HHfl r\ * m which die Army muler acted 111 tiie t. anipaign ol 17 shewing' the . tfui'chesoj the ^dvniy %c ifaP faces oj the Ji>nttci^nil . Ac ti 07 bv^NI* MedcalFE 1 Jr awn avedWIV™ FaDEX lendarur 33TH or Ouu*lesto\vii f 'W.ronS Fort Miller p; Far-/ rr yi'eerrtttnsFann JhxrniusJItyjhts A Still 'Water 0 Anthony's* Mohawks K . (Y>ht\rFtifLe llHainston A - ti hi (a fie -S.-f 7 /tf f. i>r fieri ■ e'/t*m'rtt/ e A STATE OF THE EXPEDITION FROM CANADA, AS LAID BEFORE THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, B Y LIEUTENANT-GENERAL BURGOYNE, AND VERIFIED BY EVIDENCE; WITH A COLLECTION OF AUTHENTIC DOCUMENTS, AND AN ADDITION OF MANY CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WERE PREVENTED FROM APPEARING BEFORE THE HOUSE BY THE PROROGATION OF PARLIAMENT. WRITTEN AND COLLECTED BY HIMSELF, AND DEDICATED TO THE OFFICERS OF THE ARMY HE COMMANDED. LONDON: PRINTED FOR J. ALMON, OPPOSITE BURLINGTON -HOUSE, PICCADILLY, WDCCLXXX, u T O MAJOR GENERAL PHILLIPS, AND THE OTHER OFFICERS WHO SERVED IN THE ARMY COMMANDED BY LIEUTENANT GENERAL BURGOYNE, UPON AN EXPEDITION FROM CANADA. Gentlemen,. Propriety and affedion alike incline me to infcribe to you the follow- ing undertaking. We are mutual and peculiar fufferers by the event of the campaign in 1777. You were witneffes and judges of my adions ; but I Owed you an account of the principles which direded them. Another motive for this Addrefs is to avail myfelf of a proper public op- portunity to repeat to you, what I have omitted no occafion of expreffing in Parliament, *m correfpondence, and in converfation — the fulleft approbation *of your fervices. My errors may have been numberlefs ; your conduct has been uniform — faithful, gallant and indefatigable. Debarred of the power of doing you juftice before the King, thefe teftimonies are the only means to which my efteem and gratitude can refort. After vindicating myfelf as a commanding officer from any inattention to yourintereft or fame, I next throw myfelf upon your judgment for my con- dud as a friend. You will find by this publication, and fome others, which though not addrefl’ed to you will probably engage your curiofity, that I have been accufed of fhrinking from the common captivity. A 2 I have [ iv ] 1 have been fupported under that nfperftoj* by the confcioufnefs I did not deferve it,' and the confidence that you (to whom chiefly upon that charge ] was refponfible) would not adopt it. After the fortunes we have run to- gether, it is not furely unworthy of belief, that I fhould rather have defired, than avoided to partake the clofing fcetie : uniting with a due fenfe of per- fonal attachments, the prefervation of my military fortune, and a retreat from the diftrattions of my country. The defence of your honour and my own, at one time, and refiftance to an affront which my nature could not bear, at another, alone detained me here. In regard to my political tranfacfions, I have ftated them, and I wifb them to be confidered by my friends, apart from my miltary condufl. I bear very high refpeft to fome eminent and ill-treated characters in our pro- feffion, who in deference to the tranquility of government, have filently re- figned the ftatiom which they could no longer hold with fecurity to their honour, or benefit to the ft ate. But the option is not left to thofe, who ha- ving a voice in Parliament are obliged to aft as citizens as well as foldiers. The number of officers altogether of the army and navy, who with known love to their country and profeffional fpirit equally confpicuous, have vo- luntarily withdrawn themfelves from employment within thefe two years,, exceeds all precedent. I do not place my name in the lift with the fame pretenfions ; but it is not arrogant to emulate where we cannot compare ; and I am defirous of following the high examples before me in no point more than in that of avoiding to difturb the zeal of thofe who are now em- ployed. The officers who have held it their duty to take part in oppofition, have afted openly and direftly in their place in Parliament ; but they may * The part of my treatment which I call an affront upon this and other occafions, is the rc- fufal of my fervice in this country, even at the head of my own-regiment, or as a volunteer, in the time of exigency, and when other officers precisely hi my own fituatlon were employed. My complaint of this partiality lias never been officially anfwered ; it has only been evaded by anonymous writers, who have laid it down as a pofition, that I meant to allude to the example of ford Harrington (with which it certainly has nothing to do) and then have taken a merit in refuting me. The pafiicular example to which I appeal is that of Lieutenant Colonel King- fton, of the 86th regiment, appointed to that regiment, employed in it for the defence of Ply- mouth, and a&ually now embarking with it for foreign fervice, under the fame terms of the convention, and the fame terms of parole to the Congrefs verbatim with myfelf. Other objec- tions, and of a nature that could not be afterwards fupported, were tried againft the Duke of Rutland’s recommendation of this excellent officer : but the obje&ion of parole, though fully known to be precilely the fame with that which was to peremptorily urged againft my preten- fions, was never mentioned. 3 defy [ V ] defy malice to fliew an inflance wherein they have not encouraged ardour in their profeflion. They contemplate with one and the fame fentiment the great fupply of honourable men to occupy their places. You, Gentlemen, ftand high in that defcription ; your trials have made you of fterling value ; and perhaps it will be better difeerned by men in power, when no longer viewed through the unfavourable medium of my friendfhip. If my exhortations retain their former weight, let me be permit- ted earneftly to apply them upon this occafion.. The examples of generals or admirals who decline employment, refpedt only fimilar cafes ; your honour is fecure : look not at profeliTonal difappointments ; but point all your views to the true glory of your King and country, and truft for the reward. O focil (ncque enhn ignari fumm ante Ala lo rum ) O fajfi graviora : dabit Deus his quoque finem . This paflage will bring to the remembrance of fome among you a hard hour when we before quoted it together, and not without fome cheer of mind. — May the end of your enduring be near! And with every other wifh and fentiment that can denote efteem, I have the. honour to be. Gentlemen, Your moft faithful and moft obedient Mertford-Streei Jan. i, i y So. humble fervant, J. BURGOYNE. INTRO- ■ ' v. ■ ' ' *’■ INTRODUCTION. "W HEN it becomes neceflkry for men who have aSed critical parts in public ftations to make an appeal to the world in their own juftification, there are many prudential confiderations which might lead them to commit the care of it to friends, or, which is in many refpefts the fame thing, to defend themfelves under an aflumed character. The charge of vanity ufually mace on egotifm is thus eluded : a fuller perfevere as I have directed, and be confident of my defence and proteblion.” This was a faving claufe of a nature very different from thofe it is the pradtice in the prefent day to pen j and if any man doubts the quotation, I can bring pofitive evidence to the truth of it ver- batim. 1 hus much. Sir, I thought it incumbent upon me to ftate in argument againff die pofition that has been infilled upon, that no orders can be worded fo perempto- lily at a dinance, as not to admit of an implied latitude, in cafe of unforefeen and inlurmountable difficulties: but to prevent all future cavil, upon this fubjedt, I re- queft the committee to recollect, what I have again and again repeated} that I by no means put my defence, in paffing the Hudfon’s River, folely upon this reafoning. On the contrary, fuppofing for the argument’s fake, I ffiould concede (which I never have done, nor mean to do) to the noble Lord, and to every other gentleman, all they can defire to affume upon implied latitude in given cafes, I fhould equally prove that no fuch cafe did ex iff, as would have juffified me upon their own principle, in de- parting from the letter of the orders under which I adted. Having thus cleared my way to the time of my leaving England, to take upon me the command of the Northern expedition ; I Ihall now lay before the committee a narrative of its progrefs, in as concife and fimple terms, as the nature of the fubjedt will allow, endeavouring to imitate the perfpicuity of the honourable gentle- man who took the lead in this bufinefs, and not without hope of my endeavours pro- ducing the fame effedt; and that, in the opinion of the houle, my language, as has been expreffed of his, will be deemed the language of truth. N A R~ K A u 5 R R A T I V E. narrative. NARRA- T1VE. IT is my intention, for the more ready comprehenfion of the whole '° I it into three periods. The firft, from my appointment to the comma , . end of my pur foil of the enemy from Ticonderoga r the fecund from that tone to the paflage of the Hudfon’s River ; and the third to the hgnmg the ?°" ve “'° ' Ileft London on the 27th of March, and upon my departure from Plymouth, findino theAlbion man of war ready to fail for New- York, I wrote to Sir W. Howe by that conveyance, upon the fubjecT of my expedition, and the nature of my orders, I arrived at Quebec the 6th of May. Sir Guy Carleton mrmed.ately put under my command the troops deftined for the expedition, and committed to my management the preparatory arrangements. From thence 1 wrote a fecond letter to S.r William Howe, wherein 1 repeated that I was entrufted with the command of the army deftined to march from Canada, and that my orders were to force a junflion wtth - his excellency. I expreffed alfo my willies, « that a latitude had been left me for a diverfion to- “ wards Connecticut, but that fuch an idea being out of queftion, by my orders « being precife to force the junftion, it was only mentioned to introduce the idea “ ftill refting upon my mind; viz. to give the change to the enemy if I could, and « by every feint in my power to eftablifh a fufpicion, that I ftill pointed tow aids Connefticut.” « But,” I repeated, “ that under the prefent precifion of my orders, I fhould really « have no view but that of joining him, nor think myfelf juftified by any temp- « tation to delay the moft expeditious means I could find to eftedt that purpofe. I proceeded to Montreal on the 12th, and as my letters, lately laid before the houfe * from that place* and from Quebec, will Ihew the ftate of things, I (hould not reft a See Appendix moment U p 0n this period, were it not to add one more public teftimony, to thofe I am not confcious of having omitted upon any occafion, of the afliduous and cordial manner in which the different fervices were forwarded by Sir Guy Carleton. I fhould think it as difhonourable to feek, as I know it would be impotTible to find excufe for any fault of mine in any failure on the part of Sir Guy Carleton, or of any per- fons who a&ed under him, in any matter refpe&ing the expedition. Had that officer been afting for himfelf, or for his brother, he could not have fhewn more indefatigable zeal than he did, to comply with and expedite my requifitions and ’ defires. Certain NARRATIVE. 7 Certain parts of the expected force, neverthelefs, fell fhort. The Canadian troops, ftated in the plan at 2000, confided only of three companies, intended to be of 100 men each, but in reality not amounting to more than 150 upon the whole; nor could they be augmented. The corvees , which are detachments of provincials without arms, to repair roads, convey provifions, or any other temporary employ- ments for the king’s fervice, could not be obtained in fufficient number, nor kept to their employments, although Sir Guy Carleton ufed every poffible exertion and en- couragement for the purpofe. Drivers for the provifion carts, and other carriages, could not be fully fupplied by the contractor, though no expence was fpared ; a circumftance which occafioned much inconvenience afterwards. To thefe unavoidable difappointments were added the difficulties occafioned by bad weather, which rendered the roads almoft impracticable at the carrying places, and confequently the paffage of the batteaux, artillery, and baggage exceedingly dilatory : we had befides a great deal of contrary wind. Notwithllanding all impediments the army affembled between the 17 th and 20th of June, at Cumberland Point, upon Lake Champlain. On the 2 1 ft I held a conference with the Iroquois, Algonchins,. Abenekies, and Outawas, Indians, in all about four hundred. This conference appears in your papers*. I< thought at the time that the cordiality of the Indians over the whole continent might be depended upon, and their firft operations tended to perfuade me into a belief of their utility. The prieft to whom they feemed devoted, and the Britifh officers employed to conduCt them, and to whofe controul they engaged to fubmit> gained advantages, and fipread terror without bar- barity. The firft party fent out made feveral of the enemy prifoners- in the heat of aftion, and treated them with European humanity. During the movement of the. different corps to this general rendezvous, I wrote a third letter to Sir William Howe. The chief purport of it was to give him “ intelli- “ gence of my fituation at the time, andof my expectation of being beforeTiconderoga ‘ c between the 20th and 25th inftant ; that 1 did not apprehend the effective ftrength “ of the army would amount to above- 6500 men; that I meant to apply to Sir “ Guy Carleton to fend a garrifon to Ticonderoga when it fhould be reduced, but “ that I was apprehenfive he would not think himfelf authorifed by the King’s orders ‘ c to comply; that whenever, therefore, I might be able to effeCt- the junction# Sir “ William would not expeCt me to bring near the original number. I. repeated my ,r perleverance in the idea of giving jealoufy on the fide of Connecticut, and ac the “ fame time my affurances, that I fhould make no manoeuvre. that could procraftinate “ the great objeCt of a junction.” I ftate thefe. different letters to Sir. William Howe merely to fhew that my concep- tion of the precifion of my orders was not uppn after-thought, and taken up as an excufe. * See Appendix No. VI. 8 U SfeAppendix No. VJI. N A R R A T I V E. .. . 14 ft ;u . hut a fixed decided fentiment coeval excufe when I found the expedition had failed , but a U. " ith m >’ kn0 ” kdge f rrrt 1 be« leave to Rate an extraft from my orders For a further proof of the lame fact, I be 0 - to the army at Crown Point, June 3 =th. J'^ds were ^ it The army embarks to-morrow to approach 11 - - r “ Of this particular expedition are critical and b regarded. : «* “ J r * proof to the fame effeft, and drew that the idea of forcing a way to Albany by vi- gorous exertions againft any oppofidon we might meet, was general and fixt throug ' h My ptcZngs from the time of aOembling the army as before described, to the date of my public difpatch from Skenelbotough, comprehending the manoeuvres which forced the enemy from Ticondcroga, and the aArons at Skenelboroug i, Hu- berton, and Fort Anne, are related at full in that difpatch.- . _ , It is the lefs neceffary to give the Committee further trouble upon this fubjedt, be- caufe I believe no enemy can be found to arraign my conduit in thole days of uc- cefs ■ or if there were one, he could not deprive me of the confolation, that I had his Majefty’s full approbation and applaufe, of which it is known to many, I had a very honourable and diftinguifhed proof. All therefore that is neceffary before I quit this firft period of the campaign, is to p-ive a precife Hate of the effe&ive ftrength of the army, at the time it affembled. On the i ft July, the day we encamped before 1 iconderoga, the troops confifte o Britifh rank and file - 37 2 4 German ditto - 3 01 ^ 6740 regulars, exclufiveof artillery-men. Canadians and Provincials, about Indians about 250 400 650 In regard to the artillery, I think this the proper place to re&ify the mifreprefenta- tions that have prevailed reflecting the quantity employed. It has been Hated as far .beyond the neceffarv proportion For the number of troops, an incumbrance to their movements, and one caufe of what has been called the fiow progrefs of the expedition. In order to juftify this charge, a view of the whole mafs has been prefented to the public without any explanation of its diftinft allotments •, and many have been led to believe, that the whole was attached to the army throughout the campaign, and fell i 9 narrative. fell into the enemy’s hands at laft — The intention of this reprefentation is obvious . the allegation is falfe. The facts, as I fhall prove them to the committee, are as follow. The whole origi- nal train furnifhed by Sir Guy Carleton confided of fixteen heavy twenty-four poun- ders ; ten heavy twelve-pounders ; eight medium twelve-pounders ; two light twenty- four pounders; one light twelve-pounder; twenty-fix light fix pounders; feventeen light three-pounders ; fix eight-inch howitzers ; fix five and a half inch howitzers ; two thirteen-inch mortars ; two ten-inch mortars; fix eight-inch mortars ; twelve five and a half-inch mortars ; and twenty-four four and two fifth-inch mortars. Of thefe two heavy twenty-four pounders were lent on board a fhip for the defence of Lake Champlain, and the other fourteen were fent back to St. John s. Of the heavy twelve- pounders, fix were left atTiconderoga, four ditto in the Royal George ; four medium twelve-pounders at Fort George; one light twelve-pounder at Ticonderoga; two light fix-pounders at Fort George; four light fix-pounders at St. Johns; four light three-pounders atTiconderoga ; five light three-pounders at St. John’s; two eight- inch howitzers at Fort George ; two ditto at St. John’s ; two five and a half inch ho- witzers at Fort George; two thirteen-inch mortars in the Royal George; two ten-inch mortars in ditto ; four eight-inch mortars in ditto; four five and a half inch moi tats at Ticonderoga; four royal mortars in the Royal George; twelve cohorns at Ticon- deroga ; and eight cohorns in the Royal George. The field-train therefore that proceeded with the army confided of four medium twelve-pounders ; two light twenty-four pounders; eighteen light fix-pounders; fix light three-pounders; two eight-inch howitzers; four five and a half-inch howitzers; two eight-inch mortars, and four royals. The carrying the twenty-four pounders (though they were but two) has been fpoken of as an error, and it is neceffary therefore to inform the committee that they were of a conftruftion lighter by 800 weight than medium twelves, and to all intents and purpofes field artillery. This artillery was diftributed as follows. Frafer’s corps, eftimated at three battalions. Ten pieces, viz. Four light fix-pounders. Four light three-pounders, conftrufted for being occafionally carried on horfeback. Two royal howitzers. German referve, under Colonel Breyman, eftimated at two battalions. Two light fix-pounders. Two light three-pounders, and fervedby the Hefie Hanau artillery men. The line of Britilh, four battalions C Germans, 10 N A R R A T I V E. Germans, five battalions; Total, nine battalions. . . one br igade for each Three brigades of artillery, of four lix-poun else ‘ wing, and one for the center. , ,• there were allotted twenty-fix From hence it appears that to fourteen battal ons there CQn . pieces of light artillery. Lee, lequently the proportion ot artillery << ■ Pnre r 0 detaching two guns to each bat- The forming-artillery into brigades, in prefer ° a bleft talion, has been c.ondantly pradifed in mod lervic du ^ ^ either men, and it is produce of many advantages, as of officer , fingly or united, fall under the command of a fi becomes The fervice is carried on with greater regularity, and the effect ot. me much more formidable than when " and adop ted. This mode of fervice was recommended by Major general r p , £ without hefitation by me, my own judgment being confirmed by an officer .of h» great lkill and experience. The park artillery confided of ten pieces, viz. 2 light twenty-four pounders. 4 medium twelve-pounders. 2 eight-inch howitzers. i royal howitzers. , I underftood this proportion of field artillery to be the fame as that propo.od by Sir Guy Carleton had he commanded-, it was the proportion recommended y General Phillips, and I formed my opinion conformably to the fentimen s refpedtable officers upon the following reafons, viz. that artillery was extreme y cm- midable to raw troops -, that in a country of pods it was efientially neceff,y ^ the beft troops ; that it was yet more applicable, to the- enemy we were to combat, becaufe the mode of defence they invariably adopted, and at which t aey were yond allother nations expert, was that of entrenchment covered with ftrong abbatis, Uinft which the cannon, of the nature of the heavieft above defenbed, and howit- zers might often be effectual, when to diflodge them by any other means might be attended with continued and important Ioffes. In thefe general ideas of the ufe of artillery againft the rebel forces, I have the happinefs to obferve, from the papers before you, the concurrence of Sir William Howe, who ftates fimilar ideas very fully in one of his requifitions to the fecretary of date : but further reafons for not diminifliing the proportion of guns of fuperior calibre to fix-pounders in this train, were, firft, their ufe againft block-hou es (a fpecies of fortification peculiar to America); fecondly, a probability that gun-boats mio-ht be requifite for the fecurity of the water tranfport, on fome parts of the 3 Hudfon’s n NARRATIVE. Hudfon’s River-, but principally the intention of fortifying a camp at Albany, in cafe I fhould reach that place, flrould meet with a fufficiency of prov.flon there (as I was led to exped) and lhould find it expedient to pals the winter there, without communication with New-York. With refpeft to the quantity of ammunition attached to this artillery, it ts to be obferved, that the number of rounds accompanying the light pieces, and which were carried in finall carts, were not more than fufficient for a day s action. Light fix-pounders — 124 founds each. Light three-pounders — S°° rounds. Royal howitzers - 90 rounds. The different referees of ammunition were chiefly conveyed by water in fcows and batteaux ; it certainly would not have been advifable, after a communica- tion with Canada was at an end, to depend upon precarious fuppliesfrom the fouth- ward, and therefore it became neceffary (as far as the ferv.ee would allow) to carry forward fuch (lores, as there was every appearance of an abfolute want of, during the courfe of an active campaign. , . , r Had the enemy eftablilhed themfelves in force upon the iflands at the mouth of the Mohawk river, or on other ground equally advantageous, to have difputed the paflao-e of that, or of the Hudfon’s River, or had they even waited an affault in their work! at Still- Water, it is probable, that recourfe muft have been had to artillery of the heavier nature ; in the latter cafe efpecially they muft have been ufed in order to derive any advantage from our feizing a poll upon their left flank : I have f.nce known, that they had iron twelve and nine-pounders mounted upon thole works, which were in other refpedts very formidable. The Britifh artillery-men, rank and file, were Recruits, under command of Lieutenant Nutt, of the 33d regiment, at- tached to the fervice of the artillery Hefiian artillery-men, rank and file *45 * 5 ° .73 473 Add thefe numbers to the former ftate of the army, and it will be found, that tnc regular ftrengthwhen at the greateft confifted of 7213. 1 come now to the fecond period of the campaign, comprehending the tranfachons from the time the purfuit of the enemy from Ticonderoga ceafed, and the corps 0/ Brigadier-general Frafer, and the 9 th regiment, rejoined the army, after the respec- tive aftions of Huberton and Fort Anne, to the time when the army puffed the Hud- fon’s river to attack the enemy near Still- Water. It had proved impoffible immediately to follow the quick retreat of the enemy farther, from the nature of the country, and the neceffity of waiting a frefh fupply N A r R A T I v E. of provifions. But it appeared evident to me, that could a rapid i prog^V toward, Albany be effeded, during rheir difperfion and panic, it would rUC ^ r el t °iou h LX d „ i made by thofe who began a. this period to arraign my military condudt, whether it would not have been more expedient for the purpoic of rapidity, to have fallen back to Ticonderoga, in order to take the convenient route y Lake George, than to have perfevered in the laborious and difficult courfe by and to Fort Edward ? My motives for preferring the latter were theft : I confidered not only the general impreffions which a retrograde motion is apt to make upon the minds both of enemies and friends, but alfo, that the natural condud of the enemy in that cafe would be to remain at Fort George, as their retreat could not then be cut off, in order to oblige me to open trenches, and confequently to delay me, and in the mean time they would have deflroyed the road from Fort George to Fort Ed. ward. On the other hand, by perfifting to penetrate by the ffiort cut from Fort Anne, of which I was then matter, to Fort Edward, though it was attended with o-reat labour, and many alert fituations, the troops were improved in the very effien- tial point of wood fervice; I effectually diflodged the enemy from Fort George without a blow ; and feeing me matter of one communication, they did not think it worth while to deftroy the other. The oreat number of boats alfo, which mutt neceffarily have been employed for the transport of the troops over Lake George, were by this courfe fpared for the tranfport of the provifion, artillery, and ammunition. The fuccefs anfwered this reafoning in every point } for by the vigilance of Gene- neral Phillips, to whom I had committed the important part of forwarding all thene- ceffaries from Ticonderoga, a great embarkation arrived at Fort George on July 29th. I took poffeffion of the country near Fort Edward on the fame day, and independently of other advantages, I found myfelf much more forward in point of time than I could poffibly have been by the other route. Another material motive, which could not be known by Arrangers who have rea- foned upon this movement, was, that during the time that my army was employed in clearing Wood-Creek and cutting roads, and the corps under Major-general Phillips working to pafs the tranfports over Lake George, I was enabled to detach, a large corps to my left, under Major-general Reidefel, and thereby affift my pur- pofe of giving jealoufy to Connefticut, and keeping in check the whole country called the Hampffiire Grants. It was at this time Major-general Reidefel conceived the purpofe of mounting his regiment of dragoons. In the country he traverfed during his detached command, he found the people frightened and fubmiffive. He was induftrious and expert in procuring narrative. procuring intelligence in parts of the country more remote than Bennington, and entertained no doubt of fuccefs, were an expedition formed under the command of Lieutenant-colonel Baum. On the arrival of the army at Fort Edward, the great object of attention was the tranfports from Fort George. T. he diftance was about fixteen miles, the roads wanting great repair, the weather unfavourable, the cattle and carriages fcarce . parr of the latter inconvenience was occafioned by the number of both that were neceflarily detained at Ticonderoga, for the purpofe of dragging the boats and the provifions over the carrying places, between Lake Champlain and Lake George ; another part of the inconvenience was caufed by the unavoidable delays, in bringing the different divifions of horfes as they were collefled in Canada through the defart, for fuch mod of the country is between St. John’s and Ticonderoga. It was loon found, that in the fituation of the tranfport fervice at that time, the army could barely be victualled from day to day, and that there was no profpedt of eftabliffiing a magazine in due time for purfuing prefcnt advantages. 1 he idea of the expedition to Bennington originated upon this difficulty, combined with the in- telligence reported by General Reidefel, and with all I had otherwife received. I knew that Bennington was the great depofit of corn, flour, and ftore cattle ; that it was guarded only by militia; and every day’s account tended to confirm the perfuaflon of the loyalty of one defcription of the inhabitants and the panic of the other. Thofe who knew the country beft were the molt fanguine in this per- fuafion. Had my intelligence been worfe founded, I fhould not have hefitated to try this ex- pedition with fuch troops, and under fuch inftru&ions as I gave to the commanding officer, for fo great a purpofe as that of a fupply fufficient to enable the army to follow at the heels of a broken and difconcerted enemy. The German troops employed were of the beft I had of that nation. The number of Britiffi was fmall; but it was the feleCt light corps of the army, compofcd of chofen men from all the regiments, and commanded by Captain Frafer, one of the moft diftinguiffied officers in his line of fer- vice that ever I met with. The inftruCtions recommended theutmoft caution refpeCI- ing pofts and fecurity of retreat, attention againft expofing the l’olid part of the detach- ment to affront, or committing it in any inftance, without a moral certainty of fuccefs. I touch with tendernefs and with great reluftance points that relate to the dead. My defence compels me to fay, my cautions were not obferved, nor the reinforcement ad- vanced with the alacrity I had a right to expeft. The men who commanded in both inftances were brave and experienced officers. I have ever imputed their failure partly to delufion in refpedft to the enemy, and partly to furprife and confequent confufion in the troops. For further explanation of my motives, and the circumftances attending the con- 14 * SeeAppendix No. VIII. J K A R R A T I V E. dua of the expedition, I beg leave prefer the houfe lately.* houfe laft year, and more particu ar y 0 • P • j for proceeding towards The fame letter will (hew the only refouree that rema, f ^Card a necelfary Albany, after the difappointment of this • c*P' mon, p George. I lhall bring fupply of provifion, and other .ndiljer ^ beyond . do ? bt , that no pof- proof to your bar to this point >»< imcommon for gentlemen, unacquainted with fible exertion was omitted. ... .Undine- to calculate the tranfport of the peculiarities of the country .0 w tic and then applying the refourcesof magazines, by meafuring the diftance upon 3 ^ m Eon to Drew their miftake. carriage, as praflifedrn other countries I P'™ d . The diftance and the The firft “^/^ F ^ ore t °^ F o r t Edward the Hudfon's River becomes navigable Z a dr ain extent, and it is the conftan, practice in all tranfports to -efume the water carriage Were it not, new impediments would anfe from lulls, worfe roads, a d fo h an increafed diftance, as would prevent the cattle reluming to Fort George the fame day About fix miles below Fort Edward lie the falls of Fort Miller, where foere is another carrying-place, which, though of no confiderablc length, makes nee ITary to unload the boats, to place the contents in carts, and to replace them in foelh boats, at the place the river again admits of navtgat.on. The boats unloaded, return to Fort Edward againft a rapid ftream. Upon this Ihott Rate of fafts, gentlemen will judge of our etnbarraffinents In the firft place, It was necelfary to bring forward to Fort Edward fourfeore or a hun- dred boats, as mere carriage-velfels for the provifions, each boat made a hard day s work for fr or more horfes, including the return o the horfes At the next ariy- olace as above deferibed, it was necelfary to place a confiderable relay of horfes to°draw over, firft, a portion of carriage boats, and afterwards the provifion, as it arrived. I have not mentioned the great number of other boats neceOary to be brought forward, to form bridges, to carry baggage and ammunition, and the num- ber of carriages framed to tranfport the boats themfelves at the enfuing carrying- places as we fhould proceed to Albany. This will be Ihewn in detail at the bar, if the committee chufe to hear it; and I pledge myfelf, it will appear, that the dili- gence in this iervice was extreme; that it was performed in the mod expeditious manner poflible, regard being had to our refources, and that no delay was occafioned by the artillery, becaufe the horfes appropriated to it were fupernumerary to thofe for which we had 5 carts, and the artillery, not already with the army, at laft was all brought up by its own horfes in two days. On the 13th of September, the ftore of provifion, amounting to about thirty day’s confnmption, was completed. I have ftated, in my letter to the fecretary of ftate, my reafons againft proceeding with lets quantity. And it is now time to enter upon the *N A R R A T I V E. tfce conftderation of that cbjeft, which is held by fume to b~o„cluftve upon .he 0 ^., a„ d ^ effo^.’at Bennington to procure fupplies, and to the impediments, I have juft now , ffer tha “effort faded. Againft the latter I refer to the rentes hu down my private letter to the fecretary of ftate, dated noth of Auguft. The Rate o ridnns at tins important ctif.s, and my reafoning upon tt, are enprelfed ftdl more at large in my difpatch from Albany ; 1 will now only touch them fcortly On the one hand my communications were at an end i my retreat was infecure i the en , y was collected in force; they were ftrongly potted ; Colonel St. Leger was re mn f Fnrr Stanwix. Thefe were difficulties, but none of them infurmountable. oTthe other hand, I had didodged the enemy repeatedly, when before in orce, and more ftrongly potted, nty army was confcious of ha v,n g the fopCT.omj', e -,trer to advance; I expefted co-operation; no letters Irom Sir \\ ill am Sl-e Removed that elation ; that to Sit Guy Carleton had never weighed : J hecaufe it was dated early in April, and confequently long be, ore the°tt:cretary of ftate's inftruftions, which I mutt have fuppofetl to relate to co-ope- ati„„ could be received. The letter of t,th July,* menttoned that General s re- 1 mn,nre ibotild Waihington turn his force towards me; indicated, as !To“l^«pea«ion of my arrival at Albany ; and informed me, that Sir Henry r • ran was left at New- York, and would aft as occurrences might direct. I dad Chnton was .left t f j did knoWj that confiderable remforcement m * ^7 i^exoeaed at New- York from England. After all, ffiould co-opera- tion^from t w f 1 the ^hoL force of Colonel St. Leget, and Sit William John- from belo , above> ift time t0 facilitate a retreat, though not in rime m affift my advance. Under thefe different fuggeftions, and thefe that are more copioufty flatted in the difpatch, to which I have referred, I read agatn my orders (I helieve *or an hundredth time) and I was decided. c And I am ftill convinced, that no proof that could have been roug u rom . p dances! intelligence or reafoning, could have jollified me to my country have faved me from the condemnation of my profeffion, or produced pardon wit in u ) own breaft, had I not advanced, and tried a battle with the enemy. I will conclude this fubjeft, with again averting upon my honour, what . f to fupport by evidence, though it is impoffible to bring pofmve proo to a nega- tive, that neither General Frafer, nor General Phillips, ever offered as has been re- ported, nor can be fuppofed to have conceived any objedion againft the paffage o the Hudfon’s River . See Appendix No. IX. No. X. u NARRATIVE. This refolution being taken, I truth, the manner of approaching the enemy, when explained by witneffes, will not be difgraceful to me as a foldier. a he adion, wh.cn enfued on the 19th of September, verified my opinion of the valour of my army; and I mull, in truth, acknowledge, a very readable fhare of that quality m the army of the enemy. To the general defcription given in my difpatch, it will be fit to add, by evidence, the peculiar merits of the troops in that adion. The ho- nour of three Britilh regiments, in continual and clofe fire for four hours, all of them fu fieri ng conf.derable lois, and one remaining with lefs than fixty men, and four or five officers, ought not to lofe its due applaufe, becaufe it is faid, their opponents were irregulars and militia. A victory was at laft obtained, but the clofe of day unavoidably prevented any immediate advantages. On the day following, it was known from prifoners and de- ferters, that the enemy were in a poll ftrongly fortified ; but from the thicknefs of the wood, it was impoffible to catch a view of any part of their pofition. All that could be done, therefore, was to take up ground as near them, as the nature of the country would admit with regard to miktary arrangement. It appears from the dif- patch already alluded to, that the army remained in this pofition till the 9th of Octo- ber, when the fecond adion enfued, employed in fortifying their camp, and watch- ing the enemy, whofe numbers it was now known, had been greatly fuperior to ours in the adion. It may here be alked, why, as foon as it became palpable that no ufe could be made of the vidory, 1 did not retreat ? It will be (hewn, that on the fecond day after the adion, I received intelligence from Sir Henry Clinton, of his intention to attack the highlands about that time, and I was hourly in expedation, I thought a juftly founded one, of thatmeafure operating to difiodge Mr. Gates entirely, or to oblige him to detach a large portion of his force. Either of thefe cafes would probably have opened my way to Albany. In thefe circumftances, could the preference upon thefe alternatives admit of a mo- ment’s refledion ? To wait fo fair a profped of effeding at laft: the great purpofe ©f the campaign, or to put a vidorious army, under all the difadvantages of a beat- en one, by a difficult and difgraceful retreat ; relinquilhing the long expeded co- operation, in the very hour of its promife, and leaving Sir Henry Clinton’s army, and probably Sir William Howe’s, expofed, with fo much of the feafon of the cam- paign to run, to the whole force of Mr. Gates, after he Ihould have feen me on the other fide of Hudfon’s River. Some of the fame confiderations, and other concomitant circumftances, will, in part, ferve to account for my not attacking the enemy during this interval ; for in this fituation, as in former ones, my condud has been arraigned upon oppofite principles. The NARRATIVE. *7 The committee will obferve, that after receiving intelligence of Sir Henry Clinton’s deftgn, different rneffengers were difpatched by different routes, to inform that officer of my fituation, and of the time I thought I could continue in it. To have hazarded a repul fe, under fo reafonable an expe&ation of a powerful diverfion, would, in my opinion, have been very unjuftifiable ; but when I add, that from the backwardnefs, or defeftion, of the few Indians that remained, the numbers of rifle-men, and other irregulars employed on the enemy’s out-pofts, and the ftrength and darknefs of the furrounding woods, it had not yet been practicable to gain any competent knowledge of their pofition, I trufl every man will go with me in the fentiment, that all theic circumftances confidered, an attack would have been confummate rafhnefs. Another very powerful reafon, that operated on the fide of delay, was the ftate of my fick and wounded. Numbers of the latter were recovering faft; many excellent officers in particular ; and the more I delayed the ftronger I grew. The time alfo en- titled me to expeCt Lieutenant Colonel St. Leger’s corps would be arrived at Ticom deroga, and fecret means had been long concerted to enable him to make an effort to join me, with probability of fuccefs.. Upon mature confideration of thefe and other circumftances attending this period, come to my knowledge fince, I am clearly of opinion, that had the reinfoi cements from England arrived in time,, to have enabled Sir Henry Clinton to have effefted the ftroke he afterwards fo gallantly made in the highlands,, any time between the two adions, I, ffiould have made my way. The difpatch alluded to, proceeds to ftate the reafon that induced me to make the movement on the yth Odober. I Ihall only add, to obviate a fuppofed error, in not advancing my whole line, that the part remaining in my camp, operated as effedually to keep the enemy’s right wing in check, from fupporting their left, as if it had moved, with this additional advantage, that it prevented the danger of their ad- vancing by the plain, near the river, and falling upon my rear. I have reafon to believe my difappointment on that day proceeded from an uncom- mon circumftance in the conduct of the enemy. Mr. Gates, as I have been informed, had determined to receive the attack in his lines j Mr. Arnold, who commanded on the left, forfeeing the danger of being turned, advanced without confultation with his ge- neral, and gave, infteadof receiving battle. The ftroke might have been fatal on his part had he failed. But confident I am, upon minute examination of the ground fince, that had the other idea been purfued, I fhould in a few' hours have gained a po- fition, that in fpite of the enemy’s numbers, would have put them in my power. Difagreeable as is the neceffity, I muft here again, in juftice to my own army, recur to the vigour and obftinacy with which they were fought by the enemy. A more deter- mined perfeverance than they fhewed in the attack upon the lines, though tney weie D finally J narrative* finally repulfcd by the corps under Lord Balcarras, I believe, is not in any officer’s experience. It will be the bufinefs of evidence to prove, that in the part, where Co- lonel Breyman was killed, and the enemy penetrated, the mifchief could not be re- paired, nor under it the camp be longer tenable. The tranfa&ions of the enfuing night, the day of the eighth, and the whole progrefs of the retreat to Saratoga, will be laid before the committee minutely in the courfeof my evidence, as well as every circumftance, from the time the army arrived there to the figning the convention. I have only to premife, that, I trull, I fhall be able to prove, to the fatisfa&ion of the committee, that even in this fituation, I had the chance of a favourable event. The enemy had intended to attack by the plain of Saratoga. On the morning of the i ith, a confiderable column had a&ually palled the Filh Kill for that purpofe during the log, which at that feafon was regular till fonretimc after lun rife. The intention was prevented taking place, by intelligence one of their generals received from a deferter, that I had a line formed behind the brufh-wood, to fupporc the poll of artillery, which was their immediate objeft of attack. The general in- flantly retreated his column, and prevented a general adlion, which my pofition, com- pared with the propofed one of the enemy, gave me real'on to hope would have been to my advantage. I have likewife a fatisfa&ory confidence, that I fhall dcmonflrate that the intelligence I Hated to the councils of war, refpe&ing the ftrength of the enemy, did not fall fhorc in any part, and in fome parts much exceeded my own belief, particularly on the only pofiible routes of my retreat; and that thofe polls were not taken up during my flay at Saratoga, as has been reported, but fome of them previous to the a&ion of the 7th, and the red immediately after it. I fhall clofe the whole of this by delivering at your table, from the hands of my fecre- tary, an authenticated return of the force of General Gates, figned by himielf, and the truth of it will be fupported from ocular teflimony, by every officer of the Britifh army. Many of them are now in England, and after what has been infinuated, not to fay charged in this Houfe, it becomes the duty of the accufers, not only to examine clofely the officers I have called, but to produce any other witneffes, that in their thoughts may be qualified to fpeak to the good or bad order of the rebel troops, when they marched by in their prefence, and to their behaviour, when oppofed to our troops in aftion. I cannot clofe this long trefpafs upon the patience of the committee, without ex- preffing one humble hope, that in forming a judgment upon the whole, or any diflinft part of thefe tranfa&ions, they will be confidered as they mull have appeared at the time j for, I believe, where war is concerned, few men in command would Hand ac- quitted, NARRATIVE. quitted, if any after-knowledge of fafts and circumftances were brought in argument againft decifions of the moment, and apparent exigencies of the occafion. I fubmit all I have faid, fome of it, I fear, not lufficiently prepared or arranged, with true refpeft to the committee. I fball not mention all the difadvantages, under which I have preffed this bufinefs upon their attention. I have caufe to regret the ab- fence of a mod confidential friend in Major General Phillips j zealous advocates, I truft, in Major General Reidefel and Brigadier Hamilton. Much of my vindication is in the grave with General Fraferj much with Colonel Ackland your late member. I truft my zeal, in promoting this enquiry, as I have done, will be one mark of the fenfe I bear of the general character of this houfe ; that however men may be biaffed by political attachments upon common occafions, when the honour of an individual is committed to their bands, they will alone be guided by truth and juftice. And the next inference I Ihould wilh to be drawn, from my earneftnefs for a public appeal, is this ; that however others may impute errors to my conduct, I am mylelf confcious of the rectitude of my intentions. D A J E V I- E V I D E C E. u N Jovis 20 ° die Matj , 1779* Committee to confider of the feveral Papers which were prefented to the Houfe by Mr. De Grey, upon the 19th Day of March lnft, purfuant to their Addrefs to his Majefty. Mr. F. Montagu in the Chair. Sir Guy CarletoH was called in and examined by General Burgoyne as follows : i. Q. T\0 you recollect having received a letter from the fecretary of ftate, mention- | J ing the reafons that made it expedient for you to remain in the province of Quebec ? A. Yes, very well. а. Q. What was the date of it ? . A. I think the 12th of Auguft, 1776 — I am fure it was in Auguft. 3- Was not the date of that letter long before the return of General Burgoyne from Canada to Great Britain ? A. Yes. 4. During the winter, preceding the campaign of 1777, was not the artillery pre- pared at Montreal for field fervice, upon the fuppofition that you was to command the army beyond the frontiers of the province ? A. It was. . , 5. Was the proportion allotted to General Burgoyne for field fervice more than was intended, had you fo commanded ? A. 1 don’t precifely recolleft that — It does not ftrike me there was any great dif- ference.' , б . Was the quantity of artillery decided on in concert with Major-General Phillip?, and on his recommendation ? A. The artillery I had prepared for the campaign, on a fuppofition I was to go my* felf, was in concert with General Phillips. That department, as well as others, was put under the command of General Burgoyne on his arrival •, and, I fuppofe, he fol- lowed the fame method fo far as regarded the artillery. 7. Q. Did General Burgoyne apply to you for troops from Canada to garrifon Ticon- deroga when he advanced ? A. He did. 8. 'Q. What was the purport of your anfwer ? A. That I did not think myfelf juftified to grant it by my orders — My anfwer will appear more precifely by a copy of my anfwer to General Burgoyne. Sir G. Carlcton.] EVIDENCE, zt IO. O Do you recoiled that General Burgoyne informed you of the motives on which 9, he proceeded from Skenelborough to Fort Edward by land in preference to the route by Ticonderoga and Lake George ? A. I do. . . . , Q Did you concur in his ientiments r "t iS his condua while undergo™, mand ‘ Again called in, and examined by other Members of the Committee. O Whether when you propofed to take that train of artillery with you that you 12. 1 3 m Tntfoned Tt was with a view to the reduftion of the forts at Ticonderoga - or whether you propofed to have taken with you the fame train of artillery in cale you hac m T h 1 c wTwth "ntSK^etlle fo y m and lines at Ticonderoga., the train ° f (f wK youtow what*proportion of artillery was carried forward by the ar- »y Ge„. my under General Burgoyne’s command after the redua.on of T.conderoga ! s 1 a Would'younot, in cafe you had reduced Ticonderoga and marched forwards .4. towards Albany, have carried with you a train of field artillery . A I nrobably Ihould have taken artillery with me. O Had yoi/forefeen a neceffity of fortifying a camp at Albany, would you not havTrarriedfome guns of the calibre of twelve pounders and light twenty-fours . _ A I s really a 8 very difficult matter off hand .0 run into all the minute operations of a camodun ■ every meafure of that fort mud have been a matter of conftderacion ?nd deSrauon and there are a thoufand circumftances that might have determined ^u^teTt^Ito’twilhtoconcedftomthitHoufc any thing that 1 would ETs of "ti^ftat'e L’dTuuadln’i.f ,^ 5 , as 'LtpreL^te queS ated, indtfe ** conddemlile ^ corpTas Ihhout IrSkiy buuhe prccife number mud depend on a variety ot crcumffances, whkh the difcretion and judgment of the officer who commands muff determine. Q. Were not the orders you received from government pofuive, for Gen goyn'e ° j^veiseen publilhed I underftand -Every gentleman in this Houfe mull be a judge of thofe orders whether they »ere potaveor "«• H owe, O Did vou not receive a letter, dated tlie 5U1 or flpru, nu.n 1 informing you that he could not fend any force to afiift the operations of General Burgoync’s army ? William Howe relative to his operations a copy of whfch wSTnt to General Burgoyne-I think it was not juft in thole terms, but a copy of the letter is on the table. 15. 16. i8. 19- 20 . 21 . 22 . 2J. 24. 25. 26.. 27.. 28. EVIDENCE. [Sir G. Carleton. Whether on that information, you confidered that you had any difcretionary power to detain General Burgoyne after that information ? A. Certainly not. Whether in cafe of any difficulty that General Burgoyne might meet with on his march, there was any latitude given to him (General Burgoyne) to retreat P A. I faid before, that the orders were before the Houfe, who are competent to judge on that point. Did you yourfelf underftand thofe orders tc General Burgoyne to be pofitive ? A. That is giving an opinion upon what perhaps may be a queftion in the Houfe ; whereas I have already faid, the Houfe are as competent to judge as I am. Is the Committee to underftand from that anfwer, that you have any objedtion of giving your opinion on that queftion ? A. I have an objedtion to give an opinion on almoft all points. Did you give it in orders to General Burgoyne, in cafe he met with any diffi- culties during his march in Canada, under your command, not to proceed ? A. I ftiould have taken care that General Burgoyne met with no difficulties in his march in Canada ; nor do I well fee how he could. Q^, Where do the boundaries of the province of Canada end ? A. Between the Illinois and Point au Fer. Is the fortrefs of Ticonderoga in Canada ? A. No. Q. Did your commiffion, as commander in chief of the troops in the northern divifion, extend beyond the boundaries of Canada to Ticonderoga ? A. That commiffion as commander in chief, I underftood, did extend fo far ; but by the orders already alluded to, or by thofe which General Burgoyne brought out in the fpring 1777, I underftood that my command was reftrained to the limits of the province, and that General Burgoyne was entirely from under my command, as foon as he pafled the limits of the province. Q^Did you apply to the fecretary of ftate for a reinforcement of 4000 men, as neceflary for the campaign of 1777 ? A. I recollect when General Burgoyne was coming home in the fall of 1776, as I was perfectly fatisfied with his condudt in the preceding campaign, I talked over with him, in confidence, what I thought neceflary for the following campaign ; among other things I defired him to make a memorandum to demand 4000 men, as a reinforcement for the enfuing campaign, or at leaft for four battalions. I think I have feen thofe memorandums were accurately ftated and laid before the Houfe. Q. What part of that 4000 men which you thought neceflary for the campaign of 1777, was actually fentout to Canada in that year ? A. I do not accurately remember how many — I think a very fmall part — You may have a very precife account from the returns. Q^Qf that fmall part fent in 1 77 7, did not a. certain proportion arrive very late in the year ? A. Yes, a part arrived late,. 4 Q. After I Sir G. Carleton.3 E V 1 D E N C F After you had received your orders from the fecretary of date, did you appro- 29. hend that General Burgoyne, as long as he was within the province of Canada, was pofitively under your command ? A. Yes, I did : as long as he was in the province of Canada, I looked on him to be pofitively under my command ; but the load of the expedition being on his fhoul- ders, I thought it proper that he, in all things fhould direct ; and therefore I gave out immediate orders, that not only the troops he was to command out of the pro- vince, but all the departments neceffaryfor the affifting his expedition, fhould comply immediately, and without delay, with every requifition and order he fhould give. The reafon of my doing fo was, that no time might be loft. I only required that they fhould report to me what orders they had received from General Burgoyne. I believe thofe orders are alfo on the table. Ch Will you explain to the Committee what you mean by the words, load of the 30. expedition lying on General Burgoyne' s Jhoulders ? A. I had no particular meaning ; they are words I fhould have ufed on any expedi- tion of importance. QHf General Burgoyne had met with very confiderable difficulties to impede his 31, progrefs within the province of Canada, would you have thought yourfelf juftifi- able in giving any orders to General Burgoyne, different from thofe tranfmitted to General Burgoyne, through you, from the fecretary of Bate ? A. Had there been any difficulties in Canada, I would not have given him up the command. Having given up the command to General Burgoyne, and having ordered all 32, the troops to obey him, only reporting their proceedings to you, would you after that, have thought yourfelf juflifiable to change the order to General Burgoyne, upon his meeting with great difficulties on the frontiers of the neighbouring pro- vinces ? A. I really did not mean to evade the queftion in the leaft. It did not appear to me poffible that there could be any difficulties. I don’t mean to fay there could not, from the nature of the country, be difficulties in the march that might occafion delay, but by the nature of the queflion I underftood difficulties from the enemy. In that cafe I fhould not have thought myfelf juflifiable in giving up the command. If you had heard, that on the frontiers, and within the province of Canada, 33. there was the greateft reafon to think, that the refiftance of General Burgoyne’s army was fo great as to make it, in your opinion, exceedingly difficult for that General to force his way to Albany, would you think yourfelf juflifiable in giving different or- ders to General Burgoyne, from thofe given by the fecretary of Bate ; or would you have thought the fecretary of ftate’s orders for General Burgoyne’s army fo peremp- tory that it would not be proper for vou to interfere ? A. If I underftood the queftion as it nowftands, it is what I would have done, had the province been invaded, or clofe on the point of being invaded, and the enemy entering the province. The queftion does not mean an invading army, but a refiftance from the enemy 34. to the progrefs of General Burgoyne’s army, in the cafe ftated in the laft quef- tion ? 23 A. In Oj E V I D E N C E< [Sit G. Carleton. 35 - 3 6 ' A. In that cafe, that an enemy fhould befomi * fofenceof the province,, mand) I ffiould have ordered all the "^fotcenerll Burgoyne, and have reaffum- tt^obftruftions had been removed, within the Supfwf^no'enemv within the ^evince of Canada bo. £**^£“5 upon the line of communication w.th Atony, . “jjj ^“.Wnk youtfelf juffi- General Burgoyne to obey the orders g B oyne f rom thole given by the fe- fiable in giving different orders to General B g y f Q f ftate’s orders for cretary of ftate ; or would you have though the tecr > for you to General Burgoyne’s army fo peremptory that it wouio n * V interfere ? , _ , R „ rrTnvnP \ orders one tittle, that was my opinion he A. I could not change General g > , e me my authority ; when once he received his orders from the fame p f ould „i ve him orders, nor would he paffed the limits of my command, I neither coum givt ’ a»g!g: n: being no fuch cafe rf rl ? a r f ( ?rt l out the troops and all things under his com, be loft by any unneceffary applications to me, which the ftr 61 t ) Withdrew.. might otherwife require. Jo-ain called in. O Should vou if you had been in General Burgoyne’s fituation, and afting un- • de?ihe ordtrwhich you know be renewed have thought youtfelf bound to purfue them implicitly, or at liberty to deviate from them . t j, e ut _ ft oftf^ nl C aV to h ?a U y 8 ^ =.7/ mniuT-n, ttot'all cafes poffiblc, I Tuft have goie on, i's a vay nice thing to fay indeed ; 1 fuppofe every officer, into a mod unpleafant and anxious fituation to hav bated within himfelf, whether he was or was not to go on. Every man mu ft dec for himfelf. What I would have done, I really don’t know ; the ’particular fttuaj. , and a man’s own particular feelings, muft determine the point. If 1 ■^ t b ^ oed I would bee leave to fay, that I did not mean to evade any queftion , 1 anfwer diredly Tyet queftions may be put to me, of fo delicate a > nature, and perh no man in the world is in a more delicate fituation, with refpeft to the prefent^ca queftion, and the bufinefs of this Committee, than 1 am; w en q . . put to me, I (hall pray the indulgence of the Committee, to be excufed anfwermg 3 Sir G. Carleton.] EVIDENCE. 2$ them, but I will not evade them. As I now underftand the meaning of the right honourable member in the former queflions to be, Whether I fhould have taken upon me to fuperfede the King’s orders, fuppofing I knew of any unfurmountable difficulties in the way, as that I had information of 20,000 men at Ticonderoga, before General Burgoyne left the province of Canada, I ffiould have told General Burgoyne my information ? But it was General Burgoyne who was to carry the orders into execution, and not me, and therefore it was upon his own judgment he was to determine ; I fhould have given him my opinion, but I think I had no right to give him orders under thofe circumftances. Who was it that made the arrangement and diftribution of the troops that 38, were to be left for the defence of Canada, independent of thofe under the command of General Burgoyne ? A. The orders that are before the Houfe are very full, and I thought very clear. The Committee will fee in thofe orders the troops that were deftined for General Burgoyne’s expedition, and the troops that were to remain for the defence of the province. Who made that diftribution ? 39 ' A. It came to me from the fecretary of ftate. Did not the orders from the fecretary of ftate go to the detail of the fmalleft 40. pofts within the province ? A. The letter is before the Committee. Queftion repeated. A. I fhould beg for the letter to be read ; I don’t wifh to avoid any queftion, but 41. I wifh to be accurate. Was the diftribution of the troops preferibed to you by the fecretary of ftate, or 42. left to your diferetion ? A. In mentioning the number of troops which were to remain in that province, it was there faid that thofe troops would be fufficient for garrifoning fuch and fuch places, particularizing them. Q. Did you ever know an inftance, in your military life, of a minifter making a 43. diftribution of troops for the defence of a province, without taking the opinion or leaving a great deal to the diferetion of the governor of that province, that governor being an afting military officer of very high rank ? A. I never had the honour to correfpond with a fecretary of ftate till I was ap- pointed to the command of that province. Whether you was confulted upon the practicability of penetrating from the 44* frontiers of Canada to Albany by force, with the ftrength allotted to General Bur- goyne for that purpofe ? A. No ; I was not. Are you acquainted with the paflage from New York to Canada by the Hud- 45. fon’s River. A. I have gone that way. Have you obferved it with a view to military operations ? . 46. A. No; I never made the tour having any military operations in view. E Are u z6 E V I D E N C E. [Sir G. Carleton, 47* 48. 49. 50. 5 l * 7 53 54 55 Q. Are you acquainted with the forces which Sir W ' llll ^ er ^' s immediate command at and about New York, on the 17th ot July, 7,7. Q Lwofeo Sir William Howe had ta.ooo effective men, bef.de! .a (efficient roralo.|i«lii) New York, Staten llland, and L opg Hland, to de end them .gam# Genetal ^ Waft heron's army, fuppofmg General YV.Ih.ngtonY army m the Jerfres, near Quibble I own, and that Sir William Howe had rece ved accounts of General Burgoync foccefs at Ticcnderoga, and was acquainted with the orders under which General Burgoync afted ; 1 , it your opinion that the beft movement Str W.ll.am Howe could have made for the furpotes ot forwarding the execution of the orders, undei which Genera! Burgoync adted, would have been to have tailed with his army from New York to Chefapeak Bay ? ■ . . T A. Had I had the honour to hare commanded on that fide, I do not know what I, ftiould have done myfeif. . TT . , r v- O. After you received the letter from Sir William Howe, informing you of h,s intended expedition to, the fouthward, whether you did expert that Sir William. Howe’s army could co-operate on the Hudson’s River with the northern army that feafon ? A. 1 don’t know. _ , , ... Whether you thought, after the receipt of that letter, that it- was prooable: there would be a co-operation from the iouthern army ? A. I took it for granted, that Sir William Howe knew what he was about, and would do what he thought beft for the public fervice. I really was fo little in- formed of all the particular circumftance.s of his fituation and of the provinces under his command, that I could form no judgment of the propriety or impropriety of his co ndurt, or of the effeds of his meafures. (X Did your information lead you to believe, that the inhabitants between Sara- toga and Albany, were fo well affeded to his Majefly and Great Britain, as that there would be much advantage derived from their affiftance to the King’s army ia the profecution of General B.urgoyne’s expedition ? A. I' had frequent accounts from that part of the country, that there were numbers ready to take arms and join the King’s troops if they Ihould penetrate fo far. Q^Do you mean, by penetrating Jo Jar , to Albany, or to the length the army got ? . ... . A. The whole extent of the inhabited country, according to the information brought to me. Had you no information that a formidable militia might be raifed in that country to oppofe his Majefty’s arms ? A. Yes ; I had fuch information. Did you think that the force which General Burgoyne carried with him from Ticonderoga towards Albany was fufficient to oppofe iuch force ? A. 1 really muff beg leave to be exc.ufed anfvvering that queftion. , If you had been confulted refpeding General Burgoyne’s expedition, knowing the nature of that country, and the force General Burgoyne had, would you or not have advifed fuch an enterprize ? A*, h E V I D E N C E. V Earl of Balcarras.] A. If I had had the honour to command in that campaign as I had in the former, I don’t precifely know what I Ihould have done myfeVf. Did you give any advice for employing the lavages ? 5 ^* A. 1 don’t recoiled that I faid any thing about them. [ jYiihdrevi . Jovis 27 0 die Man , 1779* Earl of Balc arras called in and examined by General Burgoyne. Q. IN what ftation did your Lordfhip ferve in the campaigns in America, in 1776, 1. and 1777 ? A. 1 commanded the Britilh light infantry. Was the Britilh light infantry continually attached to the corps under the 2. command of Brigadier General Frafer"? Y gg Q^Had you occafion to obferve that General Burgoyne and General Frafer lived 3. together in friendship and confidence ? A. Yes, I had. Had you reafon to believe that General Frafer was confulted by Genaral Bur- 4 * goyne in all material operations ? # A. I had reafon to believe that General Frafer was confulted in many material operations. . Does your Lordfhip know or believe that the proportion of artillery, at- 5* tached to General Frafer’s corps through the whole campaign, was according to his Tequifitions and defires ? A. I underflood from General Frafer, that the proportion of artillery allotted to him was agreeable to his own requisitions. , Do you recoiled the number of killed and wounded in General Frafer’s corps, at the affair of Huberton > A. I don’t recoiled exadly ; I think it was about 150. What was your opinion of the behaviour of the enemy on that day ? . 7. A. Circumftanced as the enemy was, as an army very hard prelfed in their retreat, they certainly behaved with great gallantry. Was it pradicable, the nature of the country, tire fatigue of the King’s troops, ?,. the care of the wounded, and other circumstances confidered, to have pur feed the enemy farther after that adion ? A. It was not E-2 Do evidence. [Earl of Bslcarras. on what day General Frafer’s corps rejoined the army at 10 . II. 1 3 - * 4 - * 5 * 1 6. 17,. 18. 1-9 20. HI. 2,2 Q. Do you recoiled Sk A?anhf9th of July ; I think that it was on that clay. Qn what day was the action at Huberton . A. Qn the 7th of July. f ov : n „ t he wounded from Huberton to CA Do you recoiled the difficulties oi removing me wu the hofpital at T iconderoga ? , j t p e difficulties attending the re- A. From the diftance and badnefs ot the roaus, tnc u.m » moving of the hofpital mutt have been very great. r j t0 die enemy,. Was it pradicable, unlels the wounded had been left expoled to enem )s to have rejoined the army fooner ? Does ^your* Lorclrtnp recollea how .he army was employed between .hat time “ A 1 ' m'a h iHai F w^mpto)U In opening the country and making roads to For. Anne Jtlfe GermanVunder General Re'.defcl were detached about fourteen m.les to ,h a Do you recollect the poll the enemy abandoned upon the afcent from the Low Country to the Pitch Pine Plains, in the march from Fort Anne to Fort Ed- ward ? ^ I Had*e 1 e,wmy Cl mabutaed their ground on that poll, do you apprehend that a confutable portion of artillery would have been neceflary to diflodge A. Artillery would certainly have been of great ufe to diflodge the enemv. Q. Did you ever fee an inftance, during your fervice in America, that the rebels continued twenty-four hours on the fame place without entrenching ; and was it not alfo their general practice to add abbaties to their entrenchments . , A. The rebels were always indefatigable in fecunug them e ves y en ments, and in general they added an abbatis to thofe entrenchments. Do you remember the pofition the enemy abandoned at Schuyler s Iflan . A. I do remember to have patted fuch an poll; once. . , Does you Lordfhip think that pofition could have been forced without a numerous artillery or heavy lofs ? A. I do not think it could. , - „ Ql- From the nature of that country, do you think that port could have been turned ? . A. Not without greatly rifquittg the boats and portable magazines.. Q Is it poffible at any time in that country, and with a fmall army, to quit the navigable rivers, without leaving the boats and portable magazines expoled . A. I imagine it is not. t . 1 v c 5 Did you live in habits of intimacy and communication with General f raier A. I did. , ,1 Q. Was General Frafer of a warmth and opennefs of temper that generally made him communicative of his fentiments, when they differed from the fentiments of thofe with whom he adted ? . _ , A. General 29 Earl of Balcarras.] evidence. 24. 25- 26. A. General Frafer’s temper was warm, open, and communicative, but referved in m Q? r Did yofetTrhear General Frafer exprefs difapprobation of the meafure of paf- 23. fing Hudfon’s River ? Q W^notTa bridge conftruded of rafts, and fome boats thrown over tnat river’, a little before the time of the attack on Bennington ? DhTLtGeneral Frafer’s corps pafs the river by that bridge, and take poft on the heights of Saratoga ? O Do' you remember that bridge being carried away by the torrents and bad weather, whereby the communication was cut off between that corps and the main body of the army ? Q. Was General Frafer’s corps recalled after that adion, and obliged to repafs 27. the river in boats and fcowls ? Q. Do' you remember General Frafer expreffing his forrow for being obliged to re- 2 8.. turn back over the Hudfon’s River ? .... A I remember General Frafer mentioning it with regret. r O Had the rear guard of General Frafer’s corps been attacked during that paf- 29. fage^over the river, would not a powerful fire of artillery from the oppofite fhore We been of ereat ufe, if not the only means of protecting them ? h A If the enemy had attacked General Frafer, they would have found him in a verv bad pofture ; ^t was impoffible to take a better, and, as they could not b„ fup- porLd by Th e Hie, the only means of fafety mu ft have been to get under cover of th Qc! Was ^here^not" an expedation and impatience of the troops in general to pafs Hudson’s River, and advance on the enemy ? q[ Was there not a general confidence and alacrity on the occafion 5 Q. From 6 th'efc circumftances, and your other knowledge of Ae«V • ** believe that to have made no further attempt on the enemv would have caulcd appointment and dejedion in the troops, and refledions on the ; genera A The troops were in the higheft fpints, and w lfhed to be led on. . - Q, Does your Lordlhip recoiled the march up to the enemy on the morning of 33. the 1 9th of September ? Ch Was the combination of the march fuch, as, that not withibnding fage of the ravines and the thicknefs of the woods, the column c j f ‘ to march, and that of che Bririlh line, led by General fupport each other, and fpeedily to form 111 line ol butt.., a. gan the attack ? A. After 3 °- 3 «- 34 - 35 - 3b- 3 7 - 3^- 39 - 40. 41. 42 - 43 - 44. 45 * 46. 47 - evidence. [Earl of Balcarras. A After the columns had palled the ravines, they arrived at their refpedhve po ft s ‘ with great precifvon in point of time, and every fortunateoircumftance attend- ed the forming of the line. O J~fow lonpf did that a6^ion laff ? . _ . AT The Britifti were attacked partially about one o’clock. The adtion was gene- ral at three, and ended at feven o’clock. ■ , , r Q From the nature of the country, was it poffible to difcern the enemy s pofi- tionor movements, to form any judgment what attacks were in force, and what were feints. ? A. I think not. Q. Did we remain matters of the field of battle . A. We did. A Had the field of battle been well difputed by the enemy ? A. The enemy behaved with great obftinacy and courage. . Was it too dark to purfue with effedt at the time the adtion ended ? -A. It was. Q. Did the King’s troops take up ground nearer to the enemy, the morning after the adtion ? A. It was rather nearer to the enemy. Q. How near were the out- polls of General Frafer’s corps to the out-pofts of the enemy from that time to the adtion of the 7th of Odtober? A. I Ihould imagine within half a mile. _ f From the nature of the country, and the fituation of the enemy s out-polts, was it poffible to reconnoitre their pofition ? _ _ . . A. From the nature of the country, the difficulties attending reconnoitering mute have been very great. Were not the riflemen, and other irregulars, employed by the enemy at out-pofts and on fcouts, an overmatch for the Indian or provincial troops that were with the army at that time ? A. They were. Was not General Frafer’s corps continually at work during the interval above- mentioned, in fecuring their own polls, and opening the front to oppofe the enemy ? A. They were. After General Frafer received his wound, on the 7th of Odtober, on whom did the command of his corps devolve ? A. On me. Was you in a fituation on that day, to obferve the general difpolition of the army, made by General Burgoyne, previous to the action ? A. I remember two redoubts having been eredted on the left, to cover the boats and provifions to enable General Burgoyne to make a detachment from his army. VVas you in a fituation to obferve the difpolition made immediately bdfore the attack by the enemy ? A. I only recoiled! the fituation of the two battalions of the advanced xorpa. After Earl of Balcarras.] EVIDENCE. Q, After the retreat to the lines, were the lines attacked, and with what de- 48. gl A.°Th?lhies were attacked, and with as much fury as the fire of fmaH arms can ad 'a ‘Does your Lord (hip remember that part of the lines where you commanded, 49. Being vifited by General Burgoyne during the attack ? A. I don’t recoiled! to have feen General Burgoyne. . , Was the cannon of great ufe in the repulfe of the enemy in your poft ■ 50. A. Of very great ufe. € € , Do you think that poft would have been tenable next morning, the enemy 51. having pofieffion of Colonel Briemen s poft ? A. I do not think it would. . , , M(rf „ O. Would the pofieffion of the poft by the enemy, together with the poffef- 52. ftonof Colonel Briemen’s polls, have laid open the flank and rear of the camp of the line ? ^\lhTthe 'retreat in the night, and the new difpofcion of the whole army made jj. in good order and without lofs ? ^DicUhe army remain under arms, and in momentary expectation of battle, 54. the whole of the day of the 8th ? q. Do you remember the cot, Mon and difficulties attending the line of baggage 5 S- in the retreat, in tire night of the 8th ? ^ Was not the retreat ne.crthelefs made in good order by the troops, and 5 S. without lofs ? Q Does your Lordflrip remember the weather, the ftate of the roads, the ftate 57. of ffie cattle, and the difficulty of palling the Filh Kiln, in the retreat to Saratoga, '“Z ^•"triS^;. 9 -^en,ly the roads flarved for want of forage, and the bridge over, the Filh kill had been datroyeo try it h^-e been Tibbie, from th/ftateS the fatigue of the troops, to have commned the march farther immediately after the arrival at Saratoga . A. The troops were greatly fatigued, and the artillery had been left on the other hde of. the Filh Kill. v;n ? co Q. Why were they left on the other fide of the Filh Ki . c 9 * AT The bridge had been deftroyed by the enemy •, « was exceeding dark, and 1 do not know whether the ford was paffable for the artillery without being firft exa- n,l Q^ Do you remember the enemy opening a battery on the oppofite fide of Hudfon’s Co. Paver, and the circumftances attending the opening that batteiy . ^ rp^ e 3 * EVIDENCE. [Earl of Balcarras. A. The corps I commanded was at that time polled, and they fired on us at that time, but I do not know from what direction. . , ,, 6 r. 0. Does your Lordffiip remember the ffiot from that battery going over the table when you and ieveral officers were at dinner ? A. I did not dine with General Burgoyne that day — I recollect hearing a cannon fnot had difcompofed the company at the general’s cable. , 61. Confequently mult not that battery have commanded the lord over the Huaion s River? . , n , , A. I believe I laid, I did not recoiled! from what direction the ffiot came, but they had a battery which commanded that ford. 63. CD Do you recoiled! on what day you was called, with other commanders of corps, to the fill! council of war ? A. On the 13th of Odtober. 64. Was there a fpot in the whole pofition to be found for holding that council, which was not expoled to cannon or rifle-lhot ? A. We were not fo fortunate as to find one. 65. Do you recoiled! that General Burgoyne, after Hating to the council the difficul- ties of the fituation, declare, that nothing ffiould induce him to propofe terms to the enemy without the general concurrence of the generals and field officers of the army, and that he was ready to take the lead in any meafure that they ffiould think for the honour of the Britiffi arms, or words to that effedl ? A. I remember words to that effedl. 66 . Q. Was the concurrence unanimous for treating on honourable terms ? A. I hope 1 ffiall Hand juftified with the members of that council, when I have the honour to declare to this Houfe, that, our fituation appeared to them fo decided as not to admit of one diffenting voice. 67. When Colonel Kingfton brought back the firf! propofition, wherein it was fpe- cified by Major General Gates, that the army ffiould lay down their arms in their entrenchments and furrender prifoners of war, does your Lordffiip remember, that General Burgoyne, when he read them to the council, declared, he would not fet his hand to thofe conditions, or words to that effedl ? A. I think the words of the propofal from General Gates were. That the Britiffi army ffiould be ordered, by word of command from their adjutant general, to lay down their arms in the entrenchments. It was rejedled with difdain by General Bur- gone, and the council concurred in his indignation. 68. Q. Were the counter propolals, penned by General Burgoyne, unanimoufiy ap- proved ? A. They were. 69. When thofe propofals had been agreed to by General Gates, but copies not figned by either party, do you remember General Burgoyne informing the council of intelligence he had received from a fpy in the night, and l'ubmitting to their confidera- tion, whether it was confident with public faith, and if fo, expedient to fufpend the execution of the treaty and trud to events ? A. I do remember it. 70. Q. Does your Lordffiip recoiled what was the refult of that confideration ? 3 A. The EVIDENCE. 33 Earl of Balcarras.j) A. The determination of the council, on the queftion being put, was, that the pu- blic faith was bona fide plighted. Though that was the opinion of the majority, was there not a difference of opi- yt. nion in the council ? A. There was. Were the opinions of the feveral commanding officers afked refpefting the con- 7*. dition of their refpe&ive corps, and what might be expected from them feverally irr dei'perate cafes ? A. It was. Was there not on that queftion alfo difference of opinion ? y A. There was. Q. After the Convention took place, did your Lordfhip fee the army of General y4« Gates pafs in review before General Burgoyne and General Phillips ? A. I did. Q.. From the manner and filence of their march, the order obferved in keeping 75* their divifions, and an apparent attention to their officers, did that army appear difeiplined ? A. They marched in good order and were filent, and feemed to pay attention to their officers. Thefe are efiential points of difeipline, but I faw nothing farther of it. From the general behaviour of the rebel troops in the different actions in which y6. you was prefent in the courfe of the campaign, did you think them difeiplined and refpe&able troops ? A. When I anfwered the laft queftion, I fpoke to the manoeuvre I faw upon the fpot. At all times when I was oppofed to the rebels, they fought with great courage and obftinacy. Q. Judging by your eye, and the time the rebel army was marching in review, 77. did you form any judgment of their number ? A. It requires great experience to make a computation of numbers by feeing them pafs : as far as I could judge on the occafion, they feemed to me to amount to thir- teen or fourteen thoufand rank and file under arms. Has your Lordfhip reafon to know or believe, that the troops that paffed in re- 78, view were exclufive of thofe corps that had been polled on the other fide of the Hud- l'on’s River ? A. They were exclufive of thofe corps. Examined by other Members of the Committee and by General Burgoyne occafionally. Q. What was the general opinion of the army of General Burgoyne’s behaviour 79. in adlion and in difficulty ? A. It appeared to me, that General Burgoyne always polfelfed himfelf in every fituation of danger and difficulty, and, I may venture to fay, it appeared lo to the army. . CL Had General Burgoyne the confidence of the army ? So. A. He had. Q. After the arrival of the troops at Cambridge, were the officers and foldiers of 81. F the evidence. [Earl of Balcarras. 84. tV,e army fattsfied with the general’s efforts to contribute to their comfort, and redrefs their grievances ? 82. ol Was Ac »my lkisficd with the general's behaviour at the court martial held cm C °A:ih car'ried on that profecution in perfon, and as fetch they were fatisfied with 8 , h: "u_ Did your Lordffiip ever hear any officer or foldier of that army exprefs any dills. J ’ tis faction at the general’s returning to England ? Q Does your Lordffiip think that the officers of that army wiffi to have their re- fpeftwe merits ftated to their Sovereign, by the general in perlon who had tne honour of commanding them ? „ A It was the wifhof that army that General Burgoyne fflould go to Euiope, to iuftifv not only his own conduct, but the conduct of the army he commanded, g, O Does your Lordffiip apprehend, that the return of General Burgoyne to that ar mf un der perfonal diigrace, and without any diitribution of preferment among the diftinguiffied officers of that army, would be any fort of conlolation to the troops under captivity ? , m ._. r , A. General Burgoyne, at all times^ fliared the dangers and afflictions or that aimy in common with every foldier ; as fuch they looked on him as their friend, and cer- tainly would have received him in perfon, or any accounts of him, vuth every mark of affedtion. , , ..... _ , 86. Q. Your Lordffiip having faid that if the rebels had maintained then pelt, at the afeent from the Low Countries to the Pitch Pine Plains, in the march from Foit Anne to Fort Edward, artillery would have been of great ule to diilodge them ; will your Lordffiip fay what kind of artillery, of what calibre, woulu have been neceliaiy for • thatpurpofe? . A. Any of the artillery officers now under the order of the Houfe can give a much more fatisfadtory anfwer to that queftion than I poffibly can. Did you fee that poft ? A. I think l faid I did fee it. With what kind of work was that poft fortified ? A. I fpoke of it merely from its fituation. Were there then any works or none d A. I don’t recoiled! there were any works. If the army, after taking Ticonderoga, had been embarked, and proceeded diredtly to South Bay, would there have been any occafion to have attacked the poft at Pitch Pine Plains at all ? A. The army ciid proceed by South Bay, excepting a detachment of General Frafer’s corps, and fome Germans to fupport him •, and the army affembled at Skenefborough on the 9th or 10th of July. t Was it neceffary to go to the poft at Pitch Pine Plains, in order to go to South J ‘ Bay? A. They had no fort of connection with each other. Might not the army have proceeded to Fort Edward, and omitted the attack of that pafs, fuppofing it had been meant to be defended ? 1 A. There 87. 88 . 89. 90. 92. Earl of Balcarras.] EVIDENCE. 35 A. There were two routes to Fort Edward. General Burgoyne might ftill go the fame route without any neceffity of attacking that poll, as there might have been many different ways of didodging the enemy from that poll without attacking it. In how many indances do you remember the rebels defending their entrench- 93. ments after they had made them ? A. We never got a view of any of their entrenchments but fuch as they had voluntarily abandoned. Q. Is it then to be underflood that they never defended any entrenchments ? 94. A. They never did. Did "you ever hear General Frafcr exprefs his approbation of the paffing of the 95 * Hudfon’s River ? A. I neverdid. Q. Did you ever hear General Frafer exprefs his approbation of the Bennington 96. expedition ? A. That detachment was made, and the bufinefs concluded, before I ever heard of the project or execution. Q. Have you occafion to know, when the firfl detachment was fent out under Co- 97. lonel Baume, where they were ordered to rejoin General Burgoyne, after they had per- formed the fervice they were fent on ? A. I don’t know. Whether, in your Lordfhip’s opinion, after the lofs the rebels had fu Rained over night, in theaftionof the 19th of September, if they had been attacked brifkly at break of day, the next day, there was a probability that they could have flood their ground ? A. I have nothefitated to give an opinion upon luppofed matters, which mud have been attended with evident and demonflrable confequences ; but I beg the indulgence of the Houfe in declining to give any opinion upon any queflion relative to fpeculation or judgment. Had any general officer of that army under General Burgoyne been prelent in this country, I ffiould have confined myfelf merely to the manoeuvres of the corps I commanded. As there is no general officer here, I wiffi to give this Houfe every information confident with my rank in the army. Had you any information that might indicate to you that the rebels were pre- pared to decamp after the aft ion of the 1 9th of September ? A. I was ignorant of any fuch intelligence being received. Had you any information of their baggage being packed up ? A. I have already anfwered, that I had no information at all about it. Q. In the aftion of the 7th of Odtober, on which fide did the rebels force our lines and make a lodgement ? A. The lines to the right were dormed and carried. Were the lines attacked to the left ? A. To the left of that pod they were, but not to the left of the army. Q^Did not the pofleffion of Fort Edward, and the country thereabouts, cut off the retreat of any garrifon that might have been in Fort George ? A. It undoubtedly did. Had the army proceeded to Fort George by Ticondcroga and Lake George, might not the enemy have remained at Fort George till the trenches were opened, and have -dill had their retreat fecure ? 98. 99. 100. ioi. 102. 103. 104. F 2 A. That E V X D E N C E. [Earl of Balcarras. 3 6 105. 106. A That is a matter of opinion upon fpcculation. . . , . r Q. Do you not think that the Britifh army, being well provided with artillery, was a probable reafon for their not defending entrenchments ? A. The reafon they did not defend their entrenchments was, that they always marched out of them and attacked us. „ c , O Does your Lordfhip think it would have been advifeable, in point of prudence, or i uft to brave troops, who had fuffered fevere lofs, to attack an enemy the morning after that lofs, polled within entrenchments, which it was impoffible to recon- noitre 107. 108. 109. no.. lu- ll 2. 1J 3' 114 A. That attempt was tried on the 7th of O&ober, and did not fucceed. Q. Were not the enemy reinforced between the 19th of September and the 7th of Ocftober ? A. I think it is likely they were. _ . ■ c . , O Were they likely to be in better fpirits to repel an attack the day after they had beenrepulfed with great lofs, or when they had been reinforced, and feen an army lie three weeks inaftive in their camp ? - , , A. I do not judge of the fpirit of the enemy but when I was oppofed to them On the ftrft day of the aftion, when the enemy was repulfed on the 19th of September, had not our army fuffered very confiderably ? A. They fuffered very confiderable lofs. . Q^Was not the army recruited, and in better order, on the 7th of October, than they were on the 20th of September ? ». r , A. Numbers of the men who had been wounded and diiabled in the action of the xoth, joined their corps on the 7th of October. Was the behaviour of the enemy, oppofed to your Lordfhip, in the actions you haveleen, luch as to make them contemptible in the eye of a foldier ? A. I have already mentioned, that they fought at all times with courage and ob- ' ol Whether the behaviour of the enemy was fuch as to make advantages obtained by them over hisMajefty’s troops more humiliating and difgraceful to the Britifh arms than the fame advantages obtained by an equal number of any other troops ? A. I myfelf felt more humiliation until 1 conftdered that thofe advantages proceeded from the nature of the country, and not from the want of zeal or bravery in the Bri- tifh troops. Q. Whether the enemy’s troops were fuch bad troops as to make it more difgraceful to have an advantage obtained by them over the King’s troops than by the like number of any other enemy over a like number of his Majefty’s troops in the fame circum- fiances of country ? A. The advantages gained by the rebels over the Britifh troops proceeded from their local fftuation, and not from the want of courage in the Britifh troops. We ■were taught by experience that neither their attacks nor refiftance was to be de- fpifed. Did you ever ferve againft any other troops ? A. I commenced my fervice in America,. O. Whether Earl of Balcarras.] EVIDENCE. . 37 Whether the army under General Burgoyne, in general, expected co-operation 115. in their efforts to go "to Albany, from the army under the command of Sir William I lowe ? , . - A. General Burgoyne gave it out in general orders, that he had every reaion to believe that powerful armies were afting in co-operation with the army he had the honour to command. Do you know at what time that order was given out ? A. The adjutant general’s books will fhew it: I think it was about the 3d of Oftober. , Q^Does your Lordfhip believe that if the army under General Howe had co- operated up the North River with the army under General Burgoyne, that the army under General Burgoyne would have been obliged to have made the convention it did ? A. That is a matter of judgment. The army looked forward to that co-operation, which they were led to underftand, by the orders General Burgoyne had given out, with pleafure. Ck What was the general opinion of the officers of the army in which you ferved, n$» on that fubjeft of co-operation ? A. I do not think my rank in the army entitles me to give my opinion on that fub- ieft ; l ffiall ftill lefs prefume to give that of others. J [Withdrew* Then he was called in again, and feveral parts of the examination, particularly that which immediately follows the place where it is faid that his Lordfhip was examined by other members of the Committee, were read, and then the laft queftion which was put to his Lordffiip immediately before he withdrew, was repeated, with this addition, “ To the beft of your recolledtion and information.” 1x9, A. I have already declined anfwering that queftion.. When did you firlt know that there was to be no co-operation from General 120. Howe’s army, and that Sir William Howe had carried his army to Chefapeak Bay • A. I did not know that we were to expert no co-operation, until after the con- vention was figned. When did you firft hear that Sir William Howe was gone to the fouth- 121. ward ? . A. It was reported fo in the army about the beginning of the campaign, before we crofted the river. _ When was that report firft confirmed fo as to make it a matter of belief . 122. A, I never knew it was confirmed at all.. Whether you yourfelf was not furprifed or difappointed, or both, . when you 123.. firft underftood that there was not to be any co-operation from Sir William Howe, but that Sir William Howe’s army was gone to Chefapeak Bay ? [W'th i Again xi 6 . 117. [Earl of Balcarras, E V I D E N C E. Again called in. 124. 125. 126. 127. 128. 129. 13°. 131. By General Burgoyne. Q. Whether you yourfelf was furprifed or difappointed, or both, when you firftheard that Sir William Howe’s army was gone to Chefapeak Bay ? A. I neither knew the object of the campaign nor its expectations, and tnere- fore cannot fpeak to any manoeuvre of which I could not know the tendency. Did the army in general exprefs themfelves pleafed at the news of Sir Wil- liam Howe’s being gone to Chefapeak Bay ? A. The anfwer to the laid queftion, as it relates to me in particular, relates to them in general. . _ , . ... Q. Whether your Lordfhip, as a matter of faCt, in the confideration you had in the army, on the news of Sir William Howe’s being gone to Chefapeak Bay, heard thole you converted with exprefs themfelves pleafed, or talk of that expedi- tion to Chefapeak, as a powerful co-operation with General Burgoyne ? A. I think that queftion is fully anfwered in the two preceding ones. Q. Whether you did .not think General Howe’s fighting General Waflnngton’s grand army, at the battle of Brandywine, was a very capital co-operation with the army under General Burgoyne ? A. I was not at Brandywine. Whether you was not furprifed when you returned home to this country,, to learn that the fecretary of ftate for the American department, had information from General Howe, of his intentions of going to the fouthward, before General Burgoyne departed from this country, and never communicated that information to General Burgoyne before his departure for Canada ? A. I have the honour to ftand before this Houfe as a military man, and not as a politician, and cannot anfwer any queftion but thofe relative to my own profeflion. What was your Lordfhip’s opinion of the fpirit of your own corps ? A. The opinion I gave in the council of war, relative to the fpirit of the corps I commanded was, that they were willing and zealous to undertake any enterprife that General Burgoyne would pleafe to employ them upon. When advice was received that Sir Henry Clinton was coming up the North River, did you apprehend the treaty of convention had gone fo far that it could not be broken ? A. My opinion was, with refpeft to that queftion, that all military negotiations were fair and juftifiable, to make delays and to gain time ; I therefore thought and declared my fentiments, that General Burgoyne was at full liberty to break off that treaty in the ftage it then was ; and I could not conceive that the public faith was engaged, until the treaty was a&ually figned and exchanged. W r hether the opinion of General Burgoyne, of General Phillips, of Brigadier Hamilton, and feveral other officers, did not coincide with your opinion in all the matters comprifed in the laft queftion ? A. As General Burgoyne feems defirous that I fhould anfwer that queftion, I de- .ejare his fentiments were the fame with thofe I have now delivered. I hope that 3 the / Captain Money.] EVIDENCE. 39 the other members of that council, will foon be in a fituation to ftand forward and to declare the opinion they gave on that and every other queftion. When the queftion relative to the point of public faith was decided, by the 132. maioritv of the council, was not the concurrence for figning the convention una- By General . J - . Burgoyne. nimous ? A. It was. What day was it firft known that Sir Henry Clinton had taken the highlands, * 33 * and was coming up the North River ? A. In the night of the 16th of October. | 'Withdrew. Captain Money called in and examined by General Burgoyne. Q. WAS not you deputy quarter mafter general of the army under General Bur- 1. goyne, in 1777 ? A. I was. After Lieutenant Colonel Carleton returned to Canada, was you the fupenor 2. officer in that department ? A. I wa'.. As fuch, did you make it your bufinefs from the beginning of the campaign 3. to get a knowledge of the country ? A. Whenever there was any oecalion to obtain the knowledge of any particular part of the country, a party was always fent with me for that purpofe, but the woods were fo thick that it was impoffible to go without a party. Was you well acquainted with the country between Skeneiborough and Fort 4. Edward ? A. I was. How long was the army employed in making the roads pra&icable between 3, Skenefborough and Fort Edward ? A. About fix or feven days in making the road between Skenefborough and Fort Anne, and between Fort Anne and Fort Edward. I do not believe the army w T as delayed an hour on that account ; there was a very good road made by the rebels the year before, between Fort Anne and Fort Edward, in which road the rebels had cut down fome few trees which took the provincials in our army fome few hours to clear. Does not the pofleffion of the country in the neighbourhood of Fort Ed- 6. ward, necelfarily prevent the retreat of a garrifon that might be in Fort George ? A. It EVIDENCE. [Captain Money. A. It prevents the getting off any artillery or ftores ; but a garrifon might get through the woods, in cafe we were in the poffeflion o t the giound in the neighbourhood of Fort Edward. . , , Did not the garrifon of Fort George evacuate the fort upon tne approach of the King’s troops toward Fort Edward ? A. I heard they did ; I was not near enough to fee. _ 0 Q. Had the army taken their route by South Bay, Ticonderoga, and Lake George, how many bateaux do you imagine it would have taken to carry the troops folely over Lake George, exclufive of provifions and ftores ? A. I think between three and four hundred, which bateaux mult have been car- vied up out of Lake Champlain to Lake Geoige. . 9. Q. What time would it have taken, as you imagine, to have drawn thoie ba- teaux over the land, between Lake Champlain and Lake George, with the holies then at Ticonderoga ? A. I fuppofe a fortnight — Four hundred bateaux. 10. Q. Though there were no troops paffed over Lake George, how long did it take before the fir ft tranfport of provifions arrived at Fort George ? A. I can’t recoiled precifely. ir. Q^Confidering the length of time it took to tranfport the provifions, without the troops, over "Lake George, was not the army forwarder in their way to Alba- ny, in point of time, by the route they took, than they could have been by the route of Ticonderoga and Lake George ? A. I have already faid, that it would take a fortnight to tranfport the 400 ba- teaux from Lake Champlain to Lake George ; it therefore would have delayed the army a fortnight longer than they were delayed to have returned from Skenefborough by Ticonderoga, and gone acrofs Lake George. 12. Was you commifiary of horfe, as well as deputy quarter mafter general ? A. It was. 13. Q. What is the nature of that department ? A. It was to take charge of all the horfes furnifhed by contrad for General Burgoyne’s army, by any fetter of inftrudions from General Burgoyne. I am di- rected to give proper orders and diredions to the drivers, furnifhed by that con- trad, for the purpofe of tranfporting provifions and ftores brought to Fort George, for the ufe of the army. 14. Did you report from time to time to Major General Phillips, and take orders from him, as well as from General Burgoyne ? A. Yes. 1 S' Qc Were not the orders from both the generals invariable, precife, and prefling, for uling all pofiible diligence in forwarding the tranfport of provifions ? A. They were. There was one order which I will read, as it will fullv anfwer that queftion : it is dated Auguft the 18th, Duer-Camp, and is in thefe words ; “ It having been a pradice for officers to order to be taken from the provilion train, “ in the fervice of the King for this army, the carts and horfes, for the carrying “ baggage and other purpofes, to avoid for the future the danger and inconve- “ niencies to the fervice, it is in the mod pofitive manner ordered, that no cart or * ( horfe are to be ufed but for the public tranfport of the army ; nor is any officer, 2 “ accidentally Captain Money.] EVIDENCE. accidentally coming to any particular port, to interfere with the provifion train, “ in any other manner than to give it every aid and affiftance, which he is on all “ occafions to do.” Was not the tranfport of merchandize, and even futler’s fto r es, as well j 6, as of officers’ baggage, pofitively forbid till the tranfport of provifion ffiould be over ? A. There was fuch an order, and a feizure made of two barrels of Madeira, and two barrels of rum, which were ordered to the hofpital. Do you recoiled: General Burgoyne’s expreffing, at feveral times, particular i y, anxiety on the fubjed of expediting the tranfport of provifions ? A. I do remember once to have heard General Burgoyne exprefs his concern at our not being able to bring forward a greater quantity of provifion to enable him to proceed with the army. — I do recoiled to have heard him fay with very great earneftnefs to General Phillips and Colonel Carleton, that one- month’s provifion at that particular time (it was about the latter end of Auguft) would be worth ioo,oool. to Great Britain. Do you think that the commiflary of the waggons, and other carriages, was authorifed to buy or hire ox-teams wherever they could be had, and that all draught cattle taken, were appropriated to the tranfport ? A. He received fuch directions. How many carts and ox-teams could be muttered at any one time ? T _ A. I think only 180 carts could at any one time be muttered; the number of ox- carts I really forget, but I believe between ao and 30. About how many days provifion for the troops, and all other perfons fed 20, from the King’s ftores, could that number of carriages convey ? A. There never was any trial made, but if I may prefume to judge from the proportion brought forward, over and above the daily confumption of the army, ffiould fuppofe all thofe carriages would not carry more than four days provifions at moft. I am fpeaking at random, as no trial was made. Q;_ Did it not fometimes happen, from accidents of weather, and roads, and the 2 i. tired ftate of the cattle, that not more than one day’s provifion could be brought forward in a day ? A. It did. Q. How many hours did it take, one hour with another, to draw a bateau 2 2. from Fort George to Fort Edward ? A. In general about fix. Was not the unloading the carts at Fort Edward, and embarking the contents z „ in bateaux, unloading the bateaux at the upper falls of Fort Miller, and a fecond time unloading them at the lower falls, dilatory as it was, a more expeditious method than it would have been to have carried the provifions the whole way in carts ? A. I do apprehend it was not poffible, in the feeble ftate I found the horfes fur- niffied by contract, to have brought forward the daily confumption of provifions for that army down to Fort Miller. In the month of Auguft, in the latter end of that month, at which time I was appointed a commiflary general of horfe, I made, on G * the V I D E N C E. [Captain Money; 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 2f. 3 °' 3 1, 3 2 * 33 - 34 - 35 - 3 6 * 37 .hefirftof September, a general mute, and found 3 o horfea unferviceable, from f Xwt h ,teS^r,ofproviao M at any time impeded by the bringing forward ,he A rl Th^tSrf' had G a C fcparate contraft for horles, with which they brought for- their own ftores. I tAc recolleft that any part of the proven tram were ever a m °" th ’ S ft0rC ° f pr0viri °" 1 foonerth^nuwM coUefW.^ ^ uuer ru ; n 0 f ,hehorfes furnilhed by contract: for [he P T toThe aftion of the t 9 th of September ? A. I was. , , • 1 1 n. • i Q. Did the enemy difpute the field that day with obftinary ? A. They did, and the fire was much heavier than ever I faw it any where, unlefs at the^^of Fort^ Anne^ow ^ the regiments D f thc Britifh line were under that fire ^ ‘a. The three Britilh regiments (the 20th, 21ft, and 62 d) were engaged from three o’clock in the afternoon till feven in the evening; and whilft I was a pnfonei I heard the rebel quarter-mafter general fay, they had nine different regiments m the held, op- pofed to the three Britifhl have named. . t , Do you know the lols the three Britifh regiments fuftaincd . X can’t fay. Q^Do you remember the ftrength of the 6 2d regiment when they came out of the a6 A. n I can’t fpeak to the particular ftrength of the regiment when they came out of aftion ; but I heard that they were not 100 rank and file. How many officers were left in that regiment at the end of the action ? A. 1 can’t anlwer that queftion. Q. From the general ftate of the three Britifh regiments, do you think that they would have been in a proper condition to have attacked the enemy the next morning : A. Certainly not ; nor to go on any fervice whatever. About what time of the day did the enemy finally give way ? A. They gave way very often ; finally about feven in the evening. CC Was ft practicable, at that time of the evening, and in that kind of country, to have purfued ? A. 1 ffiould think not. . f Was you not often employed, between the day of that aftion and the action or the 7th of Oftober, to reconnoitre ? A. I was. Was you able to obtain a view of the enemy’s pofition ? A. I obtained a view of the pofition of the right of the rebel entrenchments. What was the nature of their pofition to the right, with regard to entrench- ments ? A. They EVIDENCE. Captain Money.] A. They were ported on a hill that came very near the river. On the top of the hill was a ftrong breaft-work, at the foot an abbatis. Q. Did it appear to you that that wing of the enemy was attackable ? 30 . A. It is a queftion that is fcarcely in my line of fervice to anfwer ; but as there are no general officers, nor older officers than myfelf, who ferved under General Bur- govne, I hope no military man will think me prefuming to give my opinion on that fubjeft. I do think that we could not have attacked the right wing of the rebel entrenchments without rifking the lofs ol the whole army, and with little probability of fuccefs. Q. Could you obtain a view of the left wing of the enemy ? ATT never law the left wing of the enemy’s entrenchments till I was taken prifoner and concluded through their works. On the 7 th of October was you in a fituation to fee the enemy advancing to the 4°- attack of your left ? A. Yes. . Did they advance under a well ferved fire of grape-lhot from our artillery • 4 1 - A. I was in a fituation that gave me an opportunity of feeing the directions of the re', els’ columns •, and 1 was very much altonifhed to hear the ffiot from the enemy fly fo thick, after our cannonade had lafted a quarter of an hour. When the Britifh grenadiers were forced lalt from their port, what er.fued ? 4 2 * A. I did not fee the Britifh grenadiers forced back. I faw them on their march, as I apprehended, taking a different pofition •, at that time leveral of them broke their ranks, but on fome aid du camps calling to them for ffiame, to continue their rank, they marched away to their ftation in good order. A battalion of Brunfwickers that were on the left of the artillery quitted their ground as foon as the firing began, and, to the beft of my recoiled. ion, I did not lee they left a man behind them on the ground. I would add, that after fome difficulty that battalion was brought to make a land in the rear of the artillery, but in no order. Was not that battalion brought to that Hand by the activity and exhortation of 43 , Major General Reidefel ? A. I did not fee General Reidefel endeavour to flop the battalion •, but I faw an aid du camp of his and a brigade major, with their drawn fwords, keeping them up. I did fee General Reidefel immediately afterwards, on the right of the artillery, with the battalion perfe&ly formed, and in good order. Q. Do you imagine that the giving way of the battalion you firft deferibed was 44* thecaule that the artillery on that fpot was taken, and yourfelf and Major Williams being made prfoners ? A. I believe it contributed, in fome meafure, towards tire lofs of the a<5lion on that day •, but before Sir Francis Clarke died of his wounds, he told me that he received his wound in bringing orders for the artillery and the whole of the detach- ment to return to camp; and to the circumftance of Sir Francis Clarke’s being wounded, I do attribute the lofs of the artillery, if not the lofs of the whole army ? Q. Had you an opportunitv, after you was prifoner, to fee the left of the enemy’s 45* entrenchments ? A. I had. G 2 4 *, Was 44 EVIDENCE. [Captain Monty, 46. Q. Was the ground within cannon ffiot of the left open and commanding it ? a! All the ground 1 law was cleared and entrenched. 47 . CL Was there not ground within cannon fhot that would have commanded that entrenchment on the left ? A. There was. , , , , „ , - 4.3. O Had we gained poffeffion of that ground, and been able to ereft batteries of our heavieft guns, would not the whole line of the enemy have been enfiladed . A. The ground alluded to was entrenched, and commanded the whole of the rebel camp and lines. If the army had got poffeffion of that ground, I do not believe the rebels would have ftaid one hour in their camp. Did you ever hear, in converlation with the rebel officers, that General Ar- nold, forefeeing that inconvenience, had marched out of his lines, and attacked, without orders from General Gates ? A. I did hear that General Arnold had marched out on the 7th of October, without orders from General Gates. I did alfo hear that he advifed the going out to meet Gene- ral Burgoyne on his march, and engaging him before he approached their lines ; and the reafon he gave was this: If General Burgoyne fhould ever come near enough their lines to be able to make ufe of his artillery, that he would certainly poflefs himfelf of their camp ; that their troops in that cafe would never Hand any where ; but if, on the other hand, the rebels fhould be defeated in the woods, the troops would, after that, have confidence in their works, for which reafon Arnold advifed rifking an adion in the woods before General Burgoyne came near enough to fee their works. Examined by other Members of the Commit tee Y and by-Gentral Burgoyne occaftonally. $ 0 . Q. Did not your fituation, as deputy quarter mafler general, lead you to mix very much with the different officers of the army ? A. It did. 51. CL What do you apprehend to have been the general opinion of the officers of General Burgoyne’s conduct, as well in adion as in the many trying occafions which have been dated by you at the bar ? A. They entertained a very high opinion of General Burgoyne’s condud. 52. ’ A. I do know that General Frafer mentioned to me, on the 5th of Odlober, that there was forage on the right of his camp ; but at that time the ground on which that forage was to be met with was in pofleffion of the rebels’ advanced poft. Qi, Do you think your army would have been loft, if even the expedition from 59. New York had taken place a few days fooner ? A. If the troops had arrived at New York foon enough to have enabled Sir Henry Clinton to have made his expedition up the North River a week fooner, I do conceive that our army would not have been loft. Q^What was the opinion of the rebels on Sir William Howe’s going to the 60. fouthward. A. I was not acquainted enough with the rebel leaders, to hear their opinion on that queftion. I do not think that the pcafants of the country were judges of the propriety of Sir William Howe’s condudh. What was the opinion of the officers of General Burgoyne’s army, after it was loft, relative to the crofting Hudl'on’s River. A. They did think that the alternative of retreating with their army to Ca- nada, or proceeding to Stillwater, under the neceffity of giving up his commu- nication, to be an unfortunate fituation ; but I never heard any officers fay that they thought General Burgoyne had done wrong ; many faid, that if they had re- treated without Hiking an adtion, at the time Sir Henry Clinton was coming up the North River, the army would never have forgiven him, nor would he ever have forgiven himfelf. Q^Was you at New York after the lofs of General Burgoyne’s army? 62; A. Yes. 3 evidence. [Captain Money. 6 ,. q! What was the opinion or the lan£U«ge of the military *t that place, relative to c; r William Howe’s expedition to Penlylvania ? * , ... „ r> r . A. Whatever opinion was formed of Sir William Howe s expedition o en yl- vania, or is formed previous to this enquiry, fuch an opinion muft have been ill- founded, as Sir William Howe’s reafons were not known, nor his mftru&ions com- - ^ your^laft anfwer, is the committee to underftand that the opinions that ° 4 ' werTformed refpefting Sir William Howds expedition to Philadelphia, before this cnouirv. were not in favour of that expedition ? Qucftio" objefted “• \W,(bkm. J 'gain called in. , O. You have faid that the army thought it their indifpenfible duty to pafs over 5 ' Hudlon’s River— Why did they think that that meafure was particularly their in- difpenfible duty ? , . A. If the Hudfon’s River had not been there, the army would have thought it their indifpenfible duty to have gone and rilked an adtion before they returned to Canada. If I recoiled: right, I faid, that if the army had returned to Canada, without fighting, that the army would never have forgiven the general, nor the general have forgiven himfelf. 66. Q. Do you know the nature of the country, between the place where we palled the Hudfon’s River and Albany, on the eaft fide of the river ? A. Yes, I do. - , . r Gy. Could the army have taken that route, in order to pafs the river oppofite or near to Albany ? , . A. The army could not have taken that route, as part of the way was a fwamp, and on the right of the rebel entrenchments was a mountain very rugged, and not paflable nearer than two miles from the river. 68. Q. Was it not a necelfary confequence then, that the boats muft have been aban- doned, if the army had taken that route ? A. I think I have faid the army could not take that route ; if the army had marched on the eaft of the Hudfon’s River, they could not have marched near enough to have covered their provifion bateaux from the rebel force, on the weft fide of the river. g 0^ Did the army under General Burgoyne, on their approach to Albany, ex- J ' pea a co-operation of the army under Sir William Howe, upon the North River ? A. They did ; and this is the order of General Burgoyne, given October the 3d at Freeman’s Farm*: “ There is reafon to be affured, that other powerful armies are adnally in cn- ** operation with thefe troops ; and although the prefent fupply of provifion is ample, “ it is highly defirablc, ito prepare for any continuance in the field that the King s 44 Her vice may require, without the delay of bringing forward further ftores for 44 thofe EVIDENCE. 47 Captain Money.] «< thofe purpofes j the ration of bread or flour is, for the prefent, fixed at one Are you acquainted with the North River, from New York to Al- yo. bany ? A. I am not. . . Q. How many days march from Fort Edward to Albany, if no interruption from yi. an enemy ? A. I cannot anfwer that queftion, unlefs I am to fuppofe that a bridge was ready formed for the troops to pafs over, on fome part of Hudfon’s River, between Batten Kill and Fort Edward, or that there were vefl'els ready to tranfport the troops over Hudfon’s River. CX Is the diftance fo great between Fort Edward and Albany, that the army 72* could not carry provifions with them to fupport them during the march ? A. Certainly Albany is not at fo great a diftance from Fort Edward, but that a corps of troops might certainly carry provifions fufficient for the march to Albany. . Qj_ Was it not underftood, that if you had arrived at Albany, that the army 73. would find plenty of provifions there ? A. It was generally believed, and I believe it myfelf firmly, that if the army had got to Albany, we ftionld have found a number of loyal fubjedts, that would have joined and done every thing in their power to have eftabliftied the army at that place. Q^Muft not the army, to march from Fort Edward to Albany, have necelia- y^, rily carried a number of boats to form a bridge to pafs the river ? A. There was no paffing the river well without a bridge of boats, and there were not fcouls enough on that river, to make a bridge. Q. Would not the neceftary delay, arifing from carrying forward thofe boats, y^ and throwing a bridge, fit to pafs an army, have confumed more time than it was poflible for that army to fubfift with fuch provifion as they could carry with them ? A. I ftiould think it would. _ # Q^You will give the committee what information you can, refpecting a road yo. from Fort Edward to Albany, on the left fide of the river. A. I have anfwered that fully. Whether by taking a pretty large circuit, the army would have reached Al- yy, bany, and avoided the lwamps you mentioned ? A. Certainly not oa the eaft fide of the river, becaufe the enemy being on the op- pofite fliore, would certainly have oppofed General Burgoyne’s army crofting the Hudfon’s River at Albany, the river being three times the width it is at Saia- toga. [ 'Withdrew . Mari is evidence. [Earl of Harrington. 48 Mart is i° die Junii , 1779. Mr. F. Montagu in the Chair. Earl of Harrington called in and examined by General Burgoyne. x ’ Qi IN what capacity did your Lordfhip ferve in America in the campaign 1 777 ? A. I was captain in the 29th regiment of foot, and went on the expedition with General Burgoyne, with the command of the grenadier company ; I was after- wards appointed fupernutnerary aid du camp to the general. 2. While adting as captain of the grenadier company, w r as you at the adtion of Huberton ? A. I was. 3. What was the behaviour of the enemy on that day ? A. They behaved in the beginning of the adlion, with a great deal of fpirit •, but on the Britilh troops rufhing on them with their bayonets, they gave way in great confufion. 4. From the nature of the country, was it pradticable to purfue the enemy fur- ther than they were purfued on that occafion ? A. Certainly not.— I think we ran fome rifque even in purfuing them fo far. At what time of the campaign was it that General Burgoyne requefted your Lordfhip to adt as his aid du camp ? A. I think about the 12th of July. 6. Was you prefent a few days after that time, at a council held with the Indi- ans of the remote nations, then juft arrived, under the condudt of Major Camp- bell and Mr. St. Luc ? 7, A. Yes. Was you prefent at a former council of the Indians held at Lake Champlain ? .8. A. Yes. Q. What was the tenor of General Burgoyne’s fpeeches and injundtions at both thofe councils refpedting the reftraint of barbarities ? A. He abfolutely forbid their fcalping, except their dead prifoners, which they infilled on doing, and he held out rewards to them for bringing in prifoners, and enjoined them ,to treat them well. Do evidence. Earl of Harrington.] Q. Do you remember being with General Burgoyne, foon after the laft council, 9. upon a vifit to an out poft near Fort Anne ? A. I perfectly recoiled: it. Qi, Had General Burgoyne a confiderable efcort of Indians with him ? 10. A; He had. Q. Did part of that efcort, on a fcout from that poft, fall in with and' take 11. a part of the enemy, who were laid in ambufh for the purpofe of killing or taking the general, and thofe who were with him ? A. They did. Qi, What were the fentiments of the captain taken on that occafion refpeding 12. his treatment from the Indians ? A. He faid he was treated with much humanity, and I perfectly remember that prilbners brought in on many other occafions by the Indians, declared that they had been ufed with the fame degree of humanity. Q. Does your Lordlhip remember General Burgoyne’s receiving at Fort Anne, the news of the murder of Mifs M‘Rea > A. I do. Q^Did General Burgoyne repair immediately to the Indian camp, and call them to ij council, aflifted by Brigadier General Frafer ? A. He did. Q;_ What pafled at that council ? A. General Burgoyne threatened the culprit with death, infilled that he fliould be delivered up ; and there were many gentlemen of the army, and I own I was one of the number, who feared that he would put that threat in execution. Mo- tives of policy, I believe alone, prevented him from it ; and if he had not pardoned the man, which he did, I believe the total defection of the Indians would have en- fued, and the confequences, on their return through Canada, might have been dreadful ; not to fpeak of the weight they would have thrown into the op- pofite fcale, had they gone over to the enemy, which I rather imagine would have been the cafe. Qi. -^° you remember General Burgoyne’s reftraining the Indian parties from 16. going out without a Britifh officer or proper conductor, who were to be refpon- fible for their behaviour ? 1 A. I do. . D° y°u remember Mr. St. Luc’s reporting difcon tents amongft the Indians, 17. foon after our arrival at Fort Edward ? A. I do. Qc How long was that after enforcing the reftraints above mentioned? 18. A. I can t exatftly fay ; I ffiould imagine about three weeks or a month. Q^Does y°ur Lordffiip recollebt General Burgoyne’s telling Mr. St. Luc, that 19. e had rather lofe every Indian, than connive at their enormities, or ufine lan- guage to that effeft ? 0 A. I do. Q. Does your Lordfhip remember what pafled in council with the Indians at no* Fort Edward? . 49 II A, To 5 ® E V I D E N C E. [Earl of Harrington; 21 . 2 . 2 . 23 - 24. 2 . 5 . 26. 27 s8. 29 3 ° 3 2, A To the bed of my recolUaion, much the fame exhortation to aft with huma- . A * L ° a mnrh the fame rewards were offered for Caving their pritoners. Do you xecollea the drcumflar.ee of the Indians defirmg to return home at that time ? Q* Do'vo^remember * that many quitted the army without leave ? ,a afteTtvaS, was cufelby the ‘reftraint upon their cruelt.es and hab.ts of plan- der ? O HaTyou reafon to believe that the expedition to Bennington was much defined by General Reidefel, and that it was his wifh to have it conduced by Lieu- ‘“r'k’SS 1 aiw^s ‘'imagined in the army, that it was his wilh and that Colonel Baume was appointed to the command of it m compliment to hl Q^Did you know the corps of Britiffi, commanded by Captain Frafer, which m A C P They f t werr i) volunteers from the Britifh regiments, and alfo ftoo< J very high in the opinion of the army, from their gallant behaviour on all occafions. remember General Burgoyne’s vifiting the detachment after it was aflenibled, and conferring with Colonel Baume ? Q Did Colonel Baume appear fatisfied with the ftrength of his corps ? jt I converted with cilonel Baume, and with feveral officers under h, command, and they appeared perfectly fatisfied, at leaft I heard no complaint from them; the only anxiety they expreffed was, left the deftination of that corns ffiould become known to the enemy. . . . . • ■ l, „ Q. Does your Lordffiip remember General Burgoyne’s receiving, in the night a letteT from Lieutenant Colonel Baume, expreffing he found the enemy in greater force than he expelled ? Q* T Do' you remember Sir Francis Clarke, General Burgoyne’s aid du camp, being tent with orders to Colonel Breyman to march immediately to fuppovt him ? Did you communicate the fame order to General Reidefel at the fame time ? Q. Was Colonel Breyman the neareft corps for the purpofe of that fupport ? Q^Did Brigadier General Frafer at all times treat your Lordffiip with great confidence? 4 . T w9 - J Earl of Harrington.] EVIDENCE. 5 * 35 - 36 . A. I was often with General Frafer, and he frequently talked without referve upon matters which he was not particularly bound to conceal. There were certain matters of intelligence which it would have been improper for him to mention to any body. In this cafe I cannot boaft fo much of his confidence, as to fuppofe that he would have opened his mind to me on matters which he would have concealed from the reft of his friends. Q^Have you not frequently been prefent when General Burgoyne and General 33. Frafer difeuffed the object of the campaign, and converfed freely on the circumftances of the time ? A. I have. Did your Lordfliip ever, in prefence or abfence of General Burgoyne, hear Ge- 34. neral Frafer exprefs a dilapprobation of pafling the Hudfon’s River ? A. 1 never did ? Do you know or believe that the idea of forcing our way to Albany was pre- valent throughout the army ? A. In every converfation I had with different officers of the army, I never remem- ber once to have heard it doubted, but that we were to force our way. Q_. Did the army pafs the Hudfon’s River with alacrity? A. It is impoffible for any army to have been in higher fpirits than they were at that time, or more defirous of coming to an engagement with the enemy. Q^Do you not conceive, that to have remained pofted behind the Hudfon’s River, at the time the army pafled it and advanced, would have caft a damp on the fpirits of that army and a reflection on their General ? A. From the eagernefs of the army to advance and the great uneafinefs that was difcernible through it on every delay, I apprehended that it could not have been otherwife ; and I think that General Burgoyne’s charatter would not have flood very high either with the army, this country, or the enemy, had he halted at Fort Edward. Q. Do you recoiled the march up to the enemy on the 19th of Septem- ber ? A. I do. (X Will you pleafe to deferibe it ? A. The army marched in three divifions ; the German line flanking, the artillery and baggage purfued the courfe of the river through the meadows, and formed the left-hand divifion ; the Britifh line marched parallel to it at feme diftance through the woods, and formed the centre divifion ; General Frafer’s corps, with the grena- diers and light infantry of the Germans, were obliged to make a large detour through the woods, and formed the right hand divifion or column. Beyond this, on the right, there w'ere, as I underftand, flanking parties of light infantry and Provin- cials ? Q. Was the country, over which the army pafled, interfered with a deep ravine ? A. It was one of the deepeft I ever faw. Q. Which column was firft attacked ? A. The advanced party, confifting of the picquets of the centre column, being fent H 2 forwards. 38. 39 - 40. 41. 5 *- EVIDENCE. [Earl of Harrington. forwards, under the command of Major Forbes, to explore the way by which that column was to pafs, fell in with a confiderable body of the rebels, polled in ahoufe and behind fences, which they attacked, and after a great deal of fire, the detach- ment nearly drove in the body of rebels ; but on finding that the woods quite round them were filled with the enemy, they were obliged to retire to the main body. 42. Q, Was the march fo performed that when General Burgoyne formed the fine of the Britilh infantry, General Frafer’s corps were ready upon their right to fupport them ? A. General Frafer, on hearing the fire of Major Forbes’s party, detached two com- panies to fupport them, which came up juft after that engagement was over; and on their appearance the enemy finding that our troops were in ftrength, quitted the poll they had before occupied, and, immediately after this, the whole line was formed with the utmoll regularity. I would explain, that when I fpeak of the line, I do not include the left hand column which was compofed of Germans, and which did not come into the fine or into action till late in the day. 4.1. How long did the adtion lalt ? A. From three o’clock, I think, till very near eight. 44. How long were the 20th, 21ft, and 62d regiments engaged ? A. During the greateft part of that time. 45. Was the adtion well difputed by the enemy ? A. It was, very obftinately. 4 6 . Was your Lordlhip near the perfon of General Burgoyne during that adtion, except when you were employed to carry orders ? A. Yes. 47. Q.. Were not different attempts made by the General’s orders to charge the enemy with bayonets, and did not thofe attempts fail by the heavinefs of the enemy’s fire and thicknefs of the woods ? A. There were many attempts made for that purpofe, and they all failed except the lafl, when the Britifh troops finally drove them out of the field. 48. Qi When part of the German troops did get into adlion that day under General Reidefel, how did they behave ? A. I heard their behaviour fpoke of in the higheft terms ; they marched up to the enemy with great coolnefs and fteadinefs, and gave them, as I was told, three vollies by word of command from their officers. 49. Can your Lordlhip fpeak to the lofs fuflained by the three Britifh regiments, the 6 2d in particular? A. The lofs was very confiderable ; but I don’t recoiled the numbers. 50. Qe Were thofe three Britifh regiments in a condition to have attacked the enemy the next morning ? A. 1 heir numbers were fo reduced, that I apprehend they were not. 51. Q* From the lofs of killed and wounded, particularly of officers, would it have been defirable to have brought thofe three regiments into adtion for the next ten days ? A* In lefs than ten days the ftate of thofe regiments certainly would not have been EVIDENCE. Earl of Harrington.] S 3 been much mended ; I therefore apprehend, that if they were nut in a condition to be brought into adlion the next morning, their inability would have ftill continued for tho e ten days. (L Had the army made a movement to gain the left of the enemy’s entrench- 52. mencs before the redoubts were conftrudted that commanded the plain near the river, would not all the bateaux, flores, and hofpitals have been expoled to attack ? . A. It certainly would have been fo. CL Do you recoiled! the fcarciry of forage on the weft-fide of the river ? 53. A. I do perfedlly. CL Would not the bridge of boats, conftrudted for the purpofe of foraging to 54 - the eat! fide, have alfo been expofed before the redoubts, above mentioned, were raifed ? A. They certainly would, had it not been for thofe redoubts and a work called the 77 te du pont, which was raifed for the protection of the bridge. Q. Do you recoiled! how long it took .to raife thofe redoubts, to throw the bridge, 55.. and raife the Tete du pont ? A. If I recoiled! right, the bridge itfelf was finilhed in one night ; the making and compleating the other works took fome cays. themlelves with redoubts ? A. I don’t know what the fpecies of their fortification v/as ; but I have been always told that great labour had been employed on their works ; and what fmall part I faw of them convinced me of it. Cb. Had you not information from deferters or friends what the enemy was 102. doing ? A. My fituation in that army did not entitle me to receive that intelligence. When any perfon came to me to inform me that he had been employed in gaining fuch in- telligence, mar duty was to bring him to the General. I Was evidence. [Earl of Harrington. 103. 104. 105. 106. 107. 108. 109. 110. 1 1 1. 1 12. *i3- 1 14. 115. Was it not a matter of notoriety in the army, that the enemy received reinforce- ment between the 19th of September and the 7th of October ? A. The manner of receiving intelligence in an army feldom tranlpires ; the army might guefs, but I believe they knew nothing. Was it not underftood that the rebels had fuffered a much greater lofs than the king’s troops on the 19th of September ? A. It was. Was not the whole, or nearly the whole, of the rebel army engaged. A. I don’t know ; I apprehend the whole was not engaged. Was our army in general, in your apprehenfion, in as good a condition on the 20th of September as the rebel army, who had iuffered much more ? A. The rebel army was fo numerous that their lofs was not equally felt with ours. What number had you reafon to fuppofe the rebel army confifted of on the 19th of September ? A. I always underftood they were very numerous. I never heard their numbers exaftly. Was not the fcarcity of forage forefeen by every body ? A. Thofe with whom I converfed did not forelee it to the extent in which we expe- rienced it. Was it prudent, in your Lordlhip’s opinion, to bring, or attempt to bring, up- wards of fourteen hundred horfes to attend the army, in a country fo deftitute of forage ? A. I never heard that the horfes in our army were thought too numerous. On all occafions a fcarcity of them was complained of. Q. Do you know how many horfes were allowed for the baggage of each regiment ? A. I don’t know. Q. Does your Lordfhip know how many horfes were employed about the train of artillery ? A. I don’t recollect ; but the returns are on the table. Was the heavy artillery brought back from Stillwater, on the retreat of the army to Saratoga ? A. We had loft fomefmall part of it, and the reft: was brought to Saratoga. Did the bringing back of that artillery delay that retreat or not ? A. An army with cannon certainly cannot march fo rapidly as one without cannon ; but cannon always creates a delay which armies have been content to put up with. Q. Was it neceffary, in your opinion, in the fituation in which the army retreated, to make their retreat as expeditious as poftible ? A. The army appeared to me that it did make its retreat as expeditious as pof- fible. Q. Would the leaving of heavy artillery behind, in your opinion, have made a difference of four miles in the march ? A. I can’t conceive that it would. The enemy were in force behind us; not having numbers to contend with them, it would have been a very defperate circum- ftance to have abandoned our cannon, in cafe of an attack. 4 Was EVIDENCE. 59 Earl of Harrington.] Were the heavy artillery, in efTe ' favourable opinion of the general’s conduct, capacity, and attachment to them in the various feenes in which he was engaged, and more particularly on very trying occafions ? .... A. I don’t recoiled that any officer, with whom I have had converiation, has ever exprefled himfelf in different terms, and I believe there never was an army more defervedly pleafed with the conduct of their general. 0i Whether the army exprefled any diflatisfadion at the general’s return home; 6 ' that is, whether they thought he came with any purpofes not friendly to them, or looked on themfelves as deferted by him ? A. I was not with the army when General Burgoyne came away ; but I have converfed with many officers who have come from it, and they exprefs no dif- fatisfadion on that head, much lefs looked on or confidered General Burgoyne’s intentions as inimical to them. 1 3 1 What was the ftate of the American artillery, and how was it ferved ? A. Except on a few occafions, I do not remember their having made much ufe of their cannon •, I thought on thofe occafions that they ferved them flovvly, but not ill. I 3 2 * Whether all circumftances confidered at the time of the affair of Saratoga, the retreat of the army was pradicable, either with or without artillery ? - A. I thought it was impradicable. J 33 * Whether after the convention at Saratoga you went to Albany? A. Yes. J 34 ’ Qi. Whether you had any opportunity of obferving the nature of the country, if it w'as ftrong or wood) r , clear or open ? A. Very ftrong and woody, and a great number of hills. I 35 > What was the diftance ? A. I don’t exadly recoiled ; about thirty-two miles. 136. Q^Was the fituation of Albany a ftrong fituation, or was it commanded by hills round it ? A. The fituation of Albany was in a bottom very much commanded. 137. Q- If the army had penetrated to Albany, from whence might they have drawn their ibbfiftence, if the country had been againft them ? A. I don’t know enough of the country to anfvver that queftiom 13S. Qi, Muflrthey not have drawn their fubfiftence from New York ? A. I apprehend fo, if they were not mafters of the Mohawk country. I 39* Q^Had you any opportunity of observing the extent of clear or cultivated coun- try round Albany ? A. I can’t very juflly deferibe it, not having gone out of the town of Albany, from the time I came into it,, till I embarked for New York. Q. Do 6i Major Forbes.] evidence. O Do you think that, circumftanced as the army was after the engagement of the 19th of September, it would have been more advantageous to have returned than to have flayed and fortified the camp ? . , A. As matters have turned out, it certainly might ; but I believe no one thought . . 1 IVitbarezv. fo at that time. L Major Forbes called in and examined by General Burgoyne.. WAS you major of the 9th regiment, and prefent with that regiment in the action near Fort Anne ? A. I was. o What was the behaviour of the enemy on that occahon ? A. At half paft ten in the morning, they attacked 11s in front with a heavy and well-dire&ed fire; a large body of them pa fled the creek on the left, fired from a thick wood acrofs the creek on the left flank of the regiment ; they then began to re-ctofs the creek, and' attack us in the rear: we then found it neceflary to change our ground, to prevent the regiments Being furrounded ; we took poll on the top of a high hill to our right. As foon as we had taken poft the enemy made a very vigorous attack, which continued for upwards of two hours , an tney cer- tainly would have forced us, had. it not been for fome Indians that arrived and gave the Indian whoop, which we anfwered with three cheers; the rebels ioon al- ter that gave way. What command had you on the 19th of September . A. I commanded the p acquets of the Britifh. Q. Was you attacked on the march, and with what degree of vigour . A. I was attacked with great vigour- from behind railed fences, and a hou e, y a body of riflemen and light infantry. Was you wounded in that affair ? A. Very early in the day. ..... .. „ c Do you remember General Burgoyne bringing up the- Britifh line to fup- port you, and forming at the firft opening of the wood ? ^ I ci o Q. Did General Frafer’s corps arrive precifely in time to occupy the heights on the right of the Britifh line when the aftion began ? A. It did, and two companies of light infantry came to my fuppoit. Where did General Burgoyne pofl the 9th regiment ? A , 140. 2.. Z- 4 - 5 * 61 7 - S.. 6 2 evidence. 9- io. IT. 12 . *3- 14 - I 5* j6. *7- 18. [Major Forbes. A. As foon as they came out of the wood, they filed oft to the right, and were drawn off at a fmall diftance from the left of General Frafer’s corps, with orders to occupy two houfes, one company in each, and defend them to the laft extremity. Had you an opportunity in that fituation to obferve the ftrefs of the aflion ? A. I had while we remained in that pofition, Q. What was the progrefs of it ? A. The twenty-firft and fixty-fecond regiments were drawn up on our left, and were attacked about three o’clock on the fame ground where the picquets had been attacked. About that time I heard a great deal of firing to my right with the advanced corps ; an officer came up to General Burgoyne, and acquainted him that the enemy were endeavouring to turn the left of the fixty-fecond regi- ment, on which he difpatched an aid-de-camp with orders to the twentieth regi- ment to form on the left of the fixty-fecond ; immediately after, fome compa- nies of the light infantry came to occupy the ground the ninth were drawn up on ; the ninth were then ordered behind a deep ravine, to form a corps-de- referve I faw nothing of the adtion after that. What was the ftrength of the ninth regiment on that day before they fuftain- ed any lofs ? A. On the 15th of the month the weekly return was given in, and, to the heft; of my recollection, they were two hundred and fifty and odd rank and file fit for duty. What was the ftrength of the other regiments in the Britifh line ? A. I cannot fpeak with any certainty, as I did not fee the returns ; but on talking with different commanding officers ■: the four Britifh regiments were about one thoufand one hundred, and the advanced corps about one thoufand two hun- dred. Q. Where was the twenty-fourth regiment ? A. With the advanced corps. Q. Where was the forty-feventh regiment ? A. Six companies of the forty-feventh regiment that were with that army, were employed as a guard to the bateaux and provifions, and two with the advanced corps. Qi, Where were the other two companies of that regiment left ? A. One at Fort George, and another on an ifland in Lake George. Q^Of the eleven hundred which compofed the line on that day, do you know how many were loft and difabled in the adlion ? A. I have heard the furgeon of the hofpital fay, that there were more than five hundred of the whole in the hofpital, but I can’t fpeak to how many of the line. Qi Can you fay how many were killed ? A. I can’t. Can you fay how many officers were killed and wounded ? A. I can’t immediately. Were Major Forbes.] EVIDENCE. 1 Q^Were the Britilh troops in a condition to have attacked an enemy in in- 19. trenchments after the aCtion ? A. After the action of the 19th, I went to the hofpital to get my wounds dreffed, and did not join the regiment till the 8th of Odtober ; I can’t there- fore give an opinion of my own : but I have heard feveral officers fay, they did not think it would have been prudent or right from the lofs they had fuftained the day before. Cb Did the regiments begin to be encreafed in their flrengt.h from the recovered 20. men to any confiderable degree in lefs than eight or ten days ? A. Not that I know of. I was at the hofpital at the time. Q. Being in the hofpital, had you occafion to know that the regiments were 21. ftronger from the receipt of their recovered men on the 7th of Odlober, than they were at any time between the 19th of September and that day ? A. I know that feveral men were difeharged from the hofpitals fo far recover- ed as to enable them to do their duty. At what time did the troops arrive at Saratoga ? 22- A. About eight o’clock at night on the 9th. Do you know how long the troops had then been under arms, and without 23. repole or regular refrefhment ? A. From the 7th in the morning. Had they been in a&ion, or in continual expectation of aCtion, during that 24- whole time ? A. I was in the front of the army, and I heard a great deal of firing in the rear, and we conftantly expeCted and looked for an attack. Did the battery of the enemy on the other fide of the river at Saratoga com- 2 £. mand the fort on that river ? A. It did. Was the ground fuch on our fide as would have enabled our artillery to have 26. fileuced that battery ? A. It did not appear to me that it could. Had the paffage of the ford been effected, and the army have proceeded to- 27. wards Fort Edward, on the eaft fide of the river, mull they not neceffarily have palled Batten Hill ? A. Undoubtedly. Q. Do you remember the ford at Batten-Hill ? 28. Y £§ Would it have been poffible for the army to have parted that ford without 29. artillery to cover them, and the enemy polled on the other fide ? A. Certainly not. I had an opportunity of feeing the twentieth regiment pafs that ford without an enemy to oppofe them, and they took a confiderable time, owing to the depth of the water, the rapidity of the current, and the (tones being remarkable flippery, fo that feveral of them fell into the river. Was you prefent at all the councils of war to which the field officers of the 20- army were called at Saratoga ? A. I was. Q_Do> CO 64 1. 3*- E V I D E N C E. [Major Forbes, O. Do you remember whether General -fiurgoync ft a ted the difficulties of the time, and that he mentioned his readinefs to undertake any meafure they mould think for the honour of the Britiffi arms ? A. I do remember it. ... 111 q. Was the council unanimous to treat with the enemy on honourable terms i A. They were. , , , Q. When the firft terms propofed by General Gates were read to them, were they unanimous to rejed them ? A. They were. . . „ , ., , , , . 0 After it was decided by a majority of the council that the treaty could not be fufpended without breach of faith, were not the council then unanimous to fign it on that day ? .......... r . A. As the majority of the council had given it as their opinion that the public faith was pledged, the council thought that there was no time to be loft, and that it ought to be figned immediately. Examined by other Members of the Committee and by General Burgoyne occafmally. 35 - 3 6 - 37- 38. 39- 40. 41. Do you know or apprehend that the rebel camp was completely entrenched on the 19th of September ? A. I don’t know. Had you any reafon to believe from information that they completed their en- trenchments afterwards ? A. I underftood they had — T don’t fpeak from authority. Q. Had you reafon to think that the rebels received confiderable reinforcements between the 19th of September and the 7th of Odober? A. I did not hear that they had. Q. Suppofing the rebels to have received reinforcements, should any acceflion of ftrength to our army from the recovery of any number you can fuppofe of the 500 that were in the hofpital, be equal to a reinforcement of even 500 men received by the enemy ? A. I cannot take upon me to fay. From being in the hofpital yourfclf, how many of the 500 do you judge joined the army ? * A. I can’t pretend to fay. \ Q. Do you judge in your own opinion, putting all the circumftances you can toge- ther, whether the enemy were more likely to be forced on the 20th of September or a day or two after, than on the 7th of Odober ? A. It is impoffible for me to judge — I did not know their ftrength on the 19th of September, or what reinforcements they received before the 7th of Odober. Cb Did you apprehend the army might have made their retreat good to Canada immediately afcer die adion of the 19th "of September ? A. That Major Forbes.] evidence. A. That depended entirely on circumftances. Judging from the circumftances you then knew, what is your opinion * A. I was not more acquainted with the circumftances of the ioth of September than with thofe of the 7th of Ortober. F r Q^If the army had had three weeks more provifions when they began their retreat retreat ^ * material cir cumftance to them towards making good their A. The army could have defended themfelves longer in their entrenchments at Sa- ratoga if they had had more provifions. Q. Had you known, immediately after the aftion of the 19th of September, that a letter had been received from Sir Henry Clinton, mentioning his intention to attack t re highlands about that time, would you have thought either a retreat or an immediate attack on the enemy ad vifeable ? A % Certainly not. Do you know whether a council of war was called on the 20th of September or immediately after the engagement of the 19th of September? A. I don’t know that there was. QjDid the army in which you ferved, in its approach to Albany, expert a co-ope- ration from Sir William Howe on the North River ? * * A. We did. Do you believe if the army under Sir William Howe, inftead of going r ^ e Cheiapeak to Philadelphia, had operated upon the North River to eftert a junction with General Burgoyne’s army, confidering alfo the panic tliat prevailed after the taking of Ticonderoga, that the army under General Burgoyne would have been made prifoners ? A. I fhould think not. TiSiulerogaT ***** ^ ° Ppofuion from the rebel arm X after the taking A. I did not. liami-Iou°"s arT f r ° Unds d ' d yOU fo P ofitive1 }’ expert a co-operation with Sir Wil- A. f rom General Burgoyne’s orders. Q. Did you ever fee General Burgoyne’s orders ? A. Every day during the campaign. a^* r ' V wbat ° K |et s °t General Burgoyne did you expert a co-operation ? . ’arly in Ortober General Burgoyne gave it out in orders that there were po- werful armies of the King’s then co-operating with ours. Did not thofe orders give fpirits to General Burgoyne’s army ? us fpiritr^ 38 ° Ur 3rmy W3S ’ CVery prolpea of reinforcement muft certainly give in ortober ?° U eVer any co-operation before thofe orders of General Burgoyne’s r\ ^ aS u gene J al i y taPcec * op * n f it e army, but not by authority. VVhether, if the operations of Sir Henry Clinton on the North River had taken ° n 352 VCfy co-operation K A. It 42 . 43 - 44 - By General Burgoyne. 45 . By other Members. 46. 47 * 48. 49. 50. 5 r * 52. 53 - 54 - 66 [Capt. Bloomfield, E V I D E N C E. 55 * 56. 57 - < 8 . 59 ' A. It might have been attended w. partkoUlTwit^regard to provifions, was General Bu^r.™"t&you mentioned thofe encouraging hopes of co-operation " executed, is no, _ oftaV. anfwer very elfitoally the purpofo of , diverfi o». ^I^tltere h^d^bee^a^om^Uo^war^n^e^^ciT of September, or immediate., after^the engagement of the t 9 th, (hould you have known of tc ? Q Whether ranftdenng the circumftances of Sir William Howe's having car- Q. W netner, “ >n . , » , B you f upp ofed, or ever heard it fuppofed, Xat armory cSton would have attempted his operations up the North Ri” r fooner Sn he did, or previous to the arnval of hts retnforcemen, from Europe ? s . r -Clinton's ftrength, or his orders, nor the force the enemy had to oppofe him, it is impoffible for me to anfwer that quef- ‘‘“q What effect had it on the fpirits of General Burgoyne's army when they found the ^ was to be no co-operation between that army and the army of Sir William Howe ^ A. We never knew but that there was to be a co-operauon. ' Withdrew. Captain Bloomfield, of the Artillery, called in, and examined by General Burgoyne. 1. Q^IN what capacity did you ferve in the campaign in America in 1776 and 1777 ? A. I was major of brigade of the royal artillery. - a. Q. Was you employed by General Phillips, on your return to England, ai the campaign of 1776, to folicit a further i'upply of artillery for the lervice 0 the enfuing campaign ? , r vr u Pt . A. On my leaving General Phillips at St. John’s, in the month or Novern »■ 1776, I was charged with a letter to Sir Guy Carleton, wherein he recommen 4 Capt. Bloomfield.] EVIDENCE. it to make a demand of a further fupply of artillery and {lores for the com- plete equipment ot an additional number of gun-boats for the fervice of Lake Champlain in the eni'uing campaign, and likcwife for the boats themfelves to be fent out in frame-work. Sir Guy Carleton, on pcrufing the letter, difap- proved of the boats being fent out, but approved of the demand of the (lores and ardllery agreeable to General Phillips’s requeft, and they were accordingly lent out in the beginning of the year 1777. Ql At what time did you join the army in the campaign of 1777? 3. A. 1 joined the army at Ticonderoga on the 23d of July. Qc, Did .you live in^ the family of General Phillips, and had you occafion to 4. know his fentiments refpefting the artillery department ? A. I did chiefly live with the general, and had frequent occafion to know his fentiments on the fubjedt of the artillery in the courle of my duty as brigade- major. 0 Did you know, or had you reafon to believe, that the proportion of ar- 5. tillery employed that campaign was according to the opinion and recommenda- tion of General Phillips ? A. I can have no doubt but that an officer of General Phillips’s rank and extenfive experience muft have determined that point. Qi, W hat was the diftnbution of the artillery after the enemy evacuated Ti- 6 . conderoga ? A. I he light brigade of artillery proceeded with the army by the way of Skenelborough ; the park brigade and {lores were conveyed acrofs Lake George in bateaux. Q. Was not a confiderable portion of artillery of the heavieft kind either left 7. at St. John’s, fent back from Ticonderoga, or difpoled of in veflels ? A. It was : there were left at Ticonderoga fix heavy twelve- pounders, one light twelve-pounder, four light three-pounders, four royal mortars and twelve co- horns. Left on board the Royal George, two heavy twenty-four- pounders, two thirteen-inch mortars, two ten-inch mortars, four eight-inch mortars, four royal mortars and eight cohorns. Sent back to St. John’s in the Radau, fourteen heavy twenty-four-pounders, two eight-inch howitzers. Left at Fort George, four medium twelve-pounders, two light fix-pounders, two eight-inch howitzers, two royal howitzers. With Colonel St. Leger’s expedition to Fort Stanwix were fent two light fix-pounders, two light three-pounders, four cohorns. Left at St. John’s, four light lix-pounders, five light three-pounders, four cohorn mortars : that was the diftribution of artillery that remained after the army had quitted Fort George. The quantity of artillery brought forward with the army were four medium twelve-pounders, two light twenty-four- pounders, eighteen light fix-pounders, fix light three- pounders, two eighteen-inch howitzers, four royal howitzers, two eight-inch mortars, four royal mortars. Q. Was not that park artillery, tho’ confifting of fome twenty. four-pounders g and fome twelve pounders, properly field artillery ? A. They certainly were, and have ever been conlldered as fuch on all field fervices. Heavy artillery is of a diflimfi: nature, and confiderably heavier than guns of the fame calibre w T hich we had in the army. K 2 Q. Have 68 EVIDENCE. [Capt. Bloomfield. 9 - .7 0 . I I. 12 . * 3 - 14. * 5 * 16. 17. 18. Q, Have you ever known a left proportion than the brigaded artillery, which was attached to the line and to the advanced corps, allotted to the fame num- 0t A? f The proportion of field artillery certainly fhould vary both in quantity and nature according to tire variety of circumftances under which the army is to ad •, the ufual allotment of light field pieces are two to each battalion and from a calculation of the number and ftrength of General Burgoynes army, I do not conceive that our light field artillery exceeded that proportion., Q. What do you apprehend was the propofed ufe of artillery in the country, in which we were to ad? r , r . A. To diflodge the enemy from fuch polls as every where prefent themlelves in that part of the country, and from which it may be impofiible to diflodge them without artillery of a more confiderable calibre than light fix-pounders. O. Do vou remember the pofition which the enemy evacuated at Schuylei s Iflahd ? A. I do perfectly. . Q. Had that pofition been maintained, would not artillery of the heavieft nature we had have been particularly ferviceable ? A. Provided the poll could not have been turned, and the enemy had made ufe of every advantage which the ground gave them, I have no doubt but the park artillery would have been abfolutely neceflary. Had the pafTage of the Hudfon’s River, or of Batten Kill been difputed, would artillery of that nature have been ferviceable ? A. Doubtlefs it would. Had the enemy taken a pofition at the Forks of the Mohawk River, would artillery of that nature have been ferviceable ? A. From the imperfect manner in which I faw that ground, it appeared ca- pable of being made extremely defenfible, and, of courle, that fort of artillery would have been ferviceable. Had the army reached Albany, and it had been found expedient to for- tify a camp there for the winter, would artillery of that nature have been neceflary ? A. There can be no doubt of it. What do you apprehend to be the chief ufe of howitzers and fmall mortars in the field. A. I apprehend they are of inSnite fervice againft, all kinds of log work, ab- baties, and againft entrenchments.. The fmall mortars are particularly ufeful againft redoubts and other works where the enemy are confined within a fmall fpace. Are not log works a fpecies of fortification peculiar to that country ? A. I never faw any elfewhere. Q^Was the carrying forward the artillery from Lake George to the place where the army crofted the Hudfon’s River any impediment to the tranfport of pro- vifions ? A. The tranfport of our artillery and ftores were conftantly made by horfes attached Capt. Bloomfield.} EVIDENCE. h attached to our department, and therefore I do not conceive it did in any man- ner interfere with the tranfport of provifions — I mean to confine myfelf in this anfvver to the tranfport from Fort George to the Hudfon’s River ; for after crof- fmg the river we had fome oxen and horfes attached to the fervice of the ar- tillery, which I believe were before employed in bringing forward provifions and bateaux. What time did it take to bring forward the park artillery from Fort George 19, to the bridge of boats over the Hudfon’s River ? A. The light brigade and the artillery of the park, with their proper propor- tion of (lores and ammunition, had their horfes, carriages, and drivers conftantly attached to them ; it therefore required no more time to carry thole (lores than was neceffary for the carriages themfelves to pals from Fort George to the Hudfon’s River •, but with refptft to the referve which was afterwards tranf- ported by water in bateaux, I believe two days with all our carriages would eafily have conveyed them to the Hudfon’s River. Q. Do you remember the pofition of the King’s troops from the time of the 20. attack on the 19th of September to the attack on the 7th of October? A. Yes. Had the army made a movement to gain the left of the enemy’s en- 2 re- trenchments without previoufly conftrufting redoubts on the heights that com- manded the plain, would not the bateaux, provifions and hofpital have been left open to an attack from, the enemy’s right ? A. They would have been left expofed undoubtedly. Q. Were nor the largell guns we had the. propereft pieces of artillery for thofe 22. redoubts ? A. I think if was a fervice that was exaftaly adapted to them. Q. Do you remember the difpolition made by General Burgoyne on the 7th of Oflober ? A. I do. Qo At what, time was you wounded in that attack ?' 2 4 * A. I believe in about twenty minutes after it commenced.. What circumftance of the aftion did you oblervc before you was wound- 25. ed, particularly refpedling the artillery and the enemy’s advancing under the lire of the artillery, and what happened to the troops polled immediately on the left of the artillery ? A. The ground on which the artillery was polled was a clear fpot, in a great meafure lurrounded by woods, the ikirts of which on our left was dillant about two hundred yards where the attack firft began. The two medium twelve- pounders were polled on a frnall eminence, nearly in the center of this cleared, lpot between the German picquets and a detachment of the Heffe Hanan regi- ment. On the enemy’s column approaching, the fire of the twelve-pounders and- the four fixes was immediately directed towards the enemy’s column, notwith- standing which, they drew up along the fkirts of the wood behind trees, and after driving in the Germans, kept a pretty warm fire of mulketry on the guns and the troops polled about them *, foon after this I heard a firing on the right towards j E V I D E N C E. [Capt. Bloomfield. , i , r ^ f rnm us by a wood on which the light infan. “«e a poStn ve.7 commanding ground. ' On their retreating, as alfo the twenty. Kh'^imen, wi jwas drawn up I^'oTth^ !i l"rv-At this moment 1 received my wound, and therefore can give no farther account of the circumftances of that day’s action. Examined by other Members of the Committee. 26. 27 * 28. 29. 3 °- 3 1 3 2 33 Q. What was the number of horfes in general employed for the artillery af- ter the march from Ticonderoga ? . t . r> ••n *ti A. The whole number of horfes detached with the Britifii artillery, previous to the pairing the Hudfon’s River, was about four hundred. How many would have been neceffary for the field pieces attached to the bauahons only^ ^ ders a£ four hor f cs each ; fix three-pounders at three horfes each, and two royal howitzers at three horfes each : the remainder were for park artillery, ammunition, and ftores of all kinds to accommodate the army on its march. ... ... Q. Was the 1 forage for thefe horfes procured in the country on their march, or brought from a diftance ? A. A quantity of oats was brought forward from Canada, but with refpect to other forage they were under the neceffity of collecting it in the neighbourhood of the encampment. , c , , Q. How many waggons might the bringing on that quantity or oats employ . A. I believe the quantity of oats after palling Fort Edward was fo trifling that I don’t believe it loaded one waggon. ... After the army arrived at Fort Edward, did any delay or not arue to its forward progrefs from bringing on the park artillery, waiting for horles and ri- vers for that purpofe, or to provide forage? . A. The park artillery remained at Fort Edward no longer than was neceliary during the time the army remained in that neighbourhood : I do not know or any delay whatever from the want of horfes and drivers. Had the park artillery moved forwards looner, no end could have been anfwered by it, beiore the bri ge was thrown over the Hudfon’s River. Were there any gun-boats fent out to Quebec for the campaign 17 7° • A. There were. Were there a fufficient number fent out, in your opinion ? , A. It appeared that the naval force was fuperior to that of the rebels, from t e event of that engagement ; and therefore I conclude, that for the ufes of that cam- paign there were a fufficient number. Did you apprehend, before the event of the a 61 ion on the lakes, that the num- ber was fufficient, and went out in time ? . txr A. vie EVIDENCE. Capt. Bloomfield.] 7t A. We had received very exaggerated accounts of the rebel force on the lakes, and therefore uncommon exertions were ufed to render our force as formidable as polfible and probably fome time was loll, and the campaign in fome degree retarded, from that cireumftance. Would the campaign have been retarded fo long if a greater number of gun- 34. boats had been fent out ? A. Certainly not. What number of artificers were fent to Canada for the campaign in 1776 ? A. I don’t immediately recolledt the exatft number ; but I think Colonel Chriftie engaged about two hundred. I know of no others being fent out. Do you know of more being alked for by the artillery or engineers, as necelfary 3 6. for the campaign ? A. I did hear of fome fuch intention ; but at this diftance of time I cannot parti- cularly anfwer that queftion. Q^_ Whether the number of artificers fent out for that campaign were, in any 37. degiee, fufficient for the purpofe of carrying it on ? A Certainly not. We were under the neeeffity of coliefling all the artificers that could be met with in Canada tor the armament of St. John’s only, moft of the bateaux being built by private c ontradt. Q. Were nor the operations of that campaign confiderably retarded, for want of 38. the number of artificers that were alked for and not granted ? A. Had the number of artificers been greater, there can be no doubt but the work would have gone on much falter. With refpedt to the artificers being de- manded, I have already faid l do not recolledt the number. Were there not horfes necelfary for conveying the ftores and ammunition 39 - necelfary for the field train ; and how many ? A. The belt anfwer to that queftion will, I apprehend, be a ftate of the number of horfes actually attached to the feveral brigades of artillery, fince the allotment of ftores and ammunition were exactly proportioned to the number of pieces which thev accompanied. Anfwer in- [The brigade attached to the advanced corps of light artillery confifted of eighty-five—] > fhe detail. How many horfes might have been {pared, if the heavy park of artillery had 40. not attended the army ? A. It would have made a difference of two hundred and thirty-feven horfes. Q. Was the army furnilhed with carts to have employed thofe two hundred and 41. thirty-feven horfes ? A. I really cannot anfwer that queftion of my own knowledge. [Withdrew. Jovis 72 EVIDENCE. Lieut. Col. Kingfton.j J&vis 3° die Junii, I 779 - Lieutenant Colonel Kingston called in, and examined by Gcneial Burgoyne. i. 2 . 3 - 4 - 5 - Q. IN what capacity did you aft in the campaign of 1777 ? A. As deputy adjutant general of the province of Quebec ; I acted as adjutant general of the army under General Burgoyne, and alfo as fecietary to General Bur- g0 Q!*Did not that double capacity, and the confidence with which General Burgoyne treated you, lead you to the knowledge of the material circumflances attending that campaign ? A. I looked on myfelf to be in the entire confidence of the general. Did General Burgoyne give any orders for the augmentation of artillery de- ftined for this expedition, after his arrival in Canada ? A. There was no fuch order went through me ; nor did I hear of any fuch order being given. Q? Have you reafon to believe that the proportion of artillery employed was ac- cording to the opinion and recommendation of Major General Phillips ? A. I believe General Burgoyne had the greateft confidence in General Phillips’s knowledge and abilities; and I believe the proportion of artillery to have been arranged between General Phillips and Sir Guy Carleton, becaufe I don’t know of any direftions given by General Burgoyne upon that head. What were the orders given, at the opening of the campaign, refpefting the incumbrances of baggage ? [The witnefs refers to the orderly book, which he had with him . Read the orders. They are the original orders, written by myfelf at the time. [Reads."] “ Extrafts from orders iflfued by Lieutenant General Burgoyne at Montreal, dated 30th May, 1777. “ The regiments deftined for the expedition under General Burgoyne are to “ leave in their refpeftive ftores their blanket coats, legging, and all baggage “ that can be fpared during the fummer months ; the officers are depended on “ not to encumber the fervice with more baggage than ffiall be abfolutely ne- “ cefiary for a campaign where the movements may be expefted to be fudden “ and alert ; the portion of bateaux to each regiment will be regulated on thofe “ principles.” 6. Q. Were thofe orders afterwards enforced ? A. Orders 7 3 Lieut. Col. Kingflon] EVIDENCE. A. Orders were iffued again to the fame purport, dated Skenefborough Houfe, July 1 2. ** [ Reads.} “ It is obferved that the injunction given, before the army took the field, “ relative to the baggage of officers, has not been complied with ; and that the regi- “ ments in general are encumbered with much more baggage than they can poffibly be “ ffipplied with means of conveying, when they quit the lake and rivers ; warning is “ therefore again given to the officers, to convey by the bateaux, which will loon “ return to Ticonderoga, the baggage that is not indifpenfibly neceffary to them •, « or upon the firft fudden movement, it muff inevitably be left upon the ground. “ Such gentlemen as ferved in America the laft war may remember that the officers “ took up with foldiers’ tents, and often confined their baggage to a knapfack for “ months together.” Q. Have you a letter from General Burgoyne to General Reidefel, on the fubjefl of the incumbrance of baggage ? A. I have an extract of it, taken from the original letter in the letter-book. It is as follows : Extract of a Letter from Lieut. Gen. Burgoyne to Major General Reidefel, dated Head Quarters at Skenejhoi ough, the iKth July, 1777. “ Je vous fupplie de faire en forte, que l’efprit de l’ordre par rapport “ a le renvoye des baggages des officiers a Ticonderoga aye lieu.^ “ Les baggages des officiers Britanniques font deja renvoyes, et il n’en « rede a plulieurs qu’une petite tente, et un valife. C’eft reelement pour “ l'intereft de l’officier a la fin, que je fuis fi porte a cet article.” TRANSLATION. “ I requefl you to take meafures that the fpirit of the order refpeefting “ the fending back officers’ baggage to Ticonderoga may have due force. “ The baggage of the Britiffi officers is already gone, and many of them * s have only retained a fmall tent and one cloak bag. It is really for the in- “ tereft of the officers, in the end, that I am fo preffing upon this fubjedl.” Q^When the contract was made for horfes and carts at Montreal, was it the general opinion of the perfons of belt intelligence confulted, that the number was more or lefs than neceffary for the fervice on w’hich we w r ere going ? A. In general converfation on that fubjett I remember to have heard it (aid, that though they were infufficient, we might expedf to find additional fupplies in the country. I have extracts of letters here that paffecl between General Burgoyne and General Phillips on that fubjeft. They are extracted from the original letter copy- book. Llave you the returns, or extracts of the returns, of the ftrength of the army at all the different periods of the campaign ? L A. I 9 - See Appen dix. 10 . EVIDENCE. [Lieut. Col. Kingfton. A. I have extrafts from the returns. ii. What was the ftrength of the regular troops, at the higheft, at the opening of the campaign, rank and file, fit for duty ? A. The firft returns I received on the firft of July, The Britifh were 3576 fit for duty. Germans 2919 do. 6489 I fpeak folely of the army under Lieut. General Burgoyne. 12. What were the numbers of the artillery, and the corps under Lieutenant Nutt, attached to the fervice of the artillery ? Britifh artillery 257 Germans 1 00 Recruits under Lieut. Nutt 154 13. Were there any other troops in the army that could be called regulars ? A. There were Canadians, Provincials, and Indians ; but I never confidered them as regulars, becaufe they were not difciplined. 14. Can you ftate about what was the number of the Canadians ? A. The Canadians were 148 the higheft number. jj' Q. The Provincials ? A. I would be undcrftood to fpeak to the opening of the campaign the firft of July. They were low then, and enereafed afterwards. They were then 83. 16. The Indians ? A. Between three and four hundred. It was very difficult to collect what their number was exadbly. 17. Was the army ever fo high in numbers. Provincials and Indians excepted, as at that period ? A. I believe it never was. On the 3d of September additional companies joined the Britifh, to the amount of about 300 men ; but from killed and wounded, and the garrifon left at Ticonderoga, the army was at no time equal to its firft number. 18. What was the force left at Ticonderoga ? A. The firft garrifon confifted of 462 Britifh, rank and file, 448 Germans, rank and file •, making 910 in the whole. 19. Q. Do you remember the difficulties which attended moving the wounded to Ticonderoga, after the aftion at Huberton ? A. I remember to have heard they were very great. Different propofitions were made for the removing them, fuch as biers and hand-barrows, which were fo very incommodious, that I remember to have been told that the wounded would rather be left where they were than move in the then ftate of their wounds by fuch con- veyances. 20. Do you know what were General Burgoyne’s motives for detaching General Reidefel with a large corps of troops to the country in the neighbourhood of Caf- tleton ? A. I don’t remember to have been prefent when General Reidefel received his orders or inftrudtions ; but I underftood it was to create an alarm towards the Con- nedticut, to give encouragement to the loyal inhabitants, if any fuch there were,, and to protect thofe that were wounded at Huberton or thereabouts. Was 75 Lieut. Col. Kingfton.] EVIDENCE. Was the removal of thofe wounded effected long before General Reidefel was 21. recalled from Caftleton ? A. 1 believe not; for I am not quite certain that the whole were moved when Ge- neral Reidefel returned to the army at Skenefborough, a day or two before the firft divifion of the army moved towards Fort Anne. Q. Have you any papers written by General Burgoyne between the time he was 22 . at Montreal and the time he left Skenefborough, explanatory of the motives on which he aCted ? See Appen- A. I have. They are extracts from the original letter-book. dix. Are you acquainted with any fafts that will alcertain whether, on the army’s 23. arriving at Fort Edward, it was forwarder in its progrel's towards Albany, in point of time, than it would have been had it taken the route by Ticonderoga and Lake George ? A. In anfwer to that queltion I have to fay, the army, by taking that route, was a-head of the tranfport of provifions, which, for the greater parr, went from Ticon- deroga by the route of Lake George. Ck At our firft arrival at Fort Edward, and previous to the roads being mended, 24. in what proportion did provifions arrive at our camp P A. Very little more than for the immediate confumprion. Q. Have you the memorandum-books of Sir Francis Clarke ? 25. A. Yes. Ck Do you know them to be his hand-writing ? 26. A. I am fully convinced of it, having feen him enter many of the articles in thele books. Ck, Has there been any alteration or addition fince you had them ? A. None. What was the chara&er of Sir Francis Clarke refpeCting his accuracy ? 28. A. I never faw an officer more attentive to the duties of his ftation than Sir Francis Clarke, and always found him exceedingly accurate in the remarks he made. Q. Are there any memorandums refpefting the arrival of provifions at that 29. time ? A. There are feveral. Ck, You will read two or three ? 30. A. {-Reads."] — “ Fifth Auguft. Victualling of the army out this day. and from “ difficulties of the roads and tranfports, no provifion came in this night.” “ Sixth Auguft. — At ten o’clock this morning, not quite enough provifions arrived ** for the confumption of two days.” Q^Was it in general underftood, from the combined intelligence received by 31. General Reidefel, while he was detached to Caftletown, and that received by Ge- neral Burgoyne from the Provincials in his camp, that there were many well affcCted inhabitants towards Bennington, who would ffiew themfelves on the approach of troops ; and that there was dejedtion and fubmiffion among the party attached to the congrefs in that country ? A. I did hear feveral reports to that purpofe. L 2 Have 76 . 32 - See Appen- dix. 33 - 3 4 * 35 * 3 6 - 37 ' EVIDENCE. [Lieut. Col. Kingfton, q Have you the original rough draft of the expedition to Bennington as preferred to General Burgoyne from General Reidefel » with General Burgoyne s alterations and additions ?^e ^ ^ h draft of the propofals for the expedition to Benning- ton-* but not being prefent at the time, I can’t fay whether thofe propofals were deli- vered by General Reidefel or not ; but I know of alterations made in thofe propofals by General Burgoyne, from a knowledge ot his hand-writing. Noie The witnefs delivered in to the Committee the original rough draft of the Tnfl-rnftions. with a fair copy. Whether you have reafon to know that all the erafures and alterations in that plan "were made before the expedition took place ? A. I believe they were, from the reading of it. Q. Do you remember taking this plan to General Phillips the day General Bur- rroyne went to Fort George to infpeCt the tranfport of provifions ? ^ A. I do remember it very well •, it was the rough draft I took. Q. What were General Phillips’s fentiments upon it ? a! I remember General Phillips and I had a long converfation on the flownefs of the arrival of the tranfport of provifions % and he faid he looked on this as a very good idea •, that he faw no objection, and alked me if 1 knew of any. Do you remember fhewing the plan to General Frafer ? A. I do very well. Q. What did he exprefs on the fubjeCt ? __ A. He defired me to leave it with him till the afternoon for his confideration. He came himfelf to my tent the next morning early ; he exprefifed himfelf to me in a manner that conveyed a difapprobation of the Germans being employed in it. 1 think 1 : obferved to him that fince the honour gained by the advanced corps at Hu- berton, I believed General Reidefel was defirous of having the Germans employed. I mentioned to General Frafer my ideas of provifions being obtained by that expedi- tion, and the army thereby enabled to get quicker on to Albany than waiting for the flow tranfport from Fort George. General Frafer faid fomething about Germans, which I don’t recolleft; which brought this remark from me. I defired General Frafer, from the friend&ip he had. for General Burgoyne, if he faw any real objection to this plan, to exprefs himfelf fully and freely to General Burgoyne himfelf •, that the fcouts of the army and the guides were attached to his the advanced corps, and he might, through them, perhaps know more of the nature of the country than 1 did T and therefore I prefled him to mention his objections, if he had any, to General Burgoyne. I think he faid, but am not quite certain, ‘ f the Germans are “ not a very aCtive people ; but it may do.” I prefled him at parting to go to General Burgoyne, if bethought it would not do. He faid No, and went off. CK Were not many of the Provincials in the army of the country about Benning; ton, and towards the Connecticut ? A. I can’t pretend to fay they were from that country ; but I underftood many of them were well acquainted with that country. 77 Lieut. Col. Kingfton.] evidence. <( 0^ Do you remember Captain Sherwood in particular ? A. I do very well. (V Was he of that country ? AT I underftood he was of that neighbourhood. ^ nfn1t . nn an O. Did you ever hear Colonel Skeene, or any other Provincial, confulted on an eviction into that country, exprefs any apprehenfion ot its iuccels . A I never did. Sir Francis Clarke told me he had received favourable accounts from Colonel Skeene-, and I believe after part ot the expedition had tactn pl q 6 * Are there any memorandums of Sir Francis Clarke’s, refpecting the expedi- tion to Bennington ? IsThere any that marks the diftance between Batten Kill and Bennington ? £j;;i « From 'Xe'momh^of Batten Kill, Eaft, for two miles ; then ftrike off South Faff for about fifteen miles to Cambridge -, and to on about twelve miles Q. ^Have °you* the original letters, written from Colonel Baume to General Bur- g °A 6 Thev'tr^ere. °" ^ ' [Hr delivered them in to the Committee . Q, Is there any memorandum of Sir Francis Clarke’s marking the time when Colonel Breyman was ordered to march to lupport Colonel Baume . . A \_Reads.~] “ 15th Auguft. Exprefs arrived from Sancoick at five in the morn- : nrv . fAi-i.c dp referve ordered to march. . “ S i6th Auguft. During the night, exprefs arrived from Sancoick with an account of the repulfe this evening of a detachment of ours on an expedition. . « Sunday 17th Auguft. The general went up to the twentieth, regiment, ad- vanced on the road & to Sancoick, and met the corps de referve, the men ot that Do 'y ou 1 recolleft what ^time of the day it was General Burgoyne met Colo.- nelBreyman on his return on the 17th ? A T thirk it was fometime between one and three o clock- Have you the inftrudtions given by General Burgoyne to Colonel- Skeene on -that expedition ? a “'there any 0 ' 'memorandum of Sir Francis Clarice's, of any intelligence received from* Colonel St. Leger about this time ? A There is of the 1 2th of Auguft. „ „ _ _ . „ f Reads.] “ This morning received intelligence of an aftion near Fort -tanwix. After the failure of the expedition to Bennington, can you fpeak to the ef- forts made for forwarding provifions ? f , f r under . A I know that very great efforts were made both before and alter. I under flood that General Burgoyne and General Phillips had been both at different times at Fort George to forward the provifions, and I believe fubfequent to the 1 new s from Bennington. The quarter-mafter-general (I mean Captain Money), was fent 39 - 40 . AIo 4 *. 43 - 44 - See the Ap* pendix. 45 - a A ' % !’ e . turn 8 oes to the ift of September. Britifh, fit for duty under arms, 2635 rank and file. Germans — jy tl rerarfS exciufe Aem! j ° ! " ^ ** 3d ° f Se l >,ember > fo *!» time? Wllat WaS ^ ftrength the artiller y and Lieutenant Nutt’s corps at that return. 1 bdieVe the “ WaS Veiy lktle variation in either of them bom the former n( 2 rllTc° U , Ge [ era |,. Burgoyne’s application to Sir Guy Carleton for a gar- nfon from Canada for I iconderoga, before he paffed the Hudfon’s River ? S nth” of Tuly C f 7 r !? S l°” K letter L °/ T °f neral Bur g°y ne t<> Sir Guy Carleton, the rv w u 777, d the 2 9 th of July, *777- the mmn of the in the ftren S th of the arm 7 between tne return of the 1 ft of September, and the aftion on the 10th ? terfal. ^ ° r tW °’ but the lofs was n °t material in that in- aftion where C rher^ \°^ ^ ^r rv ‘ ce ’ j k l,7 0U ever know any inftance of a day of per for baZJl JIT T dedud ™ S from the effe&ive length upon pa- tal contingencies ? S *' at " menj CafC ° f the fick ’ and other indifpenfible regimen- A. Lapprehend there muft always be deductions of that fort. deduction for rtTJarf ^ lT there not a confk, erable additional A !tmi4 ? r and defence of the bateaux and movable magazines ? O wT ° f n COUrfe , ® ak * an a dditional drain from the army. & * ticular fervice? 3 " e 3 ° f the fo rty-feventh regiment appropriated to that par- A. It generally was ; I believe always fo. ““p« * ■»- 4 A. I EVIDENCE. 79 Lieut. Col. Kingfton.] A. I believe the four regiments of the line engaged that day amounted to lit- tle more than one thoufand one hundred men on the fpot under arms in the ac- tion. What lofs did the Britilh fuftain in that a&ion ? 6r. A. Killed, wounded, and prifoners, rather more than lefs than five hundred. 216 * thefe laft are rank and file. becaufe the others are met * c Sick prefent — — 6 22 “ Sick abfent — — 73i * e On command — — 3 8 7 5 “ On furlow — — 180 / I believe “that the men on command were explained to me by General Gates to have been detached from his army, in the rear and upon the flanks of the king’s troops, previous to the convention. . 99 . Do you apprehend that that return includes the corps that were on the other fide of the Hudfon’s River, immediately oppofite to Saratoga ? A. I do recoiled: the name of one of the general officers who was on the other fide of the Hudfon’s River, included in Mr. Gates’s return, and therefore I imagine the men under his command are included alfo. When I fay one, I do not mean to have underftood that the other two general officers, the one who was ftationed with a party oppofite to Saratoga, and the one who was ftationed on the fame fide of the water, between us and Fort Edward, are not alfo included in General Gates’s return. Qi,Do 4 Lieut. Col. Jungfton.J EVIDENCE. XOI. S02. 10 ?. Do * Iie returns to which you referred of our army ftate the effe&ive ftrcngth, ico at the time of figning the convention ? A. 1 hey do ftate the rough number, collected at that time, of men prefent and under arms. 1 State the numbers. The Britifh appeared to have been 1905 Germans — 1594 I can’t be anfwerable for the corredtnefs of thofe numbers, as they were taken in a great hurry. Q. Can there poflibly be a miftake of many hundreds ? A. I can ftate from a monthly return of thefirft of November, fit for dufv. Britifh — _ 20861 Germans — j 5^ ^ } Bank and file. There, might be people recovered from their wounds who were difcharged from the hofpital, and had joined the corps ; or there might have been a miftake in the return, juft before the convention, in the confufion of the army at that time. Qo B)o you remember what palled refpedting the military cheft, while the treaty of Saratoga was depending ? A. I do remember that it was ftrongly recommended to the commanding officers of corps to take fumsof money from the paymafter general, on account of fubfiftence then due to their regiments ; and I believe a great deal of money was fo dirtributed, and regularly accounted for to the paymafter general on the fubfequent fettlement of the pay of the army. Q. What became of the reft of the money in the military cheft ? A. It was taken by the paymafter general to Albany. Qo Did any part of it fall into the hands of the enemy i A. Not a fhilling that I ever heard of. Qi, Was any proportion of it loft, embezzled, or fecreted ? A. If any fuch thing had happened, I think the paymafter general would have applied to me immediately. Never having heard, then Or at any time after, of any lofs having been luftained, I do not believe there was any lofs fuffered in the retreat or after it. Qi Was the fecret fervice account, during the campaign, kept by you ? A. It was. Q. Could you produce the feveral articles of that account, if called on for it ? A. I have either a copy of it at home of my own, or from the paymafter general. Qr. Did General Burgoyne ever appropriate any part of that expenditure to the 109. extraordinaries of his own expences, or to any other purpofe for his own ufe ? A. Never that I know of. Q. Muft not you have known it if it had been fo ? A. Certainly. CL. Were there not occafions where General Burgoyne paid-, from his own purfe, expences that, in the opinion of others, he might have been juftified in placing to the public account ? A. I 104. 105. 106. 107. 108. 1 10. in. i 12 . 11 3 . 1 14. JI5. 116. 117. it 8. 119. )ao. EVIDENCE. Lieut. Col. Kingdom] A. I remember to have been told by other gentlemen, that expences of that fort General Burgoyne had been at, ought to have been charged in that manner.^ Q. What was the nature of thofe expences ? , . A A They were prefents to people who had diflinguifhed themfelves, and in afts of charity to women who had loft their hufbands, and other occafions which it was very proper for a general officer to give, and very proper to put into a public aC Q^ Had not General Burgoyne, from his fituation, all the expences attending a Commander in Chief ? .. c . A He certainly had, from being obliged to keep a public table for the entertain- ment and refreshment of officers and others coming to head quarters, on duty or bufinefs ; and I know thofe expences to have been very great, fiom the exceeding high price of all the articles of life in that part of the world. . Did General Burgoyne ever receive more than the appointment of a lieutenant general ? A Never. Q. Was there not a board of general officers appointed at Cambridge, to infpect all the accounts of the campaign ; and did not General Burgoyne regulate the pay- ment of the battalions by the report of that board ? A. There was fuch a board, and the payments were regulated according to the report of that board. Upon the whole of what you know of General Burgoyne’s receipts and expences, do you believe he was, in his own purfe, a gainer or a fufferer in the campaign 1777 ? . , A. I really believe his appointments were not equal to his expences in that campaign. Examined by other Members of the Committee and by Central Burgoyne occafionady. What were the numbers of the effective Brittfh, at the opening of the cam- paign 1777, including officers and non-commiflioned officers ? A. I have not thofe returns ; but they were fent to the Commander in Chief, and my extracts are for the rank and file. Can you anfwer that queftion with refpeeft to the Germans ? A. My extra&s are the fame both for the Britifhand the Germans. What was the greateft number of Provincials in the army at any time in the campaign ? A. I believe the only queftion that has been afked refpedting them was at the be- ginning of the campaign ; they were then eighty-three. On the firft of September they amounted to about fix hundred and eighty, which was the greateft number they ever amounted to. Q. What do you mean by Provincials ? EVIDENCE. 87 Lieut. Col. Kingfton.J A. I underfland them to be inhabitants of that country, affembled under officers who were to have had different commiflions, provided they had ever amounted to certain numbers. Do you include Canadians under the name of Provincials ? l2l A. I believe, in the former part of my evidence, the Canadians were ftated to be one hundred and forty-eight, and diftinguiffied from the Provincials. Was General Burgoyne’s fecond order of the twelfth of July, relating to the im k a gg a g e > ftri&ly complied with ? A. I conceive it was the duty of the commanding officers of regiments to enforce an obfervance and obedience to the general orders. Was it actually enforced in fuch a mannor to the degree you thought it fhould 123, have been ? A. I am not quite pofitive whether there was not another order iffued after- wards. [ Queftion repeated. ] I2 , A. I never had any report made to me by a commanding officer of any corps, of that order not being complied with. Q. What was your own ocular obfervation of the quantity of baggage carried 12?. with the army ; and did it appear to you that that order could have been fairly com- plied with ? A. I own I don’t recoiled, not hearing any complaint nor attending to it. The quarter matter general of the army mutt naturally know more of the baggao-e than the adjutant general. Do you know what allowance of waggons was made to a regiment ? 126. A. I don’t recoiled any waggons that we had to allow. Q^, Was none of the baggage brought down in wheeled carriages ? 127, A. Several officers, I believe, bought waggons and carts of the country people for their own ufe ; but I do not remember any of the king’s carts or waggons being appropriated to the carriage of officers’ baggage. It might be, but I don’t recoiled it. Q^Can you fay, in a general way, how many horfes might be employed in car- rying the baggage of the army, including officers’ horfes ? A. I never had any information upon that fubjed ; it did not belong to my de- 129. partment, and I had much bufinefs on my hands. Qi, How was the regimental baggage carried ? A. I believe chiefly in bateaux. Qi, How was it carried when there was no water-carriage ? 1 A. I can’t fpeak to that point, having had no information on that fubjed ; and when I fpeak of bateaux, I fpeak generally, having had no information on the fubjed. . 1 3 1. Q. Can you fay, in a general way, how many women attended the army ? A. I had really fo much to do that I had not much leifure to pay much attention to the ladies ; and I know very little of their beauty or their numbers. Would not the feeding of two thou&nd women be a confiderable objed with 152. refped to the provifions of the army ? ** A. I 133* *34* *35* i 3 6. *37- 138. J 39* evidence. [Lieut. Col. Kingfton. A. I ibould have been very furry to have had two thoufand women to have “!q"how *at women were there, if not two thoufand ? A I would wilh to give the lioufe every information in my power, w hencan fteek w th ny degree If accuracy or tolerable guefs. I have lien the commif- fLy of Fovifions renrrn, and I think the number of women returned, at v,aualled dra s°°“ s mom ’ t£d would havc bee “ of “^i'IwuIT very much wiftied thofe few dragoons we had could have been mounted, becaufc, though in that part of America that I law they might not have ten neceflary or ufeful to have made a charge, I think thofe light dragoons might be alwavs applied to very ufeful fervices. Q. How many had you of thofe dragoons ? _ „ , A. They are included in the ftrength of the Germans, ana I really do not re- member their particular number. , , Q. If none or lefs of the park of artillery had been brought forward, would there not have been horfes to have mounted thofe dragoons ? A. I believe there might have been horfes enough taken from the artillery, or from the provifion train, to have mounted thofe dragoons, if it had been thought more expedient to have employed the horfes in that manner ; but they were hired orcontraded for, for the fpecial purpofes of carrying provisions, and bringing on the artillery, and never meant by the perfons who furnifhed the conti act tor t e ra- goon fervice. . e If a fmaller quantity of baggage had been carried, might not the officers hav fpared fome of their baggage horfes for mounting the dragoons ? . A. I never met with an officer who had horfes to fpare. I know Sir rrancis Clarke and myfelf wiffied to buy horfes to carry our own fervants ; cared very little what expence we were at, and yet I could not obtain any. Do you know of any corps or party finding their way back to Ca- A. I never heard of any corps finding its way there and I underftood from the guides who were with us, previous to the convention’s taking place, that if that was attempted, we mutt break into fmall parties, and go by what is called Indian paths. T Suppofing there was a fmall party that found its way to Canada by In- dian- paths, do you think it would have been poffible for. an army to have done the fame ? , A. My idea of that muft be founded upon the report of thofe guides who had ferved us very faithfully as fcouts upon former occafions, and who inform- ed me that we muft break into very fmall parties, to have any chance of mak- ing our way through the woods to Canada ; and I remember that when General Phillips offered to attempt to find his way to Ticonderoga, it was talked of and looked on to be as defperate as gallant. Q. If any party did make its way to Canada, do you not fuppofe it m«it L)C 140. EVIDENCE. Lieut. Col. Kingfton.J 89 be that party of provincials that ran away while they were employed to repair roads, and that were never heard of afterwards ? A. I remember fame were reported to have run away who were making roads, and it is likely to have been that party. Q. When you mentioned the higheft number of provincials, did you mean 141,. that they were all armed ? A. I know that they were not all armed. We had not arms for them. CL Of thofe that were armed, fome refpeftable perfons excepted, were they 142* much to be depended upon ? A, A very great part of them were fuch as I fhould have placed very little de- pendence upon.. CL Before the army left Canada, was there not a ftridt order, that not more than 143. three women a company ftiould be fuffered to embark ? A. I do know there was fuch an order iffued, and I never heard any com- plaint of its having* been broke through. I don’t recolledt the date of that or- der, or I would have turned to my book, and ftated to the houfe, upon the firft qutftion relative to the number of women that were employed on our ex- pedition. Q^ls it not the cuftom in all armies victualled from the king’s ftores, to pro- 144. hibit the delivery of provifions to any women over and above the number allowed by order ? A. It was cuftomary in all places where I ferved in the laft war, and very ftrong and peremptory orders were given on that fubjeCl to the commiflaries in our army. CL Do you not then . believe, that all women who follc/wed your army were 145 - fed from the ration of the men they followed, or found their prov-ifion in the country ? A. I remember, upon alking the commiflaries how there came to be fo few women in the provincial returns, I was told, it was the cuftom for them to be fupplied out of the men’s rations. CL Were the women conveyed on baggage carts or horfes,. or did they walk 14 6 . a -foot ? A. I never heard of the women’s being- tonveyed on baggage carts or the king’s horfes. CL If the women neither employed the king’s horfes,, nor confumed his pro- 147,. vifions, do you think they were more of impediment, or of comfort to the king’s troops ? A. I never underftood from my converfation with the commanding officers, or others, that the women were any impediment. CL ^ after t^ e taking of Ticonderoga there was any doubt in the army in which 148. you ferved, of their being able to reach Albany ? A. I don’t remember to have heard any doubts exprelfed upon that fubjeft, mean- ing foon after the taking Ticonderoga. CL Was it generally underftood in the army, that it was was well fupplied with 145. all the neceflaries, appointments- for war, and articles proper for forwarding the expedition to Albany? Ns A. I EVIDEN C E. [Lieut. Col. Kingflon. A. I always underftood that the army had been very well fup, plied with every thing. 150. Q, Do you believe, if the fecretary of ftate had ordered the army under Ge- neral Howe to co-operate with the army under General Burgoyne for the North River, with a view to have formed the junction of the two armies, that the difafter which befel General Burgoyne’s army could have happened ? A. If a junction could have been formed, I fhould apprehend that Mr. Gates’s army might have been diflodged, and that the misfortune at Saratoga would not have happened. This is only matter of opinion. *5i* Do you apprehend., that if the army under Sir William Howe had ope- rated on the North River, with a view to died, a jundion, that fuch a junc- tion would have taken place ? A. I had an opinion while in America, that if the- expedition which came up the Hudfon’s River under General Vaughan, could have have been there about the time of our adion of the 19th of September, that Mr. Gates would have found it difficult to have kept his army together, if he had not crofied over the Hudfon’s .River .towards .New England. But this is mere matter of private opinion. I 5 Z - If you are of opinion, that the troops -under General Vaughan would have had lb powerful an died, even fo late as September, what effed do you think Sir William Howe’s army, affifted by all the fleet and craft, would have had as early as the beginning of July, immediately after the impreffion which took place among the enemy after the defeat at Ticonderoga ? A. I did not know what force there was under the command of General Vaughan, nor do I even now know; but I fhould -think molt certainly, that a great army upon the Hudfon’s River near Albany, would have contributed very much to our making our way to Albany. J 53 - Qu ^ ave y° u ever confidered what were the caufes of the failure of the ex- pedition under General Rurgoyne, and to what do you impute it ? A. I looked upon our force not to be equal to the forcing our way to Al- bany without fome co-operation. 15 4* Qc Where -then did you expedt that co-operation ? A. I had no where to expebl it frqm, but up the Hudfon’s River from New York ; and the fuccefs of Colonel St. Leger’s expedition would have been of ufe certainly. _ Qt If General W afhington’s army had not been diverted, would it not have impeded, or flopped the progrefs of any army up the Hudfon’s River. A. I don t know the ftrength of General Wafliington’s army, nor the nature of t e countiy between Albany and New Vork.; and therefore I .cannot form any judgment of what would have happened. 2 5 6 - you not of opinion that there are very flrong paffes or pofts on that A. I found them -very flrong between Ticonderoga and Albany, and from re- ports of military men of high reputation in the fervice, I have underftood there Were many very flrong pofts between New York and Albany. J 57 * Sc. Prom whence is the account of the ftrength of Mr. Gates’s army taken? 4 A. From EVIDENCE. Lieut. Col. Kingfton.j A. From a return voluntarily given by General Gates to me for my own fatis- fadtion when at Albany, and that return was figned by General Gartes. Have you that return ? A. I gave it to General Burgoyne ; I faw it to-day ; he has it. Was it by content of General Gates that the foldiers after the convention re- tained their cartouch-boxes ? A. They retained their belts, and I really don’t recolledt whether their car- touch boxes were in general retained or not : but talking with Mr. Gates when the king’s troops marched by with the accoutrements on, Mr Gates aiked me (we had been old acquaintance formerly) whether it was not cuftomary on field days for arms and accoutrements to go together ? I told him, there was nothing faid in the convention that I had agreed to with him relating to the accou- trements, and that he could have no right to any thing but what was ftipulated in that treaty. He replied, “ You are perfectly right;” and turned to fotne of the officers in their fervice by, and faid, “ If we meant to have had them, we ought “ to have inferted them in the convention.” ( Withdrew . REMARK. Review of the Evidence ; its fever al Parts compared with the prefatory Speech and Narrative ; and additional Remarks and Explanations, T H E noble Lord who is at iflue with me upon this occafxon has, in a great mea- fure, deprived me of the benefit of a reply, properly fo called, becaufe he has produced no defence. His Lordfliip certainly has been accufed by me in many inftances of a very ferious nature. If he is really willing that his political, and my military conduct fhould be tried by fads alone, I certainly have not fbewn lefs incli- nation than his Lordfhip for that left; but, taxed as I avow he has been by me, with proceedings derogatory to the obligations which ought to fubfift between man and man, I really expeded, as I believe did the Houfe of Commons and the public, to have heard from him fome juftification in thofe refpeds. Inftead of that, the noble Lord, in opening the fubjeds to which he propofed to call evidence, touched fo flightly upon the branch of the enquiry in which we are parties, that a Arranger would hardly have thought there fubfifted a diipute between us. His Lordfliip contradicted nothing that I have alledged refpeding his conduct or my own ; he flrated no circum- ftance of blame againft me, except he meant as fuch the enterprize of Bennington, which he qualified with the epithet “ fatal,” and pronounced to be the caufe of all the fubfequent misfortunes. He paflfed entirely over the tranfadions at Saratoga. Of forty officers or more, belonging to the Convention troops, then in England, one only was propofed to be called on his Lordlhip’s part, viz. Lieutenant Colonel Sutherland, of the 47th regiment, upon parole from the Congrefs, and ading with a corps of the Fencible Men in North Britain •, but, upon further reflection, his Lord- fliip thought proper to difpenfe with the attendance of this officer j and the only witnefs under order of the Houfe was Mr. Skene. No man was better qualified to give an account of the proceedings at Bennington ; and I heartily lament that the public is deprived of his teftimony. But although I am thus left in pofieffion of the evidence, uncontroverted by the noble Lord, I avail myfelf of my right of doling the caufe, for the fol- following purpofes : firft, to colled from the minutes (which, in an enquiry of this nature, are unavoidably prolix and difarranged) the fcattcred parts, and apply them to fads, under diftind and feparate heads. Next, to examine whether the fads (which, from the filence of the noble Lord, I am to afifume as admitted by him) are in any refped invalidated by the crofs examination of the witnefles by other gentlemen. And O laftly, The condu& of Lord G. Germain , during the enquiry. Claim of G. Burgovne to dole the caufe. Mode of pro* ceeding. 94 REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE. laftlv, to explain fuch circumftances, and anfwer fuch new and collateral objedions, as have been pointed at in the fame crols examination, and were omitted, or only (lightly noticed in my opening, becaufe they did notexift, or were not deemed poffible objefts of blame or cavil. In purfuing thefe purpofes, I (hall confider the proofs precifely in the order of the fades to which they are produced. In fm nation Though the nr ft circumftance I took notice of in my opening, viz. my conduft aftcTimfair re ^P e< ^’ n o Sir Guy Carleton, was rather an infinuation than an allegation againft me, ly by Sir Guy I thought it right that it lhould be the firft overthrown by evidence ; for while it Carleton, . , . , r r . overthrown remained in any degree ol force, it gave a general tinge, as it was meant to do, to evidenc’ Vn w ^°^ e caL, fe. I could not but expedt even the virtuous prejudices of the human heart to be againft me, whilft it was poffible to be conceived that in abfer.ee of the commander in chief, to whom I had adted fecond ; whofe attention I had conftantly See Sir Ouy Carle ton’s evidence, qu. 2 i 3 * Afperfion from the pa- per, No. HI. refuted. experienced •, and with whofe confidence I was then honoured; [ had pradtifed un- manly and adulatory intrigue to fuperfede him in a favourite objedt of command. There are few worfe modes of betraying a fuperior officer to be found upon the records of dishonour ; and whoever reflects upon the degree of odium with which the mod palliated adts of that fpecies have been received by mankind, will not wonder at or condemn my impatience, in applying my firft queftions to Sir Guy Carleton to that particular objedt. Clear as my juftification flood by the letter formerly referred to, (No. II.) I (hall be forgiven for obtaining, though with fome redundancy, a full and fatisfadtory confirmation of my innocence, from the verbal teftimony of the party whom I was fuppofed to have injured. It may be proper here to obferve, that the abovementioned afperfion, to which I have fo oiten adverted, and at which I have drove in vain for due terms to exprefs my indignation, was not the only one caft upon me refpedting Sir Guy Carleton. When impartial and candid men revolted at the infinuation of my treachery, my prefumption and inlolence (a lefler but (till a calumnious charge) was pointed out in that part of the paper (No. III.) that treats of the force to be left in Canada, and the difpofition of it. I am pleafed with the queftions in the crofs examination of Sir Guy Carleton, marking thepreferibeddiftributionof the troops, fifr. (38, 39,40, 4 r, 42, 43.) becaufe tfatt enquiry affords me an opportunity of juftifying myfelf in a point which I have not taken notice of before. I he pods, and the troops which I imagined would be ne- ceffiiry to occupy them, were fpecified merely to (hew that the number of 3000 was mdifpenfibly requifite for the defence of the province. The whole of that detail con- curred with General Carleton’s requifitions for reinforcement, and with my reafonin* upon thofe requifitions ; and when I affert, as I now do, that I never prefumed to fugged the neceffity or propriety of forming a detail of pods, (thus given for informa- tion) REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE. 95 information) into precife orders for the general upon the fpot, I am fure the fecretary of ftate will no more contradict that affertion than he has done any other I have made. When in the fame paper I confidentially communicated my reafons for preferring certain corps to others, I was actuated by the fame principle of offering every opi- nion that could conduce to make the intended fervice effectual. I thought it a juft claim in an arduous undertaking, to have my own choice of the troops ; and I am perfuaded Sir Guy Carleton never took ill of me, either that claim, or a fubfequent one in the fame paper, of being held free from any imputation of delay, till I fhould be clear of the province of Quebec. With an unfeigned confidence in Sir Guy Carle- ton, I thought it a precaution fully juftinable, to fecure myfelf againft others, in the numerous and complicated departments under him, who might be found lefs equi- table than he is. I know I have before complained of the production of thefe fecret communica- tions ; but after fo many precedents as the laft Seffion furnifhcd, of withholding parts of correfpondences from Parliament, upon the plea that they might affeCt in- dividuals, the noble Lord’s filence upon thofe complaints, gives me a right ftill to comment upon the finifter purpofes that are to be aferibed to the production of that paper at length, rather than by extraCt. Thofe purpofes were various ; but it muft be confeffed one, and only one, good effeCt may refult from a review of them, viz. It may ferve as a falutary caution to any officer, who fliall for the future be ad- mitted into confultation with the fame minifter, how he commits himfelf by an opi- nion of men and things. The next point that I entered upon previoufly to my narrative, was the tenor of my orders, and I believe it was generally expeCted that the noble Lord would have taken fome notice of the faCt I alledged, that every diferetionary latitude which I had propofed was erafed, while the plan was in his hand. As his Lordfhip had fo much com- mented upon the nature of peremptory orders, as a general queftion, in my abfence, it would have been fair in him to have reafoned upon them after that important and decifive circumftance was laid open. The general idea of forcing a way to Albany , which the army at its outfet con- ceived, by reafoning upon the apparent principles of the campaign, without partici- pation of the letter of the orders is clear, from the general tenor of the evidence. I wifhed, it is true, to have heard more copioufly the fentiments of Sir Guy Carleton, becaufe he had full participation of the orders. From the temper and judgment that always direCt his conduCf, he declined giving an opinion at the bar upon what might become a queftion in the Floufe. But I have fince (upon requeft) received his per- miffion to publifh a letter from him to me, dated foon after the Convention of Sara- O a toga, No. nr. Apology for fpecif} ing corps. Remarkable circumftance refpectingthe conftrudtion to be put up- on my orders. The general opinion of the army upon forcing away to Albany, 9 6 Strength of the army. Proportion of artillery. Evidence of Capt. Blom* field, from queft. 4. to 9. The ufes of it. Captain Blomfield fromqueftion 10 to 17, Evidence of Lord Balcar- ras, from queftion 14. to 19. Lord Balcar- ras’s crofs examination,, queft. 93,94. Lord Balcar- ras, queft. 8. Lord Har- rington, queft ion 4* March from Skenefbo- roughtoFort Edward. REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE. toga, which is in the Appendix No. X. and with this reference I clofe my re- view of the prefatory matter which I laid before the Committee. Review of the firjl Period. Moll of the circumftances ftated in my Narrative refpedting the firft period of the campaign, were, from their nature, to be eftabliftied by w r ritten teftimony ; and the papers, No. VII. and VIII. in the Appendix, were added to thofe before produ. ced for that purpofe ; but the returns of the troops, No. XI, are moreover au- thenticated by the proper official authority, the adjutant general, and the detail of the artillery, by the Major of brigade in that department. From the evidence of the latter, is alfo confirmed all that I advanced refpedting the opinion and recommendation of Major General Philips, for the proportion of artille- ry employed ; for the moderate quantity of it, comparatively with the principles and practice of other fervices, and for the great expedted ufe of artillery in the country where we were to adt. Had thefe opinions been merely fpeculative, the intelligence of the perfons from whom they came would have given them fufficient authority. But fortunately they are verified by fadts ; for it appears from a multitude of evidence, that the enemy made the true ufe of local advantages : they fortified every pafs or proper poll : the nature of the country, and the neceffity of keeping the banks of rivers, made it impoffible to turn thofe polls : had I wanted therefore artillery, I could not have proceeded any given ten miles, but at a heavy expence of my bell troops. When it was found that I was provided with that forcible arm, the enemy invariably quit- ted their entrenchments, either to retreat, or fight upon ground where they fuppofed artillery could be leaft effedtually employed. I am to thank the honourable member, whatever his intentions might have been, who by his crofs examination placed the expediency of carrying the train I did, in fo clear a view. The only remaining fadt of the firft period to which verbal evidence is appli- cable, viz. The impoffibility of following the enemy further than they were follow- ed in their precipitate retreat from Ticonderoga, is eftabliftied by Lord Balcarras, and by Lord Harrington. Review of the fecond Period. In entering upon the evidence which refpedts the firft tranfadtion of the fe- cond period, viz. the match from Skenefborough to Fort Edward, I cannot help 4 obferving REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE. 97 obferving how much of the blame imputed to me has been occafioned by mifrepre- fentation from perfons whofe bufinefs it was to decry my actions 5 and by uncom- mon miftakes in the geography of the country by thofe to whom my aftions were mifreprefented. By the crofs examination of Lord Balcarras it muft be fuppofed, that the perfons who fufpedted I erred in not taking the route by South Bay after the fucceis at Ticonderoga, did not know where South Bay was. They feem equally ig- norant of the fituation of Pitch-pine Plains , by the queftion immediately following the former one ; and it mud have been a furprife to the enquirers to find that the route which they were inclined to approve, was precifely that which the main body of the army took under me in perfon, and with fuch effeCt, as to come up with the rear of the enemy and drive them from their fortified poft at Skenefborough, with the lofs on their part of five armed veffels and all the reft of their water-craft. But it may be faid, this part of the crofs-examination, though incomprehenfible in point of geography, ftill applied to the queftion taken notice of in my narrative, viz. “ Whether it would not have been more expedient to return to Ticonderago, and • c take the route by Lake George, than to proceed, as I did, by the Pitch Pine Plains “ to Fort Edward ?” I fhall not recapitulate the various motives I have before ftated in fupport of that preference, having publickly in my favour the opinion of an officer fo enlightened in military fcience, and fo well acquainted with the country as Sir Guy Carleton ;* and never having heard a difference of opinion in any other officer of a like defcription, to reft much more upon a fubjeCt fo fupported by reafoning and by fuccefs, might be conftrued an attempt to divert the attention of my examiners from points lei's de- fenfible. I therefore lhall only add two fhort remarks ; the one, that the faCt of gaining confiderable time by allotting the whole fervice of the water-craft to the tranfport of provifion and ftores over Lake George, inftead of employing great part of it for the tranfport of the troops is inconteftably proved by the evidence of Cap- tain Money and Lieutenant Colonel Kingfton : the other, that to have reached Fort Edward with the troops fooner than the 29th of July (the day that the firft em- barkation of provifions arrived at Fort George) would not only have been ufelefs, but alfo highly impolitic ; becaufe the fubfiftence of the troops at Fort Edward, be- fore the arrival of that embarkation, muft have been brought by land carriage through much difficult road all the way from Fort Anne, when, on the contrary, by remaining in the neighbourhood of Skenefborough till the paffage of Lake George was effected, exclufively of the confiderations of covering the removal of the ho- fpital of Huberton, and alarming the Connecticut by the pofition of General Reide- fel’s corps, the army was commodioufly fupplied by water-carriage. * See alfo the map of country. Miftakes in geography. Lord Balcar- ras, queft.90. Queftion 91, Sir Guy Car- leton, queft. 9, 10. Confiderable time gained by the army taking the route to Fort Edward by land. Captain Mo- ney, queft. 4. to queft. 1 1 . Lieut. Col. Kingfton, queft. 23. The 9 8 Feeding the army. REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE. The next circumftance for examination, according to the order of the Narrative, is the tranfport of the magazines of provifions, See. from Fort George ; and it is highly incumbent upon me to fhew the difficulties of that operation, becaufe, if they were avoidable, it mull be acknowledged one of the principal grounds upon which I vindicate the plan of the expedition to Bennington will fail me. But I am perfuaded, every candid examiner will firfl indulge me in a fliort paule. The charges It will be recollected, that this is the only part of the campaign upon which the no- agamtt'tfie Lord has la ' lcl hls finger, as judging it productive of the fubfequent events. The Lt. General’s crofs-examination had already been prefled upon the fame ideas. Such want of know- thiTpaiVoV ledge of the nature of tranfport in that country has been betrayed ; fo much prepof- the cam- feflion of unnecefTary delays has appeared ; fuch emphafis of quellion has attended every circumftance of my conduCt at this period, that I fhall Band acquitted of pro- lixity, if I preface the application of the fubfequent evidence by a more comprehen- Surveyof hl« five and complete furvey of the difficulties and anxieties of my flotation than I thought difficulties was neceflary before. The combination of arrangement for feeding the army might, in fad, be ftated to have extended even to Ireland ; for fome part of the fupply depended upon the vic- tualling fleet which was prepared in that country, according to my requifition before I left London, and had not reached Quebec when the army took the field. Thete- dioufnels of the navigation from Quebec to the mouth of the Sorel need not be again deferibed. The next embarraffment was to manage the conveyance for that part of the fupply which came from Montreal, and which was much the greateft, without interfering with the tranfport which with equal neceffity was to be expedited up the Saint Lawrence to Lake Ontario, for the fervice of Colonel St. Leger’s expedition, and the immenfe ftores (then neceflarily upon the move alfo) for the winter main- tenance of the upper country. To thefe might be added a lift of chances and incon- veniences, incident to the carrying places between Chamblee and Saint John’s; the uncertaintainty afterwards of the pafiage over Lake Champlain, and Lake George; the laborious and flow operations of drawing the boats over the ifthmus which di- vides the two Lakes. Thefe together make a fyftem of embarraflments and difap- pointments hardly to be conceived by thofe who have not experienced them. But although the whole of this arrangement (the furnilhing the upper country ex- cepted) was made under my diredion, I have been content to date my difficulties from the lodgement of the fupplies at Fort George ; and I have touched the other parts only to fhew more perfpicuoufly the unfairnefs of judging of an American cam- paign upon European ideas. How zealoufly foever a general, in fuch an undertak- ing as mine, may be ferved by the chiefs of departments (and much praife is due from REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE. from me upon that fcore) for one hour he can find to contemplate how he Jball fight his army, he muji allot twenty to contrive how to feed it. The behaviour of the Indians is a circumftance too material to be palled over in a review of the anxieties in this part of the campaign. I had difcerned the caprice, the fuperllition, the felf-intereftcdnefs of the Indian character from my firft intercourfe, even with thofe nations which are fuppofed to have made the greatcft progrefs towards civilization : I mean with thofe called the domiciliated nations near Montreal. I h d been taught to look upon the remote tribes who joined me at Skenefboroug, as more warlike ; but a very little time proved that, with equal depravity in general principle, their only pre-eminence confifted in ferocity. The hopes I had placed in their wild honour, and in the controul of their conductors, which, as I ftated before, at firft had been promifing, were foon at an end ; and their ill-humour and mutinous difpofition were nunifcft foon after my arrival at Fort Edward. The apparent caufes of their change of temper were the refentment I had ftiewn upon the murder of Mifs Macrea, and the reftraints I had laid on their difpofition to commit other enormities ; but I never doubted that their evil paffions were fomented, and their defection completed by the cabals of the Canadian interpreters. Rapacity, felf-intereft, and prefumption. are the charafteriftics of thefe men, with fome few exceptions. The acquifition of the Indian language has ulually been a certain fortune to a man with an artful head and a convenient confcience. To check the old practices of peculation in thefe men. Sir Guy Carleton, with great judgment, had given the fuperintendency of the Indian department to Major Campbell and Captain Frazer, gentlemen of the higheft integrity. The Britilh officers employed folely in the military conduCt of that department, were alfo felected with equal pro- priety. The interpreters had from the firft regarded with a jealous eye a fyftem which took out of their hands the diftribution of Indian neceffaries and prefents ; but when they found the plunder of the country, as well as that of the government, was controuled, the profligate policy of many was employed to promote diffention, revolt, and defertion. I take this occafion to acquit Monfieur St. Luc of any fufpicion of his being con- cerned in thefe factions ; but I believe he difcerned them. He certainly knew that the Indians pined after a renewal of their accuftomed horrors ; and that they were be- come as impatient of his controul as of all other, though the pride and intereft of authority, and the affeCtion he bore to his old aflbciates, induced him to cover the real caufes under various frivolous pretences of difcontent, with which I was daily tor- mented, but to which I conftantly attended : and though I differed totally with Saint Luc in opinion upon the efficacy of thefe allies, I invariably took his advice in the management 99 Behaviour of the Indians, Lord Har- rington from queft.6 to 23. St. Luc# 100 Lord Har- rington’s qu. latl re- ferred to. Lord Har- rington’s qu. laft referred to. & ib. qu. 87. REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE. management of them, even to an indulgence of their moft capricious fancies, when they did not involve the diffionour of the King’s l'crvice and the difgrace of huma- nity. The council of the 4th of Auguft was held at his preffing inftance •, and in that council, to my great aftonifhment (for he had given me no intimation of the de- fign) the tribes with which he was moft particularly connected, and for whom he in- terpreted, declared their intention of returning home, and demanded my concurrence and affiftance. The embarraffment of this event was extreme. By acquiefcing, I voluntary relinquifhcd part of my force that had been obtained with immenle charge to government, that had created high expectation at home and abroad, and that in- deed my own army was by no means in condition to difpenfe with ; becaufe, depend- ing upon the fuppofed affiftance of this much over-valued race for fcouts and out- pofts, and all the leffer, but neceffary fervices, for giving due repofe to the camp, the Britiffi light-infantry had been trained to higher purpoles : they were deftined to lead in the general and decifive combats I expeCted in the woods, and could not be fpared, or rifked, or harraffed, without palpable confequences of the moft difagree- able kind. On the contrary, I was convinced a cordial reconciliation with the Indians was only to be effefted by a renunciation of all my former prohibitions and an indulgence in blood and rapine : I had not a friend in the department in whom I could confide except: Major Campbell, Captain Frazer, and the other Britifh officers : their ignorance of the languages, and the very probity of their characters, rendered them of no weight in Indian councils. An anfwer, neverthelefs, was to be made upon the moment ; and the part I took was to give a firm refufal to their propofition, and to adhere to the controuls I had before eftabliffied ; but, with a temperate reprefentation of the ties of faith, of generofity, and honour, to join every other argument confiftent with thofe principles which I could devife, to perfuade and encourage them to continue their fervices. This fpeech appeared to have the defired effeCt. The tribes neareft home affeCted to feparate from the others, and only preffed for permiffion to return in parties to gather in their harveft, propofing to relieve each other ; which was granted. Some of the remote tribes alfo feemed to retraCl their propofitions, and profeffed a zeal for the fervice •, but the defertion took place the next day by fcores, loaded with fuch plunder as they had collected ; and it continued from day to day, till fcarce a man that had joined at Skenefborough remained. This whole tranfaClion, I aver, was before the plan of Bennington was formed. It appears fo from the evidence produced upon the crofs examination by the gentlemen to whom I am obliged upon fo many occafions, for elucidating different fubjeCts ; and the precife date could have been further REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE. further fupported by a memorandum of Sir Francis Clerke; but I thought that refe- rence fuperfluous in a matter fo notorious. That MonfieurSt. Luc, anxious for the credit of his favourite troops, and invited by the propenfity he found in the minifter to liften to any whifpered intelligence, in contradiction to that he received from the General himfelf ; that, under thefe tempta- tions, that wily partizan fhould mifplace dates, and confound caufes, neither furprifes nor offends me. With this expofition of fa<5t, I leave him in full poffeffion of his petulancy refpeCting my military talents ; and am concerned at no effeCt of his com- ments or communications, in the minifter’s clofet or in the news-papers,* except as they may have tended to fupport the general fyftem of deception which haS fo long and lb fatally influenced his Majefty’s advifers. The Indian principle of war is at once odious and unavailing •, and if encouraged, I will venture to pronounce, its con- fequences wall be feverely repented by the prefent age, and univerfally abhorred by pofterity. But to proceed to the furvey of other difficulties of the time. Great attention was due to the management of the German troops. The mode of war in which they were engaged was entirely new to them ; tempta- tions to defert were in themfelves great, and had been enhanced and circulated among them by emiffaries of the enemy with much art and induflry. Jealouly of predilection in the allotment of pofts and feparate commands ever fubfifts among troops of different Hates; and a folid preference of judgment in the commander in chief often appears a narrow national partiality. I confefs I was much affifted in maintaining cordiality in an army thus compofed, by the frank, fpirited, and honourable character I had to deal with in Major General Reidefel ; — a character which was very early impreffed upon my mind, and which no trials of intricacy, danger, and diftrcfs, has ft nee effaced ; but addrefs was Hill requifite to fecond his zeal, and to diffufe it through the German ranks; and I ftudied to throw them into fituations that might give them confidence in them- felves, credit with their prince, and alacrity in the purfuit of an enterprife, which, when its difficulties were confidered, in faCt required enthufiafm. Other parts of the alliance, though not liable to fufpicion of treachery, like the Indians, nor of confequcnce to be fo much attended to as the Germans, neverthe- lefs had their perplexities. The Canadians, were officered by gentlemen of great * One of thole comments Lord George Germain thought proper to flate, in a fpeech in the Hotife of Commons. His Lordfhip gave me a chara&er in the words ufed by Mr. St. Luc, in a converfatiori between them.— u 11 ell brave, mais lourdcomme un Allemand.” The letter alluded to was add reded to me from Canada, after Mr. St. Luc’s voyage from England* I do not know to whom the duplicate was addrefled, but he certainly was a perfon of diligence ; for it appeared in the news -papers the fame day I received the original. P con- fot German troops* Chara&er of M.G. Reidc* fel. The Cana- dian troops. rofc Provincial carps.. Other critical embarrafs- nieitfs. REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE. condition in their country, but were not to be depended upon. Inflead of the enter, prifing and daring fpirit which diftinguifced the character of that people under the French government, was fubftituted a longing after home, the effedt of difufe of arms and long habits of domeftic enjoyments j and this difeafe (mal de fayz) is carried in them to a greater proverbial extreme than in any other people to whom the term is more commonly applied. It was neither eafy to keep thefe people together, nor to' fupport the ideas of re- fpedt which the enemy entertained of them from the remembrance of the formerwar. The only manner of effecting the latter purpofe was to fhew them occafionally at a diftance, but rarely to commit them upon parties where they were likely to fall in with the beft cktfles of the Rangers oppofed to us : perhaps there are few better in the world than the corps of Virginia Riflemen, which adted under Colonel Morgan. The Provincial Corps, of which I had two in embryo, and feveral detached par- ties, were yet a heavier tax upon time and patience. They were compofed of pro- feffed Loyalifts, many of whom had taken refuge in Canada the preceding winter, and others had joined as we advanced. The various interefts which influenced their adtions rendered all arrangement of them impracticable. One mans views went to the profit which he was to enjoy when his corps fhould be complete ; another’s, to the protection of the diftridt in which he refided; a third was wholly intent upon revenge againft hisperfonal enemies ; and all of them were repugnant even to an idea of fubordination. Hence the fettlement who fhould adt as a private man, and who as an officer, or in whofe corps either fhould be, was feldom fatisfadtorily made among themfelves •, and as furely as it failed, fucceeded a reference to the Com- mander in Chief, which could not be put by, or delegated to another hand, with- out diffatisfadtion, encreafe of confufion, and generally a lofs of fuch fervices as they were really fit for, viz. fearching for cattle, afcertaining the practicability of routes, clearing roads, and guiding detachments or columns upon the march.* Such were the embarraffiments of my mind, added to the many neceflfary avoca- tions of command purely military. It will likewife be remembered that Lieutenant Colonel St. Leger was, at this time, before Fort Stanwix : every hour was pregnant with critical events. The candid and unprejudiced, reflecting upon fuchafitua* tion, will check the readinefs of their cenfure : far be it from me to contend that I did not commit many errors : I only hope to have proved, that they are not thofe * 1 would not be underftood to infer, that none of the Provincials with me were fincere in their loyalty ; perhaps many were fo. A tew were of diftinguifhed bravery, among which it would be unjuft not to particularize Mr. Fiftar, who fell at Bennington, and Capt. Sherwood, who was forward in every fervice of danger to the end of the campaign. I only maintain that the interefts and thepallions of the revolted Americans concenter in the cauie of the Congrefs ; and thofe of the Loyalifts break and fubdividc into various purfuits, with, which the caufe of the King has little or nothing to do. which review of the evidence. 103 ; Fault or em- ploying Ger- mans, Lord 13410 137. which have yet been fpecifically pointed at, and whatever blame may be imputable to me in other inftances, my late examiners are not jutlly intitled to triumph on any of their difeoveries. v .. . And now for the expedition to Bennington as it (lands upon evidence. to B' nning- The queftions upon the crofs examination are fo explanatory of the hints which ton , fell from the noble Lord afterwards, that one would almoft imagine the hints were originally defigned to precede. It will be regular for me, therefore to , confider them in that manner, and, from the whole I am to colled, that the faults meant to be eftablifhed are, that I employed Germans to found the difpofition of a coun- try in which no Germans refided: that the mounting dragoons was unneceflary: that the range given to the expedition was too great : that it was not original y defined for Bennington : that the force was inadequate. In regard to the firft of thefe charges, relative to the employment of Germans, it would be wafte of time to add to the full anfwcr given by Lord Harrington. Co- lonel Kingfton has anfwered the queftion refpeaing the mount, ng the dragoons , and moreover it will be remembered, that the collecting horfes was by no means ij e „, Col. confined to that fervice. They were requifne for carrying the baggage of the annoy, on - exprefled in the inftru&ions to Colonel Baume, to the amount of .500. This circumftance may have (truck feme gentlemen, as confirming the ,dea that the bag. vave attending the army was of enormous bulk. I requell a fufpei.ee of judgment upon this article, till I come to the proper place of explanation . and I revert ,0 the part of the charge which feems of molt importance, via. the extent of the march, as deferred in the Inllruaions, compared with the ftrength of the detachment, &c ^ It can hardly efcape obfervation, what ftrength to my defence upon ns point fpeaing B , n . may be derived from advocates who were not expefted to appear in my behalf. For oingron i° take fupport from the noble Lord himfelf, and all who have believed ,n h, s late - afiertions, or adhered to his favourite doftrines, by pleading that I undertook the expedition to Bennington upon report, ftrengthened by the fuggeftion of#er/«»r »/ Z erperiene, tied "Pence in America ; who had lan prefatt on the. fpot when the rebel- lioi broke ml ; and whofe information had been much refpe&edby the adminiftiation in England , that the friends to the Britifi cauje mere as five to one, and that they lamed only the appearanee of a proving force ,0 fhew themfeh'S. Some cmicfers upon the adequacy of the force I employed, may delert the caulc of me noble Lord but will He maintain, that a recruit of force from the enemy s country was Th.ji-rd a wild expectation, when the recruiters, provincial colonels, governors, land pro- t , k „ ? prietors, and popular leaders of the party who glory in the deflation of Tory were upon the fpot, and perfonally interefted in the lev.es ? He muft purely ftand forth my advocate in this point, or entirely forget the reafoning he held to Sir \\ il- Ce Win> p 2 liam See the Iti- ilruftions and all other 104 REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE. liam Howe, when without the advantages of fuch recruiters; againft the belief of the General himfelf ; unprepared to repair the difappointment, if difappoint- inent enfued, in a meafure of fo much more magnitude, and fo much lefs real en- couragement, He referred to that expedient of recruiting from the enemy, what he had not ftrength to fupply from the national troops.^ This I muft infill is an unanfwerable defence, with refpedl to the noble Lord, and thofe who think with him ; for it is Uriel and pofitive coincidence with their opi- nions, pad and prelent — and if I faid it will be 1b vvich thofe to come, my prophecy would be authorized by the convi&ion and triumph which Mr. Galway’s evidence, refpedting the loyalty of the Americans, feemed to produce in the parties to whom I allude. But in due refpeft to other judges, it is incumbent upon me to date a more fe- rious defence. As Lieutenant Colonel Kingdon cannot prove juridically that the rough draft of the defign which ended the affair of Bennington was the fame which was deliver- ed by General Reidefel, and I am unwilling upon memory to incur a poffibility of midake, even in an immaterial circumdance that refpedls an abfent friend, I am content it fliould be confidcred as an iincertaintainty, and I drop all ufe that could be drawn from the original compofftion. It will fully anivver my purpofe to adhere to the bare adertion which I am fure will never be contradi&ed, that Major Gene- ral Reidefel originally conceived an expedition for the purpofe of mounting his dragoons, and fupplying the troops in general with baggage-horfes ; that I thought his idea might be extended to much greater ufe, and that the plan was confidered, amended, and enlarged, in concert with him. Therefore upon the abftradl ground and reafon of the meafure, I might urge, that it was fupported by naked military principle, according to the fentiments of a general of great natural talents, and long fervice under the firft mailers of the age. It is proved, that the fame fen- Kin'gfton’s* timents were ratified by the full approbation of Major General Phillips, an officer ^ueft. 0 f fiinilar defeription, to whom the plan was communicated; and if a fingle part of the fame plan, mentioned to be at firft difapproved by Brigadier General Frazer, continued to be fo after explanation, that difapprobation did not appear. In- deed the utmoft that can be drawn from the evidence of Lieutenant Colonel * In a letter from Lord George Germain to Sir William Howe, dated May 28, 1777, after acknow- ledging that the force for the campaign would be fhort of the General’s requifitions, is the following paragraph. “ If w6 may credit the accounts which arrive from all quarters, relative to the good inclinations of “ the inhabitants, there is every reafon to exp ctl that your fuccefs in Penfylvania will enable you to “ raife from among them fuch a force as may l e fufficient for the interior defence of the province, and leave the army at liberty to proceed to offenfive operations.” The whole of the letter, from which the above is an extra#, is curious, and may be fecn in the Parliamentary Regiiter, No. 68. King- REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE. 105 Kingfton, or any other witnefs, amounts to no more than an implied wiffi in the Brigadier to have conduced the expedition at the head of his diftinft corps. It was the fa< 5 fc. Devoted to glory and prodigal of life ; earneft for the general fuccefs of the campaign, and particularly anxious for every plan adopted by the man he loved, die grudged a danger or care in other hands than his own. It was not envy or dis- paragement of the German troops, but zeal and impatience for employment, that influenced his predilection for the Britifh. I honoured the principle, while I re- ftrained it ; and I referved his ardour and judgment for a fecond movement, which required thole qualities much more than the expedition to Bennington did, according to any intelligence or appearance of things at the time. It will be ob- ferved from the evidence, that the whole of Brigadier Frafer’s corps was thrown over the river, and actually polled at the opening of the plain near Saratoga, when Col. Baume marched ; and the defign was, upon the firft news of Baume’s fuccefs, to have pufhed that corps to take pofleflion of the heights near Stillwater, and to have intrenched there, till the army and the provifion could have joined, by which means the whole country on the well fide the river, to the banks of „ the Mohawk, would have been our own. But moreover it is to be obferved, that Major General Reidefel was far from being ignorant, as has been fuggelled, of the nature of the country, or the profellions of the inhabitants. He was juft returned from commanding a detached corps at a confiderable dillance from the main army, in the very heart of the country from x which the enemy’s force at Bennington was afterwards fupplied. He fpoke the Englifh language well ; he was affiHed by many natives of the belt information. It is evident, that the brave but deceived officer who commanded the detach- ment, was induced to deviate from the cautions prefcribed in the inllruClions. A plan drawn by an engineer upon the fpot is added to the evidence produced to the committee, to fhew more clearly where that deviation happened. It appears alfo in proof, that the meafures taken to relieve Colonel Baume, upon the news of his difficulty, were the moll fpeedy that could be ufed, and would have been time- Lord Far- ly, had not Colonel Brieman’s march been more tardy than could have been fuppoled agfo poffible. I take the fa£t as Hated in his own account, without impeaching his cre- dit with regard to the obllacles he defcribes. But as a farther vindication of the intelligence and principle upon which the original llrength of the detachment was framed, and the mere accident which made even error poffible, I requell admif- fion for the proof of a new fa dditlom , fea , that they could have l:ZuX^f « « «*■« «*» - more ,han " £re m ufe already. . rn t i ie tranfport, is another ac- ^'-tenant Colonel Kington and Captain Money * „ f ;f, on a „d other tores, for about thirty a£g time poflible, it now beeonres neceffiry to ~ bat Wes ever to » ' * I 2 16 To a field officer A captain ’ „ A fubaltern * A furgeon and mate A chaplain " _ »«“*'■ tents, two horfes to each company 2 do. 1 do. 2 do. 1 do. 1 do. do. 2 1 1 16 -a.—— Thc horfes for the fiveBrittth j^jbattilton^ a ^ 10 ^' arn0Un .”^ 0 ^ ,hat bd “ 8 ,he - d,ife " n “ ,n - 3 vo portion to their ftrength _ _ I0 ° Q ,fc Breyman’s corps - " Total for t h e regiments of the regulars staff. Two map 01 generals ISttSSUe, general, 'anti hi, '.Man,. German ditto * „ The hofpital * w Total' of ftaff 1 2 16 1 2 1 2 30 82 1 1 1 REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE. the queftion, which has been very much canvafled in print, and by the crofs exami- nation, appears to have made impreffion upon feme gentlemen ; whether this prepara- tion might not have been difpenfed with, and the army have reached Albany by a ra- pid march, the foldiers carrying upon their backs a fufficiency of provifion to fupport them during the time. It is very natural for men of all deferiptions, to apply the idea of a rapid march o a diftance of fifty miles, for it is not more meafuring in a ftreight line from Fort Ed- ward to Albany, and it will be proper to confider the principle and praCUbility of fucl> march, with refpeCt to two diftinCt periods, the one before, the other after the at- tempt upon Bennington. With refpeCt to the firfl, it will be remembered, that in the ftate the roads tnen were, and with the refources then to be employed, no provifion before-hand was attainable. Therefore, to have brought the plan of a rapid advance within the compafs of a poflibility, the operation mull have begun by marching the whole rapidly backward, in order to load the men with their packs of provifions. How the troops, zealous as they were, would have relilhed a ftep fo uncommon in its nature, and productive of fo much unexpected fatigue, particularly how the Ger- mans would have been fo perfuaded of the neceffity as to have undertaken it with good will, cannot be afeertained. But thefe doubts apart, it remains to be confidered, how the troops were to pafs two very large rivers,* the Hudfon and the Mohawk, without previous provifion for a bridge, or water-craft for conveying large bodies at once. Every concellion a fanzine projector can defire (hall be made upon this point alfo ; the contrivance of rafts, bound together by twigs and (trips of bark, as in faCt was praAifed at this very period for the paffage of Frafer’s corps over Hudfon’s River, fhall be admits equally practicable for the whole army •, and in argument be it traded to c ranee to pafs the Mohawk in the fame way ; or fhould it fail, let recourfe be had to the ford, which is known to be practicable, except after heavy ram , near ScheneCtady, about fifteen miles from the mouth of the river- , Thefe conceffions granted, we will fuppole the army on the bank of t le u on s River, where they afterwards palled it. , c r . The idea of a rapid march will of courfe be exempt from all thought o. pei.onal incumbrances (provifion exempted) and the foldier will ftand reprdented in tne . . . - . ^ if. Irnrilim pnramiu Queftion made, whe- ther the army might not have proceed- ed to Albany without (lores ? Ideaol a rapid inarch. -imagination, trim and nimble as he is feen at an exercife in an Englifh encamp- I .R R E G Canadians Indians, and Provincials Artificers - U L A R S. Total of irregulars 200 Recapitulation of the whole diftlibtition q ^ 2 meat— 3 12 REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE. ment — Indeed it is necefiary he fhould be confidered in that form ; for nothing can be more repugnant to a project of rapidity, than the foldier’s load, were he to carry all the articles belonging to him in a campaign.*' But it rnay be faid, and with truth, that troops are ufually relieved from a con- fiderable part of this burthen, and many examples of this relief may be brought from the general cuftom of fervice, and from many movements of General Howe’s army in particular — nay more, it was a frequent practice of the very army in quef- tion, to march free from knapfacks and camp equipage. The Wigwam, or hut con ftru died of boughs, may be made a very wholfome fubftitute for a tent ; and when vidtual can be cooked before-hand, even the camp kettle for an expeditious march may be laid afide. All thefe examples are admitted : but they all imply conveniencies for the feveral articles to follow, and to be brought up in due time. In our cafe they mufl have been loft irrecoverably. Will it be argued, that fome medium might have been devifed ? And although it were impoffible, confiftently with the idea of rapidity, to carry forward more provifion than for bare fuftenance during the march, yet carts might have been found fufficient to carry the men’s knapfacks, and camp kettles, and other indifpen- fible articles? This fuppofition would betray a great ignorance of the country. From Saratoga to Albany there is only one road pra&icable for wheel carriage. There are many places where by deftroying the bridges over deep gullies which dif- charge themfelv.es into the main river, a pafTage would be rendered impoffible, not only for a wheel carriage, but a horfe. There are others where the road is bounded by the river on one fide, and by almoft perpendicular afcents covered with wood on the other. Here the very fhort work, of felling a few trees would flop all pafTage. The expence of time to remove thefe obftruttions, or to make new roads, would have brought famine. All notion, therefore, of conveying any articles more than could be carried upon men’s fhoulders muft ceafe. The notion of artillery, even the fmal- left pieces, muft alfo ceafe of courfe, not even a little ammunition-tumbril could have found its way.— An eafy facrifice to the theorifts, who have maintained the inutility of artillery : but any officer who has feen the ground of this fuppofed march, would point out a dozen paflfes, not to fpeak of the pafTage of the Mohawk, where, ftrengthened with abattis and' fuch other works as the rebels are expert in making in a very few hours, five hundred militia would flop for a time, ten times their number of the beft. troops in. the world who had not artillery to affift them. * They confift of a knapfack, containing his bodily neceflaries, a blanket, a haverfack with provifions, a carteen, a hatchet, and a fifth (hare of the general camp equipage belonging to his tent. Theie arti- cles (reckoning the provifion to be for four davs) added to his accoutrements, arms, and fixty rounds of ammunition, make a bulk totally incompatible with combat, and a weight of about fixty pounds. Having REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE. Having ftated thefe objections to the principle of a rapid march, let us now, from the knowledge that has been fince obtained of circumftances, confider what would have been the certain confequences of the attempt. Thofe who are acquainted with the capricious workings of the tempers of men, will not wonder at the difficulty of prevailing upon a common foldier in any exi- gency to hufband his provifions. In a fettled camp, the young foldier has very fhort fare on the fourth day after delivery : but upon a march in bad weather and bad roads, when the weary foot flips back at every ftep, and a general curfe is provoked at the weight that caufes the retardment, he muft be a patient veteran, and of much experience in fcarcity, who is not tempted to throw the whole con- tents of the haverfack into the mire. He feels the prefent incumbrance grievous — Want is a day remote. — c< Let the General find afupply: it is the King’s caufe and the General’s intereft — he will never let the foldier be ftarved.” This is common reafoning in the ranks. I ftate it for thole who have not feen- fatiguing fervice, and may have a judgment to form upon it. It need not be ap- plied to the prefent confideration •, for had the march taken place at the time it ought to have done, upon the principle of the defenders of that fcheme, the time thatFrafer’s corps firft paft the river upon the bridge of rafts, wafte would only have confpired to accompliffi in three days a ruin that with the belt hulbandry would have been inevitable in fix : for the fame fall of rain which it has been fliewn in evidence actually carried away the bridge a very few days after it was conftruCted, neceffarily made the ford of the Mohawk for an advance, and every ford of the Hudfon’s River for a return, impaffable. It hardly need be noticed, that a flood muft have made any ufe of rafts, could they have been timely obtained, equally impracticable. The army, therefore, would have become victims to famine, without a blow, or a Angle effort of the enemy. Saratoga muft have been the anticipated feene of furrender, without other conditions than the mercy of fuftenance ; the whole force of Mr. Gates would have been loofe to co-operate with Mr. Wafhington, with the fineft feafon of the campaign before them ; and the General of the northern army, with- out a ffiadow of profeflional defence, and precluded from the plea ufually fo per- fuafive, that he fought hard before he failed, muft have met the cenfure of his So- vereign and ajuftly offended country, with none to fuppoit him but the prefent advocates of a rapid match. Could his dependence have been fure even upon them ? Would they not rather have adhered to their oppofite and original fyftem (for ftrange as it is, the fame men have fupported both) and- have aflerted, that it was extreme raftinefs to crols the Hudfon’s River at all ? If what I have laid in objection to the principle and practicability of a rapid march to Albany, previous to the attempt upon Bennington, has weight, very little need be added on the fubjeCt afterwards, bccaufe every objection will multiply up- 4 on H4 Col. St. Le- ger’s letter. No.V. review of the evidence. on the mind of the moil curfory obferver. I lha» only call the attention to a very few effential circumftances. The enemy was in force •, a proo o ns mg o that Mr. Gates quitted his pofition behind the Mohawk, wh.ch was his ftronoeft, and advanced to Stillwater. The force found at Bennington upon the march from the Hampfhire Grants to the main army, proved the vigour and ala- crity of the enemy in that country. The circumftances of the action at Benning- ton eftablifhed a yet more melancholy convi&ion of the fillacy oi any epen ence upon fuppofed friends. The noble Lord has laid, that * never defpaired of the campaign before the affair of Bennington > that I had no doubt of gaimng Albany in as fhort a time as the army (in due condition of fupply) could accomphfti the march.” I acknowledge the truth of the affertions in their fulled extent • all my letters at the time ftiew it. I will go further, and in one lenfe apply with the noble Lord the epithet “ fatal” to the affair of Bennington. The knowledge I acquired of the profeffors of loyalty was « fatal,” and put an end to every expectation from enterprise unfuftained by dint of force. It would have been excefs of fren- zy to have trufted for fuftenance to the plentiful region of Albany. Had the nwch thither been practicable in all refpeCts, and even unoppofed, (which nobody will think would have been the cafe) the enemy finding the Briuih army uniuppLed, would only have had to compel the Tories to drive the cattle and deftroy the coin or the corn mills, and the convention of Albany inftead of Saratoga muft have fol- lowed Would the Tories have rifen ? Why did they not rife round Albany and below it, at the time they found Mr. Gates’s army increafing by feparate and di- itinct parties from remote diftances? They were better qualified by their iituation to catch the favourable moment than I was to advife it. Why did they not rife in that populous and as fuppofed well affected diftrift, the German Flats, at the time St. Leo-er was before Fort Stanwix ? A critical infurreftion from any one point of the compafs within diftance to create diverfion, would probably have fecured the fuccefs of the campaign. „ . . , But to revert to the encreafe of reafons againft a rapid march after the affau of Bennington. It was then alfo known, that by the falle intelligence refpecting the ftrenmh of Fort Stanwix, the infamous behaviour of the Indians, and the want of the promifed co-operation of the loyal inhabitants, Lieut. Col. St. Leger had been obliged to retreat. The firft plaufible motive in favour of hazardous hafte the fa- cilitating his defeent of the Mohawk, was thus at an end. The profpeCt of finding the enemy difperfed it has before been fhewnwas ovei. The impofiibility of preferving a communication was alfo evident. Was the ar- my to have proceeded to aftion without hofpital ftores, as well as without vie ual . The general who carries troops into fire without precautions to alleviate the certain confluences, takes a fure ftep to alienate the affedions, and deftroy the ardour of REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE. ”5 the foldier — he exa&s more than human fpirit can furnifh. Men need not be ha- bituated to fields of battle to be convinced of this truth. Let the mind reft for a moment on the objects which will rife within it after the mention of adtion, and then re fled, there is not a mattrafs for broken bones, nor a cordial for agony and faint- nefs. They who talk of thefe rapid marches, fuppofe no oppofition, or no fuffer ing- in confequence of oppofition. The hundreds of wounded men to be cruelly aban- doned (if the reft could be prevailed upon to abandon thofe whole cafe might the next day be their own) make no part of the confideration of thefe gentlemen of precipitate imaginations. But officers who are refponfible to God and their coun- try for the armies they conduft, cannot fo eafily overlook fuch oojeCfs •, and muft be patient at leaft till a few hundred beds, and a proper proportion of medicine and chirurgical materials, can be brought up for troops that are to fight as well as to march. The confideration of rapid movement has run into much length : the ftrefs laid upon it in the crofs-examination, was the caufe. I beg leave very fhortly to reca- pitulate the principal points, and fhall then difmifs it to the public judgment, with- out great apprehenfion of having it renewed even in fpeculation. Had a proper ftore of ’ive cattle been obtained by the expedition to Bennington, (and by the bye it will be remembered, that had the loyalifts of the country been really of the number and defeription reprefented, that acquifition might have been made without an aaion) all the carriages might have been appropriated folely to the conveyance of flour, hofpital accommodations, entrenching tools, and other ablolute neceffaries •, and a rapid march to Albany might have been hazarded. After the expedition to Bennington had failed of that great purpofe, had a gar- rifon for Ticonderoga been attainable from Canada, and the force then at Ticon- deroga been brought forward, to eftablifh a poft of communication, and fecure a- paflage of the river by a fortified bridge, and redoubts upon the heights which every 5 where command the river, on one fhore or the other, a forced march might Hill have been juftifiable, becaufe a retreat was fecure: but, diverted of both thefe refources, a rapid movement muft inevitably have led to rapid ruin. Having gone through all the material points previous to the 13th of September, and fhewn, I truft, by diftindt evidence, as well as realoning, the expediency o. the march from Skenefborough to Fort Edward •, the principle of the expedition to Bennington ; the caufe of its failure; the efforts ufed to bring forwards the provi- Review of the fion and neceflary ftores, and the impracticability of proceeding without thofe ftore s •, the attention of the reader will now be carried to a review of the meafure Hudfon’s of parting the Hudfon’s River on that day. I entered pretty fully, in my Narrative, into the principles which then actuated me; and 1 (hall not enlarge upon them. I have only to requeft every man who has IT 6 Lord Bale ar- ras’s queft. 3 and 4, 2 1 to 2$, 30 to 32. Lord Har- rington’s, 32 to 37. Capt. Mo- ney, 36, 61, end 65 to 68. Brigadier Lrafer’s ien- timents. Progrefs of the falie- hoods propa- gated* REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE. lias been led to doubt whether I was required by duty, fituation, the voice of the army, and the voice of reafon, to advance and fight, to follow the confideradon of thofe principles, with a revifal of the applicable part of the verbal evidence, and I will then venture further to appeal to their judgment, whether, inftead of being required, I was not compelled, by the ftate of things, to act as I did ; even inde- pendently of the peremptory tenor of my orders, which, confident in the ftrength of my cafe, I have purpofely omitted, upon this occafion, to reconfider. In regard to the point fo much agitated in this country, though with no founda- tion whatever from any thing that happened in America, Brigadier Trafer sjenti- ments upon this meafure of pafiing the Hudfon’s River, it would be trifling with the patience of the reader to recapitulate and point the evidence to a matter which I do not believe there is a man fo prejudiced as now to difpute, viz. that that officer joined in opinion and impatience with the reft of the army. But though the falfe- hoods fo grofsly and fo long impofed upon the public, relpefting this matter, are no more, it may not be unworthy curiofity to explore their origin and trace their progrefs. It is not difficult to difeern that the fufpicion of difference of opinion in the army, upon the meafure of palling the Hudfon’s River, arofe from the paragraph in my public letter from Albany to the Secretary of State, wherein I lay that I had called no council upon that lubjeft, but had acted upon my own judgment of the peremp- tory tenor of my orders. That a man, chief in authority, fhould take entirely upon himfelf a meafure ot doubtful confequence, and upon mere principle preclude himfelf from any future means of drifting or dividing the blame that might enfue, appeared incredible at Whitehall : the greater part of that political fchool concluded the profellion of luch candour rauft be a fineffe, and that, in faft, the General had not communicated with his officers, becaufe he knew opinions would have been againft him. When little minds think they have got a clue of littlenefs it is wonderful with what zeal and dexterity they purfue and improve it. Correfpondence and intelligence were not wanting ; difappointed jobbers, difearded fervants, diffatisfied fugitives of every fort, fpies, tale-bearers, and lycophants, whom it is to the honour ol a Gene- ral to have his enemies, and a difgrace to Office to encourage, abounded in town ; and the primary idea once given, it was carried forward by very ready affiftar.ee, and ever, logical deduction. As thus : The General declares in his difpatch, he called no man into council upon the meafure of pafiing the Hudfon’s River: 'Therefore, his officers differed in opinion upon the expediency of advancing. To differ in opinion upon that expediency, they muft conftrue his orders not to be peremptory : Therefore , he ftands fingle in the interpretation he put upon his orders. REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE. If his officers faw that he was unadvifedly and defparately leading his army to death, they would certainly remonftrate : Therefore , they remonftrated. The remonftrance would naturally be made to him by fuperior officers : Therefore , the conclufion follows ; Major General Phillips and Brigadier General Frafer actu- ally made a remonftrance againft paffing the Hudfon’s River. General Reidefel, who was next in rank to General Phillips, feems to have been forgotten. He was probably overlooked in the eagernefs to get at General Frafer, on whofe name the important ftrefs was laid, and for two palpable reafons j the one, that his name flood high in the public eftimation, and greatly as it deferved *fo to Hand, perhaps it acquired, upon this intended ufe, more juftice from fome quarters than it would otherwife have received. The fecond and more prevalent reafon was, that Brigadier General Frafer was dead. Thus then flood the affertion when I arrived in England : & ndfon’s River was obliterated ; every com- calumny. The ralhnefs of paffing he Hud on R e ^ d , meat upon that/W ftep was fuddenly dropt at 1 d ; fappro banon, re- rnonftrance > m S” minifter was as nimble as his confederates, - exclaimed upon th . of ^ ^xioo, to derive from A „d her. If hall 1 for evidence again* me. that grave which has bee no flvfled Brigadier Frafer’s efteem. As a de- As a foldier I avow a P r ‘de .n having e ^ precedfnt of , chief fendant I am lenfible I have dwe up . b teft 0 f his actions, in Command fuffering the comments of an mfenor ^ ^ requires an apology to my pro c 1 . , and 1 was impatient to confute rafter. His approbation gave a grace to m id fene^and ^ ^ ^ the calumny that fa^rd the moft pernicious and pre- ever was praftifed to midead the public, and ,0 bettay the •a. • — « “• r, r “ :t half fentences, to depreciate an o - ^ ^ itemptible in the extreme j feeblenefs of vengeance that, in its ^ £ principle and effects, but it calls for our indignation w en we ex and the a bfolute extinction of They operate to the very inver ion o ^ P^ Qr can efficac i ou ny be exer- every idea upon which comman o g informers 5 to render camps *—'«“* t:: h a™ the c “ ofmy ro ^re"fi d id p ;:* - - — - ofLord Amherft, in the year x 759. t0 divide the enemy’s force, with fuch concurrence, that, and at the fame time to direft th e le y e P ob . e£ls of the though feparate and remote, they Ihould affift each other. ^ 4 U9 ■review of the evidence. armv to which I allude were to reduce Ticonderoga and Crown Point, and the ulti- mat e and moft important one was to efTeft a junction with Mr. W olfe before Quebec Thus far there is great fimilarity between the plans of the two campaigns, except that the points from which the armies marched, and to which they were defhned, the Spring 1759, the army, then aflembled at Albany, took the field as early as the feafon would admit : but fuch were the natural impediments of thecounuy that though fupported by the unanimous zeal of the inhabitants, and furmfhed with abundant fupplks of draft cattle, carriages, water-craft, and every other neceffary ; the feveral departments well direfted, and no enemy to oppolt 1 the march, the Ge- neral (Lord Amherft) was not able to commence the attack of Ticonderoga til he 7 thof July, when the enemy abandoned that poll, and retreated to Crown Po nt The diftance from Albany to Fort George is between fixty and feventy miles, naflao-e over Lake George to Ticonderoga about forty miles. P The General had reafon to believe that Crown Point would be g.ven up at ht* approach as precipitately as Ticonderoga had been. He did not, however, reach it, /diftance of thirteen miles, and water-carriage at will, till the 14th of Auguft. Was it at that time alked by the minifter or his adherents, what was the a, my doin'* not to purfiie a flying enemy? Not to purfue when the whole country behind was their own, and magazines, baggage, hofpitals, and every other necefla , mioht follow at leifure, and in feeurity ! When it was forefeen an encreafe of fleet :/ to be conftrudted at Crown Point, ,0 obtain the fupetiomy over the enemy upon Lie Champlain, and confequently that every day’s delay, in becoming mate of that Doft, rilked the campaign ! Although thefe enquiries were not then fuggefted to the public, an anfwer to them has been given, greatly to the honour of the General, in a very impartial hi- of that time. - The army was employed in repairing the fortifications at * Ticonderoga i and the General took his meafures with the fame care as if he ex- 's pefted an oblfinate defence, and attempt to furpnfe him on his marc . The enemy aaually did abandon Crown Point on the approach of the General, the , /h ofZgs.lt 1 and, as foon as in pofleffion of that poll, he fet about fortify- in „ it K he had done Ticonderoga. The time conformed in that operation, and in bulldinv new velTeis, brought it to the middle of Oftober before the General could cmbark° upon the L.ake. A fufpence, undoubtedly, of great anxiety; for the peat end of the campaign, the junaion of the two armies, upon winch the reduc- •_ nf all Canada was thought to depend, was unattained. But did the minifter or his adherents then cavil at the tardinefs of that armyr- Enterprifing, fanguine, and impetuous as was the charaaer of that "unite. lv 2 120 Appenix* No, Xlt. REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE. councils, there was not lefs energy in his protection. The nation, not a party, were his adherents ; and his word was a fiat of fame. Pie bellowed emphatic praifes on his General •, and a failing campaign became part of that bafis, from which he has afcended to the high honours he now defervedly pofiefles. It would be great prefumption, and it is far from being intended, to draw any parallels or inferences from the campaigns of 1759 and 1777, except fuch as merely apply to confumption of time under 'fimilar circumftances. In other points the pretenfions of the refpe&ive Generals may be as different as their fortunes ; or, to make a much clearer diftin&ion, and a yet ftronger contrail, as wide afunder as the aufpices under which they ferved, thofe of Mr. Pitt and of Lord George Germain. ObfervationSy &c. r effecting the third Period. “ A feries of hard toil, inceffant effort, ftubborn adion, till difabled in the col- « lateral branches of the army, by the total defection of the Indians, and the defer- « ti«n or timidity of the Canadians and Provincials, fome individuals excepted ■, “ difappointed in the laft hope of any timely co-operation from other armies j the « regular troops reduced, by Ioffes from the bell parts, to 3500 fighting men, not « 2coo of which were Britilh ; only three days provifions, upon fhort allowance, << in (tore-, inverted by an army of 16,000 men, and no apparent means of retreat " remaining, I called into council all the generals, field officers, and captains com- ct manding corps, and by 'their unanimous concurrence and advice, I was induced « to open a treaty with Major General^Gate’S, &c.” Such was the fummary of affairs given in my letter from Albany to the fecretary of ftate. At the time it was written, I little expeded to have occafion for any other teftimony of my adions •, and it has therefore been fuppofed, that I gave them a colouring more fpecious than exad. This is the ftage of my defence in which I am defirous to bring that matter to judgment ; and I have quoted the above paf- fage, exprefsly to lead the attention of every examiner to the whole of that letter. Let it now be confidered, unitedly with my late narrative, and both be compared in detail with the evidence — I am bold to flake my caufe upon the iffue — And reft- ingupon thefe references, my comments upon this period, though it is the moft im- portant, will be fhorter than upon either of the former : the proofs alfo are more colleded, and the matters controverted or ftarted in crofs-examination are fewer. The firft remark I have to make is, that while the managers of the minifter’s caufe have never admitted a doubt of the reality of thofe movements in the cam- paign, with the propriety of which their ingenuity promifed them even a coloura- ble caufe of cavil, they haye had the addrefs, when any little fkill and condud were generally acknowledged, to call the exiftence of fuch movements into queftion. I cannot make this remark more pertinently than at prefent, when the march of the army, REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE. l2t army, preceding the adtion of the 19th of September, is in its due place the objedt of notice — “ A pretty combination of columns and deployments compofed at Al- bany, and very fit for a Gazette.” This fort of language I believe mofi: perfons have heard, who have converfed with the dependents or runners of office, and it will be my excufe for fubmitting to the judgment of my profeffion a plan of the movement. It will fhew in fome degree the difficulties that the nature of the coun- try oppofed to a combined march of columns ; and at the lame time the difadvan- March f0 the tage (I might fay the certain defeat) that mull: have been fuftained, had the army enemy on the been only in one column upon the ground where it was attacked, or had the com- p&v. Sept ‘ bination of the other columns, thofe of General Frafer in particular, been lefs exadt to the point of time in which it was expedient they fhould arrive and form. I o prove that this march was not compojed at Albany, I refer to feveral witnefles, but particularly to the Earl of Harrington. His fituation, as my aid-de-camp, gave him a general knowledge of a movement, that an officer employed in the execu- Lord Ba| tion of a fingle part of it could not have acquired. It will be confidered by all who las > know the qualities of my noble friend, as very honourable to the difpofitions of that M^/Forbes, day, that they are fo circumftantially retained in fo diftinguifhing a mind ; and for ( l ue ^ 3 to 7! my own part, I cannot commit them to military judgment under a better truft than ringtoK"' the accuracy of his defcription. queft. 38 to I fhall not therefore detain the reader an inftant longer from a fubjedt fo worthy 4 " IJ, ' Iulne ‘ his attention, as the evidence refpedting the behaviour of the troops in the enfuino- events of that day. Few adtions have been charadterized by more obftinacy in attack or defence. The Britifh bayonet was repeatedly tried ineffiedlually. Eleven hundred Britilh foldiers, foiled in thefe trials, bore inceffant fire from a fucceffion of frefli troops in fuperior A&ion of numbers, for above four hours ; and after a lofs of above a third of their numbers J 9 th Se P u (and in one of the regiments above two thirds) forced the enemy at laft. Of a de- Lord Har tachment of a captain and forty-eight artillery men, the captain and thirty-fix were rington’s killed or wounded. i hefe fadts are marked by a concurrence of evidence that no 4 ^indtifive • man will difpute. ”1 he tribute of praile due to fuch troops will not be want- Lord Balcar- ing in this generous nation ; and it will as certainly be accompanied with a juft por- CapoVlo-’' tion of ffiame to thofe who have dared to depreciate or fully valour fo confpicuous my ' 26 10 who have their ears open only to the prejudice of American cowardice j and having Maj. Forbes, been always loud upon that courtly topic, ftifie the glory of their countrymen to Ue°ut°0,l maintain a bafe confiftency. Kingfton” \j It will be obfervable from the accounts of the killed and wounded, that the lofs to6 7- °‘ officers in ail the adtions of the campaign was proportionably much greater than tnat of tne private men : and as this oblervation applies particularly to the action, we are confidering, it inay not be improper to account for it in this place. The 1 22 Reafcnof the ditpropor- tion of kijlcd an as not as markfmen, were the German chaffiurs, tnou = n to be one to twenty of the enemy 0 f the army after this aSion will The crofs-exam, nation upon the proce = parliamentary enqm- fc« the folly there would be ,n bringing a military ^ ^ t|k very ry, upon the preemption that any ’ pairs o ^ thcm more inquif.tive, and -want of pradticai knowledge in t q , hey wou ld otherwife be : form- much more tenacious of doubts an urmi by a long an d f ev ere aftion, fiance ; I do not believe that with an y ^ queftion of stacking the and deprived of an uncommon portion * man of profeffional judgment : enemy next morning would have occuire ‘ knowledge could be obtained than s r= =i ^ "a”’ -o”" - "■'> — •' “• fiftence. thoughts of military men from attacking a few days Equally remote ™' d b ' ^ a lcmr f rom Sir Henry Clinton, in.orming FMt Momgomery ‘° be “ as at that very time. ^ , • t i e j r ba^o-age packed, if that circum- The queftions relating to the enemy .. » °= is anot her proof how fiance was meant as an indication that they meant to ^ ^ thefc •Cap,, tireen, aid d. camp to Major General !£ ' Jfet.io". ““J owing to the captain happeiui’ig little ior the general. I2J REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE. little the queftioners knew of fervioe. It does not appear in evidence how the faCt was : but no officer will difpute, that if the enemy had not only packed their bag- gage, but actually conveyed it to the other fide the river, they would have aCted conformably to the general practice of fervice when aCtion is expeCted ; and to no circumftance of fervice more than to that when it is refolved to difpute a poll to the laft extremity. Upon the whole of my fituation at that time, I am fo confident that it was the part of an officer to fortify and wait events, that I am only further intent to prove that I fortified properly, the nature of the ground and my feveral purpofes confi- dered. Upon this principle I fubmit the plan annexed. It will alio ffiew the na ture of the ground between the two armies, and ferve to explain the difficulties the witnefies exprefs of taking a view of the enemy's left : but it will be confidered, that befides thefe apparent obftacles to a near approach, the enemy abounded in militia, which fupplied out -polls and fcouts, that could by no means be driven in without making the army liable to a general aCtion. As for any other intelligence than what could be obtained by eye-fight it was generally contradictory, always imperfeCt ; the deferters were often fufpicious, the prifoners very few. I never faw any inftance of fervice where it was fo difficult to obtain information. Among people fpeaking the fame language with ourfelves, and many of them profeffing the moll favourable difpofitions, fcarcely any could be pre- vailed upon, by rewards or principle, to rifk his perfon for the purpole of intelligence. In regard to the crofs-examination, refpeCting the time neceflary for the con- ftruc'ion of the redoubts and other works, I neither thought it worth while to con- teft it at the time, nor lhall I conteft it now, though nothing would be more eafy than to ffiew that there was a great deal of neceflary labour which the queftions did not lead to, and confequently the witneffes could not with propriety enter into, the explanation of them. But what makes the confumption of time to me imma- terial is, that I place my juftification upon the expediency of waiting the co-opera- tion from Sir Henry Clinton. It is in proof, that I received a letter from him the day after the aCtion of the 19th,* informing me that he meditated an attack upon Fort Montgomery as at that very time. And as I have already faid, that I fliould have thought it the part of madnefs to have rilked an attack upon the enemy, in the weak Hate of my army, for fbme time after the late aCtion, and under the expectation of fo powerful a diverfion ; fo fliould I have deferred it longer, even after being recruit- ed from the hofpital, on account of the fame expectation, and the further chance of the reinforcement of Colonel St. Leger’s corps, and perhaps a convoy of provi- * The original letter is in my pofTeffion, but could not be produced without difcovering a fecret mode of conveying intelligence that it might be improper to make public. fions Plan No. V. 124 REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE. Hons from Ticonderoga : fo far am I from conceiving the paft delay blameable, that I acknowledge the meafure of the 7th of Oaober was precipitated by fome days, by the forage being become fo fcarce, that a fupply could only be obtained by a move- ment of the army. If any perfons have fuppofed, that what hits been called the inactive ftate of the army at this period was a ftate of reft, they are as much miftaken as they would be if they fuppofed it in any other circumftance comfortable. From the 20th of tionof^he" September to the 7th of October, the armies were fo near, that not a night paired army from w ; t l 10Ut firinfr, and fometimes concerted attacks upon our advanced picquets ; 20th Sept, to f , . ... 7th Oct. no foraging party could be made without great detacnments to cover it j it was the plan of the enemy to harrafs the army by conftant alarms, and their fuperiority of numbers enabled them to attempt it without fatigue to themfelves. By being habituated to fire, our foldiers became indifferent to it, and were capable of eating or fieeping when it was very near them : but I do not believe either officer or foldier ever flept during that interval without his cloaths, or that any general officer, or commander of a regiment, paffed a fingle night without being upon his le"s occafionally at different hours, and conftantly an hour before day-light. Lord Balcar- The circumftances in general of the action of the 7th of October Hand in that ar- •ras, 46, &c. ra°-ement in the evidence of the Earl of Balcarras, Earl of Harrington, Lieut. Col. “ 7 , Kingfton, and Captain Money, and have been fo little controverted by crofs- & c - t ^ , examination, that any length of comment upon them is unneceffary. I will only Kingfton° ’ obferve, that the movement of the enemy under General Arnold, mentioned in my 77 , Narrative, is confirmed as far as circumftantial teftimony can confirm it, by Captain nejvj 5 to "48 Money. And if there can be any perfons, who, after confidering that circumftance. See alfo Plan and the pofitive proof of the fubfequent obftinacy, in the attack upon the poll of V. Lord Balcarras, and various other actions of that day, continue to doubt, that the Americans poffcfs the quality and faculty of fighting (call it by whatever term they pleafe) they are of a prejudice that it would be very abfurd longer to contend with. But though comments upon this part of the evidence may be fpared, the remem- brance of what I perfonally underwent cannot fo eafily be fuppreffed i and I am fure I fhall not outrro the indulgence of the candid, if in delineating fituations fo affeCt- j n( y, 1 add feelings to juftification. The defence of military conduCt is an interefting point of profeffional honour j but to vindicate the heart, is a duty to God and to fociety at large. Few conjunctures in the campaign I nave been defcnbing, few, perhaps, upon military record, can be found fo diftinguifhed by exigencies, or productive of fuch critical and anxious calls upon public character, and private affeCtion, as that which now took place. At REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE. In the firft place, the poficion of the army] was untenable, and yet an immediate retreat was impoffible ; not only from the fatigue of the troops, but from the neceffity of delivering frelh ammunition and provifions. The Ioffes in the adtion were uncommonly fevere. Sir Francis Clarke, my aid-de- camp, had originally recommended himfelf to my attention by his talents and dili- gence : as fervice and intimacy opened his charadter more, he became endeared to me by every quality that can create efteern. I loft in him an ufeful affiftant, an amia- ble companion, an attached ftiend : the ftate was deprived by his death, of one of the faireft promifes of an able general. The fate of Colonel Ackland, taken priloner, and then fuppofed to be mortally wounded, was afecond fource of anxiety — General Frafer was expiring. In the courfe of the adtion, a (hot had paffed through my hat, and another had torn my waiftcoat. I Ihould be forry to be thought at any time infenlible to the protect- ing hand of Providence ; but I ever more particularly confidered (and I hope not fuperftitioufly) a foldier’s hair-breadth cfcapes as incentives to duty, a marked renewal of the trujl of Being, for the due purpofes of a public ftation ; and under that reflection to lofe our fortitude, by giving way to our affedtions ; to be diverted by any poffible felf-emotion from meeting a prefent exigency with our beft faculties, were at once dilhonour and impiety. Having therefore put aflde for a time my private fenfations, it has been {hewn that I effedted an entire change in the pofition of the army before day-light. The plan will fhew the new ground taken up. Early in the morning of the 8th, General Frafer breathed his laft — and .with the kindeft expreffions of his affedtion, his laft requeft was brought me, that he might be carried without parade by the foldiers of his corps to the great redoubt, and buried there. The whole day of the 8th of October was cor- refpondent to this inaufpicious beginning. The hours were meafured by a fuccefilon of immediate cares, encreafing doubts, and melancholy objedts. The enemy were formed in two lines. Every part of their difpofition, as well as the repeated attacks upon Lord Balcarras’s corps, and the cannonade from the plain, kept the troops in momentary expectation of a general adtion. During this fufpenfe, wounded officers, fome upon crutches, and others even carried upon hand-barrows by their fervants, were occafionally afeending the hill from the hofpital tents, to take their ffiare in the adtion, or follow the march of the army. The generals were employed in exhorting the troops. About fun-fet the corpfe of General Frafer was brought up the hill, attended only by the officers who had lived in his family. To arrive at the redoubt, it palled with- in view of the greateft part of both armies. General Phillips, General Reidefel, and myfelf, who were (landing together, were {truck with the humility of the proceffion : S They I2 5 Lord Balcar- ras, 5;. Lord Balcar- ras, 53. Lord Har- rington, 66. Plan, No. VI. State of things on the 8th. Lord Har- rington, 67, &c. Gen.Frafer’s funeral. light march f the 8th. ord Har- ington, 70, nd from 1 1 2 . * 118. Jontinuance f the march n the 9th. review of the evidenc e. 1 • 1 _ j hppn reminded, mi^ht conftrne it ncgltft. They who were ignorant tut P nva ^> ‘ ;id reftrain our natural propenfity to We could neither endure that that en fued cannot be better pay our laft attention to us ltina.n rent witncffcs * The inceffant cannonade rr:: marked a charafter of that junfb * h ^ i| ^L^ lh e canvas and' to the the pencil of a matter tnat tne ,, t friend 1 I conttgn thy memory, faithfu. page of a more important “ £^"d their erioi, find doe There may thy talents, thy manly virtues, their P c diftinaion-, and long may they fumvey long alter Ihall be t°rg° tten - , f f ffave p i ace to the perplexities of the nrhp rpfleftions aniinor from tncie lccncb i r r night. A defeated army was t0 rct "“ if ' ^1 nTe^lry tehind.'" We" Ire fuperior in front, and occupying ftro = p ^ of rca[a xhe ,jjf_ equally liable upon that march to e ““ “ circumftances’ would admit j and riJce Tn critical fLtions can only teach. The baggage, whtch could only move « „ column, and in a narrow road, fell into the confufion whtch ,t ts tmpoffible for caution to guard againft in the dark, becaufe a Angle acc, dent of an overturn or a broken wheel, or even the ftu P‘^ “ r Ihould the ‘troops, and ciders were fent to Major Genera, Phillips, who commanded the rear guard, in cafe he was attacked, to pay attenuon only to the mam ob^ft of covering the troops , or, if occafton were, of taking a pofitton to gtve them ‘“It'dav-bmak the next morning the army had reached very advantageous ground, anfUookf a pofition in which it would have been very deferable to rece.ve the enen^ A halt was neceffary to rcfrefh the troops, and to give time to the bateaux, loaded ftanding the correfpondent movement ot the army. * Particularly Lieutenant Colonel Kingfton, «$. 127 review of the evidence. The above purpofes being effected, the army proceeded in very fever* weather, and through exceedmg bad „„ cra l f at i g ue, this day was remark- Befides the contrnuatron of *®c“lt« g ^ ^ be oroitKd . ableforacircumftancc of pnta e drft Ackl a„d’s paffage through the The circumftance to which I allude is L/iay rx^ 1 enemy’s army, to attend her wounded hulband, then 1 : en pn ™ ^ abrupt]v or fu- Extraordi. The progref, of this lady with the army could ha, y J a wonderful ^"pri. perfluoufly introduced were tt only ( f °' f ' ^ pifture of L fpirit, the «««-• u ‘ wn tbc chaIle aKl " to z fliew what the 1UXUr5 f S W J re " ( t he tccorm^atTonsTrepared for the two Lieut Col. the army was encumbered, what were tn . Kmgfton, V , j that are prravely fuppofed, in the crofs examination, to hate tol I3tt0I}3 . thoujand women that are gr y pi as well a s falfe, would have lowed with the baggage. "u^efutation but t hat it was malicioufly intended •, been a fitter queffions, but by the perfons not, lam con ten , y prejudice what they defpaired of effeamg by ^ - pretenfions of having fought hard, they tould not allow the army even the claim upon the good-nature of the natron, of h tLfholev r er 'confide, ' pan of this ftory as fo far unconnefted with the immediate f j rnurfuine the line of evidence upon the retreat to Saratoga) as to nit i “ST? X well Hand by itfelf! and I venture to think that this one example of patience, fufTering, and fortitude, wrll be permuted to pals wit out cenfure or obloquy. * When * Lady Harriet Ackland had accompanied her hufoand ’^cu?,Ter;St n ln Jliu T.o't’enfity od^elve, to atteud. n psoov ami the crofled the Lake Champlain to join him Grafted by the artificers of the artillery, lomething nmiiar g^nacliers, which were attached to great roads' of hngland. Major Ackland ^ commanded th* B,„Wh grejia Qf fhc a TUcir General Frafer’s corps ; and confeqnenrly were always the mu [hclc fixations a Gt nations were often fo alert, that no perfon flept out ot their cuan tent, £) 2 REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE. 128 When the army was upon the point of moving after the halt defcribed, I re- ceived a melTage from Lady Harriet, fubmitting to my decifion a propofal (and expreffmg an earneft folicitude to execute it, if not interfering with my defigns) of parting to the camp of the enemy, and requefting General Gates’s permifllon to attend her hufband. Though I was ready to believe (for I had experienced) that patience and for- titude, in a fupreme degree, were to be found, as well as every other virtue, under the moil tender forms, I was aftonifhed at this propofal. After fo long an agitation of the fpirits, exhaufted not only for want of reft, but abfolutely want of food, drenched in rains for twelve hours together, that a woman Should be capable of fuch an undertaking as delivering herfelf to the enemy, probably in the night, and uncertain of what hands fhe might firft fall into, appeared an effort above hunian nature. The aftiftance I was enabled to give was fmall indeed; I had not even a cup of wine to offer her*, but 1 was told Ihe had found, from fome kind and fortunate hand, a little rum and dirty water. All I could furnifti to her was an open boat and a few lines, written upon dirty and wet paper, to General Gates, recommending her to his proteftion. tent, in. which the major and Lady Harriet were afleep, fuddenly took fire. An orderly ferjeant of grenadiers, with great hazard of fnffocation, dragged out the firft perfou he caught hold of. It proved to be the major. It happened, that in the fame inilant the had, unknowing what file did, and perhaps not perfe&ly awake, providentially made her efcape, by creeping under the walls of the back part of the tent. The firft object (lie faw, upon the recovery of her lenfes, was the major on the other fide, and in the fame inftant again in the fire, in fearch of her. I'he ferjeant again faved him, but not without the major being veiy feverely burned in his face and different parts of the body. Every thing they had with them in the tent was confirmed. This accident happened a little time before the army palled the Hudfon’s River. It neither altered the refolution nor the chearfulnefs of Lady Harriet; and (lie continued her progrefs, a partaker of the fatigues of the advanced corps. The next call upon her fortitude was of a different nat .re, and more difirefsful, as of longer iufpenfe. On the march of the 19th, the grenadiers being liable to action at every ftep, file had been directed by the major to follow the route of the artillery and bag- gage, which was not expofed. At the time the action began file found herfelf near a fmall uninha- bited hut, where file alighted. When it was found the action was becoming general and bloody, the furgeons of the hofpital took pofielfion of the fame place, as the moft convenient for the firft care of the wounded. Thus was this lady in hearing of one continued fire of cannon and mufketry, for four hours together, with the prefumption, from the poft of her hufband at the head of the grena- diers, that he was in the moft expofed part of the a&ion. She had three female companions, the- Earonefs of Reidefel and the wives of two Britifh officers, Major Harnage and Lieutenant Reynell but in the event their prefence ferved but little for comfort. Major Harnage was foon brought to the furgeoris, very badly wounded ; and a little time after came intelligence that Lieutenant Reynell was fliot dead. Imagination will want no helps to figure the ftate of the whole groupe. From the date of that aftion to the 7th of October, Lady Harriet, with her ufual ferenity, flood prepared for new trials ! arid it was her lot that their feverity encreafed with their numbers. . She was again expofed to the hearing of the whole aiftion, and at laft received the (hock of her individual misfortune, mixed with the intelligence of the general calamity, the troops were defeated, and Major Ackiand, defperately wounded, was a prifoner. The day of the 8th was pafied by Lady Harriet and her companions in common anxiety, not a tent, nor a (bed being (landing, except what belonged to the Hofpital, their refuge was among the. wounded and' the dying. 4. Mr. REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE. 12 9 Mr. Brudenell, the chaplain to the artillery (the fame gentleman who had offi- ciated fo fignally at General Frafer’s funeral) readily undertook to accompany her, and with one female fervant, and the major’s valet de-chambre (who had a ball which he had received in the late adtion then in his fhoulder) fhe rowed down the river to meet the enemy. But her diftrefies were not yet to end. The night was advanced before the boat reached the enemy’s out-pofts, and the centinel would not let it paft, nor even come on fhore. In vain Mr. Brudenell offered the flag of truce, and reprefented the ftate of the extraordinary paflenger. The guard, apprehenfive of treachery, and punctilious to their orders, threatened to fire into the boat if it ftirred before day light. Her anxiety and fuffering were thus protraCted through fe- ven or eight dark and cold hours ; and her reflections upon that firft reception could not give her very encouraging ideas of the treatment fhe was afterwards to expect. But it is due to juftice at the clofe of this adventure to fay, that fhe was received and accommodated, by General Gates with all the humanity and refpedt that her rank,, her merits and her fortunes deferved. Let fuch as are affeCted by thefe circumftances of alarm, hardlhip and danger, recolleft, that the fubjeCt of them was a woman ; of the moft tender and delicate frame j of the gendeft manners ; habituated to all the foft elegancies, and refined enjoyments, that attend high birth and fortune ; and far advanced in a ftate in which the tender cares, always due to the fex,. become indifpenfibly neceflary. Her mind alone was formed fur fuch trials. I now return to the army, which arrived in the night at Saratoga, in fuch a ftate of fatigue, that the men for the moft part had not ftrength or inclination to cut wood and make fires, but rather fought deep in their wet cloaths upon the wet ground under the continuing rain, and it was not till after day-light that the artil- lery and the laft of the troops pall the Fifh Kill, and took a pofition upon the heights and in the redoubts formerly conftruCted. The interval between taking that pofition, and the conclufion of the treaty, is the folemn crifis in which I confider myfelf as peculiarly accountable to my coun- try. And if all the circumftances mentioned by me, in my own vindication, in j my Letters, or my Narrative, are not eftablifhed, and many of them rtrengthened by pofitive proof; if every furmife of a furrender on my part, while there was a poffibiiity of avoiding it by fight, by manoeuvre, or by retreat, is not done away j if even in the laft extremity, it does not appear I was ready and forward to prefer death to difhonour; if the evidence I have adduced is not clear, diftinCt, and direCt to thefe points, the public odium, piercingly as it affects a fenfible breaft, would be far fhortof the punifhment I deferve. I cannot but confider it as one encouragement under this appeal, and it is no fmall one, that though very few parts of my preceding conduct have efcaped theferutiny of crofs- Arrival of the army at Saratoga. Lord Har- rington, 71,. &c. Lord Balear- ic, 57, &c. Interval be- tween the arrival at Sa- ratoga and figning the convention*. * 3 ° Lord Har- rington, 74. to 76. Lieut. Col. Kingfton, 86. See the plan. Lieut. Col. Kingfton, 91 92. Lieut. Col. Kingtlon,9 94 > Lieut. Col. King(lon,88, 89, 9.). See the plan. No. VII. Lord Har- rington, 84, 85,86. Lord Balcar- ras, from 60 to the end. Maj. Forbes, 2 2 to 29. Lord Balcar- ras, 64. review of the evidence. .^.examination, not a material tranfaftion of this crifts has been controverted or , I bee leave to recapitulate the tranfa&ions upon which I re y. 6 T“s proved by the evidence of the Earl of Harrington and Colonel K.ngfton, ... the Lemy was polled on the call fide the river to guard the ford. It u further proved by the evidence of Lieut. Col. ’ t ^"^“^mpt^ prevented by the impoffibility , dino rite delivery of neceffary provifion. The fame witnefs goes on to (hew, a ‘ " ° ’ t dr . it was evident, that had the delivery been poffible, the attempt H Hill have failed, for we then received intelligence of the enemy bemg pre- r„fly in poffieffion, in force, of the country on both fides the river beeweenus and F Whit W the J armv was lying day and night upon their arms “ in anxious hope of While tm. y / e ' , defirable expectation, an attack from “ fuccour from our fnends, or » the ne« dcfiwb^ P Colonel “ the enemy”! 1 cannot omit obfemog It would be im- Kingfton) how near the lift expectation was g P . h y reql ,e(l the prop* to pronounce pofmvely what wot, d I ten he (ft <1 the attention of my military readers to the plan of The 8™"^ J I 1 t™ r.irrefs The diipofition of the enemy ocui D y probabd.ty of fucceis P effort upon the plain, they muft have in different columns, and to make g h of grape-toot, a crofs formed under the fire of all our park am e , & hm ^ ^ foe from the artillery and mufketry of the fupported by thc mufketrv of the 20 th regiment, been the advantage, which though Germans, in front , added chtro-e upon an open plain. I am always wifbed for we never a attain ^ * . fh me when [ i am ent the accident that perfuaded the general judgment wi » actually to have paffed prevented the enemy’s defign (when <6 iar — mm, * thc the river with one column) as o whole campaign. . , . £ ar i 0 f Harrington : The ftate of things after this difappotntmentisg V h the ir provif.ons .. It was as bad as poffible i the numbers of the army were , ^ “ (hort, their pofidon not a good one, o«mg to _tie and MaJ „ r For bcs, Hate is corroborated by the evidence of the Earl o 1 the whole with the additional circumftance, that there was not a fpot pofition which was not expofed to cannon or rifle fhot. . -It was alfo in contemplation to force a way tack _to Atoy. hjj 1 [ he 'JJKjjSSjton’* evi- their pods weakened their right, fo as to have made the ettoit pomme. dcnce. f letter from Albany to the fccretary of date. REVIEW of the evidence. The minutes of the firft council of war prove the unanin'ty of opinion for open- ing the treaty ; and it is proved by the evidence of Colonel Kingfton, that the force of the enemy was actually greater, and their pofition ftronger, than the intelligence I had received and laid before the council of war reprefented them. It is proved by the fulleft evidence, that the terms fir ft propofed by the enemy were inftantly and unanimoufly rejected by the council of war as dishonourable. The fame unanimity in approving the terms I propofed and obtained, is equally inconteftably eftablilhed. And laftly, two papers are produced, and authenticated beyond a pomoility of cavil, the one General Gates’s return figned by himfelf, (hewing the effe&ive ilrength prefent of the rebel army, the other, the minutes of the laft council of war, (hew- ing that even fupported as I was by the unanimity of the former councils, in open- ing and conduding the treaty, I was repugnant to the figning of it, upon a flight hope entertained of a remote relief— (a hope arifing from fome intelligence received in the night of Sir Henry Clinton’s moving up the North River) and gave my voice againft a majority accordingly; that I at laft thought myfelf compelled to yield to the majority upon “ the uncertainty of the intelligence, and the improbability « of General Clinton’s motions being effectual if true ; upon the doubts entertained C< of fome part of the troops, if the negotiation of the treaty ceafed, and of a greater « part for want of bodily ftrength, if defperate enterprises were to be afterwards “ undertaken ; and laftly, upon the reflection that a mifcarriage of fuch enterprifes «C mu ft be fatal to the whole army, and that even a victory could not five it.” To this mafs of evidence, appofite and direCt to every fad effential to myjuftiff- cation, I beg leave to add the opinion of the army, that the terms obtained were better than the fituation of things gave us a right to exped. For a proof that fuch was their opinion, I refer to the teftimony of Lord Balcarras. A fair judgment upon recent events is hardly to be expeded, efpecially while many prejudices are alive. It will be allowed me to affume, what no one has ever ventured to deny, that there may be a combination of circumftances under which an army may be juftified in treating with an enemy. That the army under my com- mand was under fuch circumftances at Saratoga is alfo generally acknowledged : but what is not denied to me from my own fituation, is attempted to be withheld, by fome, on account of the quality of the enemy. They fugged that there lhould be no treaty with rebels. It is unneceffary in anfwer to have recourfe to hiftory. I will not take defence from treaties between Spain, the haughtieft power of the world, and the arch- rebel the great Prince of Orange; nor between Charles the Firft and the arch-rebels the Englilh Parliament .(for fuch in both inftances they were called) I need only refer to the examples exifting at that time in America, 2 and * 3 » Appendix, No. XV. Lieut. Col. Kingfton, 91, &c. Maj, Forbes, 3 1 fo 34- Lord Balcar- ras, 65 to 73. Appendix, N . XVI. Appendix, No. XVII. See alfo Lord Balcarras, 13°, 13 1, I 3 <2# Lord Balcar- ras. Lord Har- rington. Reflexions upon the convention. 1 132 REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE. and fince much improved on at home. My fuperior officer in America with the approbation of government, had treated upon different occafions with General Waffiin°ton. The Britiffi government in its higheft colleftive authority, the King in Parliament, has fince commiffioned five members of that Parliament, the one a peer the others of eminent ftation in military and civil capacities, to treat with rebels, 1 had almoft faid to fue to rebels for peace, by the furrendcr of almoft every principle for the maintenance of which they had profecuted the war. Thus highly juftified in treating with rebels, I am at a lofs to difeover by what poffible mode of defence I .could have acquitted myfelf to God or my country, when the brave and intelligent officers of my army unanimoudy refolved, upon military principle, precedent and reafon, that the treaty was expedient, and the terms honourable, if I had delivered them up to certain deftru&ion, or even to be prifoners at diferetion. . . . , If the informed and dilpaffionafe part of mankind ffiould agree in fentiment with ■the unanimous voice of the army, upon the convention of Saratoga, furely to impute to it the final lofs of the army is too palpable an injuftice long to remain upon the minds of the moft prejudiced. The convention exprefsly preferved the army for the fervice of the ftate. According to that convention a truce was made during the war, between that army and the enemy, in America, and it now might have been afting againft the Houfe of Bourbon in any other part of the world. The army was loft by the non-compliance with the treaty on the part of the Congrefs; and that violation of faith no man will ever be found to juftify 1 will not decide how far it was encouraged in America, by the perfuafton that the miniftry of Britain had neither power nor fpirit to redrefs the wrong; and that they had funk the nation fo low, in point of refpeft, that the world would over- look where ffie was concerned, an aftion that would have excited, in any other cafe ’ univerfal cenfure and indignation. But whatever motives the Congrefs may have had, the tamenefs and filence with which the Britiffi minifters have borne this outrage, is aftoniffiing. That men fo conftant and fo prodigal in their anger againft the Congrefs, as never before to have failed in expreffing it, even in cafes where it bordered upon being ridiculous, ffiould on a fudden become cold an mute and dead to feeling, in a cafe where refentment was juftly founded, can hardly be accounted for, except upon the principle that it was better to fupprels the jufteft cenfure upon a power they detefted, than that even a particle of unme- rited odium ffiould be wanting to load the man whom they were refolved to deprefs. appen- CONCLUSION. X AM not aware that in the preceding Review of Evidence I have neglected any part eflential to my defence. I do not reckon as fuch, that part which applies to the management of the public purfe. The calumny defigned to wound me upon that head was too grofs to fucceed : it perifhed in its birth, and fcorn is the only fentiment excited by the remembrance of its momentary exiftence. In regard to the more plaufible objections pointed againft my conduct, I have not only endea- voured to meet them in the crofs-examination, but have learched for them in every place where I could fuppofe them to originate or be entertained. If fome have efcaped, I fhall (land excufed, when it is recollected how they have grown and changed from one (hape to another, and that it has never been my fortune to be confronted with an avowed and regular accufer — I defpair of ever being l'o : but I defire it to be underftood, that although I am earned: in this mode of defence, I am fofar from declining another, that I (hall think it one very happy circumftance of the pad: enquiry, if any thing contained in it Ihould have effect hereafter to pro- duce an enquiry by court-martial. It would not be an ungrateful talk to follow the defence of the campaign with a detail of the occurrences which happened between the time of figning the conven- tion and my leaving America. Many of them would be found curious ; and the cares and perplexities in which I bore a principal and mod: painful part, would create a new intereft in the minds of my friends : but I do not think myfelf at liberty, upon the plan I laid down at my outfet, to enter into matter where no blame is imputed or implied. If my proceedings during that interval deferve any credit, I am content with that teftimony of it, which I may aflume from the filence of my enemies. I have not the fame reafons for palling over the tranfa&ions in which I have been engaged dnce my return to England, becaufe blame, and of a very atrocious na- ture, has been imputed to me. But as the principal of thefe tranfabtions are already before the public, I lhall mention them very briedy ; and merely to introduce con- ne&edlv fuch further thoughts upon them as could not with propriety be dated upon any former occafion. Immediately after my arrival, a board of general officers was appointed to en- quire into the caufes of the failure of the expedition from Canada. This enquiry was made the foundation of an order again!!: my appearing at court. The board reported, that they could not take cognizance of me being under parole — “the prohibition from the King’s prefence neverthelefs ftill remained in force. * S I had * 3 * CONCLUSION. I had recourfe to parliament for enquiry •, and openly, and repeatedly, and ftrenu- „1 ca. ed u p „„ the nunifters «o join iffue with me before that tribunal Objec- tion was taken againft immediate enquiry, becaufe Generals S,r Guy Carlet n and Sir William Hole who might be parties were abfenti but « was evtdently the dtf- pofition of the houfe, that an enquiry fhould be inftituted the enfuing feffion. 1 I pledged myfelf zealoufly to profecute that meafure ; I accuied nunifters of inj - rids treatment towards myfelf , and it became my duty, upon octal, ons wtth which Z own affairs had no conneftion, to exprefs deeper refentments of their conduft “"n'thisftatt of things parliament was prorogued on the 3 i of June. On the 5'i cf Jme, I received the firft ordef to repair to Bofton as loon as I had tried the Ba waters The order and my anfwer, repreientmg the hardlhip of being fen unheard, and the fecund conditional order, with entire flight of my reprefentations, a"e too well known ,0 require repetition : but there are two crcumftances attend, ng ‘the dates of thefe orders with which I was not acquainted till long after, and which have never vet been tcilven notice of. . , . The one is, that at the very time I was told that my prefence was material , and (as the fecond letter from the fecretary at war expreffed) of Jo much importance to the troops detained prijoners in New England , that it muft not be difpenfed with at that very time, it vfas determined to ratify the convention, according to the requifi ion of the Con-refs •, and to tranfmit the ratification through other hands, and without any participation with me, or employment of me, in carrying it to a conclufion I: was very poffible, the troops might have been failed for England before I a replied America, had I even complied as early as the condition of either orde could poffibly be conftrued to preferibe. But at all events, the circumftance could not but ferve to mark to me the true intent and meaning of the order beyond a po i- bility of miftake — that it was an order of vindictive punijhment ; an my pre ence with^the troops, if I reached America in time, was material and important to mark lo thm the degree of difgrace to which I was reduced. The terms are a mockery, and an infult upon common fenfe, if applied, in the fituation in which I was placed, to the fervice of the King, or the confolation of the troops. Such a difplay of ven- geance might indeed be intended to apply to their prudence, and to act as a cau- tion and warning how at their return they fhould fupport a General under the extre- mity of the King’s difpleafure * , , The other circumftance attending thefe dates is not lefs remarkable, viz. - In tim« when tKe mamtenanco oftlhe clothe of Ae niftration, the King’s name is introduce y o ice ■ influence of monarchy, the language of mercy. The CONCLUSION. *35 The determination of changing the nature of the war, as afterwards declared by the commiffioners in America, muft have been taken at this time. I am very much difinclined to believe, that the confideration of my perfon as a proper vidtim upon that occafion was ever regularly and formally debated in the cabinet: but I cannot think it uncharitable to the individual adviferof the Crown, whoever he was, who could projedt fuch an order, to fuppofe, that if upon the firft exercife of the extremes of war on the one fide, and in the ardour of retaliation on the other, it had fo happened, that an objedt fo well to be fpared as an obnoxious and difgraced Lieutenant General, had opportunely prefented itfelf to the enemy’s rigour, and had been detained in their prifons, the order for the voyage would not have been thought, by that individual, quite thrown away. Detention, with or without the troops, of a troublefome and bold complainant, could not be immate- rial or unimportant to fuch a perfon, and the order was of an import “ — To make affurance double fure — “ And take a bond of fate — - “ That he might tell pale-hearted Fear it lied.” The living prefence of an injured man is, perhaps, more oft'enfive and infup- portable to the fight of a mean injurer, that the fpedtre of him would be after death. But to return to the fadts I was recapitulating. I remained under the conditional order in England. The enfuing feflion, the parliamentary enquiry now laid before the public took place. It ended, as has been ftated, in July, 1779. In September, I received a fevere reprimand, a denial of a court-martial, and a prohibition of fervingmy country in its exigence, though other officers precilely in my fituation were employed — I refigned. The blame laid upon me for the part I took in thefe tranfadlions is, that intem- perately and fadtioufiy I engaged in oppofition ; that I was guilty of difobedience to the King’s orders ; and it has been added in a late publication, that even my de- fence of my condudt is a libel upon the King’s government. I think I have perceived, that the firft part of thefe charges, a raffi engagement in oppofition, is not combated by fome who wifii me well fo ftrenuoufiy as other imputations have been. It may poffibly have appeared to friendly and prudential obfervers, as a palliating plea for a reftitution to favour upon fome future occafion, to have to fay, that I had adted upon the fudden impulfe of paffion •, and the fequel might be, that I had repented, and would offend no more. Without doubting the kindnefs which fuggefts thefe e.xcufes, I have been im- pelled by principles too forcible, and have taken my part too decidedly, to look for a refource in thofe or any other fubterfuges. It would be inconfiftent and dis- honourable in me to withhold a public declaration upon this occafion, in addition * S 2 to CONCLUSION. to thofe I have made upon others, that I engaged in refinance to the meafures of the court upon mature refleftion ; that after collefting in my mind all the lights upon men and things which my experience and obfervation could furnilh, I be- lieved that the conftitution of England was betrayed : and neither blaming or fufpefting any men who conceived different opinions, and afted upon them, I thought it a point of time in which a man believing as I did was called upon to facrifice to his country. The teft of this motive, it is true, mud reft between God and my confidence : but let it not be fuppofed that I added blindly — the path of intereft,. a broad and beaten track, lay clearly before me from the time I arrived in England. Supple joints, and an attentive eye, always giving, way to power, on one fide,, and fometimes pufliing my friends into the dirt on the other, would have carried me fafely through. I even believe, that the ad'vifer of the letters I lately alluded to would rather have feen me in that track, than in the other which he pre- fcribed for me acrols the Atlantic. As little would I be fuppofed to want difcernment of the path I took for the barefaced preferences, rewards and punifhments held forth for parliamentary condudt, were among the moft glaring parts of the fyftem I had contemplated. And it was impoffible to doubt, that as a delinquent there , I fhould be prefled both by art and vengeance to the end the enemies I had provoked forefaw — the lofs of my profeffion and the impoverifhment of my fortune. I truft it will be. an inno- cent revenge on my part, to fnew them I can bear my condition firmly j and that I am incapable of redeeming what I have loft, were it ever in my option, by die difavowal of a fingle principle I have profefied. I come now to the fecond charge, difobedience of orders ; and in a point that fo nearly touches the very effence of military charafter, I truft I fhall not tref- pafs upon the patience of the reader, if I treat it a little more at large than I have done in my correfpondence with the fecretary at war. I admit that fubordination and implicit obedience, as applied to the operation of arms, are primary principles in the military fyftem. An army is a mere name without them. The officer who hefitates to meet certain death upon command, deferves to receive it from the hand of the executioner. But there are poffible exceptions to thefe general principles, efpecially out of the field, in the moft abfolute fervices - y and in the Britilh fervice they are known and marked, and co-exiftent with the military eftablifhment itfelf, in the mutiny aft, which confines obedience to legal commands. An army muft again be garbled like the army of Cromwell (which God avert !) before an order could be executed, like that of Cromwell, for garbling the parliament. A high fpirit will contraft the limits of obedience ftill more ; with illegal, he will rejeft difhonourable commands ; and he will follow the reafoning I have al- ready premifed, and ftate it as a maxim thus: he who obeys at the expence of for- tune, *37 CONCLUSION, tune, comfort, health and life, is a foldier ; he who obeys at the expense of honour is a fave. But I may be afked by fome difeiplinarians, who is to be the judge in thefe nice definitions of obedience ? It is uncommon military doftrine, I may be told, to rea- Jbn upon the King’s orders' — I confefs it is fo. Since the reign of James the Second, in the Britifh ftrvice it never has been neceffary. We have been ufed in this age, to fee the King’s name give wings and infpiration to duty. Difcipline, in this country, has been, ra-ifed upon perfonal honour — a firmer bafis than fear or fervility ever furnifhed : and the minider who firft fliakes that happy confidence ; who turns military command to political craft ; who dares to ufe his gracious Sovereign’3 name as an engine of date, to glut his own anger, or to remove his own fears, he is amongft the word enemies to that Sovereign. But Ibould his purpofes go further (a confideration of far greater magnitude to the public) and fhould it be leen that the royal name was brought forth for the difcipline of parliament, the minider d)' ufing it would be not only an. enemy to his Sovereign, but a traitor to the conditu- tion of the date. I will dole the defence of my principles refpefting military fubordination by re- ference to an anecdote well authenticated and not very remote. An officer in. a neighbouring nation, for fome error he had committed in a day of battle, received a blow from his prince who commanded in perfon. Tlie officer drew a, pidol, and his fird movement was to point it at his mader ; but the next (and it was indantaneous), was to turn the muzzle, and difeharge the ball into his own heart. Though- my cafe differs both in the provocation and the confequence,. in many circumdances my conduct may judly be fupported upon the fame princi- ple. I receive an affront that a liberal fpirit cannot endure ; and in a name, againft which no perfonal refentment can be purfued,. nor indeed entertained : but a fuicide of my profeffionaL exidence (if I may be allowed the phrafe) is preferable to the date in which the affront placed me. In one indance only I renounce the parallel — God forbid I fhould be thought, even in a burd of paffion, to have pointed at my Sovereign ! It was not from his- hand I received’ the blow. I fhall folicit the reader’s attention very little further : but I feel the necelfity of repeating my application to- the candour of the public,, both as a writer and an appellant. Defence,, and imputation of blame to- others, are naturally interwoven in my caufe : it required a more didintt conception, and an abler hand than mine,, to keep them always apart, and open to feparate view. In fome parts fny defence- may be weakened by this deficiency of fkill : but I have no right to offer the fame excufe for differing any blame to red upon others beyond what I thought myfclf judified to fupport. Upon this principle, I think it jud, at taking leave of the fecretary of date for the American department, briefly to enumerate the only fatts and propofitions re- 3 , fpecting i 3 8 CONCLUSION. fpeding the plan of* the expedition from Canada, that I think clearly maintainable againft him. Firft fad. It is clear that the plan of a jundion of the greater part of the forces in Canada with the army of Sir William Howe, was formed in the year 1776, when Sir William Howe was in full fuccefs ; when his whole force was in the neighbourhood of New York, or in the Jerfies, and Mr. Wafhington was beaten, and at theweakeft. Second fad. This plan of a jundion was continued (and upon juft reafoning) in the clofe of the year 1776, when Sir William Howe’s firft propofal of operations for the enfuing campaign arrived. Thofe propofols were made upon the datum of a number of troops, fufficient to furnifh, befides the main army, an offenfive army of 10,000 men, rank and file, to ad on the fide of Rhode Ifland, by taking poffeffion of Providence, and penetrating from thence into the country towards Bofton ; and another offenfive army, not lefs than 10, coo, to move up the North Rivei to Alba- ny, exclufive of 5000 for the defence of New York. In either of the above cafes, the plan of jundion could hardly have failed of fuccefs. Third fad. On the 23d of February, Sir William Howe’s alteration of the firft plan was received, and he then propofed to ad with the greater part of his force on the fide of Philadelphia, at the opening of the campaign, and to enable him fo to do, to defer the offenfive plan from Rhode Ifland till the reinforcements Jhould arrive , and to deftine only 3000 men to ad defenflvely upon the lower part of the Hudfon’s River. Fourth fad. On the 3d of March, the fecretary of ftate fignified his Majefty’s entire approbation of this deviation from the plan firft fuggefted. From thefe fads arifes my firft propofition, that at the time the change of plan for Sir William Howe’s operations was adopted, by which no offenfive force was to remain upon the Hudfon’s River, nor a diverfion probably to take place from Rhode Ifland, the plan of my operations, the fuccefs of which would probably de- pend in a great degree upon co-operation and diverfion, ought to have been changed like wife : inftead of that, it was enforced and made pofitive by the refufal of the latitude I had propofed of ading upon the Connedicut, or, in cafe of exigency, embarking the troops and effeding the jundion by fea. Fifth fad. On the 19th of March, a letter from Sir William Howe, by the fecre- tary of ftate, acquainting him, that a brigade of Britilh and fome companies of bri- gadiers and light infantry had been withdrawn from Rhode Ifland, which made the force left there merely defenfive. The fome letter mentions the piofpect^ tie mv had of bringing ro,ooo men into the field. . Sixth fad. I did not leave England till the beginning of April, by which time the fecretary of ftate muft have known, or ought to have known, that no depen- dance could be placed upon reinforcements from England arriving at New Yor in time for Sir William Flowe to refume the intention he had deferred, viz. a diverfion from 4 139 CONCLUSION. from Rhode Ifland, or of making the force upon the Hudfon’s River adequate to offenfive operation. Hence arifes my fecond propofition, that the latitude I had propofed, or other expedients of precaution, ought then at lead: to have been adopted : inftead of which, I was fuffered to fail, ignorant of Sir William Howe’s plans, and ignorant of the defalcation or the delays in the reinforcements deftined for him. The con- fequence was, that neither his letter to Sir Guy Carleton, put into my hands after my arrival in Canada, nor his letter to me of the 17th of June, informing me of his deftination for Penfylvania, removed my expectation of co-operation, becaufe I was to fuppofe, that fubfequent to the dates of either of thofe letters, he would re- ceive orders from the fecretary of ftate refpeCting the junction, and alfo a timely reinforcement. Seventh fact. The fecretary of ftate makes no mention of the northern expedi- tion in any of his difpatches to Sir William Howe at the end of March, when my orders were fixed, nor in the month of April. And it is a further fact, that I am perfuaded will not be contefted, that he did not mention any orders or recommenda- tions relative to co-operation verbally to Sir W T illiam Howe’s aid-de-camp, or any other confidential perfon who failed about that time. The firft mention made of the necefilty of co-operation was in the fecretary of ftate’s letter of the 18 th of May, wherein his Lordlhip cc Tr lifts that whatever he [&> William Howe~\ may meditate , it will be executed in time to co-operate with the army ordered to proceed from Canada The propofition clearly juftified by thefe faCts is, that if the fecretary of ftate had thought proper to fignify the King’s expectation of a co-operation to be made in my favour in the month of March or beginning of April, as in confiftency he ought to have done, it would have arrived before Sir William Howe embarked his army, and in time for him to have made a new difpofition : but inftead of that, this very material injunction was not difpatched till it was almoft phyfically impofllble it lhould have any effeCt. And fo indeed it happened, for Sir William Howe received it on the 16th of Auguft, at a diftance from Hudfon’s River too great for any de- tachment from his own army to be made in time, could it even have been lpared ; and the reinforcement from England, upon which Sir William Howe depended to ftrengthen Sir Henry Clinton, was much later ftill — too late (as it has been fhewn) to enable that general with all his activity and zeal to give any effectual fupport. Indeed the conduCt of the fecretary of ftate, in inferting this paragraph, in his letter of the 1 8th of May, when it could not avail, after omitting it when certainly it would have been timely, feems fo prepofterous, that it can only be explained by one faCt. It tranfpired about that time, that Sir William Howe’s army was deftined for Penfylvania, and people who had confidered the force of the enemy to be collect- ed from the northern provinces began to be alarmed for my army. It is well known (though 14 ® CONCLUSION. ( though 1 cannot afcertain the date) that an officer of very great ability and a per. fefi knowledge in the country through which I was to pafs, as foon as he ear no difpof.tion was made for a fupport from New York, foretold to the fecretary of (late, or his near friends, the fall of my army. Under this apprehenf.on it might appear to the fecretary of ftate a proper caution, that an expectation of co-operation Ihou d exift under his hand. .. If plans fo inconfiftently formed, and managed by the fecretary of ftate with fo much feerning confidence, as to mifiead his generals, and io much leal referve as to deftroy them, fiiould be defended by that infatuated belief then entertained of the inability of the enemy to refill, I (hould beg leave to ftate as one proportion more, that after the experience of their aftions at Trenton and many other places, ” d the intelligence of their new levies received from Sir William Howe, fiich con- fidence was an additional fault, and perhaps a more pernicious one than any I have “ Thus much for the noble Lord in his public capacity. What lhare of the perfe- cution I have fuftained (more than 1 have direffly exprefied ,n d.fterent parts of my defence) are imputable to his private councils, is not within my knowledge . but if in (peaking of my perfeentors in general, I may be thought fomeumes to have ufed ftrong terms, I have only to fay, that having advanced no faft which am not able and refolved to maintain, 1 have not felt myfelf called upon ,n applying thole faffs for any further attention, than to preferve the language of a gentleman, which is an attention due to myfelf as well as to the public. It is open and manly enmity alone that unites refped with refentment. I wilh 1 could as eafily apologife for all the other faults with which this under- takin" abounds as a compofition. At a time when fo many pens are employed, I muft not ex-peft to be (pared. I lhall treat with filent refpeft any comments that arc fairly founded and delivered with liberality r and with contempt, equally filent, the common inveaives of the political prefs. This appeal is not to reft upon li- terary criticifm, or party deputation, but upon the broad equity of my country. I know that prejudice and malice will vanilh before the man who dares to fubmit hisaftions to that teft-If acquitted there, I feel I am not degraded r and have not a fenfation within my breaft which does not at the fame time allure me, not be unhappy. J. burgoyne. appen- I Copy of a Letter from Lieutenant General Burgoyne to Lord George Germain, dated N*. I, Hertford-Streer, j/? January, 1777. My Lord, My phyfician has prefled me to go to Bath for a fliort time, and I find it requi- fite to my health and fpirits to follow his advice: but I think it a previous duty to afiu re your Lordfliip, that fliould my attendance in town become necefiary, rela- tively to information upon the affairs of Canada, I ihall be ready to obey your fummons upon one day’s notice. Your Lordfhip being out of town, I fubmitted the above intentions a few days ago perlonally to his Majefty in his clofet ; and I added, “ That as the arrange- ments for the next campaign might poffibly come under his royal contemplatTon before my return, I humbly laid myfelf at his Majefty’s feet for fuch aftive em- ployment as he might think me worthy of.” 1 his was the fubftance of my audience, on my part. I undertook it, and I now report it to your Lordfliip in the hope of your patronage in this purfuit; a hope, my Lord, founded not only upon a juft fenfe of the honour your Lordlhip’s friend- ftup muff reflect upon me, but alfo upon a feeling that I deferve ir, in as much as a folid refpetSfc and fincere perfonal attachment can conftitute fuch a claim. I leave in the hands of Mr. D’Oyley fuch of the memorandums confided to me by General Carleton as require difpatch, fhould your Lordlhip think proper to carry them into execution. I a ^° leave in that gentleman’s hands the copy of an application relative to boats ior the artillery, and which I take the liberty to fubmit to your Lordfliip as well worthy of confideration, upon the fuppofuion that the enemy fliould arm upon Lake George, and that any operation fliould be advifeable by that route. I likewife leave the difpofition of winter quarters, which I received by the laft fhip from Canada. I find no difpatch is come to your Lordfliip by that occafion, and I conceived thofe papers might be of ufe. I have the honour to be. My Lord, &c. J. Burgoyne. Extrait of a Letter from Lord George Germain to Sir Guy Carleton, dated White- ^ 0 . II, hall, 22d Auguft, 177 6. THE rapid fuccefs of his Majefty’s arms, in driving the rebels out of Canada, does great honour to your condiiA, and 1 hope foon to hear that you have been able to purfue them acrofs the lakes, and to poflefs thofe pofts upon the frontiers which may effe&uallv fecure j our province from anv future infult. T His A P P E N D I X. u No. III. • • in chief of his forces in Canada, His Majefty, in ^P oint '"^S on to th e frontiers of his provinces bordering - was pleafed to extend your comm ffio |j£ neceffary for the completing your thereupon, wifely forefeetng, that it g beyond the limits of your plan of operations that you fooold hes yollj ’that you will, by your own government. I troft, before thts lmer re^ X of a „ the rebd f orces , feint and activity, have beared the ° ireffion „f the lakes. That a^,d will have taken the proper meaft 1 ^ to acquaint you, that there fervice being performed, his Majei y ^ undertaken, which will require ftill remains another P ar * °^ y bon the reftoring peace, and the eftablifh- all your abilities and the ftncfteft Canada! It S an objeft of the greateft ing good order and legal governme attending it are imm'enfe; but his importance to this country, the difficulties «^* ience> for carrylng it into Maiefty depends upon your zeal, an P > happinefs of his fubje&s, corn- execution. His Majefty, ever anxiou d be loft in beginning fo important mands me to inform you, that nc > tim be detaching Lieutenant-General a work, and that you .do fcd i^i n k moft proper, with that part of Burgoyne, or fuch other officer as yo imme diate defence of your province, to your forces which can be fpared fiom i , cive tQ the f UCC efs of the army aftmg carry on fuch operations as (hall be moft c detached to commu- on the fide of New-York; and that you ^he^officer^ of General nicate with and put himfelf, as | foon a P ^ • dge neC eflary to proceed with Howe, you will order fuch artillery as J ' . ^ ann on and military ftores were this detachment ; and as a great quantity y have been j n the hands of the fent, upon the fuppofition tha^^b G ° neral Howe, fupply him with fuch £& y a°„d ft W o"’s as^n^ay'not be wanted for the proton of Canada. thoughts for conducing the War from the Side of Canada. By Lieutenant-General Burgoyne. WHEN thelaft ftiips came fiom Quebec, a report keels of have been founded upon pofitive evidence, that the were refolved to exert feveral large vefiels at Sken^oroug an f fleet during the winter, their utmoft powers, to conftruft a n exer tions, in fuch a degree as to I will not, however, give credit to cx " L * k Champlain early m the imagine the King’s troops will be P re ^ e ^ g J^ n f^ P C rown Point fummer, but will fuppofe the operattons of thearmy to * down every ffible -InTin ^ /of « T,co„ y deto g a t the dtffietent works there are capable of admitting twe | v a - ’ q’ wbb a confiderable naval I will fuppofe him alfo to occupy Lake George wttn ^ ^ campaig „ . ftrength, in order to fecure his retreat, and al er d„ roads from and it is natural to expedt that be wtll ake me^afure. ^ ^ (hc ftron Ticonderoga to Albany by the wa) ° w . . i Kind’s army to carry ground at different places, and thereby obltgtng the Ktngs army weight P OQ APPENDIX. weight of artillery with it, and by felling trees, breaking bridges, and other obvious impediments, to delay, though he Ihould not have power or fpint finally to refill, itS Th°e g enemy thus difpofed upon the fide of Canada, it is to be confidered what troops will be 7 neceflaryf and what difpofition of them will be moil proper to pro- (I mean ( exclufively of the troops left for the fecurity of Canada) ought nottoconfift oflels than eiglit thoufand regulars, rank and fil« The artillery required in the memorandums ot General Carleton, a corps of watermen, two thoufand Canadians, including hatchet-men and other workmen, “urtot^pedThai^inforcetnen. and the equalling .hips may all be ready to fail from the Channel and from Corke on the laft day of March. I am ^per- fuaded that to fail with a fleet of tranfports earlier, is to iubjeT government to lofs and diLplTment. It may reafonably be expefted that they will reach Quebec before the aotli of May, a period in full time for opening the campaign. The roads, °and the rivers and lakes, by the melting and running oft of the fnows, P robably admitted of labour inthe docks r»ill take to, granted that the fleet of lad year, as well bateaux as armed vefleis, will be found repaired, augmented, and fit for immediate fcrvice. T™e magazines that remain of provifion, 1 believe them not to be abundant, w.ll nrobablv be formed at Montreal, Sorel and Chamblee. ' 1 conceive the firlt bufinefs for thofe emrufted with the chief powers, Ihould be to fcledt and poll the troops deftined to remain in Canada; to throw up the military flora and provlfion with £l poffible difpatch, in which fervtce the abovementioned “ " ' P r0 ™ y potted, will greatly a&ift ; and to draw the army deftmed for ope- mion to Cantonments, within as few days march of St. John’s as convemently may be I fcould prefer cantonments at that feafon of the year to encampment, as the around is very damp, and confequently very pernicious to the men, and more^efoeciallv as they will have been for many months before ufed to lodgings, heated wUh Aovefor between decks in (hips; all %fe operates may be put in motion together, but they feverally require fome obfervation. , i ZCid S that the troops left in Canada , fuppofmg the numbet ment.oned in my former memorandum to be approved, migl t e ma e Rank and File. The 31ft regiment, Britifli, excluftve of their light company ^of grenadiers Maclean’s corps — The 29th regiment The ten additional companies from Great Britain Brunfwic and Hefte Hanau to be taken by detachments or com- plete corps, as Major General Reidefel lhall recommend, leaving the grenadiers, light infantry and dragoons compleat Detachments from the other Britilb brigades, leaving the grena- diers and light infantry complete and fquaring the battalions •equally — 111 448 300 448 560 — 650 606 3006 T 2 My iv appendix. My reafon for felefting the 31ft regiment for this duty is, that when I faw it laft it was not equally in order with the other regiments lor fervices of adhvity. I propofe the 29th regiment as it is not at prefent brigaded. I propofe Maclean’s corps, becaufe I very much apprehend defertion from fuch parts 1 of it as are compofed of Americans, ftiould they come near the enemy. F In Canada, whatfoever may be their difpofition, it is not fo eafy to effeft it. And I propofe making up the refidue by detachment, becaufe by felling the men lead calculated for fatigue or lead accudomed to it, which may be equally good foldiers in more confined movements and better provided fituations, the eflfe&ive drength for operation is much greater and the defenfive drength not f mud beo- leave to dare the expeditious conveyance of provifion and dores from Quebecf and the feveral other depofitaries, in order to form ample magazines at Crown Point, as one of the mod important operations of the campaign, becaufe it is upon that which mod of the red will depend. If failing vedels up the St. Lawrence are alone to be employed, the accident of contrary winds may delay them two months before they pafs the rapids of Richelieu, and afterwards St. Peter s Lake; delays to that extent are not uncommon, and they are only to be obviated by having a quantity of fmall craft in readinefs to work with oars. From the mouth of the Sorrel to Chamblee, rowing and tacking is a fure conveyance if diffident hands are found. From Chamblee to St. Therefe (which isjud above the Rapids) land-carriage mud be ufed, and great authority will be requifite to fupply the quantity neceflary. . A bufinefs thus complicated in arrangement, in iome parts unulual in practice, and in others perhaps difficult, can only be carried to the^defired effefl: by the peremptory powers, warm zeal, and confonant opinion ot the governor ; anc though the former are not to be doubted, a failure in the latter vindicated, or feemfng to be vindicated, by the plaufible obdruftions that will not fail to e fuggeded by others, will be fufficient to crufh fuch exertions as an officer ot a fanguine temper, entruded with the future conduct of the campaign, and who e perfonal intered and fame therefore confequentially depend upon a timely out-let, would be led to make. . t , A __ The aflembly of the favages and the Canadians will alfo entirely depend upon Under thefe confiderations, it is prefumed, that the general office !L® m P^° yccl to proceed with the army will be held to be out of the reach of any po i e ame till he is clear of the province of Canada, and furnilhed with the propofed rU The S navigation of Lake Champlain, fecured by the fuperiority of our naval force, and the arrangements for forming proper magazines fo eltabliihecl as to make the execution certain, I would not lofe a day to take pofleuion o row Point with Brigadier Frafer’s corps, a large body of favages, a body of Canadians, both for fcouts and works, and the beft of our engineers and artificers well luppnea with intrenching tools. . „ r The brigade would be fufficient to prevent infult during the time neceiiary ior collecting the ftores, forming magazines, and fortifying the pofts ; all w ic fhould be done to a certain degree, previous to proceeding in force to I icon - roga i APPENDIX. v roga j to fuch a degree I mean as may be fuppofed to be effected in time of tranf- porting artillery, preparing fafcines, and other neceffaries for artillery operations ; and by keeping the reft of the army back during that period, the tranfport of provifions wil be leffened, and the foldiers made of ufe in forwarding the convoys. But though there would be only one brigade at Crown Point at that time, it does not follow that the enemy ffiould remain in a ftate of tranquility. Corps of favages, fupported by detachments of light regulars, ffiould be continually on foot to keep them in alarm, and within their works to cover the reconnoitering of general officers and engineers, and to obtain the belt intelligence of their ftrength, pofition, and defign. If due exertion is made in the preparations Hated above, it may be hoped that Ticonderoga will be reduced early in the fummer,. and it will then become a more proper place for arms than Crown Point. The next meafure mud depend upon thofe taken by the enemy, and upon the general plan of the campaign as concerted at home. If it be determined that General Howe’s whole forces ffiould aft upon Hudfon’s River, and to the fouth- ward of it, and that the only objeft of the Canada army be to effeft ajunftion with that force, the immediate poffeffion of Lake George would be of great con- fequence, as the mod expeditious and mod commodious route to Albany ; and ffiould the enemy be in force upon that lake, which is very probable, every effort ffiould be tried, by throwing favages and light troops round it, to oblige them to quit it without waiting for naval preparations. Should thofe efforts fail, the route by South Bay and Skenefborough might be attempted, but confiderable diffi- culties may be expefted, as the narrow parts of the river may be eafily choaked up and rendered itnpaffable, and at bell there will be neceffity for a great deal of of land carriage for the artillery, provifion, &c. which can only be fupplied from Canada. Imeafeof fuccefs alfo by that route, and the enemy not removed from Lake George, it will be neceffary to leave a chain of polls, as the army proceeds, for the fecurities of your communication, which may too much weaken fo fmall an - army. Left all thefe attempts ffiould unavoidably fail, and it become indifpenfibly neceffary to attack the enemy by water upon Lake George, the army at the outfet ffiould be provided with carriages, implements, and artificers, for conveying armed veffels from Ticonderoga to the lake. Thefe ideas are formed upon the fuppofition, that, it be the foie purpofe of the Canada army to effeft a junftion with General Howe, or after co-operating fo far as to get poffeffion of Albany and open the communication to New-York, to remain upon the Hudfon’s River, and thereby enable that general to aft with his whole force to the fouthward. But ffiould the ftrength of the main American army be fuch as to admit of the corps of troops now at Rhode. Ifland remaining there during the winter, and afting feparately in the fpring, it may be highly worthy confideration, whether the moft important purpofe to which the Canada army could be employed, fuppofing it in poffeffion of Ticonderoga* would not be to gain the Connefticut River. The extent of country from Ticonderoga to the inhabited country upon that river, oppofite to Charles Town, is about fixty miles, and though to convey artil- lery and provifion fo far by land would be attended with difficulties, perhaps more than appendix. S±^wa* molefting the rear or mterrupung the ^voys^Hupf , an(J Rhode , 0and Siest eSd u^ rf.e ctntVicut it .s no't ^.anguine an expeflatton that all the New England provinces wl11 bc ™ J “” d b) omkteTin" the beginning of thefe papers toto.e'theTlfa of SSMte eVery o^eS; l°ol1a «-e arm y much i can b' P™ y > hundred pl °&arize the fecond brigade becaufe tlie ffrff is propofed Canada force, the two brigades will "d i^t, upon examination of the army, that the force is not fuffic.ent for proc^ng upon the aMve to b£c> fair profpedt of fuccefs, the alternative f bv fea o?to be employed fepa- in order to effeft ajunaion with General Howe by lea, or to oe cmp j APPENDIX. vu rately to co-operate with the main defigns, by fuch means as fhould be within their ftrength upon other parts of the continent. And though the army, upon examina- tion of the numbers from the returns here, and the reinforcements defigned, fhould appear adequate, it is humbly fubmitted, as a fecurity againft the poflibility of its remaining ina&ive, whether it might not be expedient to entruft the latitude of embarking the army by fea to the commander in chief, provided any accidents du- ring the winter, and unknown here, fhould have diminiflied the numbers confider- ablv, or that the enemy, from any winter iuccefstothe l'outhward, fhould have been able to draw fuch forces towards the frontiers of Canada, and take up their ground with fuch precaution, as to render the intended meafure impra&icable or too ha- zardous. But in that cafe it muft be confidered that more force would be reqmreu to be left behind for the fecurity of Canada, than is fuppofed to be necefiary when an army is beyond the lakes ; and I do not conceive any expedition from the lea can be fo formidable to the enemy, or fo effedtual to clofe the war, as an invafion from Canada by Ticonderoga. This laft meafure ought not to be thought of, but upon pofitive convi&ion of its necefiity. Hcrtford-Street , Feb. 28th, 1777* J* Eurgoyne * Fx trail of a Letter from Lord George Germain to General C arleton, dated Whitehall, 26 th March, 1777. MY letter of the 2ad Auguft, 1776, was intrufted to the care of Captain Le Maitre, one of your aid-de-camps ; after having been three times m the Gulph of St. Lawrence he had the mortification to find it lmpofilble to make his panage to Quebec, and therefore returned to England with my difpatch ; which, though it v^s prevented by that accident from reaching your hands in due time, I neverthelefs think proper to tranfmit to you by this earlielt opportunity. You will be informed, by the contents thereof, that as foon as you fhould have driven the rebel forces from the frontiers of Canada, it was his Majefty s pleafure that you fhould return to Quebec, and take with you fuch part of your army as in your' judgment and dilcretion appeared fufficient for the defence of the province ; that you fhould detach Lieutenant General Burgoyne, or fuch other officer as you fhould think moll proper, with the remainder of the troops, and direct the officer fo detached to proceed with all polhble expedition to join General Howe, and to put himfirif under his command. . . , u • n ^ With a view of quelling the rebellion as foon as pofllble, it is become highly ne- reffarv that the molt fpeedy jun&ion of the two armies fhould. be effected $ anc, therefore, as the fecurity and good government of Canada abfolutely require your prefenee there, it is the King’s determination to leave about 3 coo men under your command, for the defence and duties of that province, and to employ the remainder of your army upon two expeditions, the one under the command of Lieutenant Ge- neral Burgoyne, who is to force his way to Albany, and the other under the com- mand of Lieutenant Colonel St. Leger, who is to make a diverfion on the Mohawk Rl Asthis plan cannot be advantageoufly executed without the afintance of Cana- dians and Indians, his Majefty ftrongly recommends it to your care, to furmfh both CaUC* No. IV. VU1 appendix. expeditions with good and fufficient bodies of thofe men •, and I am happy in know- in 0- that your influence among them is fo great, that there can be no room to ap- prehend you will find it difficult to fulfil his Majefty’s expectations. In order that no time may be loft in entering upon thefe important undertakings, General Burgoyne has received orders to fail forthwith for Quebec-, and that the in- tended operations may be maturely confidered, and afterwards carried on in fuch a manner as is molt likely to be followed by fuccefs, he is directed to confult with you upon the fubjeCt, and to form and adjuft the plan as you both (hall think molt con- ducive to his Majefty’s fervice. 1 am alfo to acquaint you, that as foon as you (hall have fully regulated every thing relative to thefe expeditions (and the King relies upon your zeal, that you will be as expeditious as the nature of the bufinefs will admit) it is his Majefty s plea, fure that you detain for the Canada fervice , . The 8th regiment, deducting loofor the expedition to the Mohawk Battalion companies of the 29th and 31ft regiments — “ Battalion companies of the 34th, deducting 100 for the expedition to the Mohawk — ~ v Eleven additional companies from Great Britain — Detachments from the two brigades — Detachments from the German troops — Royal Highland emigrants — 460 896 348 616 300 650 500 377 ° You will naturally conclude that this allotment for Canada has not been made without properly weighing the feveral duties which are likely to be required. His Maiefty has not only confidered the feveral garrifons and polls which probably it may be neceffary for you to take, viz. Quebec, Chaudiere, the difaffected panlhes of Point Levi, Montreal, and polls between that town and Ofwegatche, Trois Rivieres, St Tohn’s, Sele aux Noix, La Prairie, Vergere, and fome other towns upon the louth Ihore of St. Lawrence, oppofite the ifte of Montreal, with polls of communi- cation to St. John’s, but he hath alfo reflected that the feveral operations which will be carrying on in different parts of America mull necelfanly confine the attention of the rebels to the refpeCtive fcenes of aftion, and fecure Canada from external at- tacks and that the internal quiet which at prefent prevails is not likely to be in- terrupted, or if interrupted, will foon be reftored by your influence over the inha- bitants j he therefore trufts that 3000 men will be quite iuflicient to anfwer every P °L^ e Hkewffie d ’his Majefty’s pleafure that you put under the command of Lieute- nant General Burgoyne , . , The grenadiers and light infantry of the army (except of the 8th regiment and the 24th regiment) as the advanced corps under the command of Brigadier General Frafer „ , , „ , , Firft brigade, battalion companies of the 9th, 21ft, and 47th regiments, duCting a detachment of 50 from each corps, to remain in Canada Second brigade, battalion companies of the aoth, 53d, and 6 2d regiments, duCling 50 from each corps to remain as above Carried over de- de- 1568 1194 1194 r, APPENDIX. IX Brought over 39 j6 All the German troops, except the Hanau chaffeurs, and a detachment of 650, 3217 The artillery, except fuch parts as (hall be neceffary for the defence of Canada. vn Together with as many Canadians and Indians as may be thought neceffary for this fervlce • and after having furnilhed him in the fulled and compleateft manner with artillery, (lores, provifions, and every other article neceffary for his expedition, and fecured to him every affiffance which it is in your power to afford and procure you are to give him orders to pals Lake Champlain, and from thence, by the mod vigorous exertion of the force under his command m proceed with all expedition to Albany, and put himfelf under the command of Sir W ilium Howe. From the King’s knowledge of the great preparations made by you lad year to fecure the command of the lakes, and your attention to this part of the fervice du- . ,.,; nr pr hiq Maieftv is led to expeit that every thing will be ready for Ge- neral Burgoyne’’s pafling the lakes by the time you and he (hall have adjufted the ^ l" i°^the King’s further pleafure that you put under the command of Lieutenant Colonel St. Leger, __ IOO Detachment from the 8th regiment ^ __ f 0(y Detachment from the 34th regiment — __ Sir John Johnfon’s regiment of New York — _ ^ Hanau chaffeurs 675 'TY.o-PfW v'irh a diffident number of Canadians and Indians j and after having fur- together with ... ft provifions, and every other neceffary am- n.ihed him w.th p °P" : “h fccuredto him every affiftance in' your power to afford cle for his expedition, and feeu ^ J ecd forthwith to and down the Mo- hat f River ’J Albany, and put himfelf unde? the command of Sir William Howe. I fhal 4 ke to Sir William Howe from hence by the firft packet - but you will never helefs endeavour to give him the earlieft intelligence of this meafure, and alfo direft Lieutenant General Burgoyne, J Colonel ScUgi William Howe Y^itl ahtfcme time in/them, that, until .Key fhall have Williarn ^owe. x u w - n - m Howe i t j s his Ma efty’s pleafure that they aft as eTmay Squirt a^diX^er^they fhi. /udfe moft proper for mak ” r; muft never view of thlr intended junftions with Sir William How D e as th e or Lieutenant Colonel St. Leger fhould hap- £3l” £ be” qualified to fuppli the place of thofe whom his Majefty has m fits wifdom at prefent appointed to conduit thefe expeditions. U Copy APPENDIX. X N<>. v. Cep'- of a Letter from Lieutenant General Burgovne to Lord George Germain, dated Quebec, May 14, 1777. [Private.] My Lord, I TAKE the opportunity of a vefiel difpatched by Sir Guy Carleton to England, to inform your Lordfhip of my arrival here the 6 th inftant. And though my prefent fituation, as adting under a fuperior upon the fpot, may make an official correfpon- dence unneceffary, I cannot perfuade myi'elf I ffiall not appear guilty of impropriety in affuming the honour of a private and confidential one, relatively to the objeds of my deftination. * From my prefent information, I have reafon to expect the preparations for open- ing the campaign to be very forward on our part. Due exertions were ufed in the courfe of the winter, and the uncommon mildnefs of the weather greatly favoured them, to convey provifions to Chamble and St. John’s. One large victualler ar- rived after I left the St. Lawrence laft November; all refidues of other victuallers have been collected ; I am in hopes of finding a fufficiency of provifion to enable me to crofs the Lake Champlain at leaft, without the arrival of the Corke fleet. I hope alfo to find artillerv ftores enough to feel the pulfe of the enemy at Ticondero- ga Should their fituation and refolution be fuch as to make great artillery prepa- rations requifite, I ffiall certainly be under the neceffity of waiting at Crown Point the arrival of the ordnance ffiips from England. A good body of the Indians I am allured are ready to move upon the firft call, and mealures are taicing for bringing them forthwith to proper redezvous. _ I cannot fpeak with fo much confidence of the military affiftance I am to look for from the Canadians. The only corps yet inftituted, or that I am informed can at prefent be inftituted, are three independent companies of 100 men each, officered by Seio-neurs of the country, who are well chofen ; but they have not been able to eno-ao-e many volunteers. The men are chiefly drafted from the militia, according to a late regulation of the legifiative council. Thofe I have yet feen afford no pio- onilb of ule of arms — aukwark, ignorant, difinclined to the fervice, and fpiritlefs. Various reafons are affigned for this change in the natives fince the time of the Erench government. It may partly be owing to a difufe of arms, but I believe principally to the unpopularity of their Seigneurs, and to the poifon which the emiffaries of the rebels have thrown into their minds. Should I find the new com- panies up the country better compofed, or that the well affedted parties can be pre- vailed upon to turn out volunteers, though but for a ffiort occafion, as they did laft year, I ffiall move Sir Guy to exert further meafures to augment my numbers. The army will fall ffiort of the ftrength computed in England ; the want of the camp equipage, cloathing, and many other neceffary articles, will caufe inconve- nience; I am neverthelefs determined to put the troops deftined for my command immediately in motion ; and, affifted by the fpirit and health in which they abound, I am confident in the profpedt of overcoming difficulties and difappoint- ments. . c Having fettled all meafures with Sir Guy Carleton, both for this purpofe and for the expeditious tranfport of the ftores as they may arrive, and having already dif- patched inftrudtions to Captain Lutwidge, who commands the fleet upon Lake r Cham- 1 APPENDIX. Champlain, to fecure the navigation, in which I clearly fee he will find no trouble, I fhall proceed in perfon this afternoon for Montreal, and from thence make my final arrangements for purftiing the King’s orders. I fhould think myfelf deficient in juftice and in honour, were I clofe my letter without mentioning the fenfe 1 entertain of General Carleton’s conduct ; that he was anxioufiy defirous of leading the military operations out of the province, is eafi- ly to be difcerned •, but his deference to his Majefty’s decifion, and his zeal to give effect to his meafures in my hands, are equally manifeft, exemplary, and latisfaCtory. I (hall take every pofiible means to tranfmit to your Lordfliip an account of my pro- ceedings from time to time, and have the honour to be, with perfect refpeCt, Your Lordfiiip’s moft obedient and moft humble fervant, J. Burgoyne. P. S. I have mentioned nothing of intelligence concerning the enemy, con- cluding that Sir Guy Carleton will tranfmit the material part of it, and in a manner more full than in my power to do. I underftand they have laboured hard to ftreno-then Ticonderoga, and threaten a vigorous refiftance there, and that they have built fome veflels on Lake George, as your Lordfliip may remember I had forefeen. Copy of a Letter from Lieutenant General Burgoyne to Lord George Germain, dated Second Montreal, May 19, 1777. No,V ’ My Lord, . I HAD the honour to write to your Lordfliip the day I left Quebec, having rea- fon to imagine this letter may reach that place in time to be difpatched with my former one, I cannot omit the occafion to inform your Lordfliip, that the hopes I exprefied of being able to put the troops in motion without waiting the arrival of the fleets from England and Ireland, are confirmed. The only delay is occafioned by the impracticability of the roads, owing to late extraordinary heavy rains, and this difficulty will be fpeedily removed, by exerting the fervices of the pariflies as foon as the weather clears. In the mean time, I am employing every means that water carriage will admit for drawing the troops and ftores towards their point. I trull, I fhall have veflels fufficient to move the army and ftores together, and in that cafe, will take poll at once, within fight of Ticon- deroga, and only make life of Crown Point for my hofpital and magazine. A continuation of intelligence from different fpies and deferters, confirms the de- ficxn of the enemy to difpute Ticonderoga vigoroufly. They are alfo building bow- gallies at Fort George, for the defence of that Lake, &c. fortifying on the road to Skenelborough. . .. r .. r , It is configned to the New England colonies, to furnilh fupplies or men and pro- vifion to oppofe the progrefsof my army, and they have undertaken the talk, upon condition of being exempt from fupplying Mr. Wafhington’s main army. It is my defign, while advancing to Ticonderago, and during the liege of that port for a fiegc I apprehend it muft be, to give all pofiible jealoufy on the fide of Connecticut. If I can by manoeuvre lead the enemy to fufpeft, that after the reduc- tion of Ticonderago, my view's are pointed that way, the Connecticut forces will be U 2 very A P P E N D I X. xu No. VI. wy couriers of paving .hair own frontier, and I may gain a Hart that may ,nncU expedite and facilitate my P r ^ re ® whatever demonftration I may endeavour to im^feon remake no movement that can procraftina.e the great okjea of my orders. x ^ ^ honour t0 ke , & c. J. Burgcyhe. [In Lieutenant-General Burgoyne’s, June 22, 1777-] Chiefs and Ware iqks an d the patron of all who feek and deferve THE great King, ou fatisfaftion the general condudt of the Indian tribes his protection, has confident with T^o fagacious and too faithful to be from the beginning of t ie rou , , v j 0 | atec j rights of the parental power deluded or corrupted they have ^obferved ak) ne, the refufe of a they love, and burned to vim ica - mifreprefentations, the fpecious al- fmr.ll tribe, at the firft were led afire , an^he mm ^ ^ reb j s are ^fe^'and alf of v^htch Ae^eniploved for that effedt, have fared only in the end to^enhance the holt of th'e tri£s in generai, ^ \Z few and how contemptible aie t e a P bablv have before this day hid their faces a and over 5 this vafi con- tinent, are on the fide of juftice, of law, an c ^ ' e . ? tke King your father’s The reftraint you have P^JS^STS.’^S.. affect could have call to arms, the hardeft pro , 1 mark of your adherence to that principle ^ * is mMua,iy the defpifed, and his farther patience w °^’. O ppreffions in the provinces that ever dif- would withold redrefs from Sins for me, the General of one of graced the hiftory of mankind. I renrefentative to releafe you from thole his Majefty’s armies and in might of bonds which your obedience impofe • enem j es of Great-Britain and peace, and happinefs-deftroyets of commerce, ^S^laTou, the chiefs of his ^ Princes his allies, efteemyouas brothers in . , . examp i e s ; we know Ihip, we will endeavour reciprocally to giv<- 1 • p n ternrize and your how to value, and we will ftrive to imitate your Pg eve ^ fK f,. ora t he dilates of con (fancy to reftft hunger, wearmefs, and pam. Be it o\ . , our appendix. “ fufpend the vp-Hfted ftroke, to orlTriS; wherever tLy'are dlfcovered,^^ fuf,,efted, and to dr- lemble, is, to a generous mind, ^^'^l^^loined to your principles of affec- Ferfuaded that your magnanirm y ’ ^ m ; nds t han the military rank lion to the King, will give me fti ei con i ^ f er i ous attention to the rules which 1 obfervation during the carn^gn. I pofitively forbid bloodfhed when you a,e n0 ^ OI |f° b e £ eld f acr ed from the knife Aged men, women, children, and puloners, or hatchet, even in the time of adual coni i . but you fhall be called to You (hall receive compenfation for the pnloners you ta*e, o ) account for fealps. „ which have affixed an idea of ho- In conformity and indulgence to you ° , take die fealps of the dead, nour to fuch badges of vl£tor >'’ y ^. ^ )flt - 10 „ . but on' no account, or pretence, when lulled by your fire, and in .' be taken from the wounded, or even dying; or fubtlety, or prevarication are the) heW tQ kU1 men in that condition, ,hM tWs p roteaton, ° the wounj uatl0n > wlth information from Brigadier Frafer that the enemy were _ retiring, andffiat hew as advancing with his picquets, leaving orders for the brigade thev could accoutre, with intention to purfue by land. . T ^% m h °^ i P en f J difcernible, as were the Britiffi colours, which the Brigadier had fixed upon the fort^f Ticonderoga. Knowing how fafely I could truft I turned my chief attention to the purfrnt by water, by wn.ch route I underltood 6 ne column were retiring in two hundred and twenty bateaux, cover y “The 1 B gfeat S bridge of communication, through which a way was tobeopejied, was fupported by twenty-two funken piers of large timber, at nearly equal di- ftancesV the fpace between were made of feparate floats, each about fifty feet long, and twelve feet wide, ftrongly faftened together by chains and rivets , and alfo faftened to the funken piers. Before this bridge was a boom, mad. ^y 3 ^ APPENDIX. large pieces of timber, fattened together by rivettcd bolts and double chains, made of iron an inch and an half fquare. The gun-boats were inftantly moved forward, and the boom and one of the intermediate floats were cut with great dexterity and difpatch, and Commodore Lutwidge, with the officers and feamen in his department, partaking the general animation, a paflage was formed in half an hour for the frigates alfo, through im- pediments which the enemy had been labouring to conftruft fince laft autumn. During this operation Major General Reidefel had patted to Mount Indepen- dence, with the corps, Breyman, and part of the left wing. He was directed to proceed by land, to fuftain Brigadier Frafer, or to aft more to the left, if he law it expedient fo to do. The 6zd regiment Britifh, and the Brunfwick regiment of Prince Frederick, were ftationed at Ticonderoga and Mount Independence, in the place of the parties of bralers brigade, which had been left in pottettion of the artillery and ftores, and the reft of the army was ordered to follow up the river as they could be col- lefted, without regard to the place in the line. About three in the afternoon I arrived with the Royal George and Inflexible ; and the beft failing gun-boats at South Bay, within three miles of Skenefborough, at which latter place the enemy were potted in a ftockaded fort, and their armed gallies in the falls below. The foremott regiments, viz. the 9th, 20th, and 21ft, were immediately dif- embarked, and al'cended the mountains with the intention of getting behind the fort, and cutting off" the retreat of the enemy ; but their precipitate flight rendered this manoeuvre ineffeftual. The gun-boats and frigates continued their courfe to Skenefborough Falls, where the armed veflels were potted. Captain Carter, with part of his brigade of gun-boats, immediately attacked, and with fo much fpirit, that two of the veflels very foon ftruck ; the other three were blown up, and the enemy having previoufly prepared combuftible materials, let fire to the fort, mills, ftorehoufes, bateaux, &c. and retired with the detachment left for that purpofe, the main body having gone off when the troops were afeending the mountain. A great quantity of provifions and fome arms were here confumed, and mod of their officers’ baggage was burnt, funk, or taken. Their lofs is not known; about 30 prifoners were made, among which were two wounded officers. During thefe operations upon the right, Brigadier General Frafer continued his purfuit to Caftletown till one o’clock, having marched in a very hot day from four o’clock in the morning till that time. Some ftragglers of the enemy were picked up, from whom the Brigadier learned that their rear guard was compofed of chofen men, and commanded by Colonel Francis, one of their beft officers. During the time that the men were refrefhing, Major General Reidefel came up, and arrange- ments for continuing the purfuit having been concerted, Brigadier Frafer moved forward again, and during the night lay upon his arms, in an advantageous fltu- ation, three miles nearer the enemy. At three in the morning he renewed his march, and about five his advanced fcouts difeovered the enemy’s centries, who fired their pieces and joined the main body. The Brigadier obferving a commanding ground to the left of his light infantry, immediately ordered it to be pofiefied by that corps; and a confiderable body of the enemy attempting the fame, they met. T{ie enemy were driven back X to xvii 7th July. xvm 8th July. appendix. to their original poft » the advance ^ S£».?5& enemy long defended t »«” ^ Capetown road by the grenadiers, they repulfed, and prevented P'“ S n and upon a fecond repulfe, attempted their rallied, and renewed the . aa ‘°" • a „ ren £|iers fcrambled up a part of that afeenr, retreat by Pitsford Mountain. 1 ,hc gren ^ fummk before them, which threw appearing almoft inacceffi e, o , fuperior in numbers, and consequent y them into confufion j they we ! Speftation of the Brunfwickers, had in extent, and the brigadier, in mom Y l At this critical moment General. latterally drawn from his left to th * e firing, arrived with the foremoft Reidefel, who had preffed on, up o . ^ o-renadiers and light infantry, of his columns, via. the chaffeurs ^ HU 1= TourS to take i he extended upon His judgment immediately P°' . p- j got into aftion with great gallantry. Brigadier Frafer’s left Bank. 1 • h ' C ™J£L leaving dead upon the field Colonel rr'othet^ofiicers, Xt’fe^catt^'eribbake-ns, and »6 men were made pttfoners i a ove 200 ft and of arms were alio taken , pno . ao . eme nt amounted to 2000 men. The The number of the enemy befor ^ t he parties left the day before Britifh detachment under Bngad co nfifted only of 850 fighting men at Ticonderoga not having been able ” j“ ci ent for its praife. Should the The bare relation of fo fignal be f ore the German brigade came up, attack againft fuel, inequality of ^ numbers tbat the enemy might have feem to require explanation, it Qn a f u dden found themfelves too efcaped by delay; that the adv ^ n , C ^ “ etreatinff . and that Brigadier Frafer had near the enemy to avoid aftion wi °The tUfference 0 f time in their fuppofed the German troops to be very n for a fhare in the glory and arrival was merely accidental. The Gjmans p^ ^ ^ the exertions of Bnga- they arrived in time to obtain ** • nuanC e of that uniform intelligence, aftivity prevented any of i»di- were ftill retreating, the oth . This was effeded, but with great Fort Anne, and obferve the enemy s m ■ and the bridges broken. The difficulty, as the roads w «re a moft »r p ^ in dragging fifty batea " x ^^ °f < tr ° OP : to "facilitate the movement of the reft of the firft 'brigade to Fort Anne, to d ' n ^|^\VrcXnel Hill (9th regiment) that thd A report was received from \ . confiderable body of freffi ij> en .» . enemy had been reinforced in the ni^l Y but he would maintain his he could not retire with his regimen brigade were ordered to ground. The two remaining regiments ot the nrit D their their march* and upon fecond intelligence of the enemy* and firing being heard, the 20th regiment was ordered forward with two pieces of artillery, and Major General Phillips was fent to take the command. A violent ftorm of rain, which lafted the whole day, prevented the troops from getting to Fort Anne fo roon as was intended ; but the delay gave the 9th regiment an opportunity of diftinguifh- ing themfelves* by {landing and repulfing an attack of fix times their number. The enemy finding the pofition not to be forced in front* endeavoured to turn it ; and from the fuperiority of their numbers that inconvenience was to be appro* hended *, and Lieutenant Colonel Hill found it necefiary to change his pofition in the height of action : fo critical an order was executed by the regiment with the utmoft fteadinefs and bravery. The enemy* after an attack cf three hours* were totally repulfed, and fled towards Fort Edward, felting fire to Fort Anne* but leaving a faw-mill and a block-houfe in good repair, which were afterwards pof * fefled by the king’s troops. The 9th regiment acquired, during their expedition, about thirty prifoners, fome ftores and baggage* and colours of the id Hampfhire regiment. One unlucky accident happened, to counterbalance, in fome degree* this fuc- cefs. Captain Montgomery, an officer of great merit* was w'ounded early in the adtion, and was in the adt of being drefled by the iurgeon when the regiment changed ground ; being unable to help himfelf, he and the furgeon were taken prifoners. I fince hear he has been well treated, and is in a fair way of lecovery at Albany. . _ . . r The army very much fatigued (many parts of it having wanted their provilions for two days, almofl the whole their tents and baggage) afiembled in their prefent pofition. The right wing occupies the heights of Skencloorough in two lines; the right flank to the mountains, covered by the regiment of Reidefel s dragoons, cnpotence-, the left to the Wood Creek. The Brunfwick troops under Major General Keidefel upon Caftletown River, with Breyman’s corps upon the communication cf roads leading to Putney and Rutland the regiment of Hefle Hanau are ported at the head of Fart Cieek* to preferve the communication with the camp at Caftletown River* and fccure the bateaux. . Brigadier Frafer’s corps is in the centre* ready to move on either wing of the The fcattered remains of the enemy are at Fort Edward, on the Hudfons River, where they have been joined* as 1 am informed, by General Putnam, with a considerable corps of frefh troops. . Roads are opening for the army to march to them by Fort Anne, and the ooci Creek is clearing of fallen trees* funken (tones* and other obftacles, to give panage to bateaux for carrying artillery, ftores* provifions and camp equipage. 7 hele aie laborious works 5 but the fpirit and zeal of the troops are fufficient to lurmount them. Some little time muft alfo be allowed for the fupplies of provifions to overtake us. In the mean time all poffible diligence is ufing at 7 lconderoga to get the gun-boats* provifion veflels* and a proper quantity of bateaux into Lake George. A corps of the army will be ordered to penetrate by that route* which will afterwards be the route for the magazines s and a jun&ion of the whole is in- tended at Fort Edward. r X -2 I trani- 9th and 10th July. XX No. VIII. appendix. , mnfmit to your Lordfliip herewith returns of the killed and wounded, and Hits of fuch pOTS of T proviffons and (lores, taken from the enemy, as could be colleSed in lb (lion a time. ( ^ ^ honour t0 be> v'itlr the greareft refpeft, Y our I ordfhips, &c. On of a Letter from Lieutenant General Burgoyne to Lord George Germain, dated D J Skenefborough, July n, 1777- [Private.] HAVING eWen your Lordfliip a detail, in my public letter of this date of the latfttalraaionl I now do myfelf the honour to Bate to y our Lordfhip, fuch ctreum- ftance S as appear to me mom and propofed ro SiSj. one from 1 She county, are confident of fuccefs a y , , with fpirit. Sir Guy Carleton embryo, but very protnifing ; t jey av ’ tQ fiR u occa {ionally, and' the agree- has given me blank commiffion ’ be fo effe&ive, till two thirds of ment with them is, that the commiffions are not to ^ ^ arms> the battalions are raifed. Some hunche s nrofefline themfelves loyalifts, and have joined me f, nee 1 have penerated this Voligh I wifhing to ferve, feme to the en j h ’ ave not hefitated to receive them, and am without inftrudhons upon J -.’ n. ^ officers till a decifion can be made as faft as companies can be formed, 1 ^ them particularly upon detach- upon the meafure by my fupenors. Dr0 curine cattle ; their real ufe 1 expedt ments, for keeping the country in > • ^ troops : but the impreflion which will will be great in the preservation of pr0 vincials be feen afting vigorouily in the raufe^the^ngf vriir be'y’et more advantageous, and, 1 truft, fudy juffify .he ex- Pe The mamfcfto, of which I ' ndo ^g r ,j£ r “he raXr^iUnofinihe^imvet of herewith fend a duplicate, as gtea ^ efforts to counteract it. 1 hey from .he demen, par. of the manifefto, they, and no. the King's troops, ate the «««. «( e no mmti „ n of .he Indians, in the y„„r Lordft.p havc ’ ‘ ffib | e to draw them in many tefpects from the purfuit from Ticonderoga. fi , 1 • acknowledge this is not the only inftance plunder of that place, and I a^name If under the management of their in which I have found little • t fted rea Vons,’in all the caprices and humours 7Sd%Ste“: bt lei they grow mote untenable and imponuna.e upon 2 APPENDIX. XX’. every new favour ; were they left to themfeives, enormities too horrid to think of would enfue, guilty and innocent, women and infants, would be a common prey. This is the character of the lower Canadian Indians, who alone have been uith the army hitherto. I am informed the Outawas, and other remote nations, who are within two days march of joining me, are more brave and more tradable ; that they profels war, not pillage. They are under the dire&ions of a M. St. Luc, a Canadian gentleman of honour and parts, and one of the beft partizans the French had laft war, and of one Langlade, the very man who projected and executed with thefe very na- tions the defeat of General Braddock. My firft intention was to turn this whole corps to the Connecticut immediately, to force a fupply of provifions, to intercept reinforcements, and to confirm the jealoufy I have in many ways endeavoured to ex- cite in the New England provinces ; but finding that the enemy are labouring to re- move their magazines from Forts George and Edward, and every where deftroying the roads, and preparing to drive and burn the country towards Albany’, I have de- termined to employ them, to prevent, if poffible, by their terror, the continuance of thofe operations. And after arriving at Albany, they may be employed to renew’ the alarm towards Connecticut and Bofton. Your Lordfhip will pardon me if I a little lament that my orders do not give me the latitude I ventured topropofe in my original projeCt for the campaign, to make a real effort inftead of a feint upon New England. As things have turned out, were I at liberty to march in force immediately by my left, inftead of my right, I fhould have little doubt of fubduing before winter the provinces where the rebellion origin ginated. If my late letters reach Mr. Howe, I ftill hope this plan may be adopted from Al- bany ; in the mean while my utmoft exertions fhall continue, according to my in- ftruCtions, to force a junction. I have fent fome Indians through the woods, in the hope of their reaching St. Leger, with the account of my progrels ; now is the critical time for his pulh upon the Mohawk. I have certain intelligence that all the country round Fort Stanwix is in alarm t but I imagine it proceeds from the appearance of fome Savages detached by Colonel Butler, not apprehending St. Leger can be got quite fo forward. Camp near Saratoga , Augujt 20, 1777. To Lord George Germaine. My Lord, IN my laft difpatch (a duplicate of which will be inclofed herewith) I had the honour to inform your Lordfhip of the proceedings of the army under my command to the 30 th of July. F'rom that period to the 1 5th of Auguft every poffible meafure was employed to bring forward bateaux, provifions, and ammunition from Fort George to the firft navigable part of Hudfon’s River, a diftance of eighteen miles, the roads in fome parts deep, and in others wanting great repair. Of the horl'es furnifhed by contract in Canada not more than a third part was yet arrived. The delay was not imputable to Second No. VIII. u APPENDIX. to negleft, but to the natural accidents attending fo of land and water carnage. l< '^dd'^vere added to affift the tranfport ; but thefe country through which 1 had marched, ^ J ^ . jUr pofes of feeding the army, relources together Exceeding heavy rains augmented the and forming a magazine at the lame , tcn or twelve oxen upon a Angle impediments. It was often neceffa y . | days above ftated, there were bateau-, and after the utmoft blteaux in the river, not above four days ptovifion before han * ^ ^ before Fort Intelligence had reached me that ~ Qf the enemy oppofed to me was at Stanwix, which was defend . m outh of the Mohawk. Stillwater, a place between Saratoga «k * °[ hc utmoft confequence at tins A rapid movement forward the Mohawk without putting period. The enemy could notha c d S t Leger fhould have fucceeded •, and them Elves between two fires, in c-fc Colonel • • ° muft ekher therefore have at beft being cut off by my arm) 1 Aihanv or have palled the Hudfon s flood an aftion, have fallen back towards Al W or have I* ^ of thcfc River, in order to tore > ^had boon enabled to advance, Colo- meatures they had taken, fotha ° b iffifted, a junction with him probab.y nel St. Leger’s operations would have been Xo maimam the commu- fecured, and the whole country of the f ovett £ nt fo as to be fupplied by daily nication with Fort George during _ s an obvious impoifibility. The degrees at a diftance, continually increa S ’ . • 0 f po fts. Efcorts for every fepa- army was much too weak to have afforded “ . l or cou ld any have been made rate tranfport would have been a ftill g reater ^ ia ' ’ the enemy might take in one fo ftrong as to force their way through fuefe ‘Lercus ml &. Had the night’s march from the White Creek, where t y hend i ng fo palpable an ad- :r/;:x n p5i y tTiy P te ^ f0,wari1 “ * the tranfport muft have ceafed behind, re linqui(h the favourable opportuni- The alternative therefore was fho t * ^ ^ e p ources of fupply. ty of advancing upon the enem) , f unn lies in live cattle, from a large trad of } It was well known that the enemy H Ar i; no -ton and other parts of the country, pffed by the route of conveyed'ftonr thence Ham pfhire Grants, to Benmn^to , , r w u ee i carriages was alio formed a Jo the main army. A large depoflt of con, a d of vvheel ca ^ Mmbers m difpatch : fuccefs would a,fo have Officer well to command. He had under him -oo mm Britifh, all the Canadian volun- fel, Captain Frafer’s niarkfmen, which Ww the country, ioo Indians, and teers, a party of the Provincials who P^^XLsoonzn. The two light pieces of cannon ; the whole det ^ n fted w hU e thel ight troops felt inftruSions were pofitive to keep the regular coips poltea * their 4 appendix. their way, and not to incur the danger of being furrouoded, or having a retreat cut ofF In order to facilitate this operation, and to be ready to take advantage of its fuc- cefs the army moved up the eatl ffiore of Hudfon’s River. On the 14th, a bridge was* formed of rafts, over which the advanced corps palled and encamped at Saratoga. Lieutenant Colonel Breyman’s corps were polled near Batten Kill, and upon intelli- gence from Colonel Baume, that the enemy were ftronger at Bennington than ex- pected, and were aware of his attack, that corps, confiding of- the Brunfwick gre- nadiers, light infantry and chaffeurs, were fent lorward to fuftain him. It fmee appears that Lieutenant Colonel Baume, not having been able to complete his march undifeovered, was joined at a place called Sancoix Mills, about four miles fhort of Bennington, by many people profelling themfelves to be Loyalilts. A pro- vincial gentleman of confidence who had been fent with the detachment, as knowing the country and the character of the inhabitants, was fo incautious as to leave at liber- ty fuch as took the oath of allegiance. „ . . r . ... His credulity and their profligacy caufed the firlt misfortune. Colonel Baume vvas induced to proceed without fufficient knowledge of the ground. His defign was be- trayed • the men who had taken the oaths were the firft to fire upon him ; he vvas attacked on all fides. He Ihewed great perfonal courage, but was overpowered by ^During this time Lieutenant Colonel Brey man was upon the march through a hea- vv rain ; and fuch were the other impediments dated in that officer s repoit, of bad roads, tired horfes, difficulties in palling artillery, carriages, &c. that he was from eight in the morning of the 1 5 th to four in the afternoon of the following day making about twenty-four miles. , f , , . He engaged, fought gallantly, and drove the enemy from three feveral heights , but was too late to fucoour Colonel Baume, who was made prifoner, and a confioera- ble part of his dragoons were killed or taken. The failure of ammunition, from the accidental breaking to pieces of a tumbril, unfortunately obliged Lieutenant Colonel Breyman to retire conquering troops, and to leave behind two pieces of cannon, be- fides two which had been loft by Lieutenant Colonel Baume. The Indians made good their retreat from the firft affair, as did Captain Frafer, with part of his compa- ny and manv of the Provincials and Canadians. , , . . , 7 The lofs, as at prefent appears, amounts to about 400 men, killed and taken in both adtions, and twenty-fix officers, moldy prifoners; but men who were difperled in the woods drop in daily. A correct return lhall be tranfnutted to your Lordlhip the ^This^my Lord, is a. true date of the event. I have not dwelt upon errors, be* caufe in many indances they were counterbalanced by fpirit. 1 he enemy will of courfe find matter of parade in the acquifition of four pieces of cannon . u apart they have fmall caufe of exultation ; their lofs in .killed and wounded being, more’ than double to ours, by the confeffion of their prifoners and defeiters, an o manv inhabitants who were witneffes to the burial of their dead. The chief fubjedt of regret on our fide, after that which any lofs of g al ' ant ™ naturally occafions, is the dilappointmerit of not obtaining live cattle, and the lofs of time in bringing forward the magazines. xxiii Xxiv No. IX. appendix. This heavy work is now nearly completed, and a new bridge of boats is thrown over the Hudfen’s River, oppofite to Saratoga, the former one of rafts hating been carried away by the fwell of water after the late continual rains. \Y hen enabled to move nothing within my fcale of talent fhall be left unattempted to fulfil his Maje- Ay’s orders, and I hope circumftances will be fuch, that my endeavours may be in fomc degree afiifted by a co-operation of the army under Sir W llliam Howe. I have the honour to be, with great refped, Your Lordfhip’s moft obedient and mod humble fervant, (Signed.) J. Burgovne.* Copy of a Letter from Lieutenant General Burgoyne to Lord George Germain, dated Camp , near Saratoga, Auguft 20, 1777. [Private, j My Lord, . r I NEED not enlarge upon the concern I have in communicating any limiter events. I am perfuadcd your Lordlhip will give me credit for partaking every fen timent that your Lordlhip, or any other man warmed with principle and zeal in this Cornell, can feC Jn regard to the affair of Saintcoick, I have only to add to the public account that if ever there was a fituation to juftify enterprize and exertion, out of the beaten track of military fervice, it was that in which I found myfelf. Had I fucceeded, I ou have effeded a jundion with St. Leger, and been now-before Albany. And I flatter myfelf, 1 need only mention thofe views, to Ihew that in hazarding this cxpedi ion had the founded: principles of military reafoning on my fide, viz. that the advantages to be expeded from fuccefs were in a great degree fupenor to the evils that could at- tend mifcarriage. The fecondary purpofes, to which I alluded in the public letter, were to try the g affedions of the country ; to complete the Provincial corps many re- ' cruits for which were unable to efcape from their villages without a force to encou- rage and proted them ; and to diftrad the councils of the enemy, by continuing their jealoufy towards New England. , . . Major General Reidefel has preffed upon me repeatedly the mounting his dragoons, the men were animated with the fame defire, and I conceived it a moft fav0 “ r * " cafion to give into their ideas and felicitations, becaule in exerting their zeal to tulhl their favourite purpofe, they neceflarily would eflfed the greater purpofe of my own. The reft of the troops were feleded from fuch as would leaft weaken the iolid ftrengt 1 of the army, in cafe of ill fuccefs ; and I thought it expedient to take a little trial of the Provincials and Canadians before I might have occafion for them in more impor- 13 Thf original detachment could not have been made larger wi thout opening roads and other preparations of time, nor fhould I have thought it juftifiable to expofe the beft troops to lofs upon a collateral adion. Had my inftrudions been followed or could Mr. Breyman have marked at the rate of two miles an hour any given twe ve hours out of the two and thirty, fuccefs would probably have enfued, misfortune Would certainly have been avoided. I did not think it prudent, in the prefent cnir, to mark thefe circumftances to the public fo ftrongly as I do in confidence to^your * The letter that follows, No. 9, is alfo materially referrable to No. 8. APPENDIX, Lordfhip j but I rely, and I will venture to fay I expedt, becaufe I think juftice wdli warrant the expectation, that while, for the fake of public harmony, that neceflaryprin- ciple for conducing nice and laborious fervice, 1 colour the faults of the execution, your Lordfhip will, in your goodnefs, be my advocate to the King, and to the world,; in vindication of the plan. The confequences of this affair, my Lord, have little effcdt upon the ftrengtb or fpirits of the army ; but the profpedt of the campaign in other refpedts, is far lefs profperous than when I wrote laft. in fpite of St. Leger’s vidlory, Fort Stanwix holds out obflinately. I am afraid the expeditions of Sir J. Johnfon greatly fail in the riling of the country. On this fide I find daily reafon to doubt the fincerity of the re- folution of the profeffing loyalifts. I have about 400, but not half of them armed, who may be depended upon ; the reft are trimmers, merely actuated by intereft. The great bulk of the country is undoubtedly with the Congrefs, in principle and in zeal ; and their mealures are executed with afecrecyand difpatch that are not to be equalled. Wherever the King’s forces point, militia, totheamount of threeorfourthoufandaffemble in twenty-four hours ; they bring with them their fubfiftence, &c c. and, the alarm over, they return to their farms. The Hamplhire Grants in particular, a country unpeopled and almoft unknown in the laft war, now abounds in the moft adtive and moft re- bellious race of the continent, and hangs like a gathering ftorm upon my left. In all parts theinduftry and managment in driving cattle, and removing corn, are indefati- gable and certain ; and it becomes impradticable to move without portable maga- zines. Another moft embarraffing circumftance, is the want of communication with Sir William Howe ; of the meffengers I have fent, I know of two being hanged, and am ignorant whether any of the reft arrived. The fame fate has pro- bably attended thofe difpatched by Sir William Hotve ; for only one letter is come to hand, informing me that his intention is for Penfylvania ; that Wathington has de- tached Sullivan^ with 2500 men to Albany ■, that Putnam is in the Highlands, with 4000 men. That after my arrival at Albany, the movements of the enemy muft guide mine ; but that he wifhed the enemy might be driven out of the province be- fore any operation took place againft the Connedticut ; that Sir Henry Clinton remain- ed in the command in the neighbourhood of New- York, and would adt as occurrences might diredf. No operation, my Lord, has yet been undertaken in my favour : the highlands have not even been threatened. The confequence is, that Putnam has detached two brigades to Mr. Gates, who is now ftrongly polled near the mouth of the Mohawk- River, with an army fuperior to mine in troops of the Congreis, and as many militia as he pleafes. He is likewife far from being deficient in artillery, having received all the pieces that were landed from the French (hips which got into Bofton. Had I a latitude in my orders, I fhould think it my duty to wait in this poution, or perhaps as far back as Fort Edward, where my communication with Lake George would be perfectly fecure, till fome event happened to aftift my movement forward •, but my orders being pofitive to“ force a junction with Sir William Howe,” I appre- hend I am not at liberty to remain inadtive longer than {hall be neceffary to colledt twenty-five days provifion, and to receive the reinforcement ol the additional com- panies, the German drafts and recruits now (and unfortunately only now) on Latte Champlain. The waiting the arrival of this reinforcement is of indilpenfible neceffity, becaufe from the hour 1 pafs the Hudfon’s River and proceed towards Albany, all Y fafety XX. VI A P p end I x. No. X. fafety of communication ceafcs. I mull the ' wafeSglon^tSn left will take poll behind me. I have pm out of ^ ,l,e,t crickal, de- the time neceflary for the foregoing ? u 'f°^£^^L anicS( it 1 a * nd hardly juftifiable landing on dentate” I mean but by orders from the , rhnuali T fho'uldmeet with infurmountable difficul- my Lord, that by moving foon, though T ihoum me back t0 T icon- ttes to my progrefs, I fliall at ea iav the diftance encreafed, and the march remain in the country. wfaw that I was to be left to purfue my When I wrote more confidently , I little forelaw without a ny co-operation way through luch a traft of wuntty, a ifon D f Ticonderoga would fall to my from New- York ; nor did I then tin nk - t ^Ve that poll in weaknefs, and - more of a retreat, bur at tu tonify there and await SkW. to the bread of the King. Whatever may be my fate m> Lord ’^ubmit y ^ mQtives become public ^ r„d "5toS?.£&££ t-hatever decifron may be patted upon my conduft, ^“ve” can be°expedted from men devoted to their King and COlUUr> ' I'have the honour to be, &c. j. Burgoyne. P. S. Upon re-perufing this letter, ChL- have exprefled myfelf, 1 mean tQ impUt e the delay to any thing but aSdenTs^nmdoTme^to Cornell Sir Guy Carleton’s reafoning upon not complying with my requifitions to garrifon Ticonderoga, I only lament . Dear Sir, , tV,* i l6 Regular troops, total — 6,740 Garrifon left out of the above at Ticonderoga. Britiih rank and file 462 German rank and file 448 910 To force a paffage to Albany 5,850 3ft July, Britiih artillery — 257 German artillery — 100 Bat men, fervants, 2 cc. in the above. Recruits under Lieut. Nutt *54 Canadians — * 4 ® Indians never more than 500 Before Septemb. fell off to 90 Provincials at moft — 682 1 ft October, no more than 456 In September the additional com- panies joined near Fort Miller, in all — — 300 Regulars killed, wounded, and prifoners in the campaign, 1777. Britiih. Killed. Wounded. Prifoners. Total Officers Serjeants Drummers R. & File 26 l 5 0 207 47 33 5 549 1 9 14 6 449 1285 Germans. Officers 10 l 6 29 Serjeants 12 28 59 Drummers I 8 18 R. & File 141 2.25 575 94 * No. rn Firjl JpptoH* from Major General Phillips relative „ Korfis. Dated Montreal, June 4, 1777* T TAKE the liberty of informing your Excellency, that therehas yet been no arrange* ^ler/st^ I have the honour to be Sir, Wltl Your S Excellency’s moft obedient and moft humble fervant, M. Phillips, Major General, commanding the royal artillery in Canada. His Excellency 4 Lieutenant General Burgoyne, APPENDIX. xxix Copy of a Letter to Major General Phillips, refpe&ing Horfes . Dated Montreal, June 4, 1777. S I R, I have the honour of your letter of this day’s date, informing me that no arrangement has yet been made for moving the field artillery by land ; and that upon the beft infor- mation you can obtain, neither carriages nor horfes can be procured on the other fide Lake Champlain nearer than Albany. In coniequence of this reprefentation, I have to requeft you, to give in your opinion upon the mode of procuring horfes and carriages from this country, combining the confiderations of difpatch, fufficiency, ceconomy towards government, and I wilh to know the opinion as foon as poffible. I am with trueft regard, Sir, Your obedient humble fervant, J. Buugoyne, Lieutenant-GeneraL Major-General Phillips* Extracts of Letters from Major General Phillips, &c. Extraft of a Letter from Major General Phillips to Lieutenant General Burgoyne. Montreal , June 5, 1777* I HAVE the honour of your Excellency’s letter to me of yefteiday, in anfwer to one I wrote on the fubjeftof the field-artillery being fupplied with horfes, &c. &c. You are plea-fed’, Sir, to order me to give an opinion upon the mode of procuring horfes and carriages from this country, combining the confideration of difpatch, fufficiency, and ceconomy towards government. There are but two modes of procuring horfes for the fervice, fuppofing the country is not to furniffi them upon Corvees, the one is by purchafing of horfes upon the account of government, the other by contract. The firth of thefe modes has always appeared to me difficult, uncertain, and full of openings for every fpecies of impofition, and the cxpenee uncertain. — Government muft truth various people to buy horfes, and in this country :t viilnot be poffible to procure any perfons w ho w .i not im media- eh purfue the views of gaining money to themlelves with a confideration for the K; ' A ! i to this, that it will be- , come fuch a charge, that man; commiffaries mult be appointed, and various other officers of that Sort, See, which being a mixture of inipedlors into the purchafes of horfes, and net cffiarily alfo at times the being purchaiers, it will be difficult ever to afeertain the price, and feklom that the goodnefsof horfes can be depended on. I have feen in my fervice this mode attempted, -but it has to my knowledge failed. I muft allow, that could it be carried into execution com mete, it v. ould be the cheapeft for government: but taking into confideration the various impofmons which will a rife, and that the letting out on a plan of this nature will require a very large fum of mo- ne]r. XXX appendix. i y r\ v*e intrufted into various hands, I freely ney, perhaps from op.oool. to }»£*»£ • The comraftiug for a terrain mu!* give it as my opinion that it is not a & 1 ^ re(luccs the whole to a very (imple, her of horfes at a fixed puce for th ends in the fetung out, by making as and therefore generally a certal P P 1 ' : £ * government as can be. And being fo cheap, as fair, and juft a barga . their duty, by attending to the receiving made, that the military and cm - • The conttador has his mterert lo dl- of horfes only as they -^arc fitting- as up0 n failure it ceales, that he will of government w,U be that it be Cone honelUy "1 SfiWa Excellency’s orders, and given an opinion winch 1 fubnnt entirely to your coflfideration. I BEG the favour of you to cakuUte whu numba f„ r conveying by fingthem fuch as are in common rife 'n C J" ' „ ltl , abl)llt ,ooo gallons ot rum, Extract of a Letter to Sir Guy Carleton. Montreal, June 7 , *777* r + rn v nnr Excellency the necefiity of being HAVING had the honor to yprefen y for the art nlery, vital, and provided with a certain number ot horfes d^ ^ be obligK l to qu „ the border other indifpenfible purpofes of the a ™J> - . f our Excellency that fuch pro- oMre lakes and rivers , & corvfc, and that , propofed vifion could not be made by the oral y b , pre carious, dilatory, ana without compulfion upon the country the eh Excellency propofals for con. expenfive ; I have the honour now to lay ^Tnillery, and 500 carts, with two trads for an expeditious iupply horfes each, for the other purpofo. cq t0 offer any judgment upon the I am too ignorant of the prices o _ D uaintance wU h Mr. Joidan, reafonablenefs of thefe propofals •, nor Xave M y 1 | q fons can be found equally or other motive for wilhing him the P re f^ V thus F far interfered, upon a con- capable, refponfible, and expedition- Kino’s orders dired, and taking all pofiible Salon,' after confiderlng the route *e &ng^ °r ^ w£ pr0CK d, that to do- methods of information upon the \u[ p > d the expedition, pend upon the country altogether wot the public expence as much * F Your Excellency will obferve, thatm order to ^ be adequate to the ooffibk, I have reduced this requifitt expedition for the reft i f 00 cans Fervice, and I mean to trull to the ie ources P General Phillips means S barely carry fourteen days provifions at a time, and j w 2 XXXI A P P E N D I: Xr to demand as few horfes as pofiible, fubjeCt to whatever future augmentations future fervices may require-, the prefent number wanted will be about 400 ; there will then remain unprovided for (for expeditious movement) the tranfport of bateaux from Lake George to Hudfon’s River, and the carriage of the tents of the army, and many other contingencies that I need not trouble your Excellency to point out to you. 1 .. r.i Extrafl of a Letter to General Harvey. Montreal, May 19, 1777. YOU have permitted me, as formerly, to write to you confidentially. I take the firft conveyance to renew a correfpondence fo pleafing and honourable to myfelf, and that may, in fome cafes, become beneficial to the public fervice. It fhall never be employed but to convey truths, to do juftice to faffs and perfons, and to fecure mylelf in the continuance of an elteem fo valuable to me as yours againft appearances and mifreprefentations. I have reafonto be exceedingly fatisfied with all that has been done, and with molt things that are doing : exertions have been made during the winter, which was remark- ably favourable, in all the departments, and preparations are very forward ; thole that have been committed to the directions of General Phillips have been executed with a diligence, precifion, and forefight, that entitle- him to the fulleft praife. The troops are in a Rate of health almolf unprecedented, and their fpirits and general improvement are equally objects of great pleafure and promife. To this agreeable reprefentation I have the happinefs to add, that Sir Guy Carleton has received me and the orders I brought in a manner that, in my opinion, does infinite honour to his public and private characfer. That he fhould have wifiied for the lead in a&ive and important military operations, is very natural. That he thinks he has fome caufe of refentment for the general tenor of treatment he has received from fome of the minifters is difcernible -, but neither his difappointment nor his perfonal feelings operate againft his duty -, and I am convinced he means to forward the King’s meafures, entrufted to my hands, with all the zeal he could have employed had they relied in his own. My intention is, during my advance to Ticonderoga, and fiege of that poll, for a fiege I apprehend it mult be, to give all pofiible jealoufy on the fide of Connecticut. If I can by manoeuvre make them fulpeft that after the reduction of Ticonderoga my views are pointed that way, it may make the Connecticut forces very cautious of leaving their own frontiers, and much facilitate my progrefs to Albany. I mention this intention only to Lord George and yourfelf, and I do it left from any intelligence of my motions that may reach England indireCtly, it fhould be fuppofed I have lufter- ed mylelf to be diverted from the main objeCt of my orders. The King and his Majefty’s minifters may reft allured that whatever demonftratrons I may endeavour to impofe upon the enemy, I fhall really make no movement that can procraftinate my progrefs to Albany. One thing more occurs. I had the furprife and mortification to find a paper handed about at Montreal, publilhing the whole defign of the campaign, almoft as accurately as if it had been copied from the Secretary of State’s letter. My own cau- tion. XXKli appendix* -i,, i, 3 c been let into the fecret. Sic •tion has been fuch that not a man in my ov> '" 1 '[ therefore led to doubt whether o" Cartoon's, I am confident, has .been England, andwilhyon imprudence has not been oorniAii md P V erv affectionate compliments, whether would afk my friend D’Oyley ta ^ h °™ ift J ial communication that he can fufpeft .to there is any perfon within tne lm- f nce here, except as tar as regards St. , bi S a nS* may b=V moft prejudicial conferee in other .cal” and Should be guarded again it. Extra® of a Letter to General Harvey. Camf m He River Bmq^mar I HAVE had to comend agarntr r nnieaoentlv the paffage of the bateaux and practicable at the carrying places, an A c q^ J winc {. Indeed the combination exceedingly dilatory, befides a ‘ Aivity Ld fometimes difobedience in the of land and water movement toads, unknown in other fervices, country, and a thoufand otner ^ 1 ti on this upon my own account, as I do difconcert all arrangements. I <-.c • n . ■ • prov i n l ce of Canada j but I mention not hold tnyfclf refponfible for delay, • ^ infinite merit in overcoming the r, (sir knowledge and tefources, donot aniwer their predi&ions and expectations. ^ brigadiers of this army. Sir I have been exceedingly drftreffed in 1 reg^d ^ an extra a of a letter Guy Carleton, tire day l to° k appointment of thole gentlemen, but from the Secretary at War, fair brigades out of the province of graphical limits of Canada, and iupp « kifind myfelf at the head ot an army to fo be employed folely in the and poffibly of time, undertake a fiege, and after* P - J betwe en ? the Lieutenant General, com- without a fingle mtermedrate Bntim ^ ^ It wou ld be prepofterous manding pro tempore in chief and a be ^ a$ an officer , upon the mipoffib^ and impertinent in me to lay one w y w | t h fuch a total deficiency of ftaff. lity of methodizing or his intentions to me m Had Lord Barrington condefcended t impropriety. As it is, I muft London, I think 1 could have convinced h 1 tl ofe gentlemen bearing a •conclude that the fpirit ot the order g in t |e fame army ; and higher rank and pay than lemor lieutena tilfthe iunefion takes place, that therefore there can be no fault in keep „ Ja a t ;u f uc h time as I .am m In other words, l look upon mine to be the ‘ ^ - d coniequently communication with General Howe, fo as to make part ot his force, Without xxxm APPENDIX. without meafuring degrees north and fouth, that the arrangements made in Canada, and approved of by the King, remain in force till that time. . I am perfuaded, my dear General, you will fupport me in this liberty, if (uch it is to be called, not only as the abfolute order and method of the lervice depends upon it, but all'o to avoid to thefe gentlemen, who have really great merit, the vexation an ^ the ridicule of being deprived of their rank and pay in the hour of that very lemce, with a view to which their appointment was originally made. I think 1 can anlwer, that the iunftion made, and the reafons for reverting to their former ranks, become obvious, they will fubmit to his Majelly’s pleafure without a murmur. Exiratl of a Letter from Lieutenant General Burgoync to General Plarvey. Head Quarters, Skenefborough, July it, i 777- THE mere compliment of fervice I have given to the troops in orders, and in the relation defigned for the Gazette, is not doing them fufficient juftice. It is a duty in me further, through you, and 1 know I fliall impofe a pleafing talk on you, to affure the Kino- that their behaviour is as uniformly good in the camp as in action. After what° I have publicly mentioned of Frafer I am lure I need not preis you m his favour. I cannot but feel confident in the hope that his Majefty s giate will fan its way through all obftacles to prevent fo difeouragmg a circumftance as the return of this^ o-allan ° officer to the mere duty of lieutenant colonel, at the head of one batta- lion after having given afcendancy to the King’s troops and done honour to his profeffion, by the molt fpiriced aftions in critical periods of two fucceflive cam- r ^You will obferve, Sir, both in the public letter and l in the order of battle which Capta ; n Gardner will put into your hands, that Major General T hillips is oceaii in v emploved feparately from the ftridl line of his department. This does not proceed from inattention to the explanation of his M a jetty’s pleafure two years ago-, but from abfolute neceffity. The itaff being computed without any Bnufii major general, 1>« i- fadier Fmfer being polled where he is of infinite ufe, at the head of the advanced corns the lervice would fuffer in the moll material degree u the talents of Genera Pin Hips were not fuffered to extend beyond the limits of the artillery, am. I n< e mvfclt fully iuftified in continuing the great uie of his afliftance under this ex ten i ( >n, bv what 1 underftand to be the fignification of the King’s pleaiure to.ir Guy ai - » vf z . That this meafure mujl not be made a precedent, but not forbidding it during t ie Pr tlaacter myfelf the King will be fatisfied with the diligence ufed in taking the field as well as with the i'ubfequent operations ; if not, my difappointment can only proceed from my own deficiency in flaring the embarraflments I found, notwithUandmg p - vkrus preparations and cordial alliances. Remote fixations of the troops currents wTnds roads want of materials for caulking the veffels, inactivity and defert.on of the Canadian corvees, were all againtl me. A great difficulty lay in providing hoi.es and carriao-es for the bare tranfport of provifions and tents, when we ffiould arrive at Fort G^ra? or any other place where the army ffiould have no reiource of water carriage 1 found an active and I think a reafonable contractor, who lupplied th^ neceffity at a much cheaper rate than it could have been done any other way. u. XXXIV appendix. I inclofe a copy of the contraft to the hdif^ If provifions ferve that I have limited the num e ^ , affiftance of officers baggage and the and tents, trotting to the co^ry for that J judged 8 ^! in not other attirail of an army- - P i d tb ; s precaution been omitted, 1 lhould be t tufting. to the country or mo re , to, I ad uns waK ,. M Tico „deroga. bound faft to the Ipot w ieie . 1 > f J r ar l e ton to grant commiffions to two pro- I avow alio to you my advice <° General Ci> C o„„.y, by a Mr. JeSop vincial battalions, to be rai * cotumiflions llrould not take place till two and a Mr. Peters, upon “ndmou tha nmvinda Co PS, afting vealouil, in the King’s thirds of the corps lhould be effeftive, provincial coys, a ’ in f a ft b be caule, mult have great impren.on upon publ, . op nm" and 1 will, of fingttlar ufe to the cale and pie crvation & f urt h er to receive and to pav Upon this principle, therefore \ S of Ticonderoga, Ld fuch loyalifts as have come in t t ■ ^ er tQ grant commiffions, I poll the wifli to be employed. Ihou^ P » p ure can be decided by thofe who officers, and form them into companies till the meaiure c S3gs^na*K» £» vent fuch being done by others. pofition, to clear roads and 1 am indifpenfrbly obliged to wait fome time on this pom a ftock of make bridges, which is great labour in this and pr0 vifion veffels to provifion, andalfoto give ^rffilt^fke and fecure the ’future route of the maga- be put into Lake George to fcour th » t jme that the force is ready to vines. I propofe to poflef. Fort EdW « *^ ^ 0 “ evacuate Fort George, move down the lake, by which mean , lt ^ J n wh ile I have ordered Reidefei the garrilon muft inevitably be caug . poffible feints of a march to make roads, reconnoitre the country, and mah al ^omer P to the Connefticut, and by fome other meafures I hope to give Instructions for Lieutenant Colonel Amendments made by Gen. Burgoyne. Baume, on a fecrei expedition to the Con- necticut River . [The erajnresvoerc made by Gen. Burgoyne*'] THE object of your expedition is to try the affeftions of the country, to difconcert the councils ot the enemy, to mount the Rcidefel’s dragoons, to corn- pleat Peters’s corps, and to obtain large lupplies of cattle, horfes, and carnages. The feveral corps, of which the m- clofed is a lift, are to be under your command. * The evafures are printed in Italics, and the amendments in die eppofiu cd appendix. XXXV Amendments by General Burgoyne. The troops muft take no tents, and what little baggage is carried by officers muft be on their own bat horfes. You are to proceed by the route from Batten Kill to Arlington, and take poll there, Jo as to fecure the pafs from Man- chejler. You are to remain at Arlington till the detachment of the Provincials, under the command of Captain Sher- wood, ffiall join you from the fouth- ward. You are then to proceed to Manche- fter, where you will take poft fo as to fecure the pafs of the mountains on the road from Manchefter to Rockingham ; from hence you will detach the Indians and light troops to the northward, to- ward Otter Creek. On their return, and alfo receiving intelligence that no enemy is in force in the neighbourhood of Rocking- ham (i) you will proceed by the road over the mountains to Rockingham, where you will take poft. This will be the moft diftant part on the expedition. (2) You are to remain there as long as ne- cejfary to fulfil the intention of the expediti- on from thence (3) and you are afterwards to defcend by the Connecticut River to Brattlebury, and from that place, by the quickeft march, you are to return by the great road to Albany. During your whole progrefs your de- tachments are to have orders to bring in to you all horfes fit to mount the dia- goons under your command, or to ierve as bat horfes to the troops, they are like- wife to bring in (4) faddles and bridles as can be found. (5) Your parties are likewife to bring in waggons and other convenient carriages, with as many draft oxen as will be necef- fary to draw them and all cattle fit for flaughter (milch cow’s excepted) which are to be left for the ufe of the inhabi- tants. (1) upon the Connecticut River , (2) And mufi be proceeded upon with caution, as you. will have the defile of the mountains behind you, which might make a retreat difficult ; you muft therefore en- deavour to be well informed of the force of the enemy's militia in the neighbouring coun- try. Should you find it may with prudence be effected. (3) while the Indians and light troops are detached up the river. (4) together with as many- (5) The number of horfes requifite, le- fides thofe neceffary for mounting the regi- ment of dragoons, ought to be 1300. If you can bring more for the ufe of the army it will befo much the better. 7. z SXXV1 A P p E N D I X. tants. Regular receipts, in the form hereto fubjoined, are to be given m all places where any of the abovementioned articles are taken, to fuch perlons as have remained in their habitations, and other- wife complied with the terms of General Burgovne’s manifefto •, but no receipts to be given to fuch as are known to be acting in the fervice ot the rebels. (6). Amendments by General Burgoyne. (6.) As you. will have with you perfons perfetlly acquainted with the abilities of the country , it may perhaps be advifeable to tax the fever a l difl riffs with the portions of the fever al articles, and limit the hours for their delivery *, and ftoould y ou find it necej ceffary to move before fuch delivery can be made, hojlages of the moft refpeti able people fhould be taken , to fecure their following you the enfuing day. All poffible mans are to be ufed to prevent plundering. _ yjs it is probable that C.aptara Sher - wood, who is already detached to thefouth- ward, and will join you at Arlington, will drive in a cor.fiderable quantity of cattle and horfes to you, you will therefore fend in this cattle to the army, with a proper detachment from Peters's corps, to cover them, in order to difen cumber yourfelf-, but you muft always keep the regiments of dr a- goons comp a 51. ? The dragoons them/elves muft nde> ana take care of the horfes of the regiment Thofe horfes which are deftined for tbe uje of the army mujl be tied together by firings often each, in order that one man may lead ten horfes. You will give the unarmed men of Peters's corps to conduct them, and inha- bitants whom you can truft. 2 ou muft al- ways take your camps in good pofttion ; but at the fame time where there is pafture, and you muft have a chain of centinels round your cattle and horfes when grazing. Colonel Skeene will be with you as much as poffible, in order to afftft you with his advice , to help you to diftinguijh the good Jubjebis from the bad, to procure you thebejt intelligence of the enemy , and to chufe thofe people who are to bring me the accounts of day or two, you muft always entiench toe camp of the regiment of dragoons, in order never to rifk an attack or affront from the enemy . APPENDIX. Amendments by General Burgoyne. You will ufe all poffible means to make the country believe that the troops under your command are the advanced corps of the armv, and that it is intend- ed to pafs the Connedicut on the road to Bolton. You will l.kewile have it infwuated (7) that the main army from Albany is to be joined at Springfield by a corps of troops from Rhode Ifland. You will fend off occafionally cattle or carriages, to prevent being too much ^cum- bered v and will give me as frequent intelli - pence of your Situation as poffible. It is highly probable that the corps tinder Mr. Warner, now fuppoled to be at Manchefter, will retreat before you but fhould they, contrary to expecta- tion, be able to colled in great force, and poll themfelves advantageoufly, it is left to your difcretion to attack them or not, always bearing in mind that your corps is too valuable to let any confide table lofs be hazarded on this occatiom Should any corps be moved from. Mr. Arnold’s main army, in order to inter- cept your retreat, you are to take as ftron" a poll as the country will afford, and fend the quickeft intelligence to me and you may depend on my making fuch a movement as fhall put the enemy be- tween two fires, or otherwife efteduaily fuft i a t n is yC imagined the progrefs of Ae whole of this expedition may be efteded in about a fortnight, but every move ment of it rauft depend upon your fuccefs in obtaining fuch fupply of provifions as willenable S you to fubfift for your ^return to the army, in cafe you can get no more. (8) you will return with the regiment Oj dragoons mounted, you muff always have a detachment of Captain Frafer’s or Peters s corps in front of the column, and tree fame in the rear , in order to prevent your falling into an ambufeade when you march through the woods. (7) inftnuatt xxxv iu All perfons ading in committees, or any officers ading under the c ire£tl ° of Congrefs, either civil or military, are to be made prifoners. C8 - ) And ffonld not the army be able to reach Albany before your expedition Should be completed,.. I will find means to fend you notice of it, .and give your route another di- re£iion ' n Batten xxxviii APPENDIX. Batten Kill, 12 th Augujt, 177- I H AD the honour of acquainting your Excellency, by a man lent yefterday evening by Colonel Skeene to head-quarters, of the feveral corps under my corn- man "being encamped at Saratoga, as well as of my intention to proceed the next n omin' affive o’clock > the corps moved at that time, and marched a mile, when Suals IVom y JE-Uency . tire -^-w^ed at Zt's which “pLT, as they fern rather to be founded on the different interells and feelings of the people who « cl ®™ v *™- honoor tobe , moft re fpeafully. Your Excellency’s moft obedient and humble fervant, J 17 Ratthu The reinforcement of fifty chafieurs, w nich your Excellency was pleated to order, joined me laft night at eleven o clociv. General Burgoyne. Cambridge , 13th Auguft , 1777. IN confeouence of your Excellency’s orders I moved this morning at four o’cVod' with the corps under my command ; and after a march of hxteen miles arrived a rCambridge P at four in the evening. On the road 1 received intelligence of forty or fifty of the rebels being left to guard fome cattle. 1 immediately orderec thirty of the provincials and fifty favages to quicken their march, in }^P es t0 ^ ' nrize* them. P They took five prifoners in arms, who declared tnemfelves to be in the fervice of the Congrefs ; yet the enemy received advice of our approach, ant abandoned the houfe they were pofted in. The provincials and favages continued their march about a mile, when they fell in with a party of fifteen men, who fired upon our people, and immediately took to the woods with the greateft precipita- X ^ The fire was quick on our fide, but I cannot learn if the enemy fuftained 43 nv lofs A private of Captain Sherwood’s company was the only one who was nightly wounded in the thigh. From the many people woo came ^ ton they amee that the number of the enemy amounted to 1800. 1 will be Ftticu arlv carefuk on my approach at that place, to be fully informed of their ftrength and' fituation, and^ake the precautions ncceffary to fulfil both the orders an of cattle, carts, and waggons taken here, as they have not been as yet colleded. A few horfes have been alfo brought in, but am W to acquaint Jour Excellency that the favages either *^**££g what is not paid for with ready money. If your Excellency would allow me to purchafe the horfes from the favages, ftipulating the price, I think they m. b bt be procured cheap, otherwife they ruin all they meet with, their officers and int ^P- *ers not having it in their power to controul them. Your Excellency may 1. \ ^ 3 appendix. on hearing how I proceed at Bennington, and' of my fuccefs there: praying my re- fpe&ful compliments to General Reidefel, I am, moft refpedtfully, Sir, Your moft obedient and humble fervant, F. Baume. P. S. The names of the men taken in arms are as follows, George Duncan, John Bell, David Slarrow, Matt. Bell. Samuel Bell, Hugh More, a noted rebel furrendered himfelf yefterday evening. The exprefs left Cambridge at 4 o’clock on the morning of the 14th of Auguft. S, R Sancoick, \ 4th Auguft, 1777, 9 o'clock. I have the honour to inform your excellency, that I arrived here at eight in the morning, having had intelligence of a party of the enemy being in pofleffion of a mill, which they abandoned at our approach, but in their ufual way fired from the bufhes, and took their road to Bennington ; a favage was {lightly wounded ; they broke down the bridge which has retarded our march above an hour, they left m the mill about feventy-eight barrels of very fine flour, 1000 bufhels of wheat, 20 barrels of fait, and about ioool. worth pearl and pot alb. I have ordered thirty pro- vincials and an officer to guard the provifion and the pafs of the bridge. By five pri- foners taken here, they agree that 1500 to 1800 men are in Bennington, but are fup- pofed to leave it on our approach ; I will proceed fo far to-day as to fall on the the enemy to-morrow early, and make fuch difpofition as I think neceffary from the intelligence I may receive. People are flocking in hourly, but want to be armed , the favages cannot be controuled, they ruin and take every thing they plea e. I am. Your excellency’s moft obedient, humble fervant,. TT a ttmt? Bes; your excellency to pardon the hurry of this letter* it is wrote on the head of a barrel. General Burgoyne.. I requeft the favour of you to proceed with Lieutenant Colonel Baume, upon an expedition of which he has the command, and which will march this evening, or to-morrow momi g. ^ t0 try t h e affeftions of the country ; to difconcert the councils of the enemy ; to mount the regiment of Reidefel dragoons to compleat Lieutenant Colonel Peters’s corps, and to procure a large fupply of horfes fortheufe cf the troops* together with cattle and carriages* The Injtruftions to Colonel Skeene, upon the expedition to Bennington . xxxxix A P P E N D I X. . j. • • + A rl i n rrt-nn mid hlanchedcr, and 1H Cafe The route marked for this expedition i rea °f orce upon the Connecticut river, it Iho uld be found that the enemy is no _ ^ ant \ defcend the river from thence » pars fofArr,„gton, Colonel Petets “ithS'en "forward for Benkngton, and afterwards are to jour at Arlington. f ,, i 10 rfes an d cattle taken from the country. - depending upon a knowledge of the eountry for carrying his inftruaions niro «ecutton.^ a(BftjncC) particularly m having U LdtSS .“{country -“ bytb£armyfro!K Rhode Iflatid. t i, e re quifites of the fervice with every I need not recommend to you “ C °J 'burning; than ; and it may be proper to m- principle of humanity in the mode o - g £ and hov f es being taken for £e m futur c ”w“n y be1o rk^hVLcroy when they fliall prefume to force them, and drive them voluntarily to my camp. ^ ^ ave t ^ e honour to be, &c. See. See. J. Burgoyne. CALCULATION CALCULATIONS of the Number of Carts that will carry Provifions for the following Number of Men. Number of Men for io,coo Men Carts £COO Men Carts 4000 Men Carts 3000 Men Carts 2.CCO Men Carts icoo Men Carts jeo Men Carts > p I Day. E 2 )ays. T A Days. I Days. ] 5 Jays. I 6 Days. ] 7 Jays. ] 8 Days. ] 9 Days. ] 10 Days. 1 1 Days. 1 2 Days. ' f. 13 Days; . 14 Days . 1 V 5 Days. ' 1 l 6 Days.^i 17 Days. 18 Days. 19 Days. 20 Days. 1 1 r 0 60 Days. 90 Days. 75 “3 i S o 188 226 263 200 sJ 338 375 413 452 49 ° 526 5 *H 600 638 678 716 75° 1125 2250 3375 *9 38 57 75 94 "3 132 ! 5 ° 169 188 207 226 245 263 282 3 °o 3*9 339 358 375 S 6 3 1 125^1688 IS i 3 ° 45 60 75 90 4 i °5 120 1 35 150 165 180 *95 210 225 ! 240 255 07O 285 300 45 ° 9 °° | 1 35 ° > 12 2 3 34 45 57 68 79 90 102 ”3 124 135 i 47 158 I69 l80 192 203 2x4 225 338 676 1014 s 8 15 23 3 ° 38 45 53 61 68 75 83 90 98 105 ”3 120 i 128 i 35 143 150 225 45 ° 675 :s 4 8 12 i 5 23 27 3 1 35 39 42 45 49 53 57 60 64 68 72 75 ”3 226 339 ts 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 .6 18 20 21 23 25 27 29 3 ° S 2 34 3 6 i 38 57 i JI 3 ‘7 1 The above Table made, allowing 3 pounds weight to the Ration and 8oo pounds to the Cart Loam Nathaniel Day, Comrn.lLry Ueneral. xlii appendix. Extras .fa Letter from Lieut, mat General ^ dal,i Head- Quarters, at SkeneJlorough llouje , wtb July, 1777. I REQUEST your Excellency to take into confideration the expediency of fupply. p rocMd ’ the dr ; i ? f “ p ° n fr y fft poKrTibconnderable ; - ^ and to awe the country that .f tha fi ft *m .nuu E intelligence is SSS « Saratoga. ^ t« Edwarlis alfo “ Youfexce"^ »|fl am fore agree .with' KnfidS'™ 5te f fZ“ Sarfam^e’^'the difficulties that- atife fro, the manner in which^the^ “aid V!wn lITthi beginning oT th°e order ami afterwards repeated, that 3000 men were held fuffiamt for the defence of ThatlTvLt you would'not he jollified in taring for the putpo: e of that garttlon, h An!? noTwithftandiL the corns 'for the Canada fervrce are precilely named by the Secretary of State, \ would further fubmit whether, upon my preffing requifition, Se tSJm ght not juftifiably be furnifhed by detachment, even though there wm no overplus under the following words of the order ; after having fecured to him fUemenant General Burgoyne) every ajftfi ance which it is in your power to afford and EX £%££&» Santis Soffit! fo ^m'wiffi a proper force m attack Fort George on Jhat fide, while with the mam of the :army as foon asre 5SSS KlhlTfo 'Z confequenriy^prevenMhe fuccour oi retreat of that garrifon*. Extras of a Letter from Lieutenant General Burgoyne, to Sir Guy Carlcton, Head- Quarters, near Fort Anne, July 29th 1777 - THE confiruftion your excellency puts upon the ordera of the &eretary of tote, is too full and decifive for me to prefume to trouble you fort cr l r a garrifon for Ticonderoga from Canada, I mult do asweUasIcan, but I am ue your Excellency, as a foldier, will tank my fituatron a Utile difficult. Abteaen^ ^ my communication muft either ruin niy army entirely, or nrevent a breach, force to redore, which might be the lofs of the campaign. It P ft Ticonderoga and Fort George muft be in very refpedable V tQ befides have pofts at Fort Edward and other carrying-places. Thefe dr * ms * d . common accidents and Ioffes of fervice, will necefl'anly render me very > n ‘ en ° r APPENDIX. xliii point of numbers to the enemy, whom I mud expeft always to find ftrongly polled. I afk pardon for dwelling fo much upon this fubjedt, and have only to add my re- queft to your Excellency to forward the additional companies as expedidoufly as may be. Copy of Lieutenant-General Burgoyne's Letter to Colonel Baume. Near Saratoga, Auguft 14, 1777. Seven at Night. SIR, THE accounts you have fent me are very fatisfaflory, and I have no doubt of every part of your proceeding continuing to be the fame. I beg the favour of you to report whether the road you have palled is practicable, and if fo, if it is convenient for a confiderable corps with cannon. Should you find the enemy too ftrongly polled at Bennington, and maintaining fuch a countenance as may make an attack imprudent, I wifh you to take a poll where you can maintain yourlelf till you receive an anfwer from me, and I will either fupport you in force, or withdraw you. You will pleafe to fend off to my camp, as foon as you can, waggons, and draft cattle, and likewife fuch other cattle as are not neceffary for your lubfitlence. Let the waggons ^nd carts bring off all the flour and wheat they can that you do not retain for the lame purpofe. This tranfport mull be under the charge of acom- milfion officer. I will write you at full to-morrow in regard to getting horfes out of the hands of the favages. In the mean time any you can colleCl from them, fit to mount the regiments, at a low price, lhall be allowed. I am with great elteem, Sir, Your moll obedient humble fervant. J. Burgoyne. Colonel St. Leger’s Account of Occurrences at Fort Stanwix. A MINUTE detail of every operation fince my leaving La Chine, with the de- tachment entrulled to my care, your Excellency will permit me to referve to a time of lefs hurry and mortification than the prefent, while I enter into the interfiling feene before Fort Stanwix, which I invelted the 3d of Auguft, having previoufly pulhed forward Lieutenant Bird of the King’s reigment, with thirty of the King s troops and two hundred Indians, under the dire&ion of Captains Hare and W ilton, and the chiefs Jofeph and Bull, to feize fall hold of the lower landing-place, and there- by cutoff the enemy’s communication with the lower country. — ft his was done with great addrefs by the lieutenant, though not attended with the effe lhat Herkimer, were on their march torehe g » garrifoh be- 11 ant at Orilka, an Indian iettlement, fort in the mor- ing appnfed of their march l>y our me , ,] e p vvamp 1 did not think it pru- ning, through what was tlwi^i ar » l ~j f ^ ^ J rackcd b y,a fally from the dent to wait tor them, and thereby n j > , ved me in front. I therefore de- garrifon in the rear, while the reimorcei ^ 17 ‘ covert ly as circumftances termined to attack them on the march, eitnei \ i y jr; n > s tr00 ps in Should offer. At this time, I had not two ^ hundred and fifty of the King s trooj^ rf camp; the various and e . xt ^¥ v 5°^ r V an d therefore, could not fend above eighty entering into, having employed the reft , and them f $ir John , white men, rangers and troops inc - u (f > , . k is ma rch that evening at Johnfon put himfelf at the head of this party, an g ^ morn ; ne . The im- five o’clock, and met the rebel corps at t c a enemy (forgetting the petuofity of the Indians is not to be described on the fight of th^enemy ^ ^ judicious difpofition formed by Sir John, ? n f ®S‘ ec , uld b ’e on both flanks fuffer the attack to begin with the troops in ‘ ^ enemy’s rear an op- and rear) they rotted to, hatchet » haiui, and.th^ ^^ « ^ ^ ^ portunity toefcape. In relation to the vi • , efcahecPonly ferved to fpread whole had fallen ; nay more fo, as the two hunched (I m * ft be the panic wider ; but it was not fo with 1 1 - nr > » k;ded and the like number underftood Indian computation, being on y a chiefs and confidential warriors wounded, and in that number fome of their fa ouute ch efs ml c G e- were flain.) On the enemy’s fide almoft all the 1 mention, that the four neral Herkimer has fince died of his wounds Ins _ | [ fet out the evening men detached with intelligence of the maich of th ^^ n account of the defeat, before the a^ion, and confequently the ^“STat which, as I and were in pofleflion only, ot the time appou towards Lieutenant Bird’s fufpected, they made a fally with two hundred ^d fifty men towar cn . poll, to facilitate the entrance of the relieving corps, or bnn D gagementj with every advantage they wi < their rear, while they Captain Hoyes was immediately detached to ™ ' n i f c taln Hoyes, having engaged the lieutenant. Immediately upon the departuie 1 cowar dly Indian, learned that Lieutenant Bird, milled by the information of a cowar y that Sir John was preffed, had quitted his poll to march to his advance, m ^ APPENDIX. lxvii the detachment- of the King’s regiment, in fupport of Captain Hoyes, by a road in fight of the garrifon, which, with executive fire from his party, immediately drove the enemy into the fort, without any further advantage than frightening forne fquaws and pilfering the packs of the warriors which they left behind them. After this affair was over, orders were immediately given to compleat a two-gun battery,, and mortar beds, with three ftrong redoubts in their rear, to enable me, in cafe of another attempt, to relieve the garrifon by their regimented troops, to march out a larger body -of the King’s troops. Captain'Lernoult was fent with iio men to the lower landing place, where he eftablilhed himfelf with great judgment and ftrength, having an enclofed battery of a three-pounder oppofed to any fally from the fort, and another to the fide of the country, where a relief muff approach; and the body of his camp deeply en- trenched and abbatifed. When by the unabating labour of officers and men (the ffnallnefs of our num- bers never admitting of a" relief, or above three hours ceffation for fleep or cooking) the batteries and redoubts were finifhed, and new cheeks and axle-trees made for the fix- pounders, thofe that were fent being reported rotten and unferviceable. It was found that our cannon had not the leaft effect upon the fod-work of the. fort, and that our royals had only, the power of teizing, as a fix-inch plank was a fufficient fecurity for their powder magazine, as we learnt from the deferters., At this time Lieutenant Glenie of the artillery, whom I had appointed to a£t as affiftant engineer, propofed a converfion of the royals (if I may ufe the exprefiion) into howitzers. The ingenuity and feafability of this mealure ftriking me very Itronrdy, the bufinefs was fet about immediately, and Toon executed, when it was found that nothing prevented their operating with the defired effect but the diftance, their chambers being too fmall to hold a fufficiency of powder. There was nothing, now to be done but to approach the town, by fap to fuch a diftance that the ram- part might be brought within their portice, at the fame time all materials were preparing to run a mine under their moft formidable baftion. . In the midft of tliefe operations intelligence was brought in by our fcouts, of a fecond corps of 1000 men being on their march. The fame zeal no longer animated the Indians ; they complained of our thinneis of troops and their former Ioffes. 1 immediately called a council of the chiefs ; encouraged them as much as I could ; promifed to lead them on myfelf, and bring into the field 300 of the beft troops. Thev liftened to this, and promifed to follow me, and agreed that I mould iecon- noitre the ground propereft for the field of battle the next morning, accompanied by fome of their chief warriors, to fettle the plan of operations. When up° n If ® mound appointed for the field of battle, fcouts came in with the account of the firft number iwelled to 2000; immediately after a third, that General Burgoyne s army was cut to pieces, and that Arnold was advancing, by rapid and forced marches, with 20CO men. It was at this moment I began to fufpeft cowardice in fome, an ‘ treaion in others ; however I returned to camp, not without hopes, with the al- fiffance of my gallant coadjutor, Sir John Johnfon, and the influence of the fup - intending colonels, Claus and Butler, of inducing them to meet the enemy. A. council, according to their cuftom, was called, to know their relolutions, befoie the breaking up of which*! learned that 200 were already decamped. In about an hour appendix. thev infixed that I Ihould retreat, or they would be obliged to abandon me. Had no other party to take, and a hard party it was to troops who could do not lung without them, to yield to their refolves; and there. ore propofedra retire at „ . fending on before my fick, wounded, artillery, 8tc. down tie oo. ., veri-nsr them by our line of march. , - . ^ , n Tins did not fall in with their views, which were no lefs than treacheroufly com- mitting ravage upon their friends, as they had loll the opportunity of doin D it upon 'their enemies. To effect this they artfully caufed meffengers to come in, one after the other, with accounts of the nearer approaches of the rebels > one and the laft affirmed that they were within two miles of Captain Leinoult s poll. N g ring endlc credir to this, and keeping ro my rdolution ot rerumg by night, they frew furious and abandoned! feized upon the olbcers liquor and clear hs, nfpde of the efforts of their fervants-, and became more formidable than the enemy we had to expeft. I now thought it time to call in Captain Lernou.t s poll, retiring the Wops in camp to the ruined fort called William, ,n the front oto garrifon, not only to wait the enemy, if they thought proper t0 W/ reft the boars from the fury of the favages, having fent forward Captain Ho> es, with his detachment, with one piece of cannon, to the place where 1 0 . flood, to receive the troops who waited the arrival or Captain Leinou . the boats wereefcorted that night beyond Canada Creek, where no danger was be apprehended from the enemy. The creek at this place bending rom tie roa^ has a deep cedar fvvafnp between. Every attention was now turned to the mouth of the creek which the enemy might have pofieffed themfelves of by a rapid march by the Oneyda Caftle. At this place the whole of the little army arrived by twelve o’clock at night, and took poft in fuch a manner as to have no feais of any thin" the enemy could do. Here we remained till three o clock next morning, when the boats which could come up the Creek arrived, or rather that the lafcally part of^ all nations of the Indians would fuffer to come up ; and proceeded acrofs SL Oneydf o the ruined fort of Brereton, where I learnt that to boats were rtUl hboiSmr down the creek, after being lightened of the beft part of thetr freight by the Meffafagoes. Captain Lernoult propoied, with a boat tull of aimed men, m reoafs the lake that night, to relieve them from their labour, and fupply them with provifion. This tranfaftion does as much honour to the humanity as to the 83 C) n ''my' arrival ^ t & th e Onondago Falls I received an anfwer to my lett J r fr ^ vour Excellency, which ffiewed, in the cleared: light, the feenes of treachery that Ld been praftifed upon me. The meffenger had heard indeed on his way that they Ae S.C kind of rabble as'Wore, but that' there was not an enemy W £n2r my 1 wm joined by Captain Lernoul^ with f he ciry my detachment down! which I mean to do with every ^ "oXedTrcX .he moment this buf.nefs is effeacd, for which purpofe I nave ordered here (now. The Hoop is already gone from this with her full lading. officers APPENDIX. xlvn Officers from each corps are fent to Montreal to procure neceffaries for the men, who are in a moil deplorable fituation from the plunder of the favages, that no time may be loft to join your army. I have the honour to be, with the greateft refpedt. Sir, your Excellency’s moll obedient, Ofwego, Aug. 1 7, 1777. and moft faithful fervant, Barry St. Leger. His Excellency General Burgoyne. Copy of a Letter from Lieutenant-General Burgoyne to Lord George Germain, dated at Albany, loth Oftober, 1777. My Lord, NO poflibility of communication with your Lordlhip having exifted fince the beginning of September, at which time my laft diipatch w r as lent away, I have to re- port to your Lordlhip the proceedings of the army under my command from that period : a feries of hard toil, incefiant effort, ftubborn adtion ; till difabled in the collateral branches of the army by the total defection of the Indians •, the defertion or timidity of the Canadians and Provincials, fome individuals excepted ; difappointed in the laft hope of any timely co-operation from other armies the regular troops re- duced by lofles from the bell part to 3500 fighting men, not 2000 of which were Britilh •, only three days provilions upon Ihort allowance in ftore •, inverted by an army of 16,000 men, and no apparent means of retreat remaining, I called into council all the generals, field officers, and captains commanding corps, and by their unanimous concurrence and advice, I was induced to open a treaty with Major General Gates. Your Lordlhip will fee, by the papers tranfmitted herewith, the difagreeable pro- fpedt which attended the firft overtures and when the terms concluded are compared, I truft that the fpirit of the councils I have mentioned, which under fuch circum- ftances dictated inftead of fubmitting, will not be refufed a ffiare of credit. Before I enter upon the detail of thefe events, I think it a duty of juftice, my Lord, to take upon myfelf the meafure of having parted the Hudfon’s River, in order to force a partfage to Albany. I did not think myfelf authorifed to call any men into council, when the peremptory tenor of my orders and the feafon of the year admitted no alternative. Provifions for about thirty days having been brought forward, the other neceffary ftores prepared, and the bridge of boats completed, the army parted the Hudfon’s River on the 13th and 14th of September, and incamped on the heights, and in the plain of Saratoga, the enemy being then in the neighbourhood of Stillwater. The whole army made a movement forward, and incamped in a good pofition in a place called Dovacote. It being found that there were feveral bridges to repair, that work was begun under cover of ftrong detachments, and the fame opportunity was taken to reconnoitre the country. The army renewed their march, repaired other bridges, and encamped upon ad- vantageous ground about four miles from the enemy. The enemy appeared in confiderable force to obftrinft the further repair of bridges, and with a view, as it was conceived, to draw on an adlion where artillery could not No. Xlv. i5tlu 1 6th. 17 th. 1 8 th. xW'iil Sept. 19 A P P E K D I "X* ■ be employed. A {mall lofs was fuftained in Ikirrmfliing, but the work ThfXes of , great ravine, and other roads towards the enemy, having been reconnoitred, the army advanced in Colonel Brey man’s corps, Brigadier General Frafer’s corps, g the heights, made a circuit, in order to pah tue 1a' 1 the riaht. Thefe corps moved in and afterwards to cover the march ot the ^ ^ upon the ir fronts three columns, and had the India , * * fon pa £Tcd the ravine in a direft line and flanks. Ihe Britifh line led -by * P they rained the fummit, where they lbuth, and formed in onto of and to enable the left wing SlSSrT 5 K uX *£' ™ds of Mgj General » d y The 47 th regiment guarded the bateaux. . • ,n«, retied to edve notice of all the columns The fignal guns, whicn had been previou y ^ “ nd two o’clock, the march being ready to advance, having «n of the Britifh line were foon fired continued. The fcouts a id - ’ fff , ^ about an hour’s march, the picquets, s f r d “ 1 ^ in force ’ andoblise to give ground, but they foon r Z^edVheTroops. A few cannon-fhot dif- On the firfl: opening of the w „i C nuets had been attacked, and Brigadier upon a very advantageous height or ithe : rig t of ^ combinat - l0n 0 f the march. In the meantime the enemy, , not with a view of turning the line upon had moved in great force out 0 t eir . f Brigadier General Frafer, counter- the right, and being checked by the Britifh. lort ’ howevernear ’ may effefted without a poffibihty of weir being £ c °^ re v ^ ous attack on the Britifh line. About three o’clock the aft ion be hlfa The enemy being continually and continued with great obftinacy all aker f • and regiments, moft »«■““ — the 9 "’ had ten as were part of the light ««°alfo of fervice , but it was J'^STadvaUe S 'evacuate , l heights where Brigadier General bra.er was polled otherwife than partially ar.d occalion.a • through a difH- P Major General Phillips upon fitft M™g the uh him J Major Williams cult part ot the wood to the feene o , t t i>ood indebted to that gallant and and four pieces of artillery, and from , that , ^ '“ocularly lot rearing the judicious fecond, for inceffant an n “ fuperiority of fire, and to ^ Major 3 APPENDIX. *lix Maior-Gcneral Riedefel exerted himfelf to bring up a part of the left wing, and arrived in time to charge the enemy with regularity and bravery luft as the li°-ht clofed, the enemy gave ground on all fides, and left us com pktely mafters of the field of battle,, with the lofs of about five hundred men oa their fide, and, as fuppofed, thrice that number wounded. The darknefs preventing a purfuit, the pnfoners were few. TWadier- The behaviour of the officers and men in general was exemplary. Brigadier General Frafer took his pofition in the beginning of the dav with great . ^F>ent & fuftained the aftion with confiant prefence of mind and vigour. Brigadier-Gener l Hamilton was the whole time engaged and acquitted himfelf with great honour, ac- ^Th/artiflery in°general was diftingudhed, and the brigade under Captain Jones. who was killed in the action, was confpicuoufly fo day took a The army lay upon their arms the night of the igth, and. the ^ 3 pofition nearly within cannon ffiot of the enemy, fortifying their right, exfe " S their left to the brow of the heights, fo as to cover the meadows th ough which the p-reat river runs, and where their bateaux and hofpitals were pla . The 47th regiment, the regiment of Heffe Hanau, and a corps of Provincials in. camped in the meadows as a further fecurity. • , l t i, e nrecedihp- Tr was foon found that no fruits, honour excepted, were attained by the precemn victory? tte enemy working with redoubled ardor ,o ftrengthen theft left : theft me of his indention to at 0 — wa< , t u e on ] v meffengerof many of his letter, which was the lath H^e aSd lim thatW reached' tssatissst asps*;; 1 *...-. „ *. pofition, if P?® ’ e 'two’foUowin^ fwo officers in difguife, and other conS- i“feKnd Tcktl a ed fortifying my camp and watching the enemy, whofe "?,hou M o-he 3 d cf O^t^diminim £ «*££*» £ order ro lengthen out the piov^ons. l Canada were clearly forefecn,,- SfSK “ libmy fuch “ ari Thft S TOnfidTra^^ofefaft^f^cib^m deK^ine^^ft^abi^^evCTta^aOong as poffible, and I reafoned thus. The expeditio ftould be devoted. A critical. fecfwft£MT 8 Wa ' , bl The The only one that feemed at all- Edward with the troops carrying their provifio P carriages out of the of repairing bridges, £ p^Swarf, or th°e ford above it. queftion, it was proposed to to » h returne d with intelligence that the enemy Before this attempt could be Md po flefled a camp in force on the high were intrenched oppoie port-George with cannon. They had alfo parties ground between Fort-Edwar . „ j DO ft s f 0 near to us, upon our own Sown the whole lEore to watch our to ^ fide of the water as muft prev , j joined by new corps of militia and vo- «Ef“ 0 ” ihk dmeth e^n ZTontin'oally upon their arms, and were cannonaded in to cLl into all parts of the line, though w.th- 'account of the ptoviftons was taken, and the cireuntftances officers and captains co— f SliSonS — r fiderable corps from Hubei ton „ , ’d Lake Georcre, and on the morning of^the TicJideroga^and ^otmf Independence.^Tfhe &stSg ^ "P " “f S & altd^ai the Portage made prifoners ; a block-houfe, commanded by L eu ena ^ a brave the furprifed vefTei wa« ^brought ^^e mhfbrmyour After dating and lamenting fo fata a want of vigilance, Lordlhip of the fatisfaclory events which followed f uc h The enemy having twice fummoned Brigadier General rowen, ana i great conunendations to the regiment of 1 nn ? tioned appendix. tvoned at Mount Independence. The Brigadier alfo mentions with great applaufe the -behaviour of Captain Taylor of the sift regiment, who was accidentally there on his route to the army from the hofpital, and Lieutenant Beecroft of the 24th regiment, who with the artificers in arms defended an important battery. On the 24th inftant, the enemy, enabled by the capture of the gun-boats and ba- teaux which they had made after the furpriie of the (loop, to embark upon 1 .ake George, attacked Diamond Ifland in two divifions. _ Captain Aubrey and two companies of the 47th regiment, had been polled at that ifland from the time the army puffed the Hudfon’s River, as a better fituat.on for the fccuritv of r fto™ at the fouth end of Lake George than Fort George, which ,s on the continent, and not tenable againft artillery and numbers The enemy were re- puifed by Captain Aubrey with great lofs, and purfued by the gun-boats under his command to the eaft ftiore, where two of their principal veffels were retaken, together with all the cannon. They had juft time to let fire to the other bateaux, and retreated OV Ybe Y mity,. he and his army mean to abide. No. q. Major-General Gates’s Propofals ; together with Lieutenant-General Burgoyne’s 3 Anfwers.*. I. General Burgoyne’s army bring exceeding andbaggage^taken ** ^ ^ ^ * iU nevcr admit that their retreat is cut off, while they have them . The II. The officers and foldiers may keep the baggage t> | generals of the United States never permit individuals to be pillaged. ^ v C APPENDIX. lviii III. The troops under his Excellency General Burgoyne will be conducted by the mod convenient route to New England, marching by eafy marches, and fuf- ficiently provided for by the way. Anfwer. This article is anfwered by General Burgoyne’s firft propofal, which is here annexed. IV. The officers will be admitted on parole ; may wear their fide-arms, and will be treated with the liberality cuftomary in Europe, fo long as they, by proper behaviour, continue to deferve it ; but thole who are apprehended having broke their parole, as fome Britifh officers have done, muft expedt to be clofe confined. Anlwer. There being no officer in this army under, or capable of being under the defcription of breaking parole, this article needs no anfwer. V. All public ftores, artillery, arms, ammunition, carriages, horfes. See. 8cc. muft be delivered to commifiaries appointed to receive them. Anfwer. All public ftores may be delivered, arms excepted. VI. Thefe terms being agreed to and figned, the troops under his Excellency General Burgoyne’s command may be drawn up in their encampments, where they will be ordered to ground their arms, and may thereupon be marched to the river iide, to be palled over in their way towards Bennington. Anfwer. This article inadmiffible in any extremity. Sooner than this army will confent to ground their arms in their encampment, they will rulh on the enemy, detertnined to take no quarter. VII. A ceflation of arms to continue till fun-fet, to receive General Burgoyne’s anfwer. (Signed) Camp at Saratoga, Odt. 14. Horatio Gates, Major Kingfton met the Adjutant-General of Major-General Gates’s army, Octo- ber 14th, at fun-fet, and delivered the following meflage : If General Gates does not mean to recede from the 6 th article, the treaty ends at once. The army will to a man proceed to any a ft of defperation, rather than fubmit to that article. The ceflation of arms ends this evening- No. XVI. No. XVI. RETURN of the Army of the United States, commanded by Major General Gates, Camp at Saratoga , October 16, 1777. Officers prefent • ' ^ and Bile. Commijjioned. Staff. mifiimtd. Brigades^ Brigadiers , 1 Colonels . -> O 55 ’S 8 « Majors, Captains, — * f' F/r/? Lieutenants, Second Lieutenants, “ '■> 1 • <*3 1 Adjutants, 1 C C. 1 «rK c; 1 < — *■ « S' Drums and F ; fcs, Prcfent Jit for Duty, 67 c£ prefent. .A * x* cg ^3 55 <3 I § O O On Furlough, Total, J Brigadier General Ninon’s I 3 4 3 2 7 2 5 28 24 1 4 , i 4 | 2 4 3 104 5 2 | I2 S 7 SS; 87 73 9 1481 Poor’s I 2 s 4 H 2 3 26 28 1 \ 3 3 | 4 3 5 I 10 S° i 1 x 3 2 Tsj 64 61 II 1316 Learned’s I 4 3 4 26 21 23 30 1 4 ?! 3 2 4 I 2 1 54 ; 1498 ! 57 SI 44 8 1658 Glover’s I 3 5 4 30 26 23 27 1 3 4 : 4 4 3 I 20 58 I 77 6 69 94 86 23 M O -f- 00 Paterfon’s l 4 3 4 28 22 24 26 0 3 3; 2 1 3 4 108 49 1255 61 77 53 12 1458 Warner’s I s 4 3 24 27 22 26 0 4 2 3 2 3 96 40 1572 95 83 68 32 1850 Stark’s I 3 3 4 2 7 30 24 22 0 3 4 2 1 4 2 IOI 48 220 2 5 3 2 X 9 X 9 7 x 3°3 • Bailey’s I 4 4 2 28 26 22 24 0 2 2 j 1 2 3 93 37 897 30 23 148 x 3 IOI 1 Whipple’s I 3 2 4 24 2 7 23 2 S 1 4 3 I 2 3 2 104 49 I 12 l8 21 897 27 I0 75 Brickett’s I 2 4 3 26 2 3 27 30 0 2 2 1 1 2 83 37 776 21 37 3 1 4 869 Fellows’s i 1* . 2 4 22 26 24 28 0 3 4 2 3 4 XI 3 51 J 3 2 40 3 1 884 10 1097 Woolcut’s J 3 2 3 2 C 23 21 2 S c 2 3 1 2 1 96 47 843 27 34 38 7 949 Ten Brock’s c > 4 3 ; 2 4 r 22 27 30 c 2 4 2 1 3 105 44 987 54 65 553 x 4 1673 Artilleries c ) c ) I i 6 - 5 5 0 c > 1 1 1 3 2 2 2 1 2 438 x 7 I 25 8 2 49 ° Cavalry 0 c > I 3 : f ; 6 » 7 0 c > 2 2 : c c 2 l6 8 321 5 7 I 2 1 346 Total ■ 1 •45 14 ^ ) 344 fc 33 2 ! 326 > 343 £ ; 4 2 '44 - 3 C 37 43 x 39 2 ! 636 I32l6 ! 622 : 731 3^75 180 18624 N. B. Exclufiye of the numbers in the above Return, there are, the upper ftaffof the army, the bateau men, the artificers, and followers of the camp. _ _ . Colonel Morgan’s corps of rifle-men, and the light-infantry, are included in the brigades. S ■ (Signed.) HORATIO - GATES, Major General. > W 2 a *— ♦ >4 * |x No. XVII. A P P E N D I X. Extracts from the Minutes of the lajl Council of War , excepting the names of the officers^ and. the notes they gave. CLu F.STION. "General Gates having, in anfwer to General Burgoyne’s mefiage, given a folemn affirmation on his honour, that no detachment has been made from his army during the negotiation of the treaty, is the treaty, in its prelent fituation, binding on this army, or is the general’s honour engaged for the figning it ? [Here follow the names of the officers as they voted.]] The lieutenant general’s opinion being clear, that he is not bound by what has pafled, he would not execute the treaty upon the foie confideration of the point of honour, notwithftanding the refpe&able majority againft him. He is likewife far from being convinced that this army, by great exertions and by great enduring in point of provifions, might not yet be relieved ; but he is com- pelled to yield on the following' conf derations. The treaty was generally thought a mod advantageous one before the intelligence arrived. That intelligence is refuted, and ocular demonftration of its falfity pledged as far as relates to General Gates’s force .; the other parts are only founded on hearfav, and not to be depended upon. Should General Clinton be where reported, yet the diftance is fuch as to render any relief from him improbable during the time our provifions could be made to laft. declares his poll untenable, and fays, if this convention is not ■figned, he apprehends there will be confiderable defertion. fays he thinks the 47th regiment not to be depended on. - - - - - — is of the fame opinion. thinks the 6 2d regiment is dilheartened by the fituation of their poll:, ;and not equal to their former exertions. Several officers think the men in general feem to have got the convention in their heads as defirable. Many of the belt officers are abfent by ficknefs and wounds from all the corps. Though the other officers at the head of the Britiffi corps think they can anfwer for the fpirit of their men, if attacked on their prefent ground, it is evident the moft fanguine do not think any part of the army in that elevation and alacrity of fpirit ne- ceffary for undertaking defperate enterprizes. To break off the treaty now renders a future renewal of it hopelefs, as our condi- tion mnft every hour grow worfe. A defeat is fatal to the army. A vidtory does not lave it, as they have neither provifions to advance nor retreat againft an enemy who by experience we know are capable of rallying at every advantageous poft. And that the life and property of every provincial and dependant of this army depends upon the execution of this treaty. POSTSCRIPT APPENDIX, lxi POSTSCRIPT to the APPENDIX. {Though the following Letters are not referred to in any Part of the Defence, it is hoped they will not be deemed fuperfiuous.] ExtraFt of a Letter from Major General Phillips, to Lieutenant General Burgoyne, dated Cambridge, September 29, 1778. My Dear Sir, THE Bofton news papers, have given extradls from Englifh and New York papers, wherein you are mentioned ; your arrival, your fpeeches in parliament and a variety of other matters concerning you. I do not always give credit to news papers, and therefore, the publishers at Bofton will excufe me, if in the in- ftance of news I do not give them, in my opinion, more veracity than I allow the news compilers at London. I will not plague you about our fituation, as you will know it, by my alluring you it is almoft exadtly as you left us j fo no more about it. The troops here de- pend upon you their chief, in whatever may relate to them j their intereft ; their honour. It is not doubted but you will exert yourfelf, that the officers may gain preferment in common, with other parts of the army. That you will have the goodnefs to exert yourfelf in behalf of their fituation, refpedting the very great expence of living, and endeavour to procure the allowance of forage money. And in fiiort, that you will ufe all your powers of perfuafion and intereft for thefe troops, which have ferved under you with zeal, and with honour ; and endeavour, by ferving their fituation and promoting their honour, to alleviate misfortunes which nor fortitude nor valour could prevent, and which they fuffer, however, with refignation aud patience. I am moft perfectly convinced of your affectionate, I will fay your grateful regard for us all ; and I leave myfelf and the troops to your friendly care *, to your humanity ; to your honour. You cannot expedt a letter of entertainment ; I have not even a power of making it one of intelligence. It fhall be however, a letter of perfedt fincerity, and in ithe fulleft fenfe of it I profefs to be. My dear Sir, Your very fincere Friend, and faithful Servant, (Signed) P HILUPS * P. S. I enclofe you the Copy of a Memorial to the Secretary at War, I am fure you will affift it. Copy appendix. lxii Copy of a Letter from Lieutenant General Burgoyne to Lord Amherft, incloftng the Memorial referred to in the above > dated November 6 , 1778* My Lord, . THE heavy misfortune I fuftain in being precluded the King s prefence, touches me in no point more nearly, than in the prevention of doing juftice to the various and extenfive merits of the army I had the honour to command. That the con- fequences of my fuppofed, or real errors, ftiould involve pretenfrons and interefts of fo many gallant officers is a painful reflection ; and it can only be alleviated by the trueft fenfe of the truft to be repofed in your Lordffiip, for the general protec- tion of the fervice. The inclofed memorial was accompanied with expreffions of reliance, in the name of the whole army, upon my efforts to fupport it. 1 he officers in New England little conceive my prefent fituation : I take the firfl: oppor- tunity to tranfmit their caufe to your Lordfhip’s happier aufpices, with this folemrv declaration, which I have mentioned upon different public occafions, and which 1 can omit no occafion to repeat, that there is not a Britiffi officer who ferved under me during the campaign of 1777* to whom I can impute blame •, that the inftances are very numerous wherein particular diftin&ion is due; and as a body, they have a claim to my fincereft refpe£t for their zeal in the King s fervice, and to my utmoft gratitude for their attention to me perfonally. I have the honour to be, &c. &c. &c. J. Burgoyne FINIS. ADVERTISEMENT. In Plan IV. the third and fourth pofitions of the army in the engagement of I 9th of September may appear upon a curfory view to want precifion. The ine- qualities of the ground could not be diftinctly marked upon fo fmall a fcale ; and the continual Ihift of the pofitions of feparate corps, as they were attacked by corps of the enemy, which frequently, from the thicknefs of the wood, they did not fee, made it equally difficult to mark regularly the pofition of the whole at any one time. The pofition of the armies on the 8th of September in Plate V. requires alfo fome explanation. P’rom the fmallnefs of the fcale, the pofition of the enemy could only be fhewn upon the plain near the river j but it is to be obferved, it extended over the ground of General Burgoyne’s former encampment, and in front of the redoubts upon the hill. N. B. The papers refpe&ingthe expedition to Bennington, referred to by miftake, tinder No. IV. page 103, will be found in the Appendix under No. XII. after Lieutenant Colonel Baume’s inftruttions. The account of the expedition of Lieutenant Colonel St. Leger, referred to alfo, by miftake, under No. V. will be found in the Appendix under No. XIII. dCTJOJST at < wulw B rigadier Gecn'^Feazee, ^jijwTizdlif Major Ge JV : z JReidesEL , on tlie 7 PlJtily 17 7 7. Drawn by V. Gerlach. DeffuJy Quarter Master General Engraved byVP^F a den . Paces to an Inch London Tublipied as the rice directs Feb ? j ^nfio , by WEaden Charing Crojs . Position of the Detachment under Lieut 1 . Col .'Buium, at WALM8COCK near BENNINGTON 3 fie wing* the Attacks of the Enemy on the iff r f*. August ljjy • Drawn by Lieut 1 . Dnrnford Engineer Engraved by "W? Laden 1700 . Position of the Detachment tfttdcr Lie tit / Coi .'/incuM, at WALMSCOCK near BENNINGTON Shewing- the Attacks of the Enemy on the A ug'ii&t ly . Drawn ly LieutVDxiraibrd Engineer.^ ilf .9 ^ ii -SL Q a !i j^rwr 1 . Ilifea 1 a ij i i-a. \ *•’ 1 A t ♦ a 1 1 ■ i» A / a ■> "■ ‘-a. ».. AiJL-*- References . K.lteid&relk Dragoons . B . Rangers . C . American Volunteer# . D . German Grenadiers . E . C/iafteurs . E . Houses, Tofts of Canadians G . Bodies of the Enemy . to an Inch boo London J x uLli/h’d as die dec directs, Feb ?1 'Si 180, tvW. Faden , CJiari/ig Oof ,ec m ii$ eibrnpardes,^ yf&ityj&b. ..^L ' A, Plan ofthe encampment andPosiTION of the ARMY under HIS EXOEL.LT LT GENERAL BURGOYNE ,rA .S’ WORDS HorrsJE on Hud son’s River near Stillwater on *\ eftf '. ly anMr the PotHtunu tyj/bad part off/ieA-rniy . engaged ontke i£»*** stpi •«*$& )'an{tj up* &mi ^ /%H\^ ‘■*y % ll^gggj 1« House *.$ _ PLAINT of the O AM PME 1ST T and. P O SIT I O^ST o f th e AR MY tuid er MIS EXCELLTLT GENERAL BURGOYNE ✓rA SWORD S HOTTSJE on Hud s oris River ne ar S tiUwater * th oh defitdywiUi t/u Po&itunu oj 7/t atfto rt of V// cA rnvif engaged* on the nj f^SehtT iq-jg Drmwi by A V. C YVYlldnson lf (?2- d ]legj. ^ruf 1 ! Erujrcived by\P^ Fa den . Scale of l'l OO Yard r. 100 'lOO 400 Jiondot /> published as thesict directs, by Whculen, l ‘haring t ross / Feb. v J^ l l 7&0. Scale of liooYanL Pl^LNT of the EN CAMFMENT ICC ICC andPosiTION of the AKMY under ^^^^JHlSEXCHJ,LrLTGE]\£JHAI.BUKGOYNE at JiecflM IT A' Hkio h TS on Hudson's River near Stillwater ENEMY'S CAM l at Stillwater. onMie 20 > 'ffi.t?junth of* 'the • E ettichm (wt 9/ c.///i f/ieActi4?n of t//e j ‘Oof f . ; , % L '//icJP cdifiott of ///cA/nrty on tfic S . \ :;^ : ;P&seP r(m7t 4 k 1 v: C .liilkiiis on TA^ZRrt/. i 4/'r. ^/u/f - -J En^jmird byVP^Y - aden . | 'A 'i if Intrench mm H'hich uvt.i j cedi' btyu yllll Poliimnsl * >• **. " «?■ . .. ./.a t-, ’*;•«. « • r::;; ^ > * ,$ ; V J4U A< * 1 t ■■ t f/ ’ ' '-v '• v »//" /7" ' ' ~ k. ^ ;* *1 A~ V, ;JU % < 5*0 ^t'*-t^ ** ® $s * - c V-I: ~ & l ■ m . ~ *£*1 l~%* *l «e^x to i AC # 'At '-V ,'^ i#aa| V' _^ : . : , : , : : : • Ai^etk&inw crpffQ ^ ^v. " ;r>e dint'E/ntafi^fi j C^;\;/' '.’■ ^EortEdWrud to ': ^•• : : ' . ; : • JtiUwala\ ffi h ■ |f **"- ..jwj •- 3 P. ~i»sr„ --.fc’- AU 'i*l . • jSf«C*s.>.-:.^ " 'V, 4/f.< / V | / ' < ' ,r 'f . 7/ " / ' /l ' . C'L N, . ■' ‘ f ’Vt r- * ’ O s y*. mm im !j; • : ’■Z&4?ci& m£ ■ ■* *■ - C-^ ( a ■ f.'fiL* ?». ,r^ 'y >* '«? — ■ Nm m*. ; ''iWTfrrjwftitjyM! Y ^ v ' l* , .i'V , i •' i‘, ■' 1 '. sirrJi'rj.i'r.,,’* '■rJfurC^rk-A'’; ■•£-. ' ; 'A.'"^,-' '" ' ' . ' '• ' '■ ,''**^^ ’ ' .A ■-^ns^v kF" rJfJ.j.f »' .5 “ ' •.''' ■*- u- i* •*. #- '«► v.*.a j. Mtsi ^Jp ^ fij> v £j>. ' ; - v -:\ : : vAVaVa ; ■ A: A •:.B-:atf J-K i d.fN''sY: \ ' '.'• '/'.'/> ' A. V/^A sy '. -\ . , -^~ 4 1:?'. ^.r ,^T ~ Tr-k. ' rr/ W ,-H under,: S>^4S!.A miM Piibliflietl as vAct directs lyfio liyW 1 . 11 Fad»m Charing -Crofs U3W