THE 
 
 ANALOGY OF RELIGION, 
 
 NATURAL AND RKVEALED, 
 
 TO THE 
 
 CONSTITUTION AND COURSE OF NATURE. 
 
 TO WHICH ARE ADDED 
 
 TWO BRIEF DISSERTATIONS, 
 
 I. OF PERSONAL IDENTITY. 
 
 II. OF THE NATURE OF VIRTUE. 
 
 BY JOSEPH BUTLER. D.C.L. 
 
 LATE LORD BISHOP OP DURHAM. 
 
 Ejus [Analogic] haec vis est, ut id quod dubiura est ad aliquid simile, de quo 
 non qua?ritur, referat; ut incerta certis probet. Quintil. i. 6. 
 
 WITH A PREFACE, 
 
 GIVING SOME ACCOUNT OK THE CHARACTER AND WRITINGS OP THE AUTHOR. 
 
 BY SAMUEL HALIFAX, D. D. 
 
 LATE LORD BISHOP OP GLOUCESTER. 
 
 OXFORD: 
 
 AT TIIE UNIVERSITY PRESS. 
 
 MDCCCXLIV. 
 
TO THE REVEREND 
 
 DR. THOMAS BALGUY, 
 
 ARCHDEACON AND PREBENDARY OF WINCHESTER, &c. 
 
 DEAR SIR, 
 
 TRUST you will excuse the liberty I have taken 
 J- of prefixing your name to the following sheets; 
 the latter part of which, I am confident, will not be 
 thought undeserving of your approbation ; and of the 
 former part you will commend the intention at least, 
 if not the execution. In vindicating the character of 
 Bishop Butler from the aspersions thrown upon it 
 since his death, I have but discharged a common duty 
 ol humanity, which survivors owe to those who have 
 deserved well of mankind by their lives or writings, 
 when they are past the power of appearing in their 
 own defence. And if what I have added, by way of 
 opening the general design of the Works of this great 
 Prelate, be of use in exciting the younger class of 
 Students in our Universities to read, and so to read as 
 to understand, the Two Volumes prepared and pub¬ 
 lished by the Author himself ; I flatter myself I shall 
 have done no inconsiderable service to Morality and 
 Religion. Your time and studies have been long suc¬ 
 cessfully devoted to the support of the same great 
 cause: and in what you have lately given to the 
 
[ vi ] 
 
 world, both as an Author and an Editor, you have 
 largely contributed to the defence of our common 
 Christianity, and of what was esteemed by One, who 
 was perfectly competent to judge, its best establish¬ 
 ment, the Church of England. In the present publi¬ 
 cation I consider myself as a fellow-labourer with 
 You in the same design, and tracing the path You 
 have trod before, but at great distance, and with un¬ 
 equal paces. When, by Ilis Majesty’s goodness, I was 
 raised to that station of eminence in the Church, to 
 which You had been first named, and which, on account 
 of the infirmity of your health, You had desired to de¬ 
 cline ; it was honour enough for Me on such an occa¬ 
 sion to have been thought of next to You : and I know 
 of no better rule by which to govern my conduct, so 
 as not to discredit the Royal Hand which conferred on 
 me so signal and unmerited a favour, than in cases of 
 difficulty to put the question to myself, How You 
 w ould probably have acted in the same situation. You 
 see, Sir, I still look up to You, as I have been wont, 
 both as my Superior and my Example. That I may 
 long reap the benefit of your advice and friendship ; 
 and that such a measure of health and strength may 
 be continued to You, as may enable You to pass the 
 evening of your days with comfort, and enjoy the 
 blessings of the life you love ; is the cordial wish of, 
 
 Dear Sir, 
 
 Your very affectionate 
 
 and faithful Servant, 
 
 S. GLOUCESTER. 
 
 Dartmouth Street, Westminster, 
 
 12th May, 178<>. 
 
PREFACE BY THE EDITOR, 
 
 When I consider how light a matter very often subjects the best 
 “ established characters to the suspicions of posterity, posterity 
 “ often as malignant to virtue as the age that saw it was envious 
 
 of its glory; and how ready a remote age is to catch at a low 
 
 “ revived slander, which the times that brought it forth saw de- 
 " spised and forgotten almost in its birth; I cannot but think it 
 “ a matter that deserves attention .*'—Letter to the Editor of the 
 Letters on the Spirit of Patriotism , &c. by Bishop Warburton. 
 See his Works, vol. vii. p. 547 . 
 
 HE Charge to the Clergy of the Diocese of Durham, which 
 
 A is placed immediately after the Sermons, was printed and 
 published in the year 1751, by the learned Prelate whose name 
 it bears ; and, together with the Sermons and Analogy of the 
 same writer, both too well known to need a more particular de¬ 
 scription, completes the collection of his Works. It has long 
 been considered as a matter of curiosity, on account of its 
 scarceness; and it is equally curious on other accounts—its 
 subject, and the calumny to which it gave occasion, of repre¬ 
 senting the Author as addicted to supetrsition , as inclined to 
 Popery, and as dying in the communion of the Church of 
 Rome. The improved edition of the Biographia Britannica , 
 published under the care of Dr. Kippis, having unavoidably 
 brought this calumny again into notice, it may not be unsea¬ 
 sonable to offer a few reflections in this place, by way of ob¬ 
 viating any impressions that may hence arise to the disad¬ 
 vantage of so great a character as that of the late Bishop But¬ 
 ler; referring those, who desire a more particular account of 
 
PREFACE 
 
 viii 
 
 his life, to the third volume of the same entertaining work, 
 printed in 1784, art. Butler (Joseph)*. 
 
 I. 1 he principal design of the Bishop in his Charge is, to 
 exhort his Clergy to “ do their part towards reviving a practi- 
 44 cal sense of religion amongst the people committed to their 
 44 care; and, as one way of effecting this, to 44 instruct them 
 in the Importance of External Religion,” or the usefulness 
 of outward observances in promoting inward piety. Now, 
 from the compound nature of man, consisting of two parts, the 
 body and the mind, together with the influence which these are 
 found to have on one another, it follows, that the religious re¬ 
 gards of such a creature ought to be so framed, as to be in 
 some way properly accommodated to both. A religion which 
 is purely spiritual, stripped of every thing that may affect the 
 senses, and considered only as a divine philosophy of the mind, 
 if it do not mount up into enthusiasm, as has frequently been 
 the case, often sinks, after a few short fervors, into indifference: 
 an abstracted invisible object, like that which natural religion 
 offers, ceases to move or interest the heart; and something 
 further is wanting to bring it nearer, and render it more pre¬ 
 sent to our view, than merely an intellectual contemplation. 
 On the other hand, when, in order to remedy this inconve¬ 
 nience, recourse is had to instituted forms and ritual injunc¬ 
 tions, there is always danger lest men be tempted to rest 
 entirely on these, and persuade themselves that a painful 
 attention to such observances will atone for the want of genuine 
 piety and \irtue. \ et surely there is a wav of steering safely 
 between these two extremes : of so consulting both the parts of 
 our constitution, that the body and the mind may concur in 
 rendering our religious services acceptable to God, and at the 
 same time useful to ourselves. And what way can this be, but 
 precisely that which is recommended in the Charge ; such a 
 cultivation of outward as well as inward religion, that from 
 both may result, what is the point chiefly to be laboured, and 
 at all events to be secured, a correspondent temper and beha¬ 
 viour ; or, in other words, such an application of the forms of 
 godliness, as may be subservient in promoting the power and 
 spirit of it? No man, who believes the Scriptures of the Old 
 
 a The account here alluded to is subjoined to this Preface. 
 
BY THE EDITOR. ix 
 
 S 
 
 and New Testament, and understands what he believes, but 
 must know, that external religion is as much enjoined, and 
 constitutes as real a part of revelation, as that which is internal. 
 The many ceremonies in use among the Jews, in consequence 
 of a Divine command ; the baptism of water, as an emblem 
 of moral purity ; the eating and drinking of bread and wine, as 
 symbols and representations of the body and blood of Christ, 
 required of Christians, are proofs of this. On comparing these 
 two parts of religion together, one, it is immediately seen, is of 
 much greater importance than the other; and, whenever they 
 happen to interfere, is always to be preferred : but does it fol¬ 
 low from hence, that therefore that other is of little or no im¬ 
 portance, and, in cases where there is no competition, may en¬ 
 tirely be neglected ? Or rather is not the legitimate conclusion 
 directly the reverse, that nothing is to be looked upon as of 
 little importance, which is of any use at all in preserving upon 
 our minds a sense of the Divine authority, which recalls to our 
 remembrance the obligations we are under, and helps to keep 
 us, as the Scripture expresses it, “ in the fear of the Lord all 
 u the day long 5 ? 1 ’ If, to adopt the instance mentioned in the 
 Charge, the sight of a church should remind a man of some 
 sentiment of piety ; if, from the view of a material building 
 dedicated to the service of God, he should be led to regard 
 himself, his own body, as a living “ temple of the Holy 
 “ Ghost V* and therefore no more than the other to be pro¬ 
 faned or desecrated by any thing that defileth or is impure; 
 could it be truly said of such a one, that he was superstitious, 
 or mistook the means of religion for the end? If, to use an¬ 
 other, and what has been thought a more obnoxious instance, 
 taken from the Bishop's practice, a cross, erected in a place of 
 public worship d , should cause us to reflect on Him who died 
 on a cross for our salvation, and on the necessity of our “ own 
 “ dying to sin 6 ,” and of “ crucifying the flesh with its affec. 
 “ tions and lusts^” would any worse consequences follow 
 from such sentiments so excited, than if the same sentiments 
 had been excited by the view of a picture, of the crucifixion 
 suppose, such as is commonly placed, and with this very 
 
 b Prov. xxiii. 17. <* 1 Cor. vi. 19. d See note A, at the end of this Preface, 
 
 e Rom. vi. 11. f Gal. v. 24. 
 
X 
 
 PREFACE. 
 
 design, in foreign churches, and indeed in many of our own? 
 Both the instances here adduced, it is very possible, may be 
 far from being approved, even by those who are under the 
 most sincere convictions of the importance of true religion: and 
 it is easy to conceive how open to scorn and censure they must 
 be from others, who think they have a talent for ridicule, and 
 have accustomed themselves to regard all pretensions to piety 
 as hypocritical or superstitious. But “ Wisdom is justified of 
 “ her children Religion is what it is, “ whether men will 
 u hear, or whether they will forbear h ;” and whatever in the 
 smallest degree promotes its interests, and assists us in perform¬ 
 ing its commands, whether that assistance be derived from the 
 medium of the body or the mind, ought to be esteemed of 
 great weight, and deserving of our most serious attention. 
 
 However, be the danger of superstition what it may, no one 
 was more sensible of that danger, or more in earnest in main¬ 
 taining, that external acts of themselves are nothing, and that 
 moral holiness, as distinguished from bodily observances of 
 every kind, is that which constitutes the essence of religion, 
 than Bishop Butler. Not only the Charge itself, the whole 
 intention of which is plainly nothing more than to enforce the 
 necessity of practical religion , the reality as well as form, is a 
 demonstration of this, but many passages besides to the same 
 purpose, selected from his other writings. Take the two fol¬ 
 lowing as specimens. In his Analogy he observes thus: 
 66 Though mankind have, in all ages, been greatly prone to 
 46 place their religion in peculiar positive rites, by way of equi- 
 “ valent for obedience to moral precepts; yet, without making 
 “ any comparison at all between them, and consequently with- 
 “ out determining which is to have the preference, the nature 
 “ of the thing abundantly shews all notions of that kind to be 
 “ utterly subversive of true religion : as they are, moreover, 
 “ contrary to the whole general tenor of Scripture ; and like- 
 46 wise to the most express particular declarations of it, that 
 “ nothing can render us accepted of God, without moral 
 “ virtue 1 .” And to the same purpose in his Sermon, preached 
 before the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel, in Feb. 
 1738-9. “ Indeed, amongst creatures naturally formed for 
 
 e Matt. xi. 19. h Ezek. ii. 5. i Analogy, part II. chap. i. 
 
BY THE EDITOR. 
 
 xi 
 
 i€ religion, yet so much under the power of imagination as men 
 44 are, superstition is an evil, which can never be out of sight. 
 46 But even against this, true religion is a great security, and 
 44 the only one. True religion takes up that place in the 
 44 mind, which superstition would usurp, and so leaves little 
 44 room for it; and likewise lays us under the strongest obliga- 
 46 tions to oppose it. On the contrary, the danger of supersti- 
 66 tion cannot but be increased by the prevalence of irreligion ; 
 44 and, by its general prevalence, the evil will be unavoidable. 
 44 For the common people, wanting a religion, will of course 
 44 take up with almost any superstition which is thrown in their 
 44 way : and in process of time, amidst the infinite vicissitudes 
 44 of the political world, the leaders of parties will certainly be 
 44 able to serve themselves of that superstition, whatever it be, 
 44 which is getting ground ; and will not fail to carry it to the 
 44 utmost length their occasions require. The general nature 
 44 of the thing shews this; and history and fact confirm it. It 
 44 is therefore wonderful, those people who seem to think there 
 44 is but one evil in life, that of superstition, should not see 
 44 that atheism and profaneness must be the introduction 
 44 of it*” 
 
 He who can think and write in such a manner, can never be 
 said to mistake the nature of real religion : and he, who, after 
 such proofs to the contrary, can persist in asserting of so dis¬ 
 creet and learned a person, that he was addicted to supci'stition , 
 must himself be much a stranger both to truth and charity. 
 
 And here it may be worth our while to observe, that the 
 same excellent prelate, who by one set of men w as suspected of 
 superstition , on account of his Charge, has by another been re¬ 
 presented as leaning to the opposite extreme of enthusiasm , on 
 account of his two discourses On the Love of God. But both 
 opinions are equally without foundation. He was neither su¬ 
 perstitious, nor an enthusiast: his mind was much too strong, 
 and his habits of thinking and reasoning much too strict and 
 severe, to suffer him to descend to the weakness of either 
 character. His piety was at once fervent and rational. W hen 
 impressed with a generous concern for the declining cause of 
 religion, he laboured to revive its dying interests; nothing he 
 
 k Serm. xvi. 
 
PREFACE 
 
 xii 
 
 judged would be more effectual to that end, among creatures 
 so much engaged with bodily things, and so apt to be affected 
 with whatever strongly solicits the senses, as men are, than a 
 religion of such a frame as should in its exercise require the 
 joint exertions of the body and the mind. On the other hand, 
 when penetrated with the dignity and importance of the first 
 “ and great commandment love to God, he set himself to in¬ 
 quire, what those movements of the heart are, which are due to 
 Him, the Author and Cause of all things; he found, in the 
 coolest way of consideration, that God is the natural object of 
 the same affections of gratitude, reverence, fear, desire of ap¬ 
 probation, trust, and dependence, the same affections in kind, 
 though doubtless in a very disproportionate degree , which any 
 one would feel from contemplating a perfect character in a 
 creature, in which goodness, with wisdom and power, are sup¬ 
 posed to be the predominant qualities, with the further cir¬ 
 cumstance, that this creature was also his governor and friend. 
 This subject is manifestly a real one ; there is nothing in it 
 fanciful or unreasonable : this way of being affected towards 
 God is piety, in the strictest sense: this is religion, considered 
 as a habit of mind ; a religion, suited to the nature and con¬ 
 dition of man" 1 . 
 
 II. From superstition to Popery the transition is easy : no 
 wonder then, that, in the progress of detraction, the simple im¬ 
 putation of the former of these, with which the attack on the 
 character of our Author was opened, should be followed by the 
 more aggravated imputation of the latter. Nothing, I think, 
 can fairly be gathered in support of such a suggestion from the 
 Charge, in which Popery is barely mentioned, and occasionally 
 only, and in a sentence or two; yet even there, it should be re¬ 
 marked, the Bishop takes care to describe the peculiar ob¬ 
 servances required by it, “ some as in themselves wrong and 
 “ superstitious, and others of them as being made subservient 
 “ to the purposes of superstition.” With respect to his other 
 writings, any one at all conversant with them needs not to be 
 told, that the matters treated of both in his Sermons and his 
 Analogy did none of them directly lead him to consider, and 
 much less to combat, the opinions, whether relating to faith or 
 
 1 Matt. xxii. 38. 
 
 m See note B, at the end of this Preface. 
 
BY THE EDITOR. 
 
 xiii 
 
 worship, which are peculiar to the Church of Rome : it might 
 therefore have happened, yet without any just conclusion 
 arising from thence, of being himself inclined to favour those 
 opinions, that he had never mentioned, so much as incidentally? 
 the subject of Popery at all. But fortunately for the reputa¬ 
 tion of the Bishop, and to the eternal disgrace of his calum¬ 
 niators, even this poor resource is wanting to support their 
 malevolence. In his Sermon at St. Bride’s before the Lord 
 Mayor in 1740, after having said that 44 our laws and whole 
 “ constitution go more upon supposition of an equality amongst 
 “ mankind, than the constitution and laws of other countries;” 
 he goes on to observe, that 44 this plainly requires, that more 
 44 particular regard should be had to the education of the 
 44 lower people here, than in places where they are born slaves 
 44 of power, and to be made slaves of superstition n meaning 
 evidently in this place, by the general term superstition , the 
 particular errors of the Romanists. This is something: but 
 we have a still plainer indication what his sentiments concern¬ 
 ing Popery really were, from another of his additional Ser¬ 
 mons, I mean that before the House of Lords on June the 
 11th, 1747, the anniversary of his late Majesty’s accession. 
 The passage alluded to is as follows; and my readers will not 
 be displeased that I give it them at length. 44 The value of 
 44 our religious Establishment ought to be very much heightened 
 44 in our esteem, by considering what it is a security from ; I 
 44 mean that great corruption of Christianity, Popery, which is 
 44 ever hard at work to bring us again under its yoke. Who- 
 44 ever will consider the Popish claims, to the disposal of the 
 44 whole earth, as of Divine right, to dispense with the most 
 44 sacred engagements, the claims to supreme absolute au- 
 44 thority in religion ; in short, the general claims which the 
 44 Canonists express by the words plentitude of power —who- 
 44 ever, I say, will consider Popery as it is professed at Rome, 
 44 may see, that it is manifest, open usurpation of all human 
 44 and Divine authority. But even in those Roman Catholic 
 44 countries where these monstrous claims are not admitted, 
 44 and the civil power does, in many respects, restrain the papal; 
 44 yet persecution is professed, as it is absolutely enjoined by 
 44 what is acknowledged to be their highest authority, a general 
 
 n Serm. xvii. 
 
XIV 
 
 PREFACE 
 
 “ council, so called, with the Pope at the head of it; and is 
 “ practised in all of them, I think without exception, where it 
 “ can be done safely. Thus they go on to substitute force in- 
 “ stead of argument; and external profession made by force, 
 “ instead of reasonable conviction. And thus corruptions of 
 “ the grossest sort have been in vogue, for many generations, 
 “ in many parts of Christendom ; and are so still, even where 
 “ Popery obtains in its least absurd form : and their antiquity 
 u and wide extent are insisted upon as proofs of their truth ; a 
 46 kind of proof, which at best can only be presumptive, but 
 “ which loses all its little weight, in proportion as the long and 
 44 large prevalence of such corruptions have been obtained by 
 44 force 0 /” In another part of the same Sermon, where he is 
 again speaking of our ecclesiastical constitution, he reminds his 
 audience that it is to be valued, 44 not because it leaves us at 
 44 liberty to have as little religion as we please, without being ac- 
 44 countable to human judicatories; but because it exhibits to our 
 44 view, and enforces upon our consciences, genuine Christianity, 
 44 free from the superstitions with which it is defiled in other 
 44 countrieswhich superstitions, he observes, 44 naturally 
 44 tend to abate its force.' 1 The date of this Sermon should 
 here be attended to. It was preached in June, 1747; that is, 
 four years before the delivery and publication of the Charge, 
 which was in the year 1751 ; and exactly five years before the 
 author died, which was in June, 1752. We have then, in the 
 passages now laid before the reader, a clear and unequivocal 
 proof, brought down to within a few years of Bishop Butler's 
 death, that Popery was held by him in the utmost abhorrence, 
 and that he regarded it in no other light, than as the great cor¬ 
 ruption of Christianity, and a manifest , open usurpation of all 
 human and Divine authority . The argument is decisive; nor 
 will any thing be of force to invalidate it, unless from some 
 after-act during the short remainder of the Bishop’s life, be¬ 
 sides that of delivering and printing his Charge, (which, after 
 what I have said here, and in the notes added to this Preface 
 and to the Charge, I must have leave to consider as affording 
 no evidence at all of his inclination to Papistical doctrines or 
 ceremonies,) the contrary shall incontrovertibly appear. 
 
 III. One such after-act however has been alleged, which 
 
 O Serm. xx. 
 
BY THE EDITOR. 
 
 xv 
 
 would effectually demolish all that we have urged in behalf of 
 our Prelate, were it true, as is pretended, that he died in the 
 communion of the Church of Rome. Had a story of this sort 
 been invented and propagated by Papists, the wonder might 
 have been less : 
 
 Hoc Ithacus velit, et magno mercentnr Atridae. 
 
 But to the reproach of Protestantism, the fabrication of this 
 calumny, for such w r e shall find it, originated from among our¬ 
 selves. It is pretty remarkable, that a circumstance so extra¬ 
 ordinary should never have been divulged till the year 1767, 
 fifteen years after the Bishop's decease. At that time Dr. 
 Thomas Seeker was Archbishop of Canterbury ; who of all 
 others was the most likely to know the truth or falsehood of 
 the fact asserted, having been educated with our Author in his 
 early youth, and having lived in a constant habit of intimacy 
 with him to the very time of his death. The good Archbishop 
 was not silent on this occasion : with a virtuous indignation he 
 stood forth to protect the posthumous character of his friend ; 
 and in a public new spaper, under the signature of Misopseudes , 
 called upon his accuser to support what he had advanced, by 
 whatever proofs he could. No proof, however, nor any thing 
 like a proof, appeared in reply; and every man of sense and 
 candour at that time was perfectly convinced the assertion was 
 entirely groundless P. Asa further confirmation of the rectitude 
 of this judgment, it may not be amiss to mention, there is yet 
 in existence a strong presumptive argument at least in its fa¬ 
 vour, drawn from the testimony of those who attended our 
 Author in the sickness of w hich he died. The last days of this 
 excellent Prelate were passed at Bath ; Dr. Nathanael Forster, 
 his chaplain, being continually with him ; and for one day, and 
 at the very end of his illness, Dr. Martin Benson also, the then 
 Bishop of Gloucester, who shortened his own life in his pious 
 haste to visit his dying friend. Both these persons constantly 
 wrote letters to Dr. Seeker, then Bishop of Oxford, containing 
 accounts of Bishop Butler’s declining health, and of the symp¬ 
 toms and progress of his disorder, which, as was conjectured, 
 soon terminated in his death. These letters, which are still 
 preserved in the Lambeth library % I have read ; and not the 
 
 P See note C, at the end of this Preface, q See note D, at the end of this Preface. 
 
XVI 
 
 PREFACE 
 
 slenderest argument can be collected front them, in justification 
 of the ridiculous slander we are here considering. If at that 
 awful season the Bishop was not known to have expressed any 
 opinion tending to shew his dislike to Popery, neither was he 
 known to have said any thing, that could at all he construed 
 in approbation of it: and the natural presumption is that 
 whatever sentiments he had formerly entertained concerning 
 that corrupt system of religion, he continued to entertain them 
 to the last. I he truth is, neither the word nor the idea of 
 Popery seems once to have occurred either to the Bishop him¬ 
 self, or to those who watched his parting moments: their 
 thoughts were otherwise engaged. His disorder had reduced 
 him to such debility, as to render him incapable of speaking 
 much or long on any subject: the few bright intervals that 
 occurred were passed in a state of the utmost tranquillity and 
 composure; and in that composure he expired. “Mark the 
 “ perfect man, and behold the upright: for the end of that 
 “ man is P^ce r." “ Let me die the death of the righteous, 
 
 “ and let my last end be like his s I” 
 
 Out of pure respect for the virtues of a man, whom I had 
 never the happiness of knowing, or even of seeing, but from 
 whose writings I have received the greatest benefit and illumi¬ 
 nation, and which I have reason to be thankful to Providence 
 for having early thrown in my way, I have adventured, in 
 what I have now offered to the public, to step forth in his 
 defence, and to vindicate his honest fame from the attacks of 
 those, who, with the vain hope of bringing down superior cha¬ 
 racters to their own level, are for ever at work in detracting 
 from their just praise. For the literary reputation of Bishop 
 Butler, it stands too high in the opinion of the world, to incur 
 the danger of any diminution : but this in truth is the least of 
 his excellencies. He was more than a good writer, he was a 
 good man; and, what is an addition even to this eulogy, he 
 was a sincere Christian. His whole study was directed To the 
 knowledge and practice of sound morality and true reli«ion : 
 these he adorned by his life, and has recommended to future 
 ages in his writings; in which, if my judgment be of any 
 avail, he has done essential service to both, as much, perhaps, 
 
 r Psalm xxxvii. 37. 
 
 R Numb, xxiii. 10. 
 
BY THE EDITOR. 
 
 XVII 
 
 as any single person since the extraordinary gifts of “ the word 
 “ °f wisdom and the word of knowledge l ” have been with¬ 
 drawn. 
 
 In what follows 1 propose to give a short account of the 
 Bishops moral and religious systems, as these are collected 
 from his Works. 
 
 I. His way of treating the subject of morals is to be gather¬ 
 ed from the volume of his Sermons, and particularly from the 
 three first, and from the preface to that volume. 
 
 • 6 I here is,” as our Author with singular sagacity has ob¬ 
 served, “ a much more exact correspondence between the natu- 
 “ ™1 and moral world, than we are apt to take notice of u .” 
 The inward frame of man answers to his outward condition ; 
 the several propensities, passions, and affections, implanted in 
 our hearts by the Author of nature, are in a peculiar manner 
 adapted to the circumstances of life in which he hath placed 
 us. This general observation, properly pursued, leads to 
 several important conclusions. The original internal constitu¬ 
 tion of man, compared with his external condition, enables us 
 to discern what course of action and behaviour that constitu¬ 
 tion leads to, what is our duty respecting that condition, and 
 furnishes us besides with the most powerful arguments to the 
 practice of it. 
 
 What the inward frame and constitution of man is, is a 
 question of fact; to be determined, as other facts are, from ex¬ 
 perience, from our internal feelings and external senses, and 
 from the testimony of others. Whether human nature, and 
 the circumstances in which it is placed, might not have been 
 ordered otherwise, is foreign to our inquiry, and none of our 
 concern : our province is, taking boih of these as they are, and 
 viewing the connexion between them, from that connexion to 
 discover, if we can, what course of action is fitted to that na¬ 
 ture and those circumstances. From contemplating the bodily 
 senses, and the organs or instruments adapted to them, we 
 learn that the eye was given to see with, the ear to hear with. 
 In like manner, from considering our inward perceptions and 
 
 t l Cor. xii. 8. u Serm. vi. 
 
 ANALOGY. 
 
 b 
 

 XV11I 
 
 PREFACE 
 
 the final causes of them, we collect that the feeling of shame, 
 for instance, was given to prevent the doing of things shameful ; 
 compassion, to carry us to relieve others in distress; anger, to 
 resist sudden violence offered to ourselves. If, continuing our 
 inquiries in this way, it should at length appear, that the na¬ 
 ture, the whole nature, of man leads him to and is fitted for 
 that particular course of behaviour which we usually distin¬ 
 guish bv the name of virtue, we are authorized to conclude, 
 that virtue is the law we are born under, that it was so intend¬ 
 ed by the Author of our being; and we are bound by the 
 most intimate of all obligations, a regard to our own highest 
 interest and happiness, to conform to it in all situations and 
 events. 
 
 Human nature is not simple and uniform, but made up of 
 several parts; and we can have no just idea of it as a system 
 or constitution, unless we take into our view the respects and 
 relations which these parts have to each other. As the body is 
 not one member, but many ; so our inward structure consists 
 of various instincts, appetites, and propensions. Thus far 
 there is no difference between human creatures and brutes. 
 Rut besides these common passions and affections, there is an¬ 
 other principle, peculiar to mankind, that of conscience, moral 
 sense, reflection, call it what you please, by which they are en¬ 
 abled to review their whole conduct, to approve of some ac¬ 
 tions in themselves, and to disapprove of others. That this 
 principle will of course have some influence on our behaviour, 
 at least at times, will hardly be disputed : but the particular 
 influence which it ought to have, the precise degree of power 
 in the regulating of our internal frame that is assigned it by 
 Him who placed it there, is a point of the utmost consequence 
 in itself, and on the determination of which the very hinge of 
 our Author’s Moral System turns. If the faculty here spoken 
 of be, indeed, what it is asserted to be, in nature and kind su - 
 perior to every other passion and affection ; if it be given, not 
 merely that it may exert its force occasionally, or as our pre¬ 
 sent humour or fancy may dispose us, but that it may at all 
 times exercise an uncontrollable authority and government over 
 all the rest; it will then follow, that, in order to complete the 
 idea of human nature, as a system, we must not only take in 
 
 
 
BY THE EDITOR. 
 
 xix 
 
 each particular bias, propension, instinct, which are seen to be¬ 
 long to it, but we must add besides the principle of conscience, 
 together with the subjection that is due to it from all the other 
 appetites and passions: just as the idea of a civil constitution 
 is formed, not barely from enumerating the several members 
 and ranks of which it is composed, but from these considered 
 as acting in various degrees of subordination to each other, and 
 all under the direction of the same supreme authority, whether 
 that authority be vested in one person or more. 
 
 The view here given of the internal constitution of man, 
 and of the supremacy of conscience, agreeably to the concep¬ 
 tions of Bishop Butler, enables us to comprehend the force of 
 that expression, common to him and the ancient moralists, that 
 virtue consists in following nature. The meaning cannot be, 
 that it consists in acting agreeably to that propensity of our 
 nature which happens to be the strongest; or which propels us 
 towards certain objects, without any regard lo the methods by 
 which they are to be obtained : but the meaning must be, that 
 virtue consists in the due regulation and subjection of all the 
 other appetites and affections to the superior faculty of con¬ 
 science ; from a conformity to which alone our actions are pro¬ 
 perly natural , or correspondent to the nature, to the whole 
 nature, of such an agent as man. From hence too it appears, 
 that the Author of our frame is by no means indifferent to vir¬ 
 tue and vice, or has left us at liberty to act at random, as 
 humour or appetite may prompt us; but that every man has 
 the rule of right within him ; a rule attended in the very no¬ 
 tion of it with authority, and such as has the force of a direc¬ 
 tion and a command from Him who made us what we are, 
 what course of behaviour is suited to our nature, and which he 
 expects that we should follow. This moral faculty implies also 
 a presentiment and apprehension, that the judgment which 
 passes on our actions, considered as of good or ill desert, will 
 hereafter be confirmed by the unerring judgment of God; 
 when virtue and happiness, vice and misery, whose ideas are 
 now so closely connected, shall be indissolubly united, and the 
 Divine government be found to correspond in the most exact 
 proportion to the nature he has given us. Lastly, this just 
 prerogative or supremacy of conscience it is, which Mr. Pope 
 
 b 2 
 
XX 
 
 PREFACE 
 
 has described in his Universal Prayer, though perhaps he may 
 have expressed it rather too strongly, where he says, 
 
 “ What conscience dictates to be done, 
 
 “ Or warns me not to do, 
 
 “ This teach me more than hell to shun, 
 
 “ That more than heaven pursue.” 
 
 The reader will observe, that this way of treating the sub¬ 
 ject of morals, by an appeal to facts, does not at all interfere 
 with that other way, adopted by Dr. Samuel Clarke and 
 others, which begins with inquiring into the relations and fit¬ 
 nesses ofi things, but rather illustrates and confirms it. I hat 
 there are essential differences in the qualities of human actions, 
 established by nature, and that this natural difference of 
 things, prior to and independent of all will , creates a natural 
 fitness in the agent to act agreeably to it, seems as little to be 
 denied, as that there is the moral difference before explained, 
 from which we approve and feel a pleasure in what is right, 
 and conceive a distaste to what is wrong. Still, however, 
 when we are endeavouring to establish either this moral or that 
 natural difference, it ought never to be forgotten, or rather it 
 will require to be distinctly shewn, that both of these, when 
 traced up to their source, suppose an intelligent Author of na¬ 
 ture and moral Ruler of the world ; who originally appointed 
 these differences, and by such an appointment has signified his 
 will that we should conform to them, as the only effectual 
 method of securing our happiness on the whole under his go¬ 
 vernment*. And of this consideration our Prelate himself was 
 not unmindful; as may be collected from many expressions in 
 different parts of his writings, and particularly from the fol¬ 
 lowing passages in his eleventh Sermon. “It may be allowed, 
 44 without any prejudice to the cause of virtue and religion, 
 44 that our ideas of happiness and misery are of all our ideas 
 44 the nearest and most important to us; that they will, nay, if 
 44 you please, that they ought to prevail over those of order, 
 44 and beauty, and harmony, and proportion, if there should 
 44 ever be, as it is impossible there ever should be, any incon- 
 44 sistence between them.” And again, 44 Though virtue or 
 
 o 7 o 
 
 44 moral rectitude does indeed consist in affection to and pur- 
 x See note E, at the end of this Preface. 
 
BY THE EDITOR. 
 
 xxi 
 
 u suit of what is right and good, as such ; yet, when we sit 
 “ down in a cool hour, we can neither justify to ourselves this 
 “ or any other pursuit, till we are convinced that it will be for 
 “ our happiness, or at least not contrary to it.y." 1 
 
 Besides the general system of morality opened above, our 
 Author in his volume of Sermons has stated with accuracy the 
 difference between self-love and benevolence in opposition to 
 those who, on the one hand, make the whole of virtue to con¬ 
 sist in benevolence 2 , and to those who, on the other, assert that 
 every particular affection and action is resolvable into self-love. 
 In combating these opinions, he has shewn, I think unanswer¬ 
 ably, that there are the same kind of indications in human na¬ 
 ture, that we were made to promote the happiness of others, as 
 that we were made to promote our own : that it is no just ob¬ 
 jection to this, that we have dispositions to do evil to others as 
 well as good ; for we have also dispositions to do evil as well 
 as good to ourselves , to our own most important interests even 
 in this life, for the sake of gratifying a present passion : that 
 the thing to be lamented is, not that men have too great a re¬ 
 gard to their own real good, but that they have not enough : 
 that benevolence is not more at variance with or unfriendly to 
 self-love, than any other particular affection is : and that by 
 consulting the happiness of others a man is so far from lessen¬ 
 ing his own, that the very endeavour to do so, though he 
 should fail in the accomplishment, is a source of the highest 
 satisfaction and peace of mind a . He has also, in passing, ani¬ 
 madverted on the philosopher of Malmsbury, who in his book 
 “ Of Human Nature" 1 has advanced, as discoveries in moral 
 science, that benevolence is only the Jove of power, and com¬ 
 passion the fear of future calamity to ourselves. And this our 
 Author has done, not so much with the design of exposing 
 the false reasoning of Mr. Hobbes, but because on so perverse 
 an account of human nature he has raised a system, subversive 
 of all justice and honesty b . 
 
 II. The religious system of Bishop Butler is chiefly to be 
 
 y Serin, xi. 
 
 z See the second Dissertation 44 On the Nature of Virtue,” at the end of the 
 Analogy. 
 
 a See Serni. i. and xi. and the preface to the volume of Sermons. 
 
 b See the Notes to Serin, i. and v. 
 
XXII 
 
 PREFACE 
 
 collected from the treatise, intitled, “ The Analogy of Reli- 
 " gion, Natural and Revealed, to the Constitution and Course 
 “ of Nature.” 
 
 66 All things are double one against another, and God hath 
 “ made nothing imperfect 0 .” On this single observation of the 
 Son of Sirach, the whole fabric of our Prelate’s defence of reli¬ 
 gion, in his Analogy, is raised. Instead of indulging to idle 
 speculations, how the world might possibly have been better 
 than it is; or, forgetful of the difference between hypothesis 
 and fact, attempting to explain the Divine economy with re¬ 
 spect to intelligent creatures, from preconceived notions of his 
 own ; he first inquires what the constitution of nature, as made 
 known to us in the way of experiment, actually is; and from 
 this, now seen and acknowledged, he endeavours to form a 
 judgment of that larger constitution, which religion discovers 
 to us. If the dispensation of Providence we are now under, 
 considered as inhabitants of this world, and having a temporal 
 interest to secure in it, be found, on examination, to be analo¬ 
 gous to, and of a piece with, that further dispensation, which 
 relates to us as designed for another world, in which we have 
 an eternal interest, depending on our behaviour here ; if both 
 may be traced up to the same general laws, and appear to be 
 carried on according to the same plan of administration ; the 
 fair presumption is, that both proceed from one and the same 
 Author. And if the principal parts objected to in this latter 
 dispensation be similar to and of the same kind with what we 
 certainly experience under the former; the objections, being 
 clearly inconclusive in one case, because contradicted by plain 
 fact, must, in all reason, be allowed to be inconclusive also in 
 the other. 
 
 This way of arguing from what is acknowledged to what is 
 disputed, from things known to other things that resemble 
 them, from that part of the Divine establishment which is ex¬ 
 posed to our view to that more important one which lies beyond 
 it, is on all hands confessed to be just. By this method Sir 
 Isaac Newton has unfolded the system of nature; by the same 
 method Bishop Butler has explained the system of grace; and 
 thus, to use the words of a writer, whom I quote with plea- 
 
 c Ecclus. xlii. 24. 
 
BY THE EDITOR. xxiii 
 
 sure, “ has formed and concluded a happv alliance between 
 “ faith and philosophy d .” 
 
 And although the argument from analogy be allowed to be 
 imperfect, and by no means sufficient to solve all difficulties re¬ 
 specting the government of God, and the designs of his provi¬ 
 dence with regard to mankind ; (a degree of knowledge, which 
 we are not furnished with faculties for attaining, at least in the 
 present state;) yet surely it is of importance to learn from it, 
 that the natural and moral world are intimately connected, and 
 parts of one stupendous whole or system; and that the chief 
 objections which are brought against religion may be urged 
 with equal force against the constitution and course of nature* 
 where they are certainly false in fact. And this information 
 we may derive from the work before us ; the proper design of 
 which, it may be of use to observe, is not to prove the truth of 
 religion, either natural or revealed, but to confirm that proof, 
 already known, by considerations from analogy. 
 
 After this account of the method of reasoning employed by 
 our Author, let us now advert to his manner of applying it, 
 first to the subject of Natural Religion, and secondly to that of 
 Revealed. 
 
 1. The foundation of all our hopes and fears is a future life; 
 and with this the treatise begins. Neither the reason of the 
 thing, nor the analogy of nature, according to Bishop Butler, 
 give ground for imagining, that the unknown event, death, will 
 be our destruction. The states in which we have formerly 
 existed, in the womb and in infancy, are not more different 
 from each other than from that of mature age in which we now 
 exist: therefore, that we shall continue to exist hereafter, in a 
 state as different from the present as the present is from those 
 through which we have passed already, is a presumption fa¬ 
 voured by the analogy of nature. All that we know from 
 reason concerning death, is the effects it has upon animal 
 bodies: and the frequent instances among men of the intellec¬ 
 tual powers continuing in high health and vigour, at the very 
 time when a mortal disease is on the point of putting an end to 
 all the powers of sensation, induce us to hope that it may have 
 no effect at all on the human soul, not even so much as to sus- 
 
 d 31 r. Maimvaiing’s Dissertation, prefixed to liis volume of Sermons. 
 
XXIV 
 
 PREFACE 
 
 pend the exercise of its faculties ; though, if it have, the sus¬ 
 pension of a power by no means implies its extinction, as sleep 
 or a swoon may convince us e . 
 
 The probability of a future state once granted, an important 
 question arises, How best to secure our interest in that state. 
 We find from what passes daily before us, that the constitution 
 of nature admits of misery as well as happiness; that both of 
 these arc the consequences of our own actions; and these con¬ 
 sequences we are enabled to foresee. Therefore, that our hap¬ 
 piness or misery in a future world may depend on our own 
 actions also, and that rewards and punishments hereafter may 
 follow our good or ill behaviour here, is but an appointment of 
 the same sort with what we experience under the Divine 
 government, according to the regular course of nature f . 
 
 This supposition is confirmed from another circumstance, 
 that the natural government of God, under which we now live, 
 is also moral ; in which rewards and punishments are the conse¬ 
 quences of actions, considered as virtuous and vicious. Not 
 that every man is rewarded or punished here in exact propor¬ 
 tion to his desert; for the essential tendencies of virtue and 
 vice, to produce happiness and the contrary, are often hin¬ 
 dered from taking effect from accidental causes. However, 
 there are plainly the rudiments and beginnings of a righteous 
 administration to be discerned in the constitution of nature; 
 from whence we are led to expect, that these accidental hin- 
 derances will one day be removed, and the rule of distributive 
 justice obtain completely in a more perfect state". 
 
 The moral government of God, thus established, implies in 
 the notion of it some sort of trial, or a moral possibility of act¬ 
 ing wrong as well as right, in those who are the subjects of it. 
 And the doctrine of religion, that the present life is in fact a 
 state of probation for a future one, is rendered credible, from 
 its being analogous throughout to the general conduct of Pro¬ 
 vidence towards us with respect to this world ; in which pru¬ 
 dence is necessary to secure our temporal interest, just as we 
 are taught that virtue is necessary to secure our eternal interest; 
 and both are trusted to ourselves h . 
 
 But the present life is not merely a state of probation, im- 
 
 c Part I. ohap. i. f Chap. ii. pr Chap. iii. 
 
 X X 'v 'N \ \ \ \ \ \ \ X X \ x XXX \ 
 
 h Chap. iv. 
 
13Y THE EDITOR. 
 
 xxv 
 
 plying in it difficulties and danger ; it is also a state of disci¬ 
 pline and improvement; and that both in our temporal and 
 religious capacity. Thus childhood is a state of discipline for 
 youth ; youth for manhood ; and that for old age. Strength 
 of body, and maturity of understanding, are acquired by de¬ 
 grees ; and neither of them without continual exercise and atten¬ 
 tion on our part, not only in the beginning of life, but through 
 the whole course of it. So again with respect to our religious 
 concerns, the present world is fitted to be, and to good men is 
 in event, a state of discipline and improvement for a future 
 one. The several passions and propensions implanted in our 
 hearts incline us, in a multitude of instances, to forbidden 
 pleasures : this inward infirmity is increased by various snares 
 and temptations, perpetually occurring from without: hence 
 arises the necessity of recollection and self-government, of 
 withstanding the calls of appetite, and forming our minds to 
 habits of piety and virtue; habits, of which we are capable, 
 and which, to creatures in a state of moral imperfection, and 
 fallen from their original integrity, must be of the greatest 
 use, as an additional security, over and above the principle of 
 conscience, from the dangers to which we are exposed'. 
 
 Nor is the credibility here given, bv the analogy of nature, 
 to the general doctrine of religion, destroyed or weakened by 
 any notions concerning necessity. Of itself it is a mere word, 
 the sign of an abstract idea; and as much requires an agent, 
 that is, a necessary agent, in order to effect any thing, as free¬ 
 dom requires a free agent. Admitting it to be speculatively 
 true, if considered as influencing practice, it is the same as 
 false: for it is matter of experience, that, with regard to our 
 present interest, and as inhabitants of this world, we are treated 
 as if we were free ; and therefore the analogy of nature leads 
 us to conclude, that, with regard to our future interest, and as 
 designed for another world, we shall be treated as free also. 
 Nor does the opinion of necessity, supposing it possible, at all af¬ 
 fect either the general proof of religion, or its external evidenced 
 
 Still objections may be made against the wisdom and good¬ 
 ness of the Divine government, to which analogy, which can 
 only shew the truth or credibility of facts, affords no answer. 
 
 i Part I. chap. v. 
 
 k Chap. vi. 
 
XXVI 
 
 PREFACE 
 
 Yet even here analogy is of use, if it suggest that the Divine 
 government is a scheme or system, and not a number of un¬ 
 connected acts, and that this system is also above our compre¬ 
 hension. Now the government of the natural world appears to 
 be a system of this kind ; with parts, related to each other, 
 and together composing a whole : in which system, ends are 
 brought about by the use of means, many of which means, be¬ 
 fore experience, would have been suspected to have had a quite 
 contrary tendency ; which is carried on by general laws, simi¬ 
 lar causes uniformly producing similar effects : the utility of 
 which general laws, and the inconveniences which would pro¬ 
 bably arise from the occasional or even secret suspension of 
 them, we are in some sort enabled to discern 1 ; but of the 
 whole we are incompetent judges, because of the small part 
 which comes within our view. Reasoning then from what we 
 know, it is highly credible, that the government of the moral 
 world is a system also, carried on by general laws, and in 
 which ends are accomplished by the intervention of means ; and 
 that both constitutions, the natural and the moral, are so con¬ 
 nected, as to form together but one scheme. But of this 
 scheme, as of that of the natural world taken alone, we are not 
 qualified to judge, on account of the mutual respect of the 
 several parts to each other and to the whole, and our own in¬ 
 capacity to survey the whole, or, with accuracy, any single 
 part. All objections therefore to the wisdom and goodness of 
 the Divine government may be founded merely on our igno¬ 
 rance 111 ; and to such objections our ignorance is the proper, 
 and a satisfactory answer n . 
 
 2. The chief difficulties concerning Natural Religion being 
 now removed, our Author proceeds, in the next place, to that 
 which is Revealed ; and as an introduction to an inquiry into 
 the Credibility of Christianity, begins with the consideration of 
 its Importance. 
 
 The Importance of Christianity appears in two respects. 
 First, in its being a republication of Natural Religion, in its 
 native simplicity, with authority, and with circumstances of ad¬ 
 vantage ; ascertaining, in many instances of moment, what be- 
 
 1 See a Treatise on Divine Benevolence, by Dr. Thomas Balgny, part ii. 
 m See note F, at the end of this Preface. n Part I. chap. vii. 
 
 
BY THE EDITOR. 
 
 XXVll 
 
 fore was only probable, and particularly confirming the doctrine 
 of a future state of rewards and punishments 0 . Secondly, as 
 revealing a new dispensation of Providence, originating from 
 the pure love and mercy of God, and conducted by the medi¬ 
 ation of his Son, and the guidance of his Spirit, for the reco¬ 
 very and salvation of mankind, represented in a state of apo¬ 
 stasy and ruin. This account of Christianity being admitted to 
 be just, and the distinct offices of these three Divine persons 
 being once discovered to us, we are as much obliged in point of 
 duty to acknowledge the relations we stand in to the Son and 
 Holy Ghost, as our Mediator and Sanctifier, as we are obliged 
 in point of duty to acknowledge the relation we stand in to 
 God the Father; although the two former of these relations be 
 learnt from Revelation only, and in the last we are instructed 
 by the light of nature ; the obligation in either case arising 
 from the offices themselves, and not at all depending on the 
 manner in which they are made known to usP. 
 
 The presumptions against Revelation in general are, that it 
 is not discoverable by reason, that it is unlike to what is so dis¬ 
 covered, and that it was introduced and supported by miracles. 
 But in a scheme so large as that of the universe, unbounded in 
 extent and everlasting in duration, there must of necessity be 
 numberless circumstances which are beyond the reach of our 
 faculties to discern, and which can only be known by Divine 
 illumination. And both in the natural and moral government 
 of the world, under which we live, we find many things unlike 
 one to another, and therefore ought not to wonder if the same 
 unlikeness obtain between things visible and invisible ; although 
 it be far from true, that revealed religion is entirely unlike the 
 constitution of nature, as analogy may teach us. Nor is there 
 any thing incredible in Revelation, considered as miraculous; 
 whether miracles be supposed to have been performed at the 
 beginning of the world, or after a course of nature has been 
 established. Not at the beginning of the world; for then 
 there was either no course of nature at all, or a power must 
 have been exerted totally different from what that course is at 
 present: all men and animals cannot have been born, as they 
 are now ; but a pair of each sort must have been produced at 
 
 o See note G, at the end of this Preface. 
 
 P Part II. chap. i. 
 
xxviii PREFACE 
 
 first, in a way altogether unlike to that in which they have 
 been since produced ; unless we affirm, that men and animals 
 have existed from eternity in an endless succession : one mira¬ 
 cle therefore at least there must have been at the beginning of 
 the world, or at the time of man’s creation. Not after the set¬ 
 tlement of a course of nature, on account of miracles being con¬ 
 trary to that course, or, in other words,contrary to experience; 
 for, in order to know whether miracles, worked in attestation 
 of a Divine religion, be contrary to experience or not, we ought 
 to be acquainted with other cases, similar or parallel to those, 
 in which miracles are alleged to have been wrought. Rut 
 where shall we find such similar or parallel cases? The world 
 which we inhabit affords none : we know of no extraordinary 
 revelations from God to man, but those recorded in the Old 
 and New Testament; all of which were established by mira¬ 
 cles : it cannot therefore be said, that miracles are incredible, 
 because contrary to experience, when all the experience we 
 have is in favour of miracles, and on the side of religion*!. Re¬ 
 sides, in reasoning concerning miracles, they ought not to be 
 compared with common natural events, but with uncommon 
 appearances, such as comets, magnetism, electricity ; which, to 
 one acquainted only with the usual phenomena of nature, and 
 the common powers of matter, must, before proof of their 
 actual existence, be thought incredible r . 
 
 The presumptions against Revelation in general being dis¬ 
 patched, objections against the Christian Revelation in parti¬ 
 cular, against the scheme of it, as distinguished from objections 
 against its evidence, are considered next. Now, supposing a 
 revelation to be really given, it is highly probable beforehand, 
 that it must contain many things appearing to us liable to ob¬ 
 jections. The acknowledged dispensation of nature is very 
 different from what we should have expected : reasoning then 
 from analogy, the revealed dispensation, it is credible, would 
 be also different. Nor are we in any sort judges at what time, 
 or in what degree, or manner, it is fit or expedient for God to 
 instruct us, in things confessedly of the greatest use, either by 
 natural reason, or by supernatural information. Thus, ar¬ 
 guing on speculation only, and without experience, it would 
 
 q See note H, at the end of this Preface. r Chap. ii. 
 
 
 \ \ \ \ \ \. \ 
 
BY THE EDITOR. 
 
 XXIX 
 
 seem very unlikely that so important a remedy as that pro¬ 
 vided by Christianity, for the recovery of mankind from a 
 state of ruin, should have been for so many ages withheld; 
 and, when at last vouchsafed, should be imparted to so few ; 
 and, after it has been imparted, should be attended with ob¬ 
 scurity and doubt. And just so we might have argued, before 
 experience, concerning the remedies provided in nature for 
 bodily diseases, to which bv nature we are exposed : for many 
 of these were unknown to mankind for a number of ages ; are 
 known but to few now ; some important ones probably not 
 discovered yet; and those which are, neither certain in their 
 application, nor universal in their use: and the same mode of 
 reasoning that would lead us to expect they should have been 
 so, would lead us to expect that the necessity of them should 
 have been superseded, by there being no diseases; as the ne¬ 
 cessity of the Christian scheme, it may be thought, might also 
 have been superseded, by preventing the fall of man, so that 
 he should not have stood in need of a Redeemer at all 3 . 
 
 As to objections against the wisdom and goodness of Christ¬ 
 ianity, the same answer may be applied to them as was to the 
 like objections against the constitution of nature. For here 
 also, Christianity is a scheme or economy, composed of various 
 parts, forming a whole; in which scheme means are used for 
 the accomplishing of ends; and which is conducted by general 
 laws, of all of which we know as little as we do of the constitu¬ 
 tion of nature. And the seeming want of wisdom or good- 
 ness in this system is to be ascribed to the same cause, as the 
 like appearances of defects in the natural system; our inability 
 to discern the whole scheme, and our ignorance of the relation 
 of those parts which are discernible to others beyond our view. 
 
 The objections against Christianity as a matter of fact, and 
 against the wisdom and goodness of it, having been obviated 
 together, the chief of them are now to be considered distinctly. 
 One of these, which is levelled against the entire system itself, 
 is of this sort: the restoration of mankind, represented in 
 Scripture as the great design of the Gospel, is described as re¬ 
 quiring a long series of means, and persons, and dispensations, 
 before it can be brought to its completion ; whereas the whole 
 
 s Chap. iii. 
 

 xxx PREFACE 
 
 ought to have been effected at once. Now every thing we see 
 in the course of nature shews the folly of this objection. For 
 in the natural course of Providence, ends are brought about 
 by means, not operating immediately and at once, but delibe¬ 
 rately and in a way of progression ; one thing being subser¬ 
 vient to another, this to somewhat further. The change of 
 seasons, the ripening of fruits, the growth of vegetable and 
 animal bodies, are instances of this. And therefore, that the 
 same progressive method should be followed in* the dispensa¬ 
 tion of Christianity, as is observed in the common dispensation 
 of Providence, is a reasonable expectation, justified by the 
 analogy of nature 1 . 
 
 Another circumstance objected to in the Christian scheme is 
 the appointment of a Mediator, and the saving of the world 
 through him. But the visible government of God being ac¬ 
 tually administered in this way, or by the mediation and in¬ 
 strumentality of others, there can be no general presumption 
 against an appointment of this kind, against his invisible govern¬ 
 ment being exercised in the same manner. We have seen 
 already, that with regard to ourselves this visible government 
 is carried on by rewards and punishments; for happiness and 
 misery are the consequences of our own actions, considered as 
 virtuous and vicious; and these consequences we are enabled 
 to foresee. It might have been imagined, before consulting 
 experience, that after we had rendered ourselves liable to misery 
 by our own ill conduct, sorrow for what was past, and behaving 
 well for the future, would, alone and of themselves, have ex¬ 
 empted us from deserved punishment, and restored us to the 
 Divine favour. But the fact is otherwise; and real reforma¬ 
 tion is often found to be of no avail, so as to secure the crimi¬ 
 nal from poverty, sickness, infamy, and death, the never-fail¬ 
 ing attendants on vice and extravagance, exceeding a certain 
 degree. By the course of nature then it appears, God does 
 not always pardon a sinner on his repentance. Yet there is 
 provision made, even in nature, that the miseries, which men 
 bring on themselves by unlawful indulgences, may in many 
 cases be mitigated, and in some removed ; partly by extraordi¬ 
 nary exertions of the offender himself, but more especially and 
 
 t Chap. iv. 
 
BY THE EDITOR. 
 
 XXXI 
 
 frequently by the intervention of others, who voluntarily, and 
 from motives of compassion, submit to labour and sorrow, such 
 as produce long and lasting inconveniences to themselves, as 
 the means of rescuing another from the wretched effects of 
 former imprudences. Vicarious punishment, therefore, or one 
 person’s sufferings contributing to the relief of another, is a 
 providential disposition in the economy of nature u : and it 
 ought not to be matter of surprise, if by a method analogous 
 to this we be redeemed from sin and misery, in the economy of 
 grace. That mankind at present are in a state of degradation, 
 different from that in which they were originally created, is the 
 very ground of the Christian revelation, as contained in the 
 Scriptures. \Y hether we acquiesce in the account, that our 
 being placed in such a state is owing to the crime of our first 
 parents, or choose to ascribe it to any other cause, it makes no 
 difference as to our condition : the vice and unhappiness of the 
 world are still there, notwithstanding all our suppositions; nor 
 is it Christianity that hath put us into this state. We learn 
 also from the same Scriptures, what experience and the use of 
 expiatory sacrifices from the most early times might have 
 taught us, that repentance alone is not sufficient to prevent the 
 fatal consequences of past transgressions: but that stili there is 
 room for mercy, and that repentance shall be available, though 
 not of itself, yet through the mediation of a Divine person, the 
 Messiah ; who, from the sublimest principles of compassion, 
 when we were dead in trespasses and sins x , suffered and died, 
 the innocent for the guilty, the just for the unjust that we 
 might have redemption through his blood , even the forgiveness 
 of sins z . In what way the death of Christ was of that efficacy 
 it is said to be, in procuring the reconciliation of sinners, the 
 Scriptures have not explained : it is enough that the doctrine 
 is revealed ; that it is not contrary to any truths which reason 
 and experience teach us; and that it accords in perfect har¬ 
 mony with the usual method of the Divine conduct in the 
 government of the world a . 
 
 Again it hath been said, that if the Christian revelation were 
 true, it must have been universal, and could not have been left 
 
 u See note 1 , at the end of this Preface, 
 y i Pet. iii. 18. z Coloss. i. 14. 
 
 x Ephes. ii. 1. 
 1 Chap. v. 
 
XX X11 
 
 PREFACE 
 
 upon doubtful evidence. Rut God, in his natural providence, 
 dispenses his gifts in great variety, not only among creatures 
 of the same species, but to the same individuals also at dif¬ 
 ferent times. Had the Christian revelation been universal at 
 first, yet, from the diversity of men’s abilities, both of mind 
 and body, their various means of improvement, and other ex¬ 
 ternal advantages, some persons must soon have been in a 
 situation, with respect to religious knowledge, much superior 
 to that of others, as much perhaps as they are at present : and 
 all men will be equitably dealt with at last ; and to whom little 
 is given, of him little will be required. Then as to the evi¬ 
 dence for religion being left doubtful, difficulties of this sort, 
 like difficulties in practice, afford scope and opportunity for a 
 virtuous exercise of the understanding, and dispose the mind 
 to acquiesce and rest satisfied with any evidence that is real. 
 In the daily commerce of life, men are obliged to act upon 
 great uncertainties, with regard to success in their temporal 
 pursuits; and the case with regard to religion is parallel. 
 However, though religion be not intuitively true, the proofs of 
 it which we have are amply sufficient in reason to induce us to 
 embrace it; and dissatisfaction with those proofs may possibly 
 be men’s own fault b . 
 
 Nothing remains but to attend to the positive evidence there 
 is for the truth of Christianity. Now, besides its direct and 
 fundamental proofs, which are miracles and prophecies, there 
 are many collateral circumstances, which may be united into 
 one view, and all together may be considered as making up 
 one argument. In this way of treating the subject, the revela¬ 
 tion, whether real or otherwise, may be supposed to be wholly 
 historical: the general design of which appears to be, to give 
 an account of the condition of religion, and its professors, with 
 a concise narration of the political state of things, as far as re¬ 
 ligion is affected by it, during a great length of time, near six 
 thousand years of which are already past. More particularly 
 it comprehends an account of God’s entering into covenant 
 with one nation, the Jews, that he would be their God, and 
 that they should be his people ; of his often interposing in their 
 affairs; giving them the promise,and afterwards the possession, 
 
 b Chap. vi. 
 
BY THE EDITOR. xxxiii 
 
 of a flourishing country; assuring them of the greatest national 
 prosperity, in case of their obedience, and threatening the se- 
 v eiest national punishment, in case they forsook him, and 
 joined in the idolatry of their Pagan neighbours. It contains 
 also a prediction of a particular person to appear in the fulness 
 of time, in whom all the promises of God to the Jews were to 
 be fulfilled : and it relates, that, at the time expected, a person 
 did actually appear, assuming to be the Saviour foretold ; that 
 he worked various miracles among them, in confirmation of his 
 Divine authority; and, as was foretold also, was rejected and 
 put to death by the very people who had long desired and 
 waited for his coming; but that his religion, in spite of all 
 opposition, was established in the world by his disciples, in¬ 
 vested with supernatural powers for that purpose; of the fate 
 and fortunes of which religion there is a prophetical descrip¬ 
 tion, carried down to the end of time. Let any one now, after 
 reading the above history, and not knowing whether the whole 
 were not a fiction, be supposed to ask, Whether all that is 
 here related be true ? and instead of a direct answer, let him be 
 informed of the several acknowledged facts, which are found to 
 correspond to it in real life ; and then let him compare the 
 history and facts together, and observe the astonishing coinci¬ 
 dence of both : such a joint review must appear to him of very 
 great weight, and to amount to evidence somewhat more than 
 human. And unless the whole series, and every particular cir¬ 
 cumstance contained in it, can be thought to have arisen from 
 accident, the truth of Christianity is proved e . 
 
 c Chap. vii. To the Analogy are subjoined two Dissertations, both originally 
 inserted in the body of the work. One on Personal Identity, in which are con¬ 
 tained some strictures on Mr. Locke, who asserts that consciousness makes or con¬ 
 stitutes personal identity; whereas, as our Author observes, consciousness makes 
 only personality, or is necessary to the idea of a person, i. e. a thinking intelligent 
 being, but presupposes, and therefore cannot constitute, personal identity ; just as 
 knowledge presupposes truth, but does not constitute it. Consciousness of past 
 actions does indeed shew us the indentity of ourselves, or gives us a certain as¬ 
 surance that we are the same persons or living agents now, which we were at the 
 time to which our remembrance can look back : but still we should be the same 
 persons as we were, though this consciousness of what is past were wanting, 
 though all that had been done by us formerly were forgotten ; unless it be true, 
 that no person has existed a single moment beyond what he can remember. The 
 other Dissertation is On the Nature of Virtue , which properly belongs to the 
 moral system of our Author, already explained. 
 
 ANALOGY. C 
 
XXXIV 
 
 PREFACE BY THE EDITOR. 
 
 The view here given of the moral and religious systems of 
 Bishop Butler, it will immediately be perceived, is chiefly in¬ 
 tended for younger students, especially for students in Divi¬ 
 nity ; to whom it is hoped it may be of use, so as to encourage 
 them to peruse, with proper diligence, the original works of 
 the Author himself. For it may be necessary to observe, that 
 neither of the volumes of this excellent Prelate are addressed 
 to those who read for amusement, or curiosity, or to get rid of 
 time. All subjects are not to be comprehended with the same 
 ease; and morality and religion, when treated as sciences, each 
 accompanied with difficulties of its own, can neither of them 
 be understood as they ought, without a very peculiar atten¬ 
 tion. But morality and religion are not merely to be studied 
 as sciences, or as being speculatively true; they are to be re¬ 
 garded in another and higher light, as a rule of life and 
 manners, as containing authoritative directions by which to re¬ 
 gulate our faith and practice. And in this view, the infinite 
 importance of them considered, it can never be an indifferent 
 matter whether they be received or rejected. For both claim 
 to be the voice of God ; and whether they be so or not, cannot 
 be known, till their claims be impartially examined. If they 
 indeed come from Him, we are bound to conform to them at 
 our peril: nor is it left to our choice, whether we will submit 
 to the obligations they impose upon us or not; for submit to 
 them we must, in such a sense, as to incur the punishments 
 denounced by both against wilful disobedience to their in¬ 
 junctions. 
 
NOTES TO THE 
 
 PREFACE 
 
 BV 
 
 THE EDITOR. 
 
 Page ix. A. 
 
 D R. BUTLER, when Bishop of Bristol, put up a cross, a plain 
 piece of marble inlaid, in the chapel of his episcopal house. 
 This, which was intended by the blameless Prelate merely as a sign 
 or memorial, that true Christians are to bear their cross, and not to 
 be ashamed of following a crucified Master, was considered as af¬ 
 fording a presumption that he was secretly inclined to Popish forms 
 and ceremonies, and had no great dislike to Popery itself. And, on 
 account of the offence it occasioned, both at the time and since, it 
 were to be wished, in prudence, it had not been done. 
 
 Page xii. B. 
 
 Many of the sentiments, in these Two Discourses of Bishop 
 Butler, concerning the sovereign good of man; the impossibility of 
 procuring it in the present life ; the unsatisfactoriness of earthly 
 enjoyments; together with the somewhat beyond and above them 
 all, which once attained, there will rest nothing further to be wished 
 or hoped ; and which is then only to be expected, when we shall 
 have put off this mortal body, and our union with Ciod shall be 
 complete ; occur in Hooker s Ecclesiastical Polity , book I. §. 1 1 . 
 
 Page xv. C. 
 
 When the first edition of this Preface was published, I had in 
 vain endeavoured to procure a sight of the papers, in which Bishop 
 Butler was accused of having died a Papist, and Archbishop 
 
 c 2 
 

 XXXVI 
 
 NOTES TO THE PREFACE 
 
 Seeker’s replies to them ; though I well remembered to have read 
 both, when they first appeared in the public prints. But a learned 
 Professor in the University of Oxford has furnished me with the 
 whole controversy in its original form; a brief history of which it 
 may not be unacceptable to offer here to the curious reader. 
 
 The attack was opened in the year 1767> i n an anonymous 
 pamphlet, entitled, “ The Root of Protestant Errors examined; 
 in which the author asserted, that, “ by an anecdote lately given 
 “ him, that same Prelate’* (who at the bottom of the page is called 
 
 B_p of D—m) “ is said to have died in the communion of a 
 
 “ Church, that makes much use of saints, saints’ days, and all the 
 “ trumpery of saint worship.” When this remarkable fact, now 
 first divulged, came to be generally known, it occasioned, as might 
 be expected, no little alarm ; and intelligence of it was no sooner 
 conveyed to Archbishop Seeker, than in a short letter, signed Mi - 
 sopseudes , and printed in the St. James’s Chronicle of May 9, he 
 called upon the writer to produce his authority for publishing “ so 
 ** gross and scandalous a falsehood.” To this challenge an imme¬ 
 diate answer was returned by the author of the pamphlet, who, 
 now assuming the name of Philcleutheros , informed Misopseudes , 
 through the channel of the same paper, that “ such anecdote had 
 “ been given him ; and that he was yet of opinion that there was 
 “ nothing improbable in it, when it is considered that the same 
 “ Prelate put up the Popish insignia of the cross in his chapel, 
 “ when at Bristol; and in his last Episcopal Charge has squinted 
 “ very much towards that superstition.” Here we find the accu¬ 
 sation not only repeated, but supported by reasons, such as they 
 are, of which it seemed necessary that some notice should be taken : 
 nor did the Archbishop conceive it unbecoming his own dignity to 
 stand up on this occasion, as the vindicator of innocence against 
 the calumniator of the helpless dead. Accordingly, in a second 
 letter in the same newspaper of May 23, and subscribed Mi¬ 
 sopseudes as before ; after reciting from Bishop Butler’s Sermon 
 before the Lords the very passage here printed in the Preface, and 
 observing, that “ there are, in the same Sermon, declarations as 
 “ strong as can be made against temporal punishments for heresy, 
 “ schism, or even for idolatry;” his Grace expresses himself thus : 
 “ Now he” (Bishop Butler) “ was universally esteemed, throughout 
 “ his life, a man of strict piety and honesty, as well as uncommon 
 “ abilities. He gave all the proofs, public and private, which his 
 “ station led him to give, and they were decisive and daily, of his 
 “ continuing to the last a sincere member of the Church of England. 
 
 
BY THE EDITOR. 
 
 XXXVll 
 
 “Nor had ever any of his acquaintance, or most intimate friends, 
 " nor have they to this day, the least doubt of it.” As to putting 
 up a cross in his chapel, the Archbishop frankly owns, that for 
 himself he wishes he had not; and thinks that in so doing the 
 Bishop did amiss. But then he asks, “ Can that be opposed, as 
 “ any proof of Popery, to all the evidence on the other side ; or 
 “ even to the single evidence of the above mentioned Sermon ? 
 “ Most of our churches have crosses upon them: are they there- 
 “ fore Popish churches ? The Lutherans have more than crosses 
 “ in theirs: are the Lutherans therefore Papists ?” And as to the 
 Charge, no Papist, his Grace remarks, would have spoken as Bishop 
 Butler there does, of the observances peculiar to Roman Catholics, 
 some of which he expressly censures as wrong and superstitious, 
 and others, as made subservient to the purposes of superstition, 
 and, on these accounts, abolished at the Reformation. After the 
 publication of this letter, Phileleutheros replied in a short defence 
 of his own conduct, but without producing any thing new in con¬ 
 firmation of what he had advanced. And here the controversy, so 
 far as the two principles were concerned, seems to have ended. 
 
 But the dispute was not suffered to die away quite so soon. For 
 in the same year, and in the same newspaper of July 21, another 
 letter appeared; in which the author not only contended that the 
 cross in the Episcopal chapel at Bristol, and the Charge to the 
 Clergy of Durham in 1751, amount to full proof of a strong at¬ 
 tachment to the idolatrous communion of the Church of Rome, 
 but, with the reader’s leave, he would fain account for the Bishop’s 
 ** tendency this way.” And this he attempted to do, “ from the 
 " natural melancholy and gloominess of Dr. Butler’s disposition; 
 “ from his great fondness for the lives of Romish saints, and their 
 “ books of mystic piety; from his drawing his notions of teaching 
 “ men religion, not from the New Testament, but from philoso- 
 " phical and political opinions of his own ; and above all, from his 
 “ transition from a strict Dissenter amongst the Presbyterians to 
 “ a rigid Churchman, and his sudden and unexpected elevation to 
 “ great wealth and dignity in the Church.” The attack, thus re¬ 
 newed, excited the Archbishop’s attention a second time, and drew 
 from him a fresh answer, subscribed also Misopseudes, in the St. 
 James’s Chronicle of August 4. In this letter, our excellent Me¬ 
 tropolitan, first of all obliquely hinting at the unfairness of sitting 
 in judgment on the character of a man who had been dead fifteen 
 years ; and then reminding his correspondent, that “ full proof had 
 “ been already published, that Bishop Butler abhorred Popery as 
 
' < 
 
 s/V^N/X/N/X/X/—X y s' S S s' s' s' 
 
 xxxviii NOTES TO THE PREFACE 
 
 “ a vile corruption of Christianity, and that it might be proved, if 
 “ needful, that he held the Pope to be Antichrist;” (to which de¬ 
 cisive testimonies of undoubted aversion from the Romish Church, 
 another is also added in the Postscript, his taking, when promoted 
 to the see of Durham, for his domestic Chaplain, Dr. Nath. Forster, 
 who had published, not four years before, a Sermon, entitled, 
 Popery destructive of the Evidence of Christianity ;) proceeds to 
 observe, “ that the natural melancholy of the Bishop’s temper 
 “ would rather have fixed him amongst his first friends, than 
 “ prompted him to the change he made : that he read books of all 
 “ sorts, as well as books of mystic piety, and knew how to pick 
 “ the good that was in them out of the bad : that his opinions 
 “ were exposed without reserve in his Analogy and his Sermons, 
 “ and if the doctrine of either be Popish or unscriptural, the 
 “ learned world hath mistaken strangely in admiring both : that, 
 “ instead of being a strict Dissenter, he never was a communicant 
 “ in any Dissenting assembly ; on the contrary, that he went oc- 
 “ casionally, from his early years, to the established worship, and 
 “ became a constant conformist to it when he was barely of age, 
 “ and entered himself, in 1714, of Oriel College : that his elevation 
 “ to great dignity in the Church, far from being sudden and un- 
 “ expected, was a gradual and natural rise, through a variety of 
 “ preferments, and a period of thirty-two years: that, as Bishop 
 “ of Durham, he had very little authority beyond his brethren, 
 “ and, in ecclesiastical matters, had none beyond them; a larger 
 “ income than most of them he had; but this he employed, not, 
 “ as was insinuated, in augmenting the pomp of worship in his 
 “ cathedral, where indeed it is no greater than in others, but for 
 “ the purposes of charity, and in the repairing of his houses.” 
 After these remarks, the letter closes with the following words : 
 “ Upon the whole, few accusations, so entirely groundless, have 
 “ been so pertinaciously, I am unwilling to say maliciously, carried 
 “ on, as the present: and surely it is high time for the authors 
 “ and abettors of it, in mere common prudence, to shew some 
 “ regard, if not to truth, at least to shame.” 
 
 It only remains to be mentioned, that the above letters of Arch¬ 
 bishop Seeker had such an effect on a writer, who signed himself 
 in the St. James’s Chronicle of August 25, A Dissenting Minister , 
 that he declared it as his opinion, that “ the author of the pam- 
 “ plilet, called, ‘ The Root of Protestant Errors examined,’ and his 
 “ friends, were obliged in candour, in justice, and in honour, to 
 44 retract their charge, unless they could establish it on much better 
 
BY THE EDITOR. 
 
 XXXIX 
 
 “ grounds than had hitherto appearedand he expressed his 
 hopes, that it would be understood that the Dissenters in general 
 had no hand in the accusation, and that it had only been the act 
 of two or three mistaken men.” Another person also, “ a 
 “ foreigner by birth,” as he says of himself, who had been long 
 an admirer of Bishop Butler, and had perused with great attention 
 all that had been written on both sides in the present controversy, 
 confesses he had been “ wonderfully pleased with observing, with 
 “ what candour and temper, as well as clearness and solidity, he 
 (< was vindicated from the aspersions laid against him.” All the 
 adversaries of our Prelate, however, had not the virtue or sense to 
 be thus convinced; some of whom still continued, under the sig¬ 
 natures of Old Marlin, Latimer , An Impartial Protestant , Paulinus , 
 Misonothos , to repeat their confuted falsehoods in the public prints ; 
 as if the curse of calumniators had fallen upon them, and their 
 memory, by being long a traitor to truth, had taken at last a severe 
 revenge, and compelled them to credit their own lie. The first of 
 these gentlemen, Old Martin , who dates from Newcastle, May 29, 
 from the rancour and malignity with which his letter abounds, and 
 from the particular virulence he discovers towards the characters of 
 Bishop Butler and his defender, I conjecture to be no other than the 
 very person who had already figured in this dispute, so early as the 
 year 1752; of whose work, entitled, “ A Serious Inquiry into the 
 “ Use and Importance of External Religion,” the reader will find 
 some account in the notes subjoined to the Bishops Charge. 
 
 Page xv. D. 
 
 The letters, with a sight of which I was indulged by the favour 
 of our present most worthy Metropolitan, are all, as I remember, 
 wrapped together under one cover; on the back of which is written, 
 in Archbishop Seeker’s own hand, the following words, or words to 
 this effect: “ Presumptive Arguments that Bishop Butler did not 
 “ die a Papist.” 
 
 Page xx. E. 
 
 “ Far be it from me,” says the excellent Dr. T. Balguy a , “ to 
 “ dispute the reality of a moral principle in the human heart. I 
 “ feel its existence : I clearly discern its use and importance. But 
 “ in no respect is it more important, than as it suggests the idea of 
 “ a moral Governor . Let this idea be once effaced, and the prin- 
 “ ciple of conscience will soon be found weak and ineffectual. Its 
 “ influence on men’s conduct has, indeed, been too much under- 
 
 a Discourse IX. 
 
xl 
 
 NOTES TO THE PREFACE 
 
 “ valued by some philosophical inquirers. But he that influence, 
 “ while it lasts, more or less, it is not a steady and permanent prin- 
 “ ciple of action. Unhappily we always have it in our power to lay 
 “ it asleep. — Neglect alone will suppress and stifle it, and bring it 
 “ almost into a state of stupefaction. Nor can any thing, less than 
 “ the terrors of religion, awaken our minds from this dangerous and 
 “ deadly sleep. It can never be a matter of indifference to a think - 
 “ ing man, whether he is to be happy or miserable beyond the grave.” 
 
 Page xxvi. F. 
 
 The ignorance of man is a favourite doctrine with Bishop Butler. 
 It occurs in the Second Part of the Analogy; it makes the subject 
 of his Fifteenth Sermon ; and we meet with it again in his Charge. 
 Whether sometimes it be not carried to a length which is excessive, 
 may admit of doubt. 
 
 Page xxvii. G. 
 
 Admirable to this purpose are the words of Dr. T. Balguy, in the 
 Ninth of his Discourses, already referred to, p. xxxvii. “ The doc- 
 “ trine of a life to come , some persons will say, is a doctrine of na- 
 “ tural religion ; and can never therefore be properly alleged to 
 “ shew the importance of revelation. They judge perhaps from the 
 “ frame of the world, that the present system is imperfect; they see 
 “ designs in it, not yet completed ; and they think they have grounds 
 “ for expecting another state, in which these designs shall be farther 
 “ carried on, and brought to a conclusion, worthy of infinite wisdom. 
 “ I am not concerned to dispute the justness of this reasoning ; nor do 
 “ I wish to dispute it. But how far will it reach ? Will it lead us 
 “ to the Christian doctrine of a judgment to come ? Will it give us 
 “ the prospect of an eternity of happiness ? Nothing of all this. It 
 “ shews us only, that death is not the end of our being; that we are 
 “ likely to pass hereafter into other systems, more favourable than 
 “ the present to the great ends of God’s providence, the virtue and 
 “ the happiness of his intelligent creatures. But into what systems 
 " we are to be removed ; what new scenes are to be presented to us, 
 " either of pleasure or pain ; what new parts we shall have to act, 
 “ and to what trials and temptations we may yet be exposed ; on 
 “ all these subjects we know just nothing. That our happiness for 
 “ ever depends on our conduct here, is a most important proposition, 
 “ which we learn only from revelation. 
 
 Page xxviii. H. 
 
 (i In the common affairs of life, common experience is sufficient to 
 
BY THE EDITOR. 
 
 xli 
 
 “ direct us. But will common experience serve to guide our judg- 
 “ ment concerning the fall and redemption of mankind ? From what 
 “ we see every day, can we explain the commencement , or foretell the 
 “ dissolution of the world ? To judge of events like these, we should 
 “ he conversant in the history of other planets ; should be distinctly 
 “ informed of God’s various dispensations to all the different orders 
 “ of rational beings. Instead then of grounding our religious 
 “ opinions on what ice call experience , let us apply to a more certain 
 “ guide, let us hearken to the testimony of God himself. The cre- 
 “ dibility of human testimony , and the conduct of human agents, are 
 “ subjects perfectly within the reach of our natural faculties ; and 
 “ we ought to desire no firmer foundation for our belief of 
 “ religion, than for the judgments we form in the common affairs of 
 " life : where we see a little plain testimony easily outweighs the 
 “ most specious conjectures, and not seldom even strong probabili- 
 “ ties.” Dr. Balguy’s Fourth Charge. See also an excellent 
 pamphlet, entitled, “ Remarks on Mr. Hume’s Essay on the Natural 
 “ History of Religion, §. 5 and the Sixth of Dr. Powell’s 
 Discourses. 
 
 Page xxxi. I. 
 
 Dr. Arthur Ashley Sykes, from whose writings some good may be 
 collected out of a multitude of things of a contrary tendency, in 
 what he is pleased to call “ The Scripture Doctrine of Redemption V’ 
 opposes what is here advanced by Bishop Butler; quoting his words, 
 but without mentioning his name. If what is said above be not 
 thought a sufficient answer to the objections of this author, the 
 reader may do well to consult a Charge “ On the Use and Abuse of 
 “ Philosophy in the Study of Religion,” bv the late Dr. Powell; who 
 seems to me to have had the observations of Dr. Svkes in his view, 
 where he is confuting the reasonings of certain philosophizing 
 Divines against the doctrine of the Atonement. Powell’s Discourses, 
 Charge III. p. 342—348. 
 
 b See the observations on the texts cited in his first chapter, and also in chapters 
 the fifth and sixth. 
 
The following Epitaph, said to be written by Dr. Nathanael Forster, 
 is inscribed on a flat marble stone, in the cathedral church of 
 Bristol, placed over the spot where the remains of Bishop Butler 
 are deposited ; and which, as it is now almost obliterated, it may 
 be worth while here to preserve. 
 
 H.S. 
 
 Reverendus admodum in Christo Pater 
 JOSEPHUS BUTLER, LL.D. 
 
 Hujusce primo Diceceseos 
 Deinde Dunelmensis Episcopus. 
 
 Qualis quantusque Vir erat 
 Sua libentissime agnovit setas : 
 
 Et si quid Prsesuli aut Scriptori ad famam valent 
 Mens altissima. 
 
 Ingenii perspicacis et subacti Vis, 
 
 Animusque pius, simplex, candidus, liberalis, 
 
 Mortui haud facile evanescet memoria. 
 
 Obiit Bathonise 16 Kalend. Julii, 
 
 A.D. 1752. 
 
 Annos natus 60. 
 
THE LIFE 
 
 OF 
 
 DR. BUTLER. 
 
 D R. JOSEPH BUTLER, a Prelate of the most distinguished 
 character and abilities, was born at Wantage, in Berkshire, 
 in the year 1692. His father, Mr. Thomas Butler, who was a 
 substantial and reputable shopkeeper in that town, observing in 
 his son Joseph a an excellent genius and inclination for learning, 
 determined to educate him for the ministry, among the Pro- 
 testant Dissenters of the Presbyterian denomination. For this 
 purpose, after he had gone through a proper course of grammatical 
 literature, at the free grammar school of his native place, under 
 the care of the Rev. Mr. Philip Barton, a Clergyman of the Church 
 of England, he was sent to a Dissenting academy, then kept at 
 Gloucester, but which was soon afterwards removed to Tewkesbury. 
 The principal tutor of this academy was Mr. Jones, a man of 
 uncommon abilities and knowledge, who had the honour of training 
 up several scholars, who became of great eminence, both in the 
 Established Church and among the Dissenters. At Tewkesbury 
 Mr. Butler made an extraordinary progress in the study of Divinity; 
 of which he gave a remarkable proof, in the letters addressed by 
 him, while he resided at Tewkesbury, to Dr. Samuel Clarke, 
 laying before him the doubts that had arisen in his mind, concern¬ 
 ing the conclusiveness of some arguments in the Doctor’s demon¬ 
 stration of the being and attributes of God. The first of these 
 letters was dated the 4th of November, 1/13; and the sagacity 
 and depth of thought displayed in it, immediately excited Dr. 
 Clarke’s particular notice. This condescension encouraged Mr. 
 Butler to address the Doctor again upon the same subject, which 
 likewise was answered by him ; and the correspondence being 
 
 He was the youngest of eight children. 
 
xliv 
 
 THE LIFE OF 
 
 carried on in three other letters, the whole was annexed to the 
 celebrated treatise before mentioned, and the collection has been 
 retained in all the subsequent editions of that work. The manage¬ 
 ment of this correspondence was entrusted by Mr. Butler to 
 his friend and fellow-pupil, Mr. Seeker, who, in order to conceal 
 the affair, undertook to convey the letters to the post-office at 
 Gloucester, and to bring back Dr. Clarke’s answers. When Mr. 
 Butler’s name was discovered to the Doctor, the candour, modesty, 
 and good sense, with which he had written, immediately procured 
 him the friendship of that eminent and excellent man. Our young 
 student was not, however, during his continuance at Tewkesbury, 
 solely employed in metaphysical speculations and inquiries. An¬ 
 other subject of his serious consideration was, the propriety of 
 his becoming a Dissenting minister. Accordingly, he entered 
 into an examination of the principles of non-conformity; the 
 result of which was, such a dissatisfaction with them, as deter¬ 
 mined him to conform to the Established Church. This intention 
 was, at first, disagreeable to his father, who endeavoured to divert 
 him from his purpose ; and, with that view, called in the assist¬ 
 ance of some eminent Presbyterian Divines j but finding bis son’s 
 resolution to be fixed, he at length suffered him to be removed 
 to Oxford, where he was admitted a commoner of Oriel College, 
 on the 17th of March, 1714. At what time he took Orders doth 
 not appear, nor who the Bishop was by whom he was ordained; 
 but it is certain that he entered into the Church soon ofter his 
 admission at Oxford, if it be true, as is asserted, that he sometimes 
 assisted Mr. Edward Talbot in the divine service, at his living 
 of Hendred, near Wantage. With this gentleman, who was the 
 second son of Dr. William Talbot, successively Bishop of Oxford, 
 Salisbury, and Durham, Mr. Butler formed an intimate friendship 
 at Oriel College; which friendship laid the foundation of all his 
 subsequent preferments, and procured for him a very honourable 
 situation, when he was only twenty-six years of age. For it was 
 in 1718 that, at the recommendation of Mr. Talbot, in conjunction 
 with that of Dr. Clarke, he was appointed by Sir Joseph Jekyll 
 to be preacher at the Rolls. This was three years before he 
 had taken any degree at the University, where he did not go 
 out Bachelor of Law till the 10th of June, 1721, which, however, 
 was as soon as that degree could suitably be conferred upon him. 
 Mr. Butler continued at the Rolls till 1726; in the beginning of 
 which year he published, in one volume octavo, “ Fifteen Sermons 
 “ preached at that Chapel.” In the meanwhile, by the patronage 
 
DR. BUTLER. 
 
 xlv 
 
 of Dr. Talbot, Bishop of Durham, to whose notice he had been 
 recommended (together with Mr. Benson and Mr. Seeker) by Mr. 
 Edward Talbot, on his death-bed, our Author had been presented 
 first to the rectory of Haughton, near Darlington, and afterwards 
 to that of Stanhope, in the same diocese. The benefice of Haugh¬ 
 ton was given to him in 1722, and that of Stanhope in 1725. 
 At Haughton there was a necessity for rebuilding a great part 
 of the parsonage-house, and Mr. Butler had neither money nor 
 talents for that work. Mr. Seeker, therefore, who had always 
 the interest of his friends at heart, and acquired a very considerable 
 influence with Bishop Talbot, persuaded that Prelate to give Mr. 
 Butler, in exchange for Haughton, the rectory of Stanhope, which 
 was not only free from any such incumbrance, but was likewise 
 of much superior value, being indeed one of the richest parsonages 
 in England. Whilst our Author continued preacher at the Rolls 
 Chapel, he divided his time between his duty in town and country; 
 but when he quitted the Rolls, he resided, during seven years, 
 wholly at Stanhope, in the conscientious discharge of every ob¬ 
 ligation appertaining to a good parish priest. This retirement, 
 however, was too solitary for his disposition, which had in it 
 a natural cast of gloominess. And though his recluse hours were 
 by no means lost, either to private improvement or public utility, 
 yet he felt at times, very painfully, the want of that select society 
 of friends, to which he had been accustomed, and which could 
 inspire him with the greatest cheerfulness. Mr. Seeker, therefore, 
 who knew this, was extremely anxious to draw him out into a 
 more active and conspicuous scene, and omitted no opportunity 
 of expressing this desire to such as he thought capable of pro¬ 
 moting it. Having himself been appointed King’s Chaplain in 
 
 1732, he took occasion, in a conversation which he had the 
 honour of holding with Queen Caroline, to mention to her his 
 friend Mr. Butler. The Queen said she thought he had been dead. 
 Mr. Seeker assured her he was not. Yet her Majesty afterwards 
 asked Archbishop Blackburn if he was not dead : his answer was, 
 “ No, Madam; but he is buried.” Mr. Seeker continuing his 
 purpose of endeavouring to bring his friend out of his retirement, 
 found means, upon Mr. Charles Talbot’s being made Lord Chan¬ 
 cellor, to have Mr. Butler recommended to him for his Chaplain. 
 His Lordship accepted, and sent for him ; and this promotion 
 calling him to Town, he took Oxford in his way, and was admitted 
 there to the degree of Doctor of Law, on the 8th of December, 
 
 1733. The Lord Chancellor, who gave him also a Prebend in the 
 

 xlvi 
 
 THE LIFE OF 
 
 church of Rochester, had consented that he should reside at his 
 parish of Stanhope one half of the year. 
 
 Dr. Butler being thus brought back into the world, his merit and 
 his talents soon introduced him to particular notice, and paved 
 the way for his rising to those high dignities which he afterwards 
 enjoyed. In 1736 he was appointed Clerk of the Closet to 
 Queen Caroline; and, in the same year, he presented to her 
 Majesty a copy of his excellent Treatise, entitled, “ The Analogy 
 “ of Religion, Natural and Revealed, to the Constitution and 
 “ Course of Nature.” His attendance upon his Royal Mistress, 
 by her especial command, was from seven to nine in the evening 
 every day : and though this particular relation to that excellent 
 and learned Queen was soon determined by her death in 1737, 
 yet he had been so effectually recommended by her, as well 
 as by the late Lord Chancellor Talbot, to his Majesty’s favour, 
 that in the next year he was raised to the highest order of the 
 Church, by a nomination to the bishopric of Bristol; to which 
 see he was consecrated on the 3rd of December, 1738. King 
 George II not being satisfied with this proof of his regard to 
 Dr. Butler, promoted him, in 1740, to the Deanery of St. Paul’s, 
 London; into which he was installed on the 24th of May in 
 that year. Finding the demands of this dignity to be incompatible 
 with his parish duty at Stanhope, he immediately resigned that 
 rich benefice. Besides our Prelate’s unremitted attention to his 
 peculiar obligations, he was called upon to preach several dis¬ 
 courses on public occasions, which were afterwards separately 
 printed, and have since been annexed to the latter editions of the 
 Sermons at the Rolls Chapel. In 1746, upon the death of Dr. 
 Egerton, Bishop of Hereford, Dr. Butler was made Clerk of the 
 Closet to the King ; and on the 16th of October, 1750, he received 
 another distinguished mark of his Majesty’s favour, by being 
 translated to the see of Durham. This was on the 16th of 
 October in that year, upon the decease of Dr. Edward Chandler. 
 Our Prelate being thus appointed to preside over a Diocese with 
 which he had long been connected, delivered his first, and indeed 
 his last Charge to his Clergy, at his primary visitation in 1751. 
 The principal object of it was “ External Religion.” The Bishop 
 having observed, with deep concern, the great and growing 
 neglect of serious piety in the kingdom, insisted strongly on 
 the usefulness of outward forms and institutions, in fixing and 
 preserving a sense of devotion and duty in the minds of men. 
 In doing this, he was thought by several persons to speak too 
 
 \ \ \” 
 
DR. BUTLER. 
 
 xlvii 
 
 favourably of Pagan and Popish ceremonies, and to countenance, 
 in a certain degree, the cause of superstition. Under that appre¬ 
 hension, an able and spirited writer, who was understood to be a 
 Clergyman of the Church of England, published, in 1752, a pam¬ 
 phlet, entitled, “ A serious Inquiry into the Use and Importance 
 “ of External Religion : occasioned by some Passages in the Right 
 “ Rev. the Lord Bishop of Durham’s Charge to the Clergy of that 
 “ Diocese ;—Humbly addressed to his Lordship.” Many persons, 
 however, and we believe the greater part of the Clergy of the 
 diocese, did not think our Prelate’s Charge so exceptionable at it 
 appeared to this author. The Charge, being printed at Durham, 
 and having never been annexed to any of Dr. Butler’s other works, 
 is now become extremely scarce ; and it is observable, that it is 
 the only one of his publications which ever produced him a direct 
 literary antagonist. 
 
 By this promotion, our worthy Bishop was furnished with ample 
 means of exerting the virtue of charity; a virtue which eminently 
 abounded in him, and the exercise of which was his highest delight. 
 But this gratification he did not long enjoy. He had been but a 
 short time seated in his new bishopric, when his health began 
 visibly to decline ; and having been complimented, during his in¬ 
 disposition, upon account of his great resignation to the Divine 
 will, he is said to have expressed some regret, that he should be 
 taken from the present world so soon after he had been rendered 
 capable of becoming much more useful in it. In his last illness he 
 was carried to Bristol, to try the waters of that place ; but these 
 proving ineffectual, he removed to Bath, where, being past recovery, 
 he died on the lfith of June 1752. His corpse was conveyed to 
 Bristol, and interred in the cathedral there, where a monument, 
 with an inscription, is erected to his memory. 
 
 On the greatness of Bishop Butler s character we need not en¬ 
 large; for his profound knowledge, and the prodigious strength of 
 his mind, are amply displayed in his incomparable writings. His 
 piety was of the most serious and fervent, and, perhaps, somewhat 
 of the ascetic kind. His benevolence was warm, generous, and 
 diffusive. Whilst he was Bishop of Bristol, he expended, in re¬ 
 pairing and improving the episcopal palace, four thousand pounds, 
 which is said to have been more than the whole revenues of the 
 bishopric amounted to, during his continuance in that see. Besides 
 his private benefactions, he was a contributor to the infirmary at 
 Bristol, and a subscriber to three of the hospitals at London. He 
 was likewise a principal promoter, though not the first founder, of 
 
xlviii 
 
 THE LIFE OF DR. BUTLER. 
 
 the infirmary at Newcastle, in Northumberland. In supporting the 
 hospitality and dignity of the rich and powerful diocese of Durham, 
 he was desirous of imitating the spirit of his patron, Bishop Talbot. 
 In this spirit he set apart three days every week for the reception 
 and entertainment of the principal gentry of the country. Nor 
 were even the Clergy who had the poorest benefices neglected by 
 him. He not only occasionally invited them to dine with him, but 
 condescended to visit them at their respective parishes. By his 
 will he left five hundred pounds to the Society for propagating the 
 Gospel in Foreign Parts, and some legacies to his friends and 
 domestics. His executor and residuary legatee was his Chaplain, 
 the Rev. Dr. Nathanael Forster, a divine of distinguished literature. 
 Bishop Butler was never married. Soon after his decease, the 
 following lines, by way of epitaph, were written concerning him ; 
 and were printed first, if we recollect aright, in the London 
 Magazine. 
 
 Beneath this marble Butler lies entomb’d, 
 
 Who, with a soul inflam’d by love divine. 
 
 His life in presence of his God consum’d, 
 
 Like the bright lamps before the holy shrine. 
 
 His aspect pleasing, mind with learning fraught: 
 
 His eloquence was like a chain of gold. 
 
 That the wild passions of mankind controll’d; 
 
 Merit, wherever to be found, he sought. 
 
 Desire of transient riches he had none; 
 
 These he, with bounteous hand, did well dispense; 
 
 Bent to fulfil the ends of Providence; 
 
 His heart still fixed on an immortal crown. 
 
 His heart a mirror was, of purest kind. 
 
 Where the bright image of his Maker shin’d; 
 
 Reflecting faithful to the throne above, 
 
 Th’ irradiant glories of the Mystic Dove. 
 
THE 
 
 ANALOGY OF RELIGION, 
 
 NATURAL AND REVEALED, 
 
 TO THE 
 
 CONSTITUTION AND COURSE OF NATURE. 
 
 ANALOGY. 
 
 (1 
 
to Tin: 
 
 RIGHT HONOURABLE 
 
 CHARLES, LORD TALBOT, 
 
 BARON OF HENSOL, 
 
 LORD HIGH CHANCELIiOR OF GREAT BRITAIN, 
 
 THE FOLLOWING TREATISE 
 
 IS, WITH ALL RESPECT, INSCRIBED, 
 
 IN ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF THE HIGHEST OBLIGATIONS 
 
 TO 
 
 THE LATE LORO BISHOP OF DURHAM, 
 
 AND TO HIMSELF, 
 
 BY HIS LORDSHIP'S MOST DUTIFUL, 
 
 MOST DEVOTED, 
 
 AND MOST HUMBLE SERVANT, 
 
 JOSEPH BUTLER. 
 
ADVERTISEMENT 
 
 PREFIXED TO THE FIRST EDITION. 
 
 TF the reader should meet here with any thing 
 which he had not before attended to, it will not 
 be in the obvervations upon the constitution and course 
 of nature, these being all obvious ; but in the appli¬ 
 cation of them : in which, though there is nothing 
 but what appears to me of some real weight, and 
 therefore of great importance; yet he will observe 
 several things, which will appear to him of verv 
 little, if we can think things to be of little importance, 
 which are of any real weight at all, upon such a 
 subject as religion. However, the proper force of 
 the following Treatise lies in the whole general 
 analogy considered together. 
 
 It is come, I know not how, to be taken for grant¬ 
 ed, by many persons, that Christianity is not so much 
 as a subject of inquiry ; but that it is, now at length, 
 discovered to be fictitious. And accordingly they treat 
 it, as if, in the present age, this were an agreed point 
 
lvi 
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 PART II. 
 
 OF REVEALED RELIGION. 
 
 CHAP. I. 
 
 Of the Importance of Christianity. 145 
 
 CHAP. II. 
 
 Of the supposed Presumption against a Revelation, considered as 
 
 miraculous . 165 
 
 CHAP. III. 
 
 Of our Incapacity of judging, what were to be expected in a Reve¬ 
 lation ; and the Credibility, from Analogy, that it must contain 
 Things appearing liable to Objections. 172 
 
 CHAP. IV. 
 
 Of Christianity, considered as a Scheme or Constitution imperfectly 
 comprehended. 189 
 
 CHAP. V. 
 
 Of the particular System of Christianity; the Appointment of a 
 Mediator, and the Redemption of the World by him. 197 
 
 CHAP. VI. 
 
 Of the Want of Universality in Revelation : and of the supposed 
 
 Deficiency in the Proof of it . 218 
 
 CHAP. VII. 
 
 Of the particular Evidence for Christianity . 239 
 
 CHAP. VIII. 
 
 Of the Objections which may be made against arguing from the 
 
 Analogy of Nature to Religion . 279 
 
 CONCLUSION . 294 
 
 DISSERTATION I. 
 
 Of Personal Identity . 307 
 
 DISSERTATION II. 
 
 Of the Nature of Virtue. 3](5 
 
INTRODUCTION. 
 
 ROB ABLE evidence is essentially distinguished 
 
 A from demonstrative by this, that it admits of de¬ 
 grees ; and of all variety of them, from the highest 
 moral certainty, to the very lowest presumption. We 
 cannot indeed say a thing is probably true upon one 
 very slight presumption for it; because, as there may 
 be probabilities on both sides of a question, there may 
 be some against it: and though there be not, yet a 
 slight presumption does not beget that degree of con¬ 
 viction, which is implied in saying a thing is probably 
 true. But that the slightest possible presumption is of 
 the nature of a probability, appears from hence; that 
 such low presumption, often repeated, will amount 
 even to moral certainty. Thus a man’s having observed 
 the ebb and flow of the tide to-day, affords some sort 
 of presumption, though the lowest imaginable, that it 
 may happen again to-morrow: but the observation of 
 this event for so many days, and months, and ages 
 together, as it has been observed by mankind, gives us 
 a full assurance that it will. 
 
 ANALOGY. B 
 
2 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 That which chiefly constitutes Probability is ex¬ 
 pressed in the word Likely, i. e. like some truth a , or 
 true event; like it, in itself, in its evidence, in some 
 more or fewer of its circumstances. For when we 
 determine a thing to be probably true, suppose that an 
 event has or will come to pass, it is from the mind’s 
 remarking in it a likeness to some other event, which 
 we have observed has come to pass. And this observ¬ 
 ation forms, in numberless daily instances, a pre¬ 
 sumption, opinion, or full conviction, that such event 
 has or will come to pass; according as the observation 
 is, that the like event has sometimes, most commonly, 
 or always so far as our observation reaches, come to 
 pass at like distances of time, or place, or upon like 
 occasions. Hence arises the belief, that a child, if it 
 lives twenty years, will grow up to the stature and 
 strength of a man ; that food will contribute to the 
 preservation of its life, and the want of it for such a 
 number of days, be its certain destruction. So likewise 
 the rule and measure of our hopes and fears concerning 
 the success of our pursuits; our expectations that 
 others will act so and so in such circumstances; and 
 our judgment that such actions proceed from such 
 principles; all these rely upon our having observed the 
 like to what we hope, fear, expect, judge ; I say upon 
 our having observed the like, either with respect to 
 others or ourselves. And thus, whereas the prince b 
 who had always lived in a warm climate, naturallv 
 concluded in the way of analogy, that there was no 
 such thing as water’s becoming hard, because he had 
 always observed it to be fluid and yielding: we, on the 
 contrary, from analogy conclude, that there is no pre¬ 
 sumption at all against this : that it is supposable there 
 
 a Verisimile. 
 
 b The story is told by Mr. Locke in the chapter of Probability. 
 
INTRODUCTION. 
 
 3 
 
 may be frost in England any given day in January 
 next; probable that there will on some day of the 
 month ; and that there is a moral certainty, i. e. ground 
 for an expectation without any doubt of it, in some 
 part or other of the winter. 
 
 Probable evidence, in its very nature, affords but an 
 imperfect kind of information ; and is to be considered 
 as relative only to beings of limited capacities. For 
 nothing which is the possible object of knowledge, 
 whether past, present, or future, can be probable to an 
 infinite Intelligence; since it cannot but be discerned 
 absolutely as it is in itself, certainly true, or certainly 
 ftdse. But to Us, probability is the very guide of life. 
 
 From these things it follows, that in questions of 
 difficulty, or such as are thought so, where more satis¬ 
 factory evidence cannot be had, or is not seen; if the 
 result of examination be, that there appears upon the 
 whole, any the lowest presumption on one side, and 
 none on the other, or a greater presumption on one 
 side, though in the lowest degree greater; this deter¬ 
 mines the question, even in matters of speculation; 
 and in matters of practice, will lay us under an absolute 
 and formal obligation, in point of prudence and of in¬ 
 terest, to act upon that presumption or low probability, 
 though it be so low as to leave the mind in very great 
 doubt which is the truth. For surely a man is as 
 really bound in prudence to do what upon the whole 
 appears, according to the best of his judgment, to be 
 for his happiness, as what he certainly knows to be so. 
 Nay further, in questions of great consequence, a 
 reasonable man will think it concerns him to remark 
 lower probabilities and presumptions than these; such 
 as amount to no more than shewing one side of a 
 question to be as supposable and credible as the other: 
 nay, such as but amount to much less even than this. 
 
 b 2 
 
4 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 For numberless instances might be mentioned respect¬ 
 ing the common pursuits of life, where a man would 
 be thought, in a literal sense, distracted, who would 
 not act, and with great application too, not only upon 
 an even chance, but upon much less, and where the 
 probability or chance was greatly against his succeeding 0 . 
 
 It is not my design to inquire further into the 
 nature, the foundation, and measure of probability; or 
 whence it proceeds that likeness should beget that pre¬ 
 sumption, opinion, and full conviction, which the 
 human mind is formed to receive from it, and which it 
 does necessarily produce in every one; or to guard 
 against the errors, to which reasoning from analogy is 
 liable. This belongs to the subject of Logic; and is a 
 part of that subject which has not yet been thoroughly 
 considered. Indeed I shall not take upon me to say, 
 how far the extent, compass, and force, of analogical 
 reasoning, can be reduced to general heads and rules; 
 and the whole be formed into a system. But though 
 so little in this way has been attempted by those who 
 have treated of our intellectual powers, and the exer¬ 
 cise of them ; this does not hinder but that we may 
 be, as we unquestionably are, assured, that analogy is 
 of weight, in various degrees, towards determining our 
 judgment and our practice. Nor does it in any wise 
 cease to be of weight in those cases, because persons, 
 either given to dispute, or who require things to be 
 stated with greater exactness than our faculties appear 
 to admit of in practical matters, may find other cases 
 in which it is not easy to say, whether it be, or be not, 
 of any weight; or instances of seeming analogies, 
 which are really of none. It is enough to the present 
 purpose to observe, that this general way of arguing is 
 evidently natural, just, and conclusive. For there is 
 
 c See part II. chap. vi. 
 
INTRODUCTION. 
 
 no man can make a question, but that the sun will 
 rise to-morrow, and be seen, where it is seen at all, in 
 the figure of a circle, and not in that of a square. 
 
 Hence, namely from analogical reasoning, Origen d 
 has with singular sagacity observed, that lie who believes 
 the Scripture to have proceeded from him who is the 
 Author of Nature , may well expect to find the same sort 
 of difficulties in it , as are found in the constitution of 
 Nature . And in a like way of reflexion it may be 
 added, that be who denies the Scripture to have been 
 from God upon account of these difficulties, may, for 
 the very same reason, deny the world to have been 
 formed by him. On the other hand, if there be an 
 analogy or likeness between that system of things and 
 dispensation of Providence, which Revelation informs 
 us of, and that system of things and dispensation of 
 Providence, which Experience together with Reason 
 informs us of, i. e. the known course of Nature; this 
 is a presumption, that they have both the same author 
 and cause; at least so far as to answer objections 
 against the former’s being from God, drawn from any 
 thing which is analogical or similar to what is in the 
 latter, which is acknowledged to be from him; for an 
 Author of Nature is here supposed. 
 
 Forming our notions of the constitution and govern¬ 
 ment of the world upon reasoning, without foundation 
 for the principles which we assume, whether from the 
 attributes of God, or any thing else, is building a world 
 upon hypothesis, like Des Cartes. Forming our notions 
 upon reasoning from principles which are certain, but 
 applied to cases to which we have no ground to apply 
 
 d Xprj pep rot ye to p anai £ napadet-apepop tov ktictciptos top Koapop eipcu 
 ravTcis tcis ypcKpas nenelo-dcu, on oara 7 rep\ rrfs KTiae(os anapra to~is (tjtovo-l 
 top 7 rep\ avrrjs \6yop, ravra kcii 7 repi tcop ypacpcop. Philocal. p. 23 . ed. 
 Cant. 
 
G 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 them, (like those who explain the structure of the 
 human body, and the nature of diseases and medicines 
 from mere mathematics without sufficient data,) is an 
 error much akin to the former: since what is assumed 
 in order to make the reasoning applicable, is Hypothe¬ 
 sis. But it must be allowed just, to join abstract 
 reasonings with the observation of facts, and argue 
 from such facts as are known, to others that are like 
 them ; from that part of the Divine government over 
 intelligent creatures which comes under our view, to 
 that larger and more general government over them 
 which is beyond it; and from what is present, to 
 collect what is likely, credible, or not incredible, will 
 be hereafter. 
 
 This method then of concluding and determining 
 being practical, and what, if we will act at all, we 
 cannot but act upon in the common pursuits of life ; 
 being evidently conclusive, in various degrees, pro¬ 
 portionable to the degree and exactness of the whole 
 analogy or likeness ; and having so great authority 
 for its introduction into the subject of religion, even 
 revealed religion ; my design is to apply it to that 
 subject in general, both natural and revealed: taking 
 for proved, that there is an intelligent Author of 
 Nature, and natural Governor of the world. For as 
 there is no presumption against this prior to the proof 
 of it: so it has been often proved with accumulated 
 evidence; from this argument of analogy and final 
 causes; from abstract reasonings; from the most an¬ 
 cient tradition and testimony; and from the general 
 consent of mankind. Nor does it appear, so far as 
 I can find, to be denied by the generality of those 
 who profess themselves dissatisfied with the evidence 
 of religion. 
 
 As there are some, who, instead of thus attending 
 
INTRODUCTION. 
 
 7 
 
 to what is in fact the constitution of Nature, form 
 their notions of God’s government upon hypothesis: 
 so there are others, who indulge themselves in vain 
 and idle speculations, how the world might possibly 
 have been framed otherwise than it is; and upon 
 supposition that things might, in imagining that they 
 should, have been disposed and carried on after a 
 better model, than what appears in the present dis¬ 
 position and conduct of them. Suppose now a person 
 of such a turn of mind, to go on with his reveries, till 
 he had at length fixed upon some particular plan of 
 
 Nature, as appearing to him the best.-One shall 
 
 scarce be thought guilty of detraction against human 
 understanding, if one should say, even beforehand, that 
 the plan which this speculative person would fix upon, 
 though he were the wisest of the sons of men, proba¬ 
 bly would not be the very best, even according to his 
 own notions of best; whether he thought that to be so, 
 which afforded occasions and motives for the exercise 
 of the greatest virtue, or which was productive of the 
 greatest happiness, or that these two were necessarily 
 connected, and run up into one and the same plan. 
 However, it may not be amiss once for all to see, what 
 would be the amount of these emendations and imasri- 
 
 o 
 
 nary improvements upon the system of nature, or how 
 far they would mislead us. And it seems there could 
 be no stopping, till we came to some such conclusions 
 as these: that all creatures should at first be made as 
 perfect and as happy as they were capable of ever 
 being: that nothing, to be sure, of hazard or danger 
 should be put upon them to do ; some indolent per¬ 
 sons would perhaps think nothing at all: or certainly, 
 that effectual care should be taken, that they should, 
 whether necessarily or not, yet eventually and in fact, 
 
8 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 always do what was right and most conducive to hap¬ 
 piness, which would be thought easy for infinite power 
 to effect; either by not giving them any principles 
 which would endanger their going wrong ; or by laying 
 the right motive of action in every instance before 
 their minds continually in so strong a manner, as would 
 never fail of inducing them to act conformably to it: 
 and that the whole method of government by punish¬ 
 ments should be rejected as absurd; as an awkward 
 round-about method of carrying things on; nay, as 
 contrary to a principal purpose, for which it would be 
 supposed creatures were made, namely, happiness. 
 
 Now, without considering what is to be said in 
 particular to the several parts of this train of folly and 
 extravagance ; what has been above intimated, is a full 
 direct general answer to it, namely, that we may see 
 beforehand that we have not faculties for this kind of 
 speculation. For though it be admitted, that, from 
 the first principles of our nature, we unavoidably judge 
 or determine some ends to be absolutely in themselves 
 preferable to others, and that the ends now mentioned, 
 or if they run up into one, that this one is absolutely 
 the best; and consequently that we must conclude the 
 ultimate end designed, in the constitution of Nature 
 and conduct of Providence, is the most virtue and 
 happiness possible : yet we are far from being able 
 to judge what particular disposition of things would 
 be most friendly and assistant to virtue; or what 
 means might be absolutely necessary to produce the 
 most happiness in a system of such extent as our own 
 world may be, taking in all that is past and to come, 
 though we should suppose it detached from the whole 
 of things. Indeed we arc so far from being able to 
 judge of this, that we are not judges what may be the 
 
INTRODUCTION. 
 
 9 
 
 necessary means of raising and conducting one person 
 to the highest perfection and happiness of his nature. 
 Nay, even in the little affairs of the present life, we 
 find men of different educations and ranks are not 
 competent judges of the conduct of each other. Our 
 whole nature leads us to ascribe all moral perfection 
 to God, and to deny all imperfection of him. And 
 this will for ever be a practical proof of his moral 
 character, to such as will consider what a practical 
 proof is; because it is the voice of God speaking in 
 us. And from hence we conclude, that virtue must 
 be the happiness, and vice the misery, of every crea¬ 
 ture ; and that regularity and order and right cannot 
 but prevail finally in a universe under his government 
 But we are in no sort judges, what are the necessary 
 means of accomplishing this end. 
 
 Let us then, instead of that idle and not very inno¬ 
 cent employment of forming imaginary models of a 
 world, and schemes of governing it, turn our thoughts 
 to what we experience to be the conduct of Nature 
 with respect to intelligent creatures; which may be 
 resolved into general laws or rules of administration, in 
 the same way as many of the laws of Nature respecting 
 inanimate matter may be collected from experiments. 
 And let us compare the known constitution and course 
 of things with what is said to be the moral system of 
 Nature; the acknowledged dispensations of Provi¬ 
 dence, or that government which we find ourselves 
 under, with what religion teaches us to believe and 
 expect ; and see whether they are not analogous and 
 of a piece. And upon such a comparison it will, I 
 think, be found, that they are very much so: that 
 both may be traced up to the same general laws, and 
 resolved into the same principles of divine conduct. 
 
10 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 The analogy here proposed to be considered is of 
 pretty large extent, and consists of several parts, in 
 some, more, in others, less, exact. In some few 
 instances perhaps it may amount to a real practical 
 proof; in others not so. Yet in these it is a con¬ 
 firmation of what is proved other ways. It will un¬ 
 deniably shew, what too many want to have shewn 
 them, that the system of Religion, both natural and 
 revealed, considered only as a system, and prior to the 
 proof of it, is not a subject of ridicule, unless that of 
 Nature be so too. And it will afford an answer to 
 almost all objections against the system both of natural 
 and revealed Religion ; though not perhaps an answer 
 in so great a degree, yet in a very considerable degree 
 an answer to the objections against the evidence of it: 
 for objections against a proof, and objections against 
 what is said to be proved, the reader will observe are 
 different things. 
 
 Now the divine government of the world, implied 
 in the notion of religion in general and of Christianity, 
 contains in it; that mankind is appointed to live in a 
 future state e ; that there every one shall be rewarded 
 or punished f ; rewarded or punished respectively for 
 all that behaviour here, which we comprehend under 
 the words, virtuous or vicious, morally good or evil £: 
 that our present life is a probation, a state of trial h , 
 and of discipline*, for that future one ; notwithstanding 
 the objections, which men may fancy they have, from 
 notions of Necessity, against there being any such 
 moral plan as this at all k ; and whatever objections 
 may appear to lie against the wisdom and goodness of 
 it, as it stands so imperfectly made known to us at 
 
 e Chap. i. f Ch. ii. * Ch. iii. h Ch. iv. * Ch. v. 
 * Ch. vi. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION. 
 
 11 
 
 present 1 : that this world being in a state of apostasy 
 and wickedness, and consequently of ruin, and the 
 sense both of their condition and duty being greatly 
 corrupted amongst men, this gave occasion for an 
 additional dispensation of Providence ; of the utmost 
 importance m ; proved by miracles n ; but containing in 
 it many things appearing to us strange, and not to 
 have been expected ° ; a dispensation of Providence, 
 which is a scheme or system of things P; carried on 
 by the mediation of a divine person, the Messiah, in 
 order to the recovery of the world ; yet not revealed 
 to all men, nor proved with the strongest possible 
 evidence to all those to whom it is revealed; but only 
 to such a part of mankind, and with such particular 
 evidence, as the wisdom of God thought fit r . The 
 design then of the following Treatise will be to shew, 
 that the several parts principally objected against in 
 this moral and Christian dispensation, including its 
 scheme, its publication, and the proof which God has 
 afforded us of its truth ; that the particular parts prin¬ 
 cipally objected against in this whole dispensation, are 
 analogous to what is experienced in the constitution 
 and course of Nature, or Providence; that the chief 
 objections themselves which are alleged against the 
 former, are no other than what may be alleged with 
 like justness against the latter, where they are found 
 in fact to be inconclusive; and that this argument 
 from analogy is in general unanswerable, and undoubt¬ 
 edly of weight on the side of religion s , notwithstanding 
 the objections which may seem to lie against it, and 
 the real ground which there may be for difference of 
 opinion, as to the particular degree of weight which is 
 
 1 Ch. vii. m Part II. ch. i. n Ch. ii. ° Ch. iii. p Ch. iv. 
 n Ch. v. r Ch. vi. vii. * Chap. viii. 
 
12 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 to be laid upon it. This is a general account of what 
 may be looked for in the following Treatise. And I 
 shall begin it with that which is the foundation of 
 all our hopes and of all our fears; all our hopes 
 and fears, which are of any consideration; I mean a 
 Future Life. 
 
THE 
 
 ANALOGY OF RELIGION 
 
 TO THE 
 
 CONSTITUTION AND COURSE OF NATURE. 
 
 PART I. 
 
 OF NATURAL RELIGION. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 Of a Future Life. 
 
 TRANGE difficulties have been raised by some 
 
 KJ concerning personal identity, or the sameness of 
 living agents, implied in the notion of our existing 
 now and hereafter, or in any two successive moments; 
 which whoever thinks it worth while, may see con¬ 
 sidered in the first Dissertation at the end of this 
 Treatise. But without regard to any of them here, 
 let us consider what the analogy of nature, and the 
 several changes which we have undergone, and those 
 which we know we may undergo without being 
 destroyed, suggest, as to the effect which death may, 
 or may not, have upon us; and whether it be not 
 from thence probable, that we may survive this 
 change, and exist in a future state of life and 
 perception. 
 
 I. From our being born into the present world in 
 the helpless imperfect state of infancy, and having 
 
14 
 
 OF A FUTURE LIFE. 
 
 [part I. 
 
 arrived from thence to mature age, we find it to be 
 a general law of nature in our own species, that the 
 same creatures, the same individuals, should exist 
 in degrees of life and perception, with capacities of 
 action, of enjoyment and suffering, in one period of 
 their being, greatly different from those appointed 
 them in another period of it. And in other creatures 
 the same law holds. For the difference of their ca¬ 
 pacities and states of life at their birth (to go no 
 higher) and in maturity; the change of worms into 
 flies, and the vast enlargement of their locomotive 
 powers by such change: and birds and insects bursting 
 the shell their habitation, and by this means entering 
 into a new world, furnished with new accommodations 
 for them, and finding a new sphere of action assigned 
 them; these are instances of this general law of 
 nature. Thus all the various and wonderful trans¬ 
 formations of animals are to be taken into consideration 
 here. But the states of life in which we ourselves 
 existed formerly in the womb and in our infancy, are 
 almost as different from our present in mature age, 
 as it is possible to conceive any two states or degrees 
 of life can be. Therefore that we are to exist here¬ 
 after in a state as different (suppose) from our present, 
 as this is from our former, is but according to the 
 analogy of nature; according to a natural order or 
 appointment of the very same kind, with what we 
 have already experienced. 
 
 II. We know we are endued with capacities of 
 action, of happiness and misery: for we are conscious 
 of acting, of enjoying pleasure and suffering pain. 
 Now that we have these powers and capacities before 
 death, is a presumption that we shall retain them 
 through and after death ; indeed a probability of it 
 abundantly sufficient to act upon, unless there be 
 
CHAP. I.] 
 
 OF A FUTURE LIFE. 
 
 15 
 
 some positive reason to think that death is the de¬ 
 struction of those living powers : because there is in 
 every case a probability, that all things will continue 
 as we experience they are, in all respects, except those 
 in which we have some reason to think they will be 
 altered. This is that kind a of presumption or pro¬ 
 bability from analogy, expressed in the very word con - 
 tinuance , which seems our only natural reason for 
 believing the course of the world will continue to¬ 
 morrow, as it has done so far as our experience or 
 knowledge of history can carry us back. Nay it seems 
 our only reason for believing, that any one substance 
 now existing will continue to exist a moment longer; 
 the self-existent substance only excepted. Thus if 
 men were assured that the unknown event, death, was 
 not the destruction of our faculties of perception and 
 of action, there would be no apprehension, that any 
 other power or event, unconnected with this of death, 
 would destroy these faculties just at the instant of 
 each creature’s death; and therefore no doubt but that 
 they would remain after it: which shews the high pro¬ 
 bability that our living powers will continue after 
 death, unless there be some ground to think that death 
 is their destruction 15 . For, if it would be in a manner 
 
 a I say kind of presumption or probability; for I do not mean to affirm 
 that there is the same degree of conviction, that our living powers will 
 continue after death, as there is, that our substances will. 
 
 b Destruction of living powers is a manner of expression unavoidably 
 ambiguous ; and may signify either the destruction of a living being , so as 
 that the same living being shall be uncapable of ever perceiving or acting 
 again at all: or the destruction of those means and instruments by which it 
 is capable of its present life , of its present state of perception and of action. 
 It is here used in the former sense. When it is used in the latter, the 
 epithet present is added. The loss of a man’s eye is a destruction of 
 living powers in the latter sense. But we have no reason to think the 
 destruction of living powers, in the former sense, to be possible. We 
 have no more reason to think a being endued with living powers, ever 
 loses them during its whole existence, than to believe that a stone ever 
 acquires them. 
 
1(5 
 
 OF A FUTURE LIFE. 
 
 [part I. 
 
 certain that we should survive death, provided it were 
 certain that death would not be our destruction, it 
 must be highly probable we shall survive it, if there be 
 no ground to think death will be our destruction. 
 
 Now though I think it must be acknowledged, that 
 prior to the natural and moral proofs of a future life 
 commonly insisted upon, there would arise a general 
 confused suspicion, that in the great shock and al¬ 
 teration which we shall undergo bv death, we, i. e. our 
 living powers, might be wholly destroyed ; yet even 
 prior to those proofs, there is really no particular dis¬ 
 tinct ground or reason for this apprehension at all, so 
 far as I can find. If there be, it must arise either 
 from the reason of the thing, or from the analogy of 
 nature . 
 
 But we cannot argue from the reason of the thing , 
 that death is the destruction of living agents, because 
 we know not at all what death is in itself; but only 
 some of its effects, such as the dissolution of flesh, skin, 
 and bones. And these effects do in no wise appear to 
 imply the destruction of a living agent. And besides, 
 as we are greatly in the dark, upon what the exercise 
 of our living powers depends, so we are wholly ignorant 
 what the powers themselves depend upon ; the powers 
 themselves as distinguished, not only from their actual 
 exercise, but also from the present capacity of exercis¬ 
 ing them ; and as opposed to their destruction : for 
 sleep, or however a swoon, shews us, not only that 
 these powers exist when they are not exercised, as the 
 passive power of motion does in inanimate matter; but 
 shews also that they exist, when there is no present 
 capacity of exercising them : or that the capacities of 
 exercising them for the present, as well as the actual 
 exercise of them, may be suspended, and yet the 
 powers themselves remain undestroyed. Since then 
 we know not at all upon what the existence of our 
 
OP A FUTURE LIFE. 
 
 17 
 
 CHAP. I.] 
 
 living powers depends, this shews further, there can no 
 probability be collected from the reason of the thing, 
 that death will be their destruction : because their 
 existence may depend, upon somewhat in no degree 
 affected by death ; upon somewhat quite out of the 
 reach of this king of terrors. So that there is nothing 
 more certain, than that the reason of the thing shews us 
 no connection between death, and the destruction of 
 living agents. Nor can we find any thing throughout 
 the whole analogy of nature, to afford us even the 
 slighest presumption, that animals ever lose their living 
 powers; much less, if it were possible, that they lose 
 them by death: for we have no faculties wherewith to 
 trace any beyond or through it, so as to see what 
 becomes of them. This event removes them from our 
 view. It destroys the sensible proof, which we had 
 before their death, of their being possessed of living 
 powers, but does not appear to afford the least reason 
 to believe that they are, then, or by that event, 
 deprived of them. 
 
 And our knowing, that they were possessed of these 
 powers, up to the very period to which we have 
 faculties capable of tracing them, is itself a probability 
 of their retaining them, beyond it. And this is con¬ 
 firmed, and a sensible credibility is given to it, by 
 observing the very great and astonishing changes which 
 we have experienced ; so great, that our existence in 
 another state of life, of perception and of action, will 
 be but according to a method of providential conduct, 
 the like to which has been already exercised even with 
 regard to ourselves; according to a course of nature, 
 the like to which we have already gone through. 
 
 However, as one cannot but be greatly sensible, how 
 difficult it is to silence imagination enough to make 
 the voice of reason even distinctly heard in this case ; 
 
 ANALOGY. 
 
 C 
 
18 
 
 OF A FUTURE LIFE. 
 
 [part I. 
 
 as we are accustomed, from our youth up, to indulge 
 that forward delusive faculty, ever obtruding beyond 
 its sphere ; of some assistance indeed to apprehension, 
 but the author of all error: as we plainly lose ourselves 
 in gross and crude conceptions of things, taking for 
 granted that we are acquainted with, what indeed we 
 are wholly ignorant of: it may be proper to consider 
 the imaginary presumptions, that death will be our 
 destruction, arising from these kinds of early and 
 lasting prejudices; and to shew how little they can 
 really amount to, even though we cannot wholly divest 
 ourselves of them. And, 
 
 I. All presumption of death’s being the destruction 
 of living beings, must go upon supposition that they 
 are compounded; and so, discerptible. But since 
 consciousness is a single and indivisible power, it should 
 seem that the subject in which it resides must be so 
 too. For were the motion of any particle of matter 
 absolutely one and indivisible, so as that it should 
 imply a contradiction to suppose part of this motion to 
 exist, and part not to exist, i. e. part of this matter to 
 move, and part to be at rest; then its power of motion 
 would be indivisible; and so also would the subject in 
 which the power inheres, namely, the particle of 
 matter: for if this could be divided into two, one part 
 might be moved and the other at rest, which is con- 
 trary to the supposition. In like manner it has been 
 argued c , and, for any thing appearing to the contrary, 
 justly, that since the perception or consciousness, which 
 we have of our own existence, is indivisible, so as that 
 it is a contradiction to suppose one part of it should be 
 here and the other there; the perceptive power, or the 
 power of consciousness, is indivisible too : and con¬ 
 sequently the subject in which it resides; i. e. the con- 
 c See Dr. Clarke’s Letter to Mr. Dodwell, and the defences of it. 
 
CHAP. I.] 
 
 OF A FUTURE LIFE. 
 
 19 
 
 scious being. Now upon supposition that living agent 
 each man calls himself, is thus a single being, which 
 there is at least no more difficulty in conceiving* than 
 in conceiving it to be a compound, and of which there 
 is the proof now mentioned; it follows, that our 
 organized bodies are no more ourselves or part of our¬ 
 selves, than any other matter around us. And it is as 
 easy to conceive, how matter, which is no part of our¬ 
 selves, may be appropriated to us in the manner which 
 our present bodies are; as how we can receive im¬ 
 pressions from, and have power over any matter. It is 
 as easy to conceive, that we may exist out of bodies, 
 as in them ; that we might have animated bodies of 
 any other organs and senses wholly different from these 
 now given us, and that we may hereafter animate these 
 same or new bodies variously modified and organized ; 
 as to conceive how we can animate such bodies as our 
 present. And lastly, the dissolution of all these several 
 organized bodies, supposing' ourselves to have succes¬ 
 sively animated them, would have no more conceivable 
 tendency to destroy the living beings ourselves, or 
 deprive us of living faculties, the faculties of per¬ 
 ception and of action, than the dissolution of any 
 foreign matter, which we are capable of receiving im¬ 
 pressions from, and making use of for the common 
 occasions of life. 
 
 II. The simplicity and absolute oneness of a living 
 agent cannot indeed, from the nature of the thing, be 
 properly proved by experimental observations. But as 
 these fall in with the supposition of its unity, so they 
 plainly lead us to conclude certainly, that our gross 
 organized bodies, with which we perceive the objects 
 of sense, and with which we act, are no part of our¬ 
 selves; and therefore shew us, that we have no reason 
 to believe their destruction to be ours: even without 
 
 c 2 
 
20 
 
 OF A FUTURE LIFE. 
 
 [part I. 
 
 determining whether our living substances be material 
 or immaterial. For we see by experience, that men 
 may lose their limbs, their organs of sense, and even 
 the greatest part of these bodies, and yet remain the 
 same living agents. And persons can trace up the 
 existence of themselves to a time, when the bulk of 
 their bodies was extremely small, in comparison of 
 what it is in mature age: and we cannot but think, 
 that they might then have lost a considerable part of 
 that small body, and yet have remained the same 
 living agents; as they may now lose great part of their 
 present body, and remain so. And it is certain, that 
 the bodies of all animals are in a constant flux, from 
 that never-ceasing attrition, which there is in every 
 part of them. Now things of this kind unavoidably 
 teach us to distinguish, between these living agents 
 ourselves, and large quantities of matter, in which we 
 are very nearly interested : since these may be alien¬ 
 ated, and actually are in a daily course of succession, 
 and chano-ins: their owners; whilst we are assured, that 
 each living agent remains one and the same permanent 
 being d . And this general observation leads us on to 
 the following ones. 
 
 First, That we have no way of determining by 
 experience, what is the certain bulk of the living being 
 each man calls himself: and yet, till it be determined 
 that it is larger in bulk than the solid elementary 
 particles of matter, which there is no ground to think 
 any natural power can dissolve, there is no sort of 
 reason to think death to be the dissolution of it, of the 
 living being, even though it should not be absolutely 
 indiscerptible. 
 
 Secondly, From our being so nearly related to and 
 interested in certain systems of matter, suppose our 
 d See Dissertation I. 
 
OF A FUTURE LIFE. 
 
 21 
 
 CHAP. I.] 
 
 flesh and bones, and afterwards ceasing to be at all 
 related to them, the living agents ourselves remaining 
 all this while undestroyed notwithstanding such alien¬ 
 ation; and consequently these systems of matter not 
 being ourselves: it follows further, that we have no 
 ground to conclude any other, suppose internal systems 
 of matter, to be the living agents ourselves; because 
 we can have no ground to conclude this, but from our 
 relation to and interest in such other systems of 
 matter: and therefore we can have no reason to con¬ 
 clude, what befalls those systems of matter at death, 
 to be the destruction of the living agents. We have 
 already several times over lost a great part or perhaps 
 the whole of our body, according to certain common 
 established laws of nature; yet we remain the same 
 living agents: when we shall lose as great a part, or 
 the whole, by another common established law of 
 nature, death ; why may we not also remain the same? 
 That the alienation has been gradual in one case, and 
 in the other will be more at once, does not prove any 
 thing to the contrary. We have passed undestroyed 
 through those many and great revolutions of matter, 
 so peculiarly appropriated to us ourselves; why should 
 we imagine death will be so fatal to us ? Nor can it be 
 objected, that what is thus alienated or lost, is no part 
 of our original solid body, but only adventitious matter; 
 because we may lose entire limbs, which must have 
 contained many solid parts and vessels of the original 
 body : or if this be not admitted, we have no proof, 
 that any of these solid parts are dissolved or alienated 
 by death. Though, by the way, we are very nearly 
 related to that extraneous or adventitious matter, 
 whilst it continues united to and distending the several 
 parts of our solid body. But after all; the relation a 
 person bears to those parts of his body, to which he is 
 
_ UAj 
 
 
 
 [part I. 
 
 the most nearly related ; what does it appear to amount 
 to but this, that the living agent, and those parts of 
 the body, mutually affect each other? And the same 
 thing, the same thing in kind though not in degree, 
 may be said of all foreign matter, which gives us ideas, 
 and which we have any power over. From these 
 observations the whole ground of the imagination is 
 removed, that the dissolution of any matter, is the 
 destruction of a living agent, from the interest he once 
 had in such matter. 
 
 Thirdly, If we consider our body somewhat more 
 distinctly, as made up of organs and instruments of 
 perception and of motion, it will bring us to the same 
 conclusion. Thus the common optical experiments 
 shew, and even the observation how sight is assisted by 
 glasses shews, that we see with our eyes in the same 
 sense as we see with glasses. Nor is there any reason 
 to believe, that we see with them in any other sense ; 
 any other, I mean, which would lead us to think the 
 eye itself a percipient. The like is to be said of 
 hearing: and our feeling distant solid matter by means 
 of somewhat in our hand, seems an instance of the 
 like kind, as to the subject we are considering. All 
 these are instances of foreign matter, or such as is no 
 part of our body, being instrumental in preparing 
 objects for, and conveying them to, the perceiving 
 power, in a manner similar or like to the manner in 
 which our organs of sense prepare and convey them. 
 Both are in a like way instruments of our receiving 
 such ideas from external objects, as the Author of 
 nature appointed those external objects to be the 
 occasions of exciting in us. However, glasses are 
 evidently instances of this ; namely of matter which is 
 no part of our body, preparing objects for and con¬ 
 veying them towards the perceiving power, in like 
 
OF A FUTURE LIFE. 
 
 23 
 
 CHAP. I.] 
 
 manner as our bodily organs do. And if we see with 
 our eyes only in the same manner as we do with 
 glasses, the like may justly be concluded, from analogy, 
 of all our other senses. It is not intended, by any 
 thing here said, to affirm, that the whole apparatus of 
 vision, or of perception by any other of our senses, can 
 be traced through all its steps, quite up to the living 
 power of seeing, or perceiving: but that so far as it 
 can be traced by experimental observations, so far it 
 appears, that our organs of sense prepare and convey 
 on objects, in order to their being perceived, in like 
 manner as foreign matter does, without affording any 
 shadow of appearance, that they themselves perceive. 
 And that we have no reason to think our organs of 
 sense percipients, is confirmed by instances of persons 
 losing some of them, the living beings themselves, 
 their former occupiers, remaining unimpaired. It is 
 confirmed also by the experience of dreams; by which 
 we find we are at present possessed of a latent, and, 
 what would otherwise be, an unimagined unknown 
 power of perceiving sensible objects, in as strong and 
 lively a manner without our external organs of sense 
 as with them. 
 
 So also with regard to our powder of moving, or 
 directing motion by will and choice: upon the de¬ 
 struction of a limb, this active power remains, as it 
 evidently seems, unlessened; so as that the living 
 being, who has suffered this loss, would be capable of 
 moving as before, if it had another limb to move with. 
 It can walk by the help of an artificial leg; just as it 
 can make use of a pole or a lever, to reach towards 
 itself and to move things, beyond the length and the 
 power of its natural arm : and this last it does in the 
 same manner as it reaches and moves, with its natural 
 arm, things nearer and of less w T eight. Nor is there 
 
24 
 
 OP A FUTURE LIFE. 
 
 [part I. 
 
 so much as any appearance of our limbs being endued 
 with a power of moving or directing themselves; though 
 they are adapted, like the several parts of a machine, 
 to be the instruments of motion to each other; and 
 some parts of the same limb, to be instruments of 
 motion to other parts of it. 
 
 Thus a man determines, that he will look at such an 
 object through a microscope; or being lame suppose, 
 that he will walk to such a place with a staff a week 
 hence. His eyes and his feet no more determine in 
 these cases, than the microscope and the staff. Nor is 
 there any ground to think they any more put the 
 determination in practice ; or that his eyes are the 
 seers or his feet the movers, in any other sense than as 
 the microscope and the staff are. Upon the whole 
 then, our organs of sense and our limbs are certainly 
 instruments, which the living persons ourselves make 
 use of to perceive and move with : there is not any 
 probability, that they are any more ; nor consequently, 
 that we have any other kind of relation to them, than 
 what we may have to any other foreign matter formed 
 into instruments of perception and motion, suppose 
 into a microscope or a staff; (I say any other kind of 
 relation, for I am not speaking of the degree of it;) 
 nor consequently is there any probability, that the 
 alienation or dissolution of these instruments is the de¬ 
 struction of the perceiving and moving agent. 
 
 And thus our finding, that the dissolution of matter, 
 in which living beings were most nearly interested, is 
 not their dissolution; and that the destruction of seve¬ 
 ral of the organs and instruments of perception and of 
 motion belonging to them, is not their destruction ; 
 shews demonstratively, that there is no ground to 
 think that the dissolution of any other matter, or 
 destruction of any other organs and instruments, will 
 
CHAP. I.] 
 
 OF A FUTURE LIFE. 
 
 25 
 
 be the dissolution or destruction of living agents, 
 from the like kind of relation. And we have no rea¬ 
 son to think we stand in any other kind of relation to 
 any thing which we find dissolved by death. 
 
 But it is said these observations are equally appli¬ 
 cable to brutes: and it is thought an insuperable 
 difficulty, that they should be immortal, and by con¬ 
 sequence capable of everlasting happiness. Now this 
 manner of expression is both invidious and weak: but 
 the thing intended by it, is really no difficulty at all, 
 either in the way of natural or moral consideration. 
 For first, suppose the invidious thing, designed in such 
 a manner of expression, were really implied, as it is 
 not in the least, in the natural immortality of brutes; 
 namely, that they must arrive at great attainments, 
 and become rational and moral agents; even this 
 would be no difficulty: since we know not what 
 latent powers and capacities they may be endued with. 
 There was once, prior to experience, as great pre¬ 
 sumption against human creatures, as there is against 
 the brute creatures, arriving at that degree of un¬ 
 derstanding, which we have in mature age. For we 
 can trace up our own existence to the same original 
 with theirs. And we find it to be a general law of 
 nature, that creatures endued with capacities of virtue 
 and religion should be placed in a condition of being, 
 in which they are altogether without the use of them, 
 for a considerable length of their duration; as in 
 infancy and childhood. And great part of the human 
 species go out of the present world, before they come 
 to the exercise of these capacities in any degree at all. 
 But then, secondly, the natural immortality of brutes 
 does not in the least imply, that they are endued with 
 any latent capacities of a rational or moral nature. 
 And the economy of the universe might require, that 
 
[part I. 
 
 there should be living creatures without any capacities 
 of this kind. And all difficulties as to the manner 
 how they are to be disposed of are so apparently and 
 wholly founded in our ignorance, that it is wonderful 
 they should be insisted upon by any, but such as are 
 weak enough to think they are acquainted with the 
 whole system of things. There is then absolutely 
 nothing at all in this objection, which is so rhetorically 
 urged, against the greatest part of the natural proofs 
 or presumptions of the immortality of human minds: 
 I say the greatest part; for it is less applicable to 
 the following observation, which is more peculiar to 
 mankind : 
 
 IQ. That as it is evident our present powers and 
 capacities of reason, memory, and affection, do not 
 depend upon our gross body in the manner in which 
 perception by our organs of sense does; so they do not 
 appear to depend upon it at all in any such manner, as 
 to give ground to think, that the dissolution of this 
 body will be the destruction of these our present powers 
 of reflection, as it will of our powers of sensation ; or to 
 give ground to conclude, even that it will be so much 
 as a suspension of the former. 
 
 Human creatures exist at present in two states of 
 life and perception, greatly different from each other; 
 each of which has its own peculiar laws, and its 
 own peculiar enjoyments and sufferings. When any 
 of our senses are affected or appetites gratified with 
 the objects of them, we may be said to exist or live 
 in a state of sensation. When none of our senses 
 are affected or appetites gratified, and yet we per¬ 
 ceive, and reason, and act; we may be said to ex¬ 
 ist or live in a state of reflection. Now it is by 
 no means certain, that any thing which is dissolved 
 by death, is any way necessary to the living being in 
 
CHAP. I.] OF A FUTURE I.1FE. 27 
 
 this its state of reflection, after ideas are gained. 
 For, though, from our present constitution and con¬ 
 dition of being, our external organs of sense are neces¬ 
 sary for conveying in ideas to our reflecting powers, as 
 carriages, and levers, and scaffolds are in architecture: 
 yet when these ideas are brought in, we are capable of 
 reflecting in the most intense degree, and of enjoying 
 the greatest pleasure, and feeling the greatest pain, by 
 means of that reflection, without any assistance from 
 our senses; and without any at all, which we know of, 
 from that body which will be dissolved by death. It 
 does not appear then, that the relation of this gross body 
 to the reflecting being is, in any degree, necessary to 
 thinking; to our intellectual enjoyments or sufferings: 
 nor, consequently, that the dissolution or alienation of 
 the former by death, will be the destruction of those 
 present powers, which render us capable of this state 
 of reflection. Further, there are instances of mortal 
 diseases, which do not at all affect our present intel¬ 
 lectual powers; and this affords a presumption, that 
 those diseases will not destroy these present powers. 
 Indeed, from the observations made above e , it appears, 
 that there is no presumption, from their mutually af¬ 
 fecting each other, that the dissolution of the body is 
 the destruction of the living agent. And by the same 
 reasoning, it must appear too, that there is no pre¬ 
 sumption, from their mutually affecting each other, 
 that the dissolution of the body is the destruction of 
 our present reflecting powers: but instances of their 
 not affecting each other, afford a presumption of the 
 contrary. Instances of mortal diseases not impairing 
 our present reflecting powers, evidently turn our 
 thoughts even from imagining such diseases to be the 
 destruction of them. Several things indeed greatly 
 
 e P. 21, 22. 
 
28 
 
 OF A FUTURE LIFE. 
 
 [part I. 
 
 affect all our living powers, and at length suspend the 
 exercise of them ; as for instance drowsiness, increasing 
 till it ends in sound sleep: and from hence we might 
 have imagined it would destroy them, till we found by 
 experience the weakness of this way of judging. But 
 in the diseases now mentioned, there is not so much as 
 this shadow of probability, to lead us to any such con¬ 
 clusion, as to the reflecting powers which we have at 
 present. For in those diseases, persons the moment 
 before death appear to be in the highest vigour of life. 
 They discover apprehension, memory, reason, all entire; 
 with the utmost force of affection ; sense of a character, 
 of shame and honour; and the highest mental enjoy¬ 
 ments and sufferings, even to the last gasp : and these 
 surely prove even greater vigour of life than bodily 
 strength does. Now what pretence is there for think¬ 
 ing, that a progressive disease when arrived to such a 
 degree, I mean that degree which is mortal, will 
 destroy those powers, which were not impaired, which 
 were not affected by it, during its whole progress quite 
 up to that degree ? And if death by diseases of this 
 kind is not the destruction of our present reflecting 
 powers, it will scarce be thought that death by any 
 other means is. 
 
 It is obvious that this general observation may be 
 carried on further: and there appears so little con¬ 
 nexion between our bodily powers of sensation, and 
 our present powers of reflection, that there is no reason 
 to conclude, that death, which destroys the former, does 
 so much as suspend the exercise of the latter, or inter¬ 
 rupt our continuing to exist in the like state of re¬ 
 flection which we do now. For suspension of reason, 
 memory, and the affections which they excite, is no 
 part of the idea of death, nor is implied in our notion 
 of it. And our daily experiencing these powers to be 
 
OF A FUTURE LIFE. 
 
 ^9 
 
 CHAP. I.] 
 
 exercised, without any assistance, that we know of, 
 from those bodies, which will be dissolved by death ; 
 and our finding often, that the exercise of them is so 
 lively to the last; these things afford a sensible appre¬ 
 hension, that death may not perhaps be so much as a 
 discontinuance of the exercise of these powers, nor of 
 the enjoyments and sufferings which it implies f . So 
 that our posthumous life, whatever there may be in it 
 additional to our present, yet may not be entirely 
 beginning anew; but going on. Death may, in some 
 sort, and in some respects, answer to our birth ; which 
 is not a suspension of the faculties which we had before 
 it, or a total change of the state of life in which we 
 existed when in the womb; but a continuation of 
 both, with such and such great alterations. 
 
 Nay, for ought we know of ourselves, of our present 
 life and of death ; death may immediately, in the 
 natural course of things, put us into a higher and more 
 enlarged state of life, as our birth doesS; a state in 
 which our capacities, and sphere of perception and of 
 action, may be much greater than at present. For as 
 our relation to our external organs of sense, renders us 
 capable of existing in our present state of sensation; 
 
 f There are three distinct questions, relating to a future life, here 
 considered: Whether death be the destruction of living agents; if not. 
 Whether it be the destruction of their present powers of reflection, as it 
 certainly is the destruction of their present powers of sensation; and if 
 not. Whether it be the suspension, or discontinuance of the exercise, of 
 these present reflecting powers. Now, if there be no reason to believe 
 the last, there will be, if that were possible, less for the next, and less still 
 for the first. 
 
 s This, according to Strabo, was the opinion of the Brachmans, 
 vopt(eiv pev yap 8rj tov pev evOdbe fiiov, cos dv aKprjv Kvopevcav eivai' tov be 
 Oavarov , yeveaiv els tov ovtcos ftiov, Kai tov evbaipova rots (juXoaocfarjo-aai. 
 Lib. xv. p. 1039. ed. Amst. 1707. To which opinion perhaps Antoninus 
 may allude in these words, 6is vvv 7 repipeveis, irore epftpvov etc ttjs yaa-Tpos 
 tt/s yvvaiKos (tov e£e\Orj, ovtcos e'ltbexeaQai Trjv a>pav ev r) to yp’v^apiov crov 
 tov eXvrpov tovtov €K7rea€iTai. Lib. ix. c. 3. 
 
30 
 
 OF A FUTURE LIFE. 
 
 [part I. 
 
 so it may be the only natural hinderance to our exist¬ 
 ing, immediately and of course, in a higher state of 
 reflection. The truth is, reason docs not at all shew 
 us, in what state death naturally leaves us. But were 
 we sure, that it would suspend all our perceptive and 
 active powers; yet the suspension of a power and the 
 destruction of it, are effects so totally different in kind, 
 as we experience from sleep and a swoon, that we 
 cannot in any wise argue from one to the other; or 
 conclude even to the lowest degree of probability, that 
 the same kind of force which is sufficient to suspend 
 our faculties, though it be increased ever so much, will 
 be sufficient to destroy them. 
 
 These observations together may be sufficient to 
 shew, how little presumption there is, that death is the 
 destruction of human creatures. However, there is 
 the shadow of an analogy, which may lead us to 
 imagine it is; the supposed likeness which is observed 
 between the decay of vegetables, and of living creatures. 
 And this likeness is indeed sufficient to afford the 
 poets very apt allusions to the flowers of the field, in 
 their pictures of the frailty of our present life. But in 
 reason, the analogy is so far from holding, that there 
 appears no ground even for the comparison, as to the 
 present question; because one of the two subjects 
 compared is wholly void of that, which is the principal 
 and chief thing in the other, the power of perception 
 and of action ; and which is the only thins: we are 
 inquiring about the continuance of. So that the 
 destruction of a vegetable is an event not similar or 
 analogous to the destruction of a living agent. 
 
 But if, as was above intimated, leaving off the 
 delusive custom of substituting imagination in the 
 room of experience, we would confine ourselves to 
 what we do know and understand ; if we would argue 
 
OF A FUTURE LIFE. 
 
 31 
 
 CHAP. I.j 
 
 only from that, and from that form our expectations; 
 it would appear at first sight, that as no probability of 
 living beings ever ceasing to be so, can be concluded 
 from the reason of the thing; so none can be collected 
 from the analogy of Nature; because we cannot trace 
 any living beings beyond death. But as we are con¬ 
 scious that we are endued with capacities of perception 
 and of action, and are living persons; what we are to 
 go upon is, that we shall continue so, till we foresee 
 some accident or event, which will endanger those 
 capacities, or be likely to destroy us: which death 
 does in no wise appear to be. 
 
 And thus, when we go out of this world, we may 
 pass into new scenes, and a new state of life and 
 action, just as naturally as we came into the present. 
 And this new state may naturally be a social one. 
 And the advantages of it, advantages of every kind, 
 may naturally be bestowed, according to some fixed 
 general laws of wisdom, upon every one in proportion 
 to the degrees of his virtue. And though the ad¬ 
 vantages of that future natural state should not be 
 bestowed, as these of the present in some measure are, 
 by the will of the society; but entirely by his more 
 immediate action, upon whom the whole frame of 
 nature depends: yet this distribution may be just as 
 natural, as their being distributed here by the instru¬ 
 mentality of men. And indeed, though one -were to 
 allow any confused undetermined sense, which people 
 please to put upon the word natural, it would be a 
 shortness of thought scarce credible, to imagine, that 
 no system or course of things can be so, but only what 
 we see at present' 1 : especially whilst the probability of 
 a future life, or the natural immortality of the soul, is 
 admitted upon the evidence of reason; because this is 
 
 h See part II. chap. ii. and part II. chap. iv. 
 
OF A FUTURE LIFE. 
 
 
 [part I. 
 
 really both admitting and denying at once, a state of 
 being different from the present to be natural. But 
 the only distinct meaning of that word is, stated, fixed, 
 or settled: since what is natural, as much requires and 
 presupposes an intelligent agent to render it so, i. e. to 
 effect it continually, or at stated times; as what is 
 supernatural or miraculous does to effect it for once. 
 And from hence it must follow, that persons’ notion ot 
 what is natural, will be enlarged in proportion to their 
 greater knowledge of the works of God, and the dis¬ 
 pensations of his Providence. Nor is there any ab¬ 
 surdity in supposing, that there may be beings in the 
 universe, whose capacities, and knowledge, and views, 
 may be so extensive, as that the whole Christian dis¬ 
 pensation may to them appear natural, i. e. analogous 
 or conformable to God’s dealings with other parts of 
 his creation ; as natural as the visible known course of 
 things appears to us. For there seems scarce any other 
 possible sense to be put upon the word, but that only 
 in which it is here used; similar, stated, or uniform. 
 
 This credibility of a future life, which has been here 
 insisted upon, how little soever it may satisfy our 
 curiosity, seems to answer all the purposes of religion, 
 in like manner as a demonstrative proof would. Indeed 
 a proof, even a demonstrative one, of a future life, 
 would not be a proof of religion. For, that we are to 
 live hereafter, is just as reconcilable with the scheme 
 of atheism, and as well to be accounted for by it, as 
 that we are now alive is: and therefore nothing can 
 be more absurd than to argue from that scheme, that 
 there can be no future state. But as religion implies 
 a future state, any presumption against such a state, is 
 a presumption against religion. And the foregoing 
 observations remove all presumptions of that sort, and 
 prove, to a very considerable degree of probability, one 
 
33 
 
 CHAP. II.] OF THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD, &C. 
 
 fundamental doctrine of religion ; which, if believed, 
 would greatly open and dispose the mind seriously to 
 attend to the general evidence of the whole. 
 
 CHAP. II. 
 
 Of the Government of God by Rewards and Punish¬ 
 ments ; and particularly of the latter. 
 
 f 11IIA1 which makes the question concerning a 
 J- future life to be of so great importance to us, is 
 our capacity of happiness and misery. And that which 
 makes the consideration of it to be of so great im¬ 
 portance to us, is the supposition of our happiness and 
 misery Hereafter, depending upon our actions Here. 
 “V\ ithout this indeed, curiosity could not but sometimes 
 bring a subject, in which we may be so highly in¬ 
 terested, to our thoughts; especially upon the mortality 
 of others, or the near prospect of our own. But 
 reasonable men would not take any further thought 
 about Hereafter, than what should happen thus oc¬ 
 casionally to rise in their minds, if it were certain that 
 our future interest no way depended upon our present 
 behaviour: whereas on the contrary, if there be ground, 
 either from analogy or any thing else, to think it does; 
 then there is reason also for the most active thought 
 and solicitude, to secure that interest; to behave so as 
 that we may escape that misery, and obtain that hap¬ 
 piness in another life, which we not only suppose our¬ 
 selves capable of, but which we apprehend also is put 
 in our own power. And whether there be ground for 
 this last apprehension, certainly would deserve to be 
 most seriously considered, were there no other proof of 
 a future life and interest, than that presumptive one, 
 which the foregoing observations amount to. 
 
 ANALOGY. 
 
 D 
 
34 OF THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD [pART I. 
 
 Now in the present state, all which we enjoy, and a 
 great part of what we suffer, is put in our own power . 
 For pleasure and pain are the consequences of our 
 actions: and we are endued by the Author of our 
 Nature with capacities of foreseeing these conse¬ 
 quences. We find by experience lie does not so 
 much as preserve our lives, exclusively of our own 
 care and attention, to provide ourselves with, and to 
 make use of, that sustenance, by which he has appoint¬ 
 ed our lives shall be preserved; and without which, 
 he has appointed, they shall not be preserved at all. 
 And in general we foresee, that the external things, 
 which are the objects of our various passions, can 
 neither be obtained nor enjoyed, without exerting 
 ourselves in such and such manners: but by thus 
 exerting ourselves, we obtain and enjoy these objects, 
 in which our natural good consists; or by this means 
 God gives us the possession and enjoyment of them. 
 I know’ not, that we have any one kind or degree of 
 enjoyment, but by the means of our own actions. 
 And by prudence and care, we may, for the most part, 
 pass our days in tolerable ease and quiet: or, on the 
 contrary, we may, by rashness, ungoverned passion, 
 wilfulness, or even by negligence, make ourselves as 
 miserable as ever w’e please. And many do please 
 to make themselves extremely miserable, i. e. to do 
 what they know beforehand will render them so. 
 They follow’ those ways, the fruit of which they know, 
 by instruction, example, experience, will be disgrace, 
 and poverty, and sickness, and untimely death. This 
 every one observes to be the general course of 
 things ; though it is to be allow’ed, we cannot find 
 by experience, that all our sufferings are owing to our 
 own follies. 
 
 Why the Author of Nature does not give his creatures 
 
CHAP. II.] 
 
 BY REWARDS AXD PUNISHMENTS. 
 
 85 
 
 promiscuously such and such perceptions, without re¬ 
 gard to their behaviour; why he does not make them 
 happy without the instrumentality of their own actions, 
 and prevent their bringing any sufferings upon them¬ 
 selves ; is another matter. Perhaps there may be 
 some impossibilities in the nature of things, which we 
 are unacquainted with *. Or less happiness, it may be, 
 would upon the whole be produced by such a method 
 ot conduct, than is by the present. Or perhaps 
 Divine goodness, with which, if I mistake not, we 
 make very free in our speculations, may not be a bare 
 single disposition to produce happiness; but a disposi¬ 
 tion to make the good, the faithful, the honest man 
 happy- Perhaps an infinitely perfect Mind may be 
 pleased, with seeing his creatures behave suitably to 
 the nature which he has given them; to the relations 
 which he has placed them in to each other; and to 
 that, which they stand in to himself: that relation to 
 himself, which, during their existence, is even neces¬ 
 sary, and which is the most important one of all : per¬ 
 haps, I say, an infinitely perfect Mind may be pleased 
 with this moral piety of moral agents, in and for 
 itself; as well as upon account of its being essentially 
 conducive to the happiness of his creation. Or the 
 whole end, for which God made, and thus governs the 
 world, may be utterly beyond the reach of our facul¬ 
 ties : there may be somewhat in it as impossible for 
 us to have any conception of, as for a blind man to 
 have a conception of colours. But however this be, 
 it is certain matter of universal experience, that the 
 general method of Divine administration is, forewarn¬ 
 ing us, or giving us capacities to foresee, with more or 
 less clearness, that if we act so and so, we shall have 
 such enjoyments, if so and so, such sufferings; and 
 
 1 Part I. chap, vii- 
 D 2 
 
36 
 
 OF THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD [PART I. 
 
 giving us those enjoyments, and making us feel those 
 sufferings, in consequence of our actions. 
 
 “ But all this is to be ascribed to the general 
 <c course of nature.” True. This is the very thing 
 which I am observing. It is to be ascribed to the 
 general course of nature: i. e. not surely to the words 
 or ideas, course of nature; but to him who appointed 
 it, and put things into it: or to a course of operation, 
 from its uniformity or constancy, called natural k ; and 
 which necessarily implies an operating agent. For 
 when men find themselves necessitated to confess an 
 Author of Nature, or that God is the natural governor 
 of the world ; they must not deny this again, because 
 his government is uniform; they must not deny that 
 he does things at all, because he does them constant¬ 
 ly; because the effects of his acting are permanent, whe¬ 
 ther his acting be so or not; though there is no reason 
 to think it is not. In short, every man, in every thing 
 / he does, naturally acts upon the forethought and ap¬ 
 prehension of avoiding evil or obtaining good: and if 
 the natural course of things be the appointment of 
 God, and our natural faculties of knowledge and ex¬ 
 perience are given us by him ; then the good and bad 
 consequences which follow our actions, are his appoint¬ 
 ment, and our foresight of those consequences, is a 
 warning given us by him, how we are to act. 
 
 “ Is the pleasure then, naturally accompanying every 
 “ particular gratification of passion, intended to put us 
 66 upon gratifying ourselves in every such particular 
 “ instance, and as a reward to us for so doing?” No 
 certainly. Nor is it to be said, that our eyes were 
 naturally intended to give us the sight of each par¬ 
 ticular object, to which they do or can extend; objects 
 which are destructive of them, or which, for any 
 
 k P-3 1 ’ 3 2 - 
 
CHAP. II.] 
 
 BY REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS. 
 
 37 
 
 other reason, it may become us to turn our eyes from. 
 Yet there is no doubt, but that our eyes were intended 
 for us to see with. So neither is there any doubt, but 
 that the foreseen pleasures and pains belonging to the 
 passions, were intended, in general, to induce mankind 
 to act in such and such manners. 
 
 Now from this general observation, obvious to every 
 one, that God has given us to understand, he has 
 appointed satisfaction and delight to be the conse¬ 
 quence of our acting in one manner, and pain and 
 uneasiness of our acting in another, and of our not 
 acting at all; and that we find the consequences, 
 which we were beforehand informed of, uniformly to 
 follow ; we may learn, that we are at present actually 
 under his government in the strictest and most proper 
 sense; in such a sense, as that he rewards and punishes 
 us for our actions. An Author of Nature being sup¬ 
 posed, it is not so much a deduction of reason, as 
 a matter of experience, that we are thus under his 
 government: under his government, in the same sense, 
 as we are under the government of civil magistrates. 
 Because the annexing pleasure to some actions, and 
 pain to others, in our power to do or forbear, and 
 giving notice of this appointment beforehand to those 
 whom it concerns; is the proper formal notion of 
 government. Whether the pleasure or pain which 
 thus follows upon our behaviour, be owing to the 
 Author of Nature’s acting upon us every moment 
 which we feel it; or to his having at once contrived 
 and executed his own part in the plan of the world; 
 makes no alteration as to the matter before us. For 
 if civil magistrates could make the sanctions of their 
 laws take place, without interposing at all, after they 
 had passed them; without a trial, and the formalities 
 
38 OF THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD [PART I. 
 
 of an execution: if they were able to make their laws 
 execute themselves, or every offender to execute them 
 upon himself; we should be just in the same sense 
 under their government then, as we are now; but in 
 a much higher degree, and more perfect manner. 
 Vain is the ridicule with which, one foresees, some 
 persons will divert themselves, upon finding lesser 
 pains considered as instances of Divine punishment. 
 There is no possibility of answering or evading the 
 general thing here intended, without denying all final 
 causes. For final causes being admitted, the pleasures 
 and pains now mentioned must be admitted too as 
 instances of them. And if they are; if God annexes 
 delight to some actions, and uneasiness to others, with 
 an apparent design to induce us to act so and so ; then 
 he not only dispenses happiness and misery, but also 
 rewards and punishes actions. If, for example, the 
 pain which we feel, upon doing what tends to the 
 destruction of our bodies, suppose upon too near 
 approaches to fire, or upon wounding ourselves, be 
 appointed by the Author of Nature to prevent our 
 doing what thus tends to our destruction; this is 
 altogether as much an instance of his punishing our 
 actions, and consequently of our being under his go¬ 
 vernment, as declaring by a voice from heaven, that 
 if we acted so, he would inflict such pain upon us, and 
 inflicting it, whether it be greater or less. 
 
 Thus we find, that the true notion or conception of 
 the Author of Nature, is that of a master or governor, 
 prior to the consideration of his moral attributes. The 
 fact of our case, which we find by experience, is, that 
 he actually exercises dominion or government over us 
 at present, by rewarding and punishing us for our 
 actions, in as strict and proper a sense of these words. 
 
BY REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS. 
 
 39 
 
 CHAP. II.] 
 
 and even in the same sense, as children, servants, 
 subjects, are rewarded and punished by those who 
 govern them. 
 
 And thus the whole analogy of Nature, the whole 
 present course of things, most fully shews, that there 
 is nothing incredible in the general doctrine of religion, 
 that God will reward and punish men for their actions 
 hereafter: nothing incredible, I mean, arising out of 
 the notion of rewarding and punishing. For the whole 
 course of nature is a present instance of his exercising 
 that government over us, which implies in it rewarding 
 and punishing. 
 
 B UT as Divine punishment is what men chiefly 
 object against, and are most unwilling to allow; 
 it may be proper to mention some circumstances in the 
 natural course of punishments at present, which are 
 analogous to what religion teaches us concerning a 
 future state of punishment; indeed so analogous, that 
 as they add a farther credibility to it, so they cannot 
 but raise a most serious apprehension of it in those who 
 will attend to them. 
 
 It has been now observed, that such and such 
 miseries naturally follow such and such actions of im¬ 
 prudence and wilfulness, as well as actions more com¬ 
 monly and more distinctly considered as vicious; and 
 that these consequences, when they may be foreseen, 
 are properly natural punishments annexed to such 
 actions. For the general thing here insisted upon, 
 is, not that we see a great deal of misery in the 
 world, but a great deal which men bring upon them¬ 
 selves by their own behaviour, which they might have 
 foreseen and avoided. Now the circumstances of these 
 natural punishments, particularly deserving our atten¬ 
 tion, are such as these; That oftentimes they follow. 
 
40 
 
 OF THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD 
 
 [part I. 
 
 or are inflicted in consequence of, actions, which pro¬ 
 cure many present advantages, and are accompanied 
 with much present pleasure; for instance, sickness and 
 untimely death is the consequence of intemperance, 
 though accompanied with the highest mirth and jollity: 
 That these punishments are often much greater, than 
 the advantages or pleasures obtained by the actions, 
 of which they are the punishments or consequences: 
 That though we may imagine a constitution of nature, 
 in which these natural punishments, which are in fact 
 to follow, would follow, immediately upon such actions 
 being done, or very soon after; we find on the contrary 
 in our world, that they are often delayed a great while, 
 sometimes even till long after the actions occasioning 
 them are forgot; so that the constitution of nature is 
 such, that delay of punishment is no sort nor degree of. 
 presumption of final impunity : That after such delay, 
 these natural punishments or miseries often come, not 
 by degrees, but suddenly, with violence, and at once; 
 however, the chief misery often does: That as certainty 
 of such distant misery following such actions, is never 
 afforded persons; so perhaps during the actions, they 
 have seldom a distinct full expectation of its following 1 : 
 and many times the case is only thus, that they see 
 in general, or may see, the credibility, that intemper¬ 
 ance, suppose, will bring after it diseases ; civil crimes, 
 civil punishments; when yet the real probability often 
 is, that they shall escape; but things notwithstanding 
 take their destined course, and the misery inevitably 
 follows at its appointed time, in very many of these 
 cases. Thus also though youth may be alleged as an 
 excuse for rashness and folly, as being naturally 
 thoughtless, and not clearly foreseeing all the con¬ 
 sequences of being untractable and profligate; this 
 
 1 See part II. chap. vi. 
 
BY PUNISHMENTS. 
 
 41 
 
 CHAP. II.] 
 
 does not hinder, but that these consequences follow, 
 and are grievously felt, throughout the whole course of 
 mature life. Habits contracted even in that a«e, are 
 often utter ruin: and men’s success in the world, not 
 only in the common sense of worldly success, but their 
 real happiness and misery, depends, in a great degree, 
 and in various ways, upon the manner in which they 
 pass their youth; which consequences they for the 
 most part neglect to consider, and perhaps seldom can 
 properly be said to believe, beforehand. It requires 
 also to be mentioned, that in numberless cases, the 
 natural course of things affords us opportunities for 
 procuring advantages to ourselves at certain times, 
 which we cannot procure when we will: nor ever 
 recall the opportunities, if we have neglected them. 
 Indeed the general course of nature is an example of 
 this. If, during the opportunity of youth, persons are 
 indocile and self-willed ; they inevitably suffer in their 
 future life, for want of those acquirements, which they 
 neglected the natural season of attaining. If the 
 husbandman lets his seed-time pass without sowing, 
 the whole year is lost to him beyond recovery. In 
 like manner, though after men have been guilty of 
 folly and extravagance up to a certain degree, it is 
 often in their power, for instance, to retrieve their 
 affairs, to recover their health and character; at least 
 in good measure: yet real reformation is, in many 
 cases, of no avail at all towards preventing the miseries, 
 poverty, sickness, infamy, naturally annexed to folly 
 and extravagance exceeding that degree. There is a 
 certain bound to imprudence and misbehaviour, which 
 being transgressed, their remains no place for repent¬ 
 ance in the natural course of things. It is further 
 very much to be remarked, that neglects from incon- 
 siderateness, want of attention m , not looking about us 
 
 Part II. chap. vi. 
 
 m 
 
42 OF THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD [PART I. 
 
 to see what we have to do, are often attended with 
 consequences altogether as dreadful, as any active 
 misbehaviour, from the most extravagant passion. And 
 lastly, civil government being natural, the punishments 
 of it are so too: and some of these punishments are 
 capital; as the effects of a dissolute course of pleasure 
 are often mortal. So that many natural punishments 
 are final 11 to him, who incurs them, if considered only 
 in his temporal capacity : and seem inflicted by natural 
 appointment, either to remove the offender out of the 
 way of being further mischievous; or as an example, 
 though frequently a disregarded one, to those who are 
 left behind. 
 
 These things are not, what we call accidental, or to 
 be met with only now and then ; but they are things 
 of every day’s experience: they proceed from general 
 laws, very general ones, by which God governs the 
 world, in the natural course of his providence. And 
 they are so analogous to what Religion teaches us 
 concerning the future punishment of the wicked, so 
 much of a piece with it, that both would naturally be 
 expressed in the very same words, and maimer of de¬ 
 scription. In the book of Proverbs °, for instance, 
 Wisdom is introduced, as frequenting the most public 
 places of resort, and as rejected when she offers herself 
 as the natural appointed guide of human life. How 
 long , speaking to those who are passing through it, how 
 
 n The general consideration of a future state of punishment, most 
 evidently belongs to the subject of Natural Religion. But if any of these 
 reflections should be thought to relate more peculiarly to this doctrine, 
 as taught in Scripture; the reader is desired to observe, that Gentile 
 writers, both moralists and poets, speak of the future punishment of the 
 wicked, both as to the duration and degree of it, in a like manner of 
 expression and of description, as the Scripture does. So that all which 
 can positively be asserted to be matter of mere Revelation, with regard to 
 this doctrine, seems to be, that the great distinction between the righteous 
 
 ° Chap. i. 
 
BY PUNISHMENTS. 
 
 43 
 
 CHAP. II.] 
 
 long, ye simple ones, will ye love folly f and the scorners 
 delight in their scorning, and fools hate knowledge ? 
 Turn ye at my reproof: behold, I will pour out my 
 spirit upon you, I will make known my words unto you. 
 But upon being neglected, Because I have called, and 
 ye refused; I have stretched out my hand, and no man 
 regarded; but ye have set at nought all my counsel, and 
 would none of my reproof: I also ivill laugh at your 
 calamity; I will mock when your fear cometh; when 
 your fear cometh as desolation, and your destruction 
 cometh as a whirlwind; when distress and anguish 
 cometh upon you. Then shall they call upon me, but 
 1 will not answer; they shall seek me early, but they 
 shall not find me. This passage, every one sees, is 
 poetical, and some parts of it are highly figurative; 
 but their meaning is obvious. And the thing intended 
 is expressed more literally in the following words; 
 For that they hated knowledge, and did not choose the 
 fear of the Lord:—therefore shall they eat of the fruit 
 of their oivn way, and be filled with their own devices. 
 For the security of the simple shall slay them, and the 
 prosperity of fools shall destroy them. And the whole 
 passage is so equally applicable, to what we experience 
 in the present world, concerning the consequences of 
 men’s actions, and to what Religion teaches us is to be 
 
 and the wicked, shall be made at the end of this world; that each shall 
 then receive according to his deserts. Reason did, as it well might, con¬ 
 clude that it should, finally and upon the whole, be well with the righteous) 
 and ill with the wicked : but it could not be determined upon any prin¬ 
 ciples of reason, whether human creatures might not have been appointed 
 to pass through other states of life and being, before that distributive 
 justice should finally and effectually take place. Revelation teaches us, 
 that the next state of things after the present is appointed for the execu¬ 
 tion of this justice ; that it shall be no longer delayed ; but the mystery of 
 God , the great mystery of his suffering vice and confusion to prevail, 
 shall then be finished; and he will take to him his great power and will 
 reign , by rendering to every one according to his works. 
 
OF THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD 
 
 44 
 
 [part I. 
 
 expected in another, that it may be questioned which of 
 the two was principally intended. 
 
 Indeed when one has been recollecting the proper 
 proofs of a future state of rewards and punishments, 
 nothing methinks can give one so sensible an appre¬ 
 hension of the latter, or representation of it to the 
 mind ; as observing, that after the many disregarded 
 checks, admonitions and warnings, which people meet 
 with in the ways of vice and folly and extravagance; 
 warnings from their very nature ; from the examples 
 of others ; from the lesser inconveniences which they 
 bring upon themselves; from the instructions of wise 
 and virtuous men : after these have been long despised, 
 scorned, ridiculed : after the chief bad consequences, 
 temporal consequences, of their follies, have been 
 delayed for a great while; at length they break in 
 irresistibly, like an armed force : repentance is too late 
 to relieve, and can serve only to aggravate, their dis¬ 
 tress : the case is become desperate : and poverty and 
 sickness, remorse and anguish, infamy and death, the 
 effects of their own doings, overwhelm them, beyond 
 possibility of remedy or escape. This is an account of 
 what is in fact the general constitution of nature. 
 
 It is not in any sort meant, that according to what 
 appears at present of the natural course of things, 
 men are always uniformly punished in proportion to 
 their misbehaviour: but that there are very many 
 instances of misbehaviour punished in the several ways 
 now mentioned, and very dreadful instances too ; suffi¬ 
 cient to shew what the laws of the universe may 
 admit; and, if thoroughly considered, sufficient fully 
 to answer all objections against the credibility of a 
 future state of punishments, from any imaginations, 
 that the frailty of our nature and external temptations, 
 almost annihilate the guilt of human vices : as well as 
 
CHAP. II.] 
 
 BY PUNISHMENTS. 
 
 45 
 
 objections of another sort; from necessity ; from sup¬ 
 positions, that the will of an infinite Being cannot be 
 contradicted ; or that he must be incapable of offence 
 and provocation q . 
 
 Reflections of this kind are not without their terrors 
 to serious persons, the most free from enthusiasm, and 
 of the greatest strength of mind; but it is fit things 
 be stated and considered as they really are. And 
 there is, in the present age, a certain fearlessness, with 
 regard to what may be hereafter under the government 
 of God, which nothing but an universally acknowledged 
 demonstration on the side of atheism can justify; and 
 which makes it quite necessary, that men be reminded, 
 and if possible made to feel, that there is no sort of 
 ground for being thus presumptuous, even upon the 
 most sceptical principles. For, may it not be said of 
 any person upon his being born into the world, he 
 may behave so, as to be of no service to it, but by 
 being made an example of the woful effects of vice and 
 folly? That he may, as any one may, if he will, incur 
 an infamous execution, from the hands of civil justice ; 
 or in some other course of extravagance shorten his 
 days ; or bring upon himself infamy and diseases worse 
 than death? So that it had been better for him, even 
 with regard to the present world, that he had never 
 been born. And is there any pretence of reason, for 
 people to think themselves secure, and talk as if they 
 had certain proof, that, let them act as licentiously as 
 they will, there can be nothing analogous to this, with 
 regard to a future and more general interest, under the 
 providence and government of the same God ? 
 
 See chap. iv. and vi. 
 
46 
 
 OK THE MORAL 
 
 [part I. 
 
 ciiap. hi. 
 
 Of the Moral Government of God. 
 
 S the manifold appearances of design and of final 
 
 causes, in the constitution of the world, prove it 
 to be the work of an intelligent Mind ; so the par¬ 
 ticular final causes of pleasure and pain distributed 
 amongst his creatures, prove that they are under his 
 government; what may be called his natural govern¬ 
 ment of creatures endued with sense and reason. 
 This, however, implies somewhat more than seems 
 usually attended to, when we speak of God’s natural 
 government of the world. It implies government of 
 the very same kind with that, which a master exercises 
 over his servants, or a civil magistrate over his subjects. 
 These latter instances of final causes, as really prove 
 an intelligent Governor of the world, in the sense 
 now mentioned, and before a distinctly treated of; as 
 any other instances of final causes prove an intelligent 
 Maker of it. 
 
 Bat this alone does not appear at first sight to 
 determine any thing certainly, concerning the moral 
 character of the Author of Nature, considered in this 
 relation of governor; does not ascertain his govern¬ 
 ment to be moral, or prove that lie is the righteous 
 judge of the world. Moral government consists, not 
 barely in rewarding and punishing men for their 
 actions, which the most tyrannical person may do: but 
 in rewarding the righteous, and punishing the wicked; 
 in rendering to men according to their actions, con¬ 
 sidered as good or evil. And the perfection of moral 
 government consists in doing this, with regard to all 
 
 a Chap. ii. 
 
GOVERNMENT OF GOD. 
 
 47 
 
 CHAP. Ill.] 
 
 intelligent creatures, in an exact proportion to their 
 personal merits or demerits. 
 
 Some men seem to think the only character of the 
 Author of Nature to be that of simple absolute bene¬ 
 volence. This, considered as a principle of action and 
 infinite in degree, is a disposition to produce the 
 greatest possible happiness, without regard to persons’ 
 behaviour, otherwise than as such regard would pro¬ 
 duce higher degrees of it. And supposing this to be 
 the only character of God, veracity and justice in him 
 would be nothing but benevolence conducted by 
 wisdom. Now surely this ought not to be asserted, 
 unless it can be proved ; for we should speak with 
 cautious reverence upon such a subject. And whether 
 it can be proved or no, is not the thing here to be 
 inquired into; but whether in the constitution and 
 conduct of the world, a righteous government be not 
 discernibly planned out: which necessarily implies a 
 righteous governor. There may possibly be in the 
 creation, beings, to whom the Author of Nature mani¬ 
 fests himself under this most amiable of all characters, 
 this of infinite absolute benevolence; for it is the most 
 amiable, supposing it not, as perhaps it is not, incom¬ 
 patible with justice: but he manifests himself to us 
 under the character of a righteous governor. lie may, 
 consistently with this, be simply and absolutely bene¬ 
 volent, in the sense now explained : but he is, for he 
 has given us a proof in the constitution and conduct of 
 the world that he is, a governor over servants, as he 
 rewards and punishes us for our actions. And in the 
 constitution and conduct of it, he may also have given, 
 besides the reason of the thing, and the natural pre¬ 
 sages of conscience, clear and distinct intimations, that 
 his government is righteous or moral: clear to such as 
 think the nature of it deserving their attention; and 
 
48 OF THE MORAL [PART l. 
 
 yet not to every careless person, who casts a transient 
 reflection upon the subject b . 
 
 But it is particularly to be observed, that the Divine 
 government, which we experience ourselves under in 
 the present state, taken alone, is allowed not to be the 
 perfection of moral government. And yet this by no 
 means hinders, but that there may be somewhat, be it 
 more or less, truly moral in it. A righteous govern¬ 
 ment may plainly appear to be carried on to some 
 degree: enough to give us the apprehension that it 
 shall be completed, or carried on to that degree of 
 perfection which religion teaches us it shall; but 
 which cannot appear, till much more of the Divine 
 administration be seen, than can in the present life. 
 And the design of this chapter is to inquire, how far 
 this is the case: how far, over and above the moral 
 nature 0 which God has given us, and our natural notion 
 of him as righteous governor of those his creatures, to 
 whom he has given this nature d ; I say how far besides 
 this, the principles and beginnings of a moral govern¬ 
 ment over the world may be discerned, notwithstanding 
 and amidst all the confusion and disorder of it. 
 
 Now one might mention here, what has been often 
 urged with great force, that in general, less uneasiness 
 and more satisfaction, are the natural consequences 6 of 
 a virtuous than of a vicious course of life, in the 
 
 b The objections against Religion, from the evidence of it not being 
 universal, nor so strong as might possibly have been, may be urged 
 against natural Religion, as well as against revealed. And therefore the 
 consideration of them belongs to the first part of this Treatise, as well as 
 the second. But as these objections are chiefly urged against revealed 
 religion, I chose to consider them in the second part. And the answer to 
 them there, chap. vi. as urged against Christianity, being almost equally 
 applicable to them as urged against the Religion of Nature; to avoid 
 repetition, the reader is referred to that chapter. 
 
 c Dissertation II. d Chap. vi. 
 
 e See Lord Shaftesbury’s Inquiry concerning Virtue, part II. 
 
CHAP. III.] 
 
 GOVERNMENT OF GOD. 
 
 49 
 
 present state, as an instance of a moral government 
 established in nature ; an instance of it, collected from 
 experience and present matter of fact. But it must 
 be owned a thing of difficulty to weigh and balance 
 pleasures and uneasinesses, each amongst themselves, 
 and also against each other, so as to make an estimate 
 vith any exactness, of the overplus of happiness on the 
 side of virtue. And it is not impossible, that, amidst 
 the infinite disorders of the world, there may be ex¬ 
 ceptions to the happiness of virtue; even with regard 
 to those persons, whose course of life from their youth 
 up has been blameless; and more with regard to those, 
 who have gone on for some time in the ways of vice, 
 and ha\e afterwards reformed. For suppose an in¬ 
 stance oi the latter case; a person w ith his passions 
 inflamed, his natural faculty of self-governmeut im¬ 
 paired by habits of indulgence, and with all his vices 
 about him, like so many harpies, craving for their ac¬ 
 customed gratification: who can say how long it might 
 be, before such a person would find more satisfaction 
 in the reasonableness and present good consequences 
 of virtue, than difficulties and self-denial in the re¬ 
 straints of itExperience also shews, that men can, to 
 a gieat degree, get over their sense of shame, so as 
 that by professing themselves to be without principle, 
 and avowing even direct villainy, they can support 
 themselves against the infamy of it. But as the ill 
 actions of any one will probably be more talked of, and 
 oftener thrown in his way, upon his reformation; so 
 the infamy of them will be much more felt, after the 
 natuial sense of virtue and of honour is recovered. 
 
 L neasiness of this kind ought indeed to be put to the 
 account of former vices: yet it will be said, they are 
 in part the consequences of reformation. Still 1 am 
 tar from allowing' it doubtful, whether virtue, upon the 
 
50 
 
 OF THE MORAL 
 
 [part I. 
 
 whole, be happier than vice in the present world. But 
 if it were, yet the beginnings of a righteous admin¬ 
 istration may beyond all question be found in nature, if 
 we will attentively inquire after them. And, 
 
 I. In whatever manner the notion of God’s moral 
 government over the world might be treated, if it did 
 not appear, whether he were in a proper sense our 
 governor at all: yet when it is certain matter of ex¬ 
 perience, that he does manifest himself to us under the 
 character of a governor, in the sense explained f ; it 
 must deserve to be considered, whether there be not 
 reason to apprehend, that he may be a righteous or 
 moral governor. Since it appears to be fact, that God 
 does govern mankind by the method of rewards and 
 punishments, according to some settled rules of dis¬ 
 tribution ; it is surely a question to be asked, What 
 presumption is there against his finally rewarding and 
 punishing them according to this particular rule, name¬ 
 ly, as they act reasonably or unreasonably, virtuously 
 or viciously ? since rendering men happy or miserable 
 by this rule, certainly falls in, much more falls in, with 
 our natural apprehensions and sense of things, than 
 doing so by any other rule whatever: since rewarding 
 and punishing actions by any other rule, would appear 
 much harder to be accounted for, by minds formed as 
 he has formed ours. Be the evidence of religion then 
 more or less clear, the expectation which it raises in 
 us, that the righteous shall, upon the whole, be happy, 
 and the wicked miserable, cannot however possibly be 
 considered as absurd or chimerical; because it is no 
 more than an expectation, that a method of government 
 already begun, shall be carried on, the method of 
 rewarding and punishing actions; and shall be carried 
 on by a particular rule, which unavoidably appears to 
 
 f Chapter ii. 
 
CHAP. Hi.] 
 
 GOVERNMENT OF GOD. 
 
 51 
 
 us at first sight more natural than any other, the rule 
 which we call distributive justice. Nor, 
 
 IT. Ought it to be entirely passed over, that tran¬ 
 quillity, satisfaction, and external advantages, being 
 the natural consequences of prudent management of 
 ouiselves, and our affairs; and rashness, profligate 
 negligence, and wilful folly, bringing* after them many 
 inconveniences and sufferings; these afford instances of 
 a light constitution of nature: as the correction of 
 children, for their own sakes, and by way of example, 
 when they run into danger or hurt themselves, is a 
 part of right education. And thus, that God governs 
 the woild by general fixed laws, that he has endued us 
 ith capacities of reflecting upon this constitution of 
 things, and foreseeing’ the good and bad consequences 
 of our behaviour; plainly implies some sort of moral 
 government: since from such a constitution of things 
 it cannot but follow, that prudence and imprudence, 
 which are of the nature of virtue and vices, must be, 
 as they are, respectively rewarded and punished. 
 
 III. From the natural course of things, vicious 
 actions are, to a great degree, actually punished as 
 mischievous to society; and besides punishment ac¬ 
 tually inflicted upon this account, there is also the fear 
 and apprehension of it in those persons, whose crimes 
 have rendered them obnoxious to it, in case of a dis¬ 
 covery ; this state of fear being itself often a very con¬ 
 siderable punishment. The natural fear and appre¬ 
 hension of it too, which restrains from such crimes, is 
 a declaration of nature against them. It is necessary 
 to the very being of society, that vices destructive of 
 it, should be punished as being so; the vices of false¬ 
 hood, injustice, cruelty: which punishment therefore is 
 as natural as society; and so is an instance of a kind 
 
 e See Dissertation II. 
 
 E 2 
 
52 
 
 OF THE MORAL 
 
 [PART I. 
 
 of moral government, naturally established, and actually 
 taking place. And, since the certain natural course of 
 things is the conduct of Providence or the government 
 of God, though carried on by the instrumentality of 
 men ; the observation here made amounts to this, that 
 mankind find themselves placed by him in such cir¬ 
 cumstances, as that they are unavoidably accountable 
 for their behaviour, and are often punished, and some¬ 
 times rewarded under his government, in the view of 
 their being mischievous, or eminently beneficial to 
 society. 
 
 If it be objected that good actions, and such as are 
 beneficial to society, are often punished, as in the case 
 of persecution and in other cases ; and that ill and 
 mischievous actions are often rewarded : it may be 
 answered distinctly; first, that this is in no sort 
 necessary, and consequently not natural, in the sense 
 in which it is necessary, and therefore natural, that ill 
 or mischievous actions should be punished : and in the 
 next place, that good actions are never punished, con¬ 
 sidered as beneficial to society, nor ill actions rewarded, 
 under the view of their being hurtful to it. So that it 
 stands good, without any thing on the side of vice to 
 be set over against it, that the Author of Nature has 
 as truly directed, that vicious actions, considered as 
 mischievous to society, should be punished, and put 
 mankind under a necessity of thus punishing them; as 
 he has directed and necessitated us to preserve our 
 lives by food. 
 
 IV. In the natural course of things, virtue as such 
 is actually rewarded, and vice as such punished : which 
 seems to afford an instance or example, not only of 
 government, but of moral government, begun and 
 established ; moral in the strictest sense; though not 
 in that perfection of degree, which religion teaches us 
 
CHAP. III.] 
 
 GOVERNMENT OF GOD. 
 
 53 
 
 to expect. In order to see this more clearly, we must 
 distinguish between actions themselves, and that quality 
 ascribed to them, which we call virtuous or vicious. 
 The gratification itself of every natural passion must 
 be attended with delight: and acquisitions of fortune, 
 however made, are acquisitions of the means or 
 materials of enjoyment. An action then, by which 
 any natural passion is gratified or fortune acquired, 
 procures delight or advantage; abstracted from all 
 consideration of the morality of such action. Con¬ 
 sequently, the pleasure or advantage in this case, is 
 gained by the action itself, not by the morality, the 
 virtuousness or viciousness of it; though it be, perhaps, 
 virtuous or vicious. Thus, to say such an action or 
 course of behaviour, procured such pleasure or ad¬ 
 vantage, or brought on such inconvenience and pain, 
 is quite a different thing from saying, that such good 
 or bad effect was owing to the virtue or vice of such 
 action or behaviour. In one case, an action abstracted 
 from all moral consideration, produced its effect: in 
 the other case, for it will appear that there are such 
 cases, the morality of the action, the action under a 
 moral consideration, i. e. the virtuousness or viciousness 
 of it, produced the effect. Now I say virtue as such, 
 naturally procures considerable advantages to the 
 virtuous, and vice as such, naturally occasions great 
 inconvenience and even misery to the vicious, in very 
 many instances. The immediate effects of virtue and 
 vice upon the mind and temper, are to be mentioned 
 as instances of it. Vice as such is naturally attended 
 with some sort of uneasiness, and, not uncommonly, 
 with great disturbance and apprehension. That inward 
 feeling, which, respecting lesser matters, and in familiar 
 speech, we call being vexed with oneself, and in 
 matters of importance and in more serious language. 
 
54 
 
 OF THE MORAL 
 
 [fart I. 
 
 remorse; is an uneasiness naturally arising from an 
 action of a man’s own, reflected upon by himself as 
 wrong, unreasonable, faulty, i. e. vicious in greater or 
 less degrees: and this manifestly is a different feeling 
 from that uneasiness, which arises from a sense of 
 mere loss or harm. What is more common, than to 
 hear a man lamenting an accident or event, and adding 
 
 -but however he has the satisfaction that he cannot 
 
 blame himself for it; or on the contrary, that he has 
 the uneasiness of being sensible it was his own doing? 
 Thus also the disturbance and fear, which often follow 
 upon a man’s having done an injury, arise from a sense 
 of his being blameworthy; otherwise there would, in 
 many cases, be no ground of disturbance, nor any 
 reason to fear resentment or shame. On the other 
 hand, inward security and peace, and a mind open to 
 the several gratifications of life, are the natural attend¬ 
 ants of innocence and virtue. To which must be 
 added the complacency, satisfaction, and even joy of 
 heart, which accompany the exercise, the real exercise, 
 of gratitude, friendship, benevolence. 
 
 And here, I think, ought to be mentioned, the fears 
 of future punishment, and peaceful hopes of a better 
 life, in those who fully believe, or have any serious 
 apprehension of religion: because these hopes and 
 fears are present uneasiness and satisfaction to the 
 mind, and cannot be got rid of by great part of the 
 world, even by men who have thought most thoroughly 
 upon that subject of religion. And no one can say, 
 how considerable this uneasiness and satisfaction may 
 be, or what upon the whole it may amount to. 
 
 In the next place comes in the consideration, that 
 all honest and good men are disposed to befriend 
 honest good men as such, and to discountenance the 
 vicious as such, and do so in some degree; indeed in a 
 
CHAP. IJI.J 
 
 GOVERNMENT OF GOD. 
 
 55 
 
 considerable degree: from which favour and dis¬ 
 couragement cannot but arise considerable advantage 
 and inconvenience. And though the generality of the 
 world have little regard to the morality of their own 
 actions, and may be supposed to have less to that of 
 others, when they themselves are not concerned ; yet 
 let any one be known to be a man of virtue, some how 
 or other he will be favoured, and good offices will be 
 done him, from regard to his character, without remote 
 views, occasionally, and in some low degree, I think, 
 by the generality of the world, as it happens to come 
 in their way. Public honours too and advantages are 
 the natural consequences, are sometimes at least the 
 consequences in fact, of virtuous actions; of eminent 
 justice, fidelity, charity, love to our country, considered 
 in the view of being virtuous. And sometimes even 
 death itself, often infamy and external inconveniences, 
 are the public consequences of vice as vice. For 
 instance, the sense which mankind have of tyranny, 
 injustice, oppression, additional to the mere feeling or 
 fear of misery, has doubtless been instrumental in 
 bringing about revolutions, which make a figure even 
 in the history of the world. For it is plain, men 
 resent injuries as implying faultiness, and retaliate, not 
 merely under the notion of having received harm, but 
 of having received wrong; and they have this resent¬ 
 ment in behalf of others, as well as of themselves. So 
 likewise even the generality are, in some degree, 
 grateful and disposed to return good offices, not merely 
 because such a one has been the occasion of good to 
 them, but under the view, that such good offices 
 implied kind intention and good desert in the doer. 
 To all this may be added two or three particular 
 things, which many persons will think frivolous; but 
 to me nothing appears so, which at all comes in 
 
56 OF THE MORAL [PART J. 
 
 towards determining a question of such importance, as, 
 whether there be, or be not, a moral institution of 
 government, in the strictest sense moral, visibly es¬ 
 tablished and begun in nature. The particular things 
 are these: That in domestic government, which is 
 doubtless natural, children and others also are verv 
 generally punished for falsehood and injustice and ill- 
 behaviour, as such, and rewarded for the contrary; 
 which are instances where veracity, and justice, and 
 right behaviour as such, are naturally enforced by 
 rewards and punishments, whether more or less con¬ 
 siderable in degree: That, though civil government be 
 supposed to take cognizance of actions in no other 
 view than as prejudicial to society, without respect to 
 the immorality of them ; yet as such actions are im¬ 
 moral, so the sense which men have of the immorality 
 of them, very greatly contributes, in different ways, to 
 bring offenders to justice: and that entire absence of 
 all crime and guilt in the moral sense, when plainly 
 appearing, will almost of course procure, and circum¬ 
 stances of aggravated guilt prevent, a remission of the 
 penalties annexed to civil crimes, in many cases, though 
 by no means in all. 
 
 Upon the whole then, besides the good and bad 
 effects of virtue and vice upon men’s own minds, the 
 course of the world does, in some measure, turn upon 
 the approbation and disapprobation of them as such, in 
 others. The sense of well and ill doing, the presages 
 of conscience, the love of good characters and dislike 
 of bad ones, honour, shame, resentment, gratitude; all 
 these, considered in themselves, and in their effects, do 
 afford manifest real instances of virtue as such naturally 
 favoured, and of vice as such discountenanced, more or 
 less, in the daily course of human life; in every age, in 
 every relation, in every general circumstance of it. 
 
GOVERNMENT OF GOD. 
 
 57 
 
 CHAP. III.] 
 
 That God has given us a moral nature h , may most 
 justly be urged as a proof of our being under his moral 
 government: but that he has placed us in a condition, 
 which gives this nature, as one may speak, scope to 
 operate, and in which it does unavoidably operate; i. e. 
 influence mankind to act, so as thus to favour and 
 reward virtue, and discountenance and punish vice; 
 this is not the same, but a further, additional proof of 
 his moral government: for it is an instance of it. The 
 first is a proof, that he will finally favour and support 
 virtue effectually: the second is an example of his 
 favouring and supporting it at present, in some degree. 
 
 If a more distinct inquiry be made, whence it arises, 
 that virtue as such is often rewarded, and vice as such 
 is punished, and this rule never inverted : it will be 
 found to proceed, in part, immediately from the moral 
 nature itself, which God has given us; and also in 
 part, from his having given us, together with this 
 nature, so great a power over each other’s happiness 
 and misery. For first, it is certain, that peace and 
 delight, in some degree and upon some occasions, is 
 the necessary and present effect of virtuous practice ; 
 an effect arising immediately from that constitution of 
 our nature. We are so made, that well-doing as such 
 gives us satisfaction, at least, in some instances; ill- 
 doing as such, in none. And secondly , from our moral 
 nature, joined with God’s having put our happiness 
 and misery in many respects in each other’s power, it 
 cannot but be, that vice as such, some kinds and 
 instances of it at least, will be infamous, and men will 
 be disposed to punish it as in itself detestable; and 
 the villain will by no means be able always to avoid 
 feeling that infamy, any more than he will be able to 
 escape this further punishment, which mankind will be 
 h See Dissertation II. 
 
58 
 
 OF THE MORAL 
 
 [fart I. 
 
 disposed to inflict upon him, under the notion of his 
 deserving it. But there can be nothing on the side of 
 vice, to answer this; because there is nothing in the 
 human mind contradictory, as the logicians speak, to 
 virtue. For virtue consists in a regard to what is 
 right and reasonable, as being so; in a regard to ve¬ 
 racity, justice, charity, in themselves: and there is 
 surely no such thing, as a like natural regard to false¬ 
 hood, injustice, cruelty. If it be thought, that there 
 are instances of an approbation of vice, as such, in 
 itself, and for its own sake, (though it does not ap¬ 
 pear to me, that there is any such thing at all; but 
 supposing there be,) it is evidently monstrous: as 
 much so, as the most acknowledged perversion of any 
 passion whatever. Such instances of perversion then 
 being left out as merely imaginary, or, however, un¬ 
 natural ; it must follow, from the frame of our nature, 
 and from our condition, in the respects now described, 
 that vice cannot at all be, and virtue cannot but be, 
 favoured as such by others, upon some occasions, and 
 happy in itself, in some degree. For what is here 
 insisted upon, is not the degree in which virtue and 
 vice are thus distinguished, but only the thing itself, 
 that they are so in some degree ; though the whole 
 good and bad effect of virtue and vice as such, is not 
 inconsiderable in degree. But that they must be thus 
 distinguished in some degree, is in a manner necessary: 
 it is matter of fact of daily experience, even in the 
 greatest confusion of human affairs. 
 
 It is not pretended but that in the natural course of 
 things, happiness and misery appear to be distributed 
 by other rules, than only the personal merit and de¬ 
 merit of characters. They may sometimes be dis¬ 
 tributed by way of mere discipline. There may be 
 the wisest and best reasons, why the world should be 
 
CHAP. III.] 
 
 GOVERNMENT OF GOD. 
 
 59 
 
 governed by general laws, from whence such promis¬ 
 cuous distribution perhaps must follow; and also why 
 our happiness and misery should be put in each other’s 
 power, in the degree which they are. And these 
 things, as in general they contribute to the rewarding 
 virtue and punishing vice, as such : so they often con¬ 
 tribute also, not to the inversion of this, which is 
 impossible; but to the rendering persons prosperous, 
 though wicked; afflicted, though righteous; and, 
 which is worse, to the rewarding some actions, though 
 vicious, and punishing other actions, though virtuous. 
 But all this cannot drown the voice of Nature in the 
 conduct of Providence, plainly declaring itself for vir¬ 
 tue, by way of distinction from vice, and preference to 
 it. For our being so constituted as that virtue and 
 vice are thus naturally favoured and discountenanced, 
 rewarded and punished respectively as such, is an 
 intuitive proof of the intent of Nature, that it should 
 be so: otherwise the constitution of our mind, from 
 which it thus immediately and directly proceeds, would 
 be absurd. But it cannot be said, because virtuous 
 actions are sometimes punished, and vicious actions 
 rewarded, that Nature intended it. For, though this 
 great disorder is brought about, as all actions are done, 
 by means of some natural passion ; yet this may be, as 
 it undoubtedly is, brought about by the perversion of 
 such passion, implanted in us for other, and those very 
 good purposes. And indeed these other and good pur¬ 
 poses, even of every passion, may be clearly seen. 
 
 We have then a declaration, in some degree of pre¬ 
 sent effect, from Him who is supreme in Nature, which 
 side lie is of, or what part He takes : a declaration for 
 virtue, and against vice. So far therefore as a man is 
 true to virtue, to veracity and justice, to equity and 
 charity, and the right of the case, in whatever he is 
 
60 
 
 OF THE MORAL 
 
 [part I. 
 
 concerned ; so far he is on the side of the Divine 
 administration, and cooperates with it: and from 
 hence, to such a man, arises naturally a secret satis¬ 
 faction and sense of security, and implicit hope of 
 somewhat further. And, 
 
 V. This hope is confirmed by the necessary tenden¬ 
 cies of virtue, which, though not of present effect, yet 
 are at present discernible in nature ; and so afford an 
 instance of somewhat moral in the essential consti¬ 
 tution of it. There is, in the nature of things, a 
 tendency in virtue and vice to produce the good and 
 bad effects now mentioned, in a greater degree than 
 they do in fact produce them. For instance; good 
 and bad men would be much more rewarded and 
 punished as such, were it not, that justice is often 
 artificially eluded, that characters are not known, and 
 many, who would thus favour virtue and discourage 
 vice, are hindered from doing so by accidental causes. 
 These tendencies of virtue and vice are obvious with 
 regard to individuals. But it may require more par¬ 
 ticularly to be considered, that power in a society , 
 by being under the direction of virtue, naturally in¬ 
 creases, and has a necessary tendency to prevail over 
 opposite power, not under the direction of it; in like 
 manner as power, by being under the direction of 
 reason, increases, and has a tendency to prevail over 
 brute force. There are several brute creatures of 
 equal, and several of superior strength, to that of men ; 
 and possibly the sum of the whole strength of brutes 
 may be greater than that of mankind : but reason 
 gives us the advantage and superiority over them; and 
 thus man is the acknowledged governing animal upon 
 the earth. Nor is this superiority considered by any 
 as accidental; but as what reason has a tendency, in 
 the nature of the thing, to obtain. And yet perhaps 
 
GOVERNMENT OF GOD. 
 
 61 
 
 CHAP. III.] 
 
 difficulties may be raised about the meaning, as well 
 as the truth, of the assertion, that virtue has the like 
 tendency. 
 
 1 o obviate these difficulties, let us see more dis¬ 
 tinctly, how the case stands with regard to reason; 
 which is so readily acknowledged to have this advan¬ 
 tageous tendency. Suppose then two or three men, of 
 the best and most improved understanding, in a de¬ 
 solate open plain, attacked by ten times the number of 
 beasts of prey; would their reason secure them the 
 victory in this unequal combat ? Power then, though 
 joined with reason, and under its direction, cannot be 
 expected to prevail over opposite power, though merely 
 brutal, unless the one bears some proportion to the 
 other. Again : put the imaginary case, that rational 
 and irrational creatures were of like external shape and 
 manner: it is certain, before there were opportunities 
 for the first to distinguish each other, to separate from 
 their adversaries, and to form an union among tliem- 
 selves, they might be upon a level, or in several 
 respects upon great disadvantage ; though united they 
 might be vastly superior: since union is of such effi¬ 
 cacy, that ten men united, might be able to accom¬ 
 plish, what ten thousand of the same natural strength 
 and understanding wholly ununited, could not. In this 
 case then, brute force might more than maintain 
 its ground against reason, for want of union among 
 the rational creatures. Or suppose a number of men 
 to land upon an island inhabited only by wild beasts; 
 a number of men who, by the regulations of civil 
 government, the inventions of art, and the experience 
 ot some years, could they be preserved so long, would 
 be really sufficient to subdue the wild beasts, and to 
 preserve themselves in security from them : yet a con¬ 
 juncture of accidents might give such advantage to the 
 
62 
 
 OF THE MORAL 
 
 [part I. 
 
 irrational animals, as that they might at once over¬ 
 power, and even extirpate, the whole species of rational 
 ones. Length of time then, proper scope and op¬ 
 portunities, for reason to exert itself, may be absolutely 
 necessary to its prevailing over brute force. Further 
 still: there are many instances of brutes succeeding in 
 attempts, which they could not have undertaken, had 
 not their irrational nature rendered them incapable of 
 foreseeing the danger of such attempts, or the fury 
 of passion hindered their attending to it; and there 
 are instances of reason and real prudence preventing 
 men’s undertaking what, it hath appeared afterwards, 
 they might have succeeded in by a lucky rashness. 
 And in certain conjunctures, ignorance and folly, weak¬ 
 ness and discord, may have their advantages. So that 
 rational animals have not necessarily the superiority 
 over irrational ones: but, how improbable soever it 
 may be, it is evidently possible, that in some globes 
 the latter may be superior. And were the former 
 wholly at variance and disunited, by false self-interest 
 and envy, by treachery and injustice, and consequent 
 rage and malice against each other, whilst the latter 
 were firmly united among themselves by instinct; this 
 might greatly contribute to the introducing such an 
 inverted order of things. For every one would con¬ 
 sider it as inverted : since reason has, in the nature of 
 it, a tendency to prevail over brute force; notwith¬ 
 standing the possibility it may not prevail, and the 
 necessity, which there is, of many concurring cir¬ 
 cumstances to render it prevalent. 
 
 Now I say, virtue in a society has a like tendency to 
 procure superiority and additional power: whether 
 this power be considered as the means of security from 
 opposite power, or of obtaining other advantages. And 
 it has this tendency, by rendering public good, an 
 
GOVERNMENT OF GOD. 
 
 63 
 
 CHAP. III.] 
 
 object and end, to every member of the society; by 
 putting every one upon consideration and diligence, 
 recollection and self-government, both in order to see 
 what is the most elfectual method, and also in order to 
 perform their proper part, for obtaining and preserving 
 it; by uniting a society within itself, and so increasing 
 its strength; and, which is particularly to be men¬ 
 tioned, uniting it by means of veracity and justice, 
 b or as these last are principal bonds of union, so 
 benevolence or public spirit, undirected, unrestrained 
 by them, is, nobody knows what. 
 
 And suppose the invisible world, and the invisible 
 dispensations of Providence, to be, in any sort, ana¬ 
 logous to what appears: or that both together make 
 up one uniform scheme, the two parts of which, the 
 part which we see, and that which is beyond our 
 observation, are analogous to each other: then, there 
 must be a like natural tendency in the derived power, 
 throughout the universe, under the direction of virtue, 
 to prevail in general over that, which is not under its 
 direction; as there is in reason, derived reason in the 
 universe, to prevail over brute force. But then, in 
 order to the prevalence of virtue, or that it may 
 actually produce, what it has a tendency to produce; 
 the like concurrences are necessary, as are, to the 
 prevalence of reason. There must be some proportion, 
 between the natural power or force which is, and that 
 which is not, under the direction of virtue : there must 
 be sufficient length of time ; for the complete success 
 of virtue, as of reason, cannot, from the nature of the 
 thing, be otherwise than gradual: there must be, as 
 one may speak, a fair field of trial, a stage large and 
 extensive enough, proper occasions and opportunities, 
 for the virtuous to join together, to exert themselves 
 against lawless force, and to reap the fruit of their 
 
64 OF THE MORAL [PART I. 
 
 united labours. Now indeed it is to be hoped, that 
 the disproportion between the good and bad, even here 
 on earth, is not so great, but that the former have 
 natural power sufficient to their prevailing to a con¬ 
 siderable degree, if circumstances would permit this 
 power to be united. For, much less, very much less, 
 power under the direction of virtue, would prevail over 
 much greater not under the direction of it. However, 
 good men over the face of the earth cannot unite; as 
 for other reasons, so because they cannot be sufficiently 
 ascertained of each other s characters. And the known 
 course of human things, the scene we are now passing 
 through, particularly the shortness of life, denies to 
 virtue its full scope in several other respects. The 
 natural tendency which we have been considering, 
 though real, is hindered from being carried into effect 
 in the present state: but these hinderances may be 
 removed in a future one. Virtue, to borrow the 
 Christian allusion, is militant here; and various un¬ 
 toward accidents contribute to its being often over¬ 
 borne: but it may combat with greater advantage 
 hereafter, and prevail completely, and enjoy its con¬ 
 sequent rewards, in some future states. Neglected as 
 it is, perhaps unknown, perhaps despised and oppressed 
 here; there may be scenes in eternity, lasting enough, 
 and in every other way adapted, to afford it a sufficient 
 sphere of action; and a sufficient sphere for the na¬ 
 tural consequences of it to follow in fact. If the soul 
 be naturally immortal, and this state be a progress 
 towards a future one, as childhood is towards mature 
 age; good men may naturally unite, not only amongst 
 themselves, but also with other orders of virtuous 
 creatures, in that future state. For virtue, from the 
 very nature of it, is a principle and bond of union, 
 in some degree, amongst all who are endued with it, 
 
CHAP. Ill ] 
 
 GOVERNMENT OF GOD. 
 
 65 
 
 and known to each other; so as that by it, a good 
 man cannot but recommend himself to the favour and 
 protection of all virtuous beings, throughout the whole 
 universe, who can be acquainted with his character, 
 and can any way interpose in his behalf in any part of 
 his duration. And one might add, that suppose all 
 this advantageous tendency of virtue to become effect, 
 amongst one or more orders of creatures, in any distant 
 scenes and periods, and to be seen by any orders 
 of vicious creatures, throughout the universal kingdom 
 of God ; this happy effect of virtue would have a 
 tendency, by way of example, and possibly in other 
 ways, to amend those of them, who are "capable of 
 amendment, and being recovered to a just sense of 
 \iitue. If our notions of the plan of Providence were 
 enlarged in any sort proportionable to what late dis¬ 
 coveries have enlarged our views with respect to the 
 material world; representations of this kind would not 
 appear absurd or extravagant. However, they are not 
 to be taken as intended for a literal delineation of 
 what is in fact the particular scheme of the universe, 
 ■which cannot be known without revelation : for sup¬ 
 positions are not to be looked on as true, because not 
 incredible: but they are mentioned to shew', that our 
 finding virtue to be hindered from procuring to itself 
 such superiority and advantages, is no objection against 
 its having, in the essential nature of the thing, a 
 tendency to procure them. And the suppositions now 
 mentioned do plainly shew this: for they shew, that 
 these hinderances are so far from being necessary, that 
 we ourselves can easily conceive, how they may be 
 removed in future states, and full scope be granted to 
 virtue. And all these advantageous tendencies of it 
 are to be considered as declarations of God in its 
 favour. This however is taking a pretty large compass: 
 
 ANALOGY. F 
 
66 
 
 OF THE MORAL 
 
 [part I. 
 
 though it is certain, that, as the material world appears 
 to be, in a manner, boundless and immense; there 
 must be some scheme of Providence vast in proportion 
 to it. 
 
 But let us return to the earth our habitation; and 
 we shall see this happy tendency of virtue, by imagining 
 an instance not so vast and remote: by supposing a 
 kingdom or society of men upon it, perfectly virtuous, 
 for a succession of many ages ; to which, if you please, 
 may be given a situation advantageous lor universal 
 monarchy. In such a state, there would be no such 
 thing as faction: but men of the greatest capacity 
 would of course, all along, have the chief direction of 
 affairs willingly yielded to them; and they would share 
 it among themselves without envy. Each of these 
 would have the part assigned him, to which his genius 
 was peculiarly adapted : and others, who had not any 
 distinguished genius, would be safe, and think them¬ 
 selves very happy, by being under the protection and 
 guidance of those who had. Public determinations 
 would really be the result of the united wisdom of the 
 community: and they would faithfully be executed, by 
 the united strength of it. Some would in a higher 
 way contribute, but all would in some way contribute, 
 to the public prosperity: and in it, each would enjoy 
 the fruits of his own virtue. And as injustice, whether 
 by fraud or force, would be unknown among them¬ 
 selves ; so they would be sufficiently secured from it 
 in their neighbours. For cunning and false self-interest, 
 confederacies in injustice, ever slight, and accompanied 
 with faction and intestine treachery ; these on one 
 hand would be found mere childish folly and weakness, 
 when set in opposition against wisdom, public spirit, 
 union inviolable, and fidelity on the other: allowing 
 both a sufficient length of years to try their force. 
 
GOVERNMENT OF GOD. 
 
 CHAP. III.] 
 
 67 
 
 Add the general influence, which such a kingdom 
 would have over the face of the earth, by way of 
 example particularly, and the reverence which would 
 be paid it. It would plainly be superior to all others, 
 and the world must gradually come under its empire; 
 not by means of lawless violence; but partly by what 
 must be allowed to be just conquest; and partly by 
 other kingdoms submitting themselves voluntarily to it, 
 throughout a course of ages, and claiming its protection, 
 one after another, in successive exigencies. The head 
 of it would be an universal monarch, in another sense 
 than any mortal has yet been; and the eastern stylo 
 would be literally applicable to him, that all people, 
 nations, and languages should serve him. And though 
 indeed our knowledge of human nature, and the whole 
 history of mankind, shew the impossibility, without 
 some miraculous interposition, that a number of men, 
 here on earth, should unite in one society or govern¬ 
 ment, in the fear of God and universal practice of 
 virtue; and that such a government should continue 
 so united for a succession of ages : yet admitting or 
 supposing this, the effect would be as now drawn out. 
 And thus, for instance, the wonderful power and 
 prosperity promised to the Jewish nation in the Scrip¬ 
 ture, would be, in a great measure, the consequence of 
 what is perdicted of them; that the people should be 
 all righteous, and inherit the land for ever '; were we 
 to understand the latter phrase of a long continuance 
 only, sufficient to give things time to work. The pre¬ 
 dictions of this kind, for there are many of them, 
 cannot come to pass, in the present known course of 
 nature; but suppose them come to pass, and then, the 
 dominion and preeminence promised must naturally 
 follow, to a very considerable degree. 
 
 * Isa. lx. 21. 
 
 F 2 
 
68 
 
 OF TIIE MORAL 
 
 [part I. 
 
 Consider now the general system of religion: that 
 the government of the world is uniform, and one, and 
 moral; that virtue and right shall finally have the 
 advantage, and prevail over fraud and lawless force, 
 over the deceits, as well as the violence of wickedness, 
 under the conduct of one supreme governor: and 
 from the observations above made, it will appear, that 
 God has, by our reason, given us to see a peculiar 
 connexion in the several parts of this scheme, and a 
 tendency towards the completion of it, arising out of 
 the very nature of virtue: which tendency is to be 
 considered as somewhat moral in the essential con¬ 
 stitution of things. If any one should think all this to 
 be of little importance; I desire him to consider, what 
 he would think, if vice had, essentially and in its 
 nature, these advantageous tendencies; or if virtue 
 had essentially the direct contrary ones. 
 
 But it may be objected, that, notwithstanding all 
 these natural effects and these natural tendencies of 
 virtue; yet things may be now going on throughout 
 the universe, and may go on hereafter, in the same 
 mixed way as here at present upon earth : virtue some¬ 
 times prosperous, sometimes depressed ; vice sometimes 
 punished, sometimes successful. The answer to which 
 is, that it is not the purpose of this chapter, nor of this 
 treatise, properly to prove God’s perfect moral govern¬ 
 ment over the world, or the truth of Religion; but to 
 observe what there is in the constitution and course 
 of nature, to confirm the proper proof of it, supposed 
 to be known : and that the weight of the foregoing 
 observations to this purpose may be thus distinctly 
 proved. Pleasure and pain are indeed to a certain 
 degree, say to a very high degree, distributed amongst 
 us without any apparent regard to the merit or 
 demerit of characters. And were there nothing else 
 
CIIAP. III.] 
 
 GOVERNMENT OF GOD. 
 
 69 
 
 concerning this matter discernible in the constitution 
 and course of nature; there would be no ground from 
 the constitution and course of nature to hope or to 
 fear, that men would be rewarded or punished hereafter 
 according to their deserts: which, however, it is to 
 be remarked, implies, that even then there would be 
 no ground from appearances to think, that vice upon 
 the whole would have the advantage, rather than that 
 virtue would. And thus the proof of a future state 
 of retribution would rest upon the usual known argu¬ 
 ments for it: which are I think plainly unanswerable; 
 and would he so, though there were no additional 
 confirmation of them from the things above insisted on. 
 But these things are a very strong confirmation of 
 them. For, 
 
 First, They shew, that the Author of Nature is not 
 indifferent to virtue and vice. They amount to a de¬ 
 claration from him, determinate and not to be evaded, 
 in favour of one, and against the other; such a decla¬ 
 ration, as there is nothing to be set over against or 
 answer, on the part of vice. So that were a man, 
 laying aside the proper proof of Religion, to determine 
 from the course of nature only, whether it were most 
 probable, that the righteous or the wicked would have 
 the advantage in a future life; there can be no doubt, 
 but that he would determine the probability to be, 
 that the former would. The course of nature then, in 
 the view of it now given, furnishes us with a real prac¬ 
 tical proof of the obligations of Religion. 
 
 Secondly, When, conformably to what Religion 
 teaches us, God shall reward and punish virtue and 
 vice as such, so as that every one shall, upon the 
 whole, have his deserts ; this distributive justice will 
 not be a thing different in kind, but only in degree , 
 from what we experience in his present government. 
 
70 
 
 OF THE MORAL 
 
 [part I. 
 
 It will be that in effect , toward which we now see a 
 tendency. It will be no more than the completion of 
 that moral government, the principles and beginning of 
 which have been shewn, beyond all dispute, discernible 
 in the present constitution and course of nature. And 
 from hence it follows, 
 
 Thirdly, That, as under the natural government of 
 God, our experience of those kinds and degrees of 
 happiness and misery, which we do experience at 
 present, gives just ground to hope for, and to fear, 
 higher degrees and other kinds of both in a future 
 state, supposing a future state admitted : so under his 
 moral government, our experience, that virtue and vice 
 are, in the manners above mentioned, actually rewarded 
 and punished at present, in a certain degree, gives just 
 ground to hope and to fear, that they may be rewarded 
 and punished in an higher degree hereafter. It is 
 acknowledged indeed that this alone is not sufficient 
 ground to think, that they actually zcill be rewarded 
 and punished in a higher degree, rather than in a 
 lower: but then, 
 
 Lastly, There" is sufficient ground to think so, from 
 the good and bad tendencies of virtue and vice. For 
 these tendencies are essential, and founded in the 
 nature of things: whereas the hinderances to their 
 becoming effect are, in numberless cases, not necessary, 
 but artificial only. Now it may be much more strongly 
 argued, that these tendencies, as well as the actual 
 rewards and punishments, of virtue and vice, which 
 arise directly out of the nature of things, will remain 
 hereafter, than that the accidental hinderances of them 
 will. And if these hinderances do not remain ; those 
 rewards and punishments cannot but be carried on 
 much farther towards the perfection of moral govern¬ 
 ment: i. e. the tendencies of virtue and vice will 
 
GOVERNMENT OF GOD. 
 
 71 
 
 CHAP. III.] 
 
 become effect: but when, or where, or in what parti¬ 
 cular way, cannot be known at all, but by revelation. 
 
 Upon the whole: there is a kind of moral govern¬ 
 ment implied in God’s natural government k : virtue 
 and vice are naturally rewarded and punished as bene¬ 
 ficial and mischievous to society 1 ; and rewarded and 
 punished directly as virtue and vice 1 ". The notion 
 then of a moral scheme of government is not fictitious, 
 but natural; for it is suggested to our thoughts by the 
 constitution and course of nature: and the execution 
 of this scheme is actually begun, in the instances here 
 mentioned. And these things are to be considered as 
 a declaration of the Author of Nature, for virtue, and 
 against vice : they give a credibility to the supposition 
 of their being rewarded and punished hereafter; and 
 also ground to hope and to fear, that they may be 
 rewarded and punished in higher degrees than they 
 are here. And as all this is confirmed, so the argument 
 for Religion, from the constitution and course of nature, 
 is carried on farther, by observing, that there are 
 natural tendencies, and, in innumerable cases, only 
 artificial hinderances, to this moral scheme’s being 
 carried on much farther towards perfection, than it is 
 at present n . The notion then of a moral scheme of 
 government, much more perfect than what is seen, is 
 not a fictitious, but a natural notion ; for it is suggested 
 to our thoughts, by the essential tendencies of virtue 
 and vice. And these tendencies are to be considered 
 as intimations, as implicit promises and threatenings, 
 from the Author of Nature, of much greater rewards 
 and punishments to follow virtue and vice, than do at 
 present. And indeed, every natural tendency, which 
 is to continue, but which is hindered from becoming 
 effect by only accidental causes, affords a presumption, 
 k P. 51. 1 Ibid. m P. 52, &c. n P. 60, &c. 
 
72 
 
 OF THE MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD. 
 
 [part I. 
 
 that such tendency will, some time or other, become 
 effect: a presumption in degree proportionable to the 
 length of the duration, through which such tendency 
 will continue. And from these things together, arises 
 a real presumption, that the moral scheme of govern¬ 
 ment established in nature, shall be carried on much 
 farther towards perfection hereafter; and, I think, a 
 presumption that it will be absolutely completed. But 
 from these things, joined with the moral nature which 
 God has given us, considered as given us by him, 
 arises a practical proof 0 that it will be completed: a 
 proof from fact; and therefore a distinct one from that, 
 which is deduced from the eternal and unalterable 
 relations, the fitness and unfitness of actions. 
 
 CHAP. IV. 
 
 Of a State of Probation, as implying Trial, Difficulties 
 and Danger. 
 
 T HE general doctrine of Religion, that our present 
 life is a state of probation for a future one, com¬ 
 prehends under it several particular things, distinct 
 from each other. But the first and most common 
 meaning of it seems to be, that our future interest is 
 now depending, and depending upon ourselves; that 
 we have scope and opportunities here, for that good 
 and bad behaviour, which God will reward and punish 
 hereafter; together with temptations to one, as well 
 as inducements of reason to the other. And this is, in 
 a great measure, the same with saying, that we are 
 under the moral government of God, and to give an 
 account of our actions to him. For the notion of 
 
 0 See this proof drawn out briefly, chap. vi. 
 
 a 
 
OF A STATE OF TRIAL. 
 
 CHAP. IV.] 
 
 73 
 
 future account and general righteous judgment, implies 
 some soit of temptations to what is wrong: otherwise 
 there would be no moral possibility of doing wrong, 
 nor ground for judgment, or discrimination. But there 
 is this difference, that the word probation is more dis¬ 
 tinctly and particularly expressive of allurements to 
 wrong, or difficulties in adhering uniformly to what is 
 right, and of the danger of miscarrying by such tempta¬ 
 tions, than the words moral government. A state of 
 probation then, as thus particularly implying in it trial, 
 difficulties and danger, may require to be considered 
 distinctly by itself. 
 
 And as the moral government of God, which Reli¬ 
 gion teaches us, implies, that we are in a state of trial 
 vith legard to a future world: so also his natural 
 government over us implies, that we are in a state of 
 tr ial, in the like sense, with regard to the present world. 
 Natural government by rewards and punishments, as 
 much implies natural trial, as moral government does 
 moral trial. The natural government of God here 
 meant 8 consists in his annexing pleasure to some 
 actions, and pain to others, which are in our power to 
 do or forbear, and in giving us notice of such appoint¬ 
 ment beforehand. This necessarily implies, that he 
 has made our happiness and misery, or our interest, to 
 depend in part upon ourselves. And so far as men 
 have temptations to any course of action which will 
 probably occasion them greater temporal inconvenience 
 and uneasiness, than satisfaction; so far their temporal 
 interest is in danger from themselves, or they are in a 
 state of trial with respect to it. Now people often 
 blame others, and even themselves, for their miscon¬ 
 duct in their temporal concerns. And we find many 
 are greatly wanting to themselves, and miss of that 
 
 a Chap, ii. 
 
74 
 
 OF A STATE OF TRIAL. 
 
 [PART I* 
 
 natural happiness, which they might have obtained in 
 the present life: perhaps every one does in some 
 degree. But many run themselves into great incon¬ 
 venience, and into extreme distress and misery: not 
 through incapacity of knowing better, and doing better 
 for themselves, which would be nothing to the present 
 purpose; but through their own fault. And these 
 things necessarily imply temptation, and danger of 
 miscarrying, in a greater or less degree, with respect 
 to our worldly interest or happiness. Every one too, 
 without having Religion in his thoughts, speaks of the 
 hazards which young people run, upon their setting 
 out in the world: hazards from other causes, than 
 merely their ignorance, and unavoidable accidents. 
 And some courses of vice, at least, being contrary to 
 men’s worldly interest or good; temptations to these 
 must at the same time be temptations to forego our 
 present and our future interest. Thus in our natural 
 or temporal capacity, we are in a state of trial, i. e. of 
 difficulty and danger, analogous, or like to our moral 
 and religious trial. 
 
 This will more distinctly appear to any one, who 
 thinks it worth while, more distinctly, to consider, 
 what it is which constitutes our trial in both capacities, 
 and to observe, how mankind behave under it. 
 
 And that which constitutes this our trial, in both 
 these capacities, must be somewhat either in our 
 external circumstances, or in our nature. For, on the 
 one hand, persons may be betrayed into wrong be¬ 
 haviour upon surprise, or overcome upon any other 
 very singular and extraordinary external occasions; 
 who would, otherwise, have preserved their character 
 of prudence and of virtue : in which cases, every one, 
 in speaking of the wrong behaviour of these persons, 
 would impute it to such particular external circum- 
 
CHAP. IV.] OF A STATE OF TRIAL. 75 
 
 stances. And on the other hand, men who have con¬ 
 tracted habits of vice and folly of any kind, or have 
 • some particular passions in excess, will seek oppor¬ 
 tunities, and, as it were, go out of their way, to gratify 
 themselves in these respects, at the expense of their 
 wisdom and their virtue; led to it, as every one would 
 say, not by external temptations, but by such habits 
 and passions. And the account of this last case is, 
 that particular passions are no more coincident with 
 prudence, or that reasonable self-love, the end of 
 which is our worldly interest, than they are with the 
 principle of virtue and religion; but often draw con¬ 
 trary ways to one, as well as to the other: and so such 
 particular passions are as much temptations, to act 
 imprudently with regard to our worldly interest, as to 
 act viciously b . However, as when we say, men are 
 misled by external circumstances of temptation; it 
 cannot but be understood, that there is somewhat 
 within themselves, to render those circumstances tempt¬ 
 ations, or to render them susceptible of impressions 
 from them: so when we say, they are misled by 
 passions; it is always supposed, that there are oc¬ 
 casions, circumstances, and objects, exciting these 
 passions, and affording means for gratifying them. 
 And therefore, temptations from within, and from 
 without, coincide, and mutually imply each other. 
 Now the several external objects of the appetites, 
 passions, and affections, being present to the senses, or 
 offering themselves to the mind, and so exciting emo¬ 
 tions suitable to their nature ; not only in cases where 
 they can be gratified consistently with innocence and 
 prudence, but also in cases where they cannot, and yet 
 can be gratified imprudently and viciously: this as 
 
 b See Sermons preached at the Rolls, 1726. 2d ed. p. 205, &c. pref. 
 p. 25, &c. Serm. p. 21, &c. 
 
76 OF A STATE OF TRIAL. [l*ART I. 
 
 really puts them in danger of voluntarily foregoing 
 their present interest or good, as their future; and as 
 really renders self-denial necessary to secure one, as 
 the other: i. e. we are in a like state of trial with 
 respect to both, by the very same passions, excited by 
 the very same means. Thus mankind having a tem¬ 
 poral interest depending upon themselves, and a pru¬ 
 dent course of behaviour being necessary to secure it; 
 passions inordinately excited, whether by means of 
 example, or by any other external circumstance, to¬ 
 wards such objects, at such times, or in such degrees, 
 as that they cannot be gratified consistently with 
 worldly prudence; are temptations, dangerous, and too 
 often successful temptations, to forego a greater tem¬ 
 poral good for a less; i. e. to forego what is, upon the 
 whole, our temporal interest, for the sake of a present 
 gratification. This is a description of our state of trial 
 in our temporal capacity. Substitute now the word 
 future for temporal , and virtue for prudence ; and it will 
 be just as proper a description of our state of trial in 
 our religious capacity; so analogous are they to each 
 other. 
 
 If, from consideration of this our like state of trial 
 in both capacities, we go on to observe farther, how 
 mankind behave under it; we shall find there are 
 some, who have so little sense of it, that they scarce 
 look beyond the passing day: they are so taken up 
 with present gratifications, as to have, in a manner, no 
 feeling of consequences, no regard to their future ease 
 or fortune in this life; any more than to their hap¬ 
 piness in another. Some appear to be blinded and 
 deceived by inordinate passion, in their worldly con¬ 
 cerns, as much as in Religion. Others are, not de¬ 
 ceived, but, as it were, forcibly carried away by the 
 like passions, against their better judgment, and feeble 
 
OF A STATE OF TRIAL. 
 
 77 
 
 CHAP. IV.J 
 
 resolutions too of acting better. And there are men, 
 and truly they are not a few, who shamelessly avow, 
 not their interest, but their mere will and pleasure, to 
 be their law of life: and who, in open defiance of 
 every thing that is reasonable, will go on in a course 
 of vicious extravagance, foreseeing, with no remorse 
 and little fear, that it will be their temporal ruin ; and 
 some of them, under the apprehension of the con¬ 
 sequences of wickedness in another state. And to 
 speak in the most moderate way, human creatures are 
 not only continually liable to go wrong voluntarily, but 
 we see likewise that they often actually do so, with 
 respect to their temporal interests, as well as with 
 respect to Religion. 
 
 Thus our difficulties and dangers, or our trials, in 
 our temporal and our religious capacity, as they pro¬ 
 ceed from the same causes, and have the same effect 
 upon men’s behaviour, are evidently analogous, and of 
 the same kind. 
 
 It may be added, that as the difficulties and dangers 
 of miscarrying in our religious state of trial, are greatly 
 increased, and one is ready to think, in a manner 
 wholly made, by the ill behaviour of others; by a 
 wrong education, wrong in a moral sense, sometimes 
 positively vicious; by general bad example; by the 
 dishonest artifices which are got into business of all 
 kinds; and, in very many parts of the world, by 
 religion’s being corrupted into superstitions, which 
 indulge men in their vices: so in like manner, the 
 difficulties of conducting ourselves prudently in respect 
 to our present interest, and our danger of being led 
 aside from pursuing it, are greatly increased, by a 
 foolish education; and, after we come to mature a^e, 
 by the extravagance and carelessness of others, whom 
 we have intercourse with; and by mistaken notions, 
 
78 
 
 OF A STATE OF TRIAL. 
 
 [part I. 
 
 very generally prevalent, and taken up from common 
 opinion, concerning temporal happiness, and wherein it 
 consists. And persons, by their own negligence and 
 folly in their temporal affairs, no less than by a course 
 of vice, bring themselves into new’ difficulties; and, by 
 habits of indulgence, become less qualified to go 
 through them: and one irregularity after another, 
 embarrasses things to such a degree, that they know 
 not whereabout they are; and often makes the path of 
 conduct so intricate and perplexed, that it is difficult 
 to trace it out; difficult even to determine what is the 
 prudent or the moral part. Thus, for instance, w r rong 
 behaviour in one stage of life, youth; w rong, I mean, 
 considering ourselves only in our temporal capacity, 
 without taking in religion ; this, in several ways, 
 increases the difficulties of right behaviour in mature 
 age; i. e. puts us into a more disadvantageous state of 
 trial in our temporal capacity. 
 
 We are an inferior part of the creation of God. 
 There are natural appearances of our being in a state 
 of degradation 0 . And w’e certainly are in a condition, 
 which does not seem , by any means, the most ad¬ 
 vantageous we could imagine or desire, either in our 
 natural or moral capacity, for securing either our 
 present or future interest. However, this condition, 
 low and careful and uncertain as it is, does not afford 
 any just ground of complaint. For, as men may 
 manage their temporal affairs with prudence, and so 
 pass their days here on earth in tolerable ease and 
 satisfaction, by a moderate degree of care : so likewise 
 with regard to religion, there is no more required than 
 what they are w’ell able to do, and what they must be 
 greatly wanting to themselves, if they neglect. And 
 for persons to have that put upon them, which they 
 c Part II. chap. v. 
 
CHAP. IV.] 
 
 OF A STATE OF TRIAL. 
 
 79 
 
 are well able to go through, and no more, we naturally 
 consider as an equitable thing; supposing it done by 
 proper authority. ?Sor have we any more reason to 
 complain of it, with regard to the Author of Nature, 
 than of his not having given us other advantages, 
 belonging to other orders of creatures. 
 
 But the thing here insisted upon is, that the state of 
 trial, which Religion teaches us we are in, is rendered 
 credible, by its being throughout uniform and of a 
 piece with the general conduct of Providence towards 
 us, in all other respects within the compass of our 
 knowledge. Indeed if mankind, considered in their 
 natural capacity, as inhabitants of this world only, 
 found themselves, from their birth to their death, in a 
 settled state of security and happiness, without any 
 solicitude or thought of their own : or if they were in 
 no danger of being brought into inconveniences and 
 distress, by carelessness, or the folly of passion, through 
 bad example, the treachery of others, or the deceitful 
 appearances of things: were this our natural condition, 
 then it might seem strange, and be some presumption 
 against the truth of Religion, that it represents our 
 future and more general interest, as not secure of 
 course, but as depending upon our behaviour, and re¬ 
 quiring recollection and self-government to obtain it. 
 For it might be alleged, “ What you say is our con- 
 “ dition in one respect, is not in any wise of a sort with 
 “ what we find, by experience, our condition is in an¬ 
 other. Our whole present interest is secured to our 
 “ bands, without any solicitude of ours; and why 
 “ should not our future interest, if we have any such, 
 
 “ be so too ?” But since, on the contrary, thought and 
 consideiation, the Aoluntary denying ourselves manv 
 things which we desire, and a course of behaviour, far 
 from being always agreeable to us; are absolutely 
 
80 
 
 OF A STATE OF TRIAL. 
 
 [PART I. 
 
 necessary to our acting even a common decent, and 
 common prudent part, so as to pass with any satis¬ 
 faction through the present world, and be received 
 upon any tolerable good terms in it: since this is the 
 case, all presumption against self-denial and attention 
 being necessary to secure our higher interest, is re¬ 
 moved. Had we not experience, it might, perhaps 
 speciously, be urged, that it is improbable any thing of 
 hazard and danger should be put upon us by an in¬ 
 finite Being; when every thing which is hazard and 
 danger in our maimer of conception, and will end in 
 error, confusion, and misery, is now already certain in 
 his foreknowledge. And indeed, why any thing of 
 hazard and danger should be put upon such frail 
 creatures as we are, may well be thought a difficulty 
 in speculation ; and cannot but be so, till we know the 
 whole, or, however, much more of the case. But still 
 the constitution of nature is as it is. Our happiness 
 and misery are trusted to our conduct, and made to 
 depend upon it. Somewhat, and, in many circum¬ 
 stances, a great deal too, is put upon us, either to do, 
 or to suffer, as we choose. And all the various mi¬ 
 series of life, which people bring upon themselves by 
 negligence and folly, and might have avoided by propel 
 care, are instances of this: which miseries are before¬ 
 hand just as contingent and undetermined as their con¬ 
 duct, and left to be determined by it. 
 
 These observations are an answer to the objections 
 against the credibility of a state of trial, as implying 
 temptations, and real danger of miscarrying with regard 
 to our general interest, under the moral government of 
 God: and they shew, that, if we are at all to be con¬ 
 sidered in such a capacity, and as having such an in¬ 
 terest ; the general analogy of Providence must lead us 
 to apprehend ourselves in danger of miscarrying, in 
 
CHAP. V.] 
 
 8L 
 
 OF A STATE OF MORAL DISCIPLINE. 
 
 different degrees, as to this interest, by our neglecting 
 to act the proper part belonging to us in that capacity, 
 hor we have a present interest, under the government 
 of God, which we experience here upon earth. And 
 this interest, as it is not forced upon us, so neither is it 
 offered to our acceptance, but to our acquisition; in 
 such sort, as that we are in danger of missing it, by 
 means of temptations to neglect, or act contrary to it; 
 and without attention and self-denial, must and do miss 
 of it. It is then perfectly credible, that this may be 
 our case, with respect to that chief and final good, 
 
 which Religion proposes to us. 
 
 CHAP. V. 
 
 Of a State of Probation, as intended for moral 
 Discipline and Improvement. 
 
 ROM the consideration of our being in a probation- 
 
 “*■ state, of so much difficulty and hazard, naturally 
 arises the question, how we came to be placed in it ? 
 But such a general inquiry as this would be found in¬ 
 volved in insuperable difficulties. For, though some of 
 these difficulties would be lessened by observing, that all 
 wickedness is voluntary, as is implied in its very notion ; 
 and that many of the miseries of life have apparent good 
 effects : yet, when we consider other circumstances be¬ 
 longing to both, and what must be the consequence of 
 the former in a life to come; it cannot but be acknow¬ 
 ledged plain folly and presumption, to pretend to give an 
 account of the whole reasons of this matter: the whole 
 reasons of our being allotted a condition, out of which so 
 much wickedness and misery, so circumstanced, would in 
 fact arise. A hether it be not beyond our faculties, not 
 
 ANALOGY. r. 
 
82 
 
 OF A STATE OF 
 
 [PART I. 
 
 only to find out, but even to understand, the whole 
 account of this; or, though we should be supposed 
 capable of understanding it, yet, whether it would be 
 of service or prejudice to us to be informed of it, is 
 impossible to say. But as our present condition can 
 in no wise be shewn inconsistent with the perfect 
 moral government of God: so Religion teaches us we 
 were placed in it, that we might qualify ourselves, by 
 the practice of virtue, for another state which is to 
 follow’ it. And this, though but a partial answer, a 
 very partial one indeed, to the inquiry now’ mentioned; 
 yet, is a more satisfactory answ r er to another, which is 
 of real, and of the utmost importance to us to have 
 answered: the inquiry, W hat is our business here ? 
 The known end then, why we are placed in a state of 
 so much affliction, hazard, and difficulty, is, our im¬ 
 provement in virtue and piety, as the requisite qualifi¬ 
 cation for a future state of security and happiness. 
 
 Now’ the beginning of life, considered as an edu¬ 
 cation for mature age in the present world, appears 
 plainly, at first sight, analogous to this our trial for a 
 future one : the former being in our temporal capacity, 
 what the latter is in our religious capacity. But some 
 observations common to both of them, and a more 
 distinct consideration of each, will more distinctly 
 shew the extent and force of the analogy between 
 them ; and the credibility, which arises from hence, as 
 well as from the nature of the thing, that the present 
 life was intended to be a state of discipline for a 
 future one. 
 
 I. Every species of creatures is, w r e see, designed for 
 a particular way of life; to which, the nature, the 
 capacities, temper, and qualifications of each species, 
 are as necessary, as their external circumstances. Both 
 come into the notion of such state, or particular way 
 
 
 
moral discipline. 
 
 83 
 
 CHAP. V.] 
 
 of life, and are constituent parts of it. Change a 
 man’s capacities or character to the degree, in which it 
 is conceivable they may be changed ; and he would he 
 altogether incapable of a human course of life, and 
 human happiness; as incapable, as if, his nature con¬ 
 tinuing unchanged, he were placed in a world, where 
 lie had no sphere of action, nor any objects to answer 
 his appetites, passions, and affections of any sort. One 
 thing is set over against another, as an ancient writer 
 expresses it. Our nature corresponds to our external 
 condition. Without this correspondence, there would 
 be no possibility of any such thing as human life and 
 human happiness: which life and happiness are, there¬ 
 fore, a result from our nature and condition jointly 
 meaning by human life, not living in the literal sense, 
 but the whole complex notion commonly understood 
 by those words. So that, without determining what 
 will be the employment and happiness, the particular 
 lite, of good men hereafter; there must be some 
 determinate capacities, some necessary character and 
 qualifications, without which persons cannot but be 
 utterly incapable of it: in like manner, as there must 
 
 f some ’ without which men would be incapable of 
 their present state of life. Now, 
 
 II. The constitution of human creatures, and indeed 
 of all creatures which come under our notice, is such, 
 as that they are capable of naturally becoming qualified 
 or states of life, for which they were once wholly un¬ 
 qualified. In imagination we may indeed conceive of 
 creatures, as incapable of having any of their faculties 
 naturally enlarged, or as being unable naturally to 
 acquire any new qualifications: but the faculties of 
 every species known to us are made for enlargement • 
 for acquirements of experience and habits. We find 
 ourselves in particular endued with capacities, not only 
 
 G 2 
 
84 
 
 OF A STATE OF 
 
 [part I. 
 
 of perceiving ideas, and of knowledge or perceiving 
 truth, but also of storing up our ideas and knowledge 
 by memory. We are capable, not only of acting, and 
 of having different momentary impressions made upon 
 us ; but of getting a new facility in any kind of action, 
 and of settled alterations in our temper or character. 
 The power of the two last is the power of habits. But 
 neither the perception of ideas, nor knowledge of any 
 sort, are habits; though absolutely necessary to the 
 forming of them. However, apprehension, reason, 
 memory, which are the capacities of acquiring know¬ 
 ledge, are greatly improved by exercise. Vs hether the 
 word habit is applicable to all these improvements, and 
 in particular how far the powers of memory and of 
 habits may be powers of the same nature, I shall not 
 inquire. But that perceptions come into our minds 
 readily and of course, by means of their having been 
 there before, seems a thing of the same sort, as readi¬ 
 ness in any particular kind of action, proceeding from 
 being accustomed to it. And aptness to recollect 
 practical observations of service in our conduct, is 
 plainly habit in many cases. There are habits of per¬ 
 ception, and habits of action. An instance of the 
 former, is our constant and even involuntary readiness, 
 in correcting the impressions of our sight concerning 
 magnitudes and distances, so as to substitute judgment 
 in the room of sensation imperceptibly to ourselves. 
 And it seems as if all other associations of ideas not 
 naturally connected might be called passive habits; as 
 properly as our readiness in understanding languages 
 upon sight, or hearing of words. And our readiness in 
 speaking and writing them is an instance of the latter, 
 of active habits. For distinctness, we may consider 
 habits, as belonging to the body, or the mind: and the 
 latter will be explained by the former. Under the 
 
moral discipline. 
 
 85 
 
 CHAP. V.] 
 
 former are comprehended all bodily activities or 
 motions, whether graceful or unbecoming, which are 
 owing to use: under the latter, general habits of life 
 and conduct; such as those of obedience and sub¬ 
 mission to authority, or to any particular person; those 
 of veracity, justice, and charity; those of attention, 
 industry, self-government, envy, revenge. And habits 
 of this latter kind seem produced by repeated acts, as 
 well as the former. And in like manner as habits 
 belonging to the body are produced by external acts : 
 so habits of the mind are produced bv the exertion of 
 inward practical principles, i. e. by carrying them into 
 act, or acting upon them ; the principles of obedience, 
 of veracity, justice, and charity. Nor can those habits 
 be formed by any external course of action, otherwise 
 than as it proceeds from these principles: because it is 
 only these inward principles exerted, which are strictly 
 acts of obedience, of veracity, of justice, and of charity. 
 So likewise habits of attention, industry, self-govern¬ 
 ment, are in the same manner acquired by exercise; 
 and habits of envy and revenge by indulgence, whether 
 in outward act, or in thought and intention, i. e. inward 
 act: for such intention is an act. Resolutions also to 
 do well are properly acts. And endeavouring to 
 enforce upon our own minds a practical sense of virtue, 
 or to beget in others that practical sense of it, which a 
 man really has himself, is a virtuous act. All these, 
 therefore, may and Mill contribute towards forming 
 good habits. But going over the theory of virtue in 
 one’s thoughts, talking well, and drawing fine pictures, 
 of it; this is so far from necessarily or certainly con¬ 
 ducing to form an habit of it, in him who thus emplovs 
 himself, that it may harden the mind in a contrary 
 course, and render it gradually more insensible, i. e. 
 form an habit of insensibility, to all moral considerations. 
 

 8G of a state of [part I. 
 
 For, from our very faculty of habits, passive impres¬ 
 sions, by being repeated, grow weaker. Thoughts, by 
 often passing through the mind, are felt less sensibly : 
 being accustomed to danger, begets intrepidity, i. e. 
 lessens fear ; to distress, lessens the passion of pity; to 
 instances of others’ mortality, lessens the sensible ap¬ 
 prehension of our own. And from these two ob¬ 
 servations together; that practical habits are formed 
 and strengthened by repeated acts, and that passive 
 impressions grow weaker by being repeated upon us; 
 it must follow, that active habits may be gradually 
 forming and strengthening, by a course of acting upon 
 such and such motives and excitements, whilst these 
 motives and excitements themselves are, by propor¬ 
 tionable degrees, growing less sensible, i. e. are con¬ 
 tinually less and less sensibly felt, even as the active 
 habits strengthen. And experience confirms this : for 
 active principles, at the very time that they are less 
 lively in perception than they were, are found to be, 
 some how, wrought more thoroughly into the temper 
 and character, and become more effectual in influencing 
 our practice. The three things just mentioned may 
 afford instances of it. Perception of danger is a na¬ 
 tural excitement of passive fear, and active caution: 
 and by being inured to danger, habits of the latter are 
 gradually wrought, at the same time that the former 
 gradually lessens. Perception of distress in others is a 
 natural excitement, passively to pity, and actively to 
 relieve it: but let a man set himself to attend to, 
 inquire out, and relieve distressed persons, and he can¬ 
 not but grow less and less sensibly affected with the 
 various miseries of life, with which he must become 
 acquainted ; when yet, at the same time, benevolence, 
 considered not as a passion, but as a practical principle 
 of action, will strengthen: and whilst he passively 
 
CHAP. V.] 
 
 MORAL DISCIPLINE. 
 
 87 
 
 compassionates the distressed less, he will acquire a 
 greater aptitude actively to assist and befriend them. 
 So also at the same time that the daily instances of 
 men’s dying around us give us daily a less sensible 
 passive feeling or apprehension of our own mortality, 
 such instances greatly contribute to the strengthening 
 a practical regard to it in serious men; i. e. to forming 
 an habit of acting with a constant view to it. And 
 this seems again further to shew, that passive im¬ 
 pressions made upon our minds by admonition, ex¬ 
 perience, example, though they may have a remote 
 efficacy, and a very great one, towards forming - active 
 habits, yet, can have this efficacy no otherwise than by 
 inducing us to such a course of action : and that it is 
 not being affected so and so, but acting, which forms 
 those habits : only it must be always remembered, that 
 real endeavours to enforce good impressions upon our¬ 
 selves are a species of virtuous action. Nor do we 
 know how far it is possible, in the nature of things, 
 that effects should be wrought in us at once, equivalent 
 to habits, i. e. what is wrought by use and exercise. 
 However, the thing insisted upon is, not what may be 
 possible, but what is in fact the appointment of nature: 
 which is, that active habits are to be formed by ex¬ 
 ercise. Their progress may be so gradual, as to be 
 imperceptible in its steps: it may be hard to explain 
 the faculty, by which we are capable of habits, through¬ 
 out its several parts ; and to trace it up to its original, 
 so as to distinguish it from all others in our mind : and 
 it seems as if contrary effects were to be ascribed to it. 
 But the thing in general, that our nature is formed to 
 yield, in some such manner as this, to use and exercise, 
 is matter of certain experience. 
 
 Thus, by accustoming ourselves to any course of 
 action, we get an aptness to go on, a facility, readiness. 
 

 k #> 
 
 88 OF A STATE OF [PART I. 
 
 and often pleasure, in it. The inclinations which ren¬ 
 dered us averse to it grow weaker: the difficulties in 
 it, not only the imaginary but the real ones, lessen: 
 the reasons for it offer themselves of course to our 
 thoughts upon all occasions: and the least glimpse of 
 them is sufficient to make us go on, in a course of 
 action, to which we have been accustomed. And prac¬ 
 tical principles appear to grow stronger, absolutely in 
 themselves, by exercise; as well as relatively, with 
 regard to contrary principles; which, by being ac¬ 
 customed to submit, do so habitually, and of course. 
 And thus a new character, in several respects, may be 
 formed; and many habitudes of life, not given by 
 nature, but which nature directs us to acquire. 
 
 TTI. Indeed we may be assured, that we should never 
 have had these capacities of improving by experience, 
 acquired knowledge, and habits, had they not been 
 necessary, and intended to be made use of. And ac¬ 
 cordingly we find them so necessary, and so much 
 intended, that without them we should be utterly 
 incapable of that, which was the end for which we 
 were made, considered in our temporal capacity only: 
 the employments and satisfactions of our mature state 
 of life. 
 
 Nature does in no wise qualify us wholly, much less 
 at once, for this mature state of life. Even maturity 
 of understanding, and bodily strength, are not only 
 arrived to gradually, but are also very much owing 
 to the continued exercise of our powers of body and 
 mind from infancy. But if we suppose a person brought 
 into the world with both these in maturity, as far as 
 this is conceivable; he would plainly at first be as 
 unqualified for the human life of mature age, as an 
 idiot. He would be in a manner distracted, with 
 astonishment, and apprehension, and curiosity, and 
 
CHAP. V.] 
 
 MORAL DISCIPLINE. 
 
 89 
 
 suspense: nor can one guess, how long it would be, 
 before he would be familiarized to himself and the 
 objects about him enough, even to set himself to any 
 thing. It may be questioned too, whether the natural 
 information of his sight and hearing would be of any 
 manner of use at all to him in acting, before experi¬ 
 ence. And it seems, that men would be strangely 
 headstrong and self-willed, and disposed to exert them¬ 
 selves with an impetuosity, which would render society 
 insupportable, and the living in it impracticable ; were 
 it not for some acquired moderation and self-govern¬ 
 ment, some aptitude and readiness in restraining- them¬ 
 selves, and concealing their sense of things. Want of 
 ever y f^ing of this kind which is learnt would render a 
 man as uncapable of society, as want of language 
 would; or as his natural ignorance of any of the 
 particular employments of life would render him unca¬ 
 pable of providing himself with the common conve¬ 
 niences, or supplying the necessary wants of it. In 
 these respects, and probably in many more, of which 
 we have no particular notion, mankind is left, by na¬ 
 ture, an unformed, unfinished creature; utterly de¬ 
 ficient and unqualified, before the acquirement of 
 knowledge, experience, and habits, for that mature 
 state of life, which was the end of his creation, con¬ 
 sidering him as related only to this world. 
 
 But then, as nature has endued us with a power of 
 supplying those deficiencies, by acquired knowledge, 
 experience, and habits: so likewise we are placed in a 
 condition, in infancy, childhood, and youth, fitted for 
 it; fitted for our acquiring those qualifications of all 
 sorts, which we stand in need of in mature age. Hence 
 children, from their very birth, are daily growing 
 acquainted with the objects about them, with the scene 
 in which they are placed, and to have a future part; 
 
OF A STATE OF 
 
 90 
 
 [PAItT I. 
 
 and learning somewhat or other, necessary to the per¬ 
 formance of it. The subordinations, to which they are 
 accustomed in domestic life, teach them self-govern¬ 
 ment in common behaviour abroad, and prepare them 
 for subjection and obedience to civil authority. A\ hat 
 passes before their eyes, and daily happens to them, 
 gives them experience, caution against treachery and 
 deceit, together with numberless little rules of action 
 and conduct, which we could not live without; and 
 which are learnt so insensibly and so perfectly, as to be 
 mistaken perhaps for instinct: though they are the 
 effect of long experience and exercise; as much so as 
 language, or knowledge in particular business, or the 
 qualifications and behaviour belonging to the several 
 ranks and professions. Thus the beginning of our days 
 is adapted to be, and is, a state of education in the 
 theory and practice of mature life. We are much 
 assisted in it by example, instruction, and the care of 
 others; but a great deal is left to ourselves to do. And 
 of this, as part is done easily and of course; so part 
 requires diligence and care, the voluntary foregoing 
 many things which we desire, and setting ourselves to 
 what we should have no inclination to, but for the 
 necessity or expedience of it. For, that labour and 
 industry, which the station of so many absolutely re¬ 
 quires, they would be greatly unqualified for, in ma¬ 
 turity ; as those in other stations would be, for any 
 other sorts of application ; if both were not accustomed 
 to them in their youth. And according as persons 
 behave themselves, in the general education which all 
 go through, and in the particular ones adapted to 
 particular employments; their character is formed, and 
 made appear; they recommend themselves more or 
 less; and are capable of, and placed in, different 
 stations in the society of mankind. 
 
MORAL DISCIPLINE. 
 
 CHAP. V.] 
 
 91 
 
 The former part of life then is to be considered as 
 an important opportunity, which nature puts into our 
 hands, and which} when lost, is not to be recovered. 
 And our being placed in a state of discipline through¬ 
 out this life, for another world, is a providential dispo¬ 
 sition of things, exactly of the same kind, as our being 
 placed in a state of discipline during childhood, for 
 mature age. Our condition in both respects is uniform 
 and of a piece, and comprehended under one and the 
 same general law of nature. 
 
 And it we were not able at all to discern, how or in 
 what way the present life could be our preparation for 
 another; this would be no objection against the credi¬ 
 bility of its being so. For we do not discern, how 
 food and sleep contribute to the growth of the body; 
 nor could have any thought that they would, before 
 we had experience. Nor do children at all think, on 
 the one hand, that the sports and exercises, to which 
 they are so much addicted, contribute to their health 
 and growth ; nor, on the other, of the necessity which 
 there is for their being restrained in them : nor are 
 they capable of understanding the use of many parts of 
 discipline, which nevertheless they must be made to go 
 through, in order to qualify them for the business of 
 mature age. Were we not able then to discover, in 
 what respects the present life could form us for a 
 future one; yet nothing would be more supposable 
 than that it might, in some respects or other, from the 
 general analogy of Providence. And this, for ought I 
 see, might reasonably be said, even though we should 
 not take in the consideration of God’s moral govern¬ 
 ment over the world. But, 
 
 IV. Take in this consideration, and consequentlv, 
 that the character of virtue and pietv is a necessarv 
 qualification for the future state; and then we may 
 
92 
 
 OF A STATE OF 
 
 [part I. 
 
 distinctly see, how, and in what respects, the present 
 life may be a preparation for it: since we want , and are 
 capable of improvement in that character , by moral and 
 religious habits ; and the present life is fit to be a state 
 of discipline for such improvement: in like manner as 
 we have already observed, how, and in what respects, 
 infancy, childhood, and youth, are a necessary prepara¬ 
 tion, and a natural state of discipline, for mature age. 
 
 Nothing which we at present see would lead us to 
 the thought of a solitary unactive state hereafter: but, 
 if we judge at all from the analogy of nature, we must 
 suppose, according to the Scripture account of it, that 
 it will be a community. And there is no shadow of 
 any thing unreasonable in conceiving, though there be 
 no analogy for it, that this community will be, as the 
 Scripture represents it, under the more immediate, or, 
 if such an expression may be used, the more sensible 
 government of God. Nor is our ignorance, what will 
 be the employments of this happy community, nor our 
 consequent ignorance, what particular scope or occasion 
 there will be for the exercise of veracity, justice, and 
 charity, amongst the members of it with regard to each 
 other; any proof, that there will be no sphere of 
 exercise for those virtues. Much less, if that were 
 possible, is our ignorance any proof, that there will be 
 no occasion for that frame of mind, or character, which 
 is formed by the daily practice of those particular 
 virtues here, and which is a result from it. This at 
 least must be owned in general, that, as the govern¬ 
 ment established in the universe is moral, the character 
 of virtue and piety must, in some way or other, be the 
 condition of our happiness, or the qualification for it. 
 
 Now from what is above observed, concerning our 
 natural power of habits, it is easy to see, that we are 
 capable of moral improvement by discipline. And how 
 
CHAP. V.] 
 
 MORAL DISCIPLINE. 
 
 93 
 
 greatly we want it, need not be proved to any one who 
 is acquainted with the great wickedness of mankind; 
 or even with those imperfections, which the best are 
 conscious of. But it is not perhaps distinctly attended 
 to by every one, that the occasion which human crea¬ 
 tures have for discipline, to improve in them this 
 character ot virtue and piety, is to be traced up higher 
 than to excess in the passions, by indulgence and 
 habits of vice. Mankind, and perhaps all finite crea¬ 
 tures, from the very constitution of their nature, before 
 habits of virtue, are deficient, and in danger of de¬ 
 viating from what is right; and therefore stand in need 
 of virtuous habits, for a security against this danger. 
 For, together with the general principle of moral 
 understanding, we have in our inward frame various 
 affections towards particular external objects. These 
 affections are naturally, and of right, subject to the 
 government of the moral principle, as to the occasions 
 upon which they may be gratified ; as to the times, 
 degrees, and manner, in which the objects of them may 
 be pursued; but then the principle of virtue can 
 neither excite them, nor prevent their being excited. 
 On the contrary, they are naturally felt, when the 
 objects of them are present to the mind, not only 
 before all consideration, whether they can be obtained 
 by lawful means, but after it is found they cannot. 
 For the natural objects of affection continue so; the 
 necessaries, conveniences, and pleasures of life, remain 
 naturally desirable; though they cannot be obtained 
 innocently: nay, though they cannot possibly be ob¬ 
 tained at all. And when the objects of any affection 
 whatever cannot be obtained without unlawful means; 
 but may be obtained by them : such affection, though 
 its being excited, and its continuing some time in the 
 mind, be as innocent as it is natural and necessary; 
 
94 
 
 OF A STATE OF 
 
 [fart I. 
 
 yet cannot but be conceived to have a tendency to 
 incline persons to venture upon such unlawful means : 
 and therefore must be conceived as putting them in 
 some danger of it. Now what is the general security 
 against this danger, against their actually deviating 
 from right ? As the danger is, so also must the security 
 be, from within : from the practical principle of virtue" 1 . 
 And the strengthening or improving this principle, 
 considered as practical, or as a principle of action, will 
 lessen the danger, or increase the security against it. 
 And this moral principle is capable of improvement, 
 by proper discipline and exercise: by recollecting the 
 practical impressions which example and experience 
 have made upon us : and, instead of following humour 
 and mere inclination, by continually attending to the 
 equity and right of the case, in whatever we are en¬ 
 gaged, be it in greater or less matters ; and accustom¬ 
 ing ourselves always to act upon it; as being itself 
 the just and natural motive of action ; and as this 
 moral course of behaviour must necessarily, under 
 Divine government, be our final interest. Thus the 
 principle of virtue, improved into an habit, of which 
 improvement ice are thus capable, will plainly be, in pro¬ 
 portion to the strength of it, a security against the 
 danger which finite creatures are in, from the very 
 nature of propension, or particular affections . This 
 way of putting the matter, supposes particular affec- 
 
 It may be thought, that a sense of interest would as effectually restrain 
 creatures from doing wrong. But if by a sense of interest is meant a 
 speculative conviction or belief, that such and such indulgence would 
 occasion them greater uneasiness, upon the whole, than satisfaction; it is 
 contrary to present experience to say, that this sense of interest is suf¬ 
 ficient to restrain them from thus indulging themselves. And if by,a sense 
 of interest is meant a practical regard to what is upon the whole our 
 happiness; this is not only coincident with the principle of virtue or 
 moral rectitude, but is a part of the idea itself. And it is evident this 
 
MORAL DISCIPLINE. 
 
 95 
 
 CHAP. V.J 
 
 tions to remain in a future state; which it is scarce 
 possible (o avoid supposing. And if they do; we 
 clearly see, that acquired habits of virtue and self- 
 go\eminent may be necessary for the regulation of 
 them. However, though we were not distinctly to 
 take in this supposition, but to speak only in g'eneral: 
 the thing really comes to the same. For habits of 
 virtue, thus acquired by discipline, are improvement in 
 virtue: and improvement in virtue must be advancement 
 in happiness, if the government of the universe be moral. 
 
 From these things we may observe, and it will 
 farther shew this our natural and original need of 
 being improved by discipline, how it comes to pass, 
 that creatures made upright fall; and that those who 
 preserve their uprightness, by so doing, raise themselves 
 to a more secure state of virtue. To say that the 
 former is accounted for by the nature of liberty, is to 
 say no more, than that an event’s actually happening is 
 accounted for by a mere possibility of its happening. 
 But it seems distinctly conceivable from the very 
 nature of particular affections or propensions. For, 
 suppose creatures intended for such a particular state 
 of life, for which such propensions were necessary: 
 suppose them endued with such propensions, together 
 with moral understanding, as well including a practical 
 sense of virtue, as a speculative perception of it; and 
 that all these several principles, both natural and moral, 
 forming an inward constitution of mind, were in the 
 
 reasonable self-love wants to be improved, as really as any principle in 
 our nature. For we daily see it overmatched, not only by the more 
 boisterous passions, but by curiosity, shame, love of imitation, by any 
 thing, even indolence : especially if the interest, the temporal interest, 
 suppose, which is the end of such self-love, be at a distance. So greatly are 
 profligate men mistaken, when they affirm they are wholly governed by 
 interestedness and self-love. And 60 little cause is there for moralists to 
 disclaim this principle. See p. 74, 75. 
 
96 OF A STATE OF [PART I. 
 
 most exact proportion possible; i. e. in a proportion 
 the most exactly adapted to their intended state of 
 life ; such creatures would be made upright, or finitely 
 perfect. Now particular propensions, from their very 
 nature, must be felt, the objects of them being present; 
 though they cannot be gratified at all, or not with the 
 allowance of the moral principle. But if they can be 
 gratified without its allowance, or by contradicting it; 
 then they must be conceived to have some tendency in 
 how low a degree soever, yet some tendency, to induce 
 persons to such forbidden gratification. This tendency, 
 in some one particular propension, may be increased, by 
 the greater frequency of occasions naturally exciting it, 
 than of occasions exciting others. The least voluntary 
 indulgence in forbidden circumstances, though but in 
 thought, will increase this wrong tendency ; and may 
 increase it further, till, peculiar conjunctures perhaps 
 conspiring, it becomes effect; and danger of deviating 
 from right, ends in actual deviation from it: a danger 
 necessarily arising from the very nature of propension; 
 and which therefore could not have been prevented, 
 though it might have been escaped, or got innocently 
 through. The case would be, as if we were to suppose 
 a straight path marked out for a person, in which such 
 a degree of attention would keep him steady : but if 
 he would not attend in this degree, any one of a thou¬ 
 sand objects, catching his eye, might lead him out of 
 it. Now it is impossible to say, how much even the 
 first full overt act of irregularity might disorder the 
 inward constitution; unsettle the adjustments, and 
 alter the proportions, which formed it, and in which 
 the uprightness of its make consisted: but repetition 
 of irregularities would produce habits. And thus the 
 constitution would be spoiled; and creatures made 
 upright, become corrupt and depraved in their settled 
 
-MORAL DISCIPLINE. 
 
 CHAP. V.] 
 
 97 
 
 character, proportionably to their repeated irregularities 
 in occasional acts. But, on the contrary, these creatures 
 might have improved and raised themselves, to an 
 higher and more secure state of virtue, by the contrary 
 behaviour: by steadily following the moral principle, 
 supposed to be one part of their nature: and thus 
 withstanding that unavoidable danger of defection, 
 u nch necessarily arose from propension, the other part 
 of it. For, by thus preserving their integrity for some 
 time, their danger would lessen ; since propensions, by 
 being inured to submit, would do it more easily and 
 of course: and their security against this lessening 
 danger would increase; since the moral principle would 
 gam additional strength by exercise: both which things 
 .are implied in the notion of virtuous habits. Thus 
 then vicious indulgence is not only criminal in itself, 
 but also depraves the inward constitution and character. 
 And virtuous self-government is not only right in itself, 
 but also improves the inward constitution or character : 
 and may improve it to such a degree, that though we 
 should suppose it impossible, for particular affections to 
 be absolutely coincident with the moral principle; and 
 consequently should allow, that such creatures as have 
 been above supposed, would for ever remain defective; 
 yet their danger of actually deviating from right may 
 be almost infinitely lessened, and they fully fortified 
 against what remains of it; if that may be called 
 danger, against which there is an adequate effectual 
 security. But still, this their higher perfection may 
 continue to consist in habits of virtue formed in a 
 state of discipline, and this their more complete 
 security remain to proceed from them. And thus it is 
 plainly conceivable, that creatures without blemish, as 
 they came out of the hands of God, may be in danger 
 of going wrong; and so may stand in need of die 
 
 -ANALOGY. tt 
 
98 
 
 OF A STATE OF 
 
 [part 1. 
 
 security of virtuous habits, additional to the moral 
 principle wrought into their natures by him. That 
 which is the ground of their danger, or their want of 
 security, may be considered as a deficiency in them, 
 to which virtuous habits are the natural supply. And 
 as they are naturally capable of being raised and im¬ 
 proved by discipline, it may be a thing fit and requisite 
 that they should be placed in circumstances with an 
 eye to it: in circumstances peculiarly fitted to be, 
 to them, a state of discipline for their improvement 
 in virtue. 
 
 But how much more strongly must this hold with 
 respect to those, who have corrupted their natures, are 
 fallen from their original rectitude, and whose passions 
 are become excessive by repeated violations of their 
 inward constitution? Upright creatures may want to 
 be improved: depraved creatures want to be renewed. 
 Education and discipline, which may be in all degrees 
 and sorts of gentleness and of severity, is expedient 
 for those: but must be absolutely necessary for these. 
 For these, discipline of the severer sort too, and in the 
 higher degrees of it, must be necessary, in order to 
 wear out vicious habits; to recover their primitive 
 strength of self-government, which indulgence must 
 have weakened; to repair, as well as raise into an 
 habit, the moral principle, in order to their arriving at 
 a secure state of virtuous happiness. 
 
 Now whoever will consider the thing, may clearly 
 see, that the present world is 'peculiarly Jit to be a 
 state of discipline for this purpose, to such as will set 
 themselves to mend and improve. For, the various 
 temptations with which we are surrounded; our ex¬ 
 perience of the deceits of wickedness; having been in 
 many instances led wrong ourselves ; the great vicious¬ 
 ness of the world; the infinite disorders consequent 
 
MORAL DISCIPLINE. 
 
 CHAP. V.] 
 
 99 
 
 upon it; our being made acquainted with pain and 
 sorrow, either from our own feeling of it, or from the 
 sight of it in others; these things, though some of 
 them may indeed produce wrong effects upon our 
 minds, yet when duly reflected upon, have, all of them, 
 a direct tendency to bring us to a settled moderation 
 and reasonableness of temper: the contrary both to 
 thoughtless levity, and also to that unstrained self-will, 
 and violent bent to follow present inclination, which 
 may be observed in undisciplined minds. Such ex¬ 
 perience, as the present state affords, of the frailty of 
 our nature; of the boundless extravagance of un- 
 governed passion; of the power which an infinite 
 3emg has over us, by the various capacities of misery 
 which he has given us; in short, that kind and degree 
 of experience, which the present state affords us, that 
 the constitution of nature is such as to admit the 
 possibility, the danger, and the actual event, of crea¬ 
 tures losing their innocence and happiness, and be¬ 
 coming vicious and wretched ; hath a tendency to give 
 us a practical sense of things very different from a 
 mere speculative knowledge, that we are liable to vice, 
 and capable of misery. And who knows, whether the 
 security of creatures in the highest and most settled 
 state of perfection, may not in part arise, from their 
 having had such a sense of things as this, formed, and 
 habitually fixed within them, in some state of pro¬ 
 bation. And passing through the present world with 
 that moral attention, which is necessary to the acting 
 a light part in it, may leave everlasting impressions of 
 this sort upon our minds. But to be a little more 
 distinct: allurements to what is wrong; difficulties in 
 the discharge of our duty; our not being able to act 
 an uniform right part without some thought and care ; 
 and the opportunities which we have, or imagine we 
 
 h 2 
 
OF A STATE OF 
 
 TOO 
 
 [part I. 
 
 have, of avoiding what we dislike, or obtaining what 
 we desire, by unlawful means, when we either cannot 
 do it at all, or at least not so easily, by lawful ones; 
 these things, i. e. the snares and temptations of vice, 
 are what render the present world peculiarly fit to be 
 a state of discipline, to those who will preserve their 
 integrity: because they render being upon our guard, 
 resolution, and the denial of our passions, necessary in 
 order to that end. And the exercise of such particular 
 recollection, intention of mind, and self-government, in 
 the practice of virtue, has, from the make of our 
 nature, a peculiar tendency to form habits of virtue; 
 as implying, not only a real, but also a more continued, 
 and a more intense exercise of the virtuous principle; 
 or a more constant and a stronger effort of virtue 
 exerted into act. Thus suppose a person to know 
 himself to be in particular danger, for some time, of 
 doing any thing wrong, which yet he fully resolves 
 not to do : continued recollection, and keeping upon 
 his guard, in order to make good his resolution, 
 is a contimied exerting of that act of virtue in a 
 high degree , which need have been, and perhaps would 
 have been, only instantaneous and iveak , had the temp¬ 
 tation been so. It is indeed ridiculous to assert, 
 that self-denial is essential to virtue and piety: but 
 it would have been nearer the truth, though not 
 strictly the truth itself, to have said, that it is 
 essential to discipline and improvement. For though 
 actions materially virtuous, which have no sort of 
 difficulty, but are perfectly agreeable to our particular 
 inclinations, may possibly be done only from these 
 particular inclinations, and so may not be any exercise 
 of the principle of virtue, i. e. not be virtuous actions 
 at all; yet, on the contrary, they may be an exercise 
 of that principle : and when they are, they have a 
 
CHAP. V.] 
 
 moral discipline. 
 
 101 
 
 tendency to form and fix the habit of virtue. But 
 ^hen the exercise of the virtuous principle is more 
 continued, oftener repeated, and more intense ; as it 
 must be in circumstances of danger, temptation, and 
 difficulty, of any kind and in any degree; this ten¬ 
 dency is increased proportionably, and a more confirmed 
 habit is the consequence. 
 
 This undoubtedly holds to a certain length : but how 
 far it may hold, I know not. Neither our intellectual 
 powers, nor our bodily strength, can be improved 
 beyond such a degree: and both may be over-wrought. 
 Possibly there may be somewhat analogous to this, 
 with respect to the moral character; which is scarce 
 worth considering. And I mention it only, lest it 
 should come into some persons thoughts, not as an 
 exception to the foregoing observations, which perhaps 
 it is; but as a confutation of them, which it is not. 
 And there may be several other exceptions. Observa¬ 
 tions of this kind cannot be supposed to hold minutely, 
 and in every case. It is enough that they hold in 
 general. And these plainly hold so far, as that from 
 them may be seen distinctly, which is all that is 
 intended by them, that the present world is peculiarly 
 Jit to he a state of discipline , for our improvement in 
 virtue and piety: in the same sense as some sciences, 
 by requiring and engaging the attention, not to be sure 
 of such persons as will not, but of such as will, set 
 themselves to them ; are fit to form the mind to habits 
 of attention. 
 
 Indeed the present state is so far from proving, 
 in event, a discipline of virtue to the generality of men, 
 that, on the contrary, they seem to make it a discipline 
 of vice. And the viciousness of the world is, in dif¬ 
 ferent ways, the great temptation, which renders it a 
 state of virtuous discipline, in the degree it is, to good 
 
102 OF A STATE OF [PART I. 
 
 men. The whole end, and the whole occasion, of man¬ 
 kind’s being placed in such a state as the present, is 
 not pretended to be accounted for. That which ap¬ 
 pears amidst the general corruption, is, that there are 
 some persons, who, having within them the principle of 
 amendment and recovery, attend to and follow the 
 notices of virtue and religion, be they more clear or 
 more obscure, which are afforded them ; and that the 
 present world is, not only an exercise of virtue in these 
 persons, but an exercise of it in ways and degrees, 
 peculiarly apt to improve it: apt to improve it, in 
 some respects, even beyond what would be, by the 
 exercise of it required in a perfectly virtuous society, 
 or in a society of equally imperfect virtue with them¬ 
 selves. But that the present world does not actually 
 become a state of moral discipline to many, even to 
 the generality, i. e. that they do not improve or grow 
 better in it, cannot be urged as a proof, that it was not 
 intended for moral discipline, by any who at all observe 
 the analogy of nature. For, of the numerous seeds of 
 vegetables and bodies of animals, which are adapted 
 and put in the way, to improve to such a point or state 
 of natural maturity and perfection, we do not see 
 perhaps that one in a million actually does. Far the 
 greatest part of them decay before they are improved 
 to it; and appear to be absolutely destroyed. Yet no 
 one, who does not deny all final causes, will deny, that 
 those seeds and bodies, which do attain to that point of 
 maturity and perfection, answer the end for which they 
 were really designed by nature; and therefore that 
 nature designed them for such perfection. And I can¬ 
 not forbear adding, though it is not to the present pur¬ 
 pose, that the appearance of such an amazing waste in 
 nature, with respect to these seeds and bodies, by 
 foreign causes, is to us as unaccountable, as, what is 
 
CHAP. V.] 
 
 MORAL DISCIPLINE. 
 
 103 
 
 much more terrible, the present and future ruin of so 
 many moral agents by themselves, i. e. by vice. 
 
 Against this whole notion of moral discipline, it may 
 be objected, in another way; that so far as a course of 
 behaviour, materially virtuous, proceeds from hope and 
 fear, so far it is only a discipline and strengthening of 
 self-love. But doing what God commands, because he 
 commands it, is obedience, though it proceeds from 
 hope or fear. And a course of such obedience will 
 form habits of it. And a constant regard to veracity, 
 justice, and charity, may form distinct habits of these 
 particular virtues; and will certainly form habits of 
 self-government, and of denying our inclinations, when¬ 
 ever veracity, justice, or charity requires it. Nor is 
 there any foundation for this great nicety, with which 
 some affect to distinguish in this case, in order to 
 depreciate all Religion proceeding from hope or fear. 
 For, veracity, justice, and charity, regard to God’s 
 authority, and to our own chief interest, are not only 
 all three coincident; but each of them is, in itself; 
 a just and natural motive or principle of action. And 
 he who begins a good life from any one of them, and 
 perseveres in it, as he is already in some degree, so he 
 cannot fail of becoming more and more, of that cha¬ 
 racter, which is correspondent to the constitution of 
 nature as moral; and to the relation, which God stands 
 in to us as moral Governor of it: nor consequently can 
 he fail of obtaining that happiness, which this consti¬ 
 tution and relation necessarily suppose connected with 
 that character. 
 
 These several observations, concerning the active 
 principle of virtue and obedience to God’s commands, 
 are applicable to passive submission or resignation to 
 his will: which is another essential part of a right cha¬ 
 racter, connected with the former, and very much in 
 
104 
 
 OF A STATE OF 
 
 PART 
 
 our power to form ourselves to. It may be imagined, 
 that nothing but afflictions can give occasion for, or 
 require this virtue ; that it can have no respect to, nor 
 be any way necessary to qualify for, a state of perfect 
 happiness: but it is not experience which can make us 
 think thus. Prosperity itself, whilst any thing supposed 
 desirable is not ours, begets extravagant and unbounded 
 thoughts. Imagination is altogether as much a source 
 of discontent, as any thing in our external condition. 
 It is indeed true, that there can be no scope for 
 patience, when sorrow shall be no more: but there 
 may be need of a temper of mind, which shall have 
 been formed by patience. For, though self-love, consi¬ 
 dered merely as an active principle leading us to pursue 
 our chief interest, cannot but be uniformly coincident 
 with the principle of obedience to God’s commands, 
 our interest, being rightly understood; because this 
 obedience, and the pursuit of our own chief interest, 
 must be in every case one and the same thing : yet it 
 may be questioned, whether self-love, considered merely 
 as the desire of our own interest or happiness, can, 
 from its nature, be thus absolutely and uniformly coin¬ 
 cident with the will of God ; any more than particular 
 affections can a : coincident in such sort, as not to be 
 liable to be excited upon occasions and in degrees, 
 impossible to be gratified consistently with the con¬ 
 stitution of things, or the Divine appointments So 
 that habits of resignation may, upon this account, be 
 requisite for all creatures: habits, I say ; which signify 
 what is formed by use. However, in general it is 
 obvious that both self-love and particular affections in 
 human creatures, considered only as passive feelings, 
 distort and rend the mind; and therefore stand in 
 need of discipline. Now denial of those particular 
 
 a P- 93 - 
 
MORAL DISCIPLINE. 
 
 105 
 
 CHAP. V.] 
 
 affections, in a course of active virtue and obedience to 
 Gods will, has a tendency to moderate them; and 
 seems also to have a tendency to habituate the mind, 
 to be easy and satisfied with that degree of happiness 
 which is allotted us, i. e. to moderate self-love. But 
 the proper discipline for resignation is affliction. For 
 a right behaviour under that trial; recollecting our¬ 
 selves so as to consider it in the view, in which 
 Religion teaches us to consider it, as from the hand of 
 God ; receiving it as what he appoints, or thinks proper 
 to pei mit, in his world and under his government; 
 this will habituate the mind to a dutiful submission. 
 And such submission, together with the active principle 
 of obedience, make up the temper and character in us, 
 which answers to his sovereignty; and which abso¬ 
 lutely belongs to the condition of our being, as depend¬ 
 ent creatures. Nor can it be said, that this is only 
 breaking the mind to a submission to mere power; for 
 mere power may be accidental, and precarious, and 
 usurped : but it is forming within ourselves the temper 
 of resignation to his rightful authority, who is, by nature, 
 supreme over all. 
 
 I pon the whole: such a character, and such qualifi¬ 
 cations, are necessary for a mature state of life in the 
 present world, as nature alone does in no wise bestow; 
 but has put it upon us, in great part, to acquire, in our 
 pi ogress fiom one stage of life to another, from child¬ 
 hood to mature age; put it upon us to acquire them, 
 h J 8 bl 8 us capacities of doing it, and by placing us, 
 in the beginning of life, in a condition fit for it. And 
 this is a general analogy to our condition in the pre¬ 
 sent world, as in a state of moral discipline for another. 
 
 It is in vain then to object against the credibility of 
 the present life’s being intended for this purpose, that 
 all the trouble and the danger, unavoidably accompany- 
 
106 OF A STATE OF MORAL DISCIPLINE. [PART I. 
 
 mg’ such discipline, might have been saved us, by our 
 bein£ made at once the creatures and the characters, 
 which we were to be. For we experience, that what ice 
 were to be , was to be the effect of what we would do: 
 and that the general conduct of nature is, not to save 
 us trouble or danger, but to make us capable of going 
 through them, and to put it upon us to do so. Ac¬ 
 quirements of our own, experience and habits, are the 
 natural supply to our deficiencies, and security against 
 our dangers: since it is as plainly natural to set our¬ 
 selves to acquire the qualifications, as the external 
 things, which we stand in need of. In particular, it is 
 as plainly a general law of nature, that we should, with 
 regard to our temporal interest, form and cultivate 
 practical principles within us, by attention, use, and 
 discipline, as any thing whatever is a natural law; 
 chiefly in the beginning of life, but also throughout the 
 whole course of it. And the alternative is left to our 
 choice: either to improve ourselves, and better our 
 condition; or, in default of such improvement, to re¬ 
 main deficient and wretched. It is therefore perfectly 
 credible, from the analogy of nature, that the same 
 may be our case, with respect to the happiness of a 
 future state, and the qualifications necessary for it. 
 
 There is a third thing, which may seem implied in 
 the present world’s being a state of probation ; that it 
 is a theatre of action, for the manifestation of persons’ 
 characters, with respect to a future one : not to be 
 sure to an all-knowing Being, but to his creation or 
 part of it. This may, perhaps, be only a consequence 
 of our being in a state of probation in the other senses. 
 However, it is not impossible, that men’s shewing 
 and making manifest what is in their heart, what their 
 real character is, may have respect to a future life, in 
 ways and manners which we are not acquainted with: 
 
CHAP. VI.J 
 
 107 
 
 OF THE OPINION OF NECESSITY, &C. 
 
 particularly it may be a means, for the Author of 
 Nature does not appear to do anything without means, 
 of their being disposed of suitably to their characters ; 
 and of its being known to the creation, by way of 
 example, that they are thus disposed of. But not to 
 enter upon any conjectural account of this ; one may 
 just mention, that the manifestation of persons’ charac¬ 
 ters contributes very much, in various ways, to the 
 carrying on a great part of that general course of 
 nature, respecting mankind, which comes under our 
 observation at present. I shall only add, that proba¬ 
 tion, in both these senses, as well as in that treated of 
 in the foregoing chapter, is implied in moral govern¬ 
 ment ; since by persons’ behaviour under it, their 
 characters cannot but be manifested, and, if they 
 behave well, improved. 
 
 CHAP. VI. 
 
 Of the Opinion of Necessity, considered as influencing 
 
 Practice. 
 
 milROUGIIOUT the foregoing Treatise it appears, 
 J- that the condition of mankind, considered as in¬ 
 habitants of this world only, and under the government 
 of God which we experience, is greatly analogous to 
 our condition, as designed for another world, or 
 under that farther government, which Religion teaches 
 us. If therefore any assert, as a Fatalist must, that 
 the opinion of universal Necessity is reconcilable with 
 the former; there immediately arises a question in the 
 way of analogy, whether he must not also own it to be 
 reconcilable with the latter, i. e. with the system of 
 Religion itself, and the proof of it. The reader then 
 will observe, that the question now before us is not 
 
108 OF THIS OPINION OF NECESSITY, [PART I. 
 
 absolute, Whether the opinion of Fate be reconcilable 
 with Religion; but hypothetical, Whether, upon sup¬ 
 position of its being reconcilable with the constitution 
 of Nature, it be not reconcilable with Religion also: 
 or, what pretence a Fatalist, not other persons, but a 
 Fatalist, has to conclude from his opinion, that there 
 can be no such thing as Religion. And as the puzzle 
 and obscurity, which must unavoidably arise from ar¬ 
 guing upon so absurd a supposition as that of universal 
 Necessity, will, I fear, easily be seen; it will, I hope, 
 as easily be excused. 
 
 But since it has been all along taken for granted, as 
 a thing proved, that there is an intelligent Author of 
 Nature, or natural Governor of the world ; and since an 
 objection may be made against the proof of this, from 
 the opinion of universal Necessity, as it may be sup¬ 
 posed, that such Necessity will itself account for the 
 origin and preservation of all things: it is requisite, 
 that this objection be distinctly answered; or that it 
 be shewn, that a Fatality, supposed consistent with 
 what we certainly experience, does not destroy the 
 proof of an intelligent Author and Governor of Nature ; 
 before we proceed to consider, whether it destroys the 
 proof of a moral Governor of it, or of our being in a 
 state of Religion. 
 
 Now, when it is said by a Fatalist, that the whole con¬ 
 stitution of Nature, and the actions of men, that every 
 thing, and every mode and circumstance of every thing, 
 is necessary, and could not possibly have been otherwise ; 
 it is to be observed, that this Necessity does not ex¬ 
 clude deliberation, choice, preference, and acting from 
 certain principles, and to certain ends: because all this 
 is matter of undoubted experience, acknowledged by 
 all, and what every man may, every moment, be con¬ 
 scious of. And from hence it follows, that Necessity, 
 
CHAP. VI.] AS INFLUENCING PRACTICE. 109 
 
 alone and of itself, is in no sort an account of the con¬ 
 stitution of Nature, and how things came to be and to 
 continue as they are ; but only an account of this cir¬ 
 cumstance relating to their origin and continuance, 
 that they could not have been otherwise than they 
 are and have been. The assertion, that every thing 
 is by Necessity of Nature, is not an answer to 
 the question ; Whether the world came into being 
 as it is, by an intelligent Agent forming it thus, or not: 
 but to quite another question ; Whether it came into 
 being as it is, in that way and manner which we call 
 necessarily, or in that way and manner which we call 
 freely. For suppose farther, that one who was a Fatal¬ 
 ist, and one who kept to his natural sense of things, 
 and believed himself a Free Agent, were disputing 
 together, and vindicating their respective opinions; and 
 they should happen to instance in a house: they 
 would agree that it was built by an architect. Then- 
 difference concerning Necessity and Freedom would 
 occasion no difference of judgment concerning this; 
 but only concerning another matter; whether the ar¬ 
 chitect built it necessarily or freely. Suppose then 
 they should proceed to inquire concerning the consti¬ 
 tution of Nature: in a lax way of speaking, one of 
 them might say, it Avas by Necessity; and the other, 
 by Freedom: but if they had any meaning to their 
 words, as the latter must mean a Free Agent, so the 
 former must at length be reduced to mean an Agent, 
 whether he would say one or more, acting by Necessity: 
 for abstract notions can do nothing. Indeed we ascribe 
 to God a necessary existence, uncaused by any agent. 
 For we find within ourselves the idea of infinity, i. e. 
 immensity and eternity, impossible, even in imagination, 
 to be remoA r ed out of being. We seem to discern 
 intuitively, that there must, and cannot but be, some- 
 
no 
 
 OF THE OPINION OF NECESSITY, 
 
 [PART I. 
 
 what, external to ourselves, answering this idea, or the 
 archetype of it. And from hence (for this abstract , as 
 much as any other, implies a concrete) we conclude, 
 that there is, and cannot but be, an infinite and im¬ 
 mense eternal Being existing, prior to all design con¬ 
 tributing to his existence, and exclusive of it. And 
 from the scantiness of language, a manner of speaking 
 has been introduced; that Necessity is the foundation, 
 the reason, the account of the existence of God. But 
 it is not alleged, nor can it be at all intended, that 
 every thing exists as it does, by this kind of Necessity ; 
 a Necessity antecedent in nature to design: it cannot, 
 I say, be meant that every thing exists as it does, by 
 this kind of Necessity, upon several accounts ; and par¬ 
 ticularly because it is admitted, that design, in the 
 actions of men, contributes to many alterations in na¬ 
 ture. For if any deny this, I shall not pretend to 
 reason with them. 
 
 From these things it follows; first, That when a 
 Fatalist asserts, that every thing is by Necessity , he 
 must mean, by an Agent acting necessarily; he must T 
 say mean this, for I am very sensible he would not 
 choose to mean it: and secondly, That the Necessity, 
 by which such an Agent is supposed to act, does not 
 exclude intelligence and design. So that, were the 
 system of Fatality admitted, it would just as much 
 account for the formation of the world, as for the 
 structure of an house, and no more. Necessity as much 
 requires and supposes a Necessary Agent, as Freedom 
 requires and supposes a Free Agent, to be the former 
 of the world. And the appearances of design and of 
 final causes in the constitution of nature as really prove 
 this acting Agent to be an intelligent designer , or to 
 act from choice; upon the scheme of Necessity, sup¬ 
 posed possible, as upon that of Freedom. 
 
AS INFLUENCING PRACTICE. 
 
 ill 
 
 CHAP. VI.] 
 
 It appearing thus, that the notion of Necessity does 
 not destroy the proof, that there is an intelligent Au¬ 
 thor ot Mature and natural Governor of the world; the 
 present question, which the analogy before mentioned 4 
 suggests, and which, I think, it will answer, is this: 
 W hether the opinion of Necessity, supposed consistent 
 with possibility, with the constitution of the world, and 
 the natural government which we experience exercised 
 over it, destroys all reasonable ground of belief, that we 
 are in a state of Religion : or whether that opinion be 
 leconeilable with Religion; with the system, and the 
 proof of it. 
 
 Suppose then a Fatalist to educate any one, from 
 his youth up, in his own principles; that the child 
 should reason upon them, and conclude, that since he 
 cannot possibly behave otherwise than he does, he is 
 not a subject of blame or commendation, nor can 
 deserve to be rewarded or punished: imagine him to 
 eradicate the very perceptions of blame and commen¬ 
 dation out of his mind, by means of this system ; to 
 form his temper, and character, and behaviour to it; 
 and from it to judge of the treatment he was to 
 expect, say, from reasonable men, upon his coming" 
 abroad into the world: as the Fatalist judges from this 
 system, what he is to expect from the Author of Na¬ 
 ture, and with regard to a future state. I cannot 
 forbear stopping here to ask, whether any one of com¬ 
 mon sense would think fit, that a child should be put 
 upon these speculations, and be left to apply them to 
 practice. And a man has little pretence to reason, 
 who is not sensible, that we are all children in spe¬ 
 culations of this kind. However, the child would 
 doubtless be highly delighted to find himself freed from 
 the restraints of fear and shame, with which his play- 
 
 a P. IO7. 
 
112 OF THE OPINION OF NECESSITY, [PART I. 
 
 fellows were fettered and embarrassed; and highly 
 conceited in his superior knowledge, so far beyond his 
 years. But conceit and vanity would be the least bad 
 part of the influence, which these principles must have, 
 when thus reasoned and acted upon, during the course 
 of his education. He must either be allowed to go on, 
 and be the plague of all about him, and himself too, 
 even to his own destruction : or else correction must 
 be continually made use of, to supply the want of those 
 natural perceptions of blame and commendation, which 
 we have supposed to be removed ; and to give him 
 a practical impression, of what he had reasoned him¬ 
 self out of the belief of, that he was in fact an ac¬ 
 countable child, and to be punished for doing what he 
 was forbid. Tt is therefore in reality impossible, but 
 that the correction which he must meet with, in the 
 course of his education, must convince him, that if the 
 scheme he was instructed in were not false; yet that 
 he reasoned inconclusively upon it, and somehow or 
 other misapplied it to practice and common life; as 
 what the Fatalist experiences of the conduct of Pro¬ 
 vidence at present, ought in all reason to convince him, 
 that this scheme is misapplied when applied to the 
 subject of Religion b . But supposing the child’s tem¬ 
 per could remain still formed to the system and his 
 expectation of the treatment he was to have in the 
 world be regulated by it; so as to expect that no 
 reasonable man would blame or punish him, for any 
 thing which he should do, because he could not help 
 doing it: upon this supposition it is manifest he would, 
 upon his coming abroad into the world, be insupport¬ 
 able to society, and the treatment which he would 
 receive from it would render it so to him; and he 
 could not fail of doing somewhat, very soon, for which 
 
 b P. 122. 
 
113 
 
 CHAP. VI.] as influencing practice. 
 
 he would be delivered over into the hands of civil 
 justice. And thus, in the end, he would be convinced 
 of the obligations he was under to his wise instructor. 
 Or suppose this scheme of Fatality, in any other way, 
 applied to practice, such practical application of it will 
 be found equally absurd; equally fallacious in a prac¬ 
 tical sense : for instance, that if a man be destined to live 
 such a time, he shall live to it, though he take no care 
 of his own preservation; or if he be destined to die 
 before that time, no care can prevent it: therefore all, 
 care about preserving one’s life is to be neglected : 
 which is the fallacy instanced in by the ancients. But 
 now on the contrary, none of these practical absurdities 
 can be drawn, from reasoning upon the supposition, 
 that we are free; but all such reasoning with regard to 
 the common affairs of life is justified by experience. 
 And therefore, though it were admitted that this opin¬ 
 ion of Necessity were speculatively true; yet, with 
 regard to practice, it is as if it were false, so far as our 
 experience reaches; that is, to the whole of our present 
 life. For, the constitution of the present world, and 
 the condition in which we are actually placed, is, as if 
 we were free. And it may perhaps justly be con¬ 
 cluded, that since the whole process of action, through 
 every step of it, suspense, deliberation, inclining one 
 way, determining, and at last doing as we determine, is 
 as if we were free, therefore we are so. But the thing 
 here insisted upon is, that under the present natural 
 government of the world, we find we are treated and 
 dealt with, as if we were free, prior to all consideration 
 whether we are or not. Were this opinion therefore 
 of Necessity admitted to be ever so true; yet such is 
 in fact our condition and the natural course of things, 
 that whenever we apply it to life and practice, this 
 application of it always misleads us, and cannot but 
 
 ANALOGY. 
 
 I 
 
114 OF THE OPINION OF NECESSITY, [PART I. 
 
 mislead us, in a most dreadful manner, with regard to 
 our present interest. And how can people think them¬ 
 selves so very secure then, that the same application 
 of the same opinion may not mislead them also, in some 
 analogous manner, with respect to a future 1 , a more 
 general, and more important interest? hor, Religion 
 being a practical subject; and the analogy of natuic 
 shewing us, that we have not faculties to apply this 
 opinion, were it a true one, to practical subjects; when¬ 
 ever we do apply it to the subject of Religion, and 
 thence conclude, that we are free from its obligations, 
 it is plain this conclusion cannot be depended upon. 
 There will still remain just reason to think, whatever 
 appearances are, that we deceive ourselves; in some¬ 
 what of a like manner, as when people fancy they can 
 draw contradictory conclusions from the idea of infinity. 
 
 From these things together, the attentive reader will 
 see it follows, that if upon supposition of Freedom 
 the evidence of Religion be conclusive, it remains so, 
 upon supposition of Necessity, because the notion of 
 Necessity is not applicable to practical subjects : i. e. 
 with respect to them, is as if it were not true. Nor 
 does this contain any reflection upon reason: but only 
 upon what is unreasonable. For to pretend to act 
 upon reason, in opposition to practical principles, which 
 the Author of our Nature gave us to act upon ; and to 
 pretend to apply our reason to subjects, with regard to 
 which, our own short views, and even our experience, 
 will shew us, it cannot be depended upon; and such, 
 at best, the subject of Necessity must be; this is vanity, 
 conceit, and unreasonableness. 
 
 But this is not all. For we find within ourselves a 
 will, and are conscious of a character. Now 7 if this, in 
 us, be reconcilable with Fate, it is reconcilable with it, 
 in the Author of Nature. And besides, natural govern- 
 
 
CHAP. VI.] 
 
 AS INFLUENCING PRACTICE. 
 
 115 
 
 ment and final causes imply a character and a will in 
 the Governor and Designer c ; a Mill concerning the 
 creatures whom he governs. The Author of Nature 
 then being certainly of some character or other, not¬ 
 withstanding Necessity; it is evident this Necessity 
 is as reconcilable with the particular character of bene- 
 Nolence, veracity, and justice in him, which attributes 
 are the foundation of Religion, as with any other cha¬ 
 racter : since we find this necessity no more hinders 
 men from being benevolent, than cruel; true, than 
 faithless; just, than unjust; or if the Fatalist pleases, 
 Mhat we call unjust. For it is said indeed, that what, 
 upon supposition of Freedom, would be just punish¬ 
 ment ; upon supposition of Necessity, becomes mani¬ 
 festly unjust: because it is punishment inflicted for 
 doing that which persons could not avoid doing. As if 
 the Necessity, M’liich is supposed to destroy the in¬ 
 justice of murder, for instance, would not also destroy 
 the injustice of punishing it. However, as little to the 
 purpose as this objection is in itself, it is very much to 
 the purpose to observe from it, how the notions of 
 justice and injustice remain, even whilst we endeavour 
 to suppose them removed ; how they force themselves 
 upon the mind, even whilst we are making suppositions 
 destructive of them: for there is not, perhaps, a man 
 in the world, but would be ready to make this objection 
 at first thought. 
 
 But though it is most evident, that universal Neces¬ 
 sity, if it be reconcilable with any thing, is reconcilable 
 M-itli that character in the Author of Nature, Mhich is 
 the foundation of Religion ; “ Yet, does it not plainly 
 “ destroy the proof, that he is of that character, and 
 
 C B >" wil1 and character is meant that, which, in speaking of men, we 
 should express, not only by these words, hut also by the words temper, 
 taste, dispositions, practical principles: that whole frame of mind, from 
 whence we act in one manner rather than another. 
 
 I 2 
 
116 
 
 OF THE OPINION OF NECESSITY, 
 
 [part I. 
 
 “ consequently the proof of Religion ?” By no means. 
 For we find, that happiness and misery are not our fate, 
 in any such sense as not to be the consequences of our 
 behaviour; but that they are the consequences of it d . 
 We find God exercises the same kind of government 
 over us, with that, which a father exercises over his 
 children, and a civil magistrate over his subjects. 
 Now, whatever becomes of abstract questions con¬ 
 cerning Liberty and Necessity, it evidently appears 
 to us, that veracity and justice must be the natural rule 
 and measure of exercising this authority or government, 
 to a Being who can have no competitions or interfering 
 of interests, with his creatures and his subjects. 
 
 But as the doctrine of Liberty, though we experience 
 its truth, may be perplexed with difficulties, which 
 run up into the most abstruse of all speculations ; and 
 as the opinion of Necessity seems to be the very basis, 
 upon which infidelity grounds itself; it may be of some 
 use to offer a more particular proof of the obligations 
 of Religion, which may distinctly be shewn not to be 
 destroyed by this opinion. 
 
 The proof from final causes of an intelligent Author 
 of Nature is not affected by the opinion of Necessity ; 
 supposing necessity a thing possible in itself, and recon¬ 
 cilable with the constitution of things e . And it is a 
 matter of fact, independent on this or any other specu¬ 
 lation, that he governs the world by the method of 
 rewards and punishments f : and also that he hath 
 given us a moral faculty, by which we distinguish 
 between actions, and approve some as virtuous and of 
 good desert, and disapprove others as vicious and of ill 
 desert p . Now this moral discernment implies, in the 
 notion of it, a rule of action, and a rule of a very 
 peculiar kind : for it carries in it authority and a right 
 
 d Chap. ii. e P. 108, &c. r Chap. ii. 
 
 £ Dissert. II. 
 
CIIAP. VI.] AS INFLUENCING PRACTICE. 117 
 
 of direction ; authority in such a sense, as that we 
 cannot depart from it without being self-condemned h . 
 And that the dictates of this moral faculty, which are 
 by nature a rule to us, are moreover the laws of God, 
 laws in a sense including sanctions; may be thus 
 proved. Consciousness of a rule or guide of action, 
 in creatures who are capable of considering it as given 
 them by their Maker, not only raises immediately a 
 sense oi duty, but also a sense of security in following 
 it, and of danger in deviating from it. A direction of 
 the Author ot Nature, given to creatures capable of 
 looking upon it as such, is plainly a command from 
 him . and a command from him necessarily includes in 
 it. at least, an implicit promise in case of obedience, or 
 threatening in case of disobedience. But then the 
 sense or perception of good and ill desert ', which is 
 contained in the moral discernment, renders the sanc¬ 
 tion explicit, and makes it appear, as one may say, 
 expressed. For since his method of government is to 
 reward and punish actions, his having annexed to some 
 actions an inseparable sense of good desert, and to 
 others of ill, this surely amounts to declaring, upon 
 whom his punishments shall be inflicted, and his re¬ 
 wards be bestowed. For he must have given us this 
 discernment and sense of things, as a presentiment of 
 what is to be hereafter: that is, by way of information 
 beforehand, what we are finally to expect in his world. 
 There is then most evident ground to think, that the 
 government of God, upon the whole, will be found to 
 correspond to the nature which he has given us : and 
 that in the upshot and issue of things, happiness and 
 misery shall, in fact and event, be made to follow 
 virtue and vice respectively; as he has already, in so 
 peculiar a manner, associated the ideas of them in our 
 h Serm. II. at the Rolls. 
 
 * Dissert. II. 
 
118 OF THE OPINION OF NECESSITY, [pAHT I. 
 
 minds. And from hence might easily be deduced the 
 obligations of religious worship, were it only to be con¬ 
 sidered as a means of preserving upon our minds a 
 sense of this moral government of God, and securing 
 our obedience to it: which yet is an extremely im¬ 
 perfect view of that most important duty. 
 
 Now I say, no objection from Necessity can lie 
 against this general proof of religion. None against 
 the proposition reasoned upon, that we have such a 
 moral faculty and discernment; because this is a mere 
 matter of fact, a thing of experience, that human kind 
 is thus constituted: none against the conclusion ; 
 because it is immediate and wholly from this fact. 
 For the conclusion, that God will finally reward the 
 righteous and punish the wicked, is not here drawn, 
 from its appearing to us fit k that he should; but from 
 its appearing, that he has told us, he will . And this 
 he hath certainly told us, in the promise and threaten- 
 n g, which it hath been observed the notion of a 
 command implies, and the sense of good and ill desert 
 which he has given us, more distinctly expresses. And 
 this reasoning from fact is confirmed, and in some 
 degree even verified, by other facts; by the natural 
 tendencies of virtue and of vice 1 ; and by this, that 
 God, in the natural course of his providence, punishes 
 vicious actions as mischievous to society; and also 
 vicious actions as such in the strictest sense m . So 
 that the general proof of Religion is unanswerably real, 
 
 k However, I am far from intending to deny, that the will of God is 
 determined, by what is fit, by the right and reason of the case; though 
 one chooses to decline matters of such abstract speculation, and to speak 
 with caution when one does speak of them. But if it be intelligible to 
 say, that it is jit and reasonable for every one to consult his ovm happiness , 
 then fitness of action , or the right and reason of the case, is an intelligible 
 manner of speaking. And it seems as inconceivable, to suppose God to 
 approve one course of action, or one end, preferably to another, which yet 
 1 P. 59, 60. m P. 51, &c. 
 
CHAP. VI.] AS INFLUENCING PRACTICE. 119 
 
 even upon the wild supposition which we are arguing 
 upon. 
 
 It must likewise be observed farther, that natural 
 Religion hath, besides this, an external evidence; 
 which the doctrine of Necessity, if it could be true, 
 would not affect. For suppose a person, by the ob¬ 
 servations and reasoning above, or by any other, con¬ 
 vinced of the truth of Religion ; that there is a God, 
 who made the world, who is the moral Governor and 
 Judge of mankind, and will upon the whole deal with 
 every one according to his works: I say, suppose a 
 person convinced of this by reason; but to know 
 nothing at all of antiquity, or the present state of 
 mankind : it would be natural for such an one to be 
 inquisitive, what was the history of this system of 
 doctrine; at what time, and in what manner, it came 
 first into the world ; and whether it were believed by 
 any considerable part of it. And were he upon inquiry 
 to find, that a particular person, in a late age, first of 
 all proposed it, as a deduction of reason, and that 
 mankind were before wholly ignorant of it; then, 
 though its evidence from reason would remain, there 
 would be no additional probability of its truth, from 
 the account of its discovery. But instead of this being 
 the fact of the case, on the contrary, he would find, 
 what could not but afford him a very strong con¬ 
 firmation of its truth: First, That somewhat of this 
 system, with more or fewer additions and alterations, 
 
 his acting at all from design implies that he does, without supposing 
 somewhat prior in that end, to be the ground of the preference; as to 
 suppose him to discern an abstract proposition to be true, without sup¬ 
 posing somewhat prior in it, to be the ground of the discernment. It 
 doth not therefore appear, that moral right is any more relative to per¬ 
 ception, than abstract truth is; or that it is any more improper, to speak 
 of the fitness and rightness of actions and ends, as founded in the nature 
 of things, than to speak of abstract truth, as thus founded. 
 

 120 OF THE OPINION OF NECESSITY, [PART I. 
 
 hath been professed in all ages and countries, of which 
 we have any certain information relating to this matter. 
 Secondly, That it is certain historical fact, so far as we 
 can trace things up, that this whole system of belief, 
 that there is one God, the Creator and moral Governor 
 of the world, and that mankind is in a state of 
 Religion, was received in the first ages. And Thirdly, 
 That as there is no hint or intimation in history, that 
 this system was first reasoned out; so there is express 
 historical or traditional evidence, as ancient as history, 
 that it was taught first by revelation. Now these 
 things must be allowed to be of great weight. The 
 first of them, general consent, shews this system to be 
 conformable to the common sense of mankind. The 
 second, namely, that Religion was believed in the first 
 ages of the world, especially as it does not appear that 
 there were then any superstitious or false additions to 
 it, cannot but be a farther confirmation of its truth. 
 For it is a proof of this alternative: either that it 
 came into the world by revelation; or that it is 
 natural, obvious, and forces itself upon the mind. The 
 former of these is the conclusion of learned men. 
 And whoever will consider, how unapt for speculation 
 rude and uncultivated minds are, will, perhaps from 
 hence alone, be strongly inclined to believe it the 
 truth. And as it is shewn in the Second Part 0 of this 
 Treatise, that there is nothing of such peculiar pre¬ 
 sumption against a revelation in the beginning of the 
 world, as there is supposed to be against subsequent 
 ones : a sceptic could not, I think, give any account, 
 which would appear more probable even to himself, of 
 the early pretences to revelation; than by supposing 
 some real original one, from whence they were copied. 
 And the third thing above mentioned, that there is 
 
 n Chap. ii. 
 
AS INFLUENCING PRACTICE. 
 
 121 
 
 CHAP. VI.] 
 
 express historical or traditional evidence as ancient as 
 history, of the system of Religion being taught man¬ 
 kind by revelation; this must be admitted as some 
 degree of real proof, that it was so taught. For why 
 should not the most ancient tradition be admitted, as 
 some additional proof of a fact, against which there is 
 no presumption \ And this proof is mentioned here, 
 because it has its weight to shew, that Religion came 
 mto the world by revelation, prior to all consideration 
 of the proper authority of any book supposed to contain 
 it; and even prior to all consideration, whether the 
 revelation itself be uncorruptly handed down, and 
 related, or mixed and darkened with fables. Thus the 
 historical account, which we have, of the origin of 
 Religion, taking in all circumstances, is a real con¬ 
 firmation of its truth, no way affected by the opinion 
 of Necessity. And the external evidence, even of 
 natural Religion, is by no means inconsiderable. 
 
 But it is carefully to be observed, and ought to be 
 recollected after all proofs of virtue and religion, which 
 are only general; that as speculative reason may be 
 neglected, prejudiced, and deceived, so also may our 
 moral understanding be impaired and perverted, and 
 the dictates of it not impartially attended to. This 
 indeed proves nothing against the reality of our spe¬ 
 culative or practical faculties of perception; against 
 their being intended by nature, to inform us in the 
 theory of things, and instruct us how we are to behave, 
 and what we are to expect in consequence of our 
 behaviour. Yet our liableness, in the degree we are 
 liable, to prejudice and perversion, is a most serious 
 admonition to us to be upon our guard, with respect 
 to what is of such consequence, as our determinations 
 concerning virtue and religion ; and particularly not to 
 take custom, and fashion, and slight notions of honour. 
 
122 OF THE OPINION OF NECESSITY, [PART I. 
 
 or imaginations of present ease, use, and convenience 
 to mankind, for the only moral rule 0 . 
 
 The foregoing observations, drawn from the nature 
 of the thing, and the history of Religion, amount, 
 when taken together, to a real practical proof of it, 
 not to be confuted: such a proof as, considering the 
 infinite importance of the thing, I apprehend, would 
 be admitted fully sufficient, in reason, to influence the 
 actions of men, who act upon thought and reflection ; 
 if it were admitted that there is no proof of the 
 contrary. But it may be said: “ There are many 
 “ probabilities, which cannot indeed be confuted, i. e. 
 “ shewn to be no probabilities, and yet may be over- 
 “ balanced by greater probabilities on the other side; 
 u much more by demonstration. And there is no oc- 
 “ casion to object against particular arguments alleged 
 “ for an opinion, when the opinion itself may be clearly 
 “ shewn to be false, without meddling with such 
 “ arguments at all, but leaving them just as they areP. 
 “ Now the method of government by rewards and 
 “ punishments, and especially rewarding and punishing 
 “ good and ill desert as such respectively, must go 
 “ upon supposition, that we are Free and not Neces- 
 “ sary Agents. And it is incredible, that the Author 
 “ of Nature should govern us upon a supposition as 
 “ true, which he knows to be false; and therefore 
 “ absurd to think, he will reward or punish us for 
 “ our actions hereafter; especially that he will do it 
 “ under the notion, that they are of good or ill desert.” 
 Here then the matter is brought to a point. And the 
 answer to all this is full, and not to be evaded: that 
 the whole constitution and course of things, the whole 
 analogy of providence, shews beyond possibility of 
 doubt, that the conclusion from this reasoning is false; 
 
 ° Dissert. II. P Page i, io. 
 
CHAP. VI.] 
 
 AS INFLUENCING PRACTICE. 
 
 123 
 
 wherever the fallacy lies. The doctrine of freedom 
 indeed clearly shews where: in supposing ourselves 
 Necessary, when in truth we are Free Agents. But 
 upon the supposition of Necessity, the fallacy lies in 
 taking for granted, that it is incredible Necessary 
 Agents should be rewarded and punished. But that, 
 some how or other, the conclusion now mentioned is 
 false, is most certain. For it is fact, that God does 
 govern even brute creatures by the method of rewards 
 and punishments, in the natural course of thing's. 
 And men are rewarded and punished for their actions, 
 punished for actions mischievous to society as being so, 
 punished for vicious actions as such; by the natural 
 instrumentality of each other, under the present con¬ 
 duct of Providence. Nay even the affection of grati¬ 
 tude, and the passion of resentment, and the rewards 
 and punishments following from them, which in general 
 are to be considered as natural, i. e. from the Author 
 of Nature; these rewards and punishments, being 
 naturallyf annexed to actions considered as implying 
 good intention and good desert, ill intention and ill 
 desert; these natural rewards and punishments. I say. 
 are as much a contradiction to the conclusion above, 
 and shew its falsehood, as a more exact and complete 
 rewarding and punishing of good and ill desert as such. 
 So that if it be incredible, that Necessary Agents 
 should be thus rewarded and punished ; then, men are 
 not necessary but free; since it is matter of fact, that 
 they are thus rewarded and punished. But if, on the 
 contrary, which is the supposition we have been argu- 
 ing upon, it be insisted, that men are N”ecessary 
 Agents; then, there is nothing incredible in the farther 
 supposition of Necessary Agents being thus rewarded 
 and punished : since we ourselves are thus dealt with. 
 
 p Serin. VUIth, at the Rolls. 
 
124 OF THE OPINION OF NECESSITY, &C. [PART I. 
 
 From the whole therefore it must follow, that a 
 Necessity supposed possible, and reconcilable with the 
 constitution of things, does in no sort prove that the 
 Author of Nature will not, nor destroy the proof that 
 he will, finally and upon the whole, in his eternal 
 government, render his creatures happy or miserable, 
 by some means or other, as they behave well or ill. 
 Or, to express this conclusion in words comformable to 
 the title of the chapter, the analogy of nature shews us, 
 that the opinion of Necessity, considered as practical, 
 is false. And if Necessity, upon the supposition above 
 mentioned, doth not destroy the proof of natural 
 Religion, it evidently makes no alteration in the proof 
 of revealed. 
 
 From these things likewise we may learn, in what 
 sense to understand that general assertion, that the 
 opinion of Necessity is essentially destructive of all 
 religion. First, in a practical sense; that by this 
 notion, atheistical men pretend to satisfy and encourage 
 themselves in vice, and justify to others their disregard 
 to all religion. And secondly, in the strictest sense; 
 that it is a contradiction to the whole constitution of 
 nature, and to what we may every moment experience 
 in ourselves, and so overturns every thing. But by no 
 means is this assertion to be understood, as if Necessity, 
 supposing it could possibly be reconciled with the con¬ 
 stitution of things and with what we experience, were 
 not also reconcilable with Religion: for upon this 
 supposition, it demonstrably is so. 
 
CHAP. VII.J 
 
 THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD, &C. 
 
 125 
 
 CHAP. VII. 
 
 Of the Government of God, considered as a Scheme or 
 Constitution, imperfectly comprehended . 
 
 rTIHOUGH it be, as it cannot but be, acknowledged, 
 J- that the analogy of nature gives a strong credi¬ 
 bility to the general doctrine of Religion, and to the 
 several particular things contained in it, considered as 
 so many matters of fact; and likewise that it shews 
 this credibility not to be destroyed by any notions of 
 Necessity: yet still, objections may be insisted upon, 
 against the wisdom, equity, and goodness of the Divine 
 government implied in the notion of Religion, and 
 against the method by which this government is con¬ 
 ducted ; to which objections analogy can be no direct 
 answer. For the credibility, or the certain truth, of a 
 matter of fact, does not immediately prove any thing 
 concerning the wisdom or goodness of it: and analogy 
 can do no more, immediately or directly, than shew 
 such and such things to be true or credible, considered 
 only as matters of fact. But still, if, upon supposition 
 of a moral constitution of nature and a moral govern¬ 
 ment oyer it, analogy suggests and makes it credible, 
 that this government must be a scheme, system, or 
 constitution of government, as distinguished from a 
 number of single unconnected acts of distributive 
 justice and goodness; and likewise, that it must be a 
 scheme, so imperfectly comprehended, and of such a 
 sort in other respects, as to afford a direct general 
 answer to all objections against the justice and good¬ 
 ness of it: then analogy is, remotely, of great service 
 in answering those objections; both by suggesting the 
 answer, and shewing it to be a credible one. 
 
126 
 
 THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD 
 
 [part I. 
 
 Now this, upon inquiry, will be found to be the 
 ease. For, first, Upon supposition that God exercises 
 a moral government over the world, the analogy of his 
 natural government suggests and makes it credible, 
 that his moral government must be a scheme, quite 
 beyond our comprehension : and this affords a general 
 answer to all objections against the justice and good¬ 
 ness of it. And, secondly, A more distinct observation 
 of some particular things contained in God’s scheme of 
 natural government, the like things being supposed, by 
 analogy, to be contained in his moral government, will 
 farther shew, how little weight is to be laid upon these 
 objections. 
 
 I. Upon supposition that God exercises a moral 
 government over the world, the analogy of his natural 
 government suggests and makes it credible, that his 
 moral government must be a scheme, quite beyond 
 our comprehension ; and this affords a general answer 
 to all objections against the justice and goodness of it. 
 It is most obvious, analogy renders it highly credible, 
 that, upon supposition of a moral government, it 
 must be a scheme : for the world, and the whole 
 natural government of it, appears to be so : to be a 
 scheme, system, or constitution, whose parts correspond 
 to each other, and to a whole ; as really as any work of 
 art, or as any particular model of a civil constitution 
 and government. In this great scheme of the natural 
 world, individuals have various peculiar relations to 
 other individuals of their own species. And whole 
 species are, we find, variously related to other species, 
 upon this earth. Nor do we know, how much farther 
 these kinds of relations may extend. And, as there is 
 not any action or natural event, which we are ac¬ 
 quainted with, so single and unconnected, as not to 
 have a respect to some other actions and events: so 
 
A SCHEME INCOMPREHENSIBLE. 
 
 CHAP. VII.] 
 
 127 
 
 possibly each of them, when it has not an immediate, 
 may yet have a remote, natural relation to other 
 actions and events, much beyond the compass of this 
 present world. There seems indeed nothing, from 
 whence we can so much as make a conjecture, whether 
 all creatures, actions, and events, throughout the whole 
 of nature, have relations to each other. But, as it is 
 ob\ ions, that all events have future unknown conse¬ 
 quences ; so if we trace any, as far as we can go, into 
 what is connected with it, we shall find, that if such 
 event were not connected with somewhat farther in 
 nature unknown to us, somewhat both past and pre¬ 
 sent, such event could not possibly have been at all. 
 
 or can we give the whole account of any one thing 
 whatever; of all its causes, ends, and necessary ad¬ 
 juncts ; those adjuncts, I mean, without which it could 
 not have been. By this most astonishing connection, 
 these reciprocal correspondencies and mutual relations, 
 every thing which we see in the course of nature is 
 actually brought about. And things seeminglv the 
 most insignificant imaginable are perpetually observed 
 to be necessary conditions to other things of the great- 
 est impoi tance: so that any one thing whatever may, 
 tor ought we know to the contrary, be a necessary con¬ 
 dition to any other. The natural world then, and 
 natural government of it, being such an incompre¬ 
 hensible scheme; so incomprehensible, that a man 
 must, really in the literal sense, know nothing at all. 
 who is not sensible of his ignorance in it; this imme¬ 
 diately suggests, and strongly shews the credibility, 
 that the moral world and government of it may be so 
 too. Indeed the natural and moral constitution and 
 government of the world are so connected, as to make 
 up together but one scheme: and it is highly probable, 
 that the first is formed and carried on merely in sub- 
 
fb 
 
 - /t'MJ 
 
 CVUvx 
 
 serviency to the latter; as the vegetable world is for 
 the animal, and organized bodies for minds. But the 
 thing intended here is, without inquiring how far the 
 administration of the natural world is subordinate to 
 that of the moral, only to observe the credibility, that 
 one should be analogous or similar to the other: that 
 therefore every act of Divine justice and goodness may 
 be supposed to look much beyond itself, and its im¬ 
 mediate object; may have some reference to other 
 parts of God’s moral administration, and to a general 
 moral plan ; and that every circumstance of this his 
 moral government may be adjusted beforehand with a 
 view to the whole of it. Thus for example: the deter¬ 
 mined length of time, and the degrees and ways, in 
 which virtue is to remain in a state of warfare and dis¬ 
 cipline, and in which wickedness is permitted to have 
 its progress; the times appointed for the execution of 
 justice; the appointed instruments of it; the kinds of 
 rewards and punishments, and the manners of their 
 distribution; all particular instances of Divine justice 
 and goodness, and every circumstance of them, may 
 have such respects to each other, as to make up alto¬ 
 gether a whole; connected and related in all its parts; 
 a scheme or system, which is as properly one as the 
 natural world is, and of the like kind. And supposing 
 this to be the case; it is most evident, that we are not 
 competent judges of this scheme, from the small parts 
 of it which come within our view in the present life: 
 and therefore no objections against any of these parts 
 can be insisted upon by reasonable men. 
 
 This our ignorance, and the consequence here drawn 
 from it, are universally acknowledged upon other occa¬ 
 sions; and though scarce denied, yet are universally 
 forgot, when persons come to argue against Religion. 
 And it is not perhaps easy, even for the most reason- 
 
'•hap. VII.] A SCHEME INCOMPREHENSIBLE. ]0() 
 
 able men, always to bear in mind the degree of our 
 ignorance, and make due allowances for it. Upon 
 these accounts, it may not be useless to go on a little 
 farther, in order to shew more distinctly, how just an 
 answer our ignorance is, to objections against the 
 scheme of Providence. Suppose then a person boldly 
 to assert, that the things complained of, the origin 
 and continuance of evil, might easily have been pre¬ 
 vented by repeated interpositions a ; interpositions so 
 guarded and circumstanced, as would preclude all 
 mischief arising from them; or, if this were impracti¬ 
 cable, that a scheme of government is itself an imper¬ 
 fection ; since more good might have been produced, 
 without any scheme, system, or constitution at all, by 
 continued single unrelated acts of distributive justice 
 and goodness ; because these would have occasioned 
 no irregularities. And farther than this, it is presumed, 
 t ie objections will not be carried. Yet the answer is 
 o vious : that were these assertions true, still the 
 observations above, concerning our ignorance in the 
 scheme of Divine government, and the consequence 
 drawn from it, would hold, in great measure; enough 
 to vindicate Religion, against all objections from the 
 disorders of the present state. Were these assertions 
 true, yet the government of the world might be just 
 and good notwithstanding ; for, at the most, thev would 
 mfer nothing more than that it might have been better. 
 But indeed they are mere arbitrary assertions; no man 
 being sufficiently acquainted with the possibilities of 
 things to bring any proof of them to the lowest decree 
 of probability. For however possible what is asserted 
 may seem; yet many instances may be alleged, in 
 thmgs much less out of our reach, of suppositions 
 absolutely impossible, and reducible to the most pal- 
 1 p - 131.132.133- 
 
 ANALOGY. 
 
130 
 
 THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD, 
 
 [part I. 
 
 pable self-contradictions, which, not every one by any 
 means would perceive to be such, nor perhaps any one 
 at first sight suspect. From these things, it is easy to 
 see distinctly, how our ignorance, as it is the common, 
 is really a satisfactory answer to all objections against 
 the justice and goodness of Providence. If a man, 
 contemplating any one providential dispensation, which 
 had no relation to any others, should object, that he 
 discerned in it a disregard to justice, or a deficiency of 
 goodness; nothing would be less an answer to such 
 objection, than our ignorance in other parts of Provi¬ 
 dence, or in the possibilities of things, no way related 
 to what he was contemplating. But when we know 
 not but the parts objected against may be relative to 
 other parts unknown to us; and when we are unac¬ 
 quainted with what is, in the nature of the thing, prac¬ 
 ticable in the case before us; then our ignorance is a 
 satisfactory answer; because, some unknown relation, 
 or some unknown impossibility, may render what is ob¬ 
 jected against, just and good; nay good in the highest 
 practicable degree. 
 
 II. And how little weight is to be laid upon such 
 objections, will farther appear, by a more distinct ob¬ 
 servation of some particular things contained in the 
 natural government of God, the like to which may be 
 supposed, from analogy, to be contained in his moral 
 government. 
 
 First, As in the scheme of the natural world, no 
 ends appear to be accomplished without means; so we 
 find that means very undesirable, often conduce to 
 bring about ends in such a measure desirable, as greatly 
 to overbalance the disagreeableness of the means. And 
 in cases where such means are conducive to such ends, 
 it is not reason, but experience, which shews us, that 
 they are thus conducive. Experience also shews many 
 
CHAP. VI].] 
 
 A SCHEME INCOMPREHENSIBLE. 
 
 131 
 
 means to be conducive and necessary to accomplish 
 ends, which means, before experience, we should have 
 thought, would have had even a contrary tendency. 
 Aow from these observations relating to the natural 
 scheme of the world, the moral being supposed ana¬ 
 logous to it, arises a great credibility, that the putting 
 our misery in each other’s power to the degree it is, 
 and making men liable to vice to the degree we are; 
 and in general, that those things which are objected 
 against the moral scheme of Providence, may be, upon 
 the whole, friendly and assistant to virtue, and pro¬ 
 ductive of an overbalance of happiness: i. e. the things 
 objected against may be means, by which an over¬ 
 balance of good will, in the end, be found produced. 
 And from the same observations, it appears to be no 
 presumption against this, that we do not, if indeed we 
 do not, see those means to have any such tendency; or 
 that they seem to us to have a contrary one. Thus 
 those things, which we call irregularities, may not be 
 so at all: because they may be means of accomplishing 
 wise and good ends more considerable. And it may be 
 added, as above 6 , that they may also be the only 
 means, by which these wise and good ends are capable 
 of being accomplished. 
 
 After these observations it may be proper to add, in 
 order to obviate an absurd and wicked conclusion from 
 any of them, that though the constitution of our nature, 
 from whence we are capable of vice and misery, may,’ 
 as it undoubtedly does, contribute to the perfection 
 and happiness of the world; and though the actual 
 permission of evil may be beneficial to it: (i. e. it 
 would have been more mischievous, not that a wicked 
 person had himself abstained from his own wickedness, 
 but that any one had forcibly prevented it, than that it 
 
 b p - 130- 
 
 K 2 
 
132 THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD, [PART I. 
 
 was permitted :) yet notwithstanding, it might have 
 been much better for the world, if this very evil had 
 never been done. Nay it is most clearly conceivable, 
 that the very commission of wickedness may be bene¬ 
 ficial to the world, and yet, that it would be infinitely 
 more beneficial for men to refrain from it. For thus, 
 in the wise and good constitution of the natural world, 
 there are disorders which bring their own cures; dis¬ 
 eases, which are themselves remedies. Many a man 
 would have died, had it not been for the gout or a 
 fever; yet it would be thought madness to assert, that 
 sickness is a better or more perfect state than health ; 
 though the like, with regard to the moral world, has 
 been asserted. But, 
 
 Secondly, The natural government of the world is 
 carried on by general laws. For this there may be 
 wise and good reasons: the wisest and best, for ought 
 we know to the contrary. And that there are such 
 reasons, is suggested to our thoughts by the analogy of 
 nature: by our being made to experience good ends to 
 be accomplished, as indeed all the good which we 
 enjoy is accomplished, by this means, that the laws, by 
 which the world is governed, are general. For we 
 have scarce any kind of enjoyments, but what we are, 
 in some way or other, instrumental in procuring our¬ 
 selves, by acting in a manner which we foresee likely 
 to procure them : now this foresight could not be at 
 all, were not the government of the world carried on 
 by general laws. And though, for ought we know to 
 the contrary, every single case may be, at length, found 
 to have been provided for even by these: yet to pre¬ 
 vent all irregularities, or remedy them as they arise, by 
 the wisest and best general laws, may be impossible in 
 the nature of things; as we see it is absolutely im¬ 
 possible in civil government. But then we are ready 
 
CHAP. VII.] A SCHEME INCOMPREHENSIBLE. 133 
 
 to think, that, the constitution of nature remaining as 
 it is, and the course of things being permitted to go on, 
 in otlici respects, as it does, there might be inter¬ 
 positions to prevent irregularities; though they could 
 not have been prevented or remedied by any general 
 laws. And there would indeed be reason to wish, 
 'ihich, by the way, is very different from a right to 
 claim, that all irregularities were prevented or re¬ 
 medied by present interpositions, if these interpositions 
 Mould have no other effect than this. But it is plain 
 they would have some visible and immediate bad ef¬ 
 fects : for instance, they would encourage idleness and 
 negligence; and they would render doubtful the na¬ 
 tural rule of life, which is ascertained by this very 
 thing, that the course of the world is carried on bv 
 general laws. And farther, it is certain they would 
 have distant effects, and very great ones too; by means 
 of the wonderful connections before mentioned c . So 
 that we cannot so much as guess, what would be the 
 whole result of the interpositions desired. It may be 
 said, any bad result might be prevented by farther in¬ 
 terpositions, whenever there was occasion for them : 
 but this again is talking quite at random, and in the 
 daik d . Upon the whole then, we see wise reasons, 
 why the course of the world should be carried on by 
 general laws, and good ends accomplished by this 
 means: and, for ought we know, there may be the 
 wisest reasons for it, and the best ends accomplished 
 by it. We have no ground to believe, that all irre¬ 
 gularities could be remedied as they arise, or could 
 have been precluded, by general laws. We find that 
 interpositions would produce evil, and prevent good: 
 and, for ought we know, they would produce greater 
 evil than they would prevent; and prevent greater good 
 
 c P. 127, &c. d p. I29 . 
 
134 
 
 THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD, 
 
 [part I. 
 
 than they would produce. And if this be the case, 
 then the not interposing is so far from being a ground 
 of complaint, that it is an instance of goodness. This 
 is intelligible and sufficient: and going farther, seems 
 beyond the utmost reach of our faculties. 
 
 But it may be said, that “ after all, these supposed 
 “ impossibilities and relations are what we are un- 
 “ acquainted with; and we must judge of Religion, as 
 “ of other things, by what we do know, and look upon 
 “ the rest as nothing: or however, that the answers 
 “ here given to what is objected against Religion, may 
 “ equally be made use of to invalidate the proof of it; 
 “ since their stress lies so very much upon our igno- 
 “ ranee.” But, 
 
 First, though total ignorance in any matter does in¬ 
 deed equally destroy, or rather preclude, all proof con¬ 
 cerning it, and objections against it; yet partial igno¬ 
 rance does not. For we may in any degree be con¬ 
 vinced, that a person is of such a character, and 
 consequently will pursue such ends; though we are 
 greatly ignorant, what is the proper way of acting, in 
 order the most effectually to obtain those ends : and in 
 this case, objections against his manner of acting, as 
 seemingly not conducive to obtain them, might be 
 answered by our ignorance; though the proof that 
 such ends were intended, might not at all be inva¬ 
 lidated by it. Thus, the proof of Religion is a proof 
 of the moral character of God, and consequently that 
 his government is moral, and that every one upon the 
 whole shall receive according to his deserts; a proof 
 that this is the designed end of his government. But 
 we are not competent judges, what is the proper way 
 of acting, in order the most effectually to accomplish 
 this end e . Therefore our ignorance is an answer to 
 
A SCHEME INCOMPREHENSIBLE. 
 
 135 
 
 CHAP. VII.] 
 
 objections against the conduct of Providence, in per- 
 mitting- irregularities, as seeming contradictory to this 
 end. Now, since it is so obvious, that our ignorance 
 may be a satisfactory answer to objections against a 
 thing, and yet not affect the proof of it; till it can be 
 shewn it is frivolous to assert, that our ignorance inva¬ 
 lidates the proof of Religion, as it does the objections 
 against it. 
 
 Secondly, Suppose unknown impossibilities, and un¬ 
 known relations, might justly be urged to invalidate 
 the proof of Religion, as well as to answer objections 
 against it: and that, in consequence of this, the proof 
 of it were doubtful. Yet still, let the assertion be 
 despised, or let it be ridiculed, it is undeniably true, 
 that moral obligations would remain certain, though it 
 were not certain what would, upon the whole, be the 
 consequences of observing or violating them. For, 
 these obligations arise immediately and necessarily from 
 the judgment of our own mind, unless perverted, which 
 we cannot violate without being self-condemned. And 
 they would be certain too, from considerations of in¬ 
 terest. For though it were doubtful, what will be the 
 future consequences of virtue and vice; yet it is, how¬ 
 ever, credible, that they may have those consequences, 
 which Religion teaches us they will: and this credi¬ 
 bility is a certain f obligation in point of prudence, to 
 abstain from all wickedness, and to live in the con¬ 
 scientious practice of all that is good. But, 
 
 Thirdly, The answers above given to the objections 
 against religion cannot equally be made use of to in- 
 validate the proof of it. For, upon supposition that 
 God exercises a moral government over the world, 
 analogy does most strongly lead us to conclude, that 
 this moral government must be a scheme, or con- 
 f Page 3; and part II. ch. vi. 
 
136 
 
 THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD, &C. 
 
 [PART I. 
 
 stitution, beyond our comprehension. And a thousand 
 particular analogies shew us, that parts of such a 
 scheme, from their relation to other parts, may con¬ 
 duce to accomplish ends, which we should have thought 
 they had no tendency at all to accomplish: nay ends, 
 which, before experience, we should have thought such 
 parts were contradictory to, and had a tendency to 
 prevent. And therefore all these analogies shew, that 
 the way of arguing made use of in objecting against 
 Religion is delusive : because they shew it is not at all 
 incredible, that, could we comprehend the whole, we 
 should find the permission of the disorders objected 
 against to be consistent with justice and goodness ; and 
 even to be instances of them. Now this is not appli¬ 
 cable to the proof of Religion, as it is to the objections 
 against it&; and therefore cannot invalidate that proof, 
 as it does these objections. 
 
 Lastly, From the observation now made, it is easy to 
 see, that the answers above given to the objections 
 against Providence, though, in a general way of speak- 
 ing, they may be said to be taken from our ignorance; 
 yet are by no means taken merely from that, but from 
 somewhat which analogy shews us concerning it. For 
 analogy shews us positively, that our ignorance in the 
 possibilities of things, and the various relations in na¬ 
 ture, renders us incompetent judges, and leads us to 
 false conclusions, in cases similar to this, in which we 
 pretend to judge and to object. So that the things 
 above insisted upon are not mere suppositions of un¬ 
 known impossibilities and relations: but they are sug¬ 
 gested to our thoughts, and even forced upon the 
 observation of serious men, and rendered credible too, 
 by the analogy of nature. And therefore, to take these 
 
 £ Sei-m. at the Rolls, p. 312, 2d ed. 
 
CONCLUSION. 
 
 CHAP. VII.] 
 
 137 
 
 things into the account, is to judge by experience and 
 what we do know: and it is not judging so, to take no 
 notice of them. 
 
 CONCLUSION. 
 
 r 11HE observations of the last chapter lead us to con- 
 -L sider this little scene of human life, in which we 
 aie so busily engaged, as having a reference, of some 
 sort or other, to a much larger plan of things. Whe¬ 
 ther we are, any way, related to the more distant parts 
 of the boundless universe, into which we are brought, 
 is altogether uncertain. But it is evident, that the 
 course of things, which comes within our view, is con¬ 
 nected with somewhat, past, present, and future, be- 
 j ond it h . So that we are placed, as one may speak, in 
 the middle of a scheme, not a fixt but a progressive 
 one, every way incomprehensible : incomprehensible, in 
 a manner equally, with respect to what has been, what 
 now is, and what shall be hereafter. And this scheme 
 cannot but contain in it somewhat as wonderful, and as 
 much beyond our thought and conception 1 , as any 
 thing in that of Religion. For, will any man in his 
 senses say, that it is less difficult to conceive, how the 
 w r orld came to be and to continue as it is, without, 
 than with, an intelligent Author and Governor of it ? 
 or, admitting an intelligent Governor of it, that there is 
 some other rule of government more natural, and of 
 easier conception, than that which we call moral ? In¬ 
 deed, without an intelligent Author and Governor of 
 Nature, no account at all can be given, how this uni¬ 
 verse, or the part of it particularly in which w T e are 
 concerned, came to be, and the course of it to be 
 carried on, as it is : nor any, of its general end and 
 
 h P. 127, &c. > See part II. ch. ii. 
 
138 
 
 CONCLUSION. 
 
 [PART I. 
 
 design, without a moral Governor of it. That there is 
 an intelligent Author of Nature, and natural Governor 
 of the world, is a principle gone upon in the foregoing 
 treatise; as proved, and generally known and con¬ 
 fessed to be proved. And the very notion of an intel¬ 
 ligent Author of Nature, proved by particular final 
 causes, implies a will and a character k . Now, as our 
 whole nature, the nature which he has given us, leads 
 us to conclude his will and character to be moral, just, 
 and good : so we can scarce in imagination conceive, 
 what it can be otherwise. However, in consequence of 
 this his will and character, whatever it be, he formed 
 the universe as it is, and carries on the course of it as 
 he does, rather than in any other manner; and has 
 assigned to us, and to all living creatures, a part and a 
 lot in it. Irrational creatures act this their part, and 
 enjoy and undergo the pleasures and the pains allotted 
 them, without any reflection. But one would think it 
 impossible, that creatures endued with reason could 
 avoid reflecting sometimes upon all this; reflecting, if 
 not from whence we came, yet, at least, whither we 
 are going; and what the mysterious scheme, in the 
 midst of which we find ourselves, will, at length, come 
 out and produce: a scheme in which it is certain we 
 are highly interested, and in which we may be inter¬ 
 ested even beyond conception. For many things prove 
 it palpably absurd to conclude, that we shall cease to 
 be, at death. Particular analogies do most sensibly 
 shew us, that there is nothing to be thought strange, in 
 our being to exist in another state of life. And that 
 we are now living beings, affords a strong probability 
 that we shall continue so ; unless there be some positive 
 ground, and there is none from reason or analogy, to 
 think death will destroy us. Were a persuasion of this 
 
 k P. 11 4 . 
 
CONCLUSION. 
 
 CHAP. VII.] 
 
 139 
 
 kind ever so well grounded, there would, surely, be 
 little reason to take pleasure in it. But indeed it can 
 have no other ground, than some such imagination, as 
 that of our gross bodies being ourselves ; which is con¬ 
 trary to experience. Experience too most clearly shews 
 us the folly of concluding, from the body and the living- 
 agent affecting each other mutually, that the dissolu¬ 
 tion of the former is the destruction of the latter. And 
 there are remarkable instances of their not affecting 
 each other, which lead us to a contrary conclusion. The 
 supposition then, which in all reason we are to go upon, 
 is, that our living nature will continue after death. And 
 it is infinitely unreasonable to form an institution of 
 life, or to act upon any other supposition. Now all 
 expectation of immortality, whether more or less cer¬ 
 tain, opens an unbounded prospect to our hopes and 
 our fears: since we see the constitution of nature is 
 such, as to admit of misery, as well as to be productive 
 of happiness, and experience ourselves to partake of 
 both in some degree; and since we cannot but know, 
 what higher degrees of both we are capable of. And 
 there is no presumption against believing farther, that 
 our future interest depends upon our present beha¬ 
 viour : for we see our present interest doth; and that 
 the happiness and misery, which are naturally annexed 
 to our actions, very frequently do not follow, till long 
 after the actions are done, to which they are respect¬ 
 ively annexed. So that were speculation to leave us 
 uncertain, whether it were likely, that the Author of 
 Mature, in giving happiness and misery to his creatures, 
 hath regard to their actions or not: yet, since we find 
 by experience that he hath such regard, the whole 
 sense of things which he has given us, plainly leads us, 
 at once and without any elaborate inquiries, to think, 
 that it may, indeed must, be to good actions chiefly 
 
140 
 
 CONCLUSION. 
 
 [part I. 
 
 that he hath annexed happiness, and to bad actions 
 misery; or that he will, upon the whole, reward those 
 who do well, and punish those who do evil. To confirm 
 this from the constitution of the world, it has been 
 observed, that some sort of moral government is neces¬ 
 sarily implied in that natural government of God, which 
 we experience ourselves under: that good and bad 
 actions, at present, are naturally rewarded and punish¬ 
 ed, not only as beneficial and mischievous to society, 
 but also as virtuous and vicious : and that there is, in 
 the very nature of the thing, a tendency to their being 
 rewarded and punished in a much higher degree than 
 they are at present. And though this higher degree 
 of distributive justice, which nature thus points out and 
 leads towards, is prevented for a time from taking 
 place; it is by obstacles, which the state of this world 
 unhappily throws in its way, and which therefore are 
 in their nature temporary. Now, as these things in 
 the natural conduct of Providence are observable on 
 the side of virtue ; so there is nothing to be set against 
 them on the side of vice. A moral scheme of govern¬ 
 ment then is visibly established, and, in some degree, 
 carried into execution: and this, together with the 
 essential tendencies of virtue and vice duly considered, 
 naturally raise in us an apprehension, that it will be 
 carried on farther towards perfection in a future state, 
 and that every one shall there receive according to his 
 deserts. And if this be so, then our future and 
 general interest, under the moral government of God, 
 is appointed to depend upon our behaviour; notwith¬ 
 standing the difficulty, which this may occasion, of 
 securing it, and the danger of losing it: just in the 
 same manner as our temporal interest, under his natural 
 government, is appointed to depend upon our behaviour; 
 notwithstanding the like difficulty and danger. For, 
 
CONCLUSION. 
 
 CHAP. VII.] 
 
 141 
 
 from our original constitution, and that of the world 
 which we inhabit, we are naturally trusted with our¬ 
 selves ; with our own conduct and our own interest. 
 And from the same constitution of nature, especially 
 joined with that course of things which is owing to 
 men, we have temptations to be unfaithful in this 
 trust; to forfeit this interest, to neglect it, and run 
 ourselves into misery and ruin. From these tempta¬ 
 tions arise the difficulties of behaving so as to secure 
 our temporal interest, and the hazard of behaving so as 
 to miscarry in it. There is therefore nothing incredible 
 in supposing there may be the like difficulty and hazard 
 nitli regard to that chief and final good, which Religion 
 lays before us. Indeed the whole account, how it came 
 to pass that we were placed in such a condition as this, 
 must be beyond our comprehension. But it is in part 
 accounted for by what Religion teaches us, that the 
 character of virtue and piety must be a necessary qua¬ 
 lification for a future state of security and happiness, 
 under the moral government of God; in like manner, 
 as some certain qualifications or other are necessary for 
 every particular condition of life, under his natural 
 government: and that the present state was intended 
 to be a school of discipline, for improving in ourselves 
 that character. Now this intention of nature is ren¬ 
 dered highly credible by observing; that we are plainly 
 made for improvement of all kinds: that it is a general 
 appointment of Providence, that we cultivate practical 
 principles, and form within ourselves habits of action, 
 in order to become fit for what we were wholly unfit 
 for before: that in particular, childhood and youth is 
 naturally appointed to be a state of discipline for ma¬ 
 ture age: and that the present world is peculiarly 
 fitted for a state of moral discipline. And, whereas 
 objections are urged against the whole notion of moral 
 
142 
 
 CONCLUSION. 
 
 [part I. 
 
 government and a probation-state, from the opinion of 
 Necessity; it has been shewn, that God has given us 
 the evidence, as it were, of experience, that all objec¬ 
 tions against Religion, on this head, are vain and 
 delusive. He has also, in his natural government, 
 suggested an answer to all our shortsighted objections, 
 against the equity and goodness of his moral govern¬ 
 ment; and in general he has exemplified to us the latter 
 by the former. 
 
 These things, which, it is to be remembered, are 
 matters of fact, ought, in all common sense, to awaken 
 mankind ; to induce them to consider in earnest their 
 condition, and what they have to do. It is absurd, 
 absurd to the degree of being ridiculous, if the subject 
 were not of so serious a kind, for men to think them¬ 
 selves secure in a vicious life; or even in that immoral 
 thoughtlessness, which far the greatest part of them are 
 fallen into. And the credibility of Religion, arising 
 from experience and facts here considered, is fully 
 sufficient, in reason, to engage them to live in the 
 general practice of all virtue and piety; under the 
 serious apprehension, though it should be mixed with 
 some doubt 1 , of a righteous administration established 
 in nature, and a future judgment in consequence of it: 
 especially when we consider, how very questionable it 
 is, whether any thing at all can be gained by vice m ; 
 how unquestionably little, as well as precarious, the 
 pleasures and profits of it are at the best; and how 
 soon they must be parted with at the longest. For, in 
 the deliberations of reason, concerning what we are to 
 pursue and what to avoid, as temptations to any thing 
 from mere passion are supposed out of the case: so 
 inducements to vice, from cool expectations of pleasure 
 and interest so small and uncertain and short, are really 
 1 Part II. ch. vi. m P. 48. 
 
CHAP. VII.] 
 
 CONCLUSION. 
 
 143 
 
 so insignificant, as, in the view of reason, to be almost 
 nothing in themselves; and in comparison with the 
 impoitance of Religion, they quite disappear and are 
 lost. Mere passion indeed may be alleged, though not 
 as a reason, yet as an excuse, for a vicious course of 
 life. And how sorry an excuse it is, will be manifest 
 by observing, that we are placed in a condition, in 
 which we are unavoidably inured to govern our passions, 
 by being necessitated to govern them : and to lay our¬ 
 selves under the same kind of restraints, and as great 
 ones too, from temporal regards, as virtue and piety, in 
 the ordinary course of things, require. The plea of 
 ungovernable passion then, on the side of vice, is the 
 poorest of all things; for it is no reason, and but a 
 poor excuse. But the proper motives to Religion are the 
 proper proofs of it, from our moral nature, from the 
 presages of conscience, and our natural apprehension of 
 God under the character of a righteous Governor and 
 Judge; a nature and conscience and apprehension 
 given us by him; and from the confirmation of the 
 dictates of reason, by life and immortality brought to 
 light by the Gospel; and the wrath of God revealed 
 from heaven against all ungodliness and unrighteousness 
 of men. 
 
 THE END OF THE FIRST PART. 
 
THE 
 
 ANALOGY OF RELIGION 
 
 TO THE 
 
 CONSTITUTION AND COURSE OF NATURE. 
 
 PART II. 
 
 OF REVEALED RELIGION. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 Of the Importance of Christianity. 
 
 OOME persons, upon pretence of the sufficiency of 
 N} the light of nature, avowedly reject all revelation, 
 as, in its very notion, incredible, and what must be 
 fictitious. And indeed it is certain, no revelation 
 would have been given, had the light of nature been 
 sufficient in such a sense, as to render one not wanting 
 and useless. But no man, in seriousness and simplicity 
 of mind, can possibly think it so, who considers the 
 state of Religion in the heathen world before reve¬ 
 lation, and its present state in those places which have 
 borrowed no light from it: particularly the doubtful¬ 
 ness of some of the greatest men, concerning things of 
 
 ANALOGY. L 
 
146 OF THE IMPORTANCE [PART II. 
 
 the utmost importance, as well as the natural inatten¬ 
 tion and ignorance of mankind in general. It is im¬ 
 possible to say, who would have been able to have 
 reasoned out that whole system, which we call natural 
 Religion, in its genuine simplicity, clear of superstition: 
 but there is certainly no ground to affirm that the 
 generality could. If they could, there is no sort of 
 probability that they would. Admitting there were, 
 they would highly want a standing admonition to re¬ 
 mind them of it, and inculcate it upon them. And 
 farther still, were they as much disposed to attend to 
 Religion, as the better sort of men are ; yet even upon 
 this supposition, there would be various occasions for 
 supernatural instruction and assistance, and the greatest 
 advantages might be afforded by them. So that to say 
 revelation is a thing superfluous, what there was no 
 need of, and what can be of no service, is, I think, to 
 talk quite wildly and at random. Nor would it be 
 more extravagant to affirm, that mankind is so entirely 
 at ease in the present state, and life so completely 
 happy, that it is a contradiction to suppose our condi¬ 
 tion capable of being, in any respect, better. 
 
 There are other persons, not to be ranked with 
 these, who seem to be getting into a way of neglecting, 
 and, as it were, overlooking revelation, as of small im¬ 
 portance, provided natural Religion be kept to. With 
 little regard either to the evidence of the former, or to 
 the objections against it, and even upon supposition of 
 its truth ; “ the only design of it,” say they, 66 must be, 
 ‘‘ to establish a belief of the moral system of nature, 
 “ and to enforce the practice of natural piety and vir- 
 “ tue. The belief and practice of these things were, 
 “ perhaps, much promoted by the first publication of 
 “ Christianity: but whether they are believed and 
 “ practised, upon the evidence and motives of nature 
 
CHAP. I.] 
 
 OF CHRISTIANITY. 
 
 147 
 
 " or of revelation, is no great matter 3 .” This way of 
 considering revelation, though it is not the same with 
 the former, yet borders nearly upon it, and very much, 
 at length, runs up into it: and requires to be particu¬ 
 larly considered, with regard to the persons who seem 
 to be getting into this way. The consideration of it 
 will likewise farther shew the extravagance of the 
 former opinion, and the truth of the observations in 
 answer to it, just mentioned. And an inquiry into the 
 Importance of Christianity, cannot be an improper 
 introduction to a treatise concerning the credibility 
 of it. 3 
 
 Now if God has given a revelation to mankind, and 
 commanded those things which are commanded in 
 Christianity; it is evident, at first sight, that it cannot 
 in any wise be an indifferent matter, whether we obey 
 or disobey those commands: unless we are certainly 
 assured, that we know all the reasons for them, and 
 that all those reasons are now ceased, with regard to 
 mankind in general, or to ourselves in particular. And 
 it is absolutely impossible we can be assured of this. 
 For our ignorance of these reasons proves nothing in 
 the case: since the whole analogy of nature shews, 
 what is indeed in itself evident, that there may be 
 infinite reasons for things, with which we are not 
 acquainted. 
 
 But the importance of Christianity will more dis¬ 
 tinctly appear, by considering it more distinctly: first, 
 
 a Invenis multos-propterea nolle fieri Christianos, quia quasi sufli- 
 
 ciunt sibi de bona vita sua. Bene vivere opus est, ait. Quid raihi 
 praecepturus est Christus ? Ut bene vivam ? Jam bene vivo. Quid mihi 
 necessarius est Christus ? Nullum homicidium, nullum furtum, nullam 
 rapinam facio, res alienas non concupisco, nullo adulterio contaminor. 
 x T am inveniatur in vita mea aliquid quod reprehendatur, et qui reprehen- 
 derit faciat Christianum. Aug . in Psal. xxxi. 
 
 L 2 
 
148 
 
 OF THE IMPORTANCE 
 
 [part IT. 
 
 as a republication, and external institution, of natural 
 or essential Religion, adapted to the present circum¬ 
 stances of mankind, and intended to promote natural 
 piety and virtue: and secondly, as containing an ac¬ 
 count of a dispensation of things not discoverable by 
 reason, in consequence of which, several distinct pre¬ 
 cepts are enjoined us. For though natural Religion is 
 the foundation and principal part of Christianity, it is 
 not in any sense the whole of it. 
 
 I. Christianity is a republication of natural Religion. 
 It instructs mankind in the moral system of the world : 
 that it is the work of an infinitely perfect Being, and 
 under his government; that virtue is his law’; and that 
 he will finally judge mankind in righteousness, and 
 render to all according to their w T orks, in a future state. 
 And, w hich is very material, it teaches natural Religion 
 in its genuine simplicity ; free from those superstitions, 
 with which it was totally corrupted, and under which it 
 was in a manner lost. 
 
 Revelation is farther, an authoritative publication of 
 natural Religion, and so affords the evidence of testi¬ 
 mony for the truth of it. Indeed the miracles and 
 prophecies recorded in Scripture, w r ere intended to 
 prote a particular dispensation of Providence, the re¬ 
 demption of the world by the Messiah : but this does 
 not hinder, but that they may also prove God’s general 
 providence over the w r orld, as our moral Governor and 
 Judge. And they evidently do prove it; because this 
 character of the Author of Nature, is necessarily con¬ 
 nected with and implied in that particular revealed 
 dispensation of things : it is likewise continually taught 
 expressly, and insisted upon, by those persons who 
 wrought the miracles and delivered the prophecies. So 
 that indeed natural Religion seems as much proved 
 
OF CHRISTIANITY. 
 
 CHAP I.] 
 
 149 
 
 by the Scripture revelation, as it would have been, 
 
 had the design of revelation been nothing else than to 
 prove it. 
 
 But it may possibly be disputed, how far miracles 
 can prove natural Religion; and notable objections 
 may be urged against this proof of it, considered as a 
 matter of speculation: but considered as a practical 
 thing, there can be none. For suppose a person to 
 teach natural Religion to a nation, who had lived in 
 total ignorance or forgetfulness of it; and to declare he 
 vas commissioned by God so to do: suppose him, in 
 proof of his commission, to foretell things future, which 
 no human foresight could have guessed at; to divide 
 the sea with a word; feed great multitudes with bread 
 fiom heaven; cure all manner of diseases; and raise 
 the dead, even himself, to life: would not this give 
 additional credibility to his teaching, a credibility be¬ 
 yond what that of a common man would have; and be 
 an authoritative publication of the law of nature, i. e. 
 a new proof of it ? It would be a practical one, of the 
 strongest kind, perhaps, which human creatures are 
 capable of having given them. The Law of Moses 
 then, and the Gospel of Christ, are authoritative pub¬ 
 lications of the religion of nature; they afford a proof 
 of God's general providence, as moral Governor of the 
 Morld, as well as of his particular dispensations of 
 providence towards sinful creatures, revealed in the 
 Law and the Gospel. As they are the only evidence 
 of the latter, so they are an additional evidence of the 
 former. 
 
 To shew this further, let us suppose a man of the 
 greatest and most improved capacity, who had never 
 heard of revelation, convinced upon the whole, not¬ 
 withstanding the disorders of the world, that it was 
 under the direction and moral government of an in- 
 
150 
 
 OF THE IMPORTANCE 
 
 [part II. 
 
 finitely perfect Being; but ready to question, whether 
 he were not got beyond the reach of his faculties: 
 suppose him brought, by this suspicion, into great 
 danger of being carried away by the universal bad 
 example of almost every one around him, who appeared 
 to have no sense, no practical sense at least, of these 
 things: and this, perhaps, would be as advantageous a 
 situation with regard to Religion, as nature alone ever 
 placed any man in. What a confirmation now must it 
 be to such a person, all at once, to find, that this moral 
 system of things was revealed to mankind, in the name 
 of that infinite Being, whom he had from principles of 
 reason believed in: and that the publishers of the 
 revelation proved their commission from him, by 
 making it appear, that he had entrusted them with a 
 power of suspending and changing the general laws of 
 nature. 
 
 Nor must it by any means be omitted, for it is a 
 thing of the utmost importance, that life and immor¬ 
 tality are eminently brought to light by the Gospel. 
 The great doctrines of a future state, the danger of a 
 course of wickedness, and the efficacy of repentance, 
 are not only confirmed in the Gospel, but are taught, 
 especially the last is, with a degree of light, to which 
 that of nature is but darkness. 
 
 Farther: As Christianity served these ends and 
 purposes, when it was first published, by the mira¬ 
 culous publication itself; so it was intended to serve 
 the same purposes in future ages, by means of the 
 settlement of a visible church: of a society, distin¬ 
 guished from common ones, and from the rest of the 
 world, by peculiar religious institutions; by an in¬ 
 stituted method of instruction, and an instituted form 
 of external Religion. Miraculous powers were given 
 to the first preachers of Christianity, in order to their 
 
OF CHRISTIANITY. 
 
 CHAP. I.] 
 
 151 
 
 introducing it into the world: a visible church was 
 established, in order to continue it, and carry it on 
 successively throughout all ages. Had Moses and the 
 Prophets, Christ and his Apostles, only taught, and by 
 miiaeles proved, Religion to their contemporaries; the 
 benefits of their instructions would have reached but 
 to a small part of mankind. Christianity must have 
 been, in a great degree, sunk and forgot in a very few 
 ages. To prevent this, appears to have been one 
 reason why a visible church was instituted : to be, like 
 a city upon a hill, a standing memorial to the world of 
 the duty which we owe our Maker: to call men con¬ 
 tinually, both by example and instruction, to attend to 
 it, and, by the form of Religion, ever before their eyes, 
 remind them of the reality: to be the repository of the 
 oracles of God: to hold up the light of revelation in 
 aid to that of nature, and propagate it throughout all 
 generations to the end of the world—the light of 
 revelation, considered here in no other view, than as 
 designed to enforce natural Religion. And in pro¬ 
 portion as Christianity is professed and taught in the 
 world. Religion, natural or essential Religion, is thus 
 distinctly and advantageously laid before mankind, and 
 brought again and again to their thoughts, as a matter 
 of infinite importance. A visible church has also a 
 faithei tendency to promote natural Religion, as being 
 an instituted method of education, originally intended 
 to be of more peculiar advantage to those who would 
 conform to it. For one end of the institution was, 
 that by admonition and reproof, as well as instruction; 
 In a general regular discipline, and public exercises of 
 Religion ; the body of Christ, as the Scripture speaks, 
 should be edified; i. e. trained up in piety and virtue 
 for a higher and better state. This settlement then 
 appearing thus beneficial; tending in the nature of the 
 
152 
 
 OF THE IMPORTANCE 
 
 PART II. 
 
 thing to answer, and in some degree actually answer¬ 
 ing, those ends; it is to be remembered, that the very 
 notion of it implies positive institutions; for the visi¬ 
 bility of the church consists in them. Take away 
 every thing of this kind, and you lose the very notion 
 itself. So that if the things now mentioned are ad¬ 
 vantages, the reason and importance of positive insti¬ 
 tutions in general is most obvious; since without them 
 these advantages could not be secured to the world. 
 And it is mere idle wantonness, to insist upon knowing 
 the reasons, why such particular ones were fixed upon 
 rather than others. 
 
 The benefit arising from this supernatural assistance, 
 which Christianity affords to natural Religion, is what 
 some persons are very slow in apprehending. And yet 
 it is a thing distinct in itself, and a very plain obvious 
 one. For will any in good earnest really say, that the 
 bulk of mankind in the heathen world were in as ad¬ 
 vantageous a situation with regard to natural Religion, 
 as they are now amongst us: that it was laid before 
 them, and enforced upon them, in a manner as distinct, 
 and as much tending to influence their practice? 
 
 The objections against all this, from the perversion 
 of Christianity, and from the supposition of its having 
 had but little good influence, however innocently they 
 may be proposed, yet cannot be insisted upon as con¬ 
 clusive, upon any principles, but such as lead to down¬ 
 right Atheism : because the manifestation of the law 
 of nature by reason, which, upon all principles of 
 Theism, must have been from God, has been perverted 
 and rendered ineffectual in the same manner. It may 
 indeed, I think, truly be said, that the good effects of 
 Christianity have not been small; nor its supposed ill 
 effects, any effects at all of it, properly speaking. 
 Perhaps too the things themselves done have been 
 
OF CHRISTIANITY. 
 
 153 
 
 CHAP. I.] 
 
 aggravated; and if not, Christianity hath been often 
 only a pretence; and the same evils in the main would 
 have been done upon some other pretence. However, 
 great and shocking as the corruptions and abuses of it 
 have really been, they cannot be insisted upon as 
 arguments against it, upon principles of Theism. For 
 one cannot proceed one step in reasoning upon natural 
 Religion, any more than upon Christianity, without 
 laying it down as a first principle, that the dispensations 
 of Providence are not to be judged of by their per¬ 
 versions, but bv their genuine tendencies: not by what 
 they do actually seem to effect, but by what they 
 would effect if mankind did their part; that part which 
 is justly put and left upon them. It is altogether as 
 much the language of one as of the other; He that is 
 unjust, let him be unjust still: and he that is holy, let 
 him be holy still h . The light of reason does not, any 
 more than that of revelation, force men to submit to 
 its authority; both admonish them of what they ought 
 to do and avoid, together with the consequences of 
 each; and after this, leave them at full liberty to act 
 just as they please, till the appointed time of judgment. 
 Every moment’s experience shews, that this is God’s 
 general rule of government. 
 
 To return then : Christianity being a promulgation 
 of the la\v of nature ; being moreover an authoritative 
 promulgation of it; w ith new light, and other circum¬ 
 stances of peculiar advantage, adapted to the wants of 
 mankind ; these things fully shew its importance. And 
 it is to be observed farther, that as the nature of the 
 case requires, so all Christians are commanded to con¬ 
 tribute, by their profession of Christianity, to preserve 
 it in the world, and render it such a promulgation and 
 enforcement of Religion. For it is the very scheme of 
 
154 OF THE IMPORTANCE [PART II. 
 
 the Gospel, that each Christian should, in his degree, 
 contribute towards continuing and carrying it on : all 
 by uniting in the public profession and external prac¬ 
 tice of Christianity; some by instructing, by having 
 the oversight and taking care of this religious com¬ 
 munity, the Church of God. Now this farther shews 
 the importance of Christianity; and, which is what I 
 chiefly intend, its importance in a practical sense: or 
 the high obligations we are under, to take it into our 
 most serious consideration ; and the danger there must 
 necessarily be, not only in treating it despitefully, 
 which I am not now speaking of, but in disregarding 
 and neglecting it. For this is neglecting to do what is 
 expressly enjoined us, for continuing those benefits to 
 the world, and transmitting them down to future 
 times. And all this holds, even though the only thing 
 to be considered in Christianity, were its subserviency 
 to natural Religion. But, 
 
 II. Christianity is to be considered in a further 
 view; as containing an account of a dispensation of 
 things, not at all discoverable by reason, in consequence 
 of which several distinct precepts are enjoined us. 
 Christianity is not only an external institution of 
 natural Religion, and a new promulgation of God’s 
 general providence, as righteous Governor and Judge 
 of the world; but it contains also a revelation of a 
 particular dispensation of Providence, carrying on bv 
 his Son and Spirit, for the recovery and salvation of 
 mankind, who are represented in Scripture to be in a 
 state of ruin. And in consequence of this revelation 
 being made, we are commanded to be baptized, not 
 only in the name of the Father, but also, of the Son, 
 and of the Holy Ghost: and other obligations of duty, 
 unknown before, to the Son and the Holy Ghost, are 
 revealed. Now the importance of these duties may 
 
be judged of, by observing that thev arise, not from 
 positive command merely, but also from the offices, 
 
 which appear, from Scripture, to belong to those Di¬ 
 
 vine persons in the Gospel dispensation; or from the 
 relations, which, we are there informed, they stand in 
 to us. By reason is revealed the relation, which God 
 the Father stands in to us. Hence arises the obligation 
 ot duty which we are under to him. In Scripture are 
 revealed the relations, which the Son and Holy Spirit 
 stand in to us. Hence arise the obligations of duty, 
 which we are under to them Tim tmtli 
 
 
156 
 
 OF TIIE IMPORTANCE 
 
 [part II. 
 
 to the Son , and to the Holy Ghost . And the obligation 
 we are under, of paying these religious regards to each 
 of these Divine persons respectively, arises from the 
 respective relations which they each stand in to us. 
 How these relations are made known, whether by rea¬ 
 son or revelation, makes no alteration in the case: 
 because the duties arise out of the relations themselves, 
 not out of the manner in which we are informed of 
 them. The Son and Spirit have each his proper office 
 in that great dispensation of Providence, the redemp¬ 
 tion of the world; the one our mediator, the other our 
 sanctifier. Does not then the duty of religious regards 
 to both these Divine persons, as immediately arise, to 
 the view of reason, out of the very nature of these 
 offices and relations; as the inward good-will and 
 kind intention, which we owe to our fellow-creatures, 
 arises out of the common relations between us and 
 them ? But it will be asked, “ What are the inward 
 “ religious regards, appearing thus obviously due to the 
 Son and Holy Spirit; as arising, not merely from 
 “ command in Scripture, but from the very nature of 
 “ the revealed relations, which they stand in to us?” 
 I answer, the religious regards of reverence, honour, 
 love, trust, gratitude, fear, hope. In what external 
 manner this inward worship is to be expressed, is a 
 matter ot pure revealed command; as perhaps the ex¬ 
 ternal manner, in which God the Father is to be wor¬ 
 shipped, may be more so, than we are ready to think: 
 but the worship, the internal worship itself, to the Son 
 and Holy Ghost, is no farther matter of pure revealed 
 command, than as the relations they stand in to us are 
 matter of pure revelation: for the relations being 
 known, the obligations to such internal worship are 
 obligations ot reason, arising out of those relations 
 themselves. In short, the history of the Gospel as 
 
OF CHRISTIANITY. 
 
 CHAP. I.] 
 
 157 
 
 immediately shews us the reason of these obligations, as it 
 shews us the meaning of the words, Son and Holy Ghost. 
 
 If this account of the Christian Religion be just; 
 those persons who can speak lightly of it, as of little 
 consequence, provided natural Religion be kept to, 
 plainly forget, that Christianity, even what is peculiarly 
 so called, as disting’uished from natural Religion, has 
 yet somewhat very important, even of a moral nature. 
 For the office of our Lord being made known, and the 
 1 elation he stands in to us, the obligation of religious 
 regards to him is plainly moral, as much as charity to 
 mankind is; since this obligation arises, before exter¬ 
 nal command, immediately out of that his office and 
 relation itself. Those persons appear to forget, that 
 revelation is to be considered, as informing us of some- 
 " hat new, in the state of mankind, and in the govern¬ 
 ment of the world : as acquainting us with some re¬ 
 lations we stand in, which could not otherwise have 
 been known. And these relations being real, (though 
 before revelation we could be under no obligations 
 from them, yet upon their being revealed,) there is no 
 reason to think, but that neg’lect of behaving suitably* 
 to them will be attended with the same kind of conse¬ 
 quences under God’s government, as neglecting to be¬ 
 have suitably to any other relations made known to us 
 by reason. And ignorance, whether unavoidable or 
 voluntary, so far as we can possibly see, will just as 
 much, and just as little, excuse in one case as in the 
 other: the ignorance being supposed equally unavoid¬ 
 able, or equally voluntary, in both cases. 
 
 If therefore Christ be indeed the mediator between 
 God and man, i. e. if Christianity be true ; if he be 
 indeed our Lord, our Saviour, and our God; no one 
 can say, what may follow, not only the obstinate, but 
 the careless disregard to him, in those high relations. 
 
158 
 
 OF THE IMPORTANCE 
 
 [PART II. 
 
 Nay no one can say, what may follow such disregard, 
 even in the way of natural consequence 11 . For, as the 
 natural consequences of vice in this life are doubtless 
 to be considered as judicial punishments inflicted by 
 God; so likewise, for ought we know, the judicial pu¬ 
 nishments of the future life may be, in a like way or a 
 like sense, the natural consequence of vice e : of men’s 
 violating or disregarding the relations which God has 
 placed them in here, and made known to them. 
 
 Again: If mankind are corrupted and depraved in 
 their moral character, and so are unfit for that state, 
 which Christ is gone to prepare for his disciples; and 
 if the assistance of God’s Spirit be necessary to renew 
 their nature, in the degree requisite to their being 
 qualified for that state ; all which is implied in the 
 express, though figurative declaration, Except a man be 
 born of the Spirit , he cannot enter into the kingdom of 
 God { : supposing this, is it possible any serious person 
 can think it a slight matter, whether or no he makes 
 use of the means, expressly commanded by God, for 
 obtaining this Divine assistance ? especially since the 
 whole analogy of nature shews, that we are not to 
 expect any benefits without making use of the ap¬ 
 pointed means for obtaining or enjoying them. Now 
 reason shews us nothing, of the particular immediate 
 means of obtaining either temporal or spiritual benefits. 
 This therefore we must learn, either from experience or 
 revelation. And experience, the present cases does not 
 admit of. 
 
 The conclusion from all this evidently is, that, 
 Christianity being supposed either true or credible, it 
 is unspeakable irreverence, and really the most pre¬ 
 sumptuous rashness, to treat it as a light matter. It 
 can never justly be esteemed of little consequence, till 
 
 d P. 31, 32. c Chap. v. f John iii. 5. 
 
OF CHRISTIANITY. 
 
 CHAP. I.] 
 
 159 
 
 it be positively supposed false. Nor do J know a 
 higher and more important obligation which we are 
 under, than that of examining most seriously into the 
 evidence of it, supposing its credibility; and of embrac¬ 
 ing it, upon supposition of its truth. 
 
 The two following deductions may be proper to be 
 added, in order to illustrate the foregoing observations, 
 and to prevent their being mistaken. 
 
 First, Hence we may clearly see, where lies the 
 distinction between what is positive and what is moral 
 in Religion. Moral precepts are precepts, the reasons 
 of which we see: positive precepts are precepts, the 
 reasons of which we do not see g. Moral duties arise 
 out of the nature of the case itself, prior to external 
 command. Positive duties do not arise out of the 
 nature of the case, but from external command ; nor 
 would they be duties at all, were it not for such com¬ 
 mand, received from him whose creatures and subjects 
 we are. But the manner in which the nature of the 
 case, or the fact of the relation, is made known, this 
 doth not denominate any duty either positive or moral. 
 That we be baptized in the name of the Father, is as 
 much a positive duty, as that we be baptized in the 
 name of the Son; because both arise equally from 
 revealed command ; though the relation which we 
 stand in to God the Father is made known to us by 
 reason ; the relation we stand in to Christ, by revelation 
 only. On the other hand, the dispensation of the 
 Gospel admitted, gratitude as immediately becomes 
 due to C hrist, from his being the voluntary minister of 
 
 £ This is the distinction between moral and positive precepts considered 
 respectively as such. But yet, since the latter have somewhat of a moral 
 nature, we may see the reason of them, considered in this view. Moral 
 and positive precepts are in some respects alike, in other respects different. 
 So far as they are alike, we discern the reasons of both ; so far as they are 
 different, we discern the reasons of the former, but not of the latter. See 
 p, 150. &c. and p. 160. 
 
160 
 
 OF THE IMPORTANCE 
 
 [part If. 
 
 this dispensation, as it is due to God the Father, from 
 his being the fountain of all good; though the first is 
 made known to us by revelation only, the second by 
 reason. Hence also we may see, and, for distinctness 
 sake, it may be worth mentioning, that positive insti¬ 
 tutions come under a twofold consideration. They are 
 either institutions founded on natural Religion, as bap¬ 
 tism in the name of the Father; though this has also 
 a particular reference to the Gospel dispensation, for it 
 is in the name of God, as the Father of our Lord Jesus 
 Christ: or they are external institutions founded on 
 revealed Religion ; as baptism in the name of the Son, 
 and of the Holy Ghost. 
 
 Secondly, From the distinction between what is 
 moral and what is positive in Religion, appears the 
 ground of that peculiar preference, which the Scripture 
 teaches us to be due to the former. 
 
 The reason of positive institutions in general is very 
 obvious; though we should not see the reason, why 
 such particular ones are pitched upon rather than 
 others. Whoever therefore, instead of cavilling at 
 words, will attend to the thing itself, may clearly see, 
 that positive institutions in general, as distinguished 
 from this or that particular one, have the nature of 
 moral commands; since the reasons of them appear. 
 Thus, for instance, the external worship of God is a 
 moral duty, though no particular mode of it be so. 
 Care then is to be taken, when a comparison is made 
 between positive and moral duties, that they be com¬ 
 pared no farther than as they are different; no farther 
 than as the former are positive, or arise out of mere 
 external command, the reasons of which we are not 
 acquainted with; and as the latter are moral, or arise 
 out of the apparent reason of the case, without such 
 external command. Unless this caution be observed, 
 we shall run into endless confusion. 
 
OF CHRISTIANITY. 
 
 161 
 
 CHAP. I.] 
 
 ISow this beiug premised, suppose two standing 
 precepts enjoined by the same authority; that, in cer¬ 
 tain conjunctures, it is impossible to obey both; that 
 the former is moral, i. e. a precept of which we see the 
 leasons, and that they hold in the particular case before 
 us; but that the latter is positive, i. e. a precept of 
 which we do not see the reasons: it is indisputable 
 that our obligations are to obey the former; because 
 there is an apparent reason for this preference, and none 
 against it. Farther, positive institutions, I suppose all 
 those which Christianity enjoins, are means to a moral 
 end: and the end must be acknowledged more ex¬ 
 cellent than the means. Nor is observance of these 
 institutions any religious obedience at all, or of any 
 value, otherwise than as it proceeds from a moral 
 principle. This seems to be the strict logical way of 
 stating and determining this matter ; but will, perhaps, 
 be found less applicable to practice, than may be 
 thought at first sight. 
 
 And therefore, in a more practical, though more lax 
 way of consideration, and taking the words, moral law 
 and positive institutions, in the popular sense; I add, 
 that the whole moral law is as much matter of revealed 
 command, as positive institutions are : for the Scripture 
 enjoins every moral virtue. In this respect then they 
 are both upon a level. But the moral law is, moreover, 
 written upon our hearts; interwoven into our very 
 nature. And this is a plain intimation of the Author 
 of it, which is to be preferred, when they interfere. 
 
 But there is not altogether so much necessity for 
 the determination of this question, as some persons 
 seem to think. Nor are we left to reason alone to 
 determine it. For, first, Though mankind have, in all 
 ages, been greatly prone to place their religion in 
 peculiar positive rites, by way of equivalent for obedi- 
 
 ANALOGY". M 
 
i m 
 
 OF THE IMPORTANCE 
 
 [part II. 
 
 ence to moral precepts ; yet, without making any 
 comparison at all between them, and consequently 
 without determining which is to have the preference, 
 the nature of the thing abundantly shews all notions of 
 that kind to be utterly subversive of true Religion: as 
 they are, moreover, contrary to the whole general tenor 
 of Scripture; and likewise to the most express par¬ 
 ticular declarations of it, that nothing can render us 
 accepted of God, without moral virtue. Secondly, 
 Upon the occasion of mentioning together positive and 
 moral duties, the Scripture always puts the stress of 
 Religion upon the latter, and never upon the former: 
 which, though no sort of allowance to neglect the for¬ 
 mer, when they do not interfere with the latter, yet is 
 a plain intimation, that when they do, the latter are to 
 be preferred. And farther, as mankind are for placing 
 the stress of their religion any where, rather than upon 
 virtue; lest both the reason of the thing, and the 
 general spirit of Christianity, appearing in the intima¬ 
 tion now mentioned, should be ineffectual against this 
 prevalent folly: our Lord himself, from whose com¬ 
 mand alone the obligation of positive institutions arises, 
 has taken occasion to make the comparison between 
 them and moral precepts ; when the Pharisees censured 
 him, for eathig with publicans and sinners ; and also 
 when they censured his disciples, for plucking the cars 
 of corn on the Sabbath-day . Upon this comparison, he 
 has determined expressly, and in form, which shall 
 have the preference when they interfere. And by 
 delivering his authoritative determination in a proverbial 
 manner of expression, he has made it general: I will 
 have mercy , and not sacrifice h . The propriety of the 
 word proverbial is not the thing insisted upon : though 
 I think the manner of speaking is to be called so, 
 h Matt. ix. 13. and xii. 7. 
 
OF CHRISTIANITY. 
 
 163 
 
 CHAP. I.] 
 
 But that the manner of speaking very remarkably 
 renders the determination general, is surely indisput¬ 
 able. For, had it, in the latter case, been said onlv, 
 that God preferred mercy to the rigid observance of 
 the Sabbath; even then, by parity of reason, most 
 justly might we have argued, that he preferred mercy 
 likewise, to the observance of other ritual institutions; 
 and m general, moral duties, to positive ones. And 
 thus the determination would have been general- 
 though its being so were inferred and not expressed! 
 But as the passage really stands in the Gospel, it is 
 much stronger. For the sense and the very literal 
 words of our Lord’s answer are as applicable to anv 
 other instance of a comparison, between positive and 
 moral duties, as to this upon which they were spoken. 
 And if, in case of competition, mercy is to be preferred 
 to positive institutions, it will scarce be thought, that 
 justice is to give place to them. Tt is remarkable too, 
 that, as the words are a quotation from the Old Testa¬ 
 ment, they are introduced, on both the forementioned 
 occasions, with a declaration, that the Pharisees did not 
 understand the meaning of them. This, I say, is very 
 remarkable. For, since it is scarce possible, for the 
 most ignorant person, not to understand the literal 
 sense of the passage, in the Prophet*; and since under¬ 
 standing the literal sense would not have prevented 
 their condemning the guiltless k ; it can hardly be 
 doubted, that the thing which our Lord really in¬ 
 tended in that declaration was, that the Pharisees had 
 not learnt from it, as they might, wherein the general 
 spirit of Religion consists: that it consists in moral 
 l>iety and virtue, as distinguished from forms, and 
 ritual observances. However, it is certain we may 
 
 k See Matt, xii. 7. 
 
 M 2 
 
 > Hosea vi. 
 
164 OF THE IMPORTANCE OF CHRISTIANITY. [PART II. 
 
 learn this from his Divine application of the passage, in 
 the Gospel. 
 
 But, as it is one of the peculiar weaknesses of 
 human nature, when, upon a comparison of two things, 
 one is found to be of greater importance than the 
 other, to consider this other as of scarce any importance 
 at all: it is highly necessary that we remind ourselves, 
 how great presumption it is, to make light of any 
 institutions of Divine appointment; that our obligations 
 to obey all God’s commands whatever are absolute and 
 indispensable; and that commands merely positive, 
 admitted to be from him, lay us under a moral obli¬ 
 gation to obey them: an obligation moral in the 
 strictest and most proper sense. 
 
 To these things I cannot forbear adding, that the 
 account now given of Christianity most strongly shews 
 and enforces upon us the obligation of searching the 
 Scriptures, in order to see, what the scheme of reve¬ 
 lation really is; instead of determining beforehand, 
 from reason, what the scheme of it must bey. Indeed 
 if in revelation there be found any passages, the seem¬ 
 ing meaning of which is contrary to natural Religion; 
 we may most certainly conclude, such seeming meaning 
 not to be the real one. But it is not any degree of a 
 presumption against an interpretation of Scripture, that 
 such interpretation contains a doctrine, which the light 
 of nature cannot discover 2 ; or a precept, which the 
 law of nature does not oblige to. 
 
 y See chap. iii. 
 
 P. 165, 166. 
 
CHAP. II.] 
 
 OF THE SUPPOSED PRESUMPTION &C. 
 
 165 
 
 CIIAP. II. 
 
 Of the supposed Presumption against a Revelation, 
 considered as miraculous . 
 
 AVING shewn the importance of the Christian 
 
 revelation, and the obligations which we are under 
 seriously to attend to it, upon supposition of its truth, 
 01 its credibility: the next thing in order, is to con¬ 
 sider the supposed presumptions against revelation in 
 general; which shall be the subject of this chapter: 
 and the objections against the Christian in particular; 
 which shall be the subject of some following ones'*! 
 1 01 it seems the most natural method, to remove the 
 prejudices against Christianity, before we proceed to 
 the consideration of the positive evidence for it, and 
 the objections against that evidence b . 
 
 It is, I think, commonly supposed, that there is 
 some peculiar presumption, from the analogy of nature, 
 against the Christian scheme of things; at least 
 against miracles; so as that stronger evidence is 
 necessary to prove the truth and reality of them, than 
 would be sufficient to convince us of other events, or 
 matters of fact. Indeed the consideration of this 
 supposed presumption cannot but be thought very 
 insignificant, by many persons. Yet, as it belongs to 
 the subject of this Treatise; so it may tend to open 
 the mind, and remove some prejudices: however need¬ 
 less the consideration of it be, upon its own account. 
 
 I. I find no appearance of a presumption, from the 
 analogy of nature, against the general scheme of Christ¬ 
 ianity, that God created and invisibly governs the 
 world by Jesus Christ; and by him also will hereafter 
 
 a Ch. iii, iv, v, vi. 
 
 b Ch. vii. 
 
1 GG- 
 
 of THE SUPPOSED PRESUMPTION 
 
 [PART II. 
 
 judge it in righteousness, i. e. render to every one 
 according to liis works; and that good men are under 
 the secret influence of his Spirit. Whether these 
 things are, or are not, to be called miraculous, is, 
 perhaps, only a question about words; or however, is 
 of no moment in the case. If the analogy of nature 
 raises any presumption against this general scheme of 
 Christianity, it must be, either because it is not dis¬ 
 coverable by reason or experience; or else, because it 
 is unlike that course of nature, which is. But analogy 
 raises no presumption against the truth of this scheme, 
 upon either of these accounts. 
 
 First, There is no presumption, from analogy, against 
 the truth of it, upon account of its not being discover¬ 
 able by reason or experience. For suppose one who 
 never heard of revelation, of the most improved under¬ 
 standing, and acquainted with our whole system of 
 natural philosophy and natural religion: such an one 
 could not but be sensible, that it was but a very small 
 part of the natural and moral system of the universe, 
 which he was acquainted with. He could not but be 
 sensible, that there must be innumerable things, in the 
 dispensations of Providence past, in the invisible go¬ 
 vernment over the world at present carrying on, and in 
 what is to come; of which he was wholly ignorant 0 , 
 and which could not be discovered without revelation. 
 Whether the scheme of nature be, in the strictest 
 sense, infinite or not; it is evidently vast, even beyond 
 all possible imagination. And doubtless that part of 
 it, which is opened to our view, is but as a point, in 
 comparison of the whole plan of Providence, reaching 
 throughout eternity past and future; in comparison of 
 what is even now going on in the remote parts of the 
 boundless universe; nay in comparison of the whole 
 
 c P. 126. 
 
AGAINST MIRACLES. 
 
 167 
 
 CHAP. II.] 
 
 scheme of this world. And therefore, that things lie 
 beyond the natural reach of our faculties, is no sort of 
 presumption against the truth and reality of them: 
 because it is certain, there are innumerable tlnno-s. in 
 the constitution and government of the universe, which 
 are thus beyond the natural reach of our faculties. 
 Secondly, Analogy raises no presumption against any 
 of the things contained in this general doctrine of 
 Scripture now mentioned, upon account of their being 
 unlike the known course of nature. For there is no 
 presumption at all from analogy, that the whole course 
 of things, or Divine government, naturally unknown to 
 us, and every tinny in it, is like to any thing in that 
 which is known ; and therefore no peculiar presumption 
 against any thing in the former, upon account of its 
 being unlike to any thing in the latter. And in the 
 constitution and natural government of the world, as 
 well as in the moral government of it, we see things, in 
 a great degree, unlike one another: and therefore 
 ought not to wonder at such unlikeness between thing's 
 visible and invisible. However, the scheme of Christ¬ 
 ianity is by no means entirely unlike the scheme of 
 nature; as will appear in the following part of this 
 Treatise. 
 
 The notion of a miracle, considered as a proof of a 
 Divine mission, has been stated with great exactness 
 by divines; and is, I think, sufficiently understood by 
 every one. There are also invisible miracles, the 
 Incarnation of Christ, for instance, which, being secret, 
 cannot be alleged as a proof of such a mission ; but 
 require themselves to be proved by visible miracles. 
 Revelation itself too is miraculous; and miracles are 
 the proof of it; and the supposed presumption against 
 these shall presently be considered. All which I have 
 been observing here is, that, whether we choose to call 
 every thing in the dispensations of Providence, not dis- 
 
16*8 
 
 OF THE SUPPOSED PRESUMPTION 
 
 PART II. 
 
 coverable without revelation, nor like the known course 
 of tilings, miraculous ; and whether the general Christ¬ 
 ian dispensation now mentioned is to be called so, or 
 not; the foregoing observations seem certainly to shew, 
 that there is no presumption against it from the 
 analogy of nature. 
 
 II. There is no presumption, from analogy, against 
 some operations, which we should now call miraculous; 
 particularly none against a revelation at the beginning 
 of the world: nothing of such presumption against it, 
 as is supposed to be implied or expressed in the word 
 miraculous. For a miracle, in its very notion, is 
 relative to a course of nature; and implies somewhat 
 different from it, considered as being so. Now, either 
 there was no course of nature at the time which we 
 are speaking of; or if there were, we are not acquaint¬ 
 ed what the course of nature is, upon the first peopling 
 of worlds. And therefore the question, whether 
 mankind had a revelation made to them at that time, 
 is to be considered, not as a question concerning a 
 miracle, but as a common question of fact. And we 
 have the like reason, be it more or less, to admit the 
 report of tradition, concerning this question, and con¬ 
 cerning common matters of fact of the same antiquity ; 
 for instance, what part of the earth was first peopled. 
 
 Or thus: When mankind was first placed in this 
 state, there was a power exerted, totally different from 
 the present course of nature. Now, whether this 
 power, thus wholly different from the present course of 
 nature, for we cannot properly apply to it the word 
 miraculous; whether this power stopped immediately 
 after it had made man, or went on, and exerted itself 
 farther in giving him a revelation, is a question of the 
 same kind, as whether an ordinary power exerted itself 
 in such a particular degree and manner, or not. 
 
 Or suppose the power exerted in the formation of 
 
AGAINST MIRACLES. 
 
 CHAP. II.] 
 
 169 
 
 the world be considered as miraculous, or rather, be 
 called by that name; the case will not be different: 
 since it must be acknowledged, that such a power was 
 exerted. For supposing it acknowledged, that our Sa¬ 
 viour spent some years in a course of working miracles: 
 there is no more presumption, worth mentioning, 
 against his having exerted this miraculous power, in a 
 certain degree greater, than in a certain degree less; in 
 one or two more instances, than in one or two fewer; 
 in this, than in another manner. 
 
 It is evident then, that there can be no peculiar 
 presumption, from the analogy of nature, against 
 supposing a revelation, when man was first placed 
 upon the earth. 
 
 Add, that there does not appear the least intimation 
 in history or tradition, that Religion was first reasoned 
 out: but the whole of history and tradition makes for 
 the other side, that it came into the world by revela¬ 
 tion. Indeed the state of Religion in the first ages, of 
 which we have any account, seems to suppose and im¬ 
 ply, that this was the original of it amongst mankind. 
 And these reflections together, without taking in the 
 peculiar authority of Scripture, amount to real and a 
 very material degree of evidence, that there was a 
 revelation at the beginning of the world. Now this, as 
 it is a confirmation of natural Religion, and therefore 
 mentioned in the former part of this Treatise d : so 
 likewise it has a tendency to remove any prejudices 
 against a subsequent revelation. 
 
 III. But still it may be objected, that there is some 
 peculiar presumption, from analogy, against miracles; 
 particularly against revelation, after the settlement and 
 during the continuance of a course of nature. 
 
 Now with regard to this supposed presumption, it is 
 d Page 120, &c. 
 
170 
 
 OF THE SUPPOSED PRESUMPTION 
 
 [part II. 
 
 to be observed in general, that before we can have 
 ground for raising what can, with any propriety, be 
 called an argument from analogy, for or against reve¬ 
 lation considered as somewhat miraculous, we must be 
 acquainted with a similar or parallel case. But the 
 history of some other world, seemingly in like circum¬ 
 stances with our own, is no more than a parallel case: 
 and therefore nothing short of this can be so. Yet, 
 could we come at a presumptive proof, for or against a 
 revelation, from being informed, whether such world 
 had one, or not; such a proof, being drawn from one 
 single instance only, must be infinitely precarious. 
 More particularly : First of all; There is a very strong 
 presumption against common speculative truths, and 
 against the most ordinary facts, before the proof of 
 them; which yet is overcome by almost any proof. 
 There is a presumption of millions to one, against the 
 story of Cocsar, or of any other man. For suppose a 
 number of common facts so and so circumstanced, of 
 which one had no kind of proof, should happen to 
 come into one’s thoughts ; every one would, without 
 any possible doubt, conclude them to be false. And 
 the like may be said of a single common fact. And 
 from hence it appears, that the question of importance, 
 as to the matter before us, is, concerning the degree of 
 the peculiar presumption supposed against miracles; 
 not whether there be any peculiar presumption at all 
 against them. For, if there be the presumption of 
 millions to one, against the most common facts; what 
 can a small presumption, additional to this, amount to, 
 though it be peculiar? It cannot be estimated, and is 
 as nothing. The only material question is, whether 
 there be any such presumption against miracles, as to 
 render them in any sort incredible. Secondly, If we 
 leave out the consideration of Religion, we are in such 
 
CHAP. II.] 
 
 AGAINST MIRACLES. 
 
 171 
 
 total darkness, upon what causes, occasions, reasons, or 
 circumstances, the present course of nature depends; 
 that there does not appear any improbability for or 
 against supposing, that five or six thousand years may 
 have given scope for causes, occasions, reasons, or cir¬ 
 cumstances, from whence miraculous interpositions 
 may have arisen. And from this, joined with the fore¬ 
 going observation, it will follow, that there must be a 
 presumption, beyond all comparison, greater, against 
 the particular common facts just now instanced in, 
 than against miracles in general ; before any evidence 
 of either. But, thirdly, Take in the consideration of 
 Religion, or the moral system of the world, and then 
 we see distinct particular reasons for miracles: to af¬ 
 ford mankind instruction additional to that of nature, 
 and to attest the truth of it. And this gives a real 
 credibility to the supposition, that it might be part of 
 the original plan of things, that there should be mi¬ 
 raculous interpositions. Then, lastly, Miracles must 
 not be compared to common natural events; or to 
 events which, though uncommon, are similar to what 
 we daily experience: but to the extraordinary pheno¬ 
 mena of nature. And then the comparison will be 
 between the presumption against miracles, and the 
 presumption against such uncommon appearances, sup¬ 
 pose, as comets, and against there being any such 
 powers in nature as magnetism and electricity, so con¬ 
 trary to the properties of other bodies not endued with 
 these powers. And before any one can determine, 
 whether there be any peculiar presumption against 
 miracles, more than against other extraordinary things; 
 he must consider, what, upon first hearing would be 
 the presumption against the last-mentioned appear¬ 
 ances and powers, to a person acquainted only with the 
 daily, monthly, and annual course of nature respecting 
 
THE CREDIBILITY OF REVELATION 
 
 172 
 
 [part II. 
 
 this earth, and with those common powers of matter 
 which we every day see. 
 
 Upon all this I conclude; that there certainly is no 
 such presumption against miracles, as to render them 
 in any wise incredible: that on the contrary, our being 
 able to discern reasons for them, gives a positive credi¬ 
 bility to the history of them, in cases where those 
 reasons hold: and that it is by no means certain, that 
 there is any peculiar presumption at all, from analogy, 
 even in the lowest degree, against miracles, as distin¬ 
 guished from other extraordinary phenomena : though 
 it is not worth while to perplex the Reader with in¬ 
 quiries into the abstract nature of evidence, in order to 
 determine a question, which, without such inquiries, 
 we see e is of no importance. 
 
 CHAP. III. 
 
 Of our Incapacity of judging , tv hat ivere to be expected 
 in a Revelation; and the Credibility , from Analogy , 
 that it must contain Things appearing liable to Ob¬ 
 jections. 
 
 B ESIDES the objections against the evidence for 
 Christianity, many are alleged against the scheme 
 of it; against the whole manner in which it is put and 
 left with the world; as well as against several par¬ 
 ticular relations in Scripture: objections drawn from 
 the deficiencies of revelation; from things in it appear¬ 
 ing to men foolishness*; from its containing matters of 
 offence, which have led, and it must have been fore¬ 
 seen would lead, into strange enthusiasm and super¬ 
 stition, and be made to serve the purposes of tyranny 
 
 P. 169. 
 
 1 Cor. i. 28. 
 
liable to objections. 
 
 CHAP. III.] 
 
 173 
 
 and wickedness; from its not being universal; and, 
 which is a thing of the same kind, from its evidence 
 not being so convincing and satisfactory as it might 
 have been : for this last is sometimes turned into a 
 positive argument against its truth b . It would be 
 tedious, indeed impossible, to enumerate the several 
 particulars comprehended under the objections here re¬ 
 ferred to; they being so various, according to the dif¬ 
 ferent fancies of men. There are persons, who think 
 it a strong objection against the authority of Scripture, 
 that it is not composed by rules of art, agreed upon by 
 critics, for polite and correct writing. And the scorn 
 is inexpressible, with which some of the prophetic parts 
 of Scripture are treated : partly through the rashness 
 of interpreters ; but very much also, on account of the 
 hieroglyphical and figurative language, in which they 
 are left us. Some of the principal things of this sort 
 shall be particularly considered in the following chap¬ 
 ters. But my design at present is to observe in ge- 
 neial, with respect to this whole wav of arguing’, that, 
 upon supposition of a revelation, it is highly credible 
 beforehand, we should be incompetent judges of it to a 
 great degree: and that it would contain many things 
 appearing to us liable to great objections; in case we 
 judge of it otherwise, than by the analogy of nature. 
 And therefore, though objections against the evidence 
 of Christianity are most seriously to be considered; 
 yet objections against Christianity itself are, in a great 
 measure, frivolous : almost all objections ag'ainst it, ex¬ 
 cepting those which are alleged against the particular 
 proofs of its coming from God. I express myself with 
 caution, lest I should be mistaken to vilify reason; 
 which is indeed the only faculty we have wherewith to 
 judge concerning any thing, even revelation itself: or 
 
 b See chap. vi. 
 
174 THE CREDIBILITY OF REVELATION [PART II. 
 
 be misunderstood to assert, that a supposed revelation 
 cannot be proved false, from internal characters. For, 
 it may contain clear immoralities or contradictions; 
 and either of these would prove it false. Nor will I 
 take upon me to affirm, that nothing else can possibly 
 render any supposed revelation incredible. Yet still 
 the observation above is, 1 think, true beyond doubt; 
 that objections against Christianity, as distinguished 
 from objections against its evidence, are frivolous. To 
 make out this, is the general design of the present 
 chapter. And with regard to the whole of it, I cannot 
 but particularly wish, that the proofs might be attended 
 to; rather than the assertions cavilled at, upon account 
 of any unacceptable consequences, whether real or 
 supposed, which may be drawn from them. For, after 
 all, that which is true, must be admitted, though it 
 should shew us the shortness of our faculties; and that 
 we are in no wise judges of many things, of which we 
 are apt to think ourselves very competent ones. Nor 
 will this be any objection with reasonable men, at 
 least upon second thought it will not be any objection 
 with such, against the justness of the following ob¬ 
 servations. 
 
 As God governs the world, and instructs his creatures, 
 according to certain laws or rules, in the known course 
 of nature, known by reason together with experience: 
 so the Scripture informs us of a scheme of Divine 
 providence, additional to this. It relates, that God has, 
 by revelation, instructed men in things concerning his 
 government, which they could not otherwise have 
 known; and reminded them of things, which they 
 might otherwise know ; and attested the truth of the 
 whole by miracles. Now if the natural and the 
 revealed dispensation of things are both from God, if 
 they coincide with each other, and together make up 
 
LIABLE TO OBJECTIONS. 
 
 CHAP. III.] 
 
 175 
 
 one scheme of Providence; our being incompetent 
 judges of one, must render it credible, that we may be 
 incompetent judges also of the other. Since, upon ex¬ 
 perience, the acknowledged constitution and course 
 of nature is found to be greatly different from what, 
 before experience, would have been expected; and 
 Mich as, men fancy, there lie great objections against: 
 this renders it beforehand highly credible, that they 
 may find the revealed dispensation likewise, if they 
 judge of it as they do of the constitution of nature, 
 very different from expectations formed beforehand; 
 and liable, in appearance, to great objections: objec¬ 
 tions against the scheme itself, and against the de- 
 giees and manners of the miraculous interpositions, 
 by which it was attested and carried on. Thus suppose 
 a prince to govern his dominions in the wisest manner 
 possible, by common known laws; and that upon some 
 exigencies he should suspend these laws; and govern, 
 in several instances, in a different manner : if one of 
 his subjects were not a competent judge beforehand, bv 
 what common rules the government should or would 
 be carried on; it could not be expected, that the same 
 person would be a competent judge, in what exigencies, 
 or in what manner, or to what degree, those laws 
 commonly observed would be suspended or deviated 
 from. If he were not a judge of the wisdom of the 
 ordinary administration, there is no reason to think he 
 would be a judge of the wisdom of the extraordinary. 
 If he thought he had objections against the former; 
 doubtless, it is highly supposable, he might think also, 
 that he had objections against the latter. And thus, 
 as we fall into infinite follies and mistakes, whenever 
 we pretend, otherwise than from experience and ana¬ 
 logy, to judge of the constitution and course of nature; 
 it is evidently supposable beforehand, that we should 
 
176 THE CREDIBILITY OF REVELATION [PART II. 
 
 fall into as great, in pretending to judge, in like man¬ 
 ner, concerning revelation. Nor is there any more 
 ground to expect that this latter should appear to us 
 clear of objections, than that the former should. 
 
 These observations, relating to the whole of Christ¬ 
 ianity, are applicable to inspiration in particular. As 
 we are in no sort judges beforehand, by what laws or 
 rules, in what degree, or by what means, it were to 
 have been expected, that God would naturally instruct 
 us; so upon supposition of his affording us light and 
 instruction by revelation, additional to what he has 
 afforded us by reason and experience, we are in no sort 
 judges, by what methods, and in what proportion, it 
 were to be expected, that this supernatural light and 
 instruction would be afforded us. We know not be¬ 
 forehand, what degree or kind of natural information, 
 it were to be expected God would afford men, each by 
 his own reason and experience: nor how far he would 
 enable and effectually dispose them to communicate it, 
 whatever it should be, to each other; nor whether the 
 evidence of it would be certain, highly probable, or 
 doubtful; nor whether it would be given with equal 
 clearness and conviction to all. Nor could we <ruess, 
 upon any good ground I mean, whether natural know¬ 
 ledge, or even the faculty itself, by which we are 
 capable of attaining it, reason, would be given us at 
 once, or gradually. In like manner, we are wholly 
 ignorant, what degree of new knowledge, it were to be 
 expected, God would give mankind by revelation, upon 
 supposition of his affording one: or how far, or in what 
 way, he would interpose miraculously, to qualify them, 
 to whom he should originally make the revelation, for 
 communicating the knowledge given by it; and to 
 secure their doing it to the age in which they should 
 live; and to secure its being transmitted to posterity. 
 
CHAP. III.] LIABLE TO OBJECTIONS. 177 
 
 W e are equally ignorant, whether the evidence of it 
 would be certain, or highly probable, or doubtful®: or 
 whethei all who should have any degree of instruction 
 from it, and any degree of evidence of its truth, would 
 have the same: or whether the scheme would be 
 levealed at once, or unfolded gradually. Nay we are 
 not in any sort able to judge, whether it were to have 
 been expected, that the revelation should have been 
 committed to writing; or left to be handed down, and 
 consequently corrupted, by verbal tradition, and at 
 length sunk under it, if mankind so pleased, and 
 during such time as they are permitted, in the degree 
 they evidently are, to act as they will. 
 
 But it may be said, “ that a revelation in some of 
 the above-mentioned circumstances, one, for instance, 
 
 “ which was 110t committed to writing, and thus secured 
 “ a o ainst danger of corruption, would not have an¬ 
 swered its purpose.” I ask, what purpose? It would 
 not have answered all the purposes, which it has now 
 answered, and in the same degree: but it would have 
 answered others, or the same in different degrees. And 
 which of these were the purposes of God, and best fell 
 m with his general government, we could not at all 
 have determined beforehand. 
 
 Now since it has been shewn, that we have no prin¬ 
 ciples of reason, upon which to judge beforehand, how 
 it were to be expected revelation should have been 
 left, or w hat was most suitable to the Divine plan of 
 government, in any of the formentioned respects; it 
 must be quite frivolous to object afterwards as to any 
 of them, against its being left in one way, rather than 
 another: for this would be to object against things, 
 upon account of their being different from expectations, 
 which have been shewn to be without reason. And 
 
 c See chap. vi. 
 
 ANALOGY. 
 
 N 
 
178 THE CREDIBILITY OF REVELATION [PART II. 
 
 thus we see, that the only question concerning the 
 truth of Christianity is, whether it be a real revelation ; 
 not whether it be attended with every circumstance 
 which we should have looked for: and concerning the 
 authority of Scripture, whether it be what it claims to 
 be; not whether it be a book of such sort, and so 
 promulged, as weak men are apt to fancy a book 
 containing a Divine revelation should. And therefore, 
 neither obscurity, nor seeming inaccuracy of style, nor 
 various readings, nor early disputes about the authors 
 of particular parts; nor any other things of the like 
 kind, though they had been much more considerable in 
 degree than they are, could overthrow the authority of 
 the Scripture: unless the Prophets, Apostles, or our 
 Lord, had promised, that the book containing the 
 Divine revelation should be secure from those things. 
 Nor indeed can any objections overthrow such a kind 
 of revelation as the Christian claims to be, since there 
 are no objections against the morality of it d , but such 
 as can shew, that there is no proof of miracles wrought 
 originally in attestation of it; no appearance of any 
 thing miraculous in its obtaining in the world; nor any 
 of prophecy, that is, of events foretold, which human 
 sagacity could not foresee. If it can be shewn, that 
 the proof alleged for all these is absolutely none at all, 
 then is revelation overturned. But were it allowed, 
 that the proof of any one or all of them is lower than 
 is allowed ; yet, whilst any proof of them remains, 
 revelation will stand upon much the same foot it does 
 at present, as to all the purposes of life and practice, 
 and ought to have the like influence upon our be¬ 
 haviour. 
 
 From the foregoing observations too, it will follow, 
 and those who will thoroughly examine into revelation 
 
 d Page 186. 
 
CHAP. III.] 
 
 LIABLE TO OBJECTIONS. 
 
 179 
 
 Will find it worth remarking; that there are several 
 ways of arguing, which, though just with regard to 
 other writings, are not applicable to Scripture: at least 
 not to the prophetic parts of it. We cannot argue, 
 foi instance, that this cannot be the sense or intent of 
 such a passage of Scripture; for, if it had, it would 
 have been expressed more plainly, or have been repre¬ 
 sented under a more apt figure or hieroglyphic: yet 
 we may justly argue thus, with respect to common 
 books. And the reason of this difference is very evi¬ 
 dent ; that in Scripture we are not competent judges, 
 as we are in common books, how plainly it were to 
 have been expected, what is the true sense" should have 
 been expressed, or under how apt an image figured, 
 ihe only question is, what appearance there is, that 
 this is the sense; and scarce at all, how much more 
 deterniinately or accurately it might have been ex- 
 pressed or figured. 
 
 But is it not self-evident, that internal improba- 
 “ bihties of all kinds weaken external probable proof?” 
 Doubtless. But to what practical purpose can this be 
 alleged here, when it has been proved before e , that 
 real internal improbabilities, which rise even to moral 
 certainty, are overcome by the most ordinary testi- 
 mony; and when it now has been made appear, that 
 we scarce know what are improbabilities, as to the 
 matter we are here considering: as it will farther 
 appear from what follows. 
 
 For though from the observations above made it is 
 manifest, that we are not in any sort competent judges, 
 what supernatural instruction were to have been ex¬ 
 pected ; and though it is self-evident, that the objections 
 of an incompetent judgment must be frivolous; yet it 
 may be proper to go one step farther, and observe; 
 
 c Page 170. 
 
 N 2 
 
180 THE CREDIBILITY OF REVELATION [PART II. 
 
 that if men will be regardless of these things, and 
 pretend to judge of the Scripture by preconceived 
 expectations; the analogy of nature shews beforehand, 
 not only that it is highly credible they may, but also 
 probable that they will, imagine they have strong 
 objections against it, however really unexceptionable: 
 for so, prior to experience, they would think they had, 
 against the circumstances, and degrees, and the whole 
 manner of that instruction, which is afforded by the 
 ordinary course of nature. Were the instruction which 
 God affords to brute creatures by instincts and mere 
 propensions, and to mankind by these together with 
 reason, matter of probable proof, and not of certain 
 observation ; it would be rejected as incredible, in 
 many instances of it, only upon account of the means 
 by which this instruction is given, the seeming dispro¬ 
 portions, the limitations, necessary conditions, and cir¬ 
 cumstances of it. For instance : would it not have 
 been thought highly improbable, that men should have 
 been so much more capable of discovering, even to 
 certainty, the general laws of matter, and the mag¬ 
 nitudes, paths, and revolutions of the heavenly bodies; 
 than the occasions and cures of distempers, and many 
 other things, in which human life seems so much more 
 nearly concerned, than in astronomy ? How capricious 
 and irregular a way of information, would it be said, is 
 that of invention ,, by means of which nature instructs 
 us in matters of science, and in many things, upon 
 which the affairs of the world greatly depend : that a 
 man should, by this faculty, be made acquainted with 
 a thing in an instant, when perhaps he is thinking of 
 somewhat else, which he has in vain been searching 
 after, it may be, for years. So likewise the imper¬ 
 fections attending the only method, by which nature 
 enables and directs us to communicate our thoughts 
 
CHAP. III.] 
 
 liable to objections. 
 
 181 
 
 to each other, are innumerable. Language is, in its 
 very nature, inadequate, ambiguous, liable to infinite 
 abuse, even from negligence; and so liable to it from 
 design, that every man can deceive and betray by it. 
 And, to mention but one instance more; that brutes, 
 without reason, should act, in many respects, with a 
 sagacity and foresight vastly greater than what men 
 have in those respects, would be thought impossible. 
 ^ et it is certain they do act with such superior fore¬ 
 sight : whether it be their own indeed, is another 
 question. From these things, it is highly credible 
 beforehand, that upon supposition God should afford 
 men some additional instruction by revelation, it would 
 be with circumstances, in manners, degrees, and re¬ 
 spects, which we should be apt to fancy we had great 
 objections against the credibility of. Nor are the ob¬ 
 jections against the Scripture, nor against Christianity 
 in general, at all more or greater, than the analogy of 
 nature would beforehand—not perhaps give ground to 
 expect; for this analogy may not be sufficient, in some 
 cases, to ground an expectation upon ; but no more 
 noi greater, than analogy would shew it, beforehand, to 
 be supposable and credible, that there might seem to 
 lie against revelation. 
 
 By applying these general observations to a parti¬ 
 cular objection, it will be more distinctly seen, how 
 they are applicable to others of the like kind : and 
 indeed to almost all objections against Christianity, as 
 distinguished from objections against its evidence. It 
 appears from Scripture, that, as it was not unusual in 
 the apostolic age, for persons, upon their conversion to 
 Christianity, to be endued with miraculous gifts; so, 
 some of those persons exercised these gifts in a strangely 
 irregular and disorderly manner; and this is made 
 an objection against their being really miraculous. 
 
182 THE CREDIBILITY OF REVELATION [PART II. 
 
 Now the foregoing observations quite remove this 
 objection, how considerable soever it may appear at 
 first sight. For, consider a person endued with any of 
 these gifts; for instance, that of tongues: it is to be 
 supposed, that he had the same power over this 
 miraculous gift, as he would have had over it, had it 
 been the effect of habit, of study and use, as it ordi¬ 
 narily is; or the same power over it, as he had over 
 any other natural endowment. Consequently, he 
 would use it in the same manner he did any other; 
 either regularly, and upon proper occasions only, or 
 irregularly, and upon improper ones: according to his 
 sense of decency, and his character of prudence. 
 Where then is the objection ? Why, if this miraculous 
 power was indeed given to the world to propagate 
 Christianity, and attest the truth of it, we might, it 
 seems, have expected, that other sort of persons should 
 have been chosen to be invested with it; or that these 
 should, at the same time, have been endued with 
 prudence; or that they should have been continually 
 restrained and directed in the exercise of it: i. e. that 
 God should have miraculously interposed, if at all, in a 
 different manner, or higher degree. But, from the 
 observations made above, it is undeniably evident, that 
 we are not judges in what degrees and manners it were 
 to have been expected he should miraculously inter¬ 
 pose ; upon supposition of his doing it in some degree 
 and manner. Nor, in the natural course of Providence, 
 are superior gifts of memory, eloquence, knowledge, 
 and other talents of great influence, conferred only on 
 persons of prudence and decency, or such as are dis¬ 
 posed to make the properest use of them. Nor is the 
 instruction and admonition naturally afforded us for 
 the conduct of life, particularly in our education, com¬ 
 monly given in a manner the most suited to recommend 
 
LIABLE TO OBJECTIONS. 
 
 183 
 
 CHAP. III.] 
 
 it; but often with circumstances apt to prejudice us 
 against such instruction. 
 
 One might go on to add, that there is a great resem- 
 blance between the light of nature and of revelation, in 
 several other respects. Practical Christianity, or that 
 faith and behaviour which renders a man a Christian, is 
 a plain and obvious thing: like the common rules of 
 conduct, with respect to our ordinary temporal affairs. 
 The more distinct and particular knowledge of those 
 things, the study of which the Apostle calls going on 
 unto perfection f , and of the prophetic parts of reve¬ 
 lation, like many parts of natural and even civil know¬ 
 ledge, may require very exact thought, and careful 
 consideration. The hinderances too, of natural, and of 
 supernatural light and knowledge, have been of the 
 same kind. And as it is owned the whole scheme of 
 Scripture is not yet understood ; so, if it ever comes to 
 be understood, before the restitution of all things e, and 
 without miraculous interpositions; it must be in the 
 same way as natural knowledge is come at: by the 
 continuance and progress of learning and of liberty; 
 and by particular persons attending to, comparing and 
 pursuing, intimations scattered up and down it, which 
 are overlooked and disregarded by the generality of 
 the world. For this is the way, in which all improve¬ 
 ments are made; by thoughtful men’s tracing on ob¬ 
 scure hints, as it were, dropped us by nature accident¬ 
 ally, or which seem to come into our minds by chance. 
 Nor is it at all incredible, that a book, which has been 
 so long in the possession of mankind, should contain 
 many truths as yet undiscovered. For, all the same 
 phenomena, and the same faculties of investigation, 
 from which such great discoveries in natural knowledge 
 have been made in the present and last age, w r ere 
 
184 THE CREDIBILITY OF REVELATION [PART II. 
 
 equally in the possession of mankind, several thousand 
 years before. And possibly it might be intended, that 
 events, as they come to pass, should open and ascertain 
 the meaning of several parts of Scripture. 
 
 It may be objected, that this analogy fails in a 
 material respect: for that natural knowledge is of little 
 or no consequence. But I have been speaking of the 
 general instruction which nature does or does not af¬ 
 ford us. And besides, some parts of natural knowledge, 
 in the more common restrained sense of the words, are 
 of the greatest consequence to the ease and conve¬ 
 nience of life. But suppose the analogy did, as it does 
 not, fail in this respect; yet it might be abundantly 
 supplied, from the whole constitution and course of na¬ 
 ture : which shews, that God does not dispense his 
 gifts according to our notions of the advantage and 
 consequence they would be of to us. And this in 
 general, with his method of dispensing knowledge in 
 particular, would together make out an analogy full to 
 the point before us. 
 
 But it may be objected still farther and more gene¬ 
 rally ; 44 The Scripture represents the world as in a 
 44 state of ruin, and Christianity as an expedient to 
 44 recover it, to help in these respects where nature 
 44 fails: in particular, to supply the deficiencies of na- 
 44 tural light. Is it credible then, that so many ages 
 44 should have been let pass, before a matter of such a 
 44 sort, of so great and so general importance, was made 
 44 known to mankind ; and then that it should be made 
 44 known to so small a part of them? Is it conceivable, 
 44 that this supply should be so very deficient, should 
 44 have the like obscurity and doubtfulness, be liable to 
 44 the like perversions, in short, lie open to all the like 
 44 objections, as the light of nature itself 11 ?” Without 
 
 h Chap. vi. 
 
CHAP. III.] LIABLE TO OBJECTIONS. 185 
 
 determining how far this in fact is so, I answer; it is 
 by no means incredible, that it might be so, if the 
 light of nature and of revelation be from the same 
 hand. Men are naturally liable to diseases : for which 
 God, in his good providence, has provided natural re¬ 
 medies *. But remedies existing in nature have been 
 unknown to mankind for many ages: are known but to 
 few now ; probably many valuable ones are not known 
 yet. Great has been and is the obscurity and difficulty, 
 in the nature and application of them. Circumstances 
 seem often to make them very improper, where they 
 are absolutely necessary. It is after long labour and 
 study, and many unsuccessful endeavours, that they are 
 brought to be as useful as they are ; after high con¬ 
 tempt and absolute rejection of the most useful we 
 have; and after disputes and doubts, which have seem¬ 
 ed to be endless. The best remedies too, when un¬ 
 skilfully, much more if dishonestly applied, may pro¬ 
 duce new diseases; and with the lightest application 
 the success of them is often doubtful. In many cases 
 they are not at all effectual: where they are, it is often 
 very slowly: and the application of them, and the ne¬ 
 cessary regimen accompanying it, is, not uncommonly, 
 so disagreeable, that some will not submit to them ; 
 and satisfy themselves with the excuse, that, if they 
 would, it is not certain whether it would be successful. 
 And many persons, who labour under diseases, for 
 which there are known natural remedies, are not so 
 happy as to be always, if ever, in the way of them. In 
 a word, the remedies which nature has provided for 
 diseases are neither certain, perfect, nor universal. And 
 indeed the same principles of arguing, which would 
 lead us to conclude, that they must be so, would lead 
 us likewise to conclude, that there could be no occa- 
 
 1 See chaj). v. 
 
186 
 
 THE CREDIBILITY OF REVELATION 
 
 [part II. 
 
 sion for them ; i. e. that there could be no diseases at 
 all. And therefore our experience that there are dis¬ 
 eases shews, that it is credible beforehand, upon sup¬ 
 position nature has provided remedies for them, that 
 these remedies may be, as by experience we find they 
 are, not certain, nor perfect, nor universal; because it 
 shews, that the principles upon which we should expect 
 the contrary are fallacious. 
 
 And now, what is the just consequence from all 
 these things ? Not that reason is no judge of what is 
 offered to us as being of Divine revelation. For this 
 Mould be to infer, that M 7 e are unable to judge of any 
 thing, because we are unable to judge of all things. 
 Reason can, and it ought to judge, not only of the 
 meaning, but also of the morality and the evidence of re¬ 
 velation. First, It is the province of reason to judge of 
 the morality of the Scripture; i.e. not whether it con¬ 
 tains things different from what we should have ex¬ 
 pected from a wise, just, and good Being; for ob¬ 
 jections from hence have been now obviated: but whe¬ 
 ther it contains things plainly contradictory to wisdom, 
 justice, or goodness; to M’hat the light of nature teaches 
 us of God. And I know nothing of this sort objected 
 against Scripture, excepting such objections as are 
 formed upon suppositions, which Mould equally con¬ 
 clude, that the constitution of nature is contradictory 
 to wisdom, justice, or goodness; which most certainly 
 it is not. Indeed there are some particular precepts in 
 Scripture, given to particular persons, requiring actions, 
 which Mould be immoral and vicious, M T ere it not for 
 such precepts. But it is easy to see, that all these are 
 of such a kind, as that the precept changes the whole 
 nature of the case and of the action; and both consti¬ 
 tutes and shews that not to be unjust or immoral, 
 which, prior to the precept, must have appeared and 
 
LIABLE TO OBJECTIONS. 
 
 CHAP. HI.] 
 
 187 
 
 really have been so: which may well be, since none of 
 these precepts are contrary to immutable morality. If 
 it were commanded, to cultivate the principles and act 
 from the spirit of treachery, ingratitude, cruelty; the 
 command would not alter the nature of the case or of 
 the action, in any of these instances. But it is quite 
 otherwise in precepts, which require only the doing an 
 external action : for instance, taking away the property 
 or life of any. For men have no right to either life or 
 property, but what arises solely from the grant of God: 
 M hen this grant is revoked, they cease to have any 
 right at all in either: and when this revocation is made 
 known, as surely it is possible it may be, it must cease 
 to be unjust to deprive them of either. And though 
 a course of external acts, which without command 
 would be immoral, must make an immoral habit; yet 
 a few detached commands have no such natural ten¬ 
 dency. I thought proper to say thus much of the few 
 Scripture precepts, which require, not vicious actions, 
 but actions which would have been vicious had it not 
 been for such precepts; because they are sometimes 
 weakly urged as immoral, and great weight is laid upon 
 objections drawn from them. But to me there seems 
 no difficulty at all in these precepts, but what arises 
 from their being offences : i. e. from their being liable 
 to be perverted, as indeed they are, by wicked design¬ 
 ing men, to serve the most horrid purposes; and, per¬ 
 haps, to mislead the weak and enthusiastic. And 
 objections from this head are not objections against 
 revelation ; but against the whole notion of religion, 
 as a trial; and against the general constitution of 
 nature. Secondly, Reason is able to judge, and must, 
 of the evidence of revelation, and of the objections 
 urged against that evidence: which shall be the sub¬ 
 ject of a following chapter k . 
 
 k Chap. vii. 
 
188 
 
 THE CREDIBILITY OF REVELATION &C. [PART II. 
 
 But the consequence of the foregoing observations 
 is, that the question upon which the truth of Christ¬ 
 ianity depends is scarce at all, what objections there 
 are against its scheme, since there are none against the 
 morality of it; but what objections there are against its 
 evidence; or, what proof there remains of it, after due 
 allowances made for the objections against that proof: 
 because it has been shewn, that the objections against 
 Christianity, as distinguished from objections against its 
 evidence, are frivolous. For surely very little weight, if 
 any at all, is to be laid upon a way of arguing and 
 objecting, which, when applied to the general constitu¬ 
 tion of nature, experience shews not to be conclusive: 
 and such, I think, is the whole way of objecting treated 
 of throughout this chapter. It is resolvable into prin¬ 
 ciples, and goes upon suppositions, which mislead us to 
 think, that the Author of Nature would not act, as we 
 experience he does; or would act, in such and such 
 cases, as we experience he does not in like cases. But 
 the unreasonableness of this way of objecting will 
 appear yet more evidently from hence, that the chief 
 things thus objected against are justified, as shall be 
 farther shewn 1 , by distinct, particular, and full analogies, 
 in the constitution and course of nature. 
 
 But it is to be remembered, that, as frivolous as 
 objections of the foregoing sort against revelation are, 
 yet, when a supposed revelation is more consistent with 
 itself, and has a more general and uniform tendency to 
 promote virtue, than, all circumstances considered, 
 could have been expected from enthusiasm and politi¬ 
 cal views; this is a presumptive proof of its not pro¬ 
 ceeding from them, and so of its truth: because we are 
 competent judges, what might have been expected 
 from enthusiasm and political views. 
 
 Chap. iv. latter part, and v, vi. 
 
CHAP. IV. 1 
 
 CHAP. IV 
 
 Of Christianity, considered as a Scheme or Constitution, 
 imperfectly comprehended. 
 
 FT hath been now shewn a , that the analogy of nature 
 -L renders it highly credible beforehand, that suppos¬ 
 ing a revelation to be made, it must contain many 
 things very different from what we should have ex¬ 
 pected, and such as appear open to great objections: 
 and that this observation, in good measure, takes off 
 the force of those objections, or rather precludes them. 
 But it may be alleged, that this is a very partial answer 
 to such objections, or a very unsatisfactory way of 
 obviating them : because it doth not shew at all, that 
 the things objected against can be wise, just, and good; 
 much less, that it is credible they are so. It will 
 therefore be proper to shew this distinctly; by applying 
 to these objections against the wisdom, justice, and 
 goodness of Christianity, the answer above b given to 
 the like objections against the constitution of Nature : 
 before we consider the particular analogies in the latter, 
 to the particular things objected against in the former. 
 i\ow that which affords a sufficient answer to objections 
 against the wisdom, justice, and goodness of the con¬ 
 stitution of Nature, is it sbeing a constitution, a system, 
 or scheme, imperfectly comprehended ; a scheme in 
 which means are made use of to accomplish ends; and 
 which is carried on by general laws. For from these 
 things it has been proved, not only to be possible, but 
 also to be credible, that those things which are objected 
 against may be consistent with wisdom, justice, and 
 
 a In the foregoing chapter. 
 b Part I. ch. vii. to which this all along refers. 
 
190 
 
 CHRISTIANITY A SCHEME 
 
 
 [part II. 
 
 goodness; nay, may be instances of them : and even 
 that the constitution and government of Nature may be 
 perfect in the highest possible degree. If Christianity 
 then be a scheme, and of the like kind ; it is evident, 
 the like objections against it must admit of the like 
 answer. And, 
 
 I. Christianity is a scheme, quite beyond our com¬ 
 prehension. The moral government of God is exercised, 
 by gradually conducting things so in the course of his 
 providence, that every one, at length and upon the 
 whole, shall receive according to his deserts; and 
 neither fraud nor violence, but truth and right, shall 
 finally prevail. Christianity is a particular scheme 
 under this general plan of Providence, and a part of 
 it, conducive to its completion, with regard to man¬ 
 kind : consisting itself also of various parts, and a 
 mysterious economy, which has been carrying on from 
 the time the world came into its present wretched 
 state, and is still carrying on, for its recovery, by a 
 Divine person, the Messiah ; who is to gather together 
 in one the children of God that are scattered abroad c , 
 and establish an everlasting kingdom , wherein dwelleth 
 righteousness d . And in order to it; after various 
 manifestations of things, relating to this great and 
 general scheme of Providence, through a succession of 
 many ages: (for the Spirit of Christ which teas in the 
 prophets , testified beforehand his sufferings , and the glory 
 that should follow: unto idiom it was revealed , that not 
 unto themselves , but unto us they did minister the things 
 which are now reported unto us by them that have 
 preached the Gospel; which things the angels desire to 
 look into e :)—after various dispensations, looking for¬ 
 ward, and preparatory, to this final salvation; in the 
 fulness of time, when infinite wisdom thought fit; He, 
 
 c John xi. 52. d 2 Pet. iii. 13. c 1 Pet. i. 11, 12. 
 
I A1 PERFECTLY COMPR EH EX DED. 
 
 CHAP. IV.] 
 
 191 
 
 being in the form of God,—made himself ofno reputation , 
 and took upon him the form of a servant, and was made 
 m the likeness of men; and being found in fashion as a 
 man, he humbled himself, and became obedient to death, 
 even the death of the cross: wherefore God also hath 
 highly exalted him, and given him a name, which is 
 above every name: that at the name of Jesus every knee 
 should bote, of things in heaven, and things in the earth, 
 and things under the earth: and that every tongue should 
 confess, that Jesus Christ is Lord, to the glory of God 
 the Father f . Parts likewise of this economy are the 
 miraculous mission of the Holy Ghost, and his ordinary 
 assistances given to good men: the invisible govern¬ 
 ment, which Christ at present exercises over his 
 church : that which he himself refers to in these 
 " °i'ds; In my Ftother's house are many mansions—I go 
 to prepare a place for you e : and his future return to 
 judge the world in righteousness, and completely reesta¬ 
 blish the kingdom of God. For the Father judgeth no 
 man ; but hath committed all judgment unto the Son : 
 that all men should honour the Son, even as they honour 
 the lather * 1 . All power is given unto him in heaven 
 and in earth'. And he must reign, till he hath put all 
 enemies under his feet. Then cometh the end, when he 
 shall have delivered up the kingdom to God, even the 
 Father; when he shall have put down all rule, and all 
 authority and power. And when all things shall be 
 subdued unto him, then shall the Son also himself be 
 subject unto him that put all things under him, that God 
 may be all in all k . Now little, surely, need be said to 
 shew, that this system, or scheme of things, is but im¬ 
 perfectly comprehended by us. The Scripture ex¬ 
 pressly asserts it to be so. And indeed one cannot 
 
 f Phil. ii. 6-11. 
 1 Matt, xxviii. 18. 
 
 B John xiv. 2. 
 k i Cor. xv. 25—28. 
 
 h John v. 22, 23. 
 
CHRISTIANITY A SCHEME 
 
 [PART II. 
 
 192 
 
 read a passage relating to this great mystery of godli¬ 
 ness l , but what immediately runs up into something 
 which shews us our ignorance in it; as every thing in 
 nature shews us our ignorance in the constitution of 
 nature. And whoever will seriously consider that part 
 of the Christian scheme, which is revealed in Scripture, 
 will find so much more unrevealed, as will convince 
 him, that, to all the purposes of judging and objecting, 
 we know as little of it, as of the constitution of nature. 
 Our ignorance, therefore, is as much an answer to our 
 objections against the perfection of one, as against the 
 perfection of the other m . 
 
 TI. It is obvious too, that in the Christian dispensa¬ 
 tion, as much as in the natural scheme of things, 
 means are made use of to accomplish ends. And the 
 observation of this furnishes us with the same answer, 
 to objections against the perfection of Christianity, as 
 to objections of the like kind, against the constitution 
 of nature. It shews the credibility, that the things 
 objected against, how foolish n soever they appear to 
 men, may be the very best means of accomplishing the 
 very best ends. And their appearing foolishness is 
 no presumption against this, in a scheme so greatly 
 beyond our comprehension °. 
 
 III. The credibility, that the Christian dispensation 
 may have been, all along, carried on by general laws P, 
 no less than the course of nature, may require to be 
 more distinctly made out. Consider then, upon what 
 ground it is we say, that the whole common course of 
 nature is carried on according to general foreordained 
 laws. We know indeed several of the general laws of 
 matter: and a great part of the natural behaviour of 
 living agents is reducible to general laws. But we 
 
 1 i Tim. iii. 1 6 . m P. 130, &c. " 1 Cor. i. ® P. 130, &c. 
 
 p P. 131, 132. 
 
19:3 
 
 CHAP. IV.] IMPERFECTLY COMPREHENDED. 
 
 know in a manner nothing, by what laws, storms and 
 tempests, earthquakes, famine, pestilence, become the 
 instruments of destruction to mankind. And the laws, 
 by which persons born into the world at such a time 
 and place are of such capacities, geniuses, tempers; the 
 laws, by which thoughts come into our mind, in a 
 multitude of cases; and by which innumerable things 
 happen, of the greatest influence upon the affairs and 
 state of the world ; these laws are so wholly unknown 
 to us, that we call the events, which come to pass by 
 them, accidental: though all reasonable men know 
 certainly, that there cannot, in reality, be any such 
 thing as chance ; and conclude, that the things which 
 have this appearance are the result of general laws, 
 and may be reduced into them. It is then but an ex¬ 
 ceeding little way, and in but a very few respects, that 
 we can trace up the natural course of things before us, 
 to general laws. And it is only from analogy, that we 
 conclude the whole of it to be capable of being reduced 
 into them : only from our seeing, that part is so. It is 
 from our finding, that the course of nature, in some 
 respects and so far, goes on by general laws, that we 
 conclude this of the rest. And if that be a just 
 ground for such a conclusion, it is a just ground also, if 
 not to conclude, yet to apprehend, to render it sup- 
 posable and credible, which is sufficient for answering 
 objections, that God’s miraculous interpositions may 
 have been, all along in like manner, b y general laws of 
 wisdom. Thus, that miraculous powers should be 
 exerted, at such times, upon such occasions, in such 
 degrees and manners, and with regard to such persons, 
 rather than others; that the affairs of the world, being 
 permitted to go on in their natural course so far, 
 should, just at such a point, have a new direction given 
 them by miraculous interpositions; that these inter- 
 
 A \ A LOGY. ,, 
 
 / 
 
194 
 
 CHRISTIANITY A SCHEME, 
 
 [part II. 
 
 positions should be exactly in such degrees and respects 
 only; all this may have been by general laws. These 
 laws are unknown indeed to us: but no more unknow n, 
 than the laws from whence it is, that some die as soon 
 as they are born, and others live to extreme old age; 
 that one man is so superior to another in understanding ; 
 with innumerable more things, which, as was befoie 
 observed, we cannot reduce to any laws or rules at all, 
 though it is taken for granted, they are as much 
 reducible to general ones, as gravitation. Now, if the 
 revealed dispensations of Providence, and miraculous 
 interpositions, be by general laws, as well as God s 
 ordinarv government in the course of nature, made 
 known by reason and experience; there is no more 
 reason to expect, that every exigence, as it arises, 
 should be provided for by these general laws or mira¬ 
 culous interpositions, than that every exigence in 
 nature should, by the general law's of nature : yet there 
 might be w'ise and good reasons, that miraculous inter¬ 
 positions should be by general laws; and that these 
 laws should not be broken in upon, or deviated from, 
 by other miracles. 
 
 Upon the whole then: the appearance of deficiencies 
 and irregularities in nature is owing to its being a 
 scheme but in part made knowm, and of such a certain 
 particular kind in other respects. Now we see no 
 more reason why the frame and course of nature should 
 be such a scheme, than why Christianity should. And 
 that the former is such a scheme, renders it credible, 
 that the latter, upon supposition of its truth, may be 
 so too. And as it is manifest, that Christianity is a 
 scheme revealed but in part, and a scheme in which 
 means are made use of to accomplish ends, like to that 
 of nature: so the credibility, that it may have been 
 all along carried on by general laws, no less than the 
 
CHAP. IV.] 
 
 IMPERFECTLY COMPREHENDED. 
 
 195 
 
 course of nature, has been distinctly proved. And 
 fi ora all this it is beforehand credible that there might, 
 I think probable that there would, be the like appear¬ 
 ance of deficiencies and irregularities in Christianity, as 
 in nature: i. e that Christianity would be liable to 
 the like objections, as the frame of nature. And these 
 objections are answered by these observations con¬ 
 cerning Christianity; as the like objections against the 
 frame of nature are answered by the like observations 
 concerning the frame of nature. 
 
 THE objections against Christianity, considered as a 
 matter of factP, having, in general, been obviated in 
 the preceding chapter; and the same, considered as 
 made against the wisdom and goodness of it, having- 
 been obviated in this : the next thing, according to the 
 method proposed, is to shew, that the principal objec¬ 
 tions, in particular, against Christianity, may be answer¬ 
 ed, by particular and full analogies in nature. And as 
 one of them is made against the whole scheme of it 
 together, as just now described, I choose to consider it 
 here, rather than in a distinct chapter by itself. The 
 thing objected against this scheme of the Gospel is, 
 
 “ that it seems to suppose God was reduced to the 
 “ necessity of a long series of intricate means, in order 
 “ to accomplish his ends, the recovery and salvation of 
 “ the world : in like sort as men, for want of under- 
 “ standing or power, not being able to come at their 
 “ ends directly, are forced to go round-about ways, and 
 “ make use of many perplexed contrivances to arrive 
 “ at them.” Now every thing which we see shews the 
 folly of this, considered as an objection against the 
 truth of Christianity. For, according to our manner of 
 
 n P. 125, &c. 
 
 O 2 
 
CHRISTIANITY A SCHEME, 
 
 190 
 
 [part II. 
 
 conception, God makes use of variety of means, what 
 we often think tedious ones, in the natural course of 
 providence, for the accomplishment of all his ends. 
 Indeed it is certain there is somewhat in this mattei 
 quite beyond our comprehension : but the mystery is 
 as great in nature as in Christianity. We know what 
 
 u 
 
 we ourselves aim at, as final ends: and what courses 
 we take, merely as means conducing- to those ends. 
 But we are greatly ignorant how far things are con¬ 
 sidered by the Author of Nature, under the single 
 notion of means and ends; so as that it may be said, 
 this is merely an end, and that merely means, in his 
 regard. And whether there be not some peculiar 
 
 o m 
 
 absurdity in our very manner of conception, concerning 
 this matter, somewhat contradictory arising from our 
 extremely imperfect views of things, it is impossible to 
 say. However, thus much is manifest, that the whole 
 natural world and government of it is a scheme or 
 system ; not a fixed, but a progressive one: a scheme, 
 in which the operation of various means takes up a 
 great length of time, before the ends they tend to can 
 be attained. The change of seasons, the ripening of 
 the fruits of the earth, the very history of a flower, is 
 an instance of this : and so is human life. Thus vege¬ 
 table bodies, and those of animals, though possibly 
 formed at once, yet grow up by degress to a mature 
 state. And thus rational agents, who animate these 
 latter bodies, are naturally directed to form each his 
 own manners and character, by the gradual gaining of 
 knowledge and experience, and by a long course of 
 action. Our existence is not only successive, as it must 
 be of necessity; but one state of our life and being is 
 appointed by God, to be a preparation for another; and 
 that, to be the means of attaining to another succeeding 
 one: infancy to childhood ; childhood to youth ; youth 
 
CHAP. IV.] 
 
 IMPERFECTLY COMPREHENDED. 
 
 197 
 
 to mature age. Men are impatient, and for precipi¬ 
 tating tilings: but the Author of Nature appears de¬ 
 liberate throughout his operations; accomplishing 
 natural ends by slow successive steps. And there is a 
 plan of things beforehand laid out, which, from the 
 nature of it, requires various systems of means, as well 
 as length of time, in order to the carrying on its several 
 parts into execution. Thus, in the daily course of 
 natural providence, God operates in the very same 
 manner, as in the dispensation of Christianity: making 
 one thing subservient to another; this, to somewhat 
 farther; and so on, through a progressive series of 
 means, which extend, both backward and forward, 
 beyond our utmost view. Of this manner of operation, 
 every thing we see in the course of nature is as much 
 an instance, as any part of the Christian dispensation. 
 
 CHAP. V. 
 
 Of the particular System of Christianity; the Appoint¬ 
 ment of a Mediator , and the Redemption of the 
 World by him. 
 
 ri lFIERE is not, 1 think, any thing - relating to Christ- 
 -I- ianity, which has been more objected against, 
 than the mediation of Christ, in some or other of its 
 parts. Yet, upon thorough consideration, there seems 
 nothing less justly liable to it. For, 
 
 I. The whole analogy of nature removes all imagined 
 presumption against the general notion of a Mediator 
 between God and man*. For we find all living creatures 
 are brought into the world, and their life in infancy is 
 preserved, by the instrumentality of others t and every 
 
 n i Tim. ii. 5. 
 
198 
 
 THE APPOINTMENT Oh 
 
 [part II. 
 
 satisfaction of it, some way or other, is bestowed by 
 the like means. So that the visible government, which 
 God exercises over the world, is by the instrumentality 
 and mediation of others. And how far his invisible 
 government be or be not so, it is impossible to deter¬ 
 mine at all by reason. And the supposition, that part 
 of it is so, appears, to say the least, altogether as 
 credible, as the contrary. There is then no sort of 
 objection, from the light of nature, against the general 
 notion of a mediator between God and man, considered 
 as a doctrine of Christianity, or as an appointment in 
 this dispensation: since we find by experience, that 
 God does appoint mediators, to be the instruments of 
 good and evil to us ; the instruments of his justice and 
 his mercy. And the objection here referred to is 
 urged, not against mediation in that high, eminent, 
 and peculiar sense, in which Christ is our mediator; 
 but absolutely against the whole notion itself of a 
 mediator at all. 
 
 II. As we must suppose, that the world is under the 
 proper moral government of God, or in a state of 
 religion, before we can enter into consideration of the 
 revealed doctrine, concerning the redemption of it by 
 Christ; so that supposition is here to be distinctly 
 taken notice of. Now the Divine moral government 
 which religion teaches us, implies, that the consequence 
 of vice shall be misery, in some future state, by the 
 righteous judgment of God. That such consequent 
 punishment shall take effect by his appointment, is 
 necessarily implied. But, as it is not in any sort to be 
 supposed, that we are made acquainted with all the 
 ends or reasons, for which it is fit future punishments 
 should be inflicted, or why God has appointed such 
 and such consequent misery should follow vice; and as 
 we are altogether in the dark, how or in what manner 
 
CHAP. V.J A MEDIATOR AND REDEEMER. 199 
 
 it shall follow, by what immediate occasions, or by the 
 instrumentality of what means; there is no absurdity 
 in supposing it may follow in a way analogous to that, 
 in which many miseries follow such and such courses 
 of action at present; poverty, sickness, infamy, un¬ 
 timely death by diseases, death from the hands of civil 
 justice. There is no absurdity in supposing future 
 punishment may follow wickedness of course, as we 
 speak, or in the way of natural consequence from God’s 
 original constitution of the world; from the nature he 
 has given us, and from the condition in which he 
 places us; or in a like manner, as a person rashly 
 trifling upon a precipice, in the way of natural conse¬ 
 quence, falls down; in the way of natural consequence, 
 breaks his limbs, suppose; in the way of natural con¬ 
 sequence of this, without help perishes. 
 
 Some good men may perhaps be offended with hear¬ 
 ing it spoken of as a supposable thing, that the future 
 punishments of wickedness may be in the way of 
 natural consequence: as if this were taking the exe¬ 
 cution of justice out of the hands of God, and giving it 
 to nature. But they should remember, that when 
 things come to pass according - to the course of nature, 
 this does not hinder them from being his doing, who is 
 the God of nature: and that the Scripture ascribes 
 those punishments to Divine justice, which are known 
 to be natural; and which must be called so, when dis¬ 
 tinguished from such as are miraculous. But after all, 
 this supposition, or rather this way of speaking, is here 
 made use of only by way of illustration of the subject 
 before us. For since it must be admitted, that the 
 future punishment of wickedness is not a matter of 
 arbitrary appointment, but of reason, equity, and justice; 
 it comes, for ought I see, to the same thing, whether it 
 is supposed to be inflicted in a way analogous to that, 
 
200 
 
 THE APPOINTMENT OF 
 
 [part fl. 
 
 in which the temporal punishments of vice and folly 
 are inflicted, or in any other way. And though there 
 were a difference, it is allowable, in the present case, 
 to make this supposition, plainly not an incredible one; 
 that future punishment may follow wickedness in the 
 way of natural consequence, or according to some 
 general laws of government already established in the 
 universe. 
 
 III. Upon this supposition, or even without it, we 
 may observe somewhat, much to the present purpose, 
 in the constitution of nature or appointments of Provi¬ 
 dence : the provision which is made, that all the bad 
 natural consequences of mens actions should not always 
 actually follow; or that such bad consequences, as, ac¬ 
 cording to the settled course of things, would inevitably 
 have followed, if not prevented, should, in certain 
 degrees, be prevented. We are apt presumptuously 
 to imagine, that the world might have been so consti¬ 
 tuted, as that there would not have been any such 
 thing as misery or evil. On the contrary we find the 
 Author of Nature permits it: but then he has provided 
 reliefs, and in many cases perfect remedies for it, after 
 some pains and difficulties; reliefs and remedies even 
 for that evil, which is the fruit of our own misconduct; 
 and which, in the course of nature, would have con¬ 
 tinued, and ended in our destruction, but for such 
 remedies. And this is an instance both of severity 
 and of indulgence, in the constitution of nature. Thus 
 all the bad consequences, now mentioned, of a man’s 
 trifling upon a precipice, might be prevented. And 
 though all were not, yet some of them might, by 
 proper interposition, if not rejected: by another’s 
 coming to the rash man’s relief, with his own laying 
 hold on that relief, in such sort as the case required. 
 Persons may do a great deal themselves towards pre- 
 
A MEDIATOR AND REDEEMER. 
 
 201 
 
 CHAP. V.] 
 
 venting the bad consequences of their follies: and 
 more may be done bv themselves, together with the 
 assistance of others their fellow-creatures; which as¬ 
 sistance Nature requires and prompts us to. This is 
 the geneial constitution of the world. Now suppose it 
 had been so constituted, that after such actions were 
 done, as were foreseen naturally to draw after them 
 miseiv to the doer, it should have been no more in 
 human power to have prevented that naturally conse¬ 
 quent misery, in any instance, than it is, in all; no one 
 can say, whether such a more severe constitution of 
 things might not yet have been really good. But, 
 that, on the contrary, provision is made by nature, that 
 we may and do, to so great degree, prevent the bad 
 natural effects of our follies; this may be called mercy 
 or compassion in the original constitution of the world: 
 compassion, as distinguished from goodness in general. 
 And, the whole known constitution and course of 
 things affording us instances of such compassion, it 
 would be according to the analogy of nature, to hope, 
 that, however ruinous the natural consequences of vice 
 might be, from the general laws of God’s government 
 over the universe; yet provision might be made, pos¬ 
 sibly might have been originally made, for preventing 
 those ruinous consequences from inevitably following : 
 at least from following universally, and in all cases. 
 
 Many, I am sensible, will wonder at finding this 
 made a question, or spoken of as in any degree doubt¬ 
 ful. The generality of mankind are so far from having 
 that awful sense of things, which the present state of 
 vice and misery and darkness seems to make but 
 reasonable, that they have scarce any apprehension or 
 thought at all about this matter, any way: and some 
 serious persons may have spoken unadvisedly concern¬ 
 ing it. But let us observe, what we experience to be, 
 
202 
 
 THE APPOINTMENT OF 
 
 [PAKT II. 
 
 and what, from the very constitution of nature, cannot 
 but be, the consequences of irregular and disorderly 
 behaviour; even of such rashness, wilfulness, neglects, 
 as we scarce call vicious. Now it is natural to appre¬ 
 hend, that the bad consequences of irregularity will be 
 greater, in proportion as the irregularity is so. And 
 there is no comparison between these irregularities, 
 and the greater instances of vice, or a dissolute profli¬ 
 gate disregard to all religion ; if there be any thing at 
 all in religion. For consider what it is for creatures, 
 moral agents, presumptuously to introduce that con¬ 
 fusion and misery into the kingdom of God, which 
 mankind have in fact introduced ; to blaspheme the 
 Sovereign Lord of all; to contemn his authority; to 
 be injurious, to the degree they are, to their fellow- 
 creatures, the creatures of God. Add that the effects 
 of vice in the present world are often extreme misery, 
 irretrievable ruin, and even death: and upon putting 
 all this together, it will appear, that as no one can say, 
 in what degree fatal the unprevented consequences of 
 vice may be, according to the general rule of Divine 
 government; so it is by no means intuitively certain, 
 how far these consequences could possibly, in the 
 nature of the thing, be prevented, consistently with 
 the eternal rule of right, or with what is, in fact, the 
 moral constitution of nature. However, there would 
 be large ground to hope, that the universal government 
 was not so severely strict, but that there was room for 
 pardon, or for having those penal consequences pre¬ 
 vented. Yet, 
 
 IV. There seems no probability, that any thing we 
 could do would alone and of itself prevent them: 
 prevent their following, or being inflicted. But one 
 would think, at least, it were impossible that the 
 contrary should be thought certain. For w r e are not 
 
CHAP. V.] 
 
 A MEDIATOR AND REDEEMER. 
 
 203 
 
 acquainted with the whole of the case. We are not 
 informed of all the reasons, which render it fit that 
 future punishments should be inflicted: and therefore 
 cannot know, whether any thing we could do would 
 make such an alteration, as to render it fit that they 
 should be remitted. We do not know what the whole 
 natural or appointed consequences of vice are; nor in 
 what way they would follow, if not prevented: and 
 therefore can in no sort say, whether we could do any 
 thing which would be sufficient to prevent them. Our 
 ignorance being thus manifest, let us recollect the 
 analogy of Nature or Providence. For, though this 
 may be but a slight ground to raise a positive opinion 
 upon, in this matter; yet it is sufficient to answer a 
 mere arbitrary assertion, without any kind of evidence, 
 urged by way of objection against a doctrine, the proof 
 of which is not reason, but revelation. Consider then : 
 people ruin their fortunes by extravagance; they bring 
 diseases upon themselves by excess; they incur the 
 penalties of civil laws; and surely civil government is 
 natural; will sorrow for these follies past, and behaving 
 well for the future, alone and of itself prevent the 
 natural consequences of them ? On the contrary, men’s 
 natural abilities of helping themselves are often im¬ 
 paired : or if not, yet they are forced to be beholden to 
 the assistance of others, upon several accounts, and in 
 different ways; assistance which they would have had 
 no occasion for, had it not been for their misconduct; 
 but which, in the disadvantageous condition they have 
 reduced themselves to, is absolutely necessary to their 
 recovery, and retrieving their affairs. Now since this 
 is our case, considering ourselves merely as inhabitants 
 of this world, and as having a temporal interest here, 
 under the natural government of God, which however 
 has a great deal moral in it; why is it not supposable 
 
204 
 
 THE APPOINTMENT OF 
 
 [part II. 
 
 that this may be our case also, in our more important 
 capacity, as under his perfect moral government, and 
 having a more general and future interest depending? 
 If we have misbehaved in this higher capacity, and 
 rendered ourselves obnoxious to the future punishment, 
 which God has annexed to vice : it is plainly credible, 
 that behaving well for the time to come may be—not 
 useless, God forbid—but wholly insufficient, alone and 
 of itself, to prevent that punishment; or to put us in 
 the condition, which we should have been in, had we 
 preserved our innocence. 
 
 And though we ought to reason with all reverence, 
 whenever we reason concerning the Divine conduct: 
 yet it may be added, that it is clearly contrary to all 
 our notions of government, as well as to what is, in 
 fact, the general consitution of nature, to suppose, that 
 doing well for the future should, in all cases, prevent 
 all the judicial bad consequences of having done evil, 
 or all the punishment annexed to disobedience. And 
 we have manifestly nothing from whence to determine, 
 in what degree, and in what cases, reformation would 
 prevent this punishment, even supposing that it would 
 in some. And though the efficacy of repentance itself 
 alone, to prevent what mankind had rendered them¬ 
 selves obnoxious to, and recover what they had for¬ 
 feited, is now insisted upon, in opposition to Christianity; 
 yet, by the general prevalence of propitiatory sacrifices 
 over the heathen world, this notion, of repentance alone 
 being sufficient to expiate guilt, appears to be contrary 
 to the general sense of mankind. 
 
 Upon the whole then; had the laws, the general 
 laws of God’s government been permitted to operate, 
 without any interposition in our behalf, the future 
 punishment, for ought we know to the contrary, or 
 have any reason to think, must inevitably have follow- 
 
A MEDIATOR AND REDEEMER. 
 
 205 
 
 CHAP. V.] 
 
 ed, notwithstanding any thing we could have done to 
 prevent it. Now, 
 
 V. In this darkness, or this light of nature, call 
 it which you please, revelation comes in ; confirms 
 every doubting fear, which could enter into the heart 
 of man, concerning the future unprevented consequence 
 of wickedness; supposes the world to be in a state of 
 ruin; (a supposition which seems the very ground of 
 the Christian dispensation, and which, if not provable 
 by reason, yet is in no wise contrary to it;) teaches 
 us too, that the rules of Divine government are such, 
 as not to admit of pardon immediately and directly 
 upon repentance, or by the sole efficacy of it: but then 
 teaches at the same time, what nature might justly 
 have hoped, that the moral government of the universe 
 was not so rigid, but that there was room for an inter¬ 
 position, to avert the fatal consequences of vice ; which 
 therefore, by this means, does admit of pardon. Reve¬ 
 lation teaches us, that the unknown laws of God’s 
 more general government, no less than the particular 
 laws by which we experience he governs us at present, 
 are compassionate b , as well as good in the more 
 general notion of goodness: and that he hath merci¬ 
 fully provided, that there should be an interposition to 
 prevent the destruction of human kind ; whatever that 
 destruction unprevented would have been. God so 
 loved the world , that he gave his only begotten Son, that 
 whosoever believeth, not, to be sure, in a speculative, 
 but in a practical sense, that whosoever believeth in him , 
 should not perish c ; gave his Son in the same way of 
 goodness to the world, as he affords particular persons 
 the friendly assistance of their fellow-creatures ; when, 
 without it, their temporal ruin would be the certain 
 consequence of their follies : in the same way of good- 
 b P. 200, &c. c John iii. 16. 
 
206 
 
 THE APPOINTMENT OF 
 
 [part If. 
 
 ness, I say; though in a transcendent and infinitely 
 higher degree. And the Son of God loved us and gave 
 himself for us, with a love, which he himself compares 
 to that of human friendship: though, in this case, all 
 comparisons must fall infinitely short of the thing in¬ 
 tended to be illustrated by them. He interposed in 
 such a manner as was necessary and effectual to prevent 
 that execution of justice upon sinners, which God had 
 appointed should otherwise have been executed upon 
 them: or in such a manner, as to prevent that punish¬ 
 ment from actually following, which, according to the 
 general laws of Divine government, must have followed 
 the sins of the world, had it not been for such 
 interposition d . 
 
 If any thing here said should appear, upon first 
 thought, inconsistent with Divine goodness ; a second, 
 I am persuaded, will entirely remove that appearance. 
 For were we to suppose the constitution of things to 
 be such, as that the -whole creation must have perished, 
 had it not been for somewhat, which God had ap¬ 
 pointed should be, in order to prevent that ruin : even 
 this supposition would not be inconsistent, in any 
 degree, with the most absolutely perfect goodness. 
 But still it may be thought, that this whole manner of 
 treating the subject before us supposes mankind to be 
 naturally in a very strange state. And truly so it does. 
 But it is not Christianity, which has put us into this 
 
 d It cannot, I suppose, be imagined, even by the most cursory reader, 
 that it is, in any sort, affirmed or implied in any thing said in this chapter, 
 that none can have the benefit of the general redemption, but such as have 
 the advantage of being made acquainted with it in the present life. But 
 it may be needful to mention, that several questions, which have been 
 brought into the subject before us, and determined, are not in the least 
 entered into here: questions which have been, I fear, rashly determined, 
 and perhaps with equal rashness contrary ways. For instance, whether 
 God could have saved the world by other means than the death of Christ, 
 consistently with the general laws of his government. And had not 
 
A MEDIATOR AND REDEEMER. 
 
 207 
 
 CHAP. V.] 
 
 state. W hoever will consider the manifold miseries, 
 and the extreme wickedness of the world ; that the 
 best have great wrongnesses within themselves, which 
 they complain of, and endeavour to amend ; but that 
 the generality grow more profligate and corrupt with 
 age; that heathen moralists thought the present state 
 to be a state of punishment: and, what might be 
 added, that the earth our habitation has the appear¬ 
 ances of being a ruin : whoever, I say, will consider all 
 these, and some other obvious things, will think he has 
 little reason to object against the Scripture account, 
 that mankind is in a state of degradation; against this 
 being the fact: how difficult soever he may think it to 
 account for, or even to form a distinct conception of 
 the occasions and circumstances of it. But that the 
 crime of our first parents was the occasion of our being- 
 placed in a more disadvantageous condition, is a thing 
 throughout and particularly analogous to what we see 
 in the daily course of natural Providence; as the 
 recovery of the world by the interposition of Christ 
 has been shewn to be so in general. 
 
 VI- The particular manner in which Christ inter¬ 
 posed in the redemption of the world, or his office as 
 Mediator, in the largest sense, between God and man, is 
 thus represented to us in the Scripture. He is the 
 light of the world*; the revealer of the will of God in 
 
 Christ come into the world, what would have been the future condition of 
 the better sort of men ; those just persons over the face of the earth, for 
 whom, Manasses in his prayer asserts, repentance was not appointed. The 
 meaning of the first of these questions is greatly ambiguous : and neither 
 of them can properly be answered, without going upon that infinitely 
 absurd supposition, that we know the whole of the case. And perhaps 
 the very inquiry. What would have followed , if God had not done as he has , 
 may have in it some very great impropriety; and ought not to be carried 
 on any further, than is necessary to help our partial and inadequate con¬ 
 ceptions of things. 
 
 e John i. and viii. 12. 
 
208 
 
 THE APPOINTMENT OF 
 
 r PART If. 
 
 the most eminent sense. lie is a propitiatory sacrifice f ; 
 the Lamb of God%: and, as lie voluntarily offered him¬ 
 self up, he is styled our High-Priest ,B . And, which 
 seems of peculiar weight, he is described beforehand in 
 the Old Testament, under the same characters of a 
 priest, and an expiatory victim 1 . And whereas it is 
 objected, that all this is merely by way of allusion to 
 the sacrifices of the Mosaic Law, the Apostle on the 
 contrary affirms, that the Laic teas a shadow of good 
 things to come , and not the very image of the things k : 
 and that the priests that offer gifts according to the Laic 
 
 - serve unto the example and shadow of heavenly 
 
 things , as Moses was admonished of God , when he teas 
 about to make the tabernacle. For see , saith he , that 
 thou make all things according to the pattern shewed to 
 thee in the mount 1 : i. e. the Levitical priesthood was a 
 shadow of the priesthood of Christ; in like manner as 
 the tabernacle made by Moses was accord in £ to that 
 shewed him in the mount. The priesthood of Christ, 
 and the tabernacle in the mount, were the originals: 
 of the former of which the Levitical priesthood was a 
 type; and of the latter the tabernacle made by Moses 
 was a copy. The doctrine of this Epistle then plainly 
 is, that the legal sacrifices were allusions to the great 
 and final atonement to be made by the blood of Christ; 
 and not that this was an allusion to those. Nor can 
 any thing be more express or determinate, than the 
 following passage. It is not possible that the blood of 
 bulls and of goats should take away sin. Wherefore 
 when he comcth into the world, he saith, Sacrifice and 
 
 f Rom. iii. 25. and v. 11 j 1 Cor. v. 7 ; Eph. v. 2 ; 1 John ii. 2 ; 
 Matth. xxvi. 28. 
 
 s John i. 29, 36. and throughout the Book of Revelation. 
 
 h Throughout the Epistle to the Hebrews. 
 
 1 Isa. liii; Dan. ix. 24; Ps. cx. 4. k Heb. x. 1. 
 
 1 Heb. viii. 4, 3. 
 
A MEDIATOR AND REDEEMER. 
 
 CHAP. V.] 
 
 209 
 
 offering, i. e. of bulls and of goats, thou wouldest not. 
 hut n /,ori .y hast thou prepared me—Lo, I come to do thy 
 irit/, O God—By which will we are sanctified, through 
 the offering of the body o f Jesus Christ once for ali m . 
 And to add one passage more of the like kind : Christ 
 teas once offered to bear the sins of many; and unto 
 them that look for him shall he appear the second time, 
 without sin; i. e. without bearing sin, as he did at his 
 first coming, bv being an offering for it; without 
 having our iniquities again laid upon him, without 
 being any more a sin offering \—nnto them that look for 
 him shall he appear the second time, without sin, unto 
 salvation Nor do the inspired writers at all confine 
 themselves to this manner of speaking concerning the 
 satisfaction of Christ; but declare an efficacy in what 
 he did and suffered for us, additional to and beyond 
 mere instruction, example, and government, in great 
 variety of expression : That Jesus should die for that 
 nation, the Jews: and not for that nation only, but that 
 also, plainly by the efficacy of his death, he should 
 gather together in one the children of God that were 
 scattered abroad that he suffered for sins, the just for 
 the unjust P; that he gave his fife, himself, a ransom 8 ; 
 that we are bought, bought with a price*: that he re¬ 
 deemed us with his blood; redeemed us from the curse 
 of the law, being made a curse for us*: that he is our 
 advocate, intercessor, and propitiation that he was 
 made perfect, or consummate, through sufferings: and 
 being thus made perfect, he became the author of salva¬ 
 tion": that God was m Christ reconciling the world to 
 himself; by the death of his Son, by the cross; not 
 
 Heb. x. 4, 5, 7, 9, 10. n Heb. ix. 28. 0 John xi. 51, 52. 
 
 p 1 Pet. m. 18. q Matt. xx. 28; Mark x. 45; 1 Tim. ii. 6.' 
 
 r 2 Pet. 11. 1 ; Rev. xiv. 4; 1 Cor. vi. 20. 
 
 6 1 Pet. i. 19 ; Rev. v. 9 ; Gal. iii. 13. 
 
 * Heb - 3 5 > 1 John ii- 1 , 2. “ Heb. ii. 10. and v. 9. 
 
 ANALOGY. p 
 
210 
 
 THE APPOINTMENT OF 
 
 [part II. 
 
 imputing their trespasses unto them": and lastly, that 
 through death he destroyed him that had the power of 
 death*. Christ then having thus humbled himself and 
 become obedient to death , even the death of the cross; 
 God also hath highly exalted him , and given him a 
 name , which is above every name: hath given all things 
 into his hands: hath committed all judgment unto him ; 
 that all men should honour the Son , even as they honour 
 the Fathery. For, worthy is the Lamb that was slain , 
 to receive power , and riches , and wisdom , and strength , 
 and honour , and glory, and blessing. And every crea¬ 
 ture which is in heaven , and on the earth , heard I, 
 saying , Blessing , and honour , glooy, and power , 
 zmto Aztw, that sitteth upon the throne , the 
 
 Lamb for ever and ever z . 
 
 These passages of Scripture seem to comprehend 
 and express the chief parts of Christ’s office, as Me¬ 
 diator between God and man, so far, I mean, as the 
 nature of this his office is revealed; and it is usually 
 treated of by divines under three heads. 
 
 First, lie was, by way of eminence, the Prophet: 
 that Prophet that should come into the world*, to declare 
 the Divine will. He published anew the law of nature, 
 which men had corrupted ; and the very knowledge of 
 which, to some degree, was lost among them. He 
 taught mankind, taught us authoritatively, to live 
 soberly , righteously , and godly in this present world , in 
 expectation of the future judgment of God. He con¬ 
 firmed the truth of this moral system of nature, and 
 gave us additional evidence of it; the evidence of 
 testimony 6 . He distinctly revealed the manner, in 
 
 w 2 Cor. v. 19; Rom. v. 10 ; Eph. ii. 16. 
 
 x Heb. ii. 14. See also a remarkable passage in the Book of 
 Job, xxxiii. 24. 
 
 y Phil. ii. 8, 9; John iii. 35. and v. 22, 23. 2 Rev. v. 12, 13. 
 
 a John vi. 14. b Page 148, &c. 
 
A MEDIATOR AND REDEEMER. 
 
 211 
 
 CHAP. V.] 
 
 which God would be worshipped, the efficacy of repent- 
 anee, and the rewards and punishments of a future 
 life. Thus he was a prophet in a sense in which no 
 other ever was. To which is to be added, that he set 
 us a perfect example, that we should follow his steps. 
 
 Secondly, He has a kingdom which is not of this 
 world. He founded a Church, to be to mankind a 
 standing memorial of religion, and invitation to it; 
 which he promised to be with always even to the end. 
 He exercises an invisible government over it, himself, 
 and by his Spirit: over that part of it, which is 
 militant here on earth, a government of discipline, for 
 the perfecting of the saints, for the edifying his body: 
 till ice all come in the unity of the faith, and of the 
 hnowledge of the Son of God, unto a perfect man, unto 
 the measure of the stature of the fulness of Christ'. Of 
 this Church, all persons scattered over the world, who 
 live in obedience to his laws, are members. For these 
 he is gone to prepare a place, and will come again to 
 receive them unto himself, that where he is, there they 
 may be also; and reign with him for ever and ever A : 
 and likewise to take vengeance on them that know not 
 God, and obey not his Gospel e . 
 
 Against these parts of Christ’s office I find no ob¬ 
 jections, but what are fully obviated in the beginning 
 of this chapter. 
 
 Lastly, Christ offered himself a propitiatory sacrifice, 
 and made atonement for the sins of the world; which 
 is mentioned last, in regard to what is objected against 
 it. Sacrifices of expiation were commanded the Jews, 
 and obtained amongst most other nations, from tra¬ 
 dition, whose original probably was revelation. And 
 they were continually repeated, both occasionally, and 
 
 c Eph. iv. 12, 13. d John xiv. 2, 3; Rev. iii. 21. and xi. 15. 
 
 e 2 Thess. i. 8. 
 
 P 2 
 
212 
 
 THE APPOINTMENT OF 
 
 [part II. 
 
 at the returns of stated times : and made up great part 
 of the external religion of mankind. But now once in 
 the end of the world Christ appeared to put away sin by 
 the sacrifice of himself f . And this sacrifice was, in the 
 highest degree and with the most extensive influence, 
 of that efficacy for obtaining pardon of sin, which the 
 heathens may be supposed to have thought their 
 sacrifices to have been, and which the Jewish sacrifices 
 really were in some degree, and with regard to some 
 persons. 
 
 IIow and in what particular way it had this efficacy, 
 there are not wanting persons who have endeavoured 
 to explain : but I do not find that the Scripture has ex¬ 
 plained it. We seem to be very much in the dark con¬ 
 cerning the manner in which the ancients understood 
 atonement to be made, i. e. pardon to be obtained by 
 sacrifices. And if the Scripture has, as surely it has, 
 left this matter of the satisfaction of Christ, mysterious, 
 left somewdiat in it unrevealed, all conjectures about it 
 must be, if not evidently absurd, yet at least un¬ 
 certain. Nor has any one reason to complain for 
 want of farther information, unless he can shew his 
 claim to it. 
 
 Some have endeavoured to explain the efficacy of 
 what Christ has done and suffered for us, beyond what 
 the Scripture has authorized : others, probably because 
 they could not explain it, have been for taking it away, 
 and confining his office as Redeemer of the world to 
 his instruction, example, and government of the church. 
 Whereas the doctrine of the Gospel appears to be, not 
 only that he taught the efficacy of repentance, but 
 rendered it of the efficacy which it is, by what he did 
 and suffered for us : that he obtained for us the benefit 
 of having our repentance accepted unto eternal life : 
 
 Heb. ix. 26. 
 
A MEDIATOR AND REDEEMER. 
 
 213 
 
 CHAP. V.] 
 
 not only that he revealed to sinners, that they were in 
 a capacity of salvation, and how they might obtain it; 
 but moreover that he put them into this capacity of 
 salvation, by what he did and suffered for them ; put us 
 into a capacity of escaping future punishment, and 
 obtaining future happiness. And it is our wisdom 
 thankfully to accept the benefit, by performing the 
 conditions, upon which it is offered, on our part, with¬ 
 out disputing how it was procured on his. For, 
 
 VII. Since we neither know by what means punish¬ 
 ment in a future state would have followed wickedness 
 in this; nor in what manner it would have been 
 inflicted, had it not been prevented; nor all the 
 reasons why its infliction would have been needful; 
 nor the particular nature of that state of happiness, 
 which Christ is gone to prepare for his disciples: and 
 since we are ignorant how far any thing which we 
 could do, would, alone and of itself, have been effectual 
 to prevent that punishment, to which we were obnox¬ 
 ious, and recover that happiness, which we had for¬ 
 feited ; it is most evident we are not judges, antece¬ 
 dently to revelation, whether a mediator was or was 
 not necessary, to obtain those ends: to prevent That 
 future punishment, and bring mankind to the final 
 happiness of their nature. And for the very same 
 reasons, upon supposition of the necessity of a mediator, 
 we are no more judges, antecedently to revelation, of 
 the whole nature of his office, or the several parts of 
 which it consists; of what was fit and requisite to be 
 assigned him, in order to accomplish the ends of 
 Divine providence in the appointment. And from 
 hence it follows, that to object against the expediency 
 or usefulness of particular things, revealed to have been 
 done or suffered by him, because we do not see how 
 they were conducive to those ends, is highly absurd. 
 

 214 THE APPOINTMENT OP [pART II. 
 
 Yet nothing is more common to be met with, than this 
 absurdity. But if it be acknowledged beforehand, 
 that we are not judges in the case, it is evident that 
 no objection can, with any shadow of reason, be urged 
 against any particular part of Christ’s mediatorial office 
 revealed in Scripture, till it can be shewn positively 
 not to be requisite or conducive to the ends proposed 
 to be accomplished ; or that it is in itself unreasonable. 
 
 And there is one objection made against the sa¬ 
 tisfaction of Christ, which looks to be of this positive 
 kind : that the doctrine of his being appointed to suffer 
 for the sins of the world, represents God as being 
 indifferent whether he punished the innocent or the 
 guilty. Now from the foregoing observations we may 
 see the extreme slightness of all such objections; and 
 (though it is most certain all who make them do not 
 see the consequence) that they conclude altogether as 
 much against God’s whole original constitution of 
 nature, and the whole daily course of Divine providence 
 in the government of the world, i. e. against the whole 
 scheme of Theism and the whole notion of Religion, as 
 against Christianity. For the world is a constitution 
 or system, whose parts have a mutual reference to each 
 other: and there is a scheme of things gradually carry¬ 
 ing on, called the course of nature, to the carrying on 
 of which God has appointed us, in various ways, to 
 contribute. And when, in the daily course of natural 
 providence, it is appointed that innocent people should 
 suffer for the faults of the guilty, this is liable to the 
 very same objection, as the instance we are now con¬ 
 sidering. The infinitely greater importance of that 
 appointment of Christianity, which is objected against, 
 does not hinder but it may be, as it plainly is, an 
 appointment of the very same kind, with what the 
 world affords us daily examples of. Nay, if there 
 
CHAP. V.] 
 
 A MEDIATOR AND REDEEMER. 
 
 215 
 
 were any force at all in the objection, it would be 
 stronger, in one respect, against natural providence, 
 than against Christianity: because under the former 
 we are in many cases commanded, and even necessitated 
 whether we will or no, to suffer for the faults of others; 
 whereas the sufferings of Christ were voluntary. The 
 world’s being under the righteous government of God 
 does indeed imply, that finally and upon the whole 
 every one shall receive according to his personal de¬ 
 serts : and the general doctrine of the whole Scripture 
 is, that this shall be the completion of the Divine 
 government. But during the progress, and, for ought 
 we know, even in order to the completion of this moral 
 scheme, vicarious punishments may be fit, and abso¬ 
 lutely necessary. Men by their follies run themselves 
 into extreme distress ; into difficulties which would be 
 absolutely fatal to them, were it not for the inter¬ 
 position and assistance of others. God commands by 
 the law of nature, that we afford them this assistance, 
 in many cases where we cannot do it without very 
 great pains, and labour, and sufferings to ourselves. 
 And we see in what variety of ways one person’s 
 sufferings contribute to the relief of another: and how, 
 or by what particular means, this comes to pass, or 
 follows, from the constitution and laws of nature, 
 which come under our notice: and, being familiarized 
 to it, men are not shocked with it. So that the rea¬ 
 son of their insisting upon objections of the foregoing 
 kind against the satisfaction of Christ is, either that 
 they do not consider God’s settled and uniform appoint¬ 
 ments as his appointments at all; or else they forget 
 that vicarious punishment is a providential appointment 
 of every day’s experience: and then, from their being- 
 unacquainted with the more general laws of nature or 
 Divine government over the world, and not seeing how 
 

 ^16 THE APPOINTMENT OF [PART II. 
 
 the sufferings of Christ could contribute to the re¬ 
 demption of it, unless by arbitrary and tyrannical will; 
 they conclude his sufferings could not contribute to it 
 any other way. And yet, what has been often alleged 
 in justification of this doctrine, even from the apparent 
 natural tendency of this method of our redemption ; its 
 tendency to vindicate the authority of God’s laws, and 
 deter his creatures from sin ; this has never yet been 
 answered, and is, I think, plainly unanswerable : though 
 I am far from thinking it an account of the whole of 
 the case. But without taking this into consideration, 
 it abundantly appears, from the observations above 
 made, that this objection is, not an objection against 
 Christianity, but against the whole general constitution 
 of nature. And if it were to be considered as an ob¬ 
 jection against Christianity, or considering it as it is, an 
 objection against the constitution of nature ; it amounts 
 to no more in conclusion than this, that a Divine ap¬ 
 pointment cannot be necessary or expedient, because 
 the objector does not discern it to be so: though he 
 must own that the nature of the case is such, as 
 renders him incapable of judging, whether it be so or 
 not; or of seeing it to be necessary, though it were so. 
 
 It is indeed a matter of great patience to reasonable 
 men, to find people arguing in this manner : objecting 
 against the credibility of such particular things revealed 
 in Scripture, that they do not see the necessity or 
 expediency of them. For though it is highly right, 
 and the most pious exercise of our understandings to 
 inquire with due reverence into the ends and reasons of 
 God s dispensations: yet when those reasons are con¬ 
 cealed, to argue from our ignorance, that such dispen¬ 
 sations cannot be from God, is infinitely absurd. The 
 presumption of this kind of objections seems almost 
 lost in the folly of them. And the folly of them is yet 
 
CHAP. V.] 
 
 A MEDIATOR AND REDEEMER. 
 
 217 
 
 greater, when they are urged, as usually they are, 
 against things in Christianity analogous or like to those 
 natural dispensations of Providence, which are matter 
 of experience. Let reason be kept to : and if any 
 part of the Scripture account of the redemption of the 
 world by Christ can be shewn to be really contrary to 
 it, let the Scripture, in the name of God, be given up: 
 but let not such poor creatures as we go on objecting 
 against an infinite scheme, that we do not see the 
 necessity or usefulness of all its parts, and call this 
 reasoning ; and, which still farther heightens the 
 absurdity in the present case, parts which we are not 
 actively concerned in. For it may be worth men¬ 
 tioning. 
 
 Lastly, That not only the reason of the thing, but 
 the whole analogy of nature, should teach us, not to 
 expect to have the like information concerning the 
 Divine conduct, as concerning our own duty. God 
 instructs us by experience, (for it is not reason, but 
 experience which instructs us,) what good or bad con¬ 
 sequences will follow from our acting in such and such 
 manners: and by this he directs us, how we are to 
 behave ourselves. But, though we are sufficiently in¬ 
 structed for the common purposes of life : yet it is but 
 an almost infinitely small part of natural providence, 
 which we are at all let into. The case is the same 
 with regard to revelation. The doctrine of a mediator 
 between God and man, against which it is objected, 
 that the expediency of some things in it is not under¬ 
 stood, relates only to what was done on God’s part in 
 the appointment, and on the Mediator’s in the execu¬ 
 tion of it. For what is required of us, in consequence 
 of this gracious dispensation, is another subject, in 
 which none can complain for want of information. The 
 constitution of the world, and God’s natural govern- 
 
218 REVELATION NOT UNIVERSAL : [PART II. 
 
 merit over it, is all mystery, as much as the Christian 
 dispensation. Yet under the first he has given men 
 all things pertaining to life; and under the other, all 
 things pertaining unto godliness. And it may be 
 added, that there is nothing hard to be accounted for 
 in any of the common precepts of Christianity: though 
 if there were, surely, a Divine command is abundantly 
 sufficient to lay us under the strongest obligations to 
 obedience. But the fact is, that the reasons of all the 
 Christian precepts are evident. Positive institutions 
 are manifestly necessary to keep up and propagate 
 religion amongst mankind. And our duty to Christ, 
 the internal and external worship of him; this part of 
 the religion of the Gospel, manifestly arises out of 
 what he has done and suffered, his authority and 
 dominion, and the relation which he is revealed to 
 stand in to us£. 
 
 CHAP. VI. 
 
 Of the Want of Universality in Revelation: and of the 
 supposed Deficiency in the Proof of it. 
 
 I T has been thought by some persons, that if the 
 evidence of revelation appears doubtful, this itself 
 turns into a positive argument against it: because it 
 cannot be supposed, that, if it were true, it would be 
 left to subsist upon doubtful evidence. And the ob¬ 
 jection against revelation from its not being universal 
 is often insisted upon as of great weight. 
 
 Now the weakness of these opinions may be shewn, 
 by observing the suppositions on which they are 
 founded: which are really such as these; that it can¬ 
 not be thought God would have bestowed any favour 
 
 * P. 154, & c . 
 
 
SUPPOSED DEFICIENCY IN ITS PROOF. 
 
 219 
 
 CHAP. VI.] 
 
 at all upon us, unless in the degree, which, we think, 
 he might, and which, we imagine, would be most to 
 our particular advantage; and also that it cannot be 
 thought he would bestow a favour upon any, unless he 
 bestowed the same upon all : suppositions, which we 
 find contradicted, not by a few instances in God’s 
 natural government of the world, but by the general 
 analogy of nature together. 
 
 Persons who speak of the evidence of religion as 
 doubtful, and of this supposed doubtfulness as a posi¬ 
 tive argument against it, should be put upon consider¬ 
 ing, what that evidence indeed is, which they act upon 
 with regard to their temporal interests. For, it is not 
 only extremely difficult, but in many cases absolutely 
 impossible, to balance pleasure and pain, satisfaction 
 and uneasiness, so as to be able to say on which side 
 the overplus is. There are the like difficulties and 
 impossibilities in making the due allowances for a 
 change of temper and taste, for satiety, disgusts, ill 
 health : any of which render men incapable of enjoying, 
 after they have obtained what they most eagerly de¬ 
 sired. Numberless too are the accidents, besides that 
 one of untimely death, which may even probably dis¬ 
 appoint the best concerted schemes: and strong ob- 
 jections are often seen to lie against them, not to be 
 removed, or answered, but which seem overbalanced by 
 reasons on the other side; so as that the certain diffi¬ 
 culties and dangers of the pursuit are, by every one, 
 thought justly disregarded, upon account of the ap¬ 
 pearing greater advantages in case of success, though 
 there be but little probability of it. Lastly, every one 
 observes our liableness, if we be not upon our guard, 
 to be deceived by the falsehood of men, and the false 
 appearances of things: and this danger must be greatly 
 increased, if there be a strong bias within, suppose 
 
220 REVELATION NOT UNIVERSAL I [PART II. 
 
 from indulged passion, to favour the deceit. Hence 
 arises that great uncertainty and doubtfulness of proof, 
 wherein our temporal interest really consists; what 
 are the most probable means of attaining it; and 
 whether those means will eventually be successful. 
 And numberless instances there are, in the daily course 
 of life, in which all men think it reasonable to engage 
 in pursuits, though the probability is greatly against 
 succeeding; and to make such provision for themselves, 
 as it is supposable they may have occasion for, though 
 the plain acknowledged probability is, that they never 
 shall. Then those who think the objection against 
 revelation, from its light not being universal, to be of 
 weight, should observe, that the Author of Nature, in 
 numberless instances, bestows That upon some, which 
 he does not upon others, who seem equally to stand in 
 need of it. Indeed he appears to bestow all his gifts 
 with the most promiscuous variety among creatures of 
 the same species: health and strength, capacities of 
 prudence and of knowledge, means of improvement, 
 riches, and all external advantages. And as there are 
 not any two men found, of exactly like shape and 
 features; so it is probable there are not any two, of an 
 exactly like constitution, temper and situation, with 
 regard to the goods and evils of life. Yet, notwith¬ 
 standing these uncertainties and varieties, God does 
 exercise a natural government over the world: and 
 there is such a thing as a prudent and imprudent insti¬ 
 tution of life, with regard to our health and our affairs, 
 under that his natural government. 
 
 As neither the Jewish nor Christian revelation have 
 been universal; and as they have been afforded to a 
 greater or less part of the world, at different times; so 
 likewise at different times, both revelations have had 
 different degrees of evidence. The Jews who lived 
 
CHAP. VI. J SUPPOSED DEFICIENCY IN ITS PROOF. 221 
 
 during the succession of prophets, that is, from Moses 
 till after the Captivity, had higher evidence of the 
 truth of their religion, than those had, who lived in the 
 interval between the last-mentioned period, and the 
 coming of Christ. And the first Christians had higher 
 evidence of the miracles wrought in attestation of 
 Christianity, than what we have now. They had also 
 a strong presumptive proof of the truth of it, perhaps 
 of much greater force, in way of argument, than many 
 think, of which we have very little remaining; I mean 
 the presumptive proof of its truth, from the influence 
 which it had upon the lives of the generality of its 
 professors. And we, or future ages, may possibly have 
 a proof of it, which they could not have, from the con¬ 
 formity between the prophetic history, and the state of 
 the world and of Christianity. And farther: if we 
 were to suppose the evidence, which some have of 
 religion, to amount to little more than seeing that it 
 may be true; but that they remain in great doubts 
 and uncertainties about both its evidence and its nature, 
 and great perplexities concerning the rule of life: 
 others to have a full conviction of the truth of religion, 
 with a distinct knowledge of their duty; and others 
 severally to have all the intermediate degrees of re¬ 
 ligious light and evidence, which lie between these 
 two—if we put the case, that for the present, it was 
 intended, revelation should be no more than a small 
 light, in the midst of a world greatly overspread, not¬ 
 withstanding it, with ignorance and darkness: that 
 certain glimmerings of this light should extend, and be 
 directed, to remote distances, in such a manner as that 
 those who really partook of it should not discern from 
 whence it originally came: that some in a nearer 
 situation to it should have its light obscured, and, in 
 different ways and degrees, intercepted : and that others 
 
222 
 
 REVELATION NOT UNIVERSAL I 
 
 [PART II. 
 
 should be placed within its clearer influence, and be 
 much more enlivened, cheered, and directed by it; but 
 yet that even to these it should be no more than a 
 light shining in a dark place: all this would be perfectly 
 uniform, and of a piece with the conduct of Providence, 
 in the distribution of its other blessings. If the fact 
 of the case really were, that some have received no 
 light at all from the Scripture; as many ages and 
 countries in the heathen world: that others, though 
 they have, by means of it, had essential or natural 
 religion enforced upon their consciences, yet have never 
 had the genuine Scripture-revelation, with its real evi¬ 
 dence, proposed to their consideration; and the ancient 
 Persians and modern Mahometans may possibly be 
 instances of people in a situation somewhat like to 
 this: that others, though they have had the Scripture 
 laid before them as of Divine revelation, yet have had 
 it with the system and evidence of Christianity so 
 interpolated, the system so corrupted, the evidence so 
 blended with false miracles, as to leave the mind in 
 the utmost doubtfulness and uncertainty about the 
 whole; which may be the state of some thoughtful 
 men, in most of those nations who call themselves 
 Christian: and lastly, that others have had Christianity 
 offered to them in its genuine simplicity, and with its 
 proper evidence, as persons in countries and churches 
 of civil and of Christian liberty; but however that 
 even these persons are left in great ignorance in many 
 respects, and have by no means light afforded them 
 enough to satisfy their curiosity, but only to regulate 
 their life, to teach them their duty, and encourage 
 them in the careful discharge of it: I say, if we were 
 to suppose this somewhat of a general true account of 
 the degrees of moral and religious light and evidence, 
 which were intended to be afforded mankind, and of 
 
CHAP. VI.] SUPPOSED DEFICIENCY IN' ITS PROOF. 
 
 wliat has actually been and is their situation, in their 
 moral and religious capacity; there would be nothing 
 in all this ignorance, doubtfulness, and uncertainty, in 
 all these varieties, and supposed disadvantages of some 
 in comparison of others, respecting religion, but may 
 be paralleled by manifest analogies in the natural 
 dispensations of Providence at present, and considering 
 ourselves merely in our temporal capacity. 
 
 Nor is there any thing shocking in all this, or which 
 would seem to bear hard upon the moral administration 
 in nature, if we would really keep in mind, that every 
 one shall be dealt equitably with : instead of forgetting 
 this, or explaining it away, after it is acknowledged in 
 words. All shadow of injustice, and indeed all harsh 
 appearances, in this various economy of Providence, 
 would be lost; if we would keep in mind, that every 
 merciful allowance shall be made, and no more be 
 required of any one, than what might have been 
 equitably expected of him, from the circumstances in 
 which he was placed ; and not what might have been 
 expected, had he been placed in other circumstances: 
 i. e. in Scripture language, that every man shall be 
 accepted, according to what he had, not according to what 
 he had not*. This however doth not by any means 
 imply, that all persons’ condition here is equally ad¬ 
 vantageous with respect to futurity. And Providence’s 
 designing to place some in greater darkness with 
 respect to religious knowledge, is no more a reason 
 why they should not endeavour to get out of that 
 darkness, and others to bring them out of it; than 
 why ignorant and slow people in matters of other 
 knowledge should not endeavour to learn, or should 
 not be instructed. 
 
 It is not unreasonable to suppose, that the same wise 
 
 a 2 Cor. viii. 12. 
 
224 REVELATION NOT UNIVERSAL: [PART II. 
 
 and good principle, whatever it was, which disposed 
 the Author of nature to make different kinds and 
 orders of creatures, disposed him also to place crea¬ 
 tures of like kinds in different situations: and that the 
 same principle which disposed him to make creatures 
 of different moral capacities, disposed him also to place 
 creatures of like moral capacities in different religious 
 situations; and even the same creatures, in different 
 periods of their being. And the account or reason of 
 this is also most probably the account why the consti¬ 
 tution of things is such, as that creatures of moral 
 natures or capacities, for a considerable part of that 
 duration in which they are living agents, are not at all 
 subjects of morality and religion; but grow up to be 
 so, and grow up to be so more and more, gradually from 
 childhood to mature age. 
 
 What, in particular, is the account or reason of these 
 things, we must be greatly in the dark, were it only 
 that we know so very little even of our own case. Our 
 present state may possibly be the consequence of 
 somewhat past, which we are wholly ignorant of: as it 
 has a reference to somewhat to come, of which we 
 know scarce any more than is necessary for practice. 
 A system or constitution, in its notion, implies variety; 
 and so complicated an one as this world, very great 
 variety. So that were revelation universal, yet, from 
 men’s different capacities of understanding, from the 
 different lengths of their lives, their different educations 
 and other external circumstances, and from their dif¬ 
 ference of temper and bodily constitution; their reli¬ 
 gious situations would be widely different, and the 
 disadvantage of some in comparison of others, perhaps, 
 altogether as much as at present. And the true 
 account, whatever it be, why mankind, or such a part 
 of mankind, are placed in this condition of ignorance, 
 
SUPPOSED DEFICIENCY IN ITS PROOF. 
 
 225 
 
 CHAP. VI.] 
 
 must be supposed also the true account of our farther 
 ignorance, in not knowing the reasons why, or whence 
 it is, that they are placed in this condition. But the 
 following practical reflections may deserve the serious 
 consideration of those persons, who think the circum¬ 
 stances of mankind or their own, in the forementioned 
 respects, a ground of complaint. 
 
 First, The evidence of Religion not appearing obvious, 
 may constitute one particular part of some men’s trial 
 in the religious sense: as it gives scope, for a virtuous 
 exercise, or vicious neglect of their understanding, in 
 examining or not examining into that evidence. There 
 seems no possible reason to be given, why we may not 
 be in a state of moral probation, with regard to the 
 exercise of our understanding upon the subject of reli¬ 
 gion, as we are with regard to our behaviour in common 
 affairs. The former is as much a thing within our 
 power and choice as the latter. And I suppose it is to 
 be laid down for certain, that the same character, the 
 same inward principle, which, after a man is convinced 
 of the truth of religion, renders him obedient to the 
 precepts of it, would, were he not thus convinced, set 
 him about an examination of it, upon its system and 
 evidence being offered to his thoughts: and that in the 
 latter state his examination would be with an impar¬ 
 tiality, seriousness, and solicitude, proportionable to 
 what his obedience is in the former. And as inatten¬ 
 tion, negligence, want of all serious concern, about a 
 matter of such a nature and such importance, when 
 offered to men’s consideration, is, before a distinct con¬ 
 viction of its truth, as real immoral depravity and dis¬ 
 soluteness ; as neglect of religious practice after such 
 conviction: so active solicitude about it, and fair im¬ 
 partial consideration of its evidence before such con¬ 
 viction is as really an exercise of a morally right temper; 
 
 ANALOGY. Q 
 
226 REVELATION NOT UNIVERSAL! [PART II. 
 
 as is religious practice after. Thus, that religion is 
 not intuitively true, but a matter of deduction and in¬ 
 ference ; that a conviction of its truth is not forced 
 upon every one, but left to be, by some, collected with 
 heedful attention to premises ; this as much constitutes 
 religious probation, as much affords sphere, scope, 
 opportunity, for right and wrong behaviour, as an\ 
 thing whatever does. And their manner of treating 
 this subject, when laid before them, shews what is in 
 their heart, and is an exertion of it. 
 
 Secondly, It appears to be a thing as evident, though 
 it is not so much attended to, that if, upon considera¬ 
 tion of religion, the evidence of it should seem to any 
 persons doubtful, in the highest supposable degree; 
 even this doubtful evidence will, however, put them 
 into a general state of probation in the moral and reli¬ 
 gious sense. For, suppose a man to be really in doubt, 
 whether such a person had not done him the greatest 
 favour; or, whether his whole temporal interest did 
 not depend upon that person : no one, who had any 
 sense of gratitude and of prudence, could possibly con¬ 
 sider himself in the same situation, with regard to such 
 person, as if he had no such doubt. In truth, it is as 
 just to say, that certainty and doubt are the same ; as 
 to say, the situations now mentioned would leave a 
 man as entirely at liberty in point of gratitude or 
 prudence, as he would be, were he certain he had 
 received no favour from such person, or that he no way 
 depended upon him. And thus, though the evidence 
 of religion which is afforded to some men should be 
 little more than they are given to see, the system of 
 Christianity, or religion in general, to be supposable 
 and credible; this ought in all reason to beget a 
 serious practical apprehension, that it may be true. 
 And even this will afford matter of exercise for reli- 
 
CHAP. VI.] 
 
 SUPPOSED DEFICIENCY IN ITS PROOF. 
 
 007 
 
 gious suspense and deliberation, for moral resolution 
 and self-government; because the apprehension that 
 leligion may be true does as really lay men under 
 obligations, as a full conviction that it is tine. It gives 
 occasion and motives to consider farther the important 
 subject; to preserve attentively upon their minds a 
 general implicit sense that they may be under Divine 
 moral government, an awful solicitude about religion, 
 whether natural or revealed. Such apprehension ought 
 to turn men’s eyes to every degree of new light which 
 may be had, from whatever side it comes ; and induce 
 them to refrain, in the mean time, from all immo¬ 
 ralities, and live in the conscientious practice of every 
 common virtue. Especially are they bound to keep at 
 the greatest distance from all dissolute profaneness; for 
 this the very nature of the case forbids; and to treat 
 with highest reverence a matter, upon which their own 
 whole interest and being, and the fate of nature, 
 depends. This behaviour, and an active endeavour to 
 maintain within themselves this temper, is the business, 
 the duty, and the wisdom of those persons, who com¬ 
 plain of the doubtfulness of religion : is what they are 
 under the most proper obligations to. And such be- 
 haA iour is an exertion of, and has a tendency to 
 improve in them, that character, which the practice of 
 all the several duties of religion, from a full conviction 
 of its truth, i$ an exertion of, and has a tendency to 
 improve in others: others, I say, to whom God has 
 affoided such conviction. Nay, considering the infinite 
 importance of religion, revealed as well as natural, I 
 think it may be said in general, that whoever will 
 weigh the matter thoroughly may see, there is not near 
 so much difference, as is commonly imagined, between 
 what ought in reason to be the rule of life, to those 
 persons who are fully convinced of its truth, and to 
 
 Q 2 
 
228 REVELATION NOT UNIVERSAL*. [PART II. 
 
 those who have only a serious doubting apprehension, 
 that it may be true. Their hopes, and fears, and 
 obligations, will be in various degrees: but, as the 
 subject-matter of their hopes and fears is the same ; so 
 the subject-matter of their obligations what they are 
 bound to do and to refrain from, is not so very unlike. 
 
 It is to be observed farther, that, from a character of 
 understanding, or a situation of influence in the world, 
 some persons have it in their power to do infinitely more 
 harm or good, by setting an example of profaneness and 
 avowed disregard to all religion, or, on the contrary, of 
 a serious, though perhaps doubting, apprehension of its 
 truth, and of a reverend regard to it under this doubt¬ 
 fulness; than they can do, by acting well or ill in all 
 the common intercourses amongst mankind. And con¬ 
 sequently they are most highly accountable for a 
 behaviour, which, they may easily foresee, is of such 
 importance, and in which there is most plainly a right 
 and a wrong; even admitting the evidence of religion 
 to be as doubtful as is pretended. 
 
 The ground of these observations, and that which 
 renders them just and true, is, that doubting necessarily 
 implies some degree of evidence for that, of which we 
 doubt. For no person would be in doubt concerning 
 the truth of a number of facts so and so circumstanced, 
 which should accidentally come into his thoughts, and 
 of which he had no evidence at all. And though in 
 the case of an even chance, and where consequently we 
 were in doubt, we should in common language say, 
 that we had no evidence at all for either side; yet that 
 situation of things, which renders it an even chance 
 and no more, that such an event will happen, renders 
 this case equivalent to all others, where there is such 
 evidence on both sides of a question 15 , as leaves the 
 
 b Introduction. 
 
CHAP. VI.] SUPPOSED DEFICIENCY IN ITS PROOF. 229 
 
 mind in doubt concerning the truth. Indeed in all 
 these cases, there is no more evidence on one side than 
 on the other; but there is (what is equivalent to) 
 much more for either, than for the truth of a number 
 of facts, which come into one’s thoughts at random. 
 And thus, in all these cases, doubt as much presupposes 
 evidence, lower degrees of evidence, as belief presup¬ 
 poses higher, and certainty higher still. Any one, 
 who will a little attend to the nature of evidence, will 
 easily carry this observation on, and see, that between 
 no evidence at all, and that degree of it which affords 
 ground of doubt, there are as many intermediate de¬ 
 grees, as there are, between that degree which is the 
 ground of doubt, and demonstration. And though we 
 have not faculties to distinguish these degrees of 
 evidence with any sort of exactness; yet, in proportion 
 as they are discerned, they ought to influence our 
 practice. For it is as real an imperfection in the 
 moral character, not to be influenced in practice by a 
 lower degree of evidence when discerned, as it is in 
 the understanding, not to discern it. And as, in all 
 subjects which men consider, they discern the lower as 
 well as higher degrees of evidence, proportionably to 
 their capacity of understanding; so, in practical sub¬ 
 jects, they are influenced in practice, by the lower as 
 well as higher degrees of it, proportionably to their 
 fairness and honesty. And as, in proportion to defects 
 in the understanding, men are unapt to see lower 
 degrees of evidence, are in danger of overlooking 
 evidence when it is not glaring, and are easily imposed 
 upon in such cases; so, in proportion to the corruption 
 of the heart, they seem capable of satisfying themselves 
 with having no regard in practice to evidence acknow¬ 
 ledged real, if it be not overbearing. From these 
 things it must follow, that doubting concerning religion 
 
REVELATION NOT UNIVERSAL: 
 
 230 
 
 [part II. 
 
 implies such a degree of evidence for it, as, joined with 
 the consideration of its importance, unquestionably 
 lays men under the obligations before mentioned, to 
 have a dutiful regard to it in all their behaviour. 
 
 Thirdly, The difficulties in which the evidence of 
 religion is involved, which some complain of, is no 
 more a just ground of complaint, than the external 
 circumstances of temptation, which others are placed 
 in; or than difficulties in the practice of it, after a full 
 conviction of its truth. Temptations render our state 
 a more improving state of discipline 0 , than it would be 
 otherwise: as they give occasion for a more attentive 
 exercise of the virtuous principle, which confirms and 
 strengthens it more, than an easier or less attentive 
 exercise of it could. Now speculative difficulties are, 
 in this respect, of the very same nature with these 
 external temptations. For the evidence of religion not 
 appearing obvious, is to some persons a temptation to 
 reject it, without any consideration at all ; and there¬ 
 fore requires such an attentive exercise of the virtuous 
 principle, seriously to consider that evidence, as there 
 would be no occasion for, but for such temptation. 
 And the supposed doubtfulness of its evidence, after it 
 has been in some sort considered, affords opportunity 
 to an unfair mind of explaining away, and deceitfully 
 hiding from itself, that evidence which it might see; 
 and also for men’s encouraging themselves in vice, 
 from hopes of impunity, though they do clearly see 
 thus much at least, that these hopes are uncertain: in 
 like manner as the common temptation to many in¬ 
 stances of folly, which end in temporal infamy and 
 ruin, is the ground for hope of not being detected, and 
 of escaping with impunity ; i. e. the doubtfulness of the 
 proof beforehand, that such foolish behaviour will thus 
 
 c Part. I. chap. v. 
 
CHAP. VI.] 
 
 end in infamy and ruin; On the contrary, supposed 
 doubtfulness in the evidence of religion calls for a 
 more careful and attentive exercise of the virtuous 
 principle, in fairly yielding themselves up to the proper 
 influence of any real evidence, though doubtful; and in 
 practising conscientiously all virtue, though under some 
 uncertainty, whether the government in the universe 
 may not possibly be such, as that vice may escape with 
 impunity. And in general, temptation, meaning by 
 this word the lesser allurements to wrong and difficul- 
 ties in the discharge of our dutv, as well as the greater 
 ones; temptation, I say, as such and of every kind and 
 degree, as it calls forth some virtuous efforts, additional 
 to what would otherwise have been wanting, cannot 
 but be an additional discipline and improvement of 
 virtue, as well as probation of it in the other senses of 
 that word (1 . So that the very same account is to be 
 given, why the evidence of religion should be left in 
 such a manner, as to require, in some, an attentive, 
 solicitous, perhaps painful exercise of their understand¬ 
 ing about it; as why others should be placed in such 
 circumstances, as that the practice of its common 
 duties, after a full conviction of the truth of it, should 
 require attention, solicitude, and pains: or, why appear¬ 
 ing doubtfulness should be permitted to afford matter 
 of temptation to some; as why external difficulties and 
 allurements should be permitted to afford matter of 
 temptation to others. The same account also is to be 
 given, why some should be exercised with temptations 
 of both these kinds ; as why others should be exercised 
 with the latter in such very high degrees, as some have 
 been, particularly as the primitive Christians were. 
 
 Nor does there appear any absurdity in supposing, 
 that the speculative difficulties, in which the evidence 
 
 d Part I. chap. iv. and p. 105, 106'. 
 
232 REVELATION NOT UNIVERSAL I [PART II. 
 
 of religion is involved, may make even the principal 
 part of some persons’ trial. For as the chief tempta¬ 
 tions of the generality of the world are the ordinary 
 motives to injustice or unrestrained pleasure; or to 
 live in the neglect of religion from that frame of mind, 
 which renders many persons almost without feeling as 
 to any thing distant, or which is not the object of their 
 senses: so there are other persons without this shallow¬ 
 ness of temper, persons of a deeper sense as to what is 
 invisible and future; who not only see, but have a 
 general practical feeling, that what is to come will be 
 present, and that things are not less real for their not 
 being the objects of sense ; and who, from their natural 
 constitution of body and of temper, and from their 
 external condition, may have small temptations to 
 behave ill, small difficulty in behaving well, in the 
 common course of life. Now when these latter per¬ 
 sons have a distinct full conviction of the truth of 
 religion, without any possible doubts or difficulties, the 
 practice of it is to them unavoidable, unless they will 
 do a constant violence to their own minds; and religion 
 is scarce any more a discipline to them, than it is to 
 creatures in a state of perfection. Yet these persons 
 may possibly stand in need of moral discipline and 
 exercise in a higher degree, than they would have by 
 such an easy practice of religion. Or it may be requi¬ 
 site, for reasons unknown to us, that they should give 
 some further manifestation 6 what is their moral charac¬ 
 ter, to the creation of God, than such a practice of it 
 would be. Thus in the great variety of religious 
 situations in which men are placed, what constitutes, 
 what chiefly and peculiarly constitutes, the probation, 
 in all senses, of some persons, may be the difficulties in 
 which the evidence of religion is involved: and their 
 e P. 105,106. 
 
CHAP. VI.] SUPPOSED DEFICIENCY IN ITS PROOF. 233 
 
 principal and distinguished trial may be, how they will 
 behave under and with respect to these difficulties. 
 Circumstances in men’s situation in their temporal 
 capacity, analogous in good measure to this respecting 
 religion, are to be observed. We find some persons 
 are placed in such a situation in the world, as that 
 their chief difficulty with regard to conduct, is not the 
 doing what is prudent when it is known ; for this, in 
 numberless cases, is as easy as the contrary: but to 
 some the principal exercise is, recollection and being 
 upon their guard against deceits, the deceits suppose of 
 those about them ; against false appearances of reason 
 and prudence. To persons in some situations, the 
 principal exercise with respect to conduct is, attention 
 in order to inform themselves what is proper, what is 
 really the reasonable and prudent part to act. 
 
 But as I have hitherto gone upon supposition, that 
 men’s dissatisfaction with the evidence of religion is 
 not owing to their neglects or prejudices; it must be 
 added, on the other hand, in all common reason, and as 
 what the truth of the case plainly requires should be 
 added, that such dissatisfaction possibly may be owing 
 to those, possibly may be men’s own fault. For, 
 
 If there are any persons, who never set themselves 
 heartily and in earnest to be informed in religion; if 
 there are any, who secretly wish it may not prove true; 
 and are less attentive to evidence than to difficulties, 
 and more to objections than to what is said in answer 
 to them: these persons will scarce be thought in a 
 likely way of seeing the evidence of religion, though it 
 were most certainly true, and capable of being ever so 
 fully proved. If any accustom themselves to consider 
 this subject usually in the way of mirth and sport: if 
 they attend to forms and representations, and inadequate 
 manners of expression, instead of the real things in- 
 
234 REVELATION NOT UNIVERSAL: [PART IK 
 
 tended by them : (for signs often can be no more than 
 inadequately expressive of the things signified :) or if 
 they substitute human errors in the room of Divine 
 truth ; why may not all, or any of these things, hinder 
 some men from seeing that evidence, which really is 
 seen by others ; as a like turn of mind, with respect to 
 matters of common speculation and practice, does, we 
 find by experience, hinder them from attaining that 
 knowledge and right understanding, in matters of com¬ 
 mon speculation and practice, which more fair and atten¬ 
 tive minds attain to ? And the effect will be the same, 
 whether their neglect of seriously considering the evi¬ 
 dence of religion, and their indirect behaviour with regard 
 to it, proceed from mere carelessness, or from the grosser 
 vices; or whether it be owing to this, that forms and 
 figurative manners of expression, as well as errors, 
 administer occasions of ridicule, when the things in- 
 tended, and the truth itself, would not. Men may 
 indulge a ludicrous turn so far as to lose all sense of 
 conduct and prudence in worldly affairs, and even, as it 
 seems, to impair their faculty of reason. And in 
 general, levity, carelessness, passion, and prejudice, do 
 hinder us from being rightly informed, with respect to 
 common things : and they may, in like manner, and 
 perhaps in some farther providential manner, with 
 respect to moral and religious subjects : may hinder 
 evidence from being laid before us, and from being 
 seen when it is. The Scripture f does declare, that 
 every one shall not understand . And it makes no 
 difference, by what providential conduct this comes to 
 pass: whether the evidence of Christianity was, origi- 
 
 f Dan. xii. io. See also Is. xxix. 13, 14; Matth. vi. 23. and xi. 25. 
 and xiii. 11, 12 ; John iii. 19. and v. 44; 1 Cor. ii. 14. and 2 Cor. iv. 4; 
 2 rim. iii. 13; and that affectionate as well as authoritative admonition, so 
 very many times inculcated, He that hath ears to hear , let him hear. 
 
CHAP. VI.] 
 
 SUPPOSED DEFICIENCY IN ITS PROOF. 
 
 235 
 
 nally and with design, put and left so, as that those 
 who are desirous of evading moral obligations should 
 not see it; and that honest-minded persons should : or, 
 whether it comes to pass by any other means. 
 
 Farther: The general proof of natural religion and 
 of Christianity does, I think, lie level to common men; 
 even those, the greatest part of whose time, from 
 childhood to old age, is taken up with providing for 
 themselves and their families the common conveniences, 
 perhaps necessaries, of life: those, I mean, of this rank, 
 who ever think at all of asking after proof, or at¬ 
 tending to it. Common men, were they as much in 
 earnest about religion, as about their temporal affairs, 
 are capable of being convinced upon real evidence, 
 that there is a God who governs the world: and 
 they feel themselves to be of a moral nature, and 
 accountable creatures. And as Christianity entirely 
 falls in with this their natural sense of things, so 
 they are capable, not only of being persuaded, but 
 of being made to see, that there is evidence of 
 miracles wrought in attestation of it, and many ap¬ 
 pearing completions of prophecy. But though this 
 proof is real and conclusive, yet it is liable to objec¬ 
 tions, and may be run up into difficulties; which, 
 however, persons who are capable, not only of talking 
 of, but of really seeing, are capable also of seeing 
 through : i. e. not of clearing up and answering them, 
 so as to satisfy their curiosity, for of such knowledge we 
 are not capable with respect to anyone thing in nature; 
 
 Grotius saw so strongly the thing intended in these and other passages of 
 Scripture of the like sense, as to say, that the proof given us of Christ¬ 
 ianity was less than it might have been, for this very purpose : Ut ita 
 senno Evanyelii tanquam lapis esset Lydius ad quern ingenia sanabilia ex- 
 plorarentur. De Ver. R. C. lib. ii. towards the end. 
 
236 REVELATION NOT UNIVERSAL: [PART II. 
 
 but capable of seeing that the proof is not lost in these 
 difficulties, or destroyed by these objections. But then 
 a thorough examination into religion, with regard to 
 these objections, which cannot be the business of every 
 man, is a matter of pretty large compass, and, from the 
 nature of it, requires some knowledge, as well as time 
 and attention ; to see, how the evidence comes out, 
 upon balancing one thing with another, and what, upon 
 the whole, is the amount of it. Now if persons who 
 have picked up these objections from others, and take 
 for granted they are of weight, upon the word of those 
 from whom they received them, or, by often retailing of 
 them, come to see, or fancy they see them to be of 
 weight; will not prepare themselves for such an ex¬ 
 amination, with a competent degree of knowledge; or 
 will not give that time and attention to the subject, 
 which, from the nature of it, is necessary for attaining 
 such information : in this case, they must remain in 
 doubtfulness, ignorance, or error; in the same way as 
 they must, with regard to common sciences, and matters 
 of common life, if they neglect the necessary means of 
 being informed in them. 
 
 But still perhaps it will be objected, that if a prince 
 or common master were to send directions to a servant, 
 he would take care, that they should always bear the 
 certain marks, who they came from, and that their 
 sense should be always plain : so as that there should 
 be no possible doubt, if he could help it, concerning the 
 authority or meaning of them. Now the proper answer 
 to all this kind of objections is, that, wherever the 
 fallacy lies, it is even certain we cannot argue thus with 
 respect to Him, who is the governor of the world: and 
 particularly that he does not afford us such information, 
 with respect to our temporal affairs and interests, as 
 
CHAP. VI.] SUPPOSED DEFICIENCY IN ITS PROOF. 237 
 
 experience abundantly shews. However, there is a 
 full answer to this objection, from the very nature of 
 religion. For, the reason why a prince would give his 
 directions in this plain manner is, that he absolutely 
 desires such an external action should be done, without 
 concerning himself with the motive or principle upon 
 which it is done: i. e. he regards only the external 
 event, or the thing’s being done; and not at all, pro¬ 
 perly speaking, the doing of it, or the action. Whereas 
 the whole of morality and religion consisting merely in 
 action itself, there is no sort of parallel between the 
 cases. But if the prince be supposed to regard only 
 the action ; i. e. only to desire to exercise, or in any 
 sense prove, the understanding or loyalty of a servant; 
 he would not always give his orders in such a plain 
 manner. It may be proper to add, that the will of 
 God, respecting morality and religion, may be considered 
 either as absolute, or as only conditional. If it be 
 absolute, it can only be thus, that we should act 
 virtuously in such given circumstances; not that we 
 should be brought to act so, by his changing of our 
 circumstances. And if God’s will be thus absolute, 
 then it is in our power, in the highest and strictest 
 sense, to do or to contradict his will; which is a most 
 weighty consideration. Or his will may be considered 
 only as conditional, that if we act so and so, we shall 
 be rewarded; if otherwise, punished: of which con¬ 
 ditional will of the Author of Nature, the whole con¬ 
 stitution of it affords most certain instances. 
 
 Upon the whole: that we are in a state of religion 
 necessarily implies, that w r e are in a state of probation: 
 and the credibility of our being at all in such a state 
 being admitted, there seems no peculiar difficulty in 
 supposing our probation to be, just as it is, in those 
 
REVELATION NOT UNIVERSAL : 
 
 MX 
 
 [part II. 
 
 respects which are above objected against. There 
 seems no pretence, from the reason of the thine/, to say, 
 that the trial cannot equitably be any thing, but 
 whether persons will act suitably to certain information, 
 or such as admits no room for doubt; so as that there 
 can be no danger of miscarriage, but either from their 
 not attending to what they certainly know, or from 
 overbearing passion hurrying them on to act contrary 
 to it. For, since ignorance and doubt afford scope for 
 probation in all senses, as really as intuitive conviction 
 or certainty; and since the two former are to be put 
 to the same account as difficulties in practice; men’s 
 moral probation may also be, whether they will take 
 due care to inform themselves by impartial consideration, 
 and afterwards whether they will act as the case 
 requires, upon the evidence which they have, however 
 doubtlul. And this, we find by experience, is frequently 
 our probations, in our temporal capacity. For, the 
 information which we want with regard to our worldly 
 interests is by no means always given us of course, with¬ 
 out any care of our own. And we are greatly liable to 
 self-deceit from inward secret prejudices, and also to 
 the deceits of others. So that to be able to judge 
 what is the prudent part, often requires much and 
 difficult consideration. Then after we have judged the 
 very best we can, the evidence upon which we must 
 act, if we will live and act at all, is perpetually doubt¬ 
 ful to a very high degree. And the constitution and 
 course of the world in fact is such, as that want of 
 impartial consideration what we have to do, and ven- 
 tuiing upon extravagant courses because it is doubtful 
 what will be the consequence, are often naturally, i. e. 
 providentially, altogether as fatal, as misconduct oc- 
 
 e P- 40,230,232,233. 
 
CHAP. VI.] SUPPOSED DEFICIENCY IN ITS PROOF. 
 
 239 
 
 casioned by heedless inattention to wliat we certainly 
 
 know, or disregarding it from overbearing passion. 
 Several of the observations here made may well 
 
 seem strange, perhaps unintelligible, to many good 
 men. But if the persons for whose sake they are 
 made think so; persons who object as above, and 
 
 throw off all regard to religion under pretence of want 
 
 of evidence; I desire them to consider again, whether 
 their thinking so be owing to any thing unintelligible 
 in these observations, or to their own not having such 
 a sense of religion and serious solicitude about it, as 
 even their state of scepticism does in all reason require? 
 It ought to be forced upon the reflection of these 
 persons, that our nature and condition necessarily 
 require us, in the daily course of life, to act upon 
 evidence much lower than what is commonly called 
 probable; to guard, not only against what we fully 
 believe will, but also against what we think it sup- 
 posable may, happen ; and to engage in pursuits when 
 the probability is greatly against success, if it be 
 credible, that possibly we may succeed in them. 
 
 CHAP. VII. 
 
 Of the particular Evidence for Christianity . 
 
 HE presumptions against revelation, and objections 
 
 JL against the general scheme of Christianity, and 
 particular things relating to it, being removed; there 
 remains to be considered, what positive evidence we 
 have for the truth of it: chiefly in order to see, what 
 the analogy of nature suggests with regard to that 
 evidence, and the objections against it: or to see what 
 
240 
 
 OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE 
 
 [part II. 
 
 is, and is allowed to be, the plain natural rule of judg¬ 
 ment and of action, in our temporal concerns, in cases 
 where we have the same kind of evidence, and the 
 same kind of objections against it, that we have in the 
 case before us. 
 
 Now in the evidence of Christianity there seem to 
 be several things of great weight, not reducible to the 
 head, either of miracles, or the completion of prophecy, 
 in the common acceptation of the words. But these 
 two are its direct and fundamental proofs: and those 
 other things, however considerable they are, yet ought 
 never to be urged apart from its direct proofs, but 
 always to be joined with them. Thus the evidence of 
 Christianity will be a long series of things, reaching, as 
 it seems, from the beginning of the world to the 
 present time, of great variety and compass, taking in 
 both the direct, and also the collateral, proofs; and 
 making up, all of them together, one argument: the 
 conviction arising from which kind of proof may be 
 compared to what they call the effect in architecture or 
 other works of art; a result from a great number of 
 things so and so disposed, and taken into one view. I 
 shall therefore, first, make some observations relating 
 to miracles, and the appearing completions of prophecy; 
 and consider what analogy suggests, in answer to the 
 objections brought against this evidence. And, secondly, 
 I shall endeavour to give some account of the general 
 argument now mentioned, consisting both of the direct 
 and collateral evidence, considered as making up one 
 argument: this being the kind of proof, upon which 
 we determine most questions of difficulty, concerning 
 common facts, alleged to have happened, or seeming 
 likely to happen; especially questions relating to 
 conduct. 
 
 First, I shall make some observations upon the direct 
 
CHAP. VII.] 
 
 FOR CHRISTIANITY. 
 
 241 
 
 pi oof of Christianity from miracles and prophecy, and 
 upon the objections alleged against it. 
 
 I. ^ow the following observations relating to the 
 historical evidence of miracles wrought in attestation 
 of Christianity, appear to be of great weight. 
 
 1. The Old Testament affords us the same historical 
 evidence of the miracles of Moses and of the prophets, 
 as of the common civil history of Moses and the kings 
 of Israel; or, as of the affairs of the Jewish nation. 
 And the Gospels and the Acts afford us the same 
 historical evidence of the miracles of Christ and the 
 Apostles, as of the common matters related in them. 
 This indeed could not have been affirmed by any rea¬ 
 sonable man, if the authors of these books, like many 
 othei historians, had appeared to make an entertaining 
 manner of writing their aim ; though they had inter¬ 
 spersed miracles in their works, at proper distances 
 and upon proper occasions. These might have ani¬ 
 mated a dull relation, amused the reader, and engaged 
 his attention. And the same account would naturally 
 have been given of them, as of the speeches and 
 descriptions of such authors: the same account, in a 
 manner, as is to be given, why the poets make use of 
 wonders and prodigies. But the facts, both miraculous 
 and natural, in Scripture, are related in plain unadorned 
 narratives: and both of them appear, in all respects, to 
 stand upon the same foot of historical evidence. 
 Farther: some parts of Scripture, containing an ac¬ 
 count of miracles fully sufficient to prove the truth of 
 Christianity, are quoted as genuine, from the age in 
 which they are said to be written, down to the present: 
 and no other parts of them, material in the present 
 question, are omitted to be quoted in such manner, as 
 to affoid any sort of proof of their not being genuine. 
 And, as common history, when called in question in 
 
 ANALOGY. R 
 
242 OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE [PART II. 
 
 any instance, may often be greatly confirmed by co¬ 
 temporary or subsequent events more known and ac¬ 
 knowledged ; and as the common Scripture-history, 
 like many others, is thus confirmed; so likewise is the 
 miraculous history of it, not only in particular instances, 
 but in general. For, the establishment of the Jewish 
 and Christian religions, which were events cotemporary 
 with the miracles related to be wrought in attestation 
 of both, or subsequent to them, these events are just 
 what we should have expected, upon supposition such 
 miracles were really wrought to attest the truth of 
 those religions. These miracles are a satisfactory 
 account of those events: of which no other satisfactory 
 account can be given; nor any account at all, but 
 what is imaginary merely, and invented. It is to be 
 added, that the most obvious, the most easy and direct 
 account of this history, how it came to be written and 
 to be received in the world, as a true history, is, that 
 it really is so : nor can any other account of it be easy 
 and direct. Now, though an account, not at all ob¬ 
 vious, but very far-fetched and indirect, may indeed be, 
 and often is, the true account of a matter; yet it 
 cannot be admitted on the authority of its being 
 asserted. Mere guess, supposition, and possibility, 
 when opposed to historical evidence, prove nothing, 
 but that historical evidence is not demonstrative. 
 
 Now the just consequence from all this, I think, is, 
 that the Scripture-history in general is to be admitted 
 as an authentic genuine history, till somewhat positive 
 be alleged sufficient to invalidate it. But no man will 
 deny the consequence to be, that it cannot be rejected, 
 or thrown by as of no authority, till it can be proved 
 to be of none; even though the evidence now men¬ 
 tioned for its authority were doubtful. This evidence 
 may be confronted by historical evidence on the other 
 
CHAP. VII.] 
 
 FOR CHRISTIANITY. 
 
 243 
 
 side, if there be any: or general incredibility in the 
 things related, or inconsistence in the general turn of 
 the history, would prove it to be of no authority. But 
 since, upon the face of the matter, upon a first and 
 general view, the appearance is, that it is an authentic 
 history; it cannot be determined to be fictitious with¬ 
 out some proof that it is so. And the following 
 observations in support of these, and coincident with 
 them, will greatly confirm the historical evidence for 
 the truth of Christianity. 
 
 2. The Epistles of St. Paul, from the nature of 
 epistolary writing, and moreover from several of them 
 being written, not to particular persons, but to churches, 
 carry in them evidences of their being genuine, beyond 
 what can be in a mere historical narrative, left to the 
 world at large. This evidence, joined with that which 
 they have in common with the rest of the New Testa¬ 
 ment, seems not to leave so much as any particular 
 pretence for denying their genuineness, considered as 
 an ordinary matter of fact, or of criticism: I say par¬ 
 ticular pretence, for denying it; because any single 
 fact, of such a kind and such antiquity, may have 
 general dn>dds raised concerning it, from the very nature 
 of human affairs and human testimony. There is also 
 to be mentioned a distinct and particular evidence of 
 the genuineness of the Epistle chiefly referred to here, 
 the first to the Corinthians; from the manner in which 
 it is quoted by Clemens Romanus, in an epistle of his 
 own to that church 3 . Now these epistles afford a 
 proof of Christianity, detached from all others, which 
 is, I think, a thing of weight; and also a proof of a 
 nature and kind peculiar to itself. For, 
 
 In them the author declares, that he received the 
 Gospel in general, and the institution of the Communion 
 
 a Clem. Rom. Ep. i. c. 47. 
 
 R 2 
 
244 OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE [PART II. 
 
 in particular, not from the rest of the Apostles, or 
 jointly together with them, but alone, from Christ 
 himself; whom he declares likewise, conformably to 
 the history in the Acts, that he saw after his ascension 5 . 
 So that the testimony of St. Paul is to be considered, 
 as detached from that of the rest of the Apostles. 
 
 And he declares farther, that he was endued with a 
 power of working miracles, as what was publicly known 
 to those very people, speaks of frequent and great 
 variety of miraculous gifts as then subsisting in those 
 very churches, to which he was writing; which he 
 was reproving for several irregularities; and where he 
 had personal opposers: he mentions these gifts inci¬ 
 dentally, in the most easy manner, and without effort; 
 by way of reproof to those who had them, for their in¬ 
 decent use of them; and by way of depreciating them, 
 in comparison of moral virtues: in short he speaks to 
 these churches, of these miraculous powers, in the 
 manner, any one would speak to another of a thing, 
 which was as familiar and as much known in common 
 to them both, as any thing in the world 0 . And this, 
 as hath been observed by several persons, is surely a 
 very considerable thing. 
 
 3. It is an acknowledged historical fact, that Christ¬ 
 ianity offered itself to the world, and demanded to be 
 received, upon the allegation, i. e. as unbelievers would 
 speak, upon the pretence, of miracles, publicly wrought 
 to attest the truth of it, in such an age; and that it 
 was actually received by great numbers in that very 
 age, and upon the professed belief of the reality of 
 these miracles. And Christianity, including the dis¬ 
 pensation of the Old Testament, seems distinguished 
 
 b Gal. i; i Cor. xi. 23, &c.; 1 Cor. xv. 8. 
 
 c Rom. xv. 19; 1 Cor. xii. 8, 9, 10—28, &c. and xiii. 1, 2, 8. and the 
 whole xivth chapter; 2 Cor. xii. 12, 13; Gal. iii. 2, 5. 
 
CHAP. VII.l 
 
 FOR CHRISTIANITY. 
 
 245 
 
 by this from all other religions. I mean, that this 
 does not appear to be the case with regard to any 
 other: for surely it will not be supposed to lie upon 
 any person, to prove by positive historical evidence, 
 that it was not. It does in no sort appear that Ma¬ 
 hometanism was first received in the world upon the 
 foot of supposed miracles d , i. e. public ones: for, as 
 revelation is itself miraculous, all pretence to it must 
 necessarily imply some pretence of miracles. And it is 
 a known fact, that it was immediately, at the very first, 
 propagated by other means. And as particular insti¬ 
 tutions, whether in Paganism or Popery, said to be 
 confirmed by miracles after those institutions had ob¬ 
 tained, are not to the purpose: so, were there what 
 might be called historical proof, that any of them were 
 introduced by a supposed divine command, believed to 
 be attested by miracles; these would not be in any 
 wise parallel. For single things of this sort are easy 
 to be accounted for, after parties are formed, and have 
 power in their hands; and the leaders of them are in 
 veneration with the multitude; and political interests 
 are blended with religious claims, and religious dis¬ 
 tinctions. But before any thing of this kind, for a few 
 persons, and those of the lowest rank, all at once, to 
 bring over such great numbers to a new religion, and 
 get it to be received upon the particular evidence of 
 miracles ; this is quite another thing. And I think it 
 will be allowed by any fair adversary, that the fact now 
 mentioned, taking in all the circumstances of it, is 
 peculiar to the Christian religion. However, the fact 
 itself is allowed, that Christianity obtained, i. e. was 
 professed to be received in the world, upon the belief 
 of miracles, immediately in the age in which it is said 
 those miracles were wrought: or that this is what its 
 
 d See the Koran, c. xiii. and c. xvii. 
 
246 OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE [ PART ,T * 
 
 first converts would have alleged, as the reason for 
 their embracing it. Now certainly it is not to be sup¬ 
 posed, that such numbers of men, in the most distant 
 parts of the world, should forsake the religion of their 
 country, in which they had been educated; separate 
 themselves from their friends, particularly in their 
 festival shows and solemnities, to which the common 
 people are so greatly addicted, and which were of a 
 nature to engage them much more, than any thing of 
 that sort amongst us; and embrace a religion, which 
 could not but expose them to many inconveniences, 
 and indeed must have been a giving up the world in a 
 great degree, even from the very first, and before the 
 empire engaged in form against them : it cannot be 
 supposed, that such numbers should make so great, 
 and, to say the least, so inconvenient a change in their 
 whole institution of life, unless they were really con¬ 
 vinced of the truth of those miracles, upon the know¬ 
 ledge or belief of which they professed to make it. 
 And it will, I suppose, readily be acknowledged, that 
 the generality of the first converts to Christianity must 
 have believed them : that as by becoming Christians 
 they declared to the world, they were satisfied of the 
 truth of those miracles; so this declaration was to be 
 credited. And this their testimony is the same kind 
 of evidence for those miracles, as if they had put it in 
 writing, and these writings had come down to us. 
 And it is real evidence, because it is of facts, which 
 they had capacity and full opportunity to inform them¬ 
 selves of. It is also distinct from the direct or express 
 historical evidence, though it is of the same kind : and 
 it would be allowed to be distinct in all cases. For 
 were a fact expressly related by one or more ancient 
 historians, and disputed in after-ages; that this fact is 
 acknowledged to have been believed by great numbers 
 
CHAP. VII.] 
 
 FOR CHRISTIANITY. 
 
 247 
 
 of the age in which the historian says it was clone, 
 would be allowed an additional proof of such fact, 
 quite distinct from the express testimony of the his¬ 
 torian. The credulity of mankind is acknowledged: 
 and the suspicions of mankind ought to be acknow¬ 
 ledged too; and their backwardness even to believe, 
 and greater still to practise, what makes against their 
 interest. And it must particularly be remembered, 
 that education, and prejudice, and authority, were 
 against Christianity, in the age I am speaking of. So 
 that the immediate conversion of such numbers is a 
 real presumption of somewhat more than human in 
 this matter: I say presumption, for it is not alleged as 
 a proof alone and by itself. Nor need any one of the 
 things mentioned in this chapter be considered as a 
 proof by itself: and yet all of them together maybe 
 one of the strongest 6 . 
 
 Upon the whole: as there is large historical evi¬ 
 dence, both direct and circumstantial, of miracles 
 wrought in attestation of Christianity, collected by 
 those who have writ upon the subject; it lies upon 
 unbelievers to shew, why this evidence is not to be 
 credited. This way of speaking is, I think, just; and 
 what persons who write in defence of religion naturally 
 fall into. Yet, in a matter of such unspeakable im¬ 
 portance, the proper question is, not whom it lies 
 upon, according to the rules of argument, to maintain 
 or confute objections: but whether there really are 
 any, against this evidence, sufficient, in reason, to 
 destroy the credit of it. However, unbelievers seem 
 to take upon them the part of shewing that there are. 
 
 They allege, that numberless enthusiastic people, in 
 different ages and countries, expose themselves to the 
 same difficulties which the primitive Christians did ; and 
 
 e Page 277, &c. 
 
248 
 
 OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE 
 
 [part II. 
 
 are ready to give up their lives for the most idle follies 
 imaginable. But it is not very clear, to what purpose 
 this objection is brought. For every one, surely, in 
 every case, must distinguish between opinions and 
 facts. And though testimony is no proof of enthusiastic 
 opinions, or of any opinions at all; yet it is allowed, in 
 all other cases, to be a proof of facts. And a person’s 
 laying down his life in attestation of facts or of opinions, 
 is the strongest proof of his believing them. And if 
 the Apostles and their cotemporaries did believe the 
 facts, in attestation of which they exposed themselves 
 to sufferings and death; this their belief, or rather 
 knowledge, must be a proof of those facts: for they 
 were such as came under the observation of their 
 senses. And though it is not of equal weight, yet it is 
 of weight, that the martyrs of the next age, notwith¬ 
 standing they were not eyewitnesses of those facts, as 
 were the Apostles and their cotemporaries, had, how¬ 
 ever, full opportunity to inform themselves, whether 
 they were true or not, and gave equal proof of their 
 believing them to be true. 
 
 But enthusiasm, it is said, greatly weakens the evi¬ 
 dence of testimony even for facts, in matters relating 
 to religion: some seem to think it totally and absolutely 
 destroys the evidence of testimony upon this subject. 
 And indeed the powers of enthusiasm, and of diseases 
 too, which operate in a like manner, are very wonderful, 
 in particular instances. But if great numbers of men! 
 not appearing in any peculiar degree weak, nor under 
 any peculiar suspicion of negligence, affirm that they 
 saw and heard such things plainly with their eyes and 
 their ears, and are admitted to be in earnest; such 
 testimony is evidence of the strongest kind we can 
 have, for any matter of fact. Yet possibly it may be 
 overcome, strong as it is, by incredibility in the things 
 
CHAP. VII.] FOR CHRISTIANITY. 249 
 
 thus attested, or by contrary testimony. And in an 
 instance where one thought it was so overcome, it 
 might be just to consider, how far such evidence could 
 be accounted for, by enthusiasm; for it seems as if no 
 other imaginable account were to be given of it. But 
 till such incredibility be shewn, or contrary testimony 
 produced, it cannot surely be expected, that so far¬ 
 fetched, so indirect and wonderful an account of such 
 testimony, as that of enthusiasm must be; an account 
 so strange, that the generality of mankind can scarce 
 be made to understand what is meant by it: it cannot, 
 I say, be expected, that such account will be admitted 
 of such evidence; when there is this direct, easy, and 
 obvious account of it, that people really saw and heard 
 a thing not incredible, which they affirm sincerely and 
 with full assurance, they did see and hear. Granting 
 then that enthusiasm is not (strictly speaking) an 
 absurd, but a possible account of such testimony; it is 
 manifest, that the very mention of it goes upon the 
 previous supposition that the things so attested are 
 incredible: and therefore need not be considered, till 
 they are shewn to be so. Much less need it be con¬ 
 sidered, after the contrary has been proved. And I 
 think it has been proved, to full satisfaction, that there 
 is no incredibility in a revelation, in general; or in 
 such an one as the Christian, in particular. However; 
 as religion is supposed peculiarly liable to enthusiasm, 
 it may just be observed, that prejudices almost without 
 number, and without name, romance, affectation, 
 humour, a desire to engage attention, or to surprise, 
 the party-spirit, custom, little competitions, unaccount¬ 
 able likings and dislikings; these influence men strongly 
 in common matters. And as these prejudices are often 
 scarce known or reflected upon by the persons them¬ 
 selves who are influenced by them, they are to be 
 
250 
 
 OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE 
 
 considered as influences of a like kind to enthusiasm. 
 Yet human testimony in common matters is naturally 
 and justly believed notwithstanding. 
 
 It is intimated farther, in a more refined way of 
 observation, that though it should be proved, that the 
 Apostles and first Christians could not, in some respects, 
 be deceived themselves, and, in other respects, cannot 
 be thought to have intended to impose upon the world; 
 yet it will not follow, that their general testimony is to 
 be believed, though truly handed down to us: because 
 they might still in part, i. e. in other respects, be de¬ 
 ceived themselves, and in part also designedly impose 
 upon others; which, it is added, is a thing very credi¬ 
 ble, from that mixture of real enthusiasm, and real 
 knavery, to be met with in the same characters. And, 
 I must confess, I think the matter of fact contained in 
 this observation upon mankind is not to be denied; 
 and that somewhat very much akin to it is often sup¬ 
 posed in Scripture as a very common case, and most 
 severely reproved. But it were to have been expected, 
 that persons capable of applying this observation as 
 applied in the objection, might also frequently have 
 met with the like mixed character, in instances where 
 religion v T as quite out of the case. The thing plainly 
 is, that mankind are naturally endued with reason, or a 
 capacity of distinguishing between truth and falsehood; 
 and as naturally they are endued with veracity, or a 
 regard to truth in what they say: but from many 
 occasions they are liable to be prejudiced and biassed 
 and deceived themselves, and capable of intending to 
 deceive others, in every different degree: insomuch 
 that, as we are all liable to be deceived by prejudice, 
 so likewise it seems to be not an uncommon thing, for 
 persons, who, from their regard to truth, would not 
 invent a lie entirely without any foundation at all, to 
 
FOR CHRISTIANITY. 
 
 251 
 
 CHAP. VII.] 
 
 propagate it with heightening circumstances, after it is 
 once invented and set agoing. And others, though 
 they would not propagate a lie, yet, which is a lower 
 degree of falsehood, will let it pass without contra¬ 
 diction. But, notwithstanding all this, human testimony 
 remains still a natural ground of assent; and this assent 
 a natural principle of action. 
 
 It is objected farther, that however it has happened, 
 the fact is, that mankind have, in different ages, been 
 strangely deluded with pretences to miracles and 
 wonders. But it is by no means to be admitted, that 
 they have been oftener, or are at all more liable to be 
 deceived by these pretences, than by others. 
 
 It is added, that there is a very considerable degree 
 of historical evidence for miracles, which are, on all 
 hands, acknowledged to be fabulous. But suppose 
 there were even the like historical evidence for these, 
 to what there is for those alleged in proof of Christian¬ 
 ity, which yet is in no wise allowed, but suppose this; 
 the consequence would not be, that the evidence of 
 the latter is not to be admitted. Nor is there a man 
 in the world, who, in common cases, would conclude 
 thus. For what would such a conclusion really amount 
 to but this, that evidence, confuted by contrary evi¬ 
 dence, or any way overbalanced, destroys the credibility 
 of other evidence, neither confuted, nor overbalanced ? 
 To argue, that because there is, if there were, like 
 evidence from testimony, for miracles acknowledged 
 false, as for those in attestation of Christianity, there¬ 
 fore the evidence in the latter case is not to be 
 credited ; this is the same as to argue, that if two men 
 of equally good reputation had given evidence in dif¬ 
 ferent cases no way connected, and one of them had 
 been convicted of perjury, this confuted the testimony 
 of the other. 
 
 Upon the whole then, the general observation, that 
 
252 
 
 OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE 
 
 PART II. 
 
 human creatures are so liable to be deceived, from 
 enthusiasm in religion, and principles equivalent to 
 enthusiasm in common matters, and in both from neg¬ 
 ligence ; and that they are so capable of dishonestly 
 endeavouring to deceive others; this does indeed 
 weaken the evidence of testimony in all cases, but does 
 not destroy it in any. And these things will appear, 
 to different men, to weaken the evidence of testimony, 
 in different degrees: in degrees proportionable to the 
 observations they have made, or the notions they have 
 any way taken up, concerning the weakness and neg¬ 
 ligence and dishonesty of mankind; or concerning the 
 powers of enthusiasm, and prejudices equivalent to it. 
 But it seems to me, that people do not know what 
 they say, who affirm these things to destroy the evi¬ 
 dence from testimony, which we have of the truth of 
 Christianity. Nothing can destroy the evidence of 
 testimony in any case, but a proof or probability, that 
 persons are not competent judges of the facts to which 
 they give testimony; or that they are actually under 
 some indirect influence in giving it, in such particular 
 case. Till this be made out, the natural laws of 
 human actions require, that testimony be admitted. 
 It can never be sufficient to overthrow direct historical 
 evidence, indolently to say, that there are so many 
 principles, from whence men are liable to be deceived 
 themselves, and disposed to deceive others, especially 
 in matters of religion, that one knows not what to 
 believe. And it is surprising persons can help reflect¬ 
 ing, that this very manner of speaking supposes they 
 are not satisfied that there is nothing in the evidence, 
 of which they speak thus ; or that they can avoid ob¬ 
 serving, if they do make this reflection, that it is, on 
 such a subject, a very material one f . 
 
 And over against all these objections is to be set the 
 
 f See the foregoing chapter. 
 
CHAP. VII.] 
 
 FOR CHRISTIANITY. 
 
 253 
 
 importance of Christianity, as what must have engaged 
 the attention of its first converts, so as to have rendered 
 them less liable to be deceived from carelessness, than 
 they would in common matters ; and likewise the strong- 
 obligations to veracity, which their religion laid them 
 under: so that the first and most obvious presumption is, 
 that they could not be deceived themselves, nor would 
 deceive others. And this presumption, in this degree, 
 is peculiar to the testimony we have been considering. 
 
 In argument, assertions are nothing in themselves, 
 and have an air of positiveness, which sometimes is not 
 very easy: yet they are necessary, and necessary to be 
 repeated; in order to connect a discourse, and dis¬ 
 tinctly to lay before the view of the reader, what is 
 proposed to be proved, and what is left as proved. 
 Now the conclusion from the foregoing observations is, 
 I think, beyond all doubt, this : that unbelievers must 
 be forced to admit the external evidence for Christ¬ 
 ianity, i. e. the proof of miracles wrought to attest 
 it, to be of real weight and very considerable; though 
 they cannot allow it to be sufficient, to convince 
 them of the reality of those miracles. And as they 
 must, in all reason, admit this; so it seems to me, 
 that upon consideration they would, in fact, admit it; 
 those of them, I mean, who know any thing at all of 
 the matter: in like manner as persons, in many cases, 
 own they see strong evidence from testimony, for the 
 truth of things, which yet they cannot be convinced 
 are true: cases, suppose, where there is contrary testi¬ 
 mony ; or things which they think, whether with or 
 without reason, to be incredible. But there is no 
 testimony contrary to that which we have been con¬ 
 sidering : and it has been fully proved, that there is 
 no incredibility in Christianity in general, or in any 
 part of it. 
 
254 OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE [PART II. 
 
 II. As to the evidence for Christianity from prophecy, 
 I shall only make some few general observations, which 
 are suggested by the Analogy of Nature; i. e. by the 
 acknowledged natural rules of judging in common 
 matters, concerning evidence of a like kind to this 
 from prophecy. 
 
 I. The obscurity or unintelligibleness of one part of 
 a prophecy does not, in any degree, invalidate the proof 
 of foresight, arising from the appearing completion of 
 those other parts which are understood. For the case 
 is evidently the same, as if those parts, which are 
 not understood, were lost, or not written at all, or 
 written in an unknown tongue. Whether this ob¬ 
 servation be commonly attended to or not, it is so 
 evident, that one can scarce bring oneself to set down 
 an instance in common matters, to exemplify it. How¬ 
 ever, suppose a writing, partly in cypher, and partly in 
 plain words at length ; and that in the part one under¬ 
 stood, there appeared mention of several known facts ; 
 it would never come into any man’s thoughts to 
 imagine, that if he understood the whole, perhaps he 
 might find, that those facts were not in reality known 
 by the writer. Indeed, both in this example, and the 
 thing intended to be exemplified by it, our not under¬ 
 standing the whole (the whole, suppose, of a sentence 
 or a paragraph) might sometimes occasion a doubt, 
 whether one understood the literal meaning of such a 
 part: but this comes under another consideration. 
 
 For the same reason, though a man should be in¬ 
 capable, for want of learning, or opportunities of inquiry, 
 or from not having turned his studies this way, even so 
 much as to judge, whether particular prophecies have 
 been throughout completely fulfilled ; yet he may see, 
 in general, that they have been fulfilled to such a 
 degree, as, upon very good ground, to be convinced of 
 
FOR CHRISTIANITY. 
 
 CHAP. VII.] 
 
 foresight more than human in such prophecies, and of 
 such events being intended by them. For the same 
 reason also, though, by means of the deficiencies in 
 civil history, and the different accounts of historians, the 
 most learned should not be able to make out to 
 satisfaction, that such parts of the prophetic history 
 have been minutely and throughout fulfilled; yet a 
 very strong proof of foresight may arise, from that 
 general completion of them, which is made out: as 
 much proof of foresight, perhaps, as the giver of pro¬ 
 phecy intended should ever be afforded by such parts 
 of prophecy. 
 
 2. A long series of prophecy being applicable to 
 such and such events, is itself a proof that it was in¬ 
 tended of them : as the rules, by which we naturally 
 judge and determine, in common cases parallel to this, 
 will shew. This observation I make in answer to the 
 common objection against the application of the pro¬ 
 phecies, that, considering each of them distinctly by 
 itself, it does not at all appear, that they were intended 
 of those particular events, to which they are applied by 
 Christians; and therefore it is to be supposed, that, if 
 they meant any thing, they were intended of other 
 events unknown to us, and not of these at all. 
 
 Now there are two kinds of writing, which bear a 
 great resemblance to prophecy, with respect to the 
 matter before us: the mythological, and the satirical, 
 where the satire is, to a certain degree, concealed. 
 And a man might be assured, that he. understood 
 what an author intended by a fable or parable, re¬ 
 lated without any application or moral, merely from 
 seeing it to be easily capable of such application, and 
 that such a moral might naturally be deduced from it. 
 And he might be fully assured, that such persons and 
 events were intended in a satirical writing, merely from 
 
256 
 
 OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE 
 
 PART II. 
 
 its being applicable to them. And, agreeably to the 
 last observation, he might be in a good measure satisfied 
 of it, though he were not enough informed in affairs, or 
 in the story of such persons, to understand half the 
 satire. For, his satisfaction, that he understood the 
 meaning, the intended meaning, of these writings, 
 would be greater or less in proportion as he saw the 
 general turn of them to be capable of such application; 
 and in proportion to the number of particular things 
 capable of it. And thus, if a long series of prophecy is 
 applicable to the present state of the church, and to 
 the political situations of the kingdoms of the world, 
 some thousand years after these prophecies were deli¬ 
 vered, and a long series of prophecy delivered before 
 the coming of Christ is applicable to him ; these 
 things are in themselves a proof, that the prophetic 
 history was intended of him, and of those events: in 
 proportion as the general turn of it is capable of such 
 application, and to the number and variety of particular 
 prophecies capable of it. And though, in all just way 
 of consideration, the appearing completion of prophecies 
 is to be allowed to be thus explanatory of, and to 
 determine, their meaning; yet it is to be remembered 
 farther, that the ancient Jews applied the prophecies 
 to a Messiah before his coming, in much the same 
 manner as Christians do now: and that the primitive 
 Christians interpreted the prophecies respecting the 
 state of the church and of the world in the last ages, 
 in the sense which the event seems to confirm and 
 verify. And from these things it may be made appear: 
 
 3. That the shewing even to a high probability, if 
 that could be, that the prophets thought of some 
 other events, in such and such predictions, and not 
 those at all which Christians allege to be completions 
 of those predictions; or that such and such prophecies 
 
FOR CHRISTIANITY. 
 
 CHAP. VII.] 
 
 ZO / 
 
 are capable of being applied to other events than those, 
 to which Christians apply them—that this would not 
 confute or destroy the force of the argument from 
 prophecy, even with regard to those very instances. 
 For, observe how this matter really is. If one knew 
 such a person to be the sole author of such a book, and 
 was certainly assured, or satisfied to any degree, that 
 one knew the whole of what he intended in it; one 
 should be assured or satisfied to such degree, that one 
 knew the whole meaning of that book: for the mean¬ 
 ing of a book is nothing but the meaning of the author. 
 But if one knew a person to have compiled a book out 
 of memoirs, which he received from another, of vastly 
 superior knowledge in the subject of it, especially if it 
 were a book full of great intricacies and difficulties; it 
 would in no wise follow, that one knew the whole 
 meaning of the book, from knowing the whole meaning 
 of the compiler: for the original memoirs, i. e. the 
 author of them, might have, and there would be no 
 degree of presumption, in many cases, against supposing 
 him to have, some farther meaning than the compiler 
 saw. To say then, that the Scriptures, and the things 
 contained in them, can have no other or farther mean¬ 
 ing than those persons thought or had, who first recited 
 or wrote them; is evidently saying, that those persons 
 were the original, proper, and sole authors of those 
 books, i. e. that they are not inspired: which is absurd, 
 whilst the authority of these books is under examina¬ 
 tion ; i. e. till you have determined they are of no 
 divine authority at all. Till this be determined, it 
 must in all reason be supposed, not indeed that they 
 have, for this is taking for granted that they are in¬ 
 spired ; but that they may have, some farther meaning 
 than what the compilers saw or understood. And, 
 upon this supposition, it is supposable also, that this 
 
 ANALOGY. 
 
 S 
 
258 
 
 OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE 
 
 [part II. 
 
 farther meaning may be fulfilled. Now events cor¬ 
 responding to prophecies, interpreted in a different 
 meaning from that, in which the prophets are supposed 
 to have understood them; this affords, in a manner, 
 the same proof, that this different sense was originally 
 intended, as it would have afforded, if the prophets 
 had not understood their predictions in the sense it is 
 supposed they did: because there is no presumption of 
 their sense of them being the whole sense of them. 
 And it has been already shewn, that the apparent com¬ 
 pletions of prophecy must be allowed to be explanatory 
 of its meaning. So that the question is, whether a 
 series of prophecy has been fulfilled, in a natural or 
 proper, i. e. in any real, sense of the words of it. For 
 such completion is equally a proof of foresight more 
 than human, whether the prophets are, or are not, sup¬ 
 posed to have understood it in a different sense. I 
 say, supposed: for, though I think it clear, that the 
 prophets did not understand the full meaning of their 
 predictions; it is another question, how far they thought 
 they did, and in what sense they understood them. 
 
 Hence may be seen, to how little purpose those 
 persons busy themselves, who endeavour to prove, that 
 the prophetic history is applicable to events of the age 
 in which it was written, or of ages before it. Indeed 
 to have proved this, before there was any appearance 
 of a farther completion of it, might have answered 
 some purpose ; for it might have prevented the ex¬ 
 pectation of any such farther completion. Thus could 
 Porphyry have shewn, that some principal parts of the 
 book of Daniel, for instance, the seventh verse of the 
 seventh chapter, which the Christians interpreted of 
 the latter ages, was applicable to events, which hap¬ 
 pened before or about the age of Antiochus Epiphanes; 
 this might have prevented them from expecting any 
 
FOR CHRISTIANITY. 
 
 CHAP. VII.] 
 
 259 
 
 farther completion of it. And, unless there was then, 
 as I think there must have been, external evidence 
 concerning that book, more than is come down to us; 
 such a discovery might have been a stumblingblock in 
 the way of Christianity itself: considering the authority 
 which our Saviour has given to the book of Daniel, 
 and how much the general scheme of Christianity pre¬ 
 supposes the truth of it. But even this discovery, had 
 there been any suche, would be of very little weight 
 with reasonable men now; if this passage, thus ap¬ 
 plicable to events before the age of Porphyry, appears 
 to be applicable also to events, which succeeded the 
 dissolution of the Roman empire. I mention this, not 
 at all as intending to insinuate, that the division of this 
 empire into ten parts, for it plainly was divided into 
 about that number, were, alone and by itself, of any 
 moment in verifying the prophetic history : but only 
 as an example of the thing I am speaking of. And 
 thus upon the whole, the matter of inquiry evidently 
 must be, as above put, Whether the prophecies are 
 applicable to Christ, and to the present state of the 
 world, and of the church ; applicable in such a degree, 
 as to imply foresight: not whether they are capable of 
 any other application ; though T know no pretence for 
 saying the general turn of them is capable of any other. 
 
 These observations are, T think, just; and the evi¬ 
 dence referred to in them real : though there may be 
 people who will not accept of such imperfect informa¬ 
 tion from Scripture. Some too have not integrity and 
 regard enough to truth, to attend to evidence, which 
 
 e It appears, that Porphyry did nothing worth mentioning in this way. 
 For Jerom on the place says, Duas posteriores bestias—in uno Macedonum 
 regno ponit . And as to the ten kings ; Decern reges enumerat, quifuerunt 
 savissimi: ipsosque reges non unius ponit regni, verbi gratia, Macedonia:, 
 Syria, Asia, et JEgypti ; sed de diversis regnis unum efficit regum ordinem. 
 And in this way of interpretation, any thing may be made of any thing. 
 
 S 2 
 
260 OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE [PART II. 
 
 keeps the mind in doubt, perhaps perplexity, and which 
 is much of a different sort from what they expected. 
 And it plainly requires a degree of modesty and fair¬ 
 ness, beyond what every one has, for a man to say, not 
 to the world, but to himself, that there is a real ap¬ 
 pearance of somewhat of great weight in this matter, 
 though he is not able thoroughly to satisfy himself 
 about it; but it shall have its influence upon him, in 
 proportion to its appearing reality and weight. It is 
 much more easy, and more falls in with the negligence, 
 presumption, and wilfulness of the generality, to deter¬ 
 mine at once, with a decisive air, There is nothing in it. 
 The prejudices arising from that absolute contempt and 
 scorn, with which this evidence is treated in the world, 
 I do not mention. For what indeed can be said to 
 persons, who are weak enough in their understandings 
 to think this any presumption against it; or, if they do 
 not, are yet weak enough in their temper to be influ¬ 
 enced by such prejudices, upon such a subject ? 
 
 I shall now, secondly, endeavour to give some ac¬ 
 count of the general argument for the truth of Christ¬ 
 ianity, consisting both of the direct and circumstantial 
 evidence, considered as making up one argument. 
 Indeed to state and examine this argument fully, 
 would be a work much beyond the compass of this 
 whole treatise; nor is so much as a proper abridgment 
 of it to be expected here. Yet the present subject 
 requires to have some brief account of it given. For 
 it is the kind of evidence, upon which most questions of 
 difficulty, in common practice, are determined : evi¬ 
 dence arising from various coincidences, which support 
 and confirm each other, and in this manner prove, with 
 more or less certainty, the point under consideration. 
 And I choose to do it also: first, because it seems to 
 be of the greatest importance, and not duly attended 
 
CHAP. VII.] 
 
 FOR CHRISTIANITY. 
 
 261 
 
 to by every one, that the proof of revelation is, not 
 some direct and express things only, but a great 
 variety of circumstantial things also ; and that though 
 each of these direct and circumstantial things is indeed 
 to be considered separately, yet they are afterwards to 
 be joined together; for that the proper force of the 
 evidence consists in the result of those several things, 
 considered in their respects to each other, and united 
 into one view: and in the next place, because it seems 
 to me, that the matters of fact here set down, which 
 are acknowledged by unbelievers, must be acknow¬ 
 ledged by them also to contain together a degree of 
 evidence of great weight, if they could be brought to 
 lay these several things before themselves distinctly, 
 and then with attention consider them together; in¬ 
 stead of that cursory thought of them, to which we are 
 familiarized. For being familiarized to the cursory 
 thought of things as really hinders the weight of them 
 from being seen, as from having its due influence upon 
 practice. 
 
 The thing asserted, and the truth of which is to be 
 inquired into, is this: That over and above our reason 
 and affections, which God has given us for the informa¬ 
 tion of our judgment and the conduct of our lives, he 
 has also, by external revelation, given us an account of 
 himself and his moral government over the world, im¬ 
 plying a future state of rewards and punishments; i. e. 
 hath revealed the system of natural religion : for 
 natural religion may be externally 1 ' revealed by God, 
 as the ignorant may be taught it by mankind their 
 fellow-creatures—that God, I say, has given us the 
 evidence of revelation, as well as the evidence of 
 reason, to ascertain this moral system ; together with 
 an account of a particular dispensation of Providence, 
 
 h P. 147, &c. 
 
262 
 
 OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE 
 
 PART II. 
 
 which reason could no way have discovered, and a 
 particular institution of religion founded on it, for the 
 recovery of mankind out of their present wretched 
 condition, and raising them to the perfection and final 
 happiness of their nature. 
 
 This revelation, whether real or supposed, may be 
 considered as wholly historical. For prophecy is no¬ 
 thing but the history of events before they come to 
 pass; doctrines also are matters of fact; and precepts 
 come under the same notion. And the general design 
 of Scripture, which contains in it this revelation, thus 
 considered as historical, may be said to be, to give us 
 an account of the world, in this one single view as 
 God’s world: by which it appears essentially distin¬ 
 guished from all other books, so far as I have found, 
 except such as are copied from it. It begins with an 
 account of God’s creation of the world, in order to 
 ascertain, and distinguish from all others, who is the 
 object of our worship, by what he has done: in order 
 to ascertain, who he is, concerning whose providence, 
 commands, promises, and threatenings, this sacred 
 book, all along, treats; the Maker and Proprietor of 
 the world, he whose creatures we are, the God of 
 nature: in order likewise to distinguish him from the 
 idols of the nations, which are either imaginary beings, 
 i. e. no beings at all; or else part of that creation, the 
 historical relation of which is here given. And St. John, 
 not improbably, with an eye to this Mosaic account 
 ot the creation, begins his Gospel with an account of 
 our Saviour’s preexistence, and that all things ivere 
 made by him ; and without him was not any thing made 
 that ivas made 1 : agreeably to the doctrine of St. Paul, 
 that God created all things by Jesus Christ k . This 
 being premised, the Scripture, taken together, 
 
 1 John i. 3. k Eph. iii. 9. 
 
 seems 
 
CHAP. VII.] 
 
 FOR CHRISTIANITY. 
 
 263 
 
 to profess to contain a kind of an abridgment of the 
 history of the world, in the view just now mentioned : 
 that is, a general account of the condition of religion 
 and its professors, during the continuance of that 
 apostasy from God, and state of wickedness, which it 
 every where supposes the world to lie in. And this 
 account of the state of religion carries with it some 
 brief account of the political state of things, as religion 
 is affected by it. Revelation indeed considers the 
 common affairs of this world, and what is going on in 
 it, as a mere scene of distraction ; and cannot be sup¬ 
 posed to concern itself with foretelling at what time 
 Rome, or Babylon, or Greece, or any particular place, 
 should be the most conspicuous seat of that tyranny 
 and dissoluteness, which all places equally aspire to be; 
 cannot, T say, be supposed to give any account of this 
 wild scene for its own sake. But it seems to contain 
 some very general account of the chief governments of 
 the world, as the general state of religion has been, is, 
 or shall be, affected by them, from the first trans¬ 
 gression, and during the whole interval of the world’s 
 continuing in its present state, to a certain future 
 period, spoken of both in the Old and New Testament, 
 very distinctly, and in great variety of expression : The 
 times of the restitution of all things 1 : when the mystery 
 of God shall he finished , as he hath declared to his 
 servants the prophets m : when the God of heaven shall 
 set up a kingdom , which shall never he destroyed: and 
 the kingdom shall not be left to other people n , as it is 
 represented to be during this apostasy, but judgment 
 shall he given to the saints °, and they shall reignV: and 
 the kingdom and dominion , and the greatness oj the 
 
 m Rev. x. 7. n Dan. ii. 44. 
 
 p Rev. xxii. 5. 
 
 1 Acts iii. 21. 
 
 0 Dan. vii. 22. 
 
2G4 
 
 OP THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE 
 
 kingdom under the whole heaven, shall be given to the 
 people of the saints of the Most High 'i. 
 
 Upon this general view of the Scripture, I would 
 remark, how great a length of time the whole relation 
 takes up, near six thousand years of which are past; 
 and how great a variety of things it treats of; the 
 natural and moral system or history of the world, in¬ 
 cluding the time when it was formed, all contained in 
 the very first book, and evidently written in a rude and 
 unlearned age; and in subsequent books, the various 
 common and prophetic history, and the particular dis¬ 
 pensation of Christianity. Now all this together gives 
 the largest scope for criticism ; and for confutation of 
 "hat is capable of being confuted, either from reason, 
 or from common history, or from any inconsistence in 
 its several parts. And it is a thing which deserves, I 
 think, to be mentioned, that whereas some imagine the 
 supposed doubtfulness of the evidence for revelation 
 implies a positive argument that it is not true; it 
 appears, on the contrary, to imply a positive argument 
 that it is true. For, could any common relation, of 
 such antiquity, extent, and variety, (for in these things 
 the stress of what I am now observing lies,) be pro¬ 
 posed to the examination of the world : that it could 
 not, in an age of knowledge and liberty, be confuted, 
 or shewn to have nothing in it, to the satisfaction of 
 leasonable men; this would be thought a strong pre¬ 
 sumptive proof of its truth. And indeed it must be a 
 proof of it, just in proportion to the probability, that if 
 it were false, it might be shewn to be so: and this, I 
 think, is scarce pretended to be shewn, but upon prin¬ 
 ciples and in ways of arguing, which have been clearly 
 obviated'. Nor does it at all appear, that any set of 
 
 1 Dan. vii. 27. r Chap, ii, hi, & c . 
 
FOR CHRISTIANITY. 
 
 265 
 
 CHAP. VII.] 
 
 men, who believe natural religion, are of the opinion, 
 that Christianity has been thus confuted. But to 
 proceed. 
 
 Together with the moral system of the world, the 
 Old Testament contains a chronological account of the 
 beginning of it, and from thence, an unbroken gene¬ 
 alogy of mankind for many ages before common history 
 begins ; and carried on as much farther as to make up a 
 continued thread of history of the length of between 
 three and four thousand years. It contains an account 
 of God’s making a covenant with a particular nation, 
 that they should be his people, and he would be their 
 God, in a peculiar sense; of his often interposing miracu¬ 
 lously in their affairs; giving them the promise, and, 
 long after, the possession, of a particular country; 
 assuring them of the greatest national prosperity in it, 
 if they would worship him, in opposition to the idols 
 which the rest of the world worshipped, and obey his 
 commands; and threatening them with unexampled 
 punishments, if they disobeyed him, and fell into the 
 general idolatry : insomuch that this one nation should 
 continue to be the observation and the wonder of all 
 the world. It declares particularly, that God would 
 scatter them among all people, from one end of the earth 
 unto the other: but that when they should return unto 
 the Lord their God, he would hare compassion upon them, 
 and gather them from all the nations, whither he had 
 scattered them : that Israel should he saved in the Lord, 
 with an everlasting salvation ; and not he ashamed or 
 confounded world without end. And as some of these 
 promises are conditional, others are as absolute, as any 
 thing can be expressed : that the time should come, 
 when the people should he all righteous, and inherit the 
 land for ever: that though God would make a full end 
 of all nations whither he had scattered them, yet would 
 
266 OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE [PART II. 
 
 he not make a full end of them: that he would bring 
 again the captivity of his people Israel , and plant them 
 upon their land, and they should be no more pulled up 
 out of their land: that the seed of Israel should not 
 cease from being a nation for ever s . It foretells, that 
 God would raise them up a particular person, in whom 
 all his promises should finally be fulfilled ; the Messiah, 
 who should be, in an high and eminent sense, their 
 anointed Prince and Saviour. This was foretold in such 
 a manner, as raised a general expectation of such a 
 person in the nation, as appears from the New Testa¬ 
 ment, and is an acknowledged fact; an expectation of 
 his coming at such a particular time before any one 
 appeared claiming to be that person, and when there 
 was no ground for such an expectation, but from the 
 prophecies: which expectation, therefore, must in all 
 reason be presumed to be explanatory of those prophe¬ 
 cies, if there were any doubt about their meaning. It 
 seems moreover to foretell, that this person should be 
 rejected by that nation, to whom he had been so long- 
 promised, and though he was so much desired by 
 them b And it expressly foretells, that he should be 
 the Saviour of the Gentiles; and even that the com¬ 
 pletion of the scheme, contained in this book, and then 
 begun, and in its progress, should be somewhat so great, 
 that, in comparison with it, the restoration of the Jews 
 alone would be but of small account. It is a light 
 thing that thou shoiddest be my servant to raise up the 
 tribes of Jacob, and to restore the preserved of Israel: I 
 will also give thee for a light to the Gentiles, that thou 
 mayest be for salvation unto the end of the earth. And. 
 In the last days, the mountain of the Lord's house shall 
 
 s Deut. xxviii. 64. xxx. 2, 3; Isa. xlv. 17. lx. 21 ; Jer. xxx. 11. xlvi. 
 28; Amos ix . 14, 15; Jer. xxxi. 36. 
 t Is. viii- 14* 15- xlix. 5. ch. liii; Mai. i. 10, 11. and ch. iii. 
 
FOR CHRISTIANITY. 
 
 267 
 
 CHAP. VII.] 
 
 be established in the top of the mountains , and shall be 
 exalted above the hills; and all nations shall flow into it 
 —for out of Zion shall go forth the law, and the word of 
 the Lord from Jerusalem. And he shall judge among 
 the nations—and the Lord alone shall be exalted in that 
 day, and the idols he shall utterly abolish u . The Scrip¬ 
 ture farther contains an account, that at the time the 
 Messiah was expected, a person rose up, in this nation, 
 claiming to be that Messiah, to be the person, whom 
 all the prophecies referred to, and in whom they should 
 centre : that he spent some years in a continued course 
 of miraculous works; and endued his immediate dis¬ 
 ciples and followers with a power of doing the same, 
 as a proof of the truth of that religion, which he com¬ 
 missioned them to publish : that, invested with this 
 authority and power, they made numerous converts in 
 the remotest countries, and settled and established his 
 religion in the world; to the end of which the Scrip¬ 
 ture professes to give a prophetic account of the state 
 
 of this religion amongst mankind. 
 
 © © 
 
 Let us now suppose a person utterly ignorant of 
 history, to have all this related to him out of the 
 Scripture. Or suppose such an one, having the Scrip¬ 
 ture put into his hands, to remark these things in it, 
 not knowing but that the whole, even its civil history, 
 as well as the other parts of it, might be, from begin¬ 
 ning to end, an entire invention ; and to ask, What 
 truth was in it, and whether the revelation here related 
 was real, or a fiction ? And, instead of a direct answer, 
 suppose him, all at once, to be told the following con¬ 
 fessed facts; and then to unite them into one view. 
 
 u Is. xlix. 6. ch. ii. ch. xi. ch. lvi. 7; Mai. i. 11. To which must be 
 added, the other prophecies of the like kind, several in the New Testa¬ 
 ment, and very many in the Old; which describe what shall be the com¬ 
 pletion of the revealed plan of Providence. 
 
268 
 
 OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE 
 
 PART II. 
 
 Let him first be told, in how great a degree the pro¬ 
 fession and establishment of natural religion, the belief 
 that there is one God to be worshipped, that virtue is 
 his law, and that mankind shall be rewarded and 
 punished hereafter, as they obey and disobey it here; 
 in how very great a degree, T say, the profession and 
 establishment of this moral system in the world is owing 
 to the revelation, whether real or supposed, contained 
 in this book : the establishment of this moral system, 
 even in those countries which do not acknowledge the 
 proper authority of the Scripture x . Let him be told 
 also, what number of nations do acknowledge its pro¬ 
 per authority. Let him then take in the consideration, of 
 what importance religion is to mankind. And upon 
 these things he might, T think, truly observe, that this 
 supposed revelation’s obtaining and being received in 
 the world, with all the circumstances and effects of it, 
 considered together as one event, is the most conspi¬ 
 cuous and important event in the history of mankind : 
 that a book of this nature, and thus promulged and 
 recommended to our consideration, demands, as if by a 
 voice from heaven, to have its claims most seriously 
 examined into: and that, before such examination, to 
 treat it with any kind of scoffing and ridicule, is an 
 offence against natural piety. But it is to be remem¬ 
 bered, that how much soever the establishment of 
 natural religion in the world is owing to the Scripture- 
 revelation, this does not destroy the proof of religion 
 from reason, any more than the proof of Euclid’s Ele¬ 
 ments is destroyed, by a man’s knowing or thinking, 
 that he should never have seen the truth of the several 
 propositions contained in it, nor had those propositions 
 come into his thoughts, but for that mathematician. 
 
 . Let such a person as we are speaking of be, in the 
 
 x Page 222. 
 
CHAP. VII.] 
 
 FOR CHRISTIANITY. 
 
 269 
 
 next place, informed of the acknowledged antiquity of 
 the first parts of this book; and that its chronology, its 
 account of the time when the earth, and the several 
 parts of it, were first peopled with human creatures, is 
 no way contradicted, but is really confirmed, by the 
 natural and civil history of the world, collected from 
 common historians, from the state of the earth, and 
 from the late invention of arts and sciences. And as 
 the Scripture contains an unbroken thread of common 
 and civil history, from the creation to the captivity, for 
 between three and four thousand years; let the person 
 we are speaking of be told, in the next place, that this 
 general history, as it is not contradicted, but is con¬ 
 firmed by profane history as much as there would be 
 reason to expect, upon- supposition of its truth ; so 
 there is nothing in the whole history itself, to give any 
 reasonable ground of suspicion of its not being, in the 
 general, a faithful and literally true genealogy of men, 
 and series of things. I speak here only of the com¬ 
 mon Scripture-history, or of the course of ordinary 
 events related in it, as distinguished from miracles, and 
 from the prophetic history. In all the Scripture- 
 narrations of this kind, following events arise out of 
 foregoing ones, as in all other histories. There appears 
 nothing related as done in any age, not conformable to 
 the manners of that age: nothing in the account of a 
 succeeding age, which, one would say, could not be 
 true, or was improbable, from the account of things in 
 the preceding one. There is nothing in the characters, 
 which would raise a thought of their being feigned ; 
 but all the internal marks imaginable of their being- 
 real. It is to be added also, that mere genealogies, 
 bare narratives of the number of years, which persons 
 called by such and such names lived, do not carry the 
 face of fiction ; perhaps do carry some presumption of 
 
270 OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE [PART II. 
 
 veracity: and all unadorned narratives, which have 
 nothing to surprise, may be thought to carry somewhat 
 of the like presumption too. And the domestic and 
 the political history is plainly credible. There may be 
 incidents in Scripture, which, taken alone in the naked 
 way they are told, may appear strange; especially to 
 persons of other manners, temper, education : but there 
 are also incidents of undoubted truth, in many or most 
 persons’ lives, which, in the same circumstances, would 
 appear to the full as strange. There may be mistakes 
 of transcribers, there may be other real or seeming 
 mistakes, not easy to be particularly accounted for: 
 but there are certainly no more things of this kind in 
 the Scripture, than what were to have been expected 
 in books of such antiquity: and nothing, in any wise, 
 sufficient to discredit the general narrative. Now, 
 that a history, claiming to commence from the creation, 
 and extending in one continued series, through so 
 great a length of time, and variety of events, should 
 have such appearances of reality and truth in its whole 
 contexture, is surely a very remarkable circumstance in 
 its favour. And as all this is applicable to the com¬ 
 mon history of the New Testament, so there is a 
 farther credibility, and a very high one, given to it by 
 profane authors: many of these writing of the same 
 times, and confirming the truth of customs and events 
 which are incidentally as well as more purposely men¬ 
 tioned in it. And this credibility of the common 
 Scripture-history, gives some credibility to its mira¬ 
 culous history: especially as this is interwoven with the 
 common, so as that they imply each other, and both 
 together make up one relation. 
 
 Let it then be more particularly observed to this 
 person, that it is an acknowledged matter of fact, which 
 is indeed implied in the foregoing observation, that 
 
 •w 
 
FOR CHRISTIANITY. 
 
 271 
 
 CHAP. VII.] 
 
 there was such a nation as the Jews, of the greatest 
 antiquity, whose government and general polity was 
 founded on the law, here related to be given them bv 
 Moses as from heaven : that natural religion, though 
 with rites additional yet no way contrary to it, was 
 their established religion, which cannot be said of the 
 the Gentile world: and that their very being as a 
 nation, depended upon their acknowledgment of one 
 God, the God of the universe. For, suppose in then- 
 captivity in Babylon, they had gone over to the religion 
 of their conquerors, there would have remained no 
 bond of union, to keep them a distinct people. And 
 whilst they were under their own kings, in their own 
 country, a total apostasy from God would have been 
 the dissolution of their whole government. They in 
 such a sense nationally acknowledged and worshipped 
 the Maker of heaven and earth, when the rest of the 
 world were sunk in idolatry, as rendered them, in fact, 
 the peculiar people of God. And this so remarkable 
 an establishment and preservation of natural religion 
 amongst them, seems to add some peculiar credibility 
 to the historical evidence for the miracles of Moses 
 and the Prophets: because these miracles are a full 
 satisfactory account of this event, which plainly wants 
 to be accounted for, and cannot otherwise. 
 
 Let this person, supposed wholly ignorant of history, 
 be acquainted farther, that one claiming to be the 
 Messiah, of Jewish extraction, rose up at the time 
 Avhen this nation, from the prophecies above mentioned, 
 expected the Messiah: that he Avas rejected, as it 
 seemed to have been foretold he should, by the body of 
 the people, under the direction of their rulers: that in 
 the course of a very feAv years, he was believed on and 
 acknoAvledged as the promised Messiah, by great num¬ 
 bers among the Gentiles, agreeably to the prophecies of 
 
272 
 
 OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE 
 
 [part II. 
 
 Scripture, yet not upon the evidence of prophecy, but 
 of miracles of which miracles we have also strong* 
 historical evidence; (by which I mean here no more 
 than must be acknowledged by unbelievers; for let 
 pious frauds and follies be admitted to weaken, it is 
 absurd to say they destroy, our evidence of miracles 
 wrought in proof of Christianity 1 :) that this religion 
 approving itself to the reason of mankind, and carrying 
 its own evidence with it, so far as reason is a judge of 
 its system, and being no way contrary to reason in 
 those parts of it which require to be believed upon the 
 mere authority of its Author; that this religion, I say, 
 gradually spread and supported itself for some hundred 
 years, not only without any assistance from temporal 
 power, but under constant discouragements, and often 
 the bitterest persecutions from it; and then became 
 the religion of the world: that in the mean time, the 
 Jewish nation and government were destroyed in a 
 very remarkable manner, and the people carried away 
 captive and dispersed through the most distant coun¬ 
 tries ; in which state of dispersion they have remained 
 fifteen hundred years: and that they remain a numerous 
 people, united amongst themselves, and distinguished 
 from the rest of the world, as they were in the days of 
 Moses, by the profession of his law; and every where 
 looked upon in a manner, which one scarce knows how 
 distinctly to express, but in the words of the prophetic 
 account of it, given so many ages before it came to 
 pass ; Thou shall become an astonishment, a proverb, and 
 a byword, among all nations whither the Lord shall 
 lead thee a . 
 
 The appearance of a standing miracle, in the Jews 
 remaining a distinct people in their dispersion, and the 
 confirmation which this event appears to give to the 
 
 ' P- 2 44i & c - z P- 251, See. a Deut. xxviii. 37. 
 
FOR CHRISTIANITY. 
 
 CHAP. VII.] 
 
 273 
 
 tiuth of revelation, may be thought to be answered, by 
 their religion’s forbidding them intermarriages with 
 those of any other, and prescribing them a great many 
 peculiarities in their food, by which they are debarred 
 from the means of incorporating with the people in 
 whose countries they live. This is not, I think, a 
 satisfactory account of that which it pretends to ac¬ 
 count for. But what does it pretend to account for? 
 The correspondence between this event and the pro¬ 
 phecies ; or the coincidence of both, with a long dispen¬ 
 sation of Providence, of a peculiar nature, towards that 
 people formerly? No. It is only the event itself, 
 which is offered to be thus accounted for; which 
 single event, taken alone, abstracted from all such 
 correspondence and coincidence, perhaps would not 
 have appeared miraculous: but that correspondence 
 and coincidence may be so, though the event itself be 
 supposed not. Thus the concurrence of our Saviour’s 
 being born at Bethlehem, with a long foregoing series 
 of prophecy and other coincidences, is doubtless mira¬ 
 culous ; the series of prophecy, and other coincidences, 
 and the event, being admitted : though the event itself, 
 his birth at that place, appears to have been brought 
 about in a natural way; of which, however, no one can 
 be certain. 
 
 And as several of these events seem, in some degree 
 expressly, to have verified the prophetic history already; 
 so likewise they may be considered farther, as having a 
 peculiar aspect towards the full completion of it ;°as 
 affording some presumption that the whole of it shall, 
 one time or other, be fulfilled. Thus, that the Jews 
 have been so wonderfully preserved in their long and 
 wide dispersion; which is indeed the direct fulfilling of 
 some prophecies, but is now mentioned only as looking- 
 forward to somewhat yet to come : that natural religion 
 
 ANALOGY. T 
 
274 
 
 OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE 
 
 [part II. 
 
 came forth from Judaea, and spread, in the degree it 
 has done over the world, before lost in idolatry ; which, 
 together with some other things, have distinguished that 
 very place, in like manner as the people of it are dis¬ 
 tinguished : that this great change of religion over the 
 earth was brought about under the profession and 
 acknowledgment, that Jesus was the promised Mes¬ 
 siah : things of this kind naturally turn the thoughts of 
 serious men towards the full completion of the pro¬ 
 phetic history, concerning the final restoration of that 
 people; concerning the establishment of the everlasting 
 kingdom among them, the kingdom of the Messiah ; 
 and the future state of the world, under this sacred 
 government. Such circumstances and events, compared 
 with these prophecies, though no completions of them, 
 yet would not, I think, be spoken of as nothing in the 
 argument, by a person upon his first being informed of 
 them. They fall in with the prophetic history of 
 things still future, give it some additional credibility, 
 have the appearance of being somewhat in order to the 
 full completion of it. 
 
 Indeed it requires a good degree of knowledge, and 
 great calmness and consideration, to be able to judge 
 thoroughly of the evidence for the truth of Christianity, 
 from that part of the prophetic history which relates to 
 the situation of the kingdoms of the world, and to the 
 state of the Church, from the establishment of Christ¬ 
 ianity to the present time. But it appears from a 
 general view of it, to be very material. And those 
 persons who have thoroughly examined it, and some of 
 them were men of the coolest tempers, greatest capaci¬ 
 ties, and least liable to imputations of prejudice, insist 
 upon it as determinately conclusive. 
 
 Suppose now a person quite ignorant of history, first 
 to recollect the passages above mentioned out of Scrip- 
 
CHAP. VII.] 
 
 FOB CHRISTIANITY. 
 
 275 
 
 tme, without knowing but that the whole was a late 
 fiction, then to be informed of the correspondent facts 
 now mentioned, and to unite them all into one view: 
 that the profession and establishment of natural religion 
 in the world is greatly owing, in different ways, to this 
 book, and the supposed revelation which it contains; 
 that it is acknowledged to be of the earliest antiquity; 
 that its chronology and common history are entirely 
 credible; that this ancient nation, the Jews, of whom 
 it chiefly treats, appear to have been, in fact, the people 
 of God, in a distinguished sense; that, as there was a 
 national expectation amongst them, raised from the 
 prophecies, of a Messiah to appear at such a time, so 
 one at this time appeared claiming to be that Messiah; 
 that he was rejected by this nation, but received by the 
 Gentiles, not upon the evidence of prophecy, but of mi¬ 
 racles ; that the religion he taught supported itself under 
 the greatest difficulties, gained ground, and at length 
 became the religion of the world ; that in the mean 
 time the Jewish polity was utterly destroyed, and the 
 nation dispersed over the face of the earth ; that not- 
 w ithstanding this, they have remained a distinct nume¬ 
 rous people for so many centuries, even to this day; 
 which not only appears to be the express completion of 
 several prophecies concerning them, but also renders it, 
 as one may speak, a visible and easy possibility that the 
 promises made to them as a nation, may yet be fulfilled. 
 And to these acknowledged truths, let the person we 
 have been supposing add, as f think he ought, whether 
 ever} one will allow it or no, the obvious appearances 
 which there are, of the state of the world, in other 
 respects besides what relates to the Jews, and of the 
 Christian Church, having so long answered, and still 
 answering to the prophetic history. Suppose, l say, 
 these facts set over against the things before mentioned 
 
 t 2 
 
276 OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE [PART II. 
 
 out of the Scripture, and seriously compared with them ; 
 the joint view of both together must, I think, appear 
 of very great weight to a considerate reasonable person: 
 of much greater indeed, upon having them first laid 
 before him, than is easy for us, who are so familiarized 
 to them, to conceive, without some particular attention 
 for that purpose. 
 
 All these things, and the several particulars con¬ 
 tained under them, require to be distinctly and most 
 thoroughly examined into; that the weight of each 
 may be judged of, upon such examination, and such 
 conclusion drawn as results from their united force. 
 But this has not been attempted here. I have gone 
 no farther than to shew, that the general imperfect 
 view of them now given, the confessed historical evi¬ 
 dence for miracles, and the many obvious appearing 
 completions of prophecy, together with the collateral 
 things b here mentioned, and there are several others 
 of the like sort; that all this together, which, being 
 fact, must be acknowledged by unbelievers, amounts to 
 real evidence of somewhat more than human in this 
 matter: evidence much more important, than careless 
 men, who have been accustomed only to transient and 
 partial views of it, can imagine ; and indeed abundantly 
 sufficient to act upon. And these things, I apprehend, 
 must be acknowledged by unbelievers. For though 
 they may say, that the historical evidence of miracles 
 wrought in attestation of Christianity, is not sufficient 
 to convince them, that such miracles were really 
 wrought; they cannot deny, that there is such histo¬ 
 rical evidence, it being a known matter of fact that 
 
 b All the particular things mentioned in this chapter, not reducible to 
 the head of certain miracles, or determinate completions of prophecy. See 
 p. 239, 240. 
 
FOR CHRISTIANITY. 
 
 277 
 
 CHAP. VII.] 
 
 there is. They may say, the conformity between the 
 prophecies and events is by accident: but there are 
 many instances in which such conformity itself cannot 
 be denied. They may say, with regard to such kind of 
 collateial things as those above mentioned, that any 
 odd accidental events, without meaning, will have a 
 meaning found in them by fanciful people: and that 
 such as are fanciful in any one certain way, will make 
 out a thousand coincidences, which seem to favour 
 their peculiar follies. Men, I say, may talk thus: but 
 no one who is serious, can possibly think these things 
 to be nothing, if he considers the importance of colla¬ 
 teral things, and even of lesser circumstances, in the 
 evidence of probability, as distinguished, in nature, 
 from the evidence of demonstration. In many cases 
 indeed it seems to require the truest judgment, to 
 determine with exactness the weight of circumstantial 
 evidence : but it is very often altogether as convincing, 
 as that which is the most express and direct. 
 
 This general view of the evidence for Christianity, 
 considered as making one argument, may also serve to 
 recommend to serious persons, to set down every thing 
 which they think may be of any real weight at all in 
 proof of it, and particularly the many seeming com¬ 
 pletions of prophecy : and they will find, that, judging 
 by the natural rules, by which we judge of probable 
 evidence in common matters, they amount to a much 
 higher degree of proof, upon such a joint review, than 
 could be supposed upon considering them separately, at. 
 different times; how strong soever the proof might 
 before appear to them, upon such separate views of it. 
 For probable proofs, by being added, not only increase 
 the evidence, but multiply it. Nor should I dissuade any 
 one from setting down, what he thought made for the 
 contrary side. But then it is to be remembered, not in 
 
278 
 
 OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE 
 
 PART II. 
 
 order to influence his judgment, but his practice, that a 
 mistake on one side may be, in its consequences, much 
 more dangerous, than a mistake on the other. And 
 what course is most safe, and what most dangerous, is 
 a consideration thought very material, when we delibe¬ 
 rate, not concerning events, but concerning conduct in 
 our temporal affairs. To be influenced by this con¬ 
 sideration in our judgment, to believe or disbelieve 
 upon it, is indeed as much prejudice, as any thing 
 whatever. And, like other prejudices, it operates 
 contrary ways, in different men ; for some are inclined 
 to believe what they hope, and others what they fear. 
 And it is manifest unreasonableness to apply to men’s 
 passions in order to gain their assent. But in delibera¬ 
 tions concerning conduct, there is nothing which reason 
 more requires to be taken into the account, than the 
 importance of it. For, suppose it doubtful, what 
 would be the consequence of acting in this, or in a 
 contrary manner: still, that taking one side could be 
 attended with little or no bad consequence, and taking 
 the other might be attended with the greatest, must 
 appear, to unprejudiced reason, of the highest moment 
 towards determining, how we are to act. But the 
 truth of our religion, like the truth of common matters, 
 is to be judged of by all the evidence taken together. 
 And unless the whole series of things which may be al¬ 
 leged in this argument, and every particular thing in it, 
 can reasonably be supposed to have been by accident; 
 (for here the stress of the argument for Christianity lies;) 
 then is the truth of it proved: in like manner, as if in 
 any common case, numerous events acknowledged, 
 were to be alleged in proof of any other event disputed ; 
 the truth of the disputed event would be proved, not 
 only if any one of the acknowledged ones did of itself 
 clearly imply it, but, though no one of them singly did 
 
CHAP. VII.] 
 
 FOR CHRISTIANITY. 
 
 279 
 
 so, if the whole of the acknowledged events taken to¬ 
 gether could not in reason be supposed to have hap¬ 
 pened, unless the disputed one were true. 
 
 It is obvious, how much advantage the nature of this 
 evidence gives to those persons who attack Christianity, 
 especially in conversation. For it is easy to shew, in a 
 short and lively manner, that such and such things are 
 liable to objection, that this and another thing is of 
 little weight in itself; but impossible to shew, in like 
 manner, the united force of the whole argument in 
 one view. 
 
 However, lastly, as it has been made appear, that 
 there is no presumption against a revelation as mira¬ 
 culous ; that the general scheme of Christianity, and 
 the principal parts of it, are conformable to the ex¬ 
 perienced constitution of things, and the whole perfectly 
 credible: so the account now given of the positive 
 evidence for it, shews, that this evidence is such, as, 
 from the nature of it, cannot be destroyed, though it 
 should be lessened. 
 
 CHAP. VIII. 
 
 Of the Objections which may be made against arguing 
 from the Analogy of Nature, to Religion. 
 
 I F every one would consider, with such attention as 
 they are bound, even in point of morality, to con¬ 
 sider, what they judge and give characters of; the 
 occasion of this chapter would be, in some good 
 measure at least, superseded. But since this is not to 
 be expected; for some we find do not concern them¬ 
 selves to understand even what they write against: 
 since this treatise, in common with most others, lies 
 
280 
 
 OBJECTIONS AGAINST THE ANALOGY 
 
 PART II. 
 
 open to objections, which may appear very material to 
 thoughtful men at first sight; and, besides that, seems 
 peculiarly liable to the objections of such as can judge 
 without thinking, and of such as can censure without 
 judging; it may not be amiss to set down the chief of 
 these objections which occur to me, and consider them 
 to their hands. And they are such as these: 
 
 u That it is a poor thing to solve difficulties in 
 revelation, by saying, that there are the same in 
 “ natural religion; when what is wanting is to clear 
 both of them of these their common, as well as other 
 “ their respective, difficulties: but that it is a strange 
 “ w ay indeed of convincing men of the obligations of 
 leligion, to shew 7 them, that they have as little reason 
 “ for their worldly pursuits: and a strange way of 
 “ vindicating the justice and goodness of the Author 
 “ of nature, and of removing the objections against 
 “ both, to which the system of religion lies open, to 
 “ show, that the like objections lie against natural 
 “ providence; a way of answering objections against 
 “ religion, without so much as pretending to make out, 
 that the system of it, or the particular things in it 
 
 “ objected against, are reasonable-especially, per- 
 
 “ haps some may be inattentive enough to add, must 
 “ this be thought strange, when it is confessed that 
 “ analogy is no answer to such objections: that when 
 “ this sort of reasoning is carried to the utmost length 
 “ ifc can be imagined capable of, it will yet leave the 
 “ mind in a very unsatisfied state: and that it must he 
 “ unaccountable ignorance of mankind, to imagine thev 
 “ will be prevailed with to forego their present interests 
 “ and pleasures, from regard to religion, upon doubtful 
 “ evidence.” 
 
 Now, as plausible as this way of talking may appear, 
 that appearance will be found in a great measure owing 
 
OF NATURE TO RELIGION. 
 
 281 
 
 CHAP. VIII.] 
 
 to half-views, which shew but part of an object, yet 
 shew that indistinctly, and to undeterminate language. 
 By these means weak men are often deceived by 
 others, and ludicrous men, by themselves. And even 
 those, who are serious and considerate, cannot always 
 readily disentangle, and at once clearly see through 
 the perplexities, in which subjects themselves are in¬ 
 volved ; and which are heightened by the deficiencies 
 and the abuse of words. To this latter sort of persons, 
 the following reply to each part of this objection seve- 
 rally, may be of some assistance ; as it may also tend a 
 little to stop and silence others. 
 
 First, The thing wanted, i. e. what men require, is 
 to have all difficulties cleared. And this is, or, at least 
 for any thing we know to the contrary, it may be, the 
 same, as requiring to comprehend the Divine nature, 
 and the whole plan of Providence from everlasting to 
 everlasting. But it hath always been allowed to argue, 
 from what is acknowledged, to what is disputed. And 
 it is in no other sense a poor thing, to argue from 
 natural religion to revealed, in the manner found fault 
 with, than it is to argue in numberless other ways of 
 probable deduction and inference, in matters of con¬ 
 duct, which we are continually reduced to the necessity 
 of doing. Indeed the epithet poor may be applied, I 
 fear, as properly to great part or the whole of human 
 life, as it is to the things mentioned in the objection. 
 Is it not a poor thing, for a physician to have so little 
 knowledge in the cure of diseases, as even the most 
 eminent have ? to act upon conjecture and guess, where 
 the life of man is concerned? Undoubtedly it is : but 
 not in comparison of having no skill at all in that 
 useful art, and being obliged to act wholly in the dark. 
 
 Further: since it is as unreasonable, as it is common, 
 to urge objections against revelation, which are of 
 
282 
 
 OBJECTIONS AGAINST THE ANALOGY 
 
 PART II. 
 
 equal weight against natural religion ; and those who 
 do this, if they are not confused themselves, deal 
 unfairly with others, in making it seem, that they are 
 arguing only against revelation, or particular doctrines 
 of it, when in reality they are arguing against moral 
 providence; it is a thing of consequence to shew, that 
 such objections are as much levelled against natural 
 religion as against revealed. And objections, which 
 are equally applicable to both, are properly speaking 
 answered, by its being shewn that they are so, provided 
 the former be admitted to be true. And, without 
 taking in the consideration how distinctly this is ad¬ 
 mitted, it is plainly very material to observe, that as 
 the things objected against in natural religion are of 
 the same kind with what is certain matter of experience 
 in the course of providence, and in the information 
 which God affords us concerning our temporal interest 
 under his government; so the objections against the 
 system of Christianity, and the evidence of it, are of 
 the very same kind with those which are made against 
 the system and evidence of natural religion. However, 
 the reader upon review may see, that most of the 
 analogies insisted upon, even in the latter part of this 
 treatise, do not necessarily require to have more taken 
 tor granted than is in the former; that there is an 
 Author of nature, or natural Governor of the world: 
 and Christianity is vindicated, not from its analogy to 
 natural religion, but chiefly from its analogy to the 
 experienced constitution of nature. 
 
 Secondly, Religion is a practical thing, and consists 
 in such a determinate course of life, as being what, 
 there is reason to think, is commanded by the Author 
 of nature, and will, upon the whole, be our happiness 
 under his government. Now it men can be convinced, 
 that they have the like reason to believe this, as to 
 
OF NATURE TO RELIGION. 
 
 283 
 
 CHAP. VIII.] 
 
 believe, that taking care of their temporal affairs will 
 be to their advantage; such conviction cannot but be 
 an argument to them for the practice of religion. And 
 if there be really any reason for believing one of these, 
 and endeavouring to preserve life, and secure ourselves 
 the necessaries and conveniences of it; then there is 
 reason also for believing the other, and endeavouring 
 to secure the interest it proposes to us. And if the 
 interest, which religion proposes to us, be infinitely 
 greater than our whole temporal interest; then there 
 must be proportionably greater reason for endeavouring 
 to secure one, than the other; since, by the supposition, 
 the probability of our securing one is equal to the pro¬ 
 bability of our securing the other. This seems plainly 
 unanswerable ; and has a tendency to influence fair 
 minds, who consider what our condition really is, or 
 upon what evidence we are naturally appointed to act; 
 and who are disposed to acquiesce in the terms upon 
 which we live, and attend to and follow that practical 
 instruction, whatever it be, which is afforded us. 
 
 But the chief and proper force of the argument re¬ 
 ferred to in the objection, lies in another place. For, 
 it is said that the proof of religion is involved in such 
 inextricable difficulties, as to render it doubtful; and 
 that it cannot be supposed, that, if it were true, it 
 would be left upon doubtful evidence. Here then, 
 over and above the force of each particular difficulty 
 or objection, these difficulties and objections taken 
 together are turned into a positive argument against 
 the truth of religion ; which argument would stand 
 thus. If religion were true, it would not be left 
 doubtful, and open to objections to the degree in 
 which it is: therefore that it is thus left, not only 
 renders the evidence of it weak, and lessens its force, 
 in proportion to the weight of such objections; but 
 
284 
 
 OBJECTIONS AGAINST THE ANALOGY 
 
 [part II. 
 
 also shews it to be false, or is a general presumption of 
 its being so. Now the observation, that, from the 
 natural constitution and course of things, we must in 
 our temporal concerns, almost continually, and in 
 matters of great consequence, act upon evidence of a 
 like kind and degree to the evidence of religion, is an 
 answer to this argument; because it shews, that it is 
 according to the conduct and character of the Author 
 of nature to appoint we should act upon evidence like 
 to that, which this argument presumes he cannot be 
 supposed to appoint we should act upon: it is an 
 instance, a general one made up of numerous particular 
 ones, of somewhat in his dealing with us, similar to 
 " hat is said to be incredible. And as the force of this 
 answer lies merely in the parallel, which there is 
 between the evidence for religion and for our temporal 
 conduct; the answer is equally just and conclusive, 
 whether the parallel be made out, by shewing the evi¬ 
 dence of the former to be higher, or the evidence of 
 the latter to be lower. 
 
 Thirdly, The design of this treatise is not to vindicate 
 the character of God, but to shew the obligations of 
 men : it is not to justify his providence, but to shew 
 v hat belongs to us to do. These are two subjects, and 
 ought not to be confounded. And though they may at 
 length run up into each other, yet observations may 
 immediately tend to make out the latter, which do not 
 appear, by any immediate connection, to the purpose 
 of the former; which is less our concern, than many 
 seem to think. For, first, it is not necessary we should 
 justify the dispensations of Providence against ob¬ 
 jections, any farther than to shew, that the things 
 objected against may, for ought we know, be consistent 
 with justice and goodness. Suppose then, that there 
 are things in the system of this world, and plan of 
 
CHAP. VIII.] 
 
 OF NATURE TO RELIGION. 
 
 285 
 
 Providence relating to it, which taken alone would be 
 unjust: yet it has been shewn unanswerably, that if we 
 could take in the reference, which these things may 
 have to other things present, past, and to come; to 
 the whole scheme, which the things objected against 
 are parts of; these very things might, for ought we 
 know, be found to be, not only consistent with justice, 
 but instances of it. Indeed it has been shewn, by the 
 analogy of what we see, not only possible that this 
 may be the case, but credible that it is. And thus 
 objections, drawn from such things, are answered, and 
 Providence is vindicated, as far as religion makes its 
 vindication necessary. Hence it appears, secondly, that 
 objections against the Divine justice and goodness are 
 not endeavoured to be removed, by shewing that the 
 like objections, allowed to be really conclusive, lie 
 against natural providence : but those objections being- 
 supposed and shewn not to be conclusive, the things 
 objected against, considered as matters of fact, are 
 farther shewn to be credible, from their conformity to 
 the constitution of nature ; for instance, that God will 
 reward and punish men for their actions hereafter, 
 from the observation, that he does reward and punish 
 them for their actions here. And this, I apprehend, is 
 of weight. And I add, thirdly, it would be of weight, 
 even though those objections were not answered. For, 
 there being the proof of religion above set down ; and 
 religion implying several facts ; for instance again, the 
 fact last mentioned, that God will reward and punish 
 men for their actions hereafter; the observation, that 
 his present method of government is by rewards and 
 punishments, shews that future fact not to be incredi¬ 
 ble : whatever objections men may think they have 
 against it, as unjust or unmerciful, according to their 
 notions of justice and mercy; or as improbable from 
 
286 
 
 OBJECTIONS AGAINST THE ANALOGY 
 
 PART II. 
 
 their belief of necessity. I say, as improbable: for it is 
 evident no objection against it, as unjust , can be urged 
 from necessity; since this notion as much destroys 
 injustice, as it does justice. Then, fourthly, Though 
 objections against the reasonableness of the system of 
 religion cannot indeed be answered without entering 
 into consideration of its reasonableness ; yet objections 
 against the credibility or truth of it may. Because the 
 system of it is reducible into what is properly matter 
 of fact: and the truth, the probable truth, of facts, 
 may be shewn without consideration of their reason¬ 
 ableness. Nor is it necessary, though, in some cases 
 and respects, it is highly useful and proper, yet it is not 
 necessary, to give a proof of the reasonableness of every 
 precept enjoined us, and of every particular dispensation 
 of Providence, which comes into the system of religion. 
 Indeed the more thoroughly a person of a right dis¬ 
 position is convinced of the perfection of the Divine 
 nature and conduct, the farther he will advance to¬ 
 wards that perfection of religion, which St. John speaks 
 of a . But the general obligations of religion are fully 
 made out, by proving the reasonableness of the practice 
 of it. And that the practice of religion is reasonable, 
 may be shewn, though no more could be proved, than 
 that the system of it may be so, for ought we know to 
 the contrary: and even without entering in the distinct 
 consideration of this. And from hence, fifthly, it is 
 easy to see, that though the analogy of nature is not 
 an immediate answer to objections against the wisdom, 
 the justice, or goodness, of any doctrine or precept of 
 leligion: yet it may be, as it is, an immediate and 
 direct answer to what is really intended by such 
 objections; which is, to shew that the things objected 
 against are incredible. 
 
 i John iv. 18 . 
 
OF NATURE TO RELIGION. 
 
 287 
 
 CHAP. VIII.] 
 
 Fourthly, It is most readily acknowledged, that the 
 foregoing treatise is by no means satisfactory ; very far 
 indeed from it: but so would any natural institution of 
 life appear, if reduced into a system, together with its 
 evidence. Leaving religion out of the case, men are 
 divided in their opinions, whether our pleasures over¬ 
 balance our pains: and whether it be, or be not, 
 eligible to live in this world. And were all such con¬ 
 troversies settled, which perhaps, in speculation, would 
 be found involved in great difficulties; and were it 
 determined upon the evidence of reason, as nature has 
 determined it to our hands, that life is to be preserved : 
 yet still, the rules which God has been pleased to 
 afford us, for escaping the miseries of it, and obtaining 
 its satisfactions, the rules, for instance, of preservin'* - 
 health, and recovering it when lost, are not only fallible 
 and precarious, but very far from being exact. Nor 
 are we informed by nature, in future contingencies and 
 accidents, so as to render it at all certain, what is the 
 best method of managing our affairs. What will be 
 the success of our temporal pursuits, in the common 
 sense of the word Success, is highly doubtful. And 
 what will be the success of them in the proper sense of 
 the word ; i. e. what happiness or enjoyment we shall 
 obtain by them, is doubtful in a much higher degree. 
 Indeed the unsatisfactory nature of the evidence, with 
 which we are obliged to take up, in the daily course of 
 life, is scarce to be expressed. Yet men do not throw¬ 
 away life, or disregard the interests of it, upon account 
 of this doubtfulness. The evidence of religion then 
 being admitted real, those who object against it, as not 
 satisfactory, i. e. as not being what they wish it, plainly 
 forget the very condition of our being : for satisfaction, 
 in this sense, does not belong to such a creature as 
 man. And, which is more material, they forget also 
 
OBJECTIONS AGAINST THE ANALOGY 
 
 J288 
 
 [part II. 
 
 the very nature of religion. For, religion presupposes, 
 in all those who will embrace it, a certain decree of 
 integrity and honesty; which it was intended to try 
 whether men have or not, and to exercise in such as 
 have it, in order to its improvement. Religion pre¬ 
 supposes this as much, and in the same sense, as 
 speaking to a man presupposes he understands the 
 language in which you speak; or as warning a man of 
 any danger presupposes that he hath such a regard to 
 himself, as that he will endeavour to avoid it. And 
 therefore the question is not at all, Whether the evi¬ 
 dence of religion be satisfactory; but Whether it be, 
 in reason, sufficient to prove and discipline that virtue, 
 which it presupposes. Now the evidence of it is fully 
 sufficient for all those purposes of probation ; how far 
 soever it is from being satisfactory, as to the purposes 
 of curiosity, or any other: and indeed it answers the 
 purposes of the former in several respects, which it 
 would not do, if it were as overbearing as is required. 
 One might add farther; that whether the motives or 
 the evidence for any course of action be satisfactory, 
 meaning here, by that word what satisfies a man, that 
 such a course of action will in event be for his good ; 
 this need never be, and 1 think, strictly speaking, never 
 is, the practical question in common matters. But the 
 piactical question in all cases is, Whether the evidence 
 for a course of action be such, as, taking in all circum¬ 
 stances, makes the faculty within us, which is the guide 
 and judge of conduct b , determine that course of action 
 to be prudent. Indeed, satisfaction that it will be for 
 our interest or happiness, abundantly determines an 
 action to be prudent: but evidence almost infinitely 
 lower than this, determines actions to be so too; even 
 in the conduct of every day. 
 
 b See Dissert. II. 
 
OF NATURE TO RELIGION. 
 
 CHAP. VIII.] 
 
 28 9 
 
 Fifthly, As to the objection concerning the influence 
 ■which this argument, or any part of it, may, or may 
 not, be expected to have upon men; I observe, as 
 above, that religion being intended for a trial and 
 exercise of the morality of every person’s character, 
 who is a subject of it; and there being, as I have 
 shewn, such evidence for it, as is sufficient, in reason, 
 to influence men to embrace it: to object, that it is 
 not to be imagined mankind will be influenced by such 
 evidence, is nothing - to the purpose of the foregoing 
 treatise. For the purpose of it is not to inquire, what 
 soit of cieatures mankind are; but what the light and 
 knowledge, which is afforded them, requires they should 
 be. to shew - how, in reason, they ought to behave; not 
 how, in fact, they will behave. This depends upon 
 themselves, and is their own concern; the personal 
 concern of each man in particular. And how - little 
 regard the generality have to it, experience indeed 
 does too fully shew. But religion, considered as a 
 piobation, has had its end upon all persons, to whom it 
 has been proposed with evidence sufficient in reason to 
 influence their practice: for by this means they have 
 been put into a state of probation; let them behave as 
 the) will in it. And thus, not only revelation, but 
 reason also, teaches us, that by the evidence of religion 
 being laid before men, the designs of Providence are 
 carrying on, not only with regard to those who will, 
 but likewise with regard to those who will not, be 
 influenced by it. However, lastly, the objection here 
 referred to, allows the things insisted upon in this 
 treatise to be of some weight: and if so, it may be 
 hoped it will have some influence. And if there be a 
 probability that it will have any at all, there is the 
 same reason in kind, though not in degree, to lay it 
 
 ANALOGY. IT 
 
OBJECTIONS AGAINST TIIE ANALOGY 
 
 290 
 
 [part II. 
 
 before men, as there would be, if it were likely to 
 have a greater influence. 
 
 And farther, I desire it may be considered, with 
 respect to the whole of the foregoing objections, that 
 in this treatise I have argued upon the principles of 
 others 0 , not my own: and have omitted what I think 
 true, and of the utmost importance, because by others 
 thought unintelligible, or not true. Thus I have 
 argued upon the principles of the Fatalists, which I 
 do not believe: and have omitted a thing of the 
 utmost importance which I do believe, the moral 
 fitness and unfitness of actions, prior to all will what¬ 
 ever; which I apprehend as certainly to determine 
 the Divine conduct, as speculative truth and falsehood 
 necessarily determine the Divine judgment. Indeed 
 the principle of liberty, and that of moral fitness, so 
 force themselves upon the mind, that moralists, the 
 ancients as well as moderns, have formed their lan¬ 
 guage upon it. And probably it may appear in mine: 
 though I have endeavoured to avoid it; and, in order 
 to avoid it, have sometimes been obliged to express 
 myself in a manner, which will appear strange to such 
 as do not observe the reason for it: but the general 
 argument here pursued does not at all suppose or 
 proceed upon these principles. Now, these two ab¬ 
 stract principles of liberty and moral fitness being 
 omitted, religion can be considered in no other view, 
 than merely as a question of fact: and in this view 
 it is here considered. It is obvious, that Christianity, 
 
 e By arguing upon the principles of others, the reader will observe 
 is meant; not proving any thing from those principles, but notwithstand¬ 
 ing them. Thus religion is proved, not from the opinion of necessity; 
 which is absurd : but, notwithstanding or even though that opinion were 
 admitted to be true. 
 
CHAP. VIII.] OP NATURE TO RELIGION. 291 
 
 and the proof of it, are both historical. And even 
 natural religion is, properly, a matter of fact. For, 
 that there is a righteous Governor of the world, is 
 so: and this proposition contains the general system 
 of natural religion. But then, several abstract truths, 
 and in particular those two principles, are usually 
 taken into consideration in the proof of it: whereas 
 it is here treated of only as a matter of fact. To ex¬ 
 plain this: that the three angles of a triangle are 
 equal to two right ones, is an abstract truth: but 
 that they appear so to our mind, is only a matter of 
 fact. And this last must have been admitted, if anv 
 thing was, by those ancient sceptics, who would not 
 have admitted the former: but pretended to doubt, 
 W hether there were any such thing as truth, or 
 Whether we could certainly depend upon our faculties 
 of understanding for the knowledge of it in any case. 
 So likewise, that there is, in the nature of things, 
 an original standard of right and wrong in actions 
 independent upon all will, but which unalterably 
 determines the will of God, to exercise that moral 
 government over the world, which religion teaches, 
 i.e. finally and upon the whole to reward and punish 
 men respectively as they act right or wrong; this 
 assertion contains an abstract truth, as well as matter 
 of fact. But suppose, in the present state, every man, 
 without exception, was rewarded and punished, in 
 exact proportion as he followed or transgressed that 
 sense of right and wrong, which God has implanted in 
 the nature of every man: this would not be at all 
 an abstract truth, but only a matter of fact. And 
 though this fact were acknowledged by every one; 
 yet the very same difficulties might be raised as are 
 now, concerning the abstract questions of liberty and 
 moral fitness: and we should have a proof, even the 
 
 U 2 
 
292 OBJECTIONS AGAINST THE ANALOGY [PART IT. 
 
 certain one of experience, that the government of 
 the world was perfectly moral, without taking in the 
 consideration of those questions: and this proof would 
 remain, in what way soever they were determined. 
 And thus, God having given mankind a moral faculty, 
 the object of which is actions, and which naturally 
 approves some actions as right, and of good desert, 
 and condemns others as wrong, and of ill desert; 
 that he will, finally and upon the whole, reward the 
 former and punish the latter, is not an assertion of 
 an abstract truth, but of what is as mere a fact, as 
 his doing so at present would be. This future fact 
 I have not indeed proved with the force with which 
 it might be proved, from the principles of liberty 
 and moral fitness; but without them have <y\\e n a 
 really conclusive practical proof of it, which is greatly 
 strengthened by the general analogy of nature: a 
 proof easily cavilled at, easily shewn not to be demon¬ 
 strative ,for it is not offered as such; but irnpossible> 
 I think, to be evaded, or answered. And thus the 
 obligations of religion are made out, exclusively of the 
 questions concerning liberty and moral fitness; which 
 have been perplexed with difficulties and abstruse 
 reasonings, as every thing may. 
 
 Hence therefore may be observed distinctly, what 
 is the force of this treatise. It will be, to such as 
 are convinced of religion upon the proof arising out 
 of the two last-mentioned principles, an additional 
 proof and a confirmation of it: to such as do not admit 
 those principles, an original proof of it d , and a confirm¬ 
 ation of that proof. Those who believe will here find 
 the scheme of Christianity cleared of objections, and 
 the evidence of it in a peculiar manner strengthened: 
 those who do not believe will at least be shewn the 
 
 d P. 115, &C. 
 
OF NATURE TO RELIGION. 
 
 CHAP. VIII.] 
 
 293 
 
 absurdity of all attempts to prove Christianity false, 
 the plain undoubted credibility of it; and, I hope, a 
 good deal more. 
 
 And thus, though some perhaps may seriously think, 
 that analogy, as here urged, has too great stress laid 
 upon it; and ridicule, unanswerable ridicule, may be 
 applied, to shew the argument from it in a dis¬ 
 advantageous light: yet there can be no question, 
 but that it is a real one. For religion, both natural 
 and revealed, implying in it numerous facts; analogy, 
 being a confirmation of all facts to which it can be 
 applied, as it is the only proof of most, cannot but 
 be admitted by every one to be a material thing, 
 and truly of weight on the side of religion, both 
 natural and revealed: and it ought to be particularly 
 regarded by such as profess to follow nature, and to 
 be less satisfied with abstract reasonings. 
 
CONCLUSION. 
 
 HATEVER account may be given of the strange 
 
 * f inattention and disregard, in some ages and 
 countries, to a matter of such importance as Religion ; 
 it would, before experience, be incredible, that there 
 should be the like disregard in those, who have had 
 the moral system of the world laid before them, as it is 
 by Christianity, and often inculcated upon them: be¬ 
 cause this moral system carries in it a good degree of 
 evidence for its truth, upon this being barely proposed 
 to our thoughts. There is no need of abstruse reasonings 
 and distinctions, to convince an unprejudiced under¬ 
 standing, that there is a God who made and governs 
 the world, and will judge it in righteousness; though 
 they may be necessary to answer abstruse difficulties, 
 w hen once such are raised: when the very meaning of 
 those words, which express most intelligibly the general 
 doctrine of religion, is pretended to be uncertain ; and 
 the clear truth of the thing itself is obscured by the 
 intricacies of speculation. But to an unprejudiced 
 mind ten thousand thousand instances of design cannot 
 but prove a designer. And it is intuitively manifest, 
 that creatures ought to live under a dutiful sense of 
 their Maker; and that justice and charity must be his 
 laws, to creatures whom he has made social, and placed 
 in society. Indeed the truth of revealed religion, 
 peculiarly so. called, is not self-evident, but requires 
 external proof, in order to its being received. Yet 
 inattention, among us, to revealed religion, will be 
 found to imply the same dissolute immoral temper of 
 mind, as inattention to natural religion : because, when 
 both are laid before us, in the manner they are in 
 
CONCLUSION. 
 
 295 
 
 PART II.] 
 
 Christian countries of liberty, our obligations to inquire 
 into both, and to embrace both upon supposition of 
 their truth, are obligations of the same nature. For, 
 revelation claims to be the voice of God : and our 
 obligation to attend to his voice is surely moral in all 
 cases. And as it is insisted, that its evidence is con¬ 
 clusive, upon thorough consideration of it; so it offers 
 itself to us with manifest obvious appearances of having 
 something more than human in it, and therefore in all 
 reason requires to have its claims most seriously ex¬ 
 amined into. It is to be added, that though light and 
 knowledge, in what manner soever afforded us, is 
 equally from God ; yet a miraculous revelation has a 
 peculiar tendency, from the first principles of our 
 nature, to awaken mankind, and inspire them with 
 reverence and awe: and this is a peculiar obligation, 
 to attend to what claims to be so with such appear¬ 
 ances of truth. It is therefore most certain, that our 
 obligations to inquire seriously into the evidence of 
 Christianity, and, upon supposition of its truth, to 
 embrace it, are of the utmost importance, and moral 
 in the highest and most proper sense. Let us then 
 suppose, that the evidence of religion in general, and 
 of Christianity, has been seriously inquired into, by all 
 reasonable men among us. Yet we find many pro¬ 
 fessedly to reject both, upon speculative principles of 
 infidelity. And all of them do not content themselves 
 with a bare neglect of religion, and enjoying their 
 imaginary freedom from its restraints. Some go much 
 beyond this. They deride God’s moral government 
 over the world. They renounce his protection, and 
 defy his justice. They ridicule and vilify Christianity, 
 and blaspheme the Author of it; and take all occasions- 
 to manifest a scorn and contempt of revelation. This 
 amounts to an active setting themselves against religion; 
 
CONCLUSION. 
 
 296 
 
 [part ii. 
 
 to what may be considered as a positive principle of 
 irreligion ; which they cultivate within themselves, and, 
 whether they intend this effect or not, render habitual, 
 as a good man does the contrary principle. And others, 
 ■who are not chargeable with all this profligateness, yet 
 are in avowed opposition to religion, as if discovered to 
 be groundless. Now admitting, which is the supposi¬ 
 tion we go upon, that these persons act upon what 
 they think principles of reason, and otherwise they are 
 not to be argued with ; it is really inconceivable, that 
 they should imagine they clearly see the whole evidence 
 of it, considered in itself, to be nothing at all: nor do 
 they pretend this. They are far indeed from having a 
 just notion of its evidence: but they would not say its 
 evidence was nothing, if they thought the system of it, 
 with all its circumstances, were credible, like other 
 matters of science or history. So that their manner of 
 treating it must proceed, either from such kind of 
 objections against all religion, as have been answered 
 or obviated in the former part of this treatise ; or else 
 from objections, and difficulties, supposed more peculiar 
 to Christianity. Thus, they entertain prejudices against 
 the whole notion of a revelation, and miraculous inter¬ 
 positions. They find things in Scripture, whether in 
 incidental passages, or in the general scheme of it, 
 which appear to them unreasonable. They take for 
 granted, that if Christianity were true, the light of it 
 must have been more general, and the evidence of it 
 more satisfactory, or rather overbearing: that it must 
 and would have been, in some way, otherwise put and 
 left, than it is. Now this is not imagining they see the 
 evidence itself to be nothing, or inconsiderable; but 
 quite another thing. It i s being fortified against the 
 ev,deuce, in some degree acknowledged, by thinking 
 t lev see the system of Christianity, or somewhat which 
 
PART II.] 
 
 CONCLUSION. 
 
 297 
 
 appears to them necessarily connected with it, to be 
 incredible or false; fortified against that evidence, 
 which might, otherwise, make great impression upon 
 them. Or, lastly, if any of these persons are, upon the 
 whole, in doubt concerning the truth of Christianity; 
 their behaviour seems owing to their taking for grant¬ 
 ed, through strange inattention, that such doubting is, in 
 a manner, the same thing, as being certain against it- 
 1 o these persons, and to this state of opinion con¬ 
 cerning religion, the foregoing treatise is adapted. For, 
 all the general objections against the moral system 
 of nature having been obviated, it is shewn, that there 
 is not any peculiar presumption at all against Christ¬ 
 ianity, either considered as not discoverable by reason, 
 or as unlike to what is so discovered; nor any worth 
 mentioning against it as miraculous, if any at all; none, 
 certainly, which can render it in the least incredible. 
 It is shewn, that, upon supposition of a divine revelation, 
 the analogy of nature renders it beforehand highly 
 credible, I think probable, that many things in it must 
 appear liable to great objections; and that we must be 
 incompetent judges of it, to a great degree. This 
 observation is, I think, unquestionably true, and of the 
 very utmost importance: but it is urged, as I hope it 
 will be understood, with great caution of not vilifying 
 the faculty of reason, which is the candle of the Lord 
 'within us a ; though it can afford no light, where it 
 does not shine; nor judge, when it has no prin¬ 
 ciples to judge upon. The objections here spoken 
 of, being first answered in the view of objections 
 against Christianity as a matter of fact, are in the 
 next place considered as urged more immediately 
 against the wisdom, justice, and goodness of the Christ¬ 
 ian dispensation. And it is fully made out, that they 
 
 a Prov. xx. 27. 
 
298 
 
 CONCLUSION. 
 
 [part II. 
 
 admit of exactly the like answer, in every respect, to 
 what the like objections against the constitution of 
 nature admit of: that, as partial views give the 
 appearance of wrong to things, which, upon farther 
 consideration and knowledge of their relations to other 
 things, are found just and good; so it is perfectly 
 credible, that the things objected against the wisdom 
 and goodness of the Christian dispensation, may be 
 rendered instances of wisdom and goodness, by their 
 reference to other things beyond our view: because 
 Christianity is a scheme as much above our comprehen¬ 
 sion, as that of nature; and like that, a scheme in 
 which means are made use of to accomplish ends, and 
 which, as is most credible, may be carried on bv 
 general laws. And it ought to be attended to, that 
 this is not an answer taken merely or chiefly from our 
 ignorance; but from somewhat positive, which our 
 observation shews us. For, to like objections, the like 
 answer is experienced to be just, in numberless pa¬ 
 rallel cases. The objections against the Christian 
 dispensation, and the method by which it is carried 
 on, having been thus obviated, in general and toge¬ 
 ther ; the chief of them are considered distinctly, and 
 the particular things objected to are shewn credible, 
 by their perfect analogy, each apart, to the constitution 
 of nature. Thus, if man be fallen from his primitive 
 state, and to be restored, and infinite wisdom and 
 power engages in accomplishing our recovery : it were 
 to have been expected, it is said, that this should 
 have been effected at once; and not by such a long 
 series of means, and such a various economy of persons 
 and things; one dispensation preparatory to another, 
 this to a farther one, and so on through an indefinite 
 number of ages, before the end of the scheme proposed 
 can be completely accomplished; a scheme conducted 
 
PART II.] 
 
 by infinite wisdom, and executed by almighty power. 
 But now, on the contrary, our finding that every thing 
 in the constitution and course of nature is thus carried 
 on, shews such expectations concerning revelation to be 
 highly unreasonable; and is a satisfactory answer to 
 them, when urged as objections against the credibility s 
 that the great scheme of Providence in the redemption 
 of the world may be of this kind, and to be accomplish¬ 
 ed in this manner. As to the particular method of our 
 redemption, the appointment of a Mediator between 
 God and man: this has been shewn to be most obviously 
 analogous to the general conduct of nature, i. e. the 
 God of nature, in appointing others to be the instru¬ 
 ments of his mercy, as we experience in the daily 
 course of providence. The condition of this world, 
 which the doctrine of our redemption by Christ pre¬ 
 supposes, so much falls in with natural appearances, 
 that heathen moralists inferred it from those appear¬ 
 ances : inferred, that human nature was fallen from its 
 original rectitude, and, in consequence of this, degraded 
 from its primitive happiness. Or, however this opinion 
 came into the world, these appearances must have kept 
 up the tradition, and confirmed the belief of it. And 
 as it was the general opinion under the light of nature, 
 that repentance and reformation, alone and by itself, 
 was not sufficient to do away sin, and procure a full 
 remission of the penalties annexed to it; and as the 
 reason of the thing does not at all lead to any such 
 conclusion ; so every day’s experience shews us, that 
 reformation is not, in any sort, sufficient to prevent 
 the present disadvantages and miseries, which, in the 
 natural course of things, God has annexed to folly and 
 extravagance. Yet there may be ground to think, that 
 the punishments, which, by the general laws of Divine 
 government, are annexed to vice, may be prevented : 
 
300 
 
 CONCLUSION. 
 
 [part II. 
 
 that provision may have been, even originally, made, 
 that they should be prevented by some means or 
 other, though they could not by reformation alone. 
 For we have daily instances of such mercy, in the 
 general conduct of nature: compassion provided for 
 misery medicines for diseases, friends against enemies, 
 iheie is provision made, in the original constitution of 
 the world, that much of the natural bad consequences 
 of our follies, which persons themselves alone cannot 
 prevent, may be prevented by the assistance of others; 
 assistance, which nature enables, and disposes, and 
 appoints them to afford. By a method of goodness 
 analogous to this, when the world lay in wickedness, 
 and consequently in ruin, God so loced the world, that 
 he gave las only begotten Son to save it: and he being 
 made perfect by suffering, became the author of eternal 
 salvation to all them that obey him c . Indeed neither 
 reason nor analogy would lead us to think, in particular, 
 that the interposition of Christ, in the manner in which 
 lie did interpose, would be of that efficacy for recovery 
 of the world, which the Scripture teaches us it was: 
 but neither would reason nor analogy lead us to think, 
 that other particular means would be of the efficacy, 
 which experience shews they are, in numberless in¬ 
 stances. And therefore, as the case before us does not 
 ac mit of experience; so, that neither reason nor ana- 
 logy can shew how, or in what particular way, the 
 interposition of Christ, as revealed in Scripture, is of 
 that efficacy, which it is there represented to be; this 
 is no kind nor degree of presumption against its bein°- 
 really 0 f that efficacy. Farther: the objections against 
 Christianity, from the light of it not being universal, 
 nor its evidence so strong as might possibly be given 
 us, have been answered by the general analogy of 
 
 b Serm - at the R °'ls, p. 106. e John iii. l6 . Heb v 9 
 
PART II.] 
 
 CONCLUSION. 
 
 301 
 
 nature. That God has made such variety of creatures, is 
 indeed an answer to the former: but that he dispenses 
 his gifts in such variety, both of degrees and kinds, 
 amongst creatures of the same species, and even to the 
 same individuals at different times ; is a more obvious 
 and full answer to it. And it is so far from beinff the 
 method of Providence in other cases, to afford us such 
 overbearing evidence, as some require in proof of 
 Christianity; that, on the contrary, the evidence upon 
 which we are naturally appointed to act in common 
 matters, throughout a very great part of life, is doubt¬ 
 ful in a high degree. And admitting the fact, that 
 God has afforded to some no more than doubtful 
 evidence of religion; the same account may be given 
 of it, as of difficulties and temptations with regard to 
 practice. But as it is not impossible d , surely, that this 
 alleged doubtfulness may be men’s own fault; it 
 deserves their most serious consideration, whether it be 
 not so. However, it is certain, that doubting implies 
 a degree of evidence for that of which we doubt: and 
 that this degree of evidence as really lays us under 
 obligations, as demonstrative evidence. 
 
 The whole then of religion is throughout credible: 
 nor is there, I think, any thing relating to the revealed 
 dispensation of things, more different from the ex¬ 
 perienced constitution and course of nature, than some 
 parts of the constitution of nature are from other parts 
 of it. And if so, the only question which remains is, 
 what positive evidence can be alleged for the truth of 
 Christianity. This too in general has been considered, 
 and the objections against it estimated. Deduct, 
 therefore, what is to be deducted from that evidence, 
 upon account of any weight which may be thought to 
 remain in these objections, after what the analogy of 
 <* Page 233, &c. 
 
302 
 
 CONCLUSION. 
 
 [part II. 
 
 nature has suggested in answer to them: and then 
 consider, what are the practical consequences from all 
 this, upon the most sceptical principles one can argue 
 upon: (for I am writing to persons who entertain 
 these principles:) and upon such consideration it will 
 be obvious, that immorality, as little excuse as it 
 admits of in itself, is greatly aggravated, in persons who 
 have been made acquainted with Christianity, whether 
 they believe it or not: because the moral system of 
 nature, or natural religion, which Christianity lays 
 before us, approves itself, almost intuitively, to a 
 reasonable mind, upon seeing it proposed. In the 
 next place, with regard to Christianity, it will be 
 observed; that there is a middle between a full satis¬ 
 faction of the truth of it, and a satisfaction of the 
 contrary. The middle state of mind between these 
 two consists in a serious apprehension, that it may 
 be true, joined with doubt whether it be so. And 
 this, upon the best judgment I am able to make, 
 is as far towards speculative infidelity, as any sceptic 
 can at all be supposed to go, who has had true 
 Christianity, with the proper evidence of it, laid before 
 him, and has in any tolerable measure considered them. 
 For I would not be mistaken to comprehend all who 
 have ever heard of it: because it seems evident, that 
 in many countries called Christian, neither Christianity, 
 nor its evidence, are fairly laid before men. And in 
 places where both are, there appear to be some, who 
 have very little attended to either, and who reject 
 Christianity with a scorn proportionate to their inatten¬ 
 tion ; and yet are by no means without understanding 
 in other matters. I\ow it has been shewn, that a 
 serious apprehension that Christianity may be true, 
 lays persons under the strictest obligations of a serious 
 regard to it, throughout the whole of their life: a 
 
PART II.] CONCLUSION. 303 
 
 regard not the same exactly, but in many respects 
 nearly the same, with what a full conviction of its 
 truth would lav them under. Lastly, it will appear, 
 that blasphemy and profaneness, T mean with regard to 
 Christianity, are absolutely without excuse. For there 
 is no temptation to it, but from the wantonness of 
 vanity or mirth: and these, considering the infinite 
 importance of the subject, are no such temptations as 
 to afford any excuse for it. If this he a just account 
 of things, and yet men can go on to vilify or disregard 
 Christianity, which is to talk and act as if they had a 
 demonstration of its falsehood ; there is no reason to 
 think they would alter their behaviour to any purpose, 
 though there were a demonstration of its truth. 
 
 T11E END OF THE SECOND PART. 
 
TWO BRIEF 
 
 DISSERTATIONS. 
 
 I. OF PERSONAL IDENTITY. 
 
 II. OF THE NATURE OF VIRTUE. 
 
 ANALOGY. 
 
ADVERTISEMENT. 
 
 In the first copy of these Papers, I had inserted the two 
 following Dissertations into the chapters, Of a Future Life, 
 and, Of the Moral Government of God; with which they are 
 closely connected. But as they do not directly fall under the 
 title of the foregoing Treatise, and would have kept the 
 subject of it too long out of sight; it seemed more proper 
 to place them by themselves. 
 
DISSERTATION I. 
 
 is the most important question which can possi- 
 
 Of Personal Identity. 
 
 we are to live in a future state, as it 
 
 bly be asked, so it is the most intelligible one which 
 can be expressed in language Yet strange perplexities 
 have been raised about the meaning of that identity or 
 sameness of person, which is implied in the notion of 
 our living now and hereafter, or in any two successive 
 moments. And the solution of these difficulties hath 
 been stranger than the difficulties themselves. For, 
 personal identity has been explained so by some, as to 
 render the inquiry concerning a future life of no con¬ 
 sequence at all to us the persons who are making it. 
 And though few men can be misled by such subtleties ; 
 yet it may be proper a little to consider them. 
 
 ^o\\ when it is asked, wherein personal identity 
 consists, the answer should be the same, as if it were 
 asked, wherein consists similitude, or equality; that all 
 attempts to define would but perplex it. Yet there is 
 no difficulty at all in ascertaining the idea. For as, 
 upon two triangles being compared or viewed together, 
 there arises to the mind the idea of similitude; or upon 
 twice two and four, the idea of equality: so likewise, 
 upon comparing the consciousnesses of one’s self, or 
 one’s own existence, in any two moments, there as 
 immediately arises to the mind the idea of personal 
 
 x 2 
 
OF PERSONAL IDENTITY. 
 
 308 
 
 [diss. I. 
 
 identity. And as the two former comparisons not only 
 give us the ideas of similitude and equality; but also 
 shew us, that two triangles are alike, and twice two 
 and four are equal: so the latter comparison not only 
 gives us the idea of personal identity, but also shews us 
 the identity of ourselves in those two moments; the 
 present, suppose, and that immediately past; or the 
 present, and that a month, a year, or twenty years 
 past. Or in other words, by reflecting upon that, 
 which is myself now, and that, which was myself 
 twenty years ago, I discern they are not two, but one 
 and the same self. 
 
 But though consciousness of what is past does thus 
 ascertain our personal identity to ourselves, yet to say, 
 that it makes personal identity, or is necessary to our 
 being the same persons, is to say, that a person has not 
 existed a single moment, nor done one action, but 
 what he can remember; indeed none but what he 
 reflects upon. And one should really think it self- 
 evident, that consciousness of personal identity pre¬ 
 supposes, and therefore cannot constitute, personal 
 identity ; any more than knowledge, in any other case, 
 can constitute truth, which it presupposes. 
 
 This wonderful mistake may possibly have arisen 
 from hence; that to be endued with consciousness is 
 inseparable from the idea of a person, or intelligent 
 being. For, this might be expressed inaccurately thus, 
 that consciousness makes personality : and from hence 
 it might be concluded to make personal identity. But 
 though present consciousness of what we at present do 
 and feel is necessary to our being the persons we now 
 are; yet present consciousness of past actions or feel¬ 
 ings is not necessary to our being the same persons 
 who performed those actions, or had those feelings. 
 
 The inquiry, what makes vegetables the same in the 
 
VWV 
 
 S/N/v^N 
 
 DISS. I.] 
 
 OF PERSONAL IDENTITY. 
 
 common acceptation of the word, does not appear to 
 have any relation to this of personal identity: because, 
 the word same , when applied to them and to person, is 
 not only applied to different subjects, but it is also used 
 in different senses. For when a man swears to the 
 same tree, as having stood fifty years in the same place, 
 he means only the same as to all the purposes of pro¬ 
 perty and uses of common life, and not that the tree 
 has been all that time the same in the strict philo¬ 
 sophical sense of the word. For he does not know, 
 whether any one particle of the present tree be the 
 same with any one particle of the tree which stood in 
 the same place fifty years ago. And if they have not 
 one common particle of matter, they cannot be the 
 same tree in the proper philosophic sense of the word 
 same: it being evidently a contradiction in terms, to 
 say they are, when no part of their substance, and no 
 one of their properties is the same: no part of their 
 substance, by the supposition ; no one of their pro¬ 
 perties, because it is allowed, that the same property 
 cannot be transferred from one substance to another. 
 And therefore when we say the identity or same¬ 
 ness of a plant consists in a continuation of the same 
 life, communicated under the same organization, to a 
 number of particles of matter, whether the same or 
 not; the word same, when applied to life and to 
 organization, cannot possibly be understood to signify, 
 what it signifies in this very sentence, when applied to 
 matter. In a loose and popular sense then, the life 
 and the organization and the plant are justly said to be 
 the same, notwithstanding the perpetual change of the 
 parts. But in a strict and philosophical manner of 
 speech, no man, no being, no mode of being, no any¬ 
 thing, can be the same with that, with which it hath 
 
310 
 
 OF PERSONAL IDENTITY. 
 
 DISS. 
 
 indeed nothing the same. Now sameness is used in 
 this latter sense, when applied to persons. The iden¬ 
 tity of these, therefore, cannot subsist with diversity of 
 substance. 
 
 The thing here considered, and demonstratively, as I 
 think, determined, is proposed by Mr. Locke in these 
 words, Whether it, i. e. the same self or person, be the 
 same identical substance? And he has suggested what 
 is a much better answer to the question, than that 
 which he gives it in form. For he defines Person, a 
 thinking intelligent being, &c. and personal identity, the 
 sameness oj a rational being*. The question then is, 
 whether the same rational being is the same substance: 
 which needs no answer, because Being and Substance, 
 in this jdace, stand for the same idea. The ground of 
 the doubt, whether the same person be the same sub¬ 
 stance, is said to be this; that the consciousness of our 
 own existence, in youth and in old age, or in any two 
 joint successive moments, is not the same individual 
 action b , i. e. not the same consciousness, but different 
 successive consciousnesses. Now it is strange that this 
 should have occasioned such perplexities. For it is 
 surely conceivable, that a person may have a capacity 
 of knowing some object or other to be the same now, 
 which it was when he contemplated it formerly: yet 
 in this case, where, by the supposition, the object is 
 perceived to be the same, the perception of it in any 
 two moments cannot be one and the same perception. 
 And thus though the successive consciousnesses, which 
 we have of our own existence, are not the same, yet 
 are they consciousnesses of one and the same thing or 
 object; of the same person, self, or living agent. The 
 person, of whose existence the consciousness is felt 
 
 a Locke’s Works, vol. i. p. 146. b Locke, p. 146,147. 
 
DISS. I.] 
 
 OF PERSONAL IDENTITY. 
 
 311 
 
 now, and was felt an hour or a year ago, is discerned 
 to be, not two persons, but oue and the same person; 
 and therefore is one and the same. 
 
 Mr. Locke’s observations upon this subject appear 
 hasty: and he seems to profess himself dissatisfied 
 with suppositions, which he has made relating’ to it c . 
 But some of those hasty observations have been 
 carried to a strange length by others; whose notion, 
 when traced and examined to the bottom, amounts, 
 I think, to this d : “ That Personality is not a per- 
 “ mauent, but a transient thing: that it lives and 
 “ di es > begins and ends continually: that no one can 
 “ any more remain one and the same person two 
 “ moments together, than two successive moments can 
 “ be one and the same moment: that our substance 
 “is indeed continually changing; but whether this 
 “ be so or not, is, it seems, nothing to the purpose; 
 “ since it is not substance, but consciousness alone, 
 which constitutes personality: which consciousness, 
 “ being successive, cannot be the same in any two 
 “ moments, nor consequently the personality consti- 
 “ tuted by it.” And from hence it must follow, 
 that it is a fallacy upon ourselves, to charge our 
 present selves with any thing we did, or to imagine 
 our present selves interested in any thing which befell 
 us yesterday; or that our present self will be inter¬ 
 ested in what will befall us to-morrow: since our 
 present self is not, in reality, the same with the self 
 of yesterday, but another like self or person coming 
 in its room, and mistaken for it; to which another 
 self will succeed to-morrow. This, I say, must follow: 
 for if the self or person of to-day, and that of to- 
 
 c Locke, p. 152. 
 
 d See an Answer to Dr. Clarke’s Third Defence of his Letter to Mr. 
 Dodwell, 2nd edit. p. 44, 56, &c. 
 
312 
 
 OF PERSONAL IDENTITY. 
 
 [DISS. I. 
 
 moiiov*, are not the same, but only like persons; 
 the person of to-day is really no more interested in 
 what will befall the person of to-morrow, than in what 
 will befall any other person. It may be thought, 
 perhaps, that this is not a just representation of the 
 opinion we are speaking of: because those who 
 maintain it allow, that a person is the same as far 
 back as his remembrance reaches. And indeed they 
 do use the words, identity and same person. Nor 
 will language permit these words to be laid aside; 
 since if they were, there must be I know not what 
 ridiculous periphrasis substituted in the room of them. 
 Hut they cannot, consistently w r ith themselves, mean, 
 that the person is really the same. For it is self- 
 evident, that the personality cannot be really the 
 same, if, as they expressly assert, that in which it 
 consists is not the same. And as, consistently with 
 themselves, they cannot, so, I think it appears, they 
 do not, mean, that the person is really the same, but 
 only that he is so in a fictitious sense: in such a 
 sense only as they assert, for this they do assert, 
 that any number of persons whatever may be the 
 same person. The bare unfolding this notion, and 
 laying it thus naked and open, seems the best con¬ 
 futation of it. However, since great stress is said to 
 be put upon it, I add the following things. 
 
 h irst. This notion is absolutely contradictory to 
 that certain conviction, which necessarily and every 
 moment rises within us, when we turn our thoughts 
 u Pon ourselves, when we reflect upon what is past, 
 and look forward upon what is to come. All imao-i- 
 nation of a daily change of that living agent which 
 each man calls himself, for another, or of any such 
 change throughout our whole present life, is entirely 
 borne down by our natural sense of things. Nor is 
 
OF PERSONAL IDENTITY. 
 
 313 
 
 DISS. I.] 
 
 it possible for a person in his wits to alter his conduct, 
 with regard to his health or affairs, from a suspicion, 
 that, though he should live to-morrow, he should not, 
 however, be the same person he is to-day. And yet, 
 if it be reasonable to act, with respect to a future 
 life, upon this notion, that personality is transient; 
 it is reasonable to act upon it, with respect to the 
 present. Here then is a notion equally applicable 
 to religion and to our temporal concerns; and every 
 one sees and feels the inexpressible absurdity of it 
 in the latter case; if, therefore, any can take up with 
 it in the foimer, this cannot proceed from the reason 
 of the thing, but must be owing to an inward unfair¬ 
 ness, and secret corruption of heart. 
 
 Secondly, It is not an idea, or abstract notion, or 
 quality, but a being only, which is capable of life and 
 - action, of happiness and misery. Now all beings 
 confessedly continue the same, during the whole 
 time of their existence. Consider then a living beino- 
 now existing, and which has existed for any time 
 alive: this living being must have done and suffered 
 and enjoyed, what it has done and suffered and 
 enjoyed formerly, (this living being, I say, and not 
 another,) as really as it does and suffers and enjoys, 
 what it does and suffers and enjoys this instant. All 
 these successive actions, enjoyments, and sufferings, 
 rpg actions, enjoyments, and sufterino’s, of tlie same 
 living being. And they are so, prior to all considera¬ 
 tion of its remembering or forgetting: since remember¬ 
 ing or forgetting can make no alteration in the truth 
 of past matter of fact. And suppose this beino- 
 endued with limited powers of knowledge and 
 memory, there is no more difficulty in conceivino- 
 it to have a power of knowing itself to be the 
 same living being which it was some time ago, of 
 
314 
 
 OF PKKSONAL IDENTITY. 
 
 DISS. I. 
 
 remembering some of its actions, sufferings, and enjoy¬ 
 ments, and forgetting others, than in conceiving it to 
 know or remember or forget any thing else. 
 
 Thirdly, Every person is conscious, that he is now 
 the same person or self he was as far back as his 
 rememberance reaches: since when any one reflects 
 upon a past action of his own, he is just as certain of 
 the person who did that action, namely, himself, the 
 person who now reflects upon it, as he is certain that 
 the action was at all done. Nay, very often a person’s 
 assurance of an action having been done, of which he is 
 absolutely assured, arises wholly from the consciousness 
 that he himself did it. And this he, person, or self, 
 must either be a substauce, or the property of some 
 substance. It he, if person, be a substance; then con¬ 
 sciousness that he is the same person is consciousness 
 that he is the same substance. If the person, or he, 
 be the property of a substance, still consciousness that 
 he is the same property is as certain a proof that his 
 substance remains the same, as consciousness that he 
 remains the same substance would be; since the same 
 Property cannot be transferred from one substance 
 to another. 
 
 But though we are thus certain, that we are the 
 same agents, living beings, or substances, now, which 
 we were as far back as our rememberance reaches; 
 yet it is asked, whether we may not possibly be 
 deceived in it ? And this question may be asked 
 at the end of any demonstration whatever: because 
 it is a question concerning the truth of perception 
 by memory. And he who can doubt, whether per¬ 
 ception by memory can in this case be depended 
 upon, may doubt also, whether perception^by deduc¬ 
 tion and reasoning, which also include memory, or 
 indeed whether intuitive perception can. Here then 
 
DISS. I.] 
 
 OF PERSONAL IDENTITY. 
 
 315 
 
 we can go no farther. For it is ridiculous to attempt 
 to prove the truth of those preceptions, whose truth 
 we can no otherwise prove, than by other perceptions 
 of exactly the same kind with them, and which there 
 is just the same ground to suspect; or to attempt to 
 prove the truth of our faculties, which can no other¬ 
 wise be proved, than by the use or means of those 
 very suspected faculties themselves. 
 
DISSERTATION II. 
 
 Of the Nature of Virtue. 
 
 mHAT which renders beings capable of moral govern- 
 J- ment, is their having a moral nature, and moral 
 faculties of perception and of action. Brute creatures 
 aie impressed and actuated by various instincts and 
 propensions: so also are we. But additional to this, we 
 have a capacity of reflecting upon actions and charac¬ 
 ters, and making them an object to our thought: and 
 on doing this, we naturally and unavoidably approve 
 some actions, under the peculiar view of their being 
 virtuous and of good desert; and disapprove others, 
 as vicious and of ill desert. That we have this moral 
 approving and disapproving a faculty, is certain from 
 oui experiencing it in ourselves, and recognising it in 
 each other. It appears from our exercising it unavoidably, 
 
 * This way of speaking is taken from Epictetus *, and is made use of as 
 seeming the most full, and least liable to cavil. And the moral faculty 
 may be understood to have these two epithets, So^aartKf, and dirogos,- 
 fiao-TiKq, upon a double account; because, upon a survey of actions, 
 whether before or after they are done, it determines them to be good or 
 evil; and also because it determines itself to be the guide of action and of 
 life, in contradistinction from all other faculties, or natural principles of 
 action: in the very same manner as speculative reason directly and 
 naturally judges of speculative truth and falsehood; and at the same time 
 is attended with a consciousness upon reflection, that the natural right to 
 j udge of them belongs to it. 
 
 * Arr. Epict. lib. i. cap. i. 
 
OF THE NATURE OF VIRTUE. 
 
 DISS. II.] 
 
 317 
 
 in the approbation and disapprobation even of feigned 
 ehaiacters: from the words, right and wrong, odious 
 and amiable, base and worthy, with many others of like 
 signification in all languages, applied to actions and 
 characters: from the many written systems of morals 
 which suppose it; since it cannot be imagined, that all 
 these authors, throughout all these treatises, had abso¬ 
 lutely no meaning - at all to their words, or a meaning 
 merely chimerical : from our natural sense of gratitude, 
 w hich implies a distinction between merely being the 
 instrument of good, and intending it: from the like 
 distinction, every one makes, between injury and mere 
 harm, which, Hobbes says, is peculiar to mankind; 
 and between injury and just punishment, a distinction 
 plainly natural, prior to the consideration of human 
 laws. It is manifest great part of common language, 
 and of common behaviour over the world, is formed 
 upon supposition of such a moral faculty; whether 
 called conscience, moral reason, moral sense, or Divine 
 reason ; whether considered as a sentiment of the un¬ 
 derstanding', or as a perception of the heart; or, which 
 seems the truth, as including both. Nor is it at all 
 doubtful in the general, what course of action this 
 faculty, or practical discerning power within us, ap¬ 
 proves, and what it disapproves. For, as much as it 
 has been disputed wherein virtue consists, or whatever 
 ground for doubt there may be about particulars ; yet, in 
 general, there is in reality an universally acknowledged 
 standard of it. It is that, which all ages and all coun¬ 
 tries have made profession of in public : it is that, which 
 every man you meet puts on the show of: it is that, 
 which the primary and fundamental laws of all civil 
 constitutions over the face of the earth make it their 
 business and endeavour to enforce the practice of upon 
 mankind : namely, justice, veracity, and regard to com- 
 
SI 8 
 
 OF THE NATURE OF VIRTUE. 
 
 DIS3 II. 
 
 mon good. It being manifest then, in general, that 
 we have such a faculty or discernment as this, it 
 may be of use to remark some things more distinctly 
 concerning it. 
 
 First, Tt ought to be observed, that the object of 
 this faculty is actions b , comprehending under that 
 name active or practical principles: those principles 
 from which men would act, if occasions and cir¬ 
 cumstances gave them power; and which, when fixed 
 and habitual in any person, we call his character. 
 It does not appear, that brutes have the least reflex 
 sense of actions, as distinguished from events: or that 
 will and design, which constitute the very nature of 
 actions as such, are at all an object to their perception. 
 But to ours they are: and they are the object, and the 
 only one, of the approving and disapproving faculty. 
 Acting conduct, behaviour, abstracted from all regard 
 to "hat is, in fact and event, the consequence of it, is 
 itself the natural object of the moral discernment; as 
 speculative truth and falsehood is of speculative reason. 
 Intention of such and such consequences, indeed, is 
 always included; for it is part of the action itself: but 
 though the intended good or bad consequences do not 
 follow, we have exactly the same sense of the action as 
 if they did. In like manner we think well or ill of 
 characters, abstracted from all consideration of the 
 good or the evil, which persons of such characters have 
 it actually in their power to do. We never, in the 
 moral way, applaud or blame either ourselves or others, 
 for what we enjoy or what we suffer, or for having 
 impressions made upon us which we consider as alto* 
 gether out of our power: but only for what we do, or 
 
 b OvBe ,) dp^KalKUKla—ivnueu, <iXXa <rW pytia, M. Anton, lib. ix. 16. 
 \ litutis laus omnis in actione consistit. Cic. Off. lib. i. cap. 6. 
 
OF THE NATURE OF VIRTUE. 
 
 DISS. II.] 
 
 319 
 
 would have clone, had it been in our power; or for 
 what we leave undone, which we might have done, or 
 would have left undone, though we could have done it. 
 
 Secondly, Our sense or discernment of actions as 
 morally good or evil, implies in it a sense or discern- 
 em as of ^ood or ill desert. It may be 
 difficult to explain this perception, so as to answer all 
 the questions which may be asked concerning it: but 
 every one speaks of such and such actions as deserving 
 punishment; and it is not, I suppose, pretended, that 
 they have absolutely no meaning at all to the expression. 
 Now the meaning plainly is not, that we conceive it 
 for the good of society, that the doer of such actions 
 should be made to suffer. For if unhappily it were 
 resolved, that a man, who, by some innocent action, 
 was infected with the plague, should be left to perish, 
 lest, by other people’s coming near him, the infection 
 should spread; no one would say he deserved this 
 treatment. Innocence and ill-desert are inconsistent 
 ideas. Ill-desert always supposes guilt: and if one be 
 no pait of the other, yet they are evidently and 
 naturally connected in our mind. The sight of a man 
 in misery raises our compassion towards him; and, if 
 this misery be inflicted on him by another, our in¬ 
 dignation against the author of it. But when we are 
 informed, that the sufferer is a villain, and is punished 
 only for his treachery or cruelty; our compassion ex¬ 
 ceedingly lessens, and in many instances our indignation 
 wholly subsides. Now what produces this effect is the 
 conception of that in the sufferer, which we call ill- 
 desert. Upon considering then, or viewing together, 
 our notion of vice and that of misery, there results a 
 third, that of ill-desert. And thus there is in human 
 creatures an association of the two ideas, natural and 
 moral evil, wickedness and punishment. If this asso- 
 
320 
 
 OF THE NATURE OF VIRTUE. 
 
 DISS. II. 
 
 ciation were merely artificial or accidental, it were 
 nothing: but being most unquestionably natural, it 
 greatly concerns us to attend to it, instead of en¬ 
 deavouring to explain it away. 
 
 It may be observed farther, concerning our perception 
 of good and of ill desert, that the former is very weak 
 with respect to common instances of virtue. One 
 reason of which may be, that it does not appear to a 
 spectator, how far such instances of virtue proceed 
 from a virtuous principle, or in what degree this prin¬ 
 ciple is prevalent: since a very weak regard to virtue 
 may be sufficient to make men act well in manv 
 common instances. And on the other hand, our per¬ 
 ception of ill-desert in vicious actions lessens, in pro¬ 
 portion to the temptations men are thought to have 
 had to such vices. For, vice in human creatures con¬ 
 sisting chiefly in the absence or want of the virtuous 
 principle; though a man be overcome, suppose, by 
 tortures, it does not from thence appear to what degree 
 the virtuous principle was wanting. All that appears 
 is, that he had it not in such a degree, as to prevail 
 over the temptation: but possibly he had it in a 
 degree, which would have rendered him proof against 
 common temptations. 
 
 Thirdly, Our perception of vice and ill-desert arises 
 from, and is the result of, a comparison of actions with 
 the nature and capacities of the agent. For the mere 
 neglect of doing what we ought to do would, in many 
 cases, be determined by all men to be in the highest 
 degree vicious. And this determination must arise 
 from such comparison, and be the result of it; because 
 such neglect would not be vicious in creatures of other 
 natures and capacities, as brutes. And it is the same 
 also with respect to positive vices, or such as consist in 
 doing what we ought not. For, every one has a dif- 
 
mss. ii.] 
 
 OF THE NATURE OF VIRTUE. 
 
 321 
 
 ferent sense of harm done by an idiot, madman, or 
 child, and by one of mature and common understand¬ 
 ing ; though the action of both, including the intention, 
 which is part of the action, be the same : as it may be, 
 since idiots and madmen, as well as children, are 
 capable not only of doing mischief, but. also of intend- 
 ing it. I\ow this difference must arise from somewhat 
 discerned in the nature or capacities of one, which 
 renders the action vicious; and the want of which, in 
 the other, renders the same action innocent or less 
 vicious: and this plainly supposes a comparison, whether 
 reflected upon or not, between the action and capacities 
 of the agent, previous to our determining an action to 
 be vicious. And hence arises a proper application of 
 the epithets, incongruous, unsuitable, disproportionate, 
 unfit, to actions which our moral faculty determines to 
 be vicious. 
 
 Fourthly, It deserves to be considered, whether men 
 are more at liberty, in point of morals, to make them¬ 
 selves miserable without reason, than to make other 
 people so: or dissolutely to neglect their own greater 
 good, for the sake of a present lesser gratification, than 
 they are to neglect the good of others, whom nature 
 has committed to their care. It should seem, that a 
 due concern about our own interest or happiness, and a 
 reasonable endeavour to secure and promote it, which 
 is, I think, very much the meaning of the word prudence, 
 in our language; it should seem, that this is virtue, 
 and the contrary behaviour faulty and blamable; since, 
 in the calmest way of reflection, we approve of the 
 first, and condemn the other conduct, both in ourselves 
 and others. This approbation and disapprobation are 
 altogether different from mere desire of our own, or of 
 their happiness, and from sorrow upon missing it. For 
 the object or occasion of this last kind of perception is 
 
 ANALOGY. Y 
 
322 
 
 OF THE NATUHE OF VIRTUE. 
 
 [hiss. II. 
 
 satisfaction or uneasiness: whereas the object of the 
 first is active behaviour. In one case, what our thoughts 
 fix upon is our condition: in the other, our conduct. 
 It is true indeed, that nature has not given us so 
 sensible a disapprobation of imprudence and folly, 
 either in ourselves or others, as of falsehood, injustice, 
 and cruelty: I suppose, because that constant habitual 
 sense of private interest and good, which we always 
 carry about with us, renders such sensible disapprobation 
 less necessary, less wanting, to keep us from impru¬ 
 dently neglecting our own happiness, and foolishly 
 injuring ourselves, than it is necessary and wanting to 
 keep us from injuring others, to whose good we cannot 
 have so strong and constant a regard : and also because 
 imprudence and folly, appearing to bring its own 
 punishment more immediately and constantly than 
 injurious behaviour, it less needs the additional punish¬ 
 ment, which would be inflicted upon it by others, had 
 they the same sensible indignation against it, as against 
 injustice, and fraud, and cruelty. Besides, unhappiness 
 being in itself the natural object of compassion; the 
 unhappiness which people bring upon themselves, though 
 it be wilfully, excites in us some pity for them: and 
 this of course lessens our displeasure against them. 
 But still it is matter of experience, that we are formed 
 so as to reflect very sevez'ely upon the greater instances 
 of imprudent neglects and foolish rashness, both in 
 ourselves and others. In instances of this kind, men 
 often say of themselves with remorse, and of others 
 with some indignation, that they deserved to suffer 
 such calamities, because they brought them upon 
 themselves, and would not take warning. Particularly 
 when persons come to poverty and distress by a long 
 course of extravagance, and after frequent admonitions, 
 though without falsehood or injustice; we plainly do 
 
OF THE NATURE OF VIRTUE. 
 
 323 
 
 DISS. II.] 
 
 not regard such people as alike objects of compassion 
 with those, who are brought into the same condition 
 by unavoidable accidents. From these things it ap¬ 
 pears, that prudence is a species of virtue, and folly 
 of vice: meaning by folly, somewhat quite different 
 from mere incapacity; a thoughtless want of that 
 regard and attention to our own happiness, which we 
 had capacity for. And this the word properly includes; 
 and, as it seems, in its usual acceptation: for we scarce 
 apply it to brute creatures. 
 
 However, if any person be disposed to dispute 
 the matter, I shall very willingly give him up the 
 words A irtue and Vice, as not applicable to prudence 
 and folly: but must beg leave to insist, that the 
 faculty within us, which is the judge of actions, 
 approves of prudent actions, and disapproves imprudent 
 ones; I say prudent and imprudent actions as such, 
 and considered distinctly from the happiness or misery 
 which they occasion. And, by the way, this ob¬ 
 servation may help to determine what justness there 
 is in that objection against religion, that it teaches 
 us to be interested and selfish. 
 
 Fifthly, Without inquiring how far, and in what 
 sense, virtue is resolvable into benevolence, and vice 
 into the want of it; it may be proper to observe, 
 that benevolence, and the want of it, singly con¬ 
 sidered, are in no sort the whole of virtue and vice. 
 For if this were the case, in the review of one’s own 
 character, or that of others, our moral understanding 
 
 O 
 
 and moral sense would be indifferent to every thing, 
 but the degrees in which benevolence prevailed, and 
 the degrees in which it was wanting. That is, we 
 should neither approve of benevolence to some persons 
 rather than to others, nor disapprove injustice and 
 falsehood upon any other account, than merely as an 
 
 y 2 
 
324 
 
 OF THE NATURE OF VIRTUE. 
 
 [diss. II. 
 
 overbalance of happiness was foreseen likely to be 
 produced by the first, and of misery by the second. 
 But now, on the contrary, suppose two men com¬ 
 petitors for any thing whatever, which would be of 
 equal advantage to each of them; though nothing 
 indeed would be more impertinent, than for a stranger 
 to busy himself to get one of them preferred to the 
 other; yet such endeavour would be virtue, in behalf 
 of a friend or benefactor, abstracted from all considera¬ 
 tion of distant consequences: as that examples of 
 gratitude, and the cultivation of friendship, would 
 be of general good to the world. Again, suppose 
 one man should, by fraud or violence, take from 
 another the fruit of his labour, with intent to give 
 it to a third, who he thought would have as much 
 pleasure from it as would balance the pleasure which 
 the first possessor would have had in the enjoyment, 
 and his vexation in the loss of it; suppose also that 
 no bad consequences would follow: yet such an action 
 would surely be vicious. Nay farther, were treachery, 
 violence and injustice, no otherwise vicious, than as 
 foreseen likely to produce an overbalance of misery 
 to society; then, if in any case a man could procure 
 to himself as great advantage by an act of injustice, 
 as the whole forseseen inconvenience, likely to be 
 brought upon others by it, would amount to; such 
 a piece of injustice would not be faulty or vicious 
 at all: because it would be no more than, in any 
 other case, for a man to prefer his own satisfaction 
 to another s in equal degrees. The fact then appears 
 to be, that we are constituted so as to condemn false¬ 
 hood, unprovoked violence, injustice, and to approve 
 of benevolence to some preferably to others, abstracted 
 from all consideration, which conduct is likeliest to 
 pioduce an overbalance of happiness or misery. And 
 
OF THE NATURE OF VIRTUE. 
 
 325 
 
 DISS. II.] 
 
 therefore, were the Author of nature to propose 
 nothing to himself as an end but the production of 
 happiness, were his moral character merely that of 
 benevolence; yet ours is not so. Upon that sup¬ 
 position indeed the only reason of his giving us the 
 above-mentioned approbation of benevolence to some 
 persons rather than others, and disapprobation of 
 falsehood, unprovoked violence, and injustice, must 
 be, that he foresaw this constitution of our nature 
 would produce more happiness, than forming us with 
 a temper of mere general benevolence. But still, 
 since this is our constitution; falsehood, violence, 
 injustice, must be vice in us, and benevolence to some, 
 preferably to others, virtue; abstracted from all con¬ 
 sideration of the overbalance of evil or good, which 
 they may appear likely to produce. 
 
 Now if human creatures are endued with such a 
 moral nature as we have been explaining, or with 
 a moral faculty, the natural object of which is actions; 
 moral government must consist in rendering them 
 happy and unhappy, in rewarding and punishing them, 
 as they follow, neglect, or depart from, the moral 
 rule of action interwoven in their nature, or suffcested 
 and enforced by this moral faculty c ; in rewarding and 
 punishing them upon account of their so doing. 
 
 I am not sensible that I have, in this fifth ob¬ 
 servation, contradicted what any author designed to 
 assert. But some of great and distinguished merit 
 have, I think, expressed themselves in a manner, 
 which may occasion some danger, to careless readers, 
 of imagining the whole of virtue to consist in singly 
 aiming, according to the best of their judgment, at 
 promoting the happiness of mankind in the present 
 state; and the whole of vice, in doing what they 
 
 * Page 121. 
 
326 
 
 OF THE NATURE OF VIRTUE. 
 
 [diss. II. 
 
 foresee, or might foresee, is likely to produce an 
 overbalance of unhappiness in it: than which mistakes, 
 none can be conceived more terrible. For it is 
 certain, that some of the most shocking instances 
 of injustice, adultery, murder, peijury, and even of 
 persecution, may, in many supposable cases, not 
 have the appearance of being likely to produce an 
 overbalance of misery in the present state; perhaps 
 sometimes may have the contrary appearance. For 
 this reflection might easily be carried on, but I for¬ 
 bear-The happiness of the world is the concern 
 
 of him, who is the lord and the proprietor of it: 
 nor do we know what we are about, when we en¬ 
 deavour to promote the good of mankind in any ways, 
 but those which he has directed; that is indeed in 
 all ways not contrary to veracity and justice. I speak 
 thus upon supposition of persons really endeavouring, 
 in some sort, to do good without regard to these. 
 But the truth seems to be, that such supposed en¬ 
 deavours proceed, almost always, from ambition, the 
 spirit of party, or some indirect principle, concealed 
 perhaps in great measure from persons themselves. 
 And though it is our business and our duty to en¬ 
 deavour, within the bounds of veracity and justice, 
 to contribute to the ease, convenience, and even 
 cheerfulness and diversion of our fellow-creatures: 
 yet, from our short view's, it is greatly uncertain, 
 whether this endeavour will, in particular instances, 
 produce an overbalance of happiness upon the whole; 
 since so many and distant things must come into 
 the account. And that which makes it our duty is, 
 that there is some appearance that it will, and no 
 positive appearance sufficient to balance this, on the 
 contrary side; and also, that such benevolent en¬ 
 deavour is a cultivation of that most excellent of 
 
DISS. II.] 
 
 OF THE NATURE OF VIRTUE. 
 
 327 
 
 all virtuous principles, the active principle of bene¬ 
 volence. 
 
 However, though veracity, as well as justice, is to 
 be our rule ot life; it must be added, otherwise a 
 snare will be laid in the way of some plain men, 
 that the use of common forms of speech, generally 
 understood, cannot be falsehood; and, in general, 
 that there can be no designed falsehood without 
 designing to deceive. It must likewise be observed, 
 that in numberless cases, a man may be under the 
 strictest obligations to what he foresees will deceive, 
 without his intending it. For it is impossible not 
 to foresee, that the words and actions of men, in 
 different ranks and employments, and of different 
 educations, will perpetually be mistaken by each 
 other; and it cannot but be so, whilst they will 
 judge with the utmost carelessness, as they daily do, 
 of what they are not, perhaps, enough informed to 
 be competent judges of, even though they considered 
 it with great attention. 
 
index 
 
 TO BISHOP BUTLER’S ANALOGY, 
 
 Drawn up by Dr. Bentham, and revised and corrected by the Bishop himself. 
 Printed from the original MS. now in the Bodleian Library. 
 
 Abstract notions, not to be applied 
 to practical subjects without great 
 cautiousness, hi, 116. 
 Accidental , in what respects events 
 are so termed, 193, 194. 
 
 Actions , to be distinguished from 
 the moral quality ascribed to 
 them, 53. 
 
 Afflictions , how they produce the 
 habit of pious resignation, 105. 
 Analogical reasoning, what, 2, 4, 5. 
 
 -how to be conducted, 5, 6. 
 
 - Origen’s hint concerning it, 5. 
 
 -how far intended to be here 
 
 applied to religion, 6. 
 
 Analogy , how it becomes the ground 
 of probability in different de¬ 
 grees, 2. 
 
 —— arguments drawn from it 
 imply something similar and 
 parallel in the cases, 30, 31,170. 
 
 - may reasonably be admitted 
 
 to determine our judgments, 3. 
 -afford sufficient proof to in¬ 
 fluence our practice, 10. 
 
 -what it shews us concerning 
 
 our ignorance, 136. 
 
 —— its use with regard to ob¬ 
 jections against natural and re¬ 
 vealed religion, both as to their 
 systems and evidence, 10. 
 
 - how it assists us in judging 
 
 of revelation, 175. 
 
 ANALOGY. 
 
 Analogy, how it may be applied 
 to invalidate objections brought 
 against the wisdom and goodness 
 of the Divine government, 125, 
 126. 
 
 how it obviates objections 
 against the credibility of future 
 punishments, 39. 
 
 -between our state of trial, in 
 
 our temporal and religious 
 capacity, 74. 
 
 - between the misconduct of 
 mankind as to present and future 
 interests, 77. 
 
 -the miserable consequences of 
 
 men’s neglecting moral improve¬ 
 ment illustrated from it, 102. 
 
 - how it invalidates the plea 
 
 which is urged in favour of vice, 
 from passion, 142, 143. 
 
 - what argument it suggests 
 
 that the principles of Fatalism, 
 if admitted to be true, do not 
 destroy the proof of God’s moral 
 attributes, 114, 115. 
 
 -suggests arguments sufficient 
 
 to confute the Fatalist’s plea for 
 irreligion, 113,114. 
 
 -between the moral system of 
 
 things, as manifested by natural 
 reason and by revelation, 9,10. 
 
 -- between the light of nature 
 
 and revelation, 183. 
 
 Z 
 

 INDEX TO 
 
 Analogy , how it obviates objections 
 drawn from our ignorance of the 
 manner or measure in which 
 knowledge supernatural is com¬ 
 municated to mankind, 180. 
 
 -as to the fitness of means to 
 
 their respective ends, 192. 
 
 - affords no argument against 
 
 the general scheme of Christ¬ 
 ianity, 165. 
 
 - affords no peculiar pre¬ 
 sumption against the reality of 
 miracles, 168. 
 
 - between the mysteriousDess 
 
 of the scheme of Christianity, 
 and of God’s natural govern¬ 
 ment, 189, 190. 
 
 -between the difficulty there is 
 
 in accounting for some parts of 
 God’s ordinary Providence, and 
 some particulars of Christianity, 
 175.17 6 - 
 
 -the usefulness of arguing from 
 
 the analogy of nature to religion, 
 254, 282. 
 
 -what is taken for granted in 
 
 this argument, 6. 
 
 -between what we see contained 
 
 in the natural government of 
 God, and what mag be contained 
 in his moral, 130. 
 
 - between what we at present 
 
 experience concerning happiness, 
 and what religion teaches us to 
 expect, 34, 42. 
 
 - affords no argument against 
 
 the certainty of a future life, 16, 
 i7- 
 
 - how it confirms our appre¬ 
 hensions of future rewards and 
 punishments, 119. 
 
 -between our state of probation, 
 
 as to temporal and future welfare, 
 
 76, 82, 91,105,106. 
 
 - how it illustrates the Scrip¬ 
 tural doctrine of the fall, 206. 
 
 - the Christian doctrine of a 
 
 Mediator and Redeemer, 197,203. 
 -how it obviates those objec¬ 
 tions against Christianity which 
 are drawn from its supposed 
 want of universality, 184, &c. 
 
 - from its supposed want 
 
 of wisdom and justice, 189,190. 
 
 -how it obviates the objection 
 
 against the miraculousness of 
 spiritual gifts in the first Christ¬ 
 ians, drawn from their disorderly 
 use of them, 181, 182. 
 
 Analogy , objections against the argu¬ 
 ment from analogy, drawn from 
 the supposed small degree of in¬ 
 fluence which it is likely to have 
 upon mankind, 289. 
 
 Attention , necessary when we con¬ 
 sider Christianity, 261. 
 
 Benevolence , divine, towards us, 
 how limited, 47. 
 
 Body , our existence may be con¬ 
 sidered without it, 19. 
 
 Brachmans, see Death. 
 
 Brutes, whether capable of immor¬ 
 tality, and what kind, 25. 
 
 Chance, what is meant by it, 193. 
 Changes which things may undergo 
 without destruction, 13. 
 Characters, what it is that renders 
 some the object of approbation, 
 others of dislike, 318. 
 
 Christ, his prophetical office, 210. 
 
 -regal and priestly, 211, 212. 
 
 - the apparent tendency of his 
 
 sufferings justifies that method 
 of our redemption, 215, 216. 
 
 -his satisfaction, see Mediator, 
 
 Redemption , Sacrifices. 
 
 -- a summary of the Bible 
 
 history, as respecting the Messiah, 
 265—267. 
 
 -upon what evidence his Divine 
 
 mission was acknowledged by 
 the Gentiles, 271. 
 
 Christianity: see Revelation, Ob¬ 
 jections. 
 
 Christians, primitive, what argu¬ 
 ment their conversion and zeal 
 afford of the reality of Christ’s 
 miracles, 248. 
 
 Church, visible, the necessity of one 
 to promote religion and virtue, 
 
 „ ! 5 o—152. 
 
 Conscience, what proof it affords of 
 God’s moral government, 47. 
 
 - the dictates of it are to be 
 
 consideredas the laws of God, 117. 
 
 -makes us proper subjects of 
 
 moral government, 316. 
 
 -regards chiefly, but not solely, 
 
 the intention of the agent, 320. 
 Consciousness does not make per¬ 
 sonal identity, but ascertains it 
 to ourselves, 308. 
 
 Contemplation , of itself, insufficient 
 to produce the habit of virtue,85. 
 Conversation : see Objections. 
 
KUTLER’S ANALOGY. 
 
 Conviction [see Evidence], how it 
 may arise from analogy , 2. 
 Creature , upright, and finitely 
 perfect; the notion of such an 
 one, 95 i 
 
 Dangers of our miscarrying as to 
 our religious interests, whence 
 they chiefly arise, 77. 
 
 - no impeachment a of God’s 
 
 goodness, 79, 80. 
 
 Daniel; the book of D. had pro¬ 
 bably greater external evidence 
 of its authority formerly than 
 what is come down to us, 258. 
 Death , the opinion of the Brack - 
 mans concerning it, 29. 
 
 -the proper notion of it, 15,17. 
 
 -our imaginations apt to ’mis¬ 
 lead us in considering it, 17. 
 
 - not likely to destroy or sus¬ 
 pend our powers of perception, 
 26, &c. 
 
 - our state after d. not dis¬ 
 coverable by reason, 30. 
 
 4 -may be supposed to open our 
 
 way into a better state, 29, &c. 
 Definitions sometimes serve only to 
 perplex, 307. 
 
 Degradation : see Fall. 
 
 Difference of men’s situations in 
 religious matters b , how to be 
 accounted for, 223, 224. 
 
 - whether a supposed univer¬ 
 sality of revelation would prevent 
 it, 224. 
 
 Different degrees of evidence in 
 religious matters, consistent with 
 the justice of God’s moral go¬ 
 vernment, 222, 223. 
 
 Difficulties in religion; unreason¬ 
 able to expect to have them all 
 cleared, 281, 282. 
 
 -as to the evidence of religion, 
 
 are analogous to those attending 
 the practice of it, 229, 230. 
 Discipline , necessary c to our im¬ 
 provement in virtue, 92, 93. 
 
 - necessary d to our security 
 
 against sin, 94. 
 
 -the expediency of it to creatures , 
 
 331 
 
 whether supposed upright or 
 depraved, 98. 
 
 Discipline , how this world is pecu¬ 
 liarly fitted to be a state of dis¬ 
 cipline, 98. 
 
 Diseases of the body and mind j the 
 analogy observable between the 
 remedies which natural providence 
 has furnished us with for the 
 former , and those of revelation 
 for the latter , 185, 186. 
 
 Doubting [see Evidence]; some 
 evidence is implied wherever we 
 doubt , 228, 264. 
 
 Duties to other beings arise from 
 the relations in which they stand 
 to us, 156, 157. 
 
 - Christian d., the reasons of 
 
 them evident, 218. 
 
 Education : see Youth. 
 
 End: see Means. 
 
 Enthusiasm; the conversion and 
 zeal of the first Christians not to 
 be accounted by for e., 248. 
 
 -in what cases the pretence of 
 
 enthusiasm may be urged in op¬ 
 position to direct testimony, 248, 
 249. 
 
 - religion not peculiarly liable 
 
 to e.y 249. 
 
 - sometimes mixed with 
 
 knavery, 250, 251. 
 
 -how injudiciously e. is some¬ 
 times urged to discredit e the evi¬ 
 dence of testimony in proof of 
 Christianity, 252. 
 
 Evidence; the different sorts of e. f 
 1, &c. 
 
 - probable e., how distinguished 
 
 from demonstrative , x, 3. 
 
 -probable e., relative to beings 
 
 of limited capacity, 3. 
 
 - probable e., even in a low 
 
 degree, is a reasonable ground of 
 action, 3. 
 
 - what great force probable e. 
 
 may receive from uniting several 
 collateral things and circum¬ 
 stances into one view, 277, &c. 
 - the nature of that which 
 
 a Credible from analog)’ that we are surrounded with these dangers, notwith¬ 
 standing any objections which may be alleged against it from the goodness 
 
 of God_ Butler. 5 
 
 b Probably to be accounted for in the same mannet as their different situations 
 in other respects— Butler . 
 
 c Of great efficacy.— Butler. d Of great efficacy. Butler. 
 
 e Destroy or overthrow_ Butler. 
 
 z 2 
 
INDEX TO 
 
 332 
 
 directs us with regard to our 
 temporal interests, 219. 
 
 Evidence , though not sufficient to 
 exclude all doubt, affords rational 
 ground to influence our conduct, 
 3, 260, 261, 282. 
 
 Evidence of testimony ; upon what 
 subjects it may be admitted as 
 proof, 248. 
 
 - the circumstances which 
 
 strengthen this kind of e., 249. 
 
 -whether it may he invalidated, 
 
 and how, 248, 249, 251,252. 
 
 •- of t. of the first converts to 
 
 Christianity has several presump¬ 
 tions in favour of it, 253. 
 
 -of religion lies level to the ap¬ 
 prehensions of all men,—why not 
 attended to, 335. 336. 
 
 -is the same kind as that which 
 
 guides us in temporal matters, 
 284—288. 
 
 -whether Natural Religion has 
 
 any external e., and what, 119. 
 
 - for Christianity represented, 
 
 p. 11. c. vii., partly direct or fun¬ 
 damental, 239, 240, 260. 
 
 -partly collateral, 275. 
 
 -not to be truly judged of with¬ 
 out careful consideration, 277. 
 
 -the supposed doubtfulness of 
 
 the e. of revelation is no ar¬ 
 gument against revelation, 218, 
 219. 
 
 - of religion, though doubtful, 
 
 enforces the obligation to behave 
 religiously, 226—228. 
 
 -why e. of religion has been left 
 
 doubtful, 230, 231. 
 
 -about the authority and mean¬ 
 ing of divine commands, why it 
 may in some cases have been de¬ 
 signedly left doubtful, 236, &c. 
 Evil, though the permission of it 
 may be beneficial, yet it might 
 have been better for the world if 
 this or that particular evil had 
 not been done, 131, &c. 
 
 -natural e., the remedies which 
 
 God has appointed for it, 200. 
 Existence , necessary , in what sense 
 attributed to God, no. 
 
 Faculties , the human, why not given 
 us at our birth in their full matu¬ 
 rity, 88, 89. 
 
 Fall of man, whether nature sug¬ 
 gests any appearances of it, 78. 
 
 -does not afford just matter of 
 
 complaint, 78, 79. 
 
 -how conceivable, 94, 96. 
 
 -not to be accounted for solely 
 
 from the nature of liberty, 95. 
 -how accounted for by particu¬ 
 lar affections, 95, 96. 
 
 - the Scriptural account of it 
 
 analogous f to what we see and 
 experience, 207. 
 
 -our not being able to account 
 
 for it would not affect the cer¬ 
 tainty of the Christian dispensa¬ 
 tion, 206. 
 
 Falsehood , the several kinds of it, 
 250. 
 
 Fatalist , what is meant thereby, 108. 
 
 - his argument against future 
 
 rewards and punishments retort¬ 
 ed, 122, 123. 
 
 Fate , in what view considered in 
 this treatise, 107. 
 
 -if reconcilable with the pre¬ 
 sent constitution of things, is so 
 with religion, 107. 
 
 -see Necessity. 
 
 Fear and Hope , proper motives to 
 religious obedience, 103. 
 
 Final Cause , the notion thereof does 
 not always imply that the end de¬ 
 signed is answered, 102. 
 
 Fitness , whether, and in what sense, 
 it determines the will of God, 
 
 118, 290, 291. 
 
 -why the proof of religion from 
 
 moral fitness is here omitted, 290. 
 Folly of mankind as to present and 
 future interests, compared, 76, 
 77* 
 
 Future Life , the questions con¬ 
 cerning it here considered, 29 n. 
 42 n. 
 
 - implied in the notion of reli¬ 
 gion, 32. 
 
 -belief of it disposes the mind 
 
 to attend to the evidence of reli¬ 
 gion, 32. 
 
 -the importance of it to us, and 
 
 of our considering it, 33, 137, 
 138. 
 
 - demonstrative proof of it not 
 
 necessary to answer the purposes 
 of religion, and to awaken our 
 serious consideration, 32, 33. 
 
 f And conformable. — Ruder. 
 
BUTLER’S ANALOGY. 
 
 333 
 
 Future Life is represented both by 
 reason and Scripture as a social 
 state, 92. 
 
 -not to be conceived without 
 
 particular affections, 94. 
 
 - this life a state of discipline 
 
 for it, 141. 
 
 -the security of our virtue in it 
 
 may possibly be the effect of im¬ 
 pressions acquired in this life, 99, 
 100. 
 
 - the certainty of it deducible 
 
 from the imperfection of God’s 
 moral government in the present 
 state of things, 48, 49. 
 
 - the argument of it as drawn 
 
 from analogy, 13, &c. 138, &c. 
 
 - the absurdity of arguing 
 
 against it upon principles of 
 Atheism, 32. 
 
 L Future Judgment , the supposal of 
 3 one implies temptations, 73. 
 Future Punishments, the considera¬ 
 tion of them, whether it belongs 
 to Natural Religion, 42 n. 
 
 - the certainty of them implied 
 
 in our natural sense of actions 
 as ill-deserving, 116. 
 
 -may be presumed from God’s 
 
 rewarding or punishing us for 
 our behaviour at present, 123. 
 -the doctrine of religion con¬ 
 cerning them is rendered credi¬ 
 ble by what we experience con¬ 
 cerning the present distribution 
 of happiness and misery, 34, &c. 
 39 > 42. 
 
 - the end for which and the 
 
 manner in which they shall be 
 inflicted, not fully discovered, 198, 
 203. 
 
 - objections against the credi¬ 
 bility of them obviated, 38,39,42. 
 Future Rewards , the certainty of 
 them is implied in our natural 
 sense of actions as well-deserving , 
 116. 
 
 General Laws; on what grounds 
 we say that the course of nature 
 is carried on by them, 192. 
 
 -whether it be supposable that 
 
 the Christian dispensation is so 
 likewise, 192. 
 
 -the use and application of this 
 
 supposition, 194, 195. 
 
 General Laws, the manifest wisdom 
 of carrying on the natural govern¬ 
 ment of the world by them, 132, 
 ' 33 - 
 
 God ; the being of G. wdiy taken 
 for granted in this treatise, 6. 
 
 -is necessarily existent, no. 
 
 -his will may be considered as 
 
 absolute or conditional, 237. 
 
 -his will,how' determined, 118 n. 
 
 -his government, how exercised 
 
 over us at present, 38. 
 
 - his natural government over 
 
 mankind, what, and how' proved, 
 
 46, 73- 
 
 -carried on by general 
 
 laws, 132, 133. 
 
 -whether natural pleasure 
 
 and pain may be considered as 
 rewards and punishments from 
 him, 37, 47, 123. 
 
 - his moral government, what, 
 
 and how r proved, 46, 51,91, 137, 
 198. 
 
 -veracity and justice are the natu¬ 
 ral rule of God’s government, 116. 
 - the analogy between his natu¬ 
 ral and moral government, 126, 
 203. 
 
 -his moral government not per¬ 
 fectly executed in this present 
 state, 48. 
 
 -the equitableness of it not yet 
 
 fully discernible by us, 70. 
 
 -w'hether the present course of 
 
 nature, and the natural tenden¬ 
 cies of virtue and vice, afford any 
 probability that it will be per¬ 
 fectly equitable hereafter, 69, 70. 
 
 - his visible government over 
 
 the world is exercised by the me¬ 
 diation of others, 197. 
 
 -not incredible that his invisi¬ 
 ble may be so likewise, 198. 
 
 - w’e may be certain that his 
 
 government is moral, and yet be 
 ignorant how it is carried on, 131. 
 
 -his goodness; w hether or how 
 
 far the notion of it implies a dis¬ 
 position to confer happiness, 35. 
 
 - his goodness w r ith regard to 
 
 the natural evils of life, 200. 
 
 - it is no objection to God's 
 
 goodness that he did not make 
 us perfect creatures all at once s, 
 105. 
 
 g The expectation that his goodness would have induced him to make us 
 perfect creatures all at once, contradicted by the analogy of w’hat we experience, 
 — Butler. 
 
334 
 
 INDEX TO 
 
 God ; the series of God’s providen¬ 
 tial dispensations is progressive, 
 196. 
 
 - his particular purposes not 
 
 knowable to us antecedently to 
 experience, 176, 177. 
 
 -- how God’s moral government 
 
 accounts for our being placed in 
 a state of probation, 91. 
 
 - upon what suppositions the 
 
 objections against God’s provi- 
 dence are usually founded, 128. 
 - the dispensations of provi¬ 
 dence, how to be judged of, 153. 
 
 - how far we are concerned to 
 
 answer objections against God’s 
 providence, 282, 285, 286. 
 
 -objections against the Divine 
 
 government, how obviated by 
 analogy, 125, &c. 
 
 -resignation to God’s will is an 
 
 essential part of virtue, 103, 104. 
 
 - what temper of mind in us 
 
 corresponds to G.’s sovereignty, 
 io 5- 
 
 —-— the heinousness h of disobey¬ 
 ing G.’s commands, 147, 202. 
 
 - whether disobedience 1 in any 
 
 case admits of an excuse, and 
 when, 137, 138. 
 
 the duties to God the Father, 
 whence their obligation arises, 
 I 55 > &c. 
 
 those to God the Son and 
 Holy Ghost , 157, &c. 
 
 Good men ; their security against 
 sin depends upon their improving 
 their virtuous habits, 194. 
 
 Good and evil, naturalj the great 
 variety and seeming inequality 
 of their distribution, 219, 220. 
 
 -moral; the notion of it implies 
 
 good desert, 319. 
 
 Goodness : see God. 
 
 Government, the formal notion of 
 it, 36. 
 
 -- natural and moral, 46, 47. 
 
 Guilt, the idea of it in our minds 
 always associated with that of ill- 
 desert, 320. 
 
 Habits, what, and how formed, 83, 
 &c. 
 
 how they differ from passive 
 impressions, 85—87. 
 
 h Qy.— Bullet. i q, 
 
 * Credible from hence, that this is t 
 happiness.— Butler. 
 
 Habits , the great consequence of ob¬ 
 taining them in their proper sea¬ 
 son, 89, 91. 
 
 —*-r virtuous and vicious , the man¬ 
 ner of their formation, 95, 97, 
 100. 
 
 —— of virtue necessary to all ra¬ 
 tional creatures, whether sup¬ 
 posed virtuous or depraved, 97, 
 98. 
 
 Happiness, wherein it consists, 82, 
 
 83. 
 
 - and Misery, reflections upon 
 
 the means of their distribution 
 at present, 34. 
 
 - present, mainly depends upon 
 
 our own behaviour, 34, 39, 43. 
 
 ——— why it is not given to all pro¬ 
 miscuously, 35. 
 
 -why not confined to merit, 58. 
 
 -- present, not to be secured 
 
 without great hazard and diffi¬ 
 culty, 79, 80. 
 
 -how this is reconcilable with 
 
 the goodness of God*, 80, 81. 
 Heathen world, the state of religion 
 in it, 145. 
 
 History, what account it gives of 
 the origin of religion, 169. 
 
 —* of the world, in what view 
 it is considered in Scripture, 262. 
 -see Scripture, Prophetic, Mi¬ 
 racles. 
 
 Hope and Fear, proper principles of 
 religious obedience, 103. 
 
 Identity or sameness, the different 
 senses of the word, 308. 
 
 -in what sense applied to per¬ 
 sons, 307,310. 
 
 - personal, not constituted by 
 
 consciousness, 308. 
 
 -why by some thought to be 
 
 so, 308. 
 
 Jews, a summary of God’s dealing 
 with them, 265. 
 
 their history as contained in 
 Scripture, confirmed by known 
 fact, 270, 271. 
 
 not to be accounted for, but 
 upon supposition of the miracles 
 recorded in Scripture, 271. 
 
 -the circumstances of their dis¬ 
 persion, and yet continuing a 
 distinct people, how they confirm 
 the truth of Revelation, 272,275. 
 
 .— Butler. 
 
 e case too with regard to our future 
 
BUTLER’S ANALOGY. 
 
 335 
 
 Ignorance in matters of Religion, 
 owing frequently to men’s negli¬ 
 gence and prejudices, 234. 
 
 -in matters of Revealed Religion, 
 
 no more excusable than of Natu¬ 
 ral, 157. 
 
 -what experience may teach us 
 
 concerning our ignorance, 136. 
 
 • - of the causes on what the 
 
 course of nature depends, 171. 
 - of the nature of our con¬ 
 dition, present and future 1 , and 
 of the reasons why we are placed 
 therein, 224. 
 
 * -of the manner and degrees in 
 
 which either natural or super¬ 
 natural knowledge would be con¬ 
 veyed to us, antecedently to 
 experience, 176, 177. 
 
 - how this life is a preparation for 
 
 a etter, should be no objection 
 z ‘ linst the credibility thereof,9i. 
 
 -concerning the scheme of the 
 
 natural world should teach us not 
 to wonder at the incomprehen¬ 
 sibleness of the moral, 127, 128. 
 
 -objections drawn from our i. 
 
 sometimes very absurd ,—when 
 more particularly so, 216, 217. 
 
 -in what cases i. may serve for a 
 
 satisfactory answer to objections, 
 and when not, 130,134. 
 
 -may be urged as a just answer 
 
 to objections against the scheme 
 of God’s providence, 130, 135, 
 136. 
 
 -may be a satisfactory answer 
 
 to objections against a thing, and 
 yet not affect the proof of it, 134. 
 -answers taken from our igno¬ 
 rance applied to objections against 
 providence™, in what sense they 
 may be called answers, 136,137. 
 Imagination, apt to mislead us, 17. 
 Improvement of the human faculties 
 in all respects is gradual, 88. 
 
 - whether this circumstance 
 
 does not render them more use¬ 
 ful than if we had been born 
 with them in their full maturity, 
 88, 89. 
 
 Inspiration j in what manner or in 
 what degree it should be vouch¬ 
 
 safed to mankind, not knowable 
 by human reason, 176. 
 
 Interest; sense of interest, what, 
 94- . 
 
 - in what respect it is, and 
 
 in what it is not, sufficient to 
 restrain men from criminal self- 
 indulgence, 94. 
 
 - in what sense it is always 
 
 coincident with virtue, 104. 
 Irregularities in nature, whence the 
 appearance of them arises, 194. 
 
 -unreasonable to expect to have 
 
 them remedied by occasional 
 interpositions, 133. 
 
 Ir religion, its aggravated guilt be¬ 
 yond that of other vice, 202, 294. 
 
 -more especially aggravated in 
 
 men of high rank and character, 
 228. 
 
 *-not justifiable upon any pre¬ 
 
 tence of w'ant of evidence in 
 religion, 227. 
 
 Kingdom; idea of a k. perfectly 
 virtuous and happy, 66. 
 
 -see Political. 
 
 Knowledge, natural, the ordinary 
 methods of improving it, 183. 
 
 Liberty ; w r hy the proof of religion 
 from thence is omitted in this 
 treatise, 290, 291. 
 
 - the nature of it insufficient 
 
 to account for the Fall , 95, 
 
 -the constitution of the present 
 
 world and our condition in it 
 imply that we are free, 113. 
 
 Life: see Future Life. 
 
 Living Powers, wffiat, 15 n. 
 
 - death not necessarily the 
 
 destruction of them, 16,17, 21. 
 
 -why thought so, 17. 
 
 -their not being exercised does 
 
 not imply their non-existence, 
 16. 
 
 -present life has reference to a 
 
 larger plan of things, not fully to 
 be comprehended by us, 137. 
 Locke, Mr., his notion of personal 
 identity examined, 308. 
 Locomotive powers, to what they 
 properly belong, 23. 
 
 1 Natural and moral.— Butler. 
 
 m Answers before given to objections against Providence, not taken from our 
 ignorance only, but from somewhat which analogy teaches us concerning it. 
 — Butler . 
 
336 
 
 INDEX TO 
 
 Mahometanism was not received in 
 the world upon the foot of 
 miracles, 245. 
 
 Man, how his nature differs from 
 that of brutes, and wherein it 
 agrees, 316. 
 
 Manifestation of persons’ characters 
 in this life to other intelligent 
 creatures, what uses may be 
 served thereby, 106. 
 
 - this may be one use of 
 temptations, 232. 
 
 Martyrs , primitive; what argument 
 their sufferings afford of the 
 reality of Christ’s miracles, 248. 
 Matter , our being affected thereby 
 does not prove it to make part of 
 our self \ 2 1, 22. 
 
 Means and End; speculative reason, 
 antecedently to experience, is a 
 very incompetent judge of either, 
 6,8, 130, 136. 
 
 the distinction between them 
 not always rightly applied by us 
 to Divine actions, £96. 
 
 - the making use of means for 
 the salvation of mankind not in¬ 
 consistent with the supposition of 
 wisdom in the contrivance 11 ,196 
 
 -prescribed by Christianity, no 
 
 presumption against their wis¬ 
 dom, 192. 
 
 Mediator between God and man, 
 the notion of it agreeable to the’ 
 light of nature, 197, 299. 
 
 -the appointment of a Mediator 
 
 considered, p. ii. ch. v. 
 
 - the Christian doctrine of a 
 
 Mediator, in what respect mostly 
 objected to; and the frivolousness 
 of such objections, 214, 217. 
 
 -see Redemption. 
 
 Messiah: see Christ. 
 
 Miracle , a relative term, 168. 
 
 — whether the power exerted at 
 the first formation of the world 
 should be so called, 168,169. 
 
 - whether the analogy of nature 
 affords any presumption against 
 their reality, p. ii. ch. ii. 
 
 — with what phenomena of nature 
 they should be compared, in 
 order to judge whether there lies 
 
 any presumption against them, 
 I7 1 - 
 
 Miracles , the consideration of reli¬ 
 gion carries with it distinct reasons 
 for them, 170, 171. 
 
 - the primary design of them, 
 
 148,149- 
 
 -whether they confirm natural 
 
 religion, and how, 149. 
 
 --peculiar to the Mosaic and 
 
 Christian religion, 244, 245. 
 
 - whether any others are well 
 
 attested by historical evidence °, 
 2 5G 271, 272. 
 
 - whether the supposition of 
 
 such attestation would discredit 
 the Scriptural miracles, 251, 272. 
 
 - related in Scripture, how 
 
 confirmed by contemporary and 
 subsequent facts, 241, 242. 
 
 - what observable as to the 
 
 manner in which they are related 
 in Scripture p, 240, 241, 243, 
 244. 
 
 - recorded in Scripture, what 
 
 confirmation they receive from 
 the credibility of common history, 
 270, 271. 
 
 -referred to in St. Paul’s Epi¬ 
 stles, 244. 
 
 -- what proof of their reality is 
 
 afforded by the conversion of the 
 first Christians, 247. 
 
 Pagan or Popish, no paral¬ 
 lelism a between them and those 
 recorded in Scripture, 245. 
 
 - invisible m., what may be 
 
 termed thus, 167. 
 
 Miraculous , in what respect many 
 events seemingly brought about 
 by natural means may justly be 
 esteemed to be miraculous, 273. 
 Misery: see Happiness. 
 
 Moral action, whether the nature of 
 it can be altered by virtue of a 
 command, 187. 
 
 Moral faculty: see Conscience. 
 
 Moral obligations, whence the force 
 of them arises, 135,159,160. 
 
 Moral precepts , see Positive. 
 
 Moral^ part ot religion, why preferred 
 in Scripture to the positive, 160, 
 161. 
 
 n Conformable to the whole constitution and course of nature.-*,u/er 
 
BUTLER’S ANALOGY. 
 
 33/ 
 
 Morality of actions depends chiefly, 
 but not solely, upon the intention 
 of the agent, 320. 
 
 -depends partly upon the nature 
 
 and capacity of the agent, 321. 
 Mysteries, as great in nature as in 
 Christianity, 195. 
 
 Mysteriousness of the Christian 
 scheme affords no just objection 
 against it, 190. 
 
 Nature , light of n. insufficient, 145. 
 
 -course of n. what, 5, 36,199. 
 
 - is progressive, 196. 
 
 - with regard to intelligent 
 
 beings, is carried on by general 
 laws, 9,132, 192. 
 
 - (as known by experience) 
 
 affords no presumption against any 
 of the Christian doctrines, 167. 
 
 - our i ^norance of the causes, 
 
 &c. on Aich the course of nature 
 depend.' 1 171. 
 
 Natural , in what sense those events 
 may be termed natural which 
 proceed from God’s immediate 
 interposition, 31,32. 
 
 - see Government , Religion , 
 
 Knowledge. 
 
 Necessary existence, how attributed 
 to God, 109,110. 
 
 Necessity , as held by the Fatalist, 
 does not exclude deliberation and 
 choice, 108. 
 
 - the supposition of n. will not 
 
 account for the origin and pre¬ 
 servation of all things, ib. 
 
 -in what sense n. is said to be 
 
 the foundation of the existence of 
 God, no. 
 
 -existence of things by n. im¬ 
 plies some operating agent, 109, 
 no. 
 
 -does not exclude an intelligent 
 
 agent, nor destroy the ground of 
 belief that we are in a state of 
 religion, in. 
 
 -nor the justice of punish¬ 
 ment for crimes, 115. 
 
 -nor the proof of God’s moral 
 
 character, 115,142. 
 
 -nor the proof of the obliga¬ 
 tions of religion, 115, 286. 
 
 - nor the external evidence 
 
 of religion, 121. 
 
 -in what respect the opinion of 
 
 n. may be said to be destructive 
 of all religion, 123. 
 
 -if made a principle of conduct 
 
 in affairs of common life, experi¬ 
 ence would soon convince us of 
 its absurdity, in—113. 
 
 Negligence , no more excusable as 
 to matters of revealed religion 
 than of natural, 157. 
 
 -is one source of dissatisfaction 
 
 about the evidence of religion, 
 2 33 > 234. 
 
 Objections ; the use of shewing that 
 the same objections lie against 
 natural religion which are com¬ 
 monly urged against revealed, 
 281, 282. 
 
 -though not cleared up, do not 
 
 destroy the proof of religion, 235. 
 
 - drawn from our ignorance, 
 
 when more particularly absurd, 
 213,216. 
 
 -what qualifications are requisite 
 
 in order to their due considera¬ 
 tion, 236. 
 
 - against the argument from 
 
 analogy , drawn from the supposed 
 small degree of influence which it 
 is likely to have upon mankind, 
 considered, 289. 
 
 - against the scheme of Provi¬ 
 dence are generally mere arbitrary 
 assertions, and receive a proper 
 answer from our ignorance, 128, 
 136. 
 
 - against the dispensations of 
 
 Providence, how far we are con¬ 
 cerned to answer them, 284, 285. 
 
 - drawn from the seeming irre¬ 
 gularities of the moral world, how 
 solved by comparing them with 
 what occurs in the natural world, 
 126,130,136. 
 
 -against the credibility of future 
 
 punishments obviated, 38, 44. 
 
 - against the credibility of a 
 
 future life, drawn from our igno¬ 
 rance how this life is a preparation 
 for it, 91. 
 
 -against this world’s being de¬ 
 signed for a state of moral im¬ 
 provement in virtue; drawn from 
 the frequent instances of men’s 
 improving only in vice, 101, 102, 
 105. 
 
 - why the matter of the 
 
 Christian Revelation must be ex¬ 
 pected to appear liable to 0., 175, 
 167. 
 
 - against the reality of the 
 
 truths discovered by Christianity, 
 
338 
 
 INDEX TO 
 
 drawn from their appearing un¬ 
 like the known course of nature, 
 I( ?7- . 
 
 Objections against Christianity, 
 drawn from the manner or degree 
 in which the light of it is vouch¬ 
 safed, why frivolous, 177. 
 
 - against Christianity, from its 
 
 supposed want of universality, 
 184,185. 7 
 
 -from its mysteriousness, 
 
 190. 
 
 - against the wisdom of it, 
 
 189. 
 
 - drawn from the perversions 
 
 of Christianity, 152. 
 
 -- against Christianity itself, as 
 
 distinguished from those against 
 its evidence, why frivolous, 173. 
 
 against the Scriptural doctrine 
 of a Redeemer, 203, 217. 
 
 - against Scripture, the com¬ 
 mon ones, their frivolousness, 
 J 77- 
 
 -— from its liableness to be 
 
 perverted, 187. 
 
 ■-as to its not answering our 
 
 preconceived expectations, 180. 
 
 - what gives particular force to 
 
 objections against Christianity, 
 when offered in common con¬ 
 versation, 279. 
 
 Obligations of duty, arising from 
 the bare supposableness or credi¬ 
 bility of religion, 227, 230. 
 Occasional interpositions to remedy 
 the supposed irregularities in the 
 government of the world, would 
 be attended with manifest ill 
 effects, 132,133. 
 
 Omissions, when vicious, 315. 
 
 Opinion : see Evidence. 
 
 Origen, his hint concerning ana¬ 
 logical reasoning, 5. 
 
 Passions, how they contribute to 
 make our present state a state 
 of trial, 75, 76. 
 
 - are excited towards particular 
 
 objects whether we will or no 
 
 93>95- 
 
 - such bare excitement not 
 criminal, 93. 
 
 -always dangerous, 95,96. 
 
 - how to be regulated, 96,97. 
 
 how the fall of man may be 
 accounted for from thence, 94,95. 
 Passive Impressions differ from prac¬ 
 tical habits, 86,87. 
 
 Passive Impressions are less sensi¬ 
 bly felt by being repeated, but 
 not less apt to influence our 
 practice, 86, 87. 
 
 St. Paul's Epistles, what particular 
 evidence we have of their ge¬ 
 nuineness, 243, 244. 
 
 -- what distinct proof of Chris. 
 
 tianity they afford, 243 , 244. 
 Perception may be without external 
 objects, 22, 23. 
 
 - our powers of p. different 
 
 from the senses, 22, 23. 
 
 -ridiculous to dispute the truth 
 
 of our/?., 315. 
 
 Person, what, 308,309. 
 
 sameness of p. prior to all 
 considerations of consciousness. 
 
 Personality, in what sense founded 
 in consciousness, 308. 
 
 Pleasure attending the gratification 
 of our passions, whether, and how 
 far, intended to put us upon 
 gratifying them, 36. 
 
 - the distribution of p. in the 
 
 world, in what sense it is reward, 
 46. 
 
 Political state of kingdoms, in what 
 view taken notice of and fore¬ 
 told in Scripture, 263. 
 
 Positive institutions implied in the 
 notion of a visible Church, i*i, 
 
 152. 
 
 — the great presumption of 
 those who slight them, 164. 
 Positive precepts, how they differ 
 from moral, 159. 
 
 - whether founded in natural 
 
 religion, 160. 
 
 -- when and in what cases they 
 
 yield to moral, 161. 
 
 caution necessary when we 
 compare p. precepts with moral, 
 160. 
 
 Practical proof, what, 122. 
 
 Practice by what evidence matters 
 of/?, are often determined, 281. 
 
 in matters of /?. their import¬ 
 ance is always to be considered, 
 27S. 
 
 Prejudices• several sorts of /?., 249. 
 —- occasion dissatisfaction about 
 the evidence of religion, 233. 
 
 the folly of being influ¬ 
 enced by /?. arising from con¬ 
 tempt and scorn, 259, 260. 
 
 Present existence affords presump¬ 
 tion of continuance, where there 
 
BUTLER’S ANALOGY. 
 
 339 
 
 appears no reason to the con¬ 
 trary, 15. 
 
 Presumption : see Evidence. 
 Presujnptuousness, the unjustifiable¬ 
 ness of it, 45. 
 
 Principles upon which we are apt 
 to reason antecedently to experi¬ 
 ence, generally prove fallacious, 
 186, 187, 188. 
 
 - the several p. of virtue, how¬ 
 ever distinct from each other, are 
 coincident, 103. 
 
 Probability: see Evidence. 
 Probation: see Trial. 
 
 - a state of p ., what is meant 
 
 by it, and how it differs from 
 moral government, 73. 
 Profaneness: see Ir religion. 
 
 Proof practical, what is meant by 
 it, 122. 
 
 Prophecies recorded in Scripture, 
 the primary design of them, 148. 
 
 - whether they confirm natural 
 
 religion, and how, ib. 
 
 - concerning the Messiah, how 
 
 understood by the Jews before 
 the coming of Christ, 256. 
 
 -- the question concerning the 
 
 force of the argument arising 
 from p. stated, 259. 
 
 - whether their true meaning 
 
 is to be determined by their 
 apparent completion, 256. 
 
 - the conformity between pro¬ 
 phecies and events not merely 
 accidental, 277. 
 
 - though applicable to other 
 
 events, might nevertheless, in the 
 Divine intention, have had regard 
 to the Christian dispensation, 
 
 258. *59- 
 
 - the force of the argument 
 
 from p. is best seen by taking 
 them in a long series, 255, 256. 
 
 - the obscurity of one part of a 
 
 p. does not invalidate the proof 
 of foresight, arising from the 
 apparent completion of other in¬ 
 telligible parts, 254. 
 
 -r- the force of the argument 
 
 from p. not destroyed, though we 
 suppose the prophets not to have 
 understood the intended mean¬ 
 ing of their predictions, 226, 
 2 57* 
 
 - the qualifications requisite 
 
 to take the force of the argu¬ 
 ment arising from p., 274, 275. 
 Prophetic History confirmed by 
 
 the state of the world, and of 
 the Christian church, 273, 274, 
 2 75 * 
 
 Prophets , not the sole authors of 
 what they wrote, 257. 
 
 Providence: see God. 
 
 Prudence , whether it ever requires 
 us to act, and when, though there 
 is no probability of our succeed¬ 
 ing* 3- 
 
 - the difficulty of obtaining p., 
 
 2 33- 
 
 - when a course of action may 
 
 be called prudent, 288, 289. 
 Public spirit , the true notion of it, 
 
 63- 
 
 Punishment ,its proper notion, 37,38. 
 
 - why natural p. is in Scripture 
 
 ascribed to divine justice, 123. 
 
 - p. of the innocent for the 
 
 guilty, whether and how far it 
 affects the doctrine of Christ’s 
 satisfaction, 214, 215. 
 
 - instances of vicarious p. in 
 
 the daily course of providence, 
 
 2 I 5 * 
 
 -see Future Punishments. 
 
 Reason, a very incompetent judge 
 of the conduciveness of means to 
 their respective ends, 130, 131. 
 
 - or in what manner God 
 
 would instruct mankind, 176. 
 
 - could not have discovered 
 
 the scheme of Christianity, 166. 
 —— how far r. can judge of 
 revelation, and in what respect , 
 
 173* 186. 
 
 -is an incompetent judge of the 
 
 matter of Divine revelation, 297. 
 
 - this consideration affords no 
 
 presumption against revelation, 
 165,297. 
 
 - an account of the opposition 
 
 sometimes made to religion upon 
 supposed principles of r., and the 
 folly of it, 295, 297. 
 
 Reasons of a divine command ceas¬ 
 ing, the obligation ceases, 147. 
 Reasoning upon the course of 
 nature, without attending to 
 known facts, apt to be fallacious, 
 5 , 8 . 
 
 - upon the several possible 
 
 formations of the universe, why 
 ridiculous, 6, 7. 
 
 - upon ^ the principles of 
 
 others, what is meant by it, 290. 
 - whether abstruse r. be ever 
 
340 
 
 INDEX TO 
 
 necessary in matters of religion, 
 294. 
 
 Redemption } the scriptural doctrine 
 of r. distinctly represented, 207. 
 
 - how illustrated by what we 
 
 experience concerning the reme¬ 
 dies which God hath provided 
 against temporal evils, 200, 201. 
 
 - further illustrated by analogy, 
 
 298, 299. 
 
 - agreeable to our natural no¬ 
 tions, our hopes and our fears, 
 205. 
 
 - the manner of its efficacy not 
 
 represented in Scripture, nor 
 discoverable by reason, 300, 
 3 QI - 
 
 —— why we are incompetent 
 judges of it, 213. 
 
 - the rashness of some persons 
 
 in determining questions con¬ 
 cerning it, 216, 217. 
 
 - see Punishment , Mediator . 
 
 Reflection , our powers of r. do not 
 depend upon what is liable to a 
 dissolution from death, 27. 
 
 - our powers of r. may be im¬ 
 proved by death, 29. 
 
 - do not depend upon our 
 
 bodily powers, 28,30. 
 
 Relations , impossible for us to say 
 how far the r. of the several 
 species and individuals in the 
 natural world extend, 126. 
 
 - between the several parts of 
 
 the Divine administration in the 
 moral world, 127, 128. 
 
 Religion , its general system, 68. 
 
 - what is implied in the notion 
 
 of r., 282, 283. 
 
 - wherein the general spirit of 
 
 r. consists, 163. 
 
 - in what view considered 
 
 throughout this treatise, 291. 
 
 - is founded in the moral 
 
 character of God, 115. 
 
 -implies a future state, 32. 
 
 -implies our being in a state of 
 
 probation, 237. 
 
 - the importance of being in¬ 
 fluenced by r., 142. 
 
 - the proper proof of r. and 
 
 motives to it, 143. 
 
 - the force of its obligation is 
 
 not destroyed by the opinion of 
 necessity, 116. 
 
 - degrees of knowledge of r. 
 
 different among different men, 
 221, 222. 
 
 Religion j why its evidence has been 
 left at all doubtful, 229, 230. 
 
 - such doubtfulness does not 
 
 destroy its obligation, 226. 
 
 -its importance, 122. 
 
 -an account of those who op¬ 
 pose it, as they suppose, on prin¬ 
 ciples of reason, 296, 297. 
 
 - the origin of r. according to 
 
 history and tradition, 169. 
 
 -the state of r. in the heathen 
 
 world, 145. 
 
 - distinguished into internal 
 
 and external, 155. 
 
 -natural r. what, 10, 11,119. 
 
 - is not the only object 
 
 of our moral regard, 157. 
 
 - probably owes its rise 
 
 and establishment to revelation, 
 120,146, 268. 
 
 -whether it hath any external 
 
 proof, 119. 
 
 - what proof it receives from 
 
 tradition, 120. 
 
 -the great advantages which it 
 
 receives from Christianity, 148, 
 I 54* 
 
 - what credibility it receives 
 
 from the miracles recorded in 
 Scripture, 148,149. 
 
 - how promoted by the settle¬ 
 ment of a visible church, 151. 
 
 - the obligations of natural r., 
 
 as inculcated in Christian coun¬ 
 tries, lie obvious to all appre¬ 
 hensions, 294, 295. 
 
 Religious knowledge , a general 
 account of the different degrees 
 of it to be found among different 
 men, 221. 
 
 Remorse , what, 53. 
 
 Repentance , its insufficiency to ex¬ 
 piate guilt, argued from analogy, 
 203, 299, 300. 
 
 -the general sense of mankind 
 
 upon this subject, 204. 
 
 - its efficacy whence derived, 
 
 212. 
 
 Resignation to God’s will, an es¬ 
 sential part of virtue, 103,104. 
 
 - how the habit of it is pro¬ 
 duced, 104,105. 
 
 Revelation necessary to explain the 
 scheme of the universe, 65. 
 
 - to ascertain and supply the 
 
 defects of natural religion, 145. 
 
 -7 the great usefulness of it 
 
 with respect to natural religion, 
 j 48, 154. 
 
TO BUTLER’S ANALOGY. 
 
 341 
 
 Revelation, supposed to have been 
 given at the beginning of the 
 world, in what sense miraculous, 
 168. 
 
 -no peculiar difficulty in sup¬ 
 posing a r. to have been made at 
 that time, 169. 
 
 -the pretences of false r. imply 
 
 a true one, 120. 
 
 Revealed Religion, (viz. Christian) 
 what is implied in the notion of 
 it, 11,12,165. 
 
 - the suppositions on which it 
 
 is grounded, 197, 204, 205. 
 
 - a short view of its scheme, 
 
 165, 190. 
 
 -the extensiveness of it, 190. 
 
 - the reasonableness and the 
 
 credibility of its system are two 
 distinct considerations, 286. 
 
 - no presumption against it 
 
 from the analogy of nature, 165. 
 
 -upon what kind of proof it is 
 
 to he received, 294, 295. 
 
 -its evidence, part direct, part 
 
 collateral, 240, 260. 
 
 -consists of various parts to be 
 
 united into one view, 276. 
 
 -briefly represented, 260, 275. 
 
 -why left at all doubtful, 283, 
 
 284, 288. 
 
 -cannot he destroyed, 279. 
 
 - how far tradition may be 
 
 admitted in proof of it, 168. 
 
 - how the question concerning 
 
 its truth ought to be stated, 177, 
 178,188. 
 
 - may be considered as wholly 
 
 historical, 262. 
 
 -unreasonable to expect to have 
 
 all difficulties in it cleared, 281, 
 282. 
 
 -difficulties in it are parallel to 
 
 those which arise in the ordinary 
 administration of providence, 175. 
 
 -objections against the matter 
 
 of r. r., 172. 
 
 -admit of the same answers 
 
 as those alleged against the wise 
 constitution of nature, 189. 
 
 - the difference between its 
 
 scheme and the experienced 
 course of nature illustrated by 
 analogy, 301. 
 
 -the mysteriousness of r.r., 190. 
 
 - its dispensation, whether 
 
 carried on by general laws, 192. 
 
 -how far to be judged of by 
 
 reason, 173,186. 
 
 Revealed Religion, objections against 
 its want of universality consider¬ 
 ed, 184,185. 
 
 -against the wisdom and jus¬ 
 tice of it, 189. 
 
 -against it as a matter of fact, 
 
 285, 286. 
 
 - against it drawn from its 
 
 abuses and perversions, 152,153. 
 
 -the duties of it strictly moral, 
 
 I 55» T 57- 
 
 - the practice of it may be 
 
 shewn to be reasonable, though 
 we cannot evince the reasonable¬ 
 ness of each precept, 286. 
 
 - the rashness of treating it 
 
 with disregard, 158. 
 
 - the occasion of some men’s 
 
 treating it with scorn, and the 
 sinfulness of so doing, 295,303. 
 
 - a brief account of its first 
 
 propagation and establishment, 
 245* 271,272; 
 
 - what strength its evidence 
 
 receives from the conversion and 
 zeal of the first Christians, 248. 
 
 - Jewish and Christian, the 
 
 degrees of their evidence different 
 at different times, 220, 221. 
 Rewards and Punisktnents , accord¬ 
 ing to the natural constitution of 
 things, correspond to virtue and 
 Wee, 139, 140. 
 
 Ridicule , how it obstructs men’s 
 seeing the evidence of religion, 
 2 34* 
 
 Sacrifices propitiatory, the general 
 prevalence of them shews the 
 sense of mankind about the 
 inefficacy of mere repentance, 204. 
 
 -legal, their design, 208, 211. 
 
 -the death of Christ a proper s., 
 
 208, 211. 
 
 -the manner of its efficacy not 
 
 explained in Scripture, and there¬ 
 fore unwarrantable in any man to 
 attempt explaining it, 212. 
 Scepticism, no justification of indif¬ 
 ference about religion, 239. 
 
 -about the evidence of religion 
 
 implies a suspicion at least of its 
 being true, 252, 253. 
 
 Sceptics among us, their im¬ 
 morality and irreligion utterly 
 inexcusable, 302, 303. 
 
 Scorn of religion, to what it is 
 owing, 296, 302, 303. 
 
 -its claim to a considerate 
 
 regard, 268. 
 
INDEX TO UUTLER’S ANALOGY. 
 
 344 
 
 of persons’ characters to other 
 intelligent creatures, 106. 
 
 World , the natural government of it 
 carried on by general laws, 132. 
 
 - the natural w. intended to be 
 
 subordinate to the moral, 127. 
 -its history in Scripture, in 
 
 what view to be considered, 262. 
 
 World , its period as spoken of in the 
 Old and New Testament, 264. 
 
 Youth , the great importance of 
 right direction in that stage of 
 life, 41,83, 84, 88. 
 

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