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#
THE
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED
OF
MAIMONIDES.
Moses ben Maimeos
TRANSLATED FROM THE ORIGINAL AND ANNOTATED
BY
M. FRIEDLÄNDER, PH. D.
VOL. I.
LONDON:
TRÜBNER & CO., LUDGATE HILL.
1885.
[All rights reserved.]
i
.
+
005 306 520
B
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1885
Ballantyne Press
BALLANTYNE, HANSON AND CO.
EDINBURGH AND LONDON
PREFACE.
In compliance with a desire repeatedly expressed by the
Committee of the Hebrew Literature Society, I have
undertaken to translate Maimonides' Dalalat al-Hairin,
better known by the Hebrew title Moreh Nebhuchim, and
I offer the first instalment of my labours in the present
volume. This contains-(1.) A short Life of Maimonides,
in which special attention is given to his alleged apostasy.
(2.) An analysis of the whole of the Moreh Nebhuchim.
(3.) A translation of the First Part of this work from the
Arabic, with explanatory and critical notes.
Parts of the Translation have been contributed by Mr.
Joseph Abrahams, B.A., * Ph. D., and Rev. H. Gollancz-
the Introduction by the former, and the first twenty-five
chapters by the latter.
In conclusion, I beg to tender my thanks to Rev.
A. Loewy, Editor of the Publications of the Hebrew
Literature Society, for his careful revision of my manu-
script and proofs, and to Mr. A. Neubauer, M.A., for
his kindness in supplying me with such information as
I required.
Jews' College, June, 1881.
M. FRIEDLÄNDER.
'
Life of Maimonides...
Note on Maimonides' Alleged Apostasy
Analysis of the Guide of the Perplexed-
Introduction
L
Part
""
""
I.
II.
III.
Introduction-
..
CHAPTER
Dedicatory Letter
The Object of the Guide
On Similes
CONTENTS.
...
Directions for the Study of this Work
Introductory Remarks
THE GUIDE OF THE Perplexed.
תואר and דמות,צלם I-On
II.-On Genesis iii. 5
תמונה and תבנית III.-On
חזה,הביט ראה IV.-On
V.- On Exod. xxiv. 10
VII-On 7"
VIII.-On Dipp
IX.-On NƆ
XI.-On W
XII.-On DIP
יר and עלה X.On
עמד XIII.-On
..
XIV.—On DIN
אחות and אח אשה and איש VI.-On
:
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:.
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••
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D:D
5:
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………
PAGE
ix
xxxiii
xli
1
lx
lxxii
1
4
10
20
23
28
33
39
41
44
47
48
50
53
54
58
60
62
63
vi
CHAPTER
יצב and נצב XV.-On
XVI.-On 13
XVII.-On Mishnah Chagigah ii. 1
נגש and נגע קרב XVIII.-On
XIX. On o
נשא and רם XX.On
XXI.-On y
XXII.-On 1
שוב and יצא XXIII.-On
XXIV. On n
CONTENTS.
XXV.-On
רגל
XXXVII.—On D
XXXVIII.—On
XXXIX. On a
XL.-On 17
XLI.-On V5)
דברי תורה כלשון בני אדם XXVI.-On
..
XLIII.—On
XLIV.—On ¡Y
XLV.—On "D"
:
:
...
:
:
מות and חיים XLII.-On
:
XXVII.—On Targum of Gen. xlvi. 4
XXVIII.-On
XXIX.—On 2YY
XXX.-On N
..
:
:
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···
:.
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••
···
9.
...
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404
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:
XXXI., XXXII.-On the Limit of Man's Intellect
XXXIII. to XXXVI.-On the Study and Teaching of
Metaphysics...
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XLVIII.—The Targum of you and 7×7
XLIX. Figurative Expressions applied to Angels
L.-On Faith
...
XLVI., XLVII.-On the attribution of Senses and Sen-
sations to God
:
...
LI.-LX.—On Attributes-
LI.—On the Necessity of Proving the Inadmissi-
bility of Attributes in Reference to God
LII.-Classification of Attributes
LIII.—The Arguments of the Attributists
..
PAGE
64
66
68
69
73
74
- 76
82
84
86
88
89
92
96
102
103
106
114
135
138
139
141
143
145
147
149
150
151
164
167
171
172
178
185
CONTENTS.
vii
*
CHAPTER
LIV.—On Exod. xxxiii. 13; xxxiv. 7.
LV.—On Attributes Implying Corporeality, Emo-
tion, Non-existence and Comparison
LVI.-On Attributes denoting Existence, Life,
Power, Wisdom, and Will
LVII.—On the Identity of the Essence of God and
His Attributes
LVIII.-On the Negative Sense of the True Attri-
butes of God
LIX.-On the Character of the Knowledge of God
Consisting of Negations ....
LX.-On the Difference between Positive and
Negative Attributes
LXI.-On the Names of God
LXII. On the Divine Names composed of Four,
Twelve and Forty-two Letters
LXIII.—On Ehyeh, Yah and Shaddai
LXIV.—On “The Name of the Lord," and "The
Glory of God"
LXV.-On the phrase "God spake
LXVI.-On Exod. xxxii. 16
נוח and שבת LXVII.-On
...
""
..
...
...
··
LXVIII.—On the Terms: The Intellectus, the Intelli-
gens and the Intelligibile
LXIX.-On the Primal Cause
:
··
..
LXX.—On Mia¬ya a
LXXI.—The Origin of the Kalām
LXXII.—A Parallel between the Universe and Man
LXXIII.—Twelve Propositions of the Kalām
LXXIV.-Proofs of the Kalam for the creatio ex
··
nihilo
-LXXV.-Proofs of the Kalām for the Unity of God
LXXVI.-Proofs of the Kalām for the Incorporeality
of God
Addenda and Corrigenda
...
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PAGE
191
199
201
203
207
213
220
226
231
236
241
243
247
249
252
259
265
272
288
309
343
355
362
369
THE LIFE OF MOSES MAIMONIDES."
"BEFORE the sun of Eli had set the sun of Samuel had
risen." Before the voice of the prophets had ceased to
guide the people, the Interpreters of the Law, the Doctors
of the Talmud, had commenced their labours, and before
the Academies of Sura and of Pumbaditha were closed, centres
of Jewish thought and learning were already flourishing in
the far West. The circumstances which led to the trans-
ference of the head-quarters of Jewish learning from the
East to the West in the tenth century are thus narrated in
the Sefer ha-kabbalah³ of Rabbi Abraham ben David:
4
"After the death of Hezekiah, the head of the Academy
and Prince of the Exile, the academies were closed and no
new Geonim were appointed. But long before that time
Heaven had willed that there should be a discontinuance
¹ Comp. Peter Beer, "Leben und Wirken des Maimonides,” Prague, 1834;
Geiger, "Zeitschrift," I., pp. 97 sqq., 210 sqq., 414 sqq.; II., 127 sqq., 564
sqq.; Geiger, Moses ben Maimon, Breslau, 1850; Jost," Annalen,” 1839,
308 sqq. 1840, 32 sqq.; Orient, L. Bl., 1846, pp. 338, 350, 355, 375, 377;
Jost, Geschichte der Israeliten, VI., ch. 6, page 166 sqq.; Geschichte des
Judenthums, II., 430 sqq.; Munk, Notice sur Joseph b. Jehouda, 1842;
Archives Israelites, 1851, pag. 319; Grätz, Geschichte der Juden, VI., ch. x.,
pag. 310 sqq.; A. Benisch, Two Lectures on the Life and Writings of Mai-
monides; Steinschneider, Cat. Bodl. sub voce; Weiss, Beth Talmud, I., No. 6
5q7., page 161 sqq.
2 Babyl. Talmud, Yoma 38a.
3 "The Book of the Tradition," ed. Basel, 1580, page 69a. The author
wrote this book (1160) in order to show, in opposition to the Karaites, that
there was a continuous chain of tradition from the Prophets to the author's
time. He died as a martyr, 1180.
* Resh-galutha, or, in Hebrew, Rosh ha-golah. The Resh-galutha was
recognised by the Persian king as the chief of the Jews in the Persian
dominions; he collected the taxes, appointed officers and judges, but rarely
interfered with the proceedings in the schools. According to Seder olam sutta,
the Princes of the Exile were descendants of the kings of Judah.
X
THE LIFE OF MOSES MAIMONIDES.
of the pecuniary gifts which used to be sent from Palestine,
North Africa and Europe. Heaven had also decreed that a
ship sailing from Bari should be captured by Ibn Romahis,
commander of the naval forces of Abd-er-rahmanal-nasr.
Four distinguished Rabbis were thus made prisoners—Rabbi
Chushiel, father of Rabbi Chananel, Rabbi Moses, father of
Rabbi Chanoch, Rabbi Shemarjahu, son of Rabbi Elchanan,
and a fourth whose name has not been recorded. They
were engaged in a mission to collect subsidies in aid of
the Academy in Sura.¹ The captor sold them as slaves;
Rabbi Chushiel was carried to Kairuan, R. Shemarjahu
was left in Alexandria, and R. Moses was brought to
Cordova. These slaves were ransomed by their brethren
and were soon placed in important positions. When Rabbi
Moses was brought to Cordova, it was supposed that he
was uneducated. In that city there was a synagogue
known at that time by the name of Keneseth ha-midrash,2
and Rabbi Nathan, renowned for his great piety, was the
head³ of the congregation. The members of the community
used to hold meetings at which the Talmud was read and
discussed. One day when Rabbi Nathan was expounding
the Talmud and was unable to give a satisfactory explana-
tion of the passage under discussion, Rabbi Moses promptly
removed the difficulty and at the same time answered
several questions which were submitted to him. Thereupon
R. Nathan thus addressed the assembly :-'I am no longer
your leader; that stranger in sackcloth shall henceforth be
my teacher, and you shall appoint him to be your chief.'
The admiral on hearing of the high attainments of his
1 The Hebrew text has hachnasath-kallah; the original meaning of the term
is, “assisting a bride in the preparatior for her wedding”; but as kalla was
the designation for the meetings of the scholars in the months of Adar and
Ellul, and reshe-challe were the heads or presidents of these meetings, the
author employed the term hachnasath-kallah in the above sense.
2 "Assembly for study."
3 Lit., "Judge." The office of a rabbi included that of a judge. The
court was usually formed of three scholars; the president was probably the
dayyan, or judge; the other two were called chabherim (colleagues).
THE LIFE OF MOSES MAIMONIDES.
xi
prisoner, desired to revoke the sale, but the king would
not permit this retraction, being pleased to learn that
his Jewish subjects were no longer dependent for their
religious instruction on the schools in the East."
Henceforth the schools in the West asserted their inde-
pendence, and even surpassed the parent institutions. The
Caliphs, mostly opulent, gave every encouragement to
philosophy and poetry; and, being generally liberal in senti-
ment, they entertained kindly feelings towards their Jewish
subjects. These were allowed to compete for the acquisition
of wealth and honour on equal terms with their Mahometan
fellow-citizens. Philosophy and poetry were consequently
cultivated by the Jews with the same zest as by the Arabs.
Ibn Gabirol, Ibn Chasdai, Juda ha-levi, Chananel, Alfasi, the
Ibn Ezras and others who flourished in that period were the
ornaments of their age, and became the pride of their
brethren. The same favourable condition was maintained
during the reign of the Omeyades¹; but when the Moravides²
and the Almohades³ came into power, the horizon darkened
once more, and misfortunes threatened to destroy the fruit
of several centuries. Amidst this gloom there appeared a
brilliant luminary which sent forth rays of life and comfort:
this was Maimonides.
Moses, the son of Maimon, was born at Cordova, on
4
¹ Abd-er-rahman, a grandson of the Calif Hisham, escaped into Spain after
the defeat of the Omeyades by the Abessides, and founded there the Califat
of Cordova, 756. His descendants reigned till 1086.
2 The Moravides who had established themselves in Africa, and had founded
there Morocco, 1070, were invited by the Omeyades to come over to Spain, and
to fight as their allies against the Christians; but they took possession of the
country for themselves, and kept it till they were displaced by the Almohades,
1148.
voce.
3 The Almohades ("Confessors of the Unity" of God) were a Mahometan
sect founded by Ibn Tamurt, the Mahadi, 1120. Their power was increased
and established in Maghreb and Spain by Abd-el-mumen (1130-1163), the suc-
cessor of Ibn Tamurt.
4 Maimonides is also called Rabbi Mosheh ha-sefardi, Mosheh b. Obed
Elohim ha-cordovi ha-yisreeli, Abu Amran Musa ben Maimun al-Cordovi
al-Israëli, Abd-allah, and by other names. See Steinschneider, Bodl. Catal., sub
xii
THE LIFE OF MOSES MAIMONIDES.
4
the 14th of Nisan, 4895 (30th March, 1135).¹ Although
the date of his birth has been recorded with the utmost
accuracy, no trustworthy notice has been preserved con-
cerning the early period of his life. But his entire
career is a proof that he did not pass his youth in
idleness; his education must have been in harmony with
the hope of his parents, that one day he would, like his
father and forefathers, 3 hold the honourable office of
Dayyan or Rabbi, and distinguish himself in theological
learning. It is probable that the Bible and the Talmud
formed the chief subjects of his study; but he unquestion-
ably made the best use of the opportunities which Mahome-
tan Spain, and especially Cordova, afforded him for the
acquisition of general knowledge. It is not mentioned in
any of his writings who were his teachers; his father, as
it seems, was his principal guide and instructor in many
branches of knowledge. David Conforte, in his historical
work, Kore ha-doroth, states that Maimonides was the pupil
of two eminent men, namely, Rabbi Joseph ibn Migash5
'This date is given by Rabbi David, a grandson of Maimonides, in a post-
script to Maimonides' Commentary on the Babyl. Talmud, Rosh ha-shanah.
From a note appended to the Commentary on the Mishnah it might be inferred
that he was born in 1138; for, according to that note, the Commentary was
completed in the author's thirtieth year, 1479 Sel. = 4928 M. = 1168. In
order to reconcile these two statements it has been suggested that a copyist
ܒܚ.
.in the second statement (33) שלשים ושלש instead of (30) שלשים wrote
Other dates mentioned in Yuchasin, in maamar al seder ha-doroth by Saadiah
ibn Danan (Edelman, Chemdah genuzah, pag. 30), and in other works may
therefore be disregarded. See Geiger, Zeitschrift I., pag. 106-107.
2 According to Shalsheleth ha-kabbalah of R. Gedaliah b. Yachyah,
Maimonides in his youth appeared dull and disinclined to study.
3 In the postscript to the Comm. on the Mishnah the author gives the
following pedigree: Moses, the son of Maimon, dayyan, son of the learned R.
Joseph, son of R. Isaac, dayyan, son of R. Joseph, dayyan, son of R. Obadiah,
dayyan, son of R. Shelomoh, son of R. Obadiah. According to Azulai in
his bibliographical work, Shem ha-gedolim, Maimonides was a descendant of
Rabbi Jehudah ha-nasi.
4
* See pag. x., note 3.
5 Joseph Ibn Migash was born 1077; he died 1141.
he was elected Rabbi of the Congregation in Lucena.
Chiddushim (notes) on various treatises of the Talmud.
partly been collected and published (Azulai sub voce).
When 26 years old
He is the author of
His Responses have
Maimonides, in quoting
THE LIFE OF MOSES MAIMONIDES.
xiii
2
and Ibn Roshd (Averroes)¹; that by the former he was
instructed in the Talmud, and by the latter in philosophy.
This statement seems to be erroneous, as Maimonides was
only a child at the time when Rabbi Joseph died, and
already far advanced in years when he became acquainted
with the writings of Ibn Roshd. The origin of this mistake,
as regards Rabbi Joseph, can easily be traced. Maimonides,
in his Mishne thorah, employs, in reference to R. Isaac Alfasi
and R. Joseph, the expression "my teachers" (rabbothai),
and this expression, by which he merely describes his in-
debtedness to their writings, has been taken in its literal
meaning.
Whoever his teachers may have been, it is evident that
he was well prepared by them for his future mission. At
the age of twenty-three he entered upon his literary career
with a treatise on the Jewish Calendar.3 It is unknown
where this work was composed, whether in Spain or in
Africa. At the beginning of this treatise the author
states that he wrote it at the request of a friend, whom he
leaves unnamed. The subject was generally considered to
his decisions, employs the formula, 171 1, "and thus my teachers
(i.e., R. Joseph and his teacher Alfasi) decided."
¹ One of the greatest Arabic philosophers. He was born at Cordova,
1126; he died at Morocco, 1198. For his philosophy and works see Munk,
Mélanges, etc. (418 sqq.); Rénan, "Averroes"; and Hercz, "Averroes, drei
Abhandlungen” (Berlin, 1869).
2 Comp. Letter addressed to his disciple, Ibn Aknin, ed. Goldberg in
Birchath Abraham, Lyck, 1859. It is dated Rosh-chodesh Marcheshvan, 1503,
Sel. = 1191.
1080
3 Sefer (or maamar, or cheshbon) haïbbur. The treatise consists of two
parts: 1, On the Molad (conjunction of the moon); 2, On the Tekufoth
(seasons of the year). In the first part the author shows how to calculate the
molad of each month from certain data, viz., the first molad (7″, 2 days
5,20 hours), and the space between two consecutive conjunctions: 29 d.
12,788 h.; how to find what place a certain year occupies in the machzor (cycle
of 19 years), and how to determine thereby the character of the year. In the
second part the author shows how to find the beginning of a certain season
(tekufah) of the year, assuming, according to the tekufoth Shemuel, each season
to consist of 911 days. It is contained in Dibhre Chachamim of Eliezer of
Tunis; also in Kobets teshubhoth Rambam, Leipzig, 1859, II., p. 17.
793
1080
xiv
THE LIFE OF MOSES MAIMONIDES.
be very abstruse, and to involve a thorough knowledge of
mathematics. Maimonides must, therefore, even at this
early period, have been regarded as a profound scholar by
those who knew him. It must, however, be owned that
this treatise is of an elementary character. It was probably
about the same time that he wrote an explanation of Logical
terms,¹ known by the Hebrew name of "Milloth higgayon.”
J
The earlier period of his life does not seem to have been
marked by any incident worth noticing. It may, however,
be easily conceived that the later period of his life, which
was replete with interesting incidents, engaged the ex-
clusive attention of his biographers. So much is certain,
that his youth was beset with trouble and anxiety; the
peaceful development of science and philosophy was dis-
turbed by wars raging between Mahometans and Christians,
and also between the several Mahometan sects. The
Moravides, who had succeeded the Omeyades, were opposed
to liberality and toleration; but they were surpassed in
cruelty and fanaticism by their successors. Cordova was
taken by the Almohades in the year 1148, when Maimonides
was about thirteen years old. The victories of the Almo-
hades, first under the leadership of the Mahadi Ibn Tamurt,
and then under Abd-al-mumen, were, according to all
testimonies, attended by acts of excessive intolerance.
Abd-al-mumen would not suffer in his dominions any other
faith but the one which he himself confessed. Jews and
Christians had the choice between Islam, emigration, or
a martyr's death. The Sefer ha-kabbalah 2 contains the
following description of one of the persecutions which then
occurred:
qalp
"After the death of R. Joseph ha-levi the study of the
Torah was interrupted, although he left a son and a
nephew, both of whom had under his tuition become pro-
found scholars. The righteous man (R. Joseph) was taken
מלות ההגיון ,in Hebrew ; מקאלת פי צנאעת אלמנטק The Arabic is 1
Moses Ibn Tibbon translated it into Hebrew. It has also been translated into
Latin and German.
2 Page 77a.
I
ADDENDA ET CORRIGENDA.
Page ix., note 1.-Tales about the birth, youth, learning, fame and skill of
Maimonides are found in Shalsheleth ha-kabbalah of Ibn Yachyah; also in
Sippurim of Pascheles (Vol. I.); some will be published by A. Neubauer,
in Dr. Roest's Letterbode, from MSS. of the London Beth ha-Midrash, and
of the Bodl. Library.
Page xiv.—It cannot be stated with certainty when Maimon and his family
left Cordova, whether they were in Cordova when that place was taken by the
Almohades, or where they lived between 1148 and 1158. About 1158 Mai-
monides was probably in Spain; he commenced in that year his Commentary
on the Mishnah, in which Spanish words are employed to illustrate his expla-
nations. It may, however, be fairly assumed, unless the contrary be proved,
that those who preferred exile and privations to conversion between 1158 and
1168, had adopted a similar course during the previous ten years.
Pages xviii. and xxix.-Ibn Osaibiah appears to have sought to damage the
fame of Maimonides. He says that Maimonides had never practisel as a
physician, while the contrary is repeatedly stated by Maimonides himself.
Page xxiv. It is noteworthy that Maimonides, on several occasions when
enumerating the sources for his decisions in the Mishneh Thorah, omits the
Mechilta. He mentions only works which, according to his opinion, supple-
ment or explain the Mishnah; the Mechiltoth of R. Yishmael and R. Akibah,
who lived before Rabbi, were superseded by the Mishnah.
Page xxxii.-Two Latin translations of the Guide are extant: those of Aug.
Justinianus (1520) and of Buxtorf (1629); the former is based on the Hebrew
Version of Charizi, and is a mere copy of an older Latin translation (comp.
J. Perles in Monatschrift, 1875, Jan., p. 399); the latter on that of Ibn Tibbon.
Thomas Hyde, chief librarian of the Bodl. Library, proposed (1690, Dec. 10),
to publish the original text, with a Latin translation and notes; he prepared
a specimen of three pages, but the delegates refused to be at the charge of
printing this work.
Page xxxvi,note S.-Maimon, in his address (Iga
-nechamah), com-
forts his brethren, and exhorts them to seek refuge in the Law and in prayer.
The forced outward conversion is not mentioned by Maimon; he only speaks
of persecution and oppression. If had been addressing a community of
forced converts he would certainly have given them some advice how to act
in order to remain faithful to the Holy Law It is dated 1476 Sel.=1165
(not 1457 Sel., as in the Hebr. transl. in Lebanon,
Vol. VIII.),

ii
ADDENDA ET CORRIGENDA.
Page 1, line 2, Aknin, loco Aknim; page 4, line 23, words, loco word; page 3,
note 2, page 202, ncte 1, loco c. lvi., note 5; page 7, et passim, Mishneh thorah
loco Mishnah torah.
The quotation, "It is impossible," etc. (page 12), I could not find in
any of the printed Midrashim; it occurs, however, in a Yemen Midrash
on Gen. i. 1 (Brit. Mus. MS., Or. 2213; and Bodl. Libr. MS. Opp. Add
להגיד כח סוד מעשה בראשית לבשר ודם אי אפשר : it runs thus ; (124
,It may be that the quotations .לפיכך סתם הכת' ואמר בראשית ברא אל
(ברוך המחזיר אבדה לבעלה) .and p. xxxii ,(שמדא עביד דבטיל) .xxii .
p.
for which I was unable to give any reference, are found in this or similar
Midrashim.
୨
3
2
Page 15, line 19, xxv. 11, loco xi. 25; page 38, note 1, in 1, loco
"'; page 42, note 2, xliv., loco liv.; page 47, note 3, explanations,
loco explanation; page 48, line 22, and ideas, and of, loco and of ideas, and;
page 51, note 1, page 52, note 1, loco note 3; page 52, note 1, page 54,
loco page 55; page 56, line 14, will³ . . . earth, loco will . . . earth³;
page 56, note 3, The expression 17pm 10197 '90, “in accordance with his
will," lit., loco The expression; page 61, line 22, servant, loco servants; page 62,
line 12, is also, loco also; page 70, note 2, which deserve, loco deserve; page 71,
note 1, i., loco iv.; page 77, note 2, "figuratively" always, loco "it was
figuratively applied "; page 78, note 4, choisissant, loco choisissent; page $3,
line 19, Ez., loco Ex.; 100, note 2, II. xix., loco xlvii.; page 101, line 1,
not, loco is not; page 140, line 21, 171, loco 1 page 145, line 7, D", loco
D'; page 151, line 17, sense. Remarks, loco sense." Remarks; page 168,
note 7, xxxii., loco xvi.; page 176, note 2, lxxiii., loco lxxii.; page 186, note 2,
"I mean psychical, loco I mean "psychical; page 187, note 1, and, loco and
nature; page 189, note 4, in, loco ; page 211, note 1. liii., p. 190, loco lii.
p. 178; page 222, note 1, 202, loco 201; page 257, note 4, 199, loco 199, note 1;
page 264, note 4, III., loco II.; page 267. note 5, 237, loco 236; page 277,
note 2, Mahometan, loco Mahomeddan; page 279, note 6, as according, loco
according; page 282, note 3, pp. 176, loco pp. 179; page 286, note 3, Method,
loco Proposition; page 289, note 3, (contin. from p. 288) sμoiwoai, ovyyεvñ
où, loco iμoviσai, σvyyεñ, ov; page 290, note 5, 91, loco,
"'; page 306, note 4, “but... man," locot... man: page 307,
note 2,, loco ; page 32, note 2, 287, loco 284; page 331,
ncte 2, In Arabic D', loco D'; pag 347, note 1, äπavorov, loco äñovoTOV;
page 348, note 1, ons, ons; page 368, note 1, Comp. Geiger
loco Comp.
>
iamba,
במלאכה
That
¿
THE
ENGLISH AND FOREIGN
PHILOSOPHICAL LIBRARY.
VOLUME XXVIII.
מורה נבוכים שא שלומי עם שלום
כל יודעי דעת ופי סכלות בלום
מכיר בערכו שור בטורי יהלם •
סורר ומורה סור ואל תקרב הלום:
[Brit. Mus. MSS. Add. 27,038.]
THE LIFE OF MOSES MAIMONIDES.
XV
away on account of the approaching evils.' After the death
of R. Joseph there came for the Jews a time of oppression
and distress. They quitted their homes, 'Such as were for
death, to death, and such as were for the sword, to the
sword; and such as were for the famine, to the famine, and
such as were for the captivity, to the captivity;' and —it
might be added to the words of Jeremiah (xv. 2)—such as
were for apostasy, to apostasy.' All this happened through
the sword of Ibn Tamurt, who, in 4902 (1142), determined
to blot out the name of Israel, and actually left no trace of
the Jews in any part of his empire."
Ibn Verga in his work on Jewish martyrdom, in Shebhet
Jehudah,¹ gives the following account of events then happen-
ing: "In the year 4902 the armies of Ibn Tamurt made
their appearance. A proclamation was issued that any one
who refused to adopt Islam would be put to death, and his
property would be confiscated. Thereupon the Jews as-
sembled at the gate of the royal palace and implored the
king for mercy. He answered-'It is because I have com-
passion on you, that I command you to become Muslemim;
for I desire to save you from eternal punishment.' The
Jews replied-'Our salvation depends on our observance of
the Divine Law; you are the master of our bodies and of our
property, but our souls will be judged by the King who
gave them to us, and to whom they will return; what-
ever be our future fate, you, O king, will not be held
responsible for it.' 'I do not desire to argue with you,' said
the king; for I know you will argue according to your
own religion. It is my absolute will that you either adopt.
my religion or be put to death.' The Jews then proposed to
emigrate, but the king would not allow his subjects to serve
another king. In vain did the Jews implore the nobles to
<
K
1 "The Rod of Judah," ha-shemad ha-rebhii, (fourth persecution), ed.
Wiener, pag. 3. The book contains an account of the persecutions of the Jews.
It was begun by Judah ibn Verga, and continued by his son Solomon, and
by his grandson Joseph, Rabbi of Adrianople (1554). It has been translated
into Jewish German (1591, 1648, 1700), into Spanish (1640), into Latin (1651),
and into German (1856).
1
xvi
THE LIFE OF MOSES MAIMONIDES.
intercede in their behalf; the king remained inexorable.
Thus many congregations forsook their religion; but within
a month the king came to a sudden death; the son, believing
that his father had met with an untimely end as a punishment
for his cruelty to the Jews, assured the involuntary converts
that it would be indifferent to him what religion they pro-
fessed. Hence many Jews returned to the religion of their
fathers, while others hesitated for some time, from fear that
the king meant to entrap the apparent converts.”
From such records it appears that during these calamities
some of the Jews fled to foreign countries, some died as
martyrs, and many others submitted for a time to outward
conversion. What course was followed by the family of
Maimon? Did they sacrifice personal comfort and safety to
their religious conviction, or did they, on the contrary, for
the sake of mere worldly considerations dissemble their
faith and pretend that they completely submitted to the dic-
tates of the tyrant? An answer to this question presents
itself in the following note which Maimonides has appended
to his commentary on the Mishnah: "I have now finished
this work in accordance with my promise, and I fervently
beseech the Almighty to save us from error.
If there be
one who shall discover an inaccuracy in this Commentary
or shall have a better explanation to offer, let my attention
be directed unto it; and let me be exonerated by the fact
that I have worked with far greater application than any
one who writes for the sake of pay and profit, and that I have
worked under the most trying circumstances. For Heaven
had ordained that we be exiled, and we were therefore driven
about from place to place; I was thus compelled to work at
the Commentary while travelling by land, or crossing the sea.
It might have sufficed to mention that during that time I, in
addition, was engaged in other studies, but I preferred to
give the above explanation in order to encourage those who
wish to criticise or annotate the Commentary, and at the same
time to account for the slow progress of this work. I, Moses,
the son of Maimon, commenced it when I was twenty-three
THE LIFE OF MOSES MAIMONIDES.
xvii
years old, and finished it in Egypt, at the age of thirty
[-three]¹ years, in the year 1479 Sel. (1168)."
The Sefer Charedim 2 of R. Eleazar Askari of Safed con-
tains the following statement of Maimonides: "On Sabbath
evening, the 4th of Iyyar, 4925 (1165), I went on board;
on the following Sabbath the waves threatened to destroy
our lives. . . . On the 3rd of Sivan, I arrived safely at Acco,
and was thus rescued from apostasy. On Tuesday, the
4th of Marcheshvan, 4926, I left Acco, arrived at Jerusalem
after a journey beset with difficulties and with dangers, and
prayed on the spot of the great and holy house on the 4th,
5th, and 6th of Marcheshvan. On Sunday, the 9th of that
month, I left Jerusalem and visited the cave of Machpelah,
in Hebron."
3
From these two statements it may be inferred that in
times of persecution Maimonides and his family did not seek
to protect their lives and property by dissimulation. They
submitted to the troubles of exile in order that they might
remain faithful to their religion. Carmoly, Geiger,*
Munk, and others are of opinion that the treatise of Mai-
monides on involuntary apostasy, as well as the accounts
of some Mahometan authors, contain strong evidence to show
that there was a time when the family of Maimon' pub-
5
6
1 See pag. xii., note 1.
2 The Sefer Charedim treats of the 613 precepts, and pays especial attention
to those which are still practised. It was written in 1588.
3 Jost, Annalen, 1839, pag. 325 sqq.
4 Moses b. Maimon, by A. Geiger, ed. S. Breslauer, Breslau, 1850.
5 Notice sur Joseph b. Jehouda, Paris, 1842, and Archives Israelites, 1851,
pag. 319 sqq.
6 Iggereth ha-shemad; it is also called Maamar kiddush ha-shem. Ed. A.
Geiger, Breslau, 1850; Edelman, Chemdah Genuzah, pag. 6.
7 The same assertion has been made in reference to Joseph Ibn Aknin, the
pupil of Maimonides. (See Munk, 1.c.) Lebrecht (Magazin für die Lit. des
Auslandes, 1844, n. 62) rejects the apostasy of Maimonides, but admits that of
Ibn Aknin. In support of the theory that Ibn Aknin was for some time an
apostate, the following lines of Charizi (50) are adduced:-ON JDI WIN
בלותו - ורחץ במים טהורים • ופשט את בגדיו ולבש בגדים אחרים • וביום
In the change of טהרתו לקח לו שני תורים • תור התורה ותור המשרה :
b
xviii
THE LIFE OF MOSES MAIMONIDES.
licly professed their belief in Mahomet. A critical exami-
nation¹ of these documents compels us to reject their evi-
dence as inadmissible.-After a long period of trouble and
anxiety, the family of Maimon arrived at Fostat,2 in Egypt,
and settled there. David, the brother of Moses Maimon-
ides, carried on a trade in precious stones, while Moses.
occupied himself with his studies and interested himself in
the communal affairs of the Jews.
3
It appears that for some time Moses was supported by
his brother, and when this brother died, he earned a living
by practising as a physician; but he never sought or derived
any benefit from his services to his community, or from his
correspondence or from the works he wrote for the instruc-
tion of his brethren ;5 the satisfaction of being of service to
his fellow-creatures was for him a sufficient reward.
The first public act in which Maimonides appears to have
taken a leading part was a decree promulgated by the Rab-
binical authorities in Cairo in the year 1167. The decree
begins as follows:-"In times gone by, when storms and
tempests threatened us, we used to wander about from place
to place; but by the mercy of the Almighty we have now
been enabled to find here a resting-place. On our arrival,
we noticed to our great dismay that the learned were dis-
garments an allusion has been found to the change of religion. But it is far
more probable that Charizi alludes here to the change of Ibn Aknin's occupa-
tion, to his retirement from mercantile speculations in order to devote himself
entirely to instructing and guiding his fellow-men. Comp. Steinschneider, in
Frankel's Monatschrift, 1845.
1 This examination is given in a note appended to this sketch (pag. xxxiii.
and sqq.).
2 In Hebrew Mitsraim, Misr in Arabic. Comp. The Travels of Benjamin
of Tudela, ed. Asher, vol. II. pag. 197.
3 Comp. Letter of Maimonides to R. Yepheth, Kobbets, etc. Part II. pag.
37. According to Alkifti Maimonides himself was engaged in this trade.
This is refuted by Lebrecht, Magazin für die Literatur des Auslandes, 1845,
No. 45.
4 See Kobhets teshubhoth, etc., Part I. pag. 30a.
5 Comp. Postscriptum to Comm. on the Mishnah.
6 Kobhets theshubhoth, etc. Part I. pag. 30a.
THE LIFE OF MOSES MAIMONIDES.
XV
united; that none of them turned his attention to what was
going on in the congregation. We therefore felt it our duty
to undertake the task of guiding the holy flock, of inquiring
into the condition of the community, of reconciling the
hearts of the fathers to their children, and of correcting
their corrupt ways. The injuries are great, but we may
succeed in effecting a cure, and-in accordance with the
words of the prophet-'I will seek the lost one, and that
which has been cast out I will bring back, and the broken
one I will cure' (Micah iv. 6). When we therefore resolved
to take the management of the communal affairs into our
hands, we discovered the existence of a serious evil in the
midst of the community," etc.
It was probably about that time that Maimon died.
Letters of condolence were sent to his son Moses from all
sides, both from Mahometan and from Christian countries;
in some instances the letters were several months
their way before they reached their destination."
The interest which Maimonides now took in communal
affairs did not prevent him from completing the great and
arduous work, the Commentary on the Mishnah, which he
had begun in Spain and continued during his wanderings
in Africa. In this Commentary he proposed to give the
quintessence of the Gemara, to expound the meaning of
each dictum in the Mishnah, and to state which of the
several opinions had received the sanction of the Talmudical
authorities. His object in writing this work was to enable
those who are not disposed to study the Gemara to under-
stand the Mishnah, and to facilitate the study of the
Gemara for those who are willing to engage in it. The
commentator generally adheres to the explanations given in
the Gemara, and it is only in cases where the halachah, or
practical law, is not affected, that he ventures to dissent.³
2
on
¹ Letter to R. Yepheth, Kobhets, etc., Part II., pag. 37b.
2 The original title is Kitab al-sirag', in Hebrew: Sefer ha-maor, "the
luminary." It was finished 1168.
3 See Z. Frankel, Hodegetica in Mishnam, pag. 320.
62
THE LIFE OF MOSES MAIMONIDES.
3
5
He acknowledges the benefit he derived from such works of
his predecessors as the Halachoth of Alfasi, and the writings
of the Geonim,' but afterwards he asserted that errors
which were discovered in his works arose from his implicit
reliance on those authorities." His originality is conspicuous
in the Introduction and in the treatment of general prin-
ciples, which in some instances precedes the exposition
of an entire section or chapter, in others that of a single
rule. The commentator is generally concise, except when
occasion is afforded to treat of ethical and theological
principles, or of a scientific subject, such as weights and
measures, or mathematical and astronomical problems. Al-
though exhortations to virtue and warnings against vice are
found in all parts of his work, they are especially abundant
in the Commentary on Abhoth, which is prefaced by a
separate psychological treatise, called "The Eight Chap-
ters." The dictum "He who speaketh much commits a
sin," elicited a lesson on the economy of speech; the expla-
nation of olam ha-ba in the treatise Sanhedrin (xi. 1) led
him to discuss the principles of faith, and to lay down the
thirteen articles of the Jewish creed. The Commentary was
written in Arabic, and was subsequently translated into
7
8
1 Introduction to the Comm. on the Mishnah.
2 E.g. The Megillath Setharim of R. Nissim and the Sefer ha-mitsvoth of
R. Chefets. Letter addressed to his pupil Ibu Aknin, Kobhets, etc., Part II.,
pag. 31.
3 E.g., Introd. to Abhoth; Sanhedrin xi. (Chelek), Berachoth vii.; Demai,
i.; Shebhiith, viii.; Shabbath i., etc.
4 E.g., Shabbath x. 6; xi. 1; xix. 6, etc.; Baba-bathra v. 9; viii. 2;
Sanhedrin viii. 6. These principles are generally introduced by the phrase
.והעקר אצלנו
5 E.g., Berachoth ix. 5 and 7; Peah i. 1; it is remarkable that the author
is exceedingly profuse on Abhoth i. 15, on the rule "speak little."
6 E.g., Berachoth, i. 1; Kilaïm iii. 1, 6; v. 5; Chullin, iii.; Rosh-ha-
shanah, ii. 4, 7.
-translated into IIebrew from the Arabic ori ; שמונה פרקים להרמ"בם 1
ginal, and provided with an introduction by Samuel Ibn Tibbon. The original
has been edited and translated into German by Dr. M. Wolf, Leipzig, 1863. The
Hebrew translation has several times been translated into German and Latin.
The introductions to the several parts were edited in the original, with a
THE LIFE OF MOSES MAIMONIDES.
xxi
1
Hebrew and into other languages.2 The estimation in which
the Commentary was held may be inferred from the follow-
ing fact: When the Jews in Italy became acquainted with
its method and spirit, through a Hebrew translation of one
of its parts, they sent to Spain in search of a complete
Hebrew version of the Commentary.3 R. Simcha, who
had been entrusted with the mission, found no copy extant,
but he succeeded, through the influence of Rabbi Shelo-
moh ben Adereth, in causing a Hebrew translation of this
important work to be prepared.-In the Introduction, the
author states that he has written a Commentary on the
Babylonian Talmud treatise Chullin and on nearly three
entire sections, viz., Moëd, Nashim, and Nezikin. Of all these
Commentaries only the one on Rosh ha-shanah is known.4
In the year 11725 Maimonides wrote the Iggereth Teman,
or Pethach-tikvah ("Letter to the Jews in Yemen," or "Open-
ing of hope") in response to a letter addressed to him by
Rabbi Jacob al-Fayumi on the critical condition of the Jews
in Yemen. Some of these Jews had been forced into apostasy;
others were made to believe that certain passages in the
Latin translation and notes by E. Pococke, under the title Porta Mosis, Oxoniæ,
1655.
1 The Hebrew translation was executed by several scholars, viz., the treatises
Berachoth, Peah, Demai, Shebhiith, by Judah Charizi; the remainder of Seder
Zeraïm and Seder Moëd by Joseph b. Isaak Ibn Alfual; Seder Nashim by Jacob
ben Mose of Huesca; Seder Nezikin-with the exception of Abboth, which
Samuel Ibn Tibbon translated-by Salomo ben Jacob of Saragossa; Seder
Kodashim by Nathaniel b. Joseph of Saragossa; Seder Tahuroth by an anony-
mous scholar.
2 Into Latin by Surenhusius, and Spanish by Ruben ben Nachman, Abi
Saglo.
3 See Translator's Preface to Seder Moëd.
Edited by T. Brill in the Hebrew Periodical Ha-lebhanon, Vol. VIII.,
page 199, sqq.
5 The date is not given by Maimonides in this letter, but in a letter addressed
to the Wise men of the Marseille congregation, which bears the date 11th
Tishri, 1506 Sel. = October, 1194 (Geiger, Moses b. Maimon, note 47, pag. 66),
the author says, twenty-two years ago I wrote to Yemen about the Messiah.
Comp. The Travels of Benjamin of Tudela, ed. Asher, II. pag. 162.
xxii
THE LIFE OF MOSES MAIMONIDES.
Bible alluded to the mission of Mahomet; others again
had been misled by an impostor who pretended to be the
Messiah.2 The character and style of Maimonides' reply
appear to have been adapted to the intellectual condition
of the Jews in Yemen, for whom it was written. These
probably read the Bible with Midrashic commentaries, and
preferred the easy and attractive Agadah to the more earnest
study of the Halachah. It is therefore not surprising that
the letter contains remarks and interpretations which cannot.
be reconciled with the philosophical and logical method
by which all the other works of Maimonides are distin-
guished. After a few complimentary words, in which the
author modestly disputes the justice of the praises lavished
upon him, he attempts to prove that the present suffer-
ings of the Jews, together with the numerous instances
of apostasy, were foretold by the prophets, especially by
Daniel, and must not perplex the faithful. It must be
borne in mind, he continues, that the attempts made in
past times to do away with the Jewish religion, had inva-
riably failed; the same would be the fate of the present
attempts; for "religious persecutions are of but short dura-
tion." The arguments which profess to demonstrate that
in certain Biblical passages allusion is made to Mahomet, are
based on interpretations which are totally opposed to com-
mon sense. He urges that the Jews, faithfully adhering to
their religion, should impress their children with the great-
ness of the Revelation on Mount Sinai, and of the miracles
4
3
3
S
""
¹ Gen. xvii. 20, 78D INDI (“exceedingly ") bimod meod-be-Mahomet;
Deut. xviii. 15, "A prophet from the midst of thee of thy brethren ; and
similar passages.
שמדא עביד דבטיל 5
2 Maimonides in referring to earlier impostors, mentions one that made his
appearance twenty years before, probably alluding to David Alroy. See Ben-
jamin of Tudela, etc., II. pag. 162.
3 Comp. the Midrashic explanation of Deut. xxx. 12; and the allegorical
interpretation of Song of Solomon, iv. 1.
4 Dan. xi. 35; xii. 10. Maimonides explains also such passages as Num-
bers xxiv. 23; Amos vii. 5; Is. xi. 4, as referring to these persecutions, and
describing the approach of the Messianic period.
THE LIFE OF MOSES MAIMONIDES.
xxiii
wrought through Moses; they also should remain firm in
the belief that God will send the Messiah to deliver their
nation, but they must abandon futile calculations of the
Messianic period, and beware of impostors. Although there
be signs which indicate the approach of the promised de-
liverance, and the times seem to be the period of the last and
most cruel persecution mentioned in the visions of Daniel
(xi. and xii.), the person in Yemen who pretends to be the
Messiah is an impostor, and if care be not taken, he is sure
to do mischief. Similar impostors in Cordova, France, and
Africa, have deceived the multitude, and brought great
troubles upon the Jews.-Yet, inconsistently with this sound
advice the author gives a positive date of the Messianic
time,¹ on the basis of an old tradition; the inconsistency
is so obvious that it is impossible to attribute this passage
to Maimonides himself. It is probably spurious, and has,
perhaps, been added by the translator. With the exception
of the rhymed introduction, the letter was written in Arabic,
"in order that all should be able to read and understand
it;" for that purpose the author desires that copies should
be made of it, and circulated among the Jews. R. Nachum,
of the Maghreb, translated the letter into Hebrew.
The success in the first great undertaking of explaining
the Mishnah encouraged Maimonides to propose to himself
another task of a still more ambitious character. In the
Commentary on the Mishnah, it was his object that those
who were unable to read the Gemara should be made ac-
quainted with the results obtained by the Amoraim in the
course of their discussions on the Mishnah. But the Mish-
nah, with the Commentary, was not such a code of laws as
might easily be consulted in cases of emergency; only the
initiated would be able to find the section, the chapter, and
¹ 4976 A.M. = 1216; the date is derived from a mystic interpretation of
Num. xxiii. 23, '121 apy's 70x) ny, "After the lapse of the same period,
Jacob and Israel shall again be told," etc., i.e., prophets will again declare the
word of God, and the return of prophecy will be the forerunner of the Messianic
period. According to the author 2,488 years had passed from the creation up
to the time of Balaam; 4,976 (=2488×2) is therefore the year of the Messiah.
xxiv
THE LIFE OF MOSES MAIMONIDES.
the paragraph in which the desired information could be
found. The halachah had, besides, been further developed
since the time when the Talmud was compiled. The changed
state of things had suggested new questions; these were dis-
cussed and settled by the Geonim, whose decisions, being
contained in special letters or treatises, were not generally
accessible. Maimonides therefore undertook to compile a
complete code, which would contain, in the language and
style of the Mishnah, and without discussion, the whole of
the Written and the Oral Law, all the precepts recorded in
the Talmud, Sifra, Sifri and Tosefta, and the decisions of the
Geonim. According to the plan of the author, this work
was to present a solution of every question touching the
religious, moral, or social duties of the Jews. It was not in
any way his object to discourage the study of the Talmud
and the Midrash; he only sought to diffuse a knowledge of
the Law amongst those who, through incapacity or other
circumstances, were precluded from that study. In order to
ensure the completeness of the code,¹ the author drew up a
list of the six hundred and thirteen precepts of the Penta-
teuch, divided them into fourteen groups, these again he
subdivided, and thus showed how many positive and negative
precepts were contained in each section of the Mishneh
thorah. The principles by which he was guided in this
arrangement were laid down in a separate treatise, called
Sefer ha-mitsvoth. Works of a similar kind, written by his
predecessors, as the Halachoth gedoloth of R. Shimon Kahira,2
and the several Azharoth 3 were, according to Maimonides,
full of errors, because their authors had not adopted any
method or system. But an examination of the rules laid
down by Maimonides and of their application leads to the
1 See Introduction to Sefer ha-mitsvoth.
2 In the Introduction to Sefer ha-mitsvoth, Maimonides appears to con-
sider the Halachoth Gedoloth as full of errors, while in a letter addressed to
R. Pinchas, of Alexandria (Kobhets, etc., I. 27a), he speaks of the mistakes
found in all such enumerations, except in his own and in the halachoth gedoloth.
3 See L. Dukes, Zur Kenntniss der neuhebräischen religiösen Poesie,
Frankfort o/M., 1842.
THE LIFE OF MOSES MAIMONIDES.
XXV
conclusion that his results were not less arbitrary; as has, in
fact, been shown by the criticisms of Nachmanides.¹ The
Sefer ha-mitsvoth was written in Arabic, and thrice translated
into Hebrew, namely, by Rabbi Abraham ben Chisdai,
Rabbi Shelomoh ben Joseph ben Job, and Rabbi Moses
ibn Tibbon. Maimonides himself desired to translate the
book into Hebrew, but to his disappointment he found no
time.2
3
This Sefer ha-mitsvoth was executed as a preparation for
his principal work, the Mishneh thorah, or Yad ha-chazakah,
which consists of an Introduction and of fourteen Books.
In the Introduction the author first describes the chain of
tradition from Moses to the close of the Talmud, and then
he explains his method in compiling the work. He distin-
guishes between the dicta found in the Talmud, Sifri,
Sifra, or Tosefta, on the one hand, and the dicta of the
Geonim on the other; the former were binding on all
Jews, the latter only as far as their necessity and their
utility or the authority of their propounders was recognised.
Having once for all, stated the sources from which he com-
piled his work, he did not deem it necessary to name in
each case the authority for his opinion or the particular
passage from which he derived his dictum. Any addition
of references to each paragraph he probably considered
useless to the uninformed and superfluous to the learned.
At a later time he discovered his error, he being himself
unable to find again the sources of some of his decisions.
Rabbi Joseph Caro, in his commentary on the Mishneh
4
חבורנו הגדול or חבורנו or
GENE
1 The principal aim of Nachmanides' criticisms appears to have been to
defend the halachoth gedoloth; his criticisms were examined by Isaac di Leon,
in Megillath-ester. The latter sides with Maimonides.
2 See Letter addressed to Mar Joseph b. Gabar, of Bagdad (Kobhets, etc.,
II. pag. 156), and Letter addressed to the Congregation of Lunel (Ibid.,
pag. 44a).
3 The number is alluded to in the title, pinn 7; the numerical value of
7 being 14. Maimonides, when referring to it in his writings, calls it an,
* See Letter addressed to R. Pinchas, of Alexandria (Kobbets, etc., I.
pag. 25a).
xxvi
THE LIFE OF MOSES MAIMONIDES.
}
thorah, termed Keseph Mishneh,' remedied this deficiency.
The Introduction is followed by the enumeration of the
six hundred and thirteen precepts and a description of the
plan of the work, its division into fourteen books, and
the division of the latter into sections, chapters, and
paragraphs.
According to the author, the Mishneh thorah is a mere
compendium of the Talmud; but he found sufficient oppor-
tunities to display his real genius, his philosophical mind,
and his ethical doctrines. For in stating what the tradi-
tional Law enjoined he had to exercise his own judgment,
and to decide whether a certain dictum was meant to be
taken literally or figuratively; whether it was the final
decision of a majority or the rejected opinion of a minority;
whether it was part of the Oral Law or a precept founded on
the scientific views of a particular author; and whether it
was of universal application or was only intended for a special
period or a special locality. The first Book, Sefer ha-madda,
is the embodiment of his own ethical and theological theories,
although he frequently refers to the Sayings of the Sages,
and employs the phraseology of the Talmud. Similarly, the
section on the Jewish Calendar, Hilchoth ha-ibbur, may be
considered as his original work. In each group of the
halachoth, its source, a certain passage of the Pentateuch, is
first quoted, with its traditional interpretation, and then the
detailed rules follow in systematic order. The Mishneh
thorah was written by the author in pure Hebrew; when
subsequently a friend asked him to translate it into Arabic,
he said he would prefer to have his Arabic writings trans-
lated into Hebrew instead of the reverse. The style is an
imitation of the Mishnah; he did not choose, the author
says, the philosophical style, because that would be un-
=
QUA
1 The same task had been undertaken by Don Vidal, of Tolosa, in Cata-
lonia, in the Comm. on the Mishneh thorah called Maggid mishneh; but as
only a few parts of this Comm. were extant, R. Joseph Caro wrote a complete
Commentary, and at the same time he proposed to himself to refute the cri-
ticisms of R. Abraham b. David (Rabad) and the author of the Hasagoth
maimonijoth. (See Introd. to Keseph mishneh.)
THE LIFE OF MOSES MAIMONIDES.
xxvii
intelligible to the common reader; nor did he select the
prophetic style, because that would not harmonise with the
subject.¹
"13
Ten years 2 of hard work by day and by night were spent
in the compilation of this code, which had originally been
undertaken for "his own benefit, to save him in his advanced
age the trouble and the necessity of consulting the Talmud
on every occasion.” Maimonides knew very well that
his work would meet with the opposition of those whose
ignorance it would betray, also of those who were in-
capable of comprehending it, and of those who were
inclined to condemn every deviation from their own pre-
conceived notions. But he had the satisfaction to learn that
it was well received in most of the congregations of Israel,
and that there was a general desire to possess and study it.
This success confirmed him in his hope that at a later time,
when all cause for jealousy would have disappeared, the
Mishneh thorah would be received by all Jews as an authori-
tative code. This hope has not been realised. The genius,
earnestness, and zeal of Maimonides are generally recog-
nised; but there is no absolute acceptance of his dicta.
The more he insisted on his infallibility, the more did the
Rabbinical authorities examine his words and point out
errors wherever they believed that they could discover any.
It was not always from base motives, as contended by Mai-
monides and his followers, that his opinions were criticised
and rejected. The language used by Rabbi Abraham ben
David in his notes (hasagoth)5 on the Mishneh thorah appears
harsh and disrespectful, if read together with the text of
4
1 See Introd. to Sefer ha-mitsvoth.
2 Letter addressed to R. Jonathan, of Lunel; Kobhets teshubhoth, etc.,
I., pag. 126.
3 Letter addressed to Ibn Aknin (Ibid. II., pag. 30 b).
4 Letter addressed by Maimonides to his pupil Ibn Aknin (Ibid., II. pag.
306). When he discovered that his hope was not fulfilled, he consoled himself
with the fact that even the books of the Prophets did not obtain universal
recognition (Ibid.).
5 The critic was guided in his strictures by the idea that the simple authority
of Maimonides was not sufficient reason why the decisions, which he gave with-
xxviii
THE LIFE OF MOSES MAIMONIDES.
the criticised passage, but it seems tame and mild if com-
pared with expressions used now and then by Maimonides
about men who happened to hold opinions differing from his
own.
Maimonides received many complimentary letters, con-
gratulating him upon his success; but likewise letters with
criticisms and questions respecting individual halachoth.¹
In most cases he had no difficulty in defending his position.
From the replies 2 it must, however, be inferred that
Maimonides made some corrections and additions, which
were subsequently embodied in his work. The letters
addressed to him on the Mishneh thorah and on other subjects.
were so numerous that he frequently complained of the time
he had to spend in their perusal, and of the annoyance
they caused him; but "he bore all this patiently, as he
had learned in his youth to bear the yoke." He was not
surprised that many misunderstood his words, for even the
simple words of the Pentateuch, "the Lord is one," had
met with the same fate. Some inferred from the fact
that he treated fully of Olam ha-ba, "the future state of
the soul," and neglected to expatiate on the resurrection
of the dead, that he altogether rejected that principle of
faith. They therefore asked Rabbi Samuel ha-levi of Bag-
dad to state his opinion; the Rabbi accordingly discussed
the subject, but, according to Maimonides, he attempted to
solve the problem in a very unsatisfactory manner. The
latter thereupon likewise wrote a treatise "On the Resur-
rection of the Dead," in which he protested his adherence to
Sk
out proof or reference, should be accepted without demur, especially when he
differed from his predecessors. See his last note on Maimonides' Introduction
to the Mishneh thorah.
Comp. Letter of R. Jonathan of Lunel, and series of questions included
in it. (Introd. to Sefer ha-mitsvoth, I., pag. 6a.)
2 See Kobhets, etc., I., pag. 10 a., No. 38; 11 a, No. 44; 11 b, No. 47.
Comp. Letter addressed to Ibn Aknin (Ibid. II., pag. 31 a.)
3 Letter addressed to Ibn Aknin (Ibid.) Some of the letters were col-
lected and translated into Hebrew by R. Mordecai Tamah, and edited under
the title of Peer ha-dor (Amsterdam, 1765).
THE LIFE OF MOSES MAIMONIDES.
xxix
F
this article of faith. He repeated the opinion he had stated
in the Commentary on the Mishnah and in the Mishneh
thorah, but "in more words; the same idea being reiterated
in various forms, as the treatise was only intended for women
and for the common multitude."
These theological studies engrossed his attention to a great
extent, but did not occupy it exclusively. In a letter
addressed to R. Jonathan, of Lunel, he says: "Although
from my birth the Torah was betrothed to me, and continues
to be loved by me as the wife of my youth in whose love I
find a constant delight, strange women whom I at first took
into my house as her handmaids have become her rivals and
absorb a portion of my time.” ¹ He devoted himself
especially to the study of medicine, in which he distin-
guished himself to such a degree that, according to Al-
kifti, "the King of the Franks in Ascalon "2 wanted to
appoint him as his physician. Maimonides declined the
honour. Alfadhel, the Vizier of Saladin king of Egypt,
admired the genius of Maimonides, and bestowed upon him
many distinctions. The name of Maimonides was entered
on the roll of physicians, he received a pension, and was
introduced to the court of Saladin. The method adopted
in his professional practice he describes in a letter to his
pupil, Ibn Aknin, as follows: "You know how difficult this
profession is for a conscientious and exact person who only
states what he can support by argument or authority."3
This method is more fully described in a treatise on hy-
giene, composed for Alfadhel, son of Saladin, who was
suffering from a severe illness and had applied to Maimon-
ides for advice. In a letter to Rabbi Samuel ibn Tibbon he
alludes to the amount of time spent in his medical prac-
tice, and says: "I reside in Egypt (or Fostat); the king
4
5
1 Letter addressed to R. Jonathan of Lunel (Ibid. I., pag. 12b).
2 According to Grätz, Geschichte, etc., VI., pag. 358, note 1, King
Richard I. of England (Coeur de Lion) is meant.
3 Munk, Archives Israelites, 1851, p. 319.
4 See Kerem chemed III.
5 Kobhets, etc., II., pag. 28b; Miscellany of Hebrew Literature, First
Series, page 224.
XXX
THE LIFE OF MOSES MAIMONIDES.
+
resides in Cairo, which lies about two Sabbath-day journeys
from the first-named place. My duties to the king are very
heavy. I am obliged to visit him every day, early in the
morning; and when he or any of his children or the inmates.
of his harem are indisposed, I dare not quit Cairo, but
must stay during the greater part of the day in the palace.
It also frequently happens that one or two of the royal
officers fall sick, and then I have to attend them. As a rule,
I go to Cairo very early in the day, and even if nothing
unusual happens I do not return before the afternoon, when
I am almost dying with hunger; but I find the antecham-
bers filled with Jews and Gentiles, with nobles and com-
mon people, awaiting my return,” etc.
1
Notwithstanding these heavy professional duties of court
physician, Maimonides continued his theological studies.
After having compiled a religious guide-Mishneh thorah.
-based on Revelation and Tradition, he found it necessary
to prove that the principles there set forth were confirmed
by philosophy. This task he accomplished in his Dalalat
al-haïrin "The Guide of the Perplexed," of which an
analysis will be given below. It was composed in Arabic,
and written in Hebrew characters.2 Subsequently it was
translated into Hebrew by Rabbi Samuel Ibn Tibbon, in the
lifetime of Maimonides, who was consulted by the translator
on all difficult passages. The congregation in Lunel, ignorant
of Ibn Tibbon's undertaking, or desirous to possess the most
correct translation of the Guide, addressed a very flattering
letter to Maimonides, requesting him to translate the work
into Hebrew. Maimonides replied that he could not do so,
as he had not sufficient leisure for even more pressing work,
1 In Hebrew Moreh nebhuchim.-Instead of Dalalat al-haïrin there occurs
also the form Delil al-haïrin.~Brit. Mus. MS. Or. 2,213.
2 Abdellatif reports that it was the wish of Maimonides that his work should
only be copied in Hebrew characters, with a view to prevent the Mahometans
from reading it. This, however, is mot the case; Ibn Tibbon in his letter to
Maimonides, suggests that his copy of the Guide was made from an original
written in Arabic characters, and Maimonides in his answer does not deny it.
The copies known at present are all in Hebrew characters.
THE LIFE OF MOSES MAIMONIDES.
xxxi
aid that a translation was being prepared by the ablest and
fi test man, Rabbi Samuel Ibn Tibbon.¹ A second trans-
lation was made later on by Jehudah Alcharizi.2-The Guide
delighted many, but it also met with much adverse criti-
cim on account of the peculiar views held by Maimonides
concerning angels, prophecy, and miracles, especially on
account of his assertion that if the Aristotelian proof for the
Eternity of the Universe had satisfied him, he would have
find no difficulty in reconciling the Biblical account of the
4
bation with that doctrine.³ The controversy on the Guide
c. itinued long after the death of Maimonides to divide the
conmunity, and it is difficult to say how far the author's
hbe to effect a reconciliation between reason and revela-
tion was realised. His disciple, Joseph Ibn Aknin, to
whom the work was dedicated, and who was expected to
derive from it the greatest benefit, appears to have been
dis (ppointed. His inability to reconcile the two antagon-
is elements of faith and science, he describes allegorically
in he form of a letter addressed to Maimonides, in which
the following passage occurs: "Speak, for I desire that you
be ustified; if you can, answer me. Some time ago your
bel ved daughter, the beautiful and charming Kimah,
obtained grace and favour in my sight, and I betrothed her
unto me in faithfulness, and married her in accordance
with the Law, in the presence of two trustworthy wit-
nesses, viz., our master, Abd-allah and Ibn Roshd. But
she soon became faithless to me; she could not have
found fault with me, yet she left me and departed from
my tent. She does no longer let me behold her pleasant
countenance or hear her melodious voice. You have not
rebuked or punished her, and perhaps you are the cause of
5

1 See Kobhets, etc., II., page 44 a.
2 The first part of this Version was edited with notes by Scheyer (London,
1851), the second and third parts by Schlossberg (London, 1876, and Vienna,
1879).
3 See Guide II., ch. xxv.
* Kobhets, etc., II., 29 a; comp. Rénan, Averroes, page 180.
• I.e., Maimonides.
xxxii
THE LIFE OF MOSES MAIMONIDES.
this misconduct. Now, 'send the wife back to the man, for
he is '--or might become a prophet; he will
a prophet; he will pray for you
that you may live,' and also for her that she may be firm and
steadfast. If, however, you do not send her back, the Lord
will punish you.
Therefore seek peace and pursue it;
listen to what our sages said: 'Blessed be he who restores
to the owner his lost property;' for this blessing applies
in a higher degree to him who restores to a man his virtuous
wife, the crown of her husband." Maimonides replied in
the same strain, and reproached his "son-in-law” that he
falsely accused his wife of faithlessness after he had
neglected her; but he restored him his wife with the
advice to be more cautious in future. In another letter
Maimonides exhorts Ibn Aknin to study his works, adding,
"apply yourself to the study of the Law of Moses; do not
neglect it, but on the contrary, devote to it the best and
the most of your time, and if you tell me that you do so,
I am satisfied that you are on the right way to eternal
bliss."
Of the letters written after the completion of the "Guide,"
one addressed to the wise men of Marseilles (1194)¹ is
especially noteworthy. Maimonides was asked to give his
opinion on astrology. He regretted in his reply that they
were not yet in possession of his Mishneh thorah; they would
have found in it the answer to their question. According
to his opinion, man should only believe what he can
grasp with his intellectual faculties, or perceive by his
senses, or what he can accept on trustworthy authority.
Beyond this nothing should be believed. Astrological state-
ments, not being founded on any of these three sources of
knowledge, must be rejected. He had himself studied
astrology, and was convinced that it was no science at all.
If some dicta be found in the Talmud which appear to
represent Astrology as a true source of knowledge, these
may either be referred to the rejected opinion of a small
minority, or may have an allegorical meaning, but they
1 Comp. note 5, page xxi.
THE LIFE OF MOSES MAIMONIDES.
xxxiii
are by no means forcible enough to set aside principles
based on logical proof.¹
2
The debility of which Maimonides so frequently com-
plained in his correspondence, gradually increased, and he
died, in his seventieth year, on the 20th Tebeth, 4964
(1204). His death was the cause of great mourning to
all Jews. In Fostat a mourning of three days was kept;
in Jerusalem a fast was appointed; a portion of the to-
chachah (Lev. xxvi. or Deut. xxix.) was read, and also
the history of the capture of the Ark by the Philistines
(1 Sam. iv.). His remains were brought to Tiberias.³
The general regard in which Maimonides was held, both
by his contemporaries and by succeeding generations, has
been expressed in the popular saying: "From Moses to
Moses there was none like Moses."4
NOTE.-Examination of the proofs adduced for the alleged
apostasy of Maimonides (pag. xviii.).
First of all, we have to examine the treatise on in-
voluntary apostasy. A certain Rabbi being asked to state
his opinion on the relation of forced converts to Judaism
replied that if a Jew publicly professes his belief in
Mahomet and joins the Moslems in their worship, his
prayer would not be acceptable before the Lord, his obser-
vance of the divine precepts had no merit whatever, and
he could no longer be considered a Jew. The Rabbi
exhorted his brethren to be firm, and prefer death to
apostasy, as he put no faith in the clandestine observance of
religious precepts. In the treatise attributed to Mai-
monides this reply is criticised, and pronounced to be
1 Comp. Friedländer, "Essays on Ibn Ezra," pag. 96 sqq.
2 According to R. Saadiah b. Maimon ibn Danan: Monday the 18th of
Kislev 4965. (Chemdah genuzah by Edelman, Königsberg, 1856.) Comp.
Rappoport in Geiger's Zeitschrift, etc., II. 127 sqq.
3 Comp. Carmoly, Itiner., pages 185, 385, 446.
xxxiv. 10.
.The phrase has its origin in Deut .ממשה עד משה לא קם כמוהו 4
C
xxxiv
THE LIFE OF MOSES MAIMONIDES.
the product of ignorance and folly. In the first place,
the author holds that the Law only demanded martyrdom
when men are compelled to worship idols, but that Islam
is not idolatry. Life need not be sacrificed, since the
Mahometans do not compel the Jews to transgress any
divine precept; they only ask them to make a profession
of their belief in Mahomet. Secondly, a compulsory trans-
gression of the Law does not render the transgressor
liable to punishment, nor does it deprive him of his
privileges as a Jew. He admits that those who prefer to
die the death of a martyr do "what is right in the sight
of the Lord;" but at the same time he declares that those
who save their lives by pretended conversion, act in strict
accordance with the Law, provided that they seek the
earliest opportunity to quit the country, and do not hesitate
to abandon, if necessary, their property, and even their
families. In the course of this treatise the author seems
to describe himself as belonging to the involuntary con-
verts; for he says: "In this our involuntary conversion we
do not simulate idolatry, but merely a belief in Islam ; the
Mahometans know that in reality we do not believe in
the truth of what we profess, and that we deceive the
king."" "What I consider the best thing to do for
myself, my friends, and for all who would follow my advice,
is this to quit the country, without the least regard to
property, friends or family."
2
If Maimonides were the author of this treatise, his apos-
tasy would seem to be established; but at the same time
also his great inconsistency. Contrary to the advice re-
"3
נמנו וגמרו בעליית בית נתזא בלוד כל 142 Babyl. Talm. Sanhedrin 1
עבירות שבתורה אם אומרים לו לאדם עבור ואל תהרג יעברו ואל יהרג
1) D'¬ i'w my ban.-Comp. Maim., Yad ha-chazakah,
Hilchoth Yesode ha-torah, v.
והשמד הזה אשר אנחנו בו אין אנו מראים בו שאנו עובדים ע"ז אלא 2
שנאמין מה שהם אומרים בלבד וכבר נתאמת אצלם שאין אנו מאמינים
זה בשום פנים : והדעת שאני רוצה בה לי ולאוהבי ולכל מבקש ממני עצה וגו' 3
THE LIFE OF MOSES MAIMONIDES.
XXXV
corded here, and still more forcibly in a letter to the Jews
in Yemen,¹ he remained, according to most of his
biographers,² more than ten years in Mahometan countries
in which the Jewish religion was not tolerated. It is,
however, by no means certain that Maimonides is the
author of this treatise; there is, on the contrary, sufficient
reason to doubt the genuineness of the introductory phrase,
"Moses, the son of Maimon, said." The following are the
arguments against its authenticity:-
1. Maimonides never quotes this treatise, though he was
in the habit of referring to his own works; such reference
might be expected in the letter to the Jews in Teman
(Yemen), in which he advised them how to conduct them-
selves in times of religious persecution, or in the letters
which he wrote to a proselyte in Palestine.*
3
2. No mention of this treatise is noticed in any of the
works of the thirteenth and the fourteenth centuries."
3. Although it was but natural that the Jews should hail
with joy the open return of involuntary converts, and
abstain from reminding them of their past trials, it is
nevertheless remarkable that, in the heat of the controversy
between Maimonists and anti-Maimonists, at a time when
harsh and insulting words were exchanged on both sides, no
1 66 They must flee into deserts and solitary places; they must not re-
gret the separation from friends, or the loss of property, for this is trifling
when compared with the service of God."
2 Grätz (Gesch. vi., pag. 316) suggests that the family of Maimon did not
profess Islam in Spain, where they remained till 1159-60; but when at Fez,
they were, like the other Jews, obliged to comply with the command of the
king.
3 Iggereth Teman. See p. xxii. Comp. also Letter to the Marseilles Con-
ואם שמעתם שהגיע כתבי לפאס שמא אותן הדברים ששלחתי-: gregation
-If the Iggereth ha-shemad had been conl בארץ תימן הועתקו והגיעו לפאס
posed by Maimonides, he would surely have mentioned the possibility that it
was that same Iggereth of which the Jews in Marseilles had heard.
• Kobets Teshubhoth Rambam, Nos. 158-160., ed. Lichtenberg, Leipzig,
5619 (1859).
5 Resp. of Isaac b. Shesheth, No. 11, and of Shimon b. Tsemach Duran,
No. 63, appear to contain the earliest mention of this treatise; both were
written in the fifteenth century.
c 2
xxxvi
THE LIFE OF MOSES MAIMONIDES.
reference is made to the views expressed by the author of
this treatise or to Maimonides' alleged lapse into Islam.
4. In an important point the opinion expressed by Mai-
monides in his Mishneh-thorah differs from that adduced in
the Iggereth ha-shemad. In the latter praise is bestowed
upon those who would sacrifice their lives in gloriam Dei on
occasions when the Law did not demand such a sacrifice;
according to the Mishneh-thorah,¹ such martyrs are sinners,
and almost guilty of suicide.
5. The first part of the treatise, which in style and con-
tents widely differs from the second part, and in which the
author appears to have had no other object than to revile his
opponent, is wholly unworthy of Maimonides. The invec-
tives here employed are not dictated by an indignant appre-
hension of the evils resulting from a false theory; they are
simply the weapons of casuistry, and serve to display the
author's superiority.2
6. The treatise contains inconsistencies which cannot be
conceived to be the product of Maimonides' logical genius.
E.g.: In one paragraph the opponent is called a sinner and
transgressor, because he recommends martyrdom where the
Law does not enjoin it, and in the next paragraph he assures
such martyrs that their reward will be great because the
Lord is pleased with such a sacrifice. Again, the Introduc-
tion begins with a eulogy of speech as the sublimest gift of
man,³ which would even be defiled if it were employed to
1 Hilchoth Yesode ha-torah, v. 1.
2 The author admits that his opponent had a good intention (ny an
He also is shocked at .קל מקלי עולם nevertheless he calls him ,(טובה אחת
the wish expressed by the opponent, that the religious earnestness of the
Karaites and the Christians should be imitated, and calls it nyn nibbin, for-
getting that the prophet Jeremiah expressed himself in the same sense when
he exclaimed x '11 7277 (Jer. ii. 11). It is absurd to ascribe such
views to one of the greatest men in Israel. For the same reason the authen-
מוסר נאה מאד מהרמ"בם) ticity of the letter addressed to his son Abraham
appears doubtful. The letter contains base (ז"ל להרב החכם אברהם בנו
invectives and calumnies.
3 Comp. Maimon., Comm. on Mishnah, Abhoth, i. 15.
THE LIFE OF MOSES MAIMONIDES.
xxxvii
refute baseless and absurd assertions; but the author appears
to attribute little value to speech when he bases his prin-
cipal argument on the fact that the tyrant demands of the
Jews nothing but the mere utterance of a few words.
7. It is remarkable that, contrary to the usual practice¹
of Maimonides, neither the person to whom the letter was
addressed nor the person against whom it was directed is
mentioned by name. Again, if Maimonides were the author,
he would probably have written in Arabic; the name of the
translator is not stated.
8. It is improbable that Maimonides took upon himself
the responsibility of deciding a question of such importance
without making an allusion to his father, who, in his autho-
rity as dayyan, had addressed his brethren in Fez, and
exhorted them to remain faithful to their religion.
These considerations lead to the conclusion that Mai-
monides was not the author of this treatise, at least not in
its present form.
The next witnesses to be examined as to the alleged apos-
tasy of Maimon and his family are some Arabic authors.
The most important of these are Ibn Ali Osaiba and Alkifti;2
for they were almost contemporaries of Maimonides, and stood
in such relation to him as would enable them to ascer-
tain whether the rumoured conversion of Maimonides was
true or not. Osaiba was a fellow-physician of Rabbi Abra-
ham, the son of Maimonides, in the great hospital at Cairo;
Alkifti was an intimate friend of Ibn Aknin, the faithful
pupil of Maimonides. Writers of a later period, as, e.g., Abul-
faragius,2 who establish their assertions on the evidence of
these witnesses, may be ignored altogether.
Osaiba, in his history of the Physicians, gives the fol-
lowing account: "It is said that Maimonides became a
.2
1 See Treatises on Resurrection, on Astrology (Letter to Marseilles congre-
gation), the Yemen letter, Guide, etc.
2 Comp. I. Chwolson, Materialien zu Biographieen jüdischer Gelehrten die
unter den Arabern gelebt, aus arabischen Schriftstellern gesammelt. Orient,
1846, pag. 337 sqq.
xxxviii
THE LIFE OF MOSES MAIMONIDES.
", 1
Mahometan in the Maghreb; that he learnt the Koran by
heart, and devoted himself to the study of the Mahometan
Law; but when he came to Egypt and settled in Fostat,
he was accused of apostasy. It would certainly be absurd
to accept as an established fact a statement founded on a
mere on dit, perhaps on the charge of apostasy which was
brought against Maimonides at Cairo, but of which he was
acquitted. Alkifti speaks with greater certainty: “Abdul-
mumen ben Ali Alkuni, the Jezedite, ruler of the Maghreb,
commanded that all Jews and Christians residing in his terri-
tory should become Moslems or emigrate before a certain date;
the converts would in every respect enjoy the same privileges
as their Mahometan fellow-citizens; but if, after the fixed
date, any Jews or Christians remained in the country with-
out changing their religion, their property would be confis-
cated, and they would be put to death. Thereupon Maimon-
ides, in order to save his property, professed outwardly the
Mahometan religion, but after some time he fled with his
family to Egypt, where he found a refuge amongst the Jews
in Fostat, and where he again openly professed Judaism."
"In his old age a serious danger threatened him; for when
the Spanish lawyer Abu'l-arab ben Moisha came to Egypt,
he recognised Maimonides, and brought the charge of apos-
tasy against him. Abd-er-rahem al-fadhel ruled that a
forced conversion was illegal, and acquitted Maimonides."
According to Dzehebi it was in the house of this Abu'l-
arab that Maimonides when outlawed, and in imminent.
danger of his life, found protection and hospitality in Spain.
The protector, however, was in consequence of this humane
act subjected to persecution.2
Although Alkifti, as an intimate friend of Joseph Ibn
Aknin, might be expected to have had the most accurate
information on the subject, his account does not appear
to be trustworthy. The imputation that Maimonides was
through covetousness induced to renounce his religion,
1 Comp. Orient, 1.c., pag. 349, note 14.
2 See Munk, Archives Israelites, 1851, pag. 329.
-
=
THE LIFE OF MOSES MAIMONIDES.
xxxix
suffices to prove that Maimonides' enthusiastic disciple was
not Alkifti's informant. It is more likely that Alkifti
also founded his account of that conversion on the charges
of apostasy which were brought against Maimonides in Cairo.
Osaiba, who lived in that city, introduces his narrative as
a mere rumour; when the report reached Alkifti, who
was far away from Cairo, it had already assumed the form
of an established fact. But on what grounds did Abu'l-arab
and others rest their charges of apostasy against Mai-
monides? That charges of this kind were made cannot be
denied. Maimonides, in a letter addressed to R. Yefeth,
mentions the fact among other causes of his troubles.¹ If
it were true that he pretended to be a convert to Mahome-
tanism, he would have enjoyed, according to Alkifti, the
same protection of the law as all other Moslems, and would
not have been outlawed or compelled to wander as a fugitive
from place to place. On the contrary, Maimon, with
his family, far from simulating conversion, preferred danger
and anxiety, if ease and security were to be purchased at
the expense of religion. They made, perhaps, no display of
their faith, and might therefore a long time have been able
to reside where they were without being recognised as
Jews. We may explain these difficulties by the follow-
ing assumption: Maimonides, like many other Jews, had
friends amongst the Mahometans; his scientific career
brought him into close contact with teachers and fellow-
students, and in his treatises on medical matters he fre-
quently mentions what he had noticed and experienced
amongst the Mahometans in the West.2 Many of these
friends probably believed him to be a Moslem, whilst others
altogether ignored the king's decree against the Jews.
Besides, the decree may perhaps not have been executed
with the same rigour in all parts of the kingdom, or against
all Jews; and Maimonides had in such cases an opportunity
of noticing the religious practices and customs of the Jews
1 Kobhets teshubhoth ha-rambam, Part II. pag. 37.
2 Comp. Munk, Archives Israelites, 1851, pag. 326.
xl
THE LIFE OF MOSES MAIMONIDES.
in the Maghreb.¹ As soon, however, as an enforcement of
the king's decree was feared, or actually took place, so that
Maimonides was outlawed, he sought safety in flight. It
may have been on such an occasion that Maimonides was
protected by Abu'l-arab, the latter not knowing the true
cause of his protégé's danger. Abu'l-arab, like many other
Mahometans, had no reason to suspect that Maimonides was
a follower of the Jewish faith. Hence might have arisen
the charges of apostasy when it was discovered in Egypt
that his protégé was a Jew.
1 Comment. on the Mishnah, Nedarim x. 8; Kelim îi. 1; x. 1; Okzin ii.
5. Kobbets, etc., Part I. p. 4a; 7b.
ANALYSIS OF THE GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED. xli
ANALYSIS OF THE GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
INTRODUCTION.
per-
It is the object of this work "to afford a guide for the
plexed," i. e., " to thinkers whose studies have brought them
into collision with religion" (p. 21), "who have studied
philosophy and have acquired sound knowledge, and who,
while firm in religious matters, are perplexed and bewildered
on account of the ambiguous and figurative expressions.
employed in the holy writings" (p. 13). Joseph, the son of
Jehudah ibn Aknin, a disciple of Maimonides, is addressed by
his teacher as an example of this kind of students. It was
"for him and for those like him" that the treatise was com-
posed, and to him this work is inscribed in the dedicatory
letter with which the Introduction begins. Maimonides,
having discovered that his disciple was sufficiently advanced
for an exposition of the esoteric ideas in the books of the
Prophets, commenced to give him such expositions “by way
of hints." His disciple then begged him to give him further
explanations, to treat of metaphysical themes, and to expound
the system and the method of the Kalam, or Mahometan
Theology.¹ In compliance with this request, Maimonides
composed the Guide of the Perplexed. The reader has,
therefore, to expect that the subjects mentioned in the dis-
ciple's request indicate the design and arrangement of the
present work, and that the Guide consists of the following
parts:-1. An exposition of the esoteric ideas (sodoth) in the
books of the Prophets. 2. A treatment of certain meta-
physical problems. 3. An examination of the system and
the method of the Kalam. This, in fact, is a correct account
of the contents of the book; but in the second part
of the Introduction, in which the theme of this work
is defined, the author mentions only the first-named sub-
ject. He observes: "My primary object is to explain
1 See infra, page 4, note 1.
xlii
INTRODUCTION.
""
certain words occurring in the prophetic books. Of these
some are homonymous, some figurative, and some hybrid
terms (p. 4). "This work has also a second object. It
is designed to explain certain obscure figures which occur
in the Prophets, and are not distinctly characterised
as being figures" (p. 6). Yet from this observation it
must not be inferred that Maimonides abandoned his
original purpose; for he examines the Kalām in the
last chapters of the First Part (ch. lxx.-lxxvi.), and
treats of certain metaphysical themes in the beginning of
the Second Part (Introd. and ch. i.-xxv.). But in the
passage quoted above he confines himself to a delineation of
the main object of this treatise, and advisedly leaves un-
mentioned the other two subjects, which, however important
they may be, are here of subordinate interest. Nor did he
consider it necessary to expatiate on these subjects; he only
wrote for the student, for whom a mere reference to works
on philosophy and science was sufficient. We therefore
frequently meet with such phrases as the following: "This
is fully discussed in works on metaphysics." By references
of this kind the author may have intended to create a taste
for the study of philosophical works. But our observation
only holds good with regard to the Aristotelian philosophy.
The writings of the Mutakallemim are never commended by
him; he states their opinions, and tells his disciple that he
would not find any additional argument, even if he were
to read all of their voluminous works (p. 343). Mai-
monides was a zealous disciple of Aristotle, although the
theory of the Kalām might seem to have been more con-
genial to Jewish thought and belief. The Kalām upheld
the theory of God's Existence, Incorporeality, and Unity,
together with the creatio ex nihilo. Maimonides neverthe-
less opposed the Kalām, and, anticipating the question,
why preference should be given to the system of Aristotle,
which included the theory of the Eternity of the Universe,
a theory contrary to the fundamental teaching of the Scrip-
tures, he exposed the weakness of the Kalam and its fallacies.
ANALYSIS OF THE GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
xliii
The exposition of Scriptural texts is divided by the author
into two parts; the first part treats of homonymous, figura-
tive, and hybrid terms,¹ employed in reference to God; the
second part relates to Biblical figures and allegories. These
two parts do not closely follow each other; they are sepa-
rated by the examination of the Kalam, and the discus-
sion of metaphysical problems. It seems that the author
adopted this arrangement for the following reason: first of
all, he intended to establish the fact that the Biblical anthro-
pomorphisms do not imply corporeality, and that the divine
Being of whom the Bible speaks could therefore be regarded
as identical with the Primal Cause of the philosophers.
Having established this principle, he discusses from a purely
metaphysical point of view the properties of the Primal
Cause and its relation to the universe. A solid foundation
is thus established for the esoteric exposition of Scriptural
passages. Before discussing metaphysical problems, which
he treats in accordance with Aristotelian philosophy, he dis-
poses of the Kalām, and demonstrates that its arguments are
illogical and illusory.
The "Guide of the Perplexed" contains, therefore, an
Introduction and the following four parts:-1. On homony-
mous, figurative, and hybrid terms. 2. On the Supreme
Being and His relation to the universe, according to the
Kalām. 3. On the Primal Cause and its relation to the
universe, according to the philosophers. 4. Esoteric expo-
sition of some portions of the Bible (sodoth): a, Maaseh
bereshith, or the history of the Creation (Genesis, ch. i.-iv.):
b, on Prophecy; c, Maaseh mercabhah, or the description of
the divine chariot (Ezekiel, ch. i.).
According to this plan, the work ends with the seventh
chapter of the Third Part. The chapters which follow may
be considered as an appendix; they treat of the following
theological themes: the Existence of Evil, Omniscience and
Providence, Temptations, Design in Nature, in the Law, and
in the Biblical Narratives, and finally the true Worship of
God.
1 See infra, page 5, note 4.
xliv
INTRODUCTION.
In the Introduction to the "Guide," Maimonides (1)
describes the object of the work and the method he has
followed; (2) treats of similes; (3) gives "directions for
the study of the work;" and (4) discusses the most usual
causes of inconsistencies in authors.
W
1 (pag. 4-10). Inquiring into the root of the evil which
this work was intended to remove, namely, the conflict be-
tween science and religion, the author perceived that in most
cases it originated in a misinterpretation of the anthropo-
morphisms in Holy Writ. The main difficulty is found in the
ambiguity of the words employed to describe the mode of
action of the Divine Being; the question arises whether they
are applied to the Deity and to other things in one and the
same sense or equivocally; in the latter case the author
distinguishes between homonyms pure and simple, figures,
and hybrid terms. In order to show that the Biblical
anthropomorphisms do not imply the corporeality of the
Deity, he seeks in each instance to demonstrate that the
expression under examination is a perfect homonym de-
noting things which are totally distinct from each other,
and whenever such a demonstration is impossible, he as-
sumes that the expression is a hybrid term, that is, being
employed in one instance figuratively and in another ho-
monymously. His explanation of "form" (b) may
serve as an illustration. According to his opinion, it in-
variably denotes "form" in the philosophical acceptation
of the term, viz., the complex of the essential properties
of a thing. But to obviate objections he proposes an alter-
native view, and takes by as either a homonym, and de-
noting as such two different things-"form" in the philo-
sophical sense of the word, and "external shape," or as a
hybrid term, i.e., that the several objects which it describes
may be equally considered as belonging to the same class
and to different classes. Maimonides seems to have refrained
from explaining anthropomorphisms as figurative expres-
sions, lest by such interpretation he might implicitly
admit the existence of a certain relation and comparison
between the Creator and His creatures.
(צלם)
ANALYSIS OF THE GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
xlv
Maimonides appears to be the first who distinguished in
the interpretation of Biblical anthropomorphisms between
perfect homonyms, i.e., terms which denote two or more
absolutely different things, and imperfect homonyms or
hybrid terms. It is true that some of his predecessors
had enunciated and demonstrated the Unity and the In-
corporeality of the Divine Being, and they had interpreted
Scriptural metaphors on the principle that "the Law
speaks in the language of man"; but our author adopted a
new and altogether original method. The Commentators,
when treating of anthropomorphisms, generally contented
themselves with the statement that the term under con-
sideration must not be taken in a literal sense, or they
paraphrased the passage in expressions which implied a
lesser degree of materiality. The Talmud, the Midrashim,
and the Targumim abound in paraphrases of this kind. The
Jewish philosophers anterior to Maimonides, as Saadiah in
Emunoth re-deoth," Bachya in his "Chobhoth ha-lebhabhoth,”
and Jehudah ha-levi in the "Cusari," insist on the necessity
and the appropriateness of such interpretations. Saadiah
enumerates ten terms which primarily denote organs of
the human body, and are figuratively employed with refer-
ence to God. To establish this point of view he cites
numerous instances in which the terms in question are
used in a figurative sense without being applied to God.
Saadiah further shows that the Divine attributes are either
qualifications of such of God's actions as are perceived by
man, or they imply a negation. The correctness of this
method was held to be so obvious that some authors found
it necessary to apologise to the reader for introducing
such well-known subjects. From R. Abraham ben David's
strictures on the Yad ha-chazakah it is, however, evident
that in the days of Maimonides persons were not wanting
who defended the literal interpretation of certain anthro-
pomorphisms. Maimonides, therefore, did not content him-
self with the vague and general rule, "The Law speaks in V
the language of man," but sought carefully to define the
<<
xlvi
INTRODUCTION.
meaning of each term when applied to God, and to identify
it with some transcendental and metaphysical term. In
pursuing this course he is sometimes forced to venture
upon interpretations which are much too far-fetched to
commend themselves even to the supposed philosophical
reader. In such instances he generally adds a simple and
plain explanation, and leaves it to the option of the reader
to choose the one which may appear preferable. The enu-
meration of the different meanings of a word is often, from a
philological point of view, incomplete; he introduces only
such significations as serve his object. When treating of
an imperfect homonym, the several significations of which
are derived from one primary signification, he apparently
follows a certain system which he does not employ in the
interpretation of perfect homonyms. The homonymity of
the term is not proved; the author confines himself to
the remark, "It is employed homonymously," even when
the various meanings of a word might easily be traced to
a common source.
2 (pag. 10-20). In addition to the explanation of homonyms
Maimonides undertakes to interpret similes and allegories.
At first it had been his intention to write two distinct works
-Sefer ha-nebhuah," A Book on Prophecy," and "Sefer ha-
shevaah, "A Book of Reconciliation." In the former work he
had intended to explain difficult passages of the Bible, and
in the latter to expound such passages in the Midrash and
the Talmud as seemed to be in conflict with common sense.
With respect to the "Book of Reconciliation," he abandoned
his plan, because he apprehended that neither the learned
nor the unlearned would profit by it: the one would find it
superfluous, the other tedious. The subject of the "Book on
Prophecy" is treated in the present work, in which he ex-
plains difficulties in the Scripture, and occasionally such as
occur in the Talmud and the Midrash.
J
The treatment of the simile must vary according as the
simile is compound or simple. In the first case, each part
represents a separate idea and demands a separate interpre-
ANALYSIS OF THE GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
xlvii
tation; in the other case, only one idea is represented, and
it is not necessary to assign to each part a separate meta-
phorical meaning. This division the author illustrates by
citing the dream of Jacob (Gen. xxviii. 12 sqq.), and the
description of the adulteress (Prov. vii. 6 sqq.). He gives
no rule by which it might be ascertained to which of the two
categories a simile belongs, and, like other Commentators, he
seems to treat as essential those details of a simile for which
he can offer an adequate interpretation. As a general prin-
ciple, he warns against the confusion and the errors which
arise when an attempt is made to expound every single
detail of a simile. His own explanations are not intended
to be exhaustive; on the contrary, they are to consist of brief
allusions to the idea represented by the simile, of mere sug-
gestions, which the reader is expected to develop and to com-
plete. The author thus aspires to follow in the wake of the
Creator, whose works can only be understood after a long
and persevering study. Yet it is possible that he derived.
his preference for a reserved and mysterious style from the
example of ancient philosophers, who discussed metaphysical
problems in figurative and enigmatic language. Like Ibn
Ezra, who frequently concludes his exposition of a Biblical
passage with the phrase, "Here a profound idea (sod) is
hidden," Maimonides somewhat mysteriously remarks at
the end of different chapters, "Note this," "Consider it
well." In such phrases some Commentators fancied that
they found references to metaphysical theories which the
author was not willing fully to discuss. Whether this was
the case or not, in having recourse to that method he was not,
as some have suggested, actuated by fear of being charged
with heresy. He expresses his opinion on the principal
theological questions without reserve, and does not dread the
searching inquiries of opponents; for he boldly announces
that their displeasure would not deter him from teaching the
truth and guiding those who are able and willing to follow
him, however few these might be. When, however, we
¹ He stated his view frankly and fully, and he therefore entrusted the work
1
xlviii
INTRODUCTION.
examine the work itself, we are at a loss to discover to which
parts the professed enigmatic method was applied. His
theories concerning the deity, the divine attributes, angels,
creatio ex nihilo, prophecy, and other subjects, are treated as
fully as might be expected. It is true that a cloud of mys-
terious phrases enshrouds the interpretation of Maaseh bere-
shith (Gen. i.-iii.), and Maaseh mercabhah (Ez. i.). But the
significant words occurring in these portions are explained
in the First Part of this work, and a full exposition is found
in the Second and Third Parts. Nevertheless the statement
that the exposition was never intended to be explicit occurs
over and over again. The treatment of the first three
chapters of Genesis concludes thus: "These remarks, toge-
ther with what we have already observed on the subject, and
what we may have to add, must suffice both for the object
and for the reader we have in view" (II. xxx.). In like
manner, he declares, after the explanation of the first
chapter of Ezekiel: "I have given you here as many sug-
gestions as may be of service to you, if you will give them
a further development. . . . Do not expect to hear from me
anything more on this subject, for I have, though with some
hesitation, gone as far in my explanation as I possibly could
go" (III. vii.).
3 (pag. 20-23). In the next paragraph, headed, "Directions
for the Study of this Work," he implores the reader not to be
hasty with his criticism, and to bear in mind that every sen-
tence, indeed each word, had been fully considered before it
was written down. Yet it might easily happen that the reader
could not reconcile his own view with that of the author,
and in such a case he is asked to ignore the disapproved
chapter or section altogether. Such disapproval Maimonides
attributes to a mere misconception on the part of the reader,
a fate which awaits every work composed in a mystical style.
In adopting this peculiar style, he intended to reduce to a
JUR
only to trustworthy persons, lest he might be accused by the Mahometans that
he was spreading heretical views. See Letter of Maimonides to Ibn Aknin
ed. Goldberg in Birchath Abraham, Lyck, 1859.
ANALYSIS OF THE GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED. xlix
-
minimum the violation of the rule laid down in the Mishnah
(Chagigah ii. 1), that metaphysics should not be taught pub-
licly. The violation of this rule he justifies by citing the
following two Mishnaic maxims: "It is time to do some-
thing in honour of the Lord" (Berachoth ix. 5), and “Let
all thy acts be guided by pure intentions" (Aboth ii. 17).
Maimonides increased the mysteriousness of the treatise, by
expressing his wish that the reader should abstain from ex-
pounding the work, lest he might spread in the name of the
author opinions which the latter never held. But it does not
occur to him that the views he enunciates might in them-
selves be erroneous. He is positive that his own theory is
unexceptionably correct, that his esoteric interpretations of
Scriptural texts are sound, and that those who differed from
him-viz., the Mutakallemin on the one hand, and the un-
philosophical Rabbis on the other-are indefensibly wrong.
In this respect other Jewish philosophers-e. g., Saadiah and
Bahya—were far less positive; they were conscious of their
own fallibility, and invited the reader to make such cor-
rections as might appear needful. Owing to this strong
self-reliance of Maimonides, it is not to be expected that
opponents would receive a fair and impartial judgment at his
hands.
4 (pag. 23-27). The same self-reliance is noticeable in the
next and concluding paragraph of the Introduction. Here
he treats of the contradictions which are to be found in every
literary work, and he divides them with regard to their
origin into seven classes. The first four classes comprise the
apparent contradictions, which can be traced back to the
employment of elliptical speech; the other three classes
comprise the real contradictions, and are due to carelessness
and oversight, or they are intended to serve some special pur-
pose. The Scriptures, the Talmud, and the Midrash abound
in instances of apparent contradictions; later works contain
real contradictions, which escaped the notice of the writers.
In the present treatise, however, there occur only such con-
tradictions as are the result of intention and design.
d
1
INTRODUCTION.
PART 1.
The homonymous expressions which are discussed in the
First Part include—(1) nouns and verbs used in reference to
God, ch. i. to ch. xlix.; (2) attributes of the Deity, ch. 1. to
lx.; (3) expressions commonly regarded as names of God,
ch. lxi. to lxx. In the first section the following groups can
be distinguished-(a) expressions which denote form and
figure, ch. i. to ch. vi. ; (b) space or relations of space, ch. viii.
to ch. xxv.; (c) parts of the animal body and their functions,
ch. xxviii. to ch. xlix. Each of these groups includes chapters
not connected with the main subjects, but which serve as a
help for the better understanding of previous or succeeding
interpretations. Every word selected for discussion bears
upon some Scriptural text which, according to the opinion of
the author, has been misinterpreted. But such phrases as
"the mouth of the Lord," and "the hand of the Lord" are
not introduced, because their figurative meaning is too
obvious to be misunderstood.
The lengthy digressions which are here and there inter-
posed appear like outbursts of feeling and passion which the
author could not repress. Yet they are "words fitly spoken
in the right place;" for they gradually unfold the author's
theory, and acquaint the reader with those general principles
on which he founds the interpretations in the succeeding
chapters. Moral reflections are of frequent occurrence, and
demonstrate the intimate connection between a virtuous life
and the attainment of higher knowledge, in accordance with
the maxim current long before Maimonides, and expressed
in the Biblical words, "The fear of the Lord is the begin-
ning of wisdom" (Ps. cxi. 10). No opportunity is lost to
inculcate this lesson, be it in a passing remark or in an
elaborate essay.
The discussion of the term "tselem" (ch. i.) afforded the
first occasion for reflections of this kind. Man, "the image
of God," is defined as a living and rational being, as though
ANALYSIS OF THE GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
li
the moral faculties of man were not an essential element
of his existence, and his power to discern between good
and evil were the result of the first sin. According to
Maimonides, the moral faculty would, in fact, not have
been required, if man had remained a purely rational
being. It is only through the senses that "the knowledge
of good and evil" has become indispensable. The narra-
tive of Adam's fall is, according to Maimonides, an allegory
representing the relation which exists between sensation,
moral faculty, and intellect. In this early part (ch. ii.),
however, the author does not yet mention this theory; on
the contrary, every allusion to it is for the present studiously
avoided, its full exposition being reserved for the Second
Part.
The treatment of , "to behold" (ch. vi.), is followed
by the advice that the student should not approach meta-
physics otherwise than after a sound and thorough prepa-
ration, because a rash attempt to solve abstruse problems.
brings nothing but injury upon the inexperienced investi-
gator. The author points to the "nobles of the children
of Israel” (Exod. xxiv. 11), who, according to his inter-
pretation, fell into this error, and received their deserved
punishment. He gives additional force to these exhortations
by citing a dictum of Aristotle to the same effect. In a
like way he refers to the allegorical use of certain terms by
Plato (ch. xvii.) in support of his interpretation of “tsur
(lit., "rock") as denoting "Primal Cause."
"5
C
The theory that nothing but a sound moral and intel-
lectual training would entitle a student to engage in meta-
physical speculations is again discussed in the digression
which precedes the third group of homonyms (xxxi.—
xxxvi.). Man's intellectual faculties, he argues, have this
in common with his physical forces, that their sphere of
action is limited, and they become inefficient whenever
they are overstrained. This happens when a student ap-
proaches metaphysics without due preparation. He goes.
on to argue that the non-success of metaphysical studies
d 2
lii
INTRODUCTION.
[
is attributable to the following causes: the transcendental
character of this discipline, the imperfect state of the
student's knowledge, the persistent efforts which have to
be made even in the preliminary studies, and finally the
waste of energy and time owing to the physical condition
of man. For these reasons the majority of persons are
debarred from pursuing the study of metaphysics. Never-
theless, there are certain metaphysical truths which have
to be communicated to all men, e.g., that God is One, and
that He is incorporeal; for to assume that God is corporeal,
or that He has any properties, or to ascribe to Him any
attributes, is a sin bordering on idolatry.
Another digression occurs as an appendix to the second
group of homonyms (ch. xxvi.-xxvii.). Maimonides found
that only a limited number of terms are applied to God in
a figurative sense; and again, that in the "Targum " of
Onkelos some of the figures are paraphrased, while other
figures received a literal rendering. He therefore seeks to
discover the principle which was applied both in the Sacred
text and in the translation, and he found it in the Tal-
mudical dictum, "The Law speaketh the language of man.
For this reason all figures are eschewed which, in their
literal sense, would appear to the multitude as implying
debasement or a blemish. Onkelos, who rigorously guards
himself against using any term that might suggest cor-
porification, gives a literal rendering of figurative terms
when there is no cause for entertaining such an appre-
hension. Maimonides illustrates this rule by the mode in
which Onkelos renders "yarad" ("to go down,"), when
used in reference to God. It is generally paraphrased,
but in one exceptional instance, occurring in Jacob's
“visions of the night" (Gen. xlvi. 4), it is translated
literally; in this instance the literal rendering does not
lead to corporification; because visions and dreams were
generally regarded as mental operations, devoid of ob-
jective reality. Simple and clear as this explanation may
be, we do not consider that it really explains the method of
ܕܐ
در
ANALYSIS OF THE GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
liii
""
Onkelos. On the contrary, the translator paraphrased an-
thropomorphic terms, even when he found them in passages
relating to dreams or visions; and indeed it is doubtful
whether Maimonides could produce a single instance in
favour of his view. He was equally unsuccessful in his
explanation of "chazah," "to see (ch. xlviii.). He
says that when the object of vision was derogatory, it
was not brought into direct relation with the deity; in
such instances the verb is paraphrased, while in other
instances the rendering is literal. Although Maimonides
grants that the force of this observation is weakened by
three exceptions, he does not doubt its correctness.
The next Section (ch. 1. to ch. lix.) " On the Divine Attri-
butes" begins with the explanation that "faith" consists
in thought, not in mere utterance; in conviction, not in mere
profession. This explanation forms the basis for the subse-
quent discussion. The several arguments advanced by Mai-
monides against the employment of attributes show that those
who assume the real existence of divine attributes may
possibly utter with their lips the creed of the Unity and
the Incorporeality of God, but they cannot truly believe it.
A demonstration of this fact would be needless, if the Attri-
butists had not put forth their false theses and defended
them with the utmost tenacity, although with the most
absurd arguments.
After this explanation the author proceeds to discuss the
impropriety of assigning attributes to God. The Attri-
butists admit that God is the Primal Cause, One, incor-
poreal, free from emotion and privation, and that He is
not comparable to any of His creatures. Maimonides there-
fore contends that any attributes which, either directly
or indirectly, are in contradiction to this creed should not
be applied to God. By this rule he rejects four classes of
attributes: namely, those which include a definition, a
partial definition, a quality, or a relation.
The definition of a thing includes its efficient cause; and
since God is the Primal Cause, He cannot be defined, or
liv
INTRODUCTION.
described by a partial definition. A quality, whether
psychical, physical, emotional, or quantitative, is always
regarded as something distinct from its substratum; a thing
which possesses any quality, consists, therefore, of that
quality and of a substratum, and should not be called one.
All relations of time and space imply corporeality; all
relations between two objects are, to a certain degree, a
comparison between these two objects. To employ any of
these attributes in reference to God would be as much as
to declare that God is not the Primal Cause, that He is
not One, that He is corporeal, or that He is comparable to
His creatures.
There is only one class of attributes to which Maimonides
makes no objection, namely, such as describe actions, and to
this class belong all the Divine attributes which occur in
the Scriptures. The "Thirteen Attributes" (shelosh esreh
middoth, Ex. xxxiv. 6-7) serve as an illustration. They were
communicated to Moses when he, as the chief of the
Israelites, wished to know the way in which God governs
the universe, in order that he himself in ruling the nation
might follow it, and thereby promote their real well-being.
On the whole, the opponents of Maimonides admit the
correctness of this theory. Only a small number of attri-
butes are the subject of dispute. The Scriptures unques-
tionably ascribe to God Existence, Life, Power, Wisdom,
Unity, Eternity, and Will. The Attributists regard these as
properties distinct from, but co-existing with, the Essence
of God. With great acumen, and with equally great
acerbity, Maimonides shows that their theory is irrecon-
cilable with their belief in the Unity and the Incorporeality
of God. He points out three different ways of interpreting
these attributes:-1. They may be regarded as descriptive
of the works of God, and as declaring that these possess such
properties as, in works of man, would appear to be the result
of the will, the power, and the wisdom of a living being.
2. The terms "existing," "one," "wise," etc., are applied to
God and to His creatures homonymously; as attributes of God
ANALYSIS OF THE GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
lv
they coincide with His Essence; as attributes of anything
beside God they are distinct from the essence of the thing.
3. These terms do not describe a positive quality, but express
a negation of its opposite. This third interpretation appears'
to have been preferred by the author; he discusses it more
fully than the two others. He observes that the knowledge
of the incomprehensible Being is solely of a negative
character, and he shows by simple and appropriate examples
that an approximate knowledge of a thing can be attained
by mere negations, that such knowledge increases with the
number of these negations, and that an error in positive
assertions is more injurious than an error in negative asser-
tions. In describing the evils which arise from the applica-
tion of positive attributes to God, he unsparingly censures
the paytanim, because he found them profuse in attributing
positive epithets to the Deity. On the basis of his own
theory, he could easily have interpreted these epithets in the
same way as he explains the Scriptural attributes of God.
His severity may, however, be accounted for by the fact that
the frequent recurrence of positive attributes in the literary
compositions of the Jews was the cause that the Mahometans
charged the Jews with entertaining false notions of the
Deity.
The inquiry into the attributes is followed by a treatment
of the names of God. It seems to have been beyond the
design of the author to elucidate the etymology of each
name, or to establish methodically its signification; for he
does not support his explanations by any proof. His sole
aim is to show that the Scriptural names of God in their
true meaning strictly harmonise with the philosophical con-
ception of the Primal Cause. There are two things which
have to be distinguished in the treatment of the Primal
Cause the Primal Cause per se, and its relation to the Uni-
verse. The first is expressed by the tetragrammaton and its
cognates, the second by the several attributes, especially by
rochebh baarabhoth, "He who rideth
"He who rideth on the arabhoth"
(Ps. lxviii. 4).
lvi
INTRODUCTION.
The tetragrammaton exclusively expresses the essence of
God, and therefore is employed as a nomen proprium. In the
mystery of this name, and others mentioned in the Talmud,
as consisting of twelve and of forty-two letters, Maimonides
finds no other secret than the solution of some metaphysical
problems. The subject of these problems is not actually
known, but the author supposes that it referred to the
“absolute existence of the Deity." He discovers the same
idea in ehyeh (Ex. iii. 14), in accordance with the explanation
added in the Sacred Text: asher ehyeh, "that is, I am."
In the course of this discussion he exposes the folly or sin-
fulness of those who pretend to work miracles by the aid of
these and similar names.
CONS
With a view of preparing the way for his peculiar inter-
pretation of rochebh baarabhoth, he explains a variety of
Scriptural passages, and treats of several philosophical terms
relative to the Supreme Being. Such expressions as "the
word of God," "the work of God," "the work of His
fingers," "He made," "He spake," must be taken in a
figurative sense; they merely represent God as the cause
that some work has been produced, and that some person has
acquired a certain knowledge. The passage, “And he rested
() on the seventh day" (Ex. xx. 11) is interpreted as
follows: On the seventh Day the forces and laws were com-
plete, which during the previous six days had been esta-
blished for the preservation of the Universe. They were
not to be increased or modified.
·
It seems that Maimonides introduced this figurative ex-
planation with a view of showing that the Scriptural “ God”
does not differ from the "Primal Cause
"or "Ever-active
Intellect" of the philosophers. On the other hand, the latter
do not reject the Unity of God, although they assume that
the Primal Cause comprises the causa efficiens, the agens, and
the causa finalis (or, the cause, the means, and the end); and
that the Ever-active Intellect comprises the intelligens, the
intellectus, and the intellectum (or, the thinking subject, the
act of thought, and the object thought of); because in this
ANALYSIS OF THE GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
lvii
case these apparently different elements are, in fact, iden-
tical. The Biblical term corresponding to "Primal Cause"
is rochebh baarabhoth, "riding on araboth." Maimonides is
at pains to prove that araboth denotes "the highest sphere,"
which causes the motion of all other spheres, and which thus
brings about the natural course of production and destruc-
tion. By "the highest sphere" he does not understand a
material sphere, but the immaterial world of intelligences
and angels, "the seat of justice and judgment, treasures of
life, peace, and blessings, the seat of the souls of the righteous,"
etc. Rochebh baarabhoth, therefore, means: He presides over
the immaterial beings, He is the source of their powers, by
which they move the spheres and regulate the course of nature.
This theory is more fully developed in the Second Part.
The next section (ch. lxxi.-lxxvi.) treats of the Kalām.
According to the author, the method of the Kalām is copied
from the Christian Fathers, who applied it in the defence of
their religious doctrines. The latter examined in their
writings the views of the philosophers, ostensibly in search
of truth, in reality, however, with the object of supporting
their own dogmas. Subsequently Mahometan theologians
found in these works arguments which seemed to confirm
the truth of their own religion; they blindly adopted these
arguments, and made no enquiry whence these had been
derived. Maimonides rejects à priori the theories of the
Mutakallemim, because they explain the phenomena in the
Universe in.conformity with preconceived notions, instead
of following the scientific method of the philosophers. Among
the Jews, especially in the East and in Africa, there were
also some who adopted the method of the Kalām; in doing
so they followed the Mutazilah (dissenting Mahometans),
not because they found it more correct than the Kalām
of the Ashariyah (orthodox Mahometans), but because at the
time when the Jews became acquainted with the Kalām it
was only cultivated by the Mutazilah. The Jews in Spain,
however, remained faithful to the Aristotelian philosophy.
The four principal dogmas upheld by the dominant
lviii
INTRODUCTION.
religions were the creatio ex nihilo, the Existence of God,
His Incorporeality, and His Unity. By the philosophers
the creatio ex nihilo was rejected, but the Mutakallemim
defended it, and founded upon it their proofs in favour of
the other three dogmas. Maimonides adopts the philo-
sophical proofs for the Existence, Incorporeality, and Unity
of God, because they must be admitted even by those who
deny the creatio ex nihilo, the proofs being independent of this
dogma. In order to show that the Mutakallemim are mistaken
in ignoring the organisation of the existing order of things,
the author gives a minute description of the analogy between
the Universe, or Kosmos, and man, the mikrokosmos (ch.
lxxii.). This analogy is merely asserted, and the reader is
advised either to find the proof by his own studies, or to
accept the fact on the authority of the learned. The Kalām
does not admit the existence of law, organization, and unity
in the universe. Its adherents have, accordingly, no trust-
worthy criterion to determine whether a thing is possible or
impossible. Everything that is conceivable by imagination
is by them held as possible. The several parts of the uni-
verse are in no relation to each other; they all consist of
equal elements; they are not composed of substance and
properties, but of atoms and accidents; the law of causality
is ignored; man's actions are not the result of will and
design, but are mere accidents. Maimonides in enumerat-
ing and discussing the twelve fundamental propositions of
the Kalam (ch. lxiii.), which embody these theories, had
apparently no intention to give a complete and impartial
account of the Kalam; he solely aimed at exposing the
weakness of a system which he regarded as founded not on
a sound basis of positive facts, but on mere fiction; not
on the evidences of the senses and of reason, but on the
illusions of imagination.
شه
After having shown that the twelve fundamental propo-
sitions of the Kalam are utterly untenable, Maimonides
finds no difficulty in demonstrating the insufficiency of
the proofs advanced by the Mutakallemim in support of
ANALYSIS OF THE GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
lix
the above-named dogmas. Seven arguments are cited
which the Mutakallemim employ in support of the creatio
ex nihilo.¹ The first argument is based on the atomic
theory, viz., that the universe consists of equal atoms
without inherent properties: all variety and change observed
in nature must therefore be attributed to an external force.
Three arguments are supplied by the proposition that finite
things of an infinite number cannot exist (Propos. xi.).
Three other arguments derive their support from the follow-
ing proposition (x.): Everything that can be imagined can
have an actual existence. The present order of things is
only one out of the many forms which are possible, and exist
through the fiat of a determining power.
P
The Unity of God is demonstrated by the Mutakallemim
as follows: Two Gods would have been unable to produce
the world; one would have impeded the work of the other.
Maimonides points out that this might have been avoided by
a suitable division of labour. Another argument is as
follows: The two Beings would have one element in com-
mon, and would differ in another; each would thus consist
of two elements, and would not be God. Maimonides might
have suggested that the argument moves in a circle, the
unity of God being proved by assuming His unity. The
following argument is altogether unintelligible: Both Gods
are moved to action by will; the will, being without a sub-
stratum, could not act simultaneously in two separate beings.
The fallacy of the following argument is clear: The exis-
1 Saadiah proves the existence of the Creator in the following way :—1.
The Universe is limited, and therefore cannot possess an unlimited force. 2.
All things are compounds; the composition must be owing to some external
cause. 3. Changes observed in all beings are effected by some external cause.
4. If time were infinite, it would be impossible to conceive the progress of
time from the present moments to the future, or from the past to the present
moment. (Emunoth vedeoth, cb. i.).— Bahya founds his arguments on three
propositions:- 1. A thing cannot be its own maker. 2. The series of suc-
cessive causes is finite. 3. Compounds owe their existence to an external
force. His arguments are:-1. The Universe, even the elements, are com-
pounds consisting of substance and form. 2. In the Universe plan and unity
is discernible. (Chobhoth ha-lebhabhoth, ch. i.)
i
lx
INTRODUCTION.
<
tence of one God is proved; the existence of a second God
is not proved, it would be possible; and as possibility is
inapplicable to God, there does not exist a second God. The
possibility of ascertaining the existence of God is here con-
founded with potentiality of existence. Again, if one God
suffices, the second God is superfluous; if one God is not
sufficient, he is not perfect, and cannot be a deity. Mai-
monides objects that it would not be an imperfection in
either deity to act exclusively within their respective
provinces. As in the criticism of the first argument,
Maimonides seems here to forget that the existence of
separate provinces would require a superior determining
Power, and the two Beings would not properly be called Gods.
The weakest of all arguments are, according to Mai-
monides, those by which the Mutakallemim sought to
support the doctrine of God's Incorporeality. If God were
corporeal, He would consist of atoms, and would not be one;
or He would be comparable to other beings; but a com-
parison implies the existence of similar and of dissimilar
elements, and God would thus not be one. A corporeal God
would be finite, and an external power would be required
to define those limits.
PART II.
The Second Part includes the following sections:-1.
Introduction; 2. Philosophical Proof of the Existence of
One Incorporeal Primal Cause (ch. i.); 3. On the Spheres
and the Intelligences (ii.-xii.); 4. On the theory of the
Eternity of the Universe (xiii.-xxix.); 5. Exposition of
Gen. i.-iv. (xxx., xxxi.); 6. On Prophecy (xxxii.-xlviii.).
The enumeration of twenty-six propositions, by the aid of
which the philosophers prove the Existence, the Unity, and
the Incorporeality of the Primal Cause, forms the introduc-
tion to the Second Part of this work. The propositions
treat of the properties of the finite and the infinite (i.-iii.,
x.-xii., xvi.), of change and motion (iv.-ix., xiii.-xviii.)
ANALYSIS OF THE GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
lxi
and of the possible and the absolute or necessary (xx.-xxv.);
they are simply enumerated, but are not demonstrated.
Whatever the value of these Propositions may be, they were
inadequate for their purpose, and the author is compelled to
introduce auxiliary propositions to prove the existence of an
infinite, incorporeal, and uncompounded Primal Cause.
(Arguments I. and III.)
The first and the fourth arguments may be termed cosmo-
logical proofs. They are based on the hypothesis that the
series of causes for every change is finite, and terminates in
the Primal Cause. There is no essential difference in the
two arguments: in the first are discussed the causes of the
motion of a moving object; the fourth treats of the causes
which bring about the transition of a thing from poten-
tiality to reality. To prove that neither the spheres nor a
force residing in them constitute the Primal Cause, the philo-
sophers employed two propositions, of which the one asserts
that the revolutions of the spheres are infinite, and the other
denies the possibility that an infinite force should reside in a
finite object. The distinction between the finite in space
and the finite in time appears to have been ignored; for it is
not shown why a force infinite in time could not reside in a
body finite in space. Moreover, those who, like Maimonides,
reject the eternity of the universe, necessarily reject this
proof, while those who hold that the universe is eternal do
not admit that the spheres have ever been only potential,
and passed from potentiality to actuality. The second argu-
ment is supported by the following supplementary proposi-
tion: If two elements coexist in a state of combination, and
one of these elements is to be found at the same time sepa-
rate, in a free state, it is certain that the second element is
likewise to be found by itself. Now, since things exist which
combine in themselves motive power and mass moved by that
power, and since mass is found by itself, motive power must
also be found by itself independent of mass.
The third argument has a logical character: The universe
is either eternal or temporal, or partly eternal and partly
lxii
INTRODUCTION.
temporal. It cannot be eternal in all its parts, as many
parts undergo destruction; it is not altogether temporal,
because, if so, the universe could not be reproduced after
being destroyed. The continued existence of the uni-
verse leads, therefore, to the conclusion that there is an
immortal force, the Primal Cause, besides the transient
world.
These arguments have this in common, that while proving
the existence of a Primal Cause, they at the same time
demonstrate the Unity, the Incorporeality, and the Eternity
of that Cause. Special proofs are nevertheless superadded
for each of these postulates, and on the whole they differ
very little from those advanced by the Mahometan Theo-
logians.
This philosophical theory of the Primal Cause was adapted
by Jewish scholars to the Biblical theory of the Creator.
The universe is a living, organised being, of which the earth
is the centre. Any changes on this earth are due to the
revolutions of the spheres; the lowest or innermost sphere,
namely, the one nearest to the centre, is the sphere of the
moon; the outermost or uppermost is "the all-encompassing
sphere." Numerous spheres are interposed; but Maimonides
divides all the spheres into four groups, corresponding to
the moon, the sun, the planets, and the fixed stars. This
division is claimed by the author as his own discovery; he
believes that it stands in relation to the four causes of their
motions, the four elements of the sublunary world, and the
four classes of beings, viz., the mineral, the vegetable, the
animal, and the rational. The spheres have souls, and are
endowed with intellect; their souls enable them to move
freely, and the impulse to the motion is given by the intel-
lect in conceiving the idea of the Absolute Intellect. Each
sphere has an intellect peculiar to itself; the intellect attached
to the sphere of the moon is called "the active intellect"
(Sechel ha-poël). In support of this theory numerous pas-
sages are cited both from Holy Writ and from post-Biblical
Jewish literature. The angels (elohim, malachim) mentioned
-
ANALYSIS OF THE GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
lxiii
in the Bible are assumed to be identical with the intellects of
the spheres; they are free agents, and their volition invari-
ably tends to that which is good and noble; they emanate
from the Primal Cause, and form a descending series of
beings, ending with the active intellect. The transmission of
power from one element to the other is called "emanation'
(shepha'). This transmission is performed without the
utterance of a sound; if any voice is supposed to be heard,
it is only an illusion, originating in the human imagination,
which is the source of all evils (ch. xii.).
""
In accordance with this doctrine, Maimonides explains
that the three men who appeared to Abraham, the angels
whom Jacob saw ascend and descend the ladder, and all other
angels seen by man, are nothing but the intellects of the
spheres, four in number, which emanate from the Primal
Cause (ch. x.). In his description of the spheres he, as
usual, follows Aristotle. The spheres do not contain any of
the four elements of the sublunary world, but consist of the
quintessence, an entirely different element. Whilst things
on this earth are transient, the beings which inhabit the
spheres above are eternal. According to Aristotle, these
spheres, as well as their intellects, coexist with the Primal
Cause. Maimonides, faithful to the teaching of the Scrip-
tures, here departs from his master, and holds that the
spheres and the intellects had a beginning, and were brought
into existence by the will of the Creator. He does not
attempt to give a positive proof of his doctrine; all he con-
tends is that the theory of the creatio ex nihilo is, from a
philosophical point of view, not inferior to the doctrine
which asserts the eternity of the universe, and that he can
refute all objections advanced against his theory (ch. xiii.-
xxviii.).
He next enumerates and criticises the various theories
respecting the origin of the Universe, viz.: A. God created
the Universe out of nothing. B. God formed the Universe
from an eternal substance. C. The Universe originating in
the eternal Primal Cause is co-eternal. It is not held
lxiv
INTRODUCTION.
necessary by the author to discuss the view of those who do
not assume a Primal Cause, since the existence of such a
cause has already been proved (ch. xiii.).
The objections raised to a creatio ex nihilo by its opponents
are founded partly on the properties of Nature, and
partly on those of the Primal Cause. They infer from
the properties of Nature the following arguments: (1.)
The first moving force is eternal; for if it had a beginning,
another motion must have produced it, and then it would
not be the First moving force. (2.) If the formless matter
be not eternal, it must have been produced out of another
substance; it would then have a certain form by which it
might be distinguished from the primary substance, and
then it would not be formless. (3.) The circular motion
of the spheres does not involve the necessity of termination;
and anything that is without an end, must be without a
beginning. (4.) Anything brought to existence existed
previously in potentia; something must therefore have pre-
existed of which potential existence could be predicated.
Some support for the theory of the eternity of the heavens
has been derived from the general belief in the eternity of
the heavens.-The properties of the Primal Cause furnished
the following arguments: -If it were assumed that the
Universe was created from nothing, it would imply that the
First Cause had changed from the condition of a potential
Creator to that of an actual Creator, or that His will had
undergone a change, or that He must be imperfect, because
He produced a perishable work, or that He had been inactive
during a certain period. All these contingencies would be
contrary to a true conception of the First Cause (ch. xiv.).
Maimonides is of opinion that the arguments based on the
properties of things in Nature are inadmissible, because the
laws by which the Universe is regulated need not have been
in force before the Universe was in existence. This refuta-
tion is styled by our author "a strong wall built round the
Law, able to resist all attacks" (ch. xvii.). In a similar
manner the author proceeds against the objections founded
ANALYSIS OF THE GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
Ixv
on the properties of the First Cause. Purely intellectual
beings, he says, are not subject to the same laws as material
bodies; that which necessitates a change in the latter or in the
will of man need not produce a change in immaterial beings.
As to the belief that the heavens are inhabited by angels and
deities, it has not its origin in the real existence of these
supernatural beings; it was suggested to man by meditation
on the apparent grandeur of heavenly phenomena (ch. xviii.).
-
Maimonides next proceeds to explain how, independently of
the authority of Scripture, he has been led to adopt the belief
in the creatio ex nihilo. Admitting that the great variety of
the things in the sublunary world can be traced to those im-
mutable laws which regulate the influence of the spheres on
the beings below-the variety in the spheres can only be
explained as the result of God's free will. According to
Aristotle the principal authority for the eternity of the
Universe it is impossible that a simple being should,
according to the laws of nature, be the cause of various and
compound beings. Another reason for the rejection of the
Eternity of the Universe may be found in the fact that the
astronomer Ptolemy has proved the incorrectness of the view
which Aristotle had of celestial spheres, although the system
of that astronomer is likewise far from being perfect and
final (ch. xxiv.). It is impossible to obtain a correct notion
of the properties of the heavenly spheres; "the heaven, even
the heavens, are the Lord's, but the earth hath he given to
the children of man." (Ps. cxv. 16.) The author, observing
that the arguments against the creatio ex nihilo are un-
tenable, adheres to his theory, which was taught by such
prophets as Abraham and Moses. Although each Scriptural
quotation could, by a figurative interpretation be made
to agree with the opposite theory, Maimonides declines to
ignore the literal sense of a term, unless it be in opposi-
tion to well-established truths, as is the case with anthro-
pomorphic expressions; for the latter, if taken literally,
would be contrary to the demonstrated truth of God's in-
corporeality (ch. xxv.). He is therefore surprised that the
e
K
lxvi
INTRODUCTION.
:
author of Pirke-di-Rabbi Eliezer ventured to assume the eter-
nity of matter, and he thinks it possible that Rabbi Eliezer
carried the license of figurative speech too far. (Ch. xxvi.)
The theory of the creatio ex nihilo does not involve the
belief that the Universe will at a future time be de-
stroyed; the Bible distinctly teaches the creation, but not
the destruction of the world except in passages which
are undoubtedly conceived in a metaphorical sense. On
the contrary, respecting certain parts of the Universe it
is clearly stated "He established them for ever." (Ps.
cxlviii. 5.) The destruction of the Universe would be,
as the creation has been, a direct act of the Divine will,
and not the result of those immutable laws which govern
the Universe. The Divine will would in that case set
aside those laws, both in the initial and the final stages
of the Universe. Within this interval, however, the laws
remain undisturbed (ch. xxvii.). Apparent exceptions, the
miracles, originate in these laws, although man is unable
to perceive the causal relation. The biblical account of
the creation concludes with the statement that God rested
on the seventh day, that is to say, He declared that the
work was complete; no new act of creation was to take
place, and no new law was to be introduced. It is true that
the second and the third chapters of Genesis appear to
describe a new creation, that of Eve, and a new law, namely,
that of man's mortality, but these chapters are explained as
containing an allegorical representation of man's psychical
and intellectual faculties, or a supplemental detail of the con-
tents of the first chapter. Maimonides seems to prefer
the allegorical explanation which, as it seems, he had in
view without expressly stating it, in his treatment of
Adam's sin and punishment. (Part I. ch. ii.) It is cer-
tainly inconsistent on the one hand to admit that at the
pleasure of the Almighty the laws of nature may become
inoperative, and that the whole Universe may become an-
nihilated, and on the other hand to deny, that during the
existence of the Universe, any of the natural laws ever
ANALYSIS OF THE GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
lxvii
have been or ever will be suspended. It seems that Mai-
monides could not conceive the idea that the work of the
All-wise should be, as the Mutakallemim taught—without
plan and system, or that the laws once laid down should not
be sufficient for all emergencies.
The account of the Creation given in the book of Ge-
nesis is explained by the author according to the fol-
lowing two rules: First its language is allegorical; and
Secondly, the terms employed are homonyms. The
words erets, mayim, ruach, and choshech in the second verse
(ch. i.), are homonyms and denote the four elements:
earth, water, air, and fire; in other instances erets is the
terrestrial globe of the earth, mayim is water or vapour,
ruach denotes wind, and choshech darkness. According to
Maimonides, a summary of the first chapter may be given
thus: God created the Universe by producing first the
reshith the "beginning
"beginning" (Gen. i. 1), or hathchalah, i.e.,
the intellects which give to the spheres both existence and
motion, and thus become the source of the existence of the
entire Universe. At first this Universe consisted of a
chaos of elements, but its form was successively developed
by the influence of the spheres, and more directly by
the action of light and darkness, the properties of which
were fixed on the first day of the Creation. In the sub-
sequent five days minerals, plants, animals, and the intellec-
tual beings came into existence. The seventh day, on which
the Universe was for the first time ruled by the same
natural laws which continue in operation, was distinguished
as a day blessed and sanctified by the Creator, who de-
signed it to proclaim the creatio ex nihilo (Exod. xx. 11).
The Israelites were moreover commanded to keep this Sab-
bath in commemoration of their departure from Egypt (Deut.
v. 15), because during the period of the Egyptian bond-
age, they had not been permitted to rest on that day. In
the history of the first sin of man, Adam, Eve, and the
serpent represent the intellect, the body, and the imagi-
nation. In order to complete the imagery, Samael or Satan,
e 2
lxviii
INTRODUCTION.
mentioned in the Midrash in connection with this account,
is added as representing man's appetitive faculties. Imagi-
nation, the source of error, is directly aided by the appe-
titive faculty, and the two are intimately connected with the
body, to which man generally gives paramount attention,
and for the sake of which he indulges in sins; in the end,
however, they subdue the intellect and weaken its power.
Instead of obtaining pure and real knowledge, man forms
false conceptions; in consequence, the body is subject to
suffering, whilst the imagination, instead of being guided
by the intellect and attaining a higher development be-
comes debased and depraved. In the three sons of Adam,
Kain, Abel, and Seth, Maimonides finds an allusion to the
three elements in man: the vegetable, the animal, and the
intellectual. First, the animal element (Abel) becomes ex-
tinct; then the vegetable elements (Kain) are dissolved;
only the third element, the intellect (Seth), survives, and
forms the basis of mankind (ch. xxx., xxxi.).
-
Maimonides having so far stated his opinion in explicit
terms, it is difficult to understand what he had in view by
the avowal that he could not disclose everything. It is un-
questionably no easy matter to adapt each verse in the first
chapters of Genesis to the foregoing allegory; but such an
adaptation is, according to the author's own view (Part I.,
Introd., p. 19), not only unnecessary, but actually objection-
able.
In the next section (xxxii.-xlviii.) Maimonides treats of
Prophecy. He mentions the following three opinions:-
1. Any person, irrespective of his physical or moral qualifi-
cations, may be summoned by the Almighty to the mission
of a prophet. 2. Prophecy is the highest degree of mental
development, and can only be attained by training and study.
3. The gift of prophecy depends on physical, moral, and
mental training, combined with inspiration. The author
adopts the last-mentioned opinion. He defines prophecy as
an emanation (shepha'), which through the will of the
Almighty descends from the Active Intellect to the intellect
ANALYSIS OF THE GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED. lxix
and the imagination of thoroughly qualified persons. The
prophet is thus distinguished both from wise men whose
intellect alone received the necessary impulse from the
Active Intellect, and from diviners or dreamers, whose
imagination alone has been influenced by the Active Intel-
lect. Although it is assumed that the attainment of this
prophetic faculty depends on God's will, this dependence is
nothing else but the relation which all things bear to the
Primal Cause; for the Active Intellect acts in conformity
with the laws established by the will of God; it gives an
impulse to the intellect of man, and, bringing to light those
mental powers which lay dormant, it merely turns potential
faculty into real action. These faculties can be perfected to
such a degree as to enable man to apprehend the highest
truths intuitively, without passing through all the stages of
research required by ordinary persons. The same fact is
noticed with respect to imagination; man sometimes forms
faithful images of objects and events which cannot be traced
to the ordinary channel of information, namely, impressions
made on the senses. Since prophecy is the result of a
natural process, it may appear surprising that, of the nume-
rous men excelling in wisdom, so few became prophets.
Maimonides accounts for this fact by assuming that the
moral faculties of such men had not been duly trained.
None of them had, in the author's opinion, gone through the
moral discipline indispensable for the vocation of a prophet.
Besides this, everything which obstructs mental improve-
ment, misdirects the imagination or impairs the physical
strength, and precludes man from attaining to the rank of pro-
phets. Hence no prophecy was vouchsafed to Jacob during
the period of his anxieties on account of his separation from
Joseph. Nor did Moses receive a divine message during the
years which the Israelites, under divine punishment, spent
in the desert. On the other hand, music and song awakened
the prophetic power (comp. 2 Kings iii. 15), and "The spirit
of prophecy alights only on him who is wise, strong, and
rich" (Babyl. Talm. Shabbath, 92a). Although the prepa-
C
lxx
INTRODUCTION.
ration for a prophetic mission, the pursuit of earnest and
persevering study, as also the execution of the divine dic-
tates, required physical strength, yet in the moment when
the prophecy was received the functions of the bodily organs
were suspended. The intellect then acquired true know-
ledge, which presented itself to the prophet's imagination in
forms peculiar to that faculty. Pure ideals are almost in-
comprehensible; man must translate them into language
which he is accustomed to use, and he must adapt them to
his own mode of thinking. In receiving prophecies and
communicating them to others the exercise of the prophet's
imagination was therefore as essential as that of his intel-
lect, and Maimonides seems to apply to this imagination the
term "angel," which is so frequently mentioned in the Bible
as the medium of communication between the Supreme
Being and the prophet.
Only Moses held his bodily functions under such control
that even without their temporary suspension he was able to
receive prophetic inspiration; the interposition of the
imagination was in his case not needed: "God spoke to him
mouth to mouth." (Numb. xii. 8.) Moses differed so com-
pletely from other prophets that the term "prophet" could
only have been applied to him and other men by way of
homonymy.
The impulses descending from the Active Intellect to
man's intellect and imagination produce various effects,
according to his physical, moral, and intellectual condition.
Some men are thus endowed with extraordinary courage
and with an ambition to perform great deeds, or they feel
themselves impelled to appeal mightily to their fellowmen
by means of exalted and pure language. Such men are
filled with "the spirit of the Lord," or, "with the spirit of
holiness." To this distinguished class belonged Jephthah,
Samson, David, Solomon, and the authors of the Hagio-
grapha. Though above the standard of ordinary men, they
were not included in the rank of prophets. Maimonides
divides the prophets into two groups, namely, those who
ANALYSIS OF THE GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
lxxi
receive inspiration in a dream and those who receive it in a
vision. The first group includes the following five classes :—
1. Those who see symbolic figures; 2. Those who hear a
voice addressing them without perceiving the speaker; 3.
Those who see a man and hear him addressing them; 4.
Those who see an angel addressing them; 5. Those who see
God and hear His voice. The other group is divided in a
similar manner, but contains only the first four classes,
for Maimonides considered it impossible that a prophet
should see God in a vision. This classification is based on the
various expressions employed in the Scriptures to describe
the several prophecies.
When the Israelites received the Law at Mount Sinai,
they distinctly heard the first two commandments, which
include the doctrines of the Existence and the Unity of
God; of the other eight commandments, which enunciate
moral, not metaphysical truths, they heard the mere "sound
of words"; and it was through the mouth of Moses that
the divine instruction was revealed to them. Maimonides
defends this opinion by quotations from the Talmud and the
Midrashim.
The theory that imagination was an essential element in
prophecy is supported by the fact that figurative speech pre-
dominates in the prophetical writings, which abound in
figures, hyperbolical expressions and allegories. The sym-
bolical acts which are described in connection with the
visions of the prophets, such as the translation of Ezekiel
from Babylon to Jerusalem (Ez. viii. 3), Isaiah's walking
about naked and barefoot (Is. xx. 2), Jacob's wrestling with
the angel (Gen. xxxii. 27 sqq.), and the speaking of Balaam's
ass (Num. xxii. 28), had no positive reality. The prophets,
employing an elliptical style, frequently omitted to state
that a certain event related by them was part of a vision or
a dream. In consequence of such elliptical speech events
are described in the Bible as coming directly from God,
although they simply are the effect of the ordinary laws of
nature, and as such depend on the will of God. Such pas-
lxxii
INTRODUCTION.
sages cannot be misunderstood when it is borne in mind that
every event and every natural phenomenon can for its origin
be traced to the Primal Cause. In this sense the prophets
employ such phrases as the following: "And I will com-
mand the clouds that they rain no rain upon it" (Is. v. 6);
"I have also called my mighty men" (ibid. xi. 3).
PART III.
This part contains the following six sections:-1. Expo-
sition of the maaseh mercabhah (Ez. i.), ch. i.-vii.; 2. On
the nature and the origin of evil, ch. viii.-xii.; 3. On the
object of the creation, ch. xiii.-xv.; 4. On Providence and
Omniscience, ch. xvi.-xxv.; 5. On the object of the Divine
precepts (taame ha-mitsvoth) and the historical portions of the
Bible, ch. xxv.-xl.; 6. A guide to the proper worship of
God.
With great caution Maimonides approaches the explana-
tion of the maaseh mercabhah, the chariot which Ezekiel
beheld in a vision (Ez. i.). The mysteries included in the
description of the divine chariot had been orally transmitted
from generation to generation, but in consequence of the
dispersion of the Jews the chain of tradition was broken,
and the knowledge of these mysteries had vanished. What-
ever he knew of those mysteries he owed exclusively to his
own inventive faculties; he therefore could not reconcile
himself to the idea that his knowledge should die with him.
He committed his exposition of the maaseh mercabhah and
the maaseh bereshith to writing, but did not divest it of its
original mysterious character; so that the explanation was
fully intelligible to the initiated—that is to say, to the
philosopher—but to the ordinary reader it was a mere para-
phrase of the biblical text.-(Introduction.)
The first seven chapters are devoted to the exposition of
the divine chariot. According to Maimonides three distinct
ANALYSIS OF THE GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED. lxxiii
""
parts are to be noticed, each of which begins with the phrase
"And I saw." These parts correspond to the three parts of
the Universe, the sublunary world, the spheres and the intel-
ligences. First of all the prophet is made to behold the
material world which consists of the earth and the spheres,
and of these the spheres as the more important, are noticed
first. In the Second Part, in which the nature of the
spheres is discussed, the author dwells with pride on his
discovery that they can be divided into four groups. This
discovery he now employs to show that the four "chayyoth
(animals) represent the four divisions of the spheres. He
points out that the terms which the prophet uses in the
description of the chayyoth are identical with terms applied
to the properties of the spheres. For the four chayyoth,
or "angels," or cherubim, (1) have human form; (2) have
human faces; (3) possess characteristics of other animals;
(4) have human hands; (5) their feet are straight and
round (cylindrical); (6) their bodies are closely joined to
each other; (7) only their faces and their wings are
separate; (8) their substance is transparent and refulgent;
(9) they move uniformly; (10) each moves in its own
direction; (11) they run; (12) swift as lightning they
return towards their starting point; and (13) they move
in consequence of an extraneous impulse (ruach). In
a similar manner the spheres are described :—(1) they
possess the characteristics of man, viz., life and intellect;
(2) they consist like man of body and soul; (3) they are
strong, mighty and swift, like the ox, the lion, and the
eagle; (4) they perform all manner of work as though they
had hands; (5) they are round, and are not divided into
parts; (6) no vacuum intervenes between one sphere and the
other; (7) they may be considered as one being, but in
respect to the intellects, which are the causes of their
existence and motion, they appear as four different beings;
(8) they are transparent and refulgent; (9) each sphere
moves uniformly, (10) and according to its special laws;
(11) they revolve with great velocity; (12) each point
lxxiv
INTRODUCTION.
returns again to its previous position; (13) they are self-
moving, yet the impulse emanates from an external power.
In the second part of the vision the prophet saw the
ofannim. These represent the four elements of the sublunary
world. For the ofannim (1) are connected with the chayyoth
and with the earth; (2) they have four faces, and are four
separate beings, but interpenetrate each other "as though
it were a wheel in the midst of a wheel" (Ez. i. 16);
(3) they are covered with eyes; (4) they are not self-
moving; (5) they are set in motion by the chayyoth; (6)
their motion is not circular but rectilinear.
The same
may almost be said of the four elements :-(1) they are in
close contact with the spheres, being encompassed by the
sphere of the moon; earth occupies the centre, water sur-
rounds earth, air has its position between water and fire;
(2) this order is not invariably maintained; the respective
portions change and they become intermixed and combined
with each other; (3) though they are only four elements
they form an infinite number of things; (4) not being
animated they do not move of their own accord; (5) they
are set in motion by the action of the spheres; (6) when a
portion is displaced it returns in a straight line to its
original position.
"the
In the third vision Ezekiel saw a human form above the
chayyoth. The figure was divided in the middle; in the
upper portion the prophet only noticed that it was chashmal,
(mysterious); from the loins downwards there was
vision of the likeness of the Divine Glory," and "the like-
ness of the throne." The world of Intelligences was re-
presented by the figure; these can only be perceived in as
far as they influence the spheres, but their relation to the
Creator is beyond human comprehension. The Creator
himself is not represented in this vision.
The key to the whole vision Maimonides finds in the
introductory words, "And the heavens were opened,” and in
the minute description of the place and the time of the reve-
lation. When pondering on the grandeur of the spheres
ANALYSIS OF THE GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
lxxv
and their influences, which vary according to time and place,
man begins to think of the existence of the Creator. At the
conclusion of this exposition Maimonides declares that he
will, in the subsequent chapters, refrain from giving further
explanation of the maaseh mercabhah. The foregoing sum-
mary, however, shows that the opinion of the author on this
subject is fully stated, and it is indeed difficult to conceive
what additional disclosures he could still have made.
The task which the author has proposed to himself in the
Preface he now regarded as accomplished. He has discussed
the method of the Kalām, the system of the philosophers, and
his own theory concerning the relation between the Primal
Cause and the Universe; he has explained the Biblical
account of the creation, the nature of prophecy, and the
mysteries in Ezekiel's vision. In the remaining portion of
the work the author attempts to solve certain theological pro-
blems, as though he wished to obviate the following objec-
tions, which might be raised to his theory that there is a
design throughout the creation, and that the entire Universe
is subject to the law of causation :-What is the purpose of
the evils which attend human life? For what purpose was
the world created? In how far does Providence interfere
with the natural course of events? Does God know and
foresee man's actions? To what end was the Divine Law
revealed? These problems are treated seriatim.
All evils, Maimonides holds, originate in the material
element of man's existence. Those who are able to emanci-
pate themselves from the tyranny of the body, and uncon-
ditionally to submit to the dictates of reason, are protected
from many evils. Man should disregard the cravings of the
body, avoid them as topics of conversation, and keep his
thoughts far away from them; convivial and erotic songs
debase man's noblest gifts-thought and speech. Matter is
the partition separating man from the pure Intellects; it is
"the thickness of the cloud" which true knowledge has to
traverse before it reaches man. In reality, evil is the mere
negative of good: "God saw all that he had made, and
lxxvi
INTRODUCTION,
behold it was very good" (Gen. i. 31). Evil does not exist
at all. When evils are mentioned in the Scriptures as the
work of God, the scriptural expressions must not be taken
in their literal sense.
There are three kinds of evils-1. Evils necessitated by
those laws of production and destruction by which the species
are perpetuated. 2. Evils which men inflict on each other;
they are comparatively few, especially among civilised men.
3. Evils which man brings upon himself, and which com-
prise the majority of existing evils. The consideration of
these three classes of evils leads to the conclusion that "the
Lord is good to all, and His tender mercies are over all
His works" (Ps. cxlv. 9).
The question, What is the object of the creation? must
be left unanswered. The creation is the result of the will of
God. Also those who believe that the Universe is eternal
must admit that they are unable to discover the purpose of
the Universe. It would, however, not be illogical to assume
that the spheres have been created for the sake of man, not-
withstanding the great dimensions of the former and the
smallness of the latter. Still it must be conceded that, even
if mankind were the main and central object of creation
there is no absolute interdependence between them; for it is
a matter of course that, under altered conditions, man could
exist without the spheres. All teleological theories must
therefore be confined within the limits of the Universe as it
now exists. They are only admissible in the relation in
which the several parts of the Universe stand to each other;
but the purpose of the Universe as a whole cannot be
accounted for. It is simply an emanation from the will of
God.
Regarding the belief in Providence, Maimonides enume-
rates the following five opinions:-1. There is no Provi-
dence; everything is subject to chance; 2. Only a part of the
Universe is governed by Providence, viz., the spheres, the
species, and such individual beings as possess the power of
perpetuating their species (e.g., the stars)-the rest, that is,
ANALYSIS OF THE GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED. lxxvii
the sublunary world is left to mere chance; 3. Everything
is predetermined; according to this theory, revealed Law is
inconceivable; 4. Providence assigns its blessings to all
creatures, according to their merits; accordingly, all beings,
even the lowest animals, if innocently injured or killed
receive compensation in a future life. 5. According to the
Jewish belief, all living beings are endowed with free-will;
God is just, and the destiny of man depends on his merits.
Maimonides denies the existence of trials inflicted by Divine
love (770), as mentioned in the Talmud, i.e.
afflictions which befall man, not as punishments of sin, but
as means to procure for him a reward in times to come.
Maimonides also rejects the notion that God ordains special
temptation. The Biblical account, according to which God
tempts men, "to know what is in their hearts," must not be
taken in its literal sense; it merely states that God made
the virtues of certain people known to their fellowmen in
order that their good example should be followed. Of all
creatures man alone enjoys the especial care of Providence;
because the acts of Providence are identical with certain
influences (shefa') which the Active Intellect brings to bear
upon the human intellect; their effect upon man varies
according to his physical, moral, and intellectual condition;
irrational beings, however, cannot be affected by these
influences. If we cannot in each individual case see how
these principles are applied, it must be borne in mind that
God's wisdom is far above that of man. The author seems
to have felt that his theory has its weak points, for he intro-
duces it as follows:-"My theory is not established by
demonstrative proof; it is based on the authority of the
Bible, and it is less subject to refutation than any of the
theories previously mentioned."
Providence implies omniscience, and men who deny this,
eo ipso, have no belief in Providence. Some are unable to
reconcile the fate of man with Divine Justice, and are there-
fore of opinion that God takes no notice whatever of the
events which occur on earth. Others believe that God, being
*
lxxviii
INTRODUCTION.
an absolute Unity, cannot possess a knowledge of a multi-
tude of things, or of things that do not yet exist, or the
number of which is infinite. These objections, which are
based on the nature of man's perception, are illogical; for
God's knowledge cannot be compared to that of man; it is
identical with His essence. Even the Attributists, who
assume that God's knowledge is different from His essence,
hold that it is distinguished from man's knowledge in the
following five points:-1. It is one, although it embraces a
plurality. 2. It includes even such things as do not yet
exist. 3. It includes things which are infinite in number.
4. It does not change when new objects of perception present
themselves. 5. It does not determine the course of events.
-However difficult this theory may appear to human com-
prehension, it is in accordance with the words of Isaiah
(lv. 8): "Your thoughts are not my thoughts, and your
ways are not my ways." According to Maimonides, the
difficulty is to be explained by the fact that God is the
Creator of all things, and His knowledge of the things is not
dependent on their existence; but, on the other hand, the
knowledge of man is solely dependent on the objects which
come under his cognition.
According to Maimonides, the book of Job illustrates the
several views which have been mentioned above. Satan, that
is, the material element in human existence, is described as
the cause of Job's sufferings. Job at first believed that man's
happiness depends on riches, health, and children; being
deprived of these sources of happiness, he conceived the
notion that Providence is indifferent to the fate of mortal
beings. After a careful study of natural phenomena, he
rejected this opinion. Eliphaz held that all misfortunes of
man serve as punishments of past sins. Bildad, the second
friend of Job, admitted the existence of those afflictions
which Divine love decrees in order that the patient sufferer
may be fitted to receive a bountiful reward. Zophar, the third
friend of Job, declared that the ways of God are beyond
human comprehension; there is but one explanation assign-
ANALYSIS OF THE GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED. lxxix
able to all Divine acts, namely: Such is His Will. Elihu
gives a fuller development to this idea; he says that such
evils as befell Job may be remedied once or twice, but the
course of nature is not altogether reversed. It is true
that by prophecy a clearer insight into the ways of God
can be obtained, but there are only few who arrive at that
exalted intellectual degree, whilst the majority of men must
content themselves with acquiring a knowledge of God
through the study of nature. Such a study leads man to the
conviction that his understanding is unable to fathom the
secrets of nature and the wisdom of Divine Providence.
The concluding section of the Third Part treats of the
purpose of the Divine precepts. In the Pentateuch they are
described as the means of acquiring wisdom, enduring
happiness, and also bodily comfort (ch. xxxi.). Generally a
distinction is made between "chukkim" ("statutes ") and
mishpatim ("judgments"). The object of the latter is, on
the whole, known, but the chukkim are considered as tests of
man's obedience; no reason is given why they have been
enacted. Maimonides rejects this distinction; he states that
all precepts are the result of wisdom and design, that all
contribute to the welfare of mankind, although with regard
to the chukkim this is less obvious. The author draws another
line of distinction between the general principles and the
details of rules. For the selection and the introduction of
the latter there is but one reason, namely: "Such is the
will of God."
.
The laws are intended to promote man's perfection; they
improve both his mental and his bodily condition; the
former in so far as they lead him to the acquisition of true
knowledge, the latter through the training of his moral and
social faculties. Each law thus imparts knowledge, improves
the moral condition of man, or conduces to the well-being of
society. Many revealed laws help to enlighten man, and to
correct false opinions. This object is not always clearly
announced. God in His wisdom sometimes withheld from
the knowledge of man the purpose of commandments and
lxxx
INTRODUCTION.
actions. There are other precepts which tend to restrain
man's passions and desires. If the same end is occasionally
attainable by other means, it must be remembered that the
Divine laws are adapted to the ordinary mental and emo-
tional state of man, and not to exceptional circumstances.
In this work, as in the Yad ha-chazakah, Maimonides divides
the laws of the Pentateuch into fourteen groups, and in each
group
he discusses the principal and the special object of
the laws.
In addition to the legislative contents, the Bible includes
historical information; and Maimonides, in briefly reviewing
the Biblical narratives, shows that these are likewise intended
to improve man's physical, moral, and intellectual condition.
"It is not a vain thing for you" (Deut. xxxii. 47), and when
it proves vain to anyone, it is his own fault.
In the final chapters the author describes the several de-
grees of human perfection, from the sinners who have turned
away from the right path to the best of men, who in all their
thoughts and acts cling to the Most Perfect Being, who
aspire after the greatest possible knowledge of God, and strive
to serve their Maker in the practice of "loving-kindness,
righteousness, and justice." This degree of human perfec-
tion can only be attained by those who never forget the
presence of the Almighty, and remain firm in their fear and
love of God. These servants of the Most High inherit the
choicest of human blessings; they are endowed with wisdom:
they are godlike beings.
THE GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED,
1.
!
སྐ
My theory aims at pointing out a straight way, at casting up a high-road.
Ye who have gone astray in the field of the holy Law, come hither and follow
the path which I have prepared. The unclean and the fool shall not pass over
it. It shall be called the way of Holiness.
INTRODUCTION.
[Letter of the Author to his Pupil, R. Joseph Ibn Aknim.¹]
In the name of Gon, Lord of the Universe.
To R. Joseph (may God protect him!), son of R. Jehudah
(may his repose be in Paradise !2) :
3
4
"My dear pupil, ever since you resolved to come to me ³
from a distant country, and to study under my direction, I
thought highly of your thirst for knowledge,5 and your fond-
¹ Munk, in his "Notice sur Joseph Ben-Jehoudah ou Aboul Hadjadj You-
souf Ben-Yahja al Sabti al Maghrebi" (Paris, 1842), described the life of this
pupil of Maimonides. The following are the principal facts :-Joseph b. Jehu-
dah was born in Maghreb about the middle of the twelfth century. Although
his father was forced to conform to the religious practices of the Mahomedans,
Joseph was taught Hebrew and trained in the study of Hebrew literature.
He left his native country about 1185, and went to Egypt, where he continued
his scientific pursuits under the tuition of Maimonides, who instructed him in
mathematics, astronomy, philosophy, and theology. Afterwards (1187) he re-
sided at Aleppo, and married Sarah, the daughter of Abu'l Ala. After a successful
journey to India, he devoted himself chiefly to science, and delivered lectures
on various subjects to numerous audiences. He practised as physician to the
Emir Faris ad-din Maimun al-Karsi, and to the king Ed-Dhahir Ghazi, son of
Saladin. The Vizier Djemal ad-din el-Kofti was his intimate friend. When
Charizi (1217) came to Aleppo, he found Joseph in the zenith of his career.
He says of him (Tachkemoni, xlvi.) :-
חכמתו כקוהלת, ושכלו כגחלת, ולשונו אש אוכלת,
ויטרוף לב מתי שכל כלביא
גביר ישאג בכל חכמה כאריה
וים חכמות לפיו נקרע ונבקע
בעת יאמר לצולתו חרבי
ואם הם כאלישע הוא כתשבי
אשר הם בזמן לפאר ולצבי
ומפיו ילמדו חכמה חכמים
יחיד הדור אבל הוליד ילדים
ולמדו עניני מוסר בטרם
ובא ממערב לשכון במזרח
ולו הדור יהי דור הנבואה
ולו קדם יהי נמצא בציון
אשר ידעו קרא אמי ואבי
וצבאות כל יקר אסף והצביא
משחו אל בישראל לנביא
נתנהו כמו נר מערבי :
His poetical talents are praised by Charizi, in the eighteenth chapter of
Tachkemoni, and in the fiftieth chapter his unparalleled generosity is
נאום טוביה בן mentioned. Of his poetical productions, one poem beginning
B
2
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
ness for speculative pursuits, which found expression in your
poems. I refer to the time when I received your writings
in prose and verse¹ from Alexandria. I was then not yet
able to test your powers of apprehension, and I thought
that your desire might possibly exceed your capacity.
But when you had gone with me through a course of astro-
'py is named by Charizi (xviii.), and others are referred to by Maimonides
in the present work. A Bodleian MS. (Uri, 341) contains a work on the
,It is written in Arabic .(מרפא הנפש or טב אלנפוש) Medicine of the Soul
and Joseph b. Yehudah Albarceloni Ibn Aknin is named as its author. Munk
(Arch. Isr., 1851, p. 327), Neubauer (Monatsschrift, 1870, p. 448), and Grätz
are of opinion that there ,(מבוא התלמוד לר' יוסף בן עקנין Introd. to)
were two authors of the same name, both living about the same time and fol-
lowing the same course of studies, the one being described as Almaghrebi, the
other as Ibn Aknin Albarceloni. Steinschneider, however (Hammaskir, 1873,
p. 38 ff.), thinks that there is not sufficient proof for the co-existence of the
two scholars with the same name, but that in a Münetian MS. he has
discovered a passage in which the Joseph b. Yehudah referred to in the More
Nebuchim was likewise called Ibn Aknin Albarceloni. Besides the 10
מאמר על Ibn Aknin wrote a commentary on Shir hashshirim and אלנפוש
1, a treatise on the measures mentioned in the Talmud, part of which is
(edited by the teachers of the Rabbinical Seminary at Breslau,
1871).
שמרהו צורו - ש"צ The original has the Hebrew formulae 2
May his
Rock be his guardian;" "= 11" May Paradise be his repose."
(Charizi has 7 DN, Gen. xliii. 29).
מאז באת אלי Ibn Tibbon ; למה מתלת ענדי וקצרת-The original 3
Munk, Lorsque tu te representas ; מאז עמדת לפני ובאת .Char ; וכוונת
chez moi, etant venu. In the marginal notes of the Br. Mus. MS. Or. 1423 the
verb is explained by "to wish,” “to resolve.”
4 Lit. "From the remotest of the countries (or cities)." The North-west of
Africa was called by the Arabs Al-Aghreb al-Aksa, "the extreme occident."
Munk.
derivative) עיין דברים עיוניים ,Hebrew אלאמור אלנטריה ,Arabic 5
עין
from "eye,") to look, to speculate; ¡'y, study, speculation; "y, specu-
lative, requiring to be studied; D")'yn 0"707, problems for speculation,
philosophical or scientific matter.
pearls joined חרוז .letter, a short treatise ; כתביך .Hebr,רשאיל .Arab 1
together (comp. Shir ha-shirim, i. 10); a rhymed composition; rhyme (p,
metre). The original NPD is rendered by Charizi лan, “séance,” a
narrative in rhymed prose, interwoven with metric verses. (Munk.) In his
Tachkemoni (xviii.), Charizi mentions one of Joseph b. Jehuda. (See
p. 1, Note 1.)
INTRODUCTION.
3
nomy, after having completed the [other] elementary studies¹
which are indispensable for the understanding of that science,
I was still more gratified by the acuteness and the quick-
ness of your apprehension. Observing your great fondness
for mathematics,¹ I let you study them more deeply, for I
felt sure of your ultimate success.2 Afterwards, when
I took you through a course of logic,³ I found that my
great expectations of you were confirmed, and I con-
sidered you fit to receive from me an exposition of the
esoteric ideas contained in the prophetic books, that you
might understand them as they are understood by other men.
of culture. When I commenced by way of hints, I noticed
that you desired additional explanation, urging me to treat
of metaphysical themes; to teach you the system of the
elementary discipline, subjects ;חכמות למודיות ,Hebrew ;תעאלם,Arabic 1
of direct instruction and training, in contradistinction to physics and metaphy-
sics, that require deeper thought and study. This principally refers to
,Efodi, des sciences mathematiques חכמות המספר והתשבורת) mathematics
חכמת,.Hebr ,עלם אלהיאה) ;Munk) as preliminaries to the study of astronomy
, signifies both astronomy and geometry; literally, the science of
the form, scil., the form of things in general-geometry, or of the uni-
verse-astronomy). In the fourteenth chapter of Milloth Higgayon, the
,שמושית or למודית (1) philosophy is divided into (עיונית) speculative
elementary or auxiliary science; (2) n'yau, physics; (3) n'n, metaphysics.
The includes the quadrivium: arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, and
music. Astronomy being one of the 'syn, the word "other" has been
added in the translation. The grammatical analysis of this complicated
sentence is rather difficult, especially as regards the pronoun in the
original (absent in the British Museum MS., Or. 1423), and □ in Ibn
חכמת התכונה and עלם אלהיאה Tibbon's version, evidently referring to
ומה שקדם לך מחכמת הלמודים :respectively. Charizi translates as follows
שאי אפשר זולתם כדי להיות הצעה לחכמת התכונה
במאלך The original is 2 Ibn Tibbon appears ; כמאלך or במאלך is Ibn Tibbon appears to have had the ; כמאלך
former reading, and rendered it ' ; Charizi had the second reading,
(.Munk) שכלך השלם and translated it
""
3 Arabic, p. The Hebrew 'n is a derivative of an (“to utter,”
"to think "), and signifies both "speech
and "
is the term used for "logic." (See Milloth Higgayon xiv.) Maimonides
appears here to have taken the quadrivium, the lesser arts, before the trivium
(grammar, rhetoric and logic), although in ch. xxxiv. he insists on logic
being studied before any other science.
""
מלאכת ההגיון .thought
B 2
4
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
2
Mutakallemim ;¹ to tell you whether their arguments were
based on logical proof; and if not, what was their method.
I perceived that you had acquired some knowledge in those
matters from others, and that you were perplexed and be-
wildered; yet you sought to find out a solution to your
difficulty. I urged you to desist from this pursuit, and
enjoined you to continue your studies systematically; for
my object was that the truth should present itself in con-
nected order, and that you should not hit upon it by mere
chance. Whilst you studied with me I never refused to
explain difficult verses in the Bible or phrases in rabbinical
literature which we happened to meet. When, by the will
of God, we parted, and you went your way, our discussions
aroused in me a resolution which had long been dormant.
Your absence has prompted me to compose this treatise for
you and for those who are like you, however few they may
be. I have divided it into chapters, each of which shall
be sent to you as soon as it is completed. Farewell!"
[Prefatory Remarks.]
“Cause me to know the way wherein I should walk, for I lift up my soul
unto Thee." (Psalm cxliii. 8.)
"Unto you, O men, I call, and my voice is to the sons of men." (Prov. viii. 4.)
"Bow down thine ear and hear the word of the wise, and apply thine heart
unto my knowledge." (Prov. xxii. 17.)³
My primary object in this work is to explain certain
in Hebrew are Mahomedan theologians המדברים in Arabic and אלמתכלמין
who discussed "the word" or "the principle" (77, ON) of the Koran,
and wished to establish its truth by philosophical argumentation. (Compare
i. 69, 71, 73, sqq.) "Some of the teachers mixed up the method of the
philosophers with that of the Kalam, and thus established a special discipline
which they called Kalam, either because the principal subject of discussion
was the Kalām (word of God), or because they wanted to imitate the way of
the philosophers who called one of their disciplines 'Mantik' (i.e., logic).
Kalām and Mantik are synonyms" (Shahrastani's "Religionsparteien,” etc.,
translated from the Arabic into German, by D. Theodor Haarbrücker, i., p. 26).
2 Lit., "to find out acceptable words," Eccl. xii. 10.
3 These three verses are probably intended to be an allusion to the three
factors that must be combined to produce the good fruit expected from the
work: 1. The divine support and guidance obtained by the author; 2. The work
of the author; and 3. Attention and application on the part of the reader.
INTRODUCTION.
5
10
""
words¹ occurring in the prophetic books. Of these some
are homonyms,² and of their several meanings the ignorant
choose the wrong ones ;3 other terms which are employed
in a figurative sense are erroneously taken by such persons
in their primary signification. There are also hybrid
terms, denoting things which are the same from one
4
¹ The term OWN in Arabic, D in Hebrew, generally signifying "noun” or
"name,” is here employed by Maimonides in the wider sense of "expression,"
or term," including verbs. It is possible that the author assumed that a
verbal noun was implied in every verb.
19
2 Maimonides divides those words which are used in more than one sense
into three classes (in Milloth Higgayon xiii., into six) viz., 1. D'annwb niDw
"homonyms
(lit., names joined in partnership; ") words which acci-
dentally coincide, but are totally different in meaning and derivation. (Comp.
c. 56, note 5). 2. D'bNwID NIDʊ “metaphors" (lit., names borrowed.")
The two meanings, the primary and the figurative, have either a real or an
imaginary tertium comparationis. 3. D'PIDD "hybrids or amphibious
(lit. doubtful) nouns," words whose several significations can be explained
as either homonymous, or as being derived from one common source. (See
note 4 infra.) This division, apparently the basis for the first part of the
Moreh, is in itself correct, but it can hardly be applied to the terms discussed
by Maimonides in this work. According to our notions they are all metaphors
"C
and similar צלם Maimonides probably preferred to explain .(מושאלים)
expressions as homonyms ('), because he thought that to explain
anthropomorphistic phrases as figures would imply the admission that God
could be compared to material beings, an admission which our philosopher
would by no means make.
³ Lit., “and the ignorant take them according to some of the significations
of that homonym."
lit. & which,שהם יאמרו בהסכמה,.Heb ; אנהא תקאל בתואטו,Arabic 4
are said (of the several things) by agreement," that is, by the agreement of the
things in certain properties. Munk: qu'ils sont employés comme noms appel-
latifs. Things, to which the same term is applied, either agree in the essential
properties contained in that term, or in some non-essential properties, or agree
in neither of them. In the first case the term is employed as a class noun or
in the third as a homonym (נאמר בהסכמה, קיל בתואטו) appellative
(7), in the second as a hybrid, namely, as a class noun in reference to the
non-essential properties, as a homonym in reference to the essential properties
of the things. The word “ man is given by Maimonides in Milloth Higgayon
xiii., as an instance of a hybrid term, for the word is applied to a living per-
son, to a dead person, to a statue or likeness; as regards the essential properties
of man (living, thinking 17 '), these are totally different things and the
term is applied to them by homonymity : as regards the non-essential properties,
figure and appearance, these things are alike, and the term may be said to be
applied to them as a class noun.
6
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
F
point of view and different from another. It is not here
intended to explain all these expressions to the unlettered
or to mere tyros, a previous knowledge of Logic and Natural
Philosophy being indispensable, or to those who confine
their attention to the study of our holy Law, I mean the
study of the canonical law alone; for the true knowledge of
the Torah is the special aim of this and of similar works.¹
1
The object of this treatise is to enlighten a religious man
who has been trained to believe in the truth of our holy
Law, who conscientiously fulfils his moral and religious
duties, and at the same time has been successful in his
philosophical studies. Human reason has impelled him to
abide within its sphere; and, on the other hand, he is dis-
turbed by the literal interpretation of the Law, and by ideas
formed by himself or received from others, in connection
with those homonymous, metaphorical, or hybrid expres-
sions. Hence he is lost in perplexity and anxiety. If he
be guided solely by reason, and renounce his previous
views which are based on those expressions, he would consider
that he had rejected the fundamental principles of the Law
and even if he retain the opinions which were derived from
those expressions, and if, instead of following his reason, he
abandon its guidance altogether, he would still feel that his
religious convictions had suffered loss and injury. He
would then be left with those errors which give rise to fear
and anxiety, constant grief and great perplexity.
;
2
This work has also a second object in view. It seeks to
explain certain obscure figures which occur in the Prophets,
and are not distinctly characterised as being figures. Ignorant
and superficial readers take them in a literal, not in a
figurative sense. Even well-informed persons are bewildered
.
: (עלם אלשערה) חכמת התורה Maimonides distinguishes two kinds of 1
1. The knowledge of the laws contained in the Torah and explained by tradi-
tion (p inArabic, ¬ in Hebrew); 2. The science of the principles of
.(חכמת התורה על האמת) faith as a subject for speculation
; המחשבות הדמיונות,Tibbon ; אלאעתקאדאת אלביאליה ,Arabic 2
מחשבות המנהלות,Charizi
INTRODUCTION.
7
if they treat these passages in their literal signification,
but they are entirely relieved of their perplexity when we
explain the figure, or merely suggest that the terms are
figurative. For this reason I have called this book "Guide
of the Perplexed" (Dalālat al-haïrin, MOREH NEBUCHIM).¹
1
I do not pretend that this treatise settles every doubt in
the minds of those who understand it, but I maintain that it
settles the greater part of their difficulties. No intelligent
man will require and expect that on introducing any subject
I shall completely exhaust it; or that on commencing the
exposition of a figure I shall fully explain all its parts. Such
a course could not be followed by a teacher in a vivâ voce
exposition, much less by an author in writing a book, without
becoming a target for every foolish conceited person to dis-
charge the arrows of folly at him. Some general principles.
bearing upon this point have been fully discussed in our
works on the Talmud, and we have there called the atten-
tion of the reader to many themes of this kind. We
also stated that the expression "Ma'aseh Bereshith” signified
"Natural Science," and "Ma'aseh Mercabah" Metaphysics,
and we explained the force of the Rabbinical dictum,³ “The
¹ Some read Nebochim (part. Niph. of 72; comp. Esther iii. 15); others
Nebuchim (like Exod. xiv. 3).
2 Mishnah Torah, especially Book I., Sefer ha-madda', and Commentary on
the Mishnah; the Eight Chapters, introductory to Treatise Aboth.
3 The vision, described in the first chapter of the prophecies of Ezekiel, is
called "the work of the chariot" (ny), because the Divine
glory and its relation to the earth is shown to the prophet allegorically repre-
sented in the figure of a wonderfully constructed chariot. This chapter was
held to include the principles of Theology and Metaphysics, which are too
difficult for the comprehension of the ordinary reader, and if imperfectly
apprehended, would lead to the gravest errors. For this reason the
rule was laid down, that that chapter should not be expounded in the pre-
sence of more than one person, and even then only on condition that the person
be able thoroughly to understand the expounder's words. The account of the
Creation ('N TYD), contained in the first chapter of the Book of
Genesis, included the principles of Physics. Only one person at a time was
allowed to listen to the exposition of that chapter; the admission to the secrets
of Ma'aseh Bereshith was less restricted than to those of the Ma'aseh Mercabah.
Mishnah Torah, i. 2, §§ 11, 12; and i. 4, §§ 10—13. Commentary on Mishnah
Chagigah, ii. 1.
8
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
|
Ma'aseh Mercabah, must not be fully expounded even in the
presence of a single student, unless he be wise and able to
reason for himself, and even then you should merely
acquaint him with the heads of the different sections of the
¦ subject." (Chagigah, fol. 11 b.) You must, therefore, not
expect from me more than such heads. And even these
have not been methodically and systematically arranged
in this work, but have been, on the contrary, scattered,
and are interspersed with other topics which we shall
have occasion to explain. My object in adopting this
arrangement is that the truths should be at one time
apparent, and at another time concealed. Thus we shall
not be in opposition to the Divine Will (from which it is
wrong to differ) for it has withheld from the multitude the
truths required for the knowledge of God, according to
the words, "The secret of the Lord is with them that fear
Him." (Ps. xxv. 14.)
Even with regard to Natural Science, it should be observed
that there are some principles which are not to be explained
in extenso. For our Sages have said, "The Ma'aseh Bere-
shith must not be expounded in the presence of two." If
an author were to explain these principles in writing, it
would be equal to expounding them unto thousands of men.
For this reason the prophets treat these subjects in figures,
and our Sages, imitating the method of Scripture, speak
of them in metaphors and allegories; for there is a close
affinity between these subjects and metaphysics, and indeed
they form part of its mysteries. Do not imagine that these
most difficult problems can be thoroughly understood by any
one of us. This is not the case. At times the truth shines
so brilliantly that we perceive it as clear as day. Nature and
habit then draw a veil over our perception, and we return to a
darkness almost as dense as before. We are like those who,
though beholding frequent¹ flashes of lightning, still find
1
-is here quite superfluous, and is pro (פעם אחר פעם) מרה בעד מרה
bably an erroneous repetition of the pbx nya ñ¬phx of the next sen-
tence.
INTRODUCTION.
9
themselves in the thickest darkness of the night. On some
the lightning flashes in rapid succession, and they seem
to be in perpetual light, and their night is as clear as
the day. This was the degree of prophetic excellence
attained by (Moses) the greatest of prophets, to whom God
said, “But as for thee, stand thou here by Me." (Deut.
v. 31), and of whom it is written "the skin of his face
shone," etc. (Exod. xxxiv. 29.) [Some¹ perceive the pro-
phetic flash at long intervals; this is the degree of most
prophets.] By others only once during the whole night is
a flash of lightning perceived. This is the case with those
of whom we are informed, "They prophesied, and did not
prophesy again." (Num. xi. 25.) There are some to whom the
flash of lightning appears though with varying intensity;
others are in the condition of men, whose darkness is
illumined not by lightning, but by some kind of crystal or
similar stone, and other things that possess the property of
2
¹ In the Arabic text this sentence is absent; also in Charizi's version.
Munk is of opinion that it is superfluous because it is nearly the same as the
sentence which follows the words, "They prophesied and did not prophesy
again." In truth, however, the two sentences referred to are not identical, as
may be seen already from the additional p (and less"). The dif-
ferent classes enumerated by Maimonides are the following five:-1. Those
who enjoy an almost perpetual light; 2. Those who are favoured with moments
of enlightenment after long intervals of darkness; 3. Those who, in their whole
life, had only one moment of light; 4. Those whose light cannot be compared
to a bright flash of lightning, but to an imperfect one, with more or less in-
tensity; 5. Those whose illumination cannot be compared at all to the flash of
lightning, but to the shining of some luminous substance. It is also possible
that two different readings were fused into one, a fact which, in the course of
these remarks, will be noticed several times. According to the one reading
only two classes were enumerated, viz., 1. Prophets who perceived frequent
flashes of light with more or less intensity; 2. Those who never perceived any
flashes of light, but only the reflex of light as if coming through some trans-
parent substance. The other reading contained the first three classes, mentioned
above, arranged from another point of view, and illustrated by examples
taken from the Pentateuch.
admits of two renderings, 1. * Long and short הפרשים רבים או מעטים 2
"}
intervals; 2. Great and small differences as regards the intensity. The
context is here in favour of the second meaning, and the sentence must be
interpreted as follows:-Others received a flash of lightning, but with an
intensity which was greater in one case, and smaller in the other.
10
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
shining during the night;¹ and to them even this small
amount of light is not continuous, but now it shines and now it
vanishes, as if it were "the flame of the rotating sword."2
The degrees in the perfection of men³ vary according
to these distinctions. Concerning those who never beheld
the light even for one day, but walk in continual dark-
ness, it is written, "They know not, neither will they
understand; they walk on in darkness." (Ps. lxxxii. 5.)
Truth, in spite of all its powerful manifestations, is com-
pletely withheld from them, and the following words of
Scripture may be applied to them, "And now men see not
the light which is bright in the skies." (Job xxxvii. 21.)
They are the multitude of ordinary men; there is no need
to notice them in this treatise.
You must know that if a person, whatever degree of
perfection he has attained, wishes to impart to others,
either orally or in writing, any portion of the knowledge
which he has acquired of these subjects, he is utterly un-
able to be as systematic and explicit as he could be in a
science of which the method is well known. The same
difficulties which he encountered when investigating the
subject for himself will attend him when endeavouring to
instruct others; viz., at one time the explanation will appear
lucid, at another time, obscure; this property of the subject
appears to remain the same both to the advanced scholar
and to the beginner. For this reason, great theological
scholars¹ gave instruction in all such matters only by means
of metaphors and allegories. They frequently employed
them in forms varying more or less essentially. In most
5
1970 DVI
¹ Most probably we have here a fusion of two readings-
.גשם טהור זך וכיוצא בו מן האבנים and האבנים וזולתם
2 Taken from Gen. iii. 24.
3 N, Hebrew Down, lit., "the perfect," generally opp. to
the ignorant and uneducated, appears here to be distinguished from the various
degrees of "prophets " enumerated before.
4 According to Munk the terms 27 and are synonyms and signify theo-
logians or metaphysicians, 17 being the Arabic, '17, "relating to God,"
derived from “master, ""God." See note 1, p. 13.
5
""
אלגנס kind " or " class * is a larger division than * סוג Hebrew ,אלנוע
""
(D) "species." Comp. Maim. Milloth Higg. x. "A term including
INTRODUCTION.
11
cases they placed the lesson to be illustrated at the
beginning, or in the middle, or at the end of the simile.
When they could find no simile which from beginning to
end corresponded to the idea which was to be illustrated,¹
they divided the subject of the lesson, although in itself
one whole, into different parts, and expressed each by a
separate figure. Still more obscure are those instances
in which one simile is employed to illustrate many sub-
jects, the beginning of the simile representing one thing,
the end another. Sometimes the whole metaphor may refer
to two cognate subjects in the same branch of knowledge.
If we were to teach in these disciplines, without the
use of parables and figures, we should be compelled to resort
to expressions both profound and transcendental, and by no
means more intelligible than metaphors and similes; as
though the wise and learned were drawn into this course by
the Divine Will, in the same way as they are compelled to
follow the laws of nature in matters relating to the body.
You should observe that the Almighty, desiring to lead us
to perfection and to improve our state of society, has revealed
to us laws which are to regulate our actions. These laws,
however, pre-suppose an advanced state of intellectual cul-
ture. We must first form a conception of the Existence of
the Creator according to our capacities; that is, we must
have a knowledge of Metaphysics, which can only be
acquired after the study of Physics; for the science of Phy-
sics is closely connected with Metaphysics, and must even
2
3
-
several individuals is called '; several species form a 1D." In our passage
the two terms are not used in their strictly philosophical signification, but in
the general sense more or "less."
(C
""
1 Munk joining this sentence with the preceding, begins here a new sentence,
and supplies "quelque fois." There is no reason why the lesson should be
placed in the beginning, the middle or the end of the simile, in the case when it
is not complete, more than in any other case. But there is sufficient reason to
express one idea through several similes, if there cannot be found one simile
that could express it adequately.
2 Lit., "theology," "the science of God;" it is the same as metaphysics.
3 Arabic, Din; Tibbon, 'D; lit. "bordering"; Charizi, 118,
a translation of the Arabic, a reading found in two Leyden MSS.
(Munk), and in a MS. of Brit. Mus. Or. 1423.
מצרנית מתאכם
12
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
precede it in the course of our studies, as is clear to all who
are familiar with these questions. Therefore the Almighty
commenced Holy Writ with the description of the Creation,
that is, with Physical Science; the subject on the one hand
being most weighty and important, and on the other hand our
means of fully comprehending those great problems being
limited, He described those profound truths, which His
Divine Wisdom found it necessary to communicate to us,
in allegorical, figurative, and metaphorical language. Our
Sages have said, "It is impossible to give a full account
of the Creation to man. Therefore Scripture simply tells
us, In the beginning God created the heavens and the
earth (Gen. i. 1)." Thus they have suggested that this
subject is a deep mystery, and in the words of Solomon,
"Far off and exceedingly deep, who can find it out?”
(Eccles. vii. 24). It has been treated in metaphors in
order that the uneducated may comprehend it according to
the measure of their faculties and the feebleness of their
apprehension, while educated persons may take it in a
different sense. In the commentary on the Mishnah¹ we
stated our intention to explain difficult problems in the
Sepher ha-nebuah (Book of Prophecy), and in the Sepher
ha-shevaah (Book of Harmony.) In the latter we intended
to examine all the passages in the Midrash which, if taken
literally, appear to be inconsistent with truth and common
sense, and must therefore be taken figuratively. Many
years have elapsed since I first commenced those works. I
had proceeded but a short way when I became dissatisfied
with my original plan. For I observed that by expounding
these passages by means of allegorical and mystical terms,
we do not explain anything, but merely substitute one thing
for another of the same nature, whilst in explaining them
fully our efforts displease the generality of men; and my sole
object in writing those books was to make the contents of
Midrashim and the exoteric lessons of the prophecies intelli-
gible to everybody. We have further noticed that when an
Comp. Maim. Comm. on Mishnah Sanhedrin, x. 1.
j
INTRODUCTION.
13
ill-informed rabbi¹ reads these Midrashim, he will find no
difficulty; for possessing no knowledge of the properties of
things, he will not reject statements which involve impossibi-
lities. When, however, a person who is both religious and well
educated reads them, he cannot escape the following dilemma:
either he takes them literally, and questions the abilities of
the author and the soundness of his mind-doing thereby
nothing which is opposed to the principles of our faith—or
he will acquiesce in assuming that the passages in question
have some secret meaning, and he will continue to hold the
author in high estimation whether he understood the allegory
or not. As regards prophecy with its various degrees and
the different metaphors used in the prophetic books, we
shall give in the present work an explanation, according to
another method.2 Guided by these considerations I have
refrained from writing those two books as I previously in-
tended. In my larger work, the Mishnah Torah, I have
contented³ myself with briefly stating the principles of
our faith and its fundamental truths, together with such
hints as approach a clear exposition. In this work, how-
ever, I address those who have studied philosophy and have
acquired sound knowledge, and who while firm in religious
matters are perplexed and bewildered on account of the am-
biguous and figurative expressions¹ employed in the holy
writings. Some chapters may be found in this work which
contain no reference whatever to homonyms. These chapters
will serve
as an introduction to others; contain some refe-
seems to have been used here as distinguished from סכל מהמון רבנים 1
.mentioned above חכם גדול אלהי רבני
-
This supports the translation of
117 by "Rabbanite."
2 Some of the editions of Ibn Tibbon's Version have 78 7772 instead
of 78 7772; Arabic, another; different from the two mentioned;
“being explicit on one part, reserved on the other" ( ) ab nbap).
Efodi.
'
3 Charizi: '
"and I directed my attention." Arabic,
NJYMPN); Charizi perhaps read NYPN). (Scheyer, Charizi's Version of
the More Nebuchim, page 6, note 19.)
Arabic "similes." Munk.
.והמשלים in both the Hebrew translations is a corruption of והמושאלים 4
14
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
rence to the signification of a homonym which I do not
wish to mention in that place; explain some figure; point
out that a certain expression is a figure; treat of difficult
passages generally misunderstood in consequence of the
homonymy they include, or because the simile they contain
is taken in place of that which it represents, and vice versa.
Having spoken of similes, I proceed to make the following
remark:¹-The key to the understanding and to the full
comprehension of all that the Prophets have said, con-
sists in the knowledge of the figures, their general ideas,
and the meaning of each word they contain. You know
the verse "I have also spoken in similes by the Pro-
phets" (Hosea xii. 10); and also the verse, "Put forth a
riddle and speak a parable" (Ezek. xvii. 2). And because
the Prophets continually employ figures, Ezekiel said,
"Does He not speak parables?" (xxi. 5.) Again, Solomon
begins his book of Proverbs with the words, "To understand
a proverb and the interpretation; the words of the wise and
their dark sayings" (Prov. i. 6)
(Prov. i. 6); and we read in the
Midrash," "To what were the words of the Law to be com-
pared before the time of Solomon? To a well the waters of
which are at a great depth, and though cool and fresh, yet
no man could drink of them. A clever man joined cord
with cord, and rope with rope, and drew up and drank.
So Solomon³ went from figure to figure, and from subject to
subject, till he obtained the true sense of the Law." So far
go the words of our Sages. I do not believe that any
intelligent man thinks that "the words of the Law"
mentioned here as requiring the application of figures in
order to be understood, can refer to the rules for building
tabernacles, or for the Lulab, or for the four kinds of trus-
Munk & noncer ; ונקדים הקדמה ,Hebrew ; פלנקדם מקדמה ,Arabic 1
une proposition." As that which follows has not the character of a scientific
"P"proposition " (comp. lxxiii.), it is more probable that the word has
here the meaning "prefatory remark" or simply "remark.”
2 Shirha-shirim, Rabba i. 1.
3 Supply or
כך מדבר לדבר וממשל In the Midrash we read הולך
למשל עמד שלמה וגו'
INTRODUCTION.
15
3
tees.¹ What is really meant is the apprehension of profound
and difficult subjects, concerning which our Sages said, "If a
man loses in his house a sela,² or a pearl, he can find it
by lighting a taper worth only one issar.2 Thus the parables
in themselves are of no great value, but through them
the words of the holy Law are rendered intelligible." These
likewise are the words of our Sages; consider well their
statement, that the deeper sense of the words of the holy Law
are pearls, and the literal acceptation of a figure is of no
value in itself. They compare the hidden meaning included
in the literal sense of the simile to a pearl lost in a dark
room, which is full of furniture. It is certain that the pearl
is in the room, but the man can neither see it nor know
where it lies. It is just as if the pearl were no longer in his
possession, for, as has been stated, it affords him no benefit
whatever until he kindles a light. The same is the case
with the comprehension of that which the simile represents.
The wise king said, "A word fitly spoken is like apples of
gold in pictures of silver" (Prov. xi. 25). Hear the expla-
nation of what he said:-The word means "filigree
network ”—i. e., things in which there are very small aper-
no
1 The rules concerning the tabernacles in which the Israelites were com-
manded (Levit. xxiii. 42) to dwell seven days in the seventh month (from the
15th to the 21st), are mentioned and discussed in the Talmud, Treatise Sukkah,
i.-ii., and by Maimonides, Mishnah Torah, in the third book (D'JD}), vi.
4-6. The details concerning the Lulab, one of the four kinds of plants to
be used on the Feast of Tabernacles (Lev. xxiii. 40) are given in the Talmud,
Sukkah, iii.-iv., and Mishnah Torah, ibid. 7-8. The law concerning the
four classes of Trustees, based on Exodus xxii. 6-14, is discussed in the
Talmud, Baba Metsia, iv., vi., viii.; Mishnah Torah, thirteenth book
(D'DDWD), ii. The four classes are, who keeps the property of
his neighbour without receiving a reward for it; 1, who receives
payment for keeping his neighbour's property; NW, who borrows some-
thing without paying for its use; 7, who hires something.
2 The sela (originally a Tyrian weight), was a silver coin, equal to 4
denar or 96 issar (Roman as). The proportion of a sela to an issar was approxi-
mately as 81:1.
shirim.
C
-are not found in Midrash Shir ha המשל הזה אינו כלום The words 3
This phrase appears to correspond to the formula N 7 (abbrev. J″y)
generally found at the end of a quotation.
16
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
tures, such as are frequently wrought by silversmiths.
They are called in Hebrew D, “transpicuous" (derived
from 3, "to look: " Onkelos renders the Hebrew
"and he looked," by the word, Gen. xxvi. 8),
because the eye penetrates through them. Thus Solomon
meant to say, "Just as apples of gold in silver filigree with
small apertures, so is a word fitly spoken."
See how beautifully the conditions of a good simile are
described in this figure! It shows that in every word
which has a double sense, a literal and a figurative meaning,
the plain meaning must be as valuable as silver, and the
hidden meaning still more precious; so that the figurative
meaning bears the same relation to the literal one as gold
to silver. It is further necessary that the plain sense of
the phrase shall give to those who consider it some notion
of that which the figure represents. Just as a golden apple
overlaid with a net-work of silver, when seen at a distance,
or looked at superficially, is mistaken for a silver apple; but
when a keen-sighted person looks at the object well, he
will find what is within, and see that the apple is gold.
The same is the case with the figures employed by prophets.
Taken literally, such expressions contain wisdom useful for
many purposes, among others, for the amelioration of the
condition of society; e.g., the Proverbs (of Solomon),¹ and
similar sayings in their literal sense. Their hidden meaning,
however, is profound wisdom, conducive to the recognition
of real truth.
Know that the figures employed by prophets are of two
kinds: first, where every word which occurs in the simile
represents a certain idea; and, secondly, where the simile,
as a whole, represents a general archetype, but has a
great many points which have no reference whatever to
that typical idea; they are simply required to give to the
simile its proper form and order, or better to conceal the
archetype; and the simile is continued as far as necessary,
according to its literal sense. Consider this well.
¹ In the editions of Tibbon's version we read an instead of 'wp.
INTRODUCTION.
17
An example of the first class of prophetic figures is to be
found in Genesis :-" And, behold, a ladder set up on the
earth, and the top of it reached to heaven; and, behold, the
angels of God ascending and descending on it.” (Gen.
xxviii. 12.) The word "ladder" refers to one idea; "set
up on the earth" to another; "and the top of it reached
to heaven" to a third; "angels of God" to a fourth;
"ascending" to a fifth; "descending" to a sixth;
"the
Lord stood above it" (ver. 13) to a seventh. Every word
in this figure introduces a fresh idea into the archetype.
An example of the second class of prophetic figures is
found in Proverbs (vii. 6—26):-" For at the window of
my house I looked through my casement, and beheld among
the simple ones; I discerned among the youths a young
man void of understanding, passing through the street near
her corner: and he went the way to her house, in the twi-
light, in the evening, in the black and dark night: and,
behold, there met him a woman with the attire of a harlot,
and subtil of heart. (She is loud and stubborn; her feet
abide not in her house: now is she without, now in the
streets, and lieth in wait in every corner.) So she caught
him, and kissed him, and with an impudent face said unto
him, I have peace offerings with me; this day have I
paid my vows. Therefore came I forth to meet thee, dili-
gently to seek thy face, and I have found thee. I have
decked my bed with coverings of tapestry, with carved
works, with fine linen of Egypt. I have perfumed my bed
with myrrh, aloes, and cinnamon. Come, let us take our
fill of love until the morning: let us solace ourselves with
loves. For the goodman is not at home, he is gone a long
journey he hath taken a bag of money with him, and
will come home at the day appointed. With her much
fair speech she caused him to yield, with the flattering of
her lips she forced him. He goeth after her straightway,
as an ox goeth to the slaughter, or as a fool to the correc-
tion of the stocks: till a dart strike through his liver; as
a bird hasteth to the snare, and knoweth not that it is for
:
с
18
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
his life. Hearken unto me now therefore, O ye children,
and attend to the words of my mouth. Let not thine
heart decline to her ways, go not astray in her paths. For
she hath cast down many wounded: yea, many strong men
have been slain by her."
The general principle expounded in all these verses is
to abstain from excessive indulgence in bodily pleasures.
The author compares the body, which is the source of all
sensual pleasures, to a married woman who at the same time
is a harlot. And this figure he has taken as the basis of
his entire book. We shall hereafter show the wisdom of
Solomon in comparing sensual pleasures to an adulterous
harlot. We shall explain how he concludes that work with
the praises of a faithful wife who devotes herself to the
welfare of her husband and of her household. All obstacles
which prevent man from attaining his highest aim in life,
all the deficiencies in the character of man, all his evil
propensities, are to be traced to the body alone. This will
be explained later on. The predominant idea running
throughout the figure is, that man shall not be entirely
guided by his animal, i.e., his material nature; for the
material substance of man is identical with that of the
brute creation.1 An adequate explanation of the figure
having been given, and its meaning having been shown,
1 Lit., "The substance that is near," next to us. The difference between
the near and the remote substance of a thing is illustrated in Milloth Higgayon
IX. as follows: "The near substance (17p inn) of, e.g., Reuben, is
formed by the limbs of the body; the remote substance consists in the humour
and the four elements of which the limbs are formed; the λŋ, which is com-
mon to all the elements, is the first substance."
The "
near substance" of man
is identical with that of animals, since the formation of the limbs and the nature
of the body are the same in both. From another point of view their identity
as regards the "near substance" is explained thus (comp. Shemtob): Life is
the substance (genus) of man as well as of all animals; the form (specific dif-
ference) of man (defined as ", "a living being gifted with speech"),
differs from that of other animals. (Comp. Mill. Higg., IX.) If, instead of
defining man as a living being with the capacity of thinking, we said, “ Man is a
created being," etc., the term "created being" would be more comprehensive than
"living being." The former is called by Maimonides the remote substance; the
latter, the near substance, because it approaches nearer the individuality of man.
INTRODUCTION.
19
do not imagine that you will find¹ in its application a
corresponding element for each part; you must not ask
what is meant by "I have peace offerings with me," (ver.
14); by "I have decked my bed with coverings of
tapestry," (ver. 16); or what is added to the force of the
figure by the observation "for the goodman is not at
home,” (ver. 19), and so on to the end of the chapter. For
all this is merely to complete the illustration of the meta-
phor in its literal meaning. The circumstances described
here are such as are common to adulterers. Such conver-
sations take place between all adulterous persons. You
must well understand what I have said, for it is a principle
of the utmost importance with respect to those things which
I intend to expound. If you observe in one of the chapters
that I explained the meaning of a certain figure, and
pointed out to you its general scope, do not trouble yourself
further in order to find an interpretation of each separate
portion, for that would lead you to one of the two following
erroneous courses; either you will miss the sense included
in the metaphor, or you will be induced to explain certain
things which require no explanation, and which are not
introduced for that purpose. Through this unnecessary
trouble you may fall into the great error which besets most
modern sects in their foolish writings and discussions; they
all endeavour to find some hidden meaning in expressions
which were never uttered by the author in that sense. Your
object should be to discover in most of the figures the general
idea which the author wishes to express. In some instances
it will be sufficient if you understand from my remarks that
a certain expression contains a figure, although I may offer
no further comment. For when you know that it is not to
be taken literally, you will understand at once to what sub-
ject it refers. My statement that it is a figurative ex-
pression will, as it were, remove the screen from between
the object and the observer.
!
The Arabic for this phrase is not found .למצא כל עניני המשל בנמשל :
in any MS. It is omitted in Charizi's translation. (Munk.)
c 2
20
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
Directions for the Study of this Work.¹
If you desire to grasp all that is contained in this book so
that nothing shall escape your notice, consider the chapters
in connected order. In studying each chapter, do not content
yourself with comprehending its principal subject, but
attend to every term mentioned therein, although it may
seem to have no connection with the principal subject. For
what I have written in this work was not the suggestion of
the moment; it is the result of deep study and great appli-
cation. Care has been taken that nothing that appeared
doubtful should be left unexplained. Whenever a thing is
mentioned apparently out of place, it will still be found to
illustrate the subject-matter of the respective chapter. Do
not read superficially, lest you do me an injury, and derive
no benefit for yourself. You must study thoroughly and read
continually; for you will then find the solution of those
important problems of religion, which are a source of
anxiety to all intelligent men. I conjure² any reader of
my book, in the name of the Most High, not to add any
explanation even to a single word; nor to explain to another
any portion of it except such passages as have been fully
treated of by previous theological authorities; he must
not teach others anything that he has learnt from my work
alone, and that has not been hitherto discussed by any of
1 Charizi adds here, nan nПIN MN, "This is the sign of the covenant,"
taken from Gen. ix. 12.
"If any
2 This request of the author has been entirely ignored, as the numerous
Commentaries on the Moreh Nebhuchim clearly show. The authors of those
Commentaries can point to the same plea on which Maimonides himself relied
when he composed his work notwithstanding the prohibition of the Mishnah
(Chagigah ii. 1); the excuse being, "It is time to do something in honour of
the Lord: for they have made void Thy law." (Psalm cxix. 126.) Joseph
Ibn Caspi, in the Preface to his Commentary on the Moreh, says:
person should blame me for explaining this book contrary to the wish of the
author, I answer that I gladly incur this blame because I prefer to serve
and to benefit every one that will read it. If I have assisted the reader
in understanding what might otherwise have remained a terra incognita, let thy
curse come upon me' (Gen. xxvii. 13), and let the reader accept my blessing.”
INTRODUCTION.
21
our authorities.
The reader must, moreover, beware of
raising objections to any of my statements,¹ because it is
very probable that he may understand my words to mean
the exact opposite to what I intended to say. He will
injure me, while I endeavoured to benefit him. "He will
requite me evil for good." Let the reader make a careful
study of this work; and if his doubt be removed on even
one point, let him praise his Maker and rest contented with
the knowledge he has acquired. But if he derive from it
no benefit whatever, he may consider that no such book was
ever composed. Should he notice any opinions with which
he does not agree, let him endeavour to find a suitable
explanation, even if it seem far-fetched, "in order that he
may judge me charitably." Such a duty we owe to every-
one. We owe it especially to our scholars and theologians,
who endeavour to teach us what is the truth according to
the best of their ability. I feel assured that those of my
readers who have not studied philosophy, will still derive
profit from many chapters. But the thinker whose studies.
have brought him into collision with religion, will, as I have
already mentioned, derive much benefit from every chapter.
How greatly will he rejoice! How agreeably will my words
strike his ears! Those, however, whose minds are confused
with false notions and perverse methods, who regard their
misleading studies as sciences, and imagine themselves phi-
losophers, though they have no knowledge which
may truly
be termed science, will object to many chapters, and will
find in them many insuperable difficulties, because they
do not understand their meaning, and also because I
expose the absurdity of their perverse notions, which con-
stitute their riches and peculiar treasure, "stored up for
ולא יהרוס ויקפוץ עצמו להשיב The translation given by Ibn Tibbon 1
על דברי
was suggested by Maimonides himself. Comp. Bodl. MS., Poc.
74. (Munk.)
והוי דן את כל refers to the rule ידין אותו לכף זכות The expression 2
111955 078. Mishnah Abhoth, i. 6. is, means literally, "according
to the scale of merit." The figure is taken from a balance in which the merits
and faults are weighed against each other.
22
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
4
their ruin."1 God knows that I hesitated very much
before writing on the subjects contained in this work, since
they are profound mysteries; they are topics which, since
the time of our captivity 2 have not been treated by any of
our scholars as far as we possess their writings; 3 how then
shall I now make a beginning and discuss them? But
I rely on two precedents: first, to similar cases our Sages
applied the verse, "It is time to do something in honour of
the Lord for they have made void thy law" (Ps. cxix.
126). Secondly, they have said, "Let all thy acts be
guided by pure intentions." On these two principles I
relied while composing some parts of this work. Lastly,
when I have a difficult subject before me-when I find
the road narrow, and can see no other way of teaching a
well-established truth except by pleasing one intelligent
man and displeasing ten thousand fools-I prefer to address
myself to the one man, and to take no notice whatever of
the condemnation of the multitude; I prefer to extricate
that intelligent man from his embarrassment and show him
the cause of his perplexity, so that he may attain perfec-
tion and be at peace.
!
¹ According to Munk, Maimonides alluded here to the Mutakallemim; but
the censure "whose minds are confused," etc., is far too severe, if compared
with the account of the Mutakallemim given by Maimonides below in ch.
lxxi. It is more probable that he means the '77 117 who have not
received a proper training in general knowledge, who confine all their energy
to the study of the Talmud, and take the allegorical sayings in the Talmud
and the Midrashim in their literal sense. The theories based on such sayings
are overthrown by the present work of Maimonides, which on that account
was considered as heretical.
!
2 The writings of Saadiah, Gabirol, Bacbjah, etc., are entirely ignored. In
ch. lxxi. he states that the philosophical works of Jewish writers are based on
the writings of Mahomedan authors, and are few in comparison with the latter.
lit.: * The writings concerning which things אלתי עדנא מא אלף פיה 3
we possess." This phrase is absent in both Hebrew versions, and appears
indeed superfluous after the words "which have not been treated by any, etc."
4 Comp. Talmud Babl. Berachoth, fol. 63, where two interpretations are
given, both applicable in this instance; (1), "It is now time to act in honour
of God, for they (i.e., the people) have broken Thy law;" (2), “They (i.e.
the authorities) have set aside Thy law, because it was time to do so in
honour of God.'
+
INTRODUCTION.
23
Introductory Remarks.
[ON METHOD.]
THERE are seven causes of inconsistencies and contradic-
tions to be met with in a literary work.¹ The first cause
arises from the fact that the author collects the opinions of
various men, each differing from the other, but he neglects
to mention the name of the author of any particular opinion.
In such a work contradictions or inconsistencies must occur,
since each statement is the opinion of a different man.
Second cause: The author holds at first one opinion which
he subsequently rejects; in his work, however, both his
original and altered views are retained. Third cause: The
passages in question are not all to be taken literally; some
only are to be understood in their literal sense, while in
others figurative language is employed, including another
meaning² besides the literal one: or, in the apparently
inconsistent passages, figures are used which, if taken
literally, would seem to be contradictories or contraries.
Fourth cause: The premises are not identical in both, but
for certain reasons are not fully stated in one of the passages;
or two propositions having different subjects (but the same
predicate) occur in two passages, and the subject is distinctly
mentioned only in one of them, and is omitted in the other.
The contradiction is therefore only apparent. The fifth
cause is traceable to use of the method which is adopted in
teaching and expounding certain things. For, a difficult
and obscure theorem must sometimes be mentioned and
assumed as known, for the illustration of some elementary
¹ E.g. I. lxx., Maimonides says that God moves the highest sphere; II. iv.,
that it is moved by intelligences (w). An instance of the seventh cause is
afforded in I. lxxi., where he says that, without entering into a discussion on
the eternity of the universe (yn P), the existence of God, His unity,
and His incorporeality can be proved; while in other places he most vehe-
mently attacks the theory of the eternity of the universe. (Munk.)
2 Arabic ¡N, Hebrew 1, "an inner part." The simile (D) is com-
pared to the husk (˜Ð¹p), its application to the fruit which is within the
husk (1).
24
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
and intelligible subject which must be taught beforehand,¹
the commencement being always made with the easier thing.
The teacher must therefore facilitate, in any manner which
he can devise, the explanation of those theorems, which
have to be assumed as known, and he must content himself
with giving a general notion on the subject, though this
may deviate from the exact meaning. It will, for the
present, be explained according to the capacity of the
students, that they may comprehend it as far as they are
required to understand the subject. Later on, the same sub-
ject is thoroughly treated and fully developed in its right
place. Sixth cause: The contradiction is not apparent, and
only becomes evident through a series of premises. The
larger the number of premises necessary to prove the con-
tradiction between the two conclusions, the greater the
chance that it will escape detection, and that the author
will not perceive his own inconsistency. Only when from
each conclusion, by means of suitable premises, an inference
is made, and from the enunciation thus inferred, by means of
proper arguments, other conclusions are formed, and after
that process has been repeated many times, then it becomes
clear that the original conclusions are contradictories or
contraries. Even able writers are liable to overlook such
inconsistencies. If, however, the contradiction between
the original statements can at once be discovered, and
the author, while writing the second, does not think of
the first, he evinces a great deficiency, and his words
deserve no notice whatever. Seventh cause: It is some-
times necessary to introduce such metaphysical matter
as may partly be disclosed, but must partly be con-
cealed; while, therefore, on one occasion the object which
the author has in view may demand that the metaphysical
problem be treated as solved in one way, it may be conve-
nient on another occasion to treat it as solved in the opposite
1 Lit., “before that first," Arabic, Hebrew 1, "the first ;"
the difficult theorem is called "the first," because it forms the basis for the
knowledge of the other, easier subjects.
INTRODUCTION.
25
way. The author must endeavour, by concealing the fact
as much as possible, to prevent the uneducated reader
from perceiving the contradiction.
2.
Inconsistencies occurring in the Mishnah and Boraithoth ¹
are traceable to the first cause. You meet frequently in the
Gemara with passages like the following 2:-" Does not the
beginning of the passage contradict the end?
No; the
beginning is the dictum of a certain Rabbi; the end that of
another;" or "Rabbi (Jehudah ha-Nasi) approved of the
opinion of a certain rabbi in one case and gave it therefore
anonymously, and having accepted that of another rabbi in
the other case he introduced it without naming the autho-
rity;" or "Who is the author of this anonymous dictum ?
Rabbi A.” "Who is the author of that paragraph in the
Mishnah? Rabbi B." Instances of this kind are innumerable.
Apparent contradictions or differences occurring in the
Talmud may be traced to the first cause and to the second,
as e.g., "In this particular case he agrees with this rabbi ;"
or "He agrees with him in one point, but differs from him
in another;" or "These two dicta are the opinions of two
Amoraim,³ who differ as regards the statement of a certain
rabbi." These are examples of contradictions traceable to
the first cause. The following are instances which may be
traced to the second cause. "Rabba altered his opinion on
that point;" it then becomes necessary to consider which
1 The Oral Law as handed down from generation to generation, and dis-
cussed in the early schools of the Tanaim, is contained in Mishnah and Boraitha ;
the former is the authorised collection; the Boraitha is the portion which was
excluded from the canon; the greater authority rested therefore with the
Mishnah. In the Gemara, the Mishnah is introduced with the formula ɔn
(C we have learnt," the Boraitha, with “it has been learnt."
2 Namely, when two Rabbis differ on a certain question, and in a Mishnah
in which this question is treated, partly the opinion of one and partly that of
the other is given (anonymously), so that the Mishnah agrees with neither
authority.
3 Amoraïm (from DN, to say, to explain), the authorities mentioned in
the Gemara, as explaining the Mishnah; the authorities of the Mishnah are
called Tanaïm (from N=7, to learn by heart, "who transmitted the
Oral Law "), and their names are generally preceded by the title Rabbi; while
the names of the Amoraïm are preceded by the title Rab.
26
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
of the two opinions came second. Again, "In the first
recension of the Talmud by Rabbi Ashi, he made one asser-
tion, and in the second a different one."
The inconsistencies and contradictions met with in some
passages of the prophetic books if taken literally, are all trace-
able to the third or fourth cause, and it is exclusively in
reference to this subject that I wrote the present introduction.
You know that the following expression frequently occurs,
"One verse says this, another that," showing the contradiction,
and explaining that either some premise is wanting or the
subject is altered. Comp. "Solomon, it is not sufficient that thy
words contradict thy father; they are themselves inconsistent,
etc." Many similar instances occur in the writings of our
Sages. The passages in the prophetical books which our
Sages have explained, mostly refer to religious or moral pre-
cepts.2 Our desire, however, is to discuss such passages as
contain apparent contradictions in regard to the principles
of our faith.³ I shall explain some of them in various
chapters of the present work; for this subject also belongs
to the secrets of the Torah.³
"1
Contradictions traceable to the seventh cause occurring
in the prophetical works require special investigation; and
no one should express his opinions on that matter by reason-
ing and arguing without weighing the matter well in
his mind.
4
Inconsistencies in the writings of true philosophers are
traceable to the fifth cause. Contradictions occurring in
most other works, and in any commentaries not previously
¹ Talm. Babyl. Shabbath, 30 a.
2 D, Hebrew D'', laws (civil, political, and religious); NTN,
,דעות ואמונות Hebrew ארא ואעתקאדאת ; ethics מוסר דרך ארץ Hebrew
matters relating to knowledge and faith.
3 That is, and deserve to be as closely investigated as matters relating to
religious precepts and to ethics.
4 pm (from Koheleth xii. 9) weighing and searching is here opposed
superficial argument and judgment. The Arabic סברא and שקול הדעת to
וצריך לבל יגזרו and Charizi's translation ,אן לא יגזף פי דלך has simply
עליו כפי מה שיזדמן
INTRODUCTION.
27
mentioned are due to the sixth cause. Many examples of
this class of contradictions are found in the Midrash and
the Agada; hence the saying, "We must not raise ques-
tions concerning the contradictions in the Agada." You
may also notice in them contradictions due to the seventh
cause. Any inconsistency discovered in the present work
will be found to arise in consequence of the fifth cause or
the seventh. Notice this, consider its truth, and remember
it well, lest you misunderstand some of the chapters in this
book.
Having concluded these introductory remarks I proceed
to examine those expressions, to the true meaning of which,
as apparent from the context, it is necessary to direct your
attention. This book will then be a key admitting to places.
the gates of which would otherwise be closed. When the
gates are opened and men enter, their souls will enjoy
repose, their eyes will be gratified, and even their bodies,
after all toil and labour, will be refreshed.
(C
Open ye the gates, that the righteous nation which keepeth
the truth may enter in.”—(Is. xxvi. 2.)
PART I.
,בצלמנו
CHAPTER I.
.Shape תואר .Likeness דמות Form צלם
1
SOME have been of opinion that by in Hebrew, the
shape and figure of a thing is to be understood, and this
explanation led men to believe in the corporeality [of the
Divine Being]: for they thought that the words
"Let us make man in our form" (Gen. i. 26),
implied that God had the form of a human being, i.e., that
He had figure and shape, and that, consequently, He was cor-
poreal. They adhered faithfully to this view, and thought
that if they were to relinquish it they would eo ipso reject the
2
¹ The author begins the homonymous expressions explained in this part of
the work with by, because it is both the first and the most striking instance
of anthropomorphism occurring in the Bible. According to Narboni (ad
locum), Maimonides here confirms the rule, that "the end of the work is the
The aim of man's .תכלית המעשה תחלת המחשבה "beginning in thought
life, viz., the highest development of his intellectual faculties (lan bov), is
treated in the last chapter of this work; these intellectual faculties of man are
also discussed in the present chapter.
2
Comp. Annotations of R. Abraham, son of David (72″87 nwn) on
Maimonides' Mishnah Torah, Book I. (DD), on Teshubhah iii. 7.
“Why does Maimonides call him (who says that God is corporeal, endowed
with a certain form) a heretic (D)? Many men, even greater and better
than Maimonides, believed it, they being apparently supported by some pas-
sages in the Bible, and particularly by Agadic writings, which frequently lead
the reader astray." Comp. I. xxvi. sqq.
PART I.-CHAPTER I.
29
truth of the Bible: and further, if they did not conceive
God as having a body possessed of face and limbs, similar
to their own in appearance, they would have to deny even
the existence of God. The sole difference which they ad-
mitted, was that He excelled in greatness and splendour,
and that His substance was not flesh and blood. Thus far
went their conception of the greatness and glory of God.
The incorporeality of the Divine Being, and His unity, in
the true sense of the word-for there is no real unity
without incorporeality-will be fully proved in the course of
the present treatise. (Part II., ch. i.) In this chapter it is our
sole intention to explain the meaning of the words by and
¹ I hold that the Hebrew equivalent of "form" in
the ordinary acceptation of the word,2 viz., the figure and
יפה תאר ויפה מראה Thus we find .תאר shape of a thing, is
"(And Joseph was) beautiful in form and beautiful in
appearance" (Gen. xxxix. 6): 1, "What form is
he of ?" (1 Sam. xxviii. 14): 7, "As the form of
the children of a king" (Judges viii. 18). It is also applied
to form produced by human labour, as 772 17787)
and, "He marketh its form with a line,"
“and he marketh its form with the compass" (Is. xliv. 13).
This term is not at all applicable to God. The term by, on
the other hand, signifies the specific form,³ viz., that which
1 The object of this chapter is to prove that the expression by, "form,"
and likeness," which have been applied to the Deity, do not denote
any material property. In all other instances of anthropomorphic phrases,
Maimonides contents himself with showing that the term in question has, in
addition to the common signification, another meaning, which has no relation
to corporeal properties. In the instance of hy, however, he attempts—but in
vain—to prove that by in the Bible is employed exclusively in that latter
sense
(See p. 31, note 2.)
2 It appears that Maimonides had no adequate term for this class of forms,
viz., the natural forms of things as distinguished from their artificial forms
if translated literally, would express הצורה הטבעית .(צורה המלאכיית)
“natural forms,” but is employed by our author in the sense of "specific
characteristic." In Milloth Higgayon IX., this class is called 'ba mus
♫”, “ non-artificial form.”
3 From
1 in the sense of "outlines," "lineaments" of a thing, Mai-
30
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
constitutes the essence of a thing, whereby the thing is what
it is; the reality of a thing in so far as it is that particular
being. In man the "form" is that constituent which gives
him human perception and on account of this intellec-
tual perception¹ the term is employed in the phrase
In the form of God He created » בצלם אלהים ברא אותו
צלמם
him" (Gen. i. 27). It is therefore rightly said, by
man, "Thou despisest their form" (Ps. lxxiii. 20);
the "contempt" can only concern the soul-the specific
form² of man, not the bodily properties and shape.³ I am
,הבזה
monides distinguishes the philosophical term
"form," which corresponds
to the Aristotelian ɛîdoç, and signifies the cause of the essential properties of
things (rò ri v εiva). Form in the latter sense is called in Hebrew Y
nya, "physical form," i.e., that which gives to the things their nature
(púσiç), the sum of their essential properties. (See III., viii., and the Eight
Chapters, I.) The formless substance is the thing potentially (duváµɛ), the
form gives the real existence (INNDX, ¿v ¿vtedɛɣɛía).—Aaron b. Elijah in
his Ets Chayyim (Tree of Life ed. by M. Steinschneider and F. Delitzsch,
Leipzig, 1841), ch. xxii., explains the word hy as follows: bab papi py
צלם
לכל
שם מוסכם
צורה המקימת דבר בין בתכונה בין במציאות והצורה המקימת הדבר
.בתכונה בין היותה טבעית בין היותה מלאכותית :
"Tselem is the name
given to the constituent element of a thing in reference to both its geometrical
form and its entire existence. As to the former the term expresses both the
natural form and the artificial." Aaron b. Elijah has evidently seen the work
of Maimonides, and adopted the second explanation of Dhy suggested in this
chapter for those who could not be satisfied with the first.
in the version of השגה שכלית and (שכל אנושי .Char) השגה אנושית 1
Ibn Tibbon appear to be identical, and to denote the essential characteristic of
man, viz., his intellectual faculties. Ibn Caspi in Ammude Khesef (edited by
S. Verblumer, Francf. a M., 1848) remarks, that while generally man is defined
as 7", "speaking, living being," the property which is common to the
whole race, Maimonides defines man as possessing intellectual comprehension,
because he has in view man's highest degree of perfection, the full develop-
ment of his intellectual faculties.
Chariti ; צורה מינית by אלצורת אלנועית Tibbon renders the original 2
has instead, and both may perhaps mean one and the same thing.
"specific" is the literal translation of the Arabic, and is also correct in
so far as it refers to the soul of man; but as the contempt is limited to the soul
of some individuals, and does not extend to the soul of all men, Charizi is not
.צורה פרטית incorrect in substituting
3 Some commentators explain the words of Maimonides as follows: In this
PART I.-CHAPTER I.
31
also of opinion that the reason why "idols
idols" are called
by, may be found in the circumstance that they are wor-
shipped on account of some idea conveyed by them,¹ not on
account of their figure and shape. In the same way is
the forms of * צלמי טחוריכם used the expression
your
emerods" (1 Sam. vi. 5), for the chief object was the
removal of the injury caused by the emerods, not a change
of their shape. If, however, it must be assumed that the
images of the emerods and the idols are called by
on account of their external shape, the term by would be
either a real or an apparent homonym, and would denote.
both the specific form and the artificial shape, or similar
properties relating to the dimensions and the figure of mate-
2
Let us" נעשה אדם בצלמנו rial bodies ; and in the phrase
make man in our form” (Gen. i. 26), the term
צלמים
passage, viz., nian op, the object of i cannot be the outer appearance
of the persons referred to in that Psalm; for God looks only to the heart of
man, not to his outer appearance. Comp. Ets Chayyim, ch. xxii., MD DIDY
.שנמצא בעצמו
שאמר צלמם תבזה אינו רוצה לתכונת האברים רק לנפשם שהיא מקימת
אותם במציאותם ומנהגת אותם כי הבזיון לא יפול רק על החלק המעולה
by would then
“But when he says (nan opby) thou wilt despise their
form,' he does not mean by 'form' (b) the shape of the limbs, but their soul,
the constituent and leading element in their existence; for the contempt can
only apply to the nobler part in man's essence."
1 Lit.," that which is sought in them, the idea which they represent" (Arab.,
an abstract conception, not their external (כוחם .Ch,ענינם,Tibbon ; מאנאהא
העולה .by Ch הנחשב .is rendered by T אלמטנון בהא form, etc. The Arabic
}}
abby. Munk (page 35, note 2), leur sens (l'idée) qu'on s'imaginait, c'est à dire,
la fausse idée qu'on se formait d'elles ou la vertu qu'on leur attribuait par erreur.
2 Here Maimonides abandons his proposition that by in the Bible denotes
exclusively “ form " in the philosophical sense of the word. He admits, that in
the images of your emerods, the » צלמי טחוריכם idols and in » צלמים
word may perhaps refer to external likeness.
our author in all circumstances is the phrase
The only proof maintained by
is. Comp. Ets Chayyim
ונאמר צלמי טחוריכם רוצה בהם צורתם המלאכותית, ולתכונה ;.xxii
the images צלמי טחוריכם In. .הטבעית רוצה באמרו וצלם אנפוהי אשתנו
of your emerods' the word refers to their artificial form; it refers to the natural
form in the following passage, and the form of his visage was changed'
(Dan. iii. 19).
"""
32
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
signify "the specific form,"¹ viz., intellectual preception, not
"figure" or "shape." Thus we have shown the difference
צלם and explained the meaning of ,תאר and צלם between
П is derived from the verb 7, "to be similar.'
This term likewise denotes agreement with regard to some
abstract relation: Comp. 27, "I am like a
pelican of the wilderness" (Ps. cii. 7); the author does not.
compare himself to the pelican in point of wings and feathers,
,כל עץ בגן אלהים לא דמה אליו ביפיו .but in point of sadness
""
"nor any tree in the garden of God was like unto him in
beauty" (Ez. xxxi. 8); the comparison refers to the idea
Their poison is * חמת למו כדמות חמת נחש .of beauty
,דמיונו כאריה
like the poison of a serpent" (Ps. lviii. 5); 177,
"He is like unto a lion" (Ps. xvii. 12); the resemblance
indicated in these passages does not refer to the figure and
shape, but to some abstract idea. In the same manner is
used on 7, "the likeness of the throne" (Ez. i. 26);
the comparison is made with regard to greatness and glory,
not, as many believe, with regard to its square form, its
breadth, or the length of its legs: this explanation applies
also to the phrase, "the likeness of the living
creatures" (Ez. i. 13).
As man's distinction consists in a property which no other
creature on earth 2 possesses, viz., intellectual perception,
in the exercise of which he does not employ his senses,
nor move his hand or his foot, it has been compared-
though only apparently, not in truth-to the Divine ex-
cellency, which requires no instrument whatever. On this
account, i.e., on account of the Divine intellect with which
3
,דמות הכסא
¹ See note 2, p. 30, and note 3, p. 29.
2 Lit., "under the sphere of the moon," "sublunary beings."
Tibb. has the ; לא תתצרף פיה חאסה ולא ארחה ולא אנחה : Arabic 3
additional phrase 1 y 1, which originally was perhaps intended as
an emendation of 1, or as the explanation of the two expressions which
and denote parts of the body in general, and also
special parts, as "hand" and "side" or "wing; " hence rendered by Tib. 7',
follow.
.אבר,נתח .by Char רגל
PART I.-CHAPTER II.
33
man has been endowed,¹ he is said to have been made
in the form and likeness of the Almighty, but far from it
be the notion that the Supreme Being is corporeal, having
a material form.
CHAPTER II.
did ye shall be like BLOHIM " והייתם כאלהים ידעי טוב ורע
“
knowing good and evil."2 (Gen. iii. 5.)
SOME years ago³ a learned man asked me a question of
great importance; the problem and the solution which we
gave in our reply deserve the closest attention.
Before,
however, entering upon this problem and its solution I
must premise that every Hebrew knew that the term "Elo-
him "
was a homonym, and denoted God, angels, judges,
and the rulers of countries, and that Onkelos the prose-
5
.שנים
¹ Munk: qui se joint à l'homme. According to this writer's opinion,
Maimonides here alludes to the union of the passive intellect (pan Saw)
with the active intellect (na). It is, however, more probable that
Maimonides simply refers to man's soul, as having its temporary abode in his
body, without any reference to philosophical theories.
2 Having shown in the first chapter that the tselem elohim in which man was
created consisted in his intellectual perception, the author distinguishes in
this chapter that intellectual perception from man's moral feelings. He
appears to be of opinion that the latter originated in some kind of disturbance
in the action of the former. The faculty of distinguishing between good and
evil is therefore considered by Maimonides as the result of man's degenera-
tion.
lit. * it has years ; the more, זה לו שנים : Ibn Tibbon ; מנד סנין .Arab 3
זה כמה or זה שנים רבות,usual phrase in Hebrew is that employed by Charizi
4 Munk: Tout Hebreu sait. Ibn Tibbon and Charizi more correctly 70'>
y; for Maimonides evidently refers to the ancient Hebrews, who spoke the
language and understood how to apply the term elohim in its various signi-
fications.
5 It is noteworthy that elohim in this passage is not employed to mean
"angels." According to Maimonides the angels are purely intellectual beings,
ideals (0‘775) 0`b), and the attribute "knowing good and evil” is not
applicable to them. Maimonides was on this account accused of heresy; it
D
34
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
lyte¹ explained it in the true and correct manner by taking
the words D (lit., "ye shall be as gods," Gen.
iii. 5) in the last-mentioned meaning, and rendering them
"and ye shall be like rulers." Having
pointed out the homonymity of the term "Elohim" we re-
turn to the question under consideration. "It would at first
sight,” said the objector, “appear from Scripture that man
was originally intended to be perfectly equal to the rest of
the animal creation, which is not endowed with intellect,
reason, or power of distinguishing between good and evil :
but that Adam's disobedience to the command of God pro-
cured him that great perfection which is the peculiarity of
man, viz. the power of distinguishing between good and
evil-the noblest of all the faculties of our nature, the
essential characteristic of the human race. It thus appears
strange that the punishment for rebelliousness should be the
means of elevating man to a pinnacle of perfection to
which he had not attained previously. This is equivalent
to saying that a certain man was rebellious and extremely
wicked, his nature was therefore changed for the better,2
and he was made to shine as a star in the heavens.³
3" Such
was the purport and subject of the question, though not
in the exact words of the inquirer. Now mark our reply,
ותהון כרברביא
was argued as follows:-If angels do not possess the faculty of distinguishing
between good and evil because they are intellectual beings, then, à fortiori
this faculty must be denied to God, who is intellectual in the highest degree ;
consequently, the laws concerning good and evil could not be divine. Abarbanel,
in his Commentary on the Moreh, refutes these insinuations.
¹ See Babyl. Talmud, Gittin, 56 b. Onkelos, in his version of the Pentateuch,
avoids, as far as possible, all anthropomorphic expressions. (See ch. xxvii.
Comp. Introd. to Nethinah lagger, Comm. on the Targum of Onkelos, by Dr. N.
Adler, Chief Rabbi, and Deutsch, "Literary Remains," etc., pp. 319, sqq.) He
renders in this passage by №77"great men." The so-called Targum
Jonathan has 177, probably a combination of two different readings.
2 Arabic D, "and he changed," Shem-tob Palquera, in Moreh ha-moreh
I
.the former is more correct ; שנו ברייתו לטוב,Ibn Tibbon ; שנו ברייתו לרע
3 This probably alludes to the constellation of Nimrod or Gabbar, which, in
the mythology of the Arabs, has the same origin as the hunter Orion in the
mythology of the Greeks.
PART I.-
Mat
-CHAPTER II.
35
which was as follows:-"You appear to have studied the
matter superficially, and nevertheless you imagine that you
can understand a book which has been the guide of past and
present generations, when you for a moment withdraw from
your lusts and appetites, and glance over its contents as
if you were reading a historical work or some poetical
composition.¹ Collect your thoughts and examine the
matter carefully, for it is not to be understood as you at
first sight thought, but as you will find after due delibera-
tion; namely, the intellect which was granted to man as
the highest endowment, was bestowed on him before his
disobedience. With reference to this gift the Bible states
that “
man was created in the form and likeness of God."
On account of this gift of intellect man was addressed
by God, and received His commandments, as it is said:
"And the Lord God commanded Adam (Gen. ii. 16)-
for no commandments are given to the brute creation or to
those who are devoid of understanding. Through the in-
tellect man distinguishes between the true and the false.
This faculty Adam possessed perfectly and completely.
The right and the wrong are terms employed in the science
of apparent truths³ (morals), not in that of necessary
2
""
1 History and poetry did not stand in high estimation with the philosophers
of those days. Comp. Yesod Mora of Ibn Ezra, ch. i, and Ibn Ezra Litera-
ture by M. Friedländer, Vol. IV., page 60.
ולא תאבה למה שאמר האפודי שרמן הרב לאמרו ולא היתה הצוואה 2
Do not » לבהמות לויאמר יי לדג כי הרב לא כיוון בזה ולא עלתה על לבו
•
listen to the words of the Efodi that Maimonides in his remark the command
could not be given to beasts' implied a criticism on the passage and the
Lord spake unto the fish' (Jonah ii. 10), for Maimonides did not mean that,
and did not think of it.”—(Abarbanel.)
3D has the same two significations as the Greek Evdožov and the Eng-
lish "apparent," viz., 1, clear, well-known; 2 (opposed to positively true), pro-
bable, generally believed to be true. That which is universally known is better
known by direct perception than by proof. Maimonides in his Milloth Higgayon,
c. viii., enumerates four kinds of assertions which are accepted without re-
quiring further proof:-. Such as are based on perception by the senses
Those .3 ; (המושכלות הראשונות) Axioms or innate ideas .2 ; (המוחשים)
assertions which are generally accepted (MDD712DM), public opinion;
D 2
36
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
truths, as, e.g., it is not correct to say, in reference to the
proposition "the heavens are spherical," it is " "right" or
to declare the assertion that the earth is flat" to be
"wrong"; but we say of one it is true, of the other it is
false. Similarly our language expresses the idea of true
and false by the terms and , of the right and
the wrong, by 210 and . Thus it is the function of the
intellect to discriminate between the true and the false-a
distinction which is applicable to all objects of intellectual
perception. When Adam was yet in a state of innocence,
and was guided solely by reflection and reason-—on account
of which it is said: "Thou hast made him (man) little lower
than the angels" (Ps. viii. 6)—he was not at all able to
follow or to understand those principles of apparent truths;-
the most manifest impropriety, viz., to appear in a state
of nudity, was nothing unbecoming according to his idea:
he could not comprehend why it should be so. After man's
disobedience, however, when he began to give way to desires.
which had their source in his imagination and in the gra-
tification of his bodily appetites, as it is said "that the tree
was good for food and delightful to the eyes" (Gen. iii. 6),
he was punished by the loss of part of this intellectual
faculty. He therefore transgressed a command with which
he had been charged on the score of his reason; and having
obtained a knowledge of the apparent truths, he was wholly
absorbed in the study of the beautiful and its opposite.
Then he fully understood the magnitude of the loss he had
sustained, what he had forfeited, and in what situation he
was thereby placed. Hence we read, "And ye shall be like
1
<<
4. Those which are made on good authority (napp).—The assertions of the
,גלוי הערוה מגונה,are explained by two instances (המפורסמות) third class
.חסד המטיב ביותר נכבד and
The theory of Maimonides appears to be the following: If Adam had
remained in the full possession of his intellectual power, so that his bodily
desires and appetites had been completely under the control of his intellect and
reason, the moral principles mostly tending to restrain those desires and to
prevent their consequences, would not have been necessary, and therefore not
known to man. In the biblical account of the first man's state of innocence,
PART I.—CHAPTER II.
37
¡
Elohim, knowing good and evil," and not "knowing" or "dis-
cerning the true and the false:" while in necessary¹ truths
we can only apply the words "true and false,” not “ good and
evil." Further observe the passage, "And the eyes of both
were opened, and they knew they were naked." (Gen.iii. 7): it
is not said, "And the eyes of both were opened, and they
saw"; for what the man had seen previously and what he saw
after this circumstance was precisely the same; there had been
no blindness which was now removed, but he received a new
faculty whereby he found things wrong which previously
he had not regarded as wrong. Besides, you must know
that the word is exclusively used in the sense of re-
ceiving new sources of knowledge, not in that of regaining
the sense of sight. Comp., "God opened her eyes," (Gen.
xxi. 19). "Then shall the eyes of the blind be opened,"
(Isaiah xxxviii. 8). Open ears, he heareth not," (ibid.
xlii. 20), similar in sense to the verse, “Which have eyes
see, and see not," (Ezek. xii. 2). When, however, Scripture
to
66
lit., "He changes his face) משנה פניו ותשלחהו,says of Adam
and thou sendest him forth," Job xiv. 20), it must be under-
stood in the following way: On account of the change of his
-
this is, according to Maimonides, figuratively expressed in the commandment,
"But of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil thou shalt not eat
of it” (Gen. ii. 17). Adam disobeyed the Divine command, he then saw
the necessity of rules for restraining the desires; he had then to investigate and
to learn the difference between good and evil, between that which is right
and that which is wrong.
¹ The term
"necessary," is the opposite of
“generally
believed." The assertions based on logical operations are called b, and
because they alone can be established by scientific proof which conveys the
conviction that it must necessarily be so and cannot be otherwise, they are
also known by the term " necessary truths" (7). In reference to the
assertion of Maimonides, "in necessary truth we can only apply the words
'true' and 'false,' not 'right' and 'wrong,' "Ibn Caspi remarks:
בפירוש פילוסופיא דק מאוד לא ראיתי ולא שמעתי מי שעמד על אמונת
all thi * : זה לפי דעתי אבל חלקו עליו גדולים ממנו ויודע יי את אשר לו
is very ingenious in a philosophical argument, but I never heard of or met with
any person who defended and proved this assertion, but many great men differ
from him, and 'the Lord will show who is His.''
38
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
י.
99 66
original aim he was sent away.¹-For the term □ signi-
•fies " face,' aim," derived from 5, " to turn," as man
generally turns his face towards the thing he desires.-In
accordance with this interpretation, our text suggests that
Adam, as he altered his intention and directed his thoughts
to the acquisition of what he was forbidden, he was banished
from Paradise: this was his punishment; it was measure for
measure. At first he had the privilege of tasting pleasure
and happiness, and of enjoying repose and security; but as
his appetites grew stronger, and he followed his desires and
impulses, (as we have already stated above), and partook of
the food he was forbidden to taste, he was deprived of every-
thing, was doomed to subsist on the meanest kind of food,
such as he never tasted before, and this even only after exer-
tion and labour, as it is said, "Thorns and thistles shall grow
up for thee" (Gen. iii. 18), "By the sweat of thy brow," etc.,
and in explanation of this the text continues, " And the Lord
God drove him from the Garden of Eden, to till the ground
whence he was taken." He was now with respect to food and
many other requirements, brought to the level of the lower
animals; comp., "Thou shalt eat the grass of the field"
(Gen. iii. 18). Reflecting on his condition, the Psalmist
says, "Adam (man) unable to dwell in dignity, was brought
to the level of the dumb beast" (Ps. xlix. 13).²
¹ It is generally supposed that the subject to the verb D is God; as to
nnn), Maimonides thinks that it refers to Adam, to whom also the pro-
noun ' is referred. Comp. Bereshith Rabba, ch. xxi.
2 This verse is generally understood as referring not to Adam but to man-
kind. “A man who is without understanding is like the rest of the animal
world." Maimonides considers it as especially applying to the fate of Adam;
ואכלת The punishment .(כמבאר) כמבינא otherwise he would have said
MTN awу M8, "and thou shalt eat the herb of the field" (Gen. iii. 18), is
taken in contradistinction to the first blessing, by which Adam was allowed to
eat the fruit of the trees (ib. i. 28), called by our author 'yon, "pleasant
food."
Comp. Bereshith Rabba xxi. It is noteworthy that R. Levi-in
opposition to Rabbi Jitschak, who thinks that the first sentence "thou shalt
eat the herb of the field" was rather mitigated by the second "in the sweat of
thy face thou shalt eat bread "-exclaims, Would that the first sentence had
remained in force! (men would have had less trouble and care).
PART I.—CHAPTER III.
39
May the Almighty¹ be praised, whose design and
wisdom cannot be fathomed.2
""
CHAPTER III.
Construction. n, 1, Shape.
2, Image. 3, Idea.
It might be thought that
and
an in Hebrew have
one and the same meaning, but it is not the case. n,
on the one hand, is derived from the verb 2 (to build), and
signifies the build and construction of a thing-that is to
say, its figure, whether square, round, triangular, or of any
את תבנית המשכן ואת תבנית כל כליו .other shape. Comp
1 Lit., "the master of the will," that is, He who alone has the power to
,בעל היכלת .literally; Char בעל הרצון do what he wills. Ibn Tibbon
according to the sense.
2 After having described the sin of Adam, and his punishment, and having
explained the apparent difficulties of the Biblical account, Maimonides
strangely exclaims, "Praised be the Lord, whose plan and wisdom cannot be
fully comprehended," as if some difficult problem had been still left without
satisfactory solution. He probably alludes in these words to the question, Why
was Adam endowed with the power of leaving the higher sphere of pure
intellect, and falling into the lower grade of animal life? He therefore names
the Creator, Master of the will (by), and declares that it is impossible
to penetrate into the depth of His wisdom.
3 While giving the several significations of temunah under three heads, mate-
rial form, imaginary form, and intellectual form, Maimonides does not think it
necessary to assign to tabhnith more than one meaning, although the instances
given include the forms perceived by our senses and also those originated in the
;(9 .Ex. xxv) תבנית המשכן ואת תבנית imagination or seen in a vision, namely
DN’Jan) (16. xxv. 40); 7' n'an (Ezek. viii. 3; and x. 8). Not having found
any instance of Пn denoting a purely immaterial form, he probably did not
consider it necessary to divide the instances quoted into two classes, espe-
cially since the forms of the second class originating in the imagination (J1’D7])
are abstracted from material bodies, and are therefore in some cases treated as
material, in others as immaterial. Ibn Caspi suggests another solution, material
forms presenting themselves to a prophet in a vision, are in the account of such
a vision treated as material, and even Onkelos would not hesitate to retain in
his version anthropomorphic phrases of this kind. Comp. ch. xxvii.
40
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
L
"the pattern of the Tabernacle and the pattern of all its
כתבניתם אשר אתה מראה בהר ; (9 .Vessels (Exod. xxv
"according to the pattern which thou wast shown upon the
mount" (Exod. xxv. 40); 75 bo nan, "the form of any
bird" (Deut. iv. 17); Tan, "the form of a hand"
(Ezek. viii. 3); b, "the pattern of the porch "
(1 Chron. xxviii. 11). In all these quotations it is the
shape which is referred to; consequently the Hebrew lan-
guage never employs the word an in speaking of the
qualities of God Almighty.
The term, on the other hand, is used in the Bible
in three different senses. It signifies, first, the outlines of
things which are perceived by our bodily senses, i. e., their
תבנית האולם
And ",ועשיתם פסל תמונת כל סמל,.9 .shape and form ; as, e
ye make an image the form of some likeness" (Deut.
for ye saw no likeness * כי לא ראיתם כל תמונה ; (16 .iv
(Deut. iv. 15). Secondly, the forms of our imagination, i.e.,
the impressions retained in imagination when the objects.
have ceased to affect our senses.2 In this sense it is used
in the passage which begins "In thoughts from the visions
of the night" (Job iv. 13), and which concludes "it
remained but I could not recognise its sight, only an
image () was before my eyes," i.e., an image which
presented itself to my sight during sleep. Thirdly, the
true form of an object, which is perceived only by the intel-
lect and it is in this third signification that the term is
(8 .Numb. xii) ותמונת ה' יביט applied to God. The words
therefore mean "he comprehended the true essence of the
Lord."3
.תבניתו וצורתו Charizi,תארו Ibn Tibbon has only 1
taken literally imply that the object has אחר העלמו מן החושים The words 2
החושים
for some time been in contact with our senses, but after this contact has ceased,
an image of the object is still perceived in our imagination. Visions of the
night, and dreams, brought under this category, are explained by Maimonides to be
nothing but impressions previously received from real objects. As, however, Dhya
also means “hidden," "absent," the meaning of the words yn s
D' may also be this: images of objects which have not been in contact with
the senses.
3 This is not in contradiction to the assertion made by our author (ch. xxxvii.)
נעלם
אחר העלמו מן
1
PART I.-CHAPTER IV.
41
CHAPTER IV.
787, 0127, nin 1, To see. 2, To comprehend.¹
THE three words 7, 2, 7, which denote "to per-
ceive with the eye," are also used figuratively in the sense
of intellectual perception. As regards, this is well
known, e.g.,
87, "And he looked, and
beheld a well in the field" (Gen. xxix. 2): here 7 signi-
,וירא והנה באר
,yea" ולבי ראה הרבה חכמה ודעת ; fies ocular perception
my heart has seen much of wisdom and of knowledge"
(Eccles. i. 16); in this passage refers to the intellectual
perception.
2
In this figurative sense the expression is to be under-
stood, when applied to God 3; e.g., 'n on '7'87, “I saw
the Lord" (1 Kings xxii. 19); ', "And the Lord
"that no man can have a conception of the real existence of God," for a dis-
tinction must be made between 9) ♬ ANDN), "he comprehends the true
idea of the Lord," scil., as far as man is able to comprehend it, and nлDN
His existence as it is in reality, cannot » מציאותו כפי מה שהוא לא תושג
be apprehended." Some commentators find here a contradiction, and explain it
to be an instance of the seventh cause of apparent contradictions, described by
Maimonides in the introduction to this work. Comp. Albo Ikkarim, Introd.
to Book II.-Crescas justly notices that the only instance adduced by Maimo-
nides in support of the third signification of the word, is one that requires to
be proved. The word "temunah" is here applied to God, and the object of
these chapters is to show that such expressions, used in reference to God, are
not to be taken in their common signification.
1 The last-mentioned instance of containing the verb 'to see' in refe-
rence to God, suggested probably to the author the appropriateness of giving
here the explanation of these three verbs.
2 By this term (in Hebrew n ), Maimonides indicates that
these words are not really homonymous (D'лл), but are used both in a
literal sense and in a figurative. According to Shem-tob this formula indicates
that in the instances which follow the word is employed in a similar meaning,
but not in exactly the same as that mentioned before. The rule does not hold
good in all cases. The phrase generally occurs before instances to which the
author desires to call our special attention.
3 That is, both in instances in which God is described as seeing, and in which
He is described as being seen.
42
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
·
את כבודך
appeared unto him" (Gen. xviii. 1); 210 cımba 87u
"And God saw that it was good" (Gen. i. 10); 7
7772, “I beseech Thee, show me Thy glory” (Exod.
xxxiii. 18); 8, "And they saw the God
of Israel" (Exod. xxiv. 10). All these instances refer to per-
ception by the intellect, and by no means to perception
with the eye as in its literal meaning: for, on the one
hand, the eye can only perceive a corporeal object, and even
this only from one point of view,¹ and in connection with it
certain accidents, as colour, shape, etc.; and, on the other
hand, God does not make use of any means in perceiving
a thing, as will be explained.²
In the same manner signifies "to view with the
eye; comp. Tan bs, "Look not behind thee" (Gen.
xix. 17); 1, "But his wife looked back
from him” (Gen. xix. 26);
1, “And if one look
into the land" (Isaiah v. 30); and figuratively, " to view and
observe" with the intellect, "to contemplate" a thing till it
be understood. In this sense 27 is used in passages like
(6
,ויראו את אלהי ישראל
ותבט אשתו מאחריו
He hath not beheld לא הביט און ביעקב :the following
וירא אלהים כי טוב
,(ובצד 1
iniquity in Jacob" (Num. xxiii. 21); for “iniquity" cannot
"And
they looked after Moses" (Exod. xxxiii. 8)—in addition to the
literal understanding of the phrase-were explained by our
Sages in a figurative sense. According to them, these words
mean that the Israelites examined and criticised the actions
,והביטו אחרי משה be seen with the eye. The words
our eye. Charizi has Dip),
of the object at the same time.
""
3
In Arabic) (in Hebrew 731), "and only in a side," or "and only
the surface" (like ni₁ =), only the exterior of a body being exposed to
"and in a certain place," that is, not all the sides
Some MSS. of the editions of Tibbon's version
,אנא מסתכל
".and in connection with it some * ובצדו קצת others ובצד וקצת have
Although the first reading agrees with the Arabic, the second reading gives evi-
dently a better sense.
2 See ch. liv.
3 Maimonides appears to hold that the subject to the verb ' is either the
indefinite "one," or (6
“I considered, there are no idolaters," etc.; Targ. Jon. n'b xyw, pyba nos
“The wicked Balaam said, I see no," etc. Others explain "God
does not see," etc.
""
אסתכלית לית פלחי גלולין Balaam. Comp. Onkelos
PART I.-
sp
43
CHAPTER IV.
Moses.
"C
הבט נא השמימה and sayings of
Contemplate, I pray thee, the heaven" (Gen. xv. 5); for
this took place in a prophetic vision.2 The term , when
applied to God, is employed in this figurative sense; e. g.,
Bimban ba or, "to look upon God" (Exod. iii. 6);
Compare
also
מהביט אל האלהים
And the similitude of the Lord shall he * ותמונת ה' יביט
,והביט אל עמל לא תוכל
behold" (Num. xii. 8); bn Abbay be 277, "And
thou canst not look on iniquity" (Habak. i. 13).
The same explanation applies to . It denotes to view
look
upon Zion" (Micah iv. 11); and also figuratively, to perceive
And let our eye ",ותחז בציון עינינו : with the eye, as
Abram in a vision
used in the phrase
(Exod. xxiv. 11).
,הביט
which he say " אשר חזה על יהודה וירושלים : mentally
>
concerning Judah and Jerusalem" (Isaiah i. 1); 27 7'
">
The word of the Lord came unto • ה' אל אברם במחזה
(Gen. xv. 1); in this sense
,ויחזו את האלהים
3
Note this well ! ³
is
ban," Also they saw God"
1 Comp. Shemoth Rabba xli., and the Commentary of Rashi on Exod. xxxiii. 8.
2 According to the literal meaning Abraham was told, although in a vision,
to go out of his tent and to look up to the heavens. In the Midrash the words
،،
-renounce thy know " צא מאצטגנינות שלך are interpreted ויוצא אתו החוצה
ledge of the influence of the stars," and in accordance with this interpretation
Maimonides appears to understand the verb D in the sense of "to reflect."
The words "for this took place in a prophetic vision," do not refer to the phrase
"in a vision" (na), by which the biblical account is introduced; for in a
vision Abraham may have looked at the heavens, and according to Maimonides
(ch. xxvii.), the account of a vision is given as it really took place. These words
are merely an explanation of that Abraham was told to reflect in a pro-
phetic vision on the heavens.
3 The author invites the reader to notice this explanation of MM in the last-
mentioned instance, as his interpretation of that passage, which will be given
in extenso in ch. v. is founded on the fact that there signifies "to
perceive mentally."
44
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
CHAPTER V.
Bimban na 10"Also they saw God."1
WHEN the chief of Philosophers² [Aristotle] was about to
inquire into some very profound subjects, and to establish
his theory by proofs, he commenced his treatise with an
apology, and requested the reader to attribute the author's
inquiries not to presumption, vanity, egotism, or arrogance,
as though he were interfering with things of which he had no
knowledge, but rather to zeal and desire to discover and
establish true doctrines, as far as lay in human power.
take the same position, and think that a man, when he com-
mences to speculate, ought not to embark at once on a subject
so vast and important; he should previously adapt himself to
the study of the several branches of science and knowledge,³
should most thoroughly refine his moral character and
subdue his passions and desires, the offspring of his imagi-
4
1 Maimonides, fond of moral reflections, introduces them in all his works
wherever opportunity is given. The last-mentioned words of the Pentateuch,
taken according to his interpretation, afford an opportunity for such a digres-
sion, and he therefore devotes a whole chapter to the explanation of that passage.
2 The Greek philosopher Aristotle is meant, who was regarded as the greatest
authority in all questions relating to philosophy. He was called the philo-
sopher Kar' oxýv, and his works were the text-books, which were read,
studied, and expounded in the schools of the Mahomedans, not from their
original, but from Arabic translations. As to the apology referred to, comp.
Arist. De cælo, ii. 12.
3 Munk: " sans s'être exercé dans les sciences et les connaissances.' It
would be strange that the curriculum of a Theological student should begin with
exercise in science and knowledge, a step certainly not the first in the course
of any student, or that other disciplines-which do not require a know-
ledge of Logic-must for a long time have engaged the attention of the scholar
before he prepared himself for Theology. Both kinds of advice would be equally
absurd. Most probably Maimonides meant by j (Hebr. Dyy 5'7") that
he should adapt himself to the requirements of the life of a Theological scholar
by learning to bear with equanimity every kind of privation, exertion, and hard
work for the sake of truth. This general advice is developed in the words which
follow.
""
4 Both Shem-tob and Efodi find these conditions indicated in the Command-
Exod. xix. 14-15), given to the) אל תנשו אל אשה and, וכבסו שמלותם ments
Israelites when preparing for the Revelation on Mount Sinai. Comp. Plat.
PART I.-CHAPTER V.
45
nation; when, in addition, he has obtained a knowledge
of the true fundamental propositions, a comprehension of
the several methods of inference and proof (logic), and the
capacity of guarding against fallacies, then he may approach
the investigation of this subject. He must, however, not
decide any question by the first idea that suggests itself to
his mind, or at once direct his thoughts to command a
knowledge of the Creator, but he must wait modestly and
patiently, and advance step by step.
In this sense we must understand the words “And Moses
hid his face, for he was afraid to look upon God" (Exod.
iii. 6), retaining at the same time the literal meaning of the
passage, that Moses was afraid to gaze at the light which ap-
peared to his eye; but it must on no account be assumed that
the Being which is exalted far above every imperfection can
be perceived by the eye.
This act of Moses was highly
commended by God, who bestowed on him a well-deserved
portion of His goodness, as it is said: "And the similitude
of the Lord shall he behold." (Num. xii. 8.) This, say our
Sages, was the reward for having previously hidden his
face, lest he should gaze at the Eternal.¹
"The nobles of the Children of Israel," on the other
hand, were impetuous, and allowed their thoughts to go un-
restrained what they perceived was but imperfect. There-
fore it is said of them, "And they saw the God of Israel,
and there was under his feet," etc. (Exod. xxiv. 10); and
not merely, "and they saw the God of Israel: " the pur-
pose of the whole passage is to criticise their act of seeing
and not to describe it. They are blamed for the nature of
T
âv ò
Phaed. 9. καὶ ἐν ᾧ ἂν ζῶμεν, οὕτως, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐγγυτάτω ἐσόμεθα τοῦ εἰδέναι,
ἐὰν ὅτι μάλιστα μηδὲν ὁμιλῶμεν τῷ σώματι, μηδὲ κοινωνῶμεν ὅ,τι μὴ πᾶσα
ἀνάγκη, μηδὲ ἀναπιμπλώμεθα τῆς τούτου φύσεως, ἀλλὰ καθαρεύωμεν ἀπ'
αὐτοῦ, ἕως ἂν ὁ θεὸς αὐτὸς ἀπολύσῃ ἡμᾶς : “ while we live, we shall probably
be nearest to knowledge when we most ignore the body, and only take
notice of it when absolutely necessary; when we do not allow ourselves to be
entirely occupied with the wants of the body, but try to make ourselves
independent of it till God Himself deliver us entirely from it." (Comp.
Part II., chap. xxxvii.)
¹ Talmud Babli Berachoth, 7 a.
46
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
their perception, which was to a certain extent corporeal—a
result which necessarily followed, from the fact that they
ventured too far before being perfectly prepared. They
deserved to perish, but at the intercession of Moses this fate
was averted by God for the time. They were afterwards.
burnt at Taberah, except Nadab and Abihu, who were
burnt in the Tabernacle of the congregation, according to
what is stated by authentic tradition.¹
If such was the case with them, how much more is it
incumbent on us who are inferior, and those still lower
than we, to persevere in perfecting our knowledge of the
elements, and in rightly understanding the preliminaries
which purify the mind from the defilement of error; then
we may enter the holy and divine camp in order to gaze:
as the Bible says, "And let the priests also, which come
near to the Lord, sanctify themselves, lest the Lord break
forth upon them." (Exod. xix. 22.) Solomon, also, has
cautioned all who endeavour to attain this high degree of
knowledge in the following figurative terms, "Keep thy.
foot when thou goest to the house of God." (Eccles. iv. 17.)
I will now return to complete what I commenced to ex-
plain. The nobles of the Children of Israel, besides erring
in their perception were, through this cause, also misled in
their actions; for, in consequence of their confused percep-
tion, they gave way to bodily cravings. This is meant by the
words, "Also they saw God and did eat and drink." (Exod.
xxiv. 11.) The principal part of that passage, viz., “ And
there was under his feet as it were a paved work of a sap-
phire stone"
(Exod. xxiv. 10), will be further explained in
the course of the present treatise. (ch. xxviii.) All we here
intend to say is, that wherever in a similar passage the word
occurs, it has reference to intellectual הביט or,חזה ראה
.Exod) ואל אצילי בני ישראל לא שלח ידו In the Midrashim the words 1
xxiv. 11) are interpreted as follows:-God did not punish the nobles of the
Israelites (Nadab, Abihu, and the seventy Elders) on that occasion, but sub-
sequently they did receive their punishment: the sons of Aaron on the eighth
day of Dedication (Lev. x. 2), and the elders at Taberah (Num. xi. 1-3).
Comp. Midrash Rabba et Tanchumah ad locum.
2 Arab. DND; D in the Hebrew versions is incorrect.
-
PART I.-CHAPTER VI.
47.
perception, not to the sensation of sight by the eye; for
God is not a being to be perceived by the eye.
It will do no harm,¹ however, if those who are unable to
comprehend what we here endeavour to explain2 should
refer all the words in question to sensuous perception, such
as lights created [for the purpose], angels, or similar beings.
CHAPTER VI.3
vs 1, Man. 2, Male. 3, One (—the other).
A
אשה
אחות
1, Woman. 2, Female. 3, One (—the other).
1, Brother. 2, (one) the other.
1, Sister. 2, (one-) the other.
THE two nouns and were originally employed to
designate the "male and female" of human beings, but were
afterwards applied to the "male and female" of the other
species of the animal creation. For instance, we read, "Of
every clean beast thou shalt take to thee by sevens," s
(Gen. vii. 2), which is identical in meaning with
"male and female." The term ¹ was after-
wards applied to anything designed and prepared for union.
with another object. Thus we read, "The five curtains.
,זכר ונקבה
That is to say, The interpretation which follows does not contradict
the principle laid down by Maimonides, that the terms D'an, n, 77, when
applied to God, denote intellectual perception, nor does such a view necessarily
include the corporification of God.
2 Lit.,
"those who fall short of attaining that degree towards which
we endeavour to go up with him."
3 It appears that Maimonides intends to return to the words Tselem and
Demuth, and to show that the significations mentioned above apply also to them
and he begat in his likeness and in his * ויולד בדמותו ובצלמו in the phrase
image." For that reason probably the explanation of N 'N and
are introduced here.
Although only
N is mentioned here by Maimonides, the explanation
must be understood to apply likewise to N. It would otherwise be strange
that Maimonides should have ignored the circumstance that in the instance
quoted by him, the feminine N is used on account of the feminine form of
.יריעה the noun
48
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
4
shall be coupled together s b s, one to the other"
(Exod. xxvi. 3).
It will easily be seen that the terms and s,
"brother and sister," are likewise treated as homonyms, and
used, in a figurative sense, like w and 8.¹
1
CHAPTER VII.
71, To bear. 2, To create. 3, To produce. 4, To cause to
happen. 5, To infer. 6, To teach.
It is well known that the term
means, "to bear,"
75 175", "they have born him children" (Deut. xxi.
15). The word was next used in a figurative sense with
reference to objects in nature, meaning, "to create," as in
"before the mountains were created'
1"
(Ps. xc. 2); also, "to produce," in reference to that which
the earth causes to come forth as if by birth, e.g., atıbımı
“He will cause her to bear and bring forth" (Isa.
lv. 10). The term further denotes, "to bring forth," scil.
changes in the process of time, as though they were things
which were born, e. g., 7, "for thou
knowest not what a day may bring forth" (Prov. xxvii. 1).
Another figurative use of the word is its application to the
formation of thoughts and of ideas, and opinions resulting
from them; comp.
"and brought forth falsehood"
(Ps. vii. 14); also, p, "and they please
themselves in the children of strangers" (Isa. ii. 6), i.e.,
"they delight in their opinions." Jonathan ben Uzziël
،،
בטרם הרים ילדו
והולידה
they walk ובנימוסי עממיא אזלין paraphrases the passage
in the customs of the Gentiles."
¹ It deserves notice how very little Maimonides has to say on and
П, leaving it entirely to the reader to find the gradations between
the primitive and the figurative meanings of the words from the analo-
איש אל אחיו and to explain accordingly the phrases ;אשה and איש gous
(Exod. xxv. 20) and nins 8 nws (Ez. i. 9). The explanation of these
words is here introduced, probably because they occur in a figurative sense in
the first chapter of Ezekiel.
+
ANALYSIS OF THE GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
lxv
on the properties of the First Cause. Purely intellectual
beings, he says, are not subject to the same laws as material
bodies; that which necessitates a change in the latter or in the
will of man need not produce a change in immaterial beings.
As to the belief that the heavens are inhabited by angels and
deities, it has not its origin in the real existence of these
supernatural beings; it was suggested to man by meditation
on the apparent grandeur of heavenly phenomena (ch. xviii.).
Maimonides next proceeds to explain how, independently of
the authority of Scripture, he has been led to adopt the belief
in the creatio ex nihilo. Admitting that the great variety of
the things in the sublunary world can be traced to those im-
mutable laws which regulate the influence of the spheres on
the beings below-the variety in the spheres can only be
explained as the result of God's free will. According to
Aristotle the principal authority for the eternity of the
Universe it is impossible that a simple being should,
according to the laws of nature, be the cause of various and
compound beings. Another reason for the rejection of the
Eternity of the Universe may be found in the fact that the
astronomer Ptolemy has proved the incorrectness of the view
which Aristotle had of celestial spheres, although the system
of that astronomer is likewise far from being perfect and
final (ch. xxiv.). It is impossible to obtain a correct notion
of the properties of the heavenly spheres; "the heaven, even
the heavens, are the Lord's, but the earth hath he given to
the children of man." (Ps. cxv. 16.) The author, observing
that the arguments against the creatio ex nihilo are un-
tenable, adheres to his theory, which was taught by such
prophets as Abraham and Moses. Although each Scriptural
quotation could, by a figurative interpretation be made
to agree with the opposite theory, Maimonides declines to
ignore the literal sense of a term, unless it be in opposi-
tion to well-established truths, as is the case with anthro-
pomorphic expressions; for the latter, if taken literally,
would be contrary to the demonstrated truth of God's in-
corporeality (ch. xxv.). He is therefore surprised that the
e
M
C
lxvi
INTRODUCTION.
author of Pirke-di-Rabbi Eliezer ventured to assume the eter-
nity of matter, and he thinks it possible that Rabbi Eliezer
carried the license of figurative speech too far. (Ch. xxvi.)
The theory of the creatio ex nihilo does not involve the
belief that the Universe will at a future time be de-
stroyed; the Bible distinctly teaches the creation, but not
the destruction of the world except in passages which
are undoubtedly conceived in a metaphorical sense. On
the contrary, respecting certain parts of the Universe it
is clearly stated "He established them for ever." (Ps.
cxlviii. 5.) The destruction of the Universe would be,
as the creation has been, a direct act of the Divine will,
and not the result of those immutable laws which govern
the Universe. The Divine will would in that case set
aside those laws, both in the initial and the final stages
of the Universe. Within this interval, however, the laws
remain undisturbed (ch. xxvii.). Apparent exceptions, the
miracles, originate in these laws, although man is unable
to perceive the causal relation. The biblical account of
the creation concludes with the statement that God rested
on the seventh day, that is to say, He declared that the
work was complete; no new act of creation was to take
place, and no new law was to be introduced. It is true that
the second and the third chapters of Genesis appear to
describe a new creation, that of Eve, and a new law, namely,
that of man's mortality, but these chapters are explained as
containing an allegorical representation of man's psychical
and intellectual faculties, or a supplemental detail of the con-
tents of the first chapter. Maimonides seems to prefer
the allegorical explanation which, as it seems, he had in
view without expressly stating it, in his treatment of
Adam's sin and punishment. (Part I. ch. ii.) It is cer-
tainly inconsistent on the one hand to admit that at the
pleasure of the Almighty the laws of nature may become
inoperative, and that the whole Universe may become an-
nihilated, and on the other hand to deny, that during the
existence of the Universe, any of the natural laws ever
K
D
ANALYSIS OF THE GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
lxvii
have been or ever will be suspended. It seems that Mai-
monides could not conceive the idea that the work of the
All-wise should be, as the Mutakallemim taught-without
plan and system, or that the laws once laid down should not
be sufficient for all emergencies.
The account of the Creation given in the book of Ge-
nesis is explained by the author according to the fol-
lowing two rules: First its language is allegorical; and
Secondly, the terms employed are homonyms. The
words erets, mayim, ruach, and choshech in the second verse
(ch. i.), are homonyms and denote the four elements:
earth, water, air, and fire; in other instances erets is the
terrestrial globe of the earth, mayim is water or vapour,
ruach denotes wind, and choshech darkness. According to
Maimonides, a summary of the first chapter may be given
thus: God created the Universe by producing first the
reshith the "beginning" (Gen. i. 1), or hathchalah, i.e.,
the intellects which give to the spheres both existence and
motion, and thus become the source of the existence of the
entire Universe. At first this Universe consisted of a
chaos of elements, but its form was successively developed
by the influence of the spheres, and more directly by
the action of light and darkness, the properties of which
were fixed on the first day of the Creation. In the sub-
sequent five days minerals, plants, animals, and the intellec-
tual beings came into existence. The seventh day, on which
the Universe was for the first time ruled by the same
natural laws which continue in operation, was distinguished
as a day blessed and sanctified by the Creator, who de-
signed it to proclaim the creatio ex nihilo (Exod. xx. 11).
The Israelites were moreover commanded to keep this Sab-
bath in commemoration of their departure from Egypt (Deut.
v. 15), because during the period of the Egyptian bond-
age, they had not been permitted to rest on that day. In
the history of the first sin of man, Adam, Eve, and the
serpent represent the intellect, the body, and the imagi-
nation. In order to complete the imagery, Samael or Satan,
-
e 2
lxviii
INTRODUCTION.
mentioned in the Midrash in connection with this account,
is added as representing man's appetitive faculties. Imagi-
nation, the source of error, is directly aided by the appe-
titive faculty, and the two are intimately connected with the
body, to which man generally gives paramount attention,
and for the sake of which he indulges in sins; in the end,
however, they subdue the intellect and weaken its power.
Instead of obtaining pure and real knowledge, man forms
false conceptions; in consequence, the body is subject to
suffering, whilst the imagination, instead of being guided
by the intellect and attaining a higher development be-
comes debased and depraved. In the three sons of Adam,
Kain, Abel, and Seth, Maimonides finds an allusion to the
three elements in man: the vegetable, the animal, and the
intellectual. First, the animal element (Abel) becomes ex-
tinct; then the vegetable elements (Kain) are dissolved;
only the third element, the intellect (Seth), survives, and
forms the basis of mankind (ch. xxx., xxxi.).
Maimonides having so far stated his opinion in explicit.
terms, it is difficult to understand what he had in view by
the avowal that he could not disclose everything. It is un-
questionably no easy matter to adapt each verse in the first
chapters of Genesis to the foregoing allegory; but such an
adaptation is, according to the author's own view (Part I.,
Introd., p. 19), not only unnecessary, but actually objection-
able.
In the next section (xxxii.-xlviii.) Maimonides treats of
Prophecy. He mentions the following three opinions:
1. Any person, irrespective of his physical or moral qualifi-
cations, may be summoned by the Almighty to the mission
of a prophet. 2. Prophecy is the highest degree of mental
development, and can only be attained by training and study.
3. The gift of prophecy depends on physical, moral, and
mental training, combined with inspiration. The author
adopts the last-mentioned opinion. He defines prophecy as
an emanation (shepha'), which through the will of the
Almighty descends from the Active Intellect to the intellect
7
ANALYSIS OF THE GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
lxix
and the imagination of thoroughly qualified persons. The
prophet is thus distinguished both from wise men whose
intellect alone received the necessary impulse from the
Active Intellect, and from diviners or dreamers, whose
imagination alone has been influenced by the Active Intel-
lect. Although it is assumed that the attainment of this
prophetic faculty depends on God's will, this dependence is
nothing else but the relation which all things bear to the
Primal Cause; for the Active Intellect acts in conformity
with the laws established by the will of God; it gives an
impulse to the intellect of man, and, bringing to light those
mental powers which lay dormant, it merely turns potential
faculty into real action. These faculties can be perfected to
such a degree as to enable man to apprehend the highest
truths intuitively, without passing through all the stages of
research required by ordinary persons. The same fact is
noticed with respect to imagination; man sometimes forms
faithful images of objects and events which cannot be traced
to the ordinary channel of information, namely, impressions
made on the senses. Since prophecy is the result of a
natural process, it may appear surprising that, of the nume-
rous men excelling in wisdom, so few became prophets.
Maimonides accounts for this fact by assuming that the
moral faculties of such men had not been duly trained.
None of them had, in the author's opinion, gone through the
moral discipline indispensable for the vocation of a prophet.
Besides this, everything which obstructs mental improve-
ment, misdirects the imagination or impairs the physical
strength, and precludes man from attaining to the rank of pro-
phets. Hence no prophecy was vouchsafed to Jacob during
the period of his anxieties on account of his separation from
Joseph. Nor did Moses receive a divine message during the
years which the Israelites, under divine punishment, spent
in the desert. On the other hand, music and song awakened
the prophetic power (comp. 2 Kings iii. 15), and "The spirit
of prophecy alights only on him who is wise, strong, and
rich" (Babyl. Talm. Shabbath, 92a). Although the prepa-
lxx
INTRODUCTION.
ration for a prophetic mission, the pursuit of earnest and
persevering study, as also the execution of the divine dic-
tates, required physical strength, yet in the moment when
the prophecy was received the functions of the bodily organs
were suspended. The intellect then acquired true know-
ledge, which presented itself to the prophet's imagination in
forms peculiar to that faculty. Pure ideals are almost in-
comprehensible; man must translate them into language
which he is accustomed to use, and he must adapt them to
his own mode of thinking. In receiving prophecies and
communicating them to others the exercise of the prophet's
imagination was therefore as essential as that of his intel-
lect, and Maimonides seems to apply to this imagination the
term "angel," which is so frequently mentioned in the Bible
as the medium of communication between the Supreme
Being and the prophet.
Only Moses held his bodily functions under such control
that even without their temporary suspension he was able to
receive prophetic inspiration; the interposition of the
imagination was in his case not needed: "God spoke to him
mouth to mouth." (Numb. xii. 8.) Moses differed so com-
pletely from other prophets that the term "prophet" could
only have been applied to him and other men by way of
homonymy.
The impulses descending from the Active Intellect to
man's intellect and imagination produce various effects,
according to his physical, moral, and intellectual condition.
Some men are thus endowed with extraordinary courage
and with an ambition to perform great deeds, or they feel
themselves impelled to appeal mightily to their fellowmen
by means of exalted and pure language. Such men are
filled with "the spirit of the Lord," or, "with the spirit of
holiness." To this distinguished class belonged Jephthah,
Samson, David, Solomon, and the authors of the Hagio-
grapha. Though above the standard of ordinary men, they
were not included in the rank of prophets. Maimonides.
divides the prophets into two groups, namely, those who
ANALYSIS OF THE GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
lxxi
receive inspiration in a dream and those who receive it in a
vision. The first group includes the following five classes :—
1. Those who see symbolic figures; 2. Those who hear a
voice addressing them without perceiving the speaker; 3.
Those who see a man and hear him addressing them; 4.
Those who see an angel addressing them; 5. Those who see
God and hear His voice. The other group is divided in a
similar manner, but contains only the first four classes,
for Maimonides considered it impossible that a prophet
should see God in a vision. This classification is based on the
various expressions employed in the Scriptures to describe
the several prophecies.
When the Israelites received the Law at Mount Sinai,
they distinctly heard the first two commandments, which
include the doctrines of the Existence and the Unity of
God; of the other eight commandments, which enunciate
moral, not metaphysical truths, they heard the mere “sound
of words"; and it was through the mouth of Moses that
the divine instruction was revealed to them. Maimonides
defends this opinion by quotations from the Talmud and the
Midrashim.
The theory that imagination was an essential element in
prophecy is supported by the fact that figurative speech pre-
dominates in the prophetical writings, which abound in
figures, hyperbolical expressions and allegories. The sym-
bolical acts which are described in connection with the
visions of the prophets, such as the translation of Ezekiel
from Babylon to Jerusalem (Ez. viii. 3), Isaiah's walking
about naked and barefoot (Is. xx. 2), Jacob's wrestling with
the angel (Gen. xxxii. 27 sqq.), and the speaking of Balaam's
ass (Num. xxii. 28), had no positive reality. The prophets,
employing an elliptical style, frequently omitted to state
that a certain event related by them was part of a vision or
a dream. In consequence of such elliptical speech events
are described in the Bible as coming directly from God,
although they simply are the effect of the ordinary laws of
nature, and as such depend on the will of God. Such pas-
lxxii
INTRODUCTION.
sages cannot be misunderstood when it is borne in mind that
every event and every natural phenomenon can for its origin
be traced to the Primal Cause. In this sense the prophets
employ such phrases as the following: "And I will com-
mand the clouds that they rain no rain upon it" (Is. v. 6);
"I have also called my mighty men" (ibid. xi. 3).
PART III.
This part contains the following six sections:-1. Expo-
sition of the maaseh mercabhah (Ez. i.), ch. i.-vii.; 2. On
the nature and the origin of evil, ch. viii.-xii. ; 3. On the
object of the creation, ch. xiii.-xv.; 4. On Providence and
Omniscience, ch. xvi.-xxv.; 5. On the object of the Divine
precepts (taame ha-mitsvoth) and the historical portions of the
Bible, ch. xxv.-xl.; 6. A guide to the proper worship of
God.
With great caution Maimonides approaches the explana-
tion of the maaseh mercabhah, the chariot which Ezekiel
beheld in a vision (Ez. i.). The mysteries included in the
description of the divine chariot had been orally transmitted
from generation to generation, but in consequence of the
dispersion of the Jews the chain of tradition was broken,
and the knowledge of these mysteries had vanished. What-
ever he knew of those mysteries he owed exclusively to his
own inventive faculties; he therefore could not reconcile
himself to the idea that his knowledge should die with him.
He committed his exposition of the maaseh mercabhah and
the maaseh bereshith to writing, but did not divest it of its
original mysterious character; so that the explanation was
fully intelligible to the initiated that is to say, to the
philosopher—but to the ordinary reader it was a mere para-
phrase of the biblical text.-(Introduction.)
The first seven chapters are devoted to the exposition of
the divine chariot. According to Maimonides three distinct
ANALYSIS OF THE GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED. lxxiii
parts are to be noticed, each of which begins with the phrase
"And I saw." These parts correspond to the three parts of
the Universe, the sublunary world, the spheres and the intel-
ligences. First of all the prophet is made to behold the
material world which consists of the earth and the spheres,
and of these the spheres as the more important, are noticed
first. In the Second Part, in which the nature of the
spheres is discussed, the author dwells with pride on his
discovery that they can be divided into four groups. This
discovery he now employs to show that the four "chayyoth"
(animals) represent the four divisions of the spheres. He
points out that the terms which the prophet uses in the
description of the chayyoth are identical with terms applied
to the properties of the spheres. For the four chayyoth,
or "angels," or cherubim, (1) have human form; (2) have
human faces; (3) possess characteristics of other animals;
(4) have human hands; (5) their feet are straight and
round (cylindrical); (6) their bodies are closely joined to
each other; (7) only their faces and their wings are
separate; (8) their substance is transparent and refulgent;
(9) they move uniformly; (10) each moves in its own
direction; (11) they run; (12) swift as lightning they
return towards their starting point; and (13) they move
in consequence of an extraneous impulse (ruach). In
a similar manner the spheres are described :-(1) they
possess the characteristics of man, viz., life and intellect;
(2) they consist like man of body and soul; (3) they are
strong, mighty and swift, like the ox, the lion, and the
eagle; (4) they perform all manner of work as though they
had hands; (5) they are round, and are not divided into
parts; (6) no vacuum intervenes between one sphere and the
other; (7) they may be considered as one being, but in
respect to the intellects, which are the causes of their
existence and motion, they appear as four different beings;
(8) they are transparent and refulgent; (9) each sphere
moves uniformly, (10) and according to its special laws;
(11) they revolve with great velocity; (12) each point
*
lxxiv
INTRODUCTION.
returns again to its previous position; (13) they are self-
moving, yet the impulse emanates from an external power.
In the second part of the vision the prophet saw the
ofannim. These represent the four elements of the sublunary
world. For the ofannim (1) are connected with the chayyoth
and with the earth; (2) they have four faces, and are four
separate beings, but interpenetrate each other "as though
it were a wheel in the midst of a wheel" (Ez. i. 16);
(3) they are covered with eyes; (4) they are not self-
moving; (5) they are set in motion by the chayyoth; (6)
their motion is not circular but rectilinear.
The same
may almost be said of the four elements :-(1) they are in
close contact with the spheres, being encompassed by the
sphere of the moon; earth occupies the centre, water sur-
rounds earth, air has its position between water and fire;
(2) this order is not invariably maintained; the respective
portions change and they become intermixed and combined
with each other; (3) though they are only four elements.
they form an infinite number of things; (4) not being
animated they do not move of their own accord; (5) they
are set in motion by the action of the spheres; (6) when a
portion is displaced it returns in a straight line to its
original position.
"the
In the third vision Ezekiel saw a human form above the
chayyoth. The figure was divided in the middle; in the
upper portion the prophet only noticed that it was chashmal,
(mysterious); from the loins downwards there was
vision of the likeness of the Divine Glory," and "the like-
ness of the throne." The world of Intelligences was re-
presented by the figure; these can only be perceived in as
far as they influence the spheres, but their relation to the
Creator is beyond human comprehension. The Creator
himself is not represented in this vision.
The key to the whole vision Maimonides finds in the
introductory words, "And the heavens were opened," and in
the minute description of the place and the time of the reve-
lation. When pondering on the grandeur of the spheres
ANALYSIS OF THE GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
lxxv
and their influences, which vary according to time and place,
man begins to think of the existence of the Creator. At the
conclusion of this exposition Maimonides declares that he
will, in the subsequent chapters, refrain from giving further
explanation of the maaseh mercabhah. The foregoing sum-
mary, however, shows that the opinion of the author on this
subject is fully stated, and it is indeed difficult to conceive
what additional disclosures he could still have made.
The task which the author has proposed to himself in the
Preface he now regarded as accomplished. He has discussed
the method of the Kalam, the system of the philosophers, and
his own theory concerning the relation between the Primal
Cause and the Universe; he has explained the Biblical
account of the creation, the nature of prophecy, and the
mysteries in Ezekiel's vision. In the remaining portion of
the work the author attempts to solve certain theological pro-
blems, as though he wished to obviate the following objec-
tions, which might be raised to his theory that there is a
design throughout the creation, and that the entire Universe
is subject to the law of causation :-What is the purpose of
the evils which attend human life? For what purpose was
the world created? In how far does Providence interfere
with the natural course of events? Does God know and
foresee man's actions ? To what end was the Divine Law
revealed? These problems are treated seriatim.
All evils, Maimonides holds, originate in the material
element of man's existence. Those who are able to emanci-
pate themselves from the tyranny of the body, and uncon-
ditionally to submit to the dictates of reason, are protected
from many evils. Man should disregard the cravings of the
body, avoid them as topics of conversation, and keep his
thoughts far away from them; convivial and erotic songs
debase man's noblest gifts-thought and speech. Matter is
the partition separating man from the pure Intellects; it is
"the thickness of the cloud" which true knowledge has to
traverse before it reaches man. In reality, evil is the mere
negative of good: "God saw all that he had made, and
200
lxxvi
INTRODUCTION.
behold it was very good" (Gen. i. 31). Evil does not exist
at all. When evils are mentioned in the Scriptures as the
work of God, the scriptural expressions must not be taken
in their literal sense.
There are three kinds of evils:-1. Evils necessitated by
those laws of production and destruction by which the species
are perpetuated. 2. Evils which men inflict on each other;
they are comparatively few, especially among civilised men.
3. Evils which man brings upon himself, and which com-
prise the majority of existing evils. The consideration of
these three classes of evils leads to the conclusion that "the
Lord is good to all, and His tender mercies are over all
His works" (Ps. cxlv. 9).
The question, What is the object of the creation? must
be left unanswered. The creation is the result of the will of
God. Also those who believe that the Universe is eternal
must admit that they are unable to discover the purpose of
the Universe. It would, however, not be illogical to assume
that the spheres have been created for the sake of man, not-
withstanding the great dimensions of the former and the
smallness of the latter. Still it must be conceded that, even
if mankind were the main and central object of creation
there is no absolute interdependence between them; for it is
a matter of course that, under altered conditions, man could
exist without the spheres. All teleological theories must
therefore be confined within the limits of the Universe as it
now exists. They are only admissible in the relation in
which the several parts of the Universe stand to each other ;
but the purpose of the Universe as a whole cannot be
accounted for. It is simply an emanation from the will of
God.
Regarding the belief in Providence, Maimonides enume-
rates the following five opinions:-1. There is no Provi-
dence; everything is subject to chance; 2. Only a part of the
Universe is governed by Providence, viz., the spheres, the
species, and such individual beings as possess the power of
perpetuating their species (e.g., the stars)-the rest, that is,
ANALYSIS OF THE GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED. lxxvii
the sublunary world is left to mere chance; 3. Everything
is predetermined; according to this theory, revealed Law is
inconceivable; 4. Providence assigns its blessings to all
creatures, according to their merits; accordingly, all beings,
even the lowest animals, if innocently injured or killed
receive compensation in a future life. 5. According to the
Jewish belief, all living beings are endowed with free-will;
God is just, and the destiny of man depends on his merits.
Maimonides denies the existence of trials inflicted by Divine
love (770), as mentioned in the Talmud, i.e.
afflictions which befall man, not as punishments of sin, but
as means to procure for him a reward in times to come.
Maimonides also rejects the notion that God ordains special
temptation. The Biblical account, according to which God
tempts men, "to know what is in their hearts," must not be
taken in its literal sense; it merely states that God made
the virtues of certain people known to their fellowmen in
order that their good example should be followed. Of all
creatures man alone enjoys the especial care of Providence;
because the acts of Providence are identical with certain
influences (shefa') which the Active Intellect brings to bear
upon the human intellect; their effect upon man varies
according to his physical, moral, and intellectual condition;
irrational beings, however, cannot be affected by these
influences. If we cannot in each individual case see how
these principles are applied, it must be borne in mind that
God's wisdom is far above that of man. The author seems
to have felt that his theory has its weak points, for he intro-
duces it as follows:-"My theory is not established by
demonstrative proof; it is based on the authority of the
Bible, and it is less subject to refutation than any of the
theories previously mentioned."
Providence implies omniscience, and men who deny this,
eo ipso, have no belief in Providence. Some are unable to
reconcile the fate of man with Divine Justice, and are there-
fore of opinion that God takes no notice whatever of the
events which occur on earth. Others believe that God, being
lxxviii
INTRODUCTION.
an absolute Unity, cannot possess a knowledge of a multi-
tude of things, or of things that do not yet exist, or the
number of which is infinite. These objections, which are
based on the nature of man's perception, are illogical; for
God's knowledge cannot be compared to that of man; it is
identical with His essence. Even the Attributists, who
assume that God's knowledge is different from His essence,
hold that it is distinguished from man's knowledge in the
following five points:-1. It is one, although it embraces a
plurality. 2. It includes even such things as do not yet
exist. 3. It includes things which are infinite in number.
4. It does not change when new objects of perception present
themselves. 5. It does not determine the course of events.
-However difficult this theory may appear to human com-
prehension, it is in accordance with the words of Isaiah
(lv. 8): "Your thoughts are not my thoughts, and your
ways are not my ways." According to Maimonides, the
difficulty is to be explained by the fact that God is the
Creator of all things, and His knowledge of the things is not
dependent on their existence; but, on the other hand, the
knowledge of man is solely dependent on the objects which
come under his cognition.
According to Maimonides, the book of Job illustrates the
several views which have been mentioned above. Satan, that
is, the material element in human existence, is described as
the cause of Job's sufferings. Job at first believed that man's
happiness depends on riches, health, and children; being
deprived of these sources of happiness, he conceived the
notion that Providence is indifferent to the fate of mortal
beings. After a careful study of natural phenomena, he
rejected this opinion. Eliphaz held that all misfortunes of
man serve as punishments of past sins. Bildad, the second
friend of Job, admitted the existence of those afflictions
which Divine love decrees in order that the patient sufferer
may be fitted to receive a bountiful reward. Zophar, the third
friend of Job, declared that the ways of God are beyond
human comprehension; there is but one explanation assign-
ANALYSIS OF THE GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED. lxxix
able to all Divine acts, namely: Such is His Will. Elihu
gives a fuller development to this idea; he says that such
evils as befell Job may be remedied once or twice, but the
course of nature is not altogether reversed. It is true
that by prophecy a clearer insight into the ways of God
can be obtained, but there are only few who arrive at that
exalted intellectual degree, whilst the majority of men must
content themselves with acquiring a knowledge of God
through the study of nature. Such a study leads man to the
conviction that his understanding is unable to fathom the
secrets of nature and the wisdom of Divine Providence.
The concluding section of the Third Part treats of the
purpose of the Divine precepts. In the Pentateuch they are
described as the means of acquiring wisdom, enduring
happiness, and also bodily comfort (ch. xxxi.). Generally a
distinction is made between “chukkim” (“statutes ") and
mishpatim ("judgments"). The object of the latter is, on
the whole, known, but the chukkim are considered as tests of
man's obedience; no reason is given why they have been
enacted. Maimonides rejects this distinction; he states that
all precepts are the result of wisdom and design, that ail
contribute to the welfare of mankind, although with regard
to the chukkim this is less obvious. The author draws another
line of distinction between the general principles and the
details of rules. For the selection and the introduction of
the latter there is but one reason, namely: "Such is the
will of God."
The laws are intended to promote man's perfection; they
improve both his mental and his bodily condition; the
former in so far as they lead him to the acquisition of true
knowledge, the latter through the training of his moral and
social faculties. Each law thus imparts knowledge, improves
the moral condition of man, or conduces to the well-being of
society. Many revealed laws help to enlighten man, and to
correct false opinions. This object is not always clearly
announced. God in His wisdom sometimes withheld from
the knowledge of man the purpose of commandments and
lxxx
INTRODUCTION.
actions. There are other precepts which tend to restrain
man's passions and desires. If the same end is occasionally
attainable by other means, it must be remembered that the
Divine laws are adapted to the ordinary mental and emo-
tional state of man, and not to exceptional circumstances.
In this work, as in the Yad ha-chazakah, Maimonides divides
the laws of the Pentateuch into fourteen groups, and in each
group
he discusses the principal and the special object of
the laws.
In addition to the legislative contents, the Bible includes
historical information; and Maimonides, in briefly reviewing
the Biblical narratives, shows that these are likewise intended
to improve man's physical, moral, and intellectual condition.
"It is not a vain thing for you" (Deut. xxxii. 47), and when
it proves vain to anyone, it is his own fault.
In the final chapters the author describes the several de-
grees of human perfection, from the sinners who have turned
away from the right path to the best of men, who in all their
thoughts and acts cling to the Most Perfect Being, who
aspire after the greatest possible knowledge of God, and strive
to serve their Maker in the practice of "loving-kindness,
righteousness, and justice." This degree of human perfec-
tion can only be attained by those who never forget the
presence of the Almighty, and remain firm in their fear and
love of God. These servants of the Most High inherit the
choicest of human blessings; they are endowed with wisdom:
they are godlike beings.
ANA
THE GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
·
My theory aims at pointing out a straight way, at casting up a high-road.
Ye who have gone astray in the field of the holy Law, come hither and follow
the path which I have prepared. The unclean and the fool shall not pass over
it. It shall be called the way of Holiness.
PART I.-CHAPTER XV.
65
This homonym has several meanings: in some instances
it signifies "to stand" or "to place oneself," as n
PO 108," And his sister stood afar off” (Exod. ii. 4);
I
""
,אחתו מרחק
The kings of the earth set themselves * יתיצבו מלכי ארץ
,יצאו נצבים
•
(Psalm ii. 2); , "They came out and stood"
(Numb. xvi. 27). In other instances it denotes continuance
and permanence, as 7727, "Thy word is esta-
blished in Heaven" (Ps. cxix. 89), i.e., it remains for ever.
66
Whenever this term is applied to God it must be under-
And, behold,
the Lord stood upon it" (Gen. xxviii. 13), "stood," i.e., ap-
peared as eternal and everlasting "upon it," namely, upon
the ladder, the upper end of which reached to heaven, while
the lower end touched the earth. By means of this ladder
all may climb up who wish to do so, and they must ulti-
mately¹ attain to a knowledge of Him who is above the
summit of the ladder, because He remains upon it perma-
nently. It must be well understood that the term “
upon it "2
is employed by me in harmony with this metaphor. “Angels
of God" who were going up represent the prophets. That
דברך נצב בשמים
,והנה ה' נצב עליו stood in the latter sense, as
taking it figuratively, our author was obliged to find for an adequate signi-
fication. The next chapter, therefore, treats of the homonymity of the term
"tsur."
¹ The expression ¬¬ỷ (777) Tibbon, omitted by Charizi), “by necessity,”
is here ambiguous. Grammatically it can be connected with by (by Hebr.); so
Munk: "celui qui est dessus nécessairement," explaining it in a note "l'être absolu
et nécessaire," or with the verb 777' (1'), in which case the sense of the
passage would be, "till he who ascends step by step reaches the top and there
necessarily attains a perception of the Supreme Being, as the latter remains
permanently and eternally above the ladder." Those who join "necessarily”
with "is upon it" (Munk, Moreh ha-moreh, etc.), make Maimonides use tau-
tological language: God is upon the ladder necessarily, for He is upon it per-
manently. The reverse order would then certainly be more correct: God is
upon it permanently, for He is there necessarily.
שמאמי (=שמאמרי) הנה עליו In the translation of Tibbon, the words 2
-
tators), though he quotes by
his own use of 1'hy, not to "hy
that here also the words
"
have been misunderstood and have been transformed, in the printed editions, into
„by an mam DD. In the Comm. of Ibn Caspi (cf. also other commen-
", the remark of Maimonides is referred to
occurring in the Biblical phrase. It is possible
have erroneously been added by the copyist.
F
66
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
the name
be seen in the following passages: 7
"angel," was applied to prophets may clearly
bw, "He sent
ויעל מלאך ה' מן הגלגל אל הבכים ; (16 .an angel" (Numb. xx
“And an angel of the Lord came up from Gilgal to Bochim
(Judges ii. 1).¹ How suggestive, too, is the expression
```, “ascending and descending on it!" The ascent
is mentioned before the descent, inasmuch as the "ascending
(¬by) and attaining a certain height of the ladder precedes
the "descending," (777), i.e., the application of the know-
ledge acquired in the ascent for the training and the in-
struction of mankind. This application is termed,
"descent," in accordance with our explanation of the term
(chapter x.).
To return to our subject. The phrase
has re-
ference to the permanence and constancy of God, not to the
idea of physical position. This is also the sense of the phrase
"Thou shalt stand upon the rock" (Ex
xxxiii. 21). It is therefore clear that and are
,ונצבת על הצור
""
הנני עומד לפניך שם על .identical in their signification. Comp
66
271027137, “Behold, I will stand before thee there upon
the rock in Horeb" (Ex. xvii. 6).2
CHAPTER XVI.
7731, Rock. 2, Flint. 3, Quarry. 4, Origin.
THE word is a homonym. First, it denotes "a rock," as
71, "And thou shalt smite the rock" (Ex. xvii. 6).
1 According to Maimonides, 7, in the first quotation, is Moses; in the
second, some other prophet, not named. He does not, however, prove that
angel," in the two passages quoted, could not be taken in the ordinary sense
of the word.
2 Having stated that Dy and Y, in their figurative application, denote the
same thing, the author supports his interpretation of in the phrase
by, by extending the identity of the two terms to that of the phrases
used,עמד על הצור It is clear, that .על הצור in which they are followed by
in reference to God, has to be taken in a figurative sense; Maimonides con-
cludes that by nay has the same meaning, although the subject in
this phrase is Moses.
PART I.-CHAPTER XVI.
67
,חצבתם
1
Then, "a hard stone," like the flint, e.g.,
7, "Knives
of stone" (Josh. v. 2). It is next employed to signify the
quarry from which the stones are hewn; comp. 713 a 1227
3, "Look unto the rock whence ye are hewn " (Isaiah
li. 1). From this latter meaning the term was afterwards.
employed to express
"the root and origin" of all things.
It is on this account that in the foregoing verse, after the
,הביטו אל אברהם וגו' it is stated הביטו אל צור חצבתם words
"Look unto Abraham your father," from which we evidently
may infer that the words " Abraham your father serve to
explain "the rock whence ye are hewn;" and that the
Prophet meant to say "Walk in his ways, put faith in his
instruction, and conduct yourselves according to the rule of
his life! for properties contained in the quarry should be
found again in those things which are formed and hewn out
of it."
,הצור תמים פעלו besides Himself. Thus we read
It is in the latter sense that the Almighty is called “rock”
(713), He being the origin and the causa efficiens of all things
"He is the
1
در
Rock, His work is perfect" (Deut. xxxii. 4); w
"Of the Rock that begat thee thou art unmindful" (Deut.
xxxii. 18);
1, "Their Rock had sold them"
(xxxii. 30); be 78, "There is no rock like our
God" (1 Sam. ii. 2):
(Isaiah xxvi. 4). Again,
1, "The Rock of Eternity"
by na, “And thou shalt
nasal,
stand upon the rock" (Exod. xxxiii. 21), i.e., Be firm and
steadfast in the conviction that God is the source of all
things (the "Primal Cause "), for this will lead you towards
the knowledge of the Divine Being. We have shown that
3
,אין צור כאלהינו
.contain the same idea הנה מקום אתי the words
Ibn Tıbbon.
Charizi), has no equivalent in the translation of,כצור החלמיש) כאלצואן
2 This verse serves to prove the use of tsur in the sense of “quarry,” and
also its use in the figurative meaning, "origin." Having no other support for
tsur denoting "quarry," Maimonides derives it, probably, from the verb
Dyn, which is used in reference to quarries (comp. 3D "JAN “minerals”).
3 Chapter viii. (p. 52), where makom is explained as denoting a certain
degree in the development of the intellectual faculties of man (1’V NITTD).
F 2
68
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
CHAPTER XVII.
Do not ermpound Physics in the" ולא במעשה בראשית בשנים
presence of two." (Talm. Bab. Chagigah 11 b.)
Do not imagine that only Metaphysics should be taught
with reserve to the common people and to the uninitiated;
for the same is also the case with most of the natural
sciences.¹ In this sense we have repeatedly made use of the
"Do
,ולא במעשה בראשית בשנים,expression of the Sages
3
not expound the chapter on the Creation in the presence of
two," [vide Introd. page 7 and note 3]. This principle was
not peculiar to our Sages; ancient philosophers and scholars
of other nations were likewise wont to treat of the principia
rerum obscurely, and to use figurative language in dis-
cussing such subjects. Thus Plato and his predecessors called
Substance the female, and Form the male.2-(You are aware'
that the elements of all existing transient things are three,
viz., Substance, Form, and Privation [of form]; the last-
named element is always inherent in the substance, for
otherwise the substance would be incapable of receiving a
new form; and it is from this point of view that privation
[of form] is included among the elements. As soon, then,
This chapter appears to aim at justifying the use of figurative, and there-
fore less intelligible, expressions, such as "Tsur," instead of the more common
appellations of the Supreme Being. It was here the proper place for Mai-
monides to make such a remark, because, according to his interpretation, the
words by may contain a figure which the reader, if left to himself,
would not easily find in them. In addition to this, his interpretation of 13 as
"the source of all things," brings the Biblical passage into closer relation to
physical science. (See Munk, note ad locum.)
2 Comp. ἆν τὸ μὲν εἶδος λόγον ἔχει ἄῤῥενός τε καὶ πατρὸς ἃ δ᾽ ὕλα, θηλεός
Tε kai parέpos, "Of which the form has the relation of the male and the
father, the substance that of the female and the mother." (Plat. Timaei
Locri, 94, b.)
3 The words "You are aware," etc., to "Treatises on Natural Science,"
are used parenthetically, containing, in opposition to the opinion of Plato
S
- that the principles of all things were two, matter and form-the author's own
opinion that three principles must be assumed, viz., matter, form, and privation
of form (i.e., form in potentia, or the capacity of matter to receive a certain
form).
PART I.-CHAPTER XVIII.
69
as a substance has received a certain form, the privation of
that form, namely, of that which has just been received,
has ceased, and is replaced by the privation of another
form, and so on with all possible forms, as is explained
in treatises on natural philosophy.¹)-Now, if those philo-
sophers who have nothing to fear from a lucid expla-
nation of these metaphysical subjects still were in the habit
of discussing them in figures and metaphors, how much more
should we, having the interest of religion at heart, refrain
from elucidating to the mass any subject that is beyond their
comprehension, or that might be taken in a sense directly
opposite to the one intended. This also deserves attention.2
CHAPTER XVIII.
27p, yao, waa, To approach, to touch, 1, physically;
2, mentally.³
THE three words 7p, v, w sometimes signify "contact" or
"nearness in space," sometimes the approach of man's know-
See Arist. Phys., i. 6 and 7.
2 In this phrase Narboni and other commentators discover an allusion to
significations of the word " not mentioned by Maimonides in this chapter.
The causes of all things being four, and only one being given here, the word 713,
denoting origin or beginning (that is, cause), must also include the other three
causes (N713, 7D1n, non, form, matter, and purpose). More probably, how-
ever, the author reminds the reader that the explanations generally given of the
passage quoted at the end of chapter xvi. are only for the common people, who
would not understand the philosophical interpretation.
""
3 In the preceding chapters Maimonides spoke of that knowledge of the
Primal Cause, which man can attain, by gradually ascending the ladder of
intellectual comprehension; he explains now the term "approaching God as
a metaphor expressing the same idea, especially in reference to the verse,
"And Moses alone shall draw near to God, and they shall not draw near."
The chapters which follow next contain the interpretation of expressions
referring to manifestations of God in certain places: as "The glory of the Lord
filled the tabernacle" (ch. xix.); "The Lord sitting upon the throne high and
exalted" (ch. xx.);
(ch. xx.); “And the Lord passed before his face" (ch. xxi.);
"Behold, I come unto thee" (ch. xxii.); "The Lord cometh out from His
place" (ch. xxiii.); “I will go, and I will return to my place" (ch. xxiv.);
and the pleasure of him who dwelleth in the bush” (ch. xxv.).
70
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
ledge to an object, as if it resembled the physical approach of
one body to another. As to the use of in the first meaning,
viz., to draw near a spot, comp. ɔnan bx 27p ¬wx “As he
drew near the camp" (Ex. xxxii. 19); 77, "And
Pharaoh drew near (Ex. xiv. 10). va in the first sense, viz.,
expressing the contact of two bodies, occurs in bab yan
"And she cast it at his feet" (Ex. iv. 25); by y, "He
caused it to touch my mouth" (Is. vi. 7).¹ And in the
first sense, viz., the approach or motion of a man towards
another, is found, e.g., in 77718, “And Judah drew
near unto him" (Gen. xliv. 1).
The second meaning of these three words is "approach by
means of knowledge," or "contact by comprehension," but
not in reference to space. As to ya in this second sense, comp.
for her judgment reacheth unto * כי נגע אל השמים משפטו
An instance of 7 being used in this
in the following passage, ¬WN72771
"And the cause that is too hard for
you, bring it unto me" (Deut. i. 17); this is equivalent to
saying, "Ye shall make it known unto me." The verb
(in the Hiphil) is thus employed in the sense of giving in-
formation concerning a thing. The verb wa is used figura-
3
heaven" (Jer. li. 9).
meaning is contained
יקשה מכם תקריבון אלי
קרב
And Abraham * ויגש אברהם ויאמר tively in the phrase
drew near, and said " (Gen. xviii. 23); this took place in
a prophetic vision and in a trance, as will be explained;
4
By adding this instance, Maimonides appears to indicate that, although
part of a prophetical vision, the words by ya", "and he caused (the coal) to
touch my mouth," may be taken literally, because the Prophet really perceived
that process in the vision.
2 This phrase is generally taken as a hyperbolic expression, meaning " very
great." According to Maimonides, the terms D'D and D'рny are here used
in the sense of "the Most High," and now as denoting "her sins de-
serve punishment" ("her sins became known to the Most High ").
3 This remark seems to be quite superfluous; there is no reason why it
should be added after 'n more than after the instances for V and
. The special figurative meaning of 37 is, perhaps, in this instance more
clearly shown by the verb 'ny “and I will hear it," which follows
immediately.
4 Pt. I., cap. xxi., and Pt. II., cap. xli.-The figurative meaning of WI) is
PART I.-CHAPTER XVIII.
71
,יען כי נגש העם הזה בפיו ובשפתיו also in
"Forasmuch as
this people draw near me with their mouths and with their
lips ” (Isaiah xxix. 13). Wherever a word denoting approach
or contact is employed in the prophetic writings to describe
a certain relation between the Almighty and any created
being, it has to be understood in this latter sense [viz., to
approach mentally]. For, as will be proved in this treatise,¹
the Supreme is incorporeal, and consequently He does not
approach nor draw near a thing, nor can aught approach or
touch Him; for when a being is without corporeality, it
cannot occupy space, and all idea of approach, contact,
distance, conjunction, separation, touch, or proximity is
inapplicable to such a being.
קרוב ה' לכל There can be no doubt respecting the verses
78777, “The Lord is nigh unto all them that call upon Him"
(Ps. cxlv. 18); 11897) ovnba n, "They take delight in
approaching to God" (Is. Iviii. 2); omba nanp,
"The nearness of God is pleasant to me" (Ps. lxxiii. 28) ;
all such phrases intimate a spiritual approach, i.c., the
attainment of some knowledge, not, however, approach in
space. Thus also be," who hath God so nigh unto
him" (Deut. iv. 7); ya nns 277, "Draw thou near and
קרובים אליו
,תרדמה נבואית
קרבת אלהים לי טוב
clearer in the instance which follows, the verb being joined to 1'52,"with
their mouths ;" and it is probably quoted to support the explanation of the
phrase DN '1, “ And Abraham approached mentally." This is in accord-
ance with the view of Maimonides, that the communication between God and
Abraham as related in Gen. xviii. 23-33, took place in a prophetic vision,
although this circumstance is not distinctly stated in the Bible. Maimonides
adds that it took place in 'NI) Din, "a prophetic trance;" the
reader is not informed on what biblical passage this statement is based.
The author nowhere proves that all divine communications were made
to Abraham in that condition. The state of prophetic trance is different
from a mere "C
vision," as is distinctly stated by Maimonides in Part II.,
chapter xli.
The preposition ¡, meaning "in the same sense as the expression has in
the following passage," or "of the same kind as," in Ibn Tibbon's version has
no equivalent in the original. It is possible that it is a corruption of ¡1.
as may be
"(
,כמו שיתבאר Some commentators join it with the preceding
explained by referring to." Charizi has 72N1 instead of ¡D.
NI
1 Pt. II., cap. iv.
72
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
hear" (Deut. v. 27); 121 172 ¬ wa, “And Moses alone
shall draw near the Lord; but they shall not come nigh
(Ex. xxiv. 2).
""
If, however, you wish to take this expression wa
"And Moses shall draw near" to mean that he approached
a certain place in the mountain, whereon the Divine
Light shone, or, in the words of the Bible, "where the
glory of the Lord abode," you may do so, provided you do
not lose sight of the truth that there is no difference whether
a person stand at the centre of the earth or at the highest
point of the ninth sphere, if this were possible; he is no
further away from God in the one case, or nearer to Him
in the other; those only approach Him who obtain a know-
ledge of Him; while those who remain ignorant of Him.
recede from Him. In this approach towards, or recession
from God there are numerous grades one above the other,
and I shall further elucidate, in one of the subsequent
chapters of the Treatise, what constitutes the difference in
our perception of God.
1
,Touch the mountains * גע בהרים ויעשנו In the passage
and they shall smoke" (Ps. cxliv. 5), the verb va is used in a
figurative sense. "Let thy word touch them," as in the
phrase by 27, "Touch thou him himself" (Job ii. 5),
the meaning of which is "Bring thy infliction upon him."
In a similar manner, in whatever form it may be em-
ployed, must in each place be interpreted according to the
context; for in some cases it denotes contact of two material
objects, in others knowledge and comprehension of a thing,
as if he who now comprehends anything which he had not
comprehended previously had thereby approached a subject
which had been distant from him. This point is of con-
siderable importance.2
וגע על עצמו
¹ Part II., cap. xxxvi., and Part I., cap. lx.
This remark is added, according to Efodi and others, to indicate that
the two passages, "You shall not touch it" (Gen. iii.) and "No hand shall
touch it” (Exod. xix.), are to be explained according to the same principle.
PART I.-CHAPTER XIX.
73
CHAPTER XIX.
№ 1, To fill. 2, To complete. 3, To reach the highest degree.
THE term is a homonym which denotes that one
substance enters another, and fills it, as 7, “And
she filled her pitcher" (Gen. xxiv. 16); un b
,"An omer-full for each " (Ex. xvi. 32), and many
other instances. Next, it signifies the expiration or com-
1
And * וימלאו ימיה ללדת pletion of a fixed period of time, as
when her days to be delivered were fulfilled" (Gen. xxv.
"And forty days were completed
for him" (Gen. 1. 3). It further denotes attainment of
the highest degree of excellency, ass, "Full
with the blessing of the Lord" (Deut. xxxiii. 23); Nha
3b noon BnI8, "Them hath he filled with wisdom of heart”
וימלאו לו ארבעים יום ; (24
כל הארץ כבודו
,וימלא את החכמה ואת התבונה ואת הדעת ; (35 .Ex. xxxv)
"He was filled with wisdom, and understanding, and
cunning" (1 Kings vii. 14).2 In this sense it is said ba
17120 p¬87 bɔ (lit. "The whole earth is full of his glory," Is.
vi. 4), "All the earth gives evidence of His perfection," that is
to say, leads to a knowledge of it.3 Thus also b
¹ The editions of the Bible have 10 ¬рyn xÝp. Either Maimonides
himself or the copyists confounded the two passages nyn 'w and
13DD ¬Dyn XÍD (Ex. xvi. 21 and 32).
According to Maimonides the meaning of these three passages is:
"The
greatest blessing of the Lord," "He gave them the highest degree of the
wisdom of the heart,"
‚” “He acquired the highest degree of wisdom," etc.
3 It is difficult to see how Maimonides reconciles the grammatical construc-
tion of the sentence with his interpretation. Some authors (as Efodi and
others) supply "the perfection as the explanation of 2, and give the
meaning of the phrase as follows: "The perfection of the whole earth proves
His perfection," so that in the words of Maimonides the principal part, the
substitute for ND, the theme of this chapter, is absent. It is possible that
Maimonides in his interpretation of the passage paraphrases only the first
""
According to this view the .כבודו excluding (מלא כל הארץ three words
phrase is to be rendered, "The perfection of the whole earth is His glory,"
that is, "the perfection which the whole earth declares is His glory." The
74
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
את המשכן
"The glory of the Lord filled the tabernacle "
(Ex. xl. 34);¹ and, in fact, every application of s to God
must be interpreted in this manner; and not that He has a
body occupying space. If, on the other hand, you prefer
to think that (in this passage) by 'n 12, "the glory
of the Lord," a certain light created for the purpose is
to be understood, that that light is always termed 72,
and that the same "filled the tabernacle," we have no
objection.2
CHAPTER XX.
and N, High, 1, in space; 2, in estimation.
THE word is a homonym, denoting elevation in space,
and elevation in dignity, i.e., greatness, honour, and
ותרם הרבה מעל הארץ power. It has the first meaning in
"And the ark was lifted up above the earth" (Gen. vii. 17);
I have הרימותי בחור מעם and the latter meaning in
exalted one chosen out of the people" (Ps. lxxxix. 20);
3
Forasmuch as I have * יען אשר הרימתיך מתוך העפר
CC
،،
exalted thee from amongst the dust" (1 Kings xvi. 2) :
Forasmuch as I exalted thee * יען הרימתיך מתוך העם
from among the people" (1 Kings xiv. 7).
Whenever the term is employed in reference to God,
רומה על שמים אלהים :it must be taken in the second sense
"Be thou exalted, O God, above the heavens" (Ps. lvii. 12).
is *) תשהו have been added in order to substitute for אי תדל עליה words
2 Comp. chapter v., page 47, note 1.
3 Our editions of the Bible have
evidence," lit. "testifies,") another verb that implied the notion of "speaking"
in a less degree. The suffix in by agrees with D. Maimonides appears
to have abandoned this somewhat forced interpretation of the passage in favour
of the more simple one, "the whole earth is full of His praise." Comp. ch.
lxiv. on the different meanings of 113.
1 That is, according to the author, the perfection of the Lord appeared in
the Tabernacle.
1.
PART I.-CHAPTER XX.
75
In the same manner w denotes both elevation in space
and elevation in rank and dignity. In the former sense
"And they lifted
up their corn upon their asses" (Gen. xlii. 26); and there
are many instances like this in which the verb has the
meaning "to carry," "to move" from place to place; for
this implies elevation in space. In the latter sense we
haven, "And his kingdom shall be exalted"
(Num. xxiv. 7); oнwa obo, "And he bare them, and
carried them" (Isaiah lxiii. 9); II), "Wherefore
do ye exalt yourselves" (Num. xvi. 3).
te
Every expression including when applied to God has
Lift up thyself,
thou judge of the earth" (Ps. xciv. 2); 787,
Thus saith the High and Exalted One" (Is. lvii. 15)—
denoting elevation in rank, quality, and power;2 not, how-
ever, in space.
וישאו את שברם על חמריהם it occurs in
,ותנשא מלכותו
הנשא שופט הארץ,..this latter sense-e
You may be surprised that I employ the expression, " eleva-
tion in rank, quality, and power,” and you may say, " How can
you assert that several distinct expressions denote the same
thing ? "3
It will be explained later on (ch. 1. seqq.) that those
,כה אמר רם ונשא
1 The original D is rendered pn by Ibn Tibbon; it is the portion
means
יתרון החלק and ;מדרגה and מעלה allotted to something; it is a synonym of
"distinction of the portion" (scil. of honour, dignity, etc.) i.e.,
"dis-
tinction." Comp. ch. viii. page 51, note 2. Shemtob and others are of opinion
that by pɔnn 11' Maimonides meant to say that NW implied a higher degree
רום of elevation than
רפעה מנזלה וגלאלה ועזה Ibn Tibbon appears to have read in the original 2
מנזלה
in the edition of Munk is omitted. The reading of Ibn Tibbon
deserves the preference, for in the first place it harmonises better with the words
ואל יקשה בעיניך אמרי גדולת מדרגה ומעלה ורוממות :which follow
and secondly the word y, "elevation," is used by Maimonides in this
chapter in its general meaning, referring both to space and to dignity, and was
therefore most probably connected in this place with a qualifying genitive.
3 The question here anticipated by Maimonides is not why the author em-
first, because there were ; מדרגה מעלה, רוממות ployed the three synonyms
in the preceding chapters, even in the first part of this same chapter, opportu-
nities for such a remark, and there is no reason why Maimonides should have
reserved it for this place (see Shemtob ad locum); secondly, the answer that in
76
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
who possess a true knowledge of God do not consider that
He possesses many attributes, but believe that these various
attributes which describe His Might, Greatness, Power,
Perfection, Goodness, etc., have one and the same sense,
namely, that of His Essence, and not anything extraneous to
His Essence. I shall devote special chapters to the Names
and Attributes of God; our intention here is solely to shew
that in the passage quoted denote elevation in rank,
not in space.
CHAPTER XXI.
ay, 1, To pass. 2, To sound. 3, To appear. 4, To transgress.
5, To miss.
In its primary signification¹ the word y refers to the
motion of a body in space, and is chiefly applied 2 to
living creatures moving at some distance in a straight
line, e. g., "And He passed over before
3
,והוא עבר לפניהם
God all attributes are one and the same thing, is no reply to this question. The
author has explained the expression in nearly the same terms as D; both
occur together in the last mentioned instance; he therefore adds, Be not sur-
prised that I explain two distinct attributes (D' D'J'Jy) to be identical
(y) for the Divine attributes, etc.; otherwise Maimonides would have
In addition to this reasoning we .איך תשים ענין א' ענינים רבים said
may add that Charizi omits those synonyms in his translation altogether. He
כה אמר רם ונשא הכל לענין גדלה ועז ואם תאמר איך תשים ענינים :has
.רבים מענין אחד
in the * במעני אלעבור פי אל ערבי The Hebrew versions omit the words 1
signification of ay in Arabic," as superfluous in a translation from Arabic into
Hebrew.
2 The Arabic is s nbærip), lit., “and the first instance of it.” Ibn
Munk, Il ; ודמיונו הראשון .in some MSS ועקר הנחתו הראשונה,Tibbon
désigne d'abord.
N AND is the first of the principal significations of
the term; each of these may contain several different meanings, which are
introduced by x nxn, "the first instance of this primary meaning
is." The first three significations given by Maimonides may be considered as
variations of the primary meaning.
The .על רוחק אחד ישר,Ibn Tibbon ; עלי בעד מא מסתקים : Arabic 3
word, corresponding to the Arabic ND, does not here denote the numeral
PART I.-CHAPTER XXI.
77
them" (Gen. xxxiii. 3); vn, "Pass before the
people” (Ex. xvii. 5). Instances of this kind are numerous.
The term was next applied to the passage of sound
And they caused a * ויעבירו קול במחנה through air, as
עבר לפני העם
sound to pass throughout the
That I hear the Lord's אשר אנכי שמע מעברים עם ה.
camp" (Ex. xxxvi. 6);
people spreading the report" (1 Sam. ii. 24).¹
Figuratively it denoted the appearance of the Light and the
Divine Presence (Shechinah) which the prophets perceived
והנה תנור עשן ולפיד אש in their prophetic visions, as it is said
,And behold a smoking furnace * אשר עבר בין הגזרים האלה
and a burning lamp that passed between those pieces " (Gen.
xv. 17).2 This took place in a prophetic vision, for the nar-
And a deep sleep" ותרדמה נפלה על אברם rative commences
M
fell upon Abram." The verb has this latter meaning in
(C
And I shall pass through the land " ועברתי בארץ מצרים
(ישר)
of Egypt " (Ex. xii. 12),³ and in all similar phrases.
The verb is next employed to express that a person
has gone too far, and transgressed the usual limit, in the per-
formance of some act, as 7, “And as a man who
in drinking wine has passed the proper limit (Jer. xxiii. 9).
994
one," but rather the indefinite "a" or "some." The addition of 'рлD
("") "straight,” implies that, strictly speaking, the verb y signifies "to
go before another (at some distance) in a straight line.”
¹ So Rashi also; Targum: "7 NDY ¡y77 (according to the reading quoted
by Kimchi, 77), "which the people of the Lord spread about." A. V., " Ye
make the Lord's people to transgress."
2 Maimonides does not appear to be consistent in these interpretations;
"The smoking furnace and a burning lamp" were really seen by Abraham
though in a vision, passing "between those pieces." The verb y, never-
theless, is said, in this instance, to have a figurative meaning, and even appears
to serve as a support to the inference that in other passages, e.g., pa 'Mayı
D', the termy is likewise to be taken in this figurative sense. In
speaking of the verb y♫ (ch. xviii.), the passage " by ya” (Isaiah vi. 7) was
quoted as an instance of the primary meaning of the word, although the act was
perceived by Isaiah in a vision. The author does not seem to use the expression
"it was figuratively applied" in the same sense; and this signification of
ay is, in fact; the primary meaning of the word. (See p. 76, Note 2.)
3 i.e., My glory will reveal itself in the land of Egypt.
4 Lit.,
מסתקים
"And like a man in whom the wine has passed the limit proper for
78
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
1
It is also used figuratively to denote: to abandon one aim,¹
and turn to a different aim and object, e.g., 00_01) 810)
, “He shot an arrow, causing it to miss the aim ”2 (1
Sam. xx. 36). This is the sense, it appears to me, of
in
lit. " And the Lord passed by) ויעבר ה' על פניו the passage
3
before him," Ex. xxxiv. 6,) the pronoun in the word 19
referring to God-also according to the opinion of our
teachers → in this passage means "the face of God,,” and,
although this is found in the midst of Agadic interpreta-
tions which would be out of place in this our work, yet it
is some support of our view, that the suffix in 1 is em-
ployed as a substitute for the name of God—and the whole
passage could in my opinion be explained as follows: Moses
sought to attain to a certain perception which is called
"the perception of the Divine countenance,"
a term occurring in the phrase, “My face
ראיית פנים
him." The grammatical construction of the phrase has by no means been
ignored by Maimonides, as Munk thinks ("L'auteur, en choisissent cet exemple,
a négligé le sens grammatical du passage"). The question whether, according
to Maimonides, or " is the subject of the sentence, was fully discussed by
Ibn Caspi, Crescas, Abrabanel, and others.
by
¹ The original " is treated by Munk as the fifth form of ɔ̃, denoting
"to advance," "to go before." This explanation is not in harmony with the
instance which follows; for
2", according to Maimonides,
means "God refused to grant the direct revelation called ';" and not
"God passed before (or beyond) that revelation." '', the render-
ing of Ibn Tibbon, ( being derived from NS), appears to be more
correct; the Hiphil X' signifies “to cause to miss," "to turn away
from a certain aim;" thus God 'turned away' from granting to Moses one gift
and granted another.
2 That is, he shot the arrow in such a manner that it should not come down
where the lad stood. Some believe that according to Maimonides, the
passage is to be explained as follows:-He shot the arrow, in order to divert
the attention of the lad from the spot where David and Jonathan intended
to have a farewell conversation. (See Ibn Caspi, Crescas and Abrabanel.)
3 It is not clear to which passage in the Talmud, or in the Midrashim
Maimonides refers. Munk thinks that Rosh ha-shanah 17b, is meant, where
and where ; ויעבור ה' על פניו מלמד שנתעטף הקב"ה כש"צ וכו' it is said
Maimonides appears to ויעבר (טליתו) על פניו is a paraphrase of נתעטף
understand this metaphor in the sense, that God withheld the direct know-
ledge of Himself (DD) from Moses.
PART I.—CHAPTER XXI.
79
cannot be seen;" but God vouchsafed to him a perception
of a lower degree, viz., that called ", "the seeing
of the back," in the words, "And thou
shalt see me from the back" (Ex. xxxiii. 23). We have men-
tioned this subject in our work Mischneh Torah.¹ Accord-
ingly, it is stated in the above-mentioned passage that the
Lord withheld from Moses that perception which is termed
"the sight of the Divine face," and substituted for it another
gift, viz., the knowledge of the acts attributed to God, which,
as I shall explain (ch. liv.), are considered to be different and
separate attributes of the Supreme. In asserting that God
withheld from Moses (the higher knowledge) I mean to say
that this knowledge was unattainable, that by its nature it
was inaccessible to Moses; for man, whilst able to gain
perfection by applying his reasoning faculties to the attain-
ment of what is within the reach of his intellect, either
weakens his reason or loses it altogether as soon as he
ventures to seek a higher degree of knowledge—as I shall
elucidate in one of the chapters 3 of this work—unless he be
granted a special aid from heaven, as is described in the
2
And I will cover thee with ",ושכתי כפי עליך עד עברי,words
my hand until I pass by " (Ex. xxxiii. 23).
Onkelos, in translating this verse, adopts the same method
which he applies to the explanation of similar subjects, viz.,
every expression implying corporeality or corporal proper-
ties, when referring to God, is explained by assuming an
ellipsis of a nomen regens before "God," thus connecting the
expression (of corporeality) with another word which is
supplied, governing the genitive "God;" e.g., 'n an
¹ See Maimonides, Mishneh Thorah, i.; Yesode hattorah, i. 8, 10. Comp.
i. 38.
2 The Arabic can, in the original, be referred both to ¡NDIN, and to
78778, i.e., either "the man dies," or "the perceptive power of the man
dies;" the latter is more probable, as Munk rightly argues, because the
author only treats here of intellectual failure and success. In Hebrew the
.אדם
must be joined with ימות,having different genders השגה,אדם,two words
3 Chap. xxxii.
80
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
,בצב עליו
by, "And behold the Lord stood upon it" (Gen.
xxviii. 13), he renders by TAYA '77 877), "The glory
of the Lord stood arrayed above it." Again,
7^^^^^, "The Lord watch between me and thee" (Gen.
xxxi. 49), he renders, 70, "The word of the
'D TO",
Lord shall watch." This is his ordinary method in explaining
ויעבר ה' על פניו Scripture. He applies it also to the phrase
ואעבר ה' שכינתיה Ex. xxxiv. 6), which he renders) ויקרא
The Lord caused His Presence to pass before ",על אפוהי וקרא
his face and called." According to this rendering the thing
which passed was unquestionably some physical object, the
suffix in the word " referring to Moses, and the expression
Comp.
66
1
".before him לפניו being equivalent to על פניו
So went the present over before),ותעבור המנחה על פניו
,כבודי
him" (Gen. xxxii. 22). This is likewise an appropriate
and satisfactory explanation; and I can adduce still further
support for the opinion of Onkelos from the words
"while my glory passeth by " (Ex. xxxiii. 22),
which expressly state that the passing object was something
ascribed to God, not God Himself; and of this Divine
ויעבור ה' until I pass by,” and " עד עברי glory it is also said
,על פניך
by, "And the Lord passed by before him."
Should it, however, be considered necessary to assume
here an ellipsis, according to the method of Onkelos who
supplies in some instances the term (glory), in others
Divine Radiance), as the) שכינה word), and in others) מימרא
context may require in each particular case, we can also
ויעבור קול voice), and explain) קול supply here the word
And a voice from the Lord passed " ה' על פניו ויקרא
before him and called." We have already shown that the
ויעבירו קול can be applied to the voice, as in עבר verb
“And they caused a voice to pass through the camp"
(Ex. xxxvi. 6). According to this explanation, it was the voice
,express according to Efodi שכינתא מימרא יקרא These three terms
three degrees of prophetic perception: the purely intellectual, the intellectual
combined with physical hearing, and intellectual combined with physical
sight.
PART I.- -CHAPTER XXI.
81
which called. No objection can be raised to applying the
expression to p (voice), for a similar phrase occurs in
the Bible in reference to God's commands to Moses, you`,
He
heard
the voice speaking unto * את הקול מדבר אליו
him "; and, in the same manner as it can be said "the voice
spoke," we may also say "the voice called" (p); indeed,
we can even support this application of the verbs
קול אמר קרא ואמר by parallel passages, as קול to קרא and
,מה אקרא
›”2
, "A voice saith Cry,' and it says 'What shall I
cry (Isaiah xl. 6). According to this view, the meaning
of the passage under discussion would be: "A voice of
God passed before him and called, 'Eternal, Eternal, All-
powerful, All-merciful, and All-gracious!'" (The word
Eternal is repeated; it is in the vocative, 3 for the Eternal
is the one who is called. Comp. Moses, Moses! Abraham,
Abraham!) This, again, is a very appropriate explanation
of the text.
,
1
You will surely not find it strange that this subject, so
profound and difficult, should bear various interpretations;
for it will not impair the force of the argument with
which we are here concerned. Either explanation may
be adopted; you may take that grand scene altogether as
a prophetic vision, and the whole occurrence as a mental
4
It is strange that Maimonides, in proving that may be applied to p
draws an inference from the application of 7 to 1p, while he at once could
have adduced the parallel passage, p p (Isa. xl. 3). Perhaps he prefers a
proof from the Pentateuch to quotations from other Biblical books.
2 A. V.,
"And he said, What shall I cry ?" According to Maimonides,
the words PN лD 81 are not, as is generally believed, the answer of the
prophet, but the continuation of what the voice says; and the first person of
P likewise refers to p. It is not clear why the author chose this forced
interpretation instead of quoting up hip (ib. ver. 3).
3 It appears that, according to the first explanation ("God refused the
direct comprehension "), Maimonides joined the two words, "p", into one
sentence, "and the Lord called." (So also Saadia; see Ibn Ezra, ad locum.)
We are not told why, according to the second interpretation, "p" could
not be explained to be identical with "", "and the voice of the Lord
called;" or why, according to the first, "", could not be in the vocative case.
Charizi has 15 winnn; wann is here, probably, a
synonym of
G
קול
82
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
operation, and you may consider that what he required,
what was withheld from him, and what he attained, were
perceived by the intellect without the use of the senses (as we
have explained above): or you may assume that in addition
there was a certain ocular perception of a material object, the
sight of which would assist intellectual perception. The
latter is the view of Onkelos, unless he assumes that in
this instance the ocular perception was likewise a pro-
phetic vision, as was the case with "a smoking furnace and
a burning lamp that passed between those pieces" (Gen. xv.
17), mentioned in the history of Abraham. You may also
assume that in addition there was a perception of sound, and
that there was a voice which passed before him, and was
undoubtedly something material. You may choose either
of these opinions, for our sole intention and purpose is
to guard you against the belief that the phrase "
"and the Lord passed," is analogous to
2, "pass
before the people" (Ex. xvii. 5), for God, being incorporeal,
cannot be said to move, and consequently the verb 71, "to
pass," cannot with propriety be applied to Him in its
primary signification.
CHAPTER XXII.
1, To come. 2, To enter. Applied (a) to living creatures ;
(b) to incorporeal things.¹
In Hebrew, the verb signifies "to come" as applied to
a living being, i.e. its arrival at a certain place, or approach
ות
nisan, endeavour, exertion (comp. 17, Ps. lv. 15; 117, ib. ii. 1), cor-
responding to the Arabic D. Munk believed that Charizi had, in the ori-
ginal, the reading on instead of 1; he found the same reading in a
Leyden MS.
¹ It is remarkable that the intermediate step, namely, "to come." used of life-
PART I.-CHAPTER XXII.
83
to a certain person, as
78 82, “Thy brother came
with subtilty" (Gen. xxvii. 35). It next denotes (with regard
to a living being) "to enter" a certain place,¹ e.g. N
","And when Joseph came into the house" (Gen.
"When ye come into the
land” (Ex. xii. 25). The term was also employed meta-
phorically in the sense of "to come" applied to a certain
event, that is, to something incorporeal, as 77,
"When thy sayings come to pass" (Judg. xiii. 17); ¬ND
TUND
Thy, "Of that which will come over thee " (Is. xlvii.
13). Nay, it is even applied to privatives,² e.g. v №7”, “ Yet
trouble came" (Job iii. 26); N 2, "And darkness
came." Now, since the word has been applied to incorporeal
things, it has also been used in reference to God-to the
fulfilment of His word, or to the manifestation of His Pre-
sence (the Shechinah). In this figurative sense it is said.
3
,יוסף הביתה
,כי תבואו אל הארץ ; (2 .xliii
,יבאו עליך
,ויבא אופל
Lo, I come unto thee in a thick * הנה אנכי בא אליך בעב הענן
Ι
а
cloud" (Ex. xix. 9);
b, “For the Lord
the God of Israel enters through it" (Ex. xliv. 2). In these
and all similar passages, the coming of the Sheehinah is
meant, while the explanation of ' 1, "And the Lord
my
1727
God shall come" (Zech. xiv. 5) is 27 N, "His word
will come," that is to say, the promises which He made
less corporeal beings, is omitted, although the author could have quoted several
instances from the Bible; e.g., NO DDDDD (Gen. xliii. 23); D’DM na 183)
(Numb. v. 24).
¹ The object of the author in making this division in the significations of N
is not apparent, especially after having already mentioned "arrival at a certain
place." The fact that no instance is quoted for "arrival at a certain place,"
suggests the idea that "arrival at a place," and "it signifies also to enter a
place (used of living beings)" are only two variations of the same thing, and
the one phrase was intended as a substitute for the other.
is the name applied to that class of terms which do not denote (העדר) עדם 2
a thing really existing, but merely the absence of their opposite, e. g., darkness,
as the absence of light; evil, as the absence of good.
3 Lit. "To things which are not at all corporeal." This phrase has been
added, because the usual formula nn nst 'b), “ and in accordance with
this use of the word," would refer to its being applied to things which have no
real existence ('77), while it is his object to show the application of the
word to God, to His word, or to His Shechinah, which have a real existence.
G 2
84
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
through the Prophets, will be fulfilled; therefore Scripture
adds Typ, that is to say, "The word of the Lord
my God will be performed, which has been spoken by all
the holy ones who are with thee, i.e., who address the
Israelites." 1
קדושים עמך
CHAPTER XXIII.
NY 1, To go out.
2, To manifest itself (of incorporeal beings).
1, To return. 2, To discontinue.
בא יצא
is the opposite of . The term is applied to the
motion of a body from a place in which it had previously
rested, to another place (whether the body be a living
"And when they were
gone out of the city" (Gen. xliv. 4); w syn, "If fire
break out" (Exod. xxii. 5). It was then figuratively em-
ployed to denote the appearance of something incorporeal,
,הם יצאו את העיר,..2 ,(being or not
The word went out of the king's ** הדבר יצא מפי המלך as
,כי יצא דבר המלכה על כל הנשים ;(8 .mouth " (Esth. vii
"When this deed of the queen shall come abroad unto all
women" (Esth. i. 17), that is to say, "the report will
spread." Again,
1, "For out of Zion shall
go forth the Law" (Is. ii. 3); further, by NY) UDUM,
y¬n
"The sun had risen upon the earth" (Gen. xix. 23), i.e., its
light became visible.³
כי מציון תצא
in the ; קדושים in the version of Ibn Tibbon agrees with מדברים !
original, the singular NDN is used. The author explains the suffix in
Dy as referring to Israel, whom the prophets address.
2 788 715), “The spreading of the word," or " of the command” has
been rendered by Ibn Tibbon, 1807 7100, “the transgression of the king's
order;" by Charizi, bon niyo pup, "The fulfilment of the king's order."
קיום מצות
but this is ; דבר המלכה explains the words נפוד אלאמר Both assume that
not necessary, since the principal thing to be mentioned here is the figurative
application of the root NY. The remark appears simply to imply that NY'
is used of an incorporeal object—a word—and its proper place would have
been after the instance which follows; after which the second figurative use,
that of the light, is introduced by 7 (11) “and similarly.”
3 "The sun" is here taken in the sense of "light;" if taken literally "the
PART I.-CHAPTER XXIII.
85
In this figurative sense we must take every expression of
.lit)הנה ה' יוצא ממקומו .relating to the Almighty, e.g יצא
"For, behold, the Lord cometh out of His place," Is. xxvi. 21)
"The word of God, which until now has been in secret,
cometh out, and will become manifest," 1 i.e., something will
come into being which had not existed before; for every-
thing new emanating from God is referred to His word.
By the word " בדבר ה' שמים נעשו וברוח פיו כל צבאם .Comp
of the Lord were the heavens made, and all the host of
them by the breath of His mouth" (Ps. xxxiii. 6). This is a
simile taken from the conduct of kings, who employ the
word as the means of carrying their will into effect. God,
however, requires no instrument wherewith to operate in
order to perform anything; the effect is produced solely by
His will alone. He does not employ any kind of speech,
as will be explained further on (ch. lv.).
The word is thus employed to designate the mani-
festation of a certain work of God, as we noticed in our
in a similar ;הנה ה' יוצא ממקומו interpretation of the phrase
,שוב
manner the term 1, "return," has been figuratively
employed to denote the discontinuance of a certain act
אלך אשובה אל מקומי according to the will of God, as in
66
'I will go and return to my place" (Hosea v. 15);
that is to say, the Divine presence (Shechinah) which
had been in our midst departed from us, the consequence
of which has been the absence of Divine protection from
amongst us. Thus the Prophet foretelling misfortune says
And I will hide my face ",והסתרתי פני מהם והיה לאכל
sun came forth,” it would be an instance of the first signification, and it is dif-
ficult to understand why Maimonides does not classify it so; perhaps because the
sun is exactly over the earth at noon, while in the phrase of the passage quoted
the morning is referred to; it may be on that account that he explains "The
light became visible over the earth." The difficulty has been noticed by the
several commentators, but the solution given by them is not satisfactory.
1 That is, His word, which is able to perform certain acts visible to our eyes,
whilst it does not act at present may be said to be hidden and invisible; when
those acts are performed it becomes visible; this is therefore expressed by the
phrase "The Lord will come forth from His place," that is, His word, which
is now in its place, invisible to us, will appear.
86
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
from them, and they shall be devoured" (Deut. xxxi. 17);
for, when man is deprived of Divine protection he is exposed
(to all dangers), and becomes the butt of all fortuitous
circumstances; his fortune and misfortune then depend
on chance. Alas! how terrible a threat!-This is the idea
1
I will go and“ אלך אשובה אל מקומי eontained in the phrase
return to my place" (Hosea v. 15).
CHAPTER XXIV.
n, To go, applied to, 1, living beings; 2, lifeless objects;
3, incorporeal beings.
THE term is likewise one of the words which denote
movements performed by living beings, as in
77,"And Jacob went on his way" (Gen. xxxii. 1), and
in many other instances. This term was next employed in
describing movements of objects less solid than the bodies of
And the waters" והמים היו הלוך וחסור .living beings, comp
were gradually decreasing" (Gen. viii. 5); 78 wa Tbanı,
“And the fire ran along upon the ground" (Ex. ix. 23).
Then it was employed to express the spreading and mani-
festation of something incorporeal, comp. i wnɔɔ nbıp,
"The voice thereof shall go like a serpent" (Jer. xlvi. 22);
፡፡
The voice of the Lord" קול ה' אלהים מתהלך בגן,again
God walking in the garden" (Gen. iii. 8). It is "the voice"
(7) that is qualified by "walking" (n).
Whenever the word , "to go," is used in reference to
God, it must be taken in this figurative sense, viz., applying to
incorporeal things, and signifying either the manifestation of
¹ A similar view was held by Ibn Ezra, and he frequently refers to it in
his writings; what Maimonides calls (pp) "chance," is to Ibn Ezra "fate,"
the necessary consequence of the natural influence of the heavenly bodies on
things on earth." Comp. Ibn Ezra Literature, by Dr. M. Friedländer, iv.
page 30.
PART I-CHAPTER XXIV.
87
something ideal,¹ or the withdrawal of the Divine protec-
tion, an act corresponding to the departure of a living being,
and effected by means of (7) "walking." The with-
drawal of God's protection is called in the Bible “ the hiding
of God's countenance," as in 9 108 107 1, “As for
me, I will hide my countenance." On the same ground it
has been designated, "going away," signifying "to
move away from a thing," comp.
78, “I Ι
will depart and return to my place" (Hos. v. 15). But in
And the anger of the Lord ",ויחר אף ה' וילך the passage
-
was kindled against them, and he departed" (Num. xii. 9),
the two meanings of are combined, viz., the withdrawal
of Divine protection,² expressed by, and the revelation
and manifestation of something, namely, of the anger
which went forth and reached them, in consequence of
which Miriam became "leprous, white as snow." The ex-
pression, was further applied to conduct, which
concerns only the inner life,³ and which requires no bodily
motion, as in the phrases 72 ), “And thou shalt
walk in his ways" (Deut. xxviii. 9);
na 'n nos,
(Deut. xiii. 5);
“Ye shall walk after the Lord your God"
,לכו ונלכו באור ה
והלכת בדרכיו
(7 7180 13331 135, “Come ye, and let us walk in the light of
the Lord" (Is. ii. 5).
¹ Both Hebrew translators understand
"thing" (y Tibbon, 717 Ch.); Munk wrongly
in this place in the sense of
translates "la divine parole ";
where ויחר אף יי בם וילך for the only instance for this signification is
אלאמר
O is explained by ", "The anger of the Lord;" if Maimonides
.(דברו אמרה had meant the Divine command he would have said
2 It is impossible to imagine how the verb could be used here as
implying two opposite motions at the same time (to come and to go away),
each of which is related to a different subject: "The Lord (i.e., His pro-
tection) went away, and His anger came," unless we assume that Maimonides
understood by ""He went," and said that the act manifested itself in
two ways: in the withdrawal of the Divine protection and the manifestation
of the Divine anger.
3 äbyaba ïvobx, "the higher walking," i.e., "the act as distinguished
from the common walking with our feet," walking in a figurative, moral sense.
Charizi does not translate
at all; Tibbon by 'n. It could
not have escaped Maimonides that 7777 is also used in a bad sense: "to
walk in the ways of the wicked." Comp. Deut. viii. 19, etc.
88
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED,
CHAPTER XXV.
w To dwell, 1, literally; 2, figuratively.
THE word, as is well known, signifies "to dwell," as
And he was dwelling in the plains " והוא שכן באלני ממרא
((
of Mamre" (Gen. xiv. 13);
2, "And it
came to pass, when Israel dwelt" (Gen. xxxv. 22). This is
the most common meaning of the word. But "dwelling in
a place" consists in the continued stay in a place, general
or special; when a living being stays long in a place, we say
that it rests in that place, although it unquestionably
<<
,והוא שכן באלוני ממרא .moves about in it, comp
,ויהי בשכן ישראל
And he
was dwelling in the plains of Mamre" (Gen. xiv. 13), and
ba¬w 7, "And it came to pass, when Israel dwelt"
(Gen. xxxv. 22).
The term
was next applied metaphorically to in-
animate objects, i.e., to all things which have settled and
remain fixed on an object, although the object on which
the thing remains is not a place, and the thing itself is
not a living being; for instance,
yn, "Let
a cloud dwell upon it" (Job iii. 5); there is no doubt
that the cloud is not a living being, and that the day is not
a corporeal thing, but a division of time.
In this sense the term is employed in reference to God,
that is to say, to denote the continuance of His Divine
Presence (Shechinah) or of His Providence in some
place where the Divine Presence 2 manifested itself con-
stantly, or in some object which was constantly protected
The Arabic has here the simple translation of 1, viz., 1; instead of
which the Hebrew translations give the definition of ; hence Tibbon,
.חנות החונה במקום,Charizi ; הוא התמדת העומד במקום אחד
2 The word ' appears to have been added by Ibn Tibbon (see Munk);
but if it is not distinctly expressed in the original, it is certainly implied. The
these are ; (ענאיה) השגחה and (סכינה) שכינה :author mentions two things
further explained by the two sentences which follow in such a manner that the
is לכל דבר in ל the ; השגחה the second to ,שכינה first sentence is related to
.שכינה is more applicable to ב while the preposition השגחתו Connected with
According to Munk, three kinds of manifestations are mentioned here: the
PART 1. CHAPTER XXVI.
89
by Providence. Comp. 11, “And the glory of the
Lord abode " (Ex. xxiv. 16); b, "And
I will dwell among the children of Israel" (Ex. xxix. 45);
And for the goodwill of him that dwelt in " ורצון שכני סנה
the bush" (Deut. xxxiii. 16). Whenever the term 1 is
applied to the Almighty, it must be taken consistently with
the context in the sense either of the presence of His
Shechinah (i.e., of His light that was created for the purpose)
in a certain place, or of the continuance of His Providence
protecting a certain object.
CHAPTER XXVI.
The Torah speaketh according to" דברה תורה כלשון בני אדם
the language of man.” (Talm. Babli., Baba Metsia, 31b.)¹
You, no doubt, know the Talmudical saying, which includes
in itself all the various kinds of interpretation connected
with our subject. It runs thus: "The Torah speaketh
manifestation of the Shechinah, of Providence in a particular place, and of
Providence in a certain object; but the difference between the last two is not
discernible, and still less clear is the distribution of the three instances quoted
by our author, between the three kinds of manifestation. In truth, Maimonides
does not even seek to decide which of the various explanations is applicable
to each instance, but rests satisfied with having shown that a figurative inter-
pretation can be given, by which anthropomorphism may be avoided.
1 The remarks on those anthropomorphic expressions which signify motion, or
any other relation to space, are in this chapter brought to a conclusion with a
discussion on the principle followed in the Bible, by which some terms in-
cluding corporeality appear to have been applied to God figuratively, while
others of an equally material character were excluded. According to Mai-
monides, all expressions which were believed by the common people to imply some
kind of perfection were admitted; such are the terms explained in the preceding
chapters. The expressions, on the other hand, which appeared to imply a notion
of imperfection, are never used in the Bible with reference to God. Onkelos, in
his version, observed a far stricter rule, and thought it necessary to paraphrase
all the anthropomorphisms employed in Scripture. As, however, his principal
object in paraphrasing such passages was to prevent misinterpretation an·l
inferences leading to the belief that God possesses material properties, he
retained the literal rendering where no such fears could be entertained. In
chapter xxvii. this method of Onkelos is fully discussed.
90
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
►
according to the language of man," that is to say, ex-
pressions, which can easily be comprehended and understood
by all, are applied to the Creator. Hence the description
of God by attributes implying corporeality, in order to
express His existence; because the multitude of people do not
easily conceive existence unless in connection with a body,
and that which is not a body nor connected with a body has
for them no existence. Whatever we regard as a state of per-
fection, is likewise attributed to God, as expressing that He
is perfect in every respect, and that no imperfection or defi-
ciency whatever is found in Him. But there is not attributed
to God anything which the multitude consider a defect or
want; thus He is never represented as eating, drinking,
sleeping, being ill, using violence, and the like. What-
ever, on the other hand, is commonly regarded as a state of
2
3
4
-
-includes the fol דברה תורה כלשון בני אדם The rabbinical principle 1
lowing two rules:-(1.) The Bible must be interpreted by the same rules of
grammar and logic as are generally applied to human language. In this sense
the principle is frequently referred to in the Talmud (Talm. Babli. Berachoth,
31 b et passim). (2.) The language of the Bible is simple, and adapted to
the average intelligence of man; anthropomorphic expressions are employed
where purely metaphysical terms would not be intelligible to the majority of
men. In this sense the words are employed by Maimonides.
Ibn Caspi
understands the rule in a wider sense, viz.,—“ Things are frequently described
in the Bible, not as they were in reality, but as they were believed to be by
the common people." Comp. "And the men pursued after them (Jos.
ii. 7). The spies had, in fact, not yet left Jericho. "And the prophet Jere-
miah said unto the prophet Hananiah" (Jer. xxviii. 5). Hananiah was not
a prophet. Applying this rule to the anthropomorphisms of the Bible, Ibn
Caspi says "The prophetic authors had to choose of two evils the lesser one.
The common people, not able to understand abstract ideas, had either to re-
main in entire ignorance of God or to receive imperfect notions of the Creator.
The latter course was preferred, as admitting of gradual improvement.”
""
2 The words
are not found in the version of Charizi, nor is the
corresponding phrase found in the original. 7 is not used here in its
strictly philosophical sense, but as a mere synonym to 11.
3 "This assertion is not contradicted by the phrase "'n nab nniy,
Awake, why sleepest Thou, O Lord?' (Ps. xliv. 24), because these words
are equivalent to 'Awake, why dost Thou appear to us as if Thou wert
asleep.'" (Shemtob and Caspi.) See Babyl. Talm. Sotah 48a, and Maimo-
nides, Comm. on Mishnah Sotah ix. 6, and on Maaser Sheni v. 15.
• In Charizi's version these words (a shi bina shi) are absent.
PART 1.-CHAPTER XXVI.
91
perfection is attributed to Him, although it is only a state
of perfection in relation to ourselves; for in relation to God,
what we consider to be a state of perfection, is in truth the
highest degree of imperfection. If, however, men were
to think that those human perfections were absent in God,
they would consider Him as imperfect.
1
You are aware that locomotion is one of the distinguishing
characteristics of living beings, and is indispensable for them
in their progress towards perfection. As they require food
and drink to supply animal waste, so they require locomo-
tion, in order to approach that which is good for them and
in harmony with their nature, and to escape from what is
injurious and contrary to their nature. It makes, in fact,
no difference whether we ascribe to God eating and drinking
or locomotion; but according to human modes of expression,
that is to say, according to common notions, eating and
drinking would be an imperfection in God, while motion
would not, in spite of the fact that the necessity of locomo-
tion is the result of some want.2 Furthermore, it has been
clearly proved, that everything which moves is corporeal
and divisible; it will be shown below that God is incorporeal
and that He can have no locomotion; nor
4
can rest be
ascribed to Him; for rest can only be applied to that which
also moves. All expressions, however, which imply the
3
in Ibn Tibbon's version are not found מן הרע לו ו and הטוב לו ו The words •
in Charizi's version, and have no corresponding words in the Arabic text.
Sa in Tibbon's version corresponds to the Arabic, “that which is
familiar," or "which is joined," "friend." Charizi translates this word 'DD.
In the second part (Introd.) both translators use instead of it Пıxın. qbsbobs
is rendered by Tibbon 171, "contrary to him," "against him; " by Charizi,
105, "the opposite of it."
2 The words " ', the correct rendering of the corresponding
Arabic text, appear to have been misunderstood by Palquera in his Moreh
ha-moreh, for, in criticising Ibn Tibbon's version, he understood 7DM in this
phrase to signify "imperfection," while Ibn Tibbon used it here in its literal
meaning, “want” (comp. na, “in want of everything," Deut. xxviii.
48), corresponding to "PN in the Arabic text.
3 See Part II., Introduction, Proposition 7.
* Ibid, ch. 1 and 2.
92
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
i
various modes of movement in living beings, are employed
with regard to God in the manner we have described and in
the same way as life is ascribed to Him; although motion is
an accident pertaining to living beings, and there is no doubt
that, without corporeality, expressions like the following
could not be imagined: "to descend, to ascend, to walk, to
place, to stand, to surround, to sit, to dwell, to depart, to
enter, to pass, etc."1
It would have been superfluous thus to dilate on this
subject, were it not for the mass of the people, who are
accustomed to such ideas. It has been necessary to ex-
patiate on the subject, as we have attempted, for the benefit
of those who are anxious to acquire perfection, to remove
from them such notions as have grown up with them² from
the days of youth.
CHAPTER XXVII.³
DIYA TAY MIO “ I shall go down with thee into Egypt”
(Targum of Onkelos, Gen. xlvi. 4).
4
ONKELOS the Proselyte, who was thoroughly acquainted
with the Hebrew and Chaldaic languages, made it his task
1 All the verbs of motion here alluded to, with the exception of 10, have
been mentioned and explained in the preceding chapters, though not in the
same order. The verbs p, p, w, and D, explained above, are here
omitted.
2 'in Ibn Tibbon's version is here used in the sense of " which come
in the beginning;” it implies the verb h or yan, and therefore the pre-
in the,המחשבות הקודמות is joined to it. Palquera suggests אליהם position
sense of "ideas received indiscriminately." The term DW in Charizi must
be understood in its literal sense of "explicit."
3 In the translation of Charizi this chapter is connected with the preceding
one, and the chapters which follow are numbered accordingly. Ibn Caspi
In the Arabic text the * אין בזה הבדל פרק בספר הערבי says in his notes
new chapter does not commence here." Palquera makes a similar remark.
4 The theory of Maimonides as to the principle by which Onkelos was guided
in paraphrasing some passages and rendering others literally, has been severely
PART I.—CHAPTER XXVII.
93
1
to oppose the belief in God's corporeality. Accordingly,
any expression employed in the Pentateuch in reference to
God, and in any way implying corporeality, he paraphrases
in consonance with the context. All expressions denoting
any mode of motion, are explained by him to mean
the appearance or manifestation of a certain light that
had been created [for the occasion], i.e., the Shechinah
(Divine Presence), or Providence. Thus he renders
(the Lord will come down), "ban",
ban, "The Lord will mani-
fest Himself" (Exod. xix. 11); "
down),, "And God manifested Himself" (ib. 20),
And God came) וירד
ארדה ;(And God came down) ונחת יי and does not say
78788, "I will go down now and see" (Gen. xviii. 21),
I will manifest myself now“ אתגלי כען ואחזה he translates
and see." This is his rendering [of the verb in
reference to God] throughout his version, with the exception
down with thee into Egypt"
I will go“ אנכי ארד עמך מצרים of the following passage
(Gen. xlvi. 4), which he
criticised by Nachmanides in his Commentary on the Pentateuch (Gen. xlvi. 4),
and defended by Abrabanel in his Commentary on the Moreh Nebhuchim.
About twenty objections are raised by Nachmanides, the strongest of which
appears to be that which is founded on Gen. xxviii. 15. The circumstances
accompanying the Divine promise to Jacob, mentioned in Gen. xxviii. 15 and
in xlvi. 4, are the same; both were made in a dream (□), in a vision by
night (15›bn n872). Maimonides distinctly states in Part II. ch. xlv. that
both visions were of one and the same category. He could certainly not have
ignored Gen. xxviii. 15 while founding such an important principle on Gen.
xlvi. 4. It appears that his commentators and objectors ignored the fact
that Maimonides treats here only of expressions of motion (D’IDN NIDWN
which occur in a Divine communication received in (על מין ממיני התנועה
a dream or nocturnal vision, and that the question whether apparent incon-
sistencies in the Targum in reference to other expressions were explained by
Maimonides by the same rule or by another, or were not explained at all, is
in no connection with the present chapter. It is noteworthy that the Targum
Jonathan (on Gen. xlvi. 4) has the addition "", "by my word."
1 Charizi
the verb
"," the revelation of the Divine presence." Although
in the Targum is directly connected with the name of God
The Lord was *) שכינה or יקרא it seems to imply the term ,(ואתגלי יי)
revealed," i.e., through p' or '). Comp. Nachmanides, 1.c.
94
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
Į
אנא אחות עמך למצרים (translates (literally
A remarkable
proof of this great man's talents, the excellence of his
version, and the correctness of his interpretation! By this
version he discloses to us an important principle as regards
prophecy.
This narrative begins: "And God spake unto Israel in
the visions of the night, and said, Jacob, Jacob, etc. And
He said, I am God, etc., I will go down with thee into
Egypt" (Gen. xlvi. 2, 3). Seeing that the whole narrative is
introduced as a vision of the night, Onkelos did not hesitate
to translate literally the words addressed (to Jacob) in the
nocturnal vision, and thus gave a faithful account of the
occurrence. 1 For the passage in question contains a state-
ment of what Jacob was told, not what actually took place,
as is the case in the words, "And the Lord came down
upon Mount Sinai" (Exod. xix. 20). Here we have an
account of what actually occurred in the physical world;
the verb is therefore paraphrased "to appear," and
entirely detached from the idea of motion. Accounts of
what happened in the imagination of man, 2 I mean of
what he was told, are not altered. A most remarkable
distinction!
3
4
Hence you may infer that there is a great difference
; והוא הנכון והאמת Charizi ; והו אלצחים Arabic 1
Maimonides
means
to
say
that
while in other instances .והוא ספור האמת
N; Ibn Tibbon
the anthropomorphism diverges from positive truth, it is the actual truth in
this instance, because Jacob really seemed to hear the Almighty speaking
those words. Charizi, who took 'n in the sense of "the right
view," added the word 11. Munk likewise renders the phrase— Et celà
avec raison.
2 According to Maimonides, the most imperfect class of prophecies consists
of those communicated to a prophet in a dream or nocturnal vision, when his
imagination receives the Divine message. This form of prophecy is adapted
to the nature of man's imagination, and therefore includes anthropomorphism.
The highest degree of prophecy is a communion of man's intellect with the
Supreme Being; in that case anthropomorphism is rigorously excluded.
3 This phrase is to qualify the preceding sentence; not everything that
passed in a dream, but only what the prophet was told, was rendered literally
by Onkelos. Comp. page 92, note 4.
4 That is, from the fact that Onkelos retains anthropomorphic expressions,
·
PART I.-CHAPTER XXVII.
95
between a communication, designated as having been made
in a dream, or a vision of the night, and a vision or a mani-
festation simply introduced¹ with phrases like “And the
word of the Lord came unto me, saying;" "And the Lord
spake unto me, saying."
According to my opinion, it is also possible that Onkelos
understood in the above passage to signify "angel,"
and that for this reason he did not hesitate to translate
I will go down with thee אבא אחות עמך למצרים literally
"I
to Egypt." Do not think it strange that Onkelos should have
believed the bs, who says to Jacob, "I am God, the God
of thy father" (ib. 3), to be an angel, for these words in the
same form can also be spoken by an angel, as you can clearly
see in the words (of Jacob), "And the angel of God spake
unto me in a dream, saying, Jacob. And I said, "Here am I"
etc. (Gen. xxxi. 11); the report of the angel's words to Jacob
concludes, “I am the God of Bethel, where thou anointedst
the pillar, and where thou vowedst a vow unto me" (ib. 13),
although there is no doubt that Jacob vowed to God, not to
the angel. It is the usual practice of prophets to relate
words addressed to them by an angel in the name of
God, as though God himself had spoken to them. Such
passages are all to be explained by supplying the
nomen regens,2 and by considering them as identical
with "I am the messenger of the God of thy father,"
"I am the messenger of God who appeared to thee in
Bethel," and the like. Prophecy with its various de-
when the words heard by a prophet in a dream are related, but he paraphrases
them when they occur in accounts of other visions and prophecies. This
distinction shows that Onkelos believed in the existence of several degrees of
prophecy. The least perfect form of prophecy was a vision in a dream, un-
folded to the prophet's imagination; the most perfect form was that revealed to
the intellect of the prophet. Comp. Part II. ch. xlv.
¹ Ibn Tibbon, and, without specifying that the words were perceived in a
vision; Charizi, üb 27, “by a decided word," i.e., clearly, not in a
dream. The Hebrew DND corresponds better to the Arabic huo.
Both
phrases denote the same thing, viz., the nomen regens which is to be supplied.
.מכח השם הסמוך,Charizi ; בחסרון המצטרף Ibn Tibbon 2
96
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
grees, and the nature of angels, will be fully discussed in
the sequel, in accordance with the object of this treatise.¹
CHAPTER XXVIII.
7,2 1, Foot. 2, Suite. 3, Cause. 4, Effect.³
is homonymous, signifying, in the first
place, the foot of a living being; comp. nnn ban,
"Foot for foot" (Exod. xxi. 24). Next it denotes an
THE term
וכל העם אשר ברגלך .object which follows another; comp
¹ See Part II. ch. xlv.
2 The next group of homonyms (ch. xxviii. to ch. xliv.) explained by
Maimonides, consists of those which signify part of the body of man or of an
animal. He begins with 1, "foot," because it is related to expressions of
motion, and after having made some remarks on the necessity of employing
figurative language in speaking of God, and also on the importance of
obtaining a correct notion of the incorporeality of God, he continues with
D'], “face,” and 78, “back,” b, nin, WD), D”, “heart,” “spirit,”
"soul," and "life," , “wing," and concludes with 'V, "eye." It is
rather difficult to define what place ch. xxix. and ch. xxx. occupy in this
group, and equally difficult to see the reason why the author introduced them
here. The reader is probably to be prepared for the theory that any belief
involving corporeality of God is equal to idolatry. For this purpose he begins
with the explanation of 17, and shows the consequence of the insufficient
preparation and imperfect conception of the idea of God, in the instance of the
nobles of Israel. According to tradition, as accepted by Maimonides (ch. v.),
they were punished without having received any warning. By introducing
next the phrase 15 bx axyn”, “And God was angry" (because of the
wickedness of the generation of the flood,
17) "without telling the
people," he tacitly invites the reader to compare the causes of God's anger in
both instances, and to conclude that a misconception of the nature of the
Supreme Being is actually a sin. It can be avoided by suitable studies, which
are as necessary for the mind as food is for the body (ch. xxx.). According to
Abrabanel and others, Maimonides explains in ch. xxx. the word occurring
in the commandment given to Adam, "Of every tree of the garden thou mayest
freely eat. But of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, thou shalt not
eat of it." That the reader is in fact expected to read between the lines, has
expressly been stated by Maimonides in the Introduction. See page 8.
3 Although Maimonides appears to give only three significations of the
word, he evidently uses the word employed to express the third signification,
רגליו because of me, and * לרגלי ; in a double sense, cause and effect ,סבה
а
"that caused by him."
me,”
PART I.-CHAPTER XXVIII.
97
"And all the people that follow thee" (ib. xi. 8). Another
ויברך יי אותך לרגלי .is * cause ; comp רגל signification of
"And the Lord hath blessed thee, I being the cause
(Gen. xxx. 30), i.e., for my sake; for that which exists
for the sake of another thing has the latter for its final
cause. Examples of used in this sense are numerous.
לרגל המלאכה אשר לפני ולרגל It has that meaning in
,הילדים
,"because of the cattle that goeth before me, and
because of the children" (Gen. xxxiii. 14).
""
ועמדו רגליו ביום ההוא על הר Consequently, the words
(Zech. xiv. 4) can be explained to mean the following:
“And the things caused by him on that day upon the Mount
of Olives, that is to say, the wonders which will then be seen,
and of which God will be the Cause or the Maker, will remain
permanently." To this explanation does Jonathan ben Uziel¹
ואתגלי בגבורתיה ביומא ההוא incline in translating the passage
And He will appear in His might on that " על טורא דזיתיא
day upon the Mount of Olives;" for expressions denoting
those parts of the body by which contact and motion are
effected, he generally translates by
"His might,"
[when referring to God] because all such expressions denote
acts done by Him.
.Ex. xxiv) ותחת רגליו כמעשה לבנת הספיר As to the words
,רגליו
10, lit., “And there was under his feet, as it were, a paved
work of a sapphire stone"), Onkelos, as you know, in his
version, considers 1, "his feet," as a figurative expression³
for D, "throne," and the phrase nnn he translates
1 Jonathan ben Uziel is named in tradition as the author of the Chaldaic
version of the books of the Prophets (Talm. Babli., Megillah, fol. 3.) The
version known by this name is supposed to be a Babylonian Targum, and not
the work of Jonathan. Comp. Zunz, "Gottesdienstliche Vorträge,” 77 sqq.
.עסק ותנועה by Charizi ; מעשה מגע והעתק rendered by Ibn Tibbon
2 The Arabic pɔn wi, translated by Munk "Les mots désig-
nant les membres dont on se sert pour saisir ou pour se transporter," is
,כורסא
(C
3 The term " in the Hebrew translations (y in Arabic) generally
means a substitute for a proper name," and denotes therefore, 1, a
pronoun; 2, a paraphrase. Here it is used in the second signification,
referring to the substitution of NO, "throne," for 1, "foot." The
H
98
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
Inn, "And under the throne of His glory."
Consider this well and you will observe with wonder how
Onkelos keeps free from the idea of the corporeality of
God, and from everything that leads thereto, even in the
remotest degree. For he does not sayını
"and
under His throne;" the direct relation of the throne to
God, implied in the literal sense of the phrase " His throne"
would necessarily suggest the idea that God is supported by
a material object, and thus lead directly to the corporeality of
God; he therefore refers the throne to His glory, i.e., to the
Shechinah, which is a light created [for the purpose].²
by T (Exod. xvii. 16, "For
Similarly, he renders
מן קדם אלהא ("my hand I lift up to the throne of God
by God whose Shechinah is upon דשכינתיה על כורסא יקריה
the throne of His glory." This principle found also expres-
sion in the popular phrase³ 71 D, "the throne of the
glory."
We have already gone too far away from the subject of
T
pan. But it is improb-
pronominal suffix " "his," is, as usual when it refers to God, rendered
"of His glory." According to Munk, who takes 7" ("")
to denote "suffix," Maimonides intended to say that "p" '071 in),
in the Targum, was the same as
able that Onkelos should have omitted in that case, nor is it more
probable that Maimonides should have omitted to call the reader's attention
to this extraordinary anxiety of Onkelos to avoid anthropomorphism. It is
remarkable that this passage has been considered by the Commentators as
extremely difficult. Narboni says: "Not one of the learned men who discussed
this passage understood it, as far as I know. When I was in Toledo, I had a
conversation on it with Don Joseph Abubecr, and I found that he was at a
loss to find a solution of the difficulty."
,יקריה
as) כורסא in the editions of Ibn
Tibbon's version is a mistake for כורסיה 1
in the Arabic text) or for 'D.
2 Comp. ch. x. p. 57, note 4.
See Luzzatto, Oheb Ger. (ad locum).
According to Abarbanel, Maimonides distin-
the Shechinah revealed in this (אשר הוא אור נברא) guished by this phrase
-
instance from other kinds. He says: "The term ' in the Targum of
Onkelos is a homonym; it is applied to three different things, to the in-
telligences, to physical light, and to Providence, according as the term is
followed by heaven' or 'throne,' by the name of some place on earth, or
by 'Israel.' Maimonides understood this correctly."
.על לשון כל העם Ibn Tibbon ; על לשון כל עדתנו : Charizi 3
PART I.—CHAPTER XXVIII.
99
this chapter, and touched upon things which will be dis-
cussed in other chapters; we will now return to our present
theme. You are acquainted with the version of Onkelos [of
the passage quoted]. He contents himself with excluding
from his version all expressions of corporeality in reference to
God, and does not show us what they (the • • •b)
perceived, or what is meant by that figure. In all
similar instances Onkelos also abstains from entering into
such questions, and only endeavours to exclude every ex-
pression implying corporeality, for the incorporeality of
God is a demonstrative truth and an indispensable element
in our faith; he could decidedly¹ state all that was
necessary in that respect. The interpretation of a simile is
a doubtful thing; it may possibly have that meaning, but it
may also refer to something else. It contains besides very
profound matter, the understanding of which is not a funda-
mental element in our faith, and the comprehension of which
is not easy for the common people. Onkelos, therefore, did
not enter at all into this subject.2
We, however, remaining faithful to our task in this
treatise, find ourselves compelled to give our explanation.
According to our opinion the expression nnn denotes
"and under that of which He is the cause," "that which
exists through Him," as we have already stated. They
therefore comprehended the real (אצילי בני ישראל the)
nature of the materia prima,³ which emanated from Him,
and of whose existence He is the only cause. Consider
1 The verb (in Ibn Tibbon's version) denotes here "to be decided," to
speak in such a manner as to leave no doubt. Charizi: mbi 12 13
כדי לגזור בו ולהבין
על ענינו
the reading of the editions of Ibn לא הכניס עצמו בזה הענין Instead of 2
Tibbon's version, Palquera had in his text of the translation of Ibn Tibbon
.The sense is the same in both phrases .לא יטפל בזה הענין
3 Maimonides calls that substance which is the source of all things in the
sublunary world, the first substance, (also the lowest ¡n, comp. Part II.
ch. xxvi.) as being the nearest to the earth, and first perceived by man, in contra-
distinction to the substance of the heavenly spheres, which is more distant. It
appears that the blame attached to the action of the nobles of Israel was, that
they held the Creator to be in direct connection with the sublunary material
H 2
100
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
like the action כמעשה לבנת הספיר well the phrase
of the whiteness of the sapphire stone." If the colour
were the point of comparison, the words
b
<<
1
2
as the whiteness of the sapphire stone" would have suf-
ficed; but the phrase, “like the action,” has been
added, because matter, as such, is, as you are well aware,
always receptive and passive, active only by some accident.³
On the other hand, Form as such¹ is always active, and
only passive by some accident, as is explained in works
on Physics. This explains the addition of "like
the action" in reference to the materia prima. As to
the expression
it refers to the transparency 6 not
to the white colour; for "the whiteness" of the sapphire is
3
7
4
.בעצמו
world, without the intermediate beings, the intelligences, and the influence of
the spheres. According to the author, their notion of the Supreme Being was
impure; it included corporeality to some extent.
¹ Lit., "according to the consideration of its nature," or "according to its
natural properties;
""
.מעשה
כמעשה
and also ,בבחינת טבעו or, לפי בחינת טבעו in Hebrew
2 Instead of byan (Ibn Tibbon), we read in Charizi, nia, "from
without." On the passivity of matter and its capacity of receiving impressions
from without, see infra, ch. xlvii. and Part III. viii.
3 I.e., the combination of matter and form; so long as they are not com-
bined and continue in a free state, the one is active, the other passive;
when combined, they are considered to participate in both qualities. The
combination is an accident to the matter as well as to the form; it endows each
with properties which are not essential to it.
4 Charizi: y
D. See Arist. De Anima, ii. 7. Maimonides explains
it fully, Part III. ch. viii.
5 This sentence is rather obscure. The connection of the word yƆ with
the difference between matter and form is not clear. The author intended,
perhaps, to say that the of comparison ("like") qualifies the notion ex-
pressed by D. "It resembled an action, but was not a real action,"
because the materia prima has no action of its own. Shemtob paraphrases the
Therefore it ולכן יצדק שיש לו כמעשה ואיננו עושה :sentence as follows
((
is correct to say that it has something similar to an action, but is not really
acting,"
of the eye through it," "transparency."
the passing * ; עבור העין בו : Charizi more clearly ; הזהר : Ibn Tibbon 6
That is, the term "white," commonly applied to the sapphire (†'N'a, ¡a1b),
does not imply that the sapphire is of a white colour; it is described as
"white'
on account of its transparency, through the absence of all colour.
""
PART I.-CHAPTER XXVIII.
101
1
is not a white colour but the property of being transparent.
Things, however, which are transparent, have no colour of
their own, as is proved in works on Physics; for if they
had a colour they would not permit all the colours ¹ to pass
through them nor would they receive colours; it is only
when the transparent object is totally colourless, that it is
able to receive successively all the colours. In this respect
it (the whiteness of the sapphire) is like the materia prima,
which as such is entirely formless, and thus receives all
the forms one after the other. What they (the
b) perceived was therefore the materia prima, whose
relation to God is distinctly mentioned, because it is the
origin of those of His creatures which are subject to
origination and destruction, and He created it. This sub-
ject also will be treated later on more fully.
2
b
3
Observe that you must have recourse to an explanation
of this kind, even according to the rendering of Onkelos
; And under the throne of His glory ",ותחות כורסא יקריה
>>
for in fact the materia prima is also under the heavens,
which are called "throne" (D) as we have remarked
above. I should not have thought of this unusual inter-
pretation, or hit on this argument were it not for an ut-
terance of R. Eliezer ben Hyrcanus, which will be discussed in
one of the parts of this treatise. The primary object of every
intelligent person must be to deny the corporeality of
God, and to believe that all those perceptions (described in
the above passage) were of a spiritual not of a material
character. Note this and consider it well.
4
אבל היה מקבל אותם ומחזיקם :Charizi
According to modern science, white is the combination of all different colours.
Instead of 7, Charizi has 7, corresponding to of the Arabic text
(bdellium).
"But it would absorb them
and keep them." The sense is the same.
2 See note 1, on previous page.
3 The word 107" in Ibn Tibbon's version is a noun, and is to be read
"and its relation." Some read 1D
ion"!,
"and they ascribed it to God;"
this is not in accordance with the Arabic N.
4 Part II. ch, xxvi.
102
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
את רוח קדשו
73, 1, Pain. 2, Grief. 3, Provocation.
1
THE term y is homonymous, denoting, in the first place,
pain and trembling, as in bn as, “In sorrow thou
shalt bring forth children" (Gen. iii. 16). Next it denotes
anger; comp. "D'D MON 123y b, "And his father had not
made him angry at any time" (1 Kings i. 6); 777 arya 10,
x
"for he was angry for the sake of David" (1 Sam. xx. 34).
The root signifies also provocation; ¹ comp. 13117
177 01 78, “They rebelled, and vexed his holy spirit"
(Is. lxiii. 10); 112 113, "and provoke him in the
desert" (Ps. lxxviii. 40); y 777 DN, "If there be any
way of provocation in me" (ib. cxxxix. 24); 27 17 b
123, “Every day they rebel against my words" (ib. lvi. 6).
The words
" (Gen. vi. 6) are to be explained
either according to the second or according to the third
signification of the word y. In the first case, the sense
of the phrase is "God was angry with them on account
of the wickedness of their deeds"; as to the words b
CHAPTER XXIX.
בעצב תלדי בנים
,אם דרך עצב בי
מרו ועצבו
כל היום דברי
,ויאמר יי אל לבו used here, and also in the history of
Noah
"And God said in his heart" (ib. viii. 21), I will here
explain what they mean. With regard to man, we use the
.מרד ופשע
he said to himself * אמר אל לבו or אמר בלבו expression
در
or "he said in his heart" in reference to a subject which
he did not utter or communicate to any other person.
And God said in * ויאמר יי אל לבו Similarly the phrase
His heart," is used in reference to an act which God decreed
without mentioning it to any prophet at the time the event
took place according to the will of God.2 And a com-
¹ Charizi has here, as in many other instances, two words instead of one
2 Tibbon ¡18 ", "in accordance with the will of God;" Charizi a
1127,"without speaking."
בלא
PART I.-CHAPTER XXX.
103
""
parison in that respect is admissible, in accordance with the
rule "the Torah speaketh in accordance with the language
of man. This is plain and clear. In the Pentateuch
no distinct mention is made of a message sent¹ to the
wicked generation of the flood, cautioning or threatening
them with death; therefore, it is said concerning them,
that God was angry with them in His heart; likewise when
He decreed that no flood should happen again, He did not
tell a prophet to communicate it to others, and for that
reason the words
"in His heart" are added.
Taking y in the third signification, we explain 237
"And man rebelled against God's will concerning
him"; for also signifies "will," as we shall explain
when treating of the homonymity of 5.
2
CHAPTER XXX.
b, 1, To eat. 2, To destroy. 3, To learn.
In its primary meaning is used in the sense of taking
food by animals; this needs no illustration. It was afterwards
observed that eating includes two processes-(1) the loss of
the food,* i.e., the destruction of its form, which first takes
place; (2) the growth of animals, the preservation of their
1 Instead of saying "no warning was given," Maimonides says "in the
Pentateuch no distinct mention (n) is made of a message," probably in
והיו ימיו מאה ועשרים opposition to the traditional explanation of the words
,"yet his days shall be a hundred and twenty years" (Gen. vi. 3), viz.,
that respite was given to the people that they might have a chance for repent-
ance; and that they were also warned by Noah, who, during the long period
when the ark was being constructed, told them for what purpose it was designed.
2 Ibn Tibbon Л), in some editions
; the correct rendering, and
1, as in Charizi's version.
, "concerning him," i.e., concerning
Munk is
perhaps also the correct reading, is
3 The translation of the Arabic
Adam, has been omitted both by Ibn Tibbon and by Charizi.
mistaken in referring the pronoun into God.
.והיותו אפס,Charizi, הנאכל Ibn Tibbon 4
104
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
strength and their existence, and the support of all their
bodily forces, caused by the food they take.
The consideration of the first process led to the figurative
use of, in the sense of "losing," "destroying;" hence
it includes all modes of depriving a thing of its form; comp.
And the land of your enemies * ואכלה אתכם ארץ איביכם
shall destroy you" (Lev. xxvi. 38); mambo Y8, "A
land that destroyeth the inhabitants thereof" (Num. xiii.
32);, "Ye shall be destroyed with the sword"
(Is. i. 6); 2, "Shall the sword destroy" (2 Sam.
And the
fire of the Lord burnt among them, and destroyed them that
were in the uttermost parts of the camp" (Num. xi. 1);
sin mbain wx, “(God) is a destroying fire" (Deut. iv. 24),
that is, He destroys those who rebel against Him, as the fire
destroys everything that comes within its reach. Instances of
this kind are very frequent.
With reference to the second process connected with the
act of eating, the word is figuratively used for “acquir-
ing wisdom," "learning;" in short, for all intellectual
perceptions, by which the human form (reason) is constantly
preserved in the most perfect manner, in the same way as by
food the body is preserved in its best condition. Comp.
5 17 133, "Come ye, buy and eat" (Is. lv. 1);
,אש אוכלה הוא
אכלת ישביה
,חרב תאכלו
תאכל חרב
,ותבער בם אש יי ותאכל בקצה המחנה ; (26 .ii
,לכו שברו ואכלו
(C
,Hearken diligently unto me * שמעו שמע אלי ואכלו טוב
אכול דבש הרבה לא טוב ; (2 .and eat ye that which is good (ib
"It is not good to eat much honey" (Prov. xxv. 27);
אכל בני דבש כי טוב ונופת מתוק לחכך כן דעה חכמה לנפשך
"My son, eat thou honey, because it is good, and the honey-
comb, which is sweet to thy taste; so shall the knowledge
of wisdom be unto thy soul" (ib. xxiv. 13, 14).
This figure of using in the sense of "acquiring
wisdom" is frequently met with in the Talmud, e.g., "Come,
eat fat meat at Raba's;" also, "all expressions of 'eating'
and 'drinking' found in this book (of Proverbs) refer to
¹ That is, Come, let us hear interesting discourses in the house of Raba.
Babyl. Talm., Baba Bathra, fol. 22a.
PART I.-CHAPTER XXX.
105
כל צמא לכו למים
wisdom," or, according to another reading, "to the Law."
Wisdom has also been frequently called "water,"
water," e.g.,
orab 1b Na3 b, "Ho, every one that thirsteth, come
ye to the waters" (Is. lv. 1).
The figurative meaning of these expressions has been
so general and common, that it was almost considered as
its primitive signification, and led to the employment
"of hunger" (y) and "thirst" (N), in the sense of
"absence of wisdom and intelligence;" comp. "I will
send a famine in the land, not a famine of bread, nor a
thirst for water, but of hearing the words of the Lord;
""
((
My soul thirsteth for God, for the living God" (Ps. xlii.
3). Instances of this kind occur frequently. The words.
With joy shall ye * ושאבתם מים בששון ממעיני הישועה
draw water out of the wells of salvation" (Is. xii. 3), are
ותקבלון אולפן : paraphrased by Jonathan ben Uziel thus
You will joyfully receive new » חדת בחדוא מבחירי צדיקיא
העדה
instruction from the chosen of the righteous." Consider how
he explains "water" to indicate "the wisdom which
will then spread," and as being identical with
779"in the eyes of the congregation" (Num. xv.
24), in the sense of "the chiefs," ie., "the wise."2 By the
phrase ", "from the chosen of the righteous,"
he expresses his belief that righteousness is true salvation
מים
(6
1 Comp. Midrash Rabba, Koheleth, iii. 13.
2 According to Maimonides the Targum, in paraphrasing the word ""yD
(lit. sources of") by '', "the best of," is supported by the similar figura-
tive use of ¡' in the phrase yn ''yo. Maimonides by no means overlooks
the fact that
is preformative, while in "?' it is a preposition;
the figurative use of the root ' in the two instances is the principal aim of
Maimonides in this argument. Ibn Tibbon, misunderstanding this passage,
in
while slumbering and lying * נאים ושכיב רבינו ז"ל אמר זה הדבר :remarks
down our teacher said this." Ibn Tibbon was justly rebuked in Moreh ha-
ור' שמואל שתפשו לחנם תפשו שכתב : moreh (p. 167) in the following words
R. Samuel * כי נאים ושכיב מר אמר זה וחשדו בתנומה תפול עליו תרדמה
censured him without reason when saying that he said this while slumbering
and lying down; he suspected that Maimonides was slumbering, while he him-
self was in deep sleep." Comp. 177 7 the Targ. of ''y (Eccl. ii. 10).
106
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
(). You now see how he gives to every word in this
verse some signification referring to wisdom and study.
This should be well considered.
CHAPTER XXXI.
Man's intellect is limited.
1
KNOW¹ that the human mind has certain objects of per-
ception which are within the scope of its nature and
capacity; on the other hand, there are, amongst things
which actually exist, certain objects which the mind can in no
way and by no means 2 grasp: the gates of perception are
closed against it. Further, there are things of which the
mind understands one part, but remains ignorant of the
other, and when man is able to comprehend some things, it
does not follow that he must be able to comprehend every-
¹ The arrangement in ch. xxxi. to ch. xxxvi. is as follows: Man's intellect
is limited (xxxi.); a transgression of the limit is not only useless, but even
dangerous (xxxii.). The limit is not the same for all. The study of
Metaphysics, accessible to some, is too difficult for the ordinary capacity of
man, and for novices in the study of philosophy (xxxiii.). Metaphysics is not a
suitable subject for general instruction (xxxiv.). The doctrine of the in-
corporeality of God, though part of Metaphysics, must not be treated as an
esoteric doctrine (xxxv.). Belief in the Corporeality of the Divine Being is
equal to idolatry (xxxvi.).
by both Ibn Tibbon בשום פנים of the original has been rendered בונה 2
and Charizi; while D is translated D in the version of the former, and
na D in that of Charizi. Munk, "D'une manière quelconque ni par une
cause quelconque." Although 2 and 30 are frequently used in the sense
indicated by these translators "in some way," and "by some cause," the author
would have added N if he wished to say "in any way," or "by any cause
39
}
the suggestion that it is to be taken in its primary signification, “in face,”
i.e., “straight on,” “directly,” as opposed to 10a, “indirectly.” In the
English translation the usual rendering has been retained, the sense being
the same,
"neither by any method," scil., of his own, "nor by any cause
leads to בסבב and בוגה,Besides, the antithesis .(בסבב מא and בוגה מא)
not by * ולא בסבה אפילו בשפע אלהי from without." Shemtob explains
any cause, even by Divine inspiration."
• The words лn ni", "and he is ignorant of certain properties,” have
no corresponding rendering in Charizi's version.
וינהל חאלאת
PART I.-CHAPTER XXXI.
107
thing. This also applies to the senses: they are able to per-
ceive things, but not at every distance; and all other powers.
of the body are limited in a similar way. A man can, e.g.,
carry two kikkar,¹ but he cannot carry ten kikkar. How
individuals of the same species surpass each other in these
sensations and in other bodily faculties is universally known,
but there is a limit to them, and they cannot extend to every
distance or to every degree.
All this is applicable to the intellectual faculties of man.
There is a considerable difference between one person and
another as regards these faculties, as is well-known to philo-
sophers. While one man can discover a certain thing by him-
self, another is never able to understand it, even if taught by
means of all possible expressions and metaphors, and during a
long period; his mind can in no way grasp it, his capacity is
insufficient for it. This distinction is not unlimited. A
boundary is undoubtedly set to the human mind which it
cannot pass. There are things (beyond that boundary)
which are acknowledged to be inaccessible to human under-
standing, and man does not show any desire to compre-
hend them, being aware that such knowledge is impossible,
and that there are no means of overcoming the difficulty;
e.g., we do not know the number of stars in heaven, whether
the number is even or odd,2 the number of animals, minerals,
or plants, and the like. There are other things, however,
which man very much desires to know, and strenuous efforts
to examine and to investigate them³ have been made by
thinkers of all classes, and at all times. They differ and
disagree, and constantly raise new doubts with regard to
4
¹ A weight equal to 3,000 shekels.
2 Comp. Gen. xv. 5, “And tell the stars, if thou be able to number them."
3 Munk, "Et les scruter," referring the suffix in Ny to NWN, "les
choses;" Ibn Tibbon, nah, the suffix agreeing with DN. Charizi,
,as a finite verb (והתגברות Ibn Tibbon) ותסלט treating the Arabic
.a new sentence (והחקירה עליהם Ibn Tibbon) ואלבחת ענהא begins with
וירדוף השכל אחרי ידיעת אמתתם, והחקירה עליהם היא מצואה
4 Ibn Tibbon adds here the word DN, "nation; " the words nyD Ma
must then be considered to be in apposition to DIN and to qualify it.
כת מעינת
108
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
them, because their minds are bent on comprehending such
things, that is to say, they are moved by desire; and every
one of them believes that he has discovered the way leading
to a true knowledge of the thing, although human reason is
entirely unable to demonstrate the fact by convincing
evidence. For a proposition which can be proved by
evidence is not subject to dispute, denial, or rejection;
none but the ignorant would contradict it, and such con-
tradiction is called "denial of a demonstrated proof." Thus
you find men who deny the spherical form of the earth, or
the circular form of the line in which the stars move,2 and
the like; such men³ are not considered in this treatise. This
confusion prevails mostly in metaphysical subjects, less in
problems relating to physics, and is entirely absent from
the exact sciences. Alexander Aphrodisius said that there
are three causes which prevent men from discovering the
exact truth: first, arrogance and vainglory; secondly, the
subtlety, depth, and difficulty of any subject which is being
examined; thirdly, ignorance and want of capacity to com-
prehend what might be comprehended. These causes are enu-
merated by Alexander. At the present time there is a fourth
cause not mentioned by him, because it did not then prevail,5
"(
1
According to the definition of Ibn Tibbon in his Glossary, a contradic-
tion against a proposition established by proof."
2 The spherical form of the earth and the circular motions of the stars were
asserted and generally accepted by the ancients. The past tense NINY
implies, perhaps, that Maimonides referred rather to former generations than
to his own age.
3 The pronoun
blished truths. In Charizi's translation
is undoubtedly a mistake.
4 Alexander Aphrodisius, a commentator of the works of Aristotle, flourished
at the end of the second and the beginning of the third century. His writings
were eagerly studied by the philosophers of the Arabic schools. Comp.
Maimonides' letter to R. Samuel Ibn Tibbon, Epistle of Maimonides, Miscel-
lany of Hebrew Literature, First Series, page 225.
5 Our training, education, and surroundings undoubtedly produce in our
minds certain prepossessions, which make our researches less absolute or
independent; and Alexander perhaps included shortcomings from this source in
the first class of obstacles. Maimonides was anxious to expose the folly of his
opponents, and, as though the three causes of opposition could not sufficiently
-refers to the persons who denied esta אלה Hebrew והאולא
PART 1.-CHAPTER XXXI.
109
>
namely, habit and training.¹ We naturally like what we
have been accustomed to, and are attracted towards it.
This may be observed amongst villagers; though they
rarely enjoy the benefit of a douche or a bath, and have few
enjoyments, and pass a life of privation,2 they dislike town
life and do not desire its pleasures, preferring the
³
bad to which they are accustomed, to the good to which
they are strangers; it would give them no satisfaction
to live in palaces, to be clothed in silk, and to indulge in
baths, ointments, and perfumes.
The same is the case with those opinions of man to which
he has been accustomed from his youth; he likes them,
defends them, and shuns the opposite views. This is like-
wise one of the causes which prevent men³ from finding
truth, and which make them cling to their habitual opinions.
Such is, e.g., the case with the vulgar notions with respect
to the corporeality of God, and many other metaphysical
questions, as we shall explain. It is the result of long
familiarity with passages of the Bible, which they are
3
account for their obstinacy, he finds for them a special fourth cause in the
ideas and words with which their minds were imbued by the authority of the
Bible taken in its literal sense. This point is repeatedly urged by Maimonides.
Comp. ch. xxxv. If, however, for Bible we substitute the sacred books and
traditions of each nation, every one will be found to be subject to similar errors
and contradictions. According to Narboni, the four divisions correspond to the
"four who entered into the garden" (see next chapter).
1
is translated by Ibn Tibbon
, “the society." The root
be accustomed."
1, "the training;" by Charizi,
denotes both "to be joined and "to
; ממיעוט רחיצת ראשם וגופם והעדר ההנאות וצוק הפרנסה Ibn Tibbon 2
appears הטירוף מן הטירוף והניוול וחסרון התענוגים ורע המאכלים Charizi
.הטינוף to be a mistake of the copyist for
2
3 Palquera uses a stronger expression, yn", "he makes himself blind as
regards."
4
כל זה מפני ההרגל וסתרנות (?) על פסוקים התישבה הגדלתם Palquera
"In the same way as man's progress
in his search for truth is impeded by false ideas imbibed in his youth, so the
apprehension of religious truths is difficult for those who have exclusively
devoted themselves to science and have ignored the teaching of religion."
5 Ibn Tibbon D'л, “Biblical texts ;” Charizi D'Jy, “subjects;” Original
:In a note he adds .והצדקה בהם
,נצוץ
1, "Scriptures."
110
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
accustomed to respect and to receive as true, and the
literal sense of which implies the corporeality of God and
other false notions; in truth, however, these words were
employed as figures and metaphors for reasons to be men-
tioned below. Do not imagine that what we have said of the
insufficiency of our understanding and of its limited extent.
is an assertion founded only on the Bible; for philosophers
likewise assert the same, and perfectly understand it, without
having regard to any religion or opinion. It is a fact
which is only doubted by those who ignore things fully
proved. This chapter is intended as an introduction to
1
the next.
CHAPTER XXXII.
Man's intellect is injured when forced beyond its natural limits.
You must consider, when reading this treatise, that mental
perception, because connected with matter,2 is subject to
conditions similar to those to which physical perception is
subject. That is to say, if your eye looks around, you can
perceive all that is within the range of your vision; if, how-
ever, you overstrain your eye, exerting it too much by
attempting to see an object which is too distant for your eye,
or to examine writings or engravings too small for your
sight, and forcing it to obtain a correct perception of them,
you will not only weaken your sight with regard to that
special object, but also for those things which you otherwise
are able to perceive: your eye will have become too weak
-
1 Ibn Tibbon, ny, "knowledge,"
""opinion," "character;" Charizi л,
..
religion." Arabic, 7, "doctrine."
2 The intellectual perceptions are here called in in, “attached to,
or connected with matter," in so far as the mind is connected with the human
body, and is, as it were, residing in it. The "ideas," of the intellect are
generally considered by Maimonides as independent of the body, but he does
not speak here of the intellect in the strictly philosophical sense of the word,
as he distinctly states at the end of this chapter.
in is according
to the Moreh ha-moreh opposed to 12 nya, "intimately connected
with matter"; the latter is applied to the five senses.
PART I.-CHAPTER XXXII.
111
to perceive what you were able to see before you exerted
yourself and exceeded the limits of your vision.
The same is the case with the speculative faculties of one
who devotes himself to the study of any science.¹ If a
person studies too much and exhausts his reflective powers,
he will be confused, and will not be able to apprehend even
that which had been within the power of his apprehension.
For the powers of the body2 are all alike in this respect.
The mental perceptions are not exempt from a similar con-
dition. If you admit the doubt, and do not persuade³ your-
self to believe that there is a proof for things which cannot
be demonstrated, or to try at once to reject and positively to
refute an assertion the opposite of which has never been
4
are (ענינו בענין מחשבה .Hebr) חאלה פי חאל אלתפכר The words 1
Munk ; (כל מעיין .Heb) אלנאצר generally understood to be a qualification of
(ימצא) יגד
translates the phrase "lorsqu'il se livre à la meditation." The purpose, how-
ever, of this qualification would not be obvious; those who study any science
must necessarily think or meditate. The principal object of the author in the
present chapter is to show that the solution of metaphysical problems is possible
only within certain limits; he supports this assertion by examples taken from
the action of man's senses, and the study of the speculative sciences. The
words
are in the objective case, governed by the verb
פ
According to Maimonides (the Eight Chapters), the rational faculties of man
are divided into "YD, "practical," and "y, "speculative." The former
""
.Arab),מחשבי artisanship, and * מלאכת מחשבת,class includes two kinds
היא :is defined as follows מלאכת מחשבת theoretical faculty. The » (פכרי
הכח אשר בו ילמד המלאכות כנגרות ועבודת האדמה והרפואות והמלחות
""
"it is man's capacity of learning a trade, as, e.g., carpentry, husbandry,
medicine, and navigation." Respecting 'D, he says: 1 W M 17
יסתכל בדבר אשר ירצה לעשות אם אפשר לעשות או לא ואם אפשר
The capacity for theoretical science is that » לעשותו היאך צריך לעשותו
faculty by which man reflects on a thing he desires to do, whether it is possible
or not, and if possible, how it is to be done."
2 The capacity for the study of theoretical science is called by Maimonides
a faculty of the body (1), because it concerns physical objects, and is
more a matter for the imagination (also a 1, comp. Part II. chap.
xxxvi.) than for the pure intellect.
,ולא תונה
3 Ibn Tibbon 1, “and you will not deceive.”
" and do not mislead."
The phrase
,ואל תשיא Charizi
'nnn sì, lit. “ do not begin to reject," in the trans-
112
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
-
proved, or attempt to perceive things which are beyond your
perception, then you have attained the highest degree of
human perfection, then you are like R. Akibha,¹ who "in peace
entered [the study of these theological problems], and came
out in peace." If, on the other hand, you attempt to ex-
ceed the limit of your perceptive power, or at once to reject
things as impossible which have never been proved to be
impossible, or which are in fact possible, though their
possibility be very remote, then you will be like Elisha
Acher; 2 you will not only fail to become perfect, but you
will become exceedingly imperfect. Ideas founded on mere
imagination will prevail over you, you will incline toward de-
fects, and towards base and degraded habits, on account of the
confusion which troubles the mind, and of the dimness of its
light, just as weakness of sight 3 causes invalids to see many
kinds of unreal images, especially when they have looked
for a long time at dazzling or at very minute objects.
-
Respecting this it has been said, "Hast thou found honey?
eat so much as is sufficient for thee, lest thou be filled there-
with, and vomit it" (Prov. xxv. 16). Our Sages also ap-
plied this verse to Elisha Acher.*
lation of Ibn Tibbon has the meaning "Do not reject at once, in the beginning
of thy research."
¹ R. Akibha was one of the four scholars, of whom it is related in the Babyl.
Talmud (Chagigah 14b), also in Jerus. Talmud (ibid., ch. ii.), that they
ventured into the garden of speculative philosophy, and met with different fates,
viz., “Ben Azai gazed and was killed; Ben Zoma gazed and was hurt; Acher
cut down the young plants; R. Akibhah went in and came out unhurt." See
Grätz, Gnosticismus, 56 and 95.
""
2 Elisha was probably called from the fact that he was no longer the same
Elisha as before (Comp. 1 Sam. x. 6, "and shall be turned into another man,'
'); his opinions were quoted as authoritative; but this was probably
only the case with such decisions as were expressed by him before he seceded
from his former colleagues.
3 Both Hebrew versions render
"the spirit of sight
("l'esprit visuel," M.), according to the sense, by 1, but some MSS.,
and the editio princeps of Ibn Tibbon's version, have
7 (Munk).
Spiritus visionis is the term used by Scholastics for “ sight."
4 This verse is applied in the Babylonian Talmud to Ben Zoma, in the
Jerusalem Talmud to Ben Azai, in Midrash Yalkut (ad locum, Prov. xxv.)
""
PART I.-CHAPTER XXXII.
113
How excellent is this simile! In comparing knowledge
to food (as we observed in chapter xxx.), the author of Pro-
verbs mentions the sweetest food, namely, honey, which has
the further property of irritating the stomach, and of causing
sickness. He thus fully describes the nature of knowledge.
Though great, excellent, noble and perfect, it is injurious if
not kept within bounds or not guarded properly; it is like
honey which gives nourishment and is pleasant, when eaten in
moderation, but is totally thrown away when eaten immode-
rately. Therefore, it is not said "lest thou be filled and loathe
it," but "lest thou vomit it." The same idea is expressed in
the words, "It is not good to eat much honey" (Prov. xxv.
27); and in the words, "Neither make thyself over-wise;
why shouldst thou destroy thyself?" (Eccl. vii. 16);
Comp. "Keep thy foot when thou goest to the house of
God" (ibid. v. 1). The same subject is alluded to in the
words of David, "Neither do I exercise myself in great
matters, or in things too high for me" (Ps. cxxxi. 2),
and in the saying of our Sages: "Do not inquire into
things which are too difficult for thee, do not search what
is hidden from thee; study what you are allowed to
study, and do not occupy thyself with mysteries.”¹
." They
meant to say, Let thy mind only attempt things which
are within human perception; for the study of things which
lie beyond man's comprehension is extremely injurious, as
has been already stated. This lesson is also contained in the
Talmudical passage, which begins, "He who considers four
things," etc., and concludes, "He who does not regard the
honour of his Creator; "3 here also is given the advice which
2
to both of them; to Acher the following verse is applied: "Suffer not thy
mouth to cause thy flesh to sin" (Eccl. v. 6).
and דרוש instead of בנפלאות and התבונן The Arabic MSS. have 1
, as in the editions of the Babyl. Talmud (Chagigah 13a, cited from
the book of Ben Sira, iii. 18).
2 Charizi adds bɔn nubin, “because of the weakness of the intellect."
כל המסתכל בד' דברים :The whole passage referred to runs as follows 3
ראוי לו כאלו לא בא לעולם מה למעלה מה למטה מה לפנים מה לאחור
I
114
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
we have already mentioned, viz., that man should not rashly
engage in speculation with false conceptions, and when he is
in doubt about any thing, or unable to find a proof for the
object of his enquiry, he must not at once abandon, reject
and deny it; he must modestly keep back, and from regard
to the honour of his Creator, hesitate [from uttering an
opinion] and pause. This has already been explained.
It was not the object of the Prophets and our Sages in
these utterances¹ to close the gate of investigation entirely,
and to prevent the mind from comprehending what is within
its reach, as is imagined by simple and idle people, whom it
suits better to put forth their ignorance and incapacity as
wisdom and perfection, and to regard the distinction and
wisdom of others as irreligion and imperfection, thus taking
darkness for light and light for darkness. The whole
object of the Prophets and the Sages was to declare that a
limit is set for human reason where it must halt. Do not
criticise the words used in this chapter and in others in
reference to the mind, for we only intended to give some
idea of the subject in view, not to describe the essence of
the intellect;2 for other chapters have been dedicated to
this subject.
į
CHAPTER XXXIII.
The study of Metaphysics is injurious to beginners.
You must know that it is very injurious to begin with this
branch of philosophy, viz., Metaphysics; or to explain [at first]
the sense of the similes occurring in prophecies, and interpret
the metaphors which are generally employed in orations
"He who reflects on four things, viz., what is above, what is below, what is
in front, what is behind, should better not have seen the light of the world”
(Mishnah, Chagigah ii. 1).
¹ Arab., "sentences;
'7, referring the one term to " Prophets," the other to Sages,"
mentioned before. Comp. ch. xxxi., p. 109, note 5.
2 See p. 110, note 2.
הכתובים,Charizi ; הכתובים,Ibn Tibbon "
"C
PART I.-CHAPTER XXXIII.
115
:
and which abound in the writings of the Prophets.
On the contrary, it is necessary to initiate the young and to
instruct the less intelligent according to their comprehension ;
those who appear to be talented and to have capacity for the
higher method of study, i.e., that based on proof and on
true logical argument, should be gradually advanced towards
perfection, either by tuition or by self-instruction. He, how-
´ever, who begins with Metaphysics, will not only become
confused in matters of religion, but will fall into infidelity.¹
I compare such a person to an infant fed with wheaten bread,
meat and wine; it will undoubtedly die, not because such
food is naturally unfit for the human body, but because of
the weakness of the child, who is unable to digest the food,2
and cannot derive benefit from it. The same is the case with
the true principles of science. They were presented in
enigmas, clad in riddles, and taught by all wise men in the
most mysterious way that could be devised, not because
they contain some secret evil, or are contrary to the funda-
mental principles of the Law (as fools think who are only
philosophers in their own eyes), but because of the in-
capacity of man to comprehend them at the beginning of
his studies only slight allusions have been made to them
to serve for the guidance of those who are capable of under-
standing them. These sciences were, therefore, called Sodoth
(mysteries), and Sithre Thorah (Secrets of the Law),³ as we
shall explain.
This also is the reason why "the Torah speaks the
language of man," as we have explained, for it is the object
of the Torah to serve for the instruction of the young, of
4
Charizi בטול לגמרי Ibn Tibbon renders תעטיל מחץ The original
M'M'AN MIJ'D; both mean the same thing—the entire rejection of the authority
of the Bible. Munk translates yn “irreligion.”
2 Charizi has here the additional explanatory phrase, naye alis ng
on, “The body is not able to grind them.”
,סוד יי ליראיו 14 .comp. Ps. xxv) סודות וסתרי תורה 3
"secrets and
hidden portions of the Law," that is, instruction contained in Scripture, but
not for him who only reads it superficially.
* See p. 90, note 1.
1 2
116
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
women, and of the common people; and as all of them are
incapable to comprehend the true sense of the words, tradi-
tion was considered sufficient to convey all truths which
were to be established; and as regards ideals, only such
remarks were made as would lead towards¹ a knowledge
of their existence, though not to¹ a comprehension of their
true essence.2
When a man attains to perfection, and
arrives at a knowledge of the "Secrets of the Law," either
through the assistance of a teacher or by self-instruction,
being led by the understanding of one part to the study of
the other, he will belong to those who faithfully believe in
the true principles, either because of conclusive proof, where
proof is possible, or by forcible arguments, where argument
is admissible; he will have a true notion of those things which
he previously received in similes and metaphors, and he will
fully understand their sense. We have frequently mentioned
in this treatise the principle of our Sages "not to discuss the
Maaseh Mercabhah even in the presence of one pupil, except
he be wise and intelligent; and then only the headings of
the chapters are to be given to him." We must, therefore,
begin with teaching these subjects according to the capacity
3
•
1 In the Arabic text two different prepositions are used to express the
direction, 1 and by, "towards," "to." In the Hebrew this variation has
been imitated by Ibn Tibbon who renders the two prepositions by and by.
Some MSS., however, have in both places (Comp. Munk, page 416,
note 4).
does (מהותו .Hebr) מאהיתה and (מציאותו .Hebr) וגודה The suffix in 2
תצור
not refer to "" God," as has been assumed by most Commentators, but to
(Hebr. 7'), “ideal." The preposition by in the Arabic text before
is co-ordinate with the same preposition before (מה שיישיר .Hebr) מה יסדר
both the prepositions being governed by the verb ,(הקבלה .Hebr) אלתקליד
nps, the Hebrew equivalent for which, np'on, being a personal
verb, does not require any preposition. Charizi appears to have mis-
understood the passage, and translates it inaccurately as follows:-
possible."
היה לו די מהם הקבלה בכל סברא אמיתית אשר יבקשו להצדיקה ובכל
מחשבה וציור השכל כמו שיורה הרעיון על מציאות הבורא לא להשיג
אמתת מהותו
where proof is *) במה שאפשר בו מופת Charizi omits the words 3
PART 1.- -CHAPTER XXXIV.
117
of the pupil, and on two conditions, first, that he be
wise, ¿.e., that he should have successfully gone through the
preliminary studies, and secondly that he be intelligent,
talented, clear-headed, and of quick perception, that is,
have a mind of his own", as our Sages
termed it.
،،
I will now proceed to explain the reasons why we should
not instruct the multitude in pure metaphysics, or begin
with describing to them the true¹ essence of things, or with
showing them that a thing must be as it is, and cannot be
otherwise. This will form the subject of the next chapter;
and I proceed to say :
CHAPTER XXXIV.
Metaphysics cannot be made popular.
THERE are five reasons why instruction should not begin
with metaphysics, but should at first be restricted to point-
ing out what is fitted for notice and what may be made
manifest to the multitude.
First Reason.—The subject itself is difficult, subtle and
profound, "Far off and exceeding deep, who can find it
out" (Eccl. vii. 24). The following words of Job may be
applied to it: "Whence then cometh wisdom? and where
is the place of understanding?" (Job xxviii. 20). Instruc-
tion should not begin with abstruse and difficult subjects.
1
The pronoun in by—the Hebrew equivalent of which, by, is frequently
cmitted in the Hebrew versions-agrees with the relative ND (Hebr. 1D),
lit., “in that (manner) in which it is," i.e., "truly" or "fully."
2 The words
joined together;
.כפי זה אשר עליו הוא is equal to (על פי .Char) כפי מה שהוא עליו
'NON N in the version of Tibbon are not to be
is the end of a sentence, and 17' begins a new one.
-Charizi trans כי אם has perhaps the same meaning as the Biblical אלא אם
ומוכרח להיות כן כמו שיתבאר בפרק הבא אחר כן lates thus
:
118
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
B
1
In one of the similes contained in the Bible, wisdom is
compared to water, and amongst other interpretations given
by our Sages of this simile,2 occurs the following: He
who can swim may bring up pearls from the depth of the
sea, he who is unable to swim will be drowned, therefore
only such persons as have had proper instruction should
expose themselves to the risk.
""
Second Reason.-The intelligence of man is at first
limited; for he is not endowed with perfection at the begin-
ning, but at first possesses perfection only in potentiâ, not in
fact. Thus it is said, "And man is born a wild ass
(Job xi. 12). If a man possesses a certain faculty in
potentiâ, it does not follow that it must become in him a
reality. He may possibly remain deficient either on
account of some obstacle, or from want of training in prac-
tices which would turn the possibility into a reality. Thus
it is distinctly stated in the Bible, "Not many are wise "
(ib. xxxii. 9); also our Sages say, "I noticed how few
were those who attained to a higher degree of perfection.
There are many things which obstruct the path to per-
fection, and which keep man away from it. Where can he
find sufficient preparation and leisure to learn all that is
necessary in order to develope that perfection which he has
in potentiâ?
"" 3
Third Reason. The preparatory studies are of long dura-
tion, and man in his natural desire to reach the goal, finds
them frequently too wearisome, and does not wish to be
Munk, & dans ; בתורתנו,Charizi ; באמתנו ,Ibn Tibbon ; פי מלתנא .Arab
(les traditions de) notre nation."
2 See end of ch. xxx.; Babyl. Talm. Baba Kama 62a; Midrash Yalkut on
Is. lv. 1, et passim. The following are a few examples: "The Law has been
compared to water; as water leaves the high places and seeks the lower ones,
so the knowledge of the Law leaves the proud and is only found with the
meek." "Water comes down by drops, and is collected into rivers and streams;
in like manner the knowledge of the Law is acquired step by step." 'Nobody
is too proud to ask for a drop of water; so nobody need be ashamed in asking
another person for instruction;" etc. The application made by Maimonides of
this simile does not appear to have been taken from Talmud or Midrash.
، ،
.Babyl. Talm. Succah 45 b ראיתי בני עליה והנם מועטים 3
120
every species such true and well-established propositions
as may assist us in the solution of metaphysical problems.
Again, many propositions based on the nature of numbers and
the properties of geometrical figures,¹ are useful in examining
things which must be negatived in reference to God, and
these negations will lead us to further inferences. You will
certainly not doubt the necessity of studying astronomy and
physics, if you are desirous of comprehending the relation
between the world and Providence as it is in reality, and
not according to imagination. There are also many sub-
jects of speculation, which, though not preparing the way
for metaphysics, help to train the reasoning power, enabling
it to understand the nature of a proof, and to test truth by
characteristics essential to it. They remove the confusion
arising in the minds of most thinkers, who confound 3 acci-
dental with essential properties, and likewise the wrong
opinions resulting therefrom. We may add, that although
they do not form the basis for metaphysical research, they
assist in forming a correct notion of these things, and are
certainly useful in many other things connected with that
discipline. Consequently he who wishes to attain to human
perfection, must therefore first study Logic, next the
2
4
t
1 Instances of inferences drawn from mathematical truths for theological
propositions are given by the author of Moreh ha-moreh (p. 18); the properties
of the unity which admits of no division, multiplication, etc., is the basis of all
numbers, etc.; similarly he refers to the nature of the circle, which is one
continuous line without beginning and without end. Comp. Ibn Ezra
Literature, IV., page 21, note 1.
Creator."
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
2 The pronoun
(Hebrew 1) refers to pПx (DN), “truth,” according
to others to П, "proof." In the translation of Charizi it is paraphrased
לה
הסתפק
Q
things which refer to the Essence of the » המורים על עצם הבורא by
→
3 "to become doubtful" in Ibn Tibbon's Version, corresponding to
the Arabic DNл, has here the same meaning as
in Charizi's Version, and in Palquera's Moreh ha-moreh (page 150).
"to be confounded”
4 Logic, e.g., assists man in finding the truth in various branches of science
connected though indirectly with Metaphysics. See Introduction, page 3,
note 3.
PART I.-CHAPTER XXXIV.
119
troubled by them. Be convinced that, if man were able to
reach the end without preparatory studies, such studies
would not be preparatory but tiresome and utterly super-
fluous. Suppose you awaken any person, even the most
simple, as if from sleep, and you say to him, Do you not desire
to know what the heavens are, what is their number and their
form; what beings are contained in them; what the angels
are; how the creation of the whole world took place; what
is its purpose, and what is the relation of its various parts to
each other; what is the nature of the soul; how it enters
the body; whether it has an independent existence, and if
so, how it can exist independently of the body; by what
means¹ and to what purpose, and similar problems. He
would undoubtedly say "Yes," and show a natural desire for
the true knowledge of these things; but he will wish to
satisfy that desire and to attain to that knowledge by listen-
ing to a few words from you. Ask him to interrupt his
usual pursuits for a week, till he learn all this, he would not
do it, and would be satisfied² and contented with imaginary
and misleading notions; he would refuse to believe that there
is anything which previously requires great research and
persevering study.
You, however, know how all these subjects are con-
nected together; for there is nothing else in existence
but God and His works, the latter including all existing
things besides Him; we can only obtain a knowledge
of Him through His works; His works are an evidence
of His existence, and of what must be assumed concerning
Him, that is to say, of what must be attributed to Him
either affirmatively or negatively. It is thus necessary to
examine all things according to their essence,³ to infer from
By what means," i.e., how man can ensure the eternal separate
existence of the soul after death.-Munk (p. 120, note 1) explains these ques-
tions as follows: (1) Has each soul an individual existence, or do all form one
substance? (2) How is the immortality of the soul obtained-by speculation
or by religious practice? (3) Is it the end of the soul to unite with the
active intellect or with God?
2 Charizi adds nya, "in his laziness.”
3 See ch. xxxiii., page 117, note 1.
PART I.-CHAPTER XXXIV.
121
I
various branches of Mathematics in their proper order,
1
then Physics, and lastly Metaphysics. We find that many
who have advanced to a certain point in the study of these
disciplines become weary, and stop; that others, who are
endowed with sufficient capacity, are interrupted in their
studies by death, which surprises them while still engaged
with the preliminary course. Now, if no knowledge what-
ever had been given to us by means of tradition, and if we
had not been brought to the belief in a thing through the
medium of similes, we would have been bound to form a
perfect notion of things with their essential characteristics,
and to believe only what we could prove: a goal which
could only be attained by long preparation. In such a case
most 2 people would die, without having known whether there
was a God or not, much less that certain things must be
asserted about Him, and other things denied as defects.
From such a fate not even one of a city or two of a
family" (Jer. iii. 14) would have escaped.
3
(C
As regards the privileged few, "the remnant whom the
Lord calls" (Joel iii. 5), they only attain the perfection at
which they aim after due preparatory labour. The neces-
sity of such a preparation and the need of such a training
for the acquisition of real knowledge, has been plainly
stated by King Solomon in the following words: “If the
iron be blunt, and he do not whet the edge, then must he
put to more strength; and it is profitable to prepare for
wisdom" (Eccl. x. 10); "Hear counsel, and receive instruc-
tion, that thou mayest be wise in thy latter end” (Prov.
xix. 20).
There is still another urgent reason why the preliminary
disciplines should be studied and understood. During the
study many doubts present themselves, and the difficulties,
1 Lit., "Elementary Disciplines," which must be learnt and which admit of
no speculation, especially mathematics and astronomy. Comp. Introd., page 3,
note 1.
2 Charizi: 078 ", "all people."
³ Arabic DM, "judgment," wisdom," or
"C relation."-The Hebrew
versions 7, "something" (perhaps in the sense of λóyoç).
122
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
that is, the objections to certain assertions, are soon under-
stood, for this may be compared to the demolition of a
building;¹ while, on the other hand, it is impossible to
prove an assertion, or to remove any doubts, without having
recourse to several propositions taken from these prelimi-
nary studies. He who approaches metaphysical problems
without proper preparation is like a person who journeys
towards a certain place, and on the road falls into a deep
pit, out of which he cannot rise, and he must perish there;
if he had not gone forth, but had remained at home, it
would have been better for him.
Solomon has expatiated in the book of Proverbs on slug-
gards and their indolence, by which he figuratively refers
to indolence in the search after wisdom. He thus speaks of
a man who desires to know the final results, but does not
exert himself to understand the preliminary disciplines which
lead to them, doing nothing else but desire. "The desire
of the slothful killeth him; for his hands refuse to labour.
He coveteth greedily all the day long; but the righteous
giveth, and spareth not" (Prov. xxi. 25, 26); that is to say,
if the desire killeth the slothful, it is because he neglects.
to seek the thing which might satisfy his desire, he does
nothing but desire, and hopes to obtain a thing without
using the means to reach it. It would be better for him
were he without that desire. Observe how the end of the
simile throws light on its beginning. It concludes with
the words “but the righteous giveth, and spareth not;” the
antithesis of “righteous" and "slothful" can only be justified
on the basis of our interpretation. Solomon thus indicates
that only such a man is righteous who gives to everything
its due portion; that is to say, who gives to the study of a
thing the whole time required for it, and does not devote any
part of that time to another purpose. The passage may
therefore be paraphrased thus: "And the righteous man
devotes his days to wisdom, and does not withhold any of
1 That is, it is easier to raise objections to an assertion, than to prove it, as
it is easier to demolish a house, than to build it.
PART I.—CHAPTER XXXIV.
123
them."
Comp. "Give not thy strength unto women
(Prov. xxxi. 3).
The majority of scholars, that is to say, the most famous
in science, are afflicted with this failing, viz., that of hurry-
ing at once to the final results, and of speaking about them,
without treating of the preliminary disciplines. Led by folly
or ambition to disregard those preparatory studies, for the
attainment of which they are either incapable or too idle,
some scholars endeavour to prove that these are injurious or
superfluous. On reflection the truth will become obvious.
The Fourth Reason is taken from the physical consti-
tution of man. It has been proved that moral conduct¹
is a preparation for intellectual progress; and that only a
man whose character is pure, calm and steadfast, can
attain to intellectual perfection; that is, acquire correct
conceptions. Many men are naturally so constituted as to
make all perfection impossible; e.g., he whose heart is very
warm and is himself very powerful, is sure to be pas-
sionate, though he tries to counteract that disposition by
training; he whose opxíπeda are warm, humid, and vigorous,
and the organs connected therewith are surcharged, will
not easily refrain from sin, even if he makes great efforts
to restrain himself. You also find persons of great levity
and rashness, whose excited manners and wild gestures prove
that their constitution is in disorder, and their temperament
so bad that it cannot be cured.2 Such persons can never
attain to perfection; it is utterly useless to occupy oneself
2 Arabic, y ay 18, "that it should pass away from him;
What Maimonides here calls is called in Yad hachazakah
Лy, and a whole section
is devoted to this subject. In the second,
of the "Eight Chapters " the excellencies of man are divided into
yo
“morals,” and own nibyn, “intellectual faculties." In both works M.
points out that the highest development of the intellectual faculties (viz.,
87127 MI) is impossible, if the moral dispositions of man have not been
regulated by good training and exercise. The two classes of virtues correspond
to the Greek ἀρηταὶ ἠθικαὶ and ἀρηταὶ διανοητικαὶ.
1
Tibbon, "that it should be separated;
Munk: "Dont on ne peut rendre compte," " qui échappe à l'analyse."
" Ibn
,להפריש אותו :Charizi יי
124
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
with them on such a subject [Metaphysics]. For this science
is, as you know, different from the science of Medicine and
of Geometry, and, from the reason already mentioned, it is
not every person who is capable of approaching it. It is
impossible for a man to study it successfully without moral
preparation; he must acquire the highest degree of up-
rightness and integrity, "for the froward is an abomina-
tion to the Lord, but His secret is with the righteous
(Prov. iii. 32). Therefore it was considered inadvisable to
teach it to young men; nay, it is impossible for them to
comprehend it, on account of the heat of their blood and
the flame of youth, which confuses their minds; that heat,
which causes all the disorder, must first disappear; they
must have become moderate and settled, humble in their
hearts, and subdued in their temperament; only then will
they be able to arrive at the highest degree of the percep-
tion of God, i.e., the study of Metaphysics, which is called
Maaseh Mercabhah. Comp. "The Lord is nigh unto them
that are of a broken heart" (Ps. xxxiv. 18); "I dwell in
the high and lofty place, with him also that is of a contrite
and humble spirit; to revive the spirit of the humble, and
to revive the heart of the contrite ones" (Is. lvii. 15).
""
the headings " מוסרין לו ראשי פרקים Therefore the rule
>
of the sections may be confided to him," is further re-
stricted in the Talmud, in the following way: The head-
ings of the sections must only be handed down to an Abh-
beth-din (President of the Court), whose heart¹ is full of
care, i.e., in whom wisdom is united with humility, meek-
ness, and a great dread of sin. It is further stated there:
"The secrets of the Law can only be communicated to a
-
counsellor, scholar, and good ,יועץ חכם חרשים ונבון לחש
orator."? These qualities can only be acquired if the physical
constitution of the student favour their development. You
certainly know that some persons, though exceedingly able,
Our editions of the Babyl. Talmud (Chagigah, 13a) have the reading
","and to every one, who.”
2 Lit., a person that is skilled in whispering (or speaking on secret things).
PART 1.—CHAPTER XXXIV.
125
are very weak in giving counsel, while others are ready with
proper counsel and good advice in social and political matters.
A person so endowed is called "counsellor" (v), and may
be unable to comprehend purely abstract notions, even such
as are similar to innate ideas.¹ He is unacquainted with
them, and has no talent whatever for them; we apply to
him the words: "Wherefore is there a price in the hand of
a fool to get wisdom, seeing he hath no heart to it ?" (Prov.
xvii. 16.) Others are intelligent and naturally clear-sighted,
able to convey complicated ideas in concise and well-chosen
language, they are called "good orators" (wn 712)-but
they have not been engaged in the pursuit of science, or
acquired any knowledge of it. Those who have actually
acquired a knowledge of the sciences, are called “wise in
arts" (or "scholars"); the Hebrew term won has
been explained in the Talmud as implying, that when such
a man speaks, all become, as it were, speechless.3
2
4
Now, consider how, in the writings of the Rabbis, the
admission of a person to discourses on metaphysics is made
dependent on distinction in social qualities, and study of
philosophy, as well as on the possession of clear-sightedness,
intelligence, eloquence, and ability to communicate things
by slight allusions. If a person satisfies these require-
ments, the secrets of the Law are confided to him. In the
"The first ideas," the intelligibilia prima, those
ideas which man possesses even before he is able to reason logically; "the
are matters which are grasped
only by the intellect (ha, hpy), not by the senses.
המושכלות הראשונות 1
מעקולות .Arab) מושכלות-.innate notions
would be נבון לחש
2 Munk: Qui maitrisse les sujets les plus obscurs en l'exprimant, etc. He
explains in the Arabic text to be an adjective, signifying "the most
hidden." Ibn Tibbon and Charizi explain it as being an infinitive, signifying
"to hide," and in accordance with this interpretation the literal translation of
,(עקל,שכל)
;התנו בספריהם
(C secretary."
3 ' is explained by them as identical with "deaf” (Babyl.
Talm. Chagigah 14a).
4 P, "with the text of the Bible," or "in the traditional ex-
ANNI
planations of the Bible." Charizi: 177 187; Ibn Tibbon:
DM'¬ÞƉƆ 1)M; Munk: "En se servant d'un texte sacré."
126
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
same place we also read the following passage:-R. Jochanan
said to R. Elasar, "Come, I will teach you Maaseh Mer-
cabhah." The reply was, "I am not yet old," or in other
words, I have not yet become old, I still perceive in myself the
hot blood and the rashness of youth. You learn from this
that, in addition to the above-named good qualities, a cer-
tain age is also required. How, then, could any person
speak on those metaphysical themes in the presence of
ordinary people, of children, and of women?
Fifth Reason.-Man is disturbed in his intellectual occu-
pation by the necessity of looking after the material wants
of the body, especially if the necessity of providing for wife
and children be superadded; much more so if he seeks
superfluities in addition to his ordinary wants, for by custom
and bad habits these become a powerful motive. Even the
perfect man to whom we have referred, if too busy with
these necessary things-much more so if busy with un-
necessary things, and filled with a great desire for them-
must weaken or altogether lose his desire for study, to which
he will apply himself with interruption, lassitude, and want
of attention. He will not attain to that for which he is fitted
by his abilities, or he will acquire imperfect knowledge, a
confused mass of true and false ideas. For these reasons it
was proper that the study of Metaphysics should have
been exclusively cultivated by privileged persons, and not
entrusted to the common people. They are not for the
beginner, and he¹ should abstain from them, as the little
child has to abstain from taking solid food and from carrying
heavy weights.
In the translation of Ibn Tibbon the following phrase is added here:
on? 187 11'8W ID, "He who has not the capacity for those studies.”
PART I.-CHAPTER XXXV.
127
CHAPTER XXXV.
The Incorporeality of God should be made known to all.
Do not think that what we have laid down in the preced-
ing chapters on the importance, obscurity, and difficulty of
the subject, and its unsuitableness for communication to
ordinary persons, includes the doctrine of God's incor-
poreality and His exemption from all affections (πán).¹
This is not the case. For in the same way as all people
must be informed, and even children must be trained in
the belief that God is One, and that none besides Him is
to be worshipped, so must all be taught by simple authority
that God is incorporeal; that there is no similarity in any
way whatsoever between Him and His creatures; that His
existence is not like the existence of His creatures, His life
not like that of any living being, His wisdom not like the
wisdom of the wisest of men; and that the difference
between Him and His creatures is not merely quantitative,
but absolute [as between two individuals of two different
classes]; I mean to say that all must understand that our
wisdom and His, or our power and His, do not differ quanti-
tatively or qualitatively, or in a similar manner; for two
things, of which the one is strong and the other weak, are
necessarily similar, belong to the same class, and can be in-
cluded in one definition. The same is the case with all other
comparisons; they can only be made between two things
belonging to the same class, as has been shown in works on
natural science.³ Anything predicated of God is totally
different from our attributes; no definition can comprehend
2
1
¹ See below, ch. lv.
2 Lit., “In the class of existence.”—The word (Hebr. 7), “merely,"
superfluous, because according to Maimonides there is no quantitative dif-
ference whatever between God and His creatures.
3 Comp. Arist. Phys., vii. 4, and below, chap. lii. and lvi.
128
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
both; therefore His existence and that of any other being
totally differ from each other, and the term existence (NY)
applied to both is homonymous, as I shall explain.
This suffices for the guidance of children and of ordinary
persons who must believe that there is a Being existing,
perfect, incorporeal, not inherent in a body as a force of it-
God, who is above all kinds of deficiency, above all affections.
But the question concerning the attributes of God, their
inadmissibility, and the meaning of those attributes which
are ascribed to Him; concerning the Creation, His Provi-
dence, in which He provides for everything; concerning His
will, His perception, His knowledge of everything; con-
cerning prophecy and its various degrees; concerning the
meaning of His names which imply the idea of unity, though
they are more than one; all these things are very diffi-
cult problems, the true "Secrets of the Law," the secrets
(170) mentioned so frequently in the Books of the
Prophets and in the words of our Teachers, the sub-
jects of which we should only mention the headings
of the chapters, as we have already stated, and only in the
presence of a person satisfying the above-named conditions.¹
That God is incorporeal, that He cannot be compared with
His creatures, that He is not subject to external influence ;
these are things which must be explained to everyone accord-
ing to his capacity, and they must be taught by way of tradi-
tion to children and women, to the stupid and ignorant, as
they are taught that God is One, that He is eternal, and
that none but He is to be worshipped. Without incorpo-
reality there is no unity, for a corporeal thing is in the first
case not simple, but composed of matter and form which are
two separate things by definition,2 and secondly, as it has
GR
¹ See preceding chapter.-Instead of ID in the translation of Ibn
.ולמי שהוא ראוי לזה Tibbon, Charizi employed the phrase
by the בגבול המנין :Charizi ; בגדר : Ibn Tibbon ; באלחד .Arab 2
(6
definition of the number." Maimonides adds this qualifying phrase, because
substance and form are in reality not found as two separate things. It is
only in the definition of a thing that they appear to be separable.
PART I.—CHAPTER XXXVI.
129
extension it is also divisible.¹ When persons have received
this doctrine, and have been trained in this belief, and are
in consequence at a loss to reconcile it with the writings of
the Prophets, the meaning of the latter must be made clear
and explained to them by pointing out the homonymity and
the figurative application of certain terms discussed in this
part of the work. Their belief in the unity of God and in the
words of the Prophets will then be a true and perfect belief.
1
Those who are not sufficiently intelligent to comprehend
the true interpretation of these passages in the Bible, or to
understand that the same term admits of two different inter-
pretations, may simply be told that the scriptural passage is
clearly understood by the wise, but that they should content
themselves with knowing that God is incorporeal, that He
is never subject to external influence, as passivity implies a
change, while God is entirely free from all change, that He
cannot be compared to anything besides Himself, that no defi-
nition includes Him together with any other being, that the
words of the Prophets are true, and that difficulties met
with in them can be explained on this principle. This will
suffice for that class of persons, and it is not proper² to leave
them in the belief that God is corporeal, or that He has any
of the properties of material objects, just as there is no need
to leave them in the belief that God does not exist, that
there are more Gods than one, or that any other being may
be worshipped.
CHAPTER XXXVI.
Belief in the Corporeality of God is equal to the sin of Idolatry.
I SHALL explain to you, when speaking on the attributes of
:Munk ;מתחלק מקבל החלוקה : .Hebr ;מנקסם קאבל אלתנזיה : Arabic •
"divisible et susceptible d'être partagé."
•
2 The expression 773 N here and in several other passages in the transla-
tion of Ibn Tibbon does not signify "it is not necessary," but "it is necessary
that .
not," i.e., it is not proper, equal in sense to the phrase " 1'8
→
K
130
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED),
God,¹ in what sense we can say that a particular thing
pleases Him, or excites His anger and His wrath, and in refe-
rence to certain persons that God was pleased with them,
was angry with them, or was in wrath against them. This
is not the subject of the present chapter; I intend to ex-
plain in it what I am now going to say. You must know,
that in examining the Law and the books of the Prophets,
כעס ",burning anger * חרון אף you will not find the term
“provocation," or "jealousy" applied to God except in
reference to idolatry;2 and that none but the idolater is
called "enemy," " adversary," or "hater of the Lord." Comp.
"And ye serve other gods,
and then the Lord's
wrath will be kindled against you" (Deut. xi. 16, 17);
"Lest the anger of the Lord thy God be kindled against
thee," etc. (ib. vi. 15); "To provoke Him to anger
employed in these passages by Charizi.-The Arabic " has both meanings:
"it is necessary" and "it is proper."
1 See below, chap. liv. sqq.
2 It has not escaped the critical eyes of the Commentators that the phrase
also occurs in the Bible when the anger of God does not appear
to have been directed against idolatry. Comp. Exod. iv. 14; xxii. 24;
Num. xii. 9. Either we must assume there is no rule without exception
(nibban in ppb p'), or that Maimonides found in these examples a de-
viation from the true belief in God, which would, in his view, be equal to
idolatry. Thus, Moses thought that God could not accomplish the deliverance
of the Israelites from Egypt through him, on account of the impediment in his
speech; Miriam and Aaron believed their conception of God equal to the most
perfect notions held by Moses; the Israelites, in oppressing the stranger, would
not believe that God is the father and protector of the poor and the helpless.
Ibn Caspi, though he believes that Maimonides did not ignore those pas-
sages, and himself fully explained them in Maskiyoth Kesef, admits the possibi-
lity that men like Maimonides could forget parts of the Bible. He says: DM DN1
ושלום שכח המורה, כי לא לאלהים הוא כמו שכתבתי פרק י"ט והיה גם
האם אין שכחה,.or as quoted in Mekor Chayim on Numbers xii ,זה עמהם :
לפני כסא כבודו ז"ל והנה משה רבינו ע"ה שכח עצמו במי מריבה אבל
האמת אין איש אשר לא יחטא וכל יתרון החכמים הוא במיעוט תעיותיו
"C
'Why should we assume that Maimonides was free from errors, seeing that even
Moses our Teacher made a mistake at the waters of Meribhah. The truth is,
that no man is free from error, and the distinction of wise men consists in the
smaller number of their mistakes."
PART I.-CHAPTER XXXVI.
131
through the work of your hands" (ib. xxxi, 29); "They
have moved me to jealousy with that which is not God;
they have provoked me to anger with their vanities
(ib. xxxii. 21); “For the Lord thy God is a jealous God"
(ib. vi. 15); "Why have they provoked me to anger with
their graven images, and with strange vanities?" (Jer. viii.
19); "Because of the provoking of his sons and of his
daughters" (Deut. xxxii. 19); "For a fire is kindled in
mine anger" (ib. 22); "The Lord will take vengeance on
His adversaries, and He reserveth wrath for His enemies "
(Nah. i. 2);¹ “And repayeth them that hate Him" (Deut.
vii. 10); "Until He hath driven out His enemies from
before Him" (Num. xxxii. 21); "Which the Lord thy God
hateth" (Deut. xvi. 22); "For every abomination to the
Lord, which He hateth, have they done unto their gods"
(ib. xii. 31). Instances like these are innumerable; and if
you examine all the examples met with in the holy writings,
you will find that they confirm our view.
3
The Prophets in their writings laid special stress on this,
because it concerns errors in reference to God, i.e., it con-
cerns idolatry. For if any one believes 2 that, e.g., Zaid is
standing, while in fact he is sitting, he does not deviate
from truth so much as one who believes that fire is under
the air, or that water is under the earth or that the earth
is a plane or things similar to these. The latter does not
deviate so much from truth as one who believes that the sun
consists of fire, or that the heavens form a hemisphere, and
similar things; in the third instance the deviation from truth
is less than the deviation of a man who believes that angels
4
נקם ה' לצריו ונוטר הוא לאויביו In our editions of the Bible we read 1
""
while the Arabic MSS. as well as the Hebrew translations have N instead of
ונוטר instead of ומשלם and ה'
2 It appears that Maimonides in the selection of these instances, took two
examples with reference to the earth, two with reference to the spheres above,
and two with reference to immaterial beings. (Efodi.)
3 On the belief in this arrangement of the four elements, comp. Arist., Phys.
iv. 5, and De Cælo, iv. 5. Comp. chap. lxxii.
+ This instance is not mentioned by Charizi.
K 2
132
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
eat and drink, and the like. The latter again deviates less
from truth than one who believes that something besides
God is to be worshipped; for ignorance and error concern-
ing a great thing, i.e., a thing which has a high position in
the universe,¹ are of greater importance than those which
refer to a thing which occupies a lower place;¹-by "error
I mean the belief that a thing is different from what
it really is; by "ignorance," the want of knowledge
respecting things the knowledge of which can be obtained.
If a person does not know the measure of the cone,² or the
sphericity of the sun, it is not so important as not to know
3
Ibn Tibbon מן לה מרתבה דון דלך and מן לה מרחבה מתמכנה Arabic 1
מי שיש לו מדרגה למטה ממנו and מי שיש לו מדרגה חזקה במציאה
""
2 The cubic contents of the cone, the sphere and the cylinder of the same
base and height are in the proportion of 1 : 2 : 3, (3г³π, ‡г³π, 2г³π).
MINIDDNÝN DID is explained to be the cone of the cylinder (Ibn Tibbon,
MINDY'N 771, lit. "the pointed portion of the column or 'cylinder'"),
i.e., the cone standing with the cylinder on the same base, and having the
same height. He therefore, who thinks that such a cone is half of that
cylinder is mistaken, the proportion being 1 : 3. Charizi, however, translates
-According to the Glossary prefixed to the trans .למוד מוצק העמוד בחציו
would give no מוצק in this sense ; (יסוד) is the base מוצק,lation of Charizi
is here used in the מוצק ; מכרוט sense, nor would it correspond to the Arabic
meaning of " narrow,” “
cone included in a cylinder. As it is not likely that Charizi was ignorant of
the above proportions, he either meant that the contents of the cone are half of
the sphere included in the cylinder, or that the area of the surface of the cone,
forming a triangle, is half of the base of the triangle multiplied by the height.
In More ha-moreh, p. 171, the following explanation is given,
is likewise the מוצק העמוד and ,(מחודד) ",pointed * *
מחודד האיצטוונה חציה, קרא האיצטוונה עמוד (הוא) האמת כי (שני
חלקים) האיצטוונה בכל עצם פרדי הם שני הלקים עד שישוב לנקודה :
"He says "the pointed portion of the cylinder (i.e., the cone) is half of it" (he
calls the pillar). The right proportion, however, is, that the portion
taken away from the cylinder in order to leave a cone [of the same base and the
same height] is equal to two-thirds of the cylinder." The same author gives a
clearer explanation (ibid.) in the following words :-NITI TIDY NIM MINDYN
אצטוונה הוא והוא-
עשוי כעגול כעין פירון בלע"ז ואם תרצה להשיבה בנקודה ילכו ב' חלקים
וישאר השליש האי מהעמוד, ואם יחשוב אדם שישאר חצי האצטוונה הוא
.טועה
עגולה .that the sun is not spherical * כי אין השמש עגולה : Charizi 3
), או שהשמש איננה מסיבה :Moreh ha-moreh
""
in Ibn Tibbon's version means a circle; Charizi uses it in the sense of "sphere."
or that the sun does not go
round." According to Munk 'N has been added, as it is not found in the
PART I.-CHAPTER XXXVI.
133
(c
whether God exists, or whether the world exists without a
God; and if a man assumes that the cone is half (of the
cylinder), or that the sun is a circle, it is not so injurious
as to believe that God is more than One. You must know
that idolaters when worshipping idols do not believe that
there is no God besides them; and no idolater ever did as-
sume or ever will assume that any image made of metal,
stone, or wood has created the heavens and the earth, and
still governs them. Idolatry is founded on the idea that a
particular form represents the agent between God and His
creatures. This is plainly said in passages like the follow-
ing: 'Who would not fear thee, O king of nations?"
(Jer. x. 7); "And in every place incense is offered unto my
name " (Mal. i. 11); by "my name" allusion is made to the
Being which is called by them [i.e., the idolaters] "the First
Cause." We have already explained this in our larger work,¹
and none of our fellow believers can doubt it.
1
The infidels, however, though believing in the existence
of the Creator, attack the exclusive prerogative of God,
namely, the service and worship which was commanded, in
order that the belief of the people in His existence should
be firmly established, in the words, " And you shall serve the
Lord," etc. (Exod. xxiii. 25). By transferring that prero-
gative to other beings, they cause the people, who only
notice the rites, without comprehending their meaning or
the true character of the being which is worshipped, to re-
nounce their belief in the existence of God. They were
therefore punished with death; Comp. "Thou shalt save
alive nothing that breatheth" (Deut. xx. 16). The object of
this commandment, as is distinctly stated, is to extirpate
that false opinion, in order that other men should not be cor-
rupted by it any more; in the words of the Bible "that they
teach you not," etc. (ib. 18). They are called "enemies,"
MSS. As, however, the sun was believed to move round the earth, the nega-
tion ', may perhaps not be without foundation.
¹ See Mishneh Torah, Book I., Hilchoth Akum (on Idolatry), ch. i.
134
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
"foes," "adversaries; " by worshipping idols they are said
to provoke God to jealousy, anger, and wrath. How great,
then, must be the offence of him who has a wrong opinion
of God himself, and believes Him to be different from what
He truly is, i.e., assumes that He does not exist, that He con-
sists of two elements, that He is corporeal, that He is subject
to external influence, or ascribes to Him any defect what-
ever! Such a person is undoubtedly worse than he who
worships idols in the belief that they, as agents,¹ can do
good or evil.
Therefore bear in mind that by the belief in the corpo-
reality or in anything connected with corporeality, you would
provoke God to jealousy and wrath, kindle His fire and anger,
become His foe, His enemy, and His adversary in a higher
degree than by the worship of idols. If you think that there
is an excuse for those who believe in the corporeality of God
on the ground of their training, their ignorance or their
defective comprehension, you must make the same conces-
sion to the worshippers of idols; their worship is due to
ignorance, or to early training, "they continue in the
custom of their fathers."2 You will perhaps say that the
literal interpretation of the Bible causes men to fall into
that doubt, but you must know that idolaters were likewise
brought to their belief by false imaginations and ideas.
There is no excuse whatever for those who, being unable
to think for themselves, do not accept [the doctrine of the
incorporeality of God] from the true philosophers. I do
not consider those men as infidels who are unable to prove
the incorporeality, but I hold those to be so who do not
believe it, especially when they see that Onkelos and
Jonathan avoid [in reference to God] expressions implying
corporeality as much as possible. This is all I intended to
say in this chapter.
,קשר אמצעות
is a Talmudical phrase employed in demonstrating מנהג אבותיהם בידיהם 2
1 Ibn Tibbon, VYDN; Charizi, ПYON
P, "link, intermediate."
that the idolatry practised by the heathens in the Talmudical age was no real
idolatry; men only followed the practice of previous generations, without
having any intention of worshipping idols (Talm. Babl., Chullin 13a).
í
1
PART I.-CHAPTER XXXVII.
135
•
05, , 1, Face. 2, Anger. 3, Presence. 4, Before (place).
5, Before (time). 6, Attention.
CHAPTER XXXVII.
THE term is homonymous; most of its various mean-
ings have a figurative character.¹ It denotes in the first place
ונהפכו כל פנים לירקון .the face of a living being; comp
,לא היו לה עוד
"And all faces are turned into paleness" (Jer. xxx. 6);
Wherefore are your faces so sad?"
(Gen. xl. 7). In this sense the term occurs frequently.
The next meaning of the word is "anger;" comp. 7
'And her anger 2 was gone" (1 Sam. i. 18).
Accordingly, the term is frequently used in reference
to God in the sense of anger and .wrath; comp.
(C
,מדוע פניכם רעים
,חלקם
לד
(C
pb, "The anger of the Lord hath divided them"
(Lam. iv. 16);", "The anger of the Lord is
against them that do evil" (Ps. xxxiv. 17); nam b
7, "Mine anger shall go and I will give thee rest" (Ex.
xxxiii. 14); AN 'N '70W), “Then I will set mine anger
(Lev. xx. 3), and many other instances.
3
""
"4
Another meaning of the word is "the presence and
existence of a person;" comp.
by, "He died
in the presence [i. e., in the lifetime] of all his brethren
(Gen. xxv. 18); TUND, "And in the presence
,פני יי בעשי רע
ועל פני כל העם אכבד
(C
1 Lit.,
are borrowed," see Introduction, p. 5, note 2. Maimonides does not
state here which of the six significations of D' are metaphorical, and which
are really homonymous. Even in the author's own interpretations the several
meanings of the term are intimately connected with the original signification.
The only case, perhaps, not included in the phrase," most of its meanings," is its
use in the sense of "attention," and its application to the Providence of God.
.ואפין בישין,and Targum ופניה של זעם,Comp. Rashi ad locum 2
3 Comp. Targ. Pseudo-Jonathan, N'EN 120; Ibn Ezra cites the
Gaon's explanation ", "my anger." Comp. Babyl. Talm., Berachoth,
fol. 7a.
4 Comp. Ibn Ezra ad locum. Here, and in many other instances, Maimonides
does not follow the authority of the Targum.
136
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
of all the people I will be glorified" (Lev. x. 3); by ab or
777, “And he will curse Thee while Thou existest,"
i.e., in Thy presence (Job i. 11). In the same sense the word is
ודבר יי אל משה פנים אל פנים,,used in the following passage
"And the Lord spake unto Moses face to face," i.e., both
being present, without any intervening medium¹ between
them. Comp. 99 nanna nab, "Come, let us look one
another in the face" (2 Kings xiv. 8); and also
""
DJDY“ ¬27, “The Lord talked with you face to face'
(Deut. v. 4); instead of which we read more plainly in
another place, “Ye heard the voice of the words, but saw
no similitude; only ye heard a voice" (ib. iv. 12). The
hearing of the voice without seeing any similitude is termed
,"face to face." Similarly do the words "And
the Lord spake unto Moses face to face" correspond 2 to
"There he heard the voice of one speaking unto him
(Num. vii. 89), in the description of God's speaking to
Moses. Thus it will be clear to you that the perception.
of the Divine voice without the intervention of an angel is
called "face to face" (
). In the same sense the
""
,דבר עמכם
פנים בפנים
And my" ופני לא יראו must be understood in פנים word
face shall not be seen" (Ex. xxxiii. 23); i.e., my true exist-
ence,³ as it is, cannot be comprehended.
The word is also used as an adverb of place, in the
sense of "before," or "between the hands of."4 In this
sense it is frequently employed in reference to God; also in
the phrase, according to Onkelos, who renders it
"without the agency of the
מבלתי אמצעי כח המדמה,Ibn Caspi י
representative faculty."
2 See ch. xxviii. p. 97, note 3 on the meaning of the word ", "para-
phrase," "substitute."
3 See ch. xxxiii. p. 117, note 1.
טרף מכאן אלמקול ענה פי אלערביה אמאמך או בין ידיך Arabic 4
This passage is .בין ידיך or אמאמך adverb of place expressed in Arabic by
certainly misunderstood by Charizi, when he translates it
“an
IP)) DIPD "IJJ
More correctly Ibn .ערב כלי מקום כגון לפניך אשר ירצה לומר בין ידיך
כלי מקום שענינו לפניך או בין "Tibbon, who omits the words * in Arabic
ידיך
PART I.-CHAPTER XXXVII.
137
1
2
})}00) NS (D7777,1 " And those before me shall not be seen.
He finds here an allusion to the fact, that there are also
higher created beings of such superiority that their true
nature cannot be perceived by man; viz., the ideals, sepa-
rate intellects, which in their relation to God are described
as being constantly before Him, or between His hands, i.e.,
as enjoying uninterruptedly the closest attention of Divine
Providence. He, i.e. Onkelos, considers that the things
which are described as completely perceptible are those
beings which, as regards existence, are inferior to the ideals,
viz., substance and form; in reference to which we are told,
"87027_2) M10, “And thou shalt see that which is be-
hind Me" (ibid.), i.e., beings, from which, as it were, I turn
away, and which I leave behind Me. This figure is to
represent the utter remoteness of such beings from the
Deity. You shall afterwards (ch. liv.) hear my explanation
of what Moses, our teacher, asked for.
is also used as an adverb of time, meaning "before."
Comp., "In former time in Israel" (Ruth iv.
Of old hast thou laid the foundation *לפנים הארץ יסדת ;(7
of the earth" (Ps. cii. 25).3
Another signification of the word is "attention and
regard."4 Comp.
ns, "Thou shalt not have
1 Abravanel classifies the six various renderings of DD by Onkelos, viz.,
and assigns to each a special רוגזי,שכנתי אפי שכנתי דקדמי ממלל,אפין
meaning. When Maimonides, e.g., says, that according to Onkelos, the know-
ledge of God and of the ideals was withheld from Moses, Abravanel finds this
indicated in the circumstance that is once rendered ' 'DR, and once
.דקדמי
שכלים or דעות נפרדות) Maimonides treats more explicitly of the ideals 2
D'775)) in Part II., ch. iv. It appears that according to Maimonides these
are comprehensible to human understanding, while Onkelos is of opinion that
man cannot directly understand them.
3 Ibn Caspi thinks that this verse has the same meaning as Genesis i. 1; if,
therefore, □' is an adverb of time, ' must likewise be an adverb of
time, and when Maimonides, in Part II., xiii. and xxx., gives a different inter-
pretation of the term ', this is an inconsistency which may be attributed
to the seventh cause mentioned in the Introduction, p. 24 and p. 26.
-attention and Provi ",,הזהרה והשגחה Ibn Tibbon רעאיה וענאיה .Arab 4
""
dence; Charizi, 1131 717, "honor and glory," and in a similar sense
138
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
regard to the poor" (Lev. xx. 15);
,אשר לא ישא פנים וכו' ; (3 .receiving attention " (Isa. iii
"Who does not show regard," etc. (Deut. x. 17, etc.). The
word has a similar signification in the blessing,
The Lord turn His
פניו אליך וישם לך שלום
""
face to thee” (i.e., Let His providence accompany thee),
“and give thee peace."
אחרי המשכן
CHAPTER XXXVIII.
8, 1, Back. 2, After (time). 3, According to (the will).
A is a homonym. It is a noun, signifying "back."
Comp. 7, "Behind the tabernacle" (Exod. xxvi.
7, "And a person
,ישא
The spear came out behind" ותצא החנית מאחריו ; (12
him" (2 Sam. ii. 23).
It is next used in reference to time, signifying
cr
,הלך אחרי צו
,וראית את אחרי
אחרי יי אלהיכם תלכו
neither after him arose there any like" ואחריו לא קם כמוהו
1
him" (2 Kings xxiii. 25); nba
8, "After these
things" (Gen. xv. 1). In this sense the term occurs
frequently.
The term includes also the idea of assimilation and
of conformity with the moral principles of some other
being. Comp. bn ba», "Ye shall walk after
the Lord, your God" (Deut. xiii. 5); ", "They
shall walk after the Lord" (Hos. xi. 10), i.e., follow His
will, walk in the way of His actions, and imitate His
virtues; 7, "He walked after the command-
ment" (Ib. v. 11). In this sense the word occurs in
088 1877, "And thou shalt see My back” (Exod.
xxxiii. 23); thou shalt perceive that which follows Me,
is similar to Me, and is the result of My will, i.e., all things
,זוהר or הדור could be translated
"after;
""
Palquera,, "splendour." It is difficult to see how the Arabic ¡¬
-
PART I.—CHAPTER XXXIX.
139
1
1
created by Me,¹ as will be explained in the course of this
treatise.2
CHAPTER XXXIX.
, 1, Heart. 2, Middle. 3, Thought. 4, Resolution. 5, Will.
6, Intellect.
THE word
is a homonymous noun, signifying that organ
which is the source of life to all beings possessing it.
And thrust them through the " ויתקעם בלב אבשלום .Comp
heart of Absalom" (1 Sam. xviii. 14).
,לבבכם
પ
This organ being in the middle of the body, the word
has been figuratively applied to express "the middle part
of a thing." Comp.
5 TY,
Comp.
57, "unto the midst of
heaven" (Deut. iv. 11); s nb, "the midst of fire" 3
(Exod. iii. 2).
It further denotes " thought." Comp. S
"Went not mine heart with thee ?" (2 Kings v. 26), i.e.,
I was with thee in my thought when a certain event
happened. Similarly must be explained inn abi
, "And that ye seek not after your own heart"
(Numb. xv. 39), i.e., after your own thoughts; b ¬ws
“Whose heart (i.e., his thought), turneth away
this day" (Deut. xxix. 18).
The word has also the signification "resolution."
,לא לבי הלך
All the" כל שארית ישראל לב אחד להמליך את דוד .Comp
לבת
rest of Israel were of one heart (i.e., had one determination)
to make David king" (1 Chron. xii. 38); ona b
1 Either two explanations of " have been combined, viz., 1, that which
follows the ways of God and is similar to Him; 2, that which His will brought
into existence, "all His creatures;
"" or the author alludes here to the ideals
'' which follow the ways of God, are similar to Him, have been
created by Him, and are themselves the cause of the existence of the whole
universe. Comp. infra ch. xlix., and Part II., ch. vi.
2 See ch. liv., Part I.
"flame."
3 Generally a is considered to be a contracted form of nans,
According to Ibn Ezra, it is also a feminine form of ; comp. Ez. xvi. 30.
140
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
,ימותו
"but fools die for want of heart," i.e., of counsel¹;
>>>>>b Anm), "My heart (ie., my counsel) shall not
turn away from this so long as I live" (Job xxvii. 6); for
this sentence is preceded by the words, "My righteousness
I hold fast, and will not let it go;" and then follows, "my
heart shall never turn away from this."-As regards the
expression, I think that it may be compared with the
a handmaid
tr
שפחה נחרפת לאיש same verb in the phrase
betrothed to a man " (Lev. xix.
is similar
in meaning to the Arabic 2, "turning away," and
signifies "turning from the state of slavery to that of
marriage."
denotes also "will;
"And I shall give you pastors according to My will," 3
20), where n
""
ונתתי לכם רעים כלבי) .comp
Is thine "היש את לבבך ישר כאשר עם לבבי (15 .Jer. iii
heart right as my heart is?" (2 Kings x. 15), ie., is thy
will right as my will is? In this sense the word has been
figuratively applied to God. Comp. w ba ¬wx
, "That shall do according to that which is in Mine
heart and in My soul" (1 Sam. ii. 35), i.e., according to My
Charizi.
2
And Mine eyes and ** והיה עיני ולבי שם כל הימים ; will
Mine heart (i.e., My providence and My will) shall be there
perpetually” (1 Kings ix. 3).ª
is also used in the sense of "understanding." Comp.
bı 212 81, "For vain man will be endowed with a
heart" (Job xi. 12), i.e., will be wise; on, "A
wise man's heart is at his right hand" (Eccles. x. 2), i.e., his
understanding is engaged in perfect thoughts, the highest
problems. Instances of this kind are numerous. It is
in this sense, namely, that of understanding, that the
is omitted by וכן אמרו ואוילים בחסר לב ימותו כלומר בחסרון עצה 1
, according to Maimonides, "to turn away,'
"" to change." According
to others "to abandon," " to give over," also “to blame."
3 a, in this instance, is applied to God. The passage is here out of place;
it belongs to the next group introduced by the words, "In this sense the word
has been figuratively applied to God."
4 This instance has been omitted by Charizi.
PART I.—CHAPTER XL.
141
:
word is used whenever figuratively applied to God;
but exceptionally it is also used in the sense of "will."
It must, in each passage, be explained in accordance with
the context. Also, in the following and similar passages,
signifies "understanding": 7bbw, "Consider
it in thine heart" (Deut. iv. 39); 12b ba zwi N, “And
none considereth in his heart" (Is. xliv. 19). Thus, also
Yet the Iuord hath not given you " ולא נתן יי לכם לב לדעת
an heart to perceive," is analogous in its meaning to "Unto
thee it was shown that thou mightest know" 1 (Deut. iv. 35).
And "ואהבת את יי אלהיך בכל לבבך,As to the passage
thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thine heart"
(Ib. vi. 5), I explain "with all thine heart" to mean "with
all the powers of thy heart," that is, with all the powers
of the body, for they all have their origin in the heart; and
the sense of the entire passage is: make the perception of
God the aim of all thy actions, as we have stated in our
Commentary on the Mishnah, and in our Mishneh Torah.²
CHAPTER XL.
п, 1, Air. 2, Wind. 3, Breath. 4, Soul. 5, Inspiration.
6, Will.
is a homonym, signifying, "air," that is, one of the
And the air³ of
(C
ורוח אלהים מרחפת .four elements. Comp
,הארבה
God moved" (Gen. i. 2).
It denotes also, "wind."
7, "And the east wind brought the locusts" (Exod.
x. 13); □," west wind" (ib. 19). In this sense the
word occurs frequently.
c
ורוח הקדים נשא את .Comp
1 This instance is added to throw light on the signification of in the
preceding quotation, to show that it means " understanding," "comprehension.”
2 Book I. Yesode ha-torah, ii. 2. See also Shemonah Perakim, ch. v.
3 Generally "the spirit." Comp. Part II., ch. xxx.
142
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
Next, it signifies "breath."1 Comp. mı,
“A breath that passeth away, and does not come again" (Ps.
wherein is the breath of
אשר בו רוח חיים ;(39 .lxxviii
life" (Gen. vii. 15).
signifies also that which remains of man after his
death, and is not subject to destruction. Comp. IWN DIIDI
והרוח תשוב
And the spirit shall return unto God " אל האלהים אשר נתנה
<<
who gave it" (Eccl. xii. 7).
רוח הולך ולא ישוב
(C
Another signification of is "the divine inspiration of
the prophets whereby they prophesy "-as we shall explain,
when speaking on prophecy, as far as it is opportune to discuss
this subject in a treatise like this.—Comp. 777 ja mbrai
r
And I will take of the spirit which " אשר עליך ושמתי עליהם
is upon thee, and will put it upon them" (Num. xi. 17);
And it came to pass, when the spirit " ויהי כנח עליהם הרוח
רוח יי דבר בי;
rested upon them" (ib. 25); 2 727", "The spirit of
the Lord spake by me" (2 Sam. xxiii. 2). is frequently
used in this sense.
The meaning of "intention," "will," is likewise contained
"A
uttereth all his spirit" (Prov. xxix. 11), i.e., his intention and
A fool " כל רוחו יוציא כסיל Comp .רוח in the word
And the spirit " ונבקה רוח מצרים בקרבו ועצתו אבלע ; will
'Munk, "l'esprit vital."
of Egypt shall fail in the midst thereof, and I will destroy
the counsel thereof” (Isa. xix. 3), i. e., her intentions will be
frustrated, and her plans will be obscured;
Who has comprehended the spirit of the",ואיש עצתו יודיענו
Lord, or who is familiar with His counsel that he may tell
us"?2 (Isa. xl. 13), i.e., Who knows the order fixed by His
will, or perceives the system of His Providence in the exist-
ing world, that he may tell us? as we shall explain in the
chapters in which we shall speak on Providence.³
Thus, when used in reference to God, has generally
the fifth signification; sometimes, however, as explained
(יודיענהויודיענו) .can be either 3rd sing יודיענו The pronominal sufix in 2
I
or 1st pl. (=1]]'). Maimonides takes it to be the latter.
3 See Part III. ch. xviii.
PART I.—CHAPTER XLI.
143
above, the last signification, viz., "will." The meaning of
the word is therefore to be gathered from the context.
CHAPTER XLI.
, 1, Vitality. 2, Blood. 3, Reason. 4, Soul. 5, Will.
is 1 נפש
a homonymous noun, signifying the vitality
which is common to all living, sentient beings. Comp.
"wherein there is a living soul” (Gen. i.
30). It denotes also "blood," as in any won boxn ab,
"Thou shalt not eat the blood with the meat" (Deut. xii.
23). Another signification of the term is "reason," that is,
the distinguishing characteristic of man, as in ¬»
אשר בו נפש חיה
As the Lord liveth that made us this",עשה לנו את הנפש הזאת
soul” (Jer. xxxviii. 16). It has also the meaning of "soul,”
the part of man that remains after death; comp.
1 777
But the soul of my lord shall", אדוני צרורה בצרור החיים
be bound in the bundle of life" (1 Sam. xxv. 29). Lastly, it de-
notes "will;" comp.
70s, "To bind his princes
at his pleasure" (Ps. cv. 22); also wann bs, “Thou
my
wilt not deliver me unto the will of my enemies" (Ps. xli.
3); and also, according to my opinion, in the passage
If it be your will that I * אם יש את נפשכם לקבור את מתי
should bury my dead" (Gen. xxiii. 8); NDUD TOY) ON
¹ Maimonides here distinguishes three kinds of WJ, "soul": 1, that which
constitutes animal life in general: vitality, blood; 2, that which constitutes
human life in particular, beginning with the birth and ending with the death
of each individual: reason, will; 3, that part of man's individuality which ex-
ists independently of his body: soul. The first is common to all living crea-
tures; the second is possessed by all human beings; it enables them to acquire
the intellect which is the third kind of W, and is here stated by Maimonides
to be immortal. These three kinds correspond to some extent to the Biblical
expressions, 1, WD); 2, M17; 3, N. See Ibn Ezra on Eccles. vii. 3.
אל תתנהו בנפש אויביו The original quotation appears to have been 2
(Ps. xli. 3), which the copyists gradually replaced by " wala uɔnn is
(Ib. xxvii. 12). (Munk.)
144
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
1
Though Moses and Samuel stood * לפני אין נפשי אל העם הזה
r
before me, yet my will could not be toward this people"
(Jer. xv. 1), that is, I had no pleasure in them, I did not
wish to preserve them. When is used in reference to
God, it has the meaning "will," as we have already
That “ כאשר בלבבי ובנפשי יעשה explained with reference to
shall do according to that
intention" (1 Sam. ii. 35).
which is in my will and in mine
Similarly we explain the phrase
And his will to trouble Israel * ותקצר נפשו בעמל ישראל
1
ceased" (Jud. x. 16). Jonathan, the son of Uzziel [in the
Targum of the Prophets], did not translate this passage,
because he understood to have the first signifi-
cation, and finding, therefore, in these words sensation
ascribed to God, he omitted them in the translation. If;
however, be here taken in the last signification, the
sentence can well be explained. For in the passage which
precedes, it is stated that Providence abandoned the Is-
raelites, and left them on the brink of death; then they
cried and prayed for help, but in vain. When, however,
they had thoroughly repented, when their misery had
increased, and their enemy had had power over them, He
showed mercy to them, and His will to continue their
trouble and misery ceased. Note it well, for it is remark-
able. The preposition in boy has the force of ;
2. מעמל ישראל has here the same meaning as בעמל ישראל
Grammarians give many instances of this use of the pre-
¹ Kimchi likewise says in his Commentary on Judges x. 16, that Jonathan
did not translate this passage; but in our editions of the Targum the passage
Perhaps the words .ועקת לנפשיה בעמל ישראל :is translated as follows
are a later addition. Ibn Caspi, in his Commentary on the More, asserts
that he found the translation in several MSS. In one MSS. of the Targum
Jonathan (Arc. fonds. hébr. No. 57, fol. 118a), the Hebrew text is given instead
of the translation (Munk).
2 The instances quoted are not to be compared with this; for there the is
used instead of D to indicate the whole, of which a part is taken, while in the
present instance the preposition is governed by the verb p; it means
"from," and cannot be replaced by 2. The preposition should rather be
translated "through," "because of," and would lead to the same interpreta-
tion of the passage.
PART I.—CHAPTER XLII.
145
And that which remaineth ",והנותר בבשר ובלחם :ב position
of the flesh and of the bread" (Lev. viii. 32); ¬NW) DVD ON
,"If there remains but few of the years" (ib. xxv. 52);
Of the strangers and of those born in" (בגר ובאזרח הארץ
the land"¹ (Exod. xii. 19).
חי
,חיותם
<<
מות
מות
CHAPTER XLII.
'n 1, Life. 2, Recovery. 3, Virtue.
1, Death. 2, Illness. 3, Vice.
(“living”) signifies a sentient organism (lit. "growing,"
"having sensation,")" comp. ", " Every
moving thing that liveth" (Gen. ix. 3); it also denotes
"And was
recovered of his sickness" (Is. xxxviii. 9); M
TY MI
“In the camp till they recovered" (Jos. v. 8); ",
'quick, raw flesh” (Lev. xiii. 10).
signifies "death" and "severe illness," as in "
,ויחי מחליו : recovery from a severe illness
That his heart died within * לבו בקרבו והוא היה לאבן
him, and he became as a stone" (1 Sam. xxv. 37), that is,
his illness was severe. For this reason it is stated con-
cerning the son of the woman of Zarephath,
And his sickness " חזק מאד עד אשר לא נותרה בו נשמה
was so sore, that there was no breath left in him” (1
Kings xvii. 17). The simple expression would have
given the idea that he was very ill, near death, like Nabal
when he heard what had taken place.
Some of the Andalusian authors³ say that his breath was
suspended, so that no breathing could be perceived at all, as
1 This instance is omitted in our editions of Ibn Tibbon's translation.
2 DIY (organic growth) and (sensation) are the two characteristics
of the animal world; man is distinguished from the rest of the animal world
by being (a speaking or thinking being).
³ D'T720M ¡D N, "One of the Sephardim," Charizi.
L
146
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
sometimes an invalid¹ is seized with a fainting fit² or an
attack of asphyxia, and it cannot be discovered whether he
is alive or dead; in this condition the patient may remain
one day or two.³
The term has also been employed in reference to the
acquisition of wisdom. Comp. Tab, “So shall
they be life unto thy soul" (Prov. iii. 22); ND INSID O
"For whoso findeth me findeth life" (ib. viii. 35);
,חיים
For they are life to those that find * חיים הם למוצאיהם
((
says,
them" (ib. iv. 22). Such instances are numerous. In
accordance with this metaphor, true principles are called
life, and corrupt principles, death. Thus the Almighty
See, I have set before thee this day life and
good and death and evil" (Deut. xxx. 15), showing that
"life" and "good," "death." and "evil," are identical, and
then He explains these terms. In the same way I understand
1 Charizi, p5 215, “ to most invalids.”
.מפגע הרחם והוא חולי יארע לנשים,Charizi 2
כי מוצאי מצא
3 The remark of the Andalusian author is not cited in reference to the last-
w) 13 71) *?, but in support of Maimonides' expla-
mentioned phrase
nation of the verb 1 in 1 n, i.e., the term which forms the subject of
this chapter. It shows that " is appropriately said of Nabal when he was
more like a dead man than like a living one. (Comp. Abravanel ad locum.)
Some critics (Munk and others) believe that the remark refers to the passage
and נשימתו misled probably by the use of עד אשר לא נותרה בו נשמה
' in that explanation. If this were correct, Maimonides would by this
quotation destroy his own argument that the two meanings of ID corre-
spond to the two meanings of ', and he would not have omitted to
make some remarks in defence of his own view. Much less is it probable
that Maimonides hid his own opinion under the cover of the Andalusian
authority, from fear of being accused of heresy. (Comp. Narboni, Ibn Caspi,
ad locum; also letter of R. Jehudah ibn Alfachar to R. David Kimchi, in
D″abin niaiwn paip, ed. Lichtenberg, Leipzig, 1859, page 2a). In such
case our author would have been silent on the point, as there was no necessity
for introducing the explanation of ID with the remark of the Andalusian
scholar.
،.
is (ופרשם Hebrew) ובינהמא and (באר Hebrew) צרח The subject to 4
,החיים והטוב refers to the juxtaposition of צרח God. The term יתי
refers to the further explanation of the ובינהמא the expression ;המות והרע
""
terms given in the verses which follow. Munk renders the first by: "Où l'on
explique clairement," and leaves the second without translation.
PART 1. - CHAPTER XLIII.
147
ļ
לך וכו'
His words, nya, "That ye may live" (ib. v. 33), in
accordance with the traditional interpretation of “ jyab
17, That it may be well with thee" (ib. xxii. 7). In
consequence of the frequent use of this figure in our lan-
guage our Sages said," "The righteous even in death are
called living, while the wicked even in life are called dead."
Note this well.
למען תחיון
כנף
CHAPTER XLIII.
A 1, Wing. 2, Corner (of garment). 3, Distant countries.
4, Cover.
is a homonym; most of its meanings are metaphorical.3
Its primary signification is "wing of a flying creature."
Any winged fowl * כל צפור כנף אשר תעוף בשמים .Comp
that flieth in the air" (Deut. iv. 17).
4.
The term was next applied figuratively to the wings or
upon * על ארבע כנפות כסותך .corners of garments ; comp
the four corners of thy vesture' (ib. xxii. 12).
It was also used to denote the ends of the inhabited part
of the earth, and the corners that are most distant from our
habitation. Comp.
2, "That it might take
hold of the ends of the earth" (Job xxxviii. 13);
(6
From the uttermost part of the earth הארץ זמירות שמענו
have we heard songs" (Is. xxiv. 16).
con-
Ibn Ganach¹ says that is used in the sense of “
cealing," in analogy with the Arabic, “I have
בדיל דיוטב לך בעלמא הדין ותוריך יומין בעלמא דאתי ad locum
M
1 "Life" being identical with "good
(6
good" or good actions," (and "death"
with "evil" or "bad actions,") it may also denote "the immortal soul," the
synthesis of the moral and intellectual perfections of man.-Comp. Pseudo-Jon.,
2 See Babyl. Talm. Berachoth 18.
3 Comp. p. 135, note 1.
♦ R. Jonah Ibn Ganach, the Grammarian and Lexicographer, lived in the
beginning of the 11th century. See Munk, Notice sur Aboul-Walid, etc.
L 2
148
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
hidden something," and accordingly explains,
ɔɔ, abi
77, "And thy teacher will no longer be hidden or
concealed "1 (Is. xxx. 20). It is a good explanation, and I
,מוריד
,ולא יגלה כנף אביו has the same meaning in כנף think, that
(C
"He shall not take away the cover of his father" (Deut.
Spread, therefore,
thy cover over thine handmaid" (Ruth iii. 9). In this
sense, I think, the word is figuratively applied to God and
to angels (for angels are not corporeal, according to my
opinion, as I shall explain). The passage ob na ¬ws
19, must therefore be translated "Under whose
protection thou art come to trust" (Ruth ii. 12); and
wherever occurs in reference to angels, it means
concealment. You have surely noticed the words of
2
ופרשת כנפיך על אמתך xxiii. 1); also in
,(2 .Is. vi) בשתים יכסה פניו ובשתים יכסה רגליו,Isaiah
"With twain he covered his face, and with twain he
covered his feet." Their meaning is this: The cause of his
existence (that of the angel) is hidden and concealed; this is
meant by the covering of the face. The things of which he
(the angel) is the cause, and which are called his feet (as I
stated in speaking of the homonym ), are likewise con-
cealed; for the actions of the intelligences are not seen,
and their ways" are, except after long study, not understood,
on account of two reasons-the one of which is contained in
their own properties, the other in ourselves; that is to
say, because our perception is imperfect and the ideals
are difficult to be fully comprehended. As regards the
phrase, I shall explain in a special chapter
(xlix.) why flight has been attributed to angels.
His Grammar Sefer ha-rikmah was published by Kirchheim and Goldberg
(Frankfort, 1856); his Lexicon by A. Neubauer (Oxford, 1875).
1 See "The Book of Hebrew Roots by Abu'l-Walid Marwân ibn Janâh,”
ed. Ad. Neubauer (Oxford, 1875), page 325.
2 See Part II., ch. vi.
3 Charizi adds here ban nina, "from the powers of the intellect.”
4 The terms
and D
are identical, according to Maimonides.
5, lit., "forces" or "impressions"; Ibn Tibbon, DJ'Jy.
•
PART I.—CHAPTER XLIV.
149
CHAPTER XLIV.
1, Well. 2, Eye. 3, Attention.
yg bygg
ry is a homonym, signifying "fountain;" comp.
,"By a fountain of water" (Gen. xvi. 7). It next de-
notes "eye";¹ comp. 77, "Eye for eye" (Ex. xxi.
1,
24). Another meaning of is "providence," as it is
Take him * קחנו ועיניך שים עליו,said concerning Jeremiah
and direct thine attention to him" (Jer. xxxix. 12). In this
figurative sense it is to be understood when used in refer-
And My " והיו עיני ולבי שם כל הימים .ence to God ; comp
,עיני יי אלהיך בה
providence and My pleasure shall be there perpetually” (1
Kings ix. 3), as we have already explained (page 140); Tл
b", "The eyes, i.e., the Providence of the Lord
thy God, are always upon it (Deut. xi. 12);
,They are the eyes of the Lord * 2 משוטטים בכל הארץ
“
which run to and fro through the whole earth" (Zech.
iv. 10), i.e., His providence is extended over everything
that is on earth, as will be explained in the chapters, in
which we shall treat of Providence. When, however,
the word "eye" (y) is connected with the verb "to see"
3
Open thine eyes, and * פקח עיניך וראה as in (חזה or ראה)
see" (1 Kings xix. 16); ", "His eyes behold"
m
(Ps. xi. 4), the phrase denotes perception of the mind,
not that of the senses; for every sensation is a passive
state, as is well known to you, and God is active, not
passive, as will be pointed out.¹
the Bible.
¹ It deserves notice that the signification "eye," which is generally believed
to be the original meaning of ', is placed by Maimonides after that of
"fountain." According to Munk, this was done because "eye" is more
similar to the metaphorical providence," which follows next, than
(C
"fountain."
2 In the Arabic text and in the translation of Ibn Tibbon the fem. form
as
we
have
in
the several editions of משוטטים is quoted instead of משוטטות
3 See Part III. xvii.
4 Infra, ch. lv.
150
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
CHAPTER XLV.
you 1, To hear. 2, To accept. 3, To understand.¹
you is used homonymously with several meanings, signifying
"to hear" and also "to obey." As regards the first signifi-
Neither let it be heard out לא ישמע על פיך .cation, comp
,והקל נשמע בית פרעה ; (13 .of thy mouth" (Ex. xxiii
"C
"And the fame thereof was heard in Pharaoh's house"
(Gen. xlv. 16). Instances of this kind are numerous.
Equally frequent are the instances of you being used in
"And they
"
172Y)) 19DW) ON,
ולא שמעו אל משה : the sense of " to obey
hearkened not unto Moses" (Ex. vi. 9).
"If they obey and serve him" (Job xxxvi. 11); vowɔn oɔbı
"Shall we then hearken unto you" (Neh. xiii. 27); ¬
words" (Jos. i. 18).
ישמעו ויעבדו
Whosoever will not hearken unto thy“ לא ישמע את דבריך
The verb you also signifies "to know" ("to understand"),
,A nation whose tongue * גוי אשר לא תשמע לשונו .comp
i.e., his language, thou shalt not understand" (Deut. xxviii.
49). The expression yw, used in reference to God, must
be taken in the sense of perceiving, which is part of the
third signification, whenever, according to the literal inter-
pretation of the passage, it appears to have the first meaning:
1 The interpretation of homonymous terms signifying parts and organs
of the body is properly followed by a discussion of the figurative use of verbs
of sensation in reference to God. In accordance with the method adopted in
the preceding chapter to select from the organs of sense, one (¡' the eye)
for special discussion, the author selected the verb y, "to hear," to serve
as an example of verbs of sensation. He then explains that the use of such verbs
in reference to God serves to convey to man the notion of God's existence
(xlvi.); but some expressions though in reality exactly the same as all the rest,
were never applied to God (xlvii.); Onkelos, in his Targum of the Law, makes
a similar distinction, even as regards the verbs "to hear" and "to see," you
שמע
והמורה השלים בבחירה ממנו בזה xlviii.). Ibn Caspi remarks) ראה and
The author » כאלו אמר שמע בני מה שאמרתי עד עתה מן השתופים
selected yn for the concluding chapter, as if to say, Listen, my son, to all that
has been said so far on the use of homonymous expressions."
PART I.-CHAPTER XLVI.
151
comp., "And the Lord heard it" (Num. xi. 1);
-For that He heareth your murmur" בשמעו את תלנתיכם
ings" (Ex. xvi. 7). In all such passages mental perception
is meant. When, however, according to the literal interpre-
tation the verb appears to have the second signification,¹ it
implies, that God responded to the prayer of man and
fulfilled his wish, or did not respond and did not fulfil his
wish: pyy own you, "I will surely hear his cry"
(Ex. xxii. 23);, "I will hear, for I am
gracious" (ib. 27); YAWI TIн л, "Bow down thine
ear, and hear" (2 Kings xix. 16); bobpa" yow wh
>>8 787, “But the Lord would not hearken to your voice,
nor give ear unto you" (Deut. i. 45); non 1277 12 02
Yea, when ye make many prayers, I will not
hear" (Is. i. 15); TAN YA, “For I will not hear
thee" (Jer. vii. 16). There are many instances in which
،،
אשמע צעקתו
,אינני שומע
,הטה אזנך ושמע
ולא שמע יי בקלכם ולא
,כי אינני שומע אותך
2.has this sense שמע
גם כי תפלה ;
Remarks will now be presented to you on these metaphors
and similes, which will quench your thirst, and explain to
you all their meanings without leaving a doubt.
CHAPTER XLVI.
Senses are ascribed to God in order to express that He exists.
WE have already stated, in one of the chapters of this
treatise,³ that there is a great difference between bringing to
view the existence of a thing and demonstrating its true
We can lead others to notice the existence of an
essence.
¹ It appears that Maimonides found an anthropomorphism in the application
of the verbs "to accept," "to listen" to God, there being implied in those
verbs a kind of influence exercised upon God (nibyn), which is not implied
in the phrase" to reply to the prayer of a man.”
2 Maimonides probably refers to what he is going to explain in ch. xlvi.-
ch. xlviii., as to the use of similes and metaphors in reference to God.
3 See ch. xxxiii., p. 116.
Są
152
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
object by pointing to its accidents, actions, or even most
remote relations to other objects,¹ e.g., if you wish to describe
the king of a country to one of his subjects who does not
know him, you can give a description and an account of
his existence in many ways. You will either say to him,
the tall man with a fair complexion and grey hair is the
king, thus describing him by his accidents; or you will say,
the king is the person round whom are seen a great multi-
tude of men on horse and on foot, and soldiers with drawn
swords, over whose head banners are waving, and before
whom trumpets are sounded; or it is the person living in
the palace in a particular region of a certain country; or it
is the person who ordered the building of that wall, or the
construction of that bridge; or by some other similar acts
and things relating to him. His existence can be demon-
strated in a still more indirect way, e.g., if you are asked
whether this land has a king, you will undoubtedly answer
in the affirmative. "What proof have you?" "The fact
that this banker here, a weak and little person, stands before
this large mass of gold pieces, and that poor man, tall and
strong, who stands before him asking in vain for alms of the
weight of a carob-grain,2 is rebuked and is compelled to go
away by the mere force of words; for had he not feared the
king he would, without hesitation, have killed³ the banker,
or pushed him away and taken as much of the money as he
held in his hand." Consequently, this is a proof that this
country has a ruler, and his existence is proved by the well-
1 Maimonides mentions here first, "His actions," and then "His relations
to others"; in the instance subsequently given for illustration the order is
reversed.
פרוטה כרובה
2 Arabic ; Charizi 175, "an obolus;
"the weight of a barley corn." Munk, “un grain de caroube." According to
Munk one is equal in weight to four grains of barley.
3 Arabic bp 778," he could have surprised and killed him;
""
,משקל שעורה Ibn Tibbon
"he could have killed him."
"Ibn
he would have commenced to kill him (that * היה מתחיל בהריגתו Tibbon
,היה יכול להרגו
is before being pushed away by the rich man); " Charizi 1♪♫ biar min,
Munk, " qu'il a ;מה שלפניו,Charizi ;מה שבידו,Ibn Tibbon literally 4
:
PART I. CHAPTER XLVI.
153
regulated affairs of the country, on account of which the king
is respected and the punishments decreed by him are feared.
In this whole example nothing is mentioned that indicated
his characteristics, and his essential properties, by virtue of
which he is king. The same is the case with the information
concerning the Creator given to the ordinary classes of men
in all prophetical books and in the Law.¹ For it was
found necessary to teach all of them that God exists, and
that He is in every respect the most perfect Being, that is to
say, He exists not only in the sense in which the earth and
the heavens exist, but He exists and possesses life, wisdom,
power,² activity, and all other properties which our belief in
His existence must include, as will be shown below. That
God exists was then shown to ordinary men by means
of similes taken from physical bodies;³ that He is living by
a simile taken from motion, because ordinary men consider
only the body as fully, truly, and undoubtedly existing;
that which is connected with a body but is itself not a body,
although believed to exist, has a lower degree of existence
on account of its dependence on the body for existence.
That, however, which is neither itself a body, nor a force
entre les mains." The suffix in 17'】 either refers to the rich man or to the
poor, in the latter case supply лp, “to take" (he would have taken as much
as he could).
¹ It deserves notice that the books of the Prophets are mentioned before the
Law. By л, the author perhaps means both the written law and the oral,
or a climax was intended by the phrase 1, "and even in the Law," the
book which is to serve as a practical guide to all the educated as well as the
uneducated, "figurative language was unavoidable."
2 In the illustration which follows, this term is passed over in silence.
The figurative expressions for the existence and the life of God are discussed
first; and then His wisdom or knowledge and His activity. These four
attributes are fully treated in ch. lvii.
of Charizi has the same meaning as מושג במחשבות גופיות The phrase 3
are not used in חשב and the verbs ,מחשבה .of Ibn Tibbon דמיון הגשמות
the sense of "thought" or "thinking," but are employed in reference to man's
imagination, a faculty considered to be intermediate between the purely physical
action of the senses and the purely intellectual operations of the mind. nann
signifies "image," and
"images taken from physical bodies."
Comp. chap. xxxii., page 111, note 1.
154
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
within a body, is non-existent according to man's original
notions, and is above all excluded from the range of ima-
gination. In the same manner motion is considered by
the ordinary man as identical with life; what cannot move
voluntarily from place to place has no life, although motion
is not part of the definition of life, but an accident connected
with it.¹ The perception by the senses, especially by hear-
ing and seeing, is best known to us; we have no idea or
notion of any other mode of communication between the soul
of one man and that of another than by means of speaking,
i.e., by the sound produced by lips, tongue, and the other
organs of speech. When, therefore, we are to be informed2
that God has a knowledge of things, and that communication is
made by Him to the Prophets who convey it to us, they repre-
sent Him to us as seeing and hearing, i.e., as perceiving and
knowing those things which can be seen and heard. They
represent Him to us as speaking, i.e., that communications
from Him reach the Prophets; that is to be understood by
the term "prophecy," as will be fully explained. God is de-
scribed as active, because we do not know any other mode of
producing a thing except by direct action. He is said to have
a soul in the sense that He is living, because all living beings
are generally supposed to have a soul; although the term
soul () is, as has been shown, a homonym.
4
5
66
3
See ch. xlii., where
"living" is defined as being WIND NDIY,
growing and having sensation." Living beings, therefore, do not move
because they have life, but their motion is owing to the circumstance (7)
that it serves living beings as the means of acquiring perfection (
"ny). Comp. ch. xxvi., p. 91.
2 Charizi, '17 117 ND), "And when our teachers taught."
3 See Part II. ch. xxxii. sqq.
4 That is to say, the Prophets were justified in applying this term to God,
since it is homonymous, but its application to God had also the purpose
mentioned here.—The explanation of W as being equal to 'П is here out of
place, and was probably added parenthetically, when the chapter was revised
by the author; the sentence beginning "Again since we perform appears to
have originally followed the words "by direct action."
5 Supra, ch. xli. The Arabic an has been rendered inaccurately by Ibn
Tibbon as well as Charizi, n' (fut.) instead of ♫ (past).
,צומח מרגיש
""
PART I.-CHAPTER XLVI.
155
Again, since we perform all these actions only by means of
corporeal organs, we figuratively ascribe to God the organs
of locomotion, as feet, and their soles;¹ organs of hearing,
seeing, and smelling, as ear, eye, and nose; organs and sub-
stance 2 of speech, as mouth, tongue, and sound; organs
for the performance of work, as hand, its fingers, its palm,
and the arm. In short, these organs of the body are figura-
tively ascribed to God, who is above all imperfection, to
express that He performs certain acts; and these acts are
figuratively ascribed to Him to express that He possesses
certain perfections different from those acts themselves.
E.g., we say that He has eyes, ears, hands, a mouth, a
tongue, to express that He sees, hears, acts, and speaks;
but seeing and hearing are attributed to Him to indicate
simply that He perceives. You thus find in Hebrew in-
stances in which the perception of the one sense is named
instead of the other; thus, "See the word of the Lord"”
(Jer. ii. 31), in the same meaning as "Hear the word
of the Lord," for the sense of the phrase is, "Perceive
what He says;” similarly the phrase, “See the smell of my
son" (Gen. xxvii. 27) has the same meaning as "Smell the
smell of my son," for it relates to the perception of the
smell. In the same way are used the words, "And all the
people saw the thunders and the lightnings" (Exod. xx. 15),
although the passage also contains the description of a
prophetical vision, as is well known and understood by
every one among the people.3 Action and speech are like-
¹n is expressly added in reference to Ezek. xliii. 7.
2 The "
"sound or "voice” (p) is, as it were, the substance of which the
speech or the words are formed (11277 7217) through the organs of speech.
Charizi 1 П, "the faculty of utterance"; the root n being here used
in its primary signification, "to utter.' "Mouth" and "tongue" refer to
organs of speech."
""
3 Two explanations are given by Maimonides for the use of the verb D'N",
with the object i nx, viz. : (a) 187, signifies “to perceive,” and may be
used in the sense of "to hear," "to see," "to smell," etc.; (b) a prophetical
vision is described in this verse, not a real physical perception, and therefore
the verb can be applied to both thunder and lightning. For the Arabic
""
""
156
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
wise figuratively applied to God to express that a certain
influence has emanated from Him, as will be explained (ch.
lxv. and ch. lxvi.). The physical organs which are attributed
to God in the writings of the Prophets are either organs of
locomotion, indicating life; organs of sensation, indicating
perception; organs of touch,' indicating action; or organs
of speech, indicating the divine inspiration² of the Prophets,
as will be explained.3
5
The object of all these indications¹ is to establish in our
minds the notion of the existence of a living being, the
Maker of everything, who also possesses a knowledge of the
things which He has made. We shall explain, when we come
to speak of the inadmissibility of Divine attributes, that
all these various attributes convey but one notion, viz., that
of the essence of God. The sole object of this chapter is to
explain in what sense physical organs are ascribed to the
Most Perfect Being, namely, that they are mere indications of
the actions generally performed by means of these organs,
which actions, being perfections respecting ourselves, are pre-
dicated of Him, because we wish to express that He is
most perfect in every respect, as we remarked above' in
explaining the Rabbinical phrase, "The language of the
Torah is like the language of man."
Instances of organs
in (המקום) אלמקאם probably taking,המאמר Ibn Tibbon has אלמקאם term
the sense of "the passage" or "the verse."
po, but this is not at all necessary.
certainly the whole phrase 'D, "the standing round the mount
Sinai," though principally referring to the act of divine revelation, cannot
be considered as indicating a mere “ vision.”
¹ Charizi,
5, "the organs of actions."
אל
כלי
2 Lit.,“the transmission of ideas" (intelligence); Ibn Tibbon own;
Charizi, by ny, "abstract knowledge.”
3 Part II. ch. xii.
·
Munk conjectures that he read
Charizi translates Dyn, but
4 Charizi, MD’DD, "metaphors.", Ibn Tibbon,
y, "indications.”
5 The attribute of being omnipotent 1, mentioned above is omitted here.
6 Ibn Tibbon, 771 71, "that we may confess." According to Munk
we should read, "that we be guided," corresponding to the Arabic
7 See ch. xxvi.
כדי להורות,Charizi לנדל
j
PART I.-CHAPTER XLVI.
157
of locomotion being applied to the Creator occur as follows:-
"My footstool" (Is. lxvi. 1); "the place of the soles
of My feet" (Ez. xliii. 7). For examples of organs of
touch² applied to God, comp. "the hand of the Lord" (Ex.
ix. 3); "with the finger of God" (ib. xxxi. 18); "the work
of Thy fingers" (Ps. viii. 4); "And Thou hast laid Thine.
hand upon me” (ib. cxxxix. 5);
(ib. cxxxix. 5); "The arm of the Lord"
(Is. liii. 1); “Thy right hand, O Lord" (Exod. xv. 6).
In instances like the following, organs of speech are attri-
buted to God: "The mouth of the Lord has spoken" (Is.
i. 20); “And He would open His lips against thee" (Job
xi. 5); “The voice of the Lord is powerful" (Ps. xxix. 4);
"And His tongue as a devouring fire" (Is. xxx. 27). Organs
of sensation are attributed to God in instances like the fol-
lowing: His eyes behold, His eyelids try" (Ps. xi. 4);
"The eyes of the Lord which run to and fro (Zech. iv.
10); "Bow down Thine ear unto me, and hear" (2 Kings xix.
16); "You have kindled a fire in My nostril" (Jer. xvii. 5).
Of the inner parts of the human body only the heart is
figuratively applied to God, because "heart" is a homonym,
and denotes also "intellect"; it is besides the source of
animal life. In phrases like, “My bowels are
troubled for him" (Jer. xxxi. 20); T 717, "The sounding
of Thy bowels" (Is. lxiii. 15), the term ", "bowels,"
is used in the sense of , "heart; " for y5 is used both in
a general and in a specific meaning; it denotes specifically
"3
(6
bowels," but more generally it can be
used as the name
of any inner organ, including "heart."
The correctness of
(C
,מעי
ותורתך בתוך this argument can be proved by the phrase
ya, lit., "And Thy law is within my bowels" (Ps. xl. 9),
1 This instance is omitted in the translation of Ibn Tibbon.
2 See p. 156, note 1.
3 Comp. ch. xliv., p. 149, note 2.
4 See ch. xxxix., p. 140.
5 " is either the supposed singular form of the word, or the plural form
contained in ' and '. Munk believes that 'VD is Arabic. This is not
the case, as the meanings contained in a root in Arabic, are not necessarily
implied in the same root in Hebrew. Maimonides would not have introduced an
Arabic word without mentioning that it is Arabic.
158
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
And Thy law is * ותורתך בתוך לבי which is identical with
С،
within my heart." For that reason the prophet employed in
המה the verb (1; המון מעיך and) המו מעי this verse the phrase
is in fact used more frequently in connection with, "heart,"
than with any other organ; comp., "My heart
maketh a noise in me" (Jer. iv. 19). Similarly, the shoulder
is never used as a figure in reference to God, because it is
known as a mere instrument of transport, and also comes
into close contact with the thing which it carries. With
far greater reason the organs of nutrition³ are never attri-
buted to God; they are at once recognised as signs of imper-
fection. In fact all organs, both the external and the
internal, are employed in the various actions of the soul;
some, as e.g., all inner organs, are the means of preserving
the individual for a certain time; others, as the organs of
generation are the means of preserving the species; others
are the means of improving the condition of man and bring-
ing his actions to perfection, as the hands, the feet, and the
eyes, all of which tend to render motion, action, and percep-
tion more perfect. Animate beings require motion in order
to be able to approach that which is conducive to their
welfare, and to move away from the opposite; they require
the senses in order to be able to discern what is injurious to
them and what is beneficial. In addition, man requires
various kinds of handiwork, to prepare his food, clothing, and
dwelling; and he is compelled by his physical constitution
to perform such work, namely, to prepare what is good for
him. Some kinds of work also occur among certain animals,
as far as such work is required by those animals. I do not
believe that any man can doubt the correctness of the asser-
tion that the Creator is not in need of anything for the con-
S
The second instance, appears to be a later addition on account
of PiDan nia," in this verse," which refers only to one instance.
I.e., Like the inner organs, with the exception of the heart, the shoulders
are generally considered as too material to be employed in a figurative sense in
reference to God.
3 See ch. xxvi.
PART I.-CHAPTER XLVI.
159
tinuance of His existence, or for the improvement of His
condition. Therefore, God has no organs, or, what is the
same, He is not a body; His actions are accomplished by His
Essence, not by any organ, and as undoubtedly physical forces
are connected with the organs, He does not possess any forces,
that is to say, He has, besides His Essence, nothing¹ that
could be the cause of His action, His knowledge, or His will;
for attributes are nothing but forces under a different name.2
It is not my intention to discuss the question in this
chapter. Our Sages laid down a general³ principle, by
which the literal sense of the physical attributes of God
mentioned by the prophets is rejected; a principle which
evidently shows that our Sages were far from the belief in
the corporeality of God, and that they did not think any
person capable of misunderstanding it, or entertaining any
doubt about it. For that reason they employ in the Tal-
mud and the Midrashim phrases similar to those contained
in the prophecies, without any circumlocution; they knew
4
5
¹ By this phrase the author means to say that God does not possess any
qualities or attributes; and therefore the author continues, "for attributes
are the same as forces.'
I.e., In the same way as physical forces are denied to God, all attributes or
qualities must be denied, for to assume that God is 'n by, "possessing
attributes," is the same as to say God is by, "possessing (physical)
force." Both phrases imply a dualism-God, and forces or qualities. Those
who apply to God D, "attributes," while decrying MM, "forces,'
are mistaken, because they only substitute one name for another, without
weakening the original objection. Munk explains the sentence thus: The
attributes of God-the term generally used-are nothing else but the sum
total of forces which only differ in name, but in reality are the same thing—
the essence of God. Maimonides could not have meant this; for instead of
,בעל כחות justifying the use of the term he constantly בעל תוארים or
reproaches those who use it.
""
3 Munk: "D'une grande portée.”—Ibn Tibbon,
.
* Munk: "Et qu'il n'y a chez eux rien qui puisse faire naître l'erreur ou le
doute." This is wrong. There are passages in the Talmud which may seem
to imply a belief in the corporeality, and Maimonides does not deny this.
(Comp. end of ch. xxxi.) Maimonides says that the belief in the corporeality
(nDwinn jay) was too absurd for them to assume that the use of metaphors
would lead a person to accept it.
.המקרא והנבואה :Charizi 5
160
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
that there could not be any doubt about their metaphorical
character, or any danger whatever of their being misunder-
stood; and that all such expressions would be understood
as figurative [language], employed to communicate to the
intellect the notion of His existence. Now, it was well
known that in figurative language God is compared to a
king who commands, cautions, punishes, and rewards, his
subjects, and whose servants and attendants publish his
orders, so that they might be acted upon, and they also
execute whatever he wishes. Thus the Sages adopted
that figure, used it frequently, and introduced such speech,
consent, and refusal¹ of a king, and other usual acts of
kings, as became necessary by that figure. In all these
instances they were sure that no doubt or confusion would
arise from it. The general principle alluded to above is
contained in the following saying of our Sages, mentioned
in Bereshith Rabba (c. xxvii.), "Great was the power of
the Prophets; they compared the creature to its Creator;
comp. 'And over the resemblance of the throne was a
resemblance like the appearance of man"" (Ezek. i. 26).
They have thus plainly stated that all those images which
the Prophets perceived, i.e., in prophetic visions, are
images created by God. This is perfectly correct; for
every image in our imagination has been created. How
pregnant is the expression 7, "Great is their bold-
ness!" They indicated by it, that they themselves found it
very remarkable; for whenever they perceived a word or
act difficult to explain, or apparently objectionable, they used
that phrase; e.g., a certain rabbi has performed the act (of
3
1
גדול כחן
(C
"respecting a thing" (omitted in the English translation as
superfluous) refers alike to speech, consent, and refusal. Ibn Tibbon renders
repetition," but
“refusal” (Munk: "inculquer des ordres'"); but a separate term for giving orders
is not required here, it is implied in "speech."—Charizi: 1," to return.”
* See p. 159, note 3.
3 The images of our imagination, as distinguished from the ideals, are our
creation; but the images in the imagination of the Prophets in a prophetic
vision are created by God, and produced directly by His will in their minds.
the latter does not mean ; החזרה by אלתרדד the Arabic
PART 1.-CHAPTER XLVII.
161
"chalitsah") with a slipper, alone and by night. Another
Rabbi, thereupon exclaimed
2, "How great
is his boldness to have followed the opinion of the minority."¹
גדול in Chaldee has the same sense as רב גובריה The phrase
2
in Hebrew. Hence, in the preceding quotation, the
sense is, How remarkable is the language which the Prophets
were obliged to use when they speak of God the Creator in
terms signifying properties of beings created by Him. This
deserves attention. Our Sages have thus stated in distinct
and plain terms that they are far from believing in the
corporeality of God; and in the figures and forms seen in
a prophetical vision, though belonging to created beings, the
Prophets, to use the words of our Sages, "compared the
creature to its Creator." If, however, after these explana-
tions, any one wishes out of malice to cavil at them, and to
find fault with them, though their method is neither com-
prehended nor understood by him, they will sustain no
injury by it.
CHAPTER XLVII.
Only some sensations were metaphorically attributed to God.
We have already stated several times³ that the prophetic
books never attribute to God anything which ordinary men
¹ Babyl. Talm., Yebhamoth 104a.-Raba bar Chiya of Ktesiphon, broke
three rules in allowing the act of chalitsah (Deut. xxv. 9) to be performed—ɑ,
with a slipper (of cloth) instead of sandal (of leather); b, when alone instead of
in the presence of several Rabbis; c, by night instead of by day.-Instead of
'', "following the opinion of the minority," the reading of Charizi and of
our editions of the Talmud, the Arabic text (according to the edition of Munk),
and the translation of Ibn Tibbon have the reading 877, "by himself
("en particulier," Munk). This is wrong. For it could only be in reference to
the expression 78777' that the minority was described (ibid.) as having con-
sisted of R. Shimeon and R. Jochanan, or, according to another interpretation,
of R. Jishmael b. R. Jose.
I.e., the Prophets have done something which we do not know how to
justify.
3 D'Dy, the literal rendering of N in Ibn Tibbon's Version, has here the
same meaning as a 'by, employed by Charizi. See ch. xxvi. and xlvi.
M
"}
162
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
consider a defect, or which they cannot in their imagination
combine with the idea of the Almighty, although such
terms may not otherwise be different from those which were
employed as metaphors in relation to God. Indeed all
things which are attributed to God are considered in some
way to be perfection,2 or can at least be imagined¹ [as
appertaining to Him].
4
5
We must now show why, according to this principle,³ the
senses of hearing, sight and smell, are attributed to God,
but not those of taste and touch. He is equally elevated
above the use of all the five senses; they are all defective as
regards perception, even for those who have no other source
of knowledge; because they are passive, receive impressions
from without, and are subject to interruptions and sufferings,
as much as the other organs of the body. By saying that
God sees, we mean to state that He perceives visible things;
"He hears" is identical with saying "He perceives audible
things"; in the same way we might say, "He tastes and
He touches," in the sense of "He perceives objects which
man perceives by means of taste and touch." For, as regards
perception, the senses are identical; if we deny the existence.
of one sensation in God, we must deny that of all other sensa-
tions, i.e., the perceptions of the five senses; and if we attri-
bute the existence of one sensation to Him, i.e., the perception
appertaining to one of the senses, we must attribute all the
five sensations. Nevertheless, we find in Holy Writ, "And
1 This condition is neither mentioned in ch. xxvi., nor in ch. xlvi., nor is it
illustrated by any instance in this chapter. It is perhaps a repetition of the
first condition in different words.
2 Charizi, n mind, faculties of the body." The whole sentence
must accordingly be translated as follows: "For all figures which are applied to
God cause men to believe that God possesses physical properties."
Both לפי השיעור הזה,,Charizi ; לפי ההנחה הזאת,Ibn Tibbon 3
phrases have the same meaning, "according to this assumption."-The two
אלתקדים and אלתקריר,different readings found in MSS. of the Arabic text
correspond to these two different translations in Hebrew. (Munk.)
4 Charizi, bɔwn nɔ, "if compared with reason.
5 This seems to have been added as an explanation of "passive." It is
omitted in the translation of Ibn Tibbon.
""
}
PART I.-CHAPTER XLVII.
163
"" (C
God saw
(Gen. vi. 5); "And God heard" (Num. xi. 1);
"And God smelt" (Gen. viii. 21); but we do not meet with
the expressions, "And God tasted,' And God touched."
According to our opinion, the reason of this is to be
found in the idea, which has a firm hold in the minds
of all men, that God does not come into contact with
a body in the same manner as one body comes into
contact with another, since He is not even seen by
the eye. While these two senses, namely, taste and
touch, only act when in close contact with the object, by
sight, hearing, and smell, even distant objects¹ are per-
ceived. These, therefore, were considered by the multi-
tude appropriate expressions [to be figuratively, applied to
God].2 Besides, the object in figuratively applying the
sensations to Him, could only have been to express that He
perceives our actions; but hearing and sight are³ sufficient
for that, namely, for the perception of what a man does or
says. Thus our Sages, among other admonitions, gave the
following advice and warning: "Know what is above thee,
a seeing eye, and a hearing ear." (Mishnah Abhoth, ii. 1.)
You, however, know that, strictly speaking, the condition
of all the sensations is the same, that the same argument
which is employed against the existence of touch and taste
in God, may be used against sight, hearing, and smell; for
they all are material perceptions and impressions which are
subject to change. There is only this difference, that the
former, touch and taste, are at once recognised as deficiencies,
while the others are considered as perfections. In a similar
manner the defect of the imagination is easily seen, less
easily that of thinking and reasoning. Imagination (1777),
""
1 Lit., "the substances having (or bearing) those qualities," i.e., those
qualities which are the cause of the sensations of sight, hearing, and smell.
2 The words, "to be figuratively applied to God," correspond to the Hebrew
phrase Des Don's in Ibn Tibbon's translation. The Arabic text and Charizi's
translation do not contain the phrase.
3 In the Arabic and the two Hebrew translations the two senses, hearing and
seeing, are treated as one faculty; therefore we have P'DDD, "sufficient," and
12, "by it," in the singular.
M 2
164
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
therefore, was never¹ employed as a figure in speaking of God,
while thought and reason ( and 2) are figuratively
ascribed to Him.2 Comp. "The thoughts (awn) which
the Lord thought" (Jer. xlix. 20); "And with His under-
standing (nan) He stretched out the heavens" (ib. x.
12). The inner senses were therefore treated in the same
way as the external; some are figuratively applied to God,
some not. All this is according to the language of man; he
ascribes to God what he considers a perfection, and does not
ascribe to Him what he considers a defect. In truth, how-
ever, no real attribute, implying an addition to His essence,
can be applied to Him, as will be proved.³
CHAPTER XLVIII.
שמע
קבל,שמיע קדם
ראה
,גלי קדם =
חזא
и
in Targum.
"to hear," is
WHENEVER in the Pentateuch the term vAN,
applied to God, Onkelos, the Proselyte, does not translate it
literally, but paraphrases it, merely expressing that a certain
speech reached Him, i.c., He perceived it, or that He accepted
or did not accept, when it refers to supplication and prayer
as its object. The phrasey is therefore rendered by
him regularly either, "It was heard before the
Lord,” or [7, “He accepted"] when it is employed in re-
lation to supplication and prayer; [e.g.] bapa abap, “I will
surely accept," corresponding to the original, OWN VIDW
pys, "I will surely hear his crying" (Exod. xxii. 22).
ואם אמצא אם לא כאשר דמיתי אינו מענין כח המדמה : Ibn Caspi 1
כמו שחשבתי
'nawnw 193 p. "When we find in Isaiah (xiv. 24) 'n' applied to God, it
does not mean I imagined,' but I thought.'"-In the Moreh ha-moreh this
ולא נזכר למורנו ז"ל :is considered an oversight on the part of Maimonides
1) DN, “And our Teacher did not think of the passage,” etc.
2 The whole of this sentence is omitted in Charizi's translation.
3 See ch. li. sqq.
PART I.-CHAPTER XLVIII.
165
This principle is followed by Onkelos in his translation of
the Pentateuch without any exception. But as regards
the term N," to see," his renderings vary in a remarkable
manner,¹ and I was unable to discern his principle or method.
and God * וחזא יי by וירא יי In some instances he translates
،،
""
saw;" in others by 2, "it was revealed before the
Lord." The use of the phrase is sufficient evidence
that the term in Chaldee is homonymous, and that it
denotes mental perception as well as the sensation of sight.
This being the case, I am surprised that, in some instances
avoiding the literal rendering, he substituted for it,
"And it was revealed before the Lord." When I, however,
examined the various readings in the version of Onkelos,
which I either saw myself or heard from others during the
time of my studies, I found that the term " to see," N, when
connected with wrong, injury, or violence, was paraphrased by
» 2, “It was manifest before the Lord." There is no
doubt that the term in that language denotes complete
apprehension and reception of the object in the state in which
it has been perceived.2 When Onkelos, therefore, found
the verb "to see" connected with the object "wrong," he did
not render it, but 7p. Now, I noticed that in all in-
stances of the Pentateuch where N is referred to God, he
of colours."
He had in this a great variety" תלון פי דלך תלונה עליבא The Arabic 1
He explained פירש בו פירושים מופלאים,Ibn Tibbon
it by explanations distinguished" (from each other), or “He explained it in
He*,,נהפך בה מצד אל צד הפוך מופלא,an extraordinary way." - Charizi
turned respecting it from one side to the other in a wonderful manner.'
2 According to Maimonides, the term in Chaldee implies a closer and
longer contact between subject and object than the Hebrew 7.—The literal
translation of the Arabic is: The verb In in Chaldee denotes the perception
and the fixing of the thing perceived in the manner in which it has been
perceived, i.e., the verb, NIM, “to look on,” implies, besides the mere act
of perceiving, also the act of retaining impressions left after the object
has been withdrawn.-Munk: NI, implique indubitablement l'idée de
percevoir et d'avouer (PN) la chose perçue telle qu'elle a été perçue.-
Charizi renders the Arabic PN by win, “to settle,” or “to fix;
Ibn Tibbon by ny", "knowledge of," i.e., the retaining of the image of
the object perceived, and also by 1, see infra, which expresses this idea
more clearly.
Mag
""
166
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
translated it by N, except those instances which I will men-
ארי גלי קדם,(32 .Gen. xxix) כי ראה יי בעניי :tion to you
,יי עלבוני
;(12 .ibid. xxxi) כי ראיתי את כל אשר לבן עושה לך
For all that Laban doeth * ארי גלי קדמי ית כל די לבן עבד לך
by","For my affliction was revealed before the Lord; "
unto thee is revealed before me;"-although the first person
in the sentence refers to the angel [and not to God], Onkelos
does not ascribe to him that perception which implies complete
comprehension of the object, because the object is "iniquity"-
וגלי קדם יי שיעבוד (25 .Exod. ii) וירא אלהים את בני ישראל
דבני ישראל
ראה ראיתי את עני עמי אשר במצרים ;known to the Lord
-The oppres * מיגלא גלי קדמי ית שעבודא דעמי,(7 .Exod. iii)
וגם ראיתי את "; sion of My people was surely known to Me
The affliction is known to *, גלי קדמי ית דוחקא,(6.9) הלחץ
ארי גלי קדמי שעבודהון,(31 .ibid. iv) וכי ראה את ענים ; Me
""
"The oppression of the children of Israel was
""
"Their oppression is known to Me;"
(ib.
xxxii. 9), 77, "This people is known to Me,"
i.e., their rebellion is known to Me-comp. the Targum of
וירא which is equal to וירא אלהים את בני ישראל the phrase
He saw their affliction and their את ענים ואת עמלם
וגלי קדם יי (19 .Deut. xxxii) וירא
((
trouble """"
"And it was known to the Lord, and He abhorred them;
>")
It was * ארי גלי קדמוהי (36 .Deut. xxxii) כי יראה כי אזלת יד
known to Him that their power was gone;" in this instance
the object of the perception is likewise the wrong done to
the Israelites, and the increasing power of the enemy. In all
these examples Onkelos is consistent,¹ following the maxim
expressed in the words "Thou canst not look on iniquity"
(Hab. i. 13); wherefore he renders the verb "to see
""
,גלי קדמוהי,when connected with oppression or rebellion
, etc. This appropriate and satisfactory expla-
nation, the correctness of which I do not doubt, is
weakened by three passages, in which, according to this
view, I expected to find the verb "to see" rendered by a
in the various copies of the וחזא יי but found instead ,קדם יי
.נמשך ונראה בו Ibn Tibbon ; נוהג מנהג נכון כפי מה שאמרנו,Charizi 1
PART I.-CHAPTER XLIX.
167
"
Targum. The following are the three passages: "And God
saw that the wickedness of man was great upon the earth
(Gen, vi. 6); “And the Lord saw the earth, and behold it
was corrupt" (ibid. vi. 12); "and God saw that Leah was
hated”¹ (ibid. xxx. 31). It appears to me that in these
passages there is a mistake, which has crept into the copies of
the Targum, since we do not possess the Targum in the ori-
ginal manuscript of Onkelos, for² in that case we should have
assumed that he could have given a proper explanation of it.
the" קדם יי גלי אמרא by אלהים יראה לו השה In rendering
lamb is known to the Lord" (Gen. xxii. 8), he either wished
to indicate that the Lord was not expected to seek and to
bring it, or he considered it inappropriate ³ in Chaldee to
connect the divine perception with one of the lower animals.
3
However, the various copies of the Targum must be care-
fully examined with regard to this point, and if you still
find those passages the same as I quoted them, I cannot
explain what he meant.*
4
CHAPTER XLIX.
On figurative expressions applied to angels.
THE angels are likewise incorporeal; they are intelligences
without matter, 5 but they are nevertheless created beings,
1 Pseudo-Jonathan translates "
1.—Some editions of Onkelos have
קדם יי
.וגלי
in the first-mentioned passage
2 I.e., if we were sure that Onkelos deviated from this rule in these three
passages, we might have tried to find some particular reason; but as we are not
sure, this is not necessary.
³ Charizi, VID), "inadmissible," "impossible."
4 The reason might perhaps be that in these passages the verb is not so
closely connected with the word "evil." In the first instance the object
perceived by God is the circumstance that the evil was great, not the evil
itself; in the second the notion of corruption is expressed in another sentence;
in the third instance the circumstance that Leah was hated, is said to have
been perceived, not the hatred itself, nor Leah the hated one.
5 Lit., "separated from matter." Charizi, 1n nɔ, “distinguished from
MD,
physical force."
168
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
،
<
6
and God created them, as will be explained below.¹ In
Bereshith Rabbah (on Gen. iii. 24) we read the following
remark of our Sages; "The angel is called the flame of the
sword which turned every way' ( nb, Gen. iii. 24), in
accordance with the words, 'His ministers a flaming fire'
(Ps. civ. 4); the attribute no, which turned every
way' is added, because angels are changeable in form; 2
they appear at one time as males, 3 at another as females; 4
now as spirits; 5 now as angels.' By this remark they
clearly showed that angels are incorporeal, and have no
permanent bodily form independent of the mind [of him
who perceives them], they exist entirely in prophetic vision,
and depend on the action of the imaginative power, as will
be explained when speaking on the true meaning of pro-
phecy. As to the words "at another time as females,"
which imply that the Prophets in prophetical vision per-
ceived angels also in the form of women, they refer to the
vision of Zechariah (v. 9), " And, behold, there came out
two women, and the wind was in their wings." You know
very well, how difficult it is for men to form a notion of
anything immaterial, and entirely devoid of corporeality,
except after considerable training: it is especially diffi-
cult for those who do not distinguish between objects of
the intellect and objects of the imagination, and depend
mostly on the mere apprehensive power. They believe that
all imagined things exist or at least have the possibility of
existing; but that which cannot be imagined does not exist,
and cannot exist.8 For persons of this class-and the
majority of thinkers belong to it cannot arrive at the
true solution of any question, or at the explanation of any-
thing doubtful. On account of this difficulty the prophetic
¹ See Part II. vi.
2 The author speaks of the form which the angels of the Bible assume, and
which exists only in the mind of him who perceives them, and not of their
real form.
3 Gen. xviii. 2.
4 Zech. v. 9.
• I.e., as divine messengers or as supernatural beings.
7 Part II. xvi. sqq.
5 1 Kings xxii. 21.
8 See Ch. lxxiii., Propos. 10.
PART I.-
CHAPTER XLIX.
Troponin
169
books contain expressions which, taken literally, imply that
angels are corporeal, moving about, endowed with human
form, receiving commands of God, obeying His word and
performing whatever He wishes, according to His command.
All this only serves to lead to the belief that angels exist,
and are alive and perfect in the same way as we have ex-
plained in reference to God. If the figurative representa-
tion of angels were limited to this, their true essence would
be believed to be the same as the essence of God, since,
in reference to the Creator expressions are likewise em-
ployed, which literally imply that He is corporeal, living,
moving and endowed with human form. In order, therefore,
to give to the mind of men the idea that the existence of
angels is lower than the divine existence, certain forms of
lower animals were introduced in the description of angels.
It was thereby shown, that the existence of God is more
perfect than that of angels, as much as man is more perfect
than the lower animals. Nevertheless no organ of the brute
creation was attributed to the angels, except wings. With-
out wings the act of flying appears as impossible as that of
walking without legs; for these two modes of motion can
only be imagined in connection with these organs. The
motion of flying has been chosen as a symbol to represent
that angels possess life, because it is the most perfect and
most sublime movement of the brute creation.
Men con-
sider this motion a perfection to such an extent that they
themselves wish to be able to fly, in order to escape easily
what is injurious, and to obtain quickly what is useful,
though it be at a distance. For this reason this motion has
been attributed to the angels.
There is besides another reason. The bird in its flight is
sometimes visible, sometimes withdrawn from our sight; one
moment near to us, and in the next far off; and these
are exactly the circumstances which we must associate with
the idea of angels, as will be explained below. This ima-
ginary perfection, the motion of flight, being the exclusive
' See ch. xlvi.
-
|
170
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
property of the brute creation, has never been attributed to
God. You must not be misled by the passage, "And he
rode upon a cherub, and did fly" (Ps. xviii. 10), for it is
the cherub that did fly, and the simile only serves to denote
the rapid arrival of that which is referred to in that passage.¹
Comp.: "Behold, the Lord sitteth upon a swift cloud, and
shall come into Egypt" (Is. xix. 1); that is, the punish-
ment² alluded to will come down quickly upon Egypt.
Nor should expressions like "the face of an ox," "the face
of a lion," "the face of an eagle," "the sole of the foot of a
calf," found in the prophecies of Ezekiel (i. 10, 7) mislead
you; for all these are explained in a different manner, as
you will learn later,³ and besides, the prophet only describes
the animals (Chajoth). The subject will be explained,
though by mere hints, as far as necessary for directing your
attention to the true interpretation.³
4
The motion of flying, frequently mentioned in the Bible,
necessitates, according to our imagination, the existence of
wings; wings are therefore given to the angels as symbols
expressive of their existence, not of their true essence. You
must also bear in mind that whenever a thing moves very
quickly, it is said to fly, as that term implies great velocity
of motion. Comp. " As the eagle flieth" (Deut. xxviii. 49).
The eagle flies and moves with greater velocity than any
other bird, and therefore it is introduced in this simile.
Furthermore, the wings are the organs [lit. causes] of flight;
hence the number of the wings of angels in the prophetic
vision corresponds to the number of the causes which set a
thing in motion,5 but this does not belong to the theme of
this chapter.
רדת שכינתו,Charizi 1
3 Part III. ch. i.
2
Charizi, “His anger,” 153p.
4 The Chayoth do not represent angels but the spheres.
5 The four causes of the motion of the spheres are the form of sphere, the
soul, the intellect, and the longing for the highest intellect (God) 17
ibaw npiwni ibaw (Efodi). Comp. Part II. ch. iv. and x.
1
PART I. CHAPTER L.
171
CHAPTER L.
Faith consists in inmost conviction, not in mere utterances.¹
WHEN reading my present treatise, bear in mind that by
"faith" we do not understand merely that which is uttered
with the lips, but also that which is apprehended by the soul,
the conviction that the object [of belief] is exactly as it is
apprehended. If, as regards real or supposed truths, you
content yourself with giving utterance to them in words,
without apprehending them or believing in them, especially
if you do not seek real truth, you have a very easy task
as, in fact, you will find many ignorant people professing
articles of faith without connecting any idea with them.
If, however, you have a desire to rise to a higher state,
viz., that of reflection, and truly to hold the conviction that
God is One and possesses true unity, without admitting
plurality or divisibility in any sense whatever, you must
understand that God has no essential² attribute in any
form or in any sense whatever, and that the rejection of
corporeality implies the rejection of essential attributes.
Those who believe that God is One, and that He has many
attributes, declare the unity with their lips, and assume
¹ Before commencing his interpretation of the attributes of God (ch. li. to lx.),
he discusses what faith is, and states that he who declares God to be one, and at
the same time believes Him to be " by, to possess attributes, believes
in the unity of God only in words, but not in reality. In ch. li. the reason
is given why the rejection of the attributes of God is proved here. The
author then proceeds to show the nature of attributes (lii.); and that the so-
called attributes of God are qualifications of the actions of God (liii., liv.);
comparison between God and His creatures is impossible (lv.); attributes imply
a comparison between all individual beings possessing the same attribute (lvi.) ;
חכם ",willing * רוצה ",mighty * יכול ",living : חי even such attributes as
((
"wise," "one," are as attributes inadmissible (lvii.); only negative
attributes are admissible (lviii.); and the more negative attributes man applies
correctly to God, the nearer he comes to truth (lix. and lx.).
2 By "essential attributes," we must understand attributes which are not
mere metaphors, but really exist in connection with the essence of God.
172
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
plurality in their thoughts. This is like the doctrine of the
Christians, who say that He is one and He is three, and that
the three are one. Of the same character is the doctrine
of those who say that God is One, but that He has many attri-
butes, and that He with His attributes are One, although
they deny corporeality and affirm His most absolute freedom
from matter; as if our object were to seek forms of expres-
sion, not subjects of belief. For belief is only possible after
the apprehension of a thing; it consists in the conviction
that the thing apprehended has its existence beyond the
mind [in reality] exactly as it is conceived in the mind.'
If in addition to this we are convinced that the thing
cannot be different in any way from what we believe it to be,
and that no reasonable argument can be found for the rejec-
tion of the belief or for the admission of any deviation from
it, then the belief is true. Renounce desires and habits,
follow your reason, and study what I am going to say
in the chapters which follow on the rejection of the attri-
butes; you will then be fully convinced of what we have
said; you will be of those who truly conceive the Unity of
God, not of those who utter it with their lips without
thought, like men of whom it has been said, "Thou art near
in their mouth, and far from their reins" (Jer. xii. 2). It
is right that a man should belong to that class of men who
have a conception of truth and understand it, though they
do not speak of it. Thus the pious are advised and
addressed, "Commune with your own heart upon your
bed
and be still. Selah." (Ps. iv. 5.)
CHAPTER LI.
On the necessity of proving the inadmissibility of attributes in
reference to God.
THERE are many things whose existence is manifest and
obvious; some of these are innate notions or objects of
1 This sentence is omitted in the translation of Charizi.
PART I.—CHAPTER LI.
173
sensation, others are nearly so; 1 and in fact they would
require no proof if² man had been left in his primitive
state. Such are the existence of motion,3 of man's free will,4
of phases of production and destruction, and of the natural
properties of things perceived by the senses, e.g., the heat
of fire, the coldness of water, and many other similar things.
False notions, however, may be spread either by a person
labouring under error,5 or by one who has some par-
ticular end in view, and who establishes theories contrary
to the real nature of things, by denying the existence of
things perceived by the senses, or by affirming the existence
of what does not exist. Philosophers are thus required to
establish by proof things which are self-evident, and to
disprove the existence of things which only exist in man's
6
'In Milloth higgayon, viii., four kinds of assertions are enumerated that
require no proof: a, D'nin, those which are perceived by the senses;
; general opinious המפורסמות, ;innate notions,המושכלות הראשונות,
a, napon, traditions.
Ibn Tibbon; quand-meme on le עד שאפילו הונח האדם כמו שהוא 2
laisserait tel qu'il est, Munk. More correct is the rendering of Charizi, 1*1
DDY D78 10': if man had been left to follow exclusively his innate notions,
and the perception of his senses, he would have believed in the existence of
motion," etc., without demanding any proof. Man, however, has been misled
by false theories and perverse methods to believe in things contrary to the
experience of his senses and to common sense. Therefore it became necessary
to prove the most obvious truths. The renderings of Munk and Ibn Tibbon
imply that at the present time the proof is less necessary, as man has not been
left in his primitive state. The contrary is the case.
admits both renderings, "and if," "and although.”
³ Motion has been denied by Zeno (Arist. Phys., vi. 2); the power of man to
act according to his free will was denied by the fatalists (Ashariyah). See Part
III. xvii. 3. Production and destruction (yέveσiç kai plopá) of the forms of
things was mere appearance according to the Eleatic school (Parmenides).
The same school denied the truth and reality of all variety and plurality of
existing things.
4 Comp. lxxiii., Propos. 6.
in the translation of Charizi is certaiuly a mistake.
פלו The Arabic
5 пy
6 According to Shemtob, the support of some religious dogma which is con-
trary to what is perceived by the senses, or understood by common sense;
or, the obtaining of superiority by overthrowing well-founded theories.
Comp. Crescas (ad locum): “as, e.g., the Mutakallemim, who employ it to
support their doctrine of the creatio ex nihilo."
174
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
imagination.¹ Thus Aristotle gives a proof for the exist-
ence of motion, because it had been denied; he disproves
the reality of atoms, because it had been asserted.²
3
To the same class belongs the rejection of essential attri-
butes in reference to God. For it is a self-evident truth
that the attribute is not inherent in the object to which
it is ascribed, but it is superadded to its essence, and
is consequently an accident; if the attribute denoted the
essence [TÒ Tì ĥv eiva] of the object, it would be either
mere tautology, as if, e.g., one would say "man is man,"
or the explanation of a name, as, e.g., "man is a speak-
ing animal"; for the words "speaking animal" include
the true essence of man, and there is no third element
besides life and speech that constitutes man; when he,
therefore, is described by the attributes of life and speech,
these are nothing but an explanation of the name man,"
that is to say, that the thing which is called man, consists of
life and speech. It will now be clear that the attribute
(6
Ibn Tibbon), are things) דברים הנחשבים in Hebrew אשיא אלמצנונאת 1
which are only imagined, opposed to things which exist in reality. Charizi
""
.these empty thoughts ** המחשבות הרקים ההם translates rather freely
2 It is remarkable that Maimonides, after having mentioned motion, man's
will, production and destruction, and physical properties of things, almost ignores
this classification, and speaks only of motion and atoms. The above instances
are, perhaps, a later addition. For proofs of the existence of motion, see
Aristotle Phys., vi. 2, and viii. 8; his objections to the atomic theory are
found, ib., vi. 1. Instead of phono 1'w phon, "atom" (Arab. 1'), Charizi
has D', “genii” (he read, perhaps, '?). Comp. Narb., by n
מי שכנהו על
T10108 T, "he who refers it to genii is mad."
3 That is to say, for those who believe in the Unity of God, and agree with
Maimonides in respect to the definition of the term "Unity." In its general
acceptation we also apply the term to beings which have many properties.
4 The logical definition, consisting of the genus (110, e.g., ', "the
living") and the differentia (1577, e.g., 17, "speaking "), is called
"the explanation of the name," it contains all the constituent elements of the
thing (777 Dry). Thus 7127, "the peculiar faculty of man," is explained in
the power by which * הכח אשר בו תצירנה המשכלות .Milloth higgayon x
ideas are conceived," i.e., mind or reason. Ibid. x., the 7117, "speech," is
divided into three kinds: 1, intellect ( WIN); 2, the conceived
.(דבור חיצוני) speech in its literal sense ,3 ; (הדבור הפנימי) notions
PART I.—CHAPTER LI.
175
2
.3
must be one of two things, either the essence of the object
described—in that case it is a mere explanation of a name,
and on that account we might admit the attribute in
reference to God, but we reject it from another cause as will
be shown¹- or the attribute is something different from the
object described, some extraneous superadded element; in
that case the attribute would be an accident, and he who
merely rejects the appellation "accidents" in reference to
the attributes of God, does not thereby alter their character ;3
for everything superadded to the essence of an object joins
it without forming part of its essential properties, and that
constitutes an accident.4 Add to this the logical conse-
quence of admitting many attributes, viz., the existence of
many eternal beings.5 There cannot be any belief in the
unity of God except by admitting that He is one simple sub-
stance, without any composition or plurality of elements; one
from whatever side you view it, and by whatever test you
examine it; not divisible into two parts in any way and by
any cause, nor capable of any form of plurality either
objectively or subjectively, as will be proved in this
treatise."
Some thinkers have gone so far as to say that the attri-
butes of God are neither His essence nor anything extraneous
1
¹ See chapter lii. An explanation-without being a strict logical definition-
is admissible in reference to the name of God; a strict definition is shown in
the next chapter to be impossible.
2 The Arabic 'N (part. act.) is rendered by Ibn Tibbon, 01 by
Charizi.
3 That is to say, although they do not expressly call it "accident" (17pb),
it is the same thing, and remains inadmissible.
4 That is, everything not included in the definition. The Hebrew name
П, here corresponds to "accident" in its original meaning, “befalling,"
"coming to," although in the Bible it is used in the sense of "chance."
5 That is, the attributes are inadmissible, because they are "accidents;"
and even if they were not "accidents" they could not be admitted; because
in that case they would eternally coexist with the essence, and this is contrary
to the belief in the perfect unity of God.
6 See II. xxii.
“Thinkers” is to be understood in an ironical sense. The Mutakal-
lemim are meant.
Uor M
176
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
to His essence. This is like the assertion of some theorists,
that the ideals, i.e., the universalia, are neither existing nor
non-existent,¹ and like the views of others, that the atom
does not fill a definite place, but keeps an atom of space
occupied ; 2 that man has no freedom at all, but has acquire-
ment.³ Such things are only said; they exist only in words,
not in thought, much less in reality. But as you know,
and as all know who do not delude themselves, these theories
are preserved by a multitude of words, by misleading
similes sustained by declamation and invective, and by
numerous methods borrowed both from dialectics and
4
¹ This is a kind of compromise (like the conceptualists) between the
nominalists and realists; the universalia are neither rejected nor entirely
admitted; they assumed universalia in re (Abaelardus). Comp. Part III., ch.
xviii.
* The atom cannot occupy any definite space; it is infinitely small, other-
wise it would be divisible, and cease to be an atom; but each atom added to
a body changes the limits of that body. The different positions of a point con-
stitute successively a line, a surface, and a body; in a similar way the dif-
ferent positions of atoms constitute the body, and have dimensions. The Arabic
Tibbon), means literally it keeps the יטריד הגבול .Heb) ישגל אלחיז
,
atom of space occupied," so that a second atom must occupy a neighbouring
unit of space, and so on; thus implying the idea of extension, which is
excluded by the first part of the proposition, "the atom is not in a place." As
to the difference between and ' see Munk ad locum; Charizi, 1
Dip, “it includes some idea of space." The contradiction implied here is,
that on the one side no measurable dimension is given to the atom, and on the
other side, each additional atom increases the magnitude of the body. Comp.
lxxii., Propos. 5. The proposition cited here as contradictory in itself occurs
in some different form in the monadic theory of Leibnitz. Comp. also Aaron b.
Eliya, Ets-Chayim, ch. iv.
3 Some of the Fatalists (the sect of the Ashariyah) modified their creed
and admitted man's will as granted specially for each action; these successive
productions of the will of man are called 'p, “acquirement,” or П17,
",
space" to move about, according to Aaron b. Eliyah, in Ets-Chayim (ch.iv.
and lxxxvi.). The rendering of Charizi, D', is by no means literal; it
expresses vaguely the sense of the original, that there is some relation between
man and his actions.
((
in the במאמרים שמשתדל אומרם לשמרם ברוב דברים The words 4
translation of Tibbon, are superfluous, as pointed out by Munk (p. 187,
-is a com בהוצאת דבות (as in some editions רבות not) והרחקת ; (2 note
אלתשניעת bination of two different renderings of the original
Maou
PART I.-CHAPTER LI.
177
sophistry. If after uttering them and supporting them
by such words a man were to examine for himself his own
belief on this subject, he would see nothing but confusion and
stupidity in an endeavour to prove the existence of things
which do not exist, or to find a mean between two opposites
that have no mean.
Or is there a mean between existence
and non-existence, or between the identity and non-identity
of two things? But, as we said,2 to such absurdities men
were forced by the great licence given to the imagina-
tion, and by the fact that every existing material thing is
necessarily imagined as a certain substance possessing several
attributes; for nothing has ever been found that consists of one
simple substance without any attribute. Guided by such.
imaginations, men thought that God was also composed of
many different elements, viz., of His essence³ and of the attri-
butes superadded to His essence. Following up this com-
parison,* some believed that God was corporeal, and that He
possessed attributes; others abandoning this theory, denied
the corporeality, but retained the attributes. The adherence
to the literal sense of the text of Holy Writ is the source of
all this error, as I shall show in some chapters devoted to
this theme.5
1
והכחשת האמת הני סופסטא,.Char : מחלוקת נצוח והטעאה,Ibn Tibbon 1
66
and the refutation of truth, which is called sophistry."
2 See ch. xlix. page 168. Comp. page 94, note 2; page 111, note 1.
3 Instead of "Dyy in the ordinary editions of Ibn Tibbon's version, the
editio princeps and the MSS. have 1Dsy (Munk).
4 Charizi: 1) 1pm, “did not admit similarity," the Arabic,
D'awnbx 81770, admits of both interpretations: "they pushed forward "
(poussant plus loin, M.), and "they pushed away.'
,רחקו ממנו הדמות
5 See ch. liii. The licence given to the imagination has been repre-
sented above as the source of the corporification of God; here the anthropo-
morphisms employed in the Bible are said to lead to these errors. Maimonides
distinctly states, in ch. liii., that not reasoning, but the Biblical anthropomor-
phism created the belief in the attributes of God. He probably meant to say,
if people would follow reason more than imagination, they would easily find
out the correct interpretation of the metaphors employed in reference to
God.
N
178
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
CHAPTER LII.
Classification of Attributes.
EVERY description of an object by an affirmative attribute,
which includes the assertion that an object is of a certain
kind, must be made in one of the following five ways¹:—
First. The object is described by its definition, as e.g., man
is described as a being that lives and has reason; such a
description, containing the true essence of the object, is, as
we have already shown, nothing else but the explanation of
a name. All agree that this kind of description cannot be
given of God; for there are no previous causes² to His ex-
istence, by which He could be defined: and on that account.
it is a well-known principle, received by all the philosophers
who are precise in their statements, that no definition can
be given of God.
3
Secondly. An object is described by part of its definition,
as when, e.g., man is described as a living being or as a
rational being. This kind of description includes the neces-
1 The attributes are divided by Maimonides into five classes: 1, those which
include all the essential properties of an object; 2, those which include only
part of them; 3, those which denote non-essential properties [quality]; 4,
those which express the relation of an object to something else [relation]; 5,
those which refer to the action of the object [action]. The ten Aristotelian
categories appear to be included in these five classes, the first two of which
refer to the substance (DYY), while the remaining three include all the rest.
Quantity, quality and passiveness are here included in “ quality;" relation,
place and time, and property are included in "relation; " position and action
are united in "action."
2 The definition, consisting of the genus and the differentia, is inapplicable
to God; genus and differentia are at the same time represented as the causes
(MD) of the existence of the thing defined (Ou µóvov tò öti deĩ Tòv óρIOTIKÒV
λόγον δηλοῦν, ὥσπερ οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν ὅρων λέγουσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν
¿vvπáρɣɛiv kai iµpaíveolat, Arist. De animâ, II. ii. § 1). For the apparent
contradiction, see ch. li., page 175, note 1.
is rendered by Ibn Tibbon, according to אלנטאר אלמחצלין למא יקולונה 3
the * והמעינים (.Ch המשכילים) המבררים למה שיאמרוהו ed. pr. and MSS. by
، ،
philosophers, who are particular in what they say." Munk. The several editions
.המבררים instead of המדברים,of Ibn Tibbon's Version erroneously read
PART I.-CHAPTER LII.
179
sary connection [of the two ideas];¹ for when we say that
every man is rational, we mean by it that every being
which has the characteristics of man must also have
reason. All 2 agree that this kind of description is inappro-
priate in reference to God; for if we were to speak of a
portion of His essence, we should consider His essence to be
a compound. The inappropriateness of this kind of descrip-
tion in reference to God is the same as that of the preceding
kind.
Thirdly. An object is described by something different from
its true essence, by something that does not complement or
establish the essence of the object. The description, there-
fore, relates to a quality; but quality, in its most general
sense,³ is an accident. If God could be described in this
way, He would be the substratum of accidents: a sufficient
reason for rejecting the idea that He possesses quality, since
it diverges from the true conception of His essence. It is
surprising how those who admit the application of attributes
to God can reject, in reference to Him, comparison and
qualification. For when they say "He cannot be qualified,"
they can only mean that He possesses no quality; and yet
every positive essential attribute of an object either consti-
tutes its essence, and in that case it is identical with the
essence, or it contains a quality of the object.
4
There are, as you know, four kinds of quality; I will
1
Char.) in) ההצמדה Ibn Tibbon) or) החיוב in Arabic, and אלתלאזם
Hebrew, denote the closest and inseparable connection between two things, here
between "man" and "reason," the latter forming part of the definition of the
former.
2 That is, even those who are not particular (b) in their speech.
* Quality is one of the categories of which nine are said to be accidents
(DPD), and quality ('), being one of these, is consequently an accident.
(אלמחצלין)
or סוג העליון also מאמרות The categories are called in Hebrew
מין העליון
* These four kinds of quality correspond to the Aristotelian subdivision of
this category into : 1. ἕξις καὶ διάθεσις. 2. ὅσα κατὰ δύναμιν φυσικὴν ἢ ἀδυνα-
μίαν λέγεται. 3. παθητικαὶ ποιότητες καὶ πάθη. 4. σχῆμά τε καὶ ἡ περὶ
ÉKÁσTOV vπáрxovoa µoppń (psychological, physical, emotional and mathema-
tical properties). The first of these four kinds of properties, žig and diúdeσiç,
includes those that concern the soul of man (D), and those that concern
N 2
180
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
1
give you instances of attributes of each kind, in order to show
you that this class of attributes cannot possibly be applied
to God. (a.) A man is described by any of his intellectual or
moral qualities, or by any of the dispositions appertaining
to him as an animate being, when, e.g., we speak of a person
who is a carpenter, or who shrinks from sin, or who is ill. It
makes no difference whether we say, a carpenter, or a sage,
or a physician;2 by all these we represent certain physical
dispositions; nor does it make any difference whether we
say "sin-fearing" or "merciful." Every trade, every pro-
fession, and every settled habit of man are certain physical
dispositions. All this is clear to those who have occupied
themselves with the study of Logic. (b.) A thing is described
by some physical quality it possesses, or by the absence of
It makes no differ-
the same, e.g., as being soft or hard.
ence whether we say "soft or hard," or "strong or weak;" in
both cases we speak of physical conditions. (c.) A man is
described by his passive qualities, or by his emotions; we
speak, e.g., of a person who is passionate, irritable, timid,
merciful, without implying that these conditions have become
permanent. The description of a thing by its colour, taste,
heat, cold, dryness, and moisture, belongs also to this
3
4
K
the body as the seat of the soul (y). Those which concern the soul are
אלכלקיאה Charizi renders .(מדות or עיוניים) either intellectual or moral
(П17, “moral qualities," in the Hebrew Version of Ibn Tibbon) by ♫♫
"the formative capacities." Although the Arabic, ph, admits of both mean-
ings, the instances which are given by the author to illustrate these terms
apply only to "moral qualities."
'The three instances refer to the three kinds of qualities mentioned before
in the same order. Carpentry means here the knowledge of carpentry, and as
such is considered as an intellectual quality.
""
66
or the
2 Arabic D, Hebr. 177; according to Munk," the wise
learned;" this is the more improbable, as the word 'sys, "the sage,"
which precedes, has almost the same meaning.
3 The Arabic PS (♬ɔ №5 Ibn Tibbon) appears to be the literal transla-
tion of the Greek ἀδυναμίαν.
4 It is remarkable that colour, taste, etc., are classified together with the
emotions; they were probably considered as momentary effects produced by
some external force, as the rays of the sun, the wind, etc. It is true that
colours in the face of man come from affections (see Munk ad locum), but that
PART 1.-CHAPTER LII.
181
class of attributes. (d.) A thing is described by any of its
qualities resulting from quantity as such;¹ we speak, e.g.,
of a thing which is long, short, curved, straight, etc.
Consider all these and similar attributes, and you will find
that they cannot be employed in reference to God. He is
not a magnitude that any quality resulting from quantity
as such could be possessed by Him; He is not affected by
external influences, and therefore does not possess any
quality resulting from emotion. He is not subject to
physical conditions, and therefore does not possess strength
or similar qualities; He is not an animate being, that He
should have a certain disposition of the soul, or acquire
certain properties, as meekness, modesty, etc., or be in a
state to which animate beings as such are subject, as, e.g.,
in that of health or of illness. Hence it follows that no
attribute coming under the head of quality in its widest.
sense, can be predicated of God. Consequently, these three
classes of attributes, describing the essence of a thing, or
part of the essence, or a quality of it, are clearly inadmissi-
ble in reference to God, for they imply composition, which,
as we shall prove,2 is out of question as regards the Creator.
We say, with regard to this latter point, that He is absolutely
One.³
Fourthly. A thing is described by its relation to another
thing, e.g., to time, to space, or to a different individual;
thus we say, Zaid, the father of A, or the partner of B, or
who dwells at a certain place, or who lived at a stated time.
This kind of attribute does not necessarily imply plurality
or change in the essence of the object described; for the
""
(6
but "the thing" ("ubx,
man
is not the meaning here, because it is not
in Hebr. 1277) that is described by these qualities.
That is, the mathematical properties of the thing, the qualities resulting
from its abstract form. It is uncertain whether "quantity" is here to
be understood as the category of quantity, or in the particular sense of geome-
trical magnitude. All the instances given refer to geometrical forms, and be-
sides the Aristotelian name oxiµа кaì µóρ÷η apply only to these.
2 See II. i.
3 This sentence does not occur in some MSS., nor in the version of Charizi.
182
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
2
same Zaid, to whom reference is made, is the partner of
Amru, the father of Becr, the master of Khalid, the
friend of Zaid, dwells in a certain house, and was born in
a certain year. Such relations are not the essence of a
thing, nor are they so intimately connected with it as
qualities. At first thought, it would seem that they may be
employed in reference to God, but after carefi alınd thorough
consideration we are convinced of their in admssibility. It
is quite clear that there is no relation between fod and time
or space.¹ For time is an accident conected with motion,
in so far as the latter includes the relation of anteriority
and posteriority, and is expressed by number, as is ex-
plained in books devoted to this subject; and since motion
is one of the conditions to which only material bodies are
subject, and God is immaterial, there can be no relation
between Him and time. Similarly there is no relation
between Him and space. But what we have to investigate
and to examine is this: whether some real relation exists be-
tween God and any of the substances created by Him, by
which He could be described? That there is no correlation
between Him and any of His creatures can easily be seen;
for the characteristic of two objects correlative to each other
is the equality of their reciprocal relation. Now, as God
4
I See II. xiii.
2 That is, motion can be considered as a series of successive positions of a
moving body, and can thus be reduced to number or measure. The idea of
succession, of before and after, or of earlier and later, necessarily includes the
idea of time. Time is called an accident connected with motion; it does not
form a constituent element, but it is inseparable from it. Comp. II. xiii.:
"Time depends on motion" (IINA JON JUDI ¡Din), and 'Apiłµòç Kivijoεwę
κατὰ τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον. (Arist. Phys., iv. 11.)
3 That is, space is an accident connected with bodies; God is not material,
the relations of space are therefore inapplicable to Him.
,(הזמן נמשך אחר התנועה)
The relation between two things is either perfect or imperfect. In the first
case the two things being equal in other respects equally participate in it, and
are equally essential in that relation; it is, therefore, out of question in re-
ference to God, whose very existence is different from that of all other beings.
When the relation is imperfect ("MDX DM' np), and does not require the
fulfilment of that condition, its application to God may seem less objectionable,
but it is in reality equally inadmissible. According to Munk, the condition of
PART I.-CHAPTER LII.
183
་
has absolute existence, while all other beings have only
possible existence, as we shall show,¹ there consequently can-
not be any correlation [between God and His creatures].
That a certain kind of relation does exist between them is
by some considered possible, but wrongly. It is impossible to
imagine a relation between intellect and sight, although, as we
believe, the same kind of existence is common to both; how,
then, could a relation be imagined between any creature and
God, who has nothing in common with any other being; for
even the term existence is applied to Him and other things,
according to our opinion,2 only by way of pure homonymity.
Consequently there is no relation whatever between Him and
any other being. For³ whenever we speak of a relation between
two things,¹ these belong to the same species;5 but when two
things belong to different species though of the same class,
there is no relation between them. We therefore do not say,
this red compared with that green, is more, or less, or equally
"1iwa Jennn, “la parfaite réciprocité," consists in inverting the relation “ A
is the master of B," into "B is the servant of A." If this were meant by
Maimonides, he has not proved the inadmissibility of that relation in reference
to God, by referring to the difference between the existence of God and that of
of His creatures, as that difference is entirely unconnected with the reci-
procity which he mentions. Besides, the relation "A is the master of B,"
always implies the inversion B is the servant of A; both sentences meaning one
and the same thing. The verb DNDYN (Hebrew лn) does not signify
"to be inverted," but "to form the opposite," and the phrase DNƆYIN
to form equally the opposite to
each other,” i.e. to have the same relation though in opposite directions, to the
mean between them.
(C
means (התהפך בשווי Hebrew) באלתכאפו
¹ Comp. II., Introd. Propos. 19.
2 According to the opinion of those who believe in the creatio ex nihilo.
Those who believe in the eternity of the Universe, need not consider the term
existence as homonymous when applied to God and to the Universe.
""
3 This passage from "For whenever we speak" to "the greatest of all
differences" contains a mere repetition of the argument just concluded with the
words "Consequently there is no relation," etc. The conjunction "for does
not appear to refer to that which closely precedes, but to the phrase “but
wrongly." The two forms of the arguments may be due to the corrections and
alterations in the text made by the author.
4 Comp. ch. xxxv.
5 The species (j') is that which is nearest to the individual beings of a
class. It is called in Milloth higgayon, ch. x., "the last species" (17787 }'DA).
P
184
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
intense, although both belong to the same class-colour; when
they belong to two different classes,¹ there does not appear
to exist any relation between them, not even to a man of
ordinary intellect, although the two things belong to the
same category; e.g., between a hundred cubits and the heat
of pepper there is no relation, the one being a quality, the
other a quantity; or between wisdom and sweetness, between
meekness and bitterness, although all these come under the
head of quality in its more general signification. How, then,
could there be any relation between God and His creatures,
considering the important difference between them in respect
to true existence, the greatest of all differences. Besides, if
any relation existed between them, God would be subject to
the accident of relation; and although that would not be an
accident to the essence of God, it would still be, to some
extent, a kind of accident. You would, therefore, be wrong
if you applied affirmative attributes in their literal sense to
God, though they contained only relations; these, however,
are the most appropriate of all attributes, to be employed, in
a less strict sense, in reference to God, because they do not
imply that a plurality of eternal things exists, or that any
change takes place in the essence of God, when those things
change to which God is in relation.
2
Fifthly. A thing is described by its actions; I do not mean
The word by in the version of Tibbon has no equivalent in the
Arabic text, and yet it does not appear to have been put in by error. In the
instance which follows, two by DD (categories) are mentioned, viz.,
quality and quantity. Besides, there is some confusion in the order of the
instances. We should expect, for the sake of the climax, which the author
undoubtedly intended, the following order: Two things of two divisions of the
same species, of two species of the same class, of two classes of the same cate-
gory, and then of two categories. The whole passage seems to have undergone
שאין ספק and אין ספק ש frequent corrections and alterations. The words
לשום אדם
O
(Munk).
are not found in the MSS., nor their equivalents in the original
-a mul * רבוי הקדמות by תכתיר אלקדים Ibn Tibbon renders the Arabic 2
titude of eternal things," Charizi 17 ", "the plurality of the eternal."
The latter takes D'h as referring to God, Ibn Tibbon in the general sense
of "eternal thing."
PART I.—CHAPTER LIII.
185
r
by its actions" the inherent capacity for a certain work, as
is expressed in "carpenter," "painter," or "smith "-for
these belong to the class of qualities which have been men-
tioned above²-but I mean the action the latter has performed;
we speak, e.g., of Zaid, who made this door, built that wall,
wove that garment. This kind of attributes is separate from
the essence of the thing described, and, therefore, the most
appropriate to be employed in describing the Creator, espe-
cially since we know that these different actions do not
imply that different elements must be contained in the sub-
stance of the agent, by which the different actions are pro-
duced, as will be explained. On the contrary, all the actions
of God emanate from His essence, not from any extraneous
thing superadded to His essence, as we have shown.¹
3
What we have explained in the present chapter is this:
that God is one in every respect, containing no plurality or
any element superadded to His essence: and that the many
attributes of different significations applied in Scripture to
God, originate in the multitude of His actions, not in a
plurality existing in His essence, and are partly employed
with the object of conveying to us some notion of His per-
fection, in accordance with what we consider perfection, as
has been explained by us. The possibility of one simple sub-
stance excluding plurality, though accomplishing different
actions, will be illustrated by examples in the next chapter.
CHAPTER LIII.
The arguments on which the Attributists found their theory.
THE circumstance which caused men to believe in the
existence of divine attributes is similar to that which
caused others to believe in the corporeality of God. The
latter have not arrived at that belief by speculation, but
' The painter is not mentioned in the Arabic text.
2 In the elucidation of the first class of qualities by examples.
Ch. xlvi., page 159.
3 Ch. liii.
5 Ch. xxvi., xlvi., xlvii.
186
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
by following the literal sense of certain passages in the
Bible. The same is the case with the attributes; when in
the books of the Prophets and of the Law,' God is described.
by attributes, such passages are taken in their literal sense,
and it is then believed that God possesses attributes; as if He
were to be exalted above corporeality, and not above things
connected with corporeality, ie., the accidents, I mean
psychical dispositions, all of which are qualities [and con-
nected with corporeality]. Every attribute³ which the
followers of this doctrine assume to be essential to the
Creator, you will find to express, although they do not
distinctly say it, a quality similar to those which they are
accustomed to notice in the bodies of all living beings. We
apply to all such passages the principle, "The Torah speaketh
2
1 Here, as in several other passages, the books of the Prophets are men-
tioned before the books of the Pentateuch. See ch. xlvi. page 153, note 1.
2 Of the several classes of attributes described in the preceding chapter, only
the psychical properties (1) are named here, because the essential
attributes the admissibility of which is denied by Maimonides, but asserted
by his opponents-are those of life, power, wisdom, and will, all of which
are (
1) psychical dispositions. All other attributes are either
not essential, or, if essential, too evidently material to be applied to God
The words, I mean
by any class of thinkers.
psychical dispositions,'
seem to be out of place; for it is entirely unnecessary to explain these by the
additional phrase "all of which are qualities." From the sentence which
follows it is evident that Maimonides describes "the things connected with
corporeality" or "accidents" as 66
qualities," and further limits this term by
ון I » אעני אלהיאת אלנפסאניה psychical dispositions. The words *
,הי כלהא כיפיאת
،،
""
-
در
Ι mean
psychical dispositions," appear therefore to include the qualification of
"all of which are qualities," and not vice versa.
3 That is, occurring in the books of the Bible.
I.e., the followers of this doctrine. According to Munk, "the Prophets,"
because in the original text the plural
"they say distinctly" does not
agree with the singular pлy, “the follower." But in reference to the Prophets
this remark of Maimonides would be superfluous; they had no occasion to declare
what the attributes which occurred in their writings were, while those philoso-
phers who believed in the existence of essential attributes, might in discussing
them, have stated whether these attributes were qualities or not.
5 Ibn Tibbon renders 'n by the adjective 217, "similar:" Charizi by
17, "in order to make a comparison." The sense is the same in both.
6 That is, of whatever kind the attributes occurring in those passages are,
whether they seem to be essential or not.
PART I.-CHAPTER LIII.
187
in the language of man," and say that the object of all these
terms is to describe God as the most perfect being, not
as possessing those qualities which are only perfections in
relation to created living beings. Many of the attributes
express different acts of God, but that difference does not
necessitate any difference as regards Him from whom the
acts proceed. This fact, viz., that from one agency different
effects may result, although that agency has not free will,
and much more so if it has free will, I will illustrate by an
instance taken from our own sphere. Fire melts certain
things and makes others hard, it boils and consumes,¹ it
bleaches and blackens. If we described the fire as bleaching,
blackening, consuming, boiling, hardening and melting,
we should be correct, and yet he who does not know the
nature of fire, would think that it included six different
elements, one by which it blackens, another by which it
bleaches, a third by which it boils, a fourth by which it
consumes, a fifth by which it melts, a sixth by which it
hardens things—actions which are opposed to one another,
and of which each has its peculiar property. He, however,
who knows the nature of fire, will know that by virtue of one
quality in action, namely, by heat, it produces all these effects.
If this is the case with that which is done by nature, how
much more is it the case with regard to those who act by
free will, and still more with regard to God, who is above
all description. If we, therefore, perceive in God certain
relations of various characters-for wisdom in us is different
from power, and power from will-it does by no means
follow that different elements are really contained in Him,
that He contains one element by which He knows, another
by which He wills, and another by which He exercises
power, as is, in fact, the signification of the attributes [of
God] according to the Mutakallemim. Some of them express
it plainly, and enumerate the attributes as elements added to
the essence. Others, however, are more reserved with regard
2
·
! That is, it prepares one thing for our use, and nature destroys another.
1, "and nature has no will.”
2 Charizi has here the addition on
188
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
to this matter, but indicate their opinion, though they
do not express it in distinct and intelligible words.
Thus, e.g., some of them say: "God is omnipotent by
His essence, wise by His essence, living by His essence,
and endowed with a will by His essence." (I will mention to
you, as an instance, man's reason, which being one faculty
and implying no plurality, enables him to know many arts
and sciences; by the same faculty man is able to sow, to do
carpenter's work, to weave, to build, to study, to acquire a
knowledge of geometry, and to govern a state. These
various acts resulting from one simple faculty, which in-
volves no plurality, are very numerous; their number, that
is, the number of the actions originating in man's reason,²
is almost infinite. It is therefore intelligible how in
reference to God, those different actions can be caused by
one simple substance, that does not include any plurality
or any additional element. The attributes found in Holy
Scripture are either qualifications of His actions, without
any reference to His essence, or indicate absolute perfection,
but do not imply that the essence of God is a compound of
various elements.)3 For in not admitting the term "com-
pound," they do not reject the idea of a compound¹ when
they admit a substance with attributes.
2
There still remains one difficulty which led them to that
error, and which I am now going to mention. Those who
¹ This is not clear, as it is not distinctly stated whether the repetition of
ya "by His essence" four times, refers to four different kinds of essence, or
to one and the same essence; Maimonides appears to understand it in the first
sense. According to Shemtob Palquera y means exclusively," no other
power being possessed of life, wisdom, power, will. (Moreh ha-moreb, p. 151.)
2 That all these actions originate in man's reason (1777) is distinctly
stated by Maimonides in his Shemonah Perakim, ch. i.
3 The passage beginning "I will mention to you as an instance," etc., to
"of various elements" is here out of place, and the words "for in not admit-
ting" etc., are to be joined with the sentence, "Others, however, are more
reserved with regard to this matter, but indicate their opinion," etc. The
sentence in parenthesis contains an elucidation of the words "how much more
is that the case as regards those who act with free will."
in the editions of the version of Tibbon is a misprint for עניינם or עניינים 4
.(Munk) ענינה
PART I.-CHAPTER LIII.
189
assert the existence of the attributes do not found¹ their
opinion on the variety of God's actions; they say it is true
that one substance can be the source of various effects, but
His essential attributes 2 cannot be qualifications of His
actions, because it is impossible to imagine that the Creator
created Himself. They vary with regard to the so-called
essential attributes-I mean as regards their number-ac-
cording to the text of the Scripture 3 which each of them
follows. I will enumerate those on which all agree, and the
knowledge of which they believe that they have derived from
reasoning, not from some words of the Prophets, namely, the
following four:-life, power, wisdom, and will. They believe
that these are four different things, and such perfections as
cannot possibly be absent in the Creator, and that these cannot
be qualifications of His actions. This is their opinion. But
4
1 Munk: Ne les admittent pas (seulement) à cause de la multiplicité.
The word "seulement" is decidedly wrong. The plurality of actions was no
reason whatever for believing in the existence of attributes, as is distinctly
stated in the text.
המדות הדבקות ; Ibn Tibbon התארים העצמיים) The essential attributes 2
13, Char.) are closely connected with the essence, and are opposed to attributes
which are qualifications of actions; the arguments in favour of their existence
appear to be as follows: these four attributes (life, power, wisdom, will) are
inseparable from the idea of God; to think of God without them, would be
the same as to think of Him without existence. Hence, if these attributes
were mere qualifications of actions, they could not have existed before the
respective actions, and the Creator would by His actions produce them, which
amounts, in the opinion of those philosophers, to saying that God created Him-
self or His own essence. The commentators have introduced much abstruse
discussion, in connection with these simple words of the text. Munk says of
this passage, "L'auteur s'est exprimé ici d'une manière tronquée et obscure.'
""
3 This refers to the Koran, as Maimonides here chiefly thinks of the
Mahomedan philosophers who believed in the attributes.
The numerous
attributes were reduced by some of them to seven :—life, knowledge, will,
might, word, hearing, sight. (Munk.)
4 These words are undoubtedly a mere repetition of what was already
shown above, namely, why the Mutakallemim believe that the essential attri-
butes are not qualifications of God's actions. Munk is less accurate in
rendering the first ÉNYEN ¡D 'п ND, “ne sont pas de (ceux qui viennent de)
"}
et qui * ולא יסוג אן תכון הדה מן גמלה אפעאלה ses actions, and here
ne sauraient être comptées au nombre de ses actions." The question of
neuter and transitive attributes is not touched upon in this passage.
190
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
you must know¹ that wisdom and life in reference to God
are not different from each other; for in every being that
is conscious of itself, life and wisdom are the same thing,
that is to say, if by wisdom we understand the consciousness
of self. Besides, the subject and the object of that conscious-
ness are undoubtedly identical [as regards God]; for accord-
ing to our opinion, He is not composed of an element that
apprehends, and another that does not apprehend; He is not
like man, who is a combination of a conscious soul and an
unconscious body. If, therefore, by "wisdom" we mean the
faculty of self-consciousness, wisdom and life are one and the
same thing. They, however, do not speak of wisdom in this
sense, but of His power to apprehend His creatures. There
is also no doubt that power and will do not exist in God in
reference to Himself; for He cannot have power or will as
regards Himself; we cannot imagine such a thing. They take
these attributes as different relations between God and His
creatures, signifying that He has power in creating things,
will in giving to things existence as He desires, and wisdom
in knowing what He created. Consequently, these attributes
do not refer to the essence of God, but express relations
between Him and His creatures.
Therefore we, who truly believe in the Unity of God, de-
clare, that as we do not believe that some element is included
in His essence by which He created the heavens, another
by which He created the [four] elements, a third by which
He created the ideals, in the same way we reject the idea that
His essence contains an element by which He has power, an-
other element by which He has will, and a third by which
He has a knowledge of His creatures. On the contrary, He is
a simple essence, without any additional element whatever;
He created the universe, and knows it, but not by any
G
1 Maimonides wishes to show the error of these philosophers, by demonstrating,
that wisdom, power, and will, if their object is God Himself, must be one and
the same thing; but if, as those philosophers assume, they have reference to
other objects, they are qualifications of actions, as all other attributes.
2 Apprehension (aio0áveo@ai, voeεîv) is the characteristic of both life and
νοεῖν)
wisdom. Comp. ch. xlii., and Arist. Metaph., xii. 7.
PART I.-CHAPTER LIV.
191
extraneous force. There is no difference whether these
various attributes refer to His actions or to relations between
Him and His works; in fact, these relations, as we have
also shown, exist only in the thoughts of men.¹ This is what
we must believe concerning the attributes occurring in the
books of the Prophets; some may also be taken as expres-
sive of the perfection of God by way of comparison with
what we consider as perfections in us, as we shall explain.
CHAPTER LIV.2
On Exodus xxxiii. 13, to xxxiv. 7.
THE wisest man,³ our Teacher Moses, asked two things of
God, and received a reply respecting both. The one thing
he asked was, that God should let him know His true
essence; the other, which in fact he asked first, that God
should let him know His attributes. In answer to both
these petitions God promised that He would let him know
all His attributes, and that these were nothing but His
actions. He also told him that His true essence could not
be perceived, and pointed out a method by which he
could obtain the utmost knowledge of God possible for man
to acquire. The knowledge obtained by Moses has not been
1 I.e., they are employed as figurative expressions, and are not meant to be
taken literally as real relations between God and His creatures.
2 In this chapter Maimonides shows that all the attributes communicated to
Moses by God Himself were qualifications of actions.
3 Moses is here called "the wisest man," (lit. the prince of the wise men), and
not as usually "the greatest prophet," because, according to Maimonides, in the
vision referred to in this chapter, Moses was shown the method ('y Dipp) of
solving the most difficult metaphysical problems, and the limits of human reason.
4 The logical order in describing an object is to speak first of the essence
of the object, and then of its properties; in practice we frequently arrive at the
knowledge of things in the reverse order, by perceiving first the properties and
then the object itself. Maimonides, therefore, in mentioning the two petitions
of Moses, followed the logical order, while Moses is said to have asked first for
that which he considered easier to obtain.
192
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
possessed by any human being before him or after him. His
petition to know the attributes of God is contained in the
following words: "Show me now Thy way, that I may know
Thee, that I may find grace in Thy sight" (Exod. xxxiii.
13). Consider how many excellent ideas found expression
in the words, "Show me Thy way, that I may know Thee."
We learn from them that God is known by His attributes,
for Moses believed that he knew Him, when he was shown the
way¹ of God.
The words "That I may know Thee," imply
that He who knows God will find grace in His eyes. Not
only is he acceptable and welcome to God, who fasts and
prays, but everyone who acquires a knowledge of Him. He
who has no knowledge of God is the object of His wrath
and displeasure. The pleasure and the displeasure of God,
the approach to Him and the withdrawal from Him are pro-
portional to the amount of man's knowledge or ignorance
concerning the Creator. We have already gone too far
away from our subject, let us now return to it.
2
Moses prayed to God to grant him knowledge of His attri-
butes, and also pardon for His people; when the latter had
been granted, he continued to pray for the knowledge of
God's essence in the words, "Show me Thy glory" (ib. 18),
and then received, respecting his first request "Show me
Thy way," the following favourable reply, "I will make all My
goodness to pass before thee" (ib. 19); as regards the second
request, however, he was told, "Thou canst not see My
1 7277
is generally taken to be the singular, but Maimonides seems to
have understood it as being identical with the plural 777,
2 According to Abravanel, Maimonides does not describe those who fast
and say prayers as unacceptable to God, but declares that, besides them, all
those who have obtained a true knowledge of God are acceptable to Him.
Narboni says that the common people approach God by fasting and saying
and would that this were done ומי יתן ויתעסקו בהם בדורנו זה,prayers
at present! The philosopher, however, must aim at the knowledge of God as
his highest blessing. Munk refers the limiting Up "only" to the phrase
“who fast and pray," but the words, "all those who," which follow,
show that is to be joined with ; "not only those who..., but
all those who..."
PART I.-CHAPTER LIV.
193
2
face" (ib. 20). The words "all my goodness" (273)
imply that God promised to show him the whole creation,
concerning which it has been stated, " And God saw every-
thing that He had made, and, behold, it was very good"
(Gen. i. 31); when I say "to show him the whole crea-
tion," I mean to imply that God promised to make him
comprehend the nature of all things, their relation to each
other, and the way they are governed by God both in
reference to the universe as a whole and to each creature
in particular.¹ This knowledge is referred to when we
are told of Moses, "he is firmly established in all Mine
house" (Num. xii. 7); that is, "his knowledge of all the
creatures in My universe is true and firmly established " ; for
false opinions are not firmly established. Consequently the
knowledge of the works of God is the knowledge of His
attributes, by which He can be known. The fact that God
promised Moses to give him a knowledge of His works, may
be inferred from the circumstance that God taught him such
attributes as refer exclusively to His works, viz., "merciful
and gracious, longsuffering and abundant in goodness," etc.
(Exod. xxxiv. 6). It is therefore clear that the ways which
Moses wished to know, and which God taught him, are the
actions emanating from God. Our Sages call them middoth
(qualities), and speak of the thirteen middoth 5 of God; they
4
3
(כל טובי)
1 Charizin) Dna 71271, "and their combination and separation."
2 The word ¡PN appears to be understood in the sense of "firm," "sure,"
"possessed with a true knowledge."
""
3 Lit., (C are His attributes." This is inaccurate; after "consequently," we
must either repeat "the knowledge of" (778 Hebrew ) before His
attributes," and substitute "is" for "are, or omit the phrase altogether. That
the text is corrupt is proved by the various readings found in the MSS.,
which, however, do not give a better sense than the one adopted by Munk,
כי הדעות שאינם : In Charizi's version the difficulty has been removed
In the printed) אמתיות לא תתקיים השגתם והפעלים ההם הם מדותיו
edition DN has wrongly been added. Munk.)
4 That is to say, the knowledge referred to in the prayer of Moses in the
words "Show me Thy ways that I may know Thee" (Ex. xxxiii. 13).
5 I.e., the thirteen attributes mentioned in Exod. xxxiv. 6-7. Contrary to
the traditional interpretation, Maimonides does not count the repetition of the
0
194
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
1
used the term also in reference to man; comp. 7 YON
Wan b, "there are four different middoth (cha-
racters) among those who go to the house of learning;"
APTIT72, "There are four different middoth (cha-
racters) among those who give charity." They do not mean
to say that God really possesses middoth³ (qualities), but that
He performs actions similar to such of our actions as originate
in certain qualities, i.e., in certain psychical dispositions; not
that God has really such dispositions. Although Moses was
shown "all His goodness," i.e., all His works, only the thirteen
middoth are mentioned, because they include those acts of God
which refer to the creation and the government of man-
kind, and to know these acts was the principal object of the
prayer of Moses. This is shown by the conclusion of his
prayer, "that I may know Thee, that I may find grace in
Thy sight, and consider that this nation is Thy people"
(Exod. xxxiii. 16), that is to say, the people whom I have
to rule by certain acts in the performance of which I must
be guided by Thy own acts in governing them. We have
thus shown that "the ways" [77 in the Bible], and “mid-
doth" [used by our Sages], are identical, denoting the acts
emanating from God in reference to the universe.
4
מדות בנותני צדקה
Whenever any one of His actions is perceived by us, we
ascribe to God that emotion which is the source of the act when
performed by ourselves, and call Him by an epithet which is
formed from the verb expressing that action. We see, e.g.,
how well5 He provides for the life of the embryo of living
beings; how He endows with certain faculties both the
embryo itself and those who have to rear it after its birth,
שלש עשרה .beg
name of God as a separate attribute, and includes in the number "visiting the
iniquity," etc. Comp. Babyl. Talm. Rosh ha-shanah, 17b, and Tosafoth
.הכחות והטבעים,.Char)
ארבע מדות
2 Mishnah Abboth v. 13 and 14.
.בעל טבעים ומנהגים ומדות,.Char 3
4 Charizi's version contains two different renderings of this sentence.
5 According to Charizi 1, "good," "well;" Ibn Tibbon nip,
"minutely," "carefully."
,דקות
PART I.-CHAPTER LIV.
195
in order that it may be protected from death and destruction,
guarded against all harm, and assisted in the performance
of all that is required [for its development]. Similar acts,
when performed by us, are due to a certain emotion and
tenderness called mercy (a and b). God is, there-
fore, said to be merciful (D); e.g., "Like as a father
is merciful (n) to his children, so the Lord is merciful
() to them that fear Him" (Ps. ciii. 13); “And I will
spare (b) them, as a man spareth (b) his own son
that serveth him" (Mal. iii. 17). Such instances do not imply
that God is influenced by a feeling of mercy, but that acts
similar to those which a father performs for his son, out of
pity, mercy and real affection, emanate from God solely for
the benefit of His pious men, and are by no means the result
of any impression or change [produced in God].—When we
give something to a person who has no claim upon us, we
perform an act of grace (); e.g., DN 7,"Grant them
graciously unto us" (Judges xxi. 22).¹ [The same term is used
in reference to God, e.g.] be an 8, "which God hath
graciously given" (Gen. xxxiii. 5); □b 7, “Because
God hath dealt graciously with me" (ib. 11). Instances of
this kind are numerous. God creates and guides beings
who have no claim upon Him to be created and guided by
Him; He is therefore called gracious (1).—His actions
towards mankind also include great calamities, which over-
take individuals and bring death to them, or affect whole
families and even entire regions, spread death, destroy gene-
ration after generation, and spare nothing whatsoever."
Hence there occur inundations, earthquakes, destructive
storms, expeditions of one nation against the other for the
sake of destroying it with the sword and blotting out its
memory, and many other evils of the same kind. When-
ever such evils are caused by us to any person, they originate
חנני אתם as in the original, Ibn Tibbon quotes חנונו אותם Instead of 1
from Job xix. 21.
2 Lit., “Neither field 'nor offspring." Charizi, ¬ y usun shi.
In Arabic
"
every thing."
is a phrase which means
0 2
196
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
in great anger, violent jealousy, or a desire for revenge.
God is therefore called, because of these acts, "jealous
(N), "revengeful" (p), "wrathful" (non by), and
"keeping anger" (, Nah. i. 2); that is to say, He per-
forms acts similar to those which, when performed by us,
originate in certain psychical dispositions, in jealousy, desire
for retaliation, revenge, or anger; they are in accordance with
the guilt of those who are to be punished, and not the result
of any emotion
emotion; for He is above all defect! The same is
the case with all divine acts; though resembling those acts
which emanate from our passions and psychical dispositions,
they are not due to anything superadded to His essence. The
governor of a country, if he is a prophet,¹ should conform to
these attributes. Acts [of punishment] must be performed.
by him moderately and in accordance with justice, not merely
as an outlet of his passion. He must not let loose his
anger, nor allow his passion to overcome him; for all pas-
sions are bad, and they must be guarded against as far as it
lies in man's power. At times and towards some persons he
must be merciful and gracious, not only from motives of
mercy and compassion, but according to their merits; at
other times and towards other persons he must evince anger,
revenge, and wrath in proportion to their guilt, but not from
motives of passion. He must be able to condemn a person
to death by fire without anger, passion, or loathing against
him, and must exclusively be guided by what he perceives
of the guilt of the person, and by a sense of the great benefit
which a large number will derive from such a sentence.
You have, no doubt, noticed in the Torah how the com-
mandment to annihilate the seven nations, and "to save
alive nothing that breatheth" (Deut. xx. 16) is followed im-
2
""
3
.
The words "if he is a prophet" seem to be superfluous; there is no
reason why only prophets should conform to these conditions.
1 of the
Arabic text is perhaps a mistake, the correct reading being N, "noble,"
and the sense of the phrase is: "if he is (or desires to be) noble."
2 That is, in so far as they prevent man from following the dictates of reason,
and prompt him to act in accordance with momentary impulses.
PART 1.-CHAPTER LIV.
197
mediately by the words "That they teach you not to do
after all their abominations, which they have done unto
their gods; so should you sin against the Lord your God"
(ib. 18); that is to say, you shall not think that this com-
mandment implies an act of cruelty or of retaliation; it is
an act demanded by the tendency of man to remove every-
thing that might turn him away from the right path, and to
clear away all obstacles in the road to perfection, that is, to
the knowledge of God. Nevertheless, acts of mercy,
pardon, pity, and grace should more frequently be per-
formed by the governor of a country than acts of punish-
ment; seeing that all the thirteen middoth of God are
attributes of mercy with only one exception, namely, 775
visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon * עון אבות על בנים
66
the children" (Exod. xxxiv. 7); for the meaning of
7 is "and He will not utterly destroy;"¹ comp. 77721
"And she will be utterly destroyed, she shall sit
upon the ground" (Is. iii. 26). When it is said that God
is visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children, this
refers exclusively to the sin of idolatry, and to no other sin.
That this is the case may be inferred from what is said in
the ten commandments, " upon the third and fourth genera-
tion of My enemies" (, Exod. xx. 5), none except idola-
ters being called "enemy " (S); comp. also s “navın ba
,"every abomination to the Lord, which He hateth "
(Deut. xii. 31). It was, however, considered sufficient to
extend the punishment to the fourth generation, because
2
Generally, "He will not hold guiltless." It appears that Maimonides
wished especially to point out, that among the principal attributes of God, there
is one of punishment and severity. Otherwise he would no doubt have ex-
,as being an attribute of mercy פקד עון אבות על בנים plained the phrase
and implying that God delays the punishment and gives the sinner an oppor-
tunity to improve.
2 Maimonides appears to have understood the word
"to my ene-
mies," in the sense of "to those whom I hate," contrary to the traditional
interpretation, viz., "to those who hate me." Therefore he quotes another
passage, in which God is said to hate idolatry. Comp. ch. xxxvi., page 131,
where the same verse is quoted in support of the view that the idolater is an
enemy (NJ) of God.
198
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
the fourth generation is the utmost a man can see of his pos-
terity; and when, therefore, the idolaters of a place are
destroyed, the old man worshipping idols is killed, his son,
his grandson, and his great-grandson, that is, the fourth
generation. By the mention of this attribute¹ we are, as
it were, told that His commandments, undoubtedly in
harmony with His acts, include the death even of the little
children of idolaters because of the sin 2 of their fathers
and grandfathers. This principle we find frequently ap-
plied in the Law, as, e. g., we read concerning the city
that has been led astray to idolatry, "destroy it utterly, and
all that is therein " (Deut. xiii. 15). All this has been
ordained in order that every vestige of that which would lead
to great injury should be blotted out, as we have explained.
We have gone too far away from the subject of this chapter,
but we have shown why it has been considered sufficient
to mention only these (thirteen) out of all His acts'; namely,
because they are required for the good government of a
country; for the chief aim of man should be to make himself,
as far as possible, similar to God: that is to say, to make
his acts similar to the acts of God, or as our Sages expressed
it in explaining the verse, “Ye shall be holy "3 (Lev. xxi. 2):
"He is gracious, so be you also gracious; He is merciful,
so be you also merciful."
The principal object of this chapter was to show that all
attributes ascribed to God are attributes of His acts, and
do not imply that God has any qualities.
פקד עון אבות על בנים That is, by mentioning to
most of the editions of the Hebrew Versions ; פי גמר or פי גמאר In Arabic 3
Moses the attribute !
have N, "by the sin." According to Munk, "Pêle-mêle avec leur
pères," etc. The MSS. of Tibbon's version and the ed. princeps have the
reading 72; the version of Charizi has " (in MS., the printed ed.
.(בחטא has
Although the words (Lev. xix. 2), “Ye shall be holy, for I am holy,”
admit of reflections similar to those quoted here, these remarks are made
in the Talmud in reference to the words " Ye shall walk after the Lord" (Deut.
xiii. 5. Comp. Babyl. Talm., Sota, 14a). Maimonides (Yad ha-chazakah, Hil-
choth Deoth, i. 6), quotes 17 ani," And thou shalt walk in His ways"
(Deut. xxviii. 9).
PART I.-CHAPTER LV.
199
CHAPTER LV.¹
On Attributes implying Corporeality, Emotion, Non-existence,
and Comparison.
WE have already, on several occasions, shown in this
treatise that everything that implies corporeality or
passiveness, is to be negatived in reference to God, for all
passiveness implies change; and the agent producing that
state is undoubtedly different from the object affected by it;
and if God could be affected in any way whatever, another
being beside Him would act on Him and cause change in
Him. All kinds of non-existence must likewise be negatived
in reference to Him; no perfection whatever can therefore
be imagined to be at one time absent from Him, and at
another present in Him: for if this were the case, He would
[at a certain time] only be potentially perfect. Potentiality
always implies non-existence, and when anything has
to pass from potentiality into reality, another thing that
exists in reality is required to effect that transition. Hence
it follows that all perfections must really exist in God,
and none of them must in any way be a mere potentiality.
Another thing likewise to be denied in reference to God,
is similarity to any existing being. This has been generally
accepted, and is also mentioned in the books of the Prophets;
e.g., "To whom, then, will you liken me?" (Is. xl. 25);
"To whom, then, will you liken God ?" (ib. 18); "There
is none like unto Thee" (Jer. x. 6). Instances of this
2
¹ Having shown in the preceding chapter that the thirteen middoth are quali-
fications of those acts which are the consequence of certain emotions when per-
formed by man, the author points out in the present chapter that it is not sufficient
to exclude from the idea of God everything leading to corporeality, all emotions
and changes, transitions from dúvaµis to ivέpyɛia, and comparison with material
objects, but the necessity of their exclusion must be established by scientific
proof.
2 This sentence is here out of place; its object is not clear. The author
intended, perhaps, to justify the substitution of potentiality for non-existence
in this argument.
200
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
kind are frequent. In short, it is necessary to demonstrate
by proof that nothing can be predicated of God that implies
any of the following four things: corporeality, emotion
or change, non-existence,-c.g.,¹ that something would be
potential² at one time and real at another—and simi-
larity with any of His creatures. In this respect our
knowledge of God is aided by the study of Natural
Science. For he who is ignorant of the latter cannot
understand the defect implied in emotions, the difference
between potentiality and reality, the non-existence implied
in all potentiality,3 the inferiority of a thing that exists in
potentia to that which moves in order to cause its transition
from potentiality into reality, and the inferiority of that
which moves to that for the sake of whose realisation it
moves. He who knows these things, but without their
proofs, does not know the details which logically result.
from these general propositions; he will not be able to
prove that God exists, or that the [four] things mentioned
above are inadmissible in reference to God.
4
Having premised these remarks, I shall explain in the
next chapter the error of those who believe that God has
essential attributes; those who have some knowledge of
Logic and Natural Science will understand it.
¹ №
Charizi, 7, "that not." The negation is a repetition of the nega-
tion contained in "nothing can be predicated."
2 Lit. "not real," according to the Arabic and Ibn Tibbon's versions.
Charizi has . A Leyden MS. of the Arabic has likewise pr.
3 An object does not possess a property which it is capable of acquiring, the
property is therefore absent; the possibility and the absence of a property are
thus always associated with each other. It has already been mentioned that
absence is required as a link between matter and form, without which the
combination of matter and form could not take place. (Comp. ch. xvii. pag.
68, note 3.)
* Three stages are here assumed, before any special form is combined with
a substance; first, the orέpnois, or the absence of the form from the respec-
tive substance, and the capacity of the latter to receive the form; secondly,
the civŋois, the motion of the form toward the matter; and thirdly, the real
combination of both.
PART I.-CHAPTER LVI.
201
CHAPTER LVI.
Existence, Life, Power, Wisdom, and Will are homonymously
ascribed to God and His Creatures.
SIMILARITY¹ is based on a certain relation between two things;
if between two things no relation can be found, there can be
no similarity between them, and there is no relation between
two things that have no similarity to each other; e. g.,
we do not say this heat is similar to that colour, or this
voice is similar to that sweetness. This is self-evident.
Since the existence of a relation between God and man, or
between Him and other beings has been denied, similarity
must likewise be denied. You must know that two things
of the same kind-i.e., whose essential properties are the
same, distinguished from each other by greatness and small-
ness, strength and weakness, etc.-are necessarily similar,
though different in a certain particular point; e.g., a grain
of mustard and the sphere of the fixed stars are similar as
regards the three dimensions, although the one is exceed-
ingly great, the other exceedingly small, the property of
having [three] dimensions is the same in both; or wax
melted by the heat of the sun and wax melted by the heat
of fire,2 are similar as regards heat; although the heat
is exceedingly great in the one case, and exceedingly
small in the other, the existence of that quality is the
same in both. Thus those who believe in the existence of
essential attributes in reference to God, viz., Existence,
Life, Power,³ Wisdom, and Will, should know that these
attributes, when applied to God, have not the same meaning
1 A comparison between God and His creatures is rejected by all thinkers;
the Mutakallemim are therefore wrong in ascribing to God essential attri-
butes in the same sense as applied to man; for this necessarily leads to a
comparison between God and man as regards the degree, quantity, intensity,
etc., of those qualities. (Comp. ch. xxxv.)
2 Lit., "the heat of the element fire."
.וחכם which is identical with ויודע Ibn Tibbon adds here 3
T
202
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
as when applied to us, and that the difference does not
only consist in magnitude, or in the degree of perfection,
stability, and durability. It cannot be said, as they
practically believe, that His existence is only more stable,
His life more permanent, His power greater, His wisdom
more perfect, and His will more general than ours, and
that the same definition applies to both. This is in no
way admissible, for the expression "more than" is used
in comparing two things as regards a certain attribute
predicated of both of them in exactly the same sense,¹ and
consequently implies similarity [between God and His crea-
tures]. When they ascribe to God essential attributes, these
so-called essential attributes should not have any similarity
to the attributes of other things, and should according to
their own opinion, not be included in one and the same defi-
nition, in the same manner as there is no similarity between
the essence of God and that of other beings. They do not
follow this principle, for they hold that one definition may
include them, and that, nevertheless, there is no similarity
between them.2 Those who are familiar with the meaning
of similarity will certainly understand that the term ex-
istence, when applied to God and to other beings, is per-
fectly homonymous. In like manner, the terms Wisdom,
Power, Will, and Life are applied to God and to other
beings by way of perfect homonymity, admitting of no
comparison whatever. Nor must you think that the homo-
nymity of these terms is doubtful. For an expression, the
3
and
1 An adjective applied in the same sense to two things admits of comparison,
but if it is applied to two things in different significations, the two cannot
means complete (הסכמה .Hebr) תואטו ;be compared with each other
agreement between the significations of a word in the several instances
in which it is employed, and is opposed to 1 or PD, complete or partial
homonymity of expressions. Comp. Introd., p. 5, note 2.
2 The contradiction which Maimonides desires here to point out in the theory
of his opponents is this: on the one hand they declare that God cannot be
compared, and on the other hand by applying attributes to Him in the same
sense as they are applied to man, they admit comparison.
³ Comp. Introd., page 5, note 2, on hybrid terms (D'PID). A term
is sometimes applied to different objects, which have a certain non-essential
PART I.-CHAPTER LVII.
203
homonymity of which is uncertain, is applied to two things
which have a similarity to each other in respect to a certain
relation which is in both of them an accident, not an essen-
tial, constituent element. The attributes of God, however,
are not considered as accidental by any intelligent person,
while all attributes applied to man are accidents, according to
the Mutakallemim.¹ I am therefore at a loss to see how
they can find any similarity [between the attributes of God
and those of man]; how their definitions can be identical, and
their significations the same! This is a decisive proof that
there is, in no way or sense, anything common to the attri-
butes predicated of God, and those used in reference to
ourselves; they have only the same names, and nothing else
is common to them. Such being the case, it is not proper
to believe, on account of the identity in those names, that
there is in God something additional to His essence, similar
to the properties which are joined to our essence. This is
most important for those who understand it. Keep it in
memory, and study it thoroughly, in order to be well pre-
pared for that which I am going to explain to you
-
CHAPTER LVII.
The Essence of God and His Attributes are identical.
ON attributes; remarks more recondite than the preceding."
property in common; it may therefore be a question regarding that term,
whether it is in all its significations of the same origin. As the property ex-
pressed by that term is an accident (PD), and not part of the constituent
elements of the object, it can in no way be ascribed to God. Comp. ch. lii.,
pag. 179.
¹ See ch. lxxiii., Propos. 4.
2 The first words "on attributes; remarks more recondite than the pre-
ceding," seem to be connected with the conclusion of the preceding chapter,
"which I am going to explain to you." The subject of this chapter is said
to be more subtle than that of the preceding. In the present chapter he proves
the necessity of even excluding the attributes of existence, unity, and eternity
204
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
It is known that existence is an accident¹ appertaining to
all things, and therefore an element superadded to their
essence. This must evidently be the case as regards every-
thing the existence of which is due to some cause; its
existence is an element superadded to its essence. But as
regards a being whose existence is not due to any cause-
God alone is that being, for His existence, as we have
said, is absolute-existence and essence are perfectly iden-
tical; He is not a substance to which existence is joined
as an accident, as an additional element. His existence
is always absolute, and has never been a new element
or an accident in Him. Consequently God exists with-
out possessing the attribute of existence. Similarly He
lives, without possessing the attribute of life; knows, with-
-
from God as attributes, although they are generally considered as inseparable
from the idea of God.-Comp. "The investigation of this subject, which is
almost too subtle for our understanding, must not be based on current ex-
pressions employed in describing it, for these are the great source of error
(infra pp. 205-6).
Of all the things we notice in the universe, we predicate that they exist; we
also speak of the things before they come into existence, or after they have ceased
to exist, and say that they did not or that they do not exist. We have, there-
fore, in our mind two separate ideas: the idea of the thing itself and the idea
of existence, which we can imagine as being combined, or separate. The idea
of God, however, is inseparable from the idea of existence. How far this sepa-
ration of the things from their existence is in reality possible, their relation
to each other and similar problems, were the subject of much discussion among
the philosophers of the Middle Ages. Ibn Sina assumed that existence was an
accident of the thing itself, so that the thing must for some time have been
without existence. If there is to be any sense in this theory, we must combine it
with the Platonic theory of ideals (avrò кal' avrò.) Ibn Roshd, on the other
hand, contended that the thing itself, its essence, was inseparable from exis-
tence, without which the thing is nothing. He therefore declares the existence
to be a part of the essence of the thing. Maimonides follows Ibn Sina in
this point. He accordingly holds that existence is an element that is super-
added to the thing, and distinguishes between the thing in potentiâ and the thing
in reality; in the first case the thing is said to be without existence, and to pass
over into the state of reality, when existence is combined with it as an accident.
(Comp. ch. xvii. and lv.)
2 That is, we say of God that He exists; but we deny that existence is in
Him an attribute or an accident, as it is in the things created by God; the
term "existence" is applied to God in the sense of denying His non-existence.
""
PART I.-CHAPTER LVII.
205
out possessing the attribute of knowledge; is omnipotent
without possessing the attribute of omnipotence; is wise,
without possessing the attribute of wisdom; all this reduces
itself to one and the same entity; there is no plurality in
Him, as will be shown. It is further necessary to consider
that unity and plurality are accidents supervening to an
object according as it consists of many elements or of one.
This is fully explained in the book called Metaphysics.'
In the same way as number is not the substance of the
things numbered, so is unity not the substance of the thing
which has the attribute of unity, for unity and plurality are
accidents belonging to the category of discrete quantity,² and
supervening to such objects as are capable of receiving them.
To that being, however, which has truly simple, absolute
existence, and in which composition is inconceivable, the
accident of unity is as inadmissible as the accident of plurality;
that is to say, God's unity is not an element superadded, but
He is One without possessing the attribute of unity. The in-
vestigation of this subject, which is almost too subtle for our
1 According to Aristotle (Metaphys. v. 6), there are two kinds of unity, rà кarà
συμβεβηκὸς ἓν λεγόμενα, καὶ τὰ καθ᾽ αὑτὰ ἓν λεγόμενα, accidental unity, or the
combination of different things into one body without forming an organic
whole, and the absolute unity, or the combination of the constituent elements into
one organic whole. In both cases the property of forming one whole may
properly be described an accident superadded (p) to the single con-
stituent elements. Unity in this sense is not different from plurality, in its
relation to the essence of the thing. Ideal unity, which is inseparable from the
idea of the thing itself, or rather identical with it, is not here referred to, but
unity as the correlative of plurality, expressive, like plurality, of a certain
property of the things as regards their relation to the ideal unity. (Comp.
Narboni ad locum). The two principal philosophers of the Mahomedan schools,
Ibn Sina and Ibn Roshd, differed from each other in that respect. While Iba
Sina considers the ideal unity as an accident, Ibn Roshd treated it as the essence
of the thing. Comp. p. 204, note 1.
Char.; both terms have the,כמות הנבדל ; Ibn Tibbon כמות המתפרק 2
same meaning. Here we see clearly that Maimonides had in view numerical
unity as correlative of plurality; and that he does not, as some believe (see
Munk ad locum), confound the two kinds of unity; the term "number," used
here as distinguished from "unity," is to be understood as equal to "the rest
of the numbers," which are generally admitted to be "accidents ;" and since
unity as such is part of the series of numbers, it is likewise an "accident."
206
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
understanding,' must not be based on current expressions
employed in describing it, for these are the great source of
error. It would be extremely difficult for us to find, in
any language whatsoever, words adequate to this subject,
and we can only employ inadequate language.
In our
endeavour to show that God does not include a plurality,
we can only say " He is one," although “one” and “many”
are both terms which serve to distinguish quantity. We
therefore make the subject clearer, and show to the under-
standing the way of truth by saying He is one but does
not possess the attribute of unity.
cr
The same is the case when we say God is the First (1177),
to express that He has not been created; the term 777,
"First," is decidedly inaccurate, for it can in its true sense
only be applied to a being that is subject to the relation of time;
the latter, however, is an accident to motion which again is
connected with a body. Besides the attribute("first" or
"eternal") is a relative term,2 being in regard to time the same
as the terms "long" and "short" are in regard to a line.³
Both expressions, "created" and "eternal" (or "first"), are
equally inadmissible in reference to any being to which the
attribute of time is not applicable, just as we do not say
"crooked" or "straight" in reference to taste, "salted" or
insipid" in reference to the voice. These subjects are not
unknown to those who have accustomed themselves to seek
a true understanding of the things, and to establish their
properties in accordance with the abstract notions which the
mind has formed of them, and who are not misled by the
CC
1 Comp. beginning of this chapter.
2 The two relative terms are 1, "beginning at a certain time," and
DP, "preceding," "anterior," viz., to every D. According to Mai-
monides, such a comparison or relation, as regards time, is inadmissible between
God and His creatures.
CC
3 The Arabic admits of two renderings, "accident," and "extension "
or measure." Ibn Tibbon translates it by PD, "accident."-Ibn Palquera,
in "Moreh ha-moreh," considers that it should be rendered by 17 or i":
Munk, adopting the latter intepretation, distinguishes between , "exten-
sion,” and jy, “accident.”
PART I.—CHAPTER LVIII.
207
""
inaccuracy¹ of the words employed. All attributes, such as
"the First," "the Last," occurring in the Scriptures in re-
ference to God, are as metaphorical as the expressions "ear
and "eye." They simply signify that God is not subject to
any change or innovation whatever; they do not imply that
God can be described by time, or that there is any comparison
between Him and any other being as regards time, and that
He is called on that account "the first" and " the last." In
short, all similar expressions are borrowed from the language
commonly used among the people. In the same way we use
"One" (TN), in reference to God, to express that there is
nothing similar to Him, but we do not mean to say that an
attribute of unity is added to His essence.
CHAPTER LVIII.
The true attributes of God have a negative sense.
THIS chapter is even more recondite than the preceding.2
Know that the negative attributes of God are the true attri-
butes they do not include any incorrect notions or any
3
:
¹ Some MSS. have, instead of binh, lit. "in the general sense,” or “in
the comprehensive meaning," D'Dina, “in a material sense.”—Ibn Tibbon
-both expressions have the same signi ; בחבור .Char ;בכללות renders it
fication. The sense of the sentence is this: The words admit of many inter-
pretations. In order to understand the nature of any particular thing, inquiry
must be directed to the nature of the object, and not solely to the signification
of the word by which it is described.
2 In this chapter Maimonides shows the propriety of applying negative attri-
butes to God, and of rejecting all positive attributes without any exception.
He says that this chapter is more subtle than the preceding, probably on
account of the difficulty of understanding how a Being with the most absolute
and the most positive existence could be described by mere negations, which
cannot give a positive idea of the object which is to be described.
3 The negative attributes fully express what we have to say; we need not
content ourselves with inadequate terms as is the case when we attempt to
describe God by positive attributes. Charizi renders Non?s (Ibn Tibbon
Sp 727, “inaccuracy,”) by pɔD, “doubt.”
208
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
deficiency whatever in reference to God, while positive
attributes imply polytheism,' and are inadequate, as we have
already shown. It is now necessary to explain how negative
expressions can in a certain sense be employed as attributes,
and how they are distinguished from positive attributes.
Then I shall show that we cannot describe the Creator by
any means except by negative attributes. An attribute does
not exclusively belong to the one object to which it is re-
lated; while qualifying one thing, it can also be employed
to qualify other things, and is in that case not peculiar to
that one thing. E.g., if you see an object from a distance,
and on enquiring what it is, are told that it is a living being,
you have certainly learnt an attribute of the object seen, and
although that attribute does not exclusively belong to the
object perceived, it expresses that the object is not a plant or
a mineral. Again, if a man is in a certain house, and you
know that something is in the house, but not exactly what,
you ask what is in that house, and you are told, not a plant.
nor a mineral. You have thereby obtained some special know-
ledge of the thing; you have learnt that it is a living being,
although you do not yet know what kind of living being
it is. The negative attributes have this in common with the
positive, that they necessarily circumscribe the object
to some extent, although such circumscription consists only
in the exclusion of what otherwise would not be excluded.
In the following point, however, the negative attributes are
distinguished from the positive. The positive attributes,
although not peculiar to one thing, describe a portion of
what we desire to know, either some part of its essence or
some of its accidents; the negative attributes, on the other
hand, do not, as regards the essence of the thing which we
desire to know, in any way tell us what it is, except it be in-
directly, as has been shown in the instance given by us.
Ką
After this introduction, I would observe that—as has already
1 By admitting positive essential attributes, we assume that, besides the
essence of God, other things co-existed with Him from eternity. (Compare ch.
xxxvi. pag. 134.)
PART I.-CHAPTER LVIII.
209
!
5
been shown-God's existence is absolute, that it includes no
composition, as will be proved,¹ and that we comprehend
only the fact that He exists, not His essence.2 Conse-
quently it is a false assumption to hold that He has any
positive attribute; for He does not possess existence 3 in
addition to His essence; it therefore cannot be said that
the one¹ may be described as an attribute [of the other];
much less has He [in addition to His existence] a compound
essence, consisting of two constituent elements to which
the attribute could refer; still less has He accidents, which
could be described by an attribute. Hence it is clear that
He has no positive attribute whatever. The negative attri-
butes, however, are those which are necessary to direct
the mind to the truths which we must believe concern-
ing God; for, on the one hand, they do not imply any
plurality, and, on the other, they convey to man the
highest possible knowledge of God; e.g., it has been estab-
lished by proof that some being must exist besides those
things which can be perceived by the senses, or appre-
hended by the mind; when we say of this being, that it
exists, we mean that its non-existence is impossible. We
thus perceive that such a being is not, for instance, like
the four elements, which are inanimate, and we therefore
¹ See Part II., ch. i.
2 That is, we only comprehend that He exists (örı or quod), but not what
he is (rí or quid); we cannot give a logical definition of God, which consists
of the genus and specific difference (comp. ch. lii., pag. 178, note 2).
3 This is according to the Arabic text, and the reading of Ibn Tibbon's
version in some MSS.; the printed editions of the latter have the reverse,
He has besides His existence, no essence." This
reading appears to be preferable; it conforms more to the phrase which follows:
"Much less has He a compound essence ; and also to the preceding sentence:
"We comprehend only the fact that He exists, not His essence.'
"1
,אין לו מהות חוץ לישותו
-
""
Charizi
אין לו הויה יוצאת : in accordance with the Arabic renders the passage thus
.חוץ מגבול מהותו
4 "One of them (Tibbon and Charizi: DMD MN), that is, either the
ni, “existence" (örı), or the MD, “essence" (ri), the one being con-
sidered as the substance, the other as its accident.
5 That is, besides His existence, e. g., genus and specific difference.
6 I.e., corporeal objects, or their forms, relations, and properties.
P
210
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
#
say
3
it is living, expressing thereby that it is not dead. We
call such a being incorporeal, because we notice that it is
unlike the heavens, which are living, but material.¹ Seeing
that it is also different from the intellect, which, though
incorporeal and living, owes its existence to some cause,
we say it is the first (17), expressing thereby that its
existence is not due to any cause. We further notice, that
the existence, that is, the essence, of this being is not limited
to its own existence; many existences emanate from it,
and its influence is not like that of the fire in producing
heat, or that of the sun in sending forth light, but consists in
constantly giving them stability and order by well-estab-
lished rule, as we shall show we say, on that account,
it has power, wisdom, and will, i.e., it is not feeble or
ignorant, or hasty, and does not abandon its creatures;
when we say that it is not feeble, we mean that its ex-
istence is capable of producing the existence of many other
things; by saying it is not ignorant, we mean
"it per-
ceives" or "it lives," for everything that perceives is
4
1 The heavens, though different from the sublunary elements, and consisting
of the fifth element which is a kind of ether, are nevertheless material. Comp.
Arist. De Cœlo, i. 2.
2 The intellect owes its existence to some cause; both the acquired intellect
(napan baw), which comes into existence by certain intellectual actions of
man, and the active intellect, byan bow, which is the source of the intel-
lectual faculty existing in man, and which emanates from immaterial beings
of a higher order created by God (see Part II. ch. iv.) have a beginning,
while God is without a beginning.
3 Lit., "As regards this existing Being, it does not content itself with its ex-
istence, which is the same as its essence, that it should exist alone." The word
MIN'YD, generally a feminiue noun, is here used by Tibbon as a masculine noun
(Пp in the editions of Ibn Tibbon's version is a mistake; the correct reading
is P'DDD), with the express purpose of leaving it undefined whether the original
as stated by him) מציאות or with נמצא is to agree with מאתו requires that
in a note on this passage; Munk ad locum). It does not make any difference
as regards the sense of the passage. The words Dy and I
have
.used before ישותו and מהותו the same meaning as
4 The difference here pointed out is as follows: heat comes from fire, light
from the sun, as a natural consequence of the properties of fire and of the sun.
There is no intention or will in either of them; but that which comes from God
emanates from His will (pin minina). See Part II., ch. xvii. sqq.
PART I.—CHAPTER LVIII.
211
..
alive¹-by saying "it is not hasty, and does not abandon
its creatures," we mean that all these creatures preserve
a certain order and arrangement; they are not left to
themselves, or produced aimlessly, but whatever condition
they receive from that being is given them with design and
intention. We thus learn that there is no other being like
unto God, and we say that He is One, i.e., there are not
more Gods than one.
It has thus been shown that every attribute predicated
of God either denotes the quality of an action, or--when the
attribute is intended to convey some idea of the Divine
Being itself, and not of His actions—the negation of the
opposite.2 Even these negative attributes must not be
formed and applied to God, except in the way in which,
as you know, sometimes an attribute is negatived in refer-
ence to a thing, although that attribute can naturally never
be applied to it³ in the same sense, as, e. g., we say, “This
wall does not see." Those who read the present work, are
aware that, notwithstanding all the efforts of the mind, we
can obtain no knowledge of the essence of the heavens,-a
revolving substance which has been measured by us in spans
and cubits, and examined even as regards the proportions of
the several spheres to each other and respecting most of their
motions-although we know that they must consist of matter
and form; but the matter not being the same as sublunary
matter, we can only describe the heavens in terms express-
ing negative properties, but not in terms denoting positive
qualities. Thus we say that the heavens are not light, not
4
1 Comp., ch. lii., pag. 178.
2 Lit.,
"The negative of the absence of that attribute," that is, the nega-
tion of the opposite, e.g.,
"wise" means "not ignorant;" "strong" means
"not weak," etc.
3 That is, absolute negation. We can never affirm of God that which we
have denied of Him, in the same way as in reference to the wall, of which
we say
"This wall does not see," it is impossible ever to assert, "This wall
does see."
signify respectively, “ without אלמחצל and גיר מחצלה The Arabic 4
clearness," or "not distinct," and "with clearness," or CC decided." Ibn
,Palquera ; מקיימים and בלתי מקיימים,Tibbon renders the two phrases
P 2
212
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
heavy, not passive and therefore not subject to impressions,
and that they do not possess the sensations of taste or smell;
or we use similar negative attributes. All this we do,
because we do not know their substance. What, then, can
be the result of our efforts, when we try to obtain a know-
ledge of a Being that is free from substance, that is most
simple, whose existence is absolute, and not due to any cause,
to whose perfect essence nothing can be superadded, and
whose perfection consists, as we have shown, in the absence
of all defects. All we understand, is the fact that He
exists, that He is a Being to whom none of all His
creatures is similar, who has nothing in common with
them, who does not include plurality, who is never too feeble
to produce other beings, and whose relation to the universe
is that of a steersman to a boat; and even this is not a
real relation, a real simile, but serves only to convey to us.
the idea that God rules the universe; that is, that He
gives it duration, and preserves its necessary arrangement.
This subject will be treated more fully.¹ Praised be He!
In the contemplation of His essence, our comprehension
and knowledge prove insufficient; in the examination of
His works, how they necessarily result from His will, our
knowledge proves to be ignorance, and in the endeavour
to extol Him in words, all our efforts in speech are mere
weakness and failure!
; both reproduce fairly the sense of the original ; המיושב and ,שאינם מיושבים
Char., 'bbio pj's, “That are not general," and 1, “That is general,”
a term that is a common noun, and includes many things in its signification ;
he understands the passage to imply that we can employ only a proper noun
for that unique substance of the heaven, not a common noun.
1 Comp. infra ch. lxx., and Part II., ch. xvii.
PART I.-CHAPTER LIX.
213
CHAPTER LIX.
On Differences in the Knowledge of God which consists of
Negations.
THE following question might perhaps be asked: Since
there is no possibility of obtaining a knowledge of the
true essence of God, and since it has also been proved that
the only thing that man can apprehend of Him is the fact
that He exists, and that all positive attributes are inad-
missible, as has been shown; what is the difference among
those who have obtained a knowledge of God? Must not
the knowledge obtained by our teacher Moses, and by Solo-
mon,¹ be the same as that obtained by any one of the lowest
class of philosophers, since there can be no addition to this
knowledge? But, on the other hand, it is generally ac-
cepted among theologians and also among philosophers, that
there can be a great difference between the knowledge of
God obtained by two different men. Know that this is really
the case, that those who have obtained a knowledge of God
differ greatly from each other; for in the same way as by
each additional attribute an object is more specified, and
is brought nearer to the true apprehension of the observer,
so by each additional negative attribute you advance toward
the knowledge of God, and you are nearer to it than he
who does not negative, in reference to God, those qualities
which you are convinced by proof must be negatived. There
2
It has been stated above (ch. liv.), that Moses surpassed all men in his
knowledge of God. For the ability which Solomon possessed to comprehend
and to unfold the secrets of the Law, see Introduction, pag. 14. According to
Shemtob, Moses and Solomon are mentioned here as representing the two
methods by which men can obtain knowledge of God-revelation and study;
by both alike, only negative knowledge is obtained. This explanation is not
correct; Maimonides does not consider revelation and study as two different
methods of obtaining true knowledge. According to his opinion revelation or
prophecy cannot be obtained without preparation and study.
2 Comp. Part II., ch. xxxii., xxxvii., seqq.
,
214
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
1
may be a man who after having earnestly devoted many
years to the pursuit of one science, and to the true under-
standing of its principles, till he is fully convinced of its
truths, has obtained as the sole result of that science the
conviction that a certain quality must be negatived in refer-
ence to God, and the means of demonstrating that there
is no reason for applying that quality to Him. Superficial
thinkers will have no proof for this, will doubt it and
ask, Is that quality existing in the Creator, or not? And
those who are deprived of sight will positively ascribe it to
God, although it has been clearly shown that He does not
possess it.
E.g., while I show that God is incorporeal,
other persons doubt and are not certain whether He
is corporeal or incorporeal; others even positively declare
that He is corporeal, and appear before the Lord (5)
with that belief.2 Now see how great the difference is
between those three men; the first is undoubtedly nearest
to the Almighty; the second is remote, and the third still
more distant from Him. If there be a fourth person who
holds himself convinced by proof that emotions are impos-
sible in God, while the first, who rejects the corporeality,
is not convinced of that impossibility, that fourth person
is undoubtedly nearer the knowledge of God than the
first, and so on, so that a person who, convinced by proof,
negatives a number of things in reference to God, which
according to our belief may possibly be in Him or emanate
from Him, is undoubtedly a more perfect man than we are,
and would surpass us still more if we positively believed
these things to be properties of God. It will now be clear
to you, that every time you establish by proof the negation
of a thing in reference to God, you become more perfect,
while with every additional positive assertion you follow
your imagination and recede from the true knowledge of
¹ Part II., ch. i.
ויראה פני אלהיו .Char ויקדים פני הבורא בזאת הכוונה,Ibn Tibbon 2
,וישליך האלה בזו האמונה ,.Palg- בזאת האמונה
his belief in God."
"And he loses thereby
PART I.-CHAPTER LIX.
215
1
God. Only by such ways must we approach the knowledge
of God, and by such researches and studies as would show
us the inapplicability of what is inadmissible as regards the
Creator, not by such methods as would prove the necessity
of ascribing to Him anything extraneous to His essence, or
asserting that He has a certain perfection, when we find it
to be a perfection in relation to us. The perfections are all
to some extent acquired properties, and a property which
must be acquired does not exist in every thing capable of
making such acquisition.2
You must bear in mind, that by affirming anything of
God, you are removed from Him in two respects; first,
whatever you affirm, is only a perfection in relation to us;
secondly, He does not possess any thing superadded to the
essence; His essence includes all His perfections, as we have
shown.³ Since it is a well-known fact that even that know-
ledge of God which is accessible to man cannot be attained
except by negations, and that negations do not convey a true
idea of the being to which they refer, all men, both of past
and present generations,¹ declared that God cannot be the
object of human comprehension, that none but Himself
comprehends what He is, and that our knowledge consists in
knowing that we are unable truly to comprehend Him. All
philosophers say, "He has overpowered us by His grace,
and is invisible to us through the intensity of His light," like
1 This word is omitted in Ibn Tibbon's version. Char. рa) п'рna.
2 There can be no doubt that the sense of this passage is as follows:-We
predicate of God certain positive attributes, as an expression of our conviction
that God is the most perfect being; these positive attributes, whatever per-
fection they describe as regards ourselves, must not be understood in the same
sense as regards God. For the term "perfection" itself implies, in reference
to ourselves, the acquisition of some quality which we did not possess before;
and what is to be acquired is not yet possessed in reality, and by some it is
not acquired at all, though they have the capacity of acquiring it. Perfection,
in this sense, namely, as an acquisition, cannot be ascribed to God. It is
remarkable how the Commentators could find any difficulty in the understand-
ing of these words; Munk says of this passage,
"" un peu obscur."
3 Comp. ch. lii.
is not quite exact ; he means the (והבאים) ואלאתון The expression 4
present age; but literally signifies “future generations.”
216
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
the sun which cannot be perceived by eyes which are too weak
to bear his rays.¹ Much more has been said on this topic,
but it is useless to repeat it here. The idea is best expressed
in the book of Psalms:
7 7, "Silence is praise to
Thee" (lxv. 2). It is a very expressive remark on this
subject; for whatever we utter with the intention of extolling
and of praising Him, contains something that cannot be
applied² to God, and includes derogatory expressions; it is
therefore more becoming to be silent, and to be content with
intellectual reflection,3 as has been recommended by men
of the highest culture, in the words "Commune with your
own heart upon your bed, and be still" (Ps. iv. 4). You
must surely know the following celebrated passage in the Tal-
mud 5—would that all passages in the Talmud were like that!
—although it is known to you, I quote it literally, as I wish
to point out to you the ideas contained in it: "A certain
person, reading prayers in the presence of Rabbi Chaninah,
4
,God האל הגדול הגבור והנורא האדיר החזק והאמיץ,said
the great, the valiant and the tremendous, the powerful, the
strong, and the mighty.'-The rabbi said to him, Have
you finished all the praises of your Master? The three
epithets,
127 127, God, the great, the
valiant and the tremendous,' we should not have applied to
God, had Moses not mentioned them in the Law, and had
not the men of the Great Synagogue' come forward subse-
' Comp. Chobhoth ha-lebhabhoth, i. 10.
2 Arabic, "burden;" Ibn Tibbon, DDD; Charizi, ], "diminished.”
Comp. Speyer, Notes on Charizi's version of Moreh Nebhuchim ad locum.
3 Some editions of Ibn Tibbon have pnn, "reflection," instead of
ולהסתפק .Char .ההסתפקות
(
4 This term does not refer to David, the author of Psalm iv., but to those
wise men who recommended silent praise of God in the words of David :
as the wise * כאשר נצטוו השלמים Char, has .ודמן and אמרו בלבבכם
1971.
men have been recommended."
(C
5 Babyl. Talm. Berachoth 33 b.
האל הגדול הגבור והנורא והאדיר In our editions of the Talmud we read 6
.והאמיץ והעזוז האמתי והיראוי החזק והנכבד, המתין לו עד דסיים
Charizi quotes it in a varied form, and Ba'hya, in Chobhoth ha-lebhabhoth
(I. ch. x.), again in another form.
7 The principal prayer (the eighteen blessings) is generally believed to have
PART I.-CHAPTER LIX.
217
2
quently and established their use in the prayer; and you
say all this! Let this be illustrated by a parable. There
was once an earthly king, possessing millions of gold coin;
he was praised for owning millions of silver coin; was this
not really dispraise to him ?" Thus far the opinion of the
pious rabbi. Consider, first, how repulsive¹ and annoying
the accumulation of all these positive attributes was to him;
next, how he has shown that, if we had only to adapt our
speech to our reason, we should never have composed them,3
and we should not have uttered any of them. It has,
however, become necessary to address men in words that
should leave some idea in their minds, and, in accordance
with the saying of our Sages, "The Torah speaks in the
language of men," the Creátor has been described to us in
terms of our own perfections; but we should not on that
account have uttered any other than the three above-
mentioned attributes, and we should not have used them as
names of God except when meeting with them in reading
the Law. Subsequently, the men of the Great Synagogue,
who were prophets, introduced these expressions also into
the prayer, but we should not on that account use [in our
prayers] any other attributes of God. The principal lesson
to be derived from this passage is that there are two reasons
for our employing those phrases in our prayers: first, they
occur in the Pentateuch; secondly, the Prophets introduced
them into the prayer. Were it not for the first reason,
we should never have uttered them; and were it not for
the second reason, we should not have copied them from the
been introduced by the men of the Great Synagogue, the origin of which is
not certain; it was probably instituted in the days of Ezra. Comp. Babyl.
Talm. Berachoth 33a; Megillah 17b.
'Ibn Tibbon, DND PAY, "his silencing and rejecting :" Charizi, 217
10V21 IMINT, "his great uneasiness and anger."
"if they
(i.c., the attributes) had been left to depend on our own reason," to decide
whether we should employ them or not.
אלו הונחו לשכלנו Some editions of Ibn Tibbon's version have 2
אלו הונחו לפשט שכלנו .Char
in some of the עקלנאה according to the reading) לא השכלנו .Chaf 3
MSS. of the original text),
((
we should not have thought of them."
218
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
Pentateuch to recite them in our prayers; how then could
we approve of the use of those numerous attributes! You
also learn from this that we ought not to mention and
employ in our prayers all the attributes we find applied
to God in the books of the Prophets; for he does not
say, "Were it not that Moses, our Teacher, said them, we
should not have been able to use them;" but he adds another
condition-" and had not the men of the Great Synagogue
come forward and established their use in the prayer,"
because only for that reason are we allowed to use them
in prayer. We cannot approve of what those foolish persons
do who are extravagant in praise, fluent and prolix in the
prayers they compose, and in the hymns they make in the
desire to approach the Creator. They describe God in attri-
butes which would be an offence if applied to a human
being; for those persons have no knowledge of these great
and important principles, which are not accessible to the
ordinary intelligence of man. Treating the Creator as a
familiar object, they describe Him and speak of Him in
any expressions they think proper; they eloquently con-
tinue to praise Him in that manner, and believe that they
can thereby influence Him and produce an effect on Him.
If they find some phrase suited to their object in the words
of the Prophets they are still more inclined to consider
that they are free to make use of such texts-which should
at least be explained-to employ them in their literal sense,
to derive new expressions from them, to form from them
numerous variations, and to found whole compositions on
them. This license is frequently met with in the com-
positions of the singers, preachers, and others who imagine
themselves to be able to compose a poem. Such authors
write things which partly are real heresy, partly contain
such folly and absurdity that they naturally cause those
who hear them to laugh, but also to feel grieved at the
thought that such things can be uttered in reference to
God. Were it not that I pitied the authors¹ for their
¹ According to Sachs, Ha-techiyah I. 58, II. 19, Ibn Gabirol is meant
•
PART I.-CHAPTER LIX.
219
defects, and did not wish to injure them, I should have
cited some passages to show you their mistakes; besides,
the fault of their compositions is obvious to all intelligent
persons. You must consider it, and think thus: If slander
and libel is a great sin, how much greater is the sin of
those who speak with looseness of tongue in reference to God,
and describe Him by attributes which are far below Him; and
I declare that they not only commit an ordinary sin, but
unconsciously at least incur the guilt of profanity and blas-
phemy. This applies both to the multitude that listens to such
prayers, and to the foolish man that recites them. Men,
however, who understand the fault of such compositions,
and, nevertheless, recite them, may be classed, according
to my opinion, among those to whom the following words
are applied: "And the children of Israel used words that
were not right against the Lord their God" (2 Kings
xvii. 9); and "utter error against the Lord” (Is. xxxii.
6). If you are of those who regard the honour of their
Creator,¹ do not listen in any way to them, much less
utter what they say, and still less compose such prayers,
knowing how great is the offence of one who hurls asper-
sions against the Supreme Being.2 There is no necessity at
all for you to use positive attributes of God with the view
of magnifying Him in your thoughts, or to go beyond the
limits which the men of the Great Synagogue have intro-
duced in the prayers and in the blessings, for this is suf-
ficient for all purposes, and even more than sufficient,³ as
Rabbi Chaninah said. Other attributes, such as occur in the
books of the Prophets, may be uttered when we meet with
them in reading those books; but we must bear in mind
what has already been explained, that they are either attri-
butes of God's actions, or expressions implying the negation
¹ A phrase taken from Mishnah Chag. ii. 1, p T by on xbw.
2 A phrase taken from Babyl. Talm., Succah, 53a,
a ornat n'on
.מעלה
,nothing can be added * עליו אין להוסיף וממנו אין לגרוע .Char 3
nothing taken away." (Eccl. iii. 14.)
220
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
of the opposite. This likewise should not be divulged to
the multitude; but a reflection of this kind is fitted for the
few only who do not consider that the glorification of God.
does not consist in uttering what is not proper, but in reflect-
ing what is proper.
We will now conclude our exposition of the wise words of
R. Chaninah. He does not employ any such simile as: "A
king who possesses millions of gold denarii, and is praised
as having hundreds ;" for this would imply that God's
perfections, although more perfect than those ascribed
to Him, are still of the same kind; but this is not the
case, as has been proved. The excellence of the simile
consists in the words: "who possesses golden denarii, and
is praised as having silver denarii ;" this implies that
these attributes, though perfections as regards ourselves,
are not such as regards God; in reference to Him they
all include defects, as is distinctly suggested in the remark,
"Is this not an offence to Him ?"
I have already told you that all these attributes, whatever
perfection they may denote according to your idea, imply
defects in reference to God, if applied to Him in the same
sense as they are used in reference to ourselves. Solomon
has already given us sufficient instruction on this subject by
saying, "For God is in heaven, and thou upon earth; there-
fore let thy words be few" (Eccl. v. 2)..
CHAPTER LX.
On the Difference between Positive and Negative Attributes.
I WILL give you in this chapter some illustrations, in order
that you may better understand the propriety of forming
as many negative attributes as possible, and the impropriety
¹ That is, the theory that the attributes are mere qualifications of God's
actions, or negations of the opposite, must not be made familiar to the multi-
tude because they would not understand it.
PART I.-CHAPTER LX.
221
2
of ascribing to God any positive attributes. A person may
know for certain that a "ship" is in existence, but he
may not know to what object that name is applied, whether
to a substance or to an accident; a second person then
learns that the ship is not an accident; a third, that it is
not a mineral; a fourth, that it is not a plant growing
in the earth; a fifth, that it is not a body whose parts
are joined together by nature; a sixth, that it is not a
flat object like boards or doors; a seventh, that it is not a
sphere; an eighth, that it is not pointed;¹ a ninth, that it
is not round-shaped, nor equilateral; a tenth, that it is not
solid. It is clear that this tenth person has almost arrived
at the correct notion of a "ship" by the foregoing nega-
tive attributes, as if he had exactly the same notion as
those have who imagine it to be a wooden substance which
is hollow, long, and composed of many pieces of wood, that
is to say, who know it by positive attributes. Of the other
persons in our illustration, each one is more remote from the
correct notion of the ship than the next mentioned, so that
the first knows nothing about it but the name. In the same
manner you will come nearer to the knowledge and com-
prehension of God by the negative attributes. But you must
be careful, in what you negative, to negative by proof, not
by mere words, for each time you ascertain by proof that a
certain thing, believed to exist in the Creator, must be
negatived, you have undoubtedly come one step nearer to
the knowledge of God.
It is in this sense that some men come very near to God,
and others remain exceedingly remote from Him, not in the
sense of those who are deprived of vision, and believe that
God occupies a place,³ which man can physically approach
or from which he can recede. Examine this well, know
it, and be content with it. The way which will bring you
2 I.e., a cylinder.
¹ I.e., a cone.
3 Lit.,
Dipp ový vie x), “not
“that there is a place." Ibn Tibbon,
that God is occupying a place," or "not that
there (, Arabic Dr)
לא ששם מקום .Palg לא שיש למעלה קרבת מקום .is a place. Char
222
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
nearer to God has been clearly shown to you; walk in it, if
you have the desire. On the other hand, there is a great
danger in applying positive attributes to God. For it has
been shown that every perfection we could imagine, even if
existing in God in accordance with the opinion of those who
assert the existence of attributes, would in reality not be of
the same kind as that imagined by us, but would only be
called by the same name, according to our explanation ;¹ it
would in fact amount to a negation. Suppose, e.g., you
say He has knowledge, and this knowledge, which admits
of no change and of no plurality, embraces many change-
able things; His knowledge remains unaltered, while new
things are constantly formed, and His knowledge of a thing
before it exists, while it exists, and when it has ceased
to exist, is the same without the least change: you would
thereby declare that His knowledge is not like ours; and
similarly that His existence is not like ours. You thus
necessarily arrive at some negation, without obtaining a
true conception of an essential attribute; on the contrary,
you are led to assume that there is a plurality in God, and
to believe that He, though one essence, has several unknown
attributes. For if you intend to affirm them, you cannot
compare them with those attributes known by us, and they
are consequently not of the same kind. You are, as it were,
brought by the belief in the reality of the attributes,² to say
that God is one subject of which several things are predi-
cated; though the subject is not like ordinary subjects,
and the predicates are not like ordinary predicates. This
3
1
¹ Chap. lvi. pag. 201.
2 The editions of Ibn Tibbon's version have '8' 1, "the
reflection on the existence of the attributes," which appears to be a corruption
.as rendered by Charizi העניין בחיוב התוארים of
and that subject is not like * ואין המוסד ההוא כאלו הנשואים :Charizi 3
3
"
those predicates." The Arabic original (ed. Munk) has likewise 757 5
Munk prefers this reading to that of אלמוצוע מתל הדה אלמחמולאת
לא דלך אלמוצוע מתל הדה אלמוצועאת ולא תלך אלמחמולאת : .other MSS
-The version of Ibn Tibbon agrees with the latter read מתל הדה אלמחמולאת
ing, which appears to be the correct one. The object of the author is to show
PART I.-CHAPTER LX.
223
belief would ultimately lead us to associate other things
with God,¹ and not to believe that He is One. For of every
subject certain things can undoubtedly be predicated, and
although in reality subject and predicate are combined in one
thing, by the actual definition they consist of two elements,
the notion contained in the subject not being the same as that
contained in the predicate. In the course of this treatise²
it will be proved to you that God cannot be a compound,
and that He is simple in the strictest sense of the word.
I do not merely declare that he who affirms attributes of
God has not sufficient knowledge concerning the Creator,
admits some association with God, or conceives Him to
be different from what He is; but I say that he uncon-
sciously loses his belief in God. For he whose knowledge
concerning a thing is insufficient, understands one part of
it while he is ignorant of the other, as, e. g., a person who
knows that man possesses life, but does not know that
that the whole theory of the attributes consists in the fact that something is
predicated of God; and although they confess that subject and predicate are
above comparison with anything known to us, the fact remains that they
assume a duality, or even a plurality: a subject and one or several predi-
cates. If the author had wished to express the idea that subject and predicate
are two distinct things, he would probably not have used the phrase "that
subject is not like those predicates," but "subject and predicate are not
identical" (778 DYY). For the assertion that two things are not alike does
not include that they are not two distinct objects.
1 According to Shemtob and Efodi, "homonymity;" this cannot be the
meaning of the word here; because from the reason which follows it is clear
that Maimonides meant here an association or a combination of several
elements (the subject and the predicate) into one whole. Subject and pre-
dicate may form one whole in reality, but they are defined each by its own
separate definition. The Arabic and the Hebrew 1 admit of several
significations: 1, association or participation of two subjects in a certain thing;
2, homonymity (the participation of two different things in the same name);
3, combination of various elements to form one whole.
2 Comp. Part II., i. 4.
3 Maimonides does not say here, that the Attributists could refute the
three charges mentioned here, as Munk believes, but merely that he does not
bring these three charges against them, as they would imply that the Attri-
butists have some knowledge of God; but Maimonides is of opinion that they
do not possess any such knowledge.
224
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
man possesses understanding; but in reference to God, in
whose real existence there is no plurality, it is impossible
that one thing should be known, and another unknown.
Similarly he who associates an object with [the properties
of] another object, conceives a true and correct notion of the
one object, and applies that notion also to the other; while
those who admit the attributes of God, do not consider them
as identical with His essence, but as extraneous elements.¹
Again, he who conceives an incorrect notion of an object,
must necessarily have a correct idea of the object to some
extent; he, however, who says that taste belongs to the
category of quantity has not, according to my opinion, an
incorrect notion of taste, but is entirely ignorant of its
nature, for he does not know to what object the term
taste" is to be applied.-This is a very difficult subject;
consider it well.
According to this explanation you will understand, that
those who do not recognise, in reference to God, the negation
of things, which others negative by clear proof, are deficient
in the knowledge of God, and are remote from compre-
hending Him. Consequently, the smaller the number of
things is which a person can negative in relation to
God, the less he knows of Him, as has been explained in
the beginning of this chapter; but the man who affirms
an attribute of God, knows nothing but the name; for the
object to which, in his imagination, he applies that name,
does not exist; it is a mere fiction and invention, as if he
applied that name to a non-existing being, for there is,
in reality, no such object. E.g., some one has heard of the
elephant, and knows that it is an animal, and wishes to
know its form and nature. A person, who is either misled
1 The association of some other being with God would mean that some
being is endowed with properties or qualities like those possessed by God.
Those who believe in such an association seem to have some knowledge of
God, but wrongly transfer what they know of God to other beings. The
Attributists, when they speak of one divine Being endowed with attributes,
have no knowledge whatever of God, and the divine being, consisting of
substance and attributes, exists only in their imagination.
!
PART I.-CHAPTER LX.
225
or misleading, tells him it is an animal with one leg,
three wings, lives in the depth of the sea, has a trans-
parent body; its face is wide like that of a man, has the
same form and shape, speaks like a man, flies sometimes
in the air, and sometimes swims like a fish. I should not
say, that he described the elephant incorrectly, or that he
has an insufficient knowledge of the elephant, but I would
say that the thing thus described is an invention and fiction,
and that in reality there exists nothing like it; it is a non-
existing being, called by the name of a really existing
being, and like the griffin, the centaur, and similar imaginary
combinations for which simple and compound names have
been borrowed from real things. The present case is analo-
gous; namely, God, praised be His name, exists, and His
existence has been proved to be absolute and perfectly
simple, as I shall explain. If such a simple, absolutely
existing essence were said to have attributes, as has been
contended, and were combined with extraneous elements,
it would in no way be an existing thing, as has been
proved by us; and when we say that that essence, which
is called "God," is a substance with many properties by
which it can be described, we apply that name to an object
which does not at all exist. Consider, therefore, what are
the consequences of affirming attributes of God! As to
those attributes of God which occur in the Pentateuch, or
in the books of the Prophets, we must assume that they are
exclusively employed, as has been stated by us, to convey to
us some notion of the perfections of the Creator, or to
express qualities of actions emanating from Him.
Q
226
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
CHAPTER LXI.¹
On the Names of God.
2
Ir is well known that all the names of God occurring in
Scripture, are derived from His actions, except one, namely
the Tetragrammaton, which consists of the letters yod, hé,
vau and hé. This name is applied exclusively to God,
and is on that account called Shem ha-meforash, "The
proper name." It is the distinct and exclusive designation
of the Divine Being; whilst His other names are common
nouns, and are derived from actions, to which some of our
own are similar, as we have already explained. Even the name
In this chapter and those which follow (Ixi.-lxx.), the author explains
the names of God: viz., (1) those which refer to His essence and existence
(lxi.—lxiv.); and (2) those which express His relation to the universe (lxv.—
lxx.). Ch. lxiv. is a sequel to the explanation of the phrase "What is His
name?" (ch. lxiii.); ch. lxv.-lxvii. a preparation for ch. lxviii.—lxx.
2 Maimonides does not mean to say that all the names of God are derived
from verbs, since N is derived by him from 8, but that they refer
to certain actions, and therefore include a whole class rather than one individual
being.
3 W¬IDDA DW, lit., "the name which is made clear," or "the name which
is separated,” i. e., is exclusively applied to one Being, and therefore dis-
tinctly indicates which being the speaker means; while other nouns, as appel-
latives, apply to a whole class, and in using them we do not distinctly indicate
the special object of our thought. The usual term for a proper name is DV
the name exclusively applied to one thing; but ,(שם עצם פרטי or) המיוחד
as in reference to God's name the term 115bn DV is used in the Mishnah
(Yoma, 6, 2), and in the Gemara (ib., 39, 2; Sota, 38 a), the author gives
it the preference. Munk is mistaken in saying, "Les mots V119D7 DV
(Mishnah, Yoma 6, 2), signifient sans doute le nom de Dieu distinctement
prononcé." There is no doubt that also denotes "to pronounce dis-
tinctly;" but if the word had this signification in the passage quoted, the
C
שם המפורש שהוא יוצא מפי כהן גדול author of the Mishnah, instead of saying
In the Borraitha, quoted .שם שהוא יוצא מפורש מפי וגו' would have said
the,שם המיוחד לי is explained by שם המפורש in the Gemara, the term
name especially applied to Me,” and is contradistinguished from ", "substi-
tute."
PART I.—CHAPTER LXI.
227
*N (Adonaï, “Lord,"), which has been substituted for the
Tetragrammaton,¹ is derived from the appellative "lord;"
The man who is the * : דבר האיש אדני הארץ אתנו קשות .comp
lord of the land spake roughly to us" (Gen. xliii. 30). The
difference between Adoni (, "my lord "), with chirek
under the nun, or Adonai (7) with kamets, is similar
to the difference between Sari (7), "my prince," and
Sarai, Abraham's wife (ib. xvi. 1), the latter form denoting
majesty and acknowledged distinction.2 An angel is also
addressed as "Adonaï;” e.g., 71297 8 38 7N,
"Adonai
(My lord), pass not away, I pray thee "3 (ib. xviii. 3). I
have restricted my explanation to the term Adunaï, the
substitute for the Tetragrammaton, because it is more com-
monly applied to God than any of the other names which
are in frequent use, like dayyan (127, “judge”), shaddai
אדני אל נא תעבור
¹ It appears that Maimonides refrains as much as possible from writing, not
only the Tetragrammaton, but also the name (Adonai) substituted for it, and
therefore he paraphrases it as above. -This mode of expression continues to be
used by many Jews.
Maimonides הדור .Heb תפכים is synonymous with כללות .Heb עמום 2
·
T
T
says that the syllable ai (" or ), in words like Saraï, is not a pronominal
suffix but a noun-termination. By the omission of the limiting pronoun "my,"
and saying "Lord," "Prince," instead of "my Lord," and "my Prince," the
speaker expresses his conviction that the title is recognised generally, and not
by himself alone. The commentators (see Munk) think that, according to the
opinion of Maimonides, the ending ai ("—) indicates two things-1, Pluralis
majestatis; 2, the character of the noun itself (117, 7) as an appellative,
including a whole class of individuals. The introduction of the second sig-
nification is entirely out of place here, where the difference between the
suffixes - and — is to be defined. Besides, it has already been stated that
Adonai is an appellative; and lastly, the instance quoted, viz.,, would not
illustrate the explanation. The names given to persons generally include some
element of honour and distinction; in the present case this is shown by the
example of. An objection has been raised by some commentators that
Sarah is described as more honourable than Sarai; but this does not exclude
the fact that "Sarai" likewise served as an expression of distinction.
T
3 In the Massorah this is marked as WP, "holy," that is, referring to God,
and not to an angel; the same is stated by Maimonides himself in Yad ha-
chazakah (Yesode ha-torah, vi. 9). In the latter work, where he describes
the laws, he adheres strictly to the traditional explanation; in this philo-
sophical work he sometimes deviates from it.
Q 2
228
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
2
4
5
(T, "almighty"), tsaddik (73, "righteous "), channun
(11, “gracious"), rachum (1, "merciful"), and elohim
(78, “chief”); all these terms are unquestionably appella-
tives and derivatives. The derivation of the name, consist-
ing of yod, hé, vau, and hé,² is not positively known,³ the
word having no additional signification. This sacred name,
which, as you know, was not pronounced except in the
sanctuary by the appointed priests, when they gave the
sacerdotal blessing, and by the high priest on the Day
of Atonement, undoubtedly denotes something which is
peculiar to God, and is not found in any other being.
It is possible that in the Hebrew language, of which we
have now but a slight knowledge, the Tetragrammaton,
in the way it was pronounced, conveyed the meaning of
"absolute existence." In short, the majesty of the name
and the great dread of uttering it, are connected with the
fact that it denotes God Himself, without including in its
meaning any names of the things created by Him. Thus our
Sages say:
My name'(, Numb. vi. 27) means the name
which is peculiar to Me." All other names of God have
reference to qualities, and do not signify a simple substance,
but a substance with attributes, they being derivatives. On
that account it is believed that they imply the presence
of a plurality in God, I mean to say, the presence of
attributes, that is, of some extraneous element superadded
to His essence. Such is the meaning of all derivative names
they imply the presence of some attribute and its sub-
stratum, though this be not distinctly named." As, how-
CC (
1 This instance is absent in the Arabic and in the version of Charizi.
which they pronounce ** god he,,אשר יהגו. בו יו"ד ה"א וא"ו ה"א .Char 2
vau hé." Comp. Yad ha-chazakah II., xiv. 10, 1″X1 8″7 7″I'D ninin Dwn
.ה"א
3 The verb ' is generally assumed to be the root of the Tetragram-
maton, although the exact meaning of the word is not known. Maimonides
admits that it may signify "absolute existence" or "essence," but does not
venture to say that it is connected with the verb '.
4 Mishnah Sotah, vii. 6, and Yoma vi. 2.
Babyl. Talmud Sotah, 38a.
6 That is, the adjective used as a noun, e.g., "the great," includes two
-
PART 1.-CHAPTER LXI.
229
ever, it has been proved,¹ that God is not a substratum
capable of attributes, we are convinced that those appella-
tives when employed as names of God, only indicate the
relation of certain actions to Him, or they convey to us
some notion of His perfection.2
""
Hence R. Chaninah would have objected to the expression
871371 71227 b "the great, the mighty, and the tre-
mendous," had it not been for the two reasons mentioned by
him; because such expressions lead men to think that the
attributes are essential, i.e., they are perfections actually
present in God. The frequent use of names of God derived
from actions, led to the belief that He had as many [essential]
attributes as there were actions from which the names were
derived. The following promise was therefore made, im-
plying that mankind will at a certain future time under-
stand this subject, and be free from the error it involves :
"In that day will the Lord be One, and His name One
(Zech. xiv. 9). The meaning of this prophecy is this: He
being One, will then be called by one name, which will
indicate the essence of God; but it does not mean that His
sole name will be a derivative [viz., "One"].³ In the Pirke
Rabbi Eliezer (ch. iii.), occurs the following passage: "Be-
fore the universe was created, there was only the Almighty
and His name." Observe, how clearly the author states that
all these appellatives employed as names of God came into
existence after the Creation. This is true; for they all
refer to actions connected with the Universe. If, however,
you consider His essence as separate and as abstracted from
all actions, you will not describe it by an appellative, but
¹ See II. ch. i., sqq.
elements: the quality, and the substratum to which the quality is attached,
although that substratum is not mentioned and must be supplied.
2 See ch. lix.
The translation of .יעני is governed by אנה ; לא אנה משתקא Arabic 3
Munk: "et ce ne sera point un nom
dérivé," is inaccurate. Comp. Targum
-for His name will be firmly esta » ארי שמיה יציב בעלמא ולית בר מניה
،،
blished in the world, and there will be none besides Him." Ibn Ezra holds
that the tetragrammaton is meant.
230
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
by a proper noun, which exclusively indicates that essence.
Every other name of God is a derivative, except this
Tetragrammaton, which is a real nomen proprium,¹ and must
not be considered from any other point of view. You must
beware of sharing the error of those who write amulets
(kameoth). Whatever you hear of them, or read in their
works, especially in reference to the names which they form
by combination, is utterly senseless; they call these com-
binations shemoth (names), and believe that their pronuncia-
tion demands sanctification and purification, and that by
using them they are enabled to work miracles. Rational
persons ought not to listen to such men, nor in any way
believe their assertions. No other name is called shem
ha-meforash except this Tetragrammaton, which is written,
but is not pronounced according to its letters. The words
Thus shall ye bless the children * כה תברכו את בני ישראל
3
of Israel" (Numb. vi. 23) are interpreted in Siphri2 as
follows: "Thus,' in the holy language; again 'thus,' with
the shem ha-meforash." The following remark is also found
there: "In the sanctuary [the name of God is pronounced]
as it is spelt, but elsewhere by its substitutes." In the
Talmud, the following passage occurs: "Thus' (7), i.e.,
with the shem ha-meforash.-You say [that the priests,
when blessing the people, had to pronounce] the shem ha-
meforash; this was perhaps not the case, as they may have
used other names instead.-We infer it from the words
"DW M8 12W): ´And they shall put My name' (Numb. vi.
27), i.e., My name, which is peculiar to Me." It has
thus been shown that the shem ha-meforash (the proper
name of God) is the Tetragrammaton, and that this is the
only name which includes nothing but His essence, and
therefore our Sages in referring to this sacred term said
My name' means the one which is peculiar to Me alone."
(66
1 The other names, Yah and Ehyeh, apparently derived from the same
root ('), are regarded by Maimonides as appellatives. See chapter lxiii.
2 Ad locum (Numb. vi. 22).
3 Talm. Babyl. Sotah 38a.
PART I.- CHAPTER LXII.
231
In the next chapter I will explain the circumstances
which brought men to a belief in the power of Shemoth
(names of God); I will point out the main subject of dis-
cussion, and lay open to you its mystery, and not any doubt
will be left in your mind, unless you prefer to be mis-
guided.
CHAPTER LXII.
On the divine Names of God composed of four, twelve, and forty-
two letters.
3
WE were commanded that,¹ in the sacerdotal blessing, the
name of the Lord should be pronounced as it is written² in the
form of the Tetragrammaton, i.e., the Shem ha-meforash. It
was not known to every one how the name was to be pro-
nounced, what vowels were to be given to each consonant, and
whether some of the letters capable of reduplication should
receive a dagesh. Wise men successively transmitted the
pronunciation of the name¹; it was only communicated to
a distinguished disciple once in seven years. I must, how-
ever, add that the statement, "The wise men communicated
the Tetragrammaton to their children and their disciples
once in seven years, "5 does not only refer to the pronuncia-
tion but also to its meaning, which makes the name a nomen
proprium of God, and includes metaphysical knowledge.
נשיאות כפים
**
1 Numb. vi. 22, sqq. As to the detailed rules, see Yad ha-chazakah Book
II. (Sepher ahabha) Hilchoth Tefillah, xiv. The act of pronouncing the bless-
ing is generally called D' "lifting up the hands," or 117, lit.
((
dais," from the circumstance that the priests ascend some elevated place
and lift up their hands when pronouncing the blessing.
2 See Babyl. Talm., Sotah 37b and 38a; Comp. also preceding chapter.
3 That is, vau and the second hé; for yod can have no dagesh being the
first letter of the word, and the first he does not take dagesh, as he can only
take a dagesh at the end of a word. Charizi 5 IN, “or without a dagesh.”
↑ Char., 1710 pay, "how it is to be learnt.”
5 Babyl. Talm. Kiddushin, 71a. The portion from "I must, however," to
<<
once in seven years" is omitted in Charizi's version.
232
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
Our Sages knew in addition a name of God which consisted
of twelve letters,¹ inferior in sanctity to the Tetragramma-
ton. I believe that this was not a single noun, but con-
sisted of two or three words, the sum of their letters being
twelve, and that these words were used by our Sages
as a substitute for the Tetragrammaton, whenever they
met with it in the course of their reading the Scriptures, in
the same manner as we at present substitute for it aleph,
daleth, etc. [i.e., Adonai]. There is no doubt that this name
also, consisting of twelve letters, was in this sense more
distinctive than the name Adonai: it was never withheld
from any of the students; whoever wished to learn it, had
the opportunity given to him without any reserve:² not so
the Tetragrammaton; those who knew it did not communi-
cate it except to a son or a disciple, once in seven years.
When, however, unprincipled men³ had become acquainted
with that name which consists of twelve letters, and in
consequence had become corrupt in faith-as is sometimes
the case when persons with imperfect knowledge become
aware that a thing is not such as they had imagined—the
Sages concealed also that name, and only communicated it
to the worthiest among the priests, that they should pro-
1 Babyl. Talm., Kiddushin 71a. The name consisting of twelve letters is
not given in the Talmud. Maimonides, therefore, conjectures that it did not
consist of a single word but of an entire phrase. Narboni, in his Commentary,
is surprised that Maimonides ignored the form of that name which is mentioned
in the Sefer ha-bahir, in the name of R. Nechunyah ben Hakanah, and which
consisted of the tetragrammaton pronounced in three different ways, according
יִפְעל to
פרוצים
יַפְעֵל with them, refers to the * ענדהם The sufix in- יַפַעַל יַפְעֶל
D’DOM, “wise men," mentioned before.
2 na mojšo xh), lit., "and there was no stint in it." The phrase is
not translated in the version of Ibn Tibbon. It is said in contradistinction
to the rule laid down concerning the tetragrammaton (Kiddushin 71a) viz.,
"that it should be kept a secret."
3 Arab. 'DD, "free," "following their own course
Ibn Tibbon,
D'; Charizi adds, 'ni, "unrestricted" or "easy," not feeling any
regret at the renunciation of the principles in which they have been brought
up, the opposite of the D, the well-trained, who would be perplexed (7173),
and seek relief in a proper solution of the difficulty. See Introduction, page 6.
,מסיבון
""
""
PART I.-CHAPTER LXII.
233
nounce it when they blessed the people in the Temple;
for the Tetragrammaton was no longer uttered in the
sanctuary on account
account of the corruption of the people.
There is a tradition, that with the death of Simeon the
Just, his brother priests discontinued the pronunciation of
the Tetragrammaton in the blessing; they used, instead,
this name of twelve letters. It is further stated,2 that
at first the name of twelve letters was communicated to every
man; but when the number of impious men increased
it was only entrusted to the worthiest among the priests,
whose voice, in pronouncing it, was drowned amid the
singing of their brother priests. Rabbi Tarphon said,
"Once I followed my grandfather³ to the daïs [where the
blessing was pronounced]; I inclined my ear to listen to a
priest [who pronounced the name], and noticed that his voice
was drowned amid the singing of his brother priests."
There was also a name of forty-two letters known among
them. Every intelligent person knows that one word of forty-
two letters is impossible. But it was a phrase of several words
which had together forty-two letters. There is no doubt
that the words had such a meaning as to convey a correct
notion of the essence of God, in the way we have stated.
This phrase of so many letters is called a name because, like
other proper nouns, they represent one single object, and
several words have been employed in order to explain
more clearly the idea which the name represents; for an
idea can more easily be comprehended if expressed in
1 Babyl. Talm., Yoma, 39 b, and Menachoth, 109 b. In the Talmud the
discontinuance of pronouncing the Holy Name in the Temple is represented as
connected with the death of Simeon the Just, but it is not stated what this
had to do with the degeneration of the people.
2 Babyl. Talm. Kiddushin, 71a.
3 In our editions of the Talmud, ¡D'S 'AN, "the brother of the mother."
4 This name likewise appears to have been unknown in the time of Mai-
monides; it was described in cabbalistic books, which Maimonides ignored.
אב"ג ית"ץ קר"ע שט"ן נג"ד יכ"ש פצ"ר צת"ג חקיר ,See Comment. of Narboni
n″y 1'pw pið b″gy. According to R. Hai Gaon, the letters were well
known, but not the way in which they should be pronounced. See Taam
Zekenim by Eliezer Ashkenazi, page 57.
234
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
many words. Mark this and observe now that the in-
struction in regard to the names of God extended to the
signification of each of those names, and did not confine
itself to the pronunciation according to letters which, in
themselves, are destitute of an idea. Shem ha-meforash
applied neither to the name of forty-two letters¹ nor to
that of twelve, but only to the Tetragrammaton, the
proper name of God, as we have explained. Those two
names must have included some metaphysical ideas. It
can be proved that one of them conveyed profound know-
ledge, from the following rule laid down by our Sages:
“The name of forty-two letters is exceedingly holy; it can
only be entrusted to him who is modest, in the midway of
life, not easily provoked to anger, temperate, gentle, and who
speaks kindly to his fellow men. He who understands it,
is cautious with it, and keeps it in purity, is loved above
and is liked here below; he is respected by his fellow men;
his learning remaineth with him, and he enjoys both this
world and the world to come."2 So far in the Talmud. How
grievously has this passage been misunderstood! Many believe
that the forty-two letters are merely to be pronounced mecha-
nically; that by the knowledge of these, without any further
interpretation, they can attain to those exalted ends, although
it is stated that he who desires to obtain a knowledge of
that name must be trained in the virtues named before, and
go through all the great preparations which are mentioned
in that passage. On the contrary, it is evident that all this
preparation aims at a knowledge of Metaphysics, and includes
ideas which constitute the "secrets of the Law" (71 ~),
as we have explained. In works on Metaphysics it has
3
¹ Although in the MSS. the order is reversed, this seems to be the correct
sequence, because in (Hebr. 7) agrees better with the preceding name of
forty-two letters, than with that of twelve letters. In the order adopted in
the MSS. the demonstrative should either be omitted, or be in the plural.
2 See Talmud Babli. Kiddushin, 71 a.
3 See ch. xxxv., page 128.
* See Arist. de Anima, iii. 5; Shahrastani, Part II. on the philosophical
system of Ibn Sina.
i
PART I. CHAPTER LXII.
235
been shown that no knowledge gained in this science, i.e.,
no knowledge of the active intellect¹ can ever be forgotten;
and this is meant by the phrase "his learning remaineth
with him."2
When bad and foolish men were reading such passages,
they considered them to be a support of their false preten-
sions and of their assertion that they could, by means of an
arbitrary combination of letters, form a shem (□, “name”)
which would act and operate miraculously when written or
spoken in a certain particular way. Such fictions, originally
invented by foolish men, were in the course of time com-
mitted to writing, and came into the hands of good³ but
weak-minded and ignorant persons who were unable to dis-
criminate between truth and falsehood, and who made a
secret of those shemoth. When after the death of such per-
sons those writings were discovered among their papers, it
was believed that they contained truths; for, “The simple
believeth every word " (Prov. xiv. 15).
We have already gone too far away from our interesting
subject and recondite inquiry, endeavouring to refute a
perverse notion, the absurdity of which everyone must per-
ceive who gives a thought to the subject. We have, how-
ever, been compelled to mention it, in treating of the
divine names, their meanings, and the opinions commonly
held concerning them. We shall now return to our theme.
Having shown that all names of God, with the exception
of the Tetragrammaton (Shem ha-meforash), are appella-
tives, we must now, in a separate chapter, speak on the
phrase Ehyeh Asher Ehych (7'78 708 7'78), because it is
connected with the difficult subject under discussion, namely,
the inadmissibility of divine attributes.
•
'Comp. "The intellect in action, which emanates from the active intellect,
and through which we attain a knowledge of the active intellect." Part II.,
ch. iv.
2 The acquired abstract knowledge or metaphysical truths form the sub-
stance of the immortal soul, or the intellect in action. Comp. ch. xli. and ch.
laviii. Also Ibn Ezra Literature, IV., page 44 899., and page 22, note 2.
3 This epithet is omitted in the version of Charizi.
236
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
(c
CHAPTER LXIII.
On Ehych, Yah and Shaddai.
BEFORE approaching the subject of this chapter,¹ we will first
consider the words of Moses, "And they shall say unto me,
What is His name? what shall I say unto them?" (Exod.
iii. 13). How far was this question, anticipated by Moses,
appropriate, and how far was he justified in seeking to be
prepared with an answer? Moses was correct in declaring,
But, behold, they will not believe me, for they will say,
The Lord hath not appeared unto thee " (ib. iv. 1); for any
man claiming the authority of a prophet must expect to
meet with such an objection so long as he has not given
a proof of his mission.2 Again, if the question, as appears
at first sight, referred only to the name, as a mere utterance
of the lips, the following dilemma would present itself:
either the Israelites knew the name, or they had never
heard it; if the name was known to them, they would
perceive in it no argument in favour of the mission of Moses,
his knowledge and their knowledge of the divine name being
the same. If, on the other hand, they had never heard it
mentioned, and if the knowledge of it was to prove the
That is, to explain the name Ehyeh asher ehyeh. The author has shown in
the last chapter, that the importance and significance of God's names consist
in the amount of metaphysical knowledge they convey concerning the First
Cause. He now attempts to prove that the great anxiety of Moses when he
anticipated the question of the Israelites, "What is His name?" was not to
learn the word to be used as God's name, and its pronunciation, but to obtain
such knowledge concerning God, and such proofs concerning His existence, as
would enable him to convince his brethren of the truth of his belief. When the
name was communicated to him, he further asked for the means of making the
Israelites believe in his mission; and it was for that purpose that the miracles
were shown to him.
2 According to Maimonides, the question of the Israelites, "What is his
name?" if referring only to the name, must have been addressed to Moses in
order to test the truth of his words; while it has generally been considered as
an expression of mere curiosity to know the name of Him by whose order Moses
addressed the people.
PART I.-CHAPTER LXIII.
237
mission of Moses, what evidence would they have that this
was really the name of God? Moreover, after God had
made known that name to Moses, and had told him, "Go
and gather the elders of Israel,...and they shall hearken to
thy voice," (ib. xvi. 18), he replied, "Behold, they will not
believe me nor hearken unto my voice," although God had
told him, " And they will hearken to thy voice "; whereupon
God answered, "What is that in thine hand?" and he said,
"A rod" (ib. iv. 2). In order to obviate this dilemma,¹ you
must understand what I am about to tell you. You know
how widespread were in those days the opinions of the
Sabeans; all men, except a few individuals, were idolaters,
that is to say, they believed in spirits, in man's power to
direct the influences of the heavenly bodies, and in the
effect of talismans. Anyone who in those days laid claim
to authority, based it either, like Abraham,5 on the fact
that, by reasoning and by proof he had been convinced of
the existence of a Being who rules the whole Universe, or
that some spiritual power was conferred upon him by a star,
by an angel, or by a similar agency; but no one could
establish his claim on prophecy, that is to say, on the fact
4
1 Char., Din," all mystery;" Tibbon, pɔɔ,
". every doubt."
2 The Sabeans (probably from NY, "host" of heaven, stars; according
to Shahrastani from the Arabic NY, "to turn away," scil. from truth), though
believing in the unity of the Supreme Being, worshipped the hosts of the
heavens, and thought that by certain formulæ and images they could direct
the influences of the stars upon mundane affairs in any way they desired. The
Chaldeans are known to have held the same doctrine.
והיו המאמינים בכחות הכוכבים ועושים כוונים למלאכת השמים .Char 3
.(אסתנזאל .compare the Arab) להזיל כחם והיו עושים תמונות בשעוה
"
3
They believed in the powers of the stars, and made images for the host of
heaven, in order to direct their influences, and also made images in wax." Ibn
Tibbon adds, as
*figures that speak." Comp. Ibn Ezra Literature, IV., p. 36, note 1.
in the Arabic original is rendered in the version of Ibn Tibbon by
<<
4
,צורות מדברות the words ,טליסמאות an explanation of
.(Munk) כבר most of the editions have ; (טענת,.Char) דבר
5 Comp. Bereshith Rabba, ch. xxxviii.
6 The definition here given of a prophet, as a person who had received a
divine mission to communicate to his fellowmen, agrees with the fact that the
book of Daniel, though containing predictions, was excluded from the number
:
238
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
that God had spoken to him, or had entrusted a mission
to him; before the days of Moses no such assertion had
ever been made.¹ You must not be misled by the
statements that God spoke to the Patriarchs, or that He
had appeared to them. For you do not find any men-
tion of a prophecy 2 which appealed to others, or which
directed them. Abraham, Isaac, or Jacob, or any other
person before them did not tell the people, "God said unto
me you shall do this thing, or you shall not do that thing,"
or "God has sent me to you." Far from it! for God spoke
to them on nothing but of what especially concerned them,
ie., He communicated to them things relating to their per-
fection, directed them in what they should do, and foretold
them what the condition of their descendants would be;
nothing beyond this. They guided their fellow-men by
means of argument and instruction, as is implied, according to
the interpretation generally received amongst us, in the words
and the souls that they had gotten * ואת הנפש אשר עשו בחרן
3
in Haran” (Gen. xii. 5). When God appeared to our Teacher
Moses, and commanded him to address the people and to
bring them the message, Moses replied that he might first
be asked to prove the existence of God in the Universe,
and that only after doing so he would be able to announce
to them that God had sent him. For all men, with few
of prophetical books; because Daniel was not charged by God with any
message to deliver to his fellowmen.
1 Maimonides is in so far correct, as no direct mission is mentioned in the
Biblical records prior to Moses; indirect commandments, however, to exercise
his influence on fellowmen, by word and example, were, according to tradition,
given to Noah when he was commanded to build the ark, in order that he
might have an opportunity of exhorting the people, and of showing them the
folly of their conduct. See Rashi on Gen. vi. 4. An opportunity appears to
have been given to Abraham for exhorting his fellowmen; comp. Gen. xviii.
19, "that he will command his children, and his household after him, and
they shall keep the way of the Lord," etc.
•
the purpose of the prophecy of * עניין נבואת מרע"ה ר"ל שיורה .Char 2
Moses, namely, that he should instruct," etc.
،،
and * וית נפשתא דשעבדו לאורייתא,s Comp. the version of Onkelos
those whom they had won for the true faith.”
CC
PART I.-CHAPTER LXIII.
239
exceptions, were ignorant of the existence of God; their
highest thoughts did not extend beyond the heavenly sphere,
its forms or its influences. They could not yet emancipate
themselves from sensation, and had not yet attained to any
intellectual perfection. Then God taught Moses how to teach
them, and how to establish amongst them the belief in the
existence of Himself, namely, by saying '08 108 778
(Ehyeh asher Ehyeh), a name derived from the verb 7 in
the sense of "existing," for denotes "to be," and in
7
Hebrew no difference is made between the verbs "to be"
and "to exist." The principal point in this phrase is that
the same word which denotes "existence," is repeated as
an attribute. The word ws, "that," corresponds to the
Arabic and, and is an incomplete noun that must
be completed by another noun;¹ it may be considered as the
subject of the predicate which follows. The first noun which
is to be described is 77; the second, by which the first is
described, is likewise, the identical word, as if to show
that the object which is to be described and the attribute by
which it is described are in this case necessarily identical.
This is, therefore, the expression of the idea that God exists,
but not in the ordinary sense of the term; or, in other words,
He is "
the existing Being which is the existing Being," that
is to say, whose existence is absolute. The proof which he
was to give consisted in demonstrating that there is a Being
of absolute existence, that has never been and never will be
without existence. This I will clearly prove.2
God thus showed Moses the proofs by which His exist-
ence would be firmly established among the wise men of His
people. Therefore the explanation of the name is followed
by the words, "Go, gather the elders of Israel," and by
the assurance that they (the elders) would understand what
God had shown to him, and they would accept it, as is stated
in the words, " And they will hearken to thy voice." Then
1 That is, the relative is the substitute for a noun with which it agrees.
.אהיה אהיה is the same as אשר אהיה
2 See II. Introd., Propos. 20, and ch. i.
•
240
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
2
Moses replied as follows: They will accept the doctrine that
God exists through these intelligible proofs, but by what
means shall I be able to show that this existing God has
sent me? Thereupon God gave him the sign.¹ We have
thus shown that the question, "What is His name?"
means "Who is that Being, which according to thy
belief has sent thee ?" The sentence "What is His name,"
(instead of, Who is He), has here been used as a tribute of
praise and homage, as though it had been said, Nobody can be
ignorant of Thy essence and of Thy real existence; if, never-
theless, I ask what is Thy name, I mean, What idea is to be
expressed by the name? (Moses considered it inappropriate
to say to God that any person was ignorant of God's exist-
ence, and therefore described the Israelites as ignorant of
God's name, not as ignorant of Him who was called by that
name.³)—The name Jah (7), likewise implies eternal exist-
ence.* Shaddai, however, is derived from ", "enough;
comp.
nasban, "for the stuff they had was suffi-
cient" (Ex. xxxvi. 7); the shin () is equal to w," which,"
as in, "which already" (Eccl. ii. 16). The name
Shaddai, therefore, signifies "he who is sufficient; " that is
to say, He does not require the existence of what He created,
or the conservation of any other being; His existence is self-
sufficient. In a similar manner the name on implies
"strength"; comp. bon, "he was strong as the
oaks" (Amos ii. 9); also 77, "rock," is a homonym, as we have
explained. It is, therefore, clear that all these names of God
are appellatives, or applied by way of homonymy, like 113
5
""
1 Exod. iv. 1, et seq.
2 The original ND, active; Munk substitutes no, the passive; in the
version of Tibbon >" can be Kal as well as Niphal. Char. ", “ they
ask me."
3 This appears to be a mere repetition of the preceding sentence in another
form. One of the two was probably the original, and the other the corrected
form which was intended to be substituted for it.
4 That is, like chyeh, the following names of God are also common nouns.
The derivation of is not indicated here by Maimonides; but probably
derived from '. Comp. Yad ha-chazakah, Yesode ha-torah, vi. 4.
5 See ch. xvi.
PART I.-CHAPTER LXIV.
241
and others,¹ the only exception being the tetragrammaton,
the Shem ha-meforash (the nomen proprium of God), which is
not an appellative; it does not denote any attribute of God,
nor does it imply anything except His existence. Absolute
existence includes the idea of eternity, i.e. the necessity of
existence. Note well the results at which we have arrived
in this chapter.
CHAPTER LXIV.
2
(*) ≤ 1, The name of God. 2, God. 3, The Word of God.
(») 77 1, The Glory of God. 2, God. 3, The praise of God.
KNOW that in some instances by the phrase “the name of
the Lord," nothing but the name alone is to be understood;
comp. “Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in
vain ” (Ex. xx. 7); “And he that blasphemeth the name of
the Lord" (Lev. xxiv. 16). This occurs in numerous other
passages. In other instances it means the essence and reality
of God himself, as in the phrase "They shall say to me, What
is His name "? Sometimes it stands for "the word of God,"
so that "the name of God," " the word of God,” and “the
command of God," are identical phrases; comp. 1,
"for My name is in him" (Ex. xxiii. 21), that is, My word
or My command is in him, i.e. he is the instrument of My
desire and will. I shall explain this fully in treating of
the homonymity of the term "angel."-The same is
the case with ", "The glory of the Lord." The
phrase sometimes signifies "the material light," which
God caused to rest on a certain place in order to show the
1 In the version of Ibn Tibbon, and in some MSS. of the Arabic text Y
because ,ואמתאלה is a corruption of ואמת Munk conjectures that .ואמת
ПD is not employed in the Bible as a name of God.
2 DV with a suffix (in the same manner as W
Comp.
the meaning of a personal pronoun.
Judges xiii. 17.
3 See II., vi. and xxxiv.
R
with a suffix), has frequently
'D, "Who art thou?"
,מי שמך
4 See ch. x., pag. 57, note 4.
242
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
distinction of that place, e.g., " And the glory of the Lord
(72) abode upon Mount Sinai and the cloud covered it"
(Ex. xxiv. 16): "And the glory of the Lord filled the
tabernacle" (ib. xl. 35). Sometimes the essence, the
reality of God is meant by that expression, as in the words.
of Moses, "Show me Thy glory" (ib. xxxiii. 18), to which
the reply was given, "For no man shall see Me and
live" (ib. xx.). This shows that the glory of the Lord in
this instance is the same as He Himself, and that "Thy
glory" has been substituted for "Thyself," as a tribute of
homage;¹ an explanation which we also gave of the words,
"And they shall say unto me, What is His name?"
Sometimes the term "glory," denotes the glorification
of the Lord by man or by any other being. For the true
glorification of the Lord consists in the comprehension of
His greatness, and all who comprehend His greatness and
perfection, glorify Him according to their capacity, with
this difference, that man alone magnifies God in words,
expressive of what he has received in his mind, and what
he desires to communicate to others. Things not endowed
with comprehension, as e.g., minerals,³ may also be considered
as glorifying the Lord, for by their natural properties they
כבוד
1 That is, instead of saying "Show me Thyself," Moses says "Show me Thy
glory," as if to express thereby his conviction that "God Himself cannot be
shown," only "His glory can be shown." See preceding chapter.
66
2 Lit. " By any other being besides the Almighty." Char. In no bai
1175, 17775 in. Munk: "Ou plutôt de la part de tout ce qui est en
dehors de lui, car tout sert à le glorifier." In a note. he gives the following
literal rendering: ou plutôt, tout ce qui est en dehors de lui le glorifie."-
The sense of the passage is as follows: Not only man's praises but also those
of all who glorify Him, are called 71; e.g., the praises of the pure intelli-
gences ('77) D's) and the angels. They do not speak, but this is not
essential in praising God. For in the perception of God's greatness consists
His praise; men require speech to communicate with each other. This is not
the case with immaterial, purely spiritual beings. After having mentioned
man and spiritual beings, both of which are capable of perceiving God's great-
ness, the author treats of inanimate beings, of which likewise it is said
figuratively that they praise God.
3 Char., D`n П17 12 1'XY MI D'OND, “as, e. g., stones and inanimate
beings."
זולתו להדרו ולרוממו
PART I.-CHAPTER LXV.
243
testify to the omnipotence and wisdom of their Creator,¹ and
cause him who examines them to praise God, by means of
speech or without the use of words, if the power of speech
be wanting.2 In Hebrew this license has been extended
still further, and the use of the verb "to speak" (N) has
been admitted as applicable in such a case; things which
have no comprehension are therefore said to give utter-
ance to praise, e.g., "All my bones shall say, Lord, who is
like unto Thee?" (Ps. xxxv. 10). Because a consideration
of the properties of the bones leads to the discovery of
that truth, and it is through them that it became known,
they are represented as having uttered the divine praise;
and since this [cause of God's praise] is itself called
3
((
the fulness" מלא כל הארץ כבודו praise, it has been said
""
of the whole earth is His praise 4" (Is. vi. 3), in the same
the earth is full of His * ותהלתו מלאה הארץ sense as
,כבוד
praise" (Hab. iii. 3). As to 72 being employed in the
sense of praise, comp. 712 by "b un, “Give praise to
the Lord your God” (Jer. xiii. 16); also N 150 151721
71, "and in His temple does everyone speak of His
praise" (Ps. xxix. 9), etc. Consider well this homonymity
of the term 7122, and explain it in each instance in accord-
ance with the context; you will thus escape great em-
barrassment.
CHAPTER LXV.
On the phrases" God spake," "God said."
AFTER you have advanced thus far," and truly compre-
hended that God exists without having the attribute of
¹ Char., IINYD, "of His existence.”
2 See page 242, note 2.
37, in Ibn Tibbon's version, is probably a mistake; the correct reading
.וכפי קריאת,.Char ; ולפי קרוא is
4 See chapter xix., page 73, note 3.
5 That is, if a person is convinced that even the attributes of existence and
unity are not predicated of God, in the ordinary sense of these terms, because
R 2
244
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
existence, and that He is One, without having the attribute
of unity, I do not think that I need explain to you the in-
admissibility of the attribute of speech in reference to God,
especially since our people generally believe that the Law,
i.e., the word ascribed to Him, was created.¹ Speech is
attributed to Him, in so far as the word which Moses
heard, was produced and brought to existence by God in
the same manner as He produced all His other works and
creations. As we shall have to speak more fully on prophecy,2
we shall here merely show that speech is attributed to God
in the same way as all other actions, which are similar to
our own. When we are told that God addressed the Pro-
phets and spoke to them, our minds are merely to receive
a notion that there is a Divine knowledge to which the
Prophets attain; we are to be impressed with the idea that
the things which the Prophets communicate to us come
from the Lord, and are not altogether the products of their
own conceptions and ideas. This subject, which we have
already mentioned above,³ will receive further explanation.
It is the object of this chapter to show that the verbs
727, "to speak," and ", "to say," are synonyms denoting
(a) "Speech;" as, e.g., 7, "Moses shall speak
(Exod. xix. 19); my ¬"), “And Pharaoh said” (ib. v. 5);
>>
every notion of a real attribute is inadmissible in reference to Him, he need
not be told that speech, as an attribute, is inadmissible; for many would
admit the attribute of existence and unity, and would still reject that of
speech. Some of the Mahomedan Theologians considered the Word of God as
an attribute co-existing with Him from eternity to eternity. According to the
theory of some Jewish philosophers, the Word of God emanated from Him, as
all His other acts, and on that account it cannot be considered as an attribute
of God. Although the Divine Word, or the Torah, is said in the Talmud and
the Midrash to have existed two thousand years (not as Munk, p. 290, note 1,
paraphrases, “de toute éternité") anterior to the creation of the universe, it
was believed to be a thing created and limited in time. As to the meaning of
"two thousand years," see Motot and Ohel Joseph on Ibn Ezra's Comm. on
the Pentat., Introd. Fourth Method.
1 That is to say, it did not exist from eternity.
2 See II., xxxv. and xxxvi.
3 See I., ch. xlvi., page 154.
PART I.-CHAPTER LXV.
245
(b) "Thought" as formed in the mind without being ex-
pressed in words; e.g.,, “And I thought in
my heart" (Eccles. ii. 15);
27, “And I thought
in my heart
heart" (ib.); 727 727, "And thy heart will
contrive" (Prov. xxiii. 33); as, "Concerning Thee my
heart thought" (Ps. xxvii. 8); b, "And Esau
thought in his heart" (Gen. xxvii. 41); examples of this kind
are numerous; (c) Will; e.g., 777 08 0127b 728, “And he
said to slay David" (2 Sam. xxi. 16), that is to say, he
ולבך ידבר
הלהרגני אתה אומר ; wished or he intended to slay him
ויאמרו כל
And the whole congregation intended" העדה לרגום אותם
1
"Dost thou desire to slay me" (Ex. ii. 14); ba man"
،،
2
to stone them" (Numb. xiv. 10). Instances of this kind are
likewise numerous.
The terms and 27 applied to God, can only have
one of the two significations mentioned last, viz., the will
and desire, or the thought, and there is no difference
whether the divine thought became known to man by means
of an actual voice, or by one of those kinds of inspiration
which I shall explain. We must not suppose that in speak-
ing God employed voice or sound, or that He has a soul in
which the thoughts reside,³ and that these thoughts are things
superadded to His essence; but we ascribe and attribute to
Him thoughts in the same manner as we ascribe to Him
any other attributes. The use of and 27 in the sense
of will and desire, is based, as I have explained, on the
homonymity of these terms. In addition they are figures
1 Lit.,
"As if he said, And he wished to kill him, that is to say, he
intended to kill him." This additional explanation appears to be superfluous;
it is a mere variation of the preceding words; it is improbable that both have
originally formed part of the same text.
2 Lit., “created,” that is, created for the purpose; a sound was produced in
a supernatural manner, that reached the ears of the Prophet or of the Israelites
when they received the Decalogue. Comp. Jehudah Hallevi in Kusri, I., 89.
Saadia in Emunoth we-deoth, II., 8. Abravanel, Comm. on Exod. xx. 18.
³ That is, we must neither imagine, that God speaks, and that a sound is pro-
duced by some organs of speech, nor that He conceives ideas or thoughts,
which form the substance of speech; for the first would lead directly to
corporeality, the latter would be contrary to the idea of absolute unity.
246
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
2
borrowed from our common practices, as has been already
pointed out.¹ For we cannot, at a first glance, see how
anything can be produced by a mere desire; we think
that he who wishes to produce a thing, must perform a
certain act, or command some one else to perform it.
Therefore the command is figuratively ascribed to God
when that takes place which He wishes, and we then say
that He commanded that a certain thing should be accom-
plished. All this has its origin in our comparing the acts of
God to our own acts, and also in the use of the term N in
the sense of," He desired," as we have already explained.
The word (lit. and He said), occurring in the account.
of the creation, signifies "He wished," or "He desired."
This has already been stated by other authors,³ and is well
known. A proof for this, namely, that all these refer-
ences to speaking denote the Will, not the Speech, is found
in the circumstance that a command can only be given to a
being which exists and is capable of receiving the command.4
Comp. "By the word of the Lord (272) were the heavens
made, and all the host of them by the breath of His mouth"
(1521) (Ps. xxxiii. 6). 5, "His mouth," and ",
"the breath of His mouth," are undoubtedly figurative
expressions, and the same is the case with "His word” and
'His speech." The meaning of the verse is therefore that
they [the heavens and all their host] exist through His will
and desire. All our eminent authorities are cognisant of
this; and I need not explain that in Hebrew ¬ and 727
have the same meaning, as is proved by the passage, “For
it has heard all the words (2) of the Lord which He
spake (727) unto us" (Jos. xxiv. 27).
<<
פיו (וברוח פיו)
1 See ch. xlvi.
2 Charizi adds here the words, 1DYya N17 IN, "either he himself.”
3 According to Narboni, in his commentary, Saadia and Ibn Gannach are
meant. Comp. Ibn Ezra, on Gen. i. 3.
4 Scil., and this could not have been the case in the Creation, in the report
of which is likewise used the verb ", "and He said."
PART I.-CHAPTER LXVI.
247
(C
CHAPTER LXVI.
And the tables were the work of God” (Exod. xxxii. 16).
And the tables were the work " והלחות מעשה אלהים המה
1
of God" (Exod. xxxii. 16), that is to say, they were the
product of nature, not of art; for all natural things are
called "the work of the Lord," e.g., "These see the works of
the Lord" (wy, Ps. cvii. 24); and the description of
the several things in nature, as plants, animals, winds, rain,
etc., is followed by the exclamation, " O Lord, how manifold
are Thy works!" (Tv, Ps. civ. 24). Still more strik-
ing³ is the relation between God and His creatures, as ex-
pressed in the phrase, "The cedars of Lebanon, which He hath
planted" (ib. 16); the cedars being the product of nature,
and not of art, are described as having been planted by
the Lord. Similarly we explain, " And the writing was the
writing of God” (obs anɔa, Exod. xxxii. 16); the relation
in which the writing stood to God has already been defined
in the words " written with the finger of God" (b,
ib. xxxi. 18), and the meaning of this phrase is the same as
that of "the work of Thy fingers" (73 mwyn, Ps.
¹ That is, of human work, as distinguished from the work of God or of
nature. The tables of stone were left in their natural state in which they were
found. Munk believes that Maimonides, in calling the tables a product of
nature, expressed his opinion that they existed in the same form since the first
days of creation. This is not probable; the phrase "product of nature is
used perhaps by the author in contradistinction to the "product of man's work ;"
and it implies simply that there is nothing more wonderful about the substance
of the tables than is noticed in the whole of the creation. Ibn Ezra on
""
; פי' מעשה אלהים שהיו ככה כמדה הראויה נבראים Exod. xxxii. 16, says
“the meaning of the phrase 'work of God' is, they were thus, in the proper
size, the direct product of the creation."
2 This is said in reference to the natural changes of the sea.
3 The application of the general term "the work of the Lord," to the
Universe or to part of it, appears less remarkable than the use of phrases which
ascribe to God a special action in reference to a single thing, as the planting
of a tree, or the writing on the tables, if such action is not meant in a figurative
sense, viz., that it is the will of God that a certain thing should be done.
248
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
viii. 4), this being an allusion to the heavens; of the latter
it has been stated distinctly that they were made by a
word; comp. "By the word of the Lord (7) were the
heavens made" (ib. xxxiii. 6). Hence you learn that in
the Bible, the creation of a thing is figuratively expressed
by terms denoting "word" and "speech" (777 and 708).
The same thing which according to one passage has been
made by a word (727), is represented in another passage
as made by the "finger of God" (
). The phrase
"written by the finger of God" is therefore identical
with "written by the word of God" ( 727); and
if the latter phrase had been used, it would have been
equal to be yon, "written by the will and desire of
God." Onkelos adopted in this place a strange explana-
tion,² and rendered it, literally "written
by the finger of the Lord"; he thought that , "the
finger," was a certain thing appertaining to God; so that
"ya "the finger of the Lord" is to be interpreted in
the same way as "the mountain of God" (Exod. iii. 1),
"the rod of God" (ib. iv. 20), that is, as being an in-
strument created by Him, which by His will engraved
the writing on the tables. I cannot see why Onkelos
preferred this explanation. It would have been more
"written by the word
of the Lord," in imitation of the verse "By the word of the
Lord the heavens were made." Or was the creation of the
writing on the tables more difficult than the creation of
אצבע יי
כתיבין במימרא דיי reasonable to say
.(אמר דבר)
אצבע
1 That is, the writing which appeared on the tables was the product of a natural
force which formed part of the creation. The "word" or "will" of God, the
cause of that writing, does not imply a command addressed to Moses. Comp.
Maim., Eight chapters, viii., and the Comm. of Ibn Ezra on Ex. xxxi. 18,
with the ** באצבע אלהים על מנהג האדם כי כל חפץ השם בדבר פיו יקום
finger of God' is a figurative phrase, for the will of God is performed by the
mere word of His mouth."
2 Char., less strictly, in 0, "a new opinion." Probably Onkelos
refrained from defining the miracle expressed in the figurative phrase “finger
of God," and therefore retained the figure as in the original. See Berkowitz,
Lechem ve-simlah ad locum.
³ Charizi, M, “a force."
PART 1.—CHAPTER LXVII.
249
the stars in the spheres? As the latter were made by
the direct will of God, not by means of an instrument, the
writing may also have been produced by His direct will,
not by means of an instrument. You know what the
Mishnah says, "Ten things were created on Friday in the
twilight of the evening, and "the writing" is one of the
ten things.¹ This shows how generally it was assumed
by our forefathers that the writing of the tables was pro-
duced in the same manner as the rest of the creation, as we
have shown in our Commentary on the Mishnah.¹
שבת
נות
CHAPTER LXVII.2
}1, To rest. 2, To discontinue. 3, To be firmly established.
SINCE the term, "to say," has been figuratively used to
express the will of the Creator, and the phrase ",
"And
He said," has repeatedly been employed in the account of all
the things created in "the six days of the beginning," the
expression, "to rest," has likewise been figuratively
¹ See Mishnah, Abhoth, v. 6, and Maimonides, ad locum: "an, 'writing,'
refers to the Law, which lay as it were written before Him; but we cannot
know how this was. Comp. And I will give thee the tables of stone [and the
Law, and the commandment which I have written to show them]' (Exod. xxiv.
12).
), and the writing,' refers to the writing on the tables; comp. 'and
the writing was the writing of God, engraved on the tables' " (ib. xxxii. 16).
•
2 In accordance with the explanation given in the preceding chapters, that the
verbs "He made," "He wrote," etc., meant "It was His will, that a certain
thing be done, be written," etc., he shows in the present chapter that the
verb “to rest” (naw, ni), used in reference to God, must not be understood
in the ordinary sense, implying previous work, as if the Creation consisted
in a material act. 'God rested" means that it no longer was His will to create
a new thing; the Universe, as it existed at the end of the sixth day, was
complete; nothing followed, except the regular development of that which had
been created.
250
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
applied to God in reference to the Sabbath-day, on which
וישבת ביום השביעי,there was no creation ; it is therefore said
"And He rested on the seventh day" (Gen. ii. 2). For
"to leave off speaking" is, in Hebrew, likewise expressed by
וישבתו שלשת האנשים האלה מענות as, e.g., in שבת the verb
,את איוב
וידברו אל נבל ככל הדברים as, e.g, in כוח xxxii. 1); also by
They spake to Nabal according to all האלה בשם דוד וינוחו
•
"So these three men ceased to answer Job" (Job
those words in the name of David, and ceased" (1 Sam. xxv.
9). In my opinion, means " they ceased to speak," and
waited for the answer; for no allusion to exertion whatever
having previously been mentioned, the word 1, "and
they rested," in its primary signification, would have been
entirely out of place in that narrative, even if the young
men who spoke had really used some exertion. The author
relates that having delivered that whole speech, which, as
you find, consisted of gentle expressions, they were silent,
that is to say, they did not add any word or act by which
the reply of Nabal could be justified; it being the object of
the entire passage to represent Nabal's conduct as extremely
reprehensible. In that sense, [viz. "to cease," or "to leave
,וינח ביום השביעי is used in the phrase כוח off] the verb
'And He left off on the seventh day."
Our Sages,¹ and some of the Commentators,2 took, however,
the word in its primary sense ("to rest "), but as a transi-
tive verb,³ explaining the phrase thus: "and He gave rest
1 See Bereshith Rabba x.: "As long as the hands of their master were
engaged with them, they were continually expanding, but as soon as the hands
of the master ceased (1 1) to touch them, repose () was granted to
them." In another part of the Midrash the following passage occurs:
What היה העולם חסר מנוחה בא שבת בא מנוחה וינח ביום השביעי
more did the Universe want? Rest; this came with the Sabbath, as it is said,
'And He gave rest on the seventh day.'
* 29
2 The idea of "rest" is by almost all commentators found in the word ',
but none of the known authors explain " as the Hiphil of ; it can,
therefore, not be determined who are meant by the phrase "and other commen-
tators."
3 This phrase is absent in Charizi's version.
PART I.-CHAPTER LXVII.
251
(וינח לעולמו ביום השביעי) "to the world on the seventh day
i.e., no further act of creation took place on that day.2
4
It is possible that the word " is derived either from ",
a verb, or П, a verb ", and has this meaning: "he
established" or "he governed³ the Universe in accordance
with the properties it possessed on the seventh day;" that is
to say, while on each of the six days events took place con-
trary to the natural laws now in operation throughout the
Universe, on the seventh day the Universe was merely upheld
and left in the condition in which it continues to exist. Our
explanation is not impaired by the fact that the form of the
word () deviates from the rules of verbs" and ";"
for there are frequent exceptions to the rules of conju-
gations, and especially of the weak verbs; and any inter-
pretation which removes such a source of error must not
be abandoned in favour of certain grammatical rules. We
know that we are ignorant of the sacred language, and that
grammatical rules only apply to the majority of cases.”—The
5
6
7
וינח נחה
¹ That is, every new thing created on the six days produced a kind of revo-
lution in the Universe; but when all was complete the Universe had stability
and rest. See supra, page 249, note 2.
2 This explanatory phrase seems to have been misplaced; its proper position
being immediately after the quotation 'y' "' ', for it refers to the
author's own interpretation of the word ", "and he left off," and not to the
explanation given by our Sages as signifying, "to cause rest."
3 Ibn Tibbon adds TD, "and prolonged;" Char. ПA AN v'Pwn
ns
ID, "He firmly established the continuance of the Universe.”
4 Char.
I MɔD D'XY", "different from the force of nature in its
present state." There is no reason why we should give a different meaning
to the phrase D'NY', employed both in Charizi's and Ibn Tibbon's versions.
Munk wrongly states: "Al Harizi a fait un contre-sens en traduisant, qui
sortaient ou émanaient de la faculté de cette nature.”
7 Charizio
s Charizi y71
,והמשיך
5 That
signifies "he left firmly established."
6 The ordinary future with Vau conversive of would be ; of
1
ܕ
bi, "not according to what is expected.”
"VN," although it is known."
.Char .ושדרכי כל לשון רבים .Tibb ואוקואנין כל לגה אכתריה .Arab 9
Munk: * et que les regles de toute langue .וכן חקי תכונת כל לשון מוסכמות
sont une chose de pluralité." The sense of the passage evidently is, that the
rules admit of many exceptions in the several languages: lit., according to Tib-
252
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
same root is also found as a verb y¹ in the sense "to place
and "to set,” as e.g., ni by bw nnni 17, “and it
shall be established and placed there upon her own base"
(Zec. v. 11), and by b 'DWn 91Y 7ɔn), “and suf-
fered neither the birds of the air to settle on them" (2 Sam.
xxi. 10).² According to my opinion, the verb has the same
that I might remain " אשר אנוח ליום צרה signification in
tr
3
firm in the day of trouble" (Hab. iii. 16).
4
The word is a verb derived from w, the homo-
nymity of which we have already explained, namely, that
it has the signification of intention or will; w accord-
ingly means "that which He desired was accomplished,
and what He wished had come into existence."
""
CHAPTER LXVIII.
God includes in His Unity the intellectus (n), the intelligens
5. (המושכל) and the intelligibile ,(המשכיל)
ינח Hiphil of
You are acquainted with the well-known principle of the
philosophers that God is the intellectus, the ens intelligens,
bon, “in every language the rules relate only to the majority" (,); or,
according to Charizi, "the grammatical rules of every language only relate to
those cases which agree."
1 П, as in our editions of the Bible, is a combination of Hophal and
2 Maimonides perhaps objects to taking
in the sense of "to rest,'
because the birds would not "rest" (in the literal sense of the word) upon the
dead bodies, but eat them, and that was especially guarded against.
3 Comp. Targ. Jon. "pa," who left me."
4 See chap. xli.
5 See Ibn Ezra, Comm. on Exod. xxxiii. 23, and Dr. Friedlander, Ibn
Ezra Literature, IV., pp. 23, 46. This proposition, that in God, the subject,
action and object of His knowledge are identical, so frequently quoted and
discussed by Jewish and Mahomedan philosophers, is traced to Aristotle's Meta-
physics, xii. 9, αὑτὸν ἄρα νοεῖ, εἴπερ ἐστὶ τὸ κράτιστον, καὶ ἔστιν ἡ νόησις
νοήσεως νόησις. Also in the last of the "Eight Chapters" Maimonides
shows that God's knowledge is inseparable from His essence, and that both are
identical.
FART I.—CHAPTER LXVIII.
253
2
and the ens intelligibile. These three things are in God one
and the same, and do not in any way constitute a plurality.
We have also mentioned it in our larger work, "Mishneh
Thorah,"¹ and we have explained there that it is a funda-
mental principle of our religion, namely, that He is absolutely
one, that nothing combines with Him; that is to say, there is
no Eternal thing besides Him. On that account we say "",
"the Lord liveth" (Ruth iii. 13), and not "the life of
the Lord," for His life is not a thing distinct from His
essence, as we have explained in treating of the inadmissi-
bility of the attributes. There is no doubt that he who has
not studied any works on mental philosophy, who has not
comprehended the nature of the mind, who has no knowledge
of its essence, and considers it in no other way than he would
consider the nature of whiteness and of blackness, will find
this subject extremely difficult, and to him our principle that
the intellectus, the intelligens, and the intelligibile, are in God
one and the same thing, will appear as unintelligible as if
we said that the whiteness, the whitening substance, and
the material which is whitened are one and the same thing.
3
נפשך)
יי
'Comp.: “The Holy One, blessed be He, perceives His true essence, and
knows it as it is in reality; for His knowledge is not like ours, separate from
His essence; we and our knowledge are not identical, but the Creator with His
knowledge and His life are one in every respect, in every way, and in every
sense of the term unity; for, if He possessed life and knowledge as things sepa-
rate from His essence, there would be several divine beings, God himself, His
life, and His knowledge. This is not the case; He is One in every respect, in
every way, and in every sense of the term unity; consequently He is the One
who knows, the thing which is known, and also the knowledge itself; all
these are One—a theory which cannot be clearly described in words, perceived
by the ear, or understood by the heart of man. The phrase 'by the life of
the Lord' (""), is therefore not used in the Bible, but the Lord liveth'
(” 'П), although we find 'by the life of Pharaoh' ('), 'by the life
of thy soul' (')". (Yesode ha-torah, ii. 10.)
••
2 is an adjective, while ' is considered to be identical with the con-
struct state of D. The phrase "the life of the Lord" would imply that
He possesses life as something different from Himself. He may be called
Din 'n, "the life of the world" (Dan. xii. 7), as being the cause of the life
or the existence of the Universe.
3 Chapter liii.; chap. lvii., etc.
254
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
2
And, indeed, many ignorant people refute at once our prin-
ciple by using such comparisons. Even amongst those who
imagine that they are wise, many find this subject difficult,
and are of opinion that it is impossible for the mind to grasp
the truth of this proposition,¹ although it is a demonstrated
truth, as has been shown by Metaphysicians. I will tell you
now what has been proved. Man, before comprehending a
thing comprehends it in potentia (duváμeɩ); ² when, however,
he comprehends a thing, e.g., the form of a certain tree
which is pointed out to him, when he abstracts its form from
its substance, and reproduces the abstract form, an act per-
formed by the intellect, he comprehends in reality (èvepyeíą),³
and the intellect which he has acquired in actuality, is the
abstract form of the tree in man's mind. For in such a
case the intellect is not a thing distinct from the thing
1 Yesode ha-torah, ii. 10. See note 1, page 253.
2 VovÇ TAÐŋTIKòg in the theory of Aristotle. The soul of man is like a tabula
rasa, which is to be filled up by him, the róπоç ɛiduv of Aristotle, a mere capa-
city of acquiring knowledge. Comp. Ibn Ezra Literature, IV. page 32.
32. The
writings on this tablet form the constituent elements of the intellect. The
relation between the writing and the tablet, the vous TalηTIKòs and the vouc
TоiηTIKоs has been compared to the relation between matter and form, whence
.(שכל הוליאני) the former received the name hylic intellect
(C
3 VOUS TOINTIKOS, Sy bow, "the intellect in action," the act by which
that which has been a mere capacity, which has only existed as a possibility
(dvváμɛi), becomes a reality. Maimonides ascribes this act to the intellect
itself (wn by the act of the intellect"); as, however, the intellect (b),
is here defined by Maimonides to be nothing but the knowledge acquired, the
question must naturally arise, whence comes that knowledge? What force
gives the impulse to man's intellectual development? Some consider the active
intellect (n) as the cause of all mental operations of man. See Moreh
והרביעי השכל הפועל והיא צורה שאינו בחומר והוא,141 .ha-moreh, pag
קרוב הדמות מהשכל הנאצל והוא המשים אותו הדבר שיהיה (שהיה ?)
bypa baw naa bay, "the fourth; the active intellect, an immaterial form,
similar to the abstract ideas; it causes that which is intellect in possibility
(dvváµɛi), to become intellect in action" (¿vɛpyɛią). The same appears to be
the opinion of Maimonides; see infra, pag. 256, note 2. The active intellect,
being considered as the highest form which the soul by progressive development
can attain (ibid.), is therefore not an original part of the soul, and the first im-
pulse for mental operation is thus assumed to come from without. Comp.
Arist., De gen, anim. II. ch. iii.
PART I.-CHAPTER LXVIII.
255
comprehended.¹ It is therefore clear to you2 that the
thing comprehended is the abstract form of the tree, and
at the same time it is the intellect in action; and that the
intellect and the abstract form of the tree are not two different
things, for the intellect in action is nothing but the thing
comprehended, and that agent by which the form of the tree
has been turned into an intellectual and abstract object,
namely, that which comprehends, is undoubtedly the intel-
lect in action. All intellect is identical with its action;
the intellect in action is not a thing different from its action,
for the true nature and essence of the intellect is compre-
hension, and you must not think that the intellect in action is
a thing existing by itself, separate from comprehension, and
that comprehension is a different thing connected with it ;
for the very essence of the intellect is comprehension. In
4
-
¹ That is to say, the intellect () is nothing else but the sum of the notions
or of the abstract ideas formed in the mind.
2 That is, by assuming on the one hand that the notion formed () is
the substance of the intellect (), and on the other hand that the action
(by bow) by which the notion is formed, is likewise the intellect (bɔv),
we arrive at the conclusion that both are identical. In the same manner
.(מושכל) and the object ,(שכל בפועל) the action ,(משכיל) subject
Maimonides asserts as a truth "which nobody doubts," that the agens (brown),
or thing which acts in the formation of the notions, is identical with the
action (by) b); he assumes that in fact that action is the essence of the
intellect to which all mental operations are ascribed. Hence he concludes
that the agens, the action and the object of the action are identical. It may
appear a paradox to say that a certain notion which does not yet exist is the
cause of its own existence. But the absurdity disappears when we consider that
the three things distinguished by Maimonides as the subject, the action, and
the object of the intellect, are nothing else but three different stages in the for-
mation of notions, viz. the possibility of their being formed, their actual formation,
and their existence in the mind as a basis for further operations. Although
generally the impulse is ascribed to certain properties and capacities inherent
in mind, the school to which Maimonides belonged considered mind as being
passive, as receiving notions and ideas by impulses from without, and, to use
the figure of the tabula rasa, being covered with self-acting inscriptions. In
this sense the ideas may justly be considered as being at the same time the
,(משכיל)
3 Charizi, by an own, "the intellect that is obtained in reality.”
+ This sentence is a mere repetition of the preceding, and probably owes
its origin to a revision of the work for both the identity of the active intellect
256
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
assuming an intellect in action you assume the comprehension
of the thing comprehended. This is quite clear to all who
have made themselves familiar with the figurative language
common to this discipline.¹ You therefore accept it as proved
that the intellect consists in its action, which is its true
nature and essence. Consequently the very thing by which
the form of that tree has been made abstract and intelligible,
viz., the intellect, is at the same time the intelligens, for the
intellect is itself the agens which abstracts the form and
comprehends it, and that is the action, on account of which it
is called the intelligens; but itself and its action are identical;
and that which is called intellect in action consists [in the
abovementioned instance] of nothing else but of the form of
the tree. It must now be obvious to you that whenever
the intellect is found in action, the intellect and the thing
comprehended are one and the same thing; and also that
the function of all intellect, namely, the act of comprehend-
ing, is its essence. The intellect, that which comprehends
and that which is comprehended, are therefore the same,
whenever a real comprehension takes place. But, when
we speak of the power of comprehension, we necessarily
distinguish two things: the power itself, and the thing
which can be comprehended; e.g., that hylic intellect of
Zaid is the power of comprehension, and this tree is, in
and the action, as well as the definition have been stated in the preceding sen-
tence as clearly as in this.
2
3
4
1 Charizi,
"in researches like these."
2 Having shown that the intellect in action (b) includes in itself
both subject and object, Maimonides proceeds now to show that the intellect in
capacity (dvváµs), is different both from subject and object. This intellect in
capacity necessarily implies the absence of the object, the presence of which
would transform it into the intellect in action. The intellect in capacity
are thus two things separate from
each other. A capacity cannot be imagined without a subject possessing that
capacity; intellect itself does not yet exist in reality, and cannot be the subject,
another subject (w) must be assumed; the three things, subject, action,
and object are therefore different from each other.
(מושכל בכח) and its object (שכל בכח)
K
3 See page 254, note 2.
4 In the Hebrew Versions: Reuben.
PART I.-CHAPTER LXVIII.
257
like manner, a thing which is capable of being compre-
hended; these, undoubtedly, are two different things.
When, however, the potential is replaced by the actual, and
when the form of the tree has really been comprehended,
the form comprehended is the intellect, and it is by that
same intellect,¹ by the intellect in action, that the tree has
been converted into an abstract idea, and has been compre-
hended. For everything in which a real action takes place
exists in reality. On the other hand, the power of com-
prehension, and the object capable of comprehension are two
things; but that which is only potential cannot be imagined
otherwise than in connection with an object possessing that
capacity, as, e.g., man, and thus we have three things: the
man who possesses the power, and is capable of comprehend-
ing; that power itself, namely, the power of comprehension,
and the thing which presents itself as an object for com-
prehension, and is capable of being comprehended; to use
the foregoing example, the man, the hylic intellect, and the
abstract form of the tree, are three different things. They
become one and the same thing when the intellect is in
action, and you will never find the intellect different from
the comprehensible object, unless the power of comprehend-
ing and the power of being comprehended be referred to.
Now, it has been proved, that God is an intellect which
always³ is in action, and that—as has been stated, and as
will be proved hereafter 5—there is in Him at no time a
mere potentiality, that He does not comprehend at one time,
and is without comprehension at another time, but He com-
4
.(ובשכל ההוא Tibbon) ובדלך instead of (וכן Charizi) וכדלך Some read 1
See Munk, page 310, note 1.
2 As e.g., the intellect in action, by bay. The intellect performing some
real action exists in reality, and therefore it can combine in itself the three
elements, subject, action, and object: while to the intellect in capacity nothing
but a possible action is ascribed: consequently it does not exist in reality, and
those three elements cannot be combined in it. See supra, page 252, note 5.
3 Omitted in Charizi and in some editions of Tibbon.
4 See ch、 lv., page 199, note 1.
5 See Part II., i. sqq.
02
258
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
prehends constantly; consequently, He and the thing com-
prehended are one and the same thing, that is to say, His
essence; and the act of comprehending because of which it
is said that He comprehends, is the intellect itself, which is
likewise His essence,¹ God is therefore always the intellectus,
the intelligens, and the intelligibile.
We have thus shown that the identity of the intellect, the
intelligens and the intelligibile, is not only a fact as regards
the Creator, but as regards all intellect, and that the same is
also the case with our intellect, when in action. There is,
however, this difference,2 that from time to time our intel-
lect passes over from mere potentiality to reality, and that
the pure intellect, i.e., the active intellect, finds sometimes
obstacles, though not in itself, but accidentally in some
external cause.³ It is not our present intention to explain
this subject, but we will merely show that God alone, and
none besides Him, is an intellect constantly in action, and
there is, neither in Himself nor in anything beside Him,
any obstacle whereby His comprehension would be hindered.
Therefore He always includes the intelligens, the intellectus,
and the intelligibile, and His essence is at the same time the
intelligens, the intelligibile, and the intellectus, as is necessarily
the case with all intellect in action.
We have reiterated this idea in the present chapter be-
cause it is exceedingly abstruse, and I do not apprehend
that the reader will confound intellectual comprehension
1 According to the definition of the intellect given above, viz., that it is
nothing but comprehension itself.
2 Maimonides explains why man's intellect is not always in action. The
transition of the passive intellect into that in action, is effected by the active
-which might be assumed to be con ,(שכל הנפרד or שכל הפועל) intellect
stantly active. Maimonides says that although in itself there can be no cause
of interruption, yet by external agencies its action may be prevented; if, e.g.,
the passive intellect is not capable of being influenced by the active intellect.
The latter is uninterruptedly active, although its effect does not always
manifest itself for the reason given. This is not the case in reference to God.
See Part II., xii. and xviii.
3 й, Hebrew Пyn, Munk, "perturbation."
PART I.- CHAPTER LXIX.
259
with the representative faculty—with the reproduction of
the material image in our imagination;¹ since this work is
designed only for those who have studied philosophy, and
who know what has already been said on the soul and its
faculties.
CHAPTER LXIX.
God is the Primal Cause.
THE philosophers, as you know, call God the First Cause 2
but those who are : (הסבה הראשונה and העלה הראשונה)
known by the name of Mutakallemim³ are very much op-
posed to the use of that name, and call Him Agens, believing
that there is a great difference whether we say that God is
the Cause or that He is the Agens. They argue thus: If we
were to say that God is the Cause, the co-existence of the
Cause with that which was produced by that Cause would
necessarily be implied; this again would involve the belief
that the Universe was eternal, and that it was inseparable
שיסתפק עליך המחשבה השכלית עם המחשבה הדמיונית,Charizi 1
that you * : והנני מדבר על דמיון המורגש בכח העולה במחשבה
will con-
found the intellectual notions with the imagination, I mean to say, with the
image formed of a material object by means of the imaginative power." The
word is in the original can be either the infinitive or first person future
. آخذ or أخذ singular according to its being read
A
2 In Arabic and in Hebrew two terms are employed promiscuously to de-
note “cause,” in Arabic by and 10, in Hebrew by and M2D.
3 See pag. 4, note 1.
: Palquera .הנקראים בשם והמדברים :Charizi
-The latter explains the term Mutakallemim as fol .המפורסמים והמדברים
lows: Knowing the science of the words, which establishes, against the oppo-
nents of religion, proofs founded on scientific research; for there are some who
have a knowledge of religion without science, and they are called Fakieh,
lit., "judges": others examine the teaching of religion, and prove it by
scientific research, these are called Mutakallemim. Moreh ha-moreh, page 152.
s 2
260
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
1
22
((
from God. When, however, we say that God is the Agens,
the co-existence of the Agens with its product is not im-
plied; for the agens can exist anterior to its product; we
cannot even imagine how an agens can be in action unless
it existed before its own production. This is an argument
advanced by persons who do not distinguish between the
potential and the actual. You, however, should know that
in this case there is no difference whether you employ the
cause" or
term ""
agens"; for if you take the term “ cause
in the sense of a mere potentiality, it precedes its effect;
but if you mean the cause in action, then the effect must
necessarily co-exist with the cause² in action. The same is
the case with the agens; take it as an agens in reality, the
work must necessarily co-exist with its agens. For the
builder, before he builds the house, is not in reality a
builder, but has the faculty for building a house³—in the
same way as the materials for the house before it is being
built are merely a house in potentia-but when the house
has been built, he is the builder¹ in reality, and his product
must likewise be in actual existence. Nothing is therefore
gained by choosing the term "agens" and rejecting the term
"cause." My object here is to show that these two terms
are equal, and in the same manner as we call God an Agens,
although the work does not yet exist, only because there is
no hindrance or obstacle which might prevent Him from
doing whenever He pleases, we may also call Him the
Cause, although the effect may not yet be in existence.
The reason why the philosophers called God the Cause,
and did not call Him the Agens, is not to be sought in their
וכי העולם עילה,Charizi ;העולם מאתו Tibbon ;אלעאלים לה ,Arabic 1
The word by in Charizi is a mistake; it is to be read either by,
66
caused," or "y, "in relation to him."
Arabic,
2
במציאות,Tibbon ; במציאותה ותהיה עלה,Chanizi ; בוגודהא עלה
”.on the existence of the cause * (במציאותה עלה Munk suggests) העלה
3 Ibn Tibbon adds here, "and when he builds, he is a builder in action.”
The allusion to the material for the building of a house is omitted in Charizi.
4 Tibbon, 7, "it is built."
PART I.-CHAPTER LXIX.
261
3
4
.
belief that the universe is eternal, but in other motives,
which I will briefly describe to you. It has been shown in
the science of Physics that everything, except the Primal
Cause, owes its origin to the following four causes :-the
substance, the form, the agens, the final cause. These are
sometimes direct, sometimes indirect; but each by itself is
called "a cause ""
(in Hebrew, by or 2). They also
believe—and I do not differ from their opinion-that God
Himself is the agens, the form, and the end; therefore
they call God "the Cause," in order to express that He
unites in Himself these three causes, viz., that He is the
agens, the form, and the final cause of the universe. In the
present chapter I only wish to show you in what sense it
may be said of God that He is the agens, the form, and also
the final cause of the universe. You need not trouble
yourself now with the question whether the universe has
been created by God, or whether, as the philosophers have
assumed, it is eternal, co-existing with Him. You will find
[in the pages of this treatise] full and instructive informa-
tion on this subject.5 Here I wish to show that God is the
"cause" of every event that takes place in the world, just
as He is the Creator of the whole universe as it now exists.
¹ Lit., "that causes exist for everything that has a cause; and that they
consist in the following four causes.
2 Comp. Arist., Phys. ii. 7. The substance, causa formalis, causa efficiens,
and causa finalis.
3 Comp. Metaph., viii. 4.
66
Although a fourth cause has been mentioned as being included in the term
cause,” viz., "matter," the first cause of all existing beings includes, according
to Aristotle and his followers, only the three causes named here; matter must
be excluded; for the first cause is an immaterial being, and its relation to the
Universe is similar to the relation of the soul to the body. The soul is likewise
said to combine in itself the three causes: causa efficiens, causa formalis, and
causa finalis. Comp. Arist. de Animâ, ii. 4; Phys., ii. 7, sqq. Maimonides
says that he does not differ from the philosophers in that point, and for the
present he leaves out of view the question as to the eternity of matter. He
only points out that, contrary to the opinions of the Mutakallemim, he goes so
far with Aristotle as to admit that in God, the first Cause, these three causes
are comprised.
6 See II., ch. i, sợ
r
262
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
It has already been explained in the science of Physics,
that a cause must again be sought for each of the four
divisions of causes. When we have found for any existing
thing those four causes which are in immediate connection
with it, we find for them again causes, and for these again
other causes, and so on until we arrive at the first causes.
E.g., a certain production has its agens, this agens again
has its agens, and so on and on until at last we arrive at a
first agens, which is the true agens throughout all the inter-
vening links. If the letter aleph be moved by beth, beth by
gimel, gimel by daleth, and daleth by hé-and as the series
does not extend to infinity, let us stop at hé—there is no
doubt that the he moves the letters aleph, beth, gimel, and
daleth, and we say correctly that the aleph is moved by hé.
In that sense everything occurring in the universe, although
directly produced by certain nearer causes, is ascribed to
the Creator, as we shall explain. He is the agens, and He
is therefore the ultimate cause. We shall also find, after
careful examination, that every physical and transient form
must be preceded by another such form, by which the sub-
stance has been fitted to receive the next form; the previous
form again has been preceded by another, and we arrive at
length at that form which is necessary for the existence of all
intermediate forms, which are the causes of the present form.
That form¹ to which the forms of all existence are traced is
God. You must not imagine that when we say that God is
the first¹ form of all forms existing in the Universe, we refer
to that first form which Aristotle, in the Book of Meta-
physics, describes as being without beginning and without
end,² for he treats of a form which is a physical, and not a
-}
1 Lit. "the last form."
2 All bodies consist of matter and form; their production and destruction is
nothing but the union and disunion of matter and a certain form. Matter and
form separately are therefore not subject to production or destruction. Comp.
Arist. Metaph., vi. 8, and xii. 3.
"the last form" is called by others "the first form "; it is the last, in so far as
it is the most remote from the object which we examine; it is the first as being
the origin from which all other forms arise. This
however abstract, is
,צורה אחרונה What Maimonides calls
PART I.-CHAPTER LXIX.
263
1
purely intellectual one. When we call God the form of the
universe, we do not use this term in the sense of form con-
nected with substance, namely, as the form of that substance,
as though God were the form of a material being. It is not
in this sense that we use it, but in the following: Every-
thing existing and endowed with a form, is whatever it is
through its form, and when that form is destroyed its whole
existence terminates and is obliterated. The same is the case
as regards the relation between God and all distant causes
of existing beings; it is through the existence of God that
all things exist, and it is He who maintains their existence
by that process which is called emanation (in Hebrew v),
as will be explained in one of the chapters of the present
work. If God did not exist, suppose this were possible,
the universe would not exist, and there would be an end to
the existence of the distant causes, the final effects, and the
intermediate causes. Consequently God maintains the same
relation to the world as the form has to a thing endowed
with a form; through the form it is what it is, and on it the
reality and essence of the thing depends. In this sense we
may say that God is the first form, that He is the form of
all forms; that is to say, the existence and continuance of all
forms in the last instance depend on Him, the forms are main-
tained by Him, in the same way as all things endowed with
forms retain their existence through their forms. On that
account God is called, in the sacred language, byn 0,
"the life of the Universe," as will be explained. The same
argument holds good in reference to all final causes. If
you assign to a thing a certain purpose, you can find for that
purpose another purpose. We mention, e.g., a (wooden)
throne; its substance is wood, the joiner is its agens, the
¹ See II., xii.
2
העולמים
3
still related to matter; it is the form of a material object, and therefore Maimo-
nides declares that it cannot be understood in the same sense, when God is to
be regarded as the First Form.
Comp. Hebrew Prayer-book, the portions beginning N 7172 and
nan, and Daniel xii. 7.
3 Ch. lxxii.
264
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
square its form, and its purpose is that one should sit upon
it. You may then ask, For what purpose does one sit upon
it ? The answer will be that he who is sitting upon it de-
sires to be high above the ground. If again you ask, For
what purpose does he desire to be high above the ground,
you will receive the answer that he wishes to appear high
in the eyes of those who see him. For what purpose does
he wish to appear higher in the eyes of those who see him?
That the people may respect and fear him. What is the
good of his being feared? His commands will be respected.
For what purpose are his commands to be respected? That
people shall refrain from injuring each other. What is the
object of this precaution? To maintain order amongst the
people. In this way one purpose necessitates the pre-existence
of another, except the final purpose, which is the execution of
the will of God, according to one of the opinions which have
been propounded, as will be explained,¹ and the final answer
will be "It is the will of God." According to the view of
others, which will likewise be explained, the final purpose is the
execution of the decree of His wisdom,¹ and the final answer
will be, "It has been decreed by His wisdom." According
to either opinion, the series of the successive purposes ter-
minates, as has been shown, in God's will or wisdom, which,
in our opinion,² are His essence, and not any thing separate
from Himself or different from His essence. Consequently,
God is the final purpose of everything. Again, it is the aim
of everything³ to become, according to its faculties, similar
to God in perfection; this is meant by the expression "His
will, which is identical with His essence," as will be shown
below.5 In this sense God is called the End of all ends
.(תכלית התכליות)
¹ See III., xiii. and xvii.
2 Ch. liii.
3 Maimonides now shows, from another point of view, that God's will is the
purpose of all purposes. According to the will of the Creator it is the purpose
of everything to seek perfection, and to approach the perfection of the Creator.
Comp. II. xiii., the explanation of ? (Prov. xvi. 4).
* See III. xiii., and I. liv.
PART I-CHAPTER LXX.
265
I have thus explained to you in what sense God is said to
be the Agens, the Form, and the End. This is the reason why
the philosophers not only call Him "the Maker" but also
"the Cause." Some of the scholars belonging to the Muta-
kallemim, went so far in their folly and in their vainglory
as to say that the non-existence of the Creator, if that were
possible, would not necessarily imply the non-existence of the
things created by Him, i.e., the Universe: for a production
need not necessarily cease to exist when the producer, after
having produced it, has ceased to exist. They would be
right, if God were only the maker of the Universe, and if
its permanent existence were not dependent on Him. The
storehouse does not cease to exist at the death of the
builder; for he does not give permanent existence to the
building. God, however, is Himself the form of the Uni-
verse, as we have already shown, and it is He who causes
its continuance and permanency. It is therefore wrong to
say that a thing can remain durable and permanent, after
the being that makes it durable and permanent has ceased
to exist, while that thing can possess no more durability
and permanency than it has received from that being. Now
you understand the greatness of the error into which they
have fallen through their assumption that God is only the
agens, and not the end or the form.
CHAPTER LXX.
172 273 "To Him that ruleth the Arabhoth.”
(Ps. lxviii. 4.)¹
לרכב בערבות
THE term (rakhabh) "to ride" is a synonym. In its
primary signification it is applied to man's riding on an
1 Having shown that God is the First Cause and the First Form of the
Universe, he explains in this chapter the term Пy 207 as expressing the
same idea.
266
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
1
animal, in the usual way;
"Now he was riding upon his ass" (Numb. xxii. 22). It
has then been figuratively used to denote "dominion over
a thing;" because the rider governs and rules the animal
he rides upon.
This sense the word has in
והוא רוכב על אתונו .comp
ירכיבהו
He made him ride on the high places of the" על במתי ארץ
,והרכבתיך על במתי ארץ ; (13 .Deut. xxxii)
earth" "and I
will cause thee to ride upon the high places of the earth"
(Is. lviii. 14), that is, you shall have dominion over the
highest (people) on earth; ¬¬ 27, “I will make
Ephraim to ride" (Hos. x. 11), i.e., I shall give him rule
and dominion. In this same sense it is said of God
, “who rideth upon the heaven in thy help "
(Deut. xxxiii. 26), that is, who rules the heaven; and
♫¬y, “Him that rideth upon the arabhoth" (Ps. lxviii. 4),
i.e., who rules the arabhoth, the uppermost, all-encompassing
sphere. It has also been repeatedly stated by our Sages
that there are seven rekiim³ (firmaments, heavens), and
that the uppermost of them, the all-surrounding, is called
arabhoth. Do not object to the number seven given by them,
although there are more rekiim, for there are spheres which
contain several circles (gilgallim), and are counted as one;
2
4
which » שהרגיל לרכוב כמו הלא אנכי אתונך אשר רכבת עלי Charizi 1
he is accustomed to ride. Comp. "Am not I thine ass upon which thou hast
ridden." (Num. xxii. 30).
ובדברי חכמים ז"ל,Tibbon .נץ אל חכמים ז"ל אלמתכרר בכל מוצע 2
It is .דבר חז"ל (גלגל) החוזר בכל מקום,Charizi הנכפלים בכל מקום
strange that the phrase "which are repeated everywhere" has been added
here. The passage referred to is not repeated frequently, much less “every-
***
-firmly es » אלמתקרר we were to read אלמתכרר where. If instead of
tablished,” the addition of “everywhere" would be intelligible, as Maimo-
nides would then be understood to say, that the words of the Chachamim have
authority even in those scientific questions.
in Tibbon's version may
be rendered “that have a double authority," although is mostly used in
the sense of "being repeated."
3 Comp. Babyl. Talm. Chagigah 12b, where the following seven names are
וילון רקיע שחקים זבול מעון מכון ערבות mentioned by Resh Lakish
* Munk: "On ne compte que pour un seul globe celui qui pourtant renferme
PART I.-CHAPTER LXX.
267
1
this is clear to those who have studied that subject, and I
shall also explain it ;¹ here I wish merely to point out that
our Sages always assumed that arabhoth is the uppermost
sphere. The arabhoth is also referred to in the words "who
rideth upon the heaven () in thy help." Thus we read
in Chagigah, "The high and exalted dwelleth on arabhoth,2
as it is said, 'Extol Him that rideth upon arabhoth"" (Ps.
lxviii. 4). How is it proved that "heaven” () and
"arabhoth" (7) are identical? The one passage has "who
rideth on arabhoth," the other has "who rideth in heaven." 3
Hence it is clear that in all these passages reference is
made to the same all-surrounding sphere, concerning which
you will hereafter receive more information.* Consider
well that the expression w, "dwelling over it," is
used by them, and not 1 7, "dwelling in it." The
latter expression would have implied that God occupies a
place or is a power in the sphere, as was in fact believed
by the Sabeans,5 who held that God was the soul of the
sphere. By saying by, "dwelling over it," they
indicated, that God was separate from the sphere, and was
,שוכן בו
different,
שוכן עליו
plusieurs sphères." The difference between "sphere" and "globe" is not
clear. The Arabic 7 and the Hebrew a primarily denote "circles";
although the term is generally employed in the sense of "spheres," in passages
like this, where it is distinguished from "sphere," it signifies "circles," or "the
orbits" of certain celestial bodies, several of which may have been imagined to
be in the same sphere.
1 II. xxiv. Comp. II. iv. Ibn Ezra on Psalm viii. 3, in commenting on the
words "Thy heavens, the work of Thy fingers," assumes ten spheres.
2 Talm. Babyl., Chagigah xii. 6. The text in our editions of the Talmud is
ya on’by jɔiw “dwells over them in the Arabhoth," the word
.is omitted in the version of Ibn Tibbon עליהם or עליו
3 This form of argument is frequently used in the Talmud, and is called
1 , "analogy;" or the assumption that the recurrence of the same
term in two phrases is an indication of the identity of the two phrases, and
that the one can be explained by the other. In the example cited above,
and רוכב שמים occurring in both phrases indicates that רוכב the word
.are identical רוכב בערבות
4 II., chap. xxiv.
5 Comp. chap. lxiii., pag. 236, note 2. In Charizi's version the explanation
DI," and these are the Chaldeans," is added.
D'
268
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
not a power in it. Know also that the term,
""
riding upon the heavens," has figuratively been applied to
God in order to show the following excellent comparison.
The rider is better than the animal upon which he rides—
the comparative is only used for the sake of convenience, for
the rider is not of the same class as the animal upon which
he rides ¹-furthermore, the rider moves the animal and
leads it as he likes; it is as it were his instrument, which he
uses according to his will; he is separate from it, apart from
it, not connected with it. In like manner the uppermost
sphere, by the rotation of which everything moveable is set in
motion, is moved by God, who is separate from the sphere,
and is not a power in it. In Bereshith Rabba² we read that
.
The * מעוני אלהי קדם in commenting on the Divine words
eternal God is a refuge” (lit., a dwelling, Deut. xxxiii. 27), our
Sages said, "He is the dwelling of His world, the world is
not His dwelling." This explanation is then followed by the
remark, “The horse is secondary to the rider, the rider is not
,כי תרכב על סוסיך subservient to the horse; this is meant by
'that Thou didst ride upon Thy horses'" (Hab. iii. 8). Con-
sider and learn how they described the relation of God to
the sphere, asserting that the latter is His instrument, by
means of which He rules the universe. For whenever you
find our Sages saying that in a certain heaven are cer-
tain things, they do not mean to say that in the heavens.
there are any extraneous things, but that from a certain
heaven the force emanates which is required for the pro-
duction of certain things, and for their continuing in proper
order. The proof for my statement you may find in the
3
¹ And therefore no comparison is admissible between God and His creatures,
as has been stated above, chapter lvi.
2 Chap. lxviii. on Gen. xxviii. 11. The phrase more frequently employed is
it is likewise mentioned there, where ; הוא מקומו של עולם ואין העולם מקומו
in reference to the words Dip y the question is asked, why is God some-
times called “makom," and the answer is, because He is the place of the uni-
verse, but the universe is not His place.
3 This refers to Babyl. Talm., Chagigah, 12 b, where to each of the seven
heavens certain qualities are attributed.
PART I.-CHAPTER LXX.
269
following saying of our Sages-"The arabhoth, in which
there are justice, charity, right, treasures of life, peace,
treasures of blessing, the souls of the righteous, the souls
and the spirits of those to be born, and the dew by which
God will at some future time revive the dead, etc."
It
is clear that the things enumerated here are not material,
and do not occupy a place-for "dew" is not to be taken in
its literal sense.¹-Consider also that here the phrase a,
"in which," meaning "in the arabhoth," is used, and not
by nw, "over which they are," as if to say that all the
things existing in the universe derive their existence from
powers emanating from the arabhoth, which God made to be
the origin and the place of these powers. They are said to
include “the treasures of life;" a perfectly true and correct
assertion! For all existing life originates in that treasure
of life, as will be mentioned below.2 Reflect on the fact that
the souls of the righteous as well as the souls and the spirits of
those to be born are named here! How sublime is this idea
to him who understands it! for the soul that remains after
the death of man, is not the soul that lives in man when he
is born; the latter is a mere faculty, while that which has
a separate existence after death, is a reality;³ again, the
soul () and the spirit () of man during his life are
two different things; therefore the souls and the spirits are
both named as existing in man; but separate from the body
only one of them exists. We have already explained the
homonymity of in this work, and also at the end of Sefer
ha-madda' we treated of the homonymity of these expres-
4
6
,שהם עליו
1 According to Efodi and others, Maimonides finds in , "dew," an allusion
to the "active intellect" which changes the passive intellect into the intellect in
(שכל בפועל) action
2 Ch. lxxii., and II. x.
3 See above, pag. 254, notes 2 and 3; and also xli., pag. 143, note 1.
4
denotes the spirit of life, "vitality," which ceases to exist when life
extinct. By way of homonymy it is also used for "soul," the immortal
element in man.
5 Viz., the soul,
D.
6 Chapter xl.
7 Hilchoth Teshubhah, viii. 3 and 4. Comp. also Yesode ha-torah iv. 8 and 9.
270
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
sions.¹ Consider how these excellent and true ideas, compre-
hended only by the greatest philosophers, are found scattered
in the Midrashim. When a student who disavows truth reads
them, he will at first sight deride them, as being contrary
to the real state of things. The cause of this is the circum-
stance, that our Sages spoke of these subjects in metaphors;
they are too difficult for the common understanding of the
people, as has been noticed by us several times.
I will now return to the subject which I commenced to
explain, in order to bring it to a conclusion. Our Sages
commenced to adduce proofs from Scriptures for their asser-
tion that the things enumerated above are contained in the
arabhoth. As to justice and right they refer to "justice and
judgment are the habitation of Thy throne " (Ps. lxxxix. 18).
In the same way they prove their assertion concerning all
things enumerated by them, by showing that they are de-
scribed as being related to God, as being near Him.2 Note
this.³ In the Pirke Rabbi Eliezer it is said: God created
4
¹ In Hilchoth Teshubhah, viii. 3, the use of W in the sense of MDW) is
mentioned; in the next paragraph Maimonides enumerates the various names
employed in describing the immortality of the soul, and its condition after its
separation from the body. The homonymity of 1 and D), mentioned
here, is not found in the end of the Sefer ha-madda.
2 According to Munk, the suffix in 7 refers to "arabhoth," not to "God;"
if this were the case Maimonides would have used 2 (12), as he constantly
".with him * אתו Charizi ;אצלו Ibn Tibbon has .בערבות says
The
things being with God who rideth upon the arabhoth, are of course contained
in the arabhoth.
3 In the version of Ibn Tibbon this passage is repeated in a different form:
וכן הביאו ראיה על השאר שהם בערבות מהיותם מיוחסים לשם ית' שהם
ni 1271 1988, “And thus they brought a proof for the other things, that they
are in the arabhoth by the fact that they are related to God, and are with Him."
It was originally a marginal note of the translator, who added the following
אמר שמואל בן תבון : remark which is found in the margin of some MSS
הלשון המוגה מחוץ אינו יוצא מלשון הערבי אך הוא יוצא מגוף הענין מלשון
חגיגה והוא האמת בעצמו והוא שהעיר עליו באמרו והבן זה :
"Samuel
Ibn Tibbon said, the form amended in the margin does not correspond to the
Arabic, but to the subject contained in the passage of Chagigah; this is its true
sense, and was indicated by Maimonides in his words and understand this.'
4 Ch. xviii. This passage is probably quoted in support of the inter-
"""
PART I.-CHAPTER LXXI.
271
seven rekiïm (heavens), and of all of them He selected the
arabhoth for His royal throne; comp. "Exalt Him who rideth
upon the araboth" (Ps. lxviii. 4). These are his words.
Note them likewise.
K
You must know that in Hebrew the collective noun de-
noting animals used for riding is "mercabhah " (2). In-
stances of this noun are not rare.
Joseph made ready his chariot” (Gen. xlvi. 29); nana)
, “in the second chariot" (ib. xli. 43); YD NIZDA,
"Pharaoh's chariots" (Ex. xv. 4). The following passage
especially proves that this noun denotes a collection of
,המשנה
מאות וסוס : animals ותעלה ותצא מרכבה ממצרים בשש
And a chariot came up and went out of " בחמשים ומאה
And "ויאסר יוסף מרכבתו
Egypt for six hundred shekels of silver, and a horse for an
hundred and fifty" (1 Kings x. 21). Hence we may learn
that mercabhah denotes here four horses. Therefore I think
that when it was stated,¹ according to the literal sense of
the words,² that four Chayoth (beasts) carry the Throne of
Glory, our Sages called this "mercabhah" on account of its
similarity with the mercabhah consisting of four single
animals. So far has the theme of this chapter carried us,
and we shall be compelled to make many further remarks
on this subject. Here, however, it is our object, and the
aim of all we have said, to show that
77, "who rideth
upon heaven" (Deut. xxxiii. 26), means "who sets the
all-surrounding sphere in motion, and turns it by His power
and will." The same sense is contained in the conclusion of
that verse: 1, "and in His excellency the
spheres,” i.e., who in His excellency³ moves the shechakim
,ובגאותו שחקים
pretation of the word 1 as signifying "who governs"; for it contains
the assertion that the arabhoth are the seat of His government (niɔbob).
1 Maimonides refers to the first chapter of Ezekiel.
; לפי הראוי Charizi ; לפי מא שנאמר,Tibbon ; בחשב מא קיל,Arabic 2
:
Munk, "par la tradition (lit., selon ce qui a été dit)." The meaning of the
phrase is "
as far as it is said ;" in truth, however, the throne is not borne by
the chayoth, but all things are borne and moved by the throne.
3 The commentators seem to be in doubt whether the pronoun in 171812)
refers to God or to the heavens. Grammatically, it can only refer to God,
.being a plural noun שמים
272
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
A
(spheres). In reference to the first sphere, the arabhoth,
the verb "to ride," is used, in reference to the rest,
the noun, "excellency," because through the motion of
the uppermost sphere in its daily circuit, all the spheres
move, participating as parts in the motion of the whole;
and this being that great power that sets everything in
motion, it is called, "excellency." Let this subject
constantly remain in your memory when you study what
I am going to say; for it-i.e., the motion of the upper-
most sphere-is the greatest proof for the existence of God,
as I shall demonstrate. Note this.
,רכב
CHAPTER LXXI.
The Origin of the Kalâm.
KNOW¹ that many branches of science relating to the correct
solution of these problems, were once cultivated by our
2
¹ Before discussing the theories of the Mutakallemim and the philosophers
about the three fundamental principles of the Jewish faith, viz., the Existence
of God, His Unity, and His Incorporeality, Maimonides describes in the pre-
sent chapter the origin and development of the Kalâm. He apologizes, as it
were, for having in these disquisitions frequent recourse to Christian and Maho-
medan sources, and he begins with the statement that the philosophical theories
of the Jewish wise men of former ages were not known, because owing to the
dispersion and the oppression of the Jews their theories were not regularly trans-
mitted from generation to generation. Comp. Mishnah, Sota ix. 15—7D
Since the destruction of the Holy * בה"מ שרי חכימיא למהוי כספריא וגו'
""
9
Temple, the Chachamim (wise men) began to be like the Soferim (elementary
teachers) of former ages," etc. Midrash Rabba, Echa, Introd. § 22. "When
the Israelites went into exile, not one of them could remember what he had
וחשכו הראות את מוצא כשגלו ישראל לבין או"ה לא היה א' .learned
171b71315 $1 D, et passim, in Talmud and Midrash. Both Jewish
and non-Jewish authors have repeatedly asserted that the Jews were the original
cultivators of philosophy, and that other nations owed their progress in that
study to the Jews. See Munk ad locum, also Arch. Israelites, March, 1848,
p. 169 sqq.
2 That is, problems treated of in Physics and Metaphysics, or, in the Tal-
mudical terms, Maaseh mercabhah and Maaseh bhereshith.
PART I. CHAPTER LXXI.
273
forefathers, but were in the course of time neglected, especially:
in consequence of the tyranny which barbarous nations¹
exercised over us. Besides, speculative studies were not
open to all men, as we have already stated; only the
subjects taught in the Scriptures were accessible to all.
Even the traditional Law,³ as you are well aware, was
not originally committed to writing, in conformity with the
rule to which our nation generally adhered,* Things
which I have communicated to you orally, you must not
communicate to others in writing."5 With reference to
the Law, this rule was very opportune; for while it re-
mained in force it averted the evils which happened subse-
quently, viz., great diversity of opinion, doubts as to the
4 (C
2
¹ Lit., "the ignorant," who took no interest in science or study. Maimonides
probably meant the Romans and Persians, who, in persecuting the Jews, used
to interdict the study of the Law, which for the Jews included all wisdom
and science. Comp. Zunz, Gottesdienstliche Vorträge, p. 40. The Arabic
is especially applied to the paganism before Mahomed.
'
2 See Introd., p. 7 sqq., and ch. xxxi. sqq.
3 “Talmud,” (71) in both Hebrew versions, is not used here in its
general acceptation, as the work consisting of the Mishnah and its interpreta-
tion, the Gemara, but in the sense of "doctrine, and system or code of laws,"
including both the Written Law and the Oral Law, and as in this passage the
Oral Law only is to be understood, it is qualified by the adjective "traditional"
(Sapon, in Arabic p). "Talmud," as a "system of laws," is
",the true science of religion • חכמת התורה על האמת contrasted to
i.e., the philosophical treatment of religious principles. See Introd., p. 6,
note 1.
T
✔
* That is, it was not a rule laid down by authority: it was not understood
as forming part of the Halacha, but was considered as a Midrashic interpreta-
tion without having any binding force.
5
✅³ In the first instance this is an interpretation of the words addressed to
Moses (Exod. xxxiv. 27), "Write thou these words," etc., viz., that Moses
should write certain laws for the Israelites, and that he should orally impart
to them additional laws. But it was assumed that the same rule applied to
future teachers in Israel, who should not permit the Written Law to be recited
by heart, or the Oral Law to be read from a book; also that the Oral Law
should not be committed to writing. See Midrash Shemoth Rabba, c. xlvii.;
Babyl. Talm., Gittin 60 b; Temurah, 14 b. Maimonides in the introduction
to his Mishneh Torah asserts that since the time of Moses the chief authorities
made copies of parts of the Oral Law for themselves, but did not use them in
public.
+
274
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
meaning of written words, slips of the pen,¹ dissensions
among the people, formation of new sects, and confused
notions about practical subjects. The traditional teaching
was in fact, according to the words of the Law, entrusted
to the Great Tribunal, as we have already stated in our
works on the Talmud.3
4
Care having been taken, for the sake of obviating injurious
influences, that the Oral Law should not be recorded in a
form accessible to all, it was but natural that no portion of
"the secrets of the Law," (i.e., metaphysical problems) would
be permitted to be written down or divulged for the use of
all men. These secrets, as has been explained, were orally
communicated by a few able men to others who were equally
distinguished. Hence the principle applied by our teachers,
"The secrets of the Law can only be entrusted to him who
is a councillor, a cunning artificer, etc." The natural effect
of this practice was that our nation lost the knowledge of
those important disciplines. Nothing but a few remarks
and allusions are to be found in the Talmud and the Mid-
rashim, like a few kernels 5 enveloped in such a quantity
of husk, that the reader is generally occupied with the
husk, and forgets that it encloses a kernel.
In addition you will find that in the few works composed
1 Lit., "and errors which are made in writing a book." Munk thinks that
the Arabic 10 signifies an error in thought (une erreur de pensée), but it must
not be forgotten that Maimonides enumerates the evils which result from the
substitution of instruction by writing for oral instruction, and error in
thought which equally occurs in both methods is here out of place.
2 Deut. xvii. 8-12.
3 Introduction to Mishnah Zeraim; and introduction to Mishneh Torah.
4 Introduction p. 7 sqq., ch. xxxiii and xxxiv.
שנים שלשה גרגרים שהם ,Charizi ; גרגרי לב מועטין,Ibn Tibbon 5
.כמו לב
כלאם
• The Arabic □ means both "word," and "the system of the Mutakal-
lemim " (comp. Logic from λóyoç). The two Hebrew translators took it in
the first signification, and render it ", "of words "; Munk thinks that
the kalam, that is the philosophy of the Mutakallemim, is here meant. But it
is not likely that Maimonides meant to say, "that the few treatises which, in
the writings of some Gaonim on those subjects, you find based on the principles
of the kalām, are borrowed from the Mahomedan Mutakallemim." This
מדברי
PART I.-CHAPTER LXXI.
275
by the Gaonim¹ and the Karaites2 on the unity of God and
on such matter as is connected with this doctrine, they
followed the lead of the Mahometan Mutakallemim, and
what they wrote is insignificant in comparison with the
kindred works of the Mahometans, It also happened, that
at the time when the Mahometans adopted this method
of the Kalam, there arose among them a certain sect,
called Mu'tazilah,5 i.e., Separatists. In certain things our
would imply that he regretted the absence of the kalam from the writings of
the Jews, while in fact he is opposed to the kalam. It is by no means surpris-
ing that the Jewish thinkers of the time were not all adherents of the Aristotelian
philosophy; some of them were in favour of the Kalam. See Munk ad locum;
comp. Introd. pag. xlii.
¹ Gaon is the title of the spiritual heads of the Jews after the close of
the Talmud, between the sixth and the eleventh centuries; the last Gaon was
R. Hai. Maimonides probably alluded to Saadiah's Emunoth vedeoth. (See
Commentary of Narboni ad locum.)
2 The Karaites (from NP, a reading, a Scriptural text) are the successors of
the ancient Sadducees; they reject most of the traditional interpretations of the
Law, and only recognise the authority of the written Law, and this according to
their own interpretation. As to Karaite Mutakallemim, comp. Kuzri v. 15,"n
"The
interpreters of the fundamental principles of religion, called by the Karaites
"dissenters." As to the
origin of the name Karaites, whether it is to be derived directly from
NP, "the Scriptural text," or from the title or name Kara, of some dis-
tinguished scholar of that sect, see A. Neubauer, Beiträge und Dokumente zur
Geschichte des Karäerthums, Leipzig, 1866, page 4. The history of the sect
has been written in two volumes, "Geschichte des Karäerthums," by Prof. Dr.
Julius Fürst, Leipzig, 1862–65. Valuable historical material has been con-
tributed by S. Pinsker, Likute Kadmoniyoth, Wien, 1860.
3 "The Unity of God" is here singled out of the several metaphysical pro-
blems as the centre of all theological and philosophical discussions of the age,
both amongst the Jews and the Mahometans.
4 The editions of Ibn Tibbon's version (except ed. pr.) have banaw noi
,שרשי האמונה והם הנקראים אצל הקראים בעלי חכמת הדברים
המינין Charizi has קראים Logicians.” Instead of
18
ומה שנתגלה
and what is dependent * ומה שנתלה probably a corruption of מזה הענין
on," or "connected with."
QUE
5 The Mu'tazilah (from by "to separate") are the followers of Wâcil
ibn-'Ata (born 699–700, and died 778-779), a disciple of Al-'Hasan al-
Bassri (of Bassora). Wâcil separated himself (inys) from the school of his
master, and established a school of his own (binys). The sect had many
subdivisions, but their common and principal characteristics were the following
two propositions: 1, Man is perfectly free in his actions; he does good or evil on
T2
276
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
scholars followed the theory and the method of these
Mu'tazilah. Although another sect, the Asha'ariyah," with
their own peculiar views, was subsequently established
amongst the Mahometans, you will not find any of these
views in the writings of our authors; not because these
authors preferred the opinions of the first-named sect to
those of the latter, but because they chanced first to become
acquainted with the theory of the Mu'tazilah, which they
adopted and treated as demonstrated truth. On the other
hand our Andalusian³ scholars followed the teachings of
the philosophers, from whom they accepted those opinions
which were not opposed to our own religious principles.
You will find that they did not adopt any of the methods
of the Mutakallemim; in many respects they approached
the view expressed in the present treatise, as may be noticed in
his own account, and consequently has merits or faults; 2, God, absolutely one,
possesses no attribute distinct from His essence. The sect is also called the
The historiafi .(אצחאב אלעדל ואלת וחיד) partisans of Justice and Unity
Al-Masudi describes also the disciples of Anan as partisans of Justice and
Unity, a proof that on the whole the Karaites followed the Mu'tazilah.-
(Munk.)
1 The Gaonim, to whom reference has been made above, are meant; perhaps
also the Karaites.
2 The Asha'ariyah are the disciples of Abu'l-hassan 'Ali ben Isma'il al-Ashari
of Bassora (born about 880 and died 970), who after having followed the
Mu'tazilah for some time, publicly declared in a mosque of Bassora, that he
abandoned that doctrine, and recognised the pre-existence of the Koran, the
attributes of God, and predestination as determining the acts of man (Munk).
These doctrines were afterwards modified. Comp. li., pag. 176, note 3.
3 Ibn Tibbon, 'distɔn o'tion, probably a combination of two
different renderings. It is difficult to say who were the philosophers to whose
works Maimonides here refers. He himself appears to have seen only some
of the writings of more recent philosophers. In a letter addressed to Samuel
Ibn Tibbon, he says that he had not seen Joseph Ibn Tsaddik's Sefer ha-olam
ha-katon (Book on the Mikrokosmos), but he appears to have known the
character of that author's philosophy. (See Miscellany of Hebrew Lit,
page 226.) The assertion that these philosophers adopted none of the methods
of the Mutakallemim seems to be inaccurate, for Bachya Ibn Pakudah
(in Chobhoth ha-lebhabhoth), and Joseph Ibn Tsaddik borrowed many argu-
ments from the system of the Mutakallemim. See Munk ad locum, and
Kaufman, Geschichte der Attributenlehre, Gotha, 1977, pages 280 and 336.
1
PART I.-CHAPTER LXXI.
277
1
2
the few works which were recently written by authors of that
school. You should also know that whatever the Mahome-
dans, that is, the Mu'tazilah and the Asha'ariyah, said on
these subjects, consists in nothing but theories founded on
propositions which are taken from the works of those
Greek and Syrian scholars who attempted to oppose the
systems of the philosophers, and to refute their arguments.
The following was the cause of that opposition: At the
time when the Christian Church brought the Greeks and
the Syrians into its fold, and promulgated its well-known
dogmas,³ the opinions of the philosophers were current
.גזרות והקדמות by מקדמאה Ibn Tibbon renders the single word 1
2 The works of the Greek philosophers, especially of Aristotle, were first
translated into Syriac, and then from the Syriac into Arabic for the Mahomed
dan scholars. When attacks were made on the Christian Church by followers
of the Aristotelean philosophy, the Fathers or Ecclesiastical writers, the de-
fenders of the Church, refuted the objections by arguments founded on Logic
and Dialectics, and suggested by that very system of philosophy.
3 Lit., "that which was already known." The force of the phrase "that
which was already known" (Dby p ND), is not apparent. If by this phrase
Maimonides simply intended to avoid a description of the Christian dogmas,
,(וטענו מה שטענו in Hebrew) ודעו אלנצרי מא דעו he would have said
"and they asserted their principles." Also the sentence "And kings arose
who protected the religion" seems to be out of place, as it is not stated what
share those kings had in the establishment of the new discipline. Again,
the sentence "the wise men among the Greeks and the Syrians in those
generations saw," etc., seems to imply that the educated portion of those
nations were Christians, and tried to guard the religion against the philo-
sophical views of the common people. We should perhaps read
learned Christians in those generations," etc. Most probably the text has
been corrupted by a fusion of two different readings: (a) DDY)7 1jybi
"the
the Christians set forth their dogma, which » שכבר נודע שאלו טענות וגו'
they knew as being very much exposed to great attacks emanating from
והיו דעות הפילוסופים מתפשטות (8) .those philosophical theories, etc
באומות ההם ומהם נולדה ופילוסופיא ונתחדשו מלכים שומרים הדת
ראו חכמי הדורות ההם. מן היונים והארמיים והולידו חכמת וגו
"Philosophical ideas at the same time spread among the people, and while
on the one hand philosophy was flourishing, kings on the other hand rose as
defenders of the Christian faith, the Greek and Syrian scholars of those
generations considered the state of things, and founded," etc. Narboni, ad
locum, remarks: They did so in order to find favour in the eyes of the kings,
278
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
1
2
amongst those nations; and whilst philosophy ¹ flourished,
kings became defenders of the Christian faith. The learned
Greek and Syrian Christians of the age, seeing³ that their
dogmas were unquestionably exposed to severe attacks from
the existing philosophical systems, laid the foundation for
this science of Dogmatics; they commenced by putting forth
such propositions as would support their doctrines, and be
useful for the refutation of opinions opposed to the funda-
mental principles of the Christian religion.
4
When the Mahomedans caused Arabic translations of the
writings of the Philosophers to be made, those criticisms
were likewise translated. When the opinions of John the
Grammarian, of Ibn Adi,5 and of kindred authors on those
subjects were made accessible to them, they adopted them,
and imagined that they had arrived at the solution of
important problems. Moreover, they selected from the
opinions of the ancient philosophers whatever seemed ser-
viceable to their purposes, although later critics had proved
that those theories were false ; as, e.g., the theories of atoms
and of a vacuum. They believed that the discussions of those
authors were of a general character, and contained proposi-
6
the defenders of the Christian religion; "if a ruler hearken to lies, all his
servants are wicked," Prov. xxix. 12.
1 Br. Mus. MS., Or. 1423, has hab, "the philosophers," and
this corresponds better to "kings."
2 “The scholars" (Noby) are here contrasted with "the philosophers "
(DONE); the Christian theologians are meant.
(עלמא)
.אשר ראו חכמי הדורות ההם וראו,Charizi 3
4 John Philiponus, the grammarian, flourished at Alexandria in the sixth
and the seventh centuries. The treatises of Philiponus, to which Maimonides
seems to allude, are-Refutation of the work of Proclus on the eternity of the
Universe, and Cosmogony of Moses.(Munk.)
Abu Zacariyya Yachya ibn Adi, a Christian Jacobite, of Mesopotamia, lived
at Bagdad in the tenth century. He was a pupil of Al-farabi, and made him-
self known by his Arabic translations of the works of Aristotle and their Com-
mentaries. Maimonides does not appear to have known when that author lived,
otherwise he would not have said that the first Mahomedan Mutakallemim
borrowed from his writings.-(Munk.)
6 See Arist. Metaphys., I., i. and vii. Below, ch. lxxiii., Propos. 1 and 2.
PART I.—CHAPTER LXXI.
279
2
3
tions useful for the defence of positive religion.¹ At a sub-
sequent period the same theories were more fully developed,
and presented an aspect unknown to those Theologians of
the Greeks and other nations who were the immediate suc-
cessors of the Philosophers. At a later time, when the
Mahomedans adopted certain peculiar theological theories,
they were naturally obliged to defend them; and when
their new theories again became the subject of controversy
among them, each party laid down such propositions as
suited their special doctrine.
G
4
Their arguments undoubtedly involved certain principles
which concerned the three communities-Jews, Christians,
and Mahomedans, such as the creatio ex nihilo, which afforded
support to the belief in miracles and to various other doc-
trines. There are, however, other subjects of belief which
the Christians and Mahomedans have undertaken to defend,
such as the doctrine of the Trinity in the theological works
of the former, and "the Word" in the works of some
5
¹ This sentence is here out of place, and is but a different form of the one
which begins “Their arguments undoubtedly," etc.
2 The Arabic ■ denotes (according to Munk ¤¶, “to enter”), "to be
troubled,” Ibn Tibbon, 1 (comp. Am. vi. 6); one MS. has y' instead
of 1.—Charizi has 1971. The original from which he translated had
probably hy instead of ; two Leyden MSS. have by.—(Munk.)
3 This may be taken literally, that they lived a short time after the Phi-
losophers, but also figuratively, that their opinions did not much differ from
those of the Greek Philosophers.
(C
4 Lit.,
There is no doubt that there are things," scil., among those
arguments. Ibn Tibbon adds here D, "among them," which is not, as
Munk suggests, superfluous; for it is not necessary to say that there are things
common to the three forms of religion, but that in those writings there are
subjects which concern all the three communities.
5 Although only one principle, the "creatio ex nihilo" is mentioned, the
plural X (Hebr. D'77) is here used, because that theory implies many
questions. As regards the grammatical construction, the Hebrew deviates
from the Arabic. The latter makes the pronoun '1 agree with NWN, while
in the Hebrew the pronoun Nagrees with DND which follows, and not
with '17, which precedes.
6 i.e., Whether the divine word addressed to Mahomed is eternal as the
Divine Being, or a thing created, according to the opinion of the Mu'tazilah.
280
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
Mahomedan sects; with a view of proving the dogmas which
they thus desired to establish, they were compelled to resort
to certain hypotheses. It is not our object to criticise things
which are peculiar to either creed, or books which were
written exclusively in the interest of the one community or
the other. We merely maintain that the earlier Theolo-
gians, both of the Greek Christians and of the Mahomedans,
when they laid down their propositions, did not investigate
the real properties of things; first of all they considered
what must be the properties of the things which should yield
proof for or against a certain creed; and when this was
found they asserted that the thing must be endowed with
those properties; then they employed the same assertion as
a proof for the identical arguments which had led to the
assertion,¹ and by which they either supported or refuted
a certain opinion. This course was followed by able
men2 who originated this method, and adopted it in their
writings. They professed to be free from preconceived
opinions, and to have been led to a stated result by actual
research. Therefore when philosophers of a subsequent date
studied the same writings they did not perceive the true
character of the arguments; on the contrary, they found in
the ancient works, strong proofs and a valuable support for
the acceptance or the rejection of certain opinions, and thus
thought that, so far as religious principles were concerned,
there was no necessity whatever to prove or refute any of
their propositions, and that the first Mutakallemim had dis-
cussed those subjects with the sole object of defeating certain
views of the philosophers, and demonstrating the insuffi-
ciency of their proofs.3 Persons who hold this opinion, do
not suspect how much they are mistaken; for the first
Mutakallemim tried to prove a proposition when it was
The words "which had led to its assertion" have no equivalent in
Charizi's version.
האנשים ההם is here used instead of המשכילים .Hebr אלעקלא The term 2
.mentioned above חכמי הדורות ההם and
3 See page 277, note 2.
PART I.—CHAPTER LXXI.
281
?
expedient to demonstrate its truth; and to disprove it, when
its rejection was desirable, and when it was contrary to the
opinion which they wished to uphold, although the con-
tradiction might only become obvious after the application
of a hundred successive propositions. In this manner the
earlier Mutakallemim effected a radical cure of the malady!
I tell you, however, as a general rule, that Themistius¹ was
right in saying that the properties of things can not adapt
themselves to our opinions, but our opinions must be adapted
to the existing properties.2
Having studied the works of these Mutakallemim, as far as
I had an opportunity,³ just as I had studied the writings of
the philosophers according to the best of my ability, I found
that the method of all Mutakallemim was the same in its
general characteristics, namely, they assume that the really
existing form of things proves nothing at all, because it is
11
1 An expounder of the Aristotelian philosophy. He lived in the fourth
century.—Narboni expresses his surprise that Maimonides quoted Themistius,
instead of citing the words of Aristotle himself, and finds, as the only solu-
tion of the difficulty, the fact that Maimonides, when writing this work, was
not so much engaged in the study of the works of Aristotle as in the writings
of later authors. The following passage of Aristotle's Metaph. (IV. 5) is
quoted by Narboni: εἴτε γὰρ τὰ δοκοῦντα πάντα ἐστὶν ἀληθῆ καὶ τὰ φαινόμενα,
ἀνάγκη πάντα ἅμα ἀληθῆ καὶ ψευδῆ εἶναι. πολλοὶ γὰρ τἀναντία ὑπολαμβά-
νουσιν ἀλλήλους, καὶ τοὺς μὴ ταὐτὰ δοξάζοντας ἑαυτοῖς διεψεῦσθαι νομίζου-
"If the thoughts and opinions of men were all true, then everything would
at the same time be true and false; because frequently one man believes the
opposite of another, and thinks that those who have not the same opinion as
he himself are wrong." It may be true that Maimonides did not read the
original works of Aristotle; but it cannot be denied that the words of The-
mistius convey the ideas which Maimonides expresses here more clearly than
those of Aristotle.
σιν
2 I.e., Our opinions concerning existing beings would not be correct, were
we, like the first Mutakallemim, arbitrarily to assume certain axioms and
principles, and thence deduct the properties which the things must have. The
reverse is the correct method: to study first the properties of the things, and
thence deduce general principles.
""
3 Shemtob and others find in the two phrases "as far as opportunity was
given to me (lit., "when
"when I had the chance,") and "as much as I could,"
used respectively in reference to the works of the Mutakallemim, and to those
of the Philosophers, an indication that Maimonides studied the former only
occasionally, while he devoted all his attention to the latter.
282
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
merely one of the various phases of the things,¹ the opposite
of which is equally admissible to our minds. In many in-
stances these Theologians were guided by their imagination,²
and thought that they were following the dictates of the
intellect. They set forth the propositions which I shall
describe to you, and demonstrated by their peculiar mode of
arguing that the Universe had a beginning. The theory
of the creatio ex nihilo being thus established, they asserted,
as a logical consequence, that undoubtedly there must be
a Maker who created the Universe: Next they showed that
this Maker is One, and from the Unity of the Creator they
deduced His Incorporeality. This method was adopted by
every Mahomedan Mutakallem in the discussion of this
subject, and by those of our co-religionists who imitated
them and walked in their footsteps. Although the Muta-
kallemim disagree in the methods of their proofs, and employ
different propositions in demonstrating the act of creation
or in rejecting the eternity of the Universe, they invariably
begin with proving the creatio ex nihilo, and establish on that
proof the existence of God. I have examined this method,
and find it most objectionable. It must be rejected, because
all the proofs for the creation have weak points, and cannot
be considered as convincing except by those who do not know
the difference between a proof, a dialectical argument, and
a sophism.3 Those who understand the force of the different
methods will clearly see that all the proofs for the creation
are questionable, because propositions have been employed
¹ Lit., "habit" (Munk: "habitude," Hebr.
ID).
2 Comp. ch. lxviii., pag. 259, and Eight Chapters, etc., ch. ii.
3 Comp. ch. li., pp. 179 and 177. The difference between the three kinds of
arguments is defined by Maimonides, in Milloth higgayon, ch. viii., as follows:
"The conclusion made from two firmly established premises is called a de-
monstrative syllogism ('n pл), and the part of Logic treating of these induc-
Qu
*
tions is called n n (syllogism): if both premises, or one of them,
are probable, the conclusion is dialectical (1) pn), and the part of Logic
that treats of these is called (dialectics); if one or both premises
are false, the conclusion is a misleading conclusion, and the part of Logic
that treats of them is called Ny axbn (sophistry). Comp. Aristot.
Metaph. IV. 2. : ἔστι δὲ ἡ διαλεκτικὴ πειραστικὴ περὶ ὧν ἡ φιλοσοφία γνω-
ριστική· ἡ δὲ σοφιστικὴ φαινομένη, οὖσα δ᾽ οὔ.
PART I.-CHAPTER LXXI.
283
which have never been proved. I think that the utmost
that can be effected by believers in the truth of Revelation
is to expose the shortcomings in the proofs of philosophers
who hold that the Universe is eternal, and if forsooth a man
has effected this, he has accomplished a great deed! For
it is well known to all clear and correct thinkers who
do not wish to deceive themselves, that this question,
namely, whether the Universe has been created or is eternal,
cannot be answered with mathematical certainty; here
human intellect must pause. We shall have occasion to
speak more fully on this subject, but for the present it
may suffice to state that the philosophers have for the last
three thousand years³ been continually divided on that
question, as far as we can learn from their works and the
records of their opinions.*
Such being the nature of this theory, how can we employ
it as
an axiom and establish on it the existence of the
Creator? In that case the existence of God would be un-
certain; if the universe had a beginning, God does exist; if
it be eternal, God does not exist; the existence of God would
therefore remain either an open question,5 or we should have
to declare that the creation had been proved, and compel
others by mere force to accept this doctrine, in order thus to
be enabled to declare that we have proved the existence of
God. Such a process is utterly inadmissible. The true
method, which is based on a logical and indubitable proof,
1
1
a place where the intellect must מעמד שכלי in Hebrew,,מוקף עקל
"
stop, it being unable to pass that limit. Comp. ch. xxxi., pag. 107, “A
boundary is undoubtedly set to the human mind, which it cannot pass."
2 Part II., ch. i., sqq.
3 Maimonides seems to refer to the time of Abraham, who taught that the
Universe was created by God, in opposition to His fellow-creatures, who had
a different belief.
their records," is omitted.
and ,(ואכבארהם .Ar) ודבריהם In the editions of Ibn Tibbon's Version 4
(6
5 The words pa in Tibbon's Version are an addition, explaining the
.על כל פנים או יהיה כן,so" : in Charizi * כן word
6 Ibn Palquera says that a theory built upon a false, or at least a weak
foundation, as, according to the opinion of Maimonides, the theory of the
284
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
consists, according to my opinion, in demonstrating the
existence of God, His unity, and His incorporeality by such
philosophical arguments as are founded on the theory of
the eternity of the Universe. I do not propose this method
as though I believed in the eternity of the Universe, for I
do not follow the philosophers in this point, but because by
the aid of this method these three principles, viz., the
existence of God, His unity and His incorporeality can be
fully proved and verified, irrespectively of the question
whether the universe has had a beginning or not. After
firmly establishing these three principles by an exact proof,
we shall treat of the problem of creation and discuss it as
fully as possible. You are at liberty to content yourself
with the declaration of the Mutakallemim, and to believe
that the act of creation has been demonstrated by proof;
nor can there be any harm if you consider it unproven that
the universe had a beginning, and if you accept this theory
as supported by the authority of the Prophets. Before you
learn our opinion on prophecy, which will be given in the
present work,¹ do not ask, how could the belief in prophecy
be justified, if it were assumed that the universe was eternal.
We will not now expatiate on that subject. You should,
however, know that some of the propositions, started and
proved by the Radicals,2 i.e., the Mutakallemim, in order to

Eternity of the Universe is, could not be "perfectly correct" (nonn).
The argument of Maimonides is as follows: The Universe is either eternal or
had a beginning; though he himself believes that it has been created, he cannot
give a scientific proof. The principles of Faith must therefore be shown to be
equally true according to both theories.
without applying any logical demonstration) that a Creator must exist, if the
creatio ex nihilo is assumed; he therefore thinks it more important to show
that the three principles mentioned here can be demonstrated (a muna
“by a convincing proof") even according to the theory of those philosophers
who believe that the Universe is eternal.
השלם)
.(האמת
¹ Part II., ch. xxxii. sqq.
מושכל ראשון) It is easy to see
are philosophers who engage (שרשיים .Hebr אצוליון) The Radicals 2
in examining and proving the fundamental principles of Religion as
distinguished from the practice and the laws (p). Ibn Tibbon renders, in
PART I.—CHAPTER LXXIÍ.
285
1
prove the act of creation, imply an order of things contrary
to that which really exists, and involve a complete change
in the laws of nature; this fact will be pointed out to you,¹
for it will be necessary to mention their propositions and
their argumentation. My method, as far as I now can
explain it in general terms, is as follows. The universe is
either eternal or has had a beginning; if it had a beginning,
there must necessarily exist a being which caused the begin-
ning; this is clear to common sense; for a thing that has
had a beginning, cannot be the cause of its own beginning,
another being must have caused it. The universe was,
therefore, created by God. If on the other hand the uni-
verse were eternal, it could in various ways be proved that,
apart from the things which constitute the universe, there
exists a being which is neither body nor a force in a body,
and which is one, eternal, not preceded by any cause, and
immutable. That being is God. You see that the proofs
for the Existence, the Unity and the Incorporeality of God
must vary according to the propositions admitted by us.
Only in this way we can succeed in obtaining a perfect
proof, whether we assume the eternity or the creation of
the universe. For this reason you will find in my works 2
on the Talmud, whenever I have to speak of the funda-
mental principles of our religion, or to prove the existence
of God, that I employ arguments which imply the eternity
of the universe. I do not believe in that eternity, but I
wish to establish the principle of the existence of God by
an indisputable proof, and should not like to see this most
important principle founded on a basis which every one
could shake or attempt to demolish, and which others might
קדמוני המדברים שהיו עיקר חכמת by אלאצוליון ch. lxxiii., the term
.המדברים
,are given in Hebrew שנוי סדרי בראשית and הפוך העולם The phrases 1
also in the Arabic original, because these are terms occurring in Talmud and
Midrash. Comp. Babyl. Talmud, Shabbath 53 b.
2 There is no passage, either in his Mishneh Torah or in his Commentary on
the Mishnah to which this remark would apply.
286
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
consider as not being established at all; especially when I
see that the proofs of the philosophers are based on those
visible properties of things, which can only be ignored by
persons possessing certain preconceived notions,¹ while the
Mutakallemim establish their arguments on propositions.
which are to such an extent contrary to the actual state of
things as to compel these arguers to deny altogether the
existence of the laws of nature. When I shall have to treat
of the creation, I shall in a special chapter 2 prove my
opinion to some extent, and shall attain the same end which
every one of the Mutakallemim had in view, yet I shall not
contradict the laws of nature, or reject any such part of the
Aristotelean theory as has been proved to be correct. Even
the most cogent of the proofs³ offered by the Mutakallemim
respecting the act of creation, has only been obtained by
reversing the whole order of things and by rejecting every-
thing fully demonstrated by the philosophers. I, however,
shall be able to give a similar proof without ignoring the laws
of nature and without being forced to contradict facts which
have been clearly perceived. I find it necessary to mention
to you the general propositions of the Mutakallemim, by
which they prove the act of creation, the existence of God,
His Unity and His Incorporeality. I intend to explain
their method, and also to point out the inferences which
are to be drawn from each proposition. After this, I shall
describe those theories of the philosophers which are closely
connected with our subject, and I shall then explain their
method.
4
Do not ask me to prove in this work the propositions of
the philosophers, which I shall briefly mention to you; they
.סודות אחרות,Charizi ; קצת דעות,Ibn Tibbon 1
1
2 Part II., ch. xix.
3 This refers to the Fifth Proposition (ch. lxxiv.) according to which there
must be a certain being that determines which, of all possible forms, accidents,
etc., are to be connected with everything; for otherwise it would be inexplicable
how it happened that one form came to be preferred to all other equally
admissible forms.
4 Charizi: ann jb "nn', "to what objections that leads."
PART I.- CHAPTER LXXII.
287
form the principal part of Physics and Metaphysics. Nor
must you expect that I should repeat the arguments of the
Mutakallemim in support of their propositions, with which
they wasted their time, with which the time of future gene-
rations will likewise be wasted, and on which numerous
books have been written. Their propositions, with few
exceptions, are contradicted by the visible properties of
things, and beset with numerous objections. For this
reason they were obliged to write many books and contro-
versial works in defence of their theories, for the refuta-
tion of objections, and for the reconciliation of all apparent
contradictions, although in reality this object cannot be
attained by any sophistical contrivance.3 As to the propo-
sitions of the philosophers which I shall briefly explain, and
which are indispensable for the demonstration of the three
principles -the Existence, the Unity, and the Incorpo-
reality of God, they will for the greater part be admitted
by you as soon as you shall hear them and understand their
meaning; whilst in the discussion of other parts reference
must be made for their proofs to works on Physics and
Metaphysics, and if you direct your attention to such pas-
sages as will be pointed out to you, you will find everything
verified that requires verification.
4
I have already told you that nothing exists except God
and this universe, and that there is no other evidence for
His Existence but this universe in its entirety and in
its several parts. Consequently the universe must be
examined as it is; the propositions must be derived from
those properties of the universe which are clearly perceived,
and hence you must know its visible form and its nature.
Then only will you find in the universe evidence for the
existence of a being not included therein. I have considered
,הספקות המתרגשות : Ibn Tibbon 1
,לרוב הענין
2 Charizi: ¡n 17, “on account of the great extent of the subject.”
אפשר בזה תחבולה
,ואם
1
3 Ika Tibbon: biann nia waN 'N DNI, "although no means can
be found by which this could be done.”
* Ch. xxxiv., pag. 119.
288
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
it, therefore, necessary to discuss first in a merely colloquial
manner, in the next chapter, the totality of existing things,
and to confine our remarks to such as have been fully
proved and established beyond all doubt. In subsequent
chapters I shall treat of the propositions of the Muta-
kallemim, and describe the method by which they explain
the four¹ fundamental principles. In the chapters which
will follow, I propose to expound the propositions of the
philosophers and the methods applied by them in verifying
those principles. In the last place, I shall explain to you
the method applied by me in proving those four¹ principles,
as I have stated to you.
CHAPTER LXXII.
A Parallel between the Universe and Man.
KNOW 2 that this Universe, in its entirety, is nothing else
but one individual being;³ that is to say, the outermost
¹ I.e., The creation of the Universe, in addition to the three principles men-
tioned above.
זה הפרק יקר ונכבד מאד נקרא שיעור :Of this chapter Shemtob says 2
.הקומה
"This chapter is most important and most interesting; it is called
Shiur hakkomah" (lit. "the measure of the height"), alluding to a cabbalistic
work of that title, which contains the most surprising mysteries concerning
the Supreme Being.
3 In this chapter the author treats of the principle that the whole universe
is one organised body, every part of which has an individual function as a
part of the whole. He further maintains that this organic body has the pro-
perties of a living being; it possesses life, it moves, and has a soul. The words
Charizi,)
are added, probably, for the sake of emphasis, in the sense of "doubtlessly'
,Ibn Tibbon לא זולת זה in Hebrew,לא גיר) " and nothing else *
"
""
בלבד
""
,in the explanatory phrase which follows). Saadiah בלא ספק Hebrew בלא שך)
ואחר כן חקרתי ואמרתי שמא יש ארצות-: in Emunoth ve-deoth I., says
רבות ושמים רבים יקיפו כל שמים מהם הארץ שלהם ויהיו עולמים שאין
The theory that the universe is .להם תכלית וראיתי זה נמנע מצר הטבע
to be considered as one finite system, being in all its parts regulated by
one and the same idea, was held by the greatest representatives of ancient
PART I.—CHAPTER LXXII.
289
2
heavenly sphere,¹ together with all included therein, is as
regards individuality beyond all question a single being like
Said and Omar. The variety of its substances-I mean the
substances of that sphere and all its component parts-is
like the variety of the substances of a human being:³ just
as, e.g., Said is one individual, consisting of various solid
substances, such as flesh, bones, sinews, of various humours,*
and of various spiritual elements; in like manner this
philosophy, by Plato and Aristotle, and continued to be maintained by
the philosophers of the Middle Ages. Comp. Plato, Timæus :-ourws
οὖν δὴ κατὰ λόγον τὸν εἰκότα δεῖ λέγειν, τόνδε τὸν κόσμον, ζῶον ἔμψυχον
ἔννουν τε τῇ ἀληθείᾳ διὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ γενέσθαι πρόνοιαν
τῷ
γὰρ τῶν νοουμένων καλλίστῳ καὶ κατὰ πάντα τελέῳ μάλιστ᾽ αὐτὸν θεὸς
ὁμουῶσαι βουληθεὶς ζῶον ἓν ὁρατὸν, πανθ' ὅσα κατὰ φύσιν αὐτοῦ συγγεῖ ζῶα
ἐντὸς ἔχον ἑαυτοῦ, ξυνέστησε· πότερον οὗ ὀρθῶς ἕνα οὐρανὸν προςειρήκαμεν,
ἢ πολλοὺς καὶ ἀπείρους λέγειν ἦν ὀρθότερον, ἕνα. τὸ γὰρ περιέχον πάντα
ὁπόσα νοητὰ ζῶα, μεθ᾿ ἑτέρου δεύτερον οὐκ ἂν ποτ' εἴη. Similarly, Aristotle,
in De Cœlo I., c. 7, 8.
1 The Universe was believed to consist of a sphere, including several
spheres within itself, and having the earth in its centre. The outermost
sphere is the all-encompassing sphere (ba qıpon baba), or from another
point of view, called by Charizi ¡Syn Sab, the uppermost sphere. Of that
•
כי אין גוף למעלה מגלגל המזלות,sphere Ibn Ezra says in his Commentaries
(on Gen. i. 15); and bɔn arpp in nbyph o'n "'m' 7'8 (ibid. i. 6, second
recension).
2 The Hebrew translations substitute for these Arabic names the Hebrew
Reuben and Shimeon.
the * ; והשתנות כחות זה העגול כהשתנות כחות איברי אדם : Charizi 3
(i
variety of the forces of that sphere corresponds to the variety which is noticed
in the forces of the various portions of the human body.”
4 The ancients assumed four kinds of humour which constituted the tem-
perament of man; the latter varied according to the relative proportion of the
different humours. Man was held to be of a sanguine, phlegmatic, bilious, or
melancholic temperament, according to a supposed predominance of the red,
white, green, or black humour in his system.
5 The spirits here mentioned are material; as compared with the afore-
mentioned humours they are more rarefied; they seem to be a species of gas
pervading the body, and having different functions according as it comes into
contact with the different organic parts. Although these "spiritual elements"
or "spirits" determine to some extent the disposition, the emotion, and even
the mental operations of man, they are different from his soul and his intellect.
The following is a translation of what Maimonides, in a letter to al-Malek
al-Afdal, son of Saladin, had to say of these spirits (the Arabic, with a
ए
290
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
sphere in its totality is composed of the celestial orbs, the
four elements and their combinations; there is no vacuum
whatever therein, but the whole space is filled up with matter.
Its centre¹ is occupied by the earth, earth is surrounded by
water, air encompasses the water, fire envelopes the air, and
this again is enveloped by the fifth substance (quintessence).
These substances form numerous spheres, one being enclosed
within another so that no intermediate empty space, no
vacuum, is left.² One sphere surrounds and closely joins the
French translation, is given by Munk in a note ad locum; the Hebrew version
is printed in Kerem Chemed, Vol. IV., pag. 24): "What the medical men
call spirits (11) are vapours which exist in the bodies of animals. The
air which the animals breathe is the origin and the principal substance of
these spirits. The vapours in the blood of the liver and the veins which
issue from it are called the physical spirit (n'yab ni7, πvɛõµa qvoikòv);
in the heart and the arteries they are called the vital spirit (7,
πvεvμа Swтiкòv); in the inner part of the brains and in the canals of the
nerves they are called animal spirit (n) 117, πvɛõµa vxikov). The
origin and the substance of all these spirits being the air which the animal
breathes, they change, and their action produces an effect which is contrary to
their proper function if the air is damp or vitiated or impure. Galenus
advises that the air to be breathed should be of the utmost uniformity and
purity. The more the spirit is rarefied the more it is affected by the
changes of the atmosphere. The physical spirit is denser than the vital spirit;
the latter denser than the animal spirit; so that the smallest change in the
condition of the atmosphere produces a noticeable change in the condition of the
animal spirit. Hence you find people whose mental operations suffer from the
deteriorated condition of the atmosphere; I mean to say, they are confused,
deficient in reasoning and in memory, although no change can be noticed
in the physical and vital functions of the body." Charizi renders
by NINI NI; Palquera omits the phrase altogether, and seems to use
ומן ארואה
הרוח החיוני for he explains it by ,רוחות in the sense of לחות here the term
it is possible that the word has been omitted by the neglect of ; והנפשי הטבעי
the copyist, or by a typographical error. In the Commentary of Mosheh b.
Shelomoh, of Salerno (MS. of the London Beth-ha-midrash Library), the word
כבר באר הרב רבינו כי חלקי הנפש הם חמשה הזן :is explained כחות
המרגיש והמדמה והמתעורר והשכלי ולכל חלק וחלק יש כחות רבות לחלק
הזן יש שבעה כחות ולחלק המרגיש יש ה' כחות וכן לכולן
¹ In Ibn Tibbon's Version the Hebrew for "centre" is 1, like the
Arabic, or p. Charizi uses instead of it by "that which stands
still," in contradistinction to all other parts which move around it.
² The substance filling space, though immutable (II. 11, xwin nɔnwi xb
.נקודת מרכז
מרכז
PART I.-CHAPTER LXXII.
291
other. All the spheres¹ revolve with constant uniformity,
without acceleration or retardation;2 that is to say, each
sphere retains its individual nature as regards its velocity
IDYYA XINN), must at least be of an elastic nature, contracting and expanding
according to necessity. The Universe, consisting of a sphere with the earth
in its centre, contains, according to the statement of our author, eccentric
spheres, whose centres rotate round the centre of the whole system, and which,
therefore, continually change their position with regard to the fixed centre.
On that account, Ibn Caspi wholly denies the existence of the eccentric spheres.
The various heavenly phenomena are the results of the apparent diurnal rotation
of the whole celestial sphere with sun, moon, and stars, and of the course of sun,
moon, and planets, through the constellations of the Zodiac. Their deviations
from an imaginary middle course, apparent irregularities, the number of which
increases with the progress of science and the improvement of the means of
observations, phenomena which, according to the present state of science, are
all explained by the Law of Gravitation, were in the time of Maimonides,
according to the theory of Ptolemy, considered to be the result of the
combined action of several eccentric spheres appertaining to each of the planets
and moving in different directions. Instead of eccentric spheres some preferred
epicycles; others combined the two. The number of spheres and epicycles
was gradually increased to 55, (their number was considered to be 38 in the
time of Ibn Roshd, see Moreh ha-moreh ad locum). Although Maimonides
speaks here with an apparent conviction of the theory of the spheres, and with
still greater positiveness in Mishneh Torah (Madda', I. iii. 27), he is by no
means satisfied with the Ptolemean system. His view is that both the
eccentricity of the spheres (Mishneh Torah, l.c., "the spheres appear to be
concentric "), and the existence of epicycles are systems which have not
been proved; they are mere hypotheses assumed for the sake of explaining
certain phenomena, and introducing system into the apparent disorder and
confusion. (Comp. Part II. xi. and xix.)
"6
¹ Maimonides seems to use the two terms
(6
(Hebr. 17, lit. “sphere” or
‘globe,”) and ¬Þ♬ (Hebr. baba, lit. “circle” or orbit,”) indiscriminately in
the sense of sphere; e.g., speaking of the relative velocity of the spheres
(ONÍN, Hebr. D'717), he describes the velocity of the all-encompassing
as the greatest. Comp. "The stars contained in
are part of their respective orbits (7)." In the
translation, the variation of the original has here been retained, but the two
terms denote evidently one and the same thing.
2 Maimonides only speaks of the regular retrocession of the equinoctial
nodes; the precession is not recognised by him. Ptolemy knows only of the
motion of the Zodiac in one direction; others after him, but long before Mai-
monides, also noticed the periodical motion of the Zodiac in the opposite
direction. See Yesod Olam, by Isaac Israeli (ed. by B. Goldberg and L.
Rosenkranz; Berlin, 1848), II. 6.
גלגל .Hebr פלך) sphere
(אלאכר) those spheres
U 2
292
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
and the peculiarity of its motion; it does not move at
one time quicker, at another slower. Compared with each
other, however, some of the spheres move with less, others
with greater velocity. The outermost, all-encompassing
sphere, revolves with the greatest speed; it completes its
revolution in one day, and causes every thing to participate
in its motion, just as every particle of a thing moves when
the entire body is in motion; for all existing beings stand in
the same relation to that sphere as a part of a thing stands to
the whole. These spheres have not a common centre; the
centres of some of them are identical with the centre of the
Universe, while those of the rest are different from it.¹
Some of the spheres have a motion independent of that of the
whole Universe, constantly revolving from East to West,
while other spheres move from West to East. The stars
contained in those spheres are part of their respective
orbits; they are fixed in them, and have no motion of their
own, but participating in the motion of the sphere of which
they are a part, they themselves appear to move. The entire
substance of this revolving fifth element is unlike the sub-
stance of those bodies which consist of the other four ele-
ments, and are enclosed by the fifth element.
2
The number of these spheres encompassing the Universe
cannot possibly be less than eighteen; it may even be
larger; but this is a matter for further investigation. It
also remains an open question whether there are spheres
which, without moving round the centre of the Universe,
have nevertheless a circular motion.³ Within that sphere
¹ See page 290, note 2.
2 The number eighteen mentioned here as a minimum is in Mishneh Torah,
l.c., given without any reserve. The eighteen spheres are, according to Shem-
tob and Efodi, distributed in the following way: the Moon has three, Venus
three, each of the remaining five planets two, the fixed stars one, the arabhoth
one. A different account occurs in the Perush Mishneh Torah, l.c.: Sun and
Venus, each three; the other planets, each two, etc.
³ See page 290, note 2. Ibn Caspi, and after him Efodi, Shem-tob, and
Narboni, contend that this is impossible, because only three kinds of motion
are admissible; the circular motion round the permanent centre, the linear
PART I.-CHAPTER LXXII.
293
2
3
which is nearest to us,¹ a substance is contained which is
different from the substance of the fifth element; it first
received four primary forms, and then became in those four
forms, four kinds of matter: earth, water, air, fire. Each
of the four elements occupies a certain position of its own.
assigned to it by nature; it is not found in another place,
so long as no other but its own natural force acts upon
it ;
it is a dead body; it has no life, no perception, no spontaneous
motion, and remains at rest in its natural place. When
moved from its place by some external force, it returns to-
wards its natural place as soon as that force ceases to operate.
For the elements have the property of moving back to their
place in a straight line, but they have no properties which
would cause them to remain where 5 they are, or to move
otherwise than in a straight line. The rectilinear motions
of these four elements when returning to their original
place are of two kinds, either centrifugal, viz., the motion of
the air and the fire; or centripetal, viz., the motion of the
earth, and the water; and when the elements have reached
their original place, they remain at rest.
4
The spherical bodies," on the other hand, have life, possess
motion in a straight line towards the centre, and that in the opposite direction;
that of the epicycles is different from all these three. Maimonides expresses
the same opinion in the second part of this work.
1 That is, the sphere included within the sphere of the Moon. Comp.
Mishneh Torah, Madda', III.
2 The original uniform, or rather formless, substance received-it is here
not stated how-four different forms, by which it changed into the four
elements.
3 This is said in order to distinguish the elements from the spheres and from
the bodies contained in the spheres, which were stated to be living and
moving on their own accord. According to Palaquera, this remark has been
made in opposition to those who attribute life to water and to air.
if not prevented by * אם לא ימנענו מונע Charizi has here the addition 4
some other force."
5 I.e., In the place to which some power forced it, away from its own
place. Munk unnecessarily adds in the translation "toujours."
← I.e., The spheres and the heavenly bodies contained in them. Comp. Sefer
ha-madda': Yesode ha-torah, iii. 9, 121 „Dibabamı orabian, “All the
stars and the spheres," etc.
294
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
We work
a soul by which they move spontaneously; they have no pro-
perties by which they could at any time come to a state of
rest; in their perpetual rotations they are not subject to any
change, except that of position.¹ The question 2 whether
they are endowed with an intellect, enabling them to com-
prehend, cannot be solved without deep research. Through
the constant revolution of the fifth element, with all con-
tained therein, the four elements are forced to move and to
change their respective positions,3 so that fire and air¹ are
driven into the water, and again these three elements enter
the depth of the earth. Thus are the elements mixed toge-
ther; and when they return to their respective places, parts
.(Charizi) בתכונה or בתשומה ; (Ibn Tibbon) בהנחה,In Hebrew 1
2 The question is answered by Maimonides in the affirmative. Comp. II.
iv., et seqq., and Sefer ha-madda', Yesode ha-torah, iii. 9.
3 Maimonides does not tell us how in his opinion the fifth substance affects
the four elements by its circular motion. He says that they are forced out of
their original and natural place. The four elements being placed in the centre
of the whole system, one above or around the other, remain at rest so long
as their natural order is not disturbed. The fifth element, that of the spheres,
being in close contact with the nearest of the four elements, sets parts of it in
motion, and this motion is gradually communicated to the other elements.
The tendency of the particles of the elements to move in a straight line
towards the centre or away from it, while the motion of the spheres forces
them in a circular path round the centre, together with the specific weight
which gives to one element a greater, to the other a smaller velocity,
appear, according to the ancient philosophers, to effect a mixture of the four
elements. Ibn Sina (quoted in Moreh ha-moreh, page 45) describes the change
מהגלגלים יפלו כחות ביסודות וינועו אותם ויערבו :in the following words
אותם ויתהוו מהם נמצאים רבים ואלו היסודות הארבעה יראה שאינם על
פשיטותם כי כחות הגופים הגלגלים יפלשו בהם ויתחדשו בגופים התחתונים
הקרים חמימות יתערבו בהן ויתחרשו מפני זה אידים עשניים יתערבו
בהם מימות ואידות ויעלו למעלה כמו כן אידים מימיים ועשניים ארציים
(13) Dna 12¬yn", "The spheres influence the elements in such a manner,
that the latter are moved, mixed and changed into the forms of existing things.
These four elements do not appear to be simple; for the influence of the bodies
of the spheres penetrates into them, and in the lower cold bodies a certain heat
is created, causing vapours to rise and to mix with the elements; all kinds of
vapours then rise," etc.
4 Char.: 7871 WN, “the fire and the air," as subject to the verb "NY",
..
ביסודות in apposition to באש ובאויר,they go out ; lbn Tibbon
PART I.-
CHAPTER LXXII.
Waldor
295
of the earth, in quitting their places, move together with the
water, the air and the fire. In this whole process the ele-
ments act and react upon each other. The elements inter-
mixed, are then combined,¹ and form at first various kinds
of vapours; afterwards the several kinds of minerals, every
species of plants, and many species of living beings,² accord-
ing to the relative proportion of the constituent parts. All
transient beings have their origin in the elements, into
which again they resolve when their existence comes to an
end. The elements themselves are subject to being trans-
formed from one into another; for although one substance is
common to all, substance without form is in reality impos-
sible,³ just as the physical form of these transient beings
cannot exist without substance. The formation and the dis-
solution of the elements, together with the things composed of
them, and resolving into them, follow each other in rotation.4
The changes of the finite substance,5 in successively receiv-
ing one form after the other, may therefore be compared to
-
1 That is to say, they do not form a mechanical mixture of the elements
but rather a compound, in which each of the elements loses its essential pro-
perties.
2 Maimonides probably follows the Biblical account of the Creation, accord-
ing to which, the vapours and the atmosphere (rakia) were formed first (on
the second day), then followed the formation of the dry land (yabbashah)
with the minerals, the creation of the vegetable world (on the third day), and
of the animals (on the fifth and sixth days).
3 That is to say, the elements are not resolved into the original infinite
vλŋ, for it has no form (i.e., no specific properties), and cannot have a real
existence. If the elements were resolved into the hylic substance, and again
into one of the elements, this change would be equal to destruction and a
new creation. In a previous passage, when explaining the act of Creation,
Maimonides assumed an infinite, formless substance, which subsequently
received the four different forms. But here he explains the changes which
take place in the existing, material world; he therefore denies the existence
of formless matter, and of forms without matter. Destruction and origina-
tion are described as transitions from one form of existence into another.
These forms being of a finite number, their changes are compared to the
motion of a circle revolving round its centre, and to the periodical re-
appearance of every point of the circle in the same place.
* Comp. ch. xi., pag. 59, note 3.
5 Lit., "substance possessing the form."
296
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
the revolution of the sphere in space,¹ when each part of the
sphere periodically2 reappears in the same position.3
4
As the human body consists both of principal organs and
of other members which depend on them and cannot exist
without the control of those organs, so does the universe
consist both of principal parts, viz., the quintessence, which
encompasses the four elements and of other parts which are
subordinated and require a leader, viz., the four elements
and the things composed of them.
Again, the principal part in the human body, namely,
the heart," is in constant motion, and is the source of every
motion noticed in the body; it rules over the other members,
and communicates to them through its own pulsations the
force required for their functions. The outermost sphere
by its motion rules in a similar way over all other parts of
the universe, and supplies all things with their special pro-
perties. Every motion in the universe has thus its origin in
the motion of that sphere; and the soul of every animated
being derives its origin from the soul of that same sphere.
6
1 Lit., (C
as regards' where' "; Hebrew, N. While the abstract terms of
quantity and quality are expressed in Hebrew by nouns derived from the
(איכות כמות) ות to which the suffix איך and כמה interrogative particles
is added, no such abstract term has been derived from N, "where;" this
word is therefore employed in the sense of "space" or "position.”
(6
2 The Arabic 7 has been rendered
by Charizi and Palquera,
ninen by Ibn Tibbon. The latter word generally means in changing;"
but here it seems to be employed in the sense of "in repeating," like nin
(Gen. xli. 32).
3 The fem. termination in the Arabic, N'ya, agreeing with the plural,
UNYINN, has been erroneously retained by Ibn Tibbon and Charizi in the
Hebrew, where the suffix should be j,, agreeing with MM (Tibbon),
.(Charizi) תשומות or
4 The editions of Ibn Tibbon's version have 'P, "and the sphere which
encompasses," as if the outermost sphere consisted of a substance different
from that of the other spheres.
5 I.e., The blood in the heart.
,(כחתיו .Hebr) קואה soul, appears to correspond to ,(נפש .Hebr) נפס 6
"C
""
are
"forces," mentioned before. In the next passage, however, the "forces
divided into four classes, one of which is "the soul." We must either assume
that the term has in this place a wider meaning, and is identical with "force,"
or we must say that the sentence is here out of place. In the Moreh ha-moreh
(page 48) it is omitted.
""
PART 1.-CHAPTER LXXII.
297
X
1
The forces which according to this explanation are com-
municated by the spheres ¹ to this sublunary world are four
in number, viz., (a) the force which effects the mixture and
the composition of the elements, and which undoubtedly
suffices to form the minerals; (b) the force which supplies.
every growing thing with its vegetative functions; (c) the
force which gives to each living being its vitality, and (d)ˇ
the force which endows rational beings with intellect. All
this is effected through the action of light and darkness,
which are regulated by the position 2 and the motion of the
spheres round the earth.
When for one instant the beating of the heart is inter-
rupted, man dies, and all his motions and powers come to an
end. In a like manner would the whole universe perish,
and everything therein cease to exist if the spheres were to
come to a standstill.3
The living being as such is one through the action of its
heart, although some parts of the body are devoid of motion
and sensation, as, e.g., the bones, the cartilage, and similar
4
¹ Although in Arabic the singular is used, b, it includes all the
spheres, since all that is said about the principal and leading portion of the
universe applies equally to the "fifth element," which includes the all-
surrounding sphere as well as the other spheres. Ibn Tibbon, in rendering the
word by the plural, translated correctly, according to the sense, the plural
-
.
(C
Ibn Tibbon's Version, seems to be a mistake. Efodi and others explain it "their
vertical position straight above the earth," (by a WDVnw)); but
the word straight" is still superfluous and unintelligible. DN, "their
lustre," i.e., their stars, refers to the stars contained in the several spheres ;
the stars as well as the motion of the spheres are the causes of the constant
changes of darkness and light. Crescas and other commentators appear to
have found the reading DN in the Version of Ibn Tibbon.
3 Caspi finds it necessary to observe that the miracle by which the sun and
the moon stood still at the bidding of Joshua does not contradict this state-
ment, miracles being an exception to the ordinary course of nature.
4 Charizi and Palquera: Diby, "cartilage." "NY in the
Arabic text has been translated by . (Comp. Talm. Babyl., Zebhachim,
109; Mishnah Taharoth, i. 4); explained by some to signify Dп ; by
others, 7. By the Talmudical such portions of the flesh must
--
.agreeing with this noun ,(דורתהא and נורא .Arab) הקפם and אורם suffix in
in most of the printed editions of אורם which occurs instead of ,יושרם 2
298
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
parts. The same is the case with the entire universe;
although it includes many beings without motion and with-
out life, it is a single living being through the motion of the
sphere, which may be compared to the heart of an animated
being.¹ You must therefore consider the entire globe as one
individual being which is endowed with life, motion, and a
soul. This mode of considering the universe is, as will be
explained,² indispensable, that is to say, it is very useful³
for demonstrating the unity of God; it also helps to eluci-
date the principle that He who is One has created only one
being.
Again, it is impossible that any of the members of a
human body should exist by themselves, not connected with
the body, and at the same time should actually be organic
parts of that body, that is to say, that the liver should exist
by itself, the heart by itself, or the flesh by itself. In like.
manner, it is impossible that one part of the Universe
should exist independently of the other parts in the existing
order of things as here considered, viz., that the fire should
exist without the co-existence of the earth, or the earth
without the heaven, or the heaven without the earth.
4
In man there is a certain force which unites the members
of the body, controls them, and gives to each of them what
C
ستو
» במופת
*
be understood as are attached to the skin when it is being removed from the
body. (See Aruch., sub voce,
1 Lit., "of those possessing a heart."
2 In Part II., ch. i., our author again lays stress on the fact that the uni-
verse is one organic system.
(.אלל
מועיל מאוד necessary,” is modified by the phrase " הכרחי The word 3
very useful for the proof," etc., "that is to say,” in the
Version of Ibn Tibbon, has here the same meaning as 1, "or," in that of
Charizi.
4 The ed. princeps of Ibn Tibbon's Version, and the MSS. have the read-
כן א"א שימצאו חלקי העולם קצתם מבלתי קצתם בזה המציאות ing
12 1777 78 2.—Munk. The last words, "in the existing order of
things of which we speak," are added, in order to make it clear that he does
not deny the successive creations which are recorded in the first chapter of
Genesis. Maimonides does not treat here of the Creation, but of the condi-
tion of the universe after it had been created.
PART I.- —CHAPTER LXXII.
299
1
it requires for the conservation of its condition, and for the
repulsion of injury-the physicians distinctly call it the
leading force in the body of the living being; sometimes
they call it "nature." The Universe likewise possesses a
force which unites the several parts with each other, protects
the species from destruction, maintains the individuals of
each species as long as possible, and endows some individual
beings 2 with permanent existence. Whether this force
operates through the medium of the sphere or otherwise
remains an open question.3
**
Again, in the body of each individual there are parts
which are intended for a certain purpose, as the organs of
nutrition for the preservation of the individual, the organs
of generation for the preservation of the species, the hands
and eyes for administering to certain wants, as to food, etc.;
there are¹ also parts which, in themselves, are not intended
for any purpose, but are mere accessories and adjuncts to the
constitution of the other parts. The peculiar constitution
of the organs, indispensable for the conservation of their
This force is more .הכח השומר,Charizi ; הכח המנהיג Ibn Tibbon 1
fully described in Part II., ch. x.: “Nature, which is represented as wise, as
ruling and regulating the existence of the living," etc. Comp. Shahrastani,
"On Religious Sects and Philosophical Schools," translated by Haarbrücker,
II., pag. 147, “Sayings of Hippocrates."
Namely, the spheres and stars, which, according to Aristotle and his
followers, are imperishable.
3 That is, whether the ideals or universalia (0'77927 0‘bow) have a
direct influence on the material world, or affect directly the spheres, and through
them indirectly all things in nature. In the Second Part, ch. x., Maimo-
nides appears to assume the indirect influence of the ideals. Although the
question refers to the nature of the spheres themselves, the expression “by
means of the spheres" (baban yiya), is used, because of their relation to
the perpetuation of the species and to the temporary preservation of the indi-
vidua on this earth. According to Narboni, the term refers to the "ideal
sphere” (baban 718), in which the properties and forces of the spheres take
הגלגל
,(במצוע
their origin.
4 Arabic, 1, "and in it," that is, in the body of man; Ibn Tibbon,
O, “in them," that is, in those parts of the body which perform certain
functions; Charizi : DMD WI, “some of them"; according to Munk, the read-
ing '," in them," instead of , is found in one of the MSS.
300
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
particular forms and for the performance of their primary
functions, produces, whilst it serves its special purpose,¹
according to the nature of the substance, other things, such
as the hair and the complexion of the body. Being mere
accessories, they are not formed according to a fixed rule;
some are altogether absent in many individuals; and vary
considerably in others. This is not the case with the
organs of the body. You never find that the liver of one
person is ten times larger than that of another person, but
you may find a person without a beard, or without hair on
certain parts of his body, or with a beard ten times longer
than that of another man. Instances of this phenomenon,
viz., great variation as regards hair and colour, are not rare.
The same differences occur in the constitution of the Uni-
verse. Some species exist as an integral part of the whole
system; these are constant and follow a fixed law; though
they vary as far as their nature permits, this variation is
insignificant in quantity and quality. Other species do not
serve any purpose; they are the mere result of the general
nature of transient things, as, e.g., the various insects which
are generated in dunghills, the animals generated in rotten
fruit, or in fetid liquids, and worms generated in the intes-
tines, etc. In short, everything devoid of the
power of gene-
ration belongs to this class. You will, therefore, find that
these things do not follow a fixed law, although their entire
absence is just as impossible as the absence of different com-
plexions and of different kinds of hair amongst human beings.
In man there are substances the individual existence of
which is permanent, and there are other substances which
3
4
6
1
1 Lit.,
"and according to the requirements of the substance, other things,
such as the hair and the colour of the body, are formed as accessories of the
existence of the body."
2 Charizi: 3, "weight."
3 That is, in the various individuals of each species.
4 Arabic, pry; Charizi, ¡¬рD; Tibbon, 2017. See ch. lvii., pag. 206, note
3,"in accordance with the limits set for that class."
5 Comp. R. Gershon, Sha'ar ha-shamayim, iv. 1.
6 That is,
(C
during the whole life of an individual."
PART I.-CHAPTER LXXII.
301
are only constant in the species, not in the individuals, as,
e.g., the four humours.¹ The same is the case in the Universe;
there are substances which are constant in individuals, such
as the fifth element, which is constant in all its formations,
and other substances which are constant in the species,
as, e.g., the four elements 2 and all that is composed of
them.
The same forces which operate in the birth and the tem-
poral existence of the human being operate also in his
destruction and death. This truth holds good with regard
to this whole transient world. The causes of production are
at the same time the causes of destruction. This may be
illustrated by the following example. If the four forces
which are present in every being sustained by food, viz.,
attraction, retention, digestion, and secretion,³ were, like
intelligent forces, able to confine themselves to what is
necessary, and to act at the proper time and within the
proper limits, man would be exempt from those great suffer-
ings and the numerous diseases [to which he is exposed].
Since, however, such is not the case, and since the forces
4
1 The four humours, the red, the white, the green, the black, constitute,
according to ancient philosophers, the temperament of man. They are never
found separately, but are always combined in proportions which vary constantly,
so that the humours existing in man at one time are not the same which
existed at another time, while the heart, the head, etc., although changeable
in dimension, seem always to be the same parts as at the beginning.
2 That is to say, the elements themselves, in the dissolution of bodies change
their forms, and, e.g., that which now is water, has previously been another
element; but none of the elements disappear entirely; the things in nature
always remain compounds of these four elements.
³ Not only the digestive organs of an animal, but all parts of the body
which through food, undergo a change of matter, include these four forces :-
the force of attraction or absorption, retention, assimilation, and secretion.
by in Ibn Tibbon's Version signifies to digest, to assimilate the nutritive
elements of the food to the various parts of the body. Charizi has instead,
namon, "the grinding" or "dissolving" process. It is remarkable that
Ibn Tibbon here uses as a masculine noun, while in Charizi it is joined
with the feminine form of the adjectives.
* Maimonides does not explain the reason of this phenomenon: he probably
is of opinion that, without reason and intellect, a systematic and regular process
a wise manager,'
is impossible. Nature, though described by our author as
(4
,הטוחנת
""
302
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
perform their natural functions without thought and intel-
ligence, without any consciousness of their action, they
necessarily cause dangerous maladies and great pains, al-
though they are the direct causes of the birth and the
temporal existence of the human being.¹ This fact is to be
explained as follows: if the attractive force would absorb
nothing but that which is absolutely beneficial, and nothing
but the quantity which is required, man would be free from
many such sufferings and disorders. But such is not the
case; the attractive force absorbs any humour2 that comes
within the range of its action,³ although such humour be
ill-adapted in quality or in quantity. It is, therefore,
natural that sometimes a humour is absorbed which is too
warm, too cold, too thick, or too thin, or that too much
humour is absorbed, and thus the veins are choked,
obstruction and decay ensue, the quality of the humour is
deteriorated, its quantities altered, diseases are originated,
such as scurvy, leprosy, abscess, or a dangerous illness, such
as cancer,5 elephantiasis, gangrene, and at last the organ or
organs are destroyed. The same is the case with every one
of the four forces, and with all existing beings. The same
force that originates all things, and causes them to exist for
6
etc., (comp. pag. 299, note 1,) does not work with intelligence in all these forces
of the body, and irregularities are therefore unavoidable. (Comp. Narboni.)
• Charizi: ", “living being."
חומר Although the literal translation would be .לחה,.Hebr ;מאדה 2
or 12, the Hebrew translators preferred nn, “fluid," because they thought
that the substance before assimilation, is reduced to the state of in,
"moisture."
3 Lit., "of the class of its absorption." Each of the several parts of the
body has its own limited power of absorption; what is not within these limits
cannot be absorbed.
הטחורים Charizi ; היבלות,Ibn Tibbon 4
5 Ibn Tibbon, N; in the editions we find the explanatory remark,
rüba, para pinipw, which is called in the vernacular "crania,”; Charizi,
.(cancer) סרטן
.Char,והנגע האוכל הבשר ; Ibn Tibbon והאיכל
6
7 Lit., "with the rest of the four forces."
PART I. CHAPTER LXXII.
303
a certain time, namely, the combination of the elements
which are moved and penetrated¹ by the forces of the
heavenly spheres, that same cause becomes throughout the
world a source of calamities, such as devastating rain,
showers, snow-storms, hail, hurricanes, thunder, lightning,
malaria, or other terrible catastrophes by which a place or
many places² or an entire country may be laid waste, such as
landslips, earthquakes, meteoric showers and floods issuing
forth from the seas and from the interior of the earth.
3
4
Bear in mind, however, that in all that we have noticed
about the similarity between the Universe and the human
being, nothing would warrant us to assert that man is a
microcosm; for although the comparison in all its parts
applies to the Universe and any living being in its normal
state, we never heard that any ancient author called the
ass or the horse a microcosm. This attribute has been
given to man alone on account of his peculiar faculty of
thinking, I mean the intellect, i.e., the hylic intellect which
appertains to no other living being. This may be explained
as follows. An animal does not require for its sustenance
any plan, thought or scheme; each animal moves and acts
by its nature, eats as much as it can find of suitable
5
,אלמנתתה
1 The passive ñññas (II. Conjug.) is perhaps a misreading for the
active innan, "which disperse" the elements, that is to say, force them
beyond their natural boundaries, and thus cause their mixture.
2 Arabic, 7, “city," has been rendered by Ibn Tibbon †, and
.אנשי מדינה by Charizi
the same term is rendered by ; אבני אלגביש : Charizi צועק,Arabic 3
thunderbolts, or * ואבני הרעמים היורדים מן השמים
""
"meteoric showers."
Also Пy, the rendering of Ibn Tibbon, and my nip' of Palquera,
have the same signification. Comp. Sha'ar ha-shamayim of R. Gershon I.,
ch. 3. on (nyt pro by). Munk: "les violents orages."
4 Narboni: "I see that Aristotle mentioned the horse as an illustration ;
and so also Ibn Roshd." Palquera quotes from Ibn Gabirol, that, of all
living creatures, man alone, by his structure, by the arrangements and propor-
tions of his constituent parts, can be considered as a likeness of the universe,
as a microcosmos.
5 i.e., The capacity innate in man to acquire the faculty of reasoning.
See c. lxviii., pag. 254, note 2.
་
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
304
things, it makes its resting-place wherever it happens to be,
cohabits with any mate it meets while in heat in the periods
of its sexual excitement. In this manner each individual
conserves itself for a certain time, and perpetuates the ex-
istence of its species without requiring for its maintenance
the assistance or support of any of its fellow creatures;
for all the things to which it has to attend it performs by
itself. With man it is different; if an individual had a
solitary existence, and were, like an animal, left without
guidance, he would soon perish, he would not endure
even one day, unless it were by mere chance, unless
he happened to find something upon which he might feed.
For the food which man requires for his subsistence
demands much work and preparation, which can only be
accomplished by reflection and by plan; many vessels
must be used, and many individuals, each in his peculiar
work, must be employed. It is therefore necessary that
one person should organise the work and direct men in such
a manner that they should properly co-operate, and that
they should assist each other. The protection from heat in
summer and from cold in winter, and shelter from rain,
snow, and wind, require in the same manner the preparation
of many things, none of which can properly be done without
design and thought. For this reason man has been endowed
with intellectual faculties, which enable him to think, con-
sider, and act, and by various labours to prepare and procure
for himself food, dwelling and clothing, and to control every
organ of his body, causing both the principal and the second-
ary organs to perform their respective functions. Conse-
quently, if a man, being¹ deprived of his intellectual faculties,
only possessed vitality, he would in a short time be lost. The
intellect is the highest of all faculties of living creatures;
it is very difficult to comprehend, and its true character can-
not be understood as easily 2 as man's other faculties.
""
1
¹ Lit., "If you imagined that.'
2 Lit., "by the beginning of common reasoning," i.e., "at first sight"
or "easily."
PART I.- CHAPTER LXXII.
305
There also exists in the Universe a certain force which
controls the whole, which sets in motion the chief and prin-
cipal parts,¹ and gives them the motive power for govern-
ing the rest. Without 2 that force, the existence of this
sphere, with its principal and secondary parts, would be
impossible. It is the source of the existence of the Uni-
verse in all its parts. That force is God; blessed be His
name! It is on account of this force that man is called mi-
crocosm; for he likewise possesses a certain principle which
governs all the forces of the body, and on account of this
comparison God is called "the life of the Universe ";" comp.
"and he swore by the life of the Universe" (Deut. xii. 7).
You must understand that in the parallel which we have.
drawn between the whole universe, on the one hand, and
the individual man, on the other, there is a complete har-
mony in all the points which we mentioned above; only in
the following three points a discrepancy may be noticed.
5
First, the principal organ of any living being which has a
heart, derives a benefit from the organs under the control
of the heart, and the benefits of the organs thus become the
benefits of the heart. This is not the case in the constitu-
tion of the universe. That part which bestows authority or
distributes power, does not receive in return any benefit
from the things under its control; whatever it grants, is
granted in the manner of a generous benefactor, not from
any selfish motive, but from a natural generosity and
6
1 Arabic sing., Ibn Tibbon 178 plur., probably meant for 17; so
also Charizi has the sing. ; it is explained by the words which follow
JIU8T W877, "the principal, the first." He means the highest sphere,
'p, "the all-surrounding one," which moves the whole system by
its own motion.
2 Lit., "If man were to imagine the absence of.”
³ Comp. lxviii., pag. 253, note 1. Charizi: obıyn 'n xın "a pipbıyn in.
4 A.V., "By Him that liveth for ever."
5 Charizi: an in viz., “the heart.”
בעבור טבע :Charizi ; כרם טבאע ופצילה סגיה לא לתרן :Arabic 6
1
: similarly but more exactly Palquera ;נכבד שיש בו ויתרון נפש לא לתקוה
Ibn Tibbon (according to לנדיבות טבע למעלה יתירה לא לתוחלת גמול
X
306
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
kindliness; only for the sake of imitating the ways of the
Most High.
Secondly, living creatures endowed with a heart have
it within the body and in the midst thereof; there it is
surrounded by organs which it governs. Thus it derives a
benefit from them, for they guard and protect it, and they
do not allow that any injury from without should approach
it. The reverse occurs in the case of the Universe. The
Take a p
A
.1*
A 19 - MODA
3
superior part encompasses the inferior parts,' it being cer-
tain that it cannot be affected by the action² of any other
being; and even if it could be affected, there is nobody
without it that could affect it. While it influences all that
is contained within, it is not influenced by any act or force
of any material being. There is, however, some similarity¹
[between the universe and man] in this point. In the body
of animals, the organs more distant from the principal
organ, are of less importance than those nearer to it. Also
in the universe, the nearer the parts are to the centre, the
in the editions לתועלתם לנדיבות טבעים ולמעלתם לא לתוחלת .MSS
seems to be a mistake; the suffix plur. does not agree with the subject
אתר
.to which it refers המטיב החונן
.(5 .Jer. xv. 19 ; Is. iii) היקר מקיף בזולל והנכבד בנקלה : Charizi 1
מלקבל מעשה : Ibn Tibbon ; מן קבול אלאתר ממא סואה .Arab 2
:Charizi ; מקבול הרשום (impression) מזולתו :Palquera ; זולתו (action)
Charizi is not consistent in his rendering מלקבל הזק (harm) מזולתו
of; in the next sentence he translates it ""change," and in other
,אותות passages
3 That is to say, it does not possess that property which would enable it
to receive the influence of others, but even if it possessed that property there
is nothing in existence that could exercise that influence.
4 Although there is a discrepancy between the Universe and the Micro-
kosmos in the relative position of their several parts, some similarity (n
Hebr., ' Ibn Tibbon, po Charizi) is nevertheless perceptible-namely,
that the greater the distance of the several parts is from the principal member,
the less important these parts are in the entire system of
the human body.
Palquera and Caspi criticise this dictum, and point out that the brains though
at a great distance from the heart are of the greatest importance to the exist
ence of man. Perhaps the PD in Charizi's version, which gives no sense,
is part of a marginal note which began PDD ; but there is a doubt about
this comparison, for it does not apply to the brains of man.
PART I.—CHAPTER LXXII.
307
greater is their turbidness, their solidity, their inertness,
their dimness and darkness, because they are further away
from the loftiest element, from the source of light and
brightness, which moves by itself and the substance of
which is the most rarefied and simplest: from the outer-
most sphere. At the same ratio at which a body is near
this sphere, it derives properties from it, and rises above
the spheres behind it.
a force inherent in
1
Thirdly. The faculty of thinking is
the body, and is not separated from it, but God is not a
force inherent in the body of the universe, but is separate
from all its parts. How God rules the universe and pro-
vides for it is a complete mystery; man is unable to solve it.
For, on the one hand, it can be proved that God is separate
from the universe, and in no contact whatever with it; but,
on the other hand, His rule and providence can be proved
to exist in all parts of the universe, even in the smallest.2
Praised be He whose perfection is above our comprehension.
It is true, we might have compared the relation between
God and the universe, to the relation between the absolute
acquired intellect³ and man; it is not a power inherent in the
1 Shemtob is surprised at this assertion, and says, "no philosopher except
the author ever said such a thing.”—Palquera in Moreh ha-moreh explains the
words of Maimonides as follows: Man's rational capacities are not as in-
dependent of the body as the Causa Prima is of the material world.
Comp. ch. lxviii., pag. 255, note 2.
2 Char. DD)) Min) noxbpɔ. (1 Sam. xv. 9.)
3 Comp. Ibn Ezra Literature IV., page 44, sqq. and notes. Maimonides
distinguishes the faculty of speaking and thinking from the intellect which
is the sum total of acquired abstract knowledge; it is called napan bay in so
far as it is the result of man's efforts; by because it is abstract
and not connected with matter, or because it is an emanation from the
universal active intellect (an). Comp. Scheyer, Psych. Syst. des
Maim., page 45. Wolff, Muse ben-Maimon's Acht Cap., page 87, note 10.
שכל הנאצל
by השכל הקנוי has been rendered by Charizi אלמוסתפאד The Arabic
השכל הנקנה הנאצל Ibn Tibbon uses both words השכל הנאצל Palquera
Although, according to this translator, the intellect may be described by both
these epithets (see П no" of Ibn Tibbon, and Munk ad locum), it is
more probable that two readings have here been fused into one.
x 2
308
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
body, but a power which is absolutely separate from the body,
and is from without brought into contact with the body. The
rational faculty of man may be further compared to the intel-
ligence of the spheres, which are, as it were, material bodies.
But the intelligences of the spheres, purely spiritual beings,
as well as man's absolute and acquired intellect, are subjects of
deep study and research; the proof of their existence, though
correct, is abstruse, and includes arguments which present
doubts, are exposed to criticism, and can be easily attacked
by objectors.¹ We have, therefore, preferred to illustrate
the relation of God to the universe by a simile which is
clear, and which will not be contradicted in any of the
points which have been laid down by us without any quali-
fication. The opposition can only emanate either from an
ignorant man, who contradicts truths even if they are per-
fectly obvious, just as a person unacquainted with geometry
rejects elementary propositions which have been clearly
demonstrated, or from the prejudiced man who deceives
himself. Those, however, who wish to study the subject
must persevere in their studies until they are convinced that
all our observations are true, and until they understand that
our account of this universe unquestionably agrees with
the existing order of things. If a man is willing to accept
this theory from one who understands how to prove things
2
3
5
4
ויש לטעון בהן טענות לרוצה לשבש שבוש : Charizi less accurately •
2 Arab. ; Ibn Tibbon DMD. This term generally signifies "anony-
mously" or "generally," here it is used in the sense "without any qualifi-
cation," unqualified"; Charizi expresses this by D (simple), and
ולא ריב
L
Palquera by (decided).
3 Lit., "he who chooses to adhere to an opinion already formed," ND "N")
is as an adverb to be קודם the word) בדעת אחת קודם : Ibn Tibbon ;סאבק
joined with ' in the beginning of the sentence), "he who has already
chosen to defend a certain view;" Charizi: Duib7pn nyya, "the advice
founded on preconceived ideas.”
• Arabic 27 №5), “and without suspicion;" Charizi, “ and with-
out falsehood." Ibn Tibbon and Palquera omit the phrase altogether.
5 Maimonides seems to have added this phrase in order that no inference
should be drawn from this about his view of the Creation. He speaks here
only of the existing order of things. Comp. page 295, note 3.
PART I.-CHAPTER LXXIII.
309
which can be proved,¹ let him accept it, and let him estab-
lish on it his arguments and proofs. If, on the other hand,
he refuses to accept without proof even the foregoing prin-
ciples, let him enquire for himself, and ultimately he will
find that they are correct. "Lo this, we have searched it, so
it is; hear it, and know thou it for thy good." 2
After these preliminary remarks, we will treat of the sub-
ject which we promised to introduce and to explain.³
CHAPTER LXXIII.
Twelve Propositions of the Mutakallemim.4
5
THERE are twelve propositions common to all Mutakalle-
mim, however different their individual opinions and
methods may be; the Mutakallemim require them in order
to establish their views on the four questions.6 I shall first
enumerate these propositions, and then discuss each sepa-
rately, together with the inferences which may be drawn
from it.
,ואם ירצה לקבל עליו זה ממי אשר בא עליו המופת In Charizi's version 1
"" who
the phrase by xx (generally, "for which a proof has been
given ") is used in the unusual sense of "to whom a proof has come,"
has accepted a proof as conclusive.”
2 Comp. Job v. 27.
3 That is, to discuss the views of the Mutakallemim on the four funda-
mental problems mentioned in the conclusion of the preceding chapter.
4 According to Palquera, in Moreh ha-moreh, the system of the kalām is dis-
cussed by Maimonides in this and the following chapters, in accordance with
the request made by his pupil and mentioned in the dedicatory letter in the be-
ginning of this work, "to teach you the system of the Mutakallemim, to tell
you whether their arguments were based on logical proof, and if not what was
their method" (page 3).
5 Munk justly points out the inaccuracy of the Hebrew translators in
rendering the Arabic, "y, "with," "in spite of” (malgré), by 'n' and 'D,
"in accordance with." Maimonides proceeds now to enumerate and discuss
the principles adopted by all Mutakallemim in spite of the differences in their
views on many other points. The correct Hebrew rendering is Dy.
6 I.e., the creatio ex nihilo, the Existence of God, His Unity, and His In-
corporeality.
310
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
PROPOSITION I. All things are composed of atoms.¹
PROPOSITION II. There is a vacuum.
PROPOSITION III. Time is composed of time-atoms.2
PROPOSITION IV. Substance cannot exist without numerous
accidents.
3
PROPOSITION V. Each atom is completely furnished with
the accidents (which I will describe), and cannot exist.
without them.
PROPOSITION VI. Accidents do not continue in existence
during two time-atoms.
PROPOSITION VII. Both positive and negative properties
have a real existence, and are accidents which owe their
existence to some causa efficiens.*
PROPOSITION VIII. All existing things, i.e., all creatures,
consist of substance and of accidents, and the physical form
of a thing is likewise an accident.
PROPOSITION IX. No accident can form the substratum for
another accident.
¹ Lit., “to establish the [theory of] atom." Arabic
1
is; Ibn
All bodies are supposed to consist .עצם הנפרד Charizi ; עצם פרדי Tibbon
of a number of small particles or molecules, each of which, when considered as
separated from the rest, is 77 DXY, "a substance in separation,”
solitary substance,” i.e., an atom."
..
2 Arabic
; Ibn Tibbon, adhering to the original, has niny (the
plural form of Пny “now," like ПNIN, plural of ¡N “now”). Charizi has
D'ny. The present moment has the same relation to time, as an infinitely
small molecule has to a substance or to material bodies; both, the moment
and the molecule, are considered as indivisible.
a
(C
а
Charizi ;תשלם מציאותו ועמידתו Ibn Tibbon ; תקום בה Arabic 3
Ibn Tibbon seems to have found a different reading in the .יתחברו בו המקרים
original text. The same variation is noticed further on where the author
discusses this proposition. Palquera, criticising Ibn Tibbon's rendering,
and says that יקוימו בו אותם המקרים suggests the following translation
the author describes the accidents as having no such independent existence as
the substance has, but as existing in these molecules. This cannot be the
meaning of the phrase: the principal object of the fifth proposition is to estab-
lish the fact that the accidents exist completely in each of the atoms.
4 Lit.," the law of their presence is the same as of their absence; they all
are accidents in real existence, and require an agent."
5 This qualification has been added, because God, though an existing being,
does not consist of substance and of properties.
6 See page 29, note 3.
PART I.—CHAPTER LXXIII.
311
PROPOSITION X. The test for the possibility of an imagined
object does not consist in its conformity with the existing
laws of nature.¹
PROPOSITION XI. The idea of the infinite is equally in-
admissible, whether the infinite be actual, potential, or acci-
dental,2 i.e., there is no difference whether the infinite be
formed by a number of co-existing things, or by a series of
things, of which one part comes into existence when another
has ceased to exist,3 in which case it is called accidental
infinite; in both cases the infinite is rejected by the Muta-
kallemim as fallacious.
PROPOSITION XII. The senses mislead, and are in many
cases inefficient; their perceptions, therefore, cannot form
the basis of any law, or yield data for any proof.
FIRST PROPOSITION.
"The Universe, that is, everything contained in it, is
composed of very small parts [atoms] which are indivisible
on account of their smallness; such an atom has no mag-
nitude; but when several atoms combine, the sum has
4
1
Lit., "The possibility [of a thing] does not depend on the agreement of
man's conception [of the thing] with actual nature."
the idea."
as far as this actual world agrees with * מזה המציאות אל המחשבה ההיא
במה שיאות : Charizi
2 In the editions of Ibn Tibbon's Version the order is inverted PD IN.
П N. The potential infinite is explained below as referring to the
divisibility of a thing ad infinitum; it cannot be actually carried out, but
is possible in theory.
,Charizi ; משוערים מן המציאות וממה שכבר נעדר,Ibn Tibbon 3
is here מוסכמות ; מוסכמות כאלו הם ממה שהוא נמצא ומה שהוא אפס
""
used in the sense of "added together; comp. " number."-It is note-
worthy that the potential infinite is not described here.
4 The Mutakallemim appear to differ essentially from their Greek teachers
Democritus and Epicurus. Lucretius in describing their theory of atoms
describes the primordia rerum as minima, indivisible and indestructible, but at
the same time as consisting of parts and having size, shape and weight. Comp.
Lucretius, "De Rerum Natura," I. 601 sqq. :-
Id (extremum cacumen) nimirum sine partibus extat
Et minima constat natura nec fuit unquam
312
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
| a
1
a magnitude, and thus forms a body." If, therefore,
two atoms were joined together, each atom would become a
body, and they would thus form two bodies, a theory which
in fact has been proposed by some Mutakallemim. All these
atoms are perfectly alike; they do not differ from each
other in any point. The Mutakallemim further assert, that
it is impossible to find a body that is not composed of such
equal atoms which are placed side by side. According to
this view genesis and combination are identical; destruction
is the same as decomposition. They do not use the term
"destruction," for they hold that "genesis "3 implies com-
position and decomposition, motion and rest. These atoms,
they believe, are not, as was supposed by Epicurus and other
Atomists numerically constant in the order of things; but
Tom
4
Per se secretum neque posthac esse valebit,
Alterius quoniam ipsum pars, primaque et una.
Inde aliae atque aliae similes ex ordine partes
Agmine condenso naturam corporis explent,
Quae quoniam per se nequeunt constare, necessest
Haerere unde queunt nulla ratione revelli.
The indivisibility of atoms, according to this theory, does not involve an
absence of dimension, but is caused by their great solidity and by the absence
of a vacuum within each of them; they are divisible in potentia, not in reality.
The objection of Maimonides to the atomic theory concerns only the modifi-
cation it received in the schools of the Mutakallemim, who described the atoms
as being without weight, shape and dimensions; the atom can therefore not
be called a body, and still the combination or juxtaposition of the atoms forms
bodies with dimensions and with other properties of material bodies.
¹ Lit., "similar, alike."
1
2 Ibn Tibbon, a composition by juxtaposition; Charizi,
Dip nap. The indestructibility and the indivisibility of the atoms make a
chemical combination impossible.
3 Arabic ¡NON (from 1) "the generations” (probably the plural is used
because the term is referred to both generation and destruction). Ibn Tibbon
קרבת מקום
יקראו (אבואן instead of אלואן sing-); Charizi (who read) הויה renders it
D'R DDW, call them (i.e., generation and destruction) brothers, that is to
say, cognate states of existing beings.
• quibæ 2 ñ
CC
is not limited in the existing things”; Ibn
,אינם נמצאם מאז (מחצורה instead of מחצורה Tibbon (reading probably
"C
are not in existence from eternity"; Charizi, nın’ypa o'bbɔɔ DI'N, “are
not comprised among the existing things." In opposition to the ancient
PART I.-
CHAPTER LXXIII.
J
313
are created anew whenever it pleases the Creator; their
annihilation is therefore not impossible. Now I will ex-
plain to you their opinion concerning the vacuum.¹
-
SECOND PROPOSITION.
2
3
On the vacuum. The Radicals also believe that there is
a vacuum, i.e., one space, or several spaces ³ which contain
nothing, which are not occupied by anything whatsoever,
and which are devoid of all substance. This proposition is
to them an indispensable sequel to the first. For, if the
Universe were full of such atoms, how could any of them
move? 5 For it is impossible to conceive that one atom
'should move into another. And yet the composition, as well
as the decomposition of things, can only be effected by the
motion of atoms! Thus the Mutakallemim are compelled
to assume a vacuum, in order that the atoms may combine,
separate, and move in that vacuum which does not contain
any thing or any atom.
atomists, who held the atoms to be eternal, neither increasing nor decreasing in
quantity, the Mutakallemim assumed that the number of the atoms is not
constant, the Creator being able at any time to destroy part of them as well as
to create new ones.
¹ Arabic, 7 DIY 'D. DO'NIN JYDDND); Munk, "je vais te faire con-
naître leurs opinions concernant la privation de la substance." Here Dу
(Hebrew 779) is not used in the same sense as in the preceding sentence.
I will again inform you on“ ועוד אשמיעך סברותם באפיסת העצם,Charizi
their opinion concerning the total absence of substance."
-Ibn Tibbon has the expla ; בעלי העקרים,Charizi ; אלאצוליון,Arabic
-the first Muta ,קדמוני המדברים שהיו עיקר חכמת המדברים natory phrase
(C
kallemim who established the doctrine of the Kalam." The simple transla-
which קדמוני וגו' seems to have been replaced by the phrase השרשיים tion
was originally intended as an explanation. Comp. lxxi., page 284, note 2.
3
one distance, a continuous space, space in general, including
all existing things; D'рn "spaces," that is, the vacuum between, and the
pores within the bodies. The phrase "which contain nothing," etc., applies
only to the plural “spaces."
4 The vacuum is not only without bodies, but contains no indivisible atoms.
5 Comp. Lucr. l.c.—
Nec tamen undique corporea stipata tenentur
Omnia natura; namque est in rebus inane.
314
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
THIRD PROPOSITION.
"Time is composed of time-atoms," i.e., of many parts,
which on account of their short duration cannot be divided.
This proposition also is a logical consequence of the first.¹
The Mutakallemim undoubtedly saw how Aristotle proved
that space, time, and locomotion are of the same nature,
that is to say, can be divided into parts which stand in the
same proportion to each other: if one of them is divided, the
other is divided in the same proportion. They, therefore,
knew that if time were continuous and divisible ad infinitum,
their assumed atom of space would of necessity likewise be
divisible. Similarly, if it were supposed that space be con-
tinuous, it would necessarily follow, that the time-element,
which they considered to be indivisible, could also be divided.
This has been shown by Aristotle in the treatise called
Acroasis.2 Hence they concluded that space was not con-
tinuous, but was composed of elements that could not be
divided; and that time could likewise be reduced to time-
elements, which were indivisible. An hour is, e.g., divided
Quod si non esset, nulla ratione moveri
Res possent, namque officium quod corporis extat
Officere atque obstare, id eis omni tempore adesset
Omnibus; haud igitur quicquam procedere posset,
Principium quoniam cedendi nulla daret res.
1 The admission of atoms-elements that cannot be divided any further-
involves the extension of the atomic theory to space, time, and motion, although
atoms are described as being without magnitude. For when a body, that is, a
system of atoms, moves, each atom changes its position; it leaves the whole
space it has occupied, and occupies another space. The way through which
each atom moves, therefore, consists of atoms; and time, the measure of motion,
is therefore likewise divisible into atoms. It can easily be understood that
material bodies may be considered as discrete, so that the atoms of matter are
separated from each other by atoms of vacuity, also that motion is discrete, and
atoms of motion are separated from each other by atoms of rest; but it is im-
possible to understand the discontinuity of time and space, or the connection
of their discontinuity with their atomicity.
2 puσiên áкpóασic, Arabic yaN NDDEN; Hebrew, youn yown.
Comp. Arist. Phys. VI., ch. i. seqq.
PART I.-CHAPTER LXXIII.
315
into sixty minutes, the minute into sixty seconds, the second
again into sixty parts, and so on; at last after ten or more
successive divisions by sixty, time-elements are obtained,
which are not subjected to division, and in fact are indivi-
sible, just as is the case with space. Time would thus be
an object of position and order.¹
The Mutakallemim did not at all understand the nature
of time. This is a matter of course; for if the greatest
philosophers became embarrassed when they investigated
the nature of time, if some of them were altogether unable
to comprehend what time really is, and even if Galenus
declared time to be something divine and incomprehensible,
what can be expected of those who do not examine the
nature of things?
Now, mark what conclusions were drawn from these three
propositions, and were accepted by the Mutakallemim as
true. They held that locomotion consisted in the transla-
tion of each atom of a body from one point to the next one;
accordingly the velocity of one body in motion cannot be
greater than that of another body. When, nevertheless,
two bodies are observed to move during the same time
through different spaces, the cause of this difference is not
1 That is, if time were composed of indivisible particles, it would be like
an aggregate of things which can be arranged one by the side of the other. This
seems to be the principal argument of Maimonides against the discontinuity of
time; and as he does not apply it to space, he appears to hold that discon-
tinuity as regards space is less objectionable than that of time. The reason
of this is perhaps the following: the division of a thing into parts, even if it
were only in theory, requires that the thing to be divided be present, and its
parts co-existing; such a division as regards time is impossible, the chief
characteristic of time being succession, and consequently the reverse of co-
existence. As time can be represented by dimensions in space, it is not more
objectionable to assume atoms of time, than it is to assume atoms of space.
*
In
2 Since every motion is to be resolved into a series of successive motions of
single atoms of substance through one atom of space, and as these atoms are
supposed to be equal, the velocity of all moving bodies must be the same.
reality different velocities are observed in the moving bodies, and, therefore,
the author argues, the atomic theory is to be rejected. The reply given by
the atomists is, that the difference is caused by the inequality of the pauses
which separate the motion-atoms from each other.
-
316
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
1
attributed by them to the fact that the body which has
moved through a larger distance had a greater velocity, but
to the circumstance that motion, which in ordinary language
is called slow, has been interrupted by more moments of
rest, while the motion which ordinarily is called quick has
been interrupted by fewer moments of rest. When it is
shown that the motion of an arrow, which is shot from a
powerful bow, is in contradiction to their theory, they
declare that in this case too the motion is interrupted by
moments of rest. They believe that it is the fault of man's
senses if it is believed that the arrow moves continuously, for
there are many things which cannot be perceived by the
senses, as they assert in the twelfth proposition. But
we ask them: "Have you observed a complete revolu-
tion of a millstone? Each point in the extreme circum-
ference of the stone describes a large circle in the very
same time in which a point nearer the centre describes a
small circle; the velocity of the outer circle is therefore
greater than that of the inner circle. You cannot say that
the motion of the latter was interrupted by more moments
of rest; for the whole moving body, i.e., the millstone, is
one coherent body." They reply, "During the circular
motion, the parts of the millstone separate from each other,
and the moments of rest interrupting the motion of the
portions nearer the centre are more than those which inter-
rupt the motion of the outer portions." We ask again,
"How is it that the millstone, which we perceive as one
body, and which cannot be easily broken, even with a
hammer, resolves into its atoms when it moves, and becomes
again one coherent body, returning to its previous state as
soon as it comes to rest, while no one is able to notice the
t
-
1 According to the theory of the Mutakallemim, that all motion is to be
resolved into atoms, a pause naturally takes place after each atom. The
difference could, therefore, not consist in the number of pauses, but in their
must be understood in the (מעט) אקל and (יותר) אכתר duration. Either
sense of "longer" and "shorter," or the "moments of rest" mentioned here
include other interruptions besides those which ordinarily intervene between
the motion-atoms.
PART I.—CHAPTER LXXIII.
317
breaking up [of the stone]?" Again their reply is based
on the twelfth proposition, which is to the effect that the
perception of the senses cannot be trusted, and thus only
the evidence of the intellect is admissible. Do not imagine
that you have seen in the foregoing example the most absurd¹
of the inferences which may be drawn from these three
propositions: the proposition relating to the existence of a
vacuum leads to more preposterous and extravagant conclu-
sions. Nor must you suppose that the aforegoing theory
concerning motion is less irrational than the proposition
resulting from this theory, that the diagonal of a square is
equal to the side of the square,2 and some of the Mutakalle-
mim go so far as to declare that the square is not a thing of
real existence. In short, the adoption of the first proposi-
tion would be tantamount to the rejection of all that has
been proved in Geometry. The propositions in Geometry
would, in this respect, be divided into two classes: some
would be absolutely rejected; e.g., those which relate to pro-
perties of the incommensurability and the commensurability
of lines and planes, to rational 5 and to irrational lines, and
all other propositions contained in the tenth book of Euclid,
and in similar works. Other propositions would appear to
be only partially true; e.g., the solution of the problem to
3
4
Ibn Tibbon, MD; Charizi, 217'7.
2 That is, the diagonal of the square contains as many atoms as the side; the
space between one atom and the other, measured in the direction of the diagonal,
being larger than that in the direction of the sides. If, however, the vacuities
and the atoms be added together, the diagonal would of course, be found to be
larger than the sides of the square, and the absurdity of the theory would at
once be removed.
³ The sense of this can only be, that the sum of atoms contained in the
diagonal of a square is not larger than the sum of atoms in each of its sides,
and the diagonal may therefore be considered as equal to a side of the square.
* Because all propositions in Geometry are founded upon the continuity of
lines and surfaces in space.
5 D'p17, in the editions of Ibn Tibbon's version, is a mistake, and
should be '17, “rational," as in the MSS., and in the editio princeps.
(Munk.) As to the use of 77 in the sense of reason or thought, comp.
ch. lxv., pag. 245. MS. Brit. Mus. Add. 14764, has 17, on the margin
מאוזרים Charizi has likewise לא מאוזרים
·
318
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
divide a line into two equal parts, if the line consists of an
odd number of atoms; according to the theory of the Mu-
takallemim such a line cannot be bisected. Furthermore, in
the well-known book of problems by the sons of Shakir¹ are
contained more than a hundred problems, all solved and
practically demonstrated; but if there really were a vacuum,
not one of these problems could be solved, and many of the
waterworks [described in that book] could not have been.
constructed. The refutation of such propositions is a mere
waste of time. I will now proceed to treat of the other
propositions mentioned above.
FOURTH PROPOSITION.
"The accidents of things have real existence; they are
elements superadded to the substance itself, and no material
thing can be without them."" Had this proposition been left
by the Mutakallemim in this form it would have been
1 The three sons of Musa Ibn Shakir, called Mo'hammed, A'hmed and
al-Hasan, flourished in the ninth century. They favoured the study of Greek
literature among the Arabs, and distinguished themselves in mathematics.
The book known by the title, Artifices (1₁ann), included in-
genious inventions, especially concerning hydraulic and pneumatic machines,
based on the principle of horror vacui.—Munk.
2 Munk,
"Et qu'il n'y a aucun corps qui en soit entièrement exempt; and
in a note: c'est à dire que dans chaque corps la substance doit être accom-
pagnée d'un accident quelconque." This cannot be correct, as is apparent from
the form which the proposition has in the beginning of this chapter, viz.,
substance cannot exist without numerous accidents. Also, from the criticism
which follows, the Mutakallemim appear to have maintained that none of the
properties could be absent from any object, and this would in fact be the sense
of the proposition taken literally: "a body cannot be free of one (or of either)
of them" (л, Hebr. Dл TND), that is to say, a body cannot be with-
out substance and accidents; and in this form Maimonides would approve of
the proposition. (Comp. lxxii., pag. 295, note 3.) But according to the theory
of the Mutakallemim, every object has all the properties either positively or
negatively, or, considering a property and its opposite as two modifications of
the same property, the theory can also be expressed thus: a body must neces-
sarily have all properties either in one or in the other modification. That the
absence of a certain property is considered a real property, is the subject of
the seventh proposition.
J
PART I.—CHAPTER LXXIII.
319
QNT
correct, simple, clear, and indisputable.' They have, how-
ever, gone further, asserting that a substance which has not
the attribute of life, must necessarily have that of death; for
it must always have one of two contrasting properties.
According to their opinion, colour, taste, motion or rest,
combination or separation, etc., can be predicated of all sub-
stances, and, if a substance have the attribute of life, it must
at the same time possess such other kinds of accidents,² as
wisdom or folly, freewill or the reverse, power or weakness,
perception or any of its opposites, and, in short, the sub-
stance must have the one or the other of all correlative acci-
dents appertaining to a living being.
1
- Ba
FIFTH PROPOSITION.
5
"The atom is fully provided with all these foregoing
accidents, and cannot exist if any be wanting." The
meaning of this proposition is this: The Mutakallemim say
that each of the atoms created by God must have accidents,
such as colour, smell, motion, or rest, except the accident
of quantity: for according to their opinion an atom has
no magnitude; and they do not designate quantity as an
accident, nor do they apply to it the laws of accidents.
In accordance with this proposition, they do not say, when
an accident is noticed in a body, that it is peculiar to the
body as such, but that it exists in each of the atoms which
6
7
,ולא דמיון
1 Charizi adds 11' 1, "nor a mere imagination." The proposition in its
entirety is rejected by the author as a mere fiction.
((
some other accidents."
,מקרים אחרים Charizi has simply 2
3 See supra, page 310, note 3.
4 That is, no change takes place in the properties of the atom when they
combine to form a body; hence all the properties noticed in the aggregate of
atoms exist also in each of them individually. There is no property in a body
which is solely due to the constitution of the whole body.
is superfluous; it לא יקראהו in the Hebrew version before אצלם 5
has no equivalent in the Arabic text.
6 See supra, page 311, note 4.
7 Quantity is only a form of thought, not a real property possessed by the
object.
320
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
form the constituent elements of that body. E.g., take a
quantity of snow; the whiteness does not exist in that
quantity as a whole, but each atom of the snow is white, and
therefore the aggregate of those atoms is likewise white.
Similarly they say that when a body moves, each atom of it
moves, and thus the whole body is in motion.¹ Life like-
wise exists, according to their view, in each atom of a
living body. The same is the case according to their opinion
with the senses; in each atom of the aggregate they notice
the faculty of perception. Life, sensation, intellect, and
wisdom are considered by them as accidents, like blackness
and whiteness, as will be shown in the further discussion
of their theory.2
T
Concerning the soul, they do not agree. The view most
predominant among them is the following:-The soul is
an accident existing in one of the atoms of which, e.g., man
is composed; the aggregate is called a being endowed with
a soul, in so far as it includes that atom. Others are of
opinion that the soul is composed of ethereal atoms,5
which have a peculiar faculty by virtue of which they con-
stitute the soul, and that these atoms are mixed with the
atoms of the body. Consequently they maintain that the
4
soul is an accident.7
As to the intellect, I found that all of them agreed in
3
¹ See supra, page 315, note 2.
2 See Proposition VIII.
וכלל,Charizi ; החזק שבדבריהם,Ibn Tibbon אגלב אקואלהם .Arab 3
.דבריהם
4 The word DD, found in most of the MSS., has been omitted by
Charizi and Ibn Tibbon. (Munk.)
.below כחות ועצמים and ; כחות,Charizi 5
6 I.e., the Mutakallemim, both those who adhere to the first, and those
who follow the second opinion concerning the soul.
7 That is, even according to the second theory, according to which the
soul consists of atoms, different from the atoms of the body, the substance of
the soul is a certain property of those atoms. The soul, therefore, or the
essence of the soul (Hebr. n 'V), is a property. All agree that the soul
is a property; some of them hold that it is a property in all the atoms of the
body, while others assume that it is a property only in one atom, or in some of
the atoms."-Caspi.
PART I.—CHAPTER LXXIII.
321
considering it to be an accident joined to one of the atoms
which constitute the whole of the intelligent being. But there
is a confusion among them about knowledge; they are uncer-
tain whether it is an accident to each of the atoms which
form the knowing aggregate, or whether it belongs only to
one atom. Both views can be disproved by a reductio ad
absurdum, when the following facts are pointed out to
them. Generally metals and stones have a special colour,
which is strongly pronounced, but disappears when they are
pulverised. Vitriol, which is intensely green, becomes white
dust when pounded;¹ this shows that that accident exists
only in the aggregate, not in the atoms. This is more
striking in the following instance: when parts of a living
being are cut off they cease to live, a proof that the accident
[of life] belongs to the aggregate of the living being, not to
each atom. In order to meet this objection they say that
the accident is of no duration, but is constantly renewed. In
discussing the next proposition I shall explain their view
on this subject.
O
SIXTH PROPOSITION.
“The accidents do not exist during two time-atoms.”—The
sense of this proposition is this: They believe that God
creates a substance, and simultaneously its accidents; that
the Creator is incapable of creating a substance devoid of an
accident, for that is impossible; that the essential character-
istic of an accident is its incapability of enduring for two
periods, for two time-atoms; that immediately after its
creation it is utterly destroyed,³ and another accident of
the same kind is created; this again is destroyed and a third
במצאנו המחצבים והאבנים כי רובם היו בעלי צבע ירוק מאד,Charizi 1
.this corresponds with the Arabic in Cod. Oxf ; ונעשה אבק לבן כשנשחק
(Sheyer, ad locum).
2 That is to say, man cannot imagine substance without accidents, and,
therefore, it cannot exist in reality. See Proposition X.
3 Lit., "it is lost and does not remain."
Y
322
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
1
accident of the same kind is created, and so on, so long as
God is pleased to preserve [in that substance] this kind of
accident; but He can at His will create in the same sub-
stance an accident of a different kind, and if He were to dis-
continue the creation and not produce a new accident, that
substance would at once cease to exist. This is one of
the opinions held by the Mutakallemim; it has been ac-
cepted by most of them, and it is the so-called "theory of
the creation of the accidents." (Some of them, however,
and they belong to the sect of the Mu'tazilah, say, that there
are accidents which endure for a certain period, and other
accidents which do not endure for two atoms of time ;
they do not follow a fixed principle in deciding which class
of accidents has and which class has not a certain duration
The object of this proposition is to oppose the theory that
there exists a natural force 2 from which each body derives
its peculiar properties. They prefer to assume that God
himself creates these properties without the intervention of
a natural force or of any other agency: a theory which implies
that no accident can have any duration.
duration. For
For suppose that
certain accidents could endure for a certain period and
then cease to exist, the question would naturally be asked,
What is the cause of that non-existence? 3 They would
בריאת המקרים,Ibn Tibbon .כלק אלאעראץ אלתי יקלונהא,Arabic 1
.אשר יאמרו אותה
The fem. suffix N in the Arabic, agrees with
~~; according to the sense, a suffix agreeing with p is required; so
in Hebrew N agrees with
(Charizi omits the suffix altogether).
It is possible that Maimonides had a form p similar to the Hebrew
.בריאה
2 See lxxi., page 281 and page 284.
3 That is to say, the creation of an accident, a momentary act, causes the
accident to exist an atom, that is as an indefinite portion, of time; its existence
in the next moment depends on the repetition of that act; if the act is not
repeated, the accident is eo ipso not in existence. If a thing were supposed to
continue for some time, as the result of one creative act, the cause of its non-
continuance after that time, could not be supposed to be only the non-
repetition of the creative act, but would result either from some positive act of
destruction-and this according to the view of the Mutakallemim is inadmissible
in the Creator, who is constantly creating-or from some natural property of
PART I.-CHAPTER LXXIII.
323
1
not be satisfied with the reply that God by His will
brought about this non-existence, because an agens does
not cause non-existence, and non-existence does not at all
require any agens whatever; for as soon as the agens leaves off
acting, the product of the agens ceases likewise to exist.
This is true to some extent. Having thus chosen
to establish the theory that there does not exist any
natural force upon which the existence or non-existence
of a thing depends, they were compelled to assume that
the properties of things were successively renewed. When
God desires to deprive a thing of its existence, He, accord-
ing to some of the Mutakallemim, discontinues the creation
of its accidents, and eo ipso the body ceases to exist."
Others, however, say, that if it pleased the Almighty to
destroy the world, He would create the accident of des-
2
the thing, which contingency is equally denied by them. The state of non-
possession of a certain property (777), which according to Proposition VII.
requires the action of the Creator for its existence, is considered by that
school as a real property; here the author speaks of the disappearance of a
property, and this requires no positive act of the Creator. This distinction
between the act of destroying a property (Proposition VI.), and the creation of
a negative property (Proposition VII.), appears to have been misunderstood
by Caspi, and other commentators who followed him; for he says "they (who
accept this proposition) do not accept Proposition VII." This cannot be right,
as Maimonides introduces these Propositions as having been accepted by all the
Mutakallemim, however different their views might have been on other points.
Comp. Munk ad locum.
That is, the successive creation of the accidents has not been accepted on
account of its own intrinsic truth, but as a consequence of the principle ac-
cepted arbitrarily without proof (017), viz. that everything is done directly
by the Creator, without the agency of natural forces.
2 This sentence can only have the following meaning: as soon as God dis-
continues the creation of the accidents of the Universe, the Universe ceases to
exist. The non-existence of the Universe according to the first-mentioned
opinion is not a state that requires the action of the Creator for its continuance,
because there is no substance; according to the second opinion it is subject to
the same law as other negative properties, and must be continually renewed.
Compare the objection of the author to the theory of the repeated creation of
"death" in Proposition VII. It need scarcely be added that this view is most
absurd, as has been shown by Ibn Roshd in his "Destruction of Destruc-
tion," second question. See Munk, ad locum.
Y 2
324
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
truction, which would be without any substratum. The
destruction of the Universe would be the correlative acci-
dent to that of existence. In accordance with this [sixth]
proposition they say, that the cloth which according to
our belief we dyed red, has not been dyed by us at all,
but God created that colour in the cloth when it came
into contact with the red pigment; we believe that colour
to have penetrated into the cloth, but they assert that
this is not the case. They¹ say that God generally acts
in such a way," that, e.g., the black colour³ is not created
unless the cloth is brought into contact with indigo; but
this blackness, which God creates in the instant when the
cloth touches the black pigment is of no duration, and
another creation of blackness then takes place; they further
say that after the blackness is gone, He does not create a
red or green colour, but again a black colour.
According to this principle, the knowledge which we
have of certain things to-day, is not the same which
we had of them yesterday; that knowledge is gone, and
another like it has been created. They positively believe
ולא זו בלבד אמרו אבל אמרו גם כן Ibn Tibbon here adds the words 1
"and not only this they said, but they also asserted." The corresponding
are found in the text of וליס הדא קאלוא פקט בל קאלוא words in Arabie
a Leyden MS. (Munk.)
2 The following objection was made to their theory: If God created the acci-
dent every moment independently of any natural law, why is a certain means re-
quired to produce that colour? Does this not prove that a certain colour is pro-
duced by properties which are contained in the materials employed for that pur-
pose? The answer to this objection is simply that God does it regularly in this
way (without being forced by any law or property); He could do it otherwise,
but it is His will to do it always in this particular way. у (Heb. JMD) is
here not used in the sense of custom or habit, a property acquired by repeating
frequently the same thing, but merely in the sense of "an act regularly re-
peated." Too much stress has been laid on the literal meaning of this term by
Ibn Roshd (quoted by Palquera, Caspi and others) in his objections to the
theory of the Mutakallemim.
3
in the version of Charizi explained by איסטיס Ibn Tibbon) נילוג
7) is "indigo," and its colour is blue; it is called “black,” be-
cause the Mutakallemim only counted five colours: black, white, red, yellow,
and green, and considered blue as a modification of black. See Munk.
PART 1.-CHAPTER LXXIII.
325
3
4
that this does take place,¹ knowledge being an accident. In
like manner it would follow that the soul, according to those
who believe that it is an accident, is renewed each moment
in every animated being, say a hundred thousand times; for,
as you know, time is composed of time-atoms. In accordance
with this principle they assert that when man is perceived
to move a pen, it is not he who has really moved it; the
motion produced in the pen, is an accident which God has
created in the pen; the apparent motion of the hand which
moves the pen is likewise an accident which God has
created in the moving 2 hand; but the creative act of God
is performed in such a manner that the motion of the hand
and the motion of the pen follow each other closely; but
the hand does not act, and is not the cause of the pen's
motion; for, as they say, an accident cannot pass from one
thing to another. Some of the Mutakallemim accordingly
contend that this white cloth, which is coloured when put
into the vessel filled with indigo, has not been blackened
by the indigo; for blackness being an attribute of indigo,
does not pass from one object to another. There does not
exist any thing to which an action could be ascribed; the
real 5 agens is God, and He has [in the foregoing instance]
created the blackness in the substance of the cloth when
it came into contact with the indigo, for this is the method
adopted by Him. In short, most of the Mutakallemim be-
lieve that it must never be said that one thing is the cause
of another; some of them who assumed causality were
blamed for doing so. As regards, however, the acts of!
man their opinions are divided. Most of them, especially the
sect of the Asha'ariyah, assume that when the pen is set in
motion God has created four accidents, none of which is the
1 Charizi omits this phrase.
2 Ibn Tibbon yon, "that moves" (trans.)
.יתרון Charizi ;מעשה Ibn Tibbon 3
4 Charizi IPD. The accident "of motion " possessed by the hand is
not of a transitive character, and has no part in the motion of the pen.
5 Lit., "the last.” The expression, however, is inexact after the assertion
that there does not exist anything to which an action could be ascribed.
326
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
2
4
cause of any of the rest, they are only related to each other
as regards the time of their co-existence, and have no other
relation to each other. The first accident is man's will to
move the pen, the second is man's power¹ to do so, the
third is the bodily motion itself, i.e., the motion of the hand,
and the fourth is the motion of the pen. They believe that
when a man has the will to do a thing and, as he believes,
does it, the will has been created for him, then the power
to conform to the will, and lastly the act itself. The act is
not accomplished by the power created in man; for, in
reality, no act can be ascribed to
be ascribed to that power. The
Mu'tazilah contend that man acts by virtue of the power
which has been created in him.³ Some of the Asha'ariyah
assert that the power created in man participates in the act,
and is connected with it, an opinion which has been re-
jected by the majority. The will and the power created in
man, according to the concurrent belief of the Mutakal-
lemim, together with the act created in him, according to
some of them, are accidents without duration. In the in-
stance of the pen, God continually creates one motion after
the other so long as the pen is in motion; it only then
ceases to move when God has created in it the accident of
rest; and so long as the pen is at rest, God continually
renews in it that accident. Consequently in every one
of these moments, i.e., of the time-atoms, God creates some
accident in every existing individual, e.g., in the angels, in
the spheres and in other things; this creation takes place
continually and without interruption. Such is, according
to their opinion, the right interpretation of the creed that
God is the causa efficiens. But I, together with all rational
¹ In the Arabic, ', '7p, "my will," "my power." Ibn Tibbon
and Charizi have the third person (11) instead of the first.
I 2 It is difficult to see why "the power to do so" is introduced; according
to the theory under consideration, it can never be ascertained whether man
possesses the power, the ultimate action being independent of that
power.
³ They hold that man has a free will. See lxxi., page 275, note 5,
4 This is perhaps the same view as expressed above, ch. li., page 176, by
the words " man has no freedom at all, but has acquirement" (P).
PART I.-CHAPTER LXXIII.
$27
persons, apply to those theories the words, "Will you mock
at Him, as you mock at man?" for they are indeed nothing
but mockery.
SEVENTH PROPOSITION.
1
1
"The absence of a property is itself a property that exists
in the body, a something superadded to its substance, an
actual accident, which is constantly renewed; as soon as
it is destroyed it is reproduced." The reason why they hold
this opinion is this: they do not understand that rest is the
absence of motion; death the absence of life; that blindness is
the absence of sight, and that all similar negative properties
are the absence of the positive correlatives. The relation
between motion and rest is, according to their theory, the
same as the relation between heat and cold, namely, as heat
and cold are two accidents found in two objects which
have the properties of heat and cold, so motion is an acci-
dent created in the thing which moves, and rest an accident
created in the thing which rests; it does not remain in
existence during two consecutive time-atoms, as we have
stated in treating of the previous proposition. Accordingly,
when a body is at rest, God has created the rest in each
atom of that body, and so long as the body remains at rest,
God continually renews that property. The same, they
believe, is the case with a man's wisdom and ignorance; the
latter is considered by them as an actual accident, which is
subject to the constant changes of destruction and creation,
so long as there remains a thing of which such a man is
ignorant. Death and life are likewise accidents, and as
the Mutakallemim distinctly state, life is constantly de-
stroyed and renewed during the whole existence of a living
being; when God decrees its death, He creates in it the
accident of death after the accident of life, which does not
continue during two time-atoms, has ceased to exist. All
this they state clearly.
¹ Comp. Propos. IV.
328
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
The logical consequence of this proposition is that the
accident of death created by God instantly ceases
exist, and is replaced by another death which again is
created by God; otherwise death could not continue. Death
is thus continually created in the same manner as life is
renewed every moment. But I should wish to know how
long God continues to create death in a dead body. Does
He do so whilst the form remains, or whilst one of the
atoms exists? For in each of the atoms of the body the
accident of death which God creates is produced, and there
are to be found teeth of persons who died thousands of years
ago; we see that those teeth have not been deprived of
existence, and therefore the accident of death has during
all these thousands of years been renewed, and according
to the opinion prevailing amongst those theorists, death
was continually replaced by death. Some of the Mu'tazilah
hold that there are cases in which the absence of a physical
property is not a real property, that weariness is the ab-
sence of strength, and ignorance the absence of knowledge;
but this cannot be said in every case of negative² proper-
ties: it cannot be said that darkness is the mere absence
of light, or that rest is the absence of motion. Some
negative properties are thus considered by them as having
a real existence, while other negative properties are con-
sidered as non-existing, just as suits their belief. Here
they proceed in the same manner as they proceed respect-
ing the duration of accidents, and they contend that some
accidents exist a long time, and other accidents do not last
two time-atoms. Their sole object is to fashion the Universe
according to their peculiar opinions and beliefs.
¹ "Vabп Dyn in the editions of Ibn Tibbon's version is a mistake:
the MSS. have pn. (Munk.)
2 That is, according to the general belief; the Mutakallemim would not
consider them as negative, but as positive properties.
PART I.—CHAPTER LXXIII.
329
EIGHTH PROPOSITION.
1
"There exists nothing but substance and accident, and
the physical forms of things belong to the class of acci-
dents." It is the object of this proposition to show that
all bodies are composed of similar atoms, as we have pointed
out in explaining the first proposition. The difference of
bodies from each other is caused by the accidents, and by
nothing else. Animality, humanity, sensibility, and speech,
are denoted as accidents like blackness, whiteness, bitterness,
and sweetness, and the difference between two individuals of
two classes is the same as the difference of two individuals
of the same class. Also the body of the heaven,² the body
of the angels, the body of the Divine Throne—such as it is
assumed to be³-the body of anything creeping on the
earth, and the body of any plant, have one and the same
substance; they only differ in the peculiarity of the acci-
dents, and in nothing else; the substance of all things is
made up of equal atoms.
¹ Comp. pag. 310, note 5.
2 Charizi renders a wrongly by an instead of D or N.
NINTH PROPOSITION.
"None of the accidents form the substratum of another
accident; it cannot be said, This is an accident to a thing
which is itself an accident to a substance. All accidents
are directly connected with the substance." The Mutakal-
lemim deny the indirect relation of the accident to the
substance, because if such a relation were assumed it would
follow that the second accident could only exist in the sub-
stance after another accident had preceded it, a conclusion
-
וגוף מי שיעלה על לב : reality. Charizi wrongly
3 That is, as the 713 D is generally conceived to be, not as it is in
!
330
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
to which they would object even with regard to some special
accidents; they prefer to show that these accidents can exist
in every possible substance, although such substance is not
determined by any other accident; for they hold that all the
accidents collectively determine the thing. They advance
also another proof [in support of this proposition], namely:
The substratum which is the bearer of certain attributes
must continue to exist for a certain time; how, then, could
the accident, which-according to their opinion-does not
remain in existence for two moments, become the sub-
stratum of something else?
TENTH PROPOSITION.
11 3
ļ This proposition concerns the theory of "admissibility,'
which is mentioned by the Mutakallemim, and forms the
principal support of their doctrine. Mark its purport: they
observe that everything conceived by the imagination is
admitted by the intellect as possible; e.g., that the terres-
trial globe should become the all-encompassing sphere, or
that this sphere should become the terrestrial globe; reason
does not find here an impossibility; or that the sphere of
fire should move towards the centre, and the sphere of earth
towards the circumference. Human intellect does not per-
ceive any reason why a body should be in a certain place
1 Lit., "they deny this (to be the case) in some of the accidents," that is, in
those concerning which the philosophers believe that they have other accidents
for their substratum, e.g., time an accident of motion, which is an accident of
the thing that moves.
2 Lit., "C
some accidents," that is, the accidents in question; for, in reality,
the Mutakallemim endeavour to show that all accidents unite with every sub-
stance.
3 The Arabic Minhs (Hebr. nyn) is derived from ti, "to let pass,
"to declare as admissible," and signifies the theory of the Mutakallemim,
according to which reason must accept as admissible everything which can be
imagined, so that the only test to find out whether a thing is possible or not,
is man's imagination. The nature and the properties of things (n'ya 7713)
are altogether ignored by them.
4 See ch. lxxii., pag. 290.
PART I.—CHAPTER LXXIII.
331
instead of being in another. In the same manner they say¹
that reason admits the possibility that an existing being
should be larger or smaller than it really is, or that it
should be different in form and position from what it really
is; e.g., a man might have the height of a mountain, might
have several heads, and fly2 in the air; or an elephant
might be as small as an insect, or an insect as huge as an
elephant. This method of admitting possibilities is applied
to the whole Universe. Whenever they affirm that a thing
belongs to this class of admitted possibilities, they say that it
can have this form, and that it is also possible that it be found
differently, and that the one form is not more possible than
the other; but they do not ask whether the reality confirms
their assumption.3 They say that the thing which exists
with certain constant and permanent forms, dimensions,
and properties, only follows the direction of habit, just as
the king generally rides on horseback through the streets.
of the city, and is never found departing from this habit;
but reason does not find it impossible that he should walk
on foot through the place; there is no doubt that he may
do so, and this possibility is fully admitted by the intellect.
Similarly, the earth moves towards the centre, the fire turns
away from the centre; the fire causes heat, the water causes
cold, in accordance with a certain habit; but it is logically
not impossible that a deviation from this habit should occur,
namely, that fire should cause cold, move downward, and
still be fire; that the water should cause heat, move up-
4
5
6
5
1
NSNP without any conjunction (Ibn Tibbon, 170N) appears to be quite
superfluous. It has been omitted by Charizi.
2 15' and '; Ibn Tibbon, 5", "to fly ;" Charizi, ", " to swim."
3 Charizi, ' ' D, "what part of their assertions harmonises
with the existing order of things;" Ibn Tibbon, 'n ", "to the
equality between the existing things and their own assertions."
,יש לו
4 ← Charizi, 1 ✰, “has"; the relative in the Arabic and in the Version of
Ibn Tibbon makes the construction of the sentence irregular.
5 See supra, pag. 324, note 2.
אמנם היותה כך הוא כפי המשך המנהג,,Ibn Tibbon ; כי כן,Charizi 6
.כמו ש...
332
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
1
ward, and still be water. On this foundation their whole
fabric was constructed. They admit, however, the impossi-
bility of two opposite properties coexisting at the same time
in one substance. This is impossible; reason would not
admit this possibility. Again, reason does not admit the
possibility of a substance existing without an accident, or
an accident existing without a substance, a possibility ad-
mitted by some of the Mutakallemim.2 It is also impossible
that a substance should become an accident, that an acci-
dent should become a substance, or that one substance
should penetrate another. They admit that reason rejects
all these things as impossible.
impossible. It is perfectly true that no
notion whatever can be formed of those things which they
describe as impossible; whilst a notion can be formed of
those things which they consider as possible. The philoso-
phers object to this method, and say, You call a thing
impossible because it cannot be imagined, or possible be-
cause it can be imagined; and thus you consider as possible
that which is found possible by imagination, not by the in-
tellect, consequently you determine that a thing is necessary,
possible, or impossible in some instances, by the aid of the
imagination—not by the intellect—and in other instances by
the ordinary common sense,³ as Abu Nasr¹ says in speaking
of that which the Mutakallemim call intellect. It is clear
that they describe as possible that which can be imagined,
whether the reality correspond to it or not,5 and as impos-
sible that which cannot be imagined. This proposition can
only be established by the nine aforementioned propositions,
and no doubt these were exclusively required for the sup-
port of this proposition. This you will see clearly when I
That is, they reject all logical impossibilities.
2 See supra, pag. 323, note 2.
3 Charizi adds a Dya, "and sometimes by reason." This is a mis-
take, for the author repeatedly declares that they do not test the possibility
of a thing by a process based on logical truths.
and
4 See Munk, "Mélanges de Philosophie Juive et Arabe," pag. 341 sqq.,
below, end of ch. lxxiv.
5 See lxxi., pag. 282, and end of ch、 lxviii.
PART I. CHAPTER LXXIII.
333
shall show and explain to you some important¹ parts of
this theory, which I shall now introduce in the form of a
discussion supposed to have taken place between a Mutakal-
lem and a philosopher.
The Mutakallem said to the philosopher: What is the
reason that we find the substance of iron extremely hard
and strong, with a dark colour; the substance of cream, on
the other hand, extremely soft and white? The philosopher
replied as follows: All physical bodies have two kinds of
accidents: those which concern their substance, as, e. g., the
health and the illness of a man; and those which concern their
form, as, e.g., the astonishment and laughter of a man.2 The
substances of compound bodies differ very much in their
ultimate form,3 according to the difference of the forms.
peculiar to each component substance. Hence the substance
of iron has become in its properties the opposite of the
substance of cream, and this difference is attended by the
difference of accidents. You notice, therefore, hardness in the
one, and softness in the other: two accidents, whose differ-
ence results from the difference which exists in the forms of
the substances; while the darkness and the whiteness are acci-
dents whose divergence corresponds to that of the two sub-
stances in their ultimate condition. The Mutakallem refuted
this reply by means of his propositions, as I am now going
to state:-There does not exist a form which, as you believe,
modifies the substance, and thus causes substances to be
different from each other; this difference is exclusively
effected by the accidents-according to the theory of the
Kalām, which we mentioned in explaining the eighth pro-
position. He then continued thus: There is no difference
between the substance of iron and that of cream; all things
are composed of the same kind of atoms.-We explained
DYD.
Charizi, "DDD"the secrets;" Shem-tob,
2 Health and disease concern the body of man; while surprise and laughter
concern that element which is the characteristic (71) of man, his soul.
3 The "ultimate form" of a thing is the form and the condition in which
the thing is noticed by man; and the substance of that composition (
1) is the same as 17p. See page 18, note 1.
pla
334
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
the view of the Mutakallemim on this point in treating of
the first proposition, the logical consequences of which are,
as we have shown, the second and the third propositions;
they further require the twelfth proposition, in order to
establish the theory of atoms. Nor do they admit that
any accidents determine the nature of a substance, or
predispose it to receive certain other accidents; for, ac-
cording to their opinion, an accident cannot be the sub-
stratum of another accident, as we have shown in explain-
ing the ninth proposition; nor can it have any duration,
according to the sixth proposition. When the Mutakalle-
mim have established all that they wish to infer from these
propositions, they arrive at the conclusion¹ that the com-
ponent atoms of cream and of iron are alike. The relation
of each atom to each of the accidents is the same; one atom
is not more adapted than another to receive a certain acci-
dent;
and as a certain atom is not more fitted to move than
to rest, so one atom is not more apt than another to
receive the accident of life, of reason, of sensation. It is
here of no moment whether a thing contains a larger or
smaller quantity of atoms, for, according to the view of the
Mutakallemim, which we explained in treating of the fifth
proposition, every accident [of a thing] exists in each of its
atoms. All these propositions lead to the conclusion that a
human being is not better constituted to become wise than
the bat,³ and establish the theory of admissibility expressed
in this [tenth] proposition. Every effort was made to
demonstrate this proposition, because it is the best means
for proving anything they like, as will be explained.
2
NOTE.-Mark, O reader, that if you know the nature of
the soul and its properties, and if you have a correct notion
of everything which concerns the soul, you will observe
that most animals possess imagination. As to the higher
.והיה המתברר לנו,Charizi 1
2 Ibn Tibbon, ", "for."
השרץ,Charizi and Palquera ; העטלף,Ibn Tibbon ; אלכנפס,Arabic •
.עטלף - אלכפאש Palquera suggests that Ibn Tibbon perhaps had the reading
PART 1.—CHAPTER LXXIII.
335
class of animals, that is, those which have a heart, it is
obvious that they have imagination.¹ Man's distinction does
not consist in the possession of imagination, and the action
of imagination is not the same as the action of the intellect,
but the reverse of it.2 For the intellect analyses and divides
the component parts of things, it forms abstract ideas of
them, represents them in their true form as well as in their
causal relations, derives from one object a great many facts,
which-for this intellect totally differ from each other,
just as two human individuals appear different to the imagi-
nation; it distinguishes that which is the property of the
genus from that which is peculiar to the individual,—and
no proof is correct, unless founded on the former; the
intellect further determines whether certain qualities of a
thing are essential or non-essential. Imagination has none
of these functions. It only perceives the individual, the com-
pound in that aggregate condition in which it presents
itself to the senses; or it combines things which exist*
separately, joins some of them together, and represents
them all as one body or as a force of the body. Hence
it is that some imagine a man with a horse's head, with
wings, etc. This is called a fiction, a phantasm; it is
3
¹ Comp. Maimon. Eight Chapters, i.; Aristotle, IIɛpì ¥vxñs, chap. iii., rõv
δὲ θηρίων ἐνίοις φαντασία μὲν ὑπάρχει, λόγος δ᾽ οὔ.—ibid. ii. 3.
οἷς δ᾽
ἐκείνων ἕκαστον, οὐ πᾶσι λογισμός, ἀλλὰ τοῖς μὲν οὐδὲ φαντασία, τὰ δὲ
Taúry μóvy Swow. Essays on Ibn Ezra, by M. Friedländer, pag. 27,
μόνη ζῶσιν.
note 2.
2 Three characteristic actions of the intellect, as distinguished from imagi-
nation, are here mentioned:-1. Analysis of the things perceived by the senses;
2. Abstraction and Generalisation; 3. Classification of the Attributes of
things as essential and non-essential. Imagination reproduces the things as
they represent themselves to the senses of man, in their individuality and
totality, either each by itself, or several things combined.
3 A proof, being a purely intellectual operation, requires for its data purely
intellectual notions; such are conveyed by generic terms, or abstract ex-
pressions which denote the sum of the properties common to all individuals
of the same class.
have no equivalent in the (במציאות .Hebr) פי אלוגוד The words 4
translation of Munk; they have been omitted by Shemtob, Efodi, etc., in their
בעת עבור המחשבה במציאות,paraphrases of this passage. Charizi
336
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
a thing to which nothing in the actual world corresponds.
Nor can imagination in any way¹ obtain a purely imma-
terial image of an object, however abstract the form of
the image may be.2 Imagination yields therefore no test
for the reality of a thing.
Hear what profit we derive from the preliminary disci-
plines, and how excellent the propositions are which we
learn through them. Know that there are certain things,
which would appear impossible, if tested by man's imagina-
tion, being as inconceivable as the co-existence of two oppo-
site properties in one object; yet the existence of those
same things, which cannot be represented by imagination,
is nevertheless established by proof, and attested by their
reality. E.g., Imagine a large globe, of any magnitude you
like, even as large as the all-encompassing sphere; further
an axis passing through the centre, and two persons standing
on the two extremities of the axis in such a manner that
their feet are in the same straight line with the axis, which
may be either parallel to the equator or not; in the first
case both persons would fall, in the second case one, namely
the one who stands on the lower extremity would fall, the
other would remain standing, as far as our imagination can
perceive. It has, however, already been proved that the
earth has the form of a globe, that it is inhabited on both
extremities of a certain diameter, that both the inhabitants
have their heads towards the heaven, and their legs towards
each other, and yet neither of them falls nor do we ever
suppose¹ that they fall; for it is incorrect to say that the one
3
to perceive that which belongs to the * להשיג הדבר הכללי The words 1
tion.
3
..
genus," which are found in the several editions of Ibn Tibbon, are superfluous;
they are not found in the ed. princeps nor in the MSS. (Munk.)
2 That is, the most abstract form that can be produced by man's imagina-
in Ibn Tibbon's version is a corruption of . (Munk.)
4 That is to say, we are so familiar with the fact that there are antipodes
on this earth, and that their relative position to the sky is exactly the same
as of those beings who exist on the opposite side of the globe, that we cannot
even conceive the idea ("") how a thing can fall down from the earth:
PART I.-CHAPTER LXXIII.
337
extremity is above, the other below; but the terms "above"
and "below" apply to both of them as regards their rela-
tive position to each other. Similarly it has been proved
in the second chapter of the book on Conic Sections,¹ that
two lines, which at first are at a certain distance from each
other, may approach each other2 in the same proportion as
they are produced further, and yet would never meet, even if
they were produced to infinity, although they are observed to
be constantly converging. This is a fact which cannot easily
be conceived, and which does not come within the scope of
imagination. Of these two lines the one is straight, the
other curved, as stated in the aforementioned book. It has
consequently been proved that things which cannot be per-
ceived or imagined, and which would be found impossible
if tested solely by imagination, are nevertheless in real
existence. The non-existence of things which are repre-
sented by imagination as possible has likewise been estab-
lished by proof, e.g., the corporeality of God, and His exist-
ence as a force residing in a body. Imagination perceives
nothing except bodies, or properties inherent in bodies.
3
It has thus been clearly shown that in man exists a certain
faculty which is entirely distinct from imagination, and by
which the necessary, the possible, and the impossible can be
distinguished from each other. This inquiry is most useful.
It is of the greatest profit to him who desires to guard
himself against the errors of men guided by imagination!
towards the sky, although in reference to other globes it could not be imagined
how two objects placed on the two extremities of a (לא יציירם כלל)
.לא יציירם בדמיון and distinguishes it from לא יצוייר בשכל
-
diameter could both remain in their positions.-Ibn Caspi explains the phrase
.מצוקים חרותים
1 Kwvikà oтoxɛia (Conic Sections) of Apollonius; in Arabic Kitab al-mah-
rutāt (Book II. Theorem 13). (Munk.) Ibn Tibbon, D'; Charizi,
N
"Their distance becomes smaller and they approach each other."
2 Lit.,
3 The author alludes to the asymptotes of the hyperbola; they approach
nearer the curve the more they are produced, but they can never touch it.~
This sentence should follow immediately after the words "to be con--
stantly converging."
:
338
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
Do not think that the Mutakallemim ignore this altogether;
to some extent they do take it into consideration; they
know it, and call that which can be imagined without having
reality—as, e.g., the corporeality of God—a phantom and a
fancy;¹ they state frequently that such phantoms are not
real. It is for this reason that they advance the first nine
propositions and establish on them the proof of the tenth,
according to which all those imaginable things which they
wish to admit as possible are really possible, because of the
similarity of all atoms and the equality of all accidents as
regards their accidentality, as we have explained.
Consider, O reader, and bear in mind that this requires
deep research. For there are certain notions which some
believe to be founded on reason, while others regard them
as mere fictions. In such cases it would be necessary to
find something that could show the difference between
conceptions of the intellect and mere imaginary fancies.
When the philosopher, in his way of expressing himself,
contends, "Reality is my evidence; by its guidance I
examine whether a thing is necessary, possible, or im-
possible," the religionist replies, "This is exactly the
difference between us; that which actually exists, has,
according to my view, been produced by the will of the
Creator, not by necessity; just as it has been created with
that special property, it might have been created with any
other property, unless the impossibility which you postulate
be proved by a logical demonstration.
About this admissibility (of imaginable things) I shall
have to say more, and I shall return to it in various parts
""
1 The Arabic text has NND); Charizi, p, "falsehood;” Ibn
t but לא דמיון The words עולה על רוח מחשבה לא דמיון Tibbon
""
not an image," have probably been added to make it clearer that the Muta-
kallemim meant something different from "imagination," although the term
*' is used, which is generally translated by '. Munk suggests that
as is found לשון אחר - ל"א - לא and that מחשבה is a variation of דמיון
=
in several manuscripts. As to the use of an in the sense of 117, see
pag. 111, notes 1 and 2.
PART 1.-CHAPTER LXXIII.
339
of this treatise; for it is not a subject which should be
rejected in haste¹ and on the spur of the moment.
ELEVENTH PROPOSITION.
"The existence of the infinite is in every respect im-
possible." The following is an explanation of this proposi-
tion. The impossibility of the existence of an infinite body
has been clearly demonstrated; the same can be said of an
infinite number of bodies, though each of them be finite, if
these beings, infinite in number, exist at the same time;"
equally impossible is the existence of an infinite series of
causes, namely, that a certain thing should be the cause of
another thing, but itself the effect of another cause, which
again is the result of another cause, and so on to infinity,
or that things in an infinite series, either bodies or ideals,
should be in actual³ existence, and in causal relation to each
other. This causal relation is the essential order of nature,
*
4
in which, as has been fully proved, the infinite is impossible.
As regards the virtual and the accidental existence of the
infinite, it has been established in some cases; it has been
proved, e.g. that a body can virtually be divided ad infinitum,
also that time can be divided ad infinitum; in other cases it
is still an open question, as e.g. the existence of the infinite 5
in succession, which is called the accidental infinite, i.e., a
series of things in which one thing comes forth when the
other is gone, and this again in its turn succeeded a thing
The word DIN in the editions of Ibn Tibbon's Version is superfluous;
it is not found in the MSS. (Munk.)
2 See Part II., Introd., Propositions i., ii. and iii.
3 That is to say, that all these causes really coexist.
4 in Charizi's Version is superfluous. The division of any magnitude
or of time ad infinitum is said to be infinite in potentia, П, because the
actual division arrives at last at a point where it cannot be continued, though,
theoretically, the continued division is possible. The successive repetition of a
magnitude ad infinitum is said to be infinite by accident, pa, because
the repetition is not necessarily included in the nature of the magnitude.
5
in Ibn Tibbon's Version is superfluous.
z 2
340
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
which had ceased to exist, and so on ad infinitum. This
subject requires deep research.
Those who boast that they have proved the eternity of
the Universe say that time is infinite; an assertion which is
not necessarily erroneous; for only when one atom has ceased
to exist, the other follows. Nor is it absolutely wrong, when
they assert, that the accidents of the substance succeed each
other in an infinite series, for these accidents do not co-
exist, but come in succession one after the other, and the
impossibility of the infinite in that case has not been proved.¹
The Mutakallemim, however, make no difference between the
existence of an infinite body and the divisibility of a body
or of time ad infinitum, between the co-existence of an infinite
number of things, as e.g. the individual human beings
who exist at present, and the infinite number of beings suc-
cessively existing, as, e.g., Reuben the son of Jacob, and Jacob
the son of Isaac, and Isaac the son of Abraham,2 and so on
to infinity. This is according to their opinion as inadmissible
as the first case; they believe these four forms of the infinite³
to be quite equal. Some of the Mutakallemim endeavour to
establish their proposition concerning the last named form
of the infinite, and to demonstrate its impossibility by a
method which I shall explain in this treatise; others say
that this impossibility is a self-evident axiom and requires
no further proof. But if it were undoubtedly wrong to
assume that an infinite number of things can exist in
succession, although that link of the series which exists at
present is finite, the inadmissibility of the eternity of the
Universe would be equally self-evident, and would not require
for its proof any other proposition. This, however, is not
the place for investigating the subject.
4
1 See Introd. to Part II. Propos. xxvi.
2 Arabic: Zeid is the son of Amr, Amr the son of Khaled, Khaled the son
of Beir.
3 Viz., 1. The infinite dimensions of a body; 2. The division of a body
continued ad infinitum; 3. The infinite number of co-existing things; 4. The
infinite number of things existing one after the other.
4 See ch. lxxiv., Second Argument.
PART I.- -CHAPTER LXXIII.
341
TWELFTH PROPOSITION.
2
"The senses are not always to be trusted." For two
reasons the Mutakallemim find fault¹ with the perception
of the senses. First, the senses are precluded from perceiv-
ing many objects, either on account of the smallness of the
objects-this is the case with the atoms, and with other
things intimately connected with the atoms, as we have
already stated-or on account of the remoteness of the
objects from the person who desires to perceive them;
e.g., we cannot see, hear, or smell at a distance of many
miles; nor do we perceive the motion of the heavens.
Secondly, the senses misapprehend the objects of their
perception: a large object appears small from a distance;
a small object immersed in water appears larger; a
crooked thing appears straight when partly placed in
water, and partly out of it;3 things appear yellow to
a person suffering from jaundice; sweet things are
bitter to him whose tongue has imbibed red gall;
and they mention many other things of this kind. There-
fore they say, we cannot trust our senses so far as to
establish any proof on their perceptions. You must not
believe that the Mutakallemin had no purpose in agreeing
upon this proposition, or as most of the later adherents
4
5
11 in the several editions of Ibn Tibbon's Version is the corrupt read-
ing of 17, “they suspected," found in some MSS. and in the editio princeps.
2 That is, the motion of the atoms. Comp. Proposition iii. (page 314).
3 More frequently a straight object, half immersed in water, appears to
be bent.
4 Comp. Shaar ha-shamayim of R. Gershon b. Shelomo (ed. Heidenheim),
Ibn Tibbon .כשתגבר הלחה הירוקה תטעם כל דברים מרים,525 page
מרה אדומה According to Munk .אדומה and Charizi render the word by
ואשר,(.Charizi (MS .מרה ירוקה was included in the several kinds of
(.Munk)- גברה על טבעו המרה הירוקה ונשתקעה בלשונו
5 Instead of 11 N in the editions of Ibn Tibbon's Version, the
MSS. and the editio princeps has 11 npw x1, "and whose tongue has
absorbed."—(Munk.)
F
342
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
!
of that school affirm, that the first Mutakallemim had no
ulterior object in endeavouring to prove the existence of
atoms. On the contrary, every proposition here mentioned
is indispensable; if one of these be rejected, the whole theory
falls to the ground.¹ The last-mentioned proposition is of
particular importance; for when our senses perceive things
by which any of the foregoing propositions are confuted,
the Mutakallemim say that no notice should be taken of the
perception of the senses so long as the proposition is sup-
ported by the testimony 2 of the intellect, and established
(as they believe) by proof. Thus they say that the con-
tinuous motion is interrupted by moments of rest; that the
millstone in its motion is broken into atoms; that the white
colour of a garment ceases to exist, and another whiteness
comes in its stead.³ All these theories are contrary to
what the eye perceives, and many inferences are drawn
from the assumed existence of a vacuum, all of which are
contradicted by the senses. The Mutakallemim, however,
meet these objections by saying, whenever they can do so,
that the perception of these things is withheld from the
senses; in other instances they maintain that the contradic-
tion has its source in the deceptive character of the senses.
You know that this theory is very ancient, and was the pride
of the sophists, who asserted that they themselves were its
authors; this is stated by Galenus 5 in his treatise on natural
forces; and you know well what he says of those who will
not admit the evidence of the senses.
4
Having discussed these propositions, I now proceed to
explain the theory of the Mutakallemim concerning the
above-mentioned four problems.
¹ See lxxi., pag. 281, note 2.
2 The feminine form
in both the Hebrew Versions is inaccurate, or
.עדות must be altered into עד
3 See lxxiii., pages 315 and 320.
appears to be a fusion היו מתפארים בהם ואמרו שהם אמרום תחלה 4
.כאנה תנתחלהא of two different renderings of the Arabic
See Gal., περὶ δυνάμεων φυσικῶν, Ι., 2.
PART I.-CHAPTER LXXIV.
343
CHAPTER LXXIV.
makes it can free. "
In this chapter will be given an outline of the proofs by
which the Mutakallemim attempt to demonstrate that the
universe is not eternal. You must of course not expect that
I shall quote their lengthy¹ arguments verbatim; I only
intend to give an abstract of each proof,2 to show in
what way it helps to establish the theory of the creatio ex
nihilo or to confute the eternity of the universe, and briefly to
notice the propositions they employed in support of their
theory. If you were to read their well-known and volu-
minous writings, you would not discover any argument with
which they support their view left unnoticed in the present
outline, but you might find there greater copiousness of
words combined with more grace and elegance of style;
frequently they employ rhyme, rhythm, and poetical
diction, and sometimes mysterious phrases which perhaps
are intended to startle persons listening to their discourses,
and to deter those who might otherwise criticise them.
You would also find many repetitions; questions propounded
and, as they believe, answered, and frequent attacks on those
who differ from their opinions.
3
4
5
1 Lit., "in their language and in their prolixity," that is, he does not pretend
to reproduce the elegance or the prolixity of their writings, which is described
below.
2 Maimonides does not promise an enumeration of all Mutakallemim (
D) and their arguments, but to reproduce those arguments and
methods which include the opinions of all of them.
3 Arabic, TP; Munk, Quelquefois. The Hebrew translators rendered it
inaccurately by " (Tibbon), and WON (Charizi), thus making it doubtful
whether Maimonides had seen the books of the Mutakallemim here referred to.
* In a letter addressed to R. Samuel Ibn Tibbon (Bodl. Libr. 74 Poc.),
Maimonides explains these terms as follows:-By yxid the rhyme is to be
מלות שקולות Hebrew
consists in the אלפקדה ; חרוז understood; the Hebrew equivalent for it is
formation of one line according to the metre of another; it is called in
5 See ch. li., pag. 176 and 177.
344
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
The First Argument.
Some of the Mutakallemim thought that by proving the
creation of one thing, they demonstrated the creatio ex nihilo in
reference to the entire universe. E.g., Zaid, who from a small
molecule has gradually been brought to a state of perfection,
has undoubtedly not effected this change and development
by his own efforts, but owes it to an external agency. It is
therefore clear that an agent is required for such organisation
and successive transmutation. A palm-tree or any other
object might equally be selected to illustrate this idea. The
whole universe, they argue, is analogous to these instances.
Thus you see how they believe that a law discovered in one
thing, may equally be applied to everything.¹
•Dr
نه
The Second Argument.
A
This argument is likewise based on the belief that the
proof by which the creation of one thing is demonstrated,
holds good for the creatio ex nihilo in reference to the whole
universe. E.g., a certain individual, called Zaid, 2 who one
time was not yet in existence, subsequently came into exist-
ence; and if it be assumed that Amr, his father, was the
cause of his existence, Amr himself must likewise have
passed from non-existence into existence; suppose then that
Zaid's father unquestionably owed his origin to Khaled,
Zaid's grandfather,³ it would be found that Khaled himself
did not exist from eternity, and the series of causes could
thus be carried back to infinity. But such an infinite
4
5
,מאברהם
In criticising this method, Maimonides shows the weakness of this proof,
which is based on analogy, i.e., on the assumption that the law discovered in
one thing is applicable to all things. Efodi adds that this proof is not sup-
ported by any of the afore-mentioned propositions,
2 See pag. 289, note 2.
3 In the editions of Ibn Tibbon's Version, 8 1998 DIM VEN 'N ONI,
DND, "and if his (i. e., Jacob's) father is necessarily the descendant of
Abraham."
4 This sentence is omitted in Ibn Tibbon's Version.
5 That is, the infinite in a series of things following each other, called
the infinite by accident (p). See pag. 339, note 4.
PART I.-CHAPTER LXXIV.
345
series of beings is inadmissible according to the theory of
the Mutakallemim, as we have shown in our discussion
of their eleventh proposition. In continuing this species.
of reasoning, you come to a first man, who had no parent,
viz., to Adam. Then you will of course ask, whence came
this first man? If, e.g., the reply be given that he was
made out of earth, you will again inquire, "Whence came
that earth ?” "Out of water." "Whence came the water ?"
The inquiry would be carried on, either ad infinitum, which
is absurd, or until you meet with a something that came
into existence from absolute non-existence; in this latter
case you would arrive at the real truth; here the series.
of inquiries ends. This result of the questions proves,
according to the opinion of the Mutakallemim, that the
whole universe came into existence from absolute non-
existence.
1
The Third Argument.
<-
The atoms of things are necessarily either joined together
or separate, and even the same atoms may at one time be
united at another disunited. It is therefore evident that the
nature of the atoms does not necessitate either their com-
bination or their separation; for if they were separate by
virtue of their nature they would never join, and if they were
joined by virtue of their nature, they could never again be
separated. Thus there is no stronger reason why atoms
should be combined than separate, or vice versâ, why rather
in a state of separation than of combination. Seeing that
some atoms are joined, others separate, and again others
subject to change, they being combined at one time and
separated at another, the fact may therefore be taken as a
1 Lit., "And that is the truth." This phrase corresponds to "which is
absurd." The theory of a Primal Cause is accepted by the Mutakallemim,
while that of an infinite number of causes is rejected. Instead of prx, one
Leyden MSS. has 77, "the limit" (Munk); but the idea of “limit” is
expressed already twice in this sentence, viz., "till" (10, "at last"), and
"here the series of inquiries ends."
346
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
I
proof that the atoms cannot combine or separate without
an agent. This argument, according to the opinion of the
Mutakallemim, establishes the theory that the universe has
been created from nothing. You have already been told,
that those who employ this argument, rely on the first
proposition of the Mutakallemim with its corollaries.
· V.3.
The Fourth Argument.
The whole Universe is composed of substance and acci-
dents; every substance must possess one accident or more,
and since the accidents are not eternal, the substance, the
substratum of the accidents, cannot be eternal; for that
which is joined to transient things and cannot exist without
them is itself transient.1 Therefore the whole Universe
has had a beginning. To the objection, that the substance
may possibly be eternal while the accidents, though in
themselves transient, succeed each other in an infinite series,
they reply that, in this case, an infinite number of transient
things would be in existence, an eventuality which, ac-
cording to their theory, is impossible. This argument is con-
sidered by them the best and safest, and has been accepted
by many of them as a strict proof. Its acceptance implies
the admission of the following three propositions, the object
of which is well understood by philosophers.2 1. An in-
finite series of things, of which the one succeeds when the
other has ceased to exist, is impossible. 2. All accidents.
have a beginning. Our opponent, who defends the theory
of the eternity of the universe, can refute this proposition
by pointing to one³ particular accident, namely to the
1 Because no substance can be without accidents, which are admitted to have
had a beginning, the substance must have a beginning.
2 That is to say, the thinker sees easily that these propositions were not
accepted because of their intrinsic value, but because of their utility for dis-
proving the eternity of the universe.
-
signifies here (מקרה מן המקרים .Hebr) ערץ מן אלאעראץ The phrase 3
while similar ,(מקרה אחד מן המקרים)
"C
a certain particular accident"
phrases are generally employed in an indefinite sense (any accident).
PART I-CHAPTER LXXIV.
347
(
2
circular motion of the sphere; for it is held by Aristotle that
this circular motion is eternal,¹ and, therefore, the spheres
which perform this motion are, according to his opinion, like-
wise eternal. It is of no use to prove that all other accidents
have a beginning; for our opponent does not deny this; he
says that accidents may supervene an object which has
existed from eternity, and may follow each other in rotation.
He contents himself with maintaining that this parti-
cular accident, viz., circular motion, the motion of the
heavenly sphere, is eternal, and does not belong to the class
of transient accidents. It is, therefore necessary to examine
this accident by itself and to prove that it is not eternal.
3. The next proposition which the author of this argument
accepts, is as follows: Every material object consists of sub-
stance and accidents, that is to say, of atoms and accidents
in the sense in which the Mutakallemim use the term. But
if a material object were held to be a combination of matter
and form, as has been proved by our opponent,³ it would
be necessary to demonstrate that the primal matter and the
primal form are transient, and only then the proof of the
creatio ex nihilo would be complete.
1 Comp. Arist. Metaph., xii. 7: καὶ ἔστι τι ἀεὶ κινούμενον κίνησιν ἄπουστον.
αὕτη δ᾽ ἡ κύκλῳ, καὶ τοῦτο οὐ λόγῳ μόνον ἀλλ' ἔργῳ.
2 According to Ibn Tibbon (in a marginal note in some MSS. of his transla-
without beginning * (בלתי מחודשת ו .Hebr) גיר חאדת ו tion) the words
:
،،
and" are superfluous, because the same has already been stated before. The
remark, however, is not quite correct; for Maimonides first mentioned the
opinion of Aristotle on which the objections are founded, and then he quotes
the objections themselves which have been made to Propositions vi. and xi. (ch.
lxiii.), and which are supported in the first place by the periodical recurrence of
each element in a finite series of accidents, which, though limited, may still
recur an infinite number of times; and in the second place, by the circular
motion of the heavenly spheres, which is likewise believed by the objector to
be infinite as regards the number of circuits accomplished.
3 That is, it does not suffice for the proof of the creatio ex nihilo to show
that such atoms as have been assumed by the Mutakallemim are finite; but it
must also be proved that matter and form in the most general sense of the term
are finite, since an authority like Aristotle taught that everything is a combi-
nation of matter and form.
348
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
The Fifth Argument.
This argument is based on the theory of Determination,'
and is made much of by the Mutakallemim. It is the same
as the theory which I explained in discussing the tenth pro-
position. Namely, when they treat either of the Universe
in general, or of any of its parts, they assume that it can
have such properties and such dimensions as it actually has ;
that it may receive such accidents as in reality are noticed
in it, and that it may exist in such a place and at such a
time as in fact is the case; but it may be larger or smaller,
may receive other properties and accidents, and come to
existence at an earlier or a later period, or in a different
place. Consequently, the fact that a thing has been deter-
mined in its composition, size, place, accident and time-
a variation in all these points being possible-is a proof
that a being exists which freely chooses and determines
these divers relations; and the circumstance that the
Universe or a part of it requires a being able to make
this selection, proves that the Universe has been created
ex nihilo. For there is no difference which of the following
expressions is used to determine, to make, to create, to
produce, to originate, or to intend; these verbs have
all one and the same meaning. The Mutakallemim give
a great many examples, both of a general and a special
character. They say, it is not more natural for earth to
be under water than to be above water; who 3 then
determined its actual position? Or, it is not more natural
that the sun is round than that it should be square or tri-
angular; for all qualities have the same relation to a body
capable of possessing them. Who then determined one
particular quality? In a similar way they treat of every
individual being; when, e.g., they notice flowers of different
3
2
; הגבלה and also,המיוחדת Charizi ; התיחד Ibn Tibbon ; אלכציץ .Arab •
Palquera D. All mean the same thing, namely, the act of determining by
free will, which of the many possible forms is to unite with a certain sub-
2 See ch. lxx., page 290.
stance.
.מי יחד in Ibn Tibbon's Version is to be read מייחר 3
1
PART I.-CHAPTER LXXIV.
349
colours, they are unable to explain the phenomenon, and
they take it as a strong proof in favour of their theory;
they say,
"Behold, the earth is everywhere alike, the
water is alike; why then is this flower red and that one
yellow? Some being must have determined the colour of
each, and that being is God. A being must therefore exist
which determines everything, both as regards the Universe
generally, and each of its parts individually.¹ All this
is the logical consequence of the tenth proposition. The.
theory of determination is moreover 2 adopted by some of
those who assume the eternity of the Universe, as will be ex-
plained below. In conclusion, I consider this to be the
best argument; and in another part³ I shall more fully
acquaint you with the opinion I have formed concerning
the theory of Determination.
-
The Sixth Argument.
-
FAN
One of the modern Mutakallemim thought that he had
found a very good argument, much better than any ad-
vanced hitherto, namely, the argument based on the triumph
of existence over non-existence. He says that, according
to the common belief, the existence of the Universe is
merely possible; for if it were necessary, the Universe would
be God,*—but he seems to forget that we are at issue with
those who, whilst they believe in the existence of God, admit
at the same time the eternity of the Universe.-The expres-
sion "A thing is possible" denotes that the thing may either
by one of the * באחד אלגאיזאת .in some MSS ; באחד אלגזאיאת .Arab 1
agrees with the באחד מן הפרטים The Hebrew
admissible properties."
former reading.—(Munk.)
(f
2 Maimonides finds two weak points in this method. First, it is based on the
tenth proposition, the weakness of which was exhibited above (ch. lxxiii. page
330 sqq.). Secondly, it is not conclusive, because there are some philosophers
who adopt the theory of determination and still believe in the eternity of
the Universe.
Part II., ch. xix.
והנמצא יסודר על מעלות והם המחויב והאפשר ; Comp. Ibn Gabirol 4
-quoted by Palquera, Moreh ha) והנמנע והמחויב הוא האחד הפועל יתי
moreh, page 63). "As regards existence things may be either necessary, or
possible or impossible. The Creator alone is necessary.”
I
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
350
1
be in existence or not in existence, and that there is not
more reason why it should exist than why it should not
exist. The fact that a thing, the existence of which is
possible, actually does exist-although it bears the same
relation to the state of existence as to that of non-existence
-proves that there is a Being which gave the preference
to existence over non-existence. This argument is very
forcible; it is a modified form of the foregoing argu-
ment which is based on the theory of determination. He
only chose the term "preference" instead of "determina-
tion," and instead of applying it to the properties of the
existing being he applies it to "the existence of the being
itself." He either had the intention to mislead, or he mis-
understood the proposition, that the existence of the Universe
is possible. Our opponent who assumes the eternity of the
Universe, employs the term "possible," and says, "the
existence of the Universe is possible" in a sense different
from that in which the Mutakallem applies it, as will be
explained below. Moreover it may be doubted whether
the conclusion, that the Universe owes its origin to a being
which is able to give preference to existence over non-
existence, is correct. For we may apply the terms "pre-
ference " and "determination" to anything capable of
receiving either of two properties which are contrary or
opposed to each other; and when we find that the thing
actually possesses one property and not the other, we
are convinced that there exists a determining agent. E.g.,
you say that a piece of copper could just as well be
formed into a kettle as into a lamp; when we find that it
That is to say, for the author of this method; not in the opinion of
Maimonides. Crescas: this Maimonides said satirically (by aybno).
2 See Introduction to Part II., Proposition xix. sqq. "Possible" in the
sense of the philosophers (dvvúµɛ) is that which requires some causa efficiens
to become real (¿vɛpyɛíą), while the Mutakallemim understood by "possible
that which may become real by the free will of some external agent. But the
Mutakallemim who do not admit causality, and who refer everything to the
direct interference of the Creator, are consistent in making no difference
between the two kinds of "possibilities."
""
PART I.-CHAPTER LXXIV.
351
is a lamp or a kettle, we have no doubt that a deciding
and determining agent has advisedly chosen one of the
two possible forms; for it is clear that the substance of
copper existed, and that before the determination took place
it had neither of the two possible forms which have just been
mentioned. When, however, it is the question whether a cer-
tain existing object is eternal, or whether it has passed from
non-existence into existence, this argument is inadmissible;
for it cannot be asked who decided in favour of the existence
of a thing, and rejected its non-existence, except when it
has been admitted that it has passed from non-existence
into existence; in the present case this is just the point
under discussion. If we were to take the existence and the
non-existence of a thing as mere objects of imagination, we
should have to apply the tenth proposition, which gives
prominence to imagination and fiction, and ignores the
things which exist in reality, or are conceived by the intel-
lect. Our opponent, however, who believes in the eternity
of the Universe, will show that we can imagine the non-
existence of the Universe as well as we can imagine any
other impossibility. It is not my intention¹ to refute
their doctrine of the creatio ex nihilo: I only wish to show
the incorrectness of their belief that this argument differs
from the one which precedes; since in fact the two argu-
ments are identical, and are founded on the well-known
principle of determination.
—(Munk.)
>"
¹ According to Shem-tob: I need not disprove this, because the premises
have been proved to be wrong. Crescas adds now (ny). This addition
does not appear to be correct; for, in fact, Maimonides does not entirely
reject this proof advanced by the Mutakallemim in demonstrating the creatio
ex nihilo. From the fact that a thing could be different from what it is, he like-
wise infers that a Being must exist, on whose decision the actual forms of
things depend. The only difference is that according to the Mutakallemim
each individual case is considered as the direct result of that decision, while
Maimonides assumes a series of natural causes between the Primal Cause (the
determining power), and the individual beings. Comp. Part II., ch. xix.
some MSS. and ed. princeps have ; these two
2 Instead of
((
G
.תקריר and תקדיר :renderings correspond with the two readings in the original
352
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
The Seventh Argument.
One of the modern Mutakallemim says that he is able to
prove the creation of the Universe from the theory put
forth by the philosophers concerning the immortality of the
soul. He argues thus: If the world were eternal, the
number of the dead would necessarily be infinite, and con-
sequently an infinite number of souls would coexist, but,
it has long since been shown that the coexistence of an
infinite number of things, is positively impossible. This
is indeed a strange argument! One difficulty is explained by
another which is still greater! Here the saying, well known
among the Arameans, may be applied: "Your guarantee
wants another guarantee." 1 He rests his argument on the
immortality of the soul, as though he understood this im-
mortality, in what respect the soul is immortal, or what the
thing is which is immortal! If, however, he only meant
to controvert the opinion of his opponent, who believed in
the eternity of the Universe, and also in the immortality
of the soul, he accomplished his task, provided the opponent
admitted the correctness of the idea which that Mutakallem
formed of the philosopher's view on the immortality of
the soul. Some of the later philosophers 2 explained this
difficulty as follows: the immortal souls are not substances
which occupy a locality or a space, and their existence in
an infinite number is therefore not impossible. You must
bear in mind that those abstract beings which are
neither bodies nor forces dwelling in bodies, and which
in fact are ideals-are altogether incapable of being repre-
sented as a plurality³ unless some ideals be the cause
CAKAPAN
¹ A proverb, which also is quoted in the Babyl. Talm. Succah, 26a; Mai-
monides probably only knew it from the Talmud. According to Munk "y
"Arabs" in the editions of Ibn Tibbon's Version is a misprint for ".
-
2 Maimonides probably alludes here to the theory of Ibn Sina. Comp.
Shahrastani (transl. by Haarbrücker) II., page 318.
3 See Introduction to Part II., Proposition xvi. Albertus Magnus wrote
against this theory: Libellus contra eos qui dicunt quod post separationem ex
omnibus animalibus non remanet nisi intellectus unus et anima una. See Alb.
M., Opera V., page 218 sqq., ed. de Jamroy.(Munk.)
.
PART I.-CHAPTER LXXIV.
353
of the existence of others, and can be distinguished from
each other by the specific difference that some
are the
efficient cause and others the effect; but that which
remains of Zaid [after his death] is neither the cause nor
the effect of that which is left of Amr, and therefore
the souls of all the departed form only, one being as has!
A been explained by Ibn Bekr Ibn Al-saig¹ and others who
ventured to speak on these profound subjects. In short,
such intricate disciplines, which our mind can scarcely com-
prehend, cannot furnish any principles for the explanation
of other subjects.-It should be noted that whoever en-
deavours to prove or to disprove the eternity of the Uni-
verse by these arguments of the Mutakallemim, must neces-
sarily rely on one of the two following propositions, or on
both of them; namely on the tenth proposition, according
to which the actual form of a thing is merely one of many
equally possible forms, and which implies that there must
be a being capable of making the special selection; or on
the eleventh proposition which rejects the existence of an
infinite series of things coming successively into existence.
The last-named proposition is demonstrated in various ways,
e.g.,² they advert to a class of transient individuals, and
to a certain particular date. From the theory which as-
serts the eternity of the Universe, it would follow that the
individuals of that class up to that particular date are
infinite³ in number; a thousand years later the indi-
viduals of that class are likewise infinite in number; the
last number must exceed the previous one by the number
of the individuals born in those thousand years, and con-
sequently one infinite number would be larger than another.
The same² argument is applied to the revolutions of the
heavenly sphere, and in like manner it is shown that one
1 He is also called Ibn Badja; his view on the subject is found in his
Risalat alvidaa (17'DEN MIN). Comp. Munk Mélange, pag. 386, note 2.
2 Lit. "either"; Hebrew DN; Munk "d'abord": instead of the corres-
ponding 18, “or," the phrase I (71) NY)'))), “similarly," is used.
agrees with the plural (מתנאהית .Arab) אין תכלית להם The plural 3
sense in ''N Sɔ (Arab. r
כל איש
שבץ
); it is constructio ad sensum.
A A
354
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
infinite number of revolutions would be larger than another;
the same result is obtained when revolutions of one sphere
are compared with those of another moving more slowly;
the revolutions of both spheres [though unequal] would be
infinite in number. Similarly they proceed with all those ac-
cidents which are subject to destruction and production; the
individual accidents that have passed into non-existence are
counted and represented as though they were still in existence,
and as though they were things with a definite beginning;¹
this imaginary number is then either increased or reduced.
Yet all these things have no reality and are mere fictions.
Abunazar Alfarabi² in criticising ³ this proposition, has
exposed all its weak points, as you will clearly perceive,
when you study his book on the changeable beings*
earnestly and dispassionately. These are the principal
arguments of the Mutakallemim in seeking to establish the
creatio ex nihilo. Having thus proved that the Universe is
not eternal, they necessarily infer that there is an Agens who
created it in accordance with His intention, desire and will.
They then proceed to prove the unity of that Agens as I am
going to point out in the next chapter.
3
5
דאת בדאת
1 The Arabic 7 8 denotes "
denotes "things that have a beginning."
Maimonides explains its meaning in a letter addressed to R. Samuel Ibn Tibbon
as 11700 87028 N NEN "things that have a marked beginning";
and adds "for everything limited in its totality on both extremities is called
tab ni; it can be increased and diminished. But things that come
gradually into existence, and have therefore no definite beginning-as e.g., the
revolutions of the heavenly spheres-do not admit of any increase or diminu-
דברים שיש להם התחלה מסוימת :tion. The translation of Ibn Tibbon
has been suggested by the author himself.- (Munk.)
2 See page 332, note 4.
3 The Arabic DT has been explained by the author in the letter addressed
to R. Samuel Ibn Tibbon as follows: " (DN, as in some copies, is
wrong) denotes to strike on the head, similar to the phrase met with in the
Talmud, NI ' 1, they struck him on the head.' I meant to say that
Alfarabi has proved the absurdity of this proposition, which the Mutakallemim
accepted as an important principle."
(
4 Narboni: 'yan xb npwon n "This work is not extant.”
5 Comp. ch. xxxiv., page 123, and note 1.
PART I.- -CHAPTER LXXV.
355
CHAPTER LXXV.
On the arguments of the Mutakallemim to prove the
Unity of God.
In this chapter I shall explain to you how the Mutakallemim
prove the Unity of God. They contend that the Maker and
Creator of the Universe, the existence of whom is testified
by all nature, is One. Two propositions are employed by
them in demonstrating the Unity of God, viz., two deities
or more would neutralise each other, and if several deities
existed they would be distinguished from each other by a
specific difference.¹
First Argument.
The first argument is that of mutual neutralisation, and
is employed by the majority of the Mutakallemim. It is to
the following effect :-If the Universe had two Gods, it
would necessarily occur that the atom-subject to a com-
bination with one of two opposite qualities-either remained
without either of them, and that is impossible, or, though
being only one atom, included both qualities at the same
ime, and that is likewise impossible. E.g., whilst one of
2
דרך ההמנעות ודרך,Ibn Tibbon אלתמאנע ואלתנאיר :Arabic 1
probably another reading for והחלוק in the editions the word) ההשתנות
תמאנע The verb .דרך הנמנע ודרך השנוי :has been added), Charizi ההשתנות
or
signifies "to hinder each other;" VND "the mutual obstruction"
"the neutralisation." As the Niphal in Hebrew expresses "reciprocity" the
Inf. Niphal ny and the participle VD employed respectively by Ibn
Tibbon and Charizi may both be taken in the same sense as the Arabic VINDË.
In denotes the condition of things which differed from each other; in
or שנוי חלוף השתנות Hebrew this is expressed by Reciprocity .חלוק
need not be expressed in this case by a separate form, because it is implied
in the meaning of the word itself.
2 A third case which is likewise possible-namely, that both forces act in
the same direction-has been entirely ignored either by the Mutakallemim or
by Maimonides who quoted them. The possibility of this third case would lead
to the admission of two Gods acting in the same direction towards each
A A 2
356
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
the two deities determined that one atom or more should
be warm, the other deity might determine that the same
should be cold; the consequence of the mutual neutralisation
of the two divine beings would thus be that the atoms
would be neither warm nor cold-a contingency which
is impossible, because all bodies must combine with one
of two opposites; or they would be at the same time both
warm and cold. Similarly, it might occur that whilst
one of the deities desired that a body be in motion, the other
might desire that it be at rest; the body would then be either
without motion and rest, or would both move and rest at
the same time. Proofs of this kind¹ are founded on the
atomic theory contained in the first proposition of the Muta-
kallemim, on the proposition which refers to the creation of
the accidents, and on the proposition that negatives are pro-
perties of actual existence and require for their production
an agens.2 For if it were assumed that the substance of this
world which, according to the philosophers is subject to suc-
cessive production and destruction, is different from the sub-
stance of the world above, viz., from the substance of the
spheres a fact established by proof³—and that as the
thing, and that would be the same as assuming only one God. Maimonides
here contents himself with naming the propositions which form the basis of
this proof; their insufficiency having been discussed by him in ch. lxxiii.
1
By employing the term "proofs of this kind," instead of "this proof,"
Maimonides indicates that the proof which he mentioned is merely one instance
of a number of proofs which were founded on the principle and the method
described.
2 Prop. i., vi. and vii., see pag. 310.-If Prop. i., viz., that all things
consist of equal constituent atoms, were not admitted, two Creators or more
might be assumed for the different classes of things, as e.g., for the sublunar
world and for the heavenly spheres. Without Prop. vi., viz., that the accidents
are constantly renewed, it could not be shown that the existence of two Gods
would lead to mutual neutralisation in the creation of accidents. In the same
manner Prop. vii., viz., that the negative property is not merely absence of
the positive, but a real property requiring an agens, is indispensable; for with-
out it, the negative property would only require non-creation; and two Gods
being assumed, they would not neutralise each other, even if one desired an
object to have a positive quality, the other a negative; the positive would
3 Comp. ch. lxxii., page 292, sqq.
then be created.
PART 1.-CHAPTER LXXV.
357
Dualists assert, there are two divine beings, one of whom
rules this world without influencing the spheres, whilst
the other governs the world above without interfering with
this world-such a theory would not involve the mutual
neutralisation of the two deities. If it were then objected,
that the existence of two deities would necessitate an im-
perfection in both of them, in so far as one deity would be
unable to influence the province of the other, the objection
would be met by the reply, that this inability need not be
considered a defect in either of them for that which is not
;
included within the sphere of action of a being can of
course not be performed by that being, and an agens is not
deficient in power, if it is unable to perform what is intrinsi-
cally impossible. Thus we, Monotheists, do not consider it
a defect in God, that He does not combine two opposites
in one object, nor do we test His omnipotence by the
accomplishment of any sinister impossibility. When the
Mutakallemim noticed the weakness of their argument,' for
which they had some apparent support, they had recourse to
another argument.
Second Argument.
If there were two Gods, there would necessarily be some
element common to both, whilst some element present in
the one would be absent in the other, and constitute the
specific difference between them. This is a philosophic
3
¹ Lit., λn-See Ibid.
2 The weak point of the proof consists in its being inapplicable to the theory
of the philosophers, according to which there exist two different substances,
one of the sublunary beings, another of the heavenly spheres. The difference
of the substances would suggest two distinct creative and managing powers,
for the collision of which there is no chance. The proof, however, holds good
for the Mutakallemim, who believe that the spheres above and the things
below consist of the same kind of atoms, and that, therefore, there is no reason
to assume two Creators.
3 The conclusion can easily be supplied, namely, that neither of the two
Gods could be the Primal Cause, because each of them is a combination of
several forces or properties, and thus requires again a cause for that combination.
358
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
2
and sound argument for those who are able to examine
it, and to obtain a clear insight into its premises, which
will be further explained, in our exposition of the view
of the philosophers on this point. But it cannot be
accepted by those who admit the existence of divine attri-
butes. For according to their opinion, the Primal Cause¹
includes many different elements.5 They represent its
wisdom and its omnipotence as two different things, and
again the omnipotence as different from the will. Conse-
quently it would not be impossible that either of the two
divine beings possessed several properties, some of which
would be common to both, and some peculiar to only one of
them.
Third Argument.
6
This argument is likewise based on one of the Propositions
of the Kalam. For some of the Mutakallemim belonging to
the old school, assume, that when the Creator wills a thing,
the will is not an element superadded to the essence of God:
it is a will without a substratum. In accordance with the
1 Lit., "to follow." Some MSS. have nann "to establish" instead of
.תתבע
2 Comp. Part II. ch. i., and Part II. Introd. Propos. xix. and xxi.
3 That is, the Mutakallemim who reject the propositions of the philosophers
(Part II. Propos. xix. and xxi.) have no demonstrative proof; and besides,
those who admit that God possesses attributes, cannot apply this proof at all,
because they do not hold that the possession of properties is contrary to the
theory of God's unity.
4 In the Arabic text the usual 'n follows the word y, so also in the
-Mai שהקדמון ית' אצלו Version of Charizi, while Ibn Tibbon inverted it
monides added 'n' before alluding to the notion that there are various elements
in God—an idea which, according to his view, amounts to blasphemy.
,in a Leyden MSS.) have the same meaning) מתנאהיה and מתגאירה 5
viz., things which differ from each other, or things which are limited and can
be distinguished from each other.
• Instead of 71 in the editions of Ibn Tibbon's Version, the
אלו הדרכים MSS. have
7 Comp. "the accident of destruction without a substratum," ch. lxxiii.,
Proposition vi., page 323.
PART I.-CHAPTER LXXV.
359
propositions which we have mentioned, and of which, as
you will see, it is difficult to form a true conception, they
say that one will, which is independent of any substratum,
cannot be ascribed to two beings; for, as they assert, one cause
cannot be the source of two laws for two essences. This
is, as I told you, the method of explaining one difficulty by
means of another and still greater difficulty. For as they
define the Will, it is inconceivable, and some have, therefore,
considered it to be a mere non-entity; others who admit its
existence, meet with many insuperable¹ difficulties. The
Mutakallemim, nevertheless, establish on its existence one
of the proofs for the unity of God.
Fourth Argument.
The existence of an action is necessarily positive evidence
of the existence of an agens, but does not prove the
existence of more than one agens. There is no difference
whether the existence of one God be assumed or the
existence of two, or three, or twenty, or any number. This
is plain and clear. But the argument does not seem to
prove the non-existence of a multitude of deities; it only
shows that their number is unknown; the deity may be
one sole being, but may also include several divine beings.
The following supplemental argument has therefore been
advanced possibility is inapplicable to the existence of
God, which is absolute; the possibility of the existence of
more than one God must therefore be denied. This is the
whole essence of the proof, and its fallacy is self-evident;
for although the notion of possibility cannot be applied
to the existence of God, it can be applied to our know-
ledge of God: for an alternative in our knowledge of a
thing does not involve an alternative in the actual existence
of the thing, and perhaps there is neither² a tripartite deity
אי אפשר לא
.admits of both interpretations לא תנחצר The Arabic לדחותם
1 Munk, “innombrables"; Charizi, 175D S; Ibn Tibbon, EN 'N
2 The words have been omitted in the editions of Ibn Tibbon's
Version.
360
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
as the Christians believe, nor an undivided Unity as we
believe. This is clear to those who have been taught to
notice the conclusions implied in given premises.
Fifth Argument.
One of the modern Mutakallemim thought that he found
proof of the Unity of God in the idea of requisiteness.
Suppose there were two divine beings; if one of them were
able to create the universe, the second God would be super-
fluous, and there would be no need for his existence. If,
on the other hand, the entire universe could not be created
or governed except by both of them, each of them would
be imperfect in so far as he would require the co-operation
of another being, and would thus be limited in power.
This argument is, in fact, only a variation of “the mutual
neutralisation of two deities." There is this difficulty in
such proofs, that a certain degree of imperfection is ascribed
to a Being which does not accomplish tasks beyond its
sphere.' We do not call a person weak because he cannot
move a thousand hundredweights, and we do not say that
God is imperfect because He cannot transform Himself into
a body, or cannot create another being like Himself, or make
a square whose diagonal should be equal to its side. In the
same manner we should not consider it an imperfection
in God, if he were not the only Creator, and if it were abso-
lutely necessary, that there should be two Creators; not be-
cause the one God required the assistance of the other, but
because the existence of both of them was equally necessary,
and because it was impossible that it should be otherwise.
Further we do not say that the Almighty is imperfect,
because He does not, according to the opinion of the Muta-
kallemim, produce a body otherwise than by the creation
of atoms, and by their combination with accidents created
1 In Ets Chayim, ch. Ixiv., a distinction is made between that which is
logically impossible, and that which is impossible because of the limited power
of the efficient cause.
PART I.—CHAPTER LXXV.
361
-
in them. That inability is not called want or imperfection,
since another process is impossible. In like manner the
Dualist might say, that it is impossible for one Being to act
alone, and that this circumstance constitutes no imperfec-
tion in either of the deities, because the absolute existence of
one Deity necessitates the coëxistence of the other. Some of
the Mutakallemim, weary of these arguments, declared that
the Unity of God is a doctrine which must be received as
a matter of faith, but most of them rejected this theory,
and reviled its authors. I, however, hold, that those who
accept this theory are right-minded, and shrink from ad-
mitting an erroneous opinion; when they do not perceive
any cogency in the arguments, and find that the proofs
advanced in favour of the doctrine are inconclusive,
they prefer to assume that it could only be received as
a matter of faith. For the Mutakallemim do not hold that
the Universe has any defined properties on which a true
proof could be founded, or that man's intellect is endowed
with any such faculty¹ as would enable him to form correct
conclusions. It is, however, not without a motive that they
defend this theory; they wish to assume such a form of the
Universe, as could be employed to support a doctrine for
which otherwise no proof could be found, and would lead
us to neglect the investigation of that which in fact can
be proved. We can only appeal to the Almighty 2 and to
those intelligent persons who confess their error when they
discover it.
""
"(
¹ Arabic:
'PD, "right beginning or right disposition;"
Ibn Tibbon nhw nyabib ny; Char. : ; Munk: justesse innée
(Lit., disposition naturelle droite).
' 1, in the editions of Ibn Tibbon's Version, is a corruption of
, which is explained by Shemtob as follows:-
לאל ולמודים
לאל שיעשה
נקמה בהם, למודים על האמת שיראו כמה כזבים שקריות וגנויות
ותועבות אמרו אלו המדברים
S
362
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
CHAPTER LXXVI.
On the arguments of the Mutakallemim for the
Incorporeality of God.
1
THE reasonings and arguments of the Mutakallemim to
demonstrate the Incorporeality of God are very weak,
and indeed inferior to their arguments for the Unity of God.
They treat the doctrine of the Incorporeality of God as if
it were the logical sequence of the theory of His Unity,
and they say that the attribute "one" cannot be applied
to a corporeal object. Those who maintain that God is
incorporeal because a corporeal object consists of substance
and form-a combination known to be impossible in the
Divine Being, are not in my opinion Mutakallemim, and
such an argument is not founded on the propositions of the
Kalām; on the contrary it is a logical proof based on the
theory of substance and form, and on a right conception of
their properties. It has the character of a philosophical
argument, and I shall fully explain it when treating of the
arguments of the philosophers.2 Here we only propose to
discuss the arguments by which the Mutakallemim desire to
prove the Incorporeality of God in accordance with their
propositions and the method of their reasoning.
First Argument.
If God were corporeal, His true essence would neces-
sarily either exist entirely ³ in every part of the body,
3
NI
1 Lit., "this is a combination, and a combination is known."
8 7 in the editions of Ibn Tibbon's Version is a corruption of
.וזאת היא ההרכבה והתבאר : Similarly Charizi ; וזאת הרכבה ויבאר
2 Part II., ch. i.
3 In the Version of Ibn Tibbon two renderings appear to have been fused
I
would have sufficed. Some שתשלם מציאות or יתוקן into one; for either
and on the margin as another reading שיתוקן בו כלל MSS. have in fact
-Munk).-Charizi renders the passage rather in) שתשלם מציאותו (בכלל)
שיתחברו בו כל עצמי הגוף ר"ל כל עצם נפרד מהם :accurately as follows
.או שיהיה בו עצם א' וגו'
PART I.—CHAPTER LXXVI.
363
2
that is to say, in each of its atoms, or would be con-
fined to one of the atoms. In the latter alternative the
other atoms would be superfluous, and the existence of the
corporeal being [with the exception of the one atom] would
be of no purpose. If, on the other hand, each atom fully
represented the Divine Being, the whole body would not be
one deity, but a complex of deities, and this would be contrary
to the doctrine adopted by the kalam that God is one. An
examination of this argument shows that it is based on the
first and the fifth propositions.¹ But there is room for the
following objection: "God does not consist of atoms, that is
to say, He is not as you assert composed of a number of
elements created by Himself, but is one continuous body,
and indivisible except in man's imagination,³ which affords
no test; for in man's imagination the substance of the
heavens may be torn or rent asunder.2 The philosopher
holds that such a possibility results from assuming a simi-
larity and an analogy between the visible, i.e., the bodies
which exist among us, and the invisible."
Second Argument.
This argument, they believe, is of great importance.
Its main support is the impossibility of comparison, i.e., the
belief that God cannot be compared to any of His creatures;
and that He would be comparable to other corporeal objects
if He were corporeal. They put great stress on this argu-
ment, and say as follows: "If it were asserted that God is
corporeal, but that His substance is not like that of other
corporeal beings, it would be self-contradictory; for all
bodies are alike as regards their substance, and are distin-
guished from each other by other things, viz., the accidents."
-
1 Viz., that all things consist of atoms, and that the properties of the things
are united with the atoms.
2 Lit. “If one said unto them." The principal sentence: "They could not
give a satisfactory answer," must be supplied.
3 Arab. DNMIN "ideas" or (C
Munk "fausses idées." Comp. lxxiii., Propos. x., page 334 sqq.
""
; דמיון and מחשבה imaginations; Hebrew
į
364
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
2
They also argue that if God were corporeal it would follow
that He has created another being like Himself.¹ This
argument is refuted in two ways. First, the objector does
not admit the impossibility of comparison; he asks how
it could be proved that God can not be compared to any
of His creatures. No doubt that, in support of their view,
that a comparison between the Almighty and any other
being is inadmissible, they would have to cite the words
of the Prophets, and thus accept this doctrine by the
authority of tradition, not by the authority of reason. The
argument, that God, if comparable to any of His creatures,
would be found to have created beings like Himself, is re-
futed by the objector in the following way: "The created
things are not like Him in every respect; for I do not deny
that God has many properties and peculiarities." For he who
admits the corporeality of God does not deny the existence
of properties in the divine Being. Another and more
forcible argument is this: All who have studied phi-
losophy, and have made themselves thoroughly acquainted
with philosophical theories, assume as demonstrated facts,
first that the term substance, when applied to the spheres
above and to the corporeal objects here on earth is a
perfect homonym, for the substance of the one is not the
substance of the other; and secondly that the forms of
the things on this earth are different from the forms of the
spheres; the terms substance and form when applied both
to things below and to the spheres above are homonyms ;
3
5
1 Namely, things which have corporeality in common with Him.
The adj. "
should be 'n
altogether.
in the ed. of Ibn Tibbon's Version is a mistake, and
"by God" as in ed. princeps.
Charizi omits the word
יותר נאותים rendered by Ibn Tibbon אשכל .Arab 3
יותר משובש Charizi
more appropriate."
“more absurd,” he probably wrote "
"better proving the absurdity of.”
4 See ch. lxxii., page 292.
""
5 That is to say, not only the term "body" but also the terms "substance'
and "form are homonymously applied to the things below and the spheres
above. Munk omits to translate the word '; Charizi likewise ignores it.
"
PART 1.-CHAPTER LXXVI.
365
although there is no doubt that the spheres have [like the
things below, three] dimensions, they are corporeal because
they consist of substance and form, not because they have
dimensions. If this explanation is admitted with reference
to the spheres, how much more is he who believes that God
is corporeal justified in saying that God is a corporeal being
which has dimensions, but which in its substance, its true
nature and properties is very different from all created bodies,
and that the term "substance" is applied to Him and to His
creatures homonymously, in the same manner as the true
believers, who have a correct conception of the divine idea,
apply the term "existence" homonymously to Him and to
His creatures. The Corporealists do not admit that all bodies
consist of similar atoms; they believe that God created all
things, and that these differ from each other both in their
substances and in their constituent properties; and just as
the substance of dung¹ differs from the substance of the
sun, so does, according to this theory, the substance of the
spheres and the stars differ from the substance of the
created light, i.e., the Divine Glory (Shechinah), and again
the substance of the Divine Glory, or the pillar of cloud
created [for the purpose]," differ from the substance of the
Most High; for the substance of the latter is sublime, perfect,
simple, constant and immutable. His absolute existence
remains always the same, and He creates all things accord-
ing to His will and desire. How could this argument,
though it be weak, be refuted by these strange methods of
the Mutakallemim, which I pointed out to you?
one ; אלאדואת or אלאדות .in some MSS אלארואת Arabic
'In
MS. (Uri, No. 359) has . Ibn Tibbon
1 which, in the
"sparks;
"' in some
editions of his Versions, has been altered into
MSS. D'NDYN D❝the substance of the plants" is found instead.—(Munk.)
.(העשבים ?) העצבים Charizi renders the expression by
2 See ch. x., page 57, note 4.
366
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
Third Argument.
If God were corporeal, He would be finite, and so far this
argument is correct; if He were finite, He would have
certain dimensions and a certain form; this is also a correct
conclusion. But they continue thus: Attribute to God any
magnitude or form whatever: He might be either larger or
smaller, and might also have a different form. The fact
that He has one special magnitude and one special form
presupposes the existence of a determining agens. I have
heard that they attach great importance to this argument,
but in truth it is the weakest of all the arguments men-
tioned above. It is founded on the tenth proposition, the
feebleness of which, in ignoring the actual properties of
things, we have clearly shown in regard to ordinary beings,
and must be much more evident in regard to the Creator.
There is no difference between this argument and their asser-
tion that the fact of the existence of the Universe having
been preferred to its non-existence proves the existence of
an agens that preferred the existence of the Universe to its
non-existence at a time when both were equally possible.
If it were asked, why this argument should not be applied
to God,-viz., that His mere existence proved the existence
of an agens which determined His existence and rejected His
non-existence—they would undoubtedly answer that this
admission would only lead to a repetition of the same argu-
ment until at length a being be found whose existence is
not merely potential but necessary, and which does not
require a causa efficiens. But this same answer can also be
applied to dimensions and to form. It can only be said in
reference to all other forms and magnitudes, the existence of
which is possible, that is to say which came into existence
after a state of non-existence, that they might have been
1
1" and its non-existence" has no equivalent in the Hebrew trans-
lations; it is also absent in one Leyden MS.-(Munk.)
PART 1.-CHAPTER LXXVI.
367
larger or smaller than they actually are, or that they
might have had a form different from that which they actu-
ally possess, and require for this reason some determining
agens. But the forms and dimensions of God (who is above
all imperfection and similitude!) did not come into existence
according to the opinion of the Corporealist after a state of
non-existence, and therefore no determining agens was
necessary; His substance with its dimensions and forms
has a necessary existence; no agens was required to decide
upon His existence, and to reject¹ His non-existence, since
non-existence is altogether inadmissible in God. In like
manner there was no force required to determine His magni-
tude and form, they were absolutely inseparable from His
existence.
If you wish to go in search of truth, to cast aside your
passions, your tradition, and your fondness of things you
have been accustomed to cherish, if you wish to guard
yourself against error: then consider the fate of these
speculators and the result of their labours; observe how
they² rushed, as it were, from the ashes into the fire. They
denied the nature of the existing things, misrepresented the
properties of heaven and earth, and thought that they were
able, by their propositions, to prove the creation of the
world, but in fact they were far from proving the creatio ex
nihilo, and have weakened the arguments for the existence,
the unity, and the incorporeality of God. The proofs of all
these doctrines must be based on the well-known nature
of the existing things, as perceived by the senses and the
intellect.
Having thus discussed the arguments of the Mutakallemim,
we shall now proceed to consider the propositions of the
""
1 Lit., "to determine or to prefer the existence to the non-existence.'
The words in absent from most MS., and only found in Oxf.
MS., Uri 359, appear to have formed part of the original text, and to have been
omitted, as may be inferred from the negation № before jD. — (Munk.)
2 in the editions of Ibn Tibbon's Version is a mistake; the MSS.
have D.—(Munk.)
368
GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED.
philosophers and their arguments for the existence of
God, His Unity and His Incorporeality, and we shall for
the present assume the Eternity of the Universe without
finally accepting it. Next to this we shall develop our own
method, which is the result of deep study, in demonstrating
these three principles, and we shall then examine the theory
of the Eternity of the Universe as assumed by the philoso-
phers.¹
1
¹ MS. Uri 359 (written 1275) has a marginal note, the translation of which
is as follows:-"I intend to refute them; I do not, however, pretend to be the
only one who has taken the trouble to refute them. On the contrary, other
persons have done it before me, as, e.g., Rabbenu Hai, Ahron ben Serdjado,
Ibn Ganach, Ibn al-Akuli, Ben Hofni ha-kohen, Rabbi Dosa and his father
Rabbenu Saadiah Gaon. With the support of the Almighty, I also will en-
deavour to refute them in the Second Part, the first chapter of which commences
The Propositions, etc." Comp. Wissenschaftliche Zeitschrift für jüdische
Theologie, IV., pages 389 and 390.—(Munk.)
܀
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