Admiral Dewey had sailed away after accomplishing that naval achievement and left this people as he found them, except for the destruction of the Spanish fleet, what, in your opinion, would have been the condition of the island as to Spanish supremacy and their ability to suppress the rebellion? General Merritt. If the Spaniards had replaced their fleet with another, I do not believe the revolutionists could have taken Manila. Along the bay it is 30 miles, 17 by water, and the coast shows the evidences of where the Spaniards have used the guns of their fleets, riddled the houses with shells, and prevented the insurgents from approaching the town; and the insurgents would have been driven to approach the town from the interior, where the Spanish troops were concentrated against them. It was only after the destruction by Dewey of the fleet and his occupation of the bay that these people surrounded the place and held their positions and took possession of the waterworks, which they held for some two or three months. For two months, perhaps three months, the water had been cut off from " the town. Mr. Reid. What is the nature of that supply? General Merritt. Very good. T p 24: 370 TREATY OF PEACE. Mr. Reid. Good aqueducts, and from a stream? General Merritt. Yes, sir; fresh water from a stream in the mountains. Mr. Davis. How many troops, in your opinion, will be necessary to administer the government of this island — to secure the administra- tion of our Government there? General Merritt. From 20,000 to 25,000 would be necessary at first. Mr, Davis. And after that? General Merritt. After that they might be very materially reduced, because you could get natives into the occupying forces there who would make perfectly good soldiers. Mr. Frye. I was going to inquire whether it would not be possible to get natives to enlist, and whether Aguinaldo could not be given a command? General Merritt. Perfectly so, perfectly. PAPERS TO ACC0MPA:MY the statement of MAJ. gen. WESLEY MERRITT, U. S. A., OCTOBER 4, 1398, BEFORE THE UNITED STATES PEACE COMMISSION AT PARIS. INDEX. OPINIONS ON PHILIPPINE ISLANDS. Pagft. Greene, Brig. Gen. F. V 374 Bourns, Frank S. . major and chief surgeon 375 Bell, J. F. , major of Engineers -.. 379 Dewey, Rear- Admiral George •- 383 JeAvett, Charles L. , lieutenant-colonel, judge-advocate 38.5 Belgian consul at Manila - - 38G CORRESPONDENCE WITH GENERAL AGUINALDO. Anderson, Gen. T. M. (July 4) Advises commanding general Philippine forces of the entire sympathy with the United States of the native people of the islands. Desires amicable relations with the people and their cooperation. It will be necessary to occupy the town of Cavite as a base of operations, but no interference will be made with the fvmc- tions or privileges of General Aguinaldo or the other native citizens. Asks that the officers of the insurgent forces be instructed not to inter- fere with United States officers in the performance of their duties in Cavite --- 300 Aguinaldo, General. (July 5) Expresses gi-atitude to General Anderson for the sympathy of the United States. Has already ordered noninterfer- ence with United States officers. Asks that he be informed of any mis- conduct of any of his people --- 390 Anderson, General. (July 6) Acknowledges letter of 5th instant from Senor Aguinaldo, commanding Philippine forces, and says he is anxious to come to a definite understanding. Expects large addition to his forces, and will need more camping room. Is anxious to avoid any con- flict of authority, but must have place for landing of supplies and storing of same - - 391 Jones, Major and Quartermaster. (July 17) Infoi-ms General Aguinaldo that the second expedition of United States ti-oops (five to seven thousand men) vsdll encamp in vicinity of Paranaque. Certain assistance will be required in the way of horses, etc. Payment will be made forthis. Sup- plies must be had even if it is necessary to seize them. Request made by General Anderson's direction - 391 Memorandum. (July 17) General Agiiinaldo and secretary called upon General Anderson to say that two Americans assuming to be officers had called and presented a letter, as to which he requested a statement whether it was authorized - 393 Anderson, General. (July 19) Acknowledges letter of General Aguinaldo of the 18th instant, and returns thanks for the offer of assistance. Says there will be no confiscation of property, and that a fair compensation will be given for all supplies - 393 Anderson, General. (July 19) Introduces to General Aguinaldo Maj. J. F. BeU, and asks that he be afforded every facility for obtaining informa- tion 393 S71 372 TREATY OF PEACE. Pageu Anderson, General. (July 21) Asks passes and such other assistance as practicable be given Lieut. E. J. Bryan and party for reconnoitering the country 393 Anderson, General. (July 22) Replies to letter of General Aguinaldo in regard to property of Don Antonio Osorio. The property in question will be held subject to investigation. Has no authority to recognize the assumption of dictatorship by Aguinaldo 393 Anderson, General. (July 23) Advises General Aguinaldo of his request of three vpeeks ago as to the necessity of means of transportation for the American army, and to which he has hitherto received no response. Makes requisition for 500 horses, 50 oxen, and ox carts. K Aguinaldo can not secure these, requisition will have to be made directly upon the people - - 394. Aguinaldo, General. (July 24) Replies to General Anderson's strictures as to seizure of a storehouse of Antonio Osorio in Cavite. Says he came from Hongkong to prevent his countrymen from making common cause with the Spanish against the United States. He then proclaimed himself dictator and established a revolutionary government, which exists to-day. While such government has not been recognized by foreign powers, he expects the United States will look upon it with greater benevolence than any other nation. Considers it inadvisable for United States troops to be landed in places conquered by Filipinos from the Spanish without previous notice to him. Such act might be misunderstood by the people. Is well aware of what he and his people owe to Admii-al Dewey, but very anxious to prevent foreign intervention prejudicial to the United States as well as to the native population of the Philippines 394 Aguinaldo, General (July 24) . States that he misunderstood the desires of the United States forces before, but now he will assist in supplying all requisitions for transportation necessities if given reasonable notice 395 Anderson, General. Refers to letter of 24th instant of Senor Aguinaldo, touching the property of Don Antonio Osorio. Advises him that same has been referred to General Merritt (July 27) - 396 Anderson, General. Acknowledges General Aguinaldo's letter of 26th as to the cattle, horses, etc. Regrets misunderstanding, but was informed that nothing could be supplied except by order of Aguinaldo. The United States quartermaster will establish a depot near the American camp and will receive and pay for all supplied. This communication bears date July 24 396 Anderson, General (July 27) . Transmits last letter he received from insur- gent chief, dated Bacood, July 24. Also submits entire correspondence of insurgent cliief 397 Anderson, General (July 27). With a view to obtain information as to approaches to Manila, requests Aguinaldo to give the officers making reconnoissance all possible assistance 397 Aguinaldo, General (August 1). Informs Consul Williams that he is impressed by the note of July 8, and thanks him for kind words therein. Thinks the islands will be in effect one of the richest and pleasantest countries of the globe if the capital and industry of North Americans come to develop the soil. In reference to annexation, does not think his people can be made to believe this. Makes suggestions as to the expecta- tions of his people and desires that Mr. Williams inform Washington that the Filipinos have abandoned savagery, etc 397 Aguinaldo, General (August 14) to General Anderson with regard to his being allowed to enter Manila, and the desk-ability of preventing conflict between the two forces 399 Aguinaldo, General (August 13) to General Anderson in reference to diffi- culties between Filipino forces and American forces, and the strict orders he gave his chiefs to preserve great respect for American forces 399 Merritt, General. With regard to a memorandum fi'om General Aguinaldo addressed to General xlnderson which purports to contain a statement of certain desires on the part of the Filipinos. Sets forth concessions which will be granted Filipinos after certain conditions are complied with. Dated August 20 400 Aguinaldo, General. (August 21. ) Agrees to withdraw his forces from the suburbs to the Line indicated by General Merritt if the within promises and conditions are agreed to. _ 400 TREATY OF PEACE. 373 Aguinaldo, General. ( Angnst 24. ) Telegram to General Merritt in regard to the death of an American soldier at Cavite. Promises full investiga- tion, but is of the opinion that his people are not responsible for the trouble - - -- .----.----» ""^^ Merritt, General. Letter to Aguinaldo acknowledging communication of 21st instant. Refers him to Admiral Dewey in regard to protection of American squadron. Promises good will of American people 401 Merritt, General. (August 25.) Reply to telegram from Aguinaldo dated August 24. Thanks him for notifying him so promptly and trusts that harmony will prevail "^02 Aguinaldo, General. (August 27. ) Is surprised that the General thinks his commissioners committed themselves in regard to the withdrawal of troops outside the line designated. Is disposed to sacrifice to friendship everything not prejudicial to the rights of the Philippine 's city. Compre- hends inconvenience of a double occupation of the city. Asks that the aid of the Filipinos be not made light of and promises to withdraw his troops to certain lines. Does not believe that the acceptance of the con- ditions proposed would be prejudicial to the rights of the city. Is forced to insist upon the said conditions to quiet the gTumblings of his chiefs and soldiers, who have already sacrificed much 402 MEMORANDUM CONCERNING THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS. [Made August 27, 1S98.] By Gen. F. V. Greene, U. S. V. If the United States evacuate these islands, anarchy and civil war will immediately ensue and lead to foreign intervention. The insur- gents were furnished arms and the moral support of the Navy prior to our arrival, and we can not ignore obligations, either to the insur- gents or to foreign nations, which our owti acts have imposed upon us. The Spanish Government is completely demoralized, and Spanish power is dead beyond possibility of resurrection. Spain would be unable to govern these islands if we surrendered them. Spaniards individually stand in great fear of the insurgents. The Spanish Gov- ernment is disorganized and their treasury bankrupt, with a large floating debt. The loss of property has been great. On the other hand, the Filipinos can not govern the country without the support of some strong nation. They acknowledge tliis themselves, and say their desire is for independence under American protection; but they have only vague ideas as to what our relative positions would be — what part we should take in collecting and expending the revenue and administering the government. The hatred between the Spanish and natives is very intense and can not be eradicated. The natives are all Roman Catholics and devoted to the church, but have bitter hatred for monastic orders — Dominican, Franciscan, and Recollects. They insist that these be sent out of the country or they will murder tliem. These friars own the greater part of the land, and have grown rich by oppressing the native husbandmen. Aguinaldo's army numbers 10,000 to 15,000 men in vicinity of Manila, who have arms and ammunition, but no regular organization. They receive no pay, and are held together by hope of booty when they enter Manila. They are composed largely of young men and boys from surrounding country, who have no property and nothing to lose in a civil war. Aguinaldo has two or three ships, and is sending armed men to the northern portions of Luzon and to other islands. TheSpaniards there, being cut off from communication with Manila and Spain, can not be reenforced. The result will be an extension of the civil war and further destruc- tion of property. There are in Manila itself nearly 200,000 native Filipinos, among whom are large numbers with more or less Spanish and Chinese blood who are men of character, education, ability, and wealth. They hate the Spanish, are unfriendly toward other nations, and look only to America for assistance. They are not altogether in sympathy with Aguinaldo, fearing the entry of his army into Manila almost as much as the Spaniards fear it. They say Aguinaldo is not fitted either by ability or experience to be the head of a native government, and doubt if he would be elected President in an honest election. Principal foreign interests here are British, and their feel- 374 TREATY OF PEACE. 375 ing is unanimous in favor of American occupation. They have already forwarded a memorial to their Government asking for it as the only way to protect life and property. Altogether the situation here is somewhat similar to Bosnia and Herzegovina in i878, and Egypt in 1882, and the only practicable solution seems to be on lines somewhat similar to those adopted in those cases. The length of our occupation would depend on circum- stances as developed in the future, but should be determined solely in our discretion without obligation to or consultation Avith other powers. This plan can only be worked out by careful study by the Paris Commission, and they should have advice and full information from some one who has been here during our occupation and thor- oughly understands the situation. It is not understood in America, and unless properly dealt with at Paris will inevitably lead to future complications and possibly war. The currency of the country is silver. The Mexican dollar is pre- ferred, and worth about 47 cents gold, but the gold doUar will not buy in labor or merchandise any more than the Mexican dollar, and any attempt to establish a gold basis for currency would ruin any business in the islands. The total revenue is about $17,000,000 Mexican, derived about 35 per cent from customs, 50 per cent from internal taxes, and 15 per cent from state lottery and sale of monopolies. More than two-thirds of the internal revenue comes from poll tax or cedula, which is very unpopular. The country was self-supporting and free of debt until the insurrection broke out about two years ago, but the expenses of the civil war have disorganized finances. There is a bonded debt, Series A, $15,000,000 Mexican, held in Spain, for which the colony never received any consideration, and another debt, Series B, same amount, which was forced on the people here, and the validity of which is open to question. Both debts are secured by first liens on custom-house receipts, but this does not appear to have been respected. Manila, Philippine Islands, August 29, 1898. Maj. Gen. "Wesley Merritt, U. S. A., Manila, Philippine Islands. Sir : In obedience to your request I have the honor to submit the following : Although the Island of Luzon is the largest of the Philippine group, and likewise the most important, there are others of great importance, especially from the commercial view-point. The most important of these are known as the Visayas, and include the islands of Panay, Negros, Zebu, Samar, Leyte, Masbate, Romblon, Tablas, and Cibuyan. The Island of Zebu, on which the City of Cebu is situated, is almost entirely under cultivation, there being but little of the original for- ests to be found. Here are cultivated sugar, to a limited extent hemp, Indian corn, and other products. Here, likewise, are found mines of coal and deposits of petroleum, both as yet undeveloped. Panay, on which the city of Iloilo, the second port in commercial importance in the islands, is situated, is also well under cultivation, there being but few places in the northwest and west still covered with forests. Both of these islands are inhabited by the Visayan race, 376 TREATY OF PEACE. all of whom have adopted Christianity and all of whom are under tribute to Spain. The island of Negros, situated between these two islands, is also of great importance from an agricultural view-point. There still exists in the interior of this island a great amount of forests, and some of the tribes in the interior have never been made tributory to Spain. It is a great sugar-producing island, almost all of the lowlands near the coast being under cultivation. Samar and Leyte, to the east, are not so well developed, but a great deal of hemp of the best quality is produced there, the most of which finds its way to markets by way of Manila, although some is shipped from Cebu. Most of the sugar produced in the three islands first mentioned is marketed at Iloilo. The smaller islands mentioned — Masbate, Romblon, Tables, and Cibuyan — are of more importance as supporting large herds of cattle, the island of Masbate being especially noteworthy for this. The products of the islands just mentioned are marketed almost entirely in Manila. All of the people in these islands, with the exception of the few mentioned in the interior of Negros, are docile, well disposed, and easily managed. They are somewhat less energetic than the Tagologs of Luzon, and have never been involved in the insurrections occurring in these islands, to my knowledge, except in Cebu in 1896, and then through the influence of Tagologs sent there for the purpose of stirring up the insurrection. Mindanao, Basilan, and the Sulu group are inhabited for the most part by Malay tribes belonging to the Mohammedan faith. The inte- rior of the great island of Mindanao has never been conquered by the Spaniards. The important Spanish towns on this island are located on the seacoast and are inhabited largely by the emigrants from the other islands. The Sulu group has recently been brought under partial control of Spanish authority, but as yet the inhabitants do not pay tribute to Spain, or at least they did not up to the year of 1893. The island of Palawan, on the west, is almost entirely undeveloped, there being perhaps a half dozen small Spanish towns along the sea- coast on either side. The most important settlement is at Puerto Princesa, where there is a fine harbor. The most of the inhabitants are known as Tageannas, a Malay tribe just being brought under the influence of Spanish methods. The Caliaimanes, northeast of Palawan, are inhabited by the same tribe, but more emigrants are found here than in Palawan. Cattle are shipped from here to Manila, grazing being the principal industry. The large island of Mindoro, just south and west of Luzon, is almost entirely undeveloped, there being but a few Spanish towns along the coast. The few agricultural products of this island are almost entirely consumed by the inhabitants themselves, the principal exports being jungle products, such as rattan and woods. The sago palm grows abundantly throughout this island, and sago flour is the principal breadstuff of the uncivilized tribes of the interior. This island is supposed to contain large deposits of coal, and I myself at one time found outcroppings indicating a coal deposit at a place within easy communication of the seacoast. In regard to the island of Luzon I do not deem it necessary to say much, as it is the best-known island of the group. Large areas are under cultivation and large areas are still covered with the primeval forests. The majority of the people have been christianized and are TREATY OF PEACE. 377 under the control of Spain, but many tribes in the forests and moun- tains have never been influenced by the Spanish Government. The products of the island are, as known, varied— sugar, hemp, tobacco, chocolate, and coffee being the important ones. As is probably well known to you, the forests of the Philippines produce most valuable woods in almost unlimited quantities. These have never been properly cared for or developed, owing to the restric- tions and hindrances of the Spanish law. This same applies to all industries in the Philippines. In regard to the people of the entire archipelago and the feasibility of bringing them under our control, I see no reason to change the opinion I gave to you before we left the United States. I believe that the masses of the people will accept our government as soon as they understand the form of government that we would offer. The people are for the most part easily controlled by proper methods, the essence of which can be expressed in two words — justice and firmness. It has been my observation, and this is backed by the statements of many intelligent natives and half-casts with whom I have talked, that the Philippine native will accept merited punishment without com- plaint and without the feeling of injury having been done him. I still believe that if a few of the ambitious chieftains now in control of the insurgent army could be disposed of, the masses of the people could be handled without difficulty. At the present it is my opinion that these chieftains find themselves in a difficult posi- tion on account of the promises made to their followers in regard to looting Manila, said promises being so far unfulfilled. Their troops have been serving up to the present time almost without remunera- tion, promises being made that their reward would come when Manila capitulated. Since my arrival I have availed myself of every opportunity to talk with natives and half-castes, both in the insurgent territory and in Manila. I find that many of them would be perfectly willing to accept an American government, and many of them are very anxious that we should take fuU possession of the islands. Many others hold to the desire of the insurgent chiefs for a Philippine government under the protection of the United States. These people express themselves as being confident of their own ability to govern the islands. Many of these would not be satisfied until the experiment had been tried, but I do not believe that such a government would be a success, and that the United States would ultimately have to take hold of the gov- ernment. This for several reasons : First, because the only example of government ever seen by these people is that given by Spain, and they would naturally follow quite closely the methods heretofore pur- sued; second, lack of unity, not only among the important men here in the island of Luzon, but likewise on account of lack of union and full understanding with the various other races of the archipelago, such, for instance, as the Visayas of the central islands; third, because of the three other elements in the islands— the uncivilized hill tribes, the Mohammedans of the south, and the Chinese residents found in all parts of the islands. The feeling existing between the Filipinos and the Chinese resi- dents can be seen any day, by anyone who will take the trouble to notice it, in the streets of Manila. The Chinese, being naturally more industrious and more thrifty than the Filipinos, usually succeed bet- ter, the result being a feeling of extreme jealousy on the part of the Filipinos. I know from observation that this racial feeling would 378 TREATY OP PEACE. be very hard to overcome, as between the Catholic Filipinos and the Mohammedans of the south questions would constantly arise difficult of adjustment by any but a third and stronger party. In regard to the hill tribes, or what are called savage tribes, I have observed in various parts of the island that they are illtreated, imposed upon in every way, and generally considered to be of a very inferior race, to be treated without consideration by the Catholic natives. Another reason for supposing that difficulty would arise in case of self-government is the jealousy among the chieftains themselves. These observations have been made since my arrival here, and are substantiated by conversations with many natives and half-castes. They themselves state that as soon as a Filipino is appointed to office, such as lieutenant or captain, or to a higher rank, he immediately considers himself far above liis fellow-Filipinos, treats them with severity and disdain, and, in short, attempts to imitate as closely as possible the methods pursued by Spanish officials in their treatment of the natives. I have definite information also that at least three or four of the leading men of the provinces to the north and east of Manila are not at all in harmony with those in authority around Manila. All of these conditions would, in my opinion, soon bring about a distressing condition. The only point on which all the natives and half-castes I have talked with agree is that they will never, so long as they have arms, ammunition, or men, submit again to Spanish authoritj'^. Their bit- terness of feeling against the Spaniards can scarcely be exaggerated. This fact I have had abundant opportunity to know. The feeling against the monastic orders is, as you know, not against the church itself, as they are all good Catholics and wish well toward the Catholic Church. The bitterness is directed against all the mem- bers of the monastic orders, with the exception of the Jesuits, whose only work here is missionary, scientific, and educational. Even the most rabid among them have expressed to me their appreciation of the work being done by the Jesuits. Taken as a whole, the Philippine Islands are as rich and productive islands, with as good climate and as good natural advantages, as are to be found anywhere in the tropics. In conclusion, I wish to state that these opinions are only my per- sonal opinions, founded upon extensive observations in these islands and comparison with other tropical regions which I have visited. I give them to you in obedience to your request, and whether they prove to be right or wrong I can only assure you that they are my honest convictions, and founded only upon personal observations made dur- ing a three years and a half residence in these islands. From a personal interest in such matters I have always talked freely with the people of whatever place I have visited, not expecting that my views would be needed in any such emergency. I do believe, how- ever, that in the main they are fairly accurate, and that my estimate of the people and of the islands and their resources is not far amiss. I am, sir, very respectfully, Frank S. Bourns, Major and Chief Surgeon, U. S. Volunteers. TREATY OF PEACE. 379 [Headquarters United Staf-es Expeditionary Forces and Department of the Pacific— Office of Military Information.] Manila, Philippine Islands, August 29, 1898. Maj. Gen. Wesley Merritt, U. S. A., Manila, Philippine Islands. Sir: Pursuant to your verbal instructions, I have the honor to report the following facts and opinions : In the city of Santa Cruz, the capital of La Laguna, about 600 Spaniards are besieged by insurgents. Albay, held by a detachment of Spanish forces, number not known, is also besieged by insurgents. All the Spanish in the Province of Tayabas have just been captured by insurgents, together with a considerable amount of money and other property. The Spanish still hold Daet, the capital of Camarines Norte, and Nueva Caceres, the capital of Camarines Sur, but both places are besieged by insurgents. The four provinces, Llocos Sur, Llocos Norte, Isabella, and Cagayan are still in the possession of the Spanish, but 400 insurgents have been dispatched to attack the Spanish in these provinces. About 250 Spaniards hold Morong, the capital of the province of the same name. There is one company of Spanish infantry in Yap, the capital of Ponape, one of the Caroline Islands. There are also a considerable number of Spanish troops in Cebu, Iloilo, Leyte, and Mindanao. The island of Mindoro and the provinces of Batangas, Pampangas, Pangasenan, Bulacan, La Union, Tayabas, Bataan, Zanbales, Tarlac, and'Cavite (all in the island of Luzon) are under the control of insur- gents. Concerning the insurgents now under arms and about the city, it is practically impossible to count or estimate their number for several reasons : First, they are being continually sent away to other prov- inces; second, many of them have laid aside their arms temporarily to raise crops for their families. As the organization is very loose, no captain knows the exact number of his following. No reports have ever been made to General Aguinaldo. The closest estimate that can be made of the available armed insurgent force is based upon the number of arms recently captured from the Spanish militia, from the arsenal at Cavite, from Spaniards captured in battle, and bought from Jackson and Evans. Together with the number it is fair to estimate were in the hands of Filipinos, who got them in previous insurrection, this foots up about 40,000, as follows: From militia.. .- - 12,000 From arsenal - 2, 500 From Jackson and Evans.. - 2,000 From Spanish - 8.000 In hands of Filipinos (about) 15,000 Total - 39,500 From this number there should probably be deducted several thou- sand guns recaptured by the Spanish and turned in under the pro- visions of a proclamation offering $50 and amnesty to each insurgent who would come in and give himself and his rifle up to the Spaniards, It is assumed that every Filipino who has a gun is ready material 380 TREATY OF PEACE. for an armed insurrectionist, providing sufficient provocation exists to appeal to the resentment of all. Aguinaldo's following, however, is not so great, nor can all of those who are under arms be considered equal in loyalty to their chief. Great differences of opinion exist among them, and General Aguinaldo is just now experiencing considerable difficulty in maintaining con- trol over his loosely organized forces. He has certain men among his leaders who are dishonest and unworthy, and are now guilty of con- duct which seriously reflects upon the character of the insurgent. Tliis is well known to General Aguinaldo, but he is powerless to pre- vent it, because he realizes that an effort to do so would be an end of their subordination to him. Concerning the capacity of the Filipinos to govern themselves, I regret to say that I see no reason to change the opinion previously expressed, that they are unfit. I wish my opinion might be other- wise, for I prefer to believe them capable of self-government. There are a number of Filipinos whom I have met, among them General Aguinaldo and a few of his leaders, whom I believe thoroughly trust- worthy and fully capable of self-government, and the main reliance for small official positions and m.any larger ones would be upon people who know no standard of government other than that the Spaniards have furnished. Their sense of equity and justice seems not fully developed, and their readiness to coerce those who come under their power has been strongly illustrated in this city since our occupation. A regularly organized system of blackmail has been instituted under the guise of making subscriptions to the insurgent cause. None of this money ever reaches the treasury of the so-called Filipino govern- ment, but is doubtless divided among the petty chiefs who assume to authorize subordinates to collect it. The Filipinos themselves, living in the outskirts of the city, are daily terrorized and interfered with by small bands of marauding insurgents, who molest them for no other purpose but the accumula- tion of booty. Aguinaldo has in Hongkong about $300,000 and in Bacoor about $220,000 of public funds. He has commissioned an agent to purchase all the nitrate of soda to be found in Manila, and a lot more in China and Japan. He has a cartridge factory at Imus capable of working 400 people. He proposes soon to move his headquarters to Malolos, on the railroad, north of Manila and only about thirty minutes' ride from the city. There is not a particle of doubt but what Aguinaldo and his leaders will resist any attempt of any government to reorganize a colonial government here. They are especially bitter toward the Spaniards, but equally determined not to submit any longer to being a colony of any other government. What they would like best of all would be a Filipino republic with an American protectorate, for none realize their inability more clearly than they to maintain a republic without pro- tection of some stronger power. Though they would prefer protec- tion from America, they would accept it from any government save the Spanish. Aguinaldo has not a universal following among the Filipinos. Though he is undoubtedly the most popular leader there is at present among the Filipinos, there are many of the wealthiest, most promi- nent, and most influential Filipino citizens who do not follow him and would not vote for him as president of their own free will and TREATY OP PEACE. 381 accord. The native population of Manila are generally opposed to insurrectionists. A number of the rich and prominent Filipino citizens have told me that if the United States would govern this country for one year Agui- naldo's following would so dwindle that he would have no army left. All the people except the Spaniards, foreign residents and natives alike, feel that a native government would be better than the contin- uation of Spanish rule; and I guess it would, for nothing could possi- bly be worse than the Spanish regime as it has long existed here. There is a very respectable and considerable number of Spaniards who openly condemn the corruption that has existed under Spanish dominion, and doubtless many more would so express themselves if they dared. Aguinaldo has recently sent all of his adjutants (eight in number) into the city and assigned them regular districts, in which they are expected to observe for the purpose of preventing interference with citizens by members of the insurrectionary forces. He is anxious to maintain the best appearance and credit for his waning cause. It is openly asserted by many of his sympathizers that some of his agents are collecting subscriptions with a view of running away into the mountains with sulficient cash to maintain themselves in ease. No one is better aware of all these facts than Aguinaldo himself, and realizing that he was losing instead of gaining ground he has recently called into counsel a number of prominent and wealthy Filipinos, who have never allied themselves with his cause and at least one of whom has fought in the trenches against him within the past month. From among these men he has organized a committee to take charge in the city of Manila of all affairs affecting his cause and the good of the people. Few of these men are really favorable to a Filipino gov- ernment, and all those who have much property at stake are praying that the Americans will continue in the country; so are all the for- eign residents, except the Spanish. In an effort to catalogue and describe the principal leaders among Aguinaldo's following I have arrived at the following conclusions, which are believed to be practically correct : Aguinaldo. — Honest, sincere, and poor, not well educated, but a natural leader of men, with considerable shrewdness and ability; has the power of creating among the people confidence in himself, and is undoubtedly a very popular man, highly respected by all; but there are many better educated and richer natives who do not think he has sufficient education or experience to be a suitable president. He was a "little governor" of a small to^vn in one of the provinces. It is also said that he was a school teacher, but I have been unable to verify this assertion. There is no secretary of state, the place being kept open for one Cayetano S. Arellano, a prominent native citizen who is said to be the best lawyer and best man among the native prominent men. He is now in Pagsanjan, and has been repeatedly sent for but does not return, stating as an excuse that he can not get through Santa Cruz, which is held by the Spanish. He is an avowed annexationist, and does not believe the Filipino people sufficiently advanced in the arts and laws of civilization to govern themselves. Baldomero Aguinaldo, a first cousin of Don Emilio, is secretary of war, and is a swelled dunce, and was once a schoolmaster. Mariano Trias, an educated, honest man of mediocre capacity, is secretary of the treasury. He was the vice-president of a former revo- 382 TREATY OF PEACE. lution, and of all the insurgent leaders he stands next to Aguinaldo in popularity with the people. Leandro Y. Barra, a lawyer and good, honest man, is secretary of the interior. One Estefan de la Rama, a rich and educated man, who speaks English, is commandante de marina, or commander in chief of the navy. He is reported honest and capable. Aguinaldo's interpreter and secretary is one Escamilla, a good lin- guist, speaking Latin, French, Spanish, and English — Spanish fluently and English well, to my personal knowledge. He was a teacher of the piano in Hongkong, and is one of the best interpreters I have ever seen. One Malabini, a student of law and notary public, honest, but not especially talented, is one of his councilors. There is a prominent and wealthy citizen of this city who is also a councilor, but I prefer not to mention his name. He is an avowed annexationist, and sincerely hopes the Americans may remain here. Don Felipe Agoncillo is a highly respected lawj^er, and has for some time been the Filipino agent in Hongkong. I understand it is he who has been designated by Aguinaldo to go to Paris and America to repre- sent the insurgent cause. C. Sandico, a skilled and well-educated machinist, who speaks English quite well, is a prominent man, and coadjutor of Aguinaldo. His present commission is to appear on behalf of political prisoners before the officer charged with investigating such cases. He has been generally useful to Aguinaldo as a delegate and negotiator with Americans. Lieut. Gen. Emiliano Riego De Dios, the military governor of Cavite, is said to be an honest man, but with little education. Major- General Ricati, in command of operations along the southern zone of trenches, appears and is said to be a well-meaning, honest man, with a fair education. Maj. Gen. Panteleon Garcia, in command of operations along the northern zone, is not educated very well, but is an able, honest, polite, and agreeable man, who has been a schoolmaster of the primary grade. Brig. Gen. Pio Del Pilar, a vicious, uneducated ignoramus and highway robber. General Estrella, commanding the military forces in Cavite, has the credit of being an honest man with little education. Brigadier- General Mascardo, fairly educated and honest, but pos- sesses little ability. Gen. Gregorio Del Pilar is young, well educated, and honest, but with little experience. He belongs to a wealthy family of Nueva Ecija. General Noriel, an honest, fairly educated, well-meaning, reasonable, and agreeable fellow, who has done good service and gained the repu- tation of a good soldier. Colonel Montenegro, a very conciliatory fellow to meet. Young, small, and well educated. Speaks French, English, and Spanish, the latter fluently; the others very well. He is a considerable of a "talk a heap." Is "kinder" honest and was a clerk in Lalla's hotel, where he received his lessons in honesty. There are other leaders of lesser grade who it is hardly necessary to mention here. Aguinaldo has many adjutants, most of whom are young, smart, and well educated. In fact nearly all of the adjutants TREATY OF PEACE. 383 of all the generals belong to the jeunesse doree Filipino, in whom insurrectionery ideas seem to breed spontaneously. They are all bright, ambitious, active, and well educated. Among them is one Captain Arevela, Noriel's adjutant, who is a dentist, having learned his profession from an American, wlio also taught him very good English. He has always possessed great partiality for Americans and it is thought has impressed this partiality upon his chief, Noriel, who on this account has been not only perfectly willing but strongly desirous of doing anything the Americans wished. In conclusion, I might add that I have met no one cognizant of the conditions now existing in these islands and in Spain who believes that Spain can ever again bring the Philippine Islands under subjec- tion to its Government. Very respectfully, J. F. Bell, Major of Engineers, in Charge. U. S. Naval Force on Asiatic Station, Flagship Baltimore, Manila, Philippine Islands, August 29, 1898. Sir: Referring to the Department's telegram of the 28th instant, I have the honor to transmit by the hand of Brig, Gen. F. V. Greene, U. S. v., the following views and information upon the subject of the Philippines. A copy of this communication is also given to Major- General Merritt. The most important islands of the Philippines are Luzon, Panay, Cebu, Negros, Leyte, and Mindanao. The others, owing either to the character of the inhabitants, the limited amount of civilization, or the almost entire absence of cultivated land, may be neglected in any con- sideration of the relative importance or desirability of these islands, especially those of the southern group, which are almost wholly given over to savages. Luzon is in almost all respects the most desirable of these islands, and therefore the one to retain. In it is situated Manila, the most important commercial as well as the most populous port of all the islands — a port that in our hands would soon become one of the first ports of the world. Not only is tobacco produced in large quantities, but all the tobacco of fine quality gro^vn in the Philippines comes from the northern provinces of this island. The interior has as yet not been developed. There is but one short railroad, from Manila to Dagupan* and no highways, so that almost all the commerce is carried on by water. Were railroads and highways built — and labor is very cheap — there is little doubt that this island would rapidly increase in productive- ness and wealth. The population of Luzon is reported to be some- thing over 3,000,000, mostly natives. These are gentle, docile, and, under just laws and with the benefits of popular education, would soon make good citizens. In a telegram sent to the Department on June 23 I expressed the opinion that "these people are far superior in their intelligence and more capable of self-government than the natives of Cuba, and I am familiar with both races." Further intercourse with them has confirmed me in this opinion. As Luzon is the farthest north of the large islands, its climate is naturally the most temperate. In this connection it may be men- 384 TREATY OF PEACE. tioned that out of a force of over 2,000 on the ships of my squadron the number of men on the sick list at any time has not exceeded forty, nor has there been any considerable sickness among our troops on shore, though they were much exposed for three weeks in the trenches during the rainy season. As a matter of fact, Manila is far from being an unhealthy city, and the climate is as fine as that of any place in the tropics. About 60 miles from Manila and to the northward and westward is Subig Bay, decidedly the best harbor in the Philippines, having no equal as a coaling station or naval and military base. The entrances are narrow, the shores bold, the water deep, the bay landlocked, easily defended from attack by sea or land, and the fresh-water supply ample. As it is just off the trade route between Manila and China and Japan, it strategically commands Manila. It is there that the Spanish Government had planned to place its prin- cipal naval arsenal in the East. Already a great deal of money has been expended, many buildings erected, and much work done. A contract has been made with an English company to construct a float- ing dock of 12,000 tons capacity; some of the material has been delivered and payments made. The arsenal is on the south side of the harbor, at the village of Olongapo. It is expected that a connection will be made with the railroad from Manila to Dagupan, thus putting Subig in easy reach of Manila. The principal naval station in the Philippines is now at Cavite, in Manila Bay. It has very fair workshops for light work and ways for vessels of less than 1,000 tons. But it is capable of little expan- sion, and the small depth of water precludes the building of dry docks for large ships, or even the use of floating docks of much capacity. Luzon has other decided advantages both in a commercial and mili- tary sense. It is nearest the great centers of trade in the far East, such as Hongkong, Canton, Shanghai, Pekin, Nagasaki, and Yoko- hama, and nearest the trade routes from the United States and Hono- lulu to those centers; consequently its influence would be greater if held by us. It also commands San Bernadine Strait, the principal water route through the Philippines from east to west. From all the above facts it seems patent that Luzon is by far the most valuable island in the group, whether considered from a com- mercial or military standpoint. Panay, Cebu, Negros, and Leyte are very thickly populated and well cultivated. In these islands the natives are conceded to be the best educated and furthest advanced in civilization. In Panay is situated Iloilo, the second commercial port of the Phil- ippines and the center of the sugar trade. It has a good harbor, with two entrances, and one that has great strategic importance. Cebu, the third commercial port, in the island of the same name, has a harbor much like that of Iloilo. From the best information obtainable it appears that the Philip- pines contain varied and valuable mineral resources, as well as admi- rable timber. I have the honor to be, very respectfully, George Dewey, Rear- Admiral, United States Navy, Commanding United States Naval Forces on Asiatic Station, The Secretary op the Navy, Washington, D. G, treaty op peace. 385 Headquarters Department of the Pacific, Manila, Philippine Islands, August 29, 1898. Maj. Gen, Wesley Merritt, U. S. A., Military Governor, Manila, Philippine Islands. Sir: In compliance with your order of to-day I submit the following report : June 1, in compliance with Special Orders, No. 119, War Depart- ment, I reported to you in person at San Francisco, and was verbally notified that you would not assign me to duty with any of the troops at that place, and that when you arrived in the Philippines I would act as your legal adviser. That meanwhile I was to make such prep- aration as I could to properly discharge such duty. . June 13 I was verbally directed by you to accompany the second detachment of the Philippine expeditionary forces, and on said day received the following letter: [Headquarters United States Expeditionary Forces and Department of the Pacific] San Francisco, Cal., June 13, 1898. Lieut. Col. Charles L. Jewett, Judge- Advocate, United States Volunteers, San Francisco, Cal. Sir: The Commanding General directs you to accompany the commanding gen- eral of the forces en route to the Philippine Islands in the capacity of legal adviser, and requests you to be governed by verbal instructions heretofore given you. Very respectfully, J. B. Babcock, Adjutant-General. I arrived at Cavite, Luzon, July 16, 1898, and remained there, mak- ing my headquarters in the house of the commandante of Cavite Arsenal, which had been reserved for your headquarters ashore, until the surrender of Manila. Upon your arrival I reported orally to you on the steamer Newport, and by your direction remained in Cavite, pursuing the line of work marked out in your original instructions in San Francisco. Four weeks were thus employed in the investigation of the political and social condition of the people of that territory, which, until the surrender of Manila, was accessible. Since the surrender of Manila I have continued to prosecute the investigation among the leading business and financial residents of Manila, principally Europeans. SOURCES FROM WHICH INFORMATION WAS SOUGHT. First, From Rear- Admiral Dewey, who cheerfully afforded full information as to his own relations to the people of the adjacent ter- ritory, and his own transactions with and treatment of them since the day he destroyed the Spanish fleet. Second. Information furnished by General Anderson in the shape of letters, documents, proclamations, and communications from the insurgent leaders, and interviews with them. Third. Daily association with the native people, and almost daily association and contact with officers and leaders of the insurgent forces in their barracks, official headquarters in Cavite, and through social intercourse in the homes of some of them. I was frequently at the house of Don Felipe Beuncamino, near Cavite, where I met a number of persons selected for military or civil positions under the proposed government which Aguinaldo claimed to have established. One of the most intelligent and satisfactory of these was Seiior Ibari, selected by Aguinaldo's alleged government as minister of the interior. T P 25 386 TREATY OF PEACE. Fourth. Observation, conversation with, and investigation of cases of the prisoners held by the insurgents for alleged political offenses, and also military prisoners held by the same or our own forces in Cavite. Fifth, Daily communication with the native people engaged in busi- ness or in service, investigating their habits, customs, and questioning, through an interpreter, as to the reason of the dissatisfaction of the native people and Mestizos with the Spanish Government. Sixth. General observation, as above stated, intercourse, inquiry, and investigation among the European residents of Manila since the surrender. From the foregoing investigation I have reached the following con- clusions : 1. The mass of the people are docile and well disposed, and would cheerfully submit to any government that without insolence or oppres- sion would firmly control and intelligently direct them. 2. The rebellion against the authorities of Spain was originally only an outbreak against the abuses and irritations, the agents and instru- ments of that government, and did not include any well-defined notion of independent national existence. 3. The people are not now fitted for local self-government or citizen- ship as those terms are used and understood in the United States. 4. Spain can not anywhere in the near future discharge the duty of government toward life and property in the island of Luzon. 5. The insurrectionary government, so called, could not sustain itself, even in this island. 6. The form of government maintained in the Territories of the United States, prior to their being admitted as States of the Union, is not practicable here at the present time. Very respectfully, Charles L. Jewett, Lieutenant- Colonel, Judge- Advocate, Eighth Army Corps. Manila, August 29, 1898. The future of the Philippine Islands is an eager and most interest- ing question ; and if the United States does not take these islands under their protection, the country will be utterly ruined and all the foreign merchants will leave these islands. The retention of the island of Luzon only is not enough, and only a half measure, and the United States must take all or nothing. If the south of the Philippines remains in the hands of Spain, the insur- gents will attack these islands and they will be in a constant revolt, exactly as happened in Cuba, and the United States will have a sec- ond edition of what has happened already, and will prepare a sec- war for the same reasons. Spain will always remain as she is now. She will even be exactly the same under any form of government. The numerous empleados (officeholders) will always be the plague of all the ministers and always want lucrative posts with a high pay. They will never admit that it would be better for them and their country to work. As the positions of these empleados (officeholders) are very uncertain, their only object is, as soon as they occupy their posts, to make as much money as they can. Even those who occupy the very highest posts in the Philippines only attend to their own fortune and hardly pay atten- tion to public affairs. As they give the example of a most corrupt TREATY OF PEACE. 387 administration, they are unable to prevent their subordinates to do the same. The justice is likewise mismanaged, and when the accused does not bribe the judges they will leave them in jail for years with- out paying the slightest attention to these unfortunates, and some of these prisoners have been in jail more than ten years. The monks, more united, have always taken advantage of the troubled state of affairs and offered their protection to those who con- sented in allowing the money of the government to go in their hands. They exacted all the money that they could of the Indians, and the Spanish governors protected openly these extortions. Such state of things exasperated the Filipinos, and those who suffered the most began the rebellion with a fury that astonished everybody. The rebellion broke out from the lower classes, and they still pre- dominate in the actual rebellion. Even the chiefs are ancient tenants of the monks. The rebellion has no committee or representatives in the United States, as the Cubans. This proves that those who revolted only act as mechanics and not as an intellectual people. Those who are in Hongkong, and represent there the revolution, went there as fugitives to escape from Manila, and later on they formed a meet- ing, and no serious man will admit that they are leading men of the revolution. Their names are not even known in Manila. The Indians are good soldiers, and suffer very little of the war. They can stay for days in the swamps, or can make a long march in this'hot climate without injury. White men can not stand it, and it must be recognized that if the Indians are very poor leaders in poli- tics they are good enough soldiers to be taken in good consideration. Since the Americans arrived in the Philippines a new period seems to take place, and many members of the upper classes of the Mestizos appeared amongst the rebels, and since then it has been possible to discuss some matters and to demonstrate to them that if they wanted to be taken into consideration that they must act as civilized people, and not retain as prisoners private citizens, women, and children, and drop many abuses that they commit exactly as the Spaniards have done and taught them. During the blockade of Manila many promi- nent families^of Mestizos preferred to take refuge amongst the insur- gents rather than stay at the mercy of the Spanish authorities in Manila, whose arbitrary acts are too well known. There is actually in Europe and Paris an important colony of Fili- pinos belonging to the leading families of Manila, and these appear to be actually^'the representatives of the rebels.. The principal of them pretended, however, that he never rebelled, and claimed his properties seized by the Spanish Government. He bribed the judges, and they publicly recognized that he never was a rebel, and restored his properties. Now he is the chief representative of the rebels. His name is P. P. Roxas. This duplicity is not much in his favor, but it reveals the character of the Indians or Mestizos, and in all their acts it will be remarked that they never are sincere. Money is what misses the most to the rebellion, and this leads the rebels to many unlawful acts. Until the present time most all the money has been raised from the lower classes. The higher classes gave very little, and these are very unwilling to facilitate funds. This class is composed entirely of usurers and pawnees. All the pawn- shops and gambling houses belong to the principal Mestizos families. There is not one family free of that stigma. This proves enough the morality of them, and what can be expected of them. They surely will not risk their capital in the rebellion, because they are 388 TREATY OF PEACE. not sure enoiigli that they will be repaid with interest. They do not care a snap for tlie country, and many told me that they would be glad to see the United States take these islands under their protection and put an end to the constant appeal of funds from the rebels. This was said to me by Bemito Legarda, a rich Mestizo, who was with Aguiualdo in Bacoor and acted as counsel, and this deceived him. In the plantations belonging to the rich families of Mestizos or Indians, the workmen are treated very inhumanly. If they do not work quick enough they treat them exactly as slaves were treated in South America. The most common punishment is to lash their backs with a thin bamboo; 25 lashes is the most ordinary punishment. I saw some receive 100 lashes in Negros Island, in the estate of Aniceto Lacson, an Indian. One hundred and twenty-five lashes were given to a man in Albay (south of Luzon) by the Indian mayor of Albay. The same man threatened to give 100 lashes to one of my workmen, but his wife warned me and I stopped it. Since then I stopped always this treat- ment when I happened to know it, and more than once had rows about it with the Spanish governor of the province, Mr. Valdes. This was in 1892, He told me that he would put me in prison if I interfered with the authorities. The custom all over the Philippines is to engage men and to pay for them their personal papers. This is the beginning of a debt that will make a slave of a man for each dollar advanced ; an interest of 5 cents is added. At the slightest fault the man is fined and his debt grows. Whenever he needs money to baptize a baby or bury a parent the planter pays the fees direct to the curate, and always adds to the small sum advanced two or three dollars and the 5 cents for interest. This last way is the most heavy yoke. At the end of the year he owes his master $50 or $60, and as long as he does not pay his debt he is considered as a slave, and if he runs away he will be arrested and returned to his master and is awfully lashed. When an estate is sold, nearly always the papers are accompanied with a list of the debtors. The buyer makes a bargain and buys the debts, and those who owe the money become his slaves. This is about the same as buying the slaves with a plantation. Now the Mestizos and Indians are the hardest masters, and if ever they dom- inate they will be most despotical to the Indians. The Spanish Gov- ernment always tolerated this, and even protected those who used to treat the men as slaves and allowed the pirates to abuse the poor Indians. Therefore it is easy to show the Indian that it would be much better for him to be ruled by Americans than by his own coun- trymen. Whatever may be the education of the Mestizos they always will behave just the same as the Indians, from whom they descend. They will eat with their hands, go barefooted, and sit on the ground. There is an enormous difference between them and a white man. In the assemblies of the chiefs of the rebels and of the Mestizos of Manila, even when very serious matters were discussed, they used to joke one with the other and give his neighbor a nip and a laugh and behave as monkeys would do. This happened the 21st of June in tli© house of P. Paterno in Manila, and in Cavite in the house of Ozorio on the 3d of August. The Chinese Mestizos join the sordidness of the Indian to the craft- iness of the Chinaman, and give the type of the rapacious Pawnee. The Spanish Mestizo joins the presumption of the Spaniard with the duplicity of the Indian, and give the type of the . This is enough, I believe, to give a very slight idea of what the TREATY OF PEACE. 389 Filipinos are and to demonstrate that they belong to an inferior race, unfitted to rule a country, and with such individuals distinguished rules must not be expected. Of course the education and example given by the monks and Span- iards is the principal cause, but even then they are worse than their masters, and that proves their inferiority, and therefore it is more than time that the United States should have pity on these people and show them better. The Spaniards, with their accustomed carelessness, are unable to manage properly the Philippines, and these rich islands, which con- tain gold, iron, coal, etc., and on which splendid forests are aban- doned, there is only one very little railway, hardly some good bridges, and no harbors. Nothing has been done with the $15,000,000 that these islands give annually. The foreign merchants in Manila are constantly robbed by the custom-house officers, and no protection is given to them. If a mer- chant makes a claim, he will be bothered all the year round. The United States can assure a steady government in these islands, and in their hands the country will increase in wealth, and will, in a short time, be able to return to the United States the money laid out; and it would be certainly much cheaper and more humane to take the entire Philippines than to keep only part of it and to run the risk of a second war with Spain for the very same reason that provoked the present conflict. It is a duty of the United States to do so and to pro- tect the entire country. Everybody in the Philippines begs them for protection ; even the Spanish merchants. Now, it is to be hoped that the United States will not deceive those who anxiously await the result of the meeting in Paris. The Indians do not desire independence. They know that they are not strong enough. They trust the United States, and they know that they will be treated rightly. The present rebellion only represents a half per cent of the inhabitants, and it would not be right to oblige 6,000,000 inhabitants to submit to 30,000 rebels. Luzon is only partly held by them, and it is not to be expected that a civilized nation will make them present with the rest of the island, which is hostile to the tagals of Luzon. The Spanish officers refuse to fight for the sake of the priests, and if the Spanish Government should retain the Philip- pines their soldiers will all fall prisoners in the hands of the Indians in the same way as they did already, and this is because the army is sick of war without result, and only to put the country at the mercy of the rapacious empleados and luxurious monks. The monks know that they are no more wanted in the Philippines, and they asked me to help them to go away as soon as possible, and it is principally for them that I asked for the transports to the United States Government, and to send them to Hongkong. The Indians will be delighted to see them go, and will be grateful to the United States. If some chiefs of the rebellion will be a little disappointed in their personal pride, they will be convinced that it is better for them to submit in any case, for most of these chiefs prefer American authority, and they are very anxious to know the result of the meeting of Paris. If the United States keeps the islands, they will remain quiet, but if the Spanish authority is restored in the islands, or part of them, they will attack the Spaniards and be in a constant revolt. This has been told to me by Aguinaldo, Landico, Ziroma, Mabim, and other principal chiefs, and repeated on Sunday, 28th of August. Very respectfully, Andre. 390 TREATY OF PEACE. Headquarteks First Brigade, United States Expeditionary Forces, Cavite Arsenal, Philippine Islands, July 4-, 1898. Sefior Don Emilio Aguinaldo, Commanding Philippine Forces, Cavite, Luzon. General : I have the honor to inform you that the United States of America, whose land forces I have the honor to command in this vicinity, being at war with the Kingdom of Spain, has entire sympa- thy and most friendly sentiments for the native people of the Philip- pine Islands. For these reasons I desire to have the most amicable relations with you, and to have you and your people cooperate with us in military- operations against the Spanish forces. In our operations it has become necessary for us to occupy the town of Cavite as a base of operations. In doing this, I do not wish to interfere with your residence here and the exercise by yourself and other native citizens of aU functions and privileges not inconsistent with military rule. I would be pleased to be informed at once of any misconduct of sol- diers under my command, as it is the intention of my Government to maintain order, and to treat all citizens with justice, courtesy, and kindness. I have therefore the honor to ask your excellency to instruct your officials not to interfere with my officers in the performance of their duties and not to assume that they can not visit Cavite without per- mission. Assuring you again of my most friendly sentiment and distinguished consideration, I am, with all respect, Thomas M. Anderson, Brigadier- General, U. S. Volunteers, Commanding. Brig. Gen. Thomas M. Anderson, Commanding tJie United States Volunteers. General: Interpreting the sentiments of the Philippine people, I have the honor to express to your excellency my most profound grate- fulness for the sympathy and amicable sentiments which the natives of these islands inspire the great North American nation and your excellency. I also thank most profoundly your desire of having friendly rela- tions with us, and of treating us with justice, courtesy, and kindness, which is also our constant wish to prove the same, and special satis- faction whenever occasion represents. I have already ordered my people not to interfere in the least with your officers and men, orders which I shall reiterate to prevent their being unfulfilled ; hoping that you will inform me of whatever mis- conduct that may be done by those in my command, so as to repri- mand them and correspond with your wishes. I beg of your excellency to accept in return the assurance of my most respectable consideration. I remain, respectfully, Emilio Aguinaldo. trp^-aty of peace. 391 Headquarters First Brigade, United States Expeditionary Forces, Cavite Arsenal, PliiUppine- Islands, July 6, 1898. SeSor Don E:\iiLio Aguinaldo y Famy, Commanding Philippine Forces. General: lam encouraged by the friendly sentiments expressed by your excellency in j^our welcome letter received on the 5th instant to endeavor to come to a definite understanding, which I hope will be advantageous to both. Very soon we expect a large addition to our forces, and it must be apparent to you as a military officer that we will require much more room to camp our soldiers, and also storeroom for our supplies. For this I would like to have your excellency's advice and cooperation, as you are best acquainted with the resources of this country. It must be apparent to you that we do not intend to remain here inactive, but to move promptly against our common enemy; but for a short time we must organize and land supplies and also retain a place for storing them near our fleet and transports. I am solicitous to avoid any conflict of authority which may result from having two sets of military officers exercising command in the same place. I am also anxious to avoid sickness by taking sanitary precautions. Your own medical officers have been making voluntary inspections with mine and fear epidemic disease, if the vicinity is not made clean. Would it not be well to have prisoners work to this end under the advice of the surgeons? I again renew my assurances of distinguished consideration. I am, with great resjiect, Thomas M. Anderson, Brigadie7'- General, U. S. Volunteers, Commanding. Headquarters Expeditionary Forces to the Philippine Islands, Chief Quartermaster's Office, Cavite, Philipinne Islands, July 17, 1898. Gen. Emilio Aguinaldo, Addressed. Sir: General Anderson wishes me to say that the second expedition having arrived, he expects to encamp in the vicinity of Paranaque from 5,000 to 7,000 men. To do this, supply this army and shelter, it will require certain assistance from the Filipinos in this neigh- borhood. We will want horses, buffaloes, carts, etc., for transporta- tion, bamboo for shelter, wood to cook wdth, etc. For all this we are willing to pay a fair price, but no more. We find so far that the native population are not willing to give us this assistance as promptly as required. But we must have it, and if it becomes necessary we will be compelled to send out parties to seize what we may need. We would regret very much to do this, as we are here to befriend the Filipinos. Our nation has spent millions of money to send forces here to expel the Spaniards and to give a good government to the whole people, and the return we are asking is comparatively slight. General Anderson wishes you to inform your people that we are here for their good, and that they must supply us with labor and material at the current market prices. 392 TREATY OF PEACE. We are prei)ared to purchase 500 horses at a fair price, but can not undertake to bargain for horses with each individual man. I regret very much that I am unable to see you personally, as it is of the utmost importance that these arrangements should be made as soon as possible. I will await your reply. Sam R. Jones, Major and Quartermaster, U. 8. Volunteers, Chief Quartermaster. At 3.30 p. m. July 17, General Aguinaldo and secretary called to say that two Americans assuming to be officers had called and pre- sented a letter as to which he requested a statement whether it was authorized. The following indorsement was put upon it — [First indorsement.] Headquarters First Brigade, United States Expeditionary Forces, Cavite Arsenal, Philiiypine Islaiids, July 17, 1898. The request herein made by Major Jones, chief quartermaster, was made by my direction. Thomas M. Anderson, Brigadier- General, U. S. Volunteers, Commanding. Headquarters First Brigade, United States Expeditionary Forces, Cavite Arsenal, Philippine Islands, July 19^ 1898. Senor Don Emilio Aguinaldo, Commanding General, Philippine Forces. General: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your let- ter of the 18th instant. Your offer of assistance is appreciated and your assurances of good will are most gratifying. The difficulty of collecting supplies, referred to by you, is appre- hended, and will be considered in fixing compensation. As a medium of communication with your people, we will be pleased to have you assure them that there will be no confiscation of their property, that our requisitions will be reasonable, and that a fair compensation will always be given. I remain, General, with all respect, your obedient servant, Thomas M. Anderson, Brigadier- Qerieral, U. S. Volunteers, Commanding. TREATY OF PEACE. 393 llEADQUAllTERS FiRST BRIGADE, United States Expeditionary Forces, Cavite Arsenal, Philippine Islands, July 19, 1898. Seiior Don Emilio Aguinaldo, Commanding General, Philippine Forces. General: The bearer, Maj. J. F. Bell, U. S. A., was sent by Maj. Gen. Wesley Merritt, XJ. S. A., to collect for hira, by the time of his personal arrival, certain information concerning the strength and positions of the enemy and concerning the topography of the country surrounding Manila. I would be obliged if you would permit him to see your maps and place at his disposal any information you may have on the above subjects, and also give him a letter or pass addressed to your subor- dinates which will authorize them to furnish him any information they can on these subjects, and to facilitate his passage along the lines upon a reconnoissance around Manila on which I propose to send him. I remain, with great respect, your obedient servant, Thomas M. Anderson, Brigadier- General, U. S. Volunteers, Commanding. Headquarters, First Brigade, United States Expeditionary Forces. Cavite Arsenal, P. I., July 21, 1898. Senor Don Emilio Aguinaldo, Commanding General, Philippine Forces. General : I have the honor to request that passes and such other assistance as practicable be given to the bearer, Lieut. E. J. Bryan, and party, who are making a reconnoissance of the surrounding country. Thanking you for assistance given on previous occasions, I remain, with great respect, your obedient servant, Thomas M. Anderson, Brigadier-General, U. S. Volunteers, Commanding. Headquarters First Brigade, United States Expeditionary Forces, Cavite Arsenal, July 22, 1898. Senor Don Emilio Aguinaldo, Commanding General Philippine Forces. General : Replying to your excellency's letter in relation to the property of Don Antonio Osorio, I have the honor to state that if he transferred the property to you personally, before the capture of Cavite by our forces, it will give me great pleasure to transfer the property in question to you. If, however, the property was not transferred to your excellency until after the capture of Cavite, the property would appear to have been public Spanish property or con- traband of war and subject to capture. This property will be held subject to investigation, but Don Osorio must make his claim and offer his proof to the commanding officer of the American Army. 394 TREATY OF PEACE. I observe that your excellency has announced yourself as a dictator and proclaimed martial law. As I am here simply in a military capac- ity, I have no authority to recognize this assumj^tion. I have no orders from my Government on the subject; and so far as I can ascertain your independent status has not been recognized by any foreign power. Your fine intellect must perceive that, happy as I am to see you fighting so bravely and successfully against a common enemy, I can not, without orders, recognize your civil authority. I remain, with great respect, Thomas M. Anderson, Brigadier- General, U. 8. Volunteers , Commanding. Headquarters First Brigade, United States Expeditionary Forces, Cavite Arsenal, Philippine Islands, July 2S, 1898. Senor Don Emilo Aguinaldo, Commanding Philippine Forces. General: When I came here three weeks ago I requested your excellency to give what assistance you could to procure means of trans- portation for the American army, as it was to fight in the cause of your people. So far we have received no response. As you represent your people, I now have the honor to make requi- sition on you for 500 horses and 50 oxen and ox carts. If you can not secure these, I will have to pass you and make requisition directly on the people. I beg leave to request an answer at your earliest convenience. i remain, with great respect, Thomas M. Anderson, Brigadier- General, U. 8. Volunteers, Commanding. ITranslation.] Bacoor, July S4, 1898. Senor Don Thomas M. Anderson, Brigadier- General, Commanding Expeditionary Forces of the United 8tates. General: In answer to the letter of your excellency, dated the 22d of the current month, I have the honor to manifest to you the fol- lowing: That even supposing that the effects existing in the storehouse of Don Antonio Osorio were subject to capture, when I established myself in the plaza (town) of Kavite, Admiral Dewey authorized me to dispose of everything I might find in the same, including the arms which the Spanish left in the arsenal. But I was aware that the said effects belonged to the personal property of a Filipino, who traded in them by virtue of the payment of a contribution to the Spanish Government. I would not have touched them if the owner had not placed them at my disposition for the purposes of the war. I came from Hongkong to prevent my countrymen from making common cause with the Spanish against the North Americans, pledg- ing before my word to Admiral Dewey to not give place [to allow] to any internal discord, because, [being] a judge of their desires, I had TREATY OF PEACE. 395 the strong convictions that I would succeed in both objects, establish- ing a government according to their desires. Thus it is that in the beginning I proclaimed the dictatorship, and afterwards when some of the provinces had already liberated them- selves from Spanish domination, I established a revolutionary gov- ernment that to-day exists, giving it a democratic and popular char- acter as far as the abnormal circumstances of war permitted, in order that they [the provinces] might be justly represented, and adminis- tered to their satisfaction. It is true that my government has not been acknowledged by any of the foreign powers, but we expected that the great North American nation, which struggled first for its independence, and afterwards for the abolition of slavery, and is now actually struggling for the independence of Cuba, would look upon it with greater benevolence than any other nation. Because of this we have always acknowledged the right of preference to our gratitude. Debtor to the generositj'' of the North Americans, and to the favors we have received througli Admiral Dewey, and (being) more desirous than any other person of preventing any conflict which would have as a result foreign intervention, which must be extremely i)rejudicial, not alone to my nation but also to that of your excellency, I consider it my duty to advise you of the undesirability of disembarking North American troops in the places conquered by the Filipinos from the Spanish, without previous notice to this government, because as no formal agreement yet exists between the two nations the Philippine people might consider the occupation of its territories by North American troops as a violation of its rights. I comprehend that without the destruction of the Spanish squadron the Philippine revolution would not have advanced so rapidly. Be- cause of this I take the liberty of indicating to your excellency the necessity that, before disembarking, you should communicate in writ- ing to this government the places that are to be occupied and also the object of the occupation, that the people may be advised in due form and [thus] prevent the commission of any transgression against friend- ship. I can answer for my people, because they have given me evident proofs of their absolute confidence in my government, but I can not answer for that which another nation whose friendship is not well guaranteed might inspire in it [the people] ; and it is certain that I do this not as a menace, but as a further proof of the true and sincere friendship which I have always professed for the North American people, in the complete security that it will find itself comx3letely dentified with our cause of liberty. With the greatest respect and consideration, Emilio Aguinaldo. [Translation.] Bacood, July 2Jf, 1898. Senor Don Thomas M. Anderson, Brigadier- General, Commander of the Expeditionary Forces of the United States. General : Replying to your letter of yesterday, I have the honor to manifest to your excellency that I am surprised beyond measure at that which you say to me in it, lamenting the nonreeeipt of any response relative to the needs (or aids) that you have asked of me in 396 TREATY OF PEACE. the way of horses, buffaloes, and carts, because I replied in a precise manner, through the bearer, that I was disposed to give convenient orders whenever you advised me of the number of these with due anticipation (notice). I have circulated orders in the provinces in the proximity that in the shortest time possible horses be brought for sale, but I can not assure your excellency that we have the number of 500 that is needed, because horses are not abundant in these vicinities, owing to deaths caused by epizootic diseases in January and March last. Whenever we have them united (or collected), I shall have the pleas- ure to advise your excellency. I have also ordered to be placed at my disposal 50 carts that I shall place at your disposition whenever necessary, always (premising) that you afford rae a previous advice of four days in anticipation. Remaining, with great respect, Emilio Aguinaldo. Headquarters First Brigade, United States Expeditionary Forces, Cavite Arsenal, Philippine Islands, July 27, 1898. Seiior Don Emilio Aguinaldo, Commanding Philippine Forces. General: Referring to your letter of the 24th instant, relative to the alleged property of Don Antonio Osorio, I have the honor to inform you that it has been forwarded to Maj. Gen. Wesley Merritt, com- manding United States Expeditionary Forces, for his action. Very respectfully, Thomas M. Anderson, Brigadier- General, U. S. Volunteers, Commanding, Headquarters First Brigade, United States Expeditionary Forces, Cavite Arsenal, Philippine Islands, July 2 If., 1898. Seiior Don Emilio Aguinaldo, Commanding Philippine Forces. General: Your favor of the 26th ultimo in relation to requisitions for cattle, horses, etc., is satisfactory. I regret that there should have been any misunderstanding about it. The peoj)le to whom we applied even for the hiring of caramates, etc. , told our people that they had orders to supply nothing except by your orders. I am pleased to think that this was a misapprehension on their part. We are not so unreasonable as to suppose that all we want can be supplied at once or from one place. We may even have to send to other islands. Our quartermaster will establish a depot near the American camp, where he will receive and pay for supplies, and from which he will send out parties to whatever places your excel- lency will indicate to transact business with your people. With great regard, your obedient servant, Thomas M. Anderson, Brigadier- General, U. S. Volunteers, Commanding. treaty of peace. 397 Headquarters First Brigade, United States Expeditionary Forces, Cavite Arsenal, Philippine Islands, July 27, 1898. Adjutant-General, United States Expeditionary Forces, Manila Bay, Philippine Islands. Sir : I have the honor to transmit to you the last letter I received from the insurgent chief, Aguinaldo, dated Bacood, July 24, 1898. This letter has not been answered by me. My whole correspondence with him is also inclosed. Very respectfully^ Thomas M. Anderson, Brigadier- General, U. S. Volunteers, Commanding. Headquarters First Brigade, United States Expeditionary Forces, Cavite Arsenal, Philippine Islands, July 14-, 1898. Seuor Don Emilio Aguinaldo, Commanding Philippine Forces. General : Wishing to get complete information of the approaches to Manila in every direction, I therefore have the honor to request that you give my officers all possible assistance in making recon- noissance to the lines and approaches, and that j^ou favor them with your advice. Officers coming from me will have a note to that effect. With gTeat respect, Thomas M. Anderson, Brigadier- General, U. S. Volunteers, Commanding. August 1, 1898. Mr. Williams. Dear Sir and Distinguished Friend : Impressed by the note of July 8 past, I can only confess that the people of North America have excited, and now excite, the universal admiration not only for the grade of progress and culture to which they have arrived in a very short time, but also for their political constitution, so admirable and inimitable, and for the generosity, honesty, and industry of the men of the Government who have so far ruled the destinies of that great people without an equal in history. Above all, I thank you sincerely for the kind words which you express in your note quoted above, and I congratulate you with all sincerity on the acuteness and ingenuity which you have displaj^ed in it in painting in an admirable manner the benefits which, especially for me and my leaders, and, in general, for all my compatriots, would be secured by the union of these islands with the United States of America. Ah ! that picture, so happy and so finished, is capable of fascinating not only the dreamy imagination of the impressionable Oriental, but also the cold and calculating thoughts of the sons of the North. This is not saying that I am not of your opinion. I am fully per- suaded that the Filipinos will arrive at the height of happiness and glory if in future they can show with raised heads the rights which to- 398 TREATY OF PP^ACE. day are shown by the free citizens of North America. These islands will be in effect one of the richest and pleasantest countries of the globe if the capital and industry of North Americans come to develop the soil. You say all this and yet more will result from annexing ourselves to your people, and I also believe the same since you are my friend and the friend of the Filipinos and have said it. But ^hy should we say it? Will my people believe it? I, with true knowledge of the character and habits of these people, do not dare assure you of it, since I have only wished to establish a government in order that none of those powers which 3^ou call ambi- tious should be able to take advantage of our good faith, as has been done in the past by the Spaniards. I have done what they desire, establishing a government in order that nothing important may be done without consulting fully their sovereign will, not only because it was my duty, but also because acting in any other manner they would fail to recognize me as the interpreter of their aspirations and would punish me as a traitor, replacing me by another more careful of his own honor and dignity. I have said always, and I now repeat, that we recognize the right of the North Americans to our gratitude, for \ve do not forget for a moment the favors which we have received and are now receiving, but however great those favors may be it is not possible for me to remove the distrust of my compatriots. These say that if the object of the United States is to annex these islands, why not recognize the government established in them in order in that manner to join with it the same as by annexation? Why do not the American generals operate in conjunction with the Filipino generals and, uniting the forces, render the end more decisive? Is it intended, indeed, to carry out«annexation against the wish of these people, distorting the legal sense of that word? If the revolu- tionary government is the genuine representative by right and deed of the Filipino people, as we have proved when necessary, why is it wished to oppress instead of gaining their confidence and friendship? It is useless for me to represent to my compatriots the favors received through Admiral Dewey, for they assert that up to the present the American forces have shown not. an active, only a passive cooperation, from which they suppose that the intention of these forces are not for the best. They assert, besides, that it is possible to suppose that I was brought from Hongkong to assure those forces by my presence that the Filipinos would not make common cause with the Spaniards, and that they have delivered to the Filipinos the. arms abandoned by the former in the Cavite Arsenal, in order to save themselves much labor, fatigue, blood, and treasure tliat a war with Spain would cost. But I do not believe these unworthy suspicions. I have full confi- dence in the generosity and philanthropy which shine in characters of gold in the history of the privileged people of the United States, and for tliat reason, invoking the friendship which you profess for me and the love which you have for my people, I pray yoa earnestly, as also the distinguished generals who represent your country in these islands, that you entreat the Government at Washington to recognize the revolutionary government of the Filipinos, and I, for my part, will labor with all my power with my people that the United States shall not repent their sentiments of humanity in coming to the aid of an oppressed people. Say to the Government at Washington that the Filipino people TREATY OF PEACE. 399 abominate savagery, that in the midst of their past misfortunes they have learned to love liberty, order, justice, and civil life, and that they are not able to lay aside their own wishes when their future lot and history are under discussion. Say also that I and my leaders know what we owe to our unfortunate country, that we know how to admire and are ready to imitate the disinterestedness, the abnegation, and the patriotism of the grand men of America, among whom stands preeminent the immortal General Washington. You and I both love the Filipinos ; both see their progress, their prosperity, and their greatness. For this wo should avoid any con- flict which would be fatal to the interests of both peoples, who should always be brothers. In this you will acquire a name in the history of humanity and an ineradicable affection in the hearts of the Filipino people. (From General Aguinaldo to Mr. Williams, United States consul.) August 13 and 14. General Anderson: My troops, who have been for so long besieging Manila, have always been promised that they could appear in it, as you know and can not deny, and for this reason and on account of the many sacrifices made of money and lives, I do not consider it prudent to issue orders to the contrary, as they might be disobeyed against my authority. Besides, I hope that you will allow the troops to enter, because we have given proofs many times of our friendship, ceding our positions at Paranaque, Pasay, Cingalon, and Mytubig. Nevertheless, if it seems best to you, and in order to enter into a frank and friendly understanding and avoid any disagreeable conflict before the eyes of the Spaniards, I will commission Don Filipe Buencamino and others, who will to-day go out from our lines to hold a conference with you, and that they will be safe during the conference. E. A. Aguinaldo. [Most urgent.] President of revolufionary government to General Anderson, Ermita. Pineda (received from Baccoor 10.50 a. m. 13th). General Anderson, Ermita: I received a telegram. My interpreter is in Cavite ; in consequence of this I have not answered till now. My troops are forced by yours, by means of threats of violence, to retire from positions taken. It is necessary, to avoid conflicts, which I should lament, that you order your troops that they avoid diificulty with mine, as until now they have conducted themselves as brothers to take Manila. I have given strict orders to my chiefs that they preserve strict respect to American forces and to aid them in case they are attacked by a common enemy. I do not doubt that the good relations and friendship which unite us will be continued if your soldiers correspond to the conduct imposed upon mine. (Communication received by General Anderson from Aguinaldo the day of the attack on Manila. ) 400 treaty of peace. Headquarters Department of the Pacific AND Eighth Army Corps, Manila, Philippine Islands, August 20, 1898. The Commanding General of the Philippine Forces. Sir: The commanding general of American forces has received a memorandum addressed to General Anderson, which purports to con- tain a statement of certain desires on the part of the Filipinos. As most of them seem to be reasonable, it gives him much pleasure to say that he agrees to the following: The forces of the Filipinos are to withdraw entirely beyond the jurisdiction of the old municipal limits, or walled city, and its suburbs — Binondo, Tondo, Santa Cruz, Quiapo, Sampaloc, San Miguel, Concepcion, Ermita, Malate, and Paco, or San Fernando dilo. The Filipinos will repair at once whatever may be needed, in order that the water may be turned on to the city, and the expenses of the repairs and the current expenses of the works will be paid by the city. The commander of the Filipinos agrees to be responsible for order and security at the pumping station. Permission for the free navigation of the Patria to entrance and exit of the port and river Pasig, and that country products for sale be admitted free of duty is granted. Free entrance and departure from the city for a,ll Filipinos with- out arms is granted. Chiefs and officers of the Filipino army may, as a matter of courtesy, wear their side arms, though this is deprecated as possibly leading to the disturbance of the quiet of the city. No pistols should be carried. The major-general having taken, for his own use, the palace at Malacanan, the request that it be turned over to the Filipinos can not be granted, and the convents at Malate, Ermita, and Paco can not be turned over and must be evacuated. The civil offices at Manila are being filled as rapidly as possible by Americans, and the com- manding general will be glad to receive recommendations for appoint- ments to offices of such Filipinos as may be considered fitted for the duties of subordinate offices. American soldiers without arms are to be allowed to pass through the Filipinos' positions outside of the city, just as the Filipinos with- out arms are permitted to enter the city. The return of the arms of the hundred and fifty men will be granted by the general in immediate command. The opening of the waterworks at once and the retirement of your soldiers from the positions now occupied within the municipal juris- diction will be sufficient notice on your part that everjihing is satis- factorily arranged on the terms of tliis letter. With the sincere hope that it may be speedily accomplished. I am, very resi^ectfully, Wesley Merritt, Major- General Commanding. Bakor, August 21, 1898. Commanding- General op the American Forces of the Pacific. Sir: The commanding-general of the Philippine forces has been favored by a letter from your excellency, dated the 20th of the present month, which contains the conditions to be accepted by the Filipinos, TREATY OF PEACE. 401 namely, that they should evacuate the places which they now hold within the suburbs of Manila. The before-mentioned letter speaks of the freu navigation of the Patria, and as no boat of this name is counted by the Filipinos, he who subscribes would be pleased to have this point made more clear. It is understood that the Filipinos desire the protection of the Amer- ican squadron, that they may have free navigation for all their boats, and free entrance to and departure from all ports which may be in pos- session of the same (squadron); but besides, in substitution of the proposed conditions, which the said letter does not mention, the Fili- pinos desire to continue in the occupation of that part of the suburbs of San Fernando de Dilao, or Paco, which is nearest the east of the bridge and stream of the same name, he who subscribes assuming responsibility for foreign interests which exist at said j)oint. Equally they desire that in consequence of a treaty of peace which may be signed between the United States of America and Spain, the Philip- pines should continue in possession of the last named, that the Ameri- can forces should turn over to the Filipinos all of the suburbs in con- sideration of the cooperation given by them in the taking of the Plaza of Manila. With these conditions and the others which are accepted in said letter, he who subscribes promises, in the name of the Filipi- nos, to evacuate the places which they now hold in the suburb; and the acceptation of the same by your excellency will be a further proof that he holds in consideration the innumerable lives sacrificed by the siege of Manila, and that he appreciates the newly arisen friendship which will be preserved at all cost. Very respectfully, Emilio Aguinaldo. [Copy of telegram from General Aguiiialdo to Major-General Merritt.] August 24, 1898. I have received notice of the death of 1 American soldier and 3 wounded. It is said that this happened by their being drunk. They fired in the air in the beginning, but afterwards fought among them- selves. General Anderson says death has been occasioned by my people, on account of which I have ordered investigation to ascertain the truth and demonstrate that the Filipinos try to be in harmony with the Americans. If I shall find any one of my people guilty, I shall order severe punishment. Yours, respectfully, Aguinaldo. Office of the Militaky Governor, Headquarters Department of the Pacific, Manila, August 24, 1898. Gen. Emilio Aguinaldo, Bakor, Philippine Islands. Sir : The commanding general of the American land forces has the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of August 21, and in replj^ to inform jon as follows: The error you speak of wliich needs clearing up as to the naviga- tion of the Patria seems to have arisen from a request on your part p T 2G 402 TREATY OF PEACE. that the Filipinos of the country should be permitted to trade freely and navigate without obstruction the streams and bay surrounding Manila. So far as the products of the country are concerned this has been acceded to, and there will be no obstruction placed by the Ameri- can land forces between the residents of the island and the city of Manila. The protection that you ask from the American squadron rests with Rear- Admiral Dewey, and it is for him to determine whether it can be granted or not. A commission of your appointment, which had an interview with the undersigned about the 15th instant, agreed that if a line were designated by a proper commission on my part, the armed Filipinos should retire beyond it. While this has been done in some instances, it has been neglected in others, and it is now desired to call your attention to the fact that the occupation of the suburbs of Manila, or any part of them, can not be acceded to by the undersigned. It has already been pointed out to you that a dual occupation of Manila was impossible in the interests of either party ; and as the troops of the United States are in possession of Manila, I must insist upon the carrjdng out of the original agreement between your commission a .d myself. I am the more insistent in this particular because recent instructions from my home Government contemplate this course. So far as any promises as to what should be done in the event of a conclusion of a treaty between the United States and Spain is con- cerned, it is utterly impossible for me, as the military representative only of the United States, to make any promises such as you request. As you have already been informed you may depend upon the good will of Americans out here and the Government of which you already know the beneficence to determine these matters in the future. This answer to your communication has been delayed by a press of business which could not very well be neglected. I thank you in the name of my country for the good will expressed toward it, and feel assured that nothing will occur to mar the friendly feeling that now exists. It is for the interests of all that the good feeling which now exists between us should be carefully fostered and maintained. Very respectfully, Wesley Merritt. [Telegram.— Reply to telegram from General Aguinaldo, dated August 84.] Malacanan, August 26^ 1898 — 8.06 a. m. General Aguinaldo, Commanding Philippine Forces, Bakor: Thank you for j'^our telegram. Am glad to learn of your intention to investigate fully. I am desirous with you that harmony should prevail, and request you always in event of trouble to communicate directly with me, as you have so wisely done this time. Merritt. Bakoor, August 27, 1898. Gen. Wesley Merritt, Manila. My Dear Sir: rhough informed by your letter of the 24th of the current month, I can not the less express my surprise at learning that you have formed the opinion that my commissioners committed them- TREATY OF PEACE. 403 selves at the conference of the 15th to the withdrawal of ray troops outside the line that you designate. I hold it is agreed and under- stood, as do the commissioners, that the evacuation by my troops of the places that they to-day occupy in the outskirts was to take place as the proposed conditions were accepted by you. Among them was one putting this agreement in writing, for this reason, as you had not accepted any of the proposals nor those which had been put in their place in my former communications. I do not believe that I have up to this time contravened the said obligations. Since I have permitted the use of water before the formal declara- tion of the treaty, you can easily see that I am disposed to sacrifice to friendship everything not greatly prejudicial to the rights of the Philippine city. I comprehend, like yourself, the inconvenience of a double occu- pation of the city of Manila and its environs, considering the condi- tions of the capitulation with the Spaniards, but you must also under •stand that without the wide blockade maintained by my forces ^^ou would have obtained possession of the ruins of the city, but neVer the surrender of the Spanish forces, who would have been able to retire to the interior towns. Now, do not make light of the aid formerly given by us to secure the capitulation mentioned. Greatly though justice may suffer, and risk- ing well-founded fears in regard to my city, I do not insist upon the retention of all the positions conquered by my forces within the environs at the cost of much bloodshed, unspeakable fatigue, and much money, I promise to withdraw them to the following line: In Malate the continuation of the highway (calzada of Singalong) as far as the bridge that unites it with this highway; from this bridge in a straight line to that of the Paco, and leaving outside the district of Zanque as far as the River Pasig; following this river and enter- ing the estuary which runs to the bridge of Aviles; from this bridge, following the highway of the same name and that of Santa Mesa, which are the dividing lines between Sampaloc and the town of Pan- dacan, to the limits of the jurisdiction of the outskirts of Sampaloc, Turzo, and Tando. But before making this withdrawal I beg that you obtain from Admiral Dewey protection for the free navigation of our boats, and grant me permission to at least insist upon the restitu- tion of the positions that we are going to give up if in the treaty of peace which is being arranged between Spain and the United States the recognition of the dominion of the former in the Philippines shall follow. I also hope that j^ou will order the entrance into the city of the American forces which are outside the line traced, as has been already agreed. I do not believe that the acceptance of the conditions proposed ^dll be prejudicial in the smallest degree to the rights of the city, since it means only the recognition of the rights of a friendly town. I am forced to insist upon the said conditions to quiet the grumblings of my chiefs and soldiers, who have exposed their lives and given of their interests during the siege of Manila. I hope that this time a spirit of justice will be manifest which is worthy of a free and admirably constituted government such as that of the United States of America. Yours, very respectfully, MEMORANDA CONCERmNG THE SITUATION IN THE PHTLIPPINES ON AUGUST 30, 1898, BY F. V. GREENE, MAJOR-GENERAL, VOLUN- TEERS, AND ACCOMPANYING PAPERS. [Washington, September 30, 1898.] INDEX. 1. The Philippine Islands: Page. (a) Area and population 404 (6) Climate 406- (c) Mineral wealth 406 id) Agriculture 406 (e) Commerce and transportation 407 (/) Revenue and expenses 409 2. Spanish troops 413 3. Spauish navy 414 4. Spanish civil administration 414 5. Insurgent troops 419 6. Insurgent civil administration 421 7. United States troops 425 8. United States Navy 425 9. United States civil administration 425 10. The future of the islands 425 THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS. (a) Area and population. — These islands, including the Ladrones, Carolines, and Palaos, which are all under the government of Manila, are variously estimated at from 1,200 to 1,800 in number. The greater portion of these are small and are of no more value than the islands off the coast of Alaska. The important islands are less than a dozen in number, and 90 per cent of the Christian population live on Luzon and the live princii)al islands of the Visayas group. The total population is somewhere between 7,000,000 and 9,000,000. This includes the wild tribes of the mountains of Luzon and of the islands in the extreme south. The last census taken by the Spanish Government was on December 31, 1887, and this stated the Christian population to be 6,000,000 (in round numbers). This is distributed as follows : Area. Popnlation. Per Hqnare mile. Lazon 44,400 4,700 2,400 3,800 1, 300 3,300 3, 426, 000 735, 000 504, 000 270, 000 245, OUO 242, 000 79 Panay 155 Le vte 71 BoW 188 Negros 73 59, 800 5, 422, 000 91 404 TREATY OF PEACE. 405 The density of poi)nlation in these six islands is nearly 50 per cent greater than in Illinois and Indiana (census of 1890), greater than in Spain, about one half as great as in France, and one third as great as in Japan and China; the exact figures being as follows: Aiea. Population. Per square mile. 56, 000 35, 910 3, 826, 351 2, 192, 404 68 61 91,910 6, 018, 755 64 197, 670 204, 092 147. 655 1, 312, 328 17, 565, 632 38,517,975 42, 270 620 383, 253, 029 88 180 286 China 292 The next most important islands in the order of population are; Area. Population. Per mile. 34. 000 4,800 4,000 600 1,400 209, 000 186, 000 67, 000 35, 000 21,000 6 38 17 58 15 44, 800 518, 000 11 Various smaller islands, including the Carolines, Ladrones, and Palaos, carry the total area and Christian population to, area, 140,000; population, 0,000,000; per mile, 43. This is considerably greater than the density of population in the States east of the Rocky Mountains. Owing to the existence of moun- tain ranges in all the islands, and lack of communications in the inte- rior, only a small part of the surface is inhabited. In many provinces the density of population exceeds 200 per square mile, or greater than that of any of the United States, except Massachusetts and Rhode Island. The total area of the Philippines is about the same as that of Japan, but its civilized population is only one-seventh. In addition to the Christian population, it is estimated (in the OflBcial Guide) that the islands contain the following: Chinese (principally in Manila) 75, 000 Moors or Mohammedans in Paragan and Jolo 100, 000 Moors or Moliamniedaus in Mindanao and Basalau 209, 000 Heathens in the Philippines 830, 000 Heathens in the Carolines and Palaos 50, 000 Total 1,264,000 The Official Guide gives a list of more than thirty different races, each speaking a different dialect, but five-sixths of the Christian popu- lation are either Tagalos or Visayas. All the races are of the Malay type. Around Manila there has been some mixture of Chinese and Spanish blood with that of the natives, resulting in the Mestizos or half-breeds, but the number of these is not very great. As seen in the provinces of Cavite and Manila, the natives (Tagalos) are of small stature, averaging probably 5 feet 4 inches in he-ght and 406 TREATY OF PEACE. 120 pounds in weight for the women. Their skin is coppery brown, somewhat darker than that of a mulatto. They seem to be industrious and hard-working, although less so than the Chinese. By the Spaniards they are considered indolent, crafty, untruthful, treacherous, cowardly, and cruel, but the hatred between the Spaniards and the native races is so intense and bitter that the Spanish opinion of the natives is of little or no value. To us they seemed industrious and docile, but there were occasional evidences of deceit and untruth- fulness in their dealings with us. The bulk of the population is engaged in agriculture, and there were hardly any evidences of manufactures, arts, or mining. The greater number seemed to be able to read and write, but I have been unable to obtain any exact figures on this subject. They are all devout Eoman Catholics, although they hate the monastic orders. In Manila (and doubtless also in Cebu and Iloilo) are many thousands of educated natives, who are merchants, lawyers, doctors, and priests. They are well informed and have accumulated property. They have not traveled much, but there is said to be quite a numerous colony of rich Philippinos in Madrid, as well as in Paris and London. The l3ib- liography of the Philippines is said to number 4,500 volumes, the greater part of which have been written by Spanish priests and missionaries. The number of books on the subject in the English language is probably less than a dozen. {b) Climate. — The climate is one of the best known in the Tropics. The islands extend from 5° to 21° north latitude, and Manila is in 14° 35'. The thermometer during July and August rarely went below 79° or above 85°. The extreme ranges in a year are said to be 61° and 97°, and the annual mean 81°. There are three well-marked seasons, temperate and dry from November to February, hot and dry from March to May, and temperate and wet from June to October, The rainy season reaches its maximum in July and August, when the rains are constant and very heavy. The total rainfall has been as high as 114 inches in one year. Yellow fever appears to be unknown. The diseases most fatal among the natives are cholera and smallpox, both of which are brought from China. Low malarial fever is brought on by sleeping on the ground or being chilled by remaining without exercise in wet clothes; and diarrhea is produced by drinking bad water or eating excessive quantities of fruit. Almost all of these diseases are preventable by proper precautions even by troops in campaign. The sickness in our troops was very small, much less than in the cold fogs at camp in San Francisco. (c) Mineral wealth. — Very little is known concerning the mineral wealth of the islands. It is stated that there are deposits of coal, petroleum, iron, lead, sulphur, copper, and gold in the various islands, but little or nothing has been done to develop them. A few concessions have been granted for working mines, but the output is not large. The gold is reported on Luzon, coal and petroleum on Cebu and Iloilo, and sulphur on Leyte. The imports of coal in 1894 (the latest year for which statistics have been printed) were 91,511 tons, and it came prin- cipally from Australia and Japan. In the same year the imports of iron of all kinds were 9,632 tons. If the Cebu coal proves to be of good quality, there is a large market for it in competition with coal from Japan and Australia. {d) Agriculture. — Although agriculture is the chief occupation of the Philippines, yet only one-ninth of the surface is under cultivation. TREATY OP PEACE. 407 The soil is very fertile, and even after deducting the mountafnous areas it is probable that the area of cultivation can be very largely extended and that the islands can support a population equal to that of Japan (42,000,000). The chief products are rice, corn, hemp, sugar, tobacco, cocoanuts, and cacao. Coffee and cotton were formerly produced in large quan- tities — the former for export and the latter for home consumption ; but the coffee plant has been almost exterminated by insects and the home- made cotton cloths have been driven out by the competition of tf lose imported from England. The rice and corn are principally producied in Luzon and Mindero and are consumed in the islands. The rice crop is about 765,000 tons. It is insufficient for the demand, and 45,000 tons of rice were imported in 1894, the greater portion from Saigon and the rest from Hongkong and Singapore; also 8,r)()9 tons (say 00,000 barrels) of flour, of which more than two-thirds came from China and less than one-third from the United States. The cacao is raised in the southern islands, the best quality of it at Mindanao. The production amounts only to 150 tons, and it is all made into chocolate and consumed in the islands. The sugar cane is raised in the Visayas. The crop yielded in 1894 about 235,000 tons of raw sugar, of which one-tenth was consumed in the islands, and the balance, or 210,000 tons, valued at $11,000,000, was exported, the greater part to China, Great Britain, and Australia. The hemp is produced in southern Luzon, Mindoro, the Visayas, and Mindanao. It is nearly all exported in bales. In 1894 the amount was 96,000 tons, valued at $12,000,000. Tobacco is raised in all the islands, but the best quality and greatest amount in Luzon. A large amount is consumed in the islands, smoking being universal among women as well as the men, but the best quality is exported. The amount in 1894 was 7,000 tons of leaf tobacco, valued at $1,750,000. Spain takes 80 per cent and Egypt 10 per cent of the leaf tobacco. Of the manufactured tobacco 70 per cent goes to China and Singapore, 10 per cent to England, and 5 per cent to Spain. Cocoanuts are grown in southern Luzon and are used in various ways. The products are largely consumed in the islands, but the exports in 1894 were valued at $2,400,000. Cattle, goats, and sheep have been introduced from Spain, but they are not numerous. Domestic pigs and chickens are seen around every- where in the farming districts. The principal beast of burden is the carabao, or water buffalo, which is used for plowing rice fields as well as drawing heavy loads on sledges or on carts. Large horses are almost unknown, but there are great numbers of native ponies from 9 to 12 hands high, possessing strength and endurance far beyond their size. (c) Commerce and transportation.— The internal commerce between Manila and the diflerent islands is quite large, but I was unable to tind any official records giving exact figures concerning it. It is carried on almost entirely by water, in steamers of 500 to 1,000 tons. There are regular mail steamers once in two weeks on four routes, viz : North- ern Luzon, southern Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao: also a steamer every two months to the Carolines and Ladrones, and daily steamers on Manila Bay. These lines are all subsidized. To facilitate this navigation extensive harbor works have been in progress at Manila for several years, and a plan for lighting the coasts has been made. 408 TREATY OF PEACE. calling for 43 principal lights, of which 17 have already been con- structed in the most substantial manner, besides 10 lights of secondary importance. There is only one line of railway, built by English capital, running from Manila north to Dagupan, a distance of about 120 miles. The roads in the immediate vicinity of Manila are macadamized and in fairly good order; elsewhere they are narrow paths of soft black soil, which become almost impassable in the rainy season. lYansportation is then effected by sledges drawn through the mud by carabaos. There are telegraph lines connecting most of the provinces of Luzon with Manila, and cables to the Visayas and southern islands and thence to Borneo and Singapore, as well as a direct cable from Manila to Hong- kong. The laud telegraph lines are owned by the Government, and the cables all belong to an English company, which receives a large sub- sidy. In Manila there is a narrow-gauge street railway, operated by horsepower, about 11 miles in total length; also, a telephone system and electric lights. Communications with Europe are maintained by the Spanish Trans- Atlantic Company (subsidized), which sends a steamer every four weeks from Manila and Barcelona, making the trip in about twenty-seven days ; the same company also sends an intermediate steamer from Manila to Singapore, meeting the French Messageric steamer each way. There is also a nonsubsidized line running from Manila to Hongkong every two weeks, and connecting there with the English, French, and German mails for Europe, and with the Pacific Mail and Canadian Pacific steamers for Japan and America. There has been no considerable development of manufacturing indus- tries in the Philippines. The only factories are those connected with the preparation of rice, tobacco, and sugar. Of the manufactures and arts in which Japan so excels there is no evidence. The foreign commerce amounted, in 1894, to $23,558,552 in imports and $33,149,984 in exports, 80 per cent of which goes through Manila. About 60 per cent of the trade is carried in British vessels, 20 per cent in Spanish, and 10 per cent in German. The value of the commerce with other countries in 1894 was as follows : [In millions of dollars (silver).] Imports. Exports. Spain 10.5 7.1 4.6 1.9 .9 .7 .7 .4 .2 .1 1.5 2 9 Great Britain 8 7 China G 8 Germany Saigon United States 7 4 France 1 '' Singapore I 7 J?pan Australia 2 other countries B Total 28.6 33 1 Tt is interesting to note that next to Great Britain we are the largest consumers of the Philippines, and that they export to us nearly three times as much as to Spain. On the other hand, Spain sells to the Philippines fifteen times as much as we do. TREATY OF PEACE. The articles of import and their vahie in 1894 were as follows: [In millions of dollars (silver).] 409 a Eus.sia. The articles of export and their values were as follows : [In millions of dollars (silver).] a Principally to Singapore. 6 Principally to Japan. Spain. Great Britain. China. Ger- many. United States. Other countries. Total. 3.9 1.2 1.8 4.0 .9 .4 .2 .3 .1 .7 .1 .1 a. 8 .1 .1 9.3 2.5 1.9 .2 ... 1.0 .7 '.2 .4 1.4 .2 .7 1.2 Kice 1. 1 Flour .2 .9 .5 .4 .1 .1 2.3 .3 .2 .3 .2 .9 .8 .1 .7 .1 .1 .6 Hats .3 .9 .'i' .6 i.4 2.0 7.6 Total 10.5 7.1 4.6 1.9 .7 3.8 28.6 Spain. Great Britain. China. United States. Aus- tralia. other countries. Total. 5.3 2.7 .1 .9 4.0 .7 6.6 .7 .6 1.9 ,1 al.l 61.3 .3 14.5 .4 .2 1.1 .3 11.0 1.8 1.4 Coflee .1 .1 1.0 .4 .6 .7 .9 .1 1.3 3.3 Total 2.9 8.7 6.8 7.4 2.6 4.7 33.16 With these islands in our possession and the construction of railroads in the interior of Luzon, it is probable that an enormous extension could be given to this commerce, nearly all of which would come to the United States. Manila cigars of the best quality are unknown in America; they are but little inferior to the best of Cuba and cost only one-third as much. The coffee industry can be revived and the sugar industry extended, mainly for consumption in the far East. The min- eral resources can be exi)lored with American energy, and there is every reason to believe that when this is done the deposits of coal, iron, gold, and lead will be found very valuable. On the other hand, we ought to be able to secure the greater part of the trade which now goes to Spain in textile fabrics, and a considerable portion of that with England in the same goods and in iron. (/) Revenue and expenses. — The budget for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1897, was as follows: (1) Direct taxes $8,496,170 (2) Indirect taxes (customs) 6, 200, 550 (3) Proceeds of mouopolies 1,222,000 (4) Lottery 1,000.000 (5) Income of Goveruraent projierty 257,000 (6) Sundry receipts 298,300 Total 17,474,020 410 TREATY OF PEACE. EXPENSES. (1) General expenses, pensions, and interest $1, 506, 686 (2) Diplomatic and consular service 74, 000 (3) Clergy and courts 1,876, 740 (4) War department 6, 035, 316 (5) Treasury department 1, 392, 414 (6) Navy department 3, 562, 716 (7) Civil administration 2,195,378 (8) Education 614,895 Total 17,258,145 The direct taxes were as follows : (1) Real estate, 5 per cent on income $140, 280 (2) Industry and commerce 1,400, 700 (3) Cedulas (poll tax) , 5, 600, 000 (4) Chinese poll tax 510,190 (5) Tribute from sultan of Jolo 20,000 (6) Railroads, 10 per cent of passenger receipts 32, 000 (7) Income tax, 10 per cent on public salaries 730, 000 (8) Sundry taxes 63,000 Total 8,496,170 Indirect taxes were as follows : (1) Imports $3,600,000 (2) Exports 1,292,550 (3) Loading tax 410,000 (4) Unloading tax 570,000 (5) Fines and penalties 27, 000 (6) Special tax ou liquors, beer, vegetables, flour, salt, and mineral oils.. 301, 000 6, 200, 550 Monopolies : (1) Opium contract 576,000 (2) Stamped paper and stamps 646, 000 Total 1,222,000 Lottery : (1) Sale of tickets, less cost of prizes 964, 000 (2) Unclaimed prizes 30,000 (3) Sundry receipts 6, 000 Total 1,000,000 Income of Government property: (1) Foresty privileges 170,000 (2) Sale and rent of public land and buildings 85, 000 (3) Mineral privileges 2, 000 Total 257,000 Sundry receipts : (1) Mint (seigniorage) 200.000 (2) Sundries 98,300 Total 298,300 The largest source of income is the cedula or poll tax. Every man and woman above 18 years of age, residing in the Philippines, whether Spanish subject or foreigner, is required to have in his or her posses- sion a paper stating name, age, and occupation, and other facts of per- sonal identity. Failure to produce and exhibit this when called upon renders anyone liable to arrest and imprisonment. This paper is TREATY OF PEACE. 411 obtained from the internal-revenue oifice annually, on payment of a certain sum, varying, according to the occupation and income of the j)erson, from 75 cents to $20, and averaging about $3 for each adult. An extra sum of 2 per cent is paid for exi^enses of collection. The tax is collected at the tribunal in each j)ueblo, and 20 per cent is retained for expenses of local administration and 80 per cent paid to the gen- eral treasury. This tax falls heavily on the poor and lightly on the rich. The tax on industry and commerce is similarly graded according to the volume of business transacted by each merchant or mercantile corporation. The tax on real estate is absurdly low and is levied only on municipal property and on the rent, not the value. The tax on imports is specific and not ad valorem; it amounts to about 13 per cent of estimated values. The free list is very small, nearly everything of commercial value which is imported being subject to duty. The revenue from imports has increased from $566,143 in 1865 to $3,095,446 in 1894. It was about the same in 1897. On the other hand, the export tax, which was nothing in 1892, the loading tax, which was nothing in 1893, and the unloading tax, which was nothing in 1894, have all been increased in the last few years in order to meet the expenses of suppressing the insurrection. These three items yielded nearly $2,700,000 in 1897. The monopoly of importing and selling opium is sold by auction to the highest bidder for a term of three years. The present contract runs until 1899, and yields $48,000 per month. Every legal document must be drawn up on paper containing a revenue stamp engraved and printed in Spain, and every note, check, draft, bill of exchange, receipt, or similar document must bear a revenue stamp in order to be valid. These stamps and stamped paper yielded a revenue of $646,000 in 1897. The lottery is conducted by the Government, the monthly drawings taking ])lace in the treasury (hacienda) department. The sale of tickets yielded $1,000,000 over and above the prizes in 1897. In a report to General Merritt on August 20, 1 recommended that the opium contract be canceled and the lottery abandoned during our occu- pation of Manila; and as the poll tax and tax on industry and com- merce had been paid for the most part in the early part of the year, our chief sources of revenue were from the custom house, the sale of stamps and stamped paper, and the sale of such licenses as the law allowed (amusements, liquor saloons, etc.), for the benelit of the city of Manila as distinguished from the general revenues. I estimated the total at about $500,000 per month. The expenses of administering the military government of occupation (apart from the expenses of the army) will consist of the current expenses of the office at the provost-marshal-general's office and its various bureaus; at the custom-house, internal-revenue office, and other oftices; and the salaries of interpreters and minor employees, who are anxious to resume work as soon as they dare do so. An estimate of these expenses was being prepared at the time 1 left, but was not com- pleted. It can hardly exceed $200,000 per month, and may be much less. This should leave $300,000 (silver) excess of income per month to go toward the military expenses of occupation. As soon as it is decided that we are to retain the islands it will be necessary to make a careful study of the sources of revenue and items of expense for all the islands, with a view to thoro ughly nnderstnding the subject, before introducing the extensive changes which wiU be necessary. 412 TREATY OF PEACE. Currency. — The standard of value lias always, until within a few years, been the Mexican milled dollar. The Spanish dollar contains a little less silver, and in order to introduce it and profit by the coinage the Spaniards prohibited the importation of Mexican dollars a few years since. Large numbers of Mexican dollars remained in the country, however, and others were smuggled in. The two dollars circulated at equal values. All valuations of goods and labor are based on the silver dollar, and a change to the gold standard would result in great financial distress and many failures among the banks and mercantile houses in Manila. Their argument is that while an American 10-dollar gold piece will bring 21 silver dollars at any bank or house having foreign connections, yet it will not buy any more labor or any more hemp and sugar from the original producer than 10 silver dollars. The products of the country are almost entirely agricultural, and the agricultural class, whether it sells its labor or its products, would refuse to accept any less than the accustomed wages or prices on account of being paid in the more valuable coin. The result of this change would be that the merchant and employee would have to pay double for what they buy, and would receive no increase for what they sell. While trade would eventually adjust itself to the change, yet many merchants would be ruined in the process and would drag some banks down with them. The Mexican dollar is the standard also in Hongkong and China, and the whole trade of the Far East has for generations been conducted on a silver basis. Japan has within the last year broken away from this and established the gold standard, but in doing so the relative value of silver and gold was fixed at 32i to 1, or about the market rate. Public debt. — I was unable to obtain any precise information in regard to the colonial debt. The last book on statistics of imports and exports was for the fiscal year 1894; and the last printed budget was for 1896-97, which was approved by the Queen Eegent in August, 1896. Subsequent to this date, according to the statements made to us by foreign bankers, the Cortes authorized two colonial loans of $14,000,000 (silver) cash, known as Series A and Series B. The proceeds were to be used in suppressing the insurrection. Both were to be secured by a first lien on the receipts of the Manila custom-house. Series A is said to have been sold in Spain and the proceeds to have been paid in to the colonial office, but no part of them has ever reached the Philippines. Possibly a portion of it was used in sending out the 25,000 troops which came from Spain to the Philippines in the autumn of 1896. Series B was offered for sale in Manila, but was not taken. An effort was then made to obtain subscribers in the provinces, but with little or no success. The Government then notified the depositors in the Public Savings Bank (a branch of the treasury department similar to the postal savings bureaus in other countries) that their deposits would no longer be redeemed in cash but only in Series B bonds. Some depositors were frightened and took bonds, others declined to do so. Then came the blockade of Manila, and all business was practically suspended. ^o printed report has been made concerning the debt, and I was unable to obtain any satisfactory statement of the matter from the Treasury officials. The exact facts in regard to the Series A bonds can be learned in Madrid, but it will be difficult to learn how much of Series B was issued and what consideration was received for them. As already stated, both series of bonds rest for security on the receipts of the Manila customhouse. TREATY OF PEACE. 413 SPANISH TROOPS. The Spanish prisoners of war number about 13,000, including about 400 officers. The infantry arms are about 22,000, the greater part Mauser, model 1895, caliber .28, and the others Kemingtons, model 1889, caliber .43. The ammunition is about 22,000,000 rounds. The field artillery consists of about 12 breech-loading steel guns, caliber 3.5 inches, and 10 breech-loading mountain guns, caliber 3.2 inches. There are six horses (ponies) for each gun, but the harness is in bad order. Ammunition, about 60 rounds per gun, with possibly more in the arsenals. There are about 500 cavalry ponies, larger than the average horses, with saddles and equipments complete. There is also a bat- talion of engineers. The fortifications of the walled city are a fine sample of the Vauban type, on which military engineers expended so much ingenuity 150 years ago, and of which Spain possessed so many in her Flemish dominions. The first walls of Manila were built about 1500, but the present fortifications date from a short time after the capture and occupation of the place by the English, in 1762-17G4. They consist of bastions and curtains, deep-set ditch, covered way, lunettes, demilunes, hornworks, and all the scientific accessories of that day. They are in a good state of preservation, and mount several hundred ancient guns, but they are chiefly of interest to the antiquarian. On the glacis facing the bay, and also on the open space just south of the walls, are mounted 9-inch breechloaders, four in all, made at Houtoria, Spain, in 1884. They are well mounted between high traverses, in which are bomb ])roof maga- zines. These guns are practically uninjured, and Admiral Dewey has the breechblocks. While not as powerful as the guns of the present day of the same caliber, they are capable of efiective service. Their location, however, is very faulty, as they are on the shore of the bay, with all the churches, public buildings, and most valuable property immediately behind them. On the day after the naval battle Admiral Dewey sent word to the Governor-General that if these guns fired a shot at any of his vessels he would immediately reply with his whole squadron. Owing to their location this meant a bombardment of the city. This threat was effect- ive; these guns were never afterwards fired, not even during the great attack of August 13; and in return the navy did not fire on them, but directed all their shells at the forts and trenches occupied by the troops outside of the suburbs of the city. Within the walled city are the cathedral and numerous churches, convents, and monasteries, the public offices, civil and military, military workshops and arsenals; barracks for artillery, cavalry, and engineers; storehouses, and a few dwellings and shops. The infantry barracks are outside of the walls, four in number, viz, Neysig, Portin, Calzada, and Ermita. They are modern and well con- structed and will accommodate about 4,000 men. They are now occu- pied by United States troops. Under the terms of the armistice the arms laid down by the Spanish troops on August 14 are to be returned to them whenever they evacuate the city or the American Army evacuates it. All other public property, including horses, artillery, public funds, munitions, etc., is surrendered to the United States unconditionally. The question of sending back the troops to Spain is left absolutely to the decision of the authorities in Washington. They are all within the walled city, but as the public buildings are insufficient to accom- 414 TREATY OF PEACE. modate them they are quartered in the churches and convents. These buildings are not adapted for this purpose; tbey have no sinks, lava- tories, kitchens, or sleeping apartjuents, and there is great danger of an epidemic of sickness if the troops are not soon removed. Pending their removal they are being fed with rations furnished by the United States Commissary Department, and the officers receive from the United States sufficient money for their support. SPANISH NAVY. At the outbreak of the war the naval force in the Philippines con- sisted of 10 cruisers, 19 gunboats, 4 armed launches, 3 transports, -^^ survey boat. Of these Admiral Dewey destroyed on May 1, 10 cruisers and 1 trans- port, and he has since captured 2 gunboats. The Spaniards have sunk 2 transports and 2 or 3 gunboats in the Pasig Elver. There remain 13 or 14 gunboats, which are scattered among the islands. They are of iron, from 140 to 200 tons each, are armed with 1 breech-loading rifle, caliber 3.6-inch, and 2 to 4 machine guns each, caliber .44 to 1 inch. One of the captured boats, the Callao, under command of Lieutenant Tappan, U. S. N., and a crew of 18 men, rendered very efficient service in the attack of August 13. These boats would all be useful in the naval police of the islands. They will, however, probably be scuttled by the Spaniards before the islands are surrendered. The navy yard at Cavite has barracks for about 1,500 men (now occu- pied by United States troops), and has shops and ways for light work and vessels of less than 1,000 tons. Many of the gunboats above men- tioned were built there. The shallow depth of water in Canacoa or Cavite Bay would prevent the enlargement of this naval station to accommodate large vessels, and the plan of the Spaniards was to create a large naval station in Subig Bay, on which considerable money has already been spent. SPANISH CIVIL ADMINISTRATION. The government of the Philippine Islands, including the Ladrones, Carolines, and Palaos, is vested in the Governor-General, who, in the language of the Spanish Official Guide or Blue Book, "is the sole and legitimate representative in these islands of the supreme power of the Government of the King of Spain, and as such is the supreme head of all branches of the public service and has authority to inspect and supervise the same, not excepting the courts of justice." The office is held by a lieutenant-general in the Spanish army; and he is also vice- royal patron of the Indies, exercising in these islands the ecclesias- tical functions conferred on the King of Spain by various bulls of the Popes of Rome, captain-general in chief of the army of the Philippines, inspector-general of all branches of the service, commander in chief of the naval forces, and president of all corporations and societies which partake of an official character. What corresponds to his cabinet or ministry of (a) the archbishop of Manila and four bishops, who administer ecclesiastical aftairs in the five dioceses into which the islands are divided for this purpose; the appointment of parish priests and curates, however, is vested in the governor-general. The various religious orders which exercise so large an influence in the politics and business of the islands, viz, Agustinians, Dominicans, Keeollects, Franciscans, Capuchins, Benedic- TREATY OF PEACE. 415 tines, and Jesuits, are all under the management of the bishops, sub- ject to the supervision of the Pope and the prerogatives of the King as royal patron, which prerogatives are exercised by the Governor- General as viceroy. (&) The high court of justice in Manila, whi(;h is the court of appeals in civil and governmental cases for all the islands; there are two prin- cipal criminal courts, in Cebu and Vigan (northern Luzon), and api^eal in criminal cases lies to these courts or to the high court of Manila; in every province there is a court of i^rimary jurisdiction in both civil and criminal cases. (c) The general second in command, who is a general of division in the Spanish army. He is the subinspector of all branches of the mili- tary service, is military governor of the province and city of Manila and commands all the troops stationed therein, and in the absence or sickness of the captain-general he commands all the military forces in the islands. {d) The general commandant of dockyards and squadron. This post is lilled by a vice-admiral in the Spanish navy, and he commands the naval forces, ships, and establishments in the islands. {e) The minister of finance, or intendente general de hacienda, who is charged with the collection of customs and internal taxes, the expend- itures of public money, and the audit and control of public accounts, {f) The minister of the interior, or director-general of civil adminis- tration, who is charged with all public business relating to pnblic instruction, charities, health, public works, torests, mines, agriculture, industry and commerce, posts and telegraphs, and meteorology. For the purpose of local administration the islands are divided into provinces and districts, classified as follows 19 civil governments, 24 political-military governments, 23 political-military commands, 15 military commands. The most important of the provinces are Manila, with a population of 400,238 (of which 10 per cent are Chinese), and Cebu, with 504,076; and the least important districts are Balabas and Corregidor, with 420 and 320, respectively. The governor or commandant has supreme control within his province or district of every branch of the public service, including the courts of justice, and each reports direct to the Governor-General. The guardia civil, or gendarmerie, is subject only to his orders, and for arrests and imprisonment for political offenses he is responsible, not to the law, but to the Governor-General and the King. The civil governments are governed by civil governors of the rank in the Spanish civil service of chiefs of administration of the second class. The political military governments and commands are in charge of military and naval officers of various grades, according to their size and importance, ranging from general of division at Mindanao, brig- adier-generals at Cebu and Iloilo, captain in the navy at Paraguay, down to lieutenant at Balabas and Corregidor. The civil or military governor is assisted by a secretary, a judge, an administrator of finances, a postmaster, and a captain of police. The affairs of cities are managed by a council (aynntamiento) con- sisting of a presidente, a recorder (sindico), one or more mayors (alcalde), six to ten aldermen (regidores), and a secretary. Outside of the cities each province or district is divided into a num- ber of villages or parishes (pueblos). The total number of these is 1,055. In each there is a parish priest, a municipal captain, a justice of the peace, a schoolmaster, and schoolmistress. The number of cities 416 TREATY OP PEACE. is very small, and the social life of the community depends almost wholly on the form of government of the pueblos or villages. In 1893 this was reorganized with the alleged intention of giving local self- governmen'. The scheme is complicated and curious, and only an out- line of it can be given here. It is contained in full in the royal decree of May 19, 1893, a long document supplemented by still longer regula- tions for carrying the same into effect. In brief, every pueblo in which there are paid more than 1,000 cedulas (poll tax) shall have a municipal tribunal, consisting of five members, by whom its local affairs and funds shall be managed. The members are a municipal captain, senior heutenant, lieutenant of police, lieuten- ant of agriculture, lieutenant of cattle; and the village priest is required to attend all the important meetings. The captain holds office for four years and is eligible for indefinite reelection; the lieutenants hold office for four years also, one half of them going out of office every two years, and they are ineligible for reelection until two years after the expiration of their term. Both captains and lieutenants are elected on a day designated by the gov- ernor, and in the presence of the village priest and the outgoing cap- tain, by the principalia or body of principal men of the village. The village is subdivided into barangayes or group of about 100 families each, and for each barangay there is a chief or headman (cabeza), who is appointed by the governor on the recommendation of the municipal tribunal. The principalia is made up of former municipal captains, former municipal lieutenants, former gobernadorcillos, chiefs of baran- gayes. All inhabitants paying more than $50 annually in taxes. The prin- cipalia choose the 13 electors, as follows: Six from the chiefs of baran- gayes, 3 from former municipal captains, and 3 from the largest tax- payers. The electors hold ofiBce for six years, and one-third go out of ofiBce every two years. The municipal captain must be a resident of the village, more than 25 years of age, read and speak Spanish, and be a chief of a barangay. While the municipal tribunal nominally controls the local affairs, yet the captain has the right to suspend all its acts which he considers against the public welfare, and report the matter to the provincial governor, who has power to rescind them. The captain appoints all village employees and removes them at will. He can also fine and punish them for petty offenses. He issues orders to the police and col- lects the taxes. He holds a commission as delegate or representative of the Governor-General, and, in fact, he exercises within his little bailiwick the same supreme power that the governor exercises in the province and the Governor-General in the whole archipelago. In each province there is a junta or council, whose membership con- sists of the administrator of finance, two vicars, the public physician, four members. The latter four members must be residents of the capital of the province, and they are elected by the municipal captains, from a list of names submitted to them by the junta, with the approval of the governor. The functions of this junta or council are solely those of inspection and advice. It watches over the affairs of the municipal tribunals, and reports to the governor its advice and recommendations concerning them. The municipal captain is obliged to deposit the taxes in the provincial treasury, the keys of which are held by thr^e members of TREATY OF. PEACE. 417 the council. He draws out the money in accordance with a municipal budget, aud his accounts must be approved by his lieutenants, couu- tersio^ned by the village priest, passed upon by the provincial council, and tin ally approved by the governor. The governor has power to suspend the municipal captain or any of his colleagues for a period of three months, and the governor general can remove one or all of them from office at will, and "'in extraordi- nary cases or for reasons of public tranquillity the governor shall have power to decree, without any legal prowess, (he abolition of the muni- cipal tribunals." (Article 45.) In December, 1896, General Polavija issued a decree suspending the elections which were to take ])lace that month for one-third of the municipal electors, and directed the governors of provinces to send in names of persons suitable for appointment, together with the recom- mendations of the village priest in each case. An examination of this unique scheme of village government shows that one-half of the electors are to be chosen from persons holding a subordinate office and appointed by the governor; that the village priest must be present at all elections aud important meetings; that the captain has all the responsibility and he must also be of the class holding a subordinate office by appointment of the governor; that the acts of the municipal tribunal can be suspended by the captain and rescinded by the governor, and finally, if the municipal tribunal is oflensive to the Governor General he can either remove its members and appoint others in their i)lace or can abolish it altogether. Such is the Spanish idea of self-government. The minister of the colonies in submitting the decree to the Queen Eegent, expatiated on its merits in giving the natives such full control of their local aftairs, and expressed the confident belief that it would prove "most beneficent to those people whom Providence has confided to the generofls sover- eignty of the Spanish monarchs." This scheme of government by municipal tribunals was highly approved by the native", except that feature of it which placed so much power in the hands of the governor and Governor General. This, however, was the essence of the matter from the Spanish standpoint, and these portions of the decree were the ones most fully carried out. The natives complained, on the one hand, of the delay in putting the decree into operation, and, on the other hand, tliat so much of it as was established was practically nullified b}^ the actiou of the governors. Seeing that the tribunals had really no power, the members soon turned their sessions (which the decree required to be secret) into ])olitical meetings in favor of the insurrection. So the whole project is thus far a failure, and the local administration is in considerable disorder, apart from that caused by the insurgents. In point of fact, self government and representation are unknown in these islands. The archbisiiop and the four bishops are appointed by the Pope. The Governor-General, military and naval officers, and all officials with a salary exceeding about $ii,()0<( (silver) are appointed by the King or the minister of the colonies. Yet all the expenses are paid from the Pliilip- pine treasury. The salaries of all officials — military, naval, civil, and ecclesiastical — the expenses and pensions of the army, navy, and church, the cost of the diplomatic and consular service in Japan, China, and Singapore, even a portion of the expenses of the colonial office at Madrid and of pensions paid to the desendaiits of Columbus, all come out of the taxes raised in the islands. The natives have no place in T P 27 418 TREATY. OF PEACE. the government, except clerks in the public offices at Manila and the petty ijositious in the villages ai d the ayunteniicntos of cities, where their powers and responsibilities, as we have seen, are at all times limited and subject to revocation whenever disapproved by the governor. Though the ])opulation of the islands is 40 per cent of that of Spain, they have no representation in the Cortes. There is a widespread report, almost universally believed by native Filipinos and by foreign merchants, and even aclinowledged by many Spaniards, that pecuniary dishonesty and corruption exist throughout the whole body of Spanish ofliceh older s, from the highest to the low- est. Forced contributions are said to be levied on the salaries of minor officials, the regimental paymasters and commissaries are said to have sold part of the regimental stores for their own profit, the collector of customs and the minister of finance to have imposed or remitted tines at the custom house and internal-revenue office according to payment or nonpayment of presemts by merchants, the judges and court officials to have "borrowed" from attorneys large sums which are never paid, and even the Governor General is reported to have organized a regular system of smuggling in Mexican dollars, the importation of which was prohibited by law, on a fixed "scale of payment to himself. The current report is that Weyler carried away over $1,()()(),000 as his savings dur- ing the three years, from 1888 to 1891, that he held the office of Governor General, on a salary of $40,000 a year. Of the proof of these reports I have naturally no personal knowledge, but tliey are matters of common talk and belief, and they have been stated to me by responsi- ble persons who have long resided in the islands. As above stated, the Governor-General is sujireme head of every brauch of the public service, not excepting the courts of justice. How this power was exercised is shown in the hundreds of executions for alleged political otfenses which took place during the years 1895, 189G, and 1897, by the thousands deported to Mindaiuio and Fernando Po, and by the numbeiof ])olitical prisoners in jail at the time of our entry into Manila. On the first examination which General JMacArthur, as military governor, made of the jail, about August 22, he released over 60 prisoners confined for alleged political offenses. One of them was a woman who had been imprisoned for eleven years, by order of the Governor-General, but withont any charges ever having been presented against her; another was a woman who had been in jail for three years on a vague charge, never formulated, of having carried a basket of cartridges to an insurgent. The day of reckoning for three centuries of this sort of government came when Admiral Dewey destroyed the Spanish squadron on May 1, 1898. An insurrection had been in progress from August, 1890, to December, 1897. Unable to suppress it, the Government made a written treaty with the insurgent leaders, paying them a large sum of money and promising to introduce various reforms on coalition that they would leave the country. Hardly had the Spanish officials recovered from this when the appalling disaster of the destruction of their fleet occurred under their very eyes. Then followed in rapid succession the naval blockade, the arrival of the insurgent leaders from Hongkong, the raising of an insurgent army, which blockaded Manila on the land side, and finally the Ameri- can troops. At the end of 104 days after the destruction of the Spanish fleet the city surrendered to a combined land and naval attack of the American forces. On the day after the capitulation the Aniericau commander in chief issued his proclamation establishing a military TREATY OF PEACE. 419 government, appointed a military governor, a minister of finance, a collector of customs, collector of internal revenue, postmaster, and judge of the provost court; took possession of all iiublic funds (about $900,000) and all public offices, and as rapidly as possible put this government in operation. The machinery of the Spanish Government was thoroughly disorgan- ized when we entered Manila. The courts of justice, except the inferior criminal courts, had not been in session since early in May; the officials had been cut off" from communication with the other islands and with Spain for over three months; there had been no customs to collect, and owing to the entire suspension of business, but little internal revenue; a forced loan of $2,000,000 for military purposes had been extracted from the Spanish-Philippine Bank, and yet the troops were several months in arrears of pay; all Government officers outside the walled city had been moved to temporary quarters within the walls, and their records had been lost or thrown into confusion; the officials, seeing the inevitable end in sight, were intent only on planning for their return to Spain. Tbis disorganization was completed Avhen the American military offi- cers took charge of the government and every Spanish official without exception refused absolutely to continue in service. They were immedi- ately dismissed and dispersed. The situation thus created is without precedent in American history. When Scott captured the City of Mexico it was acknowledged on both sides that his occupation was only to be temporary, and there were no insurgents to deal with. When the Americans entered California they found only a scanty population, who were soon outnumbered by the American immigrants. Bnt in the Philippine Islands there is a population of more than 7,000,00(». governed by an alien race whose representatives presmt in the islands, including military and naval forces, clergy, and civil employees, do not exceed 30,000 in number. Against this government an insurrection is in progress which claims to have been successful in provinces containing a population of about 2,000,000. The city and province of Manila, with a population of 400,000 more, have been captured and occupied by a foreign army, but whether its occupation is to be temporary or permanent has not yet been decided. Finally the Government officials of all classes refuse to perform their fmictions. The desire of the most of them is to escape to Spain. It was stipulated In the capitulation that they should have the right to do so at their own exi)ense, and numbers of them, as well as friars, have already taken their departure. The Spanish officials have intense fear of the insurgents; and the latter hate them, as well as the friars, with a virulence that can hardly be described. They have fought them with success and almost without interru])tion for two years, and they will continue to fight them with increased vigor and still greater pros- pects of success if any attempt is made to restore the Spanish government. In its present disorganized (;ondition the Spanish Gov- ernment could not successfully cope with them ; on the other hand, it would not surrender to them. The result, therefore, of an attempted restoration of Spanish power in any of the islands would simply be civil war and anarchy, leading inevitably and speedily to intervention by foreign nations whose subjects have property in the islands which they would not allow to be destroyed. Insurfient troops. — It is very difficult to give exact figures for the numbers of insurgent troops. In his message to foreign governments 420 TREATY OF PEACE. of August 6, asking for recognition of belligerency and independence, Aguinaldo claims to have a force of 30,000 men, organized into a rey:alar army. This included the force in the provinces of Luzon outside of Manila. What was in evidence around Manila varied from 10,000 to 15,000. They were composed of young men and boys, some as young as 15 years of age, recruited in the rural districts, having no property and nothing to lose in a civil war. They have received no pay, and although Aguinaldo speaks in his proclamation of his intention and ability to maintain order wherever his forces penetrate, yet the feeling is practically universal among the rank and hie that they are to be compensated for their time and services and hardshi])s by looting Manila. Their equipment consists of a gun, bayonet, and cartridge box; their uniform of a straw hat, gingliam shirt, and trousers and bare feet; their transportation of a few ponies and carts, impressed for a day or a week at a time; for quarters they have taken the public building in each village or pueblo, locally known as the Tribunal, and the churches and convents; from these, details are sent out to man the trenches. Their food while on duty consists of rice and banana leaves, cooked at the quarters and sent out to the trenches. After a few days or a week of active service they return to their homes to feed up or to work on their farms, their places being taken by others, to whom they turn over their guns and cartridges. Their arms have been obtained from vaiious sources — from purchases in Hongkong; from the supply which Admiral Dewey found in the arsenal at Cavite; from capture made from the Spaniards. They are partly Mausers and partly licmingtons. Their ammunition was ob- tained in the same way. They have used it freely, and the supply is now rather short. To replenish it they have established a (partridge factory at the village of Imus, about 10 miles south of Cavite, where they have 400 people engaged in reloading cartridges with powder and lead found at Cavite or i)urchased abroad. They have no artillery, except a few antique columbiads obtained from Cavite, and no cavalry. Their metliod of warfare is to dig a trench in front of the Spanish posi- tion, cover it with mats as a protection against the sun and rain, and during the night put their guns on toi> of the trench above their heads and fire in the general dirc^ction of the enemy. When their ammuni- tion is exhausted, they go off in a body to get a fresh supply in baskets, and then return to the trenches. The men are of small stature, from 5 feet to 5 feet G inches in height, and weigh from 110 to 130 pounds. Compared with them, our men from Colorado and California seemed like a race of giants. One after- noon, just after we entered jManila, a battalion of tlie insurgents fired upon the outposts of the Colorado regiment, mistaking them, as they claimed, for Spaniards. The outpost retreated to their support and the Filipinos followed; they easily fell iuto an ambush, and the sup- port, numbering about 80 men, surrounded the 250 Filipinos, wrenched the guns out of their haiuls, and marched them off as unarmed pris- oners, all in the space of a few minutes. Such a force can hardly be called an army, and yet the service which it has rendered should not be underestimated. Between 2,000 and 3,000 Spanish native troops surrendered to it during the months of June and July; it constantly annoyed and harassed the Spaniards in the trenches, keeping them up at night and wearing them out with fatigue; and it invested Manila early in July so completely that all supidies were cut off and the inhabitants, as well as the Spanish troops, were forced to live on horse TREATY OF PEACE. 421 • and buffalo meat, and the Chinese population on cats and dogs. It captured the waterworks of Manila and cut off the water supply, and if it had been in the dry season would have inflicted great suffering on the inhabitants for lack of water. These results, it is true, were obtained against a dispirited army con- taining a considerable number of native troops of doubtful loyalty. Yet from August, 181)(3, to April, 1897, they fought 25,000 of the best regular troops sent out from Spain, inflicting on them a loss of over 150 officers and 2,500 men killed and wounded, and they suffered still greater losses themselves. Nevertheless, from daily contact with them for six weeks, I am very confident that no such results could have been obtained against an American army, which would have driven them back to the hills and reduced them to a petty guerrilla warfare. If they attack the American army this will certainly be the result; and while these guerrilla bands might give some trouble so long as their ammunition lasted, yet with our navy guarding the coasts and our army pursuing them on land, it would not be long before they were reduced to subjection. Insimjeiit civil administration.— In August, 1896, an insurrection broke out in Cavite under the leadership of Emilio Aguinaldo, and soon spread to other provinces on both sides of Manila. It continued witii varying successes on both sides, and the trial and execution of numerous insurgents, until December, 1897, when the Governor-General, Primo de Rivera, entered into written agreement with Aguinaldo, the substance of the document, which is in possession of Senor Felipe Agoncillo, who accompanies me to Washington, being attached hereto and marked A. In brief, it required that Aguinaldo and the other insurgent loaders should leave the country, the Government agreeing to pay Ihem $800,000 in silver and promising to introduce numerous re- forms, including representation in the Spanish Cortes, freedom of the press, general amnesty for all insurgents, and the expulsion or secular- ization of the monastic orders. Aguinaldo and his associates went to Hongkong and Singapore. A portion of the money, $400,000, was deposited in banks at Hongkong, and a lawsuit soon arose between Aguinaldo and one of his subordi- nate chiefs named Artacho, which is interesting on account of tlie very honorable position taken by Aguinaldo. Artacho sued for a division of the money among the insurgents according to rank. Aguinaldo claimed that the money was a trust fund, and was to remain on deposit until it was seen whether the Spaniards would carry out their prom- ised reforms, and if they failed to do so, it was to be u ed to defray the expenses of a new insurrection. The suit was settled out of court by paying Artacho $5,000. ISTo steps have been taken to introduce the ref(nMus, more than 2,000 insurgents, who had been deported to Fernando Po and other places, are wStill in confinement, and Aguinaldo is now using the money to carry on the oi)erations of the present insurrection. On the 2-tth day of April Aguinaldo met the United States consul and others at Singapore and offered to begin a new insurrection in con- junction with the operations of the United States Navy at Manila. This was telegraphed to Admiral Dewey, and by his consent, or at his request, Aguinaldo left Singapore for Hongkong on April 26; and when the McGidloch went to Hongkong early in May to carry the news of Admiral Dewey's victory, it took Aguinaldo and seventeen other revolutionary chiefs on board and brought them to Manila Bay. They soon after landed at Cavite, and the Admiral allowed them to take such 422 TREATY OF PEACE guns, ainmunitioi), and stores as lie did not require for himself. With tbese, and some other arms which he had broujiht from Hongkong, Aguinaldo armed his followers, who rapidly assembled at Cavite, and in a few weeks he began moving against the Spaniards. Part of them surrendered, giving him more arms, and the others retreated to Manila. Soon afterwards two ships which were the private property of Senor Agoncillo and other insurgent sympathizers were converted into cruis- ers and sent with insurgent troops to Subig Bay and other places to capture provinces outside of Manila, They were very successful, the native militia in Spanish service capitulating with their arms in nearly every case without serious resistance. On' the 18tli of June Aguinaldo issued a proclamation from Cavite establishing a dictatorial governmenr, with himself as dictator. In each village or pueblo a chief (jefe) was to be elected, and in each ward a headman (cabeza) ; also in each pueblo three delegates — one of police, one of justice, and one of taxes. These were to constitute the junta or assembly, and after consulting the junta the cliiefs of pueblos were to elect a chief of province and three coun- cilors — one of police, one of justice, and one of taxes. They were also to elect one or more representatives from each province to form the revolutionary congress. This was followed on June 20 by a decree giving more detailed instructions in regard to the elections. On June 23 another decree fol- lowed changing the title of the government from dictatorial to revo- lutionary, and of the chief officer from dictator to president; announcing a cabinet, with a minister of foreign affairs, marine, and commerce, another of war and public works, another of police and internal order, justice, instruction, and hygiene, aiul another of taxes, agriculture, and manufactures; the jiowers of the president and congress were defined, and a code of military justice was formulated. On the same date a manifesto was issued to the world explaining the reasons and purposes of the revolution. On June 27 another decree was issued containing instructions in regard to elections. On August 6 an address was issued to foreign governments stating that the revolu- tionary government was in operation and control in 15 provinces, and that in response to the petition of the duly elected chiefs of these provinces an appeal is made for recognition of belligerency and inde- pendence. Translations of these various documents are all appended, marked B, C, D, E, F, G, and H. The scheme of government is set forth in the decree of June 23, marked D. An examination of this document shows that it provi,000. They include the island of Mindoro and about one half of Luzon. None of these (except Cavite) have yet been visited by Americans, and all comniuni- cation with them by the Spanish Government at Manila has beeu cut ofi since May 1. In the Province of Cavite and that portion of the Province of Manila outside of the city and its suburbs which was occupied by the insur- gent troops, as well as those of the United States, their military forces, military headquarters, etc., were very much in evidence, occupying the principal houses and churches in every village and hamlet, but there were no signs of civil government or administration. It was reported, however, that Aguinaldo's agents were levying taxes or forced contri- butions not only in the outside villages, but (after we entered Manila) by means of secret agents in the market places of the city itself. At Aguinaldo's headquarters, in Bacoor, there were wsigns ot activity and business, and it was reported that his cabinet ofticers were in constant session tliere. Aguinaldo himself never failed to claim all the preroga- tives due to his alleged position as the de facto ruler of the country. The only general officer who saw him or had any direct communica- tion with him was General Anderson. He did much to thwart this ofticer in organizing a native wagon train and otherwise providing for his troops, and he went so far in a letter of July 23 (copy herewith marked J) as to warn General Anderson not to land American troops on Philippine soil without his consent — a notice which it is hardly necessary to say was ignored. The day before the attack on Manila he sent staff officers to the same general asking for our plans of attack so that their troops could enter Manila with us. The same request had previously been made to me by one of his brigade commanders, to which I replied that I was not authorized to give the information desirfd. Aguinaldo did not call upon General Merritt on his arrival, and this enabled the latter to avoid any communication with him, either direct or indirect, until after Manila had been taken. General Merritt then re- ceived one of Aguinaldo's staff officers in his office as military governor. The interview lasted more than an hour. General Merritt referred to his proclamation as showing the conditions under which the American troops had come to Manila and the nature of the military government •which would be maintained until further orders from Washington. He agreed upon the lines outside of the city of Manila up to which the insurgent troops could come, but no farther, with arms in their hands; he asked for possession of the waterworks, which was given; and while expressing our friendship and sympathy for the Philippine i)eople, he stated very positively that the United States Government had placed at his disposal an ample force for carrying out his instructions, and even if the services of Aguinaldo's forces had been needed as allies he should not have felt at liberty to accept them. The problem of how to deal witli Aguinaldo's government and troops will necessarily be accompanied with embarrassment aud difficulty, and 424 TREATY OF PEACE. will require much tact aud skill in its solution. The United States Govern meut, through its naval coiniuander, has to some extent made use of them for a distinct military puri)ose, viz, to harass and annoy the IS[)anish troops, to wear them out in the trenches, to blockade Manila on the land side, and to do as much damage as possible to the Sjianish Government prior to the arrival of our troops: and for this purpose the admiral allowed them to take arms and munitions which he had cap- tured at Cavite and their ships to pass in and out of Manila Bay in their expeditions against other provinces. But the admiral has been very careful to give Aguinaldo no assurances of recognition and no pledges or promises of any description. The services which Aguinaldo and his adherents rendered in preparing the way for attack on Manila are certainly entitled to consideration; but, after all, they were small in comparison with what was done by our own fleet and army. There is no reason to believe that Agninaldo's government has any elements of stability. In the first place, Aguinaldo is a young man of 28 years; prior to the insurrection of 1896 he had been a schoolmaster and afterwards gobernadorcillo and municipal captain in one of the pueblos of the Province of Cavite. He is not devoid of ability, and he is surrounded by clever writers. But the educated and intelligent Filipinos of Manila say that not only is he lacking in ability to be at the head of affairs, but if an election for president was held he would not even be a candidate. He is a successful leader of insurgents, has the confidence of young men in the country districts, prides him- self on his military ability, and if a republic could be established the ])ost he would probably choose for himself would be general-in-chief of the army. In the next place, Aguinaldo's government, or any entirely inde- liendent government, docs not command the hearty support of the laige body of the Filipinos, both in Manila and outside, who have property, education, and intelligence. Their hatred of Spanish rule is very keen, an'd they will cooperate with Aguinaldo or anyone else to destroy it. But after that is done they fully realize that they must have the support of some strong nation for many years before they will be in a position to manage their own affairs alone. The nation to which they all turn is America, and their ideal is a Philippine republic under American protection, such as they have heard is to be granted to Cuba. But when it comes to defining their ideas of protection and the respective rights and duties of each under it — what portion of the government is to be administered by them and what portion by us; how the revenues are to be collected, and in what proi)ortion the ex- penses are to be divided — they have no clearly defined ideas at all; nor is it to be expected that they should have, after generations of Spanish rule, without any experience in self government. The sentiment of this class — the educated natives with property at stake — looks upon the prospect of Aguinaldo's government and forces entering Manila with almost as much dread as the foreign merchants or the Spaniards themselves. Finally, it must be remembered that this is purely a Tagalo insurrec- tion. There are upwards of thirty races in the Philippines, each speak- ing a difterent dialect; but five-sixths of the entire Christian population is composed of the Tagalos and Visayas. The former live in Mindoro and the southern half of Luzon, and the latter in Cebu, Iloilo, and otlier islands in the center of the group. The Tagalos are more numer- ous than the Visayas, but both races are about equal in civilization, intelligence, and wealth. It is claimed by Aguinaldo's partisans that TEE AT Y OP PEACE. 425 the Visayas are in sympathy with his insurrection and intend to send representatives to the congress. But it is a fact that the Visayas have taken no active part in the present insurrection, nor in that of 18!)6; that the Spanish Government is still in full control at Cebu and lloilo and in the Visayas' islands, and that Aguinaldo has as yet made no eiFort to attack them. The Visayas number nearly 2,000,01)0, or about as many as the population of all the Tagalo provinces which Aguinaldo claims to have captured. Tliere is no evidence to show that they will support his j^retensioiis, and many reasons to believe that, on account of racial prejudices and jealousies and other causes, they will oppose him. Upon one point all are agreed, except i)0ssibly Aguinaldo and his immediate adherents, and that is that no native goveniment can main- tain itself without the active support and protection of a strong tor- eign government. This being admitted, it is difficult to see how any foreign government can give this protection witliout taking such an active part in the management of affairs as is practically equivalent to governing in its own name and for its own account. United States troopfi and navy. — I assume thnt the reports received at the War and Navy Dei^artinents give all the desired information in regard to the military forces of the United States. At the time I left (August 30) the Eighth Corps consisted of two divisions, numbering in all about 12,000 men, with 10 field guns and 6 mountain guns. No wagons or animals had then arrived. One regiment was stationed within the walled city guarding its gates and tlie captured guns and ammunition; a small force was at Cavite, and the bulk of the troops were in Manila outside of the walled city. They were quartered in tlie Spanish barracks, which were all in good condition, and in convents and i)rivate houses. The health of the troops was excellent, notwithstanding the extraordinary hardships to which they had been subjected in the trenches before Manila. Admiral Uewey had under his command the Charleston, Monterey, and Monadnocl:, which arrived in July and August; the Gallao and Leyte, which had been captured from the Spaniards, and the ships which were in the battle of ."May 1, viz, the Olympia, Boston, Baltimore, Raleigh, Concord, Petrel, and McCulloch. The health of the squadron was excellent. The Olympia and Concord were being docked and cleaned at Hongkong. Permission to use the docks at Nagasaki during the suspension of hostilities had been declined. United States civil administration. — We entered IMauila on the after- noon of August 13. On the 14th the capitulation was signed, and the same day General Merritt issued his proclamation establishing a mili- tary government. On the loth General McArthur was ai)pointed mili- tary commandant of the walled city and provost-marshal-general of the city of Manila and its suburbs, and on the 17th I was appointed to take charge of the duties performed by the intendente general de hacienda, or minister of finance, and all fis<'al affairs. Kepresentatives of the Post-Office Department had arrived on the steamship Chitia in July, and they immediately took charge of the Manila post-office, which was opened for business on the IGth. The custom-house was opened on the 18th with Lieutenant-Colonel Whittier as collector, and the internal-revenue office with Major liement as collector, on the 22d. Captain Glass, of the Navy, was appointed cai)tain of the ])ort, or naval officer, and took charge of the office on August 10. The collections of customs during the first ten days exceeded $100,000. Tlie collection of internal revenne was small, owing to the difficulty and delay in ascertaining what persons had or had not paid 426 TREATY OF PEACE. tlieir tiixes for tlie current year. The administration of waterworks was put in charge of Lieutenant Connor, of the Engineers, on August 2.5. The provost court, with Lieutenant-Colonel Jewett, judge-advocate, United States Volunteers, sitting as judge, was appointed and held its first session on August 23. The provost-marshal-general has charge of the police, fire, healjh, and street-cleaning dei)artnients and the issuing of licenses. The guardia civil, or gendarmerie, of the city proving indifferent and inetti- cient, they were disarmed and disbanded. The Thirteenth Minnesota Kegiment was detailed for police duty, and one or more companies stationed in each police station, from which patrolmen were sent out on tbe streets to take the i)lace of tlie sentries who had constantly'' patrolled them from the hour of entering the city. The shops were all closed when we entered on Saturday afternoon, the 13tli. On jNIonday morning some of them opened, and by. Wednes- day the banks had resumed business, the newspapers were published, the merchants were ready to declare goods at the custom-house, the tramcars were running, and the retail shops were all o{)en and doing a large business. There was no disorder or pillage of any kind in the city. The conduct of the troops was simply admirable, and left no ground for criticism. It was noted and commented upon by the for- eign naval officers in the most favorable terms, and it so surprised the Si)anish soldiers that a considerable number of them applied for per- mission to eidist in our service. At the time I left General Mc Arthur had fully established his office as provost-marshal-general, and was organizing one by one the various bureaus connected with it, all with United States military officers in charge; the provost court was in daily session, sentencing gamblers and persons guilty of petty disturbances, and a military commission had just been ordered to try a Chinaman accused of burglary. At the various public offices I collected the following Spanish funds: At the general treasury $795, 517. 71 At the mint 62, 856. 08 At the internal-revenue ofBce 24, 077. 60 882,451.39 Of this amount there was — Gold coin $4,200.00 Gold bars 3,806.08 Silver coin 190, 634. 81 Copper coin 297, 300. 00 Spanish bank notes 216,305.00 Accepted checks 170, 205. .50 882, 451. 39 The money was counted by a board of officers and turned over to Maj. C. H. Whipple, paymaster. United States Army, as custodian of Spanish public funds. A few thousand dollars in other public ofiices were still to be collected. The money received at the custom-house and other offices is turned in daily, at the close of business, to Major Whipple. Money for current expenses is furnished to heads of departments on their requisition, by warrant drawn by the intendeute-general on the custodian of Spanish public funds. The heads of departments are to submit their vouchers and accounts monthly to an auditing department, which was being organized when I left. All these public offices and funds were surrendered to me only on TREATY OF PEACE. 427 threat of using force and on grantiiig- permission to file a formal pro- test. None of tliese litui been received at the time I left, but tlie ground of verbal protest was that the officials recognized no authority in these islands but the Governor- General appointed by the King of Spain, and without his order tiiey were unwilling to surrender them. On the other hand, I recognized no authority of the Spanish Governor-General, who was merely a prisoner of war; I a(;ted under the orders of General Merritt, as the United States military governor, and in accordance with the terms of capitulation. The claim will probably be made by the Spanish oflicials that as we captured Manila a few hours after the jieace protocol had been signed at Washington, this property still belongs to the Spaniards. But I believe that the law in such cases was clearly defined in decisions made by the United States Supreme Court in 1815. We cai)tured Manila, and the capitulation (utider which these funds became United States property) was signed by both parties before either had received notice of the iDrotocol or suspension of hos- tilities. On the opening of the custom-house several important questions arose for immediate decision. The first was in regard to Mexican dollars. The importation of these has for several years been prohibited, with a view to forcing the Spanish coinage (which contains less silver) into cir- culation. The large English banks represented that there was a scarcity of currency, owing to the amount which had been hoarded and sent away during the siege, and they agreed, in consideration of being allowed to import Mexican dollars free of duty, to guarantee the notes and accepted checks of the Spanish bank which should be received by us in payment of customs ui)to $i'0{),000 at any onetime. The Spanish bank was in difticulty, owing to the enormous amount which the Gov- ernment had taken from it under the form of a forced loan, and any discrimination on our part against it would result in its failure, entailing widesi)read financial disturbance. As there seemed no reason against allowing the importation of Mexican dollars, and many in favor of it, I recommended that the custom house continue to receive the notes and checks of this bank in payment of customs (for which we were amply protected by the guaranty of the strong English banks), and, with General Merritt's approval, wrote to those banks authorizing them to import Mexican dollars free of duty until further notice. The next question was in regard to the rate of duties on imports and exports. After a careful examination of the matter I recommended that the tariff be not changed until the question had been fully studied and ample notice given. General Merritt approved this, and the customs are being collected on the Spanish tariff. About a week after the custom-house was opened certain parties came to me representing that ('ousul-Geueral, Wildman, of Hongkong, had informed them that United States goods would be admitted free of duty in Manila; that acting on this they had purchased a cargo of American illuminating oil in Hongkong, and that the ])ayment of the heavy duty on it ($30 per ton, or about 8 cents per gallon) would ruin them. On consulting Lieutenant- Colonel Crowd er, judge advocate of the Eighth Army Corps, he pointed out the language of paragraph 5 of General Merritt's proclauuitiou, which followed literally the instruc- tions of the President, viz : The port of Manila * * * will be open while our military occnpation may con- tinue, to the commerce of all neutral nations «->■ tvell as our own, in articles not con- traband of war, and upon payment of the pi-escribed rates of duty which may be in force at the time of the importation. 428 TREATY OF PEACE. Under this there was clearly no authority for discriniinnting in favor of American goods, either coming direct from a United States port or by transshipment at Hongkong. The collector of customs was directed to act accordingly. Another question was in regard to the importation of Chinamen into Manila. The consul at Hongkong telegrai)hed to know if they would be admitted. As there had been no time for examining the treaties and laws in force on this subject, I replied, with General Merritt's approval, that for the present it was not practicable to admit Chinese laborers into Manila. Another very important question which arose was in regard to trade with the other Philippine Islands. Nearly all the hemp and the greater part of the sugar is grown in the Visayas. The hemp is bought by foreign merchants in Manila, who bring it there from the other islands and export it, paying large duties to the Manila custom-house. These merchants were anxious to bring up their stock, of which a large amount had accumulated during the war, and ship it abroad. The ships engaged in this island trade were idle in the Pasig. They belonged to a Spanish corporation owned entirely by Scotch capital, and had a Spanish register. The owners were ready to transfer them to the American flag. Could these vessels be allowed to clear for the ports of Cebu and Iloilo, which were in Spanish possession? The judge advocate advised me that they could not without the express authority of the President. I so notified the owners of the ships and the hemp merchants. The day before I left Manila, however. Admiral Dewey received a cable from the Navy Department, stating that Spanish ships had been granted the privilege of trading to American ports during the suspen- sion of hostilities, and that American ships could be granted a similar privilege for Spanish ports. 1 understood that on the strength of this cable General Otis intended to allow the United States consul at Manila to grant these vessels an American register, and then allow them to clear for the other islands. I do not know what arrangement,, if any, was made in regard to the payment of export duties at Iloilo. Clearly the hemp can not pay export duties at both Iloilo and Manila, and the Spaniards are not likely to allow it to leave Iloilo free while we collect an export duty on it at Manila. Incidentally this illustrates the complications and losses that will arise if the islands are subdivided. The principal merchants for all the islands are at Manila, and 80 per cent of the duties on imports and exi)orts are collected at its custom- house. A large part of the imports a'^e redistributed through the islands, and all the hemp and sugar, which form the principal exports, come to Manila from other islands. If, then, we retain Luzon, and give the other islands back to Spain, or some other nation, that nation will impose import and export duties on everything coming from or to Manila. The foreign trade of that city will be lost, and its prosperity will be destroyed; moreover, the Government revenue from that trade will be lost. In view of the fact that Spanish officials declined to cooperate or assist in any way in the American government of Manila, the ease and rapidity with which order was maintained, the machinery of govern- ment put in operation, and business reestablished after our entry into Manila, is very remarkable. For every position in the Government service — legal, administrative, financial, mechanical, clerical — men could be found in our volunteer ranks who were experienced in just that class of work at home, and they took charge of their Spanish positions with promptness and confidence. TREATY OF PEACE. 429 Even in the matter of language no serious difficulty was encountered, for no less than 30 good interpreters were found in the California and Colorado regiments. The military government as now organized and administered fulfills all the requirements of preserving order and collecting the public revenue. The civil courts, however, have yet to be organized, and their organ- ization will present many difficulties. PAPERS ACCOMPANYING GENERAL GREENE'S MEMORANDA. Appendix A. Notes by Sefior Felipe Agoncillo concerning — _ Fage. (a) Kelations between Admiral Dewey and Seiior Agninaldo 429 (6) Terms of peace made bv Spanish governor-geuei:il with insurgents, December, 1897 .' , 430 (c) Lawsuit between Agninaldo and Avtacho 431 (d) Aguiualdo's proclamation of May '2i, \6d8 431 BEIEF NOTES BY SENOR AGONCILLO. September 15, 1898. On the same day that Admiral Dewey arrived at Hongkong Senor Agninaldo was in Singapore, whither he had gone from Hongkong, and Mr. Pratt, United States consul-general, under instructions from the said Admiral, held a conference with him, in which it was agreed that Sefior Agninaldo and other revolutionary chiefs, in cooperation with the American squadron, should return to take up arms against the Spanish government of the Philippines, the sole and most laudable desire of the Washington Government being to concede to the Philippine people absolute inde- pendence, as soon as the victory against the Spanish arms should be obtained. By virtue of this agreement Seiior Agninaldo proceeded by the first steamer to Hong- kong for the express purpose of embarking on the OhimpUi and going to Manila; but this intention of his was not realized, because the American squadron left Hong- kong the day nrevious to his arrival, Admiral Dewey having received from his Gov- ernment an order to proceed inmicdiately to xManila. This is what Mr. Wildman, United States consul-general in Hongkong, said to Senor Agninaldo in the inter- view which took place between them. A few days after the Spanish S(inadron had been totally destroyed in the Bay of Manila by "the American squadron, the latter obtaining a most glorious triumph, which deserved the fullest congratulations and praise of the Plnlippine public, the McCuUoch arrived at Hongkong, and her commander said to Senor Agninaldo that Admiral Dewey needed him (le necesitaba) in Manila and that he brought an order to take him on board said transport, as well as other revolutionary chiefs, whose number shonld be determined by Senor Agninaldo; and in fact he and seventeen chiefs went to t'avite on the McCuUoch. Senor Agninaldo be>ian his campaign against the Spaniards the very day he received the 1,902 Mauser guns and 20U,000 cartridges which came from Hongkong. The first victory which he obtained from the Spaniards was the surrender or capitu- lation of the Spanish general Senor Peila, who was the military governor of Cavite, had his headquarters in the town of San Francisco de Malabon, and his force was ccmiposed of 1,500 soldiers, including volunteers. The revolutionary army, in six days' operations, succeeded in getting possession of the Spanish detachments stationed in the villages of Bacoor, Inuis, Benakayan, Noveleta, Santa Cruz de Malabon, Rosario, and Cavite Viejo. On the 9th of June last the whole Province of Cavite was under the control of the provisional revolutionary government, inclr, ding many Spanish prisoners and friars, 7,000 guns, great quantities of ammunition, and some cannon. At the same time that the Province of Cavite was being conquered, other revolt: Plen- ary chieis were carrying on campaigns in the Batangas, Laguna, Tayabas, Nueva 430 TREATY OF PEACE. Eciza, Bulacan, Batangas Pampanga, and Morong, which were under control of the revolutionary army by the 12th of June; and such projz:ress was made by the Phil- ippine revolution in tlie few days of campaigo against the Spaniards that by the 3d of August last it held under conquest fifteen important provinces of the island of Luzon. These provinces are being governed by laws emanating from the provi- sional revolutionary government, and in all of them perfect order and complete tran- quility reign. It is to be noted that the Spanish Government has sent to SeuorAguinaldo various emissaries, who invited him to make common cause with Spain against the United States, promising him that the Government of the Spanish nation would concede to him anything he might ask for the Philippine people. But Seuor Aguinaldo has invariably replied to those emissaries th;it it was too late, and that he could not consider any proposition from the Spanish Government, however beneficial it might be to the Philippines, because he had already pledged his word of honor in favor ot certain representatives of the Government at Wasliington. In view of this positive resolution of Seuor Aguinaldo there began forthwith the intrigues of the Spanish enemy, directed against the life of Sehor Aguinaldo. PEACE CONVENTION (DECEMRER, 1897). Senor Aguinaldo, in his own name and in that of the other chiefs and subordi- nates, obligated himself to lay down their arms, which, according to an inventory, were to be turned over to the Spanish Government, thus terminating the revolution. His excellency the Governor and Captnin-General, Don Fernando Primo de Eivera, as the representative of His Mnjesty's Government in the Philippines, ol>ligated himself, on his side: (1) to grant a general amnesty to all those uniler charges or Bentenccd for the crime of rel>ellion and sedition and other crimes of that eategorj-; (2) to introduce into the Philippines all reforms necessary for correcting in an effect- ive and absolute manner the evils which for so many years had oppressed the coun- try in political and administrative ali'airs; and (3) an indenmity of $800,000, paya- ble at the following dates: A letter of credit of the Spanish Filipine Bank for $400,000 against the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank, in Hongkong, was to be delivered to SeuorAguinaldo on the same day that he should leave Biak-va-Bato, where he had established his headquarters, and should embark on the steamer furnished by the Spanish Government. This letter of credit was, in point of fact, delivered; $200,000 was to be paid to the said Sefior Aguinaldo as soon as the revolutionary general, Senor Ricarte, should receive his telegram ordering him to give up his arms, with an inventory thereof, to the commissioner designated by his excellency the Governor and Captain-General, i:)on Fernando Primo de Rivera; and the remaining $200,000 should be due and payaVde when the peace should be a fact, and it should be under- stood that peace was a fact when the Te Deum should be snug by order of his excel- lency the Governor and Captain-General of the Philippines. Seuor Aguinaldo complied in every respect, so far as he was concerned, with the peace agreement. But the Spanish Government did not observe a similar conduct, and this has been deplored and still is deeply deplored by the Philippine people. The general amnesty which was promised has remained completely a dead letter. Many Philippinos are still to be found in Fernando Po and in Aarious military prisons in Spain sutiering the grievous consequences of the punishment inflicted upon them unjustly and the inclemencies of the climate to which they are not accustomed. Some of these unfortunates who succeeded in getting out of those prisons and that exile are living in beggary in S])ain without the Government furnishing them the necessary means to enalde them to return to the Philippines. In vain has the Philippine public waited for the reforms also promised. After the celebration of the compact of June and the disposition of the arms of the revolution- ists, the Governor-General began again to inflict on the defenseless natives of tin- country arbitrary arrest and execution without jiidicial proceedings solely on the ground that they were merely suspected of being secessionists; proceedings which indisputably do not conform to the law and Christian sentiments. In the matter of reforms, the religious orders again began to obtain from the Spanish Government their former and absolute power. Thus Spain pays so dearly for her fatal errors in her own destiny. In exchange for the loftiness of mind with which Senor Aguinaldo has rigidly carried out the terms of the peace agreement. General Primo de Rivera had the cynicism to state in the Congress of his nation that he had promised no reform to Sehor Aguinaldo and his army, but that he had only given them a piece of bread in order that thev might be able to maintain themselves abroad. This was reechoed in the foreign press, and Seuor Aguinaldo was accused of having allowed himself to be bought with a handful of gold, selling out his country at ihe same time. There were published moreover in those S])anish periodicals caricatures of Seuor Aguinaldo, which i^rofoundly wounded his honor and his patriotism. TREATY OF PEACE. 431 Senor Agtiinalflo and the otlier revolutionists who reside in Hono^kong agreed not to take out one cent of the $400,000 deposited in the Chartered Bank and the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank, the only amount which Senor Aguinaldo received from the Spanish Goveriimeut on account of the stii)niated indemnity, but to use it for arms in order to carry on another revolution in the Philippines in case the Spanish Governmeut should fail to carry out the jieace agreement, at least in so far as it refers to general amnesty and reforms. All the above-named revolutionists, Senor Aguinaldo setting the example, resolved to deuy themselves every kind of comfort during their stay in Hongkong, living in the most modest style, for the purpose of preventing a reduction by one single cent of the above-named sum of $400,000 which they set aside exclusively for the benefit of their country. LAWSUIT BETWEEN DON J. ARTACIIO AND DON E. AGUINALDO. Seiior Artacho, induced by the father solicitor of the Dominicans and the consul- general of Spain, filed in the courts of that colony a summons against Don E. Aguinaldo, asking for a division of the above-mentioned $400,000 between those re" olutionary chiefs who resided in Hongkong ; Artacho and three others who joined the revolution in its last days and rendered little service to it were the only ones who desired adivision of thismoney, whereas forty-seven revolutionaries, manyof whom were most distinguished chiefs, were opposed to it, supporting the resolution which Senor Auuinaldo had previously t.aken in regard to it. Senor Aguinaldo, in order to avoid all scandal, did everything possible to avoid appearing in court answering the summons of Artacho, who,' realizing that by his conduct he had made himself hated by all Filipinos, agreed in a friendly arrangement to withdraw his suit, receiving in exchange $.5,000. In this way were frustrated the intrigues of the solicitor of the Dominican order and of the Spanish consul, who endeavored at any cost to destroy the $400,000 by dividing it np. Artacho is now on trial before a judicial court on charges preferred by various revolutionists for ofieuses which can be proved; lie has no influence in the revolu- tionary party. PROCLAMATION OF GENERAL AGUINALDO, MAY 24, 1898. Filipinos: The great nation North America, cradle of true liberty, and friendly on that account to the liberty of our people, oppressed and subjugated by the tyr- anny and despotism of those who have governed us, has come to manifest even here a protection which is decisive as well as disinterested toward us, considering ns endowed with sufficient civilization to govern by ourselves this our unhappy land. To maintain this so lofty idea, which we deserve from the now very powerlul nation North America, it is our duty to detest all those acts which belie siuh an idea as pillage, robbery, and every class of injury to persons as well as to things. With a view to avoiding international conflicts during the period of our campaign, I order as follows: . -, ,. ^t.. j h Article I. The lives and property of all foreigners, including Chinese and all Spaniards, who either directly or indirectly have joined in taking arms against us, are to be respected. Art. II. The lives and property of those who lay down their arms are also to be respected. , n i i a Art. III. Also are to be respected all sanitary establishments and ambulances, ana likewise the persons and things which may be found in either one or the other, including the assistants in this service, unlfss they show hostility. Art. iV. Those who disobey what is prescribed in the preceding articles will be tried by summary court and put to death, if such disobedience shall cause assassina- tion, fire, robbery, and violation. Given at Cavite the 24th of May, 1898. Emilio Aguinaldo. Appendix — Continued. aguinaldo's proclamations. Page. B.— June 18, 1898, establishing dictatorial government 432 C— J uue 20, 1«9omleuce of the govern- ment with them; the second will study all questions relating to the formation and organization of our navy, and the fitting out of such expeditions as the necessities ot the revolution may re(|uire; and the third will have charge of everything relat- ing to the internal and external commerce, and the preliminary work which may be ne( essary for making treaties of commerce with other nations. Art. V. The secretaryship of war will be divided into two bureaus; one of war, properly speaking, and the other of ]>ublic works. The first bureau will be subdivided into four sections — one of campaigns, another of military justice, another of military administration, and another of military health. The section of campaigns will have charge of the appointment and formation of the certificates of enlistment and service of all who serve in the revijjutionary mili- tia; of the direction of campaigns; the preparation of plans, works of fortification, and preparing reports of battles; of the study of military tactics for the ;irmy and the organization of the general staff, artillery, and cavalry; and, finally, of the determination of all the other questions concerning the business of campaigns and military operations. The section of military justice will have charge of everything relating to courts of war and military tribunals, the appointment of judges and counsel, and the determination of all questions of military^ justice. The section of military adminis- tration will be charged with the furnishing of food and other supplies necessary lor the use of the army, and the section of military health will have charge of every- thing relating to the hygiene and healtli fulness of the militia. Ai4T. VI. The other secretaryships will be divided into such bureaus as their branches may require, and each bureau will be subdivided into sect ons according to the nature and importance of the work it has to do. Art. VII. The secretary will inspect and supervise all the work of his secretary- ship and will determine ail questions with the president of the go\ eninient. At the head of each bureau will be a director, and in each section an officer por- vided with such number of assistants and clerks as may be specified. Art. VIII. The president will ap]ioiut the secretaries of his own free choice, and in concert with them will appoint all the subordinate officials of each secretaryship. In order that in the choice of persons it may be possible to avoid ia\oritism it must be fully understood that the good name of the country and the triumph of the revolution r(>quire the services of persons truly capable. Art. IX. The secretaries may be present at the revolutionary congress, in order that they may make any motion in the name of the president or may be interpo- lated publicly by any one of the re]ucsentative8; but when the question which is the object of the motion shall be put to vote, or after the interpolation is ended, they shall leave and shall not take part in the vote. AiiT. X. The president of the government is the personification of the Philippine people and in accordance with this idea it shall not be possible to hold him responsi- blto while he tills the office. TREATY OP PEACE. 435 His term of office ehpine8, since they are the means designated by Providence to maintain the equililiriuui between peoples, sustaining the weak and restraining the strong, to the end that by thCvSe means shall shine forth aud be realized the most complete justice in the indefinite progress of humanity. Given at Bacoor, in the Province of Cavite, the 6th day of August, 1898. The president of the revolutionary government. Emilio Aguinaldo. H. STATEMENT. The undersigned chiefs of towns comprising the provinces hereinafter named, elected as such in the manner prescribed by the decree of the 18th and the instruc- tions dated the 20th of June last, after having been confirmed in their respective offices by the president of the government and having taken the prescribed oath before him, have met in full assembly previously called for that purpose, for the purpose of discussing the solemn proclamation of Philippine independence. TREATY OF PEACE. 439 The discussion took place with the prudence and at the lengtli which so important a question demands, and after suitable deliberation the following declarations were unanimoiislv adopted: ,• j The Philippine revolution records, on the one hand, brilliant feats of arms realized with singular courage by an improvised army almost without arms, and, on the other, the no le^s notable fact that the people after the coml)at have not entered upon great excesses nor pursued the enemy further, but have treated him on the contrary with generosity and humanity, retuVniug at once to their ordinary and tranquil life. ^ Such deeds demonstrate in an indisputable manner that the Philippine people was not created, as all believed, for the sole purpose of dragging the chains of servitude, but that it has a perfect idea of order and justice, shuns a savage life, and loves a civilized life. j. i • But what is most surprising in this people is that it goes on giving proofs that it knows how to frame laws commensurate with the progress of the age, to resi)ect them and obey them, demonstrating that its national customs are not repugnant to this progress; that it is not ambitious for power, nor honors, nor riches, aside from the rational and just aspirations for a free and independent life and inspired by the most lofty idea of patriotism and national honor; and that in the service of this idea and for the realization of that aspiration it has not hesitated in the sacridce of life and fortune. These admirable— and more than atlmirable, these wonderful— deeds necessarily engender the most lirm and ineradicable convictions of the necessity of leaving the Philippines free and independent, not only because they desire it, but because they are prepared to defend to the death their future and their history. Filipinos are fullv convinced that if individuals have need of material, moral, and intellectual perfection in order to contribute to the welfare of their fellows, peoples require to have fullness of life; they need liberty and independence in order to contribute to the indetiuite progress of mauiiiud. It lias struggled and will struggle with decision and Constance, without ever turning back or retrograding before the obstacles which may arise in its path, and with unshakable faith that it will obtain justice and fultill the laws of Providence. And neitii'er will it be turned aside from the course it has hitherto followed by the unjustitiable imprisonment, tortures, assassinations, and the other vandal acts com- mitted by the Spaniards against the persons of peaceful and defenseless Filipinos. The Spaniards believe themselves released from every legal obligation toward the Filipinos for the sole reason that the belligerency of the revolution has not been recognized, taking no account of the fact that over and above every law, whether written or prescriptive, are placed with imprescriptible characters culture, national honor, and humanity. No, the Filipinos have no need ever to make use of reprisals, because they seek independence with culture, liberty with unconditional respect for the law as the organ of justice, and a name puritied in the crucible of human sentiments. . . • . .1 In virtue of the foregoing considerations the undersigned, giving voice to the unanimous aspiration of the people whom they represent and performing the offices received from them and the duties pertaining to the powers with which they are invested — Proclaim solemnly, in the face of the whole world, the independence ot the Phil- ippines; ^ • -, i r i.1 Recognize and respect Senor Don Emilio Aguinaldo y Famy as president ot the revolutTonarv government organized in the manner prescribed by decree of the 23d and instructions of the 27th of June last, and beg the said president that he will ask and obtain from foreign governments the recognition of its belligerency and independence, not only because this act constitutes a duty of justice, but also because to no one is it permitted to contravene natural laws nor stifle the legitimate aspiration of a people for its amelioration and digiiitication. Given in the Province of Cavite the 1st day of August of the year of our Lord 1898, and the first vear of Philippine independence. Follow the signatures of the local presidents of the provinces, of Cavite and many- others. ^ ^ # * * * * * The undersigned, secretary of the interior, certifies: That the present document is a literal copy of the original, which is deposited in the secretaryship under his charge, in proof of which he signs it with the approval of the president of the revo- lutionary government in Bacoor the 6th day of August, 1898. V. B. El Presidente del G. R. Emilio Aoiinaldo. El Secretario del Interior, Leandro Ibarra. 440 TREATY OF PEACE. J. letter from senor aguinaldo to general anderson. July 23, 1«98. Brig. Gen. T. M. Andi;h80n, U. S. A. etc., ('a rife: In answer to the letter of your excellency dated the 22d of the present month, I have the honor to manifest to you the following: That even supposing that the effects existing in the storehouse of Don Antonio Osorio were subject to capture, when I established myself in the j)laza (town) of Cavite Admiral Dewey authorized me to disjiose of everythiug that I might find in the same, inclnding the arms which the Spanish left in the arsenal. But as he was aware that said effects belonged to the personal property [ownership] of a Filipino, who traded with them by virtue of a contribution to the Spanish Government, 1 would not have touched them had not the owner placed them at my disposition for the purposes of the war. 1 came from Hongkong to prevent my countrymen from making common cause with the Spanish against the North Americans, pledging before my word to Admiral Dewey to not give place to [to allow] any internal discord, because [being] a judge of tiieir desires I had the strong conviction that I would succeed in both objects, establishing a government according to their desires. Thus it is that at the beginning I proclaimed the dictatorship, and afterwards, when some of the provinces had already liberated themselves from Spanish domina- tion, I established a revolutionary government that to day exists, giving it a demo- cratic and poinilar character as far as tlie abnormal circumstances of war permitted, in order that they (the provinces) might be justly represented and administered to their satisfaction. It is true tliat my government has not been acknowledged by any of the foreign powers; but we expect that the great North American nafion, which struggled Hrst for its independence and afterwards for the abolition of slavery, and is now"actually struggling for the independence of Cuba, would look upon it with greater benevo- lence than any other nation. Because of this we have always acknowledged the right of preference to our gratitude. Debtor to the generosity of the North Americans and to the favors which we have received through Admiral Dewey, and l)eing more desirous than any other of pre- venting any conflict which would have as a result foreign intervention, which must be extremely prejudicial not alone to my nation, but also to that of your excellency, I consider it my duty to advise you of the uudesirability of disembarking North American troops in the places conquered by the l^ilipinos from the Sjjanish, with- out previous notice to this goveruinent, because, as no formal agreement yet exists between the two nations, the l^hilijjpine i)eople might consider the occupation of its territories by North American troops as a violation of its rights. I comprehend that without the destruction of the Spanish s(|uadrou the Phillip- pine revoiution would not have advanced so rai)id]y. Because of this I take the liberty of indicating to your excellency the necessity tliat liefore disembarking troops you should connnunicate in writing to this government the places that are to be occupied and also the object of the occupation, that the people may be advised in due form, and (thus; prevent the commission of any transgressions against friend- ship. I can answer for my people, because they have given me evident proofs of their absolute confidence in my government, but I can not answer for that which another nation, whose friendship is not well guaranteed, might inspire in it(the])eo- ple); and it is certain that I do this not as a menace, but as a further proof of the true and sincere friendship which I have always professed to the North American people in the complete security that it will find itself completely identified with our cause of liberty. I am, with respect, your obedient servant, Emilio Aguinaldo. STATEMENT OF MR. JOHN FOUEMAN, OCTOBER 8, 1898, BEFORE THE UNITED STATES PEACE COMMISSION AT PARIS. Examination by the Chairman: Q. Where do you live?— A. No. 1, Dodge place, Eegent's Barracks, London. Q. You are the author of a book published about 1891 on the Philip- pine Islands'^ — A. Yes, sir. Q. How long have you lived in the Philippine Islands?— A. Sum- ming up the ditierent times of being there, eleven years. Q. Covering what period of time?— A. Thirteen years and a halt, ofi'and on; altogether, eighteen years. Q. About what years were you there?— A. I was there from Septem- ber, 1880, to the middle of 1885. Q. That would be about five years?— A. Yes, sir. Then I was away six months; 1 made a voyage anmnd the world, and I returned to the islands and remained there another four years, until the end of April, 1889. Q. That would make nine years?— A. Yes, sir. Then I went to China; was there two years, and then I went out in 1893: and was there, really, in the islands about six months. Q. Six months in 1893?— A. Yes, sir; and then again in 1894 about six months. In ]89r> 1 was again fully six mouths, a little over jier- haps, and in 189G again six mouths— quite six months— nearer seven, perhaps. Q. Then you have been there as late as 1896?— A. Oh, yes. I left the islands in 189(3— the last week of November— and the rebellion broke out on tlie HOth of August that year. Q. The last insurrection was in progress, then, when you left?— A. It was; yes, sir; about three months when I left. Q. In which of the islands have you hved?— A. I had my fixed resi- dence in Manila, bur, of course, I traveled all over the islands. I have been practically all over the island of Luzon, of course; several times over in a number of years; I have been everywhere in Negros; I have been all over Panay ; I have been in the Island of Zelu or Jolo, and was a guest of the Sultan. I have been in three fourths of the places occupied by the Spaniards in Mindanao. I went on foot from Zam- boanga, rig'ht through the Province of Zamboanga, up to Misamis on the north. Q. What was your business or occupation while thus in the islands?— A. I had an interest in a firm in the city of London of engineers, princi- pally for sugar machinery, but everything in the line of machinery for the development of colonies. I had an interest in the concern, and I practically did all the foreign work connected with it. Q. Did you also make some explorations and examinatious with a view to writing the book you afterwards wrote? — A. Yes, sn\ I visited a great many parts of the islands with the intention of recording my 441 442 TREATY OF PEACE. observations. My position was independent, you may say. Of course, I was working for my own account, tliat of the firm, and of course I was quite at liberty to take any course I cliose. Q. You became interested in tlie islands?— A. Yes, sir; I became extremely interested. No book had been written which rightly repre- sents the islands, or pretends to, before this since the year 1859, when a German named, I think, Jago wrote one. Q. What, from this acquaintance with the islands, do you say as to the character of the inhabitants, and if there aredifterences among the ]ieople give us an idea of them? — A. The most plastic nature, that which can be most easily molded and attracted, and drawn to accom- modate themselves to and a(tcept a new system which might be estab- lished for their future government, would be certainly the inhabitants of the Island of Luzon. The central islands, known as the Vizcayas Islands Q. Please point out the names of those islands? — A. That is Luzon, and these here are the Vizcayas, Panay, and Negros, and Cebu and Bojol and Leyte and Samar. That is Tagal. Those islands there and there and there [indicating on mapj are known as Vizcayas. Mindanao is si)oken of separately. Q. Is Miudora spoken of with them? — A. No; that is spoken of separately. Q. Name the Vizcayas Islands? — A. Panay Island, Negros Island, Cebu, Bojol, Leyte, Samar, and Masbate. They are considered the Vizcayas Islands. Mr. Eeid : Q. Will you kindly point out theSulu Archipelago at the same time? — A. There is the Island of Zulu, called by the Spaniards Jolo, the Sultan of which resides in a place called Maybun. The Chairman : Q. How far does his jurisdiction extend? — A. Of coarse the Span- iards have tried to reduce it to his own island, but the inhabitants of this island of Mindanao give allegiance to him and acknowledge him as their chief, and also the Batnos tribes on the island of Palawan, and the islands running down to the island of Bill>aoc there, upon wliich faces the Spanish settlements of this coast, including uiose on the island of Bilbaoc. This island is. in my opinion, worthless. Q. What island? — A. Palawan. Because the whole west coast can not be approached to within less timn three miles, except by very care- ful navigation. Here and there there are a fVw shoals, but such ex- tremely careful navigation is required that it is practically useless. The island of Palawan produces very little. I have been across the island. I went with bearers and walked across it. Q. You would divide the group into Tagals, who ii. habit Luzon and Miudora — the tribes who occupy the central islands you have named; and the tribes in the island of Mindanao and the Zulu group as another group and class of inhabitants? — A. Yes, sir. Mr. Davis : Q. How are they made? — A. They have no special denomination. In Spanish they speak of them always as the Moros or Moors, because they are Mussulmans, and therefore follow the same religion as the inhabitants of Morocco. They are also spoken of as Moros from the dominion of the Moors in Spain, which lasted nearly eight centuries. TREATY OF PEACE. 443 Mr. Day: Q. Will you take up tlie three clnsses aud give, briefly, tlie cliarac- teristics of each? — A. The Tagals are of a very easy, plastic nature — willing in their nature, I should say, to accommodate themselves and take up any new established dominion which might be decided upon, and I think they would fall into any new System ado])ted. The inhab- itants of the central islands, or Viscayas, are more uncouth, decidedly less hospitable, and somewhat more averse to associations and relations with outsiders tiian the Tagals — those of Luzon — but I think they would easily come under sway. They want a little more pressure and -would have to be guided, more closely watched, and perhaps a little more of the iron hand used than in Luzon. There is a very peculiar class in the island of Panay, in the neighbor- hood of Iloilo and in the Province of lloilo. They are Chinese half- castes, the issue of Chinese men and Vizcayas women, and they hold the trade, as far as it is in native hands outside the foreign houses, with Iloilo. They are called Chinese mestizos or half-castes. They are very abrupt and not very sociable, but have no power, can not organize themselves, could not do anything, and, of course, would have to knuckle under to anything that might be established. You would probably find them rather cantankerous at first. They are perfectly civilized so far as the civilization of the Philippines goes; they are the cream of the civilization of the island of Panay, and they trade there and deal with the foreign houses. They are the middlemen, and they practically inhabit two towns near Iloilo, viz, Molo and Jaro. In the island of Negros there are very few persons of importance or who have much to say in their ruling matters, because they do not care to live iu that island more than they can help. They look upon it as a planting land and do not care to live there. Many of the planters who own estates in Negros live in these towns of Molo and Jaro. Negros Island is the richest island in the archi- pelago for the production of sugar. It was regarded as a terra incog- nito certainly up to the year 30 of this century. It seemed to be a sort of refuge for those who ran away from justice, or injustice, or perse- cution. But about the year 1852 or 1833 steam navigation was first introduced into the archipelago. It was the first time they had running the interisland steamers, and the planters, therefore, being able to chase away the Mussulmen from the south, who constantly raided Negros, they really made life more possible for settlers on this island, and things quieted down. They appointed a governor, and he had his residence at Quilo Milan. The governor was murdered because he was going to make raids into the interior of the island and brush it up gen- erally, and build roads, etc., and as he was to do this so as to cost nothing to the state, he seized people on the pretext of being criminals and on all sorts of pretexts to get large gangs of men to utilize them for the purpose of making these roads. Of course the most of them were not criminals, and they saw that they were going to have a hard time, and so they dispatched the governor. Another governor was selected, and wheii he heard what had been done there he did not want to go. Q. And he did not go there?— A. No, sir; and so he removed the seat of government to Baquil. Q. What are the characteristics of the inhabitants of Mindanao and the Zulu Archipelago? — A. From the beginning of the occupation of the islands by the Spaniards in 1751 they used to make periodical piratical raids upon the other islands. They did not interfere with 444 TREATY OF PEACE. Spauish dominioTi, because tlie Spaniards Lad never liitlierto pretended to trouble themselves much about the Vizcayas or central group. But the Spaniards thought it would be an easy matter to \vi])e out these people in a little while, in an easy campaign, but they found they had. oi)ei]ed up a hornet's nesr. They went down to attack these peo])le, known as the Moros, and ever since tliat time these people have unide a dead set upon them. They never left them any i)eace. One time they came with their craft, known as vinitos, right up the Bay of Manila, though they have never touched the city, and from that time until year before last there has been constant trouble with these peoi^le. They have been determined that they would not be subjected by the Spaniards at least. The last little war — and it became quite a custom, a thing understood, that almost every Governor-General should win an honor, a decoration, a medal, or something of that sort in his career by making war in Mindanao — the last war was known as the cam])aign of Maraout in the north of Mindanao. That was year before last, and so it would prob- ably have been the custom forever. They will not acknowledge the Spaniards; they positively refuse their dominion. The S])aniards kill a few and break uj) some ot their strongliolds, and then the thing goes on as before; they never will admit the Spaniards there. For other foreign- ers it is very diffeient. I know there are Germans tliere. There is one, whose name I think is Schultz, who, some years ago, was seized by the Spaniards for having introduced commodities and arms, etc., into the island. He was taken prisoner, and esca])ed into the interior and ingratiated himself with the natives so well that he received in marriage a Zulu wife, and I have seen his two nephews down there at Q. How far is Mindanao and the Zulu group under Spanish con- trol? — A. The Spaniards hold Zulu or Jolo town itself in Zulu Island. Frequently there are raids made into the town. When I was there on(;e, just a few days before they had made a swoop on the town and killed two or three ofiif-ers who were sitting outside a cafe, a drinking shop or shanty; and this used to go on all the time. Frequently it was so. They really do not hold on the island of Zulu more than the town itself. Q. How on the island of Mindanao? — A. They hold several little posts here — Zamboango,Cottabato,Butuwan, Misamis,Davao,Dapitan, etc. The latter is a small phice where they can go. Davao is on the Surigao coasts, and they have one or two missions along there. In the interior, nothing whatever. Q. Who controls the interior? — A. No one. It is in quite a ijrimitive state. Q. Inhabited by these tribes? — A. Yes, sir. Q. They are not subject to the Spaniards at all? — A. No, sir; they are really independent. I never heard that a Spaniard ever crossed the island from one side to the other. Q. You know the city of Manila pretty well? — A. Yes, sir. Q. How many people are there there? — A. I estimate about 400,000, including, of course, all the inhabitants, including (30,000 Chinese. The Chinese hold entire streets, and esi)ecially there is one street, the Calle del Rosalio, which is nine-tenths Chinese. Q. How would you divide the population, briefly, into classes — you have said there are 60,000 Chinese? — A. Yes, sir. I should say that, in normal times, there would be 6,000 Spaniards. There would be about 250 English; 250 to 300 Germans — I think they are rather in TREATY OF PEACE. 446 excess of the Eng^lish, There might be 300 British Indians, probably 5,000 Chinese half-castes born in Manila, and perhaps 50,000 Spanish half-castes. Q. By Spanish half-castes you mean the descendants of Spaniards who have married native women'?— A. V'es, sir. And a sprinkling of other foreigners, and the balance Tagal natives; of course, here and there, a few of all nations, Italians and otliers. The Tagal natives are extremely hospitable. It is a notable feature that there is no such thing as a hotel in the whole of the island of Luzon ontside of Manila. It is an extraordinary thing — they are so hospitable that the extent can not be realized by anyone who has not been there. Mr. Frye: Q. Tlien there is no difficulty in obtaining hospitality anywhere?— A. Oh, no; for anyone not a .Spaniard, and tnen a Spaniard, can find means to get a lodging. Anyone not a Spaniard can receive hospitality anywhere except among the hostile tribes. Mr. Eeid: Q. Can they tell a Spaniard any way except by the language?— A. Oh, yes. The Chairman: Q. How many people are there on the island of Luzon? — A. I think the island of Luzon is thinner populated than is generally considered. I do not consider that there are more than a million and a quarter. Q. How many natives on the islands"?— A. Subjected natives who have accepted the dominion of Spain and are nominally Konian Cath- olics, about 5,000,000. Those who have not accepted the dominion, who have never been subjected, and wlio are supposed to be the aborigines, and unconquered tribes, including the Mussulmeu of Mindanao, another million— 6,000,000 total. Mr. Frye : Q. 11,000,000?— A. Oh, no; 5,000,000 Eoman Catholics, subjected, and 1,000,000 more; G,000,000 in all. The Chairman: Q. Will you explain what are the relations of the church and the ecclesiastical orders to the people and the government ? — A. The island was first discovered in 1520 by Magellanes, who died there fighting the battles of the new vassal of the King of Spain. The islands were then abandoned for about fifty years. They were called the Philippine Islands in honor of Prince Philip, son of the King. Fifty years passed and a priest called , who resided in the city of Mexico, pressed the matter of the annexation of the islands for the saving of souls upon the King very forcibly. At last the King gave way, and orders were issued for an expedition to leave Mexico for that purpose. The man appointed to lead the expedition was Q. What we wish to know is the present relations rather than the history. What is the relation of the church to day to laud titles, to the people, and to the government?— A. There are four orders of monks, the Augostinos, or Augustinian friars, the Dominican friars, theEecolletto friars, and the Franciscan friars. These are the monks who are alleged to have usurped the incumbencies and are vicars of parishes. In addi- tion to them are the Jesuits, who now, for some years past, have had nothing whatever to do but to take care of the education of the people. There is not an> thing like the same animosity against them that there 446 TEEATY OF PEACE. is to the others, and I ain inclined to think tliat the people look npon them very well. They do not iuteifere with the personal liberty of the people. Mr. Reid. Q. The morality of the Jesuits is better, also, is it not? — A. Yes, sir; it is very good. There is nothing to be said against them now. The head of tlie church is the archbishop. The archbishop is usually, but it is not absolutely necessary that he shoahl be, an individual of one of these orders. The immediate chief of each of these orders is called a provincial. The provincial is the business man of the order, and these provincials are not very much subjected — they are nominally, but not very much really — to the archbishop. In fact, they sometimes, it is well known, have shown insolence and insubordination to the arch- bishop. The present archbishop seems to have very little hold upon them; what the provincials waiited to do they did. The case against the friars is this, and it showed itself in a little outbreak, called the rebellion of Oavite, in 1872. The secular clergy — these monks are the regular ordained clergy — claimed, under the conditions of the Council of Trent, that these monks, as missionaries, were not entitled to hold the incumbencies; that by a papal bull which settled this matter when it was raised these monks were allowed to be only missionaries, and could only open and establish missions, but that when these missions became parishes and when the people around them adopted the Catholic faith, they should then retire from these parishes and the incumbency should be taken by the secular (;lergy. Q. What do you mean by "incumbency"? — A, The position occupied by the parish priest — the incumbency of the parish. Q. The titles to lands are usually in the hands of these monks? — A. Yes, sir; they hold large tracts. Q. How did they get these lands? — A. Usually they simply took possession — appropriated it. They have in their orders what are called "brothers." There are "fathers "of the orders and "brothers." "Broth- ers" are simply i)ersons who have taken certain vows, but who are not allowed to celebrate mass — simply workmen — and they put these in charge to take possession of the land. Q, They took possession. Did they have no decree from the Spanish Government, or the Governor-General, authorizing them to take posses- sion of the land? — A. iSTot at first. Subsequently they received decrees, but never could they get title deeds, owing to the opposition of the natives. The lands taken were not devoid of settlers, but most of them were simply squatters, and in some instances they passed several gener- ations of squatters. Q. Practically, were they not all of that class? — A. Practically they were, as there was no one to give title deeds. The Chairman : Q. They do have title deeds? — A. Yes; but it was such a long, pon- derous matter that they have given up the idea, Q. These titles were not recorded? — A. No, sir. Q. How did it work or was it operated? — A. They let the land out in parcels for rent, called canons. The man to whom they were rented held them generally for three years — that is, usually, I think — over all these estates three years' holdings. No guaranty of any kind passed. At the end of the three years all improvements made by the man in TREATY OF PEACE. 447 possession, the tenant, were capitalized by the corporation, and tliey say that they regard the laud is of so much more capital value, on which they base the rent, and require a higher rental. So really they steal the fruits of the labor of the tenant, and they charge a new rent on the new valuation, and this new valuation has come from the work of the tenant. The natives kick very much at this; it is a very sore point witli them. In the Province of Laguna, where the Dominican corporation had their lands, they even pretended so far as to say that cane mills and machinery for crushing the cane should be left on the estate if you go out at the end of your three years and do not renew the lease — that you should leave them the machinery. A very great question arose, and then tliere appeared a certain man called Dr. llizal, who was exe- cuted in the first week of last November or the week previous, and he went down to his native town and raised this question as to title straightway with the Dominican order, and he said, " Show us your title deeds; it will satisfy me and the people around here and it will be better for yourselves, because it will restore peace and order and it will not do you any harm;" and they coald not show their title deeds. Q. Are all these lands held in this way, or do the natives have some holdings of their own? — A. Oh, yes; here and there some of the natives have holdings of their own. Q. What proportion are held in this way? — A. It does not amount to very much; 3 per cent probably. Mr. Reid: Q. Three per cent of all the lands in Luzon constitute the whole holdings of these corporations? — A. Yes, sir; it would not amount to more than a thirtieth, I think. Q. What per cent of the cultivated or valuable land? — A. I am speaking of the cultivated, valuable land; 3 per cent, not more than that. The Chairman: Q. The rest held by natives?— A. Yes, sir; and by Spaniards, and I suppose there are possibly six estates held by foreigners not Spaniards. Mr. Reid : Q. What is the size of these estates in English acreage? — A. Not large. What is called a large estate there would be about 3,000 acres. That would be considered a large estate. The Chairman : Q. What do you know of the moral character of these friars; how do they conduct themselves in that respect? — A. A very large i)er- centage of them lead loose lives. They encroach upon the virtue of the women. In the towns, for that purpose, thev get up what they call a "Cofradia." They will call a thing a "Cofradia of St. Paul" or "St. Joseph," and they get women to join, and these women really become the servants of the priests. They do not, of course, say that it is that, but that is what it really amounts to, and they are called upon every once in a while for a "Cofradia," and I knew a place in Negros where they taught the women to consider it (piite an honor to clean out the parish priest's house, and in this way they have the women at their call, and there are a great many, a very great many of the sons and daughters of the priests throughout the islands. There is no secrecy about thisj they do not tell it in whispers, and the natives allow their 448 TREATY OF PEACZ. daugliters to marry the sons of these priests freely. They do not seem to mind it much. I remember one notable case. I was staying with a friend of mine down in Laguimance Q, In the island of Luzon? — A. Yes, sir. My friend's name is Henry George Brown. He lives now at Saffron -Walden in Essex, England. I have known him about seventeen years, and I was staying at his place, and a letter came from the corporation, saying that Father So-and-So is going to pass through your town on his way to Tamina, due north of this place, and will you please take charge of his goods and parcels, and see that they are sent on to Tamaua. I was there at the time the small steamer came in, and a drenching rain came down, and simply drenched the things, and Brown said that it would be a good act to open these things and dry them, and so we had the cases opened and the things spread out to dry, and he called to me and said, "Just look here; is this not astonishing?" and he showed me some filtliy prints, photographic slides for a sort of kaleidoscope arrange- ment, slides and prints of a most filthy nature. He said: "I show you this because it does not seem possible that, coming in the package of a priest, these things could be possible." He said it was no business of ours, but that he showed them to me for their moral effect, and I men- tioned it in my book. And that is the man who was to take charge of the souls of the parish he was appointed to. That man liad been turned out of the parish he had because he was so obnoxious; he was simply a human beast. There was another case. When I first went to Manila there was quite a hubbub about a certain priest called Pierre, who held a parish in Pampanga Province, and he had beaten a boy to death, so he was taken away from there and sent farther north to a town called San Miguel de Mayamo. I had occasion to go to that town and they told me about it — it was notorious. A woman came to see him, and he kicked her in the abdomen and she fell down badly hurt, and died. This became too notorious, and they removed him from there. It was talked about freely, what a scandal it was, etc. That was when I arrived, seventeen years ago, and they said, "Is it possible we are going to have these priests free from justice, and that they can do as they like with usf so he was taken away and sent down to the prov- ince of Oavite, aiid there the rebels caught him in this last rebellion, and, more to ridicule him than anything else, I think, they made him their bishop. They said, " Mind what you do. You can be our bishop and take charge of our clergy, but don't you attempt anything behind our backs." He thought he was quite safe, and he was found taking sketches and notes of their strongholds. He had already made arrange- ments with the monks for their delivery. They caught him, and they said it was treachery — he had made negotiations with the Augustine monks in Manila — and after proper trial he was condemned to death. He was tied to a post, without a hat and without water, and died of sunstroke, fever, and hunger, and that was his end. And no one regrets it. Q. How much influence on the civil government and the administra- tion of the courts do these orders have? — A. The priests can not be summoned to an ordinary court, Jior can they pursue others in court; they can not appear in court at all, but when a priest makes a declara- tion it is accepted as a fact, and no proof is necessary. It is quite suf- ficient that Father So-and-so signs it. The administration of Manila maybe regarded as purely and simply the executive of the priests, which are the ruling order there. Over and over again Governors-General TREATY OF PEACE. 449 liave been sent away on the recnmmendation of the monastic orders in recent times. At the end of 189:i I was in Spain, and the sou of Gen- eral Despujols came to visit me, knowing- that I was well acquainted with the country, and he told me that his father was going out as Govenor-General of the islands and he would like to have a cbat with me. I asked him how his father stood with the priests. He said he stood very well, that he would try to recognize their power and stand in harmony with them, and I said that if he did that he was all right. General Despujols went out, and I went out there in 1803, and he had just left. He had been eight mouths in power. Appointed for three years, at the end of eight months he had been obliged to clear out, from the influence of the monastic power. The main points against him were these: This man, Dr. Eizal, who went down and raised the point of the deeds, etc., with the monks, had been to Europe and had studied in Germany. He was a very clever man, quite an exception to the general rule, and had published three books against the priests— one called Noli me Tangere, another Filibustero, and another was a reproduction of a book written by a priest years ago, who was also an exception. For this he was looked down upon by the priests as a disturbing element. He came to Hongkong, and from there he was cajoled to Manila on the promise that he would not be molested. He went there to the Governor-General, but they detained his baggage and pretended that he carried incendiary leaflets for the purpose of raising a rebellion. The priests required that he should be executed, but the governor- general refused to allow it; said that it was utterly impossible that he should be executed for what he had written, and refused. All they could get out out of the governor was, "Very well, you are banished to the island of Mindanao." This is the place to which he was ban- ished, and where he remained for four years, Dapitan. I saw his little hut there on the bay, and visited him there. That displeased the priests very much. They had strife and questions between tliem and the governor-general, and the latter said, "I am going to see bow you are working," and, all of a sudden, he had a raid made upon the resi- dences of the Augustino monks in a place north of Manila, and liad the place suddenly seized and raided, and it is very well known that he found a printing press printing these same incendiary leaflets, and the priest who was employed in doing so was perfectly well known to everyone in Mailabau, to Americans and English, where there is a big sugar-refining establisliment owned by Americans and English, the English resident iu Manila and the Americans in Hongkong, and known personally to them. The man disappeared and was never seen again. I can not say where he went. These leaflets were seized, aiul from that moment the governor-general was a condemned man, and he left. I went out in 1893 and he was not there. Q. You regard these orders as the dominating power?— A. Yes, sir. General Blanco was out there in Manila, where 1 saw him nearly every day. He was there at the beginning of this insurrection iu 18D(). Tiie archbishop is the most bloodthirsty man there. I knew him perfectly well. I used to meet the priests and hear what they had to say, and they said that what Blanco had done did not please them at all; did not suit their view of it, though, of course, I had very little to say- nothing to say, in fact. But their com])laints were that General Blanco was not surticiently blnodtliirsty for them, and that is the reason he went away from there. Their idea was that he should take the few T P 29 450 TREATY OF PEACE. troops he had and spread fire and sword broadcast among all the Islands. And Blanco was practically exiled from there because he was not sufficiently bloodthirsty to satisfy the priests. Q. What can you tell us about the climate? — A. Of course, everyone must act on certain lines in all tropical countries, but I consider the climate excellent for a tropical country. Q. White men live there in comfort? — A. Perfectly. I never had any sickness there; I never knew what fever wasj I had only one little experience of it there, for a few days. Mr. Eeid : Q. Are there any prevalent fevers there? — A. People do get fever, but very seldom. Q. Is it a pernicious fever, such as they have in Cuba? — A. Oh, no; very light, indeed; and the natives will get a fever more often than Europeans; it is owing to their mode of living. Q. Is it a malarial fever? — A. No, sir; I consider malarial fever to be that which comes from the opening of new ground. Q. Would it be with chills? — A. Not malarial fevers, as I understand them. I was once at Vera Cruz, and I saw that there was a lot of fine land back of the city which was not used at all, and I asked why it was not utilized, and tliey explained to me that the minute they turned the sod the people were attacked by the fever and dropped down with it, and (lied within eight hours after. I never knew or heard of men being troubled from the opening of new ground in Manila or the Philippines. The Chairman : Q. Which is the best and farthest advanced of these islands? — A. Luzon I consider the most advanced, owing, of course, to the close asso- ciation with the Europeans. Q. More insurrections break out there. — A. Yes; and it is just because they are able to see other things. What they ask is perfectly just. Their insurrection is not from a love of quarreling or opposition to white men at all. There is no such thing as any hostility to white men; snch a thing does not exist. Q. What are the causes, briefly, of insurrections? — A. Very broadly speaking, the main cause is the persecution of the priests, their inter- ference in the little petty details of a man's life, his wife, his daughter, the constant persecution, the petty revenge. These parish priests interfere in a man's own home and household, in the interior workings of a man's house. And all of a sudden a priest will take a dislike for some little thing, or nothing, and then that man is marked, and period- ically the priest will take a piece of paper and write on it and say that he has reason to believe the individuals marked in the margin are — whatever he wants to call them — disturbers of the peace, etc., and will request that they be removed from his district, and the man will be taking his coffee in the morning, getting ready to go to his estate, and the civil guard will appear and say, "You are wanted." "What for?" "By order of the governor." And he is walked off, and if he shows the least disposition to dispute his arms are tied behind him and he iias to tramp, tramp, tramp, down, and down, and down to Manila. That is one of the points especially raised by Aguinaldo, that arbitrary power to arrest at any time simply on the name of the governor. Mr. Gray: Q. Has the person so arrested no chance for a judicial inquiry? — A. No, sir; the Governor- General has the exclusive power. TREATY OF PEACE. 451 The OhatrmAN : Q. And he takes the word of the friar? — A. Yes, sir. Mr. Rp]lD: Q. To where do they banish thera?— A. Generally to the south of Miudanac. The Chairman : Q. Is there any such thing as a fair administration of justice in the courts? — A. That is one of the greatest misfortunes, and as a foreigner I would make many sacrifices to avoid a cause in the courts. You might as well leave the islands. They will follow you to the last dollar, and the thing will go on as long as there is anything to be got. There is a remarkable instance of that in the case of the Hongkong and Shanghai bank, which had some question with the house of Jurado & Co. The question is still on. They went to court over it. The bank certaiidy did make a mistake in wishing to close down upon them for certain promissory notes before they were due, but they put it on the ground that the promissory notes had been indorsed by everybody and any- body, even by boys back of the counter. The thing came into court, and Jurado & Co. found themselves in bad shape, and it came out and back again, and went from civil court to criminal court, and sometimes one side would get the best of it and sometimes the other. The bank was shut up, and Mr. Townsend, the manager of the bank there, was notified that he must consider himself a prisoner. The consul protested against it, and he was ordered to be sent to Bombay or Calcutta as a persona non grata. He removed his things, and the whole thing was shut up. They sent for an English- man who was a machinist to pry the locks of the safe, and he said he could not do it. He was working on it for a week, and then said he could not do it, that he could not possibly pry these locks, and then they got up a little syndicate of natives, a little banker there whose name I forget, and some others, to personate the bank, and they thought they would be able to make a large claim out of it, and the last I heard of it the claim was for $930,000 Mexican, the claim made by this house of Jurado & Co., and they have kept on and can not get a settlement, and it is still pending. I bank myself with the bank. It has its offices in London at 31 Lombard street, and the brother of this man Jurado is also living in London, I believe in Chelsea, but his office is at 21 Billeter street. Q. They will never get a settlement?— A. No, sir; never. Years after this came up I was in Madrid, and I was going down by the offices of the minister of war, and I met this man Jurado from Lon- don, and he said the whole thing would be settled in a fortnight, and that he would get his claim. I went on to the minister of war, with AThom I had airengagement, and he said I was a little late, and I told him that I had been detained by meeting this man and his conversation with me, and that he said the whole thing would be settled in a fort- night. He asked me if 1 would meet the man again, and I said that I might, perhaps. "Tell him it is a lie, and that the matter is not settled yet." Mr. Gray: Q. Are those things managed by Spaniards?— A. Yes, sir. Mr. Reid : Q. Peninsulars?— A. Yes, sir. 452 TREATY OF PEACE. The OiiATRMAN : Q. Appointed by the home government? — A. Yes, sir. Q. \\liat about the other causes? — A. I think I have said enough about the priests. Mr. Frye: Q. Your remarks do not apply to the Jesuits? — A. No, sir. Mr. Davis : Q. Nor to the native priests? — A. No, sir. They want to clear out the priests, except the eJesuits as educators and schoolmasters. I do not think they would have much cause to object to them. Another thing- they object to is they have fifteen days' forced labor. Tlie natives must give fifteen days' labor, which they can redeem by paying so much money down. Every governor when he comes to a province inquires how many "polistas" or men subject to this tax there are, and then he goes to the towns and makes a bargain with the petty governors of the towns, the headmen of the towns, called "capitans:" "How much will you get together to liberate so many men?" And then the governor will put down, say 5,000 men's work, when, as a matter of fact, only a thousand work, and he pockets the money paid by tlie 4,000 to get off, and they object to this method very much, because it is a constant source of worry. Mr. Davis : Q. Is that compulsory labor? — A. Yes, sir; and can be redeemed by a ])ayment. Q. Enforced by punishment and slavery, if necessary? — A. Yes, sir. Mr. Frye: Q. To whom does the money go? — A. It is supposed to go to the Government, but it really goes only to the governor of the province. The Chairman : Q. He reports a great many, of whom only a few work, and pockets the money paid by the rest? — A. Yes, sir. Q. What other grounds of complaint? — A. There is the civil guard. The institution, theoretically, is very good; it is no doubt necessary to have a civil guard. Mr. Eeid : Q. What is the civil guard?— A. A mounted military police. Q. Natives? — A. The officers are Spaniards and the line natives. They call it the civil guard, what we call the constabulary, but their functions are in rural districts; there are none whatever in towns except where specially appointed, or in mere villages, but in the city of Manila they have no functions. In my opinion the civil guard is very necessary — theoretically, a very good thing. It is necessary to have an armed force, a sort of military police, to prevent raids by real brigands on property; I should be very sorry to see the civil guard disestablished. Mr. Davis : Q. Wherein is the abuse? — A. The abuse is this: An officer will send a patrol of two men to walk through the district, and generally to patrol it and see what is going on around there. These men, as they go along from hut to hut will steal — the people are miserably poor, and it is a great thing for them to lose two or three chickens or a little tobacco or TREATY OF PEACE. 453 sn^ar — and they go alono- and pick up anytliin.o- tliey like. They will go to a man and say: " Where is your docnnientof personal identity?" and the man is out in the field, perhaps, and he says: " I have not got it; I left it somewhere else, at the house," and they arrest him at once. He says : " Let me off." " How much ?" and he gets off if he pays. They do this on their own account. They will also trump up charges against the natives. If an officer of the civil guard can not get milk delivered as he wants it, or sugar, or whatever else he wants, or can not get a man to run his horses gratis, or anything whatever he wants for his use, he will trump up a charge, and the man is taken off to the princi- pal town of the province on some trumpery charge. Then they will allow a certain license in the cock fighting. It is supposed to be pro- hibited, but it is alleged that it is so set in the native character that it can not be eradicated, and on Sundays and certain other days they allow it, and the guards will go in, and if they do not get a certain per- centage of the bets, etc., they are down on them. They are also con- stantly interfering with the internal workings of the households amongst the natives. Q. Any other ground of complaint? — A. No, sir 5 so far as I know. Mr. Eeid : Q. What about the poll tax? — A. That is the sedula of which I have spoken. They give in exchange for the payment of the tax a state- ment of personal identity, and require every one to have one, from the Governor-General down. Q. How much does that amount to? — A. It is very light, in my opin- ion. The lowest grade, I think, is $1.25, Mexican, per annum, and it goes up to $25, the highest. It is not a very high tax. Of course, the general complaint, which does not press so very hard upon the natives, nor 80 particularly, is the impossibility of obtaining justice in the courts. Mr. Gray: Q. Is the poll tax confined to the adult males? — A. l^o; women as well 5 every adult male. Mr. Davis : Q. Children ? — A. They are put upon the list, but are not taxed until they are 18. Q. All persons over 18? — A. Yes, sir. You are, theoretically, counted as not existing unless you have the paper of personal identity. If you appear at any Government department, the first thing they ask is, "Where is your cedula?" If you can not show it, you are called '-non- existing." Mr. Frte : Q. Do you know anything about the port charges? — A. I can not give the rates, but I do not think it works hardly. Mr. Davis : Q. Do you know of the existence of any coal in any of the islands you have traveled on ? — A. In the Island of Cebu. Q. Was it good coal, or simply lignite? — A. Lignite, I think. Q. Is it coal that can be used for running steam vessels? — A. 'No; it ■would not be safe to use it alone for steam vessels. Q. It has been tried? — A. Yes, sir. Q. There is no other coal? — A. Yes, sir; in the island of Luzon. Q. Has it been worked? — A. Oh, yes; but I think it was a failure; and here and here [indicating on map]. That was much better coal. 454 TREATY OF PEACE. Q. Can that be used by itself for tlie operation of steam ves^e^s? — A. I do not think it would be safe; 1 do not think it is good enough. The Chairman: Q. What do you say, from what you know, as to these natives being capable of self-government if left to themselves? — A. To speak briefly, 1 say "No." The native has no expansive ideas; he can not go far enough to understand what it is to irale matters for the benefit of the common weal; he can not get past his own most personal interests, or his town, at the most. I think the greatest length he could go would be his own toven. But constructing laws, and obeying them, for the benefit of the commonwealth, I do not think he is capable of it at all. 1 think an attempt at a native government would be a fiasco altogether. Q. Do you think they would submit to a free government, well man- aged and equitable? — A. Oh, yes; of course, there would be some little dissatisfaction at first — it would not go down, I think, very agreeably at present; they would suffer a disai)i)ointment for the moment; but in a few months they would get over that. Aguiualdo has ideas now that he would like to be president. Mr. Gray: Q. Would the p{\ssing into the hands of an anti-Catholic power be a source of irritation? — A. No, sir; the matter of religion would not trouble them at all. The Chairman: Q. They submit to the present religion because it is a matter of policy to do so? — A. Yes, sir. Q. What do you say as to whether or not, if it should be concluded that Luzon should be separated from the rest of the group, a govern- ment could be maintained there of sufficient resources in that island for the maintenar.ce of government? In short, what would be the effect of seeking to establish a colonial government on the island of Luzon by itself first? — A. For the moment there would be a difficulty of labor. Nature is so prolific there that man can get along almost entirely with- out work. Of course in the city of Manila it is not the same, but the people from among whom you would draft for labor can almost live without work and get all they want, construct their houses entirely of wood, get wearing apparel to merely cover their nudity, and can get all they want to eat and drink without the necessity of working. But I think if Luzon were kept by yourselves, they would be so startled by the perfect paradise it would seem to them under the Gov- ernment of the United States that the natives of the other islands would hear of it from all sides. There would be steamers and canoes coming to and fro, and they would hear that they could walk the streets perfectly free, without being obliged to carry a piece of paper to show, and they would be as much astonished as was Aguinaldo when he found that he was on free soil and could open his mouth when he was at Hongkong. It was months before he could open his mouth to speak freely concerning the Philippines. I think that would draw large immigration fnuu the other islands to Luzon, assuming that the other islands were under Spanish dominion. Conditional on that, I think it would draw very large numbers from there, and that you would thus get over the labor ditficulty, and the island of Luzon, being worked up, would be sufficient to establish a very prosperous colony. I think it would be a very fine colony. Q. What would be its relation to other places in the East, such as TREATY OF PEACE. 455 Cliina and Japan? — A. There is a large trade in sugar for Hongkong, a large refinery at Taku; and sugar is also sent to Shanghai, and the hemp is also shipped, principally to America; probably 90 j)er cent of the hemp, quite DO per cent of the coll'ee. A disease has come to the coffee plants, and the trade was injured, and it has been wiped out almost entirely — is said not to exist. Q. Is a considerable part of the island said not to be cultivated — as yet undeveloped? — A. Yes, sir; I should say that a third of Luzon is virgin soil. Q. And is capable of being worked and developed? — A. Oh, yes. I. should say, taking into account the neglected estates — merelj^ possessed, not worked, because of no means of trans[)()rtation, merely owned by so-and-so — putting the two together, I should say one-half of Luzon is agricultural ly dormant. Q. What kind of crops can be grown there ? — A. The center of Luzon, called the Black Bush, is a very fine valley watered by the Bio Grande, a river rising in tlie center of Luzon and emptying itself in the extreme north of Luzon at a place called Taal, where steamers drawing 7 feet can get up. There is a steamer going up very occasionally, and you can go up 25 miles. I have been up it some distance myself, and it is navigable for a big boat, canoe — a canoe drawing a foot and a half draft. In such a canoe I have been very near to the source. With a little attention it would be made very navigable for light-draft craft. It runs through a very tine valley, and the specialty of that soil is the cultivation of tobacco. The other islands produce tobacco. Kegros produces tobacco, but it has been found that Luzon jjroduces the finest. I have smoked the tobacco of the Viscayas, and it is decidedly inferior to Luzon tobacco. It is the elements of the soil. There is no getting over it. The land is also very good for coffee in Luzon. Coffee has been found elsewhere, but not found to prosper so well in the other islands as in Luzon. Coffee has been tried in Cebu. I have seen it growing there, and Bell, Smith & Co. had some of this coffee brought down to see what they could make of it, but it has been proved not to be so good as that from Luzon. Luzon seems to have the very best soil for all products of the islands except sugar. Sugar seems most i^rolific in jSTegros, though I do not know that that makes much difference, as cane sugar cultiva- tion is a declining industry, and I think more attention should be given to coffee and tobacco than to the other, because cane sugar is being cut out entirely. As to tlie trouble of keeping Manila, assuming the other islands to be occupied by other nations, if it should be suggested that the Spanish should regain possession of those other islands, I would suggest that it should be on certain conditions, and they are as follows: First, the expulsion of the monastic ordecs and every individual apper- taining thereto, Spain to bind herself never to readmit them. Second, no impediment of any kind, passport, license, permit, or any official formality, is to be put in the' way of anyone, of any class whatever, who wishes to leave the islands, and every person shall be freely permitted to leave, excepting and in the case of a judicial warrant having been issued against him for some alleged crime. Third, a Philippine com- mercial treaty to be made between the United States of America and Spain specially regulating the commerce and trade interest in all its features relating to the interislaud traffic, i. e., the commercial relations between Luzon (American) and the other islands (Spanish). Fourth, no alienation without permission of the United States. Fifth. Spain not to impose any export duties. 456 TREATY OF PEACE - In regard to the second condition, it is not a mere theory; it has a l^ractical object. In it the free exit would mean that they should not put an impediment in the way of the people going to Luzon. It is most necessary, in my opinion, that that should be an expressed condition, that there should not be an impediment to the egres< of tliose people from those islands, and by it you will have the great advantage of get- ting over the labor trouble, and through immigration and propagation in a generation the labor question will disappear entirely. Mr. Gray: Q. Free commercial intercourse between the islands? — A. There should be a treaty of commerce for interisland traffic, treating of rela- tions between Luzon and the other islands. I do not think you could ask Spain to open free ports unless you make yourself JNIanila a free port. If you make Manila a free port, no custom-houses Q. I did not mean no custom-houses. — A. I should also put on Spain the condition of no export duties, and then that will permit produce coming from Spanish islands to Luzon. Mr. Eeid: Q. Do you think it would add greatly to the complexity and difficulty of the problem to govern the whole group rather than Luzon alone? — A. It would add to the size of the establishment. Q. Would it add to the complexity of the problem to govern the entire group? — A. No, sir; I do not think it would. Q. You do not regard the problem as ditJerent in the southern part from the northern? — A. No, sir; I think to allow the natives of Mindanao to follow their own ideas, to be a little less rigid on the laws of individuals on the IMussulmans of Mindanao, would answer the purpose. The diffi- culty is that they have never been subjected to any jiower, whereas the others have. I would suggest that you take that into account. You are taking over a people who have been subjected to a European power in Luzon; in Mindanao they have not been subjected, so, of course, how much they would regard it as a brand-new conquest would enter into consideration. The Chairman : Q. You think the entire group could be taken and governed, or that Luzon could be taken and governed, with the free-trade regulations between the islands and the other stipulations you mentioned ? — A. Yes, sir; either course could be pursued. Mr. Davis : Q. Do you think the native priests would assist in establishing and maintaining good government there? — A. Oh, yes; you would certainly have no opposition from the native priests. Q. Would we have their active aid ? — A. The native jjriests would not oppose at all; they would not take a hostile course; there would be no difliculty there. The Chairman: Q. How would they regard the Protestant missionaries? — A. I think it would be a matter of indifference to them. Q. You think the only trouble would be with the monastic orders?— A. From a religious point of view only; I do not think the native priests would give the least trouble. TREATY OF PEACE. 457 Mr. Gray: Q. Are these priests supported by the state? — A. Tes, sir; by the governmental funds. Q. Would the withdrawal of government support make trouble with them? — A. I do not think they could get up any trouble. ]\Ir. Davis : Q. Would they be disposed to do so? — A. I do not think it would go past each individual feeling a little sore. You must remember they constitute the secular clergy, and the secular clergy are not bound by any vow of poverty. They are very good fellows, indeed; very hospi- table, and will put you up any time for a niglit or two. I should say that 75 per cent of the secular clergy have quite sufficient to live upon. And they have lands. Q. State, if you know, what the amount of aid furnished, per annum, to one of these secular priests will average. — A. It is very trifling all around ; I should say possibly §500 Mexican to each one would be a fair average; about ^40 per month. Mr. Frye : Q. What do you think the exactions of the church are on individ- uals? — A. 1 had some figures which 1 went over for the purpose of an article. If you would allow me to leave that until another time, I have some notes in a book, and if you can raise that question a little later I could give you a more exact answer. The Chairman : Q. I think you stated in your book that about seven tenths of the revenues of the island are turned over to the church. How is that? — A. I must have calculated it closely at that time. The commission here took a recess until 2.30 p. m. The commission met at 2.30 p. m. Mr. Foreman. In answer to the last question asked this morning, I will read an extract from an article written by me which it may be interesting to you to hear. The total revenues for the island, estimated, for 1896, were, in round numbers, 80,000,000 pesetas. If you will divide that amount by ten, it will give the amount in gold dollars, or $8,600,000. Mr. Gray : Q. That is the real value? — A. In gold. Mr. Davis : Q. About twice that in silver? — A. Tes, sir. The disburseinents to be made included the following items, viz — these are the actual figures for 1896-97. I will give it in pesetas Mr. Davis : Q. Where do you derive that? — A. From statistics sent me from Madrid for the purposes of my literary work. To the clergy I suppose we might call it an allowance made by the Government to the clergy, general allowance, 7,000,000 pesetas out of a total of 86,000,000 pesetas. Mr. Gray: Q. $700,000? — A. Tes, sir. For the Franciscan College in Spain, and passages of priests from Spain to the islands, 27"'),000 pesetas, or $27,500 gold. For the maintenance ot Manila Cathedral, 294,000 pesetas, or $29,400 gold. For the maintenance of the choir school, 20,000 pesetas, 458 TREATY OF PEACE. 12,000 gold. Total, 7,589,000 pesetas, or $758,000 i^old; sothattlie net result is three quarters of a million dollars gold out of a total of $8,000,000 gold. Mr. Davi : Q. About 10 per cent of the entire amount? — A. Yes, sir; it comes to something like what I put in my book. Of course the total amount varies from year to year. Another curious item comes out of this total revenue which, of course, would cease to exist under new arrange- ments — pensions and allowances paid outside the colony, of absolutely no interest to the Philippine Islanders. I have not noted it here, but they are pensions to the descendants of Christopher Columbus, to a man known as the Marquis de Badeinont, the maintenance of consuls in the far East, which are absolutely of no value to the Philippine Isl- ands. The consuls, as at Hongkong, are under the jurisdiction in no sense of the Governor-General of the islands; if the Governor-General wants to make use of them, he telegraphs to Spain and Spain tele- graphs back to Hongkong, while, as a matter of fact, the distance is only 030 miles from Manila to Hongkong. This amount is 5,890,000 pesetas, or $589,000 gold. For public works, highways, bridges, and public buildings, nothing. Besides the above amounts, paid direct to the clergy, the sums extorted by the priests for marriages, sale of indul- gences, feasts, masses, burials, baptisms, scapularies, etc., are estimated at about 10,000,000 pesetas, or $1,000,000 gold. Mr. Frye : Q. Does the church there have a right to levy a tax on the people? — A. Yes, sir; I think it was about the year 18S;>, but, however, leaving the date, but certainly it was during the administration of Governor- General Jovelar. Up to the time of his administration the priests used to get 1^ reals — the Mexican dollar, or the dollar out of Spain, is 8 reals; in Si)ain the dollar is 20 reals. The dollar is distinguished this way: In Spain you speak of reals veiute, 20, and 8 reals fuertes, strong, hard reals, make a dollar outside of Spain; in the colonies 1^ reals had to be paid by every individual living within the district of a parish within a certain parish priests' jurisdiction. Mr. Davis : Q. Is there a tax levied by Spain on real estate? — A. No, sir. Q. A tax on personal property levied in the islands? — A. JSo, sir. Q. Any direct tax of any kind, except a cai)itation tax, levied in the islands by Spain? — A. No, sir; there is a trading tax. Q. That is a license? — A. Yes, sir. Q. That license is levied there on all traders? — A. Yes, sir; if I wished to day to start a business of any kind, from that of a peddler to the establishment of a commercial house, in ]\lanila I would have to get a license in order to do so. Q. Tell us the range of those taxes — from what sum to what sum? — A. I think it is from about $0 to $250. Q. What tax is levied upon the lottery there, if any, or what license is required for the lottery? — A. There is no tax on the lottery, of course, because it is run by the Government, but it is generally under- stood that the prizes and the income of the lottery are so arranged in such a manner that the Government will assuredly get 25 per cent profit. Q. Is there an income tax? — A. No, sir. Q. Is there a cock-lighting tax in any way, by license or otherwise? — A. Yes, sir. TREATY OF PEACE. 459 Q. How much license?— A. lean not tell exactlywhat it araonnts to, but it is regulated in this way: They ])nt it u]) to a tender or at auc- tion, and a number will go forward with tendervS for the term of three years, and they undertake to pay a lump sum of so much, payable in periodical installments. Q. It has been stated that the church appropriated, or had some portion of the proceeds of that license! — A. 1 never heard that. Mr. Frye : Q. Did you get through with your answer to my question as to the taxing power of the church — they tax everyone so much? — A. Up to the time of Jovelars administration, I think 1883, the ciiurch used to have H reals a head for tlie sanctorum tax. iSincethat period they have no direct tax of so much a head, but now it is collected by the treasury, and they receive what is estimated to be an etpiivalent from the treasury, so the tax remains the same, but is paid to the church by the authorities. Q. Do the priests have any way of plundering the people of money ?— A. Oh, yes. 1 will just read that little piece again. Pesetas income the same, etc. The amount extorted by the church for attestation is esti- mated at about 10,000,000 pesetas— $1,000,000 gold. There is another way the priests will get money out of the people. They will say that the Feast of Our Lady of So aud So is to take place on the liOth of this month, "1 shall look to you to pay something to that;" and they will go to Captain So aud So and say, "You are generous, and we expect so much," aud if he says he can not pay so much, they will keep asking, and perhaps reducing the amount, ami he is afraid to refuse entirely, and they will finally squeeze out anything up to $500. How the money goes nobody knows. It goes into the hands of the priests and the feast comes otf, the candles are there and lighted, aud all the necessary paraphernalia, etc., usual at such times, and they have to be content. I suppose a large revenue comes from that. Mr. Davis : Q. Is there a stamp tax on the island ?— A. Oh, yes; the same stamps as in other countries. The Chairman : Q. A stamp tax for instruments, deeds, eUiJ.—A. Yes, sir j the lowest value is 25 cents of a Mexican dollar. Mr. Davis : Q. Are those stamps required on all instruments?— A. Yes, sir; you can not communicate with the authorities without paying the tax. Q. Oflicial documents, notes, deeds, etc.?— A. Y^es, sir; and you can not even communicate with any of the authorities without using stamped paper. Q. Have you any estimate of the amount of revenue derived irom that source?— A. I do not know whether it is mentioned in my book. I find the stamps are included in a lump item, Government monopolies: Stamps, cockfighting, opium, gambling, etc., one million one hundred and eighty-oue thousand odd. Q. Is there an inheritance tax?— A. ^o, sir; but there is something which is tantamount to it. It is very rarely that oue party can inherit from another without going through judicial legal formalities. You can not, in a simple way, become an heir and have your trustees and executors put the thing through nonjudicially ; you are obliged in some way to appeal to the courts, and the latter squeeze terribly. 460 TREATY OF PEACE. Q. Are tliose subject to any exactions? — A. Nominally; only «tami)s on the documents relating to it. Mr. Geay : Q. But really? — A. As a matter of fact, when you put in your papers they will lie for a while, and the interested party will go to the fountain head, the person finally having the matter in charge, and he will pooh pooh the matter and send you back to the lowest man in the office, and you talk to him and cajole him and put about a dollar in his hand, and he will push it along a little further, and you go from him to another, and you pay him, and so it goes up the scale. It might cost you a thousand Mexican dollars to get your inheritance. Of course, the same thing obtains in iSpain. I was in Spain five years before I went to the Philippines, I just mention this to let you know that I went to the islands not as a foreigner to their methods and language; I was quite familiar with the language and the character of the Spaniards; I went knowing the language and knowing the character. When I was in Si)ain, my occupation was mining. I put capital in some mines and worked those mines very successfully for three years. They paid admirably, and I had some house property and sheds which were utilized during the Carlist war. I made a little claim, simply the damage done on the different sides, particularly by the Government troops. They used to fire at one house and knock down another. There were no Carlists at my house, but there was a Frenchman who had a house across the way very near, and the Government soldiers used to fire at his house and hit mine and knock down portions of it, and I made a little claim of about $2,000 — the dollar was worth about three shillings, four pence. I was very young, and I thought 1 would go to Madrid and collect my claim. Every time that a shell would hit ray place I would put in a protest with the local officials and with the British consul at Bilbao. I went to Madrid and put in a claim at the office of the home office, and I was talking to some friends, and I had been waiting some time, and they asked who had charge of it, and I told them no one, and they said for me to go to a court agent. I said, "If you will recom- mend one I will go to him, and perhaps it will get better attention." They said that the court agent would go to one and another about the matter, and perhaps would reach the minister, and that it would cost me probably about $50 or $00. I went to the man they recommended, and he came to my hotel and took two or three dollars at different times, uj) to $50. He came to my hotel and said this and that, and I said I was not satisfied, that I wanted the thing pushed; that it was not our way of doing business, and that I did not want anything more to do with him unless he could show me some satisfactory results. He grew very indignant and said, "Oh, you think I am cheating you?" And I said, "Yes;" I thought he was a rascal; and he jumped around and ranted and said he should require satisfaction, and I took off my coat and said, "I am prepared now to give it," and he ran down the steps, and I have not seen him from then to now. Mr. Frye: Q. What would be the etfect of stopping cockfighting and lotteries? — A. Lotteries you can stop at once. Q. There would be no trouble about that? — A. Xo, sir. Q. How about the cockfighting? — A. I think there would be cock- fighting carried on secretly. I think it would be advisable to tolerate it. The life of these people is very dreary, these natives; they live in TREATY OF PEACE. 461 these rural districts and see notliiug but mountains and planted lands, and if this is prohibited their vices will break out in some other form; they would have to have some form of amusement. I do not think it would be practicable to absolutely suppress the cockfighting. Q. You tliink the lottery could be abolished without any trouble? — A. Yes, sir. The natives are so used, when they do get a prize, to hav- ing to tip so many ])eople and to having so many squeezes that they get very much disgusted and say it is a fraud, but it is not a fraud. I I believe the matter is entirely fair; but the base of a lottery system is about as strong as a house built of a pack of cards put on end. If the general idea got abroad that the lottery was a fraud the whole thing would vanish. It is not an involuntary thing. If I myself thought the Spanish lottery was a fraud I would abandon it, and if the whole com- munity got that idea the lottery would vanish like a pack of cards at a breath of wind. The lotteries could be suppressed, to answer your question. The Chairman : Q. Do you suppose, to change the subject, with your knowledge of the administration of the government in the Philippines and Spanish administration elsewhere, that if they were to agree with another Gov- ernment to institute reforms in the method of dealing with the people, and taxing the people, and permitting the priests to do as you say they do, etc., and the whole matter was left to this treaty or contract or engagement, it would be carried out by the Spanish authorities? — A. Please permit a little preamble to my answer. The Spaniards are such a proud peo])le, and such sticklers in the matter of honor, and, as I understood, they were rigorous enough on the point to cross swords with yourselves on a matter of honor, for I can not conceive any politi cians could have dreamed of doing anything more than walking out ot Cuba, it was utterly absurd to think they could do anything morethan sustain their honor — honor comes so vividly into what they do — that they would agree to do anything to get back the island of Luzon. Mr. Davis : Q. Would they keep their word ?— A. Very broadly speaking, I think there would be all sorts of attempts, not from the Government, nor on account of instructions from the Government, but I think individual ofticials would interpret it very broadly indeed. I must say that Span- iards, speaking of the character of the Spaniards, are not loyal to their engagements, as Americans and English are; they do not think "This is very repugnant to me, I dislike tiiis very much, but I have given my word and must live up to it;" but they look to see if there is not some way they can get out of it. Mr. Gray : Q. They do not live up to the Psalmist's idea of "swearing to their own hurt and changing not!" — A. Xo, sir. The Chairman: Q. Have they not engaged to make reforms, heretofore, and not done so? — A. Yes, sir; I was going to state two remarkable examples. Gen. Martinez Campos was out in Cuba in the ten years' war which terminated in 1878. I was in Spain, and I remember the news came that the war was terminated, and flags were tiying and bunting, etc., at Bilbao to celebrate the termination of the war, but later came a letter I o say that it was all a humbug, and they were all laughing 462 TREATY OF PEACE, about it, but finally came the news tLat Martinez Campos had signed tbe treaty of Zanjon, and it was found that he had signed an agree- ment which about corresponds to the system of autonomy which was granted in January of this year. He came back to Spain and became the idol of the people. He had terminated the war by this agreement, and the populace would have him go into power as prime minister. The King called Canovas, and the latter said, "You better let him go in; the higher he goes, the lower he will fall." He went in, and the object of his going into power was of course to have carried through Parliament, or the Cortes, the treaty which he had signed, for which he thought himself respousible in a certain sense, but he was pooh-poohded and laughed at. They said, "The Cubans have laid down their arms, everything is quiet; why should we do anything more; we have accomplished what we wanted." He said, " I have given my word of honor; my personal honor is aff'e(;ted." But they said, " Oh, you have fallen out of power, and you will never come in again. It is a very good trick. You have got each cue to lay down his arms and go to his house, and now let the reforms go; never mind the engagement." They have done the same with the treaty or agreement of Biac-ua-bato, made with Emilio Agninaldo, the rebel general. They paid, of course, the first installment, which had to be paid simultaneously with the exile of Agninaldo and the 32 rebel leaders, and which was deposited in the Shanghai bank, but they paid no more. One of the conditions was that the families and others connected with the rebellion should not be molested in any form or sense whatever; but immediately that Agnin- aldo left for Hongkong the i^riests started to persecute those left behind, and the result was that another chief turned up — I knew his father very well — Alejandrino. He had fled, but returned, and is one of the leaders now. Mr. Gray: Q. If that exodus of the friars, these priests of the monastic orders, was carried out, either voluntarily on their part or with some degree of compulsion applied to them, what disposition would be made of their holdings of laud; what would become of the land? — A. What the natives, I think I may say pretty decidedly, would aspire to would be that the land should be declared to be the possession of those actually in possession as tenants today, holding it in rent from these corpora- tions. It is let in parcels. They would say, " the priests are gone, let us, as we stand, hold the land," and with very little disturbance at all the man in possession holds his patch of land. Q. They hold by a legal title now? — A. Only by a contract with the priests. Q. I mean the monastic orders hold by a title? — A. No, sir. That is to say, I draw my information from this source — that Dr. Rizal chal- lenged the priests to bring forward their titles. He said, "If you will exhibit your title deeds, it will be satisfactory for you and for us; I shall be satisfied, my agitation will end, the people interested round- about will be satisfied, and you certainly will insure to yourselves tranquillity by settling this matter on the exhibition of your title deeds," and they could not do it. They would go to the length of intriguing for three or four years to bring about the execution of this Dr. Kizal rather than show their title deeds, and we can only surmise that the title deeds did not exist. Q. How long have they been flourishing there and holding these titles, so called? — A. I can not Siiy. Q. It is an old business? — A. Yes, sir; very old. TREATY OF PEACE. 463 Q. Would not the church claim the land? — A. Tt would belong to the order. For instance, the Order of Augustine Friars would be '.he owners in collectively of those lands; you would not be troubled by any individual claims. Q. The church as a corporation? — A. The corporation of friars. Q. Would not they not claim to succeed to the title by the bishop? — A. Oh, no; the corporation of the friars itself is quite distinct. Q. Suppose they go out? — A. If all the friars go, they might as well remove their establishment. The Chairman: Q. The orders that now claim the title would still claim to own the lands, although their people were not there, would they not? — A. I should think not. Q. What would become of the laud then? — A. Couliscateit from the orders . Mr. Gray: Q. On what ground? We have no law which will allow us to arbi- trarily do so. — A. They have no title deeds, and it would not be con- fiscation exactly. Q. They have a possessory title? — A. Yes, sir. Q. Have been in possession for a hundred years or so? — A, Yes, sir; but it would be a great anomaly to have these native planters working these diflerent patches of land and have a religious corporation claim- ing the lands. I would rather take the bull by the horns and say, "You clear out." Mr. Frye : Q. But you could impose upon them terms? — A. Yes, sir; you could make them give leases, niuety-nine-year leases, such as we have in Eng- land, which are the nearest approai-hes to freeholds which we have in England. Spain is very desirous of holding the balance of the islands in the first place The Chairman: Q. What do you mean by "the balance of the islands?" — A. I mean all except Luzon. In the first place, on the score of honor, dignity, etc., to show that they are not turned out entirely, and also as a refuge for the priests. I do not think that they dream that any conditions are to be put upon them. But it would be a terrible calamity for the people if the priests should repossess themselves of the islands by your generosity. It would be a terrible calamity, and to take these islands would be an extention of your policy of humanity. It would be a ter- rible thing to return them unconditionally to Spain. Mr. Frye : Q. Any of them ? — A. Any of them. I should give none of them back uucauditionally, for the reasons I have already suggested. Mr. Moore : Q. You stated they had a system of registration of property therein the islands, though it was very imperfect and not generally resorted to. Are these lands registered under that system, these monastic lands? — A. I can not tell you positively. A decree came out some few years ago to the effect that otlices of registration of real proi)erty — real estate — were being organized, and calling upon everybody to put in the documents necessary for the registration of his estate. Upon this 464 TREATY OP PEACE. a great many hurried up witli tlieir docuineuts, but tliey waited so long for tlie processes of registiation that many withdrew their papers and thought they wculd take their chance, and I learned from an official who is one of the principal men in this department, he said to me quite coutidentially, "I can tell you that, with the present staff we have for the registration of estates, with the enormous number of formalities we have to go through with, it would take seventy years before we could get through the registration of the estates at the same rate we are now going." Q. Is this system a recent one"? — A. Only within the last twelve years. The Chairman : Q. It is not what we know as a registration system, where a man merely takes in his deed and leaves it for registration? — A. What they mean is, you simply ])ut in your proofs to the possession of the estate, and you get title deeds. As we understand the registration of title deeds in England, you register your title deeds; if you want to get a loan on the security of your real estate, the man to whom you apply asks if you have registered your title deeds, and you say, "O, yes," and he says he will loan you the money, but if you say you have not registered your title, he tells you that he will have to look into the matter to make sure tliat another loan has not been made prior to this. I would never loan a cent on real estate in the Philipi)ines, because I would have no knowledge as to whether the property had not had one or two or a number of loans on it previous to mine; there would be no security on it at all. Mr. Gray : Q. The process there would be a sort of judicial process by which you would have your title quieted? — A. Yes, sir. The last man who signs these titles is called the "intendente" or chief "of the treasury," the man who gives the final signature. Mr. Frye: Q. Do you have to keep paying every step until you get to him? — A. Oh, no; you pay at the end. Q. There is no robbery? — A. Except to get it expedited in the shape of tips to one and another. The Chairman: Q. Is there any island in this group which has a good harbor and but few ])eople, sparsely populated, lars:e enough to have an amplo harbor, like Samoa, separated from the other islands? — A. Not in Luzon. Q. Such as the English Jiave at Hongkong, separated from the others of the group?— A. Oh, yes; Gubat. That is in the. island of Luzon. There is an Englishman living there, Mr. Colliugwood. Q. That is in the island of Luzon? — A. Yes, sir. Q. Subig Bay is the best, is it not? — A. Yes, sir. At one time they thought of establishing a naval station there. It has been for a long time on the tapis to establish a naval station there, transferrin jOt it from Cavite, but the objection is that tho land runs very abruptly down to the sea; it is very hilly, and you have no expanse of flat land running back from the bay. Mr. Frye : Q. What is the land back?— A. It would be a very high level. The approach to the bay as a port wc aid be rather difficult. TREATY OF PEACE. 465 Q. Is that on the west side? — A. Yes, sir; the west coast of Luzon. Q. Is that protected against the winds of the China Sea? — xV. Yes, sir; you liave only a little swell from the southwest uiousoou; it is a very good port indeed, Q. What is that bend there [indicating on map] ? — A. That is Manila Bay, and that white place to the right is the lake, called the Laguna. Q. How deep is the water in Manila Bay? — A. Any ships can anchor there. Q. How near can they approach the shore; big ships — say, 2G feet? — A. I shouhl say a mile from the city; the bay is well protected. Q. Is Manila a province by itself? — A. Yes, sir. Q. Called the Province of Manila f — A. Yes, sir. Q. There are docks and wharves there? — A. They have started a dock, but as fast as it has been built up it has been washed out, and there is no use of the woik. It was started, I think, in 1680; there is no use. Q. Is all the commerce lightered? — A. Yes, sir; except the inter- island steamers, which have fortnightly departures. They have estab- lished a line of steamers which runs from the river every fortnight, touching every cai)ital of every province in the islands. These steamers go everywhere, I think. Q. That steamer goes away up in the river? — A. Yes, sir. Q. What is the draft? — A. By jetties, sea walls, etc., you could carry it out, and then dredge the entrance, and I think steamers of pretty fair draft could go up — carry it out, say, half a mile and then dredge the entrance. Vessels drawing up to 13 teet can enter the river. Q. Then there must be a depth of about 14 feet of water. Do you know what the tide is? — A. I think they leckon the variation at 2 feet; the rise and fall at springs may be taken at 5 feet; the tides are very irregular. There is a small slip for shi])s established, just ten minutes' walk from Cavite, at a place called Kankow. It is a small slip witha hauling power of 500 tons, and small ships can be repaired, there. Q. If we take Luzon alone, establish our (xovernment there, and give the place all the freedom and comfort that we ordinarily bestow, and leave these other islands under Spanish dominion, is it not likely to provoke insurrections and revolutions in these other islands? — A. Most decidedly, unless you impose certain conditions on the Spanish. One condition alone would obviate anything very serious in the way of insur- rection — that is, an absolutely free exit from the islands; no license, permit, passport, or any kind of impediment, unless there is a warrant issued for their detention from the courts. Q. That is the most important? — A. Yes, sir. The Chairman : Q. You are dealing with the Spaniards. Suppose they want to keep people in their islands. You have that condition that they shall freely leave, unless some kind of judicial warrant has been properly issued which shall keep them there. Would it not be easy for them to get up some kind of procedure to detain whoever they wanted or whole groups of people? — A. I thought of that myself, and saw that they could trump up charges against individuals, but they could not do so to any great extent. Suppose whole families wanted to make a general exit, how could they possibly trump up a charge against whole families? It would be so visible to everybody. Q. In other words, you would have fi"ee trade among the islands, and T P 30 466 TREATY OF PEACE. free right to come and go, exit and entrance? — A. Yes, sir; I would say, of course, it might suit you to make a revenue port of Manila, and I presume you would open any other ports where vessels of large draft could come, to have as many entrances and exits as possible for trade if it could be found. That port in the extreme north of Luzon should be dredged and fitted for trade Avhich now goes to Manila. It would be absurd to make vessels come down to Manila when they could come from Hongkong to Gubat and discharge. Mr. Eeid : Q. What would be the distance from that port to Hongkong? — A. I did know once Q. IsTotmore than half the distance? — A. Three hundred and twenty- three miles, I think a cax)tain of a steamer told me. Mr. Frye : Q. Is there a harbor there? — A. Yes, sir; a very fair one. I have been there myself in a steamer belonging to the Smith-Goddin Com- pany. Ou one occasion the captain said he had to go to Cape St. Vincent, and we were talking about the matter, and 1 think it was about 323 miles; something like that; only about half the distance. Mr. Gray : Q. What is the distance from the little isthmus — not the great long tail, but from that little neck — to the northernmost point [Indicating on map] ? — A. We can tell from the degrees, GO miles to a degree. Mr. Frye : Q. Is that on the northwest corner? — A. No, sir; about the center of the north. The Chairman: Q. There is talk about the number of islands being all the way from 800 to 1,500. They must count all the little islands?— A. Oh, yes. Q. Those three groups you pointed out this morning are practically all the islands? — A. Yes, sir. Two hundred and seventy miles would appear to be the distance from north to south of the island, taking off this piece indicated. Mr. Gray: Q. That is, in geogra])hic miles; it would be a little more in statute miles, parhaps 275 to 280 miles? — A. Yes, sir. Mr. Frye: Q. Is there egress for ships through these islands, anywhere a chan- nel or strait?— A. Through the island of Luzon any channel? Q. No, sir; a strait between the islands. — A. Yes, sir; the Strait of San Bernardino is the trading exit. Small steamers can not manage it, and for sailing ships it is dangerous; the currents are tremendous. For a steamer drawing less than feet it would be very dangerous — a steamer that would run into the small creeks — or for launches. I have made particular inquiry into the navigation, because m the archipelago navigation counts very largely, and they have said to me, "Do not trust yourself in anything that draws less than 6 feet, because you are sud- denly twisted and turned around here and there." It is like it is in the Straits of Measina. Q. A big steamer could go through all right? — A. Yes, sir. TREATY OP PEACE. 467 The Chairman : Q. Is Mindora thickly populated? — A. No, sir; thinly populated, ai/id the Spaniards hold in Mindora only three little coast towns, and — I do not know why, but they will not, most persistently, allow people to work up Mindora. A number of capitalists i)roposed to form a com- pany, and they proposed to take the whole island of Mindora and indemnify the Government. They bad an idea it was very valuable. But they would not allow it. From what I know, it is very vabiable. My information came from a personal friend, a timber merchant wlio made his fortune there. I know he sent cutters to Mindora and found very fine hard wood, and as far as he could judge there was plenty of it. When I received my information from him his men were out pros- pecting and had found very fine wood. I have samples of it banging in my study in London; they are on slabs hanging from strings, and I think there are 22 of the very finest hard woods on the string. Mr. Gray: Q. Any mahogany? — A. None. Mr. Reid : Q. What is the character, better than mahogany, richer in grain or color? — A. The finest is known as malave. It has lather the appear- ance of oak. But the bad feature about these hard woods of the Tropics is want of elasticity. Oak has a great deal of elasticity compared with these, consequently you could not get so much resistance out of a given thickness of malave as out of the same slab of oak. Mr. Frye : Q. That would nothave the same eflect as to finishing? — A. Oh,no,sir. Mr. Reid. Q. Are they introduced and used anywhere now?— A. Yes sir; in China. There are two species, the dark and the light, of a wood called narro. I have seen it used. On one occasion a man had a caprice for using them, and he had a portico made of it, and it was splendid indeed — beautiful. It is curious that Europeans out there generally like the dark narro, but natives have a fancy for the light. There is a large trade with Hongkong in it. Q. Does it resemble bird's-eye maple? — A. It is not so prettily spotted, but something of that nature, about that tint; that yellowish tint. In the Island of Mindanao, speaking of woods, there is known to be the ironwood, an extremely hard wood. It is very, very hard indeed. Of course, at the same time, it has the defect of being some- what brittle, but in substantial sizes, say in 3-inch growth, it is tre- mendously strong. I have a chapter on woods in my book. Mr. Frye. Q. Is there not oil in those islands?— A. Only in one place has it been discovered so far; that is in the island of Cebu, on the estate known as Calumampao, belonging to an Englishman named Pickford and a Mr. Wilson, an American, I know this young Wilson very well. He is a working partner of Mr, Pickford. The estate is situated close to the town of Toledo, and called Calumampao, and on that estate was discovered oil, petroleum, and a little syndicate was formed, in which two or three persons connected with the firm of Smith, Bell & Co., and connected with the firm of McLeod & Co., of Manila, were con- cerned, and they were working it when I left there. 468 TREATY OF PEACE. Q. Successfully? — A. It was not refined oil, quiteprimitive, but it was there and 1 saw it. The oil as it comes from the deposit looked like chocolate, and I saw some of it. Mr. Eeid. Q. What is the nature of the carriage-making industry in Manila? — A. It is very advanced. To keep a carriage in Manila does not signify anything socially. Everybody keeps a carriage j there is a great demand for them. Q. They are small? — A. Yes, sir; little victorias. Q. Well built?— A. Yes, sir. Q. Would there be a chance for an export trade in carriages? — A. The question of freight would be a rather cumbersome thiug. Singa- pore would be the nearest place to do any thiug with carriages; in Hongkong there is no such thing. I think there exist there six omni- buses which are looked upon as very wonderful, but which are very primitive, and which are only used by the Chinese. Mr. Keswick, of Jordan, Mason & Co., I think has a carriage; I have seen it once or twice, but it is a heavy sort of thing which is put away six months at a time, and only brought out when any big personage came to Hongkong. But everyone of any importan(!e resides more or less up on the Peak. When I lived in Hongkong I lived 000 fept up, and that was very low down indeed. Mr. Frye : Q. How did you go up and down? — A. By the use of coolies. I had four coolies, two in front and two behind, and they carried me in a sort of car swung on poles. Mr. Keid : Q. Can you give the cost of those carriages? — A. You can get a nicely built carriage for $350 Mexican. Q. A victoria? — A. Yes. sir. Something might be done with horses in Singapore. Mr. Frye : Q. Do they breed horses very largely? — A. Yes, sir. They are ponies, as we call them in England. Tliey do not come above 14 hands, but they are very sturdy little tilings, and a splendid race of animals, very useful indeed, quite docile, of great endurance. The China pony is a very cantankerous, bad-tempered animal, but the Manila pony is of very good temper. Q. Large enough for cavalry? — A. Oh, yes. And there is a great field there for breeding horses. Heretofore the people have not liked to go on breeding, because as soon as a.ny official knows that you have a good pony he will come down on you. He wdl meet you on the highway, and if he sees you Avith a good pony he will want to know if you have a license to have the pony, and if you cannot satisfy him he will take your pony away. Eight on the highroad, like a highwayman. The Spaniards would almost compel you to carry every kind of docu- ment in your waistcoat pocket; it is perfectly absurd. Q. What is that island directly south of Luzon? — A. Mindora. Q. That is the island on whicli you say the Si)aniards do not allow anyone to do anythin.g? — A. Yes, sir; it is a great mystery why. Q. A good harbor on the island? — A. iS^o, sir; very open. TREATY OF PEACE. 469 Mr. Gray: Q. What about the earthquakes? — A. lu this century the greatest of tlie earthquakes which may be considered of very great importance was that in the year 1803, when, amongst other damage done, tlie whole of the roof of the cathedral came off and the building collapsed, and it is estimated 2,000 people were killed. It shook down also the Governor-General's residence in the same square where the cathedral was situated. It shattered it to pieces. That was in 1803, and two years ago only they started to rebuild this oflicial palace. Since 1803 the Governor-General has resided, outside of Manila, in a place called Malacanan. Q. Have there been any earthquakes since? — A. In 1880 there was a serious earthquake, seventeen years after, and a great deal of damage was done, and all the people very much scared. All tlie foreigners escaped to the ships in the bay. Very serious damage was (lone, although there was but little loss of life. In 1882 there was a cholera epidemic, which was a very rare thing, and I suppose 20 Europeans died and about 40,000 natives, and a typiioon came after the epidemic, and. the whole thing vanished in twenty four hours. Q. What did the typhoon do? — A. Carried off tlie roofs of 50 or GO houses. Some of the corrugated iron work from the roofs was carried oliinto the streets, and a number of Chinamen risked their lives to get it, and one had his head cut off. Q. Are they frequent?— A. There are more or less every year, but they are not so serious. Once every six or seven years there is one rather serious, and there is a certain amount of loss in schooners and sailing vessels and the interisland carrying trade. Q. There are volcanoes there? — A. Yes, sir. When the volcanoes are in eruption they know there is no danger. In this lake near Manila, known as the Laguna del Bayo, there is a very pretty and famous volcano known as the one of Taal, which was in eru[)tion when I last heard from Manila. There is a business to be done there — the export of sulphur. At one time it was permitted, but all of a sudden the Government expressly prohibited it. There is another volcano there which is very famous, and one of the finest things to be seen, with the most perfect cone to be seen. In nature it is like an enormous limpet shtdl, and the most perfect, on the clean cut style, and that is the volcano of Mayon, in the extreme east of the island of Luzon, in the province of Albay. That is a very tine volcano; a grand sight to see it at night. Of course the whole island is supposed to be volcanic origin, and when the volcanoes are in eruption you know there is no danger; you know that there will be no earthquakes, and they do no damage. Of course some of the natives are stupid enough to live in the immediate vicinity and occasionally get killed. Q. When is the rainy season? — A. The middle six months of the year; the first three months' and the last three months is the dry season. Q. From April to October? — A. Yes, sir. Q. It is rather an uncomfortable season? — A. Yes, .sir; drenching rains come, frightful downpoui^s sometimes, but everything dries so quickly. Q. How in the other six months, from October to April? — A. Out of those six months, four months absolutely not a drop; approaching it, it shades off. Q. Pleasant months? — A. Delightful. I would not choose any other place to live in the month of December. Anywhere in the islands is 470 TKEATY OF PEACE. simply delicious ; a most wonderful climate j altogether it is very agree- able living, a very pretty place. The Chairman : Q. Suppose that the island of Luzon were taken, and we should have a stipulation for free trade, for free intercourse between the islands, and that iSpain shall never alienate any of the islands to any other power, what have you left of Spanish sovereignty in any of the other islands, what is left to Sj)ain, practically, in the islands not taken? — A. Their honor. Q. Then, you have, practically, the islands deserted and no right to change the ownership? — A. Yes, sir. Q. In a case of that kind, would it not be as well to take the entire property and be done with it? — A. By taking the whole of the islands, it would be a favor to Europe by setting aside all chance of rivalry. Q. You do not seem to think it would be much of a burden? — A. No, sir; only a little more expense of administration, which I think would be covered by the islands themselves. Mr. Eeid: Q. Do you have any doubt that, with a judicious administration of the revenues of the islands, those revenues would be sufticient to cover the expenses of the islands? — A, Yes, sir. Q. You think they would be sufticient? — A. Yes, sir. Q. Do you think we would be able to recruit a sufficient number of native soldiers to form a garrison of sufficient defense? — A. I am in doubt about the island of Mindanao. It is a large island, and you could not think of recruiting any Mussulmans. Q. Do you think we could recruit, exclusive of Mindanao, enough native soldiers to maintain and defend our sovereignty over the whole group? — A. Yes, sir. Mr. Frye : Q. I understand Spain has not much to do with that lower island of Mindanao?— A. Oh, no. The Chairman: Q. What would be the effect — suppose we keep Luzon — if Spain should find it too ex})ensive to undertake to maintain her sway and sovereignty over the rest of the islands, of the establishment of some other power there? — A. I should make strenuous efforts to keep out the Germans. Q. Why? — A. Because Germany is just now Great Britain's very strong comjietitor in trade, and I think in the next generation will be the same with America. Perhaps it would be all right with this gen- eration, or for twenty-five years, but I tliink Germany is, with the next generation, destined to be the great comijetitor. Mr. Gray: Q. Do you not think any government, with Christian civilization and better government, would be better than Spain? — A. I am looking at the material Q. The material comes with that; if you are looking at mere trade rivalry, that is another tiling. — A. I do not think Germany has shown that she is capable of governing. The Chairman : Q. Your idea, in short, is this : You would prevent the alienation of the rest of the group because, peradventure, Spain might alienate to TREATY OF PEACE. 471 Germany? — A. Tes, sir. As to France, I always regard France as like taking a map, and it is practically blotted out commercially. It pre- vents others coming in, but there is nothing to be got out of it. Meta- phorically speaking, it is simply blotting out that portion of the map. France does not develop anything; there is no development of any kind, and there is nothing to fear from France in competition of any kind, now or in the future, that I can see. May I make an obser- vation? The name of Japan has been brought up. It is, of course, quite out of the question, because it is a pagan nation. The natives have been brought up as Christians, and I am sure it would be op))Osed to the liopular opinion in Burone, and in America, I should think. That excludes Japan, in my opinion. Mr. Frye : Q. Do you not think Japan will improve in that direction as she has in otliers ? — A. I do not think so. STATEMENT OF COMMANDER R. B. BRADFORD, U. S. N., OCTOBER 14, 1808, BEFORE THE UNITED STATES PEACE COMMISSION AT PARIS. Examination by the Chairman : Q. Will j^ou please state your name, residence, and position in the United States Navy? — A. R. B. Bradford, commander, United States Navy, Chief Bureau of Equipment, Navy Department, Washington, D. C. Q. How long have you been in the naval service of the United States?— A. Since 18G1. Q. State briefly in what positions and capacities. — A. I have per- formed service in all the subordinate grades of the Navy, including command afloat and at various stations on shore. Q. In the course of your duties have you liad occasion to visit the group of islands known as the Philippine Islands? — A. I have visited Manila on three different occasions. I have never visited any of the islands other than Luzon, except the coast along their shores. Q. When were you at Manila? — A. I was there first in 1867, again in 1868, and again in 1S69; not since. Q. Have you had any occasion recently to investigate the situation on these islands? — A. During the past two months I have made a study of the islands and their value as colonies of the United States. Q. State briefly what sources of information, other than your own visits there, you have had access to and had occasion to examine. — A, All the publications on the subject I could find, particularly those bearing on maritime and naval matters, coal to be found, and harbors suitable for coaling and naval stations, and as bases for naval opera- tions. Q. Will you state what islands or places in your judgment are suited for naval bases, harbors, etc.? — A. I think the entire "group would be a very valuable acquisition for naval and commercial purposes. The group is composed of over 400 islands, excluding rocks and islands not inhabited. These islands are so crowded together that anyone would in time of war require a large force for its defense, if the neigh- boring islands were in possession of an enemy. It would be less diffi- cult to defend the entire group under such circumstances than a single island. In case a division of the islands is made, those, in my opinion, of the most value from a strategic point of view are Luzon, Mindoro, the Calamianes group, Palawan, and Balabac. These command all the entrances to the China Sea from the north eni of Luzon to Borneo. The best harbors for coaling stations are the following, mentioned in order of their relative importance so far as known: 1. Manila, or Cavite, island of Luzon, latitude 14° 29' north, longi- tude 120° 55' east; Subig Bay, island of Luzon, latitude 14° 46' north, longitude 120° 13' east, might be taken as an alternative. 472 TREATY OF PEACE. 473 2. Malampaya Sound, island of Palawan, latitude 10° 53' north, longitude 122° 35' east. 3. Iloilo, island of Panay, latitude 10° 42' north, longitude 122° 35' east. 4. Cebu, island of Cebu, latitude 10° 18' north, longitude 123° 54' east. 5. Pollok(orPolak), island of Mindanao, latitude 7° 21' north longi- tude 124° 13' east. There are many harbors in the Philippine group. Some of them, upon examination and survey, might prove more valuable than some of those mentioned above. It should be borne in mind that i)ortions of the group are not well surveyed. There are almost numberless anchorages sufficiently sheltered for the transfer of coal from one ves- sel to another. So far as I can ascertain, coal is found in almost all of the large islands of the Philippine group. Its presence in the islands of IS"egros and Cebu has been known for a long time. Considerable quantities have been mined in Cebu, and coal mining there only ceased because of the difficulties of transportation, the latter rendering it unprofita- ble. The German naval commander in chief reported to his Govern- ment during the present year that the Cebu coal was of good quality. The London Board of Trade Journal for May, 1898, states that the Cebu coal is superior to the Japanese coal and slightly inferior to the Australian. Coal is found in the northern and southern parts of Lu- zon; also in Masbate and Batan. It is thought to exist in Samar and Mindanao. A few years ago the American ship Richard Parsons was wrecked on the west coast of Mindoro. Her master. Captain Joy, of Nantucket, Mass. , was obliged to cross the island with his crew to ob- tain passage to Manila. While doing so he discovered immense out- croppings of coal in the interior mountainous regions of the island. The Spanish Government, upon learning of this discovery, confiscated the lands, but nothing has ever been done toward developing this great discovery. The coal mines of the island of Batan, near the Straits of San Bernardino, are now being worked by Messrs. Gil Hermanos, of the island of Catanduans. The island of Palawan, on account of its proximity and similarity to North Borneo, where large amounts of coal are found, probably contains coal. Q. Where do you get this information that there is coal in these various islands? — A. Fi'om data compiled in the Office of Naval Intelligence. In connection with the subject of coal, I desire to call attention to the fact that the Philippine Islands are on the range and midway between the great coal-producing islands of Formosa and Borneo. It is therefore natural to expect coal to be found in this group. Mr. Gray: Q. Formosa to the north and Borneo to the south? — A. Yes. The geological characteristics of the Philippine Islands also indicate the presence of coal. I do not think that any positive statements can be made as to the quality of the coal in these islands until shafts are sunk and a thorough investigation made below the surface croppings. We do know, however, that it is used at present by coasting steamers, sometimes by itself alone and sometimes by mixing it with a better qviality, such as Cardiff. Not all the coal used in the Philippine Islands, however, is mined there, considerable amounts being imported. Coal is mined in quan- 474 TREATY OF PEACE. titles in the north end of Borneo, and also on the British island of Labuan. The latter is of a good quality and supplied for steaming purposes to British men-of-war and mail steamers. It is sold for about $4.50 a ton. This coaling station has recently been established and is becoming important. I think we may believe, judging from the doctrine of probabilities, that good coal will eventually be found in the Philippine Islands. I may mention that all of the important coal deposits of the world, so far as known at present, with the exception of those in the Philippines, are in the possession of either the United States, Great Britain, or Japan. While on the subject of coal, I desire to add that it is the duty of the Bureau of Equipment of the Navy Department to supply coal for naval purposes. As the chief of that bureau, I have been much impressed during the recent war with the necessity of acquiring coaling stations all over the world. I do not suppose any arguments are necessary to impress this fact upon the commission, but I will say that if the Hawaiian Islands had not been treated from the first as American territory, so far as using them as a coaling station is concerned, the operations undertaken at Manila would not have been successful. The necessity for coal at Honolulu was foreseen and a large amount collected there. The first three squadrons of troop ships en route to Manila were supplied with coal from that in store for the Navy. There was no other coal at Honolulu. Admiral Dewey, as soon as war was declared, was, of course, without a base of supplies, without coal, and without even a harbor of refuge. He had been authorized, before war was declared, to purchase two large steamers and to fill them with coal. He took these wifch him to Manila. Had he been defeated, he would have been obliged to abandon the Asiatic station. With the coal in the two steamers, had they remained in his possession, he probably could have reached Hawaii, but not San Francisco. I am positive, if tliis country is to possess any colonies, however insignifi- cant, in the vicinity of the China Sea, that coaling stations are abso- lutely necessary in the Pacific along the route of communication from our coast. I do not think that the facilities afl:orded by the Ladrone Islands are sufficient for this purpose. It should be remembered that the Ladrone group of islands run north and south, and therefore practi- cally afiiord but one port of call between Hawaii and the Philippines; in fact, there is but one harbor in this group, San Luis d'Apra, on the island of Guam, which is of much value. The Caroline Islands, including the Pelews, running east and west, and covering a distance of about 2,000 miles, are on the southern flank of the direct route to the Philippines. They possess many excellent harbors which will serve admirably as coaling stations and harbors of refuge. In the hands of an enemy they would offer a serious menace to the line of communication between the Pacific coast and the Philippines. It so happens that the extreme eastern and the extreme western islands of the Caroline group possess excellent harbors. Q. Will you name those islands? — A. The extreme eastern island is TJalan or Kusaie, and Yap is the extreme western, not counting the Pelew group. Between these is the important island of Ponapi, already recognized as a valuable port of call. The Pelew group is sometimes considered as part of the Carolines. Q. How far are the Carolines from the Ladrones, as to their relative position? — A. There [indicating on a chart] are the Carolines; here the Ladrones. The latter run north and south; the Carolines east TREATY OF PEACE. 475 and west. Here are the Marshall Islands, under German control, directly to the eastward of the Carolines. They are not so Important as the Carolines, because their harbors are not so good. The Mar- shall Islands are almost wholly of coral formation and afford but little vegetation. The Chairman: Q. Where are the Philippine Islands? — A. West of the Ladrones. Mr. Gray: Q. North of the equator? — A, Yes. The Philippines extend from latitude 4° 45' north to latitude 21° 30' north. Q. Have you a map showing the American and Asiatic shores, both? — A. Yes; here it is. There are the Ladrones; here the Caro- lines; there the Marshalls; here are the Hawaiian Islands, and there are the Philippines. Mr. Davis: Q. How far north of the Ladrones are the Carolines? — A. The Caro- lines are south of the Ladrones. Q. Just turn the question round. — A. The island of Guam, the extreme southernmost of the Ladrones, is almost directly north of the island of Wolea of the Caroline group and a little less than 300 miles from it. Wolea has a good harbor and is inhabited. Guam is in lati- tude 13° 15' north, and the Northern Carolines are between latitude 9° north and latitude 10° north. The Chairman: Q. Then, if we understand you, you do not think the island in the Ladrones, assuming it to be Guam, the southern island, is sufficient for a coaling station between Hawaii and the Philippines? — A. I do not. Guam has the advantage of being farther north, and therefore more on the direct route from Hawaii to the Philippines than the Caro- lines, but it has not a very good harbor. Q. It is more in the direct line from the Hawaiian group to the Philippines than any one of the Carolines? — A. Yes; it .has that advantage. Q. You would not expect to go from the Ladrones to the Carolines, on the way to the Philippines, would you? — A. No; I should not. Q, Then what is the disadvantage in not having one or more of the Carolines, from our point of view? — A. The Carolines possess better harbors; they are on several highways of commerce; they are uncom- fortably near the Ladrones, and they extend east and west along the route between the Pacific coast and the China Sea nearly 2,000 miles, affording numerous coaling stations and harbors of refuge. Mr. Reid: Q. That is, in the hands of another nation they would be trouble- some or disagreeable? — A. They might be. Here are the Pelews [indi- cating on a chart] about 600 miles from the Philippines. I am firmly convinced that the Pelews, Carolines, and Ladrones should all be acquired if we are to possess any territory near the China Sea. The Chairman: Q. If the United States could have one of the Carolines, which one would you designate as the one best suited for our purposes? — A. Ponapi. 476 TREATY OF PEACE. Q. Where is that? — A. It is about 300 miles west of Ualan, in lati- tude 7° north and longitude 158° 20' east. Mr. Reid: Q. It is the largest, is it not? — A. No; not the largest, but it has some very good harbors, is high and well watered and well wooded. Ualan, or Kusaie, the headquarters of the American missions, has also good harbors, and is similar in its characteristics to Pouapi. Yap, the extreme western island, excepting the Pelews, has good harbors, and is valuable. It is the seat of government for the western Carolines. Ponapi is the seat of government for the eastern Carolines. Truk Islands are the largest group of the Carolines and the most densely populated. This small group has about 10,000 inhabitants. The Chairman: Q. Yap is more in the line of travel to the Philippines than any of the others of these islands? — A. No; I do not think it is. It is only on the route between the Fiji Islands and the North China Sea. Here is a chart showing the usual routes of full-i^owered steamers. Upon examination it appears that Ponapi is more directly on the commercial routes traversed by steamers than any island of the Caroline group. Guam and Ponapi are both on the route from the Samoan Islands to the north end of Luzon. Q. We have a place in Samoa? — A. We hope to have a coaling station there soon. In conjunction with Great Britain and Germany we exercise a protectorate over the Samoan Islands. This is the only claim we have to the vast territory known as the Polynesian Islands. Mr. Gray: Q. Is not the great-circle route the shortest from the Pacific coast lO the Philippines? — A. Yes. It is 6,300 miles from San Francisco to the Philippines by the great-circle route, and 7,000 miles via Hawaii and Guam. The Chairman: Q. We hold the Aleutian Islands? — A. Yes. Unalaska is the best coaling station there. Mr. Frye: Q. Any harbor there? — A, Yes; Dutch Harbor, a fairly good one. The great circle-route from San Francisco to the China Sea and its neighboring islands is not often used, because of fogs near the Aleu- tian Islands in summer and heavy gales during the winter. The regular trans-Pacific steamers avoid tlie Aleutian Islands for these reasons. The presence of fog also makes it difficult to enter the har- bors of the Aleutian Islands. This colored map of the Pacific islands is very instructive. The land colored red and all islands under whose names a red line is drawn belong to Great Britain; yel- low indicates German possessions; and blue, F'rench. Islands too small to color, belonging to Germany and France, have their owner- ship indicated by finely engraved names. Q. What is the green? — A. The green islands are those that were independent when the map was constructed, or over which a joint pro- tectorate is exercised. Of the former, the Hawaiian Islands, now belonging to the United States, is the only example. Of the latter, the Samoan group, under the joint protection of the United States, Great Britain, and Germany; the New Hebrides, under the joint pro- tection of Great Britain and France; and the Tonga, or Friendly, TREATY OF PEACE. 477 Islands, under the joint protection of Great Britain and Germany, are examples. Attention is called to the fact that there is nothing in all Polynesia remaining for any nation to acquire. Although the United States, by exploration, survey and discovery, and by the work of her missionaries, has been interested in these islands in the past, her only claims now remaining to any is a joint interest in the Samoan group. England has made herself mistress of the seas and grown very rich by her colonial enterprise, and other countries are profiting by her example. Even little Holland has colonies with 30,000,000 of inhabitants which yearly export products to the value of $125,000,000 to $150,000,000. Q. You spoke of one selection, Luzon and Palawan. What other propositions did you find with regard to other coaling stations? Sup- pose Luzon alone, what is the difficulty? — A. I do not know that I quite understand you. You mean, which is the best coaling station in the entire group? Q. Yes, sir. — A. Manila, probably, though Malampaya Sound, island of Palawan, is exceedingly valuable as a site for a naval station. Q. And, as I understand you, the only trouble about Manila is the closeness of the neighbors; that the other islands might be in some other hands? — A. Yes, sir. The harbor of Manila, without the island of Luzon, would be a source of weakness rather than strength. Q. What is the difficulty about taking Luzon alone? — A. The prox- imity of the other islands of the Philippine group. There are over 400 islands in the group, crowded together. A cannon shot can be fired from one to another in many instances. To illustrate, we have the Hawaiian Islands. Suppose we had but one, and the others were possessed of excellent harbors, coal mines, valuable products, and minerals; suppose also the others were in the hands of a commercial rival, with a different form of government and not over friendly. Under these circumstances we should lose all the advantages of isolation. Mr. Davis: Q. Would not you thereby build up commercial rivals all over the archipelago? — A. I should suppose so. I have been speaking mainly from a military point of view. Speaking from a commercial point, I believe the Philippine Islands are capable of great development and valuable trade. They possess about 8,000,000 inhabitants, and are rich in products. There is not one which does not produce something we need. After Great Britain we are the largest importers from these islands. Their mineral wealth is unknown, but we do know that there are valuable minerals in these islands. The Chairman: Q. From your point of view as a naval expert, what is the objection to the division you have indicated there, taking in Luzon, Mind ore, Palawan, and the islands between Mindoro and Palawan? — A. I think it a fairly good division, if a division must be made. This division is much more valuable than Luzon alone. I do not advocate taking a part, however. Q. What is your objection to taking that part? — A. The difficulties of defense, which I have already alluded to, and the fact that a whole loaf is better than half a loaf. Q. That is, if one has a chance to take more, he better do it? — A. Yes. All of these islands are very valuable. 478 TREATY OP PEACE. Q. From a military point of view, would you not be well protected from the rest of the group? — A. Only fairly so. The straits and chan- nels between the different islands are in manj^ cases very narrow, Q. If you had the four islands, following the red line and to the left thereof as we face the map? — A. Yes. Q. Would you not then be fairly well separated, in a naval and mili- tary point of view, from the rest of the group, and have a controlling situation in that ijart of the ocean? — A. Yes; fairly so. Q. Is it not a fact that Mindoro, Palawan, and Busuanga are sparsely populated islands? — A. They are. Q. Is it not a fact that, with relation to the China Sea, Palawan is the best of the islands? — A. I think it is. Q. Do you think vessels can get in there of large draft, on the west coast? — A. The harbors of Palawan? Q. Yes, sir. — A. Yes, sir; without doubt. Q. How many harbors on the west coast? — A. There are five bays with good anchorages at any time or with any wind. There are about 10 other anchorages, good with certain prevailing winds only. Steamers that can weigh and go to sea in case of bad weather can anchor almost anywhere off the coast. The bottom is almost univer- sally mud, affording excellent holding ground. Q. Name them please; indicate by degrees. — A. The five first men- tioned are as follows, commencing to the southward: 1. Eran Bay, latitude 9° 5' north, longitude 117° 38' east. 2. Tebeyu Bay, latitude 9° 17' north, longitude 117° 58' east. 3. Ulugan Bay or Banog, latitude 10° 6' north, longitude 118° 46' east. 4. Port Barton, latitude 10° 29' north, longitude 119° 5' east. 5. Malampaya Sound, latitude 10° 53' north, longitude 119° 23' east. The last mentioned presents one of the most valuable sites for a naval station of any harbor of which I have any knowledge. In this resi)ect it is sufficiently valuable to excite the cupidity of any nation. It is 19 miles deep, with a width of from 2 to 4 miles. The entrance is six-tenths of a mile wide, and between bold and high headlands. It has been aptly named "Blockade Strait." The sound is divided into parts of about equal dei^th. The channel to the inner section passes between islands commanding the approaches and affording the most perfect means of defense. Within is a broad sheet of water from 6 to 10 fathoms deep, affording excellent anchorage and good holding ground. On this inner sound are the Spanish settlements Paukal and Baulae. The entire sound is surrounded by high lands, is well wooded, and affords an abundance of good water. It is the best place for supplies on the western coast. The Malampaya River empties into the inner sound. Boats can ascend this river 2 miles, from which jjoint a good footpath leads to the eastern shore, a distance of 2 miles. In this respect it is like Ulugan Bay, which is said to be 3 miles from the eastern shore, with a good road the entire distance. Mr. Gray: Q. Three miles from the eastern shore? — A. Yes; one authority gives it 3, and another 5. The cliart makes it 5. Mr. Davis: Q. Any harbor on the eastern shore? — A. An anchorage, but not a harbor. There is an excellent harbor, known as Port Royalist, about 15 miles south of this anchorage. It has a small arsenal, a slip, and a harbor light. Spanish gunboats have generally been stationed there. TKEATY OP PEACE. 479 Mr. Gray: Q. Is it not a fact that the eastern shore is more approachable than the western sliore? — A. Both shores are more or less frinj^ed with shoals, rocks, and islets, making navigation with the present charts dangerous in places. These dangers generally extend farther to sea- ward on the west shore than on the east. The Philippine Islands are not well surveyed, and it is unknown dangers that are most feared. The Chairman: Q. You have not any personal acquaintance with the character of the inhabitants of what is known as the Vizcayas group, between Luzon and Mindanao? — A. No, sir. Q. Nor with the inhabitants of Mindanao and the Zulu group? — A. No, sir. Q. The possible division proposed would give the United States the western part of the group according to your line. Can you state how that would divide the group with reference to population? You have then Luzon, Mindoro, Palawan, etc. — A. Practically it is the popula- tion of Luzon, which, according to the latest estimate, is about 3,000,000. Mindoro has about 40,000, the Calamianes group about 12,000, and Palawan about 15,000. Q. A little more than the population of Luzon? — A. Yes, sir. Q. By that division you would have control, practically, of the China Sea side of the group?— A. Yes, sir. Mr. Fry: Q. Do you understand that Germany is trying to get Palawan? — A, Yes, sir. Mr. Gray: Q. How do you know that Germany is trying to get it?— A. It has been so reported by the press for years; their cruisers frequent the islands and their engineers have explored them. Q. How have they been trying to get it?— A. By purchase, I pre- sume, but of this I have no knowledge. Mr. Reid: Q. Would that division which you have indicated there remove your objection to the dangerous proximity of the other islands if in unfriendly hands?— A. No, sir; the division was made with a view to taking as'little as possible in addition to Luzon, and at the same time maintaining control of a fairly good strategic line of outposts. Q. You would consider that the least evil, on a division of the group? — A. I do. . Q. But as not removing the evil, from a military point of view?— A. PreciselJ^ The Chairman: Q. Still, you recognize the point that sometimes you have to submit to dangerous neighbors?— A. Possibly. I am only advocating it be avoided, if feasible. Q. Suppose you take the group, would you not have Borneo for a neighbor?— A. But north Borneo is English and the balance Dutch. Mr. Reid: Q. When you have the option as to whether you will expose your- self to bad neighbors or not, do you think it the part of wisdom to abandon that option?— A. I do not. 480 TREATY OF PEACE. Mr. Gray: Q. Do jou not think we would rid ourselves of the possiblility of bad neighbors by keeping out of there altogether? — A. I will answer that question Q. Will you not answer it directly, first, please? — A. Will you please repeat it? Q. I ask you if we would not rid ourselves of bad neighbors by keeping out of there altogether? — A. Yes, sir; I would like to qualify that reply by saying it is my belief, if we are going to be a commercial or naval people, that it is absolutely necessary to have coaling stations and colonies the world over. Mr. Davis: Q. If we should leave them in the possession of Spain we would have a very bad neighbor there? — A. Most assuredly. The Chairman: Q. How much more of a military establishment will it require to occupy and maintain the supremacy of the United States in the entire group than in the group to the west of the line you have drawn? — A. None, whatever. Q. How do you make that out? — A. Because there is an element of safety in possessing the entire group which is not obtained by possess- ing only part of it. There is also an element of great uncertainty as to the disposition of the balance which can not be lost sight of, Q. That would also dej^end somewhat, would it not, on the char- acter and submissiveness of the inhabitants of the islands? — A. Naturally; but I do not believe there are any people anywhere in the Philippines more difficult to civilize than the North American Indians. We have civilized them. I think the enterprise of our people suffi- ciently great to civilize and settle the Philippine Islands and make them very valuable colonies; not only paying for their government, but providing a revenue; not immediately, jierhaps, but before long. They are the richest colonies possessed by Spain, Q. That is rather an expression of hope than any statement you can make from personal knowledge? — A. Certainly. I am only giving my opinion, but it is based on the exjperience of other countries. It appears to me that Great Britain has made herself powerful and rich by her colonial enterprise. This is recognized by the Germans, by the French, and by the Dutch. The latter are now trying to follow in the footsteps of Great Britain, and with some success. If these countries possess all the island territory of the world, their govern- ments will be able to discriminate against the introduction of the manufactures and against the commerce of our country. This I believe to be their object. Mr. Gray: Q. Whose object? — A. The object of the countries which are annex- ing the island territory of the world and dividing up the coast of China. Q. You will have to except Great Britain, so far as her policy is developed, — A. It is not difficult for a nation possessing colonies to discriminate by means of duties and port charges. Q. The i)orts of Great Britain are free A. Her home ports are free to most goods, but how about Canada and other colonies? Are they free to our goods and our fisherman? TREATY OF PEACE. 481 The Chairman: Q. You answered the question as to a military establishment. In your judgment, how much more naval establishment would it require to maintain ourselves in the entire group than in the part to the west? — A. I included both in my answer. I inferred that you in- cluded both the Army and Navy in your question, and I had partiular reference to both in my reply. Q. Have you any means of forming a judgment as to how large an army would have to be maintained? — A. Only by reference to the army that has been maintained by Spain, which, so far as Europeans are concerned, has been very small. Q. How large a naval squadron would it be necessary to have in and about there? — A. The present squadron, the usual Asiatic Squad- ron, could take care of the Philippines. Probably some small coast guard and revenue vessels would be required in addition. Mr. Gray: Q. Would the present naval squadron be adequate if we were at war with Germany, in regard to Luzon? — A. It is impossible to answer that question, because it would depend upon the movement of German ships. If they went to the East, we would have to send more ships there; if they came to the West Indies, we would have to meet them there. In considering such a question, available coaling sta- tions, both for the Germans and ourselves, are of the first and greatearfc importance. The Chairman: Q. You base your opinions upon the belief that these islands will readily submit to the control of the United States Government, and that there would be no great expenditure required for either naval or military force to subdue the islands to the United States? — A. Some- what. I think the islands can be subdued, if there is any serious trouble, by a blockade. The inhabitants are entirely dependent upon the coast for their supplies and for a market. They are a pleasure-loving people, and would not care to submit long to the inconvenience of a war under these circumstances. It has been their custom to produce a few articles, such as hemp, sugar, and tobacco, for the general mar- ket, and with the proceeds of their sale to purchase all necessary commodities. They are not a manufacturing people, nor do they pos- sess the means of carrying on war any leng.li of time. Q. Do you not think a commercial station in those islands is much more valuable to the United States, with a view to its trade in China and Japan and other parts of that sea, than it is with reference to any trade with the islands themselves? — A. I think a commercial station at the Philippines valuable for that purpose. How valuable depends largely upon our influence in China. The balance of trade there has been against us. Foreign powers seem to be at present in control of Chinese affairs, and if they are able to discriminate against us, our trade may not be valuable. Q. If the United States is to have a hand in the Chinese trade, oui location in Manila and Luzon would be very valuable in that direc- tion? — A. Very, indeed. Q. And probably much more valuable than any interisland trade would be? — A. It ought to be. It would be fatal to profit if our trade with China was obliged to pass through foreign hands. Q. Have you any means of estimating the value of these islands; T P 31 482 TREATY OP PEACE. and if so, will you grive us an estimate, supposing they were to be acquired by purchase? — A. No, sir; I have none. Q. You mean you could not form any estimate? — A. I do not think I could. Q. You might form an estimate, possibly? — A. I can only state that which you alreadj^ know, viz, the price paid for Alaska and that asked for the Dutch islands in the West Indies. Q. Suppose, to put it another way, you were taking this group of Islands as a war indemnity, could you form an estimate as to how much you were getting? — A. It is a subject I have not studied. I did not expect to be asked to give an opinion on such matters, and I should prefer not to do so until I can study the question. I will say, I think them extremely valuable, both from a commercial and from a military point of view. Mr. Reid: Q. If our Government once thought Cuba worth an offer of $100,- 000,000, what would you think the Philippine Archix)elago worth? — A. Double that. Mr. Frye: Q. Have j^ou stated what, in your opinion, ought to be done rela- tive to these positions in the East and in the Pacific from investiga- tions which you have made? — A. I think tliat the entire Philippine group of islands, the Carolines, including the Pelews, and the Ladrones should be annexed to the United States. The Chairman: Q. Annexed by what means; taken forcibly? — A. Yes, primarily; and if they can not be fairly taken, then purchased. I would like to say that the Carolines and Ladrones are mere dependencies of the Philippines, and it is so stated in the Blue Book of the CaiDtain- General of the latter. Q. That is, they had the same captain-general, but different local governors? — A. Yes. Q. How far are the Philippines from the Carolines? — A, The Pelews, generally included in the Caroline group, are about 600 miles from the Philippines. The Caroline group, including the Pelews, extends about 2,000 miles east and west; the Ladrones about 540 miles north and south. Relatively, the Carolines and Ladrones form an inverted T, It is about 180 miles from the westernmost Caroline proper to the Pelews and 220 miles from Yap to the Pelews. Yap is about 750 miles from the Philippines. Q. How far is Guam from Manila? — A. Guam is about 2,575 miles from San Bernardino Strait. Q. How far to the Carolines? You say about 600 miles A. From Guam to the Carolines? Q. Yes, sir. — A. Guam is a little less than 300 miles north of Wolea, one of the Caroline gi'oup. Q. What are the objections, in your judgment, to taking Luzon alone, leaving off now the three lower islands of your western group? — A. From a military point of view or from a commercial point of view, or both? Q. Cover both points, if you will. — A. It is difficult to foresee what would happen should the Philippine Islands be divided after having always been under a single government. It is certain, however, that trade and commerce would seek new channels, and if Luzon were TREATY OF PEACE. 483 detached from the other islands, Manila would no longer be the com- mercial center of the group. The islands of the entire group are so closely connected that it is almost impossible to separate them in any scheme for an offensive or defensive war. There is no possible isola- tion with Luzon alone, nor would it be practicable to prevent smug- gling. Luzon would be open to attack from almost every direction ; control over important strategic points in its immediate vicinity would be lost; control over contiguous waters would be lost; ports of refuge near by would be lost; coal, teak and other valuable timber, and hemp produced in the south would be lost, and the opportunity to intercept a possible enemy passing through various straits extending from Luzon to Borneo would be sacrificed. We would also lose the richest and most productive islands of the entire group, particularly with reference to the hemp-producing districts. Q. Where are they? — A. In Samar, Leyte, Cebu, and Bohol. Q. Is there any good harbor near to Luzon, in the Vizcaya group to the south of Luzon? — A. Yes; several in the islands of Samar, Leyte, Panay, and Masbate. The latter, very near to Luzon, is celebrated for its good harbors. Vessels can anchor in many of the sounds between the islands, and I estimate there are not less than 100 regular harbors in the group. Cebu and Iloilo are the largest com- mercial harbors outside of Manila. Q. A considerable distance south of the extremity of Luzon? — A. They are about 135 and 160 miles respectively from the island of Luzon. The best harbor near Manila is Subig Bay. Q. On the island of Luzon? — A. Yes, sir; I do not know as I fully understand your question. Q. Suppose the United States was looking for a naval station and base of operations, and no more. What place would be the best, in your judgment, to take in the group? — A. Manila, probably. Q. Then you would have the entire surroundings in the hands of somebody else? — A. I am in favor of selecting Manila because there is already a navy-yard there, a slip, and other facilities for repairing and building ships. There are also skilled workmen and other labor in abundance. Manila being a commercial port, I should expect a naval station might be maintained there without expense to the General Government. If a port without trade or many inhabitants be selected, I should expect a naval station would be a constant and considerable expense to the Government. In the event of the latter course, I would recommend Malampaya Sound, island of Palawan. I do not advocate taking any port without at least the island in which it is located. Q. Do you think the group, or the group divided, taking the west- ern part of your possible division, would be self-sustaining? — A. I think the entire group would. Q. Taking the western group, do you think that would be self- sustaining? — A. It would under present conditions; but should the remaining islands fall into the hands of some other power, able to divert the trade from Manila, it might not. Q. Manila might be very much imjiroved if the Chinese and Jap- anese trade of the United States should be developed with that as a base? — A. I should think so. Q. You think Formosa is valuable to Japan? — A. I do. I know the coal obtained there is of fair quality and the products are valuable. The soil is fertile, produces excellent tea, and I think the Japanese will soon have it under a high state of cultivation. 484 TREATY OF PEACE. Q. Have you been there since Japan acquired it? — A. No, sir. Q. Do you know from the Japanese reports that it costs more than it amounts to, from the hostility of the natives? — A. The natives at the south end of Formosa are untamed and fierce savages. The Jap- anese have much to contend with, no doubt, but they do not appear to be stopping colonial progress on that account. Mr. Frye: Q. If we should adopt your line of demarcation, what do you think Spain would do with the balance of those islands? — A. Sell them to Germany. Q. Is not Germany about as troublesome a neighbor as we could get? — A. The most so, in my opinion. I think it probable that the balance of the Spanish possessions in the Pacific not acquired by us will go to Germany. Germany has long desired to possess the Caro- lines, and she hoisted her flag at Yap in 1886. Our missionaries have been in the Caroline Islands for fifty j^ears, and all that has been done to educate and civilize the natives there has been done by American missionaries. Q. They are still there? — A. Yes, sir. Q. The Momincj Star makes its trips? — A. I believe so. Much of our knowledge of the harbors of these islands has been acquired from her voyages. Q. That vessel is not permitted to go to Ponape? — A. I understand that the Spanish have excluded the missionaries and their vessel from the islands of Yap and Ponape, where the Spanish governors reside. Q. We have captured the entire Philippine Islands, have we not? — A. Practically; we have captured their capital. Q. Well, if there had been no armistice could we not have taken the whole group? — A. Yes, sir; I believe so, with little loss or expense. Q. Would you, as a naval officer and as interested also in the development of the commerce of the United States, be content, rea- sonably content, with the division you made in your red line? — A. No; I do not think I would. The red lines were drawn for the purpose of showing what we should by no means omit, rather than to indicate what islands we should annex. The Chairman: Q. Put the question a littSe differently. We started to free the island of Cuba, which, say, we have accomplished. That was the purpose of the war. We hold Porto Rico and the other islands in the West Indies and the Ladrones as an indemnity in lieu of money. The only people of the Philippines with whom we have come in contact and to whom we owe an obligation because of supposed or actual cooperation or change of their situation are the inhabitants of the island of Luzon, where the insurrection has been carried forward at the same time, at least with our own military operations, so that, strictly, our obligation of cooperation is limited to that island. Now, if we add to Porto Rico, the islands in the West Indies, our possible and even probable interest in Cuba, the islands from Luzon down to Borneo to the west of your line of possible division, would you not think we had made a pretty fair, reasonable, and just settlement of the matters growing out of this war? — A. From a commercial point of view? Q. From an international point of view, as a great and generous nation. — A. Am I to understand that your question refers to an TREATY OF PEACE. 485 exchange of values in connection with the cost of tlw war anri a snit- able recompense therefor? Q. Yes, sir; take it that way, if you wish. — A. I answer in the affirmative. I would like, however, to add something, with yoar per- mission, in connection with the Philippines which I think yoa have omitted. It is the moral aspect of the case. If we take a portion of the islands only, are we not open to the accusation of taking the best and leaving the poorest? Have we a moral right to make a selection? We have driven the Spanish Government out of the Philippines; there is BO Spanish authority there now, or practically none. Are we going to take what we want and leave the remainder in a state of anarchy? I believe we have incurred a moral obligation to take all of the islands, govern them, civilize the natives, and do the best we can with them. Another consideration. We were driven into this war. A war with Spain over Cuba has been foreseen for years. We did not want it, the sentiment of the people was against it, and we are not respon- sible for the results. We went into it against our will, and we made as good fight as we could. The result is we have practically taken those islands, and we ought to keep them. Of course, I am interested, primarily, from a military point of view, on account of my profession. I drew those lines, and they are original with me, to preserve so far as possible the military advantages which we had won, fearing that Luzon alone would be taken. I made commercial obligations and moral obligations entirely secondary, but I recognize that they exist, and so do the people of our country. Q. What foundation have you for saying the islands other than the island of Luzon are in the military possession of the United States? — A. Simply because we have captured the seat of government and practically all of the Spanish forces. Q. Have you any doubt of the ability of the Spanish to maintain their government in the Vizcayas?— A. The greatest doubt. There is no question in my mind that they are not doing it. Spain has no colonial authority to-day; she has no navy; and she is a bankrupt nation. Q. What do you know of the disposition of the natives beyond Luzon? — A. Only what I read. Q. Do you know that this insurrection is confined to the island of Luzon? — A. No, sir. Q. It has been?— A. The Spanish have never had full control of thf southern islands of the group. Q. No one has ever had control of Mindanao and the other islands except the Mohammedan natives there; they have never submitted to any civilized government?— A. The Spaniards have suppressed piracy in the Sulu Sea. Q. But the natives have never submitted to the Spaniards?— A. ^o, sir; I believe not, outside of certain fortified towns. Q. What I want to get at is on what you predicate your opinion of our moral obligation, after we have done what we think is necessary to be done?— A. On the same ground that we interfered in Cuba. It is missionary work for some civilized nation, and a great deal of sim- ilar work has been done in Polynesia; moral obligations are not con- trolled by distance. Q. Such cultivation has been for the commercial advantage of the nation, as a rule?— A. Yes, probably a combination of missionary work and self-interest. Q. It comes to this, if I understand you, that, looking at it purely 486 TREATY OF PEACE. as a commercial indemnity, the cost of the war would be indemnified by the portion of the group indicated and what we have taken in the West Indies, if it is to be taken by the United States, but you think there is a moral obligation on our part to take the rest of the group as well? — A. Yes; also a commercial advantage and an increased mili- tary advantage. I do not wish to be understood as saying that I think the Spanish islands west of the red line are as strong, from a military standpoint, as the entire Philippine group. Mr. Reid: Q. In reckoning the indemnity, do you include Cuba? — A. I did. The Chairman: Q. Your idea is that the United States should have a strong hand in the future of Cuba? — A. Yes, sir, by all means. Self-defense requires it. Q. If we were not in the Philippines, were not taken there by the power of war, and they had a government to-day to apply for annex- ation to the United States, you think it would be a valuable acqui- sition to the United States? — A. Yes, sir, I do. In reaching this con- clusion I am much influenced by the recent action of Great Britain, Germany, and Russia in China. It seems to me that they are parcel- ing out the coast of China, and we should be in it, or as near it as possible. Q. Do you think to be "in it" in China we need to be all over the Philippine Islands? — A, I think it will be a great advantage to possess all of them. Q. We could be "in it" in China without being "in it" in the Philippines? — A. Perhaps, but I confess I do not see how. If we possess the Philippines we will not be far away. Q. How far is it from top to bottom of the Philippine group? — A. About a thousand miles. Mr. Gray: Q. If we were at war with a first-class power, would it require a greater naval establishment to defend ourselves if we were confined within what had been our limits up to the present year, or if we had islands and possessions and coaling stations, such as have been talked about here to-day, all over the Pacific Ocean? — A. That is a very extensive question. Naturally the more territory a country has to defend the greater the force, both naval and military, will be required. On the other hand, during a war with a naval power, with coaling sta- tions and ports of refuge the world over, similar coaling stations and ports of refuge outside of our own country then become, in my opin- ion, a source of strength rather than weakness. The necessity for such stations has already been referred to by me while speaking of the experience of the war, which was of short duration and with a weak power. If we are going to inclose ourselves within a shell, like a turtle, and defend ourselves after the manner of a turtle, then any possession outside o-' our own country may be said to be a source of weakness. Q. Recurring, then, to the question whether it would take a larger naval establishment to successfully hold our own in case of a war with a first-rate power if we were in the condition we were in up to the present time, your answer would be as we are at present situated, it would take a less naval establishment? — A. No, sir; that is not my answer. TREATY OF PEACE. 487 Q. Then you think that if we had the Philippines for instance — the Hawaiian Islands we have, which we had not up to the present year — it would require a less naval establishment to defend the places where we had placed our fla^, 7,000 miles away from our pres- ent coast, than it would to defend the compact territory now known as the United States of America? — A. I have answered that question already to the best of my ability. I can not call our territoi-y compact. Q. With the exception of Alaska it is, is it not? — A. Part of it is on the Atlantic and part on the Pacific; that is not very compact. Q. Let me ask another question : Is there any nation in the world which has so large an extent of contiguous and compact territory as the United States? A. No, sir. Q. Is it not exceptional? — A. Yes, sir. Q. Is it not to our advantage? — A. Yes, sir. Q. Is it not, within our territory, absolutely self-sustaining as no other country is? — A. Probably. Q. Therefore, I repeat the question. I do not mean you to under- stand that you have not given an intelligent answer to ray question. Still, I think you have missed the point whether, as a matter of fact, if we had continued in the situation in which we were up to the pres- ent year, with this compact territory of such vast extent, and with our population and resources such as they are, it would not take, in case of a foreign war with a naval power, a less naval establishment than if we had these islands in the Philippine Archipelago, extend- ing a thousand miles, open to attack, north and south? — A. I must answer "no." Q. You answer that it would take less to defend the coasts of the United States, plus the Philippine Islands?— A. Yes, sir; and I would like to give my reasons. For the purpose of illustration, let us sup- pose that war is declared and that the theater is in the neighborhood of the China Sea. Suppose we have on the Pacific coast 100 ships and no naval supply stations between that coast and China. Now, the point I make is, that we would be better off and more powerful with a chain of naval-supply stations stretching from the Pacific coast to China and 50 ships, or one-half the force under the conditions first mentioned. Few realize the great changes that have taken place since the days of sails and muzzle-loading guns. With the rapid- firing guns of to-day the entire supply of ammunition may be expended in a^few hours. Ships are helpless without coal. We must he able to follow the enemy with our ships the world over, as Nelson did. Q. Have not they to go with us?— A. That depends upon whether they desire to act on the offensive or defensive. « Q. Will they not go where we are, to the most vulnerable point?— A. Naturall5\ Q. Would not they consider a point in the Philippine Islands, 7,000 miles away from our home territory, more vulnerable than any point on our coast? — A. Not necessarily. Q. Why not?— A. Because of its small value. What is the value of all the Philippine Islands compared with that of New York? Q. Would not we be bound to defend our flag there?— A. Yes, sir. Q. Would not it require a larger establishment?— A. Possibly. We certainly want a larger one than we have now. Q. Would we not possibly require a larger establishment?— A. Yes, sir. An increase of colonies, the merchant marine, and the Navy naturally go hand in hand. 488 TREATY OF PEACE. Q. I presume that we will act on the defensive only? — A. I hope not. Q. We would not be weakened by havin^; these far places to defend? — A. Naval warfare can not now be carried on without coaling stations. Q. Would it not require more to defend Manila and Hawaii and Cuba? — A. We must always take the disadvantages with the advan- tages. Q. We would require a larger naval establishment than if we had not those places to defend? — A. Perhaps. Q. Now, Commander, as you said something about the moral point of view, you consider that we have a moral duty, unless I misunder- stood you, to take the whole of the Philippine group? — A. That is quite correct. Q. I suppose that you would recognize that one of the bases of the moral obligation is an adherence to declarations which, from a national standpoint, amount to premises, would you not? — A. Yes, sir; cer- tainly. Q. Good morals require adherence? — A. Certainly. Q. Having undertaken a war with a specific declaration that it was undertaken with an utter absence of intention to acquire territory, with a definite object defined and declared, and having accomplished that object so defined and declared, would not you believe there is some moral obligation to adhere to that declaration? — A. Nations, as well as individuals, have a right to change their minds. Q. Having made in the present war just such a declaration as I have described, and having, in the course of that war, carried it on as a civilized nation is entitled to carry it on, by striking the enemy wherever we can find him, we struck Spain in her territory in the Philippines, did we not? — A. Yes, sir. Q. Now, the war having been accomplished, and the declared end in view achieved, are we not pledged morally by the declaration we have made to content ourselves with that achieved object and to relinquish that territory we occupied merely as an act of war? If, for instance, we might have attacked and seized as an act of war the city of Barcelona on the peninsula, would we not, when we achieved the object of the war, in morality have been bound by the position we took at the outset to abandon Barcelona? — A. No, sir; not by the rules of war. Q. I am speaking of the rules of morality now? — A. Nor by the rules of morality either. We had a right to take it, and it is not immoral to keep what is our own. Besides, even when a contract is broken, ^ the law, founded on justice and morality, requires a loss by one party to be shown, before damages can be awarded. I do not believe tliat Spain relaxed her efforts to defeat us on account of the declaration you have referred to. Spain, by her oppression and misrule has lost most of the vast colonial teri-itory she once possessed. History has applauded those who brought about the separation and inscribed their names among the benefactors of the world. Mr. Frye: Q. I would like to ask just one question in that line. Suppose the United States in the progress of that war found the leader of the present Philippine rebellion an exile from his country in Hongkong and sent for him and brought him to the islands in an American ship, and then furnished him 4,000 or 5,000 stands of arms, and allowed TREATY OF PEACE. 489 him to purchase as many more stands of arms in Hongkong, and accepted his aid in conquering Luzon, what Ivind of a nation, in the eyes of the world, we would appear to be to surrender Aguinaldo and his insurgents to Spain to be dealt with as they please? — A. We become responsible for everything he has done, he is our ally, and we are bound to protect him. The Chairman: Q. Suppose that cooperation, whether wise or unwise, was limited to the island of Luzon, where the insurrection of the Tagalos, a separate class of people inhabiting the other islands, existed, and we bound the United States in the forum of morals not to leave those people and not to leave a condition of warfare and chaos on that island, if we take that island, compose everybody on that island, great and small, and protect them — does not that discharge the moral obligation to the people we have had as so-called allies? — A. I do not think I quite understand the question. Q. (Questionrepeated.)— A. No; for this reason: During the course of our naval operations at Manila, we destroyed or rendered useless all forces subject to the control of the representative of Spain at the capital of the islands, The power of Spain having become largely paralyzed, the native people of the southern islands have been enabled to practically take charge. We, therefore, are responsible, in a more or less degree, according to the amount of power in Spanish hands before being attacked by us, for what has since taken place in the southern islands and what is taking place there now Q. We have simply put the inhabitants of the southern islands in a better condition, so far as overcoming the objectionable power of Spain is concerned, than they were before; is not that true?— A. Pos- sibly, if they succeed. But there are interests in southern islands affecting civilized people of different nationalities which have suffered. Again, I doubt very much if any native government is better than the Spanish Government was. Q. There you are getting outside of the moral obligation to relieve them from an oppressive power.— A. I intended to confine myself to the indirect results of our action at Manila. Mr. Davis: Q. Do you think this so-called moral question at all impairs the right of the United States to take indemnity for the cost of the war, whether in money or territory?— A. I do not. Judging from the prac- tice of all nations for the last hundred years, indemnity for the cost of war seems to be the first point to be considered by a successful belligerent. Mr. Reid: Q. The question I wish to ask you relates to the point of its being easier or more difficult to defend the coast of the United States when we had some outlying possessions. In the late war, suppose Admiral Dewey had been defeated in the harbor of Manila, instead of being successful, and suppose the Spanish fleet had been as powerful as we believed the Spanish fleet to be, and had been capable of ravaging our coasts on the Pacific if we were not ready to defend them, would we have been then in a better position to defend the Pacific coast against that triumphant fleet with or witliout the Hawaiian Islands?— A. Incalculably better off with the Hawaiian Islands. They form a salient point which no force coming from the westward can afford to pass without first reducing. 490 TREATY OF PEACE. Mr. Gray: Q. It would take more ships to defend the Pacific coast with them than it would without them? — A. No, sir; I think not. A fleet would be stationed at the Hawaiian Islands Q. And leave your coast unprotected? — A. No, sir; the coast would not be unprotected. That duty would be performed by harbor defense ships, torpedo vessels, submarine mines, and batteries. Q. Would it be safe to defend the coast with torpedo boats? — A. They would form an important element in its defense. Q. You would have to detach some of the ships to go to Hawaii? — A. The fleet would be best disposed at Hawaii, with cable communi- cation with San Francisco. Q. They would be detached from the number on the coast? — A. A fleet must be organized and kept intact somewhere to meet an enemy's fleet. Q. Given a certain number of ships, adequate and necessary to protect the coast, would it not be necessary to have a number in addi- tion to that to protect Hawaii? — A. No, sir; not if the enemy's fleet is to come from the west. If it is to come from the north or south this would not be the best disposition. The enemy's fleet must be struck before it can coal, and its near presence must be ascertained by scouts. The acquisition of coal is the great problem in naval war- fare. How to get it and how to prevent the enemy from getting it are the first and greatest considerations. Q. Suppose they should pass to the north and not touch there at all? — A. Very well. Then the coast defenses must stand them off until the fleet arrives and gives battle. STATEMENT OF GEN. CHARLES A. WHITTIER, U. S. V., BEFORE THE UNITED STATES PEACE COMMISSION AT PARIS. Examination by Mr. Day : Q. Please state your name, the length of time you have been at Manila, and the opportunities you have had for observation there. — A. Charles A. Whittier, brigadier-general, United States Volunteers. I left San Francisco on June 28 last, and went to Honolulu, which I left on July 8, and arrived at Manila on July 25. Remained in the harbor meeting the merchants, who came out to the ship as frequently as they could, until a prohibition was put on their frequent visits. Officers constantly came aboard of our ship on the way to and from camp, and reported the different stories about the conduct of the insurgents and the Spaniards, and of the small engagements occur- ring, different evenings. After communications addressed by Admiral Dewey and General Merritt to the acting captain-general, asking him to remove his noncorabatants, and next demanding the surrender of the city, which requests were both denied, the Belgian consul, as a semi-intermediary, came repeatedly to Dewey and proposed different methods of giving up the city after we had made an attack, which, he said, was necessary to satisfy the Spanish honor. So the guns opened on August 13, and after the white flag was shown I was sent, in com- pany with Lieutenant Brumby, on the launch of the Belgiam consul, to receive the surrender. We landed by a stone pier running out into the water, which was rough and getting rougher, but we got ashore very comfortably at about noon, much better than those who went later in the afternoon. Two carriages awaited us, and an interpreter by the name of Carlos Casademunt, together with Colonel of the Staff Don Jose M. Olaguer and Captain of Artillery Don Francisco Chavairi, who also spoke English, conducted us to the house of the captain-general, where we found about 40 officers awaiting us. They had a number of pages of stipulations, to two of which I could not consent, being that their arms should be given to them and the army sent back to Spain, though I think now it would have been wise to do so. Admiral Montojo, who had commanded their vessels in the fight, was there, and seemed to have his wits about him better than the rest. I think the captain- general was much frightened. He reported in great trepidation that the insurgents were coming into the city, and I said that I knew that that was impossible, because such precautions had been taken as rendered it so. The subject had been broached two days before and all the arrangements had been made. A little later they said that our people were on the front of the city, the corner of the walled city, and were firing there. I wrote a letter to the commander of the troops, who turned out to be General Greene, and asked that the firing should be suspended, which it was, and Brumby returned to Admiral Dewey. 491 492 TREATY OF PEACE. Going through the city we passed perhaps 1,500 Spaniards, with rude, old-fashioned artillery, and the men looked very well, infinitely better than the Southerners did at the surrender of our other war. I wrote a note to General Merritt asking him to come to the city. They said that the town hall, their hotel de ville, or the Ayuntamiento was the best place for headquarters. We adjourned there, and I asked them to deposit their arms in the courtyard, to which they demurred, sajang that it was not yet a formal surrender, but they did stack them, and I went down to meet Merritt, missed him, and when he arrived he found about 3,000 people there with arms. About 9 o'clock a memorandum was made of the surrender, and the next day General Greene, Captain Lamberton of the Navy, Colonel Crowder, and myself were on the commission for the terms of surrender. After that I made it a point to know all the merchants in the town. I knew all the English, the principal traders there. The only Americans in the place were Mr. Daland, a custom-house broker, and a Mr. Russell, whose father was an American; he is now connected with one of the leading firms. I went over the line of the only railroad in the Philip- pines, leaving one Saturday morning and going up 120 miles through the rice fields, a country of marvelous and most extraordinarj^ fertility. The next morning we started out early and went up to Dagupan Bay, the terminus of the road, that little niche on the left (indicated on the map). We found about 300 insurgents in the cars, who were going down to some points on the line. They said they had been up at Vigan, where the Spaniards had a custom-house, and had been driven out. This station was all battered to pieces by the Spaniards in some previous engagement. Mr. Gray: Q. What sort of looking people are the insurgents? — A. They are somewhat undersized, are fairly good in appearance, are brave, will stand any amount of hunger and hardship, and, well led, would be very good soldiers. The country on the line of railroad is divided into four parts or zones. There was one General Macabulus, whose head- quarters were at Tarlac, and it was said that Aguinaldo rather dreaded his popularity, and wanted to transfer him. There was good feeling between them, however, and he sent down by Higgins $36,000 as a contribution. This was Mexican, of course. In all my talk it will be of Mexican dollars, about 47 cents' worth in our money or in gold. That trip was most interesting, but I have stated most of these things in my little story. We were the first ofiicers who had been anywhere in the island outside the immediate environs of Manila. The next Sunday, in company with a member of one of the chief mercantile houses and the senior British medical officer at Hongkong, Colonel Evatt, we went up the river Pasig on the launch of the former. We went up about 28 miles to the laguna. Paixanang would have been better to see, but time would not permit. We went to Banos, a health resort. There is an enormous tract of land on the laguna on the market, held by the priests. They wish to sell it for $1,700,000. It is an enormously productive country. You pass cascos loaded with cocoanuts and enormous quantities of nipa thatching for roofs. At this time I was collector of the port, and during this time I heard all sorts of expressions, and I think I had a very fair opportunity, being amused with the natives and studying their peculiarities, to form a fair judgment. I stand a little isolated in my opinions, however, per- haps. Men so quickly dismiss the natives from their minds as simply TREATY OF PEACE. 493 "niggers" and "savages," but when you think of all they hav^e done you must give them credit for great capacity. I think there is a very good authority on this subject, Sir Frank Swettenham, of the British Straits Settlements Colony, from whom I have a letter written to Mr. Pratt, our consul at Singapore. Sir Frank Swettenham has written a very clever book of local stories. Mr. Day: Q. Does he live in the Philippines? — A. No, sir; in the Straits Set- tlements in the Malay Peninsula. His letter is as follows : Carcosa, Selangor, Malay Peninsula, October SS, 1898. Dear Mr. Spencer Pratt: I send you all I have at present available. It may be all you want. The Philippines are Malays, with more intelligence, more education, more courage, perhaps, than their confreres in the Peninsula. In one sense they would be easier to govern, because they have been for many years in contact with white men and understand their ways. Moreover, the majority are not Mahommedans. But, on the other hand, they have aspirations for political institutions and the management of affairs vsdthout the necessary experience, perhaps without the essential qualities to secure success. I should say that our experiment in the Malay Peninsula might be successfully repeated in the Philippines, provided that the controlling power made it clearly understood at the start that they meant to control and not only to advise and educate. , ^ . ,, .^ If that point were never in doubt, and the means of enforcmg authority were in evidence for a short time, the rest would be easy, and I fii-mly believe the results would surpass all anticipations. Yours, sincerely, (Signed) Frank Swettenham. The above is very much my idea of the situation. I have prepared a little statement in regard to the Philippine Islands, their resources, etc., which I will read if you desire. The Chairman: Q. Please read it. General Whittier here read the following statement: "The Philippine Islands are estimated to be in number between 600 and 1,000, the latter, if we include the Sulu archipelago and Paragua, extending over about 12 degrees of latitude, including the Protectorate, extreme south of the Sultanate of Sulu (Jolo), with an area of about 114,500 square miles and a population estimated from 5,500,000 to 8,000,000. About 25 islands are of commercial impor- tance, from practically all of which supplies of produce are collected and sent to Manila for baling, pressing, classification, and shipment to foreign ports. The principal islands are Luzon, Panay (of which noilo, the second port of the Philippines, is the important toAvn), Negros, Samar, Leyte, Cebu, and Mindanao. The last named has a port of Zamboanga. Foreman, in his book (1872), says of this island and of Sulu, etc. : "Half of the Philippine archipelago still remains to be conquered, but only its Mussulman inhabitants have ever taken the aggressive against the Spaniards in regular warfare. (A change since with the effective action of the natives.) It is at a great sacrifice that the Spaniards can retain the little possession they have acquired in the south, and frequent acts of violence are still perpetrated on them by the turbulent Mussulmans who virtually refuse to recognize other rights than those of their sultans, to whom they give allegiance. 494 TREATY OF PEACE. Indeed it may be unhesitatingly asserted that the Spaniards hold no more domain in Mindanao and the Sultanate of Sulu than that of a day's march from their respective garrisons ; and in Mindanao par- ticularly not one-hundreth i)art of the territory." This same condition exists to a lesser degree in the other islands; large tracts of unexplored country, occupied by various tribes, with more rumors than is actually known about their habits, ferocity, etc., this particularly the case with the mountainous country in the center part of the northern portion of Luzon. It will require the intelligent, systematic work of years to open, develop, and govern these places. "For ages it has been the Spanish official system to declare territories to be under their rule, without taking steps to make their possessions manifest to the rest of the world " — or to themselves. The Spaniards have apparently never known the number of the islands owned by them for all these years or the population. The last census — that of 1881(?) — is very vague. The products of the islands are : Sugar, rice, hemp, coffee (reduced of late years), tobacco, cocoa (small), cocoanuts (large and increas- ing), napa palms, bamboo for rafts, furniture, carts, baskets, boats, bridges, carrying poles, floats, etc., hardwoods of great variety. Fruits: Mangoes, bananas, pomela (larger than our grape fruit, of same family), oranges, citrons, chicos, guavas, lemons, pineapples (not of best quality, cultivated for the leaves to make pina and jusi, dress and fine handkerchiefs, etc., fabrics), tamarinds, vanilla, sago (small products). No doubt it will be a great field for cotton. In fact, no country has such diversified possibilities. Account of four products exported to different countries, and all imported from the interior of the Philippine archipelago during the year 1897: Product. Where raised. Amount paid for export duties. Destination. Hemp.. Sugar.., Coffee.., Tobacco Provinces of Sarsogan (Albay), Legas- pi, Jabaco, Camarines, S. & N. Ma- rinduque, Mindoro, Calbayez, Cobu, Iloilo, and otlier soutliern provinces. Batangas, La Laguna, Cebu, Iloilo (small quantities), N. Ilocos, S. Do- cos, Pangasinan, Negros. Batangas, Laguna, Cairti (province of Manila), Zamboanga, both Ilocos, Camarines. This article is produced in almost all the Provinces of the Archipelago, and especially in Cagayan, Isabella, de Luzon, Ilocos (S. and N.), and in all the southern Provinces and in the Visayas. $562,032 75, 884 Free. 553,805 Spain, Australia, China, the United States, France, Eng- land, Japan, Singapore, and other foreign ports. America, Australia, China, Japan, Spain, England. Spain, China, Japan, Singa- pore. Dutch possessions, England, France, Saigon, Singapore, English possessions, Aus- ti'alia, Spain, China, Egypt, France. Products. Quantity. Value of same. Hemp, raw and manufactured . . Sugar Coffee Tobacco, raw and manufactured Kilograms. 74,936,294 75, 883, 919 105,638 22,125,020 11,820.536 10, 810, 451 61,858 9,350,219 Manila hemp has a world-wide reputation, and is used for cordage, bonnets, hats, tapestry, carpets, hammocks, and other network, etc. The sugar product is enormous. More capital is required, and the combination of the producers, with modern machinery and improved TREATY OF PEACE. 495 roads. It seems strange, entering the harbor of Hongkong, to see the magnificent plant of a sugar refinery there, which has made great profits, while at the Philippines practically the old rude methods prevail. The growth of the cocoanut palm, a most profitable industry, may be greatly increased, and its use for domestic purposes, in desiccated form (a new method), and in the manufacture of oil and soap is enor- mous. Of this product in Ceylon, Sir J. West Ridgway, governor, after giving sui'ijrising figures as to its development, naming the value of the local consumption then at 20,000,000 rupees (say $6,600,000 in gold), adds: That the cultivation of the cocoanut palm is rapidly increasing is a matter of congi'atulation, but should not be the cause of surijrise. There is no cultivation so simple, so cheap, and of which the returns are so certain. There is an enormous production of tobacco and a ready market for all of the cigars and cigarettes made in the large factories of Manila. Mr. Frye: Q. All the sugar product of the Philippines is shipped to the East? — A. They must send a great deal to Hongkong now, because of the refinery there, which I mentioned, but some is shipped to America, Australia, China, England, Japan, Spain. I suggested to the pro- prietor of one of these cigar factories that they send their product to America, but he said they did not know about opening a new trade; they had all the orders they wanted and for months ahead, and did not know whether it was worth while. There are good reports as to the coal mines opened in Mindoro and Cebu, but further examination by experts is necessary. I have no doubt there will be large discoveries of this and of iron. Many stories about gold — not confirmed — all from a country of which little is known. While the soil and conditions of other tropical countries permit pro- duction of one or two articles only in each place, there is no doubt that these islands will yield everything possible for all of the others. The great necessities are roads, railways, improvements in sanita- tion, and establishment of cold-storage houses. Profit and comfort will also come from the operation of banks, cotton mills, paper mills (the best material for paper making is easily obtainable), soap and ice factories. Road making should be undertaken on scientific princi- ples. The walls of the walled city of Manila should be demolished and the offensive moats filled, adding in good health what is lost in picturesqueness, and giving the Government a large tract of valuable land to be sold or leased. Mr, Frye: Q. Have you any idea what proportion of the land is now Govern- ment land? — A. There are two or three classes of lands occupied by the natives. On some of it they have erected houses ; and there is a great deal which has absolutely no ownership of record, particularly in the mountains; and there is also much, especially in Mindanao, which should come to our Government. But this question needs full investigation by a land department. STATEMENT — resumed. Railways built to the mountains — distances from 20 to 250 miles — will give a new climate, where one can find at night a temperature of 496 TREATY OF PEACE. from 40 . to 60 instead of the monotonous all-night 82, even at this season, of Manila, and where vegetables and fruits in variety may be raised. The country to be opened by well considered new lines will populate and develop fine sections. All this, of course, will take time. Field-Marshal Roberts says : It (the Mutiny) hastened on the construction of the roads, railways, and tele- graphs, which have done more than anything to increase the prosperity of the people and preserve order throughout the country. This, true of India, will be most effectively the case of the Philip- pines. I quote a portion of an article by Mr. John Foreman in the Contemporary Review for June, 1898 : The islands are extremely fertile, and will produce almost anything to he found in the tropics. I estimate that barely one-fourth of the tillable land is now under cultivation. There is at present only one railway, of 120 miles. A number of lines would have to be constructed in Luzon, Panay, Nogros, Cebu, and Mindanao islands. Companies would probably take up the contracts on ninety years' working concession and ninety-nine years' lease of acreage in lieu of guaranteed interest. The lands would become immensely valuable to the railway companies, and an enormous source of taxable wealth to the protectorate. Road making shou.ld be taken up on treasury account and bridge construction on contract, to be paid for by toll concessions. The port of Iloilo should be improved, the custom-houses abolished, and about ten more free ports opened to the world. Under the protectorate undoubtedly capital would flow into the Philippines. The coal beds in Luzon and Cebu islands would be opened out; the marble deposits of Montalban and the stone quarries of Angono (both near Manila) would surely be worked. The possibilities of development under a free, liberal government are so great that the next generation would look back with astonishment at the statistics of the present day. If we compare Egypt under British control (in fact, if not in name), Mr. Edward Dicey says : The British occupation has now lasted for over fifteen years. During the first five comparatively little was accomplished, owing to the uncertain and provi- sional character of our tenure. In this time (fifteen years) the population increased from a little under 7,000,000 to close upon 10,000,000— this is not due to foreign immigration — ' ' and can only be accounted for by the fact that con- ditions of life amid tlie mass of population are more favorable, mar- riages more frequent, families larger, infant mortality, which before kept the population at dead level, is less frequent, that the general health of the people has improved. To put tlie same idea in plainer words, the natives are better fed, better paid, better housed, better clothed," etc. That, I think, is rather pertinent to our probable status in the Philippines. I made the following jottings of a trip over the line of the only rail- road in the islands: On Saturday, September 3, upon the invitation of Mr. Higgins, manager of the Manila railroad, who furnished his private observation car, and of Mr. Wood, of the firm of Smith, Bell & Co., who was our host, the party, consisting of Major Bement, Mr. Millet, Wood, Price, Higgins, and myself, made a trip over the line of the railroad, leaving at about 10 in the morning. One hundred and twenty- three miles of railroad in fair order, telegraphic communications destroyed in many places, probably requiring a month for their restoration. The line runs through a country of most extraordinary fertility. Rice is the principal product, much sugar, possibilities of cotton, coffee, or almost anything. A small amoimt of indigo is grown on the n»rthern part of the line. The stations are at short intervals, in accordance with orders from the Spanish Government. It is a country of splendid productive power, almost all of it is at present under TREATY OF PEACE. 497 cultivation. We spent the night at Baulista (Bayamban), where Smith, Bell, & Co., have a rice mill and a new house just completed, about 100 miles from Manila. At 7 the next morning we started for Dagupan, a different country, prettier, high cocoanut palm trees, a house in one tree, and on the whole the pret- tiest scenery I have yet seen in Luzon. At Dagupan we saw about 250 insurgents on the cars en route to Tarlac, one of the headquarters. The station is almost totally destroyed, uselessly, by the Spaniards in one of their battles. The insurrectionists practically hold all of the country between Caloocan, 3 miles from Manila, and the road's terminus; but they are nowhere in evidence in great numbers. The plan seems to be to have one or two men on duty, while the others in numbers of fifty or so concentrate in the small pueblos in which the country abounds. At Malinta, aboutG miles out, a new fort and small earth- works were being prepared; at Angelos, two stone barricades. Though everyone expresses a doubt as to unanimity and cohesion in the rebel ranks, I think Aguinaldo has a comprehensive plan. His influence is constantly apparent and his orders, in the main, respected by the offcers and soldiers. One colonel, formerly a general (Gregorio Mayor), was waiting at the station for the the train, that he might report at Cavite to Aguinaldo, under the latter 's orders; and a commission from the latter, the chief of which we saw about 85 miles from Manila, had just succeeded in making an alliance with the leaders of the Iglesia, an independent band computed at 5,000 and organized by the priests and under their domination, in opposition to the insiirgents. It is impossible to forecast how far the natives will adhere to Aguinaldo, but any little show of force and good government by us will, I think, put these prov- inces in a tractable condition and result in peace and increased prosperity for all concerned. The people want peace. They have had enough fighting and dis- turbance, and will be happy in a firm and just control. The country on the railroad is divided into four zones or military districts: the southern, from Caloocan to Polo, commanded by Gen. Pantaleon Garcia: the next, from Polo to Calumpit, by Gen. Gregorio del Pilar; the next, from Calum- pit to Paruao, by Thomas Mascardo, and the northern, from Paruao to Dagupan, by Macabulus. There are about 450 Spanish prisoners at Tarlac, and, strange to say, they are receiving good treatment. A few (six or seven) are at Gerona, among these two governors of provinces. The following extensions and new lines are under consideration by the railroad company and would be most valuable in the development of the island of Luzon: First, Manila to Batangas, south; second, Dagupan to Laoag, north; third, a branch, Gerona to Alliaga, 18 miles; fourth, a branch from Guiginto to the Cagayan Valley for the tobacco district. Manila is naturally a healthy place, and the sanitary reforms necessary are very easy, especially as compared with much of the work in the east, particularly at Rangoon, the chief town of Lower Burma. The islands have a small population when their area is considered. Luzon, larger than England, has only about 3,500,000, or a little over one-tenth of England's; Panay, 2,000,000; Negrosand Cebu, 1,500,000; Mindanao, 2,000,000. The Chairman: Q. Mindanao 2,000,000?— A. That is what was stated to me. Q. That is beyond any estimate we have had.— A. I think it is all conjecture. No one has been through there to know about it. These figures were given to me by Neil MacLeod, esq., large owner and manager of the Compania Marflima, the important steamship com- pany, engaged iii interisland and coast trade. STATEMENT — resumed. If any sensible nation governs those islands for the purposes of development, a bureau of science, with the ablest chief and staff to be obtained, should at once be established, this to comprehend departs ments of geology, zoology, botany, and ethnology. The results obtained will be great and surprising. Also a land and forestry commission or a department of lands, surveys, and woiks. There are immense tracts to fall into the hands of the Government, which could be sold or leased, all of which possibilities have received no attention from the Spaniards. T P 32 498 TREATY OF PEACE. I went to Manila without prejudice ag:ainst the Spaniards there, perhaps a little doubtful, on account of the Maine massacre, for wliich, up to the time of the finding of the court of inquiry, I had been unwilling to believe that Spain was responsible, but testimony from all classes of people, English merchants, the general manager of the railway, also the general "manager of the cable company (both of the last married Spanish women), a Frenchman and his wife, the advertisements in the papers, their treatment of their dead, their actions in battle and in civil administration, all convince me that they are without principle or courage, and brutally, wickedly cruel, with no improvement on three hundred and twenty-five years ago in the days of Philip II. The bones (skulls, arms, legs) of their dead lie without the honor of a covering of earth, exposed in their fashiona- ble cemetery, exliumed on account of a failure by their descendants to pay rent for the tomb. The shooting in the Luneta (their favorite driveway) of dozens of so-called "rebels" and conspirators, notably Dr. Rizal, a man of literary merit, with no trial, vague charges of belonging to secret societies, with the hope of making their victims confess to what, in many cases, did not exist, was made a fete, adver- tised in the papers, "There will be music," and I have been frequently told that women and children attended in their carriages. The tortures inflicted with the same, view of eliciting confessions, are too brutal to commit the narrative to paper. I have brought from Manila for the inspection of the Commissioners four carvings in wood representing tortures inflicted by the Spaniards upon the natives. They were executed by Bonifacio Arevelo, who is now practicing as a dentist in Manila. lie is a man of fine presence, benevolent aspect, not sensational at all in his utterances, and in sub- mitting them to me he wrote the wish that upon reaching Paris I would not forget that the Filipinos begged me to use my efforts to convince all concerned of the utter impossibility of the return by them to Spanish domination. He also gives a description of the models: Figure No. 1. — This figure represents the chastisement which one of the municipal authorities of Jaen (Nueva Ecija) suffered in the prison of that town, the Spanish employees of the prison entertaining themselves by applying the most horrible tortures. Figure No. 2. — This represents an honorably and peaceably inclined resident in a village of the province of Nueva Ecija, taken prisoner, brutally treated for being suspected, without cause, of belonging to the Katipunan, and afterwards shot. Figure No. S. — This figure represents one of the many natives of the Philippines whom, during the late insurrection, the Spaniards shot without previous trial, in the outskirts of the village, leaving their corpses without burial. Figure No. 4- — This figure represents Mr. Moses Salvador, a young Tagalo, who studied several years in Europe. He is a native of Manila, and was imprisoned in September, 1896, for being a Freemason, was horribly martyrized in the headquarters of the police, and, after many months of imprisonment, was shot by order of the Spanish General Polavieja in the Luneta, in company with several of his countrj^men, all condemned on the same charge, of which several were absolutely innocent. The opinion of Alexandre Dumas, sr., in regard to the Spaniards was often quoted in the Philippines, that they possess "honor without honesty, religion without morality, pride with nothing to be proud of." The rapacity, stealing, and immoralities of the priests are beyond TREATY OF PEACE. 499 question, and the bitterness of the natives against them has been caused and aggravated by years of iniquity. To demand a wife or daughter from a native has been a common occurrence. Failing to obtain acquiescence, the husband's or father's goods have been seized, he deported or thrown into jail, under an order easily obtained from the government in Manila. The priests' influence was paramount — they are rich, and fathers (not only of the church), despised and hated by the people. The inefficiency, to put it mildly, of the Spaniards in war has been so clearly demonstrated in this war that I will call attention only to the facts in Manila Bay and the defenses of the town. When it was absolutely known by everyone there, on the last day of April, that our ships were on the way and very near, that night many of their naval officers spent in town, far from the fleet. All their ships were destroyed, and every man of the American fleet (except one upon whom some heavy metal on one of our ships fell) reported for duty the next day. And yet Admiral Montijo applied to Dewey for a cer- tificate of good conduct on that occasion to show to the Madrid author- ities, who lately ordered him home. Their inefficiency (and the creditable work of the insurgents as well) is further proved by the fact that they were driven by the natives from Cavite 20 odd miles into the defenses of Manila, with never a successful attack, never a capture of arms or men. All the success was on the native side, and yet the Spaniards surrendered between 7,000 and 8,000 men, well armed, plenty of ammunition, and in good physical condition. The excuse of the latter may be that their enemy was in small bands— but they never captured one of these— and the small bands drove them to their walls. Jaudenes, the acting Captain-General, in reply to Merritt and Dewey's notice to remove his noncombatants, acknowledged that the insurrectionists surrounded the city, and that he could not move women, children, etc., out. (His fear and solicitude about the natives entering the city when I received the surrender of Manila were almost painful to witness.) This admission demonstrates as well the military ability shown by the Filipinos, whose characteristics I will now enumerate. Aguinaldo went to Cavite, under the permission of Admiral Dewey, in reply to a telegram sent by Spencer Pratt, esq., our consul-general at Singapore, who offered that chief money for his expenses. The offer was declined. After arrival (on one of our ships) he went ashore, accompanied by 13 staff officers, to organize his army; but no adher- ents appeared the first day, and Aguinaldo, rather discouraged, medi- tated returning to Hongkong. I think Dewey advised him to make another effort, at the same time saying that he must leave the public buildings at Cavite, where he had made his headquarters. Soon, from across the bay and from all sides, men gathered. The fact that Dewey permitted the armed men to move from the surrounding districts and for the rebels to take arms (not many, says the Admiral) in the arsenal was the only help we gave him, excepting, of course, the most impor- tant destruction of the Spanish navy. From that time the military operations and the conduct of the insurgents have been most credit- able. Positions taken and the movements of troops show great ability on the part of some leader— I do not say it was necessarily Aguinaldo, but he gave the directions. The Chairman : Q. How many men did he get together?— A. His forces went around the city, taking the waterworks and the north part of the city, and 500 TREATY OF PEACE. running up the railroad. I asked that question of several, and the opinions differed widely — all the way from 8,000 to 30,000 or 40,000 men. Q. Do you think he had as many as 8,000 men before the surren- der? — A. Yes, sir; the environment of the city took a great many men. There is a vast extent of country there, including the water- works and running around the city, and they certainly had to have more than that to do so. Q. How mauy arms did Dewey turn over to them? — A. I never knew exactly. I asked him that question and he said a very few. Q. Where did they get the rest of their arms? — A. Some captured from the Spanish, some brought to him by deserters, and there were some shipments of arms from Hongkong — I believe Americans brought them in — and they have lately taken some to Batangas in the southern part, and have taken some new Maxim guns in there, too. Mr Gray : Q, To the insurgents? — A. Yes. Q. Since the capitulation? — A. Yes; they changed the name of a vessel and used it. She had had a Luzon name, the Pasig, and they changed it to the Ahhy. Dewey sent down and seized the boat, and the insurgents followed to Manila Bay, hoping to reclaim it. In other respects their demands, from their point of view, luive not been unreasonable, and show a proper appreciation of the status. STATEMENT RESUMED. The day after the surrender (August 13) four representatives of Aguinaldo called on General Merritt, who assured them in general terms that "we are the friends of the Filipinos." At that time they occupied a portion of Manila. We soon demanded that they should give that up, to which Aguinaldo's representative agreed, but in seeking confirmation from him the condition was made that in case we gave up the country they should be restored to the positions then occupied and which they had taken greatly by their own merits. However, matters have been amicably settled. Aguinaldo's head- quarters are at Malolos, 23 miles up the railroad. His troops control all the settled part of the island (except Manila), as well as much of the southern country. The Chairman: Q. What do you mean by the "southern country" — those islands below? — A. Yes. Their conduct to their Spanish prisoners has been deserving of the praise of all the world. With hatred of priests and Spaniards, fairly held on account of the conditions before narrated, and with every justification to a savage mind for the most brutal revenge, I have heard no instance of torture, murder, or brutality since we have been in the country. The Chairman: Q. Did you ever talk with Admiral Dewey about his relations with Aguinaldo? — A. Yes, sir. He read me a copy of liis dispatch in answer to the one in which he is asked the question wliether he had made any promises, and he said he had not. Aguinaldo went down Avith his concurrence, without doubt, and the Admiral allowed armed people to cross the bay and join him and made no remonstrance. TREATY OF PEACE. 501 Q. Did he furnish him any arms? — A. He says not, except tlie few furnished them from Cavite. Foreman, in his article, makes the state- ment that he has a treaty with Aguinaldo, and I went one morning and left the article with the Admiral to read, and he said it was not true. Q. This relation — whatever Admiral Dewey did — took place before he got the dispatch of inquiry from the Navy Department — some time before? — A. Yes. Q. IIow far does the Admiral say he encouraged Aguinaldo? — A. I do not think he says he gave him any encouragement, except that he rather dissuaded him from returning to Hongkong when he was discouraged. Q. Did you get that statement from Dewey? — A. Yes. Aguinaldo was rather discouraged when any of the people failed to come to his banner on the first day. That dispatch also included a statement that he knew well the Filipinos and the Cubans, and that the Filipinos were a far superior people — I think that was in that dispatch; it was in one. Mr. Frye: Q. Were they of material assistance to us? — A. Very great. If the protocol had not been signed I think the Spanish at home would have insisted upon their army doing something. They dismissed Augustiji because he was not disposed to fight, and I think if they had not had this experience of having been driven back into the city and the water cut off, so even that Jaudenes said he could not remove his noncom- batants, the Government would have insisted on his making a fight, and he could have made a very good one, for his position was strong, if they had any fight in them at all. But every place had been taken from them by the Filipinos, who managed their advances and occupa- tion of the country in an able manner. The Chairman : Q. The insurrection had been ended in December, 1897, by an arrangement under which money was paid in Hongkong and certain reforms promised. Were these promises ever carried out? — A. Not at all, and Primo de Rivera stated lately in the Cortes that he never made any. I was sui-prised at reading that statement. STATEMENT RESUMED. I talked with Spanish prisoners at Tarlac, an important military station on the line of the railroad, and they said that they had had good treatment only. The wives of two oificers had lately visited their husbands in jail (one at Dagupan, 123 miles north), and gave same testimony. Aguinaldo, in a letter of August 1 to our late consul at Manila, Mr. Williams, said, "Say to the Government at Washington that the Filipinos people abominate savagery; that in the midst of their past misfortunes they have learned to love liberty, order, justice, and civil life." I believe the natives to be brave (under good leader- ship), most tolerant of fatigue and hunger, and amenable to command and discipline, if justice and fair dealing rule. They are very tem- perate, as most of the natives of the East are. I have never seen a drunken one, and this with the example of our soldiers, whom they imitate in everj'thing else; very quiet, no loud quarrels, very good house servants and cooks. 502 TREATY OF PEACE. Their skill in trades, occupations, and professions is very great. Critics will call this imitation, but imitation of good things is not reprehensible. I refer now to the common people, and so will omit very able lawyers (one or two having ranked as the best of all nation- alties in the Philippines), and the higher professions. As accountants, they are excellent. In the custom-house sixty (more before) were employed during my administration. Any information desired, say the amount of imports and exports of last year, kind of articles, whence obtained, and where going, duties, etc., was sought from them, and the reply was always given in writing in a neat, satis- factory manner. All the cash was received by a native — $1,020,000, from August 22 to October 21, much of this in silver — all counterfeits and filled dollars were detected at once by his skill, and only $1 was returned to us from the banks. His neighbor, who kept the record of receipts, was most systematic and able. The Spaniards depended absolutely on them for the clerical work of the office, and the same in the other departments. I visited three factories for the manufacture of cigars and cigarettes : First, that of H. J. Andrews & Co., where 150 to 200 natives were employed ; second, the Alhambra, which had 300 in April, now 600 ; third, the Insular, with 2,000. The Tabacallera, largely owned in Paris, I was unable to see ; it has 4,000. These working people seemed to me of the best — quiet, diligent, skillful. The same qualities were apparent in the one cotton mill of the place, where at least 200 were employed. As mariners, quartermasters of large boats, and managers of small ones, their skill has been proverbial over the East for years, and we had great opportunities during our three weeks in the bay of proving their ability and cleverness. Manila straw hats have been famous for years ; also pina cloth and jusi cloth, the former made of pineapple fiber and the latter made of pineapple fiber and hemp. The station masters and employees of the Manila Railway compare favorably with any I have ever seen at ordinary way stations. Clean, neat, prompt, well disciplined, their superiority is largely due to excellence of the general manager, Mr. Higgins, a man of great ability. Still the quality is in the men. The three servants in his house (on the line) have all learned telegraphy by observation and imitation. I have also some fine samples of their embroidery. They are admittedly extraordinary musicians, and their orchestras and bands have found places all over the East, playing without notes with great harmony and sweetness. It seems to be instinct, and is all instrumental, with little or no vocal talent. All these accomplish- ments do not argue greatness, but they do show that they are some- thing more than ignorant and brutal savages. I do not mean to ascribe to them all the virtues — they may be liars and thieves, it is a wonder they are not worse after the environment and example of centuries — but to my mind they are the best of any barbaric or uncivilized race I have ever seen, and open, I trust, to a wonderful development. Mr. Gray: Q. Is Mr. Higgins an Englishman or an American? — A. An Eng- lishman. The railroad is an English one. TREATY OF PEACE. 503 STATEMENT RESUMED. And now comes the \ntal question, What is be done with these islands, and, if we hold them, what form of government is to prevail? Whatever grave doubts one may have as to colonial extension on the part of America, we have gone too far, either by design or chance, to recede. It can not be denied that we owe it as a duty to the natives and to humanity that the islands should not be restored to Spain (even if they were they could not be held for a year). Any division of them is absolutely impracticable. This would induce constant friction, the ruin of Manila as the great commercial center; the impor- tant products would be shipped direct from the southern islands and goods sent directly there in exchange. One owner must hold the whole country and prescribe uniform duties and government. I will digress here to say that the British at Manila, at Hongkong, Singapore— all over the East — are more than anxious we shall hold the islands. There is such a contrast in the expression of good will and admiration of our country with the feelings of only a few years ago. It seems to me that everyday for the last six weeks some Englishman has said to me in the strongest terms, "There should be an Anglo-American alliance." They speak in the warmest terms of praise and surprise at our moderation, absence of looting, thefts, and every kind of outrage after the taking of Manila. Strange that they should make so much of a thing which, to our officers and people, seemed so obviously the proper and necessary thing. A few days before the surrender some British and other merchants and bankers came to our transports, asking from General Merritt safeguards, or the assurance of protection for the houses and persons of foreign resi dents. I assured Mr. Wood, at the head of one of the largest houses (Smith, Bell & Co.), that they were in no danger. Noticing a look of incredulity, I said: "You don't believe me?" "Well, I think the men getting away from their officers Avill take possession of the spirit shops and commit outrages," I replied: "It is not possible; it is not in accord %vith the temper of our people. If you will consider our civil war, where after the terrible losses, running over four years, no pun- ishment of a single person or appropriation of property was made, you may believe that we shall behave in no other way as the result of this little affair." I doubt if anything has inspired so much the respect of foreigners for us as this, which seems to me so natural a thing. To take all the islands and ignore the natives would be impracti- cable and unwise. On October 25 I went, in the company of H. L. Higgins, general manager of the Manila Railway, Limited, to Malolos for an interview arranged the day before with Aguinaldo. I found his headquarters were in a very nice house, ten minutes' drive from the railway station ; a guard of twenty or thirty soldiers in the courtyard below. We were soon ushered by one of his officers, who spoke English, to the waiting room upstairs, and I met Buen Camino, a wise-looking counselor, whom I met at Ayuntamiento the day after the fall of Manila. He carried us to the presence of the insurgent leader and president, who was dressed, contrary to his usual daily garb, in a black smoking-jacket, of low-cut waistcoat and trousers, both black, large white tie — in fact, the evening dress common at our clubs and during the sujnmer. 504 TREATY OF PEACE. Buen Camino left us. I started the talk by announcing to Agui- naldo tluit I was to leave in a few days to appear before the Peace Commission, and that I had a very friendly feeling for the Filipinos and admiration for many of their good qualities, their quiet, cleanli- ness, temperance, and great imitative power, and a possibility of learning almost any profession or business; that I would like to be able to present to the Commission his and his people's views and demands and what relation they expected to hold to the United States in case we decided to keep the islands. Aguinaldo replied, rather naively, that his people were divided into two parties — those in favor of absolute independence and those of an American protectorate; that the parties are about equal; that he is waiting to see who will have the majority, in that case to take his position. I pointed out to him that it would probably be useless to try to bring those in favor of absolute independence to any change of opinion, but they must consider that they are without any navy and without capital, which is greatly needed for the development of the country; that the Philippine government alone did not possess the element of strength to insure the retention of the islands without the assistance of other governments. They would be at the mercy of any of half a dozen powers striving to take either a part or the whole of the islands, and they must consider that their greatest prosperity would come by the gradual accession of power under American auspices. He said: "But the civilized nations of the world would see that our possessions were not taken from us." I replied: "How has it been in China, where England, Russia, France, Germany, etc., all strive to control territory?" To this he could make no reply. I further asked what that side would expect America, acting the role of protector, to do. He said: "To furnish the navy, while the Filipinos held all the country and administered civil offices with its own people." "And what then would America get from this," said I. "That would be a detail," he said, "which would be settled hereafter." I asked how far they controlled Luzon and other islands. "Almost entirely," he said. That the different bands, little by Little, were expressing their desire to join him. The Igorrottos had sent in some of their leaders the day before and were acting with him. That he had had three representatives from Iloilo within a few days on the same mission. We pursued all this subject of a protectorate for some time without getting any nearer any satisfactory result. Mr, Higgins felt that Aguinaldo had been simply repeating a lesson, but I did not feel so sure of that. He said that he had had many Americans to interview him, most of them reporters, I fancy, and he had always told them the same thing. Thereupon I stated that this was quite a different case. "I am ordered, as an officer of the United States Army, to pro- ceed to Paris and give evidence on points which may be of vital inter- est to you. " After that his tone was different. Buen Camino returned, and Aguinaldo reported to him everything he had said to us. After a little talk between the two, Buen Camino said he, and he was sure the president, was in favor of an American protectorate, and seemed to approve the suggestion that we should have the nucleus of an army; that his people should be joined to it, filling the places of minor offi- cers; and the possibility and the hope within a few years that they should fill thv3 most important civil and military functions. TREATY OF PEACE. 605 Buen Camino said I could be certain that if a protectorate were granted that they wonld do their best to liave it accepted by their people on the lines that I have stated, agreeing with me fully that to hold one island and giving the others to otlier powers would be most unfortunate, and not to be considered. They expressed pleasure at my having come to them, feeling that they had been rather neglected by tlie Americans. This I dictated hastily just after the visit, and it does not give the impression which the interview left upon me — a great desire for our protection, for the improvement of their people materially and intel- lectually, the wish to send their young people to America for education. Subsequently (October 31, the day I left Manila) he sent three ofiBcers to me with the friendliest messages, expressing the wish that I should use my best influence with the commission in their favor. Many methods of government, with them as allies or subjects, are possible. I had often tliought that it might be expedient at first to admit them to some of the minor offices in army and civil govern- ment, and if they show capacity, to enlarge their powers and oppor- tunities, until finally they should have entire control, after proper compensation or an agreed subjection to us for our work and assistance to them. But, and I hope that I shall not be considered English mad in my deference to their practice, the result of so many years of successful colonial government — I am told by a governor of one of their colonies. Sir William McGregor, when I suggested such a course, that they have never thought it safe or expedient, when they have a colony of so many (in this case millions) of blacks, and so few white men, to intrust the government to the former. If of whites, as in Australia, yes, after trial trust the government to them, with what are practically supervising, or perhaps honorary governors, who maintain the connection with the mother or controlling country. It will be admitted that England has been the only successful administrator of colonial government in the world. Holland has had a great career, but possibly things are not so well with it just now in Java and Sumatra; at any rate, it is not comparable to England. "The British colonial empire comprises forty distinct and independent governments, besides a number of scattered dependencies under the dominion of protection of the Queen." "Of the forty, eleven have elected assemblies and responsible governments." The other twenty- nine are divided into three classes : (1) No legislative council; legis- lative power delegated to officer administering the government, with, in most cases, power reserved by Crown of legislating by order m council. (2) Legislative council nominated by the Crown, with some power reserved, as in No. 1. (3) Legislative council partly elected, witli reserve power in three countries, no general power reserved in five. The different conditions of country, races, traditions, etc., have made absolutely different laws necessary— one country a gold cur- rency, others silver; free trade, open ports, tariffs, duties, internal and personal taxation prevail without following any precedents or existing laws of England, varying throughout the colonies. Field-Marshal Roberts ("Forty-one years in India") says: It is difficult for people who know nothing of natives to understand and appre- ciate the value they set on cherished custom, peculiar idiosyncrasies, and fixed prejudices all of which must be carefully studied by those who are placed m the position of their rulers, if the suzerain power is to keep their respect and gain 506 TREATY OP PEACE. their gratitncle and affection. The natives of India (and I think this is true of the Filipinos) are particularly observant of character and intelligent in gauging the capabilities of those who govern them; and it is because the English Government is trusted that a mere handful of Englishmen are able to direct the administra- tion of a country with nearly three hundred millions of inhabitants, differing in race, religion, and manners of life. Throughout all the changes which India has undergone, political and social, during the present century this feeling has been maintained, and it will last so long as the services are filled by honorable men, who sympathize with the natives, respect their prejudices, and do not interfere unnecessarily with their habits and customs. The condition exists in very many colonies, that hundreds of thou- sands of natives are governed with a handful of soldiers — in many cases with none. The moral influence, justice, and fair dealing rule. This we may be able to accomplish in the Philippines, but we must have a colonial service; and to make this effective changes of officers must not be made with every change of government. There must be the surety of promotion to induce a good man to live — often alone — so far from home and in such a climate. Good pay for civil and mili- tary officers is most essential ; and here I quote an article on this sub- ject from the Spectator of September 24, 1898 : First of all, the Americans must realize that they are now face to face with a military problem which can not be solved by makeshifts. No doubt in the civil war they did wonders by means of makeshifts, but then the country was on fire with energy, and the theater of operations was, after all, a comparatively small one, or, at any rate, all on the settled portions of the North American continent. Makeshifts will not avail to keep 90,000 men, scattered from the Philippines to Cuba, regularly supplied with the munitions of war and with those " reliefs " that are essential to the welfare of an army when in foreign places and in unhealthy climates. The wastage in this army of 90,000 men caused by death, by disease, and owing to a short term of enlistment, will be very great, and the gaps will con- stantly have to be filled from America. That there will be little trouble in finding new recruits we are well aware, but it is not finding the recruit that is the diffi- culty. When he is enrolled he will have to be equipped and transported to the place where he is needed, possibly a hitherto unsurveyed island in the southeastern Pacific. But this means an elaborate system of transports and a relief system such as exists in the British army, with probably 6,000 or 7,000 soldiers always afloat, either coming home or going out to America's new colonial empire. All this, of course, presents no insoluble problem, but it does present one which will have to be tackled in earnest, unless there is to be a serious breakdown. Mil- itary organization means primarily an efficient headquarters staff, and this the the Americans will have to provide as quickly as they can. They have in their West Point officers as good material as exists in the world, but for the moment the supply is by no means equal to the demand. StUl, Americans learn new work with extraordinary rapidity; and if only young men, and not "fossils," are put at the head of departments, things will soon shake down. As we have found in Egypt, if you are only careful to put the right men at the top and give them a free hand, they will soon discover and develop efficient subordinates. There is yet another point most vitally connected with the efficiency of a large military force stationed abroad and in tropical and half-savage places to which the Americans must give attention. They must pay their military officers well. Pay on what is practically active service in the Tropics ought to be double what it is at home. The colonels, captains, and even subalterns in Cuba and the Philippines will be set to do most arduous and responsible work; and if good work is to be done, they must be well paid. There is no truer maxim in state- craft than that power will be paid. If it is not paid officially, it will sooner or later pay itself. But such self -payment means ruin and demoralization. That the private soldiers will be liberally treated goes without saying. What is not so certain is that the American people will realize that the officers to whom immense powers will be given must also be paid in proportion. Good salaries are the only instruments which can be permanently relied on to kill corruption, and it is abso- lutely essential that America should start her new colonial empire free from the slightest taint of corruption. If the salaries are good, it will be possible to intro- duce stringent rules against executive officers holding land or engaging in any kind of speculation in ttie regions which they are occupying. TREATY OF PEACE. 607 It is to such rules, coupled with good salaries, that in the last resort we owe our success 111 India. Put an American officer, civil or military, in a great position of trust and responsibility in some outlying district in the Philippines where his word will virtually be law, and pay him well and make it a matter of honor that he shall get no indirect gain from his position, and he will turn out a Lawrence. Give the same man poor pay, and expose him, as he must be exposed, to great temptations in the way of illicit gain, and you will in practice be unable to main- tain a high standard of official duty. The Americans must not bo misled by the fact that they will be able to get plenty of men, and apparently sound men, at small salaries. As Lord Comwallis told his masters in the East India Company, they could get a dozen men to be governor-general for no salary at all, but that did show that it would be wise not to give tlieir governor-general proper remunera- tion. Depend upon it, this apparently simple matter of salaries is of the utmost importance. If a man has a good salary, and therefore a desirable post, he has a perpetual reminder that he has forfeited any right to private gain. If he is inade- quately paid, he has a sense of grievance and tells himself when he is tempted that he has a moral right to do for himself what the country ought to have done for him. Side by side with the problem of military organization, and closely allied to it, is the problem of civil administration. Very soon after the troops have taken possession of Cuba, Porto Rico, and the Philippines there will be an urgent need for civil administrators, including judges, of all kinds. Here, again, the need for a satisfactory tenure of office and high salaries will become urgent, more urgent, indeed, than in the case of the soldiers, who are always largely protected by the sense of esprit de corps. It is in reference to this question of how to provide these civil administrators that we see the only signs of hopelessness and pessimism that have yet been exhibited by the Americans. Grave Americans of experience and high standing are apt to say that they do not see where or how they are to obtain men of the kind we obtain for the Indian civil service. The material, they infer, does not exist. We do not believe it for a moment. The material does exist, only as yet it is in the raw. It will be the duty of America, in the course of the next few years, to develop a body of Indian civilians — men who, if turned into a tropical swamp or forest and told to organize a government and administer it, will do so straight away. No doubt making a start will be a difficulty; but that once made, a tradition of good service will soon develop, and thousands of young men will come forward. After all, the States have never found any difficulty in filling West Point and their Naval College, and exactly the same stamp of man will do for civilian work. Look, too, at the success of the American missionaries. The same zeal and the willingness to work away from home among savages and semisavages will, we are certain, be placed at the disposal of the state. The men who fill our Indian civil service are mainly the sons of naval and military officers, of professors, of schoolmasters, of doctors, and, above all, of clergymen. All these classes are to be found in the States, and when once the need and the opportunity are realized they will give their sons to the service of the state. Only one thing is necessary — the parent who thinks of bringing up a son for imperial work must be made to feel that his boy will have a real career open to him, good pay, a secure tenure of his post, a pension when he retires, and an office conveying a certain amount of distinction and consideration. When America has developed, as we believe she will develop, a class of civilians, she will have added a most valuable element to her population. Once create a high standard of administration in Ciiba and the Philippines, and the effects will be felt in New York, Chicago, and San Francisco. A form of government (among the many) worthy of consideration is : 1. A governor with an executive council of six members, say, Official members -of legislative council: Colonial secretary (lieutenant-governor). Treasurer. Attorney-general . Commanding officer of army. Commanding officer of navy. Commissioner of lands, or collector of customs, and also six unofficial members. The official members in many cases are advisory only, but must vote in legislative council with the governor. In many cases " To the natives a large share of seK-government has been conceded ; their sys- 508 TREATY OF PEACE. tem of village and district councils has been recognized and improved and supplemented by an annual meeting of the high chiefs and rep- resentatives from each province, presided over by the governor. The regulations recommended by these bodies have, however, to receive the sanction of the legislative council before acquiring the force of law." To this should be added a commissioner or minister of native affairs, with a salary which should impart a dignity and importance to the office, which should be purely advisory and given to one of their leaders. 2. Or, like the government of Ceylon, "administered by a gov- ernor, aided by an executive council of five members and a legisla- tive council of eighteen, including the governor and executive council. The legislative council contains representatives of the principal races and interests in the island. For administrative purposes the island is divided into nine provinces, at the head of each of which there is a government agent. The larger towns have a local board, and in the country districts" (of which the Philippines will mainly consist) "the natives retain their village councils and tribunals for matters of minor importance." I believe that it will be an easy matter to secure the loyalty and fidelity of the natives, with the maintenance by us of a small and very quickly decreasing army. If we attempt the unwise thing of ignoring the natives, an army of 50,000 men will be none too small, including the exploration and absolute control of the southern islands and government of the whole of all of them. Enlisting the natives, and giving them what is very small food and pay compared with our allowances, will make a good army of any size we wish, easily subdue any hostile tribes, open all the country, and reduce our present force of 20,000 to 10,000 men. I am confident, after a short time, to very much less. In connection with the settlement of the question of form of gov- ernment will come necessarj- legislation in the four most important questions of currency, revenue, opium, and the admission of the Chinese. That silver must remain the currency for a long time seems certain. This is a question (apart from whatever views we entertain on a gold standard or bimetallism) on which it would be difficult to educate the natives to the belief that our silver dollar is worth double the Mexican of the same weight and fineness, so an attempt to intro- duce it would result in double wages and cost of products; hence, though the British are as tenacious as anj^one of the gold standard of currency, by an order in council in 1894 a British dollar was author- ized to l3e issued for circulation in the East. It is identical in weight and fineness with the Japanese yen (same as Mexican dollar), and has been made legal tender in Hongkong, the Straits Settlements, and Labuan. Notes payable in this are issued by the Hongkong and Shang- hai Bank, the manager of which, with its twenty-six branches, the recognized authority in the East, expressed to me the opinion that we might to advantage repeat the experiment with the trade dollar in the Philippines. I have no doubt that it will be a popular and successful currency, and an American bank of issue, abundantly secured, will be of great utility and preclude the cumbrous method of handling such masses of silver; but the question, as well as the other three, on all of which the wisest differ, should be considered by a commission of experts. This especially in regard to revenue. Shall we have an open gate, a TREATY OF PEACE. 509 free port? Shall we discriminate in favor of American goods, a policy not successful with the Freucli in Cochin China? They admit their goods free there and have heavy duties on those of other countries at their four ports. Shall we have a land tax, source of the greatest revenue in India and the greatest permanent source of revenue in Egyvt? 1 am inclined to believe in a personal tax, the peninsula system of a document of identity (cedula personal), which was adopted in 1884, and which, with some modilications, will be serviceable. These have ranged from $3 to $37.50. Of the higher amounts of taxation there seems to be no complaint. The lowest might be reduced to II or $1.50. The cedula serves as a passport, and must be produced by the interested parties to make legal documents effective, and is noted in the legal instrument. In Ceylon a salt tax, road tax, and tax on consumers of imported rice is levied, running from 2.12 rupees (75 cents) to 9.99 rupees ($3.30), or a little more with a large family, the latter applying to males, the head of a family of five. This was practically the same contribution by the natives to the support of the government. Further, great revenue should come from opium and tax on Chinese admitted. The British opium commissioner decided in effect that the reported ill-effects of opium have been greatly exaggerated ; that it has not been a great injury to the Chinese as a nation, no more than spirits and tobacco have been to other countries. I have not the report at hand, but this is my impression. At all events the trade in it has not been suppressed and is a source of great revenue. In India, 7,000,000 rupees; in Hongkong, a small area, $286,000 a year. To obtain this revenue by any import duty is impossible. Smuggling is too easy and the Chinese, the only consumers, too adroit. The farming sys- tem, selling by auction or by advertisement for public tenders the monopoly to the highest bidder, is the only method. For Manila and the adjoining district, $550,000 was received for the privilege for three years, and it is probable that a large sum in addition was paid to some officials. The farmer paid also a duty of 2 pesos per 100 kilos (220 pounds). Our Treasury officials, not being aware of the farming custom, in their new regulations simply left the 2 pesos duty, which would be less than $1 (gold) on 220 pounds, where the American would be $1,320. It would be absolutely impossible to collect any proper duty or prevent smuggling, but the farmer has been able to do this, and will be. Then the question of the admi.ssion of Chinese, with the strong arguments on both sides. The merchants of Manila are unanimous in their representations of the necessity for more coolie labor. They and many others require it in Manila, and think that it will be nec- essary in railroad building, and in the developinent of the country, saying, "There is no question of competing with American labor here, "there being no such in the country, nor can there be, the climate prohibiting that. Cheap labor and plenty of it is the life blood of the Philippines. There is room for three to four millions of Chinese comfortably, while 90,000 is the present estimate." The Chairman: Q. Room for them where?— A. In the island of Luzon. **Were any road making, new railway, or agriculture work being done, a million would be absorbed at once, and next year another million, and so on." This is the argument of those favoring admission. 510 TREATY OF PEACE. Statement resumed : Taxes on the admission of these could be easily made $10. In fact, it has been $40; has run on for years at varying rates, and still the Chinaman will come. I have no doubt that many might be admitted to advantage ; probably there should be limitations as to tenure of stay, numbers, and character of employment and pur- suits. Then admission will be opposed by the natives, but it is my conviction that they can be brought in this, as in other matters, to look upon it in a reasonable light, after our determination as to what is expedient. With strength, firmness, justice, and fair dealing, we can do any- thing with the native, and make a happy and prosperous country beyond any present expectations. Mr. Frye: Q. I would like to ask a question which occurs to me now. It was stated that one-half of the Spanish troops in the Philippine group was native. Do you know anything of that? — A. I think quite that. The best figures we could have at the time of the surrender and before that and pretty well carried out, was that they had between 13,500 and 14,000 men at Manila. I asked Jaudenes how many Spaniards there were, and he said 7,500 to 8,000. We took 22,000 rifies, but many were in the arsenal. In the other islands the proportion would be greater than that. Q. How did they succeed while this war was going on — this insur- rection — in keeping these soldiers within their allegiance? — A. I think the way many of the insurgents got their arms was through desertions. But there were, of course, large numbers of men who had lived under Spanish rule and in contact with the Spaniards, who regarded the natives as a low order of people, the Spaniards as their masters, and they clung to them, as I suppose the negroes did in our civil war to their white masters. Q. What kind of soldiers did the natives make with the Span- iards? — A. I think very much the same as the army Aguinaldo had. The Spanish army made a most wretched sliowing when you come to think of it, for Aguinaldo to go there without a man and then to drive even 7,000 Spaniards alone 25 miles to their defenses. It is about as feeble as their naval conduct. Q. What proportion of native soldiers do you think it would be safe for us to have acting with our command, under white field officers but under native company officers, in our control of the Phi- lippine Islands? — A. I think the question of native company officers might have to be put off for some time, except the noncommissioned officers. I would first see what turn things took in that way. I think the FUipinos have had enough fighting and want peace, and they will gain respect for us, and I think in a little while it would require very few soldiers, possibly none. You take it in Burma. I talked with an Englishman on our steamer, who is deputy chief of police or dep- uty collector, and he said he had a considerable force under him and he was the only white man for 40 miles, and that he would not see another one for three months. Q. You think it would be safe to take half and half? — A. I think three to one would be safe. I think 10,000 men would soon suffice for us, and after a year it could be reduced to a much smaller number. Mr. Reid: Q. You would want the commissioned officers white just now? — A. Yes ; I would let tlie civil offices go to some of them, and see how they TREATY OF PEACE. 511 got on, and I have no question of the result. In some of the English provinces they have a civil governor and a native governor. The moment the latter rebels at any action of the governor he is speedily brought to agreement. Mr. Frye: Q. In your judgment, from what yon have seen of the islands, ho^ near ^vill the revenues of the islands support the government? — A. That is going to depend on which way you make the revenue, and also the expenses — how much the army and navy will cost. The custom-house gave last year — which was, I suppose, a wretched year for business — between four and five millions of revenue at Manila. The personal tax was a great source of revenue, and the real-estate tax and the licenses were very great. But with a land tax and with a personal tax it is easy enough, without making it irksome, or without complaint, to pay the expenses of the islands. The Chairman: Q. And raise how much revenue? — A. That is hard to say. Q. They have been raising nine millions, we understand? — A. It should have been much more. Thefts and extortions prevailed. Monopolies were sold for which the Government received paltry sums; the concessions granted from Madrid, e. g., for the manufacture of beer, the sole privilege with immunity from all duties, the Govern- ment receiving only $120 a year. The largest tobacco company had most valuable privileges with apparently little payment. The opium monopoly for Manila and the adjoining province paid the very inade- quate amount of about $180,000 a year. Special fees pertaining to the custom-house, etc., were paid to the archbishop. Mr. Gray: Q. Those things have been stopped. How do they take it? — A. The merchants like it very much. Q. Are the priests making any difficulty? — A. No, sir; they are too frightened, and many of them have gone away. Mr. Frye: Q. Do you think they will go home, all of them? — A. The thing will be so much changed that there is no profit to them or danger from their remaining. Q. As I understand it, then, your opinion is that with a fair and reasonable imposition of taxes in the islands, and reasonable duties on imports, the islands will support themselves in all the forms of government necessary, military and civil? — A. I think certainly it will. I do not say that the first year it is going to do that; you have to give time for it; but I think there will be so much capital going into the place which will be willing to pay for privileges that it will only be a question of a short time. Mr. Reid: Q. Would it be possible, by a fair and reasonable tariff, equally applicable to the importation of all nations, collected at the principal custom-houses there, to raise money enough to administer the govern- ment? — A. A tariff alone? Q. Yes, sir. — A. On imports and exports? Q. On imports alone. — A. I should rather doubt that. But I've never heard complaints of the export charges, and very likely those, 512 TREATY OF PEACE. with the imports, will suffice. I do not see any objection to the cedula tax. Q. Has not that been the one of which the most complaint was made? — A. It has been too high ; I think that is the reason. I do not see the objection to the land tax. See how well it has worked in Egypt, and in India. Dicey says in his article that it is paid more readily than under the old government, because they know that they are being treated fairly, and that when it was once paid they would not be called upon to pay it again. I will read from Mr, Dicey's article: "Up to 1882 the acreage of taxable land in Egypt was calcu- lated at 5,000,000. It is now increased by over 600,000 acres, or close upon 13 per cent. Yet the total amount of the land tax — the great permanent source of revenue in Egypt — is actually less in 1897 than it was in 1881." According to Sir Edwin's figures the average land tax per acre has been diminished during the above period from 22s. to 18s. 3d. The arrears of land tax, which formerly attained colossal proportions, have now been practically paid off. The fellah, when once he had paid his annual contribution, has no longer any apprehension, as he had in the days of Ismail, of being called upon to pay again in advance long before the date of the next installment had become due. Mr. Gray: Q. As you understood Mr. Reid's question in regard to the produc- tion of revenue from the taxes collected at the custom-houses; they were to bo levied equally upon aU nations, including the United States? — A. Yes. PRELIMINARY REPORT OF DR. GEOPvGE F. BECKER, OF THE UNITED STATES GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, ON THE GEOLOGICAL AND MINERAL RESOURCES OF THE PHILIPPINES. Department of State, Washington, Novemher A, 1898. Sir: I have the honor to inclose, for the information of the com- mission, copy of a letter from the Secretary of the Interior, trans- mitting a cojiy of a preliminary report made by Dr. George F. Becker, of the United States Geological Survey, in regard to the geological and mineral resources of the Philippine Islands. I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant, John Hay. Hon. William R. Day, Chairman of the United States Peace Commission, Paris, France. (Inclosure: From Interior Department, October 29, 1898, with inclosare.) Department of the Interior, Washington, October 29, 1898. Sir: In May, 1898, by arrangement between the honorable the Sec- retary of War with this Department, Dr. George F. Becker, geologist, of the United States Geological Survey, accompanied the military expedition to the Philippine Islands, for the pur[)Ose of procuring information touching the geological and mineral resources of said islands. Dr. Becker has made a preliminary report on the subject, a copy of which, together with a copy of a letter from the director of the Geo- logical Survey, submitting the same for my consideration, are here- with transmitted for your information. Very respectfully, C. N. Bliss, Secretary. The honorable the Secretary of State. T P 33 513 MEMORANDUM ON THE MINERAL RESOURCES OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS. By George F. Becker, United States Geological Survc}/. This brief memoraiuluni, prepared at the request of Admiral Dewey, probably covers all the main discoveries in the geology of the Philip- pines which are of economic interest. It is drawn up from data recorded in the Spanish mining bureau (Inspeccion de Miuas), but not published, manuscript mine reports by the late William Asliburner, verbal information obtained in Manila, and from various technical publications, of Semper, Santos, Roth, Drasche, Abella, and others. Onl.\ about a score of the islands are known to contain deposits of valuable minerals. These are arranged below in the order of their latitude to give an idea of their geographical distribution, and to facili- tate tinding the islands on tlie map. Tlie latitude of the nothern end of each is taken as that of the island. The character of the valaable minerals stated in the table will alford a general notion of their resources. Afineral-learivg islands and their resources. Island. Lat. N. end. Character of mineral resources. Luzon , Catanrtiianes Marinduque Miiidoro Carraray Batan Kajiu Kapu llasbate Komblon Saniar Sibuyan Semerara Panay Bilikan Ley te Cebu Negros Bohol Panaon Mindanao Sulu Archipelago 18 40 14 8 13 34 13 32 13 21 13 19 13 15 12 37 12 37 12 36 12 30 12 7 11 56 11 43 11 35 11 17 11 .. 10 10 10 10 9 50 6 30 Coal, gold, copper, lead, iron, .sulphur, marble, kaolin. Gold. Lead, silver. Coal, gold, copper. Coal . Do. Do. Coal, copper. Mari)lo. Coal, gold. (Sold. Coal. Coal, oil, gas, gold, copper, iron, mercury ( f). Sulphur. Coal, oil, mercury (?). Coal, oil, gas, gold, lead, silver, iron. Coal. Gold. Do. Coal, gold, copper, platinum. Pearls. The distribution of each mineral or metal may now be sketched in somewhat greater detail. In many cases the information given in this abstract is exhaustive, so far as the available material is concerned. The coal fields of Cebu, however, have been studied in some detail by Mr. Abella, and in a few other instances more extended iuforination has been condensed for the present pur]jose. 514 TREATY OF PEACE. 515 COAL. So far as is definitely known, the coal of the Philippine Islands is all of Tertiary age. and might be better chavacteii/.cd as a higlily carbon- ized lignite. It is analogous to tlie Jajtancse co;il and to that of Washington, but not to the Welsh or Pennsylvania coals. Such lig- nites usually contain considerable combined water (8 to 18 per cent) and bear transportation ill. They are also apt to contain much sul- phur, as iron pyrite, rendering them subject to spontaneous combus- tion and injurious to boiler plates. Nevertheless, when pyritous seams are avoided and the lignite is i)roperly handled, it forms a valu- able fuel, especially for local consumption. In these islands it would appear that the native coal might supplant English or Australian coal for most purposes. Lignite is widely distributed in the archipelago; some of the seams are of excellent width, and the quality of certain of them is high for fuel in this class. Coal exists in various provinces of the island of Luzon (Abra, Cam- arinos, I.atan, Sorsogou). The finest beds thus far discovered appear to be in the small island of Batan, lying to the east of the southern portion of Luzon, in latitude IS-^ 19'. These seams vary from 2 feet 6 inches to 14 feet 8 inches in thickness. Analyses have been made in the laboratory of the Inspeccion de Minas, and the ii;eau of seven analyses gives the following composition: Per cent. Water 13.52 Volatile matter ^'' • ■*" Fixed carbon 44.40 Ash ^3*5 Sum 100-00 One pound of this coal will convert (J.25 ])onnds of water at 40'^ C. into steam at 100° C. The heating ef.ect is about three-fourths of that of Cardiff" coal. The same beds are known to exist in other small adja- cent islands, Carraray and Pva])n-Eapu. A number of couces.sious for coal mining have also been granted on the maiu island of Luzon, just south of Batan, at the town of Bacon. No doubt the beds here are either identical or, at least, closely associated with the coal seams in the little islands. The coal field of southern Luzon is said to extend across the Strait of San Bernardino into the northern i)ortion of Samar, Here coal is reported at half a dozen localities, but I have been able to ascertain no details as to the thickness or quality. In IMindoro there are large dei)osits of coal in the extreme southern portion (Bulacao) and on the small adjacent islands of Semarara. This fuel is said to be similar to that of P>atan. The islands of Masbate and Panay contain coal, the deposits of which thus far discovered do not seem of much importance. Specimens from the southwestern portion of Leyte, analyzed in the laboratory of the inspeccion de minas, are of remarkably high quality, but nothing definite about the dei)Osit is known to me. The first discovery of coal in the archipelago was made in the island of Zebu in 1827. Since then lignitic beds have been found on the island at a great variety of points. The most important cropi)ings are on the eastern slope, within some 15 or 20 miles of the capital, also named Cebu. Though a considerable amount of coal has been extracted here the industry has not been a profitable one hitherto. This is at 516 TREATY OF PEACE. least in part dne to crude methods of transportation. It is said, liow- ever, tliat the seams are often badly faulted. At Uling-, about 10 miles west of the capital, the seams reach a maximum thickness of . 5J feet. Ten analyses of Cebu coal are at my disposal. They indicate a fuel with about two thirds the calorific effect of Cardiff' coal and with only about 4 per cent ash. Large quan- tities of the coal niight, I suspect, contain a higher percentage of a>h. The island of Negros is nearly parallel with Cebu and appears to be of similar geological constitution, but it has been little explored and little of it seems to have been reduced to subjection by the Spaniards. There are known to be deposits of coal at Calatrava, on the east coast of Negros, and it is believed that they are of important extent. In the great island of Mindanao coal is known to occur at eight differ- ent localities, but no detailed examinations of any kind appear to have been made. iSeven of these localities are on the east coast of Mindanao and the adjacent small islands. They indicate the presence of lignite from one end of the coast to the other. The eighth locality is in the western province called Zamboanga, on the gulf of fcigbuguey. PETROLEUM. In the island of Cebu petroleum has been found associated with coal at Toledo on the west coast, where a concession has been granted. It is also reported from Asturias, to the northwest of Toledo, on the same coast, and from Algeria to the south. Natural gas is said to exist in the Cebu coal fields. On Panay, too, oil is reported at Janiuay, in the province of Iloilo, and gas is reported from the same island. Petroleum highly charged with paraffin is also found on Leyte, at a i)oiut about 4 miles trom Villaba, a town on the west coast. GOLD. Gold is found in a vast number of localities in the archipelago from northern Luzon to central Mindanao. In most cases the gold is detri- tal, and found either in existing water courses or in stream deposits now deserted by the current. These last are called "aluviones" by the Spaniards. It is said that in Mindanao some of the gravels are in an elevated position, and adapted to hydiaulic mining. There are no data at hand which intimate decisively the value of any of the placers. They are washed by natives largely with cocoanut shells for pans, though the batea is also in use. In the Province of Abra, at the northern end of Luzon, there are placers, and the gravel of the liiver Abra is auriferous. In Lai)anto there are gold-quartz veins as well as gravels. Gold is obtained in this Province close to the copper mines. In Benguet the gravels of the liiver Agno carry gold. There is also gold in the Province of Bontoc and in Nueva Ecija. The most important of the auriferous Provinces is Camarines Is'orte. Here the townships of Mambulao, Paracalfc, and L;a)o are especially well known as gold-producing locali- ties. Mr. Drasche, a well-known German geologist, says that there were TOO natives at work on the rich quartz veins of this place at the time of his visit about twenty-five years since. At Paracale there are ])arallel quartz veins in granite, one of which is 20 feet in width and contains a chute in which the ore is said to assay 38 ounces of gold per ton. One may susi)cct that this assay hardly represented an average sample. Besides th.e localities mentioned, many others of this Prov- ince have been worked by the natives. TREATY OF PEACE. 617 The islands of Mindoro, Catandnanes, Sibnyan, Simar, Panay, Cebu, and I>()Uol aie reported to contain gold, but no exact data are acces- sible. At the south end of the small island of Panaon, which is just to the south of Leyte, there are gold quartz veins, one of which has been worked to some extent. It is G feet in thickness, and has yielded from $() to $7 per ton. In the island of Mindanao there arc two known gold-bearing dis- tricts. One of these is in the province of Snrigao, wliorc Placer and other townships show gravels and veins. The sei^ond district is in the province of Misamis. Near the settlement of Imponan and on the Gulf of Macajjalar, there are said to be many square kilometers of gravel carrying large quantities of gold with which is associated platinnm. The product of this distri(!t was estimated some years since at 150 ounces per mouth, all extracted by uatives with batcas or cocoa- nut-shell dishes. COPPER. Copper ores are reported from a great number of localities in the Philip|)ines. They are said to occur in the following islands: Luzon (provinces of Lepanto, lieuguet, and Camarines), Mindoro, Capul,* Masbete, Panay (province of Autiiiue), and Mindanao (province of ►Surigao). Many of these occurrences are probably unimportant. The great island of Mindanao, being practically unexplored, is full of possi- bilities; but as 3'et no im[)urtant copper deposit is known to exist there. An attempt was made to work the deposit in Masbete, but no success seems to have been obtained. On the other hand, nortliern Luzon con- tains a copper region which is unquestionably valuable. The best known portion of this region lies about Mount Data, a peak given as 2.500 meters in height, lying in latitude 10° 53', longitude 120'^ 58' east of Greenwich or 124'^ 38' east of Madrid. The range of which data forms one peak trends due north to Cape Lacay-Lacay and forms a boundary for all the provinces infringing ui)on it. Data itself lies in the Province of Lepanto. In this range copper ore has been smelted by the natives from time immemorial, and before Magellan discovered the Phi!ii)pines. The process is a complicated one, based on the same principles as the method of smelting sulpho- salts of tiiis metal in Europe and America. It consists in alternate partial roasting and reductions to "matte," and eventually to block coj)per. It is generally believed that this process must have been introduced from China or Japan. It is practiced only by one peculiar tribe of natives, the Igorrotes, who are remarkable in many ways. Vague reports and the routes by which copper snielted by natives comes to market indicate that there are cop])er mines in various por- tions of the Cordillera Central, but the only deposits which have been examined with any care are those at IMancanyau (about 5 miles west of Mount Data) and two or three other localities within a few miles of jViancanyan. The deposits of Mancanyan are described as veins of rich ore reaching 7 meters in width and arranged in groups. Mean assays are said to show over 10 per cent of copper, mainly as tetra- hedrite and allied ores. The gaugue is quartz. The country rock is described as a large quartzite leus embedded in a great mass of trachyte. I am unable to find this island, wliicli probably is a very small one. 518 TREATY OF PEACE. All attempt lias been made by white men to work tliese deposits, but with no considerable success. The failure does not seem to have been due to the quality or quantity of ore found. LEAD AND SILVER. A lead mine has been partially developed near the town of Cebn, on the island of the same name. The most important deposit of argentiferous galena is said to be at Torrijos, on the small island of Marindu(iue (latitude 13° 34'). A metric ton, or l,(iO() kilograms, is said to contain 90 grams of silver, G grams gold, and 5(55.5 kilograms of lead. In Oamarioes, a province of Luzon, lead ores occur, but are worked only for the gold they contain. IRON. There is iron ore in abundance in Luzon, Cnrabello,* Cebu, Panay, and doubtless in other islands. In Luzon it is found in the ])rovinces of Laguna, Pampanga, and Camarines Norte, but principally in Bula- can. The finest deposits are in the last-named province, near a small settlement named Camachin, which lies in latitude 15° 1' and longitude 124° 47' east of Madrid. A small industry exists here, wrought iron being produced in a sort of bloomery and manufactured into plowshares. The process has been described in detail, so far as I know. It would appear that charcoal pig iron might be produced to some advantage in this region. The lignites of the archipelago are probably unsuitable for iron blast furnaces. QUICKSILVER. Rumors of the occurrence of this metal in Panay and Leyte have failed of verification. Accidental losses of this metal by prospectors or surveyors sometimes lead to the reports of the discovery of deposits, and ochers are not seldom mistaken for Impure cinnabar. NONMETALLIC SUBSTANCES. Sulphur deposits abound about active and extinct volcanoes in the Philiiipines. In Luzon the princii)al sulphur dei)osits are in Daclan, in the province of Benguet, and at Colasi, in Camarines. The finest deposit in the archipelago is said to be on the little Island of Biliran, which lies to the northwest of Leyte. Marble of fine quality occurs on the small island of Romblon (latitude 12° 37'). It is much employed in churches in Manila for ba])tismal fonts and other purposes. Marbles are also (juarried at Montalban in the province of Manila, and at Binangonan in the province of Marong. There are processions for mining kaolin at Losbanos in Laguna province. Pearl fisheries exist in the Sulu archipelago and are said to form an important source of wealth. Manila, September 15, 1898. *I have not found this island on the map. DATA CONCERNING THE FHILIPPINE ISLANDS: THEIR HISTORY, PEOPLE, GEOGRAPHY, GEOLOGY, RESOURCES, AND STiiATEGIC IMPORTANCE. INTRODUCTION AND NOTES ON THE STR ATEGTC IMPORTANCE OF THE PHILIPPINES. By Eusign Evkrett Hayden, United Siatcs Navy. The data herewith, selected as carefully as possible in the short time at my disposal, consist for the most part of quotations from authoritative sources giviug an outline history of the islands, their geology, geogra- }>hy, people, aud resources. There is included also a copy of a special memorandum of inlormation prepared for the President, by direction oi the Secretary of the JSTavy, on the islands of Sebu and Negros, their mineral and other resources and availability as naval stati(ms, and a compilation of data regarding coal and i)etroleum in the Philippines and vicinity, a subject of the greatest imi^ortance in connection with the present value and disposition as well as the future development of the islands. Jagor, the well-known German authority, made the following striking prediction in the concluding words of his work on the Philippines, published in 1873: In proportion as the navigation of tlio wost coast of America extends the influence of the American element over the South Sea, the cai)tivatiny:, magic power which the great Kepublic exercises over the Spanish cohjuies will not fail to make itself felt also in the Philippines. The Americans are evidently destined to brinn to a full development the germs originated by the S})auiards. As conciuerors of modern times, they pursue their road to victory with the assistance of the pioneer's ax and plow, representing an age of peace and commercial prosperity in contrast of that Ijy-gone and chivalrous age whose champions wore upheld by the cross and pro- tei ted by the sword. A considerable portion of Spanish America already belongs to the United States, and has since attained an importance which could not possibly liave been anticipated either under tlie Spanish (ioverument or during the anarchy which followed. With regard to permanence, the Spanish system can not for a moment be compared with that of America. While eacli of the colonies, in order to favor a privileged class by inimeliate gains, exhausted still more the already enfeebled population of the metropolis by the withdrawal of tlie best of its ability, America, on the contrary, has attracted to itself from all countries the most ener- getic element, which, once on its vsoil aud freed from all fetters, restlessly progress- ing, has extended its power and influence still further aud further. The actual present resources of the islands are well indicated in the accompanying papers, and in considering tlseir future, under the con- trol of one or more governments that develop and foster, rather th.an conceal and sui)press, natural resources and native talent, we must bear in mind the probable vast increase in production, pojuilation, and com- merce, accompanied by the introduction of modern methods and all the established improvements in transportation, communication, and sani- tation. The commercial future of the islands, under such new condi- tions, will be a revelation to the world, and tlieir strategic position and features must become of supreme importance in this gre?;ti future field of commercial aud naval rivalry. 519 520 TREATY OF PEACE. Tt lias been pointed out by a recent writer that the openin<>- of the Suez Canal brought untold misery upon the comparatively happy and industrious Malays in the Philippines, Inasmuch as it resulted in the establisliment of a Spanish line of steamers, bringing bureaucratic administration in place of the old paternal regime and awakening into renewed life and activity the dormant curse of Spanish civil and mili- tary rule. It seems safe to predict, however, that with the opening of the Nicaragua Canal, which will put 500 miles of the Sulu Sea, from Surigao to Balabac, on the direct great-circle route of equatorial steam navigation around tlie earth, the dawn of a new and glorious era of pros- ])erity will succeed the long night of nearly four centuries of Spanish doniiriation. The Philippines are very nearl}^ as large in area as the British Isles; they are larger than Kew Zealand, and as large as Italy, with her own Sicily and Sardinia and French Corsica and British Malta added. Indeed, the eastern archipelago may be roughly compared to beauti- ful, fertile, volcanic Italy, only more so. Imagine the plains and hills of northern Italy rent from the snowy Alps by some volcanic cataclysm to form a big island like Luzon, with Genoa for Manila; southern Italy shattered into a score of islands, large and small, Masbate, Samar and Leyte, Negros and Sebu, Panay, Bohol: Sicily enlarged to thrice its size, like Mindanao, joined by a line of islets and reefs to the project- ing cape of Tunis, as the Sulu Islands join that island to northeast Borneo; call Corsica Mindoro; elongate Sardinia to almost reach the Afiican mainland, as l^alawan does the northern ])<)int of Borneo. The inclosed Tyrrhenian Sea will then correspond to the Sulu Sea, the Med- iterranean of the far East, through which commerce from the Pacific must pass on the direct route to Singa])ore, as it does hei-e from Suez to Gibraltar: to the northward, the distant mainland (Austria, France, and Spain) will correspond to China, Tongkiug, and Siam; to the soutii- ward (Egyi)t, Tripoli, Tunis, and Morocco), to New Guinea, Celebes, Borneo, and Sumatra; and the strategic importance of the archipelago, in peace or war, is clearly manifest. This great inland sea, the Sulu or Mindoro Sea, if once well charted, its channels lighted and buoyed, its IMalay piratos suppressed, its fer- tile islands cultivated and their mineral wealth explored, must become the scene of an enormous commerce, composed not merely of the ves- sels of a local coasting trade, but the seagoing ships and steamers of every nation engaged in the Asiatic, East Indian, and Australasian trade. The completion of the Nicaragua Canal may result in the estab- lishment of an equatorial steamship line whose vessels will circumnavi- gate the globe on schedule trips in eighty days, and the great circle route from Brito, Nicaragua, to Singapore, via Honolulu and Guam Island, jiasses diagonally through 500 miles of the Sulu Sea, from Surigao Strait to Balabac. Similarly, the shortest route from Hongkong to all Australian and New Zealand ports, from Tongking to New Caledonia, from the Yellow Sea to eastern Java, Celebes, and west Australia, and from the entire North Pacific Ocean to the Straits of Sunda and Singapore, is by way of the channels of the Philippine archipelago and its great inland sea. Strategically the Philippines are admirably located for commercial and naval o])eration, in peace or in war, but every consideration of often si ve or defensive war, as well as the preservation of peace, seems to me to require that the entire group shall be the property of a single power; indeed, it were far better for that power to own also what is now British North Borneo, bounding the Sulu Sea to the southward. TREATY OF PEACE. 621 One might tliinl; , from a casual glance at a map, that tlio defense of this great inland sea, with its intricate channels and numerous islands, exits, and entrances, would be difticult if not impossible. A closer examination of a chart, however, shows but seven clear channels, four on the east (San Bernardino, Surigao, Basilan, and Hibutu) and three on the west (Verde, Mindoro, and Balabac). (xood harbors, timber, iron, and coal are prolific, even now when the ultimate resources of the islands are not even estimated ; hemp, the best in tlic world, is the product par excellence of this region. In fact the entire mati'^rici of moderu naval warfare is at hand, awaiting- only the personnel to utilize it. Coal, the very life of modern commerce and naval war, is abundant in many islands of the group and may occur in all. Tlie ownership of such resources, so near at hand, by a commercial rival and possible enemy, and tire establishment close by of naval coaling stations and dock yards, would not tend toward the preservation of peace or the successful tinish of a ]Viospective war. It is not, probably, either desirable or necessary to go into details here regarding the strategic value of the various islamls, harbors, and chan- nels, better shown on cliarts than in type, nor to discuss the relative value of each. In fact, as stated above, all are so intimately related that it is practically impossible to disassociate them in any scheme of offense or defense. It will be better for the welfare of the native inhabitants, for the com- mercial interests of all nations, and for the pea('e of the world if the control of the entire group of the Phihppine Islands remains perma- nently in the hands of the United States. The more one studies the subject, in the light of past history and the certainty of a vast future expansion of our trade with China and Australasia, the more convinced does he become that sovereignty over the entire group, from the little islands north of Luzon to the farthest cor:d reefs that stretch toward the equator from Palawan and the Sulu Islands, is essential to our future potential energy in the far East. Even the wild and unexplored Palawan, which forms a natural break- water for oOU miles against the sweep of the southwest monsoon, is cap- able, if occupied, developed, and fortified during long years of peace, of becoming a formidable base of operations in time of war. The importance of Manila is due largely to its being for centuries the capi- tal of the archipelago and the reservoir of its productions and supplies. Divide the group and you cut off streams of wealth that help till the reservoir. With a rival established at Tacloban, lloilo, Sebu, or even Ulugan, the enormous resources of the A^isayas and Mindanao might, and probably would, be diverted to build up a metropolis that would surpass Manila in wealth and importance. Strategically the Philip- pines seem, like our Union, to be "one and inseparable." SEBIJ AND NEGROS ISLANDS, PHILIPPINES: THEIR MINERAL AND OTHER RESOURCES AND AVAILABILITY AS NAVAL STATIONS. 1. The inclosed data have been prepared for tbe President in com- pliance with tlie order of the Secretary of the Navv dated August 8, 181)8. 2. The information has been compiled in this office, from records on file here, together with quotations and abstracts of information taken from books in the library of the Navy Department and the (Jnited States Geological Survey, In the latter library a large collection of books on this general subject has been made, and a catalogue of pub- lications relating to the Philippines. 3. The data herewith consist of an outline map of the Philippines,* upon which the principal coal bearing islands, so far as known, have been shaded in green, and quotations and abstracts from various pub- lications relating to the two islands under consideration, inchidiiig extracts from recent consular reports published by the State Depart- ment,' and cablegram from our naval attach^ in Paris. 4. Negros and Sebu are about the center of the Philippine group, forming part of what are called the Bisayas or Visayas Islands. Negros comprises about 5,000 square miles, and Sebu about half as many. They are long, in a north south direction, and narrow, and separated by the Strait of Tanan. A volcanic mountain ridge stretches the whole length of each island, i-ising to a height of about 9,000 feet in the north of Negros. The Hanks of the ridges and tiie low lands near the coasts are covered with luxuriant tropical vegetation. 5. The principal coal deposits thus far developed occur in these two islands and in Masbate and Batan,^ farther north. The coal, while inferior in quality, makes a good steaming coal when mixed with anthracite or Cardiff coal, and doubtless, when the mines are developed, will prove very valuable for naval and commercial uses. 6. The geological formation of the entire group seems to be like Borneo to the southward and Formosa to the northward, the carbonif- erous beds being broken through by volcanic peaks, their exposed edges upturned along the flanks of these peaks and partly covered by lava flows, etc., thence dipping under the limestone and coral beds near the sea. There seems to be no reason to doubt that the coal-bearing beds may be found upon any and all of the islands of the entire Philip- pine group, connecting the already developed mines of Borneo with those of Formosa. All the islands give strong indications of other mineral wealth, such as gold, copper, iron, lead, and precious stones. Their development hitherto has been haphazard and unscientific, but the results achieved are very promising. 522 Omitted here. «A little island southeast of Luzon, lat. 13° 15' N., long. 124° 05' E. TREATY OF PEACE. 523 7. With rojinrd to the avaihibility of ISTegros and Scbn lor naval stations, the port of iScbu, one of the oldest in the Philippines, is small, buteasily defended, and might make a useful naval and eoaling station, not equal, in any way, however, to Iloilo, Manila, or Sul)ig Bay, except- ing for its nearness to known coal deposits. It should be noted that these islands in the central portion of the group can only be reached through narrow straits with intricate navigation, and if light-houses and other aids to navigation in these straits were in the hands of another power than that owning these two islauds, they would be more or less inaccessible, especially in time of war. 8. The value of Negros and Sebu as naval stations for this country would be greatly lessened if various other nations established stations in other islands of the Philippine group; as coal is likely to occur in any of the islands, the tendency to establish such stations would appar- ently be very great, in addition to the agricultural and mineral wealth of the region. Everett IIayden, Acting Chief InicllUjence Officer, Office of ISTaval Intelltgence, liavy Department, August 9j 189S. [Coal Trade Journal, May 1, 1S95, p. 349.] Coal mining in the Philippine Islands. — The coal deposits in the island of Sebu are now being extensively developed. They are receiv- ing the support of the Government, in that tliey are giving preference to native over foreign coal. . [Hongkong, 1893, Chronicle and Directory for China, .Japan, etc.] This is the capital of the Island of Sebu, and ranks next to Iloilo among the ports of the Philippines. It was at one time the seat of the administration of revenue for the whole of the Visayas, but this was removed to Manila in 1840. Sebu is a well-built town and possesses fine roads, but the people are devoid of commeicial enterprise. The trade of Sebu consists principally of hemp and sugar. The neighbor- ing islands of Leyte, Mindanao, and Camiguin possess extensive hemp plantations, a large proportion of the produce of wliich tinds its way to Sebu for shipmenr. There are some very valuable and extensive coal deposits in the Island of Sebu, but the mines have not as yet been worked with any enterprise. The trade in 189li is represented by the following figures: Imports, $1G5,88L; exports, $2,448,433, as compared with $203,Gt»5 and $3,638,039, respectively, in 1801. The principal exports of 1893 were: Sugar, 17,240,442 kilograms, and hemp, 23,299,015 kilograms. [Stanford's Compendium of Geography, Vol. II, p. 81-82.] Sebu, or Cebu, is a long and narrow island, lying immediately to the east of Isegros, from which it is separated by a strait from o to 15 miles wideband over 100 miles in length. Sebu is 130 miles long and not more than 20 miles broad in its widest i)art and contains 2,275 square miles, or rather less than half the area of Negros. Several chains of mountains of no great height traverse it from north to south, but little is known of its geology except that it produces gold, silver, 524 TREATY OF PEACE. and lead, and has no active volcanoes. Coal occurs abundantly, and is of fairly good (juality; but the complete n(!glect of all mineral wealth by the Spaniards is exhibited here as elsewhere. The inhabitants are almost exclusively Biscayans, but there are said to be a few Negritos. The population has greatly increased of late years, owing to the great development of the sugar and abaca cultivation, and now numbers 518,000, but locusts and low prices have recently dealt as heavy a blow to Sebu as to Panay. In all these islands sugar growing will probably give place to hemp or some more paying croj). In 1890 only 3,000 tons were exported, as against 11,000 tons in 1889, and while in the latter year 34 vessels — almost all of which were British — entered the port, the number in 1890 only amounted to 14. The capital, Sebu, dignified by the title of city, is the oldest settlement in the Philij)pines, and was the seat of government until the founding of Manila. It was the first place of any importance visited by Magellan on his discovery of the group, and it was upon the little island of Mactan, which forms the harbor of Sebu, that he met with his death on the 27th April, 1521. Fifty years later Legaspi planned and built the city. It is picturesquely situated and has a fine cathedral and several churches, but the population is not large. The island forms a i)rovince of itself, under the administration of a military governor. [Hongkong, 1895, Chronicle and Directory for China, Japan, etc.] The island of Negros is extremely fertile and contributes three fourths of the sugar shii)ped from lloilo, the quality of which is excellent. [Stanford's Compendium of Geography, Volume II, p. 80.] Negros lies to the southeast of Panay, from which it is separated by a strait about 15 miles in width. It is 130 miles long and on the aver- age about 30 miles wide. Its area is 4,G50 square miles. Its coast is comparatively little broken by bays or inlets, and it has no good har- bors. A central chain of mountains runs through its entire length. For the most part these are of no height, but the Malaspina or Chalcon volcano, situated towards the northern end, forms an exception. Its height is estimated at 8,192 feet, and it is in a state of intermittent activity. Owing to the narrowness of the island, there are no naviga- ble rivers. The inhabitants are chiefly Bisayans, and number with the Negritos, from whose abundance the island received its name, about 226,000. The island is fertile, and produces sugar, rice, tobacco, and the tex- tile abaca and pina, and in common with Sebu and Samar a large amount of cacao. Its coal mines appear to be no longer worked. The ca])ital is Bacoled, on the west coast opposite to lloilo, where the "politico- military" governor resides, and there are numerous large villages around the coast, though few in the interior. Hinigaran, the former capital, contains over 12,000 inhabitants. [Stanford's Compendium of Greography, Volume II, p. 34.] Lead occurs in Sebu, and iron ores are very abundant in Luzon and Mindanao. That there are extensive coal measures in the archipelago there is little doubt, but they have been little exploited, and coal forms one of the largest imports of the group. The Com]iostela mine only turned out 700 tons in 1881. As yet no deep shafts have been driven, and what has been obtained affords very rapid combustion, and is not •weU suited for steamers. Sebu and Negros are especially rich in this TREATY OF PEACE. 525 product. Since the archipelago Hes midway between the great coal beds of northern Borneo and Formosa, it is probable that the mineral will in Inture be worked to great advantage. [British Admiralty, Eastern Archipelago, Part I, Eastern Part, 1890.] Negros Island. — So called from the number of Negritos or Actas foutid on it by the Spaniards; is about 118 miles long, and though larger than Sebu Iskind is neither so rich nor so populous. Its coast is very little broken by bays or inlets, and does not contain any good harbor. A central chain of mountains runs through it from north to south, which attains its greatest height toward the latter point. The rivers are but small, and unfit for the navigation of vessels of burden. The island produces the best cocoa in the Bisayas, besides rice, maize, sugar, tobacco, cotton, and abaca [a variety of the banana plant from which Manila hemp is obtained]. Note. — The Encyclopiedia Britannica says the population m 1887 waa 175,000. [From same publication as above.] Sebu Island. — Sebu is an island of some importance and interest, as its port has been thrown open to foreign commerce. It is long and narrow, 111 miles in length, with a greatest width of 18 miles in the northern part. A chain of mountains traverses the island through its entire length, containing beds of mineral coal and, it is stated, veins of gold. The rivers are numerous but small, and generally unfit for either navigation or irrigation. With the exception of a few fine valleys, cul- tivation is confined mainly to the seaboard. The population of the island is estimated at 38,000 souls. The chief exports are sugar, oil, hemp, tobacco, coffee, and pina silk. The chief imports are European goods, coal, and rice. [Note. — The Eucyclopsedia Britanuica says the population in 18G7 was 452,000. Reclus gives it as 518,000.— E. H.] [By Sir John Boweing, London, 1859.1 Speaking of minerals, it is stated that gold is found in many of the islands — " the mountains of Caraga and Zebu are the most productive. Many Indian families support themselves by washing the river sands. In the time of heavy rains gold is found in the streets of some of the pueblos when the floods have passed." Iron is also found in various islands. "A coal mine is being explored in Guila Guila, in the Island of Zebu, on the river Manango, at a distance of about 6 miles from the town of San Nicholas, which has nearly 20,000 inhabitants, and is by far the largest town in the island. There are reported to be strata of coal from 1 to 4 feet in thickness." Various copper mines have been worked from time immemorial, and favorable reports sent to Europe. [From the American Naturalist, September, 1886.— By J. B. Steere.] The south end of Negros has appeared, as we passed around it, a great stretch of grassy plains and hills, now dry and yellow, and burned over in some places. The mountains approach nearer at Dumaquete, and we could see forests on their heights. They were volcanic, and what we judged to be ancient lava streams extended down from a height of two or tiiree thousand leet to near sea level, and with such an even grade that they looked like gigantic railroad embankments. * * * We found it [a variety of plant known as abaca, a so-called mineral hemp] 526 TREATY OF PEACE. growing luxuriously at a height of 3,000 feet, while those varieties used for food tlirived be>t near sea level and iu the greatest heat. * * * Deer and wild hogs were abunthiut. [From Travela in the Philippines. — By F. Jagor, London, 1875.] "Sebu, with a population of 34,000, is the chief town of the island of the same nanie, the seat of government and of the bishop of the Bisayans, and within -48 miles' of Manila by steamer. It is as favor- ably situated with regard to the eastern portion of tlie Bisayan group as lloilo is in the western, and is acquiring iiu-reased importance as the emporium for its ])roducts." Among products mentioned are sugar, tobacco, rice, coffee, wax, Spanish cane, and mother of-pearl. "The island of Sebu extends over 75 square miles.* A lofty mountain range traverses it from north to south, dividing the east from the west side, and its ])opulation is estimated at 340,000 — 4,.")33 to the square mile.* The inhabitants are peaceable and docile; thefts occur verj^ seldom, and robberies never. Their occui)atious are agriculture, fishing, and weaving for home consumption. Sebu produces sugar, tobacco, maize, rice, etc., and, in the mountains, potatoes; but the rice produced does not suffice for their requirements, t\nne being only a little level land, and the deficiency is imported from Panay. The island possesses con- siderable beds of coal, the full yield of which may now be looked for, as the duty on exports was abandoned by decree of the 5th of May, 18G9. According to the Mineral Beview, Madrid, 1806, the coal in Sebu is dry, pure, almost free of sulphur pyrites, burns easily and with a strong flame. The coal of Sebu is acknowledged to be better than that of Australia and Labuan, but has not sufficient heating power to be used unmixed with other coal on long sea voyages. According to the cata- logue of the products of the Philippines (Manila, 18G6), the coal strata of Sebu have, at many places in the mountain range, which runs from north to south across the whole of the island, approached a thickness of 2 miles. The coal is of middling quality, and is burned iu the Gov- ernment steam works after being mixed with Cardiff. Average price, Sebu, $6 per ton. [From Oceanica.— By Elis^e Keclas, New York, 1890.] The whole surface of the Philippines is essentially mountainous, the only ])lains that occur being the alluvial districts at the river mouths and the si)aces left at the intersection of the ranges. Most of the sur- face appears to be formed of old rocks, especially schists, and, in the north of Luzon, granites. Extensive coal fields are found in the cen- tral islands, especially Cebu and Negros, and in many places these carboniferous beds seem to have been buried under more recent lavas. Later limestones have also been developed by the coral builders round all the seaboard, and there is clear evidence that along extensive stretches of the coast line these formations have been upiieaved to a considerable height above sea level. They tbrm at some ])oints broad horizontal tables round the headlands, and here aie found shells and other marine remains l.'elonging to the same species still living in the surrounding waters. But about the Gulf of J3avao, in South .Mindanao, the contrary movement of subsidence has taken place, as shown by the dead or dying ibrests in vailed by the sea. The Philippines abound in minerals. The natives collect gold in the 'Evidently Geriuau miles, of which 1 (liuear) =4f statute. TREATY OF PEACE. 527 alluvia of all tlie islands, but especially in the province of Oenguet, ceutral Luzon, and about the nortlicast ])oiiit of 8uiif;ao, in Mindanao. (Jop])ei' is conimon in the Lepanto hills, bordering on the same central district of Lu/on, where from time immemorial the natives have extracted the ore and wrought it into implements and ornaments. The blacksmiths also have at hand an excellent iron ore for their arms and instruments. Cebu is said to contain lead glance yieldii:g nearly half of its weight in ]>ure metal, while the solfataras of many extinct volca- noes have formed inexhaustible deposits of suli)hur. [Extracts from Letters of German Caiitaius. XV, Haiisa, Vol. 21, 1884, p. 117.] The harbor of Zebu, capital of the Philippine island of the same name, is formed by a very narrow arm of tlie sea separating the island of ^Mactan from that of Zebu. It has a northern and a southern entrance, both very small and narrow, especially the northern one, where it is quite impossible to pass by a vessel of over L'OO or ;iO() tons. On the other hand, there would be no difdculty in passing even a larger ship in the southern entrance. There are for both entrances regularly appointed government pilots, who are suppcsed to be stationed in the northeast monsoon, near the light-house at the northern entrance, and in the southwest monsoon, near the beacons Norma and Lipata, at the southern entrance. When I came from Manila and passed the light-house at the northern entrance about 4.30 o'clock p. m., there was no pilot in sight (perhaps because it was Sunday), but as I had a good Spanish chart, and as the channel moreover is well indicated by buoys on both sides, I went on and got a ])ilot sliortly before dark not far from the old tower Mandaui. Tliis is the narrowest place of the channel, hardly wide emmgh for a larger ship lying at anchor to swing around. Although we now had t!ie cur- rent against us, a light land breeze took us to a safe anchoring place. In the northeast monsoon the anchoring place southwest of the fort is in 16 to 20 meters depth. Ships are moored with chains of abont 00 meters each. There is a regular ebb and flood tide, but high and low water never coincide with the change of the current. Besides, there seem to be, at the anchoring places of the larger ships, several counter currents (eddies), for the shii)s lie very uneasy, rolling from side to side, and I'.ardly have the chains been made clear during the day when there is another half turn or round turn found in them in the morning. The best plan is, in case there is already a round turn in the chain, to make the two chains fast together, and then to give plenty of play to one chain. How great the strain is on a taut chain when the ship swings is shown by the fact that from our starboard chain, which was pretty taut, a link 2 inches thick was twisted loose and broken. If the chains had not been fastened together we slionld liave lost anchor and chain. There are three wharves here, but only one of them, the one farthest east, is sometimes used by steamers and by sailing vessels arriving with cargoes of rice and salt. For use by them there are two iron mooring-buoys south of the wharf (bridge). * * * Hard wood is good and cheap. Calking work can be done by the natives; fbrging, if not too expensive, by Chinese or natives. Fresh water, I am told, is paid for at the rate of $1 i)er barrel. We got all of our drinking water ourselves, partly from the well near the fort, partly from that near St. Nicholas Church; the latter water is the better of the two. * * * — A.. L. 528 TREATY OF PEACE. [Copy of cablegram recoivod August 5, 1808, from naval attache at Paris.] Have received reliable information that the commander in chief (of the German squadron in China recently forwarded to Ijciliu, Germany, extensive rei)ort (of the) German engineer on mineral resources of the Philii)i)ine Islands, jtarticnlarly coal deposits, all of which described containing considerable sulphur, excepting one deposit which, being free from sulphur, is necessary to the development of the mineral resource. I can not give name of (he island containing this deposit. Note. — A later telegram from uaval attache at Berlin states that the island above referred to is xirobably Sebu, COAL AND PETROLEUM IN THE PHILIPPINES AND VICINITY. [EncycloiKBdia Britannica, 9th ed., p. 749.] 31incrals. — Thougli liitherto little advantajie lias been taken of its existence, there appears to be in several of the islands a fair ainonnt of mineral wealth. Two coal fields are known to exist, one beginninj;' in Oarausau in the south of JAizon, and probably extending southward across the Strait of San Bernardino to Catbalongau, in Saniar, and another occupying the western s]o])es of Cebu and the eastern slopes of Negros, and thus probably passing under the Strait of Tafion. In the first basin there is a bed from 10 to lli feet thick cropi)ing out of Gatbo, which has given good results as a fuel for steamboats; in tlie second Centeno reports at least ;"> beds, of varying thickness and quality. The first discovery of the mineral was made in Cebu in IS'27. Hitherto little success has attended the schemes of exploitation. [Encyclopffidia Britannica, 9th ed., Coal, p. 59.] In the Dutch settlements, coal has been found in Sumatra and Bor- neo, the best known deposit being that at Pengaran, on the southeast of the latter island, where a mine has been worked by the l>ut(;h authorities for several years. * * * In the British island of Labuan, off the north coast of Borneo, five workable seams, together about 27 feet thick, are estimated to cover the whole island. The most important southern coal deposits, however, are those of Australia, which extend, with short intervals, from the Gulf of Car- pentaria to Bass Straits. In the northern districts the distribution appears to be somewhat similar to that seen in South America, Sec- ondary and Tertiary basins occupying the ground near the sea, while true carboniferous coal is found further inland. [Encyclopa'dia Britaunica, 9th ed., under Formosa, p. 416.] Coal, sulphur, and petroleum are the only mineral productions of Formosa which are known to exist in quantities sufficient to make them of economical importance. The principal coal fields are in the north of the island, near Kelung and Tam-sui, and the coal is all shipped in Kelung Harbor: In 1873, 45,000 tons; in 1874, 15,221 tons; in 1875, 27,605 tons; in 1876, 31,593 tons. [From the Statesman's Tear-Book, 1898.] Gold mining is being carried on in Luzon with favorable prospects, and coal mining in Cebu, where, when arrangements for carriage are completed, the output is expected to be about 5,000 tons per month. Longman's Gazetteer of the World, London, 1805, says that coal occurs in Luzon, Carausan, Negros, and Cebu. QA 529 T P 34: OoO TREATY OF PEACE. [Australasia, Vol. II, Giiillomard. In Stanford's Compendium of Geography, London 1894.] Pliilippine Islands (p. 35). — That there are extensive coal measures in the archipelago there is little doubt, but they have been little exploited, and coal forms one of the largest imports of the group. The Compostela mine (Zebu) only turned out 700 tons in 1881. As yet no deep shafts have been driven, and what has been obtained aftbrds very rapid combustion and is not well suited for steamers. Zebu and !Negros are especially rich in this product. Since the archipelago lies midway between the great coal beds of northern l^orneo and Formosa, it is probable that the mineral will in the future be worked to great advantage. I'nnay (p. 79). — Gold, copper, iron, and quicksilver have been found, and coal in Antique, but none of these are worked. Negros (p. 80). — Its coal mines ajipear to be no longer worked. Zebu (p. 81). — Coal occurs abundantly and is of fairly good quality, but the complete negh^'t of all mineral wealth by the Spaniards is exiiibited here as elsewhere. Samar (p, .^2). — Coal is found, but no attempt has been made to investigate the minerals of the island. Mindanao (p. 87). — It is probable that gold exists in tolerable quan- tities, and coal also. Java (p. 105). — Coal, indeed, is plentiful, but it is poor, occurs in thin strata, and liardly repays working. Sul[)iiur is abundant, and a furtlier exploitation of the mineral oils sliould give good results. (P. 138). The mineral-oil lamps which light nearly every peasant's hut consume over 20,000,000 gallons per annum. Concessions were granted in 1800, both in Java and Sumatra, for the working of petro- leum, and the prospects are said to be very encouraging. Sumatra (pp. 208, 209). — The mineral wealth of Sumatra still remains for tlie most part undeveloped, although it is probable that before long the rich coal tields of Ombilin, which are situated toward the head waters of the Batang Hari, will be opened. They were discovered in 18G9, and have been estimated by M. de Greve to contain 370,000,000 cubic meters. The mineral is of the Tertiary period, as it is probable that most of the Sumatran measures will prove to be. M. Forbes found coal in the Palembaug district, and it exists near Malabu and other places in Ache. South of Padang, at Moko-moko, it is worked. * * * Concessions were granted in 1891 for working some petroleum wells lately discovered. Borneo (pp. 219-221). — The abundance and wide distribution of coal in the islands is remarkable. In this respect Borneo is by far the richest of all the islands of the Malay Archipelago. Schwauer says: The occurrence of coal is more widespread than one might be led to think hy a first examination. In the whole of the hill foriiiatiou it constitutes a most impor- tant and almost never-failing factor. All fissures and openings that have been made use of for the investigation of the underground geology have led to the discovery of coal seams, and even the banks of the great rivers disclose them in many places. As far as is known, there is no coal of greater age than the Tertiary period. Most of it belongs to the Eocene, but the brown coals of the Miocene also occur plentifully. Mr. Motley, in his report on the geology of Labuan and neigiibor- hood, gives the following interesting description of its peculiarities: Tlie coal, dense and perfectly carbonized as it is, yet exhibits most unequivocally its vegetable origin, and not only that, but even the kind of vegetation of which it lias been composed is evident from the most cursory inspection of the heaps of coal brought out of the levels. It is clearly the product not of a bed of peat produced TREATY OF I'KAOR. 531 by the decay of small vegetation, bnt of a mass of lingo timber. At least one-half of the mass displays the grain and structure of wood, and freqiioully it separates naturally into the concentric layers of dicotyledonous wood. All the 8i)eciniens I have examined have exactly the structure of the di])terace(>u8 trees now fonniug tlie bulk of the timber growing above them. The trees must have beeu of vast dimensions. I traced one trunk upward of 60 feet, and for the whole of that dis- tance it was not less than 8 feet wide. * » * It is remarkable tbat wsucli an evidently recent fbriiiMtion should be so much upheaved, the coal measures of Labuan and Ihunei d!i)pinjj from an angle of 24° to nearly or quite vertical, the di|> being north north- west, or about at right angles to the direction of the great chain of mountains whicli rises nearly parallel to the coast. Mr. Motley's account of this coal formation would lead us to conclude that dense tropical forests growing on an extensive plain or river delta have beeu suddenly overthrown by flood or earthquake, or by sudden depression of the land, and had been covered with a deposit of clays or sands. He well remarks on the quantities of trees and shrubs which in the Tropics grow on the seashore, or even in the salt water, and thus accounts for the presence of marine shells in the shales, and even in the coal itself. (Pages 245-246:) The coal measures are practically inexhaustible, and have been worked at various places in almost every part of the island, both by Europeans and natives. Tiie results, however, have been almost uniformly unsuccessful, but this failure must be ascribed to the undeveloi)ed state of the country and other causes of secondary impor- tance, and the mines will doubtless be worked with remunerative results in the future. The "Julia Hermina" mine, near Banjarmasin, which promised well, was hardly completed when, in 1859, an insurrection took place, the European staft' were murdered, and the works com- pletelv destroyed. The Pengoran coal mine, also in the neighborhood of Martapura, was commenced in 1848, but did not average a larger annual output than about 6,000 tons, and was abandoned in 1884, as was also the neighboring Asahan mine, which had beeu working four- teen years with much the same results. A mine was also working iu Koti, abandoned, and once more reopened in 1886. In Sarawak the raja opened a mine on a tributary of the Sadong Kiver in 1880, the prospects of which are promising, nearly 50,000 tons having been raised in 1886. He also purchased, two years later, a con- cession for the working of the seams at the mouth of the Brunei Kiver. On the island of Labuan is a mine, till lately abandoned, which has caused the failure of three or more companies, but is now being suc- cessfully worked; while in Pulo Laut, the large island at the southeast point of Borneo, about 5,000 tons are yearly raised by the natives and supplied to Dutch steamers. There is little doubt that petroleum, which has been found in many places, will eventually become a work- able and most valuable product. Lahuan (pp. 254-255).— The island of Labuan is situated on the north- west coast of Borneo, opposite the moutli of Brunei Bay. * * * The coal mines are now being worked by the new Central Bornean Company, who have steamers running twice a month to Singapore. Celebes (p. 301).— Coal is found in various places in the Makassar district. (Page 304.) Coal of an inferior quality is found on the island. The Moluccas (p. 325).— Near Batjan are some coal mines which have been worked intermittently, though to no great profit, for nearly half a century. OU (irouj) (p. 326).— Coal and lignite existj and probably gold, but 532 TREATY OF PEACE. no explorations have been made, and the existing charts of the island are extremely inaccuiate, Ceram (p. 329). — Coal exists, but of what period does not seem clear. New Caledonia (p. 457). — Gohl, antimony, mercury, silver, lead, cop- per, nickel, cobalt, and chrome have all been obtained, as well as coal of various kinds. * * * The coal beds are believed to occupy a very large area. Of late the Government has charged itself with their exploration, and they are about to be worked; but hitherto they have produced nothing for want of capital and i>roper labor. It is esti- mated that the coal, which is said to be of good quality, can be sold at Noumea for as low a price as 12s. ])er ton. [Coal Trade Journal, May 1, 1895, p. 349.] Coal mining in the Philippine Islands. — The coal deposits in the island of Sebu are now being extensively developed. Tliey are receiving the support of the Government in that they are giving preference to native over foreign coal. [Hongkong, 1895, Chronicle and Directory for China, Japan, etc.] Sch)!. — There are some very valuable and extensive coal deposits in the island of Sebu, but the mines have not as yet been worked with any enterprise. [Britisii Admiralty, Eastern Archipelago, Parti, Eastern Pait, 1890.] Sehu Island. — A chain of mountains traverses the island through its entire length, containing beds of mineral coal. [Bowring, London, 1859.] Cehii. — A coal mine is being explored in Guila Guila, in the island of Cebu, on the River Manango, at a distance of about () miles from the town of San I^icholas, which has nearly 20,000 inhabitants, and is by far the largest town of the island. There are reported to be strata of coal from 1 to 4 feet in thickness. [F. Jagor, London, 1875.] Sebu. — The island possesses considerable beds of coal, the full yield of which may now be looked for, as the duty on exports was abandoned by decree on the 5th of May, 1869. According to the Mineral Review, Madrid, 18G6, the coal in Sebu is dry, pure, almost free of sulphur jjyrites, burns easily and with a strong Hame. The coal of Sebu is acknowledged to be better . than that of Australia and Labuan, but has not sufficient heating power to be used unmixed with other coal on long sea voyages. According to the catalogue of the products of the Philippines (Manila, 1866), the coal strata of Sebu have, at many i)laces in the mountain range which runs from north to south across the whole of the island, approached a thickness of 2 miles. The coal is of middling quality and is burned in the government steam works after being mixed with Cardiff'. Average price, Sebu, $6 per ton. [From Oceanica, Elis6e Eeclns, New York, 1890.] Extensive coal fields are found in the central islands, especially Cebu and JSTegros, and in many places these carboniferous beds seem to have been buried under more recent lavas. TREATY OF PEACE. 533 [Board of Traflo Joiinial. London, May, 1898.] A dispatcli, dated Ctb April last, lias beeu received at the foreign office from Her Majesty's miuister at The Hague, transmitting statement of the production of petroleum in the Dutch East Indies, according to which, in the course of the past year or two, there has been a consider- able " nortli, longi- tude 130° 1(5'' east (meridian of San Fernando), approximately. Other extensive coal mines are also being worked in the village of Oompostela, close to the city of Cebu. This coal is of superior quality and stocks are always available. # * # * * * * . [China Sea Directory, London, 1889, and Siipipleiiient, 1893.] N^orthicest coast of Borneo (p. 145). — Coal is obtained from mines in the vicinity of Muara Harbor. (Supplement, 1893, says: "These mines are known as the Brooketown collieries. The seam being worked is 28 feet thick. There are many coal seams in the vicinity of JMuara lliver.") The mines now being worked (1888) are connected by a tramway Avith the pier at the village, and are 1 mile distant Irom it. The coal is light, very friable, but of good <}uality, and is delivered on board for $G per ton. Quantities from 5U() to 2,(i0l) tons are kept in store, under cover. Two 50-ton schooners and a small tug are avaihible for coaling vessels at the anchorage, and (JO tons can be put on board from them in twelve hours, the coal being taken olf in bulk and put on board in baskets. In Febrnary, 1888, the principal mine was on fire; but as coal seams vaiying in thickness from 18 to 25 leet, running in a north by east and south by west direction have been found between Bruni Bluff and Pisang Mount, and are believed to exist from the town of Bruni north- ward to the sea, the sujiply in this district, as soon as the necessary mining skill and money are forthcoming, may be said to be practically inexhaustible. The annual output of the mines, worked with the pres- ent crude means, is 10,000 tons, the depth as reached being 85 feet. Abont 220 Malays are employed. Labuan (p. 158). — A large sup[»ly of coal obtained from the coal mines at the north end of the island was formerly kept in store in Victoria Harbor; latterly about 300 tons obtained from the Muara coal mines has been usually kept in stock and put on board in baskets, either from the jetty or from lighters, at |7 a ton. The attendance of lighters can not always be depended on. Tong-King (p. 12, supi)lenient). — Coal mines have been found a few miles off Mines Kiver, east side of Hongai Bay or Fort Courbet. A railway about 4 miles in length connects the Nagotna mine with the port Jetty, and a large output was anticipated in 1891, something approaching 800 tons daily. The coal is said to be of good quality. A steamer of 2,000 tons burden can lie afloat at the jetty, and there is a good workshop for small repairs. Tong King (p. 48(j). — Several channels lead from Fai tsi long Bay, l)ast Colosse Island, 738 feet high, to Kebao, where important coal beds have been found similar to those at Port Courbet. Borneo (p. 4). — Borneo appears to be rich in minerals. In the state of Landak the great diamond of the rajah of INIatan was found. The territory of Montrado, north of Landak, has several gold mines. In British North Borneo gold, copper, tin, and coals have been lound. In province Dent a seam of coal rises to the surface and is said to be of excellent quality. China tSea (p. 6). — Coals can be obtained at the following ports: Sarawak, Muara Harbor, Labuan, Kudat Harbor, Manila, Port Sual, Bangkok, Saigon, Toiiron Bay, and Hoihau Bay. TREATY OF PEACE. 537 Noriliwest Luzon (p. 347). — Coals are bronglit from Tjiiifraycn to Siial at $18 the ton. Anam, China, lat. 1G° N., long. 107° E. (j). 4G1). — At Hong Sone, two days' journey to the soutliwest of Tonron, is a considerable coal mine. The coal obtained from it burns quickly when used by itself; its price in 1883 was 2d shillings the ton. [Eastern Archipelago, Part I. (Eastern Part), 1890. (British Admiralty).] Negros (p. 247). — Layers of coal have recently (1879) been discovered in this part of iSTegros, and outcrops of coal have been found in the rivers which enter the sea near the towns of Calatrava and Talabe. [Isaac M. Elliott, ex-U. S. Consul at Manila, in Scribner's Magazine for July, 1898, Manila and llie Philippines, p. 19.] Mindoro. — The mineral wealth of these islands is not believed to be of great importance, although vast regions are practically unexplored. Gold has been found, but not in paying quantities. A discovery of immense value was made a few years ago in an accidental manner. The American ship Richard Parsons was wrecked on the western coast of the island of Mindoro. Captain Joy, of Nantucket, Mass., and his crew were forced to cross to a ]iort on the eastern coast, in order to reach any vessel that could carry them to Manila. To do this they made a seventeen days' journey through the wilderness and over a range of mountains. In these mountains they came upon great ledges of coal, which are outcropping, and thousands of tons had broken otf and accumulated at the base of the clift's. On hearing of this discovery the Spanish Government immediately confiscated the lands, but they have never done anything toward developing this great deposit of coal. All the coal now used in the islands is imported from Australia. [Johnson's Cyclopedia, Kew York, 1894.] Japan. — Coal is largely worked on the northern coast of Kiushiu (Nagasaki, Karatsu), and in Yezo (Poronai). [W. B. Williams, President. W^m. Jamison, Secretary.] HiTEMAN Miners' Commttee, Riteinan, Iowa, May 31, 1898. Dear Sir: I made suggestions to our Eepresentative in Congress (J. F. Laeey) that it would be to the advantage of our Government if they would send an organized company of miners to the Philippine Islands to help establish and maintain order in those islands, and when that is done that we look after the mineral resources of the country. Inclosed you will find his reply, n-hich is confidential. I shall now try to explain why I tliink it would be of benefit to us to control the coal mines in those islands. In the first place, the mines there have not been developed, for the reason that under the Spanish only they were taxed so that it was impossible to successfully work them. In Caransan there is quite a coal basin— this is south of IManila— and in the upper part of the Island of Luzon' there are several veins of coal, which is of good quality; in some respects it is superior to the coal from Vancouver. Now, if we hold those islands and this mineral exists there, I think it would certainly show bad management on the 'Probably the mines near Lingayen are meant. — E. H. 538 TKEATY OF PEACE. part of our Govorunioiit if we neglected to make use of it. And if we could sui)])ly coal for our vessels iu the Indian Ocean from the coal mines in the Philippines it would be a great saving to the Government and also be an incentive to enterprise and industry. Now, Mr. Curtis, from reading your letters in the liecord for the past four years, I know you are in a position so that you can call the attention of the proper authorities to the suggestions which I advaiice, and if I have the sane tion of the authorities, I can organize a com])lete company of miners, from mining engineers to mule drivers, and all of the skilled labor needed around a coal mine, and if it is not too much trouble I wish you would call some of the officials' attention to this matter. I am' no father's son, but I am an American. Eespoctfully, yours, Wm. Jamison. William E. Curtis, Chicago Record. HiTEMAN, Iowa, September 1, 1898. R. B. Bradford, Washington, D. C. Dear Sir: My information in regard to coal in the Philippines has been gained by intimate acquaintance with a Swede miner named Swanson, who had worked for some English company iu their mines north of ^lanila. He left here some five weeks since, and said he was going back to the islands if he could possibly get there, liesijectfully, yours, Wm, Jamison. [Copy of cipher cablegram received August 5, 1898, from naval attach^ at r:ii;is.l Have received reliable information that the commander in chief [ofj the German Sijuadron in China recently forwarded to Berlin, Germany, extensive re])ort [of the] German engineer on mineral resources of the Philippine Islands, particularly coal dei)osits, all of which described containing considerable sulphur, excei)ting one deposit, which being free from sulphur is necessary to the development of the mineral resources. I can not give name of the island containing this deposit. Note — A later telegram from naval attach^ at Berlin states that the island above referred to is probably iepper, ginger, vanilla, cinnamon, cocoa, etc. Of dangerous wild beasts there are none; oxen, buffaloes, horses, goats, sheep, and swine of peculiar but excellent breeds are extensively reared ; deer, wild boars, pheasants, ducks, and fine fish are abundant; the for- ests swarm with monkeys, squirrels, parrots, sunbirds, and bees; the jungles with lizards, snakes, tarantulas, mosquitoes, and other insects. Gold is found, also iron, copper, coal, vermilion, saltpeter, quicksilver, ,suli)hur (in large quantities, both pure and mixed with copper or iron), mother-of-pearl, coral, amber, and tortoise shell. The Philippine Islands were discovered in 1521 by Magellan, who died here in the same year, and a few years later the Spaniards, under Villalobos, took possession of the group and named it in honor of King Philip II of Spain^ The inhabitants consist partly of negritos, who have woolly hair and other characteristics of the negro, ami seemed to have formed the aboriginal jiopulation. They live in the interior, are repulsive and savage in aspect, and roam in bands. There are only a few thousand pure-blood negritos left, as they have long been in process 539 540 TREATY OF PEACE. of extermination by tlie Malay iinmii^'rants, or of absorption tbrougii crossbreeding with other peoples. llu' Malays are in a large part Koman Catholics, settled in villa;;x'S, and engaged in agriculture and tishing. They possess many line branches of industry, as, for instance, their beautiful mats and their elegant linen fabrics, and they imitate European industry, shipbuilding, leather dressing, carriage building, etc., with great success. The Chinese and the mestizos, descended from Chinese fathers and native mothers, are mostly engaged in com- merce. Very few Spaniards reside in the islands, but the Chinese are very numerous, and natives of the Malayan race form the vast majority of the population. ABSTRACT OF ARTICLE ON PHILIPPINE ISLANDS. [In Longman's Gazetteer of the World, London, 1895.] Minerals : Gold (Luzon, Bengiier, Vicols, Mindanao, Misaiiiis, Surigao). Galena (50 per cent pure). Copper (arsenical pyrites, 16 per cent pure copper, Luzon, Lepanto, Camarines, Masbate, Panay). Coal (Luzon, Cavansan [Carausau?], Negros, Cebu). Sulphur (Leyte). Products: Hemp. Sugar. Tobacco (only cultivated in all the Philippines since 1882). Cofiee (principally since 1880). Woods. Eice. Some cacao. Cotton. Only one-fifth of the islands are under cultivation. Industries: Makiug cigars. Abaca tissues. Straw hats. Perfumes. Sugar (£l>,oOO,000 exported). Imports: Food, dress materials, fiiel, arms, machinery, and iron. Commerce: Greatest with England, then United States, Spam, and Germany. Exports and imports: 1891, £10,000,000; 1892, £12,500,000. Eailroad: Manila to Dagupan, 70 miles. Telegraph: 720 miles j also cable to Hongkong. 541 THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS. [From Engineering, London, August 12, 1898.J The present state of affairs in the Philippine Islands naturally directs attention to the condition of their trade and causes speculation to be made regarding its future. A glance at the map shows that their geographical, and therefore their political, position is very important. They, along with Borneo, form the eastern shores of the South China Sea, wliich are therefore one-half Spanish and one-half British, while the British Malay Peninsula and French Cochin China form the western shores, with Hongkong, our chief far Eastern ]>ossession, at the head of this narrow storm-tossed sea. Not only do they form an important station in the far Eastern seas, and a step to the vast poi)ulatiou of China, but their great natural resources cause theni to be a most desir- able possession; so that from various ])oiuts of view it is of the utmost importance that they should not fall into the hands of any foreign power except America or Britain, either of which would not only develop their natural resources, but also use them for the purpose of maintaining an "open door" for the commerce of all countries with the far East. The Germans are beginning to express the opinion that they do not possess their legitimate share of the world, and to insist that in any new partition of any part of the earth thej^ should get their fair share. They are su^jposed to have cast longing eyes on the Philippines, but they are not likely to interfere by force, for they know that such a step would immediately open up a very large question, and nothing has happened in connection with the recent events which give theni any grounds for diplomatic intervention, which the United States svould be certain to resent. It is, indeed, probable that the real difficulties of the United States will only begin when they have made peace with Spain. If we are to judge from the opinions expressed in the American journals, the future government of the Philippines is very uncertain. The ISTew England press, as a whole, is decidedly opposed to tlie permanent holding of the islands. It is pointed out that under the Constitution there is no machinery for the government of 8,000,000 or 10,000,000 of people who could not be admitted to citizenship. Moreover, the possession of the islands would rend the Monroe doctrine from top to bottom, and would tell very much against the United States in any difhculty with a for- eign power. On the other hand, some influential journals favor annexation and maintain that the time has come when America must abandon her isolation and join in the universal search for markets and footholds in distant parts of the world. They maintain that the possession of the Philippines would support an Asiatic fleet and give the United States 542 TREATY OF PEACE. 543 a better posititm among tlie natioiis of the world, not only by increas- ing tbeir coiiinierce in Mie far East, but generally by enabling them to take that place among nations which the wealth, i)opulation, and men- tal resources of the country entitle it to. The l*acilic coast papers are specially eager in the matter, and insist that with an im])()rtant station in the i'ar East San Erancisco and the Pacific coast as a whole would become, in time, nearly as important as is the East now. Ameri- can merchants and manufacturers, under the protection of the Stars and Stripes, would develop the riches of the islands and create an immense held for counnercial enterprise. Those Journals not in favor of annexation are of ox)inion that the island should be transferred to Eugland or Japan, whose interests are essentially the same as those of the United States. Such a step, however, would at once raise the opposition of Russia, and, probably, also of Germany and France. The well known llussian journal, the Novoe Vremya, had the following remarks on the subject: It looks as if tlie sofctleiuont of the question of the fate of the Philippine Islands will be prolonged for some long time to come, since all the powers that have any use in their ha^ids take a keen Interest in this ripe and tempting bunch of grapes. The future fate of the Phili])]unes can be assumed in the following manner: Firstly, the United States can rest content with Cuba, and leave the I'hilippines to Spain; secondly, Spain may retain the Philippines, but under the guaranty of the United States the necessary reforms shall be introduced into the islands; thirdly, the Philippines might bo given up by Spain, and then establish a more or less independ- ent republic under the protection of the United States; and, fourthly, the Pliilip- pines can be annexed by the United States on the ground of enjoyment of the rights of a separate State. The last solution of the question seems to us the least likely to be carried into elfect if one takes into consideration the distance of the islands from the American continent, the general predilection on the part of Americans to observe the Monroe doctrine, and the numerous population of the islands; this population can scarcely be expected to allow themselves to be turned into American citizens without a struggle. Whatever solution is arrived at, the writer thinks it desirable that Russia should have a coaling station in the Philippines. As the war between Japan and China started a great many important questions, so in like manner is that between the United States and Spain certain to raise some new factors in the complex game which is being played in the far East. The rebels against Spain in the Philippines evidently mean to insist on a republic under the protection of the United States, an arrange- ment which they say will not disturb the balance of inliuence in the far East, and they promise to respect and protect the interest of all powers. They remember, they say, that the Japanese are their kins- men; that England is the great nation that commands 75 per cent of their import trade, and whose capital is invested to so large an extent in their undertakings; that America is their principal market for the export of sugar and hemp; that Germany and France are now opening up considerable trade, and that Russia, Austria, and Italy have no business connections in the islands. The ])riucipal articles imported into the islands include: From Spain, printed cotton cambrics, colored yarns, gunny bags, hats, umbrellas, leather goods, most of the wine, comestibles, etc., lentils, pulse, beans, and beer; from the United Kingdom, goods made of line yarns, such as muslins, etc., printed jaconets, corrugated and sheet iron for roofing, cast iron and yellow-metal goods, earthenware, tinned provisions, ham, bacon, and flour; from Germany, hardware and galvanized and enam- eled iron goods, cutlery, paints and oils, and beei-; Irom the United States, practically all the flour consumed on the .Alanila market. The 544 TREATY OF PEACE. protective tariff, which came into force in 1891, lias caused a hirge and steadily increasing quantity of the trade in cotton goods and yarns to be diverted from the ITuited Kingdom to Barcelona, and has also put a stop, practically, to the import of linen goods. Gunny bags, which used to be imported from Calcutta, come now almost exclusively from Barcelona, and Spain likewise provides the greater part of the comes- tibles, wine, etc., for the same reason. The stai)le products and prin- cipal articles of export from the Plulii)pines are tobacco (leaf and cigars), sugar, hemp, and copra; and of minor iuiportance, coliee, sapau wood, and buffalo hides. There is a large quantity of sugar machinery imported into the Philippines every year, mostly of British manufacture; but lately Ger- man manufacturers have been sending out some burnislicd mills, which have taken the fancy of many of the native planters, who like show and also long credit. The natural products of the islands are timber, including many valuable woods yielding resins, gums, dye products, fine-grained ornamental wood, and heavy timber suitable for building purposes, coi)per, and copper and iron ])yrites. Gold is also found in some quantity, and there are two coal mines situated on the east coast of the islanroximate only, being based on commercial information supi)Iied to Her Majesty's consuls by merchants resident at the ports: Ports. Imports. 1895. 1896. £1, 367, 000 145. 500 £1, 587, 500 lloilo 135, ono Cebu . ... - 2,000 Total 1, 512, 500 1, 724, 500 The principal articles imported include — From Spain. — Printed cotton cambrics, colored yarns, gunny bags, hats, umbrellas, leather goods, most of the wine, comestibles etc., lentils, pulse, beans etc., and beer. From the United Kinfjdoyn. — Goods made of fine yarns, such as book muslins etc., printed jaconets, corrugated and slieet iron for roofing, cast iron and yellow metal goods, earthenware, tinned provisions, ham, bacon, and flour. From Germany. — Hardware and galvanized and enameled iron goods, cutlery, paints and oils, and beer. From the United States. — Practically all the flour consumed on the Manila market. The pi otective tariff which came into force in 1801 has caused a large and steadily increasing quantity of the trade in cotton goods and yarns T r 35 545 546 TREATY OF PEACE, to be diverted from the TJnited Kingdom to Barcelona, and has also put a stop, practically, to the import of linen goods. Gunny bags, which used to be imported from Calcutta, come now almost exclusively from Barcelona, and Si)ain likewise provides the greater part of the comestibles, wine, etc., for the same reason. The staple products and principal articles of export from the Philippines are tobacco (leaf and cigars), sugar, hemp, and copra, and, of miner importance, coffee, sapan wood, and buffalo hides. The following table shows the value of the exports of the principal articles for the years 1895 and 1896: Articles. Tobacco (leaf) Cigars Sugar Hemp Copra £450, 000 145, 000 1, 205, 000 1, 665, 000 283, 000 £500, 000 150, 000 1,600,000 1, 500, 000 375, 000 The latest report of H. M.'s consul at Manila says that for the year 1897-98, as far as the Luzon sugar crop is concerned, the outlook is poor, and that the recent rebellion in the islands will lead to an almost total absence of any supplies from some districts and a considerable falling off in them. There is a large quantity of sugar machinery imported into the Philippines every year, mostly of British manufac- ture; but more lately German manutacturers have been sending out some burnished mills, which have taken the fancy of many of the native planters, who like show and also long credit. The principal customers for Philippine goods are the United States, the United Kingdom, China, and Japan. In 1896, 81,614 tons of sugar were exported to the United States, while China took 65,974 tons, United Kingdom 56,327 tons, and Japan 22,025. During the same year the United Kingdom imported 50,940 tons of hemp from the Philippines, and the United States 45,041 tons. China and Japan took 98,310,000 cigars. United Kingdom 26,954,000, and the rest of the Continent of Europe 42,890,000. The natural products of the islands are timber — including many val- uable woods yielding resins, gums, dye products, finegrained orna- mental woods, and heavy timber suitable for building purposes — copper, and copper and iron pyrites. In Paracele and North Camarines there are veins of gold worked by the natives, and in the rivers of Sapan, Casiguran, and New Ecija there are found gold pyrites of good quality, while in Mambualao and Camarines there are gold mines in operation. There are also many hot springs of iron and sulphur waters, all of excellent medicinal properties. The two coal mines situated in the east coast of the island of Cebu are said to yield sufficient coal to supply the local demand, and the quality is stated to be a little inferior to Australian and better than Japanese, SPANISH COLONIES. [From the Statesman's Tear-Book, 1898.] The area and population of the various possessions claimed by Spain are as follows : Colonial possessions. Possessions in America: Cuba (1.S0U) Porto Rico Total, America . PoasessioDH in Asia : Philipjiiiin Islands Sulu Islands Caroline Island.^ and Palaos Marianne Islands. . . Total, Asia. 3. Possessions in Africa: Rio de Oro and Adrar Ifni (near Cape Nun) Fernando Po, Annabon, Corisco, Elobey, San Juan. Total, Africa Total possessions . Area (Eng- lish square miles) . Popnlation. 41, 655 3,670 1.631,687 806, 7U8 45, 325 2, 438, 395 114, 326 950 560 420 7, 000, 000 75, 000 36, 000 10,172 116, 256 7, 121, 172 243, 000 27 850 100. 000 6,000 30, OUO 243, 877 136, 000 405, 458 9, 695, 567 For administrative purposes the Canary Islands are considered part of Spain. Kio de Oro and Adrar are under the governorship of the Canary Islands, with a subgovernor resident at Rio de Oro. The country on the banks of the rivers Muni and Campo is claimed by Spain, but disputed by France. It has an area of 69,000 square miles and a population of 500,000. The extent of the Sulu Archipelago, under the Spanish protection, is defined in a protocol signed at Madrid March 7, 1885, by representa- tives of Great Britain, Germany, and Spain, as including all the islands lying between the western extremity of the island of Mindanao on the one side and the islands of Borneo and Aragua on the other, exclud- ing all parts of Borneo and the islands within a zone of three maritime leagues of the coast. PHILIPPINE ISLANDS. These islands extend almost due north and south from Formosa to Borneo and the Moluccas, embracing an extent of 1<>° of latitude and 9^ of longitude. They are over 1,200 in number. Tlie two largest are Luzon (area 40,024 square miles) and Mindanao, and the total area is about 52,650 square miles.' The population, including army and 'Table quoted above says 114,326 square miles, which is evidently correct.— E. H. 547 548 TREATY OF PEACE. navy, lunnbers aboiit 7,670,000. The capital of the Philippines, Manila, has 154,062 inhabitants (1887); other towns are Laoag, 30,642; Lipa, 43,408; Banang, 35,598; Batangas, 35,587. There is a small resident Spanish population and about 100,000 Chinese, in whose liands are the principal industries. The native inhabitants are mostly of the Malayan race, but there are some tribes of Negritos. The government is admin- istered by a governor-general and a captain-general, and the 43 prov- inces are ruled by governors, alcaldes, or commandants, according to their importance and position. The estimated revenue of the Philippine Islands in 1894-95 was £2,715,980, and expenditure £2,056,026. There is an export duty on tobacco, and almost every article of foreign production is heavily taxed on being imported. On muslins and petroleum the duty is about 100 per cent of the cost. The chief products are hemp, sugar, coffee, copra, tobacco leaf, cigars, indigo. Gold mining is being carried ou in Luzon with favorable pros- pects, and coal mining in Cebu, where, when arrangements for carriage are completed, the output is expected to be about 5,000 tons per month. In the absence of official statistics, only a])proximate results can be given. In 1896 the imports were estimated at £2,187,500, and the exports at $4,151,250. The chief imports are rice, flour, wines, dress, petroleum, coal. The chief exports in 1896 were: Sugar, £1,600,000; hemp, £1,500,000; tobac(;o leaf, £500,000; cigars, £150,000; copra, £375,000. On an average about 34 per cent of the import value is from the United Kingdom, 21 per cent from Hongkong and Amoy, 13 per cent from Spain, and 10 per cent from Singapore and British India. Imports into Spain from the Philippine Iskmds in 1895, 24,970,692 pesetas; exports to Philippine Islands, 25,769,890 pesetas. The total imports into Great Britain (board of trade returns) in 1896 were of the value of £1,536,533, and the exports of British produce to the Philippine Islands, £507,601. The chief articles of import into Great Britain in 1896 were hemp, of the value of £731,633, and unrefined sugar, of the value of £647,370. Of the British exports in 1896, the value of £307,019 was for cotton manufactures and yarn. In 1895, 304 vessels of 425,025 tons cleared the ports of Manila, Iloilo, and Cebu. Tliere are 720 miles of telegraph in the islands, and 70 miles of railway. The coin in use is the Mexican dollar, with locally coined fractional money. The import of foreign money is illegal, but that of Mexican dollars is permitted. SHIFTING OF POLITICAL POWER IN THE PACIFIC OCEAN. [Deutsche Warte, August 20, 1898.— Translation.] The recent changes in the political conditions of Oceania have taken l>]ace exclusively in the, west. The Russian Empire, through its Sibe- rian coast province, borders in the north on the Pacific Ocean; on its coast Kussia had heretofore only the port of Vladivostock, blockaded by ice in winter; recently she has acquired from China Port Arthur, which, as well as the former, she has equipped as a large port for war purposes. Thereby Eussia has become one of the great powers in east Asia, offering strong competition to the hitherto preponderant iuflueuce of England. Germany, through her acquisition of the Bay of Kiao Chou, has found what she had hitherto lacked — a basis for her commercial rela- tions in that part of the world. Germany also has a share in the Aus- tralian Archipelago by reason of her possessions in New Guinea, the Bismarck Archipelago, and the Marshall Islands. England has enlarged her old possession of Hongkong, strives for the monopoly of the Yang-tse-kiang Valley, which is of the greatest importance as the commercial route to the interior of China, and has recently also made a settlement at Wei-hai-wei, between Kiao Chou and Port Arthur. Her influence in northern China has been consid- erably lessened through the Kussian rivalry, which is making itself felt. The other insular possessions of Great Britain are shown on our map. France had in Tonkin the naval station of Saigoon; in addition, she has acquired Lai Chou, in the northern part of southern China, opposite the Island of Hainan. In the archipelago of Oceania she also has a number of smaller groups of islands extending east of New Caledonia. The colonial possessions of Holland extend from the East Indian Archipelago to New Guinea, of which latter she owns the western part. But her colonial possessions lack sufficient security, so that a catas- trophe similar to that of Spain is within the range of possibilities. Spain is nominally still in possession of the Philippines, the Palau Islands, and the Caroline Islands. The Ladrone Islands she will lose, as also a station in the Phihppines. The United States has annexed Hawaii, and, as spoils of the war, the Ladrone Islands, with a coaling station on Guam Island, have fallen to her share, and for the present also Manila, cai)ital of the Philippines. Moreover, she will equip as a naval station the port of Pango Pango, acquired by contract, situated on Tutuila, the farthest of the three larger islands of the Samoa group. By this measure the power of the United States in the Pacific Ocean, where she also owns some smaller groups between the continent and Hawaii, will be very considerably increased, at the cost of an in(k'penpines, and whose articles for the last two or three years have been the chief source of popular information on the subject, contributes to the Contemporary Review for July an article in which he discourses upon the future of the islands. He is hopeful, although under no delusion as to the possibility of governing the Philippine Islands on the principles of the Declaration of Independence. He says that the insurrection which broke out in August, 1890, was in no sense repub- lican in its nature. It had as its object the removal of certain specific, well defined grievances. He says: The movement bad for its objects (1) tbe expulsion of the monastic orders; (2) the abolition of the governor-generals arbitrary power to banish without accusation, trial, or sentence; (3) restoration to the natives of the lauds held by the religious orders; (4) a limitation of the arbitrary powers of the civil guard; (5) no arrest without judge's warrant; (6) abolition of the fifteen days' per annum compulsory labor. Aguinaldo, the leader of the revolt, is a smart, intelligent man of about 30 years of age. He is a landed proprietor who has served as petty governor of his native town in Cavite. By the arrangement between him and Admiral Dewey, Mr. Foreman says: It is provisionally agreed that Aguinaldo shall set up a local republic. General Aguinaldo's plan is to establish at Manila a congress, to which deputies from all the principal islands will be invited. I do not hesitate to prophesy that, unless under European or American control, the scheme will end in complete failure. At hrst, no doubt, the islanders will welcome and cooperate in any arrangement which will rid them of monastic oppression. The Philippine Islands, however, would not remain one year peaceful under an independent native government. It is an utter impossi- bility. There is such racial antipathy that the Visayas would not, in this generation, submit to what they would always consider a Tagalog republic, and the Tagfilogs, having procured the overthrow of the Spaniads, would naturally resent a preponder- ance of Visaya influence. Families there are very closely united, but as a people they have little idea of union. Who would be the electors? The masses are decidedly too ignorant to be capable of voting intelligently. The votes would be entirely con- trolled by cliques of landowners. If the native republic did succeed, it would not be strong enough to protect itself against foreign aggression. The islands are a spleudid group, well worth picking a quarrel and spending a few millions sterling to annex them. I entertain the linn conviction that an unprotected united republic would last only until the novelty of the situation had worn olf. Then, I think, every principal island would, in turn, declare its independence. Finally, there would be complete chaos, and before th;it took root America, or some European nation, would probably have interfered, there- fore it is better to start with protection. I can not doubt that General Aguinaldo is quite alive to these facts; nevertheless, I admire his astuteness in entering on any plan which, by hook or by crook, will expel the friars. If the republic failed, at least monastic power would never return. A protectorate under a strong nation is just as necessary to insure good adminis- tration in the islands as to protect them against foreign attack. Either Great Britain 556 TREATY OF PEACE. 557 or America -wonld be equally welcome to the islanders if they had not the vnnity to think they could govern themselves. Unless America decided to start on a hrand new policy, it would hardlj' suit her, I conjecture, to accept the mission of a jirotec- torate so distant from her chief interests. England, having ample resources so near at hand, would probably find it a less irksome task. For the reasons given above the control would have to be a very direct one. I would go so far as to suggest that the government should be styled "The Philippine Protectorate." There might be a chamber of deputies, with a native jjresidcnt. The protector and his six advisers should be American or English. The functions of ministers should be vested in the advisers, and those of president (of a rej)ublic) in the protector. In any case the finances could not be confided to a native. The inducement to finance himself would be too great. All races should be represented in the chamber. Should this proposal be carried out, Mr. Foreman thinks the future of the Philippines will astonish the world. He says : The islands are extremely fertile, and wijl produce almost anything to be found in the Tropics. I estimate that barely one-fourth of the tillable laud is now under cul- tivation. There is at present only one railway of 120 miles. A number of lines would have to be constructed in Luzon, Panay, Negros, Cebu, and Mindanao islands. Companies would probably take up the contracts on ninety years' working conces- sion and ninety-nine years' lease of acreage in lieu of guaranteed interest. The lands would become immensely valuable to the railway companies, and an enormous source of taxable wealth to the protectorate. Road making should be taken up on treasury account and bridge construction on contract, to be paid for by toll conces- sions. The port of Yloilo should be improved, the custom-houses abolished, and about ten more free ports opened to the world. Under the protectorate undoubtedly capital would flow into the Philippines. [2. By an American Senator.] In the Forth American Eeview for June, Senator John T. Morgan discusses what the United States should do with the conquered islands, speaking of them, of course, in the prophetic-historical sense, for when Senator Morgan wrote the conquest was still to come. Senator Morgan is strongly of opinion that, whatever monarchical Europe may say, the United States must fulfill its destiny: We must respond in our policies to the energy with which our institutions have inspired our people in seeking wealth and commercial pursuits. Wheresoever our power may extend beyond our continental boundaries it will be confined to the pro- tection of the interests of our own people by establishing such military outposts as will secure to them the full enjoyment of all their rights and the liberty of commerce. The policy of colonization by conquest or coercion is repugnant to our national creed, which places the right of free self-government in supremacy over all other sovereign rights; and a colonial policy which discriminates between the rights of colonists and those of the people who enjoy full citizenship in the United States would be repugnant to the principles of our National Constitution. This, it must be admitted, is somewhat vague, nor is it exactly clear what the Senator is driving at. He would establish a ])rotector- ate over the Philippine Islands, but, speaking of the policy of the United States, he says : It will not inaugurate or support a propaganda in the Philippines, either political or religious; but it should not deny to itself the right to give its encouragement to good government in those islands, or to give to those people proper support against the unjust invasion of their rights by foreign powers. The fortunes of war have devolved this duty upon us. Annexation will not be a necessary or proper result of such moral or actual protection, because the United States is an American power, with high national duties that are, in every sense, American, and the Philii)pine8 are not within the sphere of American political influence, but are Asiatic, and should remain Asiatic. As with the Philippines, so with the other Spanish possessions; nor does Senator Morgan limit his survey to those possessions that are held now by Spain. He says: It is a new and inviting field for American enterprise and influence that opens Porto Rico, Cuba, the Isthmian Canal, Hawaii, the Caroline and the Philippine r)r)8 TREATY OF PEACE. Islands to fair trade and good government; and we shall need only the good -will of those people to secure to us a just participation in its advantages. This is an allur- ing field for conquest and dominion, hut no compulsiou will he needed to hold it, heyoud the temporary necessity of preserving the peace in these islands until the rightful goverumeut of their people can he establisheil on safe foundations. Con- quest would dishonor our motives in waging war against Spain, if we should hold the subjugated islands only in trust for ourselves. If by this last sentence Senator Morgan means that there is to be no attemjit to enforce the United States tariff against non-American goods in the conquered islands, well and good, but it is to be hoped he will persist in that good resolution. [3. By an American consul.] In Scribner's Magazine for June -Mr. Isaac M. Elliott, the American consul at Manila from 1893 to 1896, gives some account of the islands and their inhabitants. Mr. Elliott's narrative is illustrated by a num- ber of pictures taken from photographs, which give a rather pleasing impression of Manila and its suburbs. Mr. Elliott was much impressed by the excessive taxation levied by means of fees, stamps, and other imposts. He puts the case in a nutshell when he says that the church lives off the natives and the Spanish officials live oft' the importers. There are ninety-nine public holidays observed every year in addition to the fifty-two Sundays. The church is immensely rich, but although it plunders the natives, Mr. Elliott admits that it lias been a civilizing fear ture, and has built schools and churches all over the Philippine Islands. The insurrection, he thinks, was a righteous uprising on the part of the Malays and half-castes, who form the producing classes, against mis- government. The savages, or Negritos, have nothing to do with the insurrection. Most of the sugar produced on the island goes to the United States. Part of it, however, is taken by Hongkong. America takes most of the hemp, but none of the tobacco. Until within the last few years the United States were supreme in the Philippine trade, but of late years English firms have succeeded to the bulk of the business. The last American firms were crowded out three years ago by Spanish intrigues, caused by the hatred of Americans growing out of the Cuba's trouble. In the Island of Mindoro there are mountains so full of coal that thousands of tons have broken off" the outcropping seam and accumulated at the base of the cliffs. The Spanish Government immediately confiscated the land where the coal was discovered, but nothing has been done toward developing the seam, and all the coal used in Manila at present is brought from Australia. [4. The Philippines and the Chinese markets.] Mr. Truxtun Beale, writing in the North American Eeview on "The strategical value of the Philippines," is all for holding them, notwith- standing the objections of Senator Morgan. He would retain the Philippine Islands, not so much for their own sakes, although that weighs with him, but because they would enable America to command the Chinese markets. He says : Few realize that China is yet a sparsely populated country. It is little more than one-third as thickly populated per square mile as the most sparsely populated part of Europe. It is not one-quarter as thickly populated as the most thickly populated part of Europe. I can confirm the testimony of other travelers as to the great extent of uncultivated land in its interior. Its immense mineral deposits have not yet begun to be developed, and it is said to contain the largest and iinest deposit of coal yet discovered. Contrary to the popular impression, the Chinaman is not a good btisiness man. He is not an enterprising man. His sole idea in business is to turn his capital over rapidly and get quick returns in trade. The idea of laying TREATY OF PEACE. 559 out the profits of capital for several years in order to draiu marshes or irrigate wastes never occurs to him. The inuuensely iucreased trade that will result from the development of this country should bo ours. [5. A lady's account of the islandetfl.] There are several miseellaTieous articles in the magazines about the Philippine Islands. Miss Lucy M. J. Garnett writes upon the Pliilip- pine Islanders in the Fortnightly Review. She gives some interesting pictures of the manners and customs of the people. She has much to say of the various saints, who have superseded the ancient idols more in name than in fact. The patron saint of Manila is St. Francis the Tearful, who on one occasion wept for three hours so copiously over the danger of Manila that many cloths were moistened. Another favorite saint is the Virgin Antipolo, who appears to have interposed more elficaciously for the protection of Manila in the seventeenth cen- tury than she was disposed to do when Admiral Dewey entered the harbor. Miss Garnett discusses the marriage customs and legal status of the women at some length. Concubinage has been largely substi- tuted for marriage, owing to the rapacity of the priests, Avho demand such exorbitantly large fees that the natives decide it is not worth the money. They are jealous after marriage, but unmarried women are not very strictly looked after. The Philippine laws relating to the property of married persons are exceedingly quaint and interesting, being entirely in favor of the wife. The property of a bride is never settled on the husband. If a man is poor and his wife well to do, so they remaiu throughout their married life, he becoming simply the administrator of her po.ssessions, but having no right to them. If a husband becomes bankrupt in a business in which he has invested some of his wife's fortune, she ranks as a second- class creditor under the commercial code. Such being the legal status of women in these islands, it naturally follows that they enjoy a considerable degree of per- sonal independence, which, in some localities, economic conditions tend to increase, especially among the working classes. The chief of these economic conditions has been the almost exclusive employment in the Government cigar factories of women. The stayile industry of the city being thus debarred from men, various occupations and industries usually performed by women fall to their share. In their homes, too, while the wife is earning the family bread — or rather rice, their staple food — the husband looks after the children and cooks the dinner. It is also very difficult to get women to act as nurses and maids in European families, [6. Dr. Albert Shaw's view.] Mr. Bryan and Mr. Cleveland may deprecate extension of American sovereignty over the Philippine Islands, but Dr. Albert Shaw has made up his mind that it has to come, and says so with emphasis in the new number of the American Eeview of Reviews : The discussion of the future of the Philippines has gone on apace and has brought out a great variety of opinions. The surprising thing in the discussion has been the remarkable vigorand extent of the American sentiment in favor of the permanent reten- tion of the islands as an American possession. It is coming to be understood through- out the country that annexation of Hawaii, or the Philippines, or Porto Kico, does not by any means imply, either now or at any time in the future, admission into the sisterhood of Federal States whose government is providid for under the Constitu- tion. It is precisely as reasonable and possible that the United States sliould exer- cise general sovereignty over a distant island without bringing that island into the Federal Union as for Holland to exercise dominion in .lava without bringing the people of that remote realm into domestic relation with the Netherlands. We do not intend to hand the people of the Philippines back to the Spaniards; and our sense of decency and respect for the enlightened opinion of mankind will not per- mit us to abandon them. Nor will the rivalries and conllicta of the Enrnpoan and Asiatic powers make it possible for us to select England or Holland or any other power as our residuary legatee. 560 TREATY OF PEACE. PICTURES l^ROM MANILLA. Mr. F. T. Bnlleii, in a paper entitled "A Eeminisfence of Manila," gives a very vivid picture of what he saw in tbe Philippine Islands, which he visited many years aj>o on a sailing ship from Hongkong. Mr. Ballen has an extremely high estimate of the value of the Philip- pines. He says that they form a magnificent territory, spendidly favored with every form of wealth, and capable of supporting with the greatest ease fifteen times their present poi)ulation. Their climate, except in the low-lying valleys, is almost perfect. There was no energy shown anywhere excejiting by the English, American, and German merchants, although the most industrious laborers are the Chinese. Mr. Bullen thinks that Japan would probably succeed better than any other power in administering the Philippines. At the same time, he thinks that the tragedy of Formosa would debar them from having a chance with the islands. Therefore, as we are out of it, Mr. Bullen thinks the United States will have to t.ake in hand the administration of the great archipelago. AMERICAN IMPERIALISM. In the Forum, Mr. H. S. Townsend, formerly inspector-general ol schools at Hawaii, expresses a very strong opinion in favor of annexa- tion of the Sandwich Islands by the United States. He speaks very highly of the intelligence of the Hawaiians. He says: When first I came among the Hawaiian people I was surprised to find the school children able to put to shame with their knowledfre of Garfield, Grant, Lincoln, Washington, Gladstone, Beaconstield, Bismarck, "I'nser Fritz," Nelson, and Napo- leon, the American school children with whom I had come in contact. Although the Hawaiian press has deteriorated somewhat since that time, Hawaiian newspapers still give a greater amount of news from foreign lauds than would be appreciated by the readers of American country newspapers. THE PHILIPPINB8. Mr. F. F. Hilder, writing in the same magazine on the Philippine Islands, thinks that the Americans would do well not to lose their hold over the islands which have come into their possession by the for- tune of war. He says : The world contains no fairer nor more fertile lands, no more promising field for commercial enterprise, and no people more worthy to be elevated to a higher place in the scale of nations, and to be assisted by education and good government to obtain it. This is no imaginative statement, but the result of personal observation of the country and of intercourse with its people. The Century Magazine for August contains a mass of papers relating to the war and the American conquests. They are: "The Island of Porto Rico," with i)ictures from photographs; " Facts about the Philip- pines," by Mr. Vauderlip, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, with a discussion of pending problems, with a map and pictures from photo- graphs; "Life in Manila," with pictures from photographs; "An artist with Admiral Sampson's fleet," with pictures from sketches made on the spot; "The sanitary regeneration of Havana," by the Surgeon- General of the Army; "Cuba as seen from the inside," with pictures from photographs. Mr. Vanderlip, one of the brightest and ablest of the Assistant Secretaries of the Treasury, says of the Philippines : " It TREATY OF PEACE. 5G1 is as a base for commercial operatioius tliat the islands seom to possess the greatest importance. They occni)y a favoicd location, not with reference to one part of any pai ticular country of the Orient, but to all parts. Together with the islands of the Japanese Empire, since tlie acquirement of Formosa, the Philippines are the pickets of tlie Pacific, standing guard at the entrances to trade with the millicms of Cliina and Korea, French ludo China, the Malay Peninsula, and the islands of Indonesia to the south. Australasia may even be regarded as in the line of trade. The possession of the Phi]ii)i>ines by a i)i()gressive com- mercial power, if the Nicaragua Canal i)roject should be c()m])leted, would change the course of ocean navigation as it concerns a lai ge per- centageof the water-borne traffic of the world. The project is alluring. In the undeveloped resources of the Philippines the sanguine radicals see a great opportunity lor our genius. They recognize that in a decade we might make a change greater than has been wrought since IVIagal- hae's discovery until tlie present time. They see great development companies formed to cultivate tobacco and sugar by modern methods, others formed to test the richness of the unknown mineral deposits, and still others to develop transportation or to reap the treasures of the forest. They see also that with honest, intelligent, just, and humane government there might be astounding improvement in the character of the peoi)le." THE PHILIPPINES AND THEIR PEOPLE — AN UNPROMISING COLONY [Review of Keviews, June 15, 1898.] In th©iContemporary Review for June Mr. Claes Ericsson, who appears to have been an orchid collector, describes a visit which he paid to the Philipi)ines in the year 1894. A perusal of his paper is not calculated to encourage very joyful anticipations as to the result if the Americans should decide to begin their colonizing experiments by taking over the 2,000 islands with a population of 8,000,000, merely because Admiral Dewey destroyed half a dozen shi]>s in the harbor of Manila. For what appears most clearly from Mr. Ericsson's paper is that the natives of these islands, whether they be Sulus, or Tagals, or Bisayas, are ele- ments in the question which will have to be reckoned with altogether independently of the fate of the Spaniards. In the island of Palawan, Mr. Ericsson says, the Spaniards have no real authority, and never interfere with the natives except where Chinamen or Europeans are concerned. Again he says, after visiting the other islands, "It would have been almost useless to ask the assistance of the Spaniards. I never met with one who could speak the Sulu language or any of the dialects. As a consequence, the supposed rulers know next to nothing of the natives, their customs, and wishes. None of the larger islands is really under the domination of the Spaniards, wliose rule extends little farther than the range of their cannon. Of the native soldiery, not one in a score knows the name of his officers. In the chief town of the Sulu islands the Sulu were in the habit of taking pot shots at the Si)ani8h sentries every night, and this, be it observed, was the former state of Spanish rule in the Sulu islands. Mr. Ericsson does not give a very cheerful account of the country itself. It swarms with venomous ants, whose bites snpi)urate like smallimx. Mosquitoes, he says, swarm as they do nowhere else on the earth, while as for alligators, he once counted thirteen moving in a troop along the beach at one time. Worse than all is a virulent fever, trom which, at T p 3G 562 TREATY OF PEACE. one place that he visited, half of the Spanish garrison was prostrate. Everywhere the people seemed wretchedly poor, and their habitations the worst hovels that he had ever seen in the far East. The aborigines are little people who are tyrannized over by the Sulus, who appear to spend their time in plundering their neighbors. The Sulus are pirates or the sons of pirates, who think nothing of murder, and who have never been subdued, and, in Mr. Ericsson's opinion, never will be by Spain. It is evident that if the Aniericaus are to serve their apprenticeship to colonization they will have a pretty tough time in the Philippines. They will find it somewhat difficult to apply to those aborigines and their Sulu oppressors the great and glorious principles of the American Con- stitution; but that, some of the Americans gravely assure us, is precisely what they are determined to do. The belief of some Americans in the saving efficacy of democratic government is quite touching. It will not, however, long survive the test of actual experience in the Philippines. FACTS ABOUT THE PHILIPPINES, WITH A DISCUSSION OF PEiNDING PROBLEMS. [The Cfiitnry, Angnst, 1898.] [By Fkank a. Vandeelip, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury,] The guns of Admiral Dewey did sometliing more than destroy a Spanish fleet in the harbor at Manila. Their echo came back to us in a question new in the history of our Government. In the shaping oi the Constitution our fathers evinced a foresight that has ever since been our admiration ; but their prescience looked ahead to no such problem as this one which a naval victory on the other side of the world has raised. It is a problem for the solution of which we have suri)ris- ingly little data. Neither precedent nor experience can be satisfac- torily drawn on, and we see with sudden clearness that some of the most revered of our political maxims have outlived their force. Wash- ington's Farewell Address, and the later crystallization of its main thought by President Monroe, had come to possess with us almost the force of a constitutional provision, and even to be regarded by the nations as one of the fundamentals of our Government. Our stanch belief in the value of that doctrine of political isolation has been shaken by Dewey's victory. The impending question of what shall be done with the fruit of that victory has made us examine in a new temper, and with new Mghts, this political doctrine of ours; and it has sharply emphasized to our minds the changed conditions surrounding us now, compared with those which gave birth and force to that doctrine. The world is much smaller now than when Washington read his fare- well address. The Philippine Islands, although almost on the other side of the earth, are much nearer the seat of our Government, by the meas- ure of transportation and time, than were in that day regions that are now populous tStates. The same factors that have brought conii)ara- tively close to us the most distant countries have developed a new main- spring that has become the directing force in international affairs— the mainspring of commercialism. In the days when Washington enun- ciated the policy of political isolation the questions that were before parliaments and assemblies were questions of individual freedom, of representative government, of civil and political rights. The debates of the legislative bodies of the nations are no longer on those lines. They are on finance and questions of commercial development. It is the age of commerce, and it is commerce that has for a generation been shaping the foreign policy of every nation but ours. It has been the flag of commerce, rather than of national aggrandizement, that has led the troops of England, France, and Germany through Africa. It was to plant the flag of commerce that there has been such maneuver- ing by the nations of Europe to gain footholds along the Chinese coast. And now, without the slightest premeditation on our part, and with 563 564 TREATY OF PEACE. the most inadequate preparation to handle the question, we have sud- denly found ourselves in possession of a vantage point more valuable than the prizes for which the great nations of Europe have been scheming. With the extraordinary conditions surrounding this sud- den acquisition of rights, it is natural that there should be the most intense interest in the characteristics and the commercial possibilities of these islands and their population of 8,000,000. To reach any intelligent opinion in regard to their disposition, we need, of course, as clear an idea as possible of just what they are, of the advantages to be gained by their retention, and of the difticulties to be encountered in their administration. It is as a base for commercial operations that the islands seem to possess the greatest importance. They occupj^ a favored location, not with reference to one part of any particular country of the Orient, but to all parts. Together with the islands of the Jai)anese Empire, since the acquirement of Formosa, the Philippines are the ])ickets of the Pacitic, standing guard at the entrances to trade with the millions of China and Koiea, French IndoOhina, the Malay Peninsula, and the islands of Indonesia to the south. Australasia may even be regarded as in the line of trade. A glance at the map will readily show M'iiat a commanding position the archipelago occupies with reference to adja- cent territory. While it is true that the islands lie a little out of the direct line of ocean traffic in voyages by way of the eastern passage, there are reasons which operate strongly for a discontinuance of navi- gation by way of the Straits of Malacca and the China Sea to the Orient. The voyage by this course is one dreaded by all navigators at certain seasons of the year, when the Straits become the center of th.e worst storm disturbances known to the world, and when navigation is conse- quently restricted. With the opening of the Nicaragua Canal, how- ever, the trade of our Atlantic ports with the Orient will take the safer and shorter route thus provided; and in arogressive commercial power, if the Nica- ragua Canal project should be completed, would change the course of ocean navigation as it concerns a large percentage of the water borne traffic of the world. Europe looks to the Nicaragua Canal and the Pacific as offering a better route to the far Eastern countries; and in the event of its comi)letion, the archipelago will be the gateway to all the trade of lower China and the countries south. Hongkong, the great warehouse where are stored and whence are distributed the products of the earth in the maritime trade of China,may,in the course of these changes now in prospect, become scarcely more than a distrib- uting point for the trade of the valley of the Sa Kiang. In the trans-Pacific trade the Hawaiian Islands will afford a resting place for ships, and their importance will be immeasurably increased by the opening of the canal and the diversion of ocean traffic from the channels it now follows. The Nicaragua Canal and the Hawaiian Islands will be invested with new interest to us by the unexpected acquisition of rights in the Philippines, which will then be a key to the Orient of vast importance to the United States, or to any other pro- gressive nation which may have the opi)ortunity to make of them a base for the distribution of far Eastern commerce. More than h ilf of the people of the earth live in the countries which TREATY OF PKACE. 565 maybeeasilyreacbedfroBithePliilippines. There is Cliina, which, acord- ing to the latest estimates, has a popuhitiou of more than 40(),()l)0,()()0 ; tlie East ludies (British. Dutch, and French), 343,0()( >,()()(); Japan, 4'J,000,- 000; British Australasia, 5,000,000; Siam, 5,000,000; and the Straits Settlements, C00,0i0 — all together, a population ten times that of the United States. Trade relations can not at once be established with all these millions, for many of the populous provinces of China and far Eastern Asia lie remote from the coast, and it will be years before communication with the interior is opened by rail. Nevertheless, since the Chino-Japanese war railroad building in China has been advancing rapidly. Out of adversity something of good has come to the Celestial Empire, and the lesson taught by the victorious Jajjanese has resulted in the birth of a new China. Ancient exclusiveness is being laid aside, and the Empire is already on the road to progress. How long the dominion of Hongkong over the maritime trade of China will last, even should the Philippines not become its rival as a distribu- tive market, is a question which may largely be determined by the occupation of Kiao Chou, Port Arthur, and Wei-Hai-Wei. Prussia's great railway across her Siberian i)ossessions must also be taken into account in disposing of the trade of China. Penetrating the rich province of Manchuria, with the certain prospect of forming a junction with a road to be built from Shanghai, it will be only a few years before that city will be connected by rail with Euroi)e. The great rivers of China, the Si-Kiang, the Yang tse-Kiang, and the Yellow Ptiver, have hitherto fur- nished the only ready means of reaching the trade of the interior. Hongkong, at the mouth of the Si-Kiang, has monopolized the com- merce of the valley drained by that river, and the trade of Canton, formerly of much magnitude, has dwindled into insignificance. It may beeasily seen thattherecent acquisition of Kiao-ChouBay,Wei-Hai- Wei, and Port Arthur gives "Germany, England, and Kussia, respectively, advantageous locations with reference to the commerce of the valley of the Yellow Kiver. The onset made with a view to opening China to trade can not fail to result in a remarkable transformation of the empire in a few decades — a change as complete as that which has taken place in Japan, which twenty- live years ago was as China is to-day, and is now a ranking power, a leading member of the family of progressive nations. The foreign commerce of all the countries of the far East exceeds two thousand millions a year. The reports of the Bureau of Statistics of the Treasury Department show that the imports are a few nnllious in excess of $1,000,000,000, and the exports about the same. In the total value of the foreign trade the United States has an interest of about $150,000,000, a little over 7 per cent. Our chief trade among these countries is with Japan. We buy more than 32 per cent of Japan's exportable products, and we supply 12 per cent of all the Empire buys abroad. We take one twelith of China's exports, sending in return one twentieth of her imports. Trade with the Hawaiian Islands is almost exclusively our own, more than 99 per cent of their exjiorts being shipped to the United States, while they take from us 70 per cent of all their imports. We enter into the trade of British Australasia to the extent of 5 per cent of its total commerce. To the Philippine Islands we send but little over one two-hundredth part of their iini)orts, while we take more than one-fifth of their entire exports and more than one half of their exports of sugar and hemp. The import figures must not, however, be taken to indicate the whole of American shipments to the countries named, for they represent onjy the trade direct. 566 TREATY OF PEACE. Many exports of the United States are credited in English and American statistics to the coniinerce of Great Britain. Our interests in the Orient, however, may best be understood from the fact that, next to Great Britain, we have the largest commerce with these countries. Germany and France, although active in securing commercial advan- tages in China, have not yet acquired sufficient importance in trade returns to be classified, except as " other Europe." There is a promis- ing field for our manufactures of cotton in almost all countries of the Orient. Within a few years our exports of raw cotton to Japan have doubled, and our trade with China has shown a marked tendency toward expansion. We have the bulk of the trade in mineral oils, although there is a growing competition with Russia, which may be greater when the trans Siberian road is completed. American flour also has gained a foothold, and the growers of the hard wheat of California, the best shipping wheat in the world, look to the far East as a future market for their exportable surplus. Machinery of all kinds is rapidly gaining in favor, and within a year one of the Chinese railroads has been equipped with Baldwin locomotives. One of the street-railway lines of Manila is now provided with American cars made in Philadelphia, and, notwithstanding the great expense of transportation, they are pre- ferred to those of Germany, which were discarded. What is there in the Philippines, aside from their most important con- sideration as a base for the extension of trade? This magnificent archi- pelago has an area of about 114,000 square miles, or more than two- thirds that of the Spanish peninsula, and three times that of Spain's possessions in the West Indies. The chain extends in a southeasterly direction for a distance of some eighteen hundred miles, and separates the waters of the China Sea from the Pacific. Luzon, nearest Formosa and the coast of (yhina, and the largest islaijd of the group, is of suffi- cient extent to equal the combined area of Cuba and Porto Kico. The fertile island of Mindanao, at the southern extremity of the archipelago, has an area equal to that of "The Pearl of the Antilles." Between these two great islands, Luzon and Mindanao, are others, smaller and of varying importance. Upon one of them, Panay, is situated the city of Iloilo, rapidly developing into a port quite independent of the influ- ence of Manila, which, for the most part, controls the trade of the Phil- ippines. Apart from the chain proj)er lies the island of Palawan, which, extending in a southwesterly direction from the island of Panay, reaches almost to British Borneo, and is the western boundary of a body of water of great depth, known as Mindoro or Sulu Sea. The number of islands in the archipelago is variously estimated at from 500 to !2,000, the smaller figure relating to those which are sus- ceptible of cultivation or are valuable for their timber and minerals. Their area is as large as that of the six New England States, with New Jersey, Delaware, and Maryland. The area of arable land, however, is scarcely more than one-third of that contained within the limits of the States named. The reason for this is the volcanic origin of the islands and the consequent ruggedness of the country. In Luzon, the principal island and the one upon which Manila is situated, there is a fertile valley drained by the Cagayan, some 200 miles in length and 100 wide, lying between ranges of mountains on each coast. The val- ley of the Cagayan under good government has a bright future before it. At the mouth of the river is the town of Aparri, opposite the island of Camiguin, which stands guard over an extensive bay. In this bay harbor facilities may be found equal to and safer than those in the bay of Manila, and persons who have been to the islands investigating TREATY OF PEACE. 567 their possibilities of development look to Aparri as likely to become a rival of Manila. This is so for the reason that Aparri is twenty-four hours nearer Hongkong and 400 miles nearer San Francisco than the capital of the island. As already said, Manila dominates the Philip- pine trade, although Iloilo has gained some importance as a sugar mart and Cebu is known for its exports of hemp. After centuries of Spanish misrule, the islands are scarcely more advanced than they were when, in honor of Philip II, they were given their name. Their varied resources are virtually undeveloped. Their people have never been taught how to take advantage of the bounties which nature has placed before them. Interest chiefly centers on the Island of Luzon, not only because Manila is situated on that island, but because of the diversity of its products. In the valley of the Cagayan are great tobacco fields, which rival those of the Vuelta Abajo of Cuba, The greater part of the sugar exported from the Philippines is produced on the Island of Luzon. Hemp, the main product of the group, is grown almost entirely on other islands. Rice is a staple crop, because, as with most other peoples of the Orient, it is the greatest article of food consumi)tion. i^^one is exported, however; and notwithstanding there is abundant territory suitable for rice growing, it has not been utilized, for the rea- son that the directing agencies have in this, as in all other instances, failed to induce the peo|)le to make the most of their advantages. Cotiee also is grown, and the more civilized natives have each a little grove of trees, which produce 4 or 5 bushels of the coffee berry a year. Only small quantities are sent to the markets for export. A little corn is raised, mainly in the vicinity of Manila, where in season it is peddled on the streets, boiled or roasted. None is fed to stock, paddy rice being used for that purpose. Hay is unknown, its place being taken by a swamp grass, upon which the buffalo cattle, the draft animals of the Philippines, feed. The most important agricultural product is what is known to com- merce as Manila hemp. Thousands of tons of this fiber are raised annu- illy on the Pacific sloj)es of the southern islands, where it also grows wild. That this is the leading product of the Philippines is due to the fact that its cultivation requires the least effort. With only careless attention it is possible to raise many tons to the acre. The fiber is obtained from a species of plantain called abaca, a tree which grows to the height of from 15 to 20 feet and is from 8 to 12 inches in diameter. The trunk may be as easily separated as a stalk of celery. An ordi- nary knife only is required to cut down the tree, and a rude instrument is used to press out the juice and shred the fiber. After a little drying in the sun, and packing it into bales of 240 jjounds each, it is ready for shipment. The United States and England take almost the entire crop. Hemp of this kind is grown nowhere else in tiie world. It is said that a fortune awaits one who can invent a machine which will accelerate the process of pressing out the juice and pulp, leaving oidy the fiber. A rude knife and a lever for holding it strongly in position are the instruments now in use. Next in the order of importance as a product of the soil is sugar. The poorest sugar in the world is produced in the Philippines, and yet the islands are capable of producing the best. The reason for the poor quality lies in the method of manufacture, and not in any disadvantage of soil, climate, or character of the cane, which is su])erior in saccharine. The methods of sugar manufacture which prevailed in the fifteenth century are still in vogue in the Philippines. The last account of mills 568 TREATY OF PEACE. In operation showed that tliere were in tlie islnncls 5,920 cattle mills, 239 steam mills, and 33 water mills, while there were only 3 vacuum- pan sugar works. The process of making sugar in these islands varies with locality, but all the product is what is known as a very low grade of muscovado sugar. It is not drained or clarified by any of the modern methods, and brings the lowest price in the markets of the world, except perhaps low grade sugar of a siuiilar character made in Brazil. The estimated crop of the islands for the season of 1S97-98 is 190,000 tons. Cuba's crop for the same i)eriod is estimated at 200,000 tons. Until the year 1890 the United States annually imported from 110,000,000 to 300,000,000 pounds of Manila sugar, but since that time a market has been found nearer the supply, and China and Japan have become large consumers of Manila sugar. There are extensive retineries at Hongkong, which take a considerable part of the product. Last year our imports of sugar from Manila were only a little over 73,000,000 pounds. This falling off is due to two causes — one the market found in China and Japan, and the other the competition of the bounty-aided beet sugars of Europe, which have also the advantage of nearness to London and New York, the great sugar centers of the world. The consumption of sugar is increasing so rapidly, especially in the United States, that, properly handled, the sugar resources of the Philippines will necessarily be developed in order to add to the world's supply. We annually import sugar to the value of $100,0(t0,000, an amount which largely offsets our exports of wheat. It is believed by the best authorities that by the employment of modern methods the industry in the l*hilipi)ines may be made to rival Cuba in the output and quality of cane sugar. It has been a matter of comment that while sugar of excellent grade is produced in Cuba, in the Philippines, under the dominion of the same country, but little effort has been made to develop resources which even surpass those of Cuba. One reason for the superior quality of the sugar of Cuba, however, is to be found in the proximity of the United States. American capi- talists have there entered the held with modern ideas and modern machinery. Still other reasons maj' be assigned: In Cuba, Porto Pico, and the British West Indies, notwithstanding a lack of labor, the industry advanced until brought into competition with beet bounties. In the latter countries it has been necessary to import coolies to culti- vate the fields and work the mills, but in the Philippine Islands there are many thousands of laborers available for work in the manufacture of cane sugar. How to use the surplus labor iu the Philippines has been, seemingly, more of a problem than the lack of labor in the West Indies. With such a redundancy there has been no inducement in the Philippines to introduce labor-saving machinery. There are in abun- dance two elements of productivity — land and labor. The intelligent use of capital, added to these, would revolutionize the industry, and make the Philippines a great cane-sugar-producing country. The third product of the Philippines in the order of importance is tobacco. While the United States furnishes a market for the hemp and sugar of Manila, scarcely any of its tobacco or cigars is brought to this country, except now and then upon sailing vessels engaged in the Eastern trade. But the crop is an important one, and Manila tobacco and cigars have long held the same reputation in the East that the Havana product holds in the West. Lately the industry has shown a tendency to expand, owing to the fact that the Spanish Government, realizing, in one instance at least, the eflects of an evil policy, has abandoned its monopoly of the trade. Much revenue was formerly TREATY OF PEACE. 5G9 derived by the Government from its exclusive control of tlie tobacco market, and for that reason it was maintained many years, until the industry languished. Delivery of the crop under the old system was required to be made at the Government warehouses in Manila, and the natives were bound to accept for it the standard price fixed by tbe Spanish authorities. JSfeedless to say, this was far below the market value of the tobacco. The manufacture of cigars, cigarettes, and cut tobacco at Binondo, a ])opuIous part of new Manila, has now assumed great proportions. One comi)any employs 10,000 hands, and has a capital of $15,000,000. Spain has heretofore taken the bulk of the crop grown on the 60,000 acres under cultivation. There are few other products of agriculture to be mentioned. Fruit is not cultivated, but grows wild in abundance and variety character- istic of a tropical country. Bananas of delicious flavor, oranges of poor quality, mangos, guavas, and many other native fruits grow wild. There are no olives or figs and there is no vine culture. Dairy farming has not yet been established in the islands, although there is said to be great opportunity in that direction. Butter is im[)orted from London in bottles, and naturally is held at a very high price. Throughout all the islands of the archipelago agriculture is yet in an undeveloped state. Vast opportunities may be found for exploiting modern methods of farming. There is not a farm in any of the islands which will com- pare favorably with even the worst on the American continent. Plow- ing is done with a sharpened stick, and nothing is known of agricultural labor-saving implements such as are in use in the United States and other civilized countries. Only the most primitivemethodsareemployed. The mineral resources of the islands have never been developed, although they are known to be considerable. There is coal in abun- dance in Cebu and Negros. Gold is found in the alluvial deposits along the streams and at the mouths of rivers, particularly in Luzon and Mindanao. Coi)per exists in the central districts of Luzon, and lead is plentiful in Cebu. Immense deposits of sulphur are found in the craters of extinct volcanoes, and in some of the islands there is found a good quality of iron ore. While riches await a progressive people in the development of the agricultural and mineral resources of the country, there is still another source of wealth not yet drawn upon, and toward which the attention of capitalists in this country has already been directed. A company is now torming for the purpose of invading the forests which clothe the 8loi)e8 of the mountain ranges and cover thousands of acres of the valley lands not yet under cultivation. These forests, abounding in rare hard woods, are virtually untouched. More than sixty varieties capable of use are known to exist. The rarest are a green and a yel- low wood, which retain those colors in the finished product. They are susceptible of high polish, and for carving are said not to be surpassed. The trees are not large, but the logs cut from them will average a foot in diameter, and are quite large enough for all practical purposes. Some day, whether the United States retains possession of the Philip- pines or not, adventurous and enterprising men will push their way into the hearts of these valuable forests, and their treasures will be brought forth to decoiate the interiors of our palace cars and residences. The present foreign commerce does not seem large in comi)arison with our own enormous and growing trade. In the best seasons $30,000,000 a year will cover the exports and $L'r),000.000 the imports— a total com- merce in one year of about half the value of what we sell to foreign countries in a single month. 570 TREATY OF PEACE. The proposition to retain permanent possession of this important group, raising as it does a problem entirely new to our scheme of gov- ernment, is not attended with unanimity of public sentiment. Standing upon the threshold of a new and momentous venture, it is natural that there should be at once two parties — the one radical and in favor of holding advantages fortuitously gained, ambitious to participate in the world's rivalry for new markets; the other representing the conserva- tive element, who, while realizing the temptation which the occasion presents, are nevertheless mindful of the dangers involved in a distinct departure from time-honored precepts hitherto regarded as necessary to the safety of our institutions. To the first of these the project is alluring. In the undeveloped resources of the Philippines they see a great opportunity for our genius. They recognize that in a decade we might make a change greater than has been wrought since Magalhaes discovery until the present time. They see great development companies formed to cultivate tobacco and sugar by modern methods, others formed to test the richness of the unknown mineral deposits, and still others to develop transportation or to reap the treasures of the forest. They see also that with honest, intelligent, just, and humane government there might be astounding improvement in the character of the people. All this is recognized as well by the conservative party, to whom the commercial side of the question strongly appeals, but who fear the dangers from a govern- mental standpoint. To them the character of the population is a cause for hesitation in any plan of permanent control. There can be no thought of assimilation. It can not be expected that the people of these islands will ever be brought to a comprehension of our institu- tions. We need not even hope for sympathetic submission. In this race of natives and half castes, with its considerable percentage of Chi- nese, our conservative party sees a people who must be governed in a manner foreign to our whole system. It is foreboded that a strong paternalism, virtually without represen- tation, is what the islands must have: and this element sees that the administration of such a system would be hampered by a legislative power always jealous of the executive, and in this case necessarily ignorant of the conditions and requirements of the problem. They argue that if we are to enter this field of antipodal development, we should clearly comprehend what a departure it would be from the lines of our historical growth, and we should recognize its full import; that we should at the beginning understand that our Constitution contemplates no such conditions; that if we are to administer such a government as would be required of us, we should start with a solid foundation, laid in constitutional amendment, drawn with a full knowledge of the necessities of the case. But it is believed by them that if we take the time to give this subject the consideration necessary before such a con- stitutional amendment can be adopted, there will be little danger that we shall finally take an ill-advised or hasty step. Alaska might be offered as a precedent, but it is in our own hemi- sphere, and sparsely peopled; it involved no problem so difficult of solu- tion as would be that of a government for the Philippines. Still there are features of its acquisition and administration which, by analogy, might be applied to the permanent control of the Philippines. Alaska, it will be remembered, was ceded to the United States by Russia on March 30, 1867, and was soon thereafter formally delivered into our military possession, General Rousseau, of the Army, representing our Government. By an act of Congress approved July 27, 1808, the laws TREATY OF PEACE. 571 of the TJnited States relating to customs, commerce, and navigation were extended over the vast territory thus acquired, and from that date until May 17, 1884, a period of sixteen years, these laws were ad- ministered and executed by the Treasury Department and its subordi- nate ofiQcers. The act of May 17, 1884, provided for the appointment of a governor for Alaska, a United States district court, with marshal, clerks, and deputies, and for United States commissioners to be stationed at vari- ous points in the Territory. Subsequently laws have been passed regarding town sites, and protecting fishing and mining rights; and the present Congress has passed a law defining the rights of railway corporations, extending the homestead laws over the Territory, and limiting the amount of laud to be taken up, purchased, or occui)ied by any one person or corporation upon navigable waters. So that Congress has met the necessities of this Territory, as they have arisen from time to time, by suitable legislation; but no provision has been yet made for a territorial form of government with a legisla- ture. That will come in due time, and the future will see one or more States carved out of that great Territory, but not until it is peopled with men from the States in such numbers as to give assurance of stable self government. LIFE m MANILA, [By Wallace Cumminq.] There is no place in the civilized parts of the world which has been so entirely unknown, even to well-informed people, as the Pliilipiune Islands. Even the ubiquitous "globe trotter" passes them by, for tliey are off the regular route which runs from Singapore, via Hongkong, to Shanghai or Japan, and the China Sea is a specially unpleasant body of water to cross. The steamers running between Hongkong and Manila are so small that the trip is like a rough channel passage lengthened to between sixty and seventy hours. Of the alternative route from Singa- pore I will not speak beyond saying that the steamers on this route are Spanish, for to most people who have not had the advantage of a Spanish bringing up the usual Spanish steamer is not to be thought of. Never shall I forget the nightmare horrors of my own first passage from Hongkong to Manila. I was hurrying to Manila to enter the American house of Peele, Hubbell & Co. as a junior clerk. At that time (the autumn of 1882) Manila was being devastated by the worst epidemic of cholera ever known there. The death rate rose to 1,300 a day, and - Peele, Hubbell & Co. having lost two clerks, and not knowing how many more might go, cabled me an offer of a position. On reaching Hongkong I found that, owing to the quarantine against Manila, the next regular steamer would not leave for ten days or two weeks. Being blissfully ignorant of the fact that a person entirely unacquainted with the life and ways of the East, and not having enough knowledge of Spanish to swear by (barely enough, indeed, to swear with), is about as useful as the vermiform appendix — and with the same capacity of being very troublesome— I allowed myself to be persuaded to take passage on a tiny little German tramp steamer about to start. She was of less than 200 tons, with her cabin just forward of the engine, and separated from it by an iron bulkhead, which gave it the benefit of all the heat. It was barely large enough to accommodate a fixed table and four chairs, and had on each side a cabin with two 'berths each. There were two other passengers. One doubled up with 572 TREATY OF PEACE. the captain; the other, a yonn^ Fih'pino, shared the other cabin with me. We ran into a typhoon just outside of Hongkong Harbor, and did not get out of it until we entered Manila Bay, six days later. Ne\'er did time pass so slowly. I had forgotten to bring any reading material. The cabin was unbearably hot. the deck was under water the whole time, and the bridge was the only place of refuge; even that was soaked with spray. The night was even worse, for though I was not sick, my little Filipino more than made up for my immunity, and effectually deterred me from occupying the berth to which 1 was entitled. So I made a bed of the cabin tioor, twisting myself around the legs of the table to prevent being rolled from side to side. We did arrive at last, however, though the steamer had such a list, through the shifting of her cargo, that dishes would slide off the cabin table even when we were anchored in the calm water of Manila Bay. The coast is a bold one at the entrance to Manila Bay, a small rocky island dividing the entrance into two unequal passages. The island is that Corregidor so often mentioned in the reports of the naval battle. After passing through the entrance, the bay widens out, extending about 4:i» miles north and south, and the same east and west. Manila is on the eastern shore of the bay. About 7 miles nearer the entrance, on the southern sliore, is Cavite, the scene of the great naval battle, where there are a drydock and an arsenal. We came to anchor on Sunday morning about a mile offshore. All vessels drawing over 1«) feet discharge a part of their cargo in the bay and then enter the river Pasig, on which are located the ])rincipal business houses and wharves. Tliough any land would have been most welcome after six days of such tossing as we had experienced, yet my first view of jSIanila was most unattractive. Two terrible typhoons had visited the city six weeks before, and the shores of tlie bay were literally strewn with wrecked vessels. Every vessel lying in the bay at tiic time had been driven ashore, while thousands of native houses were destroyed. The ])opulation of Manila was placed at about 300,000. That is probably not an overestimate, for it is certain that at least 60,o00 people died of cholera during that epidemic. All statistics are, however, mere guesswork, for there are no otlicial figures. During all the years the Spaniards have owned the islands they have occupied only the mere edges, and great areas on the larger islands are as wild and unknown as at the landing of Magalhaes. The old city, called there distinctively "Manila," is built in the angle made by the Eiver Pasig and the bay. It is surrounded by stone walls 40 feet thick, and a wide moat, in part double. Each gate has a port- cullis and is approached by a drawbridge, and the top of the wall is lined with cannon of two hundred years ago. It is said to be the most l)erfectly preserved type of the old walled city now left. In it are the cathedral, the archbishop's palace, most of the Government offices, and many convents and monasteries. Many European S])aniards live theie. Spreading far on the shore of the bay, and on both banks of the Pasig, on a perfectly flat, alluvial plain intersected by numerous creeks, are the different pueblos or wards (some fifteen or twenty in number), which together constitute what is known to the outside world as Manila. The population is a mixture of all races. Every color is represented, from the blonde Caucasian Scandinavian to the darkest native. The latter is least common, and is usually an American negro from some ship, or, more rarely, a specimen of the dwarfish aboriginals known as Negritos (little negroes). They have the thick lips, flat noses, retreat- TREATY OF PEACE. 573 iDg foreheads, and woolly heads ol the West Coast African, and closely resemble the Bushman of sonth central Africa. They are numerous, and iu the unknown interior of Luzon they live an utterly savage life, and have never been even nominally subdued. The Spaniard from '' the Peninsula," as they call Spain, is invariably an office-holder, or in the army or navy. He looks down on everybody else, and has come to make as much money as possible, no matter how, and then go back to spend it in Spain. Then there are the Filipinos — "children of the country," they are called — who are supposed to be pure- blooded descendants of Spanish settlers. But there are few of them without some touch of Chinese or native blood. There are from forty to sixty thousand Chinese. Many of them are wealthy, but the bulk of them are coolies earning 20 cents a day. The vast majority of the population is made up of every shade and cross, natives (Malays) and half-breeds (mestizos). Smallest in number, but controlling the entire import and export business, are the "foreigners" — English, Ger- mans, Americans, Swiss, etc. Most of the European countries are rep- resented. Among the first things to impress a stranger are the horses. Descended from horses brought from Mexico, they have become much smaller, while they are also much more shapely. In fact, 1 have never seen a better-looking breed. There is nothing of the pony about their shape, though in size they range between 48 and 52 Inches. At first it looked absurd to see them ridden by big men whose stirrups hung down to the horses' knees; but I soon found out that they easily carried a rider weighing 200 pounds. The foreigners have a jockey club, which holds two meetings a year at the beautiful turf track at Santa Mesa. To avoid sharp practice, members of the club only are eligible to ride. This necessitates a scale of weights starting at 132 pounds and rising to 154 pounds. It demonstrates the speed and strength of these mini- ature horses that a mile has been run in two minutes and ten seconds by a pony carrying 150 pounds. Only stallions are used. Mares can not even be brought into the city. Nobody walks; everybody rides; and on any special fiesta thousands of carriages fill the streets. I doubt if there is a city in the w^orld that can turn out half the number of private vehicles in proportion to the population. The better houses differ in some ways from any other in the world. Always of two stories, there is a high stone basement, with a carriage- way through to the court, where are the servants' quarters and domestic offices. The upper story is of wood, being complete in itself, so that in case of an earthquake it will settle together. The ceilings are covered with cloth instead of plaster. A wide stairway leads up from the car- riageway. Between 3 and 4 feet above the floor of this story is a wide window ledge with grooves running the whole length of every side. In these grooves slide blinds, and also frames in which are set small squares of oyster shell (called "conchas"). Both blinds and conchas run the full 'length of each side. Either or both can be closed at the same time, and both can be slid back to the width of one at each end, leaving the whole side open, and allowing the air to circulate as freely as in a shed. The roofs were formerly made of heavy curved tiles, ^''ow gal- va^iized iron is used, as it vastly decreases the chance of the roof falling during an earthquake, and lessens the damage if it does. On the other hand, the iron roof is much more likely to be blown oft" by the terrible typhoons. The native houses are built of bamboo, with thatched roofs made of the leaf of the nipa palm, and elevated from G to 10 feet on bamboo 574 TREATY OF PEACE. poles. When one builds a house in Manila it is necessary to decide whether to make it safe from earthquake or typhoon. The frail nipa house may swing like a ship in a heavy sea during an earthquake, but is perfectly safe, while the tile or iron roof may fall, killing and destroy- ing everything near it. But when the typhoon comes the nipa houses go down by the hundred, while the tile and iron roofed ones suffer little. Possibly the chief pe'culiarity of the Philippines is its position as the stronghold of the priest and the religious orders. All the great orders are established there; black, blue, brown, and white robes swarm in the streets. All education is in their hands, and in the country and village the priest is virtually all powerful. No translation of the Bible is allowed to enter the islands, and no Protestant church can be built, no service held. To illustrate the power of the Church, I will describe the ceremony I saw on Corpus Christi. There was a great procession, with all the officials, troops, and sailors taking part. Finally the pro- cession halted, and the archbishop drove slowly by in his carriage, drawn by four white horses, with outriders and guards. As he passed the colors of each regiment, the carriage stopped and the colors were laid on the ground. The archbishop descended, stood on them, and elevated the host to the four quarters, and then went forward to repeat the ceremony at each regiment. Formerly, a serious drawback to a visit to Manila was the lack of hotels; but now there are several. If the visitor has letters of intro- duction, there is also a pleasant and comfortable foreigners' club at which he may stay. Manila loves holidays. At one time there were over forty in each year. The number has been sadly diminished, though there are still thirteen left, I under>tand. Each pueblo has its saint, and on that saint's day the inhabitants give themselves over, as they do on all the great holidays of the church, to music, fireworks, cock- fighting, processions, etc. Almost all these processions took place at night, and the effect was most picturesque. There would be a line of marchers — men, women, and children — walking in single tile on each side of the street, every one with a lighted candle in his hand. At intervals, in the middle of the road, would come images of the Saviour, the Virgin, and the saints, borne on the shoulders of from ten to thirty men, surrounded by priests, and preceded by a band of music. Some of the images were covered with diamonds and other precious stones, said to be enormously valua- ble. In these cases there was always a guard of soldiers with fixed bayonets about the image. Often there would be thousands of people walking in these processions, and all the while it was moving tens of thousands of rockets and bombs would be fired. These rockets and bombs are homemade. The rockets consist only of a joint of bamboo filled with powder, exploding with a great noise, but with little light. The bombs are simply a handful of powder tightly wrapped with hemp. They cost a mere trifle, but make a great noise, and no fiesta is com- lilete without plenty of them. The most curious procession is participated in only by natives and the poorer mestizos. It takes place, if I remember rightly, during Holy Week, and is a high solemnity. Every one walking in the procession is robed in his graveclothes. The garment is a long, loose gray robe with a hood, and it comes to the ground. The effect is very strange, and as the people go they repeat continually: ^^Santa Maria^ madre de Dios, orapro nobis !^' It may seem strange that graveclothes are pro- vided before they are needed; but in Manila they are considered a prime necessity, and every native owns those clothes, even if he is bare TREATY OF PEACE. 575 of all others. The ordinary dress of the native man is trousers and shirt of "piece goods" (calico), the sliirt being worn outside the trousers. On holidays they wear a shirt made of 2)i)la, which is an expensive material. Native servants wear the same articles, but they must be of spotless white; and very suitable and nice looking it is, though I sup- pose that the idea of being driven by a coat hiiiau so dressed would shock the habitues of Central and Hyde parks. A curious freak of custom was that native servants were required to serve barefooted, while it was an insult if a Chinese servant appeared before his superior without his shoes. Our firm had a mess house, in which the partners lived, and which was open to all their American and English em])loyees. Should the latter prefer to live elsewhere, $1,000 a year was allowed as the equiv- alent. 1 lived at the mess, finding it much the more comfortable. Indeed, it would have been hard to be dissatisfied with our way of liv- ing; and as it will show the style in wliich the great American houses in the East are conducted, I think it worth telling with some detail. The mess was a fine house, handsomely furnished, in one of the pleas- antest parts of the city. Tlie table was supplied by a Chinese cook. He was allowed $500 a month, and given certain of the heavier grocer- ies, such as flour, rice, etc. He paid his under cooks, and was responsi- ble for meals at tlie mess, and for breakfast (like the French dejeuner a la fourchette) and afternoon tea, which were taken at the office by all the employees, except on Sundays and fiestas. Then there was a major- domo, who had control of all the servants and had charge of the house. There was also an extra house servant, and a Chinese porter, who opened and shut the great house doors, filled the baths, pulled the punka, and watered the street in the dry season. Then everyone had a i)ers()nal servant, who took care of his room, attended to his clothes, waited on him at table, prepared his early breakfast (about 7 a. m.), and so on. Everybody also owned a horse or horses, which involved one more servant at least. Being a junior, I contented myself with one pony and a two-wheeled trap, something like a dogcart. The others drove victorias and pairs. Three of our mess owned racing ponies, whi(;h inured to my benefit, as it gave me as much riding as I wished. After the bath and an early breakfast came the drive to the office, between 8 and 8.30; then work till 12.15, at which hour break- fast was served at the office; then work again until 5.30, interrupted between 3 and 4 by afternoon tea; then to the bungalow to dress, to drive, and back to dinner at 7.30. To a lover of music Manila is a charming place. The natives have wonderful musical talent, and there were numerous bands. Those of the three regiments then stationed there were remarkably good, and four afternoons each week they })layed in turn on the Luneta, a sort of plaza on the shores of the bay just outside the old walls. I recall vividly the open-air concert, by three hundred instruments, given in honor of Prince Oscar of Sweden. The glorious full moon of the trop- ics, far brighter than in more northern lands, shining on the quiet waters of the bay, the innumerable lights, the brilliantly dressed crowd, and the thrilling music of the mighty bands, softened in volume on the great plain, combined to make it an occasion to be long remembered. The "Battle of Castellejos," which they played, was inspiring, and the effect was heightened by the repetition of the trumpet calls by soldiers who were stationed at intervals far off' upon the plains, while the guns on the city walls added a touch of reality. During the height of the rainy season, from about the middle of June 676' TREATY OF PEACE. to the middle of September, all outdoor pursuits are suspended. The violeuce of the downpour is hardly to be imagined by dwellers in higher latitudes. The streets in Manila and some of the roads for a few miles outside are fairly good during the dry season, but quickly become nearly impassable when the rains set in. As I have already mentioned, Manila is intersected in all directions by creeks, which are traversed by hundreds of canoes. These canoes are dugouts, often of great size, and the natives are most ex[)ert in handling them. They are indispen- sable at times when vast floods come down from the great lake, about 30 miles from Manila, of which the river Pasig is the outlet. One storm will sometimes raise the river and overflow most of the city. After a few hours* rain I have gone direct from our steps into a banca (canoe) and been paddled through the streets to the oitice. In this lake is lound one of the most remarkable phenomena in the islands. Not very far from the center rises what is evidently the old crater of a submerged volcano. Circular in shape, it comes up abruptly from the water, the sides several hundred feet in height, except in one place, where it is not more than 30. The natives are dreadfully afraid of it, saying it is full of crocodiles; but a i)arty of us who went there in a steam launch induced them to drag tlieir canoes over, and paddle us about. The interior walls rise perpendicularly, and are masses of vegetation which has lound foothold in every crack and cranny. The water within seems to have no communication with the lake, and is no longer water, but a mass of corruption and putridity that tills one with shuddering horror. We saw no crocodiles. Perhaps our noise fright- ened them; but I can not understand how fish could live in that mass of filth, nor where the crocodiles would find food, if fisli were lacking. The depth of this ])lace is unknown, no bottom having been found in the soundings thus far made. I have no space here to write of many other interesting topics — the venality of the Si)anish officials, from the lowest to the highest; the almost incredible impediments which they throw in the way of busi- ness; the character and customs of the women, Filipina, mestiza, and native; the fruits, including the mango, king of all, and the one hun- dred and sixty five varieties of bananas, and — but the list itself might extend almost to the length of an article. A VISIT TO THE PHILIPPINES. [The Contemporary Review, Jnne, 1898.] [By Claes Ericsson.] On June 13, 1894, 1 arrived in Manila Bay, from Singapore, on board the Nuestra Sefiora de Santa Loreto. The faith of the pious Spaniard who gave the steamer her long name had been abundantly justified, or she must have gone to the bottom years before, for a more ramshackle craft I never set foot upon. Luckily we had no rough weather, or these lines might never have been penned, the protection of " Our Lady of Holy Loreto" notwithstanding. It was night when we came to anchor, and the spectacle of the lamps on the Luneta gave me a bles.sed feel- ing of security which had been lacking many a day. If the Nuestra Seiiora, etc., should go down at her anchorage I might possibly swim ashore. Landing at 9 next morning, I visited the custom-house. OfiBcials, Spanish and Creole, were lounging about, cigarette or cheroot in mouth, and presently one of them condescended to inform me that my luggage would be examined at 3 o'clock. It was then 9.30 a. m. At the appointed hour I returned ; but in Manila four years ago no one dreamed of hurrying, and another hour passed before I was free of the port. An acquaintance assured me, however, that my good fortune had been great; and when, three days later, I obtained a licensia, or permit to stay in the islands, the same gentleman consoled me for the delay with the remark that such dispatch was phenomenal — in Manila. During my stay I made the acquaintance of one of the leisurely official.^, a Creole. In a burst of confidence he gave me to understand that a great deal of money was received at the Manila custom-house, but the Gov- ernment saw very little of it. I am told that they have the electric light in Manila to day, but in 1894 the streets were lit with oil lamps, on posts more or less resem- bling the famous tower of Pisa. The fortifications had a very ancient look, not surprising when it is remembered that they were built between two and three centuries ago. Leaving the Lunetta, I passed through a beautiful avenue of feathery bamboos, swaying to the gentlest breeze, and so reached the town in time to witness a very pretty sight. It was a funeral. Four white ponies, harnessed in sky-blue and silver, driven by a coachman similarly arrayed, drew the hearse, which was painted white, bine, and gold, and decked with i)lumes of snowy feathers. As my business in the Philippines was to collect plants on the moun- tains of South Palawan, I left Manila by the first steamer, taking two natives as personal servants. One of them, named Minico, was very small, not more than 4 feet in height, but brave enough, nevertheless. My f* llow-passengers numbered seven. One of them, a gentleman of martial aspect, I addressed in my best Spanish: " It is a fine day, Captain." T p 37 ^ . 578 TREAT? OF PEACE. "Senor," he answered, giving his moustache an upward twist, "jou mistake, 1 am a colonel." And he turned on his heel. There our acquaintance began and ended. The Spaniard is so seldom discourte- ous — at least, to Europeans — that I fear he was scarcely a good sample. Possibly, however, Admiral Dewey has by this time taught the colonel better manners. Steaming past the Calamianes Islands, we eventually anchored at Marangas, in Palawan, which was my destination. The settlement comprised two small houses, inhabited by Chinamen, and a stockade less than a hundred yards square, containing a hut for the officer in command, one for the garrison of 30 soldiers, and another for stores. At every corner of the stockade rose a watchtower, thatched with "alang-alang" grass, occupied night and day by sentries, with loaded rifles, lest the "Moros," as the Spaniards call the natives, should attempt a surprise, I advise no one to visit this Palawan settlement unless obliged. There was scarcely any food to be had for love or money. Mosquitoes swarmed as they do nowhere else on earth, I think. One morning I counted thirteen alligators marching in a troop along the beach toward the mouth of a small river. Ants, millions of them, were every where — in the soup, the jam, my bed, my shirt, on the table — wherever an ant can crawl. A species more venomous I never encountered. My Manila men suffered terribly. Scarcely an inch of their bodies escaped, and the wounds, if rubbed. sup])urated like smallpox. To crown all, Mar- angas is notorious for a special kind of fever of the most virulent character. Half the garrison \^ ere down while I was there, and their commander was hardly ever well. The Chinamen were engaged in the "Damar" trade, which is carried on in rather a i^eculiar manner. The Sultan will not allow the natives of the interior to sell their resin to the Celestials direct; they must dispose of it to the Sulus, who dwell on the coast, and these trade with the Chinamen. As may be supposed, the poor natives are plundered shamefully. Having arranged with Lo-Chang, the principal Chinese merchant, for the use of a hut, I paid a visit to Lieutenant Garcia, the officer in charge of the stockade. He invited me to a vino tinto and a cockfight. The latter I should have preferred to decline, but it was soon over, and perhaps cockfighting is excusable in Palawan. It appeared to be the soldiers' only recreation, except potting alligators. The next day I called upon Paduka Majasari Maulana Amiril Maum- inin, Sultan Muhammad Harum Karassid, lang de per-Tuan, ex-Sultan of the Sulu Islands, once the home of the most bloodthirsty pirates that ever sailed the China Sea, which is saying a great deal. On arriv- ing at the royal village of Bolini Bolini, which comprised the "palace" and half a dozen ruinous huts of bamboo, my presence was announced by a gong stroke, which brought out the master of the ceremonies. Invited to step within, I crawled up the bamboo ladder — the "palace" stood on the usual piles — crossed the veranda, and in the farthest apart- ment found his highness of the many titles sitting cross-legged on a divan. The Sultan was not in state attire; at least there was no suggestion of the imperial yellow in his close fitting white trousers and vest, slip- pers embroidered with seed pearls, and scarlet fez. The two attendant nobles were much more gaily clad. Both wore tight jackets of blue silk, decked with gold buttons, and trousers of salmon red, ornamented with bt3ttons of gold or gilt from the knee downward. TREATY OF PEACE. 570 His Highness, who appeared to be about 50 years of age, had rather a pleasant expression, with a twinkle in his eye that reminded nie of Arabi Pasha. A chair was brought, also vermouth and chocolate. With a cup of the last in my hand, I explained the purpose of my visit, which was to crave the Sultan's assistance in exploring Marangas Mountain. Smiling, he promised as many coolies as I needed, and I took my leave. The ex- Sultan of Sulu is all powerful in Palawan. The Spaniards have no real authority, and never interfere with the natives, except when Europeans or Chinamen are concerned. Some idea of the situ- ation may be gathered from the following incident which happened during my stay at Marangas. The Sultan's son, a boy of 10, desiring to visit Lieutenant Garcia, came with a crowd of retainers at his heels, all armed to the teeth with guns, pistols, spears, and the seldom absent kris. Every man pressed into the stockade. Had the Spaniards tried to keep them out there would have been a fight. The danger was great, but all passed quietly, although a few weeks before a Sulu who had stolen by the sentries ran amok at the lieutenant, who would have lost his life within his own stockade had not half a dozen soldiers come to the rescue. At that time there was fighting almost daily in the Sulu Islands and in Mindanao. As soon as the coolies promised by the Sultan arrived, I set out for Marangas Mountain, no great distance. The heat, was tremendous as we pressed forward, first through tall "alaug alaug" grass, and then up the bed of a mountain stream, strewn with bowlders big and little, many sharp as knives. Striking into the jungle, atter traveling some hours by the river, we found a track and, following it, presently arrived at a native hut — a mere roof on four poles, open at the sides, back, and front to all the winds that blew. The owner, a very old man, naked, except for a breechcloth, made off at once; but, on Minico ordering him to stop, the poor fellow came to a halt, shivering with fear. Bowever, at the sight of a little tobacco and cloth his weather-beaten face wrinkled into a smile, and T soon persuaded him to guide us up the mountain. He led us to a village, whose inhabitants fled, shrieking; but again a little tobacco acted like a charm. We made friends and obtained shelter for the night, invited guests. Our hosts did their best to dissuade us from proceeding farther. My spirit, they said, would remain on the mountain to vex them, and many more awful things would be sure to happen. ^Nevertheless we pressed on. Finding the mountain too precipitous, however, we were obliged to turn back and try a different route. This took us to another small settlement which boasted an Orang Kaya (headman). Tlie vil- lagers at our previous halt had told me that he was very rich and would entertain us in a royal manner, hoping, no doubt, to induce us to depart from their spur of the mountain. I found him very old, and his riches appeared to consist of an earthenware plate and a wooden club 3 feet long — his only weapon. . x. i^-j. • Everywhere the people seemed wretchedly poor, and their habitations were the worst hovels I had seen in the far East. But these aborigines have no settled places of abode. They sometimes throw a hut together, cultivate a tiny plot of ground for a year, then move on. The majority are always wandering about. As for the Sulus, they appear to do no work at all. When they are not robbing the inland natives they pass the time in laments for the bad old days when they, tin- Orang Laut, ruled the seas far and near. The old piratical spirit survives. They have never been subdued, and, in my opinion, they never will b^— by Spain. 580 TREATY OF PEACE. The aborigines of Palawan must be very near tbe bottom of the human scale. I have watched them sleeping round a fire at night in as much security as they ever know. Their tiny limbs were never still, quivering and stretching, and at the least sound in the jungle they were on their feet, wide awake, ready to flee. A mysterious people, uncanny, scarcely human, yet, in comparison with their Sulu masters, honest and trustworthy. We camped near the hut of two old people, a man and a woman, whom a few yards of cloth and a little tobacco made more happy than they had ever been in their wretched lives, perhaps. So far I had seen no large animal in Palawan. There was much talk of some mysterious beast, but the descriptions were so indefinite that I was unable to decide whether it was a goat or a buffalo. Not one of the natives with whom I conversed had ever seen it. Three days constant climbing took us to the summit of Marangas Mountain. On the bowlders were hundreds of spider like lienantheras (orchids). I saw many Phalcenopsis also; and ferns, Lj/copods and Alocacias, were very plentiful. Leaving coolies to collect the orchids, I returned to Marangas with Minico and the other Manila man. Desiring to ascend a mountain near Bulugay, I hired a Sulu boat and crew. There was trouble immediately. The turbulent Sulns refused to put to sea with the men from Manila, and I was obliged to meet them halfway, by sending one of my servants home. Minico I contrived to retain. Perhaps his insignificant appearance aided me. Anyway, I soon had cause to be thankful that I stood firm. Practically I was now at the mercy of Sulus, pirates, and sons of pirates to a man. Before engaging them I had been warned that two of their number had under- gone eight years' imprisonment for the murder of a European; and judging by the looks of the remaining five it was not difficult to imagine that it would give them the keenest pleasure to cut my throat. Stal- wart fellows they were, and not unpicturesqne in their tight blue pants, sleeved waistcoat decked with many buttons, gay sarong (a bag-shaped sash), and fez, or turban. Each bore in his sarong a kris and pistol, while a daredevil glitter in the eyes of every one of them was evidence enough that they would use those weapons on the slightest provocation. Starting at 2 o'clock in the morning, we reached Bulugay by 8, and at once set out for the panglima's (war chief's) village. In reply to an inquiry with regard to coolies, the panglima, a big fellow, told me that there were plenty of men to be had, but all were very wicked. I could quite believe him, but I must admit that the natives here did not look nearly so savage as the Kayans in Sarawak or the Muruts of North Borneo. In the evening one of my Sulus came and whispered in my ear: "Tuan, datu, him say, 'Ada orang putih naik disini, baik buleh, tapi djangan dia balek,'" which translated means, "Sir, the datu (chief) has said, 'Let the white man come here, but take care that he does not return.'" The prospect was not pleasant. I consulted Minico at once. He informed me that it was generally known that the datu of the district and the Sultan were not on friendly terms, meaning that if his high- ness of Bolini-Bolini could catch the chief, kris or bowstring would speedily settle the quarrel; but Minico did not think the datu would harm me. He was inclined to believe that the Sulus wished me to hasten from the neighborhood of the Panglima's village without coolies for some motive of their own. An hour afterwards the faithful fellow touched my arm, signing me to follow him. With a finger on his mouth, he led the way to the hut occupied by my rascally crew. Approaching TREATY OF PEACE 581 noiselessly, we listened to their conversation. Tbey were talking about me. I heard one suggest that a push over a cliff would be the safest way to compass my end. Another declared that would be foolisli. It would be much better to take me a long way up the mountains and hold me there for a ransom of $300. The majority seemed to be of this opinion, and Miuico and I stole away. Between the Datu and the "Men of the Sea" I seemed likely to come to grief, but forewarned is forearmed. We ascended the mountain next day. Nothing happened, perhaps because my revolver was seldom out of my hand. Leaving men to col- lect the plants, I returned with the Sulus to the coast and embarked for Marangas. Wanting coolies for a journey to Datu Guah's village and an ascent of Panilingan Mountain, I paid the Sultan another visit; but the master of the ceremonies whispered that the moment was unfavor- able. His highness was susa — that is, he had been vexed or troubled. By means of discreet inquiries I learned the nature of his susa. It is a rather common story in the far East. Unable to lodge the whole of his wives in the "palace," his highness boarded a few of them — not the prettiest, I suspect — in the houses of his followers. One of these peris, an outcast from the Palawan paradise through want of room, consoled herself in the usual way — quite innocently, I was assured. The news reaching the Sultan, he sent for the venturesome lover and smilingly bade him be seated opposite himself. Not being altogether an idiot, the man had come armed. From his sarong the jeweled handle of his kris protruded, plain to see. After a few complimentary commoni)laces had been exchanged his highness remarked the weapon. "Allah has been good to you, S'Ali," said he. "Those emeralds are very fine, and the diamonds are as stars in the heavens. If the blade match the hilt, you have a treasure. Show it to me." Thrown off his guard, S'Ali drew the kris from its sheath and, hold- ing it by the wavy blade, presented it to the Sultan. Instantly half a dozen of his highness's attendants threw themselves upon the unfortu- nate fellow. He was overpowered in a moment and his hands securely tied behind his back. "Take him out," said the Sultan, still smiling. S'Ali was led away and lowered to the ground. Not a word did he utter. It was Kismet. Why waste his breath ? I did not learn the manner of his end, but it would be either by kris or bowstring. Let us hope it was the first. In the hands of a skillful executioner the kris is a merciful weapon. He was buried in the jungle behind the Sultan's "palace." Such was the susa of Muhammad Harum Narrasid, lang deper-Tuan— "he who ruleth"— in the year of our Lord 1894. And the Spaniards were supposed to govern the island of Palawan ! I could understand why the Sultan did not care to see a European so soon atter his crime. However, I obtained the coolies and sent them on. It had been my intention to ascend the mountain from Datu Guah's village, but before I could make a start the coolies returned bur