^ONSIDERi^ 
 
 
 
 ON THE 
 
 VALUE AND IMPORTANCE 
 
 ^mtrtcan iProlitna^t 
 
 THE CIRCUMSTANCES ON WHICH DEPEND THEIR FURTHER 
 PROSPERITY, AND COLONIAL CONNECTION 
 
 BY 
 
 Major General SIR HOWARD DOUGLAS, Bart. 
 
 K.S.C. C.B. F.R.S. &c. &c. 
 
 SECOND EDITION. 
 
 LONDON: 
 
 JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET. 
 
 OF THE 
 
 AND 
 
 WITH GREAT BRITAIN 
 
 “ Ships, Colonies, and Commerce. 
 
 MDCCCXXXI. 
 
THE BRITISH 
 
 NORTH AMERICAN PROVINCES. 
 
 There are two signs under which the States- 
 man may estimate the value and importance of 
 the British North American Colonies. The 
 one is positive, the other relative. The positive, 
 or absolute value, consists in the shipping they 
 employ, the seamen they form, the manufac- 
 tures they consume, the supplies which they 
 furnish for the British market and our West 
 India Colonies, and the mastings and spars 
 which they ensure for our navy in the day of 
 need. The relative importance of these pro- 
 vinces may be considered by the effects which 
 would be produced if all these elements of sta- 
 tistical greatness were placed in the opposite 
 scale of the beam, by which the statesman 
 should carefully weigh the effects of measures 
 which, though treated as fiscal or finance ques- 
 tions, reach, in fact, into matters of the very 
 highest order of policy. 
 
 B 2 
 
( 4 ) 
 
 The permanency of the colonial connection 
 between Great Britain and the North Americ 
 Provinces, rests entirely on the 
 which their interests are dealt with y 
 British Parliament; it is ^ 
 
 greatest importance to consider what e 
 are likely to be produced upon the m eres 
 of those colonies, by the proposed alteration in 
 the duties on foreign and North American 
 
 timbers. . . 
 
 Some of the passages now reprinted in these 
 
 pages, appeared in a periodical work of las 
 year, for the purpose of showing the value and 
 importance of the British North American 
 Provinces, not only to the commerce, manufac- 
 tures and navigation of the parent state, but 
 to the maritime greatness and security of the 
 British empire; but, finding that, though those 
 passages appeared in a work of the highest cha- 
 racter and the greatest circulation, they may 
 again be used with some advantage to invite 
 attention to those facts, which it is necessary to 
 bring to a full and deliberate consideration of 
 the many theories by which it is proposed to 
 divest ourselves of those colonies, or at least to 
 shake the interests which bind them to Britain, 
 I embody those passages with other matter 
 in this pamphlet, intreating the indulgence of 
 the public for the hasty manner in which it 
 is composed. 
 
Had I been aware that it was the intention 
 of the Finance Minister to propose any altera- 
 tion in the timber duties, I should have con- 
 sidered it incumbent upon me, as entrusted with 
 the government of a province whose interests 
 are deeply at stake, to represent forcibly to the 
 Government, in a timely manner, that no altera- 
 tion could be made in the ratio of duties, whe- 
 ther by raising those on British timber, or by 
 lowering those on the foreign article, or in any 
 way destroying’ the present scale, without in- 
 juring, or totally ruining the British North 
 American timber trade ; but as such an inten- 
 tion was not suffered to transpire, it would 
 have been unnecessary, and indeed out of place, 
 to renew the representations which I had pre- 
 viously made to the Colonial Department on 
 this important matter. The measure being 
 now, however, brought forward for discussion, 
 there is no alternative, short of my neglecting 
 to advocate those interests, but to submit, for- 
 cibly, in this shape, whether any financial or 
 fiscal measures can be considered paramount 
 to the great objects, in national policy, which 
 we should pursue, by a continued protection 
 of the Colonial Trade. 
 
 It will occasion me infinite regret should 
 any member of His Majesty’s Government, 
 and particularly the Noble Secretary in whose 
 department I was serving, consider that this 
 
( c ) 
 
 step has thrown any unwarrantable impedi- 
 ment in the paths of its financial arrange- 
 ments. I trust it will not be considered that, 
 because I held an official situation connected 
 with the colonies, I should be restrained from 
 coming forward at this time, to make pub- 
 lic the information which I have acquired in 
 the provinces so deeply concerned, and from 
 submitting the impressions which, as a British 
 subject, I am under, as to the effects of the 
 proposed measure, on the interests of the British 
 empire. Being on the spot, it was impossible 
 for me to avoid expressing, in some way or 
 other, these convictions: and the course I 
 have taken is the only open and manly line 
 of conduct I could have adopted — namely, to 
 lay the following “ considerations” before the 
 public. If the facts which I represent, and the 
 deductions which have been made from them, are 
 not considered such as ought to occasion any 
 deviation from the proposed measure, they will 
 be over-ruled, (they cannot be disputed) by 
 those ulterior designs, for greater objects, (if 
 there be any greater,) which the government 
 may have in view; and I shall have the satisfac- 
 tion of reflecting that I have done my duty in 
 representing the injurious effects which I appre- 
 hend, from any change, upon particular pro- 
 vincial interests which, in common with those 
 

 ( 7 ) 
 
 of all British North America, I firmly believe 
 to be of paramount importance to the British 
 empire. 
 
 The population of the British North Ameri- 
 can Provinces was in the year 1828 about 
 1,000,000, and increasing in a higher ratio 
 than that of the adjoining New England 
 States ; and the British Colonies consume in 
 corresponding augmentations the manufac- 
 tures and goods of Great Britain and Ireland, 
 and take increasing quantities of West India 
 produce, upon which the United States have 
 laid heavy duties to encourage the production 
 of their own sugars. 
 
 In 1828 the amount of British manufactures 
 consumed in British North America, was about 
 £2,000,000 value, so that those Provinces take 
 about 40.y. each person per annum of British 
 goods. 
 
 The amount of British manufactures im- 
 ported into the United States from the United 
 Kingdom in 1826, (see Watterston’s Statistics,) 
 was 26,181,800 dollars, which at 4^. Gd. is 
 £5,876,975; the population of the United 
 States for that year being 12,000,000, it follows 
 that the people of the United States do not 
 take, per person, one-fourth so much of British 
 goods as the people of the British Colonies; and 
 this market must diminish under the influence 
 
( 8 ) 
 
 of the American system, by which the United 
 States are manufacturing very extensively or 
 themselves, and actually beginning to rival us 
 in many articles in foreign markets. Nor is 
 there any probability that the state and pro 
 spects of our trade with the United States wi 
 become more favourable ; for it has very late y 
 been recommended by a committee of Congress 
 that no change in the provisions of the tariff be 
 entertained, lest it spread alarm amongst the 
 great interests concerned, and shake confi- 
 dence in the faith of government by injuring, 
 or destroying, the well-founded hope which 
 had induced vast numbers of persons to make 
 investments in those branches of industry which 
 the government had encouraged. 
 
 The whole British tonnage trading to British 
 North America before the Revolution, namely, 
 in the year 1772, was only 86,745 tons. The 
 British tonnage trading to the British North 
 American provinces in the year 1828 was 
 400,841 tons, navigated by at least 25,000 sea- 
 men, which is nearly one-Jifth of the whole foreign 
 trade of the country; and this prodigiously in- 
 creased, and still active trade, should be consi- 
 dered a home trade. There is no doubt that the 
 foreign trade should not be preferred to the home 
 trade; but that position which, in argument or 
 in fiscal arrangement, would consider the colo- 
 
( 9 ) 
 
 nial trade not to be a home trade, brings the 
 colonial interest under a wrong denomination. — 
 Classed as it ought to be, the measure in ques- 
 tion would appear in the proper light. 
 
 Whilst such has been, in point of fact, the 
 happy effect of our colonial policy in that 
 quarter of the world, to the manufacturing, 
 commercial and shipping interests of Great 
 Britain, let us see in what way this matter 
 is viewed, and the possessions which aliment 
 that trade are estimated, by our great com- 
 mercial rivals ; and what effect their attempts 
 to countervail its eminent successes, have 
 produced upon themselves. It appears* that 
 the population of the British Provinces in- 
 creased, between the years 1806 and 1825, 
 more than 113 per cent., whilst that of New 
 England increased only 27 per cent. : that the 
 imports of the British Colonies have been 
 almost qtiadrupled in amount, and the exports 
 considerably more than doubled in that tiQie;t 
 while the exports and imports of the United 
 States in 1828 were about the same in amount 
 as they were in 1807: That while the whole 
 foreign trade of the United States, with every 
 part of the world, has remained stationary 
 
 * Report on the Commerce and Navigation of the United 
 States, by Mr. Cambreleng, p. 28. 
 
 •f" Report, p. 28. 
 
( 10 ) 
 
 for fifteen years, the navigation of the Britisli 
 Colonies, with the mother-country alone, has 
 increased, as the Report states, from 
 to 400,841 tons,* or about one half of all the 
 American tonnage employed in its foreign tra e, 
 which in 1828 was only 824,781 tons, being 
 an increase of only 253,528 tons, or a frac- 
 tion less than 3 per cent, on what it was m 
 1820; while the increase of the foreign navi- 
 gation of Great Britain from 1815 to 1827 was 
 741,840 tons, or nearly equal to the whole 
 foreign tonnage of the United States in 1828! 
 Again,! the whole tonnage of the United States 
 with the British empire, had, in 1828, declined 
 by 32,000 tons since 1815; whilst British ton- 
 nage employed in the direct trade between the 
 United States and Great Britain, had, in 1828, 
 increased 38 per cent ! 
 
 Having stated these, and many other remark- 
 able facts, which bear, most forcibly, upon this 
 subject, the Report proceeds to state, “ that 
 whilst the British Provinces are making this 
 signal and immense progress, the commerce 
 and navigation of the United States have fallen 
 far in the rear of their rivals for national power 
 and naval ascendency — that the rise or de- 
 cline of navigation is the index of national 
 prosperity and power— that the great object 
 
 ■\ p. 26. 
 
 * Report, p. 27. 
 
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 ( n ) 
 
 of a statesman, in a maritime nation, should be 
 to lay the foundations of a great naval power 
 in a hardy and extensive commercial marine; 
 and that to prepare for war, it is palpably in- 
 consistent for a maritime nation, to attempt to 
 accomplish that object, by a policy destructive 
 of its commercial marine, the most efficient in- 
 strument of war, whether offensive or defensive.” 
 Thus has our policy been eulogised, and the 
 effects show with what justice, “ as one of a 
 lofty, wise ambition, which never sacrifices the 
 power of a nation to the meaner considerations 
 of speculative wealth;” as never permitting any 
 conflicting interest to interfere with the steady 
 growth of our commercial marine; and that the 
 paramount motive, in all our colonial and com- 
 mercial regulations, has been the enlargement 
 and encouragement of our navigation. Shall 
 we continue to deserve this praise, and to per- 
 petuate the effects which our colonial policy 
 has produced ? What it has accomplished are 
 facts', what it may further do, is assured. Is 
 there nothing speculative, nothing uncertain, 
 in the notions and principles of change, which 
 are proposed ? 
 
 Having soundly laid down these principles, 
 the Report avows that the Northern British 
 Colonies stand in a* peculiar and dangerous 
 relation to the United States, from the immense 
 
 I 
 
( 12 ) 
 
 progress those colonies are making ; whilst 
 some persons are treating of throwing them oft, 
 or making them independent, or not properly 
 protecting their interests as British Colonists, 
 by persevering in that line of policy which has 
 produced these happy and most important re- 
 sults, the following will show in what way, and 
 with what views, these possessions are viewed 
 by the United States: — 
 
 “ It is very desirable that the people of the 
 “ United States and of the British Provinces 
 » should become better acquainted and be led to 
 “ take a more lively interest in each other. Theii 
 “ fathers were united by the bond of a common 
 “ country ; and it needs no spirit of prophecy to 
 “ foresee, that the time must come, when, in the 
 “ natural course of events, the English colonies 
 “ on our borders will be peaceably disseveied 
 “ from the remote mother-country, and the 
 “ whole continent, from the Gulf of Mexico to 
 “ the coast of Labrador, present the unbroken 
 “ outline of one compact empire of friendly con- 
 “ federated States.”— North American Review. 
 
 One should have thought that the sage doc- 
 trine of “ Letting well alone^' would have been 
 observed, with respect to a course of policy 
 which has produced positive and relative effects 
 such as these, upon Britain’s “ best bulwarks,” 
 and upon Britain’^s maritime grCihtness. But it 
 
1 
 
 ( 13 ) 
 
 has of late become a favourite doctrine amongst 
 political economists, that colonies are of no 
 use ; that the productions of any country may 
 be procured at a cheaper rate, in commercial 
 dealings with that country, as an independent 
 state, than in a colonial connection, which 
 forces, by protecting duties, the sale of its 
 produce, on the parent state, at enhanced prices ; 
 and, applying this doctrine to our North Ame- 
 rican Provinces, it is asserted, that, inasmuch 
 as the public is made to pay more for timber, 
 than would be the case if the protection given 
 to those colonies were taken off, so this protect- 
 ing policy should be abandoned, for the pur- 
 pose of lowering price. That protecting duties 
 occasion higher prices to the consumer, is a 
 truism, which applies to all subjects of taxation. 
 But by what rule should we be justified in 
 sacrificing or injuring national interests to mere 
 considerations of price to the consumer? If the 
 interests of the North American Colonies be 
 not steadily protected, they may become dis- 
 posed to seek a change of condition in the 
 federal family of those, who, as I have shown, 
 know better how to estimate them, from a tho- 
 rough conviction of their immense value to us, 
 and a deep sense of the vast importance which 
 the acquisition of those provinces would pro- 
 duce to the American union and system. It 
 
( 14 ) 
 
 never was intended that the trade of the colonies 
 should be free. It was at least the intention o 
 Mr. Huskisson that the importation of foreign 
 goods into the colonies should be made subject 
 to duties sufficient to protect the productions o 
 British industry, and that the colonies mig 
 enjoy the counter-monopoly, of supplying t le 
 United Kingdom with their productions. The 
 economists assert that this mutual protec- 
 tion is an error in principle, and a failure in 
 policy, and we are admonished to get rid, in 
 toto, of our colonial monopoly, and likewise to 
 take from the colonies that which they enjoy, 
 as is now proposed in respect to their timbers. 
 This would be, in effect, to render the colo- 
 nies valueless to us, in the sense in which 
 national policy should teach us to view them, 
 and the colonial connection useless to them. 
 In a word, to abandon our present policy, 
 would be to lose our hold of the colonies alto- 
 gether ; and to do so would be to cut from our- 
 selves, in the midst of all our difficulties, about 
 one-third of the actual trade of the country. 
 
 According to this doctrine, as the Finance 
 Minister has avowed, he proposes to double 
 the duties on British-American timber, and 
 to reduce those on foreign timber. If this 
 be carried into effect, the scale will be com- 
 pletely destroyed, upon which only it is pos- 
 
sible for the North American Provinces to com- 
 pete with the northern European countries. 
 According to this proposition, there will still 
 remain a nominal difterence in the amount of 
 duties, and this the Finance Minister says will 
 still be sufficient to favour the North American 
 timber trade. So it would, if the voyages were 
 of the same length. Nor would our shipping 
 interests be injuriously affected, or other na- 
 tional interests interfered with, if the transac- 
 tions were, in all other respects, similar. But 
 the comparative duration of voyage, and other 
 essentially different circumstances, are such, 
 that the North American timber trade, instead 
 of being favoured, would be utterly annihilated, 
 if this measure be carried into effect. To 
 equalize the duties would be to favour decid- 
 edly, and at enormous sacrifices to the nation, 
 the Baltic timber trade. It is assumed, that this 
 equalization, or alteration of duties, would mi- 
 nister somewhat to cheapness in building 
 houses, and in other operations in which foreign 
 timber may be used ; but the statesman should 
 consider with what materials, and how pro- 
 duced, and whence procured, a nation’s great- 
 ness is constructed, and in what way it may be 
 endangered. It would be a poor consolation, 
 should Britain’s bulwarks feel the want of a 
 hardy and well-trained race of seamen to pro- 
 
( 16 ) 
 
 tect the nation in the storms of war, that a 
 fraction per cent, has been saved in the cos 
 our houses and the erection of our barns. 
 There is not time to argue this case m e ai . 
 
 I avow, without fear of being found m error, an 
 it may be depended upon, that the timber trade 
 of the British Colonies can now barely compete 
 in the home market with that from formgn 
 countries.* Foreigners, particularly in the a - 
 tic, build and sail their vessels vastly cheaper 
 (about one half) than that at which British ves- 
 sels can be built and navigated. The average 
 voyage from the north-eastern parts of England 
 and Scotland to Norway, the Baltic, and back 
 again, is from twenty-four to thirty days; 
 whereas the voyage to the North American 
 
 * Viewing the question in ‘policy, I have said little about 
 the minor consideration, price. Yet it may be expected of 
 me to advert to a transaction which has been mentioned as 
 having an adverse bearing— namely, that Baltic timber has 
 been sent to Great Britain byway of the Colonies. The 
 generally low rate of freight, the unoccupied tonnage resort- 
 ing to the British North American Colonies, and the economy 
 of fitting out vessels for long voyages in the northern Euro- 
 pean ports, where the prices of provisions are so much lower 
 than in England, induced certain ship-owners to try this ex- 
 traordinary experiment. Freight for five vessels was procured 
 accordingly ; but the experiment was not profitable, (it was 
 highly discreditable,) and will not be repeated. 
 
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 ( 17 ) 
 
 Colonies and home again may be calculated at 
 about a hundred days, landing and discharging 
 cargoes included. The former are chiefly per- 
 formed by foreigners in foreign ships, the latter 
 entirely by British subjects in British vessels ; 
 and if any alteration be made in the duties on 
 foreign timber, compared with those on British 
 timber — that is, if the modifications do not 
 maintain the ratio of the present scale, the 
 greater part of the timber trade will pass into 
 the hands of foreigners. This would break faith 
 with, and injure or ruin, the British subjects 
 who have been induced to make investments in 
 the colonial timber trade. The question here 
 to be considered, then, is not the adoption of a 
 course of policy which may purely benefit the 
 British consumer, but whether a course of po- 
 licy lo7ig since adopted shall be abandoned, and 
 the persons who are engaged in it severely in- 
 jured or ruined. In this just view, it may fairly 
 be assumed, that persons who may have been 
 most opposed to the adoption of the protecting 
 duties by which those interests have been cre- 
 ated, will be still more averse to turn round 
 and injure or destroy them. 
 
 At different periods, chiefly during the French 
 revolutionary war, large advances were made 
 by British capitalists to the proprietors of fo- 
 rests in Norway, and the countries bordering 
 
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( 18 ) 
 
 on the Baltic, who gave to the former security 
 upon the timber growing in those forests, uc r 
 speculations would perhaps now recur wi 
 great activity, should the proposed measures 
 be carried into elFect; for it would become the 
 manifest policy of the Northern merchants to 
 afford every facility to the investment of Bntxs i 
 capital in their forests, and they would not 
 concern themselves as to the effect this might 
 have, upon the commercial and shipping inte- 
 rests of the British empire. 
 
 Even were British ships to become the car- 
 riers of timber from those countries, that trade 
 would not be found so good a nursery for sea- 
 men for the British Navy as those formed in 
 the North American trade, the hardy and 
 healthy character of which, and the duration of 
 its voyages, are known to form the best seamen 
 in the world. 
 
 If, under the proposed duties, the North Ame- 
 rican provinces continue to carry on the timber 
 trade, it will be in the shape of a forced manu- 
 facture of the raw material into ships, by which 
 to save the freight home. This might for a 
 time proceed ^ but it would, m the end, occa- 
 sion embarrassment to the colony, and be in- 
 jurious to the British ship-builder. 
 
 The amount of British manufactures con- 
 sumed in the timber countries of the north of 
 
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 ( 19 ) 
 
 Europe, is trifling, when compared with those 
 consumed in the British provinces, and for 
 which they have little else to pay than timber. 
 If even the people in those countries had the 
 means, and they probably never will have, of 
 consuming as much of British manufactured 
 articles as the people of the British colonies do, 
 their own habits, as well as the policy of their 
 respective governments, forbid the hope that 
 they would consume British goods to an extent 
 which would warrant a preference being given 
 to the foreign trade. Their timber will be chiefly 
 paid for in money ; for the importation of British 
 manufactures into the northern timber countries 
 is known to be constant, and not to fluctuate 
 with a greater or less consumption of their 
 timbers in the British islands — whereas the 
 whole population of British America draws its 
 supplies from the manufactures of Great Britain, 
 and these supplies must steadily increase to a 
 prodigious extent, if the trade of those colonies 
 be cherished and properly protected. The di- 
 rect emigration to the port of Quebec alone in 
 the two last years was nearly 50,000 souls, and 
 the British colonies altogether have received 
 within the last ten years at least 250,000 set- 
 tlers from the mother country. The British 
 tonnage trading to the British North American 
 provinces increased in 1829 to 432,000 tons; 
 
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( 20 ) 
 
 and the export of British manufactures to those 
 provinces continues to increase stea l y 
 the augmentation of their population. n 
 it had increased to £2,206.913 value. m ' 
 
 ports of dry goods into the port o “ 
 alone in 1829 exceeded that of the ^ 
 
 by £ 1 1 1,000. With the loss of their tia e le 
 
 British provinces would lose commensurately 
 the means they possess of paying for 
 goods; they would sink into comparative po 
 verty and insignificance; and, in pace o 
 thriving settlements, and of an active, increas- 
 ing, and contented population, there won 
 soon be seen depopulated towns, a dispirited 
 and discontented people; and the large amount 
 of British capital now usefully employed among 
 a British people, would be withdrawn from the 
 colonies into foreign countries, or those pro- 
 vinces would themselves become, in the worst 
 of humour, foreign states. 
 
 The British Parliament has under its consi- 
 deration the important measure of directing the 
 current of emigration to the North American 
 provinces, to relieve the mother country of the 
 inconveniences and distresses of a redundant 
 population; and to remove a portion of its 
 people to a country in which they may better 
 their condition, and contribute, by their labour, 
 to the further prosperity of the colonies and the 
 
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 ( 21 ) 
 
 empire. It. is not my object now to consider 
 the conditions under which an extensive system 
 of emigration may with any safety be carried 
 into effect. This is an important and serious 
 subject, which will, no doubt, be maturely 
 considered ; Jirst, as it regards the well-being 
 of the persons who may be removed, for that is 
 our first duty ; secondly, as it concerns the cir- 
 cumstances and capacities of the British islands 
 to employ its population at home, and whether 
 an actual and accurate adjustment of the sup- 
 ply of labour to the demand, if that could be 
 effected by emigration, might not produce very 
 disadvantageous results, should we have occa- 
 sion to enlarge our demands upon our popula- 
 tion, either for national service, manufacturing 
 industry, or commercial enterprise. If our po- 
 lation were, at this moment, but barely equal 
 to the demand for labour to the full extent of 
 its powers, it would be insufficient for great 
 national exertions, particularly if these were 
 accompanied by an increased activity of trade. 
 Thirdly, should a system of emigration be 
 adopted by the Government, the expense of 
 sending the emigrants out, and establishing 
 them on the land, must, somehow or other, be 
 provided for. The difficulty of making pecu- 
 niary provision for these purposes has caused 
 it to be suggested that the emigrant may him- 
 
( 22 ) 
 
 self be made liable to repay, out of the produce 
 of his labour and of his land, the- sums expended 
 in placing him in so prosperous a cond. ion , 
 and accordingly it has been proposed, an 
 still urged by many persons who are 
 this subject upon the Government, that 
 emigrant should enter into conditions to pay a 
 certain rent to the Crown, redeemable by the ac- 
 cumulations which his industry may pro uce. 
 This is a most erroneous notion,— a fa acious 
 hope, and would proceed upon a dangerous and 
 unwise tenure. All such settlers would be mere 
 tenants at will, renters of the Crown, neither 
 endowed with the qualifications, nor properly 
 imbued with the sentiments of freemen. To 
 collect such rents would be difficult; to enforce 
 them dangerous. The funding system is, in 
 principle, highly conservative, inasmuch as by 
 making the governed the creditors of the Go- 
 vernment, it is calculated to give a vested 
 interest in its stability. But what should we 
 say of reversing the principle, and making the 
 people the debtors of the Crown, in such a 
 manner as is still spoken of? It would operate 
 as a premium on a change of allegiance. But 
 leaving, for the present, these considerations 
 aside, and reverting to the circumstance upon 
 which the assurance of bettering the condition 
 of the surplus population that may be sent to 
 
( 23 ) 
 
 the provinces proceeds, namely, that those co- 
 lonies offer a profitable field, and an increasing 
 demand, sufficient at once to absorb into the 
 class of employed labour any number of 
 emigrants that may be sent out, has it been 
 well considered, in what way those philanthropic 
 arrangements and prospects must be ruined by 
 measures which shall consign the subjects of 
 this experiment, to scenes and sufferings such 
 as those which I have depicted, and which will 
 assuredly follow in the train of the proposed 
 alterations. The measures which the govern- 
 ment has been taking for some years, with a view 
 to promote the settlement and cultivation of the 
 North American Provinces, have encouraged 
 and stimulated a rapidly increasing population 
 to apply itself to the very labour, which the 
 proposed financial measure will fatally check. 
 The pursuits of the emigrant are, it is true, 
 essentially agricultural ; but let it not be over- 
 looked, that agricultural operations in a country 
 covered with forests, must commence, and be 
 accompanied, by the operations of the lum- 
 berer. Much error prevails in this country 
 with respect to the timber trade, and it is very 
 generally supposed that it may be considered 
 to be a branch of industry distinct from the 
 settlement and cultivation of the colonies. It 
 is in the very nature of things that these ope- 
 
( 24 ) 
 
 rations are, to a certain extent, intimately con- 
 nected with, and must act beneficially on each 
 other. The current of emigration, whether in- 
 dividual or organized as proposed, has for its 
 external or colonial object, the settlement of the 
 country, by bringing waste land into cultiva- 
 tion. To effect this, the settler must begin his 
 operations, and extend gradually his improve- 
 ments with the axe, to clear his land of wood, 
 before he can get at the soil. If no part of the 
 timber to be removed were in demand in the 
 market, he would have to burn all that he chops 
 down, save what he requires for his own use. 
 But if the operation of clearing his land be en- 
 couraged by such a demand for timber as may 
 excite the settler to manufacture it for sale, as 
 well as to clear it away, he is led by a double 
 impulse to exert himself in doing that upon 
 which his prosperity as a cultivator of the soil 
 essentially depends; and he is moreover re- 
 warded for thus applying his industry at times 
 and seasons when his labour cannot be given 
 to the cultivation of his land, by being enabled 
 to procure British goods in exchange for the 
 lumber he manufactures. The timber trade, 
 therefore, acts most beneficially on the settle- 
 ment and improvement of the colonies ; and a 
 discreet and industrious prosecution of it by 
 the settler, who on any scale applies to it such 
 
( 25 ) 
 
 means and portions of time as cannot be de- 
 voted to the soil, must benefit much by such 
 an economy of his industry. Any measure hav- 
 ing the effect of lowering the demand for lum- 
 ber in the colonies would therefore occasion an 
 immediate reduction in the demand for labour 
 there, and a diminution of the means by which 
 the settler can procure imported articles. The 
 effect of the financial measure which I presume 
 to question, would be, in this respect likewise, 
 to affect prejudicially all the positive values I 
 have represented, and likewise throw some- 
 thing into the opposite scale ; for it would 
 cause the tide of emigration which we, at great 
 cost, may have been directing to our colonies, 
 to proceed onwards to discharge itself upon 
 and benefit the United States. If this measure 
 be not withdrawn ; if the British North Ameri- 
 can trade languish ; if the intercolonial trade 
 with theWest Indies be unprotected, the miseries 
 and the distresses, which the emigrant may have 
 endured as a pauper at home, would be nothing 
 to those to which he will be consigned in the 
 wilds to which he has been removed. We 
 have begun this work. — It originated in a de- 
 sire to relieve ourselves; if it turn out in a 
 manner to reduce to misery, or in any way to 
 injure the interests of those to whom we have 
 held out the assurances of removal to a better 
 condition — I know not the name, for the case 
 
( 2G ) 
 
 has, happily, never yet occurred, by which to 
 call such an act. 
 
 The prosperity of the North American ro 
 vinces depends not only on the activity of t e 
 timber trade with the mother country, but on a 
 substantial and permanent protection of those 
 interests which were created in the North 
 American provinces by a course of policy, 
 which threw the West Indies upon their sister 
 colonies in the north, for supplies. 
 
 It is unnecessary to say anything as to the 
 stages through which the West India inter- 
 course question has passed. But the mea- 
 sure of reopening the ports was adopted, con- 
 ditionally, proposing that it should be ac- 
 companied by a scale of duties, which should 
 substantially protect the interests which had 
 been created in the British North American 
 provinces, and still make it worth their while to 
 continue the supply trade with their sister colo- 
 nies in the West Indies. The continuance of 
 this trade is, therefore, also a matter of policy 
 of very high order, and cannot safely be lowered 
 to any consideration of a mere mercantile na- 
 ture, as affording supplies to the West India 
 merchant, a shade lower in price. 
 
 This is so important a matter to the North 
 American Provinces, that I must say a few 
 -words upon the subject. The very active trade 
 which has been carried on, since 182G in par- 
 

 ( 27 ) 
 
 ticular, between British North America and the 
 West India colonies, is evidently calculated to 
 cultivate, in the best manner, the internal indus- 
 try of the former, and ultimately to be pro- 
 ductive of great advantage to the latter, and to 
 the British empire ; but if the interests so 
 created are not protected, the late abandon- 
 ment of that commercial policy under which 
 the British Provinces have so signally flou- 
 rished, will operate with ruinous reaction upon 
 extensive enterprises, which commenced with 
 the fairest prospects of success, and will be at- 
 tended with commensurate loss of confidence 
 in any measure of policy which may be adopted, 
 upon however fair and apparently permanent 
 a basis. The rml question now to be deter- 
 mined, with respect to the timber trade, and 
 in fixing a scale of duties on productions im- 
 ported into the West India colonies from the 
 United States, is not that of a mercantile 
 character, as to the extent of relief which the 
 late alteration in the course of trade is, either 
 now, or prospectively, to afford to the West 
 India interests, or to reduce the price of timber 
 in the British market, but whether it is, or is 
 not to be, the policy of the government to foster, 
 and long retain, the North American colonies. 
 
 There is not at present any such difference 
 of price in the supplies received in the West 
 Indies from the British Provinces, compared 
 
( 28 ) 
 
 with those formerly received from the United 
 States, as should be admitted to be any con- 
 sideration to the Government, or to the West 
 India proprietors, against the measure of pro- 
 tecting the North American Colonies in that 
 trade. As a commercial measure, all that the 
 West India interests ought to seek is— perma- 
 nency as to the places of supply to which they 
 are to look. They all see, and many have as- 
 certained personally, the capabilities of the 
 British Provinces to supply their wants, and 
 the great advantage to them, as well as to the 
 empire, of protecting the course of trade be- 
 tween these two sets of British Colonies. 
 Prices have not risen much since the measures of 
 1826 in the British West Indies; nor is price 
 significant, when compared with the nature of 
 the trade which has since been so beneficial : 
 perhaps, too, the amount of West India pro- 
 duce taken off by the United States in return 
 for their supplies, is by no means so great as is 
 generally supposed ; and whatever that amount 
 may have been, it certainly cannot but dimi- 
 nish under the influence of the heavy duties 
 levied in their ports on molasses (10 cents, 
 per gallon), on foreign spirits (from 57 to 
 85 cents, per gallon,) and on sugars (from 3 
 to 12 cents, per pound,) and from the increas- 
 ing production of sugars in Louisiana, which, 
 though subject to some checks, already pro- 
 

 ( 29 ) 
 
 duces a very large proportion of the sugars 
 consumed in the United States. From all this 
 it is clear, that however desirous the Americans 
 may be of selling their productions to us, they 
 are using every exertion not to be buyers, par- 
 ticularly of our sugars; and this is surely a 
 very sufficient reason for cultivating those 
 sources which we possess in our North Ame- 
 rican Provinces for the supply of the West 
 Indies with lumber, and for the consumption of 
 their sugars in return ; and I am well per- 
 suaded that the West India merchants, and 
 proprietors, would best consult their own per- 
 manent interests, by giving all their influence 
 to a protecting course of policy, which would 
 undoubtedly, if steadily adhered to, enable 
 the British Provinces to supply more plen- 
 tifully the wants of the British West Indies, in 
 fish, lumber, and grain ; whilst the prosecution 
 of this great course of policy is encouraging 
 and promoting a mutual interchange between 
 all the colonies, by which each will be contri- 
 butino; to the wants of the other, and the whole 
 minister to the wealth and power of the em- 
 pire. 
 
 The Welland Canal, constructed in Upper 
 Canada to connect Lake Erie with Lake On- 
 tario, will be signally successful in transport- 
 ing the produce of the vast regions bordering 
 on the lakes, with convenience ar'’ '* » mode- 
 
( 30 )' 
 
 rate rate, down the St. Lawrence to the ports 
 of Montreal and Quebec for export. But these 
 ports being locked up in ice for at least five 
 months in the year, it becomes a matter of 
 some importance to connect, by a canal, t e 
 waters of the Bay of Fundy with the Gulf of 
 St. Lawrence, so that when the Schubennacadie 
 Canal shall be finished, the ports of Halifax, St. 
 .John and St. Andrews, may become entrepots, 
 in which the grains and productions of the Ca- 
 nadas may be warehoused, before the winter 
 sets in; and, reduced to flour with the abundant 
 water power which the country possesses, be 
 shipped off for consumption in the West Indies, 
 with assorted cargoes, as required for use. 
 There can be nothing more advantageous to 
 the colonies, and to the empire, than this course 
 of trade; whilst on the other hand it is needless 
 to repeat, that the North American Provinces 
 must all suffer the greatest distress, if they are 
 not insured a market for their surplus produc- 
 tions. 
 
 The lands and waters of British North Ame- 
 rica contain inexhaustible supplies, just such 
 as our West India colonies require, and for 
 which they would become entirely depend- 
 ent on foreign states, if we did not retain pos- 
 session of our Northern Provinces. Giving up 
 the one set of colonies, would therefore incur 
 

 ( 31 ) 
 
 the risk of losing both; it would at least oblige 
 us to submit to whatever might be exacted as 
 to the rates of supply, when we should no 
 longer possess the means of competition. The 
 fisheries in the British waters of America are 
 the most productive in the world. If they were 
 not ours, whose would they be ? What would 
 be the effect of the total abandonment and 
 transfer to another power, of this branch of in- 
 dustry, upon our commercial marine, and con- 
 sequently upon our maritime ascendancy ? Can 
 we be assured that we shall never again be 
 shut out from the Baltic, by a northern coali- 
 tion, and so have occasion to depend entirely 
 upon our North American Provinces for the 
 necessary supplies of masts and spars to enable 
 Great Britain to maintain her naval superiority? 
 
 This question cannot be lowered to the 
 consideration of anything of a financial na- 
 ture ; and it is not therefore my object to 
 investigate whether the financial proposition 
 would be very productive or not. This may 
 certainly be doubted: but are the effects in 
 policy correctly estimated, by which the aban- 
 donment of a protecting policy in our colonial 
 trade, must be followed? There is no element 
 of greatness, power, and influence, that would 
 not be conceded, and made to minister to 
 others, should we trifle with the interests of 
 
( 32 ) 
 
 the North American Colonies, or show any dis- 
 position to undervalue them, far less to divest 
 ourselves of them. In those very regions, which 
 policy, such as that which the new school 
 professes, would assuredly be the means of 
 severing from Great Britain, there are, besides 
 many other valuable and inexhaustible re- 
 sources, vast and boundless stores of the very 
 article in which the manufacturing and chief 
 shipping states of the American Union are most 
 deficient, and the acquisition of which would 
 be to strengthen that Union more than the 
 addition of half a continent of mere agricultural 
 soil, and enable them to proceed with vast ad- 
 vantages in their avowed ambition to contend 
 with us for commercial ascendancy and naval 
 empire. The British Colonies contain coal of 
 the first quality, and in immense abundance . 
 and no more need be said to satisfy persons who 
 look beyond the mere surface of things, that 
 upon this account alone they are inestimable ; 
 that this precious ingredient of their value may 
 be made to bring them nearer to us, and ce- 
 ment them firmly with us; and that to surrender 
 such a boon to a rival nation, for that must be 
 the consequence of our throwing them off, 
 would be an act of political suicide. 
 
 It is useless to deny, that we have something 
 to apprehend from the maritime pursuits and 
 
( 33 ) 
 
 ambitions of the United States ; and it is our 
 duty to countervail these by a fair and honour- 
 able course of policy, to protect the colonial 
 trade, which, by their own showing, has flou- 
 rished so signally. 
 
 Nor is it in a colonial sense only that the 
 statesman should estimate the importance of 
 our North American Provinces ; for over and 
 above their value as colonies, under the heads 
 of shipping employed, seamen trained, manufac- 
 tures consumed, emigrants established, and all the 
 other advantages which might be enumerated, 
 and exclusively, too, of the tremendous effects of 
 putting all these elements of additional wealth, 
 and power, and convenience, out of our reach 
 and into the opposite scale — beyond these there 
 are considerations of a higher order still, which 
 the statesman should view with forecast — the 
 influence which Great Britain may continue to 
 exercise, — but which, by losing her possessions 
 there, she would for ever abandon in the affairs 
 of the Western World; — retaining those posses- 
 sions, Great Britain may indefinitely improve 
 her influence; but if she neglect this, she must 
 submit to be successfully rivalled, and perhaps 
 in the end overpowered. 
 
 The experience of all nations — the lessons of 
 all history, teach the value and importance of 
 colonies. America has been planted, peopled. 
 
( 34 ) 
 
 and enriched, but not by such schemes as those 
 of the new school. The United States make 
 no such experiments on themselves: nor will 
 they meet any such propositions from others. 
 If the duties protecting the colonial timber 
 trade are lowered, and those on colonial timber 
 raised, the North American Colonies would be- 
 come, tanto, valueless. We might buy tim- 
 ber cheaper, but the greater part would be 
 brought in foreign vessels, and paid for chiefly 
 in money ; and if, together with this, the course 
 of trade were unprotected, which is rapidly 
 forming a very beneficial intercourse between 
 the West India Colonies and the North American 
 Provinces, the latter would be entirely ruined in 
 almost every expectation of advantage to which 
 they can look, as dependencies of Great Bri- 
 tain. It is well for us, then, that the restric- 
 tions, which have hitherto protected the colo- 
 nial and intercolonial trade, are not taken off. 
 If that should ever happen, their industry, as 
 colonists, would be ruinously injured ; and the 
 immediate consequences would not only be, a 
 “ turning of their skill, industry and capital, to 
 “ other pursuits,” but a disposition to think 
 seriously of turnings of another description. 
 
 The economists assume, that if we were now 
 to divest ourselves of our North American Pro- 
 vinces, we might make them an independent 
 
( 35 ) 
 
 state, and that, in intercourse with them as 
 such, we should have every commercial advan- 
 tage, which we are now supposed to possess. 
 First, we cannot make them an independent 
 state; nor if we could, should we dispose them 
 to be one friendly to us, by the act of throwing 
 them off prematurely, for selfish and narrmo rea- 
 sons. We may train them to become such; 
 but this must be by a mode of treatment very 
 different from that which certain economists 
 inculcate. There is no higher object of policy 
 than to raise up, in that quarter, a power- 
 ful and finally independent state, as there 
 is no doubt we may do, provided we continue 
 to act on old-fashioned principles, which ap- 
 pear, however, to have been rejected by the 
 political economists. 
 
 It is even asserted that if we had no colonies, 
 we should be able to purchase from them, as 
 independent states, at a lower price to the 
 consumer, the articles which we now get from 
 them as colonists. Treating this as a mercan- 
 tile, and not a political consideration, is it not 
 perceived that, by divesting ourselves of our 
 colonies, we should render ourselves entirely 
 dependent, for what we now get from them, on 
 foreign states, and, consequently^ be obliged 
 to deal with foreign traders on their own 
 terms ? So long as we possess sources from 
 
( 36 ) 
 
 which to procure what raw materials we re 
 quire, we can retaliate and compete; but with 
 out these, we must submit to take what we 
 must have, upon such terms as it may please 
 the seller to dictate. 
 
 It is undoubtedly a great deal cheaper to 
 descend to be a feeble, and to submit to 
 be an inferior power, than to be rich and pow- 
 erful ; and if perpetual peace could only be 
 established, and we could persuade all other 
 nations to adopt practically the new notions of 
 commercial policy, the wisdom of retaining our 
 foreign possessions might be doubtful. But 
 how, without these, could Great Britain have 
 gone through the late struggle against all Eu- 
 rope? The very sources of her industry, the 
 raw materials of her manufactures, half the ele- 
 ments of her greatness, might have been cut off 
 by such a combination as has been already 
 witnessed among foreign nations — a combina- 
 tion which nothing but the colonial power of 
 Great Britain could prevent their renewing, or 
 enable her again to defy. 
 
 But why should the doctrinaires halt at the 
 conclusion, that the number of colonies should 
 be reduced! If this theory be true in principle, 
 it is true universally, and would prove that no 
 colonies can be so beneficial to the parent, as 
 the same countries would be in the character of 
 

 ( 37 ) 
 
 independent states. According to this the whole 
 should be declared independent; trade made 
 perfectly free; ships and troops recalled and 
 paid off. Ireland, by the same rule, should be 
 given up to Mr. O’Connell; and then, at last, 
 a general prosperity, a commercial millenium 
 might be expected ! 
 
 But even if this reasoning were unanswer- 
 able, is it safe for this country to act upon 
 the theory, before others are equally con- 
 vinced of its soundness, and adopt it accord- 
 ingly? The old prejudices, that mankind are 
 benefited by associations for the exchange of 
 labour, under mutual compacts of a protective 
 nature ; and that it is impossible to apply pure 
 and original theories, however true, to artificial 
 statistical conditions, and to the infinite and pe- 
 culiar varieties which may exist in productions 
 and pursuits — these prejudices (as the econo- 
 mists take them to be) are still so inveterate, 
 that there is danger, if we discard our colonies, 
 of their forming a new confederacy, either with 
 some rival power, or with each other, for the 
 express purpose of adhering to the former sys- 
 tem, to keep up the .same kind of monopoly, as 
 it is termed ; and even if it could be shown that 
 we gain nothing by having the colonial mono- 
 poly in our favour, it must be admitted that we 
 
( 38 ) 
 
 have something to lose in the case of one being 
 formed against us. Foreign powers, without 
 exception, still remain most obstinately attached 
 to the old system. They seem to prefer the 
 example by which our power has been created, 
 to the theories by which we are told it may be 
 increased ; but by which, in my humble opi- 
 nion, it is much more likely to be undermined 
 and ruined. 
 
 So long as Great Britain is desirous of con- 
 tinuing a manufacturing, commercial, ship- 
 owning country, and a first-rate power, colonies 
 are essential to her ; without such possessions, 
 she would soon cease to be pre-eminent in any 
 of these capacities. Founding colonies, is like 
 planting trees; they must be fenced, nursed, 
 and protected. The return may not be im- 
 mediate ; but it may be rendered certain, by 
 good management : and so far from conceding, 
 that the separation, which, through bad manage- 
 ment, has taken place between Great Britain 
 and her former North American Provinces, 
 must necessarily be followed by an abandon- 
 ment of those which remain attached to us ; or 
 from admitting that the state and prospects 
 of our trade with the former are such as should 
 reconcile us to view with indifference the sepa- 
 ration of the latter,* — neither moral rectitude. 
 
 * See page 7. 
 
( 39 ) 
 
 nor political wisdom could be more flagitiously 
 violated, than by listening seriously to any 
 such proposals respecting those loyal colonies 
 which nothing but bad treatvient can separate 
 from us. High considerations of present in- 
 terest, and considerations higher still as to the 
 future, demand that our policy should be to 
 cherish and protect the provinces that have re- 
 mained faithful to us — to set their interest apart 
 from others — to entwine them with our own — to 
 attach them by every bond that can be formed to 
 protect their trade as colonists— to provide for 
 their defence against external force — to assist 
 them in fostering and developing their vast na- 
 tural resources — and to advance with paternal 
 solicitude their moral condition. By such a 
 course, we shall not only tnable, but dispose, our 
 American colonies to take upon themselves, in 
 due season, such expenses as we shall have given 
 them the means of sustaining — until at length, 
 strong enough to stand alone, they come for- 
 ward to act the part of a son who has been 
 kindly treated, well educated, protected, and 
 liberally provided for in his youth ; and who, 
 when ‘ set up in the world,’ and enabled ‘ to 
 do for himself,’ would scorn to be a burthen to 
 the parent who has so formed and treated him. 
 Let not this be considered a romantic expecta- 
 tion ; so far it is felt, very generally, in the 
 
( 40 ) 
 
 Nortli American Provinces ; and, so tar, to such 
 a happy issue is this conduct tending T.here 
 are such sentiments in our nature, and why 
 should there not be such principles in our 
 policy ?— What a power should we thus raise !’’ 
 But to effect this, we must not be so ungenerous 
 as to withdraw any provision which has been 
 hitherto made, and which is essential to main- 
 tain the colonial connection, until by a distinct 
 understanding, and by a permanent arrange- 
 ment with the legislatures of those countries, 
 we may, with safety, make that saving. The 
 colonial connection between Great Britain and 
 her North American colonies can only subsist 
 in the monarchical form of government; and 
 whatever is essential to that, should be consi- 
 dered as contributing indispensably to the chief 
 political bond of union. At present, the British 
 Provinces which have not yet taken upon 
 themselves the expenses of their civil list, are 
 totally unable to do so with due regard to the 
 internal improvement of the country, for to this 
 the whole of their very limited revenue is de- 
 voted. The time will come when they may be 
 disposed to take these charges upon themselves; 
 and we should endeavour to accelerate that pe- 
 riod, by so protecting their interests in the co- 
 lonial connection, (which can only be done by 
 protecting the colonial trade,) as to furnish them 
 
( 41 ) 
 
 with the means of doing so. This, therefore, is 
 anot er question which should be considered 
 as one of imperial policy, and not one of 
 finance. To save £6000 upon a parliamentary 
 estimate for a few years, and thereby to throw 
 abroad a question which should be settled 
 upon safe and suitable previous arrangements, 
 would be destructive of the great objects which 
 the statesman should steadily regard, and which 
 the British Parliament, if such views were 
 forcibly put to it, would not break down. Is, 
 or is not, the colonial connection to be main- 
 tained? If it is, let nothing be spared that can 
 be proved to be essential to it. If not, let the 
 other course be taken. But it will be one that 
 would be considered as a proclamation made by 
 Britain, of fearful import to herself. If even 
 Great Britain were in such difficulty as to re- 
 quire so paltry an economy as this, let her be 
 persuaded that these are not the items upon 
 which retrenchment can safely act. If she be 
 in such difficulty, let suitable measures be 
 adopted; but let her not abandon the course 
 which made her the first maritime power in the 
 world. Let her not, recreant like, unrig and dis- 
 mast herself, and drop anchor in the midst of a 
 stormy ocean, and in a stormy time; but with a 
 steady hand at the helm, and a gallant, resolute 
 crew, let her continue to spread her wings to 
 
 E 
 
p 
 
 ri 
 
 w 
 
 ( 42 ) 
 
 the gales which waft her vessels over all the 
 oceans of the world. — Let her keep rigged for 
 the storm, and ever ready to arm and animate 
 her bulwarks for the fight, when needful, — per- 
 suaded that the course of policy, which made 
 her a great maritime power, will maintain her 
 in supremacy; but that in proportion as she 
 deviates from that course which made her great, 
 she will become feeble. 
 
 LONDON : 
 
 PniNTED UV c. ROWORTH AND SONS, BELL YARD, 
 1 KM RLE BAR. ^