rr<(T r*??' \ i ; ' . \ xiM- . \ ^we«‘ 'r^xr-^ M . ' ; tax Vj^ . r j^l ^;4 - \ \rk ■ ■ '* ^T . ...'.iisr - li I ' ' H,w„; ..,. „ .il | ,.> V ,,^:|^ 'r^'- r -.+-, ■ ^ t 35 ::::zr 4 -i- I, . -4 ,^u- ^ 1 i ,'t- ™l \ !,,jif 4 w>-**-" -i-' '* > ';. i'l‘. I i i, : TtI'*^'( I' 1 ! 1 j j' .■■ii'««»-.- *.|w- 4 - ^ .. •ISlrU: •S k • < ^ ' Tjy J I ♦ i ■ !'HS ''7 ;:rrti;:r" 7 <"-r^- •;j.:;r'M- ••{ I I ' I • if’ i , 1 1 • :.i! 1.4ii-W-4l,4*..u r JlrT^r I-- Mr!ifcT: G?: j j |i fit. ' "Sx FrRF^p" I MW 1 '"fft- i . r M r • A 1 ; •'■'" 4 {i!» t-'. n iinitU*.-. ‘ 1^11 'I-- . \^ Iff 1 < ' • I . ..' "n^". U ;::tt.l:; ± 1 - J.ftt"' .'•-M ri ■' ' IL.. ..f rr'tifi., If* 1 4 '- 1 ^ I ; * Jl ^ .^ . I "f*"**^ ' . -J .-^r - 1 ’ • ■">^•4 ‘ p V Wrfi ^ 4 |U< .....w,. 1 4 I li J * »h».. fc:a,.'ad:ial'-g::l lu. Hhi-t y| •.•^•fl«iB>iial>»- ’•*'4 1 ''‘• 4 ^'-' *"^j .._J KLli'. X / h • A N EX AM IN A T I O N O F T H E Commercial Principles OF THELATE NEGOTIATION / BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN and FRANCE In MDCCLXI. IN WHICH The Syftem of that Negotiation with Regard to our Colonies and Commerce is confidered. The SECOND EDITION. Aguntur certiffima Populi Romani veftigalia et maxima, qui- bus amiflis et pacis ornamenta et fubfidia belli requiretis— Nam ceterarum provinciarum veftigalia,Quirites,tanta funt, ut iis ad ipfas provincias tutandas vix contend elTe poflimus* Cic. pro leg, Man* LONDON: printed for R. and J. Dodsley, in Pall-Mall. MDCCLXII. [ 2 ] It is in my Opinion a fortunate Circum-' fiance, notwithftanding the additional Expence which we have incurred lince the Clofe of the late Negotiation, that we have ftill an Op- portunity coolly and at Leifure to review, and, if it be not prefumptuous, to rejudge the whole of that very interefting Tranfad;ion : becaufe W'e are dill in a Condition to make fuch a Revifio n of real Service to us. An Opportu- nity fo favourable rarely occurs. Negotiations ordinarily remain involved in the prudential ObfcLirity, with which Deliberations of that Importance ought always to be attended, until they are finally ratified. The Bufinefs of po- litical Criticifm is then at an End. However jufl it may be, it is then certainly ufelefs. We are not, I hope, fo far gone in Military Madnefs, as to look no farther than the War. We do not fight and conquer without fome Confideration of the End and Purpofe of our Vidories, and our Acquifitions. Whilft the War continues our Objed is fimple ; it is only by every poflible Means to weaken and difirels the Enemy. The Bufinefs of Pacification is more difficult, as it is more important. We are then to form fuch Plans, and to purfue liich Meafurcs, as may be mofi; conducive to -the lading, folid, and fubftantial Benefit of our Country. This is a Matter which requires the mod mature Deliberation ; and therefore not only judifies, but demands the Intervention of every Perfon, according to the Sort of Knowledge [ 3 ] Knowledge he happens to polTefs; and calls for the publick Attention to every Propofal which leems to arife from any Appearance of publick Spirit, and to be fupported by any tolerable Deg-ree of Information. O We are flill in the Train of Conqueff ; our Portion and the Afpeft of Things are conti- nually varying ; but notwithftanding thefe Va- riations, the general Plan of our Policy muft be the fame. Every Country has an Intereft more particularly its own, refuldng from thole Circumftances, which conftitute its peculiar Strength and Safety. The great Source of our particular Opulence and Power, has hitherto been confidered to arife from Trade; and it would be an unfortunate Effed: of all our Bravery and Policy, if we had either fought or negotiated ourfelves out of our commercial Character. Advantages of a merely political Kind, will be always more or lefs problema- tical; their exad Value can hardly ever come to be ellimated ; and the political Syftem is it- felf fubjed to fuch Fluduation, that what at one Time we may have fought with infinite Eagernefs, and bought at an enormous Ex- pence, by a Change, owing perhaps to the Death or Depofition of a foreign Prince, to a Love Intrigue, to perfonal Refentment, or pofiibly to mere Inconllancy and Caprice in thofe who govern, may be rendered in a Mo- ment infignificant or ufelefs, and even fome- times dangerous. Plow was all ILiirope agitated, B 2 almofi: almoft within our own Memory, upon the Bufinefs of a Barrier for the Dutch ? What Volumes were wrote upon that Subject, which no body now fo much as fpeak of? Holland thought her very Being depended upon it; Great Britain, with her ufual Warmth for all her Allies, was hill more earneft than the Principal, and laboured this V/ork as the only Means of preferving the Liberties and Inde- pendence of Europe ; France omitted nothing in her Power > to prevent, to obhrudt, or to fruhrate the Defign ; and after all this mighty Buflle, it would at this time be hard to fay, whether Holland, Great Britain, or France, concern themfelves lead about that Barrier, which once fo intirely engroffed the whole At- tention of them all.. In reality, in every po- litical Queftion the Pafllons are always more or lefs engaged, our Decifions upon fuch Q^dions are of Confequence lefs to be relied upon ; let the Situation of Affairs change but a little, and our Ideas change with them. But there is no Situation in which Wealth is not Strength, and in which Commerce is' not Wealth. It Commerce is our Objeeff, we knoue, and in ail other Cafes we can at bed vvhat we acquire. From the ge- pf r i! Nature therefore of Inch Advantages, as well^ as from their Relation to our own more particular Intereif, thefe hiould be Objedls ca- pital, and • Conditions indifpenfable in every Scneme we torm, every Conqueh we propofc, and every rsh^getiation we engage in. In f s 1 * In the Reign of Queen Amie^ the Whigs and Tories mutually and juftly cenfured each other, for that the one in the Treaty of Gertruyden burghy amidft all the exorbitant Demands, and the other at the Treaty of Utrech^ amidft all their fhameful Conceffions, took very little Care to provide any commercial Advantages for their Country, ^ while the one laboured to protra(ft the War, and the other to precipitate the Peace, folely for the Purpofes of Party. At prefent it would be indeed lamentable, if merely by miftaking our Intereft, when we cannot be milled by Party, we (hould fall into the fame or a greater Error. It * “ Your Commons naturally inclined to hope, that they faould find Care had been taken of fecurlng fame particular “ Advantages to Britain on the Terms of a future feace, fuch “ as might afford a Profpe^ of making the Nation amends in “ time for their immenfe Treofure which hath been expended, “ and ihofe heavy Debts which have been contra Sled in the Courfe of fo long and burthcnfome a IVar. 5 his reafonable “ ExpeSiation could no way have been better anfwered than by “ feme Provifion made for the future Security, and the greater Improvement of the Commerce of G reat Bri tain.” Re- prefentation of the Commons, Journals An. I7ii> R* 122 . “ On this Reprefentafion they vote the Perfens concerned ih “ making the Treaties there referred to. Enemies to their Coun- “ try. “ That he facrificed the Commerce of Great Britain ip “ and particularly confented to thfir ffhing at New- “ foundland. Art. 13, Impeachment of Lord Oxford.” Without entering into the Juifice of this Charge, both Parties by their mutual Accufations have liiffici-ntly fhewn in what Light they confidered this grand Objech'^ [ 6 ] It is an Attempt full of Danger to projeft a Change in thofe fundamental Maxims of Po- licy, by which a Nation has been long fuftain- cdj and by which the has grown into Power. It has been remarked, that States have often fuf- fered terrible Falls, or at leaft a very great and fenlible Decline, which might be dated from the Moment of their Arrival at fome very con- liderable Degree of Profperity. This Fadf, which furnilhes to Declaimers no more than an Obfervation of the Ficklenefs of Fortune, and the Inftability of human Affairs, may fupply the political Reafoner with Matter of very ufe- ful Reflection. It is only in. Time of great Prof- perity, that States .are intirely Maflers of their own Conduct, and in a Capacity of executing new Scherhes of Policy. An Error in thofe Schemes becomes at that Time highly dani gerousj becaufe they have then Ability to pufli their Error as far as it will go j and the Mif- chief they bring upon themfelves, is propor- tionable to the Strength which they abufe. An erroneous Policy always precedes a declining Power. The Moment of Profperity is there- fore critical, and ought to be watched with the utmoft Diligence, and ufed with the greated CircumfpeCtion. I think this Confideration, which on another Cccaficn might be too general, is at this Time next to neceffary. 1 have lately obferved that, in feveral ^litical Writings, which did not v/ant Admirers, a Syhem has been laid down, which if no contrary to our national Interefl^ jg > f 7 ] at leaft contrary to all our former Ideas of it j and what is more material, that Syftem feems to have been admitted as the governing Prin-- ciple in the late Negotiation. I fliall there- fore think the Time not loft, which is fpentin examining this new Plan with Attention j and if I fliould be thought to dwell long upon it, or to grow too minute, the Reader will be pleafed to remember, that his Fatigue, whatever it may be, is much lefs than mine ; and, that we i are all deeply concerned in the Event. In this Enquiry, I ftiall confine myfelf to thofe Matters of which I have been able to furnifh myfelf with exadl Details. Without . thefe, all Reafoning concerning commercial Qi^ftions, how well foever intended or con- dudled, will neceflarily be lax and inconel uftve. Supported by thefe, it is of very little publick Concern what may be the Character, the Views, or even the Abilities of a political Writer. An intelligent and difpaflionate Reader, when he is furniftied with the proper Faefts, may form a a Syftem for himfelf. By his Temper and his Sagacity, he may counteract the PafJions, and fupply the Deficiencies of his Autlior ; and whilft he is enabled to correCt his Miftakes, he will fometimes deduce from his FaCts a Chain of Confequences, which may poflibly have ef- caped the Writer, who originally furnifhed him with the Materials of Speculation. It is there- fore of no Importance, to enquire what Preju- dices may be entertained by the Publick, or by any any private Perfon, againft, or in Favour of, . j any of the Objecfts of this Negotiation. ^ The \ prefent Enquiry is not concerning Prejudices or 1 Opinions, but concerning Matters of Fadt only; and on the Evidence of thefe, I propofe there- j fore to examine Vi I. What the Sydem of that Negotiation was j with Regard to our Commerce and our Colo- ' nies in America. . ^ II. To examine into the Strength or Weak- i nets of the Principles upon which that Syftem was founded. ' III. To touch upon the Motives which may have induced us at that Time to adopt fuch ' Principles. I chufe to acquaint my Reader with the Me- thod I intend to purfue, becaufe being far from ^ any Intention of the fmallefl Deceit, or Sur- ^ prize on his Underftanding, this Order will bet- ter enable him to watch and to detedt me, if I S fhould advance any thing falfe in Fadt or in- j conclulive in Argument. The late Negotiation, fo far as it regarded ' our Colonies and Commerce, was on our Side condudted, I apprehend, on one iingle Idea, J to fecure to ourlelves the Polleflion of all ^ Canada. I fay, upon this fingle Idea, becaule i lom a careful Examination of the feveral Plans ^ delivered to the Frejich Minifter it appears, 1 that even an Attempt was not made, to pro- cure m America any other Poffeffion, or any other Advantage whatfoever. Our Intereft, and 1 t 9 ] and pur Conquefts in the VVeJi-lndies, were very little, if at all, regarded. On the Open- ing of' the Treaty, we agreed to negotiate away Guadaloupe and Marigalante ; and in the Turns which that Treaty took, and in all the different Schemes of Commutation, which were from Time to Time propofed, and they were many and various, 1 do not find that it was for a Moment the Idea to retain that Acquifition we had made in the Weji- Indies y which the very Article that reftores it to France, denomi- nates a fertile || and wealthy Ifland ; and which the very great Increafe of our Trade fince its 'Reduction, demonftrates not to have been at all over-rated in thofe Epithets, however it might be undervalued in the Exchange by which it was to have been furrendered. The Reader will not entertain any Doubt that the Treaty was condudled on a Principle wholly averfe to Weji^lndian Acquifition, when he recolledls this very remarkable Fadt. Early in the Negotiation, and as I may fay at the Out-fet, we agreed to exchange -f- Gua- daloupe for Mmorca ; but during the Progrefs of that Tranfadion Belleijle fell into our Hands. * Hifl-. Mem. of theNeg. 2I. Art. 8- “ His Ma~ “ jejiy iikewife agrees to furrender to the mojl Chrijlian King “ the opulent IJland of Guadaloupe, vAth that of Mariga- “ lante.” II Hift. Mem. of the Neg. N® 27. Art. 6, -f N® 17. Art. 3, 4. 20. Art. 8, Here Here was prefentcd a new Subje<5l for Ex- change: It was quite natural to barter one 'European Ifland for another j and it became the more natural, as the one was of no great Advantage to Englandy nor the other to France', and both were heavily expenfive to their refpec* tive Poffeifors. Accordingly, we find that J Exchange was propofed ; but what is very lin- gular, even at the Time of making that Propo«p tal, it does not appear that any Advantage was taken from this Circumftance, to retain the lead: Particle of our IVeJl-Indian Conquefts. The original Scheme of Compenfation was changed Belleijle was offered (fo the French underftood it, and they never were contradict- ed) for Minorca', but Guadaloupe, the old Equi- valent, was, notwithftanding this new ProjeCt, to have been furrendered j though not in Ex- change for Minorca, nor for any thing elfe that I can difcover ; and therefore, without -any diftinCt Compenfation at all. Yet here alfo a Difficulty occurs ; for it is not very eafy to dif- cover for what Reafbn Belle '^e was taken, if It was not to be admitted among the Equiva- lents. The Expedition for the Reduction of this Ifland was undertaken after the Com- .mencement of the Negotiation ; and the Place •could fcarcely be defired for any other Purpofe, than to give us fomc Advantage in that Nego- tiation ; and yet a very few Days after we had taken i I’age 66. Ait. 6 and 7, of Hift. Mem. of the Ne^, [ 'I 3 taken 'BelleijlCi its negotionable Value was eifti- mated at nothing ; and in all Appearance we fuffered it to be added to Giiadaloiipe^ in Com- penfation for an Obje(ft which had been before offered us for Giiada loupe alone. To date this Dealing in a few Words j we hrfl: offered them BeUeijley together with Gua^ daloupe ; and at lafl we gave them Guadaloupef ^ together with Belleljle. There was no Varia- tion at all in the Compenfations by the Diffe- rence, or the Agreement of either of the Par- ties to the Negotiation, with regard to this Article. This will appear clearly to the Read- er, if he compares the early Overtures of the P'r^/zei'Minifter with the fubfequent Memorials. For what Reafon I cannot judge, we feemed to think thefe twoObje we were to the laft Degree tenacious of our Acquilition. The French would have been content with one of thefe Objects ; they agreed to cede the Ifle of Goree, without which Senegal would always have been at our Mercy At length however they agreed to give up both Senegal and Goree^ but in order to render this Ceffion which we had lb much at Heart palatable to France, we tconfenled to give them in return fome Douceurs in the Slave Trade. It does not appear very clearly from the Memorial what they were ; ^cra and Anamabo. were mentioned by the French ; and they were not in Appearance re- fufed on the Part of England. Whatever was the real Equivalent, this, however, is plain, that we thought Senegal and Goree very wor- thy of fome Conceflions,' and of a great deal pf Negotiation. Nov/ without recurring to the Maxim I have juft mentioned, what colourable Reafon pan p'oflibly be aftigned for our Condudl ? We W’^ere not lb fond of Senegal and Goree becaufe they were a Security to our Colonies in North America. We did not feek them, to give us a * hiflo Mem. of the Neg. IStsv. 17. Art. 7, t *3 1 a Superiority In the Mediterranean. It mull be merely as commercial Objects that we va- lued them. We could poflibly have no other Motive. But were they, in a commercial View, Objeds as confiderable as Gtiadaloupe? No one ever imagined it. I fhall fhew prefently that the Trade of Guadaloupen above ieventcen times more confiderable. What then could have been put into the Scale of Senegal to turn the Eallance in its Favour againft this immenfe Dilproportion : except the Refolution, however it came to prevail, that we ought not to ex- tend our Trade, or our Empire in the Weji- Indies f It is necefiary the Reader fliould be warned, that the Q^fiion then was not, nor now is, which fbould have the Preference in our Efi:i- mation, Guadaloupe or Canada^ the Well -Indian, or the North American Commerce ; that Queflion was pradically decided by the vo- luntary unfollicited Ceflion of the whole Coun- try of Canada, ^ by France herfelf. ' Had it indeed been neceffary, by the Sur- render of the fertile Ifland of Guadaloupe, to purchafe the vafi; but unprofitable Forefts of Canada, the Paflion at lead of boundlefs Em- pire would have been flattered. There had perhaps * Pao;e 32 of Hift. Mem. of the Neg. “ Before a Me- mortal of Propoftioas was font in Form to the Court of ‘‘ London, his Majejly s Minljhr entrufled to confer tvith Mr. Stanley, authorifed him to write word, that France would guaranty the Pojfefjion of Canada England. [ H ] ncrliaps been fbmething magnificent in fuch a Delufion. But from the Beginning them was - no mention of an Exchange of that Nature. The firfi: Overtures to the Treaty declare, that, not Guadaloupe, but the Privilege of the Fifliery at NewJ'oundldndt was the Compenia- tion for Canada ; and through the whole Ne- gotiation, no particular Confideration is fpeci- lied as the Compenfation of Guadaloupe on our Side, but fingly the Reftitution of Minorca on theirs -f-. When we had fatisfied our Views in ISortb America^ our whole Bulinefs in America feemed to be confidered as over. W^e hurried to Ez/-? rope, and to Africa', our Thoughts being wholly alienated from the Wefl-Indian Com*i> merce. It will perhaps be objedled againft the Uni--- verfality of the Aflertion, that by Article the § 5th of the French Memorial of the 1 5th of fuly 1761 ; as alfo in ours of |1 29th of the fame Month, a Divifign of the four Iflands called Neutral, v/as provided ; and therefore we did not fo intirely rejed: all Ideas of Acquifition in the Wef -Indies. The Fad I readily admit ; but •f- Page 27 of the Fr. Hift. Mem. “ T})e Liberty ef “ fijhing, and the Shelter loltbout Fortipcatiom, was the Com- *• pcnfatlon for the Cejfon of all Canada.” The “ Refitu^ “ of the If and of Minorca, tvas certainly equivalent to ths “ Cejfon of Guadaloupe Marigalante.” § Vide Page 29. of the Hift. Mem. of the Neg. jl 2)^ Art. 5. Hift, Mem. of the Neg. f 15 I ^but I am very far from admitting alfo the In- \ ference ; for 1 apprehend, the Difcuflion of thiR Fad; will a'dd new Strength to my Afiertion, inftead of being in any Degree derogatory to the Point which I intend to eftablifh." For I affirm, in this Partition of the neutrd Wands, fuppoling the intended Partition '\o have been fair and equal in Point of Value (which I ffiall hereafter prove was by no Means the Cafe) inftead of acquiring any thing by our Superiority in the War, inftead of increaftng our Claimfe in Confequence of our Vidories, we adually receded from thofe Claims, on which we had always irffifted, previous to thofe Conquefts, and previous even to the War itfelf. In all our Memorials on this Subjed, we con*- tended for the abfolute exclulive Right to the neutral Wands, and in Confequence of this Right, fo early I think as 1722, we attempted a Settlemet in the only one which is valuable amongft them, Sf. Lucie } and though we tamely fuffered this Settlement to be deftroyed, we ftill kept our Pretenfions alive with all the Vigour of which Negotiation is capable. And what is very rernarkablc, our Right is no where more clearly afterted than in that very Article, in which we agreed to give away thefe Iflands. *!• But * Vid. Memorials of the Englij}} and French Commifl'a- rles concerning St. Londonyiy^^. Quaito. •}■ Vid. Hift. Mem. .of the Neg, p. 37, 38. Art. 5. of the Anfwer of the BritiJ}) Court to the Memorial of French Propofitioiis. J t i6 I But allowing the Pretenfions of England and France to thofe Iflands had been equal in the Ballance, yet the Divilion even then, and allowing it to have been an equal Divilion, has given us juft nothing. The Equality of the Right has produced an equal Partition of the contefled Objed:; and each of the Litigants has taken a Part, in Compenfation of his Pre- tenfions to the Whole : On this footing we have only ended a Difpute, we cannot pretend to fay we have made an Acquifition. But if, as we have always underflood, and uniformly afferted, our exclulive Right to thofe Iflands was clear, and indifputablej then we are not only no Gainers, but we are even con- liderable Lofers by the Stipulation contained in this Article ; and our immenfe Expences, and brilliant Advantages in the Weji-Indies, have only afforded us an Opportunity of giving up our new Acquifitions ; and along with them a confiderable Part of our old patrimonial Rights. Either it was unjufl: to have laid claim to the neutral Iflands, if that Claim was not •well founded ; or, if we had the Right we pre- tended to the Whole, it did not appear quite reafonahle, after a victorious War, to accept of a Part only. In North America we aimed to acquire a great deal more than we originally pretended to. In the W ’ifi-Indies we gave up a confider- able Part even of our oldefl: and mofl: valid Claims. [ '7 ] Claims. .It is therefore evident, that our Con- dudl with regard to the neutral lOands, inftead of being an Objedtion to my Obfervations on this Treaty, furnifhes a new and irrefragable Proof in fupport of them ; and indeed demon- ftrates, that inilead of aiming to extend, we thought it rather our Interefi: to contract our Dominions in the ; and this natu- rally conducts us to the feccnd Point which I propofe to examine : Whether the general Syftem, which I have fhewn to have prevailed in that Negotiation, Was founded on Reafon, and the real reciprocal Interefi of Great Britain and her Colonies ; and whether the particular Objedls we were to have received in Compenfation, were equivalent to the Cehions by which they were to have been purchafed. I will even pufh this Enquiry further, and endeavour to find out from an Invefligation of decifive Fadts, whether the whole Aggregate of all the Advantages of every fort which we were to have obtained by every other Article of the Treaty, were not infinitely counter- ballanced by what we loft in that fingle Ar- ticle, by which we were to have furrendered Giiadaloiipe, Thefe are, I am fare, very inte- refling Difquifitions, and very worthy the moft ferioiis Attention. And firft, with regard to the general Maxim of rejedlingor greatly undervaluing 2.WeJl-In- San Acquifition, I hope I fliall make it ap- pear to the Satisfadhon of ever}' unprejudiced D Reader, [ ] Reader, that it was grounded on a Want of due Attention to the Importance of the JVeJt- Indian Colonies, in our Syjftcm of Commerce ; and that it could never have prevailed, if we had made the lead: Enquiry into the Advan- tages VvEich the JVeJi-Indian Trade poffefles, either folely, or in a Degree very fuperior to any other. To fay the Truth, I cannot help feel- ing fomc Surprize, that fuch Ignorance, with fuch Means of Information, could poffibly be- come at all common in a commercial Nation; or that we fhould ourfelves miftake, or fuffer others to mifleadus fo exceflively with regard to the relative Value of our iNoyth American and JVeJi-Indian Poffeflions. The fundamental Principle on which all Ideas of Wefi-Indian Acquifition have been re- jed:ed, is a Maxim, laid down by the Writer of the Letter to two great Men, ^hat we had al- ready Sugar Land enough. There is no Word whatfoever of greater Latitude in the Con- ftru(5tion, when it is referred to private Con- cerns, than this Word enough. With regard to the Publick, it is often contra(fted within very reafonable Limits. Does it here mean that we have Sugar Land fufficient to fupply the Home Confumption It is not ftri<3:ly true, that we have enough for the Confumption of all the Britijh Dominions. We know that in Ireland they ufe fomC, and in North America a very great Quantity of foreign. Sugars, and Syrups ; and v/e have Realbn to believe that fome [ 19 ] (bme find their Way even into England. If he means that we have enough for foreign Con- fiimption, furely he is by this Time' at leafi: informed, that before the War we had in a Manner wholly loft the foreign Market for this Commodity. And unlefs he, or fomebody for him, will be pleafed to prove that the Sugar Commerce is detrimental, or not very advan- tageous to us, I conceive this AfTertion will be altogether equivalent to a general Declaration, that we have foreign Trade enough. A Decla- ration, which however repugnant to Fa Exports to North America, Imports from,. North America, - 1; s. d. .832,948 13 10 648,683 o 4 Imports from die Weft-Indies, Exports to the Weft- Indies, I. 'S. .834,036 z 877>57I 19 d. z 11 Deficiency of Imports being aEal- lancedueto Gr^at Bri^ tain from N. America^ ;j,. i 184,265 13 6 Excefsoflm- ports, being a Ballance due from GreatBritaia to the Weft Indies^ >956,464 2 ' 3 * lide Int. of Col. Page 57. r And [ 34 ] And from fuch a fair State of thofe Trades two Things muft have appeared j firft, that the Returns made by North America to Great Britain are exceflively inferior to what North America receives from hence, whereby a Ballance Jiands againjl North America of no lefs than 1.184,265/. 13^. 6 d. And as we know that North America contains no Mines of Gold or Silver, the Reader muft naturally have in- quired by what Means this Ballance was made up to Great Britain ; and this Enquiry would have led his Attention to the WeJi-Indian'VxzAQ'y the fair State of which would have difeovered the fecond Thing, viz. that contrary to the Cafe of North America^ the Returns made by .the Weji-Jndies to Great Britain are exceffively fuperior to what the Weji-Indies receive from hence, whereby a Ballance Jiands for the JVeJi Indies, of no lefs than 956,464 /. 2 s. 3^. Now as it is well known that we never fend Treafure to . the Wef -Indies to make up this Ballance (on the contrary we receive a great deal from thence) it would as naturally be afked how this Over- plus on the Side of the TVef -Indies was anfwer- ed and ballanced on the Side of Great Britain', and this, upon Examination, would appear to have been done by three Ways. Ftrji, By our Weft-Indies taking upon them- felves the Payment of a very large Part of that exceffive North American Deficiency, a Fa6t that would clearly have fhewn the Dependence of North America on that Trade, without which our North American Colonies could never pay 3 for, [ 35 ] for, nor confequently take off, ourManufacSlures. Secondly^ In paying for almoft the whole African Trade, by which their Importance in anotherLight would have become evident. And, 'Thirdly, In the very great Sums fpent by the JVeJi - Indian Planters relident in Engla77d ; whereas we derive fcarce any Advantage of that Kind, none 'i I am fure that is worth men- tioning, from any of the continental Plantations to the Northward. All this, I fay, would have appeared from a fair and ballanced State of the Exports to, and Imports from. North America and the Weji- Indies } and this,inftead of lowering, would have •raifed the vaft Importance of the WeJl'India Plantations. Whereas, from the imperfect, and therefore fallaciousState of it, given by that Wri- ter, an inattentive, uninformed Reader might be apt to imagine, xhziGreatBritainhdLdnooxhQr: Advantage from the Wejl-Indies, than Amply wh at arofe from herExports thither; than which Suppofition nothing can be more groundlefs. This Writer goes Hill further; and, as it were in Triumph, proceeds to fhew how fmall the proportional Increafe of the Weji~lndia Trade has been to that of North America. This is, I believe, very lamentably true ; but after what has been faid, the Reader, I imagine, will of himlelf draw a Conclufion from it dia- metrically oppoAte to that Gentleman’s Wifh- es He will fee (for even that Gentleman F 2 will * Vid. Int. of Col. p. 35. t 3^ '] will inform him) that our WeJl-lndia’Tt^AQ has been cramped merely for Want of Land ^ and not for Want of Market. Whereas the North American Trade has extended, becaufe it had Land fufficient to bear fuch an Extent for Ages to come, and becaufe it found a Market, not indeed in the EngUjht but in the French Sugar Colonies^ which had alfo increafed abundantly, becaufe they (the French) had Land in Abundance, in the Weji-lndies. Com- mon Senfe would didlate to us the Scheme of Acquifition where we wanted,not where we did not want ; and the fame plain Guide would dire<5l us to prefer that Plan, which, by the Operation of one hngle Principle, mud extend ■our Trade where it was limited, and redlify it, where it was v/rong diredled. Acquilition in the Weji-Indies mufl: increafe our limited and decaying Sugar Trade, and at the fame time recall our, extenlive indeed, but erring Trade of North America^ from French to Markets. This Angle Confideration might feem fuffi- cient to enforce the Propriety, 1 had almoft faid Neceffity, of making Acquihtions in the Weji-Indies even in Preference, had that been the Difpute, as it was not, to continental Acqui- Ations } but there is another ConAderation re- fuiting from the fameFadl,which in myOpinion is Aill more cogent. This Author has fhewn, that our Export to the WeJi-lndies^ is greatly inferior to our Ex- port to the northern Colonies. But he has, perhaps, t tS7]- perhaps, more artfully, thaningenuoufly, omitted the Proportion of the Inhabitants, who call for thefe Exports. In all the Britijh Iflands it will be difficult to raife the Whites to 90,000 ; Now if in the Year 1758, thefe 90,000 con- fumed 877,5711. 19s. I id. and the Inhabitants of North America^ who exceed a Million and an half, took off, according to his own ftatingof the Queftion, but 1.832,9481. 13s. lod. it appears at a Glance that one Man in the Weft-Indie:^ is worth to the Trade of the Mother Country as much. as eight are worth in North America, which ffiews how much more valuable the Trade of the Weft-Indies is, than the Trade of North America, in Proportion to the’ Number of Inhabitants; and if we were to take in the Extent of Territory, we ffiould be loft in the Difproportion. From thefe Fa()l.^s,\od and I muft defire the Reader to obferve, that Guadaloupe has, befides, been the Market for all the French Prize Goods taken in the Weji’- Indies. The Precifion, however, which I have prefcribed to myfelf, precludes me from bring- ing this into the Account, as it is impoffible here to afcertain exadtly the Value or Quan- tity of thofe Goods, which has however been very confiderable. But exclufive of thefe H 2 Prize [ 52 ] Prize Goods, and admitting, contrary to fa( 5 t, the immediate Export from hence, to have been no greater for the laft, or for the current. Year than what I have ftated for the hrft Year after its Reduction j yet this, joined to the Britijh Export employed for Gua- daloupe in the Slave Trade, ( which I have under calculated) will raife the Demand of BritiPo Produce and Labour, occafioned by our Poffeflion of this Ifland, to 238,569/. ^s, io<^. and to this if we add, as we muft, the Freight- age, the Commiffion, the Merchant’s Profit on the Sale of the Commodities there, and the returned Advantages of all the Produce in the Import hither, and in theRe-export abroad, in the Manufacture at home, and in the Ex- pence of thofe who come to Loiidon on their Affairs, it will appear to a Demonftration how extremely lucrative to England this Ifland is, even in its prefent State of imperfed Subjedion and imperfect Cultivation. In this Manner con- jectures are anfwcrpd by FaCts ; and when this Writer fpeaks of a Conqueff over a -j- People of different Language, Manners, and Religion, as not worth having ; and of its Value as over- ballanced by the Expence of keeping it, he muft allude to fome other Conqueft, and not to Int- Page 46. « J Country fully inhabited by cp Nation, ts no proper Pofejfion for another of different « tenable at lejs Expence than it is ivorth,^^ [ 53 ] to Guadaloupe j for we know that the Expence of keeping Guadaloupe, even now in T inie of War, and when the Ifland is entirely French, is infinitely inferior to the Advantages which we derive from its Commerce. No Difficulty is found in keeping the unwarlike Weft-Indian French, in due Obedience. On a Peace our Situation will be ftill more favourable. I ven- ture to fay, that one Regiment will be fully fufficient for its internal Defence. This Author indeed, knows, that with Canada in our Pofleffion we muft ftill for hundreds of Miles border on the French, or Spaniards J ; “ Fhat the People inhabiting the Frontiers, “ are generally the Refufeof both Nations, remote « jy-Qjyi fN Eye, the Prudence, and the Re- Jlraint of Government!' He knows and tells us, that a || “ vafl Wildernefs, thinly or fcarce at all peopled, conceals with Eafe the ** March of Froops and Workmen. Important Paf 'es may be feized withm our Limits” ; and knowing all this, his Apprehen fions for the vaft Expence, neceftary to retain a conquered Country, if applied to Canada, are reafonable and well-founded 5 but if applied to Guadaloupe, they are altogether ill-founded and unreafon- able. It is extraordinary, that fo ingenious, fo fenfible a Man ffiould fo confound all Ideas as to fuppofe, the fame Dangers, which may exift in Canada, a vaft, wild, uncommer- cial, inland Country, of an extenlive Frontier, and retired from the Eye of Government, are to J Vide, Int. Page 9. |j Vide Int. Page 5, [.54 ] to be at all dreaded in Guadaloupe, an Ifland, divided from every Neighbour, and where all lies immediately under the Eye of Govern- ment j a Country, which is one great Scene of Commerce, and which holds not one lingle Cir- cumftance in common with Canada. Gtiada- loupey in the natural Coarfe of Things, muft in a few Years he almofl wholly Engli/h j and, if fuch is the Confumption of our Manufac- tures in its prefent imperfe o®o Total Acquili- 1 per Ann. \ *7 * NetX.ols/^r^«». 551,753 6 8 We Ihould have loft 1. s. d. Guadaloupe, worth an- >603,269 3 9 nually j 603,269 3 9 603,269 3 9 Commercially therefore we fhould have loft by the Bargain above 550,000 1 . ' a Year, and have purchafed what we retained at more than ten times their Value. But if we take into the Confidcration the Expence of keeping thefe Acquilitions refpec- tively, the Account will then ftand thus : In * Canada one Regiment 20,000 In Senegal and Goree one 20,000 In Minorca four Regiments 74,000 1 14,000 To this Charge, if we oppofe even the whole grofs Value of the Trade of all thefe Places, there will be found an Over-ballance of Expence more than Profit to the Amount, in time of profoundeft Peace, of 62,484!. 2s. i id. whereas. * I believe the Reader tnoft cxcellively in Favour nada with the fame Force will fee that I fiated this Account of Canada, by only charging Ca- I did to Guadaloupe, t 6i ] whereas, allowing the fameForce to be kept up mGiiadaloupe as I have allowed for Canada, and deducting accordingly 20,000 h from the Value of the Produce of that Ifland, there will be ftill a Ballance in Favour of Guadaloupe of 583,2691. 3s. 9d.^ So that, on making the heft of the Bargain, we mufl: lofe confiderably by retaining all the Territories we were to have acquired by that Treaty. The only Objed: by which we did, or in the Nature of Things we could, gain any thing, we thought proper to give away without any Compenfation at all. Were we to confume at Home the whole Produce of Guadaloupe, the very Duties raifed on that Produce would amount to more than the whole grofs Produce of all the red of the Acquifitions which we were to have made by that Treaty. But the Fad is, that the whole, except the Cotton, is exported, and the Cotton is em- ployed in our Manufadures ; the reft of the Produce, which I fay is exported, is confequent- Jy to be placed on the Credit Side of the Ac- count of our foreign Trade. I imagine fome melancholy Refledions mud arife in the Mind of every Perfon the lead intelligent in, or concerned for, the In- tered of his Country, when he confiders the immenfe humiliating Reverfe ofFortunc, which a few Days would have made in the Affairs of Great Britain and France, if Peace had been concluded on thofe Terms. France would have got rid of a Territory, which die t 62 ] file could neither keep without Expence,' nor enlarge without Danger, and fhe would in return at the fame Time have re-entered into Pofieflion of a moft extenfive and dourilhing Trade, worth at lead three Millions annually, now either polTelTed by us, or ufelefs to her, by which fhe would have been enabled in a fhort Time to repair the Breaches of this War, to pay herDebts, to enlarge herRefources, and to breed up a Number of Seamen for the Re-eftablifhment of her Navy : Whilft the Englijk, giving a great Part of this very Trade out of their Hands, and incumbered with a Debt ofa great deal above loo Millions, acquir- ed only a barren Expence of 62,484 1. a Year, without one fingle, even poffible. Advantage to our Commerce ; without any other Confola- tion than the Liberty of parading in boundlefs and fruitlefs Forefts, and amufing ourfelves with idle Speculations upon the Importance of Canada, I have not valued the two neutral Iflands, which were to have been left us, in this Efli- mate. In common Senfe they cannot be con- fidered as Acquifitions, unlefs you fay you ac- quire when you give away ; however, T think it neither wholly unneceffary to my Purpofe, nor altogether ufelefs to the Reader, to enter a little into a Detail of the Value of thefe Iflands. In order more fully to difplay the Fallacy and Unfairnefs of the trench Proceeding in the late Negotiation, when they prefumed to call any Divifion of ihofe Illands equitable, while they infilled upon retaining St. Lucie, Of [ 63 ] Of thefe, called neutral Iflands, TobagOy the moft Southward, is abfolutely wild, covered with Woods, inhabited only by a few Caraibs. St. Vincent is neither fo fmall, nor fo cover- ed with Woods 5 nor is it thinly inhabited ; but mark well what the Inhabitants are : They are firft Caraibsy to the Number of about 7000 j and next, free Negroes, to the Num- ber of about 8000 : Thefe two people are free, and both remarkably jealous of their Free- dom. The French imagine themfelves, and pcffibly not altogether without Reafon, better adapted than we are to maintain a friendly Correfpond- ence with Savages. They have not, however, notwithftanding this Advantage, ever ventured one lingle Sugar Eftablifhment in this Ifland ; and indeed thofe, who are acquainted with the Nature of fuch Eilablifhments, know how to- tally oppofite fuch a Neighbourhood is to the Exiftence of a Sugar Settlement, which is not like a landed Eftate at Home. Its Value does not confift in the Land, but in the Number and Goodnefs of the Slaves, in the Strength and Convenience of the Mills, and other Build- ings 5 all very expenfive in the Conftrudtlon, and which notwithftanding may be all deft royed, and the Slaves cut off or carried away, in a lingle Night, by any fudden Incurlion. A Man has not hisEftate impaired and damaged, but adlual- ly annihilated. No Sugar Colony ever yet flou-r rillied, which was not cleared of the Caraibs ; fo that youmufl either have purfued the deteflable [ 64 ] and dangerous Policy of extirpatiilg the old In-* habitants, or have received a mere nominal Pof-* fefTion, without any Advantage from St. Vincent t But it was, in Reality, a Matter of great Indifference to the French^ which of the other neutral Iflands you chofe, or if you chofe all the other three, if you left them St. Lucie. They were well aware of the real intrin- fic Value of this Illand, and of the real In- fignificance of all the reft. This Ifland contains about one thoufand Men capable of bearing Arms ; they grow a great Qjyntity of Cotton 5 the Land in general is extremely good. No Ifland in the JVeJi^lndies has a better Harbour, nor a greater Plenty of Rivers ; add to th is, that its Situation made it of ineftimable Value to France^ becaufe in time of War it forms a Sort of Barrier to Martinique^ at leaft in our Hands it would be the Door to open our Way \.o ^Martinique % it lies juft to the Windward of, and not feven Leagues diftant from, Martinique. If our Objecfl was to have kept from the French an Ifland, by its Situation of Confe- quence to them, St. Lucie of all the neutral Iflands was the one not to be allow’ed to France ; and if it was our Object to ac- quire an Ifland by its Commerce or Situation of Confequence to us, we fliould never have thought oiDominique’, this Ifland, the lart of the four neutral ones, has vc\ox^Caraibs, and is little more cleared, than Lobcigo itfelf ; but even, if its intrinficValuehad been worth Attention, its Si- tuation between the two great Iflands of Gua- daloupe and Martinique ^ would render it, vvhilft hi [ 6s ] _ 1both tbefe great lOands were in the Hands of "France^ of no poffible Advantage or Service to us. The Moment a War fhould be proclaimed, not a fingle Ship could attempt to go into, or fail out of Dominique, without falling into the Hands of the French. Martinique lies exacflly in the Way to intercept every thing going from Europe to Dominique, as Guadaloupe does for intercepting every thing coming out oi' Do^ inhhque io Europe if indeed Guadaloupe re- mained to us, that Circumftance would give fome Importance to Doininique , which lying to the Windward of Guadaloupe, as St. Lucie lies to Martinique, might, if we could forget the 'Difference of intrinflc Value, be of the fame Service in covering our Poffeffions ; but if Gua^ daloupe is given up, I do inhft upon it, that not one, no, nor all of the other neutral Iflands are worth our taking, except ht. Lucie ; and if St. Lucie was of fuch Importance to Fra?7ce, that file could not part with it, flie could not have refufed paying well for it; and therefore muff it not affonifli the Reader to find, that, when We generoully made fo great, fb important a Conceffion, to which on the Terms of an equal Partition, Ihe was no way intitled, we did hot take that favourable Opportunity of work- ing on the Gratitude of the French, fince we could not on their Juffice, to befeech them not to didtare to us too like Conquerors.; to tell them, that, if St. Lucie was ncceffary to cover their great lOand cf Flartiniquc ; Guadaloupe,. even in that Idea, was fuii as neceffary to K cover { 66 J cover our j| Lewardliizvydi } that they had no€ more Right to one» than we had to the other. If this Reafoning did not prevail, might we not have imitated their own Language concerning Belleijle t If you think the neutral Illands of luch real Value, you are free to keep them, and we will content ourfelves with Guadaloupe, Ought we not to have made a Bargain, finc6 we could not make an Acquifition? if w6 were not to take Advantage of our Conquefts, we ought, methinks, to have made fome Ad- vantage of our Conceffions. If we mifs this critical Moment, and fhould one Day find ourfelves to have been miftaken in our Ideas of the Weji^Indies j our Miftake in, all human Probability will be for ever irre- trievable. The French^ who trufted too much in the natural Strength of their Iflands, and were lulled into Security by the idle Boaft of their Planters, had not during this War either in Martini CO or Guada loupe y a regular Force of one thoufand Men. They now fee their lirror, and cannot in a future War omit to corredt it ^ and then they may perhaps find Means II Guadaloupe Iie» to the Leward of Antlguoy Nevli^ Monjirraty St. Kits, and all that Clufter of limall Euglijh lilands, and confequently thofe Iflands are moll liable to be attacked from thence, if it returns to France, and this Ifland is moll capable of proteeSling them if it remains in our Hands. It is certainly very extraordinary that all fljould be facriliced to the Idea of Security, in Isforih Avicrka, where we were infinitely ftronger than the French ^ and that no Notion of Danger lltould be entertained for our valuable PoileiTions in the Indies, where we arc inlinifely weaker than the Frtfith. i [ 67 I Means to make a better Defence In their con- nected Iflands, two of them larger each than all our Leward Iflands put together, than we may be able to do in our fmall, difperfed, Scraps of ^efencelefs Land. In Reality, the Pof- feflions, in that Part of America., feem to be the Refult of Deliberation and Syftem, and to have been formed by a People, who had both a full Freedom of Choice, and Power to enforce it j our Pofleffions, on the contrary, are irregular, unconnected, and feem to have been occupied as derelict, or as ftolen ; and not as Choice pointed out, but as Occaflon and Ne- eeflity would admit. I have, 1 hope, fully demonftrated, that the Acquilition of Guadaloupe alone is not only fuperior to that of Minorca, which alone was put into the Scale againfl: it, but far fuperior in Value to every thing elfe united, which we fliould have acquired by that Treaty, upon any of thofe Plans the Enemy propofed, or even upon thofe, which we drew up agreeably to our own De fires. I (hall now, conformably to the Plan I pre- feribed to myfelf at firfl; fetting out, endeavour to afeertain, and to obferve upon, the Caufes that may have induced us to overlook the glaring Advantages, which refulted from our Pofleflion of Guadaloupe, and to enter into a Barter fo ftrangely difproportionate, as that of Guadaloupe for Minorca. I mufl: previoufly obferve, that no Man can have a Difpofition more remote from the Defire of intermixing any thing perfonal in K this- [• 68 .] this Difcuffion. No Man has a more fincer^ Veneration for the Dignity, or greater Refpe Experience, [ 93 ] Experience, and confider from what Caufes this laft American War arofe, will laugh atfuch an abfurd Expectation. Whoever examines the Anfwer of England to the Ultimatum of France^ will fee that the new Bounds of Canada will admit of as manyDifcuffions, whenever the French fhall chufe to enter into them, as our old Bounds in Nova Scotia y and on the Ohioy and that, independent of all thefe Difficulces, the real Limits of our Southern Colonies are yet further from an accurate Adjuftment than thofe of our Northern. There is nothing more painful than to be driven to maintain anArgument, where vouhave Reafon to think, your Antagonifl is not quite ferious. After all this Reafoning, does this Gentleman ferioufly, or does any Man what- ever in good Earned: believe, that if the French^ broken as they have been in this War, were in the Conclufion of it confined within the real Bounds of Canada^ and that we pofiTclTed the whole vaft Country of Nova Scotia^ and all the Country of OhiOy that our Colonies could be in any real Danger from the Attempts of the French ? Does he not on the contrary believe, or rather is he not fully convinced, that the true and real Danger would lie wholly upon the Side of i\\t French -y and that on breaking out of a V/ar between the two ° Crowns, * N° a8. Fr. Hift Mem. Art. 2 . “ As to what refpecis the Line drawn from R io per dido, with regard to Limits of Louifiana, his Majejiy is obliged to rejea it And a^ain in the next Page, “ The Lmepropofed to fix the “ Bounds of Louifiana cannot be admitted^ [ 94 ] Crowns, they muft be fubjed not only to fome Degree of Moleftation, but to utter Ruin from ours ; that the Attack would be moft probably from us, and that the French would in any fuch War gladly compound for a Neutrality ? .But this being a Sort of Confideration not much pudied by the Writers, and addreffed only to the Politicks of the moft uninformed Vulgar, I ftiall not infift upon it. Jn a Word, the Security derived from an irrefiftible Superiority, it is on all Hands ad- mitted we might have had, without Canada^ the Security againft all Poftibility of an In- vafion, we have not with Canada^ in its utmoft Extent, and a Security on the extravagant Prin- ciples, on which Canada was claimed by all the Writers for it, which w'as in EfFecTt nothing lefs than, that we ftiould have no Neighbours, we neither could have with Canada^ and Lout- Jiana^ nor with all America., nor indeed with any thing fliort of univerfal Empire. The Foundations upon which thefe Writers built their Syftem, W’ere laid in the moft unbound- ed, and unbecoming Ambition. The Value of the Demands they made in Confequence of thofe extravagant Principles, was pitiful, and ridiculoufly low, and fuch as provided for no one national Advantage of the leaft Importance. Theirs w'as juft the Reverfe of an intelligent Policy, in which, the Pretences ought to be as moderate, and the Acquifitions as advanta- geous as pofiible. I muft repeat the Caution I ufed at the Beginning of this Part of my Difegurfe : I do [ 95 ] do not propofe that Canada {hould not be ac- quired, I only propofe that the real Value of this Acquifition (hould be known. The French have made no Difficulty of furrender- ing all Canada. I am heartily glad (though I am no Way furprifed) that they did not; becaufe it puts an End to a Difpute, in which Paffion on^ one Side would have been heavy enough to have over-bailanced any Weight of Reafon on the other. Canada may be of fome Advantage to us. I mufl: confefs I do not know what that Advantage is. But whatever it may be, I conceive wc have paid the full Price for it, not only in Regard to the Value of the Objects exchanged, but alfo in Regard to the Situation of thole Objects, at the Time of the Exchange. The Equivalent which France demanded for her Guarantee of Canada was a Participation in the two North American Fiffieries : that on the Banks of Newfoundland, and that in the Gulph of St. Lawrence, it muil: be obferved, that thefe are two diftindt Fiffieries : and that they are always confidered as diftindt in our Memorials Either of thofe Fiffieries, merely as an Ob- iedt of Value, and wholly independent of its Si- tuation at the opening this Treaty (when, as the Reader may obferve, they were both in our Pof- feffion) would I believe generally have palled as a very fufficient Indemnification for Canada. But we admitted the Propofal of France for both of thefeFiffieries ; annexing only the Condition of * N® 28. Art. 4. Hill. Mem. of the Neg. [ 96 ] her deftroying the Harbour of Dunkirk con- foi mably to the Treaties oiUtrecht and jit x la Cbapelle. Even with this Condition, I appre- hend, the Bargain was ftill infinitely in the Favour of hra? 2 ce. Whether the Conceflion was very mortifying to them as they afiCrted, I know not, nor do I think that their Feelings conftitute any Part of our Intereft. They certainly loft very little by that Condition : and I think it is as certain that we have gained nothing by it. Becaufe jirji they did not agree to deftroy the trading Harbour, which was included in their Obligation under the ninth Article of the Treaty of Utrecht, Secondlyy they refufed to ere<5l a Dam -j- againft theSea j a Work tp which they had been obliged after the Peace abovementioned, and without which the Harbour cannot be deftroyed. '^hirdlyy they infifted that the l{; Cunette (hould be left ftanding to preferve the Health ot the Inhabitants, which was exactly the Pre- tence upon which they before evaded the intire Demolition of that Harbour under the Treaty of Utrecht ||. The * N® 27. Fr. Hift. Mem. Art. 4. Hh Majejly wUlleave “ the tra.iing Harbour j’* And Vid. Occafional Writer, Cafe of Dunkirk confidered, p. and 300. t Pi*!'. 59. of Fr. Hifi. Mem. and Pag. 312, 319, 322, of the Occafional Writer. t No. 29 Art. 4. Fr. Hift. Mem. “ But the Cunette “ Jkiallhe left funding round the Place for the Salubrity of the II Vid. 301, 2. Occafional Writer. [ 97 ] ’The Harbour of Durikirk would therefore have been only nominally deftroyed. But W'hether it was to be deftroyed nominally or really is, it is now apparent, a Matter of little Confequence j but I think our again making a. Point of it, after having in two Treaties ex- perienced the Inefficacy of fuch Stipulations, was not a Matter of Indifference ; but in many Refpedts a moft unfortunate Meafure. This Part of the Treaty, inftead of fettling any thing, will only give rife to daily and hourly Dif- cuffions } and it has opened an inexhauftiblc Source of Contention, the inevitable Confe- quence of which muft be, either a fhameful renouncing of a national Point, or the invol- ving us in a new War for an infignificantObjed:. If we had confulted our Reafon, we 'muft: have known that no People will ever exe- cute faithfully, the total Deftruction of one of their own Places, when the Execution de- pends wholly upon themfelves, when the Place remains in their own Poffeflion, and when they have received their Confideration, previous to the Performance on their Side ; and if we had confulted Experience, we ftiould have feen that this has been hitherto exadly the Cafe of France with Regard to Dunkirk^ not- withftanding the exprefs Stipulations in two Treaties, that of Utrecht and that oi Aix la Cha- i)elle. But what has rendered our admitting this Sort of Demolition among the Equiva- lents peculiarly unfortunate is, that when the O French [ 98 J french have found that Dunkirk forms fo lead- ing a Part in our Syftem of Politicks, they will (as it is always in their Power; by putting forward or by fufpending this Work, by pre- tended Demolitions, and by real Fdabhfhments of their Plarbour, continually play upon our PafTions, and in the fame Manner as they have now, they will for the future oblige us to purchafe the fame ineffectual Stipulation by the Ceflion of fome ObjeCt of real importance. After we have deducted me Demolition of Dunkirk^ (the Value of which the Reader may judge) all the Remainder of the Equivalent, which the French paid for the two Fifheries, confided only in the Guarantee of Canada. This Equivalent, (contraiy to the Balls of the Treaty) came not cut of her uti po/Jidetis but out .of ourSy that is, in other Words, fhe purchafed our PofTeffions with our Money* If France indeed had been in Poffeffion of all Canaduy inftead of being driven from every Part of it, and we Mafters only of the Fifheries of Newfou7idland and St. Lawrence-y if in this Situation we had admitted her to a Participation of thefe Fifheries in Exchange for Canaday I alk whether any fair Arbitrator would not have confidered it as a Bargain extremely advantageous to I-rance ^ But when we were indifputably Mafters both of the one, and the other of thefe Objeds ; and by the fundamental Principle of the Treaty laid down by France herfelf, were obliged to yield none of our PofTeffions, for I which f 99 ] which a Compenfation was not to be made from hers ; if then we admitted her to take the Fiflieries which were in our Poffeffion, in Compenfation for Canada^ which was alfo in our Pofl'eflion, would not (I won’t fay any Arbitrator, but would not) any Advocate for France^ admit our Proceeding to be governed by a Spirit of Generofity hitherto unexampled in the Dealings between Nation and Nation? Having in this Manner fettled the North American Account ;upon her own Principles) wholly to her Advantage, would it have been inconfiflent with the loftiefl Dignity on the Side of France^ or the moft diffident Humility on ours, would it have Ihocked any reafonable, decent, or conciliatory Principle, if we were to have afked in our Turn fome Advantage, infome of the Equivalents, in fome one Part or other of the World? Might not this Plan have been propofed; that they ffiould take Belleijle for Minorca? •Fh2iX. we ffiould have given them, what they required, and it was not an unrea- fonable Requeft, Senegal or Goree^ for their German Conquefts i and when we permitted them to retain St. Lucies, which tho’ com- prehended in their uti pqffidetis was our Right, ought not they to have permitted us in ourTurn to xtX2i\ViGuadaloiipe? And if thisdidnot feem to them a juft Equivalent; if we had added to the Ceftion of StXz/«V, the reft of the neutral Iflands (which to them might be of fome Advantage) could the French Negotiator himfelf pretend to deny, that as in North America we had adled a very generous, fo in the Wejl-lndies we aded O 2 at I [ 100 ] at leaft a very moderate Part? Could be fay that we had quitted the Bafis of the Nego- tiation, but when the quitting of it was clear- ly to the Advantage of France F Surely he could never fay, with any Appearance of Truth, that we afl'umed a defpotic Air, that we fpoke in the Tone of Conquerors, or that we had made any harfh ofFenhvc Ufe of our Vic- tories ; and yet this Syhem, fo refpedlable* for its Moderation, would not have coft us one Penny of Trade or of Revenue. It would have fatisded the Partizans both of North American^ and Weji~lndian Acquifition, and the Dav the Peace was concluded, it would have added to our Fnglijh and North American Trade, a Source of Wealth cheaply valued at a Million a Year. Let the Reader compare the Effedt of this Scheme with that hated in the iixtieth Page of this Treatife. I know not by what Fatality it is, but I fcarce remember a Treaty which has been in any confiderable Degree advantageous to this Nation, except that with Spain in 1670, by which our Right to Jamaica was confirmed. By that Treaty we poflcfs at this Day a Trade worth within a Trifle of Eleven hundred tfioufand Pounds a Year. The Peace of Utrecht was certainly a bad one, compared with the Advantages which we might reafon- ably have expeded. Yet even thisTreaty was not wholly unlucrative to the Nation j for we ac- quired by thatTreaty one half of thcfmalllfland St-.Chrijhpberr^he: Sale of L ands in that half of of the Mand produced 90,000 1 . which came to the Credit of the Nation, and appears upon the- public Accounts ; a Sum ten times greater than all the Pofleffions we Ihould have retain- ed in the late Treaty would have paid us in a Century. To fay nothing of the Trade of that Part of the Ifland, which is worth above 104,000 1 , annually; whereas the Trade of all our intended Acquifitions in 1761, if com- pared with the Charge of keeping them, is a good deal worfe than nothing. I am far from thinking that no Sacrifices ought to be made to the general Peace of Europe. No Man, I believe, is inhuman or unpolitic enough to advance fo cruel an Ab- furdity ; but becaufe we are to make fome Sa- crifice, are we carefully to feledt for that Sa- crifice the faireft and fattefl of all our Flock ? the only Objed: we had acquired during the War, which we are pofitively able to fay is of the leafl commercial Benefit to us ? And is France, to whom Peace is probably as necef- fary as it is to us, is France to make no Sacri- fice on her Side, but of Objeds which fhe muft confefs, and which we know are no way beneficial to her ? The Events^ of War are in themfelves of very little Confequence. The Vidors and the Vanquiflied are nearly equal Lofers both in Men andTreafure. The Terms of Peace are what difcriminate the Fortune of contending Nations ; and whoever may have won the Battles, thofe only, have the Advantage of the War, whofe Pvcfources after it, aie the largefl, and the mod entire; r »<>2 j and I defy any Man to (hew one Tnftance m which that Plan of Peace, which we have examined, would have added one Penny to ours, or have detrafted one Penny from the Refources of France. And here, I hope, it will not be thought affuming, that I take the Liberty humbly, but earned ly, to recommend it to the ferious Con- hderation of our Superiors, whether at the End of a glorious indeed, but moft expenfive War, which has laid fo heavy a Burthen upon our Revenue, and our Credit, it ought not to be one Objed:, at lead, of our Attention, to find in our Conqueds fomething which might enable us to leden, or to bear the enormous Weight of our Debt. The very jud Dread of increafing which yet further, when we have added nothing to our Refources, may one day be a Means of binding down our vieftorious Arms; and may even difable, or at lead dif- hearten us, from the Vindication of our juded, and mod important Rights. And I would fubmit it, with all due Deference, to better Judgments, ivhether we ought not to delibe- rate a little, before we venture to throw out of our Hands anAcquifition worth at this Moment above 600,000 1 . a Year to our direct BritiJJy Iradc; and whether we ought to think our- felves fudiciently indemnified for the Expence of this very chargeable W^ar, by fpeculative ProjC(fls of Commerce, in Places which never enjoyed any Trade j and by Speculations for Security in Places, which w'ere never in any Danger. ^ POST- [ J03 ] POSTSCRIPT. T he foregoing Examination is confined to the State of Affairs during the Period of the firft Negotiation. Of the Plan, which is purfued in the prefent, the Author pro- feffes himfelf totally ignorant ; but, whether his Reafonings are invalidated or ftrengthencd by the Events, which have happened fince the Period he treats of, he fubmits without any new Argument to the Reader’s Judgment, thinking that Matter tolerably evident. A great Part of the Negotiation, which Is the Subjed of the foregoing Difcourfe, turned upon Equivalents and Exchanges. It became therefore neceffary to examine, with Attention, into the realValue of the feveral Obje(5ts,which, on that Occafion, had been ballanced againft each other ; and he did not think this Exami- nation had been made, at leafl: in any Piece he had the Fortune to fee, fo fully and fo ac- curately, as the Subjed feemed to require. In the Memorials, by which the late Nego- tiation was carried on, the Equivalents are fometimes fo confounded and huddled toge- ther that it is not always eafy to difcern, what ^ particular [ J°4 J particular Objecft is fet again ft another ; but the original Propofals of theDuke deChoifeuho our Minifter at Paris, and the Recapitulation at the End of the Hiftorical Memorial, enable us to decompound this mixed Mafs, and to fee the Value, which was fet upon each diftin(5t Objedt, The Author has had frequent Occafion to mention fome political Writers j but, in oppo- ling their Sentiments, he has not fhewn any perfonal Difrefpedl. He entertains the high- eft Opinion of their Parts, though he cannot forbear thinking, that, from a Mifconception of the true Merits of the Queftion, they have for fome time contributed extremely to miflead the public Opinion ; and he hopes the Rea- der will remark one Thing in his Favour. Diffident of his own, and warned by the ill Succefs of much greater, Abilities, he has not ventured to entertain him with any political or commercial Speculations ; for he will never allow thofe Opinions to be called Speculations, which he fupports by prefent exifting Fadts, by Cuftom-houfe Entries, and other the moft authentic Vouchers j thefe he gives in the Detail, and every Reader of common Senfe, and common Attention, is capable of forming a Judgment upon them ; and he defires to be heard no longer than while he fpeaks from them. He hopes in return that the Public will 1 i°5 ] will not admit as Anfwers to his Fadls any loofc unfupported Reafonings, however ingenious they may be ; nor permit the State of the Queltion to be changed, or one Thing lubfti- tuted for another. If fuch Pracffices had never been admitted in the Difcuffion of this Que- flion, he is convinced the Public could never have been diverted from the ancient funda- mental Maxims oiBriiiJh Policy ; Maxims to which we owe all our prefent Profperity, and the Attention to which at this great Criiis, muft determine no contemptible Part of Great Britain^ future Fortune and Impor- tance. If, notwithdanding the Corredfions, which the Favour of the Public has given the Au- thor an Opportunity of making, in a fecond' Edition, any Inaccuracies ftill remain, it is hoped that fuch a Misfortune will be confi- dered as almoft unavoidable, in the Manage- ment ofanx^rgumentupon fovery comprehen- five a Subjedt in fo narrov/a Compafs. This, however, he thinks he may ftill aflert, that no Miftakes, which he may have fallen into, can in the leaf! tend to invalidate his Rea- fonincJ-s : Quite otherwife ; his Omiflions are far more numerous than his Miftakes ; and thefe Omiflions confifl; in his not having pulped to their full Extent the Advantages with which his Fadts fupplied him. Jn ffating the particular Value of Giia- Aaloupei defedtive in P many [ io6 ] many Things, which might tend to fet the Importance of that Acquifition in its proper Light : For an Inftance of this, he begs Leave to lay before the Reader a comparative View of the Trade of that liland, even in the im- perfeft State in which it flood immediately after its Reduflion, and that of one <'f our mofl flourifhing Colonies of North America^ immediately before the breaking out of the prefent War. The Colony of Penfihanta is of fuch Reputation, that he would defervedly pafs for little better than a Madman, who fliould deny or endeavour to diminifh the Idea of its Importance. It is indeed a Country of very great Extent ; one of the moft opulent, populous, and growing of all our northern Eftablifhments ; and cannot contain lefs than 200,000 Whites. This Colony in the Year 1752 took off the Value of 201,666/. 19,9. iid. in Merchandizes from England. This Demand is certainly fufficient to eftablifh Penjiharda in our Opinions as a very great commercial Ob- ject; but compare this Demand of Penfdvaniay after eighty Years Settlement, with that of Guadaloupe in its moft imperfedl State, in the Interim between its being a Conqueft and a Colony ; in this Point of Time the Demand for Briti/h Commodities in Guadaloupe dimonnt- ed to 238,000 /. Now if you compare the Demand for Bri~ tijh Commodities with the Number of Inha- bitants in each of thefe Countries, Penfylvania does [ 107 ] does not take off much above the Value of 20 5. a Head ; whereas the Inhabitants Gua- daloupe, luppofing the Whites to be 10,000, take off above 23/. Sterling for each Perfon. Upon this comparative View of their re- Ipedlive Demands from Grecit Britain ; oii what Principle can Penfihania be conlidered as an Obje(5t of very great and ferious Impor- tance to our Power and Commerce, as in com- mon Reafon it mud be, if Guadahupe is not to be confidered at lead on a Par with it ; and in every commercial Light an Objecd of as much Importance. This is the State, upon the refpediive Demands of thefe two Countries from Great Britamy in which Guadahupe is not inferior, but rather fuperior to the great Colony of Fenfdvania. But oq a comparative View of their refpedlive Exports hither, the Ballance is infinitely in Favour of Guadaloiipei the Export of the former to Great Britain is but 2 Z,/\.o^l. I'^s. id, that of the latter, as we have feen, amounts to 630,269/. 25. 9^. above five and twenty Times the Value of that of 'Fenjilvama. In this View of Export to Great Britain^ the Reader will take another comparativeView. The Exoort of all the Colonies on the Conti- nent which do not produce enumerated Com- modities, and which are the only ones truly contraded with the IVeJl-lndies, amounts to only 70,074 /. 1 2 5. 3 The Reader has I'ud fcei’ proportioned this is to that of Guadahupe alone. I But [ >o8 ] But to carry this further, the whole Produce of all the North Amet'ican Colonies put together, amounts but to 648,683 /. ot . which is but^' l §1,413 /. 1 1 j. 4^. more than the-ileturns of Guadaloitpe alone. 0 FINIS \ i ^l:il If; rii;^ M t if: i E 3 cainitiation( An)of the Commercial Principals of the late Negotiation I f — between Great Britain and France in 1761. In which the System of tha-tiJj Negotation with regard to our Colonies and Commerce is considered. SECOND EDITION. London, 1762. 8vo, wrappers, 1762. $44.50 ’’Rare and very important pamphlet relating entirely to British and French affairs in North America after the conquest. The book is considered to be an important reply to Benjamin Frank- lin’s ’Interest of Great Britain considered with regard to Canada and Guadaloupe.* This second edition, scarcer than the first, was entirely rewritten and corrected.” Bibliography tWinsor,v,p. 614; Carter Brown, iii,l, 321. Casey 332 (1st ed.) Not in Gagnon, not in Tremaine. u Tnr p li-i-ij? I